Right to Self-Organization

● SSS Employees Association v. CA, 175 SCRA 686 (GR 85279)

FACTS:

The officers and members of the Social Security System Employees Association (SSSEA)
staged an illegal strike and baricaded the entrances to the SSS Building after the SSS failed to
act on the union's demands and after the Social Security System (SSS) deducted certain
amounts from the salaries of the employees and allegedly committed acts of discrimination and
unfair labor practices. The strike was reported to the Public Sector Labor - Management Council,
which ordered the strikers to return to work. The strikers refused to return to work and as a
result, the SSS suffered damages. On the basis of the foregoing, the SSS filed a complaint for
damages with a writ of preliminary injunction against the SSSEA before the RTC. Eventually, the
RTC, having found that the strike was illegal, issued a writ of preliminary injunction. As the
SSSEA's motion for reconsideration of the RTC's decision was denied, SSSEA filed a petition for
certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction before this Court. In a resolution, the Court
resolved to refer the case to the CA whereby the CA ruled against the SSSEA.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not the employees of the SSS have the right to strike

2. Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction to hear the case initiated by the SSS and to
enjoin the strikers from continuing with the strike and to order them to return to work

HELD:

By itself, this provision would seem to recognize the right of all workers and employees, including
those in the public sector, to strike. But the Constitution itself fails to expressly confirm this
impression, for in the Sub-Article on the Civil Service Commission, it provides, after defining the
scope of the civil service as "all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the
Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters," that
"[t]he right to self-organization shall not be denied to government employees" [Art. IX(B), Sec.
2(l) and (50)]. Parenthetically, the Bill of Rights also provides that "[tlhe right of the people,
including those employed in the public and private sectors, to form unions, associations, or
societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not abridged" [Art. III, Sec. 8]. Thus, while there is
no question that the Constitution recognizes the right of government employees to organize, it is
silent as to whether such recognition also includes the right to strike. The Court is of the
considered view that they are. Considering that under the 1987 Constitution "[t]he civil service
embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government,
including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters" [Art. IX(B), Sec.
.2(l) see also Sec. 1 of E.O. No. 180 where the employees in the civil service are denominated
as "government employees"] and that the SSS is one such government-controlled corporation
with an original charter, having been created under R.A. No. 1161, its employees are part of the
civil service [NASECO v. NLRC, G.R. Nos. 69870 & 70295, November 24, 1988] and are
covered by the Civil Service Commission's memorandum prohibiting strikes. This being the case,
the strike staged by the employees of the SSS was illegal.

E.O. No. 180, which provides guidelines for the exercise of the right to organize of government
employees, while clinging to the same hilosophy, has, however, relaxed the rule to allow
negotiation where the terms and conditions of employment involved are not among those fixed
by law. Thus: Government employees may, therefore, through their unions or associations, either
petition the Congress for the betterment of the terms and conditions of employment which are
within the ambit of legislation or negotiate with the appropriate government agencies for the
improvement of those which are not fixed by law. If there be any unresolved grievances, the
dispute may be referred to the Public Sector Labor - Management Council for appropriate action.
But employees in the civil service may not resort to strikes, walk-outs and other temporary work
stoppages, like workers in the private sector, to pressure the Govemment to accede to their
demands. As now provided under Sec. 4, Rule III of the Rules and Regulations to Govern the
Exercise of the Right of Government-Employees to Self- Organization, which took effect after the
instant dispute arose, "[t]he terms and conditions of employment in the government, including
any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof and government-owned and controlled
corporations with original charters are governed by law and employees therein shall not strike for
the purpose of securing changes thereof."

The strike staged by the employees of the SSS belonging to petitioner union being prohibited by
law, an injunction may be issued to restrain it. It is futile for the petitioners to assert that the
subject labor dispute falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRC and, hence, the Regional
Trial Court had no jurisdiction to issue a writ of injunction enjoining the continuance of the strike.
The Labor Code itself provides that terms and conditions of employment of government
employees shall be governed by the Civil Service Law, rules and regulations [Art. 276]. More
importantly, E.O. No. 180 vests the Public Sector Labor - Management Council with jurisdiction
over unresolved labor disputes involving government employees [Sec. 16]. Clearly, the NLRC
has no jurisdiction over the dispute. This being the case, the Regional Trial Court was not
precluded, in the exercise of its general jurisdiction under B.P. Blg. 129, as amended, from
assuming jurisdiction over the SSS's complaint for damages and issuing the injunctive writ
prayed for therein. Unlike the NLRC, the Public Sector Labor - Management Council has not
been granted by law authority to issue writs of injunction in labor disputes within its jurisdiction.
Thus, since it is the Council, and not the NLRC, that has jurisdiction over the instant labor
dispute, resort to the general courts of law for the issuance of a writ of injunction to enjoin the
strike is appropriate.

● Trade Unions of the Philippines v. NHC, 173 SCRA 33

FACTS: National Housing Corporation (NHC) is a corporation organized in accordance with EO 399
(Uniform Charter of Government Corporations). It is fully owned by the government. The government entities
that own its shares of stock are the GSIS, the SSS, the DBP, the NIDC and the People’s Homesite and
Housing Corporation.

