Civil Society Responses To The COVID-19 Pandemic

Civil Society Responses to the COVID-19 Pandemic
Author(s): Qihai Cai, Aya Okada, Bok Gyo Jeong and Sung-Ju Kim
Source: China Review , FEBRUARY 2021, Vol. 21, No. 1, SPECIAL ISSUE: State and Society in
Extreme Times: China’s Early Response to COVID-19 Outbreak (FEBRUARY 2021), pp. 107-
138
Published by: The Chinese University of Hong Kong Press
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/10.2307/27005557
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The China Review, Vol. 21, No. 1 (February 2021), 107–137
Civil Society Responses to the COVID-19

Pandemic: A Comparative Study of China,
Japan, and South Korea*
Qihai Cai, Aya Okada, Bok Gyo Jeong, and Sung-Ju Kim
Abstract
This study examines whether nonstate actors can enhance social resil-
ience to cope with extreme events by examining and comparing civil
society’s responses to COVID-19 in China, Japan, and South Korea.
The research has found that the civil society sector in each of these
three countries played essential roles in combating the pandemic, either
by reinforcing government-led efforts or by filling the institutional voids
left by the government. Civil society actors in these countries have
contributed to social resilience by donating money and medical
supplies, providing imperative social services, disseminating needed
information, and advocating for marginalized groups in society. This
study provides timely information on how resources were mobilized by
civil society to respond to COVID-19. Additionally, it shows how insti-
tutions in different countries have shaped civil society actors’ distinctive
actions in the fight against COVID-19.
Qihai Cai is Assistant Professor in the School of Business, Macau University of

Science and Technology. Correspondence should be sent to qhcai@must.edu.mo.
Aya Okada is Associate Professor in the Graduate School of Information
Sciences, Tohoku University.
Bok Gyo Jeong is Assistant Professor in the Department of Public Administra-
tion, Kean University.
Sung-Ju Kim is Assistant Professor in the School of Social Work, North Carolina
State University.
* The authors wish to thank the editors and two anonymous reviewers for
providing critical comments and constructive suggestions on an earlier version
of this article. Responsibility for any errors remains with the authors.

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108 Qihai Cai, Aya Okada, Bok Gyo Jeong, and Sung-Ju Kim
The 2019 novel coronavirus pneumonia, also known as COVID-19, has

become a global crisis. As of 1 November 2020, nearly 46 million
COVID-19 cases worldwide were confirmed, resulting in more than 1.2
million deaths.1 As the world continues to grapple with the socioeco-
nomic challenges posed by COVID-19, national responses to these chal-
lenges and subsequent impacts have varied dramatically in different
countries. The effectiveness of such responses is affected by factors such
as leadership competency, the efficacy of policy instruments, cultural
dispositions, prior experience, and institutional infrastructure.2 The head
of the World Health Organization (WHO), Tedros Adhanom, has reiter-
ated that every country in the world should be attentive to the lessons
garnered from uniquely implemented strategies that successfully curtailed
the spread of COVID-19.3 The European media lauded the responses to
COVID-19 by Asian countries, meaning that these countries should
receive recognition from the international community.4
Although governments have taken the initiative in fighting the
pandemic, in the face of COVID-19, civil society engagement has been
essential in providing social services during this extreme event. Indeed,
we have observed civil society’s crucial role in fighting against this prolif-
erating infectious disease, either by reinforcing government-led efforts or
by filling institutional voids left by the government. For example, in Hong
Kong, civil society contributed significantly to combating the infection
with a spontaneous and robust mobilization of local communities.5
Caritas Youth and Community Service, Health in Action, Lingnan
University, and the University of Hong Kong jointly organized the Project
Ultra Violite to provide free and efficient UV disinfection services to ster-
ilize the crowded living environments of marginalized populations in
Hong Kong.6 Providing disinfection services to marginalized groups
reduced the risk of community outbreaks in Hong Kong. By contrast,
Singapore neglected foreign workers’ living conditions, resulting in a
major infection outbreak.7
Despite the merits of civil society engagement, the existing literature
on crisis management is often state-centric, with only a few exceptions
systematically documenting civil society’s contributions.8 In addition,
although empirical studies show that registered civil society organizations
(CSOs) and volunteers help reduce economic damage and human losses
in natural disasters, little is known about how exactly civil society
responses achieve such positive outcomes.9 This study investigates civil
society’s responses to COVID-19 in China, Japan, and South Korea and

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Civil Society Responses to the COVID-19 Pandemic 109
aims to answer the following two research questions: (1) What roles does
the civil society sector play in fighting against COVID-19? (2) What are
the similarities and differences between civil society responses to
COVID-19 in China, Japan, and South Korea?
This study chooses the three countries for the following reasons.
First, they were all hit by COVID-19 in the earliest phase of the
pandemic compared to the rest of the world. As shown in Figure 1, the
COVID-19 pandemic hit these three countries with slight differences in
timing but generally in January and February 2020. With the initial mass
outbreak in Wuhan, China, the People’s Republic of China faced the
earliest peak infection rate among the three countries. With a sudden
surge in confirmed cases and deaths in January, the statistics continued
to increase dramatically in February and March. It peaked by the end of
April with 84,373 confirmed cases and 4,643 deaths. Japan observed its
surge at the latest date of the three countries. In late March, the numbers
of confirmed cases and deaths started to visibly increase and continued
until they hit 18,593 confirmed cases and 972 deaths at the end of June.
South Korea became the second most infected country after China, expe-
riencing a mass outbreak in February with a jump in the number of
confirmed cases to 3,154 and 162 deaths.10 The second reason these three
countries were chosen is that they share similar cultural dispositions.
They each have historical traits of Confucian culture and “developmental
state” characterized by strong state interventions in economic affairs
coupled with extensive regulation and planning.11
Despite the similarities, however, civil societies in the three coun-
tries have developed along different paths.12 As an authoritarian state,
the Chinese government has long suppressed civil society’s develop-
ment. The state adopts the strategy of graduated control of civil society,
which is promulgated according to the capacities of the CSOs to chal-
lenge the state and the value of the public goods they provide.13 Even
after the policy experiments of “social innovation” targeted at easing
the registration procedures for CSOs, grassroots CSOs still find it
extremely challenging to obtain formal legal status from the Chinese
authorities.14 While Japan has a long history of civil society provision of
social services, the first legal underpinnings for organizations serving
public interests were adopted in the late 1890s. However, the govern-
ment had a great deal of control over which organizations would be
granted incorporated status, and they were still forced to operate
under governmental supervision. After the late 1990s, the Japanese

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Figure 1: Accumulated Cases and Deaths from COVID-19 in China, Japan, and South Korea (31 January–30 June 2020)
Source: WHO Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) Dashboard

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government adopted legal frameworks for CSOs that were more

relaxed.15 The civil society sector in South Korea has observed historical
growth since the 1987 democratic transition, and CSOs were given a
more open and inclusive space to play their roles.16 Considering the
varying development paths, one would expect civil society in China,
Japan, and South Korea to show different faces as they responded to
COVID-19; this is the question explored by the study. By drawing the
big picture of civil society actions from the analysis of newspaper
articles, we compare similarities and differences observed in the three
Asian countries. This study provides timely information on how
resources were mobilized by civil society to respond to COVID-19 and
shows how institutions in different countries enhanced distinctive
actions in fighting against COVID-19.
The rest of this article is organized as follows. We first provide the
theoretical and empirical background of civil society development and its
relationship with social resilience in coping with extreme events. Second,
we present and explain the methods employed in this study. In the third
section, we discuss civil society responses to COVID-19 in China, Japan,
and South Korea, followed by a comparative discussion of the similarities
and differences of civil society responses in these three countries. Finally,
we conclude by discussing the theoretical and practical implications of
the comparative analysis.
1. Civil Society and Social Resilience in Extreme Events

