Journal of Peacebuilding & Development

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Natural Resource Conflict Analysis Among

Pastoralists in Southern Ethiopia

Fekadu Beyene

To cite this article: Fekadu Beyene (2017) Natural Resource Conflict Analysis Among
Pastoralists in Southern Ethiopia, Journal of Peacebuilding & Development, 12:1, 19-33, DOI:
10.1080/15423166.2017.1284605

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NATURAL RESOURCE CONFLICT ANALYSIS
AMONG PASTORALISTS IN SOUTHERN
ETHIOPIA
FEKADU BEYENE

Abstract
This paper examines resource-related conflict among pastoralists in southern Ethiopia, specifi-
cally the Somali and Oromo ethnic groups. It applies theories of property rights, environmental
security and political ecology to discuss the complexity of the conflict, using narrative analysis
and conflict mapping. Results reveal that the conflict results from interrelated cultural, ecological
and political factors. The systems of governance, including the setting up of regions on an ethnic
basis and associated competition for land and control of water-points, have contributed to violent
conflict between the two ethnic groups. The creation of new administrative units (kebeles) close
to regional boundaries has exacerbated the conflict. Moreover, change in land use, prompted by
insecure property rights to communal land, rather than expected increase in economic benefits
has caused conflicts among the clans of the Oromo. The findings suggest Ethiopian authorities
support the functioning of traditional access options, successful operation of customary courts
and penalising opportunistic actors to address inter-ethnic conflicts. Applying land use and
administration guidelines and empowering customary authorities would reduce the incidence of
inter-clan conflict.

Keywords: conflict, pastoralism, resources, Somali, Oromo

Introduction
Ethiopia underwent political transformation in 1991, which was necessitated by the
desire to remove the then existing dictatorial socialist regime and to move toward democ-
racy. This transformation involved the creation of ethnic-based regional states. Pastoral-
ists inhabit the lowlands of Ethiopia, such as Afar, Somali, Southern Oromia, Gambella
and the Benishangul-Gumuz regional states, where different tribes shared grazing
resources in the 1960s and 1970s. However, resource-based conflict in these areas has
been intensifying since the 1990s due to demographic pressures, relative scarcity of graz-
ing resources, and environmental change. The formation of ethnic-based regional states
in Ethiopia in 1991 transformed the relationship between neighbouring ethnic groups,
which also include the Somali and Oromo pastoral societies, with regard to resource use
and cooperation. This process prompted Somali and Oromo pastoralists to give priority
to exclusive possession and control of wide grazing areas of the rangeland rather than
prioritising shared use of the resources (Aredo 2005; Reda 2016). A similar situation pre-
vails in eastern and north-eastern parts of Ethiopia where a shift in livelihood (from pas-
toralism to agro-pastoralism) has affected the patterns of land use and competition for
space, increasing the incidence of conflict (Unruh 2006; Hagmann & Mulugeta 2008). For
example, while agro-pastoralists (Oromo) tend to expand cultivated areas, pastoralists

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JOURNAL OF PEACEBUILDING & DEVELOPMENT, VOL. 12 NO. 1, 2017
© JOURNAL OF PEACEBUILDING & DEVELOPMENT
ISSN 1542 - 3166 PRINT/2165 - 7440 ONLINE
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15423166.2017.1284605
 JOURNAL OF PEACEBUILDING & DEVELOPMENT

(Somali) prefer having communal grazing land, and institutions governing both systems
do not accommodate different perspectives (Beyene 2009).

In southern Ethiopia, where pastoral groups differ along ethnic lines, conflict over graz-
ing resources (such as water and pasture) is often violent (Unruh 2006). Related stud-
ies among pastoralists in southern Ethiopia have overlooked changes in factors causing
conflict. Violent conflicts are triggered by different factors at different times in different
places (Reda 2016; Meier et al. 2007). The expansion of the formal administrative struc-
ture into pastoral areas (the formation of zones, districts and kebeles) since 1991 has com-
plicated pastoral relationships and prompted each pastoral group to control a specific
territory. The pre-existing cooperative relationships in the form of sharing grazing and
water resources have been declining. This phenomenon is undesirable as it affects the
livelihood security of pastoralists which for decades has been based on mobility and
communal resource use. Previous studies on resource-based conflict have overlooked
the complexity of the causes and how they vary across pastoral groups (Hagmann &
Mulugeta 2008). This paper intends to fill such a gap and answer the question: how has
ethnic-based federalism affected resource-based conflict among pastoralists in southern
Ethiopia?

