SME Annual Meeting

Feb. 25 - 28, 2018, Minneapolis, MN

Preprint 18-023

A FORWARD LOOK INTO THE U.S. RARE EARTHS INDUSTRY; HOW POTENTIAL MINES CAN CONNECT TO THE GLOBAL
REE MARKET

G. Barakos, TU Bergakademie Freiberg, Freiberg, Germany

H. Mischo, TU Bergakademie Freiberg, Freiberg, Germany
J. Gutzmer, Helmholtz Inst. Freiberg for Resource Tech., Freiberg, Germany

ABSTRACT seems to be the most important factor, as it is technically challenging

Mining used to be a business primarily focused on the technical
aspects of getting valuable ore out of the ground and extracting the
minerals efficiently. Without denying the importance of these skills, a
narrow focus on technical issues is no longer enough to guarantee
success when it comes to exploiting rare earth element (REE)
deposits. Molycorp failed to enter the global REE market in a
successful manner, while none of the many REE exploration projects
has turned into an active mine so far and none is expected to
commence operations in the near future. Accordingly, the world of REE
is far more complex compared to other commodities.
This paper looks into the REE industry to identify the factors that
can connect potential U.S. REE mines to the market. The ability to
break free from past thinking and become future-focused is a key
driver. Mining of REE is pointless without a corresponding value-
adding chain, while developing a value chain without first establishing
an uninterruptible source of REE is also senseless. The mining sector
must be based on the REE value chain and vice versa, along with the
establishment of a market channel for the REE products that come out
of the mine.
INTRODUCTION
It has been seven years since rare earth elements became the
subjects of front-page headlines. It was when the controversial
Chinese export policy for these critical commodities was epitomised in
a maritime border dispute with Japan in September 2010 that resulted
in the big REE crisis and price spike of 2011 (Barakos et al, 2016c;
Mancheri, 2015).
The world was dismayed, especially in REE-importing countries,
such as the United States that was and is still totally dependent on
Chinese production and exports (Barakos et al, 2016c; Kennedy,
2015). The short-lived alarm initiated a treasure hunt by way of
exploration for REE deposits all over the world. The continuously
growing demand on the one hand and the Chinese sovereignty of the
REE-market on the other, led the rest of the world to explore their own
REE resources. In just a few years, more than 400 projects were
initiated to explore REE deposits outside of China (ERECON, 2015;
Goodenough, 2016).
The prices of REE, however, dropped rapidly and at the moment
of writing this paper are in 6-year lows, at the level of the price average
before the 2011 crisis (Barakos, 2017). The viability of even major
established producers is being challenged, not to mention the
development prospects of potential REE-market entrants (Barakos et
al, 2016b; Rollat et al, 2016). Production cutbacks and industry
consolidation in China impel REE market experts to forecast that
prices have already reached their lowest point and have nowhere to go
but up (Adamas, 2015; Roskill 2015). Yet, expectations for increased
REE prices are limited and drastic changes are unlikely to happen in
the near future, as there is still excess supply in the overall REE
market (Barakos, 2017).
Nevertheless, the low prices of rare earths are not the only reason
that potential producers are struggling to enter the global REE market.
Among other parameters, the separation of the individual elements
1 Copyright © 2018 by SME
and expensive to build and to operate.
Thus, in this paper an analysis is made to identify the boundary
conditions that govern both the global and domestic (U.S.) REE
industry in order to determine the factors and establish a market
channel that can connect potential U.S. REE projects to the global
market.
A U.S. REE INDUSTRY RETROSPECTIVE
The exploration boom in the U.S. resulted in finding several REE
deposits (Figure 1); while Molycorp began to re-evaluate the REE
project in Mountain Pass, California with a view to bring the mine back
into production.
Figure 1. The map of U.S. showing the domestic distribution of REE
mines and deposits.
