The Past and Present Society

The Battle of Lepanto and Its Place in Mediterranean History

Author(s): Andrew C. Hess
Source: Past & Present, No. 57 (Nov., 1972), pp. 53-73
Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of The Past and Present Society
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THE BATTLE OF LEPANTO AND ITS PLACE
IN MEDITERRANEAN HISTORY1
IMMORTALIZED IN A MASSIVE LITERATURE, ON CANVASES OF HEROIC
dimensions,in epic poetry,on commemorative medals, and in
Renaissancemusic,thebattleof Lepantohas madean indeliblemark
upon the historyof modernEurope.2 On 7 October 1571 grand
naval forcesrepresenting Muslim and Christianstatesmet offthe
coast of western Greece, scene of ancient combat. Under the
commandof Don Juan,theforcesoftheChristianHoly League then
won a victorywhose dramaticcontentno Mediterraneanhistorian
couldignore.But beyondtheimmediatehumanconsequencesofthis
last majorgalleyconflict,
the Christiansuccessseemedalso to mark
the passingof an age. For manyhistorians the decisionat Lepanto
notonlysettledtheold struggle thathad brokenoutbetweenMuslims
and Christiansafterthe fallof the RomanEmpire,but it also began
an epoch in whichthe Mediterranean no longeroccupieda central
positionin the eventsthatwould mould Europe's future. Checked
at sea in 1571, the Turk entereda long period of decline that
appearedto breaktheclose linkagebetweentherhythm ofhis affairs
and those of westernEurope. Similarly,Europeansocietyshifted
the centreof her creativeactivitynorthand east, relegatingthe
Christianstates of the Mediterraneanto the peripheryof a new
Europeanand globalorderwhosehistory oftenbeganwiththefamiliar
words,afterthe battleof Lepanto.... 3
As could be expected,the early assessmentsof what the Holy
League had accomplishedoveremphasizedthe importanceof the
1 This articleowes much to the criticismof those who attendedthe session on
multi-culturalhistoryat the American Historical Association's annual meeting
in Boston, Massachusetts on 28 December 1970.
2 A
study of the literature covering the battle of Lepanto would require
volumes. Here no attemptwill be made to discuss the European literaturein
detail. For the place of Don Juan's victoryin European art see Ludwig von
Pastor, The HistoryofthePopes,fromtheClose oftheMiddle Ages,ed., R. F. Kerr
(London, 1923-53), xviii, pp. 444-9; and E. H. Gombrich, "Celebrations in
Venice of the Holy League and of the Victory of Lepanto", in Studies in
Renaissanceand Baroque Art, ed. JeanneCoutauld (London, 1967), pp. 62-8.
J. H. Elliott, Imperial Spain 1496-1716 (London, 1963), pp. 238-44;
H. G. Koenigsberger and G. L. Mosse, Europe in the SixteenthCentury(New
York, 1968), pp. 174-211, 245-74; Fernand Braudel, La Mdditerrandeet le
Monde me'diterranden a l'dpoque de Philippe II, 2nd edn. (Paris, 1966), ii,
pp. 469-514; and Leopold von Ranke, The Turkishand Spanish Empiresin the
16th and U7thCenturies,trans.Walter K. Kelley (Philadelphia, I845), pp. 33-4.

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54 PAST AND PRESENT NUMBER 57

Ottomandefeat. Vivid descriptions of the Christianvictoryin the

personalaccountsof Christiansailors,soldiersand diplomats,as
well as the massivedemonstrations organizedby Catholiccountries
to celebratetheirvictory,providedthe foundationforan argument
thatsaw a unitedChristendom, led by PhilipII and Pius V, driving
the Turk back intothe land massesof Asia. Onlythe defectionof
VenicefromtheHolyLeague during1573prevented theanti-Muslim
forcesfromexploiting theirmilitary advantage reconquereastern
to
landspreviously heldbyChristians.4Butno matter, thedefeatofthe
Grand Turk underminedhis military spiritand allowedthe church
and itsguardian,theHabsburgempire,to turntheirenergiestowards
the internalproblemsof Europe.
Satisfyingthoughthis explanationmay have been, it could not
standverylong in the face of both modernhistoricalcriticismand
theretreatoftheTurkishmenace. As thearchivesof Venice,Spain
and thePapacybecameaccessiblein thenineteenth centuryat a time
when the weaknessof the Islamic worldwas generallyrecognized,
historiansnoteda seriesof factsinconsistent withthevictorytheory
of the past. Upon examiningthe causes for the Holy League's
collapse,scholarspointedout thatthe Ottomansdid takethe island
of Cyprusfromthe Venetiansin 1571 and that the Republic of
St. Marknotonlyacceptedthelossofthisstrategic Levantineoutpost
but also paid a substantialtributeto the Ottomansultanin orderto
protectcommercial positionswithinterritoriesunderTurkishcontrol.
Moreover, the records of agents and ambassadors in the years
afterLepantosupportedtheelementof truthin thestatement of the
grandvizier,MehmetSokollu,5about therecuperative powerof the
Turkish state. When questionedconcerningthe heavy costs of
rebuildingthe sultan'sfleetin 1572,he hyberbolized,
The Ottoman stateis so powerful,if an orderwas issued to cast anchorsfrom
silver,to make riggingfromsilk, and to cut the sails fromsatin, it could be
carried out forthe entirefleet.6
Whatevertheweightof thesepointsin refuting theoldergeneraliza-
tion, the Ottomans themselvesunderlinedthe inabilityof the
Christiansto followup their1571navalvictorywhentheyseizedthe
keySpanishfortress of La GolettanearTunis duringthesummerof
1574.
4 Braudel, La Mdditerrande, ii, pp. 396-8, 405-44, 415-17.
1Grand vizier for over fourteen years, Mehmet Sokollu managed the
internationalrelations of the Ottomans after the battle of Lepanto until his
assassinationin 1579 on the eve of The Ottoman-Hapsburgagreementto end
Mediterraneanwarfare.
6 Ibrahim
Pegevi, Tarih-i Pefevi [Pegevi's History] (Istanbul, 1866), i,
pp. 498-500.

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 THE BATTLE OF LEPANTO 55

These observations, rootedin an appreciationof Ottomanstrength,

led to newarguments on theconsequencesofthe 1571Christiannaval
victory. Here the essenceof the revisedjudgementhad to do with
the inhibitingeffectLepanto had on Turkishexpansion. Although
the battle itselfresultedin no great strategicgain for the Holy
League, because the heartof the Ottomanstatein Europe and Asia
remaineduntouched,the Christianvictoryacted to establisha limit
againstthefurther advanceof theTurk in theMediterranean, ended
the fear of Turkish invincibility and marked the beginningof
Ottomannaval decline.7
The publicationof FernandBraudel'sstudyof the Mediterranean
worldin the age of PhilipII, however,introduceda noteof caution
intothesesolidlydocumenteddiscussionsof the historicalimpactof
the Holy League's victory. Probingdeep intothe formand move-
ment of Mediterraneanlife duringthe sixteenthcentury,Braudel
led the readerto the historysurrounding the battleof Lepantoafter
describinghow economic,social and technological factorsgradually
restrictedtheabilityof boththe Ottomansand Habsburgsto control
theirfrontiers.8But once the levelof imperialhistorywas reached,
thedocumentsofWesternarchivesand theworkofEuropeanscholars
ruledan organization of data thatpivotedon thefamousgalleyclash
at Lepanto.9 Forcedto generalizeon theresultsoftheHolyLeague's
mission,Braudelacceptedthe idea thatthe victoryended Christian
feelingsof inferiorityin theirrelationswiththe Turks and thatthe
navalset-back,althoughnotthedirectcause,begantheage ofTurkish
naval decline.10 Yet, havingadoptedthegeneralviewpointused by
diplomaticand militaryhistorians,Braudelended his discussionof
Lepanto's impact on Mediterraneanhistorywonderingwhether
historiansofthefuturewouldmakebettersenseofthisevent. Later
on in hishistory,he singledouttwoimportant imperialactionsduring
the post-Lepantoera thathad not receivedproperattention. First,
the deathof the Portugueseking,Don Sebastian,and the defeatof
his armyat Alcazarin Morocco duringthe summerof 1578 was an
affairof greatconsequence. Second,the Ottoman-Spanish truceof
1580appearsas an isolatedfact,which,withoutlinkageto a chainof
" The boundaries of Ottoman power in the sixteenthcenturyare outlined in
Kocnigsberger, Europe, pp. 191-6. Braudel, La Mdditerrande,ii, p. 429,
discusses the decline of the Ottoman navy.
1Braudel, op. cit., i, pp. 124-6, 2o6-IO, 341-3, 483-7; ii, pp. 39-46, 213-20,
are a few examples of the limits affectinggreat state activities during the
sixteenthcentury.
910Ibid., ii, part iii, pp. 225-514.
Ibid., ii, pp. 396-8, 429.

