STATCON | REVIEWER
an amendment of a law by judicial construction.
CHAPTER III – AIDS TO CONSTRUCTION
CHAPTER IV – ADHERENCE TO, OR DEPARTURE FROM,
LANGUAGE OF STATUTE
A. ALITERAL INTERPRETATION
4.01. Literal meaning or plain-meaning rule.
➢ As a general rule, the intent of the legislature to be ascertained and
thereafter given effect id the intent expressed in the language of the
statute.
PLAIN-MEANING RULE or VERBA LEGIS
➢ If a statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal
meaning and applied without attempted interpretation.
➢ It is expressed in the maxim, index animi sermo or speech is the index of
intention.
○ The rule rests on the valid presumption that the words employed
by the legislature in a statute correctly express its intent or will and
preclude the court from construing it differently.
➢ Verba legis non est recedendum or from the words of a statute there
should be no departure.
➢ Hence, what is not clearly provided in the law cannot be extended to those
matters outside its scope.
❖ The fundamental rule that the legislative intent must be determined from
the language of the statute itself must be adhered to even though the
court is convinced by extraneous circumstances that the legislature
intended to enact something very different from that which it did enact.
❖ The court may not speculate as to the probable intent of the legislature
different from that expressed in the words of the statute.
➢ To attempt to do so is a perilous undertaking and is apt to lead to
➢ To depart from the meaning expressed by the words is to alter the
statute, to legislate and not to interpret.
➢ Maledicta est expositio quae corrumpit textum, or it is dangerous
construction which is against the text.
4.02 Dura lex sed lex.
➢ A statute, being the will of the legislature, should be applied in exactly the
way the legislature has expressed itself clearly in the law.
➢ The clear, unambiguous and unequivocal language of a statute precludes
the court from construing it and gives it no discretion but to apply the law.
➢ Absoluta sententia expositure non indiget. When the language of the law is
clear, no explanation of it is required.
➢ Rule in statutory construction that when the words and phrases of the
statute are clear and unequivocal, their meaning must be determined from
the laguage employed and the statute must be taken to mean exactly what
it says.
➢ Dura lex sed lex. “The law may be harsh, but it is still the law.”
➢ Hoc quidem perquam durum est, ed ita lex scripta est. It is exceedingly hard
but so the law is written.
○ The statute should be applied regardless of whether it is unwise,
hard or harsh.
○ The duty of the court in interpreting a statute which is ambiguous
is not to dispute its wisdom; the duty of the court is limited to
inquiring into the legislative intent and, to making said intent
effective.
○ The law is the law, and if there is a need to change, amend, or
repeal it, that may be done through legislative process, not by
judicial decree.
❖ Equity is described as justice outside legality, which simply means that it
cannot supplant although it may supplement the law.
➢ Equity is available only in the absence of law, not its replacement.
➢ Aequitas nunquam contravenit legis which means that equity never
acts in contravention of the law

B. DEPARTURE FROM LITERAL INTERPRETATION
4.03. Statute must be capable of interpretation, otherwise inoperative.
➢ The court must use every authorized means to ascertain the intent of the
statute and give it an intelligible meaning.
➢ The court may even depart from the language of the statute if to do so will
enable it to effectuate legislative intent and purposes.
➢ If the legislative intent is not expressed in some appropriate manner, the
court may not by interpretation speculate as to its intent and supply a
meaning not found in the phraseology of the law.
➢ Where a statute totally fails to express a meaning, a becoming sense of
judicial modesty forbids the court from assuming and consequently, from
supplying a meaning thereto. – The statute in such a case, is necessarily
inoperative.
4.04. What is within the spirit is within the law.
➢ The intent or spirit of the law is the law itself.
➢ Ratio legis, or interpretation according to the spirit or reason of the law.
➢ “As a general rule of statutory construction, the spirit or intention of a
statute prevails over the letter thereof, and what is within the spirit of the
statute is within the statute although it is not within the letter thereof, while
that which is within the letter but not within the spirit of the statute is not
within the statute.”
