SHHH Digests Labor Relations 2016-2017 De Leon. Pamfilo. Tan.
Udarbe
1. Progessive Development v. Laguesma
G.R. No. 115077
April 18, 1997
Doctrine: Once a labor organization has filed the necessary documents and papers
and the same have been certified under oath and attested to, said organization
necessarily becomes clothed with the character of a legitimate labor organization.
Facts: On July 9, 1993, Nagkakaisang Lakas ng Manggagawa (NLM)-Katipunan
(respondent Union) filed a petition for certification election with the Department of
Labor (National Capital Region) in behalf of the rank and file employees of the
Progressive Development Corporation (Pizza Hut)
Petitioner filed on August 20, 1993, a verified Motion to Dismiss the petition
alleging fraud, falsification and misrepresentation in the respondent Union's
registration making it void and invalid.
The motion specifically alleged that: a) respondent Union's registration was tainted
with false, forged, double or multiple signatures of those who allegedly took part in
the ratification of the respondent Union's constitution and by-laws and in the
election of its officers that there were two sets of supposed attendees to the
alleged organizational meeting that was alleged to have taken place on June 26,
1993; that the alleged chapter is claimed to have been supported by 318 members
when in fact the persons who actually signed their names were much less; and b)
while the application for registration of the charter was supposed to have been
approved in the organizational meeting held on June 27, 1993, the charter
certification issued by the federation KATIPUNAN was dated June 26, 1993 or one
(1) day prior to the formation of the chapter, thus, there were serious falsities in the
dates of the issuance of the charter certification and the organization meeting of
the alleged chapter.
Citing other instances of misrepresentation and fraud, petitioner, on August 29,
1993, filed a Supplement to its Motion to Dismiss,claiming that:
1) Respondent Union alleged that the election of its officers was held on June 27,
1993; however, it appears from the documents submitted by respondent union to
the BIR-DOLE that the Union's constitution and by-laws were adopted only on July
7, 1993, hence, there was no bases for the supposed election of officers on June 27,
1993 because as of this date, there existed no positions to which the officers could
be validly elected;
2) Voting was not conducted by secret ballot in violation of Article 241, section (c)
of the Labor Code;
3) The Constitution and by Laws submitted in support of its petition were not
properly acknowledged and notarized.
On August 30, 1993, petitioner filed a Petition seeking the cancellation of the
Union's registration on the grounds of fraud and falsification, docketed as BIR Case
No. 8-21-83. Motion was likewise filed by petitioner with the Med-Arbiter
requesting suspension of proceedings in the certification election case until after
the prejudicial question of the Union's legal personality is determined in the
proceedings for cancellation of registration.
However, in an Order dated September 29, 1993, Med-Arbiter Rasidali C. Abdullah
directed the holding of a certification election among petitioner's rank and file
employees.
On appeal to the office of the Secretary of Labor, Labor Undersecretary Bienvenido
E. Laguesma in a Resolution dated December 29, 1993 denied the same. A motion
for reconsideration of the public respondent's resolution was denied in his Order
dated January 27, 1994, hence, this special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65
of the Revised Rules of Court.
Issue: Whether or not, after the necessary papers and documents have been filed
by a labor organization, recognition by the Bureau of Labor Relations merely
becomes a ministerial function.
Held: Yes. The principle "that employees are protected by law from unwarranted
practices that diminish their compensation without their known edge and consent" is
in accord with the constitutional principle of the State affording full protection to
labor.
Collective Bargaining;Special Assessments;Strict compliance with legal
requirements regarding special assessments must be observed
The respondent-Union brushed aside the defects pointed out by petitioners in the
manner of compliance with the legal requirements as "insignificant technicalities."
On the contrary, the failure of the Union to comply strictly with the requirements set
out by the law invalidates the questioned special assessment. Substantial compliance
is not enough in view of the fact that the special assessment will diminish the
compensation of the union members. Their express consent is required, and this
consent must be obtained in accordance with the steps outlined by law, which must
be followed to the letter. No shortcuts are allowed. The applicable provisions are
clear. The Union itself admits that both paragraphs (n) and (o) of Article 241 apply.
Paragraph (n) refers to "levy" while paragraph (o) refers to "check-off" of a special
assessment. Both provisions must be complied with. Under paragraph (n), the Union
must submit to the Company a written resolution of a majority of all the members at
a general membership meeting duly called for the purpose. In addition, the secretary
of the organization must record the minutes of the meeting which, in turn, must
include, among others, the list of all the members present as well as the votes cast.
SHHH Digests Labor Relations 2016-2017 De Leon. Pamfilo. Tan. Udarbe
Written resolution of a majority of all members of the union at a general
membership meeting required for validity of levy of a special assessment
As earlier outlined by petitioners, the Union obviously failed to comply with the
requirements of paragraph (n). It held local membership meetings on separate
occasions, on different dates and at various venues, contrary to the express
requirement that there must be a general membership meeting. The contention of the
Union that "the local membership meetings are precisely the very general meetings
required by law" is untenable because the law would not have specified a general
membership meeting had the legislative intent been to allow local meetings in lieu of
the latter. It submitted only minutes of the local membership meetings when what is
required is a written resolution adopted at the general meeting. Worse still, the
minutes of three of those local meetings held were recorded by a union director and
not by the union secretary. The minutes submitted to the Company contained no list
of the members present and no record of the votes cast. Since it is quite evident that
the Union did not comply with the law at every turn, the only conclusion that may be
made therefrom is that there was no valid levy of the special assessment pursuant to
paragraph (n) of Article 241 of the Labor Code.
Withdrawal of individual authorization is equivalent to no authorization at all;
The law does not require that the disauthorization must be in individual form
Paragraph (o) on the other hand requires an individual written authorization duly
signed by every employee in order that a special assessment may be validly checked-
off. Even assuming that the special assessment was validly levied pursuant to
paragraph (n), and granting that individual written authorizations were obtained by
the Union, nevertheless there can be no valid check-off considering that the majority
of the union members had already withdrawn their individual authorizations. A
withdrawal of individual authorizations is equivalent to no authorization at all.
Hence, the ruling in Galvadores that "no check-offs from any amounts due
employees may be effected without an individual written authorization signed by the
employees ... " is applicable.
Payment of services rendered by union officers, not to be taken from special
assessments but from regular union duties
Of the stated purposes of the special assessment, as embodied in the board resolution
of the Union, only the collection of a special fund for labor and education research is
mandated, as correctly pointed out by the Union. The two other purposes, namely,
the purchase of vehicles and other items for the benefit of the union officers and the
general membership, and the payment of services rendered by union officers,
consultants and others, should be supported by the regular union dues, there being no
showing that the latter are not sufficient to cover the same.
