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LENDENCLUB: NEW PRODUCT DEVELOPMENT IN THE DIGITAL

SPACE

Rajeev Kumra wrote this case solely to provide material for class discussion. The author does not intend to illustrate either effective
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Copyright © 2021, Ivey Business School Foundation Version: 2021-11-12

In June 2020, customer Devyanshi Shah called Bhavin Patel, chief executive officer of Innofin Solutions
Pvt. Ltd., the company behind the peer-to-peer (P2P) lending platform LenDenClub (LDC), to express her
gratitude for a loan LDC had recently advanced to her in a time of need. Patel had cross-sold Shah a new
product, InstaMoney, which was in the product-testing stage. He was delighted to know that his plan to
start a financial venture was making a difference at the grassroots level.

The LDC lending platform facilitated online lending between borrowers and lenders without the mediation
of any financial institution. These loans were unsecured. Shah had approached LDC three years earlier with
a loan request. Patel vividly remembered how frustrated Shah had been at the time because the bank had
rejected her loan application due to a reason related to her pregnancy. More recently, she had approached
LDC for a loan that fit the scope of the InstaMoney product that LDC was testing.

Patel was pleased to hear that the InstaMoney solution had been the right one for Shah. With the results of
experimental A/B testing of the InstaMoney prototype coming in, Patel wondered if, indeed, InstaMoney
was a good product concept for LDC. Could the A/B testing results be used to design an even better product?

INDUSTRY OVERVIEW AND COMPETITION

P2P lending was an alternative, unsecured form of lending used online to raise loans that would be paid
back with interest. This process was facilitated by P2P platforms on which both the lender and borrower
registered; the platform matched lenders with borrowers. The borrower could be an individual or an entity
requiring a loan. The interest rate paid by the borrower was decided either by the P2P platform or by mutual
agreement between the borrower and the lender. If set by the online platform, it calculated the interest rate
based on the risk category of the borrower.

The objective of any P2P firm was to increase returns for lenders and reduce interest rates for borrowers.
P2P lending was different from similar types of financing, such as crowdfunding or microfinance. With
crowdfunding, campaigners (individuals or firms in need of money) ran campaigns on the platform to
collect funding from angel investors, either in return for shares or as altruistic donations. The Government

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of India regulated crowdfunding when it occurred in return for shares but not when it involved donations.
Microfinance involved lenders who lent funds to borrowers who earned less than ₹100,000 per year.1

Initially, the P2P lending industry was unregulated, but after 2015, it came under the ambit of the regulations
of the central bank, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI). This gave the P2P lending industry much-needed
recognition and legal industry status and led to a surge in competition. The P2P industry in India was
expected to grow to US$10 billion by 2025.2

LDC had formidable competition from several other P2P firms: Fairassets Technologies India Pvt. Ltd.
(Faircent), Transactree Technologies Pvt. Ltd. (Lendbox), RNVP Technology Pvt. Ltd. (i2iFunding), and
Bridge Fintech Solutions Pvt. Ltd. (Finzy). In 2020, there were 20 players in this industry. However, the
business models of the three major players were differentiated in terms of targeted market segment, loan
ticket size, tenure, the interest rates offered to borrowers, and the average returns to lenders (see Exhibit 1).

The RBI regulations stipulated that firms must be registered and certified. The regulations also allowed P2P
firms to access data from and report delinquencies to a credit assessment agency. This helped in the credit
evaluation analysis. The RBI mandated a capital requirement of ₹20 million or higher in net owned funds
for a company seeking such registration, and it required the firm to maintain a leverage ratio of a maximum
of 2 per cent. To limit their exposure, lenders were restricted to a maximum of ₹5 million in investments
across all P2P platforms. Similarly, each borrower was restricted to an aggregated borrowing amount that
did not exceed ₹1 million across all P2P platforms at any given time. To protect lenders from risk, no single
loan transaction could be more than ₹50,000, and the maximum loan duration was three years.3

