Hindu Marriage Law –

 Sonder Gopal vs Sonder Rajini - Domicile

 Ram Prasad Seth vs UP – Marriage during 1st wife, in the want of a son
 Sarla Mudgal v. Union of India – Husband Converted to Islam and his 1st
marriage did not end
 Lily Thomas vs Union of India – court took a Suo moto on the fact that
conversion does not end the first marriage
 Bhaurao Shankar Lokhande vs State of Maharashtra – Nullity of marriage
due to the lack of saptapadi
 S. Nagalingam vs Sivagami – Sapdapati essential
 Arun Laxmanrao Navalkar v. Meena Arun Navalkar – Sapinda
Relationship
 Gullipilli Sowria Raj v. Bandaru Pavani – Appellant married a Christian
and said that hindu marriage act didn’t restraint him from marrying a
person of other faith, n these facts, the marriage solemnized in
accordance with Hindu customs was a nullity.
 Pinninti Venkataramana v. State – Marriage under the age of maturity,
neither void nor voidable

Divorce under Hindu Marriage Law –

Cruelty -
 Dastane vs Dastane – Wife’s cruelty, Condonation was given, Restoration
of the offending spouse to the same condition, proof of it was sex, hence
cruelty not proved.
 Animesh Trivedi v. Kiran Bagai – Grounds of cruelty established like
Slapping, taunting, calling her lazy, Slapping in the presence of family
members and Using Filthy Language
Dissertation –
Bipinchandra Jaisinghbai Shah v. Prabhavati – Wife left because of having
an extra marital affair and did not have the courage to face the husband. For the
offence of desertion, so far as the deserting spouse is concerned, two essential
conditions must be there, namely, (1) the factum of separation, and (2) the
intention to bring cohabitation permanently to an end (animus deserendi).
Similarly two elements are essential so far as the deserted spouse is concerned :
(1) the absence of consent, and (2) absence of conduct giving reasonable cause
to the spouse leaving the matrimonial home to form the necessary intention
aforesaid. Case was ot of dissertation.

Savitri Pandey v. Prem Chandra Pandey -

Husband and wife, living in a normal marriage and didn’t
consumate
Desertion, for the purpose of seeking divorce under the Act,
means the intentional permanent forsaking and
abandonment of one spouse by the other without that other's
consent and without reasonable cause
From the pleadings and evidence led in the case, it is apparent that the appellant did not
permit the respondent to have cohabitation for consummating the marriage. In the absence of
cohabitation between the parties, a particular state of matrimonial position was never
permitted by the appellant to come into existence. In the present case, in the absence of
cohabitation and consummation of marriage, the appellant was disentitled to claim divorce on
the ground of desertion.
No evidence was led by the appellant to show that she was forced to leave the company of the
respondent or that she was thrown away from the matrimonial home or that she was forced to
live separately and that the respondent had intended animus deserendi. There is nothing on
record to hold that the respondent had ever declared to bring the marriage to an end or
refused to have cohabitation with the appellant. As a matter of fact the appellant is proved to
have abandoned the matrimonial home and declined to cohabit with the respondent thus
forbearing to perform the matrimonial obligation.

Non-resumption of Cohabitation post an RCR or Judicial Separation decree (13-1A HMA)

6. Dharmendra Kumar v. Usha Kumar, AIR 1977 SC 2213 139 –
7. T. Srinivasan v. T. Varalakshmi, 1 (1991) DMC 20 (Mad.) 142 - ROCR Incomplete
that is no ground for divorce.