Explaining Conflict: Theory and Empirics

Theoretical views

Three theoretical views help explain resource-based conflict. The first is property rights
theory (Alston et al. 1997; Demsetz 1967) which underlines that conflict is a result of
poorly defined and enforced property rights and not necessarily due to scarcity. The
second theory is environmental security which associates resource conflict with resource
scarcity, whether it is supply-induced (a resource is diminished faster than it is renewed),
demand-induced (due to demographic pressure), or a result of structural scarcity (ineq-
uitable distribution of resources) (Homer-Dixon 1994; Hauge & Ellingsen 1998). The
third theory is political ecology theory,
which emphasises the relationships among
The use of different theories in explaining
political, social and economic issues with
the causes of resource-based conflict is
respect to the wider environment (Green-
essential to improve understanding of berg & Park 1994). In contrast to the envi-
their causes and how to address them. ronmental security theory, political ecology
considers resource scarcity as well as abun-
dance as causes of conflict. Within political ecology theory, there are ‘greed and griev-
ance’ arguments. While ‘greed’ refers to engaging in violent conflict being motivated
by the need to accumulate wealth through taking away others’ resources, ‘grievance’
occurs when a certain group is systematically marginalised (e.g. from making political
decisions) by the prevailing policies and systems of governance (Le Billon 2001). In the
pastoral context, greed causes violent conflict as one intends to accumulate wealth by
raiding the livestock of others (Collier 2006). The use of different theories in explaining
the causes of resource-based conflict is essential to improve understanding of the causes
and how to address them.

However, studies indicate cases where resource scarcity does not always have a linear
relationship with conflict as long as good governance improves resource productiv-
ity (Homer-Dixon 2001). This is because good governance creates institutional means
to address scarcity either by redefining property rights to ensure equitable access to
resources or by improving the resource management systems. Therefore, the scarcity–

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 Natural Resource Conflict Analysis Among Pastoralists in Southern Ethiopia

conflict and abundance–conflict relationships do vary depending on the effectiveness

of governance. The relationship between natural resources and conflict is rather com-
plex and often unpredictable (Bhavnani 2009). For instance, quantitative analysis shows
that economic and political factors (inequality and little representation in political deci-
sions) have more predictive power than resource scarcity (Hauge & Ellingsen 1998).
For instance, having limited access to water-points for the pastoral herders can reduce
animal productivity with a significant reduction in income from livestock. The under-
lying reason for this limited access comes from political interventions that cause a shift
in administrative boundaries, and as a result pastoral groups that previously utilised a
particular water-point can no longer access it. The next sections provide empirical exam-
ples of causes of pastoral conflicts in Africa.

Review of causes of pastoral conflicts in Africa

The above theoretical views jointly explain the causes of pastoral conflicts in Africa. Like-
wise, empirical studies since the late 1990s have revealed the role of environmental scar-
city in escalating conflicts in pastoral areas. They also indicate that a reduction in peace
initiatives and the method of creating access options to resources have become causes of
instability (Meier et al. 2007). For instance, a change in the governance structure is one
of the factors that affect access options to grazing resources such as pasture and water
because the location of these resources is critical to peaceful access. If they are located at
the disputed boundary between pastoral groups where each group is trying to control
the area, there could be violence over resource uses (Reda 2016).

Resource variability in space and time can also be a source of conflict. While variability
in grazing resources in space is characteristic of pastoral ecological systems, the lack of
flexible institutional arrangements to permit the use of these resources by different pas-
toral groups is a cause of conflict. This conforms to the theory of environmental security
where structurally induced scarcity causes violence (Haro et al. 2004). In many pasto-
ral contexts, livelihood transition by herders towards farming by converting part of the
grazing lands into cultivated plots often generates violent conflict (Turner et al. 2011).
Where livelihood transition causes conflict, the state can play a key role in establishing
grazing reserves and introducing new land
Land conversion from grazing into crop reform to respond to incompatible land use
farming in pastoral areas inhibits herd (Thebaud & Batterbury 2001). The common
practice is that pastoral grazing areas that
mobility and is an important cause of
can be allocated to irrigated crop farming,
resource-based conflict.
where high value crops can be grown, are
held under private use rights. This is one
of the strategies that the Ethiopian government has considered to ensure food security
in the country. Nevertheless, irrigating more land for large-scale investment increases
the risk for the grazing commons to shrink, adding pressure on the remaining graz-
ing space (Shide 2005). There is no property rights security to the communal grazing
land for Ethiopian pastoralists, which poses a threat to their livelihood (Abdulahi 2007).
But privately used land is relatively secure since the Ethiopian government provides
land holding certificates which guarantee a pastoral household the right to use the land.
Consequently, insecurity of rights to communal land is the underlying grievance for the
pastoral communities (Beyene 2016). Land conversion from grazing into crop farming in
pastoral areas inhibits herd mobility and is an important cause of resource-based conflict.

