Restoring Human-Centeredness to Environmental Conscience: The Ecocentrist's Dilemma, the

Role of Heterosexualized Anthropomorphizing, and the Significance of Language to Ecological

Feminism
Author(s): Wendy Lynne Lee
Source: Ethics and the Environment, Vol. 14, No. 1 (Spring, 2009), pp. 29-51
Published by: Indiana University Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40339167 .
Accessed: 23/06/2014 14:41

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Indiana University Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Ethics and the
Environment.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 62.122.76.78 on Mon, 23 Jun 2014 14:41:32 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
RESTORINGHUMAN-
CENTEREDNESSTO -
ENVIRONMENTAL
CONSCIENCE
THE ECOCENTRIST'S DILEMMA,
THE ROLE OF HETEROSEXUAL1ZED
ANTHROPOMORPHIZING, AND THE
SIGNIFICANCE OF LANGUAGETO
ECOLOGICAL FEMINISM

WENDYLYNNELEE

I argueherethatthecenteredness of humanexperienceas humanis mis-

representedby ecocentristsas identicalwith (or the cause of) human
chauvinism, and that although centerednessdescribesan ineradicable
featureof human consciousness,nothingnecessarilyfollows fromit
otherthanwhatfollowsfromanyuniqueconfiguration ofcapacitiesand
limitations.Appealingto theways in whichwe use anthropomorphizing
language,I argue thatat the root of thismisrepresentation is a failure
to take seriouslynot only the perceptualand epistemiccenterednessof
human experience,but the ways in whichgenderedand heterosexual-
ized social normshave become naturalizedamong its features.Restor-

ETHICS & THE ENVIRONMENT, 14(1)2009ISSN:1085-6633

©IndianaUniversity PressAll rightsof reproduction
in any formreserved.
Directall correspondence to: JournalsManager,Indiana University
Press,601 N. MortonSt.,
Bloomington, IN 47404 USA iuporder@indiana.edu

This content downloaded from 62.122.76.78 on Mon, 23 Jun 2014 14:41:32 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 inghuman-centerednessto environmental conscience becoming
requires
clearabouthowcenteredness butas
is realizednotonlyas chauvinism,
- not becauseanynecessity
heterosexism governs history, be-
this but
causewhatmakesenduring changepossibleis thedevelopment of an
environmentalconscienceequallycommitted forsocial
to thestruggle
justice.

DIVORCING HUMAN CHAUVINISM FROM HUMAN-

CENTEREDNESS
Whatever otherissuesmaydistinguish ecocentrists fromenvironmen-
talpragmatists fromecofeminists, fewquibblewiththeclaimthathuman
chauvinism hastakenitstollon Earth'senvironmental integrity.Weneed
look no further thanrecentevidenceof globalclimatechange,resource
depletion, speciesextinctions, deforestation, or waterand air pollution
to see thatthefuture of humanand nonhuman lifemaydependupon
whatever collective willwe can muster to addresstheseloomingcrises.1
Unsurprisingly, critiquesofthischauvinism varywidelyaccording to per-
spective and commitments. Ecocentrists,forexample,equatechauvinism
withhuman-centeredness, arguingthatonlythedisavowalof thelatter
andtheadoptionofan ecocentric perspective willbe adequateto thefor-
mulation ofan effective courseofaction.
Environmental pragmatists,however, rejectthisidentity and argue
thatit isn'thuman-centeredness perse thatis at faultforenvironmental
deterioration butrathera lackof foresight necessary to theenvisioning
of a sustainable future. Pragmatist BryanNorton,forexample,argues
foradoptinga "weak anthropocentrism" thatexplicitly recognizes the
interdependence of human and nonhuman nature in the formulation of
valuesappropriate to a "future forhumanconsciousness" (2003, 163-
174). Ecofeminists adopt (and reject)aspectsof theseand manyother
approaches, butare nonetheless distinguished byarguments thatreveal
theintimate andmutually reinforcingrelationshipsbetween humanchau-
vinism, androcentrism, ethnocentrism, and heterosexism. KarenWarren,
CarolAdams,GretaGaard,and ChrisCuomo,amongothers, showhow
specificinstitutionsand industriesbenefitfrom treatingwomen, nonwhite
humanbeings, and nonhuman animalsas ifeachwerevaluableprimarily
as a reflection
ofthatparadigmatic resource,nature"her"self.
Whatever thestrengths of each of theseapproaches - and thereare
-
many none,I think, canaccomplish an effectivecritiqueofhumanchau-

30 ETHICS% THE EN\^RONMENX

^4,^2009

This content downloaded from 62.122.76.78 on Mon, 23 Jun 2014 14:41:32 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
vinismand its relatedformsof oppressionwithoutinitiatinga divorce
of it fromhuman-centeredness. Thereare at least two reasonswhy.First,
thereare verygood reasons to thinkthat human-centeredness is not in
any sense a voluntary feature of human being,but rather an indigenous
featureof humanconsciousness - unchosenand ineradicable.Second,I'll
argue,notonlydo no negativeconsequencesfollowfromthisdivorce,but
rathertheverypositiveconsequenceof an opportunity to rethinkand re-
value human-centeredness as a locus of practicablemoralresponsibility.
Howeverplasticand evolvingthesomatic,perceptual,cognitive,psy-
chological,epistemicand affectivecapacities native to Homo sapiens,
-
theyare stillspecificto human- and not Chimpanzeeor dolphin being.
Human consciousnessis,in otherwords,informedbytheuniquearticula-
tion and interactionof capacitiesthatcharacterizehumanembodiment,
capacitieswhose exercisecreatestheconditionsforhumanexperience.To
be clear,I am notsuggesting thatwhatdefineshuman-centeredness is that
humanbeingshave capacitiesthatotherspeciesof creaturesdo not- this
mayor maynot be truegivenanyparticularcomparison.What I am sug-
gestingis thattheuniqueconfiguration of capacitiesthatdescribesHomo
sapiens informs an experienceunique thisspeciesand therebydefine
to
thisconsciousnessin termsof thisconfiguration. A human-centered con-
be
sciousnesscannotthen displaced,disavowed, or disowned - the notion
thatwe could get "outside" of humancenterednessmakes as littlesense
as the notionthat there'san "outside" for humanconsciousness(other
thanpermanentcoma or death).Hence, I can care profoundlyabout the
welfareof chimpanzees - I can tryto imaginewhat it mightbe liketo be
a chimpanzee,and I mightmake excellentguessesgivenall of thepercep-
tual,somatic,and psychologicalsimilarities we do appear to sharein light
ofthebehavioral,anatomical, and other evidence. ButI cannotexperience
theworld like a chimpanzeebecause thereis no "outside" to myexperi-
ence as a memberof Homo sapiens.2
Philosophyof language and empiricallyorientedphilosophiesof
mind/brain mayofferthemostpersuasivesupportforthisposition.Doug-
las Hofstadterargues,forexample,thatpartof whatdistinguishes human
beings from otherspecies of animal is our specificallylinguisticcapacity
forthecraftingof analogies:"We humanbeingsbeginlifeas ratheraus-
tereanalogy-makers - our set of categoriesis terriblysparse,and each
categoryitselfis hardlywell-honed.Categoriesgrowsharperand sharper
and evermore flexibleand subtleas we age, and of course fantastically

