III.

Discipline of Lawyers
A.1 RE: LETTER OF THE UP LAW FACULTY ENTITLED "RESTORING INTEGRITY: A STATEMENT BY THE FACULTY OF THE
UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES COLLEGE OF LAW ON THE ALLEGATIONS OF PLAGIARISM AND MISREPRESENTATION IN THE
SUPREME COURT"
A.M. No. 10-10-4-SC
March 8, 2011

Doctrine: Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, they do not involve a
trial of an action or a suit, but is rather an investigation by the Court into the conduct of one of its officers. Not being intended
to inflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. It
may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is its primary objective, and the real question for determination is
whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary
powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in
view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by purging the
profession of members who by their misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and
responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. In such posture, there can thus be no occasion to speak of a complainant
or a prosecutor

Facts: On April 28, 2010, the ponencia of Associate Justice Mariano del Castillo (Justice Del Castillo) in Vinuya, et al. v. Executive
Secretary (G.R. No. 162230) was promulgated. On May 31, 2010, the counsel 3 for Vinuya, et al. (the "Malaya Lolas"), filed a
Motion for Reconsideration of the Vinuya decision, raising solely the following grounds:
I. Our own constitutional and jurisprudential histories reject this Honorable Courts’ (sic) assertion that the Executive’s foreign
policy prerogatives are virtually unlimited; precisely, under the relevant jurisprudence and constitutional provisions, such
prerogatives are proscribed by international human rights and humanitarian standards, including those provided for in the
relevant international conventions of which the Philippines is a party. 4
II. This Honorable Court has confused diplomatic protection with the broader, if fundamental, responsibility of states to protect
the human rights of its citizens – especially where the rights asserted are subject of erga omnes obligations and pertain to jus
cogens norms.5
On July 19, 2010,6 counsel for the Malaya Lolas, Attys. H. Harry L. Roque, Jr. (Atty. Roque) and Romel Regalado Bagares (Atty.
Bagares), filed a Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration in G.R. No. 162230, where they posited for the first time their charge
of plagiarism as one of the grounds for reconsideration of the Vinuya decision. Among other arguments, Attys. Roque and
Bagares asserted that:
I.
IN THE FIRST PLACE, IT IS HIGHLY IMPROPER FOR THIS HONORABLE COURT’S JUDGMENT OF APRIL 28, 2010 TO PLAGIARIZE AT
LEAST THREE SOURCES – AN ARTICLE PUBLISHED IN 2009 IN THE YALE LAW JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, A BOOK
PUBLISHED BY THE CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS IN 2005 AND AN ARTICLE PUBLISHED IN 2006 IN THE CASE WESTERN
RESERVE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW – AND MAKE IT APPEAR THAT THESE SOURCES SUPPORT THE JUDGMENT’S
ARGUMENTS FOR DISMISSING THE INSTANT PETITION WHEN IN TRUTH, THE PLAGIARIZED SOURCES EVEN MAKE A STRONG
CASE FOR THE PETITION’S CLAIMS.7
They also claimed that "[i]n this controversy, the evidence bears out the fact not only of extensive plagiarism but of (sic) also of
twisting the true intents of the plagiarized sources by the ponencia to suit the arguments of the assailed Judgment for denying
the Petition."8
According to Attys. Roque and Bagares, the works allegedly plagiarized in the Vinuya decision were namely: (1) Evan J. Criddle
and Evan Fox-Decent’s article "A Fiduciary Theory of Jus Cogens;" 9 (2) Christian J. Tams’ book Enforcing Erga Omnes Obligations
in International Law;10 and (3) Mark Ellis’ article "Breaking the Silence: On Rape as an International Crime." 11
On the same day as the filing of the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration on July 19, 2010, journalists Aries C. Rufo and
Purple S. Romero posted an article, entitled "SC justice plagiarized parts of ruling on comfort women," on the Newsbreak
website.12 The same article appeared on the GMA News TV website also on July 19, 2010. 13
On July 22, 2010, Atty. Roque’s column, entitled "Plagiarized and Twisted," appeared in the Manila Standard Today. 14 In the said
column, Atty. Roque claimed that Prof. Evan Criddle, one of the authors purportedly not properly acknowledged in the Vinuya
decision, confirmed that his work, co-authored with Prof. Evan Fox-Decent, had been plagiarized. Atty. Roque quoted Prof.
Criddle’s response to the post by Julian Ku regarding the news report 15 on the alleged plagiarism in the international law blog,
Opinio Juris. Prof. Criddle responded to Ku’s blog entry in this wise:
The newspaper’s16 [plagiarism] claims are based on a motion for reconsideration filed yesterday with the Philippine Supreme
Court yesterday. The motion is available here:
http://harryroque.com/2010/07/18/supplemental-motion-alleging-plagiarism-in-the-supreme-court/
The motion suggests that the Court’s decision contains thirty-four sentences and citations that are identical to sentences and
citations in my 2009 YJIL article (co-authored with Evan Fox-Decent). Professor Fox-Decent and I were unaware of the
petitioners’ [plagiarism] allegations until after the motion was filed today.
Speaking for myself, the most troubling aspect of the court’s jus cogens discussion is that it implies that the prohibitions against
crimes against humanity, sexual slavery, and torture are not jus cogens norms. Our article emphatically asserts the opposite.
The Supreme Court’s decision is available here: http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/jurisprudence/2010/april2010/162230.htm 17
On even date, July 22, 2010, Justice Del Castillo wrote to his colleagues on the Court in reply to the charge of plagiarism
contained in the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration. 18
In a letter dated July 23, 2010, another purportedly plagiarized author in the Vinuya decision, Dr. Mark Ellis.

In Memorandum Order No. 35-2010 issued on July 27, 2010, the Court formed the Committee on Ethics and Ethical Standards
(the Ethics Committee) pursuant to Section 13, Rule 2 of the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court. In an En Banc Resolution also
dated July 27, 2010, the Court referred the July 22, 2010 letter of Justice Del Castillo to the Ethics Committee. The matter was
subsequently docketed as A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC.
On August 2, 2010, the Ethics Committee required Attys. Roque and Bagares to comment on the letter of Justice Del Castillo. 21
On August 9, 2010, a statement dated July 27, 2010, entitled "Restoring Integrity: A Statement by the Faculty of the University
of the Philippines College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court" (the Statement),
was posted in Newsbreak’s website 22 and on Atty. Roque’s blog. 23 A report regarding the statement also appeared on various
on-line news sites, such as the GMA News TV 24 and the Sun Star25 sites, on the same date. The statement was likewise posted at
the University of the Philippines College of Law’s bulletin board allegedly on August 10, 2010 26 and at said college’s website.27
On August 11, 2010, Dean Leonen submitted a copy of the Statement of the University of the Philippines College of Law Faculty
(UP Law faculty) to the Court, through Chief Justice Renato C. Corona.

In the course of the submission of Atty. Roque and Atty. Bagares’ exhibits during the August 26, 2010 hearing in the ethics case
against Justice Del Castillo, the Ethics Committee noted that Exhibit "J" (a copy of the Restoring Integrity Statement) was not
signed but merely reflected the names of certain faculty members with the letters (SGD.) beside the names. Thus, the Ethics
Committee directed Atty. Roque to present the signed copy of the said Statement within three days from the August 26
hearing.32
It was upon compliance with this directive that the Ethics Committee was given a copy of the signed UP Law Faculty Statement
that showed on the signature pages the names of the full roster of the UP Law Faculty, 81 faculty members in all. Indubitable
from the actual signed copy of the Statement was that only 37 of the 81 faculty members appeared to have signed the same.
However, the 37 actual signatories to the Statement did not include former Supreme Court Associate Justice Vicente V.
Mendoza (Justice Mendoza) as represented in the previous copies of the Statement submitted by Dean Leonen and Atty.
Roque. It also appeared that Atty. Miguel R. Armovit (Atty. Armovit) signed the Statement although his name was not included
among the signatories in the previous copies submitted to the Court. Thus, the total number of ostensible signatories to the
Statement remained at 37.
The Ethics Committee referred this matter to the Court en banc since the same Statement, having been formally submitted by
Dean Leonen on August 11, 2010, was already under consideration by the Court. 33
In a Resolution dated October 19, 2010, the Court en banc made the following observations regarding the UP Law Faculty
Statement:
Notably, while the statement was meant to reflect the educators’ opinion on the allegations of plagiarism against Justice Del
Castillo, they treated such allegation not only as an established fact, but a truth. In particular, they expressed dissatisfaction
over Justice Del Castillo’s explanation on how he cited the primary sources of the quoted portions and yet arrived at a contrary
conclusion to those of the authors of the articles supposedly plagiarized.
Beyond this, however, the statement bore certain remarks which raise concern for the Court. The opening sentence alone is a
grim preamble to the institutional attack that lay ahead. It reads:
An extraordinary act of injustice has again been committed against the brave Filipinas who had suffered abuse during a time of
war.
The first paragraph concludes with a reference to the decision in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary as a reprehensible act of
dishonesty and misrepresentation by the Highest Court of the land. x x x.
The insult to the members of the Court was aggravated by imputations of deliberately delaying the resolution of the said case,
its dismissal on the basis of "polluted sources," the Court’s alleged indifference to the cause of petitioners [in the Vinuya case],
as well as the supposed alarming lack of concern of the members of the Court for even the most basic values of decency and
respect.34 x x x. (Underscoring ours.)
In the same Resolution, the Court went on to state that:
While most agree that the right to criticize the judiciary is critical to maintaining a free and democratic society, there is also a
general consensus that healthy criticism only goes so far. Many types of criticism leveled at the judiciary cross the line to
become harmful and irresponsible attacks. These potentially devastating attacks and unjust criticism can threaten the
independence of the judiciary. The court must "insist on being permitted to proceed to the disposition of its business in an
orderly manner, free from outside interference obstructive of its functions and tending to embarrass the administration of
justice."
The Court could hardly perceive any reasonable purpose for the faculty’s less than objective comments except to discredit the
April 28, 2010 Decision in the Vinuya case and undermine the Court’s honesty, integrity and competence in addressing the
motion for its reconsideration. As if the case on the comfort women’s claims is not controversial enough, the UP Law faculty
would fan the flames and invite resentment against a resolution that would not reverse the said decision. This runs contrary to
their obligation as law professors and officers of the Court to be the first to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court, to
which they owe fidelity according to the oath they have taken as attorneys , and not to promote distrust in the administration of
justice.35 x x x. (Citations omitted; emphases and underscoring supplied.)
Thus, the Court directed Attys. Marvic M.V.F. Leonen, Froilan M. Bacungan, Pacifico A. Agabin, Merlin M. Magallona, Salvador T.
Carlota, Carmelo V. Sison, Patricia R.P. Salvador Daway, Dante B. Gatmaytan, Theodore O. Te, Florin T. Hilbay, Jay L.
Batongbacal, Evelyn (Leo) D. Battad, Gwen G. De Vera, Solomon F. Lumba, Rommel J. Casis, Jose Gerardo A. Alampay, Miguel R.
Armovit, Arthur P. Autea, Rosa Maria J. Bautista, Mark R. Bocobo, Dan P. Calica, Tristan A. Catindig, Sandra Marie O. Coronel,
Rosario O. Gallo, Concepcion L. Jardeleza, Antonio G.M. La Viña, Carina C. Laforteza, Jose C. Laureta, Owen J. Lynch, Rodolfo
Noel S. Quimbo, Antonio M. Santos, Gmeleen Faye B. Tomboc, Nicholas Felix L. Ty, Evalyn G. Ursua, Raul T. Vasquez, Susan D.
Villanueva and Dina D. Lucenario to show cause, within ten (10) days from receipt of the copy of the Resolution, why they
should not be disciplined as members of the Bar for violation of Canons 1, 36 11 and 13 and Rules 1.02 and 11.05 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.37

Dean Leonen was likewise directed to show cause within the same period why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with for
violation of Canon 10, Rules 10.01, 10.02 and 10.03 for submitting through his letter dated August 10, 2010, during the
pendency of G.R. No. 162230 and of the investigation before the Ethics Committee, for the consideration of the Court en banc,
a dummy which is not a true and faithful reproduction of the UP Law Faculty Statement

Issue: WON a hearing is necessary

Held: Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, they do not involve a trial
of an action or a suit, but is rather an investigation by the Court into the conduct of one of its officers. Not being intended to
inflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. It
may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is its primary objective, and the real question for determination is
whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary
powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in
view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by purging the
profession of members who by their misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and
responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. In such posture, there can thus be no occasion to speak of a complainant
or a prosecutor.144 (Emphases supplied.)

In Query of Atty. Karen M. Silverio-Buffe, Former Clerk of Court – Br. 81, Romblon – On the Prohibition from Engaging in the
Private Practice of Law,145 we further observed that:
[I]n several cases, the Court has disciplined lawyers without further inquiry or resort to any formal investigation where the facts
on record sufficiently provided the basis for the determination of their administrative liability.

In Prudential Bank v. Castro, the Court disbarred a lawyer without need of any further investigation after considering his actions
based on records showing his unethical misconduct; the misconduct not only cast dishonor on the image of both the Bench and
the Bar, but was also inimical to public interest and welfare. In this regard, the Court took judicial notice of several cases
handled by the errant lawyer and his cohorts that revealed their modus operandi in circumventing the payment of the proper
judicial fees for the astronomical sums they claimed in their cases. The Court held that those cases sufficiently provided the
basis for the determination of respondents' administrative liability, without need for further inquiry into the matter under the
principle of res ipsa loquitur.

Also on the basis of this principle, we ruled in Richards v. Asoy, that no evidentiary hearing is required before the respondent
may be disciplined for professional misconduct already established by the facts on record.
xxxx

These cases clearly show that the absence of any formal charge against and/or formal investigation of an errant lawyer do not
preclude the Court from immediately exercising its disciplining authority, as long as the errant lawyer or judge has been given
the opportunity to be heard. As we stated earlier, Atty. Buffe has been afforded the opportunity to be heard on the present
matter through her letter-query and Manifestation filed before this Court. 146 (Emphases supplied.)

Under the rules and jurisprudence, respondents clearly had no right to a hearing and their reservation of a right they do not
have has no effect on these proceedings. Neither have they shown in their pleadings any justification for this Court to call for a
hearing in this instance. They have not specifically stated what relevant evidence, documentary or testimonial, they intend to
present in their defense that will necessitate a formal hearing.

Instead, it would appear that they intend to present records, evidence, and witnesses bearing on the plagiarism and
misrepresentation issues in the Vinuya case and in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC on the assumption that the findings of this Court which
were the bases of the Show Cause Resolution were made in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC, or were related to the conclusions of the
Court in the Decision in that case. This is the primary reason for their request for access to the records and evidence presented
in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC.

This assumption on the part of respondents is erroneous. To illustrate, the only incident in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC that is relevant
to the case at bar is the fact that the submission of the actual signed copy of the Statement (or Restoring Integrity I, as Dean
Leonen referred to it) happened there. Apart from that fact, it bears repeating that the proceedings in A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC, the
ethics case against Justice Del Castillo, is a separate and independent matter from this case.
To find the bases of the statements of the Court in the Show Cause Resolution that the respondents issued a Statement with
language that the Court deems objectionable during the pendency of the Vinuya case and the ethics case against Justice Del
Castillo, respondents need to go no further than the four corners of the Statement itself, its various versions, news
reports/columns (many of which respondents themselves supplied to this Court in their Common Compliance) and internet
sources that are already of public knowledge.

Considering that what respondents are chiefly required to explain are the language of the Statement and the circumstances
surrounding the drafting, printing, signing, dissemination, etc., of its various versions, the Court does not see how any witness
or evidence in the ethics case of Justice Del Castillo could possibly shed light on these facts. To be sure, these facts are within
the knowledge of respondents and if there is any evidence on these matters the same would be in their possession.

We find it significant that in Dean Leonen’s Compliance he narrated how as early as September 2010, i.e., before the Decision
of this Court in the ethics case of Justice Del Castillo on October 12, 2010 and before the October 19, 2010 Show Cause
Resolution, retired Supreme Court Justice Vicente V. Mendoza, after being shown a copy of the Statement upon his return from
abroad, predicted that the Court would take some form of action on the Statement. By simply reading a hard copy of the
Statement, a reasonable person, even one who "fundamentally agreed" with the Statement’s principles, could foresee the
possibility of court action on the same on an implicit recognition that the Statement, as worded, is not a matter this Court
should simply let pass. This belies respondents’ claim that it is necessary for them to refer to any record or evidence in A.M. No.
10-7-17-SC in order to divine the bases for the Show Cause Resolution.

If respondents have chosen not to include certain pieces of evidence in their respective compliances or chosen not to make a
full defense at this time, because they were counting on being granted a hearing, that is respondents’ own look-out. Indeed,
law professors of their stature are supposed to be aware of the above jurisprudential doctrines regarding the non-necessity of a
hearing in disciplinary cases. They should bear the consequence of the risk they have taken.
Thus, respondents’ requests for a hearing and for access to the records of, and evidence presented in, A.M. No. 10-7-17-SC
should be denied for lack of merit.

A.5 Borres v Abella

G.R. No. 131023
July 17, 2007
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Doctrine: The court may therefore act upon its own motion and thus be the initiator of the proceedings, because, obviously the
court may investigate into the conduct of its own officers. Indeed it is not only the right but the duty of the Court to institute
upon its own motion, proper proceedings for the suspension or disbarment of an attorney, when from information submitted
to it or of its own knowledge it appears that any attorney has so conducted himself in a case pending before said court as to
show that he is wanting in the proper measure of respect for the court of which he is an officer, or is lacking in the good
character essential to his continuance as an attorney. This is for the protection of the general public and to promote the purity
of the administration of justice.
Facts: On October 4, 1929, the Court of First Instance of Capiz rendered a decision in Cadastral Case No. 15, G.L.R.O. Cadastral
Records No. 480, adjudicating Lot No. 3376 of the Cadastral Survey of Panay, Capiz, in favor of Faustina, Segundina, Felisa,
Micaela, Maria, and Sixto, all surnamed Borres. The Original Certificate of Title No. 17776 over the subject property was issued
on October 3, 1930.

Faustina died before World War II, leaving as heirs her children, namely: Jose, Juan, Concepcion, and Dolores, all surnamed
Villareiz. Herein respondent Victoria Villareiz-Radjaie (Mrs. Radjaie) is the daughter of the late Jose Villareiz who claims sole
ownership over the subject property. Meanwhile, the Borres heirs assert their rights over the property as heirs of Faustina,
Segundina, Felisa, Micaela, Maria, and Sixto, and as co-heirs of Mrs. Radjaie.

It appears that Faustina and her siblings mortgaged the subject property in favor of Navitas Fishing Company but failed to
redeem the same. Mrs. Radjaie claims that Jose personally redeemed the property and had it exclusively titled in his name on
July 24, 1940 under TCT No. 4446. Thereafter, on January 30, 1962, TCT No. RT-2089 was issued as a reconstituted title of TCT
No. 4446. Jose died on February 13, 1963.

On April 8, 1992, TCT No. T-24150 was issued in the name of Mrs. Radjaie. She claims sole ownership over the property which
she allegedly inherited from her father. However, the Borres heirs allege that Jose fraudulently caused the reconstitution and
issuance of the title exclusively in his name.

On July 6, 1992, the Borres heirs, represented by Atty. Villarruz, filed a complaint for partition and accounting 5against Mrs.
Radjaie that was docketed as Civil Case No. V-6186. The action also sought the cancellation of TCT No. T-24150 and the
declaration of the property as commonly owned by Mrs. Radjaie and the Borres heirs. The case was raffled to Branch 17 of the
Regional Trial Court of Roxas City then presided by Judge Alovera.

For her alleged failure to file an answer, Mrs. Radjaie was declared in default. On October 8 and December 10, 1993, the Borres
heirs presented their evidence ex-parte.

In a Decision6 allegedly promulgated on January 30, 1995, Judge Alovera ordered the cancellation of TCT No. T-24150 and
declared the subject property as commonly owned by Mrs. Radjaie and the Borres heirs. On January 31, 1995, Judge Alovera
retired from the judiciary having reached the mandatory age of retirement.
On January 9, 1996, Acting Presiding Judge Delano F. Villarruz, issued an order for the issuance of a writ of execution to enforce
the January 30, 1995 Decision.7 Subsequently, possession of the subject property was turned over to the Borres heirs.

On March 5, 1996, Mrs. Radjaie filed a petition for relief assailing the January 30, 1995 Decision and the January 9, 1996 Order.
She alleged that she was never served with summons; that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over her person; that the
proceedings in Civil Case No. V-6186 are null and void; and that the January 30, 1995 Decision was penned by Judge Alovera
after his retirement and was never entered in the book of judgments. 8 She prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction and "that disciplinary and contempt proceedings be taken against those involved in the perfidious
anomaly to tamper with the administration of justice."9

Mrs. Radjaie likewise filed a disbarment complaint against Judge Alovera before the Supreme Court, docketed as Administrative
Case No. 4748 and entitled "Radjaie vs. Atty. Alovera."

On March 29, 1996, Judge Abela was appointed as the new Presiding Judge of Branch 17. On June 14, 1996, he issued a
resolution nullifying the January 30, 1995 Decision and the January 9, 1996 Order. Further, he ordered the issuance of a
preliminary injunction upon the filing of a bond and directed the Borres heirs to surrender possession of the subject property to
Mrs. Radjaie.10

The Borres heirs moved for reconsideration but were denied. Meanwhile, Mrs. Radjaie filed a motion to approve cash bond
which was granted on August 9, 1996. 11 A writ of preliminary mandatory injunction was issued and possession of the subject
property was restored to Mrs. Radjaie on August 12, 1996.

On September 25, 1997, Judge Abela issued the assailed Resolution granting the petition for relief from order.

Thereafter, in an Order dated October 14, 1997, Judge Abela directed Atty. Villarruz to explain why he should not be suspended
from the practice of law for deceit, malpractice and/or gross misconduct, for making it appear that a hearing was conducted on
December 10, 1993 when in fact no such hearing took place, and for making it appear that his pleading entitled "Offer of
Exhibits" was filed with the court on January 30, 1995 when no such pleading was actually filed. 13
Likewise, in an Order dated November 6, 1997, Judge Abela required Judge Alovera to explain why he should not be suspended
from the practice of law for making it appear that he issued an Order dated January 25, 1995 admitting Atty. Villarruz’s "Offer of
Exhibits" when no such order could have been issued prior to his retirement on January 31, 1995, and for submitting the
January 30, 1995 Decision on August 1, 1995 when he was already retired and no longer had the authority to decide cases. 14
Atty. Villarruz and Judge Alovera did not submit the required explanations. In separate Orders dated November 14 15 and 21,16
1997, they were notified that hearings would be conducted, but they failed to appear before the court.

On November 3, 1997, the Borres heirs filed before this Court a petition for certiorari with prayer for temporary restraining
order in G.R. No. 131023.17 Without giving due course to the petition, the Court issued a temporary restraining order ordering
Judge Abela to cease and desist from enforcing the October 14, 1997 Order. The Court also ordered him to desist from further
conducting proceedings in Civil Case No. V-6186.

Meanwhile, on November 28, 1997, Judge Abela issued an order, the dispositive portion of which reads:
Wherefore, premises considered, this Court hereby orders Attys. Alberto Villarruz and Jose O. Alovera, suspended from the
practice of law effective immediately.
The Clerk of Court is hereby ordered to furnish copies of this Order to all courts in the Philippines. Let a certified copy of this
Order be transmitted to the Supreme Court together with a full statement of the facts upon which this order is made.
SO ORDERED.18

Consequently, Atty. Villarruz and Judge Alovera filed their respective petitions before this Court in G.R. Nos. 131505 19 and
13176820 assailing the order of suspension. The Court later issued temporary restraining orders in both cases, enjoining Judge
Abela to cease and desist from enforcing and/or implementing such order. 21

On January 13, 1999, the Court ordered the consolidation of G.R. Nos. 131023, 131505 and 131768. 22Thereafter, the parties
submitted their memoranda.23

The Borres heirs claim that the January 30, 1995 Decision has become final and executory; that Judge Abela does not have the
authority to nullify said decision; and that the proper remedy is an action for annulment of judgment before the Court of
Appeals.

Mrs. Radjaie claims that the January 30, 1995 Decision is non-existent; that the proceedings in Civil Case No. V-6186 are null
and void; and that a petition for relief under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court is the proper remedy for assailing the
aforementioned decision.

Atty. Villarruz and Judge Alovera alleged that they were denied due process, and that Judge Abela has no authority to suspend
them from the practice of law.
Issue: 1. WON in G.R. No. 131023, Judge Abela committed grave abuse of discretion in granting the petition for relief and
setting aside the January 30, 1995 Decision; and

2. WON in G.R. Nos. 131505 and 131768, whether Judge Abela committed grave abuse of discretion in suspending
petitioners Atty. Villarruz and Judge Alovera from the practice of law.
Held: In G.R. Nos. 131505 and 131768, we find that Judge Abela did not gravely abuse his discretion in issuing the November
28, 1997 Order suspending Atty. Villarruz and Judge Alovera from the practice of law. Grave abuse of discretion may arise when
a lower court or tribunal violates or contravenes the Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence. By grave abuse of
discretion is meant, such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. 31

There is none in this case. Judge Abela acted pursuant to Section 28 of Rule 138 and Section 16, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court
which provide that the Court of Appeals or a Regional Trial Court may suspend an attorney from practice for any deceit,
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the lawyer’s oath, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior
court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so. The suspended
attorney shall not practice his profession until further action of the Supreme Court.

Atty. Villarruz and Judge Alovera claim that they were denied due process as there was no verified complaint filed against them
before the trial court. Likewise, Atty. Villarruz argues that the trial court did not lawfully acquire jurisdiction over him as he was
not included as one of the respondents in the petition for relief.
However, in the early case of Tajan v. Cusi, Jr.,32 the Court held:
It should be observed that proceedings for the disbarment of members of the bar are not in any sense a civil action where
there is a plaintiff and the respondent is a defendant. Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and afford no
redress for private grievance. They are undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare. They are undertaken for the
purpose of preserving courts of justice from the official ministration of persons unfit to practice in them. The attorney is called
to answer to the court for his conduct as an officer of the court. The complainant or the person who called the attention of the
court to the attorney’s alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in the outcome except as all
good citizens may have in the proper administration of justice. The court may therefore act upon its own motion and thus be
the initiator of the proceedings, because, obviously the court may investigate into the conduct of its own officers. Indeed it is
not only the right but the duty of the Court to institute upon its own motion, proper proceedings for the suspension or
disbarment of an attorney, when from information submitted to it or of its own knowledge it appears that any attorney has
so conducted himself in a case pending before said court as to show that he is wanting in the proper measure of respect for
the court of which he is an officer, or is lacking in the good character essential to his continuance as an attorney. This is for
the protection of the general public and to promote the purity of the administration of justice. (Emphasis added)1avvphi1
In Re: Agripino A. Brillantes,33 disciplinary proceedings for the suspension of an attorney originated from an unverified motion.
The Court, citing Tajan v. Cusi, Jr., ruled that there is no substantive justifying purpose to be served by adhering to the
prescription that a complaint against a lawyer be under oath. It was held that there is substantial compliance with the
requirement where the motion was filed as an offshoot of a preliminary investigation which was conducted on the basis of
sworn complaints.
In this case, Mrs. Radjaie sought an investigation on the alleged anomalies in the proceedings of Civil Case No. V-6186. Such
constitutes sufficient ground for Judge Abela to conduct an inquiry into the matter. Further, it must be emphasized that Atty.
Villarruz and Judge Alovera were duly notified of the charges against them in the Orders dated October 14 and November 6,
1997. They were given ten days within which to explain why they should not be suspended from practice. Thereafter, they were
again duly notified that hearings relative to the aforementioned orders would be conducted. During the hearings held on
November 20 and 27, 1997, they were given the opportunity to answer the charges against them and to produce witnesses in
their own behalf.

However, they ignored the orders as well as the scheduled hearings and instead filed their respective petitions for certiorari
directly before this Court.

