1.

ALTERNATIVE CENTER FOR ORGANIZATION REFORMS VS ZAMORA

GRN 144256 June 8, 2005
Carpio-Morales, J.:

FACTS:
In the year 2000, the GAA appropriated PhP 111,778,000,000.00 of IRA as programmed fund. It
appropriated a separate amount of P10B of IRA under the classification of unprogrammed fund,
the latter amount to be released only upon th occurrence of the conditions stated in the GAA.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the questioned provision violate the constitutional injunction that the just share of
local governments in the national taxes of the IRA shall be automatically released.

RULING:
Article X Section 6 of the Constitution provides: “LGUs shall have a just share, as determined by
law, in the national taxes which shall be automatically released to them.” While automatice
release implies that the just share should be released to them as a matter of course, withholding
its release pending an event contravened the constitutional mandate.

ALTERNATIVE CENTER FOR ORGANIZATIONAL REFORMS AND DEVELOPMENT, INC., VS.

ZAMORA
G.R. No. 144256
Subject: Public Corporation
Doctrine: Automatic release of IRA
Facts:
Pres. Estrada, pursuant to Sec 22, Art VII mandating the Pres to submit to Congress a budget of
expenditures within 30 days before the opening of every regular session, submitted the National
Expenditures program for FY 2000. The President proposed an IRA of P121,778,000,000. This became
RA 8760, “AN ACT APPROPRIATING FUNDS FOR THE OPERATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF
THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES FROM JANUARY ONE TO DECEMBER THIRTY-ONE, TWO
THOUSAND, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES” also known as General Appropriations Act (GAA) for the
Year 2000. It provides under the heading “ALLOCATIONS TO LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS” that the
IRA for local government units shall amount to P111,778,000,000”.
In another part of the GAA, under the heading “UNPROGRAMMED FUND,” it is provided that an amount
of P10,000,000,000 (P10 Billion), apart from the P111,778,000,000 mentioned above, shall be used to
fund the IRA, which amount shall be released only when the original revenue targets submitted by the
President to Congress can be realized based on a quarterly assessment to be conducted by certain
committees which the GAA specifies, namely, the Development Budget Coordinating Committee, the
Committee on Finance of the Senate, and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of
Representatives.
Thus, while the GAA appropriates P111,778,000,000 of IRA as Programmed Fund, it appropriates a
separate amount of P10 Billion of IRA under the classification of Unprogrammed Fund, the latter amount
to be released only upon the occurrence of the condition stated in the GAA.
On August 22, 2000, a number of NGOs and POs, along with 3 barangay officials filed with this Court the
petition at bar, for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus With Application for Temporary Restraining
Order, against respondents then Executive Secretary Ronaldo Zamora, then Secretary of the Department
of Budget and Management Benjamin Diokno, then National Treasurer Leonor Magtolis-Briones, and the
Commission on Audit, challenging the constitutionality of provision XXXVII (ALLOCATIONS TO LOCAL
GOVERNMENT UNITS) referred to by petitioners as Section 1, XXXVII (A), and LIV (UNPROGRAMMED
FUND) Special Provisions 1 and 4 of the GAA (the GAA provisions)
Petitioners contend that the said provisions violates the LGUs autonomy by unlawfully reducing the IRA
allotted by 10B and by withholding its release by placing the same under “Unprogrammed funds”.
Although the effectivity of the Year 2000 GAA has ceased, this Court shall nonetheless proceed to
resolve the issues raised in the present case, it being impressed with public interest. Petitioners argue
that the GAA violated the constitutional mandate of automatically releasing the IRAs when it made its
release contingent on whether revenue collections could meet the revenue targets originally submitted by
the President, rather than making the release automatic.
ISSUE: WON the subject GAA violates LGUs fiscal autonomy by not automatically releasing the whole
amount of the allotted IRA.
HELD:
Article X, Section 6 of the Constitution provides:
SECTION 6. Local government units shall have a just share, as determined by law, in the national taxes
which shall be automatically released to them.
Petitioners argue that the GAA violated this constitutional mandate when it made the release of IRA
contingent on whether revenue collections could meet the revenue targets originally submitted by the
President, rather than making the release automatic. Respondents counterargue that the above
constitutional provision is addressed not to the legislature but to the executive, hence, the same does not
prevent the legislature from imposing conditions upon the release of the IRA.
Respondents thus infer that the subject constitutional provision merely prevents the executive branch of
the government from “unilaterally” withholding the IRA, but not the legislature from authorizing the
executive branch to withhold the same. In the words of respondents, “This essentially means that the
President or any member of the Executive Department cannot unilaterally, i.e., without the backing of
statute, withhold the release of the IRA.”
As the Constitution lays upon the executive the duty to automatically release the just share of local
governments in the national taxes, so it enjoins the legislature not to pass laws that might prevent the
executive from performing this duty. To hold that the executive branch may disregard constitutional
provisions which define its duties, provided it has the backing of statute, is virtually to make the
Constitution amendable by statute – a proposition which is patently absurd. If indeed the framers intended
to allow the enactment of statutes making the release of IRA conditional instead of automatic, then Article
X, Section 6 of the Constitution would have been worded differently.
Since, under Article X, Section 6 of the Constitution, only the just share of local governments is qualified
by the words “as determined by law,” and not the release thereof, the plain implication is that Congress is
not authorized by the Constitution to hinder or impede the automatic release of the IRA.
In another case, the Court held that the only possible exception to mandatory automatic release of the
IRA is, as held in Batangas:
…if the national internal revenue collections for the current fiscal year is less than 40 percent of the
collections of the preceding third fiscal year, in which case what should be automatically released shall be
a proportionate amount of the collections for the current fiscal year. The adjustment may even be made
on a quarterly basis depending on the actual collections of national internal revenue taxes for the quarter
of the current fiscal year.
This Court recognizes that the passage of the GAA provisions by Congress was motivated by the
laudable intent to “lower the budget deficit in line with prudent fiscal management.” The pronouncement in
Pimentel, however, must be echoed: “[T]he rule of law requires that even the best intentions must be
carried out within the parameters of the Constitution and the law. Verily, laudable purposes must be
carried out by legal methods.”
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. XXXVII and LIV Special Provisions 1 and 4 of the Year 2000
GAA are hereby declared unconstitutional insofar as they set apart a portion of the IRA, in the amount of
P10 Billion, as part of the UNPROGRAMMED FUND.

2 . Mandanas v. Ochoa (G.R. Nos. 199802, 208488)

July 3, 2018

Hermilando Mandanas, et al., petitioners

Executive Secretary Paquito Ochoa, et al., respondents

FACTS:

The fiscal autonomy guaranteed to local governments under Section 6, Article X of the 1987 Constitution
means the power to create their own sources of revenue in addition to their equitable share in the
"national taxes" released by the National Government, as well as the power to allocate their resources in
accordance with their own priorities.

Pursuant to this Constitutional dictum, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the
Local Government Code (LGC). Sec. 284 of the LGC provides that LGUs shall have an allotment
equivalent to 40% of the the national internal revenue taxes.

The share of the LGUs, known as the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA), has been regularly released to
the LGUs. According to the implementing rules and regulations of the LGC, the IRA is determined on the
basis of the actual collections of the National Internal Revenue Taxes (NIRTs) as certified by the Bureau
of Internal Revenue (BIR).

Two petitions were filed to challenge the base figure for the computation of the IRA.

In G.R. No. 199802, Cong. Hermilando Mandanas, et al., alleged that the NIRTs certified by the BIR
excluded the NIRTs collected by the Bureau of Customs, specifically excise taxes, value added taxes
(VATs), and documentary stamp taxes (DSTs). Such exclusion resulted in LGUs being deprived of
₱60,750,000,000.00 for FY 2012. Further, the petitioners argued that since this mistake in computation
was happening since 1992, then the National Government has effectively deprived LGUs of
₱438,103,906,675.73 in their IRA.

Meanwhile, in G.R. No. 208488, Cong. Enrique Garcia, Jr. sought the issuance of the writ of mandamus
to compel respondents to compute the just share of the LGUs on the basis of all national taxes. He
argued that the insertion by Congress of the words "internal revenue" in the phrase "national taxes" found
in Section 284 of the LGC caused the diminution of the base for determining the just share of the LGUs,
and should be declared unconstitutional.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Section 284 of the LGC is unconstitutional for being repugnant to Section 6, Article X of
the 1987 Constitution. -- YES.

HELD:
Section 6 of the Constitution mentions "national taxes" as the source of the just share of the LGUs while
Section 284 of the LGC ordains that the share of the LGUs be taken from "national internal revenue
taxes" instead. Congress thereby infringed the constitutional provision.