➢ A law should accordingly be so construed as to be in accordance with, and
not repugnant to, the spirit of the law.
4.05. Literal import must yield to intent.
➢ The literal import ot meaning of a statute must yield to its apparent intent,
purpose or spirit.
➢ The intention of the legislature and its purpose or object, being the
fundamental inquiry in judicial construction, control the literal
interpretation of particular language of a statute, and a language capable
of more than one meaning is to be taken in such sense as to harmonize
with the intention and object and effectuate the purpose of the enactment.
➢ Verba intention, non e contra, debent inservire, or words ought to be more
subservient to the intent and not the intent to the words.
➢ Where the interpretation of a statute would lead to mischievous results or
contravene the clear purposes of the legislature, it would be construed
according to its spirit and reason.
➢ A statute may therefore extended to cases not within the literal meaning of
its terms, so long as they come within its spirit or intent.
4.06. Literal import must yield to intent.
➢ If a statute is valid, it is to have effect according to the purpose and intent
of the lawmaker.
➢ The intent is the vital part, the essence of the law, and the primary rule in
construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intent.
➢ Intent is the spirit which gives life to a legislative enactment.
4.07. Limitation of rule.
➢ The principle that “what is within the spirit of a statute is within the statute
itself although it is not within its letter APPLIES ONLY when there is
ambiguity in the language employed in the law.
➢ Where the law is clear and free from ambiguity, the letter of the law is not
to be disregarded on the pretext of pursuing its spirit.
4.08. Construction to accomplish purpose.
➢ If the statute needs construction, the most dominant in that process is the
purpose.
➢ Where a provision or section of a statute admits of more than one
construction, that construction which gives effect to the evident purpose
sought to be attained by the enactment of the statute must be followed.
➢ A literal interpretation is to be rejected if it would be unjust or lead to
absurd results.
4.09. Illustration of rule.
● pp. 225 - 230
4.10. When reason of law ceases, law itself ceases.
➢ The reason which induced the legislature to enact a law is the heart of the
law.
 ➢ Cessante ratione legis, cessat et ipsa lex. It is a fundamental principle of
statutory construction that when the reason of the law ceases, the law
itself ceases.
➢ Ratio legis est anima or the reason of the law is its soul. The reason of the
law is the life of the law. A lifeless law is a dead law.
➢ A subsequent statute may render a prior law devoid of reason.
➢ Thus, where a later law has a purpose in conflict with that of a prior statute
on the same object, the latter has lost all meaning and function and has
ceased to exist.
➢ Where the mischief sought to be remedied by a statute has already been
removed in a given situation, that statute may no longer apply in such a
situation.
4.11. Supplying legislative omission.
➢ Where a literal import of the language of a statute shows that words have
been omitted that should have been in the statute in order to carry out its
intent and spirit, clearly ascertainable from the context, the court may
supply the omission to make the statute to the obvious intent of the
legislature or to prevent the act from being absurd.
➢ The court cannot, however, supply what it thinks the legislature would have
supplied had its attention been called to the omission, as that would be
judicial legislation.
4.12. Correcting clerical errors.
➢ To correct the error or mistake is to prevent the nullification of the statute
and give it a meaning and purpose.
➢ The court may correct clerical errors, mistakes or misprints which, if
uncorrected, would render the statute meaningless, empty, or nonsensical
or would defeat or impair its intended operation, so long as the meaning
intended is apparent on the face of the whole enactment and no specific
provision is abrogated.
➢ The court is not indulging in judicial legislation, but merely endeavoring to
rectify and correct a clerical wording of a statute, in order to give due
course and carry out the evident intention of the legislature.
4.13. Illustration of rule.
● pp. 233 - 234
4.14. Qualification of rule.
➢ What the courts may correct to reflect the real and apparent intention of
the legislature are ONLY those which are clearly clerical errors or obvious
mistakes, omissions, and misprints.
4.15. Construction to avoid absurdity.
➢ It is well-settled that courts are not to give a statute a meaning that would
lead to absurdities. It is their duty to construe the statute in such a way as
to avoid such consequences.
