SHHH Digests Labor Relations 2016-2017
Udarbe
1. SSS Employees Association v. Court of Appeals
GR No. 85279
July 28, 1989
SSS is a GOCC with an original charter. Its employees are part of civil service; thus,
covered by CSC’s memorandum prohibiting strikes.
Facts:  SSS filed with the RTC of Quezon City a complaint for damages with a
prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction against petitioners, alleging that on June 9,
1987, the officers and members of SSSEA staged an illegal strike and barricaded
the entrances to the SSS Building, preventing non-striking employees from
reporting for work and SSS members from transacting business with the SSS.
The strike was reported to the Public Sector Labor - Management Council, which
ordered the strikers to return to work; that the strikers refused to return to work; and
that the SSS suffered damages as a result of the strike. The complaint prayed that a
writ of preliminary injunction be issued to enjoin the strike and that the strikers be
ordered to return to work; that the defendants (petitioners herein) be ordered to pay
damages; and that the strike be declared illegal.
It appears that the SSSEA went on strike after the SSS failed to act on the union's
demands, which included: implementation of the provisions of the old SSS-SSSEA
collective bargaining agreement (CBA) on check-off of union dues; payment of
accrued overtime pay, night differential pay and holiday pay; conversion of
temporary or contractual employees with 6 months or more of service into regular
and permanent employees and their entitlement to the same salaries, allowances and
benefits given to other regular employees of the SSS; and payment of the children's
allowance of P30.00, and after the SSS deducted certain amounts from the salaries of
the employees and allegedly committed acts of discrimination and unfair labor
practices.
Petitioners filed a motion to dismiss alleging the trial court's lack of jurisdiction over
the subject matter. The court a quo denied the motion to dismiss and converted the
restraining order into an injunction upon posting of a bond, after finding that the
strike was illegal. Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction before this Court.  
The Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the petitioners from staging
another strike or from pursuing the notice of strike they filed with the DOLE and to
maintain the status quo
The position of the petitioners is that the RTC had no jurisdiction to hear the case
initiated by the SSS and to issue the restraining order and the writ of preliminary
De Leon. Tan.
injunction, as jurisdiction lay with the Department of Labor and Employment or the
National Labor Relations Commission, since the case involves a labor dispute.
On the other hand, the SSS advances the contrary view, on the ground that the
employees of the SSS are covered by civil service laws and rules and regulations, not
the Labor Code, therefore they do not have the right to strike. Since neither the
DOLE nor the NLRC has jurisdiction over the dispute, the Regional Trial Court may
enjoin the employees from striking.
In dismissing the petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction
filed by petitioners, the CA held that since the employees of the SSS, are government
employees, they are not allowed to strike, and may be enjoined by the Regional Trial
Court, which had jurisdiction over the SSS' complaint for damages, from continuing
with their strike.
Issue: 1. WON SSS employees have a right to strike
2. WON RTC has jurisdiction to hear the case initiated by SSS and to enjoin the
strikers from continuing with the strike and to order them to return to work
Held:
1. Yes. Considering that under the 1987 Constitution "[t]he civil service embraces all
branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including
government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters" [Art. IX(B),
Sec. .2(l) see also Sec. 1 of E.O. No. 180 where the employees in the civil service are
denominated as "government employees"] and that the SSS is one such
government-controlled corporation with an original charter, having been
created under R.A. No. 1161, its employees are part of the civil service
[NASECO v. NLRC, G.R. Nos. 69870 & 70295, November 24,1988] and are
covered by the Civil Service Commission's memorandum prohibiting strikes.
This being the case, the strike staged by the employees of the SSS was illegal.
Rationale for distinguishing between workers in the private sector and
government employees with regard to the right to strike
The general rule in the past and up to the present is that 'the terms and conditions of
employment in the Government, including any political subdivision or
instrumentality thereof are governed by law" (Section 11, the Industrial Peace Act,
R.A. No. 875, as amended and Article 277, the Labor Code, P.D. No. 442, as
amended). Since the terms and conditions of government employment are fixed by
law, government workers cannot use the same weapons employed by workers in the
private sector to secure concessions from their employers. 
The principle behind labor unionism in private industry is that industrial peace
cannot be secured through compulsion by law. Relations between private employers
SHHH Digests Labor Relations 2016-2017
and their employees rest on an essentially voluntary basis. Subject to the minimum
requirements of wage laws and other labor and welfare legislation, the terms and
conditions of employment in the unionized private sector are settled through the
process of collective bargaining. In government employment, however, it is the
legislature and, where properly given delegated power, the administrative heads
of government which fix the terms and conditions of employment. And this is
effected through statutes or administrative circulars, rules, and regulations, not
through collective bargaining agreements.  of the service; and absence without official leave in violation of PD 807, otherwise
The terms and conditions of employment in the government including any political
subdivision or instrumentality and government-owned and controlled corporations
with original charters are governed by law and employees therein shall not strike for
the purpose of securing changes thereof.
2. Yes. RTC was not precluded, in the exercise of its general jurisdiction under B.P.
Blg. 129, as amended, from assuming jurisdiction over the SSS's complaint for
damages and issuing the injunctive writ prayed for therein. Unlike the NLRC, the
Public Sector Labor - Management Council has not been granted by law authority to
issue writs of injunction in labor disputes within its jurisdiction. Thus, since it is the
Council, and not the NLRC, that has jurisdiction over the instant labor dispute, resort
to the general courts of law for the issuance of a writ of injunction to enjoin the strike
is appropriate.
The Labor Code itself provides that terms and conditions of employment of
government employees shall be governed by the Civil Service Law, rules and
regulations. NLRC clearly has no jurisdiction over the dispute at bar.
It is futile for the petitioners to assert that the subject labor dispute falls within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRC and, hence, the Regional Trial Court had no
jurisdiction to issue a writ of injunction enjoining the continuance of the strike. The
Labor Code itself provides that terms and conditions of employment of government
employees shall be governed by the Civil Service Law, rules and regulations [Art.
276]. More importantly, E.O. No. 180 vests the Public Sector Labor - Management
Council with jurisdiction over unresolved labor disputes involving government
employees [Sec. 16]. Clearly, the NLRC has no jurisdiction over the dispute.
2. Bangalisan v. CA
GR No. 124678
July 31, 1997
Strike of government employees NOT allowed
Facts: Petitioners, except Rodolfo Mariano, were among the 800 public school
teachers who staged "mass actions" on September 17 to 19, 1990 to dramatize their
De Leon. Tan. Udarbe
grievances concerning the alleged failure of the public authorities to implement in a
just and correct manner certain laws and measures intended for their material benefit.
On September 17, 1990, the Secretary of the DECS issued a Return-to-Work Order.
Petitioners failed to comply with said order, hence they were charged by the
Secretary with "grave misconduct; gross neglect of duty; gross violation of Civil
Service law, rules and regulations and reasonable office regulations; refusal to
perform official duty; gross insubordination; conduct prejudicial to the best interest
known as the Civil Service Decree of the Philippines." They were simultaneously
placed under preventive suspension.
Despite due notice, they failed to submit their answer to the complaint. On October
30, 1990, the DECS Secretary rendered a decision finding petitioners guilty as
charged and dismissing them from the service effective immediately.
Acting on the MR filed by petitioners Bangalisan, Gregorio, Cabalfin, Mercado,
Montances and Pagpaguitan, the Secretary subsequently modified the penalty of
dismissal to suspension for nine months without pay.
Petitioner Gomez likewise moved for reconsideration with the DECS and then
appealed to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB). The other petitioners also
filed individual appeals to the MSPB, but all of their appeals were dismissed for lack
of merit.
Not satisfied, petitioners appealed to the CSC, which were dismissed for having been
filed out of time. On MR, however, the CSC decided to rule on the merits of their
appeal in the interest of justice.
Thereafter, the CSC issued Resolution No. 94-1765 finding Cabalfin guilty of
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and imposing on him a penalty
of six months suspension without pay. The CSC also issued Resolutions Nos. 94-
2806 and 94-2384 affirming the penalty of nine months suspension without pay
imposed on petitioners Montances and Pagpaguitan.
With respect to the appeals of the other petitioners, the CSC also found them guilty
of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. It, however, modified the
penalty of 9 months suspension previously meted to them to 6months suspension
with automatic reinstatement in the service but without payment of back wages.
All the petitioners moved for reconsideration of the CSC resolutions but these were
all denied, except that of petitioner Rodolfo Mariano who was found guilty only of a
violation of reasonable office rules and regulations because of his failure to inform
the school of his intended absence and to file an application for leave therefor, and
was given only a reprimand.
Petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari with this Court but their petition was
referred to the CA pursuant to Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95.
SHHH Digests Labor Relations 2016-2017
CA dismissed the petition for lack of merit. MR was also denied.
It is the settled rule in this jurisdiction that employees in the public service may not
engage in strikes. Petitioners contend, however, that they were not on strike but were
merely exercising their constitutional right peaceably to assemble and petition the
government for redress of grievances.
Issue:
WON the mass action launched by the public school teachers was a strike.
WON Memorandum Circular No. 6 was constitutional.
WON petitioners may be entitled to back wages.
Held:
It is the settled rule in this jurisdiction that employees in the public service may
not engage in strikes. While the Constitution recognizes the right of government
employees to organize, they are prohibited from staging strikes,
demonstrations, mass leaves, walk-outs and other forms of mass action which
will result in temporary stoppage or disruption of public services. The right of
government employees to organize is limited only to the formation of unions or
associations, without including the right to strike.
It is an undisputed fact that there was a work stoppage and that petitioners' purpose
was to realize their demands by withholding their services. The fact that the
conventional term "strike" was not used by the striking employees to describe their
common course of action is inconsequential, since the substance of the situation, and
not its appearance, will be deemed to be controlling.
The actuations of petitioners definitely constituted conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service, punishable under the Civil Service law, rules and regulations
because of their successive unauthorized and unilateral absences which produced
adverse effects upon their students for whose education they are responsible.
It bears stressing that suspension of public services, however temporary, will
inevitably derail services to the public, which is one of the reasons why the right to
strike is denied government employees. Their righteous indignation does not legalize
an illegal work stoppage.
The resolution of the said issue is not really necessary in the case at bar. As a general
rule, even in the absence of express statutory prohibition like Memorandum Circular
No. 6, public employees are denied the right to strike or engage in a work stoppage
against a public employer. To grant employees of the public sector the right to strike,
there must be a clear and direct legislative authority therefor.
Section 51 of Executive Order No. 292 provides that "(t)he proper disciplining
authority may preventively suspend any subordinate officer or employee under his
authority pending an investigation, if the charge against such officer or employee
involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct, or neglect in the performance
De Leon. Tan. Udarbe
of duty, or if there are reasons to believe that the respondent is guilty of charges
which would warrant his removal from the service."
In the instant case, herein petitioners were charged by the Secretary of the DECS.
Hence, on the basis of the charges against them, it was within the competence of the
Secretary to place herein petitioners under preventive suspension.
As to the immediate execution of the decision of the Secretary against petitioners,
the same is authorized by Section 47, paragraph (2), of Executive Older No. 292,
thus: "The Secretaries and heads of agencies and instrumentalities, provinces, cities
and municipalities shall have jurisdiction to investigate and decide matters involving
disciplinary action against officers and employees under their jurisdiction. Their
decisions shall be final in case the penalty imposed is suspension for not more than
thirty days or fine in an amount not exceeding thirty days' salary. In case the decision
rendered by a bureau or office head is appealable to the Commission, the same shall
be executory except when the penalty is removal, in which case the same shall be
executory only after confirmation by the Secretary concerned."
Petitioners' claim of denial of due process must also fail. The records of this case
clearly show that they were given opportunity to refute the charges against them but
they failed to avail themselves of the same.
Such payment of salaries corresponding to the period when an employee is not
allowed to work may be decreed if he is found innocent of the charges which
caused the suspension and when the suspension is unjustified.
With respect to petitioner Rodolfo Mariano, payment of his back wages is in order.
A reading of the resolution of the Civil Service Commission will show that he was
exonerated of the charges which formed the basis for his suspension. The CSC made
a finding that Mariano was not involved in the "mass actions" but was absent
because he was in Ilocos Sur to attend the wake and interment of his grandmother.
Although the CSC imposed upon him the penalty of reprimand, the same was for his
violation of reasonable office rules and regulations because he failed to inform the
school or his intended absence and neither did he file an application for leave
covering such absences.
However, with regard to the other petitioners, the payment of their back wages must
be denied. Although the penalty imposed on them was only suspension, they were
not completely exonerated of the charges against them.
The denial of salary to an employee during the period of his suspension, if he should
later be found guilty, is proper because he had given ground for his suspension. It
does not impair his constitutional rights because the Constitution itself allows
suspension for cause as provided by law and the law provides that an employee may
be suspended pending an investigation or by way of penalty.
Moreover, the general proposition is that a public official is not entitled to any
compensation if he has not rendered any service. As he works, he shall earn.
SHHH Digests Labor Relations 2016-2017 De Leon. Tan. Udarbe
The appeal board's modified decision did not exonerate the employee nor did it affect
the validity of his dismissal or separation from work pending appeal, as ordered by Issue: 1. Whether the strike declared by NFSW is illegal
the Civil Service Commissioner. 2. Whether under Presidential Decree 851 (13th Month Pay Law), CAC is obliged to
give its workers a 13th month salary in addition to Christmas, milling and
3. National Federation of Sugar Workers v. Ovejera
amelioration bonuses, the aggregate of which admittedly exceeds by far the
GR. No. L-59743
disputed 13th month pay.
May 31, 1982
The prescribed cooling-off period in Art. 264(c) and the 7-day strike ban after the
Held:
strike-vote report prescribed in Art. 264(f) were meant to be, and should be
1. The provisions hardly leave any room for doubt that the cooling-off period in
deemed, mandatory.
Art. 264(c) and the 7-day strike ban after the strike-vote report prescribed in Art.
264(f) were meant to be, and should be deemed, mandatory.
Facts: NFSW has been the bargaining agent of Central Azucarera de la Carlota (CAC)
rank and file employees and has concluded with CAC a collective bargaining
When the law says "the labor union may strike" should the dispute "remain
agreement effective February 16, 1981 — February 15, 1984. Under Art. VII, Sec. 5
unsettled until the lapse of the requisite number of days (cooling-off period) from
of the said CBA —
the filing of the notice," the unmistakable implication is that the union may not
Bonuses — The parties also agree to maintain the present practice on the grant of
strike before the lapse of the cooling-off period. Similarly, the mandatory character
Christmas bonus, milling bonus, and amelioration bonus to the extent as the
of the 7-day strike ban after the report on the strike-vote is manifest in the
latter is required by law. The Christmas and milling bonuses amount to 1-½
provision that "in every case," the union shall furnish the MOLE with the results of
months' salary.
the voting "at least seven (7) days before the intended strike, subject to the
(prescribed) cooling-off period." It must be stressed that the requirements of
November 28, 1981, NFSW struck allegedly to compel the payment of the 13th
cooling-off period and 7-day strike ban must both be complied with, although the
month pay under PD 851, in addition to the Christmas, milling and amelioration
labor union may take a strike vote and report the same within the statutory cooling-
bonuses being enjoyed by CAC workers. To settle the strike, a compromise
off period.
agreement was concluded between CAC and NFSW.
Purpose of strike notice and strike vote
January 22, 1982, NFSW filed with the Ministry of Labor and Employment (MOLE)
In requiring a strike notice and a cooling-off period, the avowed intent of the law is
Regional Office in Bacolod City a notice to strike based on non-payment of the 13th
to provide an opportunity for mediation and conciliation. It thus directs the MOLE
month pay. Six days after, NFSW struck. One day after the commencement of the
"to exert all efforts at mediation and conciliation to effect a voluntary settlement"
strike, or on January 29, 1982, a report of the strike-vote was filed by NFSW with
during the cooling-off period.
MOLE.
Waiting period after strike notice and strike-vote report, valid regulation of right
February 8, 1982, CAC filed a petition (R.A.B. Case No. 0110-82) with the Regional
to strike
Arbitration Branch VI-A, MOLE, at Bacolod City to declare the strike illegal,
The right to strike, because of its more serious impact upon the public interest, is
principally for being violative of Batas Pambansa Blg. 130, that is, the strike was
more vulnerable to regulation than the right to organize and select representatives
declared before the expiration of the 15-day cooling-off period for unfair labor
for lawful purposes of collective bargaining. The cooling-off period and the 7-day
practice (ULP) strikes, and the strike was staged before the lapse of seven days from
strike ban after the filing of a strike- vote report, as prescribed in Art. 264 of the
the submission to MOLE of the result of the strike-vote. After the submission of
Labor Code, are reasonable restrictions and their imposition is essential to attain
position papers and hearing, Labor Arbiter Ovejera declared the NFSW strike illegal.
the legitimate policy objectives embodied in the law. We hold that they constitute a
valid exercise of the police power of the state.