Although the power of Congress to make laws is plenary in nature, congressional lawmaking remains
subject to the limitations stated in the 1987 Constitution.

The phrase "national internal revenue taxes" in Section 284 is undoubtedly more restrictive than the term
"national taxes" written in Section 6 of the Constitution. As such, Congress has actually departed from the
letter of the 1987 Constitution stating that national taxes should be the base from which the just share of
the LGU comes. Such departure is impermissible. Verba legis non est recedendum (from the words of a
statute there should be no departure).

Equally impermissible is that Congress has also thereby curtailed the guarantee of fiscal autonomy in
favor of the LGUs under the 1987 Constitution.

What the phrase "national internal revenue taxes" as used in Section 284 of the LGC included are all the
taxes enumerated in Section 21 of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC), as amended by R.A. No.
8424, namely: income tax, estate and donor's taxes, VAT, other percentage taxes, excise taxes,
documentary stamp taxes, and such other taxes as may be imposed and collected by the BIR.
In view of the foregoing enumeration of what are the national internal revenue taxes, Section 284 of the
LGC has effectively deprived the LGUs from deriving their just share from other national taxes, like the
customs duties.

Moving forward, the BIR and the BOC are directed certify all national tax collections. This ruling, also
known as the "Mandanas Ruling," is to be applied prospectively.
3. REPUBLIC v. PROVINCIAL GOVERNMENT OF PALAWAN, GR No. 170867, 2018-12-04
Facts:
The Camago-Malampaya Natural Gas ProjectOn December 11, 1990, the Republic of the Philippines
(Republic or National Government), through the Department of Energy (DoE), entered into Service
Contract No. 38 with Shell Philippines Exploration B.V. and Occidental Philippines, Incorporated
(collectively SPEX/OXY), as Contractor, for the exclusive conduct of petroleum operations in the area
known as "Camago-Malampaya" located offshore northwest of Palawan. Exploration of the area led to the
drilling of the Camago-Malampaya natural gas reservoir about 80 kilometers from the main island of
Palawan and 30 kms from the platform.[8]The nearest point of the Camago-Malampaya production area
is at a distance of 93.264 kms or 50.3585 nautical miles to the Kalayaan Island Group (Kalayaan); 55.476
kms or 29.9546 nm to mainland Palawan (Nacpan Point, south of Patuyo Cove, Municipality of El Nido);
and 48.843 kms or 26.9546 nm to the Province of Palawan (northwest of Tapiutan Island, Municipality of
El Nido).[9]The quantity of natural gas contained in the Camago-Malampaya was estimated to be
sufficient to justify the pursuit of gas-to-power projects having an aggregate power-generating capacity of
approximately 3,000 megawatts operating at baseload for 20 to 25 years.[10]Service Contract No. 38, as
clarified by the Memorandum of Clarification between the same parties dated December 11, 1990,
provides for a production sharing scheme whereby the National Government was entitled to receive an
amount equal to sixty percent (60%) of the net proceeds[11] from the sale of petroleum (including natural
gas) produced from petroleum operations while SPEX/OXY, as service contractor, was entitled to receive
an amount equal to forty percent (40%) of the net proceeds.
Palawan's ClaimThe Provincial Government of Palawan asserted its claim over forty percent (40%) of the
National Government's share in the proceeds of the project. It argued that since the reservoir is located
within its territorial jurisdiction, it is entitled to said share under Section 290[18] of the Local Government
Code. The National Government disputed the claim, arguing that since the gas fields were approximately
80 k.ms from Palawan's coastline, they are outside the territorial jurisdiction of the province and is within
the national territory of the Philippines.[19]
The Province of Palawan1. Section 7 of the Local Government Code, on the creation and conversion of
LGUs, does not expressly provide that an LGU's territorial jurisdiction refers only to its land area.[164]1.1.
Land area is included as one of the requisites for the creation or conversion of an LGU because evidently,
no LGU can be created out of the maritime area alone.[
As defined in its organic law, the Province of Palawan is comprised merely of islands. The continental
shelf, where the Camago-Malampaya reservoir is located, was clearly not included in its territory.
The UNCLOS did not confer on LGUs their own continental shelf
Dean Pangalangan posited that since the Constitution has incorporated into Philippine law the concepts
of the UNCLOS, including the concept of the continental shelf, Palawan's "area" could be construed as
including its own continental shelf.[301] The Province of Palawan and Arigo, et al. accordingly assert that
Camago-Malampaya reservoir forms part of Palawan's continental shelf.[302]The Court is unconvinced.
The Republic was correct in arguing that the concept of continental shelf under the UNCLOS does not, by
the doctrine of transformation, automatically apply to the LGUs. We quote with approval its disquisition on
this issue:The Batasang Pambansa ratified the UNCLOS through Resolution No. 121 adopted on
February 27, 1984. Through this process, the UNCLOS attained the force and effect of municipal law. But
even if the UNCLOS were to be considered to have been transformed to be part of the municipal law,
after its ratification by the Batasang Pambansa, the UNCLOS did not automatically amend the Local
Government Code and the charters of the local government units. No such intent is manifest either in the
UNCLOS or in Resolution No. 121. Instead, the UNCLOS, transformed into our municipal laws, should be
applied as it is worded. Verba legis.
Issues:
Palawan was not entitled to the 40% share because the Camago-Malampaya reservoir is outside its
territorial jurisdiction.
Ruling:
the Court finds that the Province of Palawan's remedy is not judicial adjudication based on equity but
legislation that clearly entitles it to share in the proceeds of the utilization of the Camago-Malampaya
reservoir. Mariano instructs that the territorial boundaries must be clearly defined "with precise strokes."
Defining those boundaries is a legislative, not a judicial function.[321] The Court cannot, on the basis of
equity, engage in judicial legislation and alter the boundaries of the Province of Palawan to include the
continental shelf where the subject natural resource lies. As conceded by Dean Pangalangan, "territorial
jurisdiction is fixed by a law, by a charter and that defines the territory of Palawan very strictly," and it is
"something that can be altered only in accordance with [the] proper procedure ending with a plebiscite."
WHEREFORE, the Petition in G.R. No. 170867 is GRANTED. The Decision dated December 16, 2005 of
the Regional Trial Court of the Province of Palawan, Branch 95 in Civil Case No. 3779 is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The Court declares that under existing law, the Province of Palawan is not entitled to share
in the proceeds of the Camago-Malampaya natural gas project. The Petition in G.R. No. 185941 is
DENIED.SO ORDERED.

4. Borja vs COMELEC [295 SCRA 157; GR 133495, September 3, 1998]

Posted by Pius Morados on November 6, 2011

(Municipal Corporation, Disqualification, Succession – Exception to the 3 term limit)

Facts: Private respondent Jose T. Capco, Jr. was elected vice-mayor of Pateros on January 18, 1988 for
a term ending June 30, 1992. On September 2, 1989, he became mayor, by operation of law, upon the
death of the incumbent, Cesar Borja. For the next two succeeding elections in 1992 and 1995, he was
again re-elected as Mayor.
On March 27, 1998, private respondent Capco filed a certificate of candidacy for mayor of Pateros relative
to the May 11, 1998 elections. Petitioner Benjamin U. Borja, Jr., who was also a candidate for mayor,
sought Capco’s disqualification on the theory that the latter would have already served as mayor for three
consecutive terms by June 30, 1998 and would therefore be ineligible to serve for another term after that.

The Second Division of the Commission on Elections ruled in favor of petitioner and declared private
respondent Capco disqualified from running for reelection as mayor of Pateros but in the motion for
reconsideration, majority overturned the original decision.

Issue: WON Capco has served for three consecutive terms as Mayor?
Held: No. Article X, Sec. 8 of the Constitution provides that “…the term of office of elective local
officials… …shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms.
Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the
continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.”
This provision is restated in par. 43(b) of the Local Government Code (R.A. No. 71) which states that “…
no local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same position.
Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the
continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official concerned was elected….”

The term served must therefore be one “for which [the official concerned] was elected.” The purpose of
this provision is to prevent a circumvention of the limitation on the number of terms an elective official may
serve. Conversely, if he is not serving a term for which he was elected because he is simply continuing
the service of the official he succeeds, such official cannot be considered to have fully served the term
not withstanding his voluntary renunciation of office prior to its expiration.

The term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be elected as well as the right
to serve in the same elective position. Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has served three
consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must also have been elected to the same position for the
same number of times before the disqualification can apply.