The three countries’ civil society sectors vary in size and character,
operating under distinct legal frameworks and governmental policies.
In this study, civil society refers to the space comprising organizations
or organized individual actions that are not directed by the state and
are not primarily profit-seeking but voluntary.17 We adopt this broad
definition of civil society, relaxed about the specifics of self-governance
and profit distribution constraints because we intend to incorporate
wider variations of CSOs operating in the three different East Asian
countries. This definition allows a wide spectrum of actors, such as
corporations engaging in socially responsible interventions and indi-
vidual citizens working as collaborative partners, engaging with the
pandemic response.
While pandemics, natural disasters, and human-caused disasters
differ in their characteristics, they share similar uncertainties that

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demand contributions from a wide range of individuals and organiza-

tions. The concept of resilience in the field of ecology highlights the
“measure of the persistence of systems and their ability to absorb change
and disturbance and still maintain the same relationships between popu-
lations or state variables.”18 The concept of “social resilience” underlines
the societal effort to respond to and recover from extreme events. Speed,
flexibility, and creativity are critical aspects of resilience in responding to
uncertainties, in either ecological or social realms. These features are not
always in place when response and recovery take the conventional
approach through the centralized power and authority of national
governments, often with hierarchical, bureaucratic systems. Strong states
may mobilize the resources necessary to respond to threats, but risks
easily go beyond jurisdictional or administrative borders. This “trans-
boundary nature of modern threats” calls for a multisector approach,
where different sectors of the society—public, private, and nonprofit—all
leverage their strengths in responding to extreme events.19 More specifi-
cally, experts have advocated for a bottom-up community approach
accentuating the civil society sector, which is considered more moti-
vated, flexible, and creative than governmental agencies and conven-
tional businesses.20
Existing studies of extreme events and disaster management have
paid attention to CSOs and found that the most significant feature of
CSOs’ involvement in extreme event response is cross-sector collabora-
tion. In addition, scholars have also identified some key factors for
successful cross-sector collaboration as trust building between civil
society actors and the government and transnational linkages among
different CSOs.21 We pay particular attention to these critical factors
when we comb through case evidence.
2. Methods
To capture civil society’s response to COVID-19 in three different coun-
tries, we conducted a systematic review of local newspaper articles. Using
the same or similar keywords in three languages, we identified relevant
articles published between 1 January and 20 June 2020. We analyzed who
took which action to serve whom, whom they worked with, and the
geographical scope of their actions (i.e., regional, national, or global). The
analysis of the newspaper articles offers a snapshot of civil society’s
overall response to COVID-19.

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For the Chinese case, we used the China Core Newspapers Full-text
Database, which covers 648 core newspapers officially published in China
since 2000. A total of 8,091 articles were identified using “coronavirus”
and the following keywords: social organization (社會組織 shehui zuzhi),
NGO (非政府組織 feizhengfu zuzhi), NPO (非營利組織 feiyingli zuzhi),
civil society (公民社會 gongmin shehui), community organization (社區組
織 shequ zuzhi), charity (慈善 cishan), donation (捐贈 juanzeng), and
volunteer (志願者 zhiyuanzhe).
For Japan, we analyzed articles published in Asahi Shimbun, one of
the major national newspapers with a monthly circulation of approxi-
mately 5.5 million.22 Using the Kikuzo II Visual for Libraries database, a
total of 2,436 articles were identified using “coronavirus” and the
following keywords: NGO, NPO, civil activity (市民活動 shimin katsudo),
neighborhood association (町內会 chonaikai), resident association (自治
会 jichikai), donation (寄付 kifu), and volunteer (ボランティアborantia).
For South Korea, we used BIGKinds, the largest data source of South
Korean news media. It includes articles from 54 major news media
companies, covering major national daily newspapers, economic newspa-
pers, local daily newspapers, and broadcast news programs. The following
keywords were used in combination with “coronavirus” to obtain a total
of 9,587 articles: civil society (시민사회 shimin-sahoe), CSO (시민사회단체
shimin-sahoe dan-che), NGO (비정부기구 bee-chung-bu ki-ku), NPO (비
영리단체 bee-young-li dan-che), donation (기부 ki-bu), and volunteering (자
원봉사 cha-won-bong-sa).
While our methodological approach does limit the scope of our
study to what was reported in newspaper articles, it is a strategy to
systematically capture civil society’s response to COVID-19 in three
different contexts. Where appropriate, we also referred to surveys and
reports published by CSOs, government agencies, and think tanks to
complement the findings.
3. The Civil Society Response to COVID-19 in China, Japan,

and South Korea
This section presents the civil society response to COVID-19 in China,
Japan, and South Korea. Each country’s case follows the same structure
concerning the three factors identified in previous sections: civil society
responses, collaborations between civil society and government, and
transnational engagements of civil society.

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a. China
Civil Society Responses to the Pandemic
Civil society responses to COVID-19 in China shifted over time,
depending on the pandemic stage and crisis level. On 8 January 2020, the
Chinese National Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) offi-
cially announced that a novel type of coronavirus had caused pneumonia
in Wuhan and Dr. Zhong Nanshan (鍾南山) confirmed human-to-human
transmission of this virus twelve days later. On 23 January 2020, the
lockdown policy was implemented in Wuhan, followed by other Hubei
Province cities. During the outbreak period, civil society responses
mainly involved donations (money and medical supplies) and voluntary
services. In the expansion period, the civil society sector continued to
raise donations and provide service to quarantined people. Various plat-
forms for information dissemination were constructed and operated to
improve distribution of supplies. After the curve of new cases was flat-
tened, civil society’s response shifted to helping and advocating for the
groups seriously impacted by the pandemic. The transnational engage-
ment of Chinese CSOs to help the global community was also high-
lighted in this period. We have identified four roles played by civil society
that enhanced social resilience in China: social donation, service provi-
sion, information dissemination, and advocacy.
First, the civil society sector donated large amounts of money and
medical supplies to fight COVID-19. According to the White Paper on
Fighting COVID-19, a total of 38.93 billion RMB and 990 million items
of different materials had been received by the end of May.23 As of 2
March 2020, preliminary statistics show that online donations to COVID-
19-related programs reached 1.57 billion RMB.24 The tremendous
donation of money and medical supplies mobilized by the civil society
sector substantively relieved resource shortages, especially in the
pandemic’s early stages.
In addition to cash and in-kind donations, the civil society sector
provided imperative social services. According to the White Paper on
Fighting COVID-19, by the end of May 2020, 8.81 million registered
volunteers had participated in more than 460,000 volunteer projects across
China, contributing a total of more than 290 million volunteer service
hours.25 Considering that pervasive informal volunteer groups emerged in
the pandemic, the actual number of volunteer service hours is likely higher
than reported. Volunteers in China have actively participated in assisting

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people in facing quarantine-related constraints. They provide extensive

volunteer services such as measuring residents’ temperatures at toll stations,
distributing consumer goods, purchasing medicine for quarantined resi-
dents, and delivering food to medical workers. Another noteworthy area of
volunteering is online counseling. With the escalation of COVID-19, the
number of people burdened with psychological stress has multiplied.
Groups that require counseling services include medical workers, patients,
and quarantined residents. In these cases, CSOs have stepped forward to
provide online counseling services to fill the institutional void left by the
government.26
A third role played by the civil society sector we observed is infor-
mation dissemination. Disinformation and information inaccuracy are
two challenges in extreme events. To reduce the information asymmetry
between donors and beneficiaries, CSOs in China utilize information and
communication technologies to distribute medical supplies effectively.
Similar efforts have been made in previous disaster relief efforts.27 For
example, the All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce collabo-
rated with the Shanghai Charity Foundation and the Shanghai Industrial
Technology Institute to launch the YunNiXing COVID-19 Support
Platform.28 The platform provides detailed information on demanders,
suppliers, and CSOs. Users can search for names, addresses, contact
numbers, available materials, and services in the platform. Another
salient instance of information dissemination has been the “Handbook of
COVID-19 Prevention and Treatment” distribution facilitated by the
Alibaba Foundation and the Jack Ma Foundation on 18 March 2020. The
foundations collaborated with the First Hospital of Zhejiang Province to
compile the handbook. The foundations further translated the handbook
into different languages to share experiences in combating COVID-19
with other countries.29
Last, the civil society sector promoted public awareness of marginal-
ized groups. Since the COVID-19 pandemic disproportionally impacts
different societal groups, vulnerable, high-risk groups have required extra
support. Several foundations noticed the vulnerability of frontline
workers. They set up special programs to raise public awareness and
provide financial assistance for groups, including medical workers, sani-
tation workers, and volunteers. For example, the China Foundation for
Poverty Alleviation implemented an assistance program for sanitation
workers.30 Frontline workers infected by the coronavirus are eligible to
apply for financial support. Another social problem exacerbated by

