A. Military Powers (1987 CONST., art. VII, sec.

18)
What are the military powers of the President?

1. Calling out powers

2. Suspension of the privilege of writ of habeas corpus
3. Declaration of martial law

(6) What is the calling out powers of the President?

The President is the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines. As such, he/she may call out the armed forces to suppress
lawless violence, invasion, or rebellion, whenever it shall be necessary. It is the most benign of the military powers of the president and is
merely incidental to his authority to determine the disposition of the armed forces and what degree of force a particular crisis demands. It
is however limited to ordinary police action necessary to maintain public order. (IBP v. Zamora, G.R. No. 141284, August 15,2000).

(5) What are the limitations to the power of the President to suspend the privilege of writ of habeas corpus?
The grounds for the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus under the c1987 Constitution are invasion or rebellion, or
when public safety requires it;
1. Such suspension shall not exceed sixty (60) days, following which it shall be lifted, unless otherwise extended
by the Congress;
2. Such suspension shall not impair the right to bail. (Section 13, Art. III, 1987 Constitution);
3. The suspension applies only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent or directly connected
with invasion;
4. During such suspension, any person thus arrested or detained shall be judicially charged within three (3) days,
otherwise he shall be released;
5. The President has the duty to report such action to the Congress within forty-eight (48) hours, personally or in
writing;
6. The Congress may revoke, or so extend upon the request of the President, the effectivity of the
proclamation by a majority vote of all its members, voting jointly;
7. The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding the sufficiency of the factual basis of the
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ, or the extension thereof, and must
promulgate a decision thereon within thirty (30) days from filing.
8. The suspension of the privilege of writ shall only apply to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses
inherent in or directly connected with invasion.
9. During the suspension of the privilege of the writ, any person arrested, or detained shall be judicially charged
within three days, otherwise he shall be released. (Section 18, Article VII, 1987 Constitution).

(6) What are the nature and guidelines of the President’s power to declare martial law?
The martial law is the joint power of the President and the Congress.
The following are the guidelines in order that the President can declare martial law?
1. There must be an invasion or rebellion
2. Public safety requires the proclamation of martial law all over the Philippines or any part thereof
3. Should not exceed 60 days, following which, it will be automatically lifted unless the Congress extends such
period
4. Within 48 hours, the President must report to the Congress, either personally or in writing
5. The Congress has the power to either affirm or revoke or allow the lapse or extend the effectivity of the
proclamation by majority votes of its members voting jointly
6. The citizens have the authority to question the factual basis for such declaration and the Supreme Court needs to
decide the case within 30 days from its filing.
Once revoked by the Congress, the President cannot set aside the revocation. The state of martial law does not suspend
the operation of the Constitution nor supplant the functioning of the civil or legislative assemblies nor authorize the
conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function nor
automatically suspend the privilege of writ.

93. What are the conditions in granting emergency powers to the President?
1. There must be a war or other emergency.
2. The delegation must be for a limited period only.
3. The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may prescribe.
4. The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy declared by Congress.
(Sec. 23(2), Art. VI, 1987 Constitution)

94. Can a governor declare a state of national emergency and exercise emergency powers?

No. A provincial governor is not endowed with the power to call upon the armed forces at his own bidding.

1
 He will exceed his authority when he declares a state of emergency and calls upon the Armed Forces, the
police, and his own Civilian Emergency Force. The calling-out powers contemplated under the Constitution
is exclusive to the President. Springing from the well- entrenched constitutional precept of One President is
the notion that there are certain acts which, by their very nature, may only be performed by the president
as the Head of the State. One of these acts or prerogatives is the bundle of Commander-in-Chief powers to
which the “calling-out” powers constitutes a portion. An exercise by another official, even if he is the local
chief executive, is ultra vires, and may not be justified by the invocation of Sec. 465 of the Local Government
Code. (Kulayan vs. Tan, G.R. No. 187298, July 3, 2012)

95. What is the doctrine of command responsibility?

Pursuant to the doctrine of command responsibility, the President, as the Commander-in-Chief of the AFP,
can be held liable for affront against the petitioner’s rights to life, liberty and security as long as substantial
evidence exist to show that he or she had exhibited involvement in or can be imputed with knowledge of
the violations, or had failed to exercise necessary and reasonable diligence in conducting the necessary
investigations required under the rules. (Saez vs. Macapagal- Arroyo, G.R. No. 183533, September 25, 2012)

96. Is the Philippine National Police fall under the Commander-in-Chief power of the President?

No. The police force, not being integrated with the military, is not a part of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines. As a civilian agency of the government, the President's power over the PNP is subsumed in his
general power of control and supervision over the executive department of the government. As the
President is not part of the chain of command in the PNP, it follows that he does not exercise command
responsibility over this civilian organization. (Nacino vs. Ombudsman, G.R. Nos. 234789-91, September 03,
2019)

97. What are the parameters for review to determine whether there exists a factual basis for the
proclamation of Martial Law and/or suspension of the privilege of Habeas Corpus? What is the standard
of proof required in determining such?

The parameters for determining the sufficiency of the factual basis are as follows: (a) actual rebellion or invasion; (2) public safety requires
it; and 3) there is probable cause for the President to believe that there is actual rebellion or invasion. The first two requirements must
concur. The President needs only to satisfy probable cause as the standard of proof in determining the existence of either invasion or
rebellion for purposes of declaring Martial Law. (Lagman vs. Medialdea, G.R. No. 231658, July 4, 2017)

93. After being confirmed that the town of Masinloc was attacked and seized by a group inspired by ISIS, a well-
known international terrorist group, President Munggo declared Martial Law and suspended the privilege of
the writ of habeas corpus on the entire region of Mindawi where the town of Masinloc is situated. Congress
fails to convene and vote on either extending or revoking the proclamation of Martial Law. Senator Mapilit
filed a Petition for Mandamus to compel Congress to convene and decide on the extension or revocation of the
Martial Law pursuant to Sec. 18, Art. VII, of the 1987 Constitution. Would the action prosper?

No. The Congress is not constitutionally mandated to convene in a joint session except to vote jointly to
revoke the President's declaration or suspension. The use of the word "may" in the Constitution is to be
construed as permissive and operating to confer discretion on the Congress on whether or not to revoke,
but in order to revoke, the same provision sets the requirement that at least a majority of the Members of
the Congress, voting jointly, favor revocation. (Padilla vs. Congress of the Philippines, G.R. No. 231671, July
25, 2017)

94. Acting on the recommendations of the Department of National Defense Secretary Demi and the then Armed
Forces of the Philippines Chief of Staff General Gero in a letter dated December 8, 2017, President Munggo
again asked both the Senate and the House of Representatives to extend the Proclamation of martial law
and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the entire Mindanao for one year. Before
the expiration of the second extension of Proclamation No. 216 or on December 4, 2018, Secretary Demi in
a letter to the President, recommended the third extension of martial law and the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in the entire Mindanao for one year from January 1, 2019 up to
December 31, 2019. Congressman Mario prayed for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) or
a Writ of Preliminary Injunction (WPI) to enjoin the respondents from implementing the one-year extension
contending that a third extension violates the constitutional proscription against a long duration of martial
law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Is Congressman Mario’s contention
tenable?

No. There is no limit as to how many times and for how may it extend the suspension of the privilege of
habeas corpus. The Congress has the prerogative to extend the martial law and the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus as the Constitution does not limit the period for which it can extend
the same. The Court in the case of Lagman vs. Medialdea explained the only limitations to the exercise of
congressional authority to extend such proclamation or suspension: a) the extension should be upon the
President's initiative; b) it should be grounded on the persistence of the invasion or rebellion and the

2
 demands of public safety; and c) it is subject to the Court's review of the sufficiency of its factual basis upon
the petition of any citizen. (Lagman vs. Medialdea, G.R. No. 243522, February 19, 2019)

95. Does the declaration of Martial Law automatically suspend the privilege of Habeas Corpus?

Martial law does not automatically suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or the operation of
the Constitution. The civil courts and the legislative bodies shall remain open; Military courts and agencies
are not conferred jurisdiction over civilians. The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
shall apply only to persons facing charges of rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly connected with
invasion. Any person arrested for such offenses must be judicially charged within 3 days. Otherwise, he shall
be released. (Sec. 18, Art. VII, 1987 Constitution)

B. Pardoning Power and Executive Clemency (1987 CONST., art. VII, sec. 19)
(5) What is the nature of the pardoning power of the President?
The exercise of the pardoning power is discretionary in the President and may not be interfered with by Congress or the Court, except only
when it exceeds the limits provided for by the Constitution (Risos-Vidal v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 206666, January 21, 2015). In granting the
power of executive clemency upon the President, the Constitution does not distinguish between criminal and administrative cases (Llamas
v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 99031, October 15, 1991).

98. What are the limitations on the exercise of the pardoning power of the President?

a. It cannot be granted in cases of impeachment (Sec. 19, Art. VII, 1987 Constitution);
b. It cannot be granted in cases of violation of election laws without the favorable
recommendation of the Commission on Elections (Sec. 5, Art. IX-C, 1987 Constitution);
c. It can be granted only after conviction by final judgment (People vs. Salle, Jr., G.R. No. 103567,
December 4, 1995, reiterated in People vs. Bacang, G.R. No. 116512, July 30, 1996);
d. It cannot be granted in cases of legislative or civil contempt;
e. It cannot absolve the convict of civil liability (People vs. Nacional, G.R. Nos. 111294-95, September 7, 1995);
and
f. It cannot restore public offices forfeited (Monsanto vs. Factoran, G.R. No. 78239, February 9, 1989).