"^R^ 31

This content downloaded from 62.122.76.78 on Mon, 23 Jun 2014 14:41:32 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 more numerous"(2000, 121). Similarly, Nicholas Wade argues thatthe
aboriginalclick languagesstillin use in South Africademonstratea ca-
pacityforthedevelopmentof languageand itsacquisitionuniqueevento
ancienthumancommunities(2004, 191-4). In theirnow famouswork,
Philosophyin the Flesh, George Lakoffand Mark Johnsonargue that
humanbeings"are theonlyanimalswe know of who can ask, and some-
timeseven explain,whythingshappen theway theydo. We are theonly
animalswho ponderthemeaningof theirexistenceand who worrycon-
stantlyabout love, sex, work,death,and morality. And we appear to be
theonlyanimalswho can reflect criticallyon theirlivesin orderto make
changesin how theybehave" (1999, 551).
The mostpersuasiveargument, howevermaycome fromphilosopher
of mind,Daniel Dennettwho, in ConsciousnessExplained (1991) asks:
Do ourselves,ournonminimal selfyselves,exhibitthesameperme-
and
ability flexibility of boundaries as thesimplerselvesof other
creatures? Do we expandourpersonalboundaries - theboundaries
of our selves- to encloseanyof our "stuff?In general,perhaps,
no,butthereare certainly timeswhenthisseemstrue,psychologi-
cally....So sometimes we enlargeour boundaries; at othertimes,
in responseto perceivedchallenges real or imaginary,we let our
boundaries I havereminded
shrink.... youofthesefamiliar speeches
to drawoutthesimilarities between ourselves andtheselvesofants
and hermitcrabs...Antsand hermitcrabsdon'ttalk.The hermit
crabis designed in sucha wayas to seeto itthatitacquiresa shell,
andhence,ina veryweaksense,tacitly thecrabas having
represents
a shell,butthecrabdoesnotinanystronger senserepresent itselfas
havinga shell.It doesn'tgo in forself-representationat all. (1991,
416-417)
Dennettneitherdeniesthatwe sharewithotherspeciesof creaturea vari-
etyof overlappingcapacities,nor does he denythatwe can expand- im-
aginativelyand sympathetically- our understanding of what it mightbe
like to be, say,a hermitcrab.What Dennettdoes denyis thatthe hermit
crab shares in common with us is the capacityfor self-representation.
of capacities
Indeed,what all thesepassages point to is a configuration
unique to human beingsas, forexample,language users,philosophers,
None draw a hard and fastline between
worriers,and self-representers.
"us" and "them"- theydon't need to. But whateach exampledoes illus-

32 |^^^

This content downloaded from 62.122.76.78 on Mon, 23 Jun 2014 14:41:32 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
trateis someelement of whata human-centered formof lifelookslike,
whatcapacities characterizehuman-centeredness.
Second,then,is thathoweverindigenous, no necessary implications
forethnicity,
gender,sex, or sexualidentityfollow fromhuman-centered-
ness(or followforour conceptsof ethnicity, etc.).Thatwe are,forin-
stance,bipedal,color visionequipped,big-brained, sentient
mammals
impliesno particular trajectoryforhumaninstitutions otherthanfor
whatfallswithintherangeofphysical, cognitive,andepistemic possibil-
ityfor thisspeciesof animal. That we cannot see out the backsof our
headsno doubtaffects ourexperience ofoursomaticandexistential con-
ditions,thatwe aresentientcreaturesable to not
experience onlyphysical
butpsychological paincertainly contributes substantiallyto thewaysin
whichourpointsofviewidentify as
us specific lociof experience.
Specific
capacitiesand limitationsare not,however, determinations- whilespe-
cies membership delimitsthepossible,it does not define, forexample,
the"normal"or "natural"in anyothertermsbutwhatcan be. Nothing
necessarilyfollowsforhumaninstitutions likegovernment, marriage,or
family,however otherwisechauvinistic,sexist,racist,or heterosexist
they
maybe.Whilehuman-centeredness is a defining ofhuman
characteristic
consciousness,thewaysinwhichwe realizeitis not.

FRED BENDER'S ECOLOGICAL PHILOSOPHY AND THE

ECOCENTRISTS DILEMMA
IfI'm rightaboutthecharacter ofhuman-centeredness as wellas the
of
plausibility divorcingcenteredness fromchauvinism, ecocentrist
the is
facedwithan insuperable dilemma. For the human-centered-
ecocentrist,
nessandchauvinism aresomething moreliketheunfortunate two-headed
bullsofRipley'sBelieveitor Not! (www.ripleys.com). Not onlyis no di-
vorcepossible,attachedto the"body"ofhumanconsciousness the
itself,
twoheadsactas one drivenbythepresumptive prerogativeto dominate
and commodify nature.If we'reto escapeecocide,we mustseverboth
heads,thatis, disavowhuman-centeredness (disavowthisconfiguration
ofhumanconsciousness), per se.
DeepEcologist FredBender epitomizes ina chapter
thisposition aptly
titled"Anthropocentrism andHumanChauvinism" fromhisrecent book,
The Cultureof Extinction (2003). Appealingto RalphBartonPerry's

~^^^^
33

This content downloaded from 62.122.76.78 on Mon, 23 Jun 2014 14:41:32 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 "egocentricpredicament," Benderarguesfora set of claimsthatportend
to show thatwhat followsfromanthropocentrism, "the claim that hu-
mans cannot experienceor thinkexcept in a distinctively human way"
(2003, 83) is chauvinism:
H [hypothesis] understand
humanindividuals
8: Whatever is filtered
through theirownconsciousness predicament),
(egocentric therefore
H9: Humanindividuals alwaysact egocentrically;
analogously as a
species,
H10: Humanscannotexperience theworldbutthrough distinctively
humanconsciousness (theputativeanthropocentric predicament),
as a species
therefore,
Hll: Humanscannotavoidactingfromtheirexclusive speciesinter-
ests,therefore,
H7: [retrievedfroman earlieranalysis]Nonhuman beingsare mere
means(resources) forhumanuse,therefore
H4: [retrievedfroman earlieranalysis] humanuseofna-
Unrestricted
tureis morallyjustified(thehuman chauvinism
principle),therefore
N [norm]l:Dominatenature!(2003,83)
One seriousdifficulty hereis thatthereare no good reasonsto thinkthat
"filteredthrough human consciousness"necessarilyimpliesegocentrically
predisposed(Hll). Bender,of course,mightrespondthathumanhistory
itselfprovidesthebestevidence.Indeed,in thesecondpartof The Culture
of Extinction,he providesa highlycompellingaccountof environmental
abuses and resourceexhaustion(2003, 125-303). But no matter;forun-
less Benderis willingto sanctiontheunlikelyand deterministic claimthat
thishistorycould not have been otherwise,he is stillin need of an expla-
nationas to whyit describesthechauvinistictrajectory thatit does.
Withoutsuch an explanation,Bender'sappeal to Barton begs the
questionin thatthemove fromH8 (or H10) to Nl presupposesthevery
norm- humanchauvinism(or anthropocentrism as chauvinism) - it is al-
leged to establish.In otherwords,it requireseithera leap of faithor an
argumentthatBendersuppliesneitherherenorin hishistoricalaccountto
getfroman experientialcenter(H10) to an ego (at least one fromwhich
we can deriveconsequenceslike"unrestricted humanuse of nature,HI 1).
Moreover, Bender has not shown thatanyparticularinterests - muchless