The last stated purpose is contended by petitioners to fall under the coverage of
Article 222 (b) of the Labor Code. The contention is impressed with merit. Article
222 (b) prohibits attorney's fees, negotiations fees and similar charges arising out of
the conclusion of a collective bargaining agreement from being imposed on any
individual union member. The collection of the special assessment partly for the
payment for services rendered by union officers, consultants and others may not be
in the category of "attorney's fees or negotiations fees." But there is no question that
it is an exaction which falls within the category of a "similar charge," and, therefore,
within the coverage of the prohibition in the aforementioned article.
2. Liberty Cotton Mills Workers Union v. Liberty Cotton Mills, Inc.
GR No. L-33987
September 4, 1975
Doctrine: PAFLU, acting for and in behalf of its affiliate, had the status of an agent
while the local union remained the basic unit of the association free to serve the
common interest of all its members including the freedom to disaffiliate when the
circumstances warrant.
Facts: The Liberty Cotton Mills Workers Union, hereinafter referred to as the
Union, adopted its Constitution and By-laws on January 1, 1959. Among other
things, the said Constitution provided:
ARTICLE X — UNION AFFILIATION
Section 1. The Liberty Cotton Mills Workers Union-Paflu shall be affiliated with the
Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions, otherwise known as PAFLU, and shall
remain an affiliate as long as ten or more of its members evidence their desire to
continue the said local union's affiliation, in accordance with the Paflu Constitution,
Article XI-Paragraph 11:15 thereof;
ARTICLE XIII — CHARGES, TRIALS, AND IMPEACHMENT OF OFFICERS
AND MEMBERS: APPEALS.
Section 1. Any member or officer of the Liberty Cotton Mills Workers Union-Paflu
may be charged, tried or impeached if an officer, in accordance with this and the
PAFLU CONSTITUTION.
On October 1, 1959, a Collective Bargaining Agreement   was entered into by and
between the Company and the Union represented by PAFLU. The CBA was
amended on February 28, 1964, thus: 
Article III. UNION SECURITY
Additional Clause. The Company agrees to encourage casual workers and non-union
members to join the Union which is the sole and exclusive agent for all the
employees covered by this Agreement.
The Agreements aforementioned bore the signatures of representatives of both the
Company and the PAFLU, and the incumbent President of the local union.
On March 13, 1964, while the CBA was in full force, Marciano Castillo and Rafael
Nepomuceno, President and Vice-President of the local union wrote PAFLU, its
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mother federation, complaining about the legal counsel assigned by the PAFLU to
assist them in a ULP case (Case No. 4001) they filed against the Company. In said
letter, the local union expressed its dissatisfaction and loss of confidence in the
PAFLU lawyers, claiming that PAFLU never lifted a finger regarding this particular
complaint.
On May 17, 1964, 32 out of the 36 members of the local union disaffiliated
themselves from respondent PAFLU pursuant to their local union's Constitution and
By-Laws, specifically Article X. A copy of the signed resolution of disaffiliation was
furnished the Company as well as the Bureau of Labor Relations. The following day,
the local union wrote the Company and required the turn-over of the checked-off
dues directly to its Treasurer.
PAFLU, thru its National Secretary wrote the Company this letter:
This is to inform your good office that sometime last May 25, 1964, our federation
was in receipt of a letter signed by 32 persons and informing us of their desire to
disaffiliate the local union from the mother federation — PAFLU. The members and
officers who made the letter have no right to do the same under our existing contract
and under the PAFLUs Constitution and By-Laws.
We wish to make it clear with the management that the contractual union in our
contract which was signed a few months ago is the PAFLU. The actuation made by
the supposed union members is inconsistent with the present contract we have and
under the provisions of "Maintenance of Union Membership" they can be dismissed.
Under the PAFLUs Constitution that is null and void. And in view of the disloyalty
shown by those members, the mother federation will take over the administration of
the Union in dealing with the management especially.
PAFLU wrote the Company again, this time quoting en toto Article III of the
Collective Bargaining Agreement on "Union Security" and requesting the
termination of the employment of Rafael Nepomuceno, Marciano Castillo, Nelly
Acevedo, Enrique Managan, Rizalino Castillo and Rafael Combalicer, all petitioners
herein. PAFLU at the same time expelled the aforementioned workers from their'
union membership in the mother federation for allegedly "instigating union
disaffiliation."
Company terminated the employment of the members expelled by the PAFLU.
On the last day of May, 1964, counsel for the ousted workers wrote the Company
requesting their reinstatement. This was denied by the Company; hence the
complaint for unfair labor practice filed with the Court of Industrial Relations.
After due hearing, the Court rendered its decision dismissing the complaint, but with
a strong' recommendation for the reinstatement of complainant workers in
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respondent Company. The petitioners being unsatisfied with the decision, appealed
to this Court 
Issue: WON the dismissal of the petitioners was justified or not
Held: No. The Company the acting on the request of the mother federation sent
notices of termination to the officers of the local union immediately on the day
following, or on May 30, 1964, heavily relying on the Collective Bargaining
Agreement, viz:
... for disloyalty to the union shall be dismissed from employment by the Company
upon request in writing by the Union, which shall hold the COMPANY free from
any liability arising from or caused by such dismissal.
It may have been the basis for the Company's actuation, as in fact it was alleged by
the Company in its Brief, the Court ruled that such stipulation does not bind the
courts much less released the Company from liability should a finding for unfair
labor practice be positive. In the case at bar, however, considering that the dispute
revolved around the mother federation and its local, with the company dismissing the
workers at the instance of the mother federation, Court believes that the Company's
liability should be limited to the immediate reinstatement of the workers.
Considering, however, that their dismissal was effected without previous hearing,
and at the instance of PAFLU, this mother federation should be, as it is hereby, held
liable to the petitioners for the payment of their back wages. 
Validity of Disaffiliation by local union. Under the union’s Constitution and by-
laws, the local union shall be affiliated with the PAFLU, and shall remain an affiliate
as long as 10 or more of its members evidence their desire to continue the said local
union’s affiliation.
Record shows that only 4 out of its members remained for 32 out of the 36 members
of the Union signed the resolution of disaffiliation. The disaffiliation was, therefore,
valid under the local's Constitution and By-Laws which, taken together with the
CBA, is controlling. The disaffiliation, coming as it did from the greater majority of
its members, is more than enough to show the collective desire of the members of the
local union to sever their relations from the mother federation. The right of
disaffiliation is inherent in the compact and such act should not have been branded as
an act of disloyalty, especially considering the cause which impelled the union to
take such a step.
Backwages of dismissed employees. Following the precedent of Mercury Drug Co.
vs. CIR,  of fixing an amount of net backwages and doing away with the protracted
process of determining the complainants-workers' earnings elsewhere during the
SHHH Digests Labor Relations 2016-2017 De Leon. Pamfilo. Tan. Udarbe
period of their illegal dismissal, the Court fixes the amount of backwages to be paid
under this decision to the complainants-workers at three (3) years backwages without
deduction or qualification.