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JOURNAL OF PEACEBUILDING & DEVELOPMENT

Figure 1: Location of the Study Sites

Source: Own sketch

Target Groups, Data Collection and Analysis

This study examines how the introduction of ethnic-based federalism in Ethiopia affected
the resource use relationship among neighbouring pastoral groups. In particular, it
explores how the formation of administrative boundaries and the change in the system
of governance and identity politics have developed new interests in territorial control
between ethnic groups and within clans. In connection with this, access to pastoral live-
lihood resources such as grazing land and water-points has been largely politicised,
resulting in conflict. The study was carried out in the Borana and Liben administrative
zones of southern and south-eastern Ethiopia in 2011. In each zone, there are a number
of socio-culturally distinguished pastoral groups based on clan and ethnicity. Two ethnic
groups, Oromo and Somali, live in Borana and Liben zones respectively. In Borana zone
which is located in Oromia National Regional State, there are two Oromo clans, known
as Borana and Gabra, which are neighbours to Guji (Figure 1). Whereas in Liben, which is
located in Somali National Regional State, there are two clans called Garri and Digodia.

The data collection involved 50 key informant interviews (10 from each clan) and 12
focus group discussions. The focus group size ranged between six and eight persons. The
respondents for the interviews were selected in consultation with customary authorities
(clan heads and village chiefs) from each ethnic group1 and zonal administration offices
of the two zones. The data collection took place between January and March 2011. To
address the research question indicated in the first section, data was collected on compe-
tition for grazing resources, territorial control, the pattern of conflict since 1991, conflict
between clans and ethnic groups, changes in land use and administration and the role
of conflict entrepreneurs in triggering disputes. A checklist was used for the focus group
discussions. It included causes of the conflicts with specific issues related to livestock

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 Natural Resource Conflict Analysis Among Pastoralists in Southern Ethiopia

raiding, the role of district administrators in territorial control and consequences, the
implicit role of the state-employed opportunistic actors, the position of the youth and
the diasporas as well as the change in public perception on the motivation and side
effects of territorial control. In addition to the above, five key informant interviews were
conducted with district level experts who play a role in monitoring events leading to
resource-based conflicts and participating in the mediation process. They are employ-
ees of the office called ‘Neighbouring Regions’ Affairs’ established in all administrative
regions where pastoralism is practised.

Data collected was analysed using historical narratives, which focused on the detailed
description of historical factors and how changes in these factors have gradually affected
relationships among different groups. The second method was the use of participatory
conflict mapping and ranking of causes of the conflict. It was conducted through the
active involvement of elders. The mapping exercise was used to enable participants from
the Somali and Oromo ethnic groups to reconstruct the chain of events and processes
during the different kinds of conflicts they have experienced. The exercise was used as a
methodological tool in order to identify the roles of the different actors in terms of initi-
ating and aggravating inter-ethnic and intra-ethnic conflicts. It helped as a tool in making
distinctions between their goals, positions and real interests. Subsequent to mapping,
the ranking of the identified causes was carried out based on discussion and consensus
rather than by simple voting in order to allow participants to reach a shared understand-
ing. The ranking exercise enabled elders to indicate the relative importance of different
conflict causes.

Levels of Pastoral Conflicts in Southern Ethiopia

Interviews and focus group discussions indicate that conflict among southern Ethiopian
pastoralists can be categorised into two levels — intra- and inter-ethnic. Intra-ethnic con-
flict occurs within an ethnic group due to overlapping interests.

Intra-ethnic violence

The formation of administration zones and districts in the process of creating an

­ethnic-based federal political system has transformed relationships among clans of the
Oromo ethnic group in terms of access to grazing resources and water-points. There
is violent conflict within the Oromo ethnic group. Among the Oromo, there are three
dominant clans in the study area, namely Borana (who also inhabit Northern Kenya),
Guji and Gabra. Discussions reveal that while the conflict was limited to Borana and
Guji two decades ago and the Gabra held a somewhat neutral position, the conflict has
become increasingly intense, involving the Gabra as well. At present, the Gabra occasion-
ally fight the Borana by forming coalitions with clans from the Somali within the Gabra
encampment falling under the same administrative structure. In this case, clans from
Somali ethnic groups fuel the conflict between the Borana and the Gabra. For instance,
the Garri clan of the Somali encourages the Gabra to fight against the Borana; meanwhile
the Gabra intends to have its own administrative unit within the Borana zone. Such inter-
est emerged from the impression that the Gabra clan does not have political recognition
and is not represented in the local system of governance, which is consistent with the
political ecology argument where the non-accommodative nature of the political system
has marginalised the clan. In light of this argument, a fair representation of the Gabra in
the local system of governance (for instance, by serving as head of the kebele administra-
tion) could remove the inherent grievance.