34 in^

This content downloaded from 62.122.76.78 on Mon, 23 Jun 2014 14:41:32 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
egoisticones- necessarilyfollow fromthis configuration of conscious-
ness otherthan,as I argue above, what followsfromthe specieslimita-
tionscircumscribing it.Eventheinstinctto surviveand reproducethatwe
have in commonwithotherspeciesof animaldoes not implyegocentrism
(especiallywhen such means are not always or obviouslyconduciveto
eithersurvivalor reproduction).Hence, thereare no compellingreasons
to concludethecenteredness of humanconsciousnessis any moreneces-
sarilyegoisticthanare themarkingson a lady bug polka dots- however
tempting it maybe to see themthatway.
A seconddifficulty is thatifBenderis correctthatthecenteredness of
humanconsciousnesspredisposes(or just is) chauvinistic, theneitherwe
reallyare doomed to continuetheecocidal trajectory of our historyor,as
Benderargues,we mustdisavow our human-centeredness in favorof an
ecocentric("non-dualist")perspective practice(2003, 397-404, 445-
and
9). Hence a firstversionof theecocentrist's dilemma:If theecocentrist is
wrong,and it turnsout thathuman-centeredness (qua chauvinistic)is an
ineradicablefeatureof human consciousness(at least shortof suicide),
then we're doomed to preciselythe environmental destructionBender
chroniclesin impressive(if howeverdespairing)detailin The Cultureof
Extinction.We are,in otherwordsdetermined to "dominatetheearth!"in
whichcase we may as well it
just "hang up," head out to buyHummers,
and buystockin Shell.This,of course,is nota conclusionBender(or any
of us) would findacceptable.But if,alternatively, theecocentristis right,
he/shemustshow how it is possible- at the level of conscious experi-
ence- to dissociatethatexperiencefromthe centered"I" of the subject
who, in otherwords,has it in mindto accomplishthe disavowal of the
presumablyegoisticselfand permanently redirectconsciousnesstowards
theeco-centric.3
Benderundertakesthistask in the course of promotinghis specific
versionof ecocentrismthat he calls "nondualism"but it is tellingthat,
insteadof offering an argumentthat providesgroundsforrejectingthe
"dualism" of experiencingsubjectand experiencedobject,he resortsto
an experienceof "nonduality":
I startout...inordinary, wakingconsciousness,
dualistic, feeling
my-
selfa subjectamidstmyriad objectsaroundme,eachexperiencedas
other.I discover butam likea nodein
I do notexistindependently,
a web,through whichdiversekindsof energyflow.Forexample,I

This content downloaded from 62.122.76.78 on Mon, 23 Jun 2014 14:41:32 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 takein theSun'swarmth, thein-breath,food,water, humanspeech,
and so on. Meanwhile, I expelmanykindsofenergy. Liketheout-
breath,speech,bodilymovements, and excreta. The energy I takein
andexpelcirculateseverywhere on Earth,passingthrough othersas
through myself.ThusI discovermyconnectedness to all otherbeings,
suchthatI, likethey,am butone manifestation ofthisenergy flow,
ofplanetEarth....Nonduality emerges as I realizefurther thatnatu-
ralphenomena are Earthtransientlymanifest, emptyof substantive
selfhood(objectivity),
sinceeverything is dependently co-originated.
Thus,thoughI am precisely emptiness of substantive or independ-
entselfhood; evenso, as one particularmanifold of relations,I am
unique.(2003,435)
The difficultieshereare three-fold:First,thisisn'tan argument, butrather
an experientialnarrative,henceit would be follyto thinkit could estab-
lish anythingotherthan thatsomeonecan have such an experience.But
since such could be motivatedby,say,exhaustion,illness,or the use of
narcotics,it hardlyestablishesany metaphysicalclaim about the nature
of identityor being- muchless about any capacityto dissociateoneself
from"substantiveselfhood."Second,howevermuchhe may feelhimself
to be "emptyof substantiveselfhood"Bender'suse of "P suggeststhat
he confusesthe capacityto conceivewiththe capacityto actuallybe so
emptied.It's one thingto conceiveof myselfas connectedto all otherbe-
ings- indeedI do so conceivemyself, I knowthisin theabstractto be true
and I knowof no evidencethatcontradictsit.It is,however,quiteanother
thingto experiencemyselfas emptiedof selfhood.Moreover,it is simply
falsethatwhatI can conceive,imagine,think,or evendescribeis necessar-
ilysomethingI can experienceper se.
Third,althoughBender'sappeals to intuition, mysticalinsight,Spino-
za's notionof particularsas manifestations of nature(2003, 434-5), or
Buddhistinspiredmeditation(2003, 436-7) mightbe compellingfor
someonealreadyconvincedthatso-callednondualistidentification with
nonhumannatureis possible,thesehardlysuffice as an argumentconvinc-
ing to the skepticwho may not share the necessarypresuppositionsor
traditions.Here too, then,Bender'saccountis unconvincing - theethical
normhe derivesfromit (amongothers),"Formone bodywithall beings!"
is likelyto be mystifyingto anyoneunconvincedwe can makethisleap of
faithfromcenteredness to "one body" or (as the moral dictumrequires)
fromthe"I" of subject-objectdualismto thedisavowalof mybody.

36 ethic^

This content downloaded from 62.122.76.78 on Mon, 23 Jun 2014 14:41:32 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 Moreover,ifI am rightthatthereare good reasonsto takethespecifi-
cally embodiedconfiguration of capacitiesand limitationsthatdescribe
humanbeingseriously, no such dissociationfrom"I" is possible- in fact,
it intimatespreciselyth^ dualismBenderrejects.However deep myfeel-
affectionate
ings(spiritualsensibilities, sentiments, desiresto connect)go
withrespectto myappreciationofnaturalobjectsand phenomena,I none-
thelessremainat thecenterof myembodiedconsciousness - and cannot
be/dootherwise.Hence, one more versionof the ecocentrist'sdilemma:
the dissociationof selfdemandedby the moral maxim"formone body
withall things"assumesthatI can dissociatemyconsciousnessfrommy
body- whatelse to call thisbut dualism}The notionthatI could dissoci-
ate myselfwithoutdissociatingmyselffrommysituatedbody to be "one
withall things"is comprehensible only if I am not (at least essentially)
mybody,but rathera consciousnessthat,even if not fullyindependent,
is capable of notmerelyconceivingbutexperiencing "my" bodyas some-
thingotherthanbound by myown skin,thatis, as not mybody.Hence I
mustbe dual- a "mind"that,in virtueof itscapacityto emptyitselfof its
"substantiveselfhood,"is merelyin a dissociablebody.
No doubt, Benderwould findthis objection to his view onerous.
However,when he advises us to tryto expand our selves through,for
example,meditationor to encompassan ever-wider set of relationswith
and to humanand nonhumanothers(2003, 423-4), is hardto see how
it
hisview does not fitthedualistshoe. He writesthat
overtime,shouldtransform
"[s]ucha practice, yoursenseof who
youare as youdiscover youare nottheseparateskin-encapsulated
individualyou once thoughtyou were,butthatyou belongto all
otherlivingbeings,and thatotherbeingsare notreallyother, and
thatyouyourself are notreallythecenterof concern." (2003,424,
myemphasis)
-
Again,BenderconfuseswhatI can conceivewithwhatI can experience
I can conceivemyselfas "not the centerof concern,"but not an iota of
thismoralrecognitioneitherrequiresor makespossiblean experienceof
myselfas anythingotherthan"skinencapsulated."Benderhasn't,moreo-
ver,theluxuryof tradingin his metaphysical commitments fortheoption
that he's speaking"merely"phenomenologically or metaphorically.For
neithertheenvironmental pragmatist, who would likelydeny the need to
a
undertakesuch practice in order to have a stakein thefuture of human

~ ****
m^'^Nm^ RESTORINGHUMAN-CENTEREDNESS 37

This content downloaded from 62.122.76.78 on Mon, 23 Jun 2014 14:41:32 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 northosewhoengagein suchpractices
consciousness, withouta smidg-
eonoftheenvironmental
activism
Benderhopeswillfollow,
arelikelyto
be movedbyanything
butan argument
fornondualism- andthisBender
doesnotprovide.