Labor Union. In the CBA, it appears that PAFLU has been recognized as the sole
bargaining agent for all the employees of the Company other than its supervisors and
security guards. Moreover it likewise appears that "PAFLU, represented in this Act
by its National Treasurer, and duly authorized representative, ... (was) acting for and
in behalf of its affiliate, the Liberty Cotton Mills Workers Union and the employees
of the Company, etc.' In other words, the PAFLU, acting for and in behalf of its
affiliate, had the status of an agent while the local union remained the basic unit of
the association free to serve the common interest of all its members including the
freedom to disaffiliate when the circumstances warrant. This is clearly provided in its
Constitution and By-Laws, specifically Article X on Union Affiliation.
3. Villar v. Inciong
GR No. L-50283-84
April 20, 1983
Doctrine: A closed-shop is a valid form of union security. The mother union has the
right to investigate members of a local union affiliated to it under the mother
union’s by-laws and procedures, and if found guilty to expel such members. A mere
minority of a local union’s membership cannot disaffiliate their union from its
mother union. An unregistered union has no legal personality and is not entitled to
exercise the rights and privileges of a labor union. The execution of a new CBA is no
bar to prosecution of members for violation of the union security clause of the old
CBA where the same clause has been incorporated in the new CBA.
Facts: Petitioners were members of the Amigo Employees Union-PAFLU, a duly
registered labor organization which, at the time of the present dispute, was the
existing bargaining agent of the employees. The Company and the Amigo
Employees Union-PAFLU had a CBA governing their labor relations, which
agreement was then about to expire on February 28, 1977.
On January 5, 1977, upon written authority of at least 30% of the employees,
including the petitioners, the Federation of Unions of Rizal (FUR) filed a petition for
certification election with the Med-Arbiter's Office. The petition was, however,
opposed by the Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions (PAFLU) with whom, the
Amigo Employees Union was at that time affiliated. PAFLU's opposition cited the
"Code of Ethics" governing inter-federation disputes among and between members
of the Trade Unions Congress of the Philippines (TUCP). Consequently, the Med-
Arbiter indorsed the case to TUCP for appropriate action but before any such action
could be taken thereon, the petitioners disauthorized FUR from continuing the
petition for certification election for which reason FUR withdrew the petition.
On February 7, 1977, the same employees who had signed the petition filed by FUR
signed a joint resolution which states their desire to disaffiliate from PAFLU and the
latter’s authority to represent them in a CBA and petition for certification election.
Immediately thereafter, petitioner Dolores Villar, representing herself to be the
authorized representative of the Amigo Employees Union, filed a petition for
certification election. The Amigo Employees Union-PAFLU intervened and moved
for the dismissal of the petition for certification election filed by Dolores Villar,
citing as grounds therefor: (a) the petition lacked the mandatory requisite of at
least 30% of the employees in the bargaining unit; (2) Dolores Villar had no legal
personality to sign the petition since she was not an officer of the union nor is there
factual or legal basis for her claim that she was the authorized representative of the
local union; (3) there was a pending case for the same subject matter filed by the
same individuals; (4) the petition was barred by the new CBA concluded on
February 15, 1977; (5) there was no valid disaffiliation from PAFLU; and (6) the
supporting signatures were procured through false pretenses.
Finding that the petition involved the same parties and causes of action, the Med-
Arbiter dismissed the petition filed by herein petitioner Villar.
Amigo Employees Union- PAFLU called a special meeting of its general membership.
A Resolution was thereby unanimously approved which called for the investigation
by the PAFLU national president, pursuant to the constitution and by-laws of the
Federation, of all of the petitioners and one Felipe Manlapao, for "continuously
maligning, libelling and slandering not only the incumbent officers but even the
union itself and the federation;" spreading 'false propaganda' that the union officers
were 'merely appointees of the management', and for causing divisiveness in the
union.
PAFLU, through its national President, formed a Trial Committee to investigate the
local union's charges against the petitioners for acts of disloyalty inimical to the
interest of the local union, as well as directing the Trial Committee to subpoena the
complainants (Amigo Employees Union-PAFLU) and the respondents (herein
petitioners) for investigation and to submit its findings and recommendations for
appropriate action.
On February 15, 1977, the Amigo Employees Union- PAFLU and the Company
concluded a new CBA which, besides granting additional benefits to the workers,
also reincorporated the same provisions of the existing CBA, including the union
security clause reading, to wit:
ARTICLE III
UNION SECURITY WITH RESPECT TO PRESENT MEMBERS
SHHH Digests Labor Relations 2016-2017
All members of the UNION as of the signing of this Agreement shall remain
members thereof in good standing. Therefore, any members who shall resign, be
expelled, or shall in any manner cease to be a member of the UNION, shall be
dismissed from his employment upon written request of the UNION to the
Company.
Petitioners were summoned to appear before the PAFLU Trial Committee for the
aforestated investigation, however, they did not attend but requested for a "Bill of
Particulars" of the charges.
Not recognizing PAFLU's jurisdiction, petitioners again refused to participate in the
investigation rescheduled and conducted on March 9, 1979. Instead, petitioners
merely appeared to file their Answer to the charges and moved for a dismissal.
Petitioners contend in their Answer that neither the disaffiliation of the Amigo
Employees Union from PAFLU nor the act of filing the petition for certification
election constitute disloyalty as these are in the exercise of their constitutional right
to self-organization. They further contended that PAFLU was without jurisdiction to
investigate their case since the charges, being intra-union problems within the
Amigo Employees Union-PAFLU, should be conducted pursuant to the provisions of
Article XI, Sections 2, 3, 4 and 5 of the local union's constitution and by-laws.
PAFLU President rendered a decision finding the petitioners guilty of the charges
and ordered expelled and terminated.
Petitioners appealed the Decision to the PAFLU, citing the same grounds as before,
and argued that the PAFLU decision cannot legally invoke a CBA which was
unratified, not certified, and entered into without authority from the union general
membership, in asking the Company to terminate them from their employment.
The appeal was, likewise denied.
After denying petitioner's appeal, PAFLU sent a letter to the Company stating,
request for full cooperation by implementing the provision of our CBA on security
clause by terminating the respondents concerned from their employment.
Acting on PAFLU's demand, the Company informed PAFLU that it will first secure
the necessary clearances to terminate petitioners. By letter dated April 28, 1977,
PAFLU requested the Company to put petitioners under preventive suspension
pending the application for said clearances to terminate the petitioners.
The Company filed the request for clearance to terminate the petitioners before the
Department of Labor, stated as cause therefor, "Demand by the Union Pursuant to
the Union Security Clause," and further, "Termination-upon issuance of clearance;
Suspension-upon receipt of notice of workers concerned." Petitioners were then
informed by memorandum that the Company has applied for clearance to
terminate them upon demand of PAFLU, and that each of them were placed under
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preventive suspension pending the resolution of the said applications. The security
guard was, likewise, notified to refuse petitioners entry into the work premises.