➢ Interpretatio talis in ambiguis semper fienda est ut evitetur inconvenients
et absurdum. Where there is ambiguity, such interpretation as will avoid
inconvenience and absurdity is to be adopted.
➢ Where a literal adherence to the language of a statute would produce
absurd results unless the appropriate word or words are written or omitted
therein, the court has the power to supply or omit the words from a statute
in order to prevent an absurd result.
➢ It is presumed that the legislature intended exceptions to its language
which would avoid absurd consequences.
➢ Courts should construe a statute to effectuate, and not to defeat, its
provisions.
➢ Interpretation that would lead to absurdity or nullification of laws should
be avoided.
4.16. Construction to avoid injustice.
➢ It is presumed that undesirable consequences were never intended by a
legislative measure, and that a construction of which the statute is fairly
susceptible is favored, which will avoid all objectionable, mischievous,
indefensible, wrongful, evil and injurious consequences.
➢ Ea est accipienda interpratatio quae vito caret. That interpretation is to be
adopted which is free from evil or injustice.
4.17. Construction to avoid danger to public interest.
➢ It is a well-established rule of statutory construction that where great
inconvenience will result, or great public interest will be endangered or
sacrificed, or great mischief done, from a particular construction of a
statute, such construction is to be avoided.
 ➢ Courts should presume that such constructions were not intended by the
makers of the law.
4.18. Construction in favor of right and justice.
➢ In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of law, it is presumed
the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail.
➢ Any doubt in the construction of a statute should be resolved in favor of
right and justice.
4.19. Surplusage and superfluity disregarded.
➢ Where a word, phrase or clause in a statute is devoid of meaning in
relation to the context or intent of the statute, or where it suggests a
meaning that nullifies the statute or renders it meaningless, the word,
phrase or clause may be rejected as surplusage and entirely ignored.
➢ Surplusagium non noceat. The rule is settled that surplusage does not
vitiate a statute. Utile per inutile non vitiatur. Nor is the useful vitiated by
the non-useful.
4.20. Redundant words may be rejected.
➢ Redundant words and phrases are not infrequently found in legislative
enactments, and only the most skillfully drawn statutes are entirely free
from such defeats.
4.21. Obscure or missing word or false description may not preclude
construction.
➢ Courts should not and cannot always be bound by the phraseology or
literal meaning of a statute.
➢ They may disregard loose or obscure words in order to arrive at the real
meaning and spirit of the statute.
➢ Falsa demonstratio non nocet, cum de corpore constat. Neither does false
description preclude construction nor vitiate the meaning of the statute
which is otherwise clear.
4.22. Exemption from rigid application of law
➢ Where strict and rigid application of law would work injustice, an
exemption therefrom to prevent such result on humanitarian and equitable
grounds is warranted, even though the literal import of the law suggests no
such exemption.
4.23. Law does not require the impossible.
➢ It is well-settled that the law does not require that the impossible be done.
➢ A statute may not be so construed as to require compliance with what it
prescribes cannot, at the time, be legally accomplished.
➢ It should instead be construed in such a way that substantial compliance
with what the law requires is sufficient.
4.24. Number and gender of words.
➢ It is a maxim of statutory construction that when the context of a statute
so indicates, words in plural include the singular, and vice versa.
➢ A plural word in a statute may thus apply to a singular person or thing, just
as singular words may embrace two or more persons or things.
➢ It is also a rule of statutory construction that in construing a statute, the
masculine, but not the feminine, includes all genders, unless the context in
which the word is used in the statute indicates otherwise.
C. IMPLICATIONS
4.25. Doctrine of necessary implication.
➢ Rule of statutory construction used to fill in the gap is the doctrine of
necessary implication. The doctrine states that what is implied in a statute
is as much a part thereof as that which is expressed.
➢ An implication which is violative of the law is unjustified or unwarranted.
4.26. Remedy implied from a right.
➢ It is a well-settled principle that where there is a right, there is a remedy for
violation thereof.
