G.R. No.

L-46496 February 27, 1940

ANG TIBAY, represented by TORIBIO TEODORO, manager and propietor, and
NATIONAL WORKERS BROTHERHOOD, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and NATIONAL LABOR UNION, INC., respondents.
he respondent National Labor Union, Inc., on the other hand, prays for the vacation of the judgement rendered by the majority of this Court and the
remanding of the case to the Court of Industrial Relations for a new trial, and avers:
1. That Toribio Teodoro's claim that on September 26, 1938, there was shortage of leather soles in ANG TIBAY making it necessary for him to
temporarily lay off the members of the National Labor Union Inc., is entirely false and unsupported by the records of the Bureau of Customs
and the Books of Accounts of native dealers in leather.
2. That the supposed lack of leather materials claimed by Toribio Teodoro was but a scheme to systematically prevent the forfeiture of this bond
despite the breach of his CONTRACT with the Philippine Army.
3. That Toribio Teodoro's letter to the Philippine Army dated September 29, 1938, (re supposed delay of leather soles from the States) was but a
scheme to systematically prevent the forfeiture of this bond despite the breach of his CONTRACT with the Philippine Army.
4. That the National Worker's Brotherhood of ANG TIBAY is a company or employer union dominated by Toribio Teodoro, the existence and
functions of which are illegal. (281 U.S., 548, petitioner's printed memorandum, p. 25.)
5. That in the exercise by the laborers of their rights to collective bargaining, majority rule and elective representation are highly essential and
indispensable. (Sections 2 and 5, Commonwealth Act No. 213.)
6. That the century provisions of the Civil Code which had been (the) principal source of dissensions and continuous civil war in Spain cannot
and should not be made applicable in interpreting and applying the salutary provisions of a modern labor legislation of American origin where
the industrial peace has always been the rule.
7. That the employer Toribio Teodoro was guilty of unfair labor practice for discriminating against the National Labor Union, Inc., and unjustly
favoring the National Workers' Brotherhood.
8. That the exhibits hereto attached are so inaccessible to the respondents that even with the exercise of due diligence they could not be expected
to have obtained them and offered as evidence in the Court of Industrial Relations.
9. That the attached documents and exhibits are of such far-reaching importance and effect that their admission would necessarily mean the
modification and reversal of the judgment rendered herein.
nd in the light of this legislative policy, appeals to this Court have been especially regulated by the rules recently promulgated by the rules recently
promulgated by this Court to carry into the effect the avowed legislative purpose. The fact, however, that the Court of Industrial Relations may be said
to be free from the rigidity of certain procedural requirements does not mean that it can, in justifiable cases before it, entirely ignore or disregard the
fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trials and investigations of an administrative character. There are primary rights which
must be respected even in proceedings of this character:
(1) The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his own case and
submit evidence in support thereof. In the language of Chief Hughes, in Morgan v. U.S., 304 U.S. 1, 58 S. Ct. 773, 999, 82 Law. ed. 1129, "the
liberty and property of the citizen shall be protected by the rudimentary requirements of fair play.
(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts
but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented. (Chief Justice Hughes in Morgan v. U.S. 298 U.S. 468, 56 S. Ct. 906, 80 law. ed. 1288.)
In the language of this court in Edwards vs. McCoy, 22 Phil., 598, "the right to adduce evidence, without the corresponding duty on the part of
the board to consider it, is vain. Such right is conspicuously futile if the person or persons to whom the evidence is presented can thrust it aside
without notice or consideration."
(3) "While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely,
that of having something to support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached." (Edwards vs. McCoy, supra.) This principle emanates from
the more fundamental is contrary to the vesting of unlimited power anywhere. Law is both a grant and a limitation upon power.
(4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion (City of Manila vs. Agustin, G.R. No. 45844, promulgated
November 29, 1937, XXXVI O. G. 1335), but the evidence must be "substantial." (Washington, Virginia and Maryland Coach Co. v. national
labor Relations Board, 301 U.S. 142, 147, 57 S. Ct. 648, 650, 81 Law. ed. 965.) It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind accept as
adequate to support a conclusion." (Appalachian Electric Power v. National Labor Relations Board, 4 Cir., 93 F. 2d 985, 989; National Labor
Relations Board v. Thompson Products, 6 Cir., 97 F. 2d 13, 15; Ballston-Stillwater Knitting Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 2 Cir., 98 F.
2d 758, 760.) . . . The statute provides that "the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law and equity shall not be controlling.' The obvious
purpose of this and similar provisions is to free administrative boards from the compulsion of technical rules so that the mere admission of
matter which would be deemed incompetent inn judicial proceedings would not invalidate the administrative order. (Interstate Commerce
Commission v. Baird, 194 U.S. 25, 44, 24 S. Ct. 563, 568, 48 Law. ed. 860; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville and Nashville R.
Co., 227 U.S. 88, 93 33 S. Ct. 185, 187, 57 Law. ed. 431; United States v. Abilene and Southern Ry. Co. S. Ct. 220, 225, 74 Law. ed. 624.) But
this assurance of a desirable flexibility in administrative procedure does not go far as to justify orders without a basis in evidence having
rational probative force. Mere uncorroborated hearsay or rumor does not constitute substantial evidence. (Consolidated Edison Co. v. National
Labor Relations Board, 59 S. Ct. 206, 83 Law. ed. No. 4, Adv. Op., p. 131.)"
(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties
affected. (Interstate Commence Commission vs. L. & N. R. Co., 227 U.S. 88, 33 S. Ct. 185, 57 Law. ed. 431.) Only by confining the
administrative tribunal to the evidence disclosed to the parties, can the latter be protected in their right to know and meet the case against them.
It should not, however, detract from their duty actively to see that the law is enforced, and for that purpose, to use the authorized legal methods
of securing evidence and informing itself of facts material and relevant to the controversy. Boards of inquiry may be appointed for the purpose
of investigating and determining the facts in any given case, but their report and decision are only advisory. (Section 9, Commonwealth Act No.
 103.) The Court of Industrial Relations may refer any industrial or agricultural dispute or any matter under its consideration or advisement to a
local board of inquiry, a provincial fiscal. a justice of the peace or any public official in any part of the Philippines for investigation, report and
recommendation, and may delegate to such board or public official such powers and functions as the said Court of Industrial Relations may
deem necessary, but such delegation shall not affect the exercise of the Court itself of any of its powers. (Section 10, ibid.)
(6) The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own independent consideration of the law and facts of
the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision. It may be that the volume of work is such that it is
literally Relations personally to decide all controversies coming before them. In the United States the difficulty is solved with the enactment of
statutory authority authorizing examiners or other subordinates to render final decision, with the right to appeal to board or commission, but in
our case there is no such statutory authority.
(7) The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding
can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decision rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority
conferred upon it.
In the right of the foregoing fundamental principles, it is sufficient to observe here that, except as to the alleged agreement between the Ang Tibay and the
National Worker's Brotherhood (appendix A), the record is barren and does not satisfy the thirst for a factual basis upon which to predicate, in a national
way, a conclusion of law.
This result, however, does not now preclude the concession of a new trial prayed for the by respondent National Labor Union, Inc., it is alleged that "the
supposed lack of material claimed by Toribio Teodoro was but a scheme adopted to systematically discharged all the members of the National Labor Union
Inc., from work" and this avernment is desired to be proved by the petitioner with the "records of the Bureau of Customs and the Books of Accounts of
native dealers in leather"; that "the National Workers Brotherhood Union of Ang Tibay is a company or employer union dominated by Toribio Teodoro, the
existence and functions of which are illegal." Petitioner further alleges under oath that the exhibits attached to the petition to prove his substantial
avernments" are so inaccessible to the respondents that even within the exercise of due diligence they could not be expected to have obtained them and
offered as evidence in the Court of Industrial Relations", and that the documents attached to the petition "are of such far reaching importance and effect that
their admission would necessarily mean the modification and reversal of the judgment rendered herein." We have considered the reply of Ang Tibay and its
arguments against the petition. By and large, after considerable discussions, we have come to the conclusion that the interest of justice would be better
served if the movant is given opportunity to present at the hearing the documents referred to in his motion and such other evidence as may be relevant to
the main issue involved. The legislation which created the Court of Industrial Relations and under which it acts is new. The failure to grasp the fundamental
issue involved is not entirely attributable to the parties adversely affected by the result. Accordingly, the motion for a new trial should be and the same is
hereby granted, and the entire record of this case shall be remanded to the Court of Industrial Relations, with instruction that it reopen the case, receive all
such evid

[G.R. No. 117565. November 18, 1997]

ARSENIO P. LUMIQUED (deceased), Regional Director, DAR CAR, Represented by his Heirs, Francisca A. Lumiqued, May A. Lumiqued, Arlene A.
Lumiqued and Richard A. Lumiqued, petitioners, vs. Honorable APOLINIO G. EXEVEA, ERDOLFO V. BALAJADIA and FELIX T. CABADING, ALL
Members of Investigating Committee, created by DOJ Order No. 145 on May 30, 1992; HON. FRANKLIN M. DRILON, SECRETARY OF JUSTICE,
HON. ANTONIO T. CARPIO, CHIEF Presidential Legal Adviser/Counsel; and HON. LEONARDO A. QUISIMBING, Senior Deputy Executive Secretary
of the Office of the President, and JEANNETTE OBAR-ZAMUDIO, Private Respondent, respondents.
DECISION
ROMERO, J.:
Does the due process clause encompass the right to be assisted by counsel during an administrative inquiry?
Arsenio P. Lumiqued was the Regional Director of the Department of Agrarian Reform Cordillera Autonomous Region (DAR-CAR) until President Fidel
V. Ramos dismissed him from that position pursuant to Administrative Order No. 52 dated May 12, 1993. In view of Lumiqueds death on May 19, 1994,
his heirs instituted this petition for certiorari and mandamus, questioning such order.
The dismissal was the aftermath of three complaints filed by DAR-CAR Regional Cashier and private respondent Jeannette Obar-Zamudio with the Board
of Discipline of the DAR. The first affidavit-complaint dated November 16, 1989,[1] charged Lumiqued with malversation through falsification of official
documents. From May to September 1989, Lumiqued allegedly committed at least 93 counts of falsification by padding gasoline receipts. He even
submitted a vulcanizing shop receipt worth P550.00 for gasoline bought from the shop, and another receipt for P660.00 for a single vulcanizing job. With
the use of falsified receipts, Lumiqued claimed and was reimbursed the sum of P44,172.46. Private respondent added that Lumiqued seldom made field
trips and preferred to stay in the office, making it impossible for him to consume the nearly 120 liters of gasoline he claimed everyday.
In her second affidavit-complaint dated November 22, 1989,[2] private respondent accused Lumiqued with violation of Commission on Audit (COA) rules
and regulations, alleging that during the months of April, May, July, August, September and October, 1989, he made unliquidated cash advances in the total
amount of P116,000.00. Lumiqued purportedly defrauded the government by deliberately concealing his unliquidated cash advances through the
falsification of accounting entries in order not to reflect on `Cash advances of other officials under code 8-70-600 of accounting rules.
The third affidavit-complaint dated December 15, 1989,[3] charged Lumiqued with oppression and harassment. According to private respondent, her two
previous complaints prompted Lumiqued to retaliate by relieving her from her post as Regional Cashier without just cause.
The three affidavit-complaints were referred in due course to the Department of Justice (DOJ) for appropriate action. On May 20, 1992, Acting Justice
Secretary Eduardo G. Montenegro issued Department Order No. 145 creating a committee to investigate the complaints against Lumiqued. The order
appointed Regional State Prosecutor Apolinario Exevea as committee chairman with City Prosecutor Erdolfo Balajadia and Provincial Prosecutor Felix
Cabading as members. They were mandated to conduct an investigation within thirty days from receipt of the order, and to submit their report and
recommendation within fifteen days from its conclusion.
The investigating committee accordingly issued a subpoena directing Lumiqued to submit his counter-affidavit on or before June 17, 1992. Lumiqued,
however, filed instead an urgent motion to defer submission of his counter-affidavit pending actual receipt of two of private respondents complaints. The
committee granted the motion and gave him a five-day extension.
In his counter-affidavit dated June 23, 1992,[4] Lumiqued alleged, inter alia, that the cases were filed against him to extort money from innocent public
servants like him, and were initiated by private respondent in connivance with a certain Benedict Ballug of Tarlac and a certain Benigno Aquino III. He
claimed that the apparent weakness of the charge was bolstered by private respondents execution of an affidavit of desistance.[5]
Lumiqued admitted that his average daily gasoline consumption was 108.45 liters. He submitted, however, that such consumption was warranted as it was
the aggregate consumption of the five service vehicles issued under his name and intended for the use of the Office of the Regional Director of the DAR.
He added that the receipts which were issued beyond his region were made in the course of his travels to Ifugao Province, the DAR Central Office in
Diliman, Quezon City, and Laguna, where he attended a seminar. Because these receipts were merely turned over to him by drivers for reimbursement, it
was not his obligation but that of auditors and accountants to determine whether they were falsified. He affixed his signature on the receipts only to signify
that the same were validly issued by the establishments concerned in order that official transactions of the DAR-CAR could be carried out.
Explaining why a vulcanizing shop issued a gasoline receipt, Lumiqued said that he and his companions were cruising along Santa Fe, Nueva Vizcaya on
their way to Ifugao when their service vehicle ran out of gas. Since it was almost midnight, they sought the help of the owner of a vulcanizing shop who
readily furnished them with the gasoline they needed. The vulcanizing shop issued its own receipt so that they could reimburse the cost of the gasoline.
Domingo Lucero, the owner of said vulcanizing shop, corroborated this explanation in an affidavit dated June 25, 1990.[6] With respect to the accusation
that he sought reimbursement in the amount of P660.00 for one vulcanizing job, Lumiqued submitted that the amount was actually only P6.60. Any error
committed in posting the amount in the books of the Regional Office was not his personal error or accountability.
To refute private respondents allegation that he violated COA rules and regulations in incurring unliquidated cash advances in the amount of P116,000.00,
Lumiqued presented a certification[7] of DAR-CAR Administrative Officer Deogracias F. Almora that he had no outstanding cash advances on record as of
December 31, 1989.
In disputing the charges of oppression and harassment against him, Lumiqued contended that private respondent was not terminated from the service but
was merely relieved of her duties due to her prolonged absences. While admitting that private respondent filed the required applications for leave of
absence, Lumiqued claimed that the exigency of the service necessitated disapproval of her application for leave of absence. He allegedly rejected her
second application for leave of absence in view of her failure to file the same immediately with the head office or upon her return to work. He also asserted
that no medical certificate supported her application for leave of absence.
In the same counter-affidavit, Lumiqued also claimed that private respondent was corrupt and dishonest because a COA examination revealed that her cash
accountabilities from June 22 to November 23, 1989, were short by P30,406.87. Although private respondent immediately returned the amount on January
18, 1990, the day following the completion of the cash examination, Lumiqued claimed that she should be relieved from her duties and assigned to jobs
that would not require handling of cash and money matters.
Committee hearings on the complaints were conducted on July 3 and 10, 1992, but Lumiqued was not assisted by counsel. On the second hearing date, he
moved for its resetting to July 17, 1992, to enable him to employ the services of counsel. The committee granted the motion, but neither Lumiqued nor his
counsel appeared on the date he himself had chosen, so the committee deemed the case submitted for resolution.
On August 12, 1992, Lumiqued filed an urgent motion for additional hearing,[8] alleging that he suffered a stroke on July 10, 1992. The motion was
forwarded to the Office of the State Prosecutor apparently because the investigation had already been terminated. In an order dated September 7, 1992,[9]
State Prosecutor Zoila C. Montero denied the motion, viz:
The medical certificate given show(s) that respondent was discharged from the Sacred Heart Hospital on July 17, 1992, the date of the hearing, which date
was upon the request of respondent (Lumiqued). The records do not disclose that respondent advised the Investigating committee of his confinement and
inability to attend despite his discharge, either by himself or thru counsel. The records likewise do not show that efforts were exerted to notify the
Committee of respondents condition on any reasonable date after July 17, 1992. It is herein noted that as early as June 23, 1992, respondent was already
being assisted by counsel.
Moreover an evaluation of the counter-affidavit submitted reveal(s) the sufficiency, completeness and thoroughness of the counter-affidavit together with
the documentary evidence annexed thereto, such that a judicious determination of the case based on the pleadings submitted is already possible.
Moreover, considering that the complaint-affidavit was filed as far back as November 16, 1989 yet, justice can not be delayed much longer.
Following the conclusion of the hearings, the investigating committee rendered a report dated July 31, 1992,[10] finding Lumiqued liable for all the
charges against him. It made the following findings:
After a thorough evaluation of the evidences (sic) submitted by the parties, this committee finds the evidence submitted by the complainant sufficient to
establish the guilt of the respondent for Gross Dishonesty and Grave Misconduct.
That most of the gasoline receipts used by the respondent in claiming for the reimbursement of his gasoline expenses were falsified is clearly established
by the 15 Certified Xerox Copies of the duplicate receipts (Annexes G-1 to G-15) and the certifications issued by the different gasoline stations where the
respondent purchased gasoline. Annexes `G-1 to `G-15 show that the actual average purchase made by the respondent is about 8.46 liters only at a purchase
price of P50.00, in contrast to the receipts used by the respondent which reflects an average of 108.45 liters at a purchase price of P550.00. Here, the greed
of the respondent is made manifest by his act of claiming reimbursements of more than 10 times the value of what he actually spends. While only 15 of the
gasoline receipts were ascertained to have been falsified, the motive, the pattern and the scheme employed by the respondent in defrauding the government
has, nevertheless, been established.
That the gasoline receipts have been falsified was not rebutted by the respondent. In fact, he had in effect admitted that he had been claiming for the
payment of an average consumption of 108.45 liters/day by justifying that this was being used by the 4 vehicles issued to his office. Besides he also
admitted having signed the receipts.
Respondents act in defrauding the government of a considerable sum of money by falsifying receipts constitutes not only Dishonesty of a high degree but
also a criminal offense for Malversation through Falsification of Official Documents.
This committee likewise finds that the respondent have (sic) unliquidated cash advances in the year 1989 which is in violation of established office and
auditing rules. His cash advances totalling to about P116,000.00 were properly documented. The requests for obligation of allotments and the vouchers
covering the amounts were all signed by him. The mere certification issued by the Administrative Officer of the DAR-CAR cannot therefore rebut these
concrete evidences (sic).
On the third complaint, this committee likewise believes that the respondents act in relieving the complainant of her functions as a Regional Cashier on
December 1, 1989 was an act of harassment. It is noted that this was done barely two weeks after the complainant filed charges against her (sic). The
recommendation of Jose G. Medina of the Commission on Audit came only on May 11, 1990 or almost six months after the respondents order relieving the
complainant was issued. His act in harassing a subordinate employee in retaliation to a complaint she filed constitute(s) Gross Misconduct on the part of
the respondent who is a head of office.
The affidavits of Joseph In-uyay and Josefina Guting are of no help to the respondent. In fact, this only show(s) that he is capable of giving bribes if only to
have the cases against him dismissed. He could not have given a certain Benigno Aquino III the sum of P10,000.00 for any other purpose.
Accordingly, the investigating committee recommended Lumiqueds dismissal or removal from office, without prejudice to the filing of the appropriate
criminal charges against him.
Acting on the report and recommendation, former Justice Secretary Franklin M. Drilon adopted the same in his Memorandum to President Fidel V. Ramos
dated October 22, 1992. He added that the filing of the affidavit of desistance[11] would not prevent the issuance of a resolution on the matter considering
that what was at stake was not only the violation of complainants (herein private respondents) personal rights but also the competence and fitness of the
respondent (Lumiqued) to remain in public office. He opined that, in fact, the evidence on record could call for a punitive action against the respondent on
the initiative of the DAR.
On December 17, 1992, Lumiqued filed a motion for reconsideration of the findings of the Committee with the DOJ.[12] Undersecretary Ramon S.
Esguerra indorsed the motion to the investigating committee.[13] In a letter dated April 1, 1993, the three-member investigating committee informed
Undersecretary Esguerra that the committee had no more authority to act on the same (motion for reconsideration) considering that the matter has already
been forwarded to the Office of the President and that their authority under Department Order No. 145 ceased when they transmitted their report to the
DOJ.[14] Concurring with this view, Undersecretary Esguerra informed Lumiqued that the investigating committee could no longer act on his motion for
reconsideration. He added that the motion was also prematurely filed because the Office of the President (OP) had yet to act on Secretary Drilons
recommendation.[15]
On May 12, 1993, President Fidel V. Ramos himself issued Administrative Order No. 52 (A.O. No. 52),[16] finding Lumiqued administratively liable for
dishonesty in the alteration of fifteen gasoline receipts, and dismissing him from the service, with forfeiture of his retirement and other benefits. Thus:
That the receipts were merely turned over to him by his drivers and that the auditor and accountant of the DAR-CAR should be the ones to be held liable is
untenable. The receipts in question were signed by respondent for the purpose of attesting that those receipts were validly issued by the commercial
establishments and were properly disbursed and used in the official business for which it was intended.
This Office is not about to shift the blame for all these to the drivers employed by the DAR-CAR as respondent would want us to do.
The OP, however, found that the charges of oppression and harassment, as well as that of incurring unliquidated cash advances, were not satisfactorily
established.
In a petition for appeal[17] addressed to President Ramos, Lumiqued prayed that A.O. No. 52 be reconsidered and that he be reinstated to his former
position with all the benefits accorded to him by law and existing rules and regulations. This petition was basically premised on the affidavit dated May 27,
1993, of a certain Dwight L. Lumiqued, a former driver of the DAR-CAR, who confessed to having authored the falsification of gasoline receipts and
attested to petitioner Lumiqueds being an honest man who had no premonition that the receipts he (Dwight) turned over to him were altered.[18]
Treating the petition for appeal as a motion for the reconsideration of A.O. No. 52, the OP, through Senior Deputy Executive Secretary Leonardo A.
Quisumbing, denied the same on August 31, 1993.
Undaunted, Lumiqued filed a second motion for reconsideration, alleging, among other things, that he was denied the constitutional right to counsel during
the hearing.[19] On May 19, 1994,[20] however, before his motion could be resolved, Lumiqued died. On September 28, 1994,[21] Secretary Quisumbing
denied the second motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.
Hence, the instant petition for certiorari and mandamus praying for the reversal of the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Committee, the
October 22, 1992, Memorandum of then Justice Secretary Drilon, A.O. No. 52 issued by President Ramos, and the orders of Secretary Quisumbing. In a
nutshell, it prays for the payment of retirement benefits and other benefits accorded to deceased Arsenio Lumiqued by law, payable to his heirs; and the
backwages from the period he was dismissed from service up to the time of his death on May 19, 1994.[22]
Petitioners fault the investigating committee for its failure to inform Lumiqued of his right to counsel during the hearing. They maintain that his right to
counsel could not be waived unless the waiver was in writing and in the presence of counsel. They assert that the committee should have suspended the
hearing and granted Lumiqued a reasonable time within which to secure a counsel of his own. If suspension was not possible, the committee should have
appointed a counsel de oficio to assist him.
These arguments are untenable and misplaced. The right to counsel, which cannot be waived unless the waiver is in writing and in the presence of counsel,
is a right afforded a suspect or an accused during custodial investigation.[23] It is not an absolute right and may, thus, be invoked or rejected in a criminal
proceeding and, with more reason, in an administrative inquiry. In the case at bar, petitioners invoke the right of an accused in criminal proceedings to have
competent and independent counsel of his own choice. Lumiqued, however, was not accused of any crime in the proceedings below. The investigation
conducted by the committee created by Department Order No. 145 was for the purpose of determining if he could be held administratively liable under the
law for the complaints filed against him. The order issued by Acting Secretary of Justice Montenegro states thus:
In the interest of the public service and pursuant to the provisions of existing laws, a Committee to conduct the formal investigation of the administrative
complaint for oppression, dishonesty, disgraceful and immoral conduct, being notoriously undesirable and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service against Mr. ARSENIO P. LUMIQUED, Regional Director, Department of Agrarian Reform, Cordillera Autonomous Region, is hereby created x x
x.[24]
As such, the hearing conducted by the investigating committee was not part of a criminal prosecution. This was even made more pronounced when, after
finding Lumiqued administratively liable, it hinted at the filing of criminal case for malversation through falsification of public documents in its report and
recommendation.
Petitioners misconception on the nature of the investigation [25] conducted against Lumiqued appears to have been engendered by the fact that the DOJ
conducted it. While it is true that under the Administrative Code of 1987, the DOJ shall administer the criminal justice system in accordance with the
accepted processes thereof consisting in the investigation of the crimes, prosecution of offenders and administration of the correctional system,[26]
conducting criminal investigations is not its sole function. By its power to perform such other functions as may be provided by law, [27] prosecutors may
be called upon to conduct administrative investigations. Accordingly, the investigating committee created by Department Order No. 145 was duty-bound to
conduct the administrative investigation in accordance with the rules therefor.
While investigations conducted by an administrative body may at times be akin to a criminal proceeding, the fact remains that under existing laws, a party
in an administrative inquiry may or may not be assisted by counsel, irrespective of the nature of the charges and of the respondents capacity to represent
himself and no duty rests on such a body to furnish the person being investigated with counsel.[28] In an administrative proceeding such as the one that
transpired below, a respondent (such as Lumiqued) has the option of engaging the services of counsel or not. This is clear from the provisions of Section
32, Article VII of Republic Act No. 2260[29] (otherwise known as the Civil Service Act) and Section 39, paragraph 2, Rule XIV (on discipline) of the
Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292[30] (otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987). Excerpts from the
transcript of stenographic notes of the hearings attended by Lumiqued[31] clearly show that he was confident of his capacity and so opted to represent
himself. Thus, the right to counsel is not imperative in administrative investigations because such inquiries are conducted merely to determine whether
there are facts that merit disciplinary measures against erring public officers and employees, with the purpose of maintaining the dignity of government
service.
Furthermore, petitioners reliance on Resolution No. 94-0521 of the Civil Service Commission on the Uniform Procedure in the Conduct of Administrative
Investigation stating that a respondent in an administrative complaint must be informed of his right to the assistance of a counsel of his choice,[32] is
inappropriate. In the first place, this resolution is applicable only to cases brought before the Civil Service Commission.[33] Secondly, said resolution,
which is dated January 25, 1994, took effect fifteen days following its publication in a newspaper of general circulation,[34] much later than the July 1992
hearings of the investigating committee created by Department Order No. 145. Thirdly, the same committee was not remiss in the matter of reminding
Lumiqued of his right to counsel. Thus at the July 3, 1992, hearing, Lumiqued was repeatedly appraised of his option to secure services of counsel:

Furthermore Sir, I am now being bothered by my heart ailment.[38]

The hearing was reset to July 17, 1992, the date when Lumiqued was released from the hospital. Prior to said date, however, Lumiqued did not inform the
committee of his confinement. Consequently, because the hearing could not push through on said date, and Lumiqued had already submitted his counter-
affidavit, the committee decided to wind up the proceedings. This did not mean, however, that Lumiqued was short-changed in his right to due process.
Lumiqued, a Regional Director of a major department in the executive branch of the government, graduated from the University of the Philippines (Los
Baos) with the degree of Bachelor of Science major in Agriculture, was a recipient of various scholarships and grants, and underwent training seminars
both here and abroad.[39] Hence, he could have defended himself if need be, without the help of counsel, if truth were on his side. This, apparently, was
the thought he entertained during the hearings he was able to attend. In his statement, That is my concern, one could detect that it had been uttered testily, if
not exasperatedly, because of the doubt or skepticism implicit in the question, You are confident that you will be able to represent yourself? despite his
having positively asserted earlier, Yes, I am confident. He was obviously convinced that he could ably represent himself. Beyond repeatedly reminding him
that he could avail himself of counsel and as often receiving the reply that he is confident of his ability to defend himself, the investigating committee
could not do more. One can lead a horse to water but cannot make him drink.
The right to counsel is not indispensable to due process unless required by the Constitution or the law. In Nera v. Auditor General,[40] the Court said:
x x x. There is nothing in the Constitution that says that a party in a non-criminal proceeding is entitled to be represented by counsel and that, without such
representation, he shall not be bound by such proceedings. The assistance of lawyers, while desirable, is not indispensable. The legal profession was not
engrafted in the due process clause such that without the participation of its members, the safeguard is deemed ignored or violated. The ordinary citizen is
not that helpless that he cannot validly act at all except only with a lawyer at his side.
In administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to explain ones side. One may be heard, not solely by verbal
presentation but also, and perhaps even much more creditably as it is more practicable than oral arguments, through pleadings.[41] An actual hearing is not
always an indispensable aspect of due process.[42] As long as a party was given the opportunity to defend his interests in due course, he cannot be said to
have been denied due process of law, for this opportunity to be heard is the very essence of due process.[43] Moreover, this constitutional mandate is
deemed satisfied if a person is granted an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.[44] Lumiqueds appeal and his
subsequent filing of motions for reconsideration cured whatever irregularity attended the proceedings conducted by the committee.[45]
The constitutional provision on due process safeguards life, liberty and property.[46] In the early case of Cornejo v. Gabriel and Provincial Board of Rizal
[47] the Court held that a public office is not property within the sense of the constitutional guarantee of due process of law for it is a public trust or
agency. This jurisprudential pronoucement has been enshrined in the 1987 Constitution under Article XI, Section 1 on accountability of public officers, as
follows:
Section 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost
responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.
When the dispute concerns ones constitutional right to security of tenure, however, public office is deemed analogous to property in a limited sense; hence,
the right to due process could rightfully be invoked. Nonetheless, the right to security of tenure is not absolute. Of equal weight is the countervailing
mandate of the Constitution that all public officers and employees must serve with responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency.[48] In this case, it has
been clearly shown that Lumiqued did not live up to this constitutional precept.
The committees findings pinning culpability for the charges of dishonesty and grave misconduct upon Lumiqued were not, as shown above, fraught with
procedural mischief. Its conclusions were founded on the evidence presented and evaluated as facts. Well-settled in our jurisdiction is the doctrine that
findings of fact of administrative agencies must be respected as long as they are supported by substantial evidence, even if such evidence is not
overwhelming or preponderant.[49] The quantum of proof necessary for a finding of guilt in administrative cases is only substantial evidence or such
relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.[50]
Consequently, the adoption by Secretary Drilon and the OP of the committees recommendation of dismissal may not in any way be deemed tainted with
arbitrariness amounting to grave abuse of discretion. Government officials are presumed to perform their functions with regularity. Strong evidence is not
necessary to rebut that presumption,[51] which petitioners have not successfully disputed in the instant case.
Dishonesty is a grave offense penalized by dismissal under Section 23 of Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of the Administrative
Code of 1987. Under Section 9 of the same Rule, the penalty of dismissal carries with it cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of leave credits and retirement
benefits, and the disqualification for reemployment in the government service. The instant petition, which is aimed primarily at the payment of retirement
benefits and other benefits plus backwages from the time of Lumiqueds dismissal until his demise, must, therefore, fail.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari and mandamus is hereby DISMISSED and Administrative Order No. 52 of the Office of the President is
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
ZOILO ANTONIO VELEZ, A.C. No. 6697

Complainant, Bar Matter No. 1227

- versus - A.M. No. 05-5-15-SC

ATTY. LEONARD S. DE VERA, Present:

Respondent. PANGANIBAN, C. J.,

x-------------------------x PUNO,

RE: OATH-TAKING OF ATTY. LEONARD S. DE VERA, QUISUMBING,

INCOMING PRESIDENT OF THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE
PHILIPPINES
YNARES-SANTIAGO,

x-------------------------x
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,

IN THE MATTER OF THE REMOVAL OF ATTY. LEONARD S. DE

CARPIO,
VERA FROM THE IBP BOARD OF GOVERNORS AS
EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT AND GOVERNOR
MARTINEZ,
IN THE MATTER OF THE LETTER-COMPLAINT OF ATTY.
LEONARD S. DE VERA DATED MAY 18, 2005 TO FORTHWITH CORONA,
DENY/DISAPPROVE THE IBP RESOLUTION UNJUSTLY,
ILLEGALLY, ARBITRARILY, AND ABRUPTLY REMOVING HIM
FROM THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE IBP FOR CARPIO MORALES,
ABSOLUTE LACK OF BASIS AND FOR FLAGRANT DENIAL OF
DUE PROCESS. CALLEJO,

AZCUNA,

TINGA,

CHICO-NAZARIO,

GARCIA and

VELASCO JJ.

Promulgated:

July 25, 2006

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION
Per Curiam:
Before Us are three consolidated cases revolving around Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Governor and Executive Vice-President (EVP) Atty.
Leonard de Vera. The first pertains to a disbarment case questioning Atty. de Veras moral fitness to remain as a member of the Philippine Bar, the second
refers to Atty. de Veras letter-request to schedule his oath taking as IBP National President, and the third case concerns the validity of his removal as
Governor and EVP of the IBP by the IBP Board. The resolution of these cases will determine the national presidency of the IBP for the term 2005-2007.
A.C. No. 6697

The Office of the Bar Confidant, which this Court tasked to make an investigation, report and recommendation on subject case,[1] summarized the
antecedents thereof as follows:

In a Complaint dated 11 April 2005, complainant Zoilo Antonio Velez moved for the suspension and/or disbarment of respondent Atty. Leonard de Vera
based on the following grounds:
1) respondents alleged misrepresentation in concealing the suspension order rendered
against him by the State Bar of California; and
2) respondents alleged violation of the so-called rotation rule enunciated in
Administrative Matter No. 491 dated 06 October 1989 (in the Matter: 1989 IBP Elections).
Complainant averred that the respondent, in appropriating for his own benefit funds due his client, was found to have performed an act constituting moral
turpitude by the Hearing Referee Bill Dozier, Hearing Department San Francisco, State Bar of California in Administrative Case No. 86-0-18429.
Complainant alleged that the respondent was then forced to resign or surrender his license to practice law in the said state in order to evade the
recommended three (3) year suspension. Complainant asserted that the respondent lacks the moral competence necessary to lead the countrys most noble
profession.
Complainant, likewise, contended that the respondent violated the so-called rotation rule provided for in Administrative Matter No. 491 when he
transferred to IBP Agusan del Sur Chapter. He claimed that the respondent failed to meet the requirements outlined in the IBP By-Laws pertaining to
transfer of Chapter Membership. He surmised that the respondents transfer was intended only for the purpose of becoming the next IBP National President.
Complainant prayed that the respondent be enjoined from assuming office as IBP National President.
Meanwhile, in his Comment dated 2 May 2005, respondent stated that the issues raised in above-mentioned Complaint were the very issues raised in an
earlier administrative case filed by the same complainant against him. In fact, according to him, the said issues were already extensively discussed and
categorically ruled upon by this Court in its Decision dated 11 December 2005 in Administrative Case No. 6052 (In Re: Petition to Disqualify Atty.
Leonard De Vera). Respondent prayed that the instant administrative complaint be dismissed following the principle of res judicata.
On 15 June 2005, both parties appeared before the Office of the Bar Confidant for presentation of evidence in support of their respective allegations.
Subsequently, in a Memorandum dated 20 June 2005, complainant maintained that there is substantial evidence showing respondents moral baseness,
vileness and depravity, which could be used as a basis for his disbarment. Complainant stressed that the respondent never denied that he used his clients
money. Complainant argued that the respondent failed to present evidence that the Supreme Court of California accepted the latters resignation and even if
such was accepted, complainant posited that this should not absolve the respondent from liability.
Moreover, complainant added that the principle of res judicata would not apply in the case at bar. He asserted that the first administrative case filed against
the respondent was one for his disqualification. x x x.
Bar Matter No. 1227
A.M. No. 05-5-15-SC

As earlier adverted to, Bar Matter No. 1227 refers to Atty. de Veras letter-request to this Court to schedule his oath taking as IBP National President. A.M.
No. 05-5-15-SC, on the other hand, is a letter-report dated 19 May 2005 of IBP National President Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz (IBP President Cadiz) furnishing
this Court with the IBPs Resolution, dated 13 May 2005, removing Atty. De Vera as member of the IBP Board and as IBP EVP, for committing acts
inimical to the IBP Board and the IBP in general.[2]

The controversy in Bar Matter No. 1227 and A.M. No. 05-5-15-SC arose from the regular meeting of the IBP Board of Governors held on 14 January
2005. In said meeting, by 2/3 vote (6 voting in favor and 2 against), the IBP Board approved the withdrawal of the Petition filed before this Court docketed
as Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz, et al. vs. Senate of the Philippines, et al. Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer
for the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order or Writ of Preliminary Injunction, SC-R165108. The Petition was intended to question the legality and/or
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9227, authorizing the increase in the salaries of judges and justices, and to increase filing fees.[3]

The two IBP Governors who opposed the said Resolution approving the withdrawal of the above-described Petition were herein respondent Governor and
EVP de Vera and Governor Carlos L. Valdez.[4]

On 19 January 2005, IBP President Cadiz informed this Court of the decision taken by the IBP Board to withdraw the afore-mentioned Petition. Attached
to his letter was a copy of the IBP Boards 14 January 2005 Resolution.[5]

On 15 April 2005, Bar Matter No. 1227, pertaining to Atty. de Veras request for oathtaking as National President, was filed. The same was subsequently
consolidated with A.C. No. 6697, the disbarment case filed against Atty. de Vera.[6]

On 22 April 2005, a plenary session was held at the 10 th National IBP Convention at the CAP-Camp John Hay Convention Center, Baguio City. It was at
this forum where Atty. de Vera allegedly made some untruthful statements, innuendos and blatant lies in connection with the IBP Boards Resolution to
withdraw the Petition questioning the legality of Republic Act No. 9227.[7]

On 10 May 2005, this Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) enjoining Atty. de Vera from assuming office as IBP National President.[8]

On 12 May 2005, IBP Gov. Romulo A. Rivera wrote IBP National President Cadiz a letter wherein he prayed for the removal of Atty. de Vera as member of
the IBP Board for having committed acts which were inimical to the IBP Board and the IBP.[9]

On 13 May 2005, in the 20th Regular Meeting of the Board held at the Waterfront Hotel, Cebu City, the IBP Board, by 2/3 vote, resolved to remove Atty.
de Vera as member of the IBP Board of Governors and as IBP Executive Vice President.[10] Quoted hereunder is the dispositive portion of said
Resolution:
NOW THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, AS IT IS HEREBY RESOLVED, that Governor Leonard S. de Vera is REMOVED as a member of the IBP
Board of Governors and Executive Vice President for committing acts inimical to the IBP Board of Governors and the IBP, to wit:
1. For making untruthful statements, innuendos and blatant lies in public about the Supreme Court and
members of the IBP Board of Governors, during the Plenary Session of the IBP 10th National Convention of
Lawyers, held at CAP-Camp John Hay Convention Center on 22 April 2005, making it appear that the
decision of the IBP Board of Governors to withdraw the PETITION docketed as Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz, et al. vs. The Senate of the Philippines, et al., Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition With Prayer for the Issuance of A Temporary Restraining Order or Writ of Preliminary Injunction,
S.C.-R. 165108, was due to influence and pressure from the Supreme Court of the Philippines;
2. For making said untruthful statements, innuendos and blatant lies that brought the IBP Board of
Governors and the IBP as a whole in public contempt and disrepute;
3. For violating Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for Lawyers which mandates that A
lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and should insist on
similar conduct by others, by making untruthful statements, innuendos and blatant lies during the Plenary
Session of the IBP 10th National Convention of Lawyers in Baguio City;
4. For instigating and provoking some IBP chapters to embarrass and humiliate the IBP Board of
Governors in order to coerce and compel the latter to pursue the aforesaid PETITION;
5. For falsely accusing the IBP National President, Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz, during the Plenary Session of
the 10th National Convention in Baguio City of withholding from him a copy of Supreme Court Resolution,
dated 25 January 2005, granting the withdrawal of the PETITION, thereby creating the wrong impression that
the IBP National President deliberately prevented him from taking the appropriate remedies with respect
thereto, thus compromising the reputation and integrity of the IBP National President and the IBP as a whole.
[11]
On 18 May 2005, Atty. de Vera aired his sentiments to this Court by writing the then Hon. Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. a letter
captioned as Urgent Plea to Correct a Glaring Injustice of the IBP Board of Governors; Vehement Protest to the Board Resolution
Abruptly Removing Atty. Leonard de Vera from the Board of Governors in Patent Violation of Due Process; Petition to
Deny/Disapprove the Completely Unjustified and Highly Arbitrary Resolution Precipitately Ousting Atty. de Vera from the Board of
Governors in Less Than Twenty Four (24) Hours from Notice and Judgment Without Formal Investigation.[12]

In the said letter, Atty. de Vera strongly and categorically denied having committed acts inimical to the IBP and its Board. He alleged that on the basis of an
unverified letter-complaint filed by IBP Governor Rivera, the IBP Board voted to expel him posthaste, without just cause and in complete disregard of even
the minimum standards of due process. Pertinent portions of his letter read:

It is evident that the Board of Governors has committed a grave and serious injustice against me especially when, as the incumbent Executive Vice
President of the IBP, I am scheduled to assume my position as National President of the IBP on July 1, 2005. x x x
I was denied the very basic rights of due process recognized by the Supreme Court even in administrative cases:
1. The denial of the right to answer the charges formally or in writing. The complaint
against me was in writing.
2. The denial of the right to answer the charges within a reasonable period of time after
receipt of the complaint.
3. The denial of the right to a fair hearing.
4. The denial of the right to confront the accuser and the witnesses against me. I
challenged Gov. Rivera to testify under oath so I could question him. He refused. I offered to
testify under oath so I could be questioned. My request was denied.
5. The denial of my right to present witnesses on my behalf.
6. The denial of my right to an impartial judge. Governor Rivera was my accuser,
prosecutor, and judge all at the same time.
7. Gov. Riveras prejudgment of my case becomes even more evident because when his
motion to expel me was lost in a 5-3 votes (due to his inhibition to vote), Gov. Rivera asked for
another round of voting so he can vote to support his own complaint and motion to expel me.[13]
(Emphasis and underscoring in original.)
On 27 May 2005, the IBP Board responded to the 18 May 2005 letter of Atty. de Vera.[14] In their Reply, the IBP Board explained to
this Court that their decision to remove Atty. de Vera was based on valid grounds and was intended to protect itself from a
recalcitrant member. Among the grounds cited and elucidated by the IBP Board were the following:

(i) Atty. de Vera engaged himself in a negative media campaign and solicited resolutions from IBP Chapters to condemn the IBP Board of
Governors for its decision to withdraw the PETITION, all with the end in view of compelling or coercing the IBP Board of Governors to reconsider the
decision to withdraw the PETITION.
(ii) Atty. de Vera embarrassed, humiliated and maligned the IBP Board of Governors and the IBP National President in public or during the
Plenary Session at the 10th National Convention of Lawyers.
(iii) Rather than pacify the already agitated solicited speakers (at the plenary session), Atty. de Vera fanned the fire, so to speak, and went to the
extent of making untruthful statements, innuendos and blatant lies about the Supreme Court and some members of the IBP Board of Governors. He
deliberately and intentionally did so to provoke the members of the IBP Board of Governors to engage him in an acrimonious public debate and expose the
IBP Board of Governors to public ridicule.
(iv) Atty. de Vera uttered untruthful statements, innuendos and blatant lies, e.g., that some of the members of the IBP Board of Governors voted in
favor of the withdrawal of the petition (without mentioning names) because nakakahiya kasi sa Supreme Court, nakakaawa kasi ang Supreme Court, kasi
may mga kaibigan tayo sa Court. He made it appear that the IBP Board of Governors approved the resolution, withdrawing the petition, due to influence or
pressure from the Supreme Court.[15]
The IBP Board explained that Atty. de Veras actuation during the Plenary Session was the last straw that broke the camels back. He committed acts
inimical to the interest of the IBP Board and the IBP; hence, the IBP Board decided to remove him.

On 3 June 2005, Atty. de Vera furnished the Court with copies of resolutions and a position paper coming from various IBP Chapters all condemning his
expulsion from the IBP Board and as IBP EVP.[16]

On 15 June 2005, IBP President Cadiz informed Chief Justice Davide that in a special meeting of the IBP Board held at the EDSA Shangri-la Plaza on 13
June 2005, the IBP Board took note of the vacancy in the position of the IBP EVP brought about by Atty. de Veras removal. In his stead, IBP Governor
Pura Angelica Y. Santiago was formally elected and declared as IBP EVP.[17]
On 17 June 2005, Atty. de Vera protested against the election of Atty. Santiago.[18] On 20 June 2005, Atty. Santiago voluntarily relinquished the EVP
position through a letter addressed to the IBP Board.[19] Thus, on 25 June 2005, during its last regular meeting, the IBP Board elected a new EVP in the
person of IBP Governor Jose Vicente B. Salazar to replace Atty. Santiago.
On 28 June 2005, IBP National President Cadiz, through a letter addressed to Chief Justice Davide, reported to this Court Atty. Salazars election.[20] IBP
National President Cadiz also requested, among other things, that Atty. Salazars election be approved and that he be allowed to assume as National
President in the event that Atty. de Vera is disbarred or suspended from the practice of law or should his removal from the 2003-2005 Board of Governors
and as EVP is approved by this Court.[21] Also on 28 June 2005, Atty. de Vera protested the election of Atty. Salazar.[22]
In his Extended Comment[23] dated 25 July 2005, Atty. de Vera maintained that there was absolutely no factual or legal basis to sustain the motion to
remove him from the IBP Board because he violated no law. He argued that if the basis for his removal as EVP was based on the same grounds as his
removal from the IBP Board, then his removal as EVP was likewise executed without due notice and without the least compliance with the minimum
standards of due process of law.
Atty. de Vera strongly averred that, contrary to the utterly false and malicious charges filed against him, the speakers at the Plenary Session of the Baguio
Convention, although undeniably impassioned and articulate, were respectful in their language and exhortations, not once undermining the stature of the
IBP in general and the IBP Board of Governors in particular. He posited that speaking in disagreement with the Resolution of the Board during the
Conventions Plenary Session is not a valid cause to remove or expel a duly-elected member of the IBP Board of Governors; and the decision to remove
him only shows that the right to freedom of speech or the right to dissent is not recognized by the incumbent IBP Board.
Anent the charges that he accused the National President of withholding a copy of this Courts Resolution granting the withdrawal of the Petition
questioning the legality of Republic Act No. 9227, Atty. de Vera avowed that he made no such remarks. As regards the election of a new IBP EVP, Atty. de
Vera contended that the said election was illegal as it was contrary to the provisions of the IBP By-Laws concerning national officers, to wit:
Section. 49. Term of office. - The President and the Executive Vice President shall hold office for a term of two years from July 1 following their election
until 30 June of their second year in office and until their successors shall have been duly chosen and qualified.
In the event the President is absent or unable to act, his functions and duties shall be performed by the Executive Vice President, and in the event of death,
resignation, or removal of the President, the Executive Vice President shall serve as Acting President for the unexpired portion of the term. In the event of
death, resignation, removal or disability of both the President and the Executive Vice President, the Board of Governors shall elect an Acting President to
hold office for the unexpired portion of the term or during the period of disability.
Unless otherwise provided in these By-Laws, all other officers and employees appointed by the President with the consent of the Board shall hold office at
the pleasure of the Board or for such term as the Board may fix.[24]
To bolster his position, Atty. de Vera stressed that when both the President and the EVP die, resign, are removed, or are disabled, the IBP By-Laws only
provides for the election of an Acting President and that no mention for an election for EVP was made. Thus, when such election for EVP occurs, such is
contrary to the express provision of the IBP By-Laws.
Atty. de Vera also argued that even if he were validly removed as IBP EVP, his replacement should come from Eastern Mindanao and not from any other
region, due to the Rotation Rule embodied in par. 2, Section 47, Article VII of the IBP By-Laws.
In response to Atty. de Veras averments, the 2003-2005 IBP Board, through its counsel, submitted a Reply dated 27 January 2006 and clarified as follows:
(i) The IBP Board of Governors is vested with sufficient power and authority to protect itself from an intractable member by virtue of Article
VI, Section 44 of the IBP By-Laws;
(ii) Atty. de Vera was removed as a member of the IBP Board and as IBP EVP not because of his disagreement with the IBP Boards position but
because of the various acts that he committed which the IBP Board determined to be inimical to the IBP Board and the IBP as a whole;
(iii) Atty. de Vera cannot exculpate himself from liability by invoking his constitutional right to Free Speech because, as a member of the Bar, it is
his sworn duty to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and to insist on similar conduct by others;
(iv) The IBP Board, in effecting the removal of Atty. de Vera, observed the fundamental principles of due process. As the records would bear, Atty.
de Vera was duly notified of the Regular Meeting of the IBP Board held on 13 May 2004; was furnished a copy of Governor Riveras Letter-Complaint the
day before the said meeting; was furnished a copy of the said Meetings Agenda; and was allowed to personally defend himself and his accuser, Gov.
Rivera;
(v) Atty. de Vera was validly removed because the required number of votes under Section 44 of the IBP By-Laws to remove Atty. de Vera as a
member of the IBP Board and as IBP EVP was duly complied with;
(vi) Atty. de Veras replacement as IBP EVP need not come from Eastern Mindanao Region because: (a) the rotation rule under Article VII, Section
47, par. 2 of the IBP By-Laws had already been complied with when Atty. de Vera, who hails from Eastern Mindanao, was elected IBP EVP; and (b) the
rotation rule need not be enforced if the same will not be practicable, possible, feasible, doable or viable; and, finally, that
(vii) Atty. Salazar was validly elected as IBP EVP and, thus, should now be allowed to take his oath as IBP National President.[25]

The Courts Ruling

AC No. 6697

In his Memorandum[26] dated 20 June 2005, complainant tendered the following issues for the consideration of the Court:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT ATTORNEY LEONARD S. DEVERA (sic) COMMITED MALPRACTICE WHICH AMOUNTED TO MORAL
T[U]RPITUDE IN THE STATE BAR OF CALIFORNIA AND IN THE PHILIPPINES, IN THE COURSE OF HIS PRACTICE OF LAW.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE OATH OF OFFICE AS LAWYER IS ATTACHED TO THE PERSON OF ATTORNEY LEONARD S. DEVERA (sic)
WHEREVER HE MAY GO AND NOT NECESSARILY BOUND BY THE TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION OF THE PHILIPPINES.
III.
WHETHER OR NOT THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO PROVE THE MORAL T[U]RPITUDE, AS BASIS FOR DISBARMENT OF
RESPONDENT IN AN ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDING.
IV.
WHETHER OR NOT RES JUDICATA APPLIES IN THIS CASE, DUE TO ADMIN. CASE NO. [6052][27]
The disposition of the first three related issues hinges on the resolution of the fourth issue. Consequently, we will start with the last issue.

A.C. No. 6052 is not a bar to the filing of the present administrative case.
In disposing of the question of res judicata, the Bar Confidant opined:
To reiterate, the instant case for suspension and/or disbarment against respondent Leonard De Vera is grounded on the following:
1) respondents alleged misrepresentation in concealing the suspension order rendered against him by the State Bar in California; and
2) respondents alleged violation of the so-called rotation rule enunciated in Administrative Matter No. 491 dated 06 October 1989 (In the Matter:
1989 IBP Elections).
It appears that the complainant already raised the said issues in an earlier administrative case against the respondent. Verily, these issues were already
argued upon by the parties in their respective pleadings, and discussed and ruled upon by this Court in its Decision dated 11 December 2003 in
Administrative Matter No. 6052 (In Re: Petition to Disqualify Atty. Leonard de Vera).
As such, with respect to the first issue, this Court held that:
As for the administrative complaint filed against him by one of his clients when he was practicing law in California, which in turn compelled him to
surrender his California license to practice law, he maintains that it cannot serve as basis for determining his moral qualification (or lack of it) to run for
the position he is aspiring for. He explains that there is as yet no final judgment finding him guilty of the administrative charge, as the records relied upon
by the petitioners are mere preliminary findings of a hearing referee which are recommendatory findings of an IBP Commissioner on Bar Discipline which
are subject to the review of and the final decision of the Supreme Court. He also stresses that the complainant in the California administrative case has
retracted the accusation that he misappropriated the complainants money, but unfortunately the retraction was not considered by the investigating officer.
xxx
On the administrative complaint that was filed against respondent De Vera while he was still practicing law in California, he explained that no final
judgment was rendered by the California Supreme Court finding him guilty of the charge. He surrendered his license to protest the discrimination he
suffered at the hands of the investigator and he found it impractical to pursue the case to the end. We find these explanations satisfactory in the absence of
contrary proof. It is a basic rule on evidence that he who alleges a fact has the burden to prove the same. In this case, the petitioners have not shown how
the administrative complaint affects respondent De Vera's moral fitness to run for governor.
On the other hand, as regards the second issue:
Petitioners contend that respondent de Vera is disqualified for the post because he is not really from Eastern Mindanao. His place of residence is in
Paraaque and he was originally a member of the PPLM IBP Chapter. He only changed his IBP Chapter membership to pave the way for his ultimate goal
of attaining the highest IBP post, which is the national presidency. Petitioners aver that in changing his IBP membership, respondent De Vera violated the
domicile rule.
The contention has no merit. Under the last paragraph of Section 19, Article II, a lawyer included in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court can
register with the particular IBP Chapter of his preference or choice, thus:
xxx
It is clearly stated in the aforequoted section of the By-Laws that it is not automatic that a lawyer will become a member of the chapter where his place of
residence or work is located. He has the discretion to choose the particular chapter where he wishes to gain membership. Only when he does not register
his preference that he will become a member of the Chapter of the place where he resides or maintains office. The only proscription in registering one's
preference is that a lawyer cannot be a member of more than one chapter at the same time.
The same is provided in Section 29-2 of the IBP By-Laws. In fact, under this Section, transfer of IBP membership is allowed as long as the lawyer complies
with the conditions set forth therein, thus:
xxx
The only condition required under the foregoing rule is that the transfer must be made not less than three months prior to the election of officers in the
chapter to which the lawyer wishes to transfer.
In the case at bar, respondent De Vera requested the transfer of his IBP membership to Agusan del Sur on 1 August 2001. One month thereafter, IBP
National Secretary Jaime M. Vibar wrote a letter addressed to Atty. Amador Z. Tolentino, Jr., Secretary of IBP PPLM Chapter and Atty. Lyndon J. Romero,
Secretary of IBP Agusan del Sur Chapter, informing them of respondent de Vera's transfer and advising them to make the necessary notation in their
respective records. This letter is a substantial compliance with the certification mentioned in Section 29-2 as aforequoted. Note that de Vera's transfer was
made effective sometime between 1 August 2001 and 3 September 2001. On 27 February 2003, the elections of the IBP Chapter Officers were
simultaneously held all over the Philippines, as mandated by Section 29.a of the IBP By-Laws which provides that elections of Chapter Officers and
Directors shall be held on the last Saturday of February of every other year. Between 3 September 2001 and 27 February 2003, seventeen months had
elapsed. This makes respondent de Vera's transfer valid as it was done more than three months ahead of the chapter elections held on 27 February 2003.
In the case of Romulo G. Dinsay vs. Atty. Leopoldo D. Cioco (Administrative Case No. 2995, 27 November 1996), this Court declared that:
The doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings and not to the exercise of the [Courts] administrative powers.
In the said case, respondent Clerk of Court Cioco was dismissed from service for grave misconduct highly prejudicial to the service for surreptitiously
substituting the bid price in a Certificate of Sale from P3,263,182.67 to only P730,000.00. Thereafter a complaint for disbarment was filed against the
respondent on the basis of the same incident. Respondent, interposing res judicata, argued that he may no longer be charged on the basis of the same
incident. This Court held that while the respondent is in effect being indicted twice for the same misconduct, this does not amount to double jeopardy as
both proceedings are admittedly administrative in nature. This Court qualified that, in the first case, the respondent was proceeded against as an erring
court personnel under the Courts supervisory power over courts while, in the second case, he was disciplined as a lawyer under the Courts plenary
authority over membersof the legal profession.
In subsequent decisions of this Court, however, it appears that res judicata still applies in administrative cases. Thus, in the case of Atty. Eduardo C. De
Vera vs. Judge William Layague (Administrastive Matter No. RTJ-93-986), this Court ruled that:
While double jeopardy does not lie in administrative cases, it would be contrary to equity and substantial justice to penalize respondent judge a second
time for an act which he had already answered for.
Likewise, in the recent case of Executive Judge Henry B. Basilia vs. Judge Amado L. Becamon, Lolita Delos Reyes and Eddie Delos Reyes (Administrative
Matter No. MTJ-02-1404, 14 December 2004), this Court held that:
Applying the principle of res judicata or bar by prior judgment, the present administrative case becomes dismissible.
xxx
Under the said doctrine, a matter that has been adjudicated by a court of competent jurisdiction must be deemed to have been finally and conclusively
settled if it arises in any subsequent litigation between the same parties and for the same cause. It provides that
[a] final judgment on the merits rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive as to the rights of the parties and their privies; and constitutes
an absolute bar to subsequent actions involving the same claim, demand, or cause of action. Res judicata is based on the ground that the party to be
affected, or some other with whom he is in privity, has litigated the same matter in the former action in a court of competent jurisdiction, and should not be
permitted to litigate it again.
This principle frees the parties from undergoing all over again the rigors of unnecessary suits and repetitious trials. At the same time, it prevents the
clogging of court dockets. Equally important, res judicata stabilizes rights and promotes the rule of law.
In the instant administrative case, it is clear that the issues raised by the complainant had already been resolved by this Court in an earlier administrative
case. The complainants contention that the principle of res judicata would not apply in the case at bar as the first administrative case was one for
disqualification while the instant administrative complaint is one for suspension and/or disbarment should be given least credence. It is worthy to note that
while the instant administrative complaint is denominated as one for suspension and/or disbarment, it prayed neither the suspension nor the disbarment of
the respondent but instead merely sought to enjoin the respondent from assuming office as IBP National President.[28]
Contrary to the findings of the Bar Confidant, Adm. Case No. 6052 entitled, In Re: Petition to Disqualify Atty. Leonard de Vera, on Legal and Moral
Grounds, From Being Elected IBP Governor for Eastern Mindanao in the May 31 IBP Election and promulgated on 11 December 2003 does not constitute
a bar to the filing of Adm. Case No. 6697. Although the parties in the present administrative case and in Adm. Case No. 6052 are identical, their capacities
in these cases and the issues presented therein are not the same, thereby barring the application of res judicata.
In order that the principle of res judicata may be made to apply, four essential conditions must concur, namely: (1) the judgment sought to bar the new
action must be final; (2) the decision must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) the disposition of
the case must be a judgment or order on the merits, and (4) there must be between the first and second action identity of parties, identity of subject matter,
and identity of causes of action.[29] In the absence of any one of these elements, Atty. de Vera cannot argue res judicata in his favor.

It is noteworthy that the two administrative cases involve different subject matters and causes of action. In Adm. Case No. 6052, the subject matter was the
qualification of Atty. de Vera to run as a candidate for the position of IBP Governor for Eastern Mindanao. In the present administrative complaint, the
subject matter is his privilege to practice law. In the first administrative case, complainants cause of action was Atty. de Veras alleged violation or
circumvention of the IBP By-laws. In the present administrative case, the primary cause of action is Atty. de Veras alleged violation of lawyers oath and the
Code of Professional Responsibility.

Finally, the two administrative cases do not seek the same relief. In the first case, the complainants sought to prevent Atty. de Vera from assuming his post
as IBP Governor for Eastern Mindanao. In the present case, as clarified by complainant in his Memorandum, what is being principally sought is Atty. de
Veras suspension or disbarment.

The distinctions between the two cases are far from trivial. The previous case was resolved on the basis of the parties rights and obligations under the IBP
By-laws. We held therein that Atty. de Vera cannot be disqualified from running as Regional Governor as there is nothing in the present IBP By-laws that
sanctions the disqualification of candidates for IBP governors. Consequently, we stressed that the petition had no firm ground to stand on. Likewise, we
held that the complainants therein were not the proper parties to bring the suit as the IBP By-laws prescribes that only nominees - which the complainants
were not - can file with the IBP President a written protest against the candidate. The Courts statement, therefore, that Atty. de Vera cannot be disqualified
on the ground that he was not morally fit was mere obiter dictum. Precisely, the IBP By-laws do not allow for pre-election disqualification proceedings;
hence, Atty. de Vera cannot be disqualified on the basis of the administrative findings of a hearing officer of the State Bar of California suspending him
from the practice of law for three years. We held in that case that

There is nothing in the By-Laws which explicitly provides that one must be morally fit before he can run for IBP governorship. For one, this is so because
the determination of moral fitness of a candidate lies in the individual judgment of the members of the House of Delegates. Indeed, based on each
member's standard of morality, he is free to nominate and elect any member, so long as the latter possesses the basic requirements under the law. For
another, basically the disqualification of a candidate involving lack of moral fitness should emanate from his disbarment or suspension from the practice of
law by this Court, or conviction by final judgment of an offense which involves moral turpitude.[30]
What this simply means is that absent a final judgment by the Supreme Court in a proper case declaring otherwise, every lawyer aspiring to hold the
position of IBP Regional Director is presumed morally fit. Any person who begs to disagree will not be able to find a receptive audience in the IBP through
a petition for disqualification but must first file the necessary disbarment or suspension proceeding against the lawyer concerned.
And this is precisely what complainant has chosen to do in the instant case. As his petition is sufficient in form and substance, we have given it due course
pursuant to Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. And, considering that this case is not barred by the prior judgment in Adm. Case No. 6052, the only issue left
for consideration is whether or not Atty. de Vera can be suspended or disbarred under the facts of the case and the evidence submitted by complainant.

The recommendation of the hearing officer of the State Bar of California, standing alone, is not
proof of malpractice.
In the case of the Suspension From The Practice of Law In The Territory of Guam of Atty. Leon G.
Maquera,[31] we were confronted with the question of whether or not a member of the Philippine
Bar, who is concomitantly an attorney in a foreign jurisdiction and who was suspended from the
practice of law in said foreign jurisdiction, can be sanctioned as member of the Philippine Bar for
the same infraction committed in the foreign jurisdiction.

We take the issue in Atty. Maquera one notch higher in the case of Atty. de Vera who was admitted to the practice of law in a foreign jurisdiction (State Bar
of California, U.S.A.) and against whom charges were filed in connection with his practice in said jurisdiction. However, unlike the case of Atty. Maquera,
no final judgment for suspension or disbarment was meted against Atty. de Vera despite a recommendation of suspension of three years as he surrendered
his license to practice law before his case could be taken up by the Supreme Court of California.

In Maquera, we emphasized that the judgment of suspension against a Filipino lawyer in a foreign jurisdiction does not automatically result in his
suspension or disbarment in the Philippines as the acts giving rise to his suspension are not grounds for disbarment and suspension in this jurisdiction.
Judgment of suspension against a Filipino lawyer may transmute into a similar judgment of suspension in the Philippines only if the basis of the foreign
courts action includes any of the grounds for disbarment or suspension in this jurisdiction. We likewise held that the judgment of the foreign court merely
constitutes prima facie evidence of unethical acts as lawyer.

The Maquera ruling is consistent with Rule 39, Section 48, of the Rules of Court which provides:

Sec. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders. - The effect of a judgment or final order of a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to render
the judgment or final order is as follows:
xxxx
(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or final order is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their
successors in interest by a subsequent title.
In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear
mistake of law or fact.
In Philippine Aluminum Wheels, Inc. v. Fasgi Enterprises, Inc.,[32] we explained that [a] foreign judgment is presumed to be valid and binding in the
country from which it comes, until a contrary showing, on the basis of a presumption of regularity of proceedings and the giving of due notice in the
foreign forum.

In herein case, considering that there is technically no foreign judgment to speak of, the recommendation by the hearing officer of the State Bar of
California does not constitute prima facie evidence of unethical behavior by Atty. de Vera. Complainant must prove by substantial evidence the facts upon
which the recommendation by the hearing officer was based. If he is successful in this, he must then prove that these acts are likewise unethical under
Philippine law.

There is substantial evidence of malpractice on the part of Atty. de Vera independent of the
recommendation of suspension by the hearing officer of the State Bar of California
Section 27 of Rule 138 of our Rules of Court states:

SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office
as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a wilful
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do.
The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
The disbarment or suspension of a member of the Philippine Bar by a competent court or other disciplinary agency in a foreign jurisdiction where he has
also been admitted as an attorney is a ground for his disbarment or suspension if the basis of such action includes any of the acts hereinabove enumerated.
The judgment, resolution or order of the foreign court or disciplinary agency shall be prima facie evidence of the ground for disbarment or suspension.[33]
Disciplinary action against a lawyer is intended to protect the court and the public from the misconduct of officers of the court and to protect the
administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise this important function shall be competent, honorable and reliable men in whom courts and
clients may repose confidence.[34] The statutory enunciation of the grounds for disbarment on suspension is not to be taken as a limitation on the general
power of courts to suspend or disbar a lawyer. The inherent power of the court over its officers cannot be restricted.[35]

Malpractice ordinarily refers to any malfeasance or dereliction of duty committed by a lawyer. Section 27 gives a special and technical meaning to the term
Malpractice.[36] That meaning is in consonance with the elementary notion that the practice of law is a profession, not a business.[37]

Unprofessional conduct in an attorney is that which violates the rules on ethical code of his profession or which is unbecoming a member of that
profession.[38]

Now, the undisputed facts:

1. An administrative case against Atty. de Vera was filed before the State Bar of California, docketed then as Adm. Case No. 86-0-18429. It arose
from an insurance case Atty. de Vera handled involving Julius Willis, III who figured in an automobile accident in 1986. Atty. de Vera was authorized by
the elder Willis (father of Julius who was given authority by the son to control the case because the latter was then studying in San Diego California) for
the release of the funds in settlement of the case. Atty. de Vera received a check in settlement of the case which he then deposited to his personal account;
[39]

2. The Hearing referee in the said administrative case recommended that Atty. de Vera be suspended from the practice of law for three years;[40]
and

3. Atty. de Vera resigned from the California Bar which resignation was accepted by the Supreme Court of California.[41]

Atty. de Vera vehemently insists that the foregoing facts do not prove that he misappropriated his clients funds as the latters father (the elder Willis) gave
him authority to use the same and that, unfortunately, the hearing officer did not consider this explanation notwithstanding the fact that the elder Willis
testified under oath that he expected de Vera might use the money for a few days.

By insisting that he was authorized by his clients father and attorney-in-fact to use the funds, Atty. de Vera has impliedly admitted the use of the Willis
funds for his own personal use.

In fact, Atty. de Vera did not deny complainants allegation in the latters memorandum that he (de Vera) received US$12,000.00 intended for his client and
that he deposited said amount in his personal account and not in a separate trust account and that, finally, he spent the amount for personal purposes.[42]

At this point, it bears stressing that in cases filed before administrative and quasi-judicial bodies, a fact may be deemed established if it is supported by
substantial evidence or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.[43] It means such
evidence which affords a substantial basis from which the fact in issue can be reasonably inferred.[44]

Beyond doubt, the unauthorized use by a lawyer of his clients funds is highly unethical. Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility is emphatic
about this, thus:

CANON 16. A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT MAY COME TO HIS POSSESSION.
Rule 16.01. A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client.
Rule 16.02. A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from his own and those of others kept by him.
In Espiritu v. Ulep[45] we held that
The relation between attorney and client is highly fiduciary in nature. Being such, it requires utmost good faith, loyalty, fidelity and disinterestedness on
the part of the attorney. Its fiduciary nature is intended for the protection of the client.
The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates every lawyer to hold in trust all money and properties of his client that may come into his possession.
Accordingly, he shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client. Even more specific is the Canon of Professional Ethics:
The lawyer should refrain from any action whereby for his personal benefit or gain he abuses or takes advantage of the confidence reposed in him by his
client.
Money of the client or collected for the client or other trust property coming into the possession of the lawyer should be reported and accounted for
promptly and should not under any circumstances be commingled with his own or be used by him.
Consequently, a lawyer's failure to return upon demand the funds or property held by him on behalf of his client gives rise to the presumption that he has
appropriated the same for his own use to the prejudice of, and in violation of the trust reposed in him by, his client. It is a gross violation of general
morality as well as of professional ethics; it impairs the public confidence in the legal profession and deserves punishment.
Lawyers who misappropriate the funds entrusted to them are in gross violation of professional ethics and are guilty of betrayal of public confidence in the
legal profession. Those who are guilty of such infraction may be disbarred or suspended indefinitely from the practice of law. (Emphases supplied.)
In herein case, as it is admitted by Atty. de Vera himself that he used his clients money for personal use, he has unwittingly sealed his own fate since this
admission constitutes more than substantial evidence of malpractice. Consequently, Atty. de Vera now has the burden of rebutting the evidence which he
himself supplied.

In his defense, Atty. de Vera claims that he was duly authorized by the elder Willis to use the funds intended for the latters son. Atty. de Vera also points
out that he had restituted the full amount of US$12,000.00 even before the filing of the administrative case against him in the State Bar of California.[46]

Aside from these self-serving statements, however, we cannot find anywhere in the records of this case proof that indeed Atty. de Vera was duly
authorized to use the funds of his client. In Radjaie v. Atty. Alovera[47] we declared that

When the integrity of a member of the bar is challenged, it is not enough that he denies the charges against him; he must meet the issue and overcome the
evidence against him. He must show proof that he still maintains that degree of morality and integrity which at all times is expected of him.
Atty. de Vera cannot rely on the statement made by the hearing officer that the elder Willis had indeed testified that he expected de Vera might use the
money for a few days. As Atty. de Vera had vigorously objected to the admissibility of the document containing this statement, he is now estopped from
relying thereon. Besides, that the elder Willis expected de Vera might use the money for a few days was not so much an acknowledgment of consent to the
use by Atty. de Vera of his clients funds as it was an acceptance of the probability that Atty. de Vera might, indeed, use his clients funds, which by itself did
not speak well of the character of Atty. de Vera or the way such character was perceived.

In the instant case, the act of Atty. de Vera in holding on to his clients money without the latters acquiescence is conduct indicative of lack of integrity and
propriety. It is clear that Atty. de Vera, by depositing the check in his own account and using the same for his own benefit is guilty of deceit, malpractice,
gross misconduct and unethical behavior. He caused dishonor, not only to himself but to the noble profession to which he belongs. For, it cannot be denied
that the respect of litigants to the profession is inexorably diminished whenever a member of the profession betrays their trust and confidence.[48]
Respondent violated his oath to conduct himself with all good fidelity to his client.
Nevertheless, we do not agree with complainants plea to disbar respondent from the practice of law. The power to disbar must be exercised with great
caution.[49] Where any lesser penalty can accomplish the end desired, disbarment should not be decreed.

In Mortera v. Pagatpatan,[50] we imposed upon Atty. Pagatpatan two years suspension from his practice of law for depositing the funds meant for his
client to his personal account without the latters knowledge. In Reyes v. Maglaya;[51] Castillo v. Taguines;[52] Espiritu v. Atty. Cabredo IV,[53] the
respondents were meted one year suspension each for failing to remit to their clients monies in the amounts of P1,500.00; P500.00, and P51,161.00,
respectively, received by them for their clients without the latters permission. In Dumadag v. Atty. Lumaya,[54] we indefinitely suspended respondent for
failure to remit to his client the amount of the measly sum of P4,344.00 representing the amount received pursuant to a writ of execution. Considering the
amount involved here US$12,000.00, we believe that the penalty of suspension for two (2) years is appropriate.

Transferring IBP membership to a chapter where the lawyer is not a resident of is not a ground
for his suspension or disbarment
Complainant insists that Atty. de Veras transfer of membership from the Pasay, Paraaque, Las Pias
and Muntinlupa (PPLM) Chapter to the Agusan del Sur IBP Chapter is a circumvention of the
rotation rule as it was made for the sole purpose of becoming IBP National President. Complainant
stresses that Atty. de Vera is not a resident of Agusan del Sur nor does he hold office therein.

In Adm. Case No. 6052, we held that Atty. de Veras act of transferring to another IBP Chapter is not a ground for his disqualification for the post of IBP
Governor as the same is allowed under Section 19 of the IBP By-Laws with the qualification only that the transfer be made not less than three months
immediately preceding any chapter election.

As it was perfectly within Atty. de Veras right to transfer his membership, it cannot be said that he is guilty of unethical conduct or behavior. And while one
may incessantly argue that a legal act may not necessarily be ethical, in herein case, we do not see anything wrong in transferring to an IBP chapter that --
based on the rotation rule will produce the next IBP EVP who will automatically succeed to the National Presidency for the next term. Our Code of
Professional Responsibility as well as the Lawyers Oath do not prohibit nor punish lawyers from aspiring to be IBP National President and from doing
perfectly legal acts in accomplishing such goal.

Bar Matter No. 1227

Administrative Matter No. 05-5-15-SC
To resolve Bar Matter No. 1227 and Administrative Matter No. 05-5- 15-SC, the following issues must be addressed:
I. Whether the IBP Board of Governors acted with grave abuse of discretion in removing Atty. de Vera as Governor and EVP of the IBP on 13
May 2005.
i. Whether the IBP Board of Governors complied with administrative due process in removing Atty. de Vera.
ii. Whether the IBP removed Atty. De Vera for just and valid cause.
II. Whether Governor Salazar was validly elected as EVP of the IBP on 25 June 2005, and can consequently
assume the Presidency of the IBP for the term 2005-2007.
The IBP Board observed due process in its removal of Atty. de Vera as IBP Governor
We start the discussion with the veritable fact that the IBP Board is vested with the power to
remove any of its members pursuant to Section 44, Article VI of the IBP By-Laws, which states:

Sec. 44. Removal of members. If the Board of Governors should determine after proper inquiry that any of its members, elective or otherwise, has for any
reason become unable to perform his duties, the Board, by resolution of the Majority of the remaining members, may declare his position vacant, subject to
the approval of the Supreme Court.
Any member of the Board, elective or otherwise, may be removed for cause, including three consecutive absences from Board meetings without
justifiable excuse, by resolution adopted by two-thirds of the remaining members of the Board, subject to the approval of the Supreme Court.
In case of any vacancy in the office of Governor for whatever cause, the delegates from the region shall by majority vote, elect a successor from among the
members of the Chapter to which the resigned governor is a member to serve as governor for the unexpired portion of the term. (Emphasis supplied)
Under the aforementioned section, a member of the IBP Board may be removed for cause by resolution adopted by two-thirds (2/3) of the remaining
members of the Board, subject to the approval of this Court.

In the main, Atty. de Vera questions his removal from the Board of Governors on procedural and substantive grounds. He argues that he was denied very
basic rights of due process recognized by the Honorable Court even in administrative cases like the right to answer formally or in writing and within
reasonable time, the right to present witnesses in his behalf, the right to a fair hearing. Atty. de Vera protests the fact that he was not able to cross-examine
the complainant, IBP Gov. Romulo H. Rivera (Atty. Rivera) and that Atty. Rivera voted as well for his expulsion which made him accuser, prosecutor and
judge at the same time. Atty. de Vera emphasized the fact that Atty. Rivera initially inhibited himself from voting on his own motion. However, when his
inhibition resulted in the defeat of his motion as the necessary 2/3 votes could not be mustered, Atty. Rivera asked for another round of voting so he could
vote to support his own motion.

The IBP Board counters that since its members were present during the plenary session, and personally witnessed and heard Atty. de Veras actuations, an
evidentiary or formal hearing was no longer necessary. Since they all witnessed and heard Atty. de Vera, it was enough that he was given an opportunity to
refute and answer all the charges imputed against him. They emphasized that Atty. de Vera was given a copy of the complaint and that he was present at the
Board Meeting on 13 May 2005 wherein the letter-complaint against him was part of the agenda. Therein, he was given the opportunity to be heard and
that, in fact, Atty. de Vera did argue his case.

We are in agreement with the IBP Board.

First, it needs stressing that the constitutional provision on due process safeguards life, liberty and property.[55] It cannot be said that the position of EVP
of the IBP is property within the constitutional sense especially since there is no right to security of tenure over said position as, in fact, all that is required
to remove any member of the board of governors for cause is a resolution adopted by 2/3 of the remaining members of the board.

Secondly, even if the right of due process could be rightfully invoked, still, in administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is simply the
opportunity to explain ones side.[56] At the outset, it is here emphasized that the term due process of law as used in the Constitution has no fixed meaning
for all purposes due to the very nature of the doctrine which, asserting a fundamental principle of justice rather than a specific rule of law, is not susceptible
of more than one general statement.[57] The phrase is so elusive of exact apprehension,[58] because it depends on circumstances and varies with the
subject matter and the necessities of the situation.[59]

Due process of law in administrative cases is not identical with judicial process for a trial in court is not always essential to due process. While a day in
court is a matter of right in judicial proceedings, it is otherwise in administrative proceedings since they rest upon different principles. The due process
clause guarantees no particular form of procedure and its requirements are not technical. Thus, in certain proceedings of administrative character, the right
to a notice or hearing are not essential to due process of law. The constitutional requirement of due process is met by a fair hearing before a regularly
established administrative agency or tribunal. It is not essential that hearings be had before the making of a determination if thereafter, there is available
trial and tribunal before which all objections and defenses to the making of such determination may be raised and considered. One adequate hearing is all
that due process requires. What is required for hearing may differ as the functions of the administrative bodies differ.[60]

The right to cross-examine is not an indispensable aspect of due process.[61] Nor is an actual hearing always essential[62] especially under the factual
milieu of this case where the members of the IBP Board -- upon whose shoulders the determination of the cause for removal of an IBP governor is placed
subject to the approval of the Supreme Court all witnessed Atty. de Veras actuations in the IBP National Convention in question.

It is undisputed that Atty. de Vera received a copy of the complaint against him and that he was present when the matter was taken up. From the transcript
of the stenographic notes of the 13 May 2005 meeting wherein Atty. de Vera was removed, it is patent that Atty. de Vera was given fair opportunity to
defend himself against the accusations made by Atty. Rivera.

Atty. de Vera, however, additionally questions the fact that Atty. Rivera, who authored the
complaint against him, also voted for his expulsion making him accuser, prosecutor and judge
at the same time. Atty. de Vera likewise laments the fact that Atty. Rivera initially inhibited
himself from voting but when this resulted in the defeat of his motion for lack of the necessary
2/3 vote, he agreed to another round of voting and that, this time, he voted in favor of his
motion.

For the record, of the nine governors comprising the IBP Board, six voted for Atty. de Veras expulsion (including Atty. Rivera) while 3 voted against it
(including Atty. de Vera).

Section 44 (second paragraph) of the IBP By-Laws provides:

Any member of the Board, elective or otherwise, may be removed for cause, including three consecutive absences from Board meetings without justifiable
excuse, by resolution adopted by two-thirds of the remaining members of the Board, subject to the approval of the Supreme Court. (Emphasis supplied.)
Under the rules, a resolution for expulsion of an IBP Governor is done via a resolution adopted by 2/3 of the remaining members. The phrase remaining
members refers to the members exclusive of the complainant member and the respondent member. The reason therefore is that such members are interested
parties and are thus presumed to be unable to resolve said motion impartially. This being the case, the votes of Attys. Rivera and de Vera should be
stricken-off which means that only the votes of the seven remaining members are to be counted. Of the seven remaining members, five voted for expulsion
while two voted against it which still adds up to the 2/3 vote requirement for expulsion.

The IBP Board removed Atty. de Vera as IBP Governor for just and valid cause
All the concerned parties to this case agree that what constitutes cause for the removal of an IBP
Governor has not been defined by Section 44 of the IBP By-Laws albeit it includes three
consecutive absences from Board meetings without justifiable excuse. Thus, the IBP Board argues
that it is vested with sufficient power and authority to protect itself from an intractable member
whose removal was caused not by his disagreement with the IBP Board but due to various acts
committed by him which the IBP Board considered as inimical to the IBP Board in particular and
the IBP in general.

Atty. de Vera, on the other hand, insists that speaking in disagreement with the Resolution of the Board during the Conventions Plenary Session is not a
valid cause to remove or expel a duly-elected member of the IBP Board of Governors and the decision to remove him only shows that the right to freedom
of speech or the right to dissent is not recognized by the IBP Board.
After weighing the arguments of the parties and in keeping with the fundamental objective of the IBP to discharge its public responsibility more
effectively, we hereby find that Atty. de Veras removal from the IBP Board was not capricious or arbitrary.
Indubitably, conflicts and disagreements of varying degrees of intensity, if not animosity, are inherent in the internal life of an organization, but especially
of the IBP since lawyers are said to disagree before they agree.

However, the effectiveness of the IBP, like any other organization, is diluted if the conflicts are brought outside its governing body for then there would be
the impression that the IBP, which speaks through the Board of Governors, does not and cannot speak for its members in an authoritative fashion. It would
accordingly diminish the IBPs prestige and repute with the lawyers as well as with the general public.

As a means of self-preservation, internecine conflicts must thus be adjusted within the governing board itself so as to free it from the stresses that
invariably arise when internal cleavages are made public.

The doctrine of majority rule is almost universally used as a mechanism for adjusting and resolving conflicts and disagreements within the group after the
members have been given an opportunity to be heard. While it does not efface conflicts, nonetheless, once a decision on a contentious matter is reached by
a majority vote, the dissenting minority is bound thereby so that the board can speak with one voice, for those elected to the governing board are deemed to
implicitly contract that the will of the majority shall govern in matters within the authority of the board.[63]

The IBP Board, therefore, was well within its right in removing Atty. de Vera as the latters actuations during the 10 th National IBP Convention were
detrimental to the role of the IBP Board as the governing body of the IBP. When the IBP Board is not seen by the bar and the public as a cohesive unit, it
cannot effectively perform its duty of helping the Supreme Court enforce the code of legal ethics and the standards of legal practice as well as improve the
administration of justice.

In view of the importance of retaining group cohesiveness and unity, the expulsion of a member of the board who insists on bringing to the public his
disagreement with a policy/resolution approved by the majority after due discussion, cannot be faulted. The effectiveness of the board as a governing body
will be negated if its pronouncements are resisted in public by a board member.

Indeed, when a member of a governing body cannot accept the voice of the majority, he should resign therefrom so that he could criticize in public the
majority opinion/decision to his hearts content; otherwise, he subjects himself to disciplinary action by the body.

The removal of Atty. de Vera as member of the Board of Governors ipso facto meant his removal
as EVP as well
The removal of Atty. de Vera as member of the Board of Governors ipso facto meant his removal
as EVP as well. Section 47, Article VII of the By-Laws of the IBP provides:

SEC. 47. National Officers. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines shall have a President and Executive Vice President to be chosen by the
Board of Governors from among nine (9) regional governors, as much as practicable, on a rotation basis. x x x
Thus, to be EVP of the IBP, one must necessarily be a member of IBP Board of Governors. Atty. de Veras removal from the Board of Governors,
automatically disqualified him from acting as IBP EVP. To insist otherwise would be contrary to Section 47 of the IBP By-Laws.

The Court will not interfere with the Resolution of the IBP Board to remove Atty. de Vera since
it was rendered without grave abuse of discretion
While it is true that the Supreme Court has been granted an extensive power of supervision over
the IBP,[64] it is axiomatic that such power should be exercised prudently. The power of
supervision of the Supreme Court over the IBP should not preclude the IBP from exercising its
reasonable discretion especially in the administration of its internal affairs governed by the
provisions of its By-Laws. The IBP By-Laws were precisely drafted and promulgated so as to
define the powers and functions of the IBP and its officers, establish its organizational structure,
and govern relations and transactions among its officers and members. With these By-Laws in
place, the Supreme Court could be assured that the IBP shall be able to carry on its day-to-day
affairs, without the Courts interference.

It should be noted that the general charge of the affairs and activities of the IBP has been vested in the Board of Governors. The members of the Board are
elective and representative of each of the nine regions of the IBP as delineated in its By-Laws. [65] The Board acts as a collegiate body and decides in
accordance with the will of the majority. The foregoing rules serve to negate the possibility of the IBP Board acting on the basis of personal interest or
malice of its individual members. Hence, the actions and resolutions of the IBP Board deserve to be accorded the disputable presumption[66] of validity,
which shall continue, until and unless it is overcome by substantial evidence and actually declared invalid by the Supreme Court. In the absence of any
allegation and substantial proof that the IBP Board has acted without or in excess of its authority or with grave abuse of discretion, we shall not be
persuaded to overturn and set aside the Boards action or resolution.

There is no question that the IBP Board has the authority to remove its members as provided in Article VI, Section 44 [67] of the IBP By-Laws. Issue arises
only as to whether the IBP Board abused its authority and discretion in resolving to remove Atty. de Vera from his post as an IBP Governor and EVP. As
has been previously established herein, Atty. de Veras removal from the IBP Board was in accordance with due process and the IBP Board acted well
within the authority and discretion granted to it by its By-Laws. There being no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the IBP Board, we find no reason to
interfere in the Boards resolution to remove Atty. de Vera.

The election of Atty. Salazar by the IBP Board as IBP EVP in replacement of Atty. De Vera was
conducted in accordance with the authority granted to the Board by the IBP By-Laws
In the same manner, we find no reason to disturb the action taken by the 2003-2005 IBP Board of
Governors in holding a special election to fill-in the vacant post resulting from the removal of Atty.
de Vera as EVP of the IBP since the same is a purely internal matter, done without grave abuse of
discretion, and implemented without violating the Rules and By-Laws of the IBP.

With the removal of Atty. de Vera from the Board, by virtue of the IBP Board Resolution dated 13 May 2005, he was also removed from his post as EVP;
thus, there was a resultant vacancy in the position of IBP EVP.

Article VI, Section 41(g) of the IBP By-Laws expressly grants to the Board the authority to fill
vacancies, however arising, in the IBP positions, subject to the provisions of Section 8 of the
Integration Rule,[68] and Section 11 (Vacancies),[69] Section 44 (Removal of members),[70]
Section 47 (National officers),[71] Section 48 (other officers),[72] and Section 49 (Terms of
Office)[73] of the By-Laws. The IBP Board has specific and sufficient guidelines in its Rules and
By-Laws on how to fill-in the vacancies after the removal of Atty. de Vera. We have faith and
confidence in the intellectual, emotional and ethical competencies of the remaining members of the
2005-2007 Board in dealing with the situation within the bounds of the IBP Rules and By-Laws.

The election by the 2003-2005 IBP Board of Governors of a new EVP, who will assume the Presidency for the term 2005-2007, was well within the
authority and prerogative granted to the Board by the IBP By-Laws, particularly Article VII, Section 47, which provides that [t]he EVP shall automatically
become President for the next succeeding term. The phrase for the next succeeding term necessarily implies that the EVP that should succeed Atty. Cadiz
as IBP President for the next succeeding term (i.e., 2005-2007) should come from the members of the 2003-2005 IBP Board of Governors. Hence, in A.M.
No. 05-7-19-SC, we restrained now IBP EVP Feliciano Bautista from assuming the position of Acting President because we have yet to resolve the
question as to who shall succeed Atty. Cadiz from the 2003-2005 IBP Board of Governors.

Accordingly, the elections of Governor Santiago on 13 June 2005 as IBP EVP, and thereafter, Governor Salazar on 25 June 2005, as the new IBP EVP,
upon the relinquishment of Gov. Santiago of the position, were valid.

Neither can this Court give credence to the argument of Atty. De Vera that, assuming his removal as IBP Governor and EVP was valid, his replacement as
IBP EVP should come from Eastern Mindanao Region pursuant to the rotation rule set forth in Article VII, Section 47, of the IBP By-Laws.

According to Article VII, Section 47, of the IBP By-Laws, the EVP shall be chosen by the Board of Governors from among the nine Regional Governors,
as much as practicable, on a rotation basis. This is based on our pronouncements in Bar Matter 491, wherein we ruled:

ORDER
xxxx
3. The former system of having the IBP President and Executive Vice-President elected by the Board of Governors (composed of the governors of the nine
[9] IBP regions) from among themselves (as provided in Sec. 47, Art. VII, Original IBP By-Laws) should be restored. The right of automatic succession by
the Executive Vice-President to the presidency upon the expiration of their two-year term (which was abolished by this Court's resolution dated July 9,
1985 in Bar Matter No. 287) should be as it is hereby restored.
4. At the end of the President's two-year term, the Executive Vice-President shall automatically succeed to the office of president. The incoming board of
governors shall then elect an Executive Vice-President from among themselves. The position of Executive Vice-President shall be rotated among the
nine (9) IBP regions. One who has served as president may not run for election as Executive Vice-President in a succeeding election until after the rotation
of the presidency among the nine (9) regions shall have been completed; whereupon, the rotation shall begin anew.
xxxx
(Emphasis Supplied)
In Bar Matter 491, it is clear that it is the position of IBP EVP which is actually rotated among the nine Regional Governors. The rotation with respect to
the Presidency is merely a result of the automatic succession rule of the IBP EVP to the Presidency. Thus, the rotation rule pertains in particular to the
position of IBP EVP, while the automatic succession rule pertains to the Presidency. The rotation with respect to the Presidency is but a consequence of the
automatic succession rule provided in Section 47 of the IBP By-Laws.

In the case at bar, the rotation rule was duly complied with since upon the election of Atty. De Vera as IBP EVP, each of the nine IBP regions had already
produced an EVP and, thus, the rotation was completed. It is only unfortunate that the supervening event of Atty. de Veras removal as IBP Governor and
EVP rendered it impossible for him to assume the IBP Presidency. The fact remains, however, that the rotation rule had been completed despite the non-
assumption by Atty. de Vera to the IBP Presidency.
Moreover, the application of the rotation rule is not a license to disregard the spirit and purpose of the automatic succession rule, but should be applied in
harmony with the latter. The automatic succession rule affords the IBP leadership transition seamless and enables the new IBP National President to attend
to pressing and urgent matters without having to expend valuable time for the usual adjustment and leadership consolidation period. The time that an IBP
EVP spends assisting a sitting IBP President on matters national in scope is in fact a valuable and indispensable preparation for the eventual succession. It
should also be pointed out that this wisdom is further underscored by the fact that an IBP EVP is elected from among the members of the IBP Board of
Governors, who are serving in a national capacity, and not from the members at large. It is intrinsic in the IBP By-Laws that one who is to assume the
highest position in the IBP must have been exposed to the demands and responsibilities of national leadership.
It would therefore be consistent with the purpose and spirit of the automatic succession rule for Governor Salazar to assume the post of IBP President. By
electing the replacement EVP from among the members of the 2003-2005 Board of Governors, the IBP benefits from the experience of the IBP EVP of
2003-2005 in this case, Governor Salazar who would have served in a national capacity prior to his assumption of the highest position.
It will also be inconsistent with the purpose and spirit of the automatic succession rule if the EVP for the term 2003-2005 will be elected exclusively by the
members of the House of Delegates of the region. This Court notes that the removal of Atty. De Vera in was about a month before the expiration of the term
of office of the 2003-2005 Board of Governors. Hence, the replacement Governor would not have been able to serve in a national capacity for two years
prior to assuming the IBP Presidency.
In any case, Section 47 of the IBP Rules uses the phrase as much as practicable to clearly indicate that the rotation rule is not a rigid and inflexible rule as
to bar exceptions in compelling and exceptional circumstances.
It is in view of the foregoing that the argument advanced by Atty. De Vera that the IBP national presidency should be assumed by a nominee from region
from where he comes, can not hold water. It would go against the intent of the IBP By-Laws for such a nominee would be bereft of the wealth of
experience and the perspective that only one who is honed in service while serving in a national post in the IBP would have.
We therefore rule that the IBP Board of Governors acted in accordance with the IBP By-Laws, in electing Atty. Salazar as IBP EVP and in ensuring a
succession in the leadership of the IBP. Had the Board of Governors not done so, there would have been no one qualified to assume the Presidency of the
IBP on 1 July 2005, pursuant to Section 47 of the IBP By-Laws.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, we rule as follows:

1) SUSPEND Atty. Leonard de Vera in A.C. No. 6697 from the practice of law for TWO (2) YEARS, effective from the finality of this
Resolution. Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to the personal record of Atty. Leonard de Vera and copies furnished the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts;
2) DISMISS the letter-complaint of Atty. Leonard de Vera, dated 18 May 2005, in A.M. No. 05-5-15-SC, praying for the disapproval of the
Resolution, dated 13 May 2005, of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines removing him from his posts as Governor and
Executive Vice President of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the said Resolution having been rendered without grave abuse of discretion;
3) AFFIRM the election by the Board of Governors of Atty. Jose Vicente B. Salazar as Executive Vice President of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines for the remainder of the term 2003-2005, such having been conducted in accordance with its By-Laws and absent any showing of grave abuse
of discretion; and
4) DIRECT Atty. Jose Vicente B. Salazar to immediately take his oath of office and assume the Presidency of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines for the term 2005-2007 in accordance with the automatic succession rule in Article VII, Section 47 of the IBP By-Laws, upon receipt of this
Resolution.
SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 173523, February 19, 2014
LUCENA D. DEMAALA, Petitioner, v. SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION) AND OMBUDSMAN, Respondents.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Where a party was afforded the opportunity to participate in the proceedings, yet he failed to do so, he cannot be allowed later on to claim that he was
deprived of his day in court.

This Petition for Certiorari With Urgent Motion For Preliminary Injunction And Prayer For Temporary Restraining Order 1 assails the May 23, 2006
Resolution2 of the Sandiganbayan, Third Division, in Criminal Case Nos. 27208, 27210, 27212, 27214, 27216-27219, and 27223-27228, which denied
petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration of the February 9, 2006 Resolution 3 ordering her suspension pendente lite as Mayor of Narra, Palawan

Factual Antecedents

Petitioner Lucena D. Demaala is the Municipal Mayor of Narra, Palawan, and is the accused in Criminal Case Nos. 27208, 27210, 27212, 27214, 27216-
27219, and 27223-27228 for violations of Section 3(h) of Republic Act No. 3019 4 (RA 3019), which cases are pending before the Sandiganbayan.

On January 9, 2006, the Office of the Special Prosecutor filed before the Sandiganbayan a Motion to Suspend the Accused Pursuant to Section 13, RA
30195 arguing that under Section 13 of RA 3019, 6 petitioner’s suspension from office was mandatory. Petitioner opposed 7 the motion claiming that there is
no proof that the evidence against her was strong; that her continuance in office does not prejudice the cases against her nor pose a threat to the safety and
integrity of the evidence and records in her office; and that her re-election to office justifies the denial of suspension.

Ruling of the Sandiganbayan

On February 9, 2006, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution granting the motion to suspend, thus:chanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Motion of the Prosecution is hereby GRANTED. As prayed for, this Court hereby
ORDERS the suspension pendente lite of herein accused, Lucena Diaz Demaala, from her present position as Municipal Mayor of Narra,
Palawan, and from any other public position he [sic] may now be holding. His [sic] suspension from office shall be for a period of ninety
(90) days only, to take effect upon the finality of this Resolution.

Let the Honorable Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local Government, and the Provincial Governor of Palawan be furnished
copies of this Resolution.

Once this Resolution shall have become final and executory, the Honorable Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local
Government shall be informed accordingly for the implementation of the suspension of herein accused.

Thereafter, the Court shall be informed of the actual date of implementation of the suspension of the accused.

SO ORDERED.8crallawlibrary

The Sandiganbayan held that preventive suspension was proper to prevent petitioner from committing further acts of malfeasance while in office. It stated
further that petitioner’s re-election to office does not necessarily prevent her suspension, citing this Court’s ruling in Oliveros v. Judge Villaluz9 that
pending prosecutions for violations of RA 3019 committed by an elective official during one term may be the basis for his suspension in a subsequent term
should he be re-elected to the same position or office. The court added that by her arraignment, petitioner is deemed to have recognized the validity of the
Informations against her; thus, the order of suspension should issue as a matter of course.

On March 23, 2006, petitioner filed her Motion for Reconsideration. 10 She argued that the motion to suspend should have been filed earlier and not when
the prosecution is about to conclude the presentation of its evidence; that the prosecution evidence indicates that petitioner’s acts are not covered by
Section 3(h) of RA 3019, and thus not punishable under said law; that the evidence failed to show that petitioner was committing further acts of
malfeasance in office; and that suspension - while mandatory - is not necessarily automatic. Petitioner scheduled the hearing of her Motion for
Reconsideration on April 26, 2006, thus:chanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
NOTICE OF HEARING

To: Pros. Manuel T. Soriano, Jr.

Office of the Special Prosecutor
Sandiganbayan Bldg.
Commonwealth Avenue
Quezon City

GREETINGS:chanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
 Please take notice that on Wednesday, April 26, 2006 at 1:30 o’clock P.M. or as soon as [sic] thereafter as counsels may be heard, the
undersigned will submit the foregoing Motion for the consideration and approval of the Honorable Court.

(signed)
ZOILO C. CRUZAT11crallawlibrary

The Ombudsman (prosecution) opposed12 petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.

On April 19, 2006, the prosecution filed a Manifestation with Motion to Reset the Trial Scheduled on April 26 and 27, 2006. 13 It sought to reset the
scheduled April 26 and 27, 2006 hearing for the continuation of the presentation of the prosecution’s evidence to a later date. The manifestation and motion
to reset trial was scheduled for hearing on April 21, 2006. It states, in part, that -
Per the January 19, 2006 Order of the Honorable Court, trial of these cases will continue on April 26 and 27, 2006, both at 1:30 in
the afternoon.

x x x x

In view of the foregoing and in order not to make the government unnecessarily pay for the expenses of the intended witnesses who were
in Palawan, the prosecution did not issue a subpoena to its next witnesses anymore.

Unfortunately, to date, the parties are yet to meet and discuss matters that would be included in the joint stipulations, as the two (2)
scheduled meetings at the Office of the Special Prosecutor between the prosecution and the defense did not materialize. Nevertheless, the
accused has not filed any manifestation to inform the Honorable Court that the accused is no longer willing to enter into stipulations.
Hence, there is a possibility that the parties will eventually come up with a joint stipulation of facts.14 (Emphasis supplied)

On April 21, 2006, the Sandiganbayan issued an Order15 granting the prosecution’s motion to reset trial and scheduled the continuation thereof on August
2 and 3, 2006. The Order reads, as follows:chanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In view of the Motion to Reset the Trial Scheduled on April 26 and 27, 2006 filed by the Prosecution and finding the same to be
meritorious, the motion is hereby granted. Thus, trial on April 26 and 27, 2006 is cancelled and reset on August 2 and 3, 2006, both at
1:30 in the afternoon.

Notify the parties and counsels accordingly.

SO ORDERED.16crallawlibrary

On May 23, 2006, the Sandiganbayan issued the assailed Resolution denying petitioner’s March 23, 2006 Motion for Reconsideration,
thus:chanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the instant Motion for Reconsideration filed by herein accused Mayor Lucena Diaz
Demaala, is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. Our ruling in our Resolution of February 9, 2006 is MAINTAINED.

SO ORDERED.17crallawlibrary

In denying the motion, the Sandiganbayan held that the grounds relied upon and arguments raised therein were mere reiterations of those contained in
petitioner’s Opposition to the Motion to Suspend the Accused; that contrary to petitioner’s submission that the motion to suspend should have been filed
earlier and not when the prosecution is about to conclude the presentation of its evidence, the suspension of an accused public officer is allowed so long as
his case remains pending with the court; that the issue of whether petitioner’s acts constitute violations of RA 3019 is better threshed out during trial; and
that while it is not shown that petitioner was committing further acts of malfeasance while in office, the presumption remains that unless she is suspended,
she might intimidate the witnesses, frustrate prosecution, or further commit acts of malfeasance. 18crallawlibrary

Feeling aggrieved, petitioner filed the instant Petition.

On August 9, 2006, the Court issued a Status Quo Order19 enjoining the implementation of the Sandiganbayan’s February 9, 2006 Resolution.
Issue

Petitioner claims that she was denied due process when the Sandiganbayan issued its May 23, 2006 Resolution denying her Motion for Reconsideration
even before the same could be heard on the scheduled August 2 and 3, 2006 hearings.

Petitioner’s Arguments

The Petition is premised on the argument that petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration - of the February 9, 2006 Resolution ordering her suspension from
office - was originally set for hearing on April 26, 2006, but upon motion by the prosecution, the same was reset to August 2 and 3, 2006; nonetheless,
before the said date could arrive, or on May 23, 2006, the Sandiganbayan resolved to deny her Motion for Reconsideration. Hence, she was deprived of the
opportunity to be heard on her Motion for Reconsideration on the appointed dates - August 2 and 3, 2006, thus rendering the court’s May 23, 2006
Resolution void for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion.

In her Reply,20 petitioner adds that her counsel intentionally set the hearing of her Motion for Reconsideration on April 26 and 27, 2006 in order to
coincide with the main trial of the criminal cases; that since the court rescheduled the April 26 and 27 hearings, she no longer bothered to go to court on
April 26, 2006 as “she had no business to be there”. Petitioner further claims that she did not file any pleading seeking to reset the hearing of her Motion
for Reconsideration because the same had already been scheduled for hearing on August 2 and 3, 2006 at the initiative of the prosecution.

Petitioner now prays that the February 9 and May 23, 2006 Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan be set aside, and that injunctive relief be granted to enjoin
her suspension from office.