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COVID-19 is education inequality caused by the digital divide. Due to

stay-at-home orders, many schools switched to online teaching. The lack
of facilities (e.g., computers and smartphones) hindered impoverished
students from accessing online courses. Responding to this call, the
Alipay Foundation and Adream Foundation initiated the “Smart
Learning” program.31 This program advocated for the donation of used
phones and electronic devices and raised the money from recycling these
items to purchase learning equipment for impoverished students.
Collaborations between Civil Society and Government

The Chinese government has officially recognized the great potential of
civil society responses to mitigate the damage of COVID-19 at the early
stage of the pandemic. As early as 26 January 2020, the Ministry of Civil
Affairs advocated mobilizing societal resources and donations by social
organizations to support Wuhan.32 In other words, the Chinese government
encouraged collaboration between civil society and the government in
China. However, those collaborations varied across localities and types of
CSOs, which recalls the argument of “graduated control” mentioned above.
For example, local governments in Zhejiang Province strategically
collaborated with community-based organizations to mobilize volunteers,
collect donations and medical supplies, and provide social services.33
Volunteers have been mobilized to disseminate updated information on
the pandemic and help community residents purchase and distribute
supplies. By leveraging the strengths of civil society, Zhejiang effectively
contained COVID-19 soon after the first wave of lockdowns.
Regarding government-organized NGOs (GONGOs) and grassroots
CSOs, the government collaborated more with GONGOs than grassroots
CSOs. GONGOs are “usually founded and initially organized by the
government to provide a service to society, one that the government is
unable or unwilling to do.”34 During the pandemic, only five GONGOs—
the Hubei Red Cross Society, the Wuhan Red Cross Society, the Hubei
Charity Federation, the Wuhan Charity Federation, and the Hubei Youth
Development Foundation—were assigned by the Ministry of Civil Affairs
to receive donations for Hubei Province.35 However, the massive dona-
tions to Wuhan exceeded the management capacity of the assigned
GONGOs, and the public criticized GONGOs for inefficiency in distrib-
uting materials to medical workers. Moreover, three Hubei Red Cross
officials were accused and punished for misconduct in February 2020.36

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Public trust declined significantly toward assigned GONGOs afterward.

In contrast, many grassroots CSOs are more efficient and transparent in
managing donations based on the information we have collected, a
pattern that has already emerged in previous disaster relief efforts.37
Transnational Engagement
It is critical to note the Law on the Administration of Activities of
Overseas Non-Governmental Organizations within the Territory of
China (境外非政府組織境內活動管理法 jingwai feizhengfuzuzhi jingnei
huodong guanlifa, Overseas NGO Law), enacted in January 2017, as a
main part of the background of transnational engagement of Chinese
civil society sector during the pandemic. The Overseas NGO Law has
significantly affected the operation of overseas NGOs (ONGOs) in
China since its inception. According to the Overseas NGO Law, for an
ONGO to carry out activities in China, it has to register with an estab-
lished representative office or submit documents for the record (備案
beian) concerning any temporary activities. Many ONGOs could not
fulfill this requirement on time, resulting in major shifts or shrinking of
their activities in China.
ONGOs have a long history of assisting Chinese society in dealing
with social problems such as HIV/AIDS prevention and environmental
protection.38 In the early phase of the pandemic, China received assistance
from the global community. For example, both Japan and South Korea
donated imperative medical materials to China soon after the outbreak of
COVID-19.39 Another example is alumni associations utilizing their alumni
networks to collect donations and medical materials for China worldwide.40
As of May 2020, the Hubei Charity Federation has received donations
valued at 200 million RMB from over 300 ONGOs.41 However, it is fair to
say that the number would have been much higher if the ONGOs were
allowed to operate as before the Oversea NGO Law.
While restricting ONGO activities in China, the Chinese government
increasingly encourages Chinese CSOs to go abroad and help the countries
related to its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to increase soft power influ-
ence. For example, Chinese CSOs have actively engaged in international
development assistance in Africa.42 Soon after the pandemic’s outbreak, the
Chinese Association of NGO Cooperation (CANCO) emphasized medical
assistance in its collaborative action plan for the BRI countries. As of May
2020, CANCO has coordinated with Chinese CSOs to provide medical

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supplies, traditional Chinese medicine, and experience-sharing webinars

for over 20 countries.43 Some large foundations, such as the Tencent Foun-
dation and Alibaba Foundation, have also offered medical supplies to
almost 150 countries.44 The Chinese CSOs’ active participation in global
pandemic relief echoes President Xi Jinping’s remarks made at the Extraor-
dinary G20 Leaders’ Summit to “make a collective response for control and
treatment at the international level.”45
Summary
Overall, the civil society sector was an important element in preventing
the spread of COVID-19 inside China and directing relief to the victims
of the disease. Although restrictive policies toward civil society signifi-
cantly limited the impact of CSOs during the pandemic, civil society still
showed strength and vitality in constructing social resilience.46 The civil
society sector achieved this goal by donating money and medical
supplies, providing imperative social services, disseminating needed
information, and advocating for marginalized groups. These efforts have
been well recognized by Chinese society: according to an online survey
among 8,252 university students in Wuhan, respondents highly evaluated
the perceived performance (M = 8.38, SD = 1.58, 10-point scale) of CSOs
in combating the pandemic.47 On 21 April 2020, the state media People’s
Daily (人民日報 renmin ribao) explicitly praised the contribution of
Chinese CSOs in fighting against the pandemic.48 However, the lack of
institutional channels for participation still hinders the civil society sector
from fully achieving its potential impacts. First, only the assigned
GONGOs are allowed to receive donations for Hubei Province. Many
capable grassroots CSOs that have proven to be more transparent and
efficient in distributing donations and materials were prevented from
playing a bigger role in pandemic relief. Second, in the shadow of the
Overseas NGO Law, ONGOs’ activities and monetary flows are heavily
constrained in China, and thus they are precluded from playing a notice-
able role in responding to the pandemic.
b. Japan
While COVID-19 was recognized as a potential risk in early January in
Japan, it was not until the end of February that CSOs began taking

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full-scale action.49 Until then, COVID-19 was mostly recognized as a risk

to those with links outside Japan, and actions taken were somewhat
limited. A few, such as Airborne Rescue and Relief Operations with
Search (ARROWS), had begun sending masks and protective gowns to
mainland China in late January.50 Individuals began donating masks to
mainland China in early February. When a group of Japanese citizens
returned from Wuhan on chartered flights and were held in quarantine
in a hotel, a local community organization lit bamboo lanterns to
encourage them. The wake-up call for individuals and CSOs in Japan was
the school closure announcement on 27 February 2020. Given the scope
of the populations that would be affected by this announcement—not
only children but also parents, families, and employers—CSOs began
making proactive moves in responding to COVID-19. Analysis of news-
paper articles revealed that Japan’s civil society sector played two major
roles in response to COVID-19: delivering services to vulnerable popula-
tions and advocating for them.
Nonprofit organizations, neighborhood associations, and residents’
associations identified, reached out to, and provided services to those
particularly vulnerable to both health and economic risks. These included
children, low-income families, single-parent families, foreigners living in
Japan, students, those suffering from domestic violence, and girls with
unexpected pregnancies. Given that COVID-19 was a risk that every
person across the country faced, these vulnerable groups were not among
the government’s priorities. CSOs came in to fill in the gap.
Foodbanks and children’s cafeterias known as “kodomo shokudo”
were the most active. Although some of them decided to close to avoid
the virus’s potential spread, many remained open, collecting and distrib-
uting food to those in need. Their primary targets were children in need,
particularly those living in low-income or single-parent households, as
well as children who would go hungry without school lunch. After-school
child care organizations and some residents’ associations also began
accepting children who otherwise would have to stay home alone. In
response to the situation where most schools in Japan—particularly
public schools—were not ready to go online at this point, CSOs engaged
in education and began providing online learning support. For example,
the nonprofit Katariba issued a press release the day after the school
closure announcement to state that they would provide tablets and Wi-Fi
devices for students in need, create an online space for children to get
together, and provide counseling services to parents.51