5 days before petitioners were placed under preventive suspension, they filed a
complaint with application for preliminary injunction and to deny and/or setting
aside the Decision dated March 15, 1977 and the Resolution dated March 28, 1977,
issued by National President of respondent PAFLU; (3) The Appeal of the individual
complainants to the General Membership of the complainant AMIGO EMPLOYEES
UNION.
On October 14, 1977, Vicente Leogardo, Jr., Officer-in-Charge of Regional Office No.
4, rendered a decision jointly granting clearance for termination and dismissal of
application for injunction.
Petitioners appealed to the Office of the Secretary of Labor. By Order dated
February 15, 1979, the respondent Amado G. Inciong, Deputy Minister of Labor,
dismissed their appeal for lack of merit.
Issue: Whether respondent Deputy Minister acted in grave abuse of discretion
when he affirmed the decision granting the clearance to terminate the petitioners
and dismissed petitioners' complaint, and in support thereof, allege that their
constitutional right to self-organization had been impaired.
Held: It is true that disaffiliation from a labor union is not open to legal objection. It
is implicit in the freedom of association ordained by the Constitution. But this Court
has laid down the ruling that a closed shop is a valid form of union security, and
such provision in a collective bargaining agreement is not a restriction of the right
of freedom of association guaranteed by the Constitution.
The quoted stipulation for closed-shop is clear and unequivocal and it leaves no
room for doubt that the employer is bound, under the collective bargaining
agreement, to dismiss the employees, herein petitioners, for non- union
membership. Petitioners became non-union members upon their expulsion from
the general membership of the Amigo Employees Union-PAFLU on March 15, 1977
pursuant to the Decision of the PAFLU national president.
We reject petitioners' theory that their expulsion was not valid upon the grounds
adverted to earlier in this Decision. That PAFLU had the authority to investigate
petitioners on the charges filed by their co-employees in the local union and after
finding them guilty as charged, to expel them from the roll of membership of the
Amigo Employees Union-PAFLU is clear under the constitution of the PAFLU to
which the local union was affiliated. PAFLU was justified in applying said security
clause.
When a labor union affiliates with a parent organization or mother union, or
accepts a charter from a superior body, it becomes subject to the laws of the
SHHH Digests Labor Relations 2016-2017
superior body under whose authority the local union functions. The constitution,
by-laws and rules of the parent body, together with the charter it issues pursuant
thereto to the subordinate union, constitute an enforceable contract between the
parent body and the subordinate union, and between the members of the
subordinate union inter se.
It is undisputable that oppositors were members of the Amigo Employees Union at
the time that said union affiliated with PAFLU; hence, under the afore-quoted
principle, oppositors are bound by the laws and regulations of PAFLU.
Likewise, it is undeniable that in the investigation of the charges against them,
oppositors were accorded 'due process', because in this jurisdiction, the doctrine is
deeply entrenched that the term 'due process' simply means that the parties were
given the opportunity to be heard. In the instant case, ample and unmistakable
evidence exists to show that the oppositors were afforded the opportunity to
present their evidence, but they themselves disdained or spurned the said
opportunity given to them.
The contention of petitioners that the charges against them being intra-union
problems, should have been investigated in accordance with the constitution and
by-laws of the Amigo Employees Union-PAFLU and not of the PAFLU, is not
impressed with merit. It is true that under the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of the Labor Code, in case of intra-union disputes, redress must first
be sought within the organization itself in accordance with its constitution and by-
laws. However, it has been held that this requirement is not absolute but yields to
exception under varying circumstances, where exhaustion of remedies within the
union itself would practically amount to a denial of justice or would be illusory or
vain.
Thus, were the petitioners to be charged and investigated according to the local
union's constitution, they would have been tried by a trial committee of three (3)
elected from among the members of the Board who are themselves the accusers.
Petitioners would be in a far worse position had this procedure been followed.
Petitioners insist that their disaffiliation from PAFLU and filing a petition for
certification election are not acts of disloyalty but an exercise of their right to self-
organization. We find petitioners' insistence untenable.
In the first place, had petitioners merely disaffiliated from the Amigo Employees
Union-PAFLU, there could be no legal objections thereto for it was their right to do
so. But what petitioners did by the very clear terms of their "Sama-Samang
Kapasiyahan" was to disaffiliate the Amigo Employees Union-PAFLU from PAFLU, an
act which they could not have done with any effective consequence because they
constituted the minority in the Amigo Employees Union-PAFLU.
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Extant from the records is the fact that petitioners numbering ten (10), were among
the ninety-six (96) who signed the "Sama-Samang Kapasiyahan" whereas there are
two hundred thirty four (234) union members in the Amigo Employees Union-
PAFLU. Hence, petitioners constituted a small minority for which reason they could
not have successfully disaffiliated the local union from PAFLU.
Neither is there merit to petitioners' contention that they had the right to present
representation issues within the 60-day freedom period. It is true, as contended by
petitioners, that under Article 257 of the Labor Code and Section 3, Rule 2, Book 2
of its Implementing Rules, questions of exclusive bargaining representation are
entertainable within the sixty (60) days prior to the expiry date of an existing CBA,
and that they did file a petition for certification election within that period. But the
petition was filed in the name of the Amigo Employees Union which had not
disaffiliated from PAFLU, the mother union. Petitioners being a mere minority of the
local union may not bind the majority members of the local union.
Moreover, the Amigo Employees Union, as an independent union, is not duly
registered as such with the Bureau of Labor Relations. As such unregistered union,
it acquires no legal personality and is not entitled to the rights and privileges
granted by law to legitimate labor organizations upon issuance of the certificate
of registration.
The contention of petitioners that the new CBA concluded between Amigo
Employees Union-PAFLU and the Company on February 15, 1977 containing the
union security clause cannot be invoked as against the petitioners for offenses
committed earlier than its conclusion, deserves scant consideration. We find it to be
the fact that the union security clause provided in the new CBA merely reproduced
the union security clause provided in the old CBA about to expire. And since
petitioners were expelled from Amigo Employees Union-PAFLU on March 28, 1982
upon denial of their Motion for Reconsideration of the decision expelling them, the
CBA of February 15, 1977 was already applicable to their case.
A closed-shop is a valid form of union security, and a provision therefor in a
collective bargaining agreement is not a restriction of the right of freedom of
association guaranteed by the Constitution. Where in a closed-shop agreement it is
stipulated that union members who cease to be in good standing shall immediately
be dismissed, such dismissal does not constitute an unfair labor practice exclusively
cognizable by the Court of Industrial Relations.
Petitioners may not escape the effects of the security clause under either the old
CBA or the new CBA by claiming that the old CBA had expired and that the new
CBA cannot be given retroactive enforcement. To do so would be to create a gap
during which no agreement would govern, from the time the old contract expired
to the time a new agreement shall have been entered into with the union.
