Professor: Abdennour Kharraki

Module: Semantics and Pragmatics

Lecture 3 & 4
SENSE AND REFERENCE

2.1 Introduction
According to Frege sense and Reference are two different aspects of the meaning of at least
some kinds of terms. Roughly, a term's reference is the object it refers to and its sense is the
way in which it refers to that object.
2.2 Referential Approach
It is our aim in this section to demonstrate ways in which language is used to describe an
entity picked out in the real world. For example, we point to an individual, say Ahmed, when
saying (1) 'I met Ahmed in the library yesterday.' But, we indicate a location, Birmingham,
when saying (2) ‘I have just come from Birmingham city.’ This action of identifying
individuals or locations with words is called in semantics referring or denoting. Given that,
we assume that the word Birmingham is used to refer to or denote the city situated between
the cities of London and Liverpool. The entity (city) referred to here is called referent or
denotatum.

In current semantic theories, the study of straightforward relationship between the entity
and its referent is normally dealt with within a referential (or denotational) approach, which
postulates that ‘meaning derives from language being attached to, or grounded in, reality.’
(Saeed, 1997:25). In this connection, Palmer (1981: 29) assumes that reference is 'the
relationship between the linguistic elements, words, sentences, etc., and the non-linguistic
world of experience.' He also thinks that reference is the 'essential element of semantics'
(ibid.).

2.2.1 Types of Reference

In this section, we concentrate on names and noun phrases or nominals as referring linguistic
expressions. To begin with, we consider the following basic distinctions in reference:

(a) Referring and non-referring expressions: the distinction here reveals that there are some
words which have that potentiality of reference and others that lose it. Words, for instance,
like so, if, when, not, all, very do not refer to meaning as such but just contribute to it; that is,
this class of words are intrinsically non-referring items. Conversely, words like mouse and cat
are referring expressions, since they potentially identify an entity in the real world.

(b) Constant versus variable reference: reference could either be constant or variable. For
example, Hassan Tower and the Pyramids are instances of constant reference, in that they
keep the same referent across a range of utterances regardless of any contextual information.
By contrast, expressions such as I, she, it, and you are variable reference, for they draw their
meanings or identities from the context of their occurrence like in the following sentences:

(15) I did you a favour.

(16) She found it on the desk.

Unless context is determined a priori, the words I, you, she, could refer to any individual and
it could refer to any object or animal, etc., hence they are variable referents.

c) Referents and extensions: Kreidler (1998:132) defined extension of a lexeme as 'the set of
entities which it denotes. In other words, the term extension of an expression means the
overall possible things, which are used as the referent of that expression. To illustrate, the
extension of dog includes all collies, Dalmatians, mongrels, etc. The set of entities or things
that could be denoted by the noun toad are the extension of that lexeme. That is, any frog-like
creature is supposed to be a denotation of the lexeme toad.

2.2.2 Defects of Referential Approach

Referential approach however is not always ideal, since it is very difficult to attach words like
so, if, when, of, but to entities in the real world. On the other hand, there are some nominals
(i.e., Ns and NPs) or referents, which do not find their existence in the real world like the
abstract nouns: love, democracy, justice, good, evil, etc; or they are either predictable like the
NP World War Three as in World economic crisis may lead to World War Three. or non-
existent referents at all like lghoula (i.e., a folklore/fictional Moroccan Arabic word meaning
'monster' or 'a spirit in Muslim folklore preying on corpses'). Therefore, the referents which
are in bold are meaningless when they are matched with actual things. Additionally,
referential approach is unable to handle verbs such as remember, seem, like, deal, etc., since
they do not have materialized referents.
Last but not least, there is lack of a one to one correspondence between a word(s) (i.e.,
Name(s), NP(s)) and the entities we aim at identifying in the world around us. For example,
an individual could be referred to by more than one linguistic expression as in the following:
 (17) Mohamed 6th is very dynamic.
(18) The King of Morocco is very dynamic.

(19) Nottingham is very beautiful.

(20) The city of Robin Hood is very beautiful.

"Mohamed 6th" and "Nottingham" are the names, whereas "the king of Morocco" and
"The city of Robin Hood" are definite descriptions1. Although the two linguistic expressions
in (17; 18) and in (19; 20) have different meanings, yet they share the same referent or
nominatum to use the term of Frege (1892). What seems to be highlighted more, in this case,
is meaning, not reference; or as Saeed (1997:31) put it ‘there is more to meaning than
reference.’ Further examples abound concerning this philosophical issue: a man could be
identified as a neighbour, as the father of one’s friend, as a teacher, etc. All these linguistic
expressions in italics are members of the same referent, man. In his attempt to formulate a
theory of meaning, Frege advances his classic example which further helps us understand the
relationship between reference (nominatum/ nominate/bedeutung) and meaning (sense/sinn).
He posited that the evening star and the morning star have different meanings or senses, but
share or denote a similar object (referent) which is Venus. When this latter celestial planet is
seen in the morning, it is quite often called the morning star, but when it is seen in the
evening, it is called the evening star. Frege (1892:85) summarized this idea in a mathematical
formula in his work Ueber Sinn und Bedeutung (i.e., On Sense and Nominatum)2:

The reasons that speak in its favour are the following: "a=a" and "a=b" are
sentences of obviously different cognitive significance: a=a is valid a priori and
according to Kant is to be called analytic, whereas sentences of the form "a=b"
often contain very valuable extensions of our knowledge and cannot always be
justified in an a priori manner (…) what one wishes to express with "a=b" seems to
be that the signs or names 'a' and 'b' name the same thing.

Such statements indicate Frege's objection to the view that a name's meaning is no more
than its referent for if a (e.g., the morning star) and b (e.g., the evening star) are names of the
same object (Venus), then the identity statement a = b must mean the same as a = a (i.e.,

1
It seems here that senses are descriptions as Odell (2006:20) put it, an idea which forms the basis of the
descriptive theory of referring. The theory is associated with such prominent figures in philosophy of language
as Russell (1967), Frege (1980) and Searle (1958).
2
Translated by Herbert Feigl. In Readings in Philosophical Analysis. Herbert Feigl and Wilfrid Sellars, eds.
(New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1949, pp. 85-102).
Venus is Venus). But, a = b refers to two different meanings, and thus is more informative
than a = a, which consists of the same linguistic expression, Venus. To put it simply, in the
equation 3+3= 6 and 2+4= 6, both 3+3 and 2+4 refer to same object, 6, but in different ways.
While, 3+3 and 2+4 are truly the same for they designate one similar object which is 4, they
are also different than 4 (as sums) and from each other (as two different sums). We can
therefore say that they are two expressions or senses of the same thing/object. In the light of
this explanation, we assume that 'meaning as a reference proposes an identity, while meaning
as a sense proposes interpretation'3 (Cunningham, 2006: 566). In the same vein Frege claimed
that 'by means of a sign, we express [the object's] sense and designate its reference' (1892).

The theory of meaning was afterwards improved to take new avenues. The notion of
sense is now being treated as a mediator between words and objects (i.e., the world): it is a
mental representation

2.3 Representational Approach

Representational or mental approach (or the image theory) assumes that a noun is able to
denote because it is linked to something in the speaker's/hearer's mind which takes the form of
an image. To elaborate this mentalistic view about meaning, Ogden and Richards (1923:99)
tried to explain meaning according to what is in people's minds proposing the following
semiotic or semantic triangle:

thought/ image/ concept

word (symbol) object (referent)

The scheme claims that meaning is essentially a three-fold relationship between

linguistic forms, concepts and Referents. First, we have the symbol. Then, we try to match it
with its referent calling for the thought, in the third step, to help us fulfil this task. Ogden and
Richards called the bond between word and concept an ‘association’, the bond between
concept and object ‘reference’ and the bond between object and word ‘meaning’ (see

3
Note that some we may come across distinctions similar to Fredge's. For example, we can find intension
(sense) vs. extension (reference) or more commonly, we find connotation (sense) vs. denotation (reference).
Kreidler, 1998:43). This conceptualization, therefore, to meaning comes to bridge the gaps
between words and what they mentally represent in the real world of experience. For
example, London, father, car, etc. have mental representations (images), in our minds.
However, this theory seems to lead us to a problematic issue: does everybody of us hold a
unique image of common nouns such as car, chair, triangle, house, etc. It does not seem to be
the case. This idea is well depicted by Crystal (1993:101) when he argued that:

Some words do have meanings that are relatively easy to conceptualize, but we
certainly do not have neat visual images corresponding to every word we say. Nor
is there any guarantee that a concept which might come to mind when I use the
word table is going to be the same as the one you, the reader, might bring to mind.

True, the theory could partly solve the dilemma that all that we talk about should have a
real existence in the world. Still we are faced, on the other hand, with the problem of
identifying the mental representations of these objects or entities talked about. For example,
we can imagine a triangle as having an equilateral form or isosceles or scalene form. It is
difficult to have an image of a triangle having all these forms at a time. Similarly, it is
difficult to have a common mental representation of the objects car or chair.

Being aware of such shortcomings, some scholars modified the image theory
hypothesizing that the sense of such words as car, chair, triangle and dog should not be
treated as visual objects but as more abstract concepts. A triangle therefore can be defined as '
A three-sided polygon' regardless of its different types in the real world. While some concepts
can be simple, some others involve some cultural complexities like marriage. We need to
initially determine the specific culture under focus before thinking about it in terms of an
abstract concept.
Nonetheless, supporters (esp., linguists) of representational approach find it interesting
to establish models of concepts to form the basis of semantics. They describe concepts using
different approaches such as semantic properties, semantic fields and prototypes. We
examine each of these tools of analysis in turn.

2.3.1 Semantic properties

A semantic property consists of the features or components of meaning of a word. The
number of these semantic components varies according to the nature and degree of the
semantic complexity of specific words. The following formula can aptly represent this theory:
 x is a woman if and only if L

where L is a list of attributes, like:

x is a human
x is adult
x is female, etc. (Saeed, 1997: 35)

The theory views the concept woman as lists or bits of knowledge or a heap of semantic
components. Contrastively, Man could be analysed as ADULT, HUMAN, and MALE.
Animals display similar analysis. Bull might consist of the components MALE, BOVINE, and
ADULT, as opposed to cow which consists of FEMALE, BOVINE, and ADULT and to calf
which would be BOVINE, and NON-ADULT.

Words that share a semantic property are said to be in semantic class like the semantic
class of 'female' or of 'adult'.

In componential analysis, components or contrasts are usually treated as binary, so that

meanings can economically be represented as plus (+) 'feature' or minus (-) 'feature' which are
often drawn in a matrix. By way of illustration, we break down the meanings of the words
using the following table:

Woman Father Girl mare

female + - + +
male - + - -
human + + + -
parent + + +
adult + + - +
equine - - - +
Animate + + + +

The theory of semantic properties (or componential semantics), though useful, is not
free from some shortcomings. We only cite two of them. One is related to the inability of the
theory to provide a clear breaking-down into components of words like pen, shelves or stairs.
Two, it does not contribute a lot into the development of language acquisition theory, because
acquiring the semantic structure of words does not imply acquiring their semantic features. In
this connection, Ennaji and Sadiqi (1992:276-277) maintained that ‘semantic features are ad
hoc or superimposed aspects of words and do not form part of the internalized semantic
structure of words.’ The following section introduces another way of analysing concepts.

2.3.2 Semantic field

Semantic field is an theory which was developed in the 1930s. It aims at organizing words
into fields of meaning where they define each other in different ways. For example, the words
that refer to 'parts of our body' like head, hand, leg form a semantic field. Similarly, the words
which refer to 'fruits' like apple, orange, and banana form a semantic field. In this connection,
Crystal (1980:316) maintained that

the VOCABULARY of a language is not simply a listing of independent items (as

the headwords in a dictionary would suggest), but is organised into areas, FIELDS,
within which words inter-relate and define each other in various ways.

To illustrate his definition, Crystal considered the words that refer to colours:

The words denoting colour are often cited as an example of a semantic field: the
precise meaning of a colour word can only be understood by placing it in relation
to other items which occur with it in demarcating the colour spectrum.

The example of colour spectrum introduced in the definition is a continuous band lacking
clear physical boundaries. The definition puts the emphasis on lexical structure of a language
rather than on isolated words (see also Palmer, 1981)4. Therefore, the word green in English
becomes meaningful only in relation to its neighbours in the set of colour terms: it denotes the
colour between blue and yellow.
Some scholars tried to divide the vocabulary into areas of meaning. Peter Mark Roger
(1852) suggested six main semantic fields in his famous thesaurus, namely abstract relations,
space, matter, intellect, volition, and affections.

The third suggested tool of analysing the meaning of concepts is to treat them in terms
of prototypes.

2.3.3 Prototypes

4
Palmer defined semantic field as 'a list of words referring to items of a particular class dividing up a semantic
field' (1981: 69).
The notion of prototypes was proposed by Rosch (1973). It is defined as ‘an object or
referent that is considered typical of the whole set' (Kreidler, 1998:133). He further assumed
that 'if we encounter the lexeme door in isolation and immediately think of a door swinging
on hinges rather than one that slides or rotates, that kind of door is, for us, the prototype of all
doors’ (ibid). The theory suggests that there are central or typical members of a category and
peripheral or less typical members. For example, a chair is a more central member of the
category FURNITURE than lamp. Typical members come to mind quickly. Given clothing,
we recognize shirts as an exemplar quicker than shoes, and given vegetables, we accept
potato (e.g., Moroccans) or beans (e.g., Egyptians) before carrot, depending on the culture we
are dealing with. Yule (1996) argued that the theory of prototype helps explain the meaning of
certain words, like bird, not in terms of component features (e.g. ‘has feathers’, ‘has wings’),
but in terms of resemblance to the clearest exemplar.
In the coming lecture, we will deal with the meaning of words which established
through sense relations.
Supporting documents picked up from the Internet