It is well-settled that the essence of due process is that a party is given a reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any
evidence one may have in support of one’s defense. Where the opportunity to be heard, either through verbal arguments or
pleadings, is accorded and the party can present its side or defend its interest in due course, there is no denial of due process.
Indeed, where a party was afforded an opportunity to participate in the proceedings but failed to do so, he cannot complain of
deprivation of due process.34
At any rate, the issue in G.R. No. 131768 has been effectively mooted as this Court has ordered Judge Alovera’s disbarment in
Administrative Case No. 4748.

E. Contempt
3. Silva v Lee Jr
A.M. No. R-225-RTJ
January 26, 1989
PARAS, J

Doctrine:
Facts: This administrative case stemmed from Civil Case No. 8338 before the sala of the respondent Judge and where the
complainant Atty. Himiniano D. Silva was counsel for the plaintiffs. Defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss the case. Judge Lee set
the same for hearing on April 13, 1984, notice of which was duly received by Atty. Silva as counsel.

On April 9, 1984, Atty. Silva filed a Motion for Inhibition, stating that he could not appear before the court because of the
following reason:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

a) By reason of complainant’s radio broadcast over DYRM of Dumaguete City not long ago — the Presiding Judge of the
Court allegedly felt strongly alluded to, got so hurt about it and even revealed his adverse reactions to the President of the IBP
of Negros Oriental and the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court Of Negros Oriental, and
b) A previous unwholesome atmosphere between the Presiding Judge of the Court and the complainant triggered by the
alleged uncalled for, unjustified, and unnecessary threat by the former to hold the latter in contempt of Court prejudices the
Plaintiffs’ interests in the case. (pp. 2-3, Memorandum for Respondent)

He therein prayed that the respondent Judge inhibit himself from trying the case or "in the alternative, should this motion not
be granted, that the undersigned be relieved as counsel." (p. 20, Rollo)chanrobles.com:cralaw:red

On April 10, 1984, Judge Lee denied the motion for inhibition, after finding the same "to be unfounded and patently
unmeritorious, there being no valid and legal reason for his disqualification to try the case pursuant to Rule 137 of the Rules of
Court.

However, Atty. Himiniano D. Silva may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, file his formal withdrawal with the conformity of
his clients to enable the latter to engage the services of new counsel." (p. 22, Rollo)

At the scheduled hearing of the Motion to Dismiss on April 13, 1984, Atty. Silva did not appear. This prompted Judge Lee to
dictate in open court an order citing Atty. Silva for direct contempt of court, ordering his arrest and sentencing him to five (5)
days imprisonment. Atty. Silva was arrested and jailed that same afternoon. He was in jail for five (5) days.

With his Motion to Quash the Warrant of Arrest denied and his Motion for Reconsideration similarly denied, Atty. Silva filed the
instant administrative case, resolution of which would depend on whether or not the non-appearance of Atty. Silva at the
hearing on April 13, 1984 could be considered a contumacious act and if so, was it direct or indirect contempt of court.

As is apparent from the tenor of the Motion for Inhibition and the categorical statement and intention of Atty. Silva not to
appear, there was a willful display of disrespectful language and attitude towards the court which tended to provoke and could
be considered to border on contempt, or to be contemptuous themselves.

Issue: WON such behavior be considered a direct contempt which would warrant an outright order to immediately arrest and
jail complainant

Held: Direct contempt is conduct directed against or assailing the authority and dignity of the court or a judge, or in the doing
of a forbidden act, while indirect contempt is the failure to do something ordered done by the court or judge, such as failure to
appear at a hearing or in the use of disrespectful language in a pleading. (Southern Broadcasting Network v. Davao City Light &
Power 98 SCRA 982; Nazareno v. Barnes, 136 SCRA 57; Ang v. Castro, 136 SCRA 453). A direct contempt may be punished
summarily while an indirect contempt can be punished only after charge and hearing. (Rule 71, Rules of Court)

Clearly, the acts of complainant do not constitute direct contempt.

Be that as it may, the mistake of respondent Judge Lee in the appreciation of his prerogative to charge and punish for contempt
does not make out a case of oppression, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the judiciary, violation of the anti-graft law
and ignorance of the law. Considering the circumstances of this case — the complainant aired a vehement broadcast unduly
critical of the RTC judge in Dumaguete City, filed a Motion for Inhibition intemperately written stating that he cannot appear in
the hearing if respondent judge will not inhibit himself, his subsequent expected non-appearance — respondent Judge might
have equated complainant’s actuations with an orchestrated assault against the authority and dignity of the court.

IV. C. Lawyers who have been repatriated

1. PETITION FOR LEAVE TO RESUME PRACTICE OF LAW,
BENJAMIN M. DACANAY, petitioner.
B.M. No. 1678
December 17, 2007

Doctrine: Before a lawyer who reacquires Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 can resume his law practice, he must first
secure from this Court the authority to do so, conditioned on:
(a) the updating and payment in full of the annual membership dues in the IBP;
(b) the payment of professional tax;
(c) the completion of at least 36 credit hours of mandatory continuing legal education; this is specially significant to refresh the
applicant/petitioner’s knowledge of Philippine laws and update him of legal developments and
(d) the retaking of the lawyer’s oath which will not only remind him of his duties and responsibilities as a lawyer and as an
officer of the Court, but also renew his pledge to maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.
Compliance with these conditions will restore his good standing as a member of the Philippine bar.

Facts: Petitioner was admitted to the Philippine bar in March 1960. He practiced law until he migrated to Canada in December
1998 to seek medical attention for his ailments. He subsequently applied for Canadian citizenship to avail of Canada’s free
medical aid program. His application was approved and he became a Canadian citizen in May 2004. Pursuant to RA 9225
(Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003), petitioner reacquired his Philippine citizenship. 1 On that day, he took his
oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen before the Philippine Consulate General in Toronto, Canada. Thereafter, he returned to
the Philippines and now intends to resume his law practice. He filed a petition for leave to resume the practice of law.
The Office of the Bar Confidant cites Section 2, Rule 138 (Attorneys and Admission to Bar) of the Rules of Court: SECTION 2.
Requirements for all applicants for admission to the bar. – Every applicant for admission as a member of the bar must be a
citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of good moral character, and a resident of the Philippines; and must
produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character, and that no charges against him, involving
moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines.
Applying the provision, the Office of the Bar Confidant opines that, by virtue of his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship, in
2006, petitioner has again met all the qualifications and has none of the disqualifications for membership in the bar. It
recommends that he be allowed to resume the practice of law in the Philippines, conditioned on his retaking the lawyer’s oath
to remind him of his duties and responsibilities as a member of the Philippine bar.

ISSUE: Whether petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay may be allowed to resume the practice of law in the Philippines

HELD: YES
The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. Adherence to rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the
highest degree of morality, faithful observance of the rules of the legal profession, compliance with the mandatory continuing
legal education requirement and payment of membership fees to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) are the conditions
required for membership in good standing in the bar and for enjoying the privilege to practice law. Any breach by a lawyer of
any of these conditions makes him unworthy of the trust and confidence which the courts and clients repose in him for the
continued exercise of his professional privilege.4

Section 1, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides: SECTION 1. Who may practice law. – Any person heretofore duly admitted as
a member of the bar, or thereafter admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of this Rule, and who is in good and
regular standing, is entitled to practice law.

Pursuant thereto, any person admitted as a member of the Philippine bar in accordance with the statutory requirements and
who is in good and regular standing is entitled to practice law. Moreover, admission to the bar involves various phases such as
furnishing satisfactory proof of educational, moral and other qualifications; 7 passing the bar examinations; 8 taking the lawyer’s
oath9 and signing the roll of attorneys and receiving from the clerk of court of this Court a certificate of the license to practice. 10
The second requisite for the practice of law ― membership in good standing ― is a continuing requirement. This means
continued membership and, concomitantly, payment of annual membership dues in the IBP; 11 payment of the annual
professional tax;12 compliance with the mandatory continuing legal education requirement; 13 faithful observance of the rules
and ethics of the legal profession and being continually subject to judicial disciplinary control. 14
Given the foregoing, may a lawyer who has lost his Filipino citizenship still practice law in the Philippines? No.
The Constitution provides that the practice of all professions in the Philippines shall be limited to Filipino citizens save in cases
prescribed by law. Since Filipino citizenship is a requirement for admission to the bar, loss thereof terminates membership in
the Philippine bar and, consequently, the privilege to engage in the practice of law. The practice of law is a privilege denied to
foreigners.16

The exception is when Filipino citizenship is lost by reason of naturalization as a citizen of another country but subsequently
reacquired pursuant to RA 9225. This is because "all Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed
not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of [RA 9225]."17Therefore, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a
citizen of another country is deemed never to have lost his Philippine citizenship if he reacquires it in accordance with RA
9225. Although he is also deemed never to have terminated his membership in the Philippine bar, no automatic right to resume
law practice accrues.

Under RA 9225, if a person intends to practice the legal profession in the Philippines and he reacquires his Filipino citizenship
pursuant to its provisions "(he) shall apply with the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such practice." 18 Stated
otherwise, before a lawyer who reacquires Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 can resume his law practice, he must first
secure from this Court the authority to do so, conditioned on:
(a) the updating and payment in full of the annual membership dues in the IBP;
(b) the payment of professional tax;
(c) the completion of at least 36 credit hours of mandatory continuing legal education; this is specially significant to refresh the
applicant/petitioner’s knowledge of Philippine laws and update him of legal developments and
(d) the retaking of the lawyer’s oath which will not only remind him of his duties and responsibilities as a lawyer and as an
officer of the Court, but also renew his pledge to maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.
Compliance with these conditions will restore his good standing as a member of the Philippine bar.

IV. Notarial Practice

Almazan v Felipe
A.C. No. 7184,
September 17, 2014
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Doctrine: A person commissioned as notary public may perform notarial acts in any place within the territorial jurisdiction of
the commissioning court for a period of two (2) years commencing the first day of January of the year in which the
commissioning court is made, unless either revoked or the notary public has resigned under these Rules and the Rules of Court.

Facts: In a Complaint1 dated April 27, 2006, complainant Felipe B. Almazan, Sr. (complainant) charged respondent, previously of
the Public Attorney’s Office,2 for malpractice and gross negligence in the performance of his duty as a notary public and/or
lawyer, alleging that the latter, despite not having been registered as a notary public for the City of Marikina, notarized the
acknowledgment of the document entitled “Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of the Deceased Juliana P. Vda. De Nieva”3
dated “25th day of 1999” (subject document), stating that he is a “notary public for and in the City of Marikina.” 4 Said document
was one of the attachments to the Amended Complaint 5 dated August 14, 2003 filed in Civil Case No. 03-849-MK entitled
“Esperanza Nieva Dela Cruz [(as represented by respondent)] v. Brita T. Llantada [(as represented by complainant)].”

To prove his claim, complainant attached a Certification 6 dated May 26, 2005 issued by the Office of the Clerk of Court of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Marikina City, certifying that per the court’s record, respondent is not a commissioned notary
public for the City of Marikina from March 30, 1994 to the date of issuance.

In a Resolution7 dated July 5, 2006, the Court required respondent to file his Comment 8 which he eventually submitted on
February 13, 2007 after proper service. In said pleading, respondent admitted that he indeed notarized the acknowledgment of
the subject document but denied that he was not commissioned as a notary public at that time. 9

To prove his defense, he attached a Certification 10 dated August 23, 2006 issued by the Office of the Clerk of Court of the RTC of
Pasig City, certifying the fact of his appointment as notary public for the City of Pasig and in the Municipalities of Taguig,
Pateros, San Juan, and Mandaluyong for the years 1998-1999 under Appointment No. 98. 11 Further, respondent, thru the
comment, incorporated his own administrative complaint against complainant for malpractice and harassment of a fellow
lawyer in view of the filing of the instant administrative case against him. 12cralawred

In response, complainant filed a Reply 13 dated April 26, 2007 asserting that he has the legitimate right to file the administrative
complaint against respondent for his unlawful act of notarization, which is not an act of harassment as respondent claims. He
also draws attention to the fact that the subject document was incompletely dated and yet notarized by
respondent.14cralawred

In a Resolution15 dated July 11, 2007, the Court, inter alia, referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report, and recommendation. Eventually, both parties appeared during the mandatory conference held on April
30, 2008.16cralawred

The Report and Recommendation of the IBP

In a Report and Recommendation 17 dated September 22, 2008, the IBP Investigating Commissioner found respondent guilty for
violating the Notarial Law and the lawyer’s oath, reasoning that he could not notarize the acknowledgment of the subject
document in Marikina City as it was outside the territorial limits of his jurisdiction. To this end, the Investigating Commissioner
pointed out that in the acknowledgment of the subject document, it was categorically stated that respondent is a notary public
for and in the City of Marikina, Province of Rizal, of which he was not, hence, violating the Notarial Law. Moreover, respondent
likewise violated the lawyer’s oath, specifically its mandate for lawyers, to obey the laws and do no falsehood. 18cralawred

In view of the foregoing, it was thus recommended that respondent be suspended for a period of two (2) years from the
practice of law. However, since it does not appear that he was still commissioned as a notary public, the Investigating
Commissioner did not recommend that he be disqualified as such. 19cralawred

In a Resolution20 dated October 9, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Report and Recommendation of
the Investigating Commissioner with modification, decreasing the penalty of suspension to one (1) year, with immediate
revocation of notarial commission if presently commissioned, and disqualification from being commissioned as a notary public
for two (2) years.

On reconsideration,21 the IBP Board of Governors, in a Resolution 22 dated March 8, 2014, modified the penalty stated in its
previous resolution, imposing, instead, the penalty of reprimand with warning, and disqualification from being commissioned as
a notary public for the decreased period of one (1) year.

Issue: WON respondent should be held administratively liable.

Held: As the Investigating Commissioner correctly observed, respondent, who himself admitted that he was commissioned as
notary public only in the City of Pasig and the Municipalities of Taguig, Pateros, San Juan, and Mandaluyong for the years 1998-
1999, could not notarize the subject document’s acknowledgment in the City of Marikina, as said notarial act is beyond the
jurisdiction of the commissioning court, i.e., the RTC of Pasig. The territorial limitation of a notary public’s jurisdiction is crystal
clear from Section 11, Rule III of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice: 23cralawred

Sec. 11. Jurisdiction and Term – A person commissioned as notary public may perform notarial acts in any place
within the territorial jurisdiction of the commissioning court for a period of two (2) years commencing the first day
of January of the year in which the commissioning court is made, unless either revoked or the notary public has
resigned under these Rules and the Rules of Court. (Emphasis supplied)

Said principle is equally echoed in the Notarial Law found in Chapter 12, Book V, Volume I of the Revised Administrative Code of
1917, as amended,24 of which Section 240, Article II states:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Sec. 240. Territorial jurisdiction. – The jurisdiction of a notary public in a province shall be co-extensive with the
province. The jurisdiction of a notary public in the City of Manila shall be co-extensive with said city. No notary shall
possess authority to do any notarial act beyond the limits of his jurisdiction. (Emphases supplied)

For misrepresenting in the said acknowledgment that he was a notary public for and in the City of Marikina, when it is apparent
and, in fact, uncontroverted that he was not, respondent further committed a form of falsehood which is undoubtedly
anathema to the lawyer’s oath. Perceptibly, said transgression also runs afoul of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which provides that “[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.”

In the case of Tan Tiong Bio v. Atty. Gonzales,25 citing Nunga v. Atty. Viray,26 the Court instructively expounded on infractions
similar to that of respondent:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

While seemingly appearing to be a harmless incident, respondent’s act of notarizing documents in a place outside of or
beyond the authority granted by his notarial commission, partakes of malpractice of law and falsification . While perhaps not
on all fours because of the slight dissimilarity in the violation involved, what the Court said in Nunga v. Viray is very much
apropos:
Where the notarization of a document is done by a member of the Philippine Bar at a time when he has no authorization or
commission to do so, the offender may be subjected to disciplinary action. For one, performing a notarial [act] without such
commission is a violation of the lawyer’s oath to obey the laws, more specifically, the Notarial Law. Then, too, by making it
appear that he is duly commissioned when he is not, he is, for all legal intents and purposes, indulging in deliberate
falsehood, which the lawyer’s oath similarly proscribes. These violations fall squarely within the prohibition of Rule 1.01 of
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides: “A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral
or deceitful conduct.”
It cannot be over-emphasized that notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. Far from it. Notarization is invested
with substantive public interest, such that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public. Hence, the
requirements for the issuance of a commission as notary public are treated with a formality definitely more than casual. 27
(Emphases supplied)

With respondent’s liability herein established, and considering further the attendant circumstances of this case, take for
instance, that he is a first time offender and that he had already acknowledged his wrongdoings, 28 the Court finds that
suspension for a period of six (6) months 29 from the practice of law would suffice as a penalty. In addition, he is disqualified
from being commissioned as a notary public for a period of one (1) year and, his notarial commission, if currently existing, is
hereby revoked.30cralawred