5. G.R. No. 147927. February 4, 2002

Facts:
Respondent Talaga was elected Mayor of Lucena City in 1992, re-elected in 1995, but lost to Tagarao in
1998 elections. Tagarao was recalled and in the May 12, 2000 recall elections, Talaga won and served
the unexpired term of Tagarao until June 30, 2001. Talaga was candidate for Mayor in the May 14, 2001
elections, and a petition for cancellation of his certificate of candidacy was filed on the ground that he has
served as Mayor for three consecutive terms.
Issue: Whether or not Talaga has served as Mayor of Lucena City for three consecutive terms.
Held:
The term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be elected as well as the right
to serve in the same elective position. Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has served three
consecutive terms in an elective local office. He must also have been elected to the same position for the
same number of times before the disqualification can apply.
In the case at bar, Talaga did not serve for 3 consecutive terms. For nearly 2 years, he was a private
citizen. The continuity of his
mayorship was disrupted by his defeat in the 1998 elections.
“If one is elected representative to serve the unexpired term of
another, that unexpired term, no matter how short, will be considered one term for the purpose of
computing the number of successive terms allowed”—this comment of Constitutional Commissioner Fr.
Bernas applies only to members of the House of Representatives. Unlike government officials, there is no
recall election for members of Congress.

6. Latasa vs COMELEC (G.R. No. 154829 Dec 10, 2003)

A mayor for 3 consecutive term

of a municipality which became a city in the said mayor’s
last term is barred from running in the next preceding election if the said new city has thesame territorial
jurisdiction when it was still a municipality.

Arsenio A. Latasa, was elected mayor of the Municipality of Digos, Davao del Sur in theelections of 1992, 1995,
and 1998.During petitioner’s third term, the Municipality of Digos
was became a component city. On February 28, 2001, petitioner filed his certificate ofc a n d i d a c y f o r c i t y m a y o r
f o r t h e M a y 1 4 , 2 0 0 1 e l e c t i o n s . H e s t a t e d t h e r e i n t h a t h e is eligible therefore, and
likewise disclosed that he had already served for threeconsecutive terms as mayor of the Municipality of Digos and
is now running for the firsttime for the position of city mayor. On March 1, 2001, private respondent RomeoM.Sunga, also a
candidate for city mayor in the said elections, filed before theC O M E L E C
a P e t i t i o n t o D e n y D u e C o u r s e , C a n c e l C e r t i f i c a t e o f C a n d i d a c y a n d / o r For
Disqualification against petitioner Latasa. Respondent Sunga alleged therein

thatpetitioner falsely represented in his certificate of

candidacy that he is eligibleto run as mayor of Digos
Citysince petitioner had already been elected andserved
for three consecutive terms as mayor from 1992 to 2001.
On March 5,2 0 0 1 , p e t i t i o n e r L a t a s a f i l e d h i s A n s w e r ,
a r g u i n g t h a t h e d i d n o t m a k e
a n y false representation in his certificate of candidacy since he fully
d i s c l o s e d t h e r e i n that he had served as mayor of the Municipality of Digos for three consecutive terms.Moreover,
he argued that this fact does not bar him from filing a certificate of candidacyfor the May14, 2001 elections since this will be the
first time that he will be running for thepost of city mayor.

I s s u e :
WON Latasa is barred from running as mayor of the newly
c r e a t e d c i t y o f D i g o s being the mayor of Digos for 3consecutive term when it
was still a municipality.

Held:
Yes, Latasa is barred from running. An elective local
o f f i c i a l , t h e r e f o r e , i s n o t b a r r e d from running again in for same local government
post, unless two conditions concur:1 . ) t h a t t h e o f f i c i a l c o n c e r n e d h a s b e e n
e l e c t e d f o r t h r e e c o n s e c u t i v e t e r m s t o t h e same local government post, and2.) that he has
fully served three consecutive terms. In the present case, petitioner arguedthat a city and a municipality have separate and
distinct personalities. Thus they cannotbe treated as a single entity and must be accorded different
treatment consistent withs p e c i f i c p r o v i s i o n s o f t h e L o c a l
Government Code. He does not deny
the factthat he has already served for three consecutive t
e r m s a s m u n i c i p a l mayor. However, he asserts that when Digos was converted from a municipality to a
city,i t a t t a i n e d a d i f f e r e n t j u r i d i c a l p e r s o n a l i t y . T h e r e f o r e , w h e n h e f i l e d his
certificate of candidacy for city mayor, he cannot be construed as vying for the same local
government post. True, the new city acquired a new corporate existenceseparate and distinct from that of the municipality. This
does not mean, however, that for

7. TAN v. COMELEC 142 SCRA 727 (Digested Case)

TAN v. COMELEC

Re: Limitations and requisites/Established criteria for LGU creation

FACTS: Prompted by the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 885-An Act Creating a New Province in the
Island of Negros to be known as the Province of Negros del Norte, Petitioners herein, who are residents
of the Province of Negros Occidental, in the various cities and municipalities therein, filed a case for
Prohibition for the purpose of stopping respondents from conducting the plebiscite which was scheduled
"to be conducted in the proposed new province which are the areas affected, excluding the original
province."

ISSUES: WON the law is unconstitutional and it is not in complete accord with the LGC as in Art. XI, Sec.
3, of the Constitution.

HELD: Yes. The cited provision plainly provides that, "no province, city, municipality or barrio may be
created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the
criteria established in the local government code, and subject to the approval by a majority of the votes in
a plebiscite in the unit or units affected." The phrase "the unit or units affected" refers to both the original
province and the new province sought to be created as these political groups will both be affected. Hence,
the two must be included in the plebiscite contemplated therein.
.

8. LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP), represented by LCP National President Jerry P.
Treñas; CITY OF CALBAYOG, represented by Mayor Mel Senen S. Sarmiento; and JERRY P. TREÑAS,
in his personal capacity as Taxpayer, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; MUNICIPALITY OF
BAYBAY, PROVINCE OF LEYTE; MUNICIPALITY OF BOGO, PROVINCE OF CEBU; MUNICIPALITY OF
CATBALOGAN, PROVINCE OF WESTERN SAMAR; MUNICIPALITY OF TANDAG, PROVINCE OF
SURIGAO DEL SUR; MUNICIPALITY OF BORONGAN, PROVINCE OF EASTERN SAMAR; AND
MUNICIPALITY OF TAYABAS, PROVINCE OF QUEZON, respondents. DEAN’S CIRCLE 2019 – UST
FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW 431 G.R. Nos. 176951, 177499 & 178056, EN BANC, April 12, 2011,
BERSAMIN J. We should not ever lose sight of the fact that the 16 cities covered by the Cityhood Laws
not only had conversion bills pending during the 11th Congress, but have also complied with the
requirements of the Local Government Code prescribed prior to its amendment by RA No. 9009.
Congress undeniably gave these cities all the considerations that justice and fair play demanded. Hence,
this Court should do no less by stamping its imprimatur to the clear and unmistakable legislative intent
and by duly recognizing the certain collective wisdom of Congress. FACTS: During the 11th Congress,
Congress enacted into law 33 bills converting 33 municipalities into cities. However, Congress did not act
on bills converting 24 other municipalities into cities. During the 12th Congress, Congress enacted into
law Republic Act No. 9009 (RA 9009), which took effect on 30 June 2001. RA 9009 amended Section 450
of the Local Government Code by increasing the annual income requirement for conversion of a
municipality into a city from P20 million to P100 million. The rationale for the amendment was to restrain,
in the words of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, “the mad rush” of municipalities to convert into cities solely to
secure a larger share in the Internal Revenue Allotment despite the fact that they are incapable of fiscal
independence. After the effectivity of RA 9009, the House of Representatives of the 12th Congress
adopted Joint Resolution No. 29, which sought to exempt from the P100 million income requirement in RA
9009 the 24 municipalities whose cityhood bills were not approved in the 11th Congress. However, the
12th Congress ended without the Senate approving Joint Resolution No. 29. During the 13th Congress,
the House of Representatives re-adopted Joint Resolution No. 29 as Joint Resolution No. 1 and
forwarded it to the Senate for approval. However, the Senate again failed to approve the Joint Resolution.
Following the advice of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, 16 municipalities filed, through their respective
sponsors, individual cityhood bills. The 16 cityhood bills contained a common provision exempting all the
16 municipalities from the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009. On 22 December 2006, the
House of Representatives approved the cityhood bills. The Senate also approved the cityhood bills in
February 2007, except that of Naga, Cebu which was passed on 7 June 2007. The cityhood bills lapsed
into law (Cityhood Laws) on various dates from March to July 2007 without the President’s signature. The
Cityhood Laws direct the COMELEC to hold plebiscites to determine whether the voters in each
respondent municipality approve of the conversion of their municipality into a city. Petitioners filed the
present petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws unconstitutional for violation of Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution, as well as for violation of the equal protection clause. Petitioners also lament that the
wholesale conversion of municipalities into cities will reduce the share of existing cities in the Internal
Revenue Allotment because more cities will share the same amount of internal revenue set aside for all
cities under Section 285 of the Local Government Code. ISSUE: Whether the Cityhood Laws violate
Section 10, Article X of the Constitution and the equal protection clause. (NO) DEAN’S CIRCLE 2019 –
UST FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW 432 RULING: The 16 Cityhood Laws are constitutional. “We should not
ever lose sight of the fact that the 16 cities covered by the Cityhood Laws not only had conversion bills
pending during the 11th Congress, but have also complied with the requirements of the Local
Government Code prescribed prior to its amendment by RA No. 9009. Congress undeniably gave these
cities all the considerations that justice and fair play demanded. Hence, this Court should do no less by
stamping its imprimatur to the clear and unmistakable legislative intent and by duly recognizing the certain
collective wisdom of Congress.” The Court stressed that Congress clearly intended that the local
government units covered by the Cityhood Laws be exempted from the coverage of RA 9009, which
imposes a higher income requirement of PhP100 million for the creation of cities. “The Court reiterated
that while RA 9009 was being deliberated upon, the Congress was well aware of the pendency of
conversion bills of several municipalities, including those covered by the Cityhood Laws. It pointed out
that RA 9009 took effect on June 30, 2001, when the 12th Congress was incipient. By reason of the clear
legislative intent to exempt the municipalities covered by the conversion bills pending during the 11th
Congress, the House of Representatives adopted Joint Resolution No. 29 entitled Joint Resolution to
Exempt Certain Municipalities Embodied in Bills Filed in Congress before June 30, 2001 from the
coverage of Republic Act No. 9009. However, the Senate failed to act on the said Joint Resolution. Even
so, the House readopted Joint Resolution No. 29 as Joint Resolution No. 1 during the 12th Congress, and
forwarded the same for approval to the Senate, which again failed to prove it. Eventually, the conversion
bills of respondents were individually filed in the Lower House and were all unanimously and favorably
voted upon. When forwarded to the Senate, the bills were also unanimously approved. The acts of both
Chambers of Congress show that the exemption clauses ultimately incorporated in the Cityhood Laws are
but the express articulations of the clear legislative intent to exempt the respondents, without exception,
from the coverage of RA No. 9009. Thereby, RA 9009, and, by necessity, the LCG, were amended, not by
repeal but by way of the express exemptions being embodied in the exemption clauses.” The Court held
that the imposition of the income requirement of P100 million from local sources under RA 9009 was
arbitrary. “While the Constitution mandates that the creation of local government units must comply with
the criteria laid down in the LGC, it cannot be justified to insist that the Constitution must have to yield to
every amendment to the LGC despite such amendment imminently producing effects contrary to the
original thrusts of the LGC to promote autonomy, decentralization, countryside development, and the
concomitant national growth.”

9. RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, VICTOR F. BERNAL, RENE O. MEDINA, petitioners –versusEXECUTIVE

SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, respondent G.R. No. 180050, EN BANC, April 12, 2011, Nachura, J.
The central policy considerations in the creation of local government units are economic viability, efficient
administration, and capability to deliver basic services to their constituents. The criteria prescribed by the
Local Government Code, i.e., income, population and land area, are all designed to accomplish these
results DEAN’S CIRCLE 2019 – UST FACULTY OF CIVIL LAW 433 A perusal of the congressional
debate for the matter reveals that economic viability is the primordial criterion. Land area, while
considered as an indicator of viability of a local government unit, is not conclusive in showing that Dinagat
cannot become a province. FACTS: Pursuant to RA 9355, a law creating the province of Dinagat Islands,
the Comelec conducted the mandatory plebiscite for the ratification of the creation of the province of
Dinagat under the Local Government Code. The plebiscite resulted in the approval by the people from the
mother province Surigao del Norte and the province of Dinagat. Thereafter, petitioners challenged the
constitutionality of RA 9355, contending that the province of Dinagat did not meet the population and land
area requisite for the creation of a province under the Local Government Code. They alleged that Dinagat
had a land area of 802.12 square kilometers only and a population of only 106,951, whereas, the LGC
requires, among others, that the territory should atleast be 2000 square kilometers with 250,000
inhabitants. ISSUE: Whether or not RA 9355 is constitutional. (YES) RULING: The central policy
considerations in the creation of local government units are economic viability, efficient administration,
and capability to deliver basic services to their constituents. The criteria prescribed by the Local
Government Code, i.e., income, population and land area, are all designed to accomplish these results. A
perusal of the congressional debate for the matter reveals that economic viability is the primordial
criterion. Land area, while considered as an indicator of viability of a local government unit, is not
conclusive in showing that Dinagat cannot become a province, taking into account its average annual
income of P82,696,433.23 at the time of its creation, which is four times more than the minimum
requirement of P20,000,000.00 for the creation of a province. The delivery of basic services to its
constituents has been proven possible and sustainable. The spirit rather than the letter of the law. A
statute must be read according to its spirit or intent, for what is within the spirit is within the statute
although it is not within its letter, and that which is within the letter but not within the spirit is not within the
statute. Put a bit differently, that which is within the intent of the lawmaker is as much within the statute as
if within the letter, and that which is within the letter of the statute is not within the statute unless within the
intent of the lawmakers. Withal, courts ought not to interpret and should not accept an interpretation that
would defeat the intent of the law and its legislators.

10. Abbas vs. COMELEC

Facts: A plebiscite in thirteen (13) provinces and nine (9) cities in Mindanao and Palawan, was scheduled
for November 19, 1989, in implementation of RA 6734, entitled "An Act Providing for an Organic Act for
the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao" (Organic Act). These consolidated petitions pray that the
Court: (1) enjoin the COMELEC from conducting the plebiscite; and (2) declare RA 6734, or parts thereof,
unconstitutional. The arguments against R.A. 6734 raised by petitioners may generally be categorized
into either of the following: (a) that R.A. 6734, or parts thereof, violates the Constitution, and (b) that
certain provisions of R.A. No. 6734 conflict with the Tripoli Agreement.

Issue:
Whether or not certain provisions of the Organic Act are unconstitutional.

Held:
The petition has no merit and the law is constitutional.
1. Petitioner contends that the tenor of a provision in the Organic Act makes the creation of an
autonomous region absolute, such that even if only two provinces vote in favor of autonomy, an
autonomous region would still be created composed of the two provinces where the favorable votes were
obtained. there is a specific provision in the Transitory Provisions (Article XIX) of the Organic Act, which
incorporates substantially the same requirements embodied in the Constitution and fills in the details,
thus:
SEC. 13. The creation of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao shall take effect when approved by
a majority of the votes cast by the constituent units provided in paragraph (2) of Sec. 1 of Article II of this
Act in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than ninety (90) days or later than one hundred twenty
(120) days after the approval of this Act: Provided, That only the provinces and cities voting favorably in
such plebiscite shall be included in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. The provinces and
cities which in the plebiscite do not vote for inclusion in the Autonomous Region shall remain the existing
administrative determination, merge the existing regions.
Thus, under the Constitution and R.A. No 6734, the creation of the autonomous region shall take effect
only when approved by a majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite, and only those
provinces and cities where a majority vote in favor of the Organic Act shall be included in the autonomous
region. The provinces and cities wherein such a majority is not attained shall not be included in the
autonomous region. It may be that even if an autonomous region is created, not all of the thirteen (13)
provinces and nine (9) cities mentioned in Article II, section 1 (2) of R.A. No. 6734 shall be included
therein. The single plebiscite contemplated by the Constitution and R.A. No. 6734 will therefore be
determinative of (1) whether there shall be an autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao and (2) which
provinces and cities, among those enumerated in R.A. No. 6734, shall compromise it.
2. The question has been raised as to what this majority means. Does it refer to a majority of the total
votes cast in the plebiscite in all the constituent units, or a majority in each of the constituent units, or
both?
The 1987 Constitution provides: The creation of the autonomous region shall be effective when approved
by majority of the votes cast by the constituent units in a plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that
only provinces, cities and geographic areas voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the
autonomous region. [Art. X, sec, 18, para, 2]. It will readily be seen that the creation of the autonomous
region is made to depend, not on the total majority vote in the plebiscite, but on the will of the majority in
each of the constituent units and the proviso underscores this.
3. Petitioner avers that not all of the thirteen (13) provinces and nine (9) cities included in the Organic Act,
possess such concurrence in historical and cultural heritage and other relevant characteristics. By
including areas, which do not strictly share the same characteristic as the others, petitioner claims that
Congress has expanded the scope of the autonomous region which the constitution itself has prescribed
to be limited.
Petitioner's argument is not tenable. The Constitution lays down the standards by which Congress shall
determine which areas should constitute the autonomous region. Guided by these constitutional criteria,
the ascertainment by Congress of the areas that share common attributes is within the exclusive realm of
the legislature's discretion. Any review of this ascertainment would have to go into the wisdom of the law.
4. Both petitions also question the validity of R.A. No. 6734 on the ground that it violates the constitutional
guarantee on free exercise of religion [Art. III, sec. 5]. The objection centers on a provision in the Organic
Act which mandates that should there be any conflict between the Muslim Code and the Tribal Code on
the one had, and the national law on the other hand, the Shari'ah courts created under the same Act
should apply national law. Petitioners maintain that the islamic law (Shari'ah) is derived from the Koran,
which makes it part of divine law. Thus it may not be subjected to any "man-made" national law. Petitioner
Abbas supports this objection by enumerating possible instances of conflict between provisions of the
Muslim Code and national law, wherein an application of national law might be offensive to a Muslim's
religious convictions.
In the present case, no actual controversy between real litigants exists. There are no conflicting claims
involving the application of national law resulting in an alleged violation of religious freedom. This being
so, the Court in this case may not be called upon to resolve what is merely a perceived potential conflict
between the provisions the Muslim Code and national law.
5. According to petitioners, said provision grants the President the power to merge regions, a power
which is not conferred by the Constitution upon the President.
While the power to merge administrative regions is not expressly provided for in the Constitution, it is a
power which has traditionally been lodged with the President to facilitate the exercise of the power of
general supervision over local governments. There is no conflict between the power of the President to
merge administrative regions with the constitutional provision requiring a plebiscite in the merger of local
government units because the requirement of a plebiscite in a merger expressly applies only to provinces,
cities, municipalities or barangays, not to administrative regions.
6. Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. Based on the grounds raised by
petitioners to challenge the constitutionality of R.A. No. 6734, the Court finds that petitioners have failed
to overcome the presumption. The dismissal of these two petitions is, therefore, inevitable.

11. ALEXANDER P. ORDILLOvCommission on ElectionsG.R. No. 93054December 4,

1990FACTS:Casting of votes in a plebiscite held pursuant to Republic Act No. 6766 entitled “An Act
Providing for anOrganic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region” was held on January 30, 1990 to
the people of theprovinces of Benguet, Mountain Province, Ifugao, Abra and Kalinga-Apayao, and the
city of Baguio.Results of the plebiscite from the COMELEC showed that the creation of the Region was
approved by amajority vote only in the Ifugao Province (5,889) and was rejected in the rest of the
provinces and citymentioned (148,676). On February 5, 1990, the Executive Secretary issued a
Memorandum granting authority to wind up the affairsof the Cordillera Executive Board and the Cordillera
Regional Assembly created under Executive Order No.220.On February 14, 1990, COMELEC issued
Resolution No. 2259 stating that the Organic Act for the Region hasbeen approved and/or ratified by
majority of the votes cast only in the province of Ifugao. On the same date,the Secretary of Justice issued
a memorandum for the President reiterating the COMELEC resolution andprovided that in consideration
of the proviso in Section 13(A) that only provinces and city voting favorablyshall be included in the CAR,
Ifugao being the only province which voted favorably is then alone, legally andvalidly constitutes the
CAR.Congress enacted Republic Act No. 6861 on March 8, 1990 setting the elections in the Cordillera
AutonomousRegion of Ifugao on the first Monday of March 1991.Petitioner filed a petition on March 9,
1990 against the COMELEC to declare the non-ratification of theOrganic Act for the Region which the
COMELEC merely noted. On March 30, 1990, the President issued Administrative Order No. 160
declaring among others that theCordillera Executive Board and Cordillera Regional Assembly and all the
offices created under EO No. 220were abolished in view of the ratification of the Organic Act.Petitioners
maintained that there can be no valid Cordillera Autonomous Region in only one province as
theConstitution and RA No. 6766 require that the said Region be composed of more than one constituent
unit.The petitioners pray that the Court:(1) Declare null and void COMELEC Resolution No. 2259, the
memorandum of the Secretary of Justice,the memorandum of the Executive Secretary, Administrative
Order No. 160, and Republic Act No.6861 and prohibit and restrain the respondents from implementing
the same and spending publicfunds for the purpose(2) Declare Executive Order No. 220
constituting the Cordillera Executive Board and the CordilleraRegional Assembly and other offices to
be still in force and effect until another organic law for theAutonomous Region shall have been enacted by
Congress and the same is duly ratified by the votersin the constituent units.ISSUE:WON the province of
Ifugao, being the only province which voted favorably for the creation of the CordilleraAutonomous
Region can, alone, legally and validly constitute such Region.HELD:The petition is meritorious. The sole
province of Ifugao cannot validly constitute the Cordillera Autonomous Region as explicitly providedunder
Article X, Section 15 of the 1987 Constitution that:There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim
Mindanao and in the Cordillera consisting of provinces,cities, municipalities and geographical areas
sharing common and distinctive historical and cultural heritage,economic and social structures, and
other relevant characteristics within the framework of this Constitution andthe national sovereignty as well
as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines.The keywords — provinces, cities, municipalities
and geographical areas connote that "region" is to be made upof more than one constituent unit. The term
"region" used in its ordinary sense means two or more provinces. This issupported by the fact that the
thirteen (13) regions into which the Philippines is divided for administrative purposes aregroupings of
contiguous provinces. Ifugao is a province by itself. To become part of a region, it must join other
provinces,cities, municipalities, and geographical areas. It joins other units because of their common and
distinctive historical andcultural heritage, economic and social structures and other relevant
characteristics. The Constitutional requirements arenot present in this case.The well-established rule in
statutory construction that the language of the Constitution, as much as possibleshould be understood in
the sense it has in common use and that the words used in constitutional provisions are to begiven their
ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed, must then, be applied in this case

12. FACTS:

1. From November 1986 to June 1, 2006, or spanning a period of 20 years, Sereno served as a member
of the faculty of the UP-College of Law, initially as a temporary faculty member (from November 1986 to
December 31, 1991) and thereafter, as a permanent faculty member until her resignation therefrom on
June 1, 2006. As a regular faculty member, respondent was paid by the month by U.P. While being
employed at the U.P, respondent was concurrently employed as legal counsel of the Republic in two
international arbitrations: (a) PIATCO v. Republic of the Philippines and MIAA; and (b) Fraport AG
Frankfurt Airport Services Worldwide v. Republic of the Philippines (PIATCO cases).

2. Despite having been employed at the U.P. College of Law from November 1986 to June 1, 2006, the
record of the U.P. HRDO only contains the SALNs for 1985, 1990, 1991, 1993, 1994, 1995,
1996, 1997, and 2002, filed by respondent. On the other hand, the records of the Central Records
Division of the Office of the Ombudsman yields that there is no SALN filed by respondent for calendar
years 1999 to 2009 except for the SALN ending December 1998 which was subscribed only in August
2003 and transmitted by the U.P. HRDO to the Ombudsman only on December 16, 2003.

3. After having served as a professor at the U.P. College of Law until 2006, the respondent submitted her
application for the position of Associate Justice of the Supreme Court in July 2010. Respondent only
submitted her 2006 SALN and it bears no stamp from the UP HRDO and it was signed on July 10, 2010
(which according to her it is a result of mere oversight since she only downloaded the pro-forma form and
forgot to erase it). According to respondent, the JBC considered her nomination for the position of
Associate Justice as that of a private practitioner and not as a government employee and thus, her
SALNs were not required.

4. Thus, as the certifications executed by the U.P. HRDO, the Ombudsman and the ORSN of the JBC
stand, the only SALNs available on record and filed by respondent were those for the calendar years
1985, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, and 2002 or eleven (11) SALNs filed in her
20-year government service in U.P. No SALNs were filed from 2003 to 2006 when she was employed as
legal counsel for the Republic. Neither was there a SALN filed when she resigned from U.P. College of
Law as of June 1, 2006 and when she supposedly re-entered government service as of August 16, 2010.

5. A month after, or on August 13, 2010, respondent was appointed by PNoy as Associate Justice, and on
August 16, 2010, respondent took her oath of office as such. When the position of the Chief Justice was
declared vacant in 2012, the JBC announced the opening for application and recommendation of the
position of Chief Justice

6. The JBC Announced that candidates for Chief Justice are required (a) for those in government service,
to submit all previous SALNs; and (b) for those in the private sector, to submit SALN as of Dec. 31, 2011;
and, execute a waiver in favor of the JBC of the confidentiality of local and foreign bank accounts.
However, this was amended by the JBC wherein the incumbent Justices are only required to file their
previous SALNs and no longer require them to submit other documents.

7. Then Assoc. Justice Sereno was nominated by members of various legal and evangelical groups. She
accepted the nomination. However, the Executive Officer informed the JBC that she had not submitted
her SALNs for a period of 10 years (1996-2006) covering her employment in the UP College of Law. The
Office of Recruitment Selection and Nomination (OSRN) through its then-Chief, Atty. Richard Pascual
inquired as to CJ Sereno’s SALNs. In response, CJ Sereno sent a letter to the JBC requesting that her
requirements be treated similar to those from the private sector alleging that (a) it is infeasible to get hold
of the 15-year old records, (b) that UP has cleared her of all academic/administrative responsibilities, (c)
she is considered to have been returned to public office and rendered government service anew from
August 2010, her appointment as Associate Justice. Said letter, however was not examined by the JBC
regular members nor was it deliberated by the JBC En banc nor the Executive Committee.

8. CJ Sereno was listed as Applicant No. 14 with an opposite annotation that she had “COMPLETE
REQUIREMENTS. Letter 7/23/12 — considering that her government records in the academe are more
than 15 years old, it is reasonable to consider it infeasible to retrieve all those files.” She was interviewed
for the post, was shortlisted, appointed by President Aquino, and took her oath of office.

9. In August 2017 or after 5 years, Atty. Larry Gadon filed with the House of Representatives - Justice
Committee a complaint for impeachment against CJ Sereno for culpable violation of the Constitution,
corruption, high crimes, and betrayal of public trust. The complaint also alleged that CJ Sereno failed to
make truthful declarations in her SALNs citing certifications from the UP Human Resource Development
Office that only SALNs for intermittent years were filed by CJ Sereno and the certification from the Office
of the Ombudsman that there is no SALN filed for the years 1999-2009.

10. The Justice Committee conducted several hearings to determine probable cause. During those
hearings, incumbent and retired SC Justices were invited as resource persons. The SC en banc
authorized the appearance of the Justices under strict confidentiality notice. Among the Justices who
appeared before the Committee are (1) Justice Leonardo-De Castro who recounted (a) CJ Sereno’s
bypassing the SC En banc in creating Judiciary Decentralized Office, (b) the suspicious issuance of the
TRO in the Senior Citizens case, (c) the revocation of the privilege of Members of the Court to nominate
for vacant judicial posts, and (d) the clustering of the Sandiganabayan nominees; (2) Justice Peralta who
testified as the ex-officio JBC Chairperson of the Council that nominated CJ Sereno; (3) Justice
Bersamin; (4) Justice Tijam; and, (5) Justice Jardeleza.
11. The investigation before the House Committee on Justice spawned two relevant incidents: one, the
proposal of the House Committee for this Court to investigate on the proceedings of the JBC relative to
the nomination of respondent as Chief Justice which is now presently docketed as A.M. No. 17-11-12 and
A.M. No. 17-11-17-SC; and two, the Letter dated February 21, 2018 of Atty. Eligio Mallari to the OSG
requesting that the latter, in representation of the Republic, initiate a quo warranto proceeding
against the respondent.

12. The Office of the Solicitor General then initiated the instant case for quo warranto asking the court to
declare CJ Sereno ineligible to hold office for failing to regularly disclose her assets, liabilities, and net
worth, asserting that her failure to make said dicslosures show that she does not possess “proven
integrity” demanded of every aspirant to the Judiciary.

13. The Republic argues that (1) quo warranto is the proper remedy, as the Constitution does not make
impeachment the exclusive mode of unseating an impeachable officer; (2) the petition is not time barred
as prescription cannot run against the States; and, (3) that, at the time of her appointment, CJ Sereno
was not of “proven integrity” she not having filed the required SALNs asked for by the JBC.

14. CJ Sereno argues that (1) impeachment is the only way of unseating Members of the Supreme Court,
and that the word “may” pertains to the imposable penalty after impeachment proceedings and not to the
non-exclusivity of impeachment as remedy; (2) the petition is time barred considering that the one-year
period has lapsed from her assumption of office; (3) that the Doblada doctrine, which state that the non-
filing of the SALN must be proven as fact by the person alleging its absence, should be applied in this
case; (4) she and the record-holding offices enjoy presumption of regularity in the performance of their
duty; (6) her appointment is a political question; and, (6) the SALN requirement does not go into the
requisite “proven integrity” but merely an instrument in its determination.

15. Several groups claiming standing as taxpayers and citizens filed Motions for Leave to Intervene
echoing some or all of CJ Sereno’s arguments. Senators De Lima and Trillanes filed a similar motion
alleging the usurpation of functions of the Court from the Senate Impeachment Court.

16. CJ Sereno filed Motions for Inhibition against Associate Justices Bersamin, Peralta, Jardeleza, Tijam,
and Leonardo-De Castro, imputing actual bias on said Justices for having testified before the House
Justice Committee; and, against Justice Martires for his purported insinuations of CJ Sereno’s
psychological fitness during the Oral Arguments. CJ Sereno also prayed that the Motion for Inhibition be
by the SC En banc without the participation of the Justices who are asked to inhibit.
During the pendency of the case, and while she was on leave, CJ Sereno appeared in various fora and
accepted several speaking engagements on the issue of judicial independence, and such other matters.
(including the one held in ALS)

ISSUES:

1. W/N Motions for Intervention are proper. [NO]

2. W/N the Motions for Inhibition are proper. [NO]

3. W/N the Court can assume jurisdiction and give due course to the petition for quo warranto against an
impeachable officer [MAIN ISSUE]

4. W/N the petition is dismissible on the ground of prescription [NO]

5. W/N CJ Sereno is eligible for the position of Chief Justice [NO]

6. W/N CJ Sereno is a de facto officer removable through quo warranto. [YES]

7. W/N CJ Sereno violated the sub judice rule and is administratively liable [SUBJECT TO SHOW
CAUSE ORDER]

HELD:

The motion for interventions cannot prosper since Intervention is not a matter of right but rests
on sound discretion. The intervenors must establish the requisite legal interest.

 Intervention is a remedy by which a third party, not originally impleaded in the proceedings,
becomes a litigant therein to enable the third party to protect or preserve a right or interest that
may be affected by those proceedings. It is not a matter of right but addressed to the sound
discretion of the court upon compliance with the requirements of (a) legal interest, and (b) that no
delay or prejudice should result.
 Movant-intervenors failed to establish the required legal interest which must be of a direct and
immediate character so that the intervenor will either gain or lose by the direct legal operation of
the judgment. The interest must be actual or material.Movant-intervenors’ sentiments, no matter
how noble, do not, in any way, come within the purview of the concept of “legal interest”
contemplated under the Rules to justify the allowance of intervention. Senator De Lima’s and
Trillanes’ motions are anchored on the contingency of the filing of the Articles of
Impeachment. The only intervention that could be contemplated under a quo warranto
proceeding, by its nature, is one brought by a person claiming to be entitled to the
usurped office.

Motions for Inhibition are not proper.

 The second paragraph of Rule 137, Section 1, does not give judges unfettered discretion to
decide whether to desist from hearing a case. The inhibition must be for just and valid causes.
The mere imputation of bias or partiality is not enough ground for inhibition, especially when the
charge is without basis. The Court has to be shown acts or conduct clearly indicative of
arbitrariness or prejudice before it can brand them with the stigma of bias or partiality. Moreover,
extrinsic evidence is required to establish bias, bad faith, malice or corrupt purpose, in addition to
palpable error which may be inferred from the decision or order itself. The only exception to the
rule is when the error is so gross and patent as to produce an ineluctable inference of bad faith or
malice.
 In this case, it does not appear that there are grounds for compulsory inhibition. As to voluntary
inhibition, the mere fact that some of the Associate Justices participated in the hearings of the
Committee on Justice determining probable cause for the impeachment of respondent does not
make them disqualified to hear the instant petition. Their appearance thereat was in deference to
the House of Representatives whose constitutional duty to investigate the impeachment
complaint filed against respondent could not be doubted. Their appearance was with the prior
consent of the Supreme Court En Banc and they faithfully observed the parameters that the Court
set for the purpose. Their statements in the hearing, should be carefully viewed within this
context, and should not be hastily interpreted as an adverse attack against respondent.
 A circumspect reading of Justice Tijam's statements in the Manila Times article reveals that the
manifest intent of the statements was only to prod respondent to observe and respect the
constitutional process of impeachment, and to exemplify the ideals of public accountability.As to
the act of wearing a red tie which purportedly establishes Justices Tijam and Bersamin's
prejudice against her, the argument is baseless and unfair. There is no basis, whether in logic or
in law, to establish a connection between a piece of clothing and a magistrate's performance of
adjudicatory functions. Absent compelling proof to the contrary, the red piece of clothing was
merely coincidental and should not be deemed a sufficient ground to disqualify them.
 Justice Bersamin’s statement that “Ang Supreme Court ay hindi po maaring mag function kung
isa ay diktador,” is clearly a hypothetical statement, an observation on what would the Court be if
any of its Members were to act dictatorially. Likewise, the Court cannot ascribe bias in Justice
 Bersamin’s remark that he was offended by respondent's attitude in ignoring the collegiality of the
Supreme Court when she withdrew the Justices’ “privilege” to recommend nominees to fill
vacancies in the Supreme Court. It would be presumptuous to equate this statement to a
personal resentment as respondent regards it.
 Justice Peralta’s testimony before the House Committee on Justice also contradicts respondent’s
allegation that Justice Peralta’s apparent bias arose from his belief that respondent caused the
exclusion of his wife, Court of Appeals (CA) Associate Justice Fernanda Lampas Peralta, from
the list of applications for the position of CA Presiding Justice. Justice Peralta has made it clear
during the February 12, 2018 Congressional hearing that he has already moved on from said
issue and that the purpose of his testimony was merely to protect prospective applicants to the
Judiciary.
 Justice Martires has not suggested that she suffers from some mental or psychological illness. At
most, his questions and statements were merely hypothetical in nature, which do not even
constitute as an opinion against respondent.Absent strong and compelling evidence establishing
actual bias and partiality on the part of the Justices whose recusal was sought, respondent’s
motions for inhibition must perforce fail. Mere conjectures and speculations cannot justify the
inhibition of a Judge or Justice from a judicial matter. The presumption that the judge will
undertake his noble role of dispensing justice in accordance with law and evidence, and without
fear or favor, should not be abandoned without clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.

13. E: LETTER OF MRS. MA. CRISTINA ROCO CORONA REQUESTING THE GRANT OF
RETIREMENT AND OTHER BENEFITS TO THE LATE FORMER CHIEF JUSTICE RENATO C.
CORONA AND HER CLAIM FOR SURVIVORSHIP PENSION AS HIS WIFE UNDER REPUBLIC
ACT NO. 9946 A.M. No. 20-07-10-SC, 12 January 2021 (Hernando, J.) DOCTRINE OF THE
CASE An impeached public officer whose civil, criminal, or administrative liability was not
judicially established may be considered involuntarily retired from service and is entitled to
retirement benefits. Retirement is deemed involuntary when one's profession is terminated for
reasons outside the control and discretion of the worker. Impeachment resulting in removal from
holding office falls under the column on involuntary retirement. Thus, until his liability under the
law is so established before the courts of law, retirement eligibility and benefits have properly
accrued to Chief Justice Corona when he was removed by impeachment on May 29, 2012. There
being no such determination of liability, his entitlement thereto subsisted. FACTS Renato
Coronado Corona (Corona) was the Chief Justice of the Philippines for eight years after his
appointment on May 12, 2010 until being indicted through an impeachment by the House of
Representatives pursuant to Section 2, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. The grounds of his
impeachment were betrayal of public trust, culpable violation of the Constitution, and graft and
corruption. Senate declared Corona unfit to hold the position and removed him from office
because of non-declaration of Statement of Assets, Liabilities, and Net Worth (SALN). Because of
the stress from trial, Corona’s health quickly deteriorated leading to his death in 2016. The
pending criminal cases on graft and corruption were all dismissed. His widow, Mrs. Ma. Cristina
Roco Corona (Mrs. Corona), asserted that the Senate judgment be voided for insufficiency and
non-compliance with Section 14, Art. VIII of the Constitution because the impeachment merely
stripped him of his political capacity as Chief Justice. Hence, she prayed for the retirement
benefits and other gratuities provided for under R.A. No. 9946, and survivorship pension under
Admin. Circ. No. 81-2010. 262 UST LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65 ISSUE Should the retirement benefits,
other gratuities, and survivorship pension be accorded to Mrs. Corona as the spouse of the late
Chief Justice Corona despite the latter's ouster by impeachment? RULING YES. The Court
grants the plea of Corona’s widow. The effects of a judgment on an impeachment complaint
extend no further than to removal from office and disqualification from holding any public office.
Since the Constitution expressly limited the nature of impeachment, its effects must consequently
and necessarily be confined within the constitutional limits. Impeachment proceedings are entirely
separate, distinct, and independent from any other actionable wrong or cause of action a party
may have against the impeached officer, even if such wrong or cause of action may have a
colorable connection to the grounds for which the officer have been impeached. An impeached
public officer whose civil, criminal, or administrative liability was not judicially established may be
considered involuntarily retired from service. Retirement is the termination of one's employment
 or career, especially upon reaching a certain age or for health reasons. To retire is to withdraw
from one's position or occupation, or to conclude one's active working life or professional career.
Retirement is deemed involuntary when one's profession is terminated for reasons outside the
control and discretion of the worker. Impeachment resulting in removal from holding office falls
under the column on involuntary retirement. After the judgment of impeachment was announced
on May 29, 2012, tax evasion charges, criminal cases for perjury, administrative complaints for
violation of the R.A. No. 6713 of the Code of Conduct of Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees, and a civil case for forfeiture were slapped against Chief Justice Corona in 2014.
These charges, however, were terminated upon his demise. The Court deems Chief Justice
Corona to have been involuntarily retired from public service due to the peculiar circumstances
surrounding his removal by impeachment, without forfeiture of his retirement benefits and other
allowances. Notably, from the time the impeachment court rendered its judgment, there has been
no law that commands the automatic cancellation of post-employment benefits and other
privileges pertaining to the impeached official. Considering the 2021] RECENT
JURISPRUDENCE 263 foregoing, the Supreme Court holds that Chief Justice Corona was
involuntarily retired by virtue of his conviction arising from impeachment. This is where equity
comes in. Under the prevailing circumstances, the fairer and more equitable treatment of the
present claim for post-employment privileges is to first consider Chief Justice Corona as
involuntarily retired, rather than to dismiss it outright without citing any legal basis. An impeached
public officer whose civil, criminal, or administrative liability was not judicially established is
entitled to the retirement benefits provided under R.A. Nos. 9946 and 8291. The former Chief
Justice can never be deemed to have retired at the age of 70, nor can he be considered as
resigned by reason of any permanent disability, as his separation from service was not in any way
effected through resignation. Section 1 of R.A. No. 9946 yields two instances of retirement
available to a magistrate — first, a compulsory retirement at 70 years old; and second, an
optional retirement upon reaching 60 years of age. The following legal requisites must concur for
the optional retirement of a magistrate and the consequent entitlement to the benefits under R.A.
No. 9946: (a) That the retiree be a magistrate, i.e., a Justice of the Supreme Court, the Court of
Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, or of the Court of Tax Appeals, or a judge of the trial courts, Shari'a
court, or of any other judicial court; (b) That the retiring magistrate has rendered at least 15 years
of service in the judiciary, in any other branch of the government, or in both; (c) That the retiring
magistrate be at least 60 years of age at the time of retirement; and (d) That the last 3 years of
public service by the retiring magistrate be continuously rendered in the Judiciary. The
requirements are straightforward and have all been satisfactorily complied with by the late Chief
Justice. However, whether criminal, civil, or administrative, no court imposed any such liability
upon the late Chief Justice. Impeachment is only preparatory to liability. Since a removal by
impeachment 264 UST LAW REVIEW [Vol. 65 does not explicitly provide for forfeiture as a
consequence thereof, as opposed to a criminal conviction carrying the penalty of perpetual or
absolute disqualification, an impeached official, like former Chief Justice Corona, cannot be
deprived of his retirement benefits on the sole ground of his removal. Such forfeiture could have
been imposed upon criminal conviction which, however, was pre-empted by his death. Viewing it
from another angle, a judgment of liability in a separate legal proceeding is a resolutory condition
after a verdict of ouster by impeachment has been rendered, in that the impeached official retains
all the post- employment privileges already earned unless otherwise declared by the competent
tribunals. Until his liability under the law is so established before the courts of law, retirement
eligibility and benefits have properly accrued to Chief Justice Corona when he was removed by
impeachment on May 29, 2012. There being no such determination of liability, his entitlement
thereto subsisted.

