THE INTRODUCTION OF WESTERN EDUCATION IN NORTHERN SOMALILAND, 1920—1939

Author(s): Patrick Kakwenzire

Source: Transafrican Journal of History , 1980, Vol. 9, No. 1/2 (1980), pp. 153-164
Published by: Gideon Were Publications

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/24328555

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THE INTRODUCTION OF WESTERN EDUCATION IN NORTHERN
SOMALI LAND, 1920-1939
Patrick Kakwenzire,
Department of History, Makerere University

The Foreign Office assumed responsibility for the administration

of the British Somaliland Protectorate in 1898 and appointed Lt. Col.
Hayes Sadler as Britain's first Consul-General. Prior to these develop
ments, Britain had been studying all kinds of travellers' reports about
the purported mineral wealth of the region and about the Somali
attitude towards European intruders. Richard Burton, for example,
notwithstanding the Somali attack on his party, contended that 'The
Somali admire our rule, respect our power, comprehend our forbear
ance and they evince a gentleness of disposition and a docility which
offer fair hopes to civilization in this region of barbarism."1 However,
such views were not shared by all writers on Somaliland, and indeed
did not tally with the record of the Somali treatment of the various
shipwrecked European seamen.
In spite of the contradictory literature about the Somali, it was
generally held that once European values had been inculcated through
Western education the Somali would, in due course, become amenable
to British colonial rule. A move towards the desired goal had already
been made by French Capuchin Fathers who sought and acquired
permission to build a mission at Beibera in 1894.
Whatever hopes might have been cherished by Britain, let alone
the Catholic Missionaries, were soon to be shattered by the lukewarm
and often hostile attitude of the Somali towards the mission's religious
and educational programmes.
The failure of the mission to make any headway, particularly in
its educational aims, was the first setback in Britain's optimism in the
Somali receptiveness of European values. Britain's anxieties were soon
confirmed by the inception of the anti-colonial Dervish movement
led by Sayyid Muhammad Abdille Hassan (popularly known by the
derogatory epiphet of "the Mad Mullah") which challenged British
authority from 1900 to 1920J2
Following the intensification of the Dervish operations and Bri
tain's subsequent decision in 1910 to withdraw her administration
from the interior of the Protectorate, the mission was expelled and
allowed to take with it such of its converts as wished to accompany it
to its new site in Aden.

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 Thereafter Britain took no further steps either to encourage
missionary work or to initiate any educational programme of her own.
Her one and only preoccupation was to deal with the Dervish move
ment which was then in its tenth year of existence. Between 1910 and
1919 Britain's fortunes in her Somaliland Protectorate reached their
lowest ebb. During this period, the Dervishes succeeded in capturing the
eastern and southern parts of the Protectorate, pinning the British
administration to the Western section.
It was not until the end of World War I that Britain was able to
spare the necessary manpower and resources for the overthrow of
Sayyid Muhammad's Dervish movement.
The demise of the Dervish movement in February 1920 brought
relief to Britain and the local administration. It was generally believed
that,.with the disappearance of the Sayyid, the British would, without
further difficulty, bring the Protectorate into line with the other
British dependencies. The Treasury, more than any other department,
was relieved to see the end of the Dervish period, for it expected the
local administration to initiate taxation and other revenue-earning pro
jects which, in turn, would make the Protectorate self-reliant. Hitherto
the Protectorate had received grants-in-aid averaging £100,000 per
annum.3
For the first time in the history of the Protectorate, the esti
mates for 1920-21 financial year showed a definite shift of the Pro
tectorate's attention from military to civil administration. A number
of projects were provided for, the most important being education,
medical services and roads. On the question of revenue, however,
the local administration regarded the time as premature for initiating
radical measures such as direct taxation. The omission of any substan
tial revenue-earning proposal provoked the Treasury to "urge that the
question of bringing Somaliland into line with the other East African
Protectorates by imposition of some form of direct taxation of the
natives should receive earnest consideration."4

On the Protectorate's scale of priorities, education was considered

the most vital and urgent. It was through Western Education that
Britain hoped to plant new values and attitudes among the Somali,
and especially among those who had followed Sayyid or sympathised
with his cause. The existing form of education by 1920 consisted of
a large number of Koranic schools which were scattered in different
parts of the country. The curriculum in these schools was limited to
the study of the Koran and Arabic. On the coast there were three such
schools: one at Berbera, another at Zeila and the third at Bulhar — all
receiving a small subsidy from the colonial administration. Their ave

