Sage Publications, Inc

Yan'an Communism Reconsidered
Author(s): Mark Selden

Source: Modern China, Vol. 21, No. 1, Symposium: Rethinking the Chinese Revolution.
Paradigmatic Issues in Chinese Studies, IV (Jan., 1995), pp. 8-44
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Reconsidered
Yan'anCommunism
MARK SELDEN
University
Binghamton
The essentialfactsare clear.Twice defeated,routedfromthe

revolutionarybase areastheyhadconstructed inthecourseofnearly
a decadeof guerrilla warfareand landrevolution, on theeve of the
Sino-Japanese War, the ChineseCommunist Party and itsbesieged
armywereessentially confinedto a poorand peripheral area of the
Northwest, havingnarrowly escapedextermination in thecourseof
theLong March.Less thana decadelater,Japanesearmiesin China
had beenfought By thetimeoftheir1945 surrender,
to a standstill.
Mao's party-army heldswayoveralmost100 millionpeoplemainly
in North,Northeast, and NorthCentralChina.In thecourseof the
anti-Japaneseresistance,theCommunists forgeda broadcoalitionof
forcesthatadministered andcoordinated inwidelydispersed
activities
ruralbase areas in China's interior.The base areas providedthe
springboard fornationwide victoryin thesubsequent civil warthat
endedin Guomindang defeatandestablishment of thePeople's Re-
public.These factsare clear,yetexplanations fortheCommunist
victoryandassessments ofthecharacter ofthemovement remainthe
subjectofcontroversy.
Thisarticleassessesmajorinterpretationsofthewartime resistance
since the 1940s and concludeswitha criticalreassessment of the
Yan'an Way as a framework forassessingtherevolutionary praxis
bothoftheShaanxi-Gansu-Ningxia BorderRegionandofthewider
wartime Communist movement.
Research for the book The Yenan Way in RevolutionaryChina
(Selden, 1971) was conductedduringthe 1960s,priorto access by
AUTHOR'S NOTE I thank MarcBlecher, EdwardFriedman,

JosephEsherick, Kenneth Straus,
RalphThaxton,LymanVanSlyke, AlexanderWoodside,andErnestYoungforcriticalcomments
ofthisarticle.
on earlierdrafts
and suggestions
1995 8-44
MODERN CHINA, Vol. 21 No. 1,January
? 1995Sage Publications,
Inc.

Selden/ YAN'ANCOMMUNISMRECONSIDERED 9
international researcherstomainland archives,tothespateofChinese

publication ofdocumentary sources,andtoopportunities forconduct-
ing researchin thebase areas and interviewing participantsin the
eventsstudied.Thisnevertheless seemedatthetimetobe a periodof
richnew researchopportunities. It was thebeginning of theera of
archivalanddocumentary studyofthewartime periodthatproduced
a successionof base area and thematicstudiesof the resistance
drawingonarchival, documentary, andpresssourcesinTaiwan,Hong
Kong,Japan,andtheUnitedStates.Thepresent discussiondrawson
thescholarship ofsubsequent decades,including myown,involving
archival,documentary, andinterview researchinruralChina.
TheYenanWaywaswritten attheheight oftheperiodofU.S.-China
antagonism thatwasintensified bydeepening U.S. involvement inthe
IndochinaWar,a warthatwas widelyunderstood as a proxyU.S.-
ChinaWar.Itwas also thebeginning ofa periodofcriticalreactionin
the UnitedStatesagainstcold war ideologyand scholarshipthat
coincidedwiththegrowthof theantiwarmovement. Viewedfrom
anotherperspective, itwas conceivedat a timewhenrelatively little
was knownaboutthedisastersthatweretheresultofthefundamen-
talistpoliciesandpractices oftheGreatLeap ForwardandtheCultural
Revolution:theChinesegovernment tightly
controlled information
presenting bothperiodsin thebestpossiblelight,and independent
scholarship byChineseandinternational researchers withaccessto a
rangeofofficialandunofficial sourceshadbarelybegun.Analysisof
cyclesininternational historiography ofChineseresistance andrevo-
lutionunderlines thesensitivityofinterpretivetrends toglobalconflict
and particularly to contemporary patternsof U.S.-Chinarelations
whosedramatic shiftssincethe1940shavebeenmirrored intheworks
assessedhere.
The YenanWayoffered a close documentary studyof theorigins
andpoliticaleconomyofa singleimportant base areaas a foundation
foradvancinga rangeofpropositions concerning thenationalmove-
mentand its globalsignificance. The pointis notthattheShaanxi-
Gansu-Ningxia regiontypified thebase areas.Shaan-Gan-Ning was
uniqueamongthewartimebases,notablyin fourimportant ways:it
was thepoorestofthebase areas;italonehadcompletedlandredis-
tributioninsignificantareaspriortotheshift tounitedfront strategies;
itwas largelysparedJapaneseinvasion(althoughsubjecttobombing

10 1995
MODERN CHINA/JANUARY
and blockadebyJapaneseandGuomindang forces)so thatguerrilla

warfareassumeda less centralrolethanitdid elsewhereduringthe
resistance;and, finally,it was the homeof the centralPartyand
military leadership andthemeccaforthousands of intellectualsand
otherpatriots drawntotheresistance.
Whilerecognizing distinctiveness,I argue,and researchon other
bases confirms, thatessentialinstitutional andmovement featuresof
thewartimepoliticaleconomyin Shaan-Gan-Ning emergedin the
most developed base areas, notablythe Shanxi-Chahar-Hebei,
Shanxi-Hebei-Shandong-Henan, andShanxi-Suiyuan baseareas,and
shapednotonlytheoutcome the of war but the subsequent courseof
theChineseRevolution. Fromthisperspective, Shaan-Gan-Ning was
botha microcosm anda criticalnodeinthedevelopment ofa theory
and praxisthatwould shapethe wartimemovement and the sub-
sequentcourse of the Chinese Revolution. To fully assess theresis-
tance,itis necessary toinvestigate theexperience ofeachofthebase
areasincluding features
theirself-reliant andtheirpositionwithin the
largermovement headquartered inYan'anas wellas theirrelationship
to and conditionsin Guomindang-dominated, warlord-dominated,
andespeciallyJapanese-occupied zones.
The YenanWayproposedan understanding of thenationalmove-
mentand thedominant forcesof theepochwithina framework of
people's war and socialrevolution. Where many studies of theSino-
JapaneseWarsoughtto explainthereasonsforCommunist victory,
The YenanWayalso attempted to charttheconsequencesof revolu-
tionaryprocessesforthepeopleof thebase areas.I understood the
Yan'anWay as a fluidconception, a and
spirit, praxis ofrevolutionary
changethatinitiated a redefinition ofrelationships amongtheParty,
thepeasantry, andthelocalelite.Itencompassed approaches pertinent
to waginga war of nationalindependence, but it also embodied
dimensions ofpolitical,economic,andsocialchangewhoseimplica-
tionsextendedbeyondthetemporaland spatialboundariesof the
wartimebase areas to the fullrangeof problemsassociatedwith
peripheral development.
I beginthisreassessment byevaluating briefly theunderstanding
andinsights ofcontemporary observers-the journalists,writers,and
scholarswhodirectly experienced andrecorded theeventsofwarand
revolution.In thefollowing sections,I reconsider theYan'anWayin

lightofmajorscholarly oftheChineseRevolution
interpretations and
portionsofthecomparative on revolutionary
literature changeas well
oftheoriginalwork.'Finally,I concludewith
as ofspecificcriticisms
myowncriticalreassessment of The YenanWay.
INTERPRETATIONS:
FIRST-GENERATION
CONTEMPORARYOBSERVERS
Foreignjournalists, andgovernment
writers, analystsofthe1930s
and 1940santicipatedmostofthetheories explaining popularsupport
fortheChineseCommunists thatsubsequently receivedpoliticaland
In 1936,theAmerican
scholarlyelaboration.2 journalistEdgarSnow
becamethefirsttoslipthrough theGuomindang blockadeandpayan
extendedvisitto the Communist base area in the Northwest. His
observationsand interviewswithCommunist leaders,publishedthe
followingyearinRedStaroverChina,madehimthemostinfluential
author-chroniclerof the wartimeCommunistmovementforboth
Chineseandinternational readers.
Snow was the firstof manyobserversto hold thatthe Party's
socioeconomicprogramwas the sine qua non forforgingbonds
betweena revolutionary partyandan impoverished peasantrywhose
deepestconcernslaywithland,food,andsecurity. InRedStar(Snow,
1937/1968)andsubsequent booksandarticles, he stressed
thecritical
programs.In ScorchedEarth (Snow,
role of theParty'sredistributive
1941: 310-6,320-1),he also highlighted
theimportanceofcoopera-
tivesin addressing
theissueofpoverty.
As earlyas 1940,GeorgeTaylordrewon personalobservations
of
NorthChina guerrillabases to arguethatthe key to Communist
success lay in theirabilityto exploit nationalistreactionto Japan's
invasionby providingPartyleadershipof the ruralresistance.In
contrastto Snow's insistenceon theprimacyof theland program,
Taylor(1940: 101) heldthatJapanese"brutalitywas, of course,an
excellentargument fortheguerrillas,"
provided"thattheyhad been
in a districtlongenoughto organizeand infusea new moraleand
politicaloutlookintothepeasantry."3
Taylorwas thusamongthefirst
to suggestthatwar-induced notthesocialandeconomic
nationalism,
program, heldthekeytotheparty-peasantrelationship.

12 MODERNCHINA/JANUARY
1995
Authorssuch as Harrison Forman,GuntherStein, Jack Belden,

TheodoreWhiteand Annalee Jacoby,and EdgarSnow,writingduring
thelate yearsof theanti-Japaneseresistanceand thecivil war,viewed
the Communistmovementagainst a backgroundof theirgrowing
antipathyand disillusionmentwiththecorruption, and mal-
brutality,
feasanceof theGuomindang. They argued thatCommunist success in
mobilizingthe peasantrylay in the introductionof democracy to a
peasantrythathad been politicallymarginalized-indeed, excluded
frompolitics-under Guomindangand warlordrule:
The entireCommunist politicalthesiscould be reducedto a single
paragraph: If youtakea peasantwhohas beenswindled, beaten,and
kickedaboutforall hiswakingdaysandwhosefather hastransmitted
to himan emotionofbitterness reaching backforgenerations-if you
takesucha peasant,treathimlikea man,askhisopinion,lethimvote
fora localgovernment,lethimorganizehisownpoliceandgendarmes,
decide on his own taxes,and vote himselfa reductionin rentand
interest-ifyou do all that,the peasantbecomesa man who has
something to fightfor,and he will fightto preserveit againstany
enemy, JapaneseorChinese[WhiteandJacoby,1946:201-2].
White and Jacoby,among others,saw the issues of democracyas

closely intertwined withthe Communistsocioeconomic program,as
suggested by their referencein this passage to rent and interest
reduction.Did many contemporaryWesternand Chinese observers
exaggerate the democraticelements of the movement?Were they
misled in theirview thattheparticipationand proto-democratic poli-
tics of thebase areas could be a harbingerof a democraticfuture?The
same question,to whichI turnshortly, mustbe posed to The YenanWay.
AmericanforeignserviceofficerJohnService,who visitedYan'an
withtheDixie Mission and spoke at lengthwithMao, Zhou Enlai, and
otherleaders,also called attentionto thedemocraticcharacterof the
politicalprocessin thebase areas. In a despatchof September4, 1944,
Service explainedthattherapidgrowthofChineseCommunistarmies
wouldnothavebeenpossiblewithout thesupportofthepeopleofthe
areasin whichtheyhaveoperated.Thiswidespread popularsupport
must,underthecircumstances inwhichithasoccurred, be considered
a practicalindicationthatthepolicies and methodof the Chinese
Communists character[quotedin Esherick,1974:
havea democratic
217; italicsinoriginal].

