2017 Re - Tony - Q. - Valenciano20231004 11 1ulbp57

EN BANC
[A.M. No. 10-4-19-SC. March 7, 2017.]
RE: LETTER OF TONY Q. VALENCIANO, HOLDING OF

RELIGIOUS RITUALS AT THE HALL OF JUSTICE BUILDING IN
QUEZON CITY
RESOLUTION
MENDOZA, J : p
One of our fundamental differences lies in our chosen religion.

Some put their faith in a god different from ours, while some may not
believe in a god at all. Nevertheless, despite the inconveniences this
difference may cause us, we must accept it unconditionally for only
upon acceptance of the fact that we are different from each other will
we learn to respect one another.
This controversy originated from a series of letters, written by Tony Q.
Valenciano (Valenciano) and addressed to then Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno
(Chief Justice Puno).
In his first Letter, 1 dated January 6, 2009, Valenciano reported that the
basement of the Hall of Justice of Quezon City (QC) had been converted into
a Roman Catholic Chapel, complete with offertory table, images of Catholic
religious icons, a canopy, an electric organ, and a projector. He believed that
such practice violated the constitutional provision on the separation of
Church and State and the constitutional prohibition against the appropriation
of public money or property for the benefit of a sect, church, denomination,
or any other system of religion.
Valenciano further averred that the holding of masses at the basement
of the QC Hall of Justice showed that it tended to favor Catholic litigants; that
the rehearsals of the choir caused great disturbance to other employees;
that the public could no longer use the basement as resting place; that the
employees and litigants of the Public Attorney's Office (PAO) , Branches 82
and 83 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Legal Library, Philippine Mediation
Center, and Records Section of the Office of the Clerk of Court (OCC) could
not attend to their personal necessities such as going to the lavatories
because they could not traverse the basement between 12:00 o'clock
noontime and 1:15 o'clock in the afternoon; that the court employees
became hostile toward each other as they vied for the right to read the
epistle; and that the water supply in the entire building was cut off during
the mass because the generator was turned off to ensure silence.
In his 1st Indorsement, 2 dated February 6, 2009, Chief Justice Puno
referred Valenciano's letter to then Deputy Court Administrator (DCA) and
Officer-in-Charge of the Office on Halls of Justice, Antonio H. Dujua (DCA
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Dujua).
In turn, DCA Dujua, in his 1st Indorsement, 3 dated February 11, 2009,
referred the letter to Executive Judge Teodoro A. Bay (Judge Bay) of the RTC
and to Executive Judge Luis Zenon Q. Maceren (Judge Maceren) of the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) for their respective comments.
In his March 6, 2009 Letter, 4 addressed to DCA Dujua, Judge Maceren
clarified that the basement of the QC Hall of Justice was known as the prayer
corner. He opined that the use of the said area for holding masses did not
violate the constitutional prohibition against the use of public property for
religious purposes because the religious character of such use was merely
incidental to a temporary use.
In his Memorandum, 5 dated March 10, 2009, Judge Bay manifested
that he was due to compulsorily retire on April 29, 2009, and he was taking a
leave of absence prior to such date to concentrate in resolving cases
submitted for decision before his sala and requested that then Vice-
Executive Judge Jaime N. Salazar (Judge Salazar) be assigned to further
investigate, study, and make recommendations on the matter raised by
Valenciano.
In the meantime, Judge Bay recommended that, pending the final
resolution of the case, daily masses be permitted to continue, provided that:
(1) the mass be limited to thirty (30) minutes; (2) no loud singing be allowed
so as not to disturb others; and (3) the inconveniences caused by the mass
be addressed. CAIHTE
In his 1st Indorsement, 6 dated May 27, 2009, Chief Justice Puno
referred another letter of Valenciano, dated May 13, 2009, to DCA Dujua for
appropriate action, as he complained that masses continued to be held at
the basement of the QC Hall of Justice.
On March 23, 2010, Valenciano wrote another letter, 7 praying that
rules be promulgated by the Court to put a stop to the holding of Catholic
masses, or any other religious rituals, at the QC Hall of Justice and in all
other halls of justice in the country.
In its June 22, 2010 Resolution, 8 the Court noted the March 23, 2010
letter of Valenciano and referred the matter to the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) for evaluation, report and recommendation.
Thus, in its 1st Indorsement, 9 dated September 6, 2010, the OCA,
through then Assistant Court Administrator (ACA) Jenny Lind R. Aldecoa-
Delorino (now Deputy Court Administrator), referred the letters of Valenciano
to the incumbent RTC Executive Judge Fernando T. Sagun, Jr. (Judge Sagun,
Jr.) and incumbent MeTC Executive Judge Caridad M. Walse-Lutero (Judge
Lutero).
In his Letter-Comment, 1 0 dated September 9, 2010, Judge Sagun, Jr.
informed the Court that his office had already implemented measures to
address Valenciano's complaints. He reported that masses were shortened
to a little over thirty (30) minutes; that it was only during special holy days of
obligation when the celebration of mass went beyond one (1) o'clock in the
afternoon; that the pathways leading to the lavatories were open and could
be used without obstruction; that there was never an instance where the
actions of court personnel, who were vying to read the epistle during mass,
caused back-biting and irritation among themselves; that the water
generator had been broken beyond repair and decommissioned since
December 2009; and that the court employees prepared for the mass before
the day officially started, so that the performance of their official duties in
court was not hampered.
In her letter, 11 Judge Lutero reported that Catholic masses were being
held only during lunch breaks and did not disturb court proceedings; that the
basement of the QC Hall of Justice could still be used as waiting area for the
public; that court personnel and the public were never physically prevented
from reaching the lavatories during mass as there was a clear path from the
public offices leading to the comfort rooms; that water service interruptions
were caused by maintenance problems and not because the water pump
was being shut off during mass; and that the elevators could not be used
during mass because elevator attendants took their lunch break from twelve
(12) o'clock to one (1) o'clock in the afternoon.
Judge Lutero opined that it is not the conduct of masses in public
places which the Constitution prohibited, but the passage of laws or the use
of public funds for the purpose of establishing a religion or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof. She conveyed the fact that no law or rule had been
passed and that no public funds had been appropriated or used to support
the celebration of masses. She added that the holding of Catholic masses did
not mean that Catholics had better chances of obtaining favorable
resolutions from the court.
Accordingly, Judge Lutero recommended that the holding of masses at
the basement of the QC Hall of Justice be allowed to continue considering
that it was not inimical to the interests of the court employees and the
public.
The OCA Report
and Recommendation
In its Memorandum, 12 dated August 7, 2014, the OCA believed that
the practical inconveniences cited by Valenciano were unfounded. It, thus,
recommended that his letter-complaints, dated January 6, 2009, May 13,
2009 and March 23, 2010, be dismissed for lack of merit and that the RTC
and MeTC Executive Judges of QC be directed to closely regulate and
monitor the holding of masses and other religious practices within the
premises of the QC Hall of Justice.
The OCA opined that the principle of separation of Church and State,
particularly with reference to the Establishment Clause, ought not to be
interpreted according to the rigid standards of separation; that the neutrality
of the State on religion should be benevolent because religion was an
ingrained part of society and played an important role in it; and that the
State, therefore, instead of being belligerent (in the case of Strict
Separation) or being aloof (in the case of Strict Neutrality) towards religion
should instead interact and forbear. 13
The OCA advanced the view that the standard of Benevolent

Neutrality/Accommodation was espoused because the principal religion
clauses in our Constitution were not limited to the Establishment Clause,
which created a wall between the Church and the State, but was quickly
followed by the declaration of the Free Exercise Clause, which protected the
right of the people to practice their religion. In effect, the standard of
Benevolent Neutrality/Accommodation balanced the interest of the State
through the Establishment Clause, and the interest and right of the individual
to freely exercise his religion as guaranteed by the Free Exercise Clause. 14
The OCA observed that the present controversy did not involve a
national or local law or regulation in conflict with the Free Exercise Clause.
On the contrary, Valenciano was merely questioning the propriety of holding
religious masses at the basement of the QC Hall of Justice, which was
nothing more than an issue of whether the said religious practice could be
accommodated or not. It ended up concluding that based on prevailing
jurisprudence, as well as the interpretations given to the religion clauses of
the 1987 Constitution, there was nothing constitutionally abhorrent in
allowing the continuation of the masses. 15
The OCA added that by allowing or accommodating the celebration of
Catholic masses within the premises of the QC Hall of Justice, the Court could
not be said to have established Roman Catholicism as an official religion or
to have endorsed the said religion, for the reason that it also allowed other
religious denominations to practice their religion within the courthouses. 16
ISSUE
WHETHER THE HOLDING OF MASSES AT THE BASEMENT
OF THE QUEZON CITY HALL OF JUSTICE VIOLATES THE
CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE OF SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND
STATE AS WELL AS THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROHIBITION
AGAINST APPROPRIATION OF PUBLIC MONEY OR PROPERTY
FOR THE BENEFIT OF ANY SECT, CHURCH, DENOMINATION,
SECTARIAN INSTITUTION, OR SYSTEM OF RELIGION.
The Court's Ruling

The Court agrees with the findings and recommendation of the OCA
and denies the prayer of Valenciano that the holding of religious rituals of
any of the world's religions in the QC Hall of Justice or any halls of justice all
over the country be prohibited.
The Holding of Religious
Rituals in the Halls of Justice
does not Amount to a Union of
Church and State
As earlier stated, Valenciano is against the holding of religious rituals in
the halls of justice on the ground that it violates the constitutional provision
on the separation of Church and State and the constitutional prohibition
against the appropriation of public money or property for the benefit of a
sect, church, denomination, or any other system of religion. Indeed, Section
6, Article II of the 1987 Constitution provides:
The separation of Church and State shall be inviolable.17
The Court once pronounced that "our history, not to speak of the
history of mankind, has taught us that the union of church and state is
prejudicial to both, for occasions might arise when the state will use the
church, and the church the state, as a weapon in the furtherance of their
respective ends and aims." 18
Justice Isagani Cruz expounded on this doctrine, viz.:
The rationale of the rule is summed up in the familiar saying,
"Strong fences make good neighbors." The idea is to delineate the
boundaries between the two institutions and, thus, avoid
encroachments by one against the other because of a
misunderstanding of the limits of their respective exclusive
jurisdictions. The demarcation line calls on the entities to "render
therefore unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's and unto God the
things that are God's." 19 DETACa
This, notwithstanding, the State still recognizes the inherent right of

the people to have some form of belief system, whether such may be belief
in a Supreme Being, a certain way of life, or even an outright rejection of
religion. Our very own Constitution recognizes the heterogeneity and
religiosity of our people as reflected in Imbong v. Ochoa, 20 as follows:
At the outset, it cannot be denied that we all live in a
heterogeneous society. It is made up of people of diverse ethnic,
cultural and religious beliefs and backgrounds. History has shown us
that our government, in law and in practice, has allowed these
various religious, cultural, social and racial groups to thrive in a single
society together. It has embraced minority groups and is tolerant
towards all — the religious people of different sects and the non-
believers. The undisputed fact is that our people generally believe in
a deity, whatever they conceived Him to be, and to Whom they called
for guidance and enlightenment in crafting our fundamental law.
Thus, the preamble of the present Constitution reads:
We, the sovereign Filipino people, imploring the aid
of Almighty God, in order to build a just and humane
society, and establish a Government that shall embody
our ideals and aspirations, promote the common good,
conserve and develop our patrimony, and secure to
ourselves and our posterity, the blessings of
independence and democracy under the rule of law and a
regime of truth, justice, freedom, love, equality, and
peace, do ordain and promulgate this Constitution.
The Filipino people in "imploring the aid of Almighty
God" manifested their spirituality innate in our nature and
consciousness as a people, shaped by tradition and historical
experience. As this is embodied in the preamble, it means
that the State recognizes with respect the influence of
religion in so far as it instills into the mind the purest
principles of morality. Moreover, in recognition of the contributions
of religion to society, the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions contain
benevolent and accommodating provisions towards religions
such as tax exemption of church property, salary of religious officers
in government institutions, and optional religious instructions in
public schools. [Emphases supplied]
I n Aglipay v. Ruiz 21 (Aglipay), the Court acknowledged how religion
could serve as a motivating force behind each person's actions:
Religious freedom, however, as a constitutional mandate is not
inhibition of profound reverence for religion and is not a denial of its
influence in human affairs. Religion as a profession of faith to an
active power that binds and elevates man to his Creator is
recognized. And, in so far as it instills into the minds the purest
principles of morality, its influence is deeply felt and highly
appreciated. When the Filipino people, in the preamble of their
Constitution, implored "the aid of Divine Providence , in order
to establish a government that shall embody their ideals,
conserve and develop the patrimony of the nation, promote
the general welfare, and secure to themselves and their
posterity the blessings of independence under a regime of
justice, liberty and democracy," they thereby manifested
their intense religious nature and placed unfaltering reliance
upon Him who guides the destinies of men and nations. The
elevating influence of religion in human society is recognized here as
elsewhere. In fact, certain general concessions are indiscriminately
accorded to religious sects and denominations. Our Constitution and
laws exempt from taxation properties devoted exclusively to religious
purposes (sec. 14, subsec. 3, Art. VI, Constitution of the Philippines
and sec. 1, subsec. Ordinance appended thereto; Assessment Law,
sec. 344, par. [c], Adm. Code) sectarian aid is not prohibited when a
priest, preacher, minister or other religious teacher or dignitary as
such is assigned to the armed forces or to any penal institution,
orphanage or leprosarium xxx. Optional religious instruction in the
public schools is by constitutional mandate allowed xxx. Thursday
and Friday of Holy Week, Thanksgiving Day, Christmas Day, and
Sundays are made legal holidays (sec. 29, Adm. Code) because of the
secular idea that their observance is conducive to beneficial moral
results. The law allows divorce but punishes polygamy and bigamy;
and certain crimes against religious worship are considered crimes
against the fundamental laws of the state xxx. 22 [Emphasis supplied]
Thus, the right to believe or not to believe has again been enshrined in
Section 5, Article III of the 1987 Constitution:
Section 5. xxx. The free exercise and enjoyment of
religious profession and worship, without discrimination or
preference, shall forever be allowed. xxx.
Free Exercise Clause
Freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by the framers of
our fundamental law. And this Court has consistently affirmed this preferred
status, well aware that it is "designed to protect the broadest possible liberty
of conscience, to allow each man to believe as his conscience directs, to
profess his beliefs, and to live as he believes he ought to live, consistent with
the liberty of others and with the common good." 23
"The right to religious profession and worship has a two-fold aspect —
freedom to believe and freedom to act on one's beliefs. The first is absolute
as long as the belief is confined within the realm of thought. The second is
subject to regulation where the belief is translated into external acts that
affect the public welfare." 24 Justice Isagani A. Cruz explained these two (2)
concepts in this wise:
(1) Freedom to Believe
The individual is free to believe (or disbelieve) as he pleases
concerning the hereafter. He may indulge his own theories about life
and death; worship any god he chooses, or none at all; embrace or
reject any religion; acknowledge the divinity of God or of any being
that appeals to his reverence; recognize or deny the immortality of
his soul — in fact, cherish any religious conviction as he and he alone
sees fit. However absurd his beliefs may be to others, even if they be
hostile and heretical to the majority, he has full freedom to believe as
he pleases. He may not be required to prove his beliefs. He may not
be punished for his inability to do so. Religion, after all, is a matter of
faith. "Men may believe what they cannot prove." Every one has a
right to his beliefs and he may not be called to account because he
cannot prove what he believes.
(2) Freedom to Act on One's Beliefs
But where the individual externalizes his beliefs in acts or
omissions that affect the public, his freedom to do so becomes
subject to the authority of the State. As great as this liberty may be,
religious freedom, like all other rights guaranteed in the Constitution,
can be enjoyed only with a proper regard for the rights of others.
It is error to think that the mere invocation of religious freedom
will stalemate the State and render it impotent in protecting the
general welfare. The inherent police power can be exercised to
prevent religious practices inimical to society. And this is true even if
such practices are pursued out of sincere religious conviction and not
merely for the purpose of evading the reasonable requirements or
prohibitions of the law.
Justice Frankfurter put it succinctly: "The constitutional
provision on religious freedom terminated disabilities, it did not
create new privileges. It gave religious liberty, not civil immunity. Its
essence is freedom from conformity to religious dogma, not freedom
from conformity to law because of religious dogma." 25
Allowing religion to flourish is not contrary to the principle of
separation of Church and State. In fact, these two principles are in perfect
harmony with each other.
The State is aware of the existence of religious movements whose
members believe in the divinity of Jose Rizal. Yet, it does not implement
measures to suppress the said religious sects. Such inaction or indifference
on the part of the State gives meaning to the separation of Church and
State, and at the same time, recognizes the religious freedom of the
members of these sects to worship their own Supreme Being.
As pointed out by Judge Lutero, "the Roman Catholics express their
worship through the holy mass and to stop these would be tantamount to
repressing the right to the free exercise of their religion. Our Muslim
brethren, who are government employees, are allowed to worship their Allah
even during office hours inside their own offices. The Seventh Day
Adventists are exempted from rendering Saturday duty because their
religion prohibits them from working on a Saturday. Even Christians have
been allowed to conduct their own bible studies in their own offices. All these
have been allowed in respect of the workers' right to the free exercise of
their religion. xxx" 26 aDSIHc
Clearly, allowing the citizens to practice their religion is not equivalent

to a fusion of Church and State.
No Compelling State Interest
Religious freedom, however, is not absolute. It cannot have its way if
there is a compelling state interest. To successfully invoke compelling state
interest, it must be demonstrated that the masses in the QC Hall of Justice
unduly disrupt the delivery of public services or affect the judges and
employees in the performance of their official functions. In Estrada v.
Escritor, 27 the Court expounded on the test as follows:
The "compelling state interest" test is proper where conduct is
involved for the whole gamut of human conduct has different effects
on the state's interests: some effects may be immediate and short-
term while others delayed and far-reaching. A test that would protect
the interests of the state in preventing a substantive evil, whether
immediate or delayed, is therefore necessary. However, not any
interest of the state would suffice to prevail over the right to religious
freedom as this is a fundamental right that enjoys a preferred
position in the hierarchy of rights — "the most inalienable and sacred
of all human rights," in the words of Jefferson. This right is sacred for
an invocation of the Free Exercise Clause is an appeal to a higher
sovereignty. The entire constitutional order of limited government is
premised upon an acknowledgment of such higher sovereignty, thus
the Filipinos implore the "aid of Almighty God in order to build a just
and humane society and establish a government." As held in
Sherbert, only the gravest abuses, endangering paramount
interests can limit this fundamental right. A mere balancing of
interests which balances a right with just a colorable state interest is
therefore not appropriate. Instead, only a compelling interest of
the state can prevail over the fundamental right to religious
liberty. The test requires the state to carry a heavy burden, a
compelling one, for to do otherwise would allow the state to batter
religion, especially the less powerful ones until they are destroyed. In
determining which shall prevail between the state's interest and
religious liberty, reasonableness shall be the guide. The "compelling
state interest" serves the purpose of revering religious liberty while at
the same time affording protection to the paramount interests of the
state. This was the test used in Sherbert which involved conduct, i.e.,
refusal to work on Saturdays. In the end, the "compelling state
interest" test, by upholding the paramount interests of the state,
seeks to protect the very state, without which, religious liberty will
not be preserved. 137 [Citations omitted] [Emphases supplied]
As reported by the Executive Judges of Quezon City, the masses were
being conducted only during noon breaks and were not disruptive of public
services. The court proceedings were not being distracted or interrupted and
that the performance of the judiciary employees were not being adversely
affected. Moreover, no Civil Service rules were being violated. As there has
been no detrimental effect on the public service or prejudice to the State,
there is simply no state interest compelling enough to prohibit the exercise
of religious freedom in the halls of justice.
In fact, the Civil Service Commission (CSC) was more lenient or
tolerant. On November 13, 1981, the CSC came out with Resolution No. 81-
1277, which provided, among others, that "during Friday, the Muslim pray
day, Muslims are excused from work from 10:00 o'clock in the morning to
2:00 o'clock in the afternoon." The Court struck this down 28 as not
sanctioned by the law. It wrote:
To allow the Muslim employees in the Judiciary to be excused
from work from 10:00 a.m. to 2:00 p.m. every Friday (Muslim Prayer
Day) during the entire calendar year would mean a diminution of the
prescribed government working hours. For then, they would be
rendering service twelve (12) hours less than that required by the
civil service rules for each month. Further, this would encourage
other religious denominations to request for similar treatment.
The performance of religious practices, whether by the Muslim
employees or those belonging to other religious denominations,
should not prejudice the courts and the public. Indeed, the exercise of
religious freedom does not exempt anyone from compliance with
reasonable requirements of the law, including civil service laws.
Accommodation, Not Establishment of Religion
In order to give life to the constitutional right of freedom of religion, the
State adopts a policy of accommodation. Accommodation is a recognition of
the reality that some governmental measures may not be imposed on a
certain portion of the population for the reason that these measures are
contrary to their religious beliefs. As long as it can be shown that the
exercise of the right does not impair the public welfare, the attempt of the
State to regulate or prohibit such right would be an unconstitutional
encroachment. 29
I n Estrada v. Escritor, 30 the Court adopted a policy of benevolent
neutrality:
With religion looked upon with benevolence and not hostility,
benevolent neutrality allows accommodation of religion under
certain circumstances. Accommodations are government
policies that take religion specifically into account not to
promote the government's favored form of religion, but to
allow individuals and groups to exercise their religion without
hindrance. Their purpose or effect therefore is to remove a burden
on, or facilitate the exercise of, a person's or institution's religion. As
Justice Brennan explained, the "government [may] take religion into
account . . . to exempt, when possible, from generally applicable
governmental regulation individuals whose religious beliefs and
practices would otherwise thereby be infringed, or to create
without state involvement an atmosphere in which voluntary
religious exercise may flourish." [Emphases supplied]
I n Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers Union, 31 the Court upheld the
exemption of members of Iglesia ni Cristo from the coverage of a closed
shop agreement between their employer and a union, because it would
violate the teaching of their church not to affiliate with a labor organization.
I n Ebralinag v. Division Superintendent of Schools of Cebu, 32 the
petitioners, who were members of the Jehovah's Witnesses, refused to salute
the flag, sing the national anthem, and recite the patriotic pledge for it is
their belief that those were acts of worship or religious devotion, which they
could not conscientiously give to anyone or anything except God. The Court
accommodated them and granted them an exemption from observing the
flag ceremony out of respect for their religious beliefs.
Further, several laws have been enacted to accommodate religion. The
Revised Administrative Code of 1987 has declared Maundy Thursday, Good
Friday, and Christmas Day as regular holidays. Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9177
proclaimed the first day of Shawwal, the tenth month of the Islamic
Calendar, a national holiday for the observance of Eidul Fitr (the end of
Ramadan). R.A. No. 9849 declared the tenth day of Zhul Hijja, the twelfth
month of the Islamic Calendar, a national holiday for the observance of Eidul
Adha. Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1083, otherwise known as the Code of
Muslim Personal Laws of the Philippines, expressly allows a Filipino Muslim to
have more than one (1) wife and exempts him from the crime of bigamy
punishable under Revised Penal Code (RPC). The same Code allows Muslims
to have divorce. 33
As to Muslims in government offices, Section 3 of P.D. No. 291, as
amended by P.D. No. 322, provides: ETHIDa
Sec. 3. (a) During the fasting season on the month of