Respondent’s Arguments

Praying that the Petition be dismissed, the prosecution argues in its Comment21 that petitioner’s arguments are misleading. It stresses that the prosecution’s
Manifestation with Motion to Reset the Trial Scheduled on April 26 and 27, 2006 sought to reset the scheduled April 26 and 27, 2006 hearing for the
continuation of the presentation of the prosecution’s evidence, and not the scheduled April 26, 2006 hearing of petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration. It
clarifies that a reading of its manifestation and motion to reset trial would reveal that what was sought to be rescheduled was the hearing proper and not the
hearing on petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration; in the same vein, what the Sandiganbayan granted in its April 21, 2006 Order was the rescheduling of
the April 26 and 27, 2006 hearing for the continuation of the presentation of the prosecution’s evidence, and not the April 26, 2006 hearing of petitioner’s
Motion for Reconsideration. For this reason, it cannot be said that petitioner was denied due process when the Sandiganbayan issued its assailed May 23,
2006 Resolution.

The prosecution adds that petitioner should have gone to court on April 21, 2006 to attend the hearing of its manifestation and motion to reset trial to
reiterate her Motion for Reconsideration.

Next, the prosecution argues that petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration was not denied outright; the Sandiganbayan resolved her motion on the merits
and painstakingly addressed each argument raised therein. Moreover, the prosecution filed its written opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration, which
thus joined the issues and rendered the motion ripe for resolution. As such, petitioner was given reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit her
evidence on the motion. It cites the ruling in Batul v. Bayron22 stating that “‘to be heard’ does not only mean presentation of testimonial evidence in court.
One may also be heard through pleadings and where opportunity to be heard through pleadings is accorded, there is no denial of due
process.”23crallawlibrary
Our Ruling

The Court dismisses the Petition.

The only issue is whether petitioner was denied due process when the Sandiganbayan issued its May 23, 2006 Resolution denying the Motion for
Reconsideration without conducting a hearing thereon.

Petitioner’s cause of action lies in the argument that her Motion for Reconsideration, which was originally set for hearing on April 26, 2006, was reset to
August 2 and 3, 2006 via the Sandiganbayan’s April 21, 2006 Order. Nonetheless, before the said date could arrive, the anti-graft court supposedly
precipitately issued the assailed May 23, 2006 Resolution denying her Motion for Reconsideration, thus depriving her of the opportunity to be heard.

The above premise, however, is grossly erroneous.

A reading and understanding of the April 21, 2006 Order of the Sandiganbayan indicates that what it referred to were the two hearing dates of April 26 and
27, 2006 covering the continuation of the trial proper - the ongoing presentation of the prosecution’s evidence - and not the single hearing date of April 26,
2006 for the determination of petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration. The prosecution’s manifestation and motion to reset trial itself unmistakably
specified that what was being reset was the trial proper which was scheduled on April 26 and 27, 2006 pursuant to the court’s previous January 19, 2006
Order; it had nothing at all to do with petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.

If petitioner truly believed that the prosecution’s manifestation and motion to reset trial referred to the April 26, 2006 hearing of her Motion for
Reconsideration, then she should have attended the scheduled April 21, 2006 hearing thereof to reiterate her motion or object to a resetting. Her failure to
attend said hearing is a strong indication that she did not consider the manifestation and motion to reset trial as covering or pertaining to her Motion for
Reconsideration which she set for hearing on April 26, 2006.

On the other hand, petitioner’s failure to attend the scheduled April 26, 2006 hearing of her own Motion for Reconsideration is fatal to her cause. Her
excuse - that she no longer bothered to go to court on April 26, 2006 since “she had no business to be there” - is unavailing. By being absent at the April
21, 2006 hearing, petitioner did not consider the prosecution’s manifestation and motion to reset trial as related to her pending Motion for Reconsideration.
Thus, it was incumbent upon her to have attended the hearing of her own motion on April 26, 2006. Her absence at said hearing was inexcusable, and the
Sandiganbayan was therefore justified in considering the matter submitted for resolution based on the pleadings submitted.

Consequently, there was nothing procedurally irregular in the issuance of the assailed May 23, 2006 Resolution by the Sandiganbayan. The contention that
petitioner was deprived of her day in court is plainly specious; it simply does not follow. Where a party was afforded the opportunity to participate in the
proceedings, yet he failed to do so, he cannot be allowed later on to claim that he was deprived of his day in court. It should be said that petitioner was
accorded ample opportunity to be heard through her pleadings, such conclusion being consistent with the Court’s ruling in Batul v. Bayron, later reiterated
in De La Salle University, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,24 thus -
Where a party was afforded an opportunity to participate in the proceedings but failed to do so, he cannot complain of deprivation of due
process. Notice and hearing is the bulwark of administrative due process, the right to which is among the primary rights that must be
respected even in administrative proceedings. The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or as applied to
administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one’s side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of. So long as the party is given the opportunity to advocate her cause or defend her interest in due course, it cannot be said
that there was denial of due process.

A formal trial-type hearing is not, at all times and in all instances, essential to due process - it is enough that the parties are given a fair
and reasonable opportunity to explain their respective sides of the controversy and to present supporting evidence on which a fair
decision can be based. “To be heard” does not only mean presentation of testimonial evidence in court - one may also be heard through
 pleadings and where the opportunity to be heard through pleadings is accorded, there is no denial of due process. 25crallawlibrary

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DISMISSED. The August 9, 2006 Status Quo Order is LIFTED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 213181 August 19, 2014
FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA Petitioner,
vs.
CHIEF JUSTICE MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO, THE JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL AND EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N.
OCHOA, JR., Respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
Once again, the Couii is faced with a controversy involving the acts of an independent body, which is considered as a constitutional innovation the Judicial
and Bar Council (JBC). It is not the first time that the Court is called upon to settle legal questions surrounding the JBC's exercise of its constitutional
mandate. In De Castro v. JBC,1 the Court laid to rest issues such as the duty of the JBC to recommend prospective nominees for the position of Chief
Justice vis-à-vis the appointing power of the President, the period within which the same may be exercised, and the ban on midnight appointments as set
forth in the Constitution. In Chavez v. JBC,2 the Court provided an extensive discourse on constitutional intent as to the JBC’s composition and
membership.
This time, however, the selection and nomination process actually undertaken by the JBC is being challenged for being constitutionally infirm. The heart of
the debate lies not only on the very soundness and validity of the application of JBC rules but also the extent of its discretionary power. More significantly,
this case of first impression impugns the end-result of its acts - the shortlistfrom which the President appoints a deserving addition to the Highest Tribunal
of the land.
To add yet another feature of noveltyto this case, a member of the Court, no less than the Chief Justice herself, was being impleaded as party respondent.
The Facts
The present case finds its genesis from the compulsory retirement of Associate Justice Roberto Abad (Associate Justice Abad) last May 22, 2014. Before
his retirement, on March 6, 2014, in accordance with its rules,3 the JBC announced the opening for application or recommendation for the said vacated
position.
On March 14, 2014, the JBC received a letter from Dean Danilo Concepcion of the University of the Philippines nominating petitioner Francis H.
Jardeleza (Jardeleza), incumbent Solicitor General of the Republic, for the said position. Upon acceptance of the nomination, Jardeleza was included in the
names of candidates, as well as in the schedule of public interviews. On May 29, 2014, Jardeleza was interviewed by the JBC.
It appears from the averments in the petition that on June 16 and 17, 2014, Jardeleza received telephone callsfrom former Court of Appeals Associate
Justice and incumbent JBC member, Aurora Santiago Lagman (Justice Lagman), who informed him that during the meetings held on June 5 and 16, 2014,
Chief Justice and JBC ex-officioChairperson, Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno (Chief Justice Sereno),manifested that she would be invoking Section 2, Rule 10
of JBC-0094 against him. Jardeleza was then directed to "make himself available" before the JBC on June 30, 2014, during which he would be informed of
the objections to his integrity.
Consequently, Jardeleza filed a letter-petition (letter-petition)5 praying that the Court, in the exercise of itsconstitutional power of supervision over the
JBC, issue an order: 1) directing the JBC to give him at least five (5) working days written notice of any hearing of the JBC to which he would be
summoned; and the said notice to contain the sworn specifications of the charges against him by his oppositors, the sworn statements of supporting
witnesses, if any, and copies of documents in support of the charges; and notice and sworn statements shall be made part of the public record of the JBC; 2)
allowing him to cross-examine his oppositors and supporting witnesses, if any, and the cross-examination to be conducted in public, under the same
conditions that attend the publicinterviews held for all applicants; 3) directing the JBC to reset the hearing scheduled on June 30, 2014 to another date; and
4) directing the JBC to disallow Chief Justice Sereno from participating in the voting on June 30,2014 or at any adjournment thereof where such vote
would be taken for the nominees for the position vacated by Associate Justice Abad.
During the June 30, 2014 meeting of the JBC, sansJardeleza, incumbent Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio (Associate Justice Carpio) appeared as a
resource person to shed light on a classified legal memorandum (legal memorandum) that would clarify the objection to Jardeleza’s integrity as posed by
Chief Justice Sereno. According to the JBC, Chief Justice Sereno questioned Jardeleza’s ability to discharge the duties of his office as shown in a
confidential legal memorandum over his handling of an international arbitration case for the government.
Later, Jardeleza was directed to one of the Court’s ante-rooms where Department of Justice Secretary Leila M. De Lima (Secretary De Lima) informed him
that Associate Justice Carpio appeared before the JBC and disclosed confidential information which, to Chief Justice Sereno, characterized his integrity as
dubious. After the briefing, Jardeleza was summoned by the JBC at around 2:00o’clock in the afternoon.
Jardeleza alleged that he was asked by Chief Justice Sereno if he wanted to defend himself against the integrity issues raised against him. He answered that
he would defend himself provided that due process would be observed. Jardeleza specifically demanded that Chief Justice Sereno execute a sworn
statement specifying her objectionsand that he be afforded the right to cross-examine her in a public hearing. He requested that the same directive should
also be imposed on Associate Justice Carpio. As claimed by the JBC, Representative Niel G. Tupas Jr. also manifested that he wanted to hear for himself
Jardeleza’s explanation on the matter. Jardeleza, however, refused as he would not be lulled intowaiving his rights. Jardeleza then put into record a written
statement6 expressing his views on the situation and requested the JBC to defer its meeting considering that the Court en banc would meet the next day to
act on his pending letter-petition. At this juncture, Jardeleza was excused.
Later in the afternoon of the sameday, and apparently denying Jardeleza’s request for deferment of the proceedings, the JBC continued its deliberations and
proceeded to vote for the nominees to be included in the shortlist. Thereafter, the JBC releasedthe subject shortlist of four (4) nominees which included:
Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr. with six (6) votes, Jose C. Reyes, Jr. with six (6) votes, Maria Gracia M. Pulido Tan with five (5) votes, and Reynaldo B. Daway
with four (4) votes.7
As mentioned in the petition, a newspaper article was later published in the online portal of the Philippine Daily Inquirer, stating that the Court’s
Spokesman, Atty. Theodore Te, revealed that there were actually five (5) nominees who made it to the JBC shortlist, but one (1) nominee could not be
included because of the invocation of Rule 10, Section 2 of the JBC rules.
In its July 8, 2014 Resolution, the Court noted Jardeleza’s letterpetition in view of the transmittal of the JBC list of nominees to the Office of the President,
"without prejudice to any remedy available in law and the rules that petitioner may still wish to pursue." 8 The said resolution was accompanied by an
extensive Dissenting Opinion penned by Associate Justice Arturo D. Brion,9 expressing his respectful disagreement as to the position taken by the
majority.
The Petition
Perceptibly based on the aforementioned resolution’s declaration as to his availment of a remedy in law, Jardeleza filed the present petition for certiorari
and mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), seeking to compel the JBC to
include him in the list ofnominees for Supreme Court Associate Justice viceAssociate Justice Abad, on the grounds that the JBC and Chief Justice Sereno
acted in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in excluding him, despite having garnered a sufficient number of votes to
qualify for the position.
Notably, Jardeleza’s petition decries that despite the obvious urgency of his earlier letter-petition and its concomitant filing on June 25, 2014, the same was
raffled only on July 1, 2014 or a day after the controversial JBC meeting. By the time that his letter-petition was scheduled for deliberation by the Court en
bancon July 8, 2014, the disputedshortlist had already been transmitted to the Office of the President. He attributedthis belated action on his letter-petition
to Chief Justice Sereno, whose action on such matters, especially those impressed withurgency, was discretionary.
An in-depth perusal of Jardeleza’s petition would reveal that his resort to judicial intervention hinges on the alleged illegality of his exclusion from the
shortlist due to: 1) the deprivation of his constitutional right to due process; and 2) the JBC’s erroneous application, if not direct violation, of its own rules.
Suffice it to say, Jardelezadirectly ascribes the supposed violation of his constitutional rights tothe acts of Chief Justice Sereno in raising objections against
his integrity and the manner by which the JBC addressed this challenge to his application, resulting in his arbitrary exclusion from the list of nominees.
Jardeleza’s Position
For a better understanding of the above postulates proffered in the petition, the Court hereunder succinctlysummarizes Jardeleza’s arguments, as follows:
A. Chief Justice Sereno and the JBC violated Jardeleza’s right to due process in the events leading up to and during the vote on the shortlist last June 30,
2014. When accusations against his integrity were made twice, ex parte, by Chief Justice Sereno, without informing him of the nature and cause thereof
and without affording him an opportunity to be heard, Jardeleza was deprived of his right to due process. In turn, the JBC violated his right to due process
when he was simply ordered to make himself available on the June 30, 2014 meeting and was told that the objections to his integrity would be made
known to him on the same day. Apart from mere verbal notice (by way of a telephone call) of the invocation of Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 against his
application and not on the accusations against him per se, he was deprived of an opportunity to mount a proper defense against it. Not only did the JBC fail
to ventilate questions on his integrity during his public interview, he was also divested of his rights as an applicant under Sections 3 and 4, Rule 4, JBC-
009, to wit:
Section 3. Testimony of parties. – The Council may receive written opposition to an applicant on the ground of his moral fitness and, at its discretion, the
Council may receive the testimony of the oppositor at a hearing conducted for the purpose, with due notice to the applicant who shall be allowed to cross-
examine the oppositor and to offer countervailing evidence.
Section 4. Anonymous Complaints. – Anonymous complaints against an applicant shall not be given due course, unless there appears on its face a probable
cause sufficient to engender belief that the allegations may be true. In the latter case, the Council may direct a discreet investigation or require the applicant
to comment thereon in writing or during the interview.
His lack of knowledge as to the identity of his accusers (except for yet again, the verbalinformation conveyed to him that Associate Justice Carpio testified
against him) and as to the nature of the very accusations against him caused him to suffer from the arbitrary action by the JBC and Chief Justice Sereno.
The latter gravely abused her discretion when she acted as prosecutor, witness and judge,thereby violating the very essence of fair play and the Constitution
itself. In his words: "the sui generis nature of JBC proceedings does not authorize the Chief Justice to assume these roles, nor does it dispense with the
need to honor petitioner’s right to due process."10
B. The JBC committed grave abuse of discretion in excluding Jardeleza from the shortlist of nominees, in violation of its own rules. The "unanimity
requirement" provided under Section 2, Rule10 of JBC-009 does not find application when a member of the JBC raises an objection to an applicant’s
integrity. Here, the lone objector constituted a part of the membership of the body set to vote. The lone objector could be completely capable oftaking
hostage the entire voting process by the mere expediency of raising an objection. Chief Justice Sereno’s interpretation of the rule would allow a situation
where all thata member has to do to veto other votes, including majority votes, would be to object to the qualification of a candidate, without need for
factual basis.
C. Having secured the sufficient number of votes, it was ministerial on the part of the JBC to include Jardeleza in the subject shortlist.Section 1, Rule 10 of
JBC-009 provides that a nomination for appointment to a judicial position requires the affirmative vote of at least a majority of all members of the JBC.
The JBC cannot disregard its own rules. Considering that Jardeleza was able to secure four (4) out of six (6) votes, the only conclusion is that a majority of
the members of the JBC found him to be qualified for the position of Associate Justice.
D. The unlawful exclusion ofthe petitioner from the subject shortlist impairs the President’s constitutional power to appoint.Jardeleza’s exclusion from the
shortlist has unlawfully narrowed the President’s choices. Simply put, the President would be constrained to choose from among four (4) nominees, when
five (5) applicants rightfully qualified for the position. This limits the President to appoint a member of the Court from a list generated through a process
tainted with patent constitutional violations and disregard for rules of justice and fair play. Until these constitutional infirmities are remedied, the petitioner
has the right to prevent the appointment of an Associate Justice viceAssociate Justice Abad.
Comment of the JBC
On August 11, 2014, the JBC filed its comment contending that Jardeleza’s petition lacked proceduraland substantive bases that would warrant favorable
action by the Court. For the JBC, certiorariis only available against a tribunal, a board or an officer exercising judicial or quasijudicial functions.11 The
JBC, in its exercise of its mandate to recommend appointees to the Judiciary, does not exercise any of these functions. In a pending case, 12 Jardeleza
himself, as one of the lawyers for the government, argued in this wise: Certioraricannot issue against the JBC in the implementation of its policies.
In the same vein, the remedy of mandamusis incorrect. Mandamus does not lie to compel a discretionary act. For it to prosper, a petition for mandamus
must, among other things, show that the petitioner has a clear legal right to the act demanded. In Jardeleza’s case, there is no legal right to be included in
the list of nominees for judicial vacancies. Possession of the constitutional and statutory qualifications for appointment to the Judiciary may not be used to
legally demand that one’s name be included in the list of candidates for a judicial vacancy. One’s inclusion in the shortlist is strictly within the discretion of
the JBC.
Anent the substantive issues, the JBC mainly denied that Jardeleza was deprived of due process. The JBC reiterated that Justice Lagman, on behalf of the
JBC en banc, called Jardeleza and informed him that Chief Justice Sereno would be invoking Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 due to a question on his
integrity based on the way he handled a very important case for the government. Jardeleza and Justice Lagman spoke briefly about the case and his general
explanation on how he handled the same. Secretary De Lima likewise informed him about the content of the impending objection against his application.
On these occasions, Jardeleza agreed to explain himself. Come the June 30, 2014 meeting, however, Jardeleza refused to shed light on the allegations
against him,as he chose to deliver a statement, which, in essence, requested that his accuser and her witnesses file sworn statements so that he would know
of the allegations against him, that he be allowed to cross-examine the witnesses;and that the procedure be done on record and in public.
In other words, Jardeleza was given ample opportunity to be heard and to enlighten each member of the JBC on the issues raised against him prior to the
voting process. His request for a sworn statement and opportunity to cross-examine is not supported by a demandable right. The JBC is not a fact-finding
body. Neitheris it a court nor a quasi-judicial agency. The members are notconcerned with the determination of his guilt or innocence of the accusations
against him. Besides, Sections 3 and 4, Rule 10,JBC-009 are merely directory as shown by the use of the word "may." Even the conduct of a hearing to
determine the veracity of an opposition is discretionary on the JBC. Ordinarily, if there are other ways of ascertaining the truth or falsity of an allegation or
opposition, the JBC would not call a hearing in order to avoid undue delay of the selection process. Each member of the JBC relies on his or her own
appreciation of the circumstances and qualifications of applicants.
The JBC then proceeded to defend adherence to its standing rules. As a general rule, an applicant is included in the shortlist when he or she obtains an
affirmative vote of at least a majority of all the members of the JBC. When Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009,however, is invoked because an applicant’s
integrity is challenged, a unanimous vote is required. Thus, when Chief Justice Sereno invoked the saidprovision, Jardeleza needed the affirmative vote of
all the JBC members tobe included in the shortlist. In the process, Chief Justice Sereno’s vote against Jardeleza was not counted. Even then, he needed the
votes of the five(5) remaining members. He only got four (4) affirmative votes. As a result,he was not included in the shortlist. Applicant Reynaldo B.
Daway, who gotfour (4) affirmative votes, was included in the shortlist because his integrity was not challenged. As to him, the "majority rule" was
considered applicable.
Lastly, the JBC rued that Jardeleza sued the respondents in his capacity as Solicitor General. Despiteclaiming a prefatory appearance in propria persona, all
pleadings filed with the Court were signed in his official capacity. In effect, he sued the respondents to pursue a purely private interest while retaining the
office of the Solicitor General. By suing the very parties he was tasked by law to defend, Jardeleza knowingly placed himself in a situation where his
personal interests collided against his public duties, in clear violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Code of Professional Ethics.
Moreover, the respondents are all public officials being sued in their official capacity. By retaining his title as Solicitor General, and suing in the said
capacity, Jardeleza filed a suit against his own clients, being the legal defender of the government and its officers. This runs contrary to the fiduciary
relationship sharedby a lawyer and his client.
In opposition to Jardeleza’s prayer for the issuance of a TRO, the JBC called to mind the constitutional period within which a vacancy in the Court must be
filled. As things now stand, the President has until August 20, 2014 to exercise his appointment power which cannot be restrained by a TRO or an
injunctive suit.
Comment of the Executive Secretary
In his Comment, Executive Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa Jr. (Executive Secretary)raised the possible unconstitutionality of Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009,
particularly the imposition ofa higher voting threshold in cases where the integrity of an applicant is challenged. It is his position that the subject JBC rule
impairs the body’s collegial character, which essentially operates on the basis of majority rule. The application of Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 gives rise
to a situation where all that a member needs to do, in order to disqualify an applicant who may well have already obtained a majority vote, is to object to
his integrity. In effect, a member who invokes the said provision is given a veto powerthat undermines the equal and full participation of the other members
in the nomination process. A lone objector may then override the will ofthe majority, rendering illusory, the collegial nature of the JBC and the very
purpose for which it was created— to shield the appointment process from political maneuvering. Further, Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 may beviolative
of due process for it does not allow an applicant any meaningful opportunity to refute the challenges to his integrity. While other provisions of the JBC
rules provide mechanisms enabling an applicant to comment on an opposition filed against him, the subject rule does not afford the same opportunity. In
this case, Jardeleza’s allegations as to the events which transpired on June 30, 2014 obviously show that he was neither informed ofthe accusations against
him nor given the chance to muster a defense thereto.
The Executive Secretary then offered a supposition: granting that the subject provision is held to be constitutional, the "unanimity rule" would only be
operative when the objector is not a member of the JBC. It is only in this scenario where the voting ofthe body would not be rendered inconsequential. In
the event that a JBC member raised the objection, what should have been applied is the general rule of a majority vote, where any JBC member retains
their respective reservations to an application with a negative vote. Corollary thereto, the unconstitutionality of the said rule would necessitate the inclusion
of Jardeleza in the shortlist submitted to the President.
Other pleadings
On August 12, 2014, Jardeleza was given the chance to refute the allegations of the JBC in its Comment. He submitted his Reply thereto on August 15,
2014. A few hours thereafter, orbarely ten minutes prior to the closing of business, the Court received the Supplemental Comment-Reply of the JBC, this
time with the attached minutes of the proceedings that led to the filing of the petition,and a detailed "Statementof the Chief Justice on the Integrity
Objection."13 Obviously, Jardeleza’s Reply consisted only of his arguments against the JBC’s original Comment, as it was filed prior to the filing of the
Supplemental Comment-Reply.
At the late stage of the case, two motions to admit comments-inintervention/oppositions-in-intervention were filed. One was by Atty. Purificacion S.
Bartolome-Bernabe, purportedly the President of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Bulacan Chapter. This pleading echoed the position of the JBC.14
The other one was filed by Atty. Reynaldo A. Cortes, purportedly a former President of the IBP Baguio-Benguet Chapter and former Governor of the IBP-
Northern Luzon. It was coupled with a complaint for disbarment against Jardeleza primarily for violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility for
representing conflicting interests.15
Both motions for intervention weredenied considering that time was of the essence and their motions were merely reiterative of the positions of the JBC
and were perceived to be dilatory. The complaint for disbarment, however, was re-docketed as a separate administrative case.
The Issues
Amidst a myriad of issues submitted by the parties, most of which are interrelated such that the resolution of one issue would necessarily affect the
conclusion as to the others, the Court opts to narrow down the questions to the very source of the discord - the correct application of Section 2, Rule 10
JBC-009 and its effects, if any, on the substantive rights of applicants.
The Court is not unmindful of the fact that a facial scrutiny of the petition does not directly raise the unconstitutionality of the subject JBC rule. Instead, it
bewails the unconstitutional effects of its application. It is only from the comment of the Executive Secretary where the possible unconstitutionality of the
rulewas brought to the fore. Despite this milieu, a practical approach dictatesthat the Court must confront the source of the bleeding from which the gaping
wound presented to the Court suffers.
The issues for resolution are:
I.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT CAN ASSUME JURISDICTION AND GIVE DUECOURSE TO THE SUBJECT PETITION FOR
CERTIORARI AND MANDAMUS (WITH APPLICATION FOR A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER).

II

WHETHER OR NOT THE ISSUES RAISED AGAINST JARDELEZA BEFIT "QUESTIONS OR CHALLENGES ON INTEGRITY"
AS CONTEMPLATED UNDER SECTION 2, RULE 10 OF JBC-009.

II.

WHETHER OR NOT THE RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS IS AVAILABLE IN THE COURSE OF JBC PROCEEDINGS IN CASES
WHERE AN OBJECTION OR OPPOSITION TO AN APPLICATION IS RAISED.

III.

WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER JARDELEZA MAY BE INCLUDED IN THE SHORTLIST OF NOMINEES SUBMITTED TO
THE PRESIDENT.

The Court’s Ruling

I – Procedural Issue: The Court has constitutional bases to assume jurisdiction over the case
A - The Court’s Power of Supervision over the JBC
Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides for the creation of the JBC. The Court was given supervisory authority over it. Section 8 reads:
Section 8.
A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Courtcomposed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the
Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired
Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private sector. [Emphasis supplied]
As a meaningful guidepost, jurisprudence provides the definition and scope of supervision. It is the power of oversight, or the authority to see that
subordinate officers perform their duties.It ensures that the laws and the rules governing the conduct of a government entity are observed and complied
with. Supervising officials see to it that rules are followed, but they themselves do not lay down such rules, nor do they have the discretion to modify or
replace them. If the rules are not observed, they may order the work done or redone, but only to conform to such rules. They may not prescribe their own
manner of execution of the act. They have no discretion on this matter except to see to it that the rules are followed.16
Based on this, the supervisory authority of the Court over the JBC covers the overseeing of compliance with its rules. In this case, Jardeleza’s principal
allegations in his petition merit the exercise of this supervisory authority.
B- Availability of the Remedy of Mandamus
The Court agrees with the JBC that a writ of mandamus is not available. "Mandamuslies to compel the performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty,
but not to compel the performance of a discretionary duty. Mandamuswill not issue to control or review the exercise of discretion of a public officer where
the law imposes upon said public officer the right and duty to exercise his judgment in reference to any matter in which he is required to act. It is his
judgment that is to be exercised and not that of the court.17 There is no question that the JBC’s duty to nominate is discretionary and it may not
becompelled to do something.
C- Availability of the Remedy of Certiorari
Respondent JBC opposed the petition for certiorarion the ground that it does not exercise judicial or quasi-judicial functions. Under Section 1 of Rule 65, a
writ of certiorariis directed against a tribunal exercising judicial or quasi-judicial function. "Judicial functions are exercised by a body or officer clothed
with authority to determine what the law is and what the legal rights of the parties are with respect to the matter in controversy. Quasijudicial function is a
term that applies to the action or discretion of public administrative officers or bodies given the authority to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of
facts, hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them as a basis for their official action using discretion of a judicial nature." 18 It asserts that in the
performance of its function of recommending appointees for the judiciary, the JBC does not exercise judicial or quasijudicial functions. Hence, the resort
tosuch remedy to question its actions is improper.
In this case, Jardeleza cries that although he earned a qualifying number of votes in the JBC, it was negated by the invocation of the "unanimity rule" on
integrity in violation of his right to due process guaranteed not only by the Constitution but by the Council’s own rules. For said reason, the Court is of the
position that it can exercise the expanded judicial power of review vestedupon it by the 1987 Constitution. Thus:
Article VIII.
Section 1. The judicial power is vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality
of the Government.
It has been judicially settled that a petition for certiorari is a proper remedy to question the act of any branch or instrumentality of the government on the
ground of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch orinstrumentality of the government, even if the latter does
not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions.19
In a case like this, where constitutional bearings are too blatant to ignore, the Court does not find passivity as an alternative. The impassemust be
overcome.
II – Substantial Issues
Examining the Unanimity Rule of the JBC in cases where an applicant’s integrity is challenged
The purpose of the JBC’s existence is indubitably rooted in the categorical constitutional declaration that"[a] member of the judiciary must be a person of
proven competence, integrity, probity, and independence." To ensure the fulfillment of these standards in every member of the Judiciary, the JBC has been
tasked toscreen aspiring judges and justices, among others, making certain that the nominees submitted to the President are all qualified and suitably best
for appointment. In this way, the appointing process itself is shieldedfrom the possibility of extending judicial appointment to the undeserving and
mediocre and, more importantly, to the ineligible or disqualified.
In the performance of this sacred duty, the JBC itself admits, as stated in the "whereas clauses" of JBC-009, that qualifications such as "competence,
integrity, probity and independence are not easily determinable as they are developed and nurtured through the years." Additionally, "it is not possible or
advisable to lay down iron-clad rules to determine the fitness of those who aspire to become a Justice, Judge, Ombudsman or Deputy Ombudsman." Given
this realistic situation, there is a need "to promote stability and uniformity in JBC’s guiding precepts and principles." A set of uniform criteria had to be
established in the ascertainment of "whether one meets the minimum constitutional qualifications and possesses qualities of mind and heart expected of
him" and his office. Likewise for the sake oftransparency of its proceedings, the JBC had put these criteria in writing, now in the form of JBC-009. True
enough, guidelines have been set inthe determination of competence,"20 "probity and independence,"21 "soundness of physical and mental condition,22
and "integrity."23
As disclosed by the guidelines and lists of recognized evidence of qualification laid down in JBC-009, "integrity" is closely related to, or if not,
approximately equated to an applicant’s good reputation for honesty, incorruptibility, irreproachableconduct, and fidelity to sound moral and ethical
standards. That is why proof of an applicant’s reputation may be shown in certifications or testimonials from reputable government officials and non-
governmental organizations and clearances from the courts, National Bureau of Investigation, and the police, among others. In fact, the JBC may even
conduct a discreet background check and receive feedback from the public on the integrity, reputation and character of the applicant, the merits of which
shall be verifiedand checked. As a qualification, the term is taken to refer to a virtue, such that, "integrity is the quality of person’s character."24
The foregoing premise then begets the question: Does Rule 2, Section 10 of JBC-009, in imposing the "unanimity rule," contemplate a doubt on the moral
character of an applicant? Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 provides:
SEC. 2. Votes required when integrity of a qualified applicant is challenged. - In every case where the integrity of an applicant who is not otherwise
disqualified for nomination is raised or challenged, the affirmative vote of all the Members of the Council must be obtained for the favorable consideration
of his nomination.
A simple reading of the above provision undoubtedly elicits the rule that a higher voting requirement is absolute in cases where the integrity of an applicant
is questioned. Simply put, when an integrity question arises, the voting requirement for his or her inclusion as a nominee to a judicial post becomes
"unanimous" instead of the "majority vote" required in the preceding section.25 Considering that JBC-009 employs the term "integrity" as an essential
qualification for appointment, and its doubtful existence in a person merits a higher hurdle to surpass, that is, the unanimous vote of all the members of the
JBC, the Court is of the safe conclusion that "integrity" as used in the rules must be interpreted uniformly. Hence, Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 envisions
only a situation where an applicant’s moral fitness is challenged. It follows then that the "unanimity rule" only comes into operation when the moral
character of a person is put in issue. It finds no application where the question is essentially unrelated to an applicant’s moral uprightness.
Examining the "questions of integrity" made against Jardeleza
The Court will now examine the propriety of applying Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 to Jardeleza’s case.
The minutes of the JBC meetings, attached to the Supplemental Comment-Reply, reveal that during the June 30, 2014 meeting, not only the question on his
actuations in the handling of a case was called for explanation by the Chief Justice, but two other grounds as well tending to show his lack of integrity: a
supposed extra-marital affair in the past and alleged acts of insider trading.26
Against this factual backdrop, the Court notes that the initial or original invocation of Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 was grounded on Jardeleza’s
"inability to discharge the duties of his office" as shown in a legal memorandum related to Jardeleza’s manner of representing the government in a legal
dispute. The records bear that the "unanimity rule" was initially invoked by Chief Justice Sereno during the JBC meeting held on June 5, 2014, where she
expressed her position that Jardeleza did not possess the integrity required tobe a member of the Court. 27 In the same meeting, the Chief Justice shared
withthe other JBC members the details of Jardeleza’s chosen manner of framing the government’s position in a case and how this could have been
detrimental to the national interest.
In the JBC’s original comment, the details of the Chief Justice’s claim against Jardeleza’s integrity were couched in general terms. The particulars thereof
were only supplied to the Court in the JBC’s Supplemental Comment-Reply. Apparently, the JBC acceded to Jardeleza’s demand to make the accusations
against him public. At the outset, the JBC declined to raise the fine points of the integrity question in its original Comment due to its significant bearing on
the country’s foreign relations and national security. At any rate, the Court restrains itself from delving into the details thereof in this disposition. The
confidential nature of the document cited therein, which requires the observance of utmost prudence, preclude a discussion that may possibly affect the
country’s position in a pending dispute.
Be that as it may, the Court has to resolve the standing questions: Does the original invocation of Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 involve a question on
Jardeleza’s integrity? Doeshis adoption of a specific legal strategy in the handling of a case bring forth a relevant and logical challenge against his moral
character? Does the "unanimity rule" apply in cases where the main point of contention is the professional judgment sans charges or implications of
immoral or corrupt behavior?
The Court answers these questions in the negative.
While Chief Justice Sereno claims that the invocation of Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 was not borne out ofa mere variance of legal opinion but by an "act
of disloyalty" committed by Jardeleza in the handling of a case, the fact remains that the basis for her invocation of the rule was the "disagreement" in legal
strategy as expressed by a group of international lawyers. The approach taken by Jardeleza in that case was opposed to that preferred by the legal team. For
said reason, criticism was hurled against his "integrity." The invocation of the "unanimity rule" on integrity traces its roots to the exercise ofhis discretion
as a lawyer and nothing else. No connection was established linking his choice of a legal strategy to a treacherous intent to trounce upon the country’s
interests or to betray the Constitution.
Verily, disagreement in legal opinion is but a normal, if not an essential form of, interaction among members of the legal community. A lawyer has
complete discretion on whatlegal strategy to employ in a case entrusted to him28 provided that he lives up tohis duty to serve his client with competence
and diligence, and that he exert his best efforts to protect the interests of his client within the bounds of the law. Consonantly, a lawyer is not an insurer of
victory for clients he represents. An infallible grasp of legal principles and technique by a lawyer is a utopian ideal. Stripped of a clear showing of gross
neglect, iniquity, or immoral purpose, a strategy of a legal mind remains a legal tactic acceptable to some and deplorable to others. It has no direct bearing
on his moral choices.
As shown in the minutes, the other JBC members expressed their reservations on whether the ground invoked by Chief Justice Sereno could be classified
as a "question of integrity" under Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009.29 These reservations were evidently sourced from the factthat there was no clear
indication that the tactic was a "brainchild" of Jardeleza, as it might have been a collective idea by the legal team which initially sought a different manner
of presenting the country’s arguments, and there was no showing either of a corrupt purpose on his part.30 Even Chief Justice Sereno was not certain that
Jardeleza’s acts were urged by politicking or lured by extraneous promises.31 Besides, the President, who has the final say on the conduct of the country’s
advocacy in the case, has given no signs that Jardeleza’s action constituted disloyalty or a betrayal of the country’s trust and interest. While this point does
notentail that only the President may challenge Jardeleza’s doubtful integrity, itis commonsensical to assume that he is in the best position to suspect a
treacherous agenda. The records are bereft of any information that indicatesthis suspicion. In fact, the Comment of the Executive Secretary expressly
prayed for Jardeleza’s inclusion in the disputed shortlist.
The Court notes the zeal shown by the Chief Justice regarding international cases, given her participation in the PIATCO case and the Belgian Dredging
case. Her efforts inthe determination of Jardeleza’s professional background, while commendable, have not produced a patent demonstration of a
connection betweenthe act complained of and his integrity as a person. Nonetheless, the Court cannot consider her invocation of Section 2, Rule 10 of
JBC-009 as conformably within the contemplation of the rule. To fall under Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009, there must be a showing that the act
complained of is, at the least, linked to the moral character of the person and not to his judgment as a professional. What this disposition perceives,
therefore, is the inapplicability of Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 to the original ground of its invocation.
As previously mentioned, Chief Justice Sereno raised the issues of Jardeleza’s alleged extra-marital affair and acts of insider-trading for the first time
onlyduring the June 30, 2014 meeting of the JBC. As can be gleaned from the minutes of the June 30, 2014 meeting, the inclusion of these issues had its
origin from newspaper reports that the Chief Justice might raise issues of "immorality" against Jardeleza. 32 The Chief Justice then deduced that the
"immorality" issue referred to by the media might have been the incidents that could have transpired when Jardeleza was still the General Counsel of San
Miguel Corporation. She stated that inasmuch as the JBC had the duty to "take every possible step to verify the qualification of the applicants," it might as
well be clarified.33
Do these issues fall within the purview of "questions on integrity" under Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009? The Court nods in assent. These are valid issues.
This acquiescence is consistent with the Court’s discussion supra. Unlike the first ground which centered onJardeleza’s stance on the tactical approach in
pursuing the case for the government, the claims of an illicit relationship and acts of insider trading bear a candid relation to his moral character.
Jurisprudence34 is replete with cases where a lawyer’s deliberate participation in extra-marital affairs was considered as a disgraceful stain on one’s ethical
and moral principles. The bottom line is that a lawyer who engages in extra-marital affairs is deemed to have failed to adhere to the exacting standards of
morality and decency which every member of the Judiciary is expected to observe. In fact, even relationships which have never gone physical or intimate
could still be subject to charges of immorality, when a lawyer, who is married, admits to having a relationship which was more than professional, more
than acquaintanceship, more than friendly.35 As the Court has held: Immorality has not been confined to sexual matters, but includes conduct
inconsistentwith rectitude, or indicative of corruption, indecency, depravity and dissoluteness; or is willful, flagrant, or shameless conduct showing moral
indifference to opinions of respectable members of the communityand an inconsiderate attitude toward good order and public welfare. 36 Moral character is
not a subjective term but one that corresponds to objective reality.37 To have a good moral character, a person must have the personal characteristic
ofbeing good. It is not enough that he or she has a good reputation, that is, the opinion generally entertained about a person or the estimate in which he or
she is held by the public in the place where she is known.38 Hence, lawyers are at all times subject to the watchful public eye and community
approbation.39
The element of "willingness" to linger in indelicate relationships imputes a weakness in one’s values, self-control and on the whole, sense of honor, not
only because it is a bold disregard of the sanctity of marriage and of the law, but because it erodes the public’s confidence in the Judiciary. This is no longer
a matter of an honest lapse in judgment but a dissolute exhibition of disrespect toward sacredvows taken before God and the law.
On the other hand, insider trading is an offense that assaults the integrity of our vital securities market.40 Manipulative devices and deceptive practices,
including insider trading, throw a monkey wrench right into the heart of the securities industry. Whensomeone trades inthe market with unfair advantage in
the form of highly valuable secret inside information, all other participants are defrauded. All of the mechanisms become worthless. Given enough of stock
marketscandals coupled with the related loss of faith in the market, such abuses could presage a severe drain of capital. And investors would eventuallyfeel
more secure with their money invested elsewhere.41 In its barest essence, insider trading involves the trading of securities based on knowledge of material
information not disclosed to the public at the time. Clearly, an allegation of insider trading involves the propensity of a person toengage in fraudulent
activities that may speak of his moral character.
These two issues can be properly categorized as "questions on integrity" under Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009. They fall within the ambit of "questions on
integrity." Hence, the "unanimity rule" may come into operation as the subject provision is worded.
The Availability of Due Process in the
Proceedings of the JBC
In advocacy of his position, Jardeleza argues that: 1] he should have been informed of the accusations against him in writing; 2] he was not furnished the
basis of the accusations, that is, "a very confidential legal memorandum that clarifies the integrityobjection"; 3] instead of heeding his request for an
opportunity to defend himself, the JBC considered his refusal to explain, during the June 30, 2014 meeting, as a waiver of his right to answer the
unspecified allegations; 4] the voting of the JBC was railroaded; and 5] the alleged "discretionary" nature of Sections 3 and 4 of JBC-009 is negated by the
subsequent effectivity of JBC-010, Section 1(2) of which provides for a 10-day period from the publication of the list of candidates within which any
complaint or opposition against a candidate may be filed with the JBC Secretary; 6] Section 2 of JBC-010 requires complaints and oppositions to be in
writing and under oath, copies of which shall be furnished the candidate in order for him to file his comment within five (5) days from receipt thereof; and
7] Sections 3 to 6 of JBC-010 prescribe a logical, reasonable and sequential series of steps in securing a candidate’s right to due process.
The JBC counters these by insisting that it is not obliged to afford Jardeleza the right to a hearing in the fulfillment of its duty to recommend. The JBC, as a
body, is not required by law to hold hearings on the qualifications of the nominees. The process by which an objection is made based on Section 2, Rule 10
of JBC-009 is not judicial, quasi-judicial, or fact-finding, for it does not aim to determine guilt or innocence akin to a criminal or administrative offense but
toascertain the fitness of an applicant vis-à-vis the requirements for the position. Being sui generis, the proceedings of the JBC do not confer the rights
insisted upon by Jardeleza. He may not exact the application of rules of procedure which are, at the most, discretionary or optional. Finally, Jardeleza
refused to shed light on the objections against him. During the June 30, 2014 meeting, he did not address the issues, but instead chose totread on his view
that the Chief Justice had unjustifiably become his accuser, prosecutor and judge.
The crux of the issue is on the availability of the right to due process in JBC proceedings. After a tedious review of the parties’ respective arguments, the
Court concludes that the right to due process is available and thereby demandable asa matter of right.
The Court does not brush aside the unique and special nature of JBC proceedings. Indeed, they are distinct from criminal proceedings where the finding of
guilt or innocence of the accused is sine qua non. The JBC’s constitutional duty to recommend qualified nominees to the President cannot be compared to
the duty of the courts of law to determine the commission of an offense and ascribe the same to an accused, consistent with established rules on evidence.
Even the quantum ofevidence required in criminal cases is far from the discretion accorded to the JBC.
The Court, however, could not accept, lock, stock and barrel, the argument that an applicant’s access tothe rights afforded under the due process clause is
discretionary on the part of the JBC. While the facets of criminal42 and administrative43 due process are not strictly applicable to JBC proceedings, their
peculiarity is insufficient to justify the conclusion that due process is not demandable.
In JBC proceedings, an aspiring judge or justice justifies his qualifications for the office when he presents proof of his scholastic records, work experience
and laudable citations. His goal is to establish that he is qualified for the office applied for. The JBC then takes every possible step to verify an applicant's
trackrecord for the purpose ofdetermining whether or not he is qualified for nomination. It ascertains the factors which entitle an applicant to become a part
of the roster from which the President appoints.
The fact that a proceeding is sui generisand is impressed with discretion, however, does not automatically denigrate an applicant’s entitlement to due
process. It is well-established in jurisprudence that disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generisin that they are neither purely civil nor purely
criminal; they involve investigations by the Court into the conduct of one of its officers, not the trial of an action or a suit. 44 Hence, in the exercise of its
disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to accountfor his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of
preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by purging the profession of members who, by their
misconduct, have proved themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. In such
posture, there can be no occasion to speak of a complainant or a prosecutor.45 On the whole, disciplinary proceedings are actually aimed to verifyand
finally determine, if a lawyer charged is still qualifiedto benefit from the rights and privileges that membership in the legal profession evoke.
Notwithstanding being "a class of itsown," the right to be heard and to explain one’s self is availing. The Court subscribes to the view that in cases where
an objection to an applicant’s qualifications is raised, the observance of due process neither negates nor renders illusory the fulfillment of the duty of JBC
torecommend. This holding is not an encroachment on its discretion in the nomination process. Actually, its adherence to the precepts of due process
supports and enriches the exercise of its discretion. When an applicant, who vehemently denies the truth of the objections, is afforded the chance to protest,
the JBC is presented with a clearer understanding of the situation it faces, thereby guarding the body from making an unsound and capriciousassessment of
information brought before it. The JBC is not expected to strictly apply the rules of evidence in its assessment of an objection against an applicant. Just the
same, to hear the side of the person challenged complies with the dictates of fairness for the only test that an exercise of discretion must surmount is that of
soundness.
A more pragmatic take on the matter of due process in JBC proceedings also compels the Court to examine its current rules. The pleadings of the parties
mentioned two: 1] JBC-009 and 2] JBC-010. The former provides the following provisions pertinent to this case:
SECTION 1. Evidence of integrity. - The Council shall take every possible step to verify the applicant's record of and reputation for honesty, integrity,
incorruptibility, irreproachable conduct, and fidelity to sound moral and ethical standards. For this purpose, the applicant shall submit to the Council
certifications or testimonials thereof from reputable government officials and non-governmental organizations, and clearances from the courts, National
Bureau of Investigation, police, and from such other agencies as the Council may require.
SECTION 2. Background check. - The Council mayorder a discreet background check on the integrity, reputation and character of the applicant, and
receive feedback thereon from the public, which it shall check or verify to validate the merits thereof.
SECTION 3. Testimony of parties.- The Council may receive written opposition to an applicant on groundof his moral fitness and, at its discretion, the
Council mayreceive the testimony of the oppositor at a hearing conducted for the purpose, with due notice to the applicant who shall be allowed to cross-
examine the oppositor and to offer countervailing evidence.
SECTION 4. Anonymous complaints. - Anonymous complaints against an applicant shall not begiven due course, unless there appears on its face a
probable cause sufficient to engender belief that the allegations may be true. In the latter case, the Council may either direct a discreet investigation or
require the applicant to comment thereon in writing or during the interview. [Emphases Supplied]
While the "unanimity rule" invoked against him is found in JBC-009, Jardeleza urges the Court to hold that the subsequent rule, JBC-010, 46 squarely
applies to his case. Entitled asa "Rule to Further Promote Public Awareness of and Accessibility to the Proceedings of the Judicial and Bar Council," JBC-
010 recognizes the needfor transparency and public awareness of JBC proceedings. In pursuance thereof, JBC-010 was crafted in this wise:
SECTION 1. The Judicial and Bar Council shall deliberate to determine who of the candidates meet prima facie the qualifications for the positionunder
consideration. For this purpose, it shall prepare a long list of candidates who prima facieappear to have all the qualifications.
The Secretary of the Council shall then cause to be published in two (2) newspapers of general circulation a notice of the long list of candidates in
alphabetical order.
The notice shall inform the public that any complaint or opposition against a candidate may be filed with the Secretary within ten (10) days thereof.
SECTION 2.The complaint or opposition shall be in writing, under oath and in ten (10) legible copies, together with its supporting annexes. It shall strictly
relate to the qualifications of the candidate or lack thereof, as provided for in the Constitution, statutes, and the Rules of the Judicial and Bar Council, as
well as resolutions or regulations promulgated by it.
The Secretary of the Council shallfurnish the candidate a copy of the complaint or opposition against him. The candidate shall have five (5) days from
receipt thereof within which to file his comment to the complaint or opposition, if he so desires.
SECTION 3.The Judicial and Bar Council shall fix a date when it shall meet in executive session to consider the qualification of the long list of candidates
and the complaint or opposition against them, if any. The Council may, on its own, conduct a discreet investigation of the background of the candidates.
On the basis of its evaluationof the qualification of the candidates, the Council shall prepare the shorter list of candidates whom it desires to interview for
its further consideration.
SECTION 4.The Secretary of the Council shall again cause to be published the dates of the interview of candidates in the shorter list in two (2) newspapers
of general circulation. It shall likewise be posted in the websites of the Supreme Court and the Judicial and Bar Council.
The candidates, as well as their oppositors, shall be separately notified of the dateand place of the interview.
SECTION 5.The interviews shall be conducted in public. During the interview, only the members ofthe Council can ask questions to the candidate. Among
other things, the candidate can be made to explain the complaint or opposition against him.
SECTION 6. After the interviews, the Judicial and Bar Council shall again meet in executive session for the final deliberation on the short list of candidates
which shall be sent to the Office of the President as a basis for the exercise of the Presidential power of appointment. [Emphases supplied]
Anent the interpretation of these existing rules, the JBC contends that Sections 3 and 4, Rule 10 of JBC-009 are merely directory in nature as can be
gleaned from the use of the word "may." Thus, the conduct of a hearing under Rule 4 of JBC-009 is permissive and/or discretionary on the part of the JBC.
Even the conduct of a hearing to determine the veracity of an opposition is discretionary for there are ways, besides a hearing, to ascertain the truth or
falsity of allegations. Succinctly, this argument suggests that the JBC has the discretion to hold or not to hold a hearing when an objection to an applicant’s
integrity is raised and that it may resort to other means to accomplish its objective. Nevertheless, JBC adds, "what is mandatory, however, is that if the
JBC, in its discretion, receives a testimony of an oppositor in a hearing, due notice shall be given to the applicant and that shall be allowed to cross-
examine the oppositor."47 Again, the Court neither intends to strip the JBC of its discretion to recommend nominees nor proposes thatthe JBC conduct a
full-blown trial when objections to an application are submitted. Still, it is unsound to say that, all together, the observance of due process is a part of JBC’s
discretion when an opposition to an application is made of record. While it may so rely on "other means" such as character clearances, testimonials, and
discreet investigation to aid it in forming a judgment of an applicant’s qualifications, the Court cannot accept a situation where JBC is given a full rein on
the application of a fundamental right whenever a person’s integrity is put to question. In such cases, an attack on the person of the applicant necessitates
his right to explain himself.
The JBC’s own rules convince the Court to arrive at this conclusion. The subsequent issuance of JBC-010 unmistakably projects the JBC’s deference to the
grave import of the right of the applicant to be informed and corollary thereto, the right to be heard. The provisions of JBC-010, per se, provide that: any
complaint or opposition against a candidate may be filed with the Secretary within ten (10) days thereof; the complaint or opposition shall be in writing,
under oath and in ten (10) legible copies; the Secretary of the Council shall furnish the candidate a copy of the complaint or opposition against him; the
candidate shall have five (5) days from receipt thereof within which to file his comment to the complaint or opposition, if he so desires; and the candidate
can be made to explain the complaint or opposition against him.
The Court may not close its eyes to the existence of JBC-010 which, under the rules of statutory construction,bears great weight in that: 1] it covers "any"
complaint or opposition; 2] it employs the mandatory term, "shall"; and 3] most importantly, it speaks of the very essence of due process. While JBC-010
does not articulate a procedure that entails a trialtype hearing, it affords an applicant, who faces "any complaint or opposition," the right to answer the
accusations against him. This constitutes the minimum requirements of due process.
Application to Jardeleza’s Case
Nearing the ultimate conclusion of this case, the Court is behooved to rule on whether Jardeleza was deprived of his right to due process in the events
leading up to, and during, the vote on the shortlist last June 30, 2014.
The JBC gives great weight and substance to the fact that it gave Jardeleza the opportunity to answer the allegations against him. It underscores the fact
that Jardeleza was asked to attend the June 30, 2014 meeting so that he could shed light on the issues thrown at him. During the said meeting, Chief Justice
Sereno informed him that in connection with his candidacy for the position of Associate Justice of the Supreme Court, the Council would like to propound
questions on the following issues raised against him: 1] his actuations in handling an international arbitration case not compatible with public interest; 48 2]
reports on his extra-marital affair in SMC; and 3] alleged insider trading which led to the "show cause" order from the Philippine Stock Exchange.49
As Jardeleza himself admitted, he declined to answer or to explain his side, as he would not want to be "lulled into waiving his rights." Instead, he
manifested that his statement be put on record and informed the Council of the then pendency of his letter-petition with the Court en banc. When Chief
Justice Sereno informed Jardeleza that the Council would want to hear from him on the three (3) issues against him,Jardeleza reasoned out that this was
precisely the issue. He found it irregular that he was not being given the opportunity to be heard per the JBC rules.He asserted that a candidate must be
given the opportunity to respond to the charges against him. He urged the Chief Justice to step down from her pedestal and translate the objections in
writing. Towards the end of the meeting, the Chief Justice said that both Jardeleza’s written and oral statements would be made part of the record. After
Jardeleza was excused from the conference, Justice Lagman suggested that the voting be deferred, but the Chief Justice ruled that the Council had already
completed the process required for the voting to proceed.
After careful calibration of the case, the Court has reached the determination that the application of the "unanimity rule" on integrity resulted in Jardeleza’s
deprivation of his right to due process.
As threshed out beforehand, due process, as a constitutional precept, does not always and in all situations require a trial-type proceeding. Due process is
satisfied when a person is notified of the charge against him and given an opportunity to explain or defend himself.50 Even as Jardeleza was verbally
informed of the invocation of Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 against him and was later asked to explain himself during the meeting, these circumstances
still cannot expunge an immense perplexity that lingers in the mind of the Court. What is to become of the procedure laid down in JBC-010 if the same
would be treated with indifference and disregard? To repeat, as its wording provides, any complaint or opposition against a candidate may be filed with the
Secretary withinten (10) days from the publication of the notice and a list of candidates. Surely, this notice is all the more conspicuous to JBC members.
Granting ex argumenti, that the 10-day period51 is only applicable to the public, excluding the JBC members themselves, this does not discount the fact
that the invocation of the first ground in the June 5, 2014 meeting would have raised procedural issues. To be fair, several members of the Council
expressed their concern and desire to hear out Jardeleza but the application of JBC-010 did not form part of the agenda then. It was only during the next
meeting on June 16, 2014, that the Council agreed to invite Jardeleza, by telephone, to a meeting that would be held on the same day when a resource
person would shed light on the matter.
Assuming again that the classified nature of the ground impelled the Council to resort to oral notice instead of furnishing Jardeleza a written opposition,
why did the JBC not take into account its authority to summon Jardeleza in confidence at an earlier time? Is not the Council empowered to "take every
possible step to verify the qualification of the applicants?" It would not be amiss to state, at this point, that the confidential legal memorandum used in the
invocation ofthe "unanimity rule" was actually addressed to Jardeleza, in his capacity as Solicitor General. Safe to assume is his knowledge of the
privileged nature thereof and the consequences of its indiscriminate release to the public. Had he been privately informed of the allegations against him
based on the document and had he been ordered to respond thereto in the same manner, Jardeleza’s right to be informed and to explain himself would have
been satisfied.
What precisely set off the protest of lack of due process was the circumstance of requiring Jardeleza to appear before the Council and to instantaneously
provide those who are willing to listen an intelligent defense. Was he given the opportunity to do so? The answer is yes, in the context of his physical
presence during the meeting. Was he given a reasonable chance to muster a defense? No, because he was merely asked to appear in a meeting where he
would be, right then and there, subjected to an inquiry. It would all be too well to remember that the allegations of his extra-marital affair and acts of
insider trading sprung up only during the June 30, 2014 meeting. While the said issues became the object of the JBC discussion on June 16, 2014, Jardeleza
was not given the idea that he should prepare to affirm or deny his past behavior. These circumstances preclude the very idea of due process in which the
right to explain oneself is given, not to ensnare by surprise, but toprovide the person a reasonable opportunity and sufficient time to intelligently muster his
response. Otherwise, the occasion becomes anidle and futile exercise.
Needless to state, Jardeleza’s grievance is not an imagined slight but a real rebuff of his right to be informed of the charges against him and his right to
answer the same with vigorouscontention and active participation in the proceedings which would ultimately decide his aspiration to become a magistrate
of this Court.
Consequences
To write finisto this controversy and in view of the realistic and practical fruition of the Court’s findings, the Court now declares its position on whether or
not Jardeleza may be included in the shortlist, just in time when the period to appoint a member of the Court is about to end.
The conclusion of the Court is hinged on the following pivotal points:
1. There was a misapplication of the "unanimity rule" under Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 as to Jardeleza’s legal strategy in handling a case for
the government.
2. While Jardeleza’s alleged extra-marital affair and acts of insider trading fall within the contemplation of a "question on integrity" and would
have warranted the application of the "unanimity rule," he was notafforded due process in its application.
3. The JBC, as the sole body empowered to evaluate applications for judicial posts, exercises full discretion on its power to recommend
nomineesto the President. The sui generischaracter of JBC proceedings, however, is not a blanket authority to disregard the due process under
JBC-010.
4. Jardeleza was deprived of his right to due process when, contrary to the JBC rules, he was neither formally informed of the questions on his
integrity nor was provided a reasonable opportunity to prepare his defense.
With the foregoing, the Court is compelled to rule that Jardeleza should have been included in the shortlist submitted to the President for the vacated
position of Associate Justice Abad. This consequence arose not from the unconstitutionality of Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009, per se, but from the
violation by the JBC of its own rules of procedure and the basic tenets of due process. By no means does the Court intend to strike down the "unanimity
rule" as it reflects the JBC’s policy and, therefore, wisdom in its selection of nominees. Even so, the Court refuses to turn a blind eye on the palpable
defects in its implementation and the ensuing treatment that Jardeleza received before the Council. True, Jardeleza has no vested right to a nomination, but
this does not prescind from the fact that the JBC failed to observe the minimum requirements of due process.
In criminal and administrative cases, the violation of a party’s right to due process raises a serious jurisdictional issue which cannot be glossed over or
disregarded at will. Where the denial of the fundamental right of due process is apparent, a decision rendered in disregard of that right is void for lack of
jurisdiction.52 This rule may well be applied to the current situation for an opposing view submits to an undue relaxation of the Bill of Rights. To this, the
Court shall not concede. Asthe branch of government tasked to guarantee that the protection of due process is available to an individual in proper cases, the
Court finds the subject shortlist as tainted with a vice that it is assigned to guard against. Indeed, the invocation of Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 must be
deemed to have never come into operation in light of its erroneous application on the original ground against Jardeleza’s integrity. At the risk of being
repetitive, the Court upholds the JBC’s discretion in the selection of nominees, but its application of the "unanimity rule" must be applied in conjunction
with Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-010 being invoked by Jardeleza. Having been able to secure four (4) out of six (6) votes, the only conclusion left to
propound is that a majority of the members of the JBC, nonetheless, found Jardeleza to be qualified for the position of Associate Justice and this grants him
a rightful spot in the shortlist submitted to the President. Need to Revisit JBC’s
Internal Rules
In the Court’s study of the petition,the comments and the applicable rules of the JBC, the Court is of the view that the rules leave much to be desired and
should be reviewed and revised. It appears that the provision on the "unanimity rule" is vagueand unfair and, therefore, can be misused or abused resulting
in the deprivation of an applicant’s right to due process.
Primarily, the invocation of the "unanimity rule" on integrity is effectively a veto power over the collective will of a majority. This should be clarified. Any
assertion by a member aftervoting seems to be unfair because it effectively gives him or her a veto power over the collective votes of the other members in
view of the unanimous requirement. While an oppositor-member can recuse himself orherself, still the probability of annulling the majority vote ofthe
Council is quite high.
Second, integrity as a ground has not been defined. While the initial impression is that it refers to the moral fiber of a candidate, it can be, as it has been,
used to mean other things. Infact, the minutes of the JBC meetings n this case reflect the lack of consensus among the members as to its precise definition.
Not having been defined or described, it is vague, nebulous and confusing. It must be distinctly specified and delineated.
Third, it should explicitly provide who can invoke it as a ground against a candidate. Should it be invoked only by an outsider as construed by the
respondent Executive Secretary or also by a member?
Fourth, while the JBC vetting proceedings is "sui generis" and need not be formal or trial type, they must meet the minimum requirements of due process.
As always, an applicant should be given a reasonable opportunity and time to be heard on the charges against him or her, if there are any.
At any rate, it is up to the JBC to fine-tune the rules considering the peculiar nature of its function. It need not be stressed that the rules to be adopted
should be fair, reasonable, unambiguous and consistent with the minimum requirements of due process.
One final note.
The Court disclaims that Jardeleza's inclusion in the shortlist is an endorsement of his appointment as a member of the Court. 1âwphi1 In deference to the
Constitution and his wisdom in the exercise of his appointing power, the President remains the ultimate judge of a candidate's worthiness.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, it is hereby declared that Solicitor General Francis I-I. Jardeleza is deemed INCLUDED in the
shortlist submitted to the President for consideration as an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court vice Associate Justice Roberto A. Abad.
The Court further DIRECTS that the Judicial and Bar Council REVIEW, and ADOPT, rules relevant to the observance of due process in its proceedings,
particularly JBC-009 and JBC-010, subject to the approval of the Court.
This Decision is immediately EXECUTORY. Immediately notify the Office of the President of this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
(No part)
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO*
Chief Justice

I join the Dissent of J. Leonen.

(No part)
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO*
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson

Please see my separate Opinion concurring with the Ponencia of

Pls. See: Separate Concurring Opinion
Justice Mendoza And the separate opinion of Justice Brion
ARTURO D. BRION
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

See separate opinion In corporating explanation of vote I also join the separate opinion of J, De Castro & J. Brion
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice Associate Justice

(On official leave)

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.**
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ BIENVENIDO L. REYES

Associate Justice Associate Justice

I join the dissent of J. Leonen I dissent. See separate opinion

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN
Associate Justice Associate Justice

C E R TI F I CATI O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I hereby certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the ooinion of the Court.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Acting Chairperson

Footnotes
* No part.
** On official leave.
1 G.R. No. 191002, April 20, 2010, 676 SCRA 579.
2 G.R. No. 202242, July 17, 2012, 618 SCRA 639.
3 JBC-009, Rules of the Judicial and Bar Council, promulgated on September 23, 2002.
4 Section 2. Votes required when integrity of a qualified applicant is challenged. – In every case when the integrity of an applicant who is not
otherwise disqualified for nomination is raised or challenged, the affirmative vote of all the members ofthe Council must be obtained for the
favourable consideration of his nomination.
5 Docketed as A.M. No. 14-07-01-SC-JBC, Re: Jardeleza For the Position of Associate Justice Vacated By Justice Roberto A. Abad, rollo, pp.
79-88.
6 Id. at 33-36.
7 Id.at 37-38.
8 Id. at 95.
9 Id. at 97-106.
10 Id. at 12.
11 Section 1, Rule 65, Rules of Court.
12 Villanueva v. Judicial and Bar Council, docketed as G.R. No. 211833 (still pending).
13 Rollo,pp. 170-217.
14 Id. at 128-169.
15 Id. at 220-233.
16 Drilon v. Lim, G.R. No. 112497, August 4, 1994, 235 SCRA 135, 142.
17 Paloma v. Mora, 507 Phil. 697 (2005).
18 Chamber of Real Estate And Builders’ Associations, Inc. (CREBA) v. Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC) And Manila Electric Company
(MERALCO),G.R. No. 174697, July 8, 2010, 624 SCRA 556.
19 Araullo v. Aquino, G.R. No. 209287, July 1, 2014.
20 Rule 3 SEC 1. Guidelines in determining competence. - In determining the competence of the applicant or recommendee for appointment,
the Council shall consider his educational preparation, experience, performance and other accomplishments including the completion of the
prejudicature program of the Philippine Judicial Academy; provided, however, that in places where the number of applicants or recommendees
is insufficient and the prolonged vacancy in the court concerned will prejudice the administration of justice, strict compliance with the
requirement of completion of the prejudicature program shall be deemed directory." (Effective Dec. 1, 2003)SEC. 2. Educational preparation. -
The Council shall evaluate the applicant's (a) scholastic record up to completion of the degree in law and other baccalaureate and post-graduate
degrees obtained; (b) bar examination performance; (c) civil service eligibilities and grades in other government examinations; (d) academic
awards, scholarships or grants received/obtained; and (e) membership in local or international honor societies or professional organizations.
SEC. 3. Experience. - The experience of the applicant inthe following shall be considered:
(a) Government service, which includes that in the Judiciary (Court of Appeals, Sandiganbayan, and courts of the first and second
levels); the Executive Department (Office of the President proper and the agencies attached thereto and the Cabinet); the Legislative
Department (elective or appointive positions); Constitutional Commissions or Offices; Local Government Units (elective and
appointive positions); and quasi-judicial bodies.
(b) Private Practice, which may either begeneral practice, especially in courts of justice, as proven by, among other documents,
certifications from Members of the Judiciary and the IBP and the affidavits of reputable persons; or specialized practice, as proven
by, among other documents, certifications from the IBP and appropriate government agencies or professional organizations, as well
as teaching or administrative experience in the academe; and
(c) Others, such as service in international organizations or with foreign governments or other agencies.
SEC. 4. Performance. - (a) The applicant who is in government service shall submit his performance ratings, which shall include a
verified statement as to such performance for the past three years.
(b) For incumbent Members of the Judiciary who seek a promotional or lateral appointment, performance may be based on landmark
decisions penned; court records as to status of docket; reports of the Office of the Court Administrator; verified feedback from the
IBP; and a verified statement as to his performance for the past three years, which shall include his caseload, his average monthly
output in all actions and proceedings, the number of cases deemed submitted and the date they were deemed submitted, and the
number of his decisions during the immediately preceding two-year period appealedto a higher court and the percentage of
affirmance thereof.
 SEC. 5. Other accomplishments. - The Council shall likewise consider other accomplishments of the applicant, such as authorship of
law books, treatises, articles and other legal writings, whether published or not; and leadership in professional, civic or other
organizations.
21 Rule 5 SECTION 1. Evidence of probity and independence.- Any evidence relevantto the candidate's probity and independence such as, but
not limited to, decisions he has rendered if he is an incumbent member of the judiciary or reflective of the soundness of his judgment, courage,
rectitude, cold neutrality and strength of character shall be considered.
SEC. 2. Testimonials of probity and independence. - The Council may likewise consider validated testimonies of the applicant's
probity and independence from reputable officials and impartial organizations.
22 Rule 6 SECTION 1. Good health. - Good physical health and sound mental/psychological and emotional condition of the applicant play a
critical role in his capacity and capability to perform the delicate task of administering justice. The applicant or the recommending party shall
submit together with his application or the recommendation a sworn medical certificate or the results of an executive medical examination
issued or conducted, as the case may be, within two months prior to the filing of the application or recommendation. At its discretion, the
Council may require the applicant to submit himself to another medical and physical examination if it still has some doubts on the findings
contained in the medical certificate or the results of the executive medical examination.
SEC. 2. Psychological/psychiatric tests. - The applicant shall submit to psychological/psychiatric tests to be conducted by the
Supreme Court MedicalClinic or by a psychologist and/or psychiatrist duly accredited by the Council.
23 Rule 4 SECTION 1. Evidence of integrity. - The Council shall take every possible step to verify the applicant's record of and reputation for
honesty, integrity, incorruptibility, irreproachable conduct, and fidelity to sound moral and ethical standards. For this purpose, the applicant shall
submit to the Council certifications or testimonials thereof from reputable government officials and non-governmental organizations, and
clearances from the courts, National Bureau of Investigation, police, and from such other agencies as the Council may require.
SEC. 2. Background check. - The Council may order a discreet background check on the integrity, reputation and character of the
applicant, and receive feedback thereon from the public, which it shall check or verify to validate the merits thereof.
SEC. 3. Testimony of parties.- The Council may receive written opposition to an applicant on ground of his moral fitness and, at its
discretion, the Council may receive the testimony of the oppositor at a hearing conducted for the purpose, with due notice to the
applicant who shall be allowed to cross-examine the oppositor and to offer countervailing evidence.
SEC. 4. Anonymous complaints. - Anonymous complaints against an applicant shall not be given due course, unless there appears on
its face a probable cause sufficient to engender belief that the allegations may be true. In the latter case, the Council may either direct
a discreet investigation or require the applicant to comment thereon in writing or during the interview.
SEC. 5. Disqualification. - The following are disqualified from being nominated for appointment to any judicial post or as
Ombudsman or Deputy Ombudsman:
1. Those with pending criminal or regular administrative cases;
2. Those with pending criminal cases in foreign courts or tribunals; and
3. Those who have been convicted in any criminal case; or in an administrative case, where the penalty imposed is at least
a fine of more than ₱10,000, unless he has been granted judicial clemency.
SEC. 6. Other instances of disqualification.- Incumbent judges, officials orpersonnel of the Judiciary who are facing administrative
complaints under informal preliminary investigation (IPI) by the Office of the Court Administrator may likewise be disqualified
frombeing nominated if, in the determination of the Council, the charges are serious or grave as to affect the fitness of the applicant
for nomination.
For purposes of this Section and of the preceding Section 5 insofar as pending regular administrative cases are concerned, the
Secretary of the Council shall, from time to time, furnish the Office of the Court Administrator the name of an applicant upon receipt
of the application/recommendation and completion of the required papers; and within ten days from receiptthereof the Court
Administrator shall report in writing to the Council whether or not the applicant is facing a regular administrative case or an IPI case
and the status thereof. In regard to the IPI case, the Court Administrator shall attach to his report copies of the complaint and the
comment of the respondent.

42 Article 3 of the 1987 Constitution guarantees the rights of the accused, including the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty, the
right to enjoy due process under the law, and the right to a speedy, public trial. Those accused must be informed of the charges against them and
must be given access to competent, independent counsel, and the opportunity to post bail, except in instances where there is strong evidence that
the crime could result in the maximum punishment of life imprisonment. Habeas corpus protection is extended to all except in cases of invasion
or rebellion. During a trial,the accused are entitled to be present at every proceeding, to compel witnesses, to testify and cross-examine them and
to testify or be exempt as a witness. Finally, all are guaranteed freedom from double jeopardy and, if convicted, the right to appeal.
43 The right to a hearing which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support
thereof.
(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which
he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented.
(3) While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded,
namely, that of having something to support its decision. A decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity, a place when
directly attached.
(4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion but the evidence must be "substantial." Substantial
evidence is more than a mere scintilla It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
 conclusion.
(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the
parties affected.
(6) The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own independent consideration of the law
and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision.
(7) The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the
proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decisions rendered. The performance of this duty is
inseparable fr

FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 193791, August 02, 2014
PRIMANILA PLANS, INC., HEREIN REPRESENTED BY EDUARDO S. MADRID, Petitioner, v. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION, Respondent.
DECISION
REYES, J.:

This resolves the Petition for Review on Certiorari1under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by Primanila Plans, Inc. (Primanila) to assail the Decision 2
dated March 9, 2010 and Resolution3 dated September 15, 2010 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 104083. The CA affirmed in CA-G.R.
SP No. 104083 the Securities and Exchange Commission’s (SEC) issuance of an Order 4 dated April 9, 2008, which was a cease and desist order upon
Primanila with the following dispositive portion:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, pursuant to the authority vested in the Commission, PRIMANILA PLANS, INC., its respective officers, directors,
agents, representatives, and any and all persons, conduit entities and subsidiaries claiming and acting under their authority, are hereby
ordered to immediately CEASE AND DESIST from further engaging in activities of selling, offering for sale Primasa plans and to
refrain from further collecting payments and amortizations for Primasa plans to protect the interest of investors and the public in general.

In accordance with the provisions of Section 64.3 of Republic Act No. 8799, otherwise known as the Securities Regulation Code, the
parties subject of this Cease and Desist Order may file a formal request or motion for the lifting of this Order within a non-extendible
period of five (5) days from receipt hereof.

SO ORDERED.5chanrobleslaw

The Facts

Primanila was registered with the SEC on October 17, 1988 and was issued Certificate of Registration No. 156350. Based on its amended articles of
incorporation, the company’s primary purpose was “to organize, establish, develop, conduct, provide, maintain, operate, offer, issue, market and sell
pension plans under which the savings of professionals, officers, directors and other personnel of corporations, firms, or entities, and self employed
individuals can be pooled together, accumulated and invested in profitable placements and productive enterprises so as to build an Accumulated Fund for
each individual participant or planholder for his retirement, monthly pension or for other [foreseeable] needs in the future.” Primanila then operated as a
pre-need company and maintained a business office in Makati City. 6cralawred

On April 9, 2008, the SEC was prompted to issue the subject cease and desist order after an investigation conducted by the SEC’s Compliance and
Enforcement Department (CED) on Primanila yielded the following factual findings duly explained in the cease and desist
order:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

1. The office of [Primanila] located at 20 th Floor, Philippine AXA Life Centre, Sen. Gil Puyat Ave., Makati City was closed. No
notices were posted outside said office to inform the public of the reason for such closure. x x x

2. [Primanila]’s website (www.primanila.com) was offering a pension plan product called Primasa Plan. The website contains
detailed instructions as to how interested persons can apply for the said plan and where initial contributions and succeeding
installment payments can be made by applicants and planholders. According to the website, applicants and planholders can
pay directly at the head office, any of its field offices or may deposit the payments in PRIMANILA’s METROBANK Account
No. 066-3-06631031-1. This was discovered by [CED] when a member of CED visited [Primanila’s] website on February 12,
2008.

3. [PRIMANILA] failed to renew its Dealer’s License for 2008. In view of the expiration of the said license, the [SEC’s
Non-Traditional Securities and Instruments Department (NTD)], through its Acting Director Jose P. Aquino, issued a letter
dated January 3, 2008 addressed to [Primanila’s] Chairman and CEO Mr. Eduardo S. Madrid, enjoining [Primanila] from
selling and/or offering for sale pre-need plans to the public.

4. [Primanila] has not been issued a secondary license to act as dealer or general agent for pre-need pension plans for 2008.
Also, no registration statement has been filed by [Primanila] for the approval of a pension plan product called Primasa Plan.
This is shown in the certification dated February 15, 2008 issued by NTD upon the request of Atty. Hubert B. Guevara of
CED.
 5. [Primanila’s] Bank Account is still active. This was discovered by CED when it deposited on March 6, 2008 the sum of Php
50.00 which was duly received by METROBANK Robinson’s Branch as shown by the deposit slip.

6. Among the many planholders of [PRIMANILA] are enlisted personnel of the Philippine National Police (PNP). Premium
collections for Primaplans via salary deductions were religiously remitted to [Primanila] on a monthly basis. x x x

7. PNP remitted the total amount of Php 2,072,149.38 to respondent PRIMANILA representing the aforementioned premium
collections via salary deductions of the 410 enlisted personnel of PNP who are planholders. This is shown in the table
prepared by the remittance clerk of the PNP, Ms. Mercedita A. Almeda.

8. [PRIMANILA] failed to deposit the required monthly contributions to the trust fund in violation of Pre-need Rule 19.1. This
is shown in the Trust Fund Reports for the months of November and December 2007 prepared by ASIATRUST BANK, the
trustee of [Primanila].

9. [PRIMANILA] under-declared the total amount of its collections as shown in its SEC Monthly Collection Reports which
it submitted to NTD. Its reports show that it only collected the total amount of Php 302,081.00 from January to
September 2007. However, the remittance report of the PNP shows that [Primanila] received the amount of Php
1,688,965.22 from the PNP planholders alone for the said period. Therefore, it under-declared its report by Php
1,386,884.22.7

From these findings, the SEC declared that Primanila committed a flagrant violation of Republic Act No. 8799, otherwise known as The Securities
Regulation Code (SRC), particularly Section 16 thereof which reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Section 16. Pre-Need Plans. – No person shall sell or offer for sale to the public any pre-need plan except in accordance with rules and
regulations which the Commission shall prescribe. Such rules shall regulate the sale of pre-need plans by, among other things, requiring
the registration of pre-need plans, licensing persons involved in the sale of pre-need plans, requiring disclosures to prospective plan
holders, prescribing advertising guidelines, providing for uniform accounting system, reports and record keeping with respect to such
plans, imposing capital, bonding and other financial responsibility and establishing trust funds for the payment of benefits under such
plans.

It also breached the New Rules on the Registration and Sale of Pre-Need Plans, specifically Rule Nos. 3 and 15 thereof, to
wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Rule 3. Registration of Pre-Need Plans. – No corporation shall issue, offer for sale, or sell Pre-Need Plans unless such plans shall have
been registered under Rule 4.

Rule 15. Registration of Dealers, General Agents and Salesmen of Pre-Need Plans.

15.1. Any issuer selling its own Pre-Need Plans shall be deemed a dealer in securities and shall be required to be registered as such and
comply with all the provisions hereof; provided that the issuer selling different types of Pre-Need Plans shall be required to be registered
as dealer only once for the different types of plans.

The SEC then issued the subject cease and desist order “in order to prevent further violations and in order to protect the interest of its plan holders and the
public.”8cralawred

Feeling aggrieved, Primanila filed a Motion for Reconsideration/Lift Cease and Desist Order, 9 arguing that it was denied due process as the order was
released without any prior issuance by the SEC of a notice or formal charge that could have allowed the company to defend itself. 10 Primanila further
argued that it was neither selling nor collecting premium payments for the product Primasa plans. The product was previously developed but was never
launched and sold to the public following the resignation from the company in 2006 by Benjamin Munda, the one who crafted it. The Primanila company
website that included details on the Primasa product was not updated; the advertisement of the product on the website was the result of mere
inadvertence.11 Thus, the cease and desist order against Primanila would allegedly not accomplish anything, but only prejudice the interest and claims of
its other planholders.12cralawred

On June 5, 2008, the SEC issued its Order 13 denying Primanila’s motion for reconsideration for lack of merit. The cease and desist order issued on April 9,
2008 was then made permanent.

Unyielding, Primanila appealed to the CA via a petition for review. On March 9, 2010, the CA rendered its decision dismissing the petition and affirming
in toto the issuances of the SEC.

The Present Petition

Following the CA’s denial of its motion to reconsider, Primanila filed the present petition which cites the following grounds:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
THE [CA] GROSSLY ERRED WHEN IT SUSTAINED THE ASSAILED ORDERS OF RESPONDENT SEC CONSIDERING THAT
THE FACTS AND EVIDENCE ON RECORD [STATE] OTHERWISE;chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
 THE [CA] GROSSLY ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT [PRIMANILA] WAS GIVEN DUE PROCESS BY RESPONDENT SEC AS
[PRIMANILA] WAS ABLE TO FILE A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION; AND

THE [CA] GROSSLY ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT THE PUBLIC WILL NOT SUFFER GREATLY AND IRREPARABLY BY
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ASSAILED ORDERS OF RESPONDENT SEC.14

The Ruling of the Court

The petition lacks merit.

Due Process of Law

Contrary to its stance, Primanila was accorded due process notwithstanding the SEC’s immediate issuance of the cease and desist order on April 9, 2008.
The authority of the SEC and the manner by which it can issue cease and desist orders are provided in Section 64 of the SRC, and we
quote:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Section 64. Cease and Desist Order. –

64.1. The Commission, after proper investigation or verification, motu proprio, or upon verified complaint by any aggrieved party,
may issue a cease and desist order without the necessity of a prior hearing if in its judgment the act or practice, unless restrained, will
operate as a fraud on investors or is otherwise likely to cause grave or irreparable injury or prejudice to the investing public.

64.2. Until the Commission issues a cease and desist order, the fact that an investigation has been initiated or that a complaint has been
filed, including the contents of the complaint, shall be confidential. Upon issuance of a cease and desist order, the Commission shall
make public such order and a copy thereof shall be immediately furnished to each person subject to the order.

64.3. Any person against whom a cease and desist order was issued may, within five (5) days from receipt of the order, file a formal
request for lifting thereof. Said request shall be set for hearing by the Commission not later than fifteen (15) days from its filing and the
resolution thereof shall be made not later than ten (10) days from the termination of the hearing. If the Commission fails to resolve the
request within the time herein prescribed, the cease and desist order shall automatically be lifted. (Emphasis ours)

The law is clear on the point that a cease and desist order may be issued by the SEC motu proprio, it being unnecessary that it results from a verified
complaint from an aggrieved party. A prior hearing is also not required whenever the Commission finds it appropriate to issue a cease and desist order that
aims to curtail fraud or grave or irreparable injury to investors. There is good reason for this provision, as any delay in the restraint of acts that yield such
results can only generate further injury to the public that the SEC is obliged to protect.

To equally protect individuals and corporations from baseless and improvident issuances, the authority of the SEC under this rule is nonetheless with
defined limits. A cease and desist order may only be issued by the Commission after proper investigation or verification, and upon showing that the acts
sought to be restrained could result in injury or fraud to the investing public. Without doubt, these requisites were duly satisfied by the SEC prior to its
issuance of the subject cease and desist order.

Records indicate the prior conduct of a proper investigation on Primanila’s activities by the Commission’s CED. Investigators of the CED personally
conducted an ocular inspection of Primanila’s declared office, only to confirm reports that it had closed even without the prior approval of the SEC.
Members of CED also visited the company website of Primanila, and discovered the company’s offer for sale thereon of the pension plan product called
Primasa Plan, with instructions on how interested applicants and planholders could pay their premium payments for the plan. One of the payment options
was through bank deposit to Primanila’s given Metrobank account which, following an actual deposit made by the CED was confirmed to be active.

As part of their investigation, the SEC also looked into records relevant to Primanila’s business. Records with the SEC’s Non-Traditional Securities and
Instruments Department (NTD) disclosed Primanila’s failure to renew its dealer’s license for 2008, or to apply for a secondary license as dealer or general
agent for pre-need pension plans for the same year. SEC records also confirmed Primanila’s failure to file a registration statement for Primasa Plan, to
fully remit premium collections from planholders, and to declare truthfully its premium collections from January to September 2007.

The SEC was not mandated to allow Primanila to participate in the investigation conducted by the Commission prior to the cease and desist order’s
issuance. Given the circumstances, it was sufficient for the satisfaction of the demands of due process that the company was amply apprised of the results
of the SEC investigation, and then given the reasonable opportunity to present its defense. Primanila was able to do this via its motion to reconsider and
lift the cease and desist order. After the CED filed its comment on the motion, Primanila was further given the chance to explain its side to the SEC
through the filing of its reply. “Trite to state, a formal trial or hearing is not necessary to comply with the requirements of due process. Its essence is
simply the opportunity to explain one’s position.”15 As the Court held in Ledesma v. Court of Appeals:16cralawred
Due process, as a constitutional precept, does not always and in all situations require a trial-type proceeding. Due process is satisfied
when a person is notified of the charge against him and given an opportunity to explain or defend himself. In administrative proceedings,
the filing of charges and giving reasonable opportunity for the person so charged to answer the accusations against him constitute the
minimum requirements of due process. The essence of due process is simply to be heard, or as applied to administrative proceedings, an
opportunity to explain one’s side, or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.17chanrobleslaw

Validity of the Cease and

Desist Order
The validity of the SEC’s cease and desist order is further sustained for having sufficient factual and legal bases.

The acts specifically restrained by the subject cease and desist order were Primanila’s sale, offer for sale and collection of payments specifically for its
Primasa plans. Notwithstanding the findings of both the SEC and the CA on Primanila’s activities, the company still argued in its petition that it neither
sold nor collected premiums for the Primasa product. Primanila argued that the offer for sale of Primasa through the Primanila website was the result of
mere inadvertence, after the website developer whom it hired got hold of a copy of an old Primasa brochure and then included its contents in the company
website even without the knowledge and prior approval of Primanila.

It bears emphasis that the arguments of Primanila on the matter present factual issues, which as a rule, are beyond the scope of a petition for review on
certiorari. We underscore the basic rule that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The
Supreme Court is not a trier of facts. It is not our function to review, examine and evaluate or weigh the probative value of the evidence presented, for a
question of fact would arise in such event. 18 Thus, it is equally settled that the factual findings of administrative agencies, such as the SEC, are generally
held to be binding and final so long as they are supported by substantial evidence in the record of the case. Our jurisdiction is limited to reviewing and
revising errors of law imputed to the lower court, the latter’s findings of fact being conclusive and not reviewable by this Court. 19cralawred

In ruling on the petition’s denial, we rely on the substantial evidence that supports the SEC’s and CA’s findings. Section 5, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court
defines “substantial evidence” as such relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. 20 In the instant case,
this substantial evidence is derived from the results of the SEC investigation on Primanila’s activities. Specifically on the product Primasa plans, the SEC
ascertained that there were detailed instructions on Primanila’s website as to how interested persons could apply for a plan, together with the manner by
which premium payments therefor could be effected. A money deposit by CED to Primanila’s Metrobank account indicated in the advertisement
confirmed that the bank account was active.

There could be no better conclusion from the foregoing circumstances that Primanila was engaged in the sale or, at the very least, an offer for sale to the
public of the Primasa plans. The offer for Primasa was direct and its reach was even expansive, especially as it utilized its website as a medium and visits
to it were, as could be expected, from prospective clients.

The Court finds weak and implausible the argument of Primanila that the inclusion of the Primasa advertisement on its website was due to mere
inadvertence. It was very unlikely that Primanila’s website developer would include in the Primanila website sections or items that were not sanctioned by
the company. As a hiree of the company, the website developer could have only acted upon the orders and specific instructions of the company. As
prudence requires, there also normally are employees of a company who are specifically tasked to monitor contents and activities in its company website.
It was therefore inconceivable that Primanila only knew of the Primasa post on its website after it received the subject cease and desist order. In any case,
Primanila should be held responsible for the truthfulness of all data or information that appeared on its website, especially as these were supplied by
persons who were working under its authority.

It is beyond dispute that Primasa plans were not registered with the SEC. Primanila was then barred from selling and offering for sale the said plan
product. A continued sale by the company would operate as fraud to its investors, and would cause grave or irreparable injury or prejudice to the investing
public, grounds which could justify the issuance of a cease and desist order under Section 64 of the SRC. Furthermore, even prior to the issuance of the
subject cease and desist order, Primanila was already enjoined by the SEC from selling and/or offering for sale pre-need products to the public. The SEC
Order dated April 9, 2008 declared that Primanila failed to renew its dealer’s license for 2008, prompting the SEC’s NTD to issue a letter dated January 3,
2008 addressed to Primanila’s Chairman and Chief Executive Officer Eduardo S. Madrid, enjoining the company from selling and/or offering for sale pre-
need plans to the public. It also had not obtained a secondary license to act as dealer or general agent for pre-need pension plans for 2008. 21cralawred

In view of the foregoing, Primanila clearly violated Section 16 of the SRC and pertinent rules which barred the sale or offer for sale to the public of a pre-
need product except in accordance with SEC rules and regulations. Under Section 16 of the SRC:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Sec. 16. Pre-Need Plans. – No person shall sell or offer for sale to the public any pre-need plan except in accordance with rules and
regulations which the Commission shall prescribe. Such rules shall regulate the sale of pre-need plans by, among other things, requiring
the registration of pre-need plans, licensing persons involved in the sale of pre-need plans, requiring disclosures to prospective plan
holders, prescribing advertising guidelines, providing for uniform plans, imposing capital, bonding and other financial responsibility, and
establishing trust funds for the payment of benefits under such plans.

As the foregoing provisions are necessary for the protection of investors and the public in general, even the Pre-Need Code, 22 which now governs pre-need
companies and their activities, contains similar conditions for the regulation of pre-need plans.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated March 9, 2010 and Resolution dated September 15, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP. No. 104083 are AFFIRMED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 205870 August 13, 2014
LEI SHERYLL FERNANDEZ, Petitioner,
vs.
BOTICA CLAUDIO represented by GUADALUPE JOSE, Respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the Decision2 dated September 13, 2012 and the Resolution3 dated February 11, 2013 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 123633 which nullified and set aside (a) the Resolution 4 dated March 15, 2010 of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) in NLRC NCR Case No. 01-22111-06-RI finding petitioner Lei Sheryll Fernandez (Fernandez) to have been illegally dismissed by
respondent Guadalupe Jose (Jose), and (b) the Order5 dated August 17, 2010 of Labor Arbiter (LA) Napoleon V. Fernando granting the issuance of a writ
of execution of the foregoing NLRC resolution.
The Facts
On November 14, 2002, Fernandez was hired as a trainee at Botica Claudio,6 a drugstore located at Tomas Claudio Street, Morong, Rizal,7 which is owned
and operated by Jose. In January 2003, she was promoted as sales clerk/pharmacy aide, which position she held until the termination of her services on
January 15, 2006.8 Due to her termination, Fernandez filed a complaint9 for illegal dismissal with prayer for the payment of her statutory benefits against
Jose before the NLRC Regional Arbitration Branch (RAB) No. IV, docketed as NLRC Case No. RAB-IV-01-22111-06, alleging that: (a) during her
employment, she was paid a salary of 180.00 per day,10 and worked from 8 o’clock in the morning until 8 o’clock in the evening, and sometimes, even up
to 10 o’clock at night, but was never paid any overtime pay and/or holiday pay, and that her Social Security System (SSS) contributions were not duly
remitted;11 (b) Jose merely fabricated the charges against her in order tojustify her dismissal; and (c) she did not go on absence without official leave
(AWOL).12
Jose denied the foregoing allegations, and contended that Fernandez’s dismissal was valid given that she went on AWOL; this, in addition to the various
infractions she committed during her employment, particularly, her acts of (a) dispensing wrong medicines, (b) allowing some clients to buy medicines on
credit without her employer’s consent, and (c) dishonesty. Further, Jose claimed that all of her employees, including Fernandez, were paid their
corresponding benefits, and that their SSS contributions were all duly remitted.13
The LA Ruling
In a Decision14 dated December 11, 2007, the LA held that while just cause attended Fernandez’s dismissal from work based on the finding that she went
on AWOL, the same was nonetheless effected without procedural due process.15 Thus, the LA ordered Jose to pay Fernandez 11,700.00 as separation pay
as well as14,040.00 representing three (3) years of her unpaid 13th month pay, but denied her claims for overtime pay and moral/exemplary damages for
lackof factual and legal bases.16
Dissatisfied with the LA’s ruling, Fernandez filed a Notice of Appeal17 with Memorandum of Appeal18 on February 8, 2008 before the NLRC. Copies of
the same were purportedly sent by registered mail to one "Atty. Ramon E. Solis, Jr., Counsel for respondents, No. 5 Sto. Nino St., SFDM, 1100 Quezon
City."19
The Proceedings Before the NLRC
On March 15, 2010, the NLRC rendered a Resolution20 (NLRC Resolution) granting Fernandez’s appeal, and thereby reversing the LA’s ruling.
It found Fernandez to have been illegally dismissed by her employer, Jose, without a valid cause and observance of procedural due process. 21 It observed
that the pieces of evidence presented by Jose to substantiate Fernandez’s purported infractions were merely fabricated, and that there was no indication that
Fernandez was apprised of her supposed offenses before her dismissal.22 Accordingly, it ordered Jose to pay Fernandez the aggregate amount of
₱297,522.45, consisting of ₱254,831.85 as backwages, ₱42,120.00 as separation pay,and ₱570.60 as overtime pay. 23
On June 1, 2010, an Entry of Judgment24 was issued by the NLRC, declaring its Resolution to have become final and executory on May 18, 2010.
Consequently, the LA issued an Order25 dated August 17, 2010 (LA Order) granting Fernandez’s motion for execution.26
Without disclosing the date when the foregoing resolution was received, Jose filed a motion for reconsideration 27 dated January 20, 2011 before the
NLRC, insisting that just causes attended Fernandez’s dismissal, albeit the same was made withoutprocedural due process. Despite the fact that the NLRC
had yet to act on the aforesaid motion for reconsideration, Jose filed a second motion for reconsideration 28 dated February 2, 2011 before the same
tribunal.29
Notwithstanding the pendency of the aforesaid motions for reconsideration, Jose filed a petition for certiorari30 before the CA, claiming to have secured a
copy of the NLRCResolution and LA Order only upon personal verification on February 8, 201031 and filed a motion for reconsideration therefrom on
April 12, 2011,32 referring to her second motion for reconsideration dated February 2, 2011.
The CA Ruling
In a Decision33 dated September 13, 2012,the CA granted Jose’s petition for certiorari, holding that the NLRC gravely abused its discretion in taking
cognizance of Fernandez’s appeal despite the latter’s failure to furnish Jose copies of her notice of appeal and appeal memorandum in violation of Article
223 of the Labor Code and the NLRC Rules of Procedure.34 Said pronouncement was based on the CA’s finding that copies of Fernandez’s notice of
appeal and appeal memorandum were sent to one Atty. Ramon E. Solis, Jr., who was her (Fernandez’s) own former counsel, and not Jose’s. Thus, in view
of Fernandez’s failure to comply with the requirements for the perfection of her appeal, the CA held that Jose was deprived of her right to due process, and
that Fernandez’s appeal of the LA Decision had never been perfected, thereby rendering said decision final and executory, 35 and the NLRC without any
authority to entertain Fernandez’s recourse.36 Accordingly, the CA declared the NLRC Resolution as well as the corresponding entry of judgment and the
LA Order null and void,37 and reinstated the LA Decision.38
Aggrieved, Fernandez sought reconsideration39 but the same was denied in a Resolution40
dated February 11, 2013, hence, the instant petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The core issue for the Court’s resolution is whether or not the CA erred in holding that the NLRC gravely abused its discretion in giving due course to
Fernandez’s appeal.
The Court’s Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
At the outset, the Court notes that the CA gravely abused its discretion in giving due course to respondent’s Rule 65 certiorari petition despite its finding
that the latter still had a pending motion for reconsideration from the Decision dated March 15, 2010 before the NLRC.41 It is settled that the filing of a
motion for reconsideration from the order, resolution or decision of the NLRC is an indispensable condition before an aggrieved party can avail of a
petition for certiorari.42 This is to afford the NLRC an opportunity to rectify its perceived errors or mistakes, if any. 43 Hence, the more prudent recourse
for respondent should have been to move for the immediate resolution of its motion for reconsideration before the NLRC instead of filing a petition for
certioraribefore the CA.44 Having failed to do so, her petition for certiorariwas prematurely filed,45 and the CA should have dismissed the same.
On the merits, the Court finds that the CA erred in declaring that the failure of Fernandez to furnish Jose with copies of her notice of appeal and
memorandum of appeal before the NLRC deprived the latter of her right to due process.46
While Article 22347 of the Labor Code and Section 3(a), Rule VI of the then New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC 48 require the party intending to appeal
from the LA’s ruling to furnish the other party a copy of his memorandum of appeal, the Court has heldthat the mere failure to serve the same upon the
opposing party does not bar the NLRC from giving due course to an appeal.49 Such failure is only treatedas a formal lapse, an excusable neglect, and,
hence, not a jurisdictional defect warranting the dismissal of an appeal.50 Instead, the NLRC should require the appellant to provide the opposing party
copies of the notice of appeal and memorandum of appeal.51
In this case, however, the NLRC could not be expected to require compliance from Fernandez, the appellant, since it was not aware that the opposing party,
Jose, was not notified of her appeal. Hence, it cannot be faulted in relying on Fernandez’s representation that she had sent Jose, through her counsel, a copy
of her memorandum of appeal by registered mail,52 as evidenced by Registry Receipt No. 006511.53
More significantly, it is undisputed thatJose eventually participated in the appeal proceedings by filing not only one but two motions for reconsideration
from the NLRC Resolution, thereby negating any supposed denial of due process on her part. As held in the case ofAngeles v. Fernandez,54 the availment
of the opportunity toseek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of in labor cases amounts to due process.55 After all, the essence of due
process is simply the opportunity to be heard or as applied in administrative proceedings, anopportunity to explain one’s side or an opportunity to seek a
reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. What the law prohibits is absolute absence of the opportunity to be heard, thus, an aggrieved party
cannot feign denial of due process where he had been afforded the opportunityto ventilate his side, as Jose was in this case.56
Accordingly, the Court finds thatthe CA erred in ascribing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC in taking cognizance of Fernandez’s appeal.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED.The Decision dated September 13, 2012 and the Resolution dated February 11, 2013 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 123633 are hereby REVERSED andSET ASIDE. The Decision dated March 15, 2010 of the National Labor Relations Commission and
the Order dated August 17, 2010 of the Labor Arbiter are REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

ARTURO D. BRION MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice Associate Justice
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice
ATT E S TAT I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's
Division.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Second Division
C E R TI F I CATI O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice

Footnotes
1 Rollo, pp. 3-28.
2 Id. at 32-43. Penned by Associate Justice Isaias P. Dicdican, with Associate Justices Michael P. Elbinias and Nina G. Antonio-Valenzuela,
concurring.
3 Id. at 46-47.
4 Id. at 123-130. Penned by Commissioner Pablo C. Espiritu, Jr., with Commissioners Alex A. Lopez and Gregorio 0. Bilog Ill, concurring.
5 Id. at 223-225. Docketed as NLRC Case No. RAB-IV-01-22111-06-RI.
6 Id. at 33.
7 Id. at 4.
8 Id. at 33.
9 Id. at 51.
10 Id.
11 Id. at 34.
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 Id. at 105-108. Penned by LA Jose G. De Vera.
15 Id. at 107.
16 Id.
17 Id. at 109-110.
18 Id. at 111-119.
19 Id. at 110 and 119.
20 Id. at 123-130.
21 Id. at 127.
22 Id. at 126-127.
23 Id. at 128-129.
24 Id. at 131.
25 Id. at 223-225.
26 Id. at 37.
27 Id. at 132-134.
28 Id. at 190-194.
29 Id. at 9-10.
30 Id. at 158-188.
31 Id. at 162.
32 Id. at 170.
33 Id. at 32-44.
34 Id. at 38-40.
35 Id. at 41.
36 Id. at 42.
37 Id. at 39-40.
38 Id. at 43.
39 Id. at 292-296.
40 Id. at 46-47.
41 See id. at 37.
42 Republic v. Pantranco North Express, Inc. (PNEI),G.R. No. 178593, February 15, 2012, 666 SCRA 199, 205. See also Dr. Santos v. CA, 563
Phil. 240, 245 (2007).
43 Dr. Santos v. CA, id.
44 See id. at 246.
45 Id.
46 Id. at 39.
47 Art. 223. Appeal. – Decisions, awards, or ordersof the Labor Arbiter are final and executory unless appealed to the Commission by any or
both parties within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of such decisions, awards, or orders. Such appeal may be entertained only on any of the
following grounds:
xxxx
In all cases, the appellant shall furnish a copy of the memorandum of appeal to the other party who shall file an answer not later than
ten (10) calendar days from receipt thereof.
xxxx
 48 Section 3(a), Rule VI of the then New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, as amended by NLRC Resolution No. 01-02, Series of 2002
provides:
RULE VI
Appeals

Section 3. Requisites for Perfection of Appeal. – (a) The appeal shall be filed within the reglementary period as provided in
Section 1 of this Rule; shall be under oath with proof of payment of the required appeal fee and the posting of a cash or surety
bond as provided in Section 5 of this Rule; shall be accompanied by a memorandum of appeal which shall state the grounds
relied upon and the arguments in support thereof; the relief prayed for; and a statement of the date when the appellant received
the appealed decision, order or award and proof of service on the other party of such appeal.

