LEPL - Ivane Javakhishvili Tbilisi State University

Institute for European Studies

Beka Beriashvili

The Shift of the Foreign Policy of Germany and the War of Ukraine

Thesis is submitted as a partial fulfillment for the requirements of

Master Degree in European Studies

Supervisor: Associate Professor Konstantine Shubitidze

Tbilisi, 2023
 Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to reveal the key explanations of the foreign policy shift of
Germany and its connection with 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine. The main question and the
aim of the research is to find out what is the impact of Russia’s unprovoked and unjustified full-
scale invasion and war of Ukraine on the U-turn transformation of foreign and defense policy of
Germany. The paper also seeks to explore foreign policy development of Germany since the
Second World War and analyze key characteristics and behaviors of German foreign policy
during last seven decades. The research aims to explain how new reality and increased security
threats made Germany to change its foreign policy. After analyzing scientific literature, official
documents, statements and steps made by German leadership, the research also tries to reveal
its connection with the approach of neorealism of the international relations in order to
describe the major foreign policy shift of Germany.

Key words: Germany, Foreign Policy, Russian invasion of Ukraine, Defense policy, politics,
Security, European Union, Diplomacy, Policy Shift
Table of Contents
Introduction ............................................................................................................................................... 4
Chapter 1- Literature Review ..................................................................................................................... 7
Chapter 2- Theoretical framework - Neorealism.......................................................................................14
Chapter 3- Foreign policy of Germany after World War Two ..................................................................20
3.1. Konrad Adenauer and Westpolitik.............................................................................................21
3.2 Willy Brandt and Ostpolitik .......................................................................................................22
3.3 Helmut Kohl Era ........................................................................................................................24
Chapter 4 - Foreign policy of Germany after Unification .........................................................................27
4.1. Germany as a hegemon of the region and special relations with France....................................28
4.2. Role of Germany in international conflict of 1990s. ..................................................................32
4.3. Chancellorship of Gerhard Schröder ..........................................................................................34
4.4. Foreign policy of Angela Merkel ................................................................................................35
Chapter 5- German Foreign Policy After “Zeitenwende” .........................................................................46
5.1. 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine ..............................................................................................46
5.2. Olaf Scholz’s Zeitenwende speech .............................................................................................48
5.3. Sanctions adopted against Russia................................................................................................50
5.4. Military support of Germany for Ukraine ..................................................................................54
5.5. Analysis of the interview with Ambassador of Germany to Georgia, Peter Fischer ..................57
Chapter 6- Findings ...................................................................................................................................59
Chapter 7- Conclusions .............................................................................................................................61
Bibliography ..............................................................................................................................................63
Annexes: ................................................................................................................................................69
Introduction

Nowadays Germany represents one of the most powerful countries in Europe. It has largest
population on the continent and is fourth largest economy on the globe. Today Germany’s
foreign policy is multilateralism, as the country supports European integration and has close ties
with its trans-Atlantic partners.

Russian invasion of Ukraine is one of the biggest threats for the entire world and especially
for the European Union. For Germany, one of the leading countries of the EU, the war of
Ukraine is the biggest challenge it was faced to since the Second World War. New reality and
increased security threats made the country to change its foreign policy.

Methodology

The research is based on qualitative method by analyzing and observing the sources
connected to the research topic. The qualitative research methodology gives the opportunity to
explore the issue as deeper as possible and create the solid representation of the most effective
arguments. The present research is carried out according to the logic of inductive inquiry.

The data of the research topic are connected from primary and secondary sources which
involve official documents, scientific articles and books, as wells academic papers, official
statements of officials and scholars.

There is also used content analysis research method, which helps the author to systematically
categorize and analyze textual materials. Qualitative content analysis is a method of analyzing
textual material, which performs a detailed and systematic analysis and interprets texts of
specific content, themes or trends. Textual material can be presented in the form of printed or
electronic documents, audio or video material.

There is also used discourse analysis of a qualitative research method. This method examines
the written and oral texts taking into account their social context. The context can refer to the
social, political, cultural and historical background of the discourse. This method is especially
useful considering the continuality of the given research.

In order to make the research more valuable and add contribution the author also used an
interview as a qualitative research method. There is used the method of structured interview, as
the questions were prepared earlier. The author interviewed current ambassador of Germany to
Georgia, Peter Fischer.
 Major design of research is case study. This design gives the researcher the technique in
which he/she is faced with a particular problem or case and tries to explain it as much as
possible.

Hypothesis

For Germany, one of the leading countries of the EU, Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022
became the biggest challenge since the Second World War. For decades German foreign policy
was characterized with peaceful manner and with the idea not to be actively involved in
military conflicts. Current Russo-Ukrainian war had significantly affected the traditional
Ostpolitik policy of Germany. New reality and increased security threats made the country
overthrew and change its foreign policy.

Research question

The research question of the given thesis is what is the impact of 2022 Russia's invasion of
Ukraine on the change of foreign and defense policy of Germany?

Novelty

Russia's unprovoked and unjustified full-scale invasion and war in Ukraine on February 24 of
2022 completely changed the geopolitical situation in Europe. War in Europe and collective
answer to Russia’s aggression is the biggest challenge for Europe since the Second World War.
The given research aims to analyze recent changes of the foreign policy of Germany.
Considering the time frame this topic is not well studied yet and represents one of the first
attempts to scientifically analyze is.

Limitation

The research has its limitations due to the novelty of a given topic, as the Russo-Ukrainian
war which started in 2022 is still ongoing. Meanwhile the EU and particularly Germany are still
increasing pressure on Russia and regularly imposing sanctions to the aggressor state. The given
paper reflects the main research question based on the events occurred until the end of first part
of 2023.

Theoretical framework
 Theoretical framework gives the researcher opportunity to review existing theories that suits
best the particular research topic. It helps researcher to explain problematic issue, make
connections and create hypothesis related to the issue.

Analyzing scientific literature, official documents, statements and steps made by German
leadership, the author of the research believes that the approach of neorealism of the
international relations suits and describes best the major foreign policy shift of Germany.
According to neorealism, which is one of the dominant approaches of thought of international
relations, countries are acting in accordance to the reality and challenges they are faced.

Approach of neorealism in international relations emphasizes the role of power politics in

international relations, where conflicts and competitions are always taking place. One of
prominent researchers of neorealism is American political scientist Kenneth Waltz, whose
description of defensive realism best illustrates the behavior of German foreign policy.
According to his definition, most states seek to maintain status quo and balance of power. In
this case because of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, stability and security of Europe was in
danger that made Germany to shift its foreign policy. In other words, leadership of Germany
tried to maintain international order and its position in Europe by changing foreign policy.
Chapter 1- Literature Review

Main foundation of the foreign policy of Germany is multilateralism, as the country supports
European integration and has close ties with its trans-Atlantic partners. Also, Germany is
considered to be one the most influential player in the European Union. Only in four decades
after the Second World War West Germany managed to become a potential balancer in the
equilibrium of powers between East and West. In accordance with the geopolitical situation in
the world and leadership of the country, foreign and defense policy of Germany has been
changing from time to time.

According to Hanns W. Maull formation of the foreign policy of post-war West Germany
was based on five major elements. The author has analyzed the foreign policies of defeated post
allied countries Germany and Japan and he figured out the main characteristics of their foreign
policy paradigm (Maull, 2009).

First among them was a close alignment with America and the West. This policy included
creating and developing close ties with major western partners, who have been enemies of Nazi
Germany during the Second World War. These powers were the United States, France and
United Kingdom.

Second characteristic was military security through dependance on others. After the military
conflict defeated Germany was not aware to guarantee its security and former enemies would
not let the country to increase its military capability rapidly. Also, division of Germany and the
control of GDR (German Democratic Republic) by the Soviet Union created security problems
for the West Germany. Because of these the security of West Germany was dependant on the
United States. Additionally, the US military security was including nuclear guarantees that was
extremely important for the Cold War era.

Third characteristic was building domestic consensus. According to Maull, for the post-war
West Germany fundamental reorientation of security and foreign policy was not easily
understandable for ordinary population of the country. It was extremely difficult for the
leadership of Germany to persuade electorates to follow them and it took a lot of effort.

The fourth dimension was economic strategies without which building a successful foreign
policy would not be successful. Strong economy should be a guaranty of the satisfaction of the
ordinary voters. The economy of West Germany after the war can be described as successful
and the leadership managed to strengthen social stability. Integration with other European
countries was the main characteristic of the new German foreign policy, as interdependence
and interconnection would be the solution to prevent future wars and conflict.

The fifth and last element of West German Foreign policy was community building. This
dimension meant that new identity of Germany should not only been based on German identity
but to be part of bigger European community and be an integral part of Western European
culture with sharing the same values and identities of the continent.

While analyzing foreign policy of West Germany since the Second World War there has to
be discussed the key transitions the leadership of the country fulfilled in order to follow the
reality and changes made in the international post-war system. In German Foreign Policy:
change and continuity (1949-2000), Gül defines three major phases of the transition process of
German foreign policy (Gül, 2003). According to him first phase was extremely difficult for
Germany. This process was started after the Nazi surrender and the country was occupied by
United States, France, United Kingdom and Soviet Union. In order to decrease the capability of
Germany and restore its military power, former allies tried to demilitarize West Germany as
much as possible. Together they prepared a plan according to which they had to make it
difficult for West Germany to restore its economy and miliary without their involvement. The
US was mostly active to help Germany to restore but with increased US involvement, where the
US would control the economic and political life of West Germany, including the formation of
the foreign policy. However, parallel to this, the Soviet Union incorporated East Germany into
its orbit. It would be realistic to say the very soon the East Germany became a satellite state of
the Soviet Union similar to Easter European countries, like Poland, Czechoslovakia or Hungary.

The second phase of the foreign policy of the West Germany was characterized mostly with
cooperation with Western European countries and the US. During this period Western
countries realized the danger coming from the Soviet Union and they tried to find a common
language with the descendant of former enemy. Also, the leadership of Western Germany tried
its best to deepen cooperation with the West and support the idea of European integration
process. From early 1950s West Germany with its partners established several treaties and
union to make countries interdependent and prevent the possibility of future wars.

One of the most important among them was the European Coal and Steel Community
established in 1951 in Paris by Belgium, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and West
Germany. After decades the organization's continuous enlargement in members and
responsibilities ultimately led to the creation of the European Community and later the
European Union. Another important agreements of reached by the West Germany were the
European Defense Community and European Political Community treaties which have been
adopted in 1952 and 1953. After signing them it will be correct to say that the West Germany
became a full-fledged member of the Western countries.

For the security of West Germany, the year of 1955 was extremely important. This year it
became a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Germany and NATO; NATO’S
COLD WAR FRONTIER IN EUROPE, n.d.). The process of accession was not easy because as
Germany was split into two parts and it was the first time in the history of the alliance to accept
a new member whose territories were divided. At the same time, it was a huge step for
Germany because from this moment the security of the country would be protected by a strong
alliance and attack on the West Germany would mean attack on the whole alliance. This was a
significant achievement for the country and for its defense and security capabilities.

Third phase of West Germany’s security development was established 194 by London and
Paris. This year the troops of West Germany were integrated in the amalgamated European
force. This means that from that time West Germany was more integrated into the Western
European countries and trust between them was more or less restored. From this time West
Germany had a news and better position because the country was more respected and it already
could represent its national defense and also could play its part in the security of another
European countries.

According to Gul after the unification of the country major features of German foreign policy
can be cited as follows (Gül, 2003):

Major policy objective of Germany was fundamental support of European integration and the
idea of culturally, politically and economically united Europe. United Germany was actively
supported Euro-Atlantic integration and the process of enlargement of the EU and NATO.
Another feature was economic and monetary union of the European Union. In 1991 Maastricht
Treaty was adopted and EMU was established, where Germany was one of the initiators and
played crucial role. Except of EUM, Germany also participated in the process of creation of
European Central Bank (ECB) (Larres, 1998).

Next major feature of the economic and foreign policy of Germany was free trade, as
traditionally Germany supporting liberal trade policy. After the unification process this aspect
has not changed and step by step former East Germany started to adapt liberal trade policy.

Historically relationship with France has always been extremely important for Germany. In
West Europe France has been the biggest power and especially after the Second World War
Franco-German relation moved to new dimension which was European integration. France
and Germany as the biggest and most powerful countries of the continent were key partners of
the integration process. Mostly the views of German and French leadership were similar and
the two countries acted cooperatively. Very often smaller countries of Europe had some
tensions with bigger ones and in this situation Franco-German cooperation was extremely
important to overcome these obstacles. Only between 1982 and 1992 French President and
German Chancellor met 115 times (Heurlin, 1996). This underlines the deep cooperation
between the countries. As Heurlin emphasizes without normalizing relations with France
transformation of Germany into the European institutions would be impossible, because France
has been one of the strongest countries in Europe which was always considered as the main
competitor of Germany on the continent. If these two countries would not find a common
language and understanding peaceful integration of Europe would not last for long. Mutual
trust between them created a fundament for further European integration and building trust
among them.

As Gul rightfully mentions one of the key features of German foreign policy is relationship
with the United States. During the Cold War period former enemies developed cooperative
relationships against common threats coming from the East. In 1990s even through the Cold
War was over, Soviet Union collapsed and Berlin Wall was destroyed two countries continue to
cooperate closely on international arena.

Since 1990s supporting of Central and Eastern European countries was one of key dimension
of German foreign policy. As the Iron Curtain did not exist anymore Germany believed that
Central and Eastern European countries should integrate into the European institutions. As the
leadership of the country believed closer relations with these countries would be mutually
beneficial for both sides. Consequently, with the support of Germany and other key players in
2004 the EU was faced with the largest enlargement in history as, ten more countries of Eastern
and Central Europe became members of the union (The 2004 enlargement: the challenge of a
25-member EU, 2007).

Next feature of German foreign policy is the budgetary problem as the country is considered
to be the biggest contributor of the EU economy that is sometimes a topic of debated in German
society. Some political parties of the country also believe that the role of German contribution
into the union’s economy should be reduced.

According to Gul the final dimension of the foreign policy of Germany is free movement of
people who have the opportunity to work in Germany. Since World War Two Germany
accepted several millions of migrants, some of them stayed in the country for particular time
and some moved for live. According to 2019 data, nowadays around 13.7 million people are
living in Germany, or about 17% of the population, who are first-generation immigrants.
 Defining foreign policy of Germany in 1990s Harnisch describes three main schools, which
try to analyze main assumptions and changes of the policy.

Shifts in international power structures – collapse of the Soviet Union and unification of
Germany made leadership of Germany to be more independent on European and international
arena. After the unification Germany became dominant country of the European institutions
where it tried to increase its influence (Hellmann, 1997).

The degree of international embeddedness – in 1990s Germany was one of the leading
countries of the Western community. Germany as member of the most important and
influential international organizations, such as the NATO, the EU and the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) (Banchoff, 1993).

The stability of its socially constructed foreign policy culture- expressing the desires and
perspectives of Germany based on its identity and seeing its role in the international politics.

Eruption of Russian-Ukrainian conflict of 2014 became one of the biggest challenges for
Germany since the World War Two. This conflict showed that for the first time in decades
Germany took the position of a leader. For this time main center of cooperation and discussion
of the Western countries was not Brussels, Washington or Paris, but Berlin.

According to German foreign policy analyst Ulrich Speck there were three main reasons why
Germany took the leading role in the crisis (Speck, German Power and the Ukraine Conflict,
2015). First, the economic and political power of Germany was rising since reunification. Also,
it had a central location in Europe.

Second, the military conflict had great importance for Germany, as war was entirely against
the foreign policy direction of the country, which supported cooperation and deepening
interdependence.

Third explanation was that there was no one to take the position of the leaders. Paris,
London and Brussels were weakened that time and Washington was too far from the continent.
Also, it was a right time for Germany to leave the position of formerly divided country and rise
up its leadership.

According to André Härtel, Germany’s foreign policy approach towards Russia and the Post-
Soviet region traditionally has been rested on three pillars. They are a strong transatlantic
relationship, European integration and multilateralism (Härtel, 2014).

Speck rightfully mentions another important factor of German active leadership. This is
personal dimension of Angela Merkel, who grew up in Eastern Germany – a satellite country of
the Soviet Union. She experienced live in Soviet occupation and the division of her homeland.
That factor also led her to go against war and division in Europe and never return to military
conflict, humanitarian crisis and destruction.

One more factor that helped Germany to become a leader during Russian-Ukrainian crisis
was the policy of the United States leadership. President of the US Barack Obama has always
been supporting the idea of sharing responsibilities and global burden as Germany and the US
were “partners in leadership”. When Obama saw the willingness of Angela Merkel to be the
main mediator, he only welcomed this process (Packer, 2014). For him the United States had to
reduce its influence towards Europe and European countries had to be able to protect
themselves and share the responsibility.

According to Stephen M. Walt, since Germany reunited leadership of the county was trying
to maintain multilateral policy and cooperate partners and also find a common language with
other countries with whom Germany did have some unsolved issues (Walt, 2022; ). He notes
that first of all Germany managed to maintain good cooperative relations with the United
States. There were several issues when Germany was opposing the US, e.g., the U.S. decision to
invade Iraq in 2003, but overall, the countries are still closest partners.

Second aspect of German foreign policy paradigm for Walt is that official Berlin maintained
working relations with Russia. In spite of the fact that Russia seized Crimea in 2014 Germany
continued importing natural resources and even deepened economic ties with Moscow. Before
February 2022 Germany was Russia’s second-largest trade partner. Dependence of Germany to
Russian natural gas increased after that Nord Stream 1 pipeline was completed.

The third characteristic is that Germany has stabilized relations with China which is
Germany’s largest trading partner nowadays. Also, China views Germany as the strongest
power in Europe as economically, as well politically. Due to the fact that Chine is extremely
interested in the European market as its largest exporting region, official Beijing gives
significant importance to the relation with Germany, which is the strongest country of the
European Union, as politically as well as economically.

Merkel’s main understanding of the solvation of most global basic problems was multilateral
cooperation and by dialogue between the conflictual sides (Rinke, 2022). As chancellor Merkel
believed the key of future peace and stability is economic and political interdependence.
According to her understanding, countries have to be integrated to each other so much that war
and confrontation between them should become almost impossible, as starting a military
conflict has to be too much unprofitable for that country which intends to start a war.

Main characteristic of foreign policy during Merkel’s leadership was deepening cooperation
with its Western partners, especially with the European Union and NATO. Also, she played a
central role in the most important negotiations of the European Union. Among them the most
significant ones were the Treaty of Lisbon (Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European
Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community, 2009 ) and the Berlin Declaration
( Declaration on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the signature of the Treaties of Rome,
2007 ). These treaties played crucial role in the formation of contemporary European Union.
 Chapter 2- Theoretical framework - Neorealism

Theoretical framework gives researcher the opportunity to review existing theories that suits
best the particular research topic. It helps researcher to explain problematic issue, make
connections and create hypothesis related to the issue.

Analyzing scientific literature, official documents, statements and steps made by German
leadership, the author of the research believes that the approach of neorealism of the
international relations suits and best describes the major foreign policy shift of Germany. In
this part of the research there is discussed realism as a theory of international relations, its
development, main ideas and connection to the given research.

Classical realism is one of the most common theories of the international relations.
According to this theory main subjects of international relations are states, which have their
own national interests and are concerned with their security. Their main goal is to pursuit their
national interests and are acting in accordance with it. The main factor that determines realism
is political, economic or military power and is based on the balance on powers into considering
international law and moral.

Speaking about classical realism there have to mention several prominent authors who
developed this theory. Origins of realism starts from ancient China. Chinese military leader and
theorist Sun Tzu who created a famous work named “The Art of War” argues that moral
thinking is not always useful for rulers and advises them to use force to satisfy their own
interests. (Tzu)

Greek soldier and historian Thucydides can be considered as a thinker of the same period,
who in his work "History of the Peloponnesian War" described the military conflict between
two Greek city-states, Sparta and Athens. It is important to mention that unlike other historians
of his time, Thucydides not only described the course of war, but focused on its root causes. He
was investigating generally, why the wars are taking place and what causes them to start. He
concluded that the cause of the war between the two city-states was the growth of Athenian
power, and a corresponding increase in fear of Sparta, which forced Sparta to arm itself. For the
period of ancient Greece Thucydides introduces the concepts of balance of power and political
alliances. In his works the historian is interesting for the field of international relations, because
he talks about fear not as a characteristic of human nature, but as an element of relations
between the states (Thucydides).

Niccolò Machiavelli, who worked as a civil servant until the fall of the Republic of Florence
(1512), is another influential and inspirational author of realism. He wrote a lot about the role
of personnel, the balance of power, the formation of alliances, the causes of conflicts, etc. For
Machiavelli, the survival of the state was the most important thing. In his most significant work
“The Prince” he talks about how to gain, maintain and expand power. The criticism of
Machiavelli and the Machiavellians is related to the view he developed that for the sake of the
security of the state, the ruler can commit such actions that would be morally unjustified for an
ordinary citizen. Machiavelli also writes some useful advice for domestic government, saying
that if a ruler has to choose between love and fear on the part of his servants, he should choose
fear. A ruler can be cruel if this trait makes his people loyal and united. Supporters of
Machiavelli's ideas say that he wrote about the world as it exists and the environment in which
rulers have to act, not about how it should be (Mansfield).

Another important thinker in the realist tradition is Thomas Hobbes, who lived during the
most difficult period, when there was civil strife in England. These events naturally had a great
influence on Hobbes's thinking. In 1641 he went to France as a royalist, and on his return in
1651 pledged allegiance to the newly created republic. In the same year, he published the work
"Leviathan". Hobbes had a pessimistic view of human nature and believed that a supreme
authority was necessary to ensure the safety of all citizens. Although Hobbes's "war of all
against all" should be considered in the context of the domestic political level, his contribution
is also important for international relations, because as in the "State of nature" described by
Hobbes, there is no center of power in international politics to protect the states from each
other. So, according to him anarchy is a phenomenon in international politics (Hobbes).

Classical realism of international relations became a dominant theory in the XX century. It

was born in response of the idealist perspective that was dominant theory after the First World
War. The idealists believed that it was possible to build peace and prevent another bloody
conflict in Europe in 1920s and 1930s. They thought that humanist ideas and morality could
prevent future wars and countries could leave peacefully together. But the beginning of the
Second World War clearly showed that unfortunately, the ideas of idealism did not work and
overlapping interests of dominant players became a basis of new global war.

The most influential authors of XX century realism are E. H. Carr and Hans Morgenthau. In
his major work „The Twenty Years' Crisis: 1919–1939: An Introduction to the Study of
International Relations” (Carr, 1939), which was published in July 1939, Edward Carr criticizes
idealism and calls is a utopian idea, because in practice and real life it does not work. Cari
criticizes the idealistic and utopian views that prevailed in Europe after the First World War.
Unlike the classical realists, however, he writes that true politics must be based on values as
much as on power.

Another important figure in the field of international relations of the last century is Hans
Morgenthau, whose work "Politics among Nations" covers all aspects of international politics,
from the influence of human nature to the nature of the international system. Morgenthau is
famous for formulating the 6 principles of realism, the main idea of which was that politics is an
absolutely autonomous field and is driven by interests that are satisfied through force, and the
ethics of its conduct are very different from human morality.

Based on the opinion of these historians, military figures, scientists or intellectuals, we can
formulate the 5 major assumptions on which the realist theory is based:

1. States are the main actors and therefore they represent the main objects of study. As for
other actors (non-governmental, international organizations, corporations, etc.), although they
aspire to more power, they still do not present independent players;

2. The state is a unitary actor, meaning that it stands as one integrated subject in the
international system. No matter how much tension there is in the country the state still
maintains an orderly position.

3. The state is a rational actor that always makes the decision that its leaders think is best
based on the given situation. Obviously, this does not mean that any decision will always bring
good results, it should be taken into account that the managers act in conditions of incomplete
information, therefore the probability of mistakes is high.

4. National security is the most important issue for the state. Security, military and strategic
topics are always in the first place for the ruler.

5. States operate in such a context where there is no central government, therefore the
environment is anarchic, actors have complete freedom of action, as long as other similar
elements do not interfere.

The main difference between realism and neorealism is that classical realism posits human
nature as predisposed to dominance in explaining the causes of war, but school of neorealism
downplays the human claim and believes that it is caused by the anarchy of international
system (Waltz, 2000).

According to neorealism, which is a dominant approach of international relations, countries

are acting in accordance to the reality and challenges they are faced. Theory of neorealism in
international relations emphasizes the role of power politics in international relations, where
conflicts and competitions are always taking place (Neorealism in Political Realism in
International Relations, 2017).

Neorealism or structural realism is a leading approach of international relations, which

considers the structural characteristics of the international system as the determinant of global
relations, and not the constituent parts of this system. One of the prominent scholars of
neorealism is Kenneth Waltz. According to him the nature of the global system best describes
the behavior of states, not in the contrary. By demonstrating the unity of the international
political system, neorealism pays significant importance to the autonomy of international
politics. This autonomy of interfaith politics allows for a theoretical generalization of the
characteristics of international relations. The approach of neorealism took much from classical
realism. According to it, states are rational actors and key factor in international politics is
power.

Unlike realism, neorealism pays more attention to the nature of the configuration of the
international system, rather then the behavior of states. The order of the international system
determines the actions, behavior and interaction of states. Main competitor of neorealism in the
theory of international relations is neoliberalism.

The role of Kenneth Waltz to the field of political science in the creation of neorealism is
significant. Waltz repeatedly emphasizes in his book “Realism and International Politics” that
actions of particular states are connected to the particular situation and circumstances and they
can be changed from time to time. For him neorealism can be divided into two parts, which are
defensive and offensive.

According to Waltz defensive realism believes that states are seeking to maintain the status
quo and are forced to concentrate on maintaining the balance of power in the region they are
represented. While offensive neorealism tries to explain the process when countries are willing
to reach hegemony over neighboring states and become more powerful.

Kenneth Waltz description of defensive realism best describes the behavior of German
foreign policy. According to his definition, most states seek to maintain status quo and balance
of power. In this case because of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, stability and security of
Europe appeared in danger that made Germany to shift its foreign policy. In other words,
leadership of Germany tried to maintain international order and its position in Europe by
changing foreign policy.

According to Waltz the international system is more stable when there are fewer dominant
players. As the number of strong powers increase the international system becomes more
anarchic and chaotic and separation of territories and spheres of influence creates new wars and
conflicts. With this logic, he believed that the bipolar world of the second part of the XX
century was the most stable. There have been two strongest global players the United States and
the Soviet Union. Waltz noted that except of tension and being into two hostile camps
international system was more stable and global wars were prevented.
 There has to mentioned the process of regional hegemony, which in international relations
means that one particular country politically, economically or military is stronger in
comparison to its neighbors. This country is a dominant player and its relatively weak
neighbors are under the influence of this state. The goal of this particular state is to maintain its
status quo and the balance of power it achieved in the region. Any major change in the
international politics can be dangerous for such state, because it may lose its dominant position
and usually such sates are trying to get rid from global wars or events that can damage their
position and lose the status of a regional player.

As mentioned above the behavior and steps made by the German leadership makes us think
that Russian unprovoked and aggressive invasion on Ukraine made unfavorable situation for
Germany. At the moment of February 2022 Germany was a dominant political and economic
power of the European Union while the behavior of Russia caused the foreign policy shift of
Germany without which international order that Germany was building during decades would
collapse easily. This means that Germany did not have any other choice rather than change its
foreign policy direction it was maintaining since World War Two. Imposing strong economic
sanctions to Russia, providing Ukraine with military equipment, increasing the budged of
military expenditure and others steps made by Germany were unexpected for most of
politicians.

According to the theory of realism main subjects of international relations are states, which
have their own national interests and are concerned with their security. Their main goal is to
pursuit their national interests and are acting in accordance with it. This explains well the
behavior of Germany after Russian invasion of Ukraine. It is hard to predict what would happen
if Germany had not changed its foreign policy, but most probably it would lose its status quo
and dominant position in Europe.

From the theoretical part mentioned above the steps that the leadership of Germany made
are practical implementations of defensive realism, according to which states are seeking to
maintain the status quo and are forced to concentrate on the balance of power in the region.

To understand and explain the German reaction and behavior after Russian invasion we have
to remember that, neorealism pays more attention to the nature of the configuration of the
international system, rather than the behavior of states. The international system determines
the actions, behavior and interaction of states. This theoretical process well represents the
foreign policy shift of Germany.

In order to explain the behavior of the leadership of Germany geopolitical situation of

contemporary Europe has to be analyzed. As already mentioned up nowadays Germany is the
strongest country of European Union as economically as well politically. For the decision-
making of the EU a lot is dependent on what position will Germany have about any particular
issues. The challenges and processed that were followed after the Russian invasion of Ukraine in
February 2022 Germany did not have any other choice rather than make a significant shift of its
peaceful foreign policy and become more active and stricter towards Russia. Without these
steps Germany would lose its dominant position in the European Union and all the influence
and economic ties Germany had would disappear. That was the main motive of the behavior of
Germany. Kenneth Waltz’s defensive realism explains well the steps and actions made of
Germany since Russian invasion of Ukraine of 2022.
 Chapter 3- Foreign policy of Germany after World War Two

Nowadays Germany is considered to be the most powerful country in Europe. It has largest
population on the continent and is fourth largest economy on the globe. Today Germany’s
foreign policy is multilateralism, as the country supports European integration and has close ties
with its trans-Atlantic partners. Also, Germany is considered to be one the most influential
player in the European Union (Mello, 2020).

Only in four decades after the Second World War West Germany managed to become a
potential balancer in the equilibrium of powers between East and West; the country had
significant economic achievements and became a major power for of the European Union only
in 40 years after the Second World War.

In accordance with the geopolitical situation in the world and leadership of the country
foreign and defense policy of Germany had been changing from time to time.

The World War II and its consequences marked an important change of the international
system as there was a significant change of borders around the world and especially in Europe.
Bi-polar world and redrawn borders has significant impact on the fate of many nations.

The results of the World War II, as the bloodiest conflict in the history of humankind was a
major system change not only for Germany itself, as well as for the whole world. Consequences
of the war were extremely difficult for Germany because of its militaristic and aggressive polity
before and during the military conflict. The country was defeated and discredited as one of the
initiators of military aggression. That time territory of Germany was occupied and divided by
the allied powers. The future of Germany after the country surrendered in the war was the
most important of all European questions. Considering the future threats France was actively
initiation for Germany to be “demilitarized, decentralized and deindustrialized” (Dinan, 2010)).

At the same time the leadership of France realized the threat coming from Soviet Union and
to build secured and stabile Europe there was a need of strong and integrated Germany.
European integration process was initiated by the United States and aimed to reconstruct the
continent after the bloody and terrible military conflict. This policy was called European
Recovery Program.

Wolfram Hanrieder best describes the newly established relations between the US and West
Germany. According him central feature of Post-war West German foreign policy was the
relationship with the United States and this relation was paradoxical. On the one hand the US
was the main guarantor of the free personal liberties and constitutional safeguards of the
country, but on the other hand, West Germany was not free to formulate and implement its
independent foreign policy (Hanrieder, 1989).

3.1. Konrad Adenauer and Westpolitik

One of the leaders of Germany who played an important role to shape foreign and security
policy of the country was Konrad Adenauer. In 14 August of 1949 federal elections were held in
West Germany. With Free Democrats (FDP) and the Deutsche Partei (DP), Adenauer’s
Christian Democratic Party (CDU/CSU) formed a coalition. The New Chancellor of Germany
played crucial role to normalize relation with Western countries and started a new era of the
country. Adenauer realized that in order to break the legacy with the Third Reich and not to be
associated with them it was extremely important to integrate with Western institutions and
become a major part of Western European cultural and political system (Gül, 2003). He believed
that it was the only way for Germany to become a full-fledged member of the western
community and be accepted as an equal and respected partner by the Western powers.

Meanwhile Adenauer considered that by integration and making the Western Europe
stronger and more peaceful one day Soviet Union would grant East Germany to unify with the
Western Germany and finally the country would reunify again. But if West Germany would
fail to normalize relations with its European neighbors, reunification with the East would be
extremely difficult and almost impossible. According to Frank Pfetsch consolidation with the
West and strengthening western values was directly connected with collapse of the Soviet
dominance in Europe, including Eastern Germany (Pfetsch, 1988).

Lately the foreign policy of German Chancellor was called as Westpolitik. As Adenauer
defined it this policy included cooperation with the West and making West Germany as
integral and major part of this unity. Integration with Western Organizations would restore
trust in neighbors and restore confidence of the country. Relations with France was the most
important part of this approach. Starting cooperation from new chapter with the largest and
influential country was the goal of Germany’s foreign policy. To sum up, in Adenauer’s new era
supranationalization and westernization of West Germany were main pillars of new foreign
policy.

The policy of supranationalization implied to refuse strong nationalistic ideas of foreign

policy that was one of the characteristics of German foreign policy for years. Adenauer believed
that instead of being an ordinary member of the Western unions Germany should become a
leading champion and initiator of integrations.

While the Westernization policy included developing closer relations with the Euro-Atlantic
neighbors. This policy included philosophical and ideological values that were common for
West Germany and the rest of Europe and the US.

Chancellor Adenauer was deeply skeptical about the idea, that Germany should maintain
neutrality between the East and West. He believed that West Germany lacked political
maturity and circumspection to do so and tried to prevent his successors to refuse such
neutrality (Hanrieder, 1989)

Adenauer’s reunification policy was relatively more passive towards Moscow of we compare
it to the policy towards Washington. He did not want to recognize the existence of the German
Democratic Republic at all, because he considered GDR and temporarily occupied territories of
Germany. Adenauer was sure that the unification of Germany would happen only by closing
ties with the US and in the policy to more or less neutral and balance West and East.

After Konrad Adenauer, Ludwig Erhard and later Kurt Georg Kiesinger were elected as the
Chancellors of West Germany. Overall, their direction of foreign policy mainly was unchanged
and can be characterized as western oriented.

3.2 Willy Brandt and Ostpolitik

In 1960s it became clear that continuation of Adenauer’s foreign policy direction was not
successful anymore and West Germany needed to be initiator to normalize relations with the
East and they should be the first ones who would put the first step in Soviet-West German
relations.

Some major changes were made after Kiesinger, when Willy Brandt was elected as the next
Chancellor of West Germany who maintained the position from 1969 till 1974. New Chancellor
followed the same policy as Adenauer but also tried to improve the relations with the Eastern
Bloc. His goal was to minimize the threats coming from the Soviet Union as much as possible.
Brandt realized that the unification of West and East Germany would not be possible without
normalizing relations with the Eastern Block. Brandt’s foreign policy dimension was later
described as Ostpolitik (Ash, 1993). Brandt’s attempt was to restore relations between West and
East Germans who have been divided since the war.

While Adenauer and his successor Erhard’s administration were not focused on closing
relations with the Soviet Union and the Eastern Block, this policy was changed during Willy
Brandt. Brandt’s and his Social-Liberal coalition’s Ostpolitik were a major shift from the policy
of his forerunners as he believed that without normalizing relations with the East unification of
Germany would be impossible.

There has to mentioned that except of Brandt’s Ostpolitik strategy the Chancellor maintained
and even deepened cooperation with the Western alliance. Main pillar of West German foreign
and security policy was unchanged, the country was continuation to be one of the major and
active country of the Western alliance. In other words, Brandt’s main direction of foreign
policy was to normalize relations with the Eastern Bloc but at the same time maintain
unchanged relations with the Western allies. As Gul rightfully evaluates, in comparison with
Adenauer’s Westpolitik, Brandt’s Ostpolitik should be described as the West Germany’s
opening window to the East (Gül, 2003). For the Chancellor cooperation with both sides was
crucially important to unify the country.

Changed policy of the leadership of Germany to balance between East and West was not
completely new and it had some common characteristic with the nineteenth-century
Bismarck’s policy who managed to increase peace and stability in the Europe. This was caused
by the bipolar international system on the globe and Germany could not neglect the existence
of the Eastern Block (Erb, 2003). One more success achieved during Brandt’s leadership was
that in 1973 Federal Republic of Germany became a member of the United Nations (Geiss,
1996).

On the position of the Chancellor of West Germany Willy Brandt spent only five years. His
resignation was not connected to his own desire, but because of a scandal according to which
Chancellor’s personal adviser, Günter Guillaume, was working for the German Democratic
Republic as a spy and he gathered intelligence information for East Germany's secret service
(Michels, 2013).

Foreign policy of West Germany was slightly changed after new Chancellor Helmut Schmidt
was elected. He served as the leader of the country from 1974 to 1982. In comparison with Will
Brandt, Schmidt believed that continuation of Ostpolitik was important, but there should be
more focus on the partnership of Western Countries. Also, instead the focus to deepen the
relations with the Soviet Union, attempt should be made to East-West German relations. He
believed that the role of West Germany in international politics had to be balance between
superpowers and to negotiate with all sides. Such policy helped Germany to build strong
economy and the country got benefits with international trade. Only from 1969 to 1979, just in
10 years, the trade between West Germany and the Soviet Union increased six times.

Schmidt’s foreign policy had some similar features with the Chancellor of the German
Empire Otto von Bismarck, who believed that the role of Germany in international politics was
to be an “honest broker” between East and West and the country should get all benefits (Shafiq,
2020).

Schmidt believed that in order to maintain peace and security in Europe the United States of
America and Soviet Union balance their military capabilities on the continent. There has to be
mentioned that Schmidt’s main focus on Western orientation did not mean that during his
leadership Ostpolitik was shifted and not paid attention. In order to normalize relations with
the Soviet Union in 1980 he visited Moscow and met the Soviet leadership. In other words,
Schmidt main direction of foreign policy was to bargain with both superpowers and persuade
them that West Germany has intention to cooperate with both sides. There were some topics,
when he was dissatisfied with the decision of Soviet leadership, as invasion of Afghanistan for
instance, but at the same time West Germany was keeping economic relations with the SU as
before.

The years of Helmut Schmidt’s leadership were challenging also because of the geopolitical
circumstance of Europe. In 1980s Soviet Union decided to modernize its nuclear arsenal. This
threat was extremely worrying for West Europe and especially for West Germany which was
located in the center of the region. Helmut Schmidt managed to convince the US and NATO
leadership to modernize nuclear arsenal and also start negotiation with the Soviet Union in
order both sides do decrease the amount of intermediate nuclear missiles (Erb, 2003). Finally,
Schmidt managed to convince the US leadership and increasing threat coming from the Soviet
Union nuclear arsenal was slightly reduced.

3.3 Helmut Kohl Era

New era of the foreign policy of Germany started in 1982. After federal elections Christian
Democrats managed to form a coalition with the FDP and Helmut Kohl became the next
Chancellor of the country.
 The main characteristic of Kohl’s leadership was multidimensionality as the Chancellor tried
to focus on several key factors at the same time. First of all, he absolutely shared Adenauer’s
main priority to integrate with the West. Being an active member of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization was one of his priorities. Another feature was European Integration. From the
Second World War to 1980s lots of attempts were made for European Integration. It was clear
the European Community was becoming more and more important and new countries were
becoming its members. Kohl realized that Germany was one of the leading members of the
Union and he tried to increase the interconnection of European states. And finally, Ostpolitik
remained one of his main priorities as it was clear that without normalizing relations with the
Soviet Union unification of Germany would not take place.

Except of Helmut Kohl there has to mention other influential figure of German leadership
who played active role in the formation the foreign policy of the country. Hans-Dietrich
Genscher who became foreign minister of West Germany in 1974, believed that the threat
coming from the SU must be taken into consideration seriously. He demanded for Western
leaders to focus on Gorbachev’s reform seriously as there were major changes in the politics
inside the Soviet Union.

With Chancellor Kohl, Hans-Dietrich Genscher one of the creators of Germany’s

multidimensional policy. Genscher also believed in order to be strong, Western European unity
had to be based on Franco-German relations, as these two countries were the biggest and most
influential members of European Community. On the position of foreign minister he stayed
almost two decades.

The most important event of German after the World War II people happened during the
leadership of Helmut Kohl. In 1989 the Hungarian border to Austria opened. This gave a chance
to thousands of Germans living in East Germany to go to West Germany. There were some
families who did not have chance to see each other since the Berlin Wall was built. Also,
thousands of people left East Germany as because they did not have desire to live in East
Germany.

The Collapse of the Berlin Wall was an unexpected moment and it took place on November
9 1989. Chancellor Kohl has the initiative to present a ten-point proposal for the unification of
the country. He believed that there should be created a federal republic that would finish the
division of the country. The problem in this situation was different position of former allies.
The Soviet Union was strongly opposing this idea because of the threat of creation of the “Forth
Reich”, while France and United Kingdom had some concerns. The United States was the only
country among them which strongly supported the process of German reunification (Gül,
2003).

Finally, with the support of the US president George Bush and Foreign Minister James Baker,
Chancellor Kohl and Foreign Minister Genscher managed to convince the Soviet Union Present
Mikhail Gorbachev to agree on the reunification of Germany in January of 1990.

In May of 1990 a treaty was signed between the East and West Germany. The governments
of GDR and FRG signed the treaty of economic and social union. This process was extremely
important for the unification of the country, because for more than four decades the two
Germanies had completely different ways of development and economic systems. This process
was extremely important in order to make them closer.

Another important achievement of Kohl’s leadership was signing an agreement about

withdrawing Soviet troops between the Soviet Union and the West Germany. According to the
agreement Soviet troops had to leave East Germany as soon as possible. According to official
date at the end of 1991 there were about 338 000 Soviet soldiers in East Germany in 116
different exercise areas. Also, on the territory of GDR there were approximately 4,200 tanks,
8,200 armored vehicles, 690 aircraft and 680 helicopters (Zabecki, 2014).
Chapter 4 - Foreign policy of Germany after Unification

On 30th of August 1990 Article 45 of The Unification Treaty of East and West Germany was
signed and after forty-five years of division the country was finally unified. German unification
and the end of the Cold War were important international events for the identity of Germany.
From that time bi-polar world system was over and the period when West Germany had to
balance between West and East was gone. There has to be mentioned that this time the
unification process of Germany took place without war and blood and had peaceful manner.

In the treaty of unification which was called “Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to
Germany” it was highlighted that united country would develop peaceful relations with
neighbors and would prevent aggression and war: “The Governments of the Federal Republic of
Germany and the German Democratic Republic reaffirm their declarations that only peace will
emanate from German soil. According to the constitution of the united Germany, acts tending
to and undertaken with the intent to disturb the peaceful relations between nations, especially
to prepare for aggressive war, are unconstitutional and a punishable offence. The Governments
of the Federal Republic of Germany and the German Democratic Republic declare that the
united Germany would never employ any of its weapons except in accordance with its
constitution and the Charter of the United Nations” (Article 2 of the Two Plus Four Treaty;
Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany; , 1990 ).

After the unification of Germany, it was clear the new leadership of the country would be
more active on international arena. Soviet Union was the biggest security threat for German
people in the second part of XX century and after its dissolution German leadership already
could focus on another important issues.

German foreign policy in 1990s generally can be characterized as more active, open and
involved in global affairs. Germany was actively cooperation with its European and Euro-
Atlantic partners as never before.

There are different views and perspectives about the main features and directions of the
foreign policy of Germany. According to most widely spread idea foreign policy can be
described as “modified continuity”, meaning that after unification the leadership of Germany
tried to reach integration as between former West and East Germany as well in the European
integration. This policy meant that the leadership of united Germany was continuing the policy
of West Germany as the country tried to cooperate closer with the United States and Western
European Countries. After the unification this foreign policy direction was slightly modified
but its main features remained unchangeable.

Moreover, there can be said that after unification western countries and most importantly its
neighbors did not consider Germany as a country which can attack them and their relation is
more cooperative. Also, after unification German leadership had a dilemma about the issue of
responsibility to the world and the question – does Germany have responsibility to interfere in
the conflicts in neighboring countries and on the globe generally (Haftendorn, 1996).

There has to be mentioned the problems newly united country was faced. Except of the joy
of unification there were problems, which were hard to predict before 1990s. After the
unification of the country there have been several difficulties in Germany, most of them were
economical. To overcome inequality between the former West and East Germanies the country
had to spend a lot. Former East Germany was rather less developed, with thousands of
unemployed and not favorable social welfare systems. Because of the economic policy of the
Soviet Union where market was fully controlled by the state, former Western German
companies have been less competitive to the world market. Only several companies could
manage to survive in the new reality. This meant that thousands of people were threatened to
become unemployed and hundreds of companies had to be closed.

Except of these, infrastructure of former Easter Germany needed to be capitally restored.

Roads, railways, communication systems needed massive and full restoration. Without this fast
and less painful economic development would be almost impossible.

In spite of the problematic issues after the unification, including increased expenditure to
rebuild the former East Germany, increased unemployment and division in society, Helmut
Kohl managed to win in the federal elections of 1994 (Election to the 13th German Bundestag
on 16 October 1994, 2023). With this victory he became the longest ever ruling chancellor of
Germany since Bismarck.

4.1. Germany as a hegemon of the region and special relations with France

Since the establishment of German Federal Republic for all the governments of the country
starting from Adenauer to Merkel Europe with North Atlantic Treaty Organization was the
main pillar of German foreign and security policy. Germany managed to follow its foreign and
security interest withing the European Union and the idea of the united Europe. The
integration process of Europe started in 1950s with the European Coal and Steel Community by
the idea of French politician Robert Schuman and continued by the future integration of almost
all the countries of the continent. During this time Germany managed to fulfil its foreign policy
interests and stay as the dominant power on the continent so that neighboring countries were
not afraid of Germany becoming stronger and stronger.

On the contrary, neighboring countries have received a lot of benefits by German economic
development and realized the true desire of German leadership aiming European integration
and prosperity of the whole continent (Hellmann, 2002).

In 1989-90 unification of Germany and collapse of the SU was followed by the discussions
that the power and influence of united country would be dramatically increased. But soon it
became clearer that Germany was maintaining its democratic and cooperative relations with
the members of the community. On the contrary, united Germany was more active about
deepening cooperation among member stated and supported European integration process.

Also, since 1990s the leadership of Germany believes that economic integration of Europe is
not enough anymore and member states should deepen their cooperation in the fields such as
common security and foreign policy, defense of the union and also about such issues that some
countries have problems to solve them (გარაისი, 2021).

In this integration process key factor was the partnership of Germany and France. Two
countries which had been enemies for centuries and fought for the dominance of the Western
Europe finally achieved peace and started cooperation. This relationship had a great positive
affect for the whole continent. Since the Second World War all the chancellors of Germany
paid significant attention to the cooperation with their French colleagues.

There has to mentioned that this cooperation was so valuable and important for Germany
that there were several events when they put their own interests aside and made concessions
with France. Such cases were agrarian and infrastructural projects that were extremely
important for France and the German leadership supported them.

Except of positive development there have been several important events when the idea of
the European Union was under question and Germany took a lot of afford to continue its path.
One among them was Brexit, when in 2020 the United Kingdom left the European Union. It
was the first case when a member of the union decided to leave it. That time the union was
faced with difficult times and challenges.

Another problematic issues that affected the integrity of the EU were global financial crisis,
Russian-Ukrainian war of 2014, migrant crisis and the coronavirus pandemic. All of them have
been challenges for the unity of EU and some politicians even predicted the dissolution of the
EU. But except of the problems the European Union managed to overcome all of them.

Also, the phenomenon of united Europe where countries make decisions democratically and
are united with their free choices is a completely different integrity in comparison with the
experiences of the previous centuries. It meant that the EU is gaining experience form each
challenge and tries to transform itself to a better and more effectively working entity.

Considering all mentioned above the role of Germany in the union is significant. Very often
the position of Germany as the strongest economic and political player is decisive. At the same
time the decisions of Germany are always based on the pillars of peaceful world, free and fair
trade, democracy etc. that is why member states of the union do not consider Germany as a
treat and dominant country with a bad context.

The leadership of France was quite worried in the beginning of 1990s. On the one side they
were happy that the Soviet Union collapsed, Berlin Wall, which was splitting Germany, was
fallen and security threats in Europe were reduced. But at the same time leadership of France
was worried about the rise of Germany, because they were not sure what would be the
ambitions of united Germany.

They believed that in order to reduce such treats it was essential that Germany must be
integrated into the European structures and become indivisible part of it. Soon it became clear
that their interests we correlated with the policy of German leadership. The chancellor of
Germany and influential politicians of the country were seeing the main direction of German
foreign policy inside the European Union. Instead of previous century’s imperialistic ambitions
the current leaders saw the role of Germany inside the union as the strongest economy and one
of the most important political players (გარაისი, 2021).

In early 1990s it became clear that Germany supported the enlargement of the European
Union. The Iron Curtain that was dividing Europe was disappeared, Russia was weak and busy
with its own problems. It meant that there was a great chance for the enlargement of the EU in
east. Countries like Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia
suffered a lot during the Cold War. Without their own choice these countries were under the
control of the Soviet Union for almost five decades. It was a great chance for these post-Soviet
satellite and former member states to become full-fledged members of the European Union.

It is important to mention that Germany’s active support for their integration has several
explanations. First of all, it was a right time to ‘return” these countries to the “Western Orbit”
and that was a desire of these countries also.
 Another reason was that almost all former Soviet or satellite states were poor and had
economic hardships. Germany could help these countries to develop their economy and civil
society and soon they would bring a lot of benefits to the EU. Also, Germany was much
stronger than any of these states and the position of Germany inside the union would increase
as a dominant country which had a leading position and helped poor members to develop.

Except of these Germany had moral responsibilities to Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary,
Slovakia, Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia. During the Second World War Germany occupied most
of these countries and killed thousands of people. Also, after the defeat of Germany these
countries were occupied by the Soviets and almost five decades they were under the control of
the Soviet Union, where they suffered a lot. So, in other words Germany has a good chance
towards these countries to expiation its guilt.

2004 is one of the most important years for the European Union when the union accepted
ten more member states and it was the largest expansion for the union, lately called as “big
bang”. With this step members of the EU increased for 15 to 25 and also almost 75 million more
people became citizens of the union (The 2004 enlargement: the challenge of a 25-member EU,
2007).

France and Germany have been the biggest and strongest countries of Western Europe for
the last two centuries. Peace and economic development of Europe was dependent on their
bilateral relations a lot. Constant tension and several wars between the second part of XIX and
in the first part of XX centuries caused a lot of suffer and damage on the continent.

After the Second World War countries finally reached peaceful agreement and their new
dimension was based on cooperation and partnership to overcome common challenges. No any
other two countries and their relationship shaped European integration more than France and
Germany. Their deep and comprehensive bilateral relationship has been and still is the most
important one among the member states (Woyke, 2004).

There has to be mentioned that in 1950s the goals of France and Germany have been
relatively deferent from each other. France was willing to strengthen its position in the
Western Europe as the strongest country after the war. While divided West Germany was
willing to become full-fledged member of the unity and guarantee its stability and remove
security threats.

The Elysee Treaty of 22 January 1963 (Treaty, 2023) was a culmination of efforts to start
relations from a fresh beginning. This treaty strengthened their cooperation on defense issues
and the two countries created a fundament of future European integration. The treaty also
aimed direct and systemic communication between the chancellor of Germany and president of
France, also, agreements about foreign and security policies, as well as deep cooperation in
education.

Their cooperation even deepened after 1988 the establishment of the Franco-German
Defense and Security Council, which is based on two important factors. They are: prevention to
return to the military aggression between the countries and establishing the dominant
partnership as the “locomotive of the European integration” (Gül, 2003).

After the unification of Germany Franco-German relationship changed a bit. It was clear that
united Germany was the strongest economy of the continent and France had to recognize that
it was more dependent of German economy than Germany to French economy. For a decade
relationship between the countries became “cooler”, but in 2005 since Angela Merkle was
elected as the chancellor of Germany their cooperation started a new beginning as Merkel
supported deep integration of the union.

Thomas Pederson, an academician studying on EU integration analysis strategic partnership

between France and Germany. He describes their relation as cooperative hegemony, where the
foreign and security policy of the European Union has a significant influence of the common
decision by Franco-German leadership. Both countries realize the importance of their
cooperation on the future of the European integrity and they always try to take into account
each other’s position. This policy is almost unchangeable since the World War Two.

4.2. Role of Germany in international conflict of 1990s.

First Gulf War of 1990-1991 was the first major foreign policy challenge of the united
Germany. Invasion of Iraq in Kuwait was highly criticized by the western powers. NATO and
UN decided to deliberate Kuwait and participate in the military mission. The leadership of
newly unified Germany did not want to participate in the conflict and they had memory of the
Second World War and its bitter and painful results. But soon they realized that to be fully
involved in Western community they had to contribute in international mission.

They decided to contribute financially and Germany accumulated $2 billion of financial

support for the mission. Finally including logistic support, the financial contribution of
Germany reached $12 billion.

There has to be mentioned that financial involvement of Germany in the Gulf War was
followed by demonstrations in the country. As some part of the society believed that Germany
must not be involved in military conflicts abroad and maintain peaceful policy.
 At the same time, the fact the newly unified Germany participated in the international
mission with its Western partners clearly showed that it was a reliable friend and not a former
enemy. Also, it was clear the foreign policy of Germany would be more balanced and
reasonable. United Germany would continue to remain in the multilateralist and integrationist
fold (O'Connell, 2009).

Another important political process taking place in Europe was breakup of Yugoslavia. In XX
century, Germany had close relations with the nations and political leaders of Yugoslavia and
its influence on the region especially during Nazi Germany was increased.

Protecting human rights and preventing genocide were traditional postwar German values.
That is why the leadership of Germany supported the Slovenian and Croatian desires to become
independent countries, as the rights of people living in these areas were extremely violated.
When Serbia started using its military consolidation to prevent withdrawal of Slovenia and
Croatia, Germany realized that finding peaceful solution in the conflict would be almost
impossible and it was not in the plans of Belgrade. This was the main reason that official Berlin
was ready to recognize the independence of Croatia and Slovenia.

There has to be mentioned, that many of the European nations that time have not been that
actively supporting this idea, while Germany recognized them in 1991 (Hodge, 2012). Germany
recognized these countries to prevent the ethnic cleansing in Balkans in the time when Serbia
tried to remain the hegemon of the region with any cost.

Except of this in order to normalize the situation in Balkans in 1999 Germany participated in
NATO’s Kosovo mission. The main argument which the leadership of Germany had was that
they participated in the military mission to prevent genocide and violation of human rights in
Balkans. During June of 1999 approximately 5 000 German soldiers were deployed in Kosovo in
the NATO mission. That was the first and biggest representation of German soldiers beyond the
borders of the country after the reunification. It was clear that Germany was slowly becoming
one of the leading and active country in Europe who was fully integrated in the West and
supported NATO missions abroad. United Germany shared the major values of its partners.
These values were European integration and protection of human rights in the world and
especially in Europe.

Case of Kosovo war was the first case when it took part in a major military combat operation
without a UN Security Council mandate since 1955 when West Germany became a member of
NATO. In the last almost five decade it was the first time when Germany was involved in such
military conflict. This decision was protested by the Green Party which accused the
government of Germany in following the US pressure and participating in an aggressive
military conflict (Harnisch, 2001). at the same time the leadership of Germany believed that
contemporary foreign policy of Germany had not be fully the same as “Bonn Republic” and
with partners the country could participate in such conflicts.

4.3. Chancellorship of Gerhard Schröder

In the national election of 1998, an SPD-Green coalition managed to get majority and the
head of the coalition Gerhard Schröder became next chancellor of Germany. His main promise
to German society was developing the welfare system, which is not the main topic of the
research.

Analyzing his main paradigm of foreign policy Schröder believed that Germany did not need
to be that caution on international arena as before 1990s. He described Germany as a great
power in Europe that could openly describe its national interests (Cohen, 1999).

As parts of the NATO operations Schröder sent forces to Kosovo and Afghanistan. Before the
chancellorship of Schröder German troops have not participated in combat actions since the
World War Two. He believed that Germany should deepen cooperation with its partners and
participate in international missions.

Decisions of German chancellor was not spontaneous and made by impulsive feeling. In 2019
after 20 years of bombing Belgrade when Schröder was asked would he do the same thing if he
could return the time, he answered that he would make the same decision again.

In Afghanistan we need to say that Germany had one of the biggest representation of soldiers
during Schröder leadership. When he left the position Germany had 2 000 soldiers in the
country, that was the biggest representation after the US, the UK, France and Canada. This
means during Schröder Germany quite an important and active player of NATO missions
abroad ( "KSK troops withdraw from Afghanistan", 2021).

It is important to underline that Germany was not always following the steps of its most
important partner – the United States. Schröder was taking decisions in the interests of
Germany and what he thought was crucial and suitable for German foreign policy. In 2002 at
the beginning of Iraq crisis he decided that Germany would not participate in Iraq war without
the UN mandate. During his election campaign he noted that Germany had its own ‘German
Way”, which did not mean directly executing the decisions of the United States (Sturm, 2002).

Relationship with Russia was one of the main paradigms of Schröder’s foreign policy. When
he became the chancellor of Germany Soviet Union was already collapsed and the threat
coming from the east was relatively reduced. But he believed that normalizing relation with
Russia had to be one of the pillars of foreign policy formation.

His first trip to Moscow took place in 1998, where he noted that Russian-German relations
should not only be based of personal relations of the leaders. He meant the close personal
relationship between Helmut Kohl and former president of Russia Boris Yeltsin. Schröder
noted that cooperation between counties should develop independently without concrete
political figures (Vinocur, 2003). However, he was criticized that in the nearest years he
developed close relations with the new president of Russia, Vladimir Putin.

After he left the position of chancellor Schröder continued close communication with
Vladimir Putin. In his memories he was still defending Putin and decisions made by him.
Because of this attitude towards the leader of Russia, Schröder was widely criticized in his
homeland.

4.4. Foreign policy of Angela Merkel

The Chancellorship of Angela Merkel was one of the longest in the history of Germany.
After Otto von Bismarck and Helmut Kohl, Merkle was the longest serving chancellor of
Germany, who stayed on the position more than 16 years and became one of the outstanding
leaders of the country in the latest decades.

While analyzing Merkel’s foreign policy there should be said that her chancellorship was
highly active in the field of foreign policy and relation with the partners and neighbors of
Germany. During her leadership Germany has switched from a passive to a more active role on
the global diplomatic stage.

Merkel’s main understanding of the solvation of most global basic problems was multilateral
cooperation and by dialogue between the conflictual sides (Rinke, 2021)

Main characteristic of foreign policy during Merkel’s leadership was deepening cooperation
with its Western partners, especially with the European Union and NATO. Also, she played a
central role in the most important negotiations of the European Union. Among them the most
significant ones were the Treaty of Lisbon1 and the Berlin Declaration2 . These treaties played
crucial role in the formation of contemporary European Union.

1
Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community,
2009
2
Declaration on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the signature of the Treaties of Rome, 2007
 For almost two decades Angela Merkle was considered as the de facto leader of the European
Union and the most influential leader of the continent.

During Merkel’s Chancellorship the US-German relationship was one of the key pillars of the
foreign policy priority. In order to make the German economy stronger Merkle believed it was
essential to deepen and strengthen transatlantic economic relations. In 2007 at the White House
Merkle signed Transatlantic Economic Council agreement, which was the most important
treaty between the EU and the US during last decades. The agreement aimed to remove barriers
between the sides and created free-trade area between two continents.

However, during the last years of her leadership, she still believed that the US was the most
important partner for the European Union but at the same time Europe must fight for its future
on its own and the US was not a reliable partner for Europe and Germany anymore and the
dependence of Europe to the US was reduced in comparison with the Second World War
situation (Smale, 2017).

One of key challenges taking place during Merkel’s leadership was European Migrant Crisis,
which became one of the most problematic and controversial issue for the European Union
during latest decades. War and economic instability made thousands of Syrians leave their
homeland and try to find shelter in EU countries. Adding that political instability and economic
collapse in Northern African countries made thousands of people flee to European countries as
asylum seekers.

Since mass migration of Syrian migrants to the European Union started Germany announced
its open-door policy to asylum seekers. “We can do this. These people must be given a home
free of fear and terror,”- said German chancellor Angela Merkel (Merkel, 2015).

She insisted that all these migrants should be welcomed in Germany. Merkel’s position was
widely criticized as in Germany as well by some of the EU leaders. They thought this would
cause mass emigration of Syrian asylum seekers to EU countries. Only during 2015-16 Germany
accepted more than half million migrants, mostly from Syria. Nowadays approximately 843 000
Syrians live in Germany (John Cosgrave, 2016).

The decision made by Angela Merkle towards migrants let to heavy criticism as inside the
country as well in the European Union. This criticism was used by a far-right party Alternative
for Germany to rise its supporters and helped the party to enter in Bundestag after 2017 federal
elections.

The relationship between Federal Republic of Germany and Russian Federation was one of
the most important issues for Angela Merkel. In the first years of her leadership Angela Merkle
was trying to maintain the broad outlines which were similar to the policy of Helmut Kohl.
German-Russian relationship can be a good example of this. During Merkel’s chancellorship
Russia and Germany had close and constructive relationship.

When she was elected as a chancellor, Merkle tried to convince the leadership of Russia that
she took the security concerns of Russia seriously and she knew the “red lines” of Russia’s
security demands. Her main policy towards Russia was not to make Moscow insecure and
angry.

Her first official visit to Moscow took place in the end of 2005 and met the president of
Russia, Vladimir Putin there, where she discussed human rights protection in Russia. After this
she met non-governmental organizations in Russia and heard from them how they were
protected in the country.

During the time that Angela Merkel came in politics Germany has already been the new
hegemon of Europe-but it is an uneven designation. Its economy was the strongest in the EU.
But due to traditional pacifist policy after the Second World War, Germany was still punching
below its weight to show that the goal of Germany was not become a superpower of the region
which had imperialistic ambitions.

During the chancellorship of Angela Merkel relationship with Russia has always been
important. Trade, energy, and cultural ties have been and are nowadays significant factors in
the German-Russian relationship. But Russian behavior in Europe and in post-Soviet space has
undermined the support of Germany towards Russia’s leadership. There relations did not
damage only after the 2014 Ukrainian conflict but before there were grounds for friction over
how to deal with Russia (Janes, 2014).

Moreover, she was clearly supporting Nord Stream 1 gas pipeline which would connect
Russian natural gas to Western Europe. This idea was adopted by Chancellor Schröder and
practically made during by Merkel’s time.

Merkel believed that modern Russian-EU relation should be developed similar as the
relations between Western European countries after the World War Two. According to her
logic economic interdependence would prevent conflictual situations and they would be
interconnected economically so much that war would be almost impossible and tragically
harmful for both sides. For her understanding developed economic ties were equal to reduction
of security threats.

Her foreign policy towards Russia had similarities with Willy Brandt’s Ostpolitik according
to which economic exchange helps to improve political relations, stability, and security (Raik,
2021). In the theory of international relations this idea is called as liberal interdependence,
which was quite popular in 1970s.
 But this theory was not accompanied with the policy of Russian leadership and their
understanding of global politics. Main understanding of Russia’s international affairs in
national sovereignty, defending its interests in the regions where Russia sees as areas of
influence and maintain the position of great power on the globe. Traditionally this idea do not
come with the theory of liberal interdependence as Russia considers itself as unilateral player
where it is not dependent on other countries.

This policy became even clearer after Vladimir Putin came into power and tried to reduce
dependence on the West as much as possible.

To sum up German foreign policy before and after Angela Merkel, we can say that when she
was elected in 2005 the role of Germany in international politics was limited and simply it was
following the general US and Western countries line, while in the end of her leadership Federal
Republic of Germany was more developed and independent player.

In the beginning of 2008, many politicians in Germany would not believe that Russian
Federation would return back to its imperialistic ambitions and started military conflict with its
neighbors.

At the end of May 2008, Russia ordered 400 railway-repair soldiers in a breakaway region of
Abkhazia. This decision was against 1994 ceasefire agreement by Georgian officials and
Western observers. Georgian authorities saw it as a preparation of future large-scale military
invasion.

In June 2008 in Samachablo (so called South Ossetia) the situation was becoming problematic
as Russian troops started mobilization in the region which was not under the control of
Georgian authorities. In her speech chancellor of Germany Angela Merkel highlighted that
Germany supported the territorial integrity of Georgia and she called the leadership of Georgia
to maintain peace in order to reduce tension and get rid military conflict.

In the beginning of August Russo-Georgian war started Merkel’s government tried to

maintain normalized relations with Russia. But when she realized that Russia was not going to
stop, she started to criticize the steps made by Russian leadership. Her criticism increased
especially after EU monitors began security patrols in Georgia (Merkel Supports Georgia, 2008 ).

As one of the negotiators of peaceful negotiator of Russian-Georgian conflict she met Dmitry
Medvedev, President of Russa on 15th of August. During meeting she called Russian aggression
in Georgia as disproportionate. Angela Merkle called Russian troops to withdraw from the
sovereign territories of Georgia.
 “I found some of Russia's actions disproportionate and in particular think the presence of
Russian troops in Georgia proper is not sensible. Russian troops should withdraw from central
areas in Georgia." (Merkel in Russia, 2008)

At the same time, she mentioned that in some aspects the actions of Russia were reasonable
and she also blamed Georgian side in using power in the intervention of some settlement of the
Samachablo (so called South Ossetia region).

To sum up, Russian aggression in Georgia was criticized by the chancellor of Germany. She
tried to solve the conflict diplomatically and called on Russia to withdraw its troops. But at the
same time, she did not impose sanctions to Russia and after a while she continued economic and
political cooperation with Russia.

The reaction of Germany during 2008 Russo-Georgian war was once more remembered after
Russian invasion of Ukraine of 2022. The behavior of Germany is sometimes criticized, as
Merkel did not do enough to help Georgia. The most logical understanding and comparison
with the Ukrainian case is that the war in Georgia was more local, short-term and too far from
Germany. In the case of Georgia, the security of Germany was not in danger or threat, meaning
that for Germany Georgia was not as important as Ukraine is nowadays taking into
consideration of its scale and location.

While discussing the foreign policy of Germany towards Eastern European countries, there
has to mentioned her role in 2008 during the NATO Bucharest summit when there was chance
for Georgia and Ukraine to become members of the alliance. With president of France Nicolas
Sarkozy, Angela Merkel blocked membership invitation to Georgia and Ukraine during the
summit. Despite the rejection, alliance members agreed to an unspecified timeline for Ukraine,
along with Georgia, to become members. Later on, after 2008 Russo-Georgian war and 2014
Crimean crisis the position of Germany and France were accessed as mistakes, especially after
2022 Russian invasion. It became clear, that Merkel’s policy about not making Russia agree did
not work and it was resulted with even worse results- Russia started more aggressive
movements towards its neighbors.

Migrant crisis has become one of the most problematic and controversial issue for the
European Union during latest decades. Before 2010s plenty of people have been migrating to
the Western European states but situation completely changed since a civil war started in Syria.
War and economic instability made thousands of Syrians leave their homeland and try to find
shelter in EU countries. Adding that political instability and economic collapse in Northern
African countries made thousands of people flee to European countries as asylum seekers.
 Only in 2014 about 13.9 million people have become newly displaced due to conflict. 11
million of them was forced to live their homeland and become refugee. At the end of 2014
there have been three major source countries from where people started migration to EU
countries. These countries are Syria, Afghanistan and Somalia. They have accounted about 53%
of the total refugee population ( UNHCR Global Trends; Forced Displacement in 2014, 2015).

Only in 2015 and beginning 2016 almost 1.2 million migrants reached to the EU. During next
several years their numbers reduced slightly, but overall EU countries have accepted several
millions of migrants ( The Migrant Crisis and the rise of Populism in Europe, n.d.).

Historically Germany has never been considered a migrant receiver country. After the
Second World War several million migrants moved to Germany as working migrants, mostly
from Turkey. But it has not impact politics of Germany significantly.

Since mass migration of Syrian migrants to the European Union started Germany announced
its open-door policy to asylum seekers. “We can do this. These people must be given a home
free of fear and terror,”- said German chancellor Angela Merkel ( Merkel: Migrant crisis
'historic test' for Europe, 2015 ).

She insisted that all these migrants should be welcomed in Germany. Merkel’s position was
widely criticized as in Germany as well by some of the EU leaders. They thought this would
cause mass emigration of Syrian asylum seekers to EU countries. Only during 2015-16 Germany
accepted more than half million migrants, mostly from Syria. Nowadays approximately 843 000
Syrians live in Germany (John Cosgrave, 2016).

Decision made by German chancellor has created a favorable political situation for far-right
populist rights. Since 2015 people living in Germany have been feeling themselves in danger.
Every day in newspapers or in television they could read and hear that thousands of migrants
are coming to Germany, they are part of different culture and religion, their adaptation is
almost impossible and soon criminal and drug selling would increase in the country rapidly.

One of the parties that directly criticized Merkel and risen voice against immigration was the
Alternative for Germany3, which was established in 2013. In September 2013 their support was
4.7 percent in federal elections. In the beginning they have been against bailouts for indebted
EU member states like Greece. But as soon as migrant crisis emerged, they directly change their
key policy.

In conclusion we can say, Merkel’s welcome policy to thousands of migrants created

unfavorable situation for her and her party. Politicians in Germany as well as her collages in

3
Alternative for Germany (German: Alternative für Deutschland, AfD; is a right-wing populist political party in
Germany, which is known for its Euroscepticism and opposing immigration to Germany.
Europe criticized her and believed that Germany had to strengthen its migration policy in order
to stop mass migration to the European countries.

Eruption of Russian-Ukrainian conflict of 2014 became one of the biggest challenges for
Germany since the World War Two. This conflict showed that for the first time in decades
Germany took the position of a leader. For this time main center of cooperation and discussion
of the Western countries was not Brussels, Washington or Paris, but Berlin.

According to German foreign policy analyst Ulrich Speck there were three main reasons
(Speck, 2015) why Germany took the leading role in the crisis. First, the economic and political
power of Germany was rising since reunification. Also, it had a central location in Europe.

Second, the military conflict had great importance for Germany, as war was entirely against
the foreign policy direction of the country, which supported cooperation and deepening
interdependence.

Third explanation was that there was no one to take the position of the leaders. Paris,
London and Brussels were weakened that time and Washington was too far from the continent.
Also, it was a right time for Germany to leave the position of formerly divided country and rise
up its leadership.

According to André Härtel, Germany’s foreign policy approach towards Russia and the Post-
Soviet region traditionally has been rested on three pillars. They are a strong transatlantic
relationship, European integration and multilateralism (Härtel, 2014).

One more factor that helped Germany to become a leader during Russian-Ukrainian crisis
was the policy of the United States leadership. President of the US Barack Obama has always
been supporting the idea of sharing responsibilities and global burden as Germany and the US
were “partners in leadership”. When Obama saw the willingness of Angela Merkel to be the
main mediator, he only welcomed this process (Packer, 2014)

Meanwhile, political situation in Ukraine was interesting and important for Germany.
According to the foreign policy narrative of the country it was in the interest of German
leadership to be surrounded by friendly and peaceful countries. Military conflict should not
take place near the border of Germany. Also, for German leadership it was becoming clear that
Russia was returning to its imperialistic behavior and was trying to change the status quo
reached after the end of the Cold War. In other words, main pillars of foreign policy axis were
in threat and Chancellor of Germany had to rise up her voice and solve the conflict according to
the national interests of the republic. Eastern Europe, Central Europe and Russia—have always
been vital for the security and economic prosperity of Germany.
 Speck rightfully mentions another important factor of German active leadership. This is
personal dimension of Angela Merkel, who grew up in Eastern Germany – a satellite country of
the Soviet Union. She experienced live in Soviet occupation and the division of her homeland.
That factor also led her to go against war and division in Europe and never return to military
conflict, humanitarian crisis and destruction.

Russian-Ukrainian war of 2014 significantly affected the relationship of Germany towards

Russia and it was unexpected for official Berlin, which believed that closer economic ties with
Moscow would make future wars in Europe impossible. The trust that most German politicians
had with their former strategic partners in Russia was significantly damaged.

The leadership of Germany tried to resolve conflict diplomatically and demonstrated active
diplomatic actions. During the negotiations Germany has strengthened its leadership within the
European Union. It was seen as the politically the most influential country of the EU. As the
negotiations were not successful soon the Chancellor Merkle realized that diplomatic relations
with Russia would not work and she decided to introduce economic sanctions. At the same time
Merkel intended not to damage relations with Russia to much as she believed that peace in
Europe would only be achieved by cooperation with the Russian Federations (Frymark, 2015).

It is important to mention that Russo-Ukrainian war of 2014 was not followed by dramatic
and radical changes of German foreign policy towards Russia. The main goal for German
foreign policy was to stop the war and reach ceasefire agreement between the combating sides.

The Minsk Agreement (Package of measures for the Implementation of the Minsk
agreements, 2015). Reached in 12th of February, 2015 managed to reduce the number of
casualties but it did not include strict commands to Russia to leave sovereign territories of
Ukraine. Inside the country as well as on the European level Foreign Minister Steinmeier and
Chancellor Merkel were criticized for helpless decisions and ineffective negotiations.

According to the opinion of German Politicians the only and best method of solving the
conflict between Russia and Ukraine was the doctrine of strategic patience according to which
by peaceful pressure on Russia one day it would start negotiations and the conflict would over
this way. The term strategic patience was introduced by Chancellor Merkel in 2015.

Also, Chancellor Merkel was strongly opposing the idea of providing military equipment to
Ukraine by any other country. She believed that this would only escalate the war and it would
become more global and devastating. Chancellor of Germany supported the peaceful resolution
of the military conflict with the involvement of all sides.

Grown up in former East Germany, for Angela Merkel division of Europe and Cold War
were stressful and painful experiences. She believed that the era of military conflicts and being
in hostile parts must not be repeated in the region. At the 25th anniversary celebration of the
fall of the Berlin Wall, Merkel noted Europeans should learn from the past and separation and
division should not be the reality of contemporary world.

“The fall of the Wall has shown us that dreams can come true. Who would've thought that
25 years after the fall of the Wall, after the end of the Cold War, after the end of the division of
Europe and the end of the world being divided in two, something like that can happen right at
heart of Europe?" The biggest danger is that we allow ourselves to be separate, to be divided,
that a wedge will be driven between us” ( Merkel cautions against Ukraine divide, 2014).

In September 2015 there was held a security conference in Munich, where the main issue
was how Russian-Ukrainian conflict should be solved. Speaking at the conference Merkel said
that the crisis would not be solved by military means. She once again mentioned the necessity
to implement the peace agreement which was stuck and not achieved. Chancellor of Germany
did not support the idea of Russia’s exclusion and distance from European countries. She
supported the idea of peaceful Europe with Russia and not against it.

"The Ukraine crisis is most likely not just a regional problem. It affects us all. I cannot
imagine any situation in which improved equipment for the Ukrainian army leads to President
Putin being so impressed that he believes he will lose militarily. I have to put it that bluntly.”-
said Angela Merkle at the Munich security conference (Johnston, 2015).

According to Daehnhardt, after 2014 there was created a new context of German foreign
policy towards Russia. This approach is called as ‘hybrid Ostpolitik’ according to her, meaning
that the relationship with Russia is still vital for Germany and its development. With this new
approach Germany still had strong economic ties with Russia as Germany was highly dependent
on Russia natural gas and oil, at the same time after the conflict of Ukraine Germany became
more critical towards Russia and changed its attitudes (Daehnhardt, 2018).

General understanding of German foreign policy towards the 2014 Russo-Ukrainian conflict
was that Berlin trats Moscow as a state with huge potential of potential destruction but also
Russia is the most important partner for the EU and the security of the continent should be
built with Russia and not against it.

Foreign policy of Chancellor Merkel was widely discussed in German society. Some part of
society supported balanced policy of Merkel as she managed to prevent economic hardships. At
the same time majority of Germans (65% of population) supported imposing sanctions to Russia
according to the survey of 2015.

Likewise, there has to be mentioned the role of Germany and its chancellor Angela Merkel
aiming peaceful resolution of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict and the war in Donbas by
diplomatic cooperation. One of the most important achievements of dialogue initiated by
Germany and France was and still is The Normandy Format (French: Format Normandie). The
four countries – Germany, Russia, Ukraine and France created the format in June 2014. For the
first time they met in a northern region of France, Normandy symbolically at the same day 70th
anniversary of the D-Day allied landings in Normandy.4

Overall, since the creation of the format in the last nine years the leaders of Ukraine, Russia,
France and Germany met eight times.

Despite the effort of Germany and France there can be said that not much was achieved in
the negotiations between Moscow and Kyiv. The main reason it is irreconcilable positions of
the countries, because the desires of one side is absolutely unacceptable for another one.

Speaking about the achievements of the Normandy Format there is not much to be said.
Most significant one that can be mentioned is the Minsk protocol reached in 2014. The protocol
was sought to end the war in east of Ukraine. Even though the war still continued after the
agreement we need to say that scale of the war relatively reduced. Russia’s insistence that it
does not represent a party to the conflict, and therefore is not bound by the terms of the Minsk
agreements, has impeded progress (Wintour, 2022).

There has to be mentioned that majority of Ukrainians are against the agreement, because it
requires form Ukraine to cede too much sovereignty to separatist regions- Donetsk and
Luhansk. Also, Ukrainian government is trying to avoid the adoption of required political
reforms that can harm and damage interest of official Kyiv and increase the abilities of the
separatist regions.

After Minsk agreement was reached both Russia and Ukraine repeatedly accused each other
for violating it.

Sometimes the idea of Normandy Format is under questioned due to the reason that the US
in not part of it. Ukrainian side was willing the United States involvement in the format.
Ukrainian authority believed that the US involvement would increase pressure on Russia and
reaching peace would be easier. At the same time the German side in the negotiation was
relatively mild towards Russia, because the leadership of the country did not want worsen their
relationship with Russia due to economic reasons. Meaning Nord Stream gas pipeline mainly
(Hasselbach, 2022).

While analyzing the response of the leadership of German to the Ukraine crisis it should be
examined deeply. After the crisis started, with its traditional allies Germany reduced its
multilateral vocation, which was based on consensus-building, and designed to enhance its
influence and facilitate leadership whilst accounting for the concerns and interests of partners.

4
D-Day allied landings in Normandy or The Normandy landings were the landing operations on Tuesday, 6 June 1944
of the Allied invasion of Normandy in Operation Overlord during World War II
Since the military conflict started, Germany imposed sanctions towards Russia, established
Normandy Format to create a diplomatic possibility for the conflicting sides to have a dialogue
and with France became the main mediator. It was a clear sign that Germany was starting to
gain its new role in Europe and take on responsibility as a new leader of the region.
Chapter 5- German Foreign Policy After “Zeitenwende”

Russia's unprovoked and unjustified full-scale invasion of 2022 and ongoing war in Ukraine
is the biggest military conflict in Europe since the Second World War. Despite the hardships of
economic crisis, Euroscepticism, migrant crisis, Brexit and other problematic issues the EU has
never been faced with such a huge challenge during last decades.

At the moment of February 2022 Germany was dominant political and economic power of
the European Union while the behavior of Russia caused the foreign policy shift of Germany
without which international order that Germany was building during decades would collapse
easily. This means that Germany did not have any other choice rather than chance its foreign
policy direction it was maintaining since World War Two. Imposing strong economic sanctions
to Russia, providing Ukraine with military equipment, increasing the budged of military
expenditure and others steps made by Germany were unexpected for most of politicians.

The behavior and steps made by the German leadership makes us think that Russian
unprovoked and aggressive invasion in Ukraine created unfavorable situation for Germany.
Existing challenge and new reality in Europe were threatening the domestic and foreign policy
of Germany, which included cooperation with partners and economic development so that
conflict between them had to be impossible. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine was threatening the
status quo created and developed by Germany for decades.

At the moment of February 2022 Germany was the strongest political and economic player
in the European Union. The given situation and aggressive behavior of Russia caused the
foreign policy shift of Germany without which international order that Germany was building
during decades would collapse easily. In other words, Germany did not have any other choice
rather than chance its foreign policy direction that it was maintaining since World War Two.
Providing Ukraine with military equipment, increasing the budged of military expenditure,
imposing strong economic sanctions to Russia and others steps made by Germany were
unexpected for most of politicians.

5.1. 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine

24 February of 2022 is not a turning point only for Ukrainians, but for the whole Europe as
well for the entire world. As said earlier Europe was not faced such military conflict for
decades after the Second World War.

In the early months of 2022, Russia started building up military presence at the border of
Ukraine. Around 150 000 troops were gathered close to the border of Ukraine in the beginning
of February. Additional forces were sent to Belarus as it was said for the purpose of joint
military exercise. According to the estimation of Western defense analysts about 190 000
Russian troops were encircling Ukraine at the beginning of February 2022.

The next steps and preparation for the war by president of Russia Vladimir Putin was
recognition the independence of self-proclaimed people’s republics of Donetsk and Luhansk (
Russia recognizes independence of Ukraine separatist regions; , 2022). In response Western
leaders expressed their solidarity to the territorial integrity and independence of Ukraine and
imposed sanctions against Russian financial institutions. After a few days, particularly in the
early hours of February 24, Russian soldiers started shooting at the borders of Ukraine. And
soon afterwards Russia’s president Putin announce the beginning of a “special military
operation”. In his television address Putin said he aimed to demilitarize and "de-Nazify"
Ukraine. He also blamed the government of Ukraine in carrying out a "genocide" in breakaway
pro-Russian territories in the east. Only in a few minutes shelling and bombing of Ukrainian
citied has started and air raid sirens began to sound in Kyiv.

In the beginning of 2022, the leadership of Germany was calling both sides to use diplomatic
solutions in order to get rid military conflict. Chancellor Scholz and Foreign Minister Annalena
Baerbock refused to provide Ukraine with defensive weaponry as they supported peace policy
and the idea of not to give military equipment to other countries that could escalate conflict.
Germany even blocked shipments of war materials from Estonia to Ukraine.

Even in the first days of war of Russian invasion Germany was still trying to maintain its
peaceful foreign policy and called on Russia to stop the invasion. But after almost one week
there was a U-turn in the foreign policy of Germany and Scholz announced that Germany
would send 1000 anti-tank weapons and 500 missiles to Ukraine.

The decision of Germany was also dependent on the position of its partners a lot as well.
Main partners of Germany in the European Union and NATO alliance are the United States, the
United Kingdom and France. Since the first day of the Russian invasion the role of the prime
minister of United Kingdom, Boris Jonson is significant. He was one of the firsts who sharply
criticized invasion and started mobilizing western countries to oppose brutal and unlawful
attack on Ukraine. The position of Poland and Baltic countries also was important as they have
already experienced occupation of Russia and Soviet Union in the past. As members of EU and
NATO they rose their voice and noted that they had to do something. This meant that most
important partners of Germany and also members of their alliance had strict position and the
leadership of Germany had to do something as one of the strongest powers in Europe. In other
words, were they willing it much or not they had to consider the positions of those countries
with whom they have the closest relations and partnership.
 Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 appeared a decisive moment for the foreign policy shift
of Germany. Before February 2022 Germany was maintaining the same foreign policy for
decades, which included multilateralism, cooperation with almost all its neighbors and
economic cooperation with Russa. But Russia’s unprovoked invasion of Ukraine changed
foreign and defense policy of Germany a lot.

For the first time in three decades since unification, the leadership of Germany realized that
in international politics only “soft power” is not enough and sometimes it is essential to make
more strict steps to answer the threats a country is faced (Küstner, 2022).

Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 solidified German perceptions of Russia as a very

dangerous and aggressive neighbor in the East who sometimes makes irrational steps to
maintain its power and dominance to its neighbors (Driedger, 2022).

One more additional steps of the foreign policy change of Germany took place in January of
2023 foreign minister of the country, Annalena Baerbock called international society about the
creation of special tribunal against Russia’s leaders over Ukraine war. She mentioned that Russia
cannot be prosecuted for the aggression the International Criminal Court in The Hague.

5.2. Olaf Scholz’s Zeitenwende speech

New reality and challenges made Germany act differently and be more involved in a military
conflict in its nearby. After one year of starting this process the shift of German foreign policy
was called as Zeitenwende, which is translated as a turning point. This term means that an old
era was over and it was a beginning of a new one. Germany finally ended its long-standing
policy of not allowing German-manufactured weapons to be sent to a country which was
involved in a military conflict.

German Chancellor Olaf Scholz had his famous Zeitenwende speech in February 26 in
German Bundestag. During his speech Chancellor Scholz spoke about the new reality and
security threats of the whole Europe. He mentioned that it was enough for Germany to be aside
from conflicts and they had to support to a country which was a victim of aggressive military
violence.

As political experts rightfully mention Olaf Scholz’s Zeitenwende is speech is one of the most
important recalibrations of the foreign policy of Germany since the country united in 1990.
Scholz’s speech was unusual and surprising even for German members of parliament as well
ordinary citizens of the country (Blumenau, 2022).
 One of the key decisions made by the leadership of Germany and announced by the
Chancellor Olaf Scholz was the German defense spending would meet the NATO target, which
is 2% of the GDP of the country. Before the Russian invasion Germany was spending around
€50 billion on its defense, which was about 1.5% of the GDP.

In his speech Chancellor mentioned that Russia’s invasion is a decisive moment in the
history of Europe and it was time for German traditional Russia policy (Ostpolitik) to be
radically changed. Also, he noted that the current circumstance did not give any other chance
but to increase its defense expenditure and was a right time make it closer for the NATO target,
which was demanded by the United States for decades.

During his speech the chancellor said that the German policy was living in an illusion that
after the Cold War a war would not take place in Europe and military conflict was finally
banished from the continent. He noted five key steps Germany had to make in accordance with
the new reality.

“There are five courses of action that we must take:

Firstly, we must support Ukraine in this desperate situation. We have already provided
significant support in recent weeks, months and years…

The second course of action that we must take is to divert Putin from the path of war. This
war is a catastrophe for Ukraine. However, it will prove to be a catastrophe for Russia, too…

The third major challenge lies in preventing Putin’s war from spilling over into other
countries in Europe. That means that we will stand unconditionally by our collective defense
obligation within NATO…

In order to protect our freedom and our democracy. The 2022 federal budget will provide a
one-off sum of 100 billion euro for the fund. We will use this money for necessary investments
and armament projects…

We will never accept the use of force as a political instrument. We will always advocate the
peaceful resolution of conflicts. And we will not rest until peace in Europe is secured…
(bundesregierung.de, 2022)

According to Scholz Germany’s Bundeswehr (armed forces) were not prepared enough to the
challenges the country was faced and expenditure on the defense of the country was not
enough. He said that the rise of defense budget was essential for the security and defense of
Germany.

During the speech Scholz spoke about the measures Germany was going has adopted against
the Russian aggression.
 “We must take is to divert Putin from the path of war. This war is a catastrophe for Ukraine.
However, it will prove to be a catastrophe for Russia, too. Together with the Heads of State and
Government of the EU, we have passed a package of sanctions on an unprecedented scale. We
are cutting Russian banks and state businesses off from financing. We are preventing the export
of cutting-edge technology to Russia. And we are targeting the oligarchs and their investments
in the EU. In addition to this, there are the punitive measures against Putin and individuals
close to him as well as restrictions on the granting of visas to Russian officials. And we are
excluding major Russian banks from the banking communication network Swift. We reached
an agreement on this yesterday with the Heads of State and Government of the democracies
with the strongest economies and of the EU.”- noted him in his Zeitenwende speech
(bundesregierung.de, 2022).

In his speech Scholz acknowledged that Ostpolitik policy did not work well. He said that for
decades Germany was trying to build constructive relations with Russia and Russian invasion of
Ukraine destroyed all the bridges that connected the west and Moscow. But he also noted that
still there was hope to resolve conflict by diplomacy and dialogue.

In his speech Chancellor Scholz also emphasized that one of key point of German foreign
policy Wandel Durch Handel did not work. According to this approach increasing trade with
an authoritarian regime will finally affect the regime change in the particular country. This
approach was dominant by the leadership of Germany as they believed that successful economic
relations with Russia would later cause the regime change in the country and Russia would
become more democratic state in the future (Blumernau, 2022).

To sum up, during his Zeitenwende speech, Scholz broke several key traditions that were
shaping German foreign policy for seven decades. The most significant ones among them were
the failure of Ostpolitik and the strategy of the Wandel durch Handel.

Zeitenwende speech also clearly showed that German political and economic paradigm
according to which war in Europe was impossible did not work. Also, he realized that the
defensive policy of Germany was not enough and Germany should do more to protect itself.

5.3. Sanctions adopted against Russia

After unification of the country, Germany valued its economic interests a lot. For the
leadership of the country stability and economic development was dependent on natural
resources significantly. Cooperation with Russia in the field of energy resources was crucially
important for Germany, because from Russia they could import cheap natural gas. According to
the logic of official Berlin importing Russian natural gas was beneficial economically and
politically. Germany was dependent on the import of Russian natural gas, but at the same time
it was beneficial for Russia as well, as the official Moscow was getting millions of euros every
year and it was a significant part of Russia’s state budget.

The former chancellor of Germany Angela Merkle was thinking that cancelling this win-win
cooperation would be a great loss for Russia too, as they would lose an important source of
income for their economy. She believed this economic dependence would not let Russia to fulfil
its imperialistic ambitions and prevent to start occupying or invading neighboring counties. For
her economic interdependence was key for political stability, similarly to western European
countries managed after the Second World War.

Unfortunately, 2008 Russian-Georgian war and 2014 Russia’s occupation of Crimea were not
enough lessons for Germany to realize that Vladimir Putin’s ambitions were going further and
the call from the Western countries about stopping military conflicts in neighboring countries
would not be enough. This position was a sign for Putin to feel braver and think that he could
do as he wanted.

The biggest and most important projects that connected Russian natural gas to German and
generally European market was Nord Stream 1 and Nord Stream 2. The construction of Nord
Stream 1 pipeline which run under the Baltic Sea from Russia to Germany started in 2010 and it
was over in 2011. Transportation of gas through Line 1 began in mid-November 2011 ( The
Pipeline, 2023). Construction of Nord Stream 2 was over at the end of 2021 and it was planned
to inter service in the beginning of 2022. Annually the pipelines combined together could
provide Europe with 110 billion cubic meters of natural gas.

One of the major steps Germany made in 2022 to stop Russia’s aggression was freezing the
certification of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline system. It is important to mention that Olaf Scholz’s
decision was made on 22 of February, a day after Russian State Duma recognized the Donetsk
People's Republic and Luhansk People's Republic. This was a major reversal of German policy.
With Nord Stream pipeline Russia would have the possibility to provide Germany with natural
gas without crossing Ukraine or any other state and go straight to Germany and other Western
European countries.

In February 2022, after Russian invasion of Ukraine western countries imposed numerous
sanctions to Russa. Sanctions of Germany towards Russia were extremely tough and they were
imposed by coordinating with its European partners. Since February 2022 EU countries adopted
several packages of sanctions and each time there are of restrictions was increasing and
becoming more important.
 To show how Russian invasion of Ukraine affected Russian-German economic relations,
there are given the most important sanction that were adopted by official Berlin ( Which
sanctions have been adopted against Russia?, n.d.).

Starting from the financial sector, Russian banks are excluded from SWIFT system, which
means these banks are not able to have access to international payment transactions. Also,
transaction from Russian central and other major banks are cut. All together they represent
70% of Russia’s banking system.

Another field of restrictions is energy sector, where import of Russian natural resources was
banned. In June the EU imposed an embargo on the shipment of Russian oil. As mentioned
above, one of the major steps Germany made in 2022 to stop Russia’s aggression was freezing
the certification of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline system. Olaf Scholz’s decision was made on 22 of
February, a day after Russian State Duma recognized the Donetsk People's Republic and
Luhansk People's Republic. This was a major reversal of German policy. With Nord Stream
pipeline Russia would have the possibility to provide official Berlin with natural gas without
the corridor of Ukraine straight to Germany and other Western European countries.

Since the beginning of the war EU airspace is closed to all aircrafts which are owned or
controlled by Russia. Except of landing and taking off, also they are unable to fly over the sky of
European sky. In addition, ports and harbors of EU countries, including Germany are closed for
Russian ships.

Russian diplomats and business professionals lost their privileged access to the EU countries.

Tens of Russian politicians, businessmen and their family members, who played important
role in the invasion of Ukraine and support the war against Ukraine are sanctioned. They are
restricted to enter in any of EU countries and in some cases their property in EU countries is
confiscated.

Major state-owned Russian media companies are not allowed to broadcast in the EU
countries, including Germany.

Except of these mentioned above hundreds of western companies left Russian market and
closed their factories, meaning that thousands of Russians became unemployed. Speaking about
German companies who already left or are currently in the process of leaving Russian market
are: Adidas, Audi (Volkswagen), Bosch, Deutsche Bank, Henkel, Hugo Boss, Krombacher and
others (List of Germany Companies Leaving Russia;, 2023).

In democratic states, where governments are elected via elections a lot is dependent of public
opinion. If current government does not share the same values as majority of population and
does not express the desires of the voters there is a hight probability to lose popularity in the
coming elections. For Germany, which definitely represents a democratic state public opinion is
extremely important, that is why the leadership of Germany tries to explain its population why
the major shit of foreign policy took place and why economic expenditure of Germany is
relevant and essential.

According to the research of German Institute for Economic Research’s (DIW) specialist
Marcel Fratzscher according to 2022 data, the war of Ukraine costs at least €100 billion to
German economy (Ukraine war costs Germany's economy €100 billion, 2023). He notes that
this represents 2.5% of the GDP of the country. As the expert explains, the major reason of
spending huge amount of money from the state budget is Germany’s dependence on Russian
natural resources and the closure of the supply chain.

By the calculations of German Chamber of Industry and Commerce, an individual person in

Germany lost around €2 000 wealth because of the war and created problems in energy supply
(Nia, 2023).

Except of economic expenditure another issue that German society can be concerned is the
number of Ukrainian refugees who left the country because of the Russian invasion and found
shelter in Germany. On the one side majority of Germans have solidarity for the people who
flee the country because of the war, but on the other hands accepting thousands of refugees in
the country is connected to spending additional expenditure. According to the latest date of
2023 there are more than one million of Ukrainian refugees on German soil.

According to the survey conducted in Germany in August 2022 by the research institute of
Kantar Public on behalf of the Korber Foundation, 72 percent of the population say that they
feel threatened by Russia, while 52 percent believes that German government had to continue
supporting Ukraine in the same way and only 14 percent supports sending for more military
equipment to Ukraine (Hemicker, 2022).

Since the Second World War defense capabilities of Germany were limited. The experience
of German revenge in the first half of XX century, made western countries to control defense
capabilities of Germany. Majorly the United States took the responsibility to take care of the
security of the country. After several decades the role of the US reduced and Germany was well
aware to satisfy its security needs but the pacifist manner of German foreign and security policy
did not let the country increase its defense budget.

In the beginning of XXI century, or more specifically before Russian invasion of Ukraine of
2022 military expenditure of Germany was varied from 1.1% to 1.4% of the gross domestic
product (GDP) of the country (Germany Military Spending/Defense Budget 1960-2023, 2023).
For the last two decades the US was demanding from all its NATO members to achieve 2%
target. But the leadership of Germany was hesitating to all advices and commands of the US and
NATO leaders. Limited military expenditure has almost been a tradition of German foreign and
defense policy.

It is not clear weather Germany would maintain this policy or not for longer time if there
was not Russian invasion of Ukraine of 2022. Except of the changes mentioned above Germany
also decided to change its military spending. Coalition government of Germany in May 2022
decided to boost its military budget by €100 billion. Defense Minister Christine Lambrecht
named the necessity of it as an urgently needed step. This decision was also welcomed by
foreign minister Annalena Baerbock, who called it as a good compromise to ensure that NATO
alliance can rely on Germany ( Coalition government, CDU agree military spending hike;,
2022).

5.4. Military support of Germany for Ukraine

After the Second World War for more than seven decades Germany was supporting peace
and peaceful resolutions of conflicts on international arena. With pacifist approach leaders of
Germany were paying significant attention to dialogue and cooperation among states. In
conflicts taking place over the world, they did not support country by sending military
equipment and the only way German soldiers and heavy weaponry participated in conflict
abroad was NATO missions.

Russian invasion of Ukraine of 2022 was a decisive moment for Germany. After 70 years
Germany changed its foreign policy and started providing military equipment to that country,
which was involved in a military conflict. This kind of action by Germany has not happened
since the Second World War.

After February 2022 Germany supported Ukraine with significant amount of weaponry
costing millions. Some countries criticize Germany and note that such a strong and powerful
country as Germany, is able to do more and Germany has to provide Ukraine with more
weapons. Here are given some of the most important equipment that Germany sent and are
already delivered in Ukraine.

Germany mobilized 2 billion Euros in 2022 and 5.4 billion Euros in order to use for primarily
for military assistance to Ukraine.

For Armored fighting vehicles Germany provided Ukraine with 8 tracked all-terrain vehicles
Bandvagn 206, 18 LEOPARD 2, 40 MARDERs and others. For the air defense Germany gave
Ukraine 55,000 rounds ammunitions for self-propelled anti-aircraft guns GEPARD, Iris-T SLM
missiles, air defense system PATRIOTs, 500 Man Portable Air Defense Systems STINGER 2,700
Man Portable Air Defense Systems STRELA and others. For the artillery Germany gave to
Ukraine 5 multiple rocket launchers MARS II, 14 self-propelled howitzers Panzerhaubitze
2000, counter battery radar system COBRA and other equipment.

Except of mentioned above Germany also send to Ukraine Military Engineering Capabilities,
Protective and Special Equipment, Logistics equipment, Combat Readiness and Survivability
etc.

Also, on the official website of the federal Republic of Germany there is published a plan
(Military support for Ukraine, 2023 ) of future military support to Ukraine, which will be
provided to the country in the nearest time. This plan includes armored fighting vehicles, Air
defense, Artillery, Military Engineering Capabilities, Protective and Special Equipment, Combat
Readiness and Survivability etc.

As the data shows Germany has already sent numerous amounts of military equipment to
Ukraine and according to the plan additional weaponry will also be sent in the nearest future.
Ukrainian leaders are constantly asking their international partners to send heavy weaponry to
Kyiv in order to increase their defensive and offensive capabilities which will help them to
return control on the occupied territories of the country. According to them strong military
equipment will help Ukraine to reduce humanitarian loss, which means thousands of soldiers.

According to latest official information Germany prolongs to provide Ukraine with such
strong and effective weaponry. They are worried that these armaments can be used beyond
Ukrainian territory in order to attack Russia on its soil. There is not clear whereas will Germany
satisfy the needs of Ukrainian side.

During last two year the relationship between Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy
and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz was not developing on the same line and it had several ups
and downs. Many Ukrainians including Ukraine's ambassador to Germany at the time, Andrij
Melnyk was criticizing Germany for not doing enough to help Ukraine and hesitating to worsen
relations with Russia. It took some time for the sides to normalize their relations (Hasselbach,
2023).

Another unusual decision made by the Chancellor of Germany was his official visit to Kyiv.
In the last 70 years the leader of Germany has never visited a country which had an on-going
military conflict on its soil. The meeting took place in June 2022 and this decision was
welcomed by the majority of western countries. Before his visit was held chancellor of
Germany was criticized as not actively supporting Ukraine, while that time most of European
leaders already visited Kyiv.

Scholz was not the only European leader who visited Ukraine that time. He was
accompanied by French President Emmanuel Macron, Italian Prime Minister Mario Draghi and
Romanian President Klaus Iohannes (Goncharenko, 2022).

In his speech chancellor once again expressed the support of Germany about the candidate
status of Ukraine’s EU membership.

“My colleagues and I came here to Kyiv today with a clear message: Ukraine belong to the
European family. At the European Council next week, Germany would seek to push for a
positive decision in favor of Ukraine as a candidate for EU membership… Germany was
providing both financial and humanitarian support for Ukraine in defending its sovereignty and
territorial integrity. And Germany has broken with a long tradition: we are also supplying
weapons to Ukraine and we will continue to do so as long as it needs this support.”- noted he
(Federal Chancellor Scholz in Kyiv “Ukraine belongs in the European family, 2022).

During his speech Olaf Scholz once more expressed the support of Germany towards
Ukraine. Everybody was waiting from him that the chancellor would announce that Germany
would give Ukraine another strong weaponry but he made no promise to deliver new arms.

Despite the disappointment of the leadership and society of Ukraine, Scholz’s visit can be
accessed as successful. At least the chancellor travelled to Kyiv and expressed his solidary from
the capital of war-torn country.

Visit of the president of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelenskyy to Germany took place in May 2023.
It was one of the rare cases when Germany accepted a foreign official in the country which
currently had an ongoing war. This was a major policy change for Germany too. During the
official visit Zelenskyy held high level meeting with the Chancellor, where he was told that
Ukraine will get additional support from Germany and the support of German people is
unchanged. On the other hand, Zelenskyy thanked Scholz for the support and hosting
thousands of Ukrainians, who left the country to Germany.

Also, during his visit in Germany, Volodymyr Zelenskyy was honored by the International
Charlemagne Prize for European unity in Aachen. During his speech he mentioned that this
price belongs to Ukrainian people and each of them deserved to be standing there ( Zelenskyy
thanks Germany for support — as it happened;, 2023).

Dynamic of the relationship between Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and

German Chancellor Olaf Scholz shows that several times they had misunderstandings.
Ukrainian side was condemning German leadership for not doing enough. Finally, leaders
managed to improve their relations and met each other several times as in Kyiv and Berlin, as
well in other partner countries.

5.5. Analysis of the interview with Ambassador of Germany to

Georgia, Peter Fischer

In order to make the research more valuable and add own contribution to the given field of
studies, the author also used interview as a qualitative research method. There is used the
method of structured interview, as the questions were prepared before. To understand and
analyze the position of official Berlin the author of the given research interviewed current
ambassador of Germany to Georgia, Peter Fischer. The interview was recorder on April 11,
2023 at the Embassy of Germany in Tbilisi, Georgia. The author aimed to ask the ambassador
most actual and important questions about the shift of German foreign policy, its development
and key characteristics. Full version of the interview is available in appendix of the thesis.

Ambassador of Germany to Georgia, Peter Fischer notes that relationship with Russia has
always been important for Germany. Official Berlin has always been trying to build
constructive and stabile cooperation with Moscow. He brings Russian-German economic
relations as the key fundament of their mutual cooperation. According to Peter Fischer the
understanding of Germany was that Germany needed Russian natural gas and oil which was
about 30-40% of imported natural resources for Germany and Russia needed it, because
Germany was the best costumer which always had high demands and this was a huge
contribution to Russian economy. He emphasizes that in Germany only a few people would
think that Vladimir Putin could threaten this relation and he ruined what was built during
several decades. German understanding of the relations with Russia was based on the mutual
beneficial agreement and they thought that Russia would never risk it, as economic
interdependence reduced the possibility of military conflict to zero.

Speaking about Russian-Ukrainian war of 2022 ambassador of Germany to Georgia marks,

that the war against Ukraine is not promoting Russian greatness at all, on the contrary it
showed the weaknesses Russia has. About the main explanation of Russia’s aim of protecting
Russian speaking population, Peter Fischer calls as myth.

The ambassador also noted that western countries had diplomatic efforts trying to find a way
for peaceful agreement between the countries, but Putin’s logic did not intersect with the West.
He says that as all diplomatic affords failed, the West has to learn a bitter mistake and never
repeat anymore. He also notes that Germany understanding of foreign policy was not
understood in the same way by Russia. For years Germany was offering Russia profitable
economic relations, also mediation between Ukraine and Russia to resolve the conflict, but
unfortunately it did not work.

During the interview Peter Fischer named the key changes that took place in Germany after
24 February of 2022. He names the rise of military expenditure as one of such changes and
notes that finally German military expenditure will reach the NATO target, which was
demanded by the United States for a long time.

The ambassador names German military support to Ukraine as another key changes, as
Germany has not sent military equipment to an area which had an ongoing military conflict
since the Second World War. He adds that Germany is sending powerful military equipment to
Ukraine periodically and the support is constantly increasing.

Ambassador of Germany to Georgia explains that Germany did not have any other choice
rather than change its foreign policy in order to maintain status quo, peace and stability in
Europe. Russian attack threatened main principles and international order which was
maintained for decades and was completely opposing German understanding of politics. He
called Russia’s attack of 24 February 2022 as a turning of history book to a new time.
Chapter 6- Findings

Findings of the research are key outcomes of the investigation of analyzing relevant
literature. The research aimed to find out several key characteristics of German foreign policy
transformation.

Analysis of scientific literature has shown that dependent variable of the thesis is war in
Ukraine, while independent variable is the shift of foreign policy of Germany.

After observing all the steps made by German leadership since February 2022 here are given
the most important decisions, which are key examples of foreign policy shift.

First of all, foreign policy of Germany has always been into accordance of geopolitical
circumstances as in Europe, as well on the globe. Chancellors and other influential political
leaders in the country acted adequately by the interests of the country. After the Second World
War German foreign policy was characterized by Westpolitik and Ostpolitik and there has been
several shifts between them. This policy change was dependent on global politics, mostly it was
connected to the relation with the Soviet Union.

One of the major steps Germany made in 2022 to stop Russia’s aggression was freezing the
certification of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline system. It is important to mention that Olaf Scholz’s
decision was made on 22 of February, a day after Russian State Duma recognized the Donetsk
People's Republic and Luhansk People's Republic. This was a major reversal of German policy.

Also, after Russian invasion of Ukraine with its western partners Germany imposed
numerous extremely tough sanctions to Russia. Starting from financial sector, to banks, energy
sector and business sector Germany tried to limit Russian success on international market and
refused to accept Russian natural resources, which were largest contributions to Russian
economy.

One of the key decisions made by the leadership of Germany was that in near future German
defense spending would meet the NATO target, which is 2% of the GDP of the country. Before
the Russian invasion Germany was spending around €50 billion on its defense, which was about
1.5% of the GDP.

Another key shift that Germany did since February 2022 was sending military support to a
country which had an ongoing war. Except of financial support Germany send various kinds of
heavy military equipment to Ukraine. It was a huge step for a country which was supporting
peace and peaceful resolutions of conflicts on international arena during decades and was
refusing to send military support to any country which currently has a war.

Another decision which was unusual for German pacifist foreign policy was an official visit
of German chancellor to Ukraine which had a military conflict on its soil. Such decision was
not made by German leadership during last 70 years.

The following finding is that after unification of Germany and collapse of the Soviet Union
the country started more active involvement in international conflicts and soon Germany
became a regional superpower, whose position was important. In 2010-2020s Germany was the
strongest and most powerful country of the European Union. Only into two decades Germany
has transformed as a regional superpower from a divided country.

The research also revealed that after Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022 Germany had a U-
turn transformation of its foreign policy.

One more finding of the research is the position of Germany in 2008 Russo-Georgian war
and other regional conflicts and why their behavior was different in comparison to 2022
Russian invasion of Ukraine. The most logical understanding and comparison with the
Ukrainian case is that the war in Georgia and other conflicts were less dangerous for the
security of Germany.

According to Waltz’s defensive realism, which best describes the behavior of Germany, states
are seeking to maintain the status quo and are forced to concentrate on maintaining the balance
of power in the region they are represented. This means that Germany did not have any other
choice in order to maintain its status quo position in the European Union.
Chapter 7- Conclusions

The given research aimed to analyze foreign policy dynamics of Germany. Analysis of
scholarly literature revealed that the main characteristic of Germany foreign policy is
multilateralism, as the country supports European integration and has close ties with its trans-
Atlantic partners.

The aim and research question of the work was to find out what is the impact of 2022
Russia's invasion of Ukraine on the change of foreign and defense policy of Germany. In other
words, the research explains and discusses main characteristics of the foreign policy shift of
Germany since February 2022.

There are used several types of sources and literature while working on the theses. There are
used primary sources, which include scientific literature, official speeches of Chancellors of
Germany etc. Also, the research analyses secondary sources such as articles, strategies,
researches etc.

The hypothesis of the research was that new reality, increased security threats and political
instability made the country to make a U-turn of its foreign policy. Analyzing scientific
literature, news articles and official speeches of the chancellor of Germany clearly showed the
validity of the hypothesis as the leadership did not have any other choice but chance pacifist
manner of foreign policy, which was maintained for Germany for several decades. For the first
time since unification, the leadership of Germany realized that in international politics only
“soft power” is not enough and sometimes it is essential to make more strict steps in order to
answer the threats a country is faced.

In the first part of the research the author discusses and analysis the foreign policy of
Germany since the Second World War. Reading and exploring literature revealed two main
directions of the foreign policy in post-Second World War Germany, which were Westpolitik
and Ostpolitik.

Analyzing scientific literature, official documents, statements and steps made by German
leadership, the research comes to the conclusion that the theory of Neorealism of the
international relations suits and describes best the major foreign policy shift of Germany.
According to Neorealism, which is one of the dominant schools of thought of international
relations, countries are acting in accordance to the reality and challenges they are faced. This
theory well describes all the steps made by Germany including sending military support to
Ukraine, sanctioning Russia, visiting a country which has an ongoing war etc.

In conclusion, there had to be said that answer on the main question of the thesis has verified
as the research is measurable. Theory of neorealism best explained the behavior of German
foreign policy shift after Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

The research has its limitations due to the novelty of a given topic, as the Russo-Ukrainian
war is still ongoing. Unfortunately, it is hard to predict until when the brutal and bloody war of
Russia will continue. Meanwhile the EU and particularly Germany are still increasing pressure
to Russia and regularly imposing sanctions to the aggressor state. The given paper reflected the
main research question based on the events occurred until the end of the first part of 2023.
There are chances that support of Germany to Ukraine can be even increased and limiting and
isolating Russia can strengthen in the nearest future.

There are perspectives of continuation of further analyses and observing of the given topic.
As foreign policy of Germany is in transition it is extremely hard to predict in advance how the
foreign policy will be developed after the end of Russian-Ukrainian war. The potential of future
investigation can be further transformation and development of German foreign and defense
policy shift.
Bibliography

Scientific Literature
1. Ash, T. G. (1993). In Europe’s Name. New York: Random House.

2. Banchoff, P. K. (1993). The German Problem Transformed. In ‘United Germany in an Integrationg

Europe.

3. Carr, E. (1939, Edward Carr; The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919–1939: An Introduction to the Study of
International Relations; 1939. ). The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919–1939: An Introduction to the Study
of International Relations. Harper Perennial; 450th ed. edition (March 25, 1964).

4. Cohen, R. (1999). A New German Assertiveness On Its Foreign Policy Stance . The New York Times.

5. Dinan, D. (2010)). Ever Closer Union: An Introduction to European Integration. Boulder, Colo: Lynne
Rienner Publishers; : 4th edition.

6. Driedger, J. (2022, 03). Why the German Paradigm Shift on Russia Is (Probably) Bound to Last.
Retrieved from Germanic-American Institute;

7. Erb, S. (2003). German Foreign Policy: Navigating a New Era. Boulder, Colorado:: L. Rienner.

8. Geiss, I. (1996). ‘The Federal Republic of Germany in International Politics Before and After
Unification. In K. a. Larres, The Federal Republic of Germany Since 1949 (p. p.154 ). New York:
Addison Wesley Longman.

9. Goncharenko, R. (2022, 06 17). German Chancellor Olaf Scholz makes historic Kyiv visit. Retrieved
from Deutsche Welle; : https://www.dw.com/en/german-chancellor-olaf-scholz-makes-historic-
visit-to-kyiv/a-62163543

10. Gül, M. (2003 ). Konrad Adenauer Era. In German foreign policy: change and continuity (1949-
2000). Middle East technical university.

11. Hanrieder, W. F. (1989). The Foreign Policies of the Federal Republic of Germany, 1949-1989.
German Studies Review; Vol. 12, No. 2 .

12. Härtel, A. (2014 , 04 08). Germany and the crisis in Ukraine: divided over Moscow? Retrieved from
Real Instituto Elcano: www.realinstitutoelcano.org;
https://www.realinstitutoelcano.org/en/analyses/germany-and-the-crisis-in-ukraine-divided-over-
moscow/

13. Hasselbach, C. (2022, 01 26). Ukraine: The role of the Normandy format. Retrieved from Deutsche
Welle: https://www.dw.com/en/what-is-the-normandy-format-for-resolving-the-crisis-in-
ukraine/a-60566531

14. Hellmann, G. (1997). The Sirens of Power and German Foreign Policy: Who Is Listening? German
Politics,, pp. pp.29–57.

15. Heurlin, B. (1996). France and Britain . In Y. Boyer, Germany in Europe in the Ninetees. London:
Macmillan Press LTD.

16. Hobbes, T. (Release Date: 2002, July 2). Leviathan. Retrieved from www.gutenberg.org:
https://www.gutenberg.org/files/3207/3207-h/3207-h.htm
 17. Hodge, C. C. (2012). Botching the Balkans: Germany's Recognition of Slovenia and Croatia.
Cambridge University Press:.

18. John Cosgrave, K. H. (2016). Europe's refugees and migrants Hidden flows, tightened borders and
spiralling costs. Overseas Development Institute.

19. Mansfield, H. (n.d.). The Art of War and other writings of Niccolò Machiavelli. Retrieved from
Britannica.com: https://www.britannica.com/biography/Niccolo-Machiavelli/The-Art-of-War-and-
other-writings

20. MELLO, P. A. (2020). GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY. In J. J. HAESEBROUCK, FOREIGN POLICY CHANGE IN
EUROPEAN UNION COUNTRIES SINCE 1991,. BASINGSTOKE: PALGRAVE MACMILLAN, 1-23.

21. Neorealism in Political Realism in International Relations. (2017, May 24). Retrieved from Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/realism-intl-relations/

22. O'Connell, P. (2009). Unified German identity?”, GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY AND NATIONAL
IDENTITY SINCE 1945. Graduate College of Bowling Green State University.

23. Tzu, S. (n.d.). The Art of War. Retrieved from http://classics.mit.edu/:

http://classics.mit.edu/Tzu/artwar.html

24. Waltz, K. (2000). International Security. International Security, Vol. 25, No. 1 , pp. 5–41.

Treaties and official documents

1. Article 2 of the Two Plus Four Treaty; Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany; .
(1990 ). Retrieved from https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%201696/volume-
1696-I-29226-English.pdf

2. Declaration on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the signature of the Treaties of Rome. (2007 ,
March 25 ). Retrieved from www.cvce.eu:
https://www.cvce.eu/en/obj/berlin_declaration_25_march_2007-en-e50a51f2-bb73-4d7c-873f-
adc6d93adc71.html

3. Package of measures for the Implementation of the Minsk agreements. (2015). Retrieved from
https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/UA_150212_MinskAgreement_en.pd

4. Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community. (last update 11.12.2017). Retrieved
from Europa (web portal): https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=LEGISSUM:xy0022

5. Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European
Community. (2009 , December 1). Retrieved from https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A12007L%2FTXT

6. Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European
Community. (2009 , December 1). Retrieved from https://eur-lex.europa.eu/: https://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A12007L%2FTX
 7. Treaty, E. (2023, January). France Diplomacy – Ministry for Europe and Foreign Affairs. Retrieved
from www.diplomatie.gouv.fr: https://www.diplomatie.gouv.fr/en/country-files/germany/france-
and-germany/elysee-
treaty/#:~:text=Signed%20on%2022%20January%201963,cooperation%20to%20supp

Online sources
1. "KSK troops withdraw from Afghanistan". (2021, September 11 ). Retrieved from Deutsche Welle.
DW.com: https://www.dw.com/en/ksk-troops-withdraw-from-afghanistan/a-
1004754#:~:text=Troops%20from%20Germany's%20elite%20KSK,units%20and%20al%20Qaeda%2
0forces.

2. Declaration on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the signature of the Treaties of Rome. (2007 ,
March 25). Retrieved from cvce.eu:
https://www.cvce.eu/en/obj/berlin_declaration_25_march_2007-en-e50a51f2-bb73-4d7c-873f-
adc6d93adc71.html

3. Merkel cautions against Ukraine divide. (2014, 11 17). Retrieved from Deutsche Welle:
https://www.dw.com/en/merkel-warns-of-wide-spreading-consequences-of-ukraine-conflict/a-
18068718

4. Russia recognizes independence of Ukraine separatist regions; . (2022, 02 21). Retrieved from
Deutsche Welle: https://www.dw.com/en/russia-recognizes-independence-of-ukraine-separatist-
regions/a-60861963

5. The Migrant Crisis and the rise of Populism in Europe. (n.d.). Retrieved from esri.com:
https://www.arcgis.com/apps/Cascade/index.html?appid=d63ba0dce8c346bab133ca055180e455
%20

6. The Pipeline. (2023). Retrieved from nord-stream.com; : https://www.nord-stream.com/the-

project/pipeline/#:~:text=Construction%20of%20Line%201%20of,was%20completed%20in%20Apri
l%202012.

7. Zelenskyy thanks Germany for support — as it happened;. (2023, 05 14). Retrieved from Deutsche
Welle: https://www.dw.com/en/ukraines-zelenskyy-thanks-germany-for-support-as-it-
happened/a-65613383

8. Coalition government, CDU agree military spending hike;. (2022, 05 30). Retrieved from Deutsche
Welle: https://www.dw.com/en/germany-coalition-government-cdu-agree-100-billion-military-
boost/a-61969742

9. Merkel: Migrant crisis 'historic test' for Europe. (2015 ). Retrieved from BBC.com;:
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-35091960

10. UNHCR Global Trends; Forced Displacement in 2014. (2015, Jun 18). Retrieved from www.unhcr.org
: https://reliefweb.int/report/world/unhcr-global-trends-forced-displacement-
 2014#:~:text=UNHCR's%20new%20annual%20Global%20Trends,seen%20in%20a%20single%20year
.

11. Which sanctions have been adopted against Russia? (n.d.). Retrieved from Bundesregierung.de; :
https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-en/news/eu-sanctions-2008438

12. BLUMENAU, B. (2022, 6). Breaking with convention? Zeitenwende and the traditional pillars of
German foreign policy. Retrieved from International Affairs:
https://academic.oup.com/ia/article/98/6/1895/6754148

13. Blumenau, s. M. (2022, NOVEMBER 18 ). How Russia’s invasion changed German foreign policy.
Retrieved from chathamhouse.org: https://www.chathamhouse.org/2022/11/how-russias-
invasion-changed-german-foreign-policy

14. bundesregierung.de. (2022, February 27 ). Retrieved from Policy statement by Olaf Scholz,
Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany and Member of the German Bundestag:
https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-en/news/policy-statement-by-olaf-scholz-chancellor-of-
the-federal-republic-of-germany-and-member-of-the-german-bundestag-27-february-2022-in-
berlin-2008378

15. Election to the 13th German Bundestag on 16 October 1994. (2023). Retrieved from
bundeswahlleiterin.de: https://www.bundeswahlleiterin.de/en/bundestagswahlen/1994.html

16. Federal Chancellor Scholz in Kyiv “Ukraine belongs in the European family. (2022, June 16).
Retrieved from Deutsche Welle;: https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-en/news/federal-
chancellor-in-kyiv-2053824

17. Frymark, A. K. (2015, ). Germany in the Russian-Ukrainian conflict: a political or a humanitarian

mission? . Retrieved from Center for Eastern Studies;:
https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2015-02-18/germany-russian-ukrainian-
conflict-a-po

18. Germany and NATO; NATO’S COLD WAR FRONTIER IN EUROPE. (n.d.). Retrieved from Nato.int:
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/declassified_185912.htm

19. Germany Military Spending/Defense Budget 1960-2023. (2023). Retrieved from

https://www.macrotrends.net/: https://www.macrotrends.net/countries/DEU/germany/military-
spending-defense-budget

20. Goncharenko, R. (2022, 06 17). German Chancellor Olaf Scholz makes historic Kyiv visit. Retrieved
from Deutsche Welle; : https://www.dw.com/en/german-chancellor-olaf-scholz-makes-historic-
visit-to-kyiv/a-62163543

21. Haftendorn, H. (1996). Gulliver in the Centre of Europe:International Involvement and National
Capabilities for Action’ . In B. Heurlin, Germany in Europe in the Ninetees (p. p.108). London:
Macmillan Press LTD.

22. HEMICKER, L. (2022, 10 17). Majority of Germans fear Russian nuclear attack. Retrieved from ;
Aktuelle Nachrichte Online- faz.net: https://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/inland/umfrage-grosse-
mehrheit-fuerchtet-russischen-atomschlag-18393402.html

23. Johnston, C. (2015, 02 7). “Ukraine crisis will not be solved by military means, says Angela Merkel”.
Retrieved from The Guardian.com; : https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/feb/07/ukraine-
crisis-will-not-be-solved-by-military-means-says-angela-merkel
24. Larres, K. (1998). The German Model and European Integration’ . In E. O. Smith, Germany Since
Unification:The Domestic and External Consequences, (p. p.53 ). London: Macmillan Press LTD, .

25. List of Germany Companies Leaving Russia;. (2023). Retrieved from coalitionforukraine.com; :
https://www.coalitionforukraine.com/germany

26. Maull, H. W. (2009). Japan and Germany in International Relations; 1950-2000: Parallels and
Differences. Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, 6.

27. Merkel in Russia. (2008, August 15). Retrieved from Deutsche Welle:
https://www.dw.com/en/merkel-medvedev-clash-over-russias-war-in-sochi-talks/a-3567243

28. Merkel Supports Georgia. (2008 , June 25). Retrieved from Deutsche Welle:
https://www.dw.com/en/germany-supports-georgias-territorial-integrity/a-3439941

29. Merkel: Migrant crisis 'historic test' for Europe. (2015). Retrieved from BBC:
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-35091960

30. Michels, E. (2013). Guillaume, the spy: a German-German career. Berlin: Ch. Links Verlag.

31. Military support for Ukraine. (2023 , June 6). Retrieved from Website of Federal Government:
https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-en/news/military-support-ukraine-2054992

32. Nia, O. T. (2023, 02 23). 1 year on: How Ukraine war has changed Germany. Retrieved from
Anadolu Agency: https://www.aa.com.tr/en/europe/1-year-on-how-ukraine-war-has-changed-
germany/2828955

33. Packer, G. (2014 , November 24). The Quiet German; The astonishing rise of Angela Merkel, the
most powerful woman in the world. Retrieved from The New Yorker:
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/12/01/quiet-german

34. Pfetsch, P. F. (1988). West Germany: Internal Structures and External Relations. New York:: Praeger
Publishers.

35. Raik, K. (2021, June 24). New World Order: Germany’s Dangerous Idealism vis-à-vis Russia.
Retrieved from Internationale Politik Quarterly: https://ip-quarterly.com/en/new-world-order-
germanys-dangerous-idealism-vis-vis-russia

36. Rinke, A. (202 , May 18). The Evolution of Angela Merkel’s Foreign Policy; Internationale Politik
Quarterly. Retrieved from ip-quarterly.com: https://ip-quarterly.com/en/evolution-angela-merkels-
foreign-policy

37. Shafiq, T. &. (2020). OTTO VON BISMARCK AND GERMAN POLITICS (18621898). NEAR EAST
UNIVERSITY GRADUATE SCHOOL OF EDUCATIONAL SCIENCES.

38. Smale, A. &. (2017, 05 29). "Merkel, After Discordant G-7 Meeting, Is Looking Past Trump".
Retrieved from The New York Times: https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/28/world/europe/angela-
merkel-trump-alliances-g7-
leaders.html#:~:text=BERLIN%20%E2%80%94%20Chancellor%20Angela%20Merkel%20of,depende
d%20on%20in%20the%20past.

39. Speck, U. (2015 , 03 26). Carnegie Europe. Retrieved from German Power and the Ukraine Conflict”:
https://carnegieeurope.eu/2015/03/26/german-power-and-ukraine-conflict-pub-59501
 40. The 2004 enlargement: the challenge of a 25-member EU. (2007, 01 23). Retrieved from Europa.eu:
https://eur-lex.europa.eu/EN/legal-content/summary/the-2004-enlargement-the-challenge-of-a-
25-member-eu.html

41. Ukraine war costs Germany's economy €100 billion. (2023, 02 20). Retrieved from Deutsche Welle;:
https://www.dw.com/en/ukraine-war-costs-germanys-economy-100-billion/a-64768176

42. Vinocur, J. (2003). Schroeder is edging closer to Blair. The New York Times.

43. Walt, S. M. (2022; , february 7). The Gold Medal for Foreign Policy Goes to Germany;. Retrieved
from foreignpolicy.comm: https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/02/07/the-gold-medal-for-foreign-
policy-goes-to-germany/

44. Wintour, P. (2022, January 26). Ukraine tensions: what is the Normandy format and has it achieved
anything? Retrieved from The Guardian:
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/jan/26/ukraine-russia-tensions-what-is-the-normandy-
format-and-has-it-achieved-anything

45. Zabecki, D. T. (2014). Germany at War: 400 Years of Military History.

In German

1. Küstner, K. (2022, March 25). ‘Deutschlands Außenpolitik: Strategie für mehr Sicherheit gesucht’.
Retrieved from tagesschau.de: https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/innenpolitik/nationale-
sicherheitsstrategie-101.html

2. Sturm, D. F. (2002). "Schröders deutscher Weg. Welt Online.

3. Woyke, W. (2004). Deutsch-franzosische Beziehungen seit der Wiedervereinigung; Das Tandem fast
weider Tritt.

In Georgian
1. გარაისი, ს. ბ. (2021). გერმანიის საგარეო და უსაფრთხოების პოლიტიკა - შესავალი.
თბილისი: ილიას სახელმწიფო უნივერსიტეტი.
Annexes:
Interview - Ambassador of Germany to Georgia Peter Fischer

Date: 11 April; 14:00;

Location: Embassy of Germany in Tbilisi, Georgia

- Russian invasion of Ukraine became one of the biggest challenges for the entire world
and especially for the Western countries. Also, we see a major shift of the foreign and
security policy of Germany. How would you evaluate Russian-German relations before
February 24?

- Since the end of 1960s Germany had a policy that, we agreed or disagreed on certain
fundamental issues with the Soviet Union and later Russia, was the right to continuously
developed relationship with Russia. If you have relationship or you are connected with
certain activities that creates stability in the relationship. For example, our energy
policy. We bought about 30-40% of our oil and gas from Russia. Our thinking was that it
is a mutual dependency – Russian needs it, because they sell to us, we were the best
costumer and we needed, because we want to buy this oil and gas. We thought Putin
will never threaten this relationship, because after all, we were the best costumer. We
thought our logic and Putin’s logic had intersection exactly at that point - there is a
stabile energy relationship, let us not ruin that. But what we did not understand is that
Putin’s logic is outside ours. He has thrown away this energy relationship, anything we
had to offer as a productive relationship. In the 1990s when the Soviet Union
disappeared and Russia set up a new governmental system we offered support, advice,
cooperation on administrative reform and any area of policy-making. Our companies
were interested to invest and create jobs, to produce things to the highest standards in
Russia. And all that was an offer for Russia, including selling oil and gas and Putin threw
it away for what. We do not understand is it national greatness or from our reason.

- Do you believe that western countries miscalculated the threats coming from Russia?

The war against Ukraine is not promoting Russian greatness. From our point of view the
war on Ukraine is not increasing Russian security. And there was no threat from NATO.
Protecting Russian speaking people is a myth. We had big diplomatic efforts trying to
find a way to make sure that in Ukraine and in Eastern Ukraine there can be peaceful
agreement on how to manage things. Putin’s logic does not intersect with ours, that’s
 what we understood through the Russian attack on Ukraine. That’s what we did not
fully understand before. We have to learn from this mistake.

- Since Russian invasion of Ukraine, Germany decided to change its defense policy as well.
What are the key changes of the policy shift?

- We also thought if we have mutually beneficial relations with Russia the risks of war
reduce enormously in Europe. There has been a long discussion that Europeans should
rise their military expenditure that was a goal that NATO set itself. Germany has not yet
met the goals NATO set. The Russian attack on Ukraine increased urgency and same
applies so we decided to spend more and also, we had a longstanding policy of not
exporting arms to areas of tension and certainly not to an area where there is a war
unless it is our ally who are in the war like NATO, EU. We changed that too. That policy
was result of World War two. It is not so long ago that people said that Germans should
never have an army, Germans should never manufacture arms and if they do
manufacture arms issues, they should never export them. We do not want to see German
military force. That changed. People said Germany is stabile good democracy and they
have responsibility to share and defend our NATO alliance, which we do.

-
Now we are exporting very powerful military equipment to Ukraine where there is a hot
war. So, it is complete reversal of policy, because we understand Russian attack on
Ukraine is an attack on the peace order in Europe after World War Two which
protected Germany. Germany was the main benefactor, because we were a destroyed
nation after Nazism. We were physically destroyed, we were morally destroyed, we had
no standing and order of peace that developed in Europe allowed Germany not only to
develop and prosper and be a democratic healthy society but also allowed German unity
to happen in 1989-90. This peace arrangement in Europe, the foundation which is not to
accept borders as to they are and not to violate them was a blessing for us. So, we
understand if Russia attacks Ukraine, they are basically threatening peace in the whole
Europe. Therefore, we changed some of our policies. They were adequate for previous
time but Russian attack 24 February 2022 tuned history book to a new time. So, we
adjusted our policy.