Descartes as Critic of Galileo's Scientific Methodology

Author(s): Roger Ariew

Source: Synthese, Vol. 67, No. 1, The Role of History in and for Philosophy (Apr., 1986), pp. 77-
90
Published by: Springer
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20116258
Accessed: 16-02-2016 16:53 UTC

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at http://www.jstor.org/page/
info/about/policies/terms.jsp

JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content
in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship.
For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Springer is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Synthese.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 132.174.255.116 on Tue, 16 Feb 2016 16:53:53 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 ROGER ARIEW

DESCARTES AS CRITIC OF GALILEO'S SCIENTIFIC

METHODOLOGY

ABSTRACT. Some
philosophers of science suggest that philosophical assumptions must
influence historical
scholarship, because history (like science) has no neutral data and
because the treatment of any particular historical episode is going to be influenced to
some degree by one's prior philosophical conceptions of what is important in science.
However, if the history of science must be laden with philosophical assumptions, then how
can the history of science be evidence for the philosophy of science? Would not an
inductivist history of science confirm an inductivist of science and a
philosophy
conventionalist history of science confirm a conventionalist of science? I
philosophy
attempt to resolve this problem; essentially, I deny the claim that the history of science
-
must be influenced by one's conception of what is important in science one's general

philosophy of science. To accomplish the task I look at a specific historical episode,

together with its history, and draw some metamethodological conclusions from it. The

specific historical episode I examine is Descartes' critique of Galileo's scientific

methodology.

1.

For the most part it is now taken for granted that there is a close relation
between the history and philosophy of science, and that the history of
science is evidence for the philosophy of science. Kuhn, Lakatos,, and
others have argued that any philosophical theory of science that failed
completely to account for the history of science should be deemed
- as
unacceptable Lakatos phrased it, "Philosophy of science without
history of science is empty" (Lakatos 1971, p. 91). That is the point of
view adopted in this paper.1 However, if one does hold this assumption,
one is immediately confronted with a major problem arising from the
correlative case for the history of science - the other half of Lakatos'
statement: namely that "history of science without philosophy of
science is blind" (Lakatos 1971, p. 91).
Lakatos' formula encapsulates the thesis
that history of science is
laden with implicit philosophical assumptions which determine the
character of the history that is produced. This is a thesis argued by
many; for example, Joseph Agassi demonstrates clearly that some
histories of science are laden with inductivist or conventionalist
assumptions and that such histories really do differ from one another

Synthese 67 (1986) 77-90

? 1986 by D. Reidel Publishing Company

This content downloaded from 132.174.255.116 on Tue, 16 Feb 2016 16:53:53 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 78 ROGER ARIEW

(Agassi, 1963).2 But the thesis that the history of science is laden with
can be extended. - for
philosophical assumptions Some Larry Laudan,
- even
example suggest that it is not just that "philosophical assump
tions have influenced historical scholarship, but that they must do so,
because history (like science) has no neutral data and because the
treatment of any particular historical episode is going to be influenced
to some degree by one's prior philosophical conceptions of what is
important in science" (Laudan 1977, p. 156). To illustrate his point,
Laudan gives an example of a historian convinced that experiments are
the only decisive grounds for abandoning a theory. Such a historian will
tend to focus exclusively on so-called crucial experiments.
If the history of science must be laden with philosophical assump
tions, then how can the history of science be evidence for the
philosophy of science? How does one avoid automatic self-validation?
Would not an inductivist history of science confirm an inductivist
philosophy of science and a conventionalist history of science confirm a
conventionalist philosophy of science?3
Larry Laudan attempts to resolve the problem by distinguishing
between the history of science itself and writing about the history of
science; the distinction is between what Laudan calls HOS1: the
chronologically ordered class of beliefs of scientists, and HOS2: the
descriptive and explanatory statements that historians make about
science (Laudan 1977, p. 158). Given Laudan's distinction, the problem
seems to be resolved since the philosopher of science requires HOS1
and not the suspect HOS2 as evidence for his theory of rationality
(Laudan 1977, p. 163).4 However, in practice, the problem is not
resolved by Laudan's distinction. One cannot actually separate the
beliefs ofscientists from what historians write about the beliefs of
scientists. It is not as if one has to defend the paradoxical assertion that
all statements must be interpreted; the suggestion ismerely that there is
a problem with determining what a scientist's real beliefs are, given his
pronouncements. For example, it would be naive to think that a
scientist's pronouncements about scientific methodology would ac
curately represent his beliefs, or even that his beliefs would accurately
represent his actual practice. After all, there is reason to believe that
many pronouncements about methodology are just official
pronouncements and that some merely reflect the previous popular
philosophies of science. Moreover, there is reason enough to believe
that many scientists did not practice what they preached. Even seien

