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On the Signpost Principle of Alternate Possibilities: Why

Contemporary Frankfurt-Style Cases are Irrelevant to the Free Will
Debate
William Simkulet
Cleveland State University, w.simkulet@csuohio.edu

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Original Citation
Simkulet, William. "On the Signpost Principle of Alternate Possibilities: Why Contemporary Frankfurt-Style
Cases are Irrelevant to the Free Will Debate." Filosofiska Notiser, Volume 2, Number 3, 2015, pp. 107-20.

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On the Signpost Principle of Alternate Possibilities:
Why Contemporary Frankfurt-Style Cases are
Irrelevant to the Free Will Debate
William Simkulet

Abstract
This article contends that recent attempts to construct Frankfurt-style cases
(FSCs) are irrelevant to the debate over free will. The principle of alternate
possibilities (PAP) states that moral responsibility requires indeterminism, or
multiple possible futures. Frankfurt's original case purported to demonstrate
PAP false by showing an agent can be blameworthy despite not having the
ability to choose otherwise; however he admits the agent can come to that
choice freely or by force, and thus has alternate possibilities. Neo-FSCs
attempt to show that alternate possibilities are irrelevant to explaining an
agent's moral responsibility, but a successful Neo-FSC would be consistent
with the truth of PAP, and thus is silent on the big metaphysical issues at the
center of the free will debate.

Introduction
Frankfurt-style cases (FSCs) are modeled after a case in Harry Frankfurt's
"Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility," where in an agent is
purported to be uncontroversially morally responsible despite lacking the
ability to do otherwise. 1 If FSCs are as advertised, they would be counter-
examples to the principle of alternate possibilities (PAP), according to which
one is morally responsible for something only if she could do otherwise.
Much has been written about FSCs, but the general consensus is that they fail
to be genuine counterexamples to PAP. 2 The reason FSCs have garnered
such attention is that PAP is said to play a vital role in the debate over
whether free will is consistent with determinism. Contemporary proponents
of FSCs have largely abandoned the goal of constructing a counterexample to
PAP, and instead aim to show merely that alternate possibilities don't play a
role in determining an agent's degree of moral responsibility. This article
1
Frankfurt 1969.
2
See Fischer 2010 and Widerker and McKenna 2003/2006 for strong work on the topic.

Filosofiska Notiser, Årgång 2, Nr. 3, December 2015, 107–120

 William Simkulet

argues that this concession by proponents of FSCs dramatically undermines

their relevance to the free will debate.
The main goal of this article is to show that while a successful traditional
FSC would demonstrate the falsity of PAP, a successful Neo-FSC, sometimes
called a "buffer zone" FSC 3 , would be irrelevant to the truth or falsity of
PAP. PAP, the principle Frankfurt claims "is false" (1969, 829), is most
often interpreted as asserting that indeterminism is metaphysical prerequisite
for true moral responsibility 4 . Frankfurt says of PAP that "Its exact meaning
is a subject of controversy, particularly concerning whether someone who
accepts it is thereby committed to believing that moral responsibility and
determinism are incompatible." (1969, 829) While traditional FSCs are
meant to be genuine counterexamples to PAP 5 , Neo-FSCs attempt to show
only that alternate possibilities are irrelevant to explaining an agent's moral
responsibility for her free actions. 6 The best way to illustrate the difference
between these two approaches is in terms of their implications for a specific
interpretation of PAP, known in this paper as the signpost interpretation of
the principle of alternate possibilities (SPAP):

SPAP - A necessary, but not sufficient, condition for agent A's being
morally responsible for something s is that A could have done
otherwise.