For transparency, the P2P lending firm was required to disclose to lenders the borrower’s details (personal
identity, loan amount, interest rate sought, and credit score) in addition to the platform’s fees and taxes.
The P2P firm also had to disclose details to the borrowers regarding lenders and the interest rate offered.
Information to be shared with the public on a monthly basis comprised credit assessments and scoring
methodology, disclaimers on data protection, grievance redressal mechanisms, portfolio performance, and
non-performing assets percentage. The RBI regulations restricted P2P firms from raising deposits; they
could neither lend on their own nor sell any products except insurance. Further, if a borrower defaulted,
P2P firms were expected to recover money only through legal methods.4

BEGINNING AND GROWTH OF LDC

Patel had started his career in a bank, selling mutual funds, and was later promoted to the position of vice-
president of finance. As a finance professional, he learned that banks, being expensive and bureaucratic,
were no solution for small, credit-starved firms and marginal borrowers. However, with available credit,
this marginal business section could grow not only its businesses, but also the economy in India.

Patel conceived the idea of launching his P2P fintech start-up to solve this problem because he believed
that P2P firms had the potential to democratize the lending ecosystem by removing banks as intermediaries.
He chose the name LenDenClub to incorporate lenden, a Hindi word that translated as “borrowing and

1
₹1 = average of US$0.013 and US$1 = average of ₹75.76 in June 2020.
2
Barkha Tekwani, “The Indian P2P Market is Expected to Grow to USD 10 Billion by 2025,” Finextra (blog), May 20, 2019,
https://www.finextra.com/blogposting/17255/the-indian-p2p-market-is-expected-to-grow-to-usd-10-billion-by-2025.
3
Reserve Bank of India, “Master Directions—Non-Banking Financial Company—Peer to Peer Lending Platform (Reserve Bank)
Directions, 2017,” RBI/DNBR/2017–18/57, October 5, 2017, https://rbi.org.in/scripts/NotificationUser.aspx?Mode=0&Id=11137.
4
Reserve Bank of India, “Master Directions.”

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lending.” Patel believed in the idea of his new venture so strongly that when a potential investor asked,
“What is your Plan B, in case things go south?” he replied without pause, “There is no Plan B.”

In August 2014, Patel founded LDC with two apprentices. Within a month, LDC had registered 45
borrowers and five lenders. This was a significant achievement because, at that point, the P2P industry’s
reputation was questionable—primarily because there were no government regulations in place for the P2P
industry and a few dubious digital lending applications (apps) were operating through fraudulent money
transactions, raising doubts in the minds of borrowers and lenders. Therefore, LDC started business in an
offline mode to build trust.

LDC’s offline mode included compulsory physical verification of the borrower and guarantor, who were
encouraged to visit the LDC office. However, the process was time consuming and cost intensive. LDC
realized that this mode was more suitable for a bank that had a sizeable business and sufficient economies
of scale to undertake the physical verification of customers. Instead, it finally migrated part of the loan
process to an online mode.

LDC was anxious to deliver the best personal loans to its marginal borrowers. It received its first round of
funding from venture capitalists and an Indian seed investment in the platform in October 2014. It then
scaled up 20 times in book size over its initial 20 months.

Patel was clear from the beginning that LDC would remain profitable if it enabled its lenders to earn returns.
LDC’s internal research indicated that 84 per cent of its lenders were male, and 16 per cent were female.
Moreover, 40 per cent of the lenders were young (under 30 years old), and most were from business
backgrounds or worked as salaried employees. They included those from chief experience officers (CXOs)
to mid-managers, and they had accessible liquidity and were looking for long-term investments that would
earn high returns. LDC decided that its lenders should earn more than bank fixed deposit rates.