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JOURNAL OF PEACEBUILDING & DEVELOPMENT

Inter-ethnic violence

Ethnicity is the political architect of the prevailing democratic system of governance in

Ethiopia where regional administrative boundaries are based on ethnic identity. This
practice was totally new to the pastoral system. It has completely transformed the histor-
ically embedded cooperative resource use relationships into a more competitive one. As
a result, the Somali and Oromo pastoralists in southern Ethiopia have emphasised claims
over territory rather than maintaining long-existing cooperative relationships. The two
ethnic groups claim grazing areas in districts located at their boundary. The Digodia and
Garri clans of Somali fight the three Oromo clans. For example, during the referendum
on disputed administrative districts in 2005, there was frequent conflict: (1) between the
Guji clan of Oromo and the Digodia and Garri clans of the Somali in Guji zone; (2) in
Moyale district between the Digodia clan of Somali and the Gabra and Borana clans of
Oromo; and (3) between the Digodia and Garri of the Somali and the Borana in Arero
district in Borana zone. These conflicts are often caused by the clans’ competition for pro-
ductive land and their need to expand the area of their districts. Focus group discussions
reveal that they are not seasonal in pattern in response to pasture and water scarcity.
Rather, they are irregular and sudden. Elders’ comparison shows that inter-ethnic con-
flicts are more costly (loss of human lives and livestock) and frequent than intra-ethnic
conflicts. The key benefit in using mapping exercises for causal analysis is the possibility
to trace the weights of the causes. The subsequent sections present the causes of both
types of conflict, their respective importance and the relationship between the different
causes and actors involved in the conflict process.

General Causes of Conflict among Pastoralists

in Southern Ethiopia
The causes of conflict in the study area are many, complex and dynamic. Using insights
from discussions and interviews, the causes can be categorised as socio-cultural,
economic, institutional and political. Among the institutional and economic factors,
competing land use systems (grazing, farming, enclosing), where enclosing and farming
reduce the area of land available for communal grazing, contribute to the inter-clan and
inter-ethnic conflicts. The focus group discussions expose that over the last 30 years,
rangeland enclosure has been intensified among the Somali due to tenure insecurity
in the grazing commons and the development of grazing contracts. Key informant
interviews disclose that group enclosure for grazing by calves younger than a year has
become popular among the Oromo pastoralists, which in turn triggers conflict with other
ethnic groups if the latter intrude into the enclosed area. Within the Oromo clans, Guji
pastoralists enclose land for private use by a household either for farming or for grazing.
These cases reflect that the emerging land use systems that contradict the customary
communal land use systems generated structurally induced scarcity where equity is at
risk among different groups of pastoralists in southern Ethiopia (Reda 2016).

Insights from the discussion with elders indicate that socio-economic factors, such as
an increase in human population and a general increase in livestock population, have
increased pressure on the rangeland resources, causing scarcity, competition and even-
tually violence over access. However, this does not mean both grew at equal pace. For
instance, a study in the same area shows that the livestock population has increased more
gradually compared to human population owing to fluctuations caused by droughts and
infectious diseases (Desta & Coppock 2002). Violence also occurs as herders are required
to travel long distances to have access to more pastureland and in the process encounter

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 Natural Resource Conflict Analysis Among Pastoralists in Southern Ethiopia

competition and possible disagreement. Elders perceived that demographic pressure has
generated fierce competition over land and claims for private landholding within a vil-
lage. The expert interviews indicate that the increasing trend of legally recognising only
privately held land by the regional states is a driving force for this. Concurrently, political
changes, such as the creation of new administrative units (such as a new kebele), increase
the drive to control land. For instance, the drive to secure more land by a district admin-
istrator from a Somali clan by threatening the neighbouring district from Borana has
been a source of conflict. Elders indicated that this often occurs when the Ogaden Soma-
lis, or other Somali clans, settle close to the boundary of Borana zone, and then begin to
encroach further. The Borana pastoralists in turn retaliate or resist such an action. In this
process the internal competition for space to create new administrative units has become
the source of land-related disputes between pastoralists of different ethnic groups. For
example, a leader of a particular administrative unit (e.g. kebele or district) can mobilise
residents to claim additional land under the governance of the other administrative units
leading to new forms of disputes.

The general analysis provided here produces an important implication. The increase in
private use of land within a clan and the changing relationship between ethnic groups
indicate how political interest (by political elites) influences property rights changes, with
land being used less communally and moving toward more private landholdings. This
situation is consistent with the arguments of different scholars (Demsetz 1967; Alston
et al. 1997) which indicate that an increase in population, technological change and
greater resource scarcity will force property rights to change from communal to private.
Such a change is expected to motivate investment in the management of the resources
falling under private holdings. However, a lot of literature indicates that such a shift in
property rights cannot create a stable resource use system in an unpredictable environ-
ment (Thebaud & Batterbury 2001; Meier et al. 2007). This instability occurs as pastoral-
ists fail to satisfy livestock feed demand from a specified geographical space for all the
herd species they keep and rangeland productivity varies across locations.