Ramadan, all Muslim employees in the national government,
government-owned or controlled corporations, provinces, cities,
municipalities and other instrumentalities shall observe office hours
from seven-thirty in the morning (7:30 a.m.) to three-thirty in the
afternoon (3:30 p.m.) without lunch break or coffee breaks, and that
there shall be no diminution of salary or wages, provided, that the
employee who is not fasting is not entitled to the benefit of this
provision.
Pursuant thereto, the CSC promulgated Resolution No. 81-1277, dated
November 13, 1981, which reads in part:
2. During "Ramadan" the Fasting month (30 days) of the
Muslims, the Civil Service official time of 8 o'clock to 12 o'clock and 1
o'clock to 5 o'clock is hereby modified to 7:30 A.M. to 3:30 P.M.
without noon break and the difference of 2 hours is not counted as
undertime.
Following the decree, in Re: Request of Muslim Employees in the
Different Courts in Iligan City (Re: Office Hours) , 34 the Court recognized that
the observance of Ramadan as integral to the Islamic faith and allowed
Muslim employees in the Judiciary to hold flexible office hours from 7:30
o'clock in the morning to 3:30 o'clock in the afternoon without any break
during the period. This is a clear case of accommodation because Section 5,
Rule XVII of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of E.O. No. 292, enjoins
all civil servants, of whatever religious denomination, to render public
service of no less than eight (8) hours a day or forty (40) hours a week.
Non-Establishment Clause
On the opposite side of the spectrum is the constitutional mandate that
"no law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion," 35 otherwise
known as the non-establishment clause. Indeed, there is a thin line between
accommodation and establishment, which makes it even more imperative to
understand each of these concepts by placing them in the Filipino society's
perspective.
The non-establishment clause reinforces the wall of separation
between Church and State. It simply means that the State cannot set up a
Church; nor pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religion, or prefer one
religion over another nor force nor influence a person to go to or remain
away from church against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief
in any religion; that the state cannot punish a person for entertaining or
professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-
attendance; that no tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to
support any religious activity or institution whatever they may be called or
whatever form they may adopt or teach or practice religion; that the state
cannot openly or secretly participate in the affairs of any religious
organization or group and vice versa. 36 Its minimal sense is that the state
cannot establish or sponsor an official religion. 37
In the same breath that the establishment clause restricts what the
government can do with religion, it also limits what religious sects can or
cannot do. They can neither cause the government to adopt their particular
doctrines as policy for everyone, nor can they cause the government to
restrict other groups. To do so, in simple terms, would cause the State to
adhere to a particular religion and, thus, establish a state religion. 38
Father Bernas further elaborated on this matter, as follows:
"In effect, what non-establishment calls for is government
neutrality in religious matters. Such government neutrality may be
summarized in four general propositions: (1) Government must not
prefer one religion over another or religion over irreligion because
such preference would violate voluntarism and breed dissension; (2)
Government funds must not be applied to religious purposes because
this too would violate voluntarism and breed interfaith dissension; (3)
Government action must not aid religion because this too can violate
voluntarism and breed interfaith dissension; [and] (4) Government
action must not result in excessive entanglement with religion
because this too can violate voluntarism and breed interfaith
dissension." 39
Establishment entails a positive action on the part of the State.
Accommodation, on the other hand, is passive. In the former, the State
becomes involved through the use of government resources with the primary
intention of setting up a state religion. In the latter, the State, without being
entangled, merely gives consideration to its citizens who want to freely
exercise their religion.
In a September 12, 2003 Memorandum for Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide, Jr., the Office of the Chief Attorney recommended to deny, on
constitutional grounds, the request of Rev. Fr. Carlo M. Ilagan to hold a one-
day vigil in honor of the Our Lady of Caysasay within the premises of the
Court. Such controversy must be distinguished from the present issue in that
with respect to the former, a Catholic priest was the one who requested for
the vigil. Moreover, in that case, the vigil would take one (1) whole working
day; whereas in this case, the masses are held at the initiative of Catholic
employees and only during the thirty-minute lunch break.
Guided by the foregoing, it is our considered view that the holding of
Catholic masses at the basement of the QC Hall of Justice is not a case of
establishment, but merely accommodation. First, there is no law, ordinance
or circular issued by any duly constitutive authorities expressly mandating
that judiciary employees attend the Catholic masses at the basement.
Second, when judiciary employees attend the masses to profess their faith, it
is at their own initiative as they are there on their own free will and volition,
without any coercion from the judges or administrative officers. Third, no
government funds are being spent because the lightings and airconditioning
continue to be operational even if there are no religious rituals there. Fourth,
the basement has neither been converted into a Roman Catholic chapel nor
has it been permanently appropriated for the exclusive use of its faithful.
Fifth, the allowance of the masses has not prejudiced other religions.
No Appropriation of Public
Money or Property for the
Benefit of any Church
Section 29 (2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides, "No public
money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid, or employed, directly
or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church,
denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion, or of any priest,
preacher, minister, or other religious teacher, or dignitary as such, except
when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed
forces, or to any penal institution, or government orphanage or leprosarium."
The word "apply" means "to use or employ for a particular purpose."40
"Appropriate" means "to prescribe a particular use for particular moneys or
to designate or destine a fund or property for a distinct use, or for the
payment of a particular demand." 41
Under the principle of noscitur a sociis, where a particular word or
phrase is ambiguous in itself or is equally susceptible of various meanings,
its correct construction may be made clear and specific by considering the
company of words in which it is found or with which it is associated. This is
because a word or phrase in a statute is always used in association with
other words or phrases, and its meaning may, thus, be modified or restricted
by the latter. The particular words, clauses and phrases should not be
studied as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part
of the statute must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts
and in order to produce a harmonious whole. A statute must be so construed
as to harmonize and give effect to all its provisions whenever possible. 42
Thus, the words "pay" and "employ" should be understood to mean
that what is prohibited is the use of public money or property for the sole
purpose of benefiting or supporting any church. The prohibition
contemplates a scenario where the appropriation is primarily intended for
the furtherance of a particular church.
It has also been held that the aforecited constitutional provision "does
not inhibit the use of public property for religious purposes when the
religious character of such use is merely incidental to a temporary use which
is available indiscriminately to the public in general." Hence, a public street
may be used for a religious procession even as it is available for a civic
parade, in the same way that a public plaza is not barred to a religious rally
if it may also be used for a political assemblage. 43
In relation thereto, the phrase "directly or indirectly" refers to the
manner of appropriation of public money or property, not as to whether a
particular act involves a direct or a mere incidental benefit to any church.
Otherwise, the framers of the Constitution would have placed it before "use,
benefit or support" to describe the same. Even the exception to the same
provision bolsters this interpretation. The exception contemplates a situation
wherein public funds are paid to a priest, preacher, minister, or other
religious teacher, or dignitary because they rendered service in the armed
forces, or to any penal institution, or government orphanage or leprosarium.
That a priest belongs to a particular church and the latter may have
benefited from the money he received is of no moment, for the purpose of
the payment of public funds is merely to compensate the priest for services
rendered and for which other persons, who will perform the same services
will also be compensated in the same manner.
Ut magis valeat quam pereat. The Constitution is to be interpreted as a
w h o l e . 44 As such, the foregoing interpretation finds support in the
Establishment Clause, which is as clear as daylight in stating that what is
proscribed is the passage of any law which tends to establish a religion, not
merely to accommodate the free exercise thereof.
The Constitution even grants tax exemption to properties actually,
directly and exclusively devoted to religious purposes. 45 Certainly, this
benefits the religious sects for a portion of what could have been collected
for the benefit of the public is surrendered in their favor.
In Manosca v. CA, 46 a parcel of land located in Taguig was determined
by the National Historical Institute to be the birthsite of Felix Y. Manalo, the
founder of Iglesia ni Cristo. The Republic then sought to expropriate the said
property. The exercise of the power of eminent domain was questioned on
the ground that it would only benefit members of Iglesia ni Cristo. The Court
upheld the legality of the expropriation, viz.: cSEDTC
The practical reality that greater benefit may be derived by members

of the Iglesia ni Cristo than by most others could well be true but such
a peculiar advantage still remains to be merely incidental and
secondary in nature. 47 [Emphasis supplied]
Again, in Aglipay, the issuing and selling of postage stamps
commemorative of the Thirty-third International Eucharistic Congress was
assailed on the ground that it violated the constitutional prohibition against
the appropriation of public money or property for the benefit of any church.
In ruling that there was no such violation, the Court held:
It is obvious that while the issuance and sale of the stamps in
question may be said to be inseparably linked with an event of a
religious character, the resulting propaganda, if any, received by the
Roman Catholic Church, was not the aim and purpose of the
Government. We are of the opinion that the Government should not
be embarrassed in its activities simply because of incidental results,
more or less religious in character, if the purpose had in view is one
which could legitimately be undertaken by appropriate legislation.
The main purpose should not be frustrated by its
subordination to mere incidental results not contemplated. 48
[Emphasis supplied]
Here, the basement of the QC Hall of Justice is not appropriated,
applied or employed for the sole purpose of supporting the Roman Catholics.
Further, it has not been converted into a Roman Catholic chapel for the
exclusive use of its faithful contrary to the claim of Valenciano. Judge
Maceren reported that the basement is also being used as a public waiting
area for most of the day and a meeting place for different employee
organizations. The use of the area for holding masses is limited to lunch
break period from twelve (12) o'clock to one (1) o'clock in the afternoon.
Further, Judge Sagun, Jr. related that masses run for just a little over thirty
(30) minutes. It is, therefore, clear that no undue religious bias is being
committed when the subject basement is allowed to be temporarily used by
the Catholics to celebrate mass, as the same area can be used by other
groups of people and for other purposes. 49 Thus, the basement of the QC
Hall of Justice has remained to be a public property devoted for public use
because the holding of Catholic masses therein is a mere incidental
consequence of its primary purpose.
Conclusion
Directing the Executive Judges of the RTC and MeTC to regulate and
closely monitor the holding of masses and other religious practices within
the courts does not promote excessive collaboration between courts and
various religions. On the contrary, this is necessary to ensure that there
would be no excessive entanglement.
To disallow the holding of religious rituals within halls of justice would
set a dangerous precedent and commence a domino effect. Strict
separation, rather than benevolent neutrality/accommodation, would be the
norm. Thus, the establishment of Shari'a courts, the National Commission for
Muslim Filipinos, and the exception of Muslims from the provisions of the RPC
relative to the crime of bigamy would all be rendered nugatory because of
strict separation. The exception of members of Iglesia ni Cristo from joining a
union or the non-compulsion recognized in favor of members of the
Jehovah's Witnesses from doing certain gestures during the flag ceremony,
will all go down the drain simply because we insist on strict separation.
That the holding of masses at the basement of the QC Hall of Justice
may offend non-Catholics is no reason to proscribe it. Our Constitution
ensures and mandates an unconditional tolerance, without regard to
whether those who seek to profess their faith belong to the majority or to the
minority. It is emphatic in saying that "the free exercise and enjoyment of
religious profession and worship shall be without discrimination or
preference." Otherwise, accommodation or tolerance would just be mere lip
service.
One cannot espouse that the constitutional freedom of religion ensures
tolerance, but, in reality, refuses to practice what he preaches. One cannot
ask for tolerance when he refuses to do the same for others.
In fine, the Court denies the plea that the holding of Catholic masses at
the basement of the QC Hall of Justice be prohibited because the said
practice does not violate the constitutional principle of separation of Church
and State and the constitutional prohibition against appropriation of public
money or property for the benefit of a sect, church, denomination, or any
other system of religion.
WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to:
1. NOTE the letter-complaints of Mr. Tony Q. Valenciano, dated
January 6, 2009, May 13, 2009, and March 23, 2010;
2. NOTE the 1st Indorsement, dated September 21, 2010, by the
Office on Halls of Justice, containing photocopies and certified
photocopies of previous actions made relative to the complaint;
3. NOTE the Letter-Comment, dated September 9, 2010, of Quezon
City Regional Trial Court Executive Judge Fernando T. Sagun, Jr.;
4. NOTE the undated Letter-Comment of Quezon City Metropolitan
Trial Court Executive Judge Caridad M. Walse-Lutero;
5. DENY the prayer of Tony Q. Valenciano to prohibit the holding of
religious rituals in the QC Hall of Justice and in all halls of justice
in the country; and
6. DIRECT the Executive Judges of Quezon City to REGULATE and
CLOSELY MONITOR the holding of masses and other religious
practices within the Quezon City Hall of Justice by ensuring,
among others, that:
(a) it does not disturb or interrupt court proceedings;
(b) it does not adversely affect and interrupt the delivery of
public service; and
(c) it does not unduly inconvenience the public.
In no case shall a particular part of a public building be a permanent
place for worship for the benefit of any and all religious groups. There shall
also be no permanent display of religious icons in all halls of justice in the
country. In case of religious rituals, religious icons and images may be
displayed but their presentation is limited only during the celebration of such
activities so as not to offend the sensibilities of members of other religious
denominations or the non-religious public. After any religious affair, the icons
and images shall be hidden or concealed from public view.
The disposition in this administrative matter shall apply to all halls of
justice in the country. Other churches, religious denominations or sects are
entitled to the same rights, privileges, and practices in every hall of justice.
In other buildings not owned or controlled by the Judiciary, the Executive
Judges should coordinate and seek approval of the building
owners/administrators accommodating their courts.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno, C.J., Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Reyes
and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.
Leonardo-de Castro, J., please see my Separate Concurring Opinion.
Leonen, J., I dissent. See separate opinion.
Jardeleza, J., see separate opinion.
Caguioa, J., I concur in separate opinion of J. Jardeleza.
Separate Opinions
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J., concurring:
According to the Memorandum dated August 7, 2014 submitted by the

Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), the case at bench originated from a
series of Letters dated January 6, 2009, May 13, 2009, and March 23, 2010
that Mr. Tony Q. Valenciano (Valenciano) wrote to then Chief Justice Reynato
S. Puno (Chief Justice Puno) wherein the former informed the latter about the
regular and unabated practice of holding daily Roman Catholic Masses at the
basement of the Quezon City Hall of Justice. In the aforementioned
correspondences, Valenciano questioned the use of the said government
facility for the aforesaid religious purpose and pointed out that the said
practice violated the Constitutional principle of the separation of Church and
State. 1 He likewise claimed that the same is violative of Article VI, Section
29 (2) of the 1987 Constitution 2 which prohibits the appropriation of public
funds to activities that benefit a religious organization.
In his January 6, 2009 Letter, Valenciano complained that the practice
of allowing regular Roman Catholic Masses in the premises of the Quezon
City Hall of Justice has generated a perception that there is "a stamp of
approval of a bias favoring a religion" in violation of the Constitution. He
further enumerated specific instances wherein the said practice had created
unnecessary disturbance and inconvenience to the people who are employed
and who utilize the said government facility, to wit:
1. Posted on the wall to the left side of the door of the Records
Section of the OCC is a cork board where announcements are posted
as in the name of the Priest due to say mass and at what time and
day of the week.
2. Between 1:15pm to 1:30pm from Monday to Friday, the
Basement Area also double-up as a "conservatory of music" as the
Choral Group of the Chapel practices the hymnal of the Missal in
preparation for the following day's mass which disturb those other
employees trying to take a nap or else resting in their respective
office.
3. In so far as can be gathered, the building's basement was
designed as a place of rest for the transacting public from
12:00am to 1:30pm. This function has been abolished by the above-
cited activities it being the venue of the rituals, becoming fully
occupied during this hour.
4. Personnel and litigants of the Public Attorney's Office, RTC
Branch Nos. 82 & 83, Legal Library, Philippine Mediation Center,
Records Section of the OCC go into mild consternation attending
to their personal necessities because they cannot traverse the
Basement between 12am to 1:15pm to go to the lavatories.
Additionally, the personnel of the Courts and the Public cannot use
the elevators because it is blocked during this hour of the Mass and
are forced to take several flights of stairs to reach the Basement from
the upper floor.
5. The institutionalization of the goings-on has taken root and the
imagery above-cited is in veritable fruition what with the practice of
each office, court officer or prominent personality being designated
as sponsor for the Mass to be offered and with said sponsoring is the
matter of how to raise the stipend of the Priest officiating the said
Mass. The designate usually does the reading of the Epistles of the
Saints. Additionally, the name of the celebrants of Wedding or Birth
anniversary is announced to the congregation. And devotees who are
lay ministers help the Priest distribute holy communion during the
Mass. Unmistakable signs all that the Church has appropriated
the Basement Area as its regular venue, nay, as a private
preserve.
6. And as far as can be gathered, it is not uncommon to find
among the Court personnel who have taken upon their shoulders the
duty of ministering to the goings-on of the Chapel, have entered the
practice of vying for the right to read the Epistle when the sponsor-
designate is not in attendance or pass-up the opportunity, bringing in
its train unsavory conduct toward each other. A cause for back-
biting and irritation among themselves.
7. Usually, the water-pump generator because it produces discordant
sound vis-a-vis the contrived silence during the Mass is shut-off,
bringing in its train a "no water in faucets state" for the entire
building with the attendant discomfort to the personnel who need to
wash up after lunch for they bring their own lunch box to their
respective workplace.
8. A question can be raised also as to whether or not the 2 dozens or
so personnel of the Courts who have taken upon their shoulders the
"Chapel Duties" have developed an attitude preferring to engage
more heartily in "Chapel Duties" vis-a-vis their official duty for
which they are being paid out of taxes collected from the people they
ought to have priority for.
Then Chief Justice Puno referred Valenciano's January 6, 2009 Letter to
then Deputy Court Administrator and Officer-in-Charge of the Office of Halls
of Justice Antonio H. Dujua (DCA Dujua) for appropriate action who in turn
requested then Quezon City Regional Trial Court (RTC) Executive Judge
Teodoro A. Bay (Judge Bay) and Quezon City Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC)
Executive Judge Luis Zenon A. Maceren (Judge Maceren) to provide their
respective comments on the issue. Judge Bay responded by recommending
via a Memorandum dated March 10, 2009 that pending final resolution of the
case, daily mass be permitted to continue at the basement of the Quezon
City Hall of Justice, provided that: (1) the mass is limited to 30 minutes; (2)
no loud singing is allowed so as not to disturb others who are not attending
the mass; and (3) inconveniences caused by the mass are addressed. For his
part, Judge Maceren argued in his Letter dated March 6, 2009 that the
holding of daily Roman Catholic mass does not violate the principle of
separation of Church and State because the said principle does not prohibit
the use of public property for religious purposes when the religious character
of such use is merely incidental to a temporary use which is available
indiscriminately to the public in general. He likewise claimed that the said
activity is essential to achieving moral renewal which is in line with then
Chief Justice Puno's advocacy on moral recovery. Valenciano subsequently
wrote then Chief Justice Puno a Letter dated May 13, 2009 to inquire about
the status of his complaint. The letter was again referred to DCA Dujua. No
further action on the matter was made as per records. AaCTcI
Claiming that his concerns were not properly addressed, Valenciano