RALPHACAMPORA'S "ENCAPSULATES OF CORPOREALITY '

Atleastsuperficially, RalphAcampora's response to theecocentrist's
dilemma seemsto escapetheimplicit dualismofBender's approach.Tak-
ingup ThomasNagel'santi-reductionist challenge in"Whatis it Liketo
Be a Bat?"(1974,435-50).4Acamporaaskswhether "a phenomenology
of bodilybeingcan establishlifeworldly residence as a similitude suffi-
cientto crossspeciateddifferences" (1999, 119). That is,can conditions
characterizing experiential or bodilyplaceorresidence providean avenue
forcomingto knowanotherorganism's "lifeworld" as thatother(1999,
118)? Acamporathinksso. Appealingto David Abram'sadaptationof
MauriceMerleau-Ponty's concept"fleshoftheworld,"Acamporaargues
thatbecausethebodilyexperience ofresidence canremind us ofourexis-
tentialdependence andvulnerability, italsodiscloses the"organismic con-
sanguinity," in other words, the intimate relationship between ourselves
and others(1999, 122). He remarks that"[w]orld-flesh... constitutesa
thoughtscape and lifeworld broad to
enough incorporate conceptually
andexperientially transpecific incarnality,"thatis,a communicable sense
ofembodied dependence suchthat"theflesh-of-the worldbecomesmani-
festlyearth-as-home" (1999,122-3).Then,within earth-as-home, itseems
possible,arguesAcampora, to gainsometraction withrespect to whatit
might be liketo be (orat leastbe with),say,thebat- at leastthisappears
to be whatAcamporameansinhisreference to"similitude."
IfAcamporais correct, "[h]umanbeings... can be envisioned materi-
allyas epidermal encapsulates ofcorporeality.The convivial challengeis
tointerpret theskin-boundary notas an impermeable barrier butas a sur-
faceofcontact"(1999,123),thatis,as something we notonlysharewith
otherlifeforms - namely, penetrable physicality locatedon theverysur-
faceofourskin- butcan experience transpecifically,or as a "fleshofthe
world"irrespective ofourparticularity. OfcourseAcamporais right that
skinis permeable. Fromthisfact,however, nothing necessarily follows
formyexperience of myself as encapsulated - as "I"- otherthanthatI
am indeedas physically vulnerable as is thesurfaceof myskinporous,

38 EFfflS^ 14(1)2009

This content downloaded from 62.122.76.78 on Mon, 23 Jun 2014 14:41:32 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
and thatthisis trueof otherspecies of creatureas well. That's it. Cer-
tainlynothingfollowsthatimpliesthe metaphysicalweightof "transpe-
cificincarnality."That Acamporaassumesthatbeingable to conceiveof
physicality penetrableimpliesbeingable to, say,experiencetheworld
as
as transpecificcommitshimto Bender'sfatalerror - itis one thingto envi-
sion (conceive)oneselfas an "encapsulateof corporeality," but it is quite
anotherto experienceoneselfas such. I can perfectly well conceiveof
- -
myselfas thisspatiallylocated residenced "encapsulate,"but in order
to experiencemyselfthroughthisconceptI need to be able to "step out-
side" or objectifythe very"skin-boundary" thatinformsmyexperience
per se. In otherwords, I must disavow
effectively myselfvia theadoption
of a conceptof my"self"as "encapsulate"or "contactsurface"- I must
knowinglydissociatemy selffrom"my" "self."Contraryto Acampora,
then,the"convivialchallenge"is not"to interpret theskin-boundary as a
surfaceof contact."To accomplishthisI mustalreadyhave objectified my
selfvia theconceptof "encapsulate."The convivialchallengeis whether
I can objectifymyselfqua encapsulate,and this,I suggest,cannotbe ac-
complishedwithoutimporting theverydualistbaggageAcamporarejects,
whichis to say it cannotbe accomplishedat all.
WhileAcamporadoesn'targueforit directly, like Benderhe appears
to assume that the adoption of more environmentally responsibleprac-
tices hingeson our being able to comprehendthe experienceof others
as expandedversionsof ourselvesas we come to be able to identify with
themvia "contactsurfaces."Hence it seems likelythat he equates cen-
terednesswithchauvinism - why else riskthe methodologicaldualism?5
Acamporainsiststhatwe embracethefactofourphysicaldependence,our
corporealityas residenceor home,and he seemsto assume thatonlyan
environmental borneof therightexperiencewillyieldadequate
sensibility
resolveforenvironmental activism.Butthisis clearlymistaken - I can em-
bracethefactof mycorporeality, surmiseit'sconnectedness to thatof oth-
ers,take thisseriouslyas a foundationforenvironmental responsibility,
and neverhave theexperienceseitherhe or Benderlean on so heavilyto
groundthatresponsibility. In fact,suchexperiencecould be impossiblefor
me evenifitwerepossibleforothersdue to,say,congenitalquadriplegias.
Butthisdoes notimplythatI can't thinkmyway throughto environmen-
tal activism,and, ifI'm rightabout human-centeredness, thisavenuejust
- -
mightbe morepromising and moreinclusive anyways.

-
J^~™^£L£E RESTORINGHUMAN-CENTEREDNESS 39

This content downloaded from 62.122.76.78 on Mon, 23 Jun 2014 14:41:32 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 Acampora and Bendermightrespondthatwe should take it at face
value that theyhave had the validatingexperiencesto which theylay
claim. "Who are you,"theymightask, "to denythatone might,say,via
meditationor otherspiritually orientedpractices,have theexperienceof
self-expansion?"However, this objectionfails despiteits emotionalap-
peal. That I can feelmyself"expanded"or "in touch"or "one with"natu-
ral objectsand phenomenais notevidencebyitselfthatI am so expanded,
etc.withthem- afterall, I can producethisexperiencethroughtheuse of
psychotropic drugs,butthatwould hardlyqualifyit as evidencethatsuch
an experiencehas metaphysicalcredentials.Moreover,it leaves out all
those(like thequadriplegic)who, havingno or radicallydifferent a con-
ception and experienceof embodiment - may have neitheraccess nor even
concept of such an expansion.Theymightcontinue, "Not everyinsightis
theproductof logical reasoning."True,but forthosedestinedto serveas
the basis of as radicala self-disavowalas thatstipulatedby ecocentrism,
we are surelyjustifiedin demandingsomethingmorethanan assertionof
experience.
Acampora and Bender could also object that such an expansion
doesn'trequirea disavowal of selfand henceis not necessarilydualistic
at all. But thistoo failsin that (1) the disavowal of the selfis centralto
ecocentricethicspreciselybecausetheselfis identified witha centeredness
mistakenly coded as chauvinistic bythe ecocentrist; ecocentrist
the cannot
renegeherewithoutgivingup theverygroundsupon whichhe/shecriti-
cizes human-centeredness - howevermistakentheymay be about it. (2)
Whiletheymightrejectthelogic of self/other altogetherin favorof some
experientially grounded"oneness,"thisdoesn'tget us veryfar.Afterall,
we could no moreobviouslyenvisiona practicableenvironmental respon-
sibilityfollowingfromthe pacifismthis impliesthan fromthe activism
Benderand Acampora hope for.Moreover,it simplyexcludes all of us
whose experiencedoes not"achieve" or conformto it. (3) BothAcampo-
ra's and Bender'sargumentsare- denial notwithstanding - implicitly du-
alistic,and thusinevitablyrunagroundon Cartesian-style shoals forthe
reasonsI've offered.Alternativeinterpretations of theexpansive"I" fare
littlebetter- an "I" thatappropriatestheotherintoitselfis hardlya rejec-
tionof chauvinismand a completedissociationof selffacestheproblems
in (2). The real problem,I think,is thatBenderand Acamporasimplyfail
to take seriouslyenoughthe meaningof theembodimentor "encapsula-