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rage attendance in 1919 was 72 pupils at Berbera, 16 at Bulhar and 37
at Zeila. A majority of the pupils were the sons of Indian and Arab
traders.5
In the estimates for 1920-21 Geoffrey Archer, the Governor of
the Protectorate, provided for the estabiishment of the first Govern
ment secondary school, arguing that "the time has come when the local
demand for educational facilities in the country can no longer be
ignored .... We hope eventually to recruit our clerical and subordinate
departmental establishment from the school, which will be beneficial
to the natives of the Protectorate and in the interests of economy."6
Towards the end of 1921 Archer invited E.R.J. Hussey, Chief
Inspector of Schools in the Sudan, to visit Somaliland, study the
educational requirements of the country and draw up a detailed plan
for introducing an educational programme. Hussey's educational
scheme was elaborate and extensive. He was at one with Archer in
advocating that the aims of the educational programme should be "
production of a responsible and literate type of Somali, into whom
proper ideas have been inculcated in his training It is fully
realized both at home and abroad that one of the chief objects of our
colonial administration should be gradually to guide the various races
and peoples under our control along the path of real progress, and to
teach them to take a more intelligent interest in their own affairs."7
The most important features of Hussey's scheme included the
appointment of the type of headmaster who would "endeavour to
become the friend and father of the pupils under his charge. He should
endeavour to implant and foster in the school the English public
school spirit, and build up characters on that foundation."8 In addition
to the establishment of a Government secondary school, the existing
Koranic schools — or at any rate some of them — would be placed
under the general supervision of the Headmaster, and their curriculum
would be diversified to include, besides Arabic and Koranic studies,
such subjects as Arithmetic, Hygiene and Geography. Admission to the
Government school would be on the basis of competitive examination.
Hyssey then went on to claim that "the Somali are far more alive to the
advantages to be derived from education and more anxious for its
development than the majority of the native races of Africa."9
Hussey's scheme was commended in the Colonial Office as "asto
nishingly complete."10 The problem, however, remained one of fin
ance. The Colonial Office and the Local administration had proceeded
thus far in the hope that the Treasury would sanction the estimates of
Revenue and Expenditure for 1920-1921. Some £3,397 had been
earmarked to cover the pay of the headmaster, the foundation of the

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school and the re-organization of at least four Koranic schools. With
out waiting for the Treasury's decision, Hussey, on return to the Sudan,
selected Richardson, then a teacher at Gordon College, for the post of
Headmaster of the proposed Government school. Richardson's creden
tials which made him commendable in the eyes of Hussey and Archer
were his fluency in Arabic, his two years' experience at Gordon College
and the fact that he had "commanded a battalion in France during the
War, and in his University days he was an associate blue."11
The Treasury's decision, coming a month after Richardson had
assumed his duties, was a blow to the local administration and the
Colonial Office. The education scheme was rejected on the grounds
that unless the Protectorate could devise new sources of revenue,
particularly through direct taxation, all development projects should
be held in abeyance. Richardson was sent packing, empty handed.12
Henceforth the question of taxation and that of development became
inextricably intertwined.
The Treasury's insistence that the Somali should pay for, or at
least make a substantial contribution towards, any development pro
jects forced the local administration to start experimenting with various
revenue-earning measures which were known to be unpopular with the
Somali. Archer had already warned the Colonial Office of the dangers
pertaining to the idea of introducing direct taxation. However, in view
of the Treasury's attitude, he was prepared to give it a cautious trial.
Indeed, Archer's proposal for direct taxation was the first of its kind
in the entire Somali-inhabited country as neither the French nor the
Italians had attempted it in their respective Somali colonies.
In the middle of 1921 Archer summoned a conference of the
administrative officers, the Somali Akils (agents) and the promin
Sheikhs to discuss his tax proposals as well as work out a strategy
their implementation. The main feature of the proposed tax system w
that it would take the form of annual fixed tributes for each tribal
section, the rationale being that it would have been impossible to col
lect taxes on an individual basis from the mobile Somali nomads.