Overall, changes in property rights and contests over territory are not attributed to eco-
nomic forces, but rather linked to inefficient systems of governance at the local level, as
each ethnic group is trying to expand its territorial control rather than creating a system of
sharing grazing resources. For instance, the Gabra clan has been requesting the regional
government to create its own zonal administration. Settlement of the Ogaden clan on the
Borana land by the federal government has created tension between Somali and Oromo
because the longer the Ogaden of Somali stay on the Borana territory, the greater the like-
lihood that they will claim permanent con-
trol of the land. Elders’ assessments reveal
Factors responsible for violent conflicts
that this phenomenon caused an increase
are highly interwoven and the endogenous
in the frequency and level of conflict over
movement towards private use of land is a the last 20 years. A further scrutiny of views
reflection of communal land insecurity. reveals that the process of democratisation
in the country has increased the freedom for
clans to express their own concerns and interests which has indirectly contributed to
the emergence of disputes over regional boundaries and within regions over territorial
claims among the clans. Interviewed experts recognise this outcome as part of the chal-
lenge in realising good governance. For example, the Gabra clan of the Oromo raised the
question of having an independent administrative unit when the Borana clan had been
designated a zone as ‘Borana zone’. Factors responsible for violent conflicts are highly
interwoven and the endogenous movement towards private use of land is a reflection of
communal land insecurity.

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 JOURNAL OF PEACEBUILDING & DEVELOPMENT

Conflict Mapping
Interviews with elders were used to conduct conflict mapping, which supported the
causal analysis. The purpose of conflict mapping is to undertake an in-depth analysis
of actors involved and their roles in conflict prevention and initiation. The mapping is
also useful in designing strategies for effective conflict resolution. The conflict map-
ping indicates the presence of grievances by Somalia over Ethiopia subsequent to
interstate border war until the late 1970s. During interviews, elders underlined that
cross-border relations are disrupted in connection with the presence of Ethiopian
forces in Somalia to fight terrorists. In this case, historical political relations between
the two countries influence local level conflict between Oromo and Somali, where the
past is connected to the present, which could also influence future relationships. Key
informants from the Borana clan stated that ‘we experienced intentional killing from
the Ethiopian Somali ethnic group that
often produces grievances and revenge’,
State intervention to resolve disputes in which massive violence follows, aggra-
over boundaries through referendums has vating the conflict. When the causes are
actually caused more territorial disputes disputes over land and territorial control,
to take place. the federal government conducts a ref-
erendum on the disputed territory at the
local level. But practice has shown that
resolving land-related conflict through a referendum has not ended violence because
the group which loses the referendum often takes revenge, attacking the other group.
For instance, Gofa and Galgalo Dimtu kebeles (lowest administrative units) that won
the referendum and opted to be administered under the Somali Regional State did
not experience lasting peace. Similar problems exist at the Guchi and Laga Sure kebe-
les that won the referendum to be administered under Oromia Regional State. These
kebeles still suffer from social unrest and greater instability due to the presence of
water-points at the boundary. A related study shows that claims by neighbouring
groups over the Borana land in connection with the referendum has increased ten-
sions at water-points because each group is trying to control the water-points (Reda
2016). State intervention to resolve disputes over boundaries through referendums
has actually caused more territorial disputes to take place.

Participatory mapping and ranking

The outcome of the mapping exercise shows that while pastoralists from the Oromo
ethnic group recognise the youth as aggravators of the conflict, the Somali ethnic group
considers youngsters, local leaders (elders, clan heads), opportunistic actors (state
employees, community members benefiting from violent conflict), traders (who contrib-
ute cash to purchase weapons) and diasporas (sending remittance) as aggravators of
conflicts. The discussions reveal that those who orchestrate conflict often are not victims
of violence but are beneficiaries from violence. Such hidden motives are often making
violent conflict less likely to end in the pastoral context. During the mapping exercise,
the Somali elders stated that ‘local leaders communicate with traders and facilitate mobi-
lisation of funding from the diaspora to invest in weapons’, which affects the outcome
of the peacebuilding process negatively as accumulation of weapons triggers defections
from agreements. Somali elders stated that ‘Somali traders and diaspora recognise con-
tribution as a social obligation with which elders facilitate purchase of weapons and
recruitment of youngsters’ (Figure 2). This can contribute to the spread of violence in
pastoral areas, overshadowing the prospect for productive use of natural resources in
the rangelands.