Prior to the rise of REE mining in China, the United States
dominated the global market. Mountain Pass initiated operations in
1965 and was the leading producer worldwide for decades, with the
next-largest producer, Australia, producing only a fraction of the U.S.
output (Barakos, 2017). However, mining activities stopped in 1998,
mainly due to the competition from China as well as in response to
environmental issues in the surrounding area of Mountain Pass (Ali,
2014; Mancheri, 2015).
Molycorp re-activated the mine in 2010 and committed to an
expansion, which costed US$ 1.6 billion in order to upgrade its
processing and separation facilities (Roskill, 2015). Pressed by
declining prices for its products, however, Molycorp was forced to
share capital increases and several investors entered the jointed
venture. Despite the recapitalisations, Molycorp could not avoid filing
for bankruptcy in 2015 loaded with US$ 1.7 billion in debt (Barakos et
al, 2016b; Machacek & Kalvig, 2016). On its way out of bankruptcy,
Molycorp decided in early-2016 to abandon its Mountain Pass mining
facility. The company tried to rebuild itself around the Neo Material line
of businesses that process rare earths, while the Mountain Pass mine
was separately purchased by MP Mine Operations LLC on July 2017
(Roskill, 2017).

Apart from Mountain Pass, significant exploration projects in the
United States include the Bear Lodge, the Bokan-Dotson Ridge, the
Round Top and the La Paz project. The aforementioned projects are
listed in the TMR Index (www.techmetalsresearch.com) as being in an
advanced exploration and/or evaluation stage.
Additionally, some other interesting deposits have attracted
interest. Thus, a list of the most important REE sources in the United
States is illustrated in Table 1. The numbering of projects is not related
to their significance; it starts from west to east and from north to south.
The Bokan-Dotson Ridge REE project in Alaska deals with the
largest HREE deposit in the U.S. and is currently in the evaluation
stage. UCORE Rare Metals owns the project and intends to produce
separated and purified rare earth oxides (REO) using Molecular
Recognition Technology (MRT) (Izatt et al, 2016).
The Bear Lodge LREE deposit in Wyoming is being explored by
Rare Element Resources. The mineralisation is LREE dominated, like
in Mountain Pass (Roskill, 2015). The project is at an advanced stage;
an updated pre-feasibility study was published in 2014.
Table 1. REE mining and exploration projects in the U.S.
REE project Ownership
1 Mountain Pass MP Mine Operations
2 Bokan Dotson Ridge UCORE Rare Metals
3 Thor Elissa Resources
4 Lemhi Pass U.S. Rare Earths
5 La Paz AusAmerican Mining
6 Diamond Creek U.S. Rare Earths
7 Bear Lodge Rare Element Resources
8 Round Top Mountain Texas Mineral Resources
9 Elk Creek NioCorp Developments
10 Pea Ridge Wings Enterprises
The Round Top REE deposit is another very large, yet low grade
resource worth mentioning. The project is located at Round Top
Mountain, Texas and is enriched in both LREE and HREE as well as in
other elements such as lithium, beryllium, thorium, uranium, niobium,
tantalum and hafnium (Roskill, 2015).
The La Paz REE deposit is a low grade LREE source located in
Arizona AusAmerican Mining Corporation owns and runs the La Paz
REE exploration project that is still under preliminary evaluation.
Other remarkable REE sources that have not been translated yet
into advanced exploration projects include the Thor REE deposit in
New York Mountains, Nevada; the Lemhi Pass and Diamond Creek
sources in Idaho; the Elk Creek project in Nebraska; and the Pea
Ridge REE project in St. Louis, Missouri (Roskill, 2015).
According to the United States Geological Survey (USGS) the
global estimated reserves of rare earths are rounded at 120 Mt, while
the domestic reserves in the U.S. are calculated at 1.4 Mt (USGS,
2017). It should be mentioned here that the reserves estimate for 2015
was 4.1Mt, whereas the estimate for 2010 was 13Mt (Paulick &
Machacek, 2017). This reduction is attributed to the reclassification of
historic resources at Mountain Pass using the more stringent
requirement of NI 43-101 reporting.