The LDC technology team developed an auto-invest feature to ease the lenders’ investment process. This
feature enabled lenders to choose borrowers based on 40 criteria, such as the tenure and the purpose of the
borrower’s loan. Lenders could choose to use an auto-transfer feature, by which funds would be transferred
automatically from the lender’s account to an escrow account and, in turn, from the escrow account to the
borrower’s account. Of the lenders, 70 per cent enabled this auto-transfer feature.

In 2020, all loan requests were approved through an internal LDC algorithm that assessed credit risk. The
three major components of the credit assessment model were demographic benchmarking, financial
benchmarking, and historical credit information. The interest rate generated for the lender was directly
linked to the risk associated with particular segments. For example, an interest rate of 25 per cent was
assigned to borrowers in segments with a default rate of 5 per cent; an interest rate of 28 per cent was
assigned to those in segments with a default rate of 7 per cent; and an interest rate of 23 per cent was
assigned for default rate of 4 per cent. Lenders would earn an average net return of 12–15 per cent per
annum, with a default rate of 2.5 per cent.

None of the platforms published the loan default rate per segment, which made it difficult for lenders to
compare product offerings in the industry. Given this lack of industry-wide data comparison, Patel made a
point of meeting major LDC lenders over coffee to understand their pain points. An average lender would
initially lend ₹18,000 at a time, which was spread across borrowers to break the lender’s investment into
multiple loans of ₹500 per borrower. This granularity optimized lenders’ returns and hedged the risk.
However, this increased the transaction load on LDC’s back-end technology platform by 36 times. To
facilitate this process in house, the LDC technology team implemented more flexible, easily scalable

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technologies by combining React, a JavaScript framework intended for the front end, and Python, which
was used at the back end.

With the help of domain experts, LDC invested heavily in ensuring it had the right server infrastructure and
had chosen the right technology, database structure, and so on. The platform had a total of 1.5 million
registered borrowers and 450,000 lenders. LDC was processing 25,000–30,000 loan applications and
disbursing 12,000–15,000 loans per month, which translated to approximately one loan disbursement per
minute. Borrower loan requests were processed in as little as two hours. In 2020, the platform handled more
than four million investment and repayment transactions per month between approximately 500,000
borrowers and 300,000 lenders.

LDC had earned the trust of its lenders by achieving the industry’s lowest default rate, at 3.95 per cent. Its
team had grown to 75 employees. LDC had a book value of ₹6 billion and an average loan ticket size of
₹30,000. It initially operated in Mumbai for one and a half years before venturing into Pune, Bangalore,
and Ahmedabad. Finally, it spread its operations to 19,000 pin codes across India in June 2020.

Identifying a New Target Market: Product Insight and People Insight

LDC had never faced significant problems onboarding lenders, but collecting loan repayment and
increasing the number of credit-worthy borrowers were a challenge.

In 2018, LDC’s flagship product was a personal loan, intended for the personal needs of borrowers. LDC
would earn either a flat rate for processing fees, ranging from ₹200 to ₹1,000 per application, or 2.5 per cent
on the sanctioned loan amount. LDC incurred 20–30 per cent of the processing fee as an operational cost.

Borrowers could borrow ₹20,000 to ₹50,000 for 3 to 24 months. Lenders were offered a lucrative average
risk-adjusted return of 12 per cent per annum. However, LDC soon started receiving requests from its
personal loan borrowers for smaller-ticket loans in the range of ₹5,000–₹10,000. Based on this feedback,
LDC conducted internal research on its 15,000 personal loan borrowers. The research identified a unique
borrower segment: low-salaried borrowers with monthly salaries of approximately ₹12,000. The average
loan size requested by this segment was ₹8,500 with a maximum loan request of ₹20,000. LDC projected
that the loan demand in this segment was worth ₹1.38 billion.