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We, therefore, hold and rule that petitioners, although entitled to disaffiliate from
their union and form a new organization of their own, must, however, suffer the
consequences of their separation from the union under the security clause of the
CBA.
4. Ferrer v. NLRC
GR No. 100898
July 5, 1993
Doctrine: A CBA is the law between the company and the union and compliance
therewith is mandated by the express policy to give protection to labor. A CBA
provision for a closed shop is a valid form of union security and it is not a restriction
on the right or freedom of association guaranteed by the Constitution. However, in
the implementation of the provisions of the CBA, both parties thereto should see to
it that no right is violated or impaired.
Facts: Petitioners were regular and permanent employees of the Occidental
Foundry Corporation (OFC) in Malanday, Valenzuela which was under the
management of Hui Kam Chang. As piece workers, petitioners' earnings ranged
from P110 to P140 a day. They had been employed for about ten years at the time
of their dismissal in 1989.
On January 5, 1989, the Samahang Manggagawa ng Occidental Foundry
Corporation-FFW (SAMAHAN) and the OFC entered into a CBA which would be
effective for the 3-year period between October 1, 1988 and September 30, 1991.
Article II thereof provides for a union security clause thus:
Sec. 1 — The company agrees that all permanent and regular factory workers in the
company who are members in good standing of the union or who thereafter may
become members, shall as a condition of continued employment, maintain their
membership in the union in good standing for the duration of the agreement.
Sec. 3 — The parties agree that failure to retain membership in good standing with
the UNION shall be ground for the operation of paragraph 1 hereof and the
dismissal by the company of the aforesaid employee upon written request by the
union. The aforesaid request shall be accompanied by a verified carbon original of
the Board of (sic) Resolution by the UNION signed by at least a majority of its
officers/directors.
On May 6, 1989, petitioner Ferrer and SAMAHAN, filed in the DOLE, a complaint for
the expulsion from SAMAHAN of the following officers: Genaro Capitle (president),
Jesus Tumagan (vice-president), Godofredo Pacheco (auditor), and Marcelino
Pacheco (board member) on the ground of said officers' alleged inattentiveness to
the economic demands of the workers. However, on September 4, 1989, petitioners
Diaz and Alex Ferrer withdrew the petition.
De Leon. Pamfilo. Tan. Udarbe
On September 10, 1989, petitioners conducted a special election of officers of the
SAMAHAN, which was, however, later questioned by the FFW. Nonetheless, the
elected set of officers tried to dissuade the OFC from remitting union dues to the
officers led by Capitle who were allied with the FFW. Later, however, Romulo
Erlano, one of the officers elected at the special election, manifested to the DOLE
that he was no longer objecting to the remittance of union dues to the officers led
by Capitle. Petitioners' move to stage a strike based on economic demands was also
later disowned by members of the SAMAHAN.
On September 11, 1989, a resolution expelling petitioners from the SAMAHAN was
issued by the aforesaid union officials headed by Capitle, together with some board
members. The following day, Capitle sent OFC a letter to petitioners invoking the
union security clause to dismiss Ferrer, Guzman, Diaz, Bancolita, and Ferrer, Jr.
On that same date, they had learned about their dismissal from employment as
shown by a letter which they sent the Federation of Democratic Labor Unions
(FEDLU). They volunteered therein to be admitted as members of the FEDLU and
requested that they be represented by FEDLU before the DOLE in the complaint
which they intended to file against the union (SAMAHAN), the FFW and the
company for illegal dismissal, reinstatement, and other benefits in accordance with
law.
Petitioners sent individual letters to Hui Kam Chang professing innocence of the
charges. Their letters elicited no response.
Thus, contending that their dismissal was without cause and in utter disregard of
their right to due process of law, petitioners, through the FEDLU, filed a complaint
for illegal dismissal and unfair labor practice before the NLRC against Hui Kam
Chang, OFC, Macedonio S. Velasco (as representative of the FFW) the FFW, and the
SAMAHAN officers headed by Capitle.
LA dismissed petitioners' complaint. He found that OFC was "merely complying with
the mandatory provisions of the CBA — the law between it and the union." It
concluded that such was an exercise of legitimate management prerogative which
cannot be considered as an unfair labor practice. On whether the issue of llegal
dismissal and unfair labor practice, the arbiter opined that since there was no
employer-employee relationship between petitioners and respondent unions, the
complaint against the latter has no factual and legal bases, because petitioners
"should not have confused expulsion from membership in the union as one and the
same incident to their subsequent employment termination."
Appeal to the NLRC on the grounds that there was prima facie evidence of abuse of
discretion on the part of the labor arbiter and that he committed serious errors in
his findings of facts.
SHHH Digests Labor Relations 2016-2017
NLRC affirmed in toto the decision of the LA. Petitioners MR denied, they resorted
to the instant petition for certiorari.
Issue: Whether or not NLRC gravely abused its discretion in affirming the decision of
the labor arbiter which is allegedly in defiance of the elementary principles of
procedural due process as the petitioners were summarily dismissed from
employment without an investigation having been conducted by the OFC on the
veracity of the allegation of the SAMAHAN-FFW that they violated the CBA.
Held: A CBA is the law between the company and the union and compliance
therewith is mandated by the express policy to give protection to labor. A CBA
provision for a closed shop is a valid form of union security and it is not a restriction
on the right or freedom of association guaranteed by the Constitution. However, in
the implementation of the provisions of the CBA, both parties thereto should see to
it that no right is violated or impaired. In the case at bar, while it is true that the
CBA between OFC and the SAMAHAN provided for the dismissal of employees who
have not maintained their membership in the union, the manner in which the
dismissal was enforced left much to be desired in terms of respect for the right of
petitioners to procedural due process.
In the first place, the union has a specific provision for the permanent or temporary
"expulsion" of its erring members in its constitution and by-laws. SEC. 4. Ang
sinumang kasapi ay maaring itwalag (sic) ng Samahan pangsamantala o tuluyan sa
pamamgitan (sic) ng tatlo't ikaapat (3/4) na bahagi ng dami ng bilang ng Pamunuang
Tagapapaganap. Pagkaraan lamang sa pandinig sa kanyang kaso.
No hearing was ever conducted by the SAMAHAN to look into petitioners'
explanation of their moves to oust the union leadership under Capitle, or their
subsequent affiliation with FEDLU.
OFC itself took for granted that the SAMAHAN had actually conducted an inquiry
and considered the CBA provision for the closed shop as self-operating that, upon
receipt of a notice that some members of the SAMAHAN had failed to maintain
their membership in good standing in accordance with the CBA, it summarily
dismissed petitioners.