CHALLENGES FOR THE U.S. REE INDUSTRY
Without doubt, the U.S. is home to a significant amount of REE
resources and theoretically there could be a supply of rare earths for
several years. Nevertheless, the country is 100% import-reliant on
REE and thus, the exploitation of U.S. domestic resources seems to be
offering no real solution to the problem. The emphatic failure of
Molycorp to run Mountain Pass in a successful manner is the most
typical example (Barakos et al, 2016b; Kennedy, 2015).
The REE industry is not a simple explore-extract-merchandise
business; it is governed by a set of special boundary conditions which
can determine the feasibility of any potential REE mining project.
These conditions are discussed hereinafter in order to evaluate the
2 Copyright © 2018 by SME
SME Annual Meeting
Feb. 25 - 28, 2018, Minneapolis, MN
connection perspectives of future U.S. REE mines to the global rare
earths market.
REE prices
A major challenge for the U.S. REE industry regards the low
prices of the elements. The REE prices soared in response to the
implementation of strict export quotas from the Chinese government
and to the fear that there will be a supply chain disruption (Barakos,
2017). However, when buyers realised that the actual supply to
consumers was not that tight, prices plunged. The disruption in supply
was also short-lived and the demand for rare earths barely exceeded
supply in 2010 and 2011 (Roskill, 2015).
Despite lasting for a short period of time, the high prices of REE
enticed investments in small exploration companies in the U.S. and
around the world, which in turn promised to develop new sources of
rare earths. Nonetheless, mining does not react as quickly to market
demands; in fact it takes a few years to advance from the exploration
stage to the actual initiation of mining operations. Surprisingly, this was
to the benefit of many potential REE producers, since the drop in
prices led to second thoughts and a re-evaluation of the prospects of
their projects. This situation, however, has a profound impact on the
potential of junior companies to secure investments for capital costs
required to work towards mine development (Paulick & Machacek,
2017)
The steadily low prices of REE in the last two years until the
moment of writing this paper indicate that price developments are not
necessarily linked exclusively to changes in supply and demand.
Through its monopolistic control over the small and opaque REE
market, China has managed to reduce the prices at a level that is low
enough to prevent other potential producers from commencing mining
operations. However, there are also indications that the potential of
China to influence REE prices is now also limited; the prices have
dropped so low that even the viability of Chinese REE projects is at
risk. Illegal mining and processing of rare earths inside China and their
smuggling out of the country is destroying the Chinese REE industry,
while only the downstream industries are profitable at the expense of
the environment (Packey & Kingsnorth, 2016).
In an effort to detain illegal depletion of domestic resources at the
expense of the environment, Chinese authorities have been
consolidating the domestic REE industry into big government-
controlled enterprise groups (Roskill, 2015). Nonetheless, as long as
illegal production of REE finds customers both inside and out of China,
the prices of the elements will stay in alarmingly low levels.
The balance problem
But even if the REE prices were high enough to allow potential
producers initiate operations, there would still be important issues that
would jeopardize the long-term viability of their projects.
An obvious reason for possible failure is the oversupply of REE in
their relatively small market. The global consumption is of the order of
150,000 tonnes per annum (USGS, 2017) and any additional
production of rare earths would cause a glut in the marketplace. A
reasonable argument could arise at this point. Since new sources of
REE are now available outside of China, it would be a good
opportunity to change the current situation so that worldwide
consumers stop buying from China, thus allowing new producers to
obtain that significant share of the market. Nevertheless, the rationale
behind this argument is not that simple.
The group of REE consists 15 different elements with interesting
similarities but at the same time extremely different characteristics and
behaviors. Their diversity in physical and chemical properties defines
their individual demand in different applications and in turn their
criticality. In addition to this, REE are not present in equal amounts in
their host minerals. REE-bearing minerals generally contain most of
the rare earths in varying concentrations, but tend to be biased
towards either LREE or HREE. In general terms, light REE are
substantially more abundant in REE deposits than the heavy REE.