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 Natural Resource Conflict Analysis Among Pastoralists in Southern Ethiopia

Figure 2: Relationship Mapping by Somali-Oromo Pastoral Groups

Map Key
Occasional conflict

Tense relationship
Precarious relationship
Ogaden Strong cooperation
Borana Financial support
Engage in fighting

Gabra

Garri

Traders Opportunistic
actors

Digodia
The youth
Guji
Diaspora

Elders of both ethnic groups indicated that the role of social capital (networks) in
conflict resource mobilisation is stronger among the Somali than the Oromo ethnic
group. Focus group discussions reveal that the main reason for this is the fact that
the Somali inhabit international borderlands extending from the south-east to the
north-eastern part of Ethiopia. The fact that the Somali ethnic groups live all over
four countries in the Horn (Djibouti, Somali, Kenya and eastern border of Ethiopia)
gives them an advantage in sharing information. As a result, there is proliferation of
firearms along the border.

Moreover, the result of the ranking exercise shows that access to pastoral livelihood
resources such as water and pasture was considered as the basic cause of inter-ethnic
violent conflicts. The rank order is indicated as follows: (1) uneven distribution of
water-points, (2) competition over grazing land, (3) increased drought frequency, (4)
boundary disputes, (5) livestock raid (or rustling), (6) raping women, (7) abduction
of women, (8) sudden killings and subsequent acts of revenge, (9) erosion of cultural
norms, (10) state undermining customary law, (11) expansion of rangeland enclosures,
(12) deforestation causing a scarcity in browsing resources, (13) increase in human and
livestock population, (14) expansion of crop farming (causing a reduction in grazing
space and increased competition on the remaining resource), (15) illegal access to and
accumulation of automatic weapons, (16) increased urbanisation (causing importing of
culturally unwanted practices), (17) increased poverty, (18) federalism and associated
boundary issues and (19) effort to form new kebeles.

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 JOURNAL OF PEACEBUILDING & DEVELOPMENT

The ranking exercise considered only the degree of importance of each cause without
referring to the level of conflict, that is, whether the conflict was inter-ethnic or intra-ethnic.
Later on, the elders categorised the causal factors on the basis of the level of conflict. While
pastoral herders perceived that abduction
The primary causes of violent conflict of women was only a cause of inter-clan
conflict, factors designated by numbers
in pastoral areas of southern Ethiopia
1, 2, 4, 11, 18 and 19 were considered as
are competition over grazing resources
exclusive causes of inter-ethnic conflict.
as mediated by politicisation of Elders from both ethnic groups considered
administrative boundaries. the majority of the factors (3, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 12,
13, 14, 15, 16 and 17) as causes of conflicts at
both levels. The primary causes of violent conflict in pastoral areas of southern Ethiopia
are competition over grazing resources as mediated by politicisation of administrative
boundaries.

Causal chains

Interestingly, the causal analysis using mapping and ranking was crucial to assess the
nested nature of the causes. For instance, livestock raiding is practised as a means of
intimidation, to access grazing resources by other groups of pastoralists. This occurs in
areas where there are disputes over grazing land. Focus group discussions reveal that
there is violence due to uneven distribution of water-points (where livestock watering
takes place). As water-points are economically important resources for the pastoralists,
there is motivation to control them. This is particularly the case when the water-points
are located at the disputed boundaries. Such competition is an indication not just of the
scarcity but also of the expectation that more water-points could be controlled through
territorial expansion, as predicted by the greed argument (Figure 3). For example, ancient
deep wells located at the border between Garri and Borana have become a source of con-
flict, although these wells were shared among members of both groups in the past.

There are several cause–effect relationships that can be identified from the causal analy-
sis. For example, deforestation was specified as a cause of conflict since pastoral house-
holds from one ethnic group cut trees from other ethnic groups’ grazing area for the
purpose of charcoal making, a practice that destroys herders’ grazing resources. Crop
farming and rangeland enclosures in disputed territory cause violent conflict where they
were used as a strategy for permanent claims to the land. Erosion of cultural norms
due to state influence has undermined the effectiveness of customary law in preventing
violence. For example, customary grazing resource sharing was replaced by a system
of border delineation by the government system in the process of expansion of the state
structure into pastoral areas (Figure 3). Livestock raiding is a consequence of violent

Figure 3: Causes and Consequences of Violent Conflict

Livestock Raid
Raping Women
Accumulation of Automatic Weapons
F Sudden killings and Subsequent Revenges
e
Increased Poverty
e
d
b
a Inter-ethnic Violent Conflict
c
k
Resource scarcity; competition
Erosion of culture norms, political factors
Enclosure expansion, Illegal access to weapons