This content downloaded from 132.174.255.116 on Tue, 16 Feb 2016 16:53:53 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 DESCARTES AS CRITIC OF GALILEO 79

tists like Descartes and Newton who thought long and hard about
scientific methodology and made contributions to the field seem, at
times, not to have followed their own dicta in their scientific practice, tt
looks as though one needs a historian to do some real history of science
in order to determine our HOS1; in that case the problem remains
unsolved.5
I will attempt to resolve the problem without having to rely on
Laudan's distinction. Essentially, I wish to deny the claim that the
history of science must be influenced by one's conception of what is
- of science. To ac
important in science one's general philosophy
complish the task I will look at a specific historical episode, together
with its history, and then draw some metamethodological conclusions
from it. The specific historical episode I shall examine is Descartes'
critique of Galileo's scientific methodology.

2.

One might think that the pronouncements of a great natural philoso

pher about the scientific methodology of his contemporary, yet another
great natural philosopher, might be a prize beyond value for a historian
and philosopher of science (or historian of natural philosophy); one
might think that such pronouncements would have been studied and
analyzed ad infinitum. It is surprising, then, that Descartes' lengthy
assessments of Galileo's scientific methodology have not been the
object of frequent study; in fact, they have not thus far even been
translated into English, having been omitted from Anthony Kenny's
collection of Descartes' philosophical letters, the only major collection
of Descartes' letters in English (a small volume representing just part of
the five tomes of Descartes' correspondence, which is approximately
-
half of Descartes' whole corpus cf. Kenny, 1981).
The greater surprise, however, is the treatment received by Descar
tes' assertions about Galileo's scientific methodology in the hands of the
few historians who have written about the subject. These historians are
generally in agreement that Descartes' assertions lack value. Even
those critics normally sympathetic with Descartes' positions fail to hide
the embarrassment that Descartes' statements have caused them. For
example, Charles Adam and Paul Tannery, the editors of the standard
edition of Descartes' works, note with respect to Descartes' critique of
Galileo's scientific methodology, that it has given rise to "ardent

This content downloaded from 132.174.255.116 on Tue, 16 Feb 2016 16:53:53 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
80 ROGER ARIEW

protestations and severe judgments"; they attempt to mitigate this

complaint by indicating that those protesting "have forgotten that
[Descartes'] critique, written as a draft to Mersenne, does not have the
character of an attack." However, they add that "it is no less true that
its publication has wronged the memory of Descartes himself more than
it has wronged the memory of Galileo." With respect to Descartes'
critique of Galileo, Adam and Tannery conclude that "its interest today
is purely historical" (Adam and Tannery 1964-74, vol. II, p. 402).
Similarly, Ferdinand Alqui?, the editor of the latest edition of Descar
tes' philosophical works, notes concerning the details of Descartes'
critique that "it suffices that an explanation proposed by Galileo does
not conform to his own in order for Descartes to hold it as false - and
that without any further examination. That is why we must confess that
the content of this letter is somewhat defective." Echoing Adam and
Tannery, the mitigating circumstances Alqui? gives us for this defect
are "the fact that it was addressed only to Mersenne and written rather
freely" (Alqui? 1963-73, vol. II, p. 95). It is not difficult to understand
Adam and Tannery's and Alqui?'s line of defense for Descartes'
seeming indiscretion: seeing no rational explanation for Descartes'
assertions, they resort to excuses (Descartes rushed his criticism; he
didn't really mean it; it was meant only for Mersenne; etc.) that is, they
resort to a defense based on irrationality.
William Shea in 'Descartes as Critic of Galileo', continues the line of
commentary from Adam and Tannery to Alqui? and adds another
element to the irrationality defense (Shea 1978). He suggests that
Descartes was so taken by his own philosophy that he could not give a
fair evaluation of Galileo's work. Shea cites passages from the letter to
Mersennfe as an example of Descartes' ... in
"condescending approach
keeping with Descartes' high opinion of his own method" (Shea 1978,
p. 148). He asserts that Descartes' "desire to put Galileo down is too
manifest not to raise the suspicion that there was more behind his
disparagement than the desire to castigate a poor methodology" (Shea
1978, p. 148). He then argues that Descartes' evaluation of Galileo was
colored by the suggestion that Descartes might have been influenced by
Galileo's writing on music. Shea quotes a passage from the same letter
in which Descartes denies that he has had any communication with
Galileo or has borrowed anything from him. Shea then refers to
Descartes' quarrel with Beeckman about the Compendium Musicae, in
order to accentuate the significance of music for seventeenth century

