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“One of the Principal Weapons in Trench Warfare:” Hand

Grenades and the Decline of Infantry on the Somme – Part 2/2
by William Stewart canadianmilitaryhistory.ca

In the previous blog entry, I examined the five advantages of grenades. In this entry we look at their
disadvantages and their deleterious effects. Bombs had a limited range, with the average soldier able to
toss it fifteen to twenty meters, while an experienced bomber could extend the range to thirty to forty
meters. These ranges were an ideal and seldom achieved in actual battle conditions after the first few
grenades were thrown.

Range Comparison Mills Grenade and Rifle

As mentioned earlier, the blast effect extended

beyond the range it could be thrown by the
average soldier, so a further limitation was that
the thrower had to take shelter before the
explosion or else risk injury or death. The
nominal range of the Short Magazine Lee
Enfield (SMLE) rifle was around 500 metres,
although snipers were effective up to 1000
metres. Even with the lamentable training
standards of the replacements on the Somme,
the riflemen could far outrange the bomber in
their ability to bring fire on the enemy.
Bombing_Range
Additionally, bombing exhausted men faster
than firing a rifle. This was an important
consideration when attackers had to cross long distances, encumbered with over sixty pounds of gear and
potentially more in muddy conditions, and slogging through wet and mucky crater-strewn terrain.

In the typical Canadian attack on the Somme, each soldier carried in addition to all their kit, 170 to 220
rounds per man, along with two Mills grenades to be used primarily by the trained bombers, amounting to
between 28 and 32 kg. – easily half or more of their body weight.[1] At a sustained rate of fire of five rounds
per minute, the average infantrymen could fire for 34 or 44 minutes before running out of ammunition.[2]
Two Mills grenades, on the other hand, could be expended in under a minute. The limit of two grenades per
soldier was a function of its limited range and weight as each bomb (638 g.) weighed the same as 22
rounds of ammunition.

In an attack, a battalion with a nominal trench strength of 720 men, would carry at most 2,500 grenades,
assuming each platoon included a bombing squad, with each bombing squad consisting of eight men and
an NCO. According to the training manuals, one section/squad per platoon was trained and equipped to
fight as bombers, and most battalions also had a separate bombing platoon. In a typical attack, therefore,
the battalion would consist of 20 bombing squads and 48 rifle sections. Actual usage varied between units,
but checking battalion operational orders suggests these numbers were reasonable as a maximum figure.
This was, however, a theoretical maximum as it does not account for many platoons without trained
bombers and most Canadian battalions were attacking with less than 500 men by October. Further,

casualties
Page 1 of 4 suffered in the attack, whose grenades were unrecoverable, would also diminish the number
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casualties suffered in the attack, whose grenades were unrecoverable, would also diminish the number
available. It is, therefore, likely that the actual number of grenades reaching the German front line was in
the order of 1500.[3]

Contrast this with a German defensive position, if it were not entirely obliterated by artillery fire.[4] Based
on the Canadian practice for grenade reserves—and it is reasonable to assume the Germans would not
have less grenades than the Canadian regulations—the defenders of typically company strength of 150
men would have access to 500 grenades in the company grenade depot and another 4000 in the battalion
and regimental dumps. This does not include the large numbers of grenades carried by the defenders. Of
course, the bombardment would destroy a percentage of the reserves, but they could be replenished far
more readily along communication trenches than carried across no man’s land in the face of heavy artillery
fire. Despite their greater numbers, the attackers would have no considerable advantage in grenades if
they did not have a ready means of replenishing their grenade supply. Further, in the event of a German
counterattack along an intact trench line, the Germans would have the immeasurable advantage of ready
resupply of bombs. The Canadians could hold for a period but eventually they would run out of bombs and
the Germans would drive them from their position. Access to a protected supply line meant success in a
bombing attack. In the standard training manual, the importance of replenishing the supply of grenades
from rear dumps in an attack was stressed.[5]

All of these disadvantages contributed to a tendency for bombing attacks to degenerate into grenade duels
where both sides blindly threw grenades from shelter, which brought attacks to a standstill. As along as the
defender received additional grenades and replacements, the bomb duel could last for hours. It nullified the
numerical advantage of the attacker, forced the advance to proceed at right angles to the required
direction, bled away the attack’s momentum, and gave the defender more time to gather reserves and
bring artillery to bear. Attacks with grenades were slow and often more costly than a direct assault. A
British Regular Army brigade-level staff officer lamented repeatedly about the futility of bomb attacks and
how they usually ended up in a stalemate.[6] Even the British bombing regulations observed “experience
has shown that no great or rapid progress can be made by bombing and an assault across the open after
adequate preparation will usually be quicker and in the long run a less costly operation than bombing
attacks on a large scale.”[7]

The diagram below shows the difference of a bombing attack along a trench on a front of three metres
versus a direct attack along a front of 200 metres by a battalion. In this example, assuming a full strength
battalion and the wire is uncut, the attacker was able to bring to bear the firepower and shock effect of
sixteen sections, supported by another forty-eight in follow-up waves versus the one bombing squad,
backed by other squads. Bombing attacks were more popular with front line forces because the attackers
were more sheltered, but the high command preferred the results attending a direct attack despite the
heavier immediate losses. A question to the reader, were the senior commanders correct in their view that
a direct attack, despite its heavier immediate losses, was a less costly option than bombing attacks?