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Toward the end of March, CSOs engaged in labor and employment

issues began taking active moves, opening telephone and online coun-
seling services. The Japanese government took time to determine its
compensation policy for business closures, and it was only on 1 May that
they began accepting applications for compensation benefits. With a
gloomy outlook for the economy, workers expected a substantial drop in
payroll and massive layoffs. Some of these organizations were nationwide,
while others were focused more on specific regions.
Starting approximately in early April, CSOs working on domestic
violence and child abuse began to be vocal, providing expert commen-
taries in the media and calling for active use of online counseling. As the
government continued to request citizens to stay at home, domestic
violence emerged. Beginning in mid-April, CSOs appeared to have found
a way to stay connected with their constituencies, hosting online
meetings, cafes, and seminars. We also began to see nonprofits providing
entertainment online, streaming music concerts.
In late April, some nonprofits and neighborhood associations
turned their attention to the potential risks of complex disasters as a
result of COVID-19. A series of earthquakes struck multiple regions
across the country between February and April. With the threat of
heavy rain and typhoons rapidly approaching, these organizations
began preparing for safe evacuation from natural disasters while
protecting themselves from the novel coronavirus. Some worked closely
with local governments so that they would be ready to organize and
open evacuation centers with sufficient space between evacuees and
with the necessary equipment.
Helping foreigners living in Japan also became an important action
for CSOs. There were tourists, international students, and foreign tech-
nical interns who could not go back home and lacked both a source of
income and language capabilities. Some organizations provided interpre-
tation services to patients, while others distributed food. In addition to
counseling services, emergency shelters were provided when necessary.
Learning support was provided to children with foreign roots, and funds
were raised to provide cash for these foreigners stranded in Japan.
In May, with universities making final decisions on how to proceed
with the new academic year—which conventionally begins in April in
Japan—students’ needs came to the fore. Nonprofits began distributing
food to needy students and offering online seminars and meetings for
social interaction. Some nonprofits began providing counseling services

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to teenage girls. With school closures, more teenagers became sexually

active, thus risking unexpected pregnancy.
Another role that Japanese CSOs played during the study period was
to speak out and advocate for vulnerable groups. As early as mid-March,
CSOs began conducting surveys with parents and children to understand
the impacts of school closures and the shrinking economy. Others
published reports revealing the troubles that workers were facing and the
situations of women suffering from domestic violence. In May, the scope of
these surveys was extended to families with children who refused to go to
school, children with roots outside Japan, youth raised in orphanages, and
university students having to take courses online. These findings were
shared in press conferences, and some CSOs approached the government
to make policy recommendations. The reports were compiled on one
website, The Novel Coronavirus Support Organizations Social Solidarity,
managed by the Japan NPO Center.52 These advocacy efforts tended to be
national in scope, while service delivery was focused regionally.
CSOs also conducted surveys to understand the impact of COVID-19
on the civil society sector, gathering evidence to demand the government
to include CSOs as the recipients of government subsidies. The earliest
survey effort began on 29 February in Ibaraki Prefecture.53 An official
request to the government on behalf of nonprofit corporations across
Japan was sent by an organization called Coalition for Legislation to
Support Citizens’ Organizations on 5 March.54 The breadth of advocacy
efforts made by CSOs during COVID-19 implies that the role of advo-
cates increased exponentially since the period when weak advocacy was
highlighted as one of the characteristics of Japanese civil society.55
It is also interesting to note the diversity of actions taken at the indi-
vidual level. In early March, the problem of surplus food emerged with
the cancellation of school lunches. In response, citizens stood up to
purchase and consume leftover milk and vegetables. Such consumer
efforts were aimed at saving businesses suffering from overstocks. Addi-
tionally, consumers bought takeout from restaurants that were unable to
provide regular table service. Foodbanks and children’s cafeterias also
asked for food and cash donations to support their work. Some munici-
palities adopted the framework of Furusato Nozei (“donations to home
towns”) to raise funds for medical institutions and personnel. This frame-
work, introduced in 2007, allows citizens to donate to local governments
(prefectures, cities, towns, and villages) and enjoy tax exemptions for
their gifts.

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There was a limited observation of individual volunteering—devoting

time and skills to others—during the study period. There were indeed
those who volunteered to run food banks, provide counseling services, or
provide learning support to children. However, when referring to volun-
teers, newspaper articles mainly reported on people forced to cancel their
volunteer activities due to the spread of COVID-19. It appears that both
individuals and the CSOs organizing volunteers preferred to take preven-
tion measures, such as avoiding face-to-face interactions that may have
spread the virus.

Reported by newspaper articles, CSOs tended to take action indepen-
dently without collaborating with the government. A few examples of
such collaboration, when examined closely, showed two patterns. First,
the government collaborated mainly with neighborhood and residents’
associations to distribute materials and to spread information to citizens.
Local municipalities asked some associations to distribute masks to the
residents. Others disseminated information about counseling services for
children unwilling to go to schools and businesses facing revenue losses.
There were also municipal governments that asked these local organiza-
tions to spread information about evacuation procedures in the event of
earthquakes or heavy rain. Some also disseminated information about
desirable measures to be taken for COVID-19 at possible evacuation
centers. Second, some municipal governments contracted out services to
local nonprofits. For example, the prefectural government of Saitama
worked with the Saitama IT Coordinator CSO to assist businesses in
introducing remote work. In another case, Shizuoka’s prefectural govern-
ment also contracted out to a nonprofit, All Shizuoka Best Community,
which provided a matching service between farmers facing a lack of
laborers and welfare centers that hired people with disabilities.
Newspaper articles examined by the research reported only ten CSOs
engaged in global activities. These organizations served medical personnel
in China as well as Uganda, South Sudan, Syria, and the Democratic
Republic of the Congo. The majority of CSOs and individual actions
responding to the pandemic targeted populations living within Japan. In
the newspaper articles examined, there was no case of resources coming

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in from outside Japan. This finding reflects two things. First, Japan had
sufficient capacity to handle the situation within its borders such that
there was no need for external assistance. Second, once Japan recognized
that COVID-19 was a severe risk to everyone, other countries also
entered a phase where domestic resource shortages became apparent.
Summary
CSOs in Japan played two major roles in fighting COVID-19. They
provided services to vulnerable groups that tended to fall out of govern-
mental priorities. They also conducted investigations regarding these
vulnerable populations, held press conferences to set agendas, and in some
cases made policy recommendations to national and prefectural govern-
ments. Individuals contributed not so much as volunteers but more as
consumers and donors. CSOs worked mostly on their own without collab-
orating with governmental agencies. The civil society response scope was
more regional and tended to stay within the border of Japan.
c. South Korea
Civil society responses in South Korea to the COVID-19 outbreak were
agile and multidimensional. Their responses were adaptive and shifted to
meet needs, reflecting the situation of the COVID-19 pandemic. Amid
the crisis expansion and under strict quarantine, civil society’s service
functions were more prevalent than advocacy functions. Although
COVID-19 forced approximately 70 percent of CSOs to reduce or discon-
tinue their existing programs or activities, they swiftly found ways to
continue their missions, helping communities stay resilient against
COVID-19.56
South Korea’s generosity increased remarkably to combat COVID-
19, even though the outbreak had an unprecedented impact on the
economy and communities. As of 30 June, the Community Chest of
Korea, the largest South Korean charitable institute focused on commu-
nity-based fundraising, successfully raised approximately 112.9 billion
KRW and donated 22.3 million masks and 1.7 million hand sanitizers
for COVID-19 relief.57 This amount is historically remarkable, the
second highest amount in the Community Chest of Korea’s fundraising
history (the highest was collected for the Sewol Ferry sinking accident
in 2014).58

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Corporations in South Korea took action more quickly to assist in the

fight against COVID-19. The Beautiful Foundation highlighted five different
patterns of South Korean corporations’ contributions in fighting COVID-19,
including cash donations, supporting partner companies, enhancing service
purchases from local businesses, in-kind donations, and transforming manu-
facturing to produce medical supplies.59 For example, South Korean corpora-
tions (e.g., GE Korea, LG Household & Health Care, and Samsung
Electronics) donated medical supplies such as personal protective equipment
and hand sanitizers instead of selling them during the early stage of the
pandemic. Regardless of the business size or sector, many South Korean
corporations voluntarily engaged in giving cash and in-kind donations
through various giving vehicles in South Korea. Some tech companies devel-
oped free mobile applications to prepare for and monitor the outbreak (e.g.,
Disaster Med Info by Hyundai Motor Company).
These kinds of philanthropic contributions were delivered rapidly,
flexibly, preemptively, and tailored to vulnerable groups, including the
elderly, the disabled, the homeless, and children without proper care and
support. For example, the Community Chest of Korea allocated dona-
tions by prioritizing vulnerable groups. Among the 112 billion KRW
donated, 7.5 billion KRW went for living expenses for at-risk families, 9
billion KRW for food, 5.7 billion KRW for daily necessities, 4.7 billion
KRW for livelihood support for vulnerable groups, and 12.7 billion KRW
for medical staff, volunteers, and confirmed patients.60
The Child Fund of Korea shows another example of how CSOs
played their service provision roles during this pandemic. The organiza-
tion provided food for children who needed nutritional support due to
discontinued food service through schools and local children’s centers,
covering children in 10,000 households. Besides providing needed
medical supplies and psychological-emotional support, the Child Fund of
Korea expanded its service to education by offering an e-school program
and play kits for children. The services provided by CSOs filled the gap
across a broad spectrum of various types of needs that occurred due to
the lack of public support during COVID-19.
In addition, the advocacy function of CSOs regained momentum in
the request for more structural changes in public policy and socioeco-
nomic systems in the post-expansion stage. For example, the Civil Society
Countermeasure Committee to the COVID-19 Societal and Economic
Crisis, a coalition of 530 CSOs in South Korea, was united in calling for
structural public policy changes. This coalition focused on embracing and

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lifting up economically vulnerable populations, expanding the social

safety net and public health support, and transforming the existing
system to a sustainable economic structure when the pandemic was
controlled in late April.61

As South Korean CSOs increased its engagement in assisting communi-
ties during the COVID-19 outbreak, they also significantly reinforced
collaborative partnerships with local governments. For example, the Jeju
Metropolitan government held emergency meetings with the Volunteer
Center staff and divided roles between public and private agencies for
accurate information dissemination.62 The Volunteer Center was even
given the role of providing administrative support in public areas such as
airports, ports, and pretraining professional volunteers on health, medical
care, and hygiene protocols. Consequently, the Jeju Metropolitan govern-
ment provided insurance coverage for participating volunteers. Seongbuk-
gu District in the Seoul Metropolitan area expanded the Disaster Safety
Countermeasure Headquarters to conduct an intensive quarantine in
collaboration with CSOs. The quarantine team focused its efforts on
putting quarantine equipment in public areas for residents.63
CSOs also collaborated with the South Korean government by
sharing information. For example, the Community Chest of Korea high-
lighted its proactive and complementary roles in funding support and
allocation. The Community Chest of Korea fostered a meeting group with
related governmental ministries to regularly share the details of assistance
programs. In doing so, relief support for COVID-19 was deliberately
coordinated among sectors and agencies to enhance program efficiency.64
In the South Korean context, transnational donations and relief efforts
involved a swath of multilayered governmental and civil society actors.
CSOs in South Korea have proactively engaged in cross-border generosity
engagements to fight against COVID-19. Until COVID-19 cases abruptly
arose in South Korea, financial and in-kind donations to Wuhan were
mediated by foundations, welfare associations, and charity centers in
South Korea (e.g., the Child Fund of Korea, the Community Chest of
Korea, and the Korea Senior Welfare Center Association). For example,
the South Korean Red Cross discussed procurement and proceedings for

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implementing transitional relief aid with the Chinese Red Cross and the
International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC).
The Ministry of Interior and Safety and the Ministry of Health and
Welfare of South Korea also collaborated with the IFRC and its South
Korean national chapter in this transnational donation and relief effort.65
Summary
Three features emerged through the analysis of South Korean civil society’s
response to the pandemic. First, South Korean civil society’s responses to
COVID-19 may be highlighted from two angles: service provision and
advocacy engagement. As mentioned above, South Korean CSOs proactively
participated in various philanthropic contributions to help combat COVID-
19. CSOs have played a role as efficient partners or vehicles to deliver
services to the people in need. Simultaneously, South Korean CSOs have
been proactively involved in the advocacy process as collaborative partners
of the government to deliver public services facing the spread of COVID-19.
Second, the relationship between the government and CSOs during the
pandemic in South Korea is characterized as collaborative and complemen-
tary. Many have remarked on the South Korean government’s agile,
adaptive, and transparent responses to COVID-19.66 However, another
important feature of the South Korean government’s approach to this
pandemic is that it embraced the collaborative roles of civil society and
citizens. Therefore, the maturity of citizens, coupled with a collective respon-
sibility to comply with policies to protect neighbors and communities, is
noted as a hidden but decisive contributing factor to the effective response
to COVID-19 in South Korea. Third, South Korean CSOs mainly focused
on domestic beneficiaries during the COVID-19 pandemic. However, these
organizations continued to emphasize engagement with the global commu-
nity, despite financial and nonfinancial challenges. South Korean civil soci-
ety’s engagement with the transnational community is assisted by established
global and transnational agency systems and networks.
4. Comparative Analysis: Civil Society Response

and Social Resilience
Comparing civil society responses in three countries (China, Japan, and
South Korea) reveals the general pattern between civil society response
and social resilience. Table 1 summarizes the similarities and differences
in civil society responses to COVID-19 in the three countries. The shared

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repertoire of civil society responses, namely, charitable donations, service

provisions, information dissemination, and advocacy, is observed in all
three countries to enhance social resilience in combating COVID-19.
Also, all three countries showed commonality in that the civil society
sector focused on its social service provision function for vulnerable
populations. Civil society sectors in the three countries also share similar
concerns on education inequality, domestic violence caused by stay-at-
home orders, and frontline worker safety. In terms of advocacy, the three
countries’ civil society sectors advocated for marginalized groups and the
CSOs themselves, though to varying degrees.
The Chinese case demonstrated a high level of charitable donations,
both online and offline, and information dissemination taking advantage
of information and communication technologies. Chinese CSOs’
advocacy role concerning marginalized groups was also tangible, though
highly suppressed and fragmented, at individual organizations’ levels. The
Japanese case exhibits the social service provision function through its
nonprofit organizations, neighborhood associations, and residents’ asso-
ciations. Japanese CSOs engaged their advocacy roles consistently
throughout the period, investigating vulnerable groups’ situations. Indi-
vidual citizens’ efforts to save local businesses, including restaurants and
producers, were also notable. The South Korean case reveals that civil
society’s main functions shifted over time, depending on the stage and
level of crisis during the COVID-19 pandemic. Amid the crisis expansion
and under strict quarantine, South Korean civil society’s service function
was prevalent for the vulnerable population. Later in the post-expansion
period, CSO coalitions were formed to request structural changes in
public policy and socioeconomic systems to protect vulnerable groups.
Three countries showed substantial variations in the government and
civil society relations in the COVID-19 pandemic response. In China’s
case, various types of partnerships between local governments and CSOs
were formed in the pandemic, contingent on the history of CSOs in the
country. Whereas the corruption issues of GONGOs still received atten-
tion, grassroots CSOs exhibited efficiency and transparency in their
pandemic responses. In Japan’s case, the civil society-government collab-
orative partnerships were mainly limited to neighborhood and residents’
associations. CSOs, individual consumers, and residents each played a
part in fulfilling the demand for public goods unmet by governments at
the local level. In South Korea, collaboration between the government
and CSOs was mutually enhancing and complementary. The South

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Korean government invited CSOs into the pandemic response, and this
collaborative relationship was maintained stably. Effective control of the
COVID-19 expansion without nationwide business and school lockdowns
became possible with the agile, adaptive, and transparent governmental
response, supported by a mature civil society as a critical partner.
Regarding regional and transnational engagement, all three countries’
civil societies prioritized their domestic and national target groups.
However, slight variations existed in terms of civil society’s global
community engagement during the pandemic. Due to the Chinese
government’s strong interest in supporting Chinese CSOs to “go abroad,”
Chinese CSOs engaged in a relatively high level of transnational engage-
ment. In Japan and South Korea, while conventional international NGOs
and development NGOs have continued on their original missions, other
CSOs have prioritized domestic communities and national beneficiary
groups. In South Korea, some contrasting strategies and priorities
between for-profit and nonprofit organizations were observed, revealing
some for-profit companies that engaged in international communities at
the time of the global pandemic for strategic considerations.
Table 1: Comparative Analysis of Civil Society Responses in China, Japan, and South Korea
China Japan South Korea
Charitable donations Service provision
Service provision Information Charitable donations
Observed roles Information dissemination Service provision
dissemination Advocacy Advocacy
Advocacy
Less active
Active
Active Limited organized
Coordinated and
activities
Volunteering Self-organized supported by
Lack of readiness to government
Fragmented
handle infectious
diseases
Limited Limited
Depends on the type of CSOs tend to take Extensive
Collaboration with CSOs action on their own Collaborative
government Most CSOs lack Some local partnership
institutional channels to governments contract Information sharing
collaborate out services to CSOs
Active
Limited Limited
Transnational Engagement from
engagement Focus on domestic Focus on domestic
ONGOs is constrained by
issues issues
law

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Although these three cases are similar in terms of civil society

pandemic response mechanisms and targeted groups, we also find three
main aspects of differences. First, the degree of volunteer engagement
varied significantly in these three countries. Volunteer engagement has
been more active in South Korea and China than Japan during the
pandemic. However, active volunteer engagement in China was largely
self-organized by individual citizens and CSOs. In South Korea, the
government effectively led volunteer engagement and provided sufficient
support to volunteers. Local governments in South Korea provided insur-
ance coverage to support frontline volunteers. In Japan’s case, individual
volunteers’ engagement in response to the COVID-19 pandemic was
relatively less active, at least when observed from newspaper articles. This
is an interesting phenomenon, as citizens in Japan have been active
volunteers in previous natural disasters such as earthquakes and floods.
One inference might be that the COVID-19 pandemic was perceived
differently from conventional disasters. This phenomenon was largely due
to the fear of infection, and because CSOs themselves were hard-hit, they
had to cut back their services, leaving little capacity for organizing volun-
teers.67 Another inference regarding limited volunteering in Japan is that
without the experience of dealing with SARS and MERS, people in Japan
did not have a clear idea of what one could do in responding to respira-
tory diseases.68 Nonetheless, the differences observed in volunteering
among the three countries under study raise interesting questions about
how differences in the nature of extreme events and people’s perceptions
might lead to differentiated responses among individual citizens.
Second, the degree of participation in policy advocacy differs in these
three countries. In South Korea, CSOs formed a coalition to advocate for
structural public policy changes to cope with COVID-19. In China and
Japan, the advocacy efforts to address education inequality caused by
COVID-19 were rather fragmented and not necessarily incorporated into
the government’s policy agendas.
Third, the degree of collaboration between civil society and govern-
ment differs across these three countries. As shown in South Korea, the
government’s proactive collaboration with civil society was a decisive
contributor to successful resilience during COVID-19. In China, the civil
society sector lacks institutional channels to forge systematic collabora-
tions with the government in general and the situation did not change
during the pandemic. In the background, two recent national regulations
have further hindered civil society’s response to COVID-19. The 2016

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Charity Law is argued as an extension of political control over the civil

society sector.69 The Overseas NGO Law has posed new obstacles for
collaboration between ONGOs and the Chinese government. The civil
society sector in Japan, however, tended to work relatively independently
from government agencies during the pandemic.
5. Conclusion
COVID-19 is an unprecedented public health crisis across the world that
requires collaborative, multilevel, and multisectoral approaches to limit the
virus’s spread. The global pandemic response is not just governmental
public policy action or law enforcement; it is a collaboration among the
various actors in society that has been essential in curtailing the spread of
COVID-19. In particular, civil society engagement is a necessary part of
enhancing social resilience to curb COVID-19. Based on the comparative
analysis of China, Japan, and South Korea, this article has examined civil
society’s responses to COVID-19 and provides three key findings. First,
this study shows that the actions taken against COVID-19 by civil society
at the national and cross-border levels enhance social resilience to mitigate
the damage of COVID-19. The actions examined included philanthropic
donations (cash and in-kind), targeted consumption as part of intended
action, consistent service provisions, information dissemination, and
advocacy actions in varied forms and levels across the three countries. We
observed that citizens’ generosity was enhanced in various ways during the
pandemic. Cash and in-kind donations were rushed in, and targeted
consumption by individuals and CSOs was highlighted as part of intended
generosity actions. It is uplifting to find that philanthropic donations
increased in this extreme event, portraying civil society’s humanitarian
nature. However, the long-term projection of these philanthropic donations
and their capacity might be put into question, given that the economic
outlook for all countries, despite their variations, is gloomy. Declining
economies may reduce the investments in resources for the civil society
sector, while increased demand for assistance will be needed from margin-
alized groups. Another noteworthy point is that vulnerable populations are
the main target groups for civil society interventions. Despite all variations
and differences in the crisis’s stages, the magnitude of the pandemic’s after-
math, and the types of vulnerabilities observed, the service provisions for
marginalized and vulnerable groups in each country have been an invariant
feature that commonly characterized the three countries’ cases.

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Second, for government-civil society collaboration, this study exhibits

various types of collaborative partnerships in the three cases. The hetero-
geneity of CSOs and the varying civil society development paths in the
respective countries lead to different types and levels of collaborative
partnership. As seen in China’s case, the government forged different
partnerships with GONGOs and grassroots CSOs. In Japan’s case, neigh-
borhood and resident associations formulated stronger partnerships with
local governments in responding to community needs, while grassroots
CSOs tend to work relatively independently from government agencies.
The government-CSO collaborative relationship was most inclusive,
mutually enhancing, and complementary in South Korea.
Third, this study shows that communities and civil society are not
necessarily geographically restricted in terms of their service target
groups. The target groups go beyond domestic victims, as shown in the
transnational donations, as exemplified by the joint relief efforts of the
Red Cross of Korea, China, and Japan in coordination with the IFRC to
respond to the needs of the people of Wuhan in the early stages of the
COVID-19 outbreak. The transnational engagement, however, is closely
related to the government’s diplomatic strategy.
This study’s findings contribute to our understanding of the relation-
ship between civil society and social resilience in extreme events such as
COVID-19. Various social resilience indicators use the number of CSOs
and volunteers to measure social capital and find the positive impact of
civil society on mitigating the damage of extreme events. Yet little is
known about the mechanisms of civil society response in achieving the
positive outcomes. Moreover, the measurement might be insufficient to
capture the interactions between different sectors, while multisectoral
collaboration has been identified as a key factor in comprehending civil
society’s impact. This study provides a timely and detailed account of
how the civil society sector has engaged in the COVID-19 response
among three East Asian countries. The comparative analysis of three East
Asian countries adds insight into how contextual factors enhance or
hinder civil society responses in extreme events.
Despite the contributions, we acknowledge two limitations in this
study. First, the period of study was limited to only the first half year from
the pandemic’s global outbreak. Given that the COVID-19 pandemic is
still in progress, snapshots of civil society responses may not fully reflect
the current situation or activities. Additional follow-up on the unfolding
situation and civil society’s response to the changing environment should