99. Does pardon ipso facto restore former office, as well as the corresponding rights and privileges?

No. Pardon does not ipso facto restore a convicted felon neither to his former public office nor to his rights
and privileges, which were necessarily relinquished or forfeited by reason of the conviction although such
pardon undoubtedly restores his eligibility to that office. To regain former public officer, one must re-apply
and undergo the usual procedure required for a new appointment. (Monsanto vs. Factoran, G.R. No. 78239,
February 9, 1989)

100. What are the forms of executive clemency? Explain briefly.

a. Pardon – an act of grace which exempts the individual on whom it is bestowed from the
punishment that the law inflicts for the crime he has committed;
b. Commutation – the reduction or mitigation of the penalty;
c. Reprieve – the postponement of a sentence or stay of execution;
d. Parole – the release from imprisonment but without full restoration of liberty as parolee is still in the
custody of the law although not in confinement;
e. Remission of fines and forfeitures – prevents the collection of fines or the confiscation of forfeited
property and it cannot have the effect of returning properly which has been vested in third parties or
money ion the public treasury; and Amnesty – an act of grace concurred in by the legislature and
usually extended to groups of persons who committed political offenses, and which puts into oblivion
the offense itself;
f. Amnesty - The grant of general pardon to a class of political offenders either after conviction or even
before the charges is filed. It is the form of executive clemency which under the Constitution may be
granted by the President only with the concu..rrence of the legislature. (Nachura, Outline Reviewer in
Political Law, 2016)

3
 101. Distinguish Pardon from Amnesty.

PARDON AMNESTY

Judicial notice Private act of the President upon Public act of the President that courts may
which there can be no judicial take judicial notice of.
scrutiny; it must be pleaded and
proved.

42
PARDON AMNESTY

To whom Granted to an individual after Granted to classes of persons or communities

granted; when conviction. before the institution of criminal prosecution
or sometimes after conviction.

Concurrence No need for the concurrence of the Need the concurrence of the Congress.
Congress.
by the Congress

Acceptance Acceptance is necessary. No need for a distinct act of acceptance.

Offense Generally granted for infractions of Addressed to political offenses.

peace of the state.

Effect Looks forward and relieves the Looks backward and abolishes and puts into
offender from the consequences of oblivion the offense itself, as if no offense was
an offense of which he has been committed. (Barrioquinto vs. Fernandez, G.R.
convicted. No. L-1278, January 21, 1949)

C. Diplomatic Power (1987 CONST., art. VII, secs. 16, 20 and 21)

102. What are the Foreign Relations Power of the President?

1. Inherent Diplomatic Powers

- which includes: (a) the power to make treaties; (b) the power to appoint ambassadors, other
public ministers and consuls; (c)the power to receive ambassadors and other public ministers duly
accredited to the Philippines; and (d) the power to deport.

2. Other Foreign Affairs Powers

- which includes (a) The power to appoint ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls;
(b) The power to receive ambassadors and other public ministers duly accredited to the Philippines; and
(c) Power of deportation although the Legislature may limit the substantive grounds for such.

3. To Contract or Guarantee Foreign Loans

The President may contract or guarantee foreign loans on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines with
the prior concurrence of the Monetary Board, and subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.
The Monetary Board shall, within thirty days from the end of every quarter of the calendar year, submit
to the Congress a complete report of its decision on applications for loans to be contracted or guaranteed
by the Government or government-owned and controlled corporations which would have the effect of
increasing the foreign debt, and containing other matters as may be provided by law.. (Sec. 20, Art. VII,

4
 1987 Constitution)

4. Entry into Treaties or International Agreements

The President can enter into an executive agreement without the concurrence of the Senate. The right of
the Executive to enter into binding agreements without the necessity of subsequent Congressional
approval has been confirmed by long usage. From the earliest days of our history, we have
entered executive agreements covering such subjects as commercial and consular relations, most
favored-nation rights, patent rights, trademark and copyright protection, postal and navigation
arrangements and the settlement of claims. The validity of these has never been seriously questioned by
our courts. (Bayan Muna vs. Romulo, G.R. No. 159618, February 01, 2011)

103. Distinguish Treaties from Executive Agreements.

TREATIES EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS

Binding effect Formal documents, which require Become binding through executive
ratification with the approval of 2/3 of action without need of a vote by
the Senate. the Senate or Congress.

Nature International agreements, involving International agreements

political issues or changes of national embodying adjustments of detail
policy, and those involving carrying out well established
international arrangements of a national policies and traditions and
permanent character. those involving arrangements of a
more or less temporary nature.

(5) What are the differences between a treaty and an executive agreement?
A treaty is "an international agreement concluded between states in written form and governed by international law,
whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instruments and whatever its particular designation"
(The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Art. 2 [hereinafter VCLT]). An executive agreement is similar to a treaty,
except that the former does not require legislative concurrence, is usually less formal, and deals with a narrower range of
subject matters (Bayan Muna v. Romulo, G.R. No. 159618, February 1, 2011).

(6) Is signing a treaty the same as ratification?

No. Signing of the treaty and ratification are not the same. The signature is primarily intended as a means of authenticating
the instrument and as a symbol of the good faith of the parties. It is usually performed by the state's authorized
representative in the diplomatic mission. Ratification, on the other hand, is the formal act by which a state confirms and
accepts the provisions of a treaty concluded by its representative. It is generally held to be an executive act, undertaken by
the head of the state or of the government (Pimentel, et al. v. Executive Secretary, et al., supra).

(7) Who has the power to ratify a treaty and what is the role of the Senate on the treaty-making power of the President?
Under the Constitution, the power to ratify is vested in the President, subject to the concurrence of 2/3 of the members of
the Senate. The role of the Senate, however, is limited only to giving or withholding consent, or concurrences to the
ratification (Bayan v. Zamora, 342 SCRA 449 [2000]).

(8) What are the guidelines concerning the President’s withdrawal from international agreements?
The Court adopted the following guidelines as the modality for evaluating cases concerning the president's withdrawal from
international agreements:
1. The president enjoys some leeway in withdrawing from agreements which he or she determines to be contrary to
the Constitution or statutes. In the event that courts determine the unconstitutionality of a treaty, the president may
unilaterally withdraw from it. Owing to the preeminence of statutes enacted by elected representatives and hurdling
the rigorous legislative process, the subsequent enactment of a law that is inconsistent with a treaty likewise allows
the president to withdraw from that treaty;
2. The president cannot unilaterally withdraw from agreements which were entered into pursuant to
congressional imprimatur;

5
 3. The President cannot unilaterally withdraw from international agreements where the Senate concurred and
expressly declared that any withdrawal must also be made with its concurrence (Pangilinan v. Cayetano, G.R. No.
238875, March 16, 2021).

(9) Is the Philippines’ withdrawal from the Rome Statute through a Note Verbale delivered to the Secretary- General of the
United Nations valid, binding, and effectual?
Yes. Article 127 of the Rome Statute provides mechanisms on how a state party may withdraw from it:
1. A State Party may, by written notification addressed to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, withdraw
from this Statute. The withdrawal shall take effect one year after the date of receipt of the notification, unless
the notification specifies a later date.
2. A State shall not be discharged, by reason of its withdrawal, from the obligations arising from this Statute while it
was a Party to the Statute, including any financial obligations which may have accrued. Its withdrawal shall not affect
any cooperation with the Court in connection with criminal investigations and proceedings in relation to which the
withdrawing State had a duty to cooperate and which were commenced prior to the date on which the withdrawal
became effective, nor shall it prejudice in any way the continued consideration of any matter which was already
under consideration by the Court prior to the date on which the withdrawal became effective.

The President's withdrawal from the Rome Statute was in accordance with the mechanism provided in the treaty. The
Rome Statute itself contemplated and enabled a State Party's withdrawal. A state party and its agents cannot be faulted
for merely acting within what the Rome Statute expressly allows (Pangilinan v. Cayetano, G.R. No. 238875, March 16,
2021).

(10) Former President A issued Presidential Decree No. 1234 which provides that government employees may be granted
allowances, honoraria, and other fringe benefits, subject to the approval of the President. Pursuant to this provision,
former President B issued Administrative Order No. 987, which authorized government agencies and government-owned
and controlled corporations to establish an annual medical checkup program. Philippine Institute for Developmental
Studies (PIDS), a government- owned and controlled corporation (GOCC), sought for the President's approval before
establishing its annual medical checkup program. It likewise sought the Office of the President's approval to continue the
annual medical checkup program's implementation after Notice of Disallowance No. 2006-01 had been issued. The
Executive Secretary, acting through the authority by the President, wrote a letter stating that upon the recommendation of
the Department of Health and Department of Budget and Management, PIDS is allowed to continue its implementation of
its annual medical checkup program through an accredited health organization, subject to the usual accounting and
auditing rules and regulations. Thereafter, PIDS entered into an agreement with PhilCare, a duly accredited health
organization for its annual medical checkup program. The Commission on Audit (CA) argued that said agreement is not
allowed since it is an irregular expenditure. The CA based its argument upholding the validity of the Notice of Disallowance.
Does the President, acting through its executive secretary have the power to reorganize and allow a GOCC to continue its
annual medical checkup program despite the issuance of the Notice of Disallowance?
Yes, the President has the power to reorganize. As expressly provided in Article VII, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution,
“the President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be
faithfully executed." The doctrine of qualified political agency acknowledges the multifarious executive responsibilities that
demand a president's attention, such that the delegation of control power to his or her Cabinet becomes a necessity.
Unless the Constitution or law provides otherwise, Cabinet members have the president's imprimatur to exercise control
over the offices and departments under their respective jurisdictions, which authority nonetheless remains subject to the
president's disapproval or reversal. In the present case, the Executive Secretary, as the President's alter ego, had the
authority to let petitioner continue implementing its annual medical checkup program through enrollment with health
maintenance organizations. Consequently, the exemption granted by the Executive Secretary, as the President's alter ego,
is valid. It will remain so, unless disapproved or reprobated by the President. Thus, PIDS is allowed to continue its annual
medical checkup program.

(11) Does the President have the power to enter into contract or guarantee foreign loans without the concurrence of the
Congress?
No. The President may contract or guarantee foreign loans in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines with the prior
concurrence of the Monetary Board and subject to such limitations as may be provided under law. The Monetary Board
shall, within thirty days from the end of every quarter of the calendar year, submit to the Congress a complete report of its
decisions on applications for loans to be contracted or guaranteed by the government or government-owned and
controlled corporations which would have the effect of increasing the foreign debt, and containing other matters as may
be provided by law.

(12) Republic Act No. 5678, also known as the Aurora Special Economic Zone Act of 2007, established a unique economic zone
called the Aurora Special Economic Zone (Aurora Ecozone) in the province of Aurora. The primary objectives of this Act are
to boost tourism and attract investments to the area. The proposed Aurora Ecozone covers 500 hectares of land where the
current petitioners reside. This land is inhabited by 250 Agta and Dumagat families, who are primarily engaged in farming
and fishing for their livelihoods. The petitioners argue that the mentioned laws violate specific sections of the Constitution.
They contend that the laws go against Article XII, Section 21 of the Constitution because they grant the APEZA (Aurora
Pacific Economic Zone and Freeport Authority) the power to secure foreign loans without needing approval from the
President, the Department of Finance, or the Central Bank. Additionally, the laws allegedly breach Article XII, Section 11 of

6
 the Constitution by allowing foreign investors to operate public utilities without restrictions. On the other hand, the
respondents countered that the contested laws still uphold citizenship requirements and investment regulations
concerning public utilities. They further argue that it is permissible to delegate the authority to secure foreign loans to
APEZA, which functions as a government-owned or controlled corporation. They assert that obtaining the approval of the
Central Bank Monetary Board is not an absolute requirement for contracting foreign loans. The allegations on the violation
on rules concerning foreign loans and foreign investment are likewise untenable. Does the President have the power to
enter into contracts or guarantee foreign loans?
Yes, the president is allowed to contract and guarantee foreign loans, and the Constitution does not distinguish as to the
kind of loans or debt instruments that it covers. The president shares this authority with the Central Bank. Congress has no
part in contracting foreign loans except to limit and regulate how the loans may be contracted. It cannot expand the
constitutional provision and determine who may exercise this power. Hence, APECO cannot contract foreign loans on its
own. Even though the power to contract and guarantee foreign loans may be delegated by the President, the Secretary of
Finance or any designated alter ego of the President is bound to secure the latter's prior consent to or subsequent
ratification of his acts. (Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas v. Aurora Pacific Economic Zone GR 198688, November 42, 2020).

D. Power relative to Appropriation Measures (1987 CONST., art. VI, secs. 25(5) and 27(2))

104. What are the requisites to exercise the President’s (Senate President’s, Speaker of the House’s, Chief
Justice’s, Head of Constitutional Commissions’, as the case may be) Power of Augmentation?

(1) There is a law authorizing the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of the Constitutional
Commissions to transfer funds within their respective offices;
(2) The funds to be transferred are savings generated from the appropriations for their respective
offices; and
(3) The purpose of the transfer is to augment an item in the general appropriations law for their
respective offices. (Araullo vs. Aquino III, G.R. No. 1209287, July 1, 2014)

105. The Executive Department has accumulated substantial savings from its appropriations. Needing
P5,000,000.00 for the conduct of a plebiscite for the creation of a new city but has no funds appropriated
soon by the Congress for the purpose, the COMELEC requests the President to transfer funds from the
savings of the Executive Department in order to avoid a delay in the holding of the plebiscite. May the
President validly exercise his power under the 1987 Constitution to transfer funds from the savings of the
Executive Department, and make a cross-border transfer of P5,000,000.00 to the COMELEC by way of
augmentation? Explain your answer.

The President may not transfer savings to the Commission on Elections as aid. The constitutional prohibition against the transfer of
appropriations to other branches of government or Constitutional Commission applies must be strictly observed. (Araullo vs. Aquino III,
G.R. No. 209287, July 1, 2014)

E. Veto Power (1987 CONST., art. VI, sec. 27(2))

F.Residual Power (E.O. No. 292, Book III, Title I, Chapter 7, sec. 20)
(6) Who has the power to deport?
The President has the power to deport. As an act of State, the President has the inherent right to order the deportation of
an alien while at the same time that power may be deemed vested in him through delegation by the legislative through the
enactment of appropriate statutes (Qua Chee Gan v. Deportation Board, L-10280, September 30, 1963; Kishu Dalamal v.
Deportation Board, L-16812, October 31, 1963).

G. Removal from Office (1987 CONST., art. XI, sec. 2)

H.Rules of Succession (1987 CONST., art. VII, secs. 7-12)

65. Rules in the vacancy in the Office of the President.

Circumstance Who will succeed?

Vacancy at the Death or permanent disability. Vice President-elect.

beginning of the term of

7
the President-elect
Fails to qualify. Vice President-elect shall act as
President until the President-elect
shall have qualified.

8
 Circumstance
President shall not have been
chosen.
No President and Vice President
chosen nor shall have been
qualified, or both shall have died
or become permanently disabled.
Vacancy during the term Death, permanent disability,
removal from office, or resignation
of the President.
Death, permanent disability,
removal from office, or resignation
of the President and Vice
President.
Temporary disability When President transmits to the
Senate President and the Speaker
of the House his written
declaration that he is unable to
discharge the powers and duties
of his office, and until he
transmits to them a writing
declaration to the contrary.
Who will succeed?
Vice President-elect shall act as President
until a President shall have been chosen
and qualified.
The President of the Senate or, in case of
his inability, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives shall act as President
until a President or Vice President shall
have been chosen and qualified.
N.B.: In the event of inability of the
officials mentioned, Congress shall, by
law, provide for the manner in which one
who is to act as President shall be
selected until a President or a Vice
President shall have qualified.
Vice President
The President of the Senate or, in case of
his inability, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives shall act as President
until a President or Vice President shall
have been chosen and qualified.
N.B.: In the event of inability of the
officials mentioned, Congress shall, by
law, provide for the manner in which one
who is to act as President shall be
selected until a President or a Vice
President shall have qualified.
Vice President as Acting President.
9
 Circumstance Who will succeed?

When a majority of all of the Vice President as Acting President.

members of the Cabinet transmits
to the Senate President and the
Speaker of the House their written
declaration that the President is
unable to discharge the powers
and duties of his office.
Thereafter, when the President transmits
to the Senate President and Speaker of
the House his written declaration that no
inability exists, he shall re-assume the
powers and duties of his office.

If the Congress, within ten days after

receipt of the last written declaration, or,
if not in session, within twelve days after
it is required to assemble, determines by
a two-thirds vote of both Houses, voting
separately, that the President is unable to
discharge the powers and duties of his
office, the Vice-President shall act as the
President; otherwise, the President shall
continue exercising the powers and
duties of his office.
(Sec. 11, Art. VII, 1987 Constitution)

Serious illness Does not result to vacancy because the

Cabinet members in charge of national
security and foreign relations can still
access the President. (Nachura, Outline
Reviewer in Political Law, 2016)

II. JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

A. Definition of Judicial Power (1987 CONST., art. VIII, sec. 1)

What is Judicial Power? Upon whom is judicial power conferred?

Judicial power is vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. (Sec.
1, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution)

106. What is the scope of judicial power?

a. Adjudicatory Powers - To settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable (Sec. 1[2], Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution).
b. Expanded Power of Judicial review - To determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
the Government (Sec. 1[2], Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution).
c. Incidental Powers – Those which are necessary to the effective discharge of the judicial functions such
as: power to punish persons adjudged in contempt and power to issue restraining orders or
prohibition and injunction in aid of power of judicial review.

(13) What is the concept of judicial power?

Judicial power includes the duty on the courts to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legal, demandable
and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government (Sec. 1, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution; Kilusang
Mayo Uno Labor Center v. Garcia, et al., 239 SCRA 386, G.R. No. 115381, December 23, 1994).

(14) What is the reason as to why the framers of the 1987 Constitution expanded the Supreme Court's power of judicial review?
The framers of the 1987 Constitution deliberately expanded the Court's power of judicial review to prevent courts from
seeking refuge behind the political question doctrine and turning a blind eye to abuses committed by the other branches of
government. (Leonen, J Concurring Opinion in Belgia v. Ochoa, 721 Phil. 416 (2013)

10
 B. Judicial Review
107. What is Judicial Review?

Judicial review is the power of the courts, ultimately the Supreme Court, to interpret the Constitution and
to declare any legislative or executive act invalid because it is in conflict with the fundamental law.

The power of judicial review is subject to limitations, to wit: (1) there must be an actual case or
controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must have the
standing to assail the validity of the subject act or issuance, that is, he must have a personal and
substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its
enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the
issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case. (Colmenares v. Duterte, G.R. Nos. 245981 &
246594, August 9, 2022)

108. What is the expanded power of judicial review?

To determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government (Sec. 1[2], Art. VIII, 1987
Constitution).

It is the power of the court to inquire into the exercise of discretionary powers to determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. (Sec. 1, Art. VIII,
Marcos vs. Manglapus, G.R. No. 88211, September 15, 1989)

It is the power of the courts, ultimately the Supreme Court, to interpret the Constitution and to declare
any legislative or executive act invalid because it is in conflict with the fundamental law. (Biraogo vs Truth
Commission, G.R. Nos 192935 and 193036, December 7, 2010)

1. Requisites
109. Enumerate and discuss the requisites of Judicial Review.

a. There must be an Actual case or controversy – It involves a conflict of legal rights, assertion of
opposite legal claims susceptible of legal resolution. It must be both ripe for resolution and
susceptible of judicial determination, and that which is not conjectural or anticipatory, or that which
seeks to resolve hypothetical or feigned constitutional problems.

(15) Give the concept of actual controversy.

An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial
resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute (Philippine Amusement and Gaming
Corporation V. Thunderbird Pilipinas Hotels and Resorts, Inc., et al., 730 Phil. 543, 562 [20141).

There must be a contrast of legal rights that can be interpreted and enforced on the basis of existing law and
jurisprudence. The Court can decide the constitutionality of an act, either by the Executive or Legislative, only when an
actual case between opposing parties is submitted for judicial determination (Citing Didipio Earth Savers' Multi-Purpose
Association, Inc. v. Sec. Gozun, 520 Phil. 457 [2006]; Phil. Constitution Assn. (Philconsa) v. Phil. Government, G.R. No.
218406, November 29, 2016).

(16) When is a question ripe for judicial determination?

Closely linked to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of ripeness. A question is ripe for
adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual or entity challenging it
(Guingona v. Court of Appeals, 354 Phil. 415, 427 [1998]). For a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, it is a
prerequisite that an act had then been accomplished or performed by either branch of government before a court may
interfere, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or threatened injury to himself as a result of the
challenged action (Imbong v. Ochoa, Jr., 8 April 2014, 721 SCRA 146, 280). Petitioner must show that he has sustained or is
immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of the act complained of (Phil. Constitution Assn.
(Philconsa) v. Phil. Government, G.R. No. 218406, November 29, 2016).

b. The person challenging the act must be a Proper party (locus standi) – One who has sustained or is
in immediate danger of sustaining an injury as a result of the act complained of;

(17) What is legal standing?

Legal standing is a requisite for judicial review. What is required is "a material interest, an interest in the issue affected by
the decree as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest."

11
 There are several exceptions that can be invoked, such as suing as a taxpayer, concerned citizen, and a public interest
advocate raising issue of transcendental importance. Another exception is the concept of third-party standing. Under this
concept, actions may be brought on behalf of third parties provided the criteria are met. (Luis Villafuerte v. Securities and
Exchange Commission, G.R. No. 208379, March 29, 2022)

(18) Who is a proper party?

He is one who has a personal and substantial interest in the case and that he has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a
consequence of its enforcement (Tan v. Macapagal, 43 SCRA 677; Dumlao V. Comelec, 95 SCRA 392).

(19) What is the direct injury test in determining whether a citizen has the right to raise a public issue in court?
It simply means that for a private individual to invoke the judicial power to determine the validity of an executive or legislative action, he
must show that he has sustained a direct injury as a result of that action, and it is not sufficient that he has a general interest common to
all members of the public. The purpose is to prevent just about any person from seeking judicial interference in any official policy or act
with which he disagreed with, and thus, hinders the activities of government agencies engaged in public service (David, et al. v. Arroyo,
G.R. No. 141284, August 15, 2000)

c. The question of constitutionality must be Raised at the earliest possible opportunity -

Constitutional questions must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity.

d. The issue of constitutionality must be the very Lis mota of the case or Necessary
to the determination of the case itself – As long as there are other bases which
courts can use for decision, constitutionality of the law will not be touched,
thus, courts should refrain from resolving any constitutional issue "unless the
constitutional question is the lis mota of the case." (Belgica vs. Ochoa, G.R. No.
208566, November 19, 2013)

(20) What is the rule of the necessity to settle the constitutionality of a law?
As a general rule, courts will not settle the constitutionality of a law if it can pass upon the merits on other grounds (Alger
V. CA, 135 SCRA 37; Zandueta v. dela Costa, 66 Phil. 615). The reason for the rule is that, there is a presumption of
constitutionality of a law. The exception is when there is a necessity to determine the merits of the suit in which the
constitutionality of such law has been drawn in question. Here the court cannot avoid the resolution on the validity of the
law.

2. Exceptions
a. Political Questions

III. Explain the Political Question Doctrine.

Political questions refer “to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the
people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to
the legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the
wisdom, not legality of a particular measure.” (Vinuya vs. Romulo, G.R. No. 162230, April 28, 2010)

IV. What is the test to determine whether a question is political or justiciable?

The determination of a truly political question from a non-justiciable political question lies in the answer to
the question “whether there are constitutionality imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon
political bodies.” If there are, then our courts are duty-bound to examine whether the branch or
instrumentality of the government properly acted within such limits. (Francisco Jr. vs. House of
Representatives, G.R. No. 160261, November 10, 2003)

a. Moot Questions
V. Explain the concept of Moot and Academic Question in Judicial Review. Enumerate the exceptions to
this rule.

A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervising events, so that a
declaration thereon would be of no practical value. As a rule, courts decline jurisdiction over such a case, or dismiss it on
ground of mootness. (Deutsche Bank Ag London v. Kormasinc, Inc. G.R. Nos. 201700 & 201777; April 18, 2022)

As a rule, the Court may only adjudicate actual, ongoing controversies. The Court is not empowered to decide moot questions. A case or
issue is considered moot and academic when it no longer presents a justiciable controversy because the issues involved have become
academic or dead or when the matter in dispute has already been resolved and hence, one is not entitled to judicial intervention unless

12
the issue is likely to be raised again between the parties. There is nothing for the court to resolve as the determination thereof
has been overtaken by subsequent events.

Nevertheless, the Court will decide cases, otherwise moot, if:

A. There is a grave violation of the Constitution;
B. The exceptional character of the situation and the paramount public interest are involved;

C. When the constitutional issue raised requires formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench,
the bar, and the public; and
D. The case is capable of repetition yet evading review. (People v. Montierro, G.R. Nos. 254564, 254974,
A.M. No. 21-07-16-SC & A.M. No. 18-03-16-SC, July 26, 2022)

VI. X, as a citizen and a concerned Taxpayer, filed a petition to SC seeking to nullify HB No. 4738 which
abolishes the Judicial Development Fund (JDF) and replaces it with the Judiciary Support Fund (JSF). The
funds from JSF shall be remitted to the national treasury and Congress shall determine how the funds will
be used; unlike the JDF, the spending of which is exclusively determined by the SC. X argues that HB No.
4738 infringes SC’s fiscal autonomy. Is X's petition meritorious?

No. Petitioner must comply with all the requisites for judicial review before this court may take
cognizance of the case. In this case, X’s petition failed to comply with the requirement of Actual case or
controversy and Legal Standing.

There is no actual case or controversy. A proposed bill produces no legal effects until it is passed into law
the Court cannot speculate on the constitutionality or unconstitutionality of a bill that Congress may or
may not pass. It cannot rule on mere speculations or issues that are not ripe for judicial determination.
Filing of bills is within the legislative power of Congress and is "not subject to judicial restraint"

X also has no legal standing. Applying the “direct injury test”, Petitioner has not shown that he has
sustained or will sustain a direct injury if the proposed bill is passed into law. While his concern for judicial
independence is laudable, it does not, by itself, clothe him with the requisite standing to question the
constitutionality of a proposed bill that may only affect the judiciary. (In the matter of: Save the Supreme
Court Judicial Independence Against the Abolition of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF) and Reduction of
Autonomy, UDK-15143, January 21, 2015)\

(21) What is the concept of the term "transcendental importance"?

There is no doctrinal definition of transcendental importance. There are, however, instructive determinants like:
(1) the character of the funds or other assets involved in the case; (2) the presence of a clear case of disregard of a
constitutional or statutory prohibition by the agency or instrumentality of the government; and (3) the lack of any other
party with a more direct and specific interest in raising the questions being raised (Francisco, et al. v. House of
Representatives, supra, citing Kilosbayan v. Guingona, 232 SCRA 110).

(22) What is the requirement in rendering judicial decisions?

Article VIII, Section 14 of the Constitution provides that "no decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing
therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based," and that "no petition for review or motion for
reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be refused due course or denied without stating the basis therefor." Rule
36, Section 1 of the Rules of Court embraced this constitutional mandate, directing that "a judgment or final order
determining the merits of the case shall be in writing personally and directly prepared by the judge, stating clearly and
distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based, signed by him, and filed with the clerk of the court." (Pastora
Ganancial v. Betty Cabugao, G.R. No. 203348; July 6, 2020)

a. Advisory Opinions

2. Operative Fact Doctrine

VII. What is the Operative Fact Doctrine?

The doctrine of operative fact recognizes the existence of the law or executive act prior to the determination
of its unconstitutionality as an operative fact that produced consequences that cannot always be erased,
ignored or disregarded. In short, it nullifies the void law or executive act but sustains its effects. It provides an
exception to the general rule that a void or unconstitutional law produces no effect. (Araullo vs. Aquino, G.R.
No. 209287, July 1, 2014)

Note: This is an exception to the general rule that "An unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it

13
 imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is, in legal contemplation, as inoperative as
though it had never been passed." (Republic vs. CA, G.R. No. 79732, November 8, 1993)

VIII. When can facial challenge be invoked?

In sum, the prevailing Philippine jurisprudence is that facial challenges on legislative acts are permissible only
if they curtail the freedom of speech and its cognate rights based on overbreadth and the void-for-vagueness
doctrine. Facial challenges have not been recognized as applicable to other provisions of the Constitution or
the separation of powers. On this point, it is worth repeating that Philippine jurisprudence on facial
challenges developed in a different trajectory from the American experience xxx. And the Court, at this time,
finds it improper to expand the scope of facial challenges to all other constitutional rights, as it is not even
material, much more necessary for the just disposition of this already complex case. Moreover, it appears
that if such position is adopted at this time, the judiciary will be put in a precarious position where it may be
inundated with numerous petitions to invalidate statutes as soon as they come into effect. (Calleja v.
Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 252578, December 7, 2021)

IX. What is the Doctrine of Relative Constitutionality?

The constitutionality of a statute cannot, in every instance, be determined by a mere comparison of its
provisions with applicable provisions of the Constitution, since the statute may be constitutionally valid as
applied to one set of facts and invalid in its application to another. A statute valid at one time may become
void at another time because of altered circumstances. Thus, if a statute in its practical operation becomes
arbitrary or confiscatory, its validity, even though affirmed by a former adjudication, is open to inquiry and
investigation in the light of changed conditions. (Central Bank Employees Association, Inc. vs. Bangko Sentral
ng Pilipinas, G.R. No. 148208, December 15, 2004)

A. Fiscal Autonomy (1987 CONST., art. VIII, secs. 3 and 10)

X. Discuss Judicial Independence and Fiscal Autonomy

The Supreme Court is a constitutional body. It may not be abolished by the legislature. The members of the Supreme Court are removable
only by impeachment.

Pursuant to the constitutional mandate, the Judiciary must enjoy freedom in disposition of the funds allocated to it in the appropriations
law. (Bengzon vs. Drilon, G.R. No. 103524, April 15, 1992)

Appropriation for the Judiciary may not be reduced by the legislature below the amount appropriated for
the previous year and, after approval, shall be automatically and regularly released. (Sec. 3, Art. VIII, 1987
Constitution)

The fiscal autonomy of the Judiciary is guaranteed by the Constitution which recognized the authority of
the Supreme Court to levy, assess, and collect fees.

(23) Does the SC’s power to decide on the requests and other matters of collegiate courts include fixing budgets for said
courts?
Yes. The SC has the authority and discretion as part of its constitutional power of administrative supervision over all courts
and personnel thereof. This power includes having the discretion and approval on the retirement program budgets of
Justices of collegiate courts. (Art. VIII, Sec. 6 of the 1987 Constitution)

(24) Does the power of having fiscal autonomy include increasing the budget even for retiring members of collegiate courts?
Yes. Although retirement program budgets of retiring Justices of collegiate courts are not expressly provided under any
law, such retirement program budgets are more in the nature of administrative expenses which are allotted by the
collegiate courts, with the approval of the SC En Banc as part of its constitutional power of administrative supervision over
all courts and personnel thereof. (Re: Expenses of Retirement of Court of Appeals Justices, A.M. No. 19-02-03-CA
(Resolution); June 25, 2019)

(25) What is the effect of SC’s absolute control over Judiciary’s appropriations?
The power of fiscal autonomy of the Court encompasses the power to review, then approve or deny budget and appropriations for the
Judiciary. The Court ruled that any subsequent increase will still be subject to the review and approval of the Court and will depend on the
availability of funds and prevailing circumstances. (Re: Expenses of Retirement of Court of Appeals Justices, A.M. No. 19-02-03-CA
(Resolution); June 25, 2019)

14
 XI. What are the safeguards of Judicial Independence?

A. The Supreme Court is a constitutional body. It may not be abolished by legislature.

B. The members of the Supreme Court are removable only by impeachment.
C. The Supreme Court may not be deprived of minimum original and appellate jurisdiction. Appellate
jurisdiction may not be increased without its advice and concurrence.
D. Appointees to the Judiciary are nominated by the Judicial and Bar Council and are not subject
to confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
E. The Supreme Court has administrative supervision over all inferior courts and personnel.
F. The Supreme Court has the exclusive power to discipline judges/justices of inferior courts.
G. Members of the Judiciary have security of tenure, which cannot be undermined by a law reorganizing
the Judiciary.
H. The members of the Judiciary may not be designated to any agency performing quasi- judicial or
administrative functions.
I. The Judiciary enjoys fiscal autonomy. Salaries of judges may not be reduced. (In Re: Clarifying and
Strengthening the Organizational Structure and Administrative Set-up of the Philippine Judicial Academy,
A.M. No. 01-1-04-SC-PHILJA, September 25, 2009)
J. The Supreme Court alone may promulgate Rules of Court. Congress can no longer enact any law
governing rules of procedure for the courts. (Echegaray vs. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 132601,
January 19, 1999)
K. The Supreme Court alone may order temporary detail of judges. The Supreme Court can appoint all
officials and employees of the Judiciary. (Nachura, Outline Reviewer in Political Law, 2016)
L. The Supreme Court may assign temporarily judges of lower courts to other stations as public interest
may require.
XII. Discuss Judicial Privilege.

The privilege against disclosure of information or communications that formed the process of judicial decisions. This applies to confidential
matters, which refer to information not yet publicized by the Court like (1) raffle of cases, (2) actions taken in each case in the Court’s
agenda, and (3) deliberations of the Members in court sessions on case matters pending before it. This privilege, however, is not exclusive
to the Judiciary and it extends to the other branches of government due to our adherence to the principle of separation of powers. (In Re:
Production of Court Records and Documents and the Attendance of Court Officials and Employees as Witnesses under the Subpoenas of Feb.
10, 2012 and the Various Letters of Impeachment Prosecution Panel dated January 19 and 25, 2012, February 14, 2012)
(5) What is the purpose of judicial privilege?
The purpose of judicial privilege as a child of judicial power is principally for the effective discharge of such judicial power. If
the matter upon which Members of the Court, court officials and employees privy to the Court's deliberations, are called to
appear and testify do not relate to and will not impair the Court's deliberative adjudicatory judicial power, then judicial privilege
may not be successfully invoked (Agcaoli, Jr., et al. v. Hon.Rodolfo C. Farinas, et al., G.R. No. 232395, Tijam, 1).
(6) Is the principle absolute?
No. Traditional application of judicial privilege cannot be invoked to defeat a positive Constitutional duty.
Impeachment proceedings, being sui generis, Gonzales III v. Office of the President of the Philippines, et al., 725 Phil. 380,
207 (2014), is a Constitutional process designed to ensure accountability of impeachable officers, the seriousness and
exceptional importance of which outweighs the claim of judicial privilege.

(7) Does the failure of the Clerk of Court to safe-keep court records, submit financial reports, and remit collections is an act
constitutive of grave misconduct?
Yes. It is stated under Section 14, Rules 136 of the ROC, "no record shall be taken from the clerk's office without
an order of the court except as otherwise provided by these rules.” Since the Clerk of Court is the designated custodian of
the court's properties, it is his responsibility to ensure that relevant rules are followed for their proper safekeeping and
organization. In addition, the OCA Circular Nos. 50-95 and 113-2004 and Administrative Circular No. 35-2004 also provides
that Clerks of Court have the responsibility to immediately deposit with authorized government depositories their
collections on various funds. The conduct required of court personnel, from the presiding judge to the lowliest clerk, must
always be beyond reproach and circumscribed with a heavy burden of responsibility. Respondent failed to perform with
utmost diligence his financial and administrative responsibilities. (OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR v. ALAUYA, A.M.
No. SCC-15-21-P; December 09, 2020)

(8) Can the Supreme Court review the finding of probable cause even if the trial court has already ruled on the merits of the
case?\
No. Once the information has been filed before the courts, the dismissal, conviction, or acquittal of the accused
rests on their sound discretion; they are not bound by any change in the opinion of the prosecutor or his superior
regarding probable cause.

15
A petition for certiorari filed to assail the executive determination of probable cause (and the subsequent appeal therefrom) becomes
moot once an information has been filed before the court and a warrant of arrest has been issued; more so if the trial court has already
ruled on the merits of the criminal case. (Debuque v. Nilson, G.R. No. 191718, May 10, 2021)

A. Appointments to the Judiciary

1. Qualifications (1987 CONST., art. VIII, sec. 7)
What are the qualifications to the appointment to the Judiciary?

Supreme Court Court of Regional Trial Metropolitan Trial Sandiganb ayan

Appeals Court Court,
Municipal Trial
Court, Municipal
Circuit Trial Court

Natural born citizen of the Philippines

A judge of a lower A judge of a lower Has been engaged in Has been engaged in Has been a
court engaged in the court engaged in the practice of law the practice of law in judge of a court
practice of law in the the practice of law in the the of
Philippines for fifteen in the Philippines Philippines or has Philippines or has record or
(15) years or more. for fifteen (15) held a public office in held a public office in been engaged
years or more.* the Philippines the Philippines in
requiring admission requiring admission to the practice of
*Same qualifications to the practice of the practice of law as law in the
as provided in the law as an an Philippines or
1987 indispensable indispensable requisite has held office
Constitution for requisite for at for at least five (5) requiring
Justices of the least ten (10) years. admission to
Supreme Court. years. the bar as a
(Sec. 7, Chap. 1, pre-requisite
Batas Pambansa Blg. for at least ten
129) (10)
years.

At least 40 years of age. At least 35 years of At least 30 years of age. At least 40

age. years of age.

A Member of the Judiciary must be a person of proven competence, integrity, probity, and independence. (Sec.
7 (3), Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution)

16
 2. Judicial and Bar Council (1987 CONST., art. VIII, secs. 8 and 9)

131. What are the powers and composition of the Judicial and Bar Council?

Composition Powers
a. Ex-Officio members: The Council shall have the principal function
i. Chief Justice, as Chairman; of recommending appointees to the Judiciary.
ii. Secretary of Justice; and It may exercise such other functions and
duties as the Supreme Court may assign to it.
iii. a Representative of Congress.
(Sec. 8[5], Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution)

b. Regular members:
i. Representative from the Integrated Bar of the Philippines;
ii. Professor of Law;
iii.Retired Justice of the Supreme Court; and
iv. Representative of the private sector. (Sec. 8, Art. VIII, 1987
Constitution)

What is the principal function of the JBC?

The JBC shall have the principal function of recommending appointees to the judiciary. It may exercise such other
functions and duties as the Supreme Court may assign to it (Sec. 8[5], Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution).

(5) The Judicial Bar Council submitted six lists for six vacancies to the President for the appointment of Associate Justices of
the Sandiganbayan, a practice known as “clustering”. The President in choosing appointees over-reached and disregarded
the short lists for each vacancy. Does the practice of clustering constitutional?
NO. The duty of JBC is to give all qualified nominees fair and equal opportunity to be appointed. The clustering by the JBC
of nominees for simultaneous or closely successive vacancies in collegiate courts can actually be a device to favor or
prejudice a particular nominee.

17
 B. Supreme Court of the Philippines
1. Composition (1987 CONST., art. VIII, sec. 4)

132. What is the composition, powers, and functions of the Supreme Court?

Composition Powers and Functions

A Chief Justice and 14 Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in
its discretion, in divisions of three, five or seven members. Any
vacancy shall be filled within 90 days from occurrence thereof
(Sec. 4[1], Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution)
En banc: All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty,
international or executive agreement, or law; and all other
cases, including those involving the constitutionality, application
or operation of presidential decrees, proclamations, orders,
instructions, ordinances and other regulations. These cases are
decided with the concurrence of a majority of the members who
actually took part in the deliberations on the issues and voted
thereon. (Sec. 4 [2], Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution)
Division: Other cases or matters may be heard in division, and
decided or resolved with the concurrence of majority of the
members who actually took part in the deliberations on the
issues and voted thereon, but in no case without the
concurrence of at least three (3) members. (Sec. 4 [3], Art. VIII,
1987 Constitution)
a. Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors,
public ministers and consuls, petitions for certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus
b. Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or
certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final
judgments and orders of lower courts in:
i. All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty,
international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree,
proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in
question.
ii. All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, or
toll, or any penalty imposed in relation thereto.
iii. All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue.
iv. All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion
perpetua or higher.
v. All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved.
c. Assign temporarily judges of lower courts to other stations as
public interest may require. Such temporary assignment shall not
exceed six months without the consent of the judge
concerned.
d. Order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a
miscarriage of justice.
e. Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement
of constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all
courts, the admission to the practice of law, the integrated bar, and
legal assistance to the under-privileged. Such rules shall provide a
simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of
cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall
not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of
procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain
effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.
f. Appoint all officials and employees of the Judiciary in accordance
with the Civil Service Law. (Sec. 5,
Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution)

2. Procedural Rule-Making Power (1987 CONST., art. VIII, sec. 5)

133. Distinguish judicial legislation from the rule-making power of the Supreme Court Judicial legislation is the
act of a court in engrafting upon a law something that has been omitted which someone believes ought
to have been embraced. This exercise of judicial power is forbidden by the tripartite division of powers

18
 among the three departments of government, the executive, the legislative, and the judicial. (Tañada vs.
Yulo, G.R. No. L-43575, May 31, 1935)

On the other hand, rule-making power is an auxiliary administrative power of the Supreme Court to
promulgate rules concerning the following:
a. protection and enforcement of Constitutional rights;
b. pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts;
c. admission to the practice of law;
d. Integrated Bar, discipline and practice of law;
e. legal assistance to the underprivileged.

Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be
uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules
of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the
Supreme Court. (Sec. 6[5], Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution)

3. Disciplinary Powers (1987 CONST., art. VIII, sec. 11)

4. Administrative Supervision (1987 CONST., art. VIII, sec. 6)

134. Discuss the power of the Supreme Court of Administrative Supervision over Lower Courts.

The Supreme Court shall have administrative supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof.
(Sec. 6, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution)

The Ombudsman may not initiate or investigate a criminal or administrative complaint before his office against a Judge; he must first
endorse the case to the Supreme Court for appropriate action. (Fuentes vs. Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao, G.R. No. 124295, October
23, 2001)

In the absence of any administrative action taken against the RTC Judge by the Supreme Court with regard to the former’s
certificate of service, the investigation conducted by the Ombudsman encroaches into the Supreme Court’s power of
administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel, in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers. (Maceda vs.
Vasquez, G.R. No. 102781, April 22, 1993; Dolalas v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 118808, December 24, 1996)

135. Can the Court exercise the Power of Administrative Supervision on Prosecutors employed in the
Department of Justice?

No. In the present case, the acts complained of arose from respondents’ performance or discharge of
official duties as prosecutors of the Department of Justice. The Secretary of Justice, as their superior, has the
authority to discipline them. The Office of the Ombudsman, pursuant to Section 15, paragraph 1 of Republic
Act No. 6770 or The Ombudsman Act of 1989 may also exercise disciplinary jurisdiction over them as public
officials. It is imperative to distinguish the accountability as officials performing or discharging their official
duties from their accountability as members of the Bar. (Crusade Against Violence v. Tajanlangit, A.C. No.
6616, February 16, 2022)

136. According to Sec. 3, Art. VIII of the Constitution, the Judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. What does the
term fiscal autonomy mean?

Fiscal autonomy contemplates a guarantee of full flexibility to allocate and utilize resources with the
wisdom and dispatch that the needs require. It recognizes the power and authority to deny, assess and
collect fees, fix rates of compensation not exceeding the highest rates authorized by law for compensation
and pay plans of the government and allocate and disburse such sums as may be provided by law or
prescribed by it in the course of the discharge of its functions. (Bengzon vs. Drilon, G.R. No. 103524, April 15,
1992)

137. May Congress exempt a government-owned and controlled corporation from the payment of legal or
docket fees?

No. The payment of legal fees under Rule 141 of the Rules of Court is an integral part of the rules
promulgated by the Supreme Court pursuant to its rule-making power under Sec. 5(5), Art. VIII of the
Constitution. In particular, it is part of the rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in courts. Since
the payment of legal fees is a vital component of the rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure, it

19
 cannot be validly annulled, changed or modified by Congress. Moreover, legal fees under Rule 141 have two
basic components, the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF) and the Special Allowance for the Judiciary Fund
(SAJF). The laws which established the JDF and the SAJF expressly declare the identical purpose of these
funds to "guarantee the independence of the Judiciary as mandated by the Constitution and public policy."
Legal fees therefore do not only constitute a vital source of the Court's financial resources but also comprise
an essential element of the Court's fiscal independence. Any exemption from the payment of legal fees
granted by Congress to government-owned or controlled corporations and local government units will
necessarily reduce the JDF and the SAJF. Undoubtedly, such situation is constitutionally infirm for it impairs
the Court's guaranteed fiscal autonomy and erodes its independence. (Re: Petition for Recognition of the
Exemption of the GSIS from Payment of Legal Fees, A.M. No. 08-2-01-0, February 11, 2010)

138. Can the court issue an injunction against the construction of the Torre de Manila Condominium, on the
ground that such is a sore to the view of the Rizal Monument and an endangerment to the nation’s
cultural heritage?

No. There is no law prohibiting the construction of the condominium project due to its effect on the
background of the Rizal Monument. While the Rizal Park has been declared a National Historical Site, the
area where Torre de Manila Condominium is being built is a privately-owned property that is not part of the
Rizal Park that has been declared as a National Heritage Site, and the Torre de Manila Condominium area is
in fact "well-beyond" the Rizal Park. (Knight of Rizal vs. DMCI, G.R. No. 213948, April 18, 2017)

139. Can the Court allow the release of copies of SALN and other personal documents of the incumbent
Justices?

Yes. The right to information goes hand-in-hand with the constitutional policies of full public disclosure and honesty in the public service. It
is meant to enhance the widening role of the citizenry in governmental decision-making as well as in checking abuse in government. Sec.
17, Art. XI, has classified the information disclosed in the SALN as a matter of public concern and interest. There is no cogent reason to
deny the public access to the SALN, PDS and CV of the Justices of the Court and other magistrates of the Judiciary subject, of course, to the
limitations and prohibitions provided in R.A. No. 6713, and its implementing rules and regulations. (RE: Request for Copies of the SALN and
Personal Data Sheet or Curriculum Vitae of the Justices of the Supreme Court and Officers and Employees of the Judiciary, A.M. No. 09-8-6-SC,
June 13, 2012)

5. Jurisdiction (1987 CONST., art. VI, sec. 30; art. VIII, sec. 5)

XIII. CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS (1987 CONST., art. IX)

(5) What are the Constitutional Commissions defined by the Constitution?

They are the Commission on Civil Service, the Commission on Elections, and the Commission on Audit (Section 1,
Art. IX-A, Constitution). They are declared independent by the
Constitution.

141. What are the common provisions for the CSC, COMELEC and CoA?

CONSTITUTIONAL SAFEGUARDS TO ENSURE COMMON FEATURES OF THE ROTATIONAL SCHEME OF

INDEPENDENCE OF COMMISSION CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS APPOINTMENT (REQUISITE
CONDITIONS)

a. They are multi-headed bodies. a. The terms of the first

(5) What are the independence safeguards b. They are categorized as independent three
of the Constitution with regard to the by the Constitution; Commissioners should
Chairmen and members of c. Their powers and functions are defined start on a common date.
constitutional commissions? in the Constitution; b. The appointment to
The following are the constitutional d. The Commissioners are required to be any vacancy due to death,
safeguards for independence of natural-born citizens of the Philippines; resignation, or disability
commissions as regards its members: e. Their terms of office are should only for the
staggered with a two-year interval unexpired balance of the
(Rotational Scheme of Appointment); term of the
predecessor.
a. They are constitutionally created and may
not be abolished by statute.
b. Each is expressly described as independent.
c. Each is conferred certain powers and
functions which cannot be reduced by statute.
d. The Chairmen and members cannot be

20
removed except by impeachment.
e. The Chairmen and members are given a fairly
long term of office of seven years.

21
f. The Chairmen and members may not be f. The Commissioners appointed are
reappointed or appointed in an acting capacity. ineligible for reappointment for a period
g. The salaries of the Chairmen and members beyond the maximum tenure of seven
are relatively high and are fixed by law and may years;
not be decreased during continuance in office. g. Appointment to any vacancy is only for
h. The Commission enjoys fiscal the unexpired portion of the term of the
autonomy. predecessor;
i. Its approved annual appropriations shall h. The Commissioners cannot be
be automatically and regularly released. The appointed or designated in a temporary or
Secretary of Budget and Management cannot acting capacity;
and
make the release of the appropriations
subject to the i. The Commissioners are removable only
by impeachment.
submission of reports. (Sec. 5, Art. IX-A, 1987
Constitution; Civil Service Commission vs.
Department of Budget and Management, G.R. No.
158791, July 22,
2005)
j. Each Commission may promulgate its own
procedural rules, provided they do not diminish,
increase or modify substantive rights (though
subject to disapproval by the Supreme Court).
k. The Chairmen and members are subject to
certain disqualifications calculated to strengthen
their integrity.
l. The Commissions may appoint their
own officials and employees in accordance with
the Civil Service Law.

22
 A. Powers, Functions, and Jurisdiction (1987 CONST., art. IX-A, sec. 8; art. IX-B, sec. 3; art. IX-C, secs. 2-5, 9 and 11; art.
IX-D, secs. 2-4)

142. Overview of the Powers and Functions of Constitutional Commissions.

CSC COMELEC COA

The central personnel agency of the
Government:
a. Establish a career service and
adopt measures to promote
morale, efficiency, integrity,
responsiveness and courtesy in
the civil service.
b. Strengthen the merit and
rewards system.
c. Integrate all human resources
development programs for all
levels and ranks.
d.
stitutionalize
management climate conducive
to public accountability (Sec. 3, d.Register, after sufficient publication,
Art. IX-B, 1987 Constitution).
▪ The Civil Service
Commission has the power to hear
and decide administrative cases
instituted before it directly or on e. File, upon a verified complaint, or on its
appeal, including contested own initiative, petitions in court for the
appointments (Administrative Code of inclusion or exclusion of voters, investigate
1987).
The power of the Civil Service
Commission includes the authority to
recall an appointment initially
approved in disregard of applicable
provisions of the Civil Service rules
and regulations. (Mathay vs. Civil
Service Commission,
G.R. No. 130214, August 9,
1999)
a.Enforce and administer all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an
election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum,
and recall.
b.Decide, save those involving the right to
vote, all questions affecting elections,
including determination of the number and
location of polling places, appointment of
election officials and inspectors, and
registration of voters.
c. Deputize, with the concurrence of the
President, law enforcement agencies and
instrumentalities for the exclusive purpose
In of ensuring free, orderly, honest, peaceful
and credible elections.
a (DelaLlana vs. COA,
political parties, organizations or coalitions
which must present their platform or
program of government and accredit
citizens’ arms.
and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of
violations of election laws.
f.Recommend to Congress effective
measures to minimize election spending,
including limitation of places where
propaganda materials shall be posted, and
to prevent and penalize all forms of election
frauds, offenses, malpractice, and nuisance
candidates.
g.Recommend to the President the removal
of any officer or employee it has deputized,
or the imposition of any other disciplinary
action, for violation or disregard of, or
disobedience to, its directive, order, or
decision.
h. Submit to the President and Congress a
comprehensive report on the conduct of
each election, plebiscite, initiative,
referendum or
The 1987 Constitution has made the
COA the guardian of public funds,
vesting it with broad powers over all
accounts pertaining to government
revenues and expenditures and the
use of public funds and property,
including the exclusive authority to
define the scope of its audit and
examination; to establish the
techniques and methods for the
review; and to promulgate
accounting and auditing rules and
regulations. Its exercise of its general
audit power is among the
constitutional mechanisms that give
life to the check and balance system
inherent in our form of government.
G.R. No.
180989,
February 7, 2012)
a. Examine, audit and settle all
accounts pertaining to the revenue
and receipts of, and expenditures or
uses of funds and property owned or
held in trust or pertaining to, the
Government.
The COA conducts examination or
post-audit basis with regard to
Constitutional Commissions and
bodies or offices granted fiscal
autonomy under the Constitution;
autonomous state colleges and
universities; other government-
owned and controlled corporations
and their subsidiaries; and not
governmental entities
receiving subsidy or equity, directly
or indirectly, from or through the
Government.
b. Keep the general accounts of
Government, and preserve vouchers
and supporting papers for such
period as provided by law.
c.Authority to define the scope of its
audit and examination,

23
 CSC COMELEC COA

recall. (Sec. 2, Art. IX-C, 1987 establish techniques and

Constitution) methods required therefore.

N.B.: The power of the Commission

to define the scope of its audit and to
promulgate auditing rules and
regulations and the power to disallow
unnecessary
expenditures, is exclusive, but its
power to examine and audit is not
exclusive. (Development Bank of the
Philippine vs. Commission on Audit,
G.R. No. 88435, January 15, 2002)

d. Promulgate account and auditing

rules and regulations, including those
for the prevention and disallowance
of irregular, unnecessary,
expensive, extravagant or
unconscionable expenditures or uses
of government funds or property.

(5) May the salaries of the members of the Constitutional Commissions be reduced during their tenure?
No. Under the Constitution, the salaries of the members are fixed by law and shall not be decreased during their tenure. The
rule is intended to promote their independence (sec. 3, Art IX-A, 1987 Constitution)

143. A police officer, Mandu Rugas, will be taking a Police Officer I examination. However, on the day of the
examination, Mandu Rugas conspired with another person to take the exam in his behalf. The CSC Regional
Office of Iloilo City charged Mandu Rugas with dishonesty for allegedly conspiring with another person to
impersonate him and take the examination in his behalf. Mandu Rugas alleged that by the passage of RA 8551,
the Civil Service Commission has been divested of its authority and jurisdiction to conduct entrance and/or
promotional examination to the members of the Philippine National Police. Did Mandu Rugas correctly impugn
the jurisdiction of the CSC?

No. Under prevailing jurisprudence, the CSC has the authority and jurisdiction to investigate anomalies and irregularities in the civil service
examinations and to impose necessary and appropriate sanctions. It is true that when R.A. no. 8551 became effective, the power to administer
and conduct entrance and promotional examinations to police officers from the CSC to NPC. However, the lack of authority of the CSC in the
conduct of PO I examinations must not be used to shield Ruga's wrongdoing, as he was not in good faith. Although the CSC had no authority to
administer entrance and promotional examinations for police officers, RA 8551 cannot deprive the CSC to investigate the facts of any
wrongdoings by a civil servant. As the central personnel agency, the CSC has the original disciplinary jurisdiction in order to protect the integrity
of the civil service system as an integral part of the CSC’s duty, authority and power provided for by the 1987 Constitution. (Melvin G. San Felix v.
Civil Service Commission, G.R. no. 198404, October 14, 2019, J. Hernando)

(5) What is the jurisdiction of Commission on Audit over government-owned and controlled corporations?
 A corporation, whether with or without an original charter, is under the audit jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit so long as
the government owns or has controlling interest in it.
The Constitution vests in the Commission on Audit jurisdiction over "government-owned and controlled corporations with original charters," as
well "government-owned or controlled corporations" without original charters. Government-owned or controlled corporations with original
charters are subject to the Commission's pre-audit, while government-owned or controlled corporations without original charters are subject to
the Commission's post-audit. Government-owned or controlled corporations without original charters refer to corporations created under the
Corporation Code but are owned or controlled by the government. The nature or purpose of the corporation is not material in determining the
Commission's audit jurisdiction. Neither is the manner of creation of a corporation, whether under a general or special law. (Feliciano v. COA,
G.R. No. 147402, January 14, 2004)

B. Composition and Qualifications of Members (1987 CONST., art. IX-B, sec. 1; art. IX-C, sec. 1; art. IX-D, sec. 1)

144. State the composition, qualifications, requirement of confirmation of appointment and prohibitions on
members of the Constitutional Commissions.

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION ON COMMISSION ON

COMMISSION ELECTIONS AUDIT

Composition 1 Chairman 1 Chairman 1 Chairman

2 Commissioners 6 Commissioners 2 Commissioners

Qualifications a. Natural born citizens; a. Natural born citizens; a. Natural born citizens;
b. At least 35 years at the b. At least 35 years at the time b. At least 35 years at the time
time of the appointment; of the appointment; of the appointment;
c. With proven capacity for c. Holders of College Degrees; c. Certified Public
public and Accountant with at least
administration; and d. Not candidates for any 10 years of auditing
d. Not candidates for any elective position in the experience or a lawyer
elective position in election immediately who practiced law for
the election preceding appointment at
immediately preceding least 10 years;
appointment

N.B.: Majority, including the

Chairman, must be members N.B.: At no time shall all
of the Philippine Bar and Members of the Commission
practiced law for at least belong to the same
10 years. profession

d. Not candidates for any

elective position in the
election
immediately preceding
appointment

Appointments Needs the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments.

Disqualifications Same as President and Vice President (Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution) and members of the
Congress (under Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution).

(5) What does the civil service embrace?