Comparison of Frontage and Manpower in a Bombing and Direct Attack

Consequence on Infantry Effectiveness

With the introduction of the Mills grenade, most of the

requirement for extensive training in the multiple types of
grenades was eliminated, as the Mills grenade was a more
reliable, stable, and durable grenade than the previous weapons.
However, the specialist units were not disbanded so that by the
Somme, each battalion had its own bombing platoon and each
Page 2 of 4 platoon was to train a squad in bombing. TheNovresult was
16, 2017 that
01:21:16AM MST
 Somme, each battalion had its own bombing platoon and each
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platoon was to train a squad in bombing. The result was that
these formations were not integrated into the infantry, which
created numerous problems for command and control discussed
below.

In addition to the specialization, the men selected for bomb

training were to be of a cool and calm disposition, physically
tough, and agile. Sportsmen were regarded as natural bombers,
but this led to even more men being siphoned away from the
companies. With picked men required for Lewis Gun and Colt
Machine Gun teams, snipers, signallers and scouts/runners, the
majority of the best men were concentrated in the specialist units
Based on 2nd Canadian Division Instructions, 21 to the detriment of the quality of personnel in the line units. On
August 1916, 4/3 RG9 III-C-3 v4116, LAC. the Somme, up to 40% of the personnel in a battalion were in
specialist units, which left just over half of the remaining personnel in the infantry companies – the primary
tactical fighting formation. As a result, the battalion coordinated all of the firepower potential of Lewis Guns,
bombers, snipers, and Colt MGs, but battalion commanders or their deputies remained at their
headquarters hundreds of meters and hours by runner from the front.[8] The senior company commander
in the attack actually led the assault troops at the front, including the specialist units, which they normally
did not direct.

An excellent example of the relative advantages of a direct versus a bombing attack was the 8 October
1916 assault on Regina Trench by the Canadian Corps. As part of the larger operation, the 1st Brigade
attacked with the 3rd Battalion on the left, which was to capture a section of Regina Trench, and the 4th
Battalion on the right was to take the Below and Below Support Trenches. The two battalions were also to
capture the heavily protected Quadrilateral that was the junction of Regina, Below, and Gallwitz trench
systems. The 3rd Battalion had little difficulty in directly taking its objective in twenty minutes, while uncut
wire thwarted the 4th Battalion making a direct attack on the Below trenches. The 4th sidled partly over into
the 3rd Battalion’s sector, entered Regina Trench and captured half of the Quadrilateral. It then bombed
down the Below Trench, which took four hours of hard fighting and the expenditure of most of its grenades,
as well as some from the 3rd Battalion. The Germans, once they determined the attackers’ position,
dropped an interdiction barrage across no man’s land, which prevented resupply of the troops in the
captured trenches. Currie, commander of the 1st Division, in his response to a later enquiry into the failure
stated that resupply efforts during the battle resulted in a 75% loss rate in the carrying parties. As a result,
when the Germans counterattacked along the Gallwitz and Below Trenches and retook the Quadrilateral,
the 4th Battalion was unable to respond effectively to the Germans’ bombing attack. The Germans drove
the 4th Battalion out of its positions, and it had to retreat.

German Counterattack, 1400 8 October 1916

The 4th Battalion had no choice but to use a bombing attack to

accomplish its mission, but the contrast with the relative ease and
success of the3rd Battalion is instructive. The 3rd Battalion could
attack directly and promptly took all of its objectives, while the 4th
Battalion had to spend hours to take half of its objectives and expend
most of its grenades in doing so. As a result, it was unable to defend
what it had captured when the Germans counterattacked because of
a lack of grenades. The Germans effectively isolated the 1st Brigade
in its forward positions and destroyed it piecemeal.
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 in its forward positions and destroyed it piecemeal.
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Conclusion

Post-Somme analysis identified an over-reliance on bombing as one

of the factors leading to the infantry’s reduced effectiveness. The
predominance of the grenade was a consequence of the combination
of their utility in select circumstances and commanders having to
learn how to supply, coordinate, and employ the myriad new
weapons, tactics, and organizations in a force reliant on
under-qualified officers and NCOs with inadequately trained
replacements. By Vimy, the Canadian Corps, like the rest of the
British Army, changed its fundamental fighting unit to a platoon that
integrated rifle-grenades, grenades, rifles/bayonets, and Lewis Guns
German_Counterattack_8_October
into four sections, which gave the platoon commander his own
mini-army. In this new structure, bombers were not a separate organization but were integrated into an
all-arms force that increasingly was able effectively to fight and advance based on its own capabilities. In
essence, the bomber as a specialist separate from the main fighting formation was a tactical dead-end.

A question worth further investigation is what other weapons were over, under, or misused by the
Canadians until the correct balance was found?

[1] The Training and Employment of Bombers – SS398, (General Staff at GHQ, September 1916), 52.

[2] Pre-war British Regular infantry were trained to fire at a rate of 15 aimed rounds a minute, so given the
fall in training standards a rate of fire of 5 rounds per minute is reasonable.

[3] Assuming an attacking strength of 500 men organized and equipped as before and losses suffered
before reaching the German line were 25%.

[4] In the later attempts to take Regina Trench, the attackers reported the trench reduced to little more than
a depression from the heavy artillery fire. These attacks were successful.

[5] The Training and Employment of Bombers – SS398: 32.

[6] Alexander Colin Johnston and Edwin Astill, The Great War Diaries of Brigadier Alexander Johnston,
1914-1917, (Barnsley: Pen & Sword Military, 2007). 422/684.

[7] The Training and Employment of Bombers – Ss398: 20.

[8] See my previous blog “‘The Most Aggravating Thing’: Communications and Limitations on the Somme”
for more on communications problems on the Somme.

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