Muslim Marriage –

Khursheed Ahmed Khan v. State of UP – The Man needs to register the

second marriage and didn’t, The Supreme Court also referred to precedent to
say that polygamy was not integral part of religion. The practice did not acquire
sanction of religion simply because it was permitted. Court did not find Article
25 violation. It referred to the case of Javed v. State of Haryana where it was
noted that no religion in India dictates or mandates as an obligation to enter into
bigamy or polygamy. A practice does not acquire the sanction of religion simply
because it is permitted.
Mohd. Nihal v State, 2008 –

 In this case, the brother-in-law of the bride had acted as her guardian.
  A Muslim girl who has reached puberty or is presumed to have reached puberty on
attaining the age of fifteen, is competent to enter into matrimony.
 Under Muslim law the marriage of a girl who has not attained puberty is nevertheless
legitimate provided it has the consent of her Guardian (Wali). In such cases, however,
the wife has the option to repudiate the marriage when she reaches puberty.
 In this case it was unclear if the bride was even 15 years of age or had actually
reached puberty on the date of her so-called marriage.
 As regards the factum of her Wali having consented to the marriage, it must be noted
that this important function cannot be fulfilled by a brother-in-law. It appears to be
common to all schools of Muslim Law that the father, and in his absence the paternal
grandfather, must perform the rights, duties and obligations of a Wali. During the
lifetime of the father no other relative is competent to function as the Wali. In the
absence of the father, the grandfather, the great grandfather, the brother, the uncle or
granduncle and the mother, in this sequence, are competent to act as the Wali.
 Petitioner has failed to establish that the bride had obtained puberty at the time of
marriage, that is, 31.3.2008 and/or that she has reached the age of 15 years. Since her
father is alive, only he was competent to act has her Wali for the purposes of her
marriage as prima facie she was a minor at that time. Therefore, the purported
marriage is batil or void ab initio.

Muslim Divorce -

Itwari v. Asghari,

Muslim man under ROCR wants to call the wife back after having taken in a second wife, the
court says that, Muslim Law permits polygamy but has never encouraged it, Muslim Law as
enforced in India has considered polygamy as an institution to be tolerated but not
encouraged, he is entitled to raise the question whether the court, as a court of equity,
ought to compel her to submit to co-habitation with such a husband. In that case the
circumstances in which his second marriage took place are relevant and material in
deciding whether his conduct in taking a second wife was in itself an act of cruelty to the
first. A husband who takes a second wife in these days will not be permitted to pretend
that he did not realise the likely effect of his action on the feelings and health of the first
wife. Under the law, the husband will be presumed to intend the natural consequences
of his own conduct. Under the prevailing conditions the very act of taking a second wife,
in the absence of a weighty and convincing explanation, raises a presumption of cruelty
to the first

I concur in the opinion of the District Judge that it will be inequitable to compel the first wife
to live with such a husband.

Abdurahiman v. Khairunnessa –

 The condition precedent for a polygamous marriage is the ability of the husband
to deal justly with all his wives.
 It is her (the wife’s) assessment that matters. It is not the assessment of the
partisan husband who may feel that he is ardently attempting to do the same
 and is actually treating his wives equitably. His standards are not to be applied
at all
 She can assert that she has been treated inequitably by her polygamous husband.
That would entitle her to call it a day and quit such polygamous marriage.
 We do, in these circumstances, take the view that in a claim for divorce under
Sec.2(viii)(f) of the Act, it is the assertion of the woman that matters. She is the
best Judge to decide whether she has been treated equitably or not. When it is
admitted or proved that there has been a second marriage and when the wife
asserts that she has been treated inequitably and she would like to walk out of
such marriage, no court can fetter her rights to quit such marriage
 Without pronouncement on the constitutional validity of the stipulation relating to
polygamy now on the touch stone of Arts.21 and 13 of the Constitution , we must
hold that such a liberal interpretation of the words "does not treat her equitably" is
necessary to give true meaning and content to the right to life of a woman caught in a
polygamous marriage.

A. Yousuf Rawther v. Sowramma,

 It must, therefore, be held that whatever the cause may be the wife is entitled to a
decree for the dissolution of her marriage, if the husband fails to maintain her
for a period of two years, even though the wife may have contributed towards
the failure of the maintenance by her husband.
 A Muslim woman, under Section 2(ii) of the Act, can sue for dissolution on the score
that she has not as a fact been maintained even if there is good cause for it.

