PAFLU v.

Bureau of Labor Relations

GR L-43760, 21 August 1976 (72 SCRA 396)
Second Division, Fernando (p): 4 concurring

Facts: In the certification election held on February 27, 1976, respondent

Union obtained 429 votes as against 414 of petitioner Union. Again,
admittedly, under the Rules and Regulations implementing the present Labor
Code, a majority of the valid votes cast suffices for certification of the victorious
labor union as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent. There were four votes
cast by employees who did not want any union. On its face therefore,
respondent Union ought to have been certified in accordance with the above
applicable rule. Petitioner, undeterred, would seize upon the doctrine
announced in the case of Allied Workers Association of the Philippines v. Court
of Industrial Relations that spoiled ballots should be counted in determining
the valid votes cast. Considering there were seventeen spoiled ballots, it is the
submission that there was a grave abuse of discretion on the part of
respondent Director.

Issue: Whether Director Noriel acted with grave abuse of discretion in granting
NAFLU as the exclusive bargaining agent of all the employees in the Philippine
Blooming Mills

Held: Director Noriel did not act with grave abuse of discretion. Certiorari does
not lie. The conclusion reached by the Court derives support from the
deservedly high repute attached to the construction placed by the executive
officials entrusted with the responsibility of applying a statute. The Rules and
Regulations implementing the present Labor Code were issued by Secretary
Blas Ople of the Department of Labor and took effect on 3 February 1975, the
present Labor Code having been made known to the public as far back as 1
May 1974, although its date of effectivity was postponed to 1 November 1974,.
It would appear then that there was more than enough time for a really serious
and careful study of such suppletory rules and regulations to avoid any
inconsistency with the Code. This Court certainly cannot ignore the
interpretation thereafter embodied in the Rules. As far back as In re Allen,” a
1903 decision, Justice McDonough, as ponente, cited this excerpt from the
leading American case of Pennoyer v. McConnaughy, decided in 1891: “The
principle that the contemporaneous construction of a statute by the executive
officers of the government, whose duty it is to execute it, is entitled to great
respect, and should ordinarily control the construction of the statute by the
courts, is so firmly embedded in our jurisprudence that no authorities need be
cited to support it.” There was a paraphrase by Justice Malcolm of such a
pronouncement in Molina v. Rafferty,” a 1918 decision: “Courts will and should
respect the contemporaneous construction placed upon a statute by the
executive officers whose duty it is to enforce it, and unless such interpretation
is clearly erroneous will ordinarily be controlled thereby.” Since then, such a
doctrine has been reiterated in numerous decisions. As was emphasized by
Chief Justice Castro, “the construction placed by the office charged with
implementing and enforcing the provisions of a Code should he given
controlling weight.”

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition, with costs against petitioner
PAFLU.
 National Federation of Labor (NFL) v. Eisma
GR L-61236, 31 January 1984 (127 SCRA 419)
En Banc, Fernando (p): 9 concur, 1 concur with comments, 1 took no part, 1
on leave

Facts: On 5 March 1982, the National Federation of Labor filed with the
Ministry of Labor and Employment (Labor Relations Division, Zamboanga City),
a petition for direct certification as the sole exclusive collective bargaining
representative of the monthly paid employees at the Lumbayao manufacturing
plant of the Zamboanga Wood Products, Inc. (Zambowood). On 17 April 1982,
such employees charged the firm before the same office for underpayment of
monthly living allowances. On 3 May 1982, the union issued a notice of strike
against the firm, alleging illegal termination of Dionisio Estioca, president of
the said local union; unfair labor practice; nonpayment of living allowances;
and “employment of oppressive alien management personnel without proper
permit. The strike began on 23 May 1982.

On 9 July 1982, Zambowood filed a complaint with the trial court against the
officers and members of the union, for “damages for obstruction of private
property with prayer for preliminary injunction and/or restraining order.” The
union filed a motion for the dismissal and for the dissolution of the restraining
order, and opposition to the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction,
contending that the incidents of picketing are within the exclusive jurisdiction
of the Labor Arbiter pursuant to Batas Pambansa 227 (Labor Code, Article 217)
and not to the Court of First Instance. The motion was denied. Hence, the
petition for certiorari.

Issue: Whether construction of the law is required to determine jurisdiction.

Held: The first and fundamental duty of courts is to apply the law.
Construction and interpretation come only after it has been demonstrated that
application is impossible or inadequate without them.

Jurisdiction over the subject matter in a judicial proceeding is conferred by the

sovereign authority which organizes the court; and it is given only by law.
Jurisdiction is never presumed; it must be conferred by law in words that do
not admit of doubt. Since the jurisdiction of courts and judicial tribunals is
derived exclusively from the statutes of the forum, the issue should be resolved
on the basis of the law or statute in force. Therefore, since (1) the original
wording of Article 217 vested the labor arbiters with jurisdiction; since (2)
Presidential Decree 1691 reverted the jurisdiction with respect to money claims
of workers or claims for damages arising from employer-employee relations to
the labor arbiters after Presidential Decree 1367 transferred such jurisdiction
to the ordinary courts, and since (3) Batas Pambansa 130 made no change
with respect to the original and exclusive jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters with
respect to money claims of workers or claims for damages arising from
employer-employee relations; Article 217 is to be applied the way it is worded.
The exclusive original jurisdiction of a labor arbiter is therein provided for
explicitly. It means, it can only mean, that a court of first instance judge then,
a regional trial court judge now, certainly acts beyond the scope of the
authority conferred on him by law when he entertained the suit for damages,
arising from picketing that accompanied a strike.

The Supreme Court, thus, granted the writ of certiorari, and nullified and set
aside the 20 July 1982 order issued by the court a quo. It granted the writ of
prohibition, and enjoined the Judge of said court, or whoever acts in his behalf
in the RTC to which this case is assigned, from taking any further action on
the civil case (Civil Case 716 [2751]), except for the purpose of dismissing it. It
also made permanent the restraining order issued on 5 August 1982.

Daoang v. Municipal Judge of San Nicolas

GR L-34568, 28 March 1988 (159 SCRA 369)
Second Division, Padilla (p): 4 concurring

Facts: On 23 March 1971, spouses Antero and Amanda Agonoy filed a petition
with the Municipal Court of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte seeking the adoption of
minors Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos. However, minors Roderick and
Rommel Daoang, assisted by their father and guardian ad litem, the petitioners
herein filed an opposition to the said adoption. They contended that the
spouses Antero and Amanda Agonoy had a legitimate daughter named Estrella
Agonoy, oppositors mother, who died on 1 March 1971, and therefore said
spouses were disqualified to adopt under Article 335 of the Civil Code, which
provides that those who have legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural
children or children by legal fiction cannot adopt.

Issue: Whether the spouses Antero Agonoy and Amanda Ramos are
disqualified to adopt under paragraph 1 of Article 335 of the Civil Code.

Held: The words used in paragraph (1) of Article 335 of the Civil Code, in
enumerating the persons who cannot adopt, are clear and unambiguous. When
the New Civil Code was adopted, it changed the word “descendant,” found in
the Spanish Civil Code to which the New Civil Code was patterned, to
“children.” The children thus mentioned have a clearly defined meaning in law
and do not include grandchildren. Well known is the rule of statutory
construction to the effect that a statute clear and unambiguous on its face
need not be interpreted. The rule is that only statutes with an ambiguous or
doubtful meaning may be the subjects of statutory construction. In the present
case, Roderick and Rommel Daoang, the grandchildren of Antero Agonoy and
Amanda Ramos-Agonoy, cannot assail the adoption of Quirino Bonilla and
Wilson Marcos by the Agonoys.

The Supreme Court denied the petition, and affirmed the judgment of the
Municipal Court of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte (Special Proceedings 37), wthout
pronouncement as to costs.
 Chartered Bank Employees Association v. Ople
GR L-44717, 28 August 1985 (138 SCRA 273)
En Banc, Gutierrez, Jr. (p): 10 concur, 1 concur in result, 1 took no part, 1 on
leave

Facts: On 20 May 1975, the Chartered Bank Employees Association, in

representation of its monthly paid employees/members, instituted a complaint
with the Regional Office IV, Department of Labor, now Ministry of Labor and
Employment (MOLE) against Chartered Bank, for the payment of 10 unworked
legal holidays, as well as for premium and overtime differentials for worked
legal holidays from 1 November 1974.

Both the arbitrator and the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) ruled
in favor of the petitioners ordering the bank to pay its monthly paid employees
the holiday pay and the premium or overtime pay differentials to all employees
who rendered work during said legal holidays.

On appeal, the Minister of Labor set aside the decision of the NLRC and
dismissed the petitioner’s claim for lack of merit basing its decision on Section
2, Rule IV, Book III of the Integrated Rules and Policy Instruction 9, claiming
the rule that “If the monthly paid employee is receiving not less than P240, the
maximum monthly minimum wage, and his monthly pay is uniform from
January to December, he is presumed to be already paid the 10 paid legal
holidays. However, if deductions are made from his monthly salary on account
of holidays in months where they occur, then he is still entitled to the 10 paid
legal holidays.”

Issue: Whether the Ministry of Labor is correct in maintaining that monthly

paid employees are not entitled to the holiday pay nor all employees who
rendered work during said legal holidays are entitled to the premium or
overtime pay differentials.

Held: When the language of the law is clear and unequivocal the law must be
taken to mean exactly what it says. An administrative interpretation, which
diminishes the benefits of labor more than what the statute delimits or
withholds, is obviously ultra vires. In the present case, the provisions of the
Labor Code on the entitlement to the benefits of holiday pay are clear and
explicit, it provides for both the coverage of and exclusion from the benefit. In
Policy Instruction 9, the Secretary of Labor went as far as to categorically state
that the benefit is principally intended for daily paid employees, when the law
clearly states that every worker shall be paid their regular holiday pay.

While it is true that the contemporaneous construction placed upon a statute

by executive officers whose duty is to enforce it should be given great weight by
the courts, still if such construction is so erroneous, the same must be
declared as null and void. It is the role of the Judiciary to refine and, when
necessary, correct constitutional (and/or statutory) interpretation, in the
context of the interactions of the three branches of the government, almost
always in situations where some agency of the State has engaged in action that
stems ultimately from some legitimate area of governmental power. Section 2,
Rule IV, Book III of the Rules to implement the Labor Code and Policy
Instruction was declared null and void in IBAAEU v. Inciong, and thus applies
in the case at bar. Since the private respondent premises its action on the
invalidated rule and policy instruction, it is clear that the employees belonging
to the petitioner association are entitled to the payment of 10 legal holidays
under Articles 82 and 94 of the Labor Code, aside from their monthly salary.
They are not among those excluded by law from the benefits of such holiday
pay

The Supreme Court reversed and set aside the Labor Minister’s 7 September
1976 order, and reinstated with modification (deleting the interest payments)
the 24 March 1976 decision of the NLRC affirming the 30 October 1975
resolution of the Labor Arbiter.