➢ The fact that the statute is silent as to the remedy does not preclude him
from vindicating his right, for such remedy is implied from such right.
➢ Hence, where there is no right on the part of one who prays for a remedy or
relief for alleged violation thereof, the principle does not apply and no relief
may be granted.
4.27. Grant of jurisdiction.
➢ Settled is the rule that jurisdiction to hear and decide cases is conferred
only by the Constitution or by statute.
 ➢ It cannot be conferred by the Rules of Court. Nor may jurisdiction be
implied from the language of the statute, in the absence of a clear
legislative intent to that effect.
4.28. What may be implied from grant of jurisdiction.
➢ The grant of jurisdiction to try actions carries with it all necessary and
incidental powers to employ all writs, processes and other means
essential to make its jurisdiction effective.
➢ Hence, where a court has jurisdiction over the main cause of action, it can
grant reliefs incidental thereto, even if they would otherwise be outside of
its jurisdiction.
4.29. Grant of power includes incidental power.
➢ As a rule, where a general power is conferred or duty enjoined every
particular power necessary for the exercise of one or the performance of
the other is also conferred.
➢ The incidental powers are those which are necessarily included in, and are
therefore of lesser degree than the power granted. It cannot extend to
other matters not embraced therein, nor are not incidental thereto.
4.30. Grant of power excludes greater power.
➢ The principle that the grant of power includes all incidental powers
necessary to make the exercise thereof effective implies the exclusion of
those which are greater than that conferred.
4.31. What is implied should not be against the law.
➢ The statutory grant of power does not include such incidental power which
cannot be exercised without violating the Constitution, the statute
conferring the power, or other laws on the same subject.
4.32. Authority to charge against public funds may not be implied.
➢ It is well-settled that unless a statute expressly so authorizes, no claim
against public funds may be allowed.
➢ Accordingly, a statute may not be so construed as to authorize, by
implication, a charge against public funds.
4.33. Illegality of act implied from prohibition.
➢ Where a statute prohibits the doing of an act, the act done in violation
thereof is by implication null and void.
➢ The prohibited act cannot serve as the foundation of a cause of action for
relief.
➢ No man can be allowed to found a claim upon his own wrongdoing or
inequity; no man should be allowed to take advantage of his own wrong.
4.34. Exception to the rule.
➢ The principle of pari delicito recognizes certain exceptions, one of which is
that it will not apply when its enforcement or application will violated an
avowed fundamental policy or public interest.
➢ 266
4.35. What cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly.
➢ What the law prohibits cannot, in some other ways, be legally
accomplished.
4.36. There should be no penalty for compliance with law.
➢ A person who complies with what a statute requires cannot, by
implication, be penalized thereby.
CHAPTER V – INTERPRETATION OF WORDS AND PHRASES
A. IN GENERAL
5.01. Generally.
➢ Ascertaining legislative intent primarily from the statute itself and
secondarily, from extraneous and relevant circumstances and, having
ascertained it, construing the word or phrase in such a way as effectuate
such intent.
➢ As a general rule, in interpreting the meaning and scope of a term used in
the law, a careful review of the whole law involved, as well as the
intendment of law, ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a
whole and not of an isolated part or a particular provision alone, must be
made to determine the real intent of the law.
5.02. Statutory definition.
 ➢ A statute sometimes defines particular words and phrases used therein.
➢ Where a statute defines a word or phrase employed therein, the word or
phrase should not, by construction, be given a different meaning.
➢ For the legislature, in adopting a specific definition, is deemed to have
restricted the meaning of the word within the terms of the definition.
➢ The words and phrases should be construed in the light of the context of
the whole statute.
5.03. Qualification of rule.
➢ The statutory definition of a word or term “as used in this Act” is
controlling only insofar as said act is concerned.
➢ Exceptions:
○ Where its application creates obvious incongruities in the
language of the statute,
○ It destroys one of its major purposes, or
○ Becomes illogical as a result of a change in its factual basis.
➢ In any such case, the statutory definition will be disregarded and the word
given a meaning that will avoid any of such results or consequences.