Tara Bano v. Iqbal Mohd –

 By the Act of 1939, a wife when given in marriage by father or by any other guardian
has been given the right to the dissolution of her marriage on proof of essential facts
about the marriage having not been consummated, having taken place before her
attaining the age of 18 years.
 A Court's order is not essential for conferring validity on the exercise of the option of
puberty. The Court's order would seem to be only necessary to invest it with the
judicial imprimatur in order to avoid any possible disputes.
 It is not necessary for Muslim lady to obtain a decree for dissolution of her marriage
after she exercises her option of puberty (Khyar-ul-Bulugh) upon attaining the age of
puberty i.e. 15 years. If the factum of such revocation or exercise of option of puberty
is proved before the trial Court even by the oral evidence and the trial Court returns
the findings of facts in her favour in a suit filed by the husband, even then it should be
sufficient satisfaction of requirement of Section 2 of the Dissolution of Muslim
Marriages Act, 1939. Requirement to obtain independent decree by the appellant -
wife by approaching Civil Court is not the sine qua non of law.
 Adoption –

Vinay Pathak and his wife Sonika Sahay -

Christian marriage and special marriage act –

Special Marriage act –

 Vivan Varghese v. The State of Kerala & Ors., High Court of Kerala at Ernakulam,
WP(C). No. 16350 of 2015 (P) -
o The petitioner, an Indian citizen, desired to enter into a marriage with a
Finnish citizen.
o The petitioner, residing under the jurisdiction of the 3rd respondent [Marriage
Officer], made an application for contracting the marriage under the SMA. An
objection was raised by the 3rd respondent, allegedly on the ground that the
marriage is intended to be entered into with a Finnish citizen and, hence, the
provisions of SMA, 1954 cannot be invoked.
o The Court said that the SMA does not contain any prohibition for
solemnisation of the marriage, if one of the parties is a foreigner.
o Section 4 contemplates, marriage between "any two persons" to be
solemnized under the Act; if the conditions specified therein are fulfilled.

 Deepak Krishna v. District Registrar –

o The point in dispute is whether it is mandatory that the parties should
reside within the District of the Marriage Officer for a period of 30 days
immediately preceding the date on which the application is made for the
registration of the marriage
o Even if a provision is directory in nature, it should be substantially
complied with which depends upon the facts and circumstances of each
case.
o We are therefore, of the considered view that the time frame of 30 days
prescribed under Section 16 is a mandatory clause, which is not liable to
be waived
o
ROCR –
Kailash Vati v. Ayodhia Parkash – Husband and wife teachers wife got transfers, lived with
her parents against the wishes of her huban, files for rocr

As long as the matter is consensual the spouses may not only live separately but may even
live in separate countries without in any way either jeopardising their marriage or infringing
their legal duties to each other. The difficulty or the legal conundrum arises only when the
wife unilaterally breaks away from the matrimonial home and claims a legal right to live
apart on the ground of having been already employed prior to the marriage or having
procured employment thereafter.

Swaraj Garg v. K.M. Garg

When the husband and the wife are both gainfully employed at two different places from
before their marriage, where will be the matrimonial home after the marriage?

 Between the husband and the wife, the decision as to the matrimonial home has to be
taken on the balance of circumstances. It the circumstances are equally balanced in
favour of the wife and the husband, then there would be a stalemate and neither of
them would be able to sue the other for restitution of conjugal rights. Such a
breakdown of marriage for which either of them or none of them can be blamed has
now been made a ground for obtaining divorce in the United Kingdom by Section 1 of
the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1973. A similar consideration might have led to the
abolition of right to claim restitution of conjugal rights by Section 20 of the
Matrimonial proceedings and Property Act, 1970 in the United Kingdom.
 In this case, due to the financial difficulties of the husband and comfortable position
of the wife and also due to the discouraging conduct of the husband towards the wife,
we are of the view that the wife had a reasonable excuse for not resigning her job and
for not coming to live with the husband at Delhi. We, therefore, hold that the husband
has failed to prove the grounds for awarding him restitution of conjugal rights.