The need for a company investigation is founded on the consistent ruling of this
Court that the twin requirements of notice and hearing which are essential
elements of due process must be met in employment-termination cases. The
employee concerned must be notified of the employer's intent to dismiss him and
of the reason or reasons for the proposed dismissal. The hearing affords the
employee an opportunity to answer the charge or charges against him and to
defend himself therefrom before dismissal is effected. Observance to the letter of
company rules on investigation of an employee about to be dismissed is not
mandatory.
De Leon. Pamfilo. Tan. Udarbe
Thus, OFC unduly exposed itself to a charge of unfair labor practice for dismissing
petitioners in line with the closed shop provision of the CBA, without a proper
hearing. While termination of employment is traditionally considered a
management prerogative, it is not an absolute prerogative subject as it is to
limitations founded in law, the CBA, or general principles of fair play and justice.
Under Rule XIV, Sections 2, 5, and 6 of the rules implementing B.P. Blg. 130, the OFC
and the SAMAHAN should solidarity indemnify petitioners for the violation of their
right to procedural due process. However, such penalty may be imposed only where
the termination of employment is justified and not when the dismissal is illegal as in
this case where the damages are in the form of back wages.
Petitioners' alleged act of sowing disunity among the members of the SAMAHAN
could have been ventilated and threshed out through a grievance procedure within
the union itself. But resort to such procedure was not pursued. Petitioners sought
the help of the FEDLU only after they had learned of the termination of their
employment upon the recommendation of Capitle. Their alleged application with
federations other than the FFW can hardly be considered as disloyalty to the
SAMAHAN, nor may the filing of such applications denote that petitioners failed to
maintain in good standing their membership in the SAMAHAN. The SAMAHAN is a
different entity from FFW, the federation to which it belonged. Neither may it, be
inferred that petitioners sought disaffiliation from the FFW for petitioners had not
formed a union distinct from that of the SAMAHAN. Parenthetically, the right of a
local union to disaffiliate from a federation in the absence of any provision in the
federation's constitution preventing disaffiliation of a local union is legal. Such right
is consistent with the constitutional guarantee of freedom of association.
Hence, while petitioners' act of holding a special election to oust Capitle, et al. may
be considered as an act of sowing disunity among the SAMAHAN members, and,
perhaps, disloyalty to the union officials, which could have been dealt with by the
union as a disciplinary matter, it certainly cannot be considered as constituting
disloyalty to the union. It was but a natural act of self-preservation that petitioners
fled to the arms of the FEDLU after the union and the OFC had tried to terminate
their employment. Petitioners should not be made accountable for such an act.
With the passage of Republic Act No. 6715 which took effect on March 21, 1989,
Article 279 of the Labor Code was amended to read as follows: Security of Tenure.
— In cases of regular employment, the employer shall not terminate the services of
an employee except for a just cause or when authorized by this Title. An employee
who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss
of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of
allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from
the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual
reinstatement.
SHHH Digests Labor Relations 2016-2017
Petitioners can receive their back wages computed from the moment their
compensation was withheld after their dismissal in 1989 up to the date of actual
reinstatement.
5. Palacol v. Ferrer-Calleja
G.R. No. 85333
February 26, 1990
Doctrine: Collective Bargaining;Special Assessments;Strict compliance with legal
requirements regarding special assessments must be observed .
Written resolution of a majority of all members of the union at a general
membership meeting required for validity of levy of a special assessment
Withdrawal of individual authorization is equivalent to no authorization at all; The
law does not require that the disauthorization must be in individual form
Payment of services rendered by union officers, not to be taken from special
assessments but from regular union duties
Facts: On October 12, 1987, the respondent Manila CCBPI Sales Force Union, as the
collective bargaining agent of all regular salesmen, regular helpers, and relief
helpers of the Manila Plant and Metro Manila Sales Office of the respondent Coca-
Cola Bottlers (Philippines), Inc. concluded a new collective bargaining agreement
with the latter. Among the compensation benefits granted to the employees was a
general salary increase to be given in lump sum including recomputation of actual
commissions earned based on the new rates of increase.
On the same day, the president of the Union submitted to the Company the
ratification by the union members of the new CBA and authorization for the
Company to deduct union dues equivalent to P10.00 every payday or P20.00 every
month and, in addition, 10% by way of special assessment, from the CBA lump-sum
pay granted to the union members. The last one among the aforementioned is the
subject of the instant petition.
As embodied in the Board Resolution of the Union dated September 29, 1987, the
purpose of the special assessment sought to be levied is "to put up a cooperative
and credit union; purchase vehicles and other items needed for the benefit of the
officers and the general membership; and for the payment for services rendered
by union officers, consultants and others."
This "Authorization and CBA Ratification" was obtained by the Union through a
secret referendum held in separate local membership meetings on various dates.
Subsequently however, one hundred seventy (170) members of the Union
submitted documents to the Company stating that although they have ratified the
De Leon. Pamfilo. Tan. Udarbe
new CBA, they are withdrawing or disauthorizing the deduction of any amount from
their CBA lump sum. Later, 185 other union members submitted similar documents
expressing the same intent. These members, numbering 355 in all (170 + 185),
added to the original oppositors of 173, turned the tide in favor of disauthorization
for the special assessment, with a total of 528 objectors and a remainder of 272
supporters. On account of the above-mentioned disauthorization, the Company,
being in a quandary as to whom to remit the payment of the questioned amount,
filed an action for interpleader with the Bureau of Labor Relations in order to
resolve the conflicting claims of the parties concerned. Petitioners, who are regular
rank-and-file employees of the Company and bona fide members of the Union,
filed a motion/complaint for intervention therein in two groups. They claimed to
be among those union members who either did not sign any individual written
authorization, or having signed one, subsequently withdrew or retracted their
signatures therefrom.
Petitioners assailed the 10% special assessment as a violation of Article 241(o) in
relation to Article 222(b) of the Labor Code.
Union countered that the deductions not only have the popular indorsement and
approval of the general membership, but likewise complied with the legal
requirements of Article 241 (n) and (o) of the Labor Code in that the board
resolution of the Union imposing the questioned special assessment had been
duly approved in a general membership meeting and that the collection of a
special fund for labor education and research is mandated.
Med-Arbiter Manases T. Cruz ruled in favor of petitioners in an order dated
February 15, 1988 whereby he directed the Company to remit the amount it had
kept in trust directly to the rank-and-file personnel without delay.
On appeal to the Bureau of Labor Relations, however, the order of the Med-Arbiter
was reversed and set aside by the respondent-Director.
Issue: WON the deduction of the 10% special assessment by the Union was not
made in accordance with the requirements provided by law.
Held: Yes. The principle "that employees are protected by law from unwarranted
practices that diminish their compensation without their known edge and consent"
is in accord with the constitutional principle of the State affording full protection to
labor.
Collective Bargaining;Special Assessments;Strict compliance with legal
requirements regarding special assessments must be observed
The respondent-Union brushed aside the defects pointed out by petitioners in the
manner of compliance with the legal requirements as "insignificant technicalities."