5.04. Words construed in their ordinary sense.
➢ General rule is that, in the absence of legislative intent to the contrary, they
should be given their plain, ordinary, and common usage meaning.
➢ For words are presumed to have been employed by the lawmaker in their
ordinary and common use and acceptation.
➢ And courts, as a rule, should not presume that the lawmaking body does
not know the meaning of the words and the rules of grammar.
5.05. General words construed generally.
➢ A word of general significance in a statute is to be taken in its ordinary and
comprehensive sense, unless it is shown that the word is intended to be
given in a different or restricted meaning,
➢ Generalia verba sunt generaliter intelligenda, or what is generally spoken
shall be generally understood or general words shall be understood in a
general sense.
➢ Generale dictum generaliter est interpretandum. A general statement is
understood in a general sense.
➢ The general must prevail over the restricted unless the nature of the
subject matter or the context in which it is employed clearly indicates that
the limited sense is intended.
➢ Where a general word is used in a statute, its generic meaning may not be
restricted by other words, unless the intention to do so is clear and
manifest.
➢ A general word should not be given a restricted meaning where no
restriction is indicated.
5.06. Application of rule.
➢ 277
5.07. Generic term includes things that arise thereafter.
➢ Progressive interpretation, which extends by construction the application
of a statute to all subjects or conditions within its general purpose or
scope that come into existence subsequent to its passage and thus keeps
legislation from becoming ephemeral and transitory.
➢ It is a rule of statutory construction that legislative enactments in general
and comprehensive terms, prospective in operation, apply alike to all
persons, subjects and business within their general purview and c=scope
coming into existence subsequent to their passage.
5.08. Words with commercial or trade meaning.
➢ In the absence of legislative intent to the contrary, trade or commercial
terms, when used in a statute, are presumed to have been used in their
trade or commercial sense.
5.09. Words with technical or legal meaning.
➢ The technical or legal, not the ordinary or general, meaning of a word used
in a statute should be adopted in the construction of the statute, in the
absence of any qualification or intention to the contrary.
5.10. How identical terms in same statute construed.
➢ The general rule is that a word or phrase repeatedly used in a statute will
bear the same meaning throughout the statute.
➢ A word or phrase in one part of a statute is to receive the same
interpretation when used in every other part, unless it clearly appears from
the context or otherwise that a different meaning is intended.

5.11. Meaning of word qualified by purpose of statute.
➢ The meaning of a word or phrase used in a statute may be qualified by the
purposes which included the legislature to enact the statute.
➢ The purpose may indicate whether to give a word or phrase an ordinary,
popular, technical, legal, commercial, restricted or expansive meaning.
5.12. Word or phrase construed in relation to other provisions.
➢ The general is that a word, phrase, or provision should not be construed in
isolation but must be interpreted in relation to other provisions of the law.
➢ A word or provision should not be construed in isolation from, but should
be interpreted in relation to, the other provisions of a statute or other
statutes dealing on the same subject.
5.13. Meaning of term dictated by context.
➢ The context in which the word is used often determines its meaning.
5.14. Where the law does not distinguish.
➢ It is a well-recognized rule that where the law does not distinguish, courts
should not distinguish.
➢ A general term or phrase should not be reduced into parts and one part
distinguished from the other so as to justify its exclusion from the
operation of the law.
➢ There should be no distinction in the application of a statute where none is
indicated.
5.15. Illustration of rule.
➢ 292 - 298
5.16. Disjunctive and conjunctive words.
➢ The word “or” is a disjunctive term signifying disassociation and
independence of one thing from each of the other things enumerated.
➢ It should, as a rule, be construed in the sense in which it ordinarily implies,
as a disjunctive word.
➢ The use of the disjunctive word “or” between two phrases connotes that
either phrase serves as a qualifying phrase.
➢ The term “or” has sometimes been held to mean “and,” when the spirit or
context of the law so warrants.
➢ The word “or” may also be used as the equivalent of “that is to say,” giving
that which precedes it the same significance as that which follows it.