Although Archer's taxation scheme was fairly well received,

some representatives from Burao District opposed it on the grounds
that the taxation of Muslims by infidels would contravene the Islamic
law. On return from the conference, the Akils and Sheikhs were heck
led and in some cases stoned by angry mobs who accused them of a
sell-out. Archer adopted a defiant attitude and proposed the formation
of an airforce to enforce the taxation measures. However, the Secre
tary of State for the Colonies would have none of this. He wrote,

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"I am strongly opposed to the introduction of tribute proposed since
it appears likely to lead to general unrest. I do not regard formation of
a Protectorate air force as practicable under present circumstances."14
With the collapse of Archer's tax proposals and the Treasury's intran
sigence, the fete of Hussey's educational scheme was thereby sealed.
It was not until 1928 that any mention of education for the
Somaliland Protectorate was made again. Credit for the revival of this
long-forgotten issue goes to the six Somali graduates who had just
completed their studies at Gordon College and returned to their homes
in Somaliland. These first Somali graduates of Gordon College were
appaled by the relative backwardness of their country, and took it upon
themselves to campaign for the introduction of Western education.
They brought a great deal of pressure on the then Governor, Harold
Kittermaster. The latter was thus forced to open the whole question,
notwithstanding the Treasury's well known attitude.

By 1928 the annual expenditure of the Protectorate on education

amounted to £30, this being the administration's subsidy towards the
three Koranic schools on the coast. In the unique circumstances of
Somaliland, Kittermaster proposed the introduction of an educational
scheme organized along the lines of a reformatory school. "I am
inclined", he wrote, "to the opinion that a reformatory school is the
best line of development. My idea is to start a reformatory school at
Hargeisa at which instruction would be given in agriculture and tech
nical education. A certain amount of clerical education would also go
with it... it might be found possible to enlarge the scope of this school
by admitting thereto other boys who might wish to attend."ls What
Kittermaster proposed to do was, more or less, to educate the Somali
by force. The merits of this policy, as he saw it, was to circumvent
the anticipated Somali resistance to a free Western educational pro
gramme.

Kittermaster's proposed scheme was submitted to the colonial

Office Advisory Committee on Native Education in Tropical Africa
where it found a hostile reception. The Committee felt that "to intro
duce education for the Somali by way of reformatory schools would
be a bad thing. There was, however, a strong feeling that something
should be done by way of provoding some opportunities for education
in Somaliland."16 The overwhelming feeling of the Committee was
that it would be disastrous to foster Western education through a
criminal institution; the free citizens would never respect it. The

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Somali, it was held, ought to accept Western education on its own
merit or do without it; Britain would be none the worse. Kittermaster's
proposals ipso facto lapsed.
Instead, the Committee recommended an improvement of the
existing Koranic schools, particularly those on the coast, "so that boys
going from there to Gordon College would be less handicapped than
at present."17 Guided by the Çommittee's recommendations, Kitter
master proceeded to draw up a programme by which the Koranic
schools were to be reformed. If the Koranic schools could agree to be
inspected regularly by a Government inspector of schools as well as
diversify their curriculum, Kittermaster was prepared to increase their
subsidy and give them any other assistance they might require. The
amount of subsidy he proposed to allocate would depend on the stan
dard of education and number of pupils in each of the schools. Schools
with twenty to thirty pupils would qualify for an annual grant of £9
each; those with thirty one to forty pupils would receive £18 annually
each; and those with forty one and above would receive £27. The subsi
dized schools would, in addition to the subsidy, receive free supplies of
books, visual aids and other educational equipment.18 The whole
scheme was earmarked for £250 in the first stage, so that "if the
people appear inclined to work with the Government in these schools,
I shall feel encouraged to go on to the second step in development,
i.e. the establishment of the existing school at Berbera on a better
basis by the provision of better buildings and better staff."19 The
second stage of development would entail, inter alia, the expansion
of the curriculum to include History, Hygiene, Geography, English
Physical Education and Social Services. The most brilliant boys would
proceed from there to Khartoum or Aden for further education. Vis
cher commended these proposals, describing them as "wise and very
sound."20
The Treasury, hitherto the main stumbling block, was won over,
at least to the extent that it agreed to finance the first stage of the
programme. The cards were now on the table of the Somali themselves.
Kittermaster invited the parents of the pupils then attending the three
Koranic schools on the coast and laid the whole plan before them. To
his disappointment the package deal was rejected in its entirety. Kitter
master was informed that the Somali preferred to be poor but indepe
ndent to being rich but subservient.21 He toured the interior with a
view to finding some support for his educational scheme., and returned
empty handed. Throughout the country, his scheme met with luke
warm and often hostile reception. The Colonial Office instructed
Kittermaster to shelve the plan altogether. In view of the Somali