Apparently, it is not possible to selectively target just one specific
element of the REE group for mining. All REE have to be mined

together and get separated through various metallurgical procedures.
Hence, if the elements in higher demand have a lower abundance
within these geological formations, the minimum quantity that needs to
be mined, processed and separated must be at least the amount
required for these critical applications (Binnermans & Jones, 2015). As
a consequence, elements of higher abundance and lower criticality will
be produced in larger than required quantities, and due to these
surpluses, they will have to be stockpiled, thus increasing the costs of
mining, processing and storing. This is the reason why for the time
being cerium and lanthanum sell below cost (Kennedy, 2015).
That being the case, the deposit in Mountain Pass is rich in non-
critical LREE (mainly lanthanum and cerium) and this has factually
played a major role in its current economic status. Apparently there is
already a surplus in the global market of the LREE that Molycorp had
been producing. As if this is not enough, expanding the production of
these specific elements may gradually affect market prices for all the
other non-critical rare earths. For instance, an increase in supply by
REE-separating companies in mid-2014 resulted in prices descending
further, especially for dysprosium, praseodymium and neodymium
oxides (Barakos, 2017; Mancheri, 2015)
But even if the production in Mountain Pass would have included
large volumes of high-valued REE, the only way for Molycorp and for
any other potential REE producer to sell the total amount of their
planned production would be by marketing into China that is the main
global consumer of rare earths. This would place the companies in
direct competition with a mature Chinese mining and processing sector
with significantly lower costs and thus far lower prices (ERECON,
2015).
The broken REE supply chain
But neither the overall costs nor the low prices are the real
problem facing the United States among other non-Chinese industrial
nations. The actual problem is the absence of a robust and fully
integrated value chain with sufficient capacity to translate the ore
coming out of a REE mine into valuable end-products such as smart
phones, wind turbines and electronic components for defence systems.
This vertical integration consists not only the mining and primary
beneficiation of REE -which are likely the easy steps to take- but also
the separation and purification of the individual REO and their refining
to meet specific downstream technology applications (Figure 2). Seven
years after the REE crisis, it is now common ground that the
separation of the individual elements is the most fundamental part of
the overall supply chain, since it is both technically challenging and
expensive to build and operate.
Figure 2. The rare earth element supply chain (Barakos, 2017).
China is currently the only country that has developed this
complete value adding chain - comprising of numerous independent
companies dedicated to REE research and production, each providing
highly differentiated technologies, processing, formulation, or
component-specific applications.
3 Copyright © 2018 by SME
SME Annual Meeting
Feb. 25 - 28, 2018, Minneapolis, MN
On the other hand, the processing potentials of rare earths
outside of China are limited with respect to the separation of LREE and
none concerning to the separation of HREE (Barakos, 2017; Machacek
& Fold, 2014). The Lynas Advanced Materials Plant (LAMP) in
Malaysia is currently the most advanced facility in the world for
producing a mixed rare earth oxide concentrate that is free of any
impurities and hazardous elements (e.g. naturally occurring radioactive
materials - NORMs).
When it comes to the chemical separation of the individual REO,
it can be accomplished by only a handful of companies outside of
China. There are three European-based firms, namely Rhodia in
France (also known as Rhône-Poulenc, and which is now part of
Belgian Solvay and supplying technology to Lynas), Silmet in Estonia
(which is owned by Molycorp) and the British company Less Common
Metals. Additionally, there are a few Japanese companies such as
Hitachi Metals, Santoku, Showa Denko K. K., Shin-Etsu Chemical and
Nippon Yttrium (Barakos, 2017; Roskill, 2015).
In the U.S. there are no active REE processing facilities.