➢ It is not always disjunctive and is sometimes interpretative or expository of
the preceding word.
➢ The word “or” may also mean successively.
➢ On the other hand, the word “and” is a conjunction pertinently defined as
meaning “together with,” “joined with,” “along or together with,” “added to or
linked to,” used to conjoin word with word, phrase with phrase, clause with
clause.
➢ The word “and” does not mean “or:; it is a conjunction used to denote a
joinder or union. However, “and” may mean “or” as an exception to the rule.
➢ The exception is resorted to only when a literal interpretation would
pervert the plain intention of the legislature as gleaned from the context of
the statute or from external factors.
➢ Disjunctive, conjunctive, interpretative, successive
B. ASSOCIATED WORDS
5.17. Noscitur a sociis.
➢ The maxim states that where a particular word is obscure or of doubtful
meaning, taken by itself, the obscurity or doubt may be removed by
reference to the meaning of associated or companion words.
➢ A word or phrase should be interpreted in relation to, or given the same
meaning of, words with which it is associated.
➢ A word with several meanings – i.e., limited and broad, ordinary and
technical – should be construed in, and given a meaning consistent with,
the sense in which its companion words or phrases are used.
5.18. Application of rule.
➢ 303 - 308
5.19. Ejusdem generis. “Of the same kind”
➢ Where a statute describes things of a particular class or kind
accompanied by words of a generic character, the generic words will
usually be limited to things of a kindred nature with those particularly
enumerated, unless there be something in the context of the statute to
repel such inference.

5.20. Illustration of rule.
➢ 310 - 313
5.21. Limitations of ejusdem generis.
➢ Requisites:
○ A statute contains an enumeration of particular and specific
words, followed by a general word or phrase;
○ The particular and specific words constitute a class or are of the
same kind;
○ The enumeration of the particular and specific words is not
exhaustive or is not merely by examples; and
○ There is no indication of legislative intent to give the general
words or phrases a broader meaning.
○ 315 - 318
5.22. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius.
➢ It is a settled-rule of statutory construction that the express mention of
one person, thing, or consequence implies the exclusion of all others.
○ What is expressed puts an end to that which is implied.
■ Where a statute, by its terms, is expressly limited to
certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or
construction, be extended to other matters.
○ A general expression followed by exceptions therefrom implies
that those which do not fall under the exceptions come within the
scope of the general expression.
○ The expression of one or more things of a class implies that
exclusion of all not expressed, even though all would have been
implied had none been expressed.
5.23. Negative-opposite doctrine.
➢ The principle that what is expressed puts an end to that which is implied.
5.24. Application of expressio unius rule.
➢ The rule of the expressio unius rule and its corollary canon are generally
used in the construction of statutes granting powers, creating rights and
remedies, restricting common rights, and imposing penalties and
forfeitures, as well as those statutes which are strictly construed.
➢ Pursuant to the expressio unius rule, where a statute directs the
performance of certain acts by a particular person or class or persons, it
implies that it shall not be done otherwise or by a different person or class
of persons.
➢ A law which specifically designates the persons who may bring actions for
quo warranto excludes others from bringing such actions.
➢ If a statute enumerates the things upon which it is to operate, everything
else must necessarily, and by implication, be excluded.
5.25. Limitation of rule.
➢ The rule of expressio unius est exclusio alterius is not a rule of law.
➢ It is a mere tool of a statutory construction or a means of ascertaining the
legislative intent.
5.26. Doctrine of casus omissus.
➢ A person, object or thing from an enumeration must be held to have been
omitted intentionally.
➢ The maxim operates and applies only if and when the omission has been
clearly established, and in such a case what is omitted in the enumeration
may not, by construction, be included therein.
5.27. Doctrine of last antecedent.
➢ In the absence of legislative intent to the contrary, preferential and
qualifying words and phrases must be applied only to their immediate or
last antecedent, and not to be other remote or preceding words or
association of words.
➢ Doctrine of last antecedent means that a qualifying word or phrase should
be understood as referring to the nearest antecedent.