1414.. ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR., petitioner,

NAGMAMALASAKIT NA MGA MANANANGGOL NG MGA MANGGAGAWANG PILIPINO, INC., ITS
OFFICERS AND MEMBERS, petitioner-in-intervention,
WORLD WAR II VETERANS LEGIONARIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner-in-intervention,
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, REPRESENTED BY SPEAKER JOSE G. DE VENECIA, THE
SENATE, REPRESENTED BY SENATE PRESIDENT FRANKLIN M. DRILON, REPRESENTATIVE
GILBERTO C. TEODORO, JR. AND REPRESENTATIVE FELIX WILLIAM B.
FUENTEBELLA, respondents.
JAIME N. SORIANO, respondent-in-Intervention,
SENATOR AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, respondent-in-intervention.
GR NO. 160261
Nov. 10, 2003

FACTS:
On July 22, 2002, the House of Representatives adopted a Resolution, which directed the Committee on
Justice “to conduct an investigation, in aid of legislation, on the manner of disbursements and
expenditures by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the Judiciary Development Fund (JDF). On
June 2, 2003, former President Joseph E. Estrada filed an impeachment complaint (first impeachment
complaint) against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. and seven Associate Justices of this Court for
“culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of the public trust and other high crimes.” The complaint
was endorsed by Representatives Suplico, Zamora and Dilangalen, and was referred to the House
Committee on Justice in accordance with Section 3(2) of Article XI of the Constitution.

The House Committee on Justice ruled that the first impeachment complaint was “sufficient in form,” but
voted to dismiss the same for being insufficient in substance.

On October 23, 2003, the second impeachment complaint was filed with the Secretary General of
the House against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., founded on the alleged results of the
legislative inquiry initiated by above-mentioned House Resolution. This second impeachment
complaint was accompanied by a “Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment” signed by at least
one-third (1/3) of all the Members of the House of Representatives.

Thus arose the instant petitions against the House of Representatives, et. al., most of which
petitions contend that the filing of the second impeachment complaint is unconstitutional as it
violates the provision of Section 5 of Article XI of the Constitution that “[n]o impeachment
proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one
year.”.

ISSUE:
WON Constitution has excluded impeachment proceedings from the coverage of judicial review.

HELD:
No. In cases of conflict, the judicial department is the only constitutional organ, which can be called upon
to determine the proper allocation of powers between the several departments and among the integral or
constituent units thereof.

The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to determine the nature, scope and
extent of such powers? The Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the judiciary as the
rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any
superiority over the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature,
but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine
conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an actual
controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them. This is in truth all that is
involved in what is termed “judicial supremacy” which properly is the power of judicial review under the
Constitution. More than that, courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments,
not only because the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but also because the judiciary in
the determination of actual cases and controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as
expressed through their representatives in the executive and legislative departments of the government.

As pointed out by Justice Laurel, this “moderating power” to “determine the proper allocation of powers” of
the different branches of government and “to direct the course of government along constitutional
channels” is inherent in all courts as a necessary consequence of the judicial power itself, which is “the
power of the court to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable.”

To determine the merits of the issues raised in the instant petitions, this Court must necessarily turn to the
Constitution itself which employs the well-settled principles of constitutional construction.

First, verba legis, that is, wherever possible, the words used in the Constitution must be given their
ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed.
We look to the language of the document itself in our search for its meaning. We do not of course stop
there, but that is where we begin. It is to be assumed that the words in which constitutional provisions are
couched express the objective sought to be attained. They are to be given their ordinary meaning except
where technical terms are employed in which case the significance thus attached to them prevails. As the
Constitution is not primarily a lawyer’s document, it being essential for the rule of law to obtain that it
should ever be present in the people’s consciousness, its language as much as possible should be
understood in the sense they have in common use. What it says according to the text of the provision to
be construed compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate
that the framers and the people mean what they say. Thus, these are the cases where the need for
construction is reduced to a minimum.

Second, where there is ambiguity, ratio legis est anima. The words of the Constitution should be
interpreted in accordance with the intent of its framers.
A foolproof yardstick in constitutional construction is the intention underlying the provision under
consideration. Thus, it has been held that the Court in construing a Constitution should bear in mind the
object sought to be accomplished by its adoption, and the evils, if any, sought to be prevented or
remedied. A doubtful provision will be examined in the light of the history of the times, and the condition
and circumstances under which the Constitution was framed. The object is to ascertain the reason which
induced the framers of the Constitution to enact the particular provision and the purpose sought to be
accomplished thereby, in order to construe the whole as to make the words consonant to that reason and
calculated to effect that purpose.

Finally, ut magis valeat quam pereat. The Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole.

It is a well-established rule in constitutional construction that no one provision of the Constitution is to be
separated from all the others, to be considered alone, but that all the provisions bearing upon a particular
subject are to be brought into view and to be so interpreted as to effectuate the great purposes of the
instrument. Sections bearing on a particular subject should be considered and interpreted together as to
effectuate the whole purpose of the Constitution and one section is not to be allowed to defeat another, if
by any reasonable construction, the two can be made to stand together.

In other words, the court must harmonize them, if practicable, and must lean in favor of a construction
which will render every word operative, rather than one which may make the words idle and nugatory.

If, however, the plain meaning of the word is not found to be clear, resort to other aids is available. While
it is permissible in this jurisdiction to consult the debates and proceedings of the constitutional convention
in order to arrive at the reason and purpose of the resulting Constitution, resort thereto may be had only
when other guides fail as said proceedings are powerless to vary the terms of the Constitution when the
meaning is clear.
Debates in the constitutional convention “are of value as showing the views of the individual members,
and as indicating the reasons for their votes, but they give us no light as to the views of the large majority
who did not talk, much less of the mass of our fellow citizens whose votes at the polls gave that
instrument the force of fundamental law. We think it safer to construe the constitution from what appears
upon its face.” The proper interpretation therefore depends more on how it was understood by the people
adopting it than in the framers’ understanding thereof.

15. ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS MAYOR FRANCISCO LECAROZ vs.

SANDIGANBAYAN (G.R. No. L-56384. March 22, 1984) Petitioner Lecaroz was charged with the
crime of grave coercion in an information filed before the Sandigandbayan. A public officer,
being then the mayor of Sta. Cruz, Marinduque, Francisco Lecaroz, took advantage of his
position as mayor when he intimidated the gasoline station’s owner in taking over the operation
and control of the establishment, ordering his policemen to sell the gasoline therein and
padlocking the dispensing pump thereof without legal authority. Petitioner filed a motion to
quash the information principally on the ground that the Sandiganbayan lacks jurisdiction to
entertain the case and that it should have been filed with the ordinary courts in Marinduque
where the alleged crime was committed. Stated differently, if petitioner were not the mayor he
would not have allegedly directed the policemen and the latter would not have followed his
orders and instructions to sell Pedro Par’s gasoline and padlock the station. The fact that he is
the mayor did not vest him with legal authority to take over the operations and control of
complainant’s gasoline station and padlock the same without observing due process. RULING:
Jurisdiction of Sandiganbayan under the Constitution not only over criminal and civil cases
involving graft and corrupt practices’ committed by public officers and employees but also over
other crimes committed by them in relation to their office. Section 5, Article XIII of the
Constitution, provides for the creation of a special court known as the Sandiganbayan and
defines the jurisdiction thereof. It states: “SEC. 5. The National Assembly shall create a special
court, to be known as Sandiganbayan, which shall have jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases
involving graft and corrupt practices and such other offenses committed by public officers and
employees, including those in government-owned or controlled corporations, in relation to their
office as may be determined by law.” It is clear from the above-quoted constitutional provision
that respondent court has jurisdictional competence not only over criminal and civil cases
involving graft and corrupt practices committed by public officers and employees but also over
other crimes committed by them in relation to their office , though not involving graft and corrupt
practices, as may be determined by law. There is no merit in petitioner’s contention that Section
4(c) of Presidential Decree No. 1486, as amended, is violative of the provision of Section 5 of
Article XIII of the New Constitution because the former enlarges what the latter limited. Said
constitutional provision delegates to the lawmaking body the determination of “such other
offenses” committed by public officers over which the Sandiganbayan shall have jurisdiction.
Accordingly, the President of the Philippines, exercising his lawmaking authority and prerogative
vested in him by the Constitution, issued Presidential Decree No. 1486 which mandates in
Section 4(c) thereof that the Sandiganbayan shall have jurisdiction over “other crimes or
offenses committed by public officers or employees, including those employed in government-
owned or controlled corporation, in relation to their office.” (Italics supplied) When the
lawmaking authority chose to include all public office- related offenses over which respondent
court shall have jurisdiction, the courts will not review questions of legislative policy. It is enough
that the act is within the constitutional power of the lawmaking body or authority and, if it is, the
courts are bound to follow and apply.