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opposition to taxation, education and several other colonial projects,
Britain adopted stagnation as the policy to be pursued as from 1931.
The question of Somaliland education was laid to rest until
1936. Its re-opening was connected with the fundamental economic
and political changes brought about by Italy's invasion and occupation
of Ethiopia. Once Italy had become the de facto government of Ethio
pia, she initiated a number of economic, social and administrative
policies which were intended to transform Ethiopia into a modern
industrialized country. Among many other things, the Italians con
structed modern roads, opened new markets and invested a good deal
of capital in the industrial sector.
Britain's attitude towards Italy's occupation was, at the official
level, hostile. Indeed Britain spearheaded the anti-Italian campaign in
the League of Nations. Yet, in the Horn of Africa itself, Italian occupa
tion of Ethiopia had brought nothing but positive results to the hither
to impoverished British Somaliland Protectorate: (a) Italy sought and
acquired permission to use the Protectorate for her transit trade with
Ethiopia, (b) Italy sought and acquired permission to construct a
modern road from Berbeia right across the Protectorate up to Jinjiga.
(c) She established an effective administration in the Ogaden and there
by brought to an end the state of war which had existed on the south
ern border of the Protectorate for many years.22
As far as Britain was concerned, the positive effects of Italian
occupation of Ethiopia were underlined by the Protectorate's increase
of its revenue and the corresponding decrease of the imperial grants-in
aid. For the first time in the Protectorate's history, no grant-in-aid was
needed in 1938. With regard to the Somali response to the new oppor
tunities, it was reported that "many who never thought of trading pre
viously, are taking caravans over the border and doing very well. A sign
of prosperity is a brisk demand for building plots in Hargeisa town."23

The improvement in the Protectorate's financial standing led to

serious doubts as to whether there was further justification for Britain
to persist in pursuing the policy of stagnation. Another consideration
was whether, in view of Italy's radical policies across the border, Britain
could indefinitely remain static on her side of the border without
undermining her prestige and reputation.
A breakthough was made in 1936 when the local administration
submitted the Protectorate's estimates of revenue and expenditure in
which education was earmarked for £7 350,24 This sum was intended
to build seven Government secondary schools.
After the proposal had been studied by the Colonial Office ad
visors on education, "the view was expressed that it would be prefer

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able to start not with seven schools but with a single station school
at Berbera and to follow this up, as soon as practicable, by the esta
blishment of further schools on the same lines "2S.
The Colonial Office's views were appreciated by the local ad
ministration and at the beginning of 1938 practical steps were taken
to establish the first Government Secondary School. The school would
be headed by a European headmaster who would, in addition, be the
Director of Education for the whole Protectorate. The onus of imple
menting the second part of the programme was to rest on his shoulders.
The curriculum in the new schools was to include Writing, Read
ing, Arithmetic, Hygiene, Islamic Studies, Arabic, Geography, History
and Stock Raising. During these early stages of planning, the question
of the language of instruction was not given serious thought, it being
taken for granted that the Somali would welcome the use of the Somali
language as the primary language of instruction, with Arabic as a
supplement. The administration was soon to discover how mistaken
it had been in its assumptions.
Towards the end of March 1938 the District Officer for Burao
reported the following rather alarming news, "on or about 13th inst
Ibarahim Egal arrived from Berbera; he brought a letter with him from
the religious leaders of the Qadiriyya sect in Berbera addressed to t
Salihiya in Burao. . the gist of the letter was an appeal for opposition to
the Government schools, as this would tend to bring the boys up as
infidels and would be harmful to the Mohammadan Religion. It was
suggested in the letter that the new Director of Education was a Mi
sionary in disguise."26
Three months elapsed before these incidents were reported to
London, a factor which underlined the administration's under-esti
tion of the strength of the nascent resistance movement. This delay
taking prompt action increased the movement's popularity and mi
tancy. In July Hargeisa was reported to have been affected: some tw
Wadads (itenerant religious teachers), namely Sheikh Abdullahi Ada
and Sheikh Abdullahi Gaileh, delivered a sermon in the Hargeisa M
que against the proposed educational programme, stressing in part
cular the dangers pertaining to the introduction of written Somal
So far as these two Wadads were concerned, it was hot only Islam
which was at stake but the whole status and future of the Somali ra
By August the resistance movement in British Somaliland had
assumed dangerous dimensions and gained a substantial number
supporters. Earlier on, the Colonial Office had decided to instr
the Governor to omit the teaching of written Somali and proceed w
the rest of the programme. However, the directive was withdrawn