This article is divided into three sections. In the first, I discuss the virtues
of traditional FSCs as purported counterexamples to PAP, but demonstrate
why these cases fail. 7 In the second section, I show that Neo-FSCs are

3
Franklin 2009.
4
By "true moral responsibility" here I mean to capture, roughly, what Galen Strawson discusses
in "The Impossibility of Moral Responsibility." See Strawson 1994/2002. For the purposes of
this paper, "moral responsibility" is to be understood as "true moral responsibility."
5
See Fischer 1992; Mele, Robb 1998.
6
See Hunt 200, 2005; Pereboom 2001, 2005, 2008.
7
Oddly, this approach is largely indifferent to Frankfurt's original goal of undermining PAP by
undermining its appeal. Initially Frankfurt argued that PAP was appealing because of its
relationship to a different commonsense moral principle, the coercion principle, which is
sometimes said to leave an agent no alternative to doing as their coercer desires. (1969)
Frankfurt's initial versions of the case were meant to provide a counterexample to coercion
principle; his case, he says, called attention to an important distinction, "that making an action
unavoidable is not the same thing as bringing it about that the action is performed." (2003/2006,
340) He says "Appreciating this distinction tends to liberate us from the natural but nonetheless
erroneous supposition that it is proper to regard people as morally responsible for what they have

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 On the Signpost Principle of Alternate Possibilities

concerned with demonstrating the falsity of a robust principle of alternate

possibilities (RPAP):

RPAP - A necessary and sufficient condition for agent A's being

morally responsible for something s is that A had robust alternate
possibilities to s, where a robust alternate possibility is relevant to
explaining A's degree of moral responsibility for s.

I argue Neo-FSCs fail to demonstrate the falsity of RPAP, and instead

illustrate its truth, that an agent's genuine alternate possibilities play a vital
role in determining her degree of moral responsibility in both traditional and
Neo-FSC. In the third section, I argue that a hypothetically successful Neo-
FSC that demonstrates the falsity of RPAP would fail to demonstrate the
falsity of SPAP. Furthermore, such a case is consistent with SPAP and
would be insufficient to undermine our commonsense commitment to SPAP.
While a successful Neo-FSC would break significant ground in the study of
how one's degree of moral responsibility is determined, it would be silent
about the metaphysical prerequisites of moral responsibility that are at the
heart of the debate between compatibilists and incompatibilists about free
will.

I. On Frankfurt Style Cases

Prior to Frankfurt's attack, there was little doubt about our commitment to
PAP. Frankfurt says of the principle, "Practically no one... seems inclined to
deny or even to question that the principle of alternate possibilities (construed
in some way or other) is true." (1969, 829) Frankfurt sought to convince the
reader of the principle's falsity by tying it to another supposedly
commonsense moral principle, the coercion principle. On Frankfurt's
interpretation, both principles offered sufficient conditions to absolve an
agent of moral responsibility; in PAP's case if the agent lacked the ability to
do otherwise; in the coercion principle's case if the agent was coerced.
Frankfurt believed that our commitment to PAP was contingent on the truth
of the coercion principle, and by demonstrating the falsity of the coercion

done only if they could have done otherwise." The problem is that this distinction is largely
irrelevant, as the supposition in question just is the supposition that moral responsibility and
determinism are incompatible. In all cases where an agent is determined to act, the thing that
makes it unavoidable just is that which causally determined the agent to act; the intuition in
question just is the intuition that it would be inappropriate to blame someone in such a case. See
Ginet 1996.

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 William Simkulet

principle he would undermine the appeal of PAP. 8 He argued that when an

agent acted indifferently to a coercive threat, and freely chose to do the same
actions he might otherwise have been coerced into, that agent would be
uncontroversially morally responsible for her actions despite the coercive
threat. 9 After this, Frankfurt shifts to presenting a case meant to be a direct
counterexample to PAP. Here is an updated version of this case:

Neuroscientist Black wants Jones to kill Smith at time t. Black is

fairly certain that Jones will do this freely, however he doesn't want to
take any chances. Black secretly installs a device in Jones's brain that
is designed to causally determine him to choose to kill Smith at time t.
Unbeknownst to Black the device will remain dormant if Jones were
to freely choose to kill Smith at time t; however if Jones would have
freely chose not to kill Smith, the device would activate causing him
to kill Smith. 10 As it so happens, Jones freely chooses to kill Smith
and the device remains dormant.

