FIRST DIVISION

[GR No. 46892. June 28, 1940.]

ANTAMOK GOLDFIELDS MINING COMPANY, appellant, v. COURT OF

INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, and NATIONAL LABOR UNION, INC., Appealed.

Messrs. DeWitt, Perkins and Ponce Enrile on behalf of the appellant.

Messrs. Paguia and Lerum on behalf of the respondent, National Labor Union.

SYLLABUS

1. LAW No. 103 OF COMMONWEALTH; CONSIITUTIONALITY; PURPOSES OF THE

LAW; COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS; JURISDICTION; EMPLOYEES AND
EMPLOYEES. - Commonwealth Law No. 103 which, as its title indicates, provides for the
protection of the worker, creating an Industrial Relations Tribunal empowered to set a minimum
wage for workers and the maximum rent to be paid by tenants; To enforce mandatory arbitration
between employers or owners and employees or tenants, respectively, and prescribes penalties
for the violation of its decrees, it has been promulgated by the National Assembly by virtue of
the precepts contained in Article 5, Title II; Article 6, Title XIII; and Articles 1 and 2, Title VIII,
of the Constitution of the Philippines.

2. ID .; ID .; ID .; ID .; ID .; ID. - In compliance with said constitutional precepts, the National

Assembly promulgated Commonwealth Law No. 103 which creates the Industrial Relations
Court, which is a special court with judicial powers (Pambusco Employees Union v. Court of
Industrial Relations, GR No. 46727; Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations, GR No. 46496,
concurring opinion of Judge Jose P. Laurel). Article 1 of said law provides that the Industrial
Relations Court shall exercise jurisdiction to consider, investigate, decide and settle any question,
matter, conflict or dispute that affects or arises between employers and employees or workers,
and between owners and tenants or sharecroppers, and for the relationships between them, in
accordance with and subject to the provisions of the law. And article 20 prescribes that in the
hearing, investigation and resolution of any question or conflict, and in the exercise of any of its
duties and powers, the court shall act in accordance with justice and equity and the substantial
merits of the cause, without regard to technicalities or legal formalities, and will not be subject to
any technical rules of legal evidence, but will form a judgment in the way that it believes fair and
equitable. Law No. 103 confers on the Industrial Relations Tribunal full discretionary power to
resolve and decide agricultural and industrial disputes in the manner it deems fair and equitable,
regardless of legal technicalities, and the power thus granted is judicial and not legislative,
therefore what does not violate the principle of separation of powers, the prohibition on the
delegation of legislative powers nor the equal protection before the law. As stated in the
Cincinnati case, W. & ZR Co. v. Comm'rs, of Clinton County ([1852], 1 Ohio St., 88), quoted in
the case of Rubi v. Mindoro Provincial Board (39 Jur. Fil., 675), "There is a real difference
between delegating the Faculty to dictate laws, which necessarily supposes discretion as to what
they must be, and confer power or discretion to enforce them, discretion that must be exercised
in accordance with the law. The former cannot be done in any way; against the law. second, no
objection can be raised. " The first cannot be done in any way; No objection can be raised against
the second. " The first cannot be done in any way; No objection can be raised against the second.
"cralaw virtua1aw library

3. ID .; ID .; ID .; ID .; ID .; ID. - A simple reading of Article 20 of Law No. 103 shows that the
law has not empowered the Industrial Relations Tribunal to investigate and resolve issues and
conflicts between workers and employers, and tenants and owners, in an arbitrary and capricious
manner without submit to a certain standard of conduct. The article clearly establishes that the
rules of procedure that it adopts, to which the court must comply, must be inspired by justice and
equity, and prescribes that the criterion that is formed must be based on the substantial merits of
the case without considering the technicalities or legal formalities. Law No. 103 that creates a
special court called the Industrial Relations Tribunal with the power to issue its own regulations
and to resolve and decide agrarian and industrial conflicts in accordance with the dictates of
justice and equity, cannot be challenged on the grounds that it authorizes the deprivation of
liberty and property without due process of law; nor does it conflict with the precept of Article
13, Title VIII, of the Constitution because the Industrial Relations Court is not of the same
category as municipal courts, peace courts and first instance courts for which the court
regulations have been issued by the Supreme Court. It cannot be challenged on the grounds that
it authorizes the deprivation of liberty and property without due process of law; nor does it
conflict with the precept of Article 13, Title VIII, of the Constitution because the Industrial
Relations Court is not of the same category as municipal courts, peace courts and first instance
courts for which the court regulations have been issued by the Supreme Court. It cannot be
challenged on the grounds that it authorizes the deprivation of liberty and property without due
process of law; nor does it conflict with the precept of Article 13, Title VIII, of the Constitution
because the Industrial Relations Court is not of the same category as municipal courts, peace
courts and first instance courts for which the court regulations have been issued by the Supreme
Court.