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gan to stone Ellison and companions. Ellison and three of his junior
staff were injured in the incident and the school buildings were dama
ged. Before the situation got out of hand, however, the District Officer,
Burao, arrived with his police force which opened fire on the crowd,
killing three people and dispersing the rest.29
A commission of inquiry which later investigated the incident
concluded that the resistance movement had been engineered by the
Wadads who had alleged not only that Ellison was a Catholic priest
in disguise but also that he had actually gone to Burao to proselytize
inside the Koranic school buildings. With these allegations, the Wadads
had managed to incite the people to violence.
Ironically the Burao rising, far from discrediting the educational
programme, strengthened it. The Wadads' machinations were condem
ned by the majority of the leading Sheikhs and elders. Similarly, the
British were encouraged by the renewed support to go ahead with
the programme. Unfortunately, this was nipped in the bud by the out
break of World War II. Thereafter the question of Somaliland education
was shelved until 1942.

Conclusion

By 1940 northern Somaliland was probably the only African

British dependency without any form of Western education. The main
problem was Britain's lack of interest in her Somaliland Protectorate
owing to the persistent Somali antipathy for British Colonialism and
the general unproductiveness of the area. Thus, Britain never attempted
to formulate and define any clear educational policy for Somaliland as
she had already done for the more manageable and profitable depe
ndencies such as West Africa, Uganda and the Sudan. Whereas Britain's
commercial, missionary and economic interests in the other parts of
Africa made it imperative for her to create a class of educated colla
borators, the absence of such interests in Somaliland made the creation
of that type of class less necessary. Britain's interests in Somaliland
were solely strategic and these could be well, and perhaps better, look
ed after without having a class of critical educated Somali. Thus, the
task of advocating western education for Somaliland was shouldered by
individual adminsitrative officers on the spot who happened to have an
interest in the matter or by some official in the Colonial Office who
happened to be reminded that Somaliland was lagging behind. Because
of the general lack of enthusiasm on the part of the British Govern
ments and public, any proposal to introduce Western education in
Somaliland could be thrown out with impunity by the Treasury on the
pretext that the Somali were not paying taxes or by the local officials

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 following assurances by Ellison, the newly appointed Director of
Education, that he would successfully persuade the Somali to accept
the whole scheme. He would go to them and convince them that the
teaching of written Somali had nothing to do with Christianity or
race categorization. Far from winning over the Somali, Ellison made
matters even worse; he was by then popularly known and addressed
as "padre" and nothing would convince them to believe otherwise.
Even by the end of his unsuccessful country-wide tour, Ellison
was determined to press on with the scheme in its entirety. He wrote,
"I agree with His Excellency that it would be a sign of weakness to
surrender to the Berbera leaders over the language question . . If at this
stage Somali were not to be regarded as a compulsory subject the
Berbera leaders would realize at once, and obviously take advantage
of the fact that they had won the day, and I think this would weaken
our position."27
In October the Colonial Office reiterated its stand: Ellison must
proceed with the opening of the Berbera school and forget all about
the controversial language issue. It was strongly felt in London that the
good will of the Somali and the overall advantages of opening the
school outweighed whatever concessions in pride Britain might have t
make by giving in over the language issue. Accordingly, the Berber
State School was opened on 1st December 1938, with fortv five DUDils.
increasing to sixty within the first two weeks.
Ellison's prediction about the Somali interpretation of Britain's
retraction over the language issue was soon vindicated. The opposi
tion to the Berbera school, far from diminishing, intensified. Plowman,
then acting Governor, received a petition stating that "as long as the
Somali teaching and the "padre" are in the school, we will not at all
accept any teaching in it, as this gravely changes our religion and pol
lutes our land."*'This was considered absurd by the Colonial Office
and the local administration since the Somali had been informed that
the teaching of written Somali would be omitted. Both the Colonial
Office and the local administration resolved not to give in to more
irrational demands.
By the beginning of 1939 the administration was busy laying
foundations for opening up more schools in the interior as originally
planned. In connection with these plans, Ellisson went on another
extensive tour of the country with the aim of reaching a mutual under
standing with the elders.. Part of his itinerary included Burao where
he arrived on 20th May and proceeded to inspect a local Koranic
school which he intended to up-grade. While the inspection was in
progess, an angry mob numbering nearly two hundred collected and be