A demographic profile of this segment indicated that most of these borrowers were millennials under the
age of 30 years, with various needs and wants. Most lived in smaller cities in India. These younger-
generation borrowers were tech-savvy and comfortable on digital platforms. Macro factors such as the
increasing pervasiveness of the Internet and smartphones, as well as these borrowers’ online ease and the
convenience of P2P, were major forces driving these borrowers to prefer P2P. LDC’s internal research
indicated that 63 per cent of borrowers in the bottom of the salaried segment used credit for emergency
situations, and the remaining 37 per cent used it for aspirational needs. Thus, the majority required loans
for unplanned, emergency expenditures such as medical payments, rent, education, family needs, and other
personal needs. These types of expenditures required immediate access to small-ticket loans to meet
transient demands. Another interesting finding from LDC’s research was that of these low-salaried
borrowers, there were 12 per cent more women than men who needed emergency loans.

At the time, this segment depended on strong, informal networks for credit for unplanned and emergency
expenditures—for example, borrowing from family, friends, or colleagues. However, the uncertainty of
generating money from this informal network loomed large for borrowers; either the pooled loan money

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would fall short of the required amount or the network would fail to generate money. People with the lowest
salaries were of two types: those whose salary was credited to a bank and those who received it in cash.
Specifically, those working in unorganized sectors, such as daily wage earners, were paid in cash. This
segment of borrower had distinctive characteristics: the majority were first-time earners, and many were
not working for reputed employers. The psychographic characteristics of this segment were also different
from those of other segments: these borrowers preferred to buy items with cash rather than with a debit or
credit card. This was partially because most were ineligible for credit cards and had no credit history.

In this segment, there was a clear unmet need for loans. However, many finance companies, including P2P
firms, were skeptical about entering this risky market. Most P2P firms preferred to deal with borrowers who
required loans of at least ₹100,000. While the low-income earning segment was apparently unserved, factors
such as their lack of credit history, bad employers, salaries paid in cash, and high acquisition cost made these
borrowers risky to serve. Small-ticket loans and the chances of higher default rates also made it challenging
for any firm to remain profitable in this segment. Unsurprisingly, of the 15 P2P firms that attempted to enter
this market, most, except for a few unorganized players, ended up closing their businesses. Lowering the cost
of acquisition and selecting quality borrowers were key to survival in this segment.

Patel was aware of these limitations, yet he decided to serve this segment profitably. He explained to his
product team, “This is the riskiest segment that LDC has ever served. We can succeed where others have
failed only by developing a customised product as per the needs of this segment and designing it to generate
profits for us. It has to be win–win.”

Concept Card and Testing

Patel met with Pratik Kharel, the operations head of LDC, to discuss the idea of launching a new product.
Kharel agreed with Patel in thinking that LDC should enter this low-salaried segment. Kharel emphasised,
“From our internal qualitative research, we have identified many need-gaps of this segment. Some are even
conflicting. Which one shall LDC address?” Kharel pointed out, for example, that some borrowers in this
segment wanted LDC to offer online document verification to reduce the loan processing time. Because
other borrowers felt the P2P industry was untrustworthy, Patel and Kharel thought LDC should send field
executives to physically collect the documents, even though this would take one to two days of processing
time. Patel suggested, “Let’s prepare two concept cards and conduct quantitative consumer research to
decide on which, based on the results we obtain.”

Subsequently, competing concept cards were prepared for two probable products: both would offer
essentially the same product, but one would be called InstaMoney and the other, Kwik Money (see Exhibit
2). This was followed by quantitative research for both concept cards. A total of 284 borrowers were
surveyed to collect data on the relevance, believability, differentiation, and overall likability parameters for
the two products (see student spreadsheet, product number W25402). The responses were measured on a
five-point Likert scale, where five indicated a high score and one indicated a low score on the respective
parameter. Based on an analysis of the concept testing results, Kharel decided that LDC should develop a
product beta version using the InstaMoney concept.