 The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies of the Government, including government-
owned or controlled corporations with original charters (Sec. 2[1], Art. IX-B, 1987 Constitution).

(6) Who administers the Civil Service?

It is administered by the Civil Service Commission composed of a Chairman and two Commissioners.
(ALBANO Political Law Reviewer, p. 751)

(7) What are the qualifications of the Chairman and members of the Civil Service Commission?
They must:
1. be natural-born citizens of the Philippines;
2. be at least 35 years of age at the time of their appointment; and
3. not have been candidates for any elective position in the elections immediately preceding their appointment
(Sec. 1[1], Art. IX-B, 1987 Constitution).

(8) How are the Chairman and Commissioners of the CSC appointed? What is their term of office?

They are appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments.Their term of office is seven years
without reappointment. Of those first appointed, the Chairman shall hold office for seven (7) years, a Commissioner for five (5)
years and another Commissioner for three (3) years, without reappointment.

Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall any Member be appointed
or designated in a temporary or acting capacity (Sec.1[2], Art. IX-B, 1987 Constitution).

(9) What is the composition of the Comelec?

The Comelec is composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners. (ALBANO Political Law Reviewer, p. 763)

(10) What are the qualifications of the members of the Comelec?

The following are the qualifications of the members of the Comelec:
1. natural-born citizens of the Philippines;
2. at least 35 years of age at the time of their appointment;
3. holder of a college degree; and
4. must not have been candidates for any elective position in the immediately preceding elections. A majority of the
members, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law
for at least ten years (Sec. 1, Art. IX-C, 1987 Constitution).

(127) How are the members of the Comelec appointed?

They are appointed by the President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments (Sec. 1[2], Art IX- C, 1987 Constitution).

(128) What is the term of office of the Chairman and the members of the Comelec?
The term of office of the members of the Comelec is seven (7) years without reappointment. Of those first appointed, three
Members shall hold office for seven years, two Members for five years, and the last Members for three years, without
reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall any Member
be appointed or designated in a temporary capacity (Sec. 1[21, Art. IX-C, 1987 Constitution; Brillantes v. Yorac, December 18, 1990).

(129) Who has the power to investigate and prosecute election offenses?
The COMELEC has the power to investigate and prosecute election offenses. It can, however, deputize the fiscal to conduct preliminary
investigation on election offenses and prosecute them. This power is indispensable to the task of ensuring free, honest and orderly elections
(People v.Basilla, 179 SCRA 87). If not deputized, the fiscal has no power to assume the role of prosecutor of election offenses (People v. Inting,
187 SCRA 788, G.R. No. 88919; Kilosbayan, Inc., et al. v. Comelec, et al., 280 SCRA 892, G.R. No. 128054, October 16, 1997).

(130) May the Supreme Court take cognizance of a petition for certiorari under Rule 64 to review an interlocutory order
issued by a Division of the COMELEC?
Yes. As an exception, the Supreme Court may take cognizance of a petition for certiorari under Rule 64 to review an
interlocutory order issued by a Division of the COMELEC on the ground of the issuance being made without jurisdiction or in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it does not appear to be
specifically provided under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure that the matter is one that the COMELEC en banc may sit and
consider, or a Division is not authorized to act, or the members of the Division unanimously vote to refer to the COMELEC en
 banc. Of necessity, the aggrieved party can directly resort to the Court because the COMELEC en banc is not the proper forum in
which the matter concerning the assailed interlocutory order can be reviewed (Cagas v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 194139, January 24,
2012).

C. Prohibited Offices and Interests (1987 CONST, art. IX-A, sec. 2)

145. What are the prohibited offices and interests imposed upon members of Constitutional
Commissions?

No member of a Constitutional Commission shall, during his tenure:

a. Hold any other office or employment;
b. Engage in the practice of any profession;
c. Engage in the active management and control of any business which in any way may be affected by the function of his
office; and
d. Be financially interested, directly or indirectly, in any contract with, or in any franchise or privilege granted by the Government,
any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities, including GOCCs or their subsidiaries. (Sec. 2, Art. IX, 1987 Constitution)

146. President Arroyo appointed Guillermo Carague as Chairman of the Commission on Audit (COA) for a term of
seven (7) years. Carague’s term of office started on February 2, 2001 to end on February 2, 2008. She also
appointed Reynaldo Villar as the third member of the COA for a term of seven (7) years starting February 2, 2004
until February 2, 2011. Following the retirement of Carague on February 2, 2008 and during the fourth year of
Villar as COA Commissioner, Villar was nominated and appointed as Chairman of the COA. The Commission on
Appointments confirmed his appointment. Was the appointment valid?

No. Although promotional appointment (Commissioner to Chairman) is not prohibited, Villar’s

appointment is still not valid. Sec 1(2), Art. IX(D) of the Constitution provides that:

(2) The Chairman and Commissioners [on Audit] shall be appointed x x x for a term of seven years without
reappointment. x x x Appointment to any vacancy shall be only for the unexpired portion of the term of the
predecessor. x x x

Accordingly, the promotional appointment as COA Chairman of Villar for a stated fixed term of less than seven (7)
years is void for violating a clear, but mandatory constitutional prescription. The vacancy in the position of COA
chairman when Carague stepped down in February 2, 2008 resulted from the expiration of his 7-year term.
Hence, the appointment to the vacancy thus created ought to have been one for seven (7) years. However, Villar
cannot be appointed to a full 7-year term because of the rule against one serving the commission for an
aggregate term of more than seven (7) years because when he was appointed as Chairman, he already served 4
years as Commissioner. (Funa vs. Villar, G.R. No. 192791, April 24, 2012)

147. In what instances may a promotional appointment (Commissioner to Chairman) be valid?

A commissioner who resigns after serving in the Commission for less than seven years is eligible for an
appointment to the position of Chairman for the unexpired portion of the term of the departing chairman. Such
appointment is not covered by the ban on reappointment, provided that the aggregate period of the length of
service as commissioner and the unexpired period of the term of the predecessor will not exceed seven (7) years
and provided further that the vacancy in the position of Chairman resulted from death, resignation, disability or
removal by impeachment. (Funa vs. Villar, G.R. No. 192791, April 24, 2012)

D. Review of Final Orders, Resolutions and Decisions

(130) What is the remedy of an aggrieved party from a decision, order, or ruling rendered by the Constitutional
 Commissions?
Art. IX-A, Sec. 7 of the Constitution states that "unless, otherwise provided by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each
Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy
thereof"

Particularly, Rule 64, Sec. 2 of the Revised Rules of Court (ROC) provides that "(a] judgment or final order or resolution of the
COMELEC and the COA may be brought by the aggrieved party to the Supreme Court on certiorari under Rule 65, except as
hereinafter provided." The time for filing such petition must be within 30 days from notice of the judgment or final order or
resolution sought to be reviewed.

However, for decisions of the SC, a party may elevate such decision of the CSC within 15 days from notice before the Court of
Appeals by way of a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Revised Rules of Court (Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in
the Civil Service (RRACCS), Rule 13, Sec. 70).

What decisions of the Constitutional Commissions may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari?
The certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is limited to decisions rendered in actions or proceedings taken cognizance of by
the Commissions in the exercise of their adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers. It does not refer to purely executive powers such
as those which relate to the COMELEC's appointing power (ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 133486,
January 28, 2000)

1. Rendered in the Exercise of Quasi-Judicial Functions (1987 CONST, art. IX- A, sec. 7)
148. Discuss Judicial Review of Final Orders, Resolutions and Decisions of Constitutional Commissions rendered in
the exercise of their Quasi-Judicial Functions.

CIVIL SERVICE In the case of decisions of the CSC, Administrative Circular 1-95538 which took effect on June 1,
COMMISSION 1995, provides that final resolutions of the CSC shall be appealable by certiorari to the CA within
15 days from receipt of a copy thereof. From the decision of the CA, the party adversely
affected thereby shall file a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

COMMISSION ON Only decisions of COMELEC en banc may be brought to the Court by certiorari since
ELECTIONS Art. IX-C provides that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the
Commission en banc. (Reyes vs. Mindoro, G.R. No. 108886, May 5, 1995)
COMMISSION ON Judgments or final orders of the Commission on Audit may be brought by
AUDIT an aggrieved party to the Supreme Court on certiorari under Rule 65. Only when COA acts without
or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, may the SC entertain a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65.

Can the court review the decisions rendered in the exercise of quasi-judicial functions?
Yes, the Supreme court can review decisions rendered by the Constitutional Commissions if there is a grave abuse of discretion
committed in the exercise of quasi-judicial powers and not those arising from the exercise of its administrative functions.
(Chavez v. COMELEC GR 105323, July 3, 1992)

Quasi-judicial function is a term which applies to the action, discretion, etc. of public administrative officers or bodies, who are required to
investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them as a basis for their official action and to
exercise discretion of a judicial nature. (Civil Service Commission v. Magoyag, GR 197792, December 9, 2015)

2. Rendered in the Exercise of Administrative Functions (1987 CONST, art. IX-A, secs. 4 and 6)

149. Discuss Judicial Review of Final Orders, Resolutions and Decisions of Constitutional Commissions rendered in
the exercise of their Administrative Functions.

Certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme Court over the Constitutional Commissions is limited to issues involving grave abuse of discretion resulting
in lack or excess of jurisdiction and do not ordinarily empower the court to review factual findings of the Commissions. (Aratuc v. COMELEC,
G.R. No. L-49705-09, February 8, 1979)

(130) How about the decisions rendered in the exercise of the administrative functions?
No, only those awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of a quasi-judicial agency or body in the exercise of its quasi-
judicial functions are the subjects of an appeal under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. (Civil Service Commission v. Magoyag, GR
197792, December 9, 2015)