40 ETHICS &THE ENVIRONMENT,14(1)2009

This content downloaded from 62.122.76.78 on Mon, 23 Jun 2014 14:41:32 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
tion"to whichtheythemselves appeal- iftheydid,theywouldsee that
human-centerednessis nottheenemyofenvironmental but
responsibility,
itsmostvitalally.

THE HETEROSEXUALISMOF ANTHROPOMORPHIZING

LANGUAGEUSE
Theright response to theEcocentrist's dilemma is to simply cutwhat
is reallyjusta chimerical Gordianknotby severing centeredness from
chauvinism, a taskmadesimplewhenwe realizethattheformer does
not,infact,implythelatter. So why,then,havemoreenvironmental phi-
losophers nottakenthiscourse?I thinkpartoftheanswerlayin taking
toolittleseriously - despiteprotestations tothecontrary - thespecifically
embodied, and
raced,sexed,gendered, epistemically situated configura-
tionofcapacitiesand limitations we reallyare.It is one thingto assert
ourphysical "encapsulation," butquiteanotherto exploreof whatthis
consists- especially in lightof thesocialand politicalinstitutions that
inform specifically human experience.Ironically,what the ecocentristfails
to adequately appreciate is preciselywhatecofeminists havelongrecog-
nized,namely, the extent to which our physical dependency informs our
veryexperience ofthe world not as
merely corporeal, but as raced,sexed,
andgendered - thesetooforma crucialaspectofresidence or place.
Liberatedfromthistwo-headed bull,we are now in a positionto
craftbetter toolsforthecritique ofpractices andinstitutions thatconcern
environmental activistsacrossvirtually anyapproachnotcommitted to
ecocentrism (ecofeminism, environmental the
pragmatism, stewardship
movement). My aims,then,are to articulate a human-centered environ-
mentalconscience of
capable sustaining the activism we want without
wasting precious timeandenergy in theforlorn effortto deny human
our
experience. It includesan implicit sensibilityformatters of socialjustice
precisely becauseitsaim is to comprehend therelationship betweenen-
vironmental destruction; thehumaninstitutions responsible forsuchde-
struction; and theeffects on humanbeings,nonhuman, animals,and the
ecologicalsystems uponwhichweall depend.Suchan approachcanshow
thatmatters of socialjusticeare suchan intimate partofunderstanding
thecausesofenvironmental destructionthatanytheory thateschewsthe
former is likelyto distort itsevaluation of the latter.6
Taking,then,the
conceptof"liberation" as mypointof departure, mynexttaskis to ar-

WENDY
LYNNE
LEERESTORING
HUMAN-CENTEREDNESS41

This content downloaded from 62.122.76.78 on Mon, 23 Jun 2014 14:41:32 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 ticulatein justwhatsuch bettertoolsconsist,and whytheymakepossible
a moreeffective environmental activism.
To thisend, I'll brieflyexplorea practiceI take to be epistemicbed-
rock with respectto our relationshipto nonhumannature,namely,our
use ofanthropomorphizing languageto describeand explainthebehavior
of nonhumananimalsand things.My specificfocus,however,is on how
thatrelationship comesto be heterosexualized and genderedthroughsuch
linguisticpractices. The heterosexualizing of nonhuman nature,I suggest,
is notmerelya functionofanthropomorphizing, buta basic function, that
is, a functionwithoutwhichwe would experiencenonhumannaturein
substantially differentways.Whatwe discover,in fact,is thatsuchlinguis-
tic practicesare not onlygendered,but thattheyserveto naturalizeand
therebynormalizea heterosexist viewof thenonhumanworldwhichthen
reinforces asymmetrical divisionsof statusand powerreflected in institu-
tionslike church,family, and the military.7"Basic," then,does not imply
"determined"or "inevitable,"but rather"naturalized"in thatwhat is re-
flectedin our linguisticpractices- in anthropomorphizing especially- are
the specificways in whichhumanbeingshave institutionalized relation-
shipsof prerogativeand power.
To anthropomorphize is to treatnonhumanentitiesor systemsas if
they exhibited distinctivelyhuman qualities.Disney moviesmay be the
quintessential example.Dancingpenguins,talkingcars,and singingflow-
ers entertainus because theyare us- as penguins,cars,and flowers.Re-
gardlesswhetherthe object of our anthropomorphizing is a livingor a
nonlivingthing,an animatedcharacterfromHappy Feet (WarnerBroth-
ers 2006) or a nonhumananimal fromMarch of the Penguins(Warner
Brothers2005) what we attributeto themare qualitieswe recognizein
ourselves,for example,fear,desire,envy,empathy,temptation,sadness,
joy,and so on. As I have arguedelsewhere,anthropomorphizing a
fulfills
numberof valuablepurposes,especiallywithrespectto explainingbehav-
ior thatmightotherwiseremainobscure(1996). We speak usefullyof bee
"dances,""vicious" viruses,"industrious"ants,and the"desires"of flow-
ersto warmthemselvesin thesun- to say nothingof thehumanqualities
we attributeto our dogs and cats.
It's not, however,merelyin ordinarydiscoursethat anthropomor-
phizingplaysa valuable role,but in scientific discourseas well. Consider,
forexample,MeredithSmall'sdiscussionof cognitiveethologists'Mitani

*"*""** "
42 ETHICSlyTOEE^

This content downloaded from 62.122.76.78 on Mon, 23 Jun 2014 14:41:32 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
and Waters'explanationof chimpanzeehuntingbehaviorin "Sigma Chi
Chimpy:Forgetthe Ladies- For Chimps,Huntingis About Fraternity"
(2001).
MitaniandWatersfoundthatthenumber ofmalesinthe[Chimpan-
zee] group, not thepresenceof estrous bestpredicted
females, ac-
tivehunting. Males also sharedmeatmorewithone anotherthan
withanyfemale, givemesomeofyours
andtheydidso reciprocally:
and I'll giveyousomeof mine.Thosemaleswho routinely shared
thespoilsalso formed in otherarenas;theygroomed
partnerships
oneanother moreoftenandaidedoneanother infights.
Chimpanzee
hunting is notaboutusingscarceand valuableresources to attract
females, Mitanisaysit'saboutusingthisresource to formand build
allianceswithothermales.(2001,26,myemphasis)
Whatevertheactual cognitivecapacitiesof our nearestprimaterelatives,
Mitaniand Waters'use of anthropomorphizing languagehelpsshed light
on the behaviorof huntingmales. "Give me some of yoursand I'll give
you some of mine"attributescognitivestates(not to mentionlinguistic
capacities)to animalswho mayor maynot have them,but whetherthey
as Daniel Dennett
do is beside the point since the statesare attributed,
puts it "as if" (1987, 14-35).
It can be,in otherwords,explanatorily - evenin somescientific
useful
contexts - to anthropomorphize, to adopt what Dennettcalls an "inten-
tionalstance,"so longas we remainclearabout its"as if"disclaimer, and
so long as we treatquestions about whether some species of nonhuman
animals(or eventhingslikewall thermometers) reallyhave such statesas
distinctfromthoseabout whatmakesforthecontentofgood- usefuland
predictive - explanation.As Dennettputsit:
Here'showit works:first youdecideto treattheobjectwhosebe-
agent;thenyoufigure
as a rational
havioris to be predicted outwhat
thatagentoughtto have,givenitsplacein theworldand its
beliefs
purpose.Thenyoufigure out whatdesiresit oughtto haveon the
sameconsiderations, and finallyyoupredict thatthisrationalagent
willactto furtheritsgoalsinlightofitsbeliefs.
(1987,17)
The key phraseformy purposeshere is "what beliefsthatagent ought
to have, givenits place and purpose in the world." Considerthe chim-
panzees.Theremay be moreto what appears explanatorilyusefulin this
passage than what may in fact be so in that what seems to shed light