On February 26, 1982, the NFSW — by passing the NLRC — filed the instant Petition
for prohibition alleging that Labor Arbiter Ovejera, CAC and the PC Provincial
2. No. The evident intention of the law, as revealed by the law itself, was to grant
Commander of Negros Occidental were threatening to immediately enforce the
an additional income in the form of a 13th month pay to employees not already
February 20, 1982 decision which would violate fundamental rights of the
receiving the same. Otherwise put, the intention was to grant some relief — not to
petitioner.
SHHH Digests Labor Relations 2016-2017
all workers — but only to the unfortunate ones not actually paid a 13th month
salary or what amounts to it, by whatever name called; but it was not envisioned
that a double burden would be imposed on the employer already paying his
employees a 13th month pay or its equivalent — whether out of pure generosity or
on the basis of a binding agreement and, in the latter ease, regardless of the
conditional character of the grant (such as making the payment dependent on
profit), so long as there is actual payment. Otherwise, what was conceived to be a
13th month salary would in effect become a 14th or possibly 15th month pay.
This view is justified by the law itself which makes no distinction in the grant of
exemption: "Employers already paying their employees a 13th month pay or its
equivalent are not covered by this Decree."
To require employers (already giving their employees a 13th month salary or its
equivalent) to give a second 13th month pay would be unfair and productive of
undesirable results. To the employer who had acceded and is already bound to give
bonuses to his employees, the additional burden of a 13th month pay would
amount to a penalty for his munificence or liberality. The probable reaction of one
so circumstance would be to withdraw the bonuses or resist further voluntary
grants for fear that if and when a law is passed giving the same benefits, his prior
concessions might not be given due credit; and this negative attitude would have an
adverse impact on the employees.
Note
Art. 264,Strikes, picketing and lockouts. — ...
(c) In cases of bargaining deadlocks, the certified or duly recognized
bargaining representative may file a notice of strike with the Ministry (of Labor and
Employment) at least thirty (30) days before the intended date thereof. In cases of
unfair labor practices, the period of notice shall be shortened tofifteen (15) days; ...
(d) During the cooling-off period, it shall be the duty of the voluntary
settlement. Should the dispute remain unsettled until the lapse of the requisite
number of days from the mandatory filing of the notice, the labor union may strike
or the employer may declare a lockout.
(f) A decision to declae a strike must be approved by at least two-thirds (2/3)
of the total union membership in the bargaining unit concerened by secret ballots
in meetings or referenda. A decision to declae a lockout must be approved by at
least two-thirds (2/3) of the board of direcotrs of the employer corporation or
association or of the partners in a partnership obtained by secret ballot in a meeting
called for the purpose. the decision shall be valid for the duration of the dispute
based on substantially the same grounds considered when the strike or lockout
vote was taken . The Ministry, may at its own intitiative or upon the request of any
affected party, supervise the conduct of the secret balloting. In every case, the
union of the employer shall furnish the Ministry the results of the voting at least
De Leon. Tan. Udarbe
seven (7) days before the intended strike or lockout, subject to the cooling-off period
herein provided. (Emphasis supplied).
ART. 265. Prohibited activities. — It shall be unlawful for any labor organization or
employer to declare a strike or lockout without first having bargained collectively in
accordance with Title VII of this Book or without first having filed the notice
required in the preceding Article or without the necessary strike or lockout vote
first having been obtained and reported to the Ministry.
It shall likewise be unlawful to declare a strike or lockout after assumption of
jurisdiction by the President or the Minister or after certification or submission of
the dispute to compulsory or voluntary arbitration or during the pendency of cases
involving the same grounds for the strike or lockout.
4. GOLD City Integrated Port Service, Inc. v. NLRC
GR. No. 103560;
July 6, 1995
Reinstatement and Backwages during illegal strike
Facts: On April 30, 1985, petitioner's employees stopped working and gathered in a
mass action to express their grievances regarding wages, thirteenth month pay and
hazard pay. Said employees were all members of the Macajalar Labor Union —
Federation of Free Workers (MLU-FFW) with whom petitioner had an existing
CBA.
Petitioner was engaged in stevedoring and arrastre services at the port of Cagayan de
Oro. The strike paralyzed operations at said port. The strikers filed individual notices
of strike ("Kaugalingon nga Declarasyon sa Pag-Welga") with the then Ministry of
Labor and Employment.
With the failure of conciliation conferences between petitioner and the strikers,
INPORT filed a complaint before the LA for Illegal Strike with prayer for a
restraining order/preliminary injunction. On May 7, 1985, the NLRC issued a TRO.
Thereafter, majority of the strikers returned to work, leaving private respondents who
continued their protest.
Counsel for private respondents filed a manifestation that petitioner required prior
screening conducted by the MLU-FFW before the remaining strikers could be
accepted back to work.
Meanwhile, counsel for the Macajalar Labor Union filed a "Motion to Drop Most of
the Party Respondents From the Above Entitled Case." The 278 employees claimed
that they were duped or tricked into signing the individual notices of strike. After
discovering this deception and verifying that the strike was staged by a minority of
the union officers and members and without the approval of, or consultation with,
majority of the union members, they immediately withdrew their notice of strike and
returned to work.
SHHH Digests Labor Relations 2016-2017
Petitioner, not having interposed any objection, LA, granted their prayer to be
excluded as respondents in the complaint for illegal strike. Moreover, petitioner's
complaint was directed against the 31 respondents who did not return to work and
continued with the strike.
For not having complied with the formal requirements in Article 264 of the Labor
Code, the strike staged by petitioner's workers was found by the Labor Arbiter to be
illegal. The workers who participated in the illegal strike did not, however, lose their
employment, since there was no evidence that they participated in illegal acts. After
noting that petitioner accepted the other striking employees back to work, LA held
that the private respondents should similarly be allowed to return to work without
having to undergo the required screening to be undertaken by their union (MLU-
FFW).
As regards the six private respondents who were union officers, LA ruled that they
could not have possibly been "duped or tricked" into signing the strike notice for
they were active participants in the conciliation meetings and were thus fully aware
of what was going on. Hence, said union officers should be accepted back to work
after seeking reconsideration from herein petitioner.
Both petitioner and private respondents filed MR, which public respondent NLRC
treated as appeals.
NLRC affirmed with modification the LA's decision. It held that the concerted action
by the workers was more of a "protest action" than a strike. Private respondents,
including the six union officers, should also be allowed to work unconditionally to
avoid discrimination. However, in view of the strained relations between the parties,
separation pay (12 months salaries each) was awarded in lieu of reinstatement.
Complainant is further ordered to pay respondents two (2) years backwages based on
their last salaries.
Upon petitioner's MR, NLRC modified and ruled that since private respondents were
not actually terminated from service, there was no basis for reinstatement. However,
it awarded six months' salary as separation pay or financial assistance in the nature of
"equitable relief." The award for backwages was also deleted for lack of factual and
legal basis. In lieu of backwages, compensation equivalent to P1,000.00 was given.
Petitioner alleges that public respondent Commission committed grave abuse of
discretion in awarding private respondents separation pay and backwages despite the
declaration that the strike was illegal.
Private respondents assail the reduction of separation pay and deletion of backwages
by the NLRC as constituting grave abuse of discretion.
ISSUE: Should separation pay and backwages be awarded by public respondent
NLRC to participants of an illegal strike?
HELD:
De Leon. Tan. Udarbe
A strike, considered as the most effective weapon of labor, is any temporary
stoppage of work by the concerted action of employees as a result of an
industrial or labor dispute. A labor dispute includes any controversy or matter
concerning terms or conditions of employment or the association or representation of
persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or arranging the terms and
conditions of employment, regardless of whether or not the disputants stand in the
proximate relation of employers and employees.
What transpired then was clearly a strike, for the cessation of work by concerted
action resulted from a labor dispute. The Arbiter correctly ruled that the strike was
illegal for failure to comply with the requirements of Article 264 (now Article 263)
paragraphs (c) and (f) of the Labor Code.
The language of the law leaves no room for doubt that the cooling-off period
and the seven-day strike ban after the strike-vote report were intended to be
mandatory.
The individual notices of strike filed by the workers did not conform to the notice
required by the law to be filed since they were represented by a union (MLU-FFW)
which even had an existing collective bargaining agreement with INPORT.
Neither did the striking workers observe the strike vote by secret ballot, cooling-off
period and reporting requirements.
Article 265 of the Labor Code reads, inter alia:
(i)t SHALL be unlawful for any labor organization . . . to declare a strike . . . without
first having filed the notice required in the preceding Article or without the necessary
strike vote first having been obtained and reported to the Ministry.