On the contrary, the failure of the Union to comply strictly with the requirements
SHHH Digests Labor Relations 2016-2017 De Leon. Pamfilo. Tan. Udarbe
set out by the law invalidates the questioned special assessment. Substantial
compliance is not enough in view of the fact that the special assessment will
diminish the compensation of the union members. Their express consent is
required, and this consent must be obtained in accordance with the steps outlined
by law, which must be followed to the letter. No shortcuts are allowed. The
applicable provisions are clear. The Union itself admits that both paragraphs (n) and
(o) of Article 241 apply. Paragraph (n) refers to "levy" while paragraph (o) refers to
"check-off" of a special assessment. Both provisions must be complied with. Under
paragraph (n), the Union must submit to the Company a written resolution of a
majority of all the members at a general membership meeting duly called for the
purpose. In addition, the secretary of the organization must record the minutes of
the meeting which, in turn, must include, among others, the list of all the members
present as well as the votes cast.
Written resolution of a majority of all members of the union at a general
membership meeting required for validity of levy of a special assessment
As earlier outlined by petitioners, the Union obviously failed to comply with the
requirements of paragraph (n). It held local membership meetings on separate
occasions, on different dates and at various venues, contrary to the express
requirement that there must be a general membership meeting. The contention of
the Union that "the local membership meetings are precisely the very general
meetings required by law" is untenable because the law would not have specified a
general membership meeting had the legislative intent been to allow local meetings
in lieu of the latter. It submitted only minutes of the local membership meetings
when what is required is a written resolution adopted at the general meeting.
Worse still, the minutes of three of those local meetings held were recorded by a
union director and not by the union secretary. The minutes submitted to the
Company contained no list of the members present and no record of the votes cast.
Since it is quite evident that the Union did not comply with the law at every turn,
the only conclusion that may be made therefrom is that there was no valid levy of
the special assessment pursuant to paragraph (n) of Article 241 of the Labor Code.
Withdrawal of individual authorization is equivalent to no authorization at all;
The law does not require that the disauthorization must be in individual form
Paragraph (o) on the other hand requires an individual written authorization duly
signed by every employee in order that a special assessment may be validly
checked-off. Even assuming that the special assessment was validly levied pursuant
to paragraph (n), and granting that individual written authorizations were obtained
by the Union, nevertheless there can be no valid check-off considering that the
majority of the union members had already withdrawn their individual
authorizations. A withdrawal of individual authorizations is equivalent to no
authorization at all. Hence, the ruling in Galvadores that "no check-offs from any
amounts due employees may be effected without an individual written
authorization signed by the employees ... " is applicable.
Payment of services rendered by union officers, not to be taken from special
assessments but from regular union duties
Of the stated purposes of the special assessment, as embodied in the board
resolution of the Union, only the collection of a special fund for labor and education
research is mandated, as correctly pointed out by the Union. The two other
purposes, namely, the purchase of vehicles and other items for the benefit of the
union officers and the general membership, and the payment of services rendered
by union officers, consultants and others, should be supported by the regular union
dues, there being no showing that the latter are not sufficient to cover the same.
The last stated purpose is contended by petitioners to fall under the coverage of
Article 222 (b) of the Labor Code. The contention is impressed with merit. Article
222 (b) prohibits attorney's fees, negotiations fees and similar charges arising out of
the conclusion of a collective bargaining agreement from being imposed on any
individual union member. The collection of the special assessment partly for the
payment for services rendered by union officers, consultants and others may not be
in the category of "attorney's fees or negotiations fees." But there is no question
that it is an exaction which falls within the category of a "similar charge," and,
therefore, within the coverage of the prohibition in the aforementioned article.
6. Benjamin Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers’ Union
G.R. No. L-25246
September 12, 1974
Doctrine: The right to join a union includes the right to abstain from joining any
union. However, the right to refrain from joining labor organizations recognized by
the Industrial Peace Act is limited, as in a closed shop agreement. In a closed shop
agreement, the employer may employ only members of the collective bargaining
union, and the employees must continue to be members of the union for the duration
of the contract in order to keep their jobs. An exception to this is provided for by
R.A. 3350 which excludes ipso jure from the application and coverage of the closed
shop agreement the employees belonging to any religious sects which prohibit
affiliation of their members with any labor organization.
Facts: Benjamin Victoriano, a member of Iglesia ni Cristo was employed by
Elizalde Rope Factory, Inc. Said company has a closed shop agreement with Elizalde
Rope Workers’ Union, to which Victoriano was a member. (The closed shop
provison provides that membership in the union is mandatory as a condition for
employment for all permanent employee workers covered by said agreement.)
Prior to the amendment of the Industrial Peace Act, the law governing the right to
form associations, the employer was not precluded “from making an agreement with
SHHH Digests Labor Relations 2016-2017
a labor organization to require as a condition of employment membership therein, if
such labor organization is the representative of the employees.” The exception was
provided upon the amendment of the Industrial Peace Act by R.A. 3350 which
provides that “such agreement shall not cover any members of any religious sects
which prohibit affiliation of their members in such labor organization.”
Being a member of INC which prohibits affiliation to unions, Victoriano resigned
from the Union. The Union, in turn, sought for the separation of Victoriano from
service in view of the fact that he was resigning from the Union as a member. The
Company then told Victoriano that unless he and the Union arrive in a satisfactory
arrangement, they will be constrained to dismiss him.
Victoriano filed for an action for injunction with the CFI against the Union and the
Company to which the CFI ruled in his favor.
The Union appealed directly to the Supreme Court.
Issue: WON R.A. 3350 infringes on the fundamental right to form lawful
associations when it prohibits members of certain religious sects from joining unions
should their belief system so dictate; and, consequently, deprives said members of
their constitutional right to form or join lawful associations or organizations
guaranteed by the Bill of Rights
Held: Exception to closed shop agreement provided for employees prohibited by
their religion from joining any union.
De Leon. Pamfilo. Tan. Udarbe
Doctrine: The Labor Code (PD 442) allowed supervisors (if not managerial) to join
rank-and-file unions. And under the Implementing Rules of RA 6715, supervisors
who were members of existing labor organizations on the effectivity of said RA 6715
were explicitly authorized to "remain therein."
Facts: Under the Industrial Peace Act, GOCCs had the duty to bargain collectively
and were otherwise subject to the obligations and duties of employers in the private
sector. The Act also prohibited supervisors to become, or continue to be,
members of labor organizations composed of rank-and-file employees, and
prescribed criminal sanctions for breach of the prohibition. 
It was under the regime of said Industrial Peace Act that GSIS became bound by a
CBA executed between it and the labor organization representing the majority of its
employees, the GSIS Employees Association. The agreement contained a
"maintenance-of-membership" clause,  i.e., that all employees who, at the time of
the execution of said agreement, were members of the union or became members
thereafter, were obliged to maintain their union membership in good standing for the
duration of the agreement as a condition for their continued employment in the
GSIS.