This content downloaded from 62.122.76.78 on Mon, 23 Jun 2014 14:41:32 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 on male chimpanzeebehaviordepends on our assumptionsabout rela-
tionshipsamong them.It depends,thatis, on what beliefswe thinkthey
oughtto have. But what we discoverwhenwe examinethepassage more
closelyis thatwhat governshow we ascribebeliefsto the chimpanzees
are our beliefsabout what humanrelationshipsoughtto be like- in this
case, composed of "ladies," presumablygentlemen, and heterosexual.In
otherwords,ifwe findMitani and Waters'explanationuseful,it may be
becausewe identify withthepresuppositions reflected in thearticle'stitle,
-
"Sigma Chi Chimpy:Forgetthe Ladies For Chimps,Huntingis About
Fraternity."Note thatI'm not suggesting thatMitaniand Waters'provide
a poor explanationor poor science,what I am suggestingis thatit may
not be possible to determinewhethertheyoffergood accountsof, say,
male Chimpanzeebehaviorwithoutgaininga moreperspicuousview of
whatit meansto attributebeliefsthatsomethingoughtto have.
My viewis thatifwe peel back theoutermostlayerof this"ought"-
just as ifwe peel back theoutermostlayerof what'scontainedin "chau-
vinism"- we will discoverthatwe genderand heterosexualize in thevery
course of assigninghuman characteristicsto nonhumananimals and
thingspreciselybecause theseare thecharacteristics we implicitlyregard
as themostbasic and "normal"in humanbeings.Takenforgranted,these
are the qualitieswe expect to experiencein our observationsand inter-
actionswith nonhumanbeings,hence it's hardlysurprisingthatwe do.
Amongtheobjectivesof any persuasivefeminist theoryhas been to offer
an accountof how gender,race,and sexual identity have come to be con-
structed, who benefits,and at the expenseof whose labor.While it's not
my aim to recapitulatetheseaccounts,theirrelevanceto environmental
philosophyis clear: anthropomorphizing does not occur in an historical
vacuum, but within very rich and specificsocial and politicalcontexts,
thatis,withinotherwiseinnocuoussoundingphraseslike"givenitsgoals
and place in theworld."
FeministtheoristEmilyMartin'sdiscussionof theways in whichthe
interactionof egg and spermis describedin popular and scientific litera-
tureregardingreproductive biology offers
another useful example. Look-
ingspecificallyto scientific
language,she writes:
Take the egg and the sperm.It is remarkablehow "femininely" the
egg behaves and how "masculinely"the sperm.The egg is seen as
largeand passive.It does notmoveor journey,butpassively"is trans-

44 ETM^^

This content downloaded from 62.122.76.78 on Mon, 23 Jun 2014 14:41:32 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 ported," oreven"drifts"
"is swept," tube.In utter
alongthefallopian
contrast,spermaresmall,"streamlined," andinvariably
active.They
"deliver"theirgenesto theegg,"activatethedevelopmental
program
oftheegg,"and havea velocity thatis oftenremarkedupon.Their
tailsare"strong"andefficiently
powered. Togetherwiththeforcesof
ejaculation,theycan "propelthesemenintothedeepestrecessesof
thevagina.(1999,181-2)
It's hard to imagineeven FrancisBacon more thoroughly anthropomor-
phizingegg and sperm, but the
key addressing questionwhethersuch
to
anthropomorphizing is useful is gaininga clear view of the presupposi-
tionsnaturalizedin it.As Martinputsit,"That thesestereotypes are now
beingwrittenin at the level of the cell constitutes
a powerful move to
make themseemso naturalas to be beyondalteration"(1999, 186).
Examplessuchas Martin'ssuggestthatthegendering and heterosexu-
alizingof naturalphenomenaoperatesnotonlynormatively, butepistemi-
cally,that is, not merelyat the level of how some may think thingsought
to be, butat thelevelof how we thinkthingsare. Naturalizedin thevery
languagewe taketo presentus an objectiveviewof theworld,namely,sci-
entificlanguage,such descriptionseffectively normalizea view of nature
"her"selfthatwhilecertainly chauvinistic withrespectto itsimagesofag-
gressionand dominationwould not be adequatelyaccountedforwithout
an explanationof itsgenderedand heterosexist character.
For Martin,the importof anthropomorphizing and heterosexual-
izing something as fundamental as reproductive biologycannot be
cell
overestimated:
Endowing eggandspermwithintentional action,a keyaspectofper-
sonhoodinourculture, laysthefoundation forthepointofviability
beingpushed back to themoment of Thiswilllikely
fertilization. lead
togreater technologicaldevelopments andnewforms ofscrutinyand
manipulation, forthebenefitofthoseinner"persons":court-ordered
restrictionson a pregnantwoman'sactivitiesin orderto protecther
fetal
fetus, surgery, and
amniocentesis, rescinding ofabortionrights,
to namebuta fewexamples....Morecrucial, then,thanwhatkinds
ofpersonalities we bestowon cellsis theveryfactthatwe aredoing
itat all.Thisprocesscouldultimately havethemostdisturbing social
consequences. (1999,186)
Insofaras the kindsof personalitieswe bestowon cells is modeledafter
inequitablesocial relationships(and vice versa),it is no wonderthatthe

~~ - - -- -
jhtsJ^^ 45

This content downloaded from 62.122.76.78 on Mon, 23 Jun 2014 14:41:32 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 lattercontinueto be solicitedto justifynot onlythemale,but thewhite,
capitalist,Western,industrialized associatedwithen-
exploitationrightly
vironmental destructionand resourceexhaustion.