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be examined. Nevertheless, the preliminary findings are still valuable for

other countries regarding civil society engagement in combating the
pandemic. Second, methodologically, this study largely relies on systematic
qualitative analysis of secondary sources in the three countries,
constraining the generalizability of its findings. Illustrations of cases and
examples introduced in the news media may not fully reflect the spectrum
of civil society’s roles during the COVID-19 pandemic. Since this compar-
ative study is an initial attempt to systematically explore civil society’s
responses to extreme events, we expect it to offer the broadest possible
range of insights and hypotheses for further analysis. Future research could
operationalize the factors identified by this study to delineate civil society’s
general pattern and social resilience in extreme events.
Notes
1 World Health Organization, “Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) Situation
Report-162,” 30 June 2020, https://www.who.int/docs/default-source/
coronaviruse/20200630-covid-19-sitrep-162.pdf?sfvrsn=e00a5466_2.
2 Jae M. Moon, “Fighting Against COVID-19 with Agility, Transparency, and
Participation: Wicked Policy Problems and New Governance Challenges,”
Public Administration Review, Vol. 80, No. 4 (2020), pp. 651–656; Brian Y.
An and Shui-Yan Tang, “Lessons from COVID-19 Responses in East Asia:
Institutional Infrastructure and Enduring Policy Instruments,” American
Review of Public Administration, Vol. 50, Nos. 6–7 (2020), pp. 790–800.
3 Max Fisher and Sang-Hun Choe, “How South Korea Flattened the Curve,”
New York Times, 23 March 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/23/
world/asia/coronavirus-south-korea-flatten-curve.html.
4 Nachalie Tocci, “The COVID-19 Global Inflection Point and Europe’s
Predicament,” Asia Europe Journal, Vol. 18 (2020), pp. 227–229.
5 Kin-Man Wan, Lawrence Ka-ki Ho, Natalie W. M. Wong, and Andy Chiu,
“Fighting COVID-19 in Hong Kong: The Effects of Community and Social
Mobilization,” World Development, Vol. 134 (2020): 105055.
6 The details of the project can be accessed at https://www.ln.edu.hk/lei/
project-ultra-violite.
7 Yvette Tan, “Covid-19 Singapore: A ‘Pandemic of Inequality’ Exposed,” BBC
News, 17 September 2020, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-54082861.
8 Niam Kapucu, “Public-Nonprofit Partnerships for Collective Action in
Dynamic Contexts of Emergencies,” Public Administration, Vol. 84, No. 1
(2006), pp. 205–220; Stephanie Gajewski, Holly Bell, Laura Lein, and
Ronald J. Angel, “Complexity and Instability: The Response of Nongovern-
mental Organizations to the Recovery of Hurricane Katrina Survivors in a

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Host Community,” Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, Vol. 40, No. 2
(2010), pp. 389–403; Lin Peng and Fengshi Wu, “Building Up Alliances and
Breaking Down the State Monopoly: The Rise of Non-Governmental
Disaster Relief in China,” The China Quarterly, Vol. 234 (2018), pp.
463–485.
9 Dong Keun Yoon, Jung Eun Kang, and Samuel D. Brody, “A Measurement
of Community Disaster Resilience in Korea,” Journal of Environmental
Planning and Management, Vol. 59, No. 3 (2016), pp. 436–460.
10 World Health Organization, “Coronavirus Disease (COVID-19) Situation
Report-162.”
11 Francis Fukumaya, “Confucianism and Democracy,” Journal of Democracy,
Vol. 6, No. 2 (1995), pp. 20–33; Meredith Woo-Cumings, The Developmental
State (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999).
12 For a detailed comparison of environmental civil society in China, Japan,
and South Korea, see Fengshi Wu and Bo Wen, “Nongovernmental Organi-
zations and Environmental Protests,” in Routledge Handbook of Environ-
ment and Society in Asia, edited by Graeme Lang and Paul Harris (London:
Routledge, 2015), pp. 105–119.
13 Xiaoguang Kang and Han Heng, “Graduated Controls: The State-Society
Relationship in Contemporary China,” Modern China, Vol. 34, No.1 (2008),
pp. 36–55; Fengshi Wu and Kin-man Chan, “Graduated Control and
Beyond: The Evolving Government-NGO Relations,” China Perspectives,
Vol. 2012, No. 3 (2012), pp. 9–17.
14 Jennifer Y. J. Hsu and Reza Hasmath, “The Local Corporatist State and
NGO Relations in China,” Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 23, No. 87
(2014), pp. 516–534.
15 Aya Okada, Yu Ishida, Takako Nakajima, and Yasuhiko Kotagiri, “The State
of Nonprofit Sector Research in Japan: A Literature Review,” Voluntaristics
Review, Vol. 2, No. 3 (2017), pp. 1–68.
16 Sung-Ju Kim and Jin-Kyung Jung, “Korean Nonprofit/Non-government
Sector Research: A Literature Review and Analysis,” Voluntaristics Review,
Vol. 4, No. 6 (2020), pp. 1–71.
17 For a commonly used definition of civil society, see Lester M. Salamon,
Global Civil Society (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Center for Civil Society
Studies, 1999); S. Wojciech Sokolowski and Lester M. Salamon, Global Civil
Society: Dimensions of the Nonprofit Sector (Boulder, CO: Kumarian Press,
2004).
18 Crawford S. Holling, “Resilience and Stability of Ecological Systems,”
Annual Review of Ecology and Systematics, Vol. 4, No. 2 (1973), p. 17.
19 Louise K. Comfort, Arjen Boin, and Chris C. Demchak, Designing Resil-
ience: Preparing for Extreme Events (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh
Press, 2010), p. 5; Naim Kapucu and Monty Van Wart, “The Evolving Role

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of the Public Sector in Managing Catastrophic Disasters: Lessons Learned,”

Administration and Society, Vol. 38, No. 3 (2006), pp. 279–308.
20 Naim Kapucu, “Planning for Disasters and Responding to Catastrophes:
Error of the Third Type in Disaster Policy and Planning,” International
Journal of Public Policy, Vol. 3, Nos. 5–6 (2008), pp. 313–327; Gajewski et
al., “Complexity and Instability.”
21 Louise K. Comfort and Naim Kapucu, “Inter-organizational Coordination
in Extreme Events: The World Trade Center Attacks, September 11, 2001,”
Natural Hazards, Vol. 39, No. 2 (2006), pp. 309–327; Simon Hollis, The Role
of Regional Organizations in Disaster Risk Management (London: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2015), pp. 1–12.
22 Asahi Shimbun, “Data File 2020: Asahi Shimbun Media Materials” (in Japanese)
(n.d.), https://adv.asahi.com/adv/other/ad_info/media_kit/DataFile2020.pdf.
23 State Council Information Office of China, “Kangyi xinguan feiyan yiqing
de zhongguo xingdong baipishu” (White Paper of Fighting COVID-19:
China in Action) (2020), https://covid-19.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202006/08/
WS5edd8bd6a3108348172515ec.html.
24 Details of the report are available at https://www.cafpnet.cn/index.php?s=/
Index/detail/id/409.html.
25 State Council Information Office of China, “White Paper of Fighting
COVID-19: China in Action.”
26 Examples of psychological support provided by CSOs can be found in the
article “Jiangning wenming zhijian: Zhilao xinli fangyi ‘yizhangwang’” (The
Civilized Measures Taken in Jiangning City: Enhance the Network to
Combat Psychological Difficulties during the Pandemic), 3 February 2020,
http://www.js.xinhuanet.com/2020-02/03/c_1125525873.htm.
27 Fengshi Wu and Shen Yang, “Web 2.0 and Political Engagement in China,”
Voluntas, Vol. 27, No. 5 (2015), pp. 2055–2076.
28 For more information, please refer to the article “Zhuli kangyi wuzi dian-
duidian jingzhun duijie, quanguogongshanglian dajian xianshang yiqing
wuzi gongxu pingtai” (The Platform by ACFIC to Provide Point to Point
Connection for Epidemic Prevention and Control Supplies), https://www.
acfic.org.cn/yw/qlyw/202002/t20200205_154428.html.
29 Further information can be accessed at https://www.thepaper.cn/
newsDetail_forward_6565957.
30 The China Foundation for Poverty Alleviation played an active role in
combating the widespread pandemic in Wuhan. For detailed information,
please refer to http://www.cfpa.org.cn/news/news_detail.aspx?articleid=1582.
31 For further information about the project, please refer to https://www.
alipayfoundation.org.cn/content/112.
32 Civil Affairs Ministry, PRC, “Dongyuan cishan liliang yifa youxu canyu
xinxing guanzhuang bingdu ganran de feiyan yiqing fangkong gongzuo”