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56 PAST AND PRESENT NUMBER 57

historicaldevelopments,remainsimcomprehensible."Yet taken
altogether,theworkofBraudeldoesnotsubstantially alterthepicture
of previousimperialhistories. Lepanto markeda turningpoint,in
one formor another,thatfeaturedan improvement in the position
of the westernside in the old war betweenMuslim and Christian
civilizations.
The sense of caution conveyedby Braudel's researchis surely
rootedin thecharacterof thefocaleventforhis imperialhistoryand
in the complexionof the documentsupon whichmoderngeneraliza-
tionsoverthe lifeof the Holy League are based. Imperialhistory
organizedaboutthebattleof Lepantoinvolvesthe interaction of two
civilizations. But whenthesourcesforhistorical judgements this
on
Mediterranean eventare marchedin frontof the reader,fewdocu-
mentsspeak forthe Muslim side.12 Thus the problemof how to
writea Mediterranean historyof the eventssurrounding thisbloody
action that would considerthe vastlydifferent viewpoints- ones
legitimizedby religion- of the two greatsocietieson this battle
couldbe postponeduntilrecently bytheabsenceofinformation from
the Ottomanside.
As the thousandsof entriesand reportscontainedin Ottoman
recordsfor the actionssurroundingthe battle of Lepanto slowly
reveal theirsecretsnow that the Turkisharchivesare open, the
clash betweenthe new information and past researchquicklyforces
a reconsideration of sixteenth-century history. Foremostamong
the challengesto old ideas is the importancegiven by Ottoman
documentsto the imperial war for North Africa. During the
centuriesin whichmostof the Maghribcame underthe rule of the
Ottomanempire,Westernhistorianshave largelyconcentrated their
attentionon theOttomanfrontier in theBalkanswhiledescribing the
relationshipbetweenIstanbuland NorthAfricaas one of extreme
decentralization.The regenciesof Algeria,Tunisia and Tripolitania
weresemi-autonomous, relatively
unimportant zones on the edge of
the Ottoman empire where the chief militaryactions involved

11 Ibid., ii, p. 462.

12 The two worksused by most European scholarsare Josephvon Hammer-
Purgstall's, Geschichtedes OsmanischenReiches(Pest, 1827-35), which is based
on a limiteduse of Ottomanmanuscripts,and the partialtranslation- up to the
last quarterof the sixteenthcentury- of Hajji Khalfa's (Katib Qelebi's) history
of the Ottoman navy: Hajji Khalfa, Historyof theMaritime Wars of the Turks,
trans. JamesMitchell (London, I831). There is no studyin Modern Turkish
of eitherSelim II's (1566-74) or Murad III's (1574-95) reignthat makes use of
the Ottoman archives.

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 THE BATTLE OF LEPANTO 57

corsairs.13 But the archivalrecordsof the Ottomanempiredo not

sustain any such point of view. Rather,vizierialnotebooks,the
"Miihimmedefterleri",14 documentanotherIslamic thrusttowards
Iberiaas theOttomansattempted undertheirrule,the
to restructure,
morethansevencenturiesof culturalunitylinkingSpain and North
Africato theheartlandoftheMuslimcommunity in theeast. Small
wonderthatthe Spanish negotiators, in conferencesleadingto the
Holy League agreements, took the Turkishthreatin NorthAfrica
seriously.
Long beforethe reign of Philip II, the Ottomanshad made
preparationsfor an imperial expansioninto the regions of the
westernMediterranean.Alreadya maritimepowerin the reignof
Mehmet the Conqueror (1451-81), the Turks began their naval
actionsin the westernMediterranean basin duringthe sultanateof
Bayezit II (I45I-I512). Responding to an appeal for aid from the
Muslims of Granada,BayezitII outfitted a corsairsquadronunder
the commandof Kemal Reis foroperationsin Iberianwaters. Not
onlydid Kemal Reis subsequently establishcontactwiththe Spanish
Muslims but his expeditionsalso producedthe nauticalgeography
of Piri Reis. When presentedto Ottomanrulers followingthe
conquestof Egyptin 1517,thismanuscript gave the Turkishsultans
detailedinformation about the entireMediterraneancoastlineand
the maritimeregionsvisitedby Iberian sailors in both the New
Worldand the East.'5
Ottoman imperialactivitywithinNorth Africastartedshortly
afterthe seizure of Egypt when Selim the Grim (i515-20) sent
militaryunits westwardas far as the borders of Tunisia.e6 In

13H. A. R. Gibb and Harold Bowen, Islamic Societyand theWest: A Studyof

the Impact of WesternCivilization on Modern Culturein the Near East, vol. i
in 2 parts, Islamic Society in the EighteenthCentury(London, 1950-7), i
(I),
pp. 25, 16o-I; Dorothy Vaughan, Europe and the Turk: A Patternof Alliances,
1350-18oo (Liverpool, 1954), PP. 157-68.
14 The Miihimmedefterleri are catalogued in the KmrnilKepeci collection of
the Ba? Vekalet Argivi(the State Archive in Istanbul). HereafterMD is the
abbreviationused forthese notebooks. The numbersand lettersafterMD refer
to the place of the registerin the series, the page number of the citation,the
number of the command to the Ottoman officialbeing addressed, and the
Muslim and Christiandates forthe order. Furtherreferencesconcerningthe
importance of these notebooks and my system of citation are in
Andrew C. Hess, "The Moriscos: An Ottoman Fifth Column in Sixteenth
Century Spain", Amer. Hist. Rev., lxxiv (1968), pp. 1-25.
15An outline of Ottoman naval history up to the first quarter of the
sixteenth century is in Andrew C. Hess, "The Evolution of the Ottoman
Seaborne Empire in the Age of the Oceanic Discoveries, 1453-1525", Amer.
Hist. Rev., lxxv (1970), pp. 1892-I919.
'6 Ibid., p. 1911.

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58 PAST AND PRESENT NUMBER 57