The appeal of Frankfurt's case is that it attempts to sidestep the more thorny
metaethical and metaphysical issues that have become the calling card of the
free will debate, and is designed to be an open-ended counterexample to any
reasonable interpretation of PAP, regardless of what kind of alternate
possibilities one interprets PAP as requiring. Frankfurt stipulates that Jones's
choice is free, allowing the reader to fill in whatever metaphysical
8
Frankfurt contends our intuitions about PAP are related to our commitment to the truth of the
coercion principle but offers no explanation for this being the case. Although it sometimes
makes sense to say that coerced agents can't do otherwise; Frankfurt contends that this isn't
"strictly speaking" true. (1969, 834) Rather, when faced with some threats, one shouldn't do
otherwise, and would be blameworthy if they tried. To act to avoid the bad consequences of a
sufficiently horrible threat, then, is not responsibility absolving; rather it is prima facie
praiseworthy. Not only is the coercion principle not implied by PAP, it doesn't even have the
same kind of implications as PAP. The coercion principle is about how we ought to calculate
one's degree of moral responsibility; where as a thief might be prima facie blameworthy, where
we to learn the thief acted under a coercive threat to save her children's life it would become
clear that she acted in a praiseworthy manner. In contrast, according to PAP, if we were to learn
that a thief was actually a complicated robot wholly causally determined by its programming to
steal, PAP offers a quick explanation why that thing is not morally responsible like a person
would be; because it had no say, no alternatives.
9
Frankfurt worries that it doesn't make sense to say that such an agent is coerced; however he
expands upon this view later to great effect. See Frankfurt 1973.
10
This case is partially based one found in Alfred Mele and David Robb's 1998 article "Rescuing
Frankfurt-Style Cases."

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 On the Signpost Principle of Alternate Possibilities

prerequisites they believe are necessary for moral responsibility. For

incompatibilist readers, this means Jones inhabits a world where there are
multiple possible futures at any given time. Jones is said to be both uncontro-
versially morally responsible for his free choice to kill Smith, and to be
unable to do otherwise. Frankfurt says "Of course it is in a way up to him
whether he acts on his own or as a result of Black's intervention. That
depends upon what action he himself is inclined to perform." (1969, 836)
The problem with Frankfurt's original case, and traditional attempts to
build upon it, is that either it is unable to effectively cut off alternate
possibilities, or it is such that the agent is not uncontroversially morally
responsible. This argument against FSCs is known as the Kane-Widerker
objection, sometimes called the "dilemma defense." 11 In order for Black's
device to interfere only when Jones would choose otherwise, critics contend
that it must pick up upon some prior state of affairs that is causally related to
Jones's choice, such that either his choice is wholly causally determined, and
as such he isn't morally responsible for his action according to the
incompatibilist, or there are some situations where in the device will fail to
prevent Jones from choosing otherwise. Alfred Mele and David Robb
propose that the device could be triggered by some step within Jones's natural
decision making process, and thus only activate if he would choose
otherwise. While there is some concern that such a device wouldn't be
consistent with the kind of libertarian agency incompatibilists believe is
necessary for moral responsibility; the question is largely beside the point as
Frankfurt, Mele, and Robb seem to agree that Jones can either act freely, or
be forced to act, and that these are distinct possibilities.
Compatibilist John Martin Fischer has argued that FSCs can still be
persuasive even if one needs to assume determinism in order to ensure that
Jones cannot do otherwise and that it doesn't even matter if Jones is
uncontroversially morally responsible. 12 The problem with this approach is
that it ignores and abandons the open-endedness and persuasiveness of
Frankfurt's original case. Fischer contends "... it is not alleged by the
Frankfurt-style compatibilist that the strategy is knockdown or decisive."
(2007, 470) However, this seems to miss the point of FSCs; if Jones's action
is wholly causally determined by events that occurred long before he was
born, Black's machinations are irrelevant to the explanation of why Jones

11
See Kane 1985, 1996; Widerker 1995; Ginet 1996; Wyma 1997; Goetz 2005; Simkulet 2012,
2014a.
12
See Fischer 2000, 2007, 2010.