Trade Unions of the Philippines and Allied Services (TUPAS) is a legitimate labor organization with a chapter
in the NHC.
In July 1977, TUPAS filed a petition for the conduct of a certification election with the Regional Office No. IV
of the Department of Labor in order to determine the exclusive bargaining representative of the workers in
NHC. It is claimed that its members comprised the majority of the employees of the corporation. In November
1977, Med-Arbiter Eusebio Jimenez (Jimenez) dismissed the petition because the NHC, being a GOCC, its
employees/workers are prohibited to form, join or assist any labor organization for purposes of collective
bargaining pursuant to Sec. 1, Rule II, Book V of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code.

TUPAS then appealed to the Bureau of Labor Relations. Director Carmelo Noriel (Noriel) reversed the order.
However, in November 1978, Officer-in-Charge Virgilio Sy (Sy) set aside Noriel’s upo NHC’s motion for
reconsideration. Hence, TUPAS seeks the reversal of Sy’s resolution and prays that a certification election
be held among the rank and file employees of NHC.

ISSUE: WON employees/workers of a GOCC may form, join or assist any labor organization for purposes
of collective bargaining.

HELD: Yes.

RATIO: The workers or employees of NHC undoubtedly have the right to form unions or employees'
organizations. The right to unionize or to form organizations is now explicitly recognized and granted to
employees in both the governmental and the private sectors. The Bill of Rights provides that "(t)he right of
the people, including those employed in the public and private sectors, to form unions, associations or
societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged."

This guarantee is reiterated in Art. 13 (3) of the Constitution, which mandates that the State "shall guarantee
the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted
activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law ...."

Specifically with respect to government employees, the right to unionize is recognized in Art. 9-B, Sec. 2 (5)
of the Constitution which provides that "(t)he right to self-organization shall not be denied to government
employees." This is because the government is in a sense an employer in every sense of the word, except
that the terms and conditions of work are set forth through a Civil Service Commission. The government is
the biggest employer in the Philippines. There is an employer-employee relationship existing between the
government and the people who work in and for it.

Also, Art. 244 of the Labor Code, as amended by EO 111 provides that employees of the government
corporations established under the Corporation Code shall have the right to organize and to bargain
collectively with their respective employers. All other employees in the civil service shall have the right to
form associations for purposes not contrary to law.

VI. Authority of the Public Officer

• Legazpi v. Minister of Finance, 115 SCRA 418

FACTS: In 1982, after the lifting of Martial Law, Legaspi, then incumbent member of the
interim Batasang Pambansa, petitioned to declare Presidential Decree 1840 “granting tax
amnesty and filing of statement of assets and liabilities and some other
purposes”unconstitutional. He argued that said decree was promulgated despite the fact
that under the Constitution ‘(T)he Legislative power shall be vested in a Batasang
Pambansa’ (Sec. 1, Article VIII) and the President may grant amnesty only ‘with
concurrence of the Batasang Pambansa. In this case, there was no concurrence given by
the IBP. Legaspi averred that since Martial Law is already lifted, the president can no
longer arbitrarily enact laws. At the same time, Legaspi averred that Amendment No. 6,
which provides legislative powers to Marcos, is invalid because that is no longer allowed
after the lifting of the ML.
ISSUE: WON Marcos can validly grant tax amnesties w/o the concurrence of the Batasan
Pambansa.

HELD:

RATIO: SC ruled PD 1840 to be valid. Legaspi argued that PD 1840 is invalid for it did
not enjoy the concurrence of the Batasan. He relies on Article 7, Sec 11 of the
Constitution which provides that – ‘The President may, except in cases of impeachment,
grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, remit fines and forfeitures and with the
concurrence of the Batasang Pambansa, grant amnesty.’

The SC noted that Article 7, sec. 11, applies only when the President is exercising his
power of executive clemency. In the case at bar, PD 1840 was issued pursuant to his
power to legislate under Amendment No. 6. It ought to be indubitable that when the
President acts as legislator as in the case at bar, he does not need the concurrence of
the Batasan. Rather, he exercises concurrent authority vested by the Constitution.”

VII. Salary and Perquisites

• Sevilla v. Gocon, 423 SCRA 98

FACTS: Sevilla and Limbo was charged of falsification of official document, dishonesty
and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. Gocon, Guidance Counselor III,
was designated as Chairman of the Values Education Department in 1989. Limbo was a
former Head Teacher III in the Practical Arts Department of the Quezon National High
School in Lucena City. Respondent Sevilla requested for the reclassification of eight (8)
items of Secondary Head Teacher III to Secondary Head Teacher VI. Apparently, said
request contains super impositions/erasures, specifically item 7 “wherein the Practical
Arts Department was replaced to Values Department with Limbo as the ALLEGED
Secondary Head Teacher (Head Teacher III)” when in truth he was the Head Teacher of
the Practical Arts Department which was later merged with the Home Economics
Department. Sevilla, in his capacity as Principal IV, requested the Office of the Regional
Director, DECS Region IV, for the upgrading of Gocon’s position of Guidance Counselor
III to Head Teacher VI for Values Education. DECS denied the request. Gocon
discovered that Limbo was appointed as Head Teacher VI for Values Education when he
asked about said appointment, Sevilla explained to Gocon that Limbo was temporarily
designated as Head Teacher for Values Education so that all Head Teacher items would
be reclassified by DECS Regional Office IV. Gocon filed a complaint and requested the
intercession of the then DECS Secretary regarding the matter. DECS claimed among
others, as follows: ‘I strongly deny the allegation of Mr. Sevilla that I suggested to him to
‘temporarily designate Mr. Limbo’s appointment item as Values item…” I do not know
personally Mr. Sevilla, hence, I have no reason to make such suggestion to him knowing
that such act is a clear falsification of public documents. And I do not remember having
met him.’ Limbo acknowledged that he was the one who made alterations in the request
for reclassification. He stressed, however, that he initialed all the corrections he made to
show that he was in good faith in doing so and that he acted upon the suggestion of
Monina Belen, as staff of Leovigildo Arellano at the DECS Management Division.

In the CSC case, respondents Sevilla and Limbo were formally charged by the Civil
Service Commission Regional Office No. IV of falsification of official documents,
dishonesty and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.

ISSUE: WON the acts or omissions of petitioner Sevilla amounted to dishonesty

HELD: No, the omission of petitioner Sevilla was not equilvalent to dishonesty BUT he is
administratively liable for that omission. BASIS: The Code of Conduct and Ethical
Standards of Public Officials and Employees

RATIO: Dishonesty is intentionally making a false statement in any material fact, or

practicing or attempting to practice any deception or fraud in securing his examination,
registration, appointment or promotion. Dishonesty was understood to imply a disposition
to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of integrity.

It was Limbo who had made the alterations in the letter of petitioner, who never
represented him to anyone as the head teacher of the Values Education Department.
The records show that the item of Limbo was reclassified from Head Teacher III (Practical
Arts) to Head Teacher VI (Values Education), without petitioner misrepresenting the
former as the one performing the functions of head teacher of the Values Education
Department. Although Limbo was appointed as Head Teacher VI (Values Education),
after his previous item had been reclassified as such, he continued performing the
functions of head teacher of the Practical Arts Department. Hence, there was no
misrepresentation of him as the head teacher of Practical Arts (Boys). The above
circumstances, however do not totally absolve petitioner from liability. The meat of the
anguished Complaint of respondent was the concealment from her and the entire school
of Limbo’s appointment as Head Teacher VI for Values Education. Ordinarily, no one
would assume the heavy duties and responsibilities of a position without receiving, or at
least expecting to receive in the future, the corresponding compensation therefor. Good
faith demanded that petitioner should have revealed Limbo’s appointment to respondent.
It was improper for him to expect her to continue performing the functions of a values
education head teacher, when someone else had already been appointed to that position
and was receiving the corresponding salary. Thus, he is administratively liable for his
omission which, however, did not amount to dishonesty, as he had made no false
statement. On his part, no deliberate intent to mislead, deceive or defraud can be read
from the circumstances of this case.

As a public school principal, petitioner is bound by a high standard of work ethic. “The
Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees (RA 6713),
enunciates inter alia, the State policy of promoting a high standard of ethics and utmost
responsibility in the public service. Section 4 of the Code commands that ‘(p)ublic
officials and employees at all times respect the rights of others, and refrain from doing
acts contrary to law, good morals, good customs, public policy, public order, public safety
and public interest.’

By his omissions, petitioner failed to live up to such standard. His failure to inform
respondent of Limbo’s appointment and to promptly remedy the resulting prejudice
against her may be characterized as conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the
service, since such conduct affected not only her but also all the other faculty members of
QNHS.

AS TO THE SALARIES:

The conduct grossly prejudicial to the best interest of the service is penalized under
Section 22(t) of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 and
Other Pertinent Civil Service Laws by suspension. The suspension is for six (6) months
and one (1) day to one (1) year for the first offense. HOWEVER, petitioner has already
reached the compulsory age of retirement during the pendency of this case. He is no
longer in the government service. Thus, it would be more appropriate to impose on him a
fine equivalent to his salary for six (6) months, instead of a suspension. This penalty is
allowed under Section 19 of the same Rules.
 VIII. Liability of public officers

Kinds of duties

● Mendiola v. People, 207 SCRA 85

Facts:

Sometime in 1983, the old public market of Angono, Rizal was razed to the ground by fire. In
1984, the former stallholders of the old public market were issued temporary business permits
and allow to erect and construct temporary market stalls on the public grounds where the old
market used to stand. After the February 1986 change of government, and more specifically in
January 1987, the Angono Municipal Council headed by Officer-in-Charge ("OIC") Nemesio
Miranda, Sr., enacted Resolution No. 7-1987 authorizing the construction of Angono Public
Market Phase II (APM-Phase II) on a vacant lot owned by the Municipality of Angono, adjacent to
APM-Phase I. The construction of APM-Phase II was to be financed by a novel scheme: a
contract was entered into between (a) a building contractor (b) a Construction Committee
representing the stall awardees of APM-II (c) OIC Miranda, Sr., signing on behalf of the
Municipality of Angono, stipulating that each awardee would pay the contractor the sum of
P20,000.00 for the construction of APM-Phase II, The market building would belong to the
Municipality upon turnover at completion by contractor. Notably, no public bidding for the
construction of the new market building was contemplated or provided for in the scheme.

Petitioner Lorenzo S. Mendiola was Municipal Planning Development coordinator and Civil
Registrar of Angono. Being a Civil Engineer, he was concurrently designated as Building Official
of Angono as well as other adjacent towns of Rizal Province. At the time of issuing this building
permit, petitioner noted on the construction blue-print of APM-Phase II that the proposed building
would encroach at several points upon existing stalls comprising part of APM-Phase I. For
reasons not apparent on the record, the construction plans conditionally approved by the
petitioner Mendiola were never corrected to eliminate the ecroachments on existing APM-Phase
I stalls. The February 1988 local elections resulted in the election and installation of a new set of
local officials in Angono who promptly assailed the legality of Resolution No. 7-1987 before the
Provincial Board of Rizal. The Rizal Provincial Board enacted its Resolution No. 88-71 directing
the Municipal Council of Angono to hold in abeyance the implementation of Resolution No. 7-
1987 until further notice by the [Provincial Board] of Rizal.

The contractor of AMP-Phase II, with the aid of the military, demolished the market stalls of
Ortillada, The demolition of stalls was carried out without prior hearing or a court order and
without a demolition permit from petitioner building official. Because of the demolition of the
Phase I stalls and because the AMP-Phase II contractor insisted upon continuing with the
construction of new building, which continuation was opposed by the new set of municipal
officials, the Samahan (Phase I vendors) commenced another action before the Binangonan
Regional Trial Court against the contractor and APM-Phase II awardees-vendors, seeking to
stop them from proceeding with the Construction of APM-Phase II.

Petitioner was convicted by the Sandiganbayan in two (2) criminal cases for violation of Sections
3(j) and 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. He was sentenced to two (2) penalties, each of imprisonment
ranging from six (6) years and one (1) month as minimum to ten (10) years as maximum and
perpetual disqualification from public office. The two (2) charges instituted against petitioner may
be quickly described as follows: a. Issuing "building permits for market stalls" in favor of three (3)
persons who are allegedly not legally entitled to such permits; and b. Refusing to issue
certificates of partial occupancy to awardees of market stalls in Phase II of the Angono Public
Market although said Phase II market was allegedly ready for use.
Issue: WON Petitioner legally issued the said building permits and WON they were done in bad
faith

Held: When petitioner issued the building permit for the new or Phase II building he noted the
encroachment of the proposed building upon the Phase I market stalls of Ortillada, Rosales and
Blanco and had precisely required that the building plan be corrected. We understand this act of
the petitioner to mean that he had not approved the encroachments and thus the APM-Phase II
building permit he issued did not cover the space occupied by the Phase I stalls of Ortillada,
Rosales and Blanco.

In respect of the first charge, the factors tending to show good faith on the part of petitioner
Mendiola include the following: Firstly, the permits issued by petitioner to Ortillada, Rosales and
Blanco upon their application were merely temporary renovation permits that authorized the
renovation of the stalls demolished by the Phase II contractor. Secondly, the three (3) permittees
were long-time stallholders, having been so at least since the fire which had destroyed the old
Angono Public Market. They were not strangers to the Angono Public Market, since they were
stallholders, with temporary stalls, in APM-Phase I. Thirdly, the three (3) permittees had
outstanding and paid-up municipal business permits when petitioner issued them their stall
renovation permits. Fourthly, the permittees' temporary stall had been demolished without prior
hearing or a court order, or a demolition order from the authorized building official which was
petitioner Mendiola himself.

Secondly, the decision dated 31 August 1988 of the Secretary, DPWH, was not really final since
the applicable statute itself provided for an appeal by ways of a petition for review before the
Office of the President. As noted, petitioner filed not only a motion for reconsideration with the
Secretary but also a petition for review with the Office of the President. In these further
proceedings, petitioner brought to the attention of the Secretary, DPWH, and the Office of the
President the position that had been vigorously taken by the newly-elected Angono Mayor and
Municipal Council. Contrary to the submission of the Solicitor General, we believe and so hold
that all the above factors support the claim of good faith in respect of both the first and second
charges against petitioner Mendiola. The record strongly suggests that petitioner Mendiola had
the misfortune of getting caught in the middle of a heated controversy between two (2) local
interest groups and between the outgoing OIC municipal officials and the incoming newly elected
set of municipal officials.

Disposition: ACCORDINGLY, the Decision of the Sandiganbayan dated 7 September 1989 in

Criminal Cases Nos. 13172-13173 is hereby REVERSED and petitioner Lorenzo S. Mendiola is
hereby ACQUITTED in both cases. No pronouncement as to costs.

● Tabuena v. Sandiganbayan, 268 SCRA 332

FACTS:

Then Pres. Ferdinand Marcos instructed Luis Tabuena, General Manager of the Manila
International Airport Authority (MIAA), over the phone to pay directly to the president’s office and
in cash what the MIAA owes the Phil. National Construction Corp. The verbal instruction was
reiterated in a Presidential memorandum.

In obedience to Pres. Marcos’ instruction, Tabuena, with the help of Gerardo Dabao and Adolfo
Peralta, the Asst. Gen. Mgr. and the Acting Finance Services Mgr. of MIAA, respectively, caused
the release of P55M of MIAA funds of three (3) withdrawals and delivered the money to Mrs. Fe
Roa-Gimenez, private secretary of Marcos. Gimenez issued a receipt for all the amounts she
received from Tabuena. Later, it turned out that PNCC never received the money.

The case involves two (2) separate petitions for review by Luis Tabuena and Adolfo Peralta.
They appeal the Sandiganbayan decision convicting them of malversation of MIAA funds in the
amount of P55M.

Further, petitioners claimed that they were charged with intentional malversation, as alleged in
the amended information, but it would appear that they were convicted for malversation with
negligence. Hence, their conviction of a crime different from that charged violated their
constitutional right to be informed of the accusation.