Following the failure of Molycorp to establish a processing plant in
Mountain Pass, UCORE is the only company that has entered into an
agreement with IBC Advanced Technologies Inc. to develop a
metallurgical processing method for the separation and purification of
the REE coming out of the Bokan Dotson Ridge potential mine in
Alaska. Through a customised SuperLig® hydrometallurgical process
at bench scale with the use of Molecular Recognition Technology, IBC
successfully separated the entire suite of individual REE at high purity
>99% (Izatt et al, 2016). The application of MRT is presented by Ucore
as a revolutionary clean chemistry alternative to the more costly,
slower and environmentally invasive solvent extraction based methods
of REE separation. So far, however, the company has provided no
information regarding either the costs or the potential environmental
impacts associated with the use of MRT. Hence, at the time of writing
this paper, no safe conclusions can be drawn for the efficiency of this
processing method.
By taking these facts into account it is easily understandable why
consumers prefer to be supplied by China and not from standalone
mining companies who cannot replicate a complex REE value chain.
To further highlight the significance of this issue, it must be pointed out
that before its bankruptcy Molycorp was shipping all of its non-cerium
and lanthanum oxides to China for refining into high-value metals,
alloys and then into valuable end-products with all that this situation
implies (Kennedy, 2015).
Environmental impacts and legislation issues
On top of the aforementioned, the REE industry is characterised
by another drawback, namely environmental impacts. Gaining the
necessary permits to run a mine including the “social licence to
operate” is a challenge for all mining operations but is a particular
difficulty for REE producers if ores contain NORMs and if they will
produce radioactive waste. Waste disposal areas are exposed to
weathering conditions and have the potential to pollute the air, soil and
water if adequate monitoring and protection measures are not utilized
(Barakos et al, 2015). In addition to the presence of radioactivity, the
use of dangerous chemicals and toxic compounds during the
processing of REE can also result in negative environmental effects.
Lax compliance with the regulations has resulted in environmental
consequences and illegal mining in China (Ali 2014), while overly strict
environmental regulations forced REE mining operations in Mountain
Pass to stop in the first place (Barakos, 2017). The Chinese legacy of
environmental damage due to REE mining and processing activities
has raised social concerns and caused hesitation against any REE
production activities elsewhere.
Nevertheless, the pressure to take action on REE had quickly
swelled in Congress, the Defence Department, the Department of
Energy and elsewhere across the U.S. government. In the recent
years, a series of bills were introduced to the Congress. Among the
most important legislation enactments were the H.R. 4883 and S. 2006
bills that introduced the establishment of a National Rare Earth
Refinery Cooperative to provide for the domestic processing of
thorium-bearing REE concentrates (Barakos et al, 2016a).

CONNECTING POTENTIAL MINES TO THE REE MARKET
Based on the above, the status quo of the REE market and
industry do not allow for potential producers to initiate their projects in
the foreseen future. Nevertheless, these discussions are deemed
necessary not only for preventing potential projects from failure but
also for determining which, if any, are the connection perspectives of
U.S. potential REE projects to the domestic and global market.
Policies and strategies
To begin with, a change of policy is necessary now more than
ever. China can hardly be blamed for its clever use of global mineral
resources. Prior to the rise of REE mining in China, the United States
dominated the world scene for decades but the unsustainable U.S.
mineral resource policies during the last 30 years have contributed
mightily to the present state of dependence.
Relying on export streams from China became easier and
economically more feasible. However, stakeholders ought to think
about short term versus long term. The decision to sit on the sidelines
may work in a nearsighted scenario, but when a single entity has a
near monopoly such a move will no doubt become less than desirable
as time passes.
China is not anymore mining REE for a source of income and
political clout but first and foremost for its own benefit; its growing
population is consuming REE at an astonishing rate. This is why China
is trying not only to control the depletion of own resources, but also
seeks to invest in foreign exploration REE projects. In the recent past
China has been close enough to take control of some of the most
significant REE sources in the rest of the world, including Mount Weld
in Australia and Mountain Pass in California.