In requiring a strike notice and a cooling-off period, the avowed intent of the law is
to provide an opportunity for mediation and conciliation. They constitute a valid
exercise of the police power of the state.
The effects of such illegal strikes, outlined in Article 264 of the Labor Code,
make a distinction between workers and union officers who participate therein.
A union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any worker or
union officer who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a
strike may be declared to have lost their employment status. An ordinary striking
worker cannot be terminated for mere participation in an illegal strike. There must be
proof that he committed illegal acts during a strike. A union officer, on the other
hand, may be terminated from work when he knowingly participates in an illegal
strike, and like other workers, when he commits an illegal act during a strike.
In the case at bench, INPORT accepted the majority of the striking workers,
including union officers, back to work. Private respondents were left to continue
with the strike after they refused to submit to the "screening" required by the
company.
SHHH Digests Labor Relations 2016-2017
Under the law, an employee is entitled to reinstatement and to his full
backwages when he is unjustly dismissed. Reinstatement means restoration to a
state or condition from which one had been removed or separated. Reinstatement and
backwages are separate and distinct reliefs given to an illegally dismissed employee.
Separation pay is awarded when reinstatement is not possible, due, for instance, to
strained relations between employer and employee. It is also given as a form of
financial assistance when a worker is dismissed in cases such as the installation of
labor saving devices, redundancy, retrenchment to prevent losses, closing or
cessation of operation of the establishment, or in case the employee was found to
have been suffering from a disease such that his continued employment is prohibited
by law.
Hence, an employee dismissed for causes other than those cited above is not entitled
to separation pay. Well-settled is it that separation pay shall be allowed only in
those instances where the employee is validly dismissed for causes other than
serious misconduct or those reflecting on his moral character.
Backwages, on the other hand, is a form of relief that restores the income that
was lost by reason of unlawful dismissal.
We find that private respondents were indeed dismissed when INPORT refused to
accept them back to work after the former refused to submit to the "screening"
process.
Since there appears no proof that these union members committed illegal acts during
the strike, they cannot be dismissed. The striking union members among private
respondents are thus entitled to reinstatement, there being no just cause for their
dismissal.
However, considering that a decade has already lapsed from the time the disputed
strike occurred, we find that to award separation pay in lieu of reinstatement would
be more practical and appropriate.
No backwages will be awarded to private respondent-union members as a penalty for
their participation in the illegal strike. Their continued participation in said strike,
even after most of their co-workers had returned to work, can hardly be rewarded by
such an award.
The fate of private respondent-union officers is different. Their insistence on
unconditional reinstatement or separation pay and backwages is unwarranted and
unjustified. For knowingly participating in an illegal strike, the law mandates that a
union officer may be terminated from employment.
Notwithstanding the fact that INPORT previously accepted other union officers and
that the screening required by it was uncalled for, still it cannot be gainsaid that it
possessed the right and prerogative to terminate the union officers from service. The
law, in using the word may, grants the employer the option of declaring a union
officer who participated in an illegal strike as having lost his employment.
De Leon. Tan. Udarbe
However, the above disquisition is now considered moot and academic and cannot
be effected in view of a manifestation filed by INPORT. In said Manifestation, it
attached a Certification by the President of the Macajalar Labor Union (MLU-FFW)
to the effect that the private respondents/remaining strikers have ceased to be
members of said union. Since private respondents (union members) are no longer
members of the MLU, they cannot be reinstated. Therefore, we award them
separation pay.
5. Union of Filipro Employees v. Nestle Philippines, Inc
GR No. 88710-13
December 19, 1990
The power of the Secretary of Labor under Art. 263 (g) of the Labor Code, to
assume jurisdiction over a labor dispute tainted with national interest or to certify
the same for compulsory arbitration, has not been expressly or impliedly repealed.
Facts: UFE filed a notice of strike on November 14, 1985, with the Bureau of Labor
Relations against Filipro (now Nestle Philippines, Inc., ["Nestle"]). On December 4,
1988, UFE filed a complaint for Unfair Labor Practice (ULP) against Nestle and its
officials for violation of the Labor Code (Art. 94) on Holiday Pay, non-
implementation of the CBA provisions (Labor Management Corporation scheme),
Financial Assistance and other unfair labor practice.
Acting on Nestle's petition seeking assumption of jurisdiction over the labor dispute
or its certification to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration, then Minister of Labor
and Employment Blas F. Ople assumed jurisdiction over the dispute.
On December 20, 1985, UFE filed a petition for Certiorari with prayer for issuance of
temporary restraining order, with this Court (G.R. No. 73129) assailing the
assumption of jurisdiction by the Minister.
January 23, 1986, Nestle filed a petition to declare the strike illegal (NCR-1-295-86)
premised on violation of the CBA provisions on "no strike/no lockout" clause and
the grievance machinery provisions on settlement of disputes.
On January 30, 1986, then Labor Minister Ople issued another Order, with this
disposition:
"WHEREFORE, in line with the Order of December 11, 1985, this Office hereby
orders all the striking workers to report for work and the company to accept them
under the same terms and conditions prevailing before the work stoppage within
forty eight (48) hours from notice of this Order.
Despite receipt of the second order dated January 30, 1986, and knowledge of a
notice caused to be published by Nestle in the Bulletin on February 1, 1986,
advising all workers to report to work not later than February 3, 1986, the officers
and members of UFE continued with the strike.
SHHH Digests Labor Relations 2016-2017
On February 4, 1986, the Minister B. Ople denied their motion for reconsideration
of the return-to-work order.
UFE defied the Minister and continued with their strike. Nestle filed criminal
charges against those involved.
On March 13, 1986, the new Minister of Labor and Employment, Augusto B.
Sanchez, issued a Resolution, the relevant portions of which stated thus:
"This Office hereby enjoins all striking workers to return-to-work immediately and
management to accept them under the same terms and conditions prevailing
previous to the work stoppage except as qualified in this resolution. The
management of Nestle Philippines is further directed to grant a special assistance as
suggested by this Ministry in an order dated 30 January 1986 to all striking
employees covered by the bargaining units at Makati, Alabang, Cabuyao and
Cagayan de Oro City in an amount equivalent to their weighted average monthly
basic salary, plus the cash conversion value of the vacation leave credits for the year
1986, payable not later than five (5) days from the date of the actual return to work
by the striking workers." On March 17, 1986, the strikers returned to work. March
31, 1986, We granted UFE's Motion to Withdraw its Petition for Certiorari.
Filipro (Nestle) and the Cagayan de Oro Filipro Workers Union-WATU, renewed a 3-
year contract, made effective from December 1, 1984 up to June 30, 1987.
Petitioners signed the CBA as the duly-elected officers of the Union.
On January 19, 1985, the union officers, together with other members of the union
sent a letter to Workers Alliance Trade Unions (WATU), advising them "that
henceforth we shall administer the CBA by ourselves and with the help of the Union
of Filipro Employees (UFE) to where we have allied ourselves."
UFE filed a petition (Case No. CRD-M-88-326-85) for administration of the existing
CBAs at Cebu, Davao and Cagayan de Oro bargaining units against TUPAS and
WATU.
From January 22, 1986 to March 14, 1986, the rank and file employees of the
company staged a strike at the instigation of the UFE officers, who had
represented themselves as officers.
Nestle filed a petition to declare the strike illegal. The strikers countered that their
strike was legal because the same was staged pursuant to the notice of strike filed
by UFE on November 14, 1985 (BLR-NS-11-344-85), of which they claim to be
members, having disaffiliated themselves from CDO-FWU-WATU. On November 24,
De Leon. Tan. Udarbe
1987, Executive Labor Arbiter Zosimo Vasallo issued his decision declaring the strike
illegal.
At the outset, UFE questions the power of the Secretary of Labor under Art. 263(g)
of the Labor Code to assume jurisdiction over a labor dispute tainted with national
interests, or to certify the same for compulsory arbitration. UFE contends that Arts.
263 and 264 are based on the 1973 Constitution, specifically Sec. 9 of Art. II thereof,
the pertinent portion of which reads:
"Sec. 9. . . . The State may provide for compulsory arbitration."
UFE argues that since the aforecited provision of Sec. 9 is no longer found in the
1987 Constitution, Arts. 263(g) and 264 of the Labor Code are now
"unconstitutional and must be ignored."