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 Natural Resource Conflict Analysis Among Pastoralists in Southern Ethiopia

action as it involves the capturing of one’s animals by force, and it results in an increase
in poverty as more members of one group lose their livestock. Since raiding tends to
be a repeated action (raiding and counter-raiding), it is a cause and a consequence of
violence. This was commonly practised between the Garri and Borana. Although killing
results from violent conflict, the tendency to take revenge each time creates a new cycle
of conflict. While illegal access to automatic weapons motivates youngsters to take part
in violence to raid animals, the presence of violent conflict necessitates accumulation of
illegal weapons. Generating economic rent through violent forms of livestock raiding
has become an incentive for investing in conflict technologies, such as firearms, among
different ethnic groups (Unruh 2006).

The conflict mapping and ranking exercise as well as the causal chain analysis point to the
fact that resource-based conflicts between pastoral groups at intra-ethnic and inter-ethnic
levels conform to the theoretical views outlined in the second section of this paper. Political
ecology theory strongly explains the situation as it considers the interplay of environment,
political, economic and social factors (Greenberg & Park 1994) that affect the relationships
among clans and ethnic groups. In this context, political decisions in delineating boundaries
have affected the resource use arrangements (economic) and reconfigured the pre-existing
social relationships laying the foundation for conflict over resources.

From the ranking exercise, uneven distribution of water-points and competition over
grazing land have contributed to recurring violence subscribing to the environmental
scarcity theory (Homer-Dixon 1994). The delineation of the boundary compounded the
resource-based conflict. For instance, if we take a water-point at the disputed territory,
there is a greed element as each conflicting party intends to control the water-point by
excluding others. A reduction in water-points productivity due to the reducing pattern
in the amount of rainfall and overuse of the
The causes of violent conflicts are resource by pastoralists can be explained
dynamic and do not adhere to a specific by the environmental security theory. The
causes of the violent conflict are highly
pattern of relationships.
interwoven. The personal motives of the
opportunistic actors can easily disrupt
resource use relations between pastoral groups. For instance, as the mapping exercise
shows, the intention to create an administrative unit to control important resources in a
particular area can cause instability and violence. There is interconnectedness of causes
of violent conflict. In general, the empirical evidence here indicates that a single theory
cannot adequately explain the causes of the conflict. The causes of violent conflicts are
dynamic and do not adhere to a specific pattern of relationships.

Conclusions and Policy Implications

This paper aims to analyse how administrative changes affect resource-based conflict
among pastoral groups in southern Ethiopia. It delineates the various causes responsi-
ble for violent conflict. Analysis of the causes shows that no single theory explains the
phenomenon since changes in structural factors (political and land use patterns), demo-
graphic pressure and environmental scarcity increase the complexity of violent conflict.
This case has shown that it is hard to find a definite pathway in causal analysis as situ-
ations change constantly. The results of the study indicate that inter-ethnic conflict over
resources at disputed boundaries (such as water-points) and the subsequent control of
such economic resources is perceived to be demonstrating the supremacy of one ethnic
group over the other. For instance, the findings show that pastoralists from both regional
states are settling close to a boundary to claim it for a particular area through a referen-

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 JOURNAL OF PEACEBUILDING & DEVELOPMENT

dum. This process has created a situation where some control resources trying to exclude
others (greed) and others refuse or take revenge in some way to claim control to ensure
security (grievances). The existing political system in Ethiopia has prompted pastoralists
to shift their focus from sharing scarce grazing resources to controlling them.

Nevertheless, empirical evidence indicates that ecological variability contributes to

uneven distribution of grazing and water
Incompatibility between pastoral resources in space and time. Pursuant to
this ecological influence, control over a
grazing resource use systems, requiring
specific geographical area by each pastoral
transboundary herd mobility, and the group, according to fixed regional admin-
system of governance contributes to istrative boundaries, reduces livestock feed
eruption of violent conflict. and water security to sustain their liveli-
hoods (Vanderlinden 1999; Thebaud & Bat-
terbury 2001; Huggins 2003). This suggests the need to create an institutional framework
that supports the functioning of traditional access options created through agreements
between pastoralists of different ethnic groups in the past. Incompatibility between pas-
toral grazing resource use systems, requiring transboundary herd mobility, and the sys-
tem of governance contributes to the eruption of violent conflict.