RESTORING HUMAN-CENTEREDNESSTO ENVIRONMENTAL

CONSCIENCE
The critiqueof theheterosexualizing functionofanthropomorphizing
language is vital to the ongoingstruggleto resistsexism,heterosexism,
and all otherformsof oppression.8It can show us notonlyone basic way
thatinstitutions and practiceswhichprivilegeand reinforcesexismand
heterosexualism become definedas normative,but how heterosexualism
itselfhas become a naturalizedfeatureof our expectations,of our epis-
temicand linguisticsituations(our "place and purpose in the world"),
and thus of the ways in which we experienceourselvesas perceiving,
"residenced,"embodied beings.It is no wonder that the ecocentristin-
terpretsas chauvinistichumanactionscharacterizedby theiroppressive
consequences - whatecofeminist critiquesshows,however,is thatoppres-
sion itselfis governednot only by human privilege,but by the sexed,
raced, and heterosexualizedepistemicconditionsof human experience
and language.
What analyseslike Martin'sshow is that,even at a levelof descrip-
tiontakento be objectivelytestable,not onlychauvinistic, butheterosex-
ist constructions of the "real" come to be understoodas a reflection of
nature"her" self.It is unsurprising, then,that the ecocentristmistakes
chauvinismforhuman-centeredness per se. Failingto recognizethe pri-
marilywhite,male, and Western face of chauvinism,it mattersless to the
ecocentristhow humaninstitutions becomeimplicatedin environmental
destruction, only thattheydo- yetthisis preciselywhat invitesthe de-
terminism thatjeopardizestheecocentrist approach.This lacuna is made
poignantlyclear in Bender'sdiscussionof ecofeminism where,although
he rightlycreditsKaren J. Warren'sinsightthat dualismsof mind and
body,male and female,humanand animal,civilizationand naturesolicit
oppression(2003, 364-5), he nevertheless erectsa falsedichotomyof his
own bypittingecofeminism's concernforsocial justiceagainsttheecocen-
trist'spreoccupationwithavoidingecocide (2003, 365-70).
By insistingthat the only way to escape ecocide is to disavow pre-
ciselythat which women have been systematically denied for virtually

46 ElTfflCS^^

This content downloaded from 62.122.76.78 on Mon, 23 Jun 2014 14:41:32 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
thewhole of humanhistory - theopportunity to experienceand develop
a humanly-centered self- Bendereffectively reproducesin ecocentrism
the male privilegehe otherwiseeschews.Who, afterall, is in a position
to disavow theirself-interest but those who have enjoyedthe material
opportunity to realize it? Who are theseif not primarilywhite,Western
men?As BrunoLatourputsit:"it is simplya matterof askingthemilitant
ecologiststo stop being so naive as to believethat theyare defending,
undercoverof nature,somethingotherthana particularviewpoint,that
of Westerners. When theyspeak of puttingan end to anthropocentrism,
they manifest theirown ethnocentrism" (2002, 32).
That male privilegeis builtinto Bender'sview is not surprising - it
follows from theconflation of human-centeredness with human chauvin-
ism,all the whilefailingto registerthe significance of the historicalfact
thatthe"lion's share"of environmental destructionhas been sponsored,
financed, and wroughtbymen(punintended).The centralpoint,however,
is thatthiscriticism appliesto anyecocentricperspective: First,philosoph-
ically- because the best arguments for ecocentrism turn out to be ques-
tion-begging. And second, practically - because the failure to recognize
thathumanchauvinismassumesa prerogativeenjoyedprimarily by men
risksthe reproductionof futureoppression, even in an ecologicallysus-
tainable"utopia."In short,whereamongthemostforesightful versionsof
ecocentrism, Bender'sand Acampora's,failto lay down thewelcomemat
forwomen- particularly - ecocentrism
feminists is in trouble.
That ecological feministsmightrespond to Bender'smoral axiom
"formone bodywithall beings"withincredulity in theface of a history
ofoppressionalso makesMartin'spointall themorecompelling - thatwe
anthropomorphize the actionsof cells at all raises the firstquestionwith
respectto who benefitsfromthe use of the intentional stance. In other
words,humanchauvinismis not about humanbenefitper se, but about
who benefits.Heterosexualistanthropomorphizing simplyreinforcesa
constructionof "who" that guaranteessuch benefitsto those identified
not as passiverecipient"eggs,"but as activeand deliberate"sperms."
Dennett,however,is also correct - thereremainsan importantplace
in the explanationof behavior,includingscientificexplanation,for at-
tributing humancharacteristics to nonhumananimalsand things.In fact,
it is hard to imaginethe scienceswithoutthe powerfulexplanatorytool
providedby this"as if."It is, however,at theveryjunctureof the "as if"

__ __,__
WENDY LYNNe7eE™J^^ 47

This content downloaded from 62.122.76.78 on Mon, 23 Jun 2014 14:41:32 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 thatthecruciallinkbetweenenvironmental responsibilityand social jus-
ticeis forged.Why?Becausethemomentwe treatsomething as ifshe/he/it
exhibitedhuman qualities,we have alreadygenderedand heterosexual-
ized her/him/it via thenormsnaturalizedbyour "formsof life."This is so
not becausewe cannotdo otherwise,but becausetheuse of genderedand
heterosexualizing languageis basic to theways in whichwe experiencea
world whose most fundamentalinstitutions - family,government, mili-
tary,capitalistenterprise, -
and religion remaindominatedby thosemen
who promotetheirideologiesand are responsibleforthe ongoingcorn-
modification and exploitationof women,nonhumananimals,indigenous
peoples, and the environment.
The "how,"then,of therole of humaninstitutions mattersto thede-
velopment of an environmental conscience precisely because theseinsti-
tutionscould have evolveddifferently, because theyare changeable- the
essentialingredientin both environmental activismand the strugglefor
social justice.Human-centeredness is not necessarilychauvinistic- and if
itis,eventhosewho have benefited fromitwillultimately come to pay the
price that so many othershave paid already,namely, in the ecocide that
continuing environmental abuse will generate.Coming then,as Ludwig
Wittgenstein might have put it, to a more perspicuousunderstanding of
the role of anthropomorphizing languagein our "formsof life"supplies
us with a key tool toward developingthe only consciencethat stands
any hope of deliveringus to a futureforhumanconsciousness,thatis, a
futurecenteredon the responsibility only humanbeingscan take (1953,
para.19).

NOTES
1. An excellentexample of the global natureof thisconcernis epitomizedin
thedebutof thecyberspaceconference, Eco-Res: FromAnthropocentrism to
Ecocentrism:Making the Shift.Includingover 700 participants, and eight-
een expertpanelistsfromat least eightycountries,the conferencespanned
two fullweeks of intensediscussionfromApril 14-30, 2007. I would like
to thankparticipantsTony Knight,Ronnie Hawkins,Mary Leysei;Robert
Kirkwood,Fred Bender,Ralph Acampora,and Mary Lou Finlay for their
remarks,and I would liketo thankTed Mosquin and PatrickCurry
insightful
forhelpingme to sharpenand clarifymyarguments.See: http://www.eco-res
.org/shift_econf.html.
2. Thereis considerabledebate among environmental philosophersabout how
we oughtto referto human-centeredness. I, forexample,have arguedelse-

48 ETHldT<&^^ 14(1)2009

This content downloaded from 62.122.76.78 on Mon, 23 Jun 2014 14:41:32 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 wherethatwe make a fundamentalmistakewhenwe referto anthropocen-
trismas ifit meantthesame thingas humanchauvinism.I thinkthatit does
not,and thatwe would do thecause of environmental conservationand res-
torationa servicebyreclaimingand revaluing"anthropocentrism" to referto
a human-centeredness afterthe fashionI have arguedhere.However,as this
debate is not the focusof the presentpaper,I have opted to refersimplyto
uhuman-centeredness "
throughout.For myargumentconcerningthisrecla-
mation,please see Lee 2006, 2007, 2008a, and 2008b.
3. For an exampleof a relatedargumentabout the situatednessof self-referen-
tialtermssuchas "I," please see Lee 1992.
4. For a ratherdifferent, but still phenomenologically orientedapproach to
Nagel's anti-reductionism, see Lee 1992.
5. For a relatedversionof thiscriticism, see Lee 1998.
6. Among these issues are included,for example,the view that ecofeminists
prioritizeissues of economicjusticeat the expenseof the possible environ-
mentalrepercussions of economicinitiatives. Anotheris thecriticism,
leveled
by ecofeminists, that measuresadvocated by at least some deep ecologists
(forexampleSessions(1995) and Fox (1995)) to controlhumanpopulation
growthare implicitly ifnot explicitlyoppressiveand infringe upon women's
to
right reproductive freedom. For a fulleraccount see Cuomo 1994. While,
it mustbe said, increasinghumanpopulationcertainlyis a seriousissue,my
view is thatit cannotbe usefullyaddressedoutsidethemanyotherissuesto
whichit is intimately connected,forexample,nonhumanspecieshabitatloss,
global climate change and its effectsof migrationpatternsof human and
nonhumanpopulations,theend ofcheap oil,war,thefactthatsome- prima-
rilyWestern - nationsare now experiencing negativepopulationgrowth,the
of
effects geneticengineering on food production,and theperennialissue of
theavailabilityversusthedistribution justto name a few.
of food stuffs,
7. Many ecofeminists have,of course,contributedto demonstrating thesecon-
nections.Justa fewof theseincludeKarenJ.Warren,Val Plumwood,Greta
Gaard, Vandana Shiva, Ronnie Hawkins, and Carol Adams. My aim is to
tetherthisvaluable workdirectlyto a human-centeredness thatoffersa po-
tentiallymorevibrantand cooperativeplatformto thepoliticalactivismthat
ideallyaccompaniestheseexcellentcritiques.
8. For an ethnicity-relevant versionof thisargument,please see Lee 1999 and
2003.
SOURCES
Acampora,Ralph. 1999. "BodilyBeingand AnimalWorld:Towarda Somatology
of Cross-SpeciesCommunity." In Animal Others: On Ethics,Ontology,and
AnimalLife,ed. H. PeterSteeves,117-131. New York:SUNY Press.
Bender,FredericL. 2003. The Culture of Extinction.New York: Humanity
Books.

'"
WENDYLYNNELEEREsfoS^ 49

This content downloaded from 62.122.76.78 on Mon, 23 Jun 2014 14:41:32 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 Cuomo, Christine J.1994. "Ecofeminism, Deep Ecology,and Human Population."
In Ecological Feminism,ed. KarenJ.Warren,88-105. New York: Routledge.
Dennett,Daniel. 1987. The IntentionalStance.Cambridge:MIT Press.
Dennett,Daniel. 1991. ConsciousnessExplained. Boston: Little,Brown, and
Company.
Fox, Warwick.1995. "The DeepEcology-Ecofeminism Debate and Its Parallels."
In Deep Ecologyforthe21stCentury:Readingson thePhilosophyand Practice
of theNew Environmentalism, ed. GeorgeSessions,269-289. London: Sham-
bala, 1995.
Hofstadter, Douglas R. 2000. "Analogyas the Core of Cognition."In The Best
AmericanScienceWriting:2000, ed. JamesGleickand JesseCohen, 116-144.
Boston:HoughtonMifflinCompany.
Lakoff,George,and Mark Johnson.1999. Philosophyin theFlesh:The Embodied
Mind and Its Challengeto WesternThought.New York: Basic Books.
Latour,Bruno.2004. Politicsof Nature.Cambridge:HarvardUniversity Press.
Lee-Lampshire, Wendy.1992. "Moral "I": The FeministSubjectand theGrammar
of Self-Reference." Hypatia 7(1): 34-51.
Lee-Lampshire,Wendy.1996. "Anthropomorphism withoutAnthropocentrism:
A Wittgensteinian EcofeministAlternativeto Deep Ecology."Ethics and the
Environment 1(2): 91-102.
Lee-Lampshire,Wendy.1998. "The FoundationWalls that are Carried by the
House: A Critiqueof the Povertyof StimulusThesis and a Wittgensteinian-
DennettianAlternative." The Journalof Mind and Behavior,19(2): 177-194.
Lee-Lampshire, Wendy. 1999. "The Sound of LittleHummingbird Wings:A Witt-
gensteinianInvestigation of Forms of Lifeas Formsof Power." FeministStud-
ies,25'(2): 409-426.
Lee, WendyLynne.2003. "But One Man Opens His SeeingEye: The Epistemic
UbiquityofAnthropomorphizing and itsImplicationsforConceptionsof Gen-
der,Race, and Sexual In
Identity." The GrammarofPolitics,ed. CressidaHeyes,
167-185. Ithaca,NY: CornellUniversity Press.
Lee,WendyLynne.2006. "On Ecologyand AestheticExperience:A FeministThe-
oryofValue and Praxis."Ethicsand theEnvironment 11(1): 21-41.
"
Lee,WendyLynne.2008. 'Who's My Special Beagle?'Anthropomorphizing, An-
thropocentrism, and Moral Responsibility," In WhatPhilosophyCan Tell Us
About Our Dogs, ed. SteveHales, 259-270. New York:Blackwell.
Lee, WendyLynne.2008. "Environmental PragmatismRevisited:Human-Cen-
teredness,Language,and the Futureof AestheticExperience,"Environmental
Philosophy5(1): 9-22.
Lee, WendyLynne.2007. "BewitchingWordsand Deep Confusions:Some Witt-
gensteinianTherapy for Hugh McDonald's EnvironmentalPragmatism"In
The Philosophyof Pragmatism:Salient Inquiries.Proceedings:University of
Cluj-Napoca, Romania.

50 ETHICS & THE ENVIRONMENT 14(1)2009

This content downloaded from 62.122.76.78 on Mon, 23 Jun 2014 14:41:32 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
Martin,Emily.1999. "The Egg and the Sperm:How ScienceHas Constructeda
Romancebased on Stereotypical Male-FemaleRoles." In FeministTheoryand
the Body: A Reader, ed. JanetPrice and MargritShildrick,179-189. Edin-
burgh:EdinburghUniversity Press.
Nagel, Thomas. 1974. "What Is It Like to Be a Bat?" PhilosophicalReview 83:
435-50.
Norton,Bryan.2003. "EnvironmentalEthicsand Weak Anthropocentrism." In
EnvironmentalEthics,ed. AndrewLightand Holmes Rolston III, 163-174.
New York:Blackwell.
Ripley'sBelieveit or Not. www.ripleys.com.
Sessions,George.1995. "Ecocentrismand theAnthropocentric Detour."In Deep
Ecologyforthe21stCentury:Readingson thePhilosophyand Practiceof the
New Environmentalist*!, ed. GeorgeSessions,156-183. London: Shambala.
Small, Meredith F. 2001. "Sigma Chi Chimpy:Forgetthe Ladies- For Chimps,
Hunting is About Fraternity." American,July26: 25-27.
Scientific
Wade, Nicholas. 2004, "In Click languages,an Echo or theTonguesor the An-
cients,"in The Best AmericanScience and Nature Writing:2004, ed. Steven
Pinker,191-194. New York:HoughtonMifflinCompany.
WarnerBrothers.2005 March of thePenguins,wip.warnerbros.com/marchofthe
penguins/.
WarnerBrothers.2006. Happy Feet,www2.warnerbros.com/happyfeet/.
Wittgenstein, Trans,and ed. G.E.M.
Ludwig. 1953. PhilosophicalInvestigations.
Anscombe,New York:Macmillan.

REStoTwngIIum
Ivendy'lynne'lee 51

This content downloaded from 62.122.76.78 on Mon, 23 Jun 2014 14:41:32 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions