1
Limitations of Conferment of Quasi-Judicial Power
Miller v. Mardo
These appeals, although originating from different Courts of First Instance, are here
treated together in this single decision because they present but one identical
question of law, namely, the validity of Reorganization Plan No. 20-A, prepared and
submitted by the Government Survey and Reorganization Commission under the
authority of Republic Act No. 997, as amended by Republic Act No. 1241, insofar as it
confers jurisdiction to the Regional Offices of the Department of Labor created in said
Plan to decide claims of laborers for wages, overtime and separation pay, etc.
In G.R. No. L-15138, Manuel Gonzales filed with Regional Office No. 3 of the
Department of Labor, in Manila, a complaint (IS-1148) against Bill Miller (owner and
manager of Miller Motors) claiming to be a driver of Miller from December 1, 1956 to
October 31, 1957, on which latter date he was allegedly arbitrarily dismissed, without
being paid separation pay. He prayed for judgement for the amount due him as
separation pay plus damages. Upon receipt of said complaint, Chief Hearing Officer
Atanacio Mardo of Regional Office No. 3 of the Department of Labor required Miller to
file an answer. Whereupon, Miller filed with the Court of First Instance of Baguio a
petition (Civil Case No. 759) praying for judgment prohibiting the Hearing Officer from
proceeding with the case, for the reason that said Hearing Officer had no jurisdiction
to hear and decide the subject matter of the complaint. The court then required the
Hearing Officer and Gonzales to answer and, as prayed for, issued a writ of
preliminary injunction. The latter file their separate motions to dismiss the petition, on
the ground of lack of jurisdiction, improper venue, and non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies, it being argued that pursuant to Republic Acts Nos. 997 and
1241, as implemented by Executive Order No. 218, series of 1956 and
Reorganization Plan No. 20-A, regional offices of the Department of labor have
exclusive and original jurisdiction over all cases affecting money claims arising from
violations of labor standards or working conditions. Said motions to dismiss were
denied by the court. Answers were then filed and the case was heard. Thereafter, the
court rendered a decision holding that Republic Acts Nos. 997 and 1241, as well as
Executive Order No. 218, series of 1956 and Reorganization Plan No. 20-A issued
pursuant thereto, did not repeal the provision of the Judiciary Act conferring on courts
of first instance original jurisdiction to take cognizance of money claims arising from
violations of labor standards. The question of venue was also dismissed for being
moot, the same having been already raised and decided in a petition for certiorari and
prohibition previously filed with this Court in G.R. No. L-14007 (Mardo, etc. v. De
Veyra, etc.) which was dismissed for lack of merit in our resolution of July 7, 1958.
From the decision of the Court of First Instance of Baguio, respondents Hearing
Officer and Gonzales interposed the present appeal now before us.
In G.R. No. L-16781, Cresencio Estano filed with Regional Office No. 3 of the
Department of Labor, a complaint (RO 3 Ls. Case No. 874) against Chin Hua Trading
Co. and/or Lao Kang Suy and Ke Bon Chiong, as Manager and Assistant Manager
thereof, respectively, claiming to have been their driver from June 17, 1947 to June 4,
1955, for which service he was not paid overtime pay (for work in excess of 8 hours
and for Sundays and legal holidays) and vacation leave pay. He prayed for judgment
for the amount due him, plus attorney's fees. Chin Hua Trading, et al., filed their
answer and, issues having been joined, hearing thereof was started before Chief
Hearing Officer Atanacio Mardo and Hearing Officer Jorge Benedicto. Before trial of
the case could be terminated, however, Chin Hua Trading, et al., filed with the Court
of First Instance of Manila a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction (Civil
Case No. 26826)), to restrain the hearing officers from proceeding with the disposition
of the case, on the ground that they have no jurisdiction to entertain the same, as
Reorganization Plan No. 20-A and Executive Order No. 218, series of 1956, in
relation to Republic Act No. 997, as amended by Republic Act No. 1241, empowering
them to adjudicate the complaint, is invalid or unconstitutional. As prayed for, a
preliminary injunction was issued by the court. After due hearing the court rendered a
decision holding that Reorganization Plan No. 20-A is null and void and therefore,
granted the writ of prohibition making permanent the preliminary injunction previously
issued. From this decision, the claimant and the hearing officers appealed to the
Court of Appeals, which certified the case to us, as it involves only questions of law.
In G.R. No. L-15377, appellant Numeriana Raganas filed with the Court of First
Instance of Cebu a complaint (Civil Case No. R-5535) against appellees Sen Bee
Trading Company, Macario Tan and Sergio Tan, claiming that she was employed by
appellees as a seamstress from June 5, 1952 to January 11, 1958, for which service
she was underpaid and was not given overtime, as well as vacation and sick leave
pay. She prayed for judgment on the amount due her for the same plus damages. To
said complaint, appellees filed a motion to dismiss, on the ground that the trial court
has no jurisdiction to hear the case as it involves a money claim and should, under
Reorganization Plan No. 20-A be filed with the Regional Office of the Department of
Labor; and there is pending before the regional office of the Department of Labor, a
claim for separation vacation, sick and maternity leave pay filed by the same plaintiff
(appellant) against the same defendants-appellees). Acting on said motion, the court
dismissed the case, relying on the provision of Section 25, Article VI of
Reorganization Plan No. 20-A and on our resolution in the case of NASSCO v. Arca,
et al. (G.R. No. L-12249, May 6, 1957). From this order, appellant Raganas appealed
to the Court of Appeals, but said court certified the case to us.
In G.R. No. L-16660, Vicente B. Romero filed with Regional Officer No. 2 of the
Department of Labor a complaint (Wage Case No. 196-W) against Sia Seng, for
recovery of alleged unpaid wages, overtime and separation pay. Sia Seng, filed an
answer. At the date set for hearing the latter did not appear despite due notice to him
and counsel. Upon his petition, Romero was allowed to present his evidence.
Thereafter, a decision was rendered by the Hearing Officer in favor of Romero. Upon
the latter's motion for execution, the records of the case were referred to Regional
Labor Administrator Angel Hernando for issuance of said writ of execution, being the
officer charged with the duty of issuing the same. Hernando, believing that Sia Seng
should be given a chance to present his evidence, refused to issue the writ of
execution and ordered a re-hearing. As a consequence, Romero filed with the Court
of First Instance of Isabela a petition for mandamus (Case No. Br. II-35) praying that
an order be issued commanding respondent Regional Labor Administrator to

immediately issue a writ of execution of the decision in Wage Case No. 196-W. To
this petition, respondent Regional Labor Administrator filed a motion to dismiss, on
the ground that it states no cause of action, but action thereon was deferred until the
case is decided on the merits. Sia Seng filed his answer questioning the validity of the
rules and regulations issued under the authority of Reorganization Plan No. 20-A.
After hearing, the court rendered a decision ordering, inter alia, respondent Regional
Labor Administrator to forthwith issue the corresponding writ of execution, as enjoined
by Section 48, of the Rules and Regulations No. 1 of the Labor Standards
Commission. From this decision of the Court of First Instance, Sia Seng and Regional
Labor Administrator Hernando appealed to us. Appellant Sia Seng urges in his appeal
that the trial court erred in not dismissing the petition, in spite of the fact that the
decision sought to be enforced by appellee Romero was rendered by a hearing officer
who had no authority to render the same, and in failing to hold that Reorganization
Plan No. 20-A was not validly passed as a statute and is unconstitutional.
In G.R. No. L-17056, Mariano Pabillare instituted in Regional Office No. 3 of the
Department of Labor a complaint (IS-2168) against petitioner Fred Wilson & Co., Inc.,
alleging that petitioner engaged his services as Chief Mechanic, Air conditioning
Department, from October 1947 to February 19, 1959, when he was summarily
dismissed without cause and without sufficient notice and separation pay. He also
claimed that during his employment he was not paid for overtime rendered by him. He
prayed for judgment for the amount due him for such overtime and separation pay.
Petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint, on the ground that said regional office
"being purely an administrative body, has no power, authority, nor jurisdiction to
adjudicate the claim sought to be recovered in the action." Said motion to dismiss
having been denied by respondent Hearing Officer Meliton Parducho, petitioner Fred
Wilson & Co., Inc. filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila a petition
for certiorari and prohibition, with preliminary injunction (Civil Case No. 41954) to
restrain respondent hearing officer from proceeding with the case, and praying,
among others, that Reorganization Plan No. 20-A, insofar as it vests original and
exclusive jurisdiction over money claims (to the exclusion of regular courts of justice)
on the Labor Standards Commission or the Regional Offices of the Department of
Labor, be declared null and void and unconstitutional. As prayed for, the court
granted a writ of preliminary injunction. Respondents Hearing Officer and Pabillare
filed answer and the case was heard. After hearing, the court rendered a decision
declaring that "by the force of Section 6 of R.A. No. 997, as amended by R.A. 1241,
Plan No. 20-A was deemed approved by Congress when it adjourned its session in
1956' (Res. of May 6, 1957 in National Shipyards Steel Corporation v. Vicente Area,
G.R. No. L-12249). It follows that the questioned reorganization Plan No. 20-A is
valid.".
Petitioner Fred Wilson & Co., Inc. appealed directly to us from this decision.
The specific legal provision invoked for the authority of the regional offices to take
cognizance of the subject matter involved in these cases is paragraph 25 of Article VI
of Reorganization Plan No. 20-A, which is hereunder quoted:
2
25 Each regional office shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over all
cases falling under the Workmen's Compensation law, and cases affecting
all money claims arising from violations of labor standards on working
conditions including but not restrictive to: unpaid wages, underpayment,
overtime, separation pay and maternity leave of employees and laborers;
and unpaid wages, overtime, separation pay, vacation pay and payment for
medical services of domestic help.
Under this provision, the regional offices have been given original and exclusive
jurisdiction over:
(a) all cases falling under the Workmen's Compensation law;
(b) all cases affecting money claims arising from violations of labor
standards on working conditions, unpaid wages, underpayment, overtime,
separation pay and maternity leave of employees and laborers; and .
(c) all cases for unpaid wages, overtime, separation pay, vacation pay and
payment for medical services of domestic help.
Before the effectivity of Reorganization Plan No. 20-A, however, the Department of
Labor, except the Workmen's Compensation Commission with respect to claims for
compensation under the Workmen's Compensation law, had no compulsory power to
settle cases under (b) and (c) above, the only authority it had being to mediate merely
or arbitrate when the parties so agree in writing, In case of refusal by a party to submit
to such settlement, the remedy is to file a complaint in the proper court. 1
It is evident, therefore, that the jurisdiction to take cognizance of cases affecting
money claims such as those sought to be enforced in these proceedings, is a new
conferment of power to the Department of Labor not theretofore exercised by it. The
question thus presented by these cases is whether this is valid under our Constitution
and applicable statutes.
It is true that in Republic Act No. 1241, amending Section 4 of Republic Act 997,
which created the Government Survey and Reorganization Commission, the latter
was empowered —
(2) To abolish departments, offices, agencies, or functions which may not be
necessary, or create those which way be necessary for the efficient conduct
of the government service, activities, and functions. (Emphasis supplied.)
But these "functions" which could thus be created, obviously refer merely to
administrative, not judicial functions. For the Government Survey and Reorganization
Commission was created to carry out the reorganization of the Executive Branch of
the National Government (See Section 3 of R.A. No. 997, as amended by R.A. No.
1241), which plainly did not include the creation of courts. And the Constitution

expressly provides that "the Judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and
in such inferior courts as may be established by law.(Sec. 1, Art. VII of the
Constitution). Thus, judicial power rests exclusively in the judiciary. It may be
conceded that the legislature may confer on administrative boards or bodies quasi-
judicial powers involving the exercise of judgment and discretion, as incident to the
performance of administrative functions.2 But in so doing, the legislature must state its
intention in express terms that would leave no doubt, as even such quasi-judicial
prerogatives must be limited, if they are to be valid, only to those incidental to or in
connection with the performance of jurisdiction over a matter exclusively vested in the
courts.3
If a statute itself actually passed by the Congress must be clear in its terms when
clothing administrative bodies with quasi-judicial functions, then certainly such
conferment can not be implied from a mere grant of power to a body such as the
Government Survey and Reorganization Commission to create "functions" in
connection with the reorganization of the Executive Branch of the Government.
And so we held in Corominas et al. v. Labor Standards Commission, et al. (G.R. No.
L-14837 and companion cases, June 30, 1961);
. . . it was not the intention of Congress, in enacting Republic Act No. 997, to
authorize the transfer of powers and jurisdiction granted to the courts of
justice, from these to the officials to be appointed or offices to be created by
the Reorganization Plan. Congress is well aware of the provisions of the
Constitution that judicial powers are vested 'only in the Supreme Court and
in such courts as the law may establish'. The Commission was not
authorized to create courts of justice, or to take away from these their
jurisdiction and transfer said jurisdiction to the officials appointed or offices
created under the Reorganization Plan. The Legislature could not have
intended to grant such powers to the Reorganization Commission, an
executive body, as the Legislature may not and cannot delegate its power to
legislate or create courts of justice any other agency of the Government.
(Chinese Flour Importers Assoc. vs. Price Stabilization Board, G.R. No. L-
4465, July 12, 1951; Surigao Consolidated vs. Collector of Internal Revenue
G.R. No. L-5692, March 5, 1954; U.S. vs. Shreveport, 287 U.S. 77, 77 L. ed
175, and Johnson vs. San Diego, 42 P. 249, cited in 11 Am. Jur 921-922.)
(Emphasis supplied.)
But it is urged, in one of the cases, that the defect in the conferment of judicial or
quasi-judicial functions to the Regional offices, emanating from the lack of authority of
the Reorganization Commission has been cured by the non-disapproval of
Reorganization Plan No. 20-A by Congress under the provisions of Section 6(a) of
Republic Act No. 997, as amended. It is, in effect, argued that Reorganization Plan
No. 20-A is not merely the creation of the Reorganization Commission, exercising its
delegated powers, but is in fact an act of Congress itself, a regular statute directly and
duly passed by Congress in the exercise of its legislative powers in the mode
provided in the enabling act.
3
The pertinent provision of Republic Act No. 997, as amended, invoked in favor of this
argument reads as follows:
SEC. 6 (a) The provisions of the reorganization plan or plans submitted by
the President during the Second Session of the Third Congress shall be
deemed approved after the adjournment of the said session, and those of
the plan or plans or modifications of any plan or plans to be submitted after
the adjournment of the Second Session, shall be deemed approved after the
expiration of the seventy session days of the Congress following the date on
which the plan is transmitted to it, unless between the date of transmittal and
the expiration of such period, either House by simple resolution disapproves
the reorganization plan or any, modification thereof. The said plan of
reorganization or any modification thereof may, likewise, be approved by
Congress in a concurrent Resolution within such period.
It is an established fact that the Reorganization Commission submitted
Reorganization Plan No. 20-A to the President who, in turn, transmitted the same to
Congress on February 14, 1956. Congress adjourned its sessions without passing a
resolution disapproving or adopting the said reorganization plan. It is now contended
that, independent of the matter of delegation of legislative authority (discussed earlier
in this opinion), said plan, nevertheless became a law by non-action on the part of
Congress, pursuant to the above-quoted provision.
Such a procedure of enactment of law by legislative in action is not countenanced in
this jurisdiction. By specific provision of the Constitution —
No bill shall be passed or become a law unless it shall have been printed
and copies thereof in its final form furnished the Members at least three
calendar clays prior to its passage by the National Assembly (Congress),
except when the President shall have certified to the necessity of its
immediate enactment. Upon the last reading of a bill no amendment thereof
shall be allowed, and the question upon its final passage shall be taken
immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered on the Journal. (Sec.
21-[a], Art. VI).
Every bill passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes a law, be
presented to the President. If he approves the same, he shall sign it, but if
not, he shall return it with his objections to the House where it originated,
which shall enter the objections at large on its Journal and proceed to
reconsider it. If, after such reconsideration, two-thirds of all the Members of
such House shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with the
objections, to the other House by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and
if approved by two-thirds of all the Members voting for and against shall be
entered on its journal. If any bill shall not be returned by the President as
herein provided within twenty days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have
been presented to him, the same shall become a law in like manner as if he
has signed it, unless the Congress by adjournment prevent its return, in

which case it shall become a law unless vetoed by the President within thirty
days after adjournment. (Sec. 20[1]. Art. VI of the Constitution).
A comparison between the procedure of enactment provided in section 6 (a) of the
Reorganization Act and that prescribed by the Constitution will show that the former is
in distinct contrast to the latter. Under the first, consent or approval is to be
manifested by silence or adjournment or by "concurrent resolution." In either case, the
contemplated procedure violates the constitutional provisions requiring positive and
separate action by each House of Congress. It is contrary to the "settled and well-
understood parliamentary law (which requires that the) two houses are to hold
separate sessions for their deliberations, and the determination of the one upon a
proposed law is to be submitted to the separate determination of the other," (Cooley,
Constitutional Limitations, 7th ed., p. 187).
Furthermore, Section 6 (a) of the Act would dispense with the "passage" of any
measure, as that word is commonly used and understood, and with the requirement
presentation to the President. In a sense, the section, if given the effect suggested in
counsel's argument, would be a reversal of the democratic processes required by the
Constitution, for under it, the President would propose the legislative action by action
taken by Congress. Such a procedure would constitute a very dangerous precedent
opening the way, if Congress is so disposed, because of weakness or indifference, to
eventual abdication of its legislative prerogatives to the Executive who, under our
Constitution, is already one of the strongest among constitutional heads of state. To
sanction such a procedure will be to strike at the very root of the tri-departmental
scheme four democracy.
Even in the United States (in whose Federal Constitution there is no counterpart to
the specific method of passaging laws prescribed in Section 21[2] of our Constitution)
and in England (under whose parliamentary system the Prime Minister, real head of
the Government, is a member of Parliament), the procedure outlined in Section 6(a)
herein before quoted, is but a technique adopted in the delegation of the rule-making
power, to preserve the control of the legislature and its share in the responsibility for
the adoption of proposed regulations.4 The procedure has ever been intended or
utilized or interpreted as another mode of passing or enacting any law or measure by
the legislature, as seems to be the impression expressed in one these cases.
4
On the basis of the foregoing considerations, we hold ad declare that Reorganization
Plan No. 20-A, insofar as confers judicial power to the Regional Offices over cases
other than these falling under the Workmen's Compensation on Law, is invalid and of
no effect.
This ruling does not affect the resolution of this Court in the case of National Steel &
Shipyards Corporation v. Arca et al., G.R. No. L-12249, dated May 6, 1957,
considering that the said case refers to a claim before the Workmen's Compensation
Commission, which exercised quasi-judicial powers even before the reorganization of
the Department of Labor.
WHEREFORE
(a) The decision of the Court of First Instance of Baguio involved in case G.R. No. L-
15138 is hereby affirmed, without costs;
(b) The decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila questioned in case G.R. No.
L-16781 is hereby affirmed, without costs;
(c) The order of dismissal issued by the Court of First Instance of Cebu appealed from
in case G.R. No. L-15377 is set aside and the case remanded to the court of origin for
further proceedings, without costs;
(d) In case G.R. No. L-16660, the decision of the Court of First Instance of Isabela,
directing the Regional Labor Administrator to issue a writ of execution of the order of
the Regional Office No. 2, is hereby reversed, without costs; and .
(e) In case G.R. No. L-17056, the decision rendered after hearing by the Court of First
Instance of Manila, dismissing the complaint for annulment of the proceedings before
the Regional office No. 3, is hereby reversed and the preliminary injunction at first
issued by the trial court is revived and made permanents without costs. SO
ORDERED.

Jurisdiction
Taleon v. Sec. of Public Work
Petitioner-appellant Rosita Taleon is the registered owner of a parcel of land in
Lupon, Davao, which she acquired from her co-petitioner-appellant Miguel Solis who
had constructed therein man-made canals and fishpond dikes.
On April 17, 1961, respondent-appellee Lucia Tolentino wrote a letter-complaint to the
Secretary of Public Works stating that several fishpond operators and/or owners in
Lupon, Davao have built dams across and closed the Cabatan River, a public
navigable stream, thereby depriving her and the residents therein of passageway,
fishing ground and water supply. This letter-complaint was formally amended on June
9, 1961, wherein Tolentino specified appellants Taleon and Solis, and another
neighbor, one Humberto de los Santos, as those responsible for the closing of the
alleged Cabatan River, on the banks of which their lands abutted. On June 13, 1961,
Taleon filed her answer denying the existence of the alleged river and claiming that
the dams were constructed inside her registered property and that her water source
was a man-made canal connected to the sea.
An administrative hearing was thereafter held. On July 11, 1961, the Secretary of
Public Works, through the department undersecretary, rendered a decision finding
that appellants were indeed obstructing the Cabatan River, a Public navigable stream
which used to pass inside their lands, with the dams they constructed thereon, and
ordering their demolition. Appellants filed a motion to reconsider claiming that the
ruling was contrary to the facts established and that the Secretary had no jurisdiction
over the Case. This was denied.
Appellants elevated the case to the Office of the President on October 11, 1961. After
reviewing the records, said office affirmed on November 10, 1961 the decision of July
11, 1961. Appellants filed a motion to reconsider based on an alleged decision of
Public Works Secretary Moreno rendered on November 24, 1961, reversing the
former ruling of July 11, 1961. On January 10, 1962, the Office of the President
denied the motion, on two grounds: (1) An official examination of the records of the
case showed that said decision of Secretary Moreno did not form part thereof, and (2)
even if it were genuine, it had no legal effect since the Secretary had already lost
jurisdiction when appellants filed their appeal to the President.
On February 9, 1962, Taleon was informed by the District Engineer of Davao that her
dams would be demolished on February 16, 1962, upon orders of the Executive
Secretary, the administrative decision having become final and executory. To stop the
threatened demolition, appellants filed suit in the Court of First Instance of Davao
against the Public Works Secretary and the Engineer of Davao. They were able to
obtain a writ of preliminary injunction on February 15, 1962.
On September 1, 1962, appellants filed a similar petition for certiorari and prohibition
with preliminary injunction against the herein respondents-appellees in the Court of
5
First Instance of Manila. After the latters' respective answers were filed and the case
in Davao was dismissed, upon appellants' motion, said Manila court issued the writ of
preliminary injunction prayed for, altho in form a temporary restraining order with
bond.
The issues having been joined, a pre-trial conference was held and the Court of First
Instance of Manila allowed respondents to file a motion to dismiss the petition. Upon
orders of said court, the administrative records were sent up. On January 11, 1965,
acting on the respective memoranda submitted by the parties in support of and in
opposition to the pending motion to dismiss, the court a quo ruled that appellants
were given a fair hearing in the administrative case and that the decision therein was
supported by the evidence adduced and dismissed the petition stating:
WHEREFORE, finding merit in the respondents' Motion to Dismiss,
GRANTED. Let this petition be, as it hereby DISMISSED, with costs against
petitioners.
The temporary restraining order issued on 17 December 1962 is hereby
dissolved and the bond filed by petitioners, cancelled.
Taking issue with this ruling, the petitioners instituted the present appeal, raising
questions purely of law. They submit that the court a quo erred in dismissing the case
without giving them a full trial, thereby depriving them of the opportunity to prove that
the alleged extension of the Cabatan River passing across their property is but a
depression and that the decision rendered by Secretary Moreno on November 24,
1961, is genuine. Appellants also reiterate that the Secretary of Public Works has no
jurisdiction over the case, since the dams and the body of water in question were
located inside registered private property.
Appellants' contentions are without merit. First of all, full trial was not needed. The
issues raised before the court a quo were all purely legal and thus could be resolved
on the basis of the pleadings and memoranda filed and the administrative records
sent up to it. No necessity was there for further reception of evidence.
Anent the jurisdiction of the Secretary of Public Works, this point has been squarely
covered in Lovina v. Moreno, L-17821, November 29, 1963.1 There We upheld the
power of the Public Works Secretary under Republic Act 2056 to declare as a public
navigable stream any alleged depression or bodies of water even inside titled
properties. That case involved a creek, located inside a titled land, which was alleged
to be privately owned. The Public Works Secretary declared it as part of a public
stream which plaintiffs therein had blocked with their dams. In sustaining the
Secretary, We there ruled that such fact-finding power on his part was
merely incidental to his duly to clear all navigable streams of unauthorized
obstructions and, hence, its grant did not constitute an unlawful delegation of judicial
power. And we remarked there that although the title was silent as to the existence of
any stream inside the property, that did not confer a right to the stream, it being of a
public nature and not subject to private appropriation, even by prescription.
 6

Appellants would offer affidavits — which are hearsay 2 — and testimonies aliunde to
show that the alleged Cabatan River inside their property is really a mere depression.
As also enunciated in Lovina v. Moreno, supra, however, there cannot be a trial de
novo in cases of this nature, since a review of an administrative finding is limited to
the evidence already presented before the administrative body. 3 This rule bars
presentation of evidence aliunde and limits the trial court's functions to determining
whether there is evidence in the administrative records substantial enough to support
the findings therein. Here, the records of the administrative case were actually
brought up and submitted to the court a quo and it held that the administrative finding
that the alleged depression was really a part of the navigable Cabatan River was
supported by substantial evidence. Said court fully did its duty, to have gone further
would have been exceeding its power.

Regarding the alleged second decision of the Secretary, its non-existence has been
officially certified by the Chief of the Records Division of the Department of Public
Works, the official custodian.4 This alone is proof enough that there is no such
decision.5 But even granting that there is really such a decision, it would not help
appellants' cause any. Said decision would still be wanting of legal force and effect
since Secretary Moreno had already lost jurisdiction to revoke the former ruling
because of the appeal then already taken by appellants themselves to the Office of
the President, which affirmed the former ruling. And even conceding jurisdiction, the
second decision could still affect nothing since it was actually revoked and reversed
by the ruling of the Office of the President, dated January 10, 1962, which denied the
motion to reconsider filed by appellants wherein they invoked said new decision. So,
a full trial to prove the authenticity of the Moreno decision would be a pointless waste
of the court a quo's time.

It is recognized that the trial court may dismiss a petition for certiorari even after an
answer is filed upon a motion to dismiss, where said petition is found to be patently
without merit.6 But the court a quo did not summarily dismiss the petition. It conducted
a pre-trial conference and even ordered the records in the administrative case to be
elevated to it. Now the Rules of Court 7 authorizes the trial court to render judgment on
the pleadings or a summary judgment, as justice may require, if at the pre-trial it finds
that facts exist which would warrant such judgment. All the necessary facts being
already before the court a quo, no further trial was required. Its decision rendered at
that stage was therefore sanctioned by the Rules.

Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against
petitioners-appellants. So ordered.

Jurisdiction
RCPI v. Board of Communications
These two petitions (G.R. No. L-43653 and G.R. No. L-45378) for review by certiorari
of the decisions of the Board of Communications in BC Case No. 75-01-OC, entitled
"Diego T Morales vs. Radio Communications of the Philippines, Inc. (RCPI)" and BC
Case No. 75-08-OC, entitled "Pacifica Innocencio vs. Radio Communications of the
Philippines, Inc. (RCPI)," have been Consolidated as per resolution of this Court
dated March 21, 1977, as they involve the same issue as to whether the Board of
Communications has jurisdiction over claims for damages allegedly suffered by
private respondents for failure to receive telegrams sent thru the petitioner Radio
Communications of the Philippines, Inc., RCPI for short.
In BC Case No. 75-01-OC (G.R. No. L-43653) complainant respondent Diego
Morales claims that while he was in Manila his daughter sent him a telegram on
October 15, 1974 from Santiago, Isabela, informing him of the death of his wife, Mrs.
Diego T. Morales. The telegram sent thru the petitioner RCPI however never reached
him. He had to be informed personally about the death of his wife and so to catch up
with the burial of his wife, he had to take the trip by airplane to Isabela. In its answer
petitioner RCPI claims that the telegram sent by respondent was transmitted from
Santiago, lsabela to its Message Center at Cubao, Quezon City but when it was
relayed from Cubao, the radio signal became intermittent making the copy received at
Sta. Cruz, Manila unreadable and unintelligible. Because of the failure of the RCPI to
transmit said telegram to him, respondent allegedly suffered inconvenience and
additional expenses and prays for damages.
In BC Case No. 75-08-OC (G.R. No. L-45378) complainant respondent Pacifico
Innocencio claim that on July 13, 1975 Lourdes Innocencio sent a telegram from
Paniqui, Tarlac, thru the facilities of the petitioner RCPI to him at Barrio Lomot,
Cavinti, Laguna for the Purpose of informing him about the death of their father. The
telegram was never received by Pacifico Innocencio. Inspite of the non-receipt and/or
non-delivery of the message sent to said address, the sender (Lourdes Innocencio
has not been notified about its non-delivery, As a consequence Pacifica Innocencio
was not able to attend the internment of their father at Moncada, Tarlac. Because of
the failure of RCPI to deliver to him said telegram he allegedly was "shocked when he
learned about the death of their father when he visited his hometown Moncada Tarlac
on August 14, 1975," and thus suffered mental anguish and personal inconveniences.
Likewise, he prays for damages.
After hearing. the respondent Board in both cases held that the service rendered by
petitioner was inadequate and unsatisfactory and imposed upon the petitioner in each
case a disciplinary fine of P200 pursuant to Section 21 of Commonwealth Act 146, as
amended, by Presidential Decree No. I and Letter of Implementation No. 1.
The main thrust of the argument of petitioner is that respondent Board has no
jurisdiction to entertain and take cognizance of complaints for injury caused by breach
of contractual obligation arising from negligence covered by Article 1170 of the Civil
7
Code 1 and injury caused by quasi delict or tort liability under Article 2176 of the Civil
Code 2 which according to it should be ventilated in the proper courts of justice and
not in the Board of Communications.
We agree with petitioner RCPI. In one case We have ruled that the Public Service
Commission and its successor in interest, the Board of Communications, "being a
creature of the legislature and not a court, can exercise only such jurisdiction and
powers as are expressly or by necessary implication,. conferred upon it by
statute".3 The functions of the Public Service Commission are limited and
administrative in nature and it has only jurisdiction and power as are expressly or by
necessary implication conferred upon it by statute. 4 As successor in interest of the
Public Service Commission, the Board of Communications exercises the same
powers jurisdiction and functions as that provided for in the Public Service Act for the
Public Service Commission. One of these powers as provided under Section 129 of
the Public Service Act governing the organization of the Specialized Regulatory
Board, is to issue certificate of public convenience. But this power to issue certificate
of public convenience does not carry with it the power of supervision and control over
matters not related to the issuance of certificate of public convenience or in the
performance therewith in a manner suitable to promote public interest. But even
assuming that the respondent Board of Communications has the power or jurisdiction
over petitioner in the exercise of its supervision to insure adequate public service,
petitioner cannot be subjected to payment of fine under Section 21 of the Public
Service Act, because this provision of the law subjects to a fine every public service
that violates or falls to comply with the terms and conditions of any certificate or any
orders, decisions or regulations of the Commission. In the two cases before us
petitioner is not being charged nor investigated for violation of the terms and
conditions of its certificate of public convenience or of any order, decision or
regulations of the respondent Board of Communications. The complaint of
respondents in the two case was that they were allegedly inconvenienced or injured
by the failure of the petitioner to transmit to them telegrams informing them of the
deaths of close relatives which according to them constitute breach of contractual
obligation through negligence under the Civil Code. The charges however, do not
necessarily involve petitioners failure to comply with its certificate of public
convenience or any order, decision or regulation of respondent Board of
Communication. It is clear from the record that petitioner has not been charge of any
violation or failure to comply with the terms and condition of its certificates of public
convenience or of any order, decision or regulation of the respondent Board. The
charge does not relate to the management of the facilities and system of transmission
of messages by petitioner in accordance with its certificate of public convenience. If in
the two cases before Us complainants Diego Morales and Pacifica Innocencio
allegedly suffered injury due to petitioner's breach of contractual obligation arising
from negligence, the proper forum for them to ventilate their grievances for possible
recovery of damages against petitioner should be in the courts and not in the
respondent Board of Communications. Much less can it impose the disciplinary fine of
P200 upon the petitioner. In Francisco Santiago vs. RCPI (G.R. No. L-29236)
and Constancio Langan vs. RCPI (G.R. No. L-29247), this Court speaking thru
Justice Enrique Fernando, ruled:
 8

There can be no justification then for the Public Service

Commission (now the Board of Communications as successor in
interest) imposing the fines in these two petitions. The law cannot
be any clearer . The only power it possessed over radio companies
as noted was to fix rates It could not take to task a radio company
for an negligence or misfeasance. It was not vested with such
authority. That it did then in these two petitions lacked the impress
of validity.

In the face of the provision itself, it is rather apparent that the Public
Service Commission lacked the required power to proceed against
petitioner. There is nothing in Section 21 thereof which empowers it
to impose a fine that calls for a different conclusion.

WHEREFORE. both decisions of respondent Board of Communications in BC Case

No. 75-01 OC and BC Case No. 75- 08-0C are hereby reversed, set aside, declared
null and void for lack of jurisdiction to take cognizance of both cases. Without costs.

SO ORDERED.
 9

Jurisdiction 1. The geographic positions of MBM Nos. 22 to 33, Cad

267, Caloocan Cadastre was the basis for the
National Housing Authority v. Commission on Settlement of Land establishment of the true and correct boundary between
the municipality and Caloocan City. However, during the
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari [1] assailing the Decision[2] of the Court
dialogue with concerned government agencies on May 12,
of Appeals dated November 16, 1999 and Resolution dated March 13, 2000 in CA-
1995, the municipality of San Jose del Monte, Bulacan,
G.R. SP No. 54495, entitled NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, petitioner,
emphasized that the boundary between the two local
versus, THE HON. RUFINO V. MIJARES, in his capacity as
government units is the imaginary straight line between
Commissioner, COMMISSION ON THE SETTLEMENT OF LAND
two boundary monuments, starting from MBM Nos. 22 to
PROBLEMS(COSLAP), MUNICIPALITY OF SAN JOSE DEL MONTE, BULACAN,
33.
represented by Hon. Eduardo V. Roquero, in his capacity as Municipal Mayor of San
Jose del Monte, Bulacan, JOSEPH ELMER S. GUEVARRA, Sheriff IV of the Ex-
2. The FNSP-G surveying team plotted/drafted in a
Officio Sheriff, Malolos, Bulacan, SPS. ANGEL A. CRUZ and ROSARIO C. CRUZ,
topographic map all pertinent records affecting boundary
RUFINO LAAN, RUFINA LAAN SANTOS, ANDRES NEPOMUCENO, SPS.
disputes of the two locality, such as the geographic
ALBERTO HAGOS and HERMINIA HAGOS, LEON GUILALAS, SPS. OSCAR R.
positions and coordinates of MBM Nos. 22 to 33 Cad 267
BADILLO and HAYDEE M. BADILLO, and LEONCIO LAAN, respondents.
Caloocan Cadastre, BM Nos. 11 to 23 of Tala Estate lot
lines. Tala Estate lot lines were plotted approximately by
The undisputed facts are:
scale, because there were no records on its geographic
coordinates and incomplete cadastral maps. The findings
Since 1968, there has been an existing boundary dispute between the Municipality of
are the following:
San Jose del Monte, Bulacan (one of herein respondents) and the City
of Caloocan. In order to resolve the long-challenged conflict, the Sangguniang
a) The plotted positions of MBM Nos. 23 to
Bayan of San Jose del Monte passed and approved Resolution No. 20-02-
30, 32 and 33 Cad 267 Caloocan
94[3] on February 10, 1994. This resolution recognizes the official boundary of
Cadastre are almost identical or
respondent municipality and the City of Caloocan, described as follows:
equivalent to BM Nos. 12 to 16, 18 to 20,
22 and 23 of Tala Estate.
ON JOINT MOTION of all members present;
b) The lot lines of Tala Estate traverses
RESOLVED, as it is hereby resolved to recognize the official
thru Marilao River.
boundary of the Municipality of San Jose del Monte, Bulacan and
the City of Caloocan, Metro Manila as the true and correct line
c) The northern portion of the lot lines of
marking between the two Local Government Units as shown by the
Parcels 1, 2 and 3 SWO-41615 Tala
attached certified true copy of the geographic position and plain grid
Estate indicated that it traverses
coordinates of Caloocan, Rizal per CAD-267 specifically from MBM
thru Marilao River.
(Municipal Boundary Monument) 22 to MBM 33;
xxx
3. In Municipal Resolution No. 06-08-95 dated August 8,
1995, it is requested that the geographic positions of BM
Nos. 11 to 24, Tala Estate shall be recognized as the
On August 8, 1995, another Resolution[4] was passed by the Sangguniang Bayan of
official lots lines which delineates the boundaries of San
San Jose del Monte recognizing the geographic position and plane coordinates of
Jose del Monte, Bulacan and Caloocan City. Moreover,
Tala Estate, Caloocan City contained in BM No. 11-24 as the lot lines delineating the
the resolution is opposed to the delineation
boundary between the Municipality of San Jose del Monte and Caloocan City. This
of Marilao River as the boundary of two localities, as
prompted the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), Region III
embodied in SWO-41615.
to conduct a relocation survey.
4. If the lot lines of Parcels 1, 2 and 3, SWO-41615 will be
On September 15, 1995, the survey team submitted a Comprehensive
[5] the basis for the boundaries of the two LGUs, Marilao
Report, some excerpts of which provide:
River will be the natural boundary between the two LGUs;
if BM 11 to 24, Tala Estate shall be the basis for the
ISSUES, PROBLEMS AND ANALYSIS
boundaries, some northern portions of Parcels 1, 2 and 3,
 10

SWO-41615, portions of Bankers Village and Pangarap On November 16, 1999, the Appellate Court dismissed the petition for having been
Village belongs to the Municipality of San Jose del Monte, filed out of time and for petitioners failure to avail of the remedy of appeal.
Bulacan.

Petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied.

The Comprehensive Report states that the San Jose del Monte Sangguniang
Bayan Resolutions contradict the delineation embodied in SWO-41615 of the Tala
Estate, a 598-hectare property allotted by the government mainly for housing and
resettlement site under the administration of the National Housing Authority (NHA),
pursuant to Presidential Proclamation No. 843 issued by then President Ferdinand E.
Marcos on April 26, 1971.
Unsatisfied with the report of the DENR, respondent municipality filed a complaint
with the Commission on Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP), [6] against petitioner
NHA. Several residents of San Jose del Monte, namely: spouses Angel and Rosario
Cruz, Rufino Laan, Rufina Laan Santos, Andres Nepomuceno, spouses Alberto and
Herminia Hagos, Leon Guilalas, spouses Oscar and Haydee Badillo, and Leoncio
Laan (herein private respondents) joined the municipality as complainants in the said
case. They alleged that their properties are within the Municipality of San Jose del
Monte; that Presidential Proclamation No. 843 does not cover their properties; and
that the NHAs Bagong Silang Resettlement Project encroaches on their
landholdings. They prayed that the NHA be ordered to award them
damages. Incidentally, the City of Caloocan was not impleaded as a party in their
complaint.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
At the threshold, let it be stated that a judgment issued by a quasi-judicial
body without jurisdiction is void. It can never become final and executory, hence, an
appeal is out of the question.[7]
The main issue for our resolution is whether the COSLAP has jurisdiction over the
boundary dispute between respondent municipality and Caloocan City.
COSLAP was created by Executive Order No. 561 issued on September 21, 1979 by
then President Ferdinand E. Marcos. The Commission is an administrative body
established as a means of providing a mechanism for the expeditious settlement of
land problems to avoid social unrest. Its objective is to settle land conflicts among
small settlers, landowners and members of cultural minorities.
The powers and functions of the COSLAP are laid down in Section 3 of Executive
Order No. 561, thus:

On June 22, 1998, the COSLAP rendered its Resolution ruling that the correct Sec. 3. Powers and Functions. The Commission shall have the
boundary between respondents San Jose del Monte and Caloocan City is that following powers and functions:
specified in the twin Resolutions of the Sangguniang Bayan of said respondents. The xxx
COSLAP likewise held that all other issues, such as those raised by respondents, are
mere incidents of such ruling. In effect, the COSLAP ruled that the land covered by 2. Refer and follow up for immediate action by the agency having
the NHA project, being within the Municipality of San Jose del Monte, encroaches appropriate jurisdiction any land problem or dispute referred to the
upon respondents properties. Commission: Provided, That the Commission may, in the following
cases, assume jurisdiction and resolve land problems or disputes
On January 14, 1999, petitioner NHA, upon invitation of the Bureau of Local which are critical and explosive in nature considering, for instance,
Government Supervision of the Department of Interior and Local Government the large number of parties involved, the presence or emergence of
(Bureau), attended a meeting held on January 26, 1999 between the local officials of social tension or unrest, or other similar critical situations requiring
respondent municipality and Caloocan City. The purpose of the meeting was to immediate action:
provide an avenue for the discussion of the territorial boundary between the two local
government units. During the meeting, petitioner NHA posed strong opposition to the (a) Between occupants/squatters and
COSLAP Resolution, contending that the latter has no jurisdiction over the boundary pasture lease agreement holders or
dispute.Subsequently, the Bureau directed the parties to submit their respective timber concessionaires;
position papers within 30 days. (b) Between occupants/squatters and
government reservation grantees;
Instead of submitting a position paper, respondent municipality filed with the COSLAP (c) Between occupants/squatters and
a motion for execution of its Resolution dated June 22, 1998. On May 17, 1999, the public land claimants or applicants;
COSLAP granted the motion and issued a writ of execution. (d) Petitions for classification, release
and/or subdivisions of lands of the public
Petitioner NHA then filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari alleging that domain; and
in issuing the June 22, 1998 Resolution and the writ of execution, COSLAP acted (e) Other similar land problems of grave
without jurisdiction. urgency and magnitude.
 11

xxx Art. 15. Definition and Policy. There is boundary dispute

when a portion or the whole of the territorial area of an LGU is
claimed by two or more LGUs. Boundary disputes between or
Administrative agencies, like the COSLAP, are tribunals of limited jurisdiction among LGUs shall, as much as possible, be settled amicably.
and as such could wield only such as are specifically granted to them by the enabling
statutes.[8] In acting on a land dispute, the COSLAP may either assume jurisdiction if Art. 16. Jurisdictional Responsibility. Boundary disputes
the matter falls under paragraph 2(a) to (e) or refer the matter to an agency having shall be referred for settlement to the following:
appropriate jurisdiction.
There is no provision in Executive Order No. 561 that COSLAP has (a) Sangguniang Panlungsod or
jurisdiction over boundary dispute between two local government units. Under Sangguniang Bayan for disputes
Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code, the respective legislative involving two (2) or more barangays in
councils of the contending local government units have jurisdiction over their the same city or municipality, as the
boundary disputes. Sections 118 and 119 provide: case may be;
(b) Sangguniang panlalawigan for those
Section 118. Jurisdictional Responsibility for Settlement of involving two (2) or more municipalities
Boundary Dispute. within the same province;
xxx (c) Jointly, to the sanggunians of
provinces concerned, for those involving
(d) Boundary disputes involving a component city component cities or municipalities of
or municipality on the one hand and a different provinces; or
highly urbanized city on the other, or two (d) Jointly, to the respective
(2) or more highly urbanized cities, shall sanggunians, for those involving a
be jointly referred for settlement to the component city or municipality and a
respective sanggunians of the parties. highly urbanized city or two (2) or
more highly-urbanized cities. x x x
(e) In the event the Sanggunian fails to effect an
amicable settlement within sixty (60) days Thus, instead of assuming jurisdiction over the case, the COSLAP should
from the date the dispute was referred have referred respondents complaint to the Sangguniang
thereto, it shall issue a certification to that Panglungsod of Caloocan City and the Sangguniang Bayan of San Jose del
effect. Thereafter, the dispute shall be Monte. Their decision may be appealed to the proper Regional Trial Court.
formally tried by the Sanggunian concerned
which shall decide the issue within sixty Consequently, we rule that the COSLAP does not have jurisdiction over the
(60) days from the date of the certification boundary dispute between San Jose del Monte and Caloocan City. We have
referred to above. consistently ruled that a judgment for want of jurisdiction is no judgment at all. It
cannot be the source of any right or the creator of any obligation. All acts performed
Section 119. Appeal. Within the time and manner pursuant to it and all claims emanating from it have no legal effect.Hence, it can never
prescribed by the Rules of Court, any party may elevate the become final and any writ of execution based on it is void. [9] Such nullity is correctable
decision of the Sanggunian concerned to the proper Regional Trial only by certiorari.[10] And certiorari cannot be dismissed for timeliness inasmuch as a
Court having jurisdiction over the area in dispute. The Regional void judgment never acquires finality and any action to declare its nullity does not
Trial Court shall decide the appeal within one (1) year from the filing prescribe.[11]Having no legal effect, the situation is the same as it would be as if there
thereof. Pending final resolution of the disputed area prior to the was no judgment at all. It leaves the parties in the position they were in before the
dispute shall be maintained and continued for all legal purposes. trial.[12]

Clearly, the Court of Appeals erred in disposing NHAs petition for

Rule III implementing the above provisions states: certiorari. It should have dismissed the petition, not on the grounds that it was filed
Rule III late and that certiorari is not a substitute for a lost appeal, but solely on the ground
that the COSLAP has no jurisdiction over the subject boundary dispute.
SETTLEMENT OF BOUNDARY DISPUTES

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The assailed Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 54495 are SET ASIDE. SO
ORDERED.
Rules of Procedure
Espinoza v. Provincial Adjudicator
1 2
Under review are the January 14, 1994 decision and June 01, 2000 resolution of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 502 UDK. The CA dismissed petitioner
Bonifacio Espinoza’s petition for certiorari imputing grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the provincial adjudicator of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudication Office
(PARAD) of San Fernando, Pampanga in deciding DARAB Case No. 203-P-90.
The events leading to this petition for review on certiorari stemmed from an agrarian
dispute before the PARAD, San Fernando, Pampanga. A complaint 3 for ejectment
was filed against petitioner by private respondent Maria V. Quibuloy, as co-owner and
administratrix of three parcels of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
3676. She alleged that petitioner had reneged on his obligations as tenant to pay the
rent and till the subject landholding.
Instead of answering the complaint, petitioner moved to dismiss the case for lack of
jurisdiction. He cited Section 1, Rule III of the 1989 Rules of Procedure of the
Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (1989 DARAB Rules), providing
for conciliation proceedings before the Barangay Agrarian Reform Council (BARC)
prior to initiating the case. He contended that presentation of a certification from the
BARC, attesting that the dispute had been submitted to it for mediation or conciliation
without any success of settlement, was a jurisdictional requirement. On that note, he
concluded that the provincial adjudicator could not take cognizance of the agrarian
dispute due to Quibuloy’s failure to present the required certificate.
The hearing on the motion to dismiss was set on November 7, 1990. 4 On the said
date, petitioner or his counsel failed to appear, hence the motion was submitted for
resolution.5
Without issuing a ruling on petitioner’s motion, the provincial adjudicator set the case
for hearing on May 22, 1991. Again, neither petitioner nor his counsel attended the
hearing. Thus, Quibuloy was allowed to present her evidence ex-parte. Thereafter,
the dispute was ordered submitted for decision.6
Just before the decision was rendered, petitioner filed his answer assailing Quibuloy’s
personality to bring suit. Petitioner also offered unsubstantiated denials of Quibuloy’s
charges. As his defense, he denied allegations of non-payment of rents and non-
tillage of the land for lack of knowledge and information to form a belief as to the
veracity thereof.
12
The provincial adjudicator was sufficiently convinced that Quibuloy’s allegations were
true and correct. Accordingly, he decided the case against petitioner. 7
Instead of immediately appealing from the adjudicator’s decision, petitioner allowed
the reglementary period to lapse. Thereafter, he filed a petition for certiorari with the
CA.
The appellate court dismissed the petition as "unavailing and vacuous." 8 It reiterated
the well-settled rule that certiorari lies only in cases of errors of jurisdiction and not
errors of judgment. It stressed that certiorari cannot be a substitute for a lost appeal.
Now, petitioner comes to us with practically a rehash of the issues already raised in
the CA, to wit:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT PUBLIC RESPONDENT PROVINCIAL ADJUDICATOR OF THE
[PARAD] OF PAMPANGA IS CORRECT IN PROCEEDING WITH DARAB CASE NO.
203-P-90 WITHOUT FIRST COMPLYING WITH THE JURISDICTIONAL
REQUIREMENTS SET FORTH IN SECTION 1, RULE III OF THE [1989] DARAB
REVISED RULES OF PROCEDURE.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT PUBLIC RESPONDENT PROVINCIAL ADJUDICATOR OF THE
[PARAD] OF PAMPANGA IS CORRECT IN DECIDING DARAB CASE NO. 203-P-90
WITHOUT FIRST RESOLVING PETITIONER’S MOTION TO DISMISS.
III.
WHETHER OR NOT PUBLIC RESPONDENT ERRED IN RULING THAT
PETITIONER’S ANSWER TO PRIVATE RESPONDENT’S COMPLAINT IN DARAB
CASE NO. 203-P-90 WAS FILED OUT OF TIME AND IN NOT CONSIDERING THE
SAME.
IV.
WHETHER OR NOT PUBLIC RESPONDENT IS CORRECT IN DECIDING DARAB
CASE NO. 203-P-90 IN FAVOR OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT ON THE BASIS OF
THE SELF-SERVING AFFIDAVIT OF THE LATTER AND HER LONE WITNESS
CONSIDERING HER FAILURE TO PRESENT THE TITLE OF THE LAND IN
QUESTION (TCT NO. 3676) OR ANY DOCUMENT TO SHOW HER AUTHORITY TO
ACT AS ADMINISTRATOR OF THE SAME.
V.

WHETHER OR NOT THE [CA’s] DISMISSAL OF THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI
AND DENIAL OF [PETITIONER’S] MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION IS
PROPER.9
We deny the petition.
A special civil action of certiorari is an independent action, raising the question of
jurisdiction where the tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial
functions has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. 10 The ultimate purpose of such
action is to keep an inferior tribunal within the bounds of its jurisdiction or relieve
parties from arbitrary acts of courts.111awphi1.net
A petition for certiorari was never meant as a mode of reviewing errors of judgment
committed by an inferior tribunal. Thus, it has been settled that the remedy of
certiorari is not a substitute for an appeal lost by the party entitled thereto especially if
the right of appeal was lost through negligence. 12 When the remedy of appeal is
available but is lost due to petitioner’s own negligence or error in the choice of
remedies, resort to certiorari is precluded.
Under the 1989 DARAB Rules,13 an aggrieved party may appeal the decision of a
provincial adjudicator to the Adjudication Board within 15 days from receipt. In this
case, petitioner allowed the appeal period to lapse and instead filed a petition for
certiorari in the CA roughly three months after the assailed decision was rendered.
It is evident that the CA acted on the petition properly.
Even if, in the greater interest of substantial justice, certiorari may be availed of, it
must be shown that the adjudicator acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction, that is, that the adjudicator exercised his powers in an
arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostilities, so patent
and gross as to amount to an evasion or virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or
to act in contemplation of law.14
As correctly found by the appellate court, there is no showing that errors of jurisdiction
or grave abuse of discretion were committed by public respondent.
On the first assigned error, the 1989 DARAB Rules exempted parties residing in non-
adjoining barangays from presenting the BARC certification. 15 Since it is undisputed
that Quibuloy resided in San Nicolas 1ST, Lubao, Pampanga while petitioner stayed
in San Agustin, Lubao, Pampanga, the former was not required to present the BARC
certification before the adjudicator taking cognizance of the agrarian dispute.
Needless to say, the provincial adjudicator did not err in entertaining the dispute
notwithstanding the absence of the BARC certification.
13
On the second issue, administrative agencies exercising quasi-judicial functions are
not bound by technical rules followed in courts of law. The adjudicator is given
enough latitude, subject to the essential requirements of administrative due process,
to be able to expeditiously ascertain the facts of the agrarian dispute. 16
While there may have been a technical lapse on the part of the adjudicator in
disposing of the motion to dismiss, the assailed acts of the adjudicator did not amount
to a grave abuse of discretion justifying a writ of certiorari. Considering the technical
flexibility afforded to agrarian adjudicators, the order may easily be construed as a
denial of the motion to dismiss. What would have been the prudent recourse under
the rules was to submit an answer immediately, participate in the hearing and appeal
an adverse decision. Sadly, petitioner failed to do any of these. It is now too late for
him to dispute the adjudicator’s decision.
Moving on to the third assignment of error, we hold that petitioner’s answer was
indeed filed out of time. While the 1989 DARAB Rules provides that the non-
answering respondent (petitioner) may be allowed to belatedly file his answer, it also
provides that the answer should be filed before the matter is submitted for decision.
Here, petitioner submitted his answer after the case was submitted for decision.
Lastly, on the fourth assignment of error, it cannot be overemphasized that only errors
of jurisdiction may be reviewed by the CA in a petition for certiorari. "Where the issue
or question involved affects the wisdom or legal soundness of the decision – not the
jurisdiction of the court to render said decision – the same is beyond the province of a
special civil action for certiorari."17
In sum, the petition failed to prove that the CA committed any reversible error in
denying petitioner’s petition for certiorari as well as his motion for reconsideration.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
 14

Rules of Procedure On January 16, 1989, petitioner remitted to the Office of the Provincial Treasurer of
Bohol the amounts of P10,000.00 and P15,000.00, respectively. On February 14,
Perez v. People 1989, petitioner again remitted to the Provincial Treasurer an additional amount
of P35,000.00, followed by remittances made on February 16, 1989 in the amounts
PETITIONER Zenon R. Perez seeks a review 1 of his conviction by the of P2,000.00 and P2,784.00.
Sandiganbayan2 for malversation of public funds3 under Article 217 of the Revised
Penal Code. An administrative case was filed against petitioner on February 13, 1989. He filed an
Answer11 dated February 22, 1989 reiterating his earlier verbal admission before the
This is not a big case but its implications are wide-ranging and the issues We resolve audit team.
include the rights to speedy trial and speedy disposition of a criminal case, the
balancing test, due process, and cruel and unusual punishment. On April 17, 1989, petitioner again remitted the amount of P8,000.00 to the Provincial
Treasurer of Bohol. Petitioner had then fully restituted his shortage in the amount
The Facts of P72,784.57. The full restitution of the missing money was confirmed and shown by
the following receipts:12
On December 28, 1988, an audit team headed by Auditor I Arlene R. Mandin,
Provincial Auditor’s Office, Bohol,4conducted a cash examination on the account of Official Receipt No. Date Issued and Amount
petitioner, who was then the acting municipal treasurer of Tubigon, Bohol. Received
8266659 January 16, 1989 P10,000.00
Petitioner was absent on the first scheduled audit at his office on December 28, 1988.
A radio message was sent to Loon, the town where he resided, to apprise him of the 8266660 January 16, 1989 P15,000.00
on-going audit. The following day, the audit team counted the cash contained in the 8266662 February 14, 1989 P35,000.00
safe of petitioner in his presence. In the course of the audit, the amount
8266667 February 16, 1989 P 2,000.00
of P21,331.79 was found in the safe of petitioner.
8266668 February 16, 1989 P 2,784.00
5
The audit team embodied their findings in the Report of Cash Examination, which 8266675 April 17, 1989 P 8,000.00
also contained an inventory of cash items. Based on the said audit, petitioner was TOTAL - P72,784.57
supposed to have on hand the total amount of P94,116.36, instead of the P21,331.79,
incurring a shortage of P72,784.57.6
Later, petitioner was charged before the Sandiganbayan with malversation of public
The report also contained the Cash Production Notice 7 dated January 4, 1989, where funds, defined and penalized by Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code in an
petitioner was informed and required to produce the amount of P72,784.57, and the Information that read:
cash count sheet signed and acknowledged by petitioner indicating the correctness of
the amount of P21,331.79 found in his safe and counted in his presence. A separate That on or about the period covering from December 28, 1988 to January 5,
demand letter8 dated January 4, 1989 requiring the production of the missing funds 1989, and for sometime prior thereto, in the Municipality of Tubigon,
was sent and received by petitioner on January 5, 1989. Province of Bohol, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused Zenon R. Perez, a public officer being then
When asked by the auditing team as to the location of the missing funds, petitioner Acting Municipal Treasury of the said Municipality, by reason of the duties of
verbally explained that part of the money was used to pay for the loan of his late his official position was accountable for the public funds collected and
brother, another portion was spent for the food of his family, and the rest for his received by him, with grave abuse of confidence did then and there willfully,
medicine.9 unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate, misapply, embezzle and take
away from the said funds the total amount of SEVENTY-TWO THOUSAND
SEVEN HUNDRED EIGHTY-FOUR PESOS and 57/100 (P72,784.57), which
As a result of the audit, Arlene R. Mandin prepared a memorandum 10 dated January said fund was appropriated and converted by the said accused to his own
13, 1989 addressed to the Provincial Auditor of Bohol recommending the filing of the personal use and benefit to the damage and prejudice of the government in
appropriate criminal case against petitioner. the aforementioned amount.

CONTRARY TO LAW.13 (Underscoring supplied)


On March 1, 1990, petitioner, duly assisted by counsel de parte, entered a plea of
"not guilty."14
Pre-trial was initially set on June 4-5, 1990 but petitioner’s counsel moved for
postponement. The Sandiganbayan, however, proceeded to hear the case on June 5,
1990, as previously scheduled, due to the presence of prosecution witness Arlene R.
Mandin, who came all the way from Bohol.
On said date, the Sandiganbayan dispensed with pre-trial and allowed the
prosecution to present its witness. Arlene R. Mandin testified as narrated above.
The defense presented evidence through petitioner Zenon R. Perez himself. He
denied the contents of his first Answer 15 to the administrative case filed against him by
the audit team. He claimed it was prepared without the assistance of counsel and that
at the time of its preparation and submission, he was not in peak mental and physical
condition, having been stricken with diabetes mellitus.16
He then revoked his Answer dated February 22, 1989 and filed his second Answer
dated March 2, 1989.17 In the latter, he vehemently denied that he incurred a cash
shortage P72,784.57.
According to petitioner, the alleged shortage was in the possession and custody of his
accountable personnel at the time of the audit examination. Several amounts
totalling P64,784.00 were remitted to him on separate dates by his accountable
officer, starting January 16, 1989 to February 16, 1989. The same were turned over
by him to the Office of the Provincial Treasurer, leaving an unremitted sum
of P8,000.00 as of February 16, 1989.18 He remitted the P8,000.00 on April 17, 1989
to the Provincial Treasurer of Bohol, fully restoring the cash shortage.
Petitioner further testified that on July 30, 1989, he submitted his Position
Paper19 before the Office of the Ombudsman, Cebu City and maintained that the
alleged cash shortage was only due to oversight. Petitioner argued that the
government did not suffer any damage or prejudice since the alleged cash shortage
was actually deposited with the Office of the Provincial Treasurer as evidenced by
official receipts.20
Petitioner completed his testimony on September 20, 1990. He rested his case on
October 20, 1990.21
Sandiganbayan Disposition
On September 24, 2003, the Sandiganbayan rendered a judgment of conviction with
a fallo reading:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused ZENON R.
PEREZ, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Malversation of
15
Public Funds as defined in and penalized by Article 217 of the Revised
Penal Code and, there being one mitigating circumstance without any
aggravating circumstance to offset the same, is hereby sentenced to suffer
an indeterminate penalty of from TEN (10) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY
of prision mayor as the minimum to FOURTEEN (14) YEARS and EIGHT (8)
MONTHS of reclusion temporal as the maximum and to suffer perpetual
special disqualification. The accused Zenon R. Perez is likewise ordered to
pay a FINE equal to the total amount of the funds malversed, which is
Seventy-Two Thousand Seven Hundred Eighty-Four Pesos and Fifty-Seven
Centavos (P72, 784.57).
SO ORDERED.22 (Emphasis in the original)
On January 13, 2004, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration 23 which the
prosecution opposed on January 28, 2004. 24 Petitioner replied25 to the opposition. On
August 6, 2004, petitioner’s motion was denied with finality.
On September 23, 2004, petitioner resorted to the instant appeal 26 raising the
following issues, to wit:
I. THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN BY UNDULY AND UNREASONABLY
DELAYING THE DECISION OF THE CASE FOR OVER THIRTEEN (13)
YEARS VIOLATED THE PETITIONER’S RIGHT TO SPEEDY
DISPOSITION OF HIS CASE AND DUE PROCESS.
II. THE LAW RELIED UPON IN CONVICTING THE PETITIONER AND THE
SENTENCE IMPOSED IS CRUEL AND THEREFORE VIOLATES SECTION
19 OF ARTICLE III (BILL OF RIGHTS) OF THE
CONSTITUTION.27 (Underscoring supplied)
Our Ruling
Before addressing petitioner’s twin assignment of errors, We first tackle the propriety
of petitioner’s conviction for malversation of public funds.
I. Petitioner was correctly convicted of malversation.
Malversation is defined and penalized under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code.
The acts punished as malversation are: (1) appropriating public funds or property,
(2) taking or misappropriating the same, (3) consenting, or through abandonment or
negligence, permitting any other person to take such public funds or property, and
(4) being otherwise guilty of the misappropriation or malversation of such funds or
property.28
There are four elements that must concur in order that one may be found guilty of the
crime. They are:

(a) That the offender be a public officer;
(b) That he had the custody or control of funds or property by reason of the
duties of his office;
(c) That those funds or property involved were public funds or property for
which he is accountable; and
(d) That he has appropriated, took or misappropriated or consented or,
through abandonment or negligence, permitted another person to take
them.29
Evidently, the first three elements are present in the case at bar. At the time of the
commission of the crime charged, petitioner was a public officer, being then the acting
municipal treasurer of Tubigon, Bohol. By reason of his public office, he was
accountable for the public funds under his custody or control.
The question then is whether or not petitioner has appropriated, took or
misappropriated, or consented or through abandonment or negligence, permitted
another person to take such funds.
We rule in the affirmative.
In malversation, all that is necessary to prove is that the defendant received in his
possession public funds; that he could not account for them and did not have them in
his possession; and that he could not give a reasonable excuse for its
disappearance. An accountable public officer may be convicted of malversation even
if there is no direct evidence of misappropriation and the only evidence is shortage in
his accounts which he has not been able to explain satisfactorily.30
Verily, an accountable public officer may be found guilty of malversation even if there
is no direct evidence of malversation because the law establishes a presumption that
mere failure of an accountable officer to produce public funds which have come into
his hands on demand by an officer duly authorized to examine his accounts is prima
facie case of conversion.31
Because of the prima facie presumption in Article 217, the burden of evidence is
shifted to the accused to adequately explain the location of the funds or property
under his custody or control in order to rebut the presumption that he has
appropriated or misappropriated for himself the missing funds. Failing to do so, the
accused may be convicted under the said provision.
However, the presumption is merely prima facie and a rebuttable one. The
accountable officer may overcome the presumption by proof to the contrary. If he
adduces evidence showing that, in fact, he has not put said funds or property to
personal use, then that presumption is at end and the prima facie case is destroyed.32
16
In the case at bar, petitioner was not able to present any credible evidence to rebut
the presumption that he malversed the missing funds in his custody or control. What
is extant in the records is that the prosecution, through witness Arlene R. Mandin, was
able to prove that petitioner malversed the funds under his custody and control. As
testified by Mandin:
Atty. Caballero:
Q: Was Mr. Zenon Perez actually and physically present during the time of
your cash examination?
Witness:
A. Yes, Sir.
Q: From December 28, to January 5, 1989?
A: He was present on December 28, 1988 and January 4 and 5, 1989, Sir.
Q: Did he not make any verbal explanation as the reason why he was
short of about P72,000.00, after you conducted the cash count on
January 5, 1989?
A: Yes, Sir, he did.
Q: What did he tell you?
A: He told us that he used some of the money to pay for the loan of
his brother and the other portion was spent for food of his family; and
the rest for his medicine.33 (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner gave himself away with his first Answer filed at the Office of the Provincial
Treasurer of Bohol in the administrative case filed against him.
In that Answer, petitioner narrated how he disposed of the missing funds under his
custody and control, to wit: (1) about P30,000.00 was used to pay the commercial
loan of his late brother; (2) he spent P10,000.00 for the treatment of his toxic goiter;
and (3) about P32,000.00 was spent for food and clothing of his family, and the
education of his children. He there stated:
1. That the circumstances surrounding the cash shortage in the total amount
of P72,784.57 during the examination of the respondent’s cash accounts by
the Commission on Audit on December 28-29, 1988 and January 4-5, 1989
are as follows, to wit:

(a) That respondent paid the amount of about P30,000.00 to the
Philippine National Bank, Tagbilaran Branch as interests of the
commercial loan of his late brother Carino R. Perez using
respondent’s house and lot as collateral thereof. If the interests
would not be paid, the loan would be foreclosed to respondent’s
great prejudice and disadvantage considering that he and his family
are residing in said house used as collateral;
(b) That respondent spent the amount of P10,000.00 in
connection with the treatment of his toxic goiter;
(c) That the rest of the amount amounting to about P32,000.00
was spent by him for his family’s foods, clothings (sic), and
education of his children because his monthly salary is not
enough for the needs of his family.34
By the explicit admission of petitioner, coupled with the testimony of Arlene R.
Mandin, the fourth element of the crime of malversation was duly established. His
conviction thus stands in terra firma.
True it is that petitioner filed another Answer on March 2, 1989 with the Office of the
Provincial Treasurer of Bohol, substantially changing the contents of his earlier
answer of February 22, 1989. His second Answer averred:
3. That the truth of the matter is that the alleged total cash shortage
of P72,784.57 were still in the possession and custody of his accountable
personnel at the time of the examination held by the auditor of the
Commission on Audit;
4. That out of the alleged cash shortage of P72,784.57, almost all of said
amount were already remitted to him by his accountable personnel after
January 5, 1989, and only the remaining amount of P8,000.00 remains to be
remitted to him by his accountable personnel.35
The sudden turnaround of petitioner fails to convince Us. To Our mind, petitioner only
changed his story to exonerate himself, after realizing that his first Answer put him in
a hole, so to speak.
It is contended that petitioner’s first Answer of February 22, 1989 should not have
been given probative weight because it was executed without the assistance of
counsel.36
There is no law, jurisprudence or rule which mandates that an employee should be
assisted by counsel in an administrative case. On the contrary, jurisprudence is in
unison in saying that assistance of counsel is not indispensable in administrative
proceedings.
17
Walang batas, hurisprudensiya, o tuntunin na nagsasabi na ang isang kawani
ay dapat may tulong ng abogado sa isang kasong administratibo. Sa
katunayan, ang hurisprudensiya ay iisa ang sinasabi na ang pagtulong ng
isang abogado ay hindi kailangang-kailangan sa kasong administratibo.
The right to counsel, which cannot be waived unless the waiver is in writing and in the
presence of counsel, is a right afforded a suspect or accused during custodial
investigation. It is not an absolute right and may be invoked or rejected in a criminal
proceeding and, with more reason, in an administrative inquiry. 37
Ang karapatang magkaroon ng abogado, na hindi maaaring talikdan malibang
ang waiver ay nakasulat at sa harap ng abogado, ay karapatang ibinibigay
sa suspek o nasasakdal sa isang custodial investigation. Ito ay hindi lubos na
karapatan at maaring hingin o tanggihan sa isang prosesong kriminal, at lalo
na sa isang administratibong pagsisiyasat.
While investigations conducted by an administrative body may at times be akin to a
criminal proceeding, the fact remains that under existing laws, a party in an
administrative inquiry may or may not be assisted by counsel, irrespective of the
nature of the charges and of respondent’s capacity to represent himself, and no duty
rests on such body to furnish the person being investigated with counsel. 38
Thus, the right to counsel is not imperative in administrative investigations because
such inquiries are conducted merely to determine whether there are facts that merit
disciplinary measures against erring public officers and employees, with the purpose
of maintaining the dignity of government service.39
Kung gayon, ang karapatang magkaroon ng abogado ay hindi sapilitan sa
isang administratibong imbestigasyon sapagkat ito ay ginagawa lamang upang
malaman kung may sapat na batayan na patawan ng disiplina ang nagkasalang
opisyal o empleyado, para mapanatili ang dignidad ng paglilingkod sa
pamahalaan.
There is nothing in the Constitution that says that a party in a non-litigation
proceeding is entitled to be represented by counsel and that, without such
representation, he shall not be bound by such proceedings. The assistance of
lawyers, while desirable, is not indispensable. The legal profession was not engrafted
in the due process clause such that without the participation of its members, the
safeguard is deemed ignored or violated. The ordinary citizen is not that helpless that
he cannot validly act at all except only with a lawyer at his side. 40
More than that, petitioner’s first Answer may be taken against him, as he executed it
in the course of the administrative proceedings below. This is pursuant to Rule 130,
Section 26 of the Rules of Court which provides that the "act, declaration or omission
of a party as to a relevant fact may be given against him." In People v. Lising,41 the
Court held:

Extrajudicial statements are as a rule, admissible as against their respective
declarants, pursuant to the rule that the act, declaration or omission of a
party as to a relevant fact may be given against him. This is based upon the
presumption that no man would declare anything against himself, unless
such declarations were true. A man’s act, conduct and declarations
wherever made, provided they be voluntary, are admissible against him, for
the reason that it is fair to presume that they correspond with the truth and it
is his fault if they are not.
There is also no merit in the contention that petitioner’s sickness affected the
preparation of his first Answer. He presented no convincing evidence that his disease
at the time he formulated that answer diminished his capacity to formulate a true,
clear and coherent response to any query. In fact, its contents merely reiterated his
verbal explanation to the auditing team on January 5, 1989 on how he disposed of the
missing funds.
II. There is no violation of the rights to a speedy disposition of the case and to
due process of law.
We now discuss the right to a speedy trial and disposition, the balancing test, due
process, and cruel and unusual punishment.
Petitioner asserts that his right to due process of law and to speedy disposition of his
case was violated because the decision of the Sandiganbayan was handed down
after the lapse of more than twelve years. The years that he had to wait for the
outcome of his case were allegedly spent in limbo, pain and agony.42
We are not persuaded.
Due process of law as applied to judicial proceedings has been interpreted to mean
"a law which hears before it condemns, which proceeds on inquiry, and renders
judgment only after trial."43 Petitioner cannot complain that his right to due process
has been violated. He was given all the chances in the world to present his case, and
the Sandiganbayan rendered its decision only after considering all the pieces of
evidence presented before it.
Petitioner’s claim of violation of his right to a speedy disposition of his case must also
fail.
The 1987 Constitution44 guarantees the right of an accused to speedy trial. Both the
1973 Constitution in Section 16 of Article IV and the 1987 Constitution in Section 16
of Article III, Bill of Rights, are also explicit in granting to the accused the right to
speedy disposition of his case.45
18
In Barker v. Wingo,46 the United States Supreme Court was confronted for the first
time with two "rigid approaches" on speedy trial as "ways of eliminating some of the
uncertainty which courts experience protecting the right."47
The first approach is the "fixed-time period" which holds the view that "the
Constitution requires a criminal defendant to be offered a trial within a specified time
period."48 The second approach is the "demand-waiver rule"which provides that "a
defendant waives any consideration of his right to speedy trial for any period prior to
which he has not demanded trial. Under this rigid approach, a prior demand is a
necessary condition to the consideration of the speedy trial right." 49
The fixed-time period was rejected because there is "no constitutional basis for
holding that the speedy trial can be quantified into a specific number of days or
months."50 The demand-waiver rule was likewise rejected because aside from the fact
that it is "inconsistent with this Court’s pronouncements on waiver of constitutional
rights,"51 "it is insensitive to a right which we have deemed fundamental." 52
The Court went on to adopt a middle ground: the "balancing test," in which "the
conduct of both the prosecution and defendant are weighed." 53 Mr. Justice
Powell, ponente, explained the concept, thus:
A balancing test necessarily compels courts to approach speedy trial
cases on an ad hoc basis. We can do little more than identify some of the
factors which courts should assess in determining whether a particular
defendant has been deprived of his right. Though some might express
them in different ways, we identify four such factors: Length of delay,
the reason for the delay, the defendant’s assertion of his right, and
prejudice to the defendant.
The length of the delay is to some extent a triggering mechanism. Until there
is some delay which is presumptively prejudicial, there is no necessity for
inquiry into the other factors that go into the balance. Nevertheless,
because of the imprecision of the right to speedy trial, the length of
delay that will provoke such an inquiry is necessarily dependent upon
the peculiar circumstances of the case. To take but one example, the
delay that can be tolerated for an ordinary street crime is considerably less
than for a serious, complex conspiracy charge.
Closely related to length of delay is the reason the government assigns
to justify the delay. Here, too, different weights should be assigned to
different reasons. A deliberate attempt to delay the trial in order to hamper
the defense should be weighted heavily against the government. A more
neutral reason such as negligence or overcrowded courts should be
weighted less heavily but nevertheless should be considered since the
ultimate responsibility for such circumstances must rest with the government
rather than with the defendant. Finally, a valid reason, such as a missing
witness, should serve to justify appropriate delay. We have already

discussed the third factor, the defendant’s responsibility to assert his
right. Whether and how a defendant asserts his right is closely related to the
other factors we have mentioned. The strength of his efforts will be
affected by the length of the delay, to some extent by the reason for the
delay, and most particularly by the personal prejudice, which is not
always readily identifiable, that he experiences. The more serious the
deprivation, the more likely a defendant is to complain. The defendant’s
assertion of his speedy trial right, then, is entitled to strong evidentiary
weight in determining whether the defendant is being deprived of the
right. We emphasize that failure to assert the right will make it difficult
for a defendant to prove that he was denied a speedy trial.
A fourth factor is prejudice to the defendant. Prejudice, of course,
should be assessed in the light of the interests of defendants which the
speedy trial right was designed to protect. This Court has identified three
such interests: (i) to prevent oppressive pretrial incarceration; (ii) to
minimize anxiety and concern of the accused; and (iii) to limit the
possibility that the defense will be impaired. Of these, the most serious is
the last, because the inability of a defendant adequately to prepare his case
skews the fairness of the entire system. If witnesses die or disappear during
a delay, the prejudice is obvious. There is also prejudice if defense
witnesses are unable to recall accurately events of the distant past. Loss of
memory, however, is not always reflected in the record because what has
been forgotten can rarely be shown.54(Emphasis supplied)
Philippine jurisprudence has, on several occasions, adopted the balancing test.
In 1991, in Gonzales v. Sandiganbayan,55 this Court ruled:
It must be here emphasized that the right to a speedy disposition of a case,
like the right to speedy trial, is deemed violated only when the proceeding is
attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or when
unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured, or when
without cause or justifiable motive a long period of time is allowed to elapse
without the party having his case tried. Equally applicable is the balancing
test used to determine whether a defendant has been denied his right to a
speedy trial, or a speedy disposition of a case for that matter, in which the
conduct of both the prosecution and the defendant are weighed, and such
factors as length of the delay, reason for the delay, the defendant’s assertion
or non-assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant resulting from
the delay, are considered. (Underscoring supplied)
Subsequently, in Dela Peña v. Sandiganbayan,56 this Court again enumerated the
factors that should be considered and balanced, namely: (1) length of delay; (2)
reasons for the delay; (3) assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused; and
(4) prejudice caused by the delay.57
19
Once more, in Mendoza-Ong v. Sandiganbayan,58 this Court reiterated that the right
to speedy disposition of cases, like the right to speedy trial, is violated only when the
proceedings are attended by vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays. 59 In the
determination of whether said right has been violated, particular regard must be taken
of the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case. 60 The conduct of both the
prosecution and defendant, the length of the delay, the reasons for such delay, the
assertion or failure to assert such right by accused, and the prejudice caused by the
delay are the factors to consider and balance.61
Moreover, the determination of whether the delays are of said nature is relative and
cannot be based on a mere mathematical reckoning of time. 62
Measured by the foregoing yardstick, We rule that petitioner was not deprived of his
right to a speedy disposition of his case.
More important than the absence of serious prejudice, petitioner himself did not want
a speedy disposition of his case. 63 Petitioner was duly represented by counsel de
parte in all stages of the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan. From the moment
his case was deemed submitted for decision up to the time he was found guilty by the
Sandiganbayan, however, petitioner has not filed a single motion or manifestation
which could be construed even remotely as an indication that he wanted his case to
be dispatched without delay.
Petitioner has clearly slept on his right. The matter could have taken a different
dimension if during all those twelve years, petitioner had shown signs of asserting his
right to a speedy disposition of his case or at least made some overt acts, like filing a
motion for early resolution, to show that he was not waiving that right. 64
Currit tempus contra decides et sui juris contempores: Time runs against the slothful
and those who neglect their rights. Ang panahon ay hindi panig sa mga tamad at
pabaya sa kanilang karapatan. Vigilantis sed non dormientibus jura in re
subveniunt. The law aids the vigilant and not those who slumber in their rights. Ang
batas ay tumutulong sa mga mapagbantay at hindi sa mga humihimbing sa
kanilang karapatan.
Pending his conviction by the Sandiganbayan, petitioner may have truly lived in
suspicion and anxiety for over twelve years. However, any prejudice that may have
been caused to him in all those years was only minimal. The supposed gravity of
agony experienced by petitioner is more imagined than real.
This case is analogous to Guerrero v. Court of Appeals.65 There, the Court ruled that
there was no violation of petitioner’s right to speedy trial and disposition of his case
inasmuch as he failed seasonably to assert his rights:
In the present case, there is no question that petitioner raised the violation
against his own right to speedy disposition only when the respondent trial

judge reset the case for rehearing. It is fair to assume that he would have
just continued to sleep on his right – a situation amounting to laches – had
the respondent judge not taken the initiative of determining the non-
completion of the records and of ordering the remedy precisely so he could
dispose of the case. The matter could have taken a different dimension if
during all those ten years between 1979 when accused filed his
memorandum and 1989 when the case was re-raffled, the accused showed
signs of asserting his right which was granted him in 1987 when the new
Constitution took effect, or at least made some overt act (like a motion for
early disposition or a motion to compel the stenographer to transcribe
stenographic notes) that he was not waiving it. As it is, his silence would
have to be interpreted as a waiver of such right.
While this Court recognizes the right to speedy disposition quite distinctly
from the right to a speedy trial, and although this Court has always zealously
espoused protection from oppressive and vexatious delays not attributable to
the party involved, at the same time, we hold that a party’s individual rights
should not work against and preclude the people’s equally important right to
public justice. In the instant case, three people died as a result of the crash
of the airplane that the accused was flying. It appears to us that the delay in
the disposition of the case prejudiced not just the accused but the people as
well. Since the accused has completely failed to assert his right seasonably
and inasmuch as the respondent judge was not in a position to dispose of
the case on the merits due to the absence of factual basis, we hold it proper
and equitable to give the parties fair opportunity to obtain (and the court to
dispense) substantial justice in the premises.
III. The law relied upon in convicting petitioner is not cruel and unusual. It does
not violate Section 19, Article III of the Bill of Rights.
What constitutes cruel and unusual punishment has not been exactly defined. 66 The
Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution, 67 the source of Section 19,
Article III of the Bill of Rights 68 of our own Constitution, has yet to be put to the test to
finally determine what constitutes cruel and inhuman punishment. 69
Cases that have been decided described, rather than defined, what is meant by cruel
and unusual punishment. This is explained by the pronouncement of the United
States Supreme Court that "[t]he clause of the Constitution, in the opinion of the
learned commentators, may be therefore progressive, and is not fastened to the
obsolete, but may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by a
humane justice."70
In Wilkerson v. Utah,71 Mr. Justice Clifford of the United States Supreme Court opined
that "[d]ifficulty would attend the effort to define with exactness the extent of the
constitutional provision which provides that cruel and unusual punishments shall not
be inflicted; but it is safe to affirm that punishments of torture, x x x and all others in
20
the same line of unnecessary cruelty, are forbidden by that amendment to the
constitution."72
In In Re: Kemmler,73 Mr. Chief Justice Fuller of that same Court stated that
"[p]unishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering death; but the
punishment of death is not cruel within the meaning of that word as used in the
constitution. It implies x x x something more inhuman and barbarous, something more
than the mere extinguishment of life."74
Again, in Weems v. U.S.,75 Mr. Justice McKenna held for the Court that cadena
temporal and its accessory penalties "has no fellow in American legislation. Let us
remember that it has come to us from a government of a different form and genus
from ours. It is cruel in its excess of imprisonment and that which accompanies and
follows imprisonment. It is unusual in character. Its punishments come under the
condemnation of the Bill of Rights, both on account of their degree and kind. And they
would have those bad attributes even if they were found in a Federal enactment, and
not taken from an alien source."
In Echegaray v. Executive Secretary,76 this Court in a per curiam Decision held that
Republic Act No. 8177,77 even if it does not provide in particular the details involved in
the execution by lethal injection, is not cruel, degrading or inhuman, and is thus
constitutional. Any infliction of pain in lethal injection is merely incidental in carrying
out the execution of the death penalty and does not fall within the constitutional
proscription against cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment.78
The Court adopted the American view that what is cruel and unusual is not fastened
to the obsolete but may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by
humane justice and must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency
that mark the progress of a maturing society.79
In his last ditch effort to exculpate himself, petitioner argues that the penalty meted for
the crime of malversation of public funds "that ha[ve] been replenished, remitted
and/or returned" to the government is cruel and therefore unconstitutional, "as
government has not suffered any damage."80
The argument is specious on two grounds.
First. What is punished by the crime of malversation is the act of a public officer who,
by reason of the duties of his office, is accountable for public funds or property, shall
appropriate the same, or shall take and misappropriate or shall consent, or through
abandonment or negligence shall permit any other person to take such public funds
or property, wholly or partially, or shall otherwise be guilty of the misappropriation or
malversation of such funds or property.81

Payment or reimbursement is not a defense for exoneration in malversation; it may
only be considered as a mitigating circumstance. This is because damage is not an
element of malversation.
Second. There is strong presumption of constitutionality accorded to statutes.
It is established doctrine that a statute should be construed whenever possible in
harmony with, rather than in violation of, the Constitution. 82 The presumption is that
the legislature intended to enact a valid, sensible and just law and one which
operates no further than may be necessary to effectuate the specific purpose of the
law.83 It is presumed that the legislature has acted within its constitutional powers. So,
it is the generally accepted rule that every statute, or regularly accepted act, is, or will
be, or should be, presumed to be valid and constitutional. 84
He who attacks the constitutionality of a law has the onus probandi to show why such
law is repugnant to the Constitution. Failing to overcome its presumption of
constitutionality, a claim that a law is cruel, unusual, or inhuman, like the stance of
petitioner, must fail.
IV. On the penalty
The Sandiganbayan sentenced petitioner to an indeterminate sentence of ten (10)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years and eight
(8) months of reclusion temporal, as maximum. In imposing the penalty, it found that
petitioner was entitled to the mitigating circumstance of payment which is akin to
voluntary surrender.
Article 217 penalizes malversation in the following tenor:
Article 217. Malversation of public funds or property. – Presumption of
malversation. – Any public officer who, by reason of the duties of his office,
is accountable for public funds or property, shall appropriate the same, or
shall take and misappropriate or shall consent, or through abandonment or
negligence shall permit any other person to take such public funds or
property, wholly or partially, or shall otherwise be guilty of the
misappropriation or malversation of such funds or property.
xxxx
4. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium and maximum
periods, if the amount involved is more than 12,000 but is less
than 22,000 pesos. If the amount exceeds the latter, the penalty
shall be reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion
perpetua.
21
In all cases, persons guilty of malversation shall also suffer the penalty of
perpetual special disqualification and a fine equal to the amount of the funds
malversed or equal to the total value of the property embezzled.
The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or
property with which he is chargeable upon demand by any duly authorized
officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or
property to personal uses. (Underscoring supplied)
The amount malversed totalled P72,784.57. The prescribed penalty is reclusion
temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua, which has a range of
seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to forty (40) years.
However, the commission of the crime was attended by the mitigating circumstance
akin to voluntary surrender. As correctly observed by the Sandiganbayan, petitioner
restituted the full amount even before the prosecution could present its evidence.
That is borne by the records.
It bears stressing that the full restitution of the amount malversed will not in any way
exonerate an accused, as payment is not one of the elements of extinction of criminal
liability. Under the law, the refund of the sum misappropriated, even before the
commencement of the criminal prosecution, does not exempt the guilty person from
liability for the crime.85 At most, then, payment of the amount malversed will only
serve as a mitigating circumstance 86 akin to voluntary surrender, as provided for in
paragraph 7 of Article 1387 in relation to paragraph 1088 of the same Article of the
Revised Penal Code.
But the Court also holds that aside from voluntary surrender, petitioner is entitled to
the mitigating circumstance of no intention to commit so grave a wrong, 89 again in
relation to paragraph 10 of Article 13.90
The records bear out that petitioner misappropriated the missing funds under his
custody and control because he was impelled by the genuine love for his brother and
his family. Per his admission, petitioner used part of the funds to pay off a debt owed
by his brother. Another portion of the misappropriated funds went to his medications
for his debilitating diabetes.
Further, as shown earlier, petitioner restituted all but Eight Thousand Pesos
(P8,000.00) of the funds in less than one month and a half and said small balance in
three (3) months from receipt of demand of COA on January 5, 1999. Evidently, there
was no intention to commit so grave a wrong.
Of course, the end does not justify the means. To condone what petitioner has done
because of the nobility of his purpose or financial emergencies will become a potent
excuse for malefactors and open the floodgates for more corruption in the
government, even from "small fry" like him.

The bottom line is a guilty person deserves the penalty given the attendant
circumstances and commensurate with the gravity of the offense committed. Thus, a
reduction in the imposable penalty by one degree is in order. Article 64 of the Revised
Penal Code is explicit:
Art. 64. Rules for the application of penalties which contain three periods. –
In cases in which the penalties prescribed by law contains three periods,
whether it be a single divisible penalty or composed of three difference
penalties, each one of which forms a period in accordance with the
provisions of Articles 76 and 77, the courts shall observe for the application
of the penalty, the following rules, according to whether there are no
mitigating or aggravating circumstances:
xxxx
5. When there are two or more mitigating circumstances and no
aggravating circumstances are present, the court shall impose the
penalty next lower to that prescribed by law, in the period that it
may deem applicable, according to the number and nature of such
circumstances. (Underscoring supplied)
Considering that there are two mitigating circumstances, the prescribed penalty is
reduced to prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its medium
period, to be imposed in any of its periods. The new penalty has a range of ten (10)
years and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law,91 the maximum term could be ten (10) years and one
(1) day of prision mayormaximum, while the minimum term is again one degree
lower92 and could be four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision
correccional maximum.
In the 1910 case of U.S. v. Reyes,93 the trial judge entered a judgment of conviction
against the accused and meted to him the penalty of "three years’ imprisonment, to
pay a fine of P1,500.00, and in case of insolvency to suffer subsidiary imprisonment
at the rate of one day for every P2.50 that he failed to pay, which subsidiary
imprisonment, however, should not exceed one third of the principal penalty" and to
be "perpetually disqualified for public office and to pay the costs." This was well within
the imposable penalty then under Section 1 of Act No. 1740, 94 which is "imprisonment
for not less than two months nor more than ten years and, in the discretion of the
court, by a fine of not more than the amount of such funds and the value of such
property."
On appeal to the Supreme Court, the accused’s conviction was affirmed but his
sentence was modified and reduced to six months. The court, per Mr. Justice Torres,
reasoned thus:
For the foregoing reasons the several unfounded errors assigned to the
judgment appealed from have been fully refuted, since in conclusion it is fully
22
shown that the accused unlawfully disposed of a portion of the municipal
funds, putting the same to his own use, and to that of other persons in
violation of Act. No. 1740, and consequently he has incurred the penalty
therein established as principal of the crime of misappropriation; and even
though in imposing it, it is not necessary to adhere to the rules of the Penal
Code, the court in using its discretional powers as authorized by law,
believes that the circumstances present in the commission of crimes should
be taken into consideration, and in the present case the amount
misappropriated was refunded at the time the funds were
counted.95 (Underscoring supplied)
We opt to exercise an analogous discretion.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Sandiganbayan dated September 24, 2003
is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that petitioner is hereby sentenced to suffer
the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision
correccional, as minimum term, to ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
maximum term, with perpetual special disqualification. He is likewise ORDERED to
pay a fine of P72,784.57, the amount equal to the funds malversed.
Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED.
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination
Chavez v. Court of Appeals
The thrust of petitioner's case presented in his original and supplementary petitions
invoking jurisdiction of this Court is that he is entitled, on habeas corpus, to be freed
from imprisonment upon the ground that in the trial which resulted in his
conviction1 he was denied his constitutional right not to be compelled to testify against
himself. There is his prayer, too, that, should he fail in this, he be granted the
alternative remedies of certiorari to strike down the two resolutions of the Court of
Appeals dismissing his appeal for failure to file brief, and of mandamus to direct the
said court to forward his appeal to this Court for the reason that he was raising purely
questions of law.
The indictment in the court below — the third amended information — upon which the
judgment of conviction herein challenged was rendered, was for qualified theft of a
motor vehicle, one (1) Thunderbird car, Motor No. H9YH-143003, with Plate No. H-
16648 Pasay City '62 together with its accessories worth P22,200.00. Accused were
the following: Petitioner herein, Roger Chavez, Ricardo Sumilang alias "Romeo
Vasquez", Edgardo P. Pascual alias"Ging" Pascual, Pedro Rebullo alias "Pita", Luis
Asistio alias "Baby" Asistio, Lorenzo Meneses alias "Lory" Meneses, Peter Doe,
Charlie Doe and Paul Doe.2
Averred in the aforesaid information was that on or about the 14th day of November,
1962, in Quezon City, the accused conspired, with intent of gain, abuse of confidence
 23

and without the consent of the owner thereof, Dy Sun Hiok y Lim, in asporting the I am not making him as state witness, Your Honor.
motor vehicle above-described. I am only presenting him as an ordinary witness.

Upon arraignment, all the accused, except the three Does who have not been ATTY. CARBON:
identified nor apprehended, pleaded not guilty.1äwphï1.ñët
As a matter of right, because it will incriminate my client, I object.
On July 23, 1963, trial commenced before the judge presiding Branch IX of the Court
of First Instance of Rizal in Quezon City. COURT:

The trial opened with the following dialogue, which for the great bearing it has on this The Court will give counsel for Roger Chavez fifteen minutes within which to
case, is here reproduced:. confer and explain to his client about the giving of his testimony.

COURT: xxx xxx xxx

The parties may proceed. COURT: [after the recess]

FISCAL GRECIA: Are the parties ready? .

Our first witness is Roger Chavez [one of the accused]. FISCAL:

ATTY. CARBON [Counsel for petitioner Chavez]: We are ready to call on our first witness, Roger Chavez.

I am quite taken by surprise, as counsel for the accused Roger Chavez, with ATTY. CARBON:
this move of the Fiscal in presenting him as his witness. I object.
As per understanding, the proceeding was suspended in order to enable me
COURT: to confer with my client.

On what ground, counsel? . I conferred with my client and he assured me that he will not testify for the
prosecution this morning after I have explained to him the consequences of
ATTY. CARBON: what will transpire.

On the ground that I have to confer with my client. It is really surprising that
at this stage, without my being notified by the Fiscal, my client is being
presented as witness for the prosecution. I want to say in passing that it is
only at this very moment that I come to know about this strategy of the
prosecution.
COURT (To the Fiscal):
You are not withdrawing the information against the accused Roger Chavez
by making [him a] state witness?.
FISCAL GRECIA:
COURT:
What he will testify to does not necessarily incriminate him, counsel.
And there is the right of the prosecution to ask anybody to act as witness on
the witness-stand including the accused.
If there should be any question that is incriminating then that is the time for
counsel to interpose his objection and the court will sustain him if and when
the court feels that the answer of this witness to the question would
incriminate him.
 24

Counsel has all the assurance that the court will not require the witness to
answer questions which would incriminate him.
But surely, counsel could not object to have the accused called on the
witnessstand.
That's the reason why the court will go along with counsels for the accused
and will give them time within which to prepare for their cross-examination of
this witness.
The court will not defer the taking of the direct examination of the witness.

ATTY. CARBON: Call the witness to the witness stand.

I submit. EVIDENCE FOR THE PROSECUTION

xxx xxx xxx ROGER CHAVEZ, 31 years old, single, buy and sell merchant, presently
detained at the Manila Police Department headquarters, after being duly
ATTY. CRUZ [Counsel for defendants Pascual and Meneses]: . sworn according to law, declared as follows:

MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT: ATTY. IBASCO [Counsel for defendant Luis Asistio]:

This incident of the accused Roger Chavez being called to testify for the WITH THE LEAVE OF THE COURT:
prosecution is something so sudden that has come to the knowledge of this
counsel. This witness, Roger Chavez is one of the accused in this case No. Q-5311.

This representation has been apprised of the witnesses embraced in the
information.
For which reason I pray this court that I be given at least some days to meet
whatever testimony this witness will bring about. I therefore move for
postponement of today's hearing.
COURT:
The court will give counsel time within which to prepare his cross-
examination of this witness.
The information alleges conspiracy. Under Rule 123, Section 12, it states:
'The act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during
its existence, may be given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the
conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration.'
COURT:
That is premature, counsel. Neither the court nor counsels for the accused
know what the prosecution eventsto establish by calling this witness to the
witness stand.

ATTY. CRUZ: ATTY. IBASCO:

I labored under the impression that the witnesses for the prosecution in this
criminal case are those only listed in the information.
I did not know until this morning that one of the accused will testify as
witness for the prosecution.
COURT:
I submit.
COURT: The Fiscal may proceed.3
And so did the trial proceed. It began with the "direct examination" of Roger Chavez
by "Fiscal Grecia".
Came the judgment of February 1, 1965. The version of the prosecution as found by
the court below may be briefly narrated as follows:

A few days before November 12, 1962, Roger Chavez saw Johnson Lee, a Chinese,
driving a Thunderbird car. With Ricardo Sumilang (movie actor Romeo Vasquez) in
mind, whom he knew was in the market for such a car, Chavez asked Lee whether
his car was for sale. Lee answered affirmatively and left his address with Chavez.
Then, on November 12, Chavez met Sumilang at a barbershop informed him about
the Thunderbird. But Sumilang said that he had changed his mind about buying a
new car. Instead, he told Chavez that he wanted to mortgage his Buick car for
P10,000.00 to cover an indebtedness in Pasay City. Upon the suggestion of Chavez,
they went to see Luis Asistio, who he knew was lending money on car mortgages and
who, on one occasion, already lent Romeo Vasquez P3,000.00 on the same Buick
car. Asistio however told the two that he had a better idea on how to raise the money.
His plan was to capitalize on Romeo Vasquez' reputation as a wealthy movie star,
introduce him as a buyer to someone who was selling a car and, after the deed of
sale is signed, by trickery to run away with the car. Asistio would then register it, sell it
to a third person for a profit. Chavez known to be a car agent was included in the
plan. He furnished the name of Johnson Lee who was selling his
Thunderbird. 1äwphï1.ñët
In the morning of November 14, Chavez telephoned Johnson Lee and arranged for
an appointment. Sometime in the afternoon. Chavez and Sumilang met Lee in his
Thunderbird on Highway 54. Sumilang was introduced as the interested buyer.
Sumilang's driver inspected the car, took the wheel for a while. After Sumilang and
Lee agreed on the purchase price (P21.000.00), they went to Binondo to Johnson
Lee's cousin, Dy Sun Hiok, in whose name the car was registered. Thereafter, they
went to see a lawyer notary public in Quezon City, known to Chavez for the drafting of
the deed of sale. After the deed of sale was drawn up, it was signed by Sumilang as
the vendee, Dy Sun Hiok the vendor, and Sumilang's driver and Johnson Lee the
witnesses thereto.
As payment was to be made at Eugene's restaurant in Quezon City, all of them then
drove in the Thunderbird car to that place. The deed of sale and other papers
remained in the pockets of Johnson Lee.
At Eugene's, a man approached Sumilang with a note which stated that the money
was ready at the Dalisay Theater. Sumilang then wrote on the same note that the
money should be brought to the restaurant. At the same time he requested Lee to
exhibit the deed of sale of the car to the note bearer.4
Then, the two Chinese were left alone in the restaurant. For Sumilang, who had left
the table to pose for pictures with some fans and come back, again left never to
return. So did Chavez, who disappeared after he left on the pretext of buying
cigarettes. The two Chinese could not locate Sumilang and Chavez. They went out to
the place where the Thunderbird was parked, found that it was gone. They then
immediately reported its loss to the police. Much later, the NBI recovered the already
repainted car and impounded it.
25
Right after the meeting at Eugene's, Chavez, Sumilang and Asistio converged that
same day at Barrio Fiesta, a restaurant at Highway 54 near the Balintawak monument
in Caloocan. There, Asistio handed to Sumilang P1,000.00 cash and a golf set worth
P800.00 as the latter's share in the transaction. On the 14th of November, the
registration of the car was transferred in the name of Sumilang in Cavite City, and
three days later, in the name of Asistio in Caloocan.
From the court's decision, Ricardo Sumilang's version, corroborated in part by Asistio,
may be condensed as follows:
In the last week of September, 1962, Sumilang saw Roger Chavez at a gas station.
The latter informed him that there was a Thunderbird from Clark Field for sale for a
price between P20,000.00 and P22,000.00. Chavez said that it could be held for him
with a down payment of P10,000.00.
To raise this sum, Sumilang and Chavez, on October 1, went to the house of a certain
Nena Hernaez de los Reyes who wrote out a check for P5,000.00 as a loan to
Sumilang. That check was exhibited in court. Sumilang and Chavez then went to
Pasay City to see a certain Mario Baltazar, an agent of the Pasay City Mayor, and
Narsing Cailles, Chief of the Fire Department. Sumilang asked the two for a P10,000-
loan backed up by the P5,000.00-check aforesaid on condition that it should not be
cashed immediately as there were not enough funds therefor. Baltazar and Cailles
agreed to give the money the nextday as long as the check would be left with them
and Sumilang would sign a promissory note for P10,000.00. Baltazar later informed
Sumilang that Chavez picked up the money the next day. Four or five days
afterwards, Chavez returned P4,000.00 to Sumilang because P6,000.00 was enough
for the deposit. And so, Sumilang gave back the P4,000.00 to Baltazar.
About the end of October or at the beginning of November, Chavez asked Sumilang
for another P3,000.00. Sumilang sent Chavez to Baltazar and Cailles, with a note
requesting that they accommodate him once more. He also sent a check, again
without funds. Baltazar gave the money after verifying the authenticity of the note.
On November 14, Chavez appeared at Sumilang's house with the news that the car
was ready if Sumilang was ready with the rest of the money. So Sumilang got
P9,000.00 from his mother and another P4,000.00 from his aparador. He immediately
gave P6,000.00 to Chavez, intending to pay out the balance upon the car's delivery. It
was then that Chavez told Sumilang that the car was already bought by a Chinese
who would be the vendor.
The purchase price finally agreed upon between Sumilang and Johnson Lee was
P21,000.00, plus P500.00 agents commission at the expense of the buyer. Sumilang
told Lee that he already paid part of the price to Chavez.
At Eugene's, Chavez asked Sumilang for the balance. Sumilang accommodated.
There, Sumilang, also saw a friend, "Ging" Pascual. In the course of their
conversation at the bar, Sumilang mentioned the proposed transaction thru Chavez.

Pascual warned that Chavez was a "smart" agent and advised that Sumilang should
have a receipt for his money. A certain Bimbo, a friend of Pascual, offered to make
out a receipt for Chavez to sign.
After Sumilang returned from posing for some photographs with some of his fans,
Bimbo showed him the receipt already signed by Chavez. Sumilang requested
Pascual and Bimbo to sign the receipt as witnesses. And they did. This receipt was
offered as an exhibit by the prosecution and by Sumilang.
When Sumilang was ready to leave Eugene's, Johnson Lee turned over to him the
deed of sale, the registration papers and the keys to the car. After shaking hands with
Lee, Sumilang drove away in the car with his driver at the wheel.
Two or three days afterwards, Sumilang dropped by the Barrio Fiesta on his way to a
film shooting at Bulacan. He saw Asistio with many companions. Asistio liked his
Thunderbird parked outside. Asistio offered to buy it from him for P22,500.00. As the
offer was good, and knowing Asistio's and his friends' reputation for always getting
what they wanted, Sumilang consented to the sale. Asistio tendered a down payment
of P1,000.00; the balance he promised to pay the next day after negotiating with
some financing company. Before said balance could be paid, the car was impounded.
The trial court gave evidence to Sumilang's averment, strengthened by Baltazar's and
Cailles' corroborations, that he paid good money for the car. Sumilang was thus
cleared. So was Asistio whom the trial court believed to be a mere buyer of the car.
And so, the prosecution's theory of conspiracy was discounted.
As to the other accused, the court found no case against Pedro Rebullo alias "Pita"
and Lorenzo Meneses alias "Lory". The accused "Ging" Pascual was also acquitted
for in the first place he was not identified by Johnson Lee in court.
As to Roger Chavez, however, the court had this to say: "Roger Chavez does not
offer any defense. As a matter of fact, his testimony as witness for the prosecution
establishes his guilt beyond reasonable doubt." 5 The trial court branded him "a self-
confessed culprit".6 The court further continued:
It is not improbable that true to the saying that misery loves company Roger
Chavez tried to drag his co-accused down with him by coloring his story with
fabrications which he expected would easily stick together what with the
newspaper notoriety of one and the sensationalism caused by the other. But
Roger Chavez' accusations of Asistio's participation is utterly
uncorroborated. And coming, as it does, from a man who has had at least
two convictions for acts not very different from those charged in this
information, the Court would be too gullible if it were to give full credence to
his words even if they concerned a man no less notorious than himself. 7
26
The trial court then came to the conclusion that if Johnson Lee was not paid for his
car, he had no one but Roger Chavez to blame.
The sum of all these is that the trial court freed all the accused except Roger Chavez
who was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified theft. He was
accordingly sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of not less than ten (10)
years, one (1) day, as minimum and not more than fourteen (14) years, eight (8)
months and one (1) day as maximum, to indemnify Dy Sun Hiok and/or Johnson Lee
in the sum of P21,000.00 without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, to
undergo the accessory penalties prescribed by law, and to pay the costs. The
Thunderbird car then in the custody of the NBI was ordered to be turned over to
Ricardo Sumilang, who was directed to return to Asistio the sum of P1,000.00 unless
the latter chose to pay P21,500.00, representing the balance of the contract price for
the car.
The foregoing sentence was promulgated on March 8, 1965. Roger Chavez appealed
to the Court of Appeals.
On April 18, 1968, the Court of Appeals required Atty. Natividad Marquez, counsel for
Roger Chavez, to show cause within ten days from notice why Chavez' appeal should
not be considered abandoned and dismissed. Reason for this is that said lawyer
received notice to file brief on December 28, 1967 and the period for the filing thereof
lapsed on January 27, 1968 without any brief having been filed.
On May 13, 1968, Atty. Marquez registered a detailed written explanation. She also
stated that if she were allowed to file appellant's brief she would go along with the
factual findings of the court below but will show however that its conclusion is
erroneous.8
On May 14, 1968, the Court of Appeals, despite the foregoing explanation, resolved
to dismiss the appeal. A move to reconsider was unavailing. For, on June 21, 1968,
the Court of Appeals, through a per curiam resolution, disposed to maintain its May
14 resolution dismissing the appeal, directed the City Warden of Manila where
Chavez is confined by virtue of the warrant of arrest issued by the Court of Appeals,
to turn him over to Muntinlupa Bilibid Prisons pending execution of the judgment
below, and ordered remand of the case to the Quezon City court for execution of
judgment.
It was at this stage that the present proceedings were commenced in this Court.
Upon the petitions, the return, and the reply, and after hearing on oral arguments, we
now come to grips with the main problem presented.
We concentrate attention on that phase of the issues which relates petitioner's
assertion that he was compelled to testify against himself. For indeed if this one

question is resolved in the affirmative, we need not reach the others; in which case,
these should not be pursued here.
1. Petitioner's plea on this score rests upon his averment, with proof, of violation of his
right — constitutionally entrenched — against self-incrimination. He asks that the
hand of this Court be made to bear down upon his conviction; that he be relieved of
the effects thereof. He asks us to consider the constitutional injunction that "No
person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself," 9 fully echoed in Section 1,
Rule 115, Rules of Court where, in all criminal prosecutions, the defendant shall be
entitled: "(e) To be exempt from being a witness against himself." .
It has been said that forcing a man to be a witness against himself is at war with "the
fundamentals of a republican government"; 10 that [i]t may suit the purposes of
despotic power but it can not abide the pure atmosphere of political liberty and
personal freedom."11 Mr. Justice Abad Santos recounts the historical background of
this constitutional inhibition, thus: " "The maxim Nemo tenetur seipsum accusare had
its origin in a protest against the inquisitorial and manifestly unjust methods of
interrogating accused persons, which has long obtained in the continental system,
and, until the expulsion of the Stuarts from the British throne in 1688, and the erection
of additional barriers for the protection of the people against the exercise of arbitrary
power, was not uncommon even in England. While the admissions of confessions of
the prisoner, when voluntarily and freely made, have always ranked high in the scale
of incriminating evidence, if an accused person be asked to explain his apparent
connection with a crime under investigation, the ease with which the questions put to
him may assume an inquisitorial character, the temptation to press, the witness
unduly, to browbeat him if he be timid or reluctant, to push him into a corner, and to
entrap him into fatal contradictions, which is so painfully evident in many of the earlier
state trials, notably in those of Sir Nicholas Throckmorton, and Udal, the Puritan
minister, made the system so odious as to give rise to a demand for its total abolition.
The change in the English criminal procedure in that particular seems to be founded
upon no statute and no judicial opinion, but upon a general and silent acquiescence
of the courts in a popular demand. But, however adopted, it has become firmly
embedded in English, as well as in American jurisprudence. So deeply did the
iniquities of the ancient system impress themselves upon the minds of the American
colonists that the states, with one accord, made a denial of the right to question an
accused person a part of their fundamental law, so that a maxim which in England
was a mere rule of evidence, became clothed in this country with the impregnability of
a constitutional enactment." (Brown vs. Walker, 161 U.S., 591, 597; 40 Law. ed., 819,
821)." 12 Mr. Justice Malcolm, in expressive language, tells us that this maxim was
recognized in England in the early days "in a revolt against the thumbscrew and the
rack." 13 An old Philippine case [1904] 14 speaks of this constitutional injunction as
"older than the Government of the United States"; as having "its origin in a protest
against the inquisitorial methods of interrogating the accused person"; and as having
been adopted in the Philippines "to wipe out such practices as formerly prevailed in
these Islands of requiring accused persons to submit to judicial examinations, and to
give testimony regarding the offenses with which they were charged."
27
So it is then that this right is "not merely a formal technical rule the enforcement of
which is left to the discretion of the court"; it is mandatory; it secures to a defendant a
valuable and substantive right; 15 it is fundamental to our scheme of justice. Just a few
months ago, the Supreme Court of the United States (January 29, 1968), speaking
thru Mr. Justice Harlan warned that "[t]he constitutional privilege was intended to
shield the guilty and imprudent as well as the innocent and foresighted." 16
It is in this context that we say that the constitutional guarantee may not be treated
with unconcern. To repeat, it is mandatory; it secures to every defendant a valuable
and substantive right. Tañada and Fernando (Constitution of the Philippines, 4th ed.,
vol. I, pp. 583-584) take note of U.S. vs. Navarro, supra, which reaffirms the rule that
the constitutional proscription was established on broad grounds of public policy and
humanity; of policy because it would place the witness against the strongest
temptation to commit perjury, and of humanity because it would be to extort a
confession of truth by a kind of duress every species and degree of which the law
abhors. 17
Therefore, the court may not extract from a defendant's own lips and against his will
an admission of his guilt. Nor may a court as much as resort to compulsory
disclosure, directly or indirectly, of facts usable against him as a confession of the
crime or the tendency of which is to prove the commission of a crime. Because, it is
his right to forego testimony, to remain silent, unless he chooses to take the witness
stand — with undiluted, unfettered exercise of his own free, genuine will.
Compulsion as it is understood here does not necessarily connote the use of
violence; it may be the product of unintentional statements. Pressure which operates
to overbear his will, disable him from making a free and rational choice, or impair his
capacity for rational judgment would in our opinion be sufficient. So is moral coercion
"tending to force testimony from the unwilling lips of the defendant." 18
2. With the foregoing as guideposts, we now turn to the facts. Petitioner is a
defendant in a criminal case. He was called by the prosecution as the first witness in
that case to testify for the People during the first day of trial thereof. Petitioner
objected and invoked the privilege of self-incrimination. This he broadened by the
clear cut statement that he will not testify. But petitioner's protestations were met with
the judge's emphatic statement that it "is the right of the prosecution to ask anybody
to act as witness on the witness stand including the accused," and that defense
counsel "could not object to have the accused called on the witness stand." The
cumulative impact of all these is that accused-petitioner had to take the stand. He was
thus peremptorily asked to create evidence against himself. The foregoing situation
molds a solid case for petitioner, backed by the Constitution, the law, and
jurisprudence.
Petitioner, as accused, occupies a different tier of protection from an ordinary witness.
Whereas an ordinary witness may be compelled to take the witness stand and claim
the privilege as each question requiring an incriminating answer is shot at him, 19 and
accused may altogether refuse to take the witness stand and refuse to answer any

and all questions. 20 For, in reality, the purpose of calling an accused as a witness for
the People would be to incriminate him. 21 The rule positively intends to avoid and
prohibit the certainly inhuman procedure of compelling a person "to furnish the
missing evidence necessary for his conviction." 22 This rule may apply even to a co-
defendant in a joint trial.23
And the guide in the interpretation of the constitutional precept that the accused shall
not be compelled to furnish evidence against himself "is not the probability of the
evidence but it is the capability of abuse." 24 Thus it is, that it was undoubtedly
erroneous for the trial judge to placate petitioner with these words:.
What he will testify to does not necessarily incriminate him, counsel.
And there is the right of the prosecution to ask anybody to act as witness on
the witness-stand including the accused.
If there should be any question that is incriminating then that is the time for
counsel to interpose his objection and the court will sustain him if and when
the court feels that the answer of this witness to the question would
incriminate him.
Counsel has all the assurance that the court will not require the witness to
answer questions which would incriminate him.
But surely, counsel could not object to have the accused called on the
witness stand.
Paraphrasing Chief Justice Marshall in Aaron Burr's Trial, Robertsons Rep. I, 208,
244, quoted in VIII Wigmore, p. 355, 25 While a defendant's knowledge of the facts
remains concealed within his bosom, he is safe; but draw it from thence, and he is
exposed" — to conviction.
The judge's words heretofore quoted — "But surely counsel could not object to have
the accused called on the witness stand" — wielded authority. By those words,
petitioner was enveloped by a coercive force; they deprived him of his will to resist;
they foreclosed choice; the realities of human nature tell us that as he took his oath to
tell the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth, no genuine consent underlay
submission to take the witness stand. Constitutionally sound consent was absent.
3. Prejudice to the accused for having been compelled over his objections to be a
witness for the People is at once apparent. The record discloses that by leading
questions Chavez, the accused, was made to affirm his statement given to the NBI
agents on July 17, 1963 at 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon. 26 And this statement
detailed the plan and execution thereof by Sumilang (Vasquez), Asistio and himself to
deprive the Chinese of his Thunderbird car. And he himself proceeded to narrate the
same anew in open court. He identified the Thunderbird car involved in the case. 27
28
The decision convicting Roger Chavez was clearly of the view that the case for the
People was built primarily around the admissions of Chavez himself. The trial court
described Chavez as the "star witness for the prosecution". Indeed, the damaging
facts forged in the decision were drawn directly from the lips of Chavez as a
prosecution witness and of course Ricardo Sumilang for the defense. There are the
unequivocal statements in the decision that "even accused Chavez" identified "the
very same Thunderbird that Johnson Lee had offered for sale"; that Chavez
"testimony as witness for the prosecution establishes his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt and that Chavez is "a self-confessed culprit". 1äwphï1.ñët
4. With all these, we have no hesitancy in saying that petitioner was forced to testify
to incriminate himself, in full breach of his constitutional right to remain silent. It
cannot be said now that he has waived his right. He did not volunteer to take the
stand and in his own defense; he did not offer himself as a witness; on the contrary,
he claimed the right upon being called to testify. If petitioner nevertheless answered
the questions inspite of his fear of being accused of perjury or being put under
contempt, this circumstance cannot be counted against him. His testimony is not of
his own choice. To him it was a case of compelled submission. He was a cowed
participant in proceedings before a judge who possessed the power to put him under
contempt had he chosen to remain silent. Nor could he escape testifying. The court
made it abundantly clear that his testimony at least on direct examination would be
taken right then and thereon the first day of the trial.
It matters not that, after all efforts to stave off petitioner's taking the stand became
fruitless, no objections to questions propounded to him were made. Here involve is
not a mere question of self-incrimination. It is a defendant's constitutional immunity
from being called to testify against himself. And the objection made at the beginning
is a continuing one. 1äwphï1.ñët
There is therefore no waiver of the privilege. "To be effective, a waiver must be
certain and unequivocal, and intelligently, understandably, and willingly made; such
waiver following only where liberty of choice has been fully accorded. After a claim a
witness cannot properly be held to have waived his privilege on vague and uncertain
evidence." 28 The teaching in Johnson vs. Zerbst 29 is this: "It has been pointed out
that "courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver" of fundamental
constitutional rights and that we "do not presume acquiescence in the loss of
fundamental rights." A waiver is ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or
abandonment of a known right or privilege." Renuntiatio non praesumitur.
The foregoing guidelines, juxtaposed with the circumstances of the case heretofore
adverted to, make waiver a shaky defense. It cannot stand. If, by his own admission,
defendant proved his guilt, still, his original claim remains valid. For the privilege, we
say again, is a rampart that gives protection - even to the guilty. 30
5. The course which petitioner takes is correct. Habeas corpus is a high prerogative
writ. 31 It is traditionally considered as an exceptional remedy to release a person
whose liberty is illegally restrained such as when the accused's constitutional rights

are disregarded. 32 Such defect results in the absence or loss of jurisdiction 33 and
therefore invalidates the trial and the consequent conviction of the accused whose
fundamental right was violated. 34 That void judgment of conviction may be challenged
by collateral attack, which precisely is the function of habeas corpus. 35 This writ may
issue even if another remedy which is less effective may be availed of by the
defendant. 36Thus, failure by the accused to perfect his appeal before the Court of
Appeals does not preclude a recourse to the writ. 37 The writ may be granted upon a
judgment already final. 38 For, as explained in Johnson vs. Zerbst, 39 the writ of
habeas corpus as an extraordinary remedy must be liberally given effect 40 so as to
protect well a person whose liberty is at stake. The propriety of the writ was given the
nod in that case, involving a violation of another constitutional right, in this wise:
Since the Sixth Amendment constitutionally entitles one charged with crime
to the assistance of Counsel, compliance with this constitutional mandate is
an essential jurisdictional prerequisite to a Federal Court's authority. When
this right is properly waived, the assistance of Counsel is no longer a
necessary element of the Court's jurisdiction to proceed to conviction and
sentence. If the accused, however, is not represented by Counsel and has
not competently and intelligently waived his constitutional right, the Sixth
Amendment stands as a jurisdictional bar to a valid conviction and sentence
depriving him of his liberty. A court's jurisdiction at the beginning of trial may
be lost "in the course of the proceedings" due to failure to complete the
court — as the Sixth Amendment requires — by providing Counsel for an
accused who is unable to obtain Counsel, who has not intelligently waived
this constitutional guaranty, and whose life or liberty is at stake. If this
requirement of the Sixth Amendment is not complied with, the court no
longer has jurisdiction to proceed. The judgment of conviction pronounced
by a court without jurisdiction is void, and one imprisoned thereundermay
obtain release of habeas corpus. 41
Under our own Rules of Court, to grant the remedy to the accused Roger Chavez
whose case presents a clear picture of disregard of a constitutional right is absolutely
proper. Section 1 of Rule 102 extends the writ, unless otherwise expressly provided
by law, "to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is
deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from
the person entitled thereto.
Just as we are about to write finis to our task, we are prompted to restate that: "A void
judgment is in legal effect no judgment. By it no rights are divested. From it no rights
can be obtained. Being worthless in itself, all proceedings founded upon it are equally
worthless. It neither binds nor bars any one. All acts performed under it and all claims
flowing out of it are void. The parties attempting to enforce it may be responsible as
trespassers. ... " 42
6. Respondents' return 43 shows that petitioner is still serving under a final and valid
judgment of conviction for another offense. We should guard against the improvident
issuance of an order discharging a petitioner from confinement. The position we take
here is that petitioner herein is entitled to liberty thru habeas corpus only with respect
29
to Criminal Case Q-5311 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch,
under which he was prosecuted and convicted.
Upon the view we take of this case, judgment is hereby rendered directing the
respondent Warden of the City Jail of Manila or the Director of Prisons or any other
officer or person in custody of petitioner Roger Chavez by reason of the judgment of
the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, in Criminal Case Q-5311,
entitled "People of the Philippines, plaintiff, vs. Ricardo Sumilang, et al., accused," to
discharge said Roger Chavez from custody, unless he is held, kept in custody or
detained for any cause or reason other than the said judgment in said Criminal Case
Q-5311 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, in which event the
discharge herein directed shall be effected when such other cause or reason ceases
to exist.
No costs. So ordered.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Angeles and Fernando,
JJ., concur. Castro, J., concurs in a separate opinion.
Separate Opinions
CASTRO, J., dissenting :
In 1901, early in the history of constitutional government in this country, this Court
reversed the conviction of an accused who, having pleaded "not guilty," was required
by the judge to testify and answer the complaint. The case was that of United States
v. Junio, reported in the first volume of the Philippine Reports, on page 50 thereof.
Resolution of the case did not require an extended opinion (it consumed no more
than a page in the Reports). For indeed the facts fitted exactly into the prohibition
contained in The President's Instruction to the (Second) Philippine Commission 1 "that
no person shall ... be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.".
There was no need either for a dissertation on the Rights of Man, though occasion for
this was not lacking as the predominant American members of the Court were under
a special commission to prepare the Filipinos for self-government. The privilege
against self-incrimination was fully understood by the Filipinos, whose own history
provided the necessary backdrop for this privilege. 2
The Supreme Court simply said, "The judge had no right to compel the accused to
make any statement whatever," and declared the proceedings void.

Nor was there a similar judicial error likely to be committed in the years to come, what
with the constant reminder of a Bill of Rights enshrined in successive organic acts
intended for the Philippines.3 This is not to say that the Philippine history of the
privilege ended with the Junio case. To be sure, violations of the privilege took other,
and perhaps subtle, forms4 but not the form directly prohibited by the privilege. Even
in the recent case of Cabal v. Kapunan5 it was assumed as a familiar learning that the
accused in a criminal case cannot be required to give testimony and that if his
testimony is needed at all against his co-accused, he must first be discharged. 6 If
Cabal, the respondent in an administrative case, was required by an investigating
committee to testify, it was because it was thought that proceedings for forfeiture of
illegally acquired property under Republic Act 1379 7 were civil and not criminal in
nature. Thus Mr. Justice (now Chief Justice) Concepcion could confidently say:
At the outset, it is not disputed that the accused in a criminal case may
refuse not only to answer incriminatory questions but also to take the witness
stand. (3 Whartons Criminal Evidence, pp. 1959-1960; 98 C.J.S., p. 264).
Hence, the issue before us boils down to whether or not the proceedings
before the aforementioned Committee is civil or criminal in character.
Today, perhaps because of long separation from our past, we need what Holmes
called "education in the obvious, more than investigation of the obscure." 8 The past
may have receded so far into the distance that our perspectives may have been
altered and our vision blurred.
When the court in the case at bar required the petitioner to testify, it in effect undid the
libertarian gains made over half a century and overturned the settled law. The past
was recreated with all its vividness and all its horrors: John Lilburne in England in
1637, refusing to testify before the Council of the Star Chamber and subsequently
condemned by it to be whipped and pilloried for his "boldness in refusing to take a
legal oath;"9 the Filipino priests Gomez, Burgos and Zamora in 1872 condemned by
the Inquisition to die by their own testimony. 10
It is for this reason that I deem this occasion important for the expression of my views
on the larger question of constitutional dimension.
No doubt the constitutional provision that "No person shall be compelled to be a
witness against himself" 11 may, on occasion, save a guilty man from his just deserts,
but it is aimed against a more far reaching evil — recurrence of the Inquisition and the
Star Chamber, even if not in their stark brutality. Prevention of the greater evil was
deemed of more importance than occurrence of the lesser evil. 12 As Dean Griswold
put the matter with eloquence:.
[T]he privilege against self-incrimination is one of the great landmarks in
man's struggle to make himself civilized ... [W]e do not make even the most
hardened criminal sign his own death warrant, or dig his own grave, or pull
the lever that springs the trap on which he stands. We have through the
30
course of history developed considerable feeling of the dignity and intrinsic
importance of the individual man. Even the evil man is a human being. 13
The Government must thus establish guilt by evidence independently and freely
secured; it can not by coercion prove a charge against an accused out of his own
mouth. 14
This is not what was done here. What was done here was to force the petitioner to
take the witness stand and state his part in the crime charged as "star witness for the
prosecution," to use the very words of the decision, and, by means of his testimony,
prove his guilt. Thus, the trial court said in its decision:
Roger Chavez does not offer any defense. As a matter of fact, his testimony
as a witness for the prosecution establishes his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.
The petitioner has been variously described by the trial court as "a car agent ... well
versed in this kind of chicanery" "a self-confessed culprit," and "a man with at least
two convictions for acts not very different from those charged in [the] information." But
if he has thus been described it was on the basis of evidence wrung from his lips. If
he was ultimately found guilty of the charge against him it was because of evidence
which he was forced to give. In truth he was made the "star witness for the
prosecution" against himself.
But neither torture nor an oath nor the threat of punishment such as imprisonment for
contempt can be used to compel him to provide the evidence to convict himself. No
matter how evil he is, he is still a human being.
The fact that the judgment of conviction became final with the dismissal of the appeal
to the Court of Appeals for failure of the petitioner's former counsel to file a brief, 15 is
of no moment. That judgment is void, and it is precisely the abiding concern of the writ
of habeas corpus to provide redress for unconstitutional and wrongful convictions.
Vindication of due process, it has been well said, is precisely the historic office of the
Great Writ. 16
In many respects, this case is similar to that of Fay v. Noia. 17 Noia was convicted of
murder in 1942 with Santo Caminito and Frank Bonino in the County Court of Kings
County, New York, in the killing of one Hemmeroff during the commission of a
robbery. The sole evidence against each defendant was his signed confession.
Caminito and Bonino, but not Noia appealed their convictions to the Appellate
Division of the New York Supreme Court. These appeals were unsuccessful but
subsequent legal proceedings resulted in the releases of Caminito and Bonino upon
findings that their confessions had been coerced and their conviction therefore
procured in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Although Noia's confession was
found to have been coerced, the United States District Court for the Southern District
of New York held that, because of Noia's failure to appeal, he must be denied reliefin
view of the provision of 28 U.S.C. sec. 2254 that "An application for a writ of habeas
 31

corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall
not be granted unless it appears that the applicant has exhausted the remedies
available in the courts of the State. ..." The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
reversed the judgment of the District Court and ordered Noia's conviction set aside,
with direction to discharge him from custody unless given a new trial forthwith. From
that judgment the State appealed.
As the Supreme Court of the United States phrased the issue, the "narrow question is
whether the respondent Noia may be granted federal habeas corpus relief from
imprisonment under a New York conviction now admitted by the State to rest upon a
confession obtained from him in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, after he was
denied state post-conviction relief because the coerced confession claim had been
decided against him at the trial and Noia had allowed the time for a direct appeal to
lapse without seeking review by a state appellate court."
In affirming the judgment of the Court of Appeals, the United States Supreme Court,
through Mr. Justice Brennan, spoke in enduring language that may well apply to the
case of Roger Chavez. Said the Court: 1äwphï1.ñët
Today as always few indeed is the number of State prisoners who eventually
win their freedom by means of federal habeas corpus. These few who are
ultimately successful are persons whom society has grievously wronged and
for whom belated liberation is little enough compensation. Surely no fair
minded person will contend that those who have been deprived of their
liberty without due process of law ought nevertheless to languish in prison.
Noia, no less than his co-defendants Caminito and Bonino, is conceded to
have been the victim of unconstitutional state action. Noia's case stands on
its own; but surely no just and humane legal system can tolerate a result
whereby a Caminito and a Bonino are at liberty because their confessions
were found to have been coerced yet Noia, whose confession was also
coerced, remains in jail for life. For such anomalies, such affronts to the
conscience of a civilized society, habeas corpus is predestined by its
historical role in the struggle for personal liberty to be the ultimate remedy. If
the States withhold effective remedy, the federal courts have the power and
the duty to provide it. Habeas Corpus is one of the precious heritages of
Anglo-American civilization. We do no more today than confirm its continuing
efficacy.
protecting our heritage of equal justice under the law. They can entice us,
faster than we like to believe, into endangering our liberties. 18
And these are the unforgettable words of Justice Douglas:
The challenge to our liberties comes frequently not from those who
consciously seek to destroy our system of government, but from men of
goodwill - good men who allow their proper concerns to blind them to the fact
that what they propose to accomplish involves an impairment of liberty.
xxx xxx xxx
The motives of these men are often commendable. What we must
remember, however, is that preservation of liberties does not depend on
motives. A suppression of liberty has the same effect whether the
suppressor be a reformer or an outlaw. The only protection against
misguided zeal is constant alertness to infractions of the guarantees of
liberty contained in our Constitution. Each surrender of liberty to the
demands of the moment makes easier another, larger surrender. The battle
over the Bill of Rights is a never ending one. 1äwphï1.ñët
xxx xxx xxx
The liberties of any person are the liberties of all of us.
xxx xxx xxx
In short, the liberties of none are safe unless the liberties of all are protected.
But even if we should sense no danger to our own liberties, even if we feel
secure because we belong to a group that is important and respected, we
must recognize that our Bill of Rights is a code of fair play for the less
fortunate that we in all honor and good conscience must observe.

A fitting conclusion of this separate opinion may perhaps be found in two memorable
admonitions from Marjorie G. Fribourg and Justice William O. Douglas.

Mrs. Fribourg, in her inimitable phrase, warns us that —

... Time has taught its age-old lesson. Well-meaning people burnt witches.
Well-meaning prosecutors have convicted the innocent. Well-meaning
objectives espoused by those not grounded in history can lure us from

Privilege Against Self-Incrimination
Galman v. Pamaran
On August 21, 1983, a crime unparalleled in repercussions and ramifications was
committed inside the premises of the Manila International Airport (MIA) in Pasay City.
Former Senator Benigno S. Aquino, Jr., an opposition stalwart who was returning to
the country after a long-sojourn abroad, was gunned down to death. The
assassination rippled shock-waves throughout the entire country which reverberated
beyond the territorial confines of this Republic. The after-shocks stunned the nation
even more as this ramified to all aspects of Philippine political, economic and social
life.
To determine the facts and circumstances surrounding the killing and to allow a free,
unlimited and exhaustive investigation of all aspects of the tragedy, 1 P.D. 1886 was
promulgated creating an ad hoc Fact Finding Board which later became more
popularly known as the Agrava Board. 2 Pursuant to the powers vested in it by P.D.
1886, the Board conducted public hearings wherein various witnesses appeared and
testified and/or produced documentary and other evidence either in obedience to a
subpoena or in response to an invitation issued by the Board Among the witnesses
who appeared, testified and produced evidence before the Board were the herein
private respondents General Fabian C. Ver, Major General Prospero Olivas, 3 Sgt.
Pablo Martinez, Sgt. Tomas Fernandez, Sgt. Leonardo Mojica, Sgt. Pepito Torio, Sgt.
Prospero Bona and AIC Aniceto Acupido. 4
UPON termination of the investigation, two (2) reports were submitted to His
Excellency, President Ferdinand E. Marcos. One, by its Chairman, the Hon. Justice
Corazon Juliano Agrava; and another one, jointly authored by the other members of
the Board — namely: Hon. Luciano Salazar, Hon. Amado Dizon, Hon. Dante Santos
and Hon. Ernesto Herrera. 'the reports were thereafter referred and turned over to the
TANODBAYAN for appropriate action. After conducting the necessary preliminary
investigation, the TANODBAYAN 5 filed with the SANDIGANBAYAN two (2)
Informations for MURDER-one for the killing of Sen. Benigno S. Aquino which was
docketed as Criminal Case No. 10010 and another, criminal Case No. 10011, for the
killing of Rolando Galman, who was found dead on the airport tarmac not far from the
prostrate body of Sen. Aquino on that same fateful day. In both criminal cases, private
respondents were charged as accessories, along with several principals, and one
accomplice.
Upon arraignment, all the accused, including the herein private ate Respondents
pleaded NOT GUILTY.
In the course of the joint trial of the two (2) aforementioned cases, the Prosecution
represented by the Office of the petition TANODBAYAN, marked and thereafter
offered as part of its evidence, the individual testimonies of private respondents
before the Agrava Board. 6 Private respondents, through their respective counsel
objected to the admission of said exhibits. Private respondent Gen. Ver filed a formal
"Motion to Exclude Testimonies of Gen. Fabian C. Ver before the Fact Finding Board
32
as Evidence against him in the above-entitled cases" 7 contending that its admission
will be in derogation of his constitutional right against self-incrimination and violative
of the immunity granted by P.D. 1886. He prayed that his aforesaid testimony be
rejected as evidence for the prosecution. Major Gen. Olivas and the rest of the other
private respondents likewise filed separate motions to exclude their respective
individual testimonies invoking the same ground. 8 Petitioner TANODBAYAN opposed
said motions contending that the immunity relied upon by the private respondents in
support of their motions to exclude their respective testimonies, was not available to
them because of their failure to invoke their right against self-incrimination before the
ad hoc Fact Finding Board. 9 Respondent SANDIGANBAYAN ordered the
TANODBAYAN and the private respondents to submit their respective memorandum
on the issue after which said motions will be considered submitted for resolution. 10
On May 30, 1985, petitioner having no further witnesses to present and having been
required to make its offer of evidence in writing, respondent SANDIGANBAYAN,
without the pending motions for exclusion being resolved, issued a Resolution
directing that by agreement of the parties, the pending motions for exclusion and the
opposition thereto, together with the memorandum in support thereof, as well as the
legal issues and arguments, raised therein are to be considered jointly in the Court's
Resolution on the prosecution's formal offer of exhibits and other documentary
evidences.11 On June 3, 1985, the prosecution made a written "Formal Offer of
Evidence" which includes, among others, the testimonies of private respondents and
other evidences produced by them before the Board, all of which have been
previously marked in the course of the trial.12
All the private respondents objected to the prosecution's formal offer of evidence on
the same ground relied upon by them in their respective motion for exclusion.
On June 13, 1985, respondent SANDIGANBAYAN issued a Resolution, now assailed
in these two (2) petitions, admitting all the evidences offered by the prosecution
except the testimonies and/or other evidence produced by the private respondents in
view of the immunity granted by P.D. 1886. 13
Petitioners' motion for the reconsideration of the said Resolution having been
DENIED, they now come before Us by way of certiorari 14 praying for the amendment
and/or setting aside of the challenged Resolution on the ground that it was issued
without jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction. Private prosecutor below, as counsel for the mother of deceased Rolando
Galman, also filed a separate petition for certiorari 15 on the same ground. Having
arisen from the same factual beginnings and raising practically Identical issues, the
two (2) petitioners were consolidated and will therefore be jointly dealt with and
resolved in this Decision.
The crux of the instant controversy is the admissibility in evidence of the testimonies
given by the eight (8) private respondents who did not invoke their rights against self-
incrimination before the Agrava Board.

It is the submission of the prosecution, now represented by the petitioner
TANODBAYAN, that said testimonies are admissible against the private respondents,
respectively, because of the latter's failure to invoke before the Agrava Board the
immunity granted by P.D. 1886. Since private respondents did not invoke said
privilege, the immunity did not attach. Petitioners went further by contending that such
failure to claim said constitutional privilege amounts to a waiver thereof. 16 The private
respondents, on the other hand, claim that notwithstanding failure to set up the
privilege against self- incrimination before the Agrava Board, said evidences cannot
be used against them as mandated by Section 5 of the said P.D. 1886. They contend
that without the immunity provided for by the second clause of Section 5, P.D. 1886,
the legal compulsion imposed by the first clause of the same Section would suffer
from constitutional infirmity for being violative of the witness' right against self-
incrimination. 17 Thus, the protagonists are locked in horns on the effect and legal
significance of failure to set up the privilege against self-incrimination.
The question presented before Us is a novel one. Heretofore, this Court has not been
previously called upon to rule on issues involving immunity statutes. The relative
novelty of the question coupled with the extraordinary circumstance that had
precipitated the same did nothing to ease the burden of laying down the criteria upon
which this Court will henceforth build future jurisprudence on a heretofore unexplored
area of judicial inquiry. In carrying out this monumental task, however, We shall be
guided, as always, by the constitution and existing laws.
The Agrava Board, 18 came into existence in response to a popular public clamor that
an impartial and independent body, instead of any ordinary police agency, be charged
with the task of conducting the investigation. The then early distortions and
exaggerations, both in foreign and local media, relative to the probable motive behind
the assassination and the person or persons responsible for or involved in the
assassination hastened its creation and heavily contributed to its early formation. 19
Although referred to and designated as a mere Fact Finding Board, the Board is in
truth and in fact, and to all legal intents and purposes, an entity charged, not only with
the function of determining the facts and circumstances surrounding the killing, but
more importantly, the determination of the person or persons criminally responsible
therefor so that they may be brought before the bar of justice. For indeed, what good
will it be to the entire nation and the more than 50 million Filipinos to know the facts
and circumstances of the killing if the culprit or culprits will nevertheless not be dealt
with criminally? This purpose is implicit from Section 12 of the said Presidential
Decree, the pertinent portion of which provides —
SECTION 12. The findings of the Board shall be made public.
Should the findings warrant the prosecution of any person, the
Board may initiate the filing of proper complaint with the appropriate
got government agency. ... (Emphasis supplied)
The investigation therefor is also geared, as any other similar investigation of its sort,
to the ascertainment and/or determination of the culprit or culprits, their consequent
33
prosecution and ultimately, their conviction. And as safeguard, the P.D. guarantees
"any person called to testify before the Board the right to counsel at any stage of the
proceedings." 20 Considering the foregoing environmental settings, it cannot be
denied that in the course of receiving evidence, persons summoned to testify will
include not merely plain witnesses but also those suspected as authors and co-
participants in the tragic killing. And when suspects are summoned and called to
testify and/or produce evidence, the situation is one where the person testifying or
producing evidence is undergoing investigation for the commission of an offense and
not merely in order to shed light on the facts and surrounding circumstances of the
assassination, but more importantly, to determine the character and extent of his
participation therein.
Among this class of witnesses were the herein private respondents, suspects in the
said assassination, all of whom except Generals Ver and Olivas, were detained
(under technical arrest) at the time they were summoned and gave their testimonies
before the Agrava Board. This notwithstanding, Presidential Decree No. 1886 denied
them the right to remain silent. They were compelled to testify or be witnesses against
themselves. Section 5 of P.D. 1886 leave them no choice. They have to take the
witness stand, testify or produce evidence, under pain of contempt if they failed or
refused to do so. 21 The jeopardy of being placed behind prison bars even before
conviction dangled before their very eyes. Similarly, they cannot invoke the right not
to be a witness against themselves, both of which are sacrosantly enshrined and
protected by our fundamental law. 21-a Both these constitutional rights (to remain
silent and not to be compelled to be a witness against himself) were right away totally
foreclosed by P.D. 1886. And yet when they so testified and produced evidence as
ordered, they were not immune from prosecution by reason of the testimony given by
them.
Of course, it may be argued is not the right to remain silent available only to a person
undergoing custodial interrogation? We find no categorical statement in the
constitutional provision on the matter which reads:
... Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense
shall have the right to remain and to counsel, and to be informed of
such right. ... 22 (Emphasis supplied)
Since the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution, we now have a mass of
jurisprudence 23 on this specific portion of the subject provision. In all these cases, it
has been categorically declared that a person detained for the commission of an
offense undergoing investigation has a right to be informed of his right to remain
silent, to counsel, and to an admonition that any and all statements to be given by him
may be used against him. Significantly however, there has been no pronouncement in
any of these cases nor in any other that a person similarly undergoing investigation
for the commission of an offense, if not detained, is not entitled to the constitutional
admonition mandated by said Section 20, Art. IV of the Bill of Rights.

The fact that the framers of our Constitution did not choose to use the term "custodial"
by having it inserted between the words "under" and investigation", as in fact the
sentence opens with the phrase "any person " goes to prove that they did not adopt in
toto the entire fabric of the Miranda doctrine. 24 Neither are we impressed by
petitioners' contention that the use of the word "confession" in the last sentence of
said Section 20, Article 4 connotes the Idea that it applies only to police investigation,
for although the word "confession" is used, the protection covers not only
"confessions" but also "admissions" made in violation of this section. They are
inadmissible against the source of the confession or admission and against third
person. 25
It is true a person in custody undergoing investigation labors under a more formidable
ordeal and graver trying conditions than one who is at liberty while being investigated.
But the common denominator in both which is sought to be avoided is the evil of
extorting from the very mouth of the person undergoing interrogation for the
commission of an offense, the very evidence with which to prosecute and thereafter
convict him. This is the lamentable situation we have at hand.
All the private respondents, except Generals Ver and Olivas, are members of the
military contingent that escorted Sen. Aquino while disembarking from the plane that
brought him home to Manila on that fateful day. Being at the scene of the crime as
such, they were among the first line of suspects in the subject assassination. General
Ver on the other hand, being the highest military authority of his co-petitioners labored
under the same suspicion and so with General Olivas, the first designated investigator
of the tragedy, but whom others suspected, felt and believed to have bungled the
case. The papers, especially the foreign media, and rumors from uglywagging
tongues, all point to them as having, in one way or another participated or have
something to do, in the alleged conspiracy that brought about the assassination.
Could there still be any doubt then that their being asked to testify, was to determine
whether they were really conspirators and if so, the extent of their participation in the
said conspiracy? It is too taxing upon one's credulity to believe that private
respondents' being called to the witness stand was merely to elicit from them facts
and circumstances surrounding the tragedy, which was already so abundantly
supplied by other ordinary witnesses who had testified earlier. In fact, the records
show that Generals Ver and Olivas were among the last witnesses called by the
Agrava Board. The subject matter dealt with and the line of questioning as shown by
the transcript of their testimonies before the Agrava Board, indubitably evinced
purposes other than merely eliciting and determining the so-called surrounding facts
and circumstances of the assassination. In the light of the examination reflected by
the record, it is not far-fetched to conclude that they were called to the stand to
determine their probable involvement in the crime being investigated. Yet they have
not been informed or at the very least even warned while so testifying, even at that
particular stage of their testimonies, of their right to remain silent and that any
statement given by them may be used against them. If the investigation was
conducted, say by the PC, NBI or by other police agency, all the herein private
respondents could not have been compelled to give any statement whether
incriminatory or exculpatory. Not only that. They are also entitled to be admonished of
their constitutional right to remain silent, to counsel, and be informed that any and all
34
statements given by them may be used against them. Did they lose their aforesaid
constitutional rights simply because the investigation was by the Agrava Board and
not by any police investigator, officer or agency? True, they continued testifying. May
that be construed as a waiver of their rights to remain silent and not to be compelled
to be a witness against themselves? The answer is yes, if they have the option to do
so. But in the light of the first portion of Section 5 of P.D. 1886 and the awesome
contempt power of the Board to punish any refusal to testify or produce evidence, We
are not persuaded that when they testified, they voluntarily waived their constitutional
rights not to be compelled to be a witness against themselves much less their right to
remain silent.
Compulsion as it is understood here does not necessarily connote
the use of violence; it may be the product of unintentional
statements. Pressure which operates to overbear his will, disable
him from making a free and rational choice, or impair his capacity
for rational judgment would in our opinion be sufficient. So is moral
coercion 'tending to force testimony from the unwilling lips of the
defendant. 26
Similarly, in the case of Louis J. Lefkowitz v. Russel 27 Turley" citing Garrity vs. New
Jersey" where certain police officers summoned to an inquiry being conducted by the
Attorney General involving the fixing of traffic tickets were asked questions following a
warning that if they did not answer they would be removed from office and that
anything they said might be used against them in any criminal proceeding, and the
questions were answered, the answers given cannot over their objection be later
used in their prosecutions for conspiracy. The United States Supreme Court went
further in holding that:
the protection of the individuals under the Fourteenth Amendment
against coerced statements prohibits use in subsequent
proceedings of statements obtained under threat or removal from
office, and that it extends to all, whether they are policemen or
other members of the body politic. 385 US at 500, 17 L Ed. 562.
The Court also held that in the context of threats of removal from
office the act of responding to interrogation was not voluntary and
was not an effective waiver of the privilege against self-
incrimination.
To buttress their precarious stand and breathe life into a seemingly hopeless cause,
petitioners and amicus curiae (Ex-Senator Ambrosio Padilla) assert that the "right not
to be compelled to be a witness against himself" applies only in favor of an accused in
a criminal case. Hence, it may not be invoked by any of the herein private
respondents before the Agrava Board. The Cabal vs. Kapunan 28 doctrine militates
very heavily against this theory. Said case is not a criminal case as its title very clearly
indicates. It is not People vs. Cabal nor a prosecution for a criminal offense. And yet,
when Cabal refused to take the stand, to be sworn and to testify upon being called as
a witness for complainant Col. Maristela in a forfeiture of illegally acquired assets, this
Court sustained Cabal's plea that for him to be compelled to testify will be in violation

of his right against self- incrimination. We did not therein state that since he is not an
accused and the case is not a criminal case, Cabal cannot refuse to take the witness
stand and testify, and that he can invoke his right against self-incrimination only when
a question which tends to elicit an answer that will incriminate him is profounded to
him. Clearly then, it is not the character of the suit involved but the nature of the
proceedings that controls. The privilege has consistently been held to extend to all
proceedings sanctioned by law and to all cases in which punishment is sought to be
visited upon a witness, whether a party or not. 29 If in a mere forfeiture case where
only property rights were involved, "the right not to be compelled to be a witness
against himself" is secured in favor of the defendant, then with more reason it cannot
be denied to a person facing investigation before a Fact Finding Board where his life
and liberty, by reason of the statements to be given by him, hang on the balance.
Further enlightenment on the subject can be found in the historical background of this
constitutional provision against self- incrimination. The privilege against self-
incrimination is guaranteed in the Fifth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. In the
Philippines, the same principle obtains as a direct result of American influence. At
first, the provision in our organic laws were similar to the Constitution of the United
States and was as follows:
That no person shall be ... compelled in a criminal case to be a
witness against himself. 30
As now worded, Section 20 of Article IV reads:
No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.
The deletion of the phrase "in a criminal case" connotes no other import except to
make said provision also applicable to cases other than criminal. Decidedly then, the
right "not to be compelled to testify against himself" applies to the herein private
respondents notwithstanding that the proceedings before the Agrava Board is not, in
its strictest sense, a criminal case
No doubt, the private respondents were not merely denied the afore-discussed
sacred constitutional rights, but also the right to "due process" which is fundamental
fairness. 31 Quoting the highly-respected eminent constitutionalist that once graced
this Court, the former Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando, due process —
... is responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience to the
dictates of justice. Negatively put, arbitrariness is ruled out and
unfairness avoided. To satisfy the due process requirement, official
action, to paraphrase Cardozo, must not outrun the bounds of
reason and result in sheer oppression. Due process is thus hostile
to any official action marred by lack of reasonableness. Correctly, it
has been Identified as freedom from arbitrariness. It is the
embodiment of the sporting Idea of fair play (Frankfurter, Mr.
Justice Holmes and the Supreme Court, 1983, pp. 32-33). It exacts
fealty "to those strivings for justice and judges the act of officialdom
35
of whatever branch "in the light of reason drawn from
considerations of fairness that reflect (democratic) traditions of
legal and political thought."(Frankfurter, Hannah v. Larche 1960,
363 US 20, at 487). It is not a narrow or '"echnical conception with
fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances."(Cafeteria
Workers v. McElroy 1961, 367 US 1230) Decisions based on such
a clause requiring a 'close and perceptive inquiry into fundamental
principles of our society. (Bartkus vs. Illinois, 1959, 359 US 121).
Questions of due process are not to be treated narrowly or
pedantically in slavery to form or phrases. (Pearson v. McGraw,
1939, 308 US 313).
Our review of the pleadings and their annexes, together with the oral arguments,
manifestations and admissions of both counsel, failed to reveal adherence to and
compliance with due process. The manner in which the testimonies were taken from
private respondents fall short of the constitutional standards both under the DUE
PROCESS CLAUSE and under the EXCLUSIONARY RULE in Section 20, Article IV.
In the face of such grave constitutional infirmities, the individual testimonies of private
respondents cannot be admitted against them in ally criminal proceeding. This is true
regardless of absence of claim of constitutional privilege or of the presence of a grant
of immunity by law. Nevertheless, We shall rule on the effect of such absence of claim
to the availability to private respondents of the immunity provided for in Section 5,
P.D. 1886 which issue was squarely raised and extensively discussed in the
pleadings and oral arguments of the parties.
Immunity statutes may be generally classified into two: one, which grants "use
immunity"; and the other, which grants what is known as "transactional immunity."
The distinction between the two is as follows: "Use immunity" prohibits use of witness'
compelled testimony and its fruits in any manner in connection with the criminal
prosecution of the witness. On the other hand, "transactional immunity" grants
immunity to the witness from prosecution for an offense to which his compelled
testimony relates." 32 Examining Presidential Decree 1886, more specifically Section 5
thereof, which reads:
SEC. 5. No person shall be excused from attending and testifying
or from producing books, records, correspondence, documents, or
other evidence in obedience to a subpoena issued by the Board on
the ground that his testimony or the evidence required of him may
tend to incriminate him or subject him to penalty or forfeiture; but
his testimony or any evidence produced by him shall not be used
against him in connection with any transaction, matter or thing
concerning which he is compelled, after having invoked his privilege
against self-incrimination, to testify or produce evidence, except
that such individual so testifying shall not be exempt from
prosecution and punishment for perjury committed in so testifying,
nor shall he be exempt from demotion or removal from office.
(Emphasis supplied)

it is beyond dispute that said law belongs to the first type of immunity statutes. It
grants merely immunity from use of any statement given before the Board, but not
immunity from prosecution by reason or on the basis thereof. Merely testifying and/or
producing evidence do not render the witness immuned from prosecution
notwithstanding his invocation of the right against self- incrimination. He is merely
saved from the use against him of such statement and nothing more. Stated
otherwise ... he still runs the risk of being prosecuted even if he sets up his right
against self- incrimination. The dictates of fair play, which is the hallmark of due
process, demands that private respondents should have been informed of their rights
to remain silent and warned that any and all statements to be given by them may be
used against them. This, they were denied, under the pretense that they are not
entitled to it and that the Board has no obligation to so inform them.
It is for this reason that we cannot subscribe to the view adopted and urged upon Us
by the petitioners that the right against self-incrimination must be invoked before the
Board in order to prevent use of any given statement against the testifying witness in
a subsequent criminal prosecution. A literal interpretation fashioned upon Us is
repugnant to Article IV, Section 20 of the Constitution, which is the first test of
admissibility. It reads:
No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Any
person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall
have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of
such right. No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other
means which vitiates the free will shall be used against him. Any
confession obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible
in evidence. (Emphasis supplied)
The aforequoted provision renders inadmissible any confession obtained in violation
thereof. As herein earlier discussed, this exclusionary rule applies not only to
confessions but also to admissions, 33 whether made by a witness in any proceeding
or by an accused in a criminal proceeding or any person under investigation for the
commission of an offense. Any interpretation of a statute which will give it a meaning
in conflict with the Constitution must be avoided. So much so that if two or more
constructions or interpretations could possibly be resorted to, then that one which will
avoid unconstitutionality must be adopted even though it may be necessary for this
purpose to disregard the more usual and apparent import of the language used. 34 To
save the statute from a declaration of unconstitutionality it must be given a
reasonable construction that will bring it within the fundamental law. 35Apparent
conflict between two clauses should be harmonized. 36
But a literal application of a requirement of a claim of the privilege against self-
incrimination as a condition sine qua non to the grant of immunity presupposes that
from a layman's point of view, he has the option to refuse to answer questions and
therefore, to make such claim. P.D. 1886, however, forecloses such option of refusal
by imposing sanctions upon its exercise, thus:
36
SEC. 4. The Board may hold any person in direct or indirect
contempt, and impose appropriate penalties therefor. A person
guilty of .... including ... refusal to be sworn or to answer as a
witness or to subscribe to an affidavit or deposition when lawfully
required to do so may be summarily adjudged in direct contempt by
the Board. ...
Such threat of punishment for making a claim of the privilege leaves the witness no
choice but to answer and thereby forfeit the immunity purportedly granted by Sec. 5.
The absurdity of such application is apparent Sec. 5 requires a claim which it,
however, forecloses under threat of contempt proceedings against anyone who
makes such claim. But the strong testimonial compulsion imposed by Section 5 of
P.D. 1886 viewed in the light of the sanctions provided in Section 4,infringes upon the
witness' right against self-incrimination. As a rule, such infringement of the
constitutional right renders inoperative the testimonial compulsion, meaning, the
witness cannot be compelled to answer UNLESS a co-extensive protection in the
form of IMMUNITY is offered. 37 Hence, under the oppressive compulsion of P.D.
1886, immunity must in fact be offered to the witness before he can be required to
answer, so as to safeguard his sacred constitutional right. But in this case, the
compulsion has already produced its desired results the private respondents had all
testified without offer of immunity. Their constitutional rights are therefore, in jeopardy.
The only way to cure the law of its unconstitutional effects is to construe it in the
manner as if IMMUNITY had in fact been offered. We hold, therefore, that in view of
the potent sanctions imposed on the refusal to testify or to answer questions under
Sec. 4 of P.D. 1886, the testimonies compelled thereby are deemed immunized under
Section 5 of the same law. The applicability of the immunity granted by P.D. 1886
cannot be made to depend on a claim of the privilege against self-incrimination which
the same law practically strips away from the witness.
With the stand we take on the issue before Us, and considering the temper of the
times, we run the risk of being consigned to unpopularity. Conscious as we are of, but
undaunted by, the frightening consequences that hover before Us, we have strictly
adhered to the Constitution in upholding the rule of law finding solace in the view very
aptly articulated by that well-known civil libertarian and admired defender of human
rights of this Court, Mr. Justice Claudio Teehankee, in the case of People vs.
Manalang 38 and we quote:
I am completely conscious of the need for a balancing of the
interests of society with the rights and freedoms of the individuals. I
have advocated the balancing-of-interests rule in an situations
which call for an appraisal of the interplay of conflicting interests of
consequential dimensions. But I reject any proposition that would
blindly uphold the interests of society at the sacrifice of the dignity
of any human being. (Emphasis supplied)
Lest we be misunderstood, let it be known that we are not by this disposition passing
upon the guilt or innocence of the herein private respondents an issue which is before
the Sandiganbayan. We are merely resolving a question of law and the

pronouncement herein made applies to all similarly situated, irrespective of one's rank
and status in society.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS and finding the instant petitions
without merit, same are DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Aquino, J., concurs (as certified by Makasiar, C.J.).
Abad Santos, J., is on leave.
Separate Opinions
MAKASIAR, C.J., concurring:
To admit private respondents' testimonies and evidence before the Fact-Finding
Board (FFB) against them in the criminal prosecution pending before the
Sandiganbayan, would violate their constitutional or human rights the right to
procedural due process, the right to remain silent, and the right against self-
incrimination.
That their testimonies and other evidence they submitted before the FFB in these
criminal cases are incriminatory, is confirmed by the very fact that such testimonies
and evidence were the very bases of the majority report of the FFB recommending
the prosecution of private respondents as accessories.
It should be stressed that the basic purposes of the right against self- incrimination
are (1) humanity or humanitarian reasons to prevent a witness or accused from being
coerced, whether physically, morally, and/or psychologically, into incriminating
himself, and (2) to protect the witness or accused from committing perjury, because
the first law of nature is self- preservation.
The utilization in the prosecution against them before the Sandiganbayan of the
testimonies and other evidence of private respondents before the FFB collides with
Section 1, Section 17 and Section 20 of the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution:
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property
without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the
equal of the laws.
xxx xxx xxx
Section 17, No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense
without due process of law.
37
xxx xxx xxx
Section 20. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against
himself. Any person under investigation for the commission of an
offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to
be informed of such right. No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or
any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against
him. Any confession obtained in violation of this Section shall be
inadmissible in evidence.
The Bill of Rights constitutes the reservation of the sovereign people against, as well
as the limitation on, the delegated powers of government. These rights thus
enshrined need no express assertion. On the contrary, the police and prosecution
officers of the country should respect these constitutional liberties as directed in the
recent decision in the Hildawa and Valmonte cases (G.R. Nos. 67766 and 70881,
August 14, 1985). The established jurisprudence is that waiver by the citizen of his
constitutional rights should be clear, categorical, knowing, and intelligent (Johnson vs.
Zerbst, 304 US 458, 464, cited in Abriol vs. Homeres, 84 Phil. 525 [1949] and in
Chavez vs. CA, 24 SCRA 663, 682-683).
The use of testimonies and other evidence of private respondents before the FFB
against them in the criminal cases subsequently filed before the Sandiganbayan
would trench upon the constitutional guarantees that "no person shall be deprived of
life, liberty, or property without due process of law ... that "no person shall be held to
answer for a criminal offense without due process of law" and that (Section 17, Article
IV, 1973 Constitution), that "no person shall be compelled to be a witness against
himself. ..." and that " a person has the right to remain silent ..." (Section 20, Article
IV, 1973 Constitution).
There can be no implied waiver of a citizen's right against self-incrimination or of his
right to remain silent.
Any such renunciation cannot be predicated on such a slender or tenuous reed as a
dubious implication. Otherwise, it would be easier to lose the human rights
guaranteed by the Bill of Rights than to protect or preserve them; it would be easier to
enslave the citizen than for him to remain free. Such a result was never intended by
the Founding Fathers.
The first sentence of Section 20 of the Bill of Rights stating that "no person shall be
compelled to be a witness against himself," applies to both the ordinary witness and
the suspect under custodial investigation.
In support of the rule that there can be no implied waiver of the right against self-
incrimination and all other constitutional rights by the witness or by the accused, is the
fact that the right against double jeopardy can only be renounced by the accused if
the criminal case against him is dismissed or otherwise terminated with his express

consent. Without such express consent to the dismissal or termination of the case,
the accused can always invoke his constitutional right against double jeopardy.
If Section 5 of P.D. 1886 were interpreted otherwise, said section would become a
booby trap for the unsuspecting or unwary witness, A witness summoned either by
subpoena or by Invitation to testify before the FFB under Section 5, cannot refuse,
under pain of contempt, to testify or produce evidence required of him on the ground
that his testimony or evidence may tend to incriminate or subject him to a penalty or
forfeiture; because the same Section 5 prohibits the use of such testimony or
evidence which may tend to incriminate him in any criminal prosecution that may be
filed against him. The law or decree cannot diminish the scope and extent of the
guarantee against self-incrimination or the right to remain silent or the right against
being held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law, or against
deprivation of his life, liberty or property without due process of law.
As a matter of fact, numerous decisions culled by American jurisprudence are partial
to the rule that immunity statutes which compel a citizen to testify, should provide an
immunity from prosecution that is as co-extensive, as total and as absolute as the
guarantees themselves (Jones Law on Evidence, Chapter XVIII, Section 863, pp.
1621-1623; Kastigar vs. US 1972, 406 US 441).
Even if the witness testified pursuant to an invitation, the invitation does not remove
the veiled threat of compulsion, because as stated in the Chavez case, supra.
Compulsion as it is understood here does not necessarily connote
the use of violence; it may be the product of unintentional
statements. Pressures which operate to overbear his will, disable
him from making a free and rational choice, or impair his capacity
for rational judgment would in our opinion be sufficient. So is moral
coercion attending to force testimony from the unwilling lips of the
defendant (Chavez vs. Court of Appeals, 24 SCRA 663, 679).
The summons issued to private respondents has been euphemistically called as an
invitation, instead of a subpoena or subpoena duces tecum, as a sign of respect for
the important and high positions occupied by private respondents. But the effect of
such an invitation thus worded is the same as a subpoena or subpoena duces tecum.
Precisely, the phraseology of Section 5 of P.D. 1886 entices the unsuspecting private
respondents to testify before the FFB, by dangling in the same Section 5 the
assurance that their testimony or the evidence given by them will not be used against
them in a criminal prosecution that may be instituted against them.
At the very least, their consent to testify was under such misapprehension. Hence,
there can be no clear, categorical, knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to
remain silent, against self-incrimination, against being held to answer for a criminal
offense without due process of law, and against being deprived of life, liberty or
property without due process of law under such misapprehension.
38
In any event, Section 5 of P.D. 1886 creates a doubt, which doubt is accentuated by
the difference of opinion thereon among the counsels in these cases and among
members of this Court. And it is basic in criminal law that doubts should be resolved
liberally in favor of the accused and strictly against the government.
The procedural due process both under Sections 1 and 17 of the Bill of Rights, Article
IV of the 1973 Constitution, simply means, in the language of Justice Frankfurter, the
sporting Idea of fair play. The FFB and its counsel did not inform the private
respondents herein of their right to remain silent and their right against self-
incrimination, and that their testimonies may be utilized against them in a court of law,
before they testified. This is not fair to them, and hence, they were denied procedural
due process.
It should be stressed that the FFB was merely a fact-finding agency for the purpose of
gathering all the possible facts that may lead to the Identity of the culprit. Such
testimonies may provide leads for the FFB, its counsels and agents to follow up. The
FFB and its counsels cannot rely solely on such testimonies to be used against the
private respondents in these criminal cases. It should be recalled that the FFB had
ample funds for the purpose of accomplishing its object. As a matter of fact. it
refunded several million pesos to the government after it concluded its investigation.
The Board and its counsel could have utilized the said amount to appoint additional
agents to look for witnesses to the assassination. In this respect, the FFB counsel
could be faulted in not utilizing the funds appropriated for them to ferret out all
evidence that will Identify the culprit or culprits. The failure of the FFB's counsel to use
said funds reflects on the initiative and resourcefulness of its counsel. He could
prosecute private respondents on evidence other than their testimony and the
evidence they gave before the FFB.
As heretofore stated, the private respondents were compelled to testify before the
FFB whether by subpoena or by invitation which has the effect of a subpoena as
provided for in Section 5 of P.D. 1886; because private respondents then believed, by
reading the entire Section 5, that the testimony they gave before the FFB could not be
used against them in the criminal cases subsequently filed before the
Sandiganbayan. Because the Board was merely a fact-finding board and that it was
riot conducting a criminal prosecution the private respondents were under the
impression that there was no need for them to invoke their rights to remain silent,
against self-incrimination and against being held for a criminal offense without due
process of law.
It should be recalled that the counsel of the FFB after submitting the majority report,
refused to cooperate with the Tanodbayan in these cases with the pompous
declaration that, after submitting their majority report, he automatically became
functus oficio. Was his refusal to cooperate with, and assist, the Tanodbayan in the
prosecution of these cases, born of the realization that the FFB majority report is as
weak as it was precipitate? And when the Tanodbayan has now his back to the wall,
as it were, by the ruling of the respondent Sandiganbayan excluding the testimonies
and other evidence of private respondents herein on the ground that the use of their
testimonies and other evidence will incriminate them, the FFB counsel, without being

requested by the Tanodbayan, now files a memorandum in support of the position of
the Tanodbayan. what is the reason for this turn-about to save his report from the fire
which they started with such enthusiasm?
As above emphasized, it is the duty of the police and the prosecuting authorities to
respect their rights under the Constitution as we stated in the recent Hildawa and
Valmonte cases, supra.
The grant of immunity under Section 5 of P.D. 1886 would be meaningless if we
follow the posture of petitioners herein. Such a posture would be correct if the phrase
"after having invoked his privilege against self- incrimination" were transposed as the
opening clause of Section 5 to read a follows "After having invoked his privilege
against self-incrimination, no person shall be excused from attending and testifying ...
etc."
Said Section 5 has two clauses and contemplates two proceedings. The first clause
from "No person shall be excused ... etc." up to "penalty or forfeiture refers to the
proceeding before the FFB. The second clause after the semi-colon following the
word "forfeiture which begins with but his testimony or any evidence produced by him
shall not be used against him in connection with any transaction, matter, or thing
concerning which he is compelled, after having invoked his privilege against self-
incrimination to testify . refers to a subsequent criminal proceeding against him which
second clause guarantees him against the use of his testimony in such criminal
prosecution, but does not immunize him from such prosecution based on other
evidence.
The private respondents herein, if the contention of the prosecution were sustained,
would be fried in their own fat. Consequently, the petition should be dismissed.
CONCEPCION, JR., J., concurring:
1. Let me preface my opinion by quoting from my dissent in Pimentel. 1 7. The testimonies given by private respondents before the Agrava Board are
1. We are committed to the mandate of the Rule of Law. We
resolve controversies before Us without considering what is or what
might be the popular decision. No. We never do. We only consider
the facts and the law. Always the facts and the law.
2. The issue before Us is not I repeat not the guilt or innocence of
Gen. Fabian C. Ver, Major Gen. Prospero Olivas, and others for
their alleged participation in the assassination of former Senator
Benigno S. Aquino, Jr.
3. The issue is: Are the testimonies given by them before the
Agrava Board admissible in evidence against them in their trial
before the Sandiganbayan?
39
4. The issue therefore is purely a question of law. It involves the
interpretation of Sec. 5, P.D. No. 1886 and calls for the application
of the Rule of Law.
5. Sec. 5, P.D. No. 1886 reads:
No person shall be excused from attending and testifying or from
producing books, records, correspondence, documents, or other
evidence in obedience to a subpoena issued by the Board on the
ground that his testimony or the evidence required of him may tend
to incriminate him or subject him to penalty or forfeiture; but his
testimony or any evidence produced by him shall not be used
against him in connection with any transaction, matter or thing
concerning which he is compelled. after having invoked his privilege
against self-incrimination, to testify or produce evidence, except
that such individual so testifying shall not be exempt from
prosecution and punishment for perjury committed in so testifying,
nor shall he be exempt from demotion or removal from office.
6. This section means that any person who is invited or summoned to appear must
obey and testify as to what he knows. Even if the testimony tends to incriminate him
he must testify. Even if he claims his constitutional right against self-incrimination, he
still must testify. However, his testimony cannot be used against him in any
subsequent proceeding, provided that at the time it is being presented, he invokes his
privilege against self-incrimination. His testimony, no matter what it may be, cannot in
any way cause him harm.
The only exception is if the testimony he gave is false, in which case he can be
prosecuted and punished for perjury. He may also be demoted or removed from
office.
therefore not admissible against them in their trial before the Sandiganbayan, having
invoked their privilege against self-incrimination.
PLANA, J., concurring:
I would like to underscore some considerations underlying my concurrence:
1. According to the Constitution, no person shall be compelled to be a witness against
himself. But the law (PD 1886) which created the Agrava Board decrees that no
person shall be excused from testifying on the ground of self- incrimination. If the law
had stopped after this command, it would have been plainly at variance with the
Constitution and void. lt was to ward off such a Constitutional infirmity that the law
provided for immunity against the use of coerced testimony or other evidence, an

immunity which, to be constitutionally adequate, must give at least the same measure
of protection as the fundamental guarantee against self-incrimination.
2. Presidential Decree 1886 was not intended either to restrict or expand the
constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination. On the one hand, a law cannot
restrict a constitutional provision. On the other hand, PD 1886 was adopted precisely
to coerce the production of evidence that hopefully would unmask the killers of
Senator Aquino, although the compulsory process is accompanied by "use" immunity.
3. It is argued that the right against self- incrimination must have been invoked before
the Agrava Board if the use of evidence given therein against the witness in a
subsequent criminal prosecution is to be barred. I did not agree.
I fail to see why to preserve pursuant to law (PD 1886) one's constitutional right
against self-incrimination, one has to offer resistance to giving testimony a resistance
which the said law itself says is futile and cannot prevail, as no witness by its specific
injunction can refuse to testify.
4. The constitutional right against self-incrimination may be waived expressly. It may
also be waived impliedly by speaking when one has the option to hold his tongue.
Waiver by implication presupposes the existence of the right to keep silent. Thus,
when one speaks because the law orders him to do so, his action is not really
voluntary and therefore his testimony should not be deemed an implied waiver of his
constitutional right against self- incrimination.
5. Presidential Decree 1886 does not give private respondents absolute immunity
from prosecution, It only bars the use against them of the evidence that was elicited
from them by the Agrava Board. If there are other evidence available, private
respondents are subject to indictment and conviction.
6. Moreover, the evidence given to the Agrava Board is not, in my view, completedly
immunized. What PD 1886 bars from use is only the testimony of the witness who
testified before the Agrava Board and whatever was presented as part of his
testimony, as such. PD 1886 could not have intended to convert non-confidential
official documents into shielded public records that cannot be used as evidence
against private respondents, by the mere fact that they were admitted in evidence as
part of private respondents' testimony before the Agrava Board. In other words,
evidence otherwise available to the prosecution, such as official documents, do not
become barred just because they have been referred to in the course of the testimony
of private respondents and admitted in evidence as part of their testimony They may
still be subpoenaed and offered in evidence. Conceivably, some objections might be
raised; but the evidence will be unfettered by the exclusionary rule in PD 1886.
ESCOLIN, J., concurring:
40
I concur in the dismissal of the petitions. The admission in evidence of the testimonies
of private respondents given before the Agrava Board would constitute a violation of
their right against self- incrimination guaranteed under Section 20, Article IV of the
Constitution. I subscribe to the majority view that Section 5 of P.D. 1886 cannot be
constitutionally tenable, unless a grant of immunity is read into it vis-a-vis the
compulsion it imposes upon a witness to testify. Otherwise stated, Section 5 of P.D.
1886 should be interpreted as an immunity statute, which, while depriving one of the
right to remain silent, provides an immunity from prosecution that is as co-extensive,
as total and as absolute as the guarantees themselves. (Jones Law on Evidence,
Chapter XVIII, Section 863, pp. 1621-1623, Kastigar v. U.S., 1972, 406 US 441).
Clearly, this is how the private respondents understood the legal provision under
consideration. For ably assisted as they were by counsel, they would not have
allowed themselves to be deliberately dragged into what the Chief Justice would call
a "booby trap". Viewed from another angle, therefore, it could not be truly said that
private respondents had waived their right against self- incrimination in a manner that
is clear, categorical, knowing and intelligent. (Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 US 458, 464,
cited in Abriol v. Homeres, 84 Phil. 525 and Chavez v. CA, 24 SCRA 663).
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:
I concur in the majority opinion penned by Justice Serafin R. Cuevas and in the pithy
separate opinion of Justice Nestor B. Alampay but would like to add some personal
observations.
This case furnishes an opportunity to appreciate the workings of our criminal justice
system.
The prosecutions which led to this petition serve as a timely reminder that all of us-
civilian or military, layman or judge, powerful or helpless- need the Bill of Rights. And
should the time ever come when like the respondents we may have to invoke the
Constitution's protection, the guarantees of basic rights must be readily available, in
their full strength and pristine glory, unaffected by what is currently popular or
decreed and heedless of whoever may be involved
In many petitions filed with this Court and lower courts, the military has often been
charged with riding roughshod over the basic rights of citizens. Officers and enlisted
men in the frontlines of the fight against subversion or rebellion may, in the heat of
combat, see no need to be concerned over such ,niceties" as due process,
unreasonable searches and seizures, freedom of expression, and right to counsel.
They are best reminded that these rights are not luxuries to be discarded in times of
crisis. These rights are the bedrock of a free and civilized society. They are the
reason why we fight so hard to preserve our system of government. And as earlier
stated, there may come times when we may have to personally invoke these basic
freedoms for ourselves. When we deny a right to an accused, we deny it to ourselves.

The decision of the Court underscores the importance of keeping inviolate the
protections given by the Bill of Rights. Acts which erode or sacrifice constitutional
rights under seductive claims of preserving or enhancing political and economic
stability must be resisted. Any lessening of freedom will not at all increase stability.
The liberties of individuals cannot be preserved by denying them.
The dividing line between legitimate dissent or opposition on one hand and
subversion or rebellion on the other may be difficult to pinpoint during troubled times.
The lesson of this petition is that those charged with suppressing the rebellion and
those who sit in courts of justice should ever be vigilant in not lumping legitimate
dissenters and rebels together in one indiscriminate classification.
An abiding concern for principles of liberty and justice is especially imperative in
periods of crisis and in times of transition. And all persons from the mighty to the lowy
must be given the fullest measure of protection under the Bill of Rights if our
constitutional guarantees are to have any meaning.
In addition to the right against self- incrimination, of not being compelled to be a
witness against one's self, so ably discussed by Justice Cuevas in the Court's
opinion, I am constrained by considerations of basic fairness to vote against granting
the petition.
The private respondents were called to testify before the Agrava Commission. The
decree creating the commission stated that no person may refuse to attend and
testify or to produce evidence before it on the ground that what he says or produces
may incriminate him. But since the witness is compelled to give all he knows or
possesses in effect shorn by law of his right not to incriminate himself the decree
states that the evidence wrung from that witness may not be used against him later.
This is, simply speaking, what the petition is all about.
The respondents may be prosecuted as indeed they have been prosecuted. They
may eventually be convicted if the evidence warrants conviction. however, they may
not be convicted solely on the evidence which came from their own mouths or was
produced by their own hands. The evidence must come from other sources. It would
be the height of unfairness and contrary to due process if a man is required to state
what he knows even if it would incriminate him, is promised immunity if he talks freely,
and is later convicted solely on the testimony he gave under such a promise of
immunity.
I believe that P.D. 1886 is the first Immunity Act to be enacted in the Philippines. It
may be relevant, therefore, to refer to American decisions expounding on immunity
statutes, more so when a comparison of P.D. 1886 with such statutes as the U.S.
Immunity Act of 1954, 68 Stat. 745, 18 U.S.C.A. Section 3486, shows a similarity in
the protection given by the statutes.
The U.S. Immunity Act of 1954 was enacted to assist federal grand juries in their
investigatins of attempts to endanger the national security or defense of the United
41
States by treason, sabotage, espionage, sedition, seditious conspiracy, and violations
of various laws on internal security, atomic or nuclear energy, and immigration and
nationality. The law stated that a witness shall not be excused from testifying or from
producing books, papers, or other evidence on the ground that it may tend to
incriminate him or subject him to a penalty or forfeiture. The statute then provides:
But no such witness shall be prosecuted or subjected to any
penalty or forfeiture for or on account of any transaction, matter, or
thing concerning which he is compelled, after having claimed his
privilege against self- incrimination, to testify or produce evidence
nor shall testimony so compelled be used as evidence in any
criminal proceeding ... against him in any court.
The American statute provides immunity against prosecution, penalties, and use of
the testimony. P.D. 1886 is of more limited scope. Only the use of the compelled
testimony is proscribed. The witness may still be prosecuted but the prosecution will
have to look for evidence other than the words of the accused given before the
Agrava Commission.
In Brown v. Walker (161 U.S. 591) the U.S. Supreme Court was confronted with the
validity of the 1893 Immunity Act. Brown was subpoenaed to testify before a grand
jury investigating railroad anomalies. lie refused to testify on grounds of self-
incrimination, arguing that the Immunity Act compelling him to testify was
unconstitutional. The Court ruled that "(W)hile the constitutional provision in question
is justly regarded as one of the most valuable prerogatives of the citizen, its object is
fully accomplished by the statutory immunity and we are therefore of opinion that the
witness was compellable to answer." In other words, the statutory immunity takes the
place of the invocation of the constitutional guarantee. There is no need at the time of
taking testimony to invoke the Fifth Amendment because it would be denied any way
and the witness would be compelled to testify. It would be absurd to invoke a
protection which cannot be availed of when compelled to testify. The time to invoke
the immunity is when the testimony is being used contrary to the granted immunity.
Protected by the statutory immunity, a witness cannot even insist on his right to
remain silent when testifying.
In Ullmann v. United States (350 U.S. 422), the court interpreted the Immunity Act of
1954 and stated.
xxx xxx xxx
... Since that time the Court's holding in Brown v. Walker has never
been challenged; the case and the doctrine it announced have
consistently and without question been treated as definitive by this
Court, in opinions written, among others, by Holmes and Brandeis,
Justices. See, e.g., McCarthy v. Arndstein 226 U.S. 34, 42; Heike
v. United States, 227 U.S. 131, 142. The 1893 statute has become
part of our constitutional fabric and has been included in

substantially the same terms, in virtually all of the major regulatory
enactments of the Federal Government.' Shapiro v. United States,
335 U.S. 1, 6. For a partial list of these statutes, see, Id., 335 U.S.
at pages 6-7, note 4. Moreover, the States, with one exception a
case decided prior to Brown v. Walker have, under their own
constitutions, enunciated the same doctrine, 8 Wigmore, Evidence
(3d ed.), 2281, and have passed numerous statutes compelling
testimony in exchange for immunity in the form either of complete
amnesty or of prohibition of the use of the compelled testimony. For
a list of such statutes, see 8 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed.), 2281, n.
11 (pp. 478-501) and Pocket Supplement thereto, 2281, n. 11 (pp.
147-157). (Emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
It is interesting to note how the American Supreme Court in Ullmann treated the
immunity not only against the use of the testimony (as under P.D. 1886) but even
against prosecution.
xxx xxx xxx
Petitioner, however, attempts to distinguish Brown v. Walker. He
argues that this case is different from Brown v. Walker because the
impact of the disabilities imposed by federal and state authorities
and the public in general such as loss of job, expulsion from labor
unions, state registration and investigation statutes, passport
eligibility and general public opprobrium-is so oppressive that the
statute does not give him true immunity. This, he alleges, is
significantly different from the impact of testifying on the auditor
in Brown v. Walker, who could the next day resume his job with
reputation unaffected. But, as this Court has often held, the
immunity granted need only remove those sanctions which
generate the fear justifying the invocation of the privilege 'The
interdiction of the other Amendment operates only here a witness
may possibly expose him to a criminal charge. But if the criminality
has already been taken away, the amendment ceased to
apply.' Hale v. Henkel 201 U.S. 43, 67. Here, since the Immunity
Act protects a witness who is compelled to answer to the extent of
his constitutional immunity, he has of course, when a particular
sanction is sought to be imposed against him, the right to claim that
it is criminal in nature. (Emphasis supplied).
In United States v. Murdock (284 U.S. 141), the court ruled that "the principle
established is that full and complete immunity against prosecution by the government
compelling the witness to answer is equivalent to the protection furnished by the rule
against compulsory self-incrimination.
42
P.D. 1886, being an immunity statute should not be given a strained or absurd
interpretation in order to achieve a certain result. If the immunity given by the decree
is equivalent to the protection furnished by the right against self- incrimination, then,
paraphrasing Justice Frankfurter in Ullmann, the same protection given by one of the
great landmarks in man's struggle to make himself civilized must not be interpreted in
a hostile or niggardly spirit,
xxx xxx xxx
... Too many, even those who should be better advised, view this
privilege as a shelter for wrongdoers. They too readily assume that
those who invoke it are either guilty of crime or commit perjury in
claiming the privilege. Such a view does scant honor to the patriots
who sponsored the Bill of Rights as a condition to acceptance of the
Constitution by the ratifying States. The Founders of the Nation
were not naive or disregard ful of the interest of justice ...
I, therefore, join the majority in dismissing the petition.
DE LA FUENTE, J., concurring:
No person shall be compelled to be a witness against
himself." 1 This basic right against self- incrimination, which
supplanted the inquisitorial methods of interrogating the accused as
practiced during the Spanish regime, has become an indispensable
part of our laws since 1900. Pursuant thereto, an accused in a
criminal case has the right not only to refuse to answer
incriminating questions but also to refuse to take the witness stand.
He cannot be compelled even to utter a word in his defense. 2 As
stressed in Chavez vs. Court of Appeals, 3 the rule may otherwise
be stated as the constitutional right of the accused to remain silent.
" The accused can forego testimony 4 without any adverse
implication drawn from his decision to do so, The burden is on the
State to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt; the prosecution must look elsewhere for other "evidence
independently and freely secured," The rule forbids what has been
considered as "the certainly inhuman procedure of compelling a
person 'to furnish the missing evidence necessary for his
conviction'." According to Justice Harlan, it was intended "to shield
the guilty and imprudent as well as the innocent and
foresighted." 5 Transplanted in this country with the advent of
American sovereignty 6and firmly imbedded in our fundamental
law, 7 the said privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, which
is predicated on grounds of public policy and humanity, 8 "is

fundamental to our scheme of justice" 9 and is one of the procedural
guarantees of our accusatorial system.
1. As I see it, what the prosecution proposed to do in these cases was to present, as
evidence of the alleged accessorial acts of private respondents, the transcripts of
their respective testimonies before the Agrava Board. Confronted by the apparent
unwillingness of said respondents to be called to the witness stand in subsequent
criminal proceedings, the prosecution sought to put into the record of these criminal
cases (in lieu of private respondents' testimonies) the said transcripts and other
evidence given by them in the course of their testimony before the Agrava Board. If
allowed over and despite private respondents' objection, this would be a clear
infringement of the constitutional guarantee that they can invoke in said criminal
proceedings, as all of them did. Since the prosecution cannot require said
respondents to testify in the criminal cases before the Sandiganbayan, it stands to
reason that it is equally disabled from indirectly compelling respondents to give
evidence against themselves by using their Agrava Board testimonies. The
prosecution must present evidence "derived from a legitimate source wholly
independent of the compelled testimony." 10
2. It is contended, however, that these self- incriminatory testimonies were given
voluntarily because they did not claim the constitutional guarantee before or while
giving testimony to the Agrava Board. Voluntariness, I think. cannot be inferred simply
from such failure to invoke the privilege. There was no fair warning or notice to the
declarant that his testimony would be used against him if incriminatory, unless the
privilege is invoked beforehand or during his testimony. If they were properly warned
and still gave testimony without t invoking the privilege, then it would be clear that
they knowingly waived the privilege. Otherwise, it meant at the most a willingness on
their part to help the Agrava Board in its fact-finding investigation without waiving (a)
the immunity granted by law, and (b) the constitutional guarantee against self-
incrimination in case of subsequent prosecution based on their self-incriminatory
testimony. For waiver, it is wellsettled, to be effective. "must be certain, unequivocal
and intelligently, understandably and willingly made. " 11 Mere submission to an illegal
search or seizure "is not consent or waiver of objection. 12 The prosecution has the
burden to prove otherwise. The same standard should be observed in self-
incrimination cases.
PD No. 1886 (as amended), which created that "independent ad hoc fact-finding
Board," vested it with "plenary powers to determine the facts and circumstances
surrounding the killing [of former Senator Aquino] and to allow for a free, unlimited
and exhaustive investigation into all aspects of said tragedy." In consonance with
these objectives, the law declared that the privilege was unavailable to an Agrava
Board "witness", as follows: "No person shall be excused from attending and
testifying or from producing other evidence on the ground that his testimony or any
evidence requested of him may tend to incriminate him, " 13 etc. At the same time, the
Board was empowered to summarily hold and punish any person in direct contempt
for "refusal to be sworn or to answer as a witness," its judgment being "final and
unappealable."
43
Quite plainly, the constitutional right against compulsory self-incrimination could not
be invoked by Agrava Board witnesses, The privilege was suspended or temporarily
taken away for purposes of the investigation, in order that the Board would have
access to all relevant evidence and all sources of information, not excluding
compelled incriminatory statements of probable and possible or potential defendants.
An Agrava Board witness was, under the terms of the quoted provision, placed in a
dilemma: (1) to answer truthfully all questions including those tending to be self-
incriminatory, since he cannot invoke the privilege; (2) to lie and become liable
criminally for perjury; and (3) to insist on his right to remain silent and be summarily
punished by the Board for direct contempt. It is plain that such a witness was under
compulsion to give self-incriminatory testimony. It was not voluntary. Precisely
because of its coerced nature (an infringement of his constitutional right against self-
incrimination), PD No. 1886 promised. in exchange or as a substitute for the privilege,
limited immunity (as provided in the next succeeding clause, same section), to wit:
... but his testimony or any evidence produced by him shall not be
used against him in connection with any transaction, matter or thing
concerning which he was compelled, after having invoked his
privilege against self- incrimination, to testify or produce
evidence. 14
Such immunity 15 would bar the prosecution's use against the witness of his said
testimony in subsequent criminal proceedings (wherein he is charged with offenses
related to his testimony). Nevertheless, this would not operate to change the
involuntary nature of his self- incriminatory testimony. As far as the witness is
concerned, it was "coerced", not freely given, because he was not fully accorded the
"liberty of choice." The law withheld his basic freedom to choose between testifying
and remaining silent without the risk of being punished for direct contempt to forego
testimony which could possibly be to his detriment.
3. I cannot agree with the proposition that the privilege should be invoked by the
witness before or while giving testimony to the Agrava Board. Section 5 should be
reasonably construed and fairly applied to the cases at bar, in the light of the
accused's constitutional right against compulsory self- incrimination. The formula of
limited-immunity in-lieu-of-the-privilege contained in said section rendered
unnecessary or superfluous, the invocation of the privilege before the Board. Under
said formula, the witness was deprived of the privilege to protect himself against
inquisitorial interrogation into matters that a targeted defendant or virtual respondent
can keep to himself in ordinary investigations or proceedings.
Even if the provision is susceptible of an interpretation in support of the petitioner's
stand, it appears that the time for invoking the privilege is not clear enough or certain
from the language of the law. Equally plausible and logical is the contrary view that it
may be invoked later on when it became apparent that the prosecution intended to
use the testimony given before the Board to secure conviction of the declarant in the
subsequent criminal proceedings. The privilege cannot be deemed waived by
implication merely as a consequence of failure to claim it before the Board. It bears
emphasis that the right of an accused "witnesses" against compulsory self-

incrimination is predicated on the constitutional guarantee, not on the special law in
question.
3. In the United States, the generally accepted approach in Fifth Amendment Cases
(involving the constitutional guarantee under consideration) was stated as follows
in Johnson vs Zerbst:" 16 It has been pointed out that 'courts indulge in every
reasonable presumption against a waiver of the fundamental rights and that we do
not presume acquiescence in the loss of such fundamental rights.'" Because, as Dean
Griswold of Harvard Law School (later, Solicitor General of the United States)
eloquently puts it:
[T]he privilege against self-incrimination is one of the great
landmark,s in man's struggles to make himself civilized ... [W]e do
not make even the most hardened criminal sign his own death
warrant, or dig his own grave ... We have through the course of
history developed a considerable feeling of the dignity and intrinsic
importance of the individual man. Even the evil man is a human
being. 17
In this jurisdiction, more than four decades ago, the late Justice Jose P. Laurela
nationalist, constitutionalist and eminent jurist, whose incisive and authoritative
opinions on constitutional questions are often cited by the bench and the bar- voted to
sustain a claim of the constitutional guarantee in Bermudez vs. Castillo. 18 In his
concurrence, he said inter alia:
(1) As between two possible and equally rational constructions, that
should prevail which is more in consonance with the purpose
intended to be carried out by the Constitution. The provision ...
should be construed with the utmost liberality in favor of the right of
the individual intended to be secured. ...
(2) I am averse to the enlargement of the rule allegedly calculated
to gauge more fully the credibility of a witness if the witness would
thereby be forced to furnish the means for his own destruction.
Unless the evidence is voluntarily given, the policy of the
constitution is one of protection on humanitarian considerations and
grounds of public policy...
(3) The privilege should not be disregarded merely because it often
affords a shelter to the guilty and may prevent the disclosure of
wrongdoing. Courts can not, under the guise of protecting the public
interest and furthering the ends of justice, treat a sacred privilege
as if it were mere excrescence in the Constitution. (Emphasis
supplied; at page 493.)
In sum, considering the pertinent legal provisions and judicial pronouncements as
well as the climate prevailing when the private respondents testified before the
44
Agrava Board, I find it unavoidable to reach the conclusion that they did so under
legal, moral and psychological compulsion. Their compelled testimonies before the
Agrava Board cannot thereafter be used against them in the cases at bar in view of
the immunity granted by P.D. No. 1886. They were not obliged to invoke then and
there the constitutional guarantee. If they did, that would have sufficed to afford them
adequate protection. If they did not, they could do so later on when the Government
prosecutors (in spite of the statutory grant of immunity) decided in the subsequent
criminal proceedings, to use against them their Agrava Board testimonies. For, as
earlier stated, there was no intelligent and knowing waiver on their part of their
constitutional right against self-incrimination.
Accordingly, and for other reasons well stated in the main separate concurring
opinions, I vote to dismiss the petitions.
ALAMPAY, J., concurring:
I vote for the dismissal of the petition in these consolidated cases.
What appears to be the basic and principal issue to which the consideration of the
Court is addressed to is the singular question of whether testimonies adduced by the
private respondents before the Ad Hoc Agrava Fact Finding Board and sought to be
introduced against them in the Sandiganbayan wherein they have been accused were
rightfully excluded as evidence against them.
I find untenable the insistence of the petitioner Tanodbayan that the private
respondents should have claimed the right against self-incrimination before the said
Fact Finding Board and that having omitted doing so, the said privilege afforded to
them by law can no longer be invoked by them before the Sandiganbayan.
The right claimed by private respondents rests on the fundamental principle that no
person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself as so stated in our
Constitution and from the fact that Section 5 of P.D. 1886 disallows the use against
him of such testimony or any evidence produced by him before the said Fact Finding
Board, except for perjury. Petitioner argues however, that there was a waiver of this
right to self-incrimination when respondents proceeded to give their testimonies on
various dates before the Agrava Fact Finding Board without formally invoking on said
occasions their right against self-incrimination.
As private respondents could not have excused themselves from testifying before
said Board as clearly emphasized in the very first clause of Section 5 of P.D. 1886,
and as at that point of time, there was no reason for the declarant to anticipate or
speculate that there would be any criminal charge or any proceeding instituted
against them, it would therefore, be unnatural and illogical to expect that private
respondents would even contemplate the need of prefacing their declarations with an
invocation before the Fact Finding Board of their privilege against self-incrimination.

In fact for a declarant to announce his claim of the aforestated privilege prior to or
while testifying before said Fact Finding Board, would irresistibly create an inference
and convey an impression that said witness is burdened with his own awareness that
he stands already incriminated in some wrong. To insist therefore, even in the
absence yet of any proceeding against him, that the witness invoke the said privilege
before the Agrava Fact Finding Board, would be obviously self-demeaning. Such an
effect could not have been intended by Section 5 of P.D. 1886, which was even
meant to grant to the witness a benefit rather than a burden. It is more reasonable
therefore, to conclude that the privilege against self-incrimination would be accorded
to said witness after he has invoked the same in a subsequent proceeding wherein he
has been charged of a wrong doing, except in a case for perjury. It is only at such
time when the necessity of invoking the mantle of the privilege or the immunity
afforded to him by law would arise.
It cannot also be rightfully concluded that private respondents had intentionally
relinquished or abandoned the said right which they claimed before the
Sandiganbayan. The fact that the issue of when and before what forum should such
claim to the right against self-incrimination be necessarily presented has provoked
much discussion and debate because of divergent views. This has even prompted the
submissions to the Court of opinions of amicus curiae or friends of the court as to how
Section 5 of Presidential Decree 1886 should be construed and applied which are
however different from and contrary to the views expressed by the Justices of the
Sandiganbayan and other legal luminaries. These conflicting views negate the
proposition that there was an effective waiver made by the private respondents of
their rights.
It has earlier been stated by this Court that to be effective, such waiver must be
certain and unequivocal and intelligently, understandably and willingly made. (Chavez
vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 24 SCRA 663). In the same cited case, it has been stated
that courts indulge in every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental
constitutional rights and that we do not presume acquiescence in the loss of
fundamental rights (Citing Johnson vs. Zerbst 304 U.S. 458, 464, 82 L. ed. 1461,
1466). Furthermore, whether the alleged waiver is express or implied, it must be
intentional. (Davison vs. Klaess 20 N.E. 2d. 744, 748, 280 N.Y. 252; 92 CJS, 1058).
I find it difficult to accept that private respondents had at any time, ever intended to
relinquish or abandon their right against self-incrimination.
PATAJO, J., concurring:
I vote for the dismissal of the petition in these consolidated cases. Said petitions do
not merit being given due course and should be dismissed outright.
I hold the view that the testimonies and evidence given before the Agrava Board are
inadmissible as evidence against those who testified or gave said evidence
irrespective of whether said persons were subpoenaed or invited. I believe it is not a
condition sine quo non to the non-admissibility of said evidence that at the time they
45
testified or gave evidence before the Agrava Board that they had invoked their
privilege against self-incrimination.
The Agrava Board was created as an independent ad hoc fact finding board to
determine all the facts and circumstances surrounding the assassination of former
Senator Benigno S. Aquino, Jr. on August 21, 1983. It was given plenary powers to
allow for a free, unlimited and exhaustive investigation into all the aspects of said
tragedy. It was given the power to issue subpoena or subpoena duces tecum and
"other compulsory processes" requiring the attendance and testimony of witnesses
and the production of any evidence relative to any matter under investigation by said
Board.
Those who have been subpoenaed to appear and testify or produce any documentary
evidence before the Board shall not be excused from testifying or presenting
evidence before said Board on the ground that their testimony or evidence may tend
to incriminate them or subject them to penalty or forfeiture. I believe an invitation from
the Board is as much a compulsory process 1 to appear and testify before the Board
as a subpoena and one receiving said invitation cannot also excuse himself from
appearing and testifying before the Board. Petitioners appear to share this view when
they said in subparagraph (c), paragraph 7 of their petition in G.R. No. L-71208-09.
(c) People were either invited or issued subpoenas, depending
upon their rank and office, to give testimony before the Board and
among those invited were respondents General Fabian C. Ver and
Major General Olivas while the rest of the military respondents were
issued subpoenas.
Unquestionably, it was the intention of the decree creating the Board to investigate
the Aquino assassination to encourage all who have some information on any "aspect
of said tragedy" to furnish the Board said information whether they are subpoenaed or
issued other forms of compulsory process such as an invitation and to do so without
fear that what they will say may be used against them. It is in this context that Section
5 of PD No. 1886 should be viewed. When they testified before the Board, they were
given full assurance that whatever they say before the Board will not be used against
them. Only if they testify falsely that they may be prosecuted for perjury. This is to
prevent people from preventing the Board from finding out the truth about the Aquino
assassination by giving false leads or information for ulterior reasons.
Actually Section 5 of PD No. 1886 falls under that category of statutes which do not
pronounce an entire immunity by forbidding punishment or prosecution for any
testimony or evidence given in connection with the investigation of certain offenses
more widely known as immunity statutes, but merely prohibit in any criminal
prosecution the use of the testimony of the witness. Immunity statutes as well as
statutes prohibiting the use of testimony in any subsequent criminal prosecution have
been the expedients resorted for the investigation of many offenses, chiefly those
whose proof or punishment were otherwise impracticable because of the implication
in the offense itself of all who could bear useful testimony.

The expediency and practical utility of this mode of obtaining
evidence may as a measure of legislation, be open to argument.
But the tradition of it as a lawful method of annulling the privilege
against self-incrimination is unquestioned in English history." ignore
on Evidence, Vol. III, p. 469.
Speaking of this kind of privilege of non-admission of testimony given by the witness
in subsequent prosecutions as allowed by the common law and modified by
subsequent statutes, State vs. Quarles 13 Ark 307, 311, said:
The privilege in question, in its greatest scope, as allowed by the
common law and no one, be he witness or accused, can pretend to
claim it beyond its scope at the common law never did contemplate
that the witness might not be proved guilty of the very crime about
which he may be called to testify; but only that the witness should
not be compelled to produce the evidence to prove himself guilty of
that crime. His privilege, therefore, was not an exemption from the
consequences of a crime that he might have committed; but only an
exemption from the necessity of himself producing the evidence to
establish his own crime ... So long as it might be lawful to produce
in evidence against an accused party whatever he might before
have voluntarily said as a witness on a prosecution against another,
there were no means by which the privilege could be made
available short of a claim by the witness to be silent; and as that
was the rule of the common law, this was the common-law mode of
making the privilege available. And that silence was but a mode of
making the privilege available, and was not of the essence of the
privilege itself, is conclusively proven by all that current of
enlightened authority, to which we yield our fullest assent, which
holds that the privilege has ceased when the crime has been
pardoned, when the witness has been tried and acquitted, or is
adjudged guilty, or when the prosecution, to which he was exposed,
has been barred by lapse of time ... But the Legislature has so
changed the common-law rule, by the enactment in question in the
substitution of a rule that the testimony required to be given by the
act, shall never be used against the witness for the purpose of
procuring his conviction for the crime or misdemeanor to which it
relates, that it is no longer necessary for him to claim his privilege
as to such testimony, in order to prevent its being afterwards used
against him. And the only question that can possibly arise under the
present state of the law, as applicable to the case now before us, is
as to whether our statutory regulations afford sufficient protection to
the witness, responsive to this new rule and to his constitutional
guarantee against compulsory self-accusation ...
Considering the objectives sought to be achieved by PD No. 1886 the provision
thereof making testimony and evidence given before the Board inadmissible in
evidence against the ones giving the same, provides protection beyond that granted
46
by the Constitutional provision against self- incrimination, otherwise it will be
constitutionally suspect. Counselman vs. Hitchcock, 142 US 547, 35 L Ed 1110.
Of relevance are the observations of the District Court, N.D. Illinois, in United States
vs. Armour & Co., 112 Fed 808, 821, 822:
All of these immunity acts are relied upon by the individual
defendants, and, while expressed in, slightly varying language, they
all mean the same thing, and each of them is a substitute for the
privilege contained in that clause of the fifth amendment to the
Constitution, reading:
'Nor shall any person be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself.'
This fifth amendment deals with one of the most cherished rights of
the American citizen, and has been construed by the courts to
mean that the witness shall have the right to remain silent when
questioned upon any subject where the answer would tend to
incriminate him. Congress by the immunity laws in question, and by
each of them, has taken away the privilege contained in the
amended it is conceded in argument that this cannot be done
without giving to the citizen by way of immunity something as broad
and valuable as the privilege thus destroyed We are not without
authority on this question. By a previous act, Congress undertook to
take away the constitutional privilege by giving the citizen an
equivalent, and the Supreme Court held in the case of Counselman
v. Hitchcock 142 U.S. 547, 12 Sup. Ct. 195, 35 I Ed., 1110, that the
substitution so given was not an equivalent. Then, at various times,
the immunity acts in question were passed by Congress with full
knowledge that in furnishing a substitute for this great right of the
citizen, it must give something as broad as the privilege taken
away. It might be broader, but it could not be narrower.
Now, in my judgment, the immunity law is broader than the privilege
given by the fifth amendment, which the act was intended to
substitute. The privilege of the amendment permits a refusal to
answer. The act wipes out the offense about which the witness
might have refused to answer. The privilege permits a refusal only
as to incriminating evidence. The act gives immunity for evidence of
or concerning the matter covered by the incident and the evidence
need not be self-incriminating. The privilege must be personally
claimed by the witness at the time. The immunity flows to the
witness by action of law and without any claim on his part. Brown v.
Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 16 Sup. Ct. 644, 40 L. Ed. 819; Hale vs.
Henkel (recently decided) 26 Sup. Ct. 370, 50 L. Ed. -; State v.
Quarles 13 Ark. 307, quoted in 142 U.S. 567, 12 Sup. Ct. 199 (35 L.

Ed. 1110); People Sharp, 107 N.Y. 427, 14 N.E. 319, 1 Am. St.
Rep. 851; Brown v. Walker approved in Lamson v. Boyden, 160
I11. 613, 620, 621, 43 N.E. 781: People v. Butler, St. Foundry, 201
I11. 236, 248, 66 N.E. 349.
I am further of opinion that the immunity given by the act must be
as broad as the liabilities imposed by the act. The act calls upon the
citizen to answer any 'lawful requirement' of the Commissioner.
'Require' means to ask of right and by authority. Webster's
Dictionary. Tenn. Coal Co. v. Saller (C.C.) 37 Fed. 545, 547.
Anything is a requirement by a public officer which brings home to
the person called upon that the officer is there officially and desires
compliance. 'Demand' and' require' are synonymous. Miller v.
Davis, 88 Me. 454, 34 Atl. 265. The citizen may be punished for
refusal to answer such lawful requirement. I am of opinion that
when the Commissioner of Corporations, who has power to compel,
makes his demand, it is the duty of the witness to obey.
The contention has been made that in order to get immunity the
citizen shall wait until the compulsion becomes irresistible. That is
the effect of the government contention. I am not able to bring my
mind to accept that doctrine. If I am right in saying that immunity
flows from the law l, without any claim on the part of the defendant
and at different times that has been conceded here in argument
then no act of any kind on his part which amounts to a claim of
immunity, which amounts to setting up a claim of immunity is
demanded by the law. The law never puts a premium on
contumacy. A person does not become a favored citizen by
resistance to a lawful requirement. On the contrary, the policy of the
law favors the willing giving of evidence whenever an officer entitled
to make a demand makes it upon a citizen who has no right to
refuse. And it would be absurd and un-American to favor the citizen
who resists and places obstacles in the way of the government as
against the citizen who, with a full knowledge of the law, obeys
without resistance the demand of an officer who has the legal right
to make the demand for something which the citizen has no legal
right to refuse. This, then, is the proposition to which we are led.
When an officer, who has a legal right to make a demand, makes
such demand upon a citizen who has no legal light to refuse, and
that citizen answers under such conditions, he answers under
compulsion of the law.
There is no merit then to the contention that private respondents should be invoked
the privilege against self-incrimination before the Agrava Board for precisely PD No.
1886 had explicitly provided that the testimony of those who testified before the Board
can not be used against them. It will be a meaningless act of supererogation to
require that said witnesses before answering any question addressed to them must
invoke their privilege against self-incrimination. The phrase "after having invoked his
47
privilege against self-incrimination" in Section 5 of PD No. 1886 to be consistent with
the intention of said decree, should refer to the time that the testimony of the witness
will be used against him in another proceeding, such as the cases now pending
before the Sandiganbayan. It could not refer to the proceedings before the Agrava
Board because no one is being accused before said Board and no matter how self-
incriminating the testimony of said witness is, he runs no risk of being prejudiced,
much less convicted by the Agrava Board. It is in the prosecution of cases based on
the report of said Board that the witness should invoke his right against self-
incrimination. These private respondents did just that when they moved for the
exclusion in evidence of their statement before the Agrava Board. Any other
interpretation would defeat the very purpose of PD No. 1886.
TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting:
The majority decision is based on erroneous premises, viz. what the case at bar
presents a "novel question;" that "this Court has not been previously called upon to
rule on issues involving immunity statute" and is burdened with the monumental task"
of "laying the criteria ... (to) build future jurisprudence on a heretofore unexplored area
of judicial inquiry." 1 The fact is that we have a wealth of settled jurisprudence and
precedents, Philippine and foreign, that control the determination of the simple issue
at bar and call for the setting aside of the exclusion order issued by respondent court
(Sandiganbayan) which wrongly rules as totally and absolutely inadmissible the
testimonies given by private respondents General Ver and Olivas and their six co-
respondents (all charged as accessories) as well as all the documents, records and
other evidence produced by them before the Fact-Finding Board, notwithstanding that
all were represented by counsel 2 and none of them invoked the privilege or right
against self- incrimination or made any claim or objection at the time of his testimony
before the Board that any question propounded to him and which he willingly
answered called for an incriminating answer against himself.
The following vital considerations based on settled jurisprudence and precedents
show that respondent court acted with gross error and misconception of the
applicable principles of the right against self-incrimination:
1. Respondent court grossly disregarded the settled guidelines laid down for trial
courts by this Court of Appeal vs. Paylo 3 thru Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, speaking for a
unanimous Court, Chat
By so doing [ordering the exclusion of the proferred confessions of
the two accused upon a ground not raised by counsel but motu
proprio by the trial court, i.e. lack of independent proof of
conspiracy] the [trial] court overlooked that the right to objection is a
mere privilege which the parties may waive; and if the ground for
objection is known and not seasonably made, the objection is
deemed waived and the [trial] court has no power, on its own
motion, to disregard the evidence (Marella vs. Reyes, 12 Phil. 1) ...
Suffice it to say that the lower court should have allowed such

confessions to be given in evidence at least as against the parties
who made them, and admit the same conditionally to establish
conspiracy, in order to give the prosecution a chance to get into the
record all the relevant evidence at its disposal to probe the charges.
At any rate, in the final determination and consideration of the case,
the trial court should be able to distinguish the admissible from the
inadmissible, and reject what, under the rules of evidence, should
be excluded.
Trial courts should be liberal in the matter of admission of proof and avoid the
premature and precipitate exclusion of evidence on doubtful objections to its
admissibility, citing the Court's long-standing basic ruling and policy in Prats & Co. vs.
Phoenix Ins. Co. 4 that reception and admission of evidence objected to on doubtful or
technical grounds is ultimately the less harmful course to either litigant, since the
Supreme Court upon appeal would then have all the materials before it necessary to
make a correct judgment (instead of returning the case for a new trial which only
prolongs the determination of the case); and
There is greater reason to adhere to such policy in criminal cases
where questions arise as to admissibility of evidence for the
prosecution, for the unjustified exclusion of evidence may lead to
the erroneous acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the
charges, from which the People can no longer appeal 5
2. The right against self-incrimination is found in the first sentence of section 20 of the
Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution stating that "No person shall be compelled to be
a witness against himself." This single sentence constituted the whole text of section
18 of the Bill of Rights of the 19,7,5 Constitution. This right against self-incrimination
has a settled meaning in jurisprudence which is fully applicable here since the right
against self-incrimination was first enforced here as an inviolable rule" in U.S.
President McKinley's instructions under date of April 7, 1900 to the Taft
Commission. 6 As recounted by the late Mr. Justice Conrado Sanchez as ponente for
a unanimous Court in the leading 1968 case of Chavez vs. Court of Appeals 7, "Mr.
Justice Malcolm, in expressive language, tells us that this maxim was recognized in
England in the early days 'in a revolt against the thumbscrew and the rack.' An old
Philippine case [1904] speaks of this constitutional injunction as 'older than the
Government of the United States;' as having 'its origin in a protest against the
inquisitorial methods of interrogating the accused person;' and as having been
adopted in the Philippines 'to wipe out such practices as formerly prevailed in these
Islands of requiring accused persons to submit to judicial examinations, and to give
testimony regarding the offenses will which they were charged.' " But Mr. Justice
Sanchez equally stressed that "(an) accused occupies a different tier of protection
from an ordinary witness. Whereas an ordinary witness may be compelled to take the
witness stand and claim the privilege as each question requiring an incriminating
answer is shot at him, 8 an accused may altogether refuse to take the witness stand
and refuse to answer any and all questions." 9
48
As restated by Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes for a unanimous Court in Suarez vs.
Tengco, 10 "No legal impediment exists against a litigant calling any of the adverse
parties to be his witness. ... True, an accused in a criminal case may not be
compelled to testify, or to so much as utter a word, even for his own defense (U.S. vs,
Junio, 1 Phil. 50; U.S. vs. Luzon, 4 Phil. 344: U.S. vs. Binayoh 35 Phil. 23; Sec. l(c),
Rule 111, Rules of Court). But while the constitutional guaranty against self-
incrimination protects a person in all types of cases, be they criminal, civil, or
administrative (Art. 111, Sec. 1, No. 18, Phil. constitution: Bermudez vs. Castillo, 64
Phil, 483), said privilege in, proceedings other than a criminal case against him who
invokes it, is considered an option of refusal to answer incriminating question, and not
a prohibition of inquiry.
Except in criminal cases, there is no rule prohibiting a party litigant
from utilizing his adversary as witness. As a matter of fact, section
83 of Rule 123, Rules of Court expressly authorizes a party to call
an adverse party to the witness stand and interrogate him. This rule
is, of course, subject to the constitutional injunction not to compel
any person to testify against himself. But it is established that the
privilege against self-incrimination must be invoked at the proper
time, and the proper time to invoke it is when a question calling for
a incriminating answer is propounded. This has to be so, because
before a question is asked there would be no way of telling whether
the information to be elicited from the witness is self-incriminating or
not. As stated in Jones on Evidence (Vol. 6, pp. 4926-4927), a
person who has been summoned to testify 'cannot decline to
appear, nor can he decline to be sworn as a witness' and 'no claim
of privilege can be made until a question calling for a incriminating
answer is asked, at that time, and, generally speaking, at that time
only, the claim of privilege may properly be interposed.' (Gonzales
vs. Sec. of Labor, L-6409, February 5, 1954, 11 cit. in Navarro,
Criminal Procedure, p. 302.)'
Suarez was cited with favor and reaffirmed in Bagadiong vs. Gonzales, 12 wherein
once again the Court, with the concurrence in the result of the now Chief Justice,
under similar facts held that the petitioner (provincial treasurer) could not refuse to
take the stand as an adverse party in a civil case since the privilege against self-
incrimination "in proceedings other than a criminal case against him who invokes it, is
considered an option to refuse to answer incriminating questions, and not a
prohibition of inquiry" and "must be invoked when a question calling for an
incriminating answer is propounded, because before a question is asked, there would
be no way of telling whether the information to be elicited from the witness is self-
incriminating or not." The Court therein denied "the petition to prohibit respondent
judge from directing petitioner to take the witness stand and testify ... without
prejudice to petitioner's properly invoking the guaranty against self-incrimination when
questions are propounded to him on the stand. Costs against the petitioner."
3. All the respondents at bar were in this category of ordinary witnesses in the
hearings of the Fact-Finding Board. They were not accused in any criminal case nor

were they persons under custodial interrogation who under the second part of section
20 of the Bill of Rights (consisting of three additional sentences 13) were given
additional rights to silence and counsel and to be informed of such rights and to the
out-lawing of any confession obtained in violation of the rights guaranteed in the cited
section, by virtue of the incorporation into the Bill of Rights of the rights granted in the
rulings of the U.S. Supreme Court in the Miranda-Escobedo cases. As noted by
former Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando, "(I)t amounts to an acceptance of the
applicability in this jurisdiction of the epochal American Supreme Court decision
in Miranda vs. Arizona, the opinion being rendered by Chief Justice Warren. It is thus
now a part of our fundamental law. Such doctrine was promulgated in response to the
question of the admissibility of statements obtained from an individual interrogated
under police custody, considering that such a time and under the stress of such
conditions, his right against self-incrimination could be rendered futile." 14 The Miranda
pronouncements thus became necessarily a part and parcel of the additional rights
granted in the cited section 20, as made by the late U.S. Chief Justice Warren in the
Miranda case thus: "The prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or
inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it
demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege
against self-incrimination. By custodial interrogation we mean questioning initiated by
law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. " 15 These additional Miranda
rights could not be invoked by respondents, as the members of the Fact-Finding
Board were not law enforcement officers nor were respondents under custodial
interrogation.
As ordinary witnesses before the Fact-Finding Board and under the settled
jurisprudence above-cited, they could not invoke the right to silence and refuse to
take the witness stand. Their right and privilege (which is not self-executory or
automatic ipso jure) was, while testifying, whether voluntarily or by subpoena, to
invoke the privilege and refuse to answer as and when a question calling for an
incriminating answer is propounded. Failure to invoke the privilege which is personal
does automatically result in its loss ipso facto. The law, usage and settled
jurisprudence uniformly require that the privilege must be asserted or else is lost. The
court or board upon its invocation still has to pass upon and rule upon the proper
application of the privilege. As restated by Francisco, the rule and exceptions are:
"Certainly, where the witness, on oath declares his belief that the answer to the
question would criminate or tend to criminate him, the court cannot compel him to
answer, unless it is clear perfectly, from a careful consideration of all the
circumstances of the case, that the witness is mistaken, or is acting in bad faith, and
that the answer cannot possibly have any such tendency. " 16
4. The view that withal, it is best, although not required, that a warning to the witness
of his option to refuse an answer to incriminating questions as advanced even by the
Tanodbayan at the hearing dates back to a century ago and has been long discarded
as "witnesses are usually well enough advised beforehand by counsel as to their
rights when such issues impend" and "as general knowledge spread among the
masses and the preparation for testimony became more thorough." Thus, "ignore, the
49
bible on the law of evidence so remarks and adds that "there is no reason for letting a
wholesome custom degenerate into a technical rule." —
It is plausible to argue that the witness should be warned and
notified, when a incriminating fact is inquired about, that he has an
option to refuse an answer; and this view was often insisted upon, a
century ago, by leaders at the Bar,
xxx xxx xxx
But there are opposing considerations. In the first place, such a
warning would be an anomaly; it is not given for any other privilege;
witnesses are in other respects supposed to know their rights; and
why not here? In the next place, it is not called for by principle,
since, until the witness refuses, it can hardly be said that he is
compelled to answer; nor is it material that he believes himself
compelled; for the Court's action, and not the witness' state of mind,
must be the test of compulsion. Again, the question can at any rate
only be one of judicial propriety of conduct, for no one supposes
that an answer given under such an erroneous belief should be
struck out for lack of the warning. Finally, in practical convenience,
there is no demand for such rule; witnesses are usually well enough
advised beforehand by counsel as to their rights when such issues
impend, and judges are too much concerned with other
responsibilities to be burdened with the provision of individual
witnesses' knowledge; the risk of their being in ignorance should fall
rather upon the party summoning than the party opposing.
Nevertheless, it is plain that the old practice was to give such a
warning, when it appeared to be needed. But, as general
knowledge spread among the masses, and the preparation for
testimony became more thorough, this practice seems to have
disappeared in England, so far at least as any general rule was
concerned.
In the United States, both the rule and the trial custom vary in the
different jurisdictions. No doubt a capable and painstaking judge will
give the warning, where need appears, but there is no reason for
letting a wholesome custom degenerate into a technical rule. 17
But from the environmental facts and circumstances of the Fact-Finding Board
hearings, to require such a warning to the witness of his option of refusal to answer
incriminatory questions would have been an exercise in absurdity and futility, As is a
matter of public knowledge, respondents had concluded in their investigation that
Galman was the assassin of the late Senator Aquino. As observed by former Senator
Ambrosio Padilla as amicus curiae at the hearing on the merits of August 15, 1985,
they were all too eager to testify and make a strong effort to gain support from the

Fact-Finding Board and the public for the military version and report that the assassin
was Galman who was forthwith gunned down by the military escorts and guards at
the tarmac. It would have been ridiculous, if not bordering on officiousness and
impropriety, to warn them as the highest ranking military officers of their option of
refusal to answer incriminatory questions and also as the majority holds, 18 of their
right to remain silent. When respondents generals appeared before the Board,
respondent Ver precisely made the opening statement that
GENERAL VER:
I welcome this opportunity, Madame Justice,
members of this Honorable Board, Dean,
Gentlemen this opportunity to assist ... this
Honorable Board in the quest for truth and
justice, We all deplore this tragic incident which is
now the subject of inquiry, This Board, this
Honorable Board is mandated to conduct a free,
full and exhaustive investigation into the matter
under investigation We all hope that my
testimony, madame, will somehow dispel any
misconception, or any misinformation
surrounding this tragic incident. I am now ready
to answer your questions.
JUSTICE AGRAVA:
Now, General, at the outset, we give the right and
the privilege for every witness to be assisted by
counsel Do you have your counsel with you this
morning?
GENERAL VER:
I did not bring any counsel, madame, but ... if I
need a counsel, madame, I could probably look
for... probably ...
JUSTICE AGRAVA:
Yes?
GENERAL VER:
I may call Fiscal Parena or the Public
Coordinator. I was talking to Atty. Tan to assist
me, in the protection of my constitutional rights ...
50
JUSTICE AGRAVA:
Yes.
GENERAL VER:
... if it is necessary:
ATTY. TAN:
Your Honor, please, it is part of the function of
this office to help the witness if he doesn't have
counsel, and so, if the General is willing to have
me, I will happily serve as counsel, Your Honor.
JUSTICE AGRAVA:
All right.
GENERAL VER:
Thank you. 19
Respondent Olivas likewise testified before the Board in response to its invitation to
assist it in determining the true facts and circumstances surrounding the double
killing.
6. The majority decision would go around this by asserting without basis in the record
that "(A)ll the private respondents, except Generals Ver and Olivas, are members of
the military contingent that escorted Sen. Aquino while embarking from the plane that
brought him home to Manila on that fateful day. Being at the scene of the crime as
such, they were among the first line of suspects in the subject assassination. General
Ver on the other hand, being the highest military authority of his co-petitioners labored
under the same suspicion and so with General Olivas, the first designated investigator
of the tragedy, but whom others suspected, felt and believed to have bungled the
case. The papers, especially the foreign media, and rumors from ugly wagging
tongues, all point to them as having, in one way or another participated or have
something to do, in the alleged conspiracy that brought about the assassination.
Could there still be any doubt then that their being asked to testify, was to determine
whether they were really conspirators and if so, the extent of their participation in the
said conspiracy?" In fact, the respondent court's decision and separate opinions as
well as the majority decision at bar and the separate concurring opinions all fail to
specify the particular portions of the testimonies of respondents or any specific
question and answer that can be in any way deemed to be self-incriminating. Indeed,
even if we assumed arguendo that they were warned of their right against self-

incrimination and tried absurdly to invoke the same, there is no specific question and
answer by way of testimony that could be pointed to them as having been made
under compulsion for the simple reason that their testimony was in full support of their
own military report that Galman was Aquino's killer and for which they were trying to
gain the Board's acceptance. In the all too brief and inadequate deliberations held on
August 20 and 21, 1985 after the hearing on the merits of August 15, 1985, without
reaching a definite conclusion, the ponente reported and I share this view from a
cursory examination, for want of material time, of the excluded testimonies only since
the excluded documents, records and other evidence produced by them were not
before the Court that there is nothing in the excluded testimonies that could in any
way be deemed self-incriminatory perse. So there would be no legal basis whatever
for their exclusion. But the ponente circulated only last August 26th at noon his draft
for dismissal of the petitions which were filed only last month. And its release has
been set for August 30th.
7. There has not been enough time to weigh and ponder on the far-reaching
consequences of the decision at bar. The decision orders the total and unqualified
exclusion of the testimonies and evidence produced before the Fact-Finding Board by
the eight respondents charged as accessories "even though (they) failed to claim
(their) privilege before giving the incriminating testimony" (citing 21 Am. Jur. 2d. 218).
But the cited compilation of American State and Federal Law expressly cautions that
"The question whether a witness must claim exemption . on from self-incrimination to
be entitled to immunity from subsequent prosecution must in each case be
determined in the light of constitutional and statutory provisions in the jurisdiction
where the question arises" (21 Am. Jur. 2d. 151). It recites on the same cited page
that "Under a statute granting immunity to persons who have been compelled to
testify, one who has appeared voluntarily and testified without claiming his privilege
against self-incrimination or one who has appeared and testified pursuant to a void
subpoena or one addressed to another person, without claiming the privilege, cannot
say he has been compelled to testify, and therefore, he is not entitled to immunity."
And the necessity of claiming the privilege against self-incrimination before an
administrative officer or board such as the Fact Finding Board is recognized to be
essential, thus:
This is not only equally true as for the case of testimony in a judicial
trial, but the explicitness is here even more essential, and
particularly where the administrative officer makes a general
demand for documents or testimony upon a broad class of topics.
The reason is clear. The officer has testimonial powers to extract a
general mass of facts, or which some, many, or most will certainly
be innocent and unprivileged, some may be privileged
communications (e.g., between attorney and client) whose privilege
remains unaffected by the statute defining his powers, and some
may be privileged as self-incriminating but liable to become
demandable by overriding this privilege with a grant of immunity.
Among these mass of facts, then, the officer will seek those which
are relevant to his administrative inquiry; he cannot know which of
them fall within one or another privilege in particular, which of them
51
tend to criminate at all, or to criminate a particular person; if such
facts are there, he may not desire or be authorized to exercised the
option of granting immunity so as to obtain them; his primary
function and power is to obtain the relevant facts at large, and his
power to obtain a special and limited class of facts by grant of
immunity is only a secondary one, and one which he will not
exercise till a cause arises, if even then.
For these reasons of practical sense, then, as well as for the
inherent requirements of principle already noticed for judicial
officers, it is particularly true for an inquiry by an administrative
officer that the witness must explicitly claim his privilege, and
specifically the privilege against self- incrimination, and must then
be overridden in that claim, before immunity can take effect. (VII
Wigmore on Evidence, 2282, pp. 517-518)
The concurrence of Justice Vera Cruz sounds even more ominous thus:
I believe that where evidence is produced by a witness in
accordance with the conditions of the statute granting immunity
such as P.D. No. 1886, as amended, its immunity provisions attach
instantly and it is entirely immaterial what use the investigation
authority makes of it (People ex rel. Massarsky v. Adams, 47 N.Y.S.
2d 375, 62 N.E. 2d 244).
Consequently, the evidence, given before the Agrava Board by the
accused in the instant cases namely, Generals Fabian Ver and
Prospero Olivas, and Sergeants Pablo Martinez, Tomas
Fernandez, Leonardo Mojica, Pepito Torio, Prospero Bona and
Aniceto Acupido cannot be used against them and this proscription
did attach instantly when they testified before the same Board.
Verily, the prohibition stands, irrespective of the purpose for which
the prosecution would like to use this evidence.
The total and unqualified exclusion of the testimony and evidence granted by
respondent court and sustained by the majority decision herein refers expressly to the
eight respondents charged as accessories. Would not this unprecedented grant of
immunity and exclusion of testimony be now claimed by the rest of the twenty-two
accused charged as principals except for the lone civilian? As reported by the press,
respondent court has suspended its trial and placed the pressure on the Court to rush
its decision, as "(T)he so-called 'trial of the century' has been delayed since last week
on motion of the defense panel which had argued that the high court's decision on the
admissibility of Ver's testimonies was a vital prerequisite to the presentation of
witnesses for the defense. " 20 Would this not result in the People holding an empty
bag of excluded testimonies and evidence, since to all intents and purposes all
respondents-accused testified before the Fact-Finding Board? Would their
testimonies be inadmissible for purposes even of impeaching such testimony as they

may now give before respondent court? These ponderous questions need not
confront us had we but required respondent court to hew to the settled procedure and
doctrine of Yatco (supra, par. I hereof) of giving the prosecution a chance to get into
the record its relevant evidence until the final determination and consideration of the
case, for the unjustified exclusion of evidence of the prosecution may lead to the
erroneous acquittal of the accused or dismissal of the charges, from which the People
can no longer appeal.
8. The alleged "ambiguous phraseology" of section 5 of P.D. 1886 cited in respondent
court's questioned order and bolstered by the majority decision's "novel" conclusion
and ruling that the cited section quoted therein 21 requires a claim from the witness of
the privilege against self-incrimination but "forecloses under threat of contempt
proceedings [under section 4] against anyone who makes such a claim. But the
strong testimonial compulsion imposed by section 5 of P.D. 1886 viewed in the light,
of the actions provided in section 4, infringes upon the witness' right against self-
incrimination. As a rule, such infringement of the constitutional right renders
inoperative the testimonial compulsion, meaning, the witness cannot be compelled to
answer UNLESS a co-extensive protection in the form of IMMUNITY is offered.
Hence, under the oppressive compulsion of P.D. 1886, immunity must in fact be
offered to the witness before he can be required to answer, so as to safeguard his
sacred constitutional right. But in this case, the compulsion has already produced its
desired results the private respondents had all testified without offer of immunity.
Their constitutional rights are, therefore, in jeopardy. The only way to cure the law of
its unconstitutional effects is to construe it in the manner as if IMMUNITY had in fact
been offered. We hold, therefore, that in view of the potent sanctions imposed on the
refusal to testify or to answer questions under Sec. 4 of P.D. 1886, the testimonies
compelled thereby are deemed immunized under Section 5 of the same law. The
applicability of the immunity granted by P.D. 1886 cannot be made to depend on a
claim of the privilege against self-incrimination which the same law practically strips
away from the witness. " Emphasis supplied).
It bears emphasis that none of respondents made any such claim against self-
incrimination. The "oppressive compulsion" if it may be so-called, consists of a
maximum penalty of P200. fine and/or 30 days imprisonment for direct contempt. As
indicated, it would be ridiculous for any respondent to 1 make such claim when his
testimony was but in full support of their own military theory and report that Galman
killed Aquino.
The language of the cited section 22 is plain and simple. It excuses no one from
testifying and producing books and records but grants him immunity from prosecution
(except for perjury) after having invoked his privilege against self-incrimination " There
is nothing oppressive about such compulsion in exchange for immunity provided the
witness invokes his and aims his privilege a against self-incrimination.
In the Court's Resolution of July 9, 1985, Mr. Justice Aquino, voting to dismiss
outright the petitions. opined that The clause 'concerning which lie is compelled to
testify after having invoked his privilege against self-incrimination' is surplusage. It is
in conflict with the first clause which, as already stated, gives immunity to the witness
52
except in case of perjury. So, section 5 should be read as if that clause were not
there.This is contrary to the rules of statutory construction that there is no room for
construction when tile text is plain and simple, i.e. requires invocation and that the
provisions must be taken in context and all the words taken into account and given
their full meaning. The Anti-Gambling Law, Act No. 1757, enacted on October 9, 1907
by the Philippine Commission (probably the first Philippine immunity statute) granted
such absolute immunity and does not contain the conditional clause requiring that the
witness invoke his privilege against self-incrimination. Section 10 of the cited Act
reads:
Sec. 10. Upon any investigation or proceeding for violation of this
Act no person shall be excused from giving testimony upon the
ground that such testimony would tend to convict him of a crime,
but such testimony cannot be received against him upon any
criminal investigation or proceeding; Provided, however, That no
person so testifying shall be exempt from prosecution or
punishment for perjury committed in the course of any proceeding
or investigation had by virtue of [his Act. (1 CPS [Rev. Ed.], 190)
But when the statute grants conditional immunity (and not absolute as in the above-
quoted section 10 of the Anti-Gambling Act.), then it explicitly contains the cited
conditional clause in section 5 of P.D. 1886 granting immunity only when "he is
compelled to testify after having invoked his privilege against self-incrimination. "
This is but in accord with long-settled Philippine jurisprudence cited above (supra.
paragraph 2 hereof), that the witness has an option of refusal to answer incriminatory
questions, which he loses ipso facto if he does not invoke the privilege and
nevertheless answers the questions. Here, in review of the national and international
importance of the case with the country's very prestige at stake, the P.D. added the
incentive of offering immunity: "The purpose of immunity provisions is to aid
prosecuting officers by inducing criminals or their confederates to turn state's
evidence and tell on each other, to enable prosecuting officers to procure evidence
which would otherwise be denied to them because of the constitutional right against
self-incrimination, and at the same time to protect every person from gluing testimony
which directly or indirectly would be helpful to the prosecution in securing an
indictment or a conviction. The provisions for immunity are or should be as broad as
or co-extensive with the constitutional provisions granting the privilege against self-
incrimination." (21 Am. Jur. 2d. Criminal Law, sec. 148). It is bad enough that no
state's evidence turned up to tell on his confederates in exchange of immunity. But to
call the cited section " a booby trap for the unsuspecting or unwary witness" unless it
was construed as granting absolute and unconditional immunity from the very fact of
merely testifying as a witness before the Board without claiming immunity nor giving
any incriminatory information that would aid the state to determine the true facts
about Aquino's assassination would be a sell-out. It would make a shambles of the
letter and spirit as well as the salutary intent and objective of the Decree to ferret out
the truth and obtain state witnesses.

9. The truncated and distorted reading of the cited section 5 which consists of a single
integrated paragraph and splitting it into two isolated parts so as to allow the privilege
against self-incrimination (which was already lost for failure to claim it in the Board
hearings) to be resurrected and raised in a much later time frame and "subsequent
criminal proceeding" is against all usage and rules of statutory construction, not to
mention the long line of above-cited jurisprudence to the contrary. And if there still be
doubt, we need only reproduce hereunder the similar wording of Senate Joint
Resolution 137 (Public Law 88-202) after which section 5 of P.D. 1886 was patterned.
Said law was enacted by the U.S. Congress in December 1963 to empower the
Warren Commission to issue subpoenas requiring the testimony of witness and the
production of evidence relating to any matter under its investigation. The Report of
the President's Commission on the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy in its
foreword on page X stated that "In addition, the resolution authorized the Commission
to compel testimony from witnesses claiming the privilege against self-incrimination
under the fifth amendment to the U.S. Constitution by providing for the grant of
immunity to persons testifying under such compulsion." (Emphasis supplied). The
cited Public Law reads:
(e) No person shall be excused from attending and testifying or
from producing books, records, correspondence, documents, or
other evidence in obedience to a subpoena, on the ground that the
testimony or evidence required of him may tend to incriminate him
or subject him to a penalty or forfeiture but no individual shall be
prosecuted or subjected to any penalty or forfeiture (except
demotion or removal from office) for or on account of any
transaction matter, or thing concerning which he is compelled, after
having claimed his privilege against self-incrimination to testify or
produce evidence, except that such individual so testifying shall not
be exempt from prosecution and punishment for perjury committed
in so testifying. (Emphasis supplied).
10. As already indicated above, none of the respondents, public and private, has
indicated the specific portions of their testimony that they have been "oppressively
compelled" to glue, in alleged violation of their privilege against self-incrimination. The
reason for this is that they all testified voluntarily and eagerly to support the military
report and version that Galman killed Senator Aquino. The Board unanimously
rejected the military report and found that the killings were the product of criminal
conspiracy. A brief flashback is herein appropriate: Within 60 seconds from his being
led away by soldiers from his plane that had just landed at the Manila International
Airport on Sunday, August 21, 1983 at past one p.m., former Senator Benigno S.
Aquino, Jr. who was coming home after three years of self-exile in the U.S. laid dead
face down on the tarmac, with his brain smashed by a bullet fired point blank into the
back of his head by a murderous assassin. 23 Also lying dead on the tarmac, face up,
near the senator was another man, to be Identified much later as Rolando Galman,
whom the soldiers admittedly gunned down. The military pointed to him as Aquino's
assassin, who had somehow allegedly penetrated the air-tight security of close to
2000 men ringing the airport. The military version met with great public disbelief and
skepticism. The first fact-finding commission created under Administrative Order No.
53
469 dated August 24, 1983 and P.D. 1879 dated August 27, 1983 was the object of
several suits charging bias and that the President "had already prejudged the case,
by rejecting the version of foreign media that it is one of the soldiers, supposed to
guard Aquino, who fatally shot him." 24 The said commission was dissolved per P.D.
1886, dated October 14, 1983 (later amended by P.D. 1903 dated February 8, 1984)
which created the ad hoc Fact-Finding Board with plenary powers to investigate "the
treacherous and vicious assassination (which) has to all Filipinos become a national
tragedy and national shame ... (and) to determine the facts and circumstances
surrounding the killing and to allow for a free, unlimited and exhaustive investigation
into all the aspects of said tragedy." The Board after extensive hearings, submitted to
the President their majority report on October 24, 1984, while the chairman former
Court of Appeals Justice Corazon Agrava submitted her minority report one day
earlier on October 23, 1984. All five members of the Board unanimously rejected the
official military version that Galman was the assassin and instead found that there
was criminal conspiracy. Their main difference of opinion is that the four-member
majority found twenty-five military men (headed by respondents Generals Ver, Olivas
and Luther Custodia) and one civilian "indictable for the premeditated killing of
Senator Benigno S. Aquino, Jr. and Rolando Galman at the MIA on August 21, 1983."
The chairman's report confined the conspiracy to seven men headed by General
Custodia. The Tanodbayan, after conducting the preliminary investigation, adopted
the Board's majority report recommending the indictment of the accused as "involved
in this conspiracy, either as principals, upon the theory that the act of one is the act of
all, or as accessories, for attempting to hide the corpus of the offense." The eight
accessories so indicted are the private respondents herein named headed by
respondents Ver and Olivas. (The chairman in her minority report had found that
"(T)he indications are that the plotters had agreed that only one would be the
assassin; that the others can either point to Galman as the killer; or they can state
that they did not see the shooting; and that they will give false testimony to mislead
and confuse.
11. Only the former lawyers of the Fact-Finding Board created under P.D. No. 1886,
consisting of Messrs. Andres R. Narvasa, Bienvenido A. Tan, Jr., Mario E. Ongkiko
and Francisco A. Villa have given us the answer that there is nothing incriminatory per
se in the testimonies of the respondents, in the Memorandum submitted by them, to
wit:
I. The so-called 'Galman Theory that it was Rolando Galman who
killed Senator Aquino is either true or untrue, a matter the
SANDIGANBAYAN will have to resolve.
II. If the 'Galman Theory' be true as advocated by the military
officers concerned then the testimony of Ver, et al. is true. It is not
self-incriminatory. There would then be no reason to exclude it.
If, on the other hand, the theory be untrue as the prosecution in turn
advocates then the testimony of Ver, et al. is untrue. It is
incriminatory of them, because by giving it and thereby seeking to
hide the crime, they incriminated themselves. Withal there would

also be no reason to exclude it. Surely, after their plot to deceive
the Board had been exposed, they should not now be allowed to
use the law to bring about exclusion of the very proof of their
deception.
In short, the testimonies of respondents could only be deemed incriminating if it be
found that they sought thereby to hide or cover up the crime and thus incriminate
themselves, as accessories to the murder of Senator Aquino. The former Fact-Finding
Board lawyers amplify their theory, as follows:
5. The plain language of Section 5, PD 1886 precludes its interpretation as extending
immunity to all testimony or evidence produced before the Board in obedience to
subpoena regardless of whether the witness giving such evidence invokes the
privilege against self-incrimination or not. —
6. The fact is, the invocation by Ver, et al. of such right would have been self-
defeating first, it would have prevented them from presenting evidence in
substantiation of the 'Galman Theory,' which they wished the Board to accept; and
second, it might have exposed to some extent their real objective, which was to
deceive the Board.
7. It would have been incongruous for Ver, et al. to have claimed that their testimony
would incriminate them as accessories to the murder of Aquino when they were, by
testifying, actually in process of committing that precise crime, becoming accessories.
8. Neither PD 1886 nor the Constitution should be used as a shield for crime, fraud or
trickery.
9. The foregoing propositions were ignored by the SANDIGANBAYAN. Instead, with
all due respect, it has —
a. given Section 5, PD 1886 a strained construction not justified by
and contrary to its plain language;
b. given Section 20, Article IV, Constitution, a meaning at odds with
its plain terms and contrary to relevant decisions of this Honorable
Supreme Court; and
c. sanctioned the use of legal provisions to shield persons from
criminal liability arising from their perfidious testimony before the
Fact-Finding Board.
There is no legal ground nor justification for the exclusion order. It is for respondent
court, upon consideration of the evidence for the People, without any exclusion, and
of the evidence for the defense in due course, to render its verdict of guilty or not
guilty.
54
With a word of commendation for the former Fact-Finding Board lawyers and former
Senator Ambrosio Padilla and Atty. Ramon Gonzales, whose memoranda as amid
curiae, have been of great assistance, I vote, accordingly, to grant the petitions at bar
and to set aside the questioned exclusion order.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:
I vote to grant the Petitions and to reverse the ruling of the Sandiganbayan.
The resolution of the issue revolves around the interpretation to be given to Sec. 5 of
PD No. 1886, reading as follows:
SEC. 5. No person shall be excused from attending and testifying
or from producing books, records, correspondence, documents, or
other evidence in obedience to a subpoena issued by the Board on
the grounds that his testimony or the evidence required of him may
tend to incriminate him or subject him to penalty or forfeiture; but
his testimony or any evidence produced by him shall not be used
against him in connection with any transaction, matter, or thing
concerning which he is compelled, after having invoked his privilege
against self-incrimination, to testify or produce evidence, except
that such an individual so testifying shall not be exempt from
prosecution and punishment for perjury committed in so testifying,
nor shall he be exempt from demotion or removal from office.
(Emphasis supplied)
As I read the law, Section 5 does not require that the person testifying before the
Agrava Fact Finding Board (the Board, for short) shall first invoke the privilege against
self-incrimination. Under said statute it is obvious that he has no such privilege.
But what is the effect of the second part providing that his testimony or any evidence
produced by him shall not be used against him in connection with any transaction,
matter or thing concerning which he is compelled, after having invoked his privilege
against self-incrimination, to testify or produce evidence, except in case of perjury?
To my mind, the above portion does not grant to a person who has testified before the
Board absolute or total immunity. It should not operate as a shield against criminal
liability specially since, under Section 12 of the same Decree, the Board may initiate
the filing of the proper complaint if its finding so warrant. Thus,
SEC. 12. The findings of the Board shall be made public. Should
the findings warrant the prosecution of any person the Board may
initiate the filing of the proper complaint with the appropriate
government agency. ... (Emphasis supplied)

The inquiry before the Board was a general one. It was not directed against any
particular individual or individuals. Private respondents did not testify therein as
suspects or as accused persons. There should therefore be no hindrance to a
criminal prosecution.
It has been held that where an inquiry by a grand jury is a general
one and is not directed against a particular individual the fact that
on the basis of the information elicited, grounds for a criminal
prosecution may evolve against a witness, may not serve as a bar
to such prosecution (U.S. v. Okin D.C.N.J., 154 F. Supp. 553;
Benson v. Goldstein, 124 N.Y.S. 2d 452) even though he testified
before the grand jury without being warned of his constitutional
privileges against self- incrimination. (U.S. v. Okin supra)
(Emphasis supplied)
The right against self incrimination is not a prohibition of inquiry but an option of
refusal to answer incriminating questions Cabal vs. Kapunan, 6 SCRA 1059 [1962]).
The kernel of the privilege is testimonial compulsion. Whether or not any specific
portion of the testimonies of private respondents is incriminating should be
determined by the Sandiganbayan itself. The claim against self-incrimination should
be invoked when a specific question, which is incriminating in character, is put to a
witness in the subsequent proceeding. There should be no automatic "immunity bath"
of the entire testimony before the Board for immunity does not extend to such of the
evidence as is not privileged.
... But it is established that the privilege against self-incrimination
must be invoked at the proper time, and the proper time to invoke it
is when a question calling for an incriminating answer is
propounded. This has to be so, because before a question is asked
there would be no way of telling whether the information to be
elicited from the witness is self-incriminating or not. As stated in
Jones on Evidence (Vol. 6, pp. 4926-4927), a person who has been
summoned to testify 'cannot decline to appear, nor can be decline
to be sworn as a witness' and 'no claim or privilege can be made
until a question calling for a incriminating answer is asked; at that
time, and generally speaking, at that time only, the claim of privilege
may be interposed. (Gonzales vs. Sec. of Labor, et al., 94 Phil. 325,
326 [19541).
Moreover, the issue actually addresses itself to a question of admissibility or
competency of evidence and not to its credibility. Whether the evidence so admitted is
to be given any probative weight or credence is best addressed to the
Sandiganbayan. It should be recalled that the Board was not unanimous in its
assessment of the testimonies given.
There are additional considerations. While the right against self-incrimination is
indubitably one of the most fundamental of human rights, Section 5 of PD No. 1886
55
should be construed so as to effect a practical and beneficent purpose and not in
such a manner as to hinder or obstruct the administration of criminal justice.
... Any statute which, while it compels him to testify, protects the
witness if he does disclose the circumstances of his offense and the
sources from which or the means by which evidence of its
commission or of his connection with it may be obtained or made
effectual for his subsequent prosecution and conviction is sufficient
to comply with the constitutional requirements. Such a statute,
however should be construed to effect a practical and beneficent
purpose, namely, at the same time to secure the witness in his
constitutional rights and to permit the prosecuting officer to secure
evidence of a crime. It should not be construed so as to unduly
impede, hinder, or obstruct the administration of criminal
justice." Brown v. Walker 161 US 591, 16 Sup. Ct. 644, 40 L. Ed.
819. (People ex rel. Hunt vs. Lane, 116 N.Y.S. 990, 132 App. Div.
406)
The objective in all this exercise is to arrive at the truth. "Though the constitutional
provisions for the protection of one who appears ... must be liberally and fairly
applied, the interests of the people are also entitled to consideration" (Wharton's
Criminal Evidence, 11th Ed., Vol. 1, p. 609; People vs. Coyle 15 N.Y.S. 2d 441, 172
Mis 593). Specially so since, in the language of PD No. 1886 itself, the "treacherous
and vicious assassination of former Senator Benigno S. Aquino, Jr. on August 21,
1983, has to all Filipinos become a national tragedy and national shame. "
In the interest of eliciting the truth, the excluded testimonies should be admitted,
leaving it to the Sandiganbayan to determine which specific questions and answers
are to be excluded because they are incriminatory, and which should be given
credibility, in found to be competent and admissible.
RELOVA, J., dissenting:
The issue raised in these two petitions is whether the testimonies and other evidence
produced by the private respondents before the Agrava Board may be used as
evidence against them before the Sandiganbayan
Respondent Sandiganbayan rejected their testimonies on the ground that "under
statutes providing in substance that no person shall be excused from testifying or
furnishing evidence on the ground that the testimony or evidence may tend to
incriminate him, but that no person shall be subject to indictment or prosecution for
anything concerning which he may testify or furnish evidence, it has been held that
one who testifies concerning criminal offenses when required to do so is entitled to
immunity from prosecution even though he fails to claim his privilege before giving the
incriminating testimony (21 Am Jur 2d 218). He could not be required, in order to gain

the immunity which the law afforded, to go though the formality of an objection or
protest which, however made, would be useless (VIII Wigmore 516)." (p. 4,
Resolution of Sandiganbayan)
Section 5 of Presidential Decree No. 1886 provides that:
SEC. 5. No person shall be excused from attending and testifying
or from producing books, records, correspondence, documents, or
other evidence in obedience to a subpoena issued by the Board on
the ground that his testimony or the evidence required of him may
tend to incriminate him or subject him to penalty or forfeiture; but
his testimony or any evidence produced by him shall not be used
against him in connection with any transaction, matter or thing
concerning which he is compelled, after having invoked his privilege
against self- incrimination to testify or produce evidence ...
(Emphasis supplied.)
Pursuant to the above Presidential Decree no one can refuse to testify or furnish
evidence before the Fact Finding Board. However, his testimony or any evidence
produced shall not be used against him after he invoked the privilege against self-
incrimination. Stated differently, the privilege against self-incrimination must be
invoked when the question at the hearing before the Board, calling for an
incriminating answer is propounded; otherwise, before any question is asked of the
witness, he would not know whether the information to be elicited from him is
incriminating or not.
In the case of Gonzales vs. Secretary of Labor, et al., 94 Phil. 325, this Court held
that "the privilege against self-incrimination must be invoked at the proper time, and
the proper time to invoke it is when question calling for a incriminating answer is
propounded. This has to be so, because before a question is asked there would be
no way of telling whether the information to be elicited from the witness is self-
incriminating or not. As stated in Jones on Evidence (Vol. 6, pp. 4926-4927), a person
who has been summoned to testify 'cannot decline to appear, nor can he decline to
be sworn as a witness' and 'no claim of privilege can be made until a question calling
for a incriminating answer is asked; at that time, and generally speaking, at that time
only, the claim of privilege may properly be interposed.'" And, since it is a personal
right to be exercised only by the witness, this privilege against self-incrimination may
be waived by him and, when so waived, cannot thereafter be asserted. The privilege
is waived by his voluntary offer to testify by, answering questions without objecting
and/or claiming the privilege.
When private respondents gave testimonies before the Board they were not
defendants but witnesses invited and/or subpoenaed "to ventilate the truth thorougly
free, independent and dispassionate investigation." They could not refuse or withhold
answers to questions propounded to them unless the inquiry calls for an incriminating
answer and a timely objection is raised.
56
In the case at bar, since the private respondents answered questions from the Fact
Finding Board without claiming the privilege against self-incrimination they cannot
now be allowed to invoke the immunity clause provided in Section 5 of Presidential
Decree No. 1886.
I vote to grant the petitions.
Separate Opinions
MAKASIAR, C.J., concurring:
To admit private respondents' testimonies and evidence before the Fact-Finding
Board (FFB) against them in the criminal prosecution pending before the
Sandiganbayan, would violate their constitutional or human rights the right to
procedural due process, the right to remain silent, and the right against self-
incrimination.
That their testimonies and other evidence they submitted before the FFB in these
criminal cases are incriminatory, is confirmed by the very fact that such testimonies
and evidence were the very bases of the majority report of the FFB recommending
the prosecution of private respondents as accessories.
It should be stressed that the basic purposes of the right against self- incrimination
are (1) humanity or humanitarian reasons to prevent a witness or accused from being
coerced, whether physically, morally, and/or psychologically, into incriminating
himself, and (2) to protect the witness or accused from committing perjury, because
the first law of nature is self- preservation.
The utilization in the prosecution against them before the Sandiganbayan of the
testimonies and other evidence of private respondents before the FFB collides with
Section 1, Section 17 and Section 20 of the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution:
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property
without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the
equal of the laws.
xxx xxx xxx
Section 17, No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense
without due process of law.
xxx xxx xxx
Section 20. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against
himself. Any person under investigation for the commission of an

offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to
be informed of such right. No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or
any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against
him. Any confession obtained in violation of this Section shall be
inadmissible in evidence.
The Bill of Rights constitutes the reservation of the sovereign people against, as well
as the limitation on, the delegated powers of government. These rights thus
enshrined need no express assertion. On the contrary, the police and prosecution
officers of the country should respect these constitutional liberties as directed in the
recent decision in the Hildawa and Valmonte cases (G.R. Nos. 67766 and 70881,
August 14, 1985). The established jurisprudence is that waiver by the citizen of his
constitutional rights should be clear, categorical, knowing, and intelligent (Johnson vs.
Zerbst, 304 US 458, 464, cited in Abriol vs. Homeres, 84 Phil. 525 [1949] and in
Chavez vs. CA, 24 SCRA 663, 682-683).
The use of testimonies and other evidence of private respondents before the FFB
against them in the criminal cases subsequently filed before the Sandiganbayan
would trench upon the constitutional guarantees that "no person shall be deprived of
life, liberty, or property without due process of law ... that "no person shall be held to
answer for a criminal offense without due process of law" and that (Section 17, Article
IV, 1973 Constitution), that "no person shall be compelled to be a witness against
himself. ..." and that " a person has the right to remain silent ..." (Section 20, Article
IV, 1973 Constitution).
There can be no implied waiver of a citizen's right against self-incrimination or of his
right to remain silent.
Any such renunciation cannot be predicated on such a slender or tenuous reed as a
dubious implication. Otherwise, it would be easier to lose the human rights
guaranteed by the Bill of Rights than to protect or preserve them; it would be easier to
enslave the citizen than for him to remain free. Such a result was never intended by
the Founding Fathers.
The first sentence of Section 20 of the Bill of Rights stating that "no person shall be
compelled to be a witness against himself," applies to both the ordinary witness and
the suspect under custodial investigation.
In support of the rule that there can be no implied waiver of the right against
self-incrimination and all other constitutional rights by the witness or by the accused,
is the fact that the right against double jeopardy can only be renounced by the
accused if the criminal case against him is dismissed or otherwise terminated with his
express consent. Without such express consent to the dismissal or termination of the
case, the accused can always invoke his constitutional right against double jeopardy.
If Section 5 of P.D. 1886 were interpreted otherwise, said section would become a
booby trap for the unsuspecting or unwary witness, A witness summoned either by
57
subpoena or by Invitation to testify before the FFB under Section 5, cannot refuse,
under pain of contempt, to testify or produce evidence required of him on the ground
that his testimony or evidence may tend to incriminate or subject him to a penalty or
forfeiture; because the same Section 5 prohibits the use of such testimony or
evidence which may tend to incriminate him in any criminal prosecution that may be
filed against him. The law or decree cannot diminish the scope and extent of the
guarantee against self-incrimination or the right to remain silent or the right against
being held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law, or against
deprivation of his life, liberty or property without due process of law.
As a matter of fact, numerous decisions culled by American jurisprudence are partial
to the rule that immunity statutes which compel a citizen to testify, should provide an
immunity from prosecution that is as co-extensive, as total and as absolute as the
guarantees themselves (Jones Law on Evidence, Chapter XVIII, Section 863, pp.
1621-1623; Kastigar vs. US 1972, 406 US 441).
Even if the witness testified pursuant to an invitation, the invitation does not remove
the veiled threat of compulsion, because as stated in the Chavez case, supra.
Compulsion as it is understood here does not necessarily connote
the use of violence; it may be the product of unintentional
statements. Pressures which operate to overbear his will, disable
him from making a free and rational choice, or impair his capacity
for rational judgment would in our opinion be sufficient. So is moral
coercion attending to force testimony from the unwilling lips of the
defendant (Chavez vs. Court of Appeals, 24 SCRA 663, 679).
The summons issued to private respondents has been euphemistically called as an
invitation, instead of a subpoena or subpoena duces tecum, as a sign of respect for
the important and high positions occupied by private respondents. But the effect of
such an invitation thus worded is the same as a subpoena or subpoena duces tecum.
Precisely, the phraseology of Section 5 of P.D. 1886 entices the unsuspecting private
respondents to testify before the FFB, by dangling in the same Section 5 the
assurance that their testimony or the evidence given by them will not be used against
them in a criminal prosecution that may be instituted against them.
At the very least, their consent to testify was under such misapprehension. Hence,
there can be no clear, categorical, knowing and intelligent waiver of the right to
remain silent, against self-incrimination, against being held to answer for a criminal
offense without due process of law, and against being deprived of life, liberty or
property without due process of law under such misapprehension.
In any event, Section 5 of P.D. 1886 creates a doubt, which doubt is accentuated by
the difference of opinion thereon among the counsels in these cases and among
members of this Court. And it is basic in criminal law that doubts should be resolved
liberally in favor of the accused and strictly against the government.

The procedural due process both under Sections 1 and 17 of the Bill of Rights, Article
IV of the 1973 Constitution, simply means, in the language of Justice Frankfurter, the
sporting Idea of fair play. The FFB and its counsel did not inform the private
respondents herein of their right to remain silent and their right against self-
incrimination, and that their testimonies may be utilized against them in a court of law,
before they testified. This is not fair to them, and hence, they were denied procedural
due process.
It should be stressed that the FFB was merely a fact-finding agency for the purpose of
gathering all the possible facts that may lead to the Identity of the culprit. Such
testimonies may provide leads for the FFB, its counsels and agents to follow up. The
FFB and its counsels cannot rely solely on such testimonies to be used against the
private respondents in these criminal cases. It should be recalled that the FFB had
ample funds for the purpose of accomplishing its object. As a matter of fact. it
refunded several million pesos to the government after it concluded its investigation.
The Board and its counsel could have utilized the said amount to appoint additional
agents to look for witnesses to the assassination. In this respect, the FFB counsel
could be faulted in not utilizing the funds appropriated for them to ferret out all
evidence that will Identify the culprit or culprits. The failure of the FFB's counsel to use
said funds reflects on the initiative and resourcefulness of its counsel. He could
prosecute private respondents on evidence other than their testimony and the
evidence they gave before the FFB.
As heretofore stated, the private respondents were compelled to testify before the
FFB whether by subpoena or by invitation which has the effect of a subpoena as
provided for in Section 5 of P.D. 1886; because private respondents then believed, by
reading the entire Section 5, that the testimony they gave before the FFB could not be
used against them in the criminal cases subsequently filed before the
Sandiganbayan. Because the Board was merely a fact-finding board and that it was
riot conducting a criminal prosecution the private respondents were under the
impression that there was no need for them to invoke their rights to remain silent,
against self-incrimination and against being held for a criminal offense without due
process of law.
It should be recalled that the counsel of the FFB after submitting the majority report,
refused to cooperate with the Tanodbayan in these cases with the pompous
declaration that, after submitting their majority report, he automatically became
functus oficio. Was his refusal to cooperate with, and assist, the Tanodbayan in the
prosecution of these cases, born of the realization that the FFB majority report is as
weak as it was precipitate? And when the Tanodbayan has now his back to the wall,
as it were, by the ruling of the respondent Sandiganbayan excluding the testimonies
and other evidence of private respondents herein on the ground that the use of their
testimonies and other evidence will incriminate them, the FFB counsel, without being
requested by the Tanodbayan, now files a memorandum in support of the position of
the Tanodbayan. what is the reason for this turn-about to save his report from the fire
which they started with such enthusiasm?
58
As above emphasized, it is the duty of the police and the prosecuting authorities to
respect their rights under the Constitution as we stated in the recent Hildawa and
Valmonte cases, supra.
The grant of immunity under Section 5 of P.D. 1886 would be meaningless if we
follow the posture of petitioners herein. Such a posture would be correct if the phrase
"after having invoked his privilege against self- incrimination" were transposed as the
opening clause of Section 5 to read a follows "After having invoked his privilege
against self-incrimination, no person shall be excused from attending and testifying ...
etc."
Said Section 5 has two clauses and contemplates two proceedings. The first clause
from "No person shall be excused ... etc." up to "penalty or forfeiture refers to the
proceeding before the FFB. The second clause after the semi-colon following the
word "forfeiture which begins with but his testimony or any evidence produced by him
shall not be used against him in connection with any transaction, matter, or thing
concerning which he is compelled, after having invoked his privilege against self-
incrimination to testify . refers to a subsequent criminal proceeding against him which
second clause guarantees him against the use of his testimony in such criminal
prosecution, but does not immunize him from such prosecution based on other
evidence.
The private respondents herein, if the contention of the prosecution were sustained,
would be fried in their own fat. Consequently, the petition should be dismissed.
CONCEPCION, JR., J., concurring:
1. Let me preface my opinion by quoting from my dissent in Pimentel. 1
1. We are committed to the mandate of the Rule of Law. We
resolve controversies before Us without considering what is or what
might be the popular decision. No. We never do. We only consider
the facts and the law. Always the facts and the law.
2. The issue before Us is not I repeat not the guilt or innocence of
Gen. Fabian C. Ver, Major Gen. Prospero Olivas, and others for
their alleged participation in the assassination of former Senator
Benigno S. Aquino, Jr.
3. The issue is: Are the testimonies given by them before the
Agrava Board admissible in evidence against them in their trial
before the Sandiganbayan?
4. The issue therefore is purely a question of law. It involves the
interpretation of Sec. 5, P.D. No. 1886 and calls for the application
of the Rule of Law.

5. Sec. 5, P.D. No. 1886 reads:
No person shall be excused from attending and testifying or from
producing books, records, correspondence, documents, or other
evidence in obedience to a subpoena issued by the Board on the
ground that his testimony or the evidence required of him may tend
to incriminate him or subject him to penalty or forfeiture; but his
testimony or any evidence produced by him shall not be used
against him in connection with any transaction, matter or thing
concerning which he is compelled. after having invoked his privilege
against self-incrimination, to testify or produce evidence, except
that such individual so testifying shall not be exempt from
prosecution and punishment for perjury committed in so testifying,
nor shall he be exempt from demotion or removal from office.
6. This section means that any person who is invited or summoned to appear must
obey and testify as to what he knows. Even if the testimony tends to incriminate him
he must testify. Even if he claims his constitutional right against self-incrimination, he
still must testify. However, his testimony cannot be used against him in any
subsequent proceeding, provided that at the time it is being presented, he invokes his
privilege against self-incrimination. His testimony, no matter what it may be, cannot in
any way cause him harm.
The only exception is if the testimony he gave is false, in which case he can be
prosecuted and punished for perjury. He may also be demoted or removed from
office.
7. The testimonies given by private respondents before the Agrava Board are
therefore not admissible against them in their trial before the Sandiganbayan, having
invoked their privilege against self-incrimination.
PLANA, J., concurring:
I would like to underscore some considerations underlying my concurrence:
1. According to the Constitution, no person shall be compelled to be a witness against
himself. But the law (PD 1886) which created the Agrava Board decrees that no
person shall be excused from testifying on the ground of self- incrimination. If the law
had stopped after this command, it would have been plainly at variance with the
Constitution and void. lt was to ward off such a Constitutional infirmity that the law
provided for immunity against the use of coerced testimony or other evidence, an
immunity which, to be constitutionally adequate, must give at least the same measure
of protection as the fundamental guarantee against self-incrimination.
2. Presidential Decree 1886 was not intended either to restrict or expand the
constitutional guarantee against self-incrimination. On the one hand, a law cannot
59
restrict a constitutional provision. On the other hand, PD 1886 was adopted precisely
to coerce the production of evidence that hopefully would unmask the killers of
Senator Aquino, although the compulsory process is accompanied by "use" immunity.
3. It is argued that the right against self- incrimination must have been invoked before
the Agrava Board if the use of evidence given therein against the witness in a
subsequent criminal prosecution is to be barred. I did not agree.
I fail to see why to preserve pursuant to law (PD 1886) one's constitutional right
against self-incrimination, one has to offer resistance to giving testimony a resistance
which the said law itself says is futile and cannot prevail, as no witness by its specific
injunction can refuse to testify.
4. The constitutional right against self-incrimination may be waived expressly. It may
also be waived impliedly by speaking when one has the option to hold his tongue.
Waiver by implication presupposes the existence of the right to keep silent. Thus,
when one speaks because the law orders him to do so, his action is not really
voluntary and therefore his testimony should not be deemed an implied waiver of his
constitutional right against self- incrimination.
5. Presidential Decree 1886 does not give private respondents absolute immunity
from prosecution, It only bars the use against them of the evidence that was elicited
from them by the Agrava Board. If there are other evidence available, private
respondents are subject to indictment and conviction.
6. Moreover, the evidence given to the Agrava Board is not, in my view, completedly
immunized. What PD 1886 bars from use is only the testimony of the witness who
testified before the Agrava Board and whatever was presented as part of his
testimony, as such. PD 1886 could not have intended to convert non-confidential
official documents into shielded public records that cannot be used as evidence
against private respondents, by the mere fact that they were admitted in evidence as
part of private respondents' testimony before the Agrava Board. In other words,
evidence otherwise available to the prosecution, such as official documents, do not
become barred just because they have been referred to in the course of the testimony
of private respondents and admitted in evidence as part of their testimony They may
still be subpoenaed and offered in evidence. Conceivably, some objections might be
raised; but the evidence will be unfettered by the exclusionary rule in PD 1886.
ESCOLIN, J., concurring:
I concur in the dismissal of the petitions. The admission in evidence of the testimonies
of private respondents given before the Agrava Board would constitute a violation of
their right against self- incrimination guaranteed under Section 20, Article IV of the
Constitution. I subscribe to the majority view that Section 5 of P.D. 1886 cannot be
constitutionally tenable, unless a grant of immunity is read into it vis-a-vis the
compulsion it imposes upon a witness to testify. Otherwise stated, Section 5 of P.D.
1886 should be interpreted as an immunity statute, which, while depriving one of the

right to remain silent, provides an immunity from prosecution that is as co-extensive,
as total and as absolute as the guarantees themselves. (Jones Law on Evidence,
Chapter XVIII, Section 863, pp. 1621-1623, Kastigar v. U.S., 1972, 406 US 441).
Clearly, this is how the private respondents understood the legal provision under
consideration. For ably assisted as they were by counsel, they would not have
allowed themselves to be deliberately dragged into what the Chief Justice would call
a "booby trap". Viewed from another angle, therefore, it could not be truly said that
private respondents had waived their right against self- incrimination in a manner that
is clear, categorical, knowing and intelligent. (Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 US 458, 464,
cited in Abriol v. Homeres, 84 Phil. 525 and Chavez v. CA, 24 SCRA 663).
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:
I concur in the majority opinion penned by Justice Serafin R. Cuevas and in the pithy
separate opinion of Justice Nestor B. Alampay but would like to add some personal
observations.
This case furnishes an opportunity to appreciate the workings of our criminal justice
system.
The prosecutions which led to this petition serve as a timely reminder that all of us-
civilian or military, layman or judge, powerful or helpless- need the Bill of Rights. And
should the time ever come when like the respondents we may have to invoke the
Constitution's protection, the guarantees of basic rights must be readily available, in
their full strength and pristine glory, unaffected by what is currently popular or
decreed and heedless of whoever may be involved
In many petitions filed with this Court and lower courts, the military has often been
charged with riding roughshod over the basic rights of citizens. Officers and enlisted
men in the frontlines of the fight against subversion or rebellion may, in the heat of
combat, see no need to be concerned over such ,niceties" as due process,
unreasonable searches and seizures, freedom of expression, and right to counsel.
They are best reminded that these rights are not luxuries to be discarded in times of
crisis. These rights are the bedrock of a free and civilized society. They are the
reason why we fight so hard to preserve our system of government. And as earlier
stated, there may come times when we may have to personally invoke these basic
freedoms for ourselves. When we deny a right to an accused, we deny it to ourselves.
The decision of the Court underscores the importance of keeping inviolate the
protections given by the Bill of Rights. Acts which erode or sacrifice constitutional
rights under seductive claims of preserving or enhancing political and economic
stability must be resisted. Any lessening of freedom will not at all increase stability.
The liberties of individuals cannot be preserved by denying them.
60
The dividing line between legitimate dissent or opposition on one hand and
subversion or rebellion on the other may be difficult to pinpoint during troubled times.
The lesson of this petition is that those charged with suppressing the rebellion and
those who sit in courts of justice should ever be vigilant in not lumping legitimate
dissenters and rebels together in one indiscriminate classification.
An abiding concern for principles of liberty and justice is especially imperative in
periods of crisis and in times of transition. And all persons from the mighty to the lowy
must be given the fullest measure of protection under the Bill of Rights if our
constitutional guarantees are to have any meaning.
In addition to the right against self- incrimination, of not being compelled to be a
witness against one's self, so ably discussed by Justice Cuevas in the Court's
opinion, I am constrained by considerations of basic fairness to vote against granting
the petition.
The private respondents were called to testify before the Agrava Commission. The
decree creating the commission stated that no person may refuse to attend and
testify or to produce evidence before it on the ground that what he says or produces
may incriminate him. But since the witness is compelled to give all he knows or
possesses in effect shorn by law of his right not to incriminate himself the decree
states that the evidence wrung from that witness may not be used against him later.
This is, simply speaking, what the petition is all about.
The respondents may be prosecuted as indeed they have been prosecuted. They
may eventually be convicted if the evidence warrants conviction. however, they may
not be convicted solely on the evidence which came from their own mouths or was
produced by their own hands. The evidence must come from other sources. It would
be the height of unfairness and contrary to due process if a man is required to state
what he knows even if it would incriminate him, is promised immunity if he talks freely,
and is later convicted solely on the testimony he gave under such a promise of
immunity.
I believe that P.D. 1886 is the first Immunity Act to be enacted in the Philippines. It
may be relevant, therefore, to refer to American decisions expounding on immunity
statutes, more so when a comparison of P.D. 1886 with such statutes as the U.S.
Immunity Act of 1954, 68 Stat. 745, 18 U.S.C.A. Section 3486, shows a similarity in
the protection given by the statutes.
The U.S. Immunity Act of 1954 was enacted to assist federal grand juries in their
investigations of attempts to endanger the national security or defense of the United
States by treason, sabotage, espionage, sedition, seditious conspiracy, and violations
of various laws on internal security, atomic or nuclear energy, and immigration and
nationality. The law stated that a witness shall not be excused from testifying or from
producing books, papers, or other evidence on the ground that it may tend to
incriminate him or subject him to a penalty or forfeiture. The statute then provides:

But no such witness shall be prosecuted or subjected to any
penalty or forfeiture for or on account of any transaction, matter, or
thing concerning which he is compelled, after having claimed his
privilege against self- incrimination, to testify or produce evidence
nor shall testimony so compelled be used as evidence in any
criminal proceeding ... against him in any court.
The American statute provides immunity against prosecution, penalties, and use of
the testimony. P.D. 1886 is of more limited scope. Only the use of the compelled
testimony is proscribed. The witness may still be prosecuted but the prosecution will
have to look for evidence other than the words of the accused given before the
Agrava Commission.
In Brown v. Walker (161 U.S. 591) the U.S. Supreme Court was confronted with the
validity of the 1893 Immunity Act. Brown was subpoenaed to testify before a grand
jury investigating railroad anomalies. lie refused to testify on grounds of self-
incrimination, arguing that the Immunity Act compelling him to testify was
unconstitutional. The Court ruled that "(W)hile the constitutional provision in question
is justly regarded as one of the most valuable prerogatives of the citizen, its object is
fully accomplished by the statutory immunity and we are therefore of opinion that the
witness was compellable to answer." In other words, the statutory immunity takes the
place of the invocation of the constitutional guarantee. There is no need at the time of
taking testimony to invoke the Fifth Amendment because it would be denied any way
and the witness would be compelled to testify. It would be absurd to invoke a
protection which cannot be availed of when compelled to testify. The time to invoke
the immunity is when the testimony is being used contrary to the granted immunity.
Protected by the statutory immunity, a witness cannot even insist on his right to
remain silent when testifying.
In Ullmann v. United States (350 U.S. 422), the court interpreted the Immunity Act of
1954 and stated.
xxx xxx xxx
... Since that time the Court's holding in Brown v. Walker has never
been challenged; the case and the doctrine it announced have
consistently and without question been treated as definitive by this
Court, in opinions written, among others, by Holmes and Brandeis,
Justices. See, e.g., McCarthy v. Arndstein 226 U.S. 34, 42; Heike
v. United States, 227 U.S. 131, 142. The 1893 statute has become
part of our constitutional fabric and has been included in
substantially the same terms, in virtually all of the major regulatory
enactments of the Federal Government.' Shapiro v. United States,
335 U.S. 1, 6. For a partial list of these statutes, see, Id., 335 U.S.
at pages 6-7, note 4. Moreover, the States, with one exception a
case decided prior to Brown v. Walker have, under their own
constitutions, enunciated the same doctrine, 8 Wigmore, Evidence
61
(3d ed.), 2281, and have passed numerous statutes compelling
testimony in exchange for immunity in the form either of complete
amnesty or of prohibition of the use of the compelled testimony. For
a list of such statutes, see 8 Wigmore, Evidence (3d ed.), 2281, n.
11 (pp. 478-501) and Pocket Supplement thereto, 2281, n. 11 (pp.
147-157). (Emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
It is interesting to note how the American Supreme Court in Ullmann treated the
immunity not only against the use of the testimony (as under P.D. 1886) but even
against prosecution.
xxx xxx xxx
Petitioner, however, attempts to distinguish Brown v. Walker. He
argues that this case is different from Brown v. Walker because the
impact of the disabilities imposed by federal and state authorities
and the public in general such as loss of job, expulsion from labor
unions, state registration and investigation statutes, passport
eligibility and general public opprobrium-is so oppressive that the
statute does not give him true immunity. This, he alleges, is
significantly different from the impact of testifying on the auditor
in Brown v. Walker, who could the next day resume his job with
reputation unaffected. But, as this Court has often held, the
immunity granted need only remove those sanctions which
generate the fear justifying the invocation of the privilege 'The
interdiction of the other Amendment operates only here a witness
may possibly expose him to a criminal charge. But if the criminality
has already been taken away, the amendment ceased to
apply.' Hale v. Henkel 201 U.S. 43, 67. Here, since the Immunity
Act protects a witness who is compelled to answer to the extent of
his constitutional immunity, he has of course, when a particular
sanction is sought to be imposed against him, the right to claim that
it is criminal in nature. (Emphasis supplied).
In United States v. Murdock (284 U.S. 141), the court ruled that "the principle
established is that full and complete immunity against prosecution by the government
compelling the witness to answer is equivalent to the protection furnished by the rule
against compulsory self-incrimination.
P.D. 1886, being an immunity statute should not be given a strained or absurd
interpretation in order to achieve a certain result. If the immunity given by the decree
is equivalent to the protection furnished by the right against self- incrimination, then,
paraphrasing Justice Frankfurter in Ullmann, the same protection given by one of the
great landmarks in man's struggle to make himself civilized must not be interpreted in
a hostile or niggardly spirit,

xxx xxx xxx
... Too many, even those who should be better advised, view this
privilege as a shelter for wrongdoers. They too readily assume that
those who invoke it are either guilty of crime or commit perjury in
claiming the privilege. Such a view does scant honor to the patriots
who sponsored the Bill of Rights as a condition to acceptance of the
Constitution by the ratifying States. The Founders of the Nation
were not naive or disregard ful of the interest of justice ...
I, therefore, join the majority in dismissing the petition.
DE LA FUENTE, J., concurring:
No person shall be compelled to be a witness against
himself." 1 This basic right against self- incrimination, which
supplanted the inquisitorial methods of interrogating the accused as
practiced during the Spanish regime, has become an indispensable
part of our laws since 1900. Pursuant thereto, an accused in a
criminal case has the right not only to refuse to answer
incriminating questions but also to refuse to take the witness stand.
He cannot be compelled even to utter a word in his defense. 2 As
stressed in Chavez vs. Court of Appeals, 3 the rule may otherwise
be stated as the constitutional right of the accused to remain silent.
" The accused can forego testimony 4 without any adverse
implication drawn from his decision to do so, The burden is on the
State to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt; the prosecution must look elsewhere for other "evidence
independently and freely secured," The rule forbids what has been
considered as "the certainly inhuman procedure of compelling a
person 'to furnish the missing evidence necessary for his
conviction'." According to Justice Harlan, it was intended "to shield
the guilty and imprudent as well as the innocent and
foresighted." 5 Transplanted in this country with the advent of
American sovereignty 6and firmly imbedded in our fundamental
law, 7 the said privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, which
is predicated on grounds of public policy and humanity, 8 "is
fundamental to our scheme of justice" 9 and is one of the procedural
guarantees of our accusatorial system.
1. As I see it, what the prosecution proposed to do in these cases was to present, as
evidence of the alleged accessorial acts of private respondents, the transcripts of
their respective testimonies before the Agrava Board. Confronted by the apparent
unwillingness of said respondents to be called to the witness stand in subsequent
criminal proceedings, the prosecution sought to put into the record of these criminal
cases (in lieu of private respondents' testimonies) the said transcripts and other
evidence given by them in the course of their testimony before the Agrava Board. If
62
allowed over and despite private respondents' objection, this would be a clear
infringement of the constitutional guarantee that they can invoke in said criminal
proceedings, as all of them did. Since the prosecution cannot require said
respondents to testify in the criminal cases before the Sandiganbayan, it stands to
reason that it is equally disabled from indirectly compelling respondents to give
evidence against themselves by using their Agrava Board testimonies. The
prosecution must present evidence "derived from a legitimate source wholly
independent of the compelled testimony." 10
2. It is contended, however, that these self- incriminatory testimonies were given
voluntarily because they did not claim the constitutional guarantee before or while
giving testimony to the Agrava Board. Voluntariness, I think. cannot be inferred simply
from such failure to invoke the privilege. There was no fair warning or notice to the
declarant that his testimony would be used against him if incriminatory, unless the
privilege is invoked beforehand or during his testimony. If they were properly warned
and still gave testimony without t invoking the privilege, then it would be clear that
they knowingly waived the privilege. Otherwise, it meant at the most a willingness on
their part to help the Agrava Board in its fact-finding investigation without waiving (a)
the immunity granted by law, and (b) the constitutional guarantee against self-
incrimination in case of subsequent prosecution based on their self-incriminatory
testimony. For waiver, it is wellsettled, to be effective. "must be certain, unequivocal
and intelligently, understandably and willingly made. " 11 Mere submission to an illegal
search or seizure "is not consent or waiver of objection. 12 The prosecution has the
burden to prove otherwise. The same standard should be observed in self-
incrimination cases.
PD No. 1886 (as amended), which created that "independent ad hoc fact-finding
Board," vested it with "plenary powers to determine the facts and circumstances
surrounding the killing [of former Senator Aquino] and to allow for a free, unlimited
and exhaustive investigation into all aspects of said tragedy." In consonance with
these objectives, the law declared that the privilege was unavailable to an Agrava
Board "witness", as follows: "No person shall be excused from attending and
testifying or from producing other evidence on the ground that his testimony or any
evidence requested of him may tend to incriminate him, " 13 etc. At the same time, the
Board was empowered to summarily hold and punish any person in direct contempt
for "refusal to be sworn or to answer as a witness," its judgment being "final and
unappealable."
Quite plainly, the constitutional right against compulsory self-incrimination could not
be invoked by Agrava Board witnesses, The privilege was suspended or temporarily
taken away for purposes of the investigation, in order that the Board would have
access to all relevant evidence and all sources of information, not excluding
compelled incriminatory statements of probable and possible or potential defendants.
An Agrava Board witness was, under the terms of the quoted provision, placed in a
dilemma: (1) to answer truthfully all questions including those tending to be self-
incriminatory, since he cannot invoke the privilege; (2) to lie and become liable
criminally for perjury; and (3) to insist on his right to remain silent and be summarily
punished by the Board for direct contempt. It is plain that such a witness was under

compulsion to give self-incriminatory testimony. It was not voluntary. Precisely
because of its coerced nature (an infringement of his constitutional right against self-
incrimination), PD No. 1886 promised. in exchange or as a substitute for the privilege,
limited immunity (as provided in the next succeeding clause, same section), to wit:
... but his testimony or any evidence produced by him shall not be
used against him in connection with any transaction, matter or thing
concerning which he was compelled, after having invoked his
privilege against self- incrimination, to testify or produce
evidence. 14
Such immunity 15 would bar the prosecution's use against the witness of his said
testimony in subsequent criminal proceedings (wherein he is charged with offenses
related to his testimony). Nevertheless, this would not operate to change the
involuntary nature of his self- incriminatory testimony. As far as the witness is
concerned, it was "coerced", not freely given, because he was not fully accorded the
"liberty of choice." The law withheld his basic freedom to choose between testifying
and remaining silent without the risk of being punished for direct contempt to forego
testimony which could possibly be to his detriment.
3. I cannot agree with the proposition that the privilege should be invoked by the
witness before or while giving testimony to the Agrava Board. Section 5 should be
reasonably construed and fairly applied to the cases at bar, in the light of the
accused's constitutional right against compulsory self- incrimination. The formula of
limited-immunity in-lieu-of-the-privilege contained in said section rendered
unnecessary or superfluous, the invocation of the privilege before the Board. Under
said formula, the witness was deprived of the privilege to protect himself against
inquisitorial interrogation into matters that a targeted defendant or virtual respondent
can keep to himself in ordinary investigations or proceedings.
Even if the provision is susceptible of an interpretation in support of the petitioner's
stand, it appears that the time for invoking the privilege is not clear enough or certain
from the language of the law. Equally plausible and logical is the contrary view that it
may be invoked later on when it became apparent that the prosecution intended to
use the testimony given before the Board to secure conviction of the declarant in the
subsequent criminal proceedings. The privilege cannot be deemed waived by
implication merely as a consequence of failure to claim it before the Board. It bears
emphasis that the right of an accused "witnesses" against compulsory self-
incrimination is predicated on the constitutional guarantee, not on the special law in
question.
3. In the United States, the generally accepted approach in Fifth Amendment Cases
(involving the constitutional guarantee under consideration) was stated as follows
in Johnson vs Zerbst:" 16 It has been pointed out that 'courts indulge in every
reasonable presumption against a waiver of the fundamental rights and that we do
not presume acquiescence in the loss of such fundamental rights.'" Because, as Dean
63
Griswold of Harvard Law School (later, Solicitor General of the United States)
eloquently puts it:
[T]he privilege against self-incrimination is one of the great
landmark,s in man's struggles to make himself civilized ... [W]e do
not make even the most hardened criminal sign his own death
warrant, or dig his own grave ... We have through the course of
history developed a considerable feeling of the dignity and intrinsic
importance of the individual man. Even the evil man is a human
being. 17
In this jurisdiction, more than four decades ago, the late Justice Jose P. Laurela
nationalist, constitutionalist and eminent jurist, whose incisive and authoritative
opinions on constitutional questions are often cited by the bench and the bar- voted to
sustain a claim of the constitutional guarantee in Bermudez vs. Castillo. 18 In his
concurrence, he said inter alia:
(1) As between two possible and equally rational constructions, that
should prevail which is more in consonance with the purpose
intended to be carried out by the Constitution. The provision ...
should be construed with the utmost liberality in favor of the right of
the individual intended to be secured. ...
(2) I am averse to the enlargement of the rule allegedly calculated
to gauge more fully the credibility of a witness if the witness would
thereby be forced to furnish the means for his own destruction.
Unless the evidence is voluntarily given, the policy of the
constitution is one of protection on humanitarian considerations and
grounds of public policy...
(3) The privilege should not be disregarded merely because it often
affords a shelter to the guilty and may prevent the disclosure of
wrongdoing. Courts can not, under the guise of protecting the public
interest and furthering the ends of justice, treat a sacred privilege
as if it were mere excrescence in the Constitution. (Emphasis
supplied; at page 493.)
In sum, considering the pertinent legal provisions and judicial pronouncements as
well as the climate prevailing when the private respondents testified before the
Agrava Board, I find it unavoidable to reach the conclusion that they did so under
legal, moral and psychological compulsion. Their compelled testimonies before the
Agrava Board cannot thereafter be used against them in the cases at bar in view of
the immunity granted by P.D. No. 1886. They were not obliged to invoke then and
there the constitutional guarantee. If they did, that would have sufficed to afford them
adequate protection. If they did not, they could do so later on when the Government
prosecutors (in spite of the statutory grant of immunity) decided in the subsequent
criminal proceedings, to use against them their Agrava Board testimonies. For, as

earlier stated, there was no intelligent and knowing waiver on their part of their
constitutional right against self-incrimination.
Accordingly, and for other reasons well stated in the main separate concurring
opinions, I vote to dismiss the petitions.
ALAMPAY, J., concurring:
I vote for the dismissal of the petition in these consolidated cases.
What appears to be the basic and principal issue to which the consideration of the
Court is addressed to is the singular question of whether testimonies adduced by the
private respondents before the Ad Hoc Agrava Fact Finding Board and sought to be
introduced against them in the Sandiganbayan wherein they have been accused were
rightfully excluded as evidence against them.
I find untenable the insistence of the petitioner Tanodbayan that the private
respondents should have claimed the right against self-incrimination before the said
Fact Finding Board and that having omitted doing so, the said privilege afforded to
them by law can no longer be invoked by them before the Sandiganbayan.
The right claimed by private respondents rests on the fundamental principle that no
person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself as so stated in our
Constitution and from the fact that Section 5 of P.D. 1886 disallows the use against
him of such testimony or any evidence produced by him before the said Fact Finding
Board, except for perjury. Petitioner argues however, that there was a waiver of this
right to self-incrimination when respondents proceeded to give their testimonies on
various dates before the Agrava Fact Finding Board without formally invoking on said
occasions their right against self-incrimination.
As private respondents could not have excused themselves from testifying before
said Board as clearly emphasized in the very first clause of Section 5 of P.D. 1886,
and as at that point of time, there was no reason for the declarant to anticipate or
speculate that there would be any criminal charge or any proceeding instituted
against them, it would therefore, be unnatural and illogical to expect that private
respondents would even contemplate the need of prefacing their declarations with an
invocation before the Fact Finding Board of their privilege against self-incrimination.
In fact for a declarant to announce his claim of the aforestated privilege prior to or
while testifying before said Fact Finding Board, would irresistibly create an inference
and convey an impression that said witness is burdened with his own awareness that
he stands already incriminated in some wrong. To insist therefore, even in the
absence yet of any proceeding against him, that the witness invoke the said privilege
before the Agrava Fact Finding Board, would be obviously self-demeaning. Such an
effect could not have been intended by Section 5 of P.D. 1886, which was even
meant to grant to the witness a benefit rather than a burden. It is more reasonable
64
therefore, to conclude that the privilege against self-incrimination would be accorded
to said witness after he has invoked the same in a subsequent proceeding wherein he
has been charged of a wrong doing, except in a case for perjury. It is only at such
time when the necessity of invoking the mantle of the privilege or the immunity
afforded to him by law would arise.
It cannot also be rightfully concluded that private respondents had intentionally
relinquished or abandoned the said right which they claimed before the
Sandiganbayan. The fact that the issue of when and before what forum should such
claim to the right against self-incrimination be necessarily presented has provoked
much discussion and debate because of divergent views. This has even prompted the
submissions to the Court of opinions of amicus curiae or friends of the court as to how
Section 5 of Presidential Decree 1886 should be construed and applied which are
however different from and contrary to the views expressed by the Justices of the
Sandiganbayan and other legal luminaries. These conflicting views negate the
proposition that there was an effective waiver made by the private respondents of
their rights.
It has earlier been stated by this Court that to be effective, such waiver must be
certain and unequivocal and intelligently, understandably and willingly made. (Chavez
vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 24 SCRA 663). In the same cited case, it has been stated
that courts indulge in every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental
constitutional rights and that we do not presume acquiescence in the loss of
fundamental rights (Citing Johnson vs. Zerbst 304 U.S. 458, 464, 82 L. ed. 1461,
1466). Furthermore, whether the alleged waiver is express or implied, it must be
intentional. (Davison vs. Klaess 20 N.E. 2d. 744, 748, 280 N.Y. 252; 92 CJS, 1058).
I find it difficult to accept that private respondents had at any time, ever intended to
relinquish or abandon their right against self-incrimination.
PATAJO, J., concurring:
I vote for the dismissal of the petition in these consolidated cases. Said petitions do
not merit being given due course and should be dismissed outright.
I hold the view that the testimonies and evidence given before the Agrava Board are
inadmissible as evidence against those who testified or gave said evidence
irrespective of whether said persons were subpoenaed or invited. I believe it is not a
condition sine quo non to the non-admissibility of said evidence that at the time they
testified or gave evidence before the Agrava Board that they had invoked their
privilege against self-incrimination.
The Agrava Board was created as an independent ad hoc fact finding board to
determine all the facts and circumstances surrounding the assassination of former
Senator Benigno S. Aquino, Jr. on August 21, 1983. It was given plenary powers to
allow for a free, unlimited and exhaustive investigation into all the aspects of said
tragedy. It was given the power to issue subpoena or subpoena duces tecum and

"other compulsory processes" requiring the attendance and testimony of witnesses
and the production of any evidence relative to any matter under investigation by said
Board.
Those who have been subpoenaed to appear and testify or produce any documentary
evidence before the Board shall not be excused from testifying or presenting
evidence before said Board on the ground that their testimony or evidence may tend
to incriminate them or subject them to penalty or forfeiture. I believe an invitation from
the Board is as much a compulsory process 1 to appear and testify before the Board
as a subpoena and one receiving said invitation cannot also excuse himself from
appearing and testifying before the Board. Petitioners appear to share this view when
they said in subparagraph (c), paragraph 7 of their petition in G.R. No. L-71208-09.
(c) People were either invited or issued subpoenas, depending
upon their rank and office, to give testimony before the Board and
among those invited were respondents General Fabian C. Ver and
Major General Olivas while the rest of the military respondents were
issued subpoenas.
Unquestionably, it was the intention of the decree creating the Board to investigate
the Aquino assassination to encourage all who have some information on any "aspect
of said tragedy" to furnish the Board said information whether they are subpoenaed or
issued other forms of compulsory process such as an invitation and to do so without
fear that what they will say may be used against them. It is in this context that Section
5 of PD No. 1886 should be viewed. When they testified before the Board, they were
given full assurance that whatever they say before the Board will not be used against
them. Only if they testify falsely that they may be prosecuted for perjury. This is to
prevent people from preventing the Board from finding out the truth about the Aquino
assassination by giving false leads or information for ulterior reasons.
Actually Section 5 of PD No. 1886 falls under that category of statutes which do not
pronounce an entire immunity by forbidding punishment or prosecution for any
testimony or evidence given in connection with the investigation of certain offenses
more widely known as immunity statutes, but merely prohibit in any criminal
prosecution the use of the testimony of the witness. Immunity statutes as well as
statutes prohibiting the use of testimony in any subsequent criminal prosecution have
been the expedients resorted for the investigation of many offenses, chiefly those
whose proof or punishment were otherwise impracticable because of the implication
in the offense itself of all who could bear useful testimony.
The expediency and practical utility of this mode of obtaining
evidence may as a measure of legislation, be open to argument.
But the tradition of it as a lawful method of annulling the privilege
against self-incrimination is unquestioned in English history." ignore
on Evidence, Vol. III, p. 469.
65
Speaking of this kind of privilege of non-admission of testimony given by the witness
in subsequent prosecutions as allowed by the common law and modified by
subsequent statutes, State vs. Quarles 13 Ark 307, 311, said:
The privilege in question, in its greatest scope, as allowed by the
common law and no one, be he witness or accused, can pretend to
claim it beyond its scope at the common law never did contemplate
that the witness might not be proved guilty of the very crime about
which he may be called to testify; but only that the witness should
not be compelled to produce the evidence to prove himself guilty of
that crime. His privilege, therefore, was not an exemption from the
consequences of a crime that he might have committed; but only an
exemption from the necessity of himself producing the evidence to
establish his own crime ... So long as it might be lawful to produce
in evidence against an accused party whatever he might before
have voluntarily said as a witness on a prosecution against another,
there were no means by which the privilege could be made
available short of a claim by the witness to be silent; and as that
was the rule of the common law, this was the common-law mode of
making the privilege available. And that silence was but a mode of
making the privilege available, and was not of the essence of the
privilege itself, is conclusively proven by all that current of
enlightened authority, to which we yield our fullest assent, which
holds that the privilege has ceased when the crime has been
pardoned, when the witness has been tried and acquitted, or is
adjudged guilty, or when the prosecution, to which he was exposed,
has been barred by lapse of time ... But the Legislature has so
changed the common-law rule, by the enactment in question in the
substitution of a rule that the testimony required to be given by the
act, shall never be used against the witness for the purpose of
procuring his conviction for the crime or misdemeanor to which it
relates, that it is no longer necessary for him to claim his privilege
as to such testimony, in order to prevent its being afterwards used
against him. And the only question that can possibly arise under the
present state of the law, as applicable to the case now before us, is
as to whether our statutory regulations afford sufficient protection to
the witness, responsive to this new rule and to his constitutional
guarantee against compulsory self-accusation ...
Considering the objectives sought to be achieved by PD No. 1886 the provision
thereof making testimony and evidence given before the Board inadmissible in
evidence against the ones giving the same, provides protection beyond that granted
by the Constitutional provision against self- incrimination, otherwise it will be
constitutionally suspect. Counselman vs. Hitchcock, 142 US 547, 35 L Ed 1110.
Of relevance are the observations of the District Court, N.D. Illinois, in United States
vs. Armour & Co., 112 Fed 808, 821, 822:

All of these immunity acts are relied upon by the individual
defendants, and, while expressed in, slightly varying language, they
all mean the same thing, and each of them is a substitute for the
privilege contained in that clause of the fifth amendment to the
Constitution, reading:
'Nor shall any person be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself.'
This fifth amendment deals with one of the most cherished rights of
the American citizen, and has been construed by the courts to
mean that the witness shall have the right to remain silent when
questioned upon any subject where the answer would tend to
incriminate him. Congress by the immunity laws in question, and by
each of them, has taken away the privilege contained in the
amended it is conceded in argument that this cannot be done
without giving to the citizen by way of immunity something as broad
and valuable as the privilege thus destroyed We are not without
authority on this question. By a previous act, Congress undertook to
take away the constitutional privilege by giving the citizen an
equivalent, and the Supreme Court held in the case of Counselman
v. Hitchcock 142 U.S. 547, 12 Sup. Ct. 195, 35 I Ed., 1110, that the
substitution so given was not an equivalent. Then, at various times,
the immunity acts in question were passed by Congress with full
knowledge that in furnishing a substitute for this great right of the
citizen, it must give something as broad as the privilege taken
away. It might be broader, but it could not be narrower.
Now, in my judgment, the immunity law is broader than the privilege
given by the fifth amendment, which the act was intended to
substitute. The privilege of the amendment permits a refusal to
answer. The act wipes out the offense about which the witness
might have refused to answer. The privilege permits a refusal only
as to incriminating evidence. The act gives immunity for evidence of
or concerning the matter covered by the incident and the evidence
need not be self-incriminating. The privilege must be personally
claimed by the witness at the time. The immunity flows to the
witness by action of law and without any claim on his part. Brown v.
Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 16 Sup. Ct. 644, 40 L. Ed. 819; Hale vs.
Henkel (recently decided) 26 Sup. Ct. 370, 50 L. Ed. -; State v.
Quarles 13 Ark. 307, quoted in 142 U.S. 567, 12 Sup. Ct. 199 (35 L.
Ed. 1110); People Sharp, 107 N.Y. 427, 14 N.E. 319, 1 Am. St.
Rep. 851; Brown v. Walker approved in Lamson v. Boyden, 160
I11. 613, 620, 621, 43 N.E. 781: People v. Butler, St. Foundry, 201
I11. 236, 248, 66 N.E. 349.
I am further of opinion that the immunity given by the act must be
as broad as the liabilities imposed by the act. The act calls upon the
66
citizen to answer any 'lawful requirement' of the Commissioner.
'Require' means to ask of right and by authority. Webster's
Dictionary. Tenn. Coal Co. v. Saller (C.C.) 37 Fed. 545, 547.
Anything is a requirement by a public officer which brings home to
the person called upon that the officer is there officially and desires
compliance. 'Demand' and' require' are synonymous. Miller v.
Davis, 88 Me. 454, 34 Atl. 265. The citizen may be punished for
refusal to answer such lawful requirement. I am of opinion that
when the Commissioner of Corporations, who has power to compel,
makes his demand, it is the duty of the witness to obey.
The contention has been made that in order to get immunity the
citizen shall wait until the compulsion becomes irresistible. That is
the effect of the government contention. I am not able to bring my
mind to accept that doctrine. If I am right in saying that immunity
flows from the law l, without any claim on the part of the defendant
and at different times that has been conceded here in argument
then no act of any kind on his part which amounts to a claim of
immunity, which amounts to setting up a claim of immunity is
demanded by the law. The law never puts a premium on
contumacy. A person does not become a favored citizen by
resistance to a lawful requirement. On the contrary, the policy of the
law favors the willing giving of evidence whenever an officer entitled
to make a demand makes it upon a citizen who has no right to
refuse. And it would be absurd and un-American to favor the citizen
who resists and places obstacles in the way of the government as
against the citizen who, with a full knowledge of the law, obeys
without resistance the demand of an officer who has the legal right
to make the demand for something which the citizen has no legal
right to refuse. This, then, is the proposition to which we are led.
When an officer, who has a legal right to make a demand, makes
such demand upon a citizen who has no legal light to refuse, and
that citizen answers under such conditions, he answers under
compulsion of the law.
There is no merit then to the contention that private respondents should be invoked
the privilege against self-incrimination before the Agrava Board for precisely PD No.
1886 had explicitly provided that the testimony of those who testified before the Board
can not be used against them. It will be a meaningless act of supererogation to
require that said witnesses before answering any question addressed to them must
invoke their privilege against self-incrimination. The phrase "after having invoked his
privilege against self-incrimination" in Section 5 of PD No. 1886 to be consistent with
the intention of said decree, should refer to the time that the testimony of the witness
will be used against him in another proceeding, such as the cases now pending
before the Sandiganbayan. It could not refer to the proceedings before the Agrava
Board because no one is being accused before said Board and no matter how self-
incriminating the testimony of said witness is, he runs no risk of being prejudiced,
much less convicted by the Agrava Board. It is in the prosecution of cases based on

the report of said Board that the witness should invoke his right against self-
incrimination. These private respondents did just that when they moved for the
exclusion in evidence of their statement before the Agrava Board. Any other
interpretation would defeat the very purpose of PD No. 1886.
TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting:
The majority decision is based on erroneous premises, viz. what the case at bar
presents a "novel question;" that "this Court has not been previously called upon to
rule on issues involving immunity statute" and is burdened with the monumental task"
of "laying the criteria ... (to) build future jurisprudence on a heretofore unexplored area
of judicial inquiry." 1 The fact is that we have a wealth of settled jurisprudence and
precedents, Philippine and foreign, that control the determination of the simple issue
at bar and call for the setting aside of the exclusion order issued by respondent court
(Sandiganbayan) which wrongly rules as totally and absolutely inadmissible the
testimonies given by private respondents General Ver and Olivas and their six co-
respondents (all charged as accessories) as well as all the documents, records and
other evidence produced by them before the Fact-Finding Board, notwithstanding that
all were represented by counsel 2 and none of them invoked the privilege or right
against self- incrimination or made any claim or objection at the time of his testimony
before the Board that any question propounded to him and which he willingly
answered called for an incriminating answer against himself.
The following vital considerations based on settled jurisprudence and precedents
show that respondent court acted with gross error and misconception of the
applicable principles of the right against self-incrimination:
1. Respondent court grossly disregarded the settled guidelines laid down for trial
courts by this Court of Appeal vs. Paylo 3 thru Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, speaking for a
unanimous Court, Chat
By so doing [ordering the exclusion of the proferred confessions of
the two accused upon a ground not raised by counsel but motu
proprio by the trial court, i.e. lack of independent proof of
conspiracy] the [trial] court overlooked that the right to objection is a
mere privilege which the parties may waive; and if the ground for
objection is known and not seasonably made, the objection is
deemed waived and the [trial] court has no power, on its own
motion, to disregard the evidence (Marella vs. Reyes, 12 Phil. 1) ...
Suffice it to say that the lower court should have allowed such
confessions to be given in evidence at least as against the parties
who made them, and admit the same conditionally to establish
conspiracy, in order to give the prosecution a chance to get into the
record all the relevant evidence at its disposal to probe the charges.
At any rate, in the final determination and consideration of the case,
the trial court should be able to distinguish the admissible from the
67
inadmissible, and reject what, under the rules of evidence, should
be excluded.
Trial courts should be liberal in the matter of admission of proof and avoid the
premature and precipitate exclusion of evidence on doubtful objections to its
admissibility, citing the Court's long-standing basic ruling and policy in Prats & Co. vs.
Phoenix Ins. Co. 4 that reception and admission of evidence objected to on doubtful or
technical grounds is ultimately the less harmful course to either litigant, since the
Supreme Court upon appeal would then have all the materials before it necessary to
make a correct judgment (instead of returning the case for a new trial which only
prolongs the determination of the case); and
There is greater reason to adhere to such policy in criminal cases
where questions arise as to admissibility of evidence for the
prosecution, for the unjustified exclusion of evidence may lead to
the erroneous acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the
charges, from which the People can no longer appeal 5
2. The right against self-incrimination is found in the first sentence of section 20 of the
Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution stating that "No person shall be compelled to be
a witness against himself." This single sentence constituted the whole text of section
18 of the Bill of Rights of the 19,7,5 Constitution. This right against self-incrimination
has a settled meaning in jurisprudence which is fully applicable here since the right
against self-incrimination was first enforced here as an inviolable rule" in U.S.
President McKinley's instructions under date of April 7, 1900 to the Taft
Commission. 6 As recounted by the late Mr. Justice Conrado Sanchez as ponente for
a unanimous Court in the leading 1968 case of Chavez vs. Court of Appeals 7, "Mr.
Justice Malcolm, in expressive language, tells us that this maxim was recognized in
England in the early days 'in a revolt against the thumbscrew and the rack.' An old
Philippine case [1904] speaks of this constitutional injunction as 'older than the
Government of the United States;' as having 'its origin in a protest against the
inquisitorial methods of interrogating the accused person;' and as having been
adopted in the Philippines 'to wipe out such practices as formerly prevailed in these
Islands of requiring accused persons to submit to judicial examinations, and to give
testimony regarding the offenses will which they were charged.' " But Mr. Justice
Sanchez equally stressed that "(an) accused occupies a different tier of protection
from an ordinary witness. Whereas an ordinary witness may be compelled to take the
witness stand and claim the privilege as each question requiring an incriminating
answer is shot at him, 8 an accused may altogether refuse to take the witness stand
and refuse to answer any and all questions." 9
As restated by Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes for a unanimous Court in Suarez vs.
Tengco, 10 "No legal impediment exists against a litigant calling any of the adverse
parties to be his witness. ... True, an accused in a criminal case may not be
compelled to testify, or to so much as utter a word, even for his own defense (U.S. vs,
Junio, 1 Phil. 50; U.S. vs. Luzon, 4 Phil. 344: U.S. vs. Binayoh 35 Phil. 23; Sec. l(c),
Rule 111, Rules of Court). But while the constitutional guaranty against self-
incrimination protects a person in all types of cases, be they criminal, civil, or

administrative (Art. 111, Sec. 1, No. 18, Phil. constitution: Bermudez vs. Castillo, 64
Phil, 483), said privilege in, proceedings other than a criminal case against him who
invokes it, is considered an option of refusal to answer incriminating question, and not
a prohibition of inquiry.
Except in criminal cases, there is no rule prohibiting a party litigant
from utilizing his adversary as witness. As a matter of fact, section
83 of Rule 123, Rules of Court expressly authorizes a party to call
an adverse party to the witness stand and interrogate him. This rule
is, of course, subject to the constitutional injunction not to compel
any person to testify against himself. But it is established that the
privilege against self-incrimination must be invoked at the proper
time, and the proper time to invoke it is when a question calling for
a incriminating answer is propounded. This has to be so, because
before a question is asked there would be no way of telling whether
the information to be elicited from the witness is self-incriminating or
not. As stated in Jones on Evidence (Vol. 6, pp. 4926-4927), a
person who has been summoned to testify 'cannot decline to
appear, nor can he decline to be sworn as a witness' and 'no claim
of privilege can be made until a question calling for a incriminating
answer is asked, at that time, and, generally speaking, at that time
only, the claim of privilege may properly be interposed.' (Gonzales
vs. Sec. of Labor, L-6409, February 5, 1954, 11 cit. in Navarro,
Criminal Procedure, p. 302.)'
Suarez was cited with favor and reaffirmed in Bagadiong vs. Gonzales, 12 wherein
once again the Court, with the concurrence in the result of the now Chief Justice,
under similar facts held that the petitioner (provincial treasurer) could not refuse to
take the stand as an adverse party in a civil case since the privilege against self-
incrimination "in proceedings other than a criminal case against him who invokes it, is
considered an option to refuse to answer incriminating questions, and not a
prohibition of inquiry" and "must be invoked when a question calling for an
incriminating answer is propounded, because before a question is asked, there would
be no way of telling whether the information to be elicited from the witness is self-
incriminating or not." The Court therein denied "the petition to prohibit respondent
judge from directing petitioner to take the witness stand and testify ... without
prejudice to petitioner's properly invoking the guaranty against self-incrimination when
questions are propounded to him on the stand. Costs against the petitioner."
3. All the respondents at bar were in this category of ordinary witnesses in the
hearings of the Fact-Finding Board. They were not accused in any criminal case nor
were they persons under custodial interrogation who under the second part of section
20 of the Bill of Rights (consisting of three additional sentences 13) were given
additional rights to silence and counsel and to be informed of such rights and to the
out-lawing of any confession obtained in violation of the rights guaranteed in the cited
section, by virtue of the incorporation into the Bill of Rights of the rights granted in the
rulings of the U.S. Supreme Court in the Miranda-Escobedo cases. As noted by
former Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando, "(I)t amounts to an acceptance of the
68
applicability in this jurisdiction of the epochal American Supreme Court decision
in Miranda vs. Arizona, the opinion being rendered by Chief Justice Warren. It is thus
now a part of our fundamental law. Such doctrine was promulgated in response to the
question of the admissibility of statements obtained from an individual interrogated
under police custody, considering that such a time and under the stress of such
conditions, his right against self-incrimination could be rendered futile." 14 The Miranda
pronouncements thus became necessarily a part and parcel of the additional rights
granted in the cited section 20, as made by the late U.S. Chief Justice Warren in the
Miranda case thus: "The prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or
inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it
demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege
against self-incrimination. By custodial interrogation we mean questioning initiated by
law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise
deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. " 15 These additional Miranda
rights could not be invoked by respondents, as the members of the Fact-Finding
Board were not law enforcement officers nor were respondents under custodial
interrogation.
As ordinary witnesses before the Fact-Finding Board and under the settled
jurisprudence above-cited, they could not invoke the right to silence and refuse to
take the witness stand. Their right and privilege (which is not self-executory or
automatic ipso jure) was, while testifying, whether voluntarily or by subpoena, to
invoke the privilege and refuse to answer as and when a question calling for an
incriminating answer is propounded. Failure to invoke the privilege which is personal
does automatically result in its loss ipso facto. The law, usage and settled
jurisprudence uniformly require that the privilege must be asserted or else is lost. The
court or board upon its invocation still has to pass upon and rule upon the proper
application of the privilege. As restated by Francisco, the rule and exceptions are:
"Certainly, where the witness, on oath declares his belief that the answer to the
question would criminate or tend to criminate him, the court cannot compel him to
answer, unless it is clear perfectly, from a careful consideration of all the
circumstances of the case, that the witness is mistaken, or is acting in bad faith, and
that the answer cannot possibly have any such tendency. " 16
4. The view that withal, it is best, although not required, that a warning to the witness
of his option to refuse an answer to incriminating questions as advanced even by the
Tanodbayan at the hearing dates back to a century ago and has been long discarded
as "witnesses are usually well enough advised beforehand by counsel as to their
rights when such issues impend" and "as general knowledge spread among the
masses and the preparation for testimony became more thorough." Thus, "ignore, the
bible on the law of evidence so remarks and adds that "there is no reason for letting a
wholesome custom degenerate into a technical rule." —
It is plausible to argue that the witness should be warned and
notified, when a incriminating fact is inquired about, that he has an
option to refuse an answer; and this view was often insisted upon, a
century ago, by leaders at the Bar,

xxx xxx xxx
But there are opposing considerations. In the first place, such a
warning would be an anomaly; it is not given for any other privilege;
witnesses are in other respects supposed to know their rights; and
why not here? In the next place, it is not called for by principle,
since, until the witness refuses, it can hardly be said that he is
compelled to answer; nor is it material that he believes himself
compelled; for the Court's action, and not the witness' state of mind,
must be the test of compulsion. Again, the question can at any rate
only be one of judicial propriety of conduct, for no one supposes
that an answer given under such an erroneous belief should be
struck out for lack of the warning. Finally, in practical convenience,
there is no demand for such rule; witnesses are usually well enough
advised beforehand by counsel as to their rights when such issues
impend, and judges are too much concerned with other
responsibilities to be burdened with the provision of individual
witnesses' knowledge; the risk of their being in ignorance should fall
rather upon the party summoning than the party opposing.
Nevertheless, it is plain that the old practice was to give such a
warning, when it appeared to be needed. But, as general
knowledge spread among the masses, and the preparation for
testimony became more thorough, this practice seems to have
disappeared in England, so far at least as any general rule was
concerned.
In the United States, both the rule and the trial custom vary in the
different jurisdictions. No doubt a capable and painstaking judge will
give the warning, where need appears, but there is no reason for
letting a wholesome custom degenerate into a technical rule. 17
But from the environmental facts and circumstances of the Fact-Finding Board
hearings, to require such a warning to the witness of his option of refusal to answer
incriminatory questions would have been an exercise in absurdity and futility, As is a
matter of public knowledge, respondents had concluded in their investigation that
Galman was the assassin of the late Senator Aquino. As observed by former Senator
Ambrosio Padilla as amicus curiae at the hearing on the merits of August 15, 1985,
they were all too eager to testify and make a strong effort to gain support from the
Fact-Finding Board and the public for the military version and report that the assassin
was Galman who was forthwith gunned down by the military escorts and guards at
the tarmac. It would have been ridiculous, if not bordering on officiousness and
impropriety, to warn them as the highest ranking military officers of their option of
refusal to answer incriminatory questions and also as the majority holds, 18 of their
right to remain silent. When respondents generals appeared before the Board,
respondent Ver precisely made the opening statement that
69
GENERAL VER:
I welcome this opportunity, Madame Justice,
members of this Honorable Board, Dean,
Gentlemen this opportunity to assist ... this
Honorable Board in the quest for truth and
justice, We all deplore this tragic incident which is
now the subject of inquiry, This Board, this
Honorable Board is mandated to conduct a free,
full and exhaustive investigation into the matter
under investigation We all hope that my
testimony, madame, will somehow dispel any
misconception, or any misinformation
surrounding this tragic incident. I am now ready
to answer your questions.
JUSTICE AGRAVA:
Now, General, at the outset, we give the right and
the privilege for every witness to be assisted by
counsel Do you have your counsel with you this
morning?
GENERAL VER:
I did not bring any counsel, madame, but ... if I
need a counsel, madame, I could probably look
for... probably ...
JUSTICE AGRAVA:
Yes?
GENERAL VER:
I may call Fiscal Parena or the Public
Coordinator. I was talking to Atty. Tan to assist
me, in the protection of my constitutional rights ...
JUSTICE AGRAVA:
Yes.
GENERAL VER:

... if it is necessary:
ATTY. TAN:
Your Honor, please, it is part of the function of
this office to help the witness if he doesn't have
counsel, and so, if the General is willing to have
me, I will happily serve as counsel, Your Honor.
JUSTICE AGRAVA:
All right.
GENERAL VER:
Thank you. 19
Respondent Olivas likewise testified before the Board in response to its invitation to
assist it in determining the true facts and circumstances surrounding the double
killing.
6. The majority decision would go around this by asserting without basis in the record
that "(A)ll the private respondents, except Generals Ver and Olivas, are members of
the military contingent that escorted Sen. Aquino while embarking from the plane that
brought him home to Manila on that fateful day. Being at the scene of the crime as
such, they were among the first line of suspects in the subject assassination. General
Ver on the other hand, being the highest military authority of his co-petitioners labored
under the same suspicion and so with General Olivas, the first designated investigator
of the tragedy, but whom others suspected, felt and believed to have bungled the
case. The papers, especially the foreign media, and rumors from ugly wagging
tongues, all point to them as having, in one way or another participated or have
something to do, in the alleged conspiracy that brought about the assassination.
Could there still be any doubt then that their being asked to testify, was to determine
whether they were really conspirators and if so, the extent of their participation in the
said conspiracy?" In fact, the respondent court's decision and separate opinions as
well as the majority decision at bar and the separate concurring opinions all fail to
specify the particular portions of the testimonies of respondents or any specific
question and answer that can be in any way deemed to be self-incriminating. Indeed,
even if we assumed arguendo that they were warned of their right against self-
incrimination and tried absurdly to invoke the same, there is no specific question and
answer by way of testimony that could be pointed to them as having been made
under compulsion for the simple reason that their testimony was in full support of their
own military report that Galman was Aquino's killer and for which they were trying to
gain the Board's acceptance. In the all too brief and inadequate deliberations held on
August 20 and 21, 1985 after the hearing on the merits of August 15, 1985, without
reaching a definite conclusion, the ponente reported and I share this view from a
70
cursory examination, for want of material time, of the excluded testimonies only since
the excluded documents, records and other evidence produced by them were not
before the Court that there is nothing in the excluded testimonies that could in any
way be deemed self-incriminatory perse. So there would be no legal basis whatever
for their exclusion. But the ponente circulated only last August 26th at noon his draft
for dismissal of the petitions which were filed only last month. And its release has
been set for August 30th.
7. There has not been enough time to weigh and ponder on the far-reaching
consequences of the decision at bar. The decision orders the total and unqualified
exclusion of the testimonies and evidence produced before the Fact-Finding Board by
the eight respondents charged as accessories "even though (they) failed to claim
(their) privilege before giving the incriminating testimony" (citing 21 Am. Jur. 2d. 218).
But the cited compilation of American State and Federal Law expressly cautions that
"The question whether a witness must claim exemption . on from self-incrimination to
be entitled to immunity from subsequent prosecution must in each case be
determined in the light of constitutional and statutory provisions in the jurisdiction
where the question arises" (21 Am. Jur. 2d. 151). It recites on the same cited page
that "Under a statute granting immunity to persons who have been compelled to
testify, one who has appeared voluntarily and testified without claiming his privilege
against self-incrimination or one who has appeared and testified pursuant to a void
subpoena or one addressed to another person, without claiming the privilege, cannot
say he has been compelled to testify, and therefore, he is not entitled to immunity."
And the necessity of claiming the privilege against self-incrimination before an
administrative officer or board such as the Fact Finding Board is recognized to be
essential, thus:
This is not only equally true as for the case of testimony in a judicial
trial, but the explicitness is here even more essential, and
particularly where the administrative officer makes a general
demand for documents or testimony upon a broad class of topics.
The reason is clear. The officer has testimonial powers to extract a
general mass of facts, or which some, many, or most will certainly
be innocent and unprivileged, some may be privileged
communications (e.g., between attorney and client) whose privilege
remains unaffected by the statute defining his powers, and some
may be privileged as self-incriminating but liable to become
demandable by overriding this privilege with a grant of immunity.
Among these mass of facts, then, the officer will seek those which
are relevant to his administrative inquiry; he cannot know which of
them fall within one or another privilege in particular, which of them
tend to criminate at all, or to criminate a particular person; if such
facts are there, he may not desire or be authorized to exercised the
option of granting immunity so as to obtain them; his primary
function and power is to obtain the relevant facts at large, and his
power to obtain a special and limited class of facts by grant of
immunity is only a secondary one, and one which he will not
exercise till a cause arises, if even then.

For these reasons of practical sense, then, as well as for the
inherent requirements of principle already noticed for judicial
officers, it is particularly true for an inquiry by an administrative
officer that the witness must explicitly claim his privilege, and
specifically the privilege against self- incrimination, and must then
be overridden in that claim, before immunity can take effect. (VII
Wigmore on Evidence, 2282, pp. 517-518)
The concurrence of Justice Vera Cruz sounds even more ominous thus:
I believe that where evidence is produced by a witness in
accordance with the conditions of the statute granting immunity
such as P.D. No. 1886, as amended, its immunity provisions attach
instantly and it is entirely immaterial what use the investigation
authority makes of it (People ex rel. Massarsky v. Adams, 47 N.Y.S.
2d 375, 62 N.E. 2d 244).
Consequently, the evidence, given before the Agrava Board by the
accused in the instant cases namely, Generals Fabian Ver and
Prospero Olivas, and Sergeants Pablo Martinez, Tomas
Fernandez, Leonardo Mojica, Pepito Torio, Prospero Bona and
Aniceto Acupido cannot be used against them and this proscription
did attach instantly when they testified before the same Board.
Verily, the prohibition stands, irrespective of the purpose for which
the prosecution would like to use this evidence.
The total and unqualified exclusion of the testimony and evidence granted by
respondent court and sustained by the majority decision herein refers expressly to the
eight respondents charged as accessories. Would not this unprecedented grant of
immunity and exclusion of testimony be now claimed by the rest of the twenty-two
accused charged as principals except for the lone civilian? As reported by the press,
respondent court has suspended its trial and placed the pressure on the Court to rush
its decision, as "(T)he so-called 'trial of the century' has been delayed since last week
on motion of the defense panel which had argued that the high court's decision on the
admissibility of Ver's testimonies was a vital prerequisite to the presentation of
witnesses for the defense. " 20 Would this not result in the People holding an empty
bag of excluded testimonies and evidence, since to all intents and purposes all
respondents-accused testified before the Fact-Finding Board? Would their
testimonies be inadmissible for purposes even of impeaching such testimony as they
may now give before respondent court? These ponderous questions need not
confront us had we but required respondent court to hew to the settled procedure and
doctrine of Yatco (supra, par. I hereof) of giving the prosecution a chance to get into
the record its relevant evidence until the final determination and consideration of the
case, for the unjustified exclusion of evidence of the prosecution may lead to the
erroneous acquittal of the accused or dismissal of the charges, from which the People
can no longer appeal.
71
8. The alleged "ambiguous phraseology" of section 5 of P.D. 1886 cited in respondent
court's questioned order and bolstered by the majority decision's "novel" conclusion
and ruling that the cited section quoted therein 21 requires a claim from the witness of
the privilege against self-incrimination but "forecloses under threat of contempt
proceedings [under section 4] against anyone who makes such a claim. But the
strong testimonial compulsion imposed by section 5 of P.D. 1886 viewed in the light,
of the actions provided in section 4, infringes upon the witness' right against self-
incrimination. As a rule, such infringement of the constitutional right renders
inoperative the testimonial compulsion, meaning, the witness cannot be compelled to
answer UNLESS a co-extensive protection in the form of IMMUNITY is offered.
Hence, under the oppressive compulsion of P.D. 1886, immunity must in fact be
offered to the witness before he can be required to answer, so as to safeguard his
sacred constitutional right. But in this case, the compulsion has already produced its
desired results the private respondents had all testified without offer of immunity.
Their constitutional rights are, therefore, in jeopardy. The only way to cure the law of
its unconstitutional effects is to construe it in the manner as if IMMUNITY had in fact
been offered. We hold, therefore, that in view of the potent sanctions imposed on the
refusal to testify or to answer questions under Sec. 4 of P.D. 1886, the testimonies
compelled thereby are deemed immunized under Section 5 of the same law. The
applicability of the immunity granted by P.D. 1886 cannot be made to depend on a
claim of the privilege against self-incrimination which the same law practically strips
away from the witness. " Emphasis supplied).
It bears emphasis that none of respondents made any such claim against self-
incrimination. The "oppressive compulsion" if it may be so-called, consists of a
maximum penalty of P200. fine and/or 30 days imprisonment for direct contempt. As
indicated, it would be ridiculous for any respondent to 1 make such claim when his
testimony was but in full support of their own military theory and report that Galman
killed Aquino.
The language of the cited section 22 is plain and simple. It excuses no one from
testifying and producing books and records but grants him immunity from prosecution
(except for perjury) after having invoked his privilege against self-incrimination " There
is nothing oppressive about such compulsion in exchange for immunity provided the
witness invokes his and aims his privilege a against self-incrimination.
In the Court's Resolution of July 9, 1985, Mr. Justice Aquino, voting to dismiss
outright the petitions. opined that The clause 'concerning which lie is compelled to
testify after having invoked his privilege against self-incrimination' is surplusage. It is
in conflict with the first clause which, as already stated, gives immunity to the witness
except in case of perjury. So, section 5 should be read as if that clause were not
there.This is contrary to the rules of statutory construction that there is no room for
construction when tile text is plain and simple, i.e. requires invocation and that the
provisions must be taken in context and all the words taken into account and given
their full meaning. The Anti-Gambling Law, Act No. 1757, enacted on October 9, 1907
by the Philippine Commission (probably the first Philippine immunity statute) granted
such absolute immunity and does not contain the conditional clause requiring that the

witness invoke his privilege against self-incrimination. Section 10 of the cited Act
reads:
Sec. 10. Upon any investigation or proceeding for violation of this
Act no person shall be excused from giving testimony upon the
ground that such testimony would tend to convict him of a crime,
but such testimony cannot be received against him upon any
criminal investigation or proceeding; Provided, however, That no
person so testifying shall be exempt from prosecution or
punishment for perjury committed in the course of any proceeding
or investigation had by virtue of [his Act. (1 CPS [Rev. Ed.], 190)
But when the statute grants conditional immunity (and not absolute as in the above-
quoted section 10 of the Anti-Gambling Act.), then it explicitly contains the cited
conditional clause in section 5 of P.D. 1886 granting immunity only when "he is
compelled to testify after having invoked his privilege against self-incrimination. "
This is but in accord with long-settled Philippine jurisprudence cited above (supra.
paragraph 2 hereof), that the witness has an option of refusal to answer incriminatory
questions, which he loses ipso facto if he does not invoke the privilege and
nevertheless answers the questions. Here, in review of the national and international
importance of the case with the country's very prestige at stake, the P.D. added the
incentive of offering immunity: "The purpose of immunity provisions is to aid
prosecuting officers by inducing criminals or their confederates to turn state's
evidence and tell on each other, to enable prosecuting officers to procure evidence
which would otherwise be denied to them because of the constitutional right against
self-incrimination, and at the same time to protect every person from gluing testimony
which directly or indirectly would be helpful to the prosecution in securing an
indictment or a conviction. The provisions for immunity are or should be as broad as
or co-extensive with the constitutional provisions granting the privilege against self-
incrimination." (21 Am. Jur. 2d. Criminal Law, sec. 148). It is bad enough that no
state's evidence turned up to tell on his confederates in exchange of immunity. But to
call the cited section " a booby trap for the unsuspecting or unwary witness" unless it
was construed as granting absolute and unconditional immunity from the very fact of
merely testifying as a witness before the Board without claiming immunity nor giving
any incriminatory information that would aid the state to determine the true facts
about Aquino's assassination would be a sell-out. It would make a shambles of the
letter and spirit as well as the salutary intent and objective of the Decree to ferret out
the truth and obtain state witnesses.
9. The truncated and distorted reading of the cited section 5 which consists of a single
integrated paragraph and splitting it into two isolated parts so as to allow the privilege
against self-incrimination (which was already lost for failure to claim it in the Board
hearings) to be resurrected and raised in a much later time frame and "subsequent
criminal proceeding" is against all usage and rules of statutory construction, not to
mention the long line of above-cited jurisprudence to the contrary. And if there still be
doubt, we need only reproduce hereunder the similar wording of Senate Joint
Resolution 137 (Public Law 88-202) after which section 5 of P.D. 1886 was patterned.
72
Said law was enacted by the U.S. Congress in December 1963 to empower the
Warren Commission to issue subpoenas requiring the testimony of witness and the
production of evidence relating to any matter under its investigation. The Report of
the President's Commission on the Assassination of President John F. Kennedy in its
foreword on page X stated that "In addition, the resolution authorized the Commission
to compel testimony from witnesses claiming the privilege against self-incrimination
under the fifth amendment to the U.S. Constitution by providing for the grant of
immunity to persons testifying under such compulsion." (Emphasis supplied). The
cited Public Law reads:
(e) No person shall be excused from attending and testifying or
from producing books, records, correspondence, documents, or
other evidence in obedience to a subpoena, on the ground that the
testimony or evidence required of him may tend to incriminate him
or subject him to a penalty or forfeiture but no individual shall be
prosecuted or subjected to any penalty or forfeiture (except
demotion or removal from office) for or on account of any
transaction matter, or thing concerning which he is compelled, after
having claimed his privilege against self-incrimination to testify or
produce evidence, except that such individual so testifying shall not
be exempt from prosecution and punishment for perjury committed
in so testifying. (Emphasis supplied).
10. As already indicated above, none of the respondents, public and private, has
indicated the specific portions of their testimony that they have been "oppressively
compelled" to glue, in alleged violation of their privilege against self-incrimination. The
reason for this is that they all testified voluntarily and eagerly to support the military
report and version that Galman killed Senator Aquino. The Board unanimously
rejected the military report and found that the killings were the product of criminal
conspiracy. A brief flashback is herein appropriate: Within 60 seconds from his being
led away by soldiers from his plane that had just landed at the Manila International
Airport on Sunday, August 21, 1983 at past one p.m., former Senator Benigno S.
Aquino, Jr. who was coming home after three years of self-exile in the U.S. laid dead
face down on the tarmac, with his brain smashed by a bullet fired point blank into the
back of his head by a murderous assassin. 23 Also lying dead on the tarmac, face up,
near the senator was another man, to be Identified much later as Rolando Galman,
whom the soldiers admittedly gunned down. The military pointed to him as Aquino's
assassin, who had somehow allegedly penetrated the air-tight security of close to
2000 men ringing the airport. The military version met with great public disbelief and
skepticism. The first fact-finding commission created under Administrative Order No.
469 dated August 24, 1983 and P.D. 1879 dated August 27, 1983 was the object of
several suits charging bias and that the President "had already prejudged the case,
by rejecting the version of foreign media that it is one of the soldiers, supposed to
guard Aquino, who fatally shot him." 24 The said commission was dissolved per P.D.
1886, dated October 14, 1983 (later amended by P.D. 1903 dated February 8, 1984)
which created the ad hoc Fact-Finding Board with plenary powers to investigate "the
treacherous and vicious assassination (which) has to all Filipinos become a national
tragedy and national shame ... (and) to determine the facts and circumstances

surrounding the killing and to allow for a free, unlimited and exhaustive investigation
into all the aspects of said tragedy." The Board after extensive hearings, submitted to
the President their majority report on October 24, 1984, while the chairman former
Court of Appeals Justice Corazon Agrava submitted her minority report one day
earlier on October 23, 1984. All five members of the Board unanimously rejected the
official military version that Galman was the assassin and instead found that there
was criminal conspiracy. Their main difference of opinion is that the four-member
majority found twenty-five military men (headed by respondents Generals Ver, Olivas
and Luther Custodia) and one civilian "indictable for the premeditated killing of
Senator Benigno S. Aquino, Jr. and Rolando Galman at the MIA on August 21, 1983."
The chairman's report confined the conspiracy to seven men headed by General
Custodia. The Tanodbayan, after conducting the preliminary investigation, adopted
the Board's majority report recommending the indictment of the accused as "involved
in this conspiracy, either as principals, upon the theory that the act of one is the act of
all, or as accessories, for attempting to hide the corpus of the offense." The eight
accessories so indicted are the private respondents herein named headed by
respondents Ver and Olivas. (The chairman in her minority report had found that
"(T)he indications are that the plotters had agreed that only one would be the
assassin; that the others can either point to Galman as the killer; or they can state
that they did not see the shooting; and that they will give false testimony to mislead
and confuse.
11. Only the former lawyers of the Fact-Finding Board created under P.D. No. 1886,
consisting of Messrs. Andres R. Narvasa, Bienvenido A. Tan, Jr., Mario E. Ongkiko
and Francisco A. Villa have given us the answer that there is nothing incriminatory per
se in the testimonies of the respondents, in the Memorandum submitted by them, to
wit:
I. The so-called 'Galman Theory that it was Rolando Galman who
killed Senator Aquino is either true or untrue, a matter the
SANDIGANBAYAN will have to resolve.
II. If the 'Galman Theory' be true as advocated by the military
officers concerned then the testimony of Ver, et al. is true. It is not
self-incriminatory. There would then be no reason to exclude it.
If, on the other hand, the theory be untrue as the prosecution in turn
advocates then the testimony of Ver, et al. is untrue. It is
incriminatory of them, because by giving it and thereby seeking to
hide the crime, they incriminated themselves. Withal there would
also be no reason to exclude it. Surely, after their plot to deceive
the Board had been exposed, they should not now be allowed to
use the law to bring about exclusion of the very proof of their
deception.
In short, the testimonies of respondents could only be deemed incriminating if it be
found that they sought thereby to hide or cover up the crime and thus incriminate
73
themselves, as accessories to the murder of Senator Aquino. The former Fact-Finding
Board lawyers amplify their theory, as follows:
5. The plain language of Section 5, PD 1886 precludes its interpretation as extending
immunity to all testimony or evidence produced before the Board in obedience to
subpoena regardless of whether the witness giving such evidence invokes the
privilege against self-incrimination or not. —
6. The fact is, the invocation by Ver, et al. of such right would have been self-
defeating first, it would have prevented them from presenting evidence in
substantiation of the 'Galman Theory,' which they wished the Board to accept; and
second, it might have exposed to some extent their real objective, which was to
deceive the Board.
7. It would have been incongruous for Ver, et al. to have claimed that their testimony
would incriminate them as accessories to the murder of Aquino when they were, by
testifying, actually in process of committing that precise crime, becoming accessories.
8. Neither PD 1886 nor the Constitution should be used as a shield for crime, fraud or
trickery.
9. The foregoing propositions were ignored by the SANDIGANBAYAN. Instead, with
all due respect, it has —
a. given Section 5, PD 1886 a strained construction not justified by
and contrary to its plain language;
b. given Section 20, Article IV, Constitution, a meaning at odds with
its plain terms and contrary to relevant decisions of this Honorable
Supreme Court; and
c. sanctioned the use of legal provisions to shield persons from
criminal liability arising from their perfidious testimony before the
Fact-Finding Board.
There is no legal ground nor justification for the exclusion order. It is for respondent
court, upon consideration of the evidence for the People, without any exclusion, and
of the evidence for the defense in due course, to render its verdict of guilty or not
guilty.
With a word of commendation for the former Fact-Finding Board lawyers and former
Senator Ambrosio Padilla and Atty. Ramon Gonzales, whose memoranda as amid
curiae, have been of great assistance, I vote, accordingly, to grant the petitions at bar
and to set aside the questioned exclusion order.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:
I vote to grant the Petitions and to reverse the ruling of the Sandiganbayan.
The resolution of the issue revolves around the interpretation to be given to Sec. 5 of
PD No. 1886, reading as follows:
SEC. 5. No person shall be excused from attending and testifying
or from producing books, records, correspondence, documents, or
other evidence in obedience to a subpoena issued by the Board on
the grounds that his testimony or the evidence required of him may
tend to incriminate him or subject him to penalty or forfeiture; but
his testimony or any evidence produced by him shall not be used
against him in connection with any transaction, matter, or thing
concerning which he is compelled, after having invoked his privilege
against self-incrimination, to testify or produce evidence, except
that such an individual so testifying shall not be exempt from
prosecution and punishment for perjury committed in so testifying,
nor shall he be exempt from demotion or removal from office.
(Emphasis supplied)
As I read the law, Section 5 does not require that the person testifying before the
Agrava Fact Finding Board (the Board, for short) shall first invoke the privilege against
self-incrimination. Under said statute it is obvious that he has no such privilege.
But what is the effect of the second part providing that his testimony or any evidence
produced by him shall not be used against him in connection with any transaction,
matter or thing concerning which he is compelled, after having invoked his privilege
against self-incrimination, to testify or produce evidence, except in case of perjury?
To my mind, the above portion does not grant to a person who has testified before the
Board absolute or total immunity. It should not operate as a shield against criminal
liability specially since, under Section 12 of the same Decree, the Board may initiate
the filing of the proper complaint if its finding so warrant. Thus,
SEC. 12. The findings of the Board shall be made public. Should
the findings warrant the prosecution of any person the Board may
initiate the filing of the proper complaint with the appropriate
government agency. ... (Emphasis supplied)
The inquiry before the Board was a general one. It was not directed against any
particular individual or individuals. Private respondents did not testify therein as
suspects or as accused persons. There should therefore be no hindrance to a
criminal prosecution.
74
It has been held that where an inquiry by a grand jury is a general
one and is not directed against a particular individual the fact that
on the basis of the information elicited, grounds for a criminal
prosecution may evolve against a witness, may not serve as a bar
to such prosecution (U.S. v. Okin D.C.N.J., 154 F. Supp. 553;
Benson v. Goldstein, 124 N.Y.S. 2d 452) even though he testified
before the grand jury without being warned of his constitutional
privileges against self- incrimination. (U.S. v. Okin supra)
(Emphasis supplied)
The right against self incrimination is not a prohibition of inquiry but an option of
refusal to answer incriminating questions Cabal vs. Kapunan, 6 SCRA 1059 [1962]).
The kernel of the privilege is testimonial compulsion. Whether or not any specific
portion of the testimonies of private respondents is incriminating should be
determined by the Sandiganbayan itself. The claim against self-incrimination should
be invoked when a specific question, which is incriminating in character, is put to a
witness in the subsequent proceeding. There should be no automatic "immunity bath"
of the entire testimony before the Board for immunity does not extend to such of the
evidence as is not privileged.
... But it is established that the privilege against self-incrimination
must be invoked at the proper time, and the proper time to invoke it
is when a question calling for an incriminating answer is
propounded. This has to be so, because before a question is asked
there would be no way of telling whether the information to be
elicited from the witness is self-incriminating or not. As stated in
Jones on Evidence (Vol. 6, pp. 4926-4927), a person who has been
summoned to testify 'cannot decline to appear, nor can be decline
to be sworn as a witness' and 'no claim or privilege can be made
until a question calling for a incriminating answer is asked; at that
time, and generally speaking, at that time only, the claim of privilege
may be interposed. (Gonzales vs. Sec. of Labor, et al., 94 Phil. 325,
326 [19541).
Moreover, the issue actually addresses itself to a question of admissibility or
competency of evidence and not to its credibility. Whether the evidence so admitted is
to be given any probative weight or credence is best addressed to the
Sandiganbayan. It should be recalled that the Board was not unanimous in its
assessment of the testimonies given.
There are additional considerations. While the right against self-incrimination is
indubitably one of the most fundamental of human rights, Section 5 of PD No. 1886
should be construed so as to effect a practical and beneficent purpose and not in
such a manner as to hinder or obstruct the administration of criminal justice.
... Any statute which, while it compels him to testify, protects the
witness if he does disclose the circumstances of his offense and the

sources from which or the means by which evidence of its
commission or of his connection with it may be obtained or made
effectual for his subsequent prosecution and conviction is sufficient
to comply with the constitutional requirements. Such a statute,
however should be construed to effect a practical and beneficent
purpose, namely, at the same time to secure the witness in his
constitutional rights and to permit the prosecuting officer to secure
evidence of a crime. It should not be construed so as to unduly
impede, hinder, or obstruct the administration of criminal
justice." Brown v. Walker 161 US 591, 16 Sup. Ct. 644, 40 L. Ed.
819. (People ex rel. Hunt vs. Lane, 116 N.Y.S. 990, 132 App. Div.
406)
The objective in all this exercise is to arrive at the truth. "Though the constitutional
provisions for the protection of one who appears ... must be liberally and fairly
applied, the interests of the people are also entitled to consideration" (Wharton's
Criminal Evidence, 11th Ed., Vol. 1, p. 609; People vs. Coyle 15 N.Y.S. 2d 441, 172
Mis 593). Specially so since, in the language of PD No. 1886 itself, the "treacherous
and vicious assassination of former Senator Benigno S. Aquino, Jr. on August 21,
1983, has to all Filipinos become a national tragedy and national shame. "
In the interest of eliciting the truth, the excluded testimonies should be admitted,
leaving it to the Sandiganbayan to determine which specific questions and answers
are to be excluded because they are incriminatory, and which should be given
credibility, in found to be competent and admissible.
RELOVA, J., dissenting:
The issue raised in these two petitions is whether the testimonies and other evidence
produced by the private respondents before the Agrava Board may be used as
evidence against them before the Sandiganbayan
Respondent Sandiganbayan rejected their testimonies on the ground that "under
statutes providing in substance that no person shall be excused from testifying or
furnishing evidence on the ground that the testimony or evidence may tend to
incriminate him, but that no person shall be subject to indictment or prosecution for
anything concerning which he may testify or furnish evidence, it has been held that
one who testifies concerning criminal offenses when required to do so is entitled to
immunity from prosecution even though he fails to claim his privilege before giving the
incriminating testimony (21 Am Jur 2d 218). He could not be required, in order to gain
the immunity which the law afforded, to go though the formality of an objection or
protest which, however made, would be useless (VIII Wigmore 516)." (p. 4,
Resolution of Sandiganbayan)
Section 5 of Presidential Decree No. 1886 provides that:
75
SEC. 5. No person shall be excused from attending and testifying
or from producing books, records, correspondence, documents, or
other evidence in obedience to a subpoena issued by the Board on
the ground that his testimony or the evidence required of him may
tend to incriminate him or subject him to penalty or forfeiture; but
his testimony or any evidence produced by him shall not be used
against him in connection with any transaction, matter or thing
concerning which he is compelled, after having invoked his privilege
against self- incrimination to testify or produce evidence ...
(Emphasis supplied.)
Pursuant to the above Presidential Decree no one can refuse to testify or furnish
evidence before the Fact Finding Board. However, his testimony or any evidence
produced shall not be used against him after he invoked the privilege against self-
incrimination. Stated differently, the privilege against self-incrimination must be
invoked when the question at the hearing before the Board, calling for an
incriminating answer is propounded; otherwise, before any question is asked of the
witness, he would not know whether the information to be elicited from him is
incriminating or not.
In the case of Gonzales vs. Secretary of Labor, et al., 94 Phil. 325, this Court held
that "the privilege against self-incrimination must be invoked at the proper time, and
the proper time to invoke it is when question calling for a incriminating answer is
propounded. This has to be so, because before a question is asked there would be
no way of telling whether the information to be elicited from the witness is self-
incriminating or not. As stated in Jones on Evidence (Vol. 6, pp. 4926-4927), a person
who has been summoned to testify 'cannot decline to appear, nor can he decline to
be sworn as a witness' and 'no claim of privilege can be made until a question calling
for a incriminating answer is asked; at that time, and generally speaking, at that time
only, the claim of privilege may properly be interposed.'" And, since it is a personal
right to be exercised only by the witness, this privilege against self-incrimination may
be waived by him and, when so waived, cannot thereafter be asserted. The privilege
is waived by his voluntary offer to testify by, answering questions without objecting
and/or claiming the privilege.
When private respondents gave testimonies before the Board they were not
defendants but witnesses invited and/or subpoenaed "to ventilate the truth thorougly
free, independent and dispassionate investigation." They could not refuse or withhold
answers to questions propounded to them unless the inquiry calls for an incriminating
answer and a timely objection is raised.
In the case at bar, since the private respondents answered questions from the Fact
Finding Board without claiming the privilege against self-incrimination they cannot
now be allowed to invoke the immunity clause provided in Section 5 of Presidential
Decree No. 1886.
I vote to grant the petitions.
76

Privilege Against Self-Incrimination
Bengzon, Jr. v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee
This is a petition for prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order and/or injuective relief, to enjoin the respondent Senate Blue Ribbon committee
from requiring the petitioners to testify and produce evidence at its inquiry into the
alleged sale of the equity of Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez to the Lopa Group in thirty-
six (36) or thirty-nine (39) corporations.
On 30 July 1987, the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Presidential
Commission on Good Government (PCGG), assisted by the Solicitor General, filed
with the Sandiganbayan Civil Case No. 0035 (PCGG Case No. 35) entitled "Republic
of the Philippines vs. Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez, et al.", for reconveyance,
reversion, accounting, restitution and damages.
The complaint was amended several times by impleading new defendants and/or
amplifying the allegations therein. Under the Second Amended Complaint, 1 the
herein petitioners were impleaded as party defendants.
The complaint insofar as pertinent to herein petitioners, as defendants, alleges
among others that:
14. Defendants Benjamin (Kokoy) Romualdez and Juliette Gomez
Romualdez, acting by themselves and/or in unlawful concert with
Defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos, and taking undue
advantage of their relationship, influence and connection with the latter
Defendant spouses, engaged in devices, schemes and strategems to
unjuestly enrigh themselves at the expense of Plaintiff and the Filipino
people, among others:
(a) Obatained, with the active collaboration of Defendants Sene J.
Gabaldon, Mario D. Camacho, Mamerto Nepomuceno, Carlos J.
Valdez, Cesar C. Zalamea and Francisco Tantuico, Atty. Jose
Bengzon, Jr. and his law partners, namely: Edilberto S. Narciso, Jr.,
Jose Vicente E. Jimenez, Amando V. Faustino, Jr., and Leonardo
C. Cruz; Jose S. Sandejas and his fellow senior managers of
FMMC/PNI Holdings groups of companies such as Leonardo
Gamboa, Vicente T. Mills, Jr., Jose M. Mantecon, Abelardo S.
Termulo, Rex C. Drilon II and Kurt Bachmann, Jr., control of some
of the biggest business enterprises in the Philippines, such as the
Manila Corporation (MERALCO), Benguet Consolidated and the
Philippine Commercial International Bank (PCI Bank) by employing
devious financial schemes and techniques calculated to require the
massive infusion and hemorrhage of government funds with
minimum or negligible "cashout" from Defendant Benjamin
Romualdez...
77
xxx xxx xxx
(m) manipulated, with the support, assistance and collaboration of
Philgurantee officials led by chairman Cesar E.A. Virata and the
Senior managers of FMMC/PNI Holdings, Inc. led by Jose S.
Sandejas, Jr., Jose M. Mantecom and Kurt S. Bachmann, Jr.,
among others, the formation of Erectors Holdings, Inc. without
infusing additional capital solely for the purpose of Erectors
Incorporated with Philguarantee in the amount of P527,387,440.71
with insufficient securities/collaterals just to enable Erectors Inc, to
appear viable and to borrow more capitals, so much so that its
obligation with Philgurantee has reached a total of more than P2
Billion as of June 30, 1987.
(n) at the onset of the present Administration and/or within the week
following the February 1986 People's Revolution, in conspiracy
with, supoort, assistance and collaboration of the abovenamed
lawyers of the Bengzon Law Offices, or specifically Defendants
Jose F.S. Bengzon, Jr., V.E. Jimenez, Amando V. Faustino, Jr.,
and Edilberto S. Narciso, Jr., manipulated, shcemed, and/or
executed a series of devices intended to conceal and place, and/or
for the purpose of concealing and placing, beyond the inquiry and
jurisdiction of the Presidential Commission on Good Government
(PCGG) herein Defendant's individual and collective funds,
properties, and assets subject of and/or suited int he instant
Complaint.
(o) manuevered, with the technical know-how and legalitic talents of
the FMMC senior manager and some of the Bengzon law partners,
such as Attys. Jose F.S. Bengzon, Jr., Edilberto S. Narciso, Jr.,
Amando V. Faustino, Jose Vicente E. Jimenez and Leonardo C.
Cruz, the purported sale of defendant Benjamin Romualdez's
interests in the (i) Professional Managers, (ii) A & E International
Corporation (A & E), (iii) First Manila Managerment Corporation
(FMMC), (iv) Philippine World Travel Inc. (PWTI) and its
subsidiaries consisting of 36 corporations in all, to PNI Holdings,
Inc. (wjose purported incorporations are all members of Atty. Jose
F.S. Bengzon's law firm) for only P5 million on March 3, 1986 or
three days after the creation of the Presidential Commission on
Good Government on February 28, 1986, for the sole purpose of
deceiving and preempting the Government, particularly the PCGG,
and making it appear that defendant Benjamin Romualdez had
already divested himself of his ownership of the same when in truth
and in fact, his interests are well intact and being protected by Atty.
Jose F.S. Bengzon, Jr. and some of his law partners, together with
the FMMC senior managers who still control and run the affiars of
said corporations, and in order to entice the PCGG to approve the

said fictitious sale, the above-named defendants offered P20 million
as "donation" to the Government;
(p) misused, with the connivance, support and technical assitance
of the Bengzon law firm represented by Atty. Jose F.S. Bengzon,
Jr. as legal counsel, together with defendants Cesar Zalamea,
Antonio Ozaeta, Mario D. Camacho amd Senen J. Gabaldon as
members of the Board of Directors of the Philippine Commercial
International bank (PCIB), the Meralco Pension Fund (Fund, for
short) in the amount of P25 million by cuasing it to be invested in
the PCIB and through the Bank's TSG, assigned to PCI
Development and PCI Equity at 50% each, the Fund's (a)
8,028.011 common shares in the Bank and (b) "Deposit in
Subscription" in the amount of P4,929.972.50 but of the agreed
consideration of P28 million for the said assignment, PCI
Development and PCI Equity were able to pay only P5,500.00
downpayment and the first amortization of P3,937,500.00 thus
prompting the Fund to rescind its assignment, and the consequent
reversion of the assigned brought the total shareholding of the Fund
to 11,470,555 voting shares or 36.8% of the voting stock of the
PCIB, and this development (which the defendants themselves
orchestrated or allowed to happen) was used by them as an excuse
for the unlawful dismantling or cancellation of the Fund's 10 million
shares for allegedly exceeding the 30-percent ceiling prescribed by
Section 12-B of the General Banking Act, although they know for a
fact that what the law declares as unlawful and void ab initio are the
subscriptions in excess of the 30% ceiling "to the extent of the
excess over any of the ceilings prescribed ..." and not the whole or
entire stockholding which they allowed to stay for six years (from
June 30, 1980 to March 24, 1986);
(q) cleverly hid behind the veil of corporate entity, through the use
of the names and managerial expertise of the FMMC senior
manager and lawyers identified as Jose B. Sandejas, Leonardo
Gamboa, Vicente T. Mills, Abelardo S, Termulo, Edilberto S.
Narciso, Jr., Jose M. Mantecon, Rex C. Drilon II, Kurt Bachmann,
Jr. together with the legal talents of corporate lawyers, such as
Attys. Jose F.S. Bengzon, Jr., Jose V.E. Jimenez, Amando V.
Faustino, Jr., and Leonardo C. Cruz, the ill-gotten wealth of
Benjamin T. Romualdez including, among others, the 6,229,177
shares in PCIB registered in the names of Trans Middle East Phils.
Equities, Inc. and Edilberto S. Narciso, Jr. which they refused to
surrender to PCGG despite their disclosure as they tried and
continue to exert efforts in getting hold of the same as well as the
shares in Benguet registered in the names of Palm Avenue
Holdings and Palm Avenue Realty Development Corp. purportedly
to be applied as payment for the claim of P70 million of a "merger
company of the First Manila Managerment Corp. group" supposedly
78
owned by them although the truth is that all the said firms are still
beneficially owned by defendants Benjamin Romualdez.
xxx xxx xxx
On 28 September 1988, petitioner (as defendants) filed their respective
answers. 2 Meanwhile, from 2 to 6 August 1988, conflicting reports on the
disposition by the PCGG of the "Romualdez corporations" were carried in
various metropolitan newspapers. Thus, one newspaper reported that the
Romuladez firms had not been sequestered because of the opposition of
certain PCGG officials who "had worked prviously as lawyers of the Marcos
crony firms." Another daily reported otherwise, while others declared that on
3 March 1986, or shortly after the EDSA February 1986 revolution, the
Romualdez companies" were sold for P5 million, without PCGG approval, to
a holding company controlled by Romualdez, and that Ricardo Lopa, the
President's brother-in-law, had effectively taken over the firms, even pending
negotiations for the purchase of the corporations, for the same price of P5
million which was reportedly way below the fair value of their assets. 3
On 13 September 1988, the Senate Minority Floor Leader, Hon. Juan Ponce Enrile delivered a speech "on a matter of personal
privilege" before the Senate on the alleged "take-over personal privilege" before the Senate on the alleged "take-over of SOLOIL
Incorporated, the flaship of the First Manila Management of Companies (FMMC) by Ricardo Lopa" and called upon "the Senate to
look into the possible violation of the law in the case, particularly with regard to Republic Act No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act." 4
On motion of Senator Orlando Mercado, the matter was referred by the Senate to the Committee on Accountability of Public Officers
(Blue Ribbon Committee). 5
Thereafter, the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee started its
investigation on the matter. Petitioners and Ricardo Lopa were subpoenaed
by the Committee to appear before it and testify on "what they know"
regarding the "sale of thirty-six (36) corporations belonging to Benjamin
"Kokoy" Romualdez."
At the hearing held on 23 May 1989, Ricardo Lopa declined to testify on the
ground that his testimony may "unduly prejudice" the defendants in Civil
Case No. 0035 before the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner Jose F.S. Bengzon, Jr.
likewise refused to testify involing his constitutional right to due process, and
averring that the publicity generated by respondents Committee's inquiry
could adversely affect his rights as well as those of the other petitioners who
are his co-defendants in Civil Case No. 0035 before the Sandiganbayan.
The Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, thereupon, suspended its inquiry and
directed the petitioners to file their memorandum on the constitutional issues
raised, after which, it issued a resolution 6 dated 5 June 1989 rejecting the
petitioner's plea to be excused from testifying, and the Committee voted to
pursue and continue its investigation of the matter. Senator Neptali Gonzales
dissented. 7
 79

and interlacing of funcstions and duties between the several

deaprtments, however, sometimes makes it hard to say just where
Claiming that the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee is poised to subpoena them and required their attendance and testimony in
the political excitement, the great landmarks of the Constitution are
proceedings before the Committee, in excess of its jurisdiction and legislative purpose, in clear and blatant disregard of their
apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated, in cases of
constitutional rights, and to their grave and irreparable damager, prejudice and injury, and that there is no appeal nor any other plain,
conflict, the judicial departments is the only constitutional organ
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the petitioners filed the present petition for prohibition with a prayer for
which can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of
temporary restraning order and/or injunctive relief.
powers between the several departments and among the integral or
constituent units thereof.

xxx xxx xxx

Meanwhile, one of the defendants in Civil Case No. 0035 before the Sandiganbayan, Jose S. Sandejas, filed with the Court of motion
for intervention, 8
which the Court granted in the resolution 9 of 21 December 1989,
and required the respondent Senate Blue Ribbon Committee to comment on
the petition in intervention. In compliance, therewith, respondent Senate Blue
Ribbon Committee filed its comment 10 thereon.
Before discussing the issues raised by petitioner and intervenor, we will first
tackle the jurisdictional question raised by the respondent Committee.
In its comment, respondent Committee claims that this court cannot properly
inquire into the motives of the lawmakers in conducting legislative
investigations, much less cna it enjoin the Congress or any its regular and
special commitees — like what petitioners seek — from making inquiries in
aid of legislation, under the doctrine of separation of powers, which obtaines
in our present system of government.
11
The contention is untenable. In Angara vs. Electoral Commission,
Court held:
The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system
of government. It obtains not hrough express provision but by
actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the
government has exclusive cognizance of matters wihtin its
jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does not
follow from the fact that the three powers are to be kept separate
and distinct that the Constitution intended them to be absolutely
unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has
provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure
coordination in the workings of the various departments of the
government...
xxx xxx xxx
But in the main, the Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes
and in bold lines, allotment of power to the executive, the legislative
and the judicial departments of the government. The ovelapping
The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is
to determine the nature, scope and extent of such powers? The
Constitution itself has provided for the instrumentality of the
judiciary as the rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to
allocate constitutional boundaries; it does not assert any superiority
over the other departments; it does not inr eality nullify or invalidate
an act of the legislature, but only asserts the solemn and sacred
obligation assigned to it by tyhe Constitution to determine
conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to
established for the parties in an actual controversy the rights which
that instrument secures and guarantess to them. This is in thruth all
that is involved in what is termed "judicial supremacy" which
properly is the power of judicial review under the Constitution. Even
the, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and
controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by
the parties, and limited further to the constitutional question raised
or the very lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could
the only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile
conclusions unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its function is in
this manner, the judiciary does not pass upon questions of wisdom,
justice or expediency of legislation. More thatn that, courts accord
the presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not
only because the legislature is presumed to abide by the
Constitution but also becuase the judiciary in the determination of
actual cases and controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice
of the people as expressed through their representatives in the
executive and legislative departments of the government.
The "allocation of constituional boundaries" is a task that this Court must
perfomr under the Constitution. Moreowever, as held in a recent
case, 12 "(t)he political question doctrine neither interposes an obstacle to
judicial determination of the rival claims. The jurisdiction to delimit
constitutional boundaries has been given to this Court. It cannot abdicate
that obligation mandated by the 1987 Constitution, although said provision
by no means does away with kthe applicability of the principle in appropriate
cases." 13
 80

be had to the speech or resolution under which such an inquiry is proposed

to be made.
The Court is thus of the considered view that it has jurisdiction over the present controversy for the purpose of determining the scope
and extent of the power of the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee to conduct inquiries into private affirs in purported aid of legislation. A perusal of the speech of Senator Enrile reveals that he (Senator Enrile)
made a statement which was published in various newspapers on 2
Coming to the specific issues raised in this case, petitioners contend that (1) the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee's inquiry has no
September 1988 accusing Mr. Ricardo "Baby" Lopa of "having taken over
valid legislative purpose, i.e., it is not done in aid of legislation; (2) the sale or disposition of hte Romualdez corporations is a "purely
the FMMC Group of Companies." As a consequence thereof, Mr. Lopa wrote
private transaction" which is beyond the power of the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee to inquire into; and (3) the inquiry violates their
a letter to Senator Enrile on 4 September 1988 categorically denying that he
right to due process.
had "taken over " the FMMC Group of Companies; that former PCGG
Chairman Ramon Diaz himself categorically stated in a telecast interview by
Mr. Luis Beltran on Channel 7 on 31 August 1988 that there has been no
takeover by him (Lopa); and that theses repeated allegations of a "takeover"
on his (Lopa's) part of FMMC are baseless as they are malicious.
The 1987 Constition expressly recognizes the power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation. 14
Thus, Section 21, Article VI thereof provides: The Lopa reply prompted Senator Enrile, during the session of the Senate
on 13 September 1988, to avail of the privilege hour, 17 so that he could
The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its repond to the said Lopa letter, and also to vindicate his reputation as a
respective committee may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in Member of the Senate of the Philippines, considering the claim of Mr. Lopa
accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of that his (Enrile's) charges that he (Lopa) had taken over the FMMC Group of
persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be Companies are "baseless" and "malicious." Thus, in his speech, 18Senator
respected. 15 Enrile said, among others, as follows:

Mr. President, I rise this afternnon on a matter of personal privilege;

the privilege being that I received, Mr. President, a letter dated
September 4, 1988, signed by Mr. ricardo A. Lopa, a.k.a. or Baby
The power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is not, therefore, absolute or unlimited. Its exercise is
Lopa, wherein he denied categorically that he has taken over the
circumscribed by the afore-quoted provision of the Constitution. Thus, as provided therein, the investigation must be "in aid of
First Manila Management Group of Companies which includes
legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure" and that "the rights of persons appearing in or affected by such
SOLOIL Incorporated.
inquiries shall be respected." It follows then that the rights of persons under the Bill of Rights must be respected, including the right to
due process and the right not to be compelled to testify against one's self.
xxx xxxx xxx
The power to conduct formal inquiries or investigations in specifically provided for in Sec. 1 of the Senate Rules of Procedure
Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation. Such inquiries may refer to the implementation or re-examination of any law or in
In answer to Mr. Lopa, I will quote pertinent portions from an Official
connection with any proposed legislation or the formulation of future legislation. They may also extend to any and all matters vested
Memorandum to the Presidential Commission of Good Government
by the Constitution in Congress and/or in the Seante alone.
written and signed by former Governor, now Congressman Jose
Ramirez, in his capacity as head of the PCGG Task Force for
Region VIII. In his memorandum dated July 3, 1986, then Governor
Ramirez stated that when he and the members of his task force
sought to serve a sequestration order on the management of
As held in Jean L. Arnault vs. Leon Nazareno, et al., 16
the inquiry, to be within the jurisdiction of SOLOIL in Tanauan, Leyte, management officials assured him that
the legislative body making it, must be material or necessary to the exervise relatives of the President of the Philippines were personally
of a power in it vested by the Constitution, such as to legislate or to expel a discussing and representing SOLOIL so that the order of
member. sequestration would be lifted and that the new owner was Mr.
Ricardo A. Lopa.
Under Sec. 4 of the aforementioned Rules, the Senate may refer to any
committee or committees any speech or resolution filed by any Senator I will quote the pertinent portions in the Ramire's memorandum.
which in tis judgment requires an appropriate inquiry in aid of legislation. In
order therefore to ascertain the character or nature of an inquiry, resort must

The first paragraph of the memorandum reads as follows and I
quote, Mr. President:
"Our sequestration work of SOLOIL in Tanauan, Leyte
was not heeded by management because they said
another representation was being made to this
Commission for the ventual lifting of our
sequestrationorder. They even assured us that Mr.
Ricardo Lopa and Peping Cojunangco were personally
discussing and representing SOLOIL, so the order of
sequestration will finally be lifted. While we attempted to
carry on our order, management refused to cooperate and
vehemently turned down our request to make available to
us the records of the company. In fact it was obviously
clear that they will meet us with forcethe moment we insist
on doing normally our assigned task. In view of the
impending threat, and to avoid any untoward incident we
decided to temporarily suspend our work until there is a
more categorical stand of this Commission in view of the
seemingly influential represetation being made by SOLOIL
for us not to continue our work."
Another pertinent portion of the same memorandum is paragraph
five, which reads as follows, and I quote Mr. President:
"The President, Mr. Gamboa, this is, I understand, the
President of SOLOIL, and the Plant Superintendent, Mr.
Jimenez including their chief counsel, Atty. Mandong
Mendiola are now saying that there have been divestment,
and that the new owner is now Mr. Ricardo Lopa who
according to them, is the brother-in-law of the President.
They even went further by telling us that even Peping
Cojuangco who we know is the brother of her excellency is
also interested in the ownership and management of
SOLOIL. When he demanded for supporting papers which
will indicate aforesaid divestment, Messrs. Gamboa,
Jimenez and Mendiola refused vehemently to submit
these papers to us, instead they said it will be submitted
directly to this Commission. To our mind their continuous
dropping of names is not good for this Commission and
even to the President if our dersire is to achieve
respectability and stability of the government."
The contents of the memorandum of then Governor and now
Congressman Jose Ramirez were personally confirmed by him in a
news interview last September 7, 1988.
81
xxx xxxx xxx
Also relevant to this case, Mr. President, is a letter of Mr. Ricardo
Lopa himself in August 11, 1988 issue of the
newspaper Malaya headlined "On Alleged Takeover of Romualdez
Firms."
Mr. Lopa states in the last paragraph of the published letter and I
quote him:
12. As of this writing, the sales agreement is under review
by the PCGG solely to determine the appropriate price.
The sale of these companies and our prior rigtht to
requires them have never been at issue.
Perhaps I could not make it any clearer to Mr. Lopa that I was not
really making baseless and malicious statements.
Senator Enrile concluded his privilege speech in the following tenor:
Mr. President, it may be worthwhile for the Senate to look into the
possible violation of the law in the case particularly with regard to
Republic Act No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
Section 5 of which reads as follows and I quote:
Sec. 5. Prohibition on certain relatives. — It shall be
unlawful for the spouse or for nay relative, by
consanguinity or affinity, within the third civil degree, of the
President of the Philippines, the Vice-President of the
Philippines, the President of the Senate, or the Speaker of
the House of Representatives, to intervene directly or
indirectly, in any business, transaction, contract or
application with the Government: Provided, that this
section shall not apply to any person who prior to the
assumption of office of any of the above officials to whom
he is related, has been already dealing with the
Government along the same line of business, nor to any
transaction, contract or application filed by him for
approval of which is not discretionary on the part of the
officials concerned but depends upon compliance with
requisites provided by law, nor to any act lawfully
performed in an official capacity or in the exercise of a
profession.
Mr. President, I have done duty to this Senate and to myself. I leave
it to this august Body to make its own conclusion.

Verily, the speech of Senator Enrile contained no suggestion of
contemplated legislation; he merely called upon the Senate to look into a
possible violation of Sec. 5 of RA No. 3019, otherwise known as "The Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act." I other words, the purpose of the inquiry to
be conducted by respondent Blue Ribbon commitee was to find out whether
or not the relatives of President Aquino, particularly Mr. ricardo Lopa, had
violated the law in connection with the alleged sale of the 36 or 39
corporations belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez to the Lopaa Group.
There appears to be, therefore, no intended legislation involved.
The Court is also not impressed with the respondent Committee's argument
that the questioned inquiry is to be conducted pursuant to Senate Resolution
No. 212. The said resolution was introduced by Senator Jose D. Lina in view
of the representaions made by leaders of school youth, community groups
and youth of non-governmental organizations to the Senate Committee on
Youth and Sports Development, to look into the charges against the PCGG
filed by three (3) stockholders of Oriental petroleum, i.e., that it has adopted
a "get-rich-quick scheme" for its nominee-directors in a sequestered oil
exploration firm.The pertinent portion of Senate Resolution No. 212 reads as
follows:
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREAS, recent developments have shown that no less than the
Solicitor-General has stated that the PCGG Chairman and at least
three Commissioners should resign and that the agency should rid
itself of "ineptness, incompetence and corruption" and that the
Sandiganbayan has reportedly ordered the PCGG to answer
charges filed by three stockholders of Oriental Petroleum that it has
adopted a "get-rich-quick scheme" for its nominee-directors in a
sequestered oil exploration firm;
WHEREAS, leaders of school youth, community groups and youth
of non-governmental organization had made representations to the
Senate Committee on Youth and Sports Development to look into
the charges against the PCGG since said agency is a symbol of the
changes expected by the people when the EDSA revolution took
place and that the ill-gotten wealth to be recovered will fund priority
projects which will benefit our people such as CARP, free education
in the elementary and secondary levels reforestration, and
employment generation for rural and urban workers;
WHEREAS, the government and the present leadeship must
demonstrate in their public and private lives integrity, honor and
efficient management of government services lest our youth
become disillusioned and lose hope and return to an Idelogy and
82
form of government which is repugnant to true freedom, democratic
participation and human rights: Now, therefore, be it.
Resolved by the Senate, That the activities of the Presidential
Commission on Good Government be investigated by the
appropriate Committee in connection with the implementation of
Section 26, Article XVIII of the Constitution. 19
Thus, the inquiry under Senate Resolution No. 212 is to look into the charges against the PCGG filed by the three (3) stockholders of
Oriental Petroleum in connection with the implementation of Section 26, Article XVIII of the Constitution.
It cannot, therefore, be said that the contemplated inquiry on the subject of the privilege speech of Senator Juan Ponce Enrile, i.e.,
the alleged sale of the 36 (or 39) corporations belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez to the Lopa Group is to be conducted
pursuant to Senate Resolution No. 212 because, firstly, Senator Enrile did not indict the PCGG, and, secondly, neither Mr. Ricardo
Lopa nor the herein petitioners are connected with the government but are private citizens.
It appeals, therefore, that the contemplated inquiry by respondent Committee is not really "in aid of legislation" becuase it is not
related to a purpose within the jurisdiction of Congress, since the aim of the investigation is to find out whether or not the ralatives of
the President or Mr. Ricardo Lopa had violated Section 5 RA No. 3019, the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act", a matter that
appears more within the province of the courts rather than of the legislature. Besides, the Court may take judicial notice that Mr.
Ricardo Lopa died during the pendency of this case. In John T. Watkins vs. United States, 20
it was held held:
... The power of congress to conduct investigations in inherent in
the legislative process. That power is broad. it encompasses
inquiries concerning the administration of existing laws as well as
proposed, or possibly needed statutes. It includes surveys of
defects in our social,economic, or political system for the purpose of
enabling Congress to remedy them. It comprehends probes into
departments of the Federal Government to expose corruption,
inefficiency or waste. But broad asis this power of inquiry, it is not
unlimited. There is no general authority to expose the private affairs
ofindividuals without justification in terms of the functions of
congress. This was freely conceded by Solicitor General in his
argument in this case. Nor is the Congress a law enforcement or
trial agency. These are functions of the executive and judicial
departments of government. No inquiry is an end in itself; it must be
related to and in furtherance of a legitimate task of Congress.
Investigations conducted soly for the personal aggrandizement of
the investigators or to "punish" those investigated are
indefensible. (emphasis supplied)
 83
the Constitution upon the judiciary to insure that the Congress does not unjustifiably encroah upon an individual's
It can not be overlooked that when respondent Committee decide to conduct
right to privacy nor abridge his liberty of speech, press, religion or assembly. 23
its investigation of the petitioners, the complaint in Civil No. 0035 had
already been filed with the Sandiganbayan. A perusal of that complaint
shows that one of its principal causes of action against herein petitioners, as One of the basic rights guaranteed by the Constitution to an individual is the right against self-incrimination. 24
Thir right
defendants therein, is the alleged sale of the 36 (or 39) corporations constured as the right to remain completely silent may be availed of by the
belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez. Since the issues in said accused in a criminal case; but kit may be invoked by other witnesses only
complaint had long been joined by the filing of petitioner's respective as questions are asked of them.
answers thereto, the issue sought to be investigated by the respondent
Commitee is one over which jurisdiction had been acquired by the
Sandiganbayan. In short, the issue had been pre-empted by that court. To This distinction was enunciated by the Court in Romeo Chavez vs. The
allow the respondent Committee to conduct its own investigation of an issue Honorable Court of Appeals, et al. 25thus —
already before the Sandiganbayan would not only pose the possibility of
conflicting judgments betweena legislative commitee and a judicial tribunal, Petitioner, as accused, occupies a different tier of protection from
but if the Committee's judgment were to be reached before that of the an ordinary witness. Whereas an ordinary witness may be
Sandiganbayan, the possibility of its influence being made to bear on the compelled to take the witness stand and claim the privilege as each
ultimate judgment of the Sandiganbayan can not be discounted. question requiring an incriminating answer is hot at him, an
accused may altother refuse to take the witness stand and refuse to
In fine, for the rspondent Committee to probe and inquire into the same answer any all questions.
justiciable controversy already before the Sandiganbayan, would be an
encroachment into the exclusive domain of judicial jurisdiction that had much Moreover, this right of the accused is extended to respondents in
earlier set in. In Baremblatt vs. United States, 21 it was held that: administrative investigations but only if they partake of the nature of a
criminal proceeding or analogous to a criminal proceeding. In Galman vs.
Broad as it is, the power is not, howevern, without limitations. Since Pamaran,26 the Court reiterated the doctrine in Cabal vs. Kapuanan (6 SCRA
congress may only investigate into those areas in which it may 1059) to illustrate the right of witnesses to invoke the right against self-
potentially legislate or appropriate, it cannot inquire into matters incrimination not only in criminal proceedings but also in all other types of
which are within the exclusive province of one of the other branches suit
of the government. Lacking the judicial power given to the Judiciary,
it cannot inquire into mattes that are exclusively the concern of the It was held that:
Judiciary. Neither can it suplant the Executive in what exclusively
belongs to the Executive. ... We did not therein state that since he is not an accused and the
case is not a criminal case, Cabal cannot refuse to take the witness
Now to another matter. It has been held that "a congressional committee's stand and testify, and that he can invoke his right against self-
right to inquire is 'subject to all relevant limitations placed by the Constitution incrimination only when a question which tends to elicit an answer
on governmental action,' including "'the relevant limitations of the Bill of that will incriminate him is propounded to him. Clearly then, it is not
Rights'." 22 the characeter of the suit involved but the nature of the proceedings
that controls. The privilege has consistenly been held to extend to
all proceedings sanctioned by law and to all cases in which
punishment is sought to be visited upon a witness, whether a party
or not.
In another case —

We do not here modify these doctrines. If we presently rule that petitioners

... the mere semblance of legislative purpose would not justify an inquiry in the face of the Bill of Rights. The critical
element is the exeistence of, and the weight to be ascribed to, the interest of the Congress in demanding disclosures
from an unwilling witness. We cannot simply assume, however, that every congressional investigation is justified by a
public need that over-balances any private rights affected. To do so would be to abdicate the responsibility placed by
may not be compelled by the respondent Committee to appear, testify and
produce evidenc before it, it is only becuase we hold that the questioned
inquiry is not in aid of legislation and, if pursued, would be violative of the
principle of separation of powers between the legislative and the judicial
departments of government, ordained by the Constitution.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court holds that, under the
facts, including the circumtance that petitioners are presently impleaded as
defendants in a case before the Sandiganbayan, which involves issues
intimately related to the subject of contemplated inquiry before the respondet
Committee, the respondent Senate Blue Ribbon Committee is hereby
enjoined from compelling the petitioners and intervenor to testify before it
and produce evidence at the said inquiry.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Feliciano, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea,
Regalado, Davide, Jr. and Romero, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
PARAS, J., concurring:
I concur principally because any decision of the respondent committee may
unduly influence the Sandiganbayan
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:
I regret that I must express a strong dissent the Court's opinion in this case.
The Court is asserting a power which I believe we do not possess. We are
encroaching on the turf of Congress. We are prohibiting the Senate from
proceeding with a consitutionally vested function. We are stopping the
Senate Blue Ribbon Committee from exercising a legislative prerogative —
investigations in aid of legislation. We do so becuase we somehow feel that
the purported aim is not the real purpose.
The Court has no power to second guess the motives behind an act of a
House of Congress. Neither can we substitute our judgment for its judgment
on a matter specifically given to it by the Constitution. The scope of the
legislative power is broad. it emcompasses practically every aspect of
human or corporate behavior capable of regulation. How can this Court say
that unraveling the tangled and secret skeins behind the acquisition by
Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez of 39 corporations under the past regime and
their sudden sale to the Lopa Group at the outset of the new dispensation
will not result in useful legislation?
The power of either House of Congress to conduct investigations is inherent.
It needs no textual grant. As stated in Arnault v. Nazareno, 87 Phil. 29
(1950)
84
Our form of government being patterned after the American system
— the framers of our Constitution having drawn largely from
American institutions and practices — we can, in this case, properly
draw also from American precedents in interpreting analogous
provisions of our Constitution, as we have done in other cases in
the past.
Although there is no provision in the Constitution expressly
investing either House of Congress with power to make
investigations and exact testimony to the end that it may exercise
its legislative functions advisely and effectively, such power is so far
incidental to the legislative function as to be implied. In other words,
the power of inquiry — with process to enforce it — is an essential
and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative
body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of
information respecting the conditions which the legislation is
intended to affect or change: and where the legislative body does
not itself possess the requisite information — which is not
infrequently true — recourse must be had to others who do possess
it. ... (At p. 45)
The framers of the present Constitution were not content to leave the power
inherent, incidental or implied. The power is now expressed as follows:
Sec. 21 — The Senate or the House of Representatives or may of
its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legialtion
in accordance with its duly published rules of precedure. The rights
of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be
respected.
Apart from the formal requirement of publishing the rules of procedure, I
agree that there are three queries which, if answered in the affirmative, may
give us cause to intervene.
First, is the matter being investigated one on which no valid legislation could
possibly be enacted?
Second, is Congress encroaching on terrain which the Constitution has
reserved as the exclusive domain of another branch of government?
And third, is Congress violating the basic liberties of an individual?
The classic formulation of the power of the Court to interpret the meaning of
"in aid of legislation" is expressed in Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168
(1880).

The House of Representatives passed a resolution creating a committee to
investigate the financial relations between Jay Cooke and Co., a depositary
of federal funds and a real estate pool. A debtor of Jay Cooke and Co,
Kilbourn, general manager of the pool refused to answer questions put to
him by the Committee and to produce certain book sna papers.
Consequently, he was ordered jailed for forty-five days. He brought an action
for false imprisonment and the Supreme Court decided in his favor.
Speaking through Justice Miller, the Court ruled:
The resolution adopted as a sequence of this preamble contains no
hint of any intention of final action by Congress on the subject, In all
the argument of the case no suggestion has been made of what the
House of Respresentatives or the Congress could have done in the
way of remedying the wrong or securing the creditors of Jay Cooke
and Co., or even the United States. Was it to be simply a fruitless
investigation into the personal affiars of individuals? If so the House
of Representatives had no power or authority in the matter more
than any other equal number of gentlemen interested for the
government of their country. By fruitless we mean that it could
result in no valid legislation on the subject to which the inquiry
referrred. (Kilbourn v. Thompson, Id. at page 388)
The Kilbourn decision is, however, crica 1880. The world has turned over
many times since that era. The same court which validated separate but
equal facilities against of racial discrimination and ruled that a private
contract may bar improved labor standards and social justice legislation has
reversed itslef on these and many other questions.
In McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135; 71 L. Ed. 580 [1927], the court went
beyond the express terms of the Senate resolution directing the investigation
of a former Attorney General for non-feasance, misfeasance, and
malfeasance in office. It presumed that the action of the Senate was with a
legitimate object.
... Plainly the subject was one on which legislation could be had
and would be materially aided by the information which the
investigation was calculated to elicit. This becomes manifest when
it is reflected that the functions of the Department of Justice, the
powers and duties of the Attorney-General and the duties of his
assitants, are all subject to regulation by congressional legislation,
and that the department is maintained and its activitites are carried
on under such appropriations as in the judgment of Congress are
needed from year to year.
The only legitimate object the Senate could have in ordering the
investigation was to aid it in legislating, and we think the subject
85
was the real object. An express avowal of the object would have
been better; but in view of the particular subject matter was not
indispenable. In People ex rel. Mc Donald v. Keeler, 99, N.Y. 463,
52 Am. Rep. 49, 2 N.E. 615, where the Court of Appeals of New
york sustained an investigation order by the House of
Representatives of that state where the resolution contained no
avowal, but disclosed that it definitely related to the administrative
of public office the duties of which were subject to legislative
regulation, the court said (pp. 485, 487): Where public institutions
under the control of the State are ordered to be investigated, it is
generally with the view of some legislative action respecting them,
and the same may be said in respect of public officers,' And again
"We are bound to presume that the action of the legislative body
was with a legitimate object if it is capable of being so
construed, and we have no right to assume that the contrary was
intended." (McGrain v. Daugherty Id., at page 594-595, Emphasis
supplied)
The American Court was more categorical in United States v. Josephson,
333 U.S. 858 (1938). It declared that declaration of legislative purpose was
conclusive on the Courts:
Whatever may be said of the Committee on the un-American
activities, its authorizing resolution recites it is in aid of legislation
and that fact is establshed for courts.
And since the matter before us in somethingwe inherited from the American
constitutional system, rulings from the decision of federal courts may be
apropos. (Stamler v. Willis, 287 F. Supp. 734 [1968]
The Court cannot probe into the motives of the members of the
Congress.
Barsky v. United States, 167 F. 2d 241 [1948]
The measure of the power of inquiry is the potentiality that
constitutional legislation might ensue from information derived from
such inquiry.
The possibility that invalid as well as valid legislation might ensue
from an inquiry does not limit the power of inquiry, since invalid
legislation might ensue from any inquiry.
United States v. Shelton, 148 F. Supp. 926 [1957]

The contention of the defendant that the hearing at which he
testified and from which the indictment arose was not in furtherance
og a legislative purpose proceeds on the assumption that a failure
to have specific legislation in contemplation, or a failure to show
that legislation was in fact enacted, estabished an absence of
legislative purpose. This argument is patently unsound. The
investigative power of Congress is not subject to the limitation that
hearings must result in legislation or recommendations for
legislation.
United States v. Deutch (147 F. Supp. 89 (1956)
Under the Constitution of the U.S., the Federal Government is a
government of limited powers. The Congress, being the legislative
branch of the Federal Government, is also clothed with limited
legislative powers. In orders, however, to carry its legislative
powers into effect successfully, it has always been held that
Congress has the power to secure information concerning matters
in respect to which it has the authority to legislate. In fact, it would
seem that Congress must secure information in order to legislate
intelligently. Beyond that, the Congress has the right secure
information in order to determine whether or not to legislate on a
particular subject matter on which it is within its constitutional
powers to act. — (Emphasis Supplied)
The even broader scope of legislative investigation in the Philippine context
is explained by a member of the Constitutional Commission.
The requirement that the investigation be "in aid of legislation" is an
essential element for establishing the jurisdiction of the legislative
body. It is, however, a requirement which is not difficult to satisfy
becuase, unlike in the United States, where legislative power is
shared by the United State Congress and the states legislatures,
the totality of legislative power is possessed by the Congress nad
its legislative field is well-nigh unlimited. "It would be difficult to
define any limits by which the subject matter of its inquiry can be
bounded." (Supra, at p. 46) Moreover, it is not necessary that every
question propounded to a witness must be material to a proposed
legislation. "In other words, the materiality of the question must be
determined by its direct relation to the subject of the inquiry and not
by its indirect relation to any proposed or possible legislation. The
reason is that the necessity or lack of necessity for legislative action
and form and character of the action itself are determined by the
sum total of the information to be gathered as a result of the
investigation, and not by a fraction to be gathered as a result of the
investigation, and not by a fraction of such information elicited from
a single question. (Id., at 48)
86
On the basis of this interpretation of what "in aid of legislation"
means, it can readily be seen that the phrase contributes practically
nothing towards protecting witnesses. Practically any investigation
can be in aid of the broad legislative power of Congress. The
limitation, therefore cannot effectively prevent what Kilbourn v.
Thompson (103 U.S. 168 [1880]) characterized as "roving
commissions" or what Watkins v. United States (354 U.S. 178, 200
[1957] labeled as exposure for the sake of exposure. (Bernas,
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, Vol. II, 1st Ed., page
132).
Applying the above principles to the present casem, it can readily be seen
that the Senate is investigating an area where it may potentially legislate.
The ease with which relatives of the President were allegedly able to amass
great wealth under the past regime is a legitimate area of inquiry. And if we
tack on the alleged attempts o f relatives of a succeeding adminsitration to
duplicate the feat, the need for remedial legislation becomes more
imperative.
Our second area of concern is congressional encroachment on matters
reserved by the Constitution for the Executive or the Judiciary.
The majority opinion cites the decision in Angara v. Electoral Commission,
63 Phil. 139 (1936) explaining our power to determined conflicting claims of
authority. It is indeed the function on this Court to allocate constitutional
boundaries but in the exercise of this "umpire" function we have to take care
that we do not keep any of the three great departments of government from
performing functions peculiar to each department or specifically vested to it
sby the Constitution. When a power is vested, ti carries with is everything
legitimately neede to exercise it.
It may be argued that the investigation into the Romualdez — Lopa
transactions is more appropriate for the Department of Justice and the
judiciary. This argument misses the point of legislative inquiry.
The prosecution of offenders by the Department of Justice or the
Ombudsman and their trial before courts of justice is intended to punish
persons who violate the law. Legislative investigations go further. The aim is
to arrive at policy determinations which may or may not be enacted into
legislation. Referral to prosecutors or courts of justice is an added bonus.
For sure, the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee knows it cannot sentence any
offender, no matter how overwhelming the proof that it may gatherm to a jail
term. But certainly, the Committee can recommend to Congress how the
situation which enabled get-rich-quick schemes to flourish may be remedied.
The fact that the subject of the investigation may currently be undergoing
trial does not restrict the power of Congress to investigate for its own

purposes. The legislative purpose is distinctly different from the judicial
purpose.
In Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263, 73 L ed. 692 (1928), leases of
naval reservations to oil companies were investigated by the United States
Senate. On a finding that certain leases were fraudulent, court action was
recommended. In other words, court action on one hand and legislation on
the other, are not mutually exclusive. They may complement each other.
... It may be conceded that Congress is without authority to compel
disclosyres for the purpose of aiding the prosecution of pending
suits; but the authority of that body, directly or through it
Committees, to require pertinent disclosures in aid of its own
consitutional power is not abridged because the information sought
to be elicited may also be of use in such suits... It is plain that
investigation of the matters involved in suits brought or to be
commenced under the Senate resolution directing the institution of
suits for the cancellation of the leases might directly aid in respect
of legislative action... (Sinclair v. United States, Id.at page 698).
In United States v. Orman, 207 F. 2d Ed. 148 (1953), the court declared that
it was pertinent for a legislative committee to seek facts indicating that a
witness was linked to unlawful intestate gambling.
The power of a congressional committee to investigate matters
cannot be challenged on the ground that the Committee went
beyond the scope of any contemplated legislative and assumed the
functions of a grand jury. Whre the genral subject of investigation is
one concerning which Congress can legislate, and the information
sought might aid the congressional consideration, in such a
situation a legitimate legislative purpose must be presumed...
I submit that the filing of indictments or informations or the trial of certain
persons cannot, by themselves, half the intitiation or stop the progress of
legislative investigations.
The other ground which I consider the more important one is where the
legislative investigation violates the liberties of the witnesses.
The Constitution expressly provides that "the rights of persons appearing in
or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.
It should be emphasized that the constitutional restriction does not call for
the banning or prohibition of investigations where a violation of a basis rights
is claimed. It only requires that in the course of the proceedings, the right of
persons should be respected.
87
What the majority opinion mandates is a blanket prohibition against a
witness testifying at all, simply because he is already facing charges before
the Sandiganbayan. To my mind, the Consitution allows him to interpose
objections whenever an incriminating question is posed or when he is
compelled to reveal his ocurt defenses, but not ot refuse to take the witness
stand completely.
Arnault v. Nazareno, supra, illustrates the reticence, with which the court
views petitions to curtail legislative investigations even where an invocation
of individual liberties is made.
In Arnault, the entire country already knew the name of the presidential
realtive whom the Sentate was trying to link to the Tambobong-Buenavista
estate anomalies. Still, the Court did not interfere when Arnault refused to
answer specific questions directed at him and he was punished for hir
refusal. The Court did not restrain the Senate when Arnault was sent o the
national penitentiary for an indefinite visit until the name which the Senate
wanted him to utter was extracted. Only when the imprisonment became
ureasonably prolonged and the situation in Congress had changed was he
released.
As pointed out by the respondents, not one question has been asked
requiring an answer that would incriminate the petitioners. The allegation
that their basic rights are vilolated is not only without basis but is also
premature.
I agree with the respondents that the slae of 39 Romualdez corporations to
Mr. Lopa is not a purely private transaction into which the Senate may not
inquire. if this were so, much of the work of the Presidential Commission on
Good Government (PCGG) as it seeks to recover illegally acquired wealth
would be negated. Much of what PCGG is trying to recover is the product of
arrangements which are not only private but also secret and hidden.
I therefore, vote to DISMISS the petition.
Narvasa, J., dissents.
CRUZ, J., dissenting:
I regret I am unable to give my concurrence, I do not agree that the
investigation being conducted by the Blue Ribbon Committee is not in aid of
legislation.
In Arnault v. Nazareno, 87 Phil. 29, this Court observed that "we are bound
to presume that the action of the legislative body was with a legitimate object
if it is capable of being so construed, and we have no right ot assume that

the contrary was intended." (People ex rel. Mc Donald vs. Keeler, 99 N.Y.
463; 52 Am. Rep., 49; 2 N.E., 615, quoted with approval by the U.S.
Supreme Court in McGrain vs. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135). As far as I know,
that is still the rule today.
More importantly, the presumption is supported by the established facts. The
inquiry is sustainable as an implied of power the legislature and even as
expressly limited by the Constitution.
The inquiry deals with alleged manipulations of public funds and illicit
acquisitions of properties now being claimed by the PCGG for the Republic
of the Philippines. The purpose of the Committee is to ascertain if and how
such anomalies have been committed. It is settled that the legislature has a
right to investigate the disposition of the public funds it has appropriated;
indeed, "an inquiry into the expenditure of all public money is na
indispensable duty of the legislature." Moreover, an investigation of a
possible violation of a law may be useful in the drafting of amendatory
legislation to correct or strengthen that law.
The ponencia quotes lengthily from Senator Enrile's speech and concludes
that it "contained no suggestions of contemplated legislation; he merely
called upon the Senate to look into a possible violation of section 5 of R.A.
No. 3019." However, according to McGrain v. Daugherty, supra:
Primarily, the purpose for which legislative inquiry and investigation
is pursued is to serve as an aid in legislation. Through it, the
legislature is able to obtain facts or data in aid fo proposed
legislation. However, it is not necessary that the resolution ordering
an investigation should in terms expressly state that the object of
the inquiry is to obtain data in aid of proposed legislation. It is
enough that such purpose appears from a consideration of the
entire proceedings or one in which legislation could be had and
would be materially aided by the information which the investigation
was calculated to elicit. An express avowal of the object would be
better, but such is not indispensable. (Emphasis supplied).
The petitioner's contention that the questioned investigation would compel
them to reveal their defense in the cases now pending against them in the
Sandigangbayan is untenable. They know or should know that they cannot
be compelled to answer incriminating questions. The case of Chavez v.
Court of Appeals, 24 SCRA 663, where we held that an accused may refuse
at the outset to take the stand on the ground that the questions to be put by
the prosecutor will tend to incriminate him is, of course, not applicable to
them. They are not facing criminal charges before the Blue Ribbon
Committee. Like any ordinary witness, they can invoke the right against self-
incrimination only when and as the incriminating question is propounded.
88
While it is true that the Court is now allowed more leeway in reviewing the
traditionally political acts of the legislative and executive departments, the
power must be exercised with the utmost circumspection lest we unduly
trench on their prerogatives and disarrange the constitutional separation of
powers. That power is available to us only if there is a clear showing of a
grave abuse of discretion, which I do not see in the case at bar.
Guided by the presumption and the facts, I vote to DISMISS the petition.
Narvasa, J., dissents.
# Separate Opinions
PARAS, J., concurring:
I concur principally because any decision of the respondent committee may
unduly influence the Sandiganbayan
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:
I regret that I must express a strong dissent the Court's opinion in this case.
The Court is asserting a power which I believe we do not possess. We are
encroaching on the turf of Congress. We are prohibiting the Senate from
proceeding with a consitutionally vested function. We are stopping the
Senate Blue Ribbon Committee from exercising a legislative prerogative —
investigations in aid of legislation. We do so becuase we somehow feel that
the purported aim is not the real purpose.
The Court has no power to second guess the motives behind an act of a
House of Congress. Neither can we substitute our judgment for its judgment
on a matter specifically given to it by the Constitution. The scope of the
legislative power is broad. it emcompasses practically every aspect of
human or corporate behavior capable of regulation. How can this Court say
that unraveling the tangled and secret skeins behind the acquisition by
Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez of 39 corporations under the past regime and
their sudden sale to the Lopa Group at the outset of the new dispensation
will not result in useful legislation?
The power of either House of Congress to conduct investigations is inherent.
It needs no textual grant. As stated in Arnault v. Nazareno, 87 Phil. 29
(1950)
Our form of government being patterned after the American system
— the framers of our Constitution having drawn largely from

American institutions and practices — we can, in this case, properly
draw also from American precedents in interpreting analogous
provisions of our Constitution, as we have done in other cases in
the past.
Although there is no provision in the Constitution expressly
investing either House of Congress with power to make
investigations and exact testimony to the end that it may exercise
its legislative functions advisely and effectively, such power is so far
incidental to the legislative function as to be implied. In other words,
the power of inquiry — with process to enforce it — is an essential
and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative
body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of
information respecting the conditions which the legislation is
intended to affect or change: and where the legislative body does
not itself possess the requisite information — which is not
infrequently true — recourse must be had to others who do possess
it. ... (At p. 45)
The framers of the present Constitution were not content to leave the power
inherent, incidental or implied. The power is now expressed as follows:
Sec. 21 — The Senate or the House of Representatives or may of
its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legialtion
in accordance with its duly published rules of precedure. The rights
of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be
respected.
Apart from the formal requirement of publishing the rules of procedure, I
agree that there are three queries which, if answered in the affirmative, may
give us cause to intervene.
First, is the matter being investigated one on which no valid legislation could
possibly be enacted?
Second, is Congress encroaching on terrain which the Constitution has
reserved as the exclusive domain of another branch of government?
And third, is Congress violating the basic liberties of an individual?
The classic formulation of the power of the Court to interpret the meaning of
"in aid of legislation" is expressed in Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168
(1880).
The House of Representatives passed a resolution creating a committee to
investigate the financial relations between Jay Cooke and Co., a depositary
89
of federal funds and a real estate pool. A debtor of Jay Cooke and Co,
Kilbourn, general manager of the pool refused to answer questions put to
him by the Committee and to produce certain book sna papers.
Consequently, he was ordered jailed for forty-five days. He brought an action
for false imprisonment and the Supreme Court decided in his favor.
Speaking through Justice Miller, the Court ruled:
The resolution adopted as a sequence of this preamble contains no
hint of any intention of final action by Congress on the subject, In all
the argument of the case no suggestion has been made of what the
House of Respresentatives or the Congress could have done in the
way of remedying the wrong or securing the creditors of Jay Cooke
and Co., or even the United States. Was it to be simply a fruitless
investigation into the personal affiars of individuals? If so the House
of Representatives had no power or authority in the matter more
than any other equal number of gentlemen interested for the
government of their country. By fruitless we mean that it could
result in no valid legislation on the subject to which the inquiry
referrred. (Kilbourn v. Thompson, Id. at page 388)
The Kilbourn decision is, however, crica 1880. The world has turned over
many times since that era. The same court which validated separate but
equal facilities against of racial discrimination and ruled that a private
contract may bar improved labor standards and social justice legislation has
reversed itslef on these and many other questions.
In McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135; 71 L. Ed. 580 [1927], the court went
beyond the express terms of the Senate resolution directing the investigation
of a former Attorney General for non-feasance, misfeasance, and
malfeasance in office. It presumed that the action of the Senate was with a
legitimate object.
... Plainly the subject was one on which legislation could be had
and would be materially aided by the information which the
investigation was calculated to elicit. This becomes manifest when
it is reflected that the functions of the Department of Justice, the
powers and duties of the Attorney-General and the duties of his
assitants, are all subject to regulation by congressional legislation,
and that the department is maintained and its activitites are carried
on under such appropriations as in the judgment of Congress are
needed from year to year.
The only legitimate object the Senate could have in ordering the
investigation was to aid it in legislating, and we think the subject
was the real object. An express avowal of the object would have
been better; but in view of the particular subject matter was not

indispenable. In People ex rel. Mc Donald v. Keeler, 99, N.Y. 463,
52 Am. Rep. 49, 2 N.E. 615, where the Court of Appeals of New
york sustained an investigation order by the House of
Representatives of that state where the resolution contained no
avowal, but disclosed that it definitely related to the administrative
of public office the duties of which were subject to legislative
regulation, the court said (pp. 485, 487): Where public institutions
under the control of the State are ordered to be investigated, it is
generally with the view of some legislative action respecting them,
and the same may be said in respect of public officers,' And again
"We are bound to presume that the action of the legislative body
was with a legitimate object if it is capable of being so
construed, and we have no right to assume that the contrary was
intended." (McGrain v. Daugherty Id., at page 594-595, Emphasis
supplied)
The American Court was more categorical in United States v. Josephson,
333 U.S. 858 (1938). It declared that declaration of legislative purpose was
conclusive on the Courts:
Whatever may be said of the Committee on the un-American
activities, its authorizing resolution recites it is in aid of legislation
and that fact is establshed for courts.
And since the matter before us in somethingwe inherited from the American
constitutional system, rulings from the decision of federal courts may be
apropos. (Stamler v. Willis, 287 F. Supp. 734 [1968]
The Court cannot probe into the motives of the members of the
Congress.
Barsky v. United States, 167 F. 2d 241 [1948]
The measure of the power of inquiry is the potentiality that
constitutional legislation might ensue from information derived from
such inquiry.
The possibility that invalid as well as valid legislation might ensue
from an inquiry does not limit the power of inquiry, since invalid
legislation might ensue from any inquiry.
United States v. Shelton, 148 F. Supp. 926 [1957]
The contention of the defendant that the hearing at which he
testified and from which the indictment arose was not in furtherance
og a legislative purpose proceeds on the assumption that a failure
90
to have specific legislation in contemplation, or a failure to show
that legislation was in fact enacted, estabished an absence of
legislative purpose. This argument is patently unsound. The
investigative power of Congress is not subject to the limitation that
hearings must result in legislation or recommendations for
legislation.
United States v. Deutch (147 F. Supp. 89 (1956)
Under the Constitution of the U.S., the Federal Government is a
government of limited powers. The Congress, being the legislative
branch of the Federal Government, is also clothed with limited
legislative powers. In orders, however, to carry its legislative
powers into effect successfully, it has always been held that
Congress has the power to secure information concerning matters
in respect to which it has the authority to legislate. In fact, it would
seem that Congress must secure information in order to legislate
intelligently. Beyond that, the Congress has the right secure
information in order to determine whether or not to legislate on a
particular subject matter on which it is within its constitutional
powers to act. — (Emphasis Supplied)
The even broader scope of legislative investigation in the Philippine context
is explained by a member of the Constitutional Commission.
The requirement that the investigation be "in aid of legislation" is an
essential element for establishing the jurisdiction of the legislative
body. It is, however, a requirement which is not difficult to satisfy
becuase, unlike in the United States, where legislative power is
shared by the United State Congress and the states legislatures,
the totality of legislative power is possessed by the Congress nad
its legislative field is well-nigh unlimited. "It would be difficult to
define any limits by which the subject matter of its inquiry can be
bounded." (Supra, at p. 46) Moreover, it is not necessary that every
question propounded to a witness must be material to a proposed
legislation. "In other words, the materiality of the question must be
determined by its direct relation to the subject of the inquiry and not
by its indirect relation to any proposed or possible legislation. The
reason is that the necessity or lack of necessity for legislative action
and form and character of the action itself are determined by the
sum total of the information to be gathered as a result of the
investigation, and not by a fraction to be gathered as a result of the
investigation, and not by a fraction of such information elicited from
a single question. (Id., at 48)
On the basis of this interpretation of what "in aid of legislation"
means, it can readily be seen that the phrase contributes practically

nothing towards protecting witnesses. Practically any investigation
can be in aid of the broad legislative power of Congress. The
limitation, therefore cannot effectively prevent what Kilbourn v.
Thompson (103 U.S. 168 [1880]) characterized as "roving
commissions" or what Watkins v. United States (354 U.S. 178, 200
[1957] labeled as exposure for the sake of exposure. (Bernas,
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, Vol. II, 1st Ed., page
132).
Applying the above principles to the present casem, it can readily be seen
that the Senate is investigating an area where it may potentially legislate.
The ease with which relatives of the President were allegedly able to amass
great wealth under the past regime is a legitimate area of inquiry. And if we
tack on the alleged attempts o f relatives of a succeeding adminsitration to
duplicate the feat, the need for remedial legislation becomes more
imperative.
Our second area of concern is congressional encroachment on matters
reserved by the Constitution for the Executive or the Judiciary.
The majority opinion cites the decision in Angara v. Electoral Commission,
63 Phil. 139 (1936) explaining our power to determined conflicting claims of
authority. It is indeed the function on this Court to allocate constitutional
boundaries but in the exercise of this "umpire" function we have to take care
that we do not keep any of the three great departments of government from
performing functions peculiar to each department or specifically vested to it
sby the Constitution. When a power is vested, ti carries with is everything
legitimately neede to exercise it.
It may be argued that the investigation into the Romualdez — Lopa
transactions is more appropriate for the Department of Justice and the
judiciary. This argument misses the point of legislative inquiry.
The prosecution of offenders by the Department of Justice or the
Ombudsman and their trial before courts of justice is intended to punish
persons who violate the law. Legislative investigations go further. The aim is
to arrive at policy determinations which may or may not be enacted into
legislation. Referral to prosecutors or courts of justice is an added bonus.
For sure, the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee knows it cannot sentence any
offender, no matter how overwhelming the proof that it may gatherm to a jail
term. But certainly, the Committee can recommend to Congress how the
situation which enabled get-rich-quick schemes to flourish may be remedied.
The fact that the subject of the investigation may currently be undergoing
trial does not restrict the power of Congress to investigate for its own
purposes. The legislative purpose is distinctly different from the judicial
purpose.
91
In Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263, 73 L ed. 692 (1928), leases of
naval reservations to oil companies were investigated by the United States
Senate. On a finding that certain leases were fraudulent, court action was
recommended. In other words, court action on one hand and legislation on
the other, are not mutually exclusive. They may complement each other.
... It may be conceded that Congress is without authority to compel
disclosyres for the purpose of aiding the prosecution of pending
suits; but the authority of that body, directly or through it
Committees, to require pertinent disclosures in aid of its own
consitutional power is not abridged because the information sought
to be elicited may also be of use in such suits... It is plain that
investigation of the matters involved in suits brought or to be
commenced under the Senate resolution directing the institution of
suits for the cancellation of the leases might directly aid in respect
of legislative action... (Sinclair v. United States, Id.at page 698).
In United States v. Orman, 207 F. 2d Ed. 148 (1953), the court declared that
it was pertinent for a legislative committee to seek facts indicating that a
witness was linked to unlawful intestate gambling.
The power of a congressional committee to investigate matters
cannot be challenged on the ground that the Committee went
beyond the scope of any contemplated legislative and assumed the
functions of a grand jury. Whre the genral subject of investigation is
one concerning which Congress can legislate, and the information
sought might aid the congressional consideration, in such a
situation a legitimate legislative purpose must be presumed...
I submit that the filing of indictments or informations or the trial of certain
persons cannot, by themselves, half the intitiation or stop the progress of
legislative investigations.
The other ground which I consider the more important one is where the
legislative investigation violates the liberties of the witnesses.
The Constitution expressly provides that "the rights of persons appearing in
or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.
It should be emphasized that the constitutional restriction does not call for
the banning or prohibition of investigations where a violation of a basis rights
is claimed. It only requires that in the course of the proceedings, the right of
persons should be respected.
What the majority opinion mandates is a blanket prohibition against a
witness testifying at all, simply because he is already facing charges before

the Sandiganbayan. To my mind, the Consitution allows him to interpose
objections whenever an incriminating question is posed or when he is
compelled to reveal his ocurt defenses, but not ot refuse to take the witness
stand completely.
Arnault v. Nazareno, supra, illustrates the reticence, with which the court
views petitions to curtail legislative investigations even where an invocation
of individual liberties is made.
In Arnault, the entire country already knew the name of the presidential
realtive whom the Sentate was trying to link to the Tambobong-Buenavista
estate anomalies. Still, the Court did not interfere when Arnault refused to
answer specific questions directed at him and he was punished for hir
refusal. The Court did not restrain the Senate when Arnault was sent o the
national penitentiary for an indefinite visit until the name which the Senate
wanted him to utter was extracted. Only when the imprisonment became
ureasonably prolonged and the situation in Congress had changed was he
released.
As pointed out by the respondents, not one question has been asked
requiring an answer that would incriminate the petitioners. The allegation
that their basic rights are vilolated is not only without basis but is also
premature.
I agree with the respondents that the slae of 39 Romualdez corporations to
Mr. Lopa is not a purely private transaction into which the Senate may not
inquire. if this were so, much of the work of the Presidential Commission on
Good Government (PCGG) as it seeks to recover illegally acquired wealth
would be negated. Much of what PCGG is trying to recover is the product of
arrangements which are not only private but also secret and hidden.
I therefore, vote to DISMISS the petition.
Narvasa, J., dissents.
CRUZ, J., dissenting:
I regret I am unable to give my concurrence, I do not agree that the
investigation being conducted by the Blue Ribbon Committee is not in aid of
legislation.
In Arnault v. Nazareno, 87 Phil. 29, this Court observed that "we are bound
to presume that the action of the legislative body was with a legitimate object
if it is capable of being so construed, and we have no right ot assume that
the contrary was intended." (People ex rel. Mc Donald vs. Keeler, 99 N.Y.
463; 52 Am. Rep., 49; 2 N.E., 615, quoted with approval by the U.S.
92
Supreme Court in McGrain vs. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135). As far as I know,
that is still the rule today.
More importantly, the presumption is supported by the established facts. The
inquiry is sustainable as an implied of power the legislature and even as
expressly limited by the Constitution.
The inquiry deals with alleged manipulations of public funds and illicit
acquisitions of properties now being claimed by the PCGG for the Republic
of the Philippines. The purpose of the Committee is to ascertain if and how
such anomalies have been committed. It is settled that the legislature has a
right to investigate the disposition of the public funds it has appropriated;
indeed, "an inquiry into the expenditure of all public money is na
indispensable duty of the legislature." Moreover, an investigation of a
possible violation of a law may be useful in the drafting of amendatory
legislation to correct or strengthen that law.
The ponencia quotes lengthily from Senator Enrile's speech and concludes
that it "contained no suggestions of contemplated legislation; he merely
called upon the Senate to look into a possible violation of section 5 of R.A.
No. 3019." However, according to McGrain v. Daugherty, supra:
Primarily, the purpose for which legislative inquiry and investigation
is pursued is to serve as an aid in legislation. Through it, the
legislature is able to obtain facts or data in aid fo proposed
legislation. However, it is not necessary that the resolution ordering
an investigation should in terms expressly state that the object of
the inquiry is to obtain data in aid of proposed legislation. It is
enough that such purpose appears from a consideration of the
entire proceedings or one in which legislation could be had and
would be materially aided by the information which the investigation
was calculated to elicit. An express avowal of the object would be
better, but such is not indispensable. (Emphasis supplied).
The petitioner's contention that the questioned investigation would compel
them to reveal their defense in the cases now pending against them in the
Sandigangbayan is untenable. They know or should know that they cannot
be compelled to answer incriminating questions. The case of Chavez v.
Court of Appeals, 24 SCRA 663, where we held that an accused may refuse
at the outset to take the stand on the ground that the questions to be put by
the prosecutor will tend to incriminate him is, of course, not applicable to
them. They are not facing criminal charges before the Blue Ribbon
Committee. Like any ordinary witness, they can invoke the right against self-
incrimination only when and as the incriminating question is propounded.
While it is true that the Court is now allowed more leeway in reviewing the
traditionally political acts of the legislative and executive departments, the
 93

power must be exercised with the utmost circumspection lest we unduly

trench on their prerogatives and disarrange the constitutional separation of
powers. That power is available to us only if there is a clear showing of a
grave abuse of discretion, which I do not see in the case at bar.

Guided by the presumption and the facts, I vote to DISMISS the petition.

Narvasa, J., dissents.


Substantial Evidence Rule
Ang Tibay v. CIR
The Solicitor-General in behalf of the respondent Court of Industrial Relations in the
above-entitled case has filed a motion for reconsideration and moves that, for the
reasons stated in his motion, we reconsider the following legal conclusions of the
majority opinion of this Court:
1. Que un contrato de trabajo, asi individual como colectivo, sin termino fijo
de duracion o que no sea para una determinada, termina o bien por
voluntad de cualquiera de las partes o cada vez que ilega el plazo fijado
para el pago de los salarios segun costumbre en la localidad o cunado se
termine la obra;
2. Que los obreros de una empresa fabril, que han celebrado contrato, ya
individual ya colectivamente, con ell, sin tiempo fijo, y que se han visto
obligados a cesar en sus tarbajos por haberse declarando paro forzoso en
la fabrica en la cual tarbajan, dejan de ser empleados u obreros de la
misma;
3. Que un patrono o sociedad que ha celebrado un contrato colectivo de
trabajo con sus osbreros sin tiempo fijo de duracion y sin ser para una obra
determiminada y que se niega a readmitir a dichos obreros que cesaron
como consecuencia de un paro forzoso, no es culpable de practica injusta in
incurre en la sancion penal del articulo 5 de la Ley No. 213 del
Commonwealth, aunque su negativa a readmitir se deba a que dichos
obreros pertenecen a un determinado organismo obrero, puesto que tales
ya han dejado deser empleados suyos por terminacion del contrato en virtud
del paro.
The respondent National Labor Union, Inc., on the other hand, prays for the vacation
of the judgement rendered by the majority of this Court and the remanding of the case
to the Court of Industrial Relations for a new trial, and avers:
1. That Toribio Teodoro's claim that on September 26, 1938, there was
shortage of leather soles in ANG TIBAY making it necessary for him to
temporarily lay off the members of the National Labor Union Inc., is entirely
false and unsupported by the records of the Bureau of Customs and the
Books of Accounts of native dealers in leather.
2. That the supposed lack of leather materials claimed by Toribio Teodoro
was but a scheme to systematically prevent the forfeiture of this bond
despite the breach of his CONTRACT with the Philippine Army.
3. That Toribio Teodoro's letter to the Philippine Army dated September 29,
1938, (re supposed delay of leather soles from the States) was but a
94
scheme to systematically prevent the forfeiture of this bond despite the
breach of his CONTRACT with the Philippine Army.
4. That the National Worker's Brotherhood of ANG TIBAY is a company or
employer union dominated by Toribio Teodoro, the existence and functions
of which are illegal. (281 U.S., 548, petitioner's printed memorandum, p. 25.)
5. That in the exercise by the laborers of their rights to collective bargaining,
majority rule and elective representation are highly essential and
indispensable. (Sections 2 and 5, Commonwealth Act No. 213.)
6. That the century provisions of the Civil Code which had been (the)
principal source of dissensions and continuous civil war in Spain cannot and
should not be made applicable in interpreting and applying the salutary
provisions of a modern labor legislation of American origin where the
industrial peace has always been the rule.
7. That the employer Toribio Teodoro was guilty of unfair labor practice for
discriminating against the National Labor Union, Inc., and unjustly favoring
the National Workers' Brotherhood.
8. That the exhibits hereto attached are so inaccessible to the respondents
that even with the exercise of due diligence they could not be expected to
have obtained them and offered as evidence in the Court of Industrial
Relations.
9. That the attached documents and exhibits are of such far-reaching
importance and effect that their admission would necessarily mean the
modification and reversal of the judgment rendered herein.
The petitioner, Ang Tibay, has filed an opposition both to the motion for
reconsideration of the respondent National Labor Union, Inc.
In view of the conclusion reached by us and to be herein after stead with reference to
the motion for a new trial of the respondent National Labor Union, Inc., we are of the
opinion that it is not necessary to pass upon the motion for reconsideration of the
Solicitor-General. We shall proceed to dispose of the motion for new trial of the
respondent labor union. Before doing this, however, we deem it necessary, in the
interest of orderly procedure in cases of this nature, in interest of orderly procedure in
cases of this nature, to make several observations regarding the nature of the powers
of the Court of Industrial Relations and emphasize certain guiding principles which
should be observed in the trial of cases brought before it. We have re-examined the
entire record of the proceedings had before the Court of Industrial Relations in this
case, and we have found no substantial evidence that the exclusion of the 89 laborers
here was due to their union affiliation or activity. The whole transcript taken contains
what transpired during the hearing and is more of a record of contradictory and

conflicting statements of opposing counsel, with sporadic conclusion drawn to suit
their own views. It is evident that these statements and expressions of views of
counsel have no evidentiary value.
The Court of Industrial Relations is a special court whose functions are specifically
stated in the law of its creation (Commonwealth Act No. 103). It is more an
administrative than a part of the integrated judicial system of the nation. It is not
intended to be a mere receptive organ of the Government. Unlike a court of justice
which is essentially passive, acting only when its jurisdiction is invoked and deciding
only cases that are presented to it by the parties litigant, the function of the Court of
Industrial Relations, as will appear from perusal of its organic law, is more active,
affirmative and dynamic. It not only exercises judicial or quasi-judicial functions in the
determination of disputes between employers and employees but its functions in the
determination of disputes between employers and employees but its functions are far
more comprehensive and expensive. It has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines, to
consider, investigate, decide, and settle any question, matter controversy or dispute
arising between, and/or affecting employers and employees or laborers, and regulate
the relations between them, subject to, and in accordance with, the provisions of
Commonwealth Act No. 103 (section 1). It shall take cognizance or purposes of
prevention, arbitration, decision and settlement, of any industrial or agricultural
dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout, arising from differences as
regards wages, shares or compensation, hours of labor or conditions of tenancy or
employment, between landlords and tenants or farm-laborers, provided that the
number of employees, laborers or tenants of farm-laborers involved exceeds thirty,
and such industrial or agricultural dispute is submitted to the Court by the Secretary of
Labor or by any or both of the parties to the controversy and certified by the Secretary
of labor as existing and proper to be by the Secretary of Labor as existing and proper
to be dealth with by the Court for the sake of public interest. (Section 4, ibid.) It shall,
before hearing the dispute and in the course of such hearing, endeavor to reconcile
the parties and induce them to settle the dispute by amicable agreement. (Paragraph
2, section 4, ibid.) When directed by the President of the Philippines, it shall
investigate and study all industries established in a designated locality, with a view to
determinating the necessity and fairness of fixing and adopting for such industry or
locality a minimum wage or share of laborers or tenants, or a maximum "canon" or
rental to be paid by the "inquilinos" or tenants or less to landowners. (Section 5, ibid.)
In fine, it may appeal to voluntary arbitration in the settlement of industrial disputes;
may employ mediation or conciliation for that purpose, or recur to the more effective
system of official investigation and compulsory arbitration in order to determine
specific controversies between labor and capital industry and in agriculture. There is
in reality here a mingling of executive and judicial functions, which is a departure from
the rigid doctrine of the separation of governmental powers.
In the case of Goseco vs. Court of Industrial Relations et al., G.R. No. 46673,
promulgated September 13, 1939, we had occasion to joint out that the Court of
Industrial Relations et al., G. R. No. 46673, promulgated September 13, 1939, we had
occasion to point out that the Court of Industrial Relations is not narrowly constrained
by technical rules of procedure, and the Act requires it to "act according to justice and
equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal
95
forms and shall not be bound by any technicalities or legal forms and shall not be
bound by any technical rules of legal evidence but may inform its mind in such
manner as it may deem just and equitable." (Section 20, Commonwealth Act No.
103.) It shall not be restricted to the specific relief claimed or demands made by the
parties to the industrial or agricultural dispute, but may include in the award, order or
decision any matter or determination which may be deemed necessary or expedient
for the purpose of settling the dispute or of preventing further industrial or agricultural
disputes. (section 13, ibid.) And in the light of this legislative policy, appeals to this
Court have been especially regulated by the rules recently promulgated by the rules
recently promulgated by this Court to carry into the effect the avowed legislative
purpose. The fact, however, that the Court of Industrial Relations may be said to be
free from the rigidity of certain procedural requirements does not mean that it can, in
justifiable cases before it, entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential
requirements of due process in trials and investigations of an administrative
character. There are primary rights which must be respected even in proceedings of
this character:
(1) The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the right
of the party interested or affected to present his own case and submit
evidence in support thereof. In the language of Chief Hughes, in Morgan v.
U.S., 304 U.S. 1, 58 S. Ct. 773, 999, 82 Law. ed. 1129, "the liberty and
property of the citizen shall be protected by the rudimentary requirements of
fair play.
(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and
to adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the
tribunal must consider the evidence presented. (Chief Justice Hughes in
Morgan v. U.S. 298 U.S. 468, 56 S. Ct. 906, 80 law. ed. 1288.) In the
language of this court in Edwards vs. McCoy, 22 Phil., 598, "the right to
adduce evidence, without the corresponding duty on the part of the board to
consider it, is vain. Such right is conspicuously futile if the person or persons
to whom the evidence is presented can thrust it aside without notice or
consideration."
(3) "While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide
right, it does imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of
having something to support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached."
(Edwards vs. McCoy, supra.) This principle emanates from the more
fundamental is contrary to the vesting of unlimited power anywhere. Law is
both a grant and a limitation upon power.
(4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion
(City of Manila vs. Agustin, G.R. No. 45844, promulgated November 29,
1937, XXXVI O. G. 1335), but the evidence must be "substantial."
(Washington, Virginia and Maryland Coach Co. v. national labor Relations
Board, 301 U.S. 142, 147, 57 S. Ct. 648, 650, 81 Law. ed. 965.) It means
such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind accept as adequate to support
a conclusion." (Appalachian Electric Power v. National Labor Relations

Board, 4 Cir., 93 F. 2d 985, 989; National Labor Relations Board v.
Thompson Products, 6 Cir., 97 F. 2d 13, 15; Ballston-Stillwater Knitting Co.
v. National Labor Relations Board, 2 Cir., 98 F. 2d 758, 760.) . . . The statute
provides that "the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law and equity
shall not be controlling.' The obvious purpose of this and similar provisions is
to free administrative boards from the compulsion of technical rules so that
the mere admission of matter which would be deemed incompetent inn
judicial proceedings would not invalidate the administrative order. (Interstate
Commerce Commission v. Baird, 194 U.S. 25, 44, 24 S. Ct. 563, 568, 48
Law. ed. 860; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville and Nashville
R. Co., 227 U.S. 88, 93 33 S. Ct. 185, 187, 57 Law. ed. 431; United States v.
Abilene and Southern Ry. Co. S. Ct. 220, 225, 74 Law. ed. 624.) But this
assurance of a desirable flexibility in administrative procedure does not go
far as to justify orders without a basis in evidence having rational probative
force. Mere uncorroborated hearsay or rumor does not constitute substantial
evidence. (Consolidated Edison Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 59 S.
Ct. 206, 83 Law. ed. No. 4, Adv. Op., p. 131.)"
(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the
hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties
affected. (Interstate Commence Commission vs. L. & N. R. Co., 227 U.S. 88,
33 S. Ct. 185, 57 Law. ed. 431.) Only by confining the administrative tribunal
to the evidence disclosed to the parties, can the latter be protected in their
right to know and meet the case against them. It should not, however,
detract from their duty actively to see that the law is enforced, and for that
purpose, to use the authorized legal methods of securing evidence and
informing itself of facts material and relevant to the controversy. Boards of
inquiry may be appointed for the purpose of investigating and determining
the facts in any given case, but their report and decision are only advisory.
(Section 9, Commonwealth Act No. 103.) The Court of Industrial Relations
may refer any industrial or agricultural dispute or any matter under its
consideration or advisement to a local board of inquiry, a provincial fiscal. a
justice of the peace or any public official in any part of the Philippines for
investigation, report and recommendation, and may delegate to such board
or public official such powers and functions as the said Court of Industrial
Relations may deem necessary, but such delegation shall not affect the
exercise of the Court itself of any of its powers. (Section 10, ibid.)
(6) The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act
on its or his own independent consideration of the law and facts of the
controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a
decision. It may be that the volume of work is such that it is literally Relations
personally to decide all controversies coming before them. In the United
States the difficulty is solved with the enactment of statutory authority
authorizing examiners or other subordinates to render final decision, with the
right to appeal to board or commission, but in our case there is no such
statutory authority.
96
(7) The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions,
render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can
know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decision rendered.
The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred
upon it.
In the right of the foregoing fundamental principles, it is sufficient to observe here that,
except as to the alleged agreement between the Ang Tibay and the National Worker's
Brotherhood (appendix A), the record is barren and does not satisfy the thirst for a
factual basis upon which to predicate, in a national way, a conclusion of law.
This result, however, does not now preclude the concession of a new trial prayed for
the by respondent National Labor Union, Inc., it is alleged that "the supposed lack of
material claimed by Toribio Teodoro was but a scheme adopted to systematically
discharged all the members of the National Labor Union Inc., from work" and this
avernment is desired to be proved by the petitioner with the "records of the Bureau of
Customs and the Books of Accounts of native dealers in leather"; that "the National
Workers Brotherhood Union of Ang Tibay is a company or employer union dominated
by Toribio Teodoro, the existence and functions of which are illegal." Petitioner further
alleges under oath that the exhibits attached to the petition to prove his substantial
avernments" are so inaccessible to the respondents that even within the exercise of
due diligence they could not be expected to have obtained them and offered as
evidence in the Court of Industrial Relations", and that the documents attached to the
petition "are of such far reaching importance and effect that their admission would
necessarily mean the modification and reversal of the judgment rendered herein." We
have considered the reply of Ang Tibay and its arguments against the petition. By and
large, after considerable discussions, we have come to the conclusion that the
interest of justice would be better served if the movant is given opportunity to present
at the hearing the documents referred to in his motion and such other evidence as
may be relevant to the main issue involved. The legislation which created the Court of
Industrial Relations and under which it acts is new. The failure to grasp the
fundamental issue involved is not entirely attributable to the parties adversely affected
by the result. Accordingly, the motion for a new trial should be and the same is hereby
granted, and the entire record of this case shall be remanded to the Court of Industrial
Relations, with instruction that it reopen the case, receive all such evidence as may
be relevant and otherwise proceed in accordance with the requirements set forth
hereinabove. So ordered.

Substantial Evidence Rule
De Jesus v. Guerrero III
Before us is a petition for review seeking to reverse and set aside the
Decision[1] dated September 30, 2005 of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. SP No.
83779, and its Resolution[2] dated February 9, 2006 denying petitioners motion for
reconsideration.
Culled from the records are the following facts:
Nilo A. Bareza, Records Officer III of the Philippine Council for Aquatic and Marine
Research and Development (PCAMRD), made out a check payable to himself and
drawn against the Asean-Canada Project Fund, a foreign-assisted project being
implemented by PCAMRD. To avoid being caught, Bareza stole Land Bank Check
No. 070343 from the trust fund of the PCAMRD from the desk of Arminda S. Atienza,
PCAMRD Cashier III. He filled out the check for the amount of P385,000.00, forged
the signatures of the authorized signatories, made it appear that the check was
endorsed to Atienza, and with him as the endorsee, encashed the check that was
drawn against the PCAMRD Trust Fund. Then, he deposited part of the money to the
Asean-Canada Project Fund and pocketed the difference.[3]
Atienza discovered that the check in question was missing on the third week of
February 1999 while preparing the Report of Checks Issued and Cancelled for the
Trust Fund for the month of January. Not finding the check anywhere in her office,
Atienza called the bank to look for the same.She was shocked to learn from a bank
employee that the check had been issued payable in her name.When Atienza went to
the bank to examine the check, she noticed that her signature and the signature of
Dir. Rafael D. Guerrero III (Guerrero), PCAMRD Executive Director, were forged. She
also found out that Bareza appeared to be the person who encashed the check. [4]
Bareza admitted his wrongdoings when he was confronted by Atienza about the
incident, but begged that he be not reported to the management. Bareza also
promised to return the money in a few days. Against her good judgment, Atienza
acquiesced to Barezas request, seeing Barezas remorse over his transgressions. But
Atienza also felt uneasy over her decision to keep silent about the whole thing, so
Atienza persuaded Bareza to inform Fortunata B. Aquino (Aquino), PCAMRD Director
of Finance and Administrative Division, about what he did. Bareza, however, decided
to confess to Carolina T. Bosque, PCAMRD Accountant III, instead. [5]
When Bareza revealed to Bosque what he had done, he was also advised to report
the matter to Aquino, but, Bareza became hysterical and threatened to commit suicide
if his misdeeds were ever exposed. Due to his fervent pleading and his promise to
97
repay the amount he took, Bosque, like Atienza, assented to his plea for her to
remain silent.[6]
True to his word, Bareza deposited back P385,000.00 to the PCAMRD account
on February 25, 1999.[7]
On July 27, 2001, following rumors that an investigation will be conducted concerning
irregularities in the said project, Bareza set fire to the PCAMRD Records Section in
order to clear his tracks.[8]
A fact-finding committee was thus created by virtue of PCAMRD Memorandum
Circular No. 30[9] to investigate the burning incident and forgery of checks by
Bareza. After investigation, the fact-finding committee found sufficient evidence to
charge Bareza with dishonesty, grave misconduct and falsification of official
document.[10] The fact-finding committee likewise found sufficient evidence to charge
Atienza with inefficiency and incompetence in the performance of official duties [11] and
Bosque with simple neglect of duty.[12]
Concomitant to the above findings, Guerrero formed an investigation committee to
conduct formal investigations on the charges filed against Bareza, Atienza and
Bosque.[13] The investigation committee found Bareza guilty of dishonesty and grave
misconduct and recommended his dismissal from the service. It also found sufficient
basis to uphold the charge filed against Atienza and Bosque, and recommended a
minimum penalty of six (6) months and one (1) day suspension for Atienza, and a
maximum penalty of six (6) months suspension for Bosque.[14]
On September 10, 2001 the PCAMRD adopted the findings of the investigation
committee but imposed only the penalty of six (6) months suspension on Atienza and
only three (3) months suspension on Bosque.[15]
Not convinced with the results of the investigation and the penalties imposed on
Bareza, Atienza and Bosque, petitioner exerted efforts to obtain a copy of the
complete records of the proceedings had. Upon reading the same, petitioner was of
the opinion that the investigation conducted by the fact-finding committee and
investigation committee was perfunctorily and superficially done, and made only to
whitewash and cover-up the real issues because the report exonerated other persons
involved in the crimes and omitted other erroneous acts. According to him, these
circumstances led to partiality in deciding the charges. Hence, petitioner filed with the
Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon (Ombudsman) a complaint against
Guerrero, Cesario R. Pagdilao (Pagdilao), PCAMRD Deputy Executive Director, and
Aquino, among others, for incompetence and gross negligence.[16] The case was
docketed as OMB Case No. L-A-02-0209-D.

In their Joint Counter-Affidavit and Complaint for Malicious Prosecution [17] dated July
9, 2002, the respondents argued that the complaint is wanting in material, relevant
and substantive allegations and is clearly intended only to harass them. Furthermore,
they contended that petitioner failed to identify the persons he claims were
exonerated, and worse, petitioner failed to state with particularity their participation in
the crimes.[18]
In his Consolidated Reply and Counter-Affidavit[19] dated July 25, 2002, petitioner
belied the allegation of the respondents that his complaint was lacking in
substance. He stressed that the report of the investigation committee that was
submitted by the respondents reinforced his claim that the investigation relative to the
forgery and arson case was indeed perfunctory and superficial, designed only to
whitewash and cover-up the real issues. To bolster his contention, he pointed out that
the sworn affidavit of Bareza revealed that the latter was able to use certain funds of
the Asean-Canada Project by encashing blank checks that were previously signed by
Pagdilao. Thus, he averred that the failure to implicate Pagdilao as a conspirator to
the crime of forgery shows that the investigation was just a farce. Petitioner also
claimed that Atienza and Bosque were not charged with the proper administrative
offense to avoid their dismissal from the service. Petitioner pointed to the command
responsibility of respondents over Bareza, Atienza and Bosque. He maintained that
had they been prudent enough in handling PCAMRDs finances, the forgery of checks
and the arson incident could have been avoided. Furthermore, petitioner alleged that
being the head of PCAMRD, Guerrero should have pursued investigations on the
criminal aspect of the cases of forgery and arson because a huge amount of
government money was involved therein. His act, therefore, of declaring the cases
closed after the conduct of the investigations in the administrative aspect only is
contrary to the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (Republic Act No. 3019) because
its object is to conceal more big anomalies and issues.[20]
[21]
In a Decision dated August 5, 2002, the Ombudsman recommended the dismissal
of the administrative case filed against the respondents for lack of merit. It agreed
with the respondents that the complaint was couched in general terms that contains
no material, relevant and substantial allegation to support the theory of cover-up or
whitewash. The Ombudsman also held that there is nothing to sustain petitioners
allegation that Pagdilao should be implicated in the forgery because petitioner failed
to sufficiently prove that the check that was signed in blank by Pagdilao was Land
Bank Check No. 070343, or the subject check encashed by Bareza. Even assuming
that the forged check was the one signed in blank by Pagdilao, the Ombudsman
opined that the latter still cannot be said to have participated in the forgery because
the check was in the custody and safekeeping of Atienza, the cashier, when it was
stolen. In the same vein, the Ombudsman found no adequate basis in the petitioners
allegation that Guerrero charged Atienza and Bosque with erroneous administrative
infractions to lessen their liability, noting that Guerrero merely adopted the
recommendation of the fact-finding and investigation committees as to what they
should be charged with. The Ombudsman added that Guerrero cannot be indicted for
violation of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019 or be held administratively liable for his
failure to initiate criminal cases against Bareza, Atienza and Bosque because he had
98
no personal knowledge of the commission of the crimes allegedly committed by them.
[22]
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the Ombudsman denied it in an
Order[23] dated November 25, 2003. According to the Ombudsman, nowhere in
petitioners complaint did he allege that respondents should be blamed for arson and
forgery because of command responsibility. It held that petitioners averment of the
same only in his reply-affidavit and in his motion for reconsideration should be
disregarded altogether since it materially and belatedly alters his original cause of
action against the respondents, which cannot be allowed.[24]
Not accepting defeat, petitioner elevated the matter by way of a petition for
review[25] under Rule 43 before the appellate court. Petitioner claimed that the
Ombudsman gravely erred when it recommended the dismissal of the charges
against the respondents and denied his motion for reconsideration despite the
existence of a prima facie case against them for incompetence and gross negligence.
On September 30, 2005, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision affirming
the August 5, 2002Decision and November 25, 2003 Order of the Ombudsman in
OMB Case No. L-A-02-0209-D. The appellate court found that the Ombudsman
correctly dismissed the complaint against the respondents.The appellate court held
that petitioner questioned the handling of the PCAMRD finances without specifying
the particular acts or omissions constituting the gross negligence of the
respondents. The charges, being broad, sweeping, general and purely speculative,
cannot, by their nature, constitute aprima facie case against the respondents.[26]
Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the said Decision but it was denied by the
appellate court in the Resolution dated February 9, 2006.
Hence, the present petition raising the following issues for our resolution:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
COMMITTED A GRAVE AND REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT
DENIED IN ITS DECISION PETITIONERS PETITION AND
AFFIRMED THE OMBUDSMANS DECISION OF AUGUST 5, 2002
IN OMB-L[-A]-02-020[9]-D, RECOMMENDING DISMISSAL OF
THE CASE BY RELYING SOLELY AND EXCLUSIVELY ON THE
GENERAL RULE/PRINCIPLE THAT THE COURTS WILL NOT
INTERFERE IN THE INVESTIGATORY AND PROSECUTORY
POWERS OF THE OMBUDSMAN, IGNORING THE EXCEPTIONS
TO THE RULE PRESENCE OF COMPELLING REASONS AND
GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN THE EXERCISE THEREOF.
II.

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
COMMITTED A SERIOUS REVERSIBLE ERROR AND A GRAVE
MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS AND MISAPPRECIATION OF
THE EVIDENCE WHEN IT RULED THAT THERE IS NO PRIMA
FACIE OR PROBABLE CAUSE AGAINST RESPONDENTS,
[THAT] IF CONSIDERED, WILL ALTER THE OUTCOME OF THE
CASE.
III.
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
COMMITTED A GRAVE AND REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT
RULED THAT RESPONDENTS ARE NOT ADMINISTRATIVELY
LIABLE.[27]
Simply put, we are asked to resolve whether the appellate court erred in affirming the
dismissal of the complaint. We hold that it did not.
In administrative proceedings, the quantum of proof necessary for a finding of guilt is
substantial evidence, i.e., that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Further, the complainant has the
burden of proving by substantial evidence the allegations in his complaint. The basic
rule is that mere allegation is not evidence and is not equivalent to proof. Charges
based on mere suspicion and speculation likewise cannot be given credence. Hence,
when the complainant relies on mere conjectures and suppositions, and fails to
substantiate his allegations, the administrative complaint must be dismissed for lack
of merit.[28]
Mainly, petitioner ascribes incompetence and gross negligence to respondents
because according to him, the fraudulent use of PCAMRD funds and arson would not
have happened had they not been remiss in the performance of their
duties. Specifically, he averred that Guerrero, being the head of PCAMRD, should
have seen to it that all the resources of the government are managed and expended
in accordance with laws and regulations, and safeguarded against loss and waste;
Pagdilao should have ensured that the signed blank checks were used for what they
were intended; and that anomalies would have been avoided had Aquino supervised
Bareza, Atienza and Bosque, her subordinates, properly and efficiently. In sum,
petitioner argues that they are accountable because of command responsibility. [29]
We agree with the appellate court and the Ombudsman that the complaint against the
respondents should be dismissed. A perusal of petitioners allegations clearly shows
that they are mere general statements or conclusions of law, wanting in evidentiary
support and substantiation. It is not enough for petitioner to simply aver that
respondents had been derelict in their duties; he must show the specific acts or
omissions committed by them which amount to incompetence and gross
99
negligence. This, he failed to do. Hence, the complaint was correctly dismissed for
lack of merit.
Petitioners allegation that he has specified the acts and omissions of respondents
which show that they are guilty of dishonesty and falsification lacks merit. Aside from
the fact that nowhere in the records does it appear that he has indeed shown the
particular acts or omissions of respondents constituting dishonesty or which
amounted to falsification of whatever nature, it must be emphasized that the case he
filed before the Ombudsman was an administrative complaint for incompetence and
gross negligence. Hence, these are the two charges he needed to prove by
substantial evidence, not any other crime or administrative infraction. At the very
least, petitioner should have shown how his accusations of dishonesty and
falsification constituted incompetence and gross negligence on the part of the
respondents.
To further persuade us that his complaint was wrongly dismissed, petitioner argues
that he had in his petition established the existence of probable cause to hold
respondents liable for violation of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019, or the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act.[30] He then concludes that if there is sufficient basis to
indict the respondents of a criminal offense then with more reason that they should be
made accountable administratively considering the fact that the quantum of evidence
required in administrative proceedings is merely substantial evidence.[31]
This argument likewise has no merit. It is worthy to note that petitioner is merely
proceeding from his own belief that there exists sufficient basis to charge respondents
criminally. This is not within his province to decide. He could not arrogate unto himself
the power that pertains to the proper authorities enjoined by law to determine the
absence or existence of probable cause to indict one of a criminal offense.
More importantly, an administrative proceeding is different from a criminal case and
may proceed independently thereof.[32] Even if respondents would subsequently be
found guilty of a crime based on the same set of facts obtaining in the present
administrative complaint, the same will not automatically mean that they are also
administratively liable.
As we have said in Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pool, Inc. v. Naldoza [33] and which
we have reiterated in a host of cases,[34] a finding of guilt in the criminal case will not
necessarily result in a finding of liability in the administrative case. Conversely,
respondents acquittal will not necessarily exculpate them administratively. The basic
premise is that criminal and civil cases are altogether different from administrative
matters, such that the disposition in the first two will not inevitably govern the third and
vice versa.[35]
It must be stressed that the basis of administrative liability differs from criminal
liability. The purpose of administrative proceedings is mainly to protect the public
 100

service, based on the time-honored principle that a public office is a public trust. On
the other hand, the purpose of criminal prosecution is the punishment of crime. [36] To
state it simply, petitioner erroneously equated criminal liability to administrative
liability.

Neither will the allegation of the principle of command responsibility make the
respondents liable. In the absence of substantial evidence of gross negligence of the
respondents, administrative liability could not be based on the principle of command
responsibility.[37] Without proof that the head of office was negligent, no administrative
liability may attach. Indeed, the negligence of subordinates cannot always be
ascribed to their superior in the absence of evidence of the latters own negligence.
[38]
While it may be true that certain PCAMRD employees were sanctioned for
negligence and some other administrative infractions, it does not follow that those
holding responsible positions, like the respondents in this case, are likewise
negligent, especially so when the contentions of petitioner remain unsubstantiated.

WHEREFORE, there being no sufficient showing of grave and reversible error in the
assailed decision and resolution, the petition is DENIED. Said Decision
dated September 30, 2005 and Resolution dated February 9, 2006 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 83779 are hereby AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to
costs.
 101

Administrative Subpeona investigation pending therein."cralaw virtua1aw library

Evangelista v. Jarencio Instead of obeying the subpoena, respondent Fernando Manalastas filed on June 25,
1968 with the Court of First Instance of Manila an Amended Petition for
This is an original action for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction,
prohibition, certiorari and/or injunction with preliminary injunction and/or restraining
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking to annul and set aside the order of
order docketed as Civil Case No. 73305 and assailed its legality.
respondent Judge, the Honorable Hilarion J. Jarencio, Presiding Judge of the Court of
First Instance of Manila, dated July 1, 1968, in Civil Case No. 73305, entitled
On July 1, 1968, respondent Judge issued the aforementioned
"Fernando Manalastas v. Sec. Ramon D. Bagatsing, etc.", which reads as
Order:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"IT IS ORDERED that, upon the filing of a bond in the amount of P5,000.00, let the
"IT IS ORDERED that, upon the filing of a bond in the amount of P5,000.00, let the
writ of preliminary injunction prayed for by the petitioner [private respondent] be
writ of preliminary injunction prayed for by the petitioner [private respondent] be
issued restraining the respondents [petitioners], their agents, representatives,
issued restraining the respondents [petitioners] their agents, representatives,
attorneys and/or other persons acting in their behalf from further issuing subpoenas in
attorneys and/or other persons acting in their behalf from further issuing subpoenas in
connection with the fact-finding investigations to the petitioner [private respondent]
connection with the fact-finding investigations to the petitioner [private respondent]
and from instituting contempt proceedings against the petitioner [private respondent]
and from instituting contempt proceedings against the petitioner [private respondent]
under Section 530 of the Revised Administrative Code." (Stress supplied)
under Section 580 of the Revised Administrative Code." (Stress supplied).
Because of this, petitioners 5 elevated the matter direct to Us without a motion for
Pursuant to his special powers and duties under Section 64 of the Revised
reconsideration first filed on the fundamental submission that the Order is a patent
Administrative Code, 1 the President of the Philippines created the Presidential
nullity. 6
Agency on Reforms and Government Operations (PARGO) under Executive Order
No. 4 of January 7, 1966. 2 Purposedly, he charged the Agency with the following
As unfurled, the dominant issue in this case is whether the Agency, acting thru its
functions and responsibilities: 3
officials, enjoys the authority to issue subpoenas in its conduct of fact-finding
investigations.
"b. To investigate all activities involving or affecting immoral practices, graft and
corruptions, smuggling (physical or technical), lawlessness, subversion, and all other
It has been essayed that the life blood of the administrative process is the flow of fact,
activities which are prejudicial to the government and the public interests, and to
the gathering, the organization and the analysis of evidence. 7 Investigations are
submit proper recommendations to the President of the Philippines.
useful for all administrative functions, not only for rule making, adjudication, and
licensing, but also for prosecuting, for supervising and directing, for determining
"e. To investigate cases of graft and corruption and violations of Republic Acts Nos.
general policy, for recommending, legislation, and for purposes no more specific than
1379 and 3019, and gather necessary evidence to establish prima facie, acts of graft
illuminating obscure areas to find out what if anything should be done. 8 An
and acquisition of unlawfully amassed wealth . . .
administrative agency may be authorized to make investigations, not only in
proceedings of a legislative or judicial nature, but also in proceedings whose sole
"h. To receive and evaluate, and to conduct fact-finding investigations of sworn
purpose is to obtain information upon which future action of a legislative or Judicial
complaints against the acts, conduct or behavior of any public official or employee
nature may be taken 9 and may require the attendance of witnesses in proceedings
and to file and prosecute the proper charges with the appropriate agency."cralaw
of a purely investigatory nature. It may conduct general inquiries into evils calling for
virtua1aw library
correction and to report findings to appropriate bodies and make recommendations
for actions. 10
For a realistic performance of these functions, the President vested in the Agency all
the powers of an investigating committee under Sections 71 and 580 of the Revised
We recognize that in the case before Us, petitioner Agency draws its subpoena power
Administrative Code, including the power to summon witnesses by subpoena or
from Executive Order No. 4, para. 5 which, in an effectuating mood, empowered it to
subpoena duces tecum, administer oaths, take testimony or evidence relevant to the
"summon witnesses, administer oaths, and take testimony relevant to the
investigation. 4
investigation" 11 with the authority "to require the production of documents under a
subpoena duces tecum or otherwise, subject in all respects to the same restrictions
Whereupon, on June 7, 1968, petitioner Quirico Evangelista, as Undersecretary of the
and qualifications as apply in judicial proceedings of a similar character." 12 Such
Agency, issued to respondent Fernando Manalastas, then Acting City Public Service
subpoena power operates in extenso to all the functions of the Agency as laid out in
Officer of Manila, a subpoena ad testificandum commanding him "to be and appear
the aforequoted sub-paragraphs (b), (e), and (h). It is not bordered by nor is it merely
as witness at the Office of the PRESIDENTIAL AGENCY ON REFORMS AND
exercisable, as respondents would have it, in quasi-judicial or adjudicatory function
GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS . . . then and there to declare and testify in a certain

under sub-paragraph (b). The functions enumerated in all these sub-paragraphs (b),
(e), and (h) interlink or intertwine with one another with the principal aim of meeting
the very purpose of the creation of the Agency, which is to forestall and erode
nefarious activities and anomalies in the civil service. To hold that the subpoena
power of the Agency is confined to mere quasijudicial or adjudicatory functions would
therefore imperil or inactiviate the Agency in its investigatory functions under sub-
paragraphs (e) and (h). More than that, the enabling authority itself (Executive Order
No. 4, para. 5) fixes no distinction when and in what function should the subpoena
power be exercised. Similarly, We see no reason to depart from the established rule
that forbids differentiation when the law itself makes none.
Nor could We impress upon this subpoena power the alleged strictures of a subpoena
issued under the Rules of Court 13 to abridge its application. The seeming proviso in
Section 580 of the Revised Administrative Code that the right to summon witnesses
and the authority to require the production of documents under a subpoena duces
tecum or otherwise shall be "subject in all respects to the same restrictions and
qualifications as apply in judicial proceedings of a similar character" cannot be validly
seized upon to require, in respondents’ formulation, that, as in a subpoena under the
Rules, a specific case must be pending before a court for hearing or trial and that the
hearing or trial must be in connection with the exercise of the court’s judicial or
adjudicatory functions 14 before a non-judicial subpoena can be issued by an
administrative agency like petitioner Agency. It must be emphasized, however, that an
administrative subpoena differs in essence from a judicial subpoena. Clearly, what
the Rules speaks of is a judicial subpoena, one procurable from and issuable by a
competent court, and not an administrative subpoena. To an extent, therefore, the
"restrictions and qualifications" referred to in Section 580 of the Revised
Administrative Code could mean the restraints against infringement of constitutional
rights or when the subpoena is unreasonable or oppressive and when the relevancy
of the books, documents or things does not appear. 15
Rightly, administrative agencies may enforce subpoenas issued in the course of
investigations, whether or not adjudication is involved, and whether or not probable
cause is shown 16 and even before the issuance of a complaint. 17 It is not
necessary, as in the case of a warrant, that a specific charge or complaint of violation
of law be pending or that the order be made pursuant to one. It is enough that the
investigation be for a lawfully authorized purpose. 18 The purpose of the subpoena is
to discover evidence, not to prove a pending charge, but upon which to make one if
the discovered evidence so justifies. 19 Its obligation cannot rest on a trial of the
value of testimony sought; it is enough that the proposed investigation be for a
lawfully authorized purpose, and that the proposed witness be claimed to have
information that might shed some helpful light. 20 Because judicial power is reluctant
if not unable to summon evidence until it is shown to be relevant to issues on
litigations it does not follow that an administrative agency charged with seeing that the
laws are enforced may not have and exercise powers of original inquiry. The
administrative agency has the power of inquisition which is not dependent upon a
case or controversy in order to get evidence, but can investigate merely on suspicion
that the law is being violated or even just because it wants assurance that it is not.
When investigative and accusatory duties are delegated by statute to an
administrative body, it, too may take steps to inform itself as to whether there is
102
probable violation of the law. 21 In sum, it may be stated that a subpoena meets the
requirements for enforcement if the inquiry is (1) within the authority of the agency; (2)
the demand is not too indefinite; and (3) the information is reasonably relevant. 22
There is no doubt that the fact-finding investigations being conducted by the Agency
upon sworn statements implicating certain public officials of the City Government of
Manila in anomalous transactions 23 fall within the Agency’s sphere of authority and
that the information sought to be elicited from respondent Fernando Manalastas, of
which he is claimed to be in possession, 24 is reasonably relevant to the
investigations.
We are mindful that the privilege against self-incrimination extends in administrative
investigations, generally, in scope similar to adversary proceedings. 25 In Cabal v.
Kapunan, Jr., 26 the Court ruled that since the administrative charge of unexplained
wealth against the respondent therein may result in the forfeiture of the property
under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, a proceeding criminal or penal in
nature, the complainant cannot call the respondent to the witness stand without
encroaching upon his constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. Later, in
Pascual, Jr. v. Board of Medical Examiners, 27 the same approach was followed in
the administrative proceedings against a medical practitioner that could possibly
result in the loss of his privilege to practice the medical profession. Nevertheless, in
the present case, We find that respondent Fernando Manalastas is not facing any
administrative charge. 28 He is merely cited as a witness in connection with the fact-
finding investigation of anomalies and irregularities in the City Government of Manila
with the object of submitting the assembled facts to the President of the Philippines or
to file the corresponding charges. 29 Since the only purpose of investigation is to
discover facts as a basis of future action, any unnecessary extension of the privilege
would thus be unwise. 30 Anyway, by all means, respondent Fernando Manalastas
may contest any attempt in the investigation that tends to disregard his privilege
against self-incrimination.
A question of constitutional dimension is raised by respondents on the inherent power
of the President of the Philippines to issue subpoena. 31 More tersely stated,
respondents would now challenge, in a collateral way, the validity of the basic
authority, Executive Order No. 4, as amended in part by Executive Order No. 88.
Unfortunately, for reasons of public policy, the constitutionality of executive orders,
which are commonly said to have the force and effect of statutes 32 cannot be
collaterally impeached. 33 Much more when the issue was not duly pleaded in the
court below as to be acceptable for adjudication now. 34 The settled rule is that the
Court will not anticipate a question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of
deciding it. 35
Nothing then appears conclusive than that the disputed subpoena issued by petitioner
Quirico Evangelista to respondent Fernando Manalastas is well within the legal
competence of the Agency to issue.
WHEREFORE, the aforequoted order of respondent Judge, dated July 1, 1968, is
hereby set aside and declared of no force and effect.
 103

Without pronouncement as to costs. here to examine the question of whether a corporation is entitled to the protection of
the Fourth Amendment. . . . Although the ‘right to be let alone — the most
SO ORDERED. comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized men,’ . . . is not
confined literally to searches and seizures as such, but extends as well to the orderly
Castro, Antonio, Esguerra, Muñoz Palma and Aquino, JJ., concur. taking under compulsion of process, . . . neither incorporated nor unincorporated
associations can plead an unqualified right to conduct their affairs in secret. . . . While
Makalintal, C.J., in the result. they may and should have protection from unlawful demands made in the name of
public investigation, . . . corporations can claim no equality with individuals in the
Barredo, Makasiar and Concepcion, Jr., JJ., took no part. enjoyment of a right to privacy . . . . They are endowed with public attributes. They
have a collective impact upon society, from which they derive the privilege of acting
Separate Opinions as artificial entities. The Federal Government allows them the privilege of engaging in
interstate commerce. Favors from government often carry with them an enhanced
measure of regulation. . . . Even if one were to regard the request for information in
FERNANDO, J., Concurring:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library this case as caused by nothing more than official curiosity, nevertheless law-enforcing
agencies have a legitimate right to satisfy themselves that corporate behavior is
The opinion of the Court, ably penned by Justice Martin, is both learned and consistent with the law and the public interest." 10 Thus is rendered clear that the
comprehensive. It reflects the current state of doctrinal pronouncements in American landmark Boyd decision which warned against the use of the subpoena power to
Administrative Law, which up to now possesses worth in this jurisdiction. It is in trench upon this guarantee still speaks authoritatively. This Court has spoken to the
accordance with the views expressed in two authoritative American treatises, that of same effect, Boyd having been cited in a number of cases. 11 I would, therefore, read
Davis 1 and that of Jaffe. 2 The compact but highly useful text of Parker yields the the opinion of my brethren as not departing from but precisely adhering to its
same conclusion. 3 A similar approach may be discerned in the casebooks of Katz, 4 command. Whatever relaxation of its compelling force may be allowable in case of
and McFarland and Vanderbelt. 5 A concurrence is thus called for. That for me does corporations should not apply where an individual is concerned. That should reassure
not conclude matters though. The constitutional rights of a person who may be respondent Manalastas that if he could demonstrate a failure to abide by the
involved in such administrative investigation, call for respect. A recognition of the constitutional mandate on search and seizure, he is not without a remedy.
expanded reach of the administrative process in order to assure that the objectives of
a regulatory statute be attained cannot obscure the protection that the Constitution 2. Nor can I fully reconcile myself to the implications lurking in this observation in the
affords a person who may find himself in the position of a Respondent. It is worthwhile opinion of the Court: "Since the only purpose of investigation is to discover facts as a
to my mind that there be a reference, even if far from detailed, to such an aspect. basis of future action, any unnecessary extension of the privilege would thus be
Hence this separate opinion. unwise." 12 The right not to incriminate oneself 13 is equally deserving of the utmost
deference and respect. What is more, the present Constitution by the adoption of the
1. The right to be protected against unreasonable search and seizure should not fall Miranda doctrine has vitalized it even further. 14 There is, happily, the last sentence
by the wayside. 6 The broad sweep of the administrative power of investigation of such paragraph: "Anyway, by all means, respondent Fernando Manalastas may
cannot, consistently with the Constitution, go so far as to render it meaningless. It is contest any attempt in the investigation that tends to disregard his privilege against
with such a reading in mind that I view the pronouncement in United States v. Morton self-incrimination." 15 When read in connection with the earlier reference to the fact
Salt Co., 7 on which reliance is placed in the opinion of Justice Martin. The doctrine that the respondent is called as a witness not as the party proceeded against, it
formulated in such American case by Justice Jackson reads thus: "Of course a cannot be said, in the light of the ruling in Planas v. Gil, 16 that it offends against this
governmental investigation into corporate matters may be of such a sweeping nature constitutional guarantee. As of now then, with the question of any modification of the
and so unrelated to the matter properly under inquiry as to exceed the investigatory Planas doctrine not being properly before us, I can yield my concurrence. Candor
power. Federal Trade Comm. v. American Tobacco Co., . . . But it is sufficient if the compels the statement, however, that for me a reexamination of such a
inquiry is within the authority of the agency, the demand is not too indefinite and the pronouncement is desirable. A distinction between a witness and a respondent may
information sought is reasonably relevant.’The gist of the protection is in the be too tenuous if the realities of the situation be fully considered. I am bothered by the
requirement, expressed in terms, that the disclosure sought shall not be thought that the force of the Cabal 17 and the Pascual, Jr. decisions 18 may be
unreasonable.’" 8 It has been given approval in an impressive number of subsequent eroded if the prospective respondent is first called as a witness and is thus compelled
adjudications. 9 It suffices, however, to call attention to the words of Justice Jackson to testify. For the present, it may suffice if I express my misgivings. At any rate,
in the two paragraphs preceding the excerpts cited to remove any doubt as to its concurrence is not ruled out in view of the aforementioned caveat in the able opinion
lending itself to the construction that an inroad into the right of search and seizure is of Justice Martin.
now permissible: "The Commission’s order is criticized upon grounds that the order
transgresses the Fourth Amendment’s proscription of unreasonable searches and TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
seizures and the Fifth Amendment’s due process of law clause. It is unnecessary

I am constrained to dissent from the main opinion of Mr. Justice Martin which grants
the petition and sets aside respondent court’s order and writ of preliminary injunction
of July 1, 1968 and would therefore require respondent Fernando Manalastas as
assistant city public service officer of Manila (and all other city officials similarly
situated) to comply with the PARGO subpoena "to testify to matters relevant to the
investigation of anomalies and sworn statements involving or implicating certain City
officials or other public officers." 1 respect accorded the human personality. More and more in line with the democratic
While the subpoena commands respondent Manalastas to appear as witness before
the PARGO, 2 on the basis whereof the main opinion finds that said respondent "is
not facing any administrative charge" and that "he is merely cited as witness in
connection with the fact-finding investigation of anomalies and irregularities in the City
Government of Manila with the object of submitting the assembled facts to the
President of the Philippines or to file the corresponding charges." 3 it is a fact shown
by the very petition at bar itself and its Annexes B and B1 that respondent Manalastas
is in fact and for all intents and purposes subpoenaed as a respondent or one directly
implicated with alleged bribery and graft in the said sworn statements that concededly
as per the petition itself initiated the PARGO’s alleged "fact-finding investigation." 4
Thus Annex B of the petition which is a sworn statement of one Edilberto Arguelles,
investigated by the PARGO on the overpricing of eight steam cleaners sold through
him as commission agent to the City of Manila, sets forth the detailed allegations of
said declarant that respondent Manalastas and a number of other city officials named
and unnamed got the lion’s share of the overpricing. Annex B-1 of the petition is the
sworn statement of one Carlos Montañez with reference to some overpriced
equipment sold by him to the City of Manila wherein he likewise narrated in detail the
modus operandi and specifically named respondent Manalastas and five other
officials to whom he allegedly gave: "due monetary consideration."cralaw virtua1aw
library
All claims of PARGO to the contrary notwithstanding, the very petition and said
annexed sworn statements (which were not shown to respondent judge in spite of his
expressly asking for them during the course of the hearing 5) show that respondent
Manalastas (and others similarly situated) are indeed not merely witnesses but in
reality respondents (subject to administrative and criminal charges.)
Respondent has therefore correctly invoked Cabal v. Kapunan, 6 wherein the Court
through then Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion held that therein petitioner rightfully
refused to take the witness stand as against the order of the Presidential Committee
investigating the complaint against him for alleged unexplained wealth (since such
proceedings were in substance and effect a criminal one and his position was virtually
that of an accused on trial and he therefore had the right to remain silent and invoke
the privilege against self-incrimination in support of a blanket refusal to answer any
and all questions) and ordered the dismissal of the criminal contempt charge against
him.
Pascual, Jr. v. Bd. of Examiners 7 is equally in point, wherein the Court sustained the
lower court’s writ of injunction against the respondent board’s order compelling
therein petitioner to take the witness stand in a malpractice case (wherein he was
104
respondent) in view of the penal nature of the proceedings and the right of the
accused to refuse "not only to answer incriminatory questions, but also to take the
witness stand." 8 The Court therein stressed that "the constitutional guarantee, along
with other rights granted an accused, stands for a belief that while crime should not
go unpunished and that the truth must be revealed, such desirable objectives should
not be accomplished according to means or methods offensive to the high sense of
creed, the deference accorded an individual even those suspected of the most
heinous crimes is given due weight. To quote from Chief Justice Warren, ‘the
constitutional foundation underlying the privilege is the respect a government . . .
must accord to the dignity and integrity of its citizens.’" and that "while earlier
decisions stressed the principle of humanity on which this right is predicated,
precluding as it does all resort to force or compulsion, whether physical or mental,
current judicial opinion places equal emphasis on its identification with the right to
privacy. Thus according to Justice Douglas: ‘The Fifth Amendment in its Self
Incrimination clause enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy which government
may not force to surrender to his detriment."cralaw virtua1aw library
That petitioner’s investigation and subpoena against respondent Manalastas were in
substance and effect criminal in mature against him as a respondent (and not merely
as witness) as indicated above, is borne out by the fact of record in Sugay v.
Pumaran 9 (of which the Court can well take judicial notice) that on July 22, 1971
respondent Manalastas as well as Carlos Montañez the trader (affiant in Annex B-1,
petition, supra, 10) and a number of other city officials were charged by the city fiscal
in the Circuit Criminal Court of Manila for violations of Republic Act 3019 (Anti-Graft
Law) in connection with the alleged gross overpricing of the same equipment (steam
cleaners and air compressor) purchased for the City.
The main opinion’s justification for upholding the subpoena, viz, that "since the only
purpose of investigation is to discover facts as a basis of future action, any
unnecessary extension of the privilege (against self-incrimination) would thus be
unnecessary" 11 thus appears to be flawed in fact and in law: respondent was in fact
being investigated as respondent-suspect and without submitting to the investigation
was actually criminally charged in court; as a pure matter of legal principle, the 1973
Constitution has recognized the necessity of strengthening (and extending) the
privilege against self-incrimination by expressly providing as a constitutional mandate
in the Bill of Rights that "Any person under investigation for the commission of an
offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of
such right" (Article IV, section 20) and outlawing the use of any confession obtained in
violation of said section by declaring its inadmissibility in evidence.
Respondent Manalastas was therefore justified in invoking the privilege against self-
incrimination and in securing the respondent court’s injunction against enforcement of
petitioner’s subpoena. Respondent was unquestionably a party respondent who
under the doctrine of Cabal and Pascual, supra, had the right to remain silent and
invoke the privilege against self-incrimination and refuse to take the witness stand.
This legal and constitutional right may not be defeated by the transparent expedient
of citing respondent as a supposed witness in what was avowed to be a general fact-
finding investigation but obviously was a fishing expedition to ensnare respondent as
 105

a prime suspect, as borne out by the sworn statements withheld from respondent
court and now annexed to the very petition at bar and petitioner’s contention that "In
effect, the injunction issued by the lower court is one to restrain criminal
prosecutions." This contention has of course been proven baseless by the events
already cited above that such criminal prosecutions were in fact filed in court against
respondent and others without the need of petitioner’s "fact-finding investigation" and
subpoenas.

The thrust of all this is that the State with its overwhelming and vast powers and
resources can and must ferret out and investigate wrongdoing, graft and corruption
and at the same time respect the constitutional guarantees of the individual’s right to
privacy, silence and due process and against self-incrimination and unreasonable
search and seizure. This means that leads and charges must be investigated and
followed up through the assistance of the corresponding police and law enforcement
agencies as provided in the petitioner’s executive charter 12 and the evidence
secured by proper applications for search warrants, and as conceded in the petition
itself, after the corresponding report to the President "to file the corresponding
charges against the persons who may appear responsible or merely refer them to
other appropriate offices such as the Fiscal’s office, like what was done in other
cases." 13

There appears to be validity in respondent’s contention that the subpoena power

granted petitioner in its executive charter does not apply to general fact-finding
investigations conducted by it. 14 I find no need, however, of going further into this
issue, since this dissent is based directly on the fundamental tenet that respondent
Manalastas was unquestionably being investigated by petitioner as respondent and a
prime suspect (and not as a mere witness) and accordingly, under settled doctrine, he
had every right to remain silent and to invoke his right against self-incrimination and
to refuse to take the witness stand.

I therefore vote for upholding respondent court’s injunction against enforcement of

petitioner’s subpoena.

Power of Contempt
Masangkay v. COMELEC
Benjamin Masangcay, with several others, was on October 14, 1957 charged before
the Commission on Election with contempt for having opened three boxes bearing
serial numbers l-8071, l-8072 and l-8073 containing official and sample ballots for the
municipalities of the province of Aklan, in violation of the instructions of said
Commission embodied in its resolution promulgated September 2, 1957, and its
unnumbered resolution date March 5, 1957, inasmuch as he opened said boxes not
the presence of the division superintendent of schools of Aklan, the provincial auditor,
and the authorized representatives of the Nacionalista Party, the Liberal Party and the
Citizens' Party, as required in the aforesaid resolutions, which are punishable under
Section 5 of the Revised Election Code and Rule 64 of the Rules of Court.
Masangcay was then the provincial treasurer of Aklan designated by the Commission
in its resolution in Case CE-No. 270, part II 2 (b) thereof, to take charge of the receipt
and custody of the official ballots, election forms and supplies, as well as of their
distribution, among the different municipalities of the province.
In compliance with the summons issued to Masangcay and his co-respondents to
appear and show cause why they should not be punished for contempt on the basis
of the aforementioned charge, they all appeared before the Commission on October
21, 1957 and entered a plea of not guilty. Thereupon, evidence was presented by
both the prosecution and the defense, and on December 16, 1957 the Commission
rendered its decision finding Masangcay and his co-respondent Molo guilty as
charged and sentencing each of them to suffer three months imprisonment and pay a
fine of P500, with subsidiary imprisonment of two months in case of insolvency, to be
served in the provincial jail of Aklan. The other respondents were exonerated for lack
of evidence.
Masangcay brought the present petition for review raising as main issue the
constitutionality of Section 5 of the Revised Election Code which grants the
Commission on Elections as well as its members the power to punish acts of
contempt against said body under the same procedure and with the same penalties
provided for in Rule 64 of the Rules of Court in that the portion of said section which
grants to the Commission and members the power to punish for contempt is
unconstitutional for it infringes the principle underlying the separation of powers that
exists among the three departments of our constitutional form of government. In other
words, it is contended that, even if petitioner can be held guilty of the act of contempt
charged, the decision is null and void for lack of valid power on the part of the
Commission to impose such disciplinary penalty under the principle of separation of
powers. There is merit in the contention that the Commission on Elections lacks
power to impose the disciplinary penalty meted out to petitioner in the decision
subject of review. We had occasion to stress in the case of Guevara v. The
Commission on Elections 1 that under the law and the constitution, the Commission on
Elections has only the duty to enforce and administer all laws to the conduct of
elections, but also the power to try, hear and decide any controversy that may be
submitted to it in connection with the elections. In this sense, said, the Commission,
106
although it cannot be classified a court of justice within the meaning of the
Constitution (Section 30, Article VIII), for it is merely an administrative body, may
however exercise quasi-judicial functions insofar as controversies that by express
provision law come under its jurisdiction. The difficulty lies in drawing the demarcation
line between the duty which inherently is administrative in character and a function
which calls for the exercise of the quasi-judicial function of the Commission. In the
same case, we also expressed the view that when the Commission exercises a
ministerial function it cannot exercise the power to punish contempt because such
power is inherently judicial in nature, as can be clearly gleaned from the following
doctrine we laid down therein:
. . . In proceeding on this matter, it only discharged a ministerial duty; it did
not exercise any judicial function. Such being the case, it could not exercise
the power to punish for contempt as postulated in the law, for such power is
inherently judicial in nature. As this Court has aptly said: 'The power to
punish for contempt is inherent in all courts; its existence is essential to the
preservation of order in judicial proceedings, and to the enforcement of
judgments, orders and mandates courts, and, consequently, in the
administration of justice (Slade Perkins v. Director of Prisons, 58 Phil., 271;
U.S. v. Lee Hoc, 36 Phil., 867; In Re Sotto, 46 O.G., 2570; In Re Kelly, Phil.,
944). The exercise of this power has always been regarded as a necessary
incident and attribute of courts (Slade Perkins v. Director of Prisons, Ibid.).
Its exercise by administrative bodies has been invariably limited to making
effective the power to elicit testimony (People v. Swena, 296 P., 271). And
the exercise of that power by an administrative body in furtherance of its
administrative function has been held invalid (Langenberg v. Lecker, 31
N.E., 190; In Re Sims, 37 P., 135; Roberts v. Hacney, 58 SW.,
810).1awphîl.nèt
In the instant case, the resolutions which the Commission tried to enforce and for
whose violation the charge for contempt was filed against petitioner Masangcay
merely call for the exercise of an administrative or ministerial function for they merely
concern the procedure to be followed in the distribution of ballots and other election
paraphernalia among the different municipalities. In fact, Masangcay, who as
provincial treasurer of Aklan was the one designated to take charge of the receipt,
custody and distribution of election supplies in that province, was charged with having
opened three boxes containing official ballots for distribution among several
municipalities in violation of the instructions of the Commission which enjoin that the
same cannot be opened except in the presence of the division superintendent of
schools, the provincial auditor, and the authorized representatives of the Nacionalista
Party, the Liberal Party, and the Citizens' Party, for he ordered their opening and
distribution not in accordance with the manner and procedure laid down in said
resolutions. And because of such violation he was dealt as for contempt of the
Commission and was sentenced accordingly. In this sense, the Commission has
exceeded its jurisdiction in punishing him for contempt, and so its decision is null and
void.
 107

Having reached the foregoing conclusion, we deem it unnecessary to pass on the

question of constitutionality raised by petitioner with regard to the portion of Section 5
of the Revised Election Code which confers upon the Commission on Elections the
power to punish for contempt for acts provided for in Rule 64 of our rules of court.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from insofar as petitioner Benjamin Masangcay

is concerned, as well as the resolution denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration,
insofar as it concerns him, are hereby reversed, without pronouncement as to costs.