This content downloaded from 132.174.255.116 on Tue, 16 Feb 2016 16:53:53 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 DESCARTES AS CRITIC OF GALILEO 81

thinkers and thereby to indicate that any suggestion that Descartes

might have taken something about music from Galileo would be galling
to Descartes.

One does not have to deny that Descartes considered his work in
music to be extremely significant in order to deny the suggestion that
Descartes' evaluation of Galileo in the Letter to Mersenne of October
16, 1638 was colored by his being galled and by his desire "to put
Galileo down." Most of the elements of Descartes' critique of Galileo
can be found in previous letters, letters in which there is no suggestion
of borrowing , or any reason to believe that Descartes wishes to belittle
Galileo.
Here is the principal offending passage that precipitated the respon
ses of Adam and Tannery, Alqui?, and Shea. The passage was written
to Mersenne as the preface to some specific objections regarding
Galileo's methodology and theories in the Two New Sciences; it puts
forth Descartes' general opinion of Galileo's work. Descartes states:

I find in general that [Galileo] philosophizes much better than common insofar as
people
he avoids as much as possible the errors of the Scholastics, and attempts to examine
physical matters by means of mathematical reasons. In that I agree entirely with him, and
hold that there is no other means to discover truth. But it seems to me that he is greatly
deficient in that he digresses continually and that he does not stop to explain fully any
subject; this shows that he has not examined any in orderly fashion, and that he has sought
for the reasons of some particular effects without having considered the first causes of
nature, and that thus, he has built without foundation. But, to the extent that his method
of philosophizing is closer to the true one, we can more easily know his faults, in the same
way that we can more easily recognize of those who sometimes follow the right path that
they have strayed away, than we can of those who never follow the right path. (Adam and
Tannery 1964-74, vol. II, p. 380)

As already indicated, this criticism is consistent with Descartes' pre

vious criticism of Galileo. For example, as early as August 14, 1634,
Descartes complained about Galileo's "digressions," asserting to Mer
senne that "[Galileo's] reasons for proving the motion of the earth are
good reasons; but it seems to me that he does not set them out as one
should in order to persuade, for his digressions cause one to forget the
earlier reasons by the time one is reading the later reasons" (Adam and
Tannery 1964-74, vol. I, p. 305). And in June 22, 1637 Descartes
complained about Galileo's "not explaining a subject fully," asserting
to Mersenne that "I can only say that neither Galileo nor anyone else
can determine anything clear and demonstrative with respect to this
matter [the motion of heavy bodies being slowed by the air in which

This content downloaded from 132.174.255.116 on Tue, 16 Feb 2016 16:53:53 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 82 ROGER ARIEW