The findings generate important policy implications to address the underlying struc-
tural factors (resource access and boundary) contributing to violent conflicts. One of
the strategies is to divert the attention of the pastoralists from heavily emphasising the
administrative boundary that is based on identity politics within the political structure
of the country and re-emphasise reciprocal resource-sharing arrangements. Practitioners
and local level administration can help pastoralists make a distinction between state law
and customary practices where the latter assist to instil stability in the pastoral resource
use relationships. Although pastoral groups vary along ethnic lines and clannishness,
they have common cultural values and altruistic behaviour that have persisted for cen-
turies. The subtle shift in pastoralists’ action in favour of territorial control twinned with
the gradual erosion of norms safeguarding against violent conflict indicate the threat
posed by the introduction of an ethnic-based federal system. What needs to be done to
overcome such undesirable consequence? The Ministry of Federal Affairs and Pastoralist
Area Development in Ethiopia celebrates Pastoralists’ Day annually where representa-
tives of diverse pastoral groups attend the ceremony. One of the items on the agenda for
this day has often been how to ensure peace and security in peripheral areas inhabited
by pastoralists. The Regional State Authorities and the Ministry should use this event to
create a forum for discussions and ultimately to design peacebuilding strategies where
lower level state and customary authorities can jointly create institutions that facilitate
resource access by different ethnic groups and clans. This would prevent the transition
of disputes over grazing and water resources into violent conflict.

The evidence from the field also implies that the legal recognition of customary law and
prevention of opportunistic behaviour can overcome the spread of violent conflict over
resources. As part of the peacebuilding process, the formal system should not replace the
customary system but rather support the enforcement of any pre-existing peace agree-
ment between ethnic groups as a component of customary law in accordance with the
national constitution which recognises the role of customary law (as stipulated in Article
78, sub-article 5). The article recognises the protection of customary courts that existed
prior to the adoption of the constitution. The state should also introduce legal mecha-
nisms to penalise opportunistic actors triggering violence for their private benefit. These
actors provide incorrect information for the pastoral groups at conflict on livestock raid-
ing and abduction of women, an action that can trigger further violence. To address this

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 Natural Resource Conflict Analysis Among Pastoralists in Southern Ethiopia

problem, the state should train and build the capacity of all actors inciting violence to
derive short-term benefits so that they would be refrained from triggering violence. For
this to succeed, the cooperation between the Neighbouring Regions Affairs office and the
Ministry of Federal Affairs and Pastoralist Area Development is crucial.

The results of the study also show that land use change and competition for space within
a clan, while triggered by insecurity of property rights to communal grazing land, have
been sources of conflict. Addressing such conflicts that arise from land use change and
a related shift in property rights to natural resources at the inter-clan level requires the
intervention of regional government whose role could be:

(1) Development of effective land use and administration guidelines: As a result of pop-

ulation growth, diversification of economic activities and expansion of settle-
ments in pastoral areas, land use changes were observed. But such changes
are not systematic and are often confusing to the pastoralists themselves. The
development of land use administration guidelines with the participation and
consultation of pastoral communities (representatives of each clan) will be
instrumental in settling disputes arising from expansion of enclosure, farming
and extension of urban settlement. Such an approach can help entertain differ-
ent interests and consider proactive measures to make the guidelines as compre-
hensive as possible.
(2) Empowering customary authorities: One of the unintended consequences of the
extension of the state administrative structure into pastoral areas was the decline
in the position of customary authorities in addressing violent conflict over
resources. In its recent move, the Ethiopian government reconsidered the impor-
tance of customary governance as an intangible cultural asset that needs to be
preserved and used. This is particularly
Empowerment of customary authorities beneficial to the pastoralists. Therefore,
empowerment of customary authorities
helps to make effective use of land use
helps to make effective use of land use
and administration guidelines through the and administration guidelines through
coordination of experts from the district the coordination of experts from the dis-
rural land administration offices. trict rural land administration offices.
It will also provide an opportunity to
combine indigenous ecological knowledge of the pastoralists and scientific
knowledge of the experts in the development of land use and administration
guidelines. Land use and administration guidelines that recognise diverse pas-
toral interests and ecological conditions and involvement of customary author-
ities in making key decisions affecting land use would reduce the incidence of
violent conflict over natural resources.

FEKADU BEYENE is Professor of Institutional and Resource Economics at Haramaya

University in Ethiopia. He has published on issues related to institutions in natural
resource management, resource-based conflicts, collective action and property rights in
natural resource governance, adaptation strategies to climate change and the political
economy of biodiversity conservation.

Disclosure Statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

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JOURNAL OF PEACEBUILDING & DEVELOPMENT

Acknowledgements
I would like to acknowledge the financial support of the Centre for International Gov-
ernance Innovation (CIGI) within the framework of the African Initiative as a capaci-
ty-building programme. The detailed comments of the reviewers and the editors were
very useful to enrich this material.

Endnote
1
In this paper, ‘ethnic group’ is referring to either Somali or Oromo, whereas each ethnic group
has its own clans. The ‘pastoral group’ is frequently used here to refer to either ‘ethnic’ or ‘clan’
depending on context.

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