Servicespelledoutthebasisforpeasantsupport
in termsthatlinked
theParty'ssocioeconomicprogramwithdemocracy:
The peasantssupport,join and fightwiththe Communistarmies
becausetheyhave beenconvincedthattheCommunists are fighting
and because the Communists
fortheirinterests, have createdthis
conviction
byproducing sometangiblebenefits forthepeasants.
These benefitsmustbe improvement of the social, politicalor
economicconditionofthepeasants.Whatever theexactnatureofthis
improvement, it mustbe-in thebroadersense of the termas the
servingoftheinterests
ofthemajority ofthepeople-towarddemoc-
racy(quotedinEsherick,1974:219).
Thisviewofdemocracy does notreston multipartyelections, parlia-

mentary systems,checksand balances,or otherfeaturesof liberal
democracy. Indeed,ithighlights a party-peasantbondsecuredthrough
improvement ofthematerial conditions ofimpoverished villagersas
a precondition fora democratic polity.
Passagessuchas thesebringServiceclosetothosewhoemphasize
thecontribution oftheParty'ssocioeconomic program to improving
conditionsforbroadstrataof thepeasantry. Serviceand othersim-
plied,thoughnevertomyknowledge fullyarticulated,
a positionthat
socioeconomic issues-and notelectoralpolitics-werecrucialtothe
possibilitiesof democracyin ruralChina wherelandlordand rich
peasantelitesdominatedsocietyand politics.Arguably, theParty's
rentreduction, taxreforms, andcooperative in strength-
institutions,
eningthe owner-cultivator rankswhilereducingthe powerof the
richestand mostpowerfulfamilies,createdsocioeconomicfounda-
tionsthatcould supporta democratic polityfarbetterthancould a
societywithvastimbalancesofwealthandpower.4
A fourthperspective viewedskeptically theclaimsofdemocracy
and nationalism andheldthatorganizationalsuperioritywas thekey
to theCommunist abilitytofillthegap createdbywar,Guomindang
and ruralanarchy.
retreat, The U.S. WarDepartment reportof June
1945 (VanSlyke,1968: 1) statedthepointsuccinctly:5
The ChineseCommunists are Communists.
Theyarethemosteffec-
tivelyorganizedgroupin China.
The "democracy"whichtheChineseCommunists sponsorrepre-
sents"Sovietdemocracy" onthepattern
oftheSovietUnionrather
than

14 1995
democracyin theAnglo-American more

sense.It is a "democracy"
bytheChineseCommunist
rigidlycontrolled Party(CCP) thanis the
so-called"one-party oftheChungking
dictatorship" Governmentcon-
trolledbytheGuomindang.
Sucha "realist"view,a harbinger ofcoldwarperspectives thatwould

dominate Americanscholarship duringthe1950s,assessedCommu-
niststrength in termsof organization and manipulation. It stressed
close adherence tothe"SovietRussian'partyline' " whiletending to
ignoreor denigrate populistand nationalist elementsof theparty-
peasantbondandthesocioeconomic program.
The preceding discussionhashighlighted fourcompeting, butalso
potentially complementary, thesesexplainingthe strengths of the
wartime Communist movement andoftheCommunist-peasant bond
elaboratedduringthe 1940sby thefirstgeneration of Westernob-
servers,ranging from andwriters
journalists toforeign serviceofficers
and military personnel.Theiranalysesemphasized,respectively, a
socioeconomicprogram, nationalism, democracy, and organization!
manipulation. Mostof theseauthorsdid notinsiston a singlethesis
butsaw Communist achievement as multifaceted.EdgarSnow,for
example,stressedtheimportance ofmaterial appealsincluding land,
taxes,and cooperatives.But he also recognizedthe abilityof the
Communists totaptheburgeoning patriotismofruralyouth,someof
whomtheyintroduced tothe world beyond theirvillagesforthefirst
time(Snow, 1941: 347; 1968: 244). Whiteand Jacoby(1946: 205)
complemented theirdiscussionof democracywiththeobservation
that"theCommunists wontheirrealpopularity bythewartheywaged
againstJapan. The black natureof Japanese conquest was common
foe to everyman,richor poor,learnedor ignorant." And Service
pointedto theintertwined character of democratic appealsand the
Communist socioeconomic program.
Many of these authorssharedwithothercontem-
first-generation
poraryobserversan appreciation forthededication, patriotism,and
accomplishments of the Communists reinforced by theirgrowing
perceptions oftheGuomindang as corrupt,faction-ridden, andinca-
of
pable dealing with the social,economic, political,and security
problems thatoverwhelmed theChinese As
nation. a group,theyhad

Se/den/ YAN'ANCOMMUNISMRECONSIDERED 15
yearsof experiencein observingand reporting fromChina and at

learningfirsthand aboutChineseeconomyand societyat thegrass-
roots.Incontrasttothenextgeneration ofwriters,whowerepredomi-
nantly university-orgovernment-trained Chinaspecialistsorstudents
of Communist affairs,and who enjoyedaccess to a wide rangeof
primary sourcematerials including Partyandgovernment documents
andintelligence reports collectedintheUnitedStates,Taiwan,Hong
Kong,andJapanbutwereunabletoconductresearchinorevenvisit
China,thefirst generation reliedpredominantly ontheireyesandears
as trainedreporters and on-the-spot observers. And,in contrast with
a generationofreporters whoreturned toChinaduringthe1980s only
tofindtheiractivitiescircumscribed andtheircontactslimited bytight
government controls,the wartimegeneration enjoyedremarkable
access to peopleofall ranksandwalksoflifeandin diverseregions
ofChinawiththeimportant exceptionofJapanese-occupied zones.
The first-generationAmericanworkssurveyedherewerewritten
duringor shortly afterthePacificWarat a timewhenthespecterof
fascismplaceda premium on democratic valuesandwhenAmerican
populistand egalitarian impulseswerereinforced by experiencesin
China wherethe UnitedStateswas allied withforcesresistinga
rapaciousJapaneseimperialism. Thisconjuncture produceda telling
critiqueof Japaneseimperialism and,particularly duringtheyears
1945-1949,of Guomindang ineptitude and corruption.The interna-
tionalmilieualso facilitatedappreciation ofthebroadpopularsupport
thatthe Communist-led resistanceenjoyedin the base areas and
amongmanyintellectuals. Likewise,withSoviet-American alliance
as thepivotof theallied war effort in Europe,and withFord and
Chrysleradvertising theircontributions to keepingthe Soviet Red
Armyrolling,it was notuntilsometimeaftertheallied victoryin
WorldWarII thatgrowing hostilitytoward theSovietUnionstructured
American thinking aboutCommunist conspiracy. Aboveall,itwasthe
outbreakof theKoreanWarin 1950and subsequent Sino-American
militaryconfrontation thatfrozedebateon manyof theissuescon-
cerningtheChineseRevolutionthathadbeendebatedso vigorously
duringthepreceding decade.

16 1995
CONFLICTINGPOLITICALAND SCHOLARLY
PERSPECTIVES ON THE CHINESE REVOLUTION
DURING THE ERAOF SINO-AMERICAN CONFRONTATION.
FROM THE TOTALITARIANMODEL TO PEASANTNATIONALISM
Withthecold war,American preoccupationsshifted froma focus

on thenationalandsocialrevolution andon party-peasant-elite rela-
tionsto the searchforconspirators in highplaces to answerthe
questionas to who lostChina.Duringtheera of Americanpolitics
associatedwiththenameof SenatorJosephMcCarthy, theanswers
frequentlytookthe form ofdenunciations offoreignservice officers,
includingServiceand JohnDavies, and culminated in thepurgeof
virtuallythe entirecorps of Americandiplomaticpersonnelwith
Chinaexpertise. Also targetedforscapegoating wereacademicssuch
and
as JohnFairbank OwenLattimore, whohadplayedgovernment
oradvisoryrolesinwartime Chinaandsubsequently tookup leading
universityposts.The impactofMcCarthyism on thefledgling field
ofChinastudiesandon perceptions ofChinawas profound. Schol-
arlyand politicalanalysisand debatewerestuntedbyan enforced
consensusthatprecluded
intellectual-political seriouscriticaldiscus-
sion of theissuesshapingrevolution and imperialism in Chinaand
Asia andoftheexerciseofAmerican powerinAsia.
Duringthe1950sandearly1960s,attheheight ofSoviet-American
and Sino-American antagonism, Americanscholarlyinterest in the
party-peasant imperialism,
relationship, andanti-Japanese resistance
declined.Publicdiscussion centeredon SovietandComintern machi-
nationsinChina.6Simultaneously, research fromtheperiodof
shifted
anti-Japanese resistanceto the years 1920-1935,emphasizingthe
Sovietrolein shapingtheChineseCommunist movement. Muchof
focusedon Comintern
thisliterature, conspiracyand manipulation,
largelyignoredthe social and economicrootsof revolutionand
stressedtheslavishadherence oftheChineseCommunist movement
toSoviettheory andpraxis.7 ConsistentwithU.S. government denun-
ciationsof a monolithicCommunist movement dominated by Mos-
cow,a viewreinforced byChinesestatements of support forSoviet
foreignpolicy during the early 1950s, scholarship of the period
focusedon Sovietmanipulation oftheChineseRevolution.

Duringthe1960sand 1970s,scholarsreturned to theissuesofthe

anti-Japanese resistance.Deniedaccesstoarchivalsourcesorpartici-
pantinterviews inChina,researchers forthefirst timebegantodraw
on Japanesemilitary and diplomatic archives,on theChinesedocu-
mentary and intelligence sourcesof theBureauof Investigation in
Taiwan,and on Stanford University'sHoovercollectionof wartime
materials.
ChalmersJohnson's (1962) Peasant Nationalismand Communist
Power igniteddebatewitha forceful presentation of theview that
peasantnationalism, inspiredby Japan'sinvasion,occupation,and
pacification, was thekeyto Communist victory in China.Breaking
withconspiracytheoriesand withversionsof the "organizational
weapon"and totalitarian modelstransplanted fromSoviet studies,
Johnson drewattention tothecriticalimportance ofthewaras a factor
redefining theparameters ofChinesepolitics,particularly theparty-
peasantrelationship. Fromtheobservation thatearlierattempts to
buildruralbase areasthrough guerrillawarfare and landrevolution
had endedin defeat,he concludedthattheparty'swartime socioeco-
nomicprogramwas irrelevant and, as GeorgeTaylorhad argued
earlier,thatwar-induced nationalismwas thedecisiveingredient of
Communist victory.
Peasant Nationalism becamethedominant interpretation of the
periodamongChinaspecialists, anditwasalso influential inthefields
of comparative Communism and social movements. Because itpro-
videdan important stimulusthatled to myown interpretation and
becauseitprovidesa springboard forconsidering issuesofnational-
ism,I takeupitsanalysisinsomedetail.Thisfirst monograph todraw
extensively on Japaneseintelligence sourcesoffersa usefulmilitary
historyof theSino-Japanese Warand drawsattention to theimpor-
tanceofwar-induced peasantnationalism as a unifying factorcontrib-
utingto itsoutcome.By securingthemajorcities,therailroads, and
the coastal areas,Japanforceda vastlyweakenedGuomindangto
retreatfromthecoastalurbanandindustrial basetoSouthwest China.
This notonlyprevented theGuomindang fromtakingadvantageof
thehistoricdefeatoftheCentralSoviettoconsolidateitsrule,italso
opened new terrainbehindJapaneselines wherethe Communists
wouldeventually builda powerful guerrillamovement andestablish
ruralbase areasthatsustainedtheresistance.

18 1995
In focusingon the Japaneseinvasionand subsequentmilitary

campaigns, however, PeasantNationalism virtuallyignoresChinese
social and economicreality, above all slighting endemic sourcesof
ruralunrestrootedinlandlord-peasant andstate-peasant conflict,and
the natureof the contending politicaland class forceswiththeir
profoundly differentapproaches tothecountryside. Eventhespecific
outcomesofJapanese militarycampaigns as theyaffectedtheChinese
countryside fadeintoinsignificance inthesensethatJohnson assumes
thattheJapanese presence fueledwartime
inall situations nationalism.
however,
It is difficult, toaccepthispremiseofa universally thriving
wartimenationalism defined,followingKarl Deutsch,in termsof
socialmobilization. Duringtheyears1942-1943,notablyinthebase
areasthatborethebrunt ofJapanese attack,theNorth Chinabaseareas
and manyoftheirinhabitants actuallyweredemobilized as thebase
areascontracted from44 millionto 25 millionpeople. During these
years,the EighthRouteArmydeclinedfrom400,000 to 300,000
soldiers,and90% oftheplainsareasfellto Japan(VanSlyke,1986:
680). Can thisbe called social mobilization or shouldit ratherbe
understood as demobilization? There was no to survival
inevitability
oftheresistance forcesandbaseareas,andstilllesstovictory, whether
explanations are framedin termsof nationalism or a mixof other
factors.
A numberof scholarshavechallengedcentralpropositions of the
peasantnationalism thesis.Inthefirstsignificant ofthethesis,
critique
DonaldGillin(1964: 274,283-5)heldthatnationalism was primarily
an eliteissuewhereaspeasantmobilization hingedon theabilityto
addresssocial and economic problems.
ExaminingdiverseareasacrossNorthChinafollowing theJapa-
neseinvasion, LymanVanSlyke(1986:631)observed, quoting Kathleen
Hartford (1980: 118-9),that"thelocal resistanceforceswere not
formedspontaneouslyand . . . the spontaneouslyorganized forces
werenotformed forthepurposeofresistance."He showedrather that
muchoftheresistance sprangupinareasoutsidethespecificlocalities
ofJapan'sadvanceand,by 1939,whenmostvillagersbeganto feel
thebiteofJapanesemilitary might,themajorbase areashadalready
beenestablished.
andwarlord
In studiesofareasundernationalist rule,LloydEastman
concern"everywhere
(1984: 141) founda lack of nationalist appar-

ent,"notingthat"manyChinese-specially ... thepeasantry-were

by no meanshostile"to theJapanese.Indeed,froma half-million to
I milliontroopsservedin Japanese-sponsored forces,manyofthem
defectors fromnationalist armies.
Hartford has shownthatJapaneserepression, farfromstrengthen-
ingthebase areasandtheresistance byprovoking a powerful nation-
alistresponse,frequently stifledmassactivism, droveguerrilla forces
fromevenconsolidated regions, andreducedoreliminated entirebase
areas (Hartford and Goldstein,1989: 94). The centralpointdemon-
stratedby Van Slyke,Eastman,and Hartford is thattherewas no
automaticor reflexive peasantnationalist responseto Japanesecon-
questandbrutality, andstilllessanyinevitability tothetriumph ofthe
resistance.WheretheJapanesemilitary succeededinruthlessly crush-
ingopposition forces,nationalist ifany,was generally
reaction, weak
and ineffectual.To understand popularresponsesto warandrevolu-
tion and the volatileinteraction amongpeasantry, local elite,and
competing party-armies, we needtoexploreboththecomplexworld
of ruralsocietyand the natureof the programsimplemented by
Japanese, Guomindang andwarlord, andCommunist administrations,
as wellas thebalanceofforcesinparticular timesandplaces.
Ifa reflexivepeasantnationalism wasdecisive,whywasa renegade
Communist Party andnot the nationalgovernment theeventualbene-
ficiaryof thiswindfallof "war-induced anarchy"providedby an
imperialistinvader?Afterall,at theoutbreak ofthewar,thenational
government had consolidatedpowerand was and continuedto be
internationallyrecognized as thegovernment ofChina;by1935,ithad
curbeditsmajorwarlord andCommunist challengers andittoosought
to organizeruralresistance.The Guomindangwas, in short,well
positionedto reapthepoliticalbenefits ofwar-induced patriotism as
in
did rulinggroups the United States,Britain,Germany, the Soviet
Union,andJapan.China'sCommunist Party, bycontrast, was barely
surviving ina poorandperipheral regionoftheNorthwest atthestart
of thewar.It enjoyedno suchadvantage.In theend,a discussionof
peasantnationalism, divorcedfromtheanalysisoftheParty'sagrarian
program andpraxis,offers intowhytheCommunists
littleinsight were
more successfulthantheirrivalsin buildingreararea bases and
strengthening theirforces.

20 MODERN CHINA/JANUARY
1995
The outcomeof thewar,particularly thedynamicgrowthof the

Communist movement andthewaningofGuomindang power,hinged
on theoutcomesofpolitical,social,economic,andmilitary programs
of contending forcesin widelydiffering localities.YetPeasantNa-
tionalism toucheson Communist wartime landpolicyonlyto slight
itssignificance, anditignoresotherelements oftheeconomic,politi-
cal, andsocialprograms thatdistinguishedlifeinthebase areasfrom
otherregions.Notingcorrectly thatthe Partyhad abandonedthe
radicalredistributive program oftheJiangxi era in favorofrentand
interestreduction, it concludessummarily that"the communists'
in
success winningpeasantsupportcannotbe attributed to their
carrying out an 'agrarianrevolution.' " The issue is not,however,
whether thewartime socioeconomic program constitutedan"agrarian
revolution."It is whether agrarianpoliciessuchas rentreduction, tax
reform, and mutualaid helpedto forgestrongparty-peasant bonds
essentialto thesurvivaland growthof themovement.8 As Yung-fa
Chen(1986: 99) rightly observed,"itwasprimarily redistribution
that
enabledtheCommunist Partytoinvolvepeasantsintheanti-Japanese
resistance."
The outpouring of literature
on nationalism sincethe 1980s,and
theexplosion ofvirulent nationalist
conflictsfrom theSino-Vietnamese-
Cambodianwarsofthe1970sand 1980stothebreakupoftheSoviet
UnionandYugoslaviaduring the1990s,hasproducedanalytical and
bases forreconceptualizing
historical issuesofChinesenationalism.
BenedictAnderson (1983: 16) hasobservedastutely thatnationalism
is imagined as a community, oftheactualinequality
because,regardless
and exploitation thatmayprevailin each,thenationis alwayscon-
ceivedas a deep,horizontal
comradeship. itisthisfraternity
Ultimately,
thatmakesitpossible,overthepasttwocenturies, forso manymillions
of people,notso muchto kill,as willinglyto die forsuch limited
imaginings.
In TheYenanWay,I havesuggested thattheChineseresistanceoffers

exampleof an imaginedcommunity
a historical withstrikinglydif-
ferent fromthetypicalpattern
implications describedby Anderson.
createdintellectual
The resistance foundations
andinstitutional fora
nationalcommunity in two importantsenses.First,it provideda
defensivecommunity invasionanddomination.
againstforeign Sec-

ond, thiscommunity was definedin partby a reform agendathat

addressedcertainimportant formsof"actualinequality andexploita-
tion"in Chinesesociety.Thisdynamicsynthesis was at theheartof
theYan'anWay.
The termcommunity in thiscontextdoes not,of course,implya
face-to-facerelationshipinvolvingall members of a nationalmove-
ment.I use itin an effortto captureimportant elementsofcommon
purposethatmeetAnderson'scriteria.At the same time,wartime
nationalism questionsofcommunity-for
raisesotherdifficult exam-
ple,itsassumptions aboutsharedinterestsof Han andminority peo-
ples,assumptions whoseproblematic character wouldbecomeclearer
duringthedecadesfollowing thefounding ofthePeople'sRepublic.
That is, wartime(and postwar)Chinese nationalismassumedan
identity betweenHan and minorities
of interests without addressing
deeplyrootedpatterns of inequalityand oppression.Nationalism,
whichseemsto meto havehadsignificant emancipatory elementsas
a focusforthewartime resistance,couldbecomea vehicleafter1949
forreifying themythosof theinfallibility of theParty,thestate,its
leader,anditscadres,thusstrengtheningnumerous forms ofinequality
and subordination.
RECENT SCHOLARLYPERSPECTIVES: BASE AREASTUDIES

AND THE REASSESSMENTOF THE CHINESE REVOLUTION
Since the 1970s,numerousstudieshave probedtherelationship

betweenthe impactof war and the socioeconomicand political
programsof contending forcesin an effortto bettergraspchanging
party-peasant and state-societyrelationships.Significantnew re-
searchhas focusedon individualbase areas and regionsand even
extended themicrosocietal
approachfurther toexplorelocalitiesdown
tothecountyandvillagelevel.Attheirbest,localandregionalstudies
illuminatethe complexinteraction of a specificecology,political
economy, war,andcompeting socioeconomic programs andplacethe
national,andglobalframeworks.
localitywithinregional,
Analysisofthewartime economic,political,and social programs
inthebase areasprovidesthemostimportant vehicleforassessingthe
impactofthePartyon theoutcomeofthewar,on popularmobiliza-

22 MODERN CHINA/JANUARY 1995
tion,on newformsof statebuilding,and on thecharacter of social

change.The best known component of the wartime social and eco-
nomicprogram wasthereduction ofrentandinterest, whichreplaced
theParty'searlierconfiscatory landdistribution. In mostcontested
areas,however, including thosepartsofShaan-Gan-Ning thathadnot
earlierexperienced landreform, taxreform was morewidelyimple-
mentedanddeeplyfeltthanwas rentandinterest reduction.
Therewereseveralreasonsforthis.First,lowtenancy ratesinmost
ofNorthandCentralChina,including thelargestandmostimportant
of thebase areas,meantthatmosthouseholdspaid no rentand that
manywho did weretaxpaying owner-tenants. Tax issues werefar
morepressing fortheoverwhelming majority ofvillagers.Second,as
LucienBianco (1986), PrasenjitDuara (1988), and RalphThaxton
(1992) havewelldocumented, twentieth-century peasantprotest and
insurrection havelongbeendirected predominantly againsttaxesand
an aggrandizing stateratherthanagainstthe landlordclass.9The
Party'swartime unitedfront program madeitpossibletobuildonthis
antistateanimusand createcoalitionsthatcouldbe directedagainst
Japanesepuppetadministrations thatenforced oneroustaxationand
corvee policies. Third,particularly in contestedareas, resistance
forceslackedthestrength toimplement rentreduction, whichrequired
sustained of
mobilization poorer strataand hadthe potentialtoweaken
theunitedfront bystressing class divisions.Tax reform, bycontrast,
whichshifteda slightlylargershareof thefiscalburdento richer
families,couldbe effected administratively and without overtclass
conflict.It was far more widelyimplemented (Friedman, Pickowicz,
and Selden,1991: 40-4; Dorris,1976: 704-9). One resultwas that
incomedifferentials inthebase areaswerereducedmoresharply than
weredifferentials in property ownership (Van Slyke,1986: 700). In
exempting thedestitute entirely fromtaxes,andinreducing thefiscal
burdenona significant groupofpoorerhouseholds, taxreform helped
consolidate a broadparty-peasant bond.Together withrentreduction,
itcontributed toa generalprocessofexpanding andstrengthening the
owner-cultivator majority andreducing incomeandwealthdifferen-
tials.Thiswas frequently accomplished without significantly reduc-
ingtheoveralltaxburdenorreducing therevenuesrequired tosustain
thecostlywareffort.

Rentandinterest reduction, andparticularlytaxreform, exemplify

the Party'sapproachto curbingthe powerof the ruralelite and
equalizing incomeand land ownershipthrougha "silentrevolu-
tion"thatgraduallyshifted theburdenoftaxationfrompoorerstrata
towardthemoreprosperous andstrengthened thepositionofowner-
cultivators.'"Yung-faChen (1986: 420-1) has shownforEast and
CentralChinathatbothprograms encountered fiercelandlordresis-
tance,particularlyin contestedareas or wherethePartywas weak.
Whereitwaseffectively implemented, however, as ina number ofthe
olderNorthChinabase areasincluding Jin-Cha-Ji, Shaan-Gan-Ning,
andpartsofJin-Ji-Lu-Yu, progressivetaxationandrentreduction had
redistributiveeffectsthatconsolidatedtheParty'sbase bothamong
the pooreststrataand broadlyamongthe self-cultivating majority
(Hartford andGoldstein,1989: 101; Kataoka,1974: 122-33,249-51;
Thaxton,1983: 103-9; Friedmanet al., 1991: 40-4). In manyin-
stances,moreover, tax reform and rentreduction programs did not
rupturetheunitedfront bydriving thelocal eliteintothearmsofthe
Japaneseor outof thearea.In short,limitedreforms, predicated on
thecontinued economicandsocialpredominance offamilyfarmand
market, strengthened theunitedfront.
The wartimeprogram, embracingtax reform, rentand interest
reduction, and,insecurebase areas,mutualaid andelementary forms
ofcooperation, initiatedlimitedbutsignificantsocialchangeinclud-
ing gradualtransformation and interclass
of state-society relations.
The richfrequently declinedin wealthandpowerwhereasthepoor,
as well as sectionsof theindependent cultivator majority, achieved
palpableiffragileeconomic,social,andpoliticalgains.These gains
werefragilein thesensethatshifting fortunes in theguerrillawar
couldquicklyerasethem.Therelative declineinthepoweroftherich
was reinforced bythegeneralwartime declineofcommercial agricul-
tureand the expansion of food cropsat the expense of commercial
cropsas cultivators soughtto ensuresubsistence andbase area gov-
ernments to promotetradein an epochof insecurity (Myers,1986:
267). Theresultwas an increasinglyhomogeneous socialbasisforthe
consolidation ofpowerbytheparty-army leadingtheresistance inthe
rearareasofNorthandCentralChina.
Severalissuesremaincontested inassessingthewartime program,
in partbecauseof varying evidencederivedfromdifferent regions.

1995
One concernstherelationship betweenresistance forcesandthelocal

elite. In CentralHebei and throughout Jin-Cha-Ji, the resistance
workedtowinoverpatriotic members ofthelocaleliteas wellas the
poor.In someunitedcommunities, itsucceededin bringing someof
therichandtheirscionsintolocalgovernment. The Partysometimes
succeededin bridging thegap betweentheprosperous and thepoor
through a sharedcommitment totheresistance andimplementation of
an economicandfiscalprogram thatprovedminimally acceptableto
significant partsof theeliteas well as to thepoor(Friedmanet al.,
1991: chap.2). Morethana sharedpatriotism was involved.Where
resistanceforcesenjoyedsustaineddominance, armyenlistment by
thesonsofelitefamiliescouldsecuretaxexemptions andstrengthen
thefamily'spoliticalposition.In short, a rangeof factorscomeinto
playin assessingPartyefforts to mobilizepatriotic eliteruralyouth
and the scions of independent cultivators,manyof whom sub-
sequently rosewithin theParty,army, andgovernment as middle-and
higher-level cadres.
Themoraleconomy/rational peasantdebate,framed inthewritings
of JamesScott(1976) and Samuel Popkin(1979), offersanother
approachforexplainingwhy substantial numbersof villagersof
diversesocialclassesralliedtosupport theresistance.Withreference
to themoraleconomyargument emphasizing theprimacyof subsis-
tenceandsecurity considerations, intheresistancebaseswe noteboth
Partyefforts and villagerresponsesto policiesthatsoughtto secure
subsistence. Butthejuxtaposition ofsubsistence versusmarkets may
misconstrue a situationin whichCommunist forcessimultaneously
soughtto ensuresubsistence and promotemarketactivity. Positive
peasantresponses to theexpansion of market opportunities wereby
no meansrestricted to independent cultivatorsandthemoreprosper-
ous, butextendedto thepoorand landless.In ruralChina,widely
sharedunderstanding of theessentialsof a good life,a morallife,
requiredcash to ensure a properweddingandburialandto celebrate
theNew Yearandotherimportant festivalsinappropriate ways.Cash
couldbe obtainedonlyinthemarket.
Aftercomingto power,particularly after1957,theCommunist
Partywouldbrandsuchcustomsas feudalsuperstition and seek to
eliminatethemarkets thatsustained them. But in buildingtheresis-
tance duringthe 1940s, the party-army generallyprotectedboth

customand the market, rightly seeingin thempowerfulweapons

essentialforthesurvivaland growthof theresistance. David Holm
has shown how the in
Party Shaan-Gan-Ning andotherareas,during
thecourseof theresistance, drewon and adaptedpopularcultural
themes.For example,yanggeperforming troupesfannedoutacross
the countryside, visitingeach courtyard in turnon theNew Year,
improvising songsand versesof a congratulatory variety considered
auspiciousfortheNew Year,explodingfirecrackers, payingrespects
tothesmallshrinetoTudiatthemaingate,andevenexchanging hong
fengzigiftsof moneyin redenvelopes.Holm (1991: 160-2)shows,
too,thewaysin whichculture becamea battleground, as intellectuals
resistedpopularization policiesandas thePartymovedtoreplacesuch
enshrinedand popularculturalmotifsas sexuallyexplicitor lewd
male-female bantering andtointroduce contemporary mobilizational
themessuchas theproduction movement andrentreduction.
In lightoftherationalpeasantperspective's emphasison market-
derivedcash income,myresearchshowsthatsuchgoalswerewidely
sharedamongdiversesocialclasses.Butthequestforcashwas never
theexclusivepreoccupation suggested bysomerationalchoicetheo-
ristswhose conceptionof rationality beginsand ends withprofit
maximization andwhoruleoutcultural factors entirely.Indeed,inthe
desperate times ofblockade,pillage,andfaminethatconsumedmuch
ofwartime ruralChinaandaboveall theborderareas,bothPartyand
villagersprioritized subsistence guarantees overcashincomes.More-
over,theruralcrisisplaceda premium onfamilial, lineage,andvillage
groupingsand networks ratherthanon thestriving of autonomous
individuals. It is mostfruitfulinthinking aboutruralChinatounder-
standthat"moral"and "rational"values were weddedin popular
consciousnessand thattheirrelativeweightchangedin responseto
historicalconditions. Prevailingconceptions of thegood and moral
life,a lifethathonoredritualnormsfrombirththrough marriage to
burial,ofcoursepresupposed subsistencebutlookedbeyondit.
The market madepossiblerealization ofthecashincomesessential
forthe fulfillment of ritualnorms.It was also the locus of much
culturally sanctioned activity fromtheperformance of local operato
thebrokerageof marriage negotiations.The resistance Partysought
to ensurebothsubsistence andcash incomesandthismeantencour-
aging,butalso attimesregulating, markets. In short,someofthepolar

26 1995
positionsthathavedefinedmuchdiscussionof peasantvaluesand
agrarian revolution dissolveinthefaceofChineseruralrealitieswith
respecttothebase areasandthechemistry ofparty-villagerrelations.
The preceding discussionhas underscored theParty'ssuccessin
some important base areas in buildingbroadruralcoalitionsthat
includedthedestitute andsectionsof moreprosperous strataaround
issuesoftaxreform, rentandinterest reduction,andmutualaid.This
politicalandeconomicprogram contributedtotheunityandelanthat
madepossiblethesurvivalof thebase areasin thefaceofJapanese
blockade.Important dimensions of thewartime programin Shaan-
Gan-Ning,notablytax reform and mutualaid, and involvingmass
organizationsandmobilization forlocalandregional elections,
spread
and took rootin morestablebase areas (Keating,1993)." These
programs facilitatedthebroadening ofa socialbase anda reduction
in thesharpest class antagonisms thatthreatenedto dividetheresis-
tance.On theseissues,therecent literature
contributestoa broadening
anddeepening ofapproachesfirst proposedin TheYenanWay.
Subsequentresearch on theresistance hasconfirmed thatessential
elements ofTheYenanWaycanbe applied,withappropriate attention
to variations,to otherbase areasandthewartime movement overall.
The periodization oftheepochproposedin TheYenanWay,pivoting
watershed
on theinstitutional-political-ideological of 1942-1943and
stressingthe multifaceted responseto theJapaneseoffensive that
jeopardizedthesurvivalofseveralbases,remainsgenerally validnot
onlyforShaan-Gan-Ning butalso forthenationalmovement. Simi-
larly,thefocuson thesocioeconomic foundations oftherelationship
betweenPartyand villagersin peripheralregionsunderwartime
conditions offersa basis forthecomparative studyofthebase areas
leadingto a deeperunderstanding ofthedynamism oftheresistance.
Finally, the wartime constitutes
resistance not onlythe mostinnova-
tive periodof the ChineseCommunistmovementbut a seminal
experienceforeshadowing and influencing subsequentanticolonial
movements throughout Asia, Africa,and Latin America.In these
dimensions, TheYenanWayhas stoodthetestoftime.
Is so positivean appraisalofthewartime resistancetenableduring
the1990sinlightofwhatwe nowknowoftheCommunist Partythat
presidedovertheGreatLeap famine, thatledChinaonthedevastating
courseoftheCultural Revolution,andthatpresided overtheTiananmen

massacreand muchmore?In thediscussionthatfollows,I consider

anewsomeofthecorejudgments ofmyearlierThe YenanWayinlight
oftheseissuesandparticularly inlightofimportant newevidenceon
theperiodoftheresistance. I insist,however,as in theearlierwork,
thatjudgments include,butnotbe limitedto,comparative frameworks
suchas thoseofQingandRepublican China,otherAsiancolonialand
semicolonialsocieties,andpooranddividedagrarian nationsthenand
subsequently.Let meturnthentoa reassessment ofThe YenanWayin
lightofthemostimportant challengesto it.
TOWARDANAUTO-CRITIQUEOF THE YENANWAY
The centralissuespivoton democracy andauthoritarianism,fun-

damentalism, thecultofMao,andthenatureofpoliticalmobilization,
all ofwhichhavebeenattheheartofdebateoverYan'anCommunism.
I begin withan exampleof a kind rarelyencountered in the
publisheddocumentary, oreventheintelligence, recordthatprovided
theresearch base forThe YenanWay.Examplesofcommandism from
a Hebeiplainsregion,whichcouldbe multiplied manytimes,include
an instanceinwhichoutsiders forceda smallandstruggling coopera-
tiveto acceptnormsof incomedistribution basedpredominantly on
laborat theexpenseofreturn on land.To do less,thecadresclaimed,
would constitute'"exploitation."'2 The new policy drovehalf the
households, notablythosethatwerebetter endowedwithland,outof
thestruggling cooperative(membership at thattimewas genuinely
voluntary). Responding tothevirtualcollapseofthecooperative, the
leadershipquicklyrestored former distributionnorms,butitwas too
lateto bringbackthosewhohadbolted.
In an instanceofheavy-handed politicsintheserviceofan exem-
plarycause,cadrespromoted nightschoolsforyoungwomen.They
neglected,however,to undertake thepreparatory workrequiredto
makesuchactivity sociallyacceptableina patriarchalcommunity in
whichwomenwereexpectedto remainwithincourtyard walls and
manypeopleviewedtheeducationofwomenas irrelevant orworse.
Iratefamilymembersrespondedby beatingto deathseveralyoung
marriedwomenseekingeducation.Commandism, fundamentalism,
and insensitivityto local values,whereunchecked, sometimespro-

28 1995
duceddeadlyconsequences.In extremecases,theyjeopardizedthe
survivaloftheresistance. The issueis thedistinction betweenmobi-
lizationalapproachesresponsive to local perceptions andneeds,ap-
proachesthatcould expandthe horizonsof social justiceand the
imposition of externally derivedand rigidlyimposedformulas. Fre-
quentlya fineline separatedeffective popularmobilizationfrom
repressive commandism. WherethePartypressedreforms thatlacked
a popularbasis,repression or violencecouldcontribute to passivity,
disunity, or worse.The factthatjudgmentshad to be madeunder
conditions ofguerrilla warfare in thefaceofmilitary repression and
at timesunderpressure fromPartyofficials withlittleknowledgeof
local conditions madetheissuesall themorepoignant. Errorswere
sometimes fatal.
These examplesillustrate tensionswithinthemass line thatre-
ceivedtoo littleattention in theoriginalwork.At itsbest,themass
line,an approachdesignedtomediateandresolvesuchantagonisms,
ralliedbroadstrataofthepopulation intheserviceofsharednational
resistance goalsandthoseofsocialandeconomicreform. TheYenan
Wayhighlighted such instancesof leadershippraxisresponsiveto
popularneedsand values.Such a politics,whereattunedto popular
needsanddesires,couldcontribute tosocialandeconomicequity.At
itsworst,however, itwas capableofdestructive formsoffundamen-
talismresting onParty claims to exercise a monopoly on morality and
truth.
Thedarksideofmobilizational politicswouldbe amplymanifested
inthepoliticalscapegoating, personality cult,repression,andmanipu-
lationthatcrescendoed during the lateMao years,particularlyduring
theGreatLeap Forward andCultural Revolution andcontinued during
thereignof Deng Xiaopingas well.Yet,underwartime conditions,
wheresurvivalof the movement dependedon sustaining popular
the
support, Partygenerally succeeded in curbing commandist and
fundamentalist tendencies. It displayeda tacticaland strategic flexi-
bilityand sensitivity in dealingwitha rangeof social classes. For
example,thePartypressedelectoralcampaignsthatbroughtnon-
Communists intolocal administration, to be surein waysthatnever
challengeditspredominance in the base areasit led. But successful
democratic transitionsalmostinvariably beginwithsomemeasureof
Theevidencefromtheresistance
elitecontinuity."3 suggests thatthere

was a significant democratizing potentialwithinthe Communist

movement, ifthatwasbynomeanstheonlypotential. Thiswasamong
thefactorsthatcontributed to thehighlevelsof popularsupportthe
Partyenjoyed,a factamplynotedbycontemporary observers. Never-
theless,writingduringthe 1990s,myaffirmation of thedemocratic
promiseofthemovement wouldbe moreguardedthanit was at the
timeoftheoriginal.
The movement achievedsubstantial successinimplementing war-
timereform programs responsive topopularneeds(particularly those
ofpoorerstrata),inestablishing socioeconomic preconditions favor-
able to democracy,and in broadeningthe scope of the political
process.By whatstandards? Certainlyby comparisonto anything
foundintheruralareasunderGuomindang, warlord, orJapaneserule
and by comparison to mostothercontemporary poorandperipheral
nations.Bothin Shaan-Gan-Ning and in thebase areasbehindJapa-
nese lines,thesocioeconomicand politicalprograms of thisperiod
rankamongthemostinnovative toemergeanywhere duringa century
of nationalindependence struggle and Communist revolution in the
colonialandsemicolonial regionsoftheperiphery. Theachievements
includebringing substantialnumbers ofmarginalized peopleintothe
politicalprocessandexpanding theireconomic,cultural, andpolitical
resources.The YenanWayrecognizedandhighlighted theseseedsof
a democratic Lookingbackfromthe1990s,however,
transition. itis
equallyimportant tounderstand whytheseedsofdemocracy sownin
the resistance failed to germinate-or ratherwere decisively
crushed-in thePeople's Republic.Amongtheseis thefactthatthe
resistancemovement also carriedwithinittheseedsofPartydespot-
ism,ofideologicalfundamentalism, andthecultoftheleader.
I wouldliketo takeup twodirectchallengestotheoriginalwork.
The firstand mostimportant centerson strainsof Partydespotism,
even fundamentalism, thatsurfacedduringthecourseof theresis-
tance.The seconddisputesclaimsthattheresistance pioneeredeffec-
tivenewapproachesto economyand societyincluding self-reliance
andcooperation.
Lookingbeyondtheresistance to thePeople'sRepublic,itis now
clearthatcentralist,
authoritarian,andfundamentalist strains
thatwere
presentin incipientformwithinthewartimemovement came to the
foreoncethePartywonpowerandposedobstaclestoachievingmany

30 1995
ofitsdevelopmental andpoliticalgoals.'4Manyofthemostpromising
elementsoftheYan'anWaywerethensuppressed. TheMao cultand
theParty'stightmonopoly onpowerstifled thereformist sproutsthat
wereassociatedwiththeinfluxofintellectuals, theunitedfront, and
social policyachievements oftheresistance era;thespiritof mutual
aid andcooperation thathadbeenencouraged bythePartywithinthe
framework ofa mixedeconomywasundermined bytheimposition of
giantcollectivesmodeledon Stalin'skolkhozbutwithlittleor no
mechanization; thepossibilities of a mixedeconomyof household,
cooperative, andmarket after1955collectivization yieldedtoextreme
formsofantimarket collectivism; andtheinterests ofthecountryside
weresacrificedin theserviceof a visionof development thattook
large-scaleheavyindustry as its goal and the countryside as the
primarysourceof accumulation to achieveit. Whereasthe Party
claimedlegitimacy as heirto theYan'an Way,duringthelateMao
yearsit definedits legacyas asceticism, hardwork,class struggle,
andboundlessloyaltytotheleader.
self-sacrifice,
Reconsideration ofthe1942Partyrectification movement permits
us toaddressothercriticalissues.Thisstudywasthefirst torecognize
therectification as a vehicleforbuildingconsensuswithintheParty
and preparing itscadresand intellectuals fortheimportant political
and institutional changesthatwouldemergeduringtheyears1942-
1944 at theheartoftheYan'an Way:themovements formutualaid
andtaxreform, theproduction campaignbringing manywomeninto
thesocialeconomy, theexpansionoftheorganizational economy, and
innovations ineducationandhealthcare.Theseandotherinitiatives,
suchas promulgating a culturalpolicyto facethecountryside, were
boundup withpreparations fora transferofcadresand intellectuals
to the villages(xiafang).In short,the rectification contributed to
buildingtheorganizational unityrequired toformulate, evaluate,and
implement thefar-reaching changesin thebase areas
institutional
duringtheyears1942-1944.
Therectification wasalso a meansofmediating intenseintra-Party
In thisrespect,
conflicts. I contrast ittoearlierresorttoassassination
and executionas a meansof intra-Party conflictresolution.The
originalworksupported thefindings ofBoydCompton's(1952) study
thattherectification was nota purge,although itdidprovidea venue
forsharppolitical-intellectual struggle. appearanceof newevi-
The

dence and thesubsequent courseof theChineseRevolutionrequire

rethinking oftherectification fromtheperspective ofitsrepression of
dissenting views,itssignificance forintra-Party politicalprocesses,
andtheadministration ofjustice.
Therectification was a pivotaleventinthecreation ofa cultofMao
and in crushingindependent thought amongintellectuals and party
Thesetendencies
activists. wouldbe carriedtodisastrous extremes in
thePeople'sRepublic.Dai Qing'sseminalworkinexhuming thecase
ofthewriter WangShiweibringsintofocusperhapsthesinglemost
important case forgaugingrepressive dimensions ofthemovement.
Wang'srealcrime,hisscathing attackonelitisttendencieswithin what
bymoststandards wasa mostegalitarian movement, wascompounded
intheeyesofPartyleadersbythepresumptuousness ofa littleknown
writer whopersisted injudgingthePartybyitsownhighest standards.
WangchargedthePartywithhypocrisy inproviding itsownofficials
withprivileged access to food,clothing, andsex. He derided
shelter,
"thethreeclasses of clothingand fivegradesof food"(Apterand
Cheek,1993) as an unnecessary-indeed immoral-luxury at a time
all
when wereaskedto sacrificeforthesurvivalof an independent
China.Whenthe36-year-old Wangrefused tobackdownbyaccepting
criticism ofhisviewsata timewhentheCommunist writer DingLing
andall othersunderattackmadeat leasttokenself-criticisms, he was
incarcerated. Finally,afterfiveyearsof imprisonment on chargesof
Trotskyism, he becamethevictimofa grislyexecution.David Apter
and TimothyCheek (1993: 3, 66-68; cf. Seybolt,1986) correctly
concludethattheissuesaresystemic, thatis,emblematic "ofYan'an's
darkside,as authentica partof Yan'an's inner'symboliccapital'
as theoutermanifestations offrugality, and national
self-sacrifice,
salvation."
I read the case at severallevels. Most importantly, it, and the
rectification movement ofwhichitwas a part,illuminates a stagein
the formation of a thought-control apparatuswithinthe Chinese
Communist Party,a criticalmoment increating mechanisms ofrepres-
sionandcontrolthatwouldintensify andexpandin scopeto become
thenormoncethePartyconsolidated powerinthePeople'sRepublic.
Wanghadstakedouta positioninthecultural-intellectual debates
thatled up totherectification beyondtheissuesofpromoting "abso-
luteegalitarianism" forwhichMao andotherswouldattackhim.The

32 1995
case is also revealingintermsofthespaceandlimitsofdissentthat

werepossiblewithinthewartime movement. Wangwas notwithout
supporters during theearlyphasesofthecampaign.He succeedednot
onlyinpublishing histwodissenting essaysbutinmobilizing support
forhispositionand fighting backwithinthePartywithsomeinitial
successpriortohisincarceration. Suchopportunities tocontestlead-
ershipdecisionswouldsubsequently disappear.Since the 1980s,as
moreinformation becameavailable,Wang'scase hasrightly received
attention in Chinaand abroad,bothas themostextremecase of its
kindinthisepochandforitschillingimpactonthepoliticalmilieuin
theborderregionandbeyond.
The case of WangShiweiexposesthemanipulative andcoercive
sideofYan'anCommunism. Giventhestrength ofpopulist,refonrnist,
andevenproto-democratic tendencies withinthewartime movement,
it is essentialto understand whythe authoritarian and repressive
tendenciesillustrated so tragicallybyWang'scase triumphed in the
subsequent People'sRepublic,fromtheantirightist movements ofthe
1950sto theCulturalRevolution to thecrushing ofdemocratic aspi-
rationsduringthe1980s.
In assessingtheresistance period,PhilipHuang(1991: 325) ob-
servesthat"theChineseCommunist movement enjoyedmuchgreater
popularsupport thandidtheGuomindang," buthe goesontobalance
thisjudgmentwithanother:"therecan be no denyingthestrongly
conspiratorial mentality and workstyle of theLeninistCommunist
Party,itsprotestations of a 'mass line' notwithstanding."
The latter
judgmentis one thatI sharewhenappliedto theyearsin power,
particularly if couchedin termsof an authoritarian ratherthana
conspiratorial mentality.I find,moreover, infacetsoftherectification
movement suchas thecrushing ofdissentin thecases ofDingLing
and WangShiwei,therootsoftherepression ofintellectualsandthe
formation ofa Mao cultthatwouldso profoundly shapethemovement
subsequently.
Nevertheless, as a comprehensive judgmenton thePartyof the
resistanceepoch,Huang's perspectiveseems to me one-sided.In
particular, itrestson readingbackfromthesubsequent courseofthe
If
revolution. the dark sideof Yan'an Communism was understated in
The YenanWay,as itsurelywas,we shouldnotlosesightofdistinctive

featuresofthemovement in this,perhapsitsmostopenandcreative
period.Onlyin thiswaycan we beginto grasphow it succeededin
attracting loyaltyofa broadrangeofpatriotic
extraordinary Chinese
ofdiverseclasses,manyofwhomsacrificed theirlivesinthewartime
struggle.And onlythencan we understand thedemocraticvoices
withinthePartywhocontinued to struggle againstauthoritarianism
after1949.
This is notto condonemanipulative, violent,or fundamentalist
elements thatsurfacedinthePartyduring theresistance. Itis,however,
to suggestthatthesetendencies weregenerally heldin checkat the
timenotonlyby theimperatives of survivalin thefaceofpowerful
enemies-thatis,byan objectivesituation thatrequiredwinning and
retaining substantial
popularsupport-butalso bythepopulistchar-
acterofthewartime movement whoseconstituency includedmanyof
China'sleadingintellectualsas wellas broadruralsupport.
Yung-fa Chen(inpress)hasshownthatduring theyears1943-1945,
theShaan-Gan-Ning economyandgovernment financebecameheav-
ilydependent on theproductionandsales ofa "specialproduct" that,
he shows,can onlybe opium.Workingwithbudgetary, sales, and
exportdataas wellas withprivate diaries,Chendemonstrates, andthe
unpublishedfindingsof otherresearchers confirm, thatduringthe
years1943-1945theparty-army responded tocrushing budgetdeficits
thatthreatened survivalbygrowing andsellingsubstantial quantities
ofopium.He presents strongcircumstantial evidencethatopiumwas
controlledat varioustimesby the359thBrigadeunderWangZhen
(theregionalmodelofmilitary self-sufficiency)andbytheNanchang
Company(theregionalmodelofstate-supported cooperation). More-
over,ChenarguesthatMao personally approvedtheopiumsales in
1943,banning themonlywhenthecrisiseasedin 1945.Chen(inpress)
sumsup hisdiscussionintheformofa critiqueofthefindings ofThe
YenanWay:
No one can denythe communists' achievementin developingthe
Shaan-Gan-Ning BorderRegionthrough themass linein the 1940s.
Butignorance oftheroleplayedbytherevenuesfromtheopiumtrade
led Seldentoexaggerate
theeconomicaccomplishments andoverlook
theinternalconstraints
imposedbythepoverty and backwardness of
theBorderRegion.... As thesize ofopiumtradetestifies,
theBorder
Regionneverachievedthegoal ofgenuineself-reliance.

1995
Chen'sresearch providescompelling testimony tothedesperation of

the struggleforsurvivalin the ruralbackwaterthatwas Shaan-
Gan-Ning.Italso suggests dimensions ofhistoricalcontinuitylinking
modemrevolutionaries andtraditional rebelsin a manner pioneered
earlierbyElizabethPerry(1980) inherstudiesoftheHuaibeiregion.
Withthepoverty oftheborderregionexacerbated byblockadeand
war,andwiththeendofGuomindang subsidiesby1939,theeconomic
andfinancial optionsavailabletoresistance forceswerenarrow. Even
in theabsenceofwar-induced resourceconstraints, theabilityofthe
borderregiontosupport thesubstantial influxofsoldiers, administra-
tors,and students thatfollowedthearrivalof theredarmieswould
haveplacedan enormous strainontheeconomy. Chenunderlines the
distinction betweentheCommunists' desperateturnto opiumand
characteristic warlordbehavior,notingthatthe Partyeffectively
bannedopiumsmokingwithintheborderregionand thatit ended
opiumsales as soonas thecrisiseased.Nevertheless, thesefindings
call intoquestionanyuniversalclaimthatrevolutionaries occupied
themoralhighground. Chen'sfindings requirereconsideration ofthe
case foreconomicself-reliance intheborderarea,drawingattention
tothecriticalroleofthemarket inmakingpossiblethesurvivalofthe
resistancein itstimeoftrial.
Surprisingly,Chendidnotdirectly addressthefindings ofthemost
exhaustive effort far
thus toanalyzetheeconomicperformance ofthe
region, PeterSchran's(1976) GuerrillaEconomy.GuerrillaEconomy
providesdetailedanalysisof the rangeof state-directed efforts
mounted inresponsetotheeconomicandfinancial crisisoftheearly
1940s including theinstitutionaleconomy,substantial tax increases
coupled withtax reform, printing of currency, import-substituting
and mobilization
industrialization, of femaleand otherlaborin pro-
ductioncampaigns.Schranshowsthattheborderregionadministra-
tionsustainedlargeand growingbudgetdeficitseach yearbetween
1941 and 1944 despiteincreasedrevenuesprovidedby theinstitu-
tionaleconomy.Presumably, thedeficitswouldhave beensubstan-
tiallylarger,
perhapsinsupportable, intheabsenceofopiumrevenues.
Chen'snewevidenceis significant inthecalculusbothofeconom-
ics and politics.Yet his critique of earlierscholarship is notquite
persuasive.NeitherSchran'sGuerrillaEconomynorThe Yenan Way
contended thattheself-reliant
efforts solvedtheproblems ofpoverty,

technologicalbackwardness, or government deficitsin the Shaan-

Gan-Ningregion.Bothstudies,and othersprobingeconomicsand
financein otherborderareas, in factemphasizethe heavyfiscal
pressuresin theregionand offerrathermodestassessmentsof the
economicanddevelopmental Ata timewhentheborder
results. region
supporteda large militaryand administrative population,facing
blockadeand protracted war,no economicbreakthrough occurred.
Norcouldithave.TheYenanWay'snarrower claimwasrather thatthe
combinationof rentand tax reform, mutualaid, the market,and
attempts bolsteredthewareffort.
at self-reliance It furtherhintedat
thepotentialvalueoftheseapproachesforsubsequent development
efforts.No claimofeconomicbreakthrough was made.
Partof theprocesswherebytherevolutionary armiesand Party
adaptedto theharshconditions of borderregionlife,itis nowclear,
includedcontinuing as wellas attemptingtocontroltheopiumtrade,
an important sourceofrevenueforbothcultivators andthestateinan
impoverished region.Thecontinuing oftheopiumtrade
significance
helpsilluminate one of thewaysin whichsurvivalin thepoverty-
strickenperiphery was possible,and it underlinesthepointmade
earlierthatborderregionofficials encouraged evenas theysoughtto
controlcriticalleversin themarket.
Futureunderstanding ofeconomyandfinanceintheborderregion
willincorporate therevenuesderivedfromopiumduringthelatewar
years(Chen suggeststhatit accountedfor27% of Shaan-Gan-Ning
government spendingin 1944 and40% in 1945) and adjustaccord-
inglyinassessingtheself-reliance. Theopiumfactor is oneofseveral
domainsinwhichtheCommunist movement willbe seenlessinterms
of historicruptureandmoreintermsofcontinuity withecologically
and culturally conditioned patternsspanningthe 1949 divide.That
certainlyincludestheefforttotakeadvantage ofmarket opportunities,
a keyelementofthewartime economythatnowmustbe understood
to includeopiumat leastduringtheyears1943-1945.Opiumis one
ofmanyexamplesillustrative ofrealmsinwhichdifferences between
Shaan-Gan-Ning andareasunderGuomindang andwarlord jurisdic-
tionare less pronounced thanmanyresearchers, includingmyself,
previously assumed.
The shiftinresearch fromnationaltolocalandregional
orientation
studiessincethe 1970s reflected thedesireto examinecloselythe

1995
interaction betweenPartyand ruralpeople in situ,to move from

theoreticalabstractions to experienced socialprocessesat thegrass-
rootslevel.The YenanWaywas amongtheearliestresponsesto this
impulse.It soughtto assess thecharacter ofrevolutionary changein
Shaan-Gan-Ning in relationship to theecologyoftheareaincluding
itsterrain,itsdemography and social structure, and itsculturaland
historicallegacies.On thisfoundation, itoffered broaderhypotheses
on thenatureofthewartime resistance. Yetfromthe1970sforward,
writersfromRobertMarks(1984) toRalphThaxton(1983) toHuang
(1991: 327) havearguedconvincingly (inHuang'swords)that"There
has beenno significant workon whathappenedwhentherevolution-
ary movementactuallymetruralsociety"or thathistorians have
focusedonthePartyanditspronouncements, neglecting orrelegating
to obscurity peasantperspectives andself-activity.
Ironically, in
perhaps no fieldofmodemorcontemporary history
have researchers expendedcomparableenergiesand ingenuity to
movebeyondofficialdocumentation to approachthesubstanceof
ruralsocietyandgaininsight intopeasantvalues,consciousness, and
action. It is nevertheless difficult to take exception to the critical
judgments rendered earlierconcerning thelimitsofexistingscholar-
ship.This is particularly, butby no meansonly,trueof theearlier
scholarship at armslength, including TheYenanWay,thatwas neces-
sarily restricted to the realm of documentary and archivalresearch
outsideChina.We continueto havea muchfirmer graspof official
goalsandpoliciesthanofpopularvaluesandresponses, notonlyfor
theRepublicbutforbothimperialChinaandthePeople'sRepublic.
Moreover,we knowvastlymoreaboutthebehaviorof intellectuals
andofficials thanwe do aboutthelives,beliefs,and socialnetworks
ofvariousstrataofthepeasantry. Fromthisperspective, themassline
maybeunderstood as theParty'sattempt tospeakonbehalfofa largely
illiterateandfrequently silentpeasantry. Ifthemasslinealso consti-
tutedan attempt to articulate voices of theoppressed,it above all
ensuredthatthevoicesheardspokein"correct" (i.e.,Party-approved)
nationalandclasscategories andnotin"inappropriate" (e.g.,lineage,
particularistic, or anti-Party) categories. The difficulties confronting
researchers-even thosemostcriticalofPartyfiat,whoseektobreak
through theironringofofficial categories andtopermit ruralpeople
toarticulate theirownideas,hopes,anddreams-remainformidable.

Recentresearchpermitsus to addressanew severalof themost

pressingissuespertaining to theparty-peasant relationship. To what
extentdidtheresistance constitute a "peasantrevolution" inthesense
thatpeasantsnotonlyprovidedthemassbaseofrevolutionary armies
but thattheirmoraluniverseultimately shaped the trajectory of
revolution? This view has been advancedby historians of a moral
economypersuasion, andforChinamostclearlybyEdwardFriedman
(1974) foran earlierperiodand by RalphThaxton(1983) forthe
resistanceera.Heretheconventional wisdomconcerning theMarxist-
Leninistvanguard partyis essentially reversedwiththepartylearning
fromthemassesand framing a socioeconomic andculturalprogram
thatspringsprimarily frompopularvalues,particularly villagers'
aspirations to rightthewrongsof a worlddominatedby imperialist
invadersas well as rapaciouslandlords and warlords and shapedby
lineageandreligious values.In thisviewtheparty, ifitis successful at
all,becomestheexpression ofruralvaluesandaspirations.
The strength ofthisperspective appliedtotheresistance lies in its
recognition ofhowa Party, whosemembership was overwhelmingly
ruraland whichspenttwo decades in thecountryside en routeto
nationalpower,learnedfromand was shapedby villagersand rural
values.It is suggestiveforunderstanding howtheparty-army regu-
larlyadaptedprograms and valuesin theattempt to winthesupport
ofdiverseruralconstituencies evenwhenitassumeditwas transmit-
ting"correctideology"to a feudalpeasantry. It recognizesthatrural
people notonlybroughttheirvaluesand beliefsintothePartybut
retainedmanyof them,and it helpsto recognizeimportant waysin
whichtheruraloriginsof thevastmajority of Partymembersand
soldiersshapedthecharacter ofthemovement. Thisperspective can
be used to exploreareasof sharedvalueslinkingPartyactivistsand
leaders,ontheonehand,andvillagers, ontheotherhand,ranging from
egalitarianto patriarchalto religiousvalues.
Critics
ofsucha peasant-centered perspectivehave,however, attacked
certainofitspremises. Bianco(1986:270) observes convincingly inhis
of
study twentieth-century peasantmovements thattheCommunists
couldnothavewonwithout thepeasantarmiesandthesupportof so
manyvillagers.Yetwithout
thecommunists thepeasantswouldquite
simplyneverhaveconceivedtheidea ofa revolution.

38 1995
In the absence of the Communists or otherextra-village forces,

China'speasantsthroughout the twentiethcenturyhad mounted nu-
merousuprisings and rebellionsdirected againstthestate,
variously
againstlocal landlordsandotherelites,andagainstothercommuni-
ties.The veryqualitiesthatmadepossibletheeruption ofthousands
ofprotests anduprisingsmadedifficulttheirexpansionfromisolated
localitytosustainednationalmovement (Bianco,1986:274; cf.Perry,
1980).Formillennia, thedynamic andsuccessful
oflarge-scale peas-
antrebellionsandpeasantmovements was one thatuniteda popular
ruralbase withleadershipdrawnfromthosewithwiderhorizons,
whethercultivatedby education,elite position,or extra-village
experience.
The poverty, exploitation,and social disintegrationshapingrural
lifeconstitutednecessary preconditions fortheChineseRevolution.
Yet,as Bianco(1986: 327) argues,thepeasantry alonecouldnotbring
therevolution tofruition.The Communists, withtheirurban,cosmo-
politan,andinternationalist
leadership andhistoricalorigins,andwith
commitments tonationalindependence to
andultimately thebuilding
ofa prosperous andpowerful socialistChina,succeededinthecourse
ofprotracted warinknitting together disparate forcesincluding broad
ruralstrataand urbanintellectuals. This is notto denythepeasant
characterofarmieswhoserecruits, andsomeofwhoseleaders,were
ofruralorigin.Noris ittooverlooktheshapingofPartyprograms and
in waysresponsive
priorities to peasantvalues.The strength ofthis
perspectivelies in drawingattention to the diverseelementsthat
coalesced and the points of tension within themovement: between
coastal and inland,betweenvalues shapedin thecitiesand those
shapedinthecountryside, betweenmilitary andcivilianperspectives,
andbetween Partyandsociety. Itslimit,inmyview,liesinitscomplete
dichotomization of Partyand peasantry and itsfailureto recognize
ways in whicha two-waysocializationprocessoccurredin which
peasantswerenotmerelymoldedbythePartybutinturnshapedthe
characteroftheParty.
Thisarticlehas posedimportant questionsconcerning democracy
inthebaseareas.I viewtheissuesfromseveralangles.TheYenanWay
highlightedegalitarian,participatory, andcooperativeachievements
of thewartimeresistance. In thecourseof theresistance, landlord

powerwas challenged,thepositionof thepoorand of independent

cultivators was strengthened, and fruitful formsof mutualaid were
all withinthecontextofa mixedeconomyresting
initiated, on foun-
dationsof thefamilyfarmand market access.At thesametime,the
movement promoted literacy andeducation, and itintroduced a mo-
bilizationalpoliticsthatembracedtheruralpoorand women.These
wereamongthefactorsthatseemedto me to constitute foundations
fora socialisttransition thatultimately requiredexpandedpolitical
rolesandtheempowerment ofvillagers.
Thisapproach, although suggestive, nevertheless nowseemsinade-
quate.Fromtheperspective ofthe1990s,theappropriate questionis
why,givenpromising beginnings conduciveto a democratic transi-
tion,particularly thestrengthening of an independent cultivatorma-
joritybutalso the of
unfolding multicandidate electoralprocesses,was
subsequent development ofdemocratic processesso meager?Whydid
thereformist anddemocratic elements oftheParty'sNewDemocracy
wither anddieduring subsequent decades?Whywereimportant gains
reversedas thePartyexerciseda tightmonopoly on power?Andwhy
did villagers,who providedthecore of the wartimerevolutionary
forceand werein manywaysbeneficiaries of Partypoliciesframed
in thecourseof theresistance, experiencesuchhardship duringthe
eraofmobilizational collectivism associated withthe final
decadesof
Mao's rule?Partoftheanswer-butonlya part-lies inrecognizing
moreexplicitly thelimitsofdemocratic progress oftheresistance era.
In particular,it is necessaryto graspthewaysin whichdemocratic
impulsesremained subordinated tothedictatesofparty-army mobili-
zation.In thecourseoftheresistance, forall thegainsassociatedwith
therevolutionary movement, itis necessaryto grasptheelementsof
Partyhegemony and ideologicalorthodoxy and to locatetheorigins
of subsequentconflicts betweenPartyand peopleand betweencity
andcountryside.
The Yenan Wayrightly notedthesignificance ofsproutsofdemoc-
racyassociatedwiththeintroduction offorms ofelectoralpolitics,the
growth ofan independent cultivator majority, andtheemergence ofa
cooperativeeconomy, butitinsufficiently graspedthefactthatthese
werepartof a packageassociatedwitha Party-dominated massline
anda conception ofmobilization thatwouldposeformidable obstacles

1995
democraticadvance and economic and political empower-

to further
mentof ruralproducersduringtheyearsahead.
Reflectingon the Yan'an Way duringthe 1990s leads me to the
followingconclusions:
The Yan'anWay,as thesummation of theParty'sexperiencein the

resistance,constitutedan important moment inthehistoryofanticolo-
nialresistance.Italso offershintsapplicabletothepoliticaleconomy
of development, including thecontributions ofpoliciesempowering
an owner-cultivator majoritythrough rentandtaxreforms thatconsti-
tuteda "silentrevolution," andpreliminary stepstowardmutualaid,
cooperation, anddemocracy. Thiscentralthesisoftheoriginalwork
remainsintact.
* The Yan'an Wayalso, however,encapsulated repressiveand elitist
tendencies thatwereinsufficiently recognizedin theoriginalstudy.
Whencarriedto extremesin thePeople's Republic,notablyin the
GreatLeap Forward,theCulturalRevolution, and therepressionof
democratic aspirationsandmovements from1957to 1979to 1989and
beyond, theresultswerefrequently tragicandcertainly with
inconflict
therevolution's finest including
proclivities thosetowarddemocracy,
equality,andtheuplifting ofa poverty-strickencountryside.
We can trace these and other unresolved tensions in Chinese

political economy back to the synthesiswe have called the Yan'an
Way. It is worthappreciatingin all itscomplexityso as to keep alive
its most humanepossibilitieswhile identifying the repressiveforces
detrimentalto furtherprogresstowardsocial and economic develop-
ment,culturalfulfillment,and humanliberation.
NOTES
fromthreeincisivesurveysof theliterature
1. I have benefited and theperiodof the
Sino-Japanese War:HartfordandGoldstein (1989: 3-33),VanSlyke(1986:609-722),andChen
(1986: 499-523).
2. The mostimportant Westernchroniclersoftheera,manyofwhoseworksarediscussed
later,wereEdgarSnow,AgnesSmedley,JackBelden,JohnService,GeorgeTaylor,Theodore
WhiteandAnnaleeJacoby, NymWales,Harrison Forman, AnnaLouiseStrong, EvansCarlson,
Gunther Stein,andMichaelLindsay.
3. The argument receivedabbreviateddiscussiona yearearlierinHanson(1939: 274).
4. Thisposition, byBarrington
mostbrilliantly
articulated Moore(1966),is at theheartof
myunderstanding bothin The YenanWayandin ChineseVillage,SocialistState.

5. Thequotedpassagefromtheintroduction, andparticularly thesummary report prepared

by GeneralPaul Peabody,chiefof military intelligence,
exemplifies theorganization weapon
perspective.The completereportdrewon a rangeof wartimeobserverswithdiverseviews
including JohnServiceandEdgarSnow.
6. We can tracea seriesof cyclesin Americanand Western Chinascholarship fromthe
predominantly "external"perspectivesof pioneerfiguressuchas H. B. Morseduringthelate
nineteenth and earlytwentieth centuriesto the "internal"perspectives championedby the
modernization schoolwithJohnFairbankas therepresentative figure,to theexternalperspec-
tivesof manyKremlinologists duringthe1950sand therather different externalperspectives
advancedbyproponents ofa viewemphasizing theroleofimperialism in shapingChina,some
of themassociatedwiththerethinking prompted bytheVietnamWarandtheformation ofthe
Committee ofConcernedAsianScholarsduringthesixtiesandseventies.The sharpest debate
ontheseissuesbeganwiththeexchangebetweenPeck(1969)andFairbank (1970) (see Friedman
and Selden,1971).Thesedebatescontinued duringthe1970sand 1980swithcounter-critiques
of theChina fieldby RamonMyersand ThomasMetzger(1983), SimonLeys, (1977), and
StephenMosher(1990), whose chargesand tone frequently evoked the specterof 1950s
McCarthyism butwithout comparablepoliticalclout.WithChina'sincorporation inthecapitalist
worldeconomyfromthenineteenth century forward,theinternal-external distinction becomes
moreandmoretenuousas a basisforgaugingsocialformations, theeconomy, andmuchmore.
In a sense,The YenanWayattempted to breakthrough thisinternal-external distinctionby
providinga microsocietal studythatwas sensitivebothto international forces,particularly
Japaneseimperialism, and domesticforcesassociatedwithpatterns of socioeconomicand
politicaldisintegration and discontentthatderivedfromimpositions associatedwithstate
building.For an influential critiqueof AmericanChinascholarship, particularly of external
perspectives, see Cohen(1984).
7. The firsttwoissuesof The China Quarterly presenttheseminaldebateon theissues
involving KarlWittfogel andBenjaminSchwartz. Schwartz's analysisofMaoismas a distinctive
andoriginaldevelopment ofMarxism-Leninism, particularlyChineseCommunism and theRise
of Mao (Schwartz,1951), markedan important stepin advancingthestudyof theChinese
Revolution.The YenanWayextendsSchwartz'srecognition ofthecreativeand indigenous, as
opposedto transplanted Soviet,rootsofcoreelementsofthesynthesis ofthewartime period,a
perspectivethatseems to me stronger forthe periodof the resistancewhenthe Chinese
Communist Partyachievedgreater independence andwhentheRussianswerepreoccupied with
survivalin thefaceof theGermaninvasion.Representative worksof the 1950s focusingon
Sovietmachinations in Chinacentering on, butnotlimitedto,theJiangxiperiodand deeply
informed bythecoldwarpremises oftheeraincludedHsiao(1961),McLane(1958),andWilbur
and How (1959).
8. Six yearsafterpublicationof Peasant Nationalism, Johnson casuallyabandonedhis
extrememonocausalthesisby recognizing theimportance of rentreduction in thebase areas
(Johnson, 1968: 397-437).Comparethediscussionin hiscelebration of thebookfifteen years
afterpublication (Johnson, 1977:775).
9. ElizabethPerry(1980) has addedfurther important dimensions. Herstudyofa century
ofruralstruggles intheCentralChinaHuaibeiregionunderlines themultiplicity ofrebeltargets
including thepredatory andprotective strategies ofentirecommunities.
10. The conceptand consequencesof diverseprogramsincludingtax reformand rent
reductionthattogether constitutedthe "silentrevolution" in CentralHebei are analyzedin
Friedmanetal. (1991: chap.4).
11. PaulineKeating'sclose readingofcontrasting patterns ofmutualaid andcooperation in
twosubdistricts ofShaan-Gan-Ning suggeststhecentrality ofthecooperative program notonly

1995
totheregionaleconomybuttograssroots politicsas well.Therelationship betweencooperation

and democratictransitions,impliedbut not exploredin The YenanWay,is an important
underresearchedareaofinquiry.
12. Thisandthefollowing examplearediscussedin Friedman etal. (1991: chap.3).
13.The issuesarediscussedindetailinFriedman (1994).
14. Forfulldiscussionsee Friedmanet al. (1991). See also Selden(1993).
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Yan'an Communism Reconsidered

Author(s): Mark Selden

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The essentialfactsare clear.Twice defeated,routedfromthe

AUTHOR'S NOTE I thank MarcBlecher, EdwardFriedman,

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international researcherstomainland archives,tothespateofChinese

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and blockadebyJapaneseandGuomindang forces)so thatguerrilla

This content downloaded from 92.63.106.124 on Sat, 28 Jun 2014 13:35:25 PM

This content downloaded from 92.63.106.124 on Sat, 28 Jun 2014 13:35:25 PM

Authorssuch as Harrison Forman,GuntherStein, Jack Belden,

White and Jacoby,among others,saw the issues of democracyas

This content downloaded from 92.63.106.124 on Sat, 28 Jun 2014 13:35:25 PM

Thisviewofdemocracy does notreston multipartyelections, parlia-

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democracyin theAnglo-American more

Sucha "realist"view,a harbinger ofcoldwarperspectives thatwould

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yearsof experiencein observingand reporting fromChina and at

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Withthecold war,American preoccupationsshifted froma focus

This content downloaded from 92.63.106.124 on Sat, 28 Jun 2014 13:35:25 PM

Duringthe1960sand 1970s,scholarsreturned to theissuesofthe

This content downloaded from 92.63.106.124 on Sat, 28 Jun 2014 13:35:25 PM

In focusingon the Japaneseinvasionand subsequentmilitary

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ent,"notingthat"manyChinese-specially ... thepeasantry-were

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The outcomeof thewar,particularly thedynamicgrowthof the

In TheYenanWay,I havesuggested thattheChineseresistanceoffers

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ond, thiscommunity was definedin partby a reform agendathat

RECENT SCHOLARLYPERSPECTIVES: BASE AREASTUDIES

Since the 1970s,numerousstudieshave probedtherelationship

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tion,on newformsof statebuilding,and on thecharacter of social

This content downloaded from 92.63.106.124 on Sat, 28 Jun 2014 13:35:25 PM

Rentandinterest reduction, andparticularlytaxreform, exemplify

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One concernstherelationship betweenresistance forcesandthelocal

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customand the market, rightly seeingin thempowerfulweapons

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massacreand muchmore?In thediscussionthatfollows,I consider

TOWARDANAUTO-CRITIQUEOF THE YENANWAY

The centralissuespivoton democracy andauthoritarianism,fun-

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was a significant democratizing potentialwithinthe Communist

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dence and thesubsequent courseof theChineseRevolutionrequire

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case is also revealingintermsofthespaceandlimitsofdissentthat

This content downloaded from 92.63.106.124 on Sat, 28 Jun 2014 13:35:25 PM

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Chen'sresearch providescompelling testimony tothedesperation of

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technologicalbackwardness, or government deficitsin the Shaan-

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interaction betweenPartyand ruralpeople in situ,to move from