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on the pretext that the Somali would not learn to write their language
in Roman orthography. After Britain had replaced the Italians in their
Somaliland Colony, the British sphere of influence increased in size
and therefore Somaliland became more valuable than hitherto. Hence
in 1942, notwithstanding the fact that the Somali were still not payin
taxes, Britain was prepared to launch a serious educational programm
for the hitherto neglected northern Somaliland.

FOOTNOTES

1. Burton, R. as quoted by Brockett, A. "British Somaliland Pr

torate to 1905": Oxford Ph. D. 1969, p. 23.
2. For a detailed account of Sayyid Muhammad Abdille Ha
Dervish movement, see Lewis, I.M. The Modern History of So
land.^ London 1965, Chapter IV; also P.K. Kakwenzire, "Colon
Rule in the British Somaliland Protectorate, 1905-1939", Un
sity of London, Ph. D. thesis, 1976, Chapters I — V.
3. C.O. 535/56 Estimates of Revenue and Expenditure for 1920
4. C.O. 535/64 Treasury to C.O. 27/10/1921.
5. C.O. 535/56 Report on the Somaliland Blue Book for the
1918-1919 by D. Jardine, Secretary to the Administration.
6. Estimates of Revenue of Expenditure 1920-1921. op. cit.
7. C.O. 535/62 Hussey's Memorandum on Somaliland Educa
5/12/1920
8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid. Minute by Machtig, 1st Class Clerk in the Colonial Of
11. C.O. 535/65 Archer to C.O. 2/2/1921.
12. C.O. 535/67 Treasury to C.O. 11/3/1921.
13. C.O. 535/67 Archer to C.O. 3/7/1921.
14. C.O. 535/67 Milner to Archer 3/7/1921.
15. C.O. 535/85/38052 Kittermaster to C.O. 14/4/1928
16. Ibid. Minute by Vischer, Secretary to the Committee.
17. C.O. 535/85/38052 Minutes of C.O. Advisory Committe
Native Education in Tropical Africa 17/10/1929.
18. C.O. 830/3 Education Department Annual Report for
19. C.O. 535/85/38052 Kittermaster to C.O. 26/11/1929.
20. Ibid. Minute by Vischer
21. C.O. 535/94/38465 Kittermaster to C.O. 8/5/1931.
22. In January 1937 Britain and Italy signed the Transit Trade
Grazing Rights Agreement which established political and e
mic co-operation between the Protectorate and the Italian re
in Ethiopia.

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23. Annual Colonial Report No. 1815 for 1936 P. 15.
24. C.O. 535/119/46075 Estimates of Revenue & Expenditure for
1937.
25. 830/3 Education Dept. Report op. cit.
26. C.O. 535/129/46062 Lawrence to C.O. 4/7/1938.
27. C.O. 535/129/46062 Ellison to C.O. 2/9/1938
28. C.O. 535/129/46062 Plowman (quoting parts of the petition)
to C.O. 8/12/1938.
29. C.O. 535/132/46062 Plowman to C.O. 22/5/1939.

REFERENCES

Burton, R.F. First Steps in East Africa. (London, 1956).

Brockett, A.M. "British Somaliland Protectorate to 1905", Oxford
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