Issue: 1. WON sections 263 and 264 of the Labor Code are now unconstitutional
2. WON the strike was legal
Held:
1. Article 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or
non-observance shall not be excused by disuse or custom or practice to the
contrary. In the case at bar, no law has ever been passed by Congress expressly
repealing Articles 263 and 264 of the Labor Code. Neither may the 1987
Constitution be considered to have impliedly repealed the said Articles considering
that there is no showing that said articles are inconsistent with the said
Constitution. Moreover, no court has ever declared that the said articles are
inconsistent with the 1987 Constitution. On the contrary, the continued validity and
operation of Articles 263 and 264 of the Labor Code has been recognized by no less
than the Congress of the Philippines when the latter enacted into law R.A. 6715,
otherwise known as Herrera Law, Section 27 of which amended paragraphs (g) and
(i) of Article 263 of the Labor Code.
2. On the issue of the legality of the strike committed, UFE seeks to absolve itself by
pointing out qualifying factors such as motives, good faith, absence of findings on
specific participation and/or liability, and limiting the no-strike provision to
economic strikes.
UFE completely misses the underlying principle embodied in Art. 264(g) on the
settlement of labor disputes and this is, that assumption and certification orders are
executory in character and are to be strictly complied with by the parties even
during the pendency of any petition questioning their validity. This extraordinary
authority given to the Secretary of Labor is aimed at arriving at a peaceful and
speedy solution to labor disputes, without jeopardizing national interests.
SHHH Digests Labor Relations 2016-2017
Regardless therefore of their motives, or the validity of their claims, the striking
workers must cease and/or desist from any and all acts that tend to, or undermine
this authority of the Secretary of Labor, once an assumption and/or certification
order is issued. They cannot, for instance, ignore return-to-work orders, citing
unfair labor practices on the part of the company, to justify their actions.
One other point that must be underscored is that the return-to-work order is issued
pending the determination of the legality or illegality of the strike. It is not correct
to say that it may be enforced only if the strike is legal and may be disregarded if
the strike is illegal, for the purpose precisely is to maintain the status quo while
the determination is being made.
We also wish to point out that an assumption and/or certification order of the
Secretary of Labor automatically results in a return-to-work of all striking workers,
whether or not a corresponding order has been issued by the Secretary of Labor.
Thus, the striking workers erred when they continued with their strike alleging
absence of a return-to-work order. Article 264(g) is clear. Once an
assumption/certification order is issued, strikes are enjoined, or if one has already
taken place, all strikers shall immediately return to work.
A strike that is undertaken despite the issuance by the Secretary of Labor of an
assumption or certification order becomes a prohibited activity and thus illegal,
pursuant to the second paragraph of Art. 264 of the Labor Code as amended. The
Union officers and members, as a result, are deemed to have lost their employment
status for having knowingly participated in an illegal act.
The prescribed mandatory cooling-off period and then 7-day strike and after
submission of the report of strike vote at Nestle's Makati Offices and Muntinlupa
and Cabuyao Plants were not complied with (NLRC-NCR-124007-85 & NCR-1-295-
86), while no notice of strike was filed by respondents when they staged the strike
at Nestle's Cagayan de Oro Plant (RABX-2-0047-86) contrary to the pertinent
provision of Articles 263 and 264 of the Labor Code, emphasizing that "the
mandatory character of these cooling-off periods has already been categorically
ruled upon by the Supreme Court”
On the alleged lack of jurisdiction of Labor Arbiter Lubaton, NLRC has clarified that
the question on the legality of strike was properly resolved by the Labor Arbiter, not
only because the question is perfectly within the original and exclusive jurisdiction
of the Labor Arbiter to adjudicate, but also because the issue was not subsumed by
the Order of Labor Minister Sanchez, dated December 23, 1986, certifying the
Notice of Strike dated December 4, 1986 for compulsory arbitration, further
clarifying that the issue of whether or not the strike staged on September 11, 1987
De Leon. Tan. Udarbe
by UFE and its officials and members was illegal is a prejudicial question to the issue
of whether or not the complainants were illegally dismissed.
6. Filsyn Employees Chapter v. Drilon, et. al.,
GR No. 82225
April 5, 1989
Concerted action of the union members and officers in not reporting for work on
when they were supposed to render work on those days and during the pendency of
the compulsory arbitration proceedings constituted an illegal strike.
Facts: Filsyn, which produced polyester raw materials for textiles, required 24-hour
operations. Pursuant to the employment contracts of the employees, they were to
report for work on Sundays and holidays if their work schedules so required, subject,
of course , to additional compensation required by law.
In February 1985, the union officers filed notices of strike. Upon Filsyn’s petition,
the Minister of Labor certified the labor dispute to the NLRC for compulsory
arbitration.
The NLRC held conciliation meetings upon the union’s request. However, on April
4, 1985 (Maundy Thursday), while the conciliation meetings were still pending, the
union officers and members did not report work. The shuttle buses that were
regularly sent to fetch employees from designated pick-up points returned with only
probationary employees on board, as the regular employees refused to board the
buses. Neither did they report for work on the next two days (Good Friday and Black
Saturday). Thus, the factor’s operations stopped and the company suffered losses.
The union contended that there was no strike, the failure to work of the officers and
members on Maundy Thursday, Good Friday, and Black Saturday, being justified
because these days were legal holidays.
Issue: Whether or not there was a legal strike during days considered as legal
holidays
Held:
No. The certification of the dispute to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration had the
effect of enjoining the intended strike subject of the notices. The concerted action of
the union members and officers in not reporting for work on April 4-6, 1985, when
they were supposed to render work on those days according to their work schedules
and during the pendency of the compulsory arbitration proceedings on the certified
labor dispute, constituted an illegal strike. The strike being illegal, the officers of the
striking union who knowingly took park in the strike are deemed to have lost their
employment status.
7. Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Secretary of Labor and Employment
GR No. 88210
January 23, 1991
SHHH Digests Labor Relations 2016-2017
Jurisdiction to decide the legality of strikes and lock-outs is vested in Labor
Arbiters
Facts: The 1986-1989 CBA between the Philippine Airlines (PAL) and the
Philippine Airlines Employees Association (PALEA) provided for pay increases for
various categories of employees in Section 1, Article V entitled "PAY SCALE."
Besides the pay increases, the CBA also provided for the formation of a
PAL/PALEA Payscale Panel.
As agreed by the parties, the PAL/PALEA Payscale Panel was formed in due time
and went to work.
The Job Evaluation Committee of the panel had finished the reconciliation and
initial evaluation of positions in all departments within PAL. In November, 1988, the
PALEA members of the panel proposed the amount of PHP 3,349 as the minimum
salary entry level for the lowest job classification (Job Grade 1), while the PAL panel
members proposed PHP 2,310 and a PHP 200 across-the-board increase for
employees who could not avail of the payscale adjustments. The panel conferences
continued but there was no meeting of minds. PALEA would not accept less than the
amount it proposed, while the PAL panel members alleged that they had no authority
to offer more.
PALEA accused PAL of bargaining in bad faith.
On December 29, 1988, PALEA filed with the NCMB a notice of strike on account
of: (1) bargaining deadlock; and (2) unfair labor practice by bargaining in bad
faith.
On January 3, 1989, PAL filed with the NCMB a motion to dismiss PALEA's notice
of strike for being premature as the issues raised were not strikeable since there still
existed a PAL-PALEA CBA which would not yet expire until September 30, 1989 or
with 9 more months to run.
During the conciliation meeting, the following evolved as the real issues:
1. determination of the minimum entry rate
2. wage adjustment due to payscale study
3. retroactive pay as a consequence of the upgraded payscale or goodwill bonus. 
Atty. Jesus C. Sebastian, NCMB-NCR Executive Conciliator/Mediator, advised
PALEA president, George Pulido, that the issues raised in the notice of strike were
"appropriate only for preventive mediation," hence, not valid grounds for a lawful
strike.
PALEA submitted the strike vote results to the NCMB. The next day, January 13,
1989, PAL petitioned Secretary of Labor Franklin Drilon to immediately assume
jurisdiction over the dispute in order to avert the impending strike and PAL’s petition
was “being the sole airline that services domestic routes, a prolonged work stoppage
will push back the national economic recovery program of the government and
consequently result to enormous damage to the economy of the country.”
De Leon. Tan. Udarbe
Inexplicably, the Secretary failed to act promptly on PAL's petition for his
assumption of jurisdiction.
7 days passed with no reaction from Secretary Drilon. On January 20, 1989, PALEA
declared a strike paralyzing PAL's entire operations the next day, January 21, 1989,
and resulting in serious inconvenience to thousands of passengers who were stranded
in 43 airports throughout the country, and the loss of millions of pesos in unearned
revenue for PAL.