InstaMoney: From Concept to Product Beta Version

A competitive analysis of unorganized P2P players operating in this segment—such as Aeries Financial
Technology Pvt. Ltd. (CashE), Social Worth Technologies Pvt. Ltd. (Early Salary), Camden Town Technologies
Pvt Ltd. (ZestMoney), and Ant Creditex Technologies Pvt. Ltd. (Qbera)—revealed that competitors in this

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market offered lower loan amounts per borrower compared to LDC’s average loan ticket size. The product team
realized that LDC might reduce its default risk by offering a maximum loan amount of ₹20,000 per borrower.
Specifically, the key to success was to offer a lower loan amount to more borrowers in this market.

The challenge in this strategy, however, was profitability per customer. The costs to serve each customer
included customer acquisition, document verification, and servicing or processing. LDC would recover all
its costs and generate profits if the borrower returned for business four times. Another challenge, due to the
low ticket size of the loans, was to lower the collection costs per borrower. To complicate the process
further, any delay in loan repayment by the borrower would distort this calculation. Patel instructed his
product team, “We are looking for dreamers and thinkers who can design innovative products for this
segment so that it reduces our costs yet attracts quality borrowers at reduced default rates.”

The LDC product team decided to digitize all steps of the customer journey and charge processing fees. It
created five major modules on the InstaMoney technology platform, based on the journey of customers who
signed up and received loans from InstaMoney: (1) initial app visits by potential customers; (2) user
onboarding, during which prospective borrowers uploaded their loan documents; (3) loan assessment,
which included the verification and selection of quality borrowers for the investor–borrower matching
system; (4) a repayment system, which sent borrowers reminders about payments due and deadlines; and
(5) a borrower query system, which resolved queries using email and chat bots. LDC decided that the time
it took for a customer to complete the journey from signing up to receiving a loan from InstaMoney needed
to be reduced from the industry standard of three days to one day.

The product team spent substantial time improving and adding new features to increase the efficiency of each of
the modules, which were interdependent and interwoven to deliver a better result. LDC also initiated registration
fees (assessment fees) of ₹199 and explained to its customers the reasons for this fee, which went toward costs
related to checking and verifying customers’ credit scores. This fee also offset the costs the company incurred
due to its very low conversion ratio of 18–20 per cent; that is, out of each 100 loan applications LDC received,
only 18–20 loans were eventually disbursed. Transparency in disclosing the reason for the fees helped LDC gain
its customers’ confidence in paying ₹199 for registration. LDC also introduced delay fees, which were charged
if a customer delayed payments according to their loan repayment schedule.

LDC decided to create a dedicated InstaMoney app. Borrowers were encouraged to create accounts and to fill
in the requisite eligibility information, including their income, age, place of residence, and bank details. To
make the process seamless, the app’s sign-up could be linked to a borrower’s Facebook or Google account or
their mobile number. The user then uploaded the RBI-mandated legal documents—such as their income tax
permanent account number (PAN) details and their Aadhar number, which was similar to a US social security
card number—and paid the ₹199 processing fee. Within 10 minutes, a borrower who had completed a personal
loan application would be notified of their approval status. After approval, the loan amount would be
transferred directly to the borrower’s bank account. InstaMoney loans were ultra-short term, with a tenure of
three to five months and an ideal ticket size of ₹5,000 to ₹12,500, although the maximum was ₹20,000. Even
first-time salary earners and employees of lesser-known employers were eligible. The app’s first beta version,
InstaMoney v.0.1, hit the Google Play Store and Apple App Store in June 2018.

Patel decided that the initial marketing would be organic. LDC targeted its prospective borrowers digitally,
owing to the entirely digital nature of the loans. It placed advertisements on Facebook, targeted specifically
to lower-salary customers. It also relied heavily on Google Ads to promote InstaMoney. Key phrases used
to gain traction and drive traffic were “instant loan approval,” “two-hour loan,” “personal loan,” “advance
salary loan,” and “cash loan.” A public relations campaign was created around the launch of the InstaMoney
app to create a buzz.

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A few days before the launch of the InstaMoney beta version, the team ran email and text (SMS) campaigns
to educate lenders, who were facing increased risk in lending money to InstaMoney borrowers. The lenders
knew that InstaMoney was LDC’s first entirely digital product and that it targeted a particularly risky
segment of borrowers. Thus, they were educated about InstaMoney’s new assessment process and the
expected default risk and returns.

Initially, the lenders were exposed to just a few borrowers for a one-to-one mapping of lenders and
borrowers. Later, LDC changed this set-up by mapping one borrower to multiple lenders in InstaMoney.
Lenders were encouraged to lend money to as many borrowers as possible but to lend only up to ₹500 to
any single borrower. Thus, each borrower would typically be funded by multiple lenders, while each lender
would lend to multiple borrowers. This spread of small loan amounts to multiple borrowers hedged the
lenders’ risk in the eventuality of borrower default. Lenders were also advised not to lend all their money
to InstaMoney borrowers alone but to spread their investment across other LDC products as well.

Subsequently, LDC acquired another digital lending platform, LoanMeet, to build a portfolio around the
InstaMoney product. LoanMeet was an existing, unorganized P2P firm that focused on disbursing loans to
the low-salaried segment. LDC also collaborated with GooglePay (GPay) to integrate the LDC and GPay
app interfaces, allowing GPay customers to easily lend and borrow.

InstaMoney Product A/B Testing

LDC undertook A/B product testing after launching the beta version of the InstaMoney app. The objective
of the A/B testing was to incorporate the best features of the beta version into the final InstaMoney product.
Multiple sequential and iterative A/B tests were undertaken at each step of the customer journey to improve
the product (see the results in the student spreadsheet, product number W25402).

The first step of the customer journey was the conversion from lead to prospect. Leads were those who
might or might not borrow, while prospects were confirmed potential borrowers. The number of leads was
calculated based on the number of borrowers who visited the InstaMoney app and showed interest in
borrowing. The number of prospects was calculated based on the number of borrowers who paid the
processing fee of ₹199. The leads who searched for information on the InstaMoney loan app were randomly
subjected to one of two sets of website aesthetics. Half the leads were shown a green, blue, and white
website—an original LDC-brand colour combination. The other half were assigned an InstaMoney website
in purple, green, blue, and white. This test was used to decide the best colour for the website’s background.

The second step in the customer journey was to qualify the prospects so they could apply for a loan. LDC
had simplified the InstaMoney application process and app interface to make them extremely user-friendly.
Prospects who had shown that they were serious by paying the registration fee of ₹199 were verified for
creditworthiness on the basis of the documents issued and required by the government, such as bank account
details and income tax return filings. These prospects were randomly assigned to one of two methods of
document collection: half were asked to manually upload the documents onto the InstaMoney website, and
the other half were advised to authorize LDC to collect their information by auto-fetching it from the
original source, such as the bank. The results of both possibilities were collected for second-step testing.

The third step in the customer journey was to select quality borrowers by assessing InstaMoney borrowers’
creditworthiness with the help of artificial intelligence and machine learning. LDC employed a unique
amalgamation of traditional and non-traditional data points to check the creditworthiness of its borrowers. An
internal proprietary credit algorithm accounted for more than 120 parameters, including soft and hard

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information. Soft information included demographics, educational qualifications, past employment patterns,
place of residence, and past residence location history. Hard financial information included income, credit
history and repayment behaviour, utility bill payment history, and spending patterns. LDC also used unique
parameters to assess borrower creditworthiness, such as employer reputation. LDC’s internal research
indicated that employees of reputed employers were paid on time, making their default rates much lower than
the rates of employees of poorly reputed employers. However, LDC was constantly trying to improve the
ability of its financial credit scores to predict default rates. Thus, it acquired half its customers by giving more
weight to their location of residence and the other half by giving more weight to their income.

The fourth step in the customer journey was the repayment of the loan amount. Research revealed that defaulters
were of two types: intentional and unintentional. Unintentional defaults happened largely because borrowers
forgot about the due date for their repayment, and default rates improved significantly if these borrowers were
reminded well in advance of their upcoming repayment dates. LDC conducted an A/B test by subjecting half the
borrowers to payment reminders using voice bots and half to reminders using email or text messages.

Finally, during the customer journey, borrowers contacted LDC for various queries related to ongoing or new
loans. Providing borrowers with satisfactory replies was important in generating repeat business. This customer
support service was A/B tested for query resolution turnaround time. The turnaround time was measured as the
time taken to close the query to the satisfaction of the borrower, which also included a follow-up to the main
query and its resolution time. Half the queries were resolved by email and the other half by chatbots.

Shah, who was from the low-salary segment, called LDC for the first time in 2017. She was pregnant, her
husband was working in Dubai, and she wanted to redecorate her new house to welcome her baby and
husband. Before approaching LDC, she had been denied a loan by the bank. When she called LDC to
enquire about a loan, by chance, the call went to Patel, whom she believed was a customer service executive.
She went on to take out three additional loans.

In June 2020, she called Patel again and asked if he still worked for LedDenClub. “Yes,” he said. “I still
work here.”

“I am in dire need of a loan,” Shah continued. “My father is in hospital, and he does not have medical insurance.”

“No worries,” Patel replied, “you are our old customer. We do not need any documents from you. We have
a new product, InstaMoney.”

“InstaMoney! What is that?” Shah asked.

“It is a loan intended for small loan needs,” Patel explained. “You can access the loan instantaneously—as
fast as two hours.”

“Wow, that is amazing,” said Shah. “You are nothing less than a saviour to our family.”

This customer feedback told Patel that it had been the right decision to target a marginal salary segment.
However, he still had more to consider, specifically, he wondered which features should be included in the
improved version of the InstaMoney app to ensure its success.

The author would like to thank Saha Devanshi Purwangbhai, MBA-21,

for their assistance in the writing of this case.

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EXHIBIT 1: COMPETITION IN THE INDIAN PEER-TO-PEER LENDING INDUSTRY

P2P Platforms
Faircent Lendbox LenDenClub
Business needs and Business needs and
Target Borrowers Personal consumption
personal consumption personal consumption
Business need: ₹30,000 to
₹1,000,000
Loan Amount ₹5,000 to ₹500,000 ₹25,000 to ₹500,000
Personal consumption:
₹30,000 to ₹750,000
Loan Tenure 6 to 36 months 3 to 36 months 3 to 24 months
Investor Profile Individuals and institutions Individuals and institutions Individuals and institutions
Business loans and Business loans and
Product Offered Personal loans
personal loans personal loans
Interest Rates to Discretion of lenders and
12% to 28% 6.5% to 20.95%
Borrowers borrowers
Average Return to
18% 26% 17%
Lenders
No. of Registered
147,000+ 36,000+ 89,000+
Borrowers
No. of Registered
1,768,332+ 400,000+ 680,000+
Lenders

Source: Rajeev Kumra, S. Abu Khalek, and Tamal Samanta, “Factors Affecting BoP Producer Intention to Use P2P Lending
Platforms in India,” Journal of Global Marketing 34, no. 4 (2021): 328–352.

This document is authorized for use only in Prof.Rajeev Kumra's MDP-NC/405/23/DGMP/329 at Indian Institute of Management - Lucknow from Nov 2023 to May 2024.
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EXHIBIT 2: CONCEPT CARDS

Concept Card 1: InstaMoney

Concept Card 2: Kwik Money

Source: Company documents.

This document is authorized for use only in Prof.Rajeev Kumra's MDP-NC/405/23/DGMP/329 at Indian Institute of Management - Lucknow from Nov 2023 to May 2024.