The latter was eventually sold in July 2017 to a Chinese-led
consortium and it is likely that Beijing will have an influence over the
development and direction of Mountain Pass. Similarly to other REE
projects in the U.S. and around the world, the restart of production at
Mountain Pass in the short term remains unlikely.
A suggestion could be that the United States should play a
waiting game and simply allow for reserves in China to be exhausted
(Paulick & Machacek, 2017). Such a mindset, however, is troubling,
since it would place an additional delay on the time it would take to
ready a potential REE mine site or build a processing plant for the full
separation of rare earths. In addition to this, the Chinese expansionary
policy will keep on luring junior projects from all over the world to ship
their products to China for further processing and fabrication.
China was able to establish an integrated value adding chain of
REE, but it has taken decades to achieve current capacities and
capabilities and Chinese producers have been careful to keep this
technology secret. Hence, such a technology cannot be duplicated in
the short term and that is something that the Western world has to
realize and act accordingly.
It will take time and a lot of effort to catch up with China, let alone
the fact that the cost of creating a large-scale fully integrated value
chain exceeds the financial capacity of any one company, industry or
even nation. In such cases, the U.S. has historically used cooperatives
to overcome market failures by spreading financial risk, gaining access
to low-cost capital, and expanding market access, thus ensuring the
production and lowering the cost for critical resources (Kennedy,
2015).
A cooperative would enable end users to act together and procure
finished REE products that currently are available only from China.
This value chain could provide a market for the U.S. REE resources,
without being undercut by the Chinese monopoly.
Initially, however, the low REE prices and the elevated costs will
still be a deterrent factor for new REE projects even in a cooperative.
Thus, projects that can start with a low capital expenditure, and then
run at low cost, may have a distinct advantage. Furthermore, the
extraction of REE as co- or by-products from existing mines is
potentially an attractive way to bring new supplies rapidly on stream,
4 Copyright © 2018 by SME
SME Annual Meeting
Feb. 25 - 28, 2018, Minneapolis, MN
possibly even “switch-on, switch-off” supplies that could react quickly
to changes in demand and to the fluctuation of REE prices.
Stakeholders from the U.S. coal industry hope to re-purpose old
mines to produce REE, while recent research in the United States
points out that the size and concentration of HREE as by products in
some unmined U.S. phosphorites predominates over the world's
richest REE deposits (Barakos et al, 2016b).
Regulations and legislation instruments
The enactment of direct and effective legislation instruments in
the U.S. has been an optimistic step towards a more robust and
efficient REE supply chain. Yet, there is more that needs to be done. In
the context of establishing a cooperative for the domestic REE
industry, further regulations must be issued.
No mining or processing licence should be granted if there is an
insufficient mining site remediation plan followed by a waste disposal
and management project as well. The Chinese pollution problem due
to lax legislation that is now costing China billions of dollars to correct
is to be avoided at any cost.
However, due to the current regulations on extracting and storing
NORMs, many mines dump material containing REE with the rest of
their waste products, despite the high value of such material (Kennedy,
2015). Thus the foundation of a corporation with the express purpose
of extracting and storing radioactive materials like thorium could result
in having additional REE sources without the cost of mining them.
It should be noted here, that REE do not harm the environment,
bad practices do. Under modern technologies the mining and
processing of REE might be just as good or bad as in any other mining
industry sector (Barakos, 2017). Hence, local societies also need to be
informed about the significance of REE production in order for the REE
mining companies to obtain the social license to operate.
Marketability of REE mine products
The entire above are steps to be taken in the right direction, but
are not the most determining factors that will connect a potential U.S.
REE mine to the market. Given the size of the market, only a few of the
exploration projects will actually become REE mines over the next
decade; which ones go into production is also difficult to predict. The
only sure thing is that the different demand for the individual REE will
play an important role.
The demand pattern for REE has changed in recent years with a
tilt towards higher use of HREE (Paulick & Machacek, 2017). Demand
is driven by the expansive interest in renewable and more efficient
energy technologies, which rely, among other, on the magnetic and
fluorescent properties of HREE.