ISSUE:

(1) Whether or not the Sandiganbayan convicted them of a crime not charged in the
amended information; and

(2) Whether or not Tabuena and Peralta acted in good faith.

HELD:

(1) No. Malversation is committed either intentionally or by negligence. The dolo or the culpa
present in the offense is only a modality in the perpetration of the felony. Even if the mode
charged differs from the mode proved, the same offense of malversation is involved.

(2) Yes. Tabuena acted in strict compliance with the MARCOS Memorandum. The order
emanated from the Office of the President and bears the signature of the President himself, the
highest official of the land. It carries with it the presumption that it was regularly issued. And on
its face, the memorandum is patently lawful for no law makes the payment of an obligation
illegal. This fact, coupled with the urgent tenor for its execution constrains one to act swiftly
without question.

However, a more compelling reason for the ACQUITTAL is the violation of the accused's basic
constitutional right to due process. Records show that the Sandiganbayan actively took part in
the questioning of a defense witness and of the accused themselves. The questions of the court
were in the nature of cross examinations characteristic of confrontation, probing and insinuation.
Tabuena and Peralta may not have raised the issue as an error, there is nevertheless no
impediment for the court to consider such matter as additional basis for a reversal since the
settled doctrine is that an appeal throws the whole case open to review, and it becomes the duty
of the appellate court to correct such errors as may be found in the judgment appealed from
whether they are made the subject of assignments of error or not.

The "cold neutrality of an impartial judge" requirement of due process was certainly denied
Tabuena and Peralta when the court, with its overzealousness, assumed the dual role of
magistrate and advocate. Time and again the Court has declared that due process requires no
less than the cold neutrality of an impartial judge. That the judge must not only be impartial but
must also appear to be impartial, to give added assurance to the parties that his decision will be
just. The parties are entitled to no less than this, as a minimum guaranty of due process.

HENCE, Luis Tabuena and Adolfo Peralta are acquitted of the crime of malversation.
President

• Estrada v. Desierto, 353 SCRA 452

FACTS: On November 13, 2000, The House of Representatives transmitted the Articles of
Impeachment signed by 115 representatives, or more than 1/3 of all the members of the House
of Representatives to the Senate. On December 7, 2000, the impeachment proceedings began
in the Senate during which more serious allegations of graft and corruption against Estrada were

made. On January 16, 2001, the impeachment trial stopped when 11 senators, in sympathy with
the President, voted to stop the opening of an envelope which allegedly has damaging evidence
against Estrada. As a result, the impeachment trial was thrown into an uproar as the entire
prosecution panel walked out and then Senate President Pimentel resigned after casting his vote
against Estrada.

On January 19, Estrada fell from power. At 1:20 p.m. of said day, the Erap informed then
Executive Secretary Edgardo Angara that General Angelo Reyes, Chief of Staff of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, had defected. January. On January 20, SC declared that the seat of
presidency was vacant, saying that Estrada “constructively resigned his post”. At noon, Arroyo
took her oath of office in the presence of the crowd at EDSA as the 14th President. Estrada and
his family later left Malacañang Palace. Estrada, after his fall, filed a petition for prohibition with
prayer for Writ of Preliminary Injunction. He sought to enjoin the Ombudsman from conducting
any further proceedings in the cases that may be filed in his office, until after his term as
President is over and only if legally warranted.” Thru another counsel, Estrada, on February 6,
filed a case for Quo Warranto praying for judgment confirming Estrada to be the lawful and
incumbent President of the Republic of the Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties
of his office,

and declaring Arroyo to have taken her oath as and to be holding the Office of the President,
only in an acting capacity pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution.

ISSUE/S:

1.WON Estrada validly resigned

2.WON Estrada enjoyed immunity from suit

HELD:

1. Yes 2. No

RATIO:

1. Yes. The resignation of President Estrada could not be doubted as confirmed by his leaving
Malacañan Palace. The elements of a valid resignation are: (a) an intent to resign and (b) acts of
relinquishment. Both were present when President Estrada left the Palace. He constructively
resigned. In the press release containing his final statement:

a. He acknowledged the oath-taking of the Arroyo as President.

b. He emphasized he was leaving the Palace for the sake of peace and in order to begin the
healing process (he did not say that he was leaving due to any kind of disability and that he was
going to reassume the Presidency as soon as the disability disappears);

c. He expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them as President
(without doubt referring to the past opportunity);

d. He assured that he will not shirk from any future challenge that may come in the same
service of the country;

e. He called on his supporters to join him in promotion of a constructive national spirit of

reconciliation and solidarity.

2. No. Estrada is not immune for suit because he is not the president anymore. “Incumbent
Presidents are immune from suit or from being brought to court during the period of their
incumbency and tenure” but not beyond. Considering the peculiar circumstance that the
impeachment process against the petitioner has been aborted and thereafter he lost the
presidency, petitioner Estrada cannot demand as a condition sine qua non to his criminal
prosecution before the Ombudsman that he be convicted in the impeachment proceedings.

The cases filed against Estrada are criminal in character. They involve plunder, bribery and
graft and corruption. By no stretch of the imagination can these crimes, especially plunder which
carries the death penalty, be covered by the allege mantle of immunity of a non-sitting president.
It will be anomalous to hold that immunity is an inoculation from liability for unlawful acts and
omissions. The rule is that unlawful acts of public officials are not acts of the State and the
officer who acts illegally is not acting as such but stands in the same footing as any other
trespasser.

Legislators
• Santiago v. Sandiganbayan, 356 SCRA 636

FACTS: In October 1988, Miriam Defensor Santiago, who was the then Commissioner of the
Commission of Immigration and Deportation (CID), approved the application for legalization of
the stay of about 32 aliens. Her act was said to be illegal and was tainted with bad faith and it ran
counter against Republic Act No. 3019 (AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act). The legalization of
such is also a violation of Executive Order No. 324 which prohibits the legalization of disqualified
aliens. The aliens legalized by Santiago were allegedly known by her to be disqualified. Two
other criminal cases were filed against Santiago. Pursuant to this information, Francis
Garchitorena, a presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan, issued a warrant of arrest against
Santiago. Santiago petitioned for provisional liberty since she was just recovering from a car
accident which was approved. In 1995, a motion was filed with the Sandiganbayan for the
suspension of Santiago, who was already a senator by then. The Sandiganbayan ordered the
Senate President (Maceda) to suspend Santiago from office for 90 days.

ISSUE: WON Sandiganbayan can order suspension of a member of the Senate without violating
the Constitution.

HELD: Yes.

RATIO: It is true that the Constitution provides that each “… house may determine the rules of its
proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds
of all its Members, suspend or expel a Member. A penalty of suspension, when imposed, shall
not exceed sixty days.” But on the other hand, Section 13 of RA 3019 provides:
“Suspension and loss of benefits. – any incumbent public officer against whom any criminal
prosecution under a valid information under this Act or under Title 7, Book II of the Revised
Penal Code or for any offense involving fraud upon government or public funds or property
whether as a simple or as a complex offense and in whatever stage of execution and mode of
participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended from office. Should he be convicted by final
judgment, he shall lose all retirement or gratuity benefits under any law, but if he is acquitted, he
shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive
during suspension, unless in the meantime administrative proceedings have been filed against
him”.

In here, the order of suspension prescribed by RA. 3019 is distinct from the power of Congress
to discipline its own ranks under the Constitution. The suspension contemplated in the above
constitutional provision is a punitive measure that is imposed upon determination by the Senate
or the Lower House, as the case may be, upon an erring member. This is quite distinct from the
suspension spoken of in Section 13 of RA 3019, which is not a penalty but a preliminary,
preventive measure, prescinding from the fact that the latter is not being imposed on petitioner
for misbehavior as a Member of the Senate.

Republic Act No. 3019 does not exclude from its coverage the members of Congress and that,
therefore, the Sandiganbayan did not err in thus decreeing the assailed preventive suspension
order.

Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 does not state that the public officer concerned must be
suspended only in the office where he is alleged to have committed the acts with which he has
been charged. Thus, it has been held that the use of the word “office” would indicate that it
applies to any office which the officer charged may be holding, and not only the particular office
under which he stands accused.

The law does not require that the guilt of the accused must be established in a pre-suspension
proceeding before trial on the merits proceeds. Neither does it contemplate a proceeding to
determine (1) the strength of the evidence of culpability against him, (2) the gravity of the offense
charged, or (3) whether or not his continuance in office could influence the witnesses or pose a
threat to the safety and integrity of the records another evidence before the court could have a
valid basis in decreeing preventive suspension pending the trial of the case. All it secures to the
accused is adequate opportunity to challenge the validity or regularity of the proceedings against
him, such as, that he has not been afforded the right to due preliminary investigation, that the
acts imputed to him do not constitute a specific crime warranting his mandatory suspension from
office under Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019, or that the information is subject to quashal on
any of the grounds set out in Section 3, Rule 117, of the Revised Rules on Criminal procedure.

Judges

Dantes v. Caguioa, 461 SCRA 236

Where the law violated is so elementary for a judge not to know it or to act as if he does not
know it constitutes gross ignorance.

Atty. Nestor Dantes (Dantes) was the counsel in a case for the declaration of nullity of a deed of
sale with a right to repurchase, which was filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC). Judge
Philbert Iturralde dismissed the complaint. The court found Dantes and his clients guilty of direct
contempt for willful and deliberate forum shopping.

Atty. Dantes filed a motion for reconsideration. Judge Ramon Caguioa (Caguioa) was thereafter
appointed as the Presiding Judge and took over the pending case. The motion was dismissed on
the ground of res judicata. The plaintiffs, through Atty. Dantes, filed a motion for clarification of
said order. Respondent judge directed plaintiffs and Atty. Dantes to show cause and explain why
they should not be cited in contempt of Court for using disrespectful language in their pleadings.

Atty. Dantes filed a motion requesting Judge Caguioa to specify/particularize the ―disrespectful
language‖ used in the pleadings he submitted, which was denied. Judge Caguioa then ordered
the arrest of Atty. Dantes. He requested respondent judge to allow him to post a bond for his
provisional liberty but the same was denied. Consequently, an administrative case was filed
against Judge Caguiao.

ISSUE:Whether or not Judge Caguioa is guilty gross ignorance of the law for not grating the
petition to post bail

HELD:Not every error bespeaks ignorance of the law, for if committed in good faith, it does not
warrant administrative sanctions. To hold otherwise would be nothing short of harassment and
would make his position doubly unbearable, for no one called upon to try the facts or interpret the
law in the process of administering justice can be infallible in judgment.

Good faith, however, in situations of fallible discretion inheres only within the parameters of
tolerable judgment and does not apply where the issues are so simple and the applicable legal
principles evident and basic as to be beyond possible margins of error.

Thus where the law violated is so elementary, like Rule 71 which provides the scope of a judge’s
authority to punish for contempt and the procedure to be followed, for a judge not to know it or to
act as if he does not know it constitutes gross ignorance.

Judge Caguioa’s denial of Atty. Dantes’ request to post a bond for his provisional liberty violated
Atty. Dantes’ right to due process — his right to avail of the remedies of certiorari or prohibition
pending resolution of which the execution of the judgment should have been suspended. His
denial of the request betrayed his ignorance.

In Re: Raul M. Gonzalez, 160 SCRA 771

FACTS: An anonymous letter by the “Concerned Employees of the Supreme Court ”was
addressed to Hon. Raul M. Gonzales with regard to charges of disbarment initiated by Mr. Miguel
Cuenco against Justice Marcelo Fernan. Mr. Cuenco was encouraging Hon. Gonzales ro ask the
intervention of Tanodbayan regarding the issue. The Court then directed the Clerk of Court to
furnish Hon. Gonzales a copy of the Resolution on the administrative case entitled, “Miguel
Cuenco v. Hon. Marcelo Fernan” wherein the Court resolved to dismiss the case for disbarment
against Justice Fernan for lack of merit. Mr. Cuenco in turn filed an Omnibus Pleading which the
Court considered as a motion for reconsideration which was likewise denied by the Court.

ISSUE: WON the herein act of Mr. Cuenco, in initiating a disbarment proceeding against Justice
Fernan is correct?

HELD: No.

RATIO: Under Art. XI, Sec.2 of the 1987 Constitution, a member of the Supreme Court must first
be removed by impeachment. With this, it has been held by the Court that a public officer who
under the Constitution is required to be a member of the Philippine Bar as a qualification for the
office held by him and who may be removed from office only by impeachment, cannot be
charged with disbarment during the incumbency of such public officer.

Chief Justice Fernando, in his authoritative dissertation on the New Constitution, stated that
judgment in cases of impeachment shall be limited to removal from office and disqualification to
hold any office of honor, trust, or profit under the Republic of the Philippines, but the party
convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution trial, and punishment, in
accordance with law. This position implies that a member of the Supreme Court must first be
removed from office by impeachment. Should he be terminated as such, he may then be held to
answer either criminally or administratively (by disbarment proceedings) for any misbehavior
proven to be done by him.

The above rule is pertinent to the fundamental principles of separation of powers and judicial
independence. The proper remedy therefore is for Mr. Cuenco to file impeachment proceedings
against Justice Fernan.

Quasi-judicial officers

• Philippine Racing Club v. Bonifacio, 109 SCRA 233

FACTS: The horse race held in Santa Ana Hippodrome had a faulty start. One of the horses
turned around and blocked the three horses at its left thus enabling the three horses from the right
side to run ahead and gain a good lead. The official starter signalled the stewards to cancel the
race. The two stewards were also acting as judges. Since his signal was unheeded, the official
starter went to the stewards and told them that in his opinion the race must be cancelled. one of
the stewards asked him to "shut up". When the winning horses were announced, the public showed
its disapproval of the result. Respondents (Commission on Races), convinced that the race was
faulty, decided to cancel it. While the investigation was going on, the holders of the winning tickets
were able to cash the tickets. The company had to refund to the holders of the losing tickets the
sum of P5,032.

ISSUE: WON the respondents, acting in their capacity as members of the Commission on Races,
should be held liable for the loss sustained by the Company when it decided to cancel the race.

HELD: No. RATIO: Although the Court said that the respondents, in deciding to cancel the race,
acted in excess of the authority granted to them by law, they could not be held liable for damages.
As a rule, a public officer, whether judicial, quasi-judicial, or executive, is not personally liable to
one injured as a consequence of an act performed within the scope of his official authority, and in
the line of his official duty. In order that acts may be done within the scope of official authority, it is
not necessary that they be prescribed by statute, or even that they be specifically directed or
requested by a superior officer, but it is sufficient if they are done by an officer in relation to matters
committed by law to his control or supervision, or that they have more or less connection with such
matters, or that they have more or less connection with such matters, or that they are governed by
a lawful requirement of the department under whose authority the officer is acting.

Where an officer is invested with discretion and is empowered to exercise his judgment in
matters brought before him, he is sometimes called a quasi-judicial officer, and when so acting he
is actually given immunity from liability to persons who may be injured as the result of an erroneous
or mistaken decision, however erroneous judgment may be, provided the acts complained of are
done within the scope of the officer's authority, and without willfulness, malice, or corruption.

Liability for acts of subordinates

• Chan v. Sandiganbayan, 466 SCRA 190

CHAN v. SANDIGANBAYAN- ASTER CARRILLO

FACTS: In November 1989, petitioner was hired as Accounting Clerk II and assigned at the
Regional Office of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) in Cebu City, discharging the function
of Cashier or Collection Officer. An audit was conducted to the petitioner’s account and the auditor
found that petitioner had a cumulative shortage of cash accountability in the amount of
P333,360.00 which was reflected in her Cash Examination Report dated March 1, 1996, signed
by petitioner. The auditor issued a demand letter to petitioner requiring her to explain the shortage
incurred, to which petitioner did not respond.

During trial, petitioner admitted that she extended loans using her collection (public funds) to her
colleagues and that the same is practiced in their office (although she knows its illegality). She was
in effect telling that such act was known by her superiors and that they consented to the doing of
the same.. She furthered that even her immediate supervisor was getting money out of the fund.

RTC and Sandiganbayan found her guilty of Malversation of Public Funds. Hence, petitioner filed
an appeal contending that she is in good faith and therefore if she should be penalized, it should
be administratively and not criminally.

ISSUE: WON petitioner is guilty of malversation despite the facts that there is an implied consent
by her superiors?

HELD: Yes.

RATIO: The fact that the immediate superiors of the accused (petitioner herein) have acquiesced
to the practice of giving out cash advances for convenience did not legalize the disbursements.
The accused was not in good faith because she allowed the doing of an illegal act. There was no
reason that prohibited her from doing the right thing. Moreover, there was no indication that she
attempted to stop the doing of the illegal act. She allowed herself to be machinery in doing the
criminal act and therefore she should be held liable.

Personal liability

• Tabuena v. CA, 3 SCRA 413

FACTS: Eugenio de la Cruz, in his official capacity as Director of the Forest Research Institute,
was commanded by the Trial Court to appoint Santos Tabuena, to the position of Administrative
Assistant II in the Forest Products Research Institute.

Along with the said decree, de la Cruz was also sentenced to pay Tabuena the sum of P230 a
month commencing from June 16, 1958 until he shall have been appointed and assumed office as
Administrative Assistant II in the Forest Products Research Institute, plus the sum of P3,000 for
moral damages and P1,000 for attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation, aside from the costs of
the suit.

De la Cruz filed an appeal and therein manifested that an appeal bond is not required to perfect
his appeal. In answer to this, Tabuena prayed to the Trial Court asking that de a Cruz be required
to file an appeal bond and to execute its judgment in so far as it commands the appointment of
Tabuena to the position of Administrative
Assistant II.

For the issue on the appeal bond, the Court ruled in favor of de la Cruz. It sustained the contention
of de la Cruz that he was exempted from filing an appeal bond, as a public officer sued in his
official capacity.

ISSUE: WON de la Cruz is required to file an appeal bond

HELD: Yes.

RATIO: De la Cruz must pay the appeal bond.

The general rule is that an appeal bond is required for the purpose of paying for costs, which the
appellate court may award against the appellant (Sec 5, Rule 41). As an exception, an appeal
bond is not required of the Government when it is the unsuccessful party, because no costs are
supposed to accrue against the Republic of the Philippines unless otherwise provided by law (Sec.
1, Rule 131). But exemption from the filing of bonds applies only where the action is brought by or
against public officers impleaded merely as nominal representatives of the Government, and sued
purely in their official capacity.

In this case, de la Cruz was sued not only in his official capacity as director of the Forest Product
Research Institute, but also in his personal capacity for having acted allegedly in manifest bad
faith, "with the purpose of persecuting, discriminating against or committing injustice to the
petitioner" and accordingly, the judgment of the court of origin made him personally liable for
damages in varying concepts. On principle, a public officer, by virtue of his office alone, is not
immune from damages in his personal capacity arising from illegal acts done in bad faith.

Remedies

• Rodrigo v. Sandiganbayan 303 SCRA 309

FACTS: Rodrigo and Mejica are the Mayor and Municipal Planning and Development Coordinator,
respectively, Pangasinan, while Facundo is the former Municipal Treasurer.

Rodrigo entered into an agreement with Philwood Construction for the electrification of San
Nicolas.

Mejica prepared an Accomplishment Report stating that the project was 97.5% accomplished.
Said report was supposedly approved by mayor Rodrigo and confirmed so payment was effected
by the Municipal Treasurer. Then they received a Notice of Disallowance from the Provincial
Auditor of Pangasinanwho found that as per COA evaluation of the electrification project, only
60.0171% of the project was actually accomplished.

Of the two units of generator supposedly purchased, only one second-hand unit was delivered.
The same generator broke down after only two nights of operation. In addition, instead of 40
wooden posts, only 27 were installed. The powerhouse was only 65.635% completed. The
Provincial Auditor thus disallowed the a part of the payment.

Then they requested the Provincial Auditor to lift the notice of disallowance] and to re-inspect the
project. Reiterated their plea in a letter but the Provincial Auditor, however, allegedly did not act
on petitioners’ requests. So the case was filed and reached the Sandiganbayan.
ISSUE: WON Sandiganyan has jurisdiction to decide the case against the Mayor even if his salary
grade was less than 27SG?

HELD: Yes.

RATIO: Because the local government official’s actual salary may be less than what the Salary
Schedule under Section 7 prescribes, depending on the class and financial capability of his or her
respective local government unit.

This circumstance, however, has no bearing on such official’s Grade. As the foregoing discussion
shows, on official’s salary is determined by the Grade accorded his position, and ultimately by the
nature of his position – the level of difficulty and responsibilities and level of qualification
requirements of the work. To give credence to petitioners’ argument that Mayor Rodrigo’s salary
determines his Grade would be to misconstrue the provisions of R.A. No. 6758, and ignore the
constitutional and statutory policies behind said law.

Petitioner mayor’s position having been classified as Grade 27 in accordance with R.A. No. 6758,
and having been charged with violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019, petitioner is subject to
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, as defined by Section 4 a. of P.D. No. 1606, as amended
by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7975. By virtue of the same Section 4 a., as amended, his co-accused
are also subject to the Anti-Graft Court’s jurisdiction. Case dismissed.