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 William Simkulet

can't do otherwise. Fischer-style interpretations of FSCs might convince

compatibilists of the falsity of PAP, but compatibilists already widely reject
PAP.
Frankfurt's own account is inconsistent with Fischer's; Frankfurt
volunteers that Jones has alternate possibilities, and that he can act either
virtuously or viciously (1969, 826; 2003/2006 , 343); he stipulates that there
are two possible futures open to Jones; Jones can either freely choose to kill
Smith, or be forced by Black to choose to kill Smith. The former is vicious
and blameworthy; the latter is virtuous, perhaps even praiseworthy! 13 On
Frankfurt's view it seems Jones would be praiseworthy for trying to make his
choice in such a manner that would trigger Black's device; but because the
device ultimately determines Jones's choice, it would be inappropriate to hold
him morally accountable for the outcome of that deliberation.
Frankfurt's case is said to be a counterexample to SPAP because Black's
device prevents Jones from choosing anything but to kill Smith, and
intuitively he's morally responsible for that choice because he freely chose to
do so. The problem is that Jones is only morally responsible for his choice if
he freely chooses it; had he been forced to make the choice by Black's device,
although his deliberation would have the same outcome, he wouldn't be
morally responsible for its outcome. Jones has alternatives; he can freely
choose to kill Smith, or freely choose to act in a way that, sans Black's
device, would result in him choosing something else, but that thanks to
Black's device instead results in him being (unfreely) caused to choose to kill
Smith.
SPAP is agnostic on the role that one's alternate possibilities play in
determining how morally responsible one is; it merely states that alternate
possibilities are a necessary condition for moral responsibility; because Jones
can act in either of two ways, Frankfurt's case fails to cut off alternate
possibilities of the kind relevant to this principle, and thus fails to constitute a
counterexample to the principle.

II. On Neo-Frankfurt-Style Cases

Recent attempts to construct FSCs have moved away from trying to construct
scenarios in which an agent completely lacks alternate possibility. Instead

13
Michael Otsuka similarly argues that the morally relevant kind of alternate possibilities in
question are the alternate manner in which Jones can act; either freely (viciously) or be forced to
act by Black (in such a way that makes it absurd to hold him accountable for his action). See
Otsuka 1998.

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 On the Signpost Principle of Alternate Possibilities

these Neo-FSCs are meant to restrict an agent's alternate possibilities to

possibilities that don't seem to be morally relevant. David Hunt and Derk
Pereboom have each constructed cases of this kind, designed to show that the
alternate possibilities open to the agents in question are insufficient to explain
their moral responsibility. 14 Here are concise versions of these cases:

Hunt's Revenge case

Smith humiliates Jones, which causally determines Jones to have a
strong desire to kill Smith. If Jones does not rid himself of this desire
soon, it will causally determine him to choose to try to kill Smith.
Jones knows acting on this desire would be wrong, and knows that to
rid himself of this desire he must first consider his alternatives, then
he must choose not to kill Smith. Black is monitoring Smith's
thoughts, and if Jones considers not killing Smith, Black will
intervene and force Jones to choose to kill Smith. As it so happens,
Jones never considers his alternatives, and his desire to kill Smith
causally determines that he chooses to kill Smith, and he does. (Hunt,
2005)

Pereboom's Tax Evasion case:

Joe believes that he can get away with cheating on his taxes, but that
doing so would be wrong. His strong desire to advance his self
interest will causally determine him to cheat on his taxes unless he
chooses otherwise. However, he cannot choose otherwise on a whim;
he knows a prerequisite for him to choose otherwise is for him to
freely raise his moral attentiveness level through the use of his
libertarian free will. If he raises it enough, he will be able to use his
libertarian free will to reconsider; however he might then freely
choose act either in his self interest, or act as he believes is moral.
Unbeknownst to Joe, Black has implanted a device in his brain that is
triggered by him reaching the appropriate level of moral attentiveness.
When triggered, the device robs him of his libertarian free will and
causally determines him to cheat on his taxes. As it so happens, Joe
never uses his libertarian free will to raise his moral attentiveness
level "and he chooses to evade taxes while the device remains idle."
(Pereboom, 2008)

14
See Hunt 2005, Pereboom 2001, 2005, 2008.

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 William Simkulet

Jones and Joe are supposed to be uncontroversially morally responsible for

their actions, and both have the ability to do otherwise - Jones can freely
consider not killing Smith (which would prompt Black to intervene and rob
him of his free will), while Joe can freely raise his moral attentiveness level
(which would trigger Black's device and rob him of his free will). The
primary difference between these cases and Frankfurt's original is that in the
original, Frankfurt admits Jones can act virtuously - he can act in such a way
that would counterfactually lead to him choosing not to kill Smith - and in
doing so be prima facie praiseworthy; however in Hunt and Pereboom's
cases, the best Jones can do is to freely consider not killing Smith, while the
best Joe can do is raise his attentiveness level to consider not cheating on his
taxes. Because after this consideration, Jones and Joe could go on to freely
act immorally, they do not consider the alternate possibility to consider doing
otherwise as a robust alternate possibility, where an alternate possibility is
robust if and only if an agent knew she would be differently morally
responsible if she chose that action.
Hunt and Pereboom contend that Jones and Joe, respectively, are morally
culpable for their actions, despite lacking robust alternate possibilities and if
this is the case RPAP is false. The problem for this account is that both Jones
and Joe know that considering alternatives and raising one's moral
attentiveness level, respectively, are necessary, but not sufficient, conditions
for freely choosing to do otherwise. 15 While it is true that the needlessly
complicated (and evolutionarily deficient) buffer-step that Hunt and
Pereboom incorporate into their agents' decision making process might lead
to either a morally praiseworthy or blameworthy decision by that agent, both
agents know that this step is a necessary prerequisite to doing what they
believe is right. 16
If one has a moral obligation to do something y, and x is a necessary, but
not sufficient, step for obtaining y, one has a moral obligation to do x. As
such Jones and Joe are each morally obligated to take this step; Jones has a
moral obligation to freely consider his alternatives, and Joe has a moral
obligation to raise his moral attentiveness level. Although Black's

15
In Hunt and Pereboom's original cases they fail to specify whether Jones or Joe have sufficient
working knowledge of their bizarre mental faculties to know the steps they need to take to act
otherwise. This article stipulates that they have this knowledge, because if they were ignorant of
such things it would be absurd to expect them to do otherwise as they would have no reason to
do so, and thus absurd to hold them morally accountable for failing to take the steps to change
their minds.
16
See Simkulet 2014a.

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 On the Signpost Principle of Alternate Possibilities

monitoring makes it impossible that Jones can ever freely choose not to kill
Smith, and Black's device makes it impossible that Joe can ever freely choose
not to cheat on his taxes; both Jones and Joe know that they have a strong
moral obligation to do otherwise, and fail to do so. Implicit in the idea of a
moral obligation is that if one fails, one is differently morally responsible
than if one succeeds. As such, the buffer-step that Hunt and Pereboom
construct constitutes a robust alternate possibility - if Jones and Joe take this
step intending it to be the first step in avoiding a blameworthy action (killing
Smith, cheating) in favor of a praiseworthy action (not killing Smith, not
cheating), they are inherently praiseworthy for doing so.
I've argued that Jones and Joe have a strong moral obligation to engage in
the steps they believe are necessary prerequisites for freely choosing to do
what each thinks is right - not killing Smith, and not cheating on taxes,
respectively - and that if they do these prerequisites for these reasons, they
are morally praiseworthy for doing so. However, it is possible that Jones and
Joe engage in these steps for other reasons. Suppose that Jones knows that
unless he considers his alternatives, he will be causally determined to kill
Smith, but that Jones wants Smith to experience worse, say by letting Smith
live and systematically killing everyone and everything Smith loves. By
stipulation, Jones knows the only way he can choose to do such a thing is to
freely consider his alternatives. If, intent upon getting his revenge, Jones
considers his alternatives (with the hope of choosing this long drawn out
torture over a swift death), Black will intervene and rob Jones of his free will
and causally determine that he kills Smith then and there. If this were the
case, it doesn't make sense to say that Jones is morally blameworthy for
Smith's death... but he is blameworthy for something. He is blameworthy for
freely acting in such a way that he believes is a necessary prerequisite for his
murdering Smith's friends and loved ones to bring about that very
consequence.
Although critics of Neo-FSCs could focus on demonstrating the prima
facie praiseworthy possibilities of Jones or Joe acting otherwise, it is clear
that whether they would be praiseworthy or blameworthy for their alternate
possible actions depends upon the intentions they take those actions with. 17

17
It strikes me as possible that a well-intentioned Jones might still freely choose to either kill
Smith, or get revenge on Smith by killing Smith's friends and family; however such a Jones
would still be prima facie praiseworthy for acting in a manner such that he believed was
necessary for him to do what is right. He is, however, blameworthy for his latter, wrong, free
choice.

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 William Simkulet

Rather than demonstrate the falsity of RPAP, it seems as though Neo-FSCs

actually demonstrate its truth; an agent's beliefs about the moral character of
their possible intentional actions play a vital role in determining her degree of
moral responsibility. If Jones were to consider his alternatives hoping to do
worse than kill Smith, he would be blameworthy for doing so (and blameless
for being forced to kill Smith by Black), while if Joe were to raise his moral
attentiveness level in hopes of doing the right thing, he would be praise-
worthy for doing so (and as Pereboom contends Joe's choice to cheat on his
taxes is the result of his being determined to act in his self interest, Joe would
be blameless for being caused by his beliefs about his self interest to cheat on
his taxes as a result).

III. Why Neo-Frankfurt-Style Cases are Irrelevant

In the previous two sections I've argued that traditional FSCs fail to
demonstrate the falsity of SPAP, and Neo-FSCs fail to demonstrate the falsity
of RPAP. The goal of this section is to compare the implications of a
hypothetically successful traditional FSC with those of a hypothetically
successful Neo-FSC.
For our purposes a successful traditional FSC is stipulated to have the
following characteristics: The agent, Jones*, is actually and uncontro-
versially truly morally blameworthy for his free choice, s, and he is
blameworthy to non-zero degree d for s. Jones*'s moral responsibility for s is
not derivative of some prior act r that preceded it. Jones* could not do
otherwise; by this I mean that from the moment that immediately preceded
Jones*'s deliberative process in which he chose s, there was only one possible
way in which he could choose s and no possible way that he could choose
other than s. There was no way such that he could choose s and be morally
blameworthy in any other degree than d.
A successful traditional FSC would be a decisive counterexample to both
SPAP and RPAP, directly demonstrating the falsity of the principles. Jones*
would be morally responsible despite lacking the ability to do otherwise, but
even if he had the ability to do otherwise it would be irrelevant to explaining
how morally responsible he is. This case does not show that moral
responsibility is impossible within an indeterministic universe, but it would
demonstrate the truth of compatibilism. 18

18
Note that a successful Fischer-style interpretation of a FSC would prove the truth of
compatibilism. It strikes me that such a successful case would also undermine the majority of

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 On the Signpost Principle of Alternate Possibilities