Consequently, the development prospects of LREE suppliers like
Mountain Pass seem to be low; only a few of the mines that can
produce high-in-demand and commercially recoverable HREE may
start operations.
Nevertheless, the Chinese involvement in Mountain Pass may be
a positive, given the processing expertise which Shenghe Resource
that is leading the consortium can bring to the project and its
experience of marketing rare earth products. On the other hand,
among the HREE-oriented U.S. REE potential projects, Bokan
Mountain seems to be having some potential. However, until the MRT
proves to be a feasible REE separation method the perspectives of this
project will remain uncertain.
As if this is not enough, potential REE producers must carefully
assess which of their products can be sold entirely and which will be
stockpiled. For instance, elements such as holmium, erbium, thulium,
ytterbium and lutetium, despite being classified as HREE have limited
to no marketability and should not be considered in the REE basket
price calculations. The marketability of REE included in the deposit is,
therefore, significant.
The existence of negotiations and/or agreements with potential
customers is critical and can determine the REE basket price and
marketing policy of the mining company. Having a fixed long-term

pricing deck on customer-specified products (either oxides or mix
concentrates) will define the feasibility prospects of the REE project in
a more secure manner.
Rational evaluation of potential REE projects
Despite the significance of marketability, no relevant study is
included in the majority of published technical reports and pre-
feasibility studies conducted for potential REE projects in the U.S. and
around the world (Barakos, 2017). Additionally, it is expected in all
reports that all products will be sold in unreasonably high REE prices.
Such controversial reporting practices have infused the U.S. REE
industry and are widely adopted despite being in discordance with
regulated reporting standards.
Thus, a more careful assessment is needed, where all the
erroneous practices are eliminated and the boundary conditions
defined in this paper are considered. A proper evaluation will not
necessarily mean that any examined REE project will have a positive
economic result, but at least it can give more robust indications on
whether to further invest in the project or not.
CONCLUSIONS
In this effort to determine the connecting factors between potential
U.S. REE projects and the market of rare earths some interesting
conclusions came up.
First and foremost, China still holds the monopoly power and
despite all efforts nothing has really changed; as China goes, so goes
the global REE market. Many attribute the issue of Chinese monopoly
power to the low REE prices, but this is not the only reason. Even if the
prices were higher, the U.S. potential market entrants would have to
merchandise part of their production into China, in order to sustain
themselves.
In order to be competitive, future REE producers should then not
only concentrate on the mining side but also try to offer the entire chain
from mining to end-products in high demand and reach agreements
with potential buyers inside and out of China before proceeding to
production.
The U.S. along with the rest of the western world will have to
accept the fact that either they will finally become only the REE end-
product customers of China or, alternatively, they will have to
cooperate and re-establish the raw materials value chain from the very
beginning – having to take a steep and risky road to re-
industrialisation, in order to compete with China.
REFERENCES
1. Ali, S.H. (2014), “Social and environmental impact of the rare
earth industries”, Resources, 3(1):123-134.
2. Adamas Intelligence (2015), “Rare earth market outlook update:
Supply, demand and pricing from 2014 through 2020”.
3. Barakos, G.; Mischo, H.; Gutzmer, J. (2015), “Rare earth
underground mining approaches with respect to radioactivity
control and monitoring strategies”, in Rare Earths Industry:
Technological, Economic, and Environmental Implications, I.
Borges de Lima and W.L. Filho, ed., Amsterdam, Elsevier, 121-
138.
4. Barakos, G.; Gutzmer, J.; Mischo, H. (2016a), “Legislation:
Challenges and policy strategies: In search for a regulatory
framework for sustainable development in the rare earths mining
industry”, in Proceedings of the SME Annual Conference & Expo,
21-24 February 2016, Phoenix, Arizona, U.S.A.
