Corporate Governance and Audit Quality

By

Prof E. I. Okoye, Okaro, S.C and Okafor, G.O

All Lecturers at Nnamdi Azikiwe University, Awka

ABSTRACT

This work evaluates the practice of auditing in Nigeria in order to determine empirically corporate governance factors that affect audit quality

some of which if addressed will help in stemming the tide of audit failures. The study made use of secondary data. The secondary data was

extracted from the annual reports of a sample of 104 companies randomly selected from a population of 134 non-bank companies listed in the

Nigerian Stock Exchange. However, only 84 companies with sufficient data were used. Banks were excluded from the study because of the

special regulations guiding their operations. The dependent variable of the study is audit quality while independent variables included Board

size, Board independence, Board diligence, Audit committee size, Audit Committee diligence and audit committee independence. The

hypothesis of study were analysed using binary logistic regression model. The policy implication of the findings is that some corporate

governance practices do have positive effects on audit quality and should be made mandatory. The major findings are that small board size and

greater board diligence impact positively on audit quality.

Key words: Audit failure, Audit Quality, Corporate governance, Board, Audit Committee
INTRODUCTION

Attempts to solve the problem of audit failures have taken the front burner and cuts across jurisdictions. The genesis of current global attempts to

fix audit failures, arguably, can be traced to Enron debacle in the United States of America and resulted in the promulgation of Sarbanes-Oxley

Act in 2002 with dire consequences for the accounting profession in that country. In Europe, a lot of options to strengthen the conduct of audit is

currently being debated by various stakeholder groups and include freeing up audit competition, mandatory rotation of auditors, audit tendering

and joint audits (Nonnenmacher, 2011). This is happening at a time that uniform global financial reporting standard(IFRS) is gaining currency

(Okpala, 2012). Jurisdictions attempt to take into cognizance their peculiar socio-economic, political and cultural environments in the search for

audit quality (Okike, 2004).

Studies on the issue of corporate governance factors in audit quality in Nigeria is still evolving (Adeyemi & Fagbemi 2010). These include

studies on Board diligence, Audit Committee diligence audit committee size, Board independence, Audit committee independence and Board

size. This gives room for more studies in this area. Some of the studies are industry specific (Samuel, 2012; Olayiwola, 2010; Akinyomi, 2012;

Otusanya, 2010; Okoye & Akenbor, 2010) implying that their findings cannot be generalized. Furthermore, the findings of some of the studies

were in direct conflict with the results of some similar studies by other researchers. A good example is the issue of audit firm tenure or

mandatory rotation of auditors. While Ebimobowei and Keretu (2011) conclude that mandatory rotation of auditors is desirable and has a

salutary effect on audit quality. Mgbame, Eragbhe and Osazuwa (2012) did not see any significant effect of mandatory rotation of auditors on
audit quality. This study intends to look at how some corporate governance factors affect audit quality with a view to adding to the scanty

literature in this area in Nigeria.

The general objective of this study is to evaluate the practice of auditing in Nigeria in order to determine empirically some corporate governance

factors that affect audit quality in the Nigerian environment. The specific objectives are as follows:

i. To investigate whether audit committee effectiveness as measured by independence, size and diligence has any significant effect on audit

quality.

ii. To determine whether Board of Directors effectiveness as measured by board independence, size, diligence has a significant effect on

audit quality.

The following research questions were formulated to achieve the objectives of this study:

i. What is the relationship between audit committee effectiveness as measured by audit committee independence, audit committee size,

audit committee diligence, and audit quality?

ii. How would board effectiveness as measured by board size, board independence, board diligence affect audit Quality?

The following hypotheses were formulated and tested in the course of the study

(1a) Ho: Audit Committee size does not significantly affectAudit quality.

(1b) Ho: Audit Committee Diligence has no significant effect on Audit Quality
(1c) Ho: Audit Committee independence has no significant effect on Audit Quality.

(2a) Ho:Board size does not have a significant effect on Audit quality.

(2b) Ho: Board diligence is not significantly related to audit quality

(2c) Ho: Board independence has no significant effect on Audit quality.

This study is expected to equip the regulatory authorities with better knowledge of the corporate governance factors impinging on audit quality

in Nigeria which will guide future regulatory interventions in solving the vexed issue of audit failures in Nigeria. Also, members of the

Accounting Profession, Company Management and indeed the members of the public will also benefit from a greater insight into some corporate

governance factors that affect audit quality in Nigeria.

This study covers the search for audit quality in Nigeria with a view to stemming the tide of audit failure. The geographical scope of this study is

Nigeria. Secondary data was sourced from 84 companies out of the 136 non-financial companies quoted on the exchange. Financial companies

were excluded because they are guided by special regulations. A sample of 104 firms was randomly selected from a population of 136 non-

financial firms quoted on the Nigerian Stock Exchange. However, only 84 companies were used because of the problem of availability of

relevant data.
REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE

Conceptual Framework

An audit must be of sufficient quality if audit failures will be reduced to the barest minimum. According to Tackett, Wolf and Claypool (2006),

auditing failure occurs when management grossly misrepresents their financial statements and auditors through negligence or incompetence fail

to discover and report the misrepresentation. A classical definition of audit quality is that it is the market-assessed joint probability that a given

auditor will both: (i)identify a breach in the client company accounting system and (ii) report that breach, that is that the auditor has both the

technical competence to detect any material errors during the audit process, and the independence to ensure that material errors and omissions

are corrected or disclosed in the auditor’s report (De-Angelo, 1981).

The following propositions about audit quality, among others, have been made in order to further clarify the concept:

How to define and measure audit quality is still not known

1) Zero risk cannot be the goal of audit quality

2) Audit quality as an outcome cannot be completely divorced from reporting quality

3) Any definition of audit quality must take cognizance of the fact that audit is a professional service

4) Audit quality is uncertain and idiosyncratic

5) Audit failure from the perspective of the auditor can be grouped into two. Calibration failure refers to the variance of planned assurance

from targeted assurance. Execution failure, on the other hand, refers to the variance of achieved assurance from planned assurance.
 6) The primary cause of execution failure are misdiagnosis and inappropriate treatment of risk

7) The quality of auditing is inherent in the nature and execution of the activities that diagnose and treat risk in the audit process (Knechel,

2009)

This study will use the presence of any of the big 4 Audit firms in an audit as evidence of audit quality and vice versa.

Audit Committees

Characteristics of Effective Audit Committees

Many characteristics have been canvassed as making for an effective audit Committee ( Lin, Xiao, & Tang, 2008). These include independence,

large size and frequency of meetings (Karamanou & Vafeas, 2005). Other studies also emphasize the multiple directorships of audit committee

members, yet other studies premise audit committee effectiveness on its composition, size, members’ qualifications and actual audit committee

operations. One study tested the following audit committee characteristics; size, the ratio of audit committee members with accounting financial

expertise, average tenure of audit committee members and average number of outside audit committee positions held by audit committee

members (Kiatapiwat, 2010).

Audit committee members should be independent of an organisation’s management to perform the oversight role and protect shareholders

interests (Al-lehaidan, 2006). However, independence is not enough (Sori, Ali, Hamid, & Evans, 2007). Anderson et al. (2003), however did not

find any relationship between audit committee independence and information content of earnings. Lack of adequate knowledge and relevant
experience causes inability and failure of audit committee members to understand their roles and responsibilities in the firm (Karbhari &

Mohiuddin, 2010; Ashikin, Saat, Karbhari, Xiao, & Heravi, 2012).

It is debatable whether audit committee size is an influential factor in its effective functioning. While some argue that it does (Ahmad-zaluki,

Nordin, & Hussin, 2009; Al-matari & Al-Swidi, 2012), others are not so persuaded arguing that a large audit committee may in fact be

counterproductive as more members in audit committee may lead to unnecessary debates resulting in delayed decisions (Al-matari & Al-matari,

2012).

Members’ diligence is extremely important in shouldering the responsibilities of the committee effectively and with integrity (Lifschutz &

Jacobi, 2010; Ghafran, 2013). However, since diligence is extremely difficult to measure in practice, researchers usually use the frequency of

audit committee meetings as a surrogate for diligence (Saleem & Alzoubi, 2012).

The Board of Directors

The Board and Corporate Governance

The four drivers of corporate governance are accountability, fairness, transparency and independence. An essential feature of the modern

corporation is the divorce of ownership from management. This separation of ownership from control, however, implies a loss of effective

control by shareholders over managerial decisions. The primary objective of corporate governance is, therefore, to try and align managerial

incentives with that of stakeholders so that managers work in the best interest of the stakeholders, (Nworji, Adebayo, & David, 2011).
Board Effectiveness

Independence is a quality that can be possessed by individuals and is an essential component of professionalism and professional behavior. It

refers to the avoidance of being unduly influenced by a vested interest and to being free from any constraints that would prevent a correct course

of action being taken. It is an ability to “Stand Apart” from inappropriate influences and to be free of managerial capture, to be able to make the

correct and uncontaminated decision on a given issue,(Campbell, 2011). Outside directors are generally believed to be more effective in

monitoring management and enhancing financial reporting quality. Researches have, however, shown that it is not ideal to have only outside

directors in the board (He, Labelle, Piot, & Thornton, 2013). Board size is also likely to be related to board performance because adding more

people to the board enhances the knowledge base (Azim, 2012). However, very large boards are less flexible due to potential free riding,

communication break downs and inefficiencies (Boo & Sharma, 2008). Caution is therefore required in choosing the optimum size of a board.

Frequency of board meetings is usually taken as a proxy for board diligence (Kent & Stewart, 2008).

The Board and Audit Quality

The board of directors typically collaborates with management in selecting the external auditor, often subject to shareholder ratification. The

board usually reviews the overall planned audit scope and fee thus indirectly influencing audit quality. The board’s commitment to vigilant

oversight may signal to both management and the auditor that the expectations placed on the audit firm are very high. If that is the case, the
auditors will strive to do high quality audit so as not to do disappoint the directors (Soliman & Elsalam, 2012). Such situations will also

minimize the” games” auditors and managements sometimes play (Osei-afoakwa, 2013; Akpomi, Amesi, & Harcourt, 2009).

Agency Theory

Agency theory presupposes that shareholders require protection because management (agents) may not always act in the best interest of absentee

owners,(Jensen & Meckling, 1976). To deal with this, the Board assumes an oversight role that typically involves monitoring the Chief

executives and other top executives and monitoring internal control over financial reporting,(Wan- Hussin & Haji-Abdullah, 2009). Debt holders

are also another group with interests in deriving maximum utility from the actions of management. In addition to investing in control systems,

owners and agents have incentives to invest in various information systems to reduce agency costs associated with information asymmetry. Two

agency problems exist in an information asymmetry situation: adverse selection where the principal cannot determine if the agent is performing

the work for which he/she is paid, and moral hazard where the principal is unsure as to whether the agent has performed their work to their

ability (Arnold & Lange, 2004). All in all, agency theory places economic self-interest at the centre of theoretical expectations. Certain

contractual relationships combined with information asymmetry indicate a corresponding demand for investment in control and monitoring

mechanisms including independent Boards, effective audit committees and external audit, (Kalbers & Fogarty, 1998).
RESEARCH METHODS

This study made of use of secondary data. The 136 non-financial companies listed on the Nigerian Stock Exchange in 2012/13 year of the

Exchange constituted the population of the study.We applied random technique in selecting 104 companies determined using the Taro Yamani

formula. We, however, used only 84 companies who had full data.

Our source of data was longitudinal data gathered from annual reports of selected quoted companies in Nigeria. The data collected included the

companies’ auditors, the number of times their boards met in the year and the number of executive directors in their boards (appendix 1). The

Nigerian Stock Exchange 2012/2013 Fact Book was used in collecting secondary data and showed that 134 companies were listed on the main

Board of the Exchange. This figure excluded Banks and Insurance companies because of the fact that they are subject to special regulations.

The relevant annual reports are reports of companies with year ends covering 1 st January 2012 to 31st December 2013. The reports were the latest

available from the Exchange. The relevant data were extracted from the annual reports between June and July 2014.The list of the 84 companies

used in the study is shown in Appendix 1.

The statistical technique applied in this study was as follows:

The binary logistic regression model used to test the relationships between audit quality as a dependent variable and some Board characteristics

and Audit committee characteristics as independent variables. The use of binary logistic regression model is justified since this is a situation

where the dependent variable is binary (0 or 1) (Niemi, Kinnunen, Ojala, & Troberg, 2012).

Accordingly, the following econometric model in general form is thus specified for the study:

Dependent variable = β + ∑β + Independent Variables + ∑β Control Variables +ԑ

Where β = Intercept of regression line and ԑ = error term.

Source: Adapted from (Wan-Hussin & Haji-Abdullah, 2009).

Our dependent variable is audit quality and is measured by the likelihood that a sampled company employs the services of the big 4 audit firms

in Nigeria. In the choice of our dependent variable, we find empirical support in (Velnampy, Sivathaasan, Tharanika, &Sinthuja, 2014). The big

4 audit firms in Nigeria are namely, Price Water House/Cooper (PWC), Ernst and Young (EY), Akintola Williams/Delliote (AWD) and KPMG

Professional group (KPMG). Accordingly, a dummy variable of 1 is used if a firm is audited by any of the big 4 audit firms otherwise a 0 value

is assigned. We specify our model as follows:

Audit Quality = β Audit Tenure + β Director Share Ownership + β Financial Expertise of Audit Committee Chair + β Audit Committee

Independence + β Audit Committee Diligence + β Board Size + β Board Independence + β Audit Committee Size + β Board Diligence
+ β Total Assets + β Return on Assets.

The independent variables for our model are: Board independence represented by proportion of non-executive directors in the board of a

company.Board size is represented by the number of directors on the board. Audit tenure measured by the number of years an auditor has been

with a company on a continuous basis, if greater than 10 we assign1 else 0. The use of greater than 10 and otherwise 0 to measure length of audit

tenure is informed by the SEC code of 2011 and CBN corporate governance code both of which recommend a maximum external audit tenure of

10 years.Board ownership is measured by proportion of equity shares owned by the directors of a company. Board diligence is measured by the

number of annual meetings held by the directors annually. Similarly,audit committee diligence is measured by the number of meetings held

annually by members of the committee. Audit committee size is represented by the number of audit committee members. If the chairman of an

audit committee is either a member of ICAN or ANAN we assign 1 otherwise 0.Audit committee independence is measured by the proportion of

non- executive directors in the audit committee in relation to the total number of directors in the committee.

In line with similar studies, we control for the following, firm size and Return on Assets.

The firm size is measured by the Natural logarithm of total assets while Return on Assets is = total annual earnings of the sample firm/total

assets (Mgbame et al., 2012). Testing the two variables is not one of the study goals. They were used to control the influence of firm specific

financial factors.
Also to make the research manageable, we did not review literature on, nor hypothesised on board ownership, financial expertise of audit

committee chair and audit tenure although they appeared in the modelas X3, X4 andX1 in the model respectively.

Model Confirmation
Table 1: Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients (Output of SPSS 17)
Chi-square Df Sig.
Step 26.918 11 .005
Step 1 Block 26.918 11 .005
Model 26.918 11 .005
Source: Field survey(2015)
A Chi square of 26.918 at 0.005level of significance (approximately1%) shows that the model is dependable and reliable.

Table 2: Likelihood Test (Output of SPSS 17).

Step -2 Log likelihood Cox & Snell R Square Nagelkerke R Square
a
1 82.577 .274 .376
a. Estimation terminated at iteration number 6 because parameter estimates changed by less than 0.001.

Source: Field survey (2015)

The Nagelkerke R Square is 0.376. This means that 37.6% of audit quality is explained by the independent variables.

Table 3: Classification Table (Output of SPSS 17)

Classification Tablea
Observed Predicted
Audit Quality Percentage
Otherwise Audited by Correct
big four Firms
Otherwise 16 14 53.3
Audit
Audited by big four
Step 1 Quality 10 44 81.5
Firms
Overall Percentage 71.4
a. The cut value is .500
Source: Field Survey (2015)

Table 3 shows that the model classified the data accurately 53.3% of the time (16 out of 30 audited by the non- big 4) in respect of companies

audited by the non- big four. In a similar vein, for the companies audited by the big four the model classified the data accurately 81.5% of the

time ( 44 out of 54 audited by the big four).Overall on a weighted average basis the model classified the data correctly 71.4% of the time which

is greater than the cut off value of 50%. Also the value of 53.3% correct classification for non- big four audited companies is greater than the cut
 off value of 50% . We conclude that the result of the test shows that the model is dependable and reliable and can be relied upon in making

inferences.

DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS

Summary of Data for Test of Hypotheses One and Two

Table 4- Output of Regression Analysis (SPSS 17).

Variables in the Equation
B S.E. Wald Df Sig. Exp(B)
x1 -.006 .628 .000 1 .993 .994
x3 -.012 .013 .762 1 .383 .989
x4 .506 .572 .783 1 .376 1.659
x5 -.617 1.631 .143 1 .705 .539
x6 1.086 .545 3.969 1 .046 2.962
x7 .353 .345 1.043 1 .307 1.423
Step 1a
x8 -.406 .191 4.527 1 .033 .666
x9b .283 .212 1.782 1 .182 1.327
x10 2.950 2.834 1.083 1 .298 19.105
x11 .242 .353 .469 1 .493 1.274
x12 .610 .288 4.476 1 .034 1.840
Constant -8.494 4.098 4.296 1 .038 .000
a. Variable(s) entered on step 1: x1, x3, x4, x5, x6, x7, x8, x9b, x10, x11, x12.

Source: Computed by the researcher,2014(Appendix 3).

Test of Hypothesis

Hypothesis 1a

Ho: Audit committee size does not significantly affect audit quality

From table 4 above, the relevant variable is X11. Also from the table Audit committee size is positively related audit quality (B

coefficient= .242) but is not significant at 0.05 level(.493).

Decision:We accept the null hypothesis and reject the alternative hypothesis that audit committee size significantly affects audit quality.

Hypothesis 1b

Ho: Audit committee diligence has no significant effect on audit quality.

From table 4 above the relevant variable is X7. Also from the table, Audit committee diligence is positively related to audit quality (B

coefficient= .353) but is not significant at 0.05 level (.307).

Decision:We accept the null hypothesis and the reject the alternative hypothesis that Audit committee diligence has a significant effect on audit

quality

Hypothesis 1c
Ho: Audit Committee Independence has no significant effect on audit quality.

The relevant independent variable is X5 which was regressed against the dependent variable (audit quality). The table showed a negative

relationship between Audit committee independence and audit quality(B coefficient = -.617). However, the relationship is not significant at 0.05

level (.617).

Decision: We accept the null hypothesis and reject the alternative hypothesis that Audit Committee independence has significant effect on audit

quality.

Hypothesis 2a

Ho: Board size does not have any significant effect on audit quality

From table 4 above, the relevant independent variable is X8.This was regressed against audit quality as the dependent variable. The table shows

that Board size has a negative effect on audit quality (B coefficient= - .406). The table also shows that this relationship is significant at 0.05 level

(.033).

Decision: We reject the null hypothesis and accept the researcher’s hypothesis that Board size has significant effect on audit quality.

Hypothesis 2b

Ho: Board diligence is not significantly related to audit quality

From table 4, the relevant independent variable is X12. This is regressed against audit quality as the dependent variable. The table showed a

positive relationship between board independence and audit quality (Bcoefficient=.610). The table also showed that the relationship is significant

at 0.05 level (.034).

Decision: We reject the null hypothesis and accept the researcher’s hypothesis that Board diligence is significantly related to audit quality.

Hypothesis 2c

Ho: Board independence does not have any significant effect on audit quality.

From table 4 the relevant independent variable is X10. The table showed a positive relationship between Board independence and audit quality

(B coefficient = 2.950). This is not significant at 0.05 level of confidence (.298).

Decision: Accept the null hypothesis and reject the alternate hypotheses that Board independence has a significant effect on audit quality.

Discussion of Findings

The empirical analysis of this study provides interesting and revealing results and will be discussed under the following headings Audit

Committees and Audit quality; Board of Directors and Audit quality.

Audit Committees and Audit Quality

Our empirical finding was that audit committee size had a positive but insignificant effect on audit quality. A positive audit committee size and

audit quality relationship has empirical support, (Saidin, 2007). However, there are also views that audit committee size may in fact be

detrimental to audit quality ( Al-matari & Al-matari, 2012).

Audit committee diligence is proxied by the number of meetings held annually by audit committee members. Our study documented a positive

but insignificant relationship with audit quality. Many empirical studies lend credence to a positive relationship between audit quality and audit

committee diligence (Song & Windram, 2000; Lifschutz & Jacobi, 2010). There are also empirical studies that document negative or not

significant relationship between audit committee diligence and audit quality,(Haji-Abdullah, 2006). We found negative but insignificant

association between audit quality and audit committee independence. Many studies document positive association between audit committee

independence and audit quality (Al-lehaidan, 2006; Adelopo, 2010). One study, however, documented a negative association between audit

committee independence and audit quality in a situation where some executive officers of a company do not participate in audit committee

meetings (Ashikin, et al., 2012)

Board Committees and Audit Quality

We hypothesised that board size had an insignificant effect on audit quality. Our empirical evidence supported this view. Other studies that

confirmed this view or reported insignificant association between board size and audit quality include (Al-matari & Al-Swidi, 2012; Ibadin,

2012; Velnampy, et al., 2014). Other views support large board size being consistent with audit quality (Lajmi & Gana, 2011).
We hypothesised that board diligence does not have significant effect on audit quality. The result was not consistent with the hypothesis. Other

empirical works however find insignificant association between board diligence and audit quality (Lajmi & Gana, 2011). The SEC 2011 code

requires boards to meet at once in a quarter and members of the board should attend at least 2/3 of the meetings.

We hypothesised that board independence has an insignificant effect on audit quality. Our result showed a positive but not significant

relationship. Many empirical studies record a positive and significant relationship between board independence and audit quality,(Enofe,

Mgbame, Aderin, & Ehi-oshio, 2013b;Soliman & Elsalam, 2012; Hassan, 2013). Other studies report a negative or insignificant relationship

between board independence and audit quality (Matoussi & Gharbi, 2011; Ibadin, 2012; Hoseinbeglou,Masrori & Asadzadeh., 2013).

Conclusion

From the empirical examination of the hypotheses developed from the theoretical framework presented in this study we found that

1) Audit committee size has a positive effect on audit quality but the relationship was not significant.

2) Audit committee diligence was positively related to audit quality although the relationship was not significant

3) Audit committee independence has a positive but insignificant effect on audit quality.

4) Board size has a negative and significant effect on audit quality.

 5) Board diligence has a positive and significant effect on audit quality.

6) Board independence has a positive but insignificant effect on audit quality.

The results of our analysis, shows that there is a fairly significant influence of corporate governance characterists on audit quality. There is need

to mandate corporate governance practices that affect positively audit quality in Nigeria. These include optimum board size and board diligence.

.
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APPENDIX 1
List of Sampled Companies
S/N Company Auditors Audit Proportion Fin Proportion Total Annual Audit Board Total Assets Board Audit Board
Retained for Quality of Shares Expertise of of NEDs in Earnings/Total Committee Size #000 Independ- Commit- Diligence
more than owned by Audit Audit Assets Diligence ence tee Size
 10years=1 Directors Committee Committee
else 0 Chair

1 Chams 0 0 0.02% 0 0.666 0.325 2 7 8717393 0.86 6 4

Paints and Coatings

2 manufacturers Plc
1 0 77% 1 0.5 1.458 4 6 1995093 0.5 4 4

3 Julius Berger 1 1 12.51% 1 0.666 1.126 3 12 179034164 0.66 6 4

4 Dangote Cement Plc 1 1 0.17% 1 1 0.443 4 8 673666223 0.75 6 7

Trans Nationwide
5 Express Plc
0 0 33.56% 0 1 0.994 2 8 605067 0.88 4 5

6 Roads Nig. Plc 1 1 40.15% 1 0.5 1.575 3 5 2117973 0.6 4 3

7 Presco Plc 1 0 2.66% 0 1 0.402 4 10 28006505 0.8 6 4

8 Beta Glass Plc 0 1 0.04% 1 1 0.576 3 9 22456567 0.89 6 4

9 Nestle Food Plc 1 1 0.05% 1 0.666 1.919 4 8 60828397 0.63 6 4

10 Tantalizers Plc 0 0 38.51% 1 0.5 4.547 4 10 923360561 0.6 4 4

11 Grief Nig Plc 1 1 0.49% 1 1 1.049 3 5 713816 0.8 6 3

12 May and Baker Plc 0 1 38.30% 1 0.66 0.702 4 6 8069406 0.83 6 4

13 BOC Cases (Nig) Plc 1 1 0.07% 0 1 0.878 3 6 2648408 0.66 4 4

14 Triple GEE and CO 0 0 36.85% 0 0.5 0.36 3 6 1713203 0.83 4 2

15 Aluminum Extrusion 0 0 0.06% 0 1 1.073 2 9 1605396 0.89 4 4

Industries Plc
16 Multiverse Plc 1 0 30.93% 0 0.5 0.123 4 8 5488123 0.75 4 4

17 Conoil Plc 1 1 0.01% 0 0.33 1.81 4 7 83095975 0.42 6 7

18 Cutix Plc 0 0 11.50% 0 1 1.67 2 9 943686 0.89 6 4

19 BAGGO Plc 1 1 0.32% 0 0.66 0.995 3 11 24353687 0.73 6 4

20 UTC Nigeria Plc 0 1 8.90% 0 1 0.981 4 7 2852882 0.86 6 4

21 Portlands Paints 0 1 61.20% 1 1 1.2 5 5 2386022 0.8 4 8

22 Mobil Oil Nig Plc 1 1 0.03% 1 0.333 2.407 4 6 33563722 0.5 6 5

23 African Paints 1 0 26.26% 1 1 0.15 4 8 357122 0.88 6 4

first Aluminum Nigeria

24 Plc
0 0 0.67% 0 0.66 0.3 3 8 8770956 0.625 6 6

Courteville Business
25 Solutions Plc
1 0 71.77% 0 0.5 0.254 3 11 4178776 0.55 4 3

26 Dangote flour Mills 0 1 0.82% 0 1 0.758 4 10 77449018 0.8 6 5

27 John Holt Plc 0 0 1.60% 1 0.66 0.23 4 6 11923000 0.66 6 3

28 Premier Paints Plc 0 1 13.86% 0 0.66 0.88 3 9 291702 0.78 6 5

29 AG Leventis 1 1 0.77% 1 0.66 0.716 4 9 22784783 0.55 6 4

Cement Company of
30 Northern Nigeria Plc
0 0 0.15% 1 1 1.062 4 11 1241655.42 0.73 6 6
31 Total (Nig) Plc 1 1 0.28% 1 0.66 2.86 4 10 76067065 0.8 6 4

32 Academy Press 1 0 16.00% 0 0.66 0.81 4 9 2821876 0.66 6 5

33 Okomu Plc 0 0 5.29% 0 1 0.326 4 11 31054673 0.82 6 3

34 MRS Oil Plc 0 1 60.02% 0 0.66 1.434 5 6 55595688 0.66 6 5

35 Unilever Plc 1 1 0.18% 0 0.66 1.522 4 7 36497624 0.57 6 4

36 Cadbury Nig Plc 0 1 0.55% 1 0.66 0.835 3 7 40156508 0.71 6 5

37 Nigerian Breweries Plc 1 1 0.19% 1 0.66 1 4 12 253633629 0.5 6 5

38 Dangote Sugar 0 1 5.54% 1 1 1.287 5 9 83051450 0.89 6 6

National Salt company

39 of Nigeria Plc
0 1 3.47% 1 1 1.255 4 9 10689542 0.89 4 6

40 Red Star Plc 0 1 37.58% 0 1 2.19 4 7 2297305 0.71 4 4

UACN Property
41 Development Company 1 1 0.25% 1 0.5 0.169 4 8 71358619 0.75 4 6
Plc

International Breweries
42 Plc
1 0 4.96% 1 1 0.48 3 9 9911676 0.89 6 4

43 ABC Transport Plc 0 1 45.00% 0 0.5 1.23 2 6 3755272 0.66 4 4

44 Longman Plc 0 1 2.03% 1 1 0.68 5 10 5196239 0.7 6 4

45 Chellarams 0 0 59.34% 0 1 1.69 2 7 14831380 0.57 6 3

46 UACN Plc 1 1 1.44% 1 0.66 0.566 3 9 122975593 0.66 6 7

47 Pharma Deko Plc 0 0 41.74% 0 1 0.393 6 9 2782811 0.78 6 3

48 Juli Plc 0 0 74.64% 1 1 0.89 2 8 279314.66 0.875 4 1

49 Guinness Nig Plc 1 1 0.08% 0 1 1.232 5 12 102534172 0.83 6 4

50 OANDO Plc 1 1 1.98% 1 1 2.96 4 10 227319478 0.6 6 5

51 Lafarge Plc 1 1 0.08% 1 0.66 0.579 3 13 151948633 0.85 6 9

52 Forte Plc 0 0 40.04% 1 1 0.054 4 8 42512938 0.75 6 5

53 Transcorp Plc 0 1 27.60% 0 1 0.175 4 9 75604202 0.89 6 6

54 Honey Well Flour Mill 0 0 23% 0 1 0.847 4 9 44940080 0.78 6 5

55 R.T Briscoe Plc 0 1 8.41% 1 0.66 1.558 3 6 14114930 0.83 6 6

56 WAMCO Plc 0 1 0.84% 1 1 2.28 4 8 48685094 0.875 6 4

57 G S K Plc 1 1 1.27% 1 1 1.16 4 9 21792721 0.78 6 6

Champion Breweries
58 Plc
1 1 0.06% 0 1 0.263 3 9 6799200 0.89 4 3

59 Vita Foam Plc 0 1 16.89% 1 0.66 1.389 3 10 10423641 0.6 6 4

60 PZ Cussons Plc 0 1 0.17% 0 0.66 1.12 6 12 64406797 0.5 6 7

61 Nigerian Enamelware 0 1 0.97% 1 0.66 2.35 2 7 1058098 0.57 6 4

Plc
 Seven Up Bottling
62 Company Plc
0 1 0.65% 0 0.66 1.35 3 9 44330405 0.78 6 4

63 Flour Mills Nig Plc. 1 1 0.44% 1 0.33 1.11 5 14 232857369 0.86 6 5

64 Berger Paints Plc 1 1 5.10% 1 1 0.86 3 9 2906601 0.89 6 8

65 Thomas Wyatt 0 0 8.25% 1 1 0.182 3 6 672492 0.833 4 4

66 Studio Press 0 1 52.64% 0 0.66 0.73 4 6 7457961 0.66 6 5

67 Morison Industries Plc 0 0 11% 1 1 0.69 3 7 586090 0.86 4 4

68 CAP Plc 1 1 0.02% 1 0.66 1.82 4 7 2875802 0.71 6 6

69 D N Meyer Plc 0 1 9.34% 0 1 0.58 3 9 2581419 0.88 4 5

70 SCOA Plc 0 1 0.00% 1 0.66 0.9 4 10 7074635 0.8 6 4

71 Ashaka Cement Plc 1 0 0.06% 0 0.66 0.68 4 12 28125125 0.83 6 5

72 Eterna oil 0 1 29.31% 0 0.5 2.79 2 5 1471183 0.8 4 2

Japaul Maritime
73 Services
1 0 7.08% 1 0.66 0.376 4 9 27263607 0.66 6 4

Tourist Company of
74 Nig. Plc
0 1 31.26% 1 1 0.13 5 8 11088160 0.875 5 3

75 Costain Plc 0 1 0.31% 1 1 1.1 3 7 8724463 0.57 4 4

Avon Crown Caps and

76 Container Plc
1 0 2.66% 1 0.5 1.18 3 8 9909033 0.5 4 4

77 Nigerian Aviation 0 0 10.27% 0 1 60.00% 4 13 13599184 0.77 6 5

 Handling Company Plc

78 Learn Africa 0 1 6.12% 1 1 0.63 6 11 4605806 0.82 5 6

79 E Transact Plc 0 1 94.35% 0 1 1 3 9 3059173 0.77 6 6

80 Nigerian Ropes 0 0 0.05% 0 1 0.62 4 9 619204 0.66 4 4

81 Vono Plc 0 1 78.00% 1 1 0.37 3 6 1887393 0.83 6 4

82 Fidson Plc 0 1 45.10% 1 0.66 0.95 4 9 5379027 0.55 6 4

83 University Press 1 0 6.87% 1 1 0.78 4 10 2682337 0.7 6 4

84 Afromedia Plc 0 1 28.32% 0 1 8.36 2 6 1967278 0.66 4 6

Source: Field Survey, 2015

37