For our purposes, a successful Neo-FSC is stipulated to have the

following characteristics: The agent, Joe*, is actually and uncontroversially
truly morally responsible for something, his free choice c, and he is
blameworthy to degree b for c. Joe* had alternate possibilities, but these
alternate possibilities are not relevant to explaining his moral responsibility
for c to degree b. By this I mean that Joe* has a set of alternate possibilities
a, composed of one or more alternate possibilities, and that had he had acted
on any of the alternate possibilities within set a, he would still have been
blameworthy to degree b.
A successful Neo-FSC demonstrates the falsity of RPAP; Joe* would be
morally responsible despite lacking robust alternate possibilities because the
alternate possibilities within set a would be irrelevant to explaining Joe*'s
blame. However, at least as formulated above, a successful Neo-FSC is not a
counterexample to SPAP, Joe* is stipulated to have alternate possibilities. If
this were the case, then it is still possible that there is some connection
between moral responsibility and indeterministic metaphysics, such that
compatibilism is false.
Assuming the existence of a successful Neo-FSC, critics of SPAP have
two options to attack SPAP: First, they might revise the successful Neo-FSC
such that Joe* would be blameworthy to degree b for choice c regardless the
size of the set of alternate possibilities he has, such that if Joe* had no
alternate possibilities (an empty set e), Joe* would be blameworthy to degree
b for choice c in the same exact way as if he had alternate possibilities. If
successful, all this approach does is turn the Neo-FSC into a traditional FSC,
which by assumption would be a counterexample to SPAP.
The second way in which a critic might argue against SPAP, given a
successful Neo-FSC, is to argue that our belief in SPAP is contingent on our
belief in RPAP. This style of argument is similar to Frankfurt's original
assertion that our commitment to the truth of PAP is based, at least in part, on
our commitment to the coercion principle. I don't see how this argument
could gain any traction among proponents of SPAP. The appeal of SPAP is
that alternate possibilities serve as signposts that indicate an agent might have
the kind of control over their actions necessary for moral responsibility. In
contrast, the truth of RPAP might actually be a problem for incompatibilists;
the thought that such alternate possibilities might play a role in determining
an agent's moral responsibility is actually quite troubling, raising the specter

our beliefs about moral responsibility and undermine the idea that commonsense moral intuitions
could be a reliable guide to either metaphysical or moral truth.

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 William Simkulet

of moral luck. 19 Analytically, the truth of RPAP necessitates the truth of

SPAP; but proponents of SPAP leery of the problem of moral luck are far
more likely to reject RPAP than attribute their belief in SPAP to it. 20
Not only would a successful Neo-FSC fail prove the falsity of SPAP, but
there is no reason to think that a Neo-FSC's proving RPAP false would give
us any reason to rethink our commonsense commitment to SPAP. To my
knowledge, proponents of Neo-FSCs don't argue RPAP is connected to our
beliefs about any other principles relevant to the free will debate; and thus I
have to conclude that a hypothetically successful Neo-FSCs would be silent
on the issues relevant to the debate over free will; in contrast a successful
FSC would have substantial implications for the debate, demonstrating the
truth of compatibilism. This is not to say that a successful Neo-FSC would
be irrelevant; quite the contrary. A successful Neo-FSC would seem to show
that some actions have fixed moral value; for example maybe killing Smith
always wrong to the exact same degree and always wrong in the same
manner. On this view, killing Smith for embarrassing you at a party might be
as wrong and equally as bad as killing Smith because it is the only way to
stop him from murdering thousands of helpless newborn infants.
If that sounds wrong, it's probably because it is. I've argued there are no
successful traditional FSCs and that there are no successful Neo-FSCs.
Rather than demonstrate the falsity of RPAP, I've argued (unsuccessful) Neo-
FSCs demonstrate its truth; killing Smith out of revenge is prima facie
blameworthy; however killing Smith because it is the only way to prevent
him from murdering infants is prima facie praiseworthy. The reason why
killing Smith in the former case is morally abhorrent is because there are
better alternatives; the reason it is morally necessary in the second is because
there are no better alternatives. However all of this is quite beside the point;
what this article set out to show was that while a successful traditional FSC
would have substantive implications for the free will debate, a successful
Neo-FSC would do nothing of the sort; I believe it has succeeded in this goal.

19
For more on moral luck see Nagel 1976, Zimmerman 2002, 2006, Simkulet 2014b.
20
Moral luck would occur if and only if something outside of an agent's control would determine
their moral responsibility; however as demonstrated in Hunt and Pereboom's cases, the existence
of alternate possibilities don't determine the moral responsibility of either Jones or Joe; however
the agent's beliefs about their alternate possibilities plays a vital role in explaining why they are
morally culpable to the degree in which they are, much as Frankfurt argues that an agent's beliefs
and intentions surrounding a coercive threat determines how morally culpable they are for acting
in accordance with that threat, because of the threat, or indifferent to the threat.

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William Simkulet
Cleveland State University
simkuletwm@yahoo.com

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