Late in the day, at 7:50 P.M., Secretary Drilon issued an order assuming jurisdiction
over the labor dispute which had already exploded into a full-blown strike, ordering
the strikers to lift their pickets and return to work, directing management to accept all
returning employees, and resolving the issues subject of the strike, by awarding the
following monetary benefits to the strikers, while prohibiting the company from
taking retaliatory action against them
Secretary declared the strike valid. The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration.
The Secretary denied it in a minute resolution on May 8, 1989 or 3 months later. In
this petition for review, PAL avers that the Secretary of Labor gravely abused his
discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction.
Issue: WON the jurisdiction falls within the Secretary of Labor
Held: No. Under Art. 263 of the Labor Code, the Labor Secretary's authority to
resolve a labor dispute within 30 days from the date of assumption of jurisdiction,
encompasses only the issues in the dispute, not the legality or illegality of any strike
that may have been resorted to in the meantime (Binamira vs. Ogan-Occena, 148
SCRA 677, 685 [1987]).
The legality or illegality of the strike was not submitted to the Secretary of Labor for
resolution. The jurisdiction to decide the legality of strikes and lock-outs is
vested in Labor Arbiters, not in the Secretary of Labor. Art. 217, par. a, subpar. 5
of the Labor Code provides:
Art. 217. Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the Commission.
(a) The Labor Arbiters shall have the original and exclusive jurisdiction to
hear and decide within thirty (30) working days after submission of the
case by the parties for decision, the following cases involving all workers,
whether agricultural or non- agricultural.
5. Cases arising from any violation of Article 265 of this code, including questions
involving the legality of strikes and lock-outs.
SHHH Digests Labor Relations 2016-2017
Since the strike was illegal, the company has a right to take disciplinary action
against the union officers who participated in it, and against any union members who
committed illegal acts during the strike, Art. 264 of the Labor Code provides:
Art. 264. Prohibited activities.—. . .Any worker whose employment has been
terminated as a consequence of an unlawful lockout shall be entitled to reinstatement
with full back wages. Any union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal
strike and any worker or union officer who knowingly participates in the commission
of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost his employment
status: Provided, That mere participation of a worker in a lawful strike shall not
constitute sufficient ground for termination of his employment, even if a replacement
had been hired by the employer during such lawful strike.
The Labor Secretary exceeded his jurisdiction when he restrained PAL from taking
disciplinary action against its guilty employees, for, under Art. 263 of the Labor
Code, all that the Secretary may enjoin is the holding of the strike, but not the
company's right to take action against union officers who participated in the
illegal strike and committed illegal acts. The prohibition which the Secretary
issued to PAL constitutes an unlawful deprivation of property and denial of due
process for it prevents PAL from seeking redress for the huge property losses that it
suffered as a result of the union's illegal mass action.
The Secretary may have realized that he was partly to blame for PAL's damages
because of his failure to act promptly and use his authority to avert the illegal strike
under Article 263(g) of the Labor Code.
Nevertheless, the Secretary's delay does not excuse the reckless and irresponsible
action of the union in declaring the illegal strike. The liability of the union for that is
primary and exclusive.
8. SAN MIGUEL CORP. v. NLRC
GR No. 119293
June 10, 2003
Injunction of an illegal strike
Facts: SMC and respondent Ilaw at Buklod ng Manggagawa (IBM), exclusive
bargaining agent of petitioner’s daily-paid rank and file employees, executed a CBA
under which they agreed to submit all disputes to grievance and arbitration
proceedings. The CBA also included a mutually enforceable no-strike no-lockout
agreement during the term of the agreement.
On April 11, 1994, IBM, through its VP Alfredo Colomeda, filed with the NCMB a
notice of strike against petitioner for allegedly committing: (1) illegal dismissal of
union members, (2) illegal transfer, (3) violation of CBA, (4) contracting out of jobs
being performed by union members, (5) labor-only contracting, (6) harassment of
De Leon. Tan. Udarbe
union officers and members, (7) non-recognition of duly-elected union officers, and
(8) other acts of unfair labor practice.
The next day, IBM filed another notice of strike, this time through its president
Edilberto Galvez, raising similar grounds: (1) illegal transfer, (2) labor-only
contracting, (3) violation of CBA, (4) dismissal of union officers and members, and
(5) other acts of unfair labor practice.
The Galvez group subsequently requested the NCMB to consolidate its notice of
strike with that of the Colomeda group, to which the latter opposed, alleging
Galvez’s lack of authority in filing the same.
Petitioner thereafter filed a Motion for Severance of Notices of Strike with Motion to
Dismiss, on the grounds that the notices raised non-strikeable issues and that they
affected four corporations which are separate and distinct from each other.
After several conciliation meetings, NCMB Director Reynaldo Ubaldo found that the
real issues involved are non-strikeable. Hence on May 2, 1994, he issued separate
letter-orders to both union groups, converting their notices of strike into preventive
mediation. The said letter-orders, in part, read:
During the conciliation meetings, it was clearly established that the real issues
involved are illegal dismissal, labor only contracting and internal union disputes,
which affect not only the interest of the San Miguel Corporation but also the interests
of the MAGNOLIA-NESTLE CORPORATION, the SAN MIGUEL FOODS, INC.,
and the SAN MIGUEL JUICES, INC.
Considering that San Miguel Corporation is the only impleaded employer-
respondent, and considering further that the aforesaid companies are separate and
distinct corporate entities, we deemed it wise to reduce and treat your Notice of
Strike as Preventive Mediation case for the four (4) different companies in order to
evolve voluntary settlement of the disputes. . . .
On May 16, 1994, while separate preventive mediation conferences were ongoing,
the Colomeda group filed with the NCMB a notice of holding a strike vote.
Petitioner opposed by filing a Manifestation and Motion to Declare Notice of Strike
Vote Illegal, invoking the case of PAL v. Drilon, which held that no strike could be
legally declared during the pendency of preventive mediation. NCMB Director
Ubaldo in response issued another letter to the Colomeda Group reiterating the
conversion of the notice of strike into a case of preventive mediation and
emphasizing the findings that the grounds raised center only on an intra-union
conflict, which is not strikeable, thus:
A perusal of the records of the case clearly shows that the basic point to be resolved
entails the question of as to who between the two (2) groups shall represent the
workers for collective bargaining purposes, which has been the subject of a Petition
for Interpleader case pending resolution before the Office of the Secretary of Labor
and Employment. Similarly, the other issues raised which have been discussed by the
SHHH Digests Labor Relations 2016-2017
parties at the plant level, are ancillary issues to the main question, that is, the union
leadership...
Meanwhile, on May 23, 1994, the Galvez group filed its second notice of strike
against petitioner. Additional grounds were set forth therein, including
discrimination, coercion of employees, illegal lockout and illegal closure. The
NCMB however found these grounds to be mere amplifications of those alleged in
the first notice that the group filed. It therefore ordered the consolidation of the
second notice with the preceding one that was earlier reduced to preventive
mediation. On the same date, the group likewise notified the NCMB of its intention
to hold a strike vote on May 27, 1994.
On May 27, 1994, the Colomeda group notified the NCMB of the results of their
strike vote, which favored the holding of a strike. In reply, NCMB issued a letter
again advising them that by virtue of the PAL v. Drilon ruling, their notice of strike
is deemed not to have been filed, consequently invalidating any subsequent strike for
lack of compliance with the notice requirement. Despite this and the pendency of the
preventive mediation proceedings, on June 4, 1994, IBM went on strike. The strike
paralyzed the operations of petitioner, causing it losses allegedly worth P29.98
million in daily lost production.
Two days after the declaration of strike, petitioner filed with public respondent
NLRC an amended Petition for Injunction with Prayer for the Issuance of TRO, Free
Ingress and Egress Order and Deputization Order. After due hearing and ocular
inspection, the NLRC on June 13, 1994 resolved to issue a TRO directing free
ingress to and egress from petitioner’s plants, without prejudice to the union’s right
to peaceful picketing and continuous hearings on the injunction case.
Petitioner on June 16, 1994, entered into a MOA with the respondent-union, calling
for a lifting of the picket lines and resumption of work in exchange of "good faith
talks" between the management and the labor management committees. The MOA,
signed in the presence of Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) officials,
expressly stated that cases filed in relation to their dispute will continue and will not
be affected in any manner whatsoever by the agreement. The picket lines ended and
work was then resumed.
Respondent thereafter moved to reconsider the issuance of the TRO, and sought to
dismiss the injunction case in view of the cessation of its picketing activities as a
result of the signed MOA. It argued that the case had become moot and academic
there being no more prohibited activities to restrain, be they actual or threatened.
Petitioner, however, opposed and submitted copies of flyers being circulated by
IBM, as proof of the union’s alleged threat to revive the strike. The NLRC did not
rule on the opposition to the TRO and allowed it to lapse.
NLRC issued the challenged decision, denying the petition for injunction for lack of
factual basis. It found that the circumstances at the time did not constitute or no
longer constituted an actual or threatened commission of unlawful acts. It likewise
denied petitioner’s MR.
De Leon. Tan. Udarbe
ISSUE: WON the NLRC gravely abused its discretion when it failed to enforce, by
injunction, the parties’ reciprocal obligations to submit to arbitration and not to
strike.
HELD:
Article 254 of the Labor Code provides that no temporary or permanent
injunction or restraining order in any case involving or growing out of labor
disputes shall be issued by any court or other entity except as otherwise
provided in Articles 218 and 264 of the Labor Code. Under the first exception,
Article 218 (e) of the Labor Code expressly confers upon the NLRC the power to
"enjoin or restrain actual and threatened commission of any or all prohibited or
unlawful acts, or to require the performance of a particular act in any labor dispute
which, if not restrained or performed forthwith, may cause grave or irreparable
damage to any party or render ineffectual any decision in favor of such party x x x."
The second exception, on the other hand, is when the labor organization or the
employer engages in any of the "prohibited activities" enumerated in Article 264.
Pursuant to Article 218 (e), the coercive measure of injunction may also be used
to restrain an actual or threatened unlawful strike. It is the legal duty and
obligation of the NLRC to enjoin a partial strike staged in violation of the law.
In the case at bar, petitioner sought a permanent injunction to enjoin the respondent’s
strike. A strike is considered as the most effective weapon in protecting the
rights of the employees to improve the terms and conditions of their
employment. However, to be valid, a strike must be pursued within legal
bounds. One of the procedural requisites that Article 263 of the Labor Code
and its Implementing Rules prescribe is the filing of a valid notice of strike with
the NCMB. Imposed for the purpose of encouraging the voluntary settlement of
disputes, this requirement has been held to be mandatory, the lack of which
shall render a strike illegal.
In the present case, NCMB converted IBM’s notices into preventive mediation as it
found that the real issues raised are non-strikeable. Such order is in pursuance of the
NCMB’s duty to exert "all efforts at mediation and conciliation to enable the parties
to settle the dispute amicably," and in line with the state policy of favoring voluntary
modes of settling labor disputes. In accordance with the Implementing Rules of the
Labor Code, the said conversion has the effect of dismissing the notices of strike
filed by respondent.
During the pendency of preventive mediation proceedings no strike could be legally
declared. Petitioners should have complied with the prohibition to strike ordered by
the NCMB when the latter dismissed the notices of strike. The refusal of the
petitioners to heed said proscription of the NCMB is reflective of bad faith.
The NCMB having no coercive powers of injunction, petitioner sought recourse
from the public respondent. The NLRC issued a TRO only for free ingress to and
egress from petitioner’s plants, but did not enjoin the unlawful strike itself.
SHHH Digests Labor Relations 2016-2017
We find that at the time the injunction was being sought, there existed a threat to
revive the unlawful strike as evidenced by the flyers then being circulated by the
IBM-NCR Council which led the union. These flyers were not denied by respondent.
Moreover, it bears stressing that Article 264(a) of the Labor Code explicitly states
that a declaration of strike without first having filed the required notice is a
prohibited activity, which may be prevented through an injunction in accordance
with Article 254. Clearly, public respondent should have granted the injunctive relief
to prevent the grave damage brought about by the unlawful strike.
Petitioner herein evinced its willingness to negotiate with the union by seeking for an
order from the NLRC to compel observance of the grievance and arbitration
proceedings. Respondent however resorted to force without exhausting all available
means within its reach. Such infringement of the aforecited CBA provisions
constitutes further justification for the issuance of an injunction against the strike. As
we said long ago: "Strikes held in violation of the terms contained in a collective
bargaining agreement are illegal especially when they provide for conclusive
arbitration clauses. These agreements must be strictly adhered to and respected if
their ends have to be achieved."
As to petitioner’s allegation of violation of the no-strike provision in the CBA,
jurisprudence has enunciated that such clauses only bar strikes which are economic
in nature, but not strikes grounded on unfair labor practices. The notices filed in the
case at bar alleged unfair labor practices, the initial determination of which would
entail fact-finding that is best left for the labor arbiters.
We cannot sanction the respondent-union’s brazen disregard of legal requirements
imposed purposely to carry out the state policy of promoting voluntary modes of
settling disputes. The state’s commitment to enforce mutual compliance therewith to
foster industrial peace is affirmed by no less than our Constitution.
9. Pepsi Cola v. NLRC
GR. No. L-58341
June 29, 1982
Members of a union cannot be held responsible for an illegal strike on the sole
basis of such membership or even on account of their affirmative vote authorizing
the same. They become liable only if they actually participated therein.
Facts: On December 11, 1979, a certification election was held at the Pepsi-Cola
Bottling Company's (PEPSI) plant in Naga City .Out of 131 votes which were cast, the
UNION got 128 so it regarded itself as the sole and exclusive bargaining unit. The
losing labor group contested the election at various levels but it was unsuccessful.
Its petition for review was dismissed by this Court in a resolution dated June 11,
1980.
Meanwhile, on April 1, 1980, the UNION filed a notice of strike with MOLE's
Regional Office in Legaspi City on the ground that PEPSI refused to bargain. PEPSI
De Leon. Tan. Udarbe
countered that it was willing to bargain but there was yet no final decision on the
appeal of the other labor union. On April 25, 1980, Med-Arbiter Antonio B. Caayao
issued a resolution with following dispositive portion:
“WHEREFORE, conformably with the foregoing, the Notice of Strike under
consideration, being premature, is illegal and should, therefore, be dismissed.
Consequently, any strike staged by virtue of this Notice of Strike shall, likewise, be
deemed illegal.”
In disregard of the resolution, the UNION staged a strike on May 7, 1980. There are
conflicting claims on the duration of the strike. The UNION claims that it was only a
one-day strike; PEPSI says the strike lasted for three days. At any rate, a return to
work order was issued on May 9, 1980.
On May 15, 1980, PEPSI filed a complaint for unfair labor practice and illegal strike.
(see full text for decision)
On December 8, 1980, the UNION filed a "MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OR
APPEAL TO THE NLRC" alleging that there was grave abuse of discretion, lack of
jurisdiction, and contrary to the law and the facts. PEPSI moved to dismiss on the
ground that the UNION failed to furnish it a copy of the motion for reconsideration
or appeal — a fatal omission amounting to non-perfection of the appeal.
Issue: WON all the officers and members of the union whose names and positions
appear on Annex "A" of the complaint except Romulo Cal, Nilo Bariso and Mauro
Nieto be considered to have lost their employment status effective May 7, 1980.
Held: We are bound by the finding of the NLRC that, "A careful scrutiny of the
appeal shows that the respondents-appellants failed to serve/furnish a copy thereof
on the adverse party which fact has further been ascertained thru the positive
asseveration of the complainant-appellee in its motion to dismiss the appeal." This
being the case, NLRC cannot be faulted in dismissing the UNION'S appeal for its
action was in accordance with both the law and regulations.
However, We go deeper than sustaining the action of the NLRC in dismissing the
appeal because We have been asked to review not only the actuation of that
agency but also that of the Labor Arbitrator who declared in his decision that, "all
the officers and members of the union whose names and positions appear on
Annex "A" of the complaint except Romulo Cal, Nilo Bariso and Mauro Nieto be
considered to have lost their employment status effective May 7, 1980. "
It is now settled "that a strike does not automatically carry the stigma of illegality
even if no unfair labor practice were committed by the employer. It suffices if such
SHHH Digests Labor Relations 2016-2017
a belief in good faith is entertained by labor as the inducing factor for staging a
strike."
And it has also been held that the members of a union cannot be held responsible
for an illegal strike on the sole basis of such membership or even on account of
their affirmative vote authorizing the same. They become liable only if they
actually participated therein.
In the case at bar, although the strike was indeed illegal, We cannot discount the
presence of good faith on the part of the rank and file members of the UNION
considering that in the certification election the UNION obtained 128 out of the 131
votes cast so that they could justifiably consider it as their sole bargaining
representative. Moreover, there is no proof that the members of the UNION all
participated in the illegal strike. The ones who deserve what Justice Barredo calls
"capital punishment" in the Esso Philippines case, supra, are the officers of the
UNION who staged the strike in defiance of the ruling of Med-Arbiter Caayao.
10. Tiu & Hayuhay v. NLRC
GR No. 123276
August 18, 1997
Good Faith Doctrine in Strike NOT applicable in the case at bar.
Facts: RBS had a CBA with GMAEU which took effect on 2 July 1989. After the first
quarter of 1991, RBS management noted the huge amount of overtime expense it
incurred during the said period, which averaged to P363,085.26 monthly. To
streamline its operations, the president of RBS created a committee to formulate
guidelines on the availment of leaves and rendering of overtime work.
RBS, furnished GMAEU a copy of the new guidelines and requested the latter to
comment thereon. The union did not file any comment. RBS officially issued the
implementing guidelines. The following day, GMAEU sent a letter to the president
of RBS wherein it argued that:
1. The union was not consulted in the formulation of said guidelines which was a
clear violation under Sec. 3(c) of the collective bargaining agreement;
2. The guidelines would render nugatory the CBA provisions on the same subject;
3. The diminution of benefits being enjoyed by all employees with respect to the
mid-year bonuses from 2-1/2 months to 1-1/2 months constitutes a withdrawal of
an existing company policy.
Thereafter, RBS management and GMAEU officials met on 3 July 1991 and on 10
July 1991 to thresh out the issues raised by GMAEU in its 26 June 1991 letter. Both
talks, however, were short lived as the union refused to hold further talks with RBS.
De Leon. Tan. Udarbe
On 12 July 1991, GMAEU filed a Notice of Strike with the NCMB based on ULP
allegedly committed by RBS:
1. Gross violation of the existing collective bargaining agreement; 2. Employees
(members and officers) coercion; 3. Union interference; and 4. Discrimination.
The NCMB set a conciliation meeting on 19 July 1991, but as early as 16 July 1991
the Union held a strike vote among its members and submitted the results thereof
to the NCMB on 18 July 1991 which showed that majority of the union members
voted to go on strike.
During the conciliation meeting held on 19 July 1991, RBS, through counsel,
informed GMAEU's officers that RBS did not violate any provision in the CBA since
the issuance of the guidelines was a management prerogative duly recognized in
their agreement. RBS argued that the alleged ULP were neither raised by the union
in its letter nor during their talks. RBS' counsel requested GMAEU's officers to name
the persons or officers of RBS involved in the alleged ULP and to state the specific
act or acts complained of so that RBS management could adequately refute said
allegations or impose appropriate disciplinary actions against its erring officers.
GMAEU's officers, however, ignored both RBS' and the labor conciliator's requests
for a bill of particulars.
In a second conciliation meeting held on 25 July 1991, RBS reiterated its request to
GMAEU's officers to furnish RBS the details of the alleged ULPs committed by RBS'
officers. Again, the Union denied RBS' request and refused to hold any further talks
with RBS management. On the same day, RBS filed a motion to dismiss GMAEU's
notice of strike and forewarned the Union about the consequences of an illegal
strike.
On 2 August 1991, the union struck. RBS filed a complaint for illegal strike and ULP
against GMAEU and its fourteen (14) officers. Meanwhile, the Secretary of Labor
immediately assumed jurisdiction over the case, issued a return-to-work order, and
certified the case to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration.
The LA found no factual and legal ground to hold RBS guilty of ULP against the
Union. On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the LA's decision.
Meanwhile, the LA continued to hear the illegal strike case filed by RBS against
GMAEU. The LA rendered judgment declaring the strike illegal and the union
officers who knowingly participated in the illegal strike to have validly lost their
employment status based on the following reasons:
a. "The notice of strike did not specifically charge the company (RBS) of ULP, only
pro forma allegations of gross violation of the CBA, employees coercion, union
interference, and discrimination." It is "defective as it consisted of vague and
SHHH Digests Labor Relations 2016-2017
general charges which could not be substantiated and which the company could not
properly defend itself against."
b. "The absence of evidence on record that the mandatory cooling-off period and
strike vote under the law were complied which renders the strike staged by the
respondents illegal per se on technical grounds."
c. "On the merits . . . there are no strikeable grounds as there was no bargaining
deadlock between the parties. The alleged gross violation of the CBA cannot
constitute ULP because said charges were bereft of factual and legal basis." "There
being no ULP, it follows that there is no strikeable issue to support the strike
conducted by the Union."
d. The union violated the no strike-no lockout clause of the CBA with RBS; thus
rendering the strike illegal. NLRC affirmed the labor arbiter's decision.
Petitioners argue that any defect in their pro-forma notice of strike was cured when
the NCMB took cognizance of the case and conducted conciliation proceedings. In
addition, upon assumption by the Secretary of Labor of jurisdiction over the dispute
and certification of the same for compulsory arbitration, it is presumed that the
union had complied with the procedural requirements under the labor code for a
valid notice of strike.
Petitioners further argue that they believed in good faith that RBS had committed
acts of ULP which induced them to proceed with the strike. Since it was a ULP strike,
the no-strike clause in the CBA with RBS does not apply They also showed good
faith by their immediate compliance with the return-to-work order issued by the
Secretary of Labor.
Private respondent RBS refutes that petitioners cannot invoke the protective
mantle of the good faith strike doctrine because the alleged issues in the notice of
strike were never substantiated by the union either before or during the
conciliation proceedings, and they violated the no strike clause.
ISSUE:
WON the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion when it upheld the labor
arbiter's decision that petitioners staged an illegal strike.
HELD:
The notice of strike filed by the union before the NCMB contained general
allegations that RBS management committed ULP by its gross violation of the
economic provisions in their CBA and by alleged acts of coercion, union interference
and discrimination which amounted to union busting. It is the union, therefore, who
had the burden of proof to present substantial evidence to support these
allegations.
De Leon. Tan. Udarbe
It is not disputed that prior to 12 July 1991, the union treated RBS' issuance of the
"guidelines on the availment of leaves and rendering of overtime services" as
"gross" violations of the existing CBA. In its talks with the union, RBS painstakingly
explained that the said allegation was unfounded because the issuance of said
guidelines was RBS' management prerogative. Up to that point, the union never
raised the issue of ULP allegedly committed by RBS' officials under Article 248 of the
Labor Code. But in its notice of strike filed two days later, the union raised issues of
coercion, discrimination, and union interference for the first time.
Significantly, the union had 2 conciliatory meetings arranged by the NCMB at which
it could have substantiated these additional allegations. However, the fact that it
had submitted the results of the strike vote even ahead of the conciliatory
meetings, and continuously refused to substantiate its allegations in its notice of
strike thereafter, lends credence to the NLRC's observation that these charges were
indiscriminately hurled against RBS to give a semblance of validity to its notice of
strike.
Under Rule XIII Sec. 4 Book V of the Implementing Rules of the Labor Code —
. . . . . In cases of unfair labor practices, the notice of strike shall as far as practicable,
state the acts complained of and the efforts to resolve the dispute amicably.
Upon the other hand, Rule III Sec. 6 provides that —
During the (conciliation) proceeding, the parties shall not do any act which may
disrupt or impede the early settlement of the dispute. They are obliged, as part of
their duty to bargain collectively in good faith, to participate fully and promptly in
the conciliation meetings called by the regional branch of the board...
Petitioners plead that their contemporaneous acts, from their letter to RBS up to
the actual strike, were justified based on its honest belief that RBS was committing
ULP. "The presumption of legality (of the strike) prevails even if the allegations of
ULP are subsequently found out to be untrue."
But in the case at bar the facts and the evidence did not establish even at least a
rational basis why the union would wield a strike based on ULP it did not even
bother to substantiate during the conciliation proceedings when the circumstances
clearly negate even a prima facie showing to warrant such a belief.
The Court affirms the factual finding of the LA and the NLRC that" there was no
strikeable issue to support respondent's subject strike." The evidence shows that
the union anchored its position on alleged ULP in order to evade not only the
grievance machinery but also the no strike clause in their CBA with RBS.
RBS did not issue its implementing guidelines in an arbitrary manner. The union was
promptly informed that RBS' decision was based on its management prerogative to
SHHH Digests Labor Relations 2016-2017 De Leon. Tan. Udarbe
regulate all aspects of employment, subject of course to well-defined limitations
imposed by law or by contract.

Even assuming arguendo that in the issuance of said guidelines RBS may have
violated some provisions in the CBA, there was no palpable showing that the same
was a flagrant and/or malicious refusal to comply with its economic provisions.
Hence, the law mandates that said violation "shall not be considered ULP and shall
not be strikeable."

The bottom line is that the union should have immediately resorted to the
grievance machinery established in their agreement with RBS. In disregarding said
procedure the union leaders who knowingly participated in the illegal strike "have
acted unreasonably, and, as such, the law cannot interpose its hand to protect
them from the consequences of their behavior."