There appears to be no dispute that at that time, the petitioners occupied supervisory
positions in the GSIS. Pablo Arizala and Sergio Maribao were, respectively, the
Chief of the Accounting Division, and the Chief of the Billing Section of said
Division, in the Central Visayas Regional Office of the GSIS.

No. What the exception provides, therefore, is that members of said religious sects
cannot be compelled or coerced to join labor unions even when said unions have
closed shop agreements with the employers; that in spite of any closed shop
agreement, members of said religious sects cannot be refused employment or
dismissed from their jobs on the sole ground that they are not members of the
collective bargaining union.
If, notwithstanding their religious beliefs, the members of said religious sects prefer
to sign up with the labor union, they can do so. If in deference and fealty to their
religious faith, they refuse to sign up, they can do so; the law does not coerce them to
join; neither does the law prohibit them from joining; and neither may the employer
or labor union compel them to join. Republic Act No. 3350, therefore, does not
violate the constitutional provision on freedom of association. 
7. Pablo Arizala, et. al v. Court of Appeals
GR No. 43633-34
September 14, 1990
Leonardo Joven and Felino Bulandus were, respectively, the Assistant Chief of the
Accounting Division (sometimes Acting Chief in the absence of the Chief) and the
Assistant Chief of the Field Service and Non-Life Insurance Division (and Acting
Division Chief in the absence of the Chief), of the same Central Visayas Regional
Office of the GSIS.
Demands were made on all four of them to resign from the GSIS Employees
Association, in view of their supervisory positions. They refused to do so.
Consequently, 2 criminal cases for violation of the Industrial Peace Act were lodged
against them in the City Court of Cebu: one involving Arizala and Maribao and the
other, Joven and Bulandus. Both criminal actions resulted in the conviction of the
accused in separate decisions. 
The appellants moved for reconsideration. They argued that when the so called
"1973 Constitution" took effect on January 17, 1973 pursuant to Proclamation No.
1104, the case of Arizala and Maribao was still pending in the Court of Appeals and
that of Joven and Bulandus, pending decision in the City Court of Cebu; that since
the provisions of that constitution and of the Labor Code subsequently promulgated
(eff., November 1, 1974), repealing the Industrial Peace Act-placed employees of all
SHHH Digests Labor Relations 2016-2017 De Leon. Pamfilo. Tan. Udarbe
categories in government-owned or controlled corporations without distinction
within the Civil Service, and provided that the terms and conditions of their
employment were to be "governed by the Civil Service Law, rules and regulations"
and hence, no longer subject of collective bargaining, the appellants ceased to fall
within the coverage of the Industrial Peace Act and should thus no longer
continue to be prosecuted and exposed to punishment for a violation.
They pointed out further that the criminal sanction in the Industrial Peace Act no
longer appeared in the Labor Code. The Appellate Court denied their plea for
reconsideration.Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari.
Issue: WON petitioners’ criminal liability for violation of Industrial Peace Act have
been obliterated in virtue of subsequent legislation and provisions of 1973 and 1987
Constitutions
Held: Yes. The petitioners appear to be correct in their view of the disappearance
from the law of the prohibition on supervisors being members of labor organizations
composed of employees under their supervision. The Labor Code (PD 442)
allowed supervisors (if not managerial) to join rank-and-file unions. And under
the Implementing Rules of RA 6715, supervisors who were members of existing
labor organizations on the effectivity of said RA 6715 were explicitly authorized to
"remain therein."
Supervisory Employees. The decisive consideration is that at present, supervisors
who were already members of a rank-and-file labor organization at the time of the
effectivity of R.A. No. 6715, are authorized to "remain therein." It seems plain, in
other words, that the maintenance by supervisors of membership in a rank-and-file
labor organization even after the enactment of a statute imposing a prohibition on
such membership, is not only not a crime, but is explicitly allowed, under present
law.
Right to Organize. EO 111. The petitioners contend that the right of self-
organization and collective bargaining had been withdrawn by the Labor Code from
government employees including those in government-owned and controlled
corporations- chiefly for the reason that the terms and conditions of government
employment, all embraced in civil service, may not be modified by collective
bargaining because set by law.
Executive Order No. 111, issued by President Corazon C. Aquino on December 24,
1986 in the exercise of legislative powers under the Freedom Constitution, modified
the general disqualification above mentioned of 'government employees, including
employees of government-owned and/or controlled corporations" from "the right to
self-organization and to form, join or assist labor organizations for purposes of
collective bargaining.' It granted to employees "of government corporations
established under the Corporation Code x x the right to organize and to bargain
collectively with their respective employers."  To all 'other employees in the civil
service, ... (it granted merely) the right to form associations for purposes not contrary
to law,"  not for "purposes of collective bargaining."
And EO 180, and apparently RA 6715, too, granted to all government employees the
right of collective bargaining or negotiation except as regards those terms of their
employment which were fixed by law; and as to said terms fixed by law, they were
prohibited to strike to obtain changes thereof.
Unfair Labor Practice. The correctness of the petitioners' theory that unfair labor
practices ceased to be crimes and were deemed merely administrative offenses in
virtue of the Labor Code, cannot be gainsaid. Article 250 of the Labor Code did
provide as follows:
ART. 250. Concept of unfair labor practice.-The concept of unfair labor practice is
hereby modified. Henceforth, it shall be considered merely as an administrative
offense rather than a criminal offense. Unfair labor practice complaints shall,
therefore, be processed like any ordinary labor disputes.
But unfair labor practices were declared to be crimes again by later amendments of
the Labor Code effected by Batas Pambansa Blg. 70, approved on May 1, 1980. As
thus amended, the Code now pertinently reads as follows:
ART. 248. Concept of unfair labor practice and procedure for prosecution thereof.
— Unfair labor practices violate the right of workers and employees to self
organization, are inimical to the legitimate interests of both labor and management
including their right to bargain collectively and otherwise deal with each other in an
atmosphere of freedom and mutual respect, and hinder the promotion of healthy and
stable labor management relations. Consequently, unfair labor practices are not only
violations of the civil rights of both labor and management but are also offenses
against the State which shall be subject to prosecution and punishment as herein
provided.
Recovery of civil liability in the administrative proceedings shall bar recovery under
the Civil Code.
No criminal prosecution under this title may be instituted without a final judgment,
finding that an unfair labor practice was committed having been first obtained in the
preceding paragraph.
Effects of Repeal. The repeal of a penal law deprives the courts of jurisdiction to
punish persons charged with a violation of the old penal law prior to its repeal. The
foregoing precedents dictate absolution of the appellants of the offenses imputed to
them.
SHHH Digests Labor Relations 2016-2017 De Leon. Pamfilo. Tan. Udarbe