4. ID .; ID .; ID .; ID .; ID .; ID .; COMMISSIONERS. - The commissioner was appointed by the

Court of Industrial Relations in the exercise of its power conferred by article 10 of
Commonwealth Law No. 103 and in the inspection and hearings held by the commissioner and
the court, respectively, the parties were represented duly, they were heard and presented the
evidence that they had available and thought it convenient to offer. Such inspection and hearings
had the character of an impartial and fair judicial hearing and constitute the due process of law
guaranteed by the Constitution.

5. ID .; ID .; ID .; ID .; ID .; ID .; CONCLUSIONS OF FACT. - The findings of fact made by the

Industrial Relations Court show that the contested order is supported by the result of the
investigation carried out by the commissioner and the evidence that the parties presented directly
to the Court. In said conclusions, all the evidence presented by the parties has been considered
and analyzed by the Industrial Relations Tribunal and the conclusion that the order is not
arbitrary and is justified and supported by 108 proven facts is inevitable.

6. ID .; ID .; ID .; ID .; ID .; ID .; PAYMENT OF EMPLOYEE DAYS. - The Industrial Relations

Court, as has already been said, is a special court and as such has the power to order the
appellant to pay the wages of its employees and workers who have been replaced. Articles 1 and
4 of Commonwealth Law No. 103, as the first one has been amended by Article 1 of Law No.
254, confer power and jurisdiction to the Industrial Relations Court to hear, resolve and decide
all questions, controversies and disputes between employers and workers and owners and
landowners, and the wages of 108 workers replaced, during the time they were separated from
service,

DECISION

IMPERIAL, M .:

This is an appeal by certiorarifiled by the appellant against the order issued by the
Court of Industrial Relations on May 6, 1939, which forced her to reinstate in her
previous jobs or in other substantially equivalent jobs the 45 workers listed in the
petition dated March 31, 1939 and the 10 workers headed by A. Haber who were
excluded indefinitely, within 10 days of receiving a copy of the order; to pay these
55 workers the wages they should have received from the date of their suspension
or separation until their reinstatement; and that pending resolution of the other
issues that the parties have submitted, the appellant abstains, under penalty of
contempt, from dismissing or excluding, without prior permission of the court, to
any worker or employee who was under his service at the time the dispute arose
who is currently working in the mines or who is reinstated in his work in
accordance with the order; and against the resolution of the same court of August
17, 1939 that denied the motion for reconsideration of the appellant presented on
May 26, 1939.
On December 12, 1938, the respondent National Labor Union, Inc., representing
the workers and employees of the appellant who were members of said labor
union, addressed a letter to the appellant requesting 21 claims in favor of its
members. The letter was received by the appellant's office in Manila in an envelope
stamped by the Baguio post office on the 30th of the same month. The appellant's
officials called their employees to a meeting on January 2, 1939, and in it they
informed all their workers that some of the demands had been accepted and had
already been put into practice, others would be considered and the rest would be be
rejected for being unreasonable, and they were advised not to resort to violence
and to observe legal methods in settling their differences with the appellant. On the
night of the same day, the appellant's workers and employees went on strike and
left their jobs. The appellant immediately reported this strike to the Department of
Labor and requested its intervention in order to resolve it. The Secretary of Labor
appointed Adolfo Umengan, Special Investigator of the Department, and Eladio C.
Leaño, Public Defender of the Montanosa Province, to intervene and see how to
solve the strike. These officials called a conference which was attended by officials
of the Complainant, a representative of the strikers, and Luis Lardizabal, Head of
the Baguio Federation of Labor, a labor organization affiliated to the National
Labor Union, Inc. As a result of the conference, the parties agreed to the following
amicable arrangement: jgc: chanrobles.com.ph

"AMICABLE SETTLEMENT

"In order to have the present strike of the contractors and laborers of the
respondent company who staged a walk-out on January 3, 1939, amicably settled,
the parties hereby mutually agree to end the said strike under the condition that all
laborers will be readmitted upon the execution of this agreement; provided, that all
laborers whose services should be dispensed with due to lack of work in those
tunnels where they are no longer needed will be given not less than fifteen days
employment from the date of this settlement or resumption of work, and provided,
further, that as soon as the stopes in 1360 and 1460 levels are opened and the
services of men are needed,the company will give preference to efficient laborers
when reducing the personnel as above mentioned in those working places and may
transfer them to other divisions to replace inefficient men. " cralaw virtua1aw library

"In witness hereof, the laborers represented by a committee composed of Messrs.

Luis Lardizabal, Tomas Dirige, Victoriano Madayag, Maximo Conaoi, Daniel
Lambinicio, and Juan Cerilo and the Antamok Goldfields Mining Co. as
represented by its President, Mr Andres Soriano, have hereunto placed their
signatures this 4th day of January, 1939. " cralaw virtua1aw library
The agreement was signed by the parties on January 4, 1939, but the workers did
not appear until 9 in the morning of the 6 of the same month. However, the
appellant's management did not allow any worker to enter the underground section
known as "830 level" for the reason that the air had become stale due to the strike
and it was necessary to renew it with fresh air with the In order to avoid personal
misfortunes. This precaution was taken by the workers as a refusal by the appellant
to allow them to work again, so they went on strike again. The strikers were
sympathetically joined by the workers working in the mine called "680 division,"
which is another separate mine located 3 kilometers from the factory. Again the
Department of Labor intervened and through the mediation of Eladio C.

On January 9, 1939, the Department of Labor endorsed the dispute to the Industrial
Relations Court in accordance with Article 4 of Commonwealth Law No. 103 and
said Court held the first hearing of the matter on the 13th of the same month in the
City of Baguio. At this hearing, the 21 claims of the respondent National Labor
Union, Inc. were discussed one by one, and the parties reached an agreement on
some of them, others were submitted to the Court's decision and the rest were left
pending for be seen and resolved later.

On March 31, 1939, with most of the aforementioned claims still pending decision,
the defendant National Labor Union, Inc., filed a motion alleging that Foreman A.
Haber and 9 other workers of the plaintiff had been indefinitely suspended on the
29th of the same month; that these workers had previously been transferred to
outside jobs in order to provide the appellant with an excuse to later separate them
from service; that another group of about 30 workers were fired by the company
for no reason and without court authorization; and that the suspensions and
separations that were made were acts of revenge and discriminatory against the
workers, for which reason it was requested that the appellant's officials responsible
for said acts be punished for contempt and that the appellant be obliged to reinstate
the workers in their primitive jobs inside the mines and to pay them their wages
corresponding to the period in which they were separated from the service. The
appellant answered the motion denying the alleged facts and alleged that Haber
and his 9 companions were suspended for their continuous laziness during working
hours and for having constantly refused to work, and that the 45 workers led by
foreman Victoriano Madayag were fired by having refused to point out those
responsible for the mistreatment of foreman Juan Moldero on the morning of
March 30, 1939. The motion was heard on April 3, 1939 and the parties presented
their witnesses at the hearing. The court appointed one of its special agents to join
the appellant's mines and conduct an investigation in order to supplement the facts
that were made during the hearing. After considering the evidence presented before
him and the facts found by the appointed commissioner, the court in its order of
May 6, 1939 declared the following facts proven: jgc: chanrobles.com.ph

"1. The discharges and indefinite suspensions alleged in the motion were made by
the respondent without first securing the consent of the Court in violation of the
order of this Court of January 23, 1939." cralaw virtua1aw library

"2. The discharges and indefinite suspensions were made by the respondent
without just cause."cralaw virtua1aw library

In the same order the Industrial Relations Tribunal makes the following
considerations that support the conclusions reached: jgc: chanrobles.com.ph

"In the order of January 23, 1939, the respondent was enjoined to refrain from
discharging any laborer involved in the dispute without just cause and without
previous authority of the Court. It appears and no denial of the fact is made by the
respondent that the dismissal in one case and the alleged suspension for an
indefinite time in the other, which has all the effects of a discharge, were made
without seeking the authority of the Court. " cralaw virtua1aw library

"The charge that Haber and the group of nine laborers were indefinitely suspended
because of continuous loafing and refusal to work was not established. The real
motive behind the lay off was the completion of their work 'outside.' Under the
circumstances, the provision of the order of March 21, to the effect that these men
should be returned to their work underground after the completion of their work
'outside' should have been observed. The respondent instead of complying with the
order laid off the men. " cralaw virtua1aw library

precluded their hearing or seeing clearly what transpired above them in the place
where Moldero was assaulted. An ocular inspection of the premises made by the
investigator confirmed this view. So far as is known, despite the investigations
conducted by the officials of the company and the policemen of the camp and by
the constabulary authorities in Baguio, the person or persons responsible for the
stoning has not been determined. The precipitate and unwarranted dismissal of the
forty-five men after the incident seems to have been spurred by an over anxious
desire on the part of the company to get rid of these men. " Despite the
investigations conducted by the officials of the company and the policemen of the
camp and by the constabulary authorities in Baguio, the person or persons
responsible for the stoning has not been determined. The precipitate and
unwarranted dismissal of the forty-five men after the incident seems to have been
spurred by an over anxious desire on the part of the company to get rid of these
men. " Despite the investigations conducted by the officials of the company and
the policemen of the camp and by the constabulary authorities in Baguio, the
person or persons responsible for the stoning has not been determined. The
precipitate and unwarranted dismissal of the forty-five men after the incident
seems to have been spurred by an over anxious desire on the part of the company
to get rid of these men. "
cralaw virtua1aw library

The temporary transfer of these men to 'outside' work was authorized by the Court
in said order on the strength of the assurance of the respondent that no more work
suited for them inside the mines existed. It was directed, however, in the aforesaid
order that as soon as their work outside was completed the laborers should be
immediately returned to their respective work inside the mines. Subsequent events
and acts of the officials of the respondent in charge of the mines have convinced
the Court that work existed and exists for the men inside the tunnels and their
transfers were made to provide an opportunity to the company to dispense with
their services as soon as the work outside is completed. The unwarranted
discharges of Haber and nine others and those of Victoriano Madayag and his
forty-four companions amply demonstrated this conclusion. Upon the company's
own admission, as shown in its reports in the records and upon the findings of the
investigator of the Court, more than four hundred (400) workers of different
classes among them, muckers, miners, timbermen, trammers and foremen coming
from different mines in the region have been employed by the respondent as fresh
laborers. Almost all, if not all, of these men are not members of the petitioner, the
National Labor Union, Inc. " cralaw virtua1aw library

"At the same time the work in different tunnels and divisions in the mines are
allegedly being completed, the old workers are being laid off. Although a small
number of the men found transfer to other divisions being operated, the majority
are being left without work. Instead of laying hands on the old men laid off and
making them work in the tunnels needing hands and reinstating in the tunnel work
those laborers transferred to the 'outside' department, the respondent preferred to
take in and hire other workers coming from different places because evidently they
are not members of the union. " cralaw virtua1aw library

had worked for months and many for years in the mines of the respondent and it
can not be easily accepted that their experience gained in their particular lines in
the very property of the respondent would be inferior to that attained by the other
workmen in other mines in the district for an equal period of time. Their
inefficiency as a whole group can not be successfully sustained now because they
were not transferred to surface work for this reason but because of the alleged lack
of work or completion of their work underground. Had any of them been
inefficient in the past, it can not be explained why such laborer continued in the
service as the records of the company abound with instances of discharges made in
the past of laborers who were found either inefficient or incompentent or whose
services were unsatisfactory. " cralaw virtua1aw library

"The company asserts ignorance of the union affiliations of the men in the mine
but the evidence stands uncontradicted that before the strike was called a petition
was presented by the men to the management carrying the signatures of about eight
hundred (800) workers demanding higher pay and better working conditions.
When the men struck, the operation of the mine was completely paralyzed and
there is a strong indication that a great majority of the workers joined openly the
strike. It would not have been difficult for the respondent, with the means at its
command, to find for itself the employees and laborers who remained loyal to the
company and to consider those who struck as either members of the union or its
sympathizers. " cralaw virtua1aw library

"The respondent's claim as to the motive for the suspension and discharges lacks
substance and support in the evidence and the inferences to be drawn from it. From
all what appears, it is inferred that the respondent desires to discourage
membership in the union and to rout it if possible. The wholesale discharges were
the expression of such desire. The acts in the mind of the Court, are calculated to
have two effects. They will not only immediately affect the discharged laborers but
would also discourage other laborers from joining or remaining members of the
union. "cralaw virtua1aw library

"The allegation that it has always been the policy to consider the laborer's
connection with the company terminated upon termination of the working place in
which he is employed is not supported by the facts. It has been shown that as a
general rule when work in a place is completed, workers are transferred to another
working place in one level or to another level, although in some instances days
may elapse before all the men in a bunch can be absorbed in different levels. " cralaw virtua1aw library

But all these arguments are meaningless in the face of the finding of the Court that
the underground laborers transferred to the 'outside' work are not wanting in
experience, efficiency and other conditions alleged to be found among the fresh
laborers. The special qualifications to do particular work can not rightly be invoked
in favor of the employment of new laborers most especially in those cases of
common or unskilled labor like muckers, trammers, helpers, etc. " cralaw virtua1aw library

"Under normal circumstances, the exercise of Judgment of the employer in

selecting men he is to employ should not be interfered with. But when such
judgment is arbitrarily exercised to the prejudice of members of a labor union
whose rights should be safeguarded in consonance with the policies of the law, the
Court not only feels it justified but rightly its duty to interfere to afford protection
to the laborers affected. "cralaw virtua1aw library

The Complainant presented an extensive motion to reconsider the indicated order,

a motion that was denied by the resolution of August 17, 1939. The order of May
6, 1939 and the resolution of August 17 of the same year are the which gave rise to
the appeal filed by the appellant.

The appellant maintains that Commonwealth Law No. 103, as amended by Laws
Nos. 254 and 355, is unconstitutional (1) because it violates the principle of
separation of powers; (2) because by it the National Assembly abdicated its
legislative power, violating the doctrine on the delegation of powers; (3) because
the judicial powers that the law confers on the Industrial Relations Tribunal,
considered separately, are arbitrary and unreasonable and allow the deprivation of
liberty and property without due process of law; and (4) because assuming that the
law is valid and constitutional in its entirety, the portion, at least, of Article 20 that
provides that the Industrial Relations Tribunal "shall adopt its procedural
regulations." It must be declared null and void because it violates Article 13 of
Title VIII of the Philippine Constitution, which obliges the Industrial Relations
Tribunal to observe the general rules of procedure applicable to the courts of
justice. The appellant alleges in this regard that since she has been subjected to an
arbitrary procedure different from that applied to other litigants in 105 courts in the
Philippines, she has been denied due process of law and the principle of equal
protection before laws.

Commonwealth Law No. 103, which, as its title indicates, provides for the
protection of the worker, creating an Industrial Relations Tribunal empowered to
set a minimum wage for workers and the maximum rent to be paid by tenants; to
enforce mandatory arbitration between employers or owners and employees or
tenants, respectively, and prescribes penalties for the violation of its decrees, it has
been promulgated by the National Assembly by virtue of the precepts contained in
Article 5, Title II; Article 6, Title XIII; and Articles 1 and 2, Title VIII, of the
Constitution of the Philippines that provide: jgc: chanrobles.com.ph
"ART. 5. The State will take care to promote social justice in order to ensure the
welfare and economic stability of all the village." cralaw virtua1aw library

"ART. 6. The State shall protect all workers, especially women and minors, and
shall regulate the relations between owners and tenants, and between labor and
capital in industry and agriculture. . The State may establish compulsory
arbitration. "
cralaw virtua1aw library

"ART. 1. The Judicial Power shall be vested in a Supreme Court and in other lower
courts established by law." cralaw virtua1aw library

"ART. 2. The National Assembly shall have the power to define, prescribe and
distribute the jurisdiction of the various courts,..." cralaw virtua1aw library

In compliance with the transcribed constitutional precepts, the National Assembly

promulgated Commonwealth Law No. 103 that creates the Industrial Relations
Court, which is a special court with judicial powers (Pambusco Employees Union
v. Court of Industrial Relations Et. Al., GR No. 46727; Ang Tibay Et. Al. V. Court
of Industrial Relations Et. Al., GR No. 46496, concurring opinion of Judge Jose P.
Laurel). Article 1 of said law provides that the Industrial Relations Court shall
exercise jurisdiction to consider, investigate, decide and settle any question, matter,
conflict or dispute that affects or arises between employers and employees or
workers, and between owners and tenants or sharecroppers, and to regulate the
relationships between them, in accordance and subject to the provisions of the
law. And article 20 prescribes that in the hearing, investigation and resolution of
any question or conflict, and in the exercise of any of its duties and powers, the
court shall act in accordance with justice and equity and the substantial merits of
the cause, without regard to technicalities or legal formalities, and will not be
subject to any technical rules of legal evidence, but will form a judgment in the
way that it believes fair and equitable. Law No. 103 confers on the Industrial
Relations Tribunal full discretionary power to resolve and decide agricultural and
industrial disputes in the way that it believes fair and equitable, regardless of
technicalities and legal formalities, and the power thus granted is judicial and not
legislative. , so it does not violate the principle of separation of powers, the
prohibition on the delegation of legislative powers nor the equal protection before
the law. As stated in the Cincinnati case, W. & ZR Co. v. Comm'rs, of Clinton
County '1852), 1 Ohio St., 88, cited in the case of Rubi et al v. Mindoro Provincial
Board, 39 Jur. Fil., 675, "There is a real difference between delegating power to
enact laws, which necessarily implies discretion as to what they must be, and
confer taxation or discretion to enforce them, a discretion that must be exercised in
accordance with the law. The first cannot be done in any way; against the second
no objection can be raised. " discretion to be exercised in accordance with the
law. The first cannot be done in any way; No objection can be raised against the
second. " discretion to be exercised in accordance with the law. The first cannot be
done in any way; No objection can be raised against the second. " cralaw virtua1aw library

To reinforce the arguments in favor of the unconstitutionality of Law No. 103, the
appellant emphasizes what was resolved in the case of Schechter v. United States
(1935), 295 US, 496, 79 Law. ed. 270, in which the Supreme Court of the United
States declared the National Recovery Act unconstitutional. There is, however, a
marked difference between that matter and the one considered because the
National Recovery Act instead of creating a court of law, created together with
legislative powers and I authorize the President of the United States to promulgate
codes that prescribe the rules of precedence in order to carry out the purposes of
the law.

The last ground that is alleged against the validity of Law No. 103 is that the
judicial powers granted to the Industrial Relations Tribunal are so arbitrary and
unreasonable that they allow the deprivation of liberty and property without due
process of law; and that its Article 20, at least, suffers from this fundamental defect
because it confers on the Industrial Relations Court the power to dictate its own
rules of procedure, which contravenes Article 13, Title VIII, of the Constitution
that prescribes that the Court The Supreme Court will dictate rules concerning the
writings of allegations, uniform practice and procedure for all courts of the same
category.

Article 20 of Law No. 103 reads like this: jgc: chanrobles.com.ph

"ART. 20. Regulations of the Court. - The Court of Industrial Relations will
promulgate its rules of procedure and will have the other powers that generally
correspond to a court of justice: Understanding, however, That in the hearing,
investigation and resolution of any question or conflict, and in the exercise of any
of its duties and powers under this Law, the Court will act in accordance with
justice and equity and the substantive merits of the case, without regard to
technicalities or legal formalities, and will not be subject to any rules, legal testing
techniques, but will form a judgment in the way that it believes fair and equitable.
"cralaw virtua1aw library
A simple reading of said article shows that the law has not empowered the
Industrial Relations Tribunal to investigate and resolve issues and conflicts
between workers and employers, and tenants and owners, in an arbitrary and
capricious manner without submitting to a specific standard of conduct. . The
article clearly establishes that the rules of procedure that it adopts, to which the
court must comply, must be inspired by justice and equity, and prescribes that the
criterion that is formed must be based on the substantial merits of the case without
regard to the technicalities or legal formalities. Law No. 103 that creates a special
court called the Industrial Relations Tribunal with the power to issue its own
regulations and to resolve and decide agrarian and industrial conflicts in
accordance with the dictates of justice and equity, cannot be challenged on the
grounds that it authorizes the deprivation of liberty and property without due
process of law; nor does it conflict with the precept of Article 13, Title VIII, of the
Constitution because the Industrial Relations Court is not of the same category as
the municipal courts, peace courts and first instance courts for which the
regulations of the courts by the Supreme Court.

In relation to the validity and constitutionality of Law No. 103 AND ITS
amendments, we insert below the concurring opinion of Judge Laurel in the matter
of Ang Tibay, supra, whose observations will serve to rebut the stated proposition
that said law and its amendments is valid and does not violate the Constitution.

"It should be observed at the outset that our Constitution was adopted in the midst
of surging unrest and dissatisfaction resulting from economic and social distress
which was threatening the stability of governments the world over. Alive to the
social and economic forces at work, the framers of our Constitution boldly met the
problems and difficulties which faced them and endeavored to crystalize, with
more or less fidelity, the political, social and economic propositions of their age,
and this they did, with the consciousness that the political and philosophical
aphorism of their generation will, in the language of a great jurist, 'be doubted by
the next and perhaps entirely discarded by the third.' (Chief Justice Winslow in
Gorgnis v. Falk Co., 147 WiS., 327; 133 NW, 209.) Embodying the spirit of the
present epoch, general provisions were inserted in the Constitution which are
intended to bring about the needed social and economic equilibrium between
component elements of society through the application of what may be termed as
the justitia communis advocated by Grotius and Leibnits many years ago to be
secured through the counterbalancing of economic and social forces and
opportunities which should be regulated, if not controlled, by the State or placed,
as it were, in custodia societatis.'The promotion of social justice to in sure the well-
being and economic security of all the people 'was thus inserted as vital principle
in our Constitution. (Sec. 5, Art. II, Constitution.) And in order that this declaration
of principle may not just be an empty medley of words, the Constitution in various
sections thereof has provided the means towards its realization. For instance,
section 6 of Article XIII declares that the State 'shall afford protection to labor,
especially to working women and minors, and shall regulate the relations between
landowner and tenant, and between labor and capital in industry and in
agriculture.' The same section also states that 'the State may provide for
compulsory arbitration.' In extraordinary cases mentioned in section 16, Article VI,
of the Constitution, the President of the Philippines may be authorized by law, for a
limited period and subject to such restrictions as the National Assembly may
prescribe, to 'promulgate rules and regulations to carry out a declared national
policy. ' Albeit, almost at the same time the Congress of the United States approved
the National Labor Regulations Act (49 Stat., 449) on July 5, 1935, commonly
known as the Wagner Act, we were in the Philippines headway towards the
adoption of our fundamental law, pursuant to congressional authority given in the
Tydings-McDuffie Independence Act, approved March 24, 1934. In our Bill of
Rights we now find the following provision 'The right to form associations or
societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged. ' (Par. 6, section 1,
art. III, Constitution.) What was an agitation in the United States which brought
about the recommendation by the Commission on Industrial Relations created by
an Act of Congress in 1912 for the adoption of a Labor Bill of Rights as an
amendment to the United States Constitution is, in our case, virtually an accepted
principle, which may be expanded and vitalized by legislation to keep pace with
the development of time and circumstances. pursuant to congressional authority
given in the Tydings-McDuffie Independence Act, approved March 24, 1934. In
our Bill of Rights we now find the following provision 'The right to form
associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be
abridged.' (Par. 6, section 1, art. III, Constitution.) What was an agitation in the
United States which brought about the recommendation by the Commission on
Industrial Relations created by an Act of Congress in 1912 for the adoption of a
Labor Bill of Rights as an amendment to the United States Constitution is, in our
case, virtually an accepted principle, which may be expanded and vitalized by
legislation to keep pace with the development of time and circumstances. pursuant
to congressional authority given in the Tydings-McDuffie Independence Act,
approved March 24, 1934. In our Bill of Rights we now find the following
provision 'The right to form associations or societies for purposes not contrary to
law shall not be abridged.' (Par. 6, section 1, art. III, Constitution.) What was an
agitation in the United States which brought about the recommendation by the
Commission on Industrial Relations created by an Act of Congress in 1912 for the
adoption of a Labor Bill of Rights as an amendment to the United States
Constitution is, in our case, virtually an accepted principle, which may be
expanded and vitalized by legislation to keep pace with the development of time
and circumstances. In our Bill of Rights we now find the following provision 'The
right to form associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be
abridged.' (Par. 6, section 1, art. III, Constitution.) What was an agitation in the
United States which brought about the recommendation by the Commission on
Industrial Relations created by an Act of Congress in 1912 for the adoption of a
Labor Bill of Rights as an amendment to the United States Constitution is, in our
case, virtually an accepted principle, which may be expanded and vitalized by
legislation to keep pace with the development of time and circumstances. In our
Bill of Rights we now find the following provision 'The right to form associations
or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged.' (Par. 6, section
1, art. III, Constitution.) What was an agitation in the United States which brought
about the recommendation by the Commission on Industrial Relations created by
an Act of Congress in 1912 for the adoption of a Labor Bill of Rights as an
amendment to the United States Constitution is, in our case, virtually an accepted
principle, which may be expanded and vitalized by legislation to keep pace with
the development of time and circumstances.

'An Act to define and regulate legitimate labor organizations.' (As to this last act,
vide 'findings and policy,' preamble [sec. 1] of the Wagner Act [49 Sta., 449]).

"Commonwealth Act No. 103, .approved October 29, 1936, was originally Bill No.
700 of the National Assembly. More light is shed by the explanatory statement of
the Bill than by what transpired in the course of the deliberation of the measure in
the legislative chamber. 'This bill,' thus begins the explanatory statement of Bill
No. 700, 'creates an Industrial Relations Board ... and provides for mandatory
arbitration ... in accordance with Article 6, Title XIII of the Constitution, which
provides that "The State may establish mandatory arbitration." "Incorporating the
conclusion reached by a committee appointed, a year or so before it was observed
that 'under current legislation'" - evidently referring to Act No. 4055 - 'there is no
adequate instrument to prevent strikes. The Department of Labor merely plays the
role of peacemaker between the parties in dispute and its decisions are not binding
on either the employers or the workers. The people have reached a degree of
industrial development, which makes it imperative that the government's
intervention in these conflicts be more effective. . . ' The creation of a Court of
Industrial Relations was thus proposed, endowed "not only of the power to
arbitrate but also of the duty to investigate, decide, and make recommendations on
the issues in conflict and the problems that affect Capital and Labor in Industry and
Agriculture under the direction of the President of the Commonwealth of the
Philippines or at the request of the Secretary of Labor. ' which makes it imperative
that the government's intervention in these conflicts be more effective. . . ' The
creation of a Court of Industrial Relations was thus proposed, endowed "not only
of the power to arbitrate but also of the duty to investigate, decide, and make
recommendations on the issues in conflict and the problems that affect Capital and
Labor in Industry and Agriculture under the direction of the President of the
Commonwealth of the Philippines or at the request of the Secretary of Labor.
' which makes it imperative that the government's intervention in these conflicts be
more effective. . . ' The creation of a Court of Industrial Relations was thus
proposed, endowed "not only of the power to arbitrate but also of the duty to
investigate, decide, and make recommendations on the issues in conflict and the
problems that affect Capital and Labor in Industry and Agriculture under the
direction of the President of the Commonwealth of the Philippines or at the request
of the Secretary of Labor. '

xxx

In the United States labor legislation has undergone a long process of development
too long to narrate here, culminating in the enactments of what were commonly
known as the Clayton Act, the Norris-La Guardia Act, and finally, the Wagner Act
and the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938. The Wagner Act created the National
Labor Relations Board as an instrumentality of the Federal Government in the
settlement of labor disputes, which device is aimed at the avoidance of unnecessary
friction between labor and capital and the establishment of industrial
peace. Scrutiny of legislation in that country and of pronouncements made by its
Supreme Court reveals a continuous renovation and change made necessary by the
impact of changing needs and economic pressure brought about by the irrisistible
momentum of new social and economic forces developed there. In the light of
changes that have occurred, it is doubted if the pronouncements made by the said
Supreme Court in 1905 (Lochner v. New York, 198, US, 45) or in 1908 (Adair v.
US, 52 Law. Ed. 430, 208 US, 161, and Coppage v. Kansas, 236 US, 1) - cases
which are relied upon by the petitioner in its printed memorandum - still retain
their virtuality at the present time. In the Philippines, social legislation has had a
similar development, although of course to a much smaller degree and of different
adaptation giving rise to several attempts at meeting and solving our peculiar social
and economic problems. (See Commonwealth Acts Nos. 37, 104, 139, 211;
Presidential Message to the National Assembly, September 2, 1936; Executive
Order No. 49, S. 1936). The system of voluntary arbitration devised by Act
No. 4055 of the defunct Philippine Legislature has apparently been abandoned by
the enactment of the aforementioned Commonwealth Acts Nos. 103 and 213. In
the midst of changes that have taken place, it may likewise be doubted if the
pronouncement made by this court in the case of People v. Pomar (46 Phil., 440) -
also relied upon by the petitioner in its printed memorandum - still retains its
virtuality as a living principle. The policy of laissez faire has to some extent given
way to the assumption by the government of the right of intervention even in
contractual relations affected with public interests. " it may likewise be doubted if
the pronouncement made by this court in the case of People v. Pomar (46 Phil.,
440) - also relied upon by the petitioner in its printed memorandum - still retains its
virtuality as a living principle. The policy of laissez faire has to some extent given
way to the assumption by the government of the right of intervention even in
contractual relations affected with public interests. " it may likewise be doubted if
the pronouncement made by this court in the case of People v. Pomar (46 Phil.,
440) - also relied upon by the petitioner in its printed memorandum - still retains its
virtuality as a living principle. The policy of laissez faire has to some extent given
way to the assumption by the government of the right of intervention even in
contractual relations affected with public interests. " cralaw virtua1aw library

xxx

"In Commonwealth Act No. 103, and by it, our Government no longer performs
the role of a mere mediator or intervenor but that of the supreme arbiter." cralaw virtua1aw library

In her next error, the appellant alleges that the conduct of the investigator, the
investigation that she carried out, and the way the Industrial Relations Court heard
the matter deprived her of an impartial and fair hearing, and constituted deprivation
of her property without due process. Of law. To demonstrate the lack of foundation
of the error, we believe it is sufficient to reproduce below the way in which the
investigation was carried out by the commissioner appointed by the Industrial
Relations Court and the way in which the hearing was held by said court, as set out
in the order of May 6, 1939.

"Hearing was held on April 3, 1939, where witnesses for both the petitioners and
the respondent testified. To supplement the facts brought out at the hearing, the
Court ordered one of its Special Agents to proceed to the premises of the mines to
conduct a further investigation. "cralaw virtua1aw library

The commissioner was appointed by the Industrial Relations Tribunal in the

exercise of its power conferred by article 10 of Commonwealth Law No. 103 and
in the inspection and hearings held by the commissioner and the court,
respectively, the parties were duly represented , they were heard and presented the
evidence that they had available and believed it convenient to offer. Such
inspection and hearings had the character of an impartial and fair judicial hearing
and constitute the due process of law guaranteed by the Constitution.

The appellant also maintains that the order of May 6, 1939 is arbitrary because
there is no substantial or competent evidence to support it. On this point, the
findings of fact established by the Industrial Relations Tribunal show that the
contested order is supported by the result of the investigation carried out by the
commissioner and the evidence that the parties presented directly to the
Tribunal. In these conclusions, all the evidence presented by the parties has been
considered and analyzed by the Industrial Relations Tribunal and the conclusion
that the order is not arbitrary and is justified and supported by the proven facts is
inevitable.

The last signaling of error is related to the part of the order of May 6, 1939 that
provides that the appellant pay the 55 replacement workers the wages they ceased
to receive during their separation from service. The appellant maintains that this
part of the order amounts to a judgment for damages that the Industrial Relations
Tribunal cannot pronounce due to lack of jurisdiction. The claim is not
meritorious. The Industrial Relations Court, as has already been said, is a special
court and as such has the power to order the appellant to pay the wages of its
employees and workers who have been replaced. Articles 1 and 4 of
Commonwealth Law No. 103, as the first one has been amended by Article 1 of
Law No. 254,

The certiorari appeal is denied and the order of May 6, 1939 and the resolution of
August 17 of the same year are confirmed, with the costs to the appellant. So
ordered.

Avanceña, Diaz, Laurel, and Moran, MM., Are satisfied.