sent his March 23, 2010 Letter to then Chief Justice Puno. In an En Banc
Resolution dated June 22, 2010, the Court noted the aforementioned
correspondence and referred the same to the OCA for evaluation, report and
recommendation. Subsequently, the OCA through then Assistant Court
Administrator Jenny Lind Aldecoa-Delorino (ACA Delorino) required then
Quezon City RTC Executive Judge Fernando T. Sagun, Jr. (Judge Sagun) and
Quezon City MeTC Executive Judge Carida M. Walse-Lutero (Judge Lutero) to
comment on Valenciano's complaint.
In response, Judge Sagun informed the Court through his Letter-
Comment dated September 9, 2010 that the concerns raised by Valenciano
in his January 6, 2009 Letter have been addressed and measures have
already been implemented to this end. He also maintained that the holding
of daily masses should not be stopped because it is not detrimental and is in
fact a source of an individual's power and strength. He also commented on
the specific issues raised by Valenciano in this wise:
1. The cork board mentioned by Mr. Valenciano which used to be
located at the Office of the Clerk of Court announcing the schedule of
masses and the priest officiating the same is no longer being used;
2. While it is true that the choral group practices singing at the
basement of the Quezon City Hall of Justice, it is not true that the
group does this on a daily basis. Rehearsals are usually conducted
either a few minutes before or after the celebration of mass;
3. Masses have been considerably shortened to a little over thirty
(30) minutes. It is only during special holidays of obligation when the
celebration of mass goes beyond past 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon;
4. It is not true that personnel and litigants go into mild
consternation because they allegedly cannot traverse the basement
going to the lavatories on the first floor between 12:00 noon and
1:15pm during mass. Indeed, the side pathways leading to the
lavatories upstairs are open and can be used without obstruction;
5. As regards the use of elevators, note must be taken of the fact
that elevator attendants operating the elevator also take their lunch
break from 12:00 noon to 1:00pm;
6. On the issue of sponsoring masses, priests who officiate the
masses never demand a fee for the services, and are rarely assisted
by a lay minister as the priest distribute holy communion all by
himself;
7. There is no such instance where court personnel vying to read
the epistle during mass, cause back-biting and irritation amongst
themselves;
8. Regarding the shutting off of the water pump to prevent the
noise it caused from disrupting mass, but which allegedly also cut off
water supply to the entire Hall of Justice, the said pump has been
broken beyond repair and decommissioned since December of 2009;
9. Finally, with respect to court personnel who assist in the
preparation of the mass, they do the preparations before the day
official starts and do not hamper the performance of their official
duties in court. 3
On the other hand, Judge Lutero in her Memorandum to then ACA
Delorino defended the Roman Catholic activity in question despite her being
a Protestant Christian because she does not believe that, contrary to
Valenciano's claims, it violates the principle of separation of Church and
State. However, she suggested that in order to avoid offending the
sensibilities of non-Roman Catholics, religious statues should not be
displayed with the exception of the crucifix. She likewise made the following
specific comments on the issue as enumerated in the August 7, 2014 OCA
Memorandum:
1. Although mass is held at the basement of the Quezon City Hall
of Justice during lunch breaks, it is not true that the Executive Judges
of the Quezon City courts have approved the conversion of the said
portion of the basement into a chapel, as in fact, the said area
continues to be used as a waiting area for the public;
2. The allegation of Mr. Valenciano that holding of masses at the
Quezon City Hall of Justice violates the Constitution is baseless. It is
not the conduct of masses in public places which the Constitution
prohibits, but the passage of laws or the use of public funds for the
purpose of establishing a religion or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof which is prohibited. In this instance, no law or rule has been
passed nor have public funds been used to support the celebration of
masses within the Quezon City Hall of Justice;
3. Considering that Catholic masses are held only during lunch
breaks and do not disturb court proceedings, there is no reason to
discontinue the practice. To stop the celebration of mass at the
Quezon City Hall of Justice would be tantamount to repressing the
right of those who attend these masses from freely exercising their
religion. If Muslim court personnel are allowed to worship their Allah
even during office hours inside their offices; Seventh Day Adventists
are exempt from rendering Saturday court duties because their
religion prohibits them from working on Saturdays; and Christians are
allowed to conduct Bible studies inside their offices, Roman Catholics
should also be allowed to freely exercise their religion and worship in
the form of celebrating mass;
4. It is not true as alleged by Mr. Valenciano that the holding of
Catholic masses attended by Judges, Branch Clerks of Court and
other judicial employees grant Catholics better chances of obtaining
favorable resolutions from the Court. The fear is imagined. Indeed,
most cases filed in court are filed between and among Catholics. In
such instance, how then can a magistrate favor one Catholic over the
other;
5. The holding of masses has no connection to judges being
biased. In any case, only a handful of judges attend the subject mass
celebrated at the basement of the Quezon City Hall of Justice. Neither
does the posting of announcements relating to mass schedules and
name of officiating priests on the cork board of the Office of the Clerk
of Court has anything to do with perceived judicial biases;
6. Contrary to Mr. Valenciano's allegation, the basement of the
Quezon City Hall of Justice was not designed as a resting place for the
public, but was originally occupied by the Register of Deeds.
However, the said Office has since been moved to another location.
Other court offices and branches were therefore, subsequently
transferred to the basement after the Register of Deeds moved out;
7. The public is generally prohibited from loitering inside the
Quezon City Hall of Justice unless they have official business
transactions with the concerned offices thereat. On the other hand,
no official business is transacted during lunch breaks. This being the
case, the public is not actually deprived of a waiting space during
lunch breaks as they cannot be said to have official business with the
offices located at the Hall of Justice during the said time;
8. There is a clear path from the public offices leading to the
comfort rooms. Court personnel and the public are thus never
physically prevented from reaching the lavatories during mass.
Neither are the elevators unreachable for use since the area fronting
the same are clear of any obstructions. If at all the elevators cannot
be used during the mass, it is because elevator attendants also take
their lunch breaks from 12:00 noon to 1:00pm. In any case, to climb a
single flight of stairs from the basement to the first floor should not
really pose too much trouble, and should in fact be encouraged to
save energy;
9. The alleged water interruption caused by the shutting off of the
water pump during mass clearly has no basis. Executive Judge Lutero
claims that being on the third floor of the Quezon City Hall of Justice,
she has yet to experience the unavailability of water during mass. If
ever water interruptions occurred before, the same was caused by
pump maintenance problems and not because the water pump was
specifically shut off during mass;
10. There is really no problem in allowing court employees to
volunteer their services during the mass as long as this does not
interfere with the performance of their official duties. To date, the
Office of the Executive Judge has yet to receive a single complaint
coming from either judges of the Metropolitan Trial Court or other
court users regarding such a situation[.] 4
As pointed out by the OCA in its August 7, 2014 Memorandum,
Valenciano seeks to abate and discontinue the practice of holding Roman
Catholic Mass not only in the premises of the Quezon City Hall of Justice but
also in all Halls of Justice in the country. He cites the violation of the
Constitutional principle of the separation of Church and State and the
general inconvenience created by such practice on the public as bases for
requesting its total prohibition.
In the said memorandum, the OCA analyzes and frames Valenciano's
Constitutional argument in the following manner: EcTCAD
On constitutional grounds, complainant Valenciano raises the

issue of the Separation of the Church and the State.
Article II, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution emphatically
declares that the "separation of Church and State shall be inviolable."
The Bill of Rights, specifically Article III, Section 5 of the Constitution,
on the other hand, provides that: "No law shall be made respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The
free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship,
without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No
religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political
rights." The aforementioned provisions are known as the principal
religion clauses of the Constitution, which essentially guarantee two
things: first, the State cannot establish or favor a particular religion as
embodied in the "Establishment Clause"; and second, the State
cannot prohibit anyone from freely choosing his religion as embodied
in the "Free Exercise Clause."
The Establishment Clause principally prohibits the State from
sponsoring any religion, or favoring any religion as against other
religions. It mandates a strict neutrality in affairs among religious
groups. In the landmark United States case of Everson v. Board of
Education, the United States Supreme Court, speaking through Justice
Hugo Black, held that the Establishment Clause means at least this:
Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set
up a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion,
aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another.
Neither can force nor influence a person to go to or to
remain away from church against his will or force him to
profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No person can
be punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs
or disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-attendance.
No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to
support any religious activities or institutions, whatever
they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to
teach or practice religion. Neither a state nor the Federal
Government can, openly or secretly, participate in the
affairs of any religious organizations or groups and vice
versa. In the words of Jefferson, the clause against
establishment of religion by law was intended to erect 'a
wall of separation' between Church and State.
In our own landmark case of Estrada v. Escritor , the High Court
has however scholarly explained that the Establishment Clause has
been interpreted using either of two standards. First is the standard of
separation, which may take the form of either (a) strict
separation, or (b) the tamer version of strict neutrality or
separation.
The Strict Separation believes that the Establishment Clause
was meant to protect the state from the church, and the state's
hostility towards religion allows no interaction between the two.
According to this Jeffersonian view, an absolute barrier to formal
interdependence of religion and state needs to be erected. Religious
institutions could not receive aid, whether direct or indirect, from the
state. Nor could the state adjust its secular programs to alleviate
burdens the programs placed on believers. Only the complete
separation of religion from politics would eliminate the formal
influence of religious institutions and provide for a free choice among
political views, thus a strict "wall of separation" is necessary. In short,
there is total detachment between the church and the state, and
neither should have anything to do with the other.
On the other hand, the tamer version of the strict separationist
view, the Strict Neutrality view, believes that the "wall of
separation" does not require the state to be their adversary. Rather,
the state must be neutral in its relations with groups of religious
believers and non-believers." State power is no more to be used so as
to handicap religious than it is to favor them. The Strict Neutrality
approach is not hostile to religion, but it is strict in holding that
religion may not be used as a basis for classification for purposes of
governmental action, whether the action confers right or privileges or
imposes duties or obligations. Only secular criteria may be the basis
of government action. It does not permit, much less require,
accommodation of secular programs to religious belief.
Viewed in light of the foregoing discussion, it is clear that
complainant Mr. Valenciano anchors his present protest on the
standard of Separation in interpreting the Establishment Clause.
Accordingly, by applying the standard of Separation, the courts in
this case should either be totally disconnected with any religion
(when approached from the Strict Separation perspective) or that it
should, at the very least remain neutral among all religions (when
approached from the Strict Neutrality perspective). Mr. Valenciano
however contends that in allowing the celebration of masses in the
basement of the Quezon City courthouses in this case, the State, as
represented by the Judicial Branch of government, shows bias
towards the Roman Catholic religion.
Indeed, Mr. Valenciano imputes that the Executive Judges of
Quezon City have neither exercised strict separation from the church
nor strict neutrality when: (1) they allegedly gave tacit or formal
approval in converting a portion of the basement of the Quezon City
HOJ into a "Roman Catholic Church"; (2) resultantly, the attendance
of judges, clerks of court, and other judicial employees to the said
mass allegedly created an "imagery in the minds of non-Roman
Catholics among the citizenry that Catholics always stand a better
chance of being granted leniency before the Courts. . ."; and (3) the
said Chapel was permitted to celebrate its 20th anniversary
sometime in October of 2008, with the "pomp as befits a Chapel of
the Roman Catholic Church." 5
The OCA then opined that Valenciano's arguments are without merit. It
arrived at this conclusion by using the standard of Benevolent
Neutrality/Accommodation as the controlling approach that should be
applied in this case which involves the interpretation of the Establishment
Clause vis-a-vis the Free Exercise Clause. Quoting Estrada v. Escritor, 6 the
OCA declared that "[a]commodations are government policies that take
religion specifically into account not to promote the government's favored
form of religion, but to allow individuals and groups to exercise their religion
without hindrance. Their purpose or effect therefore is to remove a burden
on, or facilitate the exercise of, a person's or institution's religion." 7
Thus, the OCA concluded that:
In sum, the religious nature of the use of the herein public area
is merely incidental. The primary secular purpose for accommodating
the religious exercise within the court premises is apparently to
sustain an individual's free exercise of his religion as equally
guaranteed by the Constitution and to reinforce an individual's sense
of morality. In case of the latter, there is no dispute that morality is a
value most crucial and indispensable for government employees most
especially for those working in the judicial branch of government. x x
x.
xxx xxx xxx
It is thus clear that while the celebration of mass is religious in
nature, and while the Court allows its exercise within its public
edifices, the overriding consideration for such an accommodation is
not religious in nature, but secular — that is that the Court recognizes
and appreciates that such an exercise help elevate an employee's
sense of morality which eventually translates in the performance of
his work. 8
The OCA then put forward the following recommendations for the
consideration of the Court:
1. the 1st Indorsement dated 21 September 2010 by the Halls of
Justice, containing photocopies and certified photocopies of previous
actions made on the instant case, be NOTED;
2. the Letter-Comment dated 9 September 2010 of Quezon City
Regional Trial Court Executive Judge Fernando T. Sagun, Jr., be
NOTED;
3. the undated Letter-Comment of Quezon City Metropolitan Trial
Court Executive Judge Caridad M. Walse-Lutero, be NOTED;
4. the letter-complaints of Mr. Valenciano dated 9 January 2009,
13 May 2009 and 23 March 2010 be DISMISSED for lack of merit
and basis;
5. the Executive Judges of Quezon City be DIRECTED to CLOSELY
REGULATE and MONITOR the holding of masses and other religious
practices within the Quezon City Hall of Justice by ensuring that: (a)
the public is not unduly inconvenienced by the exercise thereof; (b) it
does not adversely affect and interrupt the delivery of public service,
and (c) display of religious icons are limited only during the
celebration of such activities so as not to offend the sensibilities of
members of other religious denominations or the non-religious public;
and
6. the instant administrative case be considered CLOSED and
TERMINATED. 9
Justice Jose C. Mendoza, who reviewed the August 7, 2014
Memorandum of the OCA, agreed with the findings and recommendations of
the OCA and denied the prayer of Valenciano that the holding of religious
rituals of any of the world's religions in the Quezon City Hall of Justice or any
hall of justice all over the country be prohibited.
I fully concur with the ponencia of Justice Mendoza which
comprehensively and with clarity enunciated the grounds to deny the prayer
of Valenciano. I deemed it necessary, however, with due respect to Justice
Marvic MVF Leonen, to respond to his Dissenting Opinion.
According to Justice Leonen, the views of Judges Sagun and Lutero are
inconsistent with the stand of the Office of the Chief Attorney as reflected in
its September 12, 2003 Memorandum for then Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide, Jr., wherein it recommended to deny on constitutional grounds, the
request of Rev. Fr. Carlo M. Ilagan to hold a one-day vigil in honor of the Our
Lady of Caysasay within the premises of the Supreme Court building. 10 HSAcaE
However, the jurisprudence cited in the Memorandum dated

September 12, 2003 of the Office of the Chief Attorney (OCAT) addressed to
then Chief Justice Davide had already been overturned. Gerona v. Secretary
of Education 11 was superseded by Ebralinag v. The Division Superintendent
of Schools of Cebu, 12 wherein the Court upheld the religious freedom of
members of Jehovah's Witnesses not to salute the flag because, according to
their religion, to do otherwise is prohibited by the Holy Bible. The Court, thus
said:
We are not persuaded that by exempting the Jehovah's Witnesses
from saluting the flag, singing the national anthem and reciting the
patriotic pledge, this religious group which admittedly comprises a
"small portion of the school population" will shake up our part of the
globe and suddenly produce a nation "untaught and uninculcated in
and unimbued with reverence for the flag, patriotism, love of country
and admiration for national heroes" (Gerona vs. Sec. of Education,
106 Phil. 2, 24). After all, what the petitioners seek only is exemption
from the flag ceremony, not exclusion from the public schools where
they may study the Constitution, the democratic way of life and form
of government, and learn not only the arts, sciences, Philippine
history and culture but also receive training for a vocation or
profession and be taught the virtues of patriotism, respect for human
rights, appreciation for national heroes, the rights and duties of
citizenship, and moral and spiritual values (Sec. 3[2], Art. XIV, 1987
Constitution) as part of the curricula. Expelling or banning the
petitioners from Philippine schools will bring about the very situation
that this Court had feared in Gerona . Forcing a small religious group,
through the iron hand of the law, to participate in a ceremony that
violates their religious beliefs, will hardly be conducive to love of
country or respect for duly constituted authorities.
The ruling in County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union 13
also cited by the aforesaid Memorandum of the Office of the Court Attorney
did not enunciate an absolute rule. In Lynch v. Donnelly , 14 cited in Estrada
v. Escritor , 15 the Court upheld a city-sponsored Nativity scene or crèche in
Pawtucket City, Rhode Island because the "city has a secular purpose for
including the crèche, the city has not impermissibly advanced religion, and
including the crèche does not create excessive entanglement between
religion and government." 16 Thus, the September 12, 2003 OCAT
Memorandum is not a reliable support for the Dissenting Opinion.
Justice Leonen is also of the opinion that the case of Estrada v. Escritor
17 involving an administrative complaint for immorality against a court
interpreter who cohabited and had a son with a married man is not
applicable to the case at bar since "jurisprudence which provides for
exceptions to State regulation is different from doctrinal support for
endorsing a specific religion without a separate overarching compelling
lawful and separate state interest." He further argues that the
aforementioned jurisprudence was not unanimously voted upon by the Court
En Banc therefore the status of benevolent neutrality approach as doctrine
is suspect. 18
I respectfully submit that it is a mistake to trivialize the import of the
ruling in Estrada v. Escritor 19 in the case at bar which involves a lawful
exercise of religious freedom. While this case does not concern an immoral
act nor a criminal offense, Estrada v. Escritor 20 is a jurisprudential gem that
painstakingly, comprehensively, and exhaustively considered numerous
cases of different factual background before passing upon the issue in said
case. It traced the Old World antecedents of the American religion clauses,
particularly the history and background of the concepts, jurisprudence and
standards of the two religion clauses in the United States — the Free
Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause — and the history of religious
freedom in the Philippines from the Treaty of Paris of December 10, 1898,
the Malolos Constitution of 1899, the laws and regulations enforced in the
Philippines during the American regime, and the provisions of the 1935,
1973 and 1987 Constitution dealing with the religious clauses and the
jurisprudence that applied the said provisions to diverse factual settings
which called upon the Court to determine "what the clauses specifically
require, permit and forbid." The standards and the tests in the balancing of
the interaction between the two religious clauses that jurisprudence has laid
down throughout the long history of these clauses are valuable guides in the
resolution of this case.
The dissenting opinions in the Estrada v. Escritor 21 case focused on
whether or not the act of respondent court employee which is penalized by
our law as concubinage and which may be considered as immoral or
prejudicial to the best interest of public service can be excused or condoned
due to the Declaration of Pledging Faithfulness between respondent Escritor
and her married partner which is recognized by their religious sect known as
Jehovah's Witnesses as sufficient justification for their cohabitation. The
facts of the case which triggered the strong dissenting opinions in the
aforesaid case are far removed from the religious exercise now before the
Court, as no criminal act is committed by the faithful in hearing the mass
during lunch break.
Moreover, it is also my view that religious freedom can be invoked not
only against a facially-neutral law that unduly impairs such freedom but any
regulation or practice that has the same effect unless it passes the accepted
test or standard laid down by jurisprudence to protect the freedom of
religion that occupies a preferred status in the hierarchy of human rights.
Moreover, religion has an admitted moralizing influence that can contribute
in the nurturing of high moral values among public servants which will have
a beneficial effect in the discharge of their duties.
At the outset, it must be stressed that the holding of the masses at the
premises of the Quezon City Hall of Justice is not sponsored or supported by
the said Court. It was at the own initiative of the Catholic faithful. Neither
were the masses endorsed by the Court or any of its officials with the
intention of propagating the Catholic religion to the detriment of other
religions. The assumption that inequality of treatment is promoted has no
factual basis. No person has complained that his/her religious practice has
been discriminated upon. Hence, the holding of masses during lunch break
would not amount to an excessive entanglement between the courts and
religion.
To require the faithful to go to nearby churches to attend masses or to
pray will make the exercise of religious freedom too burdensome,
notwithstanding that no prejudice to public service nor discrimination of
other religions is shown. The obligations demanded of a public servant to
comply with the highest standards of integrity, morality and commitment in
the efficient delivery of public service almost always coincide with the
obligations dictated by his religion, which has been defined in American Bible
Society v. City of Manila, 22 also cited in Estrada v. Escritor, 23 as follows:

[Religion] has reference to one's views of his relations to His Creator
and to the obligations they impose of reverence to His being and
character, and obedience to His Will. x x x.
Hence, in the Aglipay v. Ruiz 24 case, Justice Laurel recognized the
"elevating influence of religion in human society." Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, SJ, a
member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, stated in his position paper
that the Philippine Constitution is not hostile to religion and, in fact,
recognizes the value of religion and accommodates religion. 25 In Estrada v.
Escritor, 26 the Court further elucidated that:
Finally, to make certain the Constitution's benevolence to
religion, the Filipino people "implored(ing) the aid of Divine
Providence(,) in order to establish a government that shall embody
their ideals, conserve and develop the patrimony of the nation,
promote the general welfare, and secure to themselves and their
posterity the blessings of independence under a regime of justice,
liberty, and democracy, (in) ordain(ing) and promulgat(ing) this
Constitution." A preamble is a "key to open the mind of the authors of
the constitution as to the evil sought to be prevented and the objects
sought to be accomplished by the provisions thereof." There was no
debate on the inclusion of a "Divine Providence" in the preamble. In
Aglipay, Justice Laurel noted that when the Filipino people implored
the aid of Divine Providence, "(t)hey thereby manifested their intense
religious nature and placed unfaltering reliance upon Him who guides
the destinies of men and nations. The 1935 Constitution's religion
clauses, understood alongside the other provisions on religion in the
Constitution, indubitably shows not hostility, but benevolence, to
religion.
xxx xxx xxx
The provisions of the 1935, 1973 and 1987 constitutions on tax
exemption of church property, salary of religious officers in
government institutions, optional religious instruction and the
preamble all reveal without doubt that the Filipino people, in adopting
these constitutions, did not intend to erect a high and impregnable
wall of separation between the church and state. The strict neutrality
approach which examines only whether government action is for a
secular purpose and does not consider inadvertent burden on
religious exercise protects such a rigid barrier. By adopting the above
constitutional provisions on religion, the Filipinos manifested their
adherence to the benevolent neutrality approach in interpreting the
religion clauses, an approach that looks further than the secular
purposes of government action and examines the effect of these
actions on religious exercise. x x x.
The benevolent neutrality approach is further explored in Estrada v.
Escritor 27 as follows:
Benevolent neutrality is manifest not only in the Constitution
but has also been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence, albeit not
expressly called "benevolent neutrality" or "accommodation." In
Aglipay, the Court not only stressed the "elevating influence of
religion in human society" but acknowledged the Constitutional
provisions on exemption from tax of church property, salary of
religious officers in government institutions, and optional religious
instruction as well as the provisions of the Administrative Code
making Thursday and Friday of the Holy Week, Christmas Day and
Sundays legal holidays. In Garces, the Court not only recognized the
Constitutional provisions indiscriminately granting concessions to
religious sects and denominations, but also acknowledged that
government participation in long-standing traditions which have
acquired a social character — "the barrio fiesta is a socio-religious
affair" — does not offend the Establishment Clause. In Victoriano, the
Court upheld the exemption from closed shop provisions of members
of religious sects who prohibited their members from joining unions
upon the justification that the exemption was not a violation of the
Establishment Clause but was only meant to relieve the burden on
free exercise of religion. In Ebralinag, members of the Jehovah's
Witnesses were exempt from saluting the flag as required by law, on
the basis not of a stature granting exemption but of the Free Exercise
Clause without offending the Establishment Clause. HESIcT
While the U.S. and Philippine religion clauses are similar in form
and origin, Philippine constitutional law has departed from the U.S.
jurisprudence of employing a separationist or strict neutrality
approach. The Philippine religion clauses have taken a life of their
own, breathing the air of benevolent neutrality and accommodation.
Thus, the wall of separation in Philippine jurisdiction" is not as high
and impregnable as the wall created by the U.S. Supreme Court in
Everson. While the religion clauses are a unique American experiment
which understandably came about as a result of America's English
background and colonization, the life that these clauses have taken in
this jurisdiction is the Philippines' own experiment, reflective of the
Filipinos' own national soul, history and tradition. After all, "the life of
the law . . . . has been experience." (Citations omitted.)
The Dissenting Opinion reverses the test enunciated in the Estrada v.
Escritor 28 case when it posits that there must be an "urgent and compelling
need" for allowing religious rituals or the exercise of one's religious freedom.
The said case ruled not that "urgent and compelling need" must be shown
before religious freedom can be exercised, but instead, it is the State that
bears a heavy burden to show a compelling State interest to hinder the
exercise of religious freedom. I quote the case of Estrada v. Escritor: 29
A test that would protect the interests of the state in preventing a
substantive evil, whether immediate or delayed, is therefore
necessary. However, not any interest of the state would suffice to
prevail over the right to religious freedom as this is a fundamental
right that enjoys a preferred position in the hierarchy of rights — "the
most inalienable and sacred of all human rights," in the words of
Jefferson. This right is sacred for an invocation of the Free Exercise
Clause is an appeal to a higher sovereignty. The entire constitutional
order of limited government is premised upon an acknowledgment of
such higher sovereignty, thus the Filipinos implore the "aid of
Almighty God in order to build a just and humane society and
establish a government." As held in Sherbert, only the gravest
abuses, endangering paramount interests can limit this fundamental
right. A mere balancing of interests which balances a right with just a
colorable state interest is therefore not appropriate. Instead, only a
compelling interest of the state can prevail over the fundamental
right to religious liberty. The test requires the state to carry a heavy
burden, a compelling one, for to do otherwise would allow the state to
batter religion, especially the less powerful ones until they are
destroyed. In determining which shall prevail between the state's
interest and religious liberty, reasonableness shall be the guide. The
"compelling state interest" serves the purpose of revering religious
liberty while at the same time affording protection to the paramount
interests of the state. x x x. (Citations omitted.)
In this administrative matter, RTC Executive Judge Sagun and MeTC
Executive Judge Lutero both submitted their respective comments as
directed by the OCA findings that the Roman Catholic masses held during
lunch breaks did not disturb court proceedings and the service of employees
during the mass did not interfere with the performance of their official
duties. Moreover, devotees of other religions were not discriminated upon.
No compelling State interest to prohibit the exercise of religious
freedom having been established in this instance, I reiterate my concurrence
with the ponencia of Justice Mendoza.
JARDELEZA, J., concurring:
"Offense, however, does not equate to coercion. Adults often
encounter speech they find disagreeable; and an Establishment
Clause violation is not made out any time a person experiences a
sense of affront from the expression of contrary religious views x x x."
1
I agree with the excellently argued ponencia and its conclusion that the
Catholic masses held at the Quezon City Hall of Justice should not be
prohibited. I take this opportunity to add a few words on the important
constitutional issues raised in this case.
Mr. Tony Q. Valenciano (Mr. Valenciano) wrote this Court in 2009, and
again in 2010, concerning the holding of Roman Catholic masses at the
basement of the Quezon City Hall of Justice. He claims that this is a violation
of the constitutional command of separation of church and state and the
constitutional prohibition against the appropriation of public money for the
benefit of a sect, church, denomination, or any other system of religion. This
Court asked Executive Judge Fernando T. Sagun, Jr. (Executive Judge Sagun)
of the Regional Trial Court, and Executive Judge Caridad W. Lutero
(Executive Judge Lutero) of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City to
comment on the letters. Both judges take the position that the questioned
practice violates no constitutional provision. Executive Judge Sagun explains
that steps have been taken to address Mr. Valenciano's concerns, such as
the shortening of the mass to thirty (30) minutes. Executive Judge Lutero
adds that all denominations are allowed to engage in religious practices
within the confines of the Quezon City Hall of Justice. Christians are allowed
to conduct their own bible studies and Muslims to worship Allah in their
offices.
The Office of the Court Administrator recommends that daily masses at
the Quezon City Hall of Justice be allowed subject to the following conditions:
(a) the public is not unduly inconvenienced by the exercise thereof; (b) it
does not adversely affect and interrupt the delivery of public service; and (c)
the display of religious icons are limited only during the celebration of such
activities so as not to offend the sensibilities of members of other religious
denominations or the non-religious public.
The Establishment Clause is a central doctrine in our constitutional
democracy. Through the years, this Court has been called upon to uphold
this constitutional provision and strike down government acts that threaten
to break the wall of separation that prevent religion and government from
excessively entangling. In all Establishment Clause cases, the "measure of
constitutional adjudication is the ability and willingness to distinguish
between real threat and mere shadow." 2 I believe that this case poses no
danger to the separation of church and state.
Section 5 of the Bill of Rights of the Constitution states —
Sec. 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise
and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without
discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious
test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights.
This provision encapsulates the Religion Clauses of our Constitution —
the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause. These two clauses
complement each other, and together, they promote the flourishing of the
freedom to choose to believe or not to believe in the concept of a supreme
being.
The Free Exercise Clause mandates an absolute protection of the
freedom to believe. Thus, a person is free to worship any god he or she may
choose or none at all. 3 The difficulty and the beauty of the Free Exercise
Clause, however, are found in its application in the realm of actions. While a
person is free to believe what he or she may choose, he or she is not
absolutely free to act on his or her beliefs. In constitutional adjudication, the
challenge has often been the determination of whether a governmental act
jeopardizes the freedom to act on one's belief, and whether the freedom to
exercise a religion justifies an exemption from a law or government
regulation. We have had the opportunity to rule on cases involving the Free
Exercise Clause, and we have consistently endeavored to find the delicate
balance between the secular interest of the state and the freedom of religion
of the individual.
On the other hand, the Establishment Clause, in its strict sense, bars a
state from creating a state religion or espousing an official religion. There
are, however, several gradations in the application of the Establishment
Clause. It extends its prohibition not only to official acts establishing a state
religion but also to government acts that have the effect of endorsing
religion or favoring one over others. In Iglesia Ni Cristo v. Court of Appeals, 4
we held that the Establishment Clause prohibits the state from leaning in
favor of religion. "Neutrality alone is its fixed and immovable stance." 5
This notwithstanding, the Establishment Clause must not be construed
so literally so as to impose an absolute separation between the affairs of the
state and the church. It exists not in the pursuit of separation for its own
sake. Rather, the goal of the Establishment Clause is to create constitutional
space where religion may flourish. The Establishment Clause bars the state
from favoring any religion so that it may not inhibit religious belief by
rewarding other religious beliefs. 6 The Establishment Clause has never been
intended, and as such, should not be interpreted to serve as a tool to
alienate the church from the state.
The Religion Clauses are unique in that while their application
oftentimes creates tension, they also exist to protect the essential need to
promote liberty of conscience — the choice to believe or not to believe in a
greater being. The Free Exercise Clause insures this by insulating the
individual from any government act that may prevent or burden his or her
right to practice his or her faith within the limits of the law. The
Establishment Clause upholds freedom of religion by enforcing neutrality and
making volunteerism the determining factor in an individual's religious
choices. 7 The state is neutral to all religions. It does not espouse any of
them so that an individual will be free, without any kind of compulsion, to
make the choice for himself or herself. caITAC
Our jurisprudence on the Religion Clauses reveal that in cases where

this Court is called upon to perform the delicate balancing of protecting
freedom of religion and upholding the legitimate interest of the state, we
have always chosen not to espouse a blind adherence to an absolute
separation of church and state but one that permits accommodation,
whenever possible, in the greater pursuit of allowing freedom of religion to
flourish.
I n Aglipay v. Ruiz , 8 we found that the Director of Posts may validly
issue and sell postage stamps commemorative of the Thirty-Third
International Eucharistic Congress without violating the Establishment
Clause. We found that the purpose for issuing and selling the stamps was to
promote the Philippines and attract tourists as it was the seat of the
Eucharistic Congress. While the issuance and sale of the stamps may be
"inseparably linked with an event of a religious character, the resulting
propaganda, if any, received by the Roman Catholic Church, was not the aim
and purpose of the Government." 9 It is the main purpose and not the mere
incidental results that should matter. We categorically declared that what is
guaranteed in the Constitution is religious liberty and not mere religious
toleration. In explaining the many ways that the affairs of the state and the
church often intersect, we held —
Religious freedom, however, as a constitutional mandate is not
inhibition of profound reverence for religion and is not a denial of its
influence in human affairs. Religion as a profession of faith to an
active power that binds and elevates man to his Creator is
recognized. And, in so far as it instills into the minds the purest
principles of morality, its influence is deeply felt and highly
appreciated. When the Filipino people, in the preamble of their
Constitution, implored "the aid of Divine Providence , in order to
establish a government that shall embody their ideals, conserve and
develop the patrimony of the nation, promote the general welfare,
and secure to themselves and their posterity the blessings of
independence under a regime of justice, liberty and democracy," they
thereby manifested their intense religious nature and placed
unfaltering reliance upon Him who guides the destinies of men and
nations. The elevating influence of religion in human society is
recognized here as elsewhere. In fact, certain general concessions
are indiscriminately accorded to religious sects and denominations.
Our Constitution and laws exempt from taxation properties devoted
exclusively to religious purposes (sec. 14, subsec. 3, Art. VI,
Constitution of the Philippines and sec. 1, subsec. 4, Ordinance
appended thereto; Assessment Law, sec. 344, par. [c], Adm. Code).
Sectarian aid is not prohibited when a priest, preacher, minister or
other religious teacher or dignitary as such is assigned to the armed
forces or to any penal institution, orphanage or leprosarium (sec. 13,
subsec. 3, Art. VI, Constitution of the Philippines). Optional religious
instruction in the public schools is by constitutional mandate allowed
(sec. 5, Art. XIII, Constitution of the Philippines, in relation to sec. 928,
Adm. Code). Thursday and Friday of Holy Week, Thanksgiving Day,
Christmas Day, and Sundays and made legal holidays (sec. 29, Adm.
Code) because of the secular idea that their observance is conclusive
to beneficial moral results. The law allows divorce but punishes
polygamy and bigamy; and certain crimes against religious worship
are considered crimes against the fundamental laws of the state (see
arts. 132 and 133, Revised Penal Code). 10
In American Bible Society v. City of Manila, 11 we held that ordinances
requiring businesses to obtain permits and pay license fees cannot be
applied to the American Bible Society's practice of distributing and selling
bibles and/or gospel excerpt. We explained that the constitutional guaranty
of the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship
carries with it the right to disseminate religious information. Any restraint of
this right can only be justified on the ground that there is a clear and present
danger of any substantive evil which the state has the right to prevent. 12
We also upheld, in Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union , 13 a law
exempting certain employees from close shop agreements in collective
bargaining when their religion prohibits it. In explaining the Religion Clauses
of the Constitution, we declared —
The constitutional provision [not] only prohibits
legislation for the support of any religious tenets or the
modes of worship of any sect, thus forestalling compulsion by
law of the acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form
of worship, but also assures the free exercise of one's chosen
form of religion within limits of utmost amplitude. It has been
said that the religion clauses of the Constitution are all designed to
protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man
to believe as his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs, and to live
as he believes he ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others
and with the common good. 14

I n Ebralinag v. The Division Superintendent of Schools of Cebu, 15 we
reversed the thirty-year old doctrine in Gerona v. Secretary of Education 16
that members of the Jehovah's Witness may be validly dismissed from school
because of their refusal to salute the Philippine flag. We held that while
saluting the flag is required under the law, members of the Jehovah's
Witness ought to be exempted out of respect for their religious beliefs. We
said that dismissing students from school because of their refusal to salute
the flag in accordance with their religion is "alien to the conscience of the
present generation of Filipinos who cut their teeth on the Bill of Rights which
guarantees their rights to free speech and the free exercise of religious
profession and worship." 17
We also found constitutionally infirm the decision of the Movie and
Television Review and Classification Board (MTRCB) in giving an X-rating to
the show "Ang Iglesia Ni Cristo." 18 The MTRCB used as one of its grounds
the fact that the show, which discussed the doctrines of the Iglesia Ni Cristo,
"offend[s] and constitute[s] an attack against other religions." 19 We ruled
that the MTRCB has no authority to stifle the show's criticisms of other
religions as it is not the task of the state "to favor any religion by protecting
it against an attack by another religion." 20 We emphasized that neutrality
alone is the "fixed and immovable stance." 21
We have even incorporated in our administrative policy an
accommodation of the religious practices of our court employees. In Re:
Request of Muslim Employees in the Different Courts in Iligan City (Re: Office
Hours), 22 we allowed Muslim court employees to hold flexible office hours
from 7:30 a.m. to 3:30 p.m. without any break during the month of
Ramadan. While we refused to allow them to hold office from 7:30 am to
3:30 pm every Friday for the entire calendar year, this was based on what
we deem is a value that justifies slightly inconveniencing the religious
practice of Muslims. Specifically, we upheld the civil service rule which
enjoins all civil servants, of whatever religious denomination, to render
public service of no less than eight hours a day or 40 hours a week. In other
words, our declared policy is to allow the practice and expression of religious
faith for as long as it does not unjustifiably prejudice our avowed duty to
serve the public. 23
In 2003, we promulgated Estrada v. Escritor 24 which became an
essential case in our growing jurisprudence on the Religion Clauses. Here,
we categorically and unequivocally declared that in resolving claims
involving religious freedom benevolent neutrality or accommodation,
whether mandatory or permissive, is the spirit, intent, and framework
underlying the Religion Clauses in our Constitution.
Benevolent neutrality, as held in Estrada, is an approach to the Religion
Clauses which leaves room for the accommodation of religion. In explaining
the concept of accommodation and how it is compatible with the
Establishment Clause, we quoted the American case Zorach v. Clauson , 25
which said —
The First Amendment, however, does not say that, in every and
all respects there shall be a separation of Church and State. Rather, it
studiously defines the manner, the specific ways, in which there shall
be no concert or union or dependency one or the other. That is the
common sense of the matter. Otherwise, the state and religion would
be aliens to each other — hostile, suspicious, and even unfriendly. 26
Estrada then proceeded to analyze our religion cases and declared that
"the well-spring of Philippine jurisprudence on this subject is for the most
part, benevolent neutrality which gives room for accommodation." 27 I agree.
Estrada has, since its promulgation, been cited by this Court in cases
involving the Religion Clauses. We invoked the benevolent neutrality
accommodation in Imbong v. Ochoa, Jr. 28 In ascertaining whether the duty
to refer, under the Reproductive Health Law, unduly burdened the free
exercise of religion of conscientious objectors, we applied the compelling
state interest test in accordance with the benevolent neutrality approach.
We ruled that conscientious objectors must be exempt from the duty to refer
so as not to infringe their freedom of religion.
In my view, Estrada did not introduce anything new in applying
benevolent neutrality in religion cases. Rather, it is an expression of the
decades of jurisprudence that has persistently chosen a path where the
separation of church and state may be used to create a space where religion
is not stifled but is allowed to flourish. ICHDca
Of course there have been cases where we refused to grant a claim