124.153.16.66 on Tue, 17 Oct 2023 19:08:25 +00:00
(Mobilizing Philanthropic Efforts to Combat COVID-19), 26 January 2020,

http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/zhengceku/2020-01/26/content_5472289.htm.
33 Yuan Cheng, Jianxing Yu, Yongdong Shen and Biao Huang, “Coproducing
Responses to COVID-19 with Community-Based Organizations: Lessons
from Zhejiang Province, China,” Public Administration Review, Vol. 80, No.
5 (2020), pp. 866–873.
34 Reza Hasmath, Timothy Hildebrandt, and Jennifer Y. J. Hsu, “Conceptualizing
Government-Organized Non-governmental Organizations,” Journal of Civil
Society, Vol. 15, No. 3 (2019), pp. 267–284.
35 Civil Affairs Ministry, PRC, “Mobilizing Philanthropic Efforts to Combat
COVID-19.”
36 For more information about the Red Cross Society of China Hubei Branch
incidents, please refer to http://www.xinhuanet.com/renshi/2020-02/04/
c_1125530316.htm.
37 Lin Peng and Fengshi Wu, “Building Up Alliances and Breaking Down the
State Monopoly.”
38 Fengshi Wu, “Strategic State Engagement in Transnational Activism: AIDS
Prevention in China,” Journal of Contemporary China, Vol. 20, No. 71 (2011),
pp. 621–637.
39 During the early stage of pandemic, Japan and South Korea had kindly
contributed medical supplies to China: http://nagoya.china-consulate.org/
chn/zt_1/ngyfy/xskj/t1737071.htm, http://world.people.com.cn/n1/2020/01
28/c1002-31563814.html.
40 For more information on the role of alumni associations in the pandemic,
please refer to https://www.infzm.com/contents/176425.
41 For further details, please refer to http://gat.hubei.gov.cn/fjwbqzglbgs/
gzdt/307605.htm.
42 Jennifer Y. J. Hsu, Timothy Hildebrandt, and Reza Hasmath, “Going Out or
Staying In? The Expansion of Chinese NGOs in Africa,” Development Policy
Review, Vol. 34, No. 3 (2016), pp. 423–439; David Brenner, “Are Chinese
NGOs ‘Going Out’? The Role of Chinese NGOs and GONGOs in Sino-
African Relations,” Journal of Public and International Affairs, Vol. 22, No. 1
(2012), pp. 131–152.
43 For more information, see “Zhongguo minjian zuzhi guoji jiaoliu cujinhui
faqi siluyijiaqin minjian kangyi gongtong xingdong” (The Chinese Associa-
tion of NGO Cooperation Calls for Collective Actions Against the
Pandemic), https://www.the paper.cn/newsDetail_forward_7280757.
44 See the example of the Alibaba Foundation’s contribution to the interna-
tional community, https://www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_6961461.
45 For details on Xi Jinping’s remarks made at the Summit, please refer to
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202003/27/WS5e7d688aa310128217282741.
html.

124.153.16.66 on Tue, 17 Oct 2023 19:08:25 +00:00
46 Ming Hu and Mark Sidel, “Civil Society and COVID in China: Responses
in An Authoritarian Society,” Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, Vol.
49, No. 6 (2020), pp. 1173–1181.
47 The average scores for other institutions in the survey were as follows:
central government (8.83), provincial government (7.76), subprovincial
government (7.62), Wuhan Municipal Government (5.89), and medical
workers (9.7). See Huan Yang, Peng Bin, and Alex Jingwei He, “Opinions
from the Epicenter: An Online Survey of University Students in Wuhan
Amidst the COVID-19 Outbreak,” Journal of Chinese Governance, Vol. 5,
No. 2 (2020), pp. 234–248.
48 People’s Daily, “Diaodong shehui zuzhi canyu yingdui zhongda shijian”
(Mobilize Social Organizations to Participate in Tackling Major Incidents),
21 April 2020, http://paper.people.com.cn/rmrb/html/2020-04/21/
nw.D110000renmrb_20200421_3-09.htm.
49 Hiroshi Kashiwagi, “Corona Pandemic and Citizens Activities: Reading
from the Timeline” (in Japanese), Volo, No. 531 (2020), pp. 2–3.
50 ARROWS, “Emergency Assistance on the Novel Coronavirus: Staff
Dispatched to China” (in Japanese), 28 January 2020, https://arrows.red/
news/emergency/n20200128/.
51 Katariba, “Press Release: NPO Katariba Has Begun Offering Online Support
Measures for Children at Home and Preparing to Set Up a Consultation
Desk for Parents as the New Coronavirus Spreads” (in Japanese), 28
February 2020, https://www.katariba.or.jp/news/2020/02/28/20908/.
52 The Novel Coronavirus Support Organizations Social Solidarity, “Voice of
Nonprofits and Recommendations” (in Japanese), 9 November 2020, stop-
covid19-for-npo.jp/page/7#secondary-31.
53 Kashiwagi, “Corona Pandemic and Citizens Activities,” p. 2.
54 Coalition for Legislation to Support Citizens’ Organizations, “[Submission
of Request] Items Demanded to Support Nonprofit Corporations in
Responding to the Novel Coronavirus Infectious Disease” (in Japanese), 5
March 2020.
55 Robert Pekkanen, Japan’s Dual Civil Society: Members without Advocates
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2006).
56 Beautiful Foundation and S. Kim, “Examination of the Impact of COVID-19
on Nonprofits” (in Korean), paper presented at the 6th Sharing Philan-
thropy/Nonprofit-Related Knowledge Network Special Forum, 1 July 2020.
57 Community Chest of Korea, “Report on COVID-19 Special Fundraising
Status” (in Korean), https://chest.or.kr/ca/speclmys/initCovid.do.
58 Community Chest of Korea and H. Shin, “Responses and Responsibilities of
Community Chest of Korea in the COVID-19 Pandemic” (in Korean),
paper presented at the 6th Sharing Philanthropy/Nonprofit-Related Knowl-
edge Network Special Forum, 1 July 2020.

124.153.16.66 on Tue, 17 Oct 2023 19:08:25 +00:00
59 Beautiful Foundation, “Implications of Corporate Social Responsibility on

COVID-19” (in Korean), 15 July 2020, https://research.beautifulfund.org/
blog/2020/07/15/.
60 Community Chest of Korea, “Report on COVID-19 Special Fundraising
Status.”
61 Hope Institute, “COVID-19 Civil Society Countermeasure Committee
Launched” (In Korean), 6 May 2020, https://www.makehope.org/.
62 Halla Daily Newspaper, “Jeju Province, Strengthening Government-Private
Collaboration in COVID-19 Response” (in Korean), 29 January 2020.
63 Asia Economy Daily Newspaper, “We Must Stop the Spread of the Corona-
virus Together” (in Korean), 2 February 2020.
64 Community Chest of Korea and H. Shin, “Responses and Responsibilities of
Community Chest of Korea in the COVID-19 Pandemic.”
65 Mae-il Economy Daily Newspaper, “The Korean Red Cross Provides Masks
to China” (in Korean), 30 January 2020.
66 Moon, “Fighting Against COVID-19 with Agility.”
67 David H. Slater, “Vulnerable Populations under COVID-19 in Japan: A Lull
in the Storm?,” Asia-Pacific Journal, Vol.18, No. 2 (2020), pp. 1–16.
68 Nikkei Asian Review, “Does Japan Need an Equivalent of the CDC to Fight
Coronavirus?,” 17 March 2020, https://asia.nikkei.com/Opinion/
Does-Japan-need-an-equivalent-of-the-CDC-to-fight-coronavirus.
69 Anthony J. Spires, “Regulation as Political Control: China’s First Charity
Law and Its Implications for Civil Society,” Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector
Quarterly, Vol. 49, No. 3 (2020), pp. 571–588.

124.153.16.66 on Tue, 17 Oct 2023 19:08:25 +00:00
124.153.16.66 on Tue, 17 Oct 2023 19:08:25 +00:00

Civil Society Responses To The COVID-19 Pandemic

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