5. Barakos, G.; Gutzmer, J.; Mischo, H. (2016b), “Strategic
evaluations and mining process optimization towards a strong
global REE supply chain”, Journal of Sustainable Mining,
15(1):26-35.
6. Barakos, G.; Mischo, H.; Gutzmer, J. (2016c), “An outlook on the
rare earth elements mining industry”, The AusIMM Bulletin,
2(2016):62-66.
5 Copyright © 2018 by SME
SME Annual Meeting
Feb. 25 - 28, 2018, Minneapolis, MN
7. Barakos, G. (2017), “An assessment tool for the mineability of
rare earth element deposits”, PhD Diss., Technical University
Bergakademie Freiberg, Germany.
8. Binnermans, K.; Jones, P.T. (2015), “Rare earths and the balance
problem”, Journal of Sustainable Metallurgy, 1(1):29-38.
9. European Rare Earths Competency Network (ERECON) (2015),
“Strengthening the European rare earths supply-chain:
Challenges and policy options”.
http://ec.europa.eu/DocsRoom/documents/10882/attachments/1/tr
anslations/en/renditions/pdf (last accessed 15.09.17).
10. Goodenough, K.M.; Schilling, J.; Jonsson, E.; Kalvig,; P.; Charles,
N.; Tuduri, J.; Deady, E.A.; Sadeghi, M.; Schiellerup, H.; Müller,
A.; Bertrand, G.; Arvanitidis, N.; Eliopoulos, D.G.; Shaw, R.A.;
Thrane, K.; Keulen, N. (2016), “Europe’s rare earth element
resource potential: An overview of REE metallogenetic provinces
and their geodynamic setting”, Ore Geology Reviews,
72(201):838-856.
11. Izatt, S.R.; McKenzie, J.S.; Izatt, N.E.; Bruening, R.L.; Krakowiak,
K.E.; Izatt, R.M. (2016), “Molecular Recognition Technology: A
green chemistry process for separation of individual rare earth
metals”.
http://ucore.com/documents/WhitePaper_REE_Separations.pdf
(last accessed 15.09.17).
12. Kennedy, G.; Mischo, H.; Gutzmer, J. (2015), “Rare earth
production, regulatory USA/International constraints and Chinese
dominance: The economic viability is bounded by geochemistry
and value chain integration”, in Rare Earths Industry:
Technological, Economic, and Environmental Implications, I.
Borges de Lima and W.L. Filho, ed., Amsterdam, Elsevier, 37-55.
13. Machacek, E.; Fold, N. (2014), “Alternative value chains for rare
earths: The Anglo-deposit developers”, Resources Policy, 42:53-
64.
14. Machacek, E.; Kalvig, P. (2016), “Assessing advanced rare earth
element-bearing deposits for industrial demand in the EU”,
Resources Policy, 49:188-203.
15. Mancheri, N.A. (2015), “World trade in rare earths, Chinese
export restrictions, and implications”, Resource Policy, 46:262-
271.
16. Packey, D.J.; Kingsnorth, D. (2016), “The impact of unregulated
ionic clay rare earth mining in China”, Resource Policy, 48:112-
116.
17. Paulick, H.; Machacek, E. (2017), “The global rare earth
exploration boom: An analysis of resources outside of China and
discussion of development perspectives”, Resources Policy,
52:134-153.
18. Rollat, A.; Guyonnet, D.; Planchon, M.; Tuduri, J. (2016),
“Prospective analysis of the flows of certain rare earths in Europe
at the 2020 horizon”, Waste Management, 49: 427-436.
19. Roskill (2015), “Rare earths: Market outlook to 2020”.
20. Roskill (2017), “Rare earths: Mountain Pass sold to Chinese-led
consortium”. https://roskill.com/news/ rare-earths-mountain-pass-
sold-chinese-led-consortium/ (last accessed 20.10.17).
21. U.S. Geological Survey (2017), “Mineral Commodity Summaries”.
http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/mcs/ (last accessed
14.09.17).