approximately the same period,Muslim corsairsfromthe eastern

Mediterranean,the Barbarossabrothers,petitionedthe Ottoman
sultan for militaryassistancein orderto protectthe privateering
bases theyhad establishedalong the coast of the CentralMaghrib.
When Stileyman the Lawgiver(1520-66)suppliedarms,ammunition
and men to thesefrontiersmen and in 1534 appointedtheirleader,
HayreddinBarbarossa,to the post of admiral,he projectedthe
boundariesof the Ottomanempireinto the westernMediterranean
basin. The expansionof the Turkishfrontier a series
precipitated
of increasingly
severefrontierbattlesbetweenthe Ottomansand the
Spanishthatonce again emphasizedthe strategicimportanceof the
narrowsbetweenSicilyand thecityofTunis: theengagements at the
Pefion of Algiers (1529), Tunis (1534, 1535), Algiers (1541), Tripoli
Bougie (I555), Gerba (1560) and Malta (1565).17
(I551),
By the end of Siileymanthe Lawgiver'sreign(1566), Ottoman
documentspreservedin Istanbulforthe provinceof Algeria"'show
a thoroughorganizationof this frontierregion by the central
administrationin Istanbul. Imperialpapers,forexample,recorded
the assignment and transferto military
menof grantsto collecttaxes
in themainagricultural regionsoftheCentralMaghrib,thedismissal
and appointment ofOttomangovernors forAlgeria,theestablishment
and organization of janissaryand cannoncorps,the adjudicationof
tax disputes,and a multitudeof othermattersnormalto a frontier
provinceunder the controlof the centralbureaucracy.19But the
17 Braudel, La Me'diterrande,
ii, p. 125.
1" The Ottomans employed the term Cezdyir-i Gharb for the nameof their
province in the Central Maghrib. I have translatedthat expressionas Algeria
without implying that the sixteenth-centuryOttoman possession resembled
modern Algeria. MD 9 77:204 Z 977/April 1570) is an example of the
Ottoman usage. (IO
19The followingimperial commands are selected examples of the Ottoman
administrativeeffortin Algeria. MD 30 208-9:489 (II RA 985/29 May 1577)
changes governors; MD 2 59:538, 543, 545-8 (8 C 963/19 Apr. 1566) assigns
life-fiefs,timars ; MD 70 210:413 (19 CA loo0/21 Feb. 1593) sets imperial
policy for the payment of salaries to militaryunits; MD 4 175:1823-4 (3 C
968/19 Feb. 1561) describes the internal administrativeorganization of the
province; MD 28 42:103 (25 B 984/18 Oct. 1576) concerns the collection of
provincial revenues for the imperial treasury in Istanbul; MD Io 181:268
(29 L 979/16 Mar. 1572) protects local religious practices; MD 7 236:655
(20 B 975/20 Jan. 1568) requires the governor of Algeria to protect the
subjects of the sultan from the exaction of illegal taxes; MD 23 121:244
(19 B 981/14 Nov. 1573) provides relief for Muslim refugees from Spain;
MD 24 82:221 (14 ZA 981/1 Mar. 1574) deals with tribal affairs; MD 58
189:496 (25 CA 993/27 Mar. 1585) condemns the unlawful manipulation of
market prices; MD 24 91-2:246 (14 Z 981/6 Apr. 1574) mobilizes regular
Ottoman militaryunits fromAlgiers, Tenks, Mosteganum, Tlemsen, Medea,
Kouko [Kabylia], Constantine,and Biskra; and MD 21 267:639 (16 Z 980/19
Apr. 1573) congratulatesthe provincial militaryclass on the constructionof
strongforts.

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 THE BATTLE OF LEPANTO 59

consolidationof an Ottomanadministration in NorthAfricaand the

economicintegration oftheMaghribintotheempirerestedupon the
abilityof the Ottomansto reachNorthAfricaby a sea routethatran
past the Spanish frontierdefencesat Malta, Sicily and Tunis (La
Goletta).20
By themid-sixteenth centurythemajoropponentsto the Ottoman
thrustintoNorthAfricahad clearlyidentified themselves. The first
threatto the sultan's new territoriesin the west came fromthe
commanding positionthe Spanishhad takenacrosstheOttomanlines
of communication betweenthe CentralMaghriband Istanbul. The
second, and less known,menace to imperialgrowtharose from
withinIslamicNorthAfricain theformofa dynasticcompetitor, the
Saadi dynastyof Morocco.
Among Muslims the Ottomanshad establishedtheir universal
claim to commandthe OrthodoxCommunityon the basis of both
success in the Holy War and the protectionof the Pilgrimageand
the Holy Citiesof Islam."2 The thrustofthe Turkishadvanceinto
NorthAfrica,therefore, quicklyproducedan alliancebetweenthe
Ottomans,the Holy War advocatesamongMaghribians,the corsairs
alongtheNorthAfricancoast,and theMuslimrefugeeswhohad fled
Spain duringand afterthe Christianreconquest. But the loyaltyof
thisNorthAfricanwarpartyto alienTurkishleadersdependedupon
themilitary successofthe Ottomansand thereligiousprestigeof the
Istanbul sultanate. When the Saadis, an Arab dynastybased in
southernMorocco,launcheda counter-claim to rulein NorthAfrica
whichrestedon theirreligiousprestigeas membersof theProphet's
familyand on theirvigorouspursuitof the Holy War againstthe
Portuguese,22 theyconfronted the Ottomanswitha seriouspolitical
challengein a regionoftheIslamicworldwhere,as in thecase ofthe
Arab Hafsid rulersof Tunis,23there were still alternativesto a
Turkishconquest. Moreover,theSaadis did nothesitateto confront
2o Francisco-Felipe Olesa Mufiido, La Organizaci6n Naval de los Estados
Mediterraneos y en Especial de Espahia durantelos Siglos XVI y XVII (Madrid,
1968), i, pp. 6i, III-12, 126.
21 The implicationsof Ottoman religious
policy after 1517 are developed in
Halil Inalcik, "Les peuples de l'Europe du sud-est et leur r6le dans l'Histoire:
l'empire ottoman", in 1Pditions de L'Acadimie Bulgare des Sciences(Sofia, 1969),
iii, pp. 88-94.
22 The rise of the Saadi
dynastyis the subject of Diego de Torres, Relacidn
del Origeny Sucesso de los Xarifes... (Seville, 1586), pp.
23 On the beginning of the Saadi-Ottoman conflict7-27. see August Cour,
L'detablissement des dynastiesdes Chlrifsau Maroc et leurrivalitj avec les Turcsde
la rigenced'Alger (50o9-1830) (Paris, 1904). For the r6le of the Iafsid dynasty
in the imperial competitionbetween the Ottomans and Habsburgs see Hess,
"Moriscos", pp. 9-13-

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60 PAST AND PRESENT NUMBER 57

the Ottomanson the battlefield, layingsiege to the bordercityof

Tlemcen at mid-century.Since the historyof the Islamic world
containsamplewarningsof how dangerousit is to permittheriseof
a competitivepoliticalgroup with a militantreligiousclaim on a
distant frontier,24the Ottoman-Moroccanconvergencequickly
escalatedinto a borderconflictwithwide politicalimplications for
Turkishrulein NorthAfrica.
The Saadis, however,could notmatchthecapacityofthe Spanish
to wage imperialwarfare. In NorthAfrica,as in the Balkans,the
Habsburgdynastybecamethemainopponentto Ottomanexpansion
duringthesixteenth century. Yet, likethePortuguese,the Spanish
had adopted a defensivestrategyfor theirNorth Africanborder.
Selecting other imperial alternativesthan the conquest of the
mountainousand solidly Islamic Maghrib, the Spanish erected
a seriesof fortifiedposts along the coast of NorthAfrica,Melilla
(I497), Mazalquivir (1505), Pefionde Velez (1508), Oran (1509),
Pefionde Argel (15Io), Bougie (151o), Tripoli (I5Io), La Goletta
(1535), whiletheyslowlyexpelled,convertedor neutralizedthe old
Muslimpopulationof Spain. Whenthe Ottomansestablishedtheir
positionin Algeriaand Tripolitaniaafterthe conquestof Egyptin
1517,the SpanishcounteredtheMuslimadvanceby expandingtheir
naval forcesin the Mediterraneanand by designatingSicily and
Naplesas theborderprovinceswhoseprimetaskwasto blockTurkish
expansionintothewesternMediterranean.In frontof theseNorth
Africanand Italian bases, Charles V also emplaced his border
warriors,the Knightsof St. John,at Malta and Tripoli in 1530.
Meanwhile,withinNorthAfrica,the emperor'sagentseverywhere
supportedthe Maghribianopposition,such as the IHafsidsultanof
Tunis, to Turkishimperialism.25Thus, theseigeof Malta in 1565,
which seemed to tarnishthe militaryreputationof the Ottomans
duringthelastyearsof Siileyman'sreign,waspartofa welldeveloped
frontierconflictthatunderscored a half-centuryof Ottomanpressure
on thedefensivenetwork ofthe Spanishand thestrategicimportance
forbothempiresof Tunis.26
24 Ibn Khaldun, The Muqaddimah, trans. Franz Rosenthal, 2nd edn.
(Princeton, 1967), i, pp. 313-36.
25
Archivo General de Simancas in Spain, Estado series, legajo (hereafter
cited as Sim. E) 461, fo. 32, 20 July1529; and 479, fo. I15, I Mar. 1555 are two
among many proposals for turning the political leaders from the Maghrib
againstthe Turks. For a discussionof Spanish policy on this point see Mufiido,
Organizaci6n,i, pp. 122, 126-8; ii, 939-88, 1078-88.
26 erafettinTuran, "Rodos'un Zaptindan Malta Muhasarasina [From the
Conquest of Rhodes to the Siege of Malta]", in Kanuni Armaganz[Siileymanthe
Lawgiver's CommemorativeVolume] (Ankara, I970), pp. 47-117, describeswhy
the siege failedand how the Ottomannavy quicklyrecoveredits strength.

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 THE BATTLE OF LEPANTO 6I

The accession of Selim II in 1566 in no way diminishedthe

intentionof the Ottomansto expand into the westernbasin of the
Mediterranean.Two yearsafterSelim assumedleadershipof the
Ottomanempire,theTurksescalatedtheirpoliticalstrugglewiththe
Saadi dynastyofMorocco- a matteraboutwhichthe Spanishwere
well informed27 - by installingopponentsof the reigningsultan,
'Abdullah al-Ghllib (i557-74), in Ottomanfortsnear the Saadi
frontier.8 In the same period, Muslims in Spain petitionedthe
Ottomansultanforaid againstthe anti-Islamicpoliciesof PhilipII.
In keepingwiththeOttomanclaimto protecttheMuslimcommunity,
Selim II respondedto the Spanish-Muslimappeal, orderingthe
governorofAlgeriato supplyarms,ammunition and mento Muslim
rebelsin Iberia. At this point,however,the realitiesof sixteenth-
centurywarfareand the revivalof Red Sea tradedictatedthe more
modestconquestof Cyprusratherthanan imperialcampaignin the
western Mediterranean. Selim II, nevertheless,informedthe
Muslims in Spain that once the infidelpossessionwas taken,he
wouldsend an Ottomanarmadato aid the Islamiccommunity in the
west. But as the units of the fleetgatheredfor the conquestof
Cyprus,a Moriscorebellionbrokeout in Alpujarras(I568), forcing
Philip II to send militaryunits fromItaly to Spain in order to
suppressanotherinternalrevolt. Whilethe OttomanstookCyprus
in 1570-1,Don JuancrushedtheMoriscorebellionin Spain,causing
moreMuslimmigrations to NorthAfrica,and theOttomangovernor
of Algeriacontinuedthe process of straightening the frontiers by
takingthe cityof Tunis, but not the Spanishfortat La Goletta,in
1569. 29
In thespringof 1570theOttomanfleetcarriedthefirstunitsofan
expeditionary forcesouthtowardstheislandof Cyprus. Continuing
the conquestof thecoastsand islandsoverlooking thetradingroutes
in the easternMediterranean, the Ottomaninvasionof the Venetian
possessionin 1570 roughlycoincidedwiththe rebellionand defeat
of the Moriscos in Spain (1568-70), the consolidationof Ottoman
power south of Sicily (1569), the elevationof the crusadingPope
Pius V (1566), and the temporarypacificationof the Protestant
21
Torres, Relaci6n, pp. 482-5.
as The administrativearrangementsestablishingthe opponents of the Saadi
sultan in the Taza and Tlemsen forts are in MD 7 898:2460, 899:2461-2,
906:2481, all dated between 18-22 CA 976/8-12 Oct. 1568. Spanish sources
confirmthese actions: Sim. E 485, no. fo. no., "Relaci6n del Alferez Diego de
Esquilla de Cosas de Berberia", no date, but from internalevidence, it was
probably
21
composed between 1574 and 1576.
Hess, "Moriscos", pp. 15-25.

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62 PAST AND PRESENT NUMBER 57

rebellion in the Low Countries (1567). Three Mediterranean

powers,therefore, had ample reasonto supportjointactionagainst
Turkish aggression. The record of how their combined efforts
overcamethe different interestsamong them is the well-known
diplomatic historythatforeshadowed thecreationoftheHolyLeague.
In the galleybattlefoughtat Lepanto duringthe fallof 1571 the
Ottomanssuffereda naval disaster. Yet the resultsof military
operationsbetween1569and 1571improvedthestrategic positionof
the Turks. The soldiers of Selim II cleared the south-eastern
Mediterraneanof the Christianstrongholdat Cyprus,improving
their controlover the Levant. Equally, the frontiersmen of the
Ottomansconsolidatedthe positionof the sultanin North Africa
withtheconquestof Tunis latein 1569. On thenegativeside,how-
ever,two-thirds of the imperialfleetalongwithits manpowereither
restedon the bottomof the sea or floatedin infidelports,a major
blow to the prestigeand powerof a Muslim leader whose politics
stoodon his successin theHoly War. But Ottomansourcesgiveno
indicationthat the sultan's naval difficultiesconstituteda turning
pointin eitherOttomanself-confidence or navalhistory;rather,in his
correspondence with otherMuslims,the sultan displayeda sober
resolveto continuein thefaceof adversity. Citing[sfiraii.] 216. of
theKoran,"But it mayhappenthatye hatea thingwhichis goodfor
you",30Selim II acknowledged negligenceand promisedto revenge
the defeatat Lepanto withthe conquestof Christianfortsin the
west.
In orderto fulfilhis pledge, Selim II set about rebuildingthe
shatteredOttomannavy. With extraordinary speed, the Ottoman
statedemonstrated boththesufficiency of its navalresourcesand the
effectivenessof its bureaucracythroughthe reconstruction of its
fleetwithintwoyearsof thebattleof Lepanto. Impressivealso was
the speed withwhichthe Turks wereable to restaff theirnavywith
experiencedseamen. Fortunately fortheOttomans,thenavallosses
in 1571 did not includethe galleyunitsfromNorthAfrica. Under
the commandof the old governorof Algeriaand now admiral,Kilih
Ali Maghribiansailorsand ships formeda nucleusfora new
Papa,
Ottoman fleet.31
30
Ahmet Feridun Bey, Miinja'at-us-Salatin [Writsof the Sultans] (Istanbul,
1858), ii, p. 551.
31Mustafa Selaniki, Tarih-i Selaniki [Selaniki's History] (Istanbul, 1863),
p. Io9; Peqevi, Tarih, i, pp. 498-500. The shiftof experiencedcorsaircaptains
fromNorth Africato Istanbul afterthe battle of Lepanto is recordedin "Rufis
Defterleri-RD", Ba? Vekilet Argivi[State Archives in Istanbul], Kimil Kepeci
collection,RD 225 pp. 46-7, 79, 95, I12, 288-9, 330, all forthe year 1572.

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 THE BATTLE OF LEPANTO 63

Betweenthe battleof Lepanto and the end of the year 1573 the
Christiancoalitionfellapartand the Ottomanempirerecoveredits
naval strength. What caused the Venetians to desertthe Holy
League is now fairlywell known. But if the Venetiansacted to
preservetheirplace as a commercialstatewithimportant Levantine
the Spanishequallyhad to defendtheirfrontlinesfromthe
interests,
anticipatedcounter-attackoftheTurks. In 1573Don Juan,therefore,
bolsteredthecentralMediterranean withthereconquestand
frontier
of Tunis. Althoughoftendepictedas an act motivated
fortification
by the personalconcernsof Don Juan,the defenceof Tunis in 1573
clearlyfalls withinthe patternof warfarethat characterizedthe
sixteenth-century Ottoman-Habsburg frontier.32
For the Ottomansthissame periodsaw a burstofactivityat many
levels. Dispatchingmessengers to NorthAfrica,the sultanordered
thecorsairsto attackSpanishshippingwherever it was encountered."
Meanwhile,Ottomanambassadorscalled upon the Muslim com-
munityof NorthAfricato armthemselvesforthe Holy War against
the Christians." At the heartof the empire,Ottomanshipyards
workedat fullcapacityas thenewadmiral,Kili Ali Papa,broughtthe
fleetbackto old levelsbythesummerof 1573. Sometimelatein that
sameyeartheviziersmadethedecision,afterhearingthenewsofthe
Habsburgactionsat Tunis,to recapturethedirectionofpoliticaland
militaryaffairsin the westernregionof the Mediterranean withan
attack on Tunis.35 To accomplish their object the Ottomans
assembledthe militaryresourcesof an enormousempire,drawing
oarsmen,sailors,soldiersand suppliesfromregionsas farapartas
NorthAfrica,the Balkans,Black Sea shores,and easternAnatolia.36

3" Braudel, La Mdditerrande, ii, pp. 417-30, rejects personal ambition as the
decisive factorin Don Juan's refortification of Tunis in 1573. For a list of the
strategic reasons why Don Juan's advisers thought it was necessary to
strengthenLa Goletta see Sim. E 487, no fo. no., 18 Oct. 1573.
33 MD 24 72:198 (5 Z 981/28 Mar. 1574); MD 24 82:222 (14 Z 981/6 Apr.
1574).
"4 MD 22 136:273 (15 RA 981/15July1573); MD 22 332:656 (15 CA 981/12
Sept. 1573); MD 23 292:633 (18 L 981/Io Feb. 1574); MD 24 59:166 (5 Z
981/28 Mar. 1574).
3" Sim. E 1332, fo. 155, 12 May 1573 reports the issuance of the sultan's
order fora fleetof three hundred galleysto take La Goletta. MD 23 300:658
(18 L 981/Io Feb. 1574) informedthe governorof Algeria that the imperial
fleetwould reach Tunis during the summer of 1574.
:3 The mobilizationorders forthe Tunis campaign are contained in MD 24.
The multiple entriesdated fromthe end of February 1574 to the beginningof
April 1574 list the principalneeds of the expeditionaryforce:troops,supplies -
especially powder and hard biscuit - and rowers. An example is MD 24
1:2 (I6 ZA 981/9Mar. 1574), which orders 3,000 kantars(a weightof about 120
pounds) of powder fromthe governorof Buda.

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64 PAST AND PRESENT NUMBER 57

HoweverOttomanactivitybetweenI568 and 1574 mightappear

in Westernhistories, Turkishsourcestimeand timeagainemphasize
the importanceof the 1574 Tunis campaign. Ottomanleaders,like
theirHabsburgcounterparts, knewthe dangersattachedto distant
naval campaigns. To directthe movementof a largegalleyfleetso
soon aftertheloss at Lepantoovera greatdistanceintoan area close
to the land strongholds of the Habsburgempirewas an ambitious
undertaking.No-one in the sixteenthcenturycommandedthe sea
spaces and, as one maritimedisasterafteranotherproved,heavily
loaded galleysfloundered easilyin sudden Mediterraneanstorms.37
Not onlydid the sultanriskthe military powerof his empirefor
the conquest of Tunis, but the Ottoman ruler also mobilized
internationalpolitics to assist westernexpansion. Informedof
Europeanaffairs throughintelligence fromthe westernfrontier and
throughthe commercialconnectionsof the Merranocommunity in
Istanbulwhoseleader,Don JosephNassi,advisedSelimII, thesultan
dispatchedimperialordersdesignedto createan anti-Spanishrevolu-
tionarycoalitionbetweenProtestant rebelsin theLow Countriesand
the remnantsof the Morisco community in Spain. The degreeto
whichtheattemptoftheOttomanagentsaffected thedefensiveplans
of the Spanishduringthe summerof 1574 is not yetknown. But
PhilipII, whosefrontier problemswereextraordinarilycomplicated,
appreciatedthe gravedangersuch a wide alliancecould hold forhis
state.38
During the summerof 1574, the Ottomanscarriedout their
militarypromise,placingin frontof the Spanishoutpostssouthof
Sicilya fleetlargerthan that used by eitherside at the battleof
did
Lepanto.39 Philip II, on the eve of the 1575 statebankruptcy,
31 Comparing theOttomanmobilization forthereconquestofTunisin 1574
withtheinformation in the MD forthePersiancampaignof 1578registered
in MD 38,39 and40,showsthatthenavalexpedition wasthemoreextensive of
thetwooperations.
38Hess, "Moriscos",pp. 1-25. For evidenceoftheMoriscointerest in the
progress oftheOttomans see L. P. Harvey,"A MoriscoReaderofJeanLemaire
de Belges?",Al-Andalus, xxviii(1963),pp. 23I-6. On thereplyoftherebels
in the Low Countriesto Ottomanproposalssee Sim. E Io8I, fo. 94, whichis
a summary of lettersfromGiovanniMargliani,PhilipII's agentin Istanbul,
to theviceroy of Naples betweenthe 4th and 15thof June1580 in whichhe
reportedon the knowledgein Istanbulthatan agentof Williamof Orange,
who was carrying a largesum of money,had died suddenlyin Venice.
39Ktib Qelebi,Tuhfet-ul-Kibar fi Esfaril Bihar[thecompleteOttomantext
ofHajji Khalfa'sHistory oftheMaritimeWarsoftheTurks](Istanbul,1728-9),
fo.45a lists298 shipsand48,000rowers. Braudel,La Mdditerrange, ii,pp. 395,
425-7,givestwo figuresthatrangefrom230 galleysand smallvesselsto 247
galleys plus other ships. R. C. Anderson,Naval Wars in the Levant
(Liverpool,1952), p. 56,describestheOttomanfleetas consisting of280 galleys,
(cont.onp. 65)

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 THE BATTLE OF LEPANTO 65

notmakea navalresponseto thecostlygambleoftheOttomans. By

the end of the summerthe siege equipmentof the sultan had
accomplishedits work,allowingOttomantroopsto raze the Spanish
fortsguardingthenarrowsbetweenSicilyand NorthAfrica.40
For theimperialpositionofthe Ottomansin theIslamicworldthe
victoryat Tunis had importantconsequences. The sultanrestored
whatevermilitaryprestigehe had lost with a resoundingvictory,
which was celebrated Ottoman style, in a long, elegant and
poem.4' In additionthe Turkish administration
difficult-to-read
noworganizedall ofNorthAfricaexceptforwesternregions. There,
with imperialmomentumreestablished,the sultan proceeded to
remove the Moroccan challenge to Ottoman predominance.
Followingthe Spanish defeatin 1574, the viziersof Murad III
selectedone ofthemembersofthe Saadi family,'Abd al-Malik,who
had been exiledfromMoroccoand who had foughtin the Ottoman
armyat Tunis,as theOttomancandidateto unseatthereigningSaadi
sultan,Muhammadal-Mutawakkil." To assisthim in an invasion
of Morocco,the sultanorderedthe governorof Algeriato supply
thenecessaryarms,ammunition, and men. Supportedbyjanissaries
and cannoneersfromAlgeria,thecombinedforcesof the Ottomans
and 'Abd al-Malik took the city of Fez in 1576 and drove the
Moroccan sultan, Muhammad al-Mutawakkil,fromhis throne.43
'Abd al-Malikthenassumedruleof Moroccoas a clientofthe Otto-
mans, having,accordingto the governorof Algeria,the name of
Murad III read in the Fridayprayerand placed on the coinage.44
Unlikethehistory oftheHoly League afterthebattleofLepanto,the

(note39 cont.)
15 galeases,15 galeots,19 sailingvessels,and 70,000troops. In Marchof 1574
thesultanpromisedtheOttomangovernor of Tunisiathata fleetof 300 ships
would attackthe Spanishfortsat Tunis: MD 24 59:166 (5 Z 981/28Mar.
1574). Sim.E 1333,fos.161,162,163,datedfrom17February to 2 May 1574,
all estimatethesizeoftheOttomanarmadaforthatsummerat over300units.
40 The firstnewsof theTunis victoryin the MD is MD 26 287:832 (I5 B
982/13Oct. 1574). Returning to Istanbulon 15 November1574 according
La
to Braudel, Mdditerrande, ii, p. 427, the Ottoman naval campaignclearly
exceededtheperiodofsafenavalactivity in theMediterranean: fromthemiddle
of Marchto themiddleof October.
41 In MustafdBey (Rfimfizi), "Tirih-i fetih-iYemen", Topkapi Sarayi
Library, MS. 698 R I297, fos. 18Ib-205a.
42 Miineccimbagi, Saha'if-ul-ahbar
[The Recordsof Histories],Turkish
trans. by Ahmet Nedim (Istanbul, 1868-9), iii, pp. 271-2.
43 Muhammad al 'Ufrani, Nozhet El-Hadi: Histoirede la dynastieSaadienne

au Maroc(1511-1670),ed. andtransbyO. V. Houdas(Paris,1889),p. 109.

44 MZD 3 204-5 (I3 R 984/0I July 1576). MZD are the MtihimmeZeyli
whichare held in the Ba? VekiletArgiviin Istanbul,Kamil Kepeci
defterleri
collection.

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66 PAST AND PRESENT NUMBER 57

Ottomanshad exploitedtheirmilitary victoryat Tunis to carrythe

empire to the doorstepof Iberia.
Withthe symbolsof Turkishpowerannouncedin Morocco,the
Portuguese,old enemiesof the Ottomansin Indian Ocean regions,
had one morereasonto strikeback at theirmainMuslimopponent.
Alreadyexperiencingeconomicdifficulty due to the size of their
empireand to the strainof competingwiththe Ottomansin places
as faroffas Sumatra,the Portuguesecould hardlyignorethe new
Turkishthreatnot onlyto theirwest Africanoutpostsbut also to
theirnavallinesofcommunication in theAtlanticOcean.45 Although
thereis overwhelming evidencethatcrusadingattitudes influencedthe
subsequentPortuguesedecisionto invadeMoroccoin thesummerof
1578,thenew information fromthe Turkisharchivessuggestsother,
morerational, considerationsforDon Sebastian'sill-fated
expedition.46
While the king of Portugalelectedto continuethe war against
Islam, Philip II adopted the opposite policytowardsthe Turk.
Followingthe Ottomanvictoryat Tunis in 1574 and the state
bankruptcy of 1575,PhilipII made a dramaticnew effort to resolve
the manifoldpressuresbearingon his enormousempire. Sensing
thatthe Turk had reachedthe limitof his abilityto expandin the
west,47theHabsburgrulerlaunchedanothersecretattemptto secure
a treatywiththeOttomans;at thesametimea successioncrisisbroke
out amongtheheirsto the Safavidstatein Persia."8 As theimperial
4" Guzmin de Silva, the Spanish ambassador in Venice, wrote to Philip II
in Sim. 1335, fo. 6o on 23 May 1576 and reported how pleased the Venetians
would be over an Ottoman conquest of Morocco since this act would give
Muslim shippinga base fromwhichtheycould attackIberian trade and thereby
restoreVenice to its grand position. Philip II commentedas follows: "If this
were so, it would be important... ." For the problems the Portuguese had
with the Ottoman empire in the east see Vitorino Magalhdes-Godinho,
L'iconomiede l'empireportugaisaux XVe et XVIe sidcles(Paris, 1969), pp. 573-4,
630-I, 713-834; C. R. Boxer, "Portugueseand Spanish Projectsforthe Conquest
of Southeast Asia I580-I6oo", Ji. of Asian History,iii (2) (1969), pp. 118-36;
C. R. Boxer, "A Note on Portuguese Reactions to the Revival of the Red Sea
Spice Trade and the Rise of Acheh, 1540-1600", Ji. of SoutheastAsian History,
x (3) (1969), pp. 415-28. Ottoman ordersdispatchingnaval forcesand cannon
mastersto Acheh are in MD 7, especially90:244 (15 RA 975/19 Sept. 1567).
48 Don Juan de Silva wrote to Philip II from Lisbon concerning the
Portuguese ruler's plan to invade Morocco in order to stop Turkish expansion
in North Africa: Sim. E 396, fos. 20-23, end of Feb. 1578. But Queiroz
Velloso, D. Sebastiao 1554-1578, 3rd edn. (Lisbon, 1945), pp. 89-123, 248-58,
290-4, 331, places emphasis on the crusading motive as the reason for the
Moroccan campaign.
47 GeoffreyParker, "Spain, Her Enemies and the Netherlands 1559-1648",
Past and Present,no. 49 (Nov. 1970), pp. 82-95.
48 Sim. E 393, fo.
49, 7 June 1576 alerted Philip II to the Ottoman interest
in this importantevent. Braudel, La Miditerrande,ii, pp. 431-68, covers the
negotiationsin detail.

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 THE BATTLE OF LEPANTO 67

opponentof the Ottomansin the east lost politicalcohesion,the

Portugueseking,in alliance with the deposed ruler of the Saadi
dynasty,Muhammad al-Mutawakkil,requestedmilitaryaid from
Spain in orderto attackthe Moroccan protegeof the Ottomans,
'Abd al-Malik. PhilipII thenfoundhimselfin the difficult position
of conductingsecretnegotiationswiththe enemyof the Faith while
beingpetitionedto carryon his r81eas a defenderof Christendom.
By Februaryof 1578 Don Sebastianhad learnedof the diplomatic
contactsbetweenthe Turks and the agentsof Philip II in Istanbul.
Demandingto be includedin thenegotiations so as to ensurethatno
aid fromthe Ottomanswould reach his Moroccan opponent,the
Portugueseleader added one more elementto a complexnetwork
of imperialinterestsreachingwell beyond the boundariesof the
Mediterranean.Pressed by his Portuguese relative, Philip II
discouragedthe invasion of Morocco while he reassured Don
Sebastianof his controlover the Istanbul negotiations.Persisting,
however,in his plan to invadeMorocco,thekingof Portugalobliged
PhilipII to providehimwithmenand ships.49 Meanwhile,Ottoman
scribes recorded,in February 1578, the coming and going at
Istanbul of the Spanish ambassadorswho were involvedin peace
negotiations.50 Simultaneously,the sultan'sofficialsreceivedintel-
ligence from North Africa concerning the invasion plans of the
Portuguese.51Warninghis governorof Algeriato armborderunits
and to support'Abd al-Malik,Murad III waitedforthe outcomeof
the impendingfrontierclash before settlingwith Philip II's
representatives.6a
battle of Alcazar took place in Morocco on
The extraordinary
4 August1578. As thougha completedestruction ofold relationsin
Africawas somehownecessary,the encounterat Alcazar
north-west

49 Sim. E 395, fo. 244, 15 July 1579; E 395, fo. 254, 15 Aug. 1578; E 396,
fos. 20-3, end of Feb. 1578: E 396, fo. 67, 8 June 1578. J. F. Conestaggio,
The Historieof the Unitingof the Kingdomof Portugallto the Crownof Castill,
trans. Edward Blount (?) (London, 16oo), pp. 15-25, describes the Spanish
position. E. W. Bovill, The Battle of Alcazar (London, 1952) gives a good
account of the European militarypreparations.
50From the Ottoman side the MD entriesconcerningthe peace negotiations
with Spain begin in 1578: MD 33 275: 559-60 (27 ZA 985/5 Feb. 1578),
whichare ordersto send the Spanish ambassadorsCevdniIstefinfi- see Braudel,
La Mediterrande,ii, p. 444 - and Cevin Vardis (?) to Istanbul.
51MD 35 189:475 (2 R 986/4 Sept. 1578). This is the reply of the
sultan afterhe had received the informationfromNorth Africa. The date of
the entryin the MD is one month afterthe battle of Alcazar.
52 An Ottoman
entry specificallymentioning peace negotiations appears
approximatelyone year afterthe battle of Alcazar: MD 40 126:276 (27 CA
987/22 July1579).

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68 PAST AND PRESENT NUMBER 57

betweentheMoroccanand Portuguesearmiesleftall threecontenders

fortherulingpositionin Moroccodead on thebattlefield: thesultan
of Morocco,'Abd al-Malik,his opponent,the deposedMuhlammad
al-Mutawwakkil, and the king of Portugal,Don Sebastian. The
resultof the military action,however,was muchless equitable. At
the close of combaton the fourthof August,Muslim troopshad
completelydefeatedthe Portuguesearmy,havingkilledor captured
a substantialportionof the Portuguesearistocracy.In contrastto
thedifficultpoliticalhistory Portugalafterthedeath
thatwouldafflict
oftheirkingat Alcazar,thisdefinite Muslimvictoryquicklyresulted
in thetriumphant accessionof Ahmadal-Mansfir,thebrotherofthe
dead 'Abd al-Malik,as the reigningSaadi sultan.53
The Portuguesedisasterat Alcazartriggereda revolutionin the
sixteenth-century imperialhistoryof the Mediterranean. Spain, in
opposition to her reactionduringthe Muslim militarymovements
in 1568-70,did not intervenein Morocco upon the news of the
Portuguesedefeat but continuedto negotiatewith the Turks.
Meanwhile,the Ottomans,having learned about the Portuguese
disasterand the weakand scatteredstateof the Muslimcommunity
in Spain fromtheirfrontier commanderin Algeria,reversedtheir
directionof expansion,dispatchingtroopsand suppliestowardsthe
Persianfrontier in the summerof 1578.54 Duringthissame period
the sultan of Moroccosignalledhis desireto maintaina degreeof
independencebetweentwo empiresby simultaneously welcoming
Ottomanand Spanish ambassadors."5 Finally, in August 158o,
scribescopied into theirvizierialnotebooksan agreementbetween
the Ottomanand Habsburgempiresto end almosta centuryofgreat
wars. For such a turningpoint in Mediterraneanhistory,the
Ottomanbureaucracyoughtto speakforitself.
The ImperialLetterto Spain that...
Yourambassador whois currentlyatourimperialcourtsubmitteda petition
to ourthroneofdignityand royalhomeofjustice. Our exaltedthreshold of
ourimperialcourtofomnipotent
thecentreofgreatness, poweris indeedthe
ofcommanding
sanctuary sultansand thestrongholdoftherulersoftheage.