based on religion. In all these cases, however, this Court found interests that
justify the refusal of a claim under the Religion Clauses.
German v. Barangan, 29 a decision involving a public demonstration at
the peak of anti-government rallies during the Martial Law, is one such case.
Petitioners intended to pray in the St. Jude Chapel which was within the
Malacañang premises. They were, however, prevented from doing so, on the
ground that St. Jude Chapel was located within a Malacañang security area.
Petitioners went to this Court and claimed that they should be allowed to
pray inside the chapel in accordance with their freedom to practice their
religion. This Court denied their petition. While the case was hinged on the
petitioners supposed lack of good faith in their claim, the Court also found
that even if there was good faith, the refusal to allow them within a
Malacañang security area did not violate their freedom of religion. The
refusal to allow them into the security area was motivated by the need to
protect the life of the then President Marcos and his family, as well as other
governmental officers transacting business in Malacañang.
I n Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v. Commission on Elections (COMELEC), 30
we chastised the COMELEC for relying on the Holy Bible and the Koran in
their decision to disqualify Ang Ladlad LGBT Party from participating in the
party-list elections. We found this to be a clear violation of the Establishment
Clause. The government must act for secular purposes for primarily secular
effects. We explained —
x x x Otherwise, if government relies upon religious beliefs in
formulating public policies and morals, the resulting policies and
morals would require conformity to what some might regard as
religious programs or agenda. The non-believers would therefore be
compelled to conform to a standard of conduct buttressed by a
religious belief, i.e., to a "compelled religion," anathema to religious
freedom. Likewise, if government based its actions upon religious
beliefs, it would tacitly approve or endorse that belief and thereby
also tacitly disapprove contrary religious or non-religious views that
would not support the policy. As a result, government will not provide
full religious freedom for all its citizens, or even make it appear that
those whose beliefs are disapproved are second-class citizens.
In other words, government action, including its proscription of
immorality as expressed in criminal law like concubinage, must have
a secular purpose. x x x 31
In this case, we clarified that not all claims based on religion should be
recognized. But even while we disagreed with the COMELEC, we emphasized
that the imperative for the government to pursue secular purposes rather
than religious ones is to avoid the endorsement of any particular religion and
in effect, disapproving others. Neutrality is the stance not because the
Establishment Clause requires the government to put up a wall of separation
between church and state that is "high and impregnable" 32 but because it is
only in neutrality that freedom of religion can find expression.
I n Imbong, we also refused a claim based on the Religion Clauses. In
this case, petitioners argued that the use of contraceptives is against their
religion. Thus, the state procurement of contraceptives is unconstitutional as
it violates the Religion Clauses. We ruled that the question of whether the
use of contraceptives is moral from a religious standpoint falls outside the
province of the Court. Further, this Court invoked the Establishment Clause in
denying the petitioner's claims. We explained that while "the establishment
clause restricts what the government can do with religion, it also limits what
religious sects can or cannot do with the government." 33 Members of a
particular religion cannot ask the government to adopt their religious
doctrine as the policy for everyone else. We said, "[t]o do so, in simple
terms, would cause the State to adhere to a particular religion and, thus,
establishing a state religion." 34 Imbong exemplifies the delicate balancing
act involved in cases involving the Establishment Clause. It also
demonstrates that in protecting the wall of separation, the goal is not to
shun all religion for the sake of stifling the presence of religion in the sphere
of government but rather refuse any policy that may directly or indirectly
favor one religion over others.
This is the path that our jurisprudence on the Religion Clauses has
taken. It is one that chooses accommodation, where there is no danger of
breaching the wall of separation, instead of a blind and literal adherence to
the concept of a separate church and state. To repeat, the Establishment
Clause exists not for the sake of separation per se but as a tool to allow all
religion (as well as the choice not to have one) to thrive and flourish. Our
Establishment Clause, existing in the context of a unique Filipino culture, has
developed its own narrative. It is this narrative that must permeate any
understanding of what it means for our constitutional democracy to uphold
the separation of church and state.
I note, however, that the present case is one of first impression. While
we have had the opportunity to rule on cases involving our Religion Clauses,
these cases generally involved a challenge of an official act that threatens to
burden the free exercise of religion. In the present case, this Court is asked
to interpret a governmental institution's acquiescence to a religious practice
and ascertain whether this acquiescence amounts to an endorsement or
support for a particular region.
Our Establishment Clause finds its source in the First Amendment of
the American Constitution. In several Establishment Clause cases, this Court
has relied upon the guidance of American jurisprudence in appreciating the
complexities of the separation of church and state. American jurisprudence
has persuasive weight in this jurisdiction. More importantly, a review of
relevant American cases may give us a guide on what analytical tools we can
use in exploring the boundaries of permissible religious accommodation.
I highlight that the issue presented before us actually involves two
matters — the constitutionality of allowing religious practice within the
premises of the Quezon City Hall of Justice and of allowing Catholic images
to be displayed in a particular area. Most relevant to the present case are
the United States Supreme Court's rulings in matters pertaining to
government entities allowing the display of religious items in their premises
as well as the act of government instrumentalities of opening government
activities with prayer. The leading cases of Marsh v. Chambers , 35 Town of
Greece v. Galloway , 36 Lynch v. Donnelly , 37 and County of Allegheny v.
ACLU 38 merit a review.
Marsh v. Chambers dealt with the constitutionality of the practice of
the Nebraska Legislature of beginning its session with a prayer by a chaplain
paid by the state and with the legislature's approval. Here, the United States
Supreme Court ruled that the practice did not violate the Establishment
Clause. In arriving at this conclusion, the United States Supreme Court used
history and the intent of the framers of the First Amendment as the
framework of analysis. The United States Supreme Court found that the
practice of opening the sessions of congress with a prayer has existed for
two centuries. The First Congress, during whose term the language of the
American Bill of Rights which includes the United States' religion clauses was
finalized, adopted the policy of selecting a chaplain to open each session
with a prayer. The United States Supreme Court explained —
Standing alone, historical patterns cannot justify contemporary
violations of constitutional guarantees, but there is far more here
than simply historical patterns. In this context, historical evidence
sheds light not only on what the draftsmen intended the
Establishment Clause to mean, but also on how they thought that
Clause applied to the practice authorized by the First Congress —
their actions reveal their intent. 39
The United States Supreme Court found that the unique history of
opening prayers in legislative sessions and the First Amendment leads to the
conclusion that the drafters of the First Amendment Religion Clauses saw no
real threat to the Establishment Clause in a practice of prayer similar to that
used in the Nebraska Legislature. Marsh also declared that the content of the
prayer is not the concern of the court in the absence of any indication that
the prayer opportunity has been exploited to advance or disparage any
other faith or belief.
This ruling was echoed in the 2014 case Town of Greece v. Galloway
where the United States Supreme Court upheld the practice of beginning
town board meetings with a prayer led by a chosen "chaplain of the month"
who may come from any religious congregation selected from a list of
available ministers in the town. The practice was challenged on the ground
that the prayers were sectarian and dominated by Christian themes. The
petitioner insisted that prayers must be inclusive and ecumenical so as not
to associate the government with one particular religion. The United States
Supreme Court found that the town board meeting opening prayer follows
the tradition of the legislative prayer declared constitutional in Marsh. The
decision also highlighted that Marsh did not find relevant the content of the
prayer itself so long as the practice is not being used to promote or
disadvantage any other religion. The validity of prayers in this particular
context does not arise from the generic theism of the prayers themselves
but from a finding that history and tradition have shown that this kind of
practice can be accommodated without posing a threat to the Establishment
Clause. Town of Greece further highlighted that the prayers being challenged
were intended for the board members only and no member of the public was
compelled to participate. The religious practice was an internal act among
the town board members and not meant to promote any religion to the
public. So long as the town board pursued a policy of non-discrimination and
the prayers may be in accord with any religious denomination of the
particular chaplain assigned to lead the opening prayer, no violation of the
Establishment Clause exists. The United States Supreme Court added that
non-believers may feel offended by the practice is no justification to rule that
it is unconstitutional. Said the court — TCAScE
x x x Offense, however, does not equate to coercion. Adults

often encounter speech they find disagreeable; and an Establishment
Clause violation is not made out any time a person experiences a
sense of affront from the expression of contrary religious views in a
legislative forum, especially where, as here, any member of the
public is welcome in turn to offer an invocation reflecting his or her
own convictions. x x x 40
While Marsh and Town of Greece involve the constitutionality of a
religious practice sanctioned by the government, Lynch and County of
Allegheny pertain to the constitutionality of government sanctioned displays
of religious images.
In Lynch v. Donnelly , the United States Supreme Court was called upon
to rule on the constitutionality of the City of Pawtucket's annual Christmas
display which includes a Santa Claus house, a Christmas tree, a banner that
reads "SEASONS GREETINGS," and a crèche or Nativity scene. Here, the
United States Supreme Court held that the Establishment Clause does not
seek to establish a regime of total separation between church and state. It
explained —
No significant segment of our society, and no institution within
it, can exist in a vacuum or in total or absolute isolation from all the
other parts, much less from government. "It has never been thought
either possible or desirable to enforce a regime of total separation. . .
." x x x Nor does the Constitution require complete separation of
church and state; it affirmatively mandates accommodation, not
merely tolerance, of all religions, and forbids hostility toward any. x x
x Anything less would require the "callous indifference" we have said
was never intended by the Establishment Clause. x x x 41
Thus, not every governmental action that has religious undertones
must be automatically struck down as a breach of the wall of separation. In
Lynch, the United States Supreme Court held that each case requires courts
to scrutinize whether the challenged official conduct, in reality, establishes a
religion or tends to do so. Each case thus requires line-drawing. 42 In this
task, Lynch applied the test established in Lemon v. Kurtzman , 43 which
involves an inquiry as to whether the official act has a secular purpose,
whether its principal or primary effect is to advance or inhibit religion, and
whether it creates an excessive entanglement of government with religion.
In the application of the Lemon Test, Lynch necessarily required an
examination of the circumstances surrounding the challenged Christmas
display. The United States Supreme Court pursued this framework of
analysis in County of Allegheny v. ACLU. 44 This case repeated and
emphasized that a government's use of religious symbols is unconstitutional
if it has the effect of endorsing a religious belief. Whether the use of religious
symbols has this effect, in turn, depends upon the context. Here, the United
States Supreme Court ruled that the display of a crèche at the grand
staircase of the county courthouse violated the Establishment Clause. Its
setting clearly signified the government's endorsement of a particular
religious message. County of Allegheny, however, declared valid the display
of a menorah in front of the city-county building. Relying on an analysis of
setting and context, particularly that the menorah was displayed during the
winter holidays along with a Christmas tree and a sign that reads "Salute to
Liberty," the United States Supreme Court found that taken as a whole, the
religious display does not amount to an endorsement of a religion but only
recognizes that both Christmas and Chanukah are part of the same winter
holiday season.
These four cases capture the doctrine and the framework of analysis
that ought to apply in cases where the state uses religious symbols. The
Establishment Clause is breached when the state, by using a religious
symbol, effectively endorses religion. In determining if this endorsement
exists, reliance has been made on history insofar as it reflects the intent of
the drafters of the Religion Clause. The particular setting of the religious
display is also taken into account in order to ascertain if it indeed amounts to
the sponsorship of religion.
It is within these contexts that this Court must proceed to apply the
principles of the Establishment Clause to the present case.
Majority of the country's population believe in some form of religion.
Out of around 92 million Filipinos, about 74 million are Catholics and around
5 million are Muslims. There are also millions belonging to the Christian faith
such as the Iglesia Ni Cristo and the Philippine Council of Evangelical Church.
45 While these numbers alone do not justify any erosion of the wall of
separation, they are, however, an indication of the inevitable link between

this government and the various religious faiths present among its people.
The duty of the state, as mandated by the Religion Clauses of the
Constitution, is not to endeavor to completely rid itself of any traces of
respect for religion, but to pursue a policy where the freedom to believe or
not to believe may thrive.
Thus, historically, the government has accommodated religion in the
public space. This is seen in the various national holidays declared in the
name of important religious events such as Eid'l Fitr , Eidul Adha, Maundy
Thursday, Good Friday, and All Saints' Day.
Even the oath of office prescribed for government officials end with the
phrase "So help me God." While government officials are free to omit this
line, it is, nevertheless, an indication that a display of faith in a supreme
being is not completely barred from the public space.
Further, the Preamble of the Constitution also mentions an Almighty
God. In fact, the sessions of the 1986 Constitutional Commission always
began with a prayer. This manifests how the drafters of the Constitution
understood the Establishment Clause. The acknowledgment of religion, the
acceptance that ours is a generally theistic society, the agreement that the
phrase "Almighty God" appear in the Preamble of the Constitution, and the
shared participation in prayer at the start of every Constitutional
Commission session all shed light as to how the Establishment Clause was
intended to be construed. The framers of the Constitution themselves did
not perceive the acknowledgment of religion as a threat to the separation of
church and state. The records of the debates on the floor of the
Constitutional Commission show the deliberateness of the inclusion of the
term "Almighty God" in the Preamble. While the Committee on the Preamble
initially used the term Divine Providence and proposals were made to
change it to "Lord of History," the phrase "Almighty God" eventually found
its way into the Preamble as we know it now. The drafters of the Constitution
agreed that this phrase more accurately reflected the spirit and culture of
the Filipinos and was accepted both by the Christian and Muslim
representatives in the Constitutional Commission. 46
In fact, our Constitution, as well as its predecessors, the 1935 and the
1973 Constitutions, all contain provisions granting tax exemptions to
religious institutions. These have never been seen as endangering the wall of
separation between church and state.
Even this Court has been consistent in recognizing the role of religion
in our society. The Supreme Court arms and great seal contains an image of
the ten commandments described in Section 1 of Rule 136 of the Rules of
Court as "x x x two tablets containing the commandments of God x x x." 47
Similarly, the entrance to our own Supreme Court Old Building has a statue
of Moses and the Ten Commandments.
In the United States, the display of the Ten Commandments in
government property has been found constitutional by the United States
Supreme Court. In Van Orden v. Perry , 48 the United States Supreme Court
held that the display of a monument of the Ten Commandments in the Texas
State Capitol does not violate the Religion Clauses. The United States
Supreme Court further noted that even its own courtroom —
x x x Moses has stood, holding two tablets that reveal portions
of the Ten Commandments written in Hebrew, among other lawgivers
in the south frieze. Representations of the Ten Commandments adorn
the metal gates lining the north and south sides of the Courtroom as
well as the doors leading into the Courtroom. Moses also sits on the
exterior east facade of the building holding the Ten Commandments
tablets.
The United States Supreme Court stated that while Moses and the Ten
Commandments are religious symbols, they also possess significance in the
country's national heritage and history. That it is placed in the United States
Supreme Court courtroom is a recognition of this significance. The same is
true in the case of this Court's arms and great seal as well as the image of
Moses in the entrance steps of our building.
Further, we have consistently chosen a policy of benevolence to the
practice of various religions. The Court has an Ecumenical Prayer 49 — a
prayer carefully crafted to reflect and represent the various faiths in the
judiciary and in the country. This prayer is used at the beginning of sessions
of this Court, in the lower courts, and in flag ceremonies. As a matter of fact,
this Court begins its sessions whether en banc or in division by reciting this
Ecumenical Prayer. This same Ecumenical Prayer is printed in the official
Supreme Court calendars distributed among Supreme Court employees and
courts nationwide. cTDaEH
Nevertheless, it is important to highlight that the Court has never made

this prayer mandatory. We also have the Centennial Prayer for the Courts 50
(Centennial Prayer) which this Court encourages to be recited at the start of
sessions in this Court and in lower courts. As in the Ecumenical Prayer, this
Centennial Prayer was crafted after consultations with various major
religious denominations. At no point, however, has it been made mandatory.
As Supreme Court Memorandum Circular No. 001-2001 states, its regular
recitation is voluntary and no administrative sanction will be imposed on
those who refuse to use it for any personal reason.
In accordance with the protection accorded to freedom of religion,
every person in the judiciary is free to pray in the way he or she desires or
not at all. The Ecumenical and Centennial prayers exist merely as options for
members and employees of the judiciary to express their prayer in one
particular way. These prayers exist to support the practice of religious faith
but they do not impose a monopoly or a singular standard on the proper
expression of prayers. Consistent with the Religion Clauses, these practices
allow all religions to flourish while leaving sufficient room for people to
practice their faith or lack thereof in the manner they deem proper.
Supreme Court employees also hold first Friday masses within the
Court premises. These employees have done so voluntarily during lunch
break for years now. This Court has not deemed it necessary to prevent
them from doing so. We merely regulate the time and place for the holding
of the masses so as to insure that there will be no prejudice to public
service. It is worth highlighting that this Court, while it has not prohibited the
holding of first Friday masses, has refused to designate one particular room
where the masses may be held. These employees are free to hold their
masses during lunch break within the Court's premises provided that the
area they intend to use is not currently needed for any official Court activity.
The Court has, and continues to exercise, the right to regulate the use of
rooms within the Court premises for the purpose of these first Friday
masses. To me, this practice is an eloquent example of the proper
understanding of our Religion Clauses and their narrative within the unique
Filipino culture.
All these are efforts to recognize the unique role that religion plays in
the lives of Filipinos. These efforts do not espouse one particular religion or
insist on theism over atheism. These practices are the Court's contribution to
giving life to the mandate of the Constitution's Religion Clauses — the
creation of space where all religions may exist while at the same time giving
the people absolute freedom to believe and practice their faith in the manner
they deem proper or to have none at all.
Further, this long history of the presence of religion in the conduct of
the judiciary's affairs speaks volumes of its perceived effect on the
constitutional wall of separation. There is no indication that these practices
have led to the establishment of a religion in the judiciary or the mandatory
participation of non-Catholics or atheists in religious activities. In the words
of United States Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, "a page of
history is worth a volume of logic." 51
These and our consistent jurisprudence all point to the conclusion that
the Establishment Clause does not mandate an automatic finding of
unconstitutionality whenever the State engages in an activity that has
religious undertones. Whether a government practice breaches the wall of
separation depends on whether the effect of that practice is to endorse a
religion. This analysis then compels us to examine the context of a particular
case.
I note that in 2003, the Office of the Chief Attorney recommended to
then Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide that the request to hold a one-day vigil in
honor of the Our Lady of Caysasay be rejected on constitutional grounds.
Specifically, the Chief Attorney opined that this would violate the wall of
separation between the Church and the State. Certainly while the
recommendations of the Chief Attorney, and even of the Court Administrator,
are given due consideration, they are nonetheless not binding on the
Supreme Court. How the Constitution should be applied in a matter involving
the administration of our courts is a matter that ultimately lies within the
province of the Supreme Court. While recommendations of the Court
Administrator and Chief Attorney are important, they are not definitive. This
Court determines for itself what the rule is.
To facilitate our discussion, we repeat the facts of this case. There
exists a practice among certain Catholic employees of attending mass within
the Quezon City Hall of Justice. It appears that attendance in the mass is
purely voluntary and there has been no official institutionalization of the
practice by virtue of any act from any of the officials of the courts in Quezon
City. In other words, this case involves a group of employees who have
decided to come together at assigned hours during the workweek to practice
their faith. It also appears from the records that these Catholic masses are
allowed only during lunch break and for a period of 30 minutes. There is a
designated area in the basement of the Quezon City Hall of Justice for this
activity. There are religious icons and objects displayed during the mass.
There is no proof that these masses have affected the delivery of public
service or disrupted judges and employees in their work. There is no proof
that the Quezon City trial courts have spent money to support the Catholic
masses being held or that it has made a policy to actively provide resources
for the continuous conduct of this religious activity. There is no showing that
the specific area has been made exclusive for the use of the Catholic
employees. There is also no indication that other employees who are non-
Catholics are prevented from practicing their faith within the premises. In
fact, Executive Judge Lutero explains that Muslim employees are allowed to
pray while Christians are allowed to hold bible studies in their offices.
Mr. Valenciano would have us put an end to this activity on the ground
that our acquiescence to this practice amounts to a violation of the
Establishment Clause. I find that no violation exists.
At the risk of repetition, the responsible officials in the Quezon City Hall
of Justice never ordered the holding of the Catholic masses. Instead, the
Catholic court employees themselves decided to organize the activity. The
trial courts never officially sanctioned these Catholic masses nor have they
actively supported it. It is quite a stretch to insist that though the trial courts
have not been officially participating at all in any of these activities, they are
endorsing the Catholic faith.
Further, there can be no endorsement of the Catholic faith when the
masses are not being held to send a religious message to the public.
Attending a Catholic mass is a central tenet in the Catholic faith. The
Catholic court employees who regularly go to mass do not do so to
communicate a message but for purely personal reasons between them and
their God. As the Catholic masses are being held during lunch break, there is
little opportunity for litigants and other people visiting the Quezon City Hall
of Justice to actually witness the practice. More importantly, no member of
the public and the non-Catholic employees has been coerced to participate
in the masses.
Moreover, that these Catholic masses are being held within the Quezon
City Hall of Justice is, by no means, an indication that the trial court endorses
Catholicism. For as long as these Catholic masses are not being used to
discriminate against any other religion or against the choice to believe, the
Quezon City trial courts' acquiescence ought not to be interpreted as
endorsing a religion. Rather, the Quezon City trial courts are simply allowing
people of a particular faith to practice it. In Re: Request of Muslim
Employees, we allowed our Muslim employees to hold office within flexible
hours during the period of Ramadan. We have pursued a policy of creating a
work environment where our employees may be free to worship as they see
fit, the only limitation being that public service is not prejudiced. As the
Catholic masses in this case are being held during lunch break and only for
30 minutes, the Catholic employees who persist in pursuing the practice of
their faith cannot be said to have sacrificed their duty to serve the public.
I highlight that even the framers of our Constitution began the sessions
of the Constitutional Commission with a prayer. They did not find this open
profession of their faith offensive to the Establishment Clause that they
drafted into constitutional law. We can compare the religious significance of
an opening prayer during the sessions of the Constitutional Commission to
the holding of masses at the Quezon City Hall of Justice premises. If prayer
participated in by the drafters themselves was not deemed as a threat to the
separation of church and state, it escapes reason why a trial court's
acquiescence to the practice of its employees of voluntarily holding mass
during lunch break should be interpreted as constituting a violation. The
drafters of the Constitution have given us a guidepost in exploring the
bounds of the Establishment Clause. We must give life to their intent.
That there are churches near the Quezon City Hall of Justice or that it is
not mandatory in the Catholic faith for its members to attend mass every
day is no reason for this Court to interfere with the religious practice of the
Catholic employees. In the absence of any indication that these masses are
being used to discriminate against non-Catholics and that attendance in
these masses prejudice public service, it is in the best interest of the Court
to allow sufficient public space for the practice of religion. It is not for us to
determine whether the expression of faith of these Catholic employees in
choosing to attend mass every day is unreasonable or excessive. The
manner and frequency by which these Catholic employees choose to express
their faith are matters between them and their God. It is not our place to say
that it is too much or that it is unnecessary. Our duty is to grant permissive
accommodation when there is no breach of the wall of separation.
That Mr. Valenciano and other non-Catholics may be offended by these
Catholic masses is no reason to declare the practice unconstitutional.
Religious tolerance, a doctrine essential to our religious clauses, mandates
that, within the bounds of law, we give space for religion even if to us, it is
unusual or unnecessary. As the United States Supreme Court pronounced in
Town of Greece , offense itself is not sufficient for a finding of
unconstitutionality. We protect speech even if it is offensive as it is essential
to the freedom of speech. The Bill of Rights, in truth, realizes its purpose and
reaffirms its value in instances where what is sought to be protected is the
exercise of a right that does not seem traditional, acceptable, or normal. In
the realm of religion, it is in the lawful practice of religious activities that
may seem odd or unusual that we are challenged, as a society, to further
extend the limits of our religious tolerance. It is in questions like this that we
are called to choose between an interpretation of the law that is humane or
one that is literal, strict, and blind to the dictates of conscience. The
Establishment Clause, as well as the Bill of Rights, speaks to our humanity. It
is this humanity, rather than a blind adherence to an overly literal
interpretation of the law, that must prevail. cSaATC
Further, there is an important secular purpose achieved when

employees are allowed to practice their religion during their free time in the
workplace, under defined restrictions that ensure they do not obstruct their
delivery of public service. The Constitution declares that public office is a
public trust. In Aglipay, we recognized that religion exerts an elevating
influence in human affairs because it instills into human minds the purest
principles of morality. 52 Among the many general concessions
indiscriminately accorded to religious sects and denominations, we declare
certain religious holy days as legal holidays "because of the secular idea that
their observance is conducive to beneficial moral results." 53 Allowing the
faithful among public servants to hear mass in the workplace, insofar as it
renews in them daily their desire to achieve the highest principles of
morality, can only better equip them to meet their secular obligation to be at
all times accountable to the people. That other public servants may draw
their sense of morality from other faiths, or no religion at all, or find no need
for any morality to define or guide their discharge of the public trust, is of no
moment. This is what religious tolerance is all about.
The Supreme Court not only dispenses justices through decisions, we
also have the obligation to manage our human resources. The same is true
for lower courts. Part of our duty as administrators and managers is to
motivate our employees, maximize their skills, and create a work
environment that encourages them to do their best in the service of the
public. This is the reason why we organize sports fests, celebrations, and
events within our premises and support our employees' decision to form
groups that cater to their interests. When our employees feel that we look
after their interests and well-being, they are motivated to work harder and to
choose to stay in the judiciary.
From this management perspective, allowing Catholic employees to
group together in prayer and in Catholic masses serves an important human
resources purpose. By choosing to allow Catholic masses instead of stifling
them, these Catholic employees are made to feel that their spiritual well-
being, on a non-discriminatory basis, is important to the Judiciary. At the
same time, the Court, as administrator, must emphasize that all religions
represented within the Judiciary are free to express their religious beliefs,
provided they similarly do not interfere with public service and do not coerce
others to participate. In the same vein, non-believers can pursue their own
interests without prejudice or bias against them. In a very real sense,
choosing not to interfere with what employees decide to do in their free
time, whether it is to attend mass, pray, or participate in sports activities,
provided it does not affect their work and the delivery of public service,
carries an important secular purpose. It creates a satisfying working
environment for our employees who can then perform their work with better
efficiency.
Thus, while Justice Leonen argues that our decision to allow the
Catholic masses provided they do not interfere with public service violates
Section 29 of Article VI of the Constitution, I view the matter differently. This
is not a circumstance where the Judiciary is consciously or purposively
designating a particular public property for religious purposes. This is, in
truth, a matter of allowing employees to pursue an activity that, while it may
relate to religion, ultimately benefits the interest of the Judiciary. It ensures
that we keep employee morale high and reaffirms that we care enough
about our employees and their spiritual pursuits.
Further, there is no breach of the proscription against using public
property to benefit a religion. I see no distinction between allowing
employees to group together to attend mass in the Quezon City Hall of
Justice in their free time and allowing them to use their workspace to pray,
which Justice Leonen concedes in his dissent as valid. These two situations
involve similar religious acts done in government property. It is not as if we
allowed or funded the construction of a particular portion of the Quezon City
Hall of Justice for the sole purpose of allowing Catholic Masses to be held
there. The Quezon City Hall of Justice's basement remains to be an area
dedicated for the use of the courts. That it sometimes becomes a venue, for
a brief thirty-minute period during lunch break, of the activities of certain
employees does not change the situation into one where the judiciary is
allotting a public property for the benefit of a religion.
I note, however, that the matter of the display of Catholic images may
be a different matter. I agree with the recommendation of the Court
Administrator that Catholic images used for the Catholic mass must not be
permanently stationed in the area. This is to avoid any impression that the
Quezon City Trial Courts are endorsing a particular religion by allowing the
building of a chapel exclusive for the use of Catholic employees. There is
here a greater danger that we become entangled in the religious practice of
Catholicism as well as greater likelihood that we be misconstrued to espouse
Catholicism as a favored religion. This threatens to breach the wall of
separation, and thus must be avoided.
To ensure that no espousal or sponsoring of the Catholic faith arises
out of this case, the Executive Judges of the Regional Trial Court and
Municipal Trial Court of Quezon City should be allowed to regulate the time,
place, and manner of the holding of the Catholic masses at the Quezon City
Hall of Justice. While the Catholic mass is traditionally held during lunch
break at the basement of the Quezon City Hall of Justice, the Executive
Judges of the trial courts should retain the authority to order its transfer to
another area or its conduct at another time before or after office hours,
when public service so demands.

Allowing Executive Judges to regulate the time, place, and manner of
the Catholic masses by no means leads to excessive entanglement by the
government in religious matters.
Excessive entanglement is part of a three part-test now known as the
Lemon Test first used by the United States Supreme Court in Lemon v.
Kurtzman. 54 Lemon involves the constitutionality of government aid to
church-related elementary and secondary schools. To resolve the
constitutional question presented before it, the United States Supreme Court
applied a three-part test. A law which involves direct contact with religion is
valid if, first, it has a secular legislative purpose. Second, the law's principal
and primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion.
Third, the law must not foster an "excessive government entanglement with
religion." 55 As to the third part of the test, now famously known as the
excessive entanglement test, Lemon identified the criteria that make a law
or government act one that excessively entangles the State in church affairs.
These criteria are the "character and purposes of the institutions that are
benefited, the nature of the aid that the State provides, and the resulting
relationship between the government and religious authority." 56
In Lemon, the United States Supreme Court found that the government
aid granted to church-related schools led to excessive entanglement. It
found that the schools that stood to benefit from the financial aid were
characterized by "substantial religious activity and purpose." Further, it
involved aid to schools where two-thirds of the teachers were nuns and the
students were of an impressionable age. Furthermore, even when the law
involved provided for means so that the State may ensure that no religious
teaching is encouraged, these means would inevitably excessively entangle
the government in religious matters. 57
Nevertheless, Lemon recognized that "[s]ome relationship between
government and religious organizations is inevitable." Thus, it held that "
[f]ire inspections, buildings and zoning regulations, and state requirements
under compulsory school attendance laws are examples of necessary and
permissible contacts." 58
In later cases where the United States Supreme Court found the need
to apply the Lemon Test, the issue usually revolved around the grant of
government aid to particular institutions or activities. Thus, the question of
excessive entanglement can be said to arise when the circumstances pertain
to a positive government act affecting identified beneficiaries.
In my view, there can be no talk of excessive entanglement in a case
as the one before us where the judiciary, in fact, does nothing to directly
support any religious organization. The issue presented to us by Mr.
Valenciano's letter is whether we must allow the Catholic masses voluntarily
held by Catholic employees in their own free time or interfere in their
religious practice because these are offensive to non-Catholics. There is no
direct government action or policy involved. As Lemon teaches, there is a
whale of a difference between excessive entanglement and necessary and
permissible contact.
Moreover, even if we gratuitously assume that there is a question of
excessive entanglement in this case, we can proceed to look at the criteria
set forth in Lemon and arrive at the conclusion that no excessive
entanglement exists.
First, as to the nature and character of the beneficiaries, allowing the
Catholic masses does not benefit one particular religion. Allowing employees
to practice their faith in the matter they deem fit, provided it does not
interfere with their work and the freedom of religion of other employees,
contributes to their well-being as our employees and is ultimately beneficial
to us. cHDAIS
Second, as to the nature of the aid granted. The facts show that there
truly is no aid being given by the judiciary in allowing the Catholic masses.
The Quezon City trial courts have not required any attendance in the
masses. They have not spent government funds for these activities. They
have refused to dedicate any particular portion of the Quezon City Hall of
Justice to these religious pursuits.
Third, the conduct of these Catholic masses creates no relationship
between the judiciary and the Catholic Church. Even if the Executive Judges
are to regulate the time, place, and manner of the conduct of these masses,
any entanglement is so de minimis and by no stretch of the imagination can
it be deemed as excessive. This is similar to zoning regulations which the
United States Supreme Court held in Lemon as permissible contact between
the State and the church. To assume that ascertaining whether the
basement of the Quezon City Hall of Justice is available on lunch time for the
conduct of a particular group of employees' activity will lead to excessive
entanglement and will distract our judges from their duty is presumptuous
and unfair. It assumes that our judges are incapable of so minimal a task as
determining whether the activity of a group of Catholic employees may be
held on a particular place in the Quezon City Hall of Justice on a particular
day without immersing themselves in religious protestations. It also assumes
that our judges are so easily distracted so as to be unable to dispense justice
whenever they are saddled with minor administrative concerns.
In truth, the question asked of us in this case is whether we should
leave the Catholic employees in the Quezon City Hall of Justice to practice
their faith in the manner they seem fit or whether we should interfere with
their voluntary and private activity because it might be offensive to other
people of a different religion or those with none at all. Our Constitution
compels us to rule that we must let these employees be. There is no
constitutional duty to prevent them from holding these masses. That it
offends non-participants who may happen to witness the event is not a
constitutionally recognized ground for regulating religious freedom. That
some of us may not like something does not mean that we should stop it
because it offends our sensibilities. The Constitution deals in matters far
more important than our feelings and sentiments. It deals with fundamental
freedoms that cannot be trifled with, much less on the basis of our personal
biases.

Thus, I submit that the Catholic Mass regularly held at the Quezon City
Hall of Justice should be allowed to continue subject to the conditions
prescribed by the Office of the Court Administrator.
I vote to deny the prayer in Mr. Valenciano's letter. I agree with the
ponencia that the Catholic masses and other religious practices in the
Quezon City Hall of Justice should be allowed subject to regulation.
LEONEN, J., dissenting:
"Imagine there's no countries, it isn't hard to do.

Nothing to kill or die for, and no religion, too. Imagine all
the people living life in peace. . ."
— Lennon, John. "Imagine."
Imagine. Ascot, 1971. Vinyl.
"But Jesus, aware of their malice, said, 'Why put me to the test, you
hypocrites? Show me the money for the tax.' And they brought him a
coin. And Jesus said to them, 'Whose likeness and inscription is this?'
They said, 'Caesar's.' Then he said to them, 'Render therefore to
Caesar the things that are Caesar's, and to God the things
that are God's.' When they heard it, they marveled; and they
left him and went away."
— Matthew 22:15-22 1
Tolerating and allowing court personnel to hold and celebrate daily
masses within public Halls of Justice is a clear violation of the Constitutional
prohibition against the State's establishment of a religion. It has no secular
purpose other than to benefit and, therefore, promote a religion. It has the
effect of imposing an insidious cultural discrimination against those whose
beliefs may be different. Religious rituals should be done in churches,
chapels, mosques, synagogues, and other private places of worship.
To provide that all faiths of all denominations may likewise avail of the
same public space within courts of law is a painful illusion. Apart from
violating Sections 5 and 29 (2) of Article III of the Constitution, it is a
privilege that is not available to those who profess non-belief in any god or
whose conviction is that the presence or absence of god is unknowable. It
likewise undermines religious faiths, which fervently believe that rituals that
worship icons and symbols are contrary to their conception of god.
Furthermore, the majority opinion invites judges to excessively
entangle themselves with religious institutions and worship. Decisions on the
duration, frequency, decorations, and other facets of religious rituals are not
judicial functions. This also should certainly not be a governmental one.
By holding daily Catholic masses or any religious ritual within court
premises, courts unnecessarily shed their impartiality. It weakens our
commitment to protect all religious beliefs.
I
Mr. Tony Q. Valenciano (Mr. Valenciano) wrote this Court in 2009 2 and
again, in 2010, 3 questioning the practice of holding Roman Catholic masses
at the basement of the Quezon City Hall of Justice. He submitted that the
basement floor of the court of law was practically converted into a Roman
Catholic chapel, with religious icons permanently displayed, in violation of
the separation of church and State 4 and the constitutional prohibition on the
appropriation of public money for the benefit of a sect, church,
denomination, or any other system of religion. 5
Mr. Valenciano's letters were indorsed to Executive Judge Fernando T.
Sagun, Jr. (Executive Judge Sagun, Jr.) of the Regional Trial Court and
Executive Judge Caridad W. Lutero (Executive Judge Lutero) of the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City for comment. 6 The Executive Judges
shared the view that there was nothing constitutionally infirm in celebrating
daily masses at the Quezon City Hall of Justice during lunch break.
Executive Judge Sagun, Jr.'s Comment 7 discussed the measures
already implemented to address Mr. Valenciano's specific complaints, such
as the shortening of masses to 30 minutes. For her part, Executive Judge
Lutero maintained that court personnel must be allowed to freely exercise
their respective religions:
The undersigned finds no reason to discontinue the masses being
held at the basement since they do not disturb the proceedings of the
court and are held during lunch break. As we all know, the Roman
Catholics express their worship through the holy mass and to
stop these would be tantamount to repressing the right of
those holding the masses to the free exercise of their
religion. Our Muslim brethren who are government employees
are allowed to worship their Allah even during office hours
inside their own offices. The Seventh Day Adventists are
exempted from rendering Saturday duty because their
religion prohibits them from working on a Saturday. Even
Christians have been allowed to conduct their own bible
studies in their own offices. All these have been allowed in
respect of the worker's right to the free exercise of their
religion. I therefore see no reason why we should stop our Catholic
brethrens (sic) from exercising their religion during lunch breaks. 8
(Emphases provided)
The views of Executive Judges Sagun, Jr. and Lutero are inconsistent
with the view of the Office of the Chief Attorney.
In a September 12, 2003 Memorandum for Chief Justice Hilario G.
Davide, Jr., the Office of the Chief Attorney recommended to deny, on
constitutional grounds, the request of Rev. Fr. Carlo M. Ilagan to hold a one-
day vigil in honor of Our Lady of Caysasay within the premises of this Court.
Said the Office of the Chief Attorney:
[T]he Court is not an ordinary government department. It is the
recognized bulwark of justice and the rule of law, with its much
vaunted independence, impartiality, and integrity. It thus behooves
the Court to consider the constitutional and legal issues surrounding
the request for the conduct in its premises of vigil for a religious
image.
Article II of the Constitution declares, as one of the policies of
the State, the inviolability of the separation of Church and State. ISHCcT
In consonance therewith, the Bill of Rights of the Constitution

states:
Sec. 5. No law shall be made respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious
profession and worship, without discrimination or
preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test
shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights.
This provision is a reproduction of Section 8, Article IV of the
1973 Constitution, and Section 1 (7) of the 1935 Constitution. Its
basic principle regarding religions is the "establishment clause"
provided for in the first sentence of the section. The "establishment
clause" is reiterated in Section 29 (2) of Article VI of the Constitution
in the form of a prohibition against the enactment of laws that
support any religion. Thus:
Sec. 29 (1) . . . .
(2) No public money or property shall be
appropriated, applied, paid, or employed, directly or
indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect,
church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system of
religion, or of any priest, preacher, minister, or other
religious teacher, or dignitary as such, except when such
priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the
armed forces, or to any penal institution, or government
orphanage or leprosarium.
The constitutional provision on religious freedom in the Bill of
Rights has two aspects: freedom of conscience and freedom to
exercise the chosen form of religion. Freedom to believe is absolute
while freedom to act on the belief is not. Conduct remains subject to
regulation and even prohibition for the protection of society.
I n Gerona v. Secretary of Education , the Court, holding that
saluting the flag does not involve a religious ceremony and hence the
requirement that students should attend the flag ceremony does not
violate the religious freedom of Jehovah's Witnesses, likewise said:
. . .But between the freedom of belief and the
exercise of said belief, there is quite a stretch of road to
travel. If the exercise of said religious belief clashes with
the established institutions of society and with the law,
then the former must yield and give way to the latter. The
Government steps in and either restrains said exercise or
even prosecutes the one exercising it.
The overt acts in pursuit of religious belief are thus subject to
regulation by the State.
No case has yet been filed in this Court to restrain an act
similar to the subject of the instant request; neither has there been
an instance when this Office was required to comment on a similar
request. However, an American decision regarding the placing of a
religious item in a courthouse is of persuasive effect as far as this
jurisdiction is concerned.
I n G. County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union,
since 1981 the county of Allegheny had been permitting the Holy
Name Society, a Roman Catholic Church group, to display a crèche in
the County Courthouse during the Christmas holiday season. The
crèche, a visual representation of the nativity scene, was placed at
the Grand Staircase, the most public part of the County Courthouse
which was used as a setting for the county's annual Christmas carol
program. In ruling that the display of the crèche had the effect of
endorsing religious beliefs in violation of the Establishment Clause,
the court said:
. . . There is no doubt, of course, that the crèche itself is
capable of communicating a religious message. . . .
Indeed, the crèche in this lawsuit uses words, as well as
the picture of the nativity scene, to make its religious
meaning unmistakably clear. "Glory to God in the
Highest!" says the angel in the crèche — Glory to God
because of the birth of Jesus. This praise to God in
Christian terms is indisputable religious — indeed
sectarian — just as it is when said in the Gospel or in a
church service.
xxx xxx xxx
Nor does the fact that the crèche was the setting
for the county's annual Christmas carol-program diminish
its religious meaning. First, the carol program in 1986
lasted only from December 3 to December 23 and
occupied at most two hours a day . . . . The effect of the
crèche on those who viewed it when the choirs were not
singing — the vast majority of the time — cannot be
negated by the presence of the choir program. Second,
because some of the carols performed at the site of the
crèche were religious in nature, those carols were more
likely to augment the religious quality of the scene than
to secularize it.
Furthermore, the crèche sits on the Grand
Staircase, the "main" and "most beautiful part" of the
building that is the seat of county government. . . . No
viewer could reasonably think that it occupies this
location without the support and approval of the
government. Thus, by permitting the "display of the
crèche in this particular physical setting,". . . the county
sends an unmistakable message that it supports and
promotes the Christian praise to God that is the crèche's
religious message.
The fact that the crèche bears a sign disclosing its
ownership by a Roman Catholic organization does not
alter this conclusion. On the contrary, the sign simply
demonstrates that the government is endorsing the
religious message of that organization, rather than
communicating a message of its own. But the
Establishment Clause does not limit only the religious
content of the government's own communications. It also
prohibits the government's support and promotion of
religious communications by religious organizations. . . .
Indeed, the very concept of "endorsement" conveys the
sense of promoting someone else's message. Thus, by
prohibiting governmental endorsement of religion, the
Establishment Clause prohibits precisely what occurred
here: the government's lending its support to the
communication of a religious organization's religious
message.
Finally, the county argues that it is sufficient to
validate the display of the crèche on the Grand Staircase
that the display celebrates Christmas, and Christmas is a
national holiday. This argument obviously proves too
much. It would allow the celebration of the Eucharist
inside a courthouse on Christmas Eve. While the county
may have doubts about the constitutional status of
celebrating the Eucharist inside the courthouse under the
government's auspices, . . . this Court does not. The
government may acknowledge Christmas as a cultural
phenomenon, but under the First Amendment it may not
observe it as a Christian holy day by suggesting that
people praise God for the birth of Jesus.
CAacTH
In sum, Lynch teaches that government may

celebrate Christmas in some manner and form, but not in
a way that endorses Christian doctrine. Here, Allegheny
County has transgressed this line. It has chosen to
celebrate Christmas in a way that has the effect of
endorsing a patently Christian message: Glory to God for
the birth of Jesus Christ. Under Lynch, and the rest of our
cases, nothing more is required to demonstrate a
violation of the Establishment Clause. The display of the
crèche in this context, therefore, must be permanently
enjoined.
When the image of Our Lady of Manaoag was once brought to
the Court, it was displayed at the lobby of the second floor of the Old
Supreme Court Building. The choice of that area could not have been
made without the permission of the Court and/or its proper officials.
The vigil conducted entailed praying the rosary, a form of prayer of
Roman Catholics, by groups of employees or by offices scheduled at
an hourly basis. A vigil would thus involve not only the display of a
religious image but the performance of a religious act. Hence, it is
undeniable that the "visit" of the image of Our Lady of Caysasay
would involve likewise the use of the Court's properties, resources,
employees, and official working time.
There is likewise no denying that should the instant request be
granted, the Court would "endorse" the Roman Catholic religion in
violation of the Constitution. By allowing the "visit" of the image in
the Court, it would convey the message that the Virgin Mother it
represents is, in Fr. Ilagan's words, the "Advocate of Faith," specially
the Roman Catholic Church.

Although it is true that other Christian groups or sects are
allowed to hold Bible-reading and other similar activities within Court
premises, it appears that other religious groups have not made
similar requests for the conduct of their religious services. In the
event that such requests are made, the Court would have to grant
such requests and thus cater to the needs of all religious persuasions,
lest it be charged with favoritism and partiality. Obviously, the grant
of such requests would result in the sacrifice of services that are
needed in the exercise of the Court's constitutional duties and
responsibilities. It is thus high time that the Court clearly defines [a]
policy statement founded on pertinent provisions of the Constitution,
its position regarding the holding of religious practices and activities
in Court premises.
The denial of the instant request on constitutional grounds is
imperative but it must be stressed that such denial does not in any
way reflect the religious fervor or lack of it of the Members of the
Court and its officials and employees who are Roman Catholics. Their
personal beliefs and official acts are distinct and separate.
The denial is likewise impelled by the need to prevent the
cropping up of another issue against the Court that militant non-
Catholics may pick up and raise publicly to the detriment of the Court,
notwithstanding its good faith and intention. 9 (Emphasis in the
original; citations omitted)
II
On the other hand, the Office of the Court Administrator argued for the
dismissal of the complaints of Mr. Valenciano in an August 7, 2014
Memorandum addressed to Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno.
The Office of the Court Administrator recommended that the daily
Roman Catholic masses at the Quezon City Hall of Justice be allowed, subject
to the close regulation and monitoring by the Quezon City Executive Judges
and so long as "(a) the public is not unduly inconvenienced by the exercise
thereof; (b) it does not adversely affect and interrupt the delivery of public
service; and (c) display of religious icons are limited only during the
celebration of such activities so as not to offend the sensibilities of members
of other religious denominations or the non-religious public." 10
In making its recommendations, the Office of the Court Administrator
cited Estrada v. Escritor 11 where this Court, speaking through Justice,
subsequently Chief Justice, Reynato S. Puno, held that the religion clauses of
our Constitution are to be read and interpreted using the benevolent
neutrality approach. The Office of the Court Administrator explained:
[T]he principle of Separation of Church and State, particularly
with reference to the Establishment Clause, ought not to be
interpreted according to the rigid standards of Separation. Rather,
the state's neutrality on religion should be benevolent because
religion is an ingrained part of society and plays an important role in
it. The state therefore, instead of being belligerent (in the case of
Strict Separation) or being aloof (in the case of Strict Neutrality)
toward religion should instead interact and forbear. 12 (Emphasis in
the original)
III
The majority essentially agrees with the recommendation of the Office
of the Court Administrator. According to the majority, our State adopts the
policy of accommodation; that despite the separation of church and State
required by the Constitution, the State may take religion into account in
forming government policies not to favor religion but only to allow its free
exercise. 13 The majority cites as bases Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers
Union, 14 where this Court allowed the exemption of members of Iglesia ni
Cristo from closed shop provisions; and Ebralinag v. Division Superintendent
of Schools of Cebu, 15 where this Court allowed the exemption of members
of Jehovah's Witnesses from observance of the flag ceremony.
In discussing the non-establishment clause, the majority cites Father
Joaquin Bernas (Father Bernas), a Catholic priest:
In effect, what non-establishment calls for is government
neutrality in religious matters. Such government neutrality may be
summarized in four general propositions: (1) Government must not
prefer one religion over another religion or religion over irreligion
because such preference would violate voluntarism and breed
dissension; (2) Government funds must not be applied to religious
purposes because this too would violate voluntarism and breed
interfaith dissension; (3) Government action must not aid religion
because this too can violate voluntarism and breed interfaith
dissension; [and] (4) Government action must not result in excessive
entanglement with religion because this too can violate voluntarism
and breed interfaith dissension. 16
The majority views the holding of daily Roman Catholic masses at the
Quezon City Hall of Justice constitutionally permissible. They see no violation
of the establishment clause because court personnel are not coerced to
attend masses; no government funds are allegedly spent in the exercise of
the religious ritual; the use of the basement for masses was not permanent;
and other religions are allegedly not prejudiced. 17
Thus, the majority disposes of this administrative matter in this wise:
WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to:
1. NOTE the letter-complaints of Mr. Valenciano, dated
January 9, 2009, May 13, 2009, and March 23, 2010;
2. NOTE the 1st Indorsement dated September 21, 2010, by
the Office on Halls of Justice, containing photocopies and
certified photocopies of previous actions made relative to
the complaint;
3. NOTE the Letter-Comment dated September 9, 2010, of
Quezon City Regional Trial Court Executive Judge Fernando
T. Sagun, Jr.;
4. NOTE the undated Letter-Comment of Quezon City
Metropolitan Trial Court Executive Judge Caridad M. Walse-
Lutero;
5. DENY the prayer of Tony Q. Valenciano to prohibit the
holding of religious rituals in the QC Hall of Justice and in all
halls of justice in the country; and
6. DIRECT the Executive Judges of Quezon City to
REGULATE and CLOSELY MONITOR the holding of
masses and other religious practices within the Quezon
City Hall of Justice by ensuring, among others, that:
(a) it does not disturb or interrupt court proceedings;
(b) it does not adversely affect and interrupt the
delivery of public service;
(c) it does not unduly inconvenience the public.
In no case shall a particular part of a public building be a
permanent place for worship for the benefit of any and all religious
groups. There shall also be no permanent display of religious icons in
all Halls of Justice in the country. In case of religious rituals, religious
icons and images may be displayed but their presentation is limited
only during the celebration of such activities so as not to offend the
sensibilities of members of other religious denominations or the non-
religious public. After any religious affair, the icons and images shall
be hidden or concealed from public view.
The disposition in this administrative matter shall apply to all
halls of justice in the country. Other churches and religious
denominations or sects are entitled to the same rights, privileges and
practices in every hall of justice. In other buildings not owned or
controlled by the Judiciary, the Executive Judges should coordinate
and seek approval of the building owners/administrators
accommodating their courts. 18
IV
Allowing the exercise of religious rituals within government buildings
violate both Section 5, Article III and Section 29 (2), Article VI of the
Constitution. IAETDc
Section 5, Article III of the Constitution provides:

Section 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise
and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without
discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious
test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political rights.
This provision articulates two fundamental duties of the State. The first
is to respect the free exercise of any religious faith. The second is not to
establish, endorse, or favor any religion.
The parameters of the duty to respect the free exercise of any religion
manifest in the context of a continuum. On the one hand, freedom to believe
is absolute. On the other, physical manifestations of one's faith in the form
of rituals will largely be tolerated except if they will tend to encroach or
impede into the rights of others. 19
Among those who profess adherence to the Roman Catholic Church,
the Holy Eucharist is not simply a ritual, it is an important sacrament. More
than a symbolism or the occasion to display icons, it requires the active,
collective and public participation of its believers. It will require the presence
of a priest and, while the ritual is ongoing, the prayers and incantations will
be heard beyond the vicinity of its participants.
The offensiveness of this ritual cannot be obvious to those who belong
to this dominant majority religion. It will not be obvious to those who will
continuously enjoy the privilege of consistently hosting this in a government
building charged with the impartial adjudication of the rule of law. The
inability to see how this practice will not square with those who believe
otherwise will especially be because religion is a matter of faith. The
stronger one's faith is, the more tenacious the belief in the conception of
one's god and the correctness of his or her fundamental teachings.
It will take great strides in both humility and sensitivity to understand
that religious practices within government buildings are offensive to those
who do not believe in any of the denominations or sects of Christianity.
Those who do believe in a god but do not practice any ritual that worships
their supernatural being or their deity will also find the allowance of the full
Catholic sacrament of the Holy Eucharist demeaning.
Definitely, the sponsorship of these rituals within the halls of justice will
not be acceptable to atheists, who fervently believe that there is no god; or
to agnostics, who fundamentally believe that the existence of a supernatural
and divine being cannot be the subject of either reason or blind faith.
As correctly underscored by the Chief Attorney, courts are not simply
venues for the resolution of conflict. Our Halls of Justice should symbolize
our adherence to the majesty and impartiality of the rule of law.
Unnecessary sponsorship of religious rituals undermines the primacy of
secular law and its impartiality. It consists of physical manifestations of a
specific kind of belief which can best be done in private churches and
chapels, not in a government building. There is no urgency that it be done in
halls of justice.
V
Justice Jardeleza is of the view that allowing the holding of religious

rituals in our courts is an allowable accommodation under the freedom to
worship clause. Accommodation, also termed "benevolent neutrality," was
extensively discussed in Estrada v. Escritor. 20
I disagree.
The precedent cited is inappropriate. It is also not a binding precedent.
Jurisprudence which provides for exceptions to State regulation is
different from doctrinal support for endorsing a specific religion without a
separate overarching compelling lawful and separate state interest.
Escritor involved an administrative complaint for immorality against
Soledad Escritor, a court interpreter in the Regional Trial Court of Las Piñas,
who cohabited and had a son with a married man. Invoking her religious
freedom, Escritor argued that her conjugal arrangement conformed to the
teachings of the Jehovah's Witnesses, the religious sect to which she
belonged.
After a review of religion cases, the Court in Escritor formulated a two-
part test in resolving cases involving freedom to worship. First, "the spirit,
intent, and framework underlying the religion clauses in our Constitution" 21
is benevolent neutrality or accommodation. Government actions must
neither burden nor facilitate "the exercise of a person's or institution's
religion" 22 and that the State should "exempt, when possible, from generally
governmental regulation individuals, whose religious beliefs and practices
would otherwise thereby be infringed, or to create without state involvement
an atmosphere in which voluntary religious exercise may flourish." 23
Second, there must be a compelling state interest should religious liberty be
burdened. 24
Escritor was ultimately absolved of the immorality charge against her,
but only because the State failed to prove the compelling state interest in
overriding her religious freedom. Escritor therefore involved a state policy
that was apparently neutral and the question as to whether its consistent
application given the ambient facts specific to a religion would violate the
adherent's freedom to worship.
This is not the situation in this administrative matter. Here, we are
asked to create a policy to sponsor religious rituals. There is no neutral state
policy we are asked to interpret. We are asked to create a policy to enable a
specific religion, and others similarly situated, to conduct their rituals within
government space.
Escritor involved accommodation or exceptions to a state policy. In this
administrative matter, we create a policy that benefits a group of religions
that have rituals. It will not benefit believers who do not have public rituals
or a deity. It certainly will not benefit all beliefs including those who profess
to atheism or agnosticism.
Escritor therefore is not the proper precedent.
S i n c e Escritor's promulgation, benevolent neutrality has been
constantly but erroneously quoted as a talisman to erase all legitimate
constitutional objections to religious activity that impinges upon secular
government policy. Yet, in the 2003 Decision, where the two-part test was
formulated, only five Justices fully concurred with Justice Puno's ponencia. 25
Two other Justices wrote separate concurring opinions. 26 There were five
other Justices who dissented, with Justice Carpio leading in the dissent. 27
That benevolent neutrality is even doctrine is, therefore, suspect.
More importantly, benevolent neutrality in reality may turn out to be an
insidious means for those who believe in a majority decision to maintain
their dominance in the guise of neutral tolerance of all religions.
Not all Buddhists have as active, collective, and public a ritual that
requires a public space as Catholics. Agnostics do not practice any ritual.
Opening space in our Halls of Justice for rituals such as the Holy Eucharist in
effect provides further advantage to an already dominant religion. Since the
number of Catholics in Quezon City far outnumbers any other denomination,
the number of requests to make use of public spaces within the Halls of
Justice will likely dwarf any other Christian denomination or religion. This is
true in Quezon City. This is also true in most other Halls of Justice, including
portions of the Supreme Court Compound. Catholic rituals dominate. DcHSEa
Benevolent neutrality in practice, thus, favors the already dominant.

VI
The proscription in Section 5, Article III of the Constitution against the
State's establishment of a religion covers not only official government
communication of its religious beliefs. It likewise generally prohibits support
and endorsement of a religious organization or any of their activities or
rituals.
The non-establishment clause can be appreciated in two basic ways.
First, it can be a corollary to the Constitutional respect given to each
individual's freedom of belief and freedom of exercise of one's religion.
Second, it is also a restatement of the guarantee of equality of each citizen.
That is, that no person shall be discriminated against on the basis of her or
his creed or religious beliefs.
Congealed in this provision is the concept that the Constitution
acknowledges the cultural power of the State. Government's resources, its
reach, and ubiquity easily affect public consciousness. For example, actions
of public officials are regular subjects of media in all its forms. The
statements and actions of public officials easily pervade public deliberation.
They also constitute frames for public debate on either personality or policy.
The rituals and symbolisms of government not only educate the public
but also etch civic and constitutional values into mainstream culture. The
flag for instance, reminds us of our colorful history. Flag ceremonies instill
passionate loyalty to the republic and the values for which it stands. Halls of
Justice consist of buildings to remind the public that their cases are given
equal importance. The arrangement of bench and bar within our courtrooms
exhibits the majesty of the law by allowing the judicial occupants to tower
over the advocates to a cause. This arrangement instills the civic value that
no one's cause will be above the law: that no matter one's creed or belief, all
will be equal.
Any unnecessary endorsement, policy, or program that privileges,
favors, endorses, or supports a religious practice or belief per se therefore
would be constitutionally impermissible. It communicates a policy that
contrary beliefs are not so privileged, not so favored, not so endorsed and
unsupported by the Constitutional order. It implies that those whose creeds
or whose faiths are different may not be as part of the political community
as the other citizens who understand the rituals that are supported. It is to
install discrimination against minority faiths or even against those who do
not have any faith whatsoever.
There is no urgency in holding masses within the Halls of Justice. The
Catholic Church owns many elegant places of worship. There are churches
and chapels accessible to court personnel in the Quezon City Hall of Justice
during their lunch hour. There are some, which are walking distance from
their offices.
Allowing masses to be held within Halls of Justice therefore have no
other purpose except to allow a sect, or religious denomination to express its
beliefs. The primary purpose of the policy that is favored by the majority of
this Court is not secular in nature, but religious. This is contrary to the
existing canons of our Constitutional law.
Section 5, Article III does not allow the endorsement by the State of
any religion. The only exception would be if such incidental endorsement of
a religious exercise is in the context of a governmental act that satisfies the
following three-part test: it has a "secular legislative purpose"; 28 "its
primary effect [is] that [which] neither advances nor inhibits religion"; 29 and
that it "must not foster 'an excessive entanglement with religion.'" 30
In Aglipay v. Ruiz, 31 this Court allowed the issuance of postage stamps
with a Philippine map and an indication that the City of Manila was the seat
of the Roman Catholic Church's Eucharistic Congress in 1937. The Court held
that "while the issuance and sale of the stamps in question may be said to
be inseparably linked with an event of a religious character, the resulting
propaganda, if any, received by the Roman Catholic Church, was not the aim
and purpose of the Government." 32 In Aglipay, the legitimate public purpose
was to boost the country's tourism, not to celebrate religion. The Court found
that the principal purpose was secular. The religious benefit was also
considered to be incidental.
There is no duration, degree of convenience, or extent of following that
justifies any express or implied endorsement of any religious message or
practice. There is also no type of endorsement allowed by the provision. It is
sufficient that the State, through its agents, favors expressly or impliedly a
religious practice.
The majority opinion cites Father Bernas in discussing the non-
establishment clause. Unfortunately, Father Bernas, even as a celebrated
author in Constitutional law, is not the Supreme Court. Neither are his
statements precedents for purposes of this Court. He is also a Catholic priest
and therefore his opinions on the impact of law on religion should be taken
with a lot of advisement.
Furthermore, directing our Executive Judges to regulate and closely
monitor the holding of masses and other religious practices within our courts
promotes excessive entanglements 33 between courts and various religions.
This close monitoring will result in an unnecessary interaction between the
church and the State. It will take time from our Executive Judges, who,
instead of monitoring the holding of religious rituals, could otherwise be
performing their secular functions such as reducing court dockets. They will
be asked to arbitrate between religions.
VII
Justices De Castro 34 and Jardeleza 35 take a contrary view. For them,
allowing our employees to hold religious rituals in our Halls of Justice serves
"a human resource purpose" 36 in that "it renews in [our employees] daily
their desire to achieve the highest principles of morality [which] can only
better equip them to meet their secular obligation to be at all times
accountable to the people." 37
Unfortunately, this is a rationalization which benefits only those who
are of the same faith for which the rituals will be conducted. It does not
apply to those who do not share in the same beliefs. The non-establishment
clause does not protect those that believe in the religion that is favored,
privileged, endorsed, or supported. It is supposed to protect those that may
be in the minority. The alleged secular purpose of the Holy Mass therefore
only benefits Catholics. It does not apply to a Buddhist, a Taoist, an atheist,
or an agnostic.
Any moralizing effect of religion notwithstanding, religion should
correctly remain to be "a private matter for the individual, the family, and
the institutions of private choice." 38 As Justice Jardeleza points out, setting
and context determine whether the use of a religious symbol effectively
endorses a religious belief. 39 There is no violation of the establishment
clause if we allow an employee to privately pray the rosary within the
confines of his or her workspace. 40
The case is different, however, if the religious ritual is collectively and
publicly performed. Our Halls of Justice were not built for religious purposes.
Allowing the performance of religious rituals in our Halls of Justice runs
roughshod over the rights of non-believing employees and other litigants
who, for non-religious purposes, are present in the courthouse but are
involuntarily exposed to the religious practice.
Moreover, the purpose and goal of our secular laws and service to our
people should be enough motivation for all public officers to do their best in
their jobs. To provide the public space for a supposedly private matter like
religion, in the name of morality, is not what the Constitution concedes.
If rituals for any religion serve any human resource incentive, so
should any form of non-belief, be it in the form of atheism or agnosticism. It
does not make sense for a state to favor any religious ritual yet at the same
time accommodate citizens, who fervently believe that rituals should never
be done.
VIII
More specific to the prohibition against the establishment of a religion

are the provisions in the second paragraph of Section 29, Article VI of the
Constitution:
Section 29.
xxx xxx xxx
(2) No public money or property shall be appropriated,
applied, paid, or employed, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit,
or support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution, or
system of religion, or of any priest, preacher, minister, or other
religious teacher, or dignitary as such, except when such priest,
preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces, or to
any penal institution, or government orphanage or leprosarium.
(Emphasis supplied) SCaITA
The Constitution specifically prohibits public property from being

"employed for the benefit or support of any sect, church, denomination,
sectarian institution or system of religion."
This provision allows for no qualification. Allowing Catholic masses to
be celebrated daily within the Halls of Justice definitely employs public
property for the "benefit or support" of the Catholic religion. Catholicism is a
"church," "denomination," and a "system of religion."
The majority believes that Section 29 (2), Article VI of the Constitution
"contemplates a scenario where the appropriation is primarily intended for
the furtherance of a particular church." 41 In interpreting the provision, the
majority deploys the statutory interpretative device labelled as noscitur a
sociis — the doctrine of associated words — and examined the definitions of
"appropriate" and "apply" mentioned before "use" and "employ" in the
provision. Based on the definitions in Black's Law Dictionary, "appropriate"
and "apply" are similarly done for a particular purpose. 42 The ponencia then
concluded that "use" and "employ," associated with "appropriate" and
"apply," must similarly be done for a particular purpose, specifically, to
benefit a particular religion. 43
I do not agree with this interpretation. It implies that the religious use
or employment of public property is allowable so long as other religious
groups may use or employ the property.
Section 29 (2), Article VI of the Constitution is straightforward and
needs no statutory construction. The religious use of public property is
proscribed in its totality. This proscription applies to any religion. This is
especially so if the accommodation for the use of public property is
principally, primarily, and exclusively only for a religious purpose.
This holistic interpretation of the Constitution is more sensitive to
those who disbelieve — the agonistics and the atheists — who are equally
protected under the Constitution. It is also more sensitive to the concept that
the state remains neutral in matters pertaining to faith: that no institutional
religion, due to their dominance or resources, may have any form of
advantage over another act of religious belief.
IX
The other cases cited by the majority do not involve the non-
establishment clause. Rather, the cases involve exceptions to a secular
policy.
Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers Union 44 challenged the
applicability of the closed shop provisions to Members of Iglesia ni Cristo.
The closed shop provisions were meant to further the State's protection to
labor through collective negotiations. The petitioner in that case alleged that
the means through which the purpose was to be achieved interferes with the
exercise of his religion. That case did not involve allowance for any religious
ritual within public property for the convenience of its adherents.
Ebralinag v. Division Superintendent of Schools of Cebu 45 examined
the plea of a group of students who adhered to the tenets of the Jehovah's
Witnesses to be exempted from certain gestures during the flag ceremony.
L i ke Escritor and Victoriano, Ebralinag pursued a secular governmental
interest. Religion, thus, only becomes significant as a basis to seek
exemption to its application.
Allowing religious rituals within the Halls of Justice is not supported by
these cases. Allowing the celebration of Roman Catholic masses within court
premises definitely is not occasioned by a need to relieve their faithful from
any burdensome effect. This case involves the State, through its employees,
allowing the practice of religious rituals with no other purpose except to
practice religious rituals in a public space. This cannot be done.
X
The Constitution guarantees liberty for those who choose to believe in
a god. It does not, however, sanction insensibilities towards those who
believe otherwise. The Constitution is also a guarantee that those who
profess a dominant religion do not, in fact and in reality, further dominate
our government spaces with their rituals or messages.
The non-establishment clause is the normative protection that ensures
and mandates tolerance. It is meant to sharpen the sensitivity of those who
are powerful so that they understand the point of view of others who have
different beliefs. It is a sovereign command that those who hold important
public offices — such as judges and justices — be conscious that their
fervent personal and religious beliefs should not be mirrored in the doctrines
and results of their cases.
Projecting the verses of Catholic prayers in a public building, using
powerful sound systems to proclaim one's faith, selecting a space in the
center of a Hall of Justice where the rituals resonate will not be obviously
offensive to Catholics in the majority. However, it is utter callousness to say
that it will offend no one. It causes discomfort to all those who will pass and
do not share or have objections to the teachings broadcast in the Holy
Eucharist. It offends those who believe that the State should endeavor to be
neutral and impartial and avoid situations where this will be compromised.
Certainly, there is no urgent and compelling need to allow a certain
sect to exercise their rituals within the Halls of Justice on a regular basis.
There are churches, chapels, mosques, synagogues, and private spaces
available for worship.
"Benevolent neutrality" to render state regulation impotent in a
situation where a religion dominates becomes a painful illusion to those at
the margins of our society. For this Court to adopt this façade is to reward
the dominant. It is to maintain the status quo and reify the hegemony of
those who have power. This will not be lost to those that pass our Halls of
Justice.
To reward the dominant would be to further ensure divisiveness,
distrust, and intolerance. It will ultimately result in the accommodation of
fundamentalist views embedded in popular religions. The marginalized will
perceive no succor in the system. They will see no opening and no space for
their own freedoms. Religious rituals in our Halls of Justice, no matter the
justification, breed contempt for the impartiality of the Rule of Law.
The faiths which anchor our Constitution are diverse. It should not be
the monopoly of any sect. The diversity mandated by our Constitution
deepens our potentials as sovereigns. To favor a belief system in a divine
being therefore, in any shape, form, or manner, is to undermine the very
foundations of our legal order.
The Constitution does mention god. It may be that the divine is the
Judeo-Christian God. It may be that it is Allah of Islam or Yahweh of the Jews.
The god may not be theistic and may simply be the Dharma of the
Buddhists. It may also not be a divinity but reasoned secularism as
advocated by the most militant Atheists.
It may also be a god that is so secure in itself that it does not require
any kind of religious rituals, just the humility of not imposing one's belief on
others.
Except for our own individual consciences, we are not competent to
make these religious judgments as Supreme Court Justices. Certainly, it is
not within our constitutional mandate to favor one over the other in any
manner.
There is no reason for the Holy Eucharist to be celebrated in our Halls
of Justice. Catholic churches are ubiquitous. Should the faithful among our
judges and employees find the need to worship, I am of the belief that they
should practice the compassion for others and the virtue for humble sacrifice
taught by no less than Jesus Christ himself. Thus, they should muster the
patience to walk to the closest church and there to fervently pray for more
humility and a socially just and tolerant society.
The same doctrine applies for all other religions.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to NOTE the letter-complaints of Mr.
Valenciano, dated January 9, 2009, May 13, 2009, and March 23, 2010 and
GRANT his request to disallow the holding of daily Roman Catholic masses,
or any other religious ritual, at the basement of the Quezon City Hall of
Justice.
Footnotes
1. Rollo , pp. 20-22.
2. Id. at 2.
3. Id. at 23.
4. Id. at 28-30.
5. Id. at 31-33.
6. Id. at 3.
7. Id. at 34.
8. Id. at 6-7.
9. Id. at 8.
10. Id. at 10-12.

11. Id. at 13-16.
12. Id. at 52-67.
13. Id. at 60.
14. Id. at 61-62.
15. Id. at 62.
16. Id. at 63.

17. Const. (1987), Article II, Sec. 6.
18. Aglipay v. Ruiz, 64 Phil. 201, 205 (1937).
19. Cruz, Philippine Political Law (2002), p. 68.
20. 732 Phil. 1 (2014).
21. Supra note 18.
22. Id. at 206-207.
23. Islamic Da'wah Council of the Philippines, Inc. v. Executive Secretary, 453 Phil.
440, 449 (2003). [Citations omitted]
24. Cruz, Constitutional Law (2007), p. 188.
25. Cruz, Constitutional Law (2007), pp. 188-189.
26. Rollo , p. 14.

27. 455 Phil. 411, 577-588 (2006).
28. Re: Request of Muslim Employees in the Different Courts in Iligan City (Re:
Office Hours), 514 Phil. 31, 40 (2005).
29. See Cruz, Constitutional Law (2007), p. 189.
30. Estrada v. Escritor, supra note 27, at 522-523.

31. 158 Phil. 60 (1974).
32. G.R. No. 95770, March 1, 1993, 219 SCRA 256.
33. Rollo , p. 61.
34. Supra note 28.
35. Section 5, Article III, 1987 Constitution.
36. Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1.
37. Bernas, the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines, 2009 Ed., p. 345.
38. Imbong v. Ochoa , supra note 20.
39. Bernas, the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines, 2009 Ed., p. 346.
40. Black's Law Dictionary (Fifth Ed.), p. 91.
41. Black's Law Dictionary (Fifth Ed.), p. 93.
42. Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council, 691 Phil. 173, 200 (2012).
43. Cruz Philippine Political Law (2002), pp. 174-175.

44. Francisco v. House of Representatives, 460 Phil. 830, 886 (2003).
45. Section 28 (3), Art. VI, 1987 Constitution.
46. 322 Phil. 442 (1996).
47. Id. at 453.
48. Supra note 18, at 209-210.
49. Rollo , p. 63.
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J., concurring:

1. 1987 Constitution, Article II, Section 6. "The separation of Church and State shall
be inviolable."
2. "No public money or property shall ever be appropriated, applied, paid, or
employed, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect,
church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion, or of any
priest, preacher, minister, or other religious teacher, or dignitary as such,
except when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the
armed forces, or to any penal institution, or government orphanage or
leprosarium."
3. OCA Memorandum dated August 7, 2014, pp. 4-5.
4. Id. at 5-6.
5. Id. at 7-9.
6. 525 Phil. 110 (2006).
7. OCA Memorandum dated August 7, 2014, p. 9.
8. Id. at 13.
9. Id. at 15-16.
10. J. Leonen, Dissenting Opinion, p. 3.
11. 106 Phil. 2 (1959).

12. G.R. Nos. 95770 & 95887, March 1, 1993, 219 SCRA 256, 271-272.
13. 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
14. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
15. 455 Phil. 411 (2003).
16. Lynch v. Donnelly, supra note 14.
17. Supra note 15.

18. Supra note 10 at 11-13.
19. Supra note 15.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. 101 Phil. 386, 398 (1957).
23. Supra note 15.
24. 64 Phil. 201, 206 (1937).

25. Estrada v. Escritor, supra note 15 at 571.
26. Id. at 569-573.
27. Id. at 575-576.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 578.
JARDELEZA, J., concurring:

1. Town of Greece v. Galloway, 12-696, May 5, 2014.
2. School Dist. of Abington Tp. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 308 (1963), Justice
Goldberg, concurring.
3. Re: Request of Muslim Employees in the Different Courts in Iligan City (Re: Office
Hours), A.M. No. 02-2-10-SC, December 14, 2005, 477 SCRA 648, 655-656,
citing Justice Isagani A. Cruz, Constitutional Law (1995).
4. G.R. No. 119673, July 26, 1996, 259 SCRA 529.

5. Id. at 547.
6. Estrada v. Escritor, A.M. No. P-02-1651, June 22, 2006, 492 SCRA 1, 33.
7. Estrada v. Escritor, A.M. No. P-02-1651, August 4, 2003, 408 SCRA 1.
8. 64 Phil. 201 (1937).
9. Id. at 209.
10. Id. at 206-207.
11. G.R. No. L-9637, 101 Phil. 386 (1957).

12. Id. at 398-399.
13. G.R. No. L-25246, September 12, 1974, 59 SCRA 54.
14. Id. at 73; citations omitted; emphasis ours.
15. G.R. No. 95770, March 1, 1993, 219 SCRA 256.
16. 106 Phil. 2 (1959).
17. Ebralinag v. The Division Superintendent of Schools of Cebu City, supra at 270.
18. Iglesia Ni Cristo v. Court of Appeals, supra note 4.
19. Id. at 535.
20. Id. at 547.

21. Id.
22. Supra note 3.
23. Id. at 657.
24. Supra note 7.
25. 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
26. Estrada v. Escritor, supra note 7 at 118-119; Zorach v. Clauson , supra at 312.
27. Supra note 7 at 133.
28. G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014, 721 SCRA 146.
29. G.R. No. L-68828, March 27, 1985, 135 SCRA 514.
30. G.R. No. 190582, April 8, 2010, 618 SCRA 32.
31. Id. at 59.
32. Estrada v. Escritor, supra note 7 at 106.
33. Imbong v. Ochoa, Jr., supra note 28 at 334.

34. Id.
35. 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
36. Supra note 1.
37. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
38. 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
39. Marsh v. Chambers , supra note 35 at 790.
40. Town of Greece v. Galloway, supra note 1.

41. Lynch v. Donnelly, supra note 37 at 674; citations omitted.
42. Id. at 669.
43. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
44. Supra note 38.
45. 2015 Philippine Statistical Yearbook, Philippine Statistics Authority, October
2015, <https://psa.gov.ph/sites/default/files/2015%20PSY%20PDF.pdf>
(visited November 28, 2016).
46. I RECORD, CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION (June 11, 1986).
47. RULES OF COURT, Rule 136, Sec. 1.
48. 545 U.S. 677 (2005).

49. See Supreme Court Human Resources Manual, 2012, p. xiv.
The Ecumenical Prayer for the Courts
"Almighty God, we stand in Your holy presence as our Supreme Judge. We
humbly beseech You to bless and inspire us so that what we think, say, and
do will be in accordance with Your will. Enlighten our minds, strengthen our
spirit, and fill our hearts with fraternal love, wisdom and understanding, so
that we can be effective channels of truth, justice, and peace. In our
proceedings today, guide us in the path of righteousness for the fulfillment of
Your greater glory. Amen."
50. Supreme Court Memorandum Circular No. 001-2001.
Centennial Prayer for the Courts
Almighty God, we stand in Your holy presence as our Supreme Judge. We
humbly beseech You to bless and inspire us so that what we think, say, and
do will be in accordance with Your will.
Enlighten our minds, strengthen our spirit, and fill our hearts with fraternal
love, wisdom and understanding, so that we can be effective channels of
truth, justice, and peace. In our proceedings today, guide us in the path of
righteousness. Amen.
51. New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345 (1921).
52. Supra note 8 at 206.
53. Id.
54. Supra note 43.
55. Id., citing Walz v. Tax Comm'n of City of New York, 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
56. Lemon v. Kurtzman, supra note 43.

57. Id.
58. Id.
LEONEN, J., dissenting:
1. Revised Standard Version Catholic Edition.
2. Rollo , pp. 20-22.
3. Id. at 34.
4. CONST., art. II, sec. 6.
5. CONST., art. VI, sec. 29 (2) provides:
SECTION 29.
xxx xxx xxx
(2) No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid, or
employed, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect,
church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion, or of any
priest, preacher, minister, or other religious teacher, or dignitary as such,
except when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the
armed forces, or to any penal institution, or government orphanage or
leprosarium.
6. Rollo , p. 8.
7. Id. at 10-12.
9. OCAT Memorandum dated September 12, 2013, pp. 2-5.

11. 455 Phil. 411 (2003) [Per J. Puno, En Banc].
13. Ponencia , pp. 12-13.
14. 158 Phil. 60 (1974) [Per J. Zaldivar, En Banc]. Members of Iglesia ni Cristo are
not allowed to affiliate with labor organizations.
15. 292 Phil. 267 (1993) [Per J. Griño-Aquino, En Banc]. Members of Jehovah's
Witnesses believe that saluting the flag, singing the National Anthem, and
reciting the patriotic pledge constitute acts of worship not due to the State.
16. Ponencia , p. 15.
17. Id. at 15-16.
18. Id. at 19-20.
19. Re: Request of Muslim Employees in the Different Courts in Iligan City (Re:
Office Hours), 514 Phil. 31, 38-39 (2005) [Per J. Callejo, Sr., En Banc]; Estrada
v. Escritor , 455 Phil. 411, 537-538 (2003) [Per J. Puno, En Banc]; Centeno v.
Villalon-Pornillos, G.R. No. 113092, September 1, 1994, 236 SCRA 197, 206-
207 [Per J. Regalado, Second Division]; German v. Barangan, 220 Phil. 189,
202 (1985) [Per J. Escolin, En Banc]; Gerona v. Secretary of Education, 106
Phil. 2, 9-10 (1959) [Per J. Montemayor, En Banc].
20. 455 Phil. 411, 506 (2003) [Per J. Puno, En Banc].
21. Id. at 137.

22. Id. at 148.
23. Id. at 148-149.
24. Id. at 137.
25. The ponencia was concurred in by the Chief Justice Davide, Jr., and Associate
Justices Austria-Martinez, Corona, Azcuna, and Tinga.
26. Associate Justices Bellosillo and Vitug.
27. Associate Justices Ynares-Santiago and Carpio wrote their separate dissenting
opinions. Associate Justices Panganiban, Carpio-Morales, and Callejo, Sr.
joined the dissenting opinion of Associate Justice Carpio.
28. Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union , 158 Phil. 60, 83 (1974) [Per J.
Zaldivar, En Banc] citing Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 20 L. ed.
2d, 1060, 88 S. Ct. 1923. See Aglipay v. Ruiz, 64 Phil. 201 (1937) [Per J.
Laurel, En Banc].
29. Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union , 158 Phil. 60, 83 (1974) [Per J.
Zaldivar, En Banc] citing Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 20 L. ed.
2d, 1060, 88 S. Ct. 1923.
30. Estrada v. Escritor, 455 Phil. 411, 506 (2003) [Per J. Puno, En Banc] citing
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613 (1971).
31. 64 Phil. 201 (1937) [Per J. Laurel, First Division].
32. Id. at 209.

33. Estrada v. Escritor, 455 Phil. 411, 506 (2003) [Per J. Puno, En Banc]. In this
case, this Court mentions the concept of "excessive entanglement" which
appears in Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613 (1971). In Lemon v.
Kurtzman, it was noted that the way to determine whether government
entanglement with religion is excessive is by "[examining] the character and
purposes of the institutions that are benefited, the nature of the aid that the
State provides, and the resulting relationship between the government and
the religious authority."
34. Justice de Castro's Concurring Opinion, p. 15, where Justice de Castro stated
that "[i]s religion without any redeeming value or beneficial effect insofar as
public service is concerned?"
35. Justice Jardeleza's Reflections, p. 19.
36. Id. at 20.
37. Id. at 19.

38. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 402 US 613, 625 (1971).
39. Justice Jardeleza's Reflections, p. 12, citing County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492
U.S. 573 (1989).
40. Justice de Castro's Concurring Opinion, p. 15.
41. Id. at 16.

42. Id. The ponencia states:
The word "apply" means "to use or employ for a particular purpose."
"Appropriate" means "to prescribe a particular use for particular moneys or
to designate or destine a fund or property for a distinct use, or for the
payment of a particular demand."
43. Id.
44. 158 Phil. 60 (1974) [Per J. Zaldivar, En Banc].
45. 292 Phil. 267 (1993) [Per J. Griño-Aquino, En Banc].

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EN BANC

[A.M. No. 10-4-19-SC. March 7, 2017.]

RE: LETTER OF TONY Q. VALENCIANO, HOLDING OF

One of our fundamental diﬀerences lies in our chosen religion.

The OCA advanced the view that the standard of Benevolent

The Court's Ruling

This, notwithstanding, the State still recognizes the inherent right of

Clearly, allowing the citizens to practice their religion is not equivalent

Sec. 3. (a) During the fasting season on the month of

The practical reality that greater beneﬁt may be derived by members

According to the Memorandum dated August 7, 2014 submitted by the

Claiming that his concerns were not properly addressed, Valenciano

On constitutional grounds, complainant Valenciano raises the

However, the jurisprudence cited in the Memorandum dated

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Our jurisprudence on the Religion Clauses reveal that in cases where

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Of course there have been cases where we refused to grant a claim

x x x Oﬀense, however, does not equate to coercion. Adults

separation, they are, however, an indication of the inevitable link between

Nevertheless, it is important to highlight that the Court has never made

Further, there is an important secular purpose achieved when

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"Imagine there's no countries, it isn't hard to do.

In consonance therewith, the Bill of Rights of the Constitution

In sum, Lynch teaches that government may

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Section 5, Article III of the Constitution provides:

Justice Jardeleza is of the view that allowing the holding of religious

Benevolent neutrality in practice, thus, favors the already dominant.

More speciﬁc to the prohibition against the establishment of a religion

The Constitution speciﬁcally prohibits public property from being

10. Id. at 10-12.

16. Id. at 63.

26. Rollo , p. 14.

30. Estrada v. Escritor, supra note 27, at 522-523.

43. Cruz Philippine Political Law (2002), pp. 174-175.

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J., concurring:

11. 106 Phil. 2 (1959).

17. Supra note 15.

24. 64 Phil. 201, 206 (1937).

JARDELEZA, J., concurring:

4. G.R. No. 119673, July 26, 1996, 259 SCRA 529.

11. G.R. No. L-9637, 101 Phil. 386 (1957).

20. Id. at 547.

33. Imbong v. Ochoa, Jr., supra note 28 at 334.

40. Town of Greece v. Galloway, supra note 1.

48. 545 U.S. 677 (2005).

56. Lemon v. Kurtzman, supra note 43.

9. OCAT Memorandum dated September 12, 2013, pp. 2-5.

21. Id. at 137.

32. Id. at 209.

37. Id. at 19.

41. Id. at 16.

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