they are moving] if he does not know first what weight is and does not
have the true principles of physics" (Adam and Tannery 1964-74, vol.
I, p. 392).
It is true that one can see a small change in the tone of Descartes'
criticism between the letters of 1637 and 1638 which is clearly due to
Descartes' reading of Galileo just before the letter of 1638. In the letter
of 1637, Descartes does not criticize Galileo directly; the critique is
phrased conditionally: "if he does not know what weight is." Descartes
seems to be waiting to examine Galileo's actual writings and reasons
- an that appears to have taken him
concerning weight examination
from June to October 1638 (see Adam and Tannery 1964-74, vol. II.
pp. 194, 271, and 336). By the letter of October 16, 1638 the criticism
is formulated as a specific instance of Galileo's failure to explain "any
subject fully," having "sought for the reasons of some particular
effects": "What [Galileo] asserts here cannot be determined without
knowing what weight is" (Adam and Tannery 1964-74, vol. II, p. 385).
This criticism is repeated in a Letter toMersenne (January 29,1640): "I
have just reviewed my Notes on Galileo; I did not really assert there
that falling bodies do not go through every degree of retardation, but I
did assert that this matter cannot be determined unless one knows what
-
weight is which means the same thing" (Adam and Tannery 1964-74,
vol. Ill, p. 9).
One should note that, in the letter of 1640, Descartes calls the letter
of October 16, 1638, his "Notes on Galileo." He seems to treat this
letter as a modern would treat a journal article. That may be the true
status of all of Descartes' letters toMersenne; that is, they are intended
for a wider readership than just Mersenne; it would not be an
exaggeration to think of the audience for the letters as the same as the
audience for a highly specialized research journal. To think that
Descartes might treat a letter toMersenne as one might treat a letter to
a slightly dull-witted friendly correspondent is to misunderstand Mer
senne's relationship to Descartes. After all, Mersenne is Galileo's
translator, the author of Les M?caniques de Galil?e,6 and Mersenne's
views are not entirely dependent on Descartes' (cf. Lenoble 1943 and
Gouhier 1972). Moreover, in this case, we do have evidence that
Descartes is not likely to be writing the letter merely for Mersenne:
there are Descartes' own references to this letter - his "Notes on
- and some of
Galileo" there is evidence requests for the letter by
others (Adam and Tannery 1964-74, vol. II, pp. 518/526).

This content downloaded from 132.174.255.116 on Tue, 16 Feb 2016 16:53:53 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 DESCARTES AS CRITIC OF GALILEO 83

There is therefore enough evidence to conclude that Descartes is

consistent in his criticism of Galileo, that it was not written hastily, just
for Mersenne, or out of pique. Perhaps more interestingly, one can
argue that this criticism is consistent with Descartes' methodology from
the period, as detailed in the unpublished Rules for the Direction of the
Mind and abbreviated in the published Discourse on Method. The key
to Descartes' criticism of
Galileo involves the basic Cartesian
methodological prescriptions to "consider a subject in orderly fashion,"
and to "explain a subject fully"; these two fundamental Cartesian rules
are part and parcel of Descartes' announced goal of "building on a solid
foundation."
-
In his 'Notes on Galileo', Descartes criticizes Galileo's exposition
what he calls Galileo's digressions. Galileo's exposition indicates to him
that Galileo has not considered any subject in an orderly fashion, in
opposition to Rule V of the Rules: "method consists entirely in the
order and disposition of the objects toward which our mental vision
must be directed if we would find out any truth" (Adam and Tannery
1964-74, vol. X, pp. 379-80) and maxim 3 of Discourse, part 2: "the
third [maxim] was to carry out my reflections in due order ... assuming
an order, even a fictitious one, among those which do not follow a
natural sequence relatively to one another" (Adam and Tannery
1964-74, vol. VI, p. 18). While a requirement for orderliness might
seem odd or frivolous from a modern perspective, from Descartes'
point of view, the failure to examine reasons in orderly fashion is a most
serious failure.7 It isworthwhile to note that Descartes was admired for
his examination of reasons in an orderly fashion even by thinkers one
can hardly call supporters; for example, Robert Boyle asserts: "Des
cartes is one of the most extraordinary geniuses, one of the most fertile
minds and deepest thinkers that has appeared in these latter times; his
linkage of doctrines achieves its aim, his order is well considered,
according to his principles, and his system, composed both of ancient
and modern ideas, is properly arranged" (Royal Society, Boyle Papers,
vol. xliv).8
Descartes also claims that Galileo has not explained any subject fully,
in opposition to Rule VII of the Rules: "if we wish our science to be
complete, those matters which promote the end we have in mind must
one and all be scrutinized by a movement of thought which is
continuous and nowhere interrupted; they must also be included in an
enumeration which is both adequate and methodical" (Adam and