63 Bovill, Alcazar,pp. 12-165.

64 Hess, "Moriscos", p. 22.
"6 Miineccimbali, Saha'if, iii, pp. 263-4, describes the Spanish and Ottoman
struggleto establishinfluenceat the court of the Saadi sultan. MD 42 84:347
and 86:352 (beginning R 989/1 Aug. 1581) cautions the governorof Algeria
not to trustthe Moroccan ruler even though he paid homage and gave gifts
to the Ottoman sultan. Meanwhile Giovanni Margliani wrote from Istanbul
that the uncertainposition of Morocco would constitutea block to the peace
negotiations:Sim. E 1079, fo. 68, 8 Apr. 1579; and io8o, fo. 28, 24 Mar. 1579.

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 THE BATTLE OF LEPANTO 69

A petitionof friendshipand devotioncame fromyour side. For the safety

and securityof state and the affluenceand tranquilityof subjects,you wished
friendshipwith our home of majestic greatness. In orderto arrangea struc-
ture forpeace and to set up conditionsfora treaty,our justice-ladenimperial
agreement was issued on these matters. Also, regarding whatever was
writtenand described in detail, our noble knowledge and world-inclusive
sovereigntycomprehendedand included all of it.
Now our world-inclusivethrone is indeed open and uncovered to friend
and to enemy. Those who are aiding the sincere developmentof friendship
and who are displaying homage and faithfulnesswill not be obstructed or
rejected in any way. Always their rightintentionswill be royallyrefreshed
with the [?] loftyfavours of our rulers.
Since our most pious of sultans is to be the [friendof] yourfriendsand the
enemy of your enemies, your hope which existed in this matterreceived our
imperialacceptance and our imperialletterwith the gloriousroyalmonogram
was ordered to be sent.
It is necessary.., .when it arrives,that is to say afterpetitioningto our
abode of happiness on the basis of sincerity and frankness,that your
irregularsand corsairs who are producing ugliness and wickedness on land
and sea do not harm the subjects of our protectedterritoriesand thattheybe
stopped and controlled.
On the point of faithfulnessand integritylet you be staunch and constant
and let you respect the conditions of the truce. From this side also no
situationwill come into existence at all contraryto the truce. Whether it
be our naval commanderson the sea, our volunteercaptains [corsairs]or our
commanderswho are on the frontiersof the protectedterritories,our world-
obeyed orders will be sent and damage and difficultieswill not reach your
countryor statesand the businessmenwho come fromthatarea fromany one.
In our imperialtime and at our royalabode of happinessit is indeed decided
that the prosperityof times come into being. In the same manner, if the
building of peace and prosperityand the constructionof a treaty and of
security,are your aims, withoutdelay send your man to our fortunatethrone
and make known your position. According to it our imperial treatywill
be commanded.5"

Fromtheperspective theyear1580is clearly

of diplomatichistory,
the best date for the new era in imperialrelationswithinthe
Mediterranean. Spain, turningnorth and west to engage the
Englishand theirDutch allies,seized Portugalin thatsame fateful
year. Concludingthat furtherexpansionin the west would be

5*
MD 43 177:322 (end C 988/11 Aug. 1580). This unique copy of the
imperial truce with Spain was writtento be read aloud. In several places I
have translatedthe term'ahd as treatyeven thoughthe word in English implies
a greaterbond than Islamic law permits: Muslim governmentsare theoretically
only able to sign truceswiththe infidel. These negotiationsin Istanbul during
the years 158o-i aimed at establishing a truce between the two empires as
a preliminarystep towardsthe signingof a morepermanentagreement:thetreaty
mentioned in the Ottoman letter. Whether or not the second part of the
negotiationever took place is not clear. The above letter,which verifiesthe
establishmentof the truce, is probably the diplomatic material referedto in
Margliani's letterof 7 Aug. 1580 in Sim. E 1338, fo. 39.

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70 PAST AND PRESENT NUMBER 57

unproductive, theviziersofMurad III alliedtheOttomanstatewith

Poland againstthe Russiansin I57757 and turnedOttomanpower
towardsthe Persianborderone year later. In the meantime,the
Turkishimperialists tookstepsto see thatthe longborderin North
Africaproducedno local attemptto rekindlelarge-scalewarfare, this
despite counter-advicefrom English and French ambassadors.58
BeyondthelimitsofdirectOttomanadministration, the Saadi sultan,
Ahmad al-Mansfir,again preservedthe independentcharacterof
Moroccan historyby balancingthe interestsof the great empires
againsteach otherwhileturninghis army,now well suppliedwith
munitionsfromEngland,southalong the gold and salt routesinto
sub-SaharanAfricaat the end of the century.59
Withthe tracesof Ottomanimperialism in NorthAfricaafterthe
battleofLepantonowassembled,howdo thegeneralizations covering
the greathistoryof the Mediterranean duringthe last quarterof the
sixteenthcenturychange? Certainlythe Ottomannaval defeatin
1571had impelledtheMuslimempireto recoveritsnavalpowerand
to continueitsadvanceintothewesternportionsoftheIslamicworld.
From eitherthe Christianor the Muslim pointof view,important
imperialcampaignswithfar-reaching consequencesforMediterranean
and Europeanstatestookplace afterthegalleybattleof1571. At the
level of diplomatichistory,the turningpoint in the post-Lepanto
imperialstruggleswas the battleof Alcazar,whichwas foughtin
Morocco duringthe summerof 1578. Linked to the historyof
Ottoman-Spanish warfareand diplomacy, thisnewinformation shifts
the locus of the Christian-Muslim disengagement in 1580 fromthe
easternand centralMediterranean to Moroccowherethesubsequent
diplomaticmanoeuvres ofAhlmad al-Mansfirled to theskilfulcreation
of a Muslimbuffer state. The battleof Lepanto,therefore, did not
directlyset the conditions
fortheneutralizationof the Mediterranean

57 30 July 1577: I. H. Danigmend, Isahh Osmanh Tarihi Kronologisi [A

Detailed Chronologyof Ottoman History],2nd edn. (Istanbul, 196I), iii, pp. 9-
17.
58 MD 52 227:592 (13 M 992/26 Jan. 1584) instructs the governor of
Algeria to cease war with the Saadi sultan over the oasis of Figuig which,
according to previous agreements,belonged to the Moroccan sultan. Akdes
Nimet Kurat, Tiirk-IngilizMinasebetlerininBaslangzczve Geli4mesi(1553-6z0o)
[The Beginning and Development of Turkish-English Relations] (Ankara,
1953), 75-81, 96-7, 112, 127, 143-5, 154, discusses the various English and
FrenchPp.attemptsto break the Ottoman-Habsburgpeace by using the Moriscos
in Spain or by directlyattackingthe Iberian Peninsula fromMorocco.
5 E. W. Bovill, The Golden Trade of the Moors, 2nd edn. (London, 1970),
pp. I64-2o6.

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 THE BATTLE OF LEPANTO 71

but insteadencouragedfurtherwarfareuntil the questionof who

controlledNorthAfricawas settledin favourofthe Ottomans.60
Based on theresultsofbattle,on thepublicexpressions ofjoy,and
on the sense of accomplishment containedin diplomaticcorrespon-
dence,historianshave arguedthatthe brilliantsuccessof Don Juan
in 1571removedthefeelingthattheTurkswereinvincible. Maybe
so. On theotherhand,thediplomacyofthepost-Lepantoerashows
neitherPhilipII northeleadersof Venicecomingto termswiththe
Ottomansunderfavourableconditions. Equallysubjectto question
is the implicationthat the emotional fervourof the Lepanto
celebrationsdemonstrated a new-found senseof Christiansuperiority
overthe Turk. The Christiannaval victory,as Pius V recognized,
representeda convenientmeans by which establishedinstitutions
could unifypopulationswiththe news of a victoryover a known
exteriorenemyat a timewhenEurope was passingthrougha major
religiousrevolution.61How and when European attitudestowards
theTurkchangedis a complexquestiondependingless on theresults
of one naval battleand moreon the mobilizationof intellectuals,a
matterthatsurelytakestime.
Alteringthe geographicaland temporallocationof the Ottoman-
Habsburgseparationdirectlyraisesthe issue ofthe conditionsunder
whichbothempiresbrokeoffwarfare. This question,moreover,is
not just a matterof militaryhistorynarrowlydefined,but affects
assessmentsbothof relativeimperialstrengths and of ther81eplayed
by religionin the greatpoliticsof thiscrucialperiod. Rather,for
example,thanseeingdisengagement as followinga major Christian
victory,with some qualifications, over a decliningopponent,the
addition of Ottoman data to Mediterraneanhistoryshows that
separationtookplace aftera seriesof post-LepantoMuslimvictories
culminating in the annihilation
of a crusadingarmy. In thefieldof
naval history,whatended the greatgalleybattlesforthe Ottomans
o0Nikolai Jorga, Geschichtedes OsmanischenReiches (Gotha, 19o8-I3), iii,
159-60, recognized the important position Morocco held in the Ottoman-
Spanish negotiations. There is ample evidence that the Saadi sultan paid a
tributeto the Ottomans throughto the end of the sixteenthcentury: MD 40
63:143 (12 S 987/4 Oct. 1579); MD 42 84:347 and 86:352 (B 989/Aug.
1581); MD 48 31:86 (18 B 990/8 Aug. 1582); MD 58 82:235 (17 CA
993/17 May 1585); MD 62 189:426 (II RA 996/9 Feb. 1588); and MD 72
86:170 (15 S oo002/6May 1594). For a report by one of the Moroccan
ambassadors on his trip to Istanbul see Abou-l-Hasen . . . Et-Tamgrouti,
En-Nafhat El-Miskiya Fi-s-Sifarat Et-Tourkiya158z-z591 [The Report on the
Mission to Turkey 1581-1591],trans.Henry De Castries(Paris, 1929). Finally,
Sim. E 1339, fo. 68, 27 July1581 contains a list of the presentsthe Moroccan
sultan sentMurad III in 1581.
"e Pastor, Popes, xviii, pp. 426-7.

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72 PAST AND PRESENT NUMBER 57

was not the damage done to the fleetat Lepanto. The Tunis
campaigndemonstrated how quicklythe fleetcould be rebuiltand
staffedwithexperiencedmanpowerfromthe frontier.It was the
statedecisionafterthe Tunis victoryto forgofurther conflictin the
Mediterranean thatended the majorr61leof the navyin Ottoman
military operations.62 If theseconclusionsthensuggestthattheold
organizationof Mediterraneanimperialhistoryunderestimated the
power of the Ottoman empire, the actions of stateleadersafter 1580
also underlinedhow much the Venetiansanticipatedthe end of
large-scalereligiouswarfarein theMediterranean whentheyleftthe
the
HolyLeague during year1573. Spain, afterthe battleofAlcazar,
did not attacktheIslamiccommunity acrossthe Straitsof Gibraltar,
butsigneda trucewiththeOttomans, conquereditsdefeatedCatholic
neighbourPortugal,and preparedforwar withProtestant England.
The Ottomans,on theirpart,abandonedthe Muslimcommunity in
Spain aftera seriesof NorthAfricanvictorieswhichbroughtthem
close to both the Iberian peninsulaand Sicily to fightheterodox
Muslimsin Persia. Meanwhile,the victoriousSaadi army,largely
composedof MuslimrefugeesfromSpain,63turnedits guns not on
Christiansoldiersbut on the Muslimsof sub-SaharanAfrica. All
alongthe military frontierin the westernMediterranean, rulershad
concludedthatan appeal to religiouswarfarewouldnotsubstantially
changethe space of respectivecivilizations.
If thebattleof Lepantois nottheclimacticeventitappearedtobe,
how does this last grand galleybattlefitinto the historyof the
Mediterranean? On the basis of old perspectives,it could be
arguedthattheTurkswontheMediterranean wars,having,afterthe
battleof Alcazarin 1578,forcedthe Christianstatesback into the
Europeanland mass. But thisinterpretation would simplyreverse
the viewpointof manyoriginalEuropeansources. Integrating the
recordsoftwoMediterranean thebattleofLepantotakes
civilizations,
its place in Mediterranean historyas a majorfrontier clash in the
brutalstrugglebetweentwodifferent and relatively powerfulciviliza-
tions. The siege at Malta in 1565, the Morisco revolt in 1568-70,
the battleof Lepantoin 1571,theconquestand reconquestof Tunis
between 1569-74, and the Portuguese defeat at Alcazar in 1578 not
onlyprovidea measureof thathostility
but also markout the long
s2 Bekir Kiitiiko'lu, Osmanh Safevi Siyasi Miinasebetleri 1578-i590
[Ottoman-Safavid Political Relations] (Istanbul, 1957), PP. 1-19. Cardinal
Granvellemade thispoint in Sim. E 1527, fo. 131, 17 Oct. 1582: the Turks could
not wage war in Persia and on the sea at the same time.
s3 'Abd al-Rahman ibn 'Abdhallah al Sa'di, TarikhEs-Soudan [The Historyof
the Sudan], trans. 0. V. Houdas (Paris, 1964), PP- 215, 277.

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 THE BATTLE OF LEPANTO 73
frontierbetweenthe two civilizations,a zone of divisiondetermined
not solelyby battlesbut by whereMuslim and westernEuropean
statescould not or would not impose theirinstitutions.By 1580,
for Muslims and their imperialchampions,the Ottomans,this
excludedSpain and Italy,whereasin thecase ofwesternEurope,the
Balkansand NorthAfricaremainedoutsidenew Europeanfrontiers.
Strippedof its mythicalframework, humbledby the strengthof
another civilization,and outflankedby the internalhistoryof
Europe, the greatgalleyengagementof 7 October 1571 seems of
much less consequence. Yet it is only the internalconcernsof
Europeanhistorythathave divertedattentionfromthe majorevent
underlying thisgrandsixteenth-century battle. WhenOttomanand
Spanish rulersagreed to a truce during i58o they confirmedan
increasinglyrigid divisionof the Mediterraneannot only between
Islamic and Christianstates,but also betweenthe revolutionizing
economicsocietiesof westernEurope and the successfulbut socially
conservativeTurko-Muslimworld.64 If, in the centuriesto come,
this differentiation of Mediterraneancivilizations became so
unbalancedas to inflictwarfareand internalchangeofunprecedented
dimensionson the Muslim community, thengrandhistorydid not
desertthe Mediterranean afterthe battleof Lepanto.
TempleUniversity, Philadelphia AndrewC. Hess

" The drive for

predominance in the internationaltrade of an expanding
world economy,which appears time and time again in Spanish sources,has little
counterpartin the imperial recordsof the Ottomans. No doubt the controlof
inter-continentaltrade was a subject forvizierial meetings. But what inspired
far more bureaucratic activitythan any concern forinternationalcommercial
competitionwas the delineationof internalsocial structures,ones whose forms
were, in the main, highly conservative. Compare, for example, the letter of
Cardinal Granvelleto Philip II in Sim. E 1525, fo. 42, 21 Sept. 1581 on how the
1580 truce with the Ottomans would leave the Turks outflankedin the compe-
tition for internationalcommerce with the conclusion of Halil Inalcik on the
socio-economic actions of the Ottomans during the early modern age in
"Capital Formation in the Ottoman Empire", Ji. of EconomicHistory,xxix (I)
(1969), pp. 97-140.

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