A mere notice of appeal without complying withthe other requisites aforestated shall not stop the running of the period for
perfecting an appeal.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 174996 December 3, 2014
BRO. BERNARD OCA, FSC, BRO. DENNIS MAGBANUA, FSC, MRS. CIRILA MOJICA, MRS. JOSEFINA PASCUAL AND ST. FRANCIS
SCHOOL OF GENERAL TRIAS, CAVITE, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
LAURITA CUSTODIO, Respondent.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
Before this Court is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure assailing the Decision 1 dated September 16, 2005 as well as
the Resolution2 dated October 9, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 79791, entitled "Bro. Bernard Oca, FSC, Bro. Dennis Magbanua, FSC,
Mrs. Cirila Mojica, Mrs. Josefina Pascual and St. Francis School of General Trias, Cavite, Inc. v. Hon. Norbert J. Quisumbing, Jr., in his capacity as
Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 21, Imus, Cavite, and Mrs. Laurita Custodio". Through said rulings, the appellate court dismissed the
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction against the
Orders dated August 5, 2003,3 August 21, 20034 and October 8, 20035 issued by Branch 21 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Imus, Cavite in SEC
Case No. 024-02, entitled "Laurita Custodio, plaintiff, versus Bro. Bernard Oca, Bro. Dennis Magbanua, Mrs. Cirila Mojica, Mrs. Josefina Pascual, and St.
Francis School, defendants."
The factual backdrop of the case
The facts of this case, as narrated in the assailed September 16, 2005 Decision of the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
On July 9, 1973, petitioner St. Francis School of General Trias Cavite, Inc. (School) was organized and established as a non-stock and non-profit
educational institution. The organization and establishment of the school was accomplished through the assistance of the La Salle Brothers without any
formal agreement with the School. Thus, the incorporators of the School consist of the following persons: private respondent Custodio, petitioner Cirila
Mojica (Mojica), petitioner Josefina Pascual (Pascual), Rev. Msgr. Feliz Perez, Bro. Vernon Poore, FSC. The five original incorporators served as the
School’s Members and Board of Trustees until the deaths of Bro. Poore and Msgr. Perez.
On September 8, 1988, to formalize the relationship between the De La Salle Greenhills (DLSG) and the School, a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA)
was executed. This agreement permitted DLSG to exercise supervisory powers over the School’s academic affairs. Pursuant to the terms of the MOA,
DLSG appointed supervisors who sit in the meetings of the Board of Trustees without any voting rights. The first such supervisor was Bro. Victor Franco.
Later on, Bro. Franco also became a member of the Board of Trustees and President of the School. Then, on September 8, 1998, petitioner Bro. Bernard
Oca joined Bro. Franco as DLSG supervisor. In a while, Bro. Oca also served as a member of the Board of Trustees and President of the School. Bro.
Dennis Magbanua also joined Bro. Franco and Bro. Oca as DLSG supervisor and also as a Treasurer of the School.
Petitioners declare that the membership of the DLSG Brothers in the Board of Trustee[s] as its officers was valid since an election was conducted to that
effect.
On the other hand, Custodio challenges the validity of the membership of the DLSG Brothers and their purported election as officers of the School. The
legality of the membership and election of the DLSG Brothers is the main issue of the case in the lower court.
Custodio alleges that sometime in 1992, Bro. Franco was invited by Mrs. Mojica to act as President of the School. This is because there was only the Tres
Marias (referring to the original incorporators, Pascual, Mojica and Custodio) who [were] left tomanage the affairs of the school. Bro. Franco accepted the
invitation. However, while Bro. Franco acted as President and presided over meetingsof the Tres Marias, he never participated in the operation of the
School and never exercised voting rights.
Custodio further alleges that on September 8, 1998, during one of the informal meetings held at the School, Bro. Franco unilaterally declared the said
meeting as the Board of Trustees’ Meeting and at the same time an Annual Meeting of the Members of the Corporation. During the meeting, Bro. Franco
declared that the corporation is composed of the Tres Marias and their husbands, Dr. Castaneda and himself (Bro. Franco) as members. On the other hand,
the Board of Trustees was declared to be composed of Bro. Oca, the Tres Marias and himself (Bro. Franco).
According to Custodio, when Bro. Franco eventually left and became inactive in the School, Bro. Oca assumed his position as President and Chairman of
the Board of Trustees, without being formally admitted as member of the School and without the benefit of an actual election. Custodio further states that
on December 6, 2000, Bro. Magbanua was introduced to the original incorporators for the first time. Automatically, he was declared as Member of the
School and at the same time, Treasurer by Bro. Oca, also without any formal admission into the corporate membership and without the benefit of an actual
election.
Custodio alleges that clearly the composition of the membership of the School had no basis there being no formal admission as members nor election as
officers.
It appears that the legality of the membership and assumption as officers of the DLSG Brothers was questioned by Custodio following a disagreement
regarding a proposed MOA that would replace the existing MOA with the DLSG Brothers and her removal as Curriculum Administrator through the Board
of Trustee[s].
Under the proposed MOA, DLSG will supervise and control not only the academic affairs of the School but also the matters of the finance, administration
and operations of the latter. Custodio vigorously opposed the proposed MOA. Consequently, unable to convince Custodio and the academic populace to
accept the MOA, the DLSG brothers withdrew [their] academic support from the School. A day after the rejection of the proposed MOA, Mojica and
Pascual retired as Administrators for Finance and Physical Resource Development (PRD), respectively. However, they maintained their positions as
Members and Trustees of the School.
Custodio contends that while Pascual and Mojica remained to be Members and Trustees of the School, upon retirement, they stopped reporting for work.
Mr. Al Mojica, son of Mrs. Mojica, who was then the school cashier, also stopped reporting for work. Thus, Custodio avers that being the only remaining
Administrator, she served as the Over-all Director of the School. Being the Over-all Director, Custodio made appointments to fill in the vacuum created by
the sudden retirement of Pascual and Mojica. Hence, she appointed Mr. Joseph Custodio as OIC both for Finance and PRD and [Ms. Herminia] Reynante
as Cashier.
Upon the appointment of Joseph Custodio and Reynante, a special meeting was called by Bro. Oca in which the petitioners alleged that the prior
organizational structure was restored, and the retirement of Pascual and Mojica disapproved by proper corporate action. It was agreed to in the meeting that
the school was going to revert to the three-man co-equal structure with Pascual as PRD head, Mojica as Finance head and Custodio as Curriculum
Administrator.
In the same meeting, petitioners alleged that Custodio admitted to having opened an account with the Luzon Development Bank in her own name for the
alleged purpose of depositing funds for and in behalf of the School. Petitioners alleged that a directive was issued for the immediate closing of this account.
Still, Custodio refused to close such account.
Subsequently, on January 31, 2002, Mojica and Pascual formally resigned from their administrative posts. As such as a replacement, Atty. Eleuterio A.
Pascual and Mr. Florante N. Mojica[,] Jr. were appointed by the Board of Trustees as PRD Administrator and Finance Administrator respectively.
According to petitioners, due to the repeated refusal of Custodio to close the account she opened in her own name with the Luzon Development Bank, the
Board of Trustees, in a meeting held on March 7, 2002, approved a resolution to file a case against the latter. Consequently, the Board of Trustees also
approved resolutions to the effect that Custodio, Mr. Joseph Custodio and Reynante be stopped from performing their functions in the School.
On June 7, 2002, Custodio filed a Complaint in the RTC of Trece Martirez City, questioning the legality of the Board of the School. The case was docketed
as Civil Case No. TMCV-0033-02, entitled Laurita Custodio v. Bro. Bernard Oca, et al. Custodio prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order
and/or writ of preliminary injunction for the purpose of preventing Bro. Oca as President of the corporation, from calling a special membership meeting to
remove Custodio as Member of the School and the Board of Trustees. The case was dismissed on July 4, 2002.6
Summary of the legal proceedings involved
in the present controversy
On July 8, 2002, the Board of Trustees of St. Francis School resolved to remove respondent Laurita Custodio as a member of the Board of Trustees and as
a member of the Corporation pursuant to Sections 28 and 91 of the Corporation Code as indicated in Resolution No. 011-2002.7
Subsequently, respondent was issued a Memorandum dated July 23, 2002 and signed by petitioner Bro. Bernard Oca, in his capacity as Chairman of the
Board of Trustees, wherein she was informed of her immediate removal as Curriculum Administrator of St. Francis School on the grounds of willful breach
of trust and loss of confidence and for failure to explain the charges against her despite notice from the Board of Trustees.8
In reaction to her removal, respondent filed with the trial court, on October 3, 2002, a Complaint with Prayer for the Issuance of a Preliminary Injunction
against petitioners again assailing the legality of the membership of the Board of Trustees of St. Francis School.9
During the submission of pleadings, respondent filed a Manifestation and Motion. She alleged that on October 8, 2002, her son,Joseph Custodio, was being
prevented from entering the premises of the school. Also, respondent alleges that a meeting with the parents of the School’s students was convened wherein
the parents were informed that she had been removed as Member of the corporation and the Board of Trustees, and as Curriculum Administrator. As such,
petitioners directed the parents to give all payments regarding matriculation and other fees to the corporate treasurer.10
On October 14, 2002, respondent filed another Motion for Clarification asking the trial court toissue an order as to whom the matriculation fees should be
paid pending the hearing of the complaint and the earlier Manifestation and Motion.11
Acting on the motions filed by respondent, the trial court in an Order dated October 21, 2002, appointed Herminia Reynante (Reynante) as cashier of the
school and required all parties to turn over all money previously collected with respect to matriculation fees and other related collectibles of the school to
the latter.12
At this point, it should be noted that petitioners Cirila Mojica and Josefina Pascual put up another school called the Academy of St. John with the same
structure as petitioner St. Francis School. This fact was testified to by petitioners’ counsel Atty. Armando Fojas during the preliminary hearings on the main
case.13
On October 30, 2002, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration seeking to set aside the October 21, 2002 Order of the trial court. Petitioners aver that
had they been given an opportunity to be heard and to present evidence to oppose the appointment ofReynante, proof would have been adduced to
demonstrate the latter’s lackof moral integrity to act as court appointed cashier.14
Subsequently, on February 19, 2003, petitioners filed a Manifestation informing the trial court that in compliance with its October 21, 2002 Order, they
took steps to turn over the amount of ₱397,127.64, representing collections from matriculation fees, but the same was not accepted by the court appointed
cashier, Reynante, who preferred to receive the amount in cash.15
On February 26, 2003, respondent filed her Comment in which she averred that contrary to petitioners’ claim, petitioners had not complied with the
October 21, 2002 Order for failure to include in their accounting, the funds allegedly in Special Savings Deposit No. 239 and Special Savings Deposit No.
459 or the retirement fund for the teachers of the School, amounts paid by the canteen concessionaire, and amounts paid to three resigned teachers.16
In an Order17 dated March 24, 2003, the trial court acted upon petitioners’ February 19, 2003 Manifestation and respondent’s February 26, 2003
Comment. The text of the said March 24, 2003 Order is reproduced herein:
This treats of the defendant’s explanation, manifestation and plaintiff’s comment thereto.
A perusal of the allegations of the defendants’ pleadings shows that they merely turned-over a manager’s check in the amount of ₱397,127.64 representing
money collected from the students from October 2002 to December 2002. The Order of October 21, 2002 directed plaintiff and defendants, as well as Mr.
Al Mojica to turn over to Ms. Herminia Reynante all money previously collected and to submit a report on what have been collected, how much, from
whom and the dates collected.
Defendants and Mr. Al Mojica are hereby directed, within ten days from receipt hereof, to submit a reportand to turn-over to Ms. Herminia Reynante all
money collected by them, more particularly:
1. ₱4,339,607.54 deposited in the Special Savings Deposit No. 239 (Rural Bank of General Trias, Inc.);
2. ₱5,639,856.11 deposited in Special Savings Deposit No. 459 (Rural Bank of General Trias, Inc.);
3. ₱92,970.00 representing amount paid by the school canteen;
4. Other fees collected from January 2003 to February 19, 2003;
5. Accounting on how and how muchdefendants are paying Ms. Daisy Romero and three (3) other teachers who already resigned.18
On April 18, 2003, petitioners filed a Manifestation, Observation, Compliance, Exception and Motion to the March 24, 2003 Order of the trial court which
contests the inclusion of specific funds to be turned over to Reynante.19
In the first questioned Order20 dated August 5, 2003, the lower court denied the Manifestation and Motion of petitioners and reiterated its order for
petitioners to turn over the items enumerated in its March 24, 2003 Order.
Subsequently, in the second questioned Order21 dated August 21, 2003, the trial court, acting favorably on private respondent’s October 9, 2002
Manifestation and Motion ruled: WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the motion is granted. Accordingly, a status quoorder is hereby issued wherein
the plaintiff is hereby allowed to continue discharging her functions as school director and curriculum administrator as well as those who are presently and
actually discharging functions as school officer to continue performing their duties until the application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order is
resolved.22
On September 1, 2003, petitioners filed a Motion for Clarification of the August 5, 2003 Order.23
In an Order24 dated October 8, 2003, the court ruled, to wit:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the defendants are hereby ordered to comply with the mandate contained in the order[s] dated March 24 and
August 5, 2003.
Defendants are further directed toinform the court of the total amount of the funds deposited reserved for teachers’ retirement, and in what bank and under
what account the same is deposited.25
Dissatisfied with the rulings made by the trial court, petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with application for
the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction to nullify, for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction, the Orders dated August 5, 2003, August 21, 2003 and October 8, 2003 that were issued by the trial court.
However, the Court of Appeals frustrated petitioners’ move through the issuance of the assailed September 16, 2005 Decision which dismissed outright
petitioners’ special civil action for certiorari. Petitioners moved for reconsideration but this was also thwarted by the Court of Appeals in the assailed
October 9,2006 Resolution.
Thus, petitioners filed the instant petition and submitted the following issues for consideration in their Memorandum26 dated October 3, 2007:
A.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS, CONTRARY TO LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE, COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
RULING THAT THE TRIAL COURT HAD NOT DEPRIVED PETITIONERS OF DUE PROCESS IN ISSUING ITS ORDERS OF 5 AUGUST 2003, 21
AUGUST 2003 AND 8 OCTOBER 2003.
B.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS, CONTRARY TO LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE, COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
RULING THAT THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT GRAVELY ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN DISREGARDING THE PROVISIONS OF THE INTERIM
RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR INTRACORPORATE CONTROVERSIES PERTAINING TO THE ISSUANCE OF A STATUS QUOORDER AND THE
REQUIREMENTS THEREOF.27
On the other hand, respondent puts forward the following arguments in her Memorandum28 dated October 9, 2007:
THE HONORABLE COURT OFAPPEALS WAS CORRECT WHEN IT RULED THAT THE TRIAL COURT (RTC Br. 21) HAD NOT
DEPRIVED PETITIONERS OF DUE PROCESS IN ISSUING ITS ORDERS OF 5 AUGUST 2003, 21 AUGUST 2003 AND 8
OCTOBER 2003.

THE HONORABLE COURT OFAPPEALS WAS CORRECT WHEN IT RULED THAT THE TRIAL COURT (RTC Br. 21) DID NOT
COMMIT GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT ISSUED A STATUS QUOORDER.29
In fine, the sole issue in this case is whether or not the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion inissuing the assailed Orders dated August 5, 2003,
August 21, 2003 and October 8, 2003.
Petitioners argue that the Court of Appeals, in its assailed September 16, 2005 Decision, failed to consider that no adequate proceedings had been accorded
to the petitioners by the trial court for the exercise of its right to be heard on the matters subject of the questioned Orders. Furthermore, petitioners point out
that the Court of Appeals erroneously gave its imprimatur to the trial court’s issuance of the assailed Status Quo Order dated August 21, 2003 without first
requiring and accepting from respondent the requisite bond that is required under the Interim Rules of Procedure for Intra-Corporate Controversies.
On the other hand, respondent maintains that the manner of the issuance of the assailed Orders of the trial court did not violate the due process rights of
petitioners. Respondent also claims that a valid ground for the issuance of the assailed Status Quo Order dated August 21, 2003 did exist and that the
alleged failure of the trial court to require the posting of a bond prior to the issuance of a status quoorder was mooted by the assailed Order dated October
8, 2003 which required respondent and Reynante to file a bond in the amount of ₱300,000.00 each.
We find the petition to be partly meritorious.
In the case of Garcia v. Executive Secretary,30 we reiterated what grave abuse of discretion means in this jurisdiction, to wit:
Grave abuse of discretion means such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Mere abuse of discretion is not
enough. It must be grave abuse of discretion, as when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility,
and must be so patent and so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in
contemplation of law.
With regard to the right to due process, we have emphasized in jurisprudence that while it is true that the right to due process safeguards the opportunity to
be heard and to submit any evidence one may have in support of his claim or defense, the Court has time and again held that where the opportunity to be
heard, either through verbal arguments or pleadings, is accorded, and the party can "present its side" or defend its "interest in due course," there is no denial
of due process because what the law proscribes is the lack of opportunity to be heard.31
In the case at bar, we find that petitioners were not denied due process by the trial court when it issued the assailed Orders dated August 5, 2003, August
21, 2003 and October 8, 2003. The records would show that petitioners were given the opportunity to ventilate their arguments through pleadings and that
the same pleadings were acknowledged in the text of the questioned rulings. Thus, petitioners cannot claim grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial
court on the basis of denial of due process.
However, with respect to the assailed Status Quo Order dated August 21, 2003, we find that the trial court has failed to comply with the pertinent
procedural rules regarding the issuance of a status quo order.
Jurisprudence tells us that a status quo order is merely intended to maintain the last, actual, peaceable and uncontested state of things which preceded the
controversy. It further states that, unlike a temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction, a status quo order is more in the nature of a cease and
desist order, since it neither directs the doing or undoing of acts as in the case of prohibitory or mandatory injunctive relief.32
Pertinently, the manner of the issuance of a status quoorder in an intra-corporate suit such asthe case at bar is governed by Section 1, Rule 10 of the Interim
Rules of Procedure for Intra-Corporate Controversies which reads:
SECTION 1. Provisional remedies. - A party may apply for any of the provisional remedies provided in the Rules of Court as may be available for the
purposes. However, no temporary restraining order or status quo order shall be issued save in exceptional cases and only after hearing the parties and the
posting of a bond.
In the case before us, the trial court’s August 21, 2003 Status Quo Order conflicted with the rules and jurisprudence in the following manner:
First, the directive to reinstate respondent to her former position as school director and curriculum administrator is a command directing the undoing of an
act already consummated which is the exclusive province of prohibitory or mandatory injunctive relief and not of a status quo order which is limited only
to maintaining the last, actual, peaceable and uncontested state of things which immediately preceded the controversy. It must be remembered that
respondentwas already removed as trustee, member of the corporation and curriculum administrator by the Board of Trustees of St. Francis School of
General Trias, Cavite, Inc. months prior to her filing of the present case in the trial court.
Second, the trial court’s omission of not requiring respondent to file a bond before the issuance of the Status Quo Order dated August 21, 2003 is in
contravention with the express instruction of Section 1, Rule 10 of the Interim Rules of Procedure for Intra-Corporate Controversies. Even the subsequent
order to post a bond as indicated in the assailed October 8, 2003 Order did not cure this defect because a careful reading of the nature and purpose of the
bond would reveal that it was meant by the trial court as security solely for the teachers’ retirement fund, the possession of which was given by the trial
court to respondent and Reynante.1âwphi1 It was never intended and can never be considered as the requisite security, in compliance with the express
directive of procedural law, for the assailed Status Quo Order dated August 21, 2003. In any event, there is nothing on record to indicate that respondent
had complied with the posting of the bond as directed in the October 8, 2003 Order except for the respondent’s unsubstantiated claim to the contrary as
asserted in her Memorandum.33
Third, it is settled in jurisprudence that an application for a status quo order which in fact seeks injunctive relief must comply with Section 4, Rule 58 of
the Rules of Court: i.e., the application must be verified aside from the posting of the requisite bond.34 In the present case, the Manifestation and Motion,
through which respondent applied for injunctive relief or in the alternative a status quo order, was merely signed by her counsel and was unverified.
In conclusion, we rule that no grave abuse of discretion was present in the issuance of the assailed August 5, 2003 and October 8, 2003 Orders of the trial
court. However, we find that the issuance of the assailed August 21, 2003 Status Quo Order was unwarranted for non-compliance with the rules. Therefore,
the said status quo order must be set aside.
At this point, the Court finds it apropos to note that the Status Quo Order on its face states that the same is effective until the application for the issuance of
a temporary restraining order is resolved. However, respondent's prayer for a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction in her
Complaint still appears to be pending before the trial court. For this reason, the Court deems it necessary to direct the trial court to resolve the same at the
soonest possible time.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated September 16, 2005 and the Resolution dated
October 9, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 79791 are hereby AFFIRMED in part insofar as they upheld the assailed August 5, 2003 and
October 8, 2003 Orders of the trial court. They are REVERSED with respect to the assailed August 21, 2003 Status Quo Order which is hereby SET
ASIDE for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion. The trial court is further DIRECTED to resolve respondent's application for injunctive relief
with dispatch.
SO ORDERED.
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
Chief Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN JOSE P. PEREZ

Associate Justice Associate Justice
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
C E R TI F I CATI O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
Chief Justice

Footnotes
1 Rollo, pp. 9-27; penned by Presiding Justice Romeo A. Brawner with Associate Justices Edgardo P. Cruz and Jose C. Mendoza (now Supreme
Court Associate Justice), concurring.
2 Id. at 29-30; penned by Associate Justice Jose C. Mendoza (now a member of this Court) with Associate Justices Edgardo P. Cruz and
Lucenito N. Tagle, concurring.
3 Id. at 169-171.
4 Id. at 172-173.
5 Id. at 458-459.
6 The trial court found that the case was not in reality a case for injunction but for quo warranto and thus dismissed the case. In any event,
private respondent allegedly withdrew her Motion for Reconsideration of the dismissal order after learning that said court had no jurisdiction
since it was not designated as a special commercial court. (Id. at 10-14.)
7 Id. at 270-271.
8 Id. at 211.
9 Id. at 212-236.
10 Id. at 303-307.
11 Id. at 308-310.
12 Id. at 313.
13 TSN, June 17, 2003, pp. 10-21.
14 Rollo, pp. 314-320.
15 Id. at 321-322.
16 Id. at 329-338.
17 Id. at 339.
18 Id.
19 Records, Vol. I, pp. 325-337.
20 Rollo, pp. 169-171.
21 Id. at 172-173.
22 Id. at 173.
23 Id. at 174-179.
24 Id. at 458-459.
25 Id. at 459.
 SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 194061, April 20, 2015
EMELIE L. BESAGA, Petitioner, v. SPOUSES FELIPE ACOSTA AND LUZVIMINDA ACOSTA AND DIGNA MATALANG COCHING,
Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:

We resolve the present petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the October 30, 2009 decision 2 and the October 1, 2010 resolution 3 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.'SP No. 100616.

The CA affirmed the decision4 of the Office of the President setting aside the resolution 5 of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) Secretary. The DENR Secretary earlier affirmed the orders dated December 1, 2003 6 and July 26, 2004 7 of the DENR Regional Executive
Director (RED), Region IV-B-MIMAROPA.8

The Antecedents9

The dispute involved Lot Nos. 4512 and 4514 located at Barangay Port Barton, San Vicente, Palawan, which are parts of a six-hectare timberland.

On February 11, 2003, Emelie L. Besaga (petitioner) applied for a Special Land Use Permit (SLUP) for Lot Nos. 4512, 4513 and 4514 for a bathing
establishment. According to the petitioner, the lots are covered by Tax Declaration No. 048 in the name of her father, the late Arturo Besaga, Sr. who
allegedly occupied the land during his lifetime.

On February 13, 2003, spouses Felipe and Luzviminda Acosta (respondent spouses) also applied for SLUP for a bathing establishment over Lot Nos. 4512
and 4514. According to the respondent spouses, they acquired Lot Nos. 4512 and 4514 through a March 19, 1998 Affidavit of Waiver of Rights executed
by Rogelio Maranon, a registered survey claimant, and a February 9, 1999 Joint Affidavit of Waiver of Rights, executed by Arturo Besaga, Jr., 10 and Digna
Matalang Coching (another respondent in this case), also registered survey claimants.

On September 10, 2003, the respondents challenged the petitioner's SLUP application before the DENR. On December 1, 2003, the RED issued the order
giving due course to the petitioner's SLUP application and rejecting the respondents' SLUP application. The RED later denied the respondents' motion for
reconsideration on July 26, 2004.

The respondent spouses received the July 26, 2004 order on August 16, 2004. They tiled on. August 25, 2004, through registered mail, an Appeal
Memorandum to the Office of the DENR Secretary, copy furnished the petitioner's lawyer and the Office of the RED. The appeal fee was paid on
September 10, 2004. Respondent Digna Matalang Coching received the July 26, 2004 order on August 30, 2004 and filed her appeal (which adopted the
appeal of the respondent spouses) on September 16, 2004.

While the appeal was pending in the Office of the DENR Secretary, the RED issued a Certificate of Finality 11 declaring the December 1, 2003 and July 26,
2004 orders final and executory for failure of the respondents to file a Notice of Appeal.

On December 10, 2004, the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Officer (PENRO) issued the SLUP12 to the petitioner covering Lot Nos. 4512,
4513 and 4514. On November 18, 2005, the SLUP was converted into a Special Forest Land-Use Agreement for Tourism Purposes (FLAgT).

On August 6, 2006, the DENR Secretary rendered a decision (i) vacating the December 1, 2003 and July 26, 2004 orders of the RED; (ii) amending the
coverage of the SLUP of the petitioner to cover Lot No. 4513 only; and (iii) giving due course to the SLUP of the respondent spouses to cover Lot Nos.
4512 and 4514.

Acting on the motion for reconsideration13 filed by the petitioner, the DENR Secretary reversed his August 6, 2006 decision on October 17, 2006 and held
that the December 1, 2003 and July 26, 2004 orders of the RED have attained finality because: (i) the respondent spouses filed an Appeal Memorandum,
instead of a Notice of Appeal; (ii) the Appeal Memorandum was directly filed with the DENR Secretary and not with the RED; and (iii) the respondent
spouses failed to pay the required appeal fees within the reglementary period.

The Office of the President reversed the October 17, 2006 resolution of the DENR Secretary.

The CA, through the assailed decision and resolution, affirmed the decision of the Office of the President.

The petitioner filed the present petition to contest the CA's ruling.
The DENR's Findings

The RED, relying mainly on the report 14 prepared by the chief of Forest Management Services ruled in favor of the petitioner.

The report gave credence to Tax Declaration No. 048, 15 which purportedly showed that Lot Nos. 4512, 4513 and 4514 are parts of the six (6) hectare
timberland occupied by the petitioner's father during his lifetime. The RED also gave weight to the statements of two former Barangay Captains of Port
Barton and the document signed by the alleged occupants of the said six (6) hectare timberland supporting the petitioner's claim.

The DENR Secretary reversed the orders of the RED in his decision dated August 6, 2006. 16

He ruled that the petitioner cannot claim preferential right to apply for an SLUP over Lot Nos. 4512 and 4514 in view of her sweeping allegation that the
said lots are part of the six (6) hectare timberland, which his father possessed in his lifetime and whose possession she tacked. The DENR Secretary asked:
if indeed the petitioner tacked the possession of his father and she was the actual occupant over Lot Nos. 4512 and 4514, why was she not made the survey
claimants of the said lots?

The DENR Secretary found that the respondent spouses have a preferential right over Lot Nos. 4512 and 4514. Rogelio Maranon, the registered survey
claimant and occupant of Lot No. 4512, waived and transferred his right over the lot in favor of the respondent spouses in a duly-notarized Affidavit of
Waiver of Rights. The respondent spouses derived their right over Lot No. 4514 from Arturo Besaga, Jr. and Digna Matalang Coching, the registered
survey claimants, who executed a duly-notarized Joint-Affidavit of Waiver of Rights over the said lot. The DENR Secretary held that these are the legal
and vital documents (disregarded by the chief of Forest Management Services) which support the preferential rights of the respondent spouses over Lot
Nos. 4512 and 4514.

The DENR Secretary, however, reversed his August 6, 2006 decision in a resolution 17 dated October 17, 2006. He ruled that the respondent spouses failed
to perfect the appeal because they filed a Memorandum of Appeal instead of a Notice of Appeal contrary to Section 1(a) of DENR Department
Administrative Order (DAO) No. 87, series of 1990.18

The Office of the President's Ruling19

The Office of the President reversed the October 17, 2006 resolution of the DENR Secretary.

It held that the orders of the RED did not become final because there is no law, rule or regulation prohibiting an appellant to file an appeal memorandum,
instead of a notice of appeal, to the office concerned. It further held that the appeal memorandum itself serves as a sufficient notice of the party's intention
to elevate the case to a higher authority. The Office of the President observed that in a plethora of cases, notices of appeal are filed directly with the DENR,
rather than with the RED, which practice has not since been prohibited nor made as a ground for the outright dismissal of the appeal. Finally, it found that
the respondent spouses paid the appeal fees. All of these negate the finding that the respondent spouses did not perfect their appeal to the DENR Secretary.

As to the merits of the case, the Office of the President found that Tax Declaration No. 048 did not cover Lot Nos. 4512, 4513 and 4514 but Lot No. 4741,
which is entirely different and distinct from the contested lots. It gave credence to the Affidavit of Waiver of Rights executed by Rogelio Maranon and the
Joint Affidavit of Waiver of Rights jointly executed by Arturo Besaga, Jr. and Digna Matalang Coching in favor of the respondent spouses. No
countervailing proof was presented by the petitioner to impugn these affidavits.
The CA's Ruling

The CA sustained the Office of the President. Citing decisions of this Court, it held that rules of procedure are construed liberally in proceedings before
administrative bodies. They are not to be applied in a very rigid and technical manner, as they are used only to hold secure and not to override substantial
justice.

The CA ruled that the orders of the RED have not attained finality.
The Petition

The petitioner seeks reversal of the CA decision and resolution for being contrary to law and jurisprudence. She submits that the respondent spouses failed
to perfect an appeal in the administrative proceedings. She argues that the perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period prescribed by law is
not only mandatory but also jurisdictional and that failure to conform to the rules will render the judgment sought to be reviewed final and unappealable.
She adds that the liberal interpretation of the rules has no clear application in the present case because the respondents failed to adequately explain their
non-compliance therewith.

As is proper under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the petitioner does not raise any factual questions.

Respondent's Comment20
The respondent spouses ask for the petition's dismissal for lack of merit. They submit that the CA acted in accordance with law and jurisprudence in
upholding the ruling of the Office of the President.

They argue that to dismiss the case on the mere ground of technicalities would mean to dispense with the determination of the party having preferential
right on the disputed lots and could cause the perpetuation of a wrong. They maintain that the cases cited by the petitioner, where procedural rules were
strictly enforced by this Court, involved violation of the rules either before the trial court, the CA or before this Court, and not before an administrative
agency like the DENR. In sum, the respondent spouses contend that the orders of the RED have not attained finality, thus, said orders are still subject to
reversal, amendment or modification on appeal.
Issues

The petitioner raises the following issues:21

I. WHETHER THE APPEAL INTERPOSED BY THE RESPONDENTS WAS CORRECTLY FILED TO THE DENR
SECRETARY AND NOT TO THE REGIONAL OFFICE AS PROVIDED UNDER SECTION 1 (A) OF DAO NO. 87,
SERIES OF 1990;

II. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENTS' APPEAL TO THE OFFICE OF THE DENR SECRETARY WAS PERFECTED
DESPITE OF THEIR FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH SECTION 1 (A) OF DAO NO. 87, SERIES OF 1990;
 III. WHETHER THE LIBERAL INTERPRETATION OF THE RULES ON APPEAL INVOLVING ADMINISTRATIVE
PROCEEDINGS WAS CORRECTLY APPLIED BY THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IN THE CASE OF
RESPONDENTS;

IV. WHETHER THE ASSAILED ORDERS, ISSUED ON DECEMBER 1, 2003 AND JULY 26, 2004, OF THE REGIONAL
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF DENR REGION IV-MIMAROPA IN DENR CASE NO. M-003-03-F, WERE ALREADY
FINAL AND EXECUTORY;

V. WHETHER THE PERFECTION OF APPEAL IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 1 (A) OF DAO NO. 87, SERIES OF
1990 IS NOT ONLY MANDATORY BUT JURISDICTIONAL; AND

VI. WHETHER THE ORDERS DATED DECEMBER 1, 2003 AND JULY 23, 2014 CAN STILL BE MODIFIED AND SET
ASIDE BY THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS.

The resolution of these issues hinges on whether the orders of the RED dated December 1, 2003 and July 26, 2004 have attained finality because the
respondents filed a Memorandum of Appeal directly to the DENR Secretary instead of a Notice of Appeal to the RED.
The Court's Ruling

We deny the petition.

The petitioner insists that the filing of a Memorandum of Appeal instead of a Notice of Appeal was fatal to the respondent spouses' case.

We are not convinced of the merits of this position.

The crux of the dispute is Section 1(a) of DAO No. 87. It provides:
Section 1. Perfection of Appeals. - a) Unless otherwise provided by law or executive order, appeals from the decisions/orders of the
DENR Regional Offices shall be perfected within fifteen (15) days after the receipt of a copy of the decision/order complained of
by the party adversely affected, by tiling with the Regional Office which adjudicated the case a notice of appeal, serving copies
thereof upon the prevailing party and Office of the Secretary, and paying the required fees. [Emphasis ours.]

According to the petitioner, this provision is mandatory and jurisdictional. She argues that respondents filed a defective appeal because: (i) they filed a
Memorandum of Appeal instead of a Notice of Appeal; (ii) directly to the DENR and not to the Regional Office, which adjudicated the case; and (iii) no
docket fee was paid.22

The petitioner cites jurisprudence to bolster her argument that the perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period prescribed by law is not oniy
mandatory but also jurisdictional.

We accordingly review the cited cases to determine the correctness of the petitioner's submitted position.

In Asian Spirit Airlines v. Bautista,23 the CA dismissed the appeal because the appellant failed to file his brief within the time provided by the Rules of
Court. The appellant not only neglected to file its brief within the stipulated time but also failed to seek an extension of time based on a cogent ground
before the expiration of the time sought to be extended. In sustaining the CA, we held that liberality in the application of rules of procedure may not be
invoked if it will result in the wanton disregard of the rules or cause needless delay in the administration of justice.

In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Natividad,24 we affirmed the trial court when it considered a motion for reconsideration pro forma for not containing a
notice of hearing. We held that a motion that does not contain the requisite notice of hearing is nothing but a mere scrap of paper. The clerk of court does
not even have the duty to accept it, much less to bring it to the attention of the presiding judge.

In Videogram Regulatory Board v. CA,25 the Regional Trial Court granted the petitioner a non-extendible 15-day period to file a Petition for Review from
the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court. The petitioner failed to file the petition despite the extension. We held that the requirements for perfecting an
appeal within the reglementary period specified in the law must be strictly followed as they are considered indispensable interdictions against needless
delays and for orderly discharge of judicial business.

In MC Engineering, Inc. v. NLRC,26 we affirm the CA when it denied due course to the petitioner's appeal because of its failure to explain why another
mode of service other than personal service was resorted to. We held that an affidavit of service is required merely as proof that service has been made to
the other parties in a case. It is a requirement totally different from the requirement that an explanation be made if personal service of pleadings was not
resorted to.

Finally, in Artistica Ceramica v. Ciudad Del Carmen Homeowner's Association, Inc.,27 the issue was whether the petitioner properly filed a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 instead of an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. We held that as a rule, the remedy from a judgment or final
order of the CA is appeal by certiorari under Rule 45. The failure to file the appeal within the 15-day reglementary period under Rule 45 is not an excuse to
use Rule 65. Rule 65 is not a substitute for a lost appeal,

In sum, all these cases strictly applied the rule that the right to appeal is a mere statutory right and the party who avails of such right must comply with the
law. Otherwise, the right to appeal is lost.
To reiterate, these involved violations of the Rules of Court while the cases were pending in the trial court, the CA or before this Court. They do not
involved violation of administrative rules of procedure. They are not strictly applicable in the present case.

The Nature of Administrative

Rules of Procedure

It is true that the right to appeal, being merely a statutory privilege, should be exercised in the manner prescribed by law. This has been consistently held in
relation to non-observance by a party-litigant of the Rules of Court and failure to offer a valid and acceptable excuse for non-compliance.

Yet, it is equally true that in proceedings before administrative bodies the general rule has always been liberality.

Strict compliance with the rules of procedure in administrative cases is not required by law. 28 Administrative rules of procedure should be construed
liberally in order to promote their object to assist the parties in obtaining a just, speedy and inexpensive determination of their respective claims and
defenses.29

In Birkenstock Orthopaedie GmbH and Co. KG v. Philippine Shoe Expo Marketing Corp.,30 we held:
It is well-settled that the rules of procedure are mere tools aimed at facilitating the attainment of justice, rather than its frustration. A strict
and rigid application of the rules must always be eschewed when it would subvert the primary objective of the rules, that is, to enhance
fair trials and expedite justice. Technicalities should never be used to defeat the substantive rights of the other party . Every party-
litigant must be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from the constraints of
technicalities, x x x This is especially true with quasi-judicial and administrative bodies, such as the IPO, which are not bound by
technical rules of procedure. [Emphasis supplied.]

The liberality of procedure in administrative actions, however, is subject to limitations imposed by the requirements of due process. 31

Administrative due process means reasonable opportunity to be heard. As held in Vivo v. Pagcor.32
The observance of fairness in the conduct of any investigation is at the very heart of procedural due process. The essence of due process
is to be heard, and, as applied to administrative proceedings, this means a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain one's side, or
an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of . Administrative due process cannot be fully equated
with due process in its strict judicial sense, for in the former a formal or trial-type hearing is not always necessary, and technical rules of
procedure are not strictly applied. [Emphasis supplied.]

Where due process is present, the administrative decision is generally sustained. 33

Thus, while this Court allows liberal construction of administrative rules of procedure to enhance fair trial and expedite justice, we are keenly aware that
liberal construction has no application when due process is violated. The crucial point of inquiry in cases involving violation of administrative rules of
procedure is whether such violation disregards the basic tenets of administrative due process. If the gravity of the violation of the rules is such that due
process is breached, the rules of procedure should be strictly applied. Otherwise, the rules are liberally construed.

Liberal Construction as
Applied in the Present Case

It is undisputed that the respondent spouses, instead of filing a Notice of Appeal to the RED, filed a Memorandum of Appeal to the DENR Secretary within
the fifteen (15)-day reglementary period. They paid the appeal fee, although beyond the fifteen (15)-day period. These violate Section 1 (a) of DAO No. 87
which requires the filing of a Notice of Appeal and the payment of the appeal fee within the reglementary period.

Do these errors breach due process so as to call for the strict application of administrative rules of procedure? Is there basis for the liberal construction of
the rules?

We uphold liberality.

First, there is no violation of due process. In fact, to sustain the position of the petitioner and strictly apply Section l(a) of DAO No. 87 may violate the
respondent spouses right to due process as this would result to a denial of their right to appeal.

We stress that the respondent spouses appealed within the reglementary period. The appeal was timely filed, albeit not directly to the office which
issued the order sought to be reviewed. They also paid the full appeal fees although beyond the 15-day period.

We hold that these procedural lapses were neither prejudicial nor unfair to the petitioner. The petitioner's right to due process was not breached.

Notably, both the petitioner and the RED were furnished copies of the Memorandum of Appeal, a fact that the petitioner did not deny .34

We agree with the observation of the Office of the President that the Memorandum of Appeal essentially served the purpose of the Notice of Appeal. The
filing of the Memorandum of Appeal had the same practical effect had a Notice of Appeal been filed: inform the RED that his order is sought to be
appealed to the DENR Secretary.

Significantly, the respondent spouses notified the petitioner of the filing of the Memorandum of Appeal. The petitioner subsequently filed her opposition
thereto. When the DENR Secretary initially ruled in favor of the respondent spouses, the petitioner tiled a motion for reconsideration of the said decision.
Clearly, the petitioner participated in every stage of the administrative proceeding. Her right to be heard was not compromised despite the wrong mode of
appeal.

As to the late payment of the appeal fee, suffice it to say that this Court has disregarded late payment of appeal fees at the administrative level in order to
render substantial justice.35

Second, the liberal construction of DAO No. 87 would serve its purpose, i.e., grant a party the right to appeal decisions of the Regional Offices to the
DENR Secretary in order for the latter to review the findings of the former. To disallow appeal in this case would not only work injustice to the respondent
spouses, it would also diminish the DENR Secretary's power to review the decision of the RED. It would deny the DENR Secretary the opportunity to
correct, at the earliest opportunity, "errors of judgment" of his subordinates. This is obviously not the intent of DAO No. 87.

Finally, the petitioner failed to convince us why liberality should not be applied. The petitioner does not claim that her right to due process was violated as
a result of the wrong mode of appeal. The petitioner merely asks this Court to strictly construe DAO No. 87 and affirm the orders of the RED, which
according to her, have attained finality.

Between strict construction of administrative rules of procedure for their own sake and their liberal application in order to enhance fair trials and expedite
justice, we uphold the latter. After all, administrative rules of procedure do not operate in a vacuum. The rules facilitate just, speedy and inexpensive
resolution of disputes before administrative bodies. The better policy is to apply these rules in a manner that would give effect rather than defeat their
intended purpose.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petition and AFFIRM the October 30, 2009 decision and October 1, 2010 resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 100616, affirming the August 13, 2007 decision of the Office of the President in O.P. Case No. 06-K-398.
EN BANC
FELIX B. PEREZ and G.R. No. 152048
AMANTE G. DORIA,
Petitioners,
Present:
PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,*
- v e r s u s - CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION and
PERALTA, JJ.
PHILIPPINE TELEGRAPH AND
TELEPHONE COMPANY and
JOSE LUIS SANTIAGO,
Respondents. Promulgated:
April 7, 2009

x--------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

CORONA, J.:

Petitioners Felix B. Perez and Amante G. Doria were employed by respondent Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Company (PT&T) as shipping clerk and

supervisor, respectively, in PT&Ts Shipping Section, Materials Management Group.

Acting on an alleged unsigned letter regarding anomalous transactions at the Shipping Section, respondents formed a special audit team to investigate the

matter. It was discovered that the Shipping Section jacked up the value of the freight costs for goods shipped and that the duplicates of the shipping

documents allegedly showed traces of tampering, alteration and superimposition.

On September 3, 1993, petitioners were placed on preventive suspension for 30 days for their alleged involvement in the anomaly.[1] Their suspension was

extended for 15 days twice: first on October 3, 1993[2] and second on October 18, 1993.[3]

On October 29, 1993, a memorandum with the following tenor was issued by respondents:

In line with the recommendation of the AVP-Audit as presented in his report of October 15, 1993 (copy attached) and the subsequent filing of criminal
charges against the parties mentioned therein, [Mr. Felix Perez and Mr. Amante Doria are] hereby dismissed from the service for having falsified company
documents.[4] (emphasis supplied)
On November 9, 1993, petitioners filed a complaint for illegal suspension and illegal dismissal.[5] They alleged that they were dismissed on November 8,

1993, the date they received the above-mentioned memorandum.

The labor arbiter found that the 30-day extension of petitioners suspension and their subsequent dismissal were both illegal. He ordered respondents to pay

petitioners their salaries during their 30-day illegal suspension, as well as to reinstate them with backwages and 13 th month pay.

The National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) reversed the decision of the labor arbiter. It ruled that petitioners were dismissed for just cause, that

they were accorded due process and that they were illegally suspended for only 15 days (without stating the reason for the reduction of the period of

petitioners illegal suspension).[6]

Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA). In its January 29, 2002 decision,[7] the CA affirmed the NLRC decision insofar as petitioners illegal

suspension for 15 days and dismissal for just cause were concerned. However, it found that petitioners were dismissed without due process.

Petitioners now seek a reversal of the CA decision. They contend that there was no just cause for their dismissal, that they were not accorded due process

and that they were illegally suspended for 30 days.

We rule in favor of petitioners.

RESPONDENTS FAILED TO PROVE JUST

CAUSE AND TO OBSERVE DUE PROCESS
The CA, in upholding the NLRCs decision, reasoned that there was sufficient basis for respondents to lose their confidence in petitioners [8] for allegedly

tampering with the shipping documents. Respondents emphasized the importance of a shipping order or request, as it was the basis of their liability to a

cargo forwarder.[9]

We disagree.

Without undermining the importance of a shipping order or request, we find respondents evidence insufficient to clearly and convincingly establish the

facts from which the loss of confidence resulted.[10] Other than their bare allegations and the fact that such documents came into petitioners hands at some

point, respondents should have provided evidence of petitioners functions, the extent of their duties, the procedure in the handling and approval of shipping

requests and the fact that no personnel other than petitioners were involved. There was, therefore, a patent paucity of proof connecting petitioners to the

alleged tampering of shipping documents.

The alterations on the shipping documents could not reasonably be attributed to petitioners because it was never proven that petitioners alone had control

of or access to these documents. Unless duly proved or sufficiently substantiated otherwise, impartial tribunals should not rely only on the statement of the

employer that it has lost confidence in its employee.[11]

Willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized representative is a just cause for termination. [12] However,

in General Bank and Trust Co. v. CA,[13] we said:

[L]oss of confidence should not be simulated. It should not be used as a subterfuge for causes which are improper, illegal or unjustified. Loss of confidence
may not be arbitrarily asserted in the face of overwhelming evidence to the contrary. It must be genuine, not a mere afterthought to justify an earlier action
taken in bad faith.
The burden of proof rests on the employer to establish that the dismissal is for cause in view of the security of tenure that employees enjoy under the

Constitution and the Labor Code. The employers evidence must clearly and convincingly show the facts on which the loss of confidence in the employee

may be fairly made to rest.[14] It must be adequately proven by substantial evidence.[15] Respondents failed to discharge this burden.

Respondents illegal act of dismissing petitioners was aggravated by their failure to observe due process. To meet the requirements of due process in the

dismissal of an employee, an employer must furnish the worker with two written notices: (1) a written notice specifying the grounds for termination and

giving to said employee a reasonable opportunity to explain his side and (2) another written notice indicating that, upon due consideration of all

circumstances, grounds have been established to justify the employer's decision to dismiss the employee.[16]

Petitioners were neither apprised of the charges against them nor given a chance to defend themselves. They were simply and arbitrarily separated from

work and served notices of termination in total disregard of their rights to due process and security of tenure. The labor arbiter and the CA correctly found

that respondents failed to comply with the two-notice requirement for terminating employees.

Petitioners likewise contended that due process was not observed in the absence of a hearing in which they could have explained their side and refuted the

evidence against them.

There is no need for a hearing or conference. We note a marked difference in the standards of due process to be followed as prescribed in the Labor Code

and its implementing rules. The Labor Code, on one hand, provides that an employer must provide the employee ample opportunity to be heard and to

defend himself with the assistance of his representative if he so desires:

ART. 277. Miscellaneous provisions. x x x

(b) Subject to the constitutional right of workers to security of tenure and their right to be protected against dismissal except for a just and authorized cause
and without prejudice to the requirement of notice under Article 283 of this Code, the employer shall furnish the worker whose employment is sought to be
terminated a written notice containing a statement of the causes for termination and shall afford the latter ample opportunity to be heard and to defend
himself with the assistance of his representative if he so desires in accordance with company rules and regulations promulgated pursuant to guidelines
set by the Department of Labor and Employment. Any decision taken by the employer shall be without prejudice to the right of the worker to contest the
validity or legality of his dismissal by filing a complaint with the regional branch of the National Labor Relations Commission. The burden of proving that
the termination was for a valid or authorized cause shall rest on the employer. (emphasis supplied)
The omnibus rules implementing the Labor Code, on the other hand, require a hearing and conference during which the employee concerned is given the

opportunity to respond to the charge, present his evidence or rebut the evidence presented against him:[17]

Section 2. Security of Tenure. x x x

(d) In all cases of termination of employment, the following standards of due process shall be substantially observed:
For termination of employment based on just causes as defined in Article 282 of the Labor Code:
(i) A written notice served on the employee specifying the ground or grounds for termination, and giving said employee reasonable opportunity within
which to explain his side.
(ii) A hearing or conference during which the employee concerned, with the assistance of counsel if he so desires, is given opportunity to respond
to the charge, present his evidence or rebut the evidence presented against him.
(iii) A written notice of termination served on the employee, indicating that upon due consideration of all the circumstances, grounds have been established
to justify his termination. (emphasis supplied)
Which one should be followed? Is a hearing (or conference) mandatory in cases involving the dismissal of an employee? Can the apparent conflict between

the law and its IRR be reconciled?

At the outset, we reaffirm the time-honored doctrine that, in case of conflict, the law prevails over the administrative regulations implementing it.[18] The

authority to promulgate implementing rules proceeds from the law itself. To be valid, a rule or regulation must conform to and be consistent with the

provisions of the enabling statute.[19] As such, it cannot amend the law either by abridging or expanding its scope.[20]
Article 277(b) of the Labor Code provides that, in cases of termination for a just cause, an employee must be given ample opportunity to be heard and to

defend himself. Thus, the opportunity to be heard afforded by law to the employee is qualified by the word ample which ordinarily means considerably

more than adequate or sufficient.[21] In this regard, the phrase ample opportunity to be heard can be reasonably interpreted as extensive enough to cover

actual hearing or conference. To this extent, Section 2(d), Rule I of the Implementing Rules of Book VI of the Labor Code is in conformity with Article

277(b).

Nonetheless, Section 2(d), Rule I of the Implementing Rules of Book VI of the Labor Code should not be taken to mean that holding an actual hearing or

conference is a condition sine qua non for compliance with the due process requirement in termination of employment. The test for the fair procedure

guaranteed under Article 277(b) cannot be whether there has been a formal pretermination confrontation between the employer and the employee. The

ample opportunity to be heard standard is neither synonymous nor similar to a formal hearing. To confine the employees right to be heard to a solitary form

narrows down that right. It deprives him of other equally effective forms of adducing evidence in his defense. Certainly, such an exclusivist and absolutist

interpretation is overly restrictive. The very nature of due process negates any concept of inflexible procedures universally applicable to every imaginable

situation.[22]

The standard for the hearing requirement, ample opportunity, is couched in general language revealing the legislative intent to give some degree of

flexibility or adaptability to meet the peculiarities of a given situation. To confine it to a single rigid proceeding such as a formal hearing will defeat its

spirit.

Significantly, Section 2(d), Rule I of the Implementing Rules of Book VI of the Labor Code itself provides that the so-called standards of due process

outlined therein shall be observed substantially, not strictly. This is a recognition that while a formal hearing or conference is ideal, it is not an absolute,

mandatory or exclusive avenue of due process.

An employees right to be heard in termination cases under Article 277(b) as implemented by Section 2(d), Rule I of the Implementing Rules of Book VI of

the Labor Code should be interpreted in broad strokes. It is satisfied not only by a formal face to face confrontation but by any meaningful opportunity to

controvert the charges against him and to submit evidence in support thereof.

A hearing means that a party should be given a chance to adduce his evidence to support his side of the case and that the evidence should be taken into

account in the adjudication of the controversy.[23] To be heard does not mean verbal argumentation alone inasmuch as one may be heard just as

effectively through written explanations, submissions or pleadings.[24] Therefore, while the phrase ample opportunity to be heard may in fact include an

actual hearing, it is not limited to a formal hearing only. In other words, the existence of an actual, formal trial-type hearing, although preferred, is not

absolutely necessary to satisfy the employees right to be heard.

This Court has consistently ruled that the due process requirement in cases of termination of employment does not require an actual or formal hearing.

Thus, we categorically declared in Skippers United Pacific, Inc. v. Maguad:[25]

The Labor Code does not, of course, require a formal or trial type proceeding before an erring employee may be dismissed. (emphasis supplied)
In Autobus Workers Union v. NLRC,[26] we ruled:

The twin requirements of notice and hearing constitute the essential elements of due process. Due process of law simply means giving opportunity to be
heard before judgment is rendered. In fact, there is no violation of due process even if no hearing was conducted, where the party was given a chance
to explain his side of the controversy. What is frowned upon is the denial of the opportunity to be heard.
xxxxxxxxx
A formal trial-type hearing is not even essential to due process. It is enough that the parties are given a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain
their respective sides of the controversy and to present supporting evidence on which a fair decision can be based. This type of hearing is not even
mandatory in cases of complaints lodged before the Labor Arbiter. (emphasis supplied)
In Solid Development Corporation Workers Association v. Solid Development Corporation,[27] we had the occasion to state:

[W]ell-settled is the dictum that the twin requirements of notice and hearing constitute the essential elements of due process in the dismissal of employees.
It is a cardinal rule in our jurisdiction that the employer must furnish the employee with two written notices before the termination of employment can be
effected: (1) the first apprises the employee of the particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is sought; and (2) the second informs the employee
of the employers decision to dismiss him. The requirement of a hearing, on the other hand, is complied with as long as there was an opportunity to
be heard, and not necessarily that an actual hearing was conducted.
In separate infraction reports, petitioners were both apprised of the particular acts or omissions constituting the charges against them. They were also
required to submit their written explanation within 12 hours from receipt of the reports. Yet, neither of them complied. Had they found the 12-hour period
too short, they should have requested for an extension of time. Further, notices of termination were also sent to them informing them of the basis of their
dismissal. In fine, petitioners were given due process before they were dismissed. Even if no hearing was conducted, the requirement of due process
had been met since they were accorded a chance to explain their side of the controversy. (emphasis supplied)
Our holding in National Semiconductor HK Distribution, Ltd. v. NLRC[28] is of similar import:

That the investigations conducted by petitioner may not be considered formal or recorded hearings or investigations is immaterial. A formal or
trial type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential to due process, the requirements of which are satisfied where the parties are afforded
fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy. It is deemed sufficient for the employer to follow the natural sequence of notice,
hearing and judgment.
The above rulings are a clear recognition that the employer may provide an employee with ample opportunity to be heard and defend himself with the

assistance of a representative or counsel in ways other than a formal hearing. The employee can be fully afforded a chance to respond to the charges against

him, adduce his evidence or rebut the evidence against him through a wide array of methods, verbal or written.

After receiving the first notice apprising him of the charges against him, the employee may submit a written explanation (which may be in the form of a

letter, memorandum, affidavit or position paper) and offer evidence in support thereof, like relevant company records (such as his 201 file and daily time

records) and the sworn statements of his witnesses. For this purpose, he may prepare his explanation personally or with the assistance of a representative or

counsel. He may also ask the employer to provide him copy of records material to his defense. His written explanation may also include a request that a

formal hearing or conference be held. In such a case, the conduct of a formal hearing or conference becomes mandatory, just as it is where there exist

substantial evidentiary disputes[29] or where company rules or practice requires an actual hearing as part of employment pretermination procedure. To this

extent, we refine the decisions we have rendered so far on this point of law.

This interpretation of Section 2(d), Rule I of the Implementing Rules of Book VI of the Labor Code reasonably implements the ample opportunity to be

heard standard under Article 277(b) of the Labor Code without unduly restricting the language of the law or excessively burdening the employer. This not

only respects the power vested in the Secretary of Labor and Employment to promulgate rules and regulations that will lay down the guidelines for the

implementation of Article 277(b). More importantly, this is faithful to the mandate of Article 4 of the Labor Code that [a]ll doubts in the implementation

and interpretation of the provisions of [the Labor Code], including its implementing rules and regulations shall be resolved in favor of labor.

In sum, the following are the guiding principles in connection with the hearing requirement in dismissal cases:

(a) ample opportunity to be heard means any meaningful opportunity (verbal or written) given to the employee to answer the charges

against him and submit evidence in support of his defense, whether in a hearing, conference or some other fair, just and reasonable

way.

(b) a formal hearing or conference becomes mandatory only when requested by the employee in writing or substantial evidentiary

disputes exist or a company rule or practice requires it, or when similar circumstances justify it.

(c) the ample opportunity to be heard standard in the Labor Code prevails over the hearing or conference requirement in the

implementing rules and regulations.

PETITIONERS WERE ILLEGALLY

SUSPENDED FOR 30 DAYS
An employee may be validly suspended by the employer for just cause provided by law. Such suspension shall only be for a period of 30 days, after which

the employee shall either be reinstated or paid his wages during the extended period.[30]

In this case, petitioners contended that they were not paid during the two 15-day extensions, or a total of 30 days, of their preventive suspension.

Respondents failed to adduce evidence to the contrary. Thus, we uphold the ruling of the labor arbiter on this point.

Where the dismissal was without just or authorized cause and there was no due process, Article 279 of the Labor Code, as amended, mandates that the

employee is entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and other benefits or

their monetary equivalent computed from the time the compensation was not paid up to the time of actual reinstatement.[31] In this case, however,

reinstatement is no longer possible because of the length of time that has passed from the date of the incident to final resolution. [32] Fourteen years have

transpired from the time petitioners were wrongfully dismissed. To order reinstatement at this juncture will no longer serve any prudent or practical

purpose.[33]

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals dated January 29, 2002 in CA-G.R. SP No. 50536 finding that

petitioners Felix B. Perez and Amante G. Doria were not illegally dismissed but were not accorded due process and were illegally suspended for 15 days, is

SET ASIDE. The decision of the labor arbiter dated December 27, 1995 in NLRC NCR CN. 11-06930-93 is hereby AFFIRMED with the

MODIFICATION that petitioners should be paid their separation pay in lieu of reinstatement.

SO ORDERED.

RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
ANTONIO T. CARPIO (On Official Leave)

Associate Justice MA. ALICIA M. AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES DANTE O. TINGA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

 CER TIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

* On official leave.
[1] Records, pp. 70-71.
[2] Id., pp. 72-73.
[3] Id., pp. 74-75.
[4] Id., p. 76.
[5] Id., p. 39.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 122846 January 20, 2009
WHITE LIGHT CORPORATION, TITANIUM CORPORATION and STA. MESA TOURIST & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Petitioners,

vs.
CITY OF MANILA, represented by DE CASTRO, MAYOR ALFREDO S. LIM, Respondent.
DECISION
Tinga, J.:
With another city ordinance of Manila also principally involving the tourist district as subject, the Court is confronted anew with the incessant clash
between government power and individual liberty in tandem with the archetypal tension between law and morality.

In City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr.,1 the Court affirmed the nullification of a city ordinance barring the operation of motels and inns, among other
establishments, within the Ermita-Malate area. The petition at bar assails a similarly-motivated city ordinance that prohibits those same establishments
from offering short-time admission, as well as pro-rated or "wash up" rates for such abbreviated stays. Our earlier decision tested the city ordinance against
our sacred constitutional rights to liberty, due process and equal protection of law. The same parameters apply to the present petition.

This Petition2 under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules on Civil Procedure, which seeks the reversal of the Decision 3 in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 33316 of the Court
of Appeals, challenges the validity of Manila City Ordinance No. 7774 entitled, "An Ordinance Prohibiting Short-Time Admission, Short-Time Admission
Rates, and Wash-Up Rate Schemes in Hotels, Motels, Inns, Lodging Houses, Pension Houses, and Similar Establishments in the City of Manila" (the
Ordinance).
I.
The facts are as follows:

On December 3, 1992, City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim (Mayor Lim) signed into law the Ordinance.4 The Ordinance is reproduced in full, hereunder:
SECTION 1. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby the declared policy of the City Government to protect the best interest, health and welfare, and the morality
of its constituents in general and the youth in particular.
SEC. 2. Title. This ordinance shall be known as "An Ordinance" prohibiting short time admission in hotels, motels, lodging houses, pension houses and
similar establishments in the City of Manila.
SEC. 3. Pursuant to the above policy, short-time admission and rate [sic], wash-up rate or other similarly concocted terms, are hereby prohibited in hotels,
motels, inns, lodging houses, pension houses and similar establishments in the City of Manila.
SEC. 4. Definition of Term[s]. Short-time admission shall mean admittance and charging of room rate for less than twelve (12) hours at any given time or
the renting out of rooms more than twice a day or any other term that may be concocted by owners or managers of said establishments but would mean the
same or would bear the same meaning.
SEC. 5. Penalty Clause. Any person or corporation who shall violate any provision of this ordinance shall upon conviction thereof be punished by a fine of
Five Thousand (₱5,000.00) Pesos or imprisonment for a period of not exceeding one (1) year or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the
court; Provided, That in case of [a] juridical person, the president, the manager, or the persons in charge of the operation thereof shall be liable: Provided,
further, That in case of subsequent conviction for the same offense, the business license of the guilty party shall automatically be cancelled.
SEC. 6. Repealing Clause. Any or all provisions of City ordinances not consistent with or contrary to this measure or any portion hereof are hereby deemed
repealed.
SEC. 7. Effectivity. This ordinance shall take effect immediately upon approval.
Enacted by the city Council of Manila at its regular session today, November 10, 1992.
Approved by His Honor, the Mayor on December 3, 1992.
On December 15, 1992, the Malate Tourist and Development Corporation (MTDC) filed a complaint for declaratory relief with prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order ( TRO) 5 with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 9 impleading as defendant,
herein respondent City of Manila (the City) represented by Mayor Lim. 6 MTDC prayed that the Ordinance, insofar as it includes motels and inns as among
its prohibited establishments, be declared invalid and unconstitutional. MTDC claimed that as owner and operator of the Victoria Court in Malate, Manila
it was authorized by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 259 to admit customers on a short time basis as well as to charge customers wash up rates for stays of
only three hours.
On December 21, 1992, petitioners White Light Corporation (WLC), Titanium Corporation (TC) and Sta. Mesa Tourist and Development Corporation
(STDC) filed a motion to intervene and to admit attached complaint-in-intervention 7 on the ground that the Ordinance directly affects their business
interests as operators of drive-in-hotels and motels in Manila. 8 The three companies are components of the Anito Group of Companies which owns and
operates several hotels and motels in Metro Manila.9

On December 23, 1992, the RTC granted the motion to intervene. 10 The RTC also notified the Solicitor General of the proceedings pursuant to then Rule
64, Section 4 of the Rules of Court. On the same date, MTDC moved to withdraw as plaintiff.11

On December 28, 1992, the RTC granted MTDC's motion to withdraw. 12 The RTC issued a TRO on January 14, 1993, directing the City to cease and
desist from enforcing the Ordinance.13 The City filed an Answer dated January 22, 1993 alleging that the Ordinance is a legitimate exercise of police
power.14

On February 8, 1993, the RTC issued a writ of preliminary injunction ordering the city to desist from the enforcement of the Ordinance. 15 A month later, on
March 8, 1993, the Solicitor General filed his Comment arguing that the Ordinance is constitutional.

During the pre-trial conference, the WLC, TC and STDC agreed to submit the case for decision without trial as the case involved a purely legal question. 16
On October 20, 1993, the RTC rendered a decision declaring the Ordinance null and void. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, [O]rdinance No. 7774 of the City of Manila is hereby declared null and void.
Accordingly, the preliminary injunction heretofor issued is hereby made permanent.

SO ORDERED.17

The RTC noted that the ordinance "strikes at the personal liberty of the individual guaranteed and jealously guarded by the Constitution." 18 Reference was
made to the provisions of the Constitution encouraging private enterprises and the incentive to needed investment, as well as the right to operate economic
enterprises. Finally, from the observation that the illicit relationships the Ordinance sought to dissuade could nonetheless be consummated by simply
paying for a 12-hour stay, the RTC likened the law to the ordinance annulled in Ynot v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 19 where the legitimate purpose of
preventing indiscriminate slaughter of carabaos was sought to be effected through an inter-province ban on the transport of carabaos and carabeef.

The City later filed a petition for review on certiorari with the Supreme Court.20 The petition was docketed as G.R. No. 112471. However in a resolution
dated January 26, 1994, the Court treated the petition as a petition for certiorari and referred the petition to the Court of Appeals.21
Before the Court of Appeals, the City asserted that the Ordinance is a valid exercise of police power pursuant to Section 458 (4)(iv) of the Local
Government Code which confers on cities, among other local government units, the power:
[To] regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses and other
similar establishments, including tourist guides and transports.22
The Ordinance, it is argued, is also a valid exercise of the power of the City under Article III, Section 18(kk) of the Revised Manila Charter, thus:
"to enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and proper for the sanitation and safety, the furtherance of the prosperity and the promotion of the morality,
peace, good order, comfort, convenience and general welfare of the city and its inhabitants, and such others as be necessary to carry into effect and
discharge the powers and duties conferred by this Chapter; and to fix penalties for the violation of ordinances which shall not exceed two hundred pesos
fine or six months imprisonment, or both such fine and imprisonment for a single offense.23
Petitioners argued that the Ordinance is unconstitutional and void since it violates the right to privacy and the freedom of movement; it is an invalid
exercise of police power; and it is an unreasonable and oppressive interference in their business.

The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the RTC and affirmed the constitutionality of the Ordinance. 24 First, it held that the Ordinance did not
violate the right to privacy or the freedom of movement, as it only penalizes the owners or operators of establishments that admit individuals for short time
stays. Second, the virtually limitless reach of police power is only constrained by having a lawful object obtained through a lawful method. The lawful
objective of the Ordinance is satisfied since it aims to curb immoral activities. There is a lawful method since the establishments are still allowed to
operate. Third, the adverse effect on the establishments is justified by the well-being of its constituents in general. Finally, as held in Ermita-Malate Motel
Operators Association v. City Mayor of Manila, liberty is regulated by law.

TC, WLC and STDC come to this Court via petition for review on certiorari. 25 In their petition and Memorandum, petitioners in essence repeat the
assertions they made before the Court of Appeals. They contend that the assailed Ordinance is an invalid exercise of police power.
II.
We must address the threshold issue of petitioners’ standing. Petitioners allege that as owners of establishments offering "wash-up" rates, their business is
being unlawfully interfered with by the Ordinance. However, petitioners also allege that the equal protection rights of their clients are also being interfered
with. Thus, the crux of the matter is whether or not these establishments have the requisite standing to plead for protection of their patrons' equal protection
rights.
Standing or locus standi is the ability of a party to demonstrate to the court sufficient connection to and harm from the law or action challenged to support
that party's participation in the case. More importantly, the doctrine of standing is built on the principle of separation of powers, 26 sparing as it does
unnecessary interference or invalidation by the judicial branch of the actions rendered by its co-equal branches of government.

The requirement of standing is a core component of the judicial system derived directly from the Constitution. 27 The constitutional component of standing
doctrine incorporates concepts which concededly are not susceptible of precise definition. 28 In this jurisdiction, the extancy of "a direct and personal
interest" presents the most obvious cause, as well as the standard test for a petitioner's standing. 29 In a similar vein, the United States Supreme Court
reviewed and elaborated on the meaning of the three constitutional standing requirements of injury, causation, and redressability in Allen v. Wright.30
Nonetheless, the general rules on standing admit of several exceptions such as the overbreadth doctrine, taxpayer suits, third party standing and, especially
in the Philippines, the doctrine of transcendental importance.31

For this particular set of facts, the concept of third party standing as an exception and the overbreadth doctrine are appropriate. In Powers v. Ohio,32 the
United States Supreme Court wrote that: "We have recognized the right of litigants to bring actions on behalf of third parties, provided three important
criteria are satisfied: the litigant must have suffered an ‘injury-in-fact,’ thus giving him or her a "sufficiently concrete interest" in the outcome of the issue
in dispute; the litigant must have a close relation to the third party; and there must exist some hindrance to the third party's ability to protect his or her own
interests."33 Herein, it is clear that the business interests of the petitioners are likewise injured by the Ordinance. They rely on the patronage of their
customers for their continued viability which appears to be threatened by the enforcement of the Ordinance. The relative silence in constitutional litigation
of such special interest groups in our nation such as the American Civil Liberties Union in the United States may also be construed as a hindrance for
customers to bring suit.34
American jurisprudence is replete with examples where parties-in-interest were allowed standing to advocate or invoke the fundamental due process or
equal protection claims of other persons or classes of persons injured by state action. In Griswold v. Connecticut,35 the United States Supreme Court held
that physicians had standing to challenge a reproductive health statute that would penalize them as accessories as well as to plead the constitutional
protections available to their patients. The Court held that:
"The rights of husband and wife, pressed here, are likely to be diluted or adversely affected unless those rights are considered in a suit involving those who
have this kind of confidential relation to them."36

An even more analogous example may be found in Craig v. Boren,37 wherein the United States Supreme Court held that a licensed beverage vendor has
standing to raise the equal protection claim of a male customer challenging a statutory scheme prohibiting the sale of beer to males under the age of 21 and
to females under the age of 18. The United States High Court explained that the vendors had standing "by acting as advocates of the rights of third parties
who seek access to their market or function." 38
Assuming arguendo that petitioners do not have a relationship with their patrons for the former to assert the rights of the latter, the overbreadth doctrine
comes into play. In overbreadth analysis, challengers to government action are in effect permitted to raise the rights of third parties. Generally applied to
statutes infringing on the freedom of speech, the overbreadth doctrine applies when a statute needlessly restrains even constitutionally guaranteed rights. 39
In this case, the petitioners claim that the Ordinance makes a sweeping intrusion into the right to liberty of their clients. We can see that based on the
allegations in the petition, the Ordinance suffers from overbreadth.
We thus recognize that the petitioners have a right to assert the constitutional rights of their clients to patronize their establishments for a "wash-rate" time
frame.
III.
To students of jurisprudence, the facts of this case will recall to mind not only the recent City of Manila ruling, but our 1967 decision in Ermita-Malate
Hotel and Motel Operations Association, Inc., v. Hon. City Mayor of Manila. 40 Ermita-Malate concerned the City ordinance requiring patrons to fill up a
prescribed form stating personal information such as name, gender, nationality, age, address and occupation before they could be admitted to a motel, hotel
or lodging house. This earlier ordinance was precisely enacted to minimize certain practices deemed harmful to public morals. A purpose similar to the
annulled ordinance in City of Manila which sought a blanket ban on motels, inns and similar establishments in the Ermita-Malate area. However, the
constitutionality of the ordinance in Ermita-Malate was sustained by the Court.
The common thread that runs through those decisions and the case at bar goes beyond the singularity of the localities covered under the respective
ordinances. All three ordinances were enacted with a view of regulating public morals including particular illicit activity in transient lodging
establishments. This could be described as the middle case, wherein there is no wholesale ban on motels and hotels but the services offered by these
establishments have been severely restricted. At its core, this is another case about the extent to which the State can intrude into and regulate the lives of its
citizens.
The test of a valid ordinance is well established. A long line of decisions including City of Manila has held that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not
only be within the corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and pass according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to
the following substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial
or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and (6) must not be unreasonable. 41
The Ordinance prohibits two specific and distinct business practices, namely wash rate admissions and renting out a room more than twice a day. The ban
is evidently sought to be rooted in the police power as conferred on local government units by the Local Government Code through such implements as the
general welfare clause.
A.
Police power, while incapable of an exact definition, has been purposely veiled in general terms to underscore its comprehensiveness to meet all exigencies
and provide enough room for an efficient and flexible response as the conditions warrant. 42 Police power is based upon the concept of necessity of the
State and its corresponding right to protect itself and its people. 43 Police power has been used as justification for numerous and varied actions by the State.
These range from the regulation of dance halls, 44 movie theaters,45 gas stations46 and cockpits.47 The awesome scope of police power is best demonstrated
by the fact that in its hundred or so years of presence in our nation’s legal system, its use has rarely been denied.
The apparent goal of the Ordinance is to minimize if not eliminate the use of the covered establishments for illicit sex, prostitution, drug use and alike.
These goals, by themselves, are unimpeachable and certainly fall within the ambit of the police power of the State. Yet the desirability of these ends do not
sanctify any and all means for their achievement. Those means must align with the Constitution, and our emerging sophisticated analysis of its guarantees
to the people. The Bill of Rights stands as a rebuke to the seductive theory of Macchiavelli, and, sometimes even, the political majorities animated by his
cynicism.
Even as we design the precedents that establish the framework for analysis of due process or equal protection questions, the courts are naturally inhibited
by a due deference to the co-equal branches of government as they exercise their political functions. But when we are compelled to nullify executive or
legislative actions, yet another form of caution emerges. If the Court were animated by the same passing fancies or turbulent emotions that motivate many
political decisions, judicial integrity is compromised by any perception that the judiciary is merely the third political branch of government. We derive our
respect and good standing in the annals of history by acting as judicious and neutral arbiters of the rule of law, and there is no surer way to that end than
through the development of rigorous and sophisticated legal standards through which the courts analyze the most fundamental and far-reaching
constitutional questions of the day.
B.
The primary constitutional question that confronts us is one of due process, as guaranteed under Section 1, Article III of the Constitution. Due process
evades a precise definition.48 The purpose of the guaranty is to prevent arbitrary governmental encroachment against the life, liberty and property of
individuals. The due process guaranty serves as a protection against arbitrary regulation or seizure. Even corporations and partnerships are protected by the
guaranty insofar as their property is concerned.
The due process guaranty has traditionally been interpreted as imposing two related but distinct restrictions on government, "procedural due process" and
"substantive due process." Procedural due process refers to the procedures that the government must follow before it deprives a person of life, liberty, or
property.49 Procedural due process concerns itself with government action adhering to the established process when it makes an intrusion into the private
sphere. Examples range from the form of notice given to the level of formality of a hearing.
If due process were confined solely to its procedural aspects, there would arise absurd situation of arbitrary government action, provided the proper
formalities are followed. Substantive due process completes the protection envisioned by the due process clause. It inquires whether the government has
sufficient justification for depriving a person of life, liberty, or property. 50
The question of substantive due process, moreso than most other fields of law, has reflected dynamism in progressive legal thought tied with the expanded
acceptance of fundamental freedoms. Police power, traditionally awesome as it may be, is now confronted with a more rigorous level of analysis before it
can be upheld. The vitality though of constitutional due process has not been predicated on the frequency with which it has been utilized to achieve a
liberal result for, after all, the libertarian ends should sometimes yield to the prerogatives of the State. Instead, the due process clause has acquired potency
because of the sophisticated methodology that has emerged to determine the proper metes and bounds for its application.
C.
The general test of the validity of an ordinance on substantive due process grounds is best tested when assessed with the evolved footnote 4 test laid down
by the U.S. Supreme Court in U.S. v. Carolene Products. 51 Footnote 4 of the Carolene Products case acknowledged that the judiciary would defer to the
legislature unless there is a discrimination against a "discrete and insular" minority or infringement of a "fundamental right." 52 Consequently, two
standards of judicial review were established: strict scrutiny for laws dealing with freedom of the mind or restricting the political process, and the rational
basis standard of review for economic legislation.
A third standard, denominated as heightened or immediate scrutiny, was later adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court for evaluating classifications based on
gender53 and legitimacy.54 Immediate scrutiny was adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court in Craig, 55 after the Court declined to do so in Reed v. Reed. 56
While the test may have first been articulated in equal protection analysis, it has in the United States since been applied in all substantive due process cases
as well.

We ourselves have often applied the rational basis test mainly in analysis of equal protection challenges. 57 Using the rational basis examination, laws or
ordinances are upheld if they rationally further a legitimate governmental interest. 58 Under intermediate review, governmental interest is extensively
examined and the availability of less restrictive measures is considered. 59 Applying strict scrutiny, the focus is on the presence of compelling, rather than
substantial, governmental interest and on the absence of less restrictive means for achieving that interest.
In terms of judicial review of statutes or ordinances, strict scrutiny refers to the standard for determining the quality and the amount of governmental
interest brought to justify the regulation of fundamental freedoms. 60 Strict scrutiny is used today to test the validity of laws dealing with the regulation of
speech, gender, or race as well as other fundamental rights as expansion from its earlier applications to equal protection. 61 The United States Supreme
Court has expanded the scope of strict scrutiny to protect fundamental rights such as suffrage,62 judicial access63 and interstate travel.64
If we were to take the myopic view that an Ordinance should be analyzed strictly as to its effect only on the petitioners at bar, then it would seem that the
only restraint imposed by the law which we are capacitated to act upon is the injury to property sustained by the petitioners, an injury that would warrant
the application of the most deferential standard – the rational basis test. Yet as earlier stated, we recognize the capacity of the petitioners to invoke as well
the constitutional rights of their patrons – those persons who would be deprived of availing short time access or wash-up rates to the lodging
establishments in question.
Viewed cynically, one might say that the infringed rights of these customers were are trivial since they seem shorn of political consequence. Concededly,
these are not the sort of cherished rights that, when proscribed, would impel the people to tear up their cedulas. Still, the Bill of Rights does not shelter
gravitas alone. Indeed, it is those "trivial" yet fundamental freedoms – which the people reflexively exercise any day without the impairing awareness of
their constitutional consequence – that accurately reflect the degree of liberty enjoyed by the people. Liberty, as integrally incorporated as a fundamental
right in the Constitution, is not a Ten Commandments-style enumeration of what may or what may not be done; but rather an atmosphere of freedom where
the people do not feel labored under a Big Brother presence as they interact with each other, their society and nature, in a manner innately understood by
them as inherent, without doing harm or injury to others.
D.
The rights at stake herein fall within the same fundamental rights to liberty which we upheld in City of Manila v. Hon. Laguio, Jr. We expounded on that
most primordial of rights, thus:
Liberty as guaranteed by the Constitution was defined by Justice Malcolm to include "the right to exist and the right to be free from arbitrary restraint or
servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed into mere freedom from physical restraint of the person of the citizen, but is deemed to embrace the right of man to
enjoy the facilities with which he has been endowed by his Creator, subject only to such restraint as are necessary for the common welfare."[ 65] In
accordance with this case, the rights of the citizen to be free to use his faculties in all lawful ways; to live and work where he will; to earn his livelihood by
any lawful calling; and to pursue any avocation are all deemed embraced in the concept of liberty.[ 66]
The U.S. Supreme Court in the case of Roth v. Board of Regents, sought to clarify the meaning of "liberty." It said:
While the Court has not attempted to define with exactness the liberty . . . guaranteed [by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments], the term denotes not
merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire useful
knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and generally to enjoy those
privileges long recognized . . . as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men. In a Constitution for a free people, there can be no doubt that the
meaning of "liberty" must be broad indeed.67 [Citations omitted]
It cannot be denied that the primary animus behind the ordinance is the curtailment of sexual behavior. The City asserts before this Court that the subject
establishments "have gained notoriety as venue of ‘prostitution, adultery and fornications’ in Manila since they ‘provide the necessary atmosphere for
clandestine entry, presence and exit and thus became the ‘ideal haven for prostitutes and thrill-seekers.’" 68 Whether or not this depiction of a mise-en-scene
of vice is accurate, it cannot be denied that legitimate sexual behavior among willing married or consenting single adults which is constitutionally
protected69 will be curtailed as well, as it was in the City of Manila case. Our holding therein retains significance for our purposes:
The concept of liberty compels respect for the individual whose claim to privacy and interference demands respect. As the case of Morfe v. Mutuc,
borrowing the words of Laski, so very aptly stated:
Man is one among many, obstinately refusing reduction to unity. His separateness, his isolation, are indefeasible; indeed, they are so fundamental that they
are the basis on which his civic obligations are built. He cannot abandon the consequences of his isolation, which are, broadly speaking, that his experience
is private, and the will built out of that experience personal to himself. If he surrenders his will to others, he surrenders himself. If his will is set by the will
of others, he ceases to be a master of himself. I cannot believe that a man no longer a master of himself is in any real sense free.
Indeed, the right to privacy as a constitutional right was recognized in Morfe, the invasion of which should be justified by a compelling state interest.
Morfe accorded recognition to the right to privacy independently of its identification with liberty; in itself it is fully deserving of constitutional protection.
Governmental powers should stop short of certain intrusions into the personal life of the citizen.70
We cannot discount other legitimate activities which the Ordinance would proscribe or impair. There are very legitimate uses for a wash rate or renting the
room out for more than twice a day. Entire families are known to choose pass the time in a motel or hotel whilst the power is momentarily out in their
homes. In transit passengers who wish to wash up and rest between trips have a legitimate purpose for abbreviated stays in motels or hotels. Indeed any
person or groups of persons in need of comfortable private spaces for a span of a few hours with purposes other than having sex or using illegal drugs can
legitimately look to staying in a motel or hotel as a convenient alternative.
E.
That the Ordinance prevents the lawful uses of a wash rate depriving patrons of a product and the petitioners of lucrative business ties in with another
constitutional requisite for the legitimacy of the Ordinance as a police power measure. It must appear that the interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular class, require an interference with private rights and the means must be reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive of private rights.71 It must also be evident that no other alternative for the accomplishment of the
purpose less intrusive of private rights can work. More importantly, a reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of the measure and the means
employed for its accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private property will not
be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded.72
Lacking a concurrence of these requisites, the police measure shall be struck down as an arbitrary intrusion into private rights. As held in Morfe v. Mutuc,
the exercise of police power is subject to judicial review when life, liberty or property is affected. 73 However, this is not in any way meant to take it away
from the vastness of State police power whose exercise enjoys the presumption of validity. 74

Similar to the Comelec resolution requiring newspapers to donate advertising space to candidates, this Ordinance is a blunt and heavy instrument. 75 The
Ordinance makes no distinction between places frequented by patrons engaged in illicit activities and patrons engaged in legitimate actions. Thus it
prevents legitimate use of places where illicit activities are rare or even unheard of. A plain reading of section 3 of the Ordinance shows it makes no
classification of places of lodging, thus deems them all susceptible to illicit patronage and subject them without exception to the unjustified prohibition.

The Court has professed its deep sentiment and tenderness of the Ermita-Malate area, its longtime home, 76 and it is skeptical of those who wish to depict
our capital city – the Pearl of the Orient – as a modern-day Sodom or Gomorrah for the Third World set. Those still steeped in Nick Joaquin-dreams of the
grandeur of Old Manila will have to accept that Manila like all evolving big cities, will have its problems. Urban decay is a fact of mega cities such as
Manila, and vice is a common problem confronted by the modern metropolis wherever in the world. The solution to such perceived decay is not to prevent
legitimate businesses from offering a legitimate product. Rather, cities revive themselves by offering incentives for new businesses to sprout up thus
attracting the dynamism of individuals that would bring a new grandeur to Manila.
The behavior which the Ordinance seeks to curtail is in fact already prohibited and could in fact be diminished simply by applying existing laws. Less
intrusive measures such as curbing the proliferation of prostitutes and drug dealers through active police work would be more effective in easing the
situation. So would the strict enforcement of existing laws and regulations penalizing prostitution and drug use. These measures would have minimal
intrusion on the businesses of the petitioners and other legitimate merchants. Further, it is apparent that the Ordinance can easily be circumvented by
merely paying the whole day rate without any hindrance to those engaged in illicit activities. Moreover, drug dealers and prostitutes can in fact collect
"wash rates" from their clientele by charging their customers a portion of the rent for motel rooms and even apartments.
IV.
We reiterate that individual rights may be adversely affected only to the extent that may fairly be required by the legitimate demands of public interest or
public welfare. The State is a leviathan that must be restrained from needlessly intruding into the lives of its citizens. However well-intentioned the
Ordinance may be, it is in effect an arbitrary and whimsical intrusion into the rights of the establishments as well as their patrons. The Ordinance
needlessly restrains the operation of the businesses of the petitioners as well as restricting the rights of their patrons without sufficient justification. The
Ordinance rashly equates wash rates and renting out a room more than twice a day with immorality without accommodating innocuous intentions.
The promotion of public welfare and a sense of morality among citizens deserves the full endorsement of the judiciary provided that such measures do not
trample rights this Court is sworn to protect. 77 The notion that the promotion of public morality is a function of the State is as old as Aristotle. 78 The
advancement of moral relativism as a school of philosophy does not de-legitimize the role of morality in law, even if it may foster wider debate on which
particular behavior to penalize. It is conceivable that a society with relatively little shared morality among its citizens could be functional so long as the
pursuit of sharply variant moral perspectives yields an adequate accommodation of different interests. 79
To be candid about it, the oft-quoted American maxim that "you cannot legislate morality" is ultimately illegitimate as a matter of law, since as explained
by Calabresi, that phrase is more accurately interpreted as meaning that efforts to legislate morality will fail if they are widely at variance with public
attitudes about right and wrong. 80 Our penal laws, for one, are founded on age-old moral traditions, and as long as there are widely accepted distinctions
between right and wrong, they will remain so oriented.
Yet the continuing progression of the human story has seen not only the acceptance of the right-wrong distinction, but also the advent of fundamental
liberties as the key to the enjoyment of life to the fullest. Our democracy is distinguished from non-free societies not with any more extensive elaboration
on our part of what is moral and immoral, but from our recognition that the individual liberty to make the choices in our lives is innate, and protected by
the State. Independent and fair-minded judges themselves are under a moral duty to uphold the Constitution as the embodiment of the rule of law, by
reason of their expression of consent to do so when they take the oath of office, and because they are entrusted by the people to uphold the law. 81
Even as the implementation of moral norms remains an indispensable complement to governance, that prerogative is hardly absolute, especially in the face
of the norms of due process of liberty. And while the tension may often be left to the courts to relieve, it is possible for the government to avoid the
constitutional conflict by employing more judicious, less drastic means to promote morality.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED, and the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 9, is REINSTATED. Ordinance No. 7774 is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

(On Official Leave)

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

RENATO C. CORONA CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ADOLFO S. AZCUNA PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHUR

Associate Justice Associate Justice

(On Sick Leave)

TERESITA LEONARDO DE CASTRO
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

(On Official Leave)

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
C E RT I FI CAT I O N
Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

Footnotes
1 G.R. 118127, 12 April 2005, 455 SCRA 308.
 2 See rollo, pp. 4-41.
3Id.at 42-59. Penned by Associate Justice Jaime M. Lantin, concurred in by Associate Justices Ricardo P. Galvez (later, Solicitor-General) and
Antonio P. Solano.
4 Id. at 46.
5 Id. at 62-69.
6 Id. at 45-46.
7 Id. at 70-77.
8 Id. at 47.
9Id.

10Id.

11Id. at 48.
12Id. at 81.
13Id. at 82-83.
14Id. at 84-99.
15 Id. at 104-105.
16 Id. at 49.
17 Id. at 52.
18Id. at 120.
19 No. L-74457, 20 March 1987, 148 SCRA 659.
20 Rollo, pp. 129-145.
21 Id. at 158.
22 Id. at 53.
23 Id.
24 Id. at 43-59.
25 Id. at 4-40.
26 Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984).
27 Const., Art. VIII , Sec. 5, Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary Reyes, 466 Phil. 482 (2004).
[G.R. No. 121777. January 24, 2001]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CAROL M. DELA PIEDRA, accused-appellant.
DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:
Accused-appellant Carol M. dela Piedra questions her conviction for illegal recruitment in large scale and assails, as well, the constitutionality of the law
defining and penalizing said crime.
The Court affirms the constitutionality of the law and the conviction of the accused, but reduces the penalty imposed upon her.
The accused was charged before the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga City in an information alleging:
That on or about January 30, 1994, in the City of Zamboanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
without having previously obtained from the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, a license or authority to engage in recruitment and overseas
placement of workers, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, offer and promise for a fee employment abroad particularly in Singapore
thus causing Maria Lourdes Modesto [y] Gadrino, Nancy Araneta y Aliwanag and Jennelyn Baez y Timbol, all qualified to apply, in fact said Maria
Lourdes Modesto had already advanced the amount of P2,000.00 to the accused for and in consideration of the promised employment which did not
materialized [sic] thus causing damage and prejudice to the latter in the said sum; furthermore, the acts complained of herein tantamount [sic] to economic
sabotage in that the same were committed in large scale.[1]
Arraigned on June 20, 1994, the accused pleaded not guilty[2] to these charges.
At the trial, the prosecution presented five (5) witnesses, namely, Erlie Ramos, SPO2 Erwin Manalopilar, Eileen Fermindoza, Nancy Araneta and Lourdes
Modesto. The succeeding narration is gathered from their testimonies:
On January 30, 1994, at exactly 10:00 in the morning, Erlie Ramos, Attorney II of the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency (POEA), received a
telephone call from an unidentified woman inquiring about the legitimacy of the recruitment conducted by a certain Mrs. Carol Figueroa. Ramos, whose
duties include the surveillance of suspected illegal recruiters, immediately contacted a friend, a certain Mayeth Bellotindos, so they could both go to No.
26-D, Tetuan Highway, Sta. Cruz, Zamboanga City, where the recruitment was reportedly being undertaken. Upon arriving at the reported area at around
4:00 p.m., Bellotindos entered the house and pretended to be an applicant. Ramos remained outside and stood on the pavement, from where he was able to
see around six (6) persons in the houses sala. Ramos even heard a woman, identified as Carol Fegueroa, talk about the possible employment she has to
provide in Singapore and the documents that the applicants have to comply with. Fifteen (15) minutes later, Bellotindos came out with a bio-data form in
hand.
On February 1, 1994, Ramos conferred with a certain Capt. Mendoza of the Criminal Investigation Service (CIS) to organize the arrest of the alleged
illegal recruiter. Also present were other members of the CIS, including Col. Rodolfo Almonte, Regional Director of the PNP-CIS for Region IX, Eileen
Fermindoza, and a certain SPO3 Santos. The group planned to entrap the illegal recruiter the next day by having Fermindoza pose as an applicant.[3]
On February 2, 1994, at around 8:00 p.m., Col. Almonte directed the case to SPO2 Erwin Manalopilar, a member of the Philippine National Police who
was assigned as an investigator of the CIS, to conduct a surveillance of the area to confirm the report of illegal recruitment. Accordingly, he, along with
Eileen Fermindoza, immediately proceeded to Tetuan Highway. The two did not enter the house where the recruitment was supposedly being conducted,
but Fermindoza interviewed two people who informed them that some people do go inside the house. Upon returning to their office at around 8:30 a.m.,
the two reported to Capt. Mendoza who organized a team to conduct the raid.
The raiding team, which included Capt. Mendoza, SPO2 Manalopilar, Fermindoza and a certain Oscar Bucol, quickly set off and arrived at the reported
scene at 9:30 that morning. There they met up with Erlie Ramos of the POEA. Fermindoza then proceeded to enter the house while the rest of the team
posted themselves outside to secure the area. Fermindoza was instructed to come out after she was given a bio-data form, which will serve as the teams cue
to enter the house.[4]
Fermindoza introduced herself as a job applicant to a man and a woman, apparently the owners of the house, and went inside. There, she saw another
woman, later identified as Jasmine, coming out of the bathroom. The man to whom Fermindoza earlier introduced herself told Jasmine that Fermindoza
was applying for a position. Jasmine, who was then only wearing a towel, told her that she would just get dressed. Jasmine then came back and asked
Fermindoza what position she was applying for. Fermindoza replied that she was applying to be a babysitter or any other work so long as she could go
abroad. Jasmine then gave her an application form.
A few minutes later, a certain Carol arrived. Jasmine informed Carol that Fermindoza was an applicant. Fermindoza asked Carol what the requirements
were and whether she (Fermindoza) was qualified. Carol told Fermindoza that if she had a passport, she could fill up the application papers. Fermindoza
replied that she had no passport yet. Carol said she need not worry since Jasmine will prepare the passport for her. While filling up the application form,
three women who appeared to be friends of Jasmine arrived to follow up the result of their applications and to give their advance payment. Jasmine got
their papers and put them on top of a small table. Fermindoza then proceeded to the door and signaled to the raiding party by raising her hand.
Capt. Mendoza asked the owners of the house, a married couple, for permission to enter the same. The owners granted permission after the raiding party
introduced themselves as members of the CIS. Inside the house, the raiding party saw some supposed applicants. Application forms, already filled up, were
in the hands of one Mrs. Carol Figueroa. The CIS asked Figueroa if she had a permit to recruit. Figueroa retorted that she was not engaged in recruitment.
Capt. Mendoza nevertheless proceeded to arrest Figueroa. He took the application forms she was holding as the raiding party seized the other papers[5] on
the table.[6]
The CIS team then brought Figueroa, a certain Jasmine Alejandro, and the three women suspected to be applicants, to the office for investigation.[7]
In the course of their investigation, the CIS discovered that Carol Figueroa had many aliases, among them, Carol Llena and Carol dela Piedra. The accused
was not able to present any authority to recruit when asked by the investigators.[8] A check by Ramos with the POEA revealed that the acused was not
licensed or authorized to conduct recruitment.[9] A certification[10] dated February 2, 1994 stating thus was executed by Renegold M. Macarulay, Officer-
in-Charge of the POEA.
The CIS likewise interviewed the supposed applicants, Lourdes Modesto, Nancy Araneta and Jennelyn Baez, all registered nurses working at the Cabato
Medical Hospital, who executed their respective written statements.[11]
At the trial, Nancy Araneta, 23, recounted that she was at Jasmine Alejandros house in the afternoon of January 30, 1994. Araneta had learned from Sandra
Aquino, also a nurse at the Cabato Medical Hospital, that a woman was there to recruit job applicants for Singapore.
Araneta and her friends, Jennelyn Baez and Sandra Aquino, arrived at Jasmines house at around 4:30 p.m. Jasmine welcomed them and told them to sit
down. They listened to the recruiter who was then talking to a number of people. The recruiter said that she was recruiting nurses for Singapore. Araneta
and her friends then filled up bio-data forms and were required to submit pictures and a transcript of records. They were also told to pay P2,000, and the
rest will be salary deduction. Araneta submitted her bio-data form to Carol that same afternoon, but did not give any money because she was not yet sure.
On the day of the raid on February 2, 1994, Araneta was again at the Alejandro residence to submit her transcript of records and her picture. She arrived at
the house 30 minutes before the raid but did not witness the arrest since she was at the porch when it happened.[12]
Maria Lourdes Modesto, 26, was also in Jasmine Alejandros house on January 30, 1994. A friend of Jasmine had informed her that there was someone
recruiting in Jasmines house. Upon arriving at the Alejandro residence, Lourdes was welcomed by Jasmine.
Lourdes recalled that Carol Figueroa was already briefing some people when she arrived. Carol Figueroa asked if they would like a good opportunity since
a hospital was hiring nurses. She gave a breakdown of the fees involved: P30,000 for the visa and the round trip ticket, and P5,000 as placement fee and for
the processing of the papers. The initial payment was P2,000, while P30,000 will be by salary deduction.
Lourdes filled up the application form and submitted it to Jasmine. After the interview, she gave the initial payment of P2,000 to Jasmine, who assured
Lourdes that she was authorized to receive the money. On February 2, 1994, however, Lourdes went back to the house to get back the money. Jasmine gave
back the money to Lourdes after the raid.[13]
Denial comprised the accuseds defense.
Carol dela Piedra, 37, is a housewife and a resident of Cebu City. Her husband is a businessman from Cebu, the manager of the Region 7 Branch of the
Grollier International Encyclopedia. They own an apartment in Cebu City, providing lodging to students.
The accused claimed that she goes to Singapore to visit her relatives. She first traveled to Singapore on August 21, 1993 as a tourist, and came back to the
Philippines on October 20 of the same year. Thereafter, she returned to Singapore on December 10, 1993.
On December 21, 1993, while in Singapore, the accused was invited to a Christmas party sponsored by the Zamboanga City Club Association. On that
occasion, she met a certain Laleen Malicay, who sought her help. A midwife, Malicay had been working in Singapore for six (6) years. Her employer is a
certain Mr. Tan, a close friend of Carol.
According to the accused, Malicay sent P15,000 home for her father who was then seriously ill. Malicay was not sure, however, whether her father
received the money so she requested the accused to verify from her relatives receipt thereof. She informed the accused that she had a cousin by the name of
Jasmine Alejandro. Malicay gave the accused Jasmines telephone number, address and a sketch of how to get there.
The accused returned to the country on January 21, 1994. From Cebu City, the accused flew to Zamboanga City on January 23, 1994 to give some presents
to her friends.
On January 30, 1994, the accused called up Jasmine Alejandro, Laleen Malicays cousin, to inform her that she would be going to her house. At around
noon that day, the accused, accompanied by her friend Hilda Falcasantos, arrived at the house where she found Jasmine entertaining some friends. Jasmine
came down with two of her friends whom she introduced as her classmates. Jasmine told them that the accused was a friend of Laleen Malicay.
The accused relayed to Jasmine Malicays message regarding the money the latter had sent. Jasmine assured her that they received the money, and asked
Carol to tell Malicay to send more money for medicine for Malicays mother. Jasmine also told her that she would send something for Malicay when the
accused goes back to Singapore. The accused replied that she just needed to confirm her flight back to Cebu City, and will return to Jasmines house. After
the meeting with Jasmine, the accused went shopping with Hilda Falcasantos. The accused was in the house for only fifteen (15) minutes.
On February 2, 1994, the accused went to the Philippine Airlines office at 7:30 in the morning to confirm her 5:30 p.m. flight to Cebu City. She then
proceeded to Jasmines residence, arriving there at past 8 a.m.
Inside the house, she met a woman who asked her, Are you Carol from Singapore? The accused, in turn, asked the woman if she could do anything for her.
The woman inquired from Carol if she was recruiting. Carol replied in the negative, explaining that she was there just to say goodbye to Jasmine. The
woman further asked Carol what the requirements were if she (the woman) were to go to Singapore. Carol replied that she would need a passport.
Two (2) minutes later, three (3) girls entered the house looking for Jasmine. The woman Carol was talking with then stood up and went out. A minute after,
three (3) members of the CIS and a POEA official arrived. A big man identified himself as a member of the CIS and informed her that they received a call
that she was recruiting. They told her she had just interviewed a woman from the CIS. She denied this, and said that she came only to say goodbye to the
occupants of the house, and to get whatever Jasmine would be sending for Laleen Malicay. She even showed them her ticket for Cebu City.
Erlie Ramos then went up to Jasmines room and returned with some papers. The accused said that those were the papers that Laleen Malicay requested
Jasmine to give to her (the accused). The accused surmised that because Laleen Malicay wanted to go home but could not find a replacement, one of the
applicants in the forms was to be her (Malicays) substitute. Ramos told the accused to explain in their office.
The accused denied in court that she went to Jasmines residence to engage in recruitment. She claimed she came to Zamboanga City to visit her friends, to
whom she could confide since she and her husband were having some problems. She denied she knew Nancy Araneta or that she brought information
sheets for job placement. She also denied instructing Jasmine to collect P2,000 from alleged applicants as processing fee.[14]
The accused presented two witnesses to corroborate her defense.
The first, Jasmine Alejandro, 23, testified that she met the accused for the first time only on January 30, 1994 when the latter visited them to deliver Laleen
Malicays message regarding the money she sent. Carol, who was accompanied by a certain Hilda Falcasantos, stayed in their house for 10 to 15 minutes
only. Carol came back to the house a few days later on February 2 at around 8:00 in the morning to get the envelope for the candidacy of her daughter.
Jasmine did not elaborate.
Jasmine denied that she knew Nancy Araneta or Lourdes Modesto. She denied that the accused conducted recruitment. She claimed she did not see Carol
distribute bio-data or application forms to job applicants. She disclaimed any knowledge regarding the P2,000 application fee.[15]
The other defense witness, Ernesto Morales, a policeman, merely testified that the accused stayed in their house in No. 270 Tugbungan, Zamboanga City,
for four (4) days before her arrest, although she would sometimes go downtown alone. He said he did not notice that she conducted any recruitment.[16]
On May 5, 1995, the trial court rendered a decision convicting the accused, thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing consideration[s][,] this Court finds the accused Carol dela Piedra alias Carol Llena and Carol Figueroa guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of Illegal Recruitment committed in a large scale and hereby sentences her to suffer the penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT and
to pay a fine of P100,000.00, and also to pay the costs.
Being a detention prisoner, the said accused is entitled to the full time of the period of her detention during the pendency of this case under the condition
set forth in Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code.
SO ORDERED.[17]
The accused, in this appeal, ascribes to the trial court the following errors:
I
WITH DUE RESPECT, THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING SEC. 13 (B) OF P.D. 442[,] AS AMENDED[,] OTHERWISE
KNOWN AS [THE] ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT LAW UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
II
WITH DUE RESPECT, THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE APPREHENDING TEAM COMPOSED OF POEA AND
CIS REPRESENTATIVES ENTERED INTO [sic] THE RESIDENCE OF JASMIN[E] ALEJANDRO WITHOUT ANY SEARCH WARRANT IN
VIOLATION OF ARTICLE III, SECTION 2 OF THE PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION, AND ANY EVIDENCE OBTAINED IN VIOLATION
THEREOF, SHALL BE INADMISSIBLE FOR ANY PURPOSE IN ANY PROCEEDING AS PROVIDED UNDER ARTICLE III, SECTION 3, (2)
OF THE SAME CONSTITUTION;
III
WITH DUE RESPECT, THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN IGNORING THAT WHEN SPO2 [sic] EILE[E]N FERMINDOZA ENTERED THE
 RESIDENCE OF JASMIN[E] ALEJANDRO, THERE WAS NO CRIME COMMITTED WHATSOEVER, HENCE THE ARREST OF THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT WAS ILLEGAL;
[IV]
WITH DUE RESPECT, THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DISCOVERING THAT SPO2 [sic] EILE[E]N FERMINDOZA WAS NOT
ILLEGALLY RECRUITED BY THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT, HENCE, ACCUSED-APPELLANT SHOULD BE ACQUITTED;
V
WITH DUE RESPECT, THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DETECTING THAT NANCY ARANETA WAS NOT ILLEGALLY
RECRUITED BY THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT, HENCE, ACCUSED SHOULD BE EXONERATED;
VI
WITH DUE RESPECT, THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT REALIZING THAT MARIA LOURDES MODESTO WAS NOT ILLEGALLY
RECRUITED BY THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT, HENCE, ACCUSED-APPELLANT SHOULD BE EXCULPATED;
VII
WITH DUE RESPECT, THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT WAS CHARGED WITH LARGE
SCALE ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT ON JANUARY 30, 1994, THE DATE STATED IN THE INFORMATION AS THE DATE OF THE CRIME,
BUT ACCUSED WAS ARRESTED ON FEB. 2, 1994 AND ALL THE EVIDENCES [sic] INDICATED [sic] THAT THE ALLEGED CRIME
WERE [sic] COMMITTED ON FEB. 2, 1994, HENCE, THE INFORMATION IS FATALLY DEFECTIVE;
VIII
WITH DUE RESPECT, THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE ALLEGED CRIME OF ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT WAS
COMMITTED NOT ON [sic] LARGE SCALE, HENCE, THE PENALTY SHOULD NOT BE LIFE IMPRISONMENT;
IX
WITH DUE RESPECT, THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THOSE EVIDENCES [sic] SEIZED AT THE HOUSE OF
JASMIN[E] ALEJANDRO AND PRESENTED TO THE COURT WERE PLANTED BY A BOGUS ATTORNEY[,] ERLIE S. RAMOS OF THE
POEA;
X
WITH DUE RESPECT, THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DISCOVERING THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT DID NOT RECEIVE ANY
PAYMENT EVEN A SINGLE CENTAVO FROM THE ALLEGED VICTIMS WHO DID NOT SUFFER DAMAGE IN ANY MANNER, YET
SHE WAS CONVICTED TO SERVE HER ENTIRE LIFE BEHIND PRISON BARS. SUCH PUNISHMENT WAS CRUEL AND UNUSUAL,
HENCE, A WANTON VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION.[18]
In the first assigned error, appellant maintains that the law defining recruitment and placement violates due process. Appellant also avers, as part of her
sixth assigned error, that she was denied the equal protection of the laws.
We shall address the issues jointly.
Appellant submits that Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code defining recruitment and placement is void for vagueness and, thus, violates the due process
clause.[19]
Due process requires that the terms of a penal statute must be sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to it what conduct on their part will
render them liable to its penalties.[20] A criminal statute that fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is
forbidden by the statute, or is so indefinite that it encourages arbitrary and erratic arrests and convictions, is void for vagueness.[21] The constitutional vice
in a vague or indefinite statute is the injustice to the accused in placing him on trial for an offense, the nature of which he is given no fair warning.[22]
We reiterated these principles in People vs. Nazario:[23]
As a rule, a statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its
meaning and differ as to its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord persons,
especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and
become an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.
We added, however, that:
x x x the act must be utterly vague on its face, that is to say, it cannot be clarified by either a saving clause or by construction. Thus, in Coates v. City of
Cincinnati, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down an ordinance that had made it illegal for three or more persons to assemble on any sidewalk and there
conduct themselves in a manner annoying to persons passing by. Clearly, the ordinance imposed no standard at all because one may never know in advance
what annoys some people but does not annoy others.
Coates highlights what has been referred to as a perfectly vague act whose obscurity is evident on its face. It is to be distinguished, however, from
legislation couched in imprecise languagebut which nonetheless specifies a standard though defectively phrasedin which case, it may be saved by proper
construction.
Here, the provision in question reads:
ART. 13. Definitions.(a) x x x.
(b) Recruitment and placement refers to any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, and includes
referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not: Provided, That any person or entity
which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement.
x x x.
When undertaken by non-licensees or non-holders of authority, recruitment activities are punishable as follows:
ART. 38. Illegal Recruitment. (a) Any recruitment activities, including the prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34 of this Code, to be undertaken
by non-licensees or non-holders of authority shall be deemed illegal and punishable under Article 39 of this Code. The Ministry of Labor and Employment
or any law enforcement officer may initiate complaints under this Article.
(b) Illegal recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in large scale shall be considered an offense involving economic sabotage and shall be penalized
in accordance with Article 39 hereof.
Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of three (3) or more persons conspiring and/or confederating with one
another in carrying out any unlawful or illegal transaction, enterprise or scheme defined under the first paragraph hereof. Illegal recruitment is deemed
committed in large scale if committed against three (3) or more persons individually or as a group.
x x x.
Art. 39. Penalties. (a) The penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000) shall be imposed if illegal recruitment
constitutes economic sabotage as defined herein:
(b) Any licensee or holder of authority found violating or causing another to violate any provision of this Title or its implementing rules and regulations,
shall upon conviction thereof, suffer the penalty of imprisonment of not less than five years or a fine of not less than P10,000 nor more than P50,000 or
both such imprisonment and fine, at the discretion of the court;
(c) Any person who is neither a licensee nor a holder of authority under this Title found violating any provision thereof or its implementing rules and
regulations shall, upon conviction thereof, suffer the penalty of imprisonment of not less than four years nor more than eight years or a fine of not less than
P20,000 nor more than P100,000 or both such imprisonment and fine, at the discretion of the court;
x x x.
In support of her submission that Article 13 (b) is void for vagueness, appellant invokes People vs. Panis,[24] where this Court, to use appellants term,
criticized the definition of recruitment and placement as follows:
It is unfortunate that we can only speculate on the meaning of the questioned provision for lack of records of debates and deliberations that would
otherwise have been available if the Labor Code had been enacted as a statute rather than a presidential decree is that they could be, and sometimes were,
issued without previous public discussion or consultation, the promulgator heeding only his own counsel or those of his close advisers in their lofty
pinnacle of power. The not infrequent results are rejection, intentional or not, of the interest of the greater number and, as in the instant case, certain
esoteric provisions that one cannot read against the background facts usually reported in the legislative journals.
If the Court in Panis had to speculate on the meaning of the questioned provision, appellant asks, what more the ordinary citizen who does not possess the
necessary [legal] knowledge?
Appellant further argues that the acts that constitute recruitment and placement suffer from overbreadth since by merely referring a person for employment,
a person may be convicted of illegal recruitment.
These contentions cannot be sustained.
Appellants reliance on People vs. Panis is misplaced. The issue in Panis was whether, under the proviso of Article 13 (b), the crime of illegal recruitment
could be committed only whenever two or more persons are in any manner promised or offered any employment for a fee. The Court held in the negative,
explaining:
As we see it, the proviso was intended neither to impose a condition on the basic rule nor to provide an exception thereto but merely to create a
presumption. The presumption is that the individual or entity is engaged in recruitment and placement whenever he or it is dealing with two or more
persons to whom, in consideration of a fee, an offer or promise of employment is made in the course of the canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting,
utilizing, hiring or procuring (of) workers.
The number of persons dealt with is not an essential ingredient of the act of recruitment and placement of workers. Any of the acts mentioned in the basic
rule in Article 13(b) will constitute recruitment and placement even if only one prospective worker is involved. The proviso merely lays down a rule of
evidence that where a fee is collected in consideration of a promise or offer of employment to two or more prospective workers, the individual or entity
dealing with them shall be deemed to be engaged in the act of recruitment and placement. The words shall be deemed create that presumption.
This is not unlike the presumption in article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, for example, regarding the failure of a public officer to produce upon lawful
demand funds or property entrusted to his custody. Such failure shall be prima facie evidence that he has put them to personal use; in other words, he shall
be deemed to have malversed such funds or property. In the instant case, the word shall be deemed should by the same token be given the force of a
disputable presumption or of prima facie evidence of engaging in recruitment and placement.
It is unfortunate that we can only speculate on the meaning of the questioned provision for lack of records of debates and deliberations that would
otherwise have been available if the Labor Code had been enacted as a statute rather than a presidential decree is that they could be, and sometimes were,
issued without previous public discussion or consultation, the promulgator heeding only his own counsel or those of his close advisers in their lofty
pinnacle of power. The not infrequent results are rejection, intentional or not, of the interest of the greater number and, as in the instant case, certain
esoteric provisions that one cannot read against the background facts usually reported in the legislative journals.
At any rate, the interpretation here adopted should give more force to the campaign against illegal recruitment and placement, which has victimized many
Filipino workers seeking a better life in a foreign land, and investing hard-earned savings or even borrowed funds in pursuit of their dream, only to be
awakened to the reality of a cynical deception at the hands of their own countrymen.
Evidently, therefore, appellant has taken the penultimate paragraph in the excerpt quoted above out of context. The Court, in Panis, merely bemoaned the
lack of records that would help shed light on the meaning of the proviso. The absence of such records notwithstanding, the Court was able to arrive at a
reasonable interpretation of the proviso by applying principles in criminal law and drawing from the language and intent of the law itself. Section 13 (b),
therefore, is not a perfectly vague act whose obscurity is evident on its face. If at all, the proviso therein is merely couched in imprecise language that was
salvaged by proper construction. It is not void for vagueness.
An act will be declared void and inoperative on the ground of vagueness and uncertainty, only upon a showing that the defect is such that the courts are
unable to determine, with any reasonable degree of certainty, what the legislature intended. x x x. In this connection we cannot pretermit reference to the
rule that legislation should not be held invalid on the ground of uncertainty if susceptible of any reasonable construction that will support and give it effect.
An Act will not be declared inoperative and ineffectual on the ground that it furnishes no adequate means to secure the purpose for which it is passed, if
men of common sense and reason can devise and provide the means, and all the instrumentalities necessary for its execution are within the reach of those
intrusted therewith.[25]
That Section 13 (b) encompasses what appellant apparently considers as customary and harmless acts such as labor or employment referral (referring an
applicant, according to appellant, for employment to a prospective employer) does not render the law overbroad. Evidently, appellant misapprehends
concept of overbreadth.
A statute may be said to be overbroad where it operates to inhibit the exercise of individual freedoms affirmatively guaranteed by the Constitution, such as
the freedom of speech or religion. A generally worded statute, when construed to punish conduct which cannot be constitutionally punished is
unconstitutionally vague to the extent that it fails to give adequate warning of the boundary between the constitutionally permissible and the
constitutionally impermissible applications of the statute.[26]
In Blo Umpar Adiong vs. Commission on Elections,[27] for instance, we struck down as void for overbreadth provisions prohibiting the posting of election
propaganda in any place including private vehicles other than in the common poster areas sanctioned by the COMELEC. We held that the challenged
provisions not only deprived the owner of the vehicle the use of his property but also deprived the citizen of his right to free speech and information. The
prohibition in Adiong, therefore, was so broad that it covered even constitutionally guaranteed rights and, hence, void for overbreadth. In the present case,
however, appellant did not even specify what constitutionally protected freedoms are embraced by the definition of recruitment and placement that would
render the same constitutionally overbroad.
Appellant also invokes the equal protection clause[28] in her defense. She points out that although the evidence purportedly shows that Jasmine Alejandro
handed out application forms and even received Lourdes Modestos payment, appellant was the only one criminally charged. Alejandro, on the other hand,
remained scot-free. From this, appellant concludes that the prosecution discriminated against her on grounds of regional origins. Appellant is a Cebuana
while Alejandro is a Zamboanguea, and the alleged crime took place in Zamboanga City.
The argument has no merit.
At the outset, it may be stressed that courts are not confined to the language of the statute under challenge in determining whether that statute has any
discriminatory effect. A statute nondiscriminatory on its face may be grossly discriminatory in its operation.[29] Though the law itself be fair on its face
and impartial in appearance, yet, if it is applied and administered by public authority with an evil eye and unequal hand, so as practically to make unjust
and illegal discriminations between persons in similar circumstances, material to their rights, the denial of equal justice is still within the prohibition of the
Constitution.[30]
The prosecution of one guilty person while others equally guilty are not prosecuted, however, is not, by itself, a denial of the equal protection of the laws.
[31] Where the official action purports to be in conformity to the statutory classification, an erroneous or mistaken performance of the statutory duty,
although a violation of the statute, is not without more a denial of the equal protection of the laws.[32] The unlawful administration by officers of a statute
fair on its face, resulting in its unequal application to those who are entitled to be treated alike, is not a denial of equal protection unless there is shown to
be present in it an element of intentional or purposeful discrimination. This may appear on the face of the action taken with respect to a particular class or
person, or it may only be shown by extrinsic evidence showing a discriminatory design over another not to be inferred from the action itself. But a
discriminatory purpose is not presumed, there must be a showing of clear and intentional discrimination.[33] Appellant has failed to show that, in
charging appellant in court, that there was a clear and intentional discrimination on the part of the prosecuting officials.
The discretion of who to prosecute depends on the prosecutions sound assessment whether the evidence before it can justify a reasonable belief that a
person has committed an offense.[34] The presumption is that the prosecuting officers regularly performed their duties,[35] and this presumption can be
overcome only by proof to the contrary, not by mere speculation. Indeed, appellant has not presented any evidence to overcome this presumption. The mere
allegation that appellant, a Cebuana, was charged with the commission of a crime, while a Zamboanguea, the guilty party in appellants eyes, was not, is
insufficient to support a conclusion that the prosecution officers denied appellant equal protection of the laws.
There is also common sense practicality in sustaining appellants prosecution.
While all persons accused of crime are to be treated on a basis of equality before the law, it does not follow that they are to be protected in the commission
of crime. It would be unconscionable, for instance, to excuse a defendant guilty of murder because others have murdered with impunity. The remedy for
unequal enforcement of the law in such instances does not lie in the exoneration of the guilty at the expense of society x x x. Protection of the law will be
extended to all persons equally in the pursuit of their lawful occupations, but no person has the right to demand protection of the law in the commission of
a crime.[36]
Likewise,
[i]f the failure of prosecutors to enforce the criminal laws as to some persons should be converted into a defense for others charged with crime, the result
would be that the trial of the district attorney for nonfeasance would become an issue in the trial of many persons charged with heinous crimes and the
enforcement of law would suffer a complete breakdown.[37]
We now come to the third, fourth and fifth assigned errors, all of which involve the finding of guilt by the trial court.
Illegal recruitment is committed when two elements concur. First, the offender has no valid license or authority required by law to enable one to lawfully
engage in recruitment and placement of workers. Second, he or she undertakes either any activity within the meaning of recruitment and placement defined
under Article 13 (b), or any prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34 of the Labor Code.[38] In case of illegal recruitment in large scale, a third
element is added: that the accused commits said acts against three or more persons, individually or as a group.[39]
In this case, the first element is present. The certification of POEA Officer-in-Charge Macarulay states that appellant is not licensed or authorized to engage
in recruitment and placement.
The second element is also present. Appellant is presumed engaged in recruitment and placement under Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code. Both Nancy
Araneta and Lourdes Modesto testified that appellant promised them employment for a fee. Their testimonies corroborate each other on material points: the
briefing conducted by appellant, the time and place thereof, the fees involved. Appellant has not shown that these witnesses were incited by any motive to
testify falsely against her. The absence of evidence as to an improper motive actuating the principal witnesses of the prosecution strongly tends to sustain
that no improper motive existed and that their testimony is worthy of full faith and credence.[40]
Appellants denials cannot prevail over the positive declaration of the prosecution witnesses. Affirmative testimony of persons who are eyewitnesses of the
fact asserted easily overrides negative testimony.[41]
That appellant did not receive any payment for the promised or offered employment is of no moment. From the language of the statute, the act of
recruitment may be for profit or not; it suffices that the accused promises or offers for a fee employment to warrant conviction for illegal recruitment.
The testimonies of Araneta and Modesto, coming as they do from credible witnesses, meet the standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt that appellant
committed recruitment and placement. We therefore do not deem it necessary to delve into the second and third assigned errors assailing the legality of
appellants arrest and the seizure of the application forms. A warrantless arrest, when unlawful, has the effect of invalidating the search incidental thereto
and the articles so seized are rendered inadmissible in evidence.[42] Here, even if the documents seized were deemed inadmissible, her conviction would
stand in view of Araneta and Modestos testimonies.
Appellant attempts to cast doubt on the prosecutions case by claiming in her ninth assigned error that Erlie Ramos of the POEA supposedly planted the
application forms. She also assails his character, alleging that he passed himself off as a lawyer, although this was denied by Ramos.
The claim of frame-up, like alibi, is a defense that has been invariably viewed by the Court with disfavor for it can easily be concocted but difficult to
prove.[43] Apart from her self-serving testimony, appellant has not offered any evidence that she was indeed framed by Ramos. She has not even hinted at
any motive for Ramos to frame her. Law enforcers are presumed to have performed their duties regularly in the absence of evidence to the contrary.[44]
Considering that the two elements of lack of license or authority and the undertaking of an activity constituting recruitment and placement are present,
appellant, at the very least, is liable for simple illegal recruitment. But is she guilty of illegal recruitment in large scale? We find that she is not.
A conviction for large scale illegal recruitment must be based on a finding in each case of illegal recruitment of three or more persons whether individually
or as a group.[45] In this case, only two persons, Araneta and Modesto, were proven to have been recruited by appellant. The third person named in the
complaint as having been promised employment for a fee, Jennelyn Baez, was not presented in court to testify.
It is true that law does not require that at least three victims testify at the trial; nevertheless, it is necessary that there is sufficient evidence proving that the
offense was committed against three or more persons.[46] In this case, evidence that appellant likewise promised her employment for a fee is sketchy. The
only evidence that tends to prove this fact is the testimony of Nancy Araneta, who said that she and her friends, Baez and Sandra Aquino, came to the
briefing and that they (she and her friends) filled up application forms.
The affidavit[47] Baez executed jointly with Araneta cannot support Aranetas testimony. The affidavit was neither identified, nor its contents affirmed, by
Baez. Insofar as it purports to prove that appellant recruited Baez, therefore, the affidavit is hearsay and inadmissible.[48] In any case, hearsay evidence,
such as the said affidavit, has little probative value.[49]
Neither can appellant be convicted for recruiting CIS agent Eileen Fermindoza or even the other persons present in the briefing of January 30, 1994.
Appellant is accused of recruiting only the three persons named in the information Araneta, Modesto and Baez. The information does not include
Fermindoza or the other persons present in the briefing as among those promised or offered employment for a fee. To convict appellant for the recruitment
and placement of persons other than those alleged to have been offered or promised employment for a fee would violate her right to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against her.[50]
In any event, the purpose of the offer of the testimonies of Araneta, Morales and Fermindoza, respectively, was limited as follows:
FISCAL BELDUA:
Your Honor please, we are offering the oral testimony of the witness, as one of those recruited by the accused, and also to identify some exhibits for the
prosecution and as well as to identify the accused.[51]
xxx
FISCAL BELDUA:
We are offering the oral testimony of the witness, Your Honor, to testify on the fact about her recruitment by the accused and immediately before the
recruitment, as well as to identify some exhibits for the prosecution, and also the accused in this case, Your Honor.[52]
xxx
FISCAL BELDUA:
This witness is going to testify that at around that date Your Honor, she was connected with the CIS, that she was instructed together with a companion to
conduct a surveillance on the place where the illegal recruitment was supposed to be going on, that she acted as an applicant, Your Honor, to ascertain the
truthfulness of the illegal recruitment going on, to identify the accused, as well as to identify some exhibits for the prosecution.[53]
xxx
Courts may consider a piece of evidence only for the purpose for which it was offered,[54] and the purpose of the offer of their testimonies did not include
the proving of the purported recruitment of other supposed applicants by appellant.
Appellant claims in her seventh assigned error that the information is fatally defective since it charges her with committing illegal recruitment in large scale
on January 30, 1994 while the prosecution evidence supposedly indicates that she committed the crime on February 2, 1994.
We find that the evidence for the prosecution regarding the date of the commission of the crime does not vary from that charged in the information. Both
Nancy Araneta and Lourdes Modesto testified that on January 30, 1994, while in the Alejandro residence, appellant offered them employment for a fee.
Thus, while the arrest was effected only on February 2, 1994, the crime had already been committed three (3) days earlier on January 30, 1994.
The eighth and tenth assigned errors, respectively, pertain to the penalty of life imprisonment imposed by the trial court as well as the constitutionality of
the law prescribing the same, appellant arguing that it is unconstitutional for being unduly harsh.[55]
The penalty of life imprisonment imposed upon appellant must be reduced. Because the prosecution was able to prove that appellant committed
recruitment and placement against two persons only, she cannot be convicted of illegal recruitment in large scale, which requires that recruitment be
committed against three or more persons. Appellant can only be convicted of two counts of simple illegal recruitment, one for that committed against
Nancy Araneta, and another count for that committed against Lourdes Modesto. Appellant is sentenced, for each count, to suffer the penalty of four (4) to
six (6) years of imprisonment and to pay a fine of P30,000.00. This renders immaterial the tenth assigned error, which assumes that the proper imposable
penalty upon appellant is life imprisonment.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the regional trial court is MODIFIED. Appellant is hereby declared guilty of illegal recruitment on two (2) counts and is
sentenced, for each count, to suffer the penalty of four (4) to six (6) years of imprisonment and to pay a fine of P30,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Pardo, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

[1] Records, p. 1.
[2] Id., at 28.
[3] TSN, July 11, 1994, pp. 3-13, 26-39.
[4] TSN, July 12, 1994, pp. 7-14, 35-56, 82-88, 102-110.
[5] The documents seized include: Exhibit C, the application form of one Josilyn Villa, consisting of four (4) pages; Exhibit D, the application form of one
Shirley Estrada, consisting of nine (9) pages; Exhibit E, the application form of one Cora Iglesia, with an annex of nine (9) pages; Exhibit F, the application
form of Jocelyn Santos. Exhibit G, the application form of Jennifer Alejandro; Exhibit H, the application form of one Geraldine Reyes; Exhibit I, the
application form of Lilibeth Estrada, consisting of six (6) pages; Exhibit J, is the application form of Geraldine Sunga; Exhibit K, is the diploma of Shirley
Estrada, together with a photocopy of her passport; Exhibit L, a certification that Jasmine Alejandro rendered services as Staff Nurse with the Camp
Navarro General Hospital.
[6] TSN, July 12, 1994, pp. 88-101, 110-124.
[7] TSN, July 12, 1994, pp. 28-34.
[8] TSN, July 11, 1994, pp. 18-19; TSN, July 12, 1994, p. 18.
[9] TSN, July 11, 1994, pp. 21-22.
[10] Exhibit A.
[11] Exhibits M and N. Araneta and Baez executed a Joint Affidavit.
[12] TSN, August 15, 1994, pp. 4-18.
[13] Id., at 21-35.
[14] TSN, September 19, 1994, pp. 5-39.
[15] TSN, September 28, 1994, pp. 4-8.
[16] TSN, October 13, 1994, pp. 2-7.
[17] Decision of the Regional Trial Court, p. 24.
[18] Brief for the Accused-Appellant, pp. 1-4.
[19] Constitution, Article III, Section 1.
[20] Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 US 385, 70 L Ed 322 46 S Ct 126 (1926).
[21] Colautti v. Franklin, 439 US 379, 58 L Ed 2d 596, 99 S Ct 675 (1979).
[22] American Communications Asso. v. Douds, 339 US 382, 94 L Ed 925, 70 S Ct 674 (1950).
[23] 165 SCRA 186 (1988).
[24] 142 SCRA 664 (1986).
[25] People vs. Rosenthal and Osmea, 68 Phil. 328 (1939).
[26] Wright vs. Georgia, 373 US 284, 10 L Ed 2d 349, 83 S Ct 1240 (1963).
[27] 207 SCRA 712 (1992).
[28] Constitution, Article III, Section 1.
[29] American Motorists Ins. Co. v. Starnes, 425 US 637, 48 L Ed 2d 263, 96 S Ct 1800 (1976).
[30] Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 US 356, 30 L Ed 1012, 18 S Ct 583 (1886), cited in Genaro Reyes Construction, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals, 234 SCRA 16
(1994).
[31] Application of Finn, 356 P.2d 685 (1960).
[32] Snowden v. Hughes, 321 US 1, 88 L Ed 497, 64 S Ct 397 (1943).
[33] Ibid.
[34] Tan, Jr. vs. Sandiganbayan (Third Division), 292 SCRA 452 (1998).
[35] Rules Of Court, Rule 131, Sec. 5 (m).
[36] People v. Montgomery, 117 P.2d 437 (1941).
[37] State v. Hicks, 325 P.2d 794 (1958).
[38] Abaca vs. Court of Appeals, 290 SCRA 657 (1998); Darvin vs. Court of Appeals, 292 SCRA 534 (1998); People vs. Juego, 298 SCRA 22 (1998).
[39] People vs. Benedictus, 288 SCRA 319 (1998); People vs. Sadiosa, 290 SCRA 92 (1998); People vs. Sanchez, 291 SCRA 333 (1998); People vs. Saley,
291 SCRA 715 (1998); People vs. Ganaden, 299 SCRA 433 (1998).
[40] People vs. Badozo, 215 SCRA 33 (1992).
[41] People vs. Santos, 276 SCRA 329 (1997).
[42] E.g., Espano vs. Court of Appeals, 288 SCRA 558 (1998)
[43] Espano vs. Court of Appeals, supra; People vs. Alegro, 275 SCRA 216 (1997).
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 148560. November 19, 2001]
JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (Third Division) and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
BELLOSILLO, J.:
JOHN STUART MILL, in his essay On Liberty, unleashes the full fury of his pen in defense of the rights of the individual from the vast powers of the
State and the inroads of societal pressure. But even as he draws a sacrosanct line demarcating the limits on individuality beyond which the State cannot
tread - asserting that "individual spontaneity" must be allowed to flourish with very little regard to social interference - he veritably acknowledges that the
exercise of rights and liberties is imbued with a civic obligation, which society is justified in enforcing at all cost, against those who would endeavor to
withhold fulfillment. Thus he says -
The sole end for which mankind is warranted, individually or collectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection.
The only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.
Parallel to individual liberty is the natural and illimitable right of the State to self-preservation. With the end of maintaining the integrity and cohesiveness
of the body politic, it behooves the State to formulate a system of laws that would compel obeisance to its collective wisdom and inflict punishment for
non-observance.
The movement from Mill's individual liberalism to unsystematic collectivism wrought changes in the social order, carrying with it a new formulation of
fundamental rights and duties more attuned to the imperatives of contemporary socio-political ideologies. In the process, the web of rights and State
impositions became tangled and obscured, enmeshed in threads of multiple shades and colors, the skein irregular and broken. Antagonism, often outright
collision, between the law as the expression of the will of the State, and the zealous attempts by its members to preserve their individuality and dignity,
inevitably followed. It is when individual rights are pitted against State authority that judicial conscience is put to its severest test.
Petitioner Joseph Ejercito Estrada, the highest-ranking official to be prosecuted under RA 7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder),[1]
as amended by RA 7659,[2] wishes to impress upon us that the assailed law is so defectively fashioned that it crosses that thin but distinct line which
divides the valid from the constitutionally infirm. He therefore makes a stringent call for this Court to subject the Plunder Law to the crucible of
constitutionality mainly because, according to him, (a) it suffers from the vice of vagueness; (b) it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in
criminal prosecutions; and, (c) it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal Code, all of which are
purportedly clear violations of the fundamental rights of the accused to due process and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him.
Specifically, the provisions of the Plunder Law claimed by petitioner to have transgressed constitutional boundaries are Secs. 1, par. (d), 2 and 4 which are
reproduced hereunder:
Section 1. x x x x (d) "Ill-gotten wealth" means any asset, property, business, enterprise or material possession of any person within the purview of Section
Two (2) hereof, acquired by him directly or indirectly through dummies, nominees, agents, subordinates and/or business associates by any combination or
series of the following means or similar schemes:
(1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids on the public treasury;
(2) By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage, kickbacks or any other form of pecuniary benefit from any person and/or
entity in connection with any government contract or project or by reason of the office or position of the public office concerned;
(3) By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the National Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies or
instrumentalities, or government owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries;
(4) By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any other form of interest or participation including the
promise of future employment in any business enterprise or undertaking;
(5) By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other combinations and/or implementation of decrees and orders intended to
benefit particular persons or special interests; or
(6) By taking advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection or influence to unjustly enrich himself or themselves at the expense and to
the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines.
Section 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder, Penalties. - Any public officer who, by himself or in connivance with members of his family, relatives by
affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons, amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a combination or
series of overt or criminal acts as described in Section 1 (d) hereof, in the aggregate amount or total value of at least fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00)
shall be guilty of the crime of plunder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death. Any person who participated with the said public officer in the
commission of an offense contributing to the crime of plunder shall likewise be punished for such offense. In the imposition of penalties, the degree of
participation and the attendance of mitigating and extenuating circumstances as provided by the Revised Penal Code shall be considered by the court. The
court shall declare any and all ill-gotten wealth and their interests and other incomes and assets including the properties and shares of stocks derived from
the deposit or investment thereof forfeited in favor of the State (underscoring supplied).
Section 4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it shall not be necessary to prove each and every criminal act done by
the accused in furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth, it being sufficient to establish beyond
reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy (underscoring supplied).
On 4 April 2001 the Office of the Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan eight (8) separate Informations, docketed as: (a) Crim. Case No. 26558, for
violation of RA 7080, as amended by RA 7659; (b) Crim. Cases Nos. 26559 to 26562, inclusive, for violation of Secs. 3, par. (a), 3, par. (a), 3, par. (e) and
3, par. (e), of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), respectively; (c) Crim. Case No. 26563, for violation of Sec. 7, par. (d), of RA 6713 (The
Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees); (d) Crim. Case No. 26564, for Perjury (Art. 183 of The Revised Penal Code);
and, (e) Crim. Case No. 26565, for Illegal Use Of An Alias (CA No. 142, as amended by RA 6085).
On 11 April 2001 petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion for the remand of the case to the Ombudsman for preliminary investigation with respect to
specification "d" of the charges in the Information in Crim. Case No. 26558; and, for reconsideration/reinvestigation of the offenses under specifications
"a," "b," and "c" to give the accused an opportunity to file counter-affidavits and other documents necessary to prove lack of probable cause. Noticeably,
the grounds raised were only lack of preliminary investigation, reconsideration/reinvestigation of offenses, and opportunity to prove lack of probable cause.
The purported ambiguity of the charges and the vagueness of the law under which they are charged were never raised in that Omnibus Motion thus
indicating the explicitness and comprehensibility of the Plunder Law.
On 25 April 2001 the Sandiganbayan, Third Division, issued a Resolution in Crim. Case No. 26558 finding that "a probable cause for the offense of
PLUNDER exists to justify the issuance of warrants for the arrest of the accused." On 25 June 2001 petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied by
the Sandiganbayan.
On 14 June 2001 petitioner moved to quash the Information in Crim. Case No. 26558 on the ground that the facts alleged therein did not constitute an
indictable offense since the law on which it was based was unconstitutional for vagueness, and that the Amended Information for Plunder charged more
than one (1) offense. On 21 June 2001 the Government filed its Opposition to the Motion to Quash, and five (5) days later or on 26 June 2001 petitioner
submitted his Reply to the Opposition. On 9 July 2001 the Sandiganbayan denied petitioner's Motion to Quash.
As concisely delineated by this Court during the oral arguments on 18 September 2001, the issues for resolution in the instant petition for certiorari are: (a)
The Plunder Law is unconstitutional for being vague; (b) The Plunder Law requires less evidence for proving the predicate crimes of plunder and therefore
violates the rights of the accused to due process; and, (c) Whether Plunder as defined in RA 7080 is a malum prohibitum, and if so, whether it is within the
power of Congress to so classify it.
Preliminarily, the whole gamut of legal concepts pertaining to the validity of legislation is predicated on the basic principle that a legislative measure is
presumed to be in harmony with the Constitution.[3] Courts invariably train their sights on this fundamental rule whenever a legislative act is under a
constitutional attack, for it is the postulate of constitutional adjudication. This strong predilection for constitutionality takes its bearings on the idea that it is
forbidden for one branch of the government to encroach upon the duties and powers of another. Thus it has been said that the presumption is based on the
deference the judicial branch accords to its coordinate branch - the legislature.
If there is any reasonable basis upon which the legislation may firmly rest, the courts must assume that the legislature is ever conscious of the borders and
edges of its plenary powers, and has passed the law with full knowledge of the facts and for the purpose of promoting what is right and advancing the
welfare of the majority. Hence in determining whether the acts of the legislature are in tune with the fundamental law, courts should proceed with judicial
restraint and act with caution and forbearance. Every intendment of the law must be adjudged by the courts in favor of its constitutionality, invalidity being
a measure of last resort. In construing therefore the provisions of a statute, courts must first ascertain whether an interpretation is fairly possible to sidestep
the question of constitutionality.
In La Union Credit Cooperative, Inc. v. Yaranon[4] we held that as long as there is some basis for the decision of the court, the constitutionality of the
challenged law will not be touched and the case will be decided on other available grounds. Yet the force of the presumption is not sufficient to catapult a
fundamentally deficient law into the safe environs of constitutionality. Of course, where the law clearly and palpably transgresses the hallowed domain of
the organic law, it must be struck down on sight lest the positive commands of the fundamental law be unduly eroded.
Verily, the onerous task of rebutting the presumption weighs heavily on the party challenging the validity of the statute. He must demonstrate beyond any
tinge of doubt that there is indeed an infringement of the constitution, for absent such a showing, there can be no finding of unconstitutionality. A doubt,
even if well-founded, will hardly suffice. As tersely put by Justice Malcolm, "To doubt is to sustain."[5] And petitioner has miserably failed in the instant
case to discharge his burden and overcome the presumption of constitutionality of the Plunder Law.
As it is written, the Plunder Law contains ascertainable standards and well-defined parameters which would enable the accused to determine the nature of
his violation. Section 2 is sufficiently explicit in its description of the acts, conduct and conditions required or forbidden, and prescribes the elements of the
crime with reasonable certainty and particularity. Thus -
1. That the offender is a public officer who acts by himself or in connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business
associates, subordinates or other persons;
2. That he amassed, accumulated or acquired ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of the following overt or criminal acts: (a) through
misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids on the public treasury; (b) by receiving, directly or indirectly, any
commission, gift, share, percentage, kickback or any other form of pecuniary benefits from any person and/or entity in connection with any government
contract or project or by reason of the office or position of the public officer; (c) by the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging
to the National Government or any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities of Government owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries;
(d) by obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any other form of interest or participation including the
promise of future employment in any business enterprise or undertaking; (e) by establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other
combinations and/or implementation of decrees and orders intended to benefit particular persons or special interests; or (f) by taking advantage of official
position, authority, relationship, connection or influence to unjustly enrich himself or themselves at the expense and to the damage and prejudice of the
Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines; and,
3. That the aggregate amount or total value of the ill-gotten wealth amassed, accumulated or acquired is at least P50,000,000.00.
As long as the law affords some comprehensible guide or rule that would inform those who are subject to it what conduct would render them liable to its
penalties, its validity will be sustained. It must sufficiently guide the judge in its application; the counsel, in defending one charged with its violation; and
more importantly, the accused, in identifying the realm of the proscribed conduct. Indeed, it can be understood with little difficulty that what the assailed
statute punishes is the act of a public officer in amassing or accumulating ill-gotten wealth of at least P50,000,000.00 through a series or combination of
acts enumerated in Sec. 1, par. (d), of the Plunder Law.
In fact, the amended Information itself closely tracks the language of the law, indicating with reasonable certainty the various elements of the offense
which petitioner is alleged to have committed:
"The undersigned Ombudsman, Prosecutor and OIC-Director, EPIB, Office of the Ombudsman, hereby accuses former PRESIDENT OF THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Joseph Ejercito Estrada, a.k.a. 'ASIONG SALONGA' and a.k.a. 'JOSE VELARDE,' together with Jose 'Jinggoy'
Estrada, Charlie 'Atong' Ang, Edward Serapio, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Alma Alfaro, JOHN DOE a.k.a. Eleuterio Tan OR Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy,
Jane Doe a.k.a. Delia Rajas, and John DOES & Jane Does, of the crime of Plunder, defined and penalized under R.A. No. 7080, as amended by Sec. 12 of
R.A. No. 7659, committed as follows:
That during the period from June, 1998 to January 2001, in the Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Joseph Ejercito
Estrada, THEN A PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, by himself AND/OR in CONNIVANCE/CONSPIRACY with his co-
accused, WHO ARE MEMBERS OF HIS FAMILY, RELATIVES BY AFFINITY OR CONSANGUINITY, BUSINESS ASSOCIATES,
SUBORDINATES AND/OR OTHER PERSONS, BY TAKING UNDUE ADVANTAGE OF HIS OFFICIAL POSITION, AUTHORITY,
RELATIONSHIP, CONNECTION, OR INFLUENCE, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally amass, accumulate and acquire BY
HIMSELF, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount or TOTAL VALUE of FOUR BILLION NINETY SEVEN
MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS
(P4,097,804,173.17), more or less, THEREBY UNJUSTLY ENRICHING HIMSELF OR THEMSELVES AT THE EXPENSE AND TO THE
DAMAGE OF THE FILIPINO PEOPLE AND THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, through ANY OR A combination OR A series of overt
OR criminal acts, OR SIMILAR SCHEMES OR MEANS, described as follows:
(a) by receiving OR collecting, directly or indirectly, on SEVERAL INSTANCES, MONEY IN THE AGGREGATE AMOUNT OF FIVE HUNDRED
FORTY-FIVE MILLION PESOS (P545,000,000.00), MORE OR LESS, FROM ILLEGAL GAMBLING IN THE FORM OF GIFT, SHARE,
PERCENTAGE, KICKBACK OR ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY BENEFIT, BY HIMSELF AND/OR in connection with co-accused CHARLIE
'ATONG' ANG, Jose 'Jinggoy' Estrada, Yolanda T. Ricaforte, Edward Serapio, AND JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, in consideration OF
TOLERATION OR PROTECTION OF ILLEGAL GAMBLING;
(b) by DIVERTING, RECEIVING, misappropriating, converting OR misusing DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, for HIS OR THEIR PERSONAL
gain and benefit, public funds in the amount of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY MILLION PESOS (P130,000,000.00), more or less, representing a portion of
the TWO HUNDRED MILLION PESOS (P200,000,000.00) tobacco excise tax share allocated for the province of Ilocos Sur under R.A. No. 7171, by
himself and/or in connivance with co-accused Charlie 'Atong' Ang, Alma Alfaro, JOHN DOE a.k.a. Eleuterio Ramos Tan or Mr. Uy, Jane Doe a.k.a.
Delia Rajas, AND OTHER JOHN DOES & JANE DOES; (italic supplied).
(c) by directing, ordering and compelling, FOR HIS PERSONAL GAIN AND BENEFIT, the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) TO
PURCHASE 351,878,000 SHARES OF STOCKS, MORE OR LESS, and the Social Security System (SSS), 329,855,000 SHARES OF STOCK,
MORE OR LESS, OF THE BELLE CORPORATION IN THE AMOUNT OF MORE OR LESS ONE BILLION ONE HUNDRED TWO
MILLION NINE HUNDRED SIXTY FIVE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS ( P1,102,965,607.50) AND
MORE OR LESS SEVEN HUNDRED FORTY FOUR MILLION SIX HUNDRED TWELVE THOUSAND AND FOUR HUNDRED FIFTY
PESOS (P744,612,450.00), RESPECTIVELY, OR A TOTAL OF MORE OR LESS ONE BILLION EIGHT HUNDRED FORTY SEVEN
MILLION FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTY EIGHT THOUSAND FIFTY SEVEN PESOS AND FIFTY CENTAVOS ( P1,847,578,057.50); AND BY
COLLECTING OR RECEIVING, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, BY HIMSELF AND/OR IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND JANE
DOES, COMMISSIONS OR PERCENTAGES BY REASON OF SAID PURCHASES OF SHARES OF STOCK IN THE AMOUNT OF ONE
HUNDRED EIGHTY NINE MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS ( P189,700,000.00) MORE OR LESS, FROM THE BELLE
CORPORATION WHICH BECAME PART OF THE DEPOSIT IN THE EQUITABLE-PCI BANK UNDER THE ACCOUNT NAME 'JOSE
VELARDE;'
(d) by unjustly enriching himself FROM COMMISSIONS, GIFTS, SHARES, PERCENTAGES, KICKBACKS, OR ANY FORM OF PECUNIARY
BENEFITS, IN CONNIVANCE WITH JOHN DOES AND JANE DOES, in the amount of MORE OR LESS THREE BILLION TWO HUNDRED
THIRTY THREE MILLION ONE HUNDRED FOUR THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY THREE PESOS AND SEVENTEEN CENTAVOS
(P3,233,104,173.17) AND DEPOSITING THE SAME UNDER HIS ACCOUNT NAME 'JOSE VELARDE' AT THE EQUITABLE-PCI BANK."
We discern nothing in the foregoing that is vague or ambiguous - as there is obviously none - that will confuse petitioner in his defense. Although subject to
proof, these factual assertions clearly show that the elements of the crime are easily understood and provide adequate contrast between the innocent and the
prohibited acts. Upon such unequivocal assertions, petitioner is completely informed of the accusations against him as to enable him to prepare for an
intelligent defense.
Petitioner, however, bewails the failure of the law to provide for the statutory definition of the terms "combination" and "series" in the key phrase "a
combination or series of overt or criminal acts" found in Sec. 1, par. (d), and Sec. 2, and the word "pattern" in Sec. 4. These omissions, according to
petitioner, render the Plunder Law unconstitutional for being impermissibly vague and overbroad and deny him the right to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him, hence, violative of his fundamental right to due process.
The rationalization seems to us to be pure sophistry. A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because general terms are used therein, or because
of the employment of terms without defining them;[6] much less do we have to define every word we use. Besides, there is no positive constitutional or
statutory command requiring the legislature to define each and every word in an enactment. Congress is not restricted in the form of expression of its will,
and its inability to so define the words employed in a statute will not necessarily result in the vagueness or ambiguity of the law so long as the legislative
will is clear, or at least, can be gathered from the whole act, which is distinctly expressed in the Plunder Law.
Moreover, it is a well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics that words of a statute will be interpreted in their natural, plain and ordinary acceptation and
signification,[7] unless it is evident that the legislature intended a technical or special legal meaning to those words.[8] The intention of the lawmakers -
who are, ordinarily, untrained philologists and lexicographers - to use statutory phraseology in such a manner is always presumed. Thus, Webster's New
Collegiate Dictionary contains the following commonly accepted definition of the words "combination" and "series:"
Combination - the result or product of combining; the act or process of combining. To combine is to bring into such close relationship as to obscure
individual characters.
Series - a number of things or events of the same class coming one after another in spatial and temporal succession.
That Congress intended the words "combination" and "series" to be understood in their popular meanings is pristinely evident from the legislative
deliberations on the bill which eventually became RA 7080 or the Plunder Law:
DELIBERATIONS OF THE BICAMERAL COMMITTEE ON JUSTICE, 7 May 1991
REP. ISIDRO: I am just intrigued again by our definition of plunder. We say THROUGH A COMBINATION OR SERIES OF OVERT OR CRIMINAL ACTS
AS MENTIONED IN SECTION ONE HEREOF. Now when we say combination, we actually mean to say, if there are two or more means, we mean to say
that number one and two or number one and something else are included, how about a series of the same act? For example, through misappropriation,
conversion, misuse, will these be included also?
REP. GARCIA: Yeah, because we say a series.
REP. ISIDRO: Series.
REP. GARCIA: Yeah, we include series.
REP. ISIDRO: But we say we begin with a combination.
REP. GARCIA: Yes.
REP. ISIDRO: When we say combination, it seems that -
REP. GARCIA: Two.
REP. ISIDRO: Not only two but we seem to mean that two of the enumerated means not twice of one enumeration.
REP. GARCIA: No, no, not twice.
REP. ISIDRO: Not twice?
REP. GARCIA: Yes. Combination is not twice - but combination, two acts.
REP. ISIDRO: So in other words, thats it. When we say combination, we mean, two different acts. It cannot be a repetition of the same act.
REP. GARCIA: That be referred to series, yeah.
REP. ISIDRO: No, no. Supposing one act is repeated, so there are two.
REP. GARCIA: A series.
REP. ISIDRO: Thats not series. Its a combination. Because when we say combination or series, we seem to say that two or more, di ba?
REP. GARCIA: Yes, this distinguishes it really from ordinary crimes. That is why, I said, that is a very good suggestion because if it is only one act, it may
fall under ordinary crime but we have here a combination or series of overt or criminal acts. So x x x x
REP. GARCIA: Series. One after the other eh di....
SEN. TANADA: So that would fall under the term series?
REP. GARCIA: Series, oo.
REP. ISIDRO: Now, if it is a combination, ano, two misappropriations....
REP. GARCIA: Its not... Two misappropriations will not be combination. Series.
REP. ISIDRO: So, it is not a combination?
REP. GARCIA: Yes.
REP. ISIDRO: When you say combination, two different?
REP. GARCIA: Yes.
SEN. TANADA: Two different.
REP. ISIDRO: Two different acts.
REP. GARCIA: For example, ha...
REP. ISIDRO: Now a series, meaning, repetition...
DELIBERATIONS ON SENATE BILL NO. 733, 6 June 1989
SENATOR MACEDA: In line with our interpellations that sometimes one or maybe even two acts may already result in such a big amount, on line 25,
would the Sponsor consider deleting the words a series of overt or, to read, therefore: or conspiracy COMMITTED by criminal acts such as. Remove the
idea of necessitating a series. Anyway, the criminal acts are in the plural.
SENATOR TANADA: That would mean a combination of two or more of the acts mentioned in this.
THE PRESIDENT: Probably two or more would be....
SENATOR MACEDA: Yes, because a series implies several or many; two or more.
SENATOR TANADA: Accepted, Mr. President x x x x
THE PRESIDENT: If there is only one, then he has to be prosecuted under the particular crime. But when we say acts of plunder there should be, at least,
two or more.
SENATOR ROMULO: In other words, that is already covered by existing laws, Mr. President.
Thus when the Plunder Law speaks of "combination," it is referring to at least two (2) acts falling under different categories of enumeration provided in
Sec. 1, par. (d), e.g., raids on the public treasury in Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (1), and fraudulent conveyance of assets belonging to the National Government
under Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (3).
On the other hand, to constitute a series" there must be two (2) or more overt or criminal acts falling under the same category of enumeration found in Sec.
1, par. (d), say, misappropriation, malversation and raids on the public treasury, all of which fall under Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (1). Verily, had the
legislature intended a technical or distinctive meaning for "combination" and "series," it would have taken greater pains in specifically providing for it in
the law.
As for "pattern," we agree with the observations of the Sandiganbayan[9] that this term is sufficiently defined in Sec. 4, in relation to Sec. 1, par. (d), and
Sec. 2 -
x x x x under Sec. 1 (d) of the law, a 'pattern' consists of at least a combination or series of overt or criminal acts enumerated in subsections (1) to (6) of
Sec. 1 (d). Secondly, pursuant to Sec. 2 of the law, the pattern of overt or criminal acts is directed towards a common purpose or goal which is to enable
the public officer to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth. And thirdly, there must either be an 'overall unlawful scheme' or 'conspiracy' to
achieve said common goal. As commonly understood, the term 'overall unlawful scheme' indicates a 'general plan of action or method' which the principal
accused and public officer and others conniving with him follow to achieve the aforesaid common goal. In the alternative, if there is no such overall
scheme or where the schemes or methods used by multiple accused vary, the overt or criminal acts must form part of a conspiracy to attain a common
goal.
Hence, it cannot plausibly be contended that the law does not give a fair warning and sufficient notice of what it seeks to penalize. Under the
circumstances, petitioner's reliance on the "void-for-vagueness" doctrine is manifestly misplaced. The doctrine has been formulated in various ways, but is
most commonly stated to the effect that a statute establishing a criminal offense must define the offense with sufficient definiteness that persons of ordinary
intelligence can understand what conduct is prohibited by the statute. It can only be invoked against that specie of legislation that is utterly vague on its
face, i.e., that which cannot be clarified either by a saving clause or by construction.
A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning
and differ in its application. In such instance, the statute is repugnant to the Constitution in two (2) respects - it violates due process for failure to accord
persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of what conduct to avoid; and, it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its
provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.[10] But the doctrine does not apply as against legislations that are merely couched
in imprecise language but which nonetheless specify a standard though defectively phrased; or to those that are apparently ambiguous yet fairly applicable
to certain types of activities. The first may be "saved" by proper construction, while no challenge may be mounted as against the second whenever directed
against such activities.[11] With more reason, the doctrine cannot be invoked where the assailed statute is clear and free from ambiguity, as in this case.
The test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for uncertainty is whether the language conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to the
proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practice.[12] It must be stressed, however, that the "vagueness" doctrine merely
requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld - not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude, as petitioner seems to suggest.
Flexibility, rather than meticulous specificity, is permissible as long as the metes and bounds of the statute are clearly delineated. An act will not be held
invalid merely because it might have been more explicit in its wordings or detailed in its provisions, especially where, because of the nature of the act, it
would be impossible to provide all the details in advance as in all other statutes.
Moreover, we agree with, hence we adopt, the observations of Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza during the deliberations of the Court that the allegations that
the Plunder Law is vague and overbroad do not justify a facial review of its validity -
The void-for-vagueness doctrine states that "a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due process of law."[13] The overbreadth
doctrine, on the other hand, decrees that "a governmental purpose may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade
the area of protected freedoms."[14]
A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of possible "chilling effect" upon protected speech. The
theory is that "[w]hen statutes regulate or proscribe speech and no readily apparent construction suggests itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes in
a single prosecution, the transcendent value to all society of constitutionally protected expression is deemed to justify allowing attacks on overly broad
statutes with no requirement that the person making the attack demonstrate that his own conduct could not be regulated by a statute drawn with narrow
specificity."[15] The possible harm to society in permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that the protected
speech of others may be deterred and perceived grievances left to fester because of possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes.
This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have general in terrorem effect resulting from their very existence, and, if facial challenge
is allowed for this reason alone, the State may well be prevented from enacting laws against socially harmful conduct. In the area of criminal law, the law
cannot take chances as in the area of free speech.
The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines then have special application only to free speech cases. They are inapt for testing the validity of penal statutes. As
the U.S. Supreme Court put it, in an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, "we have not recognized an 'overbreadth' doctrine outside the limited context of
the First Amendment."[16] In Broadrick v. Oklahoma,[17] the Court ruled that "claims of facial overbreadth have been entertained in cases involving
statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only spoken words" and, again, that "overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have been curtailed when
invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be applied to protected conduct." For this reason, it has been held that "a facial challenge to a
legislative act is the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the
Act would be valid."[18] As for the vagueness doctrine, it is said that a litigant may challenge a statute on its face only if it is vague in all its possible
applications. "A plaintiff who engages in some conduct that is clearly proscribed cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of
others."[19]
In sum, the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are analytical tools developed for testing "on their faces" statutes in free speech cases
or, as they are called in American law, First Amendment cases. They cannot be made to do service when what is involved is a criminal statute. With respect
to such statute, the established rule is that "one to whom application of a statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on the ground that
impliedly it might also be taken as applying to other persons or other situations in which its application might be unconstitutional."[20] As has been
pointed out, "vagueness challenges in the First Amendment context, like overbreadth challenges typically produce facial invalidation, while statutes found
vague as a matter of due process typically are invalidated [only] 'as applied' to a particular defendant."[21] Consequently, there is no basis for petitioner's
claim that this Court review the Anti-Plunder Law on its face and in its entirety.
Indeed, "on its face" invalidation of statutes results in striking them down entirely on the ground that they might be applied to parties not before the Court
whose activities are constitutionally protected.[22] It constitutes a departure from the case and controversy requirement of the Constitution and permits
decisions to be made without concrete factual settings and in sterile abstract contexts.[23] But, as the U.S. Supreme Court pointed out in Younger v.
Harris[24]
[T]he task of analyzing a proposed statute, pinpointing its deficiencies, and requiring correction of these deficiencies before the statute is put into effect, is
rarely if ever an appropriate task for the judiciary. The combination of the relative remoteness of the controversy, the impact on the legislative process of
the relief sought, and above all the speculative and amorphous nature of the required line-by-line analysis of detailed statutes, . . . ordinarily results in a
kind of case that is wholly unsatisfactory for deciding constitutional questions, whichever way they might be decided.
For these reasons, "on its face" invalidation of statutes has been described as "manifestly strong medicine," to be employed "sparingly and only as a last
resort,"[25] and is generally disfavored.[26] In determining the constitutionality of a statute, therefore, its provisions which are alleged to have been
violated in a case must be examined in the light of the conduct with which the defendant is charged.[27]
In light of the foregoing disquisition, it is evident that the purported ambiguity of the Plunder Law, so tenaciously claimed and argued at length by
petitioner, is more imagined than real. Ambiguity, where none exists, cannot be created by dissecting parts and words in the statute to furnish support to
critics who cavil at the want of scientific precision in the law. Every provision of the law should be construed in relation and with reference to every other
part. To be sure, it will take more than nitpicking to overturn the well-entrenched presumption of constitutionality and validity of the Plunder Law. A
fortiori, petitioner cannot feign ignorance of what the Plunder Law is all about. Being one of the Senators who voted for its passage, petitioner must be
aware that the law was extensively deliberated upon by the Senate and its appropriate committees by reason of which he even registered his affirmative
vote with full knowledge of its legal implications and sound constitutional anchorage.
The parallel case of Gallego v. Sandiganbayan[28] must be mentioned if only to illustrate and emphasize the point that courts are loathed to declare a
statute void for uncertainty unless the law itself is so imperfect and deficient in its details, and is susceptible of no reasonable construction that will support
and give it effect. In that case, petitioners Gallego and Agoncillo challenged the constitutionality of Sec. 3, par. (e), of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act for being vague. Petitioners posited, among others, that the term "unwarranted" is highly imprecise and elastic with no common law meaning
or settled definition by prior judicial or administrative precedents; that, for its vagueness, Sec. 3, par. (e), violates due process in that it does not give fair
warning or sufficient notice of what it seeks to penalize. Petitioners further argued that the Information charged them with three (3) distinct offenses, to wit:
(a) giving of "unwarranted" benefits through manifest partiality; (b) giving of "unwarranted" benefits through evident bad faith; and, (c) giving of
"unwarranted" benefits through gross inexcusable negligence while in the discharge of their official function and that their right to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against them was violated because they were left to guess which of the three (3) offenses, if not all, they were being
charged and prosecuted.
In dismissing the petition, this Court held that Sec. 3, par. (e), of The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act does not suffer from the constitutional defect of
vagueness. The phrases "manifest partiality," "evident bad faith," and "gross and inexcusable negligence" merely describe the different modes by which the
offense penalized in Sec. 3, par. (e), of the statute may be committed, and the use of all these phrases in the same Information does not mean that the
indictment charges three (3) distinct offenses.
The word 'unwarranted' is not uncertain. It seems lacking adequate or official support; unjustified; unauthorized (Webster, Third International Dictionary, p.
2514); or without justification or adequate reason (Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. US Dept. of Justice, C.D. Pa., 405 F. Supp. 8, 12, cited in Words and
Phrases, Permanent Edition, Vol. 43-A 1978, Cumulative Annual Pocket Part, p. 19).
The assailed provisions of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act consider a corrupt practice and make unlawful the act of the public officer in:
x x x or giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official, administrative or judicial functions
through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence, x x x (Section 3 [e], Rep. Act 3019, as amended).
It is not at all difficult to comprehend that what the aforequoted penal provisions penalize is the act of a public officer, in the discharge of his official,
administrative or judicial functions, in giving any private party benefits, advantage or preference which is unjustified, unauthorized or without justification
or adequate reason, through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.
In other words, this Court found that there was nothing vague or ambiguous in the use of the term "unwarranted" in Sec. 3, par. (e), of The Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, which was understood in its primary and general acceptation. Consequently, in that case, petitioners' objection thereto was held
inadequate to declare the section unconstitutional.
On the second issue, petitioner advances the highly stretched theory that Sec. 4 of the Plunder Law circumvents the immutable obligation of the
prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt the predicate acts constituting the crime of plunder when it requires only proof of a pattern of overt or
criminal acts showing unlawful scheme or conspiracy -
SEC. 4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it shall not be necessary to prove each and every criminal act done by the
accused in furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth, it being sufficient to establish beyond reasonable
doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy.
The running fault in this reasoning is obvious even to the simplistic mind. In a criminal prosecution for plunder, as in all other crimes, the accused always
has in his favor the presumption of innocence which is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, and unless the State succeeds in demonstrating by proof beyond
reasonable doubt that culpability lies, the accused is entitled to an acquittal.[29] The use of the "reasonable doubt" standard is indispensable to command
the respect and confidence of the community in the application of criminal law. It is critical that the moral force of criminal law be not diluted by a
standard of proof that leaves people in doubt whether innocent men are being condemned. It is also important in our free society that every individual
going about his ordinary affairs has confidence that his government cannot adjudge him guilty of a criminal offense without convincing a proper factfinder
of his guilt with utmost certainty. This "reasonable doubt" standard has acquired such exalted stature in the realm of constitutional law as it gives life to the
Due Process Clause which protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the
crime with which he is charged.[30] The following exchanges between Rep. Rodolfo Albano and Rep. Pablo Garcia on this score during the deliberations
in the floor of the House of Representatives are elucidating -
DELIBERATIONS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ON RA 7080, 9 October 1990
MR. ALBANO: Now, Mr. Speaker, it is also elementary in our criminal law that what is alleged in the information must be proven beyond reasonable
doubt. If we will prove only one act and find him guilty of the other acts enumerated in the information, does that not work against the right of the accused
especially so if the amount committed, say, by falsification is less than P100 million, but the totality of the crime committed is P100 million since there is
malversation, bribery, falsification of public document, coercion, theft?
MR. GARCIA: Mr. Speaker, not everything alleged in the information needs to be proved beyond reasonable doubt. What is required to be proved beyond
reasonable doubt is every element of the crime charged. For example, Mr. Speaker, there is an enumeration of the things taken by the robber in the
information three pairs of pants, pieces of jewelry. These need not be proved beyond reasonable doubt, but these will not prevent the conviction of a crime
for which he was charged just because, say, instead of 3 pairs of diamond earrings the prosecution proved two. Now, what is required to be proved beyond
reasonable doubt is the element of the offense.
MR. ALBANO: I am aware of that, Mr. Speaker, but considering that in the crime of plunder the totality of the amount is very important, I feel that such a
series of overt criminal acts has to be taken singly. For instance, in the act of bribery, he was able to accumulate only P50,000 and in the crime of
extortion, he was only able to accumulate P1 million. Now, when we add the totality of the other acts as required under this bill through the interpretation
on the rule of evidence, it is just one single act, so how can we now convict him?
MR. GARCIA: With due respect, Mr. Speaker, for purposes of proving an essential element of the crime, there is a need to prove that element beyond
reasonable doubt. For example, one essential element of the crime is that the amount involved is P100 million. Now, in a series of defalcations and other
acts of corruption in the enumeration the total amount would be P110 or P120 million, but there are certain acts that could not be proved, so, we will sum
up the amounts involved in those transactions which were proved. Now, if the amount involved in these transactions, proved beyond reasonable doubt, is
P100 million, then there is a crime of plunder (underscoring supplied).
It is thus plain from the foregoing that the legislature did not in any manner refashion the standard quantum of proof in the crime of plunder. The burden
still remains with the prosecution to prove beyond any iota of doubt every fact or element necessary to constitute the crime.
The thesis that Sec. 4 does away with proof of each and every component of the crime suffers from a dismal misconception of the import of that provision.
What the prosecution needs to prove beyond reasonable doubt is only a number of acts sufficient to form a combination or series which would constitute a
pattern and involving an amount of at least P50,000,000.00. There is no need to prove each and every other act alleged in the Information to have been
committed by the accused in furtherance of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth. To illustrate,
supposing that the accused is charged in an Information for plunder with having committed fifty (50) raids on the public treasury. The prosecution need not
prove all these fifty (50) raids, it being sufficient to prove by pattern at least two (2) of the raids beyond reasonable doubt provided only that they amounted
to at least P50,000,000.00.[31]
A reading of Sec. 2 in conjunction with Sec. 4, brings us to the logical conclusion that "pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful
scheme or conspiracy" inheres in the very acts of accumulating, acquiring or amassing hidden wealth. Stated otherwise, such pattern arises where the
prosecution is able to prove beyond reasonable doubt the predicate acts as defined in Sec. 1, par. (d). Pattern is merely a by-product of the proof of the
predicate acts. This conclusion is consistent with reason and common sense. There would be no other explanation for a combination or series of
overt or criminal acts to stash P50,000,000.00 or more, than "a scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill gotten wealth." The prosecution is
therefore not required to make a deliberate and conscious effort to prove pattern as it necessarily follows with the establishment of a series or combination
of the predicate acts.
Relative to petitioner's contentions on the purported defect of Sec. 4 is his submission that "pattern" is "a very important element of the crime of plunder;"
and that Sec. 4 is "two pronged, (as) it contains a rule of evidence and a substantive element of the crime," such that without it the accused cannot be
convicted of plunder -
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: In other words, cannot an accused be convicted under the Plunder Law without applying Section 4 on the Rule of Evidence if
there is proof beyond reasonable doubt of the commission of the acts complained of?
ATTY. AGABIN: In that case he can be convicted of individual crimes enumerated in the Revised Penal Code, but not plunder.
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: In other words, if all the elements of the crime are proved beyond reasonable doubt without applying Section 4, can you not have
a conviction under the Plunder Law?
ATTY. AGABIN: Not a conviction for plunder, your Honor.
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: Can you not disregard the application of Sec. 4 in convicting an accused charged for violation of the Plunder Law?
ATTY. AGABIN: Well, your Honor, in the first place Section 4 lays down a substantive element of the law x x x x
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: What I said is - do we have to avail of Section 4 when there is proof beyond reasonable doubt on the acts charged constituting
plunder?
ATTY. AGABIN: Yes, your Honor, because Section 4 is two pronged, it contains a rule of evidence and it contains a substantive element of the crime of
plunder. So, there is no way by which we can avoid Section 4.
JUSTICE BELLOSILLO: But there is proof beyond reasonable doubt insofar as the predicate crimes charged are concerned that you do not have to go that
far by applying Section 4?
ATTY. AGABIN: Your Honor, our thinking is that Section 4 contains a very important element of the crime of plunder and that cannot be avoided by the
prosecution.[32]
We do not subscribe to petitioner's stand. Primarily, all the essential elements of plunder can be culled and understood from its definition in Sec. 2, in
relation to Sec. 1, par. (d), and "pattern" is not one of them. Moreover, the epigraph and opening clause of Sec. 4 is clear and unequivocal:
SEC. 4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder x x x x
It purports to do no more than prescribe a rule of procedure for the prosecution of a criminal case for plunder. Being a purely procedural measure, Sec. 4
does not define or establish any substantive right in favor of the accused but only operates in furtherance of a remedy. It is only a means to an end, an aid to
substantive law. Indubitably, even without invoking Sec. 4, a conviction for plunder may be had, for what is crucial for the prosecution is to present
sufficient evidence to engender that moral certitude exacted by the fundamental law to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, even
granting for the sake of argument that Sec. 4 is flawed and vitiated for the reasons advanced by petitioner, it may simply be severed from the rest of the
provisions without necessarily resulting in the demise of the law; after all, the existing rules on evidence can supplant Sec. 4 more than enough. Besides,
Sec. 7 of RA 7080 provides for a separability clause -
Sec. 7. Separability of Provisions. - If any provisions of this Act or the application thereof to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the remaining
provisions of this Act and the application of such provisions to other persons or circumstances shall not be affected thereby.
Implicit in the foregoing section is that to avoid the whole act from being declared invalid as a result of the nullity of some of its provisions, assuming that
to be the case although it is not really so, all the provisions thereof should accordingly be treated independently of each other, especially if by doing so, the
objectives of the statute can best be achieved.
As regards the third issue, again we agree with Justice Mendoza that plunder is a malum in se which requires proof of criminal intent. Thus, he says, in his
Concurring Opinion -
x x x Precisely because the constitutive crimes are mala in se the element of mens rea must be proven in a prosecution for plunder. It is noteworthy that the
amended information alleges that the crime of plunder was committed "willfully, unlawfully and criminally." It thus alleges guilty knowledge on the part of
petitioner.
In support of his contention that the statute eliminates the requirement of mens rea and that is the reason he claims the statute is void, petitioner cites the
following remarks of Senator Taada made during the deliberation on S.B. No. 733:
SENATOR TAADA . . . And the evidence that will be required to convict him would not be evidence for each and every individual criminal act but only
evidence sufficient to establish the conspiracy or scheme to commit this crime of plunder.[33]
However, Senator Taada was discussing 4 as shown by the succeeding portion of the transcript quoted by petitioner:
SENATOR ROMULO: And, Mr. President, the Gentleman feels that it is contained in Section 4, Rule of Evidence, which, in the Gentleman's view, would
provide for a speedier and faster process of attending to this kind of cases?
SENATOR TAADA: Yes, Mr. President . . .[34]
Senator Taada was only saying that where the charge is conspiracy to commit plunder, the prosecution need not prove each and every criminal act done to
further the scheme or conspiracy, it being enough if it proves beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or ciminal acts indicative of the overall unlawful
scheme or conspiracy. As far as the acts constituting the pattern are concerned, however, the elements of the crime must be proved and the requisite mens
rea must be shown.
Indeed, 2 provides that -
Any person who participated with the said public officer in the commission of an offense contributing to the crime of plunder shall likewise be punished
for such offense. In the imposition of penalties, the degree of participation and the attendance of mitigating and extenuating circumstances, as provided by
the Revised Penal Code, shall be considered by the court.
The application of mitigating and extenuating circumstances in the Revised Penal Code to prosecutions under the Anti-Plunder Law indicates quite clearly
that mens rea is an element of plunder since the degree of responsibility of the offender is determined by his criminal intent. It is true that 2 refers to "any
person who participates with the said public officer in the commission of an offense contributing to the crime of plunder." There is no reason to believe,
however, that it does not apply as well to the public officer as principal in the crime. As Justice Holmes said: "We agree to all the generalities about not
supplying criminal laws with what they omit, but there is no canon against using common sense in construing laws as saying what they obviously
mean."[35]
Finally, any doubt as to whether the crime of plunder is a malum in se must be deemed to have been resolved in the affirmative by the decision of Congress
in 1993 to include it among the heinous crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. Other heinous crimes are punished with death as a straight
penalty in R.A. No. 7659. Referring to these groups of heinous crimes, this Court held in People v. Echegaray:[36]
The evil of a crime may take various forms. There are crimes that are, by their very nature, despicable, either because life was callously taken or the victim
is treated like an animal and utterly dehumanized as to completely disrupt the normal course of his or her growth as a human being . . . . Seen in this light,
the capital crimes of kidnapping and serious illegal detention for ransom resulting in the death of the victim or the victim is raped, tortured, or subjected to
dehumanizing acts; destructive arson resulting in death; and drug offenses involving minors or resulting in the death of the victim in the case of other
crimes; as well as murder, rape, parricide, infanticide, kidnapping and serious illegal detention, where the victim is detained for more than three days or
serious physical injuries were inflicted on the victim or threats to kill him were made or the victim is a minor, robbery with homicide, rape or intentional
mutilation, destructive arson, and carnapping where the owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped vehicle is killed or raped, which are penalized by
reclusion perpetua to death, are clearly heinous by their very nature.
There are crimes, however, in which the abomination lies in the significance and implications of the subject criminal acts in the scheme of the larger socio-
political and economic context in which the state finds itself to be struggling to develop and provide for its poor and underprivileged masses. Reeling from
decades of corrupt tyrannical rule that bankrupted the government and impoverished the population, the Philippine Government must muster the political
will to dismantle the culture of corruption, dishonesty, greed and syndicated criminality that so deeply entrenched itself in the structures of society and the
psyche of the populace. [With the government] terribly lacking the money to provide even the most basic services to its people, any form of
misappropriation or misapplication of government funds translates to an actual threat to the very existence of government, and in turn, the very survival of
the people it governs over. Viewed in this context, no less heinous are the effects and repercussions of crimes like qualified bribery, destructive arson
resulting in death, and drug offenses involving government officials, employees or officers, that their perpetrators must not be allowed to cause further
destruction and damage to society.
The legislative declaration in R.A. No. 7659 that plunder is a heinous offense implies that it is a malum in se. For when the acts punished are inherently
immoral or inherently wrong, they are mala in se[37] and it does not matter that such acts are punished in a special law, especially since in the case of
plunder the predicate crimes are mainly mala in se. Indeed, it would be absurd to treat prosecutions for plunder as though they are mere prosecutions for
violations of the Bouncing Check Law (B.P. Blg. 22) or of an ordinance against jaywalking, without regard to the inherent wrongness of the acts.
To clinch, petitioner likewise assails the validity of RA 7659, the amendatory law of RA 7080, on constitutional grounds. Suffice it to say however that it is
now too late in the day for him to resurrect this long dead issue, the same having been eternally consigned by People v. Echegaray[38] to the archives of
jurisprudential history. The declaration of this Court therein that RA 7659 is constitutionally valid stands as a declaration of the State, and becomes, by
necessary effect, assimilated in the Constitution now as an integral part of it.
Our nation has been racked by scandals of corruption and obscene profligacy of officials in high places which have shaken its very foundation. The
anatomy of graft and corruption has become more elaborate in the corridors of time as unscrupulous people relentlessly contrive more and more ingenious
ways to bilk the coffers of the government. Drastic and radical measures are imperative to fight the increasingly sophisticated, extraordinarily methodical
and economically catastrophic looting of the national treasury. Such is the Plunder Law, especially designed to disentangle those ghastly tissues of grand-
scale corruption which, if left unchecked, will spread like a malignant tumor and ultimately consume the moral and institutional fiber of our nation. The
Plunder Law, indeed, is a living testament to the will of the legislature to ultimately eradicate this scourge and thus secure society against the avarice and
other venalities in public office.
These are times that try men's souls. In the checkered history of this nation, few issues of national importance can equal the amount of interest and passion
generated by petitioner's ignominious fall from the highest office, and his eventual prosecution and trial under a virginal statute. This continuing saga has
driven a wedge of dissension among our people that may linger for a long time. Only by responding to the clarion call for patriotism, to rise above
factionalism and prejudices, shall we emerge triumphant in the midst of ferment.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Court holds that RA 7080 otherwise known as the Plunder Law, as amended by RA 7659, is CONSTITUTIONAL.
Consequently, the petition to declare the law unconstitutional is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr. C.J., Melo, Quisumbing, JJ., join concurring opinion of J. Mendoza.
Puno, Vitug, JJ., concurred and joins J. Mendoza's concurring opinion.
Kapunan, Pardo, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Ynares-Santiago, JJ., see dissenting opinion.
Mendoza, J., please see concurring opinion.
Panganiban J., please see separate concurring opinion.
Carpio, J., no part. Was one of the complainants before Ombudsman.

[1] Approved 12 July 1991 and took effect 8 October 1991.

[2] Approved 13 December 1993 and took effect 31 December 1993.
[3] Lim v. Pacquing, et al., G.R. No. 115044, 27 January 1995, 240 SCRA 644.
[4] G.R. No. 87001, 4 December 1989, 179 SCRA 828.
[5] Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 47 Phil. 385, 414 (1925).
[6] 82 C.J.S. 68, p. 113; People v. Ring, 70 P.2d 281, 26 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 768.
[7] Mustang Lumber, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 104988, 18 June 1996, 257 SCRA 430, 448.
[8] PLDT v. Eastern Telecommunications Phil., Inc., G.R. No. 943774, 27 August 1992, 213 SCRA 16, 26.
[9] Resolution of 9 July 2001.
[10] See People v. Nazario, No. L-44143, 31 August 1988, 165 SCRA 186, 195-196.
[11] Ibid.
[12] State v. Hill, 189 Kan 403, 369 P2d 365, 91 ALR2d 750.
[13] Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391, 70 L. Ed. 328 (1926) cited in Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Ass'n. v. City Mayor, 20
SCRA 849, 867 (1967).
[14] NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307, 12, 2 L. Ed 325, 338 (1958); Shelton v. Tucker 364 U.S. 479, 5 L. Ed. 2d 231 (1960).
[15] Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 521, 31 L. Ed. 2d 408, 413 (1972) (internal quotation marks omitted).
[16] United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 95 L. Ed 2d 697, 707 (1987); see also People v. De la Piedra, G.R. No. 121777, 24 January 2001.
[17] 413 U.S. 601, 612-613, 37 L. Ed 2d 830, 840-841 (1973).
[18] United States v. Salerno, supra.
[19] Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 494-95, 71 L. Ed. 2d 362, 369 (1982).
[20] United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 21, 4 L. Ed. 2d 524, 529 (1960). The paradigmatic case is Yazoo & Mississippi Valley RR. v. Jackson Vinegar
Co., 226 U.S. 217, 57 L. Ed. 193 (1912).
[21] G. Gunther & K. Sullivan, Constitutional Law 1299 (2001).
[22] Id. at 1328. See also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., As Applied and Facial Challenges, 113 Harv. L. Rev. 1321 (2000) arguing that, in an important sense, as
applied challenges are the basic building blocks of constitutional adjudication and that determinations that statutes are facially invalid properly occur only
as logical outgrowths of ruling on whether statutes may be applied to particular litigants on particular facts.
[23] Constitution, Art. VIII, 1 and 5. Compare Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139, 158 (1936); "[T]he power of judicial review is limited to
actual cases and controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to be constitutional question raised or
the very lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to
actualities."
[24] 401 U.S. 37, 52-53, 27 L. Ed. 2d 669, 680 (1971). Accord, United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 4 L. Ed. 2d 524 (1960); Board of Trustees, State Univ.
of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 106 L. Ed. 2d 388 (1989).
[25] Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. at 613, 37 L. Ed. 2d at 841; National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 580 (1998).
[26] FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 223, 107 L. Ed. 2d 603 (1990); Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, G.R. No. 135385, 6
December 2000 (Mendoza, J., Separate Opinion).
[27] United States v. National Dairy Prod. Corp., 372 U.S. 29, 32-33, 9 L. Ed. 2d 561, 565-6 (1963).
[28] G.R. No. 57841, 30 July 1982, 115 SCRA 793.
[29] People v. Ganguso, G.R. No. 115430, 23 November 1995, 250 SCRA 268, 274-275.
EN BANC
SOUTHERN HEMISPHERE ENGAGEMENT
NETWORK, INC., on behalf of the South-SouthG.R. No. 178552
Network (SSN) for Non-State Armed Group
Engagement, and ATTY. SOLIMAN M. SANTOS, JR., Present:

Petitioners, CORONA, C.J.,

- versus - CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
ANTI-TERRORISM COUNCIL, THE EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, THE VELASCO, JR.,
SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, THE
SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, THE
NACHURA,
SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT, THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE,
THE NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER, THE CHIEF LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
OF STAFF OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES, AND THE CHIEF OF THE
BRION,
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE,

Respondents. PERALTA,

BERSAMIN,
x ------------------------------- x

KILUSANG MAYO UNO (KMU), represented by its DEL CASTILLO,

Chairperson Elmer Labog, NATIONAL FEDERATION
OF LABOR UNIONS-KILUSANG MAYO UNO ABAD,
(NAFLU-KMU), represented by its National President
Joselito V. Ustarez and Secretary General Antonio C.
Pascual, and CENTER FOR TRADE UNION AND VILLARAMA, JR.,
HUMAN RIGHTS, represented by its Executive
Director Daisy Arago, PEREZ,

Petitioners, MENDOZA, and

- versus - SERENO, JJ.

HON. EDUARDO ERMITA, in his capacity as Promulgated:

Executive Secretary, NORBERTO GONZALES, in his
capacity as Acting Secretary of National Defense, HON.
RAUL GONZALES, in his capacity as Secretary of October 5, 2010
Justice, HON. RONALDO PUNO, in his capacity as
Secretary of the Interior and Local Government, GEN. G.R. No. 178554
HERMOGENES ESPERON, in his capacity as AFP
Chief of Staff, and DIRECTOR GENERAL OSCAR
CALDERON, in his capacity as PNP Chief of Staff,
Respondents. G.R. No. 178581

x ------------------------------------ x G.R. No. 178890

BAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN (BAYAN),G.R. No. 179157

GENERAL ALLIANCE BINDING WOMEN FOR
REFORMS, INTEGRITY, EQUALITY, LEADERSHIP
G.R. No. 179461
AND ACTION (GABRIELA), KILUSANG
MAGBUBUKID NG PILIPINAS (KMP), MOVEMENT
OF CONCERNED CITIZENS FOR CIVIL
LIBERTIES (MCCCL), CONFEDERATION FOR
UNITY, RECOGNITION AND ADVANCEMENT OF
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES (COURAGE),
KALIPUNAN NG DAMAYANG MAHIHIRAP
(KADAMAY), SOLIDARITY OF CAVITE WORKERS,
LEAGUE OF FILIPINO STUDENTS (LFS),
ANAKBAYAN, PAMBANSANG LAKAS NG
KILUSANG MAMAMALAKAYA (PAMALAKAYA),
ALLIANCE OF CONCERNED TEACHERS (ACT),
MIGRANTE, HEALTH ALLIANCE FOR
DEMOCRACY (HEAD), AGHAM, TEOFISTO
GUINGONA, JR., DR. BIENVENIDO LUMBERA,
RENATO CONSTANTINO, JR., SISTER MARY
JOHN MANANSAN OSB, DEAN CONSUELO PAZ,
ATTY. JOSEFINA LICHAUCO, COL. GERRY
CUNANAN (ret.), CARLITOS SIGUION-REYNA, DR.
CAROLINA PAGADUAN-ARAULLO, RENATO
REYES, DANILO RAMOS, EMERENCIANA DE
LESUS, RITA BAUA, REY CLARO CASAMBRE,

Petitioners,

- versus -

GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, in her capacity as

President and Commander-in-Chief, EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, DEPARTMENT
OF JUSTICE SECRETARY RAUL GONZALES,
DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
SECRETARY ALBERTO ROMULO, DEPARTMENT
OF NATIONAL DEFENSE ACTING SECRETARY
NORBERTO GONZALES, DEPARTMENT OF
INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT
SECRETARY RONALDO PUNO. DEPARTMENT OF
FINANCE SECRETARY MARGARITO TEVES,
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER NORBERTO
GONZALES, THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
COORDINATING AGENCY (NICA), THE
NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (NBI),
THE BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION, THE OFFICE OF
CIVIL DEFENSE, THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICE
OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES
(ISAFP), THE ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING
COUNCIL (AMLC), THE PHILIPPINE CENTER ON
TRANSNATIONAL CRIME, THE CHIEF OF THE
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE GEN. OSCAR
CALDERON, THE PNP, including its intelligence and
investigative elements, AFP CHIEF GEN.
HERMOGENES ESPERON,

Respondents.

x ------------------------------------ x

KARAPATAN, ALLIANCE FOR THE

ADVANCEMENT OF PEOPLES RIGHTS, represented
herein by Dr. Edelina de la Paz, and representing the
following organizations: HUSTISYA, represented by
Evangeline Hernandez and also on her own behalf;
DESAPARECIDOS, represented by Mary Guy
Portajada and also on her own behalf, SAMAHAN NG
MGA EX-DETAINEES LABAN SA DETENSYON AT
PARA SA AMNESTIYA (SELDA), represented by
Donato Continente and also on his own behalf,
ECUMENICAL MOVEMENT FOR JUSTICE AND
PEACE (EMJP), represented by Bishop Elmer M.
Bolocon, UCCP, and PROMOTION OF CHURCH
PEOPLES RESPONSE, represented by Fr. Gilbert
Sabado, OCARM,

Petitioners,

- versus -

GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, in her capacity as

President and Commander-in-Chief, EXECUTIVE
SECRETARTY EDUARDO ERMITA, DEPARTMENT
OF JUSTICE SECRETARY RAUL GONZALEZ,
DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
SECRETARY ALBERTO ROMULO, DEPARTMENT
OF NATIONAL DEFENSE ACTING SECRETARY
NORBERTO GONZALES, DEPARTMENT OF
INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT
SECRETARY RONALDO PUNO, DEPARTMENT OF
FINANCE SECRETARY MARGARITO TEVES,
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER NORBERTO
GONZALES, THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
COORDINATING AGENCY (NICA), THE
NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (NBI),
THE BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION, THE OFFICE OF
CIVIL DEFENSE, THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICE
OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES
(ISAFP), THE ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING
COUNCIL (AMLC), THE PHILIPPINE CENTER ON
TRANSNATIONAL CRIME, THE CHIEF OF THE
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE GEN. OSCAR
CALDERON, THE PNP, including its intelligence and
investigative elements, AFP CHIEF GEN.
HERMOGENES ESPERON,

Respondents.

x------------------------------------ x

THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES

(IBP), represented by Atty. Feliciano M. Bautista,
COUNSELS FOR THE DEFENSE OF (CODAL), SEN.
MA. ANA CONSUELO A.S. MADRIGAL and
FORMER SENATORS SERGIO OSMEA III and
WIGBERTO E. TAADA,

Petitioners,

- versus -

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA

AND THE MEMBERS OF THE ANTI-TERRORISM
COUNCIL (ATC),

Respondents.

x------------------------------------- x

BAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN-SOUTHERN

TAGALOG (BAYAN-ST), GABRIELA-ST,
KATIPUNAN NG MGA SAMAHYANG
MAGSASAKA-TIMOG KATAGALUGAN (KASAMA-
TK), MOVEMENT OF CONCERNED CITIZENS FOR
CIVIL LIBERTIES (MCCCL), PEOPLES MARTYRS,
ANAKBAYAN-ST, PAMALAKAYA-ST,
CONFEDERATION FOR UNITY, RECOGNITION
AND ADVANCEMENT OF GOVERNMENT
EMPLOYEES (COURAGE-ST), PAGKAKAISAT
UGNAYAN NG MGA MAGBUBUKID SA LAGUNA
(PUMALAG), SAMAHAN NG MGA MAMAMAYAN
SA TABING RILES (SMTR-ST), LEAGUE OF
FILIPINO STUDENTS (LFS), BAYAN MUNA-ST,
KONGRESO NG MGA MAGBUBUKID PARA SA
REPORMANG AGRARYO KOMPRA, BIGKIS AT
LAKAS NG MGA KATUTUBO SA TIMOG
KATAGALUGAN (BALATIK), SAMAHAN AT
UGNAYAN NG MGA MAGSASAKANG
KABABAIHAN SA TIMOG KATAGALUGAN
(SUMAMAKA-TK), STARTER, LOSOS RURAL
POOR ORGANIZATION FOR PROGRESS &
EQUALITY, CHRISTIAN NIO LAJARA, TEODORO
REYES, FRANCESCA B. TOLENTINO, JANNETTE
E. BARRIENTOS, OSCAR T. LAPIDA, JR., DELFIN
DE CLARO, SALLY P. ASTRERA, ARNEL SEGUNE
BELTRAN,

Petitioners,

- versus -

GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, in her capacity as

President and Commander-in-Chief, EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, DEPARTMENT
OF JUSTICE SECRETARY RAUL GONZALEZ,
DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS
SECRETARY ALBERTO ROMULO, DEPARTMENT
OF NATIONAL DEFENSE ACTING SECRETARY
NORBERTO GONZALES, DEPARTMENT OF
INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMEN T
SECRETARY RONALDO PUNO, DEPARTMENT OF
FINCANCE SECRETARY MARGARITO TEVES,
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER NORBERTO
GONZALES, THE NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
COORDINATING AGENCY (NICA), THE
NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (NBI),
THE BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION, THE OFFICE OF
CIVIL DEFENSE, THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICE
OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES
(ISAFP), THE ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING
COUNCIL (AMLC), THE PHILIPPINE CENTER ON
TRANSNATIONAL CRIME, THE CHIEF OF THE
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE GEN. OSCAR
CALDERON, THE PNP, including its intelligence and
investigative elements, AFP CHIEF GEN.
HERMOGENES ESPERON,

Respondents.

x--------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Before the Court are six petitions challenging the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 9372 (RA 9372), An Act to Secure the State and Protect our People
from Terrorism, otherwise known as the Human Security Act of 2007,[1] signed into law on .

Following the effectivity of RA 9372 on ,[2] petitioner Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc., a non-government organization, and Atty.
Soliman Santos, Jr., a concerned citizen, taxpayer and lawyer, filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition on docketed as G.R. No. 178552. On even date,
petitioners Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU), National Federation of Labor Unions-Kilusang Mayo Uno (NAFLU-KMU), and Center for Trade Union and
Human Rights (CTUHR), represented by their respective officers[3] who are also bringing the action in their capacity as citizens, filed a petition for
certiorari and prohibition docketed as G.R. No. 178554.

The following day, July 17, 2007, organizations Bagong Alyansang Makabayan (BAYAN), General Alliance Binding Women for Reforms, Integrity,
Equality, Leadership and Action (GABRIELA), Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP), Movement of Concerned Citizens for Civil Liberties
(MCCCL), Confederation for Unity, Recognition and Advancement of Government Employees (COURAGE), Kalipunan ng Damayang Mahihirap
(KADAMAY), Solidarity of Cavite Workers (SCW), League of Filipino Students (LFS), Anakbayan, Pambansang Lakas ng Kilusang Mamamalakaya
(PAMALAKAYA), Alliance of Concerned Teachers (ACT), Migrante, Health Alliance for Democracy (HEAD), and Agham, represented by their
respective officers,[4] and joined by concerned citizens and taxpayers Teofisto Guingona, Jr., Dr. Bienvenido Lumbera, Renato Constantino, Jr., Sister
Mary John Manansan, OSB, Dean Consuelo Paz, Atty. Josefina Lichauco, Retired Col. Gerry Cunanan, Carlitos Siguion-Reyna, Dr. Carolina Pagaduan-
Araullo, Renato Reyes, Danilo Ramos, Emerenciana de Jesus, Rita Baua and Rey Claro Casambre filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition docketed as
G.R. No. 178581.

On August 6, 2007, Karapatan and its alliance member organizations Hustisya, Desaparecidos, Samahan ng mga Ex-Detainees Laban sa Detensyon at para
sa Amnestiya (SELDA), Ecumenical Movement for Justice and Peace (EMJP), and Promotion of Church Peoples Response (PCPR), which were
represented by their respective officers[5] who are also bringing action on their own behalf, filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition docketed as G.R.
No. 178890.

On , the Integrated Bar of the (IBP), Counsels for the Defense of (CODAL),[6] Senator Ma. Ana Consuelo A.S. Madrigal, Sergio Osmea III, and Wigberto
E. Taada filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition docketed as G.R. No. 179157.

Bagong Alyansang Makabayan-Southern Tagalog (BAYAN-ST), other regional chapters and organizations mostly based in the Southern Tagalog Region,
[7] and individuals[8] followed suit by filing on a petition for certiorari and prohibition docketed as G.R. No. 179461 that replicates the allegations raised
in the BAYAN petition in G.R. No. 178581.

Impleaded as respondents in the various petitions are the Anti-Terrorism Council[9] composed of, at the time of the filing of the petitions, Executive
Secretary Eduardo Ermita as Chairperson, Justice Secretary Raul Gonzales as Vice Chairperson, and Foreign Affairs Secretary Alberto Romulo, Acting
Defense Secretary and National Security Adviser Norberto Gonzales, Interior and Local Government Secretary Ronaldo Puno, and Finance Secretary
Margarito Teves as members. All the petitions, except that of the IBP, also impleaded Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) Chief of Staff Gen.
Hermogenes Esperon and Philippine National Police (PNP) Chief Gen. Oscar Calderon.

The Karapatan, BAYAN and BAYAN-ST petitions likewise impleaded President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and the support agencies for the Anti-Terrorism
Council like the National Intelligence Coordinating Agency, National Bureau of Investigation, Bureau of Immigration, Office of Civil Defense, Intelligence
Service of the AFP, , Philippine Center on Transnational Crime, and the PNP intelligence and investigative elements.

The petitions fail.

Petitioners resort to certiorari is improper

Preliminarily, certiorari does not lie against respondents who do not exercise judicial or quasi-judicial functions. Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
is clear:

Section 1. Petition for certiorari.When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its
or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty
and praying that judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer, and granting such incidental reliefs as law
and justice may require. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Parenthetically, petitioners do not even allege with any modicum of particularity how respondents acted without or in excess of their respective
jurisdictions, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

The impropriety of certiorari as a remedy aside, the petitions fail just the same.

In constitutional litigations, the power of judicial review is limited by four exacting requisites, viz: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy; (b)
petitioners must possess locus standi; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality
must be the lis mota of the case.[10]

In the present case, the dismal absence of the first two requisites, which are the most essential, renders the discussion of the last two superfluous.
Petitioners lack locus standi
Locus standi or legal standing requires a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.[11]

Anak Mindanao Party-List Group v. The Executive Secretary[12] summarized the rule on locus standi, thus:

Locus standi or legal standing has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in a case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury
as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The gist of the question on standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination
of difficult constitutional questions.
[A] party who assails the constitutionality of a statute must have a direct and personal interest. It must show not only that the law or any governmental
act is invalid, but also that it sustained or is in immediate danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that it
suffers thereby in some indefinite way. It must show that it has been or is about to be denied some right or privilege to which it is lawfully entitled or that it
is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act complained of.
For a concerned party to be allowed to raise a constitutional question, it must show that (1) it has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury
as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government, (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action, and (3) the injury is likely to be
redressed by a favorable action. (emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
Petitioner-organizations assert locus standi on the basis of being suspected communist fronts by the government, especially the military; whereas
individual petitioners invariably invoke the transcendental importance doctrine and their status as citizens and taxpayers.

While Chavez v. PCGG[13] holds that transcendental public importance dispenses with the requirement that petitioner has experienced or is in actual
danger of suffering direct and personal injury, cases involving the constitutionality of penal legislation belong to an altogether different genus of
constitutional litigation. Compelling State and societal interests in the proscription of harmful conduct, as will later be elucidated, necessitate a closer
judicial scrutiny of locus standi.

Petitioners have not presented any personal stake in the outcome of the controversy. None of them faces any charge under RA 9372.

KARAPATAN, Hustisya, Desaparecidos, SELDA, EMJP and PCR, petitioners in G.R. No. 178890, allege that they have been subjected to close
security surveillance by state security forces, their members followed by suspicious persons and vehicles with dark windshields, and their offices
monitored by men with military build. They likewise claim that they have been branded as enemies of the [S]tate.[14]

Even conceding such gratuitous allegations, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) correctly points out that petitioners have yet to show any connection
between the purported surveillance and the implementation of RA 9372.

BAYAN, GABRIELA, KMP, MCCCL, COURAGE, KADAMAY, SCW, LFS, Anakbayan, PAMALAKAYA, ACT, Migrante, HEAD and Agham,
petitioner-organizations in G.R. No. 178581, would like the Court to take judicial notice of respondents alleged action of tagging them as militant
organizations fronting for the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) and its armed wing, the National Peoples Army (NPA). The tagging, according to
petitioners, is tantamount to the effects of proscription without following the procedure under the law.[15] The petition of BAYAN-ST, et al. in G.R. No.
179461 pleads the same allegations.

The Court cannot take judicial notice of the alleged tagging of petitioners.

Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material requisites: (1) the matter must be one of common and general knowledge; (2) it must
be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain; and (3) it must be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court. The
principal guide in determining what facts may be assumed to be judicially known is that of notoriety. Hence, it can be said that judicial notice is limited to
facts evidenced by public records and facts of general notoriety. Moreover, a judicially noticed fact must be one not subject to a reasonable dispute in that it
is either: (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court; or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resorting to
sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questionable.
Things of common knowledge, of which courts take judicial matters coming to the knowledge of men generally in the course of the ordinary experiences
of life, or they may be matters which are generally accepted by mankind as true and are capable of ready and unquestioned demonstration. Thus, facts
which are universally known, and which may be found in encyclopedias, dictionaries or other publications, are judicially noticed, provided, they are of
such universal notoriety and so generally understood that they may be regarded as forming part of the common knowledge of every person. As the common
knowledge of man ranges far and wide, a wide variety of particular facts have been judicially noticed as being matters of common knowledge. But a court
cannot take judicial notice of any fact which, in part, is dependent on the existence or non-existence of a fact of which the court has no
constructive knowledge.[16] (emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
No ground was properly established by petitioners for the taking of judicial notice. Petitioners apprehension is insufficient to substantiate their plea . That
no specific charge or proscription under RA 9372 has been filed against them, three years after its effectivity, belies any claim of imminence of their
perceived threat emanating from the so-called tagging.

The same is true with petitioners KMU, NAFLU and CTUHR in G.R. No. 178554, who merely harp as well on their supposed link to the CPP and NPA.
They fail to particularize how the implementation of specific provisions of RA 9372 would result in direct injury to their organization and members.

While in our jurisdiction there is still no judicially declared terrorist organization, the United States of America[17] (US) and the European Union[18] (EU)
have both classified the CPP, NPA and Abu Sayyaf Group as foreign terrorist organizations. The Court takes note of the joint statement of Executive
Secretary Eduardo Ermita and Justice Secretary Raul Gonzales that the Arroyo Administration would adopt the US and EU classification of the CPP and
NPA as terrorist organizations.[19] Such statement notwithstanding, there is yet to be filed before the courts an application to declare the CPP and
NPA organizations as domestic terrorist or outlawed organizations under RA 9372. Again, RA 9372 has been in effect for three years now. From July
2007 up to the present, petitioner-organizations have conducted their activities fully and freely without any threat of, much less an actual, prosecution or
proscription under RA 9372.

Parenthetically, the Fourteenth Congress, in a resolution initiated by Party-list Representatives Saturnino Ocampo, Teodoro Casio, Rafael Mariano and
Luzviminda Ilagan,[20] urged the government to resume peace negotiations with the NDF by removing the impediments thereto, one of which is the
adoption of designation of the CPP and NPA by the US and EU as foreign terrorist organizations. Considering the policy statement of the Aquino
Administration[21] of resuming peace talks with the NDF, the government is not imminently disposed to ask for the judicial proscription of the CPP-NPA
consortium and its allied organizations.

More important, there are other parties not before the Court with direct and specific interests in the questions being raised.[22] Of recent development is
the filing of the first case for proscription under Section 17[23] of RA 9372 by the Department of Justice before the Basilan Regional Trial Court against
the Abu Sayyaf Group.[24] Petitioner-organizations do not in the least allege any link to the Abu Sayyaf Group.

Some petitioners attempt, in vain though, to show the imminence of a prosecution under RA 9372 by alluding to past rebellion charges against them.

In Ladlad v. Velasco,[25] the Court ordered the dismissal of rebellion charges filed in 2006 against then Party-List Representatives Crispin Beltran and
Rafael Mariano of Anakpawis, Liza Maza of GABRIELA, and Joel Virador, Teodoro Casio and Saturnino Ocampo of Bayan Muna. Also named in the
dismissed rebellion charges were petitioners Rey Claro Casambre, Carolina Pagaduan-Araullo, Renato Reyes, Rita Baua, Emerencia de Jesus and Danilo
Ramos; and accused of being front organizations for the Communist movement were petitioner-organizations KMU, BAYAN, GABRIELA,
PAMALAKAYA, KMP, KADAMAY, LFS and COURAGE.[26]

The dismissed rebellion charges, however, do not save the day for petitioners. For one, those charges were filed in 2006, prior to the enactment of RA
9372, and dismissed by this Court. For another, rebellion is defined and punished under the Revised Penal Code. Prosecution for rebellion is not made
more imminent by the enactment of RA 9372, nor does the enactment thereof make it easier to charge a person with rebellion, its elements not having been
altered.

Conversely, previously filed but dismissed rebellion charges bear no relation to prospective charges under RA 9372. It cannot be overemphasized that three
years after the enactment of RA 9372, none of petitioners has been charged.

Petitioners IBP and CODAL in G.R. No. 179157 base their claim of locus standi on their sworn duty to uphold the Constitution. The IBP zeroes in on
Section 21 of RA 9372 directing it to render assistance to those arrested or detained under the law.

The mere invocation of the duty to preserve the rule of law does not, however, suffice to clothe the IBP or any of its members with standing.[27] The IBP
failed to sufficiently demonstrate how its mandate under the assailed statute revolts against its constitutional rights and duties. Moreover, both the IBP and
CODAL have not pointed to even a single arrest or detention effected under RA 9372.

Former Senator Ma. Ana Consuelo Madrigal, who claims to have been the subject of political surveillance, also lacks locus standi. Prescinding from the
veracity, let alone legal basis, of the claim of political surveillance, the Court finds that she has not shown even the slightest threat of being charged under
RA 9372. Similarly lacking in locus standi are former Senator Wigberto Taada and Senator Sergio Osmea III, who cite their being respectively a
human rights advocate and an oppositor to the passage of RA 9372. Outside these gratuitous statements, no concrete injury to them has been pinpointed.

Petitioners Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network and Atty. Soliman Santos Jr. in G.R. No. 178552 also conveniently state that the issues they
raise are of transcendental importance, which must be settled early and are of far-reaching implications, without mention of any specific provision of RA
9372 under which they have been charged, or may be charged. Mere invocation of human rights advocacy has nowhere been held sufficient to clothe
litigants with locus standi. Petitioners must show an actual, or immediate danger of sustaining, direct injury as a result of the laws enforcement. To rule
otherwise would be to corrupt the settled doctrine of locus standi, as every worthy cause is an interest shared by the general public.

Neither can locus standi be conferred upon individual petitioners as taxpayers and citizens. A taxpayer suit is proper only when there is an exercise of the
spending or taxing power of Congress,[28] whereas citizen standing must rest on direct and personal interest in the proceeding.[29]
RA 9372 is a penal statute and does not even provide for any appropriation from Congress for its implementation, while none of the individual petitioner-
citizens has alleged any direct and personal interest in the implementation of the law.

It bears to stress that generalized interests, albeit accompanied by the assertion of a public right, do not establish locus standi. Evidence of a direct and
personal interest is key.

Petitioners fail to present an actual case or controversy

By constitutional fiat, judicial power operates only when there is an actual case or controversy.

Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.[30] (emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
As early as Angara v. Electoral Commission,[31] the Court ruled that the power of judicial review is limited to actual cases or controversies to be exercised
after full opportunity of argument by the parties. Any attempt at abstraction could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile
conclusions unrelated to actualities.

An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the
decision of the court would amount to an advisory opinion.[32]

Information Technology Foundation of the Philippines v. COMELEC[33] cannot be more emphatic:

[C]ourts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest, however intellectually challenging. The controversy must be
justiciabledefinite and concrete, touching on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests. In other words, the pleadings must show an
active antagonistic assertion of a legal right, on the one hand, and a denial thereof on the other hand; that is, it must concern a real and not merely
a theoretical question or issue. There ought to be an actual and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief through a decree conclusive in
nature, as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Thus, a petition to declare unconstitutional a law converting the of into a Highly Urbanized City was held to be premature as it was tacked on uncertain,
contingent events.[34] Similarly, a petition that fails to allege that an application for a license to operate a radio or television station has been denied or
granted by the authorities does not present a justiciable controversy, and merely wheedles the Court to rule on a hypothetical problem.[35]

The Court dismissed the petition in Philippine Press Institute v. Commission on Elections[36] for failure to cite any specific affirmative action of the
Commission on Elections to implement the assailed resolution. It refused, in Abbas v. Commission on Elections,[37] to rule on the religious freedom claim
of the therein petitioners based merely on a perceived potential conflict between the provisions of the Muslim Code and those of the national law, there
being no actual controversy between real litigants.

The list of cases denying claims resting on purely hypothetical or anticipatory grounds goes on ad infinitum.

The Court is not unaware that a reasonable certainty of the occurrence of a perceived threat to any constitutional interest
suffices to provide a basis for mounting a constitutional challenge. This, however, is qualified by the requirement that there must be sufficient facts to
enable the Court to intelligently adjudicate the issues.[38]

Very recently, the US Supreme Court, in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project,[39] allowed the pre-enforcement review of a criminal statute, challenged on
vagueness grounds, since plaintiffs faced a credible threat of prosecution and should not be required to await and undergo a criminal prosecution as the
sole means of seeking relief.[40] The plaintiffs therein filed an action before a federal court to assail the constitutionality of the material support statute, 18
U.S.C. 2339B (a) (1),[41] proscribing the provision of material support to organizations declared by the Secretary of State as foreign terrorist
organizations. They claimed that they intended to provide support for the humanitarian and political activities of two such organizations.

Prevailing American jurisprudence allows an adjudication on the merits when an anticipatory petition clearly shows that the challenged prohibition
forbids the conduct or activity that a petitioner seeks to do, as there would then be a justiciable controversy.[42]

Unlike the plaintiffs in Holder, however, herein petitioners have failed to show that the challenged provisions of RA 9372 forbid constitutionally
protected conduct or activity that they seek to do. No demonstrable threat has been established, much less a real and existing one.

Petitioners obscure allegations of sporadic surveillance and supposedly being tagged as communist fronts in no way approximate a credible threat
of prosecution. From these allegations, the Court is being lured to render an advisory opinion, which is not its function.[43]

Without any justiciable controversy, the petitions have become pleas for declaratory relief, over which the Court has no original jurisdiction. Then again,
declaratory actions characterized by double contingency, where both the activity the petitioners intend to undertake and the anticipated reaction to it of a
public official are merely theorized, lie beyond judicial review for lack of ripeness.[44]

The possibility of abuse in the implementation of RA 9372 does not avail to take the present petitions out of the realm of the surreal and merely imagined.
Such possibility is not peculiar to RA 9372 since the exercise of any power granted by law may be abused.[45] Allegations of abuse must be anchored on
real events before courts may step in to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable.

A facial invalidation of a statute is allowed only in free speech cases, wherein certain rules
of constitutional litigation are rightly excepted
Petitioners assail for being intrinsically vague and impermissibly broad the definition of the crime of terrorism[46] under RA 9372 in that terms like
widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the populace and coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand are nebulous, leaving law
enforcement agencies with no standard to measure the prohibited acts.

Respondents, through the OSG, counter that the doctrines of void-for-vagueness and overbreadth find no application in the present case since these
doctrines apply only to free speech cases; and that RA 9372 regulates conduct, not speech.

For a jurisprudentially guided understanding of these doctrines, it is imperative to outline the schools of thought on whether the void-for-vagueness and
overbreadth doctrines are equally applicable grounds to assail a penal statute.

Respondents interpret recent jurisprudence as slanting toward the idea of limiting the application of the two doctrines to free speech cases. They
particularly cite Romualdez v. Hon. Sandiganbayan[47] and Estrada v. Sandiganbayan.[48]

The Court clarifies.

At issue in Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan was whether the word intervene in Section 5[49] of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act was intrinsically
vague and impermissibly broad. The Court stated that the overbreadth and the vagueness doctrines have special application only to free-speech cases, and
are not appropriate for testing the validity of penal statutes.[50] It added that, at any rate, the challenged provision, under which the therein petitioner was
charged, is not vague.[51]

While in the subsequent case of Romualdez v. Commission on Elections,[52] the Court stated that a facial invalidation of criminal statutes is not
appropriate, it nonetheless proceeded to conduct a vagueness analysis, and concluded that the therein subject election offense[53] under the Voters
Registration Act of 1996, with which the therein petitioners were charged, is couched in precise language.[54]

The two Romualdez cases rely heavily on the Separate Opinion[55] of Justice Vicente V. Mendoza in the Estrada case, where the Court found the Anti-
Plunder Law (Republic Act No. 7080) clear and free from ambiguity respecting the definition of the crime of plunder.

The position taken by Justice Mendoza in Estrada relates these two doctrines to the concept of a facial invalidation as opposed to an as-applied challenge.
He basically postulated that allegations that a penal statute is vague and overbroad do not justify a facial review of its validity. The pertinent portion of the
Concurring Opinion of Justice Mendoza, which was quoted at length in the main Estrada decision, reads:
A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of possible "chilling effect" upon protected speech. The
theory is that "[w]hen statutes regulate or proscribe speech and no readily apparent construction suggests itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes in
a single prosecution, the transcendent value to all society of constitutionally protected expression is deemed to justify allowing attacks on overly broad
statutes with no requirement that the person making the attack demonstrate that his own conduct could not be regulated by a statute drawn with narrow
specificity." The possible harm to society in permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that the protected
speech of others may be deterred and perceived grievances left to fester because of possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes.
This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have general in terrorem effect resulting from their very existence, and, if facial challenge
is allowed for this reason alone, the State may well be prevented from enacting laws against socially harmful conduct. In the area of criminal law, the law
cannot take chances as in the area of free speech.
The overbreadth and vagueness doctrines then have special application only to free speech cases . They are inapt for testing the validity of penal
statutes. As the U.S. Supreme Court put it, in an opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, "we have not recognized an 'overbreadth' doctrine outside the limited
context of the First Amendment." In Broadrick v. Oklahoma, the Court ruled that "claims of facial overbreadth have been entertained in cases involving
statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only spoken words" and, again, that "overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have been curtailed when
invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be applied to protected conduct." For this reason, it has been held that "a facial challenge to a
legislative act is the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the
Act would be valid." As for the vagueness doctrine, it is said that a litigant may challenge a statute on its face only if it is vague in all its possible
applications. "A plaintiff who engages in some conduct that is clearly proscribed cannot complain of the vagueness of the law as applied to the conduct of
others."
In sum, the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are analytical tools developed for testing "on their faces" statutes in free
speech cases or, as they are called in American law, First Amendment cases. They cannot be made to do service when what is involved is a criminal
statute. With respect to such statute, the established rule is that "one to whom application of a statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute
on the ground that impliedly it might also be taken as applying to other persons or other situations in which its application might be unconstitutional." As
has been pointed out, "vagueness challenges in the First Amendment context, like overbreadth challenges typically produce facial invalidation, while
statutes found vague as a matter of due process typically are invalidated [only] 'as applied' to a particular defendant." Consequently, there is no basis
for petitioner's claim that this Court review the Anti-Plunder Law on its face and in its entirety.
Indeed, "on its face" invalidation of statutes results in striking them down entirely on the ground that they might be applied to parties not before the Court
whose activities are constitutionally protected. It constitutes a departure from the case and controversy requirement of the Constitution and permits
decisions to be made without concrete factual settings and in sterile abstract contexts. But, as the U.S. Supreme Court pointed out in Younger v. Harris
[T]he task of analyzing a proposed statute, pinpointing its deficiencies, and requiring correction of these deficiencies before the statute is put into effect, is
rarely if ever an appropriate task for the judiciary. The combination of the relative remoteness of the controversy, the impact on the legislative process of
the relief sought, and above all the speculative and amorphous nature of the required line-by-line analysis of detailed statutes, . . . ordinarily results in a
kind of case that is wholly unsatisfactory for deciding constitutional questions, whichever way they might be decided.
For these reasons, "on its face" invalidation of statutes has been described as "manifestly strong medicine," to be employed "sparingly and only as a last
resort," and is generally disfavored. In determining the constitutionality of a statute, therefore, its provisions which are alleged to have been violated in a
case must be examined in the light of the conduct with which the defendant is charged.[56] (Underscoring supplied.)
The confusion apparently stems from the interlocking relation of the overbreadth and vagueness doctrines as grounds for a facial or as-applied challenge
against a penal statute (under a claim of violation of due process of law) or a speech regulation (under a claim of abridgement of the freedom of speech and
cognate rights).

To be sure, the doctrine of vagueness and the doctrine of overbreadth do not operate on the same plane.

A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its
meaning and differ as to its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord persons,
especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and
becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.[57] The overbreadth doctrine, meanwhile, decrees that a governmental purpose to control or
prevent activities constitutionally subject to state regulations may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the
area of protected freedoms.[58]

As distinguished from the vagueness doctrine, the overbreadth doctrine assumes that individuals will understand what a statute prohibits and will
accordingly refrain from that behavior, even though some of it is protected.[59]

A facial challenge is likewise different from an as-applied challenge.

Distinguished from an as-applied challenge which considers only extant facts affecting real litigants, a facial invalidation is an examination of the entire
law, pinpointing its flaws and defects, not only on the basis of its actual operation to the parties, but also on the assumption or prediction that its very
existence may cause others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or activities.[60]

Justice Mendoza accurately phrased the subtitle[61] in his concurring opinion that the vagueness and overbreadth doctrines, as grounds for a facial
challenge, are not applicable to penal laws. A litigant cannot thus successfully mount a facial challenge against a criminal statute on either
vagueness or overbreadth grounds.

The allowance of a facial challenge in free speech cases is justified by the aim to avert the chilling effect on protected speech, the exercise of which should
not at all times be abridged.[62] As reflected earlier, this rationale is inapplicable to plain penal statutes that generally bear an in terrorem effect in
deterring socially harmful conduct. In fact, the legislature may even forbid and penalize acts formerly considered innocent and lawful, so long as it refrains
from diminishing or dissuading the exercise of constitutionally protected rights.[63]

The Court reiterated that there are critical limitations by which a criminal statute may be challenged and underscored that an on-its-face invalidation of
penal statutes x x x may not be allowed.[64]

[T]he rule established in our jurisdiction is, only statutes on free speech, religious freedom, and other fundamental rights may be facially challenged.
Under no case may ordinary penal statutes be subjected to a facial challenge. The rationale is obvious. If a facial challenge to a penal statute is
permitted, the prosecution of crimes may be hampered. No prosecution would be possible. A strong criticism against employing a facial challenge in the
case of penal statutes, if the same is allowed, would effectively go against the grain of the doctrinal requirement of an existing and concrete controversy
before judicial power may be appropriately exercised. A facial challenge against a penal statute is, at best, amorphous and speculative. It would, essentially,
force the court to consider third parties who are not before it. As I have said in my opposition to the allowance of a facial challenge to attack penal statutes,
such a test will impair the States ability to deal with crime. If warranted, there would be nothing that can hinder an accused from defeating the States power
to prosecute on a mere showing that, as applied to third parties, the penal statute is vague or overbroad, notwithstanding that the law is clear as applied to
him.[65] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
It is settled, on the other hand, that the application of the overbreadth doctrine is limited to a facial kind of challenge and, owing to the given
rationale of a facial challenge, applicable only to free speech cases.

By its nature, the overbreadth doctrine has to necessarily apply a facial type of invalidation in order to plot areas of protected speech, inevitably almost
always under situations not before the court, that are impermissibly swept by the substantially overbroad regulation. Otherwise stated, a statute cannot be
properly analyzed for being substantially overbroad if the court confines itself only to facts as applied to the litigants.

The most distinctive feature of the overbreadth technique is that it marks an exception to some of the usual rules of constitutional litigation. Ordinarily, a
particular litigant claims that a statute is unconstitutional as applied to him or her; if the litigant prevails, the courts carve away the unconstitutional aspects
of the law by invalidating its improper applications on a case to case basis. Moreover, challengers to a law are not permitted to raise the rights of third
parties and can only assert their own interests. In overbreadth analysis, those rules give way; challenges are permitted to raise the rights of third parties; and
the court invalidates the entire statute "on its face," not merely "as applied for" so that the overbroad law becomes unenforceable until a properly
authorized court construes it more narrowly. The factor that motivates courts to depart from the normal adjudicatory rules is the concern with the
"chilling;" deterrent effect of the overbroad statute on third parties not courageous enough to bring suit. The Court assumes that an overbroad laws "very
existence may cause others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or expression." An overbreadth ruling is designed to
remove that deterrent effect on the speech of those third parties.[66] (Emphasis in the original omitted; underscoring supplied.)
In restricting the overbreadth doctrine to free speech claims, the Court, in at least two cases, [67] observed that the US Supreme Court has not recognized
an overbreadth doctrine outside the limited context of the First Amendment,[68] and that claims of facial overbreadth have been entertained in cases
involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only spoken words.[69] In Virginia v. Hicks,[70] it was held that rarely, if ever, will an
overbreadth challenge succeed against a law or regulation that is not specifically addressed to speech or speech-related conduct. Attacks on overly broad
statutes are justified by the transcendent value to all society of constitutionally protected expression.[71]

Since a penal statute may only be assailed for being vague as applied to petitioners, a limited
vagueness analysis of the definition of terrorism in RA 9372 is legally impermissible absent an
actual or imminent charge against them
While Estrada did not apply the overbreadth doctrine, it did not preclude the operation of the vagueness test on the Anti-Plunder Law as applied to the
therein petitioner, finding, however, that there was no basis to review the law on its face and in its entirety. [72] It stressed that statutes found vague as a
matter of due process typically are invalidated only 'as applied' to a particular defendant.[73]

American jurisprudence[74] instructs that vagueness challenges that do not involve the First Amendment must be examined in light of the specific facts of
the case at hand and not with regard to the statute's facial validity.

For more than 125 years, the US Supreme Court has evaluated defendants claims that criminal statutes are unconstitutionally vague, developing a doctrine
hailed as among the most important guarantees of liberty under law.[75]

In this jurisdiction, the void-for-vagueness doctrine asserted under the due process clause has been utilized in examining the constitutionality of criminal
statutes. In at least three cases,[76] the Court brought the doctrine into play in analyzing an ordinance penalizing the non-payment of municipal tax on
fishponds, the crime of illegal recruitment punishable under Article 132(b) of the Labor Code, and the vagrancy provision under Article 202 (2) of the
Revised Penal Code. Notably, the petitioners in these three cases, similar to those in the two Romualdez and Estrada cases, were actually charged with the
therein assailed penal statute, unlike in the present case.

There is no merit in the claim that RA 9372 regulates speech so as to permit a facial
analysis of its validity
From the definition of the crime of terrorism in the earlier cited Section 3 of RA
9372, the following elements may be culled: (1) the offender commits an act
punishable under any of the cited provisions of the Revised Penal Code, or under
any of the enumerated special penal laws; (2) the commission of the predicate
crime sows and creates a condition of widespread and extraordinary fear and panic
among the populace; and (3) the offender is actuated by the desire to coerce the
government to give in to an unlawful demand.

In insisting on a facial challenge on the invocation that the law penalizes speech, petitioners contend that the element of unlawful demand in the definition
of terrorism[77] must necessarily be transmitted through some form of expression protected by the free speech clause.

The argument does not persuade. What the law seeks to penalize is conduct, not speech.

Before a charge for terrorism may be filed under RA 9372, there must first be a predicate crime actually committed to trigger the operation of the key
qualifying phrases in the other elements of the crime, including the coercion of the government to accede to an unlawful demand. Given the presence of the
first element, any attempt at singling out or highlighting the communicative component of the prohibition cannot recategorize the unprotected conduct into
a protected speech.

Petitioners notion on the transmission of message is entirely inaccurate, as it unduly focuses on just one particle of an element of the crime. Almost every
commission of a crime entails some mincing of words on the part of the offender like in declaring to launch overt criminal acts against a victim, in
haggling on the amount of ransom or conditions, or in negotiating a deceitful transaction. An analogy in one case[78] illustrated that the fact that the
prohibition on discrimination in hiring on the basis of race will require an employer to take down a sign reading White Applicants Only hardly means that
the law should be analyzed as one regulating speech rather than conduct.

Utterances not elemental but inevitably incidental to the doing of the criminal conduct alter neither the intent of the law to punish socially harmful conduct
nor the essence of the whole act as conduct and not speech. This holds true a fortiori in the present case where the expression figures only as an inevitable
incident of making the element of coercion perceptible.

[I]t is true that the agreements and course of conduct here were as in most instances brought about through speaking or writing. But it has never been
deemed an abridgement of freedom of speech or press to make a course of conduct illegal merely because the conduct was, in part, initiated, evidenced, or
carried out by means of language, either spoken, written, or printed. Such an expansive interpretation of the constitutional guaranties of speech and press
would make it practically impossible ever to enforce laws against agreements in restraint of trade as well as many other agreements and conspiracies
deemed injurious to society.[79] (italics and underscoring supplied)
Certain kinds of speech have been treated as unprotected conduct, because they merely evidence a prohibited conduct.[80] Since speech is not involved
here, the Court cannot heed the call for a facial analysis.

IN FINE, Estrada and the other cited authorities engaged in a vagueness analysis of the therein subject penal statute as applied to the therein petitioners
inasmuch as they were actually charged with the pertinent crimes challenged on vagueness grounds. The Court in said cases, however, found no basis to
review the assailed penal statute on its face and in its entirety.

In Holder, on the other hand, the US Supreme Court allowed the pre-enforcement review of a criminal statute, challenged on vagueness grounds, since the
therein plaintiffs faced a credible threat of prosecution and should not be required to await and undergo a criminal prosecution as the sole means of
seeking relief.

As earlier reflected, petitioners have established neither an actual charge nor a credible threat of prosecution under RA 9372. Even a limited vagueness
analysis of the assailed definition of terrorism is thus legally impermissible. The Court reminds litigants that judicial power neither contemplates
speculative counseling on a statutes future effect on hypothetical scenarios nor allows the courts to be used as an extension of a failed legislative lobbying
in Congress.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
 ANTONIO T. CARPIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN MARIANO C. CASTILLO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ROBERTO A. ABAD MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE PEREZ JOSE CATRAL

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARIA P. A. SERENO
Associate Justice
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 152259. July 29, 2004]
ALFREDO T. ROMUALDEZ, petitioner, vs. The Honorable SANDIGANBAYAN (Fifth Division) and the PEOPLE of the PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Repetitive motions to invalidate or summarily terminate a criminal indictment prior to plea and trial, however they may be named or identified -- whether
as a motion to quash or motion to dismiss or by any other nomenclature -- delay the administration of justice and unduly burden the court system. Grounds
not included in the first of such repetitive motions are generally deemed waived and can no longer be used as bases of similar motions subsequently filed.
Section 5 of the Anti-Graft Law is constitutional. It penalizes certain presidential relatives who intervene, directly or indirectly, in any business, transaction,
contract or application with the Government. This provision is not vague or impermissibly broad, because it can easily be understood with the use of
simple statutory construction. Neither may the constitutionality of a criminal statute such as this be challenged on the basis of the overbreadth and the void-
for-vagueness doctrines, which apply only to free-speech cases.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Certiorari[1] under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking to set aside the November 20, 2001[2] and the March 1, 2002[3]
Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 13736. The first Resolution disposed thus:
WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the Motion to Dismiss is hereby DENIED. The arraignment of the accused and the pre-trial of the case shall proceed as
scheduled.[4]
The second Resolution denied reconsideration.
The Facts
The facts of the case are narrated by the Sandiganbayan as follows:
[The People of the Philippines], through the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), filed on July 12, 1989 an information before [the
anti-graft court] charging the accused [with] violation of Section 5, Republic Act No. 3019,[5] as amended. The Information reads:
That on or about and during the period from July 16, 1975 to July 29, 1975, in Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of [the
Sandiganbayan], said [petitioner], brother-in-law of Ferdinand E. Marcos, former President of the Philippines, and therefore, related to the latter by affinity
within the third civil degree, did then and there wil[l]fully and unlawfully, and with evident bad faith, for the purpose of promoting his self-interested [sic]
and/or that of others, intervene directly or indirectly, in a contract between the National Shipyard and Steel Corporation (NASSCO), a government-owned
and controlled corporation and the Bataan Shipyard and Engineering Company (BASECO), a private corporation, the majority stocks of which is owned by
former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, whereby the NASSCO sold, transferred and conveyed to the BASECO its ownership and all its titles and interests
over all equipment and facilities including structures, buildings, shops, quarters, houses, plants and expendable and semi-expendable assets, located at the
Engineer Island known as the Engineer Island Shops including some of its equipment and machineries from Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte needed by
BASECO in its shipbuilding and ship repair program for the amount of P5,000,000.00.
Contrary to law.
On December 27, 1996, the accused filed his first MOTION TO DISMISS AND TO DEFER ARRAIGNMENT claiming that no valid preliminary
investigation was conducted in the instant case. He asserts that if a preliminary investigation could be said to have been conducted, the same was null and
void having been undertaken by a biased and partial investigative body.
On January 9, 1997, [the Sandiganbayan], through the First Division, issued an order giving the accused fifteen days to file a Motion for Reinvestigation
with the Office of the Special Prosecutor.
[Petitioner] questioned said order before the Supreme Court via a petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with prayer for temporary restraining order. On
January 21, 1998, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition for failure to show that [the Sandiganbayan] committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the
assailed order.
On November 9, 1998, the [petitioner] filed with the Office of the Special Prosecutor a Motion to Quash.
On September 22, 1999, x x x Special Prosecution Officer (SPO) III Victorio U. Tabanguil, manifested that the prosecution had already concluded the
reinvestigation of the case. He recommended the dismissal of the instant case. Both the Deputy Special Prosecutor and the Special Prosecutor approved the
recommendation. However, Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto disagreed and directed the prosecutors to let the [petitioner] present his evidence in Court.
Subsequently, [petitioner] filed on October 8, 1999 his second MOTION TO QUASH AND TO DEFER ARRAIGNMENT.
On February 9, 2000, the [Sandiganbayan] denied the motion for lack of merit.
On June 19, 2001, [the] accused filed a MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE MOTION TO DISMISS. On June 29, 2001, the [Sandiganbayan] admitted the
motion and admitted the attached (third) Motion to Dismiss.
The [Motion to Dismiss] raise[d] the following grounds:
I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS OF LAW OF [PETITIONER] WAS VIOLATED DURING THE PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATION STAGE IN THE FOLLOWING WAYS:
A. NO VALID PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION WAS CONDUCTED IN THE INSTANT CASE; AND
B. THE PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION WAS CONDUCTED BY A BIASED AND PARTIAL INVESTIGATOR
II. THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF [PETITIONER] TO BE INFORMED OF THE NATURE AND CAUSE OF THE ACCUSATION AGAINST
HIM WAS VIOLATED
III. PURSUANT TO ARTICLE VII, SECTION 17 OF THE 1973 CONSTITUTION, [PETITIONER] IS IMMUNE FROM CRIMINAL PROSECUTION
IV. THE CRIMINAL ACTION OR LIABILITY HAS BEEN EXTINGUISHED BY PRESCRIPTION[6]
Ruling of the Sandiganbayan
The Sandiganbayan explained that all the grounds invoked by petitioner, except the third one, had already been raised by him and passed upon in its
previous Resolutions.[7] In resolving the third ground, the anti-graft court pointed out that Section 17 of the 1973 Constitution became effective only in
1981 when the basic law was amended. Since his alleged illegal intervention had been committed on or about 1975, the amended provision was
inapplicable to him.[8]
In denying the Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioner, the Sandiganbayan passed upon the other grounds he had raised. It ruled that his right to a
preliminary investigation was not violated, because he had been granted a reinvestigation.[9] It further held that his right to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation was not trampled upon, either, inasmuch as the Information had set forth the essential elements of the offense charged.[10]
Hence, this Petition.[11]
The Issues
In his Memorandum, petitioner assigns the following errors for our consideration:
Whether or not the Honorable Sandiganbayan erred and gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack of, or in excess of jurisdiction
I. In not dismissing and/or quashing Criminal Case No. 13736 despite clear and incontrovertible evidence that:
A. Section 5 of Republic Act No. 3019 is unconstitutional because its vagueness violates the due process right of an
individual to be informed of the nature and the cause of the accusation against him;
B. Section 5 of Republic Act No. 3019 is unconstitutional because it violates the due process right of an individual to be
presumed innocent until the contrary is proved;
C. The constitutional right of petitioner x x x to be informed of the nature and the cause of the accusation against him was
violated;
D. The constitutional right to due process of law of petitioner x x x was violated during the preliminary investigation
stage in the following ways:
[i] No valid preliminary investigation was con-ducted for Criminal Case No. 13736; and
[ii] The preliminary investigation was conducted by a biased and partial investigator.
E. The criminal action or liability has been extinguished by prescription; and
F. Pursuant to Article VII, Section 17 of the 1973 Constitution, petitioner x x x is immune from criminal prosecution.
And
 II. In light of the foregoing, in denying petitioner[s] x x x right to equal protection of the laws.[12]
Simply stated, the issues are as follows: (1) whether Section 5 of Republic Act 3019 is unconstitutional; (2) whether the Information is vague; (3) whether
there was a valid preliminary investigation; (4) whether the criminal action or liability has been extinguished by prescription; and (5) whether petitioner is
immune from criminal prosecution under then Section 17 of Article VII of the 1973 Constitution.
The Courts Ruling
The Petition has no merit.
First Issue:
Constitutionality of Section 5,
Republic Act 3019
Petitioner challenged the constitutionality of Section 5 of RA 3019 for the first time in the Sandiganbayan through a Supplemental Motion to Dismiss.
Attached to his December 7, 2001 Motion for Reconsideration of the Order denying his Motion to Dismiss was this Supplemental Motion which was, in
effect, his third motion to quash.[13] We note that the Petition for Certiorari before us challenges the denial of his original, not his Supplemental, Motion to
Dismiss.
Upon the denial of his original Motion to Quash on February 9, 2000, petitioner could have filed a motion for reconsideration of the denial. Had
reconsideration been turned down, the next proper remedy would have been either (1) a petition for certiorari[14] -- if there was grave abuse of discretion
-- which should be filed within 60 days from notice of the assailed order;[15] or (2) to proceed to trial without prejudice to his right, if final judgment is
rendered against him, to raise the same questions before the proper appellate court.[16] But instead of availing himself of these remedies, he filed a Motion
to Dismiss on June 19, 2001.
Impropriety of
Repetitive Motions
There is no substantial distinction between a motion to quash and a motion to dismiss. Both pray for an identical relief, which is the dismissal of the case.
Such motions are employed to raise preliminary objections, so as to avoid the necessity of proceeding to trial. A motion to quash is generally used in
criminal proceedings to annul a defective indictment. A motion to dismiss, the nomenclature ordinarily used in civil proceedings, is aimed at summarily
defeating a complaint. Thus, our Rules of Court use the term motion to quash in criminal,[17] and motion to dismiss in civil, proceedings.[18]
In the present case, however, both the Motion to Quash and the Motion to Dismiss are anchored on basically the same grounds and pray for the same relief.
The hairsplitting distinction posited by petitioner does not really make a difference.
By filing a Motion to Dismiss, petitioner submitted in effect a prohibited second motion to quash. A party is not permitted to raise issues, whether similar
or different, by installment. The Rules abhor repetitive motions. Otherwise, there would be no end to preliminary objections, and trial would never
commence. A second motion to quash delays the administration of justice and unduly burdens the courts. Moreover, Rule 117 provides that grounds not
raised in the first motion to quash are generally deemed waived.[19] Petitioners Motion to Dismiss violates this rule.
Constitutionality of
the Challenged Provision
If only for the foregoing procedural lapses, the Petition deserves to be dismissed outright. However, given the importance of this case in curtailing graft and
corruption, the Court will nevertheless address the other issues on their merit. Petitioner challenges the validity of Section 5 of Republic Act 3019, a penal
statute, on the ground that the act constituting the offense is allegedly vague and impermissibly broad.
It is best to stress at the outset that the overbreadth[20] and the vagueness[21] doctrines have special application only to free-speech cases. They are not
appropriate for testing the validity of penal statutes. Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza explained the reason as follows:
A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of possible chilling effect upon protected speech. The
theory is that [w]hen statutes regulate or proscribe speech and no readily apparent construction suggests itself as a vehicle for rehabilitating the statutes in a
single prosecution, the transcendent value to all society of constitutionally protected expression is deemed to justify allowing attacks on overly broad
statutes with no requirement that the person making the attack demonstrate that his own conduct could not be regulated by a statute drawn with narrow
specificity. The possible harm to society in permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that the protected speech
of others may be deterred and perceived grievances left to fester because of possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes.
This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have general in terrorem effect resulting from their very existence, and, if facial challenge
is allowed for this reason alone, the State may well be prevented from enacting laws against socially harmful conduct. In the area of criminal law, the law
cannot take chances as in the area of free speech.
xxxxxxxxx
In sum, the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are analytical tools developed for testing on their faces statutes in free speech cases or,
as they are called in American law, First Amendment cases. They cannot be made to do service when what is involved is a criminal statute. With respect to
such statute, the established rule is that one to whom application of a statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on the ground that
impliedly it might also be taken as applying to other persons or other situations in which its application might be unconstitutional. As has been pointed out,
vagueness challenges in the First Amendment context, like overbreadth challenges typically produce facial invalidation, while statutes found vague as a
matter of due process typically are invalidated [only] as applied to a particular defendant.[22] (underscoring supplied)
To this date, the Court has not declared any penal law unconstitutional on the ground of ambiguity.[23] While mentioned in passing in some cases, the
void-for-vagueness concept has yet to find direct application in our jurisdiction. In Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad,[24] the Bookkeeping Act was found
unconstitutional because it violated the equal protection clause, not because it was vague. Adiong v. Comelec[25] decreed as void a mere Comelec
Resolution, not a statute. Finally, Santiago v. Comelec[26] held that a portion of RA 6735 was unconstitutional because of undue delegation of legislative
powers, not because of vagueness.
Indeed, an on-its-face invalidation of criminal statutes would result in a mass acquittal of parties whose cases may not have even reached the courts. Such
invalidation would constitute a departure from the usual requirement of actual case and controversy and permit decisions to be made in a sterile abstract
context having no factual concreteness. In Younger v. Harris, this evil was aptly pointed out by the U.S. Supreme Court in these words:[27]
[T]he task of analyzing a proposed statute, pinpointing its deficiencies, and requiring correction of these deficiencies before the statute is put into effect, is
rarely if ever an appropriate task for the judiciary. The combination of the relative remoteness of the controversy, the impact on the legislative process of
the relief sought, and above all the speculative and amorphous nature of the required line-by-line analysis of detailed statutes, x x x ordinarily results in a
kind of case that is wholly unsatisfactory for deciding constitutional questions, whichever way they might be decided.
For this reason, generally disfavored is an on-its-face invalidation of statutes, described as a manifestly strong medicine to be employed sparingly and only
as a last resort. In determining the constitutionality of a statute, therefore, its provisions that have allegedly been violated must be examined in the light of
the conduct with which the defendant has been charged.[28]
As conduct -- not speech -- is its object, the challenged provision must be examined only as applied to the defendant, herein petitioner, and should not be
declared unconstitutional for overbreadth or vagueness.
The questioned provision reads as follows:
Section 5. Prohibition on certain relatives. It shall be unlawful for the spouse or for any relative, by consanguinity or affinity, within the third civil degree,
of the President of the Philippines, the Vice-President of the Philippines, the President of the Senate, or the Speaker of the House of Representatives, to
intervene, directly or indirectly, in any business, transaction, contract or application with the Government: Provided, That this section shall not apply to any
person who, prior to the assumption of office of any of the above officials to whom he is related, has been already dealing with the Government along the
same line of business, nor to any transaction, contract or application already existing or pending at the time of such assumption of public office, nor to any
application filed by him the approval of which is not discretionary on the part of the official or officials concerned but depends upon compliance with
requisites provided by law, or rules or regulations issued pursuant to law, nor to any act lawfully performed in an official capacity or in the exercise of a
profession.
Petitioner also claims that the phrase to intervene directly or indirectly, in any business, transaction, contract or application with the Government is vague
and violates his right to be informed of the cause and nature of the accusation against him.[29] He further complains that the provision does not specify
what acts are punishable under the term intervene, and thus transgresses his right to be presumed innocent.[30] We disagree.
Every statute is presumed valid.[31] On the party challenging its validity weighs heavily the onerous task of rebutting this presumption.[32] Any
reasonable doubt about the validity of the law should be resolved in favor of its constitutionality.[33] To doubt is to sustain, as tersely put by Justice George
Malcolm. In Garcia v. Executive Secretary,[34] the rationale for the presumption of constitutionality was explained by this Court thus:
The policy of the courts is to avoid ruling on constitutional questions and to presume that the acts of the political departments are valid in the absence of a
clear and unmistakable showing to the contrary. To doubt is to sustain. This presumption is based on the doctrine of separation of powers which enjoins
upon each department a becoming respect for the acts of the other departments. The theory is that as the joint act of Congress and the President of the
Philippines, a law has been carefully studied and determined to be in accordance with the fundamental law before it was finally enacted.[35]
In the instant case, petitioner has miserably failed to overcome such presumption. This Court has previously laid down the test for determining whether a
statute is vague, as follows:
x x x [A] statute establishing a criminal offense must define the offense with sufficient definiteness that persons of ordinary intelligence can understand
what conduct is prohibited by the statute. It can only be invoked against that species of legislation that is utterly vague on its face, i.e., that which cannot be
clarified either by a saving clause or by construction.
A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning
and differ in its application. In such instance, the statute is repugnant to the Constitution in two (2) respects - it violates due process for failure to accord
persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of what conduct to avoid; and, it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its
provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.[36] But the doctrine does not apply as against legislations that are merely couched
in imprecise language but which nonetheless specify a standard though defectively phrased; or to those that are apparently ambiguous yet fairly applicable
to certain types of activities. The first may be saved by proper construction, while no challenge may be mounted as against the second whenever directed
against such activities.[37] With more reason, the doctrine cannot be invoked where the assailed statute is clear and free from ambiguity, as in this case.
The test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for uncertainty is whether the language conveys a sufficiently definite warning as to the
proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practice.[38] It must be stressed, however, that the vagueness doctrine merely requires a
reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld - not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude, as petitioner seems to suggest. Flexibility,
rather than meticulous specificity, is permissible as long as the metes and bounds of the statute are clearly delineated. An act will not be held invalid merely
because it might have been more explicit in its wordings or detailed in its provisions, especially where, because of the nature of the act, it would be
impossible to provide all the details in advance as in all other statutes.[39]
A simpler test was decreed in Dans v. People,[40] in which the Court said that there was nothing vague about a penal law that adequately answered the
basic query What is the violation?[41] Anything beyond -- the hows and the whys -- are evidentiary matters that the law itself cannot possibly disclose, in
view of the uniqueness of every case.[42]
The question What is the violation? is sufficiently answered by Section 5 of RA 3019, as follows:
1. The offender is a spouse or any relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree of the President of the Philippines, the Vice-
President of the Philippines, the President of the Senate, or the Speaker of the House of Representatives; and
2. The offender intervened directly or indirectly in any business, transaction, contract or application with the government.
Applicability of
Statutory Construction
As to petitioners claim that the term intervene is vague, this Court agrees with the Office of the Solicitor General that the word can easily be understood
through simple statutory construction. The absence of a statutory definition of a term used in a statute will not render the law void for vagueness, if the
meaning can be determined through the judicial function of construction.[43] Elementary is the principle that words should be construed in their ordinary
and usual meaning.
x x x. A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because general terms are used therein, or because of the employment of terms without defining
them;[44] much less do we have to define every word we use. Besides, there is no positive constitutional or statutory command requiring the legislature to
define each and every word in an enactment. Congress is not restricted in the form of expression of its will, and its inability to so define the words
employed in a statute will not necessarily result in the vagueness or ambiguity of the law so long as the legislative will is clear, or at least, can be gathered
from the whole act x x x.
x x x [I]t is a well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics that words of a statute will be interpreted in their natural, plain and ordinary acceptation and
signification,[45] unless it is evident that the legislature intended a technical or special legal meaning to those words.[46] The intention of the lawmakers -
who are, ordinarily, untrained philologists and lexicographers - to use statutory phraseology in such a manner is always presumed.[47]
The term intervene should therefore be understood in its ordinary acceptation, which is to to come between.[48] Criminally liable is anyone covered in the
enumeration of Section 5 of RA 3019 -- any person who intervenes in any manner in any business, transaction, contract or application with the
government. As we have explained, it is impossible for the law to provide in advance details of how such acts of intervention could be performed. But the
courts may pass upon those details once trial is concluded. Thus, the alleged vagueness of intervene is not a ground to quash the information prior to the
commencement of the trial.
In sum, the Court holds that the challenged provision is not vague, and that in any event, the overbreath and void for vagueness doctrines are not applicable
to this case.
Second Issue:
Allegedly Vague Information
Other than arguing on the alleged intrinsic vagueness of intervene, petitioner further contends that the Information itself is also unconstitutionally vague,
because it does not specify the acts of intervention that he supposedly performed.[49] Again, we disagree.
When allegations in the information are vague or indefinite, the remedy of the accused is not a motion to quash, but a motion for a bill of particulars.[50]
The pertinent provision in the Rules of Court is Section 9 of Rule 116, which we quote:
Section 9. Bill of particulars. -- The accused may, before arraignment, move for a bill of particulars to enable him properly to plead and prepare for trial.
The motion shall specify the alleged defects of the complaint or information and the details desired.
The rule merely requires the information to describe the offense with sufficient particularity as to apprise the accused of what they are being charged with
and to enable the court to pronounce judgment. [51] The particularity must be such that persons of ordinary intelligence may immediately know what is
meant by the information.[52]
While it is fundamental that every element of the offense must be alleged in the information,[53] matters of evidence -- as distinguished from the facts
essential to the nature of the offense -- need not be averred.[54] Whatever facts and circumstances must necessarily be alleged are to be determined by
reference to the definition and the essential elements of the specific crimes.[55]
In the instant case, a cursory reading of the Information shows that the elements of a violation of Section 5 of RA 3019 have been stated sufficiently.
Likewise, the allegations describe the offense committed by petitioner with such particularity as to enable him to prepare an intelligent defense. Details of
the acts he committed are evidentiary matters that need not be alleged in the Information.
Third Issue:
Preliminary Investigation
Clearly, petitioner already brought the issue of lack of preliminary investigation when he questioned before this Court in GR No. 128317 the
Sandiganbayans Order giving him 15 days to file a Motion for Reinvestigation with the Office of the Special Prosecutor.[56] Citing Cojuangco v.
Presidential Commission on Good Government,[57] he undauntedly averred that he was deprived of his right to a preliminary investigation, because the
PCGG acted both as complainant and as investigator.[58]
In the case cited above, this Court declared that while PCGG had the power to conduct a preliminary investigation, the latter could not do so with the cold
neutrality of an impartial judge in cases in which it was the agency that had gathered evidence and subsequently filed the complaint.[59] On that basis, this
Court nullified the preliminary investigation conducted by PCGG and directed the transmittal of the records to the Ombudsman for appropriate action.
It is readily apparent that Cojuangco does not support the quashal of the Information against herein petitioner. True, the PCGG initiated the present
Complaint against him; hence, it could not properly conduct the preliminary investigation. However, he was accorded his rights -- the Sandiganbayan
suspended the trial and afforded him a reinvestigation by the Ombudsman. The procedure outlined in Cojuangco was thus followed.
The Sandiganbayans actions are in accord also with Raro v. Sandiganbayan,[60] which held that the failure to conduct a valid preliminary investigation
would not warrant the quashal of an information. If the information has already been filed, the proper procedure is for the Sandiganbayan to hold the trial
in abeyance while the preliminary investigation is being conducted or completed.[61]
Fourth Issue:
Prescription
The issue of prescription was the principal basis of the Motion to Quash filed by petitioner with the Sandiganbayan on October 8, 1999.[62] Such issue
should be disregarded at this stage, since he failed to challenge its ruling debunking his Motion within the 60-day period for the filing of a petition for
certiorari. A party may not circumvent this rule by filing a subsequent motion that raises the same issue and the same arguments.
Furthermore, it is easy to see why this argument being raised by petitioner is utterly unmeritorious. He points out that according to the Information, the
offense was committed during the period from July 16, 1975 to July 29, 1975. He argues that when the Information was filed on July 12, 1989,[63]
prescription had already set in, because the prescriptive period for a violation of Republic Act No. 3019 is only ten (10) years from the time the offense was
allegedly committed. The increase of this prescriptive period to fifteen (15) years took effect only on March 16, 1982, upon the enactment of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 195.[64]
Act No. 3326, as amended,[65] governs the prescription of offenses penalized by special laws. Its pertinent provision reads:
Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same not be known at the time, from the
discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed
for reasons not constituting jeopardy.
Consistent with the provision quoted above, this Court has previously reckoned the prescriptive period of cases involving RA 3019 (committed prior to the
February 1986 EDSA Revolution) from the discovery of the violation.[66] In Republic v. Desierto, the Court explained:
This issue confronted this Court anew, albeit in a larger scale, in Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto. In the said
recent case, the Board of Directors of the Philippine Seeds, Inc. and Development Bank of the Philippines were charged with violation of paragraphs (e)
and (g) of Section 3 of RA No. 3019, by the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans, created by then President Fidel V. Ramos to
investigate and to recover the so-called Behest Loans, where the Philippine Government guaranteed several foreign loans to corporations and entities
connected with the former President Marcos. x x x In holding that the case had not yet prescribed, this Court ruled that:
In the present case, it was well-nigh impossible for the State, the aggrieved party, to have known the violations of RA No. 3019 at the time the questioned
transactions were made because, as alleged, the public officials concerned connived or conspired with the beneficiaries of the loans. Thus, we agree with
the COMMITTEE that the prescriptive period for the offenses with which the respondents in OMB-0-96-0968 were charged should be computed from the
discovery of the commission thereof and not from the day of such commission.
xxxxxxxxx
People v. Duque is more in point, and what was stated there stands reiteration: In the nature of things, acts made criminal by special laws are frequently not
immoral or obviously criminal in themselves; for this reason, the applicable statute requires that if the violation of the special law is not known at the time,
the prescription begins to run only from the discovery thereof, i.e., discovery of the unlawful nature of the constitutive act or acts. (Italics supplied)
There are striking parallelisms between the said Behest Loans Case and the present one which lead us to apply the ruling of the former to the latter. First,
both cases arose out of seemingly innocent business transactions; second, both were discovered only after the government created bodies to investigate
these anomalous transactions; third, both involve prosecutions for violations of RA No. 3019; and, fourth, in both cases, it was sufficiently raised in the
pleadings that the respondents conspired and connived with one another in order to keep the alleged violations hidden from public scrutiny.
This Courts pronouncement in the case of Domingo v. Sandiganbayan is quite relevant and instructive as to the date when the discovery of the offense
should be reckoned, thus:
In the present case, it was well-nigh impossible for the government, the aggrieved party, to have known the violations committed at the time the questioned
transactions were made because both parties to the transactions were allegedly in conspiracy to perpetuate fraud against the government. The alleged
anomalous transactions could only have been discovered after the February 1986 Revolution when one of the original respondents, then President
Ferdinand Marcos, was ousted from office. Prior to said date, no person would have dared to question the legality or propriety of those transactions. Hence,
the counting of the prescriptive period would commence from the date of discovery of the offense, which could have been between February 1986 after the
EDSA Revolution and 26 May 1987 when the initiatory complaint was filed.[67]
The above pronouncement is squarely applicable to the present case. The general rule that prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of
the crime cannot apply to the present case. It is not legally prudent to charge the State, the aggrieved party, with knowledge of the violation of RA 3019 at
the time the alleged intervention was made. The accused is the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos brother-in-law. He was charged with intervening in a
sale involving a private corporation, the majority stocks of which was allegedly owned by President Marcos.
Prior to February 1986, no person was expected to have seriously dared question the legality of the sale or would even have thought of investigating
petitioners alleged involvement in the transaction. It was only after the creation[68] of PCGG[69] and its exhaustive investigations that the alleged crime
was discovered. This led to the initiation on November 29, 1988 of a Complaint against former President Marcos and petitioner for violation of the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Consequently, the filing of the Information on July 12, 1989 was well within the prescriptive period of ten years from the
discovery of the offense.
Fifth Issue
Immunity from Prosecution
Petitioner argues that he enjoys derivative immunity, because he allegedly served as a high-ranking naval officer -- specifically, as naval aide-de-camp -- of
former President Marcos.[70] He relies on Section 17 of Article VII of the 1973 Constitution, as amended, which we quote:
The President shall be immune from suit during his tenure. Thereafter, no suit whatsoever shall lie for official acts done by him or by others pursuant to his
specific orders during his tenure.
xxxxxxxxx
As the Sandiganbayan aptly pointed out, the above provision is not applicable to petitioner because the immunity amendment became effective only in
1981 while the alleged crime happened in 1975.
In Estrada v. Desierto,[71] this Court exhaustively traced the origin of executive immunity in order to determine the extent of its applicability. We
explained therein that executive immunity applied only during the incumbency of a President. It could not be used to shield a non-sitting President from
prosecution for alleged criminal acts done while sitting in office. The reasoning of petitioner must therefore fail, since he derives his immunity from one
who is no longer sitting as President. Verily, the felonious acts of public officials and their close relatives are not acts of the State, and the officer who acts
illegally is not acting as such but stands on the same footing as any other trespasser.
In sum, petitioner utterly fails to show that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in issuing the assailed Resolutions.[72] On the contrary, it
acted prudently, in accordance with law and jurisprudence.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DISMISSED, and the questioned Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Quisumbing, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Puno, Ynares-Santiago, and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., in the result.
Corona, J., on leave.
Tinga, J., in the result. Please see separate opinion.
Chico-Nazario, J., no part. Ponente of assailed SB Resolutions.

[1] Rollo, pp. 3-55.

[2] Id., pp. 56-62.
[3] Id., pp. 63-68. Fifth Division. Penned by Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario (chairman), with the concurrence of Justices Ma. Cristina G. Cortez-Estrada
and Francisco H. Villaruz Jr. (members).
[4] Sandiganbayan Resolution, p. 5; rollo, p. 62.
[5] Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
[6] Sandiganbayan Resolution, pp. 1-3; rollo, pp. 56-60.
[7] Id., p. 60.
[8] Ibid.
[9] Id., p. 64.
[10] Id., p. 66.
[11] This case was deemed submitted for resolution on March 6, 2003, upon this Courts receipt of petitioners Memorandum, signed by Atty. Enrico Q.
Fernando. The Memorandum of the Office of the Ombudsman, signed by Deputy Special Prosecutor Robert E. Kallos, Director Rodrigo V. Coquia, and
Special Prosecution Officer Elvira C. Chua, was received by this Court on January 30, 2003. The Memorandum of the Office of the Solicitor General,
signed by Solicitor General Alfredo L. Benipayo, Assistant Solicitor General Alexander G. Gesmundo, and Associate Solicitor Raymond C. de Lemos, was
received on February 19, 2003.
[12] Petitioners Memorandum, p. 6.
[13] On October 8, 1999, petitioner had already filed a Motion to Quash, which was denied by the Sandiganbayan on February 9, 2000. Then on June 19,
2001, he filed a Motion to Dismiss.
[14] A motion for reconsideration is generally required prior to the filing of a petition for certiorari to allow the tribunal an opportunity to correct its
assigned errors (Lasco v. United Nations Revolving Fund for Natural Resources Exploration, 241 SCRA 681, 684, February 23, 1995; Butuan Bay Wood
Export Corp. v. CA, 297 SCRA 297, 305, April 28, 1980). Being interlocutory, the order denying a motion to quash is not appealable. The Order may,
however, be reviewed in the ordinary course of law by an appeal from the judgment after trial. (Tan Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, 354 Phil. 463, 470, July 10,
1998; Cruz v. CA, 194 SCRA 145, 152, February 18, 1991; Bulaong v. CA, 181 SCRA 618, 622, January 30, 1990; Gamboa v. Cruz, 162 Phil. 642, 652,
June 27, 1988.)
[15] 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
[16] Tan Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, 354 Phil. 463, 470, July 10, 1998; Cruz v. CA, 194 SCRA 145, 152, February 18, 1991; Bulaong v. CA, 181 SCRA 618, 622,
January 30, 1990.
[17] Governed by Rule 117.
[18] Under Rule 16.
[19] 9, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, states: The failure of the accused to assert any ground of a motion to quash before he pleads to the complaint or
information, either because he did not file a motion to quash or failed to allege the same in said motion, shall be deemed a waiver of any objections except
those based on the grounds provided for in paragraphs (a), (b), (g) and (i) of section 3 of this Rule. The exceptions refer to the following grounds: the facts
do not constitute an offense, lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged, extinction of the offense or penalty, and double jeopardy.
[20] The overbreadth doctrine x x x decrees that a governmental purpose may not be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby
invade the area of protected freedoms. Separate Opinion of Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, 421 Phil. 290, 430, November
19, 2001 (citing NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 307, 12 L. Ed. 2d 325, 338 [1958]; Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 5 L. Ed. 2d 231 [1960]).
[21] The void-for-vagueness doctrine states that a statute which either forbids or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of due process of law. Separate Opinion of Mr.
Justice Mendoza in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan 421 Phil. 290, 429-430, November 19, 2001 (citing Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391, 70
L. Ed. 328 [1926]; in turn cited in Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Assn v. City Mayor, 20 SCRA 849, 867 [1967]).
[22] Separate Opinion of Mr. Justice Mendoza in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, supra.
[23] Separate Opinion of Mr. Justice Panganiban in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, supra.
[24] 271 US 500, June 7, 1926.
[25] 207 SCRA 712, March 31, 1992.
[26] 270 SCRA 106, March 19, 1997.
[27] 401 U.S. 37, 52-53, 27 L. Ed. 2d 669, 680 (1971), per Black, J.
[28] Separate Opinion of Mr. Justice Mendoza in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, supra.
[29] Petitioners Memorandum, p. 9.
[30] Id., p. 11.
[31] Heirs of Juancho Ardona v. Reyes, 210 Phil. 187, 207, October 26, 1983; Peralta v. Commission on Elections, 82 SCRA 30, 55, March 11, 1978;
Ermita-Malate Hotel & Motel Operations Association, Inc. v. Hon. City Mayor of Manila, 127 Phil. 306, 314, July 31, 1967.
[32] Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, supra; Heirs of Juancho Ardona v. Reyes, supra; Peralta v. Commission on Elections, supra.
[33] Heirs of Juancho Ardona v. Reyes, supra; Peralta v. Commission on Elections, supra.
[34] 204 SCRA 516, December 2, 1991.
[35] Id., p. 523, per Cruz, J.
[36] Citing People v. Nazario, 165 SCRA 186, 195-196, August 31, 1988.
[37] Ibid.
[38] Citing State v. Hill, 189 Kan 403, 369 P2d 365, 91 ALR 2d 750.
[39] Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, supra, p. 352, per Bellosillo, J.
[40] 349 Phil. 434, January 29, 1998.
[41] Id., p. 462, per Romero, J.
[42] Ibid.
[43] Caltex v. Palomar, 18 SCRA 247, September 29, 1966, Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, supra, p. 443.
[44] Citing 82 CJS 68, p. 113; People v. Ring, 70 P. 2d 281, 26 Cal. App 2d Supp. 768.
[45] Citing Mustang Lumber, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 257 SCRA 430, 448, June 18, 1996.
[46] Citing PLDT v. Eastern Telecommunications Phil., Inc., 213 SCRA 16, 26, August 27, 1992.
[47] Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, supra, pp. 347-348.
[48] Websters Third New International Dictionary, 1993 ed., p. 11.
[49] Petitioners Memorandum, p. 14.
[50] Dans v. People, supra, p. 461.
[51] Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, 427 Phil. 820, 858, February 26, 2002; People v. Arcillas, 348 SCRA 729, 733, December 27, 2000; U.S. v. Go Chanco, 23
Phil. 641, 645, December 28, 1912.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-45987 May 5, 1939
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
CAYAT, defendant-appellant.
Sinai Hamada y Cariño for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Tuason for appellee.
MORAN, J.:
Prosecuted for violation of Act No. 1639 (secs. 2 and 3), the accused, Cayat, a native of Baguio, Benguet, Mountain Province, was sentenced by the justice
of the peace court of Baguio to pay a fine of five pesos (P5) or suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. On appeal of the Court of First
Instance, the following information was filed against him:
That on or about the 25th day of January, 1937, in the City of Baguio, Commonwealth of the Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
court, the above-named accused, Cayat, being a member of the non-Christian tribes, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and illegally
receive, acquire, and have in his possession and under his control or custody, one bottle of A-1-1 gin, an intoxicating liquor, other than the so-
called native wines and liquors which the members of such tribes have been accustomed themselves to make prior to the passage of Act No.
1639.
Accused interposed a demurrer which was overruled. At the trial, he admitted all the facts alleged in the information, but pleaded not guilty to the charge
for the reasons adduced in his demurrer and submitted the case on the pleadings. The trial court found him guilty of the crime charged and sentenced him
to pay a fine of fifty pesos (P50) or supper subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. The case is now before this court on appeal. Sections 2 and 3 of
Act No. 1639 read:
SEC. 2. It shall be unlawful for any native of the Philippine Islands who is a member of a non-Christian tribe within the meaning of the Act
Numbered Thirteen hundred and ninety-seven, to buy, receive, have in his possession, or drink any ardent spirits, ale, beer, wine, or intoxicating
liquors of any kind, other than the so-called native wines and liquors which the members of such tribes have been accustomed themselves to
make prior to the passage of this Act, except as provided in section one hereof; and it shall be the duty of any police officer or other duly
authorized agent of the Insular or any provincial, municipal or township government to seize and forthwith destroy any such liquors found
 unlawfully in the possession of any member of a non-Christian tribe.
SEC. 3. Any person violating the provisions of section one or section two of this Act shall, upon conviction thereof, be punishable for each
offense by a fine of not exceeding two hundred pesos or by imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months, in the discretion of the court.
The accused challenges the constitutionality of the Act on the following grounds:
(1) That it is discriminatory and denies the equal protection of the laws;
(2) That it is violative of the due process clause of the Constitution: and.
(3) That it is improper exercise of the police power of the state.
Counsel for the appellant holds out his brief as the "brief for the non-Christian tribes." It is said that as these less civilized elements of the Filipino
population are "jealous of their rights in a democracy," any attempt to treat them with discrimination or "mark them as inferior or less capable rate or less
entitled" will meet with their instant challenge. As the constitutionality of the Act here involved is questioned for purposes thus mentioned, it becomes
imperative to examine and resolve the issues raised in the light of the policy of the government towards the non-Christian tribes adopted and consistently
followed from the Spanish times to the present, more often with sacrifice and tribulation but always with conscience and humanity.
As early as 1551, the Spanish Government had assumed an unvarying solicitous attitude toward these inhabitants, and in the different laws of the Indies,
their concentration in so-called "reducciones" (communities) have been persistently attempted with the end in view of according them the "spiritual and
temporal benefits" of civilized life. Throughout the Spanish regime, it had been regarded by the Spanish Government as a sacred "duty to conscience and
humanity" to civilize these less fortunate people living "in the obscurity of ignorance" and to accord them the "the moral and material advantages" of
community life and the "protection and vigilance afforded them by the same laws." (Decree of the Governor-General of the Philippines, Jan. 14, 1887.)
This policy had not been deflected from during the American period. President McKinley in his instructions to the Philippine Commission of April 7, 1900,
said:
In dealing with the uncivilized tribes of the Islands, the Commission should adopt the same course followed by Congress in permitting the tribes
of our North American Indians to maintain their tribal organization and government, and under which many of those tribes are now living in
peace and contentment, surrounded by civilization to which they are unable or unwilling to conform. Such tribal government should, however,
be subjected to wise and firm regulation; and, without undue or petty interference, constant and active effort should be exercised to prevent
barbarous practices and introduce civilized customs.
Since then and up to the present, the government has been constantly vexed with the problem of determining "those practicable means of bringing about
their advancement in civilization and material prosperity." (See, Act No. 253.) "Placed in an alternative of either letting them alone or guiding them in the
path of civilization," the present government "has chosen to adopt the latter measure as one more in accord with humanity and with the national
conscience." (Memorandum of Secretary of the Interior, quoted in Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil., 660, 714.) To this end, their homes and
firesides have been brought in contact with civilized communities through a network of highways and communications; the benefits of public education
have to them been extended; and more lately, even the right of suffrage. And to complement this policy of attraction and assimilation, the Legislature has
passed Act No. 1639 undoubtedly to secure for them the blessings of peace and harmony; to facilitate, and not to mar, their rapid and steady march to
civilization and culture. It is, therefore, in this light that the Act must be understood and applied.
It is an established principle of constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not equal protection of the laws is not violated by a
legislation based on reasonable classification. And the classification, to be reasonable, (1) must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) must be germane to the
purposes of the law; (3) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) must apply equally to all members of the same class. (Borgnis vs. Falk Co.,
133 N.W., 209; Lindsley vs. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61; 55 Law. ed., Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil., 660; People and
Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation vs. Vera and Cu Unjieng, 37 Off. Gaz ., 187.)
Act No. 1639 satisfies these requirements. The classification rests on real and substantial, not merely imaginary or whimsical, distinctions. It is not based
upon "accident of birth or parentage," as counsel to the appellant asserts, but upon the degree of civilization and culture. "The term 'non-Christian tribes'
refers, not to religious belief, but, in a way, to the geographical area, and, more directly, to natives of the Philippine Islands of a low grade of civilization,
usually living in tribal relationship apart from settled communities." (Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro, supra.) This distinction is unquestionably
reasonable, for the Act was intended to meet the peculiar conditions existing in the non-Christian tribes. The exceptional cases of certain members thereof
who at present have reached a position of cultural equality with their Christian brothers, cannot affect the reasonableness of the classification thus
established.
That it is germane to the purposes of law cannot be doubted. The prohibition "to buy, receive, have in his possession, or drink any ardent spirits, ale, beer,
wine, or intoxicating liquors of any kind, other than the so-called native wines and liquors which the members of such tribes have been accustomed
themselves to make prior to the passage of this Act.," is unquestionably designed to insure peace and order in and among the non-Christian tribes. It has
been the sad experience of the past, as the observations of the lower court disclose, that the free use of highly intoxicating liquors by the non-Christian
tribes have often resulted in lawlessness and crimes, thereby hampering the efforts of the government to raise their standard of life and civilization.
The law is not limited in its application to conditions existing at the time of its enactment. It is intended to apply for all times as long as those conditions
exist. The Act was not predicated, as counsel for appellant asserts, upon the assumption that the non-Christians are "impermeable to any civilizing
influence." On the contrary, the Legislature understood that the civilization of a people is a slow process and that hand in hand with it must go measures of
protection and security.
Finally, that the Act applies equally to all members of the class is evident from a perusal thereof. That it may be unfair in its operation against a certain
number non-Christians by reason of their degree of culture, is not an argument against the equality of its application.
Appellants contends that that provision of the law empowering any police officer or other duly authorized agent of the government to seize and forthwith
destroy any prohibited liquors found unlawfully in the possession of any member of the non-Christian tribes is violative of the due process of law provided
in the Constitution. But this provision is not involved in the case at bar. Besides, to constitute due process of law, notice and hearing are not always
necessary. This rule is especially true where much must be left to the discretion of the administrative officials in applying a law to particular cases.
(McGehee, Due Process of Law p. 371, cited with approval in Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro, supra.) Due process of law means simply: (1) that
there shall be a law prescribed in harmony with the general powers of the legislative department of the government; (2) that it shall be reasonable in its
operation; (3) that it shall be enforced according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed; and (4) that it shall be applicable alike to all citizens of the
state or to all of the class. (U.S. vs. Ling Su Fan, 10 Phil., 104, affirmed on appeal by the United States Supreme Court, 218 U.S., 302: 54 Law. ed., 1049.)
Thus, a person's property may be seized by the government in payment of taxes without judicial hearing; or property used in violation of law may be
confiscated (U.S. vs. Surla, 20 Phil., 163, 167), or when the property constitutes corpus delicti, as in the instant case (Moreno vs. Ago Chi, 12 Phil., 439,
442).
Neither is the Act an improper exercise of the police power of the state. It has been said that the police power is the most insistent and least limitable of all
powers of the government. It has been aptly described as a power co-extensive with self-protection and constitutes the law of overruling necessity. Any
measure intended to promote the health, peace, morals, education and good order of the people or to increase the industries of the state, develop its
resources and add to its wealth and prosperity (Barbier vs. Connolly, 113 U.S., 27), is a legitimate exercise of the police power, unless shown to be
whimsical or capricious as to unduly interfere with the rights of an individual, the same must be upheld.
Act No. 1639, as above stated, is designed to promote peace and order in the non-Christian tribes so as to remove all obstacles to their moral and
intellectual growth and, eventually, to hasten their equalization and unification with the rest of their Christian brothers. Its ultimate purpose can be no other
than to unify the Filipino people with a view to a greater Philippines.
The law, then, does not seek to mark the non-Christian tribes as "an inferior or less capable race." On the contrary, all measures thus far adopted in the
promotion of the public policy towards them rest upon a recognition of their inherent right to equality in tht enjoyment of those privileges now enjoyed by
their Christian brothers. But as there can be no true equality before the law, if there is, in fact, no equality in education, the government has endeavored, by
appropriate measures, to raise their culture and civilization and secure for them the benefits of their progress, with the ultimate end in view of placing them
with their Christian brothers on the basis of true equality. It is indeed gratifying that the non-Christian tribes "far from retrograding, are definitely asserting
themselves in a competitive world," as appellant's attorney impressively avers, and that they are "a virile, up-and -coming people eager to take their place
in the world's social scheme." As a matter of fact, there are now lawyers, doctors and other professionals educated in the best institutions here and in
America. Their active participation in the multifarious welfare activities of community life or in the delicate duties of government is certainly a source of
pride and gratification to people of the Philippines. But whether conditions have so changed as to warrant a partial or complete abrogation of the law, is a
matter which rests exclusively within the prerogative of the National Assembly to determine. In the constitutional scheme of our government, this court can
go no farther than to inquire whether the Legislature had the power to enact the law. If the power exists, and we hold it does exist, the wisdom of the policy
adopted, and the adequacy under existing conditions of the measures enacted to forward it, are matters which this court has no authority to pass upon. And,
if in the application of the law, the educated non-Christians shall incidentally suffer, the justification still exists in the all-comprehending principle of salus
populi suprema est lex. When the public safety or the public morals require the discontinuance of a certain practice by certain class of persons, the hand of
the Legislature cannot be stayed from providing for its discontinuance by any incidental inconvenience which some members of the class may suffer. The
private interests of such members must yield to the paramount interests of the nation (Cf. Boston Beer Co. vs. Mass., 97 U.S., 25; 24 law. ed., 989).
Judgment is affirmed, with costs against appellant.
Avanceña, C.J., Villa-Real, Imperial, Diaz, Laurel, and Conception, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 113811 October 7, 1994

ISHMAEL HIMAGAN, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and HON. JUDGE HILARIO MAPAYO, RTC, Br. 11, Davao City, respondents.
Victorio S. Advincula for petitioner.

KAPUNAN, J.:
Petitioner, a policeman assigned with the medical company of the Philippine National Police Regional Headquarters at Camp Catitigan,
Davao City, was implicated in the killing of Benjamin Machitar, Jr. and the attempted murder of Bernabe Machitar. After the informations for
murder1 and attempted murder2 were filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 11, Davao City, on September 16, 1992, the trial court
issued an Order suspending petitioner until the termination of the case on the basis of Section 47, R.A. 6975, otherwise known as
Department of Interior and Local Government Act of 1990, which provides:
Sec. 47. Preventive Suspension Pending Criminal Case. — Upon the filing of a complaint or information sufficient in form
and substance against a member of the PNP for grave felonies where the penalty imposed by law is six (6) years and
one (1) day or more, the court shall immediately suspend the accused from office until the case is terminated . Such case
shall be subject to continuous trial and shall be terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment of the accused
(Emphasis ours).
On October 11, 1993, petitioner filed a motion to lift the order for his suspension,3 relying on Section 42 of P.D. 807 of the Civil Service
Decree, that his suspension should be limited to ninety (90) days and, also, on our ruling in Deloso v. Sandiganbayan,4 and Layno v.
Sandiganbayan.5 In his order dated December 14, 19936 respondent judge denied the motion pointing out that under Section 47 of R.A.
6975, the accused shall be suspended from office until his case is terminated. The motion for reconsideration of the order of denial was,
likewise, denied.7 Hence, the petition for certiorari and mandamus to set aside the orders of respondent Judge and to command him to lift
petitioner's preventive suspension.
We find the petition devoid of merit.
There is no question that the case of petitioner who is charged with murder and attempted murder under the Revised Penal Code falls
squarely under Sec. 47 of RA 6975 which specifically applies to members of the PNP. In dispute however, is whether the provision limits the
period of suspension to 90 days, considering that while the first sentence of Sec. 47 provides that the accused who is charged with grave
felonies where the penalty imposed is six (6) years and one (1) day shall be suspended from office "until the case is terminated", the second
sentence of the same section mandates that the case, which shall be subject to continuous trial, shall be terminated within 90 days from the
arraignment of the accused.
Petitioner posits that as a member of the Philippine National Police, under Sec. 91 of RA 6975 which reads:
Sec. 91. The Civil Service Law and its implementing rules and regulations shall apply to all personnel of the Department.
he is covered by the Civil Service Law, particularly Sec. 42 of PD 807 of the Civil Service Decree, which limits the maximum period of
suspension to ninety (90) days, thus:
Sec. 42. Lifting of Preventive Suspension Pending Administrative Investigation. — When the administrative case against
the officer or employee under preventive suspension is not finally decided by the disciplining authority within the period of
ninety (90) days after the date of suspension of the respondent who is not a presidential appointee, the respondent shall
be automatically reinstated in the service; Provided, That when the delay in the disposition of the case is due to the fault,
negligence or petition of the respondent, the period of delay shall not be counted in computing the period of suspension
herein provided.
He claims that an imposition of preventive suspension of over 90 days is contrary to the Civil Service Law and would be a violation of his
constitutional right to equal protection of laws. He further asserts that the requirements in
Sec. 47 of R.A. 6975 that "the court shall immediately suspend the accused from office until the case is terminated" and the succeeding
sentence, "Such case shall be subject to continuous trial and shall be terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment of the accused"
are both substantive and should be taken together to mean that if the case is not terminated within 90 days, the period of preventive
suspension must be lifted because of the command that the trial must be terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment.
We disagree.
First. The language of the first sentence of Sec. 47 of R.A. 6975 is clear, plain and free from ambiguity. It gives no other meaning than that
the suspension from office of the member of the PNP charged with grave offense where the penalty is six years and one day or more shall
last until the termination of the case. The suspension cannot be lifted before the termination of the case. The second sentence of the same
Section providing that the trial must be terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment does not qualify or limit the first sentence. The
two can stand independently of each other. The first refers to the period of suspension. The second deals with the time frame within which
the trial should be finished.
Suppose the trial is not terminated within ninety days from arraignment, should the suspension of accused be lifted? The answer is certainly
no. While the law uses the mandatory word "shall" before the phrase "be terminated within ninety (90) days", there is nothing in R.A. 6975
that suggests that the preventive suspension of the accused will be lifted if the trial is not terminated within that period. Nonetheless, the
Judge who fails to decide the case within the period without justifiable reason may be subject to administrative sanctions and, in appropriate
cases where the facts so warrant, to criminal8 or civil liability.9 If the trial is unreasonably delayed without fault of the accused such that he is
deprived of his right to a speedy trial, he is not without a remedy. He may ask for the dismissal of the case. Should the court refuse to
dismiss the case, the accused can compel its dismissal by certiorari, prohibition or mandamus, or secure his liberty by habeas corpus. 10
Second. Petitioner misapplies Sec. 42 of PD 807. A meticulous reading of the section clearly shows that it refers to the lifting of preventive
suspension in pending administrative investigation, not in criminal cases, as here. What is more, Section 42 expressly limits the period of
preventive suspension to ninety (90) days. Sec. 91 of R.A. 6975 which states that "The Civil Service Law and its implementing rules shall
apply to all personnel of the Department" simply means that the provisions of the Civil Service Law and its implementing rules and
regulations are applicable to members of the Philippine National Police insofar as the provisions, rules and regulations are not inconsistent
with
R.A. 6975. Certainly, Section 42 of the Civil Service Decree which limits the preventive suspension to ninety (90) days cannot apply to
members of the PNP because Sec. 47 of R.A. 6995 provides differently, that is, the suspension where the penalty imposed by law exceeds
six (6) years shall continue until the case is terminated.
Third. Petitioner's reliance on Layno and Deloso is misplaced. These cases all stemmed from charges in violation of R.A. 3019 (1060),
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act which, unlike
R.A. 6975, is silent on the duration of the preventive suspension. Sec. 13 of R.A. 3019 reads as follows:
Suspension and loss of benefits. — Any public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information
under this Act or under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on bribery is pending in court, shall be suspended from
office. Should he be convicted by final judgment, he shall lose all retirement or gratuity benefits under any law, but if he is
acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during
suspension, unless in the meantime administrative proceedings have been filed against him.
In the case of Layno, the duly elected mayor of Lianga, Surigao del Sur, was preventively suspended after an information was filed against
him for offenses under R.A. 3019 (1060), the Anti-Graft Corrupt Practices Act. He had been suspended for four (4) months at the time he
filed a motion to lift his preventive suspension. We held that his indefinite preventive suspension violated the "equal protection clause" and
shortened his term of office. Thus:
2. Petitioner is a duly elected municipal mayor of Lianga, Surigao del Sur. His term of office does not expire until 1986.
Were it not for this information and the suspension decreed by the Sandiganbayan according to the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, he would have been all this while in the full discharge of his functions as such municipal mayor. He
was elected precisely to do so. As of October 26, 1983, he has been unable to. It is a basic assumption of the electoral
process implicit in the right of suffrage that the people are entitled to the services of elective officials of their choice. For
misfeasance or malfeasance, any of them could, of course, be proceeded against administratively or, as in this instance,
criminally. In either case, his culpability must be established. Moreover, if there be a criminal action, he is entitled to the
constitutional presumption of innocence. A preventive suspension may be justified. Its continuance, however, for an
unreasonable length of time raises a due process question. For even if thereafter he were acquitted, in the meanwhile
his right to hold office had been nullified. Clearly, there would be in such a case an injustice suffered by him. Nor is he
the only victim. There is injustice inflicted likewise on the people of Lianga. They were deprived of the services of the
man they had elected to serve as mayor. In that sense, to paraphrase Justice Cardozo, the protracted continuance of
 this preventive suspension had outrun the bounds of reason and resulted in sheer oppression. A denial of due process is
thus quite manifest. It is to avoid such an unconstitutional application that the order of suspension should be lifted.
3. Nor is it solely the denial of procedural due process that is apparent. There is likewise an equal protection question. If
the case against petitioner Layno were administrative in character the Local Government Code would be applicable. It is
therein clearly provided that while preventive suspension is allowable for the causes therein enumerated, there is this
emphatic limitation on the duration thereof: "In all cases, preventive suspension shall not extend beyond sixty days after
the start of said suspension." It may be recalled that the principle against indefinite suspension applies equally to
national government officials. So it was held in the leading case of Garcia v. Hon. Executive Secretary. According to the
opinion of Justice Barrera: "To adopt the theory of respondents that an officer appointed by the President, facing
administrative charges, can be preventively suspended indefinitely, would be to countenance a situation where the
preventive suspension can, in effect, be the penalty itself without a finding of guilt after due hearing, contrary to the
express mandate of the Constitution and the Civil Service law." Further: "In the guise of a preventive suspension, his
term of office could be shortened and he could in effect, be removed without a finding of a cause duly established after
due hearing, in violation of the Constitution. Clearly then, the policy of the law mandated by the Constitution frowns at a
suspension of indefinite duration. In this particular case, the mere fact that petitioner is facing a charge under the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act does not justify a different rule of law. To do so would be to negate the safeguard of the
equal protection guarantee. 11
The case of Deloso, likewise, involved another elective official who
was preventively suspended as provincial governor, also under RA 3019 the Anti-Graft Law. This Court, faced with similar factual
circumstances as in Layno, applied the ruling in the latter case "in relation to the principles of due process and equal protection."
It is readily apparent that Section 13 of R.A. 3019 upon which the preventive suspension of the accused in Layno and Deloso was based is
silent with respect to the duration of the preventive suspension, such that the suspension of the accused therein for a prolonged and
unreasonable length of time raised a due process question. Not so in the instant case. Petitioner is charged with murder under the Revised
Penal Code and it is undisputed that he falls squarely under Sec. 47 of R.A. 6975 which categorically states that his suspension shall last
until the case is terminated. The succeeding sentence of the same section requires the case to be subjected to continuous trial which shall
be terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment of the accused. As previously emphasized, nowhere in the law does it say that after
the lapse of the 90-day period for trial, the preventive suspension should be lifted. The law is clear, the ninety (90) days duration applies to
the trial of the case not to the suspension. Nothing else should be read into the law. When the words and phrases of the statute are clear and
unequivocal, their meaning determined from the language employed and the statute must be taken to mean exactly what it says. 12
Fourth. From the deliberations of the Bicameral Conference Committee on National Defense relative to the bill that became R.A. 6975, the
meaning of Section 47 of R.A. 6975 insofar as the period of suspension is concerned becomes all the more clear. We quote:
So other than that in that particular section, ano ba itong "Jurisdiction in Criminal Cases?" What is
this all about?
REP. ZAMORA. In case they are charged with crimes.
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). Ah, the previous one is administrative, no. Now, if it is charged
with a crime, regular courts.
SEN. GONZALES. Ano, the courts mismo ang magsasabing . . .
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). No, the jurisdiction.
REP. ZAMORA. The jurisdiction if there is robbery.
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). Okay. "Preventive Suspension Pending Criminal Case. Upon the
filing of a complaint or informations sufficient in form and substance against a member of the PNP for
grave felonies where the penalty imposed by law is six years and one day or more, the court shall
immediately suspend the accused from the office until the case is terminated."
REP. ALBANO. Where are we now Mr. Chairman.
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). Grave felonies ito e. Six years and one day or more.
SEN. SAGUISAG. Kung five years and litigation ng Supreme Court, ganoon ba and . . .?
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). Hindi, dahil iyong iba panay disciplinary iyon e.
SEN. PIMENTEL. Anong page iyan, Rene?
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). Page 29 — Preventive Suspension.
REP. GUTANG. Ang complaint kasi ng mga tao, pagka may pulis na may criminal case at may baril
pa rin at nag-uuniforme, hindi magandang tingnan e. So parang natatakot iyong mga witnesses.
SEN. GONZALES. Anyway, kung ma-exempt na rito naman siya e.
REP. GUTANG. Mayroong entitlement to reinstatement and pay. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
SEN. PIMENTEL. Dito sa "Preventive Suspension Pending Criminal Case." Okay ito but I think we
should also mandate the early termination of the case. Ibig sabihin, okay, hindi ba "the suspension of
the accused from office until the case is terminated?" Alam naman natin ang takbo ng mga kaso rito
sa ating bansa e.
REP. ZAMORA. Twenty days, okay na.
SEN. PIMENTEL. Hindi, and ibig kong sabihin, let us just assume that a case can be, as Rene
pointed out, can run to six years bago
ma-terminate, sometimes ten years pa nga e. Okay, but maybe we should mandate. . .
REP. ZAMORA. Continuous hearing.
SEN. PIMENTEL. Not only that, but the case must be terminated within a period.
REP. ALBANO. Ninety days na ho sa Supreme Court the trial.
SEN. PIMENTEL. Ha?
REP. ALBANO. The trial must be done within ninety days,
SEN. PIMENTEL. Ang ibig kong sabihin kung maari sanang ilagay rito that the case shall also be
terminated in one year from the time . . . aywan ko kung kaya nating gawin iyon.
REP. ALBANO. One solution, Mr. Chairman.
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). Criminal case? Hindi ba that has all been held as directory even
if you put it in the law?
SEN. PIMENTEL. I know, but, iyon na nga, we are looking at some solution to a particular situation.
SEN. ANGARA. Let's have continuous hearing and be terminated not later than ninety days.
REP. ZAMORA. Ang point ni Ernie, that's really only the directory. All of these, well, looks exactly the
same thing.
SEN. ANGARA. No, but at least, we will shorten it up in a case like this. We are really keen on
having it quick, swift.
SEN. PIMENTEL. Swift justice.
REP. ALBANO. Mr. Chairman.
THE CHAIRMAN. (SEN. MACEDA). Yes.
REP. ALBANO. Following the Veloso case in Anti-graft cases before the Sandiganbayan, the
preventive suspension is only ninety days. In no case shall it go beyond ninety days which can also
be applicable here because this is a preventive suspension.
SEN. PIMENTEL. No, because you can legislate at least.
SEN. SAGUISAG. But then the case may be anti-graft ha. The case filed against a policeman may
be anti-graft in nature. . .
SEN. PIMENTEL. Correct, correct, but is that a constitutional provision? Is it?
REP. ALBANO. No, but as a standard procedure.
SEN. PIMENTEL. Then you can legislate.
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). No, because this particular provision is for criminal cases. I know
anti-graft is a criminal case but here we are talking, let's say, of murder, rape, treason, robbery.
That's why it is in that context that there is a difference between a purely anti-graft case and a
criminal case which could be a serious case since it is six years and one day or more, so it must be
already a grave felony.
xxx xxx xxx
REP. ALBANO. . . .
What I mean to say is, preventive suspension, we can use the
Veloso case.
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). No, that's too short, that's what I am saying. The feeling here is,
for policeman, we have to be stricter especially if it is a criminal case.
What Rene is just trying to say is, he is agreeable that the suspension is until the case is terminated,
but he just wants some administrative balancing to expedite it. So let us study what kind of language
could be done along that line. So just on the National Police Commission . . .
SEN. ANGARA. Can I suggest a language that may reflect. . .
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). Okay, please.
SEN. ANGARA. "Such case shall be subject to continuous trial and be terminated not later than . . ."
whatever we agree.
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). Okay, so let's study that.
So if there are any further amendments to Chapter 2 on the National Police Commission. . . . . . 13
The foregoing discussions reveal the legislative intent to place on preventive suspension a member of the PNP charged with grave felonies
where the penalty imposed by law exceeds six years of imprisonment and which suspension continues until the case against him is
terminated.
The reason why members of the PNP are treated differently from the other classes of persons charged criminally or administratively insofar
as the application of the rule on preventive suspension is concerned is that policemen carry weapons and the badge of the law which can be
used to harass or intimidate witnesses against them, as succinctly brought out in the legislative discussions.
If a suspended policeman criminally charged with a serious offense is reinstated to his post while his case is pending, his victim and the
witnesses against him are obviously exposed to constant threat and thus easily cowed to silence by the mere fact that the accused is in
uniform and armed. The imposition of preventive suspension for over 90 days under Section 47 of
R.A. 6975 does not violate the suspended policeman's constitutional right to equal protection of the laws.
The equal protection clause exists to prevent undue favor or privilege. It is intended to eliminate discrimination and oppression based on
inequality. Recognizing the existence of real differences among men, the equal protection clause does not demand absolute equality. It
merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to the privileges conferred and
liabilities enforced. 14 Thus, the equal protection clause does not absolutely forbid classifications, such as the one which exists in the instant
case. If the classification is based on real and substantial differences; 15 is germane to the purpose of the law; 16 applies to all members of
the same
class; 17 and applies to current as well as future conditions, 18 the classification may not be impugned as violating the Constitution's equal
protection guarantee. A distinction based on real and reasonable considerations related to a proper legislative purpose such as that which
exists here is neither unreasonable, capricious nor unfounded.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Feliciano, Padilla and Bidin, JJ., are on leave.

# Footnotes
1 Criminal Case No. 27, 148-92, Rollo, p. 30.
2 Criminal Case No. 27, 147-92, Rollo, p. 29.
3 Rollo, pp. 32-33.
4 173 SCRA 409 (1989).
5 136 SCRA 536 (1985).
6 Rollo, pp. 24-26.
7 Id. at pp. 27-28.
8 REVISED PENAL CODE, Art. 207. The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum period shall be imposed upon
any judge guilty of malicious delay in the administration of justice.
9 CIVIL CODE, Articles 27 and 32 provide:
Art. 27. Any person suffering material or moral loss because a public servant or employee refuses or neglects, without
just cause, to perform his official duty may file an action for damages and other relief against the latter, without prejudice
to any disciplinary administrative action that may be taken.
Art. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in
any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for
damages:
xxx xxx xxx
(16) The right of the accused to have a speedy and public trial,. . . .
10 Acebedo v. Sarmiento, 36 SCRA 247; Esguerra v. de la Costa, 66 Phil. 134; Kalaw v. Apostol, 64 Phil. 852.
11 See note 5, supra, pp. 541-542.
12 Pascual v. Pascual-Bautista, 207 SCRA 567.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 128845. June 1, 2000]
INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL ALLIANCE OF EDUCATORS (ISAE), petitioner, vs. HON. LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING in his capacity as
the Secretary of Labor and Employment; HON. CRESENCIANO B. TRAJANO in his capacity as the Acting Secretary of Labor and
Employment; DR. BRIAN MACCAULEY in his capacity as the Superintendent of International School-Manila; and INTERNATIONAL
SCHOOL, INC., respondents.
DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:
Receiving salaries less than their counterparts hired abroad, the local-hires of private respondent School, mostly Filipinos, cry discrimination.
We agree. That the local-hires are paid more than their colleagues in other schools is, of course, beside the point. The point is that
employees should be given equal pay for work of equal value. That is a principle long honored in this jurisdiction. That is a principle that rests
on fundamental notions of justice. That is the principle we uphold today.
Private respondent International School, Inc. (the School, for short), pursuant to Presidential Decree 732, is a domestic educational
institution established primarily for dependents of foreign diplomatic personnel and other temporary residents.[1] To enable the School to
continue carrying out its educational program and improve its standard of instruction, Section 2(c) of the same decree authorizes the School
to
employ its own teaching and management personnel selected by it either locally or abroad, from Philippine or other
nationalities, such personnel being exempt from otherwise applicable laws and regulations attending their employment,
except laws that have been or will be enacted for the protection of employees.
Accordingly, the School hires both foreign and local teachers as members of its faculty, classifying the same into two: (1) foreign-hires and
(2) local-hires. The School employs four tests to determine whether a faculty member should be classified as a foreign-hire or a local hire:
a.....What is one's domicile?
b.....Where is one's home economy?
c.....To which country does one owe economic allegiance?
d.....Was the individual hired abroad specifically to work in the School and was the School responsible for bringing that
individual to the Philippines?[2]
Should the answer to any of these queries point to the Philippines, the faculty member is classified as a local hire; otherwise, he or she is
deemed a foreign-hire.
The School grants foreign-hires certain benefits not accorded local-hires. These include housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes, and
home leave travel allowance. Foreign-hires are also paid a salary rate twenty-five percent (25%) more than local-hires. The School justifies
the difference on two "significant economic disadvantages" foreign-hires have to endure, namely: (a) the "dislocation factor" and (b) limited
tenure. The School explains:
A foreign-hire would necessarily have to uproot himself from his home country, leave his family and friends, and take the
risk of deviating from a promising career path-all for the purpose of pursuing his profession as an educator, but this time
in a foreign land. The new foreign hire is faced with economic realities: decent abode for oneself and/or for one's family,
effective means of transportation, allowance for the education of one's children, adequate insurance against illness and
death, and of course the primary benefit of a basic salary/retirement compensation.
Because of a limited tenure, the foreign hire is confronted again with the same economic reality after his term: that he
will eventually and inevitably return to his home country where he will have to confront the uncertainty of obtaining
suitable employment after a long period in a foreign land.
The compensation scheme is simply the School's adaptive measure to remain competitive on an international level in
terms of attracting competent professionals in the field of international education.[3]
When negotiations for a new collective bargaining agreement were held on June 1995, petitioner International School Alliance of Educators,
"a legitimate labor union and the collective bargaining representative of all faculty members"[4] of the School, contested the difference in
salary rates between foreign and local-hires. This issue, as well as the question of whether foreign-hires should be included in the
appropriate bargaining unit, eventually caused a deadlock between the parties.
On September 7, 1995, petitioner filed a notice of strike. The failure of the National Conciliation and Mediation Board to bring the parties to a
compromise prompted the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) to assume jurisdiction over the dispute. On June 10, 1996, the
DOLE Acting Secretary, Crescenciano B. Trajano, issued an Order resolving the parity and representation issues in favor of the School. Then
DOLE Secretary Leonardo A. Quisumbing subsequently denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration in an Order dated March 19, 1997.
Petitioner now seeks relief in this Court.
Petitioner claims that the point-of-hire classification employed by the School is discriminatory to Filipinos and that the grant of higher salaries
to foreign-hires constitutes racial discrimination.
The School disputes these claims and gives a breakdown of its faculty members, numbering 38 in all, with nationalities other than Filipino,
who have been hired locally and classified as local hires.[5]The Acting Secretary of Labor found that these non-Filipino local-hires received
the same benefits as the Filipino local-hires:
The compensation package given to local-hires has been shown to apply to all, regardless of race. Truth to tell, there are foreigners who
have been hired locally and who are paid equally as Filipino local hires.[6]
The Acting Secretary upheld the point-of-hire classification for the distinction in salary rates:
The principle "equal pay for equal work" does not find application in the present case. The international character of the
School requires the hiring of foreign personnel to deal with different nationalities and different cultures, among the
student population.
We also take cognizance of the existence of a system of salaries and benefits accorded to foreign hired personnel which
system is universally recognized. We agree that certain amenities have to be provided to these people in order to entice
them to render their services in the Philippines and in the process remain competitive in the international market.
Furthermore, we took note of the fact that foreign hires have limited contract of employment unlike the local hires who
enjoy security of tenure. To apply parity therefore, in wages and other benefits would also require parity in other terms
and conditions of employment which include the employment contract.
 A perusal of the parties' 1992-1995 CBA points us to the conditions and provisions for salary and professional
compensation wherein the parties agree as follows:
All members of the bargaining unit shall be compensated only in accordance with Appendix C
hereof provided that the Superintendent of the School has the discretion to recruit and hire
expatriate teachers from abroad, under terms and conditions that are consistent with accepted
international practice.
Appendix C of said CBA further provides:
The new salary schedule is deemed at equity with the Overseas Recruited Staff (OSRS) salary
schedule. The 25% differential is reflective of the agreed value of system displacement and
contracted status of the OSRS as differentiated from the tenured status of Locally Recruited Staff
(LRS).
To our mind, these provisions demonstrate the parties' recognition of the difference in the status of two types of
employees, hence, the difference in their salaries.
The Union cannot also invoke the equal protection clause to justify its claim of parity. It is an established principle of
constitutional law that the guarantee of equal protection of the laws is not violated by legislation or private covenants
based on reasonable classification. A classification is reasonable if it is based on substantial distinctions and apply to all
members of the same class. Verily, there is a substantial distinction between foreign hires and local hires, the former
enjoying only a limited tenure, having no amenities of their own in the Philippines and have to be given a good
compensation package in order to attract them to join the teaching faculty of the School.[7]
We cannot agree.
That public policy abhors inequality and discrimination is beyond contention. Our Constitution and laws reflect the policy against these evils.
The Constitution[8] in the Article on Social Justice and Human Rights exhorts Congress to "give highest priority to the enactment of
measures that protect and enhance the right of all people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political inequalities." The very
broad Article 19 of the Civil Code requires every person, "in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, [to] act with
justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith."
International law, which springs from general principles of law,[9] likewise proscribes discrimination. General principles of law include
principles of equity,[10] i.e., the general principles of fairness and justice, based on the test of what is reasonable.[11] The Universal
Declaration of Human Rights,[12] the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights,[13] the International Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,[14] the Convention against Discrimination in Education,[15] the Convention (No. 111)
Concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation[16] - all embody the general principle against discrimination, the very
antithesis of fairness and justice. The Philippines, through its Constitution, has incorporated this principle as part of its national laws.
In the workplace, where the relations between capital and labor are often skewed in favor of capital, inequality and discrimination by the
employer are all the more reprehensible.
The Constitution[17] specifically provides that labor is entitled to "humane conditions of work." These conditions are not restricted to the
physical workplace - the factory, the office or the field - but include as well the manner by which employers treat their employees.
The Constitution[18] also directs the State to promote "equality of employment opportunities for all." Similarly, the Labor Code[19] provides
that the State shall "ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race or creed." It would be an affront to both the spirit and letter of
these provisions if the State, in spite of its primordial obligation to promote and ensure equal employment opportunities, closes its eyes to
unequal and discriminatory terms and conditions of employment.[20]
Discrimination, particularly in terms of wages, is frowned upon by the Labor Code. Article 135, for example, prohibits and penalizes[21] the
payment of lesser compensation to a female employee as against a male employee for work of equal value. Article 248 declares it an unfair
labor practice for an employer to discriminate in regard to wages in order to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization.
Notably, the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, supra, in Article 7 thereof, provides:
The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to the enjoyment of just and favourable
conditions of work, which ensure, in particular:
a.....Remuneration which provides all workers, as a minimum, with:
i.....Fair wages and equal remuneration for work of equal value without distinction of any kind, in
particular women being guaranteed conditions of work not inferior to those enjoyed by men, with
equal pay for equal work;
x x x.
The foregoing provisions impregnably institutionalize in this jurisdiction the long honored legal truism of "equal pay for equal work." Persons
who work with substantially equal qualifications, skill, effort and responsibility, under similar conditions, should be paid similar salaries.[22]
This rule applies to the School, its "international character" notwithstanding.
The School contends that petitioner has not adduced evidence that local-hires perform work equal to that of foreign-hires.[23] The Court
finds this argument a little cavalier. If an employer accords employees the same position and rank, the presumption is that these employees
perform equal work. This presumption is borne by logic and human experience. If the employer pays one employee less than the rest, it is
not for that employee to explain why he receives less or why the others receive more. That would be adding insult to injury. The employer
has discriminated against that employee; it is for the employer to explain why the employee is treated unfairly.
The employer in this case has failed to discharge this burden. There is no evidence here that foreign-hires perform 25% more efficiently or
effectively than the local-hires. Both groups have similar functions and responsibilities, which they perform under similar working conditions.
The School cannot invoke the need to entice foreign-hires to leave their domicile to rationalize the distinction in salary rates without violating
the principle of equal work for equal pay.
"Salary" is defined in Black's Law Dictionary (5th ed.) as "a reward or recompense for services performed." Similarly, the Philippine Legal
Encyclopedia states that "salary" is the "[c]onsideration paid at regular intervals for the rendering of services." In Songco v. National Labor
Relations Commission,[24] we said that:
"salary" means a recompense or consideration made to a person for his pains or industry in another man's business.
Whether it be derived from "salarium," or more fancifully from "sal," the pay of the Roman soldier, it carries with it the
fundamental idea of compensation for services rendered. (Emphasis supplied.)
While we recognize the need of the School to attract foreign-hires, salaries should not be used as an enticement to the prejudice of local-
hires. The local-hires perform the same services as foreign-hires and they ought to be paid the same salaries as the latter. For the same
reason, the "dislocation factor" and the foreign-hires' limited tenure also cannot serve as valid bases for the distinction in salary rates. The
dislocation factor and limited tenure affecting foreign-hires are adequately compensated by certain benefits accorded them which are not
enjoyed by local-hires, such as housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes and home leave travel allowances.
The Constitution enjoins the State to "protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare,"[25] "to afford labor full protection."[26] The
State, therefore, has the right and duty to regulate the relations between labor and capital.[27] These relations are not merely contractual but
are so impressed with public interest that labor contracts, collective bargaining agreements included, must yield to the common good.[28]
Should such contracts contain stipulations that are contrary to public policy, courts will not hesitate to strike down these stipulations.
In this case, we find the point-of-hire classification employed by respondent School to justify the distinction in the salary rates of foreign-hires
and local hires to be an invalid classification. There is no reasonable distinction between the services rendered by foreign-hires and local-
hires. The practice of the School of according higher salaries to foreign-hires contravenes public policy and, certainly, does not deserve the
sympathy of this Court.
We agree, however, that foreign-hires do not belong to the same bargaining unit as the local-hires.
A bargaining unit is "a group of employees of a given employer, comprised of all or less than all of the entire body of employees, consistent
with equity to the employer indicate to be the best suited to serve the reciprocal rights and duties of the parties under the collective
bargaining provisions of the law."[29] The factors in determining the appropriate collective bargaining unit are (1) the will of the employees
(Globe Doctrine); (2) affinity and unity of the employees' interest, such as substantial similarity of work and duties, or similarity of
compensation and working conditions (Substantial Mutual Interests Rule); (3) prior collective bargaining history; and (4) similarity of
employment status.[30] The basic test of an asserted bargaining unit's acceptability is whether or not it is fundamentally the combination
which will best assure to all employees the exercise of their collective bargaining rights.[31]
It does not appear that foreign-hires have indicated their intention to be grouped together with local-hires for purposes of collective
bargaining. The collective bargaining history in the School also shows that these groups were always treated separately. Foreign-hires have
limited tenure; local-hires enjoy security of tenure. Although foreign-hires perform similar functions under the same working conditions as the
local-hires, foreign-hires are accorded certain benefits not granted to local-hires. These benefits, such as housing, transportation, shipping
costs, taxes, and home leave travel allowance, are reasonably related to their status as foreign-hires, and justify the exclusion of the former
from the latter. To include foreign-hires in a bargaining unit with local-hires would not assure either group the exercise of their respective
collective bargaining rights.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GIVEN DUE COURSE. The petition is hereby GRANTED IN PART. The Orders of the Secretary of Labor and
Employment dated June 10, 1996 and March 19, 1997, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE insofar as they uphold the practice of
respondent School of according foreign-hires higher salaries than local-hires.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, and Pardo, JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), on official leave.
Ynares-Santiago, J., on leave.

[1] Issued on June 19, 1975 (authorizing International School, Inc. to Donate Its Real Properties to the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and
Granting It Certain Rights.)
[2] Rollo, p. 328.
[3] Id., at 324.
[4] Id., at 8.
[5] Id., at 325. The breakdown is as follows:
Americans - 17
Australian -2
Belgian -1
British -2
Burmese -1
Canadian -2
Chinese -2
French
 -1
German -1
Indian -5
Japanese -1
Malaysian -1
New Zealander -1
Spanish -1

[6] Id., at 39.

[7] Id., at 38-39.
[8] In Section 1, Article XIII thereof.
[9] Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38.
[10] M. DEFENSOR-SANTIAGO, International Law 75 (1999), citing Judge Hudson in River Meuse Case, (1937) Ser. A/B No. 70.
[11] Ibid., citing Rann of Kutch Arbitration (India vs. Pakistan), 50 ILR 2 (1968)
[12] Adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on December 10, 1948. Article 1 thereof states: "All human beings are born free and equal in
dignity and rights." Article 2 provides, "1. Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind,
such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status."
[13] Adopted by the General of the United Nations in Resolution 2200 (XXI) of 16 December 1966. Article 2 provides: "2. The States Parties to the present
Covenant undertake to guarantee that the rights enunciated in the present Covenant will be exercised without discrimination of any kind as to race, colour,
sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status."
[14] Adopted by the General assembly of the United Nations in Resolution 2106 (XX) 21 December 1965. Article 2 of the Convention states: "States
Parties condemn racial discrimination and undertake to pursue by all appropriate means and without delay a policy of eliminating racial discrimination in
all its forms and promoting understanding among all races xxx."
[15] Adopted at Paris, December 14, 1960. Under Article 3, the States Parties undertake, among others, "to abrogate any statutory provisions and any
administrative instructions and to discontinue any administrative practices which involve discrimination in education." Under Article 4, "The States Parties
to this Convention undertake further more to formulate, develop and apply a national policy which, by methods appropriate to the circumstances and to
national usage, will tend to promote equality of opportunity and of treatment in the matter of education xxx."
[16] Adopted by the General Conference of the International Labor Organization at Geneva, June 25, 1958. Article 2 provides that, "Each Member for
which this Convention is in force undertakes to declare and pursue a national policy designed to promote, by methods appropriate to national condition and
practice, equality of opportunity and treatment in respect of employment and occupation, with a view to eliminating any discrimination in respect thereof."
[17] In Article XIII, Section 3 thereof.
[18] Id.
[19] In Article 3 thereof.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 179267 June 25, 2013
JESUS C. GARCIA, Petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE RAY ALAN T. DRILON, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court-Branch 41, Bacolod City, and ROSALIE JAYPE-GARCIA,
for herself and in behalf of minor children, namely: JO-ANN, JOSEPH EDUARD, JESSE ANTHONE, all surnamed GARCIA, Respondents.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Hailed as the bastion of Christianity in Asia, the Philippines boasts of 86.8 million Filipinos- or 93 percent of a total population of 93.3 million – adhering
to the teachings of Jesus Christ. 1 Yet, the admonition for husbands to love their wives as their own bodies just as Christ loved the church and gave himself
up for her2 failed to prevent, or even to curb, the pervasiveness of violence against Filipino women. The National Commission on the Role of Filipino
Women (NCRFW) reported that, for the years 2000-2003, "female violence comprised more than 90o/o of all forms of abuse and violence and more than
90% of these reported cases were committed by the women's intimate partners such as their husbands and live-in partners." 3
Thus, on March 8, 2004, after nine (9) years of spirited advocacy by women's groups, Congress enacted Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262, entitled "An Act
Defining Violence Against Women and Their Children, Providing for Protective Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties Therefor, and for Other
Purposes." It took effect on March 27, 2004.4
R.A. 9262 is a landmark legislation that defines and criminalizes acts of violence against women and their children (VAWC) perpetrated by women's
intimate partners, i.e, husband; former husband; or any person who has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom the woman has a common
child.5 The law provides for protection orders from the barangay and the courts to prevent the commission of further acts of VAWC; and outlines the duties
and responsibilities of barangay officials, law enforcers, prosecutors and court personnel, social workers, health care providers, and other local government
officials in responding to complaints of VAWC or requests for assistance.
A husband is now before the Court assailing the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 as being violative of the equal protection and due process clauses, and an
undue delegation of judicial power to barangay officials.
The Factual Antecedents

On March 23, 2006, Rosalie Jaype-Garcia (private respondent) filed, for herself and in behalf of her minor children, a verified petition 6 (Civil Case No. 06-
797) before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City for the issuance of a Temporary Protection Order (TPO) against her husband, Jesus C. Garcia
(petitioner), pursuant to R.A. 9262. She claimed to be a victim of physical abuse; emotional, psychological, and economic violence as a result of marital
infidelity on the part of petitioner, with threats of deprivation of custody of her children and of financial support. 7
Private respondent's claims
Private respondent married petitioner in 2002 when she was 34 years old and the former was eleven years her senior. They have three (3) children, namely:
Jo-Ann J. Garcia, 17 years old, who is the natural child of petitioner but whom private respondent adopted; Jessie Anthone J. Garcia, 6 years old; and
Joseph Eduard J. Garcia, 3 years old.8
Private respondent described herself as a dutiful and faithful wife, whose life revolved around her husband. On the other hand, petitioner, who is of
Filipino-Chinese descent, is dominant, controlling, and demands absolute obedience from his wife and children. He forbade private respondent to pray, and
deliberately isolated her from her friends. When she took up law, and even when she was already working part time at a law office, petitioner trivialized her
ambitions and prevailed upon her to just stay at home. He was often jealous of the fact that his attractive wife still catches the eye of some men, at one
point threatening that he would have any man eyeing her killed.9
Things turned for the worse when petitioner took up an affair with a bank manager of Robinson's Bank, Bacolod City, who is the godmother of one of their
sons. Petitioner admitted to the affair when private respondent confronted him about it in 2004. He even boasted to the household help about his sexual
relations with said bank manager. Petitioner told private respondent, though, that he was just using the woman because of their accounts with the bank. 10
Petitioner's infidelity spawned a series of fights that left private respondent physically and emotionally wounded. In one of their quarrels, petitioner
grabbed private respondent on both arms and shook her with such force that caused bruises and hematoma. At another time, petitioner hit private
respondent forcefully on the lips that caused some bleeding. Petitioner sometimes turned his ire on their daughter, Jo-Ann, who had seen the text messages
he sent to his paramour and whom he blamed for squealing on him. He beat Jo-Ann on the chest and slapped her many times. When private respondent
decided to leave petitioner, Jo-Ann begged her mother to stay for fear that if the latter leaves, petitioner would beat her up. Even the small boys are aware
of private respondent's sufferings. Their 6-year-old son said that when he grows up, he would beat up his father because of his cruelty to private
respondent.11
All the emotional and psychological turmoil drove private respondent to the brink of despair. On December 17, 2005, while at home, she attempted suicide
by cutting her wrist. She was found by her son bleeding on the floor. Petitioner simply fled the house instead of taking her to the hospital. Private
respondent was hospitalized for about seven (7) days in which time petitioner never bothered to visit, nor apologized or showed pity on her. Since then,
private respondent has been undergoing therapy almost every week and is taking anti-depressant medications. 12
When private respondent informed the management of Robinson's Bank that she intends to file charges against the bank manager, petitioner got angry with
her for jeopardizing the manager's job. He then packed his things and told private respondent that he was leaving her for good. He even told private
respondent's mother, who lives with them in the family home, that private respondent should just accept his extramarital affair since he is not cohabiting
with his paramour and has not sired a child with her.13
Private respondent is determined to separate from petitioner but she is afraid that he would take her children from her and deprive her of financial support.
Petitioner had previously warned her that if she goes on a legal battle with him, she would not get a single centavo. 14
Petitioner controls the family businesses involving mostly the construction of deep wells. He is the President of three corporations – 326 Realty Holdings,
Inc., Negros Rotadrill Corporation, and J-Bros Trading Corporation – of which he and private respondent are both stockholders. In contrast to the absolute
control of petitioner over said corporations, private respondent merely draws a monthly salary of ₱20,000.00 from one corporation only, the Negros
Rotadrill Corporation. Household expenses amounting to not less than ₱200,000.00 a month are paid for by private respondent through the use of credit
cards, which, in turn, are paid by the same corporation together with the bills for utilities.15
On the other hand, petitioner receives a monthly salary of ₱60,000.00 from Negros Rotadrill Corporation, and enjoys unlimited cash advances and other
benefits in hundreds of thousands of pesos from the corporations. 16 After private respondent confronted him about the affair, petitioner forbade her to hold
office at JBTC Building, Mandalagan, where all the businesses of the corporations are conducted, thereby depriving her of access to full information about
said businesses. Until the filing of the petition a quo, petitioner has not given private respondent an accounting of the businesses the value of which she had
helped raise to millions of pesos.17
Action of the RTC of Bacolod City
Finding reasonable ground to believe that an imminent danger of violence against the private respondent and her children exists or is about to recur, the
RTC issued a TPO18 on March 24, 2006 effective for thirty (30) days, which is quoted hereunder:
Respondent (petitioner herein), Jesus Chua Garcia, is hereby:
a) Ordered to remove all his personal belongings from the conjugal dwelling or family home within 24 hours from receipt of the Temporary
Restraining Order and if he refuses, ordering that he be removed by police officers from the conjugal dwelling; this order is enforceable
notwithstanding that the house is under the name of 236 Realty Holdings Inc. (Republic Act No. 9262 states "regardless of ownership"), this is
to allow the Petitioner (private respondent herein) to enter the conjugal dwelling without any danger from the Respondent.
After the Respondent leaves or is removed from the conjugal dwelling, or anytime the Petitioner decides to return to the conjugal dwelling to
remove things, the Petitioner shall be assisted by police officers when re-entering the family home.
The Chief of Police shall also give the Petitioner police assistance on Sunday, 26 March 2006 because of the danger that the Respondent will
attempt to take her children from her when he arrives from Manila and finds out about this suit.
b) To stay away from the petitioner and her children, mother and all her household help and driver from a distance of 1,000 meters, and shall not
 enter the gate of the subdivision where the Petitioner may be temporarily residing.
c) Not to harass, annoy, telephone, contact or otherwise communicate with the Petitioner, directly or indirectly, or through other persons, or
contact directly or indirectly her children, mother and household help, nor send gifts, cards, flowers, letters and the like. Visitation rights to the
children may be subject of a modified TPO in the future.
d) To surrender all his firearms including a .9MM caliber firearm and a Walther PPK and ordering the Philippine National Police Firearms and
Explosives Unit and the Provincial Director of the PNP to cancel all the Respondent's firearm licenses. He should also be ordered to surrender
any unlicensed firearms in his possession or control.
e) To pay full financial support for the Petitioner and the children, including rental of a house for them, and educational and medical expenses.
f) Not to dissipate the conjugal business.
g) To render an accounting of all advances, benefits, bonuses and other cash he received from all the corporations from 1 January 2006 up to 31
March 2006, which himself and as President of the corporations and his Comptroller, must submit to the Court not later than 2 April 2006.
Thereafter, an accounting of all these funds shall be reported to the court by the Comptroller, copy furnished to the Petitioner, every 15 days of
the month, under pain of Indirect Contempt of Court.
h) To ensure compliance especially with the order granting support pendente lite, and considering the financial resources of the Respondent and
his threat that if the Petitioner sues she will not get a single centavo, the Respondent is ordered to put up a BOND TO KEEP THE PEACE in the
amount of FIVE MILLION PESOS, in two sufficient sureties.

On April 24, 2006, upon motion19 of private respondent, the trial court issued an amended TPO, 20 effective for thirty (30) days, which included
the following additional provisions:
i) The petitioners (private respondents herein) are given the continued use of the Nissan Patrol and the Starex Van which they are using in
Negros Occidental.
j) The petitioners are given the continued use and occupation of the house in Parañaque, the continued use of the Starex van in Metro Manila,
whenever they go to Manila.
k) Respondent is ordered to immediately post a bond to keep the peace, in two sufficient sureties.
l) To give monthly support to the petitioner provisionally fixed in the sum of One Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (Php 150,000.00) per month
plus rental expenses of Fifty Thousand Pesos (Php 50,000.00) per month until the matter of support could be finally resolved.

Two days later, or on April 26, 2006, petitioner filed an Opposition to the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Renewal of the TPO 21 seeking the denial of the
renewal of the TPO on the grounds that it did not (1) comply with the three-day notice rule, and (2) contain a notice of hearing. He further asked that the
TPO be modified by (1) removing one vehicle used by private respondent and returning the same to its rightful owner, the J-Bros Trading Corporation, and
(2) cancelling or reducing the amount of the bond from ₱5,000,000.00 to a more manageable level at ₱100,000.00.

Subsequently, on May 23, 2006, petitioner moved22 for the modification of the TPO to allow him visitation rights to his children.
On May 24, 2006, the TPO was renewed and extended yet again, but subject only to the following modifications prayed for by private respondent:
a) That respondent (petitioner herein) return the clothes and other personal belongings of Rosalie and her children to Judge Jesus Ramos, co-
counsel for Petitioner, within 24 hours from receipt of the Temporary Protection Order by his counsel, otherwise be declared in Indirect
Contempt of Court;
b) Respondent shall make an accounting or list of furniture and equipment in the conjugal house in Pitimini St., Capitolville Subdivision,
Bacolod City within 24 hours from receipt of the Temporary Protection Order by his counsel;
c) Ordering the Chief of the Women's Desk of the Bacolod City Police Headquarters to remove Respondent from the conjugal dwelling within
eight (8) hours from receipt of the Temporary Protection Order by his counsel, and that he cannot return until 48 hours after the petitioners have
left, so that the petitioner Rosalie and her representatives can remove things from the conjugal home and make an inventory of the household
furniture, equipment and other things in the conjugal home, which shall be submitted to the Court.
d) Deliver full financial support of Php200,000.00 and Php50,000.00 for rental and Php25,000.00 for clothes of the three petitioners (sic)
children within 24 hours from receipt of the Temporary Protection Order by his counsel, otherwise be declared in indirect contempt of Court;
e) That respondent surrender his two firearms and all unlicensed firearms to the Clerk of Court within 24 hours from receipt of the Temporary
Protection Order by his counsel;

f) That respondent shall pay petitioner educational expenses of the children upon presentation of proof of payment of such expenses. 23
Claiming that petitioner continued to deprive them of financial support; failed to faithfully comply with the TPO; and committed new acts of harassment
against her and their children, private respondent filed another application 24 for the issuance of a TPO ex parte. She alleged inter
alia that petitioner contrived a replevin suit against himself by J-Bros Trading, Inc., of which the latter was purportedly no longer president, with the end in
view of recovering the Nissan Patrol and Starex Van used by private respondent and the children. A writ of replevin was served upon private respondent by
a group of six or seven policemen with long firearms that scared the two small boys, Jessie Anthone and Joseph Eduard. 25
While Joseph Eduard, then three years old, was driven to school, two men allegedly attempted to kidnap him, which incident traumatized the boy resulting
in his refusal to go back to school. On another occasion, petitioner allegedly grabbed their daughter, Jo-Ann, by the arm and threatened her. 26 The incident
was reported to the police, and Jo-Ann subsequently filed a criminal complaint against her father for violation of R.A. 7610, also known as the "Special
Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act."
Aside from the replevin suit, petitioner's lawyers initiated the filing by the housemaids working at the conjugal home of a complaint for kidnapping and
illegal detention against private respondent. This came about after private respondent, armed with a TPO, went to said home to get her and her children's
belongings. Finding some of her things inside a housemaid's (Sheryl Jamola) bag in the maids' room, private respondent filed a case for qualified theft
against Jamola.27

On August 23, 2006, the RTC issued a TPO,28 effective for thirty (30) days, which reads as follows:
Respondent (petitioner herein), Jesus Chua Garcia, is hereby:
1) Prohibited from threatening to commit or committing, personally or through another, acts of violence against the offended party;
2) Prohibited from harassing, annoying, telephoning, contacting or otherwise communicating in any form with the offended party, either directly
or indirectly;
3) Required to stay away, personally or through his friends, relatives, employees or agents, from all the Petitioners Rosalie J. Garcia and her
children, Rosalie J. Garcia's three brothers, her mother Primitiva Jaype, cook Novelita Caranzo, driver Romeo Hontiveros, laundrywoman
Mercedita Bornales, security guard Darwin Gayona and the petitioner's other household helpers from a distance of 1,000 meters, and shall not
enter the gate of the subdivision where the Petitioners are temporarily residing, as well as from the schools of the three children; Furthermore,
that respondent shall not contact the schools of the children directly or indirectly in any manner including, ostensibly to pay for their tuition or
other fees directly, otherwise he will have access to the children through the schools and the TPO will be rendered nugatory;
4) Directed to surrender all his firearms including .9MM caliber firearm and a Walther PPK to the Court;
5) Directed to deliver in full financial support of Php200,000.00 a month and Php50,000.00 for rental for the period from August 6 to September
6, 2006; and support in arrears from March 2006 to August 2006 the total amount of Php1,312,000.00;
6) Directed to deliver educational expenses for 2006-2007 the amount of Php75,000.00 and Php25,000.00;
7) Directed to allow the continued use of a Nissan Patrol with Plate No. FEW 508 and a Starex van with Plate No. FFD 991 and should the
respondent fail to deliver said vehicles, respondent is ordered to provide the petitioner another vehicle which is the one taken by J Bros Tading;
8) Ordered not to dissipate, encumber, alienate, sell, lease or otherwise dispose of the conjugal assets, or those real properties in the name of
Jesus Chua Garcia only and those in which the conjugal partnership of gains of the Petitioner Rosalie J. Garcia and respondent have an interest
in, especially the conjugal home located in No. 14, Pitimini St., Capitolville Subdivision, Bacolod City, and other properties which are conjugal
assets or those in which the conjugal partnership of gains of Petitioner Rosalie J. Garcia and the respondent have an interest in and listed in
Annexes "I," "I-1," and "I-2," including properties covered by TCT Nos. T-186325 and T-168814;
9) Ordered that the Register of Deeds of Bacolod City and E.B. Magalona shall be served a copy of this TEMPORARY PROTECTION ORDER
and are ordered not to allow the transfer, sale, encumbrance or disposition of these above-cited properties to any person, entity or corporation
without the personal presence of petitioner Rosalie J. Garcia, who shall affix her signature in the presence of the Register of Deeds, due to the
fear of petitioner Rosalie that her signature will be forged in order to effect the encumbrance or sale of these properties to defraud her or the
conjugal partnership of gains.

In its Order29 dated September 26, 2006, the trial court extended the aforequoted TPO for another ten (10) days, and gave petitioner a period of five (5)
days within which to show cause why the TPO should not be renewed, extended, or modified. Upon petitioner's manifestation, 30 however, that he has not
received a copy of private respondent's motion to modify/renew the TPO, the trial court directed in its Order 31 dated October 6, 2006 that petitioner be
furnished a copy of said motion. Nonetheless, an Order 32 dated a day earlier, October 5, had already been issued renewing the TPO dated August 23, 2006.
The pertinent portion is quoted hereunder:
xxxx
x x x it appearing further that the hearing could not yet be finally terminated, the Temporary Protection Order issued on August 23, 2006 is hereby renewed
and extended for thirty (30) days and continuously extended and renewed for thirty (30) days, after each expiration, until further orders, and subject to such
modifications as may be ordered by the court.
After having received a copy of the foregoing Order, petitioner no longer submitted the required comment to private respondent's motion for renewal of the
TPO arguing that it would only be an "exercise in futility."33
Proceedings before the CA

During the pendency of Civil Case No. 06-797, petitioner filed before the Court of Appeals (CA) a petition 34 for prohibition (CA-G.R. CEB-SP. No.
01698), with prayer for injunction and temporary restraining order, challenging (1) the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 for being violative of the due process
and the equal protection clauses, and (2) the validity of the modified TPO issued in the civil case for being "an unwanted product of an invalid law."

On May 26, 2006, the appellate court issued a 60-day Temporary Restraining Order 36 (TRO) against the enforcement of the TPO, the amended TPOs and
other orders pursuant thereto.

Subsequently, however, on January 24, 2007, the appellate court dismissed 36 the petition for failure of petitioner to raise the constitutional issue in his
pleadings before the trial court in the civil case, which is clothed with jurisdiction to resolve the same. Secondly, the challenge to the validity
of R.A. 9262 through a petition for prohibition seeking to annul the protection orders issued by the trial court constituted a collateral attack on said law.

His motion for reconsideration of the foregoing Decision having been denied in the Resolution 37 dated August 14, 2007, petitioner is now before us
alleging that –
The Issues
I.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PETITION ON THE THEORY THAT THE ISSUE OF
CONSTITUTIONALITY WAS NOT RAISED AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY AND THAT, THE PETITION CONSTITUTES A
 COLLATERAL ATTACK ON THE VALIDITY OF THE LAW.

II.

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR IN FAILING TO CONCLUDE THAT R.A. 9262 IS
DISCRIMINATORY, UNJUST, AND VIOLATIVE OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE.

III.

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE MISTAKE IN NOT FINDING THAT R.A. 9262 RUNS COUNTER TO THE DUE
PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION.

IV.

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE LAW DOES VIOLENCE TO THE POLICY OF THE STATE TO
PROTECT THE FAMILY AS A BASIC SOCIAL INSTITUTION.

V.

THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT DECLARING R.A. No. 9262 AS INVALID AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL
BECAUSE IT ALLOWS AN UNDUE DELEGATION OF JUDICIAL POWER TO THE BARANGAY OFFICIALS. 38

The Ruling of the Court

Before delving into the arguments propounded by petitioner against the constitutionality of R.A. 9262, we shall first tackle the propriety of the dismissal by
the appellate court of the petition for prohibition (CA-G.R. CEB-SP. No. 01698) filed by petitioner.
As a general rule, the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity so that if not raised in the pleadings, ordinarily it may not be
raised in the trial, and if not raised in the trial court, it will not be considered on appeal. 39 Courts will not anticipate a question of constitutional law in
advance of the necessity of deciding it.40
In defending his failure to attack the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 before the RTC of Bacolod City, petitioner argues that the Family Court has limited
authority and jurisdiction that is "inadequate to tackle the complex issue of constitutionality."41
We disagree.
Family Courts have authority and jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of a statute.
At the outset, it must be stressed that Family Courts are special courts, of the same level as Regional Trial Courts. Under R.A. 8369, otherwise known as
the "Family Courts Act of 1997," family courts have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of domestic violence against women and
children.42 In accordance with said law, the Supreme Court designated from among the branches of the Regional Trial Courts at least one Family Court in
each of several key cities identified. 43 To achieve harmony with the first mentioned law, Section 7 of R.A. 9262 now provides that Regional Trial Courts
designated as Family Courts shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over cases of VAWC defined under the latter law, viz:
SEC. 7. Venue. – The Regional Trial Court designated as a Family Court shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over cases of violence against
women and their children under this law. In the absence of such court in the place where the offense was committed, the case shall be filed in the Regional
Trial Court where the crime or any of its elements was committed at the option of the complainant. (Emphasis supplied)
Inspite of its designation as a family court, the RTC of Bacolod City remains possessed of authority as a court of general original jurisdiction to pass upon
all kinds of cases whether civil, criminal, special proceedings, land registration, guardianship, naturalization, admiralty or insolvency. 44 It is settled that
RTCs have jurisdiction to resolve the constitutionality of a statute, 45 "this authority being embraced in the general definition of the judicial power to
determine what are the valid and binding laws by the criterion of their conformity to the fundamental law." 46 The Constitution vests the power of judicial
review or the power to declare the constitutionality or validity of a law, treaty, international or executive agreement, presidential decree, order, instruction,
ordinance, or regulation not only in this Court, but in all RTCs. 47 We said in J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc. v. CA48 that, "plainly the Constitution contemplates
that the inferior courts should have jurisdiction in cases involving constitutionality of any treaty or law, for it speaks of appellate review of final judgments
of inferior courts in cases where such constitutionality happens to be in issue." Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution reads in part as follows:
SEC. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
xxx
2. Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower
courts in:
a. All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order,
instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.
xxxx
Thus, contrary to the posturing of petitioner, the issue of constitutionality of R.A. 9262 could have been raised at the earliest opportunity in his Opposition
to the petition for protection order before the RTC of Bacolod City, which had jurisdiction to determine the same, subject to the review of this Court.
Section 20 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, the Rule on Violence Against Women and Their Children, lays down a new kind of procedure requiring the
respondent to file an opposition to the petition and not an answer.49 Thus:
SEC. 20. Opposition to petition. – (a) The respondent may file an opposition to the petition which he himself shall verify. It must be
accompanied by the affidavits of witnesses and shall show cause why a temporary or permanent protection order should not be issued.

(b) Respondent shall not include in the opposition any counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint, but any cause of action which
could be the subject thereof may be litigated in a separate civil action. (Emphasis supplied)

We cannot subscribe to the theory espoused by petitioner that, since a counterclaim, cross-claim and third-party complaint are to be excluded from the
opposition, the issue of constitutionality cannot likewise be raised therein. A counterclaim is defined as any claim for money or other relief which a
defending party may have against an opposing party. 50 A cross-claim, on the other hand, is any claim by one party against a co-party arising out of the
transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter either of the original action or of a counterclaim therein. 51 Finally, a third-party complaint is a claim that
a defending party may, with leave of court, file against a person not a party to the action for contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any other relief, in
respect of his opponent's claim.52 As pointed out by Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro, the unconstitutionality of a statute is not a cause of action that
could be the subject of a counterclaim, cross-claim or a third-party complaint. Therefore, it is not prohibited from being raised in the opposition in view of
the familiar maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius.
Moreover, it cannot be denied that this issue affects the resolution of the case a quo because the right of private respondent to a protection order is founded
solely on the very statute the validity of which is being attacked 53 by petitioner who has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its
enforcement. The alleged unconstitutionality of R.A. 9262 is, for all intents and purposes, a valid cause for the non-issuance of a protection order.
That the proceedings in Civil Case No. 06-797 are summary in nature should not have deterred petitioner from raising the same in his Opposition. The
question relative to the constitutionality of a statute is one of law which does not need to be supported by evidence. 54 Be that as it may, Section 25 of A.M.
No. 04-10-11-SC nonetheless allows the conduct of a hearing to determine legal issues, among others, viz:
SEC. 25. Order for further hearing. - In case the court determines the need for further hearing, it may issue an order containing the following:
(a) Facts undisputed and admitted;
(b) Factual and legal issues to be resolved;
(c) Evidence, including objects and documents that have been marked and will be presented;
(d) Names of witnesses who will be ordered to present their direct testimonies in the form of affidavits; and
(e) Schedule of the presentation of evidence by both parties which shall be done in one day, to the extent possible, within the 30-day period of
the effectivity of the temporary protection order issued. (Emphasis supplied)
To obviate potential dangers that may arise concomitant to the conduct of a hearing when necessary, Section 26 (b) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC provides that
if a temporary protection order issued is due to expire, the trial court may extend or renew the said order for a period of thirty (30) days each time until
final judgment is rendered. It may likewise modify the extended or renewed temporary protection order as may be necessary to meet the needs of the
parties. With the private respondent given ample protection, petitioner could proceed to litigate the constitutional issues, without necessarily running afoul
of the very purpose for the adoption of the rules on summary procedure.
In view of all the foregoing, the appellate court correctly dismissed the petition for prohibition with prayer for injunction and temporary restraining order
(CA-G.R. CEB - SP. No. 01698). Petitioner may have proceeded upon an honest belief that if he finds succor in a superior court, he could be granted an
injunctive relief. However, Section 22(j) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC expressly disallows the filing of a petition for certiorari, mandamus or prohibition
against any interlocutory order issued by the trial court. Hence, the 60-day TRO issued by the appellate court in this case against the enforcement of the
TPO, the amended TPOs and other orders pursuant thereto was improper, and it effectively hindered the case from taking its normal course in an
expeditious and summary manner.
As the rules stand, a review of the case by appeal or certiorari before judgment is prohibited. Moreover, if the appeal of a judgment granting permanent
protection shall not stay its enforcement,55 with more reason that a TPO, which is valid only for thirty (30) days at a time,56 should not be enjoined.

The mere fact that a statute is alleged to be unconstitutional or invalid, does not of itself entitle a litigant to have the same enjoined. 57 In Younger v. Harris,
Jr.,58 the Supreme Court of the United States declared, thus:
Federal injunctions against state criminal statutes, either in their entirety or with respect to their separate and distinct prohibitions, are not to be granted as a
matter of course, even if such statutes are unconstitutional. No citizen or member of the community is immune from prosecution, in good faith, for his
alleged criminal acts. The imminence of such a prosecution even though alleged to be unauthorized and, hence, unlawful is not alone ground for relief in
equity which exerts its extraordinary powers only to prevent irreparable injury to the plaintiff who seeks its aid. (Citations omitted)
The sole objective of injunctions is to preserve the status quo until the trial court hears fully the merits of the case. It bears stressing, however, that
protection orders are granted ex parte so as to protect women and their children from acts of violence. To issue an injunction against such orders will defeat
the very purpose of the law against VAWC.
Notwithstanding all these procedural flaws, we shall not shirk from our obligation to determine novel issues, or issues of first impression, with far-reaching
implications. We have, time and again, discharged our solemn duty as final arbiter of constitutional issues, and with more reason now, in view of private
respondent's plea in her Comment59 to the instant Petition that we should put the challenge to the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 to rest. And so we shall.
Intent of Congress in enacting R.A. 9262.
Petitioner claims that since R.A. 9262 is intended to prevent and criminalize spousal and child abuse, which could very well be committed by either the
husband or the wife, gender alone is not enough basis to deprive the husband/father of the remedies under the law. 60

A perusal of the deliberations of Congress on Senate Bill No. 2723, 61 which became R.A. 9262, reveals that while the sponsor, Senator Luisa Pimentel-
Ejercito (better known as Senator Loi Estrada), had originally proposed what she called a "synthesized measure" 62 – an amalgamation of two measures,
namely, the "Anti-Domestic Violence Act" and the "Anti-Abuse of Women in Intimate Relationships Act" 63 – providing protection to "all family members,
leaving no one in isolation" but at the same time giving special attention to women as the "usual victims" of violence and abuse, 64 nonetheless, it was
eventually agreed that men be denied protection under the same measure. We quote pertinent portions of the deliberations:
Wednesday, December 10, 2003
Senator Pangilinan. I just wanted to place this on record, Mr. President. Some women's groups have expressed concerns and relayed these concerns to me
that if we are to include domestic violence apart from against women as well as other members of the household, including children or the husband, they
fear that this would weaken the efforts to address domestic violence of which the main victims or the bulk of the victims really are the wives, the spouses
or the female partners in a relationship. We would like to place that on record. How does the good Senator respond to this kind of observation?
Senator Estrada. Yes, Mr. President, there is this group of women who call themselves "WIIR" Women in Intimate Relationship. They do not want to
include men in this domestic violence. But plenty of men are also being abused by women. I am playing safe so I placed here members of the family,
prescribing penalties therefor and providing protective measures for victims. This includes the men, children, live-in, common-law wives, and those related
with the family.65
xxx
Wednesday, January 14, 2004
xxxx
The President Pro Tempore. x x x
Also, may the Chair remind the group that there was the discussion whether to limit this to women and not to families which was the issue of the AWIR
group. The understanding that I have is that we would be having a broader scope rather than just women, if I remember correctly, Madam sponsor.
Senator Estrada. Yes, Mr. President.
As a matter of fact, that was brought up by Senator Pangilinan during the interpellation period.
I think Senator Sotto has something to say to that.
Senator Legarda. Mr. President, the reason I am in support of the measure. Do not get me wrong. However, I believe that there is a need to protect women's
rights especially in the domestic environment.
As I said earlier, there are nameless, countless, voiceless women who have not had the opportunity to file a case against their spouses, their live-in partners
after years, if not decade, of battery and abuse. If we broaden the scope to include even the men, assuming they can at all be abused by the women or their
spouses, then it would not equalize the already difficult situation for women, Mr. President.
I think that the sponsor, based on our earlier conversations, concurs with this position. I am sure that the men in this Chamber who love their women in
their lives so dearly will agree with this representation. Whether we like it or not, it is an unequal world. Whether we like it or not, no matter how
empowered the women are, we are not given equal opportunities especially in the domestic environment where the macho Filipino man would always feel
that he is stronger, more superior to the Filipino woman.
xxxx
The President Pro Tempore. What does the sponsor say?
Senator Estrada. Mr. President, before accepting this, the committee came up with this bill because the family members have been included in this
proposed measure since the other members of the family other than women are also possible victims of violence. While women are most likely the
intended victims, one reason incidentally why the measure focuses on women, the fact remains that in some relatively few cases, men also stand to be
victimized and that children are almost always the helpless victims of violence. I am worried that there may not be enough protection extended to other
family members particularly children who are excluded. Although Republic Act No. 7610, for instance, more or less, addresses the special needs of abused
children. The same law is inadequate. Protection orders for one are not available in said law.
I am aware that some groups are apprehensive about granting the same protection to men, fearing that they may use this law to justify their abusive
behavior against women. However, we should also recognize that there are established procedures and standards in our courts which give credence to
evidentiary support and cannot just arbitrarily and whimsically entertain baseless complaints.
Mr. President, this measure is intended to harmonize family relations and to protect the family as the basic social institution. Though I recognize the
unequal power relations between men and women in our society, I believe we have an obligation to uphold inherent rights and dignity of both husband and
wife and their immediate family members, particularly children.
While I prefer to focus mainly on women, I was compelled to include other family members as a critical input arrived at after a series of
consultations/meetings with various NGOs, experts, sports groups and other affected sectors, Mr. President.
Senator Sotto. Mr. President.
The President Pro Tempore. Yes, with the permission of the other senators.
Senator Sotto. Yes, with the permission of the two ladies on the Floor.
The President Pro Tempore. Yes, Sen. Vicente C. Sotto III is recognized.
Senator Sotto. I presume that the effect of the proposed amendment of Senator Legarda would be removing the "men and children" in this particular bill
and focus specifically on women alone. That will be the net effect of that proposed amendment. Hearing the rationale mentioned by the distinguished
sponsor, Sen. Luisa "Loi" Ejercito Estrada, I am not sure now whether she is inclined to accept the proposed amendment of Senator Legarda.
I am willing to wait whether she is accepting this or not because if she is going to accept this, I will propose an amendment to the amendment rather than
object to the amendment, Mr. President.
xxxx
Senator Estrada. The amendment is accepted, Mr. President.
The President Pro Tempore. Is there any objection?
xxxx
Senator Sotto. x x x May I propose an amendment to the amendment.
The President Pro Tempore. Before we act on the amendment?
Senator Sotto. Yes, Mr. President.
The President Pro Tempore. Yes, please proceed.
Senator Sotto. Mr. President, I am inclined to believe the rationale used by the distinguished proponent of the amendment. As a matter of fact, I tend to
agree. Kung may maaabuso, mas malamang iyong babae kaysa sa lalake. At saka iyong mga lalake, puwede na talagang magulpi iyan. Okey lang iyan. But
I cannot agree that we remove the children from this particular measure.
So, if I may propose an amendment –
The President Pro Tempore. To the amendment.
Senator Sotto. – more than the women, the children are very much abused. As a matter of fact, it is not limited to minors. The abuse is not limited to seven,
six, 5-year-old children. I have seen 14, 15-year-old children being abused by their fathers, even by their mothers. And it breaks my heart to find out about
these things.
Because of the inadequate existing law on abuse of children, this particular measure will update that. It will enhance and hopefully prevent the abuse of
children and not only women.
SOTTO-LEGARDA AMENDMENTS
Therefore, may I propose an amendment that, yes, we remove the aspect of the men in the bill but not the children.
Senator Legarda. I agree, Mr. President, with the Minority Leader.
The President Pro Tempore. Effectively then, it will be women AND CHILDREN.
Senator Sotto. Yes, Mr. President.
Senator Estrada. It is accepted, Mr. President.

The President Pro Tempore. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the amendment, as amended, is approved. 66

It is settled that courts are not concerned with the wisdom, justice, policy, or expediency of a statute. 67 Hence, we dare not venture into the real motivations
and wisdom of the members of Congress in limiting the protection against violence and abuse under R.A. 9262 to women and children only. No proper
challenge on said grounds may be entertained in this proceeding. Congress has made its choice and it is not our prerogative to supplant this judgment. The
choice may be perceived as erroneous but even then, the remedy against it is to seek its amendment or repeal by the legislative. By the principle of
separation of powers, it is the legislative that determines the necessity, adequacy, wisdom and expediency of any law. 68 We only step in when there is a
violation of the Constitution. However, none was sufficiently shown in this case.
R.A. 9262 does not violate the guaranty of equal protection of the laws.
Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities
imposed. The oft-repeated disquisition in the early case of Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union 69 is instructive:
The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the application of the laws upon all citizens of the state. It is not, therefore, a
requirement, in order to avoid the constitutional prohibition against inequality, that every man, woman and child should be affected alike by a statute.
Equality of operation of statutes does not mean indiscriminate operation on persons merely as such, but on persons according to the circumstances
surrounding them. It guarantees equality, not identity of rights. The Constitution does not require that things which are different in fact be treated in law as
though they were the same. The equal protection clause does not forbid discrimination as to things that are different. It does not prohibit legislation which
is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by the territory within which it is to operate.
The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification. Classification in law, as in the other departments of knowledge or practice,
is the grouping of things in speculation or practice because they agree with one another in certain particulars. A law is not invalid because of simple
inequality. The very idea of classification is that of inequality, so that it goes without saying that the mere fact of inequality in no manner determines the
matter of constitutionality. All that is required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the classification should be based on
substantial distinctions which make for real differences; that it must be germane to the purpose of the law; that it must not be limited to existing conditions
only; and that it must apply equally to each member of the class. This Court has held that the standard is satisfied if the classification or distinction is based
on a reasonable foundation or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary. (Emphasis supplied)
Measured against the foregoing jurisprudential yardstick, we find that R.A. 9262 is based on a valid classification as shall hereinafter be discussed and, as
such, did not violate the equal protection clause by favoring women over men as victims of violence and abuse to whom the State extends its protection.
I. R.A. 9262 rests on substantial distinctions.
The unequal power relationship between women and men; the fact that women are more likely than men to be victims of violence; and the widespread
gender bias and prejudice against women all make for real differences justifying the classification under the law. As Justice McIntyre succinctly states, "the
accommodation of differences ... is the essence of true equality." 70
A. Unequal power relationship between men and women
According to the Philippine Commission on Women (the National Machinery for Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment), violence against women
(VAW) is deemed to be closely linked with the unequal power relationship between women and men otherwise known as "gender-based violence". Societal
norms and traditions dictate people to think men are the leaders, pursuers, providers, and take on dominant roles in society while women are nurturers,
men's companions and supporters, and take on subordinate roles in society. This perception leads to men gaining more power over women. With power
comes the need to control to retain that power. And VAW is a form of men's expression of controlling women to retain power. 71
The United Nations, which has long recognized VAW as a human rights issue, passed its Resolution 48/104 on the Declaration on Elimination of Violence
Against Women on December 20, 1993 stating that "violence against women is a manifestation of historically unequal power relations between men and
women, which have led to domination over and discrimination against women by men and to the prevention of the full advancement of women, and that
violence against women is one of the crucial social mechanisms by which women are forced into subordinate positions, compared with men." 72
Then Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno traced the historical and social context of gender-based violence and developments in advocacies to eradicate VAW, in
his remarks delivered during the Joint Launching of R.A. 9262 and its Implementing Rules last October 27, 2004, the pertinent portions of which are
quoted hereunder:
History reveals that most societies sanctioned the use of violence against women. The patriarch of a family was accorded the right to use force on members
of the family under his control. I quote the early studies:
Traditions subordinating women have a long history rooted in patriarchy – the institutional rule of men. Women were seen in virtually all societies to be
naturally inferior both physically and intellectually. In ancient Western societies, women whether slave, concubine or wife, were under the authority of
men. In law, they were treated as property.
The Roman concept of patria potestas allowed the husband to beat, or even kill, his wife if she endangered his property right over her. Judaism, Christianity
and other religions oriented towards the patriarchal family strengthened the male dominated structure of society.
English feudal law reinforced the tradition of male control over women. Even the eminent Blackstone has been quoted in his commentaries as saying
husband and wife were one and that one was the husband. However, in the late 1500s and through the entire 1600s, English common law began to limit the
right of husbands to chastise their wives. Thus, common law developed the rule of thumb, which allowed husbands to beat their wives with a rod or stick
no thicker than their thumb.
In the later part of the 19th century, legal recognition of these rights to chastise wives or inflict corporeal punishment ceased. Even then, the preservation of
the family was given more importance than preventing violence to women.
The metamorphosis of the law on violence in the United States followed that of the English common law. In 1871, the Supreme Court of Alabama became
the first appellate court to strike down the common law right of a husband to beat his wife:
The privilege, ancient though it may be, to beat one's wife with a stick, to pull her hair, choke her, spit in her face or kick her about the floor, or to inflict
upon her like indignities, is not now acknowledged by our law... In person, the wife is entitled to the same protection of the law that the husband can
invoke for himself.
As time marched on, the women's advocacy movement became more organized. The temperance leagues initiated it. These leagues had a simple focus.
They considered the evils of alcoholism as the root cause of wife abuse. Hence, they demonstrated and picketed saloons, bars and their husbands' other
watering holes. Soon, however, their crusade was joined by suffragette movements, expanding the liberation movement's agenda. They fought for women's
right to vote, to own property, and more. Since then, the feminist movement was on the roll.
The feminist movement exposed the private invisibility of the domestic violence to the public gaze. They succeeded in transforming the issue into an
important public concern. No less than the United States Supreme Court, in 1992 case Planned Parenthood v. Casey, noted:
In an average 12-month period in this country, approximately two million women are the victims of severe assaults by their male partners. In a 1985
survey, women reported that nearly one of every eight husbands had assaulted their wives during the past year. The [American Medical Association] views
these figures as "marked underestimates," because the nature of these incidents discourages women from reporting them, and because surveys typically
exclude the very poor, those who do not speak English well, and women who are homeless or in institutions or hospitals when the survey is conducted.
According to the AMA, "researchers on family violence agree that the true incidence of partner violence is probably double the above estimates; or four
million severely assaulted women per year."
Studies on prevalence suggest that from one-fifth to one-third of all women will be physically assaulted by a partner or ex-partner during their lifetime...
Thus on an average day in the United States, nearly 11,000 women are severely assaulted by their male partners. Many of these incidents involve sexual
assault... In families where wife beating takes place, moreover, child abuse is often present as well.
Other studies fill in the rest of this troubling picture. Physical violence is only the most visible form of abuse. Psychological abuse, particularly forced
social and economic isolation of women, is also common.
Many victims of domestic violence remain with their abusers, perhaps because they perceive no superior alternative...Many abused women who find
temporary refuge in shelters return to their husbands, in large part because they have no other source of income... Returning to one's abuser can be
dangerous. Recent Federal Bureau of Investigation statistics disclose that 8.8 percent of all homicide victims in the United States are killed by their
spouses...Thirty percent of female homicide victims are killed by their male partners.
Finally in 1994, the United States Congress enacted the Violence Against Women Act.
In the International front, the women's struggle for equality was no less successful. The United States Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights affirmed the equality of all human beings. In 1979, the UN General Assembly adopted the landmark Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). In 1993, the UN General Assembly also adopted the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against
Women. World conferences on the role and rights of women have been regularly held in Mexico City, Copenhagen, Nairobi and Beijing. The UN itself
established a Commission on the Status of Women.
The Philippines has been in cadence with the half – and full – steps of all these women's movements. No less than Section 14, Article II of our 1987
Constitution mandates the State to recognize the role of women in nation building and to ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women and
men. Our Senate has ratified the CEDAW as well as the Convention on the Rights of the Child and its two protocols. To cap it all, Congress, on March 8,
2004, enacted Rep. Act No. 9262, entitled "An Act Defining Violence Against Women and Their Children, Providing for Protective Measures for Victims,
 Prescribing Penalties therefor and for other Purposes." (Citations omitted)
B. Women are the "usual" and "most likely"
victims of violence.
At the time of the presentation of Senate Bill No. 2723, official statistics on violence against women and children show that –
x x x physical injuries had the highest number of cases at 5,058 in 2002 representing 55.63% of total cases reported (9,903). And for the first semester of
2003, there were 2,381 reported cases out of 4,354 cases which represent 54.31%. xxx (T)he total number of women in especially difficult circumstances
served by the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD) for the year 2002, there are 1,417 physically abused/maltreated cases out of the
total of 5,608 cases. xxx (T)here are 1,091 DSWD cases out of a total number of 3,471 cases for the first semester of 2003. Female violence comprised
more than 90% of all forms of abuse and violence and more than 90% of these reported cases were committed by the women's intimate partners such as
their husbands and live-in partners.73
Recently, the Philippine Commission on Women presented comparative statistics on violence against women across an eight-year period from 2004 to
August of 2011 with violations under R.A. 9262 ranking first among the different VAW categories since its implementation in 2004,74 thus:
Table 1. Annual Comparative Statistics on Violence Against Women, 2004 - 2011*

Reported
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Cases

Rape 997 927 659 837 811 770 1,042 832

Incestuous Rape 38 46 26 22 28 27 19 23

Attempted Rape 194 148 185 147 204 167 268 201

Acts of
580 536 382 358 445 485 745 625
Lasciviousness

Physical
3,553 2,335 1,892 1,505 1,307 1,498 2,018 1,588
Injuries

Sexual
53 37 38 46 18 54 83 63
Harassment

RA 9262 218 924 1,269 2,387 3,599 5,285 9,974 9,021

Threats 319 223 199 182 220 208 374 213

Seduction 62 19 29 30 19 19 25 15

Concubinage 121 102 93 109 109 99 158 128

RA 9208 17 11 16 24 34 152 190 62

Abduction
16 34 23 28 18 25 22
/Kidnapping 29

Unjust Vexation 90 50 59 59 83 703 183 155

Total 6,271 5,374 4,881 5,729 6,905 9,485 15,104 12,948

*2011 report covers only from January to August

Source: Philippine National Police – Women and Children Protection Center (WCPC)
On the other hand, no reliable estimates may be obtained on domestic abuse and violence against men in the Philippines because incidents thereof are
relatively low and, perhaps, because many men will not even attempt to report the situation. In the United Kingdom, 32% of women who had ever
experienced domestic violence did so four or five (or more) times, compared with 11% of the smaller number of men who had ever experienced domestic
violence; and women constituted 89% of all those who had experienced 4 or more incidents of domestic violence. 75 Statistics in Canada show that spousal
violence by a woman against a man is less likely to cause injury than the other way around (18 percent versus 44 percent). Men, who experience violence
from their spouses are much less likely to live in fear of violence at the hands of their spouses, and much less likely to experience sexual assault. In fact,
many cases of physical violence by a woman against a spouse are in self-defense or the result of many years of physical or emotional abuse. 76
While there are, indeed, relatively few cases of violence and abuse perpetrated against men in the Philippines, the same cannot render R.A. 9262 invalid.
In a 1960 case involving the violation of a city ordinance requiring drivers of animal-drawn vehicles to pick up, gather and deposit in receptacles the
manure emitted or discharged by their vehicle-drawing animals in any public highways, streets, plazas, parks or alleys, said ordinance was challenged as
violative of the guaranty of equal protection of laws as its application is limited to owners and drivers of vehicle-drawing animals and not to those animals,
although not utilized, but similarly pass through the same streets.
The ordinance was upheld as a valid classification for the reason that, while there may be non-vehicle-drawing animals that also traverse the city roads,
"but their number must be negligible and their appearance therein merely occasional, compared to the rig-drawing ones, as not to constitute a menace to the
health of the community."77 The mere fact that the legislative classification may result in actual inequality is not violative of the right to equal protection,
for every classification of persons or things for regulation by law produces inequality in some degree, but the law is not thereby rendered invalid. 78
C. Gender bias and prejudices
From the initial report to the police through prosecution, trial, and sentencing, crimes against women are often treated differently and less seriously than
other crimes. This was argued by then United States Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr., now Vice President, chief sponsor of the Violence Against Women Act
(VAWA), in defending the civil rights remedy as a valid exercise of the U.S. Congress' authority under the Commerce and Equal Protection Clauses. He
stressed that the widespread gender bias in the U.S. has institutionalized historic prejudices against victims of rape or domestic violence, subjecting them to
"double victimization" – first at the hands of the offender and then of the legal system.79
Our own Senator Loi Estrada lamented in her Sponsorship Speech for Senate Bill No. 2723 that "(w)henever violence occurs in the family, the police treat
it as a private matter and advise the parties to settle the conflict themselves. Once the complainant brings the case to the prosecutor, the latter is hesitant to
file the complaint for fear that it might later be withdrawn. This lack of response or reluctance to be involved by the police and prosecution reinforces the
escalating, recurring and often serious nature of domestic violence."80
Sadly, our own courts, as well, have exhibited prejudices and biases against our women.
In a recent case resolved on March 9, 2011, we fined RTC Judge Venancio J. Amila for Conduct Unbecoming of a Judge. He used derogatory and
irreverent language in reference to the complainant in a petition for TPO and PPO under R.A. 9262, calling her as "only a live-in partner" and presenting
her as an "opportunist" and a "mistress" in an "illegitimate relationship." Judge Amila even called her a "prostitute," and accused her of being motivated by
"insatiable greed" and of absconding with the contested property. 81 Such remarks betrayed Judge Amila's prejudices and lack of gender sensitivity.
The enactment of R.A. 9262 aims to address the discrimination brought about by biases and prejudices against women. As emphasized by the CEDAW
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, addressing or correcting discrimination through specific measures focused on women
does not discriminate against men.82 Petitioner's contention,83 therefore, that R.A. 9262 is discriminatory and that it is an "anti-male," "husband-bashing,"
and "hate-men" law deserves scant consideration. As a State Party to the CEDAW, the Philippines bound itself to take all appropriate measures "to modify
the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, with a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices and customary and all other practices
which are based on the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and women." 84 Justice Puno correctly
pointed out that "(t)he paradigm shift changing the character of domestic violence from a private affair to a public offense will require the development of a
distinct mindset on the part of the police, the prosecution and the judges."85
II. The classification is germane to the purpose of the law.
The distinction between men and women is germane to the purpose of R.A. 9262, which is to address violence committed against women and children,
spelled out in its Declaration of Policy, as follows:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. – It is hereby declared that the State values the dignity of women and children and guarantees full respect for human rights.
The State also recognizes the need to protect the family and its members particularly women and children, from violence and threats to their personal
safety and security.
Towards this end, the State shall exert efforts to address violence committed against women and children in keeping with the fundamental freedoms
guaranteed under the Constitution and the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women, Convention on the Rights of the Child and other international human rights instruments of which the Philippines is a party.
In 1979, the U.N. General Assembly adopted the CEDAW, which the Philippines ratified on August 5, 1981. Subsequently, the Optional Protocol to the
CEDAW was also ratified by the Philippines on October 6, 2003. 86 This Convention mandates that State parties shall accord to women equality with men
before the law87 and shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in all matters relating to marriage and family relations
on the basis of equality of men and women. 88 The Philippines likewise ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child and its two protocols. 89 It is,
thus, bound by said Conventions and their respective protocols.
III. The classification is not limited to existing
conditions only, and apply equally to all members
Moreover, the application of R.A. 9262 is not limited to the existing conditions when it was promulgated, but to future conditions as well, for as long as the
safety and security of women and their children are threatened by violence and abuse.
R.A. 9262 applies equally to all women and children who suffer violence and abuse. Section 3 thereof defines VAWC as:
x x x any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or
had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the
family abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts,
battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty. It includes, but is not limited to, the following acts:
A. "Physical Violence" refers to acts that include bodily or physical harm;

B. "Sexual violence" refers to an act which is sexual in nature, committed against a woman or her child. It includes, but is not limited to:

a) rape, sexual harassment, acts of lasciviousness, treating a woman or her child as a sex object, making demeaning and
sexually suggestive remarks, physically attacking the sexual parts of the victim's body, forcing her/him to watch obscene
publications and indecent shows or forcing the woman or her child to do indecent acts and/or make films thereof, forcing the
wife and mistress/lover to live in the conjugal home or sleep together in the same room with the abuser;

b) acts causing or attempting to cause the victim to engage in any sexual activity by force, threat of force, physical or other
harm or threat of physical or other harm or coercion;

c) Prostituting the woman or child.

C. "Psychological violence" refers to acts or omissions causing or likely to cause mental or emotional suffering of the victim such as but
not limited to intimidation, harassment, stalking, damage to property, public ridicule or humiliation, repeated verbal abuse and marital
infidelity. It includes causing or allowing the victim to witness the physical, sexual or psychological abuse of a member of the family to
which the victim belongs, or to witness pornography in any form or to witness abusive injury to pets or to unlawful or unwanted
deprivation of the right to custody and/or visitation of common children.

D. "Economic abuse" refers to acts that make or attempt to make a woman financially dependent which includes, but is not limited to the
following:

1. withdrawal of financial support or preventing the victim from engaging in any legitimate profession, occupation, business
or activity, except in cases wherein the other spouse/partner objects on valid, serious and moral grounds as defined in Article
73 of the Family Code;

2. deprivation or threat of deprivation of financial resources and the right to the use and enjoyment of the conjugal, community
or property owned in common;

3. destroying household property;

4. controlling the victims' own money or properties or solely controlling the conjugal money or properties.

It should be stressed that the acts enumerated in the aforequoted provision are attributable to research that has exposed the dimensions and dynamics of
battery. The acts described here are also found in the U.N. Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women. 90 Hence, the argument advanced by
petitioner that the definition of what constitutes abuse removes the difference between violent action and simple marital tiffs is tenuous.
There is nothing in the definition of VAWC that is vague and ambiguous that will confuse petitioner in his defense. The acts enumerated above are easily
understood and provide adequate contrast between the innocent and the prohibited acts. They are worded with sufficient definiteness that persons of
ordinary intelligence can understand what conduct is prohibited, and need not guess at its meaning nor differ in its application. 91 Yet, petitioner insists92
that phrases like "depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her child of a legal right," "solely controlling the conjugal or common money or
properties," "marital infidelity," and "causing mental or emotional anguish" are so vague that they make every quarrel a case of spousal abuse. However,
we have stressed that the "vagueness" doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld – not absolute precision or
mathematical exactitude, as petitioner seems to suggest. Flexibility, rather than meticulous specificity, is permissible as long as the metes and bounds of the
statute are clearly delineated. An act will not be held invalid merely because it might have been more explicit in its wordings or detailed in its provisions. 93
There is likewise no merit to the contention that R.A. 9262 singles out the husband or father as the culprit. As defined above, VAWC may likewise be
committed "against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship." Clearly, the use of the gender-neutral word "person" who
has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the woman encompasses even lesbian relationships. Moreover, while the law provides that the offender be
related or connected to the victim by marriage, former marriage, or a sexual or dating relationship, it does not preclude the application of the principle of
conspiracy under the Revised Penal Code (RPC). Thus, in the case of Go-Tan v. Spouses Tan, 94 the parents-in-law of Sharica Mari L. Go-Tan, the victim,
were held to be proper respondents in the case filed by the latter upon the allegation that they and their son (Go-Tan's husband) had community of design
and purpose in tormenting her by giving her insufficient financial support; harassing and pressuring her to be ejected from the family home; and in
repeatedly abusing her verbally, emotionally, mentally and physically.
R.A. 9262 is not violative of the
due process clause of the Constitution.
Petitioner bewails the disregard of R.A. 9262, specifically in the issuance of POs, of all protections afforded by the due process clause of the Constitution.
Says he: "On the basis of unsubstantiated allegations, and practically no opportunity to respond, the husband is stripped of family, property, guns, money,
children, job, future employment and reputation, all in a matter of seconds, without an inkling of what happened."95
A protection order is an order issued to prevent further acts of violence against women and their children, their family or household members, and to grant
other necessary reliefs. Its purpose is to safeguard the offended parties from further harm, minimize any disruption in their daily life and facilitate the
opportunity and ability to regain control of their life.96
"The scope of reliefs in protection orders is broadened to ensure that the victim or offended party is afforded all the remedies necessary to curtail access by
a perpetrator to the victim. This serves to safeguard the victim from greater risk of violence; to accord the victim and any designated family or household
member safety in the family residence, and to prevent the perpetrator from committing acts that jeopardize the employment and support of the victim. It
also enables the court to award temporary custody of minor children to protect the children from violence, to prevent their abduction by the perpetrator and
to ensure their financial support."97

The rules require that petitions for protection order be in writing, signed and verified by the petitioner 98 thereby undertaking full responsibility, criminal or
civil, for every allegation therein. Since "time is of the essence in cases of VAWC if further violence is to be prevented," 99 the court is authorized to issue
ex parte a TPO after raffle but before notice and hearing when the life, limb or property of the victim is in jeopardy and there is reasonable ground to
believe that the order is necessary to protect the victim from the immediate and imminent danger of VAWC or to prevent such violence, which is about to
recur.100
There need not be any fear that the judge may have no rational basis to issue an ex parte order. The victim is required not only to verify the allegations in
the petition, but also to attach her witnesses' affidavits to the petition. 101
The grant of a TPO ex parte cannot, therefore, be challenged as violative of the right to due process. Just like a writ of preliminary attachment which is
issued without notice and hearing because the time in which the hearing will take could be enough to enable the defendant to abscond or dispose of his
property,102 in the same way, the victim of VAWC may already have suffered harrowing experiences in the hands of her tormentor, and possibly even
death, if notice and hearing were required before such acts could be prevented. It is a constitutional commonplace that the ordinary requirements of
procedural due process must yield to the necessities of protecting vital public interests, 103 among which is protection of women and children from violence
and threats to their personal safety and security.
It should be pointed out that when the TPO is issued ex parte, the court shall likewise order that notice be immediately given to the respondent directing
him to file an opposition within five (5) days from service. Moreover, the court shall order that notice, copies of the petition and TPO be served
immediately on the respondent by the court sheriffs. The TPOs are initially effective for thirty (30) days from service on the respondent. 104
Where no TPO is issued ex parte, the court will nonetheless order the immediate issuance and service of the notice upon the respondent requiring him to
file an opposition to the petition within five (5) days from service. The date of the preliminary conference and hearing on the merits shall likewise be
indicated on the notice.105
The opposition to the petition which the respondent himself shall verify, must be accompanied by the affidavits of witnesses and shall show cause why a
temporary or permanent protection order should not be issued.106
It is clear from the foregoing rules that the respondent of a petition for protection order should be apprised of the charges imputed to him and afforded an
opportunity to present his side. Thus, the fear of petitioner of being "stripped of family, property, guns, money, children, job, future employment and
reputation, all in a matter of seconds, without an inkling of what happened" is a mere product of an overactive imagination. The essence of due process is
to be found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one may have in support of one's defense. "To be heard" does not only mean
verbal arguments in court; one may be heard also through pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, is
accorded, there is no denial of procedural due process.107
It should be recalled that petitioner filed on April 26, 2006 an Opposition to the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Renewal of the TPO that was granted only two
days earlier on April 24, 2006. Likewise, on May 23, 2006, petitioner filed a motion for the modification of the TPO to allow him visitation rights to his
children. Still, the trial court in its Order dated September 26, 2006, gave him five days (5) within which to show cause why the TPO should not be
renewed or extended. Yet, he chose not to file the required comment arguing that it would just be an "exercise in futility," conveniently forgetting that the
renewal of the questioned TPO was only for a limited period (30 days) each time, and that he could prevent the continued renewal of said order if he can
show sufficient cause therefor. Having failed to do so, petitioner may not now be heard to complain that he was denied due process of law.
Petitioner next laments that the removal and exclusion of the respondent in the VAWC case from the residence of the victim, regardless of ownership of the
residence, is virtually a "blank check" issued to the wife to claim any property as her conjugal home.108
The wording of the pertinent rule, however, does not by any stretch of the imagination suggest that this is so. It states:
SEC. 11. Reliefs available to the offended party. -- The protection order shall include any, some or all of the following reliefs:
xxxx
(c) Removing and excluding the respondent from the residence of the offended party, regardless of ownership of the residence, either temporarily for the
purpose of protecting the offended party, or permanently where no property rights are violated. If the respondent must remove personal effects from the
residence, the court shall direct a law enforcement agent to accompany the respondent to the residence, remain there until the respondent has gathered his
things and escort him from the residence;
xxxx
Indubitably, petitioner may be removed and excluded from private respondent's residence, regardless of ownership, only temporarily for the purpose of
protecting the latter. Such removal and exclusion may be permanent only where no property rights are violated. How then can the private respondent just
claim any property and appropriate it for herself, as petitioner seems to suggest?
The non-referral of a VAWC case
to a mediator is justified.
Petitioner argues that "by criminalizing run-of-the-mill arguments, instead of encouraging mediation and counseling, the law has done violence to the
avowed policy of the State to "protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution." 109
Under Section 23(c) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, the court shall not refer the case or any issue thereof to a mediator. The reason behind this provision is
well-explained by the Commentary on Section 311 of the Model Code on Domestic and Family Violence as follows: 110
This section prohibits a court from ordering or referring parties to mediation in a proceeding for an order for protection. Mediation is a process by which
parties in equivalent bargaining positions voluntarily reach consensual agreement about the issue at hand. Violence, however, is not a subject for
compromise. A process which involves parties mediating the issue of violence implies that the victim is somehow at fault. In addition, mediation of issues
in a proceeding for an order of protection is problematic because the petitioner is frequently unable to participate equally with the person against whom the
protection order has been sought. (Emphasis supplied)
There is no undue delegation of
judicial power to barangay officials.
Petitioner contends that protection orders involve the exercise of judicial power which, under the Constitution, is placed upon the "Supreme Court and such
other lower courts as may be established by law" and, thus, protests the delegation of power to barangay officials to issue protection orders. 111 The
pertinent provision reads, as follows:
SEC. 14. Barangay Protection Orders (BPOs); Who May Issue and How. – Barangay Protection Orders (BPOs) refer to the protection order issued by the
Punong Barangay ordering the perpetrator to desist from committing acts under Section 5 (a) and (b) of this Act.1âwphi1 A Punong Barangay who receives
applications for a BPO shall issue the protection order to the applicant on the date of filing after ex parte determination of the basis of the application. If the
Punong Barangay is unavailable to act on the application for a BPO, the application shall be acted upon by any available Barangay Kagawad. If the BPO is
issued by a Barangay Kagawad, the order must be accompanied by an attestation by the Barangay Kagawad that the Punong Barangay was unavailable at
the time of the issuance of the BPO. BPOs shall be effective for fifteen (15) days. Immediately after the issuance of an ex parte BPO, the Punong Barangay
or Barangay Kagawad shall personally serve a copy of the same on the respondent, or direct any barangay official to effect its personal service.
The parties may be accompanied by a non-lawyer advocate in any proceeding before the Punong Barangay.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality
of the Government.112 On the other hand, executive power "is generally defined as the power to enforce and administer the laws. It is the power of carrying
the laws into practical operation and enforcing their due observance."113
As clearly delimited by the aforequoted provision, the BPO issued by the Punong Barangay or, in his unavailability, by any available Barangay Kagawad,
merely orders the perpetrator to desist from (a) causing physical harm to the woman or her child; and (2) threatening to cause the woman or her child
physical harm. Such function of the Punong Barangay is, thus, purely executive in nature, in pursuance of his duty under the Local Government Code to
"enforce all laws and ordinances," and to "maintain public order in the barangay."114
We have held that "(t)he mere fact that an officer is required by law to inquire into the existence of certain facts and to apply the law thereto in order to
determine what his official conduct shall be and the fact that these acts may affect private rights do not constitute an exercise of judicial powers." 115
In the same manner as the public prosecutor ascertains through a preliminary inquiry or proceeding "whether there is reasonable ground to believe that an
offense has been committed and the accused is probably guilty thereof," the Punong Barangay must determine reasonable ground to believe that an
imminent danger of violence against the woman and her children exists or is about to recur that would necessitate the issuance of a BPO. The preliminary
investigation conducted by the prosecutor is, concededly, an executive, not a judicial, function. The same holds true with the issuance of a BPO.
We need not even belabor the issue raised by petitioner that since barangay officials and other law enforcement agencies are required to extend assistance
to victims of violence and abuse, it would be very unlikely that they would remain objective and impartial, and that the chances of acquittal are nil. As
already stated, assistance by barangay officials and other law enforcement agencies is consistent with their duty to enforce the law and to maintain peace
and order.
Conclusion
Before a statute or its provisions duly challenged are voided, an unequivocal breach of, or a clear conflict with the Constitution, not merely a doubtful or
argumentative one, must be demonstrated in such a manner as to leave no doubt in the mind of the Court. In other words, the grounds for nullity must be
beyond reasonable doubt.116 In the instant case, however, no concrete evidence and convincing arguments were presented by petitioner to warrant a
declaration of the unconstitutionality of R.A. 9262, which is an act of Congress and signed into law by the highest officer of the co-equal executive
department. As we said in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, 117 courts must assume that the legislature is ever conscious of the borders and edges of its plenary
powers, and passed laws with full knowledge of the facts and for the purpose of promoting what is right and advancing the welfare of the majority.
We reiterate here Justice Puno's observation that "the history of the women's movement against domestic violence shows that one of its most difficult
struggles was the fight against the violence of law itself. If we keep that in mind, law will not again be a hindrance to the struggle of women for equality
but will be its fulfillment."118 Accordingly, the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 is, as it should be, sustained.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice
 ANTONIO T. CARPIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice Associate Justice

See separate concurring opinion: See: Concurring Opinion

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice Associate Justice

On official leave
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA*
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

See Separate Concurring Opinion

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA BIENVENIDO L. REYES

Associate Justice Associate Justice

See separate concurring opinion

MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN
Associate Justice
C E R TI F I CATI O N
I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice

Footnotes
* On official leave.
1 "Philippines still top Christian country in Asia, 5th in world," Philippine Daily Inquirer, December 21, 2011.
2 Ephesians 5:25-28.
3RATIONALE OF THE PROPOSED RULE ON VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND THEIR CHILDREN, citing statistics furnished by the
National Commission on the Role of Filipino Women.
4 Id.
5 Section 3(a), R.A. 9262.
6 Rollo, pp. 63-83.
7 Id. at 66-67.
8 Id. at 64.
9 Id. at 67-68.
10 Id. at 68-70.
11 Id. at 70-71.
12 Id. at 72.
13 Id. at 73.
14 Id. at 74.
15 Id. at 65-66.
16 Id. at 66.
17 Id. at 70.
18 Id. at 84-87.
 19 Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Renewal of Temporary Protection Order (TPO) or Issuance of Modified TPO. Id. at 90-93.
20 Id. at 94-97.
21 Id. at 98-103.
22 Id. at 138-140.
23 Order dated May 24, 2006. Id. at 148-149.
Dumlao v COMELEC G.R. No. L-52245. January 22, 1980

Preliminary Injunction and/or Restraining Order

J. Melencio-Herrera

Facts:
Petitioner Dumlao is a former Governor of Nueva Vizcaya, who has filed his certificate of candidacy for said position of Governor in the forthcoming
elections of January 30, 1980.

He specifically questions the constitutionality of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 as discriminatory and contrary to the equal protection and due
process guarantees of the Constitution.

S4 -Any retired elective provincial, city of municipal official who has received payment of the retirement benefits to which he is entitled under the law and
who shall have been 65 years of age at the commencement of the term of office to which he seeks to be elecOted, shall not be qualified to run for the same
elective local office from which he has retired.

He claimed that the aforecited provision was directed insidiously against him, and that the classification provided therein is based on "purely arbitrary
grounds and, therefore, class legislation.

His colleague Igot, assailed the same law for the prohibition for candidcay of a person who was convicted of a crime given that there was judgment for
conviction and the prima facie nature of the filing of charges for the commission of such crimes.

He also questioned the accreditation of some political parties by respondent COMELEC, as authorized by Batas Pambansa Blg. 53, on the ground that it is
contrary to section 9(1), Art. XII(C) of the Constitution, which provides that a "bona fide candidate for any public office shall be free from any form of
harassment and discrimination." Apart form this, hey also attacked the term of office and the election period. These were Sec 7 of BP 51, Sec 4; Sec 6, and
Sec 1 of BP 52.

Issue:
1. Did petitioners have standing
2. Are the statutory provisions violative of the Constitution?

Held:
1. No
2. Dumlao's petition dismissed. Igot's petition partially granted.
Petition granted

Ratio:
1. Dumalo sued as a candidate while Igot sued as a taxpayer. In order to determine judicial review, three requisites are present:
a. actual case and controversy
b. proper party
c. existence of a constitutional question

a. Dumlao has not yet been affected by the statute. No petition has yet been filed for his disqualification. It was only a hypothetical question.
b. Did they sustain direct injury as a result of the enforcement? No one has yet been adversely affected by the operation of the statutes.
c. They are actually without cause of action. It follows that the necessity for resolving the issue of constitutionality is absent, and procedural regularity
would require that his suit be dismissed.

However, they relaxed the procedural standard due to the public interest involved and the imminent elections.

2. Section 4 of BP Blg. 52 is not contrary to equal protection. The constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws is subject to rational
classification.

If the groupings are based on reasonable and real differentiations, one class can be treated and regulated differently from another class. For purposes of
public service, employees 65 years of age, have been validly classified differently from younger employees. Employees attaining that age are subject to
compulsory retirement, while those of younger ages are not so compulsorily retirable.

The requirement to retire government employees at 65 may or may not be a reasonable classification. Young blood can be encouraged to come in to
politics.

But, in the case of a 65-year old elective local official who has already retired, there is reason to disqualify him from running for the same office, as
provided for in the challenged provision. The need for new blood assumes relevance.

The tiredness of the retiree for government work is present, and what is emphatically significant is that the retired employee has already declared himself
tired an unavailable for the same government work, but, which, by virtue of a change of mind, he would like to assume again.
It is for the very reason that inequality will neither result from the application of the challenged provision. Just as that provision does not deny equal
protection, neither does it permit such denial.

In fine, it bears reiteration that the equal protection clause does not forbid all legal classification. What is proscribes is a classification which is arbitrary
and unreasonable. hat constitutional guarantee is not violated by a reasonable classification is germane to the purpose of the law and applies to all those
belonging to the same class.

The purpose of the law is to allow the emergence of younger blood in local governments. The classification in question being pursuant to that purpose, it
cannot be considered invalid "even if at times, it may be susceptible to the objection that it is marred by theoretical inconsistencies.

Regarding Igot's petition, the court held that explicit is the constitutional provision that, in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed
innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel. An accusation, according to the fundamental law, is not
synonymous with guilt. The challenged proviso contravenes the constitutional presumption of innocence, as a candidate is disqualified from running from
public office on the ground alone that charges have been filed against him before a civil or military tribunal. It condemns before one is fully heard. In
ultimate effect, except as to the degree of proof, no distinction is made between a person convicted of acts of disloyalty and one against whom charges
have been filed for such acts, as both of them would be ineligible to run for public office.

A person disqualified to run for public office on the ground that charges have been filed against him is virtually placed in the same category as a person
already convicted of a crime with the penalty of arresto, which carries with it the accessory penalty of suspension of the right to hold office during the term
of the sentence.

And although the filing of charges is considered as but prima facie evidence, and therefore, may be rebutted, yet, there is "clear and present danger" that
because the proximity of the elections, time constraints will prevent one charged with acts of disloyalty from offering contrary proof to overcome the prima
facie evidence against him.

A legislative/administrative determination of guilt should not be allowed to be substituted for a judicial determination. Igot's petition was meritorious.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-52245 January 22, 1980
PATRICIO DUMLAO, ROMEO B. IGOT, and ALFREDO SALAPANTAN, JR., petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
Raul M. Gonzales for petitioners
Office of the Solicitor General for respondent.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J:
This is a Petition for Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction and/or Restraining Order filed by petitioners, in their own behalf and all others
allegedly similarly situated, seeking to enjoin respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from implementing certain provisions of
Batas Pambansa Big. 51, 52, and 53 for being unconstitutional.
The Petition alleges that petitioner, Patricio Dumlao, is a former Governor of Nueva Vizcaya, who has filed his certificate of candidacy for
said position of Governor in the forthcoming elections of January 30, 1980. Petitioner, Romeo B. Igot, is a taxpayer, a qualified voter and a
member of the Bar who, as such, has taken his oath to support the Constitution and obey the laws of the land. Petitioner, Alfredo
Salapantan, Jr., is also a taxpayer, a qualified voter, and a resident of San Miguel, Iloilo.
Petitioner Dumlao specifically questions the constitutionality of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 as discriminatory and contrary to the
equal protection and due process guarantees of the Constitution. Said Section 4 provides:
Sec. 4. Special Disqualification in addition to violation of section 10 of Art. XI I-C of the Constitution and disqualification
mentioned in existing laws, which are hereby declared as disqualification for any of the elective officials enumerated in
section 1 hereof.
Any retired elective provincial city or municipal official who has received payment of the retirement benefits to which he
is entitled under the law, and who shall have been 6,5 years of age at the commencement of the term of office to which
he seeks to be elected shall not be qualified to run for the same elective local office from which he has retired (Emphasis
supplied)
Petitioner Dumlao alleges that the aforecited provision is directed insidiously against him, and that the classification provided therein is based
on "purely arbitrary grounds and, therefore, class legislation."
For their part, petitioners igot and Salapantan, Jr. assail the validity of the following statutory provisions:
Sec 7. Terms of Office — Unless sooner removed for cause, all local elective officials hereinabove mentioned shall hold
office for a term of six (6) years, which shall commence on the first Monday of March 1980.
.... (Batas Pambansa Blg. 51) Sec. 4.
Sec. 4. ...
 Any person who has committed any act of disloyalty to the State, including acts amounting to subversion, insurrection,
rebellion or other similar crimes, shall not be qualified to be a candidate for any of the offices covered by this Act, or to
participate in any partisan political activity therein:
provided that a judgment of conviction for any of the aforementioned crimes shall be conclusive evidence of such fact
and
the filing of charges for the commission of such crimes before a civil court or military tribunal after preliminary
investigation shall be prima fascie evidence of such fact.
... (Batas Pambansa Big. 52) (Paragraphing and Emphasis supplied).
Section 1. Election of certain Local Officials — ... The election shall be held on January 30, 1980. (Batas Pambansa, Blg.
52)
Section 6. Election and Campaign Period — The election period shall be fixed by the Commission on Elections in
accordance with Section 6, Art. XII-C of the Constitution. The period of campaign shall commence on December 29,
1979 and terminate on January 28, 1980. (ibid.)
In addition to the above-cited provisions, petitioners Igot and Salapantan, Jr. also question the accreditation of some political parties by
respondent COMELEC, as authorized by Batas Pambansa Blg. 53, on the ground that it is contrary to section 9(1)Art. XIIC of the
Constitution, which provides that a "bona fide candidate for any public office shall be it. from any form of harassment and discrimination. "The
question of accreditation will not be taken up in this case but in that of Bacalso, et als. vs. COMELEC et als. No. L-52232) where the issue
has been squarely raised,
Petitioners then pray that the statutory provisions they have challenged be declared null and void for being violative of the Constitution.
I . The procedural Aspect
At the outset, it should be stated that this Petition suffers from basic procedural infirmities, hence, traditionally unacceptable for judicial
resolution. For one, there is a misjoinder of parties and actions. Petitioner Dumlao's interest is alien to that of petitioners Igot and Salapantan
Petitioner Dumlao does not join petitioners Igot and Salapantan in the burden of their complaint, nor do the latter join Dumlao in his. The
respectively contest completely different statutory provisions. Petitioner Dumlao has joined this suit in his individual capacity as a candidate.
The action of petitioners Igot and Salapantan is more in the nature of a taxpayer's suit. Although petitioners plead nine constraints as the
reason of their joint Petition, it would have required only a modicum more of effort tor petitioner Dumlao, on one hand said petitioners lgot
and Salapantan, on the other, to have filed separate suits, in the interest of orderly procedure.
For another, there are standards that have to be followed inthe exercise of the function of judicial review, namely (1) the existence of an
appropriate case:, (2) an interest personal and substantial by the party raising the constitutional question: (3) the plea that the function be
exercised at the earliest opportunity and (4) the necessity that the constiutional question be passed upon in order to decide the case (People
vs. Vera 65 Phil. 56 [1937]).
It may be conceded that the third requisite has been complied with, which is, that the parties have raised the issue of constitutionality early
enough in their pleadings.
This Petition, however, has fallen far short of the other three criteria.
A. Actual case and controversy.
It is basic that the power of judicial review is limited to the determination of actual cases and controversies.
Petitioner Dumlao assails the constitutionality of the first paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52, quoted earlier, as being contrary
to the equal protection clause guaranteed by the Constitution, and seeks to prohibit respondent COMELEC from implementing said
provision. Yet, Dumlao has not been adversely affected by the application of that provision. No petition seeking Dumlao's disqualification has
been filed before the COMELEC. There is no ruling of that constitutional body on the matter, which this Court is being asked to review on
Certiorari. His is a question posed in the abstract, a hypothetical issue, and in effect, a petition for an advisory opinion from this Court to be
rendered without the benefit of a detailed factual record Petitioner Dumlao's case is clearly within the primary jurisdiction (see concurring
Opinion of now Chief Justice Fernando in Peralta vs. Comelec, 82 SCRA 30, 96 [1978]) of respondent COMELEC as provided for in section
2, Art. XII-C, for the Constitution the pertinent portion of which reads:
"Section 2. The Commission on Elections shall have the following power and functions:
1) xxx
2) Be the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of all members of the National
Assembly and elective provincial and city officials. (Emphasis supplied)
The aforequoted provision must also be related to section 11 of Art. XII-C, which provides:
Section 11. Any decision, order, or ruling of the Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the
aggrieved party within thirty days from his receipt of a copy thereof.
B. Proper party.
The long-standing rule has been that "the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the
case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement" (People vs. Vera, supra).
In the case of petitioners Igot and Salapantan, it was only during the hearing, not in their Petition, that Igot is said to be a candidate for
Councilor. Even then, it cannot be denied that neither one has been convicted nor charged with acts of disloyalty to the State, nor
disqualified from being candidates for local elective positions. Neither one of them has been calle ed to have been adversely affected by the
operation of the statutory provisions they assail as unconstitutional Theirs is a generated grievance. They have no personal nor substantial
interest at stake. In the absence of any litigate interest, they can claim no locus standi in seeking judicial redress.
It is true that petitioners Igot and Salapantan have instituted this case as a taxpayer's suit, and that the rule enunciated in People vs. Vera,
above stated, has been relaxed in Pascual vs. The Secretary of Public Works (110 Phil. 331 [1960], thus:
... it is well settled that the validity of a statute may be contested only by one who will sustain a direct injury in
consequence of its enforcement. Yet, there are many decisions nullifying at the instance of taxpayers, laws providing for
the disbursement of public funds, upon the theory that "the expenditure of public funds, by an officer of the State for the
purpose of administering an unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds," which may be enjoined at
the request of a taxpayer.
In the same vein, it has been held:
In the determination of the degree of interest essential to give the requisite standing to attack the constitutionality of a
statute, the general rule is that not only persons individually affected, but also taxpayers have sufficient interest in
preventing the illegal expenditure of moneys raised by taxation and they may, therefore, question the constitutionality of
statutes requiring expenditure of public moneys. (Philippine Constitution Association, Inc., et als., vs. Gimenez, et als., 15
SCRA 479 [1965]).
However, the statutory provisions questioned in this case, namely, sec. 7, BP Blg. 51, and sections 4, 1, and 6 BP Blg. 52, do not directly
involve the disbursement of public funds. While, concededly, the elections to be held involve the expenditure of public moneys, nowhere in
their Petition do said petitioners allege that their tax money is "being extracted and spent in violation of specific constitutional protections
against abuses of legislative power" (Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S., 83 [1960]), or that there is a misapplication of such funds by respondent
COMELEC (see Pascual vs. Secretary of Public Works, 110 Phil. 331 [1960]), or that public money is being deflected to any improper
purpose. Neither do petitioners seek to restrain respondent from wasting public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or
unconstitutional law. (Philippine Constitution Association vs. Mathay, 18 SCRA 300 [1966]), citing Philippine Constitution Association vs.
Gimenez, 15 SCRA 479 [1965]). Besides, the institution of a taxpayer's suit, per se is no assurance of judicial review. As held by this Court in
Tan vs. Macapagal (43 SCRA 677 [1972]), speaking through our present Chief Justice, this Court is vested with discretion as to whether or
not a taxpayer's suit should be entertained.
C. Unavoidability of constitutional question.
Again upon the authority of People vs. Vera, "it is a wellsettled rule that the constitutionality of an act of the legislature will not be determined
by the courts unless that question is properly raised and presented in appropriate cases and is necessary to a determination of the case; i.e.,
the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota presented."
We have already stated that, by the standards set forth in People vs. Vera, the present is not an "appropriate case" for either petitioner
Dumlao or for petitioners Igot and Salapantan. They are actually without cause of action. It follows that the necessity for resolving the issue
of constitutionality is absent, and procedural regularity would require that this suit be dismissed.
II. The substantive viewpoint.
We have resolved, however, to rule squarely on two of the challenged provisions, the Courts not being entirely without discretion in the
matter. Thus, adherence to the strict procedural standard was relaxed in Tinio vs. Mina (26 SCRA 512 [1968]); Edu vs. Ericta (35 SCRA 481
[1970]); and in Gonzalez vs. Comelec (27 SCRA 835 [1969]), the Opinion in the Tinio and Gonzalez cases having been penned by our
present Chief Justice. The reasons which have impelled us are the paramount public interest involved and the proximity of the elections
which will be held only a few days hence.
Petitioner Dumlao's contention that section 4 of BP Blg. 52 is discriminatory against him personally is belied by the fact that several petitions
for the disqualification of other candidates for local positions based on the challenged provision have already been filed with the COMELEC
(as listed in p. 15, respondent's Comment). This tellingly overthrows Dumlao's contention of intentional or purposeful discrimination.
The assertion that Section 4 of BP Blg. 52 is contrary to the safer guard of equal protection is neither well taken. The constitutional guarantee
of equal protection of the laws is subject to rational classification. If the groupings are based on reasonable and real differentiations, one
class can be treated and regulated differently from another class. For purposes of public service, employees 65 years of age, have been
validly classified differently from younger employees. Employees attaining that age are subject to compulsory retirement, while those of
younger ages are not so compulsorily retirable.
In respect of election to provincial, city, or municipal positions, to require that candidates should not be more than 65 years of age at the time
they assume office, if applicable to everyone, might or might not be a reasonable classification although, as the Solicitor General has
intimated, a good policy of the law would be to promote the emergence of younger blood in our political elective echelons. On the other
hand, it might be that persons more than 65 years old may also be good elective local officials.
Coming now to the case of retirees. Retirement from government service may or may not be a reasonable disqualification for elective local
officials. For one thing, there can also be retirees from government service at ages, say below 65. It may neither be reasonable to disqualify
retirees, aged 65, for a 65 year old retiree could be a good local official just like one, aged 65, who is not a retiree.
But, in the case of a 65-year old elective local official, who has retired from a provincial, city or municipal office, there is reason to disqualify
him from running for the same office from which he had retired, as provided for in the challenged provision. The need for new blood assumes
relevance. The tiredness of the retiree for government work is present, and what is emphatically significant is that the retired employee has
already declared himself tired and unavailable for the same government work, but, which, by virtue of a change of mind, he would like to
assume again. It is for this very reason that inequality will neither result from the application of the challenged provision. Just as that
provision does not deny equal protection neither does it permit of such denial (see People vs. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 [1933]). Persons similarly
situated are sinlilarly treated.
In fine, it bears reiteration that the equal protection clause does not forbid all legal classification. What is proscribes is a classification which
is arbitrary and unreasonable. That constitutional guarantee is not violated by a reasonable classification based upon substantial distinctions,
where the classification is germane to the purpose of the law and applies to all Chose belonging to the same class (Peralta vs. Comelec, 82
SCRA 30 [1978] citing Felwa vs. Salas, 18 SCRA 606 [1966]; Rafael v. Embroidery and Apparel Control and Inspection Board, 21 SCRA 336
[1967]; Inchong etc., et al. vs. Hernandez 101 Phil. 1155 [1957]). The purpose of the law is to allow the emergence of younger blood in local
governments. The classification in question being pursuant to that purpose, it cannot be considered invalid "even it at times, it may be
susceptible to the objection that it is marred by theoretical inconsistencies" (Chief Justice Fernando, The Constitution of the Philippines, 1977
ed., p. 547).
There is an additional consideration. Absent herein is a showing of the clear invalidity of the questioned provision. Well accepted is the rule
that to justify the nullification of a law, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and equivocal breach.
Courts are practically unanimous in the pronouncement that laws shall not be declared invalid unless the conflict with the Constitution is clear
beyond reasonable doubt (Peralta vs. COMELEC, 82 SCRA 55 [1978], citing Cooper vs. Telfair 4 Dall 14; Dodd, Cases on Constitutional
Law, 3rd ed. 1942, 56). Lastly, it is within the compentence of the legislature to prescribe qualifications for one who desires to become a
candidate for office provided they are reasonable, as in this case.
In so far as the petition of Igot and Salapantan are concerned, the second paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52, quoted in full
earlier, and which they challenge, may be divided in two parts. The first provides:
a. judgment of conviction jor any of the aforementioned crimes shall be conclusive evidence of such fact ...
The supremacy of the Constitution stands out as the cardinal principle. We are aware of the presumption of validity that attaches to a
challenged statute, of the well-settled principle that "all reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of constitutionality," and that Courts
will not set aside a statute as constitutionally defective "except in a clear case." (People vs. Vera, supra). We are constrained to hold that this
is one such clear case.
Explicit is the constitutional provision that, in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved,
and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel (Article IV, section 19, 1973 Constitution). An accusation, according to the
fundamental law, is not synonymous with guilt. The challenged proviso contravenes the constitutional presumption of innocence, as a
candidate is disqualified from running for public office on the ground alone that charges have been filed against him before a civil or military
tribunal. It condemns before one is fully heard. In ultimate effect, except as to the degree of proof, no distinction is made between a person
convicted of acts of dislotalty and one against whom charges have been filed for such acts, as both of them would be ineligible to run for
public office. A person disqualified to run for public office on the ground that charges have been filed against him is virtually placed in the
same category as a person already convicted of a crime with the penalty of arresto, which carries with it the accessory penalty of suspension
of the right to hold office during the term of the sentence (Art. 44, Revised Penal Code).
And although the filing of charges is considered as but prima facie evidence, and therefore, may be rebutted, yet. there is "clear and present
danger" that because of the proximity of the elections, time constraints will prevent one charged with acts of disloyalty from offering contrary
proof to overcome the prima facie evidence against him.
Additionally, it is best that evidence pro and con of acts of disloyalty be aired before the Courts rather than before an administrative body
such as the COMELEC. A highly possible conflict of findings between two government bodies, to the extreme detriment of a person charged,
will thereby be avoided. Furthermore, a legislative/administrative determination of guilt should not be allowed to be substituted for a judicial
determination.
Being infected with constitutional infirmity, a partial declaration of nullity of only that objectionable portion is mandated. It is separable from
the first portion of the second paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Big. 52 which can stand by itself.
WHEREFORE, 1) the first paragraph of section 4 of Batas pambansa Bilang 52 is hereby declared valid. Said paragraph reads:
SEC. 4. Special disqualification. — In addition to violation of Section 10 of Article XII(C) of the Constitution and
disqualifications mentioned in existing laws which are hereby declared as disqualification for any of the elective officials
enumerated in Section 1 hereof, any retired elective provincial, city or municipal official, who has received payment of the
retirement benefits to which he is entitled under the law and who shall have been 65 years of age at the commencement
of the term of office to which he seeks to be elected, shall not be qualified to run for the same elective local office from
which he has retired.
2) That portion of the second paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 52 providing that "... the filing of charges
for the commission of such crimes before a civil court or military tribunal after preliminary investigation shall be prima
facie evidence of such fact", is hereby declared null and void, for being violative of the constitutional presumption of
innocence guaranteed to an accused.
SO ORDERED.
Makasiar, Antonio, Concepcion, Jr., Fernandez and Guerrero, JJ., concur.
Fernando, C.J., concurs and submits a brief separate opinion.
De Castro, J., abstain as far as petitioner Dumlao is concerned.

Separate Opinions

BARREDO, J., concurring:

But as regards the matter of equal protection, I reiterate my view for Peralta that Sec. 9(1) Art. XI I is more expensive than the equal
protection clause.
AQUINO, J, concurring:
concur in the result as to paragraph I of the dispositive part of the decision. I dissent as to paragraph 2. In my opinion, paragraph 2, section 4
of Batas Pambansa Bilang 52 is valid, being similar to certain presumptions in Articles 217 and 315 of the Penal Code, as amended by
Republic Act No. 4885. See U.S. v. Luling, 34 Phil. 725 and People v. Mingoa, 92 Phil. 856.
ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring:
concur but wish to add that a judgment of conviction as provided in Sec. 4, par. 2 of Batas Pambansa Big. 52 should be one which is final
and unappealable.
FERNANDO, C.J., concurring.
It is particularly gratifying that the reiteration in the ably-written and scholarly opinion of the Court, penned by Justice Melencio-Herrera, of
the standard that must be met before the power of judicial review may be availed of, set forth with such lucidity and force by Justice Laurel in
the two leading cases of Angara v. Electoral Commission 1 and People v. Vera, 2 did not constitute an obstacle to this Court ruling on the
crucial constitutional issues raised. It was a cause for concern, for me at least, that counsel of private parties in not a few cases in the recent
past had shown less than full awareness of the doctrines, procedural in character, that call for application whenever the exercise of this
awesome and delicate responsibility of adjudging the validity of a statute or presidential decree is invoked. 3 While this Court cannot be
accused of being bound by the letters of judicial timidity, it remains true that no cavalier disregard of tried and tested concepts should be
given encouragement. A petitioner who bases his claim for relief on asserted constitutional deficiencies deserves to be heard. That goes
without saying. For the judiciary must ever endeavor to vindicate rights safeguarded by the fundamental law. In that sense, this Tribunal is
not susceptible to the reproach that it has imprisoned itself in its allegiance to the philosophy of judicial self-restraint. There are, however,
limits to judicial activism. It cannot be too strongly stressed that a petition of this character must ever remain an orderly proceeding that
cannot be oblivious of the requisites to be complied with to justify a pronouncement on constitutional issues. Where there is exuberance in
the exercise of judicial power, the forms of litigation are but slight retaining walls. It is right and proper that the voice of the Solicitor General
should be heard in protest against such neglect of rudimentary precepts. Necessarily then, whenever objections based on refusal to abide by
the procedural principles are presented, this Court must rule. It would suffice if thereby the petition is dismissed for non-observance of the
controlling doctrines. There are times, however, when the controversy is of such a character that to resolve doubts, erase uncertainty, and
assure respect for constitutional limitations, this Tribunal must pass on the merits. This is one such case. I therefore concur with the opinion
of the Court.
It may be a task of superfluity then to write a concurring opinion. Nonetheless, a few words may not be amiss on what for me is the proper
approach to take as to the lack of power of this Court to pass on the motives of the legislative body, on the lack of persuasiveness of
petitioner's argument based on the equal protection guarantee, and on the fundamental concept of fairness of which the due process clause
is an embodiment, thus calling for the nullification of the disqualification of a candidate upon the mere filing of charges against him.
1. The challenge to the provision in question is predicated on what was referred to as "a known fact in the province of Nueva Vizcaya that the
aforesaid provision was concocted and designed precisely to frustrate any bid of herein petitioner to make a political come back [sic] as
governor of Nueva Vizcaya. The wordings [sic] of the law is so peculiarly attuned to discriminate against herein petitioner because every
condition imposed as disqualification grounds are known to be possessed by him because he was a former elective provincial official who
has received his retirement benefits, he desires to run for the same elective office and at the commencement of the term of office to which he
now seeks to be elected, he shall have reached 65 years of age. 4 Clearly then, the plea for invalidating such provision is the motive
attributed to the Interim Batasang Pambansa. For petitioner, it amounted to a constitutional infirmity fatal in character. The weakness of the
petition is thus apparent. No decision of this Tribunal can be cited in support of such a proposition. It would be to extend unduly the concept
of judicial review if a court can roam far and wide and range at will over the variety and diversity of the reasons, the promptings that may lead
a legislator to cast his vote for or against a proposed legislation. It is not what inspired the introduction of a bill but the effect thereof if duly
enacted that is decisive. That would be the test for its validity or lack of it. There is this relevant excerpt from McCray v. United States: 5 "The
decisions of this Court [Supreme Court of the United States] from the beginning lend no support whatever to the assumption that the
judiciary may restrain the exercise of lawful power on the assumption that a wrongful purpose of motive has caused the power to be exerted.
6 The late Chief Justice Warren, who penned the opinion in United States v. O' Brien 7 put the matter thus: "Inquiries into congressional
motives or purposes are a hazardous matter. When the issue is simply the interpretation of legislation, the Court will look to statements by
legislators for guidance as to the purpose of the legislature, because the benefit to sound decision-making in this circumstance is thought
sufficient to risk the possibility of misreading Congress' purpose. It is entirely a different matter when we are asked to void a statute that is,
under well-settled criteria, constitutional on its face, on the basis of what fewer than a handful of Congressmen said about it. What motivates
one legislator to make a speech about a statute is not necessarily what motivates scores of others to enact it, and the stakes are sufficiently
high for us to eschew guesswork. We decline to void essentially on the ground that it is unwise legislation which Congress had the
undoubted power to enact and which could be reenacted in its exact form if the same or another legislator made a 'wiser' speech about it." 8
2. If, however, the provision in question is susceptible to the reproach that it amounts to a denial of equal protection, then his plea for
nullification should be accorded a sympathetic response. As the opinion of the Court makes clear, such imputation is not deserving of
credence. The classification cannot be stigmatized as lacking in rationality. It is germane to the subject. Age, as well as the fact of retirement
and the receipt of retirement benefits are factors that can enter into any legislative determination of what disqualifications to impose. As was
pointed out in J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration: 9 "It suffices then that the laws operate equally and uniformly on all
persons under similar circumstances or that all persons must be treated in the same manner, the conditions not being different, both in the
privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed. Favoritism and undue preference cannot be allowed. For the principle is that equal protection
and security shall be given to every person under circumstances, which if not Identical, are analogous. If law be looked upon in terms of
burden or charges, those that fall within a class should be treated in the same fashion, whatever restrictions cast on some in the group
equally binding on the rest. 10 It cannot be denied that others similarly fall under the same ban. It was not directed at petitioner solely. The
most that can be said is that he falls within the-proscribed class. The point was likewise raised as to why should national officials be excluded
in the above provision. The answer is simple. There is nothing to prevent the legislative body from following a system of priorities. This it did
under the challenged legislative provision. In its opinion, what called for such a measure is the propensity of the local officials having reached
the retirement age and having received retirement benefits once again running for public office. Accordingly, the provision in question was
enacted. A portion of the opinion in the aforesaid J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc. finds relevance: "It was confronted with a situation that caned for
correction, and the legislation that was the result of its deliberation sought to apply the necessary palliative. That it stopped short of possibly
attaining the cure of other analogous ills certainly does not stigmatize its effort as a denial of equal protection. We have given our sanction to
the principle underlying the exercise of police power and taxation, but certainly not excluding eminent domain, that 'the legislature is not
required by the Constitution to adhere to the policy of all "or none." ' Thus, to reiterate, the invocation by petitioner of the equal protection
clause is futile and unavailing ." 11
3. That brings us to the assailed provision as to the sufficiency of the filing of charges for the commission of such crimes as subversion,
insurrection, rebellion or others of similar nature before a civil court or military tribunal after preliminary investigation, being a prima facie
evidence of such fact and therefore justifying the disqualification of a candidate. The opinion of the Court invoked the constitutional
presumption of innocence as a basis for its being annulled. That conclusion is well-founded. Such being the case, I am in full agreement. I
would add that such a provision is moreover tainted with arbitrariness and therefore is violative of the due process clause. Such a
constitutional right, to quote from Luzon Surety Co., Inc. v. Beson, 12 is "not a mere formality that may be dispensed with at will. Its disregard
is a matter of serious concern. It is a constitutional safeguard of the highest order. It is a response to man's innate sense of justice." 13 As
rightfully stressed in the opinion of the Court, the time element may invariably preclude a full hearing on the charge against him and thus
effectively negate the opportunity of an individual to present himself as a candidate. If, as has been invariably the case, a prosecutor,
whether in a civil court or in a military tribunal saddled as he is with so many complaints filed on his desk would give in to the all-too-human
propensity to take the easy way out and to file charges, then a candidate Would be hard put to destroy the presumption. A sense of realism
for me compels a declaration of nullity of a provision which on its face is patently offensive to the Constitution.
Hence my concurrence.
TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting:
Files a separate opinion dissenting from the adverse ruling on Dumlaos candidacy and declining to rule on the invalidity of the first part of
Section 4 of the questioned Law; and concurs with the pronouncement that the mere filing of charges shall be prima facie cause for
disqualification is void.
I. I dissent from the majority's dismissal of the petition insofar as it upholds the discriminatory and arbitrary provision of Sec. 4 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 52 which would impose a special disqualification on petitioner Patricio Dumlao from running for the elective local office of
governor of his home province of Nueva Vizcaya and would in effect bar the electors of his province from electing him to said office in the
January 30 elections, simply because he is a retired provincial governor of said province "who has received payment of the retirement
benefits to which he is entitled under the law and who shall have been 65 years of age at the commencement of the term of office to which
he seeks to be elected."
To specially and peculiarly ban a 65-year old previously retired elective local official from running for the same elective office (of governor, in
this case) previously held by him and from which he has retired is arbitrary, oppressive and unreasonable. Persons similarly situated are not
similarly treated, e.g. a retired vice-governor, mayor or councilor of 65 is entitled to run for governor (because the disqualification is for the
retiree of 65 to run for the same elective office from which he retired) but petitioner is barred from doing so (although he may run for any
other lesser office). Both are 65 and are retirees, yet one is barred from running for the office of governor. What is the valid distinction? Is this
not an arbitrary discrimination against petitioner who has cause to that "the aforesaid provision was concocted and designed precisely to
frustrate any bid of petition to make a political comeback as governor of Nueva Vizcaya 1 — (since no other case by a former governor
similarly barred by virtue of said provision can never be cited 2 ). Is there not here, therefore a gross denial of the cardinal constitutional
guarantee that equal protection and security shall be given under the law to every person, under analogous if not Identical circumstances?
Respondent's claim, as accepted by the majority, is that the purpose of the special disqualification is "to infuse new blood in local
governments but the classification (that would bar 65-year old retirees from running for the same elective local office) is not rational nor
reasonable. It is not germane nor relevant to the alleged purpose of "infusing new blood" because such "old blood" retirees may continue in
local governments since they are not disqualified at all to run for any other local elective office such as from provincial governor, vice-
governor, city, municipal or district mayor and vice- mayor to member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan Sangguniang Panglunsod and
Sangguniang Bayan, other than the local elective office from which they retired.
Furthermore, other 65-year olds who have likewise retired from the judiciary and other branches of government are not in any manner
disqualified to run for any local elective office, as in the case of retired Court of First Instance Judge (former Congressman) Alberto S. Ubay
who retired with full substantial retirement benefits as such judge in 1978 at age 70 and now at past 71 years of age, is running as the official
KBL candidate for governor of his province. And even in the case of 65-year old local elective officials, they are disqualified only when they
have received payment of the retirement benefits to which they are entitled under the law (which amount to very little, compared to
retirement benefits of other executive officials and members of the judiciary). If they have not received such retirement benefits, they are not
disqualified. Certainly, their disqualification or non-disqualification and consequent classification as "old blood" or "new blood" cannot hinge
on such an irrelevant question of whether or not they have received their retirement benefits.
The classification is patently arbitrary and unreasonable and is not based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences that
would justify the special disqualification of petitioner, which, it is claimed, "is based on a presumption that elective local officials who have
retired and are of advanced age cannot discharge the functions of the office they seek as those who are differently situated." 3 Such
presumption is sheer conjecture. The mere fact that a candidate is less than 65 or has "young or new blood" does not mean that he would be
more efficient, effective and competent than a mature 65year old like petition er who has had experience on the job and who was observed
at the hearing to appear to be most physically fit. Sufice it to city the outstanding case of the incumbent ebullient Minister of Foreign Affairs,
General Carlos P. Romulo, who was elected a 80 as a member of the Interim Batasan Pambansa and who has just this month completed 81
years of age and has been hailed by the President himself as "the best foreign minister the Republic has ever had
Age has simply just never been a yardstick for qualification or disqualification. Al. the most, a minimum age to hold public
office has been required as a qualification to insure a modicum of maturity 'now reduced to 21 years in the present
batas), but no maximum age has ever been imposed as a disqualification for elect public office since the right and win of
the people to elect the candidate of their choice for any elective office, no matter his age has always been recognized as
supreme.
The disqualification in question therefore is grossly violative of the equal protection clause which mandates that all persons subjected to
legislation shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions, both in the privileges conferred and in the liabilities imposed. The
guarantee is meant to proscribe undue favor and individual or class privilege on the one hand and hostile discrimination and the oppression
of in quality on the other. The questioned provision should therefore at the least be declared invalid in its application insofar as it would
disqualify petitioner from running for the office of governor of his province.
As aptly restated by the Chief Justice, "Persons similarly situated should be similarly treated. Where no valid distinction could be made as to
the relevant conditions that call for consideration, there should be none as to the privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed. There can
be no undue favoritism or partiality on the one hand or hostility on the other. Arbitrary selection and discrimination against persons in thus
ruled out. For the principle is that equal protection and security shall be given to every person under circumstances, which if not Identical are
analogous. If law be looked upon in terms of burden or charges, those that full within a class should be treated in the same fashion, whatever
restrictions cast on some in the group equally binding on the rest." 4
Finally, this arbitrary disqualification is likewise grossly violative of Article XII, sub-article C, section 9(1) of the 1973 Constitution that Bona
fide candidates for any public office shall be free from any form of harassment and discrimination.
II. I concur with the majority's declaration of invalidity of the portion of the second paragraph of Section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 which
would make the mere filing of charges of subversion, insurrection, rebellion or other similar crimes before a civil court or military tribunal after
preliminary investigation prima facie evidence of the fact of commission of an act of disloyalty to the State on the part of the candidate and
disqualify him from his candidacy. Such a provision could be the most insidious weapon to disqualify bona fide candidates who seem to be
headed for election and places in the hands of the military and civil prosecutors a dangerous and devastating weapon of cutting off any
candidate who may not be to their filing through the filing of last-hour charges against him.
I also concur with the pronouncement made in the majority decision that in order that a judgment of conviction may be deemed "as
conclusive evidence" of the candidate's disloyalty to the State and of his disqualification from office, such judgment of conviction must be
final and unappealable. This is so specifically provided in Section 22 of the 1978 Election Code. 5 Otherwise, the questioned provision would
deny the bona fide candidate substantive due process and would be grossly violative of his constitutional right of presumption of innocence
and of the above-quoted provision of the 1973 Constitution protecting candidates for public office from any form of harassment and
discrimination.
ADDENDUM
When the case was voted upon a second time last January 21st, there appeared to be a majority in favor of the declarations and
pronouncements above referred to in the two preceding paragraphs, in view of the urgency of the matter and the evil sought to be avoided.
However, as of this writing, January 23, 1980 in the afternoon, such majority seems to have been dissipated by the view that the action to
nullify such second paragraph of section 4 of the Batas in question is premature and has not been properly submitted for ajudication under
the strict procedural require . If this be the case, my above views, termed as concurrences, should be taken as dissents against the majority
action.

Separate Opinions

BARREDO, J., concurring:

But as regards the matter of equal protection, I reiterate my view for Peralta that Sec. 9(1) Art. XI I is more expensive than the equal
protection clause.
AQUINO, J, concurring:
concur in the result as to paragraph I of the dispositive part of the decision. I dissent as to paragraph 2. In my opinion, paragraph 2, section 4
of Batas Pambansa Bilang 52 is valid, being similar to certain presumptions in Articles 217 and 315 of the Penal Code, as amended by
Republic Act No. 4885. See U.S. v. Luling, 34 Phil. 725 and People v. Mingoa, 92 Phil. 856.
ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring:
concur but wish to add that a judgment of conviction as provided in Sec. 4, par. 2 of Batas Pambansa Big. 52 should be one which is final
and unappealable.
FERNANDO, C.J., concurring.
It is particularly gratifying that the reiteration in the ably-written and scholarly opinion of the Court, penned by Justice Melencio-Herrera, of
the standard that must be met before the power of judicial review may be availed of, set forth with such lucidity and force by Justice Laurel in
the two leading cases of Angara v. Electoral Commission 1 and People v. Vera, 2 did not constitute an obstacle to this Court ruling on the
crucial constitutional issues raised. It was a cause for concern, for me at least, that counsel of private parties in not a few cases in the recent
past had shown less than full awareness of the doctrines, procedural in character, that call for application whenever the exercise of this
awesome and delicate responsibility of adjudging the validity of a statute or presidential decree is invoked. 3 While this Court cannot be
accused of being bound by the letters of judicial timidity, it remains true that no cavalier disregard of tried and tested concepts should be
given encouragement. A petitioner who bases his claim for relief on asserted constitutional deficiencies deserves to be heard. That goes
without saying. For the judiciary must ever endeavor to vindicate rights safeguarded by the fundamental law. In that sense, this Tribunal is
not susceptible to the reproach that it has imprisoned itself in its allegiance to the philosophy of judicial self-restraint. There are, however,
limits to judicial activism. It cannot be too strongly stressed that a petition of this character must ever remain an orderly proceeding that
cannot be oblivious of the requisites to be complied with to justify a pronouncement on constitutional issues. Where there is exuberance in
the exercise of judicial power, the forms of litigation are but slight retaining walls. It is right and proper that the voice of the Solicitor General
should be heard in protest against such neglect of rudimentary precepts. Necessarily then, whenever objections based on refusal to abide by
the procedural principles are presented, this Court must rule. It would suffice if thereby the petition is dismissed for non-observance of the
controlling doctrines. There are times, however, when the controversy is of such a character that to resolve doubts, erase uncertainty, and
assure respect for constitutional limitations, this Tribunal must pass on the merits. This is one such case. I therefore concur with the opinion
of the Court.
It may be a task of superfluity then to write a concurring opinion. Nonetheless, a few words may not be amiss on what for me is the proper
approach to take as to the lack of power of this Court to pass on the motives of the legislative body, on the lack of persuasiveness of
petitioner's argument based on the equal protection guarantee, and on the fundamental concept of fairness of which the due process clause
is an embodiment, thus calling for the nullification of the disqualification of a candidate upon the mere filing of charges against him.
1. The challenge to the provision in question is predicated on what was referred to as "a known fact in the province of Nueva Vizcaya that the
aforesaid provision was concocted and designed precisely to frustrate any bid of herein petitioner to make a political come back [sic] as
governor of Nueva Vizcaya. The wordings [sic] of the law is so peculiarly attuned to discriminate against herein petitioner because every
condition imposed as disqualification grounds are known to be possessed by him because he was a former elective provincial official who
has received his retirement benefits, he desires to run for the same elective office and at the commencement of the term of office to which he
now seeks to be elected, he shall have reached 65 years of age. 4 Clearly then, the plea for invalidating such provision is the motive
attributed to the Interim Batasang Pambansa. For petitioner, it amounted to a constitutional infirmity fatal in character. The weakness of the
petition is thus apparent. No decision of this Tribunal can be cited in support of such a proposition. It would be to extend unduly the concept
of judicial review if a court can roam far and wide and range at will over the variety and diversity of the reasons, the promptings that may lead
a legislator to cast his vote for or against a proposed legislation. It is not what inspired the introduction of a bill but the effect thereof if duly
enacted that is decisive. That would be the test for its validity or lack of it. There is this relevant excerpt from McCray v. United States: 5 "The
decisions of this Court [Supreme Court of the United States] from the beginning lend no support whatever to the assumption that the
judiciary may restrain the exercise of lawful power on the assumption that a wrongful purpose of motive has caused the power to be exerted.
6 The late Chief Justice Warren, who penned the opinion in United States v. O' Brien 7 put the matter thus: "Inquiries into congressional
motives or purposes are a hazardous matter. When the issue is simply the interpretation of legislation, the Court will look to statements by
legislators for guidance as to the purpose of the legislature, because the benefit to sound decision-making in this circumstance is thought
sufficient to risk the possibility of misreading Congress' purpose. It is entirely a different matter when we are asked to void a statute that is,
under well-settled criteria, constitutional on its face, on the basis of what fewer than a handful of Congressmen said about it. What motivates
one legislator to make a speech about a statute is not necessarily what motivates scores of others to enact it, and the stakes are sufficiently
high for us to eschew guesswork. We decline to void essentially on the ground that it is unwise legislation which Congress had the
undoubted power to enact and which could be reenacted in its exact form if the same or another legislator made a 'wiser' speech about it." 8
2. If, however, the provision in question is susceptible to the reproach that it amounts to a denial of equal protection, then his plea for
nullification should be accorded a sympathetic response. As the opinion of the Court makes clear, such imputation is not deserving of
credence. The classification cannot be stigmatized as lacking in rationality. It is germane to the subject. Age, as well as the fact of retirement
and the receipt of retirement benefits are factors that can enter into any legislative determination of what disqualifications to impose. As was
pointed out in J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration: 9 "It suffices then that the laws operate equally and uniformly on all
persons under similar circumstances or that all persons must be treated in the same manner, the conditions not being different, both in the
privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed. Favoritism and undue preference cannot be allowed. For the principle is that equal protection
and security shall be given to every person under circumstances, which if not Identical, are analogous. If law be looked upon in terms of
burden or charges, those that fall within a class should be treated in the same fashion, whatever restrictions cast on some in the group
equally binding on the rest. 10 It cannot be denied that others similarly fall under the same ban. It was not directed at petitioner solely. The
most that can be said is that he falls within the-proscribed class. The point was likewise raised as to why should national officials be excluded
in the above provision. The answer is simple. There is nothing to prevent the legislative body from following a system of priorities. This it did
under the challenged legislative provision. In its opinion, what called for such a measure is the propensity of the local officials having reached
the retirement age and having received retirement benefits once again running for public office. Accordingly, the provision in question was
enacted. A portion of the opinion in the aforesaid J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc. finds relevance: "It was confronted with a situation that caned for
correction, and the legislation that was the result of its deliberation sought to apply the necessary palliative. That it stopped short of possibly
attaining the cure of other analogous ills certainly does not stigmatize its effort as a denial of equal protection. We have given our sanction to
the principle underlying the exercise of police power and taxation, but certainly not excluding eminent domain, that 'the legislature is not
required by the Constitution to adhere to the policy of all "or none." ' Thus, to reiterate, the invocation by petitioner of the equal protection
clause is futile and unavailing ." 11
3. That brings us to the assailed provision as to the sufficiency of the filing of charges for the commission of such crimes as subversion,
insurrection, rebellion or others of similar nature before a civil court or military tribunal after preliminary investigation, being a prima facie
evidence of such fact and therefore justifying the disqualification of a candidate. The opinion of the Court invoked the constitutional
presumption of innocence as a basis for its being annulled. That conclusion is well-founded. Such being the case, I am in full agreement. I
would add that such a provision is moreover tainted with arbitrariness and therefore is violative of the due process clause. Such a
constitutional right, to quote from Luzon Surety Co., Inc. v. Beson, 12 is "not a mere formality that may be dispensed with at will. Its disregard
is a matter of serious concern. It is a constitutional safeguard of the highest order. It is a response to man's innate sense of justice." 13 As
rightfully stressed in the opinion of the Court, the time element may invariably preclude a full hearing on the charge against him and thus
effectively negate the opportunity of an individual to present himself as a candidate. If, as has been invariably the case, a prosecutor,
whether in a civil court or in a military tribunal saddled as he is with so many complaints filed on his desk would give in to the all-too-human
propensity to take the easy way out and to file charges, then a candidate Would be hard put to destroy the presumption. A sense of realism
for me compels a declaration of nullity of a provision which on its face is patently offensive to the Constitution.
Hence my concurrence.
TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting:
Files a separate opinion dissenting from the adverse ruling on Dumlaos candidacy and declining to rule on the invalidity of the first part of
Section 4 of the questioned Law; and concurs with the pronouncement that the mere filing of charges shall be prima facie cause for
disqualification is void.
I. I dissent from the majority's dismissal of the petition insofar as it upholds the discriminatory and arbitrary provision of Sec. 4 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 52 which would impose a special disqualification on petitioner Patricio Dumlao from running for the elective local office of
governor of his home province of Nueva Vizcaya and would in effect bar the electors of his province from electing him to said office in the
January 30 elections, simply because he is a retired provincial governor of said province "who has received payment of the retirement
benefits to which he is entitled under the law and who shall have been 65 years of age at the commencement of the term of office to which
he seeks to be elected."
To specially and peculiarly ban a 65-year old previously retired elective local official from running for the same elective office (of governor, in
this case) previously held by him and from which he has retired is arbitrary, oppressive and unreasonable. Persons similarly situated are not
similarly treated, e.g. a retired vice-governor, mayor or councilor of 65 is entitled to run for governor (because the disqualification is for the
retiree of 65 to run for the same elective office from which he retired) but petitioner is barred from doing so (although he may run for any
other lesser office). Both are 65 and are retirees, yet one is barred from running for the office of governor. What is the valid distinction? Is this
not an arbitrary discrimination against petitioner who has cause to that "the aforesaid provision was concocted and designed precisely to
frustrate any bid of petition to make a political comeback as governor of Nueva Vizcaya 1 — (since no other case by a former governor
similarly barred by virtue of said provision can never be cited 2 ). Is there not here, therefore a gross denial of the cardinal constitutional
guarantee that equal protection and security shall be given under the law to every person, under analogous if not Identical circumstances?
Respondent's claim, as accepted by the majority, is that the purpose of the special disqualification is "to infuse new blood in local
governments but the classification (that would bar 65-year old retirees from running for the same elective local office) is not rational nor
reasonable. It is not germane nor relevant to the alleged purpose of "infusing new blood" because such "old blood" retirees may continue in
local governments since they are not disqualified at all to run for any other local elective office such as from provincial governor, vice-
governor, city, municipal or district mayor and vice- mayor to member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan Sangguniang Panglunsod and
Sangguniang Bayan, other than the local elective office from which they retired.
Furthermore, other 65-year olds who have likewise retired from the judiciary and other branches of government are not in any manner
disqualified to run for any local elective office, as in the case of retired Court of First Instance Judge (former Congressman) Alberto S. Ubay
who retired with full substantial retirement benefits as such judge in 1978 at age 70 and now at past 71 years of age, is running as the official
KBL candidate for governor of his province. And even in the case of 65-year old local elective officials, they are disqualified only when they
have received payment of the retirement benefits to which they are entitled under the law (which amount to very little, compared to
retirement benefits of other executive officials and members of the judiciary). If they have not received such retirement benefits, they are not
disqualified. Certainly, their disqualification or non-disqualification and consequent classification as "old blood" or "new blood" cannot hinge
on such an irrelevant question of whether or not they have received their retirement benefits.
The classification is patently arbitrary and unreasonable and is not based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences that
would justify the special disqualification of petitioner, which, it is claimed, "is based on a presumption that elective local officials who have
retired and are of advanced age cannot discharge the functions of the office they seek as those who are differently situated." 3 Such
presumption is sheer conjecture. The mere fact that a candidate is less than 65 or has "young or new blood" does not mean that he would be
more efficient, effective and competent than a mature 65year old like petition er who has had experience on the job and who was observed
at the hearing to appear to be most physically fit. Sufice it to city the outstanding case of the incumbent ebullient Minister of Foreign Affairs,
General Carlos P. Romulo, who was elected a 80 as a member of the Interim Batasan Pambansa and who has just this month completed 81
years of age and has been hailed by the President himself as "the best foreign minister the Republic has ever had
Age has simply just never been a yardstick for qualification or disqualification. Al. the most, a minimum age to hold public
office has been required as a qualification to insure a modicum of maturity 'now reduced to 21 years in the present
batas), but no maximum age has ever been imposed as a disqualification for elect public office since the right and win of
the people to elect the candidate of their choice for any elective office, no matter his age has always been recognized as
supreme.
The disqualification in question therefore is grossly violative of the equal protection clause which mandates that all persons subjected to
legislation shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions, both in the privileges conferred and in the liabilities imposed. The
guarantee is meant to proscribe undue favor and individual or class privilege on the one hand and hostile discrimination and the oppression
of in quality on the other. The questioned provision should therefore at the least be declared invalid in its application insofar as it would
disqualify petitioner from running for the office of governor of his province.
As aptly restated by the Chief Justice, "Persons similarly situated should be similarly treated. Where no valid distinction could be made as to
the relevant conditions that call for consideration, there should be none as to the privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed. There can
be no undue favoritism or partiality on the one hand or hostility on the other. Arbitrary selection and discrimination against persons in thus
ruled out. For the principle is that equal protection and security shall be given to every person under circumstances, which if not Identical are
analogous. If law be looked upon in terms of burden or charges, those that full within a class should be treated in the same fashion, whatever
restrictions cast on some in the group equally binding on the rest." 4
Finally, this arbitrary disqualification is likewise grossly violative of Article XII, sub-article C, section 9(1) of the 1973 Constitution that Bona
fide candidates for any public office shall be free from any form of harassment and discrimination.
II. I concur with the majority's declaration of invalidity of the portion of the second paragraph of Section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 which
would make the mere filing of charges of subversion, insurrection, rebellion or other similar crimes before a civil court or military tribunal after
preliminary investigation prima facie evidence of the fact of commission of an act of disloyalty to the State on the part of the candidate and
disqualify him from his candidacy. Such a provision could be the most insidious weapon to disqualify bona fide candidates who seem to be
headed for election and places in the hands of the military and civil prosecutors a dangerous and devastating weapon of cutting off any
candidate who may not be to their filing through the filing of last-hour charges against him.
I also concur with the pronouncement made in the majority decision that in order that a judgment of conviction may be deemed "as
conclusive evidence" of the candidate's disloyalty to the State and of his disqualification from office, such judgment of conviction must be
final and unappealable. This is so specifically provided in Section 22 of the 1978 Election Code. 5 Otherwise, the questioned provision would
deny the bona fide candidate substantive due process and would be grossly violative of his constitutional right of presumption of innocence
and of the above-quoted provision of the 1973 Constitution protecting candidates for public office from any form of harassment and
discrimination.
ADDENDUM
When the case was voted upon a second time last January 21st, there appeared to be a majority in favor of the declarations and
pronouncements above referred to in the two preceding paragraphs, in view of the urgency of the matter and the evil sought to be avoided.
However, as of this writing, January 23, 1980 in the afternoon, such majority seems to have been dissipated by the view that the action to
nullify such second paragraph of section 4 of the Batas in question is premature and has not been properly submitted for ajudication under
the strict procedural require . If this be the case, my above views, termed as concurrences, should be taken as dissents against the majority
action.

Separate Opinions
BARREDO, J., concurring:
But as regards the matter of equal protection, I reiterate my view for Peralta that Sec. 9(1) Art. XI I is more expensive than the equal
protection clause.
AQUINO, J, concurring:
concur in the result as to paragraph I of the dispositive part of the decision. I dissent as to paragraph 2. In my opinion, paragraph 2, section 4
of Batas Pambansa Bilang 52 is valid, being similar to certain presumptions in Articles 217 and 315 of the Penal Code, as amended by
Republic Act No. 4885. See U.S. v. Luling, 34 Phil. 725 and People v. Mingoa, 92 Phil. 856.
ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring:
concur but wish to add that a judgment of conviction as provided in Sec. 4, par. 2 of Batas Pambansa Big. 52 should be one which is final
and unappealable.
FERNANDO, C.J., concurring.
It is particularly gratifying that the reiteration in the ably-written and scholarly opinion of the Court, penned by Justice Melencio-Herrera, of
the standard that must be met before the power of judicial review may be availed of, set forth with such lucidity and force by Justice Laurel in
the two leading cases of Angara v. Electoral Commission 1 and People v. Vera, 2 did not constitute an obstacle to this Court ruling on the
crucial constitutional issues raised. It was a cause for concern, for me at least, that counsel of private parties in not a few cases in the recent
past had shown less than full awareness of the doctrines, procedural in character, that call for application whenever the exercise of this
awesome and delicate responsibility of adjudging the validity of a statute or presidential decree is invoked. 3 While this Court cannot be
accused of being bound by the letters of judicial timidity, it remains true that no cavalier disregard of tried and tested concepts should be
given encouragement. A petitioner who bases his claim for relief on asserted constitutional deficiencies deserves to be heard. That goes
without saying. For the judiciary must ever endeavor to vindicate rights safeguarded by the fundamental law. In that sense, this Tribunal is
not susceptible to the reproach that it has imprisoned itself in its allegiance to the philosophy of judicial self-restraint. There are, however,
limits to judicial activism. It cannot be too strongly stressed that a petition of this character must ever remain an orderly proceeding that
cannot be oblivious of the requisites to be complied with to justify a pronouncement on constitutional issues. Where there is exuberance in
the exercise of judicial power, the forms of litigation are but slight retaining walls. It is right and proper that the voice of the Solicitor General
should be heard in protest against such neglect of rudimentary precepts. Necessarily then, whenever objections based on refusal to abide by
the procedural principles are presented, this Court must rule. It would suffice if thereby the petition is dismissed for non-observance of the
controlling doctrines. There are times, however, when the controversy is of such a character that to resolve doubts, erase uncertainty, and
assure respect for constitutional limitations, this Tribunal must pass on the merits. This is one such case. I therefore concur with the opinion
of the Court.
It may be a task of superfluity then to write a concurring opinion. Nonetheless, a few words may not be amiss on what for me is the proper
approach to take as to the lack of power of this Court to pass on the motives of the legislative body, on the lack of persuasiveness of
petitioner's argument based on the equal protection guarantee, and on the fundamental concept of fairness of which the due process clause
is an embodiment, thus calling for the nullification of the disqualification of a candidate upon the mere filing of charges against him.
1. The challenge to the provision in question is predicated on what was referred to as "a known fact in the province of Nueva Vizcaya that the
aforesaid provision was concocted and designed precisely to frustrate any bid of herein petitioner to make a political come back [sic] as
governor of Nueva Vizcaya. The wordings [sic] of the law is so peculiarly attuned to discriminate against herein petitioner because every
condition imposed as disqualification grounds are known to be possessed by him because he was a former elective provincial official who
has received his retirement benefits, he desires to run for the same elective office and at the commencement of the term of office to which he
now seeks to be elected, he shall have reached 65 years of age. 4 Clearly then, the plea for invalidating such provision is the motive
attributed to the Interim Batasang Pambansa. For petitioner, it amounted to a constitutional infirmity fatal in character. The weakness of the
petition is thus apparent. No decision of this Tribunal can be cited in support of such a proposition. It would be to extend unduly the concept
of judicial review if a court can roam far and wide and range at will over the variety and diversity of the reasons, the promptings that may lead
a legislator to cast his vote for or against a proposed legislation. It is not what inspired the introduction of a bill but the effect thereof if duly
enacted that is decisive. That would be the test for its validity or lack of it. There is this relevant excerpt from McCray v. United States: 5 "The
decisions of this Court [Supreme Court of the United States] from the beginning lend no support whatever to the assumption that the
judiciary may restrain the exercise of lawful power on the assumption that a wrongful purpose of motive has caused the power to be exerted.
6 The late Chief Justice Warren, who penned the opinion in United States v. O' Brien 7 put the matter thus: "Inquiries into congressional
motives or purposes are a hazardous matter. When the issue is simply the interpretation of legislation, the Court will look to statements by
legislators for guidance as to the purpose of the legislature, because the benefit to sound decision-making in this circumstance is thought
sufficient to risk the possibility of misreading Congress' purpose. It is entirely a different matter when we are asked to void a statute that is,
under well-settled criteria, constitutional on its face, on the basis of what fewer than a handful of Congressmen said about it. What motivates
one legislator to make a speech about a statute is not necessarily what motivates scores of others to enact it, and the stakes are sufficiently
high for us to eschew guesswork. We decline to void essentially on the ground that it is unwise legislation which Congress had the
undoubted power to enact and which could be reenacted in its exact form if the same or another legislator made a 'wiser' speech about it." 8
2. If, however, the provision in question is susceptible to the reproach that it amounts to a denial of equal protection, then his plea for
nullification should be accorded a sympathetic response. As the opinion of the Court makes clear, such imputation is not deserving of
credence. The classification cannot be stigmatized as lacking in rationality. It is germane to the subject. Age, as well as the fact of retirement
and the receipt of retirement benefits are factors that can enter into any legislative determination of what disqualifications to impose. As was
pointed out in J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration: 9 "It suffices then that the laws operate equally and uniformly on all
persons under similar circumstances or that all persons must be treated in the same manner, the conditions not being different, both in the
privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed. Favoritism and undue preference cannot be allowed. For the principle is that equal protection
and security shall be given to every person under circumstances, which if not Identical, are analogous. If law be looked upon in terms of
burden or charges, those that fall within a class should be treated in the same fashion, whatever restrictions cast on some in the group
equally binding on the rest. 10 It cannot be denied that others similarly fall under the same ban. It was not directed at petitioner solely. The
most that can be said is that he falls within the-proscribed class. The point was likewise raised as to why should national officials be excluded
in the above provision. The answer is simple. There is nothing to prevent the legislative body from following a system of priorities. This it did
under the challenged legislative provision. In its opinion, what called for such a measure is the propensity of the local officials having reached
the retirement age and having received retirement benefits once again running for public office. Accordingly, the provision in question was
enacted. A portion of the opinion in the aforesaid J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc. finds relevance: "It was confronted with a situation that caned for
correction, and the legislation that was the result of its deliberation sought to apply the necessary palliative. That it stopped short of possibly
attaining the cure of other analogous ills certainly does not stigmatize its effort as a denial of equal protection. We have given our sanction to
the principle underlying the exercise of police power and taxation, but certainly not excluding eminent domain, that 'the legislature is not
required by the Constitution to adhere to the policy of all "or none." ' Thus, to reiterate, the invocation by petitioner of the equal protection
clause is futile and unavailing ." 11
3. That brings us to the assailed provision as to the sufficiency of the filing of charges for the commission of such crimes as subversion,
insurrection, rebellion or others of similar nature before a civil court or military tribunal after preliminary investigation, being a prima facie
evidence of such fact and therefore justifying the disqualification of a candidate. The opinion of the Court invoked the constitutional
presumption of innocence as a basis for its being annulled. That conclusion is well-founded. Such being the case, I am in full agreement. I
would add that such a provision is moreover tainted with arbitrariness and therefore is violative of the due process clause. Such a
constitutional right, to quote from Luzon Surety Co., Inc. v. Beson, 12 is "not a mere formality that may be dispensed with at will. Its disregard
is a matter of serious concern. It is a constitutional safeguard of the highest order. It is a response to man's innate sense of justice." 13 As
rightfully stressed in the opinion of the Court, the time element may invariably preclude a full hearing on the charge against him and thus
effectively negate the opportunity of an individual to present himself as a candidate. If, as has been invariably the case, a prosecutor,
whether in a civil court or in a military tribunal saddled as he is with so many complaints filed on his desk would give in to the all-too-human
propensity to take the easy way out and to file charges, then a candidate Would be hard put to destroy the presumption. A sense of realism
for me compels a declaration of nullity of a provision which on its face is patently offensive to the Constitution.
Hence my concurrence.
TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting:
Files a separate opinion dissenting from the adverse ruling on Dumlaos candidacy and declining to rule on the invalidity of the first part of
Section 4 of the questioned Law; and concurs with the pronouncement that the mere filing of charges shall be prima facie cause for
disqualification is void.
I. I dissent from the majority's dismissal of the petition insofar as it upholds the discriminatory and arbitrary provision of
Sec. 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 which would impose a special disqualification on petitioner Patricio Dumlao from
running for the elective local office of governor of his home province of Nueva Vizcaya and would in effect bar the
electors of his province from electing him to said office in the January 30 elections, simply because he is a retired
provincial governor of said province "who has received payment of the retirement benefits to which he is entitled under
the law and who shall have been 65 years of age at the commencement of the term of office to which he seeks to be
elected.
To specially and peculiarly ban a 65-year old previously retired elective local official from running for the same elective office (of governor, in
this case) previously held by him and from which he has retired is arbitrary, oppressive and unreasonable. Persons similarly situated are not
similarly treated, e.g. a retired vice-governor, mayor or councilor of 65 is entitled to run for governor (because the disqualification is for the
retiree of 65 to run for the same elective office from which he retired) but petitioner is barred from doing so (although he may run for any
other lesser office). Both are 65 and are retirees, yet one is barred from running for the office of governor. What is the valid distinction? Is this
not an arbitrary discrimination against petitioner who has cause to that "the aforesaid provision was concocted and designed precisely to
frustrate any bid of petition to make a political comeback as governor of Nueva Vizcaya 1 — (since no other case by a former governor
similarly barred by virtue of said provision can never be cited 2 ). Is there not here, therefore a gross denial of the cardinal constitutional
guarantee that equal protection and security shall be given under the law to every person, under analogous if not Identical circumstances?
Respondent's claim, as accepted by the majority, is that the purpose of the special disqualification is "to infuse new blood in local
governments but the classification (that would bar 65-year old retirees from running for the same elective local office) is not rational nor
reasonable. It is not germane nor relevant to the alleged purpose of "infusing new blood" because such "old blood" retirees may continue in
local governments since they are not disqualified at all to run for any other local elective office such as from provincial governor, vice-
governor, city, municipal or district mayor and vice- mayor to member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan Sangguniang Panglunsod and
Sangguniang Bayan, other than the local elective office from which they retired.
Furthermore, other 65-year olds who have likewise retired from the judiciary and other branches of government are not in any manner
disqualified to run for any local elective office, as in the case of retired Court of First Instance Judge (former Congressman) Alberto S. Ubay
who retired with full substantial retirement benefits as such judge in 1978 at age 70 and now at past 71 years of age, is running as the official
KBL candidate for governor of his province. And even in the case of 65-year old local elective officials, they are disqualified only when they
have received payment of the retirement benefits to which they are entitled under the law (which amount to very little, compared to
retirement benefits of other executive officials and members of the judiciary). If they have not received such retirement benefits, they are not
disqualified. Certainly, their disqualification or non-disqualification and consequent classification as "old blood" or "new blood" cannot hinge
on such an irrelevant question of whether or not they have received their retirement benefits.
The classification is patently arbitrary and unreasonable and is not based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences that
would justify the special disqualification of petitioner, which, it is claimed, "is based on a presumption that elective local officials who have
retired and are of advanced age cannot discharge the functions of the office they seek as those who are differently situated." 3 Such
presumption is sheer conjecture. The mere fact that a candidate is less than 65 or has "young or new blood" does not mean that he would be
more efficient, effective and competent than a mature 65year old like petition er who has had experience on the job and who was observed
at the hearing to appear to be most physically fit. Sufice it to city the outstanding case of the incumbent ebullient Minister of Foreign Affairs,
General Carlos P. Romulo, who was elected a 80 as a member of the Interim Batasan Pambansa and who has just this month completed 81
years of age and has been hailed by the President himself as "the best foreign minister the Republic has ever had
Age has simply just never been a yardstick for qualification or disqualification. Al. the most, a minimum age to hold public
office has been required as a qualification to insure a modicum of maturity 'now reduced to 21 years in the present
batas), but no maximum age has ever been imposed as a disqualification for elect public office since the right and win of
the people to elect the candidate of their choice for any elective office, no matter his age has always been recognized as
supreme.
The disqualification in question therefore is grossly violative of the equal protection clause which mandates that all persons subjected to
legislation shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions, both in the privileges conferred and in the liabilities imposed. The
guarantee is meant to proscribe undue favor and individual or class privilege on the one hand and hostile discrimination and the oppression
of in quality on the other. The questioned provision should therefore at the least be declared invalid in its application insofar as it would
disqualify petitioner from running for the office of governor of his province.
As aptly restated by the Chief Justice, "Persons similarly situated should be similarly treated. Where no valid distinction could be made as to
the relevant conditions that call for consideration, there should be none as to the privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed. There can
be no undue favoritism or partiality on the one hand or hostility on the other. Arbitrary selection and discrimination against persons in thus
ruled out. For the principle is that equal protection and security shall be given to every person under circumstances, which if not Identical are
analogous. If law be looked upon in terms of burden or charges, those that full within a class should be treated in the same fashion, whatever
restrictions cast on some in the group equally binding on the rest." 4
Finally, this arbitrary disqualification is likewise grossly violative of Article XII, sub-article C, section 9(1) of the 1973 Constitution that Bona
fide candidates for any public office shall be free from any form of harassment and discrimination.
II. I concur with the majority's declaration of invalidity of the portion of the second paragraph of Section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 which
would make the mere filing of charges of subversion, insurrection, rebellion or other similar crimes before a civil court or military tribunal after
preliminary investigation prima facie evidence of the fact of commission of an act of disloyalty to the State on the part of the candidate and
disqualify him from his candidacy. Such a provision could be the most insidious weapon to disqualify bona fide candidates who seem to be
headed for election and places in the hands of the military and civil prosecutors a dangerous and devastating weapon of cutting off any
candidate who may not be to their filing through the filing of last-hour charges against him.
I also concur with the pronouncement made in the majority decision that in order that a judgment of conviction may be deemed "as
conclusive evidence" of the candidate's disloyalty to the State and of his disqualification from office, such judgment of conviction must be
final and unappealable. This is so specifically provided in Section 22 of the 1978 Election Code. 5 Otherwise, the questioned provision would
deny the bona fide candidate substantive due process and would be grossly violative of his constitutional right of presumption of innocence
and of the above-quoted provision of the 1973 Constitution protecting candidates for public office from any form of harassment and
discrimination.
ADDENDUM
When the case was voted upon a second time last January 21st, there appeared to be a majority in favor of the declarations and
pronouncements above referred to in the two preceding paragraphs, in view of the urgency of the matter and the evil sought to be avoided.
However, as of this writing, January 23, 1980 in the afternoon, such majority seems to have been dissipated by the view that the action to
nullify such second paragraph of section 4 of the Batas in question is premature and has not been properly submitted for ajudication under
the strict procedural require . If this be the case, my above views, termed as concurrences, should be taken as dissents against the majority
action.
Footnotes
Fernando, CJ.:
1 63 Phil. 139 (1936).
2 65 Phil. 56 (1937).
3 Cf. Sanidad, Commision on Election L-44640, October 12, 1976, 73 SCRA 333; De la T Llana v. Election. L-47245,
December 9, 1917, 80 SCRA 525; Hidalgo v. Marcos L-17329, December 9, 1977, 80 SCRA 538; Peralta v. Commission
on Elections, L-47771, March 11, 1978, 82 SCRA 30),
4 Petition, 3-4.
5 195 US 27 (1904).
6 Ibid, 56.
7 391 US 367 (1968).
8 lbid, 383-384.
9 L-21064, February 18, 1970, 31 SCRA 413.
10 lbid, 435.
11 Ibid, 439.
12 L-26865-66, January 30, 1970, 31 SCRA 313.
13 Ibid, 318.
Teehankee, K.:
1 Petition at page 4.
2 Respondents cites in its comment (at page 15) a handful of pending cases for disqualification of mayoral candidates.
3 Respondent's Comment, at pages 12-13.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
 EN BANC

G.R. No. 105371 November 11, 1993

THE PHILIPPINE JUDGES ASSOCIATION, duly rep. by its President, BERNARDO P. ABESAMIS, Vice-President for Legal Affairs,
MARIANO M. UMALI, Director for Pasig, Makati, and Pasay, Metro Manila, ALFREDO C. FLORES, and Chairman of the Committee
on Legal Aid, JESUS G. BERSAMIRA, Presiding Judges of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 85, Quezon City and Branches 160, 167
and 166, Pasig, Metro Manila, respectively: the NATIONAL CONFEDERATION OF THE JUDGES ASSOCIATION OF THE
PHILIPPINES, composed of the METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT JUDGES ASSOCIATION rep. by its President. REINATO QUILALA of
the MUNICIPAL TRIAL CIRCUIT COURT, Manila; THE MUNICIPAL JUDGES LEAGUE OF THE PHILIPPINES rep. by its President,
TOMAS G. TALAVERA; by themselves and in behalf of all the Judges of the Regional Trial and Shari'a Courts, Metropolitan Trial
Courts and Municipal Courts throughout the Country, petitioners,
vs.
HON. PETE PRADO, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Transportation and Communications, JORGE V.
SARMIENTO, in his capacity as Postmaster General, and the PHILIPPINE POSTAL CORP., respondents.

CRUZ, J.:
The basic issue raised in this petition is the independence of the Judiciary. It is asserted by the petitioners that this hallmark of republicanism
is impaired by the statute and circular they are here challenging. The Supreme Court is itself affected by these measures and is thus an
interested party that should ordinarily not also be a judge at the same time. Under our system of government, however, it cannot inhibit itself
and must rule upon the challenge, because no other office has the authority to do so. We shall therefore act upon this matter not with
officiousness but in the discharge of an unavoidable duty and, as always, with detachment and fairness.
The main target of this petition is Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 as implemented by the Philippine Postal Corporation through its Circular No.
92-28. These measures withdraw the franking privilege from the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Regional Trial Courts, the
Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the Land Registration Commission and its Registers of Deeds, along with certain
other government offices.
The petitioners are members of the lower courts who feel that their official functions as judges will be prejudiced by the above-named
measures. The National Land Registration Authority has taken common cause with them insofar as its own activities, such as sending of
requisite notices in registration cases, affect judicial proceedings. On its motion, it has been allowed to intervene.
The petition assails the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7354 on the grounds that: (1) its title embraces more than one subject and does not
express its purposes; (2) it did not pass the required readings in both Houses of Congress and printed copies of the bill in its final form were
not distributed among the members before its passage; and (3) it is discriminatory and encroaches on the independence of the Judiciary.
We approach these issues with one important principle in mind, to wit, the presumption of the constitutionality of statutes. The theory is that
as the joint act of the Legislature and the Executive, every statute is supposed to have first been carefully studied and determined to be
constitutional before it was finally enacted. Hence, unless it is clearly shown that it is constitutionally flawed, the attack against its validity
must be rejected and the law itself upheld. To doubt is to sustain.
I
We consider first the objection based on Article VI, Sec. 26(l), of the Constitution providing that "Every bill passed by the Congress shall
embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof."
The purposes of this rule are: (1) to prevent hodge-podge or "log-rolling" legislation; (2) to prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislature by
means of provisions in bills of which the title gives no intimation, and which might therefore be overlooked and carelessly and unintentionally
adopted; and (3) to fairly apprise the people, through such publication of legislative proceedings as is usually made, of the subject of
legislation that is being considered, in order that they may have opportunity of being heard thereon, by petition or otherwise, if they shall so
desire.1
It is the submission of the petitioners that Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 which withdrew the franking privilege from the Judiciary is not
expressed in the title of the law, nor does it reflect its purposes.
R.A. No. 7354 is entitled "An Act Creating the Philippine Postal Corporation, Defining its Powers, Functions and Responsibilities, Providing
for Regulation of the Industry and for Other Purposes Connected Therewith."
The objectives of the law are enumerated in Section 3, which provides:
The State shall pursue the following objectives of a nationwide postal system:
a) to enable the economical and speedy transfer of mail and other postal matters, from sender to addressee, with full
recognition of their privacy or confidentiality;
b) to promote international interchange, cooperation and understanding through the unhampered flow or exchange of
postal matters between nations;
c) to cause or effect a wide range of postal services to cater to different users and changing needs, including but not
limited to, philately, transfer of monies and valuables, and the like;
d) to ensure that sufficient revenues are generated by and within the industry to finance the overall cost of providing the
varied range of postal delivery and messengerial services as well as the expansion and continuous upgrading of service
standards by the same.
Sec. 35 of R.A. No. 7354, which is the principal target of the petition, reads as follows:
 Sec. 35. Repealing Clause. — All acts, decrees, orders, executive orders, instructions, rules and regulations or parts
thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are repealed or modified accordingly.
All franking privileges authorized by law are hereby repealed, except those provided for under Commonwealth Act No.
265, Republic Acts Numbered 69, 180, 1414, 2087 and 5059. The Corporation may continue the franking privilege under
Circular No. 35 dated October 24, 1977 and that of the Vice President, under such arrangements and conditions as may
obviate abuse or unauthorized use thereof.
The petitioners' contention is untenable. We do not agree that the title of the challenged act violates the Constitution.
The title of the bill is not required to be an index to the body of the act, or to be as comprehensive as to cover every single detail of the
measure. It has been held that if the title fairly indicates the general subject, and reasonably covers all the provisions of the act, and is not
calculated to mislead the legislature or the people, there is sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement. 2
To require every end and means necessary for the accomplishment of the general objectives of the statute to be expressed in its title would
not only be unreasonable but would actually render legislation impossible. 3 As has been correctly explained:
The details of a legislative act need not be specifically stated in its title, but matter germane to the subject as expressed
in the title, and adopted to the accomplishment of the object in view, may properly be included in the act. Thus, it is
proper to create in the same act the machinery by which the act is to be enforced, to prescribe the penalties for its
infraction, and to remove obstacles in the way of its execution. If such matters are properly connected with the subject as
expressed in the title, it is unnecessary that they should also have special mention in the title (Southern Pac. Co. v.
Bartine, 170 Fed. 725).
This is particularly true of the repealing clause, on which Cooley writes: "The repeal of a statute on a given subject is properly connected with
the subject matter of a new statute on the same subject; and therefore a repealing section in the new statute is valid, notwithstanding that the
title is silent on the subject. It would be difficult to conceive of a matter more germane to an act and to the object to be accomplished thereby
than the repeal of previous legislations connected therewith."4
The reason is that where a statute repeals a former law, such repeal is the effect and not the subject of the statute; and it is the subject, not
the effect of a law, which is required to be briefly expressed in its title.5 As observed in one case,6 if the title of an act embraces only one
subject, we apprehend it was never claimed that every other act which repeals it or alters by implication must be mentioned in the title of the
new act. Any such rule would be neither within the reason of the Constitution, nor practicable.
We are convinced that the withdrawal of the franking privilege from some agencies is germane to the accomplishment of the principal
objective of R.A. No. 7354, which is the creation of a more efficient and effective postal service system. Our ruling is that, by virtue of its
nature as a repealing clause, Section 35 did not have to be expressly included in the title of the said law.
II
The petitioners maintain that the second paragraph of Sec. 35 covering the repeal of the franking privilege from the petitioners and this Court
under E.O. 207, PD 1882 and PD 26 was not included in the original version of Senate Bill No. 720 or House Bill No. 4200. As this paragraph
appeared only in the Conference Committee Report, its addition, violates Article VI, Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution, reading as follows:
(2) No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three readings on separate days, and printed
copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its Members three days before its passage, except when the
President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the last
reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and
the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.
The petitioners also invoke Sec. 74 of the Rules of the House of Representatives, requiring that amendment to any bill when the House and
the Senate shall have differences thereon may be settled by a conference committee of both chambers. They stress that Sec. 35 was never
a subject of any disagreement between both Houses and so the second paragraph could not have been validly added as an amendment.
These argument are unacceptable.
While it is true that a conference committee is the mechanism for compromising differences between the Senate and the House, it is not
limited in its jurisdiction to this question. Its broader function is described thus:
A conference committee may, deal generally with the subject matter or it may be limited to resolving the precise
differences between the two houses. Even where the conference committee is not by rule limited in its jurisdiction,
legislative custom severely limits the freedom with which new subject matter can be inserted into the conference bill. But
occasionally a conference committee produces unexpected results, results beyond its mandate, These excursions occur
even where the rules impose strict limitations on conference committee jurisdiction. This is symptomatic of the
authoritarian power of conference committee (Davies, Legislative Law and Process: In a Nutshell, 1986 Ed., p.81).
It is a matter of record that the conference Committee Report on the bill in question was returned to and duly approved by both the Senate
and the House of Representatives. Thereafter, the bill was enrolled with its certification by Senate President Neptali A. Gonzales and
Speaker Ramon V. Mitra of the House of Representatives as having been duly passed by both Houses of Congress. It was then presented to
and approved by President Corazon C. Aquino on April 3, 1992.
Under the doctrine of separation powers, the Court may not inquire beyond the certification of the approval of a bill from the presiding officers
of Congress. Casco Philippine Chemical Co. v. Gimenez7 laid down the rule that the enrolled bill, is conclusive upon the Judiciary (except in
matters that have to be entered in the journals like the yeas and nays on the final reading of the
bill).8 The journals are themselves also binding on the Supreme Court, as we held in the old (but still valid) case of U.S. vs. Pons,9 where we
explained the reason thus:
To inquire into the veracity of the journals of the Philippine legislature when they are, as we have said, clear and explicit,
would be to violate both the, letter and spirit of the organic laws by which the Philippine Government was brought into
existence, to invade a coordinate and independent department of the Government, and to interfere with the legitimate
 powers and functions, of the Legislature.
Applying these principles, we shall decline to look into the petitioners' charges that an amendment was made upon the last reading of the bill
that eventually became R.A. No. 7354 and that copies thereof in its final form were not distributed among the members of each House. Both
the enrolled bill and the legislative journals certify that the measure was duly enacted i.e., in accordance with Article VI, Sec. 26(2) of the
Constitution. We are bound by such official assurances from a coordinate department of the government, to which we owe, at the very least,
a becoming courtesy.
III
The third and most serious challenge of the petitioners is based on the equal protection clause.
It is alleged that R.A. No. 7354 is discriminatory because while withdrawing the franking privilege from the Judiciary, it retains the same for
the President of the Philippines, the Vice President of the Philippines; Senators and Members of the House of Representatives, the
Commission on Elections; former Presidents of the Philippines; the National Census and Statistics Office; and the general public in the filing
of complaints against public offices and officers.10
The respondents counter that there is no discrimination because the law is based on a valid classification in accordance with the equal
protection clause. In fact, the franking privilege has been withdrawn not only from the Judiciary but also the Office of Adult Education, the
Institute of National Language; the Telecommunications Office; the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation; the National Historical
Commission; the Armed Forces of the Philippines; the Armed Forces of the Philippines Ladies Steering Committee; the City and Provincial
Prosecutors; the Tanodbayan (Office of Special Prosecutor); the Kabataang Barangay; the Commission on the Filipino Language; the
Provincial and City Assessors; and the National Council for the Welfare of Disabled Persons.11
The equal protection of the laws is embraced in the concept of due process, as every unfair discrimination offends the requirements of justice
and fair play. It has nonetheless been embodied in a separate clause in Article III Sec. 1., of the Constitution to provide for a more, specific
guaranty against any form of undue favoritism or hostility from the government. Arbitrariness in general may be challenged on the basis of
the due process clause. But if the particular act assailed partakes of an unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it down
is the equal protection clause.
According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both
as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed, 12 Similar subjects, in other words, should not be treated differently, so as to give undue
favor to some and unjustly discriminate against others.
The equal protection clause does not require the universal application of the laws on all persons or things without distinction. This might in
fact sometimes result in unequal protection, as where, for example, a law prohibiting mature books to all persons, regardless of age, would
benefit the morals of the youth but violate the liberty of adults. What the clause requires is equality among equals as determined according to
a valid classification. By classification is meant the grouping of persons or things similar to each other in certain particulars and different from
all others in these same particulars. 13
What is the reason for the grant of the franking privilege in the first place? Is the franking privilege extended to the President of the
Philippines or the Commission on Elections or to former Presidents of the Philippines purely as a courtesy from the lawmaking body? Is it
offered because of the importance or status of the grantee or because of its need for the privilege? Or have the grantees been chosen pell-
mell, as it were, without any basis at all for the selection?
We reject outright the last conjecture as there is no doubt that the statute as a whole was carefully deliberated upon, by the political
departments before it was finally enacted. There is reason to suspect, however, that not enough care or attention was given to its repealing
clause, resulting in the unwitting withdrawal of the franking privilege from the Judiciary.
We also do not believe that the basis of the classification was mere courtesy, for it is unimaginable that the political departments would have
intended this serious slight to the Judiciary as the third of the major and equal departments the government. The same observations are
made if the importance or status of the grantee was the criterion used for the extension of the franking privilege, which is enjoyed by the
National Census and Statistics Office and even some private individuals but not the courts of justice.
In our view, the only acceptable reason for the grant of the franking privilege was the perceived need of the grantee for the accommodation,
which would justify a waiver of substantial revenue by the Corporation in the interest of providing for a smoother flow of communication
between the government and the people.
Assuming that basis, we cannot understand why, of all the departments of the government, it is the Judiciary, that has been denied the
franking privilege. There is no question that if there is any major branch of the government that needs the privilege, it is the Judicial
Department, as the respondents themselves point out. Curiously, the respondents would justify the distinction on the basis precisely of this
need and, on this basis, deny the Judiciary the franking privilege while extending it to others less deserving.
In their Comment, the respondents point out that available data from the Postal Service Office show that from January 1988 to June 1992,
the total volume of frank mails amounted to P90,424,175.00. Of this amount, frank mails from the Judiciary and other agencies whose
functions include the service of judicial processes, such as the intervenor, the Department of Justice and the Office of the Ombudsman,
amounted to P86,481,759. Frank mails coming fromthe Judiciary amounted to P73,574,864.00, and those coming from the petitioners
reached the total amount of P60,991,431.00. The respondents' conclusion is that because of this considerable volume of mail from the
Judiciary, the franking privilege must be withdrawn from it.
The argument is self-defeating. The respondents are in effect saying that the franking privilege should be extended only to those who do not
need it very much, if at all, (like the widows of former Presidents) but not to those who need it badly (especially the courts of justice). It is like
saying that a person may be allowed cosmetic surgery although it is not really necessary but not an operation that can save his life.
If the problem of the respondents is the loss of revenues from the franking privilege, the remedy, it seems to us, is to withdraw it altogether
from all agencies of government, including those who do not need it. The problem is not solved by retaining it for some and withdrawing it
from others, especially where there is no substantial distinction between those favored, which may or may not need it at all, and the
Judiciary, which definitely needs it. The problem is not solved by violating the Constitution.
In lumping the Judiciary with the other offices from which the franking privilege has been withdrawn, Section 35 has placed the courts of
justice in a category to which it does not belong. If it recognizes the need of the President of the Philippines and the members of Congress
for the franking privilege, there is no reason why it should not recognize a similar and in fact greater need on the part of the Judiciary for
such privilege. While we may appreciate the withdrawal of the franking privilege from the Armed Forces of the Philippines Ladies Steering
Committee, we fail to understand why the Supreme Court should be similarly treated as that Committee. And while we may concede the
need of the National Census and Statistics Office for the franking privilege, we are intrigued that a similar if not greater need is not
recognized in the courts of justice.
(On second thought, there does not seem to be any justifiable need for withdrawing the privilege from the Armed Forces of the Philippines
Ladies Steering Committee, which, like former Presidents of the Philippines or their widows, does not send as much frank mail as the
Judiciary.)
It is worth observing that the Philippine Postal Corporation, as a government-controlled corporation, was created and is expected to operate
for the purpose of promoting the public service. While it may have been established primarily for private gain, it cannot excuse itself from
performing certain functions for the benefit of the public in exchange for the franchise extended to it by the government and the many
advantages it enjoys under its charter.14 Among the services it should be prepared to extend is free carriage of mail for certain offices of the
government that need the franking privilege in the discharge of their own public functions.
We also note that under Section 9 of the law, the Corporation is capitalized at P10 billion pesos, 55% of which is supplied by the
Government, and that it derives substantial revenues from the sources enumerated in Section 10, on top of the exemptions it enjoys. It is not
likely that the retention of the franking privilege of the Judiciary will cripple the Corporation.
At this time when the Judiciary is being faulted for the delay in the administration of justice, the withdrawal from it of the franking privilege can
only further deepen this serious problem. The volume of judicial mail, as emphasized by the respondents themselves, should stress the
dependence of the courts of justice on the postal service for communicating with lawyers and litigants as part of the judicial process. The
Judiciary has the lowest appropriation in the national budget compared to the Legislative and Executive Departments; of the P309 billion
budgeted for 1993, only .84%, or less than 1%, is alloted for the judiciary. It should not be hard to imagine the increased difficulties of our
courts if they have to affix a purchased stamp to every process they send in the discharge of their judicial functions.
We are unable to agree with the respondents that Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 represents a valid exercise of discretion by the Legislature
under the police power. On the contrary, we find its repealing clause to be a discriminatory provision that denies the Judiciary the equal
protection of the laws guaranteed for all persons or things similarly situated. The distinction made by the law is superficial. It is not based on
substantial distinctions that make real differences between the Judiciary and the grantees of the franking privilege.
This is not a question of wisdom or power into which the Judiciary may not intrude. It is a matter of arbitrariness that this Court has the duty
and power to correct.
IV
In sum, we sustain R.A. No. 7354 against the attack that its subject is not expressed in its title and that it was not passed in accordance with
the prescribed procedure. However, we annul Section 35 of the law as violative of Article 3, Sec. 1, of the Constitution providing that no
person shall "be deprived of the equal protection of laws."
We arrive at these conclusions with a full awareness of the criticism it is certain to provoke. While ruling against the discrimination in this
case, we may ourselves be accused of similar discrimination through the exercise of our ultimate power in our own favor. This is inevitable.
Criticism of judicial conduct, however undeserved, is a fact of life in the political system that we are prepared to accept.. As judges, we
cannot debate with our detractors. We can only decide the cases before us as law imposes on us the duty to be fair and our own conscience
gives us the light to be right.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is partially GRANTED and Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. Circular No. 92-28 is
SET ASIDE insofar as it withdraws the franking privilege from the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Regional trail Courts, the
Municipal trial Courts, and the National Land Registration Authority and its Register of Deeds to all of which offices the said privilege shall be
RESTORED. The temporary restraining order dated June 2, 1992, is made permanent.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon, Melo, Quiason, Puno and Vitug, JJ., concur.
Bellosillo, J., is on leave.

# Footnotes
1 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 8th Ed., pp. 295-296; State vs. Dolan, 14 L.R.A. 1259; State v. Doherty, 29 Pac. 855.
2 Public Service Co. v. Recktenwald, 8 A.L.R. 466.
3 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 8th Ed., pp. 297.
4 Ibid., p. 302.
5 Southern Pac. Co. v. Bartine, 170 Fed. 737.
6 City of Winona v. School District, 41 N.W. 539.
7 7 SCRA 347.
8 Mabanag v. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1.
9 34 Phil. 729
 10 Rollo, pp. 8-9.
EN BANC
LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE G.R. No. 176951
PHILIPPINES (LCP) represented
by LCP National President
JERRY P. TREAS, CITY OF
ILOILO represented by
MAYOR JERRY P. TREAS,
CITY OF CALBAYOG
represented by MAYOR
MEL SENEN S. SARMIENTO,
and JERRY P. TREAS in his
personal capacity as taxpayer,
Petitioners,
- versus -
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS;
MUNICIPALITY OF BAYBAY,
PROVINCE OF LEYTE;
MUNICIPALITY OF BOGO,
PROVINCE OF CEBU;
MUNICIPALITY OF CATBALOGAN,
PROVINCE OF WESTERN SAMAR;
MUNICIPALITY OF TANDAG,
PROVINCE OF SURIGAO DEL SUR;
MUNICIPALITY OF BORONGAN,
PROVINCE OF EASTERN SAMAR;
and MUNICIPALITY OF TAYABAS,
PROVINCE OF QUEZON,
Respondents.
CITY OF TARLAC, CITY OF SANTIAGO,
CITY OF IRIGA, CITY OF LIGAO,
CITY OF LEGAZPI, CITY OF
TAGAYTAY, CITY OF SURIGAO,
CITY OF BAYAWAN, CITY OF
SILAY, CITY OF GENERAL SANTOS,
CITY OF ZAMBOANGA, CITY OF
GINGOOG, CITY OF CAUAYAN,
CITY OF PAGADIAN, CITY OF
SAN CARLOS, CITY OF
SAN FERNANDO, CITY OF
TACURONG, CITY OF TANGUB,
CITY OF OROQUIETA, CITY OF
URDANETA, CITY OF VICTORIAS,
CITY OF CALAPAN, CITY OF
HIMAMAYLAN, CITY OF
BATANGAS, CITY OF BAIS,
CITY OF CADIZ, and
CITY OF TAGUM,
Petitioners-In-Intervention.
x-----------------------------x
LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE G.R. No. 177499
PHILIPPINES (LCP) represented
by LCP National President
JERRY P. TREAS, CITY OF
ILOILO represented by
MAYOR JERRY P. TREAS,
CITY OF CALBAYOG
represented by MAYOR
MEL SENEN S. SARMIENTO,
and JERRY P. TREAS in his
personal capacity as taxpayer,
Petitioners,
- versus -
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS;
MUNICIPALITY OF LAMITAN,
PROVINCE OF BASILAN;
MUNICIPALITY OF TABUK,
PROVINCE OF KALINGA;
MUNICIPALITY OF BAYUGAN,
PROVINCE OF AGUSAN DEL SUR;
MUNICIPALITY OF BATAC,
PROVINCE OF ILOCOS NORTE;
MUNICIPALITY OF MATI,
PROVINCE OF DAVAO ORIENTAL;
and MUNICIPALITY OF GUIHULNGAN,
PROVINCE OF NEGROS ORIENTAL,
Respondents.
CITY OF TARLAC, CITY OF
SANTIAGO, CITY OF IRIGA,
CITY OF LIGAO, CITY OF LEGAZPI,
CITY OF TAGAYTAY, CITY OF SURIGAO,
CITY OF BAYAWAN, CITY OF
SILAY, CITY OF GENERAL SANTOS,
CITY OF ZAMBOANGA, CITY OF
GINGOOG, CITY OF CAUAYAN,
CITY OF PAGADIAN, CITY OF
SAN CARLOS, CITY OF
SAN FERNANDO, CITY OF
TACURONG, CITY OF TANGUB,
CITY OF OROQUIETA, CITY OF
URDANETA, CITY OF VICTORIAS,
CITY OF CALAPAN, CITY OF
HIMAMAYLAN, CITY OF
BATANGAS, CITY OF BAIS,
CITY OF CADIZ, and
CITY OF TAGUM,
Petitioners-In-Intervention.
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --x
LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE G.R. No. 178056
PHILIPPINES (LCP) represented
by LCP National President Present:
JERRY P. TREAS, CITY OF
ILOILO represented by PUNO, C.J.,
MAYOR JERRY P. TREAS, QUISUMBING,
CITY OF CALBAYOG YNARES-SANTIAGO,
represented by MAYOR CARPIO,
MEL SENEN S. SARMIENTO, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
and JERRY P. TREAS in his CORONA,
personal capacity as taxpayer, CARPIO MORALES,
Petitioners, AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
- versus - VELASCO, JR., NACHURA,
REYES,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; BRION, JJ.
MUNICIPALITY OF CABADBARAN,
PROVINCE OF AGUSAN
DEL NORTE; MUNICIPALITY
OF CARCAR, PROVINCE OF
CEBU; and MUNICIPALITY OF
EL SALVADOR, MISAMIS
ORIENTAL,
Respondents.
CITY OF TARLAC, CITY OF
SANTIAGO, CITY OF IRIGA,
CITY OF LIGAO, CITY OF LEGAZPI,
CITY OF TAGAYTAY, CITY OF SURIGAO,
CITY OF BAYAWAN, CITY OF SILAY,
CITY OF GENERAL SANTOS,
CITY OF ZAMBOANGA, CITY OF
GINGOOG, CITY OF CAUAYAN,
CITY OF PAGADIAN, CITY OF
SAN CARLOS, CITY OF
SAN FERNANDO, CITY OF
TACURONG, CITY OF TANGUB,
CITY OF OROQUIETA, CITY OF
URDANETA, CITY OF VICTORIAS,
CITY OF CALAPAN, CITY OF
HIMAMAYLAN, CITY OF
BATANGAS, CITY OF BAIS,
CITY OF CADIZ, and Promulgated:
CITY OF TAGUM,
Petitioners-In-Intervention. November 18, 2008
x--------------------------------------------------x
DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

These are consolidated petitions for prohibition[1] with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order filed by
the League of Cities of the Philippines, City of Iloilo, City of Calbayog, and Jerry P. Treas[2] assailing the constitutionality of the subject Cityhood Laws
and enjoining the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) and respondent municipalities from conducting plebiscites pursuant to the Cityhood Laws.

The Facts

During the 11th Congress,[3] Congress enacted into law 33 bills converting 33 municipalities into cities. However, Congress did not act on bills
converting 24 other municipalities into cities.

During the 12th Congress,[4] Congress enacted into law Republic Act No. 9009 (RA 9009),[5] which took effect on 30 June 2001. RA 9009 amended
Section 450 of the Local Government Code by increasing the annual income requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city from P20 million to
P100 million. The rationale for the amendment was to restrain, in the words of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, the mad rush of municipalities to convert into
cities solely to secure a larger share in the Internal Revenue Allotment despite the fact that they are incapable of fiscal independence.[6]

After the effectivity of RA 9009, the House of Representatives of the 12 th Congress[7] adopted Joint Resolution No. 29,[8] which sought to exempt from

the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 the 24 municipalities whose cityhood bills were not approved in the 11 th Congress. However, the 12th
Congress ended without the Senate approving Joint Resolution No. 29.

During the 13th Congress,[9] the House of Representatives re-adopted Joint Resolution No. 29 as Joint Resolution No. 1 and forwarded it to the Senate for
approval. However, the Senate again failed to approve the Joint Resolution. Following the advice of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, 16 municipalities filed,
through their respective sponsors, individual cityhood bills. The 16 cityhood bills contained a common provision exempting all the 16 municipalities from
the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009.

On 22 December 2006, the House of Representatives approved the cityhood bills. The Senate also approved the cityhood bills in February 2007, except
that of Naga, Cebu which was passed on 7 June 2007. The cityhood bills lapsed into law (Cityhood Laws [10]) on various dates from March to July 2007
without the Presidents signature.[11]

The Cityhood Laws direct the COMELEC to hold plebiscites to determine whether the voters in each respondent municipality approve of the conversion of
their municipality into a city.

Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws unconstitutional for violation of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, as well as for
violation of the equal protection clause.[12] Petitioners also lament that the wholesale conversion of municipalities into cities will reduce the share of
existing cities in the Internal Revenue Allotment because more cities will share the same amount of internal revenue set aside for all cities under Section
285 of the Local Government Code.[13]
 The Issues

The petitions raise the following fundamental issues:

1. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of the Constitution; and
2. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate the equal protection clause.
The Ruling of the Court
We grant the petitions.
The Cityhood Laws violate Sections 6 and 10, Article X of the Constitution, and are thus unconstitutional.

First, applying the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 to the present case is a prospective, not a retroactive application, because RA
9009 took effect in 2001 while the cityhood bills became law more than five years later.

Second, the Constitution requires that Congress shall prescribe all the criteria for the creation of a city in the Local Government Code and not in
any other law, including the Cityhood Laws.

Third, the Cityhood Laws violate Section 6, Article X of the Constitution because they prevent a fair and just distribution of the national taxes to
local government units.

Fourth, the criteria prescribed in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, for converting a municipality into a city
are clear, plain and unambiguous, needing no resort to any statutory construction.

Fifth, the intent of members of the 11th Congress to exempt certain municipalities from the coverage of RA 9009 remained an intent and was
never written into Section 450 of the Local Government Code.

Sixth, the deliberations of the 11th or 12th Congress on unapproved bills or resolutions are not extrinsic aids in interpreting a law passed in the

13th Congress.

Seventh, even if the exemption in the Cityhood Laws were written in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, the exemption would still be
unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection clause.

Preliminary Matters

Prohibition is the proper action for testing the constitutionality of laws administered by the COMELEC,[14] like the Cityhood Laws, which direct the
COMELEC to hold plebiscites in implementation of the Cityhood Laws. Petitioner League of Cities of the Philippines has legal standing because Section
499 of the Local Government Code tasks the League with the primary purpose of ventilating, articulating and crystallizing issues affecting city government
administration and securing, through proper and legal means, solutions thereto.[15] Petitioners-in-intervention,[16] which are existing cities, have legal
standing because their Internal Revenue Allotment will be reduced if the Cityhood Laws are declared constitutional. Mayor Jerry P. Treas has legal
standing because as Mayor of Iloilo City and as a taxpayer he has sufficient interest to prevent the unlawful expenditure of public funds, like the release of
more Internal Revenue Allotment to political units than what the law allows.

Applying RA 9009 is a Prospective Application of the Law

RA 9009 became effective on 30 June 2001 during the 11 th Congress. This law specifically amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code, which
now provides:

Section 450. Requisites for Creation. (a) A municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted into a component city if it has a locally generated
average annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of at least One hundred million pesos (P100,000,000.00) for the last two (2)
consecutive years based on 2000 constant prices, and if it has either of the following requisites:
(i)
a contiguous territory of at least one hundred (100) square kilometers, as certified by the Land Management Bureau; or
(ii) a population of not less than one hundred fifty thousand (150,000) inhabitants, as certified by the National Statistics Office.
The creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population and income of the original unit or units at the time of said creation to less than the minimum
requirements prescribed herein.
(b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created city shall be properly identified by metes and bounds. The requirement on land area shall not apply where
the city proposed to be created is composed of one (1) or more islands. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands.
(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special funds, transfers, and non-recurring income.
(Emphasis supplied)
Thus, RA 9009 increased the income requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city from P20 million to P100 million. Section 450 of the Local
Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, does not provide any exemption from the increased income requirement.

Prior to the enactment of RA 9009, a total of 57 municipalities had cityhood bills pending in Congress. Thirty-three cityhood bills became law before the

enactment of RA 9009. Congress did not act on 24 cityhood bills during the 11th Congress.

During the 12th Congress, the House of Representatives adopted Joint Resolution No. 29, exempting from the income requirement of P100 million in RA

9009 the 24 municipalities whose cityhood bills were not acted upon during the 11 th Congress. This Resolution reached the Senate. However, the 12th
Congress adjourned without the Senate approving Joint Resolution No. 29.

During the 13th Congress, 16 of the 24 municipalities mentioned in the unapproved Joint Resolution No. 29 filed between November and December of
2006, through their respective sponsors in Congress, individual cityhood bills containing a common provision, as follows:

Exemption from Republic Act No. 9009. The City of x x x shall be exempted from the income requirement prescribed under Republic Act No. 9009.
This common provision exempted each of the 16 municipalities from the income requirement of P100 million prescribed in Section 450 of the Local
Government Code, as amended by RA 9009. These cityhood bills lapsed into law on various dates from March to July 2007 after President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo failed to sign them.

Indisputably, Congress passed the Cityhood Laws long after the effectivity of RA 9009. RA 9009 became effective on 30 June 2001 or during the 11th

Congress. The 13th Congress passed in December 2006 the cityhood bills which became law only in 2007. Thus, respondent municipalities cannot
invoke the principle of non-retroactivity of laws.[17] This basic rule has no application because RA 9009, an earlier law to the Cityhood Laws, is not being
applied retroactively but prospectively.

Congress Must Prescribe in the Local Government Code All Criteria

Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides:

No province, city, municipality, or barangay shall be created, divided, merged, abolished or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with
the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly
affected. (Emphasis supplied)
The Constitution is clear. The creation of local government units must follow the criteria established in the Local Government Code and not in any
other law. There is only one Local Government Code.[18] The Constitution requires Congress to stipulate in the Local Government Code all the criteria
necessary for the creation of a city, including the conversion of a municipality into a city. Congress cannot write such criteria in any other law, like the
Cityhood Laws.

The criteria prescribed in the Local Government Code govern exclusively the creation of a city. No other law, not even the charter of the city, can govern
such creation. The clear intent of the Constitution is to insure that the creation of cities and other political units must follow the same uniform, non-
discriminatory criteria found solely in the Local Government Code. Any derogation or deviation from the criteria prescribed in the Local Government
Code violates Section 10, Article X of the Constitution.

RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code to increase the income requirement from P20 million to P100 million for the creation of a
city. This took effect on 30 June 2001. Hence, from that moment the Local Government Code required that any municipality desiring to become a
city must satisfy the P100 million income requirement. Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, does not contain any
exemption from this income requirement.

In enacting RA 9009, Congress did not grant any exemption to respondent municipalities, even though their cityhood bills were pending in Congress when
Congress passed RA 9009. The Cityhood Laws, all enacted after the effectivity of RA 9009, explicitly exempt respondent municipalities from the
increased income requirement in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009. Such exemption clearly violates Section 10,
Article X of the Constitution and is thus patently unconstitutional. To be valid, such exemption must be written in the Local Government Code
and not in any other law, including the Cityhood Laws.

Cityhood Laws Violate Section 6, Article X of the Constitution

Uniform and non-discriminatory criteria as prescribed in the Local Government Code are essential to implement a fair and equitable distribution of
national taxes to all local government units. Section 6, Article X of the Constitution provides:
Local government units shall have a just share, as determined by law, in the national taxes which shall be automatically released to them. (Emphasis
supplied)
If the criteria in creating local government units are not uniform and discriminatory, there can be no fair and just distribution of the national taxes to local
government units.

A city with an annual income of only P20 million, all other criteria being equal, should not receive the same share in national taxes as a city with an annual
income of P100 million or more. The criteria of land area, population and income, as prescribed in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, must be
strictly followed because such criteria, prescribed by law, are material in determining the just share of local government units in national taxes. Since the
Cityhood Laws do not follow the income criterion in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, they prevent the fair and just distribution of the Internal
Revenue Allotment in violation of Section 6, Article X of the Constitution.

Section 450 of the Local Government Code is Clear,

Plain and Unambiguous
There can be no resort to extrinsic aids like deliberations of Congress if the language of the law is plain, clear and unambiguous. Courts determine the
intent of the law from the literal language of the law, within the laws four corners.[19] If the language of the law is plain, clear and unambiguous, courts
simply apply the law according to its express terms. If a literal application of the law results in absurdity, impossibility or injustice, then courts may resort
to extrinsic aids of statutory construction like the legislative history of the law.[20]

Congress, in enacting RA 9009 to amend Section 450 of the Local Government Code, did not provide any exemption from the increased income
requirement, not even to respondent municipalities whose cityhood bills were then pending when Congress passed RA 9009. Section 450 of the Local
Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, contains no exemption whatsoever. Since the law is clear, plain and unambiguous that any municipality
desiring to convert into a city must meet the increased income requirement, there is no reason to go beyond the letter of the law in applying Section 450 of
the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009.

The 11th Congress Intent was not Written into the Local Government Code

True, members of Congress discussed exempting respondent municipalities from RA 9009, as shown by the various deliberations on the matter during the

11th Congress. However, Congress did not write this intended exemption into law. Congress could have easily included such exemption in RA 9009 but
Congress did not. This is fatal to the cause of respondent municipalities because such exemption must appear in RA 9009 as an amendment to Section 450
of the Local Government Code. The Constitution requires that the criteria for the conversion of a municipality into a city, including any exemption from
such criteria, must all be written in the Local Government Code. Congress cannot prescribe such criteria or exemption from such criteria in any other law.
In short, Congress cannot create a city through a law that does not comply with the criteria or exemption found in the Local Government Code.

Section 10 of Article X is similar to Section 16, Article XII of the Constitution prohibiting Congress from creating private corporations except by a general
law. Section 16 of Article XII provides:

The Congress shall not, except by general law, provide for the formation, organization, or regulation of private corporations. Government-owned
or controlled corporations may be created or established by special charters in the interest of the common good and subject to the test of economic viability.
(Emphasis supplied)
Thus, Congress must prescribe all the criteria for the formation, organization, or regulation of private corporations in a general law applicable to all
without discrimination.[21] Congress cannot create a private corporation through a special law or charter.

Deliberations of the 11th Congress on Unapproved Bills Inapplicable

Congress is not a continuing body.[22] The unapproved cityhood bills filed during the 11th Congress became mere scraps of paper upon the adjournment

of the 11th Congress. All the hearings and deliberations conducted during the 11th Congress on unapproved bills also became worthless upon the

adjournment of the 11th Congress. These hearings and deliberations cannot be used to interpret bills enacted into law in the 13 th or subsequent
Congresses.

The members and officers of each Congress are different. All unapproved bills filed in one Congress become functus officio upon adjournment of that
Congress and must be re-filed anew in order to be taken up in the next Congress. When their respective authors re-filed the cityhood bills in 2006 during

the 13th Congress, the bills had to start from square one again, going through the legislative mill just like bills taken up for the first time, from the filing to
the approval. Section 123, Rule XLIV of the Rules of the Senate, on Unfinished Business, provides:
Sec. 123. x x x

All pending matters and proceedings shall terminate upon the expiration of one (1) Congress, but may be taken by the succeeding Congress as if
presented for the first time. (Emphasis supplied)
Similarly, Section 78 of the Rules of the House of Representatives, on Unfinished Business, states:

Section 78. Calendar of Business. The Calendar of Business shall consist of the following:

a.
Unfinished Business. This is business being considered by the House at the time of its last adjournment. Its consideration shall be
resumed until it is disposed of. The Unfinished Business at the end of a session shall be resumed at the commencement of the next session as if no
adjournment has taken place. At the end of the term of a Congress, all Unfinished Business are deemed terminated. (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, the deliberations during the 11th Congress on the unapproved cityhood bills, as well as the deliberations during the 12th and 13th Congresses on the
unapproved resolution exempting from RA 9009 certain municipalities, have no legal significance. They do not qualify as extrinsic aids in construing laws
passed by subsequent Congresses.

Applicability of Equal Protection Clause

If Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, contained an exemption to the P100 million annual income requirement, the
criteria for such exemption could be scrutinized for possible violation of the equal protection clause. Thus, the criteria for the exemption, if found in the
Local Government Code, could be assailed on the ground of absence of a valid classification. However, Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as
amended by RA 9009, does not contain any exemption. The exemption is contained in the Cityhood Laws, which are unconstitutional because such
exemption must be prescribed in the Local Government Code as mandated in Section 10, Article X of the Constitution.

Even if the exemption provision in the Cityhood Laws were written in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, such
exemption would still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection clause. The exemption provision merely states, Exemption from Republic
Act No. 9009 ─ The City of x x x shall be exempted from the income requirement prescribed under Republic Act No. 9009. This one sentence
exemption provision contains no classification standards or guidelines differentiating the exempted municipalities from those that are not exempted.

Even if we take into account the deliberations in the 11th Congress that municipalities with pending cityhood bills should be exempt from the P100 million
income requirement, there is still no valid classification to satisfy the equal protection clause. The exemption will be based solely on the fact that the 16

municipalities had cityhood bills pending in the 11th Congress when RA 9009 was enacted. This is not a valid classification between those entitled and
those not entitled to exemption from the P100 million income requirement.

To be valid, the classification in the present case must be based on substantial distinctions, rationally related to a legitimate government objective which is
the purpose of the law,[23] not limited to existing conditions only, and applicable to all similarly situated. Thus, this Court has ruled:

The equal protection clause of the 1987 Constitution permits a valid classification under the following conditions:
1. The classification must rest on substantial distinctions;
2. The classification must be germane to the purpose of the law;
3. The classification must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
4. The classification must apply equally to all members of the same class.[24]

There is no substantial distinction between municipalities with pending cityhood bills in the 11th Congress and municipalities that did not have pending

bills. The mere pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress is not a material difference to distinguish one municipality from another for the purpose of

the income requirement. The pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress does not affect or determine the level of income of a municipality.

Municipalities with pending cityhood bills in the 11th Congress might even have lower annual income than municipalities that did not have pending

cityhood bills. In short, the classification criterion − mere pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress − is not rationally related to the purpose of the
law which is to prevent fiscally non-viable municipalities from converting into cities.

Municipalities that did not have pending cityhood bills were not informed that a pending cityhood bill in the 11th Congress would be a condition for
exemption from the increased P100 million income requirement. Had they been informed, many municipalities would have caused the filing of their own
cityhood bills. These municipalities, even if they have bigger annual income than the 16 respondent municipalities, cannot now convert into cities if their
income is less than P100 million.

The fact of pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress limits the exemption to a specific condition existing at the time of passage of RA 9009. That
specific condition will never happen again. This violates the requirement that a valid classification must not be limited to existing conditions only. This
requirement is illustrated in Mayflower Farms, Inc. v. Ten Eyck,[25] where the challenged law allowed milk dealers engaged in business prior to a fixed
date to sell at a price lower than that allowed to newcomers in the same business. In Mayflower, the U.S. Supreme Court held:

We are referred to a host of decisions to the effect that a regulatory law may be prospective in operation and may except from its sweep those presently
engaged in the calling or activity to which it is directed. Examples are statutes licensing physicians and dentists, which apply only to those entering the
profession subsequent to the passage of the act and exempt those then in practice, or zoning laws which exempt existing buildings, or laws forbidding
slaughterhouses within certain areas, but excepting existing establishments. The challenged provision is unlike such laws, since, on its face, it is not a
regulation of a business or an activity in the interest of, or for the protection of, the public, but an attempt to give an economic advantage to those
engaged in a given business at an arbitrary date as against all those who enter the industry after that date. The appellees do not intimate that the
classification bears any relation to the public health or welfare generally; that the provision will discourage monopoly; or that it was aimed at any abuse,
cognizable by law, in the milk business. In the absence of any such showing, we have no right to conjure up possible situations which might justify the
discrimination. The classification is arbitrary and unreasonable and denies the appellant the equal protection of the law. (Emphasis supplied)
In the same vein, the exemption provision in the Cityhood Laws gives the 16 municipalities a unique advantage based on an arbitrary date − the filing of

their cityhood bills before the end of the 11th Congress as against all other municipalities that want to convert into cities after the effectivity of RA 9009.

Furthermore, limiting the exemption only to the 16 municipalities violates the requirement that the classification must apply to all similarly situated.
Municipalities with the same income as the 16 respondent municipalities cannot convert into cities, while the 16 respondent municipalities can. Clearly, as
worded the exemption provision found in the Cityhood Laws, even if it were written in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, would still be
unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection clause.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petitions and declare UNCONSTITUTIONAL the Cityhood Laws, namely: Republic Act Nos. 9389, 9390, 9391, 9392,
9393, 9394, 9398, 9404, 9405, 9407, 9408, 9409, 9434, 9435, 9436, and 9491.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
(On leave)
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ RENATO C. CORONA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES ADOLFO S. AZCUNA

Associate Justice
Associate Justice

DANTE O. TINGA MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO

Associate Justice
Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice
Associate Justice

RUBEN T. REYES TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice Associate Justice
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
 CERTIFICATION
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 189028 July 16, 2013
NATIONAL ARTIST FOR LITERATURE VIRGILIO ALMARIO, NATIONAL ARTIST FOR LITERATURE BIENVENIDO LUMBERA,
NATIONAL ARTIST FOR VISUAL ARTS (PAINTING) BENEDICTO CABRERA, NATIONAL ARTIST FOR VISUAL ARTS (SCULPTURE)
NAPOLEON ABUEVA, NATIONAL ARTIST FOR VISUAL ARTS (PAINTING AND SCULPTURE) ARTURO LUZ, NATIONAL ARTIST FOR
PRODUCTION DESIGN SALVADOR BERNAL, UNIVERSITY PROFESSOR EMERITUS GEMINO ABAD, DEAN MARVIC M.V.F.
LEONEN (UP COLLEGE OF LAW), DEAN DANILO SILVESTRE (UP COLLEGE OF ARCHITECTURE), DEAN ROLAND TOLENTINO
(UP COLLEGE OF MASS COMMUNICATION), PROF. JOSE DALISAY, DR. ANTON JUAN, DR. ALEXANDER CORTEZ, DR. JOSE NEIL
GARCIA, DR. PEDRO JUN CRUZ REYES, PROF. JOSE CLAUDIO GUERRERO, PROF. MICHAEL M. COROZA, PROF. GERARD LICO,
PROF. VERNE DE LA PENA, PROF. MARIAN ABUAN, PROF. THEODORE O. TE, DR. CRISTINA PANTOJA-HIDALGO, PROF. JOSE
WENDELL CAPILI, PROF. SIR ANRIAL TIATCO, PROF. NICOLO DEL CASTILLO, PROF. HORACIO DUMANLIG, PROF. DANTON
REMOTO, PROF. PRISCELINA PATAJOLEGASTO, PROF. BELEN CALINGACION, PROF. AMIEL Y. LEONARDIA, PROF. VIM
NADERA, PROF. MARILYN CANTA, PROF. CECILIA DELA PAZ, ROF. CHARLSON ONG, PROF. CLOD MARLON YAMBAO, PROF.
KENNETH JAMANDRE, PROF. JETHRO JOAQUIN, ATTY. F.D. NICOLAS B. PICHAY, ATTY. ROSE BEATRIX ANGELES, MR.
FERNANDO JOSEF, MS. SUSAN S. LARA, MR. ALFRED YUSON, MS. JING PANGANIBANMENDOZA, MR. ROMULO BAQUIRAN, JR.,
MR. CARLJOE JAVIER, MS. REBECCA T. ANONUEVO, MR. JP ANTHONY D. CUNADA, MS. LEAH NAVARRO, MR. MARK MEILLY,
MR. VERGEL O. SANTOS, MR. GIL OLEA MENDOZA, MR. EDGAR C. SAMAR, MS. CHRISTINE BELLEN, MR. ANGELO R.
LACUESTA, MS. ANNA MARIA KATIGBAKLACUESTA, MR. LEX LEDESMA, MS. KELLY PERIQUET, MS. CARLA PACIS, MR. J.
ALBERT GAMBOA, MR. CESAR EVANGELISTA BUENDIA, MR. PAOLO ALCAZAREN, MR. ALWYN C. JAVIER, MR. RAYMOND
MAGNO GARLITOS, MS. GANG BADOY, MR. LESLIE BOCOBO, MS. FRANCES BRETANA, MS. JUDITH TORRES, MS. JANNETTE
PINZON, MS. JUNE POTICAR-DALISAY, MS. CAMILLE DE LA ROSA, MR. JAMES LADIORAY, MR. RENATO CONSTANTINO, JR., and
CONCERNED ARTISTS OF THE PHILIPPINES (CAP), Petitioners,
vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, THE CULTURAL
CENTER OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON CULTURE AND THE ARTS, MS. CECILE GUIDOTE-ALVAREZ,
MR. CARLO MAGNO JOSE CAPARAS, 1 MR. JOSE MORENO, MR. FRANCISCO MANOSA, AND ALL PERSONS, PUBLIC AND
PRIVATE, ACTING UNDER THEIR INSTRUCTIONS, DIRECTION, CONTROL AND SUPERVISION IN RELATION TO THE
CONFERMENT OF THE ORDER OF THE NATIONAL ARTIST AND THE RELEASE OF FUNDS IN RELATION TO THE CONFERMENT
OF THE HONORS AND PRIVILEGES OF THE ORDER OF NATIONAL ARTISTS ON RESPONDENTS GUIDOTE-ALVAREZ, CAPARAS,
MORENO AND MANOSA, Respondents.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
Art has traditionally been viewed as the expression of everything that is true, good and beautiful. As such, it is perceived to evoke and produce a spirit of
harmony. Art is also considered as a civilizing force, a catalyst of nation-building. The notion of art and artists as privileged expressions of national culture
helped shape the grand narratives of the nation and shared symbols of the people. The artist does not simply express his/her own individual inspiration but
articulates the deeper aspirations of history and the soul of the people. 2 The law recognizes this role and views art as something that "reflects and shapes
values, beliefs, aspirations, thereby defining a people’s national identity." 3 If unduly politicized, however, art and artists could stir controversy and may
even cause discord, as what happened in this case.
The Antecedents
History of the Order of National Artists

On April 27, 1972, former President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1001 4 and, upon recommendation of the Board of Trustees of the
Cultural Center of the Philippines (CCP), created the category of Award and Decoration of National Artist to be awarded to Filipinos who have made
distinct contributions to arts and letters. In the same issuance, Fernando Amorsolo was declared as the first National Artist.

On May 15, 1973, Proclamation No. 11445 was issued. It amended Proclamation No. 1001 "by creating a National Artists Awards Committee" that would
"administer the conferment of the category of National Artist" upon deserving Filipino artists. The Committee, composed of members of the Board of
Trustees of the CCP, was tasked to "draft the rules to guide its deliberations in the choice of National Artists, to the end that those who have created a body
of work in the arts and letters capable of withstanding the test of time will be so recognized."
The authority of the National Artists Awards Committee to administer the conferment of the National Artist Award was again reiterated in Presidential
Decree No. 2086 issued on June 7, 1973.
On April 3, 1992, Republic Act No. 7356, otherwise known as the Law Creating the National Commission for Culture and the Arts, was signed into law. It
established the National Commission for Culture and the Arts (NCCA) and gave it an extensive mandate over the development, promotion and
preservation of the Filipino national culture and arts and the Filipino cultural heritage. The NCCA was tasked with the following:
Sec. 8. The Commission. – A National Commission for Culture and Arts is hereby created to formulate policies for the development of culture and arts;
implement these policies in coordination with affiliated cultural agencies; coordinate the implementation of programs of these affiliated agencies;
administer the National Endowment Fund for Culture and Arts (NEFCA); encourage artistic creation within a climate of artistic freedom; develop and
promote the Filipino national culture and arts; and preserve Filipino cultural heritage. The Commission shall be an independent agency. It shall render an
annual report of its activities and achievements to the President and to Congress.
Among the specific mandates of the NCCA under Republic Act No. 7356 is to "extend recognition of artistic achievement through awards, grants and
services to artists and cultural groups which contribute significantly to the Filipino’s cultural legacy." 7 In connection with this mandate, the NCCA is
vested with the power to "advise the President on matters pertaining to culture and the arts, including the creation of a special decoration or award, for
persons who have significantly contributed to the development and promotion of Philippine culture and arts."8
As both the CCP Board of Trustees and the NCCA have been mandated by law to promote, develop and protect the Philippine national culture and the arts,
and authorized to give awards to deserving Filipino artists, the two bodies decided to team up and jointly administer the National Artists Award. 9
Thereafter, they reviewed the guidelines for the nomination, selection and administration of the National Artists Award. Pursuant to their respective powers
to draft and promulgate rules, regulations and measures to guide them in their deliberations in the choice of National Artists, the CCP and NCCA adopted
the following revised guidelines in September 200710:
4. ADMINISTRATION OF THE AWARD

4.1. The National Commission for Culture and the Arts (NCCA) shall plan, organize and implement the Order of National
Artists in coordination with the Cultural Center of the Philippines (CCP).

4.2. It shall enlist the support and cooperation of private sector experts from the various fields of art to ensure that the awards
are implemented in a successful and impartial manner.

4.3. The National Artist Award Secretariat shall commission art experts to form a Special Research Group who shall verify
information submitted on nominees and provide essential data.

They shall be selected for their specialization and familiarity with the works and accomplishments of nominated artists.

4.4. The Special Research Group shall be composed of ten (10) to twenty (20) members who have expertise in one or more
fields or disciplines.

4.5. The National Artist Award Council of Experts shall be created before or during the nomination period. It is tasked to
screen nominees and recommend to the NCCA and CCP Boards the candidates for the Order of National Artists. It shall be
composed of highly regarded peers, scholars, (including cultural philosophers and historians), academicians, researchers, art
critics, and other knowledgeable individuals. A wider age-range of experts who would have first-hand knowledge of
achievements of nominees shall be considered.

4.6. The selection of the members of the National Artist Award Council of Experts shall be based on the following criteria:

(a) should have achieved authority, credibility and track record in his field(s) of expertise;

(b) should have extensive knowledge in his field(s) and his views on Philippine art and culture must be national in
perspective;

(c) should be a recognized authority in the study or research of Philippine art and culture;

(d) must be willing to devote sufficient time and effort to the work of the Council;

(e) must be willing to sign a non-disclosure statement in order to safeguard the confidentiality of the deliberations;

(f) must not have been convicted with finality of any crime by a court of justice or dismissed for cause by any
organization, whether public or private.

4.7. The National Artist Award Council of Experts shall be composed of a maximum of seven (7) members each of the seven
(7) areas/disciplines. The living National Artists will automatically become members in addition to the forty-nine (49) selected
members. These members will constitute the first deliberation panel and will be invited to evaluate the nominations and
materials submitted by the Special Research Group.

4.8. Any member of the Council of Experts who is nominated or related to a nominee up to the fourth degree of consanguinity
or affinity shall inhibit himself/herself from the deliberation process. Likewise, any member may decline to participate in the
deliberation for any reason or may be removed for just cause upon recommendation to the NCCA Board by at least two thirds
(2/3) of the members; in which case, the National Artist Award Secretariat shall again select the replacements for those who
decline or resigned until the first deliberation panel is completed.

4.9. The list of nominated members of the National Artist Award Council of Experts shall be reviewed by the National Artist
Award Secretariat as needed, for purposes of adding new members or replacements.

4.10. The members of the National Artist Award Council of Experts shall serve for a fixed term of three (3) years.

5. CRITERIA FOR SELECTION

 The Order of National Artists shall be given to:

5.1 Living artists who are Filipino citizens at the time of nomination, as well as those who died after the establishment of the
award in 1972 but were Filipino citizens at the time of their death.

5.2 Artists who through the content and form of their works have contributed in building a Filipino sense of nationhood.

5.3. Artists who have pioneered in a mode of creative expression or style, thus, earning distinction and making an impact on
succeeding generations of artists.

5.4. Artists who have created a substantial and significant body of works and/or consistently displayed excellence in the
practice of their art form thus enriching artistic expression or style.

5.5 Artists who enjoy broad acceptance through:

5.5.1. prestigious national and/or international recognition, such as the Gawad CCP Para sa Sining, CCP Thirteen
Artists Award and NCCA Alab ng Haraya

5.5.2. critical acclaim and/or reviews of their works

5.5.3. respect and esteem from peers.

6. NOMINATION PROCEDURE

6.1. The National Artist Award Secretariat shall announce the opening of nominations through media releases and letters to
qualified organizations.

6.2. Candidates may be nominated under one or more of the following categories:

6.2.1. Dance – choreography, direction and/or performance.

6.2.2. Music – composition, direction, and/or performance.

6.2.3. Theater – direction, performance and/or production design.

6.2.4. Visual Arts – painting, sculpture, printmaking, photography, installation art, mixed media works, illustration,
comics/komiks, graphic arts, performance art and/or imaging.

6.2.5. Literature – poetry, fiction (short story, novel and play); non-fiction (essay, journalism, literary criticism and historical
literature).

6.2.6. Film and Broadcast Arts – direction, writing, production design, cinematography, editing, camera work, and/or
performance.

6.2.7. Architecture, Design and Allied Arts – architecture design, interior design, industrial arts design, landscape architecture
and fashion design.

6.3. Nominations for the Order of National Artists may be submitted by government and non-government cultural
organizations and educational institutions, as well as private foundations and councils.

6.4. Members of the Special Research Group, as well as agencies attached to the NCCA and CCP shall not submit
nominations.

6.5. NCCA and CCP Board members and consultants and NCCA and CCP officers and staff are automatically disqualified
from being nominated.

6.6. Nominations shall be accepted only when these are submitted in writing and with proper supporting documentation, as
follows:

6.6.1. A cover letter signed by the head or designated representative of the nominating organization.
 The cover letter shall be accompanied by a Board Resolution approving the nominee concerned with the said
resolution signed by the organization President and duly certified by the Board Secretary.

6.6.2. A duly accomplished nomination form;

6.6.3. A detailed curriculum vitae of the nominee;

6.6.4. A list of the nominee’s significant works categorized according to the criteria;

6.6.5. The latest photograph (color or black and white) of the nominee, either 5" x 7" or 8" x 11";

6.6.6. Pertinent information materials on the nominee’s significant works (on CDs, VCDs and DVDs);

6.6.7. Copies of published reviews;

6.6.8. Any other document that may be required.

6.7. Nominations received beyond the announced deadline for the submission of nominations shall not be considered.

6.8. The National Artist Award Secretariat shall announce the opening of nominations through media releases.

6.9. All inquiries and nominations shall be submitted to

The NATIONAL ARTIST AWARD SECRETARIAT

Office of the Artistic Director Cultural Center of the Philippines Roxas Boulevard, 1300 Pasay City or The NATIONAL ARTIST
AWARD SECRETARIAT Office of the Deputy Executive Director National Commission for Culture and the Arts 633 General Luna
Street, Intramuros, Manila

7. SCREENING AND SELECTION PROCESS

7.1. The National Artist Award Secretariat shall pre-screen the nominees based on technical guideline items 5.1, 6.2, 6.3, 6.4,
6.5 and 6.6. The pre-screening shall not be based on the accomplishments and merits of the nominee.

7.2. The Special Research Group shall accomplish its task within six (6) months. The main objective is to verify the validity of
the data, and evaluate the quality, true value and significance of works according to the criteria. It shall come up with the
updated and comprehensive profiles of nominees reflecting their most outstanding achievements.

7.3. The National Artist Award Secretariat will meet to review the list of nominees for oversights. Consequently, deserving
nominees shall be added to the list.

7.4. The first deliberation panel (Council of Experts) shall be intra-disciplinary. The panelists shall be grouped according to
their respective fields of expertise or disciplines to shortlist the nominees in their disciplines or categories for presentation to
the second deliberation panel.

7.5. The second deliberation panel shall be composed of a different set of experts from the first deliberation panel three (3)
experts each of the seven (7) areas/discipline and may include members from varying backgrounds such as critics and
academicians. The achievements of each shortlisted nominee shall be presented by one designated member of Council of
Experts. Then panel deliberates and ranks the shortlisted nominees according to the order of precedence following the set
criteria of the Order of National Artists. In extreme cases, the Second Deliberation may add new names to the lists.

7.6. The second deliberation panel may recommend not to give award in any category if no nominee is found deserving. The
number of awardees shall also depend on the availability of funds. All decisions and recommendations shall be in writing.

7.7. The recommendations from the Second Deliberation Panel of the National Artist Award Council of Experts shall then be
presented to the joint boards of NCCA and CCP for final selection. The presentors shall prepare their presentation in writing
together with an audio-visual presentation or powerpoint presentation. Written interpellations/opinions will be accepted from
selected critics. The review shall be based on the ranking done by the Second Deliberation. The voting shall be across
disciplines. The National Artists will be given the option whether to vote on all categories or on his/her particular discipline.

7.8. Proxy votes will not be allowed in the Selection Process. Designation of permanent representatives of agencies should be
made at the outset to make them regular Board members of NCCA and thus, may be allowed to cast votes.
 7.9. The list of awardees shall be submitted to the President of the Republic of the Philippines for confirmation, proclamation
and conferral.

8. PRESENTATION OF THE AWARDS

8.1. The Order of National Artists shall not be conferred more frequently than every three (3) years.

8.2. The Order of National Artists shall be conferred by the President of the Philippines on June 11 or any appropriate date in
fitting ceremonies to be organized by the National Artist Secretariat.

8.3. The medallion of the Order of National Artists and citation shall be given to the honoree during the conferment ceremony.
The cash award of ₱100,000.00 in cheque shall be given immediately after the ceremony or at another time and place as
requested by the honoree.

8.4. A posthumous conferral consisting of the medallion and citation shall be given to the family or legal heir/s of the honoree.
The cash award of ₱75,000.00 in cheque shall be given to the honoree’s legal heir/s or a representative designated by the
family immediately after the ceremony or at another time and place as requested by the family. (Emphases supplied.)

In 1996, the NCCA and the CCP created a National Artist Award Secretariat composed of the NCCA Executive Director as Chairperson, the CCP President
as Vice-Chairperson, and the NCCA Deputy Executive Director, the CCP Vice-President/Artistic Director, the NCCA National Artist Award Officer and the
CCP National Artist Award Officer as members. They also centralized with the NCCA all financial resources and management for the administration of the
National Artists Award. They added another layer to the selection process to involve and allow the participation of more members of the arts and culture
sector of the Philippines in the selection of who may be proclaimed a National Artist.
On September 19, 2003, Executive Order No. 236, s. 2003, entitled Establishing the Honors Code of the Philippines to Create an Order of Precedence of
Honors Conferred and for Other Purposes, was issued. The National Artists Award was renamed the Order of National Artists and raised to the level of a
Cultural Order, fourth in precedence among the orders and decorations that comprise the Honors of the Philippines. Executive Order No. 236, s. 2003,
recognizes the vital role of the NCCA and the CCP in identifying Filipinos who have made distinct contributions to arts and letters and states that the
National Artist recognition is conferred "upon the recommendation of the Cultural Center of the Philippines and the National Commission for Culture and
the Arts."12 Executive Order No. 236, s. 2003, further created a Committee on Honors to "assist the President in evaluating nominations for recipients of
Honors,"13 including the Order of National Artists, and presidential awards. The Committee on Honors has been allowed to "authorize relevant department
or government agencies to maintain Honors and/or Awards Committees to process nominations for Honors and/or Presidential Awards." 14 In this
connection, Section 2.4(A) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations15 of Executive Order No. 236, s. 2003, states:
2.4: Awards Committees
There shall be two types of awards committees: the Committee on Honors and the various awards committees in the various units of the government
service.
A. The Committee on Honors
The Committee on Honors serves as a National Awards Committee. It is composed of the following:
The Executive Secretary, Chairman
The Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Vice-Chairman
Head, Presidential Management Staff, member
Presidential Assistant for Historical Affairs, member
Chief of Presidential Protocol, member
Chief of Protocol, DFA, member
All nominations from the various awards committees must be submitted to the Committee on Honors via the Chancellery of Philippine Orders and State
Decorations. The Chancellery shall process nominations for the consideration of the Committee on Honors. The Committee on Honors shall screen and
recommend these nominations to the President.
The Committee on Honors shall, as a general rule, serve as a screening committee to ensure that nominations received from the various awards committees
meet two tests: that there has not been an abuse of discretion in making the nomination, and that the nominee is in good standing. Should a nomination
meet these criteria, a recommendation to the President for conferment shall be made.
The President of the Philippines takes the recommendations of the Committee on Honors in the highest consideration when making the final decision on
the conferment of awards. (Emphasis supplied.)
Executive Order No. 435, s. 2005, entitled Amending Section 5(IV) of Executive Order No. 236 Entitled "Establishing the Honors Code of the Philippines
to Create an Order of Precedence of Honors Conferred and for Other Purposes" was subsequently issued on June 8, 2005. It amended the wording of
Executive Order No. 236, s. 2003, on the Order of National Artists and clarified that the NCCA and the CCP "shall advise the President on the conferment
of the Order of National Artists."
Controversy Surrounding the 2009
Order of National Artists
Petitioners alleged that on January 30, 2007, a joint meeting of the NCCA Board of Commissioners and the CCP Board of Trustees was held to discuss,
among others, the evaluation of the 2009 Order of National Artists and the convening of the National Artist Award Secretariat. The nomination period was
set for September 2007 to December 31, 2007, which was later extended to February 28, 2008. The pre-screening of nominations was held from January to
March 2008.16

On April 3, 2009, the First Deliberation Panel met.17 A total of 87 nominees18 were considered during the deliberation and a preliminary shortlist 19 of 32
names was compiled.
On April 23, 2009, the Second Deliberation Panel purportedly composed of an entirely new set of Council of Experts met and shortlisted 13 out of the 32
names in the preliminary shortlist.20 On May 6, 2009, the final deliberation was conducted by the 30-member Final Deliberation Panel comprised of the
CCP Board of Trustees and the NCCA Board of Commissioners and the living National Artists. 21 From the 13 names in the second shortlist, a final list of
four names was agreed upon.22 The final list, according to rank, follows:

Name Art Field/Category Number of Votes

Manuel Conde (+) Film and Broadcast Arts (Film) 26

Ramon Santos Music 19

Lazaro Francisco (+) Literature 15

Federico Aguilar-Alcuaz Visual Arts 15

On May 6, 2009, a letter, signed jointly by the Chairperson of the NCCA, Undersecretary Vilma Labrador, and the President and Artistic Director of the
CCP, Mr. Nestor Jardin, was sent to the President.23 The letter stated, thus:
May 6, 2009

Her Excellency GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO

President of the Philippines
Malacañan Palace, Manila

Subject: 2009 Order of National Artist Awardees

Dear President Arroyo:

We are respectfully submitting a recommendation of the NCCA Board of Trustees and CCP Board of Trustees for the Proclamation of the
following as 2009 Order of National Artists:

1. Mr. MANUEL CONDE+ (Posthumous) – Film and Broadcast Arts

2. Dr. RAMON SANTOS – Music

3. Mr. LAZARO FRANCISCO+ (Posthumous) – Literature

4. Mr. FEDERICO AGUILAR-ALCUAZ – Visual Arts

The above persons were identified by experts in the various fields of arts and culture, including living National Artists. An intensive
selection process was observed following established practice. In the past, awards were presented by the President at a Ceremony held at
the Malacañan Palace followed by a program called "Parangal" at the Cultural Center of the Philippines. We also propose to continue
with past practice of celebrating the life and works of the four (4) Order of National Artists through an exhibit that will open and a
commemorative publication that will be released on the day of the proclamation.

We respectfully suggest, subject to Her Excellency’s availability, that the Proclamation be on June 11, 2009, if possible at the Malacañan
Palace.

Thank you for your kind attention.

Very respectfully yours,

(Sgd.)
VILMA L. LABRADOR
Chairman
National Commission for Culture and the Arts

(Sgd.)
NESTOR O. JARDIN
President and Artistic Director
 Cultural Center of the Philippines24

According to respondents, the aforementioned letter was referred by the Office of the President to the Committee on Honors. Meanwhile, the Office of the
President allegedly received nominations from various sectors, cultural groups and individuals strongly endorsing private respondents Cecile Guidote-
Alvarez, Carlo Magno Jose Caparas, Francisco Mañosa and Jose Moreno. The Committee on Honors purportedly processed these nominations and invited
resource persons to validate the qualifications and credentials of the nominees.25
The Committee on Honors thereafter submitted a memorandum to then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo recommending the conferment of the Order of
National Artists on the four recommendees of the NCCA and the CCP Boards, as well as on private respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Mañosa and
Moreno. Acting on this recommendation, Proclamation No. 1823 declaring Manuel Conde a National Artist was issued on June 30, 2009. Subsequently, on
July 6, 2009, Proclamation Nos. 1824 to 1829 were issued declaring Lazaro Francisco, Federico AguilarAlcuaz and private respondents Guidote-Alvarez,
Caparas, Mañosa and Moreno, respectively, as National Artists. This was subsequently announced to the public by then Executive Secretary Eduardo
Ermita on July 29, 2009.26
Convinced that, by law, it is the exclusive province of the NCCA Board of Commissioners and the CCP Board of Trustees to select those who will be
conferred the Order of National Artists and to set the standard for entry into that select group, petitioners instituted this petition for prohibition, certiorari
and injunction (with prayer for restraining order) praying that the Order of National Artists be conferred on Dr. Santos and that the conferment of the Order
of National Artists on respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Mañosa and Moreno be enjoined and declared to have been rendered in grave abuse of
discretion.27

In a Resolution28 dated August 25, 2009, the Court issued a status quo order 29 enjoining "public respondents" "from conferring the rank and title of the
Order of National Artists on private respondents; from releasing the cash awards that accompany such conferment and recognition; and from holding the
acknowledgment ceremonies for recognition of the private respondents as National Artists."
What is the nature and scope of the power of the President to confer the Order of the National Artists and how should it be exercised? This is the essential
issue presented in this case. It will determine whether the proclamation of respondents as National Artists is valid. Preliminary procedural issues on the
standing of the petitioners and the propriety of the remedies taken,30 however, call for resolution as a prerequisite to the discussion of the main question.
Contention of the Parties
A perusal of the pleadings submitted by the petitioners reveals that they are an aggrupation of at least three groups, the National Artists, cultural workers
and academics, and the Concerned Artists of the Philippines (CAP). The National Artists assert an "actual as well as legal interest in maintaining the
reputation of the Order of National Artists." 31 In particular, they invoke their right to due process not to have the honor they have been conferred with
diminished by the irregular and questionable conferment of the award on respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Mañosa and Moreno. For petitioners, this
would adversely affect their right to live a meaningful life as it detracts not only from their right to enjoy their honor as a fruit of their lifelong labor but
also from the respect of their peers.32
The cultural workers, academics and CAP claim to be Filipinos who are deeply concerned with the preservation of the country’s rich cultural and artistic
heritage. As taxpayers, they are concerned about the use of public monies for illegal appointments or spurious acts of discretion. 33
All of the petitioners claim that former President Macapagal-Arroyo gravely abused her discretion in disregarding the results of the rigorous screening and
selection process for the Order of National Artists and in substituting her own choice for those of the Deliberation Panels. According to petitioners, the
President’s discretion to name National Artists is not absolute but limited. In particular, her discretion on the matter cannot be exercised in the absence of or
against the recommendation of the NCCA and the CCP. In adding the names of respondents Caparas, Guidote-Alvarez, Mañosa and Moreno while
dropping Dr. Santos from the list of conferees, the President’s own choices constituted the majority of the awardees in utter disregard of the choices of the
NCCA and the CCP and the arts and culture community which were arrived at after a long and rigorous process of screening and deliberation. Moreover,
the name of Dr. Santos as National Artist for Music was deleted from the final list submitted by the NCCA and the CCP Boards without clearly indicating
the basis thereof. For petitioners, the President’s discretion to name National Artists cannot be exercised to defeat the recommendations made by the CCP
and NCCA Boards after a long and rigorous screening process and with the benefit of expertise and experience. The addition of four names to the final list
submitted by the Boards of the CCP and the NCCA and the deletion of one name from the said list constituted a substitution of judgment by the President
and a unilateral reconsideration without clear justification of the decision of the First, Second and Final Deliberation Panels composed of experts. 34
Petitioners further argue that the choice of respondent GuidoteAlvarez was illegal and unethical because, as the then Executive Director of the NCCA and
presidential adviser on culture and arts, she was disqualified from even being nominated. 35 Moreover, such action on the part of the former President
constituted grave abuse of discretion as it gave preferential treatment to respondent Guidote-Alvarez by naming the latter a National Artist despite her not
having been nominated and, thus, not subjected to the screening process provided by the rules for selection to the Order of National Artists. Her inclusion
in the list by the President represented a clear and manifest favor given by the President in that she was exempted from the process that all other artists
have to undergo. According to petitioners, it may be said that the President used a different procedure to qualify respondent Guidote-Alvarez. This was
clearly grave abuse of discretion for being manifest and undue bias violative of the equal protection clause. 36
Respondent Caparas refutes the contention of the petitioning National Artists and insists that there could be no prejudice to the latter. They remain to be
National Artists and continue to receive the emoluments, benefits and other privileges pertaining to them by virtue of that honor. On the other hand, all the
other petitioners failed to show any material and personal injury or harm caused to them by the conferment of the Order of National Artists on respondents
Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Mañosa and Moreno. The rule on standing may not be relaxed in favor of the petitioners as no question of constitutionality has
been raised and no issue of transcendental importance is involved.37
Respondent Caparas further argues that the remedies of prohibition and injunction are improper as the act sought to be enjoined – the declaration of
respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Mañosa and Moreno as National Artists – had already been consummated. In particular, respondent Caparas was
already proclaimed National Artist through Proclamation No. 1827 issued on July 6, 2009.38
On the merits, respondent Caparas contends that no grave abuse of discretion attended his proclamation as National Artist. The former President considered
the respective recommendations of the NCCA and the CCP Boards and of the Committee on Honors in eventually declaring him (Caparas) as National
Artist. The function of the NCCA and the CCP Boards is simply to advise the President. The award of the Order of National Artists is the exclusive
prerogative of the President who is not bound in any way by the recommendation of the NCCA and the CCP Boards. The implementing rules and
regulations or guidelines of the NCCA cannot restrict or limit the exclusive power of the President to select the recipients of the Order of National
Artists.39

For her part, in a letter40 dated March 11, 2010, respondent Guidote-Alvarez manifested that she was waiving her right to file her comment on the petition
and submitted herself to the Court’s discretion and wisdom.
Respondent Mañosa manifested that his creations speak for themselves as his contribution to Filipino cultural heritage and his worthiness to receive the
award. Nonetheless, he expressed his conviction that the Order of National Artists is not a right but a privilege that he would willingly relinquish should he
be found not worthy of it.41

Respondent Moreno did not file any pleading despite being given several opportunities to do so. Hence, the Court dispensed with his pleadings. 42

In a Resolution dated July 12, 2011, this Court gave due course to the petition and required the parties to file their respective memoranda. 43 Respondent
Caparas filed his memorandum on September 8, 2011, 44 the CCP filed its memorandum on September 19, 2011, 45 respondent Mañosa on September 20,
2011,46 and the Office of the Solicitor General filed a manifestation stating that it is adopting its comment as its memorandum on September 21, 2011. 47
Respondent Moreno failed to file a Memorandum, hence, the Court resolved to dispense with the same. 48 Petitioners filed their Memorandum on May 14,
2012.49

On the other hand, the original position of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) was similar to that of respondent Caparas. 50 In a subsequent
manifestation,51 however, the OSG stated that the current Board of Commissioners of the NCCA agree with the petitioners that the President cannot honor
as a National Artist one who was not recommended by the joint Boards of the NCCA and the CCP. The implementing rules and regulations of Executive
Order No. 236, s. 2003, recognized the binding character of the recommendation of the NCCA and the CCP Boards and limited the authority of the
Committee on Honors to the determination that (1) there has been no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NCCA and the CCP Boards in making the
nomination, and (2) the nominee is in good standing. Where a nomination meets the said two criteria, a recommendation to the President to confer the
award shall be made.52
The OSG further argued that, while the President exercises control over the NCCA and the CCP, the President has the duty to faithfully execute the laws,
including the NCCA-CCP guidelines for selection of National Artists and the implementing rules of Executive Order No. 236, s. 2003. Moreover, the laws
recognize the expertise of the NCCA and the CCP in the arts and tasked them to screen and select the artists to be conferred the Order of National Artists.
Their mandate is clear and exclusive as no other agency possesses such expertise. 53

The OSG also assailed the former President’s choice of respondent Guidote-Alvarez for being contrary to Republic Act No. 7356. 54 Section 11 of the said
law provides:
Sec. 11. Membership Restrictions. – During his/her term as member of the Commission, a Commissioner shall not be eligible for any grant, or such other
financial aid from the Commission as an individual: Provided, however, That he/she may compete for grants and awards on the same level as other artists
one (1) year after his/her term shall have expired.
The omission of the word "award" in the first portion of the above provision appears to be unintentional as shown by the proviso which states that a
member may compete for grants and awards only one year after his or her term shall have expired. As such, respondent Guidote-Alvarez is restricted and
disqualified from being conferred the 2009 Order of National Artists.55
The Court’s Ruling
Standing of the Petitioners

Standing is the determination of whether a specific person is the proper party to bring a matter to the court for adjudication. 56 The gist of the question of
standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. 57
The parties who assail the constitutionality or legality of a statute or an official act must have a direct and personal interest. They must show not only that
the law or any governmental act is invalid, but also that they sustained or are in immediate danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its
enforcement, and not merely that they suffer thereby in some indefinite way. They must show that they have been or are about to be denied some right or
privilege to which they are lawfully entitled or that they are about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act complained
of.58
In this case, we find that the petitioning National Artists will be denied some right or privilege to which they are entitled as members of the Order of
National Artists as a result of the conferment of the award on respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Mañosa and Moreno. In particular, they will be
denied the privilege of exclusive membership in the Order of National Artists.

In accordance with Section 2(a)59 of Executive Order No. 236, s. 2003, the Order of National Artists is "an exclusive association of honored individuals."
To ensure the exclusivity of the membership in the Order, a rigid nomination and screening process has been established with different sets of renowned
artists and respected art critics invited to sit as the Council of Experts for the First and Second Deliberation Panels. Moreover, all living National Artists are
given a voice on who should be included in their exclusive club as they automatically become members of the Final Deliberation Panel that will vote on
who should be included in the final list to be submitted to the President for conferment of the Order of National Artists. To allow the untrammeled
discretion and authority of the President to confer the Order of National Artists without regard to the stringent screening and rigorous selection process
established by the NCCA and the CCP will diminish, if not negate, the exclusive nature of the said Order. It will unduly subject the selection and
conferment of the Order of National Artists to politics rather than to principles and procedures. It will subvert the transparent and rigorous process and
allow entry to the exclusive Order of National Artists through a secret backdoor of lobbying, back channeling and political accommodation.
Among the other petitioners, Prof. Gemino Abad presents a unique valid personal and substantial interest. Like respondents Caparas, Mañosa and Moreno,
he was among the 87 nominees for the 2009 Order of National Artists. Like respondent Moreno, he made it to the preliminary shortlist. As he did not make
it to the second shortlist, he was not considered by the Final Deliberation Panel, more so by the former President.
It should be recalled too that respondent Guidote-Alvarez was disqualified to be nominated for being the Executive Director of the NCCA at that time
while respondents Mañosa and Caparas did not make it to the preliminary shortlist and respondent Moreno was not included in the second shortlist. Yet, the
four of them were treated differently and considered favorably when they were exempted from the rigorous screening process of the NCCA and the CCP
and conferred the Order of National Artists. The Committee on Honors and the former President effectively treated respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas,
Mañosa and Moreno as a preferred class. The special treatment accorded to respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Mañosa and Moreno fails to pass
rational scrutiny.60 No real and substantial distinction between respondents and petitioner Abad has been shown that would justify deviating from the laws,
guidelines and established procedures, and placing respondents in an exceptional position. The undue classification was not germane to the purpose of the
law. Instead, it contradicted the law and well-established guidelines, rules and regulations meant to carry the law into effect. While petitioner Abad cannot
claim entitlement to the Order of National Artists, 61 he is entitled to be given an equal opportunity to vie for that honor. In view of the foregoing, there was
a violation of petitioner Abad’s right to equal protection, an interest that is substantial enough to confer him standing in this case.
As regards the other concerned artists and academics as well as the CAP, their claim of deep concern for the preservation of the country’s rich cultural and
artistic heritage, while laudable, falls short of the injury in fact requirement of standing. Their assertion constitutes a generalized grievance shared in a
substantially equal measure by all or a large class of citizens.62 Nor can they take refuge in their status as taxpayers as the case does not involve any illegal
appropriation or taxation. A taxpayer’s suit is proper only when there is an exercise of the spending or taxing power of the Congress. 63
Nonetheless, as a reading of the petition shows that it has advanced an issue which deserves the attention of this Court in view of its seriousness, novelty
and weight as precedent, it behooves the Court to relax the rules on standing and to resolve the issue presented before it. 64 Moreover, this issue is of
paramount interest,65 which further justifies a liberal stance on standing.
Propriety of the Remedies
The present action is a petition for prohibition, certiorari, injunction, restraining order and all other legal, just and equitable reliefs.
It has been held that the remedies of prohibition and injunction are preventive and, as such, cannot be availed of to restrain an act that is already fait
accompli.66 Where the act sought to be prohibited or enjoined has already been accomplished or consummated, prohibition or injunction becomes moot. 67
Nevertheless, even if the principal issue is already moot, this Court may still resolve its merits for the future guidance of both bench and bar. Courts will
decide a question otherwise moot and academic if it is "capable of repetition, yet evading review." 68

It is an opportune time for the Court to assert its role as republican schoolmaster, 69 a teacher in a vital national seminar. 70 There are times when the
controversy is of such character that, to prevent its recurrence and to assure respect for constitutional limitations, this Court must pass on the merits of a
case.71 This is one such case. More than being a teaching moment, this is not the first time that the Order of National Artists was conferred in the manner
that is being assailed in this case.72 If not addressed here and now, there is great probability that the central question involved in this case will haunt us
again in the future. Every President may invoke absolute presidential prerogative and thrust upon us National Artists after his or her own heart, in total
disregard of the advise of the CCP and the NCCA and the voice of the community of artists, resulting to repeated episodes of indignation and uproar from
the artists and the public.
Furthermore, if not corrected, such an act would give rise to mischief and dangerous precedent whereby those in the corridors of power could avoid judicial
intervention and review by merely speedily and stealthily completing the commission of an illegality. 73
In any event, the present petition is also for certiorari and there is no procedural bar for the Court to pass upon the question of whether the proclamations of
respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Mañosa and Moreno as National Artists were attended by grave abuse of presidential discretion.
Limits of the President’s Discretion
The respective powers of the CCP Board of Trustees and of the NCCA Board of Commissioners with respect to the conferment of the Order of National
Artists are clear. They jointly administer the said award and, upon their recommendation or advice, the President confers the Order of National Artists.

To "recommend" and to "advise" are synonymous. To "recommend" is "to advise or counsel." 74 To "advise" is "to give an opinion or counsel, or
recommend a plan or course of action; also to give notice. To encourage, inform or acquaint." 75 "Advise" imports that it is discretionary or optional with
the person addressed whether he will act on such advice or not.76 This has been clearly explained in Cojuangco, Jr. v. Atty. Palma77:
The "power to recommend" includes the power to give "advice, exhortation or indorsement, which is essentially persuasive in character, not binding upon
the party to whom it is made." (Emphasis supplied.)
Thus, in the matter of the conferment of the Order of National Artists, the President may or may not adopt the recommendation or advice of the NCCA and
the CCP Boards. In other words, the advice of the NCCA and the CCP is subject to the President’s discretion.
Nevertheless, the President’s discretion on the matter is not totally unfettered, nor the role of the NCCA and the CCP Boards meaningless.
Discretion is not a free-spirited stallion that runs and roams wherever it pleases but is reined in to keep it from straying. In its classic formulation,
"discretion is not unconfined and vagrant" but "canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing."78
The President’s power must be exercised in accordance with existing laws. Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution prescribes faithful execution of the
laws by the President:
Sec. 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.
(Emphasis supplied.)
The President’s discretion in the conferment of the Order of National Artists should be exercised in accordance with the duty to faithfully execute the
relevant laws. The faithful execution clause is best construed as an obligation imposed on the President, not a separate grant of power. 79 It simply
underscores the rule of law and, corollarily, the cardinal principle that the President is not above the laws but is obliged to obey and execute them. 80 This is
precisely why the law provides that "administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or
the Constitution."81
In this connection, the powers granted to the NCCA and the CCP Boards in connection with the conferment of the Order of National Artists by executive
issuances were institutionalized by two laws, namely, Presidential Decree No. 208 dated June 7, 1973 and Republic Act No. 7356. In particular,
Proclamation No. 1144 dated May 15, 1973 constituted the CCP Board as the National Artists Awards Committee and tasked it to "administer the
conferment of the category of National Artist" upon deserving Filipino artists with the mandate to "draft the rules to guide its deliberations in the choice of
National Artists":
Proclamation No. 1001 dated April 27, 1972, creating the Award and Decoration of National Artist, is hereby amended by creating a National Artists
Awards Committee, hereinafter to administer the conferment of the category of National Artist upon those deserving thereof. The Committee, which shall
be composed of members of the Board of Trustees of the Cultural Center of the Philippines, shall organize itself immediately and shall draft the rules to
guide its deliberations in the choice of National Artists, to the end that those who have created a body of work in the arts and in letters capable of
withstanding the test of time will be so recognized. (Emphases supplied.)
The authority of the CCP Board of Trustees as National Artists Awards Committee was reiterated in Presidential Decree No. 208 dated June 7, 1973.
The function of the CCP Board of Trustees as National Artists Awards Committee has been recognized under Republic Act No. 7356:
Sec. 18. The National Cultural Agencies. – The [NCCA] shall coordinate with the national cultural agencies including but not limited to the Cultural Center
of the Philippines, the Institute of Philippine Languages, the National Historical Institute, the National Library, the National Museum, the Records
Management and Archives Office. However, they shall continue operating under their respective charters or as provided by law where provisions therein
are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act. They shall serve as the national repository and/or showcase, as the case may be, of the best of
Philippine culture and arts. For this purpose, these agencies shall submit periodic reports, including recommendations to the [NCCA]. (Emphasis supplied.)
On the other hand, the NCCA has been given the following mandate in connection with the conferment of cultural or arts awards:
Sec. 12. Mandate. – The Commission is hereby mandated to formulate and implement policies and plans in accordance with the principles stated in Title 1
of this Act.
(a) To encourage the continuing and balanced development of a pluralistic culture by the people themselves, it shall:
xxxx
(4) extend recognition of artistic achievement through awards, grants and services to artists and cultural groups which contribute significantly to
the Filipino’s cultural legacy;
xxxx
Sec. 13. Powers and Functions. – To carry out its mandate, the Commission shall exercise the following powers and functions:
xxxx
(j) advise the President on matters pertaining to culture and the arts, including the creation of a special decoration or award, for persons who
have significantly contributed to the development and promotion of Philippine culture and arts;
(k) promulgate rules, regulations and undertake any and all measures as may be necessary to implement this Act. (Emphases supplied.)
By virtue of their respective statutory mandates in connection with the conferment of the National Artist Award, the NCCA and the CCP decided to work
together and jointly administer the National Artist Award. They reviewed the guidelines for the nomination, selection and administration of the National
Artist Award, created a National Artist Award Secretariat, centralized all financial resources and management for the administration of the National Artist
Award, and added another layer to the selection process so that more members of the arts and culture sector of the Philippines may be involved and
participate in the selection of National Artists.

We have held that an administrative regulation adopted pursuant to law has the force and effect of law. 82 Thus, the rules, guidelines and policies regarding
the Order of National Artists jointly issued by the CCP Board of Trustees and the NCCA pursuant to their respective statutory mandates have the force and
effect of law. Until set aside, they are binding upon executive and administrative agencies, 83 including the President himself/herself as chief executor of
laws. In this connection, Section 2.5(A) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations 84 of Executive Order No. 236, s. 2003 provides:
2.5: General Guidelines for Awards Committees
A. National Orders of Cultural and Scientific Merit
The existing modalities of the NCCA for selecting recipients for the Order of National Artists, and the Gawad sa Manlilikha ng Bayan, and of the NAST
for selecting recipients of the Order of National Scientists, shall remain in force. (Emphases supplied.)
Section 2.4(A) of the same implementing rules further states:
2.4: Awards Committees
There shall be two types of awards committees: the Committee on Honors and the various awards committees in the various units of the government
service.
A. The Committee on Honors
The Committee on Honors serves as a National Awards Committee. It is composed of the following:
The Executive Secretary, Chairman
The Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Vice-Chairman
Head, Presidential Management Staff, member
Presidential Assistant for Historical Affairs, member
Chief of Presidential Protocol, member
Chief of Protocol, DFA, member
All nominations from the various awards committees must be submitted to the Committee on Honors via the Chancellery of Philippine Orders and State
Decorations. The Chancellery shall process nominations for the consideration of the Committee on Honors. The Committee on Honors shall screen and
recommend these nominations to the President.
The Committee on Honors shall, as a general rule, serve as a screening committee to ensure that nominations received from the various awards committees
meet two tests: that there has not been an abuse of discretion in making the nomination, and that the nominee is in good standing. Should a nomination
meet these criteria, a recommendation to the President for conferment shall be made.
The President of the Philippines takes the recommendations of the Committee on Honors in the highest consideration when making the final decision on
the conferment of awards. (Emphasis supplied.)
Pursuant to the above provision of the implementing rules of Executive Order No. 236, s. 2003, the authority of the Committee on Honors is limited to
determining whether the nominations submitted by a particular awards committee, in this case, the joint NCCA and CCP Boards, have been tainted by
abuse of discretion, and whether the nominees are in good standing. Should the nominations meet these two criteria, the Committee on Honors shall make
a recommendation to the President for conferment of the Order of National Artists.
In view of the various stages of deliberation in the selection process and as a consequence of his/her duty to faithfully enforce the relevant laws, the
discretion of the President in the matter of the Order of National Artists is confined to the names submitted to him/her by the NCCA and the CCP Boards.
This means that the President could not have considered conferment of the Order of National Artists on any person not considered and recommended by
the NCCA and the CCP Boards. That is the proper import of the provision of Executive Order No. 435, s. 2005, that the NCCA and the CCP "shall advise
the President on the conferment of the Order of National Artists." Applying this to the instant case, the former President could not have properly considered
respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Mañosa and Moreno, as their names were not recommended by the NCCA and the CCP Boards. Otherwise, not
only will the stringent selection and meticulous screening process be rendered futile, the respective mandates of the NCCA and the CCP Board of Trustees
under relevant laws to administer the conferment of Order of National Artists, draft the rules and regulations to guide its deliberations, formulate and
implement policies and plans, and undertake any and all necessary measures in that regard will also become meaningless.
Furthermore, with respect to respondent Guidote-Alvarez who was the Executive Director of the NCCA at that time, the Guidelines expressly provides:

6.5 NCCA and CCP Board members and consultants and NCCA and CCP officers and staff are automatically disqualified from being nominated. 85
Respondent Guidote-Alvarez could not have even been nominated, hence, she was not qualified to be considered and conferred the Order of National
Artists at that time. The President’s discretion on the matter does not extend to removing a legal impediment or overriding a legal restriction.
From the foregoing, the advice or recommendation of the NCCA and the CCP Boards as to the conferment of the Order of National Artists on Conde, Dr.
Santos, Francisco and Alcuaz was not binding on the former President but only discretionary or optional for her whether or not to act on such advice or
recommendation. Also, by virtue of the power of control, the President had the authority to alter or modify or nullify or set aside such recommendation or
advice. It was well within the President’s power and discretion to proclaim all, or some or even none of the recommendees of the CCP and the NCCA
Boards, without having to justify his or her action. Thus, the exclusion of Santos did not constitute grave abuse of discretion on the part of the former
President.
The conferment of the Order of National Artists on respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Mañosa and Moreno was an entirely different matter.
There is grave abuse of discretion when an act is (1) done contrary to the Constitution, the law or jurisprudence or (2) executed whimsically, capriciously
or arbitrarily, out of malice, ill will or personal bias.86

There was a violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution 87 when the former President gave preferential treatment to respondents Guidote-
Alvarez, Caparas, Mañosa and Moreno.1âwphi1 The former President’s constitutional duty to faithfully execute the laws and observe the rules, guidelines
and policies of the NCCA and the CCP as to the selection of the nominees for conferment of the Order of National Artists proscribed her from having a free
and uninhibited hand in the conferment of the said award. The manifest disregard of the rules, guidelines and processes of the NCCA and the CCP was an
arbitrary act that unduly favored respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Mañosa and Moreno. The conferment of the Order of National Artists on said
respondents was therefore made with grave abuse of discretion and should be set aside.
While the Court invalidates today the proclamation of respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Mañosa and Moreno as National Artists, such action should
not be taken as a pronouncement on whether they are worthy to be conferred that honor. Only the President, upon the advise of the NCCA and the CCP
Boards, may determine that. The Court simply declares that, as the former President committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing Proclamation Nos.
1826 to 1829 dated July 6, 2009, the said proclamations are invalid. However, nothing in this Decision should be read as a disqualification on the part of
respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Mañosa and Moreno to be considered for the honor of National Artist in the future, subject to compliance with the
laws, rules and regulations governing said award.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED in PART. Proclamation Nos. 1826 to 1829 dated July 6, 2009 proclaiming respondents Cecile Guidote-
Alvarez, Carlo Magno Jose Caparas, Francisco Mañosa, and Jose Moreno, respectively, as National Artists are declared INVALID and
SET ASIDE for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion.
SO ORDERED.
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

(On leave) DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

ARTURO D. BRION* Associate Justice
 Associate Justice

(no part)
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO**
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

ROBERTO A. ABAD MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

BIENVENIDO L. REYES ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN

Associate Justice
C E R TI F I CATI O N
Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the
case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice

Footnotes
* On leave.
** No part.
1 Also referred to as Carlos Caparas" and "Carlo Caparas" in some parts or the records.
2 Arts and Creative Industries: A Historical Overview and an Australian Conversation, p. 51, Australia Council for the Arts.
3 Republic Act No. 7356, Section 3 or the Law Creating the National Commission for Culture and the Arts.
4 Entitled Declaring Fernando Amorsolo a National Artist.
5 Entitled Declaring Francisca Reyes Aquino, Carlos V. Francisco, Amado V. Hernandez, Antonio J. Molina, Juan F. Nakpil, Guillermo E.
Tolentino and Jose Garcia Villa National Artists; and Amending Proclamation No. 1001 dated April 27, 1972, by Creating a National Artists
Awards Committee, Hereinafter to Administer the Conferment of the Award/Decoration of National Artist.
6 Entitled Granting Certain Privileges and Honors to National Artists and Creating a Special Fund for the Purpose.
7 Republic Act No. 7356, Section 12(4).
8 Id., Section 13(j).
9 Rollo, p. 82. This effort on coordination is consistent with the powers of the NCCA to "set up a system of networking and coordination with
and among all existing government cultural agencies for the effective implementation of programs and activities" under Section 13(c) of
Republic Act No. 7356. Section 18 in connection with Section 23(b) of the same law further provides that the NCCA "shall coordinate with the
national cultural agencies including but not limited to the Cultural Center of the Philippines" with the NCCA as "over all policy-making and
coordinating body."
10 Id. at 138-144.
11 EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 236, S. 2003, Sections 3 and 5.
12 Id., Section 5.
13 Id., Section 9.
14 Id.
15 Approved under MEMORANDUM ORDER NO. 128 dated December 23, 2003.
16 Rollo, p. 17.
17 Id. at 18.
18 Id. at 39-40. These nominees were as follows:
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Baguio City
EN BANC
G.R. No. 204819 April 8, 2014
JAMES M. IMBONG and LOVELY-ANN C. IMBONG, for themselves and in behalf of their minor children, LUCIA CARLOS IMBONG and
BERNADETTE CARLOS IMBONG and MAGNIFICAT CHILD DEVELOPMENT CENTER, INC., Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and Management,
HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education, Culture and
Sports and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local Government, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 204934
ALLIANCE FOR THE FAMILY FOUNDATION PHILIPPINES, INC. [ALFI], represented by its President, Maria Concepcion S. Noche, Spouses
Reynaldo S. Luistro & Rosie B . Luistro, Jose S. Sandejas & Elenita S.A. Sandejas, Arturo M. Gorrez & Marietta C. Gorrez, Salvador S. Mante,
Jr. & Hazeleen L. Mante, Rolando M. Bautista & Maria Felisa S. Bautista, Desiderio Racho & Traquilina Racho, F emand Antonio A. Tansingco
& Carol Anne C. Tansingco for themselves and on behalf of their minor children, Therese Antonette C. Tansingco, Lorenzo Jose C. Tansingco,
Miguel F emando C. Tangsingco, Carlo Josemaria C. Tansingco & Juan Paolo C. Tansingco, Spouses Mariano V. Araneta & Eileen Z. Araneta for
themselves and on behalf of their minor children, Ramon Carlos Z. Araneta & Maya Angelica Z. Araneta, Spouses Renato C. Castor & Mildred
C. Castor for themselves and on behalf of their minor children, Renz Jeffrey C. Castor, Joseph Ramil C. Castor, John Paul C. Castor & Raphael
C. Castor, Spouses Alexander R. Racho & Zara Z. Racho for themselves and on behalf of their minor children Margarita Racho, Mikaela Racho,
Martin Racho, Mari Racho & Manolo Racho, Spouses Alfred R. Racho & Francine V. Racho for themselves and on behalf of their minor children
Michael Racho, Mariana Racho, Rafael Racho, Maxi Racho, Chessie Racho & Laura Racho, Spouses David R. Racho & Armilyn A. Racho for
themselves and on behalf of their minor child Gabriel Racho, Mindy M. Juatas and on behalf of her minor children Elijah Gerald Juatas and
Elian Gabriel Juatas, Salvacion M. Monteiro, Emily R. Laws, Joseph R . Laws & Katrina R. Laws, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO,
Secretary, Department of Education, Culture and Sports, HON. CORAZON SOLIMAN, Secretary, Department of Social Welfare and
Development, HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local Government, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD,
Secretary, Department of Budget and Management, HON. ARSENIO M. BALISACAN, Socio-Economic Planning Secretary and NEDA Director-
General, THE PHILIPPINE COMMISSION ON WOMEN, represented by its Chairperson, Remedios lgnacio-Rikken, THE PHILIPPINE
HEALTH INSURANCE CORPORATION, represented by its President Eduardo Banzon, THE LEAGUE OF PROVINCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES, represented by its President Alfonso Umali, THE LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its President
Oscar Rodriguez, and THE LEAGUE OF MUNICIPALITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its President Donato Marcos, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 204957
TASK FORCE FOR FAMILY AND LIFE VISAYAS, INC. and VALERIANO S. AVILA, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary; HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and Management;
HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Education; and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local
Government, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 204988
SERVE LIFE CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY, INC., represented by Dr. Nestor B. Lumicao, M.D., as President and in his personal capacity,
ROSEVALE FOUNDATION INC., represented by Dr. Rodrigo M. Alenton, M.D., as member of the school board and in his personal capacity,
ROSEMARIE R. ALENTON, IMELDA G. IBARRA, CPA, LOVENIAP. NACES, Phd., ANTHONY G. NAGAC, EARL ANTHONY C. GAMBE
and MARLON I. YAP, Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR.,
Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and Management; HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary,
Department of Health; HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary,
Department of Interior and Local Government, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 205003
EXPEDITO A. BUGARIN, JR., Petitioner,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, HON. SENATE PRESIDENT, HON. SPEAKER OF THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES and HON. SOLICITOR GENERAL, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 205043
EDUARDO B. OLAGUER and THE CATHOLIC XYBRSPACE APOSTOLATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioners,
vs.
DOH SECRETARY ENRIQUE T. ONA, FDA DIRECTOR SUZETTE H. LAZO, DBM SECRETARY FLORENCIO B. ABAD, DILG
SECRETARY MANUELA. ROXAS II, DECS SECRETARY ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 205138
PHILIPPINE ALLIANCE OF XSEMINARIANS, INC. (PAX), herein represented by its National President, Atty. Ricardo M . Ribo, and in his
own behalf, Atty. Lino E.A. Dumas, Romeo B. Almonte, Osmundo C. Orlanes, Arsenio Z. Menor, Samuel J. Yap, Jaime F. Mateo, Rolly Siguan,
Dante E. Magdangal, Michael Eugenio O. Plana, Bienvenido C. Miguel, Jr., Landrito M. Diokno and Baldomero Falcone, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and Management,
HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education, HON.
MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local Government, HON. CORAZON J. SOLIMAN, Secretary, Department of
Social Welfare and Development, HON. ARSENIO BALISACAN, Director-General, National Economic and Development Authority, HON.
SUZETTE H. LAZO, Director-General, Food and Drugs Administration, THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS, Philippine Health Insurance
Corporation, and THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS, Philippine Commission on Women, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 205478
REYNALDO J. ECHAVEZ, M.D., JACQUELINE H. KING, M.D., CYNTHIA T. DOMINGO, M.D., AND JOSEPHINE MILLADO-LUMITAO,
M.D., collectively known as Doctors For Life, and ANTHONY PEREZ, MICHAEL ANTHONY G. MAPA, CARLOS ANTONIO PALAD,
WILFREDO JOSE, CLAIRE NAVARRO, ANNA COSIO, and GABRIEL DY LIACCO collectively known as Filipinos For Life, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary; HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management;
HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary of the Department of Health; HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary of the Department of Education; and
HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local Government, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 205491
SPOUSES FRANCISCO S. TATAD AND MARIA FENNY C. TATAD & ALA F. PAGUIA, for themselves, their Posterity, and the rest of Filipino
posterity, Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT of the Republic of the Philippines, Respondent.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 205720
PRO-LIFE PHILIPPINES FOUNDATION, Inc., represented by Loma Melegrito, as Executive Director, and in her personal capacity, JOSELYN
B. BASILIO, ROBERT Z. CORTES, ARIEL A. CRISOSTOMO, JEREMY I. GATDULA, CRISTINA A. MONTES, RAUL ANTONIO A. NIDOY,
WINSTON CONRAD B. PADOJINOG, RUFINO L. POLICARPIO III, Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR.,
Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary,
Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education and HON. MANUEL A. ROXAS II, Secretary,
Department of Interior and Local Government, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 206355
MILLENNIUM SAINT FOUNDATION, INC., ATTY. RAMON PEDROSA, ATTY. CITA BORROMEO-GARCIA, STELLAACEDERA, ATTY.
BERTENI CATALUNA CAUSING, Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, DEPARTMENT OF
EDUCATION, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 207111
JOHN WALTER B. JUAT, MARY M. IMBONG, ANTHONY VICTORIO B. LUMICAO, JOSEPH MARTIN Q. VERDEJO, ANTONIA EMMA
R. ROXAS and LOTA LAT-GUERRERO, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and Management, HON.
ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education, Culture and Sports and
HON. MANUEL A. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local Government, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 207172
COUPLES FOR CHRIST FOUNDATION, INC., SPOUSES JUAN CARLOS ARTADI SARMIENTO AND FRANCESCA ISABELLE
BESINGA-SARMIENTO, AND SPOUSES LUIS FRANCIS A. RODRIGO, JR. and DEBORAH MARIE VERONICA N. RODRIGO, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and Management,
HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education, Culture and
Sports and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local Government, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 207563
ALMARIM CENTI TILLAH and ABDULHUSSEIN M. KASHIM, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary of the Department of Health, and HON. ARMIN A.
LUISTRO,Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management, Respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
Freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by the framers of our fundamental law. And this Court has consistently affirmed this preferred status,
well aware that it is "designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to believe as his conscience directs, to profess his
beliefs , and to live as he believes he ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others and with the common good."1
To this day, poverty is still a major stumbling block to the nation's emergence as a developed country, leaving our people beleaguered in a state of hunger,
illiteracy and unemployment. While governmental policies have been geared towards the revitalization of the economy, the bludgeoning dearth in social
services remains to be a problem that concerns not only the poor, but every member of society. The government continues to tread on a trying path to the
realization of its very purpose, that is, the general welfare of the Filipino people and the development of the country as a whole. The legislative branch, as
the main facet of a representative government, endeavors to enact laws and policies that aim to remedy looming societal woes, while the executive is
closed set to fully implement these measures and bring concrete and substantial solutions within the reach of Juan dela Cruz. Seemingly distant is the
judicial branch, oftentimes regarded as an inert governmental body that merely casts its watchful eyes on clashing stakeholders until it is called upon to
adjudicate. Passive, yet reflexive when called into action, the Judiciary then willingly embarks on its solemn duty to interpret legislation vis-a-vis the most
vital and enduring principle that holds Philippine society together - the supremacy of the Philippine Constitution.
Nothing has polarized the nation more in recent years than the issues of population growth control, abortion and contraception. As in every democratic
society, diametrically opposed views on the subjects and their perceived consequences freely circulate in various media. From television debates 2 to sticker
campaigns,3 from rallies by socio-political activists to mass gatherings organized by members of the clergy 4 - the clash between the seemingly antithetical
ideologies of the religious conservatives and progressive liberals has caused a deep division in every level of the society. Despite calls to withhold support
thereto, however, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), was
enacted by Congress on December 21, 2012.
Shortly after the President placed his imprimatur on the said law, challengers from various sectors of society came knocking on the doors of the Court,
beckoning it to wield the sword that strikes down constitutional disobedience. Aware of the profound and lasting impact that its decision may produce, the
Court now faces the iuris controversy, as presented in fourteen (14) petitions and two (2) petitions- in-intervention, to wit:
(1) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,5 filed by spouses Attys. James M. Imbong and Lovely Ann C. Imbong, in their personal capacities as
citizens, lawyers and taxpayers and on behalf of their minor children; and the Magnificat Child Leaming Center, Inc., a domestic, privately-
owned educational institution (Jmbong);
(2) Petition for Prohibition,6 filed by the Alliance for the Family Foundation Philippines, Inc., through its president, Atty. Maria Concepcion S.
Noche7 and several others8 in their personal capacities as citizens and on behalf of the generations unborn (ALFI);
(3) Petition for Certiorari,9 filed by the Task Force for Family and Life Visayas, Inc., and Valeriano S. Avila, in their capacities as citizens and
taxpayers (Task Force Family);
(4) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,10 filed by Serve Life Cagayan De Oro City, Inc.,11 Rosevale Foundation, Inc.,12 a domestic,
privately-owned educational institution, and several others,13 in their capacities as citizens (Serve Life);
(5) Petition,14 filed by Expedito A. Bugarin, Jr. in his capacity as a citizen (Bugarin);
(6) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,15 filed by Eduardo Olaguer and the Catholic Xybrspace Apostolate of the Philippines,16 in their
capacities as a citizens and taxpayers (Olaguer);
(7) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,17 filed by the Philippine Alliance of Xseminarians Inc.,18 and several others19 in their capacities as
citizens and taxpayers (PAX);
(8) Petition,20 filed by Reynaldo J. Echavez, M.D. and several others,21 in their capacities as citizens and taxpayers (Echavez);
(9) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,22 filed by spouses Francisco and Maria Fenny C. Tatad and Atty. Alan F. Paguia, in their capacities as
citizens, taxpayers and on behalf of those yet unborn. Atty. Alan F. Paguia is also proceeding in his capacity as a member of the Bar (Tatad);
(10) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,23 filed by Pro-Life Philippines Foundation Inc.24 and several others,25 in their capacities as
citizens and taxpayers and on behalf of its associates who are members of the Bar (Pro-Life);
(11) Petition for Prohibition,26 filed by Millennium Saint Foundation, Inc.,27 Attys. Ramon Pedrosa, Cita Borromeo-Garcia, Stella Acedera,
and Berteni Catalufia Causing, in their capacities as citizens, taxpayers and members of the Bar (MSF);
(12) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,28 filed by John Walter B. Juat and several others,29 in their capacities as citizens (Juat) ;
(13) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,30 filed by Couples for Christ Foundation, Inc. and several others,31 in their capacities as citizens
(CFC);
(14) Petition for Prohibition32 filed by Almarim Centi Tillah and Abdulhussein M. Kashim in their capacities as citizens and taxpayers (Tillah);
and
(15) Petition-In-Intervention,33 filed by Atty. Samson S. Alcantara in his capacity as a citizen and a taxpayer (Alcantara); and
 (16) Petition-In-Intervention,34 filed by Buhay Hayaang Yumabong (B UHAY) , an accredited political party.
A perusal of the foregoing petitions shows that the petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of RH Law on the following GROUNDS:
• The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn. According to the petitioners, notwithstanding its declared policy against abortion, the
implementation of the RH Law would authorize the purchase of hormonal contraceptives, intra-uterine devices and injectables which are
abortives, in violation of Section 12, Article II of the Constitution which guarantees protection of both the life of the mother and the life of the
unborn from conception.35
• The RH Law violates the right to health and the right to protection against hazardous products. The petitioners posit that the RH Law provides
universal access to contraceptives which are hazardous to one's health, as it causes cancer and other health problems.36
• The RH Law violates the right to religious freedom. The petitioners contend that the RH Law violates the constitutional guarantee respecting
religion as it authorizes the use of public funds for the procurement of contraceptives. For the petitioners, the use of public funds for purposes
that are believed to be contrary to their beliefs is included in the constitutional mandate ensuring religious freedom.37
It is also contended that the RH Law threatens conscientious objectors of criminal prosecution, imprisonment and other forms of punishment, as it compels
medical practitioners 1] to refer patients who seek advice on reproductive health programs to other doctors; and 2] to provide full and correct information
on reproductive health programs and service, although it is against their religious beliefs and convictions.38
In this connection, Section 5 .23 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the RH Law (RH-IRR),39 provides that skilled health professionals who
are public officers such as, but not limited to, Provincial, City, or Municipal Health Officers, medical officers, medical specialists, rural health physicians,
hospital staff nurses, public health nurses, or rural health midwives, who are specifically charged with the duty to implement these Rules, cannot be
considered as conscientious objectors.40
It is also argued that the RH Law providing for the formulation of mandatory sex education in schools should not be allowed as it is an affront to their
religious beliefs.41
While the petit10ners recognize that the guarantee of religious freedom is not absolute, they argue that the RH Law fails to satisfy the "clear and present
danger test" and the "compelling state interest test" to justify the regulation of the right to free exercise of religion and the right to free speech.42
• The RH Law violates the constitutional provision on involuntary servitude. According to the petitioners, the RH Law subjects medical
practitioners to involuntary servitude because, to be accredited under the PhilHealth program, they are compelled to provide forty-eight (48)
hours of pro bona services for indigent women, under threat of criminal prosecution, imprisonment and other forms of punishment.43
The petitioners explain that since a majority of patients are covered by PhilHealth, a medical practitioner would effectively be forced to render
reproductive health services since the lack of PhilHealth accreditation would mean that the majority of the public would no longer be able to avail of the
practitioners services.44
• The RH Law violates the right to equal protection of the law. It is claimed that the RH Law discriminates against the poor as it makes them the
primary target of the government program that promotes contraceptive use. The petitioners argue that, rather than promoting reproductive health
among the poor, the RH Law seeks to introduce contraceptives that would effectively reduce the number of the poor.45
• The RH Law is "void-for-vagueness" in violation of the due process clause of the Constitution. In imposing the penalty of imprisonment
and/or fine for "any violation," it is vague because it does not define the type of conduct to be treated as "violation" of the RH Law.46
In this connection, it is claimed that "Section 7 of the RH Law violates the right to due process by removing from them (the people) the right to manage
their own affairs and to decide what kind of health facility they shall be and what kind of services they shall offer." 47 It ignores the management
prerogative inherent in corporations for employers to conduct their affairs in accordance with their own discretion and judgment.
• The RH Law violates the right to free speech. To compel a person to explain a full range of family planning methods is plainly to curtail his
right to expound only his own preferred way of family planning. The petitioners note that although exemption is granted to institutions owned
and operated by religious groups, they are still forced to refer their patients to another healthcare facility willing to perform the service or
procedure.48
• The RH Law intrudes into the zone of privacy of one's family protected by the Constitution. It is contended that the RH Law providing for
mandatory reproductive health education intrudes upon their constitutional right to raise their children in accordance with their beliefs.49
It is claimed that, by giving absolute authority to the person who will undergo reproductive health procedure, the RH Law forsakes any real dialogue
between the spouses and impedes the right of spouses to mutually decide on matters pertaining to the overall well-being of their family. In the same breath,
it is also claimed that the parents of a child who has suffered a miscarriage are deprived of parental authority to determine whether their child should use
contraceptives.50
• The RH Law violates the constitutional principle of non-delegation of legislative authority. The petitioners question the delegation by
Congress to the FDA of the power to determine whether a product is non-abortifacient and to be included in the Emergency Drugs List
(EDL).51
• The RH Law violates the one subject/one bill rule provision under Section 26( 1 ), Article VI of the Constitution.52
• The RH Law violates Natural Law.53
• The RH Law violates the principle of Autonomy of Local Government Units (LGUs) and the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao
{ARMM). It is contended that the RH Law, providing for reproductive health measures at the local government level and the ARMM, infringes
upon the powers devolved to LGUs and the ARMM under the Local Government Code and R.A . No. 9054.54
Various parties also sought and were granted leave to file their respective comments-in-intervention in defense of the constitutionality of the RH Law.
Aside from the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) which commented on the petitions in behalf of the respondents,55 Congressman Edcel C. Lagman,56
former officials of the Department of Health Dr. Esperanza I. Cabral, Jamie Galvez-Tan, and Dr. Alberto G. Romualdez,57 the Filipino Catholic Voices for
Reproductive Health (C4RH),58 Ana Theresa "Risa" Hontiveros,59 and Atty. Joan De Venecia60 also filed their respective Comments-in-Intervention in
conjunction with several others. On June 4, 2013, Senator Pia Juliana S. Cayetano was also granted leave to intervene.61
The respondents, aside from traversing the substantive arguments of the petitioners, pray for the dismissal of the petitions for the principal reasons that 1]
there is no actual case or controversy and, therefore, the issues are not yet ripe for judicial determination.; 2] some petitioners lack standing to question the
RH Law; and 3] the petitions are essentially petitions for declaratory relief over which the Court has no original jurisdiction.
Meanwhile, on March 15, 2013, the RH-IRR for the enforcement of the assailed legislation took effect.
On March 19, 2013, after considering the issues and arguments raised, the Court issued the Status Quo Ante Order (SQAO), enjoining the effects and
implementation of the assailed legislation for a period of one hundred and twenty (120) days, or until July 17, 2013.62
On May 30, 2013, the Court held a preliminary conference with the counsels of the parties to determine and/or identify the pertinent issues raised by the
parties and the sequence by which these issues were to be discussed in the oral arguments. On July 9 and 23, 2013, and on August 6, 13, and 27, 2013, the
cases were heard on oral argument. On July 16, 2013, the SQAO was ordered extended until further orders of the Court.63
Thereafter, the Court directed the parties to submit their respective memoranda within sixty (60) days and, at the same time posed several questions for
their clarification on some contentions of the parties.64
The Status Quo Ante
(Population, Contraceptive and Reproductive Health Laws
Prior to the RH Law
Long before the incipience of the RH Law, the country has allowed the sale, dispensation and distribution of contraceptive drugs and devices. As far back
as June 18, 1966, the country enacted R.A. No. 4729 entitled "An Act to Regu,late the Sale, Dispensation, and/or Distribution of Contraceptive Drugs and
Devices." Although contraceptive drugs and devices were allowed, they could not be sold, dispensed or distributed "unless such sale, dispensation and
distribution is by a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and with the prescription of a qualified medical practitioner."65
In addition, R.A. No. 5921,66 approved on June 21, 1969, contained provisions relative to "dispensing of abortifacients or anti-conceptional substances and
devices." Under Section 37 thereof, it was provided that "no drug or chemical product or device capable of provoking abortion or preventing conception as
classified by the Food and Drug Administration shall be delivered or sold to any person without a proper prescription by a duly licensed physician."
On December 11, 1967, the Philippines, adhering to the UN Declaration on Population, which recognized that the population problem should be considered
as the principal element for long-term economic development, enacted measures that promoted male vasectomy and tubal ligation to mitigate population
growth.67 Among these measures included R.A. No. 6365, approved on August 16, 1971, entitled "An Act Establishing a National Policy on Population,
Creating the Commission on Population and for Other Purposes. " The law envisioned that "family planning will be made part of a broad educational
program; safe and effective means will be provided to couples desiring to space or limit family size; mortality and morbidity rates will be further reduced."
To further strengthen R.A. No. 6365, then President Ferdinand E . Marcos issued Presidential Decree. (P.D.) No. 79, 68 dated December 8, 1972, which,
among others, made "family planning a part of a broad educational program," provided "family planning services as a part of over-all health care," and
made "available all acceptable methods of contraception, except abortion, to all Filipino citizens desirous of spacing, limiting or preventing pregnancies."
Through the years, however, the use of contraceptives and family planning methods evolved from being a component of demographic management, to one
centered on the promotion of public health, particularly, reproductive health.69 Under that policy, the country gave priority to one's right to freely choose
the method of family planning to be adopted, in conformity with its adherence to the commitments made in the International Conference on Population and
Development.70 Thus, on August 14, 2009, the country enacted R.A. No. 9710 or "The Magna Carta for Women, " which, among others, mandated the
State to provide for comprehensive health services and programs for women, including family planning and sex education.71
The RH Law
Despite the foregoing legislative measures, the population of the country kept on galloping at an uncontrollable pace. From a paltry number of just over 27
million Filipinos in 1960, the population of the country reached over 76 million in the year 2000 and over 92 million in 2010. 72 The executive and the
legislative, thus, felt that the measures were still not adequate. To rein in the problem, the RH Law was enacted to provide Filipinos, especially the poor
and the marginalized, access and information to the full range of modem family planning methods, and to ensure that its objective to provide for the
peoples' right to reproductive health be achieved. To make it more effective, the RH Law made it mandatory for health providers to provide information on
the full range of modem family planning methods, supplies and services, and for schools to provide reproductive health education. To put teeth to it, the
RH Law criminalizes certain acts of refusals to carry out its mandates.
Stated differently, the RH Law is an enhancement measure to fortify and make effective the current laws on contraception, women's health and population
control.
Prayer of the Petitioners - Maintain the Status Quo
The petitioners are one in praying that the entire RH Law be declared unconstitutional. Petitioner ALFI, in particular, argues that the government sponsored
contraception program, the very essence of the RH Law, violates the right to health of women and the sanctity of life, which the State is mandated to
protect and promote. Thus, ALFI prays that "the status quo ante - the situation prior to the passage of the RH Law - must be maintained."73 It explains:
x x x. The instant Petition does not question contraception and contraceptives per se. As provided under Republic Act No. 5921 and Republic Act No.
4729, the sale and distribution of contraceptives are prohibited unless dispensed by a prescription duly licensed by a physician. What the Petitioners find
deplorable and repugnant under the RH Law is the role that the State and its agencies - the entire bureaucracy, from the cabinet secretaries down to the
barangay officials in the remotest areas of the country - is made to play in the implementation of the contraception program to the fullest extent possible
using taxpayers' money. The State then will be the funder and provider of all forms of family planning methods and the implementer of the program by
ensuring the widespread dissemination of, and universal access to, a full range of family planning methods, devices and supplies.74
ISSUES
After a scrutiny of the various arguments and contentions of the parties, the Court has synthesized and refined them to the following principal issues:
I. PROCEDURAL: Whether the Court may exercise its power of judicial review over the controversy.
1] Power of Judicial Review
 2] Actual Case or Controversy
3] Facial Challenge
4] Locus Standi
5] Declaratory Relief
6] One Subject/One Title Rule
II. SUBSTANTIVE: Whether the RH law is unconstitutional:
1] Right to Life
2] Right to Health
3] Freedom of Religion and the Right to Free Speech
4] The Family
5] Freedom of Expression and Academic Freedom
6] Due Process
7] Equal Protection
8] Involuntary Servitude
9] Delegation of Authority to the FDA
10] Autonomy of Local Govemments/ARMM
DISCUSSION
Before delving into the constitutionality of the RH Law and its implementing rules, it behooves the Court to resolve some procedural impediments.
I. PROCEDURAL ISSUE: Whether the Court can exercise its power of judicial review over the controversy.
The Power of Judicial Review
In its attempt to persuade the Court to stay its judicial hand, the OSG asserts that it should submit to the legislative and political wisdom of Congress and
respect the compromises made in the crafting of the RH Law, it being "a product of a majoritarian democratic process" 75 and "characterized by an
inordinate amount of transparency."76 The OSG posits that the authority of the Court to review social legislation like the RH Law by certiorari is "weak,"
since the Constitution vests the discretion to implement the constitutional policies and positive norms with the political departments, in particular, with
Congress.77 It further asserts that in view of the Court's ruling in Southern Hemisphere v. Anti-Terrorism Council, 78 the remedies of certiorari and
prohibition utilized by the petitioners are improper to assail the validity of the acts of the legislature.79
Moreover, the OSG submits that as an "as applied challenge," it cannot prosper considering that the assailed law has yet to be enforced and applied to the
petitioners, and that the government has yet to distribute reproductive health devices that are abortive. It claims that the RH Law cannot be challenged "on
its face" as it is not a speech-regulating measure.80
In many cases involving the determination of the constitutionality of the actions of the Executive and the Legislature, it is often sought that the Court
temper its exercise of judicial power and accord due respect to the wisdom of its co-equal branch on the basis of the principle of separation of powers. To
be clear, the separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government, which obtains not through express provision but by actual
division in our Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction and is supreme within its own
sphere.81
Thus, the 1987 Constitution provides that: (a) the legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines;82 (b) the executive power shall be
vested in the President of the Philippines;83 and (c) the judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established
by law.84 The Constitution has truly blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines, the allotment of powers among the three branches of government.85
In its relationship with its co-equals, the Judiciary recognizes the doctrine of separation of powers which imposes upon the courts proper restraint, born of
the nature of their functions and of their respect for the other branches of government, in striking down the acts of the Executive or the Legislature as
unconstitutional. Verily, the policy is a harmonious blend of courtesy and caution.86
It has also long been observed, however, that in times of social disquietude or political instability, the great landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be
forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated.87 In order to address this, the Constitution impresses upon the Court to respect the acts performed by a co-
equal branch done within its sphere of competence and authority, but at the same time, allows it to cross the line of separation - but only at a very limited
and specific point - to determine whether the acts of the executive and the legislative branches are null because they were undertaken with grave abuse of
discretion.88 Thus, while the Court may not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of the RH Law, it may do so where an attendant
unconstitutionality or grave abuse of discretion results.89 The Court must demonstrate its unflinching commitment to protect those cherished rights and
principles embodied in the Constitution.
In this connection, it bears adding that while the scope of judicial power of review may be limited, the Constitution makes no distinction as to the kind of
legislation that may be subject to judicial scrutiny, be it in the form of social legislation or otherwise. The reason is simple and goes back to the earlier
point. The Court may pass upon the constitutionality of acts of the legislative and the executive branches, since its duty is not to review their collective
wisdom but, rather, to make sure that they have acted in consonance with their respective authorities and rights as mandated of them by the Constitution. If
after said review, the Court finds no constitutional violations of any sort, then, it has no more authority of proscribing the actions under review.90 This is in
line with Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution which expressly provides:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality
of the Government. [Emphases supplied]
As far back as Tanada v. Angara,91 the Court has unequivocally declared that certiorari, prohibition and mandamus are appropriate remedies to raise
constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit/nullify, when proper, acts of legislative and executive officials, as there is no other plain, speedy or
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. This ruling was later on applied in Macalintal v. COMELEC,92 Aldaba v. COMELEC,93 Magallona v.
Ermita,94 and countless others. In Tanada, the Court wrote:
In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravenes the Constitution, the petition no doubt raises a justiciable controversy.
Where an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the
judiciary to settle the dispute. "The question thus posed is judicial rather than political. The duty (to adjudicate) remains to assure that the supremacy of the
Constitution is upheld. " Once a "controversy as to the application or interpretation of constitutional provision is raised before this Court (as in the instant
case), it becomes a legal issue which the Court is bound by constitutional mandate to decide. [Emphasis supplied]
In the scholarly estimation of former Supreme Court Justice Florentino Feliciano, "judicial review is essential for the maintenance and enforcement of the
separation of powers and the balancing of powers among the three great departments of government through the definition and maintenance of the
boundaries of authority and control between them. To him, judicial review is the chief, indeed the only, medium of participation - or instrument of
intervention - of the judiciary in that balancing operation.95
Lest it be misunderstood, it bears emphasizing that the Court does not have the unbridled authority to rule on just any and every claim of constitutional
violation. Jurisprudence is replete with the rule that the power of judicial review is limited by four exacting requisites, viz : (a) there must be an actual case
or controversy; (b) the petitioners must possess locus standi; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue
of constitutionality must be the lis mota of the case.96
Actual Case or Controversy
Proponents of the RH Law submit that the subj ect petitions do not present any actual case or controversy because the RH Law has yet to be
implemented.97 They claim that the questions raised by the petitions are not yet concrete and ripe for adjudication since no one has been charged with
violating any of its provisions and that there is no showing that any of the petitioners' rights has been adversely affected by its operation. 98 In short, it is
contended that judicial review of the RH Law is premature.
An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the
decision of the court would amount to an advisory opinion.99 The rule is that courts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly
interest, however intellectually challenging. The controversy must be justiciable-definite and concrete, touching on the legal relations of parties having
adverse legal interests. In other words, the pleadings must show an active antagonistic assertion of a legal right, on the one hand, and a denial thereof, on
the other; that is, it must concern a real, tangible and not merely a theoretical question or issue. There ought to be an actual and substantial controversy
admitting of specific relief through a decree conclusive in nature, as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical
state of facts.100
Corollary to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of ripeness. 101 A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being
challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. For a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, it is a prerequisite that
something has then been accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may come into the picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence
of an immediate or threatened injury to himself as a result of the challenged action. He must show that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of
sustaining some direct injury as a result of the act complained of102
In The Province of North Cotabato v. The Government of the Republic of the Philippines,103 where the constitutionality of an unimplemented
Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) was put in question, it was argued that the Court has no authority to pass upon the issues
raised as there was yet no concrete act performed that could possibly violate the petitioners' and the intervenors' rights. Citing precedents, the Court ruled
that the fact of the law or act in question being not yet effective does not negate ripeness. Concrete acts under a law are not necessary to render the
controversy ripe. Even a singular violation of the Constitution and/or the law is enough to awaken judicial duty.
In this case, the Court is of the view that an actual case or controversy exists and that the same is ripe for judicial determination. Considering that the RH
Law and its implementing rules have already taken effect and that budgetary measures to carry out the law have already been passed, it is evident that the
subject petitions present a justiciable controversy. As stated earlier, when an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the
Constitution, it not only becomes a right, but also a duty of the Judiciary to settle the dispute.104
Moreover, the petitioners have shown that the case is so because medical practitioners or medical providers are in danger of being criminally prosecuted
under the RH Law for vague violations thereof, particularly public health officers who are threatened to be dismissed from the service with forfeiture of
retirement and other benefits. They must, at least, be heard on the matter NOW.
Facial Challenge
The OSG also assails the propriety of the facial challenge lodged by the subject petitions, contending that the RH Law cannot be challenged "on its face" as
it is not a speech regulating measure.105
The Court is not persuaded.
In United States (US) constitutional law, a facial challenge, also known as a First Amendment Challenge, is one that is launched to assail the validity of
statutes concerning not only protected speech, but also all other rights in the First Amendment.106 These include religious freedom, freedom of the press,
and the right of the people to peaceably assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. 107 After all, the fundamental right to
religious freedom, freedom of the press and peaceful assembly are but component rights of the right to one's freedom of expression, as they are modes
which one's thoughts are externalized.
In this jurisdiction, the application of doctrines originating from the U.S. has been generally maintained, albeit with some modifications. While this Court
has withheld the application of facial challenges to strictly penal statues,108 it has expanded its scope to cover statutes not only regulating free speech, but
also those involving religious freedom, and other fundamental rights.109 The underlying reason for this modification is simple. For unlike its counterpart
in the U.S., this Court, under its expanded jurisdiction, is mandated by the Fundamental Law not only to settle actual controversies involving rights which
are legally demandable and enforceable, but also to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.110 Verily, the framers of Our Constitution envisioned a proactive Judiciary,
ever vigilant with its duty to maintain the supremacy of the Constitution.
Consequently, considering that the foregoing petitions have seriously alleged that the constitutional human rights to life, speech and religion and other
fundamental rights mentioned above have been violated by the assailed legislation, the Court has authority to take cognizance of these kindred petitions
and to determine if the RH Law can indeed pass constitutional scrutiny. To dismiss these petitions on the simple expedient that there exist no actual case or
controversy, would diminish this Court as a reactive branch of government, acting only when the Fundamental Law has been transgressed, to the detriment
of the Filipino people.
Locus Standi
The OSG also attacks the legal personality of the petitioners to file their respective petitions. It contends that the "as applied challenge" lodged by the
petitioners cannot prosper as the assailed law has yet to be enforced and applied against them,111 and the government has yet to distribute reproductive
health devices that are abortive.112
The petitioners, for their part, invariably invoke the "transcendental importance" doctrine and their status as citizens and taxpayers in establishing the
requisite locus standi.
Locus standi or legal standing is defined as a personal and substantial interest in a case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a
result of the challenged governmental act.113 It requires a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure the concrete adverseness which
sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.114
In relation to locus standi, the "as applied challenge" embodies the rule that one can challenge the constitutionality of a statute only if he asserts a violation
of his own rights. The rule prohibits one from challenging the constitutionality of the statute grounded on a violation of the rights of third persons not
before the court. This rule is also known as the prohibition against third-party standing.115
Transcendental Importance
Notwithstanding, the Court leans on the doctrine that "the rule on standing is a matter of procedure, hence, can be relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs like
ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when the matter is of transcendental importance, of overreaching
significance to society, or of paramount public interest."116
In Coconut Oil Refiners Association, Inc. v. Torres,117 the Court held that in cases of paramount importance where serious constitutional questions are
involved, the standing requirement may be relaxed and a suit may be allowed to prosper even where there is no direct injury to the party claiming the right
of judicial review. In the first Emergency Powers Cases,118 ordinary citizens and taxpayers were allowed to question the constitutionality of several
executive orders although they had only an indirect and general interest shared in common with the public.
With these said, even if the constitutionality of the RH Law may not be assailed through an "as-applied challenge, still, the Court has time and again acted
liberally on the locus s tandi requirement. It has accorded certain individuals standing to sue, not otherwise directly injured or with material interest
affected by a Government act, provided a constitutional issue of transcendental importance is invoked. The rule on locus standi is, after all, a procedural
technicality which the Court has, on more than one occasion, waived or relaxed, thus allowing non-traditional plaintiffs, such as concerned citizens,
taxpayers, voters or legislators, to sue in the public interest, albeit they may not have been directly injured by the operation of a law or any other
government act. As held in Jaworski v. PAGCOR:119
Granting arguendo that the present action cannot be properly treated as a petition for prohibition, the transcendental importance of the issues involved in
this case warrants that we set aside the technical defects and take primary jurisdiction over the petition at bar. One cannot deny that the issues raised herein
have potentially pervasive influence on the social and moral well being of this nation, specially the youth; hence, their proper and just determination is an
imperative need. This is in accordance with the well-entrenched principle that rules of procedure are not inflexible tools designed to hinder or delay, but to
facilitate and promote the administration of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate, rather than
promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed. (Emphasis supplied)
In view of the seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents, not only to the public, but also to the bench and bar, the issues raised must be resolved for the
guidance of all. After all, the RH Law drastically affects the constitutional provisions on the right to life and health, the freedom of religion and expression
and other constitutional rights. Mindful of all these and the fact that the issues of contraception and reproductive health have already caused deep division
among a broad spectrum of society, the Court entertains no doubt that the petitions raise issues of transcendental importance warranting immediate court
adjudication. More importantly, considering that it is the right to life of the mother and the unborn which is primarily at issue, the Court need not wait for a
life to be taken away before taking action.
The Court cannot, and should not, exercise judicial restraint at this time when rights enshrined in the Constitution are being imperilled to be violated. To do
so, when the life of either the mother or her child is at stake, would lead to irreparable consequences.
Declaratory Relief
The respondents also assail the petitions because they are essentially petitions for declaratory relief over which the Court has no original jurisdiction. 120
Suffice it to state that most of the petitions are praying for injunctive reliefs and so the Court would just consider them as petitions for prohibition under
Rule 65, over which it has original jurisdiction. Where the case has far-reaching implications and prays for injunctive reliefs, the Court may consider them
as petitions for prohibition under Rule 65.121
One Subject-One Title
The petitioners also question the constitutionality of the RH Law, claiming that it violates Section 26(1 ), Article VI of the Constitution, 122 prescribing the
one subject-one title rule. According to them, being one for reproductive health with responsible parenthood, the assailed legislation violates the
constitutional standards of due process by concealing its true intent - to act as a population control measure.123
To belittle the challenge, the respondents insist that the RH Law is not a birth or population control measure,124 and that the concepts of "responsible
parenthood" and "reproductive health" are both interrelated as they are inseparable.125
Despite efforts to push the RH Law as a reproductive health law, the Court sees it as principally a population control measure. The corpus of the RH Law is
geared towards the reduction of the country's population. While it claims to save lives and keep our women and children healthy, it also promotes
pregnancy-preventing products. As stated earlier, the RH Law emphasizes the need to provide Filipinos, especially the poor and the marginalized, with
access to information on the full range of modem family planning products and methods. These family planning methods, natural or modem, however, are
clearly geared towards the prevention of pregnancy.
For said reason, the manifest underlying objective of the RH Law is to reduce the number of births in the country.
It cannot be denied that the measure also seeks to provide pre-natal and post-natal care as well. A large portion of the law, however, covers the
dissemination of information and provisions on access to medically-safe, non-abortifacient, effective, legal, affordable, and quality reproductive health care
services, methods, devices, and supplies, which are all intended to prevent pregnancy.
The Court, thus, agrees with the petitioners' contention that the whole idea of contraception pervades the entire RH Law. It is, in fact, the central idea of the
RH Law.126 Indeed, remove the provisions that refer to contraception or are related to it and the RH Law loses its very foundation. 127 As earlier
explained, "the other positive provisions such as skilled birth attendance, maternal care including pre-and post-natal services, prevention and management
of reproductive tract infections including HIV/AIDS are already provided for in the Magna Carta for Women."128
Be that as it may, the RH Law does not violate the one subject/one bill rule. In Benjamin E. Cawaling, Jr. v. The Commission on Elections and Rep. Francis
Joseph G Escudero, it was written:
It is well-settled that the "one title-one subject" rule does not require the Congress to employ in the title of the enactment language of such precision as to
mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein. The rule is sufficiently complied with if the title is comprehensive enough as
to include the general object which the statute seeks to effect, and where, as here, the persons interested are informed of the nature, scope and
consequences of the proposed law and its operation. Moreover, this Court has invariably adopted a liberal rather than technical construction of the rule "so
as not to cripple or impede legislation." [Emphases supplied]
In this case, a textual analysis of the various provisions of the law shows that both "reproductive health" and "responsible parenthood" are interrelated and
germane to the overriding objective to control the population growth. As expressed in the first paragraph of Section 2 of the RH Law:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. - The State recognizes and guarantees the human rights of all persons including their right to equality and nondiscrimination
of these rights, the right to sustainable human development, the right to health which includes reproductive health, the right to education and information,
and the right to choose and make decisions for themselves in accordance with their religious convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs, and the demands of
responsible parenthood.
The one subject/one title rule expresses the principle that the title of a law must not be "so uncertain that the average person reading it would not be
informed of the purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents, or which is misleading, either in referring to or indicating one subject where
another or different one is really embraced in the act, or in omitting any expression or indication of the real subject or scope of the act."129
Considering the close intimacy between "reproductive health" and "responsible parenthood" which bears to the attainment of the goal of achieving
"sustainable human development" as stated under its terms, the Court finds no reason to believe that Congress intentionally sought to deceive the public as
to the contents of the assailed legislation.
II - SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES:
1-The Right to Life
Position of the Petitioners
The petitioners assail the RH Law because it violates the right to life and health of the unborn child under Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. The
assailed legislation allowing access to abortifacients/abortives effectively sanctions abortion.130
According to the petitioners, despite its express terms prohibiting abortion, Section 4(a) of the RH Law considers contraceptives that prevent the fertilized
ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb as an abortifacient; thus, sanctioning contraceptives that take effect after fertilization and prior to
implantation, contrary to the intent of the Framers of the Constitution to afford protection to the fertilized ovum which already has life.
They argue that even if Section 9 of the RH Law allows only "non-abortifacient" hormonal contraceptives, intrauterine devices, injectables and other safe,
legal, non-abortifacient and effective family planning products and supplies, medical research shows that contraceptives use results in abortion as they
operate to kill the fertilized ovum which already has life.131
As it opposes the initiation of life, which is a fundamental human good, the petitioners assert that the State sanction of contraceptive use contravenes
natural law and is an affront to the dignity of man.132
Finally, it is contended that since Section 9 of the RH Law requires the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to certify that the product or supply is not to
be used as an abortifacient, the assailed legislation effectively confirms that abortifacients are not prohibited. Also considering that the FDA is not the
agency that will actually supervise or administer the use of these products and supplies to prospective patients, there is no way it can truthfully make a
certification that it shall not be used for abortifacient purposes.133
Position of the Respondents
For their part, the defenders of the RH Law point out that the intent of the Framers of the Constitution was simply the prohibition of abortion. They
contend that the RH Law does not violate the Constitution since the said law emphasizes that only "non-abortifacient" reproductive health care services,
methods, devices products and supplies shall be made accessible to the public.134
According to the OSG, Congress has made a legislative determination that contraceptives are not abortifacients by enacting the RH Law. As the RH Law
was enacted with due consideration to various studies and consultations with the World Health Organization (WHO) and other experts in the medical field,
it is asserted that the Court afford deference and respect to such a determination and pass judgment only when a particular drug or device is later on
determined as an abortive.135
For his part, respondent Lagman argues that the constitutional protection of one's right to life is not violated considering that various studies of the WHO
show that life begins from the implantation of the fertilized ovum. Consequently, he argues that the RH Law is constitutional since the law specifically
provides that only contraceptives that do not prevent the implantation of the fertilized ovum are allowed.136
The Court's Position
It is a universally accepted principle that every human being enjoys the right to life.137
Even if not formally established, the right to life, being grounded on natural law, is inherent and, therefore, not a creation of, or dependent upon a particular
law, custom, or belief. It precedes and transcends any authority or the laws of men.
In this jurisdiction, the right to life is given more than ample protection. Section 1, Article III of the Constitution provides:
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the
laws.
As expounded earlier, the use of contraceptives and family planning methods in the Philippines is not of recent vintage. From the enactment of R.A. No.
4729, entitled "An Act To Regulate The Sale, Dispensation, and/or Distribution of Contraceptive Drugs and Devices "on June 18, 1966, prescribing rules
on contraceptive drugs and devices which prevent fertilization,138 to the promotion of male vasectomy and tubal ligation,139 and the ratification of
numerous international agreements, the country has long recognized the need to promote population control through the use of contraceptives in order to
achieve long-term economic development. Through the years, however, the use of contraceptives and other family planning methods evolved from being a
component of demographic management, to one centered on the promotion of public health, particularly, reproductive health.140
This has resulted in the enactment of various measures promoting women's rights and health and the overall promotion of the family's well-being. Thus,
aside from R.A. No. 4729, R.A. No. 6365 or "The Population Act of the Philippines" and R.A. No. 9710, otherwise known as the "The Magna Carta of
Women" were legislated. Notwithstanding this paradigm shift, the Philippine national population program has always been grounded two cornerstone
principles: "principle of no-abortion" and the "principle of non-coercion."141 As will be discussed later, these principles are not merely grounded on
administrative policy, but rather, originates from the constitutional protection expressly provided to afford protection to life and guarantee religious
freedom.
When Life Begins*
Majority of the Members of the Court are of the position that the question of when life begins is a scientific and medical issue that should not be decided,
at this stage, without proper hearing and evidence. During the deliberation, however, it was agreed upon that the individual members of the Court could
express their own views on this matter.
In this regard, the ponente, is of the strong view that life begins at fertilization.
In answering the question of when life begins, focus should be made on the particular phrase of Section 12 which reads:
Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall
equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception. The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the
youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government.
Textually, the Constitution affords protection to the unborn from conception. This is undisputable because before conception, there is no unborn to speak
of. For said reason, it is no surprise that the Constitution is mute as to any proscription prior to conception or when life begins. The problem has arisen
because, amazingly, there are quarters who have conveniently disregarded the scientific fact that conception is reckoned from fertilization. They are waving
the view that life begins at implantation. Hence, the issue of when life begins.
In a nutshell, those opposing the RH Law contend that conception is synonymous with "fertilization" of the female ovum by the male sperm. 142 On the
other side of the spectrum are those who assert that conception refers to the "implantation" of the fertilized ovum in the uterus.143
Plain and Legal Meaning
It is a canon in statutory construction that the words of the Constitution should be interpreted in their plain and ordinary meaning. As held in the recent case
of Chavez v. Judicial Bar Council:144
One of the primary and basic rules in statutory construction is that where the words of a statute are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given
its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. It is a well-settled principle of constitutional construction that the language employed in
the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed. As much as possible, the words of the Constitution
should be understood in the sense they have in common use. What it says according to the text of the provision to be construed compels acceptance and
negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and the people mean what they say. Verba legis non est recedendum -
from the words of a statute there should be no departure.
The raison d' etre for the rule is essentially two-fold: First, because it is assumed that the words in which constitutional provisions are couched express the
objective sought to be attained; and second, because the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer's document but essentially that of the people, in whose
consciousness it should ever be present as an important condition for the rule of law to prevail.
In conformity with the above principle, the traditional meaning of the word "conception" which, as described and defined by all reliable and reputable
sources, means that life begins at fertilization.
Webster's Third New International Dictionary describes it as the act of becoming pregnant, formation of a viable zygote; the fertilization that results in a
new entity capable of developing into a being like its parents.145
Black's Law Dictionary gives legal meaning to the term "conception" as the fecundation of the female ovum by the male spermatozoon resulting in human
life capable of survival and maturation under normal conditions.146
Even in jurisprudence, an unborn child has already a legal personality. In Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation v. Hon. Accredited Voluntary
Arbitrator Allan S. Montano,147 it was written:
Life is not synonymous with civil personality. One need not acquire civil personality first before he/she could die. Even a child inside the womb already
has life. No less than the Constitution recognizes the life of the unborn from conception, that the State must protect equally with the life of the mother. If
the unborn already has life, then the cessation thereof even prior to the child being delivered, qualifies as death. [Emphases in the original]
In Gonzales v. Carhart,148 Justice Anthony Kennedy, writing for the US Supreme Court, said that the State "has respect for human life at all stages in the
pregnancy" and "a legitimate and substantial interest in preserving and promoting fetal life." Invariably, in the decision, the fetus was referred to, or cited,
as a baby or a child.149
Intent of the Framers
Records of the Constitutional Convention also shed light on the intention of the Framers regarding the term "conception" used in Section 12, Article II of
the Constitution. From their deliberations, it clearly refers to the moment of "fertilization." The records reflect the following:
Rev. Rigos: In Section 9, page 3, there is a sentence which reads:
"The State shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from the moment of conception."
When is the moment of conception?
xxx
Mr. Villegas: As I explained in the sponsorship speech, it is when the ovum is fertilized by the sperm that there is human life. x x x.150
xxx
As to why conception is reckoned from fertilization and, as such, the beginning of human life, it was explained:
Mr. Villegas: I propose to review this issue in a biological manner. The first question that needs to be answered is: Is the fertilized ovum alive? Biologically
categorically says yes, the fertilized ovum is alive. First of all, like all living organisms, it takes in nutrients which it processes by itself. It begins doing this
upon fertilization. Secondly, as it takes in these nutrients, it grows from within. Thirdly, it multiplies itself at a geometric rate in the continuous process of
cell division. All these processes are vital signs of life. Therefore, there is no question that biologically the fertilized ovum has life.
The second question: Is it human? Genetics gives an equally categorical "yes." At the moment of conception, the nuclei of the ovum and the sperm rupture.
As this happens 23 chromosomes from the ovum combine with 23 chromosomes of the sperm to form a total of 46 chromosomes. A chromosome count of
46 is found only - and I repeat, only in human cells. Therefore, the fertilized ovum is human.
Since these questions have been answered affirmatively, we must conclude that if the fertilized ovum is both alive and human, then, as night follows day, it
must be human life. Its nature is human.151
Why the Constitution used the phrase "from the moment of conception" and not "from the moment of fertilization" was not because of doubt when human
life begins, but rather, because:
Mr. Tingson: x x x x the phrase from the moment of conception" was described by us here before with the scientific phrase "fertilized ovum" may be
beyond the comprehension of some people; we want to use the simpler phrase "from the moment of conception."152
Thus, in order to ensure that the fertilized ovum is given ample protection under the Constitution, it was discussed:
Rev. Rigos: Yes, we think that the word "unborn" is sufficient for the purpose of writing a Constitution, without specifying "from the moment of
conception."
Mr. Davide: I would not subscribe to that particular view because according to the Commissioner's own admission, he would leave it to Congress to define
when life begins. So, Congress can define life to begin from six months after fertilization; and that would really be very, very, dangerous. It is now
determined by science that life begins from the moment of conception. There can be no doubt about it. So we should not give any doubt to Congress,
too.153
Upon further inquiry, it was asked:
Mr. Gascon: Mr. Presiding Officer, I would like to ask a question on that point. Actually, that is one of the questions I was going to raise during the period
of interpellations but it has been expressed already. The provision, as proposed right now states:
The State shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from the moment of conception.
When it speaks of "from the moment of conception," does this mean when the egg meets the sperm?
Mr. Villegas: Yes, the ovum is fertilized by the sperm.
Mr. Gascon: Therefore that does not leave to Congress the right to determine whether certain contraceptives that we know today are abortifacient or not
because it is a fact that some of the so-called contraceptives deter the rooting of the ovum in the uterus. If fertilization has already occurred, the next
process is for the fertilized ovum to travel towards the uterus and to take root. What happens with some contraceptives is that they stop the opportunity for
the fertilized ovum to reach the uterus. Therefore, if we take the provision as it is proposed, these so called contraceptives should be banned.
Mr. Villegas: Yes, if that physical fact is established, then that is what is called abortifacient and, therefore, would be unconstitutional and should be banned
under this provision.
Mr. Gascon: Yes. So my point is that I do not think it is up to Congress to state whether or not these certain contraceptives are abortifacient. Scientifically
and based on the provision as it is now proposed, they are already considered abortifacient.154
From the deliberations above-quoted, it is apparent that the Framers of the Constitution emphasized that the State shall provide equal protection to both the
mother and the unborn child from the earliest opportunity of life, that is, upon fertilization or upon the union of the male sperm and the female ovum. It is
also apparent is that the Framers of the Constitution intended that to prohibit Congress from enacting measures that would allow it determine when life
begins.
Equally apparent, however, is that the Framers of the Constitution did not intend to ban all contraceptives for being unconstitutional. In fact, Commissioner
Bernardo Villegas, spearheading the need to have a constitutional provision on the right to life, recognized that the determination of whether a
contraceptive device is an abortifacient is a question of fact which should be left to the courts to decide on based on established evidence.155
From the discussions above, contraceptives that kill or destroy the fertilized ovum should be deemed an abortive and thus prohibited. Conversely,
contraceptives that actually prevent the union of the male sperm and the female ovum, and those that similarly take action prior to fertilization should be
deemed non-abortive, and thus, constitutionally permissible.
As emphasized by the Framers of the Constitution:
xxx xxx xxx
Mr. Gascon: xx xx. As I mentioned in my speech on the US bases, I am pro-life, to the point that I would like not only to protect the life of the unborn, but
also the lives of the millions of people in the world by fighting for a nuclear-free world. I would just like to be assured of the legal and pragmatic
implications of the term "protection of the life of the unborn from the moment of conception." I raised some of these implications this afternoon when I
interjected in the interpellation of Commissioner Regalado. I would like to ask that question again for a categorical answer.
I mentioned that if we institutionalize the term "the life of the unborn from the moment of conception" we are also actually saying "no," not "maybe," to
certain contraceptives which are already being encouraged at this point in time. Is that the sense of the committee or does it disagree with me?
Mr. Azcuna: No, Mr. Presiding Officer, because contraceptives would be preventive. There is no unborn yet. That is yet unshaped.
Mr. Gascon: Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer, but I was speaking more about some contraceptives, such as the intra-uterine device which actually stops the egg
which has already been fertilized from taking route to the uterus. So if we say "from the moment of conception," what really occurs is that some of these
contraceptives will have to be unconstitutionalized.
Mr. Azcuna: Yes, to the extent that it is after the fertilization.
Mr. Gascon: Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.156
The fact that not all contraceptives are prohibited by the 1987 Constitution is even admitted by petitioners during the oral arguments. There it was
conceded that tubal ligation, vasectomy, even condoms are not classified as abortifacients.157
Atty. Noche:
Before the union of the eggs, egg and the sperm, there is no life yet.
Justice Bersamin:
There is no life.
Atty. Noche:
So, there is no life to be protected.
Justice Bersamin:
To be protected.
Atty. Noche:
Under Section 12, yes.
Justice Bersamin:
So you have no objection to condoms?
Atty. Noche:
Not under Section 12, Article II.
Justice Bersamin:
Even if there is already information that condoms sometimes have porosity?
Atty. Noche:
Well, yes, Your Honor, there are scientific findings to that effect, Your Honor, but I am discussing here Section 12, Article II, Your Honor, yes.
Justice Bersamin:
Alright.
Atty. Noche:
And it's not, I have to admit it's not an abortifacient, Your Honor.158
Medical Meaning
That conception begins at fertilization is not bereft of medical foundation. Mosby s Medical, Nursing, and Allied Health Dictionary defines conception as
"the beginning of pregnancy usually taken to be the instant a spermatozoon enters an ovum and forms a viable zygote."159
It describes fertilization as "the union of male and female gametes to form a zygote from which the embryo develops."160
The Textbook of Obstetrics (Physiological & Pathological Obstetrics),161 used by medical schools in the Philippines, also concludes that human life
(human person) begins at the moment of fertilization with the union of the egg and the sperm resulting in the formation of a new individual, with a unique
genetic composition that dictates all developmental stages that ensue.
Similarly, recent medical research on the matter also reveals that: "Human development begins after the union of male and female gametes or germ cells
during a process known as fertilization (conception). Fertilization is a sequence of events that begins with the contact of a sperm (spermatozoon) with a
secondary oocyte (ovum) and ends with the fusion of their pronuclei (the haploid nuclei of the sperm and ovum) and the mingling of their chromosomes to
form a new cell. This fertilized ovum, known as a zygote, is a large diploid cell that is the beginning, or primordium, of a human being."162
The authors of Human Embryology & Teratology163 mirror the same position. They wrote: "Although life is a continuous process, fertilization is a critical
landmark because, under ordinary circumstances, a new, genetically distinct human organism is thereby formed.... The combination of 23 chromosomes
present in each pronucleus results in 46 chromosomes in the zygote. Thus the diploid number is restored and the embryonic genome is formed. The embryo
now exists as a genetic unity."
In support of the RH Bill, The Philippine Medical Association came out with a "Paper on the Reproductive Health Bill (Responsible Parenthood Bill)" and
therein concluded that:
CONCLUSION
The PMA throws its full weight in supporting the RH Bill at the same time that PMA maintains its strong position that fertilization is sacred because it is at
this stage that conception, and thus human life, begins. Human lives are sacred from the moment of conception, and that destroying those new lives is
never licit, no matter what the purported good outcome would be. In terms of biology and human embryology, a human being begins immediately at
fertilization and after that, there is no point along the continuous line of human embryogenesis where only a "potential" human being can be posited. Any
philosophical, legal, or political conclusion cannot escape this objective scientific fact.
The scientific evidence supports the conclusion that a zygote is a human organism and that the life of a new human being commences at a scientifically
well defined "moment of conception." This conclusion is objective, consistent with the factual evidence, and independent of any specific ethical, moral,
political, or religious view of human life or of human embryos.164
Conclusion: The Moment of Conception is Reckoned from
Fertilization
In all, whether it be taken from a plain meaning, or understood under medical parlance, and more importantly, following the intention of the Framers of the
Constitution, the undeniable conclusion is that a zygote is a human organism and that the life of a new human being commences at a scientifically well-
defined moment of conception, that is, upon fertilization.
For the above reasons, the Court cannot subscribe to the theory advocated by Hon. Lagman that life begins at implantation. 165 According to him,
"fertilization and conception are two distinct and successive stages in the reproductive process. They are not identical and synonymous." 166 Citing a letter
of the WHO, he wrote that "medical authorities confirm that the implantation of the fertilized ovum is the commencement of conception and it is only after
implantation that pregnancy can be medically detected."167
This theory of implantation as the beginning of life is devoid of any legal or scientific mooring. It does not pertain to the beginning of life but to the
viability of the fetus. The fertilized ovum/zygote is not an inanimate object - it is a living human being complete with DNA and 46 chromosomes. 168
Implantation has been conceptualized only for convenience by those who had population control in mind. To adopt it would constitute textual infidelity not
only to the RH Law but also to the Constitution.
Not surprisingly, even the OSG does not support this position.
If such theory would be accepted, it would unnervingly legitimize the utilization of any drug or device that would prevent the implantation of the fetus at
the uterine wall. It would be provocative and further aggravate religious-based divisiveness.
It would legally permit what the Constitution proscribes - abortion and abortifacients.
The RH Law and Abortion
The clear and unequivocal intent of the Framers of the 1987 Constitution in protecting the life of the unborn from conception was to prevent the
Legislature from enacting a measure legalizing abortion. It was so clear that even the Court cannot interpret it otherwise. This intent of the Framers was
captured in the record of the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission. Commissioner Bernardo Villegas, the principal proponent of the
protection of the unborn from conception, explained:
The intention .. .is to make sure that there would be no pro-abortion laws ever passed by Congress or any pro-abortion decision passed by the Supreme
Court.169
A reading of the RH Law would show that it is in line with this intent and actually proscribes abortion. While the Court has opted not to make any
determination, at this stage, when life begins, it finds that the RH Law itself clearly mandates that protection be afforded from the moment of fertilization.
As pointed out by Justice Carpio, the RH Law is replete with provisions that embody the policy of the law to protect to the fertilized ovum and that it
should be afforded safe travel to the uterus for implantation.170
Moreover, the RH Law recognizes that abortion is a crime under Article 256 of the Revised Penal Code, which penalizes the destruction or expulsion of the
fertilized ovum. Thus:
1] xx x.
Section 4. Definition of Terms. - For the purpose of this Act, the following terms shall be defined as follows:
xxx.
(q) Reproductive health care refers to the access to a full range of methods, facilities, services and supplies that contribute to reproductive health and well-
being by addressing reproductive health-related problems. It also includes sexual health, the purpose of which is the enhancement of life and personal
relations. The elements of reproductive health care include the following:
xxx.
(3) Proscription of abortion and management of abortion complications;
xxx.
2] xx x.
Section 4. x x x.
(s) Reproductive health rights refers to the rights of individuals and couples, to decide freely and responsibly whether or not to have children; the number,
spacing and timing of their children; to make other decisions concerning reproduction, free of discrimination, coercion and violence; to have the
information and means to do so; and to attain the highest standard of sexual health and reproductive health: Provided, however, That reproductive health
rights do not include abortion, and access to abortifacients.
3] xx x.
SEC. 29. Repealing Clause. - Except for prevailing laws against abortion, any law, presidential decree or issuance, executive order, letter of instruction,
administrative order, rule or regulation contrary to or is inconsistent with the provisions of this Act including Republic Act No. 7392, otherwise known as
the Midwifery Act, is hereby repealed, modified or amended accordingly.
The RH Law and Abortifacients
In carrying out its declared policy, the RH Law is consistent in prohibiting abortifacients. To be clear, Section 4(a) of the RH Law defines an abortifacient
as:
Section 4. Definition of Terms - x x x x
(a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that induces abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized
ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb upon determination of the FDA.
As stated above, the RH Law mandates that protection must be afforded from the moment of fertilization. By using the word " or," the RH Law prohibits
not only drugs or devices that prevent implantation, but also those that induce abortion and those that induce the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's
womb. Thus, an abortifacient is any drug or device that either:
(a) Induces abortion; or
(b) Induces the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb; or
(c) Prevents the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb, upon determination of the FDA.
Contrary to the assertions made by the petitioners, the Court finds that the RH Law, consistent with the Constitution, recognizes that the fertilized ovum
already has life and that the State has a bounden duty to protect it. The conclusion becomes clear because the RH Law, first, prohibits any drug or device
that induces abortion (first kind), which, as discussed exhaustively above, refers to that which induces the killing or the destruction of the fertilized ovum,
and, second, prohibits any drug or device the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb (third kind).
By expressly declaring that any drug or device that prevents the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb is an abortifacient (third
kind), the RH Law does not intend to mean at all that life only begins only at implantation, as Hon. Lagman suggests. It also does not declare either that
protection will only be given upon implantation, as the petitioners likewise suggest. Rather, it recognizes that: one, there is a need to protect the fertilized
ovum which already has life, and two, the fertilized ovum must be protected the moment it becomes existent - all the way until it reaches and implants in
the mother's womb. After all, if life is only recognized and afforded protection from the moment the fertilized ovum implants - there is nothing to prevent
any drug or device from killing or destroying the fertilized ovum prior to implantation.
From the foregoing, the Court finds that inasmuch as it affords protection to the fertilized ovum, the RH Law does not sanction abortion. To repeat, it is the
Court's position that life begins at fertilization, not at implantation. When a fertilized ovum is implanted in the uterine wall , its viability is sustained but
that instance of implantation is not the point of beginning of life. It started earlier. And as defined by the RH Law, any drug or device that induces abortion,
that is, which kills or destroys the fertilized ovum or prevents the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb, is an abortifacient.
Proviso Under Section 9 of the RH Law
This notwithstanding, the Court finds that the proviso under Section 9 of the law that "any product or supply included or to be included in the EDL must
have a certification from the FDA that said product and supply is made available on the condition that it is not to be used as an abortifacient" as empty as it
is absurd. The FDA, with all its expertise, cannot fully attest that a drug or device will not all be used as an abortifacient, since the agency cannot be
present in every instance when the contraceptive product or supply will be used.171
Pursuant to its declared policy of providing access only to safe, legal and non-abortifacient contraceptives, however, the Court finds that the proviso of
Section 9, as worded, should bend to the legislative intent and mean that "any product or supply included or to be included in the EDL must have a
certification from the FDA that said product and supply is made available on the condition that it cannot be used as abortifacient." Such a construction is
consistent with the proviso under the second paragraph of the same section that provides:
Provided, further, That the foregoing offices shall not purchase or acquire by any means emergency contraceptive pills, postcoital pills, abortifacients that
will be used for such purpose and their other forms or equivalent.
Abortifacients under the RH-IRR
At this juncture, the Court agrees with ALFI that the authors of the RH-IRR gravely abused their office when they redefined the meaning of abortifacient.
The RH Law defines "abortifacient" as follows:
SEC. 4. Definition of Terms. - For the purpose of this Act, the following terms shall be defined as follows:
(a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that induces abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized
ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb upon determination of the FDA.
Section 3.0l (a) of the IRR, however, redefines "abortifacient" as:
Section 3.01 For purposes of these Rules, the terms shall be defined as follows:
a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that primarily induces abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb or the prevention of the
fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb upon determination of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). [Emphasis supplied]
Again in Section 3.0lG) of the RH-IRR, "contraceptive," is redefined, viz:
j) Contraceptive refers to any safe, legal, effective and scientifically proven modern family planning method, device, or health product, whether natural or
artificial, that prevents pregnancy but does not primarily destroy a fertilized ovum or prevent a fertilized ovum from being implanted in the mother's womb
in doses of its approved indication as determined by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).
The above-mentioned section of the RH-IRR allows "contraceptives" and recognizes as "abortifacient" only those that primarily induce abortion or the
destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb.172
This cannot be done.
In this regard, the observations of Justice Brion and Justice Del Castillo are well taken. As they pointed out, with the insertion of the word "primarily,"
Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR173 must be struck down for being ultra vires.
Evidently, with the addition of the word "primarily," in Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR is indeed ultra vires. It contravenes Section 4(a) of the RH
Law and should, therefore, be declared invalid. There is danger that the insertion of the qualifier "primarily" will pave the way for the approval of
contraceptives which may harm or destroy the life of the unborn from conception/fertilization in violation of Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution. With
such qualification in the RH-IRR, it appears to insinuate that a contraceptive will only be considered as an "abortifacient" if its sole known effect is
abortion or, as pertinent here, the prevention of the implantation of the fertilized ovum.
For the same reason, this definition of "contraceptive" would permit the approval of contraceptives which are actually abortifacients because of their fail-
safe mechanism.174
Also, as discussed earlier, Section 9 calls for the certification by the FDA that these contraceptives cannot act as abortive. With this, together with the
definition of an abortifacient under Section 4 (a) of the RH Law and its declared policy against abortion, the undeniable conclusion is that contraceptives to
be included in the PNDFS and the EDL will not only be those contraceptives that do not have the primary action of causing abortion or the destruction of a
fetus inside the mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb, but also those that do not have the
secondary action of acting the same way.
Indeed, consistent with the constitutional policy prohibiting abortion, and in line with the principle that laws should be construed in a manner that its
constitutionality is sustained, the RH Law and its implementing rules must be consistent with each other in prohibiting abortion. Thus, the word "
primarily" in Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR should be declared void. To uphold the validity of Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR and prohibit
only those contraceptives that have the primary effect of being an abortive would effectively "open the floodgates to the approval of contraceptives which
may harm or destroy the life of the unborn from conception/fertilization in violation of Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution."175
To repeat and emphasize, in all cases, the "principle of no abortion" embodied in the constitutional protection of life must be upheld.
2-The Right to Health
The petitioners claim that the RH Law violates the right to health because it requires the inclusion of hormonal contraceptives, intrauterine devices,
injectables and family products and supplies in the National Drug Formulary and the inclusion of the same in the regular purchase of essential medicines
and supplies of all national hospitals.176 Citing various studies on the matter, the petitioners posit that the risk of developing breast and cervical cancer is
greatly increased in women who use oral contraceptives as compared to women who never use them. They point out that the risk is decreased when the use
of contraceptives is discontinued. Further, it is contended that the use of combined oral contraceptive pills is associated with a threefold increased risk of
venous thromboembolism, a twofold increased risk of ischematic stroke, and an indeterminate effect on risk of myocardial infarction.177 Given the
definition of "reproductive health" and "sexual health" under Sections 4(p)178 and (w)179 of the RH Law, the petitioners assert that the assailed legislation
only seeks to ensure that women have pleasurable and satisfying sex lives.180
The OSG, however, points out that Section 15, Article II of the Constitution is not self-executory, it being a mere statement of the administration's principle
and policy. Even if it were self-executory, the OSG posits that medical authorities refute the claim that contraceptive pose a danger to the health of
women.181
The Court's Position
A component to the right to life is the constitutional right to health. In this regard, the Constitution is replete with provisions protecting and promoting the
right to health. Section 15, Article II of the Constitution provides:
Section 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness among them.
A portion of Article XIII also specifically provides for the States' duty to provide for the health of the people, viz:
HEALTH
Section 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach to health development which shall endeavor to make essential goods, health
and other social services available to all the people at affordable cost. There shall be priority for the needs of the underprivileged, sick, elderly, disabled,
women, and children. The State shall endeavor to provide free medical care to paupers.
Section 12. The State shall establish and maintain an effective food and drug regulatory system and undertake appropriate health, manpower development,
and research, responsive to the country's health needs and problems.
Section 13. The State shall establish a special agency for disabled person for their rehabilitation, self-development, and self-reliance, and their integration
into the mainstream of society.
Finally, Section 9, Article XVI provides:
Section 9. The State shall protect consumers from trade malpractices and from substandard or hazardous products.
Contrary to the respondent's notion, however, these provisions are self-executing. Unless the provisions clearly express the contrary, the provisions of the
Constitution should be considered self-executory. There is no need for legislation to implement these self-executing provisions. 182 In Manila Prince Hotel
v. GSIS,183 it was stated:
x x x Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions
of the constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would
have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law. This can be cataclysmic. That is why the prevailing view is, as it has
always been, that –
... in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing rather than non-self-executing. . . . Unless the contrary is clearly intended, the
provisions of the Constitution should be considered self-executing, as a contrary rule would give the legislature discretion to determine when, or whether,
they shall be effective. These provisions would be subordinated to the will of the lawmaking body, which could make them entirely meaningless by simply
refusing to pass the needed implementing statute. (Emphases supplied)
This notwithstanding, it bears mentioning that the petitioners, particularly ALFI, do not question contraception and contraceptives per se. 184 In fact, ALFI
prays that the status quo - under R.A. No. 5921 and R.A. No. 4729, the sale and distribution of contraceptives are not prohibited when they are dispensed
by a prescription of a duly licensed by a physician - be maintained.185
The legislative intent in the enactment of the RH Law in this regard is to leave intact the provisions of R.A. No. 4729. There is no intention at all to do
away with it. It is still a good law and its requirements are still in to be complied with. Thus, the Court agrees with the observation of respondent Lagman
that the effectivity of the RH Law will not lead to the unmitigated proliferation of contraceptives since the sale, distribution and dispensation of
contraceptive drugs and devices will still require the prescription of a licensed physician. With R.A. No. 4729 in place, there exists adequate safeguards to
ensure the public that only contraceptives that are safe are made available to the public. As aptly explained by respondent Lagman:
D. Contraceptives cannot be
dispensed and used without
prescription
108. As an added protection to voluntary users of contraceptives, the same cannot be dispensed and used without prescription.
109. Republic Act No. 4729 or "An Act to Regulate the Sale, Dispensation, and/ or Distribution of Contraceptive Drugs and Devices" and Republic Act
No. 5921 or "An Act Regulating the Practice of Pharmacy and Setting Standards of Pharmaceutical Education in the Philippines and for Other Purposes"
are not repealed by the RH Law and the provisions of said Acts are not inconsistent with the RH Law.
110. Consequently, the sale, distribution and dispensation of contraceptive drugs and devices are particularly governed by RA No. 4729 which provides in
full:
"Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, partnership, or corporation, to sell, dispense or otherwise distribute whether for or without consideration,
any contraceptive drug or device, unless such sale, dispensation or distribution is by a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and with the
prescription of a qualified medical practitioner.
"Sec. 2 . For the purpose of this Act:
"(a) "Contraceptive drug" is any medicine, drug, chemical, or portion which is used exclusively for the purpose of preventing fertilization of the
female ovum: and
"(b) "Contraceptive device" is any instrument, device, material, or agent introduced into the female reproductive system for the primary purpose
of preventing conception.
"Sec. 3 Any person, partnership, or corporation, violating the provisions of this Act shall be punished with a fine of not more than five hundred pesos or an
imprisonment of not less than six months or more than one year or both in the discretion of the Court.
"This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
"Approved: June 18, 1966"
111. Of the same import, but in a general manner, Section 25 of RA No. 5921 provides:
"Section 25. Sale of medicine, pharmaceuticals, drugs and devices. No medicine, pharmaceutical, or drug of whatever nature and kind or device shall be
compounded, dispensed, sold or resold, or otherwise be made available to the consuming public except through a prescription drugstore or hospital
pharmacy, duly established in accordance with the provisions of this Act.
112. With all of the foregoing safeguards, as provided for in the RH Law and other relevant statutes, the pretension of the petitioners that the RH Law will
lead to the unmitigated proliferation of contraceptives, whether harmful or not, is completely unwarranted and baseless. 186 [Emphases in the Original.
Underlining supplied.]
In Re: Section 10 of the RH Law:
The foregoing safeguards should be read in connection with Section 10 of the RH Law which provides:
SEC. 10. Procurement and Distribution of Family Planning Supplies. - The DOH shall procure, distribute to LGUs and monitor the usage of family
planning supplies for the whole country. The DOH shall coordinate with all appropriate local government bodies to plan and implement this procurement
and distribution program. The supply and budget allotments shall be based on, among others, the current levels and projections of the following:
(a) Number of women of reproductive age and couples who want to space or limit their children;
(b) Contraceptive prevalence rate, by type of method used; and
(c) Cost of family planning supplies.
Provided, That LGUs may implement its own procurement, distribution and monitoring program consistent with the overall provisions of this Act and the
guidelines of the DOH.
Thus, in the distribution by the DOH of contraceptive drugs and devices, it must consider the provisions of R.A. No. 4729, which is still in effect, and
ensure that the contraceptives that it will procure shall be from a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and that the actual dispensation of
these contraceptive drugs and devices will done following a prescription of a qualified medical practitioner. The distribution of contraceptive drugs and
devices must not be indiscriminately done. The public health must be protected by all possible means. As pointed out by Justice De Castro, a heavy
responsibility and burden are assumed by the government in supplying contraceptive drugs and devices, for it may be held accountable for any injury,
illness or loss of life resulting from or incidental to their use.187
At any rate, it bears pointing out that not a single contraceptive has yet been submitted to the FDA pursuant to the RH Law. It behooves the Court to await
its determination which drugs or devices are declared by the FDA as safe, it being the agency tasked to ensure that food and medicines available to the
public are safe for public consumption. Consequently, the Court finds that, at this point, the attack on the RH Law on this ground is premature. Indeed, the
various kinds of contraceptives must first be measured up to the constitutional yardstick as expounded herein, to be determined as the case presents itself.
At this point, the Court is of the strong view that Congress cannot legislate that hormonal contraceptives and intra-uterine devices are safe and non-
abortifacient. The first sentence of Section 9 that ordains their inclusion by the National Drug Formulary in the EDL by using the mandatory "shall" is to be
construed as operative only after they have been tested, evaluated, and approved by the FDA. The FDA, not Congress, has the expertise to determine
whether a particular hormonal contraceptive or intrauterine device is safe and non-abortifacient. The provision of the third sentence concerning the
requirements for the inclusion or removal of a particular family planning supply from the EDL supports this construction.
Stated differently, the provision in Section 9 covering the inclusion of hormonal contraceptives, intra-uterine devices, injectables, and other safe, legal,
non-abortifacient and effective family planning products and supplies by the National Drug Formulary in the EDL is not mandatory. There must first be a
determination by the FDA that they are in fact safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective family planning products and supplies. There can be no
predetermination by Congress that the gamut of contraceptives are "safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective" without the proper scientific examination.
3 -Freedom of Religion
and the Right to Free Speech
Position of the Petitioners:
1. On Contraception
While contraceptives and procedures like vasectomy and tubal ligation are not covered by the constitutional proscription, there are those who, because of
their religious education and background, sincerely believe that contraceptives, whether abortifacient or not, are evil. Some of these are medical
practitioners who essentially claim that their beliefs prohibit not only the use of contraceptives but also the willing participation and cooperation in all
things dealing with contraceptive use. Petitioner PAX explained that "contraception is gravely opposed to marital chastity, it is contrary to the good of the
transmission of life, and to the reciprocal self-giving of the spouses; it harms true love and denies the sovereign rule of God in the transmission of Human
life."188
The petitioners question the State-sponsored procurement of contraceptives, arguing that the expenditure of their taxes on contraceptives violates the
guarantee of religious freedom since contraceptives contravene their religious beliefs.189
2. On Religious Accommodation and
The Duty to Refer
Petitioners Imbong and Luat note that while the RH Law attempts to address religious sentiments by making provisions for a conscientious objector, the
constitutional guarantee is nonetheless violated because the law also imposes upon the conscientious objector the duty to refer the patient seeking
reproductive health services to another medical practitioner who would be able to provide for the patient's needs. For the petitioners, this amounts to
requiring the conscientious objector to cooperate with the very thing he refuses to do without violating his/her religious beliefs.190
They further argue that even if the conscientious objector's duty to refer is recognized, the recognition is unduly limited, because although it allows a
conscientious objector in Section 23 (a)(3) the option to refer a patient seeking reproductive health services and information - no escape is afforded the
conscientious objector in Section 23 (a)(l) and (2), i.e. against a patient seeking reproductive health procedures. They claim that the right of other
individuals to conscientiously object, such as: a) those working in public health facilities referred to in Section 7; b) public officers involved in the
implementation of the law referred to in Section 23(b ); and c) teachers in public schools referred to in Section 14 of the RH Law, are also not
recognize.191
Petitioner Echavez and the other medical practitioners meanwhile, contend that the requirement to refer the matter to another health care service provider is
still considered a compulsion on those objecting healthcare service providers. They add that compelling them to do the act against their will violates the
Doctrine of Benevolent Neutrality. Sections 9, 14 and 1 7 of the law are too secular that they tend to disregard the religion of Filipinos. Authorizing the use
of contraceptives with abortive effects, mandatory sex education, mandatory pro-bono reproductive health services to indigents encroach upon the religious
freedom of those upon whom they are required.192
Petitioner CFC also argues that the requirement for a conscientious objector to refer the person seeking reproductive health care services to another
provider infringes on one's freedom of religion as it forces the objector to become an unwilling participant in the commission of a serious sin under
Catholic teachings. While the right to act on one's belief may be regulated by the State, the acts prohibited by the RH Law are passive acts which produce
neither harm nor injury to the public.193
Petitioner CFC adds that the RH Law does not show compelling state interest to justify regulation of religious freedom because it mentions no emergency,
risk or threat that endangers state interests. It does not explain how the rights of the people (to equality, non-discrimination of rights, sustainable human
development, health, education, information, choice and to make decisions according to religious convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs and the demands of
responsible parenthood) are being threatened or are not being met as to justify the impairment of religious freedom.194
Finally, the petitioners also question Section 15 of the RH Law requiring would-be couples to attend family planning and responsible parenthood seminars
and to obtain a certificate of compliance. They claim that the provision forces individuals to participate in the implementation of the RH Law even if it
contravenes their religious beliefs.195 As the assailed law dangles the threat of penalty of fine and/or imprisonment in case of non-compliance with its
provisions, the petitioners claim that the RH Law forcing them to provide, support and facilitate access and information to contraception against their
beliefs must be struck down as it runs afoul to the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom.
The Respondents' Positions
The respondents, on the other hand, contend that the RH Law does not provide that a specific mode or type of contraceptives be used, be it natural or
artificial. It neither imposes nor sanctions any religion or belief.196 They point out that the RH Law only seeks to serve the public interest by providing
accessible, effective and quality reproductive health services to ensure maternal and child health, in line with the State's duty to bring to reality the social
justice health guarantees of the Constitution,197 and that what the law only prohibits are those acts or practices, which deprive others of their right to
reproductive health.198 They assert that the assailed law only seeks to guarantee informed choice, which is an assurance that no one will be compelled to
violate his religion against his free will.199
The respondents add that by asserting that only natural family planning should be allowed, the petitioners are effectively going against the constitutional
right to religious freedom, the same right they invoked to assail the constitutionality of the RH Law.200 In other words, by seeking the declaration that the
RH Law is unconstitutional, the petitioners are asking that the Court recognize only the Catholic Church's sanctioned natural family planning methods and
impose this on the entire citizenry.201
With respect to the duty to refer, the respondents insist that the same does not violate the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom, it being a carefully
balanced compromise between the interests of the religious objector, on one hand, who is allowed to keep silent but is required to refer -and that of the
citizen who needs access to information and who has the right to expect that the health care professional in front of her will act professionally. For the
respondents, the concession given by the State under Section 7 and 23(a)(3) is sufficient accommodation to the right to freely exercise one's religion
without unnecessarily infringing on the rights of others.202
Whatever burden is placed on the petitioner's religious freedom is minimal as the duty to refer is limited in duration, location and impact.203
Regarding mandatory family planning seminars under Section 15 , the respondents claim that it is a reasonable regulation providing an opportunity for
would-be couples to have access to information regarding parenthood, family planning, breastfeeding and infant nutrition. It is argued that those who
object to any information received on account of their attendance in the required seminars are not compelled to accept information given to them. They are
completely free to reject any information they do not agree with and retain the freedom to decide on matters of family life without intervention of the
State.204
For their part, respondents De Venecia et al., dispute the notion that natural family planning is the only method acceptable to Catholics and the Catholic
hierarchy. Citing various studies and surveys on the matter, they highlight the changing stand of the Catholic Church on contraception throughout the years
and note the general acceptance of the benefits of contraceptives by its followers in planning their families.
The Church and The State
At the outset, it cannot be denied that we all live in a heterogeneous society. It is made up of people of diverse ethnic, cultural and religious beliefs and
backgrounds. History has shown us that our government, in law and in practice, has allowed these various religious, cultural, social and racial groups to
thrive in a single society together. It has embraced minority groups and is tolerant towards all - the religious people of different sects and the non-believers.
The undisputed fact is that our people generally believe in a deity, whatever they conceived Him to be, and to whom they call for guidance and
enlightenment in crafting our fundamental law. Thus, the preamble of the present Constitution reads:
We, the sovereign Filipino people, imploring the aid of Almighty God, in order to build a just and humane society, and establish a Government that shall
embody our ideals and aspirations, promote the common good, conserve and develop our patrimony, and secure to ourselves and our posterity, the
blessings of independence and democracy under the rule of law and a regime of truth, justice, freedom, love, equality, and peace, do ordain and promulgate
this Constitution.
The Filipino people in "imploring the aid of Almighty God " manifested their spirituality innate in our nature and consciousness as a people, shaped by
tradition and historical experience. As this is embodied in the preamble, it means that the State recognizes with respect the influence of religion in so far as
it instills into the mind the purest principles of morality.205 Moreover, in recognition of the contributions of religion to society, the 1935, 1973 and 1987
constitutions contain benevolent and accommodating provisions towards religions such as tax exemption of church property, salary of religious officers in
government institutions, and optional religious instructions in public schools.
The Framers, however, felt the need to put up a strong barrier so that the State would not encroach into the affairs of the church, and vice-versa. The
principle of separation of Church and State was, thus, enshrined in Article II, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution, viz:
Section 6. The separation of Church and State shall be inviolable.
Verily, the principle of separation of Church and State is based on mutual respect.1âwphi1 Generally, the State cannot meddle in the internal affairs of the
church, much less question its faith and dogmas or dictate upon it. It cannot favor one religion and discriminate against another. On the other hand, the
church cannot impose its beliefs and convictions on the State and the rest of the citizenry. It cannot demand that the nation follow its beliefs, even if it
sincerely believes that they are good for the country.
Consistent with the principle that not any one religion should ever be preferred over another, the Constitution in the above-cited provision utilizes the term
"church" in its generic sense, which refers to a temple, a mosque, an iglesia, or any other house of God which metaphorically symbolizes a religious
organization. Thus, the "Church" means the religious congregations collectively.
Balancing the benefits that religion affords and the need to provide an ample barrier to protect the State from the pursuit of its secular objectives, the
Constitution lays down the following mandate in Article III, Section 5 and Article VI, Section 29 (2), of the 1987 Constitution:
Section. 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of
religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil
or political rights.
Section 29.
xxx.
No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid, or employed, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church,
denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion, or of any priest, preacher, minister, other religious teacher, or dignitary as such, except when such
priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal institution, or government orphanage or leprosarium.
In short, the constitutional assurance of religious freedom provides two guarantees: the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause.
The establishment clause "principally prohibits the State from sponsoring any religion or favoring any religion as against other religions. It mandates a
strict neutrality in affairs among religious groups."206 Essentially, it prohibits the establishment of a state religion and the use of public resources for the
support or prohibition of a religion.
On the other hand, the basis of the free exercise clause is the respect for the inviolability of the human conscience. 207 Under this part of religious freedom
guarantee, the State is prohibited from unduly interfering with the outside manifestations of one's belief and faith.208 Explaining the concept of religious
freedom, the Court, in Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers Union209 wrote:
The constitutional provisions not only prohibits legislation for the support of any religious tenets or the modes of worship of any sect, thus forestalling
compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form of worship (U.S. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 88 L. ed. 1148, 1153), but also assures
the free exercise of one's chosen form of religion within limits of utmost amplitude. It has been said that the religion clauses of the Constitution are all
designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to believe as his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs, and to live as
he believes he ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others and with the common good. Any legislation whose effect or purpose is to impede the
observance of one or all religions, or to discriminate invidiously between the religions, is invalid, even though the burden may be characterized as being
only indirect. (Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 10 L.ed.2d 965, 83 S. Ct. 1970) But if the state regulates conduct by enacting, within its power, a general
law which has for its purpose and effect to advance the state's secular goals, the statute is valid despite its indirect burden on religious observance, unless
the state can accomplish its purpose without imposing such burden. (Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 6 Led. 2d. 563, 81 S. Ct. 144; McGowan v.
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 444-5 and 449).
As expounded in Escritor,
The establishment and free exercise clauses were not designed to serve contradictory purposes. They have a single goal-to promote freedom of individual
religious beliefs and practices. In simplest terms, the free exercise clause prohibits government from inhibiting religious beliefs with penalties for religious
beliefs and practice, while the establishment clause prohibits government from inhibiting religious belief with rewards for religious beliefs and practices. In
other words, the two religion clauses were intended to deny government the power to use either the carrot or the stick to influence individual religious
beliefs and practices.210
Corollary to the guarantee of free exercise of one's religion is the principle that the guarantee of religious freedom is comprised of two parts: the freedom to
believe, and the freedom to act on one's belief. The first part is absolute. As explained in Gerona v. Secretary of Education:211
The realm of belief and creed is infinite and limitless bounded only by one's imagination and thought. So is the freedom of belief, including religious
belief, limitless and without bounds. One may believe in most anything, however strange, bizarre and unreasonable the same may appear to others, even
heretical when weighed in the scales of orthodoxy or doctrinal standards. But between the freedom of belief and the exercise of said belief, there is quite a
stretch of road to travel.212
The second part however, is limited and subject to the awesome power of the State and can be enjoyed only with proper regard to the rights of others. It is
"subject to regulation where the belief is translated into external acts that affect the public welfare