This content downloaded from 132.174.255.116 on Tue, 16 Feb 2016 16:53:53 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 84 ROGER ARIEW

Tannery 1964-74, vol. X, pp. 388-392) and maxim 4 of Discourse, part

2: "the last [maxim] was in all cases to make enumerations so complete
and reviews so general that I should be certain of having omitted
nothing" (Adam and Tannery, vol. VI, p. 19). In his 'Notes on Galileo',
Descartes supports this general criticism with many specific objections
to Galileo's Two New Sciences', among these is a series of objections
using the language of building on a foundation (or, in this case building
without a foundation): "Everything he asserts concerning the speed of
falling bodies in the void, etc., is built without foundation, for he should
have previously determined what weight is; and if he had known the
truth of this, he would have known that there is no weight in the void"
(Adam and Tannery 1964-74, vol. II, p. 385; for other "building
without a foundation" language against Galileo, see pp. 386 and 388).
To understand why, for Descartes, there is no weight in the void, one
has to understand that, for Descartes, weight is the effect of the vortex
of subtle matter that pushes bodies toward the center of the earth (see
The World, Adam and Tannery 1964-74, vol. XI, pp. 72 et seq.).
Descartes' direct criticism of Galileo, then, is that Galileo attempts to
theorize about motion without considering middle-level causes of
-
motion, which, in this case, are due to weight and to understand what
weight is, one has to understand the effect on an object of its location in
the vortex of subtle matter. According to Descartes, the evidence for
Galileo not considering first causes is that he often does not even
consider middle-level causes. the most
Perhaps famous Cartesian
pronouncement against Galileo, it
which, can be argued, it also
consistent with Descartes' general position of giving an explanation
that considers the first causes of nature, is the statement from the letter
to Mersenne (from November 15, 1638): "Concerning what Galileo
wrote about the balance and the lever, it explains very well that it is so
(quod ita sit), but not why it is so (cur ita sit), as I do by my principle"
(Adam and Tannery 1964-74, vol. II, p. 433).
It should be indicated that not all historians of philosophy have
treated Descartes' critique of Galileo in the fashion of Adam and
Tannery, Alqui?, and Shea. In fact, the preceding analysis agrees with a
remark made in a different context by Etienne Gilson. In an article
entitled 'Physique et m?taphysique dans le syst?me cart?sien', Gilson
argues that for Descartes the word 'philosophy' is not used as we use it
today. When Descartes speaks of philosophy, it is to the physics of The
World and the Principles of Philosophy that he refers. We would

This content downloaded from 132.174.255.116 on Tue, 16 Feb 2016 16:53:53 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 DESCARTES AS CRITIC OF GALILEO 85

therefore be mistaken if we translated philosophy by nothing but

metaphysics, but we would also be misunderstanding Descartes if we
excluded metaphysics from what he means by physics. In Cartesian
terminology, philosophy means neither metaphysics nor physics
separated from metaphysics in the sense that we understand. Gilson
recalls, as external evidence for the internality of metaphysics in
Cartesian physics, what Descartes thought of Galileo: "Galileo in
carnated, inDescartes' eyes, the man who errs in physics because he has
no philosophy - someone whose science is inexact because it
meaning
... Galileo's errors in physics have
thought to do without metaphysics
no other origin. In fact, to reproach Galileo, as has Descartes, for
having 'built without foundations,' or for not knowing what weight is,
lacking 'the true principles of physics,' is precisely to reproach him for
not having climbed down to the first definitions of matter by extension
and movement which are also the ultimate conclusions of metaphysics"
(Gilson 1930, pp. 176-77).

3.

To have argued that Descartes' critique of Galileo was not written

hastily, just for Mersenne, or out of pique, but that the critique arises
from some of Descartes' fundamental positions and is consistent with
what is derivable from his methodology, is not yet to have indicated
what can and cannot be demonstrated as a consequence. Obviously the
above points do not entail that Descartes' critique of Galileo's scien
tific methodology, as Descartes understands Galileo's scientific
methodology, accurately represents Galileo's methodology. The
argument requires no more than the claim that Descartes' represen
tation of Galileo is a common representation; and it should be beyond
dispute, given the standard view of Galileo as an inductivist and
Newton's approbation of Galileo as a kindred spirit, that Descartes'
representation of Galileo is not an outrageous distortion. Hence, it is
not necessary to argue, as does Alexandre Koyr?, that "from a certain
point of view Descartes' criticism of Galileo is justified, in principle, but
not in fact. In effect Descartes' charge is that Galileo built a mathema
tical physics which contradicted common sense and everyday
... i.e., without a In
experience illegitimately, supporting metaphysics.
principle, Descartes is right. In fact, however, he is wrong, for Galileo
was a Platonist" (Koyr? 1978, pp. 111-12).9 Koyr?'s position requires

This content downloaded from 132.174.255.116 on Tue, 16 Feb 2016 16:53:53 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
86 ROGER ARIEW

espousing a controversial interpretation of Galileo as a Platonist

together with a reading of Descartes that seems to contain elements
external to the text. Koyr? is right to insist that "in his famous critique
of Galileo ... what Descartes holds against [Galileo] above all is that he
proceeded 'without method' and that he did not go to the limit in his
analysis of the ideas he used;" but Koyr? errs when he adds that,
according to Descartes, "[Galileo] retained, and used just as they were,
ideas (such as those of gravity and of the vacuum) which, so to speak,
announced quite openly their origins in perception, instead of attempt
ing to reconstruct them on the basis of the clear and distinct ideas of
extension and motion, ideas of which the origin is entirely in the
understanding" (Koyr? 1978, p. 90). It is clear that there is too much
interpretive baggage in Koyr?'s claim, both with respect to Galileo's
and with respect to the particulars of Descartes' -
"Platonism" critique
for instance, the degree to which the ideas of gravity and vacuum
announce their origin in perception.10
Returning to the consequences of Descartes' critique, it should be
acknowledged that the argument does not entail that Descartes'
critique of Galileo's scientific methodology is a good critique, either
with respect to the aims and methodology of seventeenth century
science or with respect to ours. This further claim would need to be
argued; however, if one can show that Descartes' representation of
Galileo's methodology is a common representation during the seven
teenth century, and that Descartes' methodology is generally thought to
be significant during the seventeenth century (and it should not be too
difficult to demonstrate these two theses) then one might conclude that
the relative significances of Descartes and Galileo's methodologies for
the seventeenth century have been incorrectly estimated and that
perhaps their relative significances for the philosophy of science in
general have also been incorrectly estimated. This conclusion would be
consistent with recent r??valuations of the significance of Galileo's
-
methodology for the philosophy of science generally cf. for example,
Larry Laudan's 'A Revisionist Note on the Methodological Significance
of Galilean Mechanics' from his Science and Hypothesis (Laudan 1981,
pp. 20-26). In Science and Hypothesis, Laudan argues that the philoso
phically exciting sciences for the seventeenth century were not those
parasitic on the Copernican-Galilean revolution in astronomy and
mechanics, but those associated with theories of matter (that is,
micro-phenomena) and the hypothetical character of theoretical know

This content downloaded from 132.174.255.116 on Tue, 16 Feb 2016 16:53:53 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 DESCARTES AS CRITIC OF GALILEO 87

ledge. So Galileo's failure to explain some topics fully (to link his
explanations to theories of matter) allows him to disregard the philoso
phically significant questions concerning micro-phenomena.11
Although such questions as whether Descartes has represented
Galileo fairly or correctly and what is the significance of Descartes'
criticism for seventeenth century scientific methodology in general are
interesting questions, to resolve them would require me to stray too far
from the thesis of this paper, dealing with the role of history in
- of science in of
philosophy in this case, specifically, history philosophy
science; instead I wish to ask what the case study can reveal about
writing history of science.
The present case study indicates that some historians of science, who
should have known better, produced an account of a historical episode
that cannot stand up to any real scrutiny. It would be a mistake to
dismiss this as inconsequential or to account for it in the same fashion as
those historians accounted for Descartes' critique: they wrote their
history hastily, they didn't really mean it, etc. (though, of course, these
may be part of the explanation). In fact, there is a hypothesis that can
explain how normally good historians might provide the kind of history
discussed above; namely, that these historians somehow were rewriting
their history with a particular end in mind (or even with particular
details of the history already fixed for them), that is, knowing how the
history should end up. Thus the case study supports the complaint of
historians and philosophers of science that many histories of science are
written from the perspective of the present. It is, of course, common
place to term a history whiggish when the history is written from the
perspective of the present, when theories are evaluated as anticipations
of present theories; however, the term should be extended to include
histories written from the perspective of the present, when not only
theories, but also methods and aims are evaluated as anticipations of
our present theories, methods and aims. In this way, one can also term a

history whiggish when the history is written from the point of view of
the prevailing philosophy of science, and one can include complaints
against inductivist and conventionalist histories of science under the
same umbrella.

4.

We can now return to the questions posed at the beginning of this

paper. The case study suggests that some distortion is inevitable if

This content downloaded from 132.174.255.116 on Tue, 16 Feb 2016 16:53:53 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
88 ROGER ARIEW

foreign elements are introduced into a historical episode. One of the

foreign elements that is likely to warp our understanding of a historical
episode would be the interpretation introduced by a general account of
scientific aims and methods or by our present understanding of
scientific aims and methods. To understand Descartes we need to
understand Descartes' aims and methods, so that to understand Des
cartes we do need what I call a local philosophy of science;12 and, of
course, we also need a historiography to tell us whom we should study,13
but a general philosophy of science will not give us the needed local
philosophy of science and will not do any better than the historiography
in telling us whom to study. We certainly do not need an inductivist or
conventionalist (or Popperian) historiography of science. To under
stand both Descartes and Galileo we would need to move up to what
would be the aims and methods of an early seventeenth century natural
philosopher, given the intellectual context of the beginning of the
seventeenth century. Here what Descartes says is helpful to the
historian. As Descartes indicates, it is because he and Galileo are both
following the same path that their science can be compared and
evaluated. Descartes and Galileo share enough theory, methodology,
epistemic values, etc. that one can ask which of them succeeds (or
which of them more fully answers the needs of early seventeenth
century science). This would not have been possible had we attempted
to compare Descartes and a Paracelsian, for example.
Our initial problem is resolved: as long as the history of science
requires local philosophies of science, then no general philosophy of
science is validated by the theory-ladenness of history of science. Of
course, we might be able to conclude that there can be no general
- that to the highest level of generaliza
philosophy of science moving
tion to talk about the aims and methods of science is probably vacuous
(that becomes an empirical question determined by the similarity or
lack of similarity of aims and goals in science). Similarly, it might be
vacuous to talk about the aims and methods of seventeenth century
science; we would need to know whether the figures in question are
following along a sufficiently similar path. Returning to Laudan's
example, in Progress and Its Problems, of a historian of science who is
convinced that experiments are the only decisive grounds for abandon
ing a theory and who therefore concentrates on so-called crucial
experiments, we can judge that this historian is a bad historian; a good

This content downloaded from 132.174.255.116 on Tue, 16 Feb 2016 16:53:53 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 DESCARTES AS CRITIC OF GALILEO 89

historian would wonder whether the figure or figures he studies are

convinced that experiments are the only decisive grounds for abandon
ing a theory and then write his history accordingly.14

NOTES

1
I leave it to Daniel Garber and Larry Laudan to question the assumption; cf.
Garber's article and Laudan's response in this issue.
2
Agassi's remedy is a history of science laden with Popper's critical philosophy of
science. This history would also differ from inductivist and conventionalist histories but I
shall argue that it is not likely to be any better as a history.
3
Would not a Popperian history of science confirm a Popperian philosophy of science?
4
According to Laudan, the historian of science needs both the philosophy of science and
HOS1 to construct his HOS2.
5 arose
A real instance of this problem inWinter 1984 when Isaac Levi visited Virginia

Polytechnic Institute to give a lecture. Levi admitted in conversation that he does not
think of history of science as evidence
for philosophy of science because history of science
is theory-laden. Everyone agreed with him about the theory-ladenness
present of history
of science, though some thought that the problem depended upon what methodological
theory history of science is laden with. Levi replied that the history of science is normally
laden with the very methodological theory that it attempts to prove. Levi's assertions
express the problem defined above. This paper, then, is also an attempt to answer Levi.
6
Les M?caniques de Galil?e is a translation from the Italian of an early work of Galileo
with additions from other sources.
7
This general issue is treated at length in Gueroult (1984-85).
8
Boyle continues: "However, he teaches too much which is capable of being doubted,
and that is not a good model for naturally incredulous minds; but he is the most original
thinker."
9
Koyr? refers his reader to Descartes' The World (Adam and Tannery 1964-74, vol. XI,
p. 41), but this text does not provide unambiguous support for his view.
10
The obvious point is that one does not need to get into the thorny issue of Galilean

interpretation to understand Descartes' position.

1*
On the topic of the importance of Descartes' methodology for the seventeenth century
and its significance for the philosophy of science generally (hypotheses, experiments, and

certainty), see Buchdahl (1962, 1963, and 1969), Laudan (1981, pp. 27-58), and Garber

(1978).
12
As opposed to a global or general philosophy of science, of the kind given by Kuhn,
Lakatos, and Laudan, for example.
13
Along with such things as general rules about how to study: Lockean type rules ? la
Yolton (cf. John Yolton's paper in this issue), or Spinoza-type rules, from his On the
Improvement of the Intellect, as Edwin Curley pointed out in discussion.
14
I would like to thank Peter Barker and the organizers and participants of Virginia

Polytechnic Institute and State University's Workshop on the Role of History in

Philosophy, especially Daniel Garber, for their helpful discussions.

This content downloaded from 132.174.255.116 on Tue, 16 Feb 2016 16:53:53 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
 90 ROGER ARIEW

REFERENCES

Adam, Charles and Paul Tannery (eds.): 1964-74, Oeuvres de Descartes, 2nd. ed., Vrin,
Paris.

Agassi, Joseph: 1963, 'Towards an Historiography of Science', History and Theory.

Alqui?, Ferdinand (ed.): 1963-73, Descartes: Oeuvres philosophiques, Gamier, Paris.

Buchdahl, Gerd: 1962, 'Descartes' Anticipation of a Logic of Scientific Discovery', inA.
C. Crombie (ed.), Scientific Change, Basic Books, New York, pp. 399-417.
Buchdahl, Gerd: 1963, 'The Relevance of Descartes' Philosophy for Modern Philosophy
of Science', British Journal for the History of Science 1, 277-349.
Buchdahl, Gerd: 1969, Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Science, M.I.T. Press, Cam

bridge.
Garber, Daniel: 1978, 'Science and Certainty in Descartes', in M. Hooker (ed.),
Descartes, Critical and Interpretive Essays, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore,
pp. 114-151.
Gilson, Etienne: 1930, Etudes sur le r?le de la pens?e m?di?vale dans la formation du

syst?me cart?sien, Vrin, Paris.

Gouhier, Henri: 1972, La Pens?e Religieuse de Descartes, Vrin, Paris.
Gueroult, Martial: 1984-85, Descartes' Philosophy According to the Order of Reasons,

Roger Ariew (trans.), The University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis.

Kenny, Anthony (ed. and trans.): 1981, Descartes: Philosophical Letters, University of
Minnesota Press, Minneapolis.
Koyr?, Alexandre: 1978, Galileo Studies, John Mepham (trans.), Humanities Press, New

Jersey.
Lakatos, Imre: 1971, 'History of Science and its Rational Reconstructions', Boston
Studies in the Philosophy of Science 8, 91-136.
Laudan, Larry: 1977, Progress and Its Problems, University of California Press, Berkeley.
Laudan, Larry: 1981, Science and Hypothesis, Reidel, Dordrecht.
Lenoble, Robert: 1943, Mersenne et la naissance du m?canisme, Vrin, Paris.
Shea, William R.: 1978, 'Descartes as Critic of Galileo', in R. E. Butts and J. Cf Pitt

(eds.), New Perspectives on Galileo, Reidel, Dordrecht, pp. 139-159.

Dept. of Philosophy
VA Polytechnic Inst. and State University

Blacksburg, VA 24061
U.S.A.

This content downloaded from 132.174.255.116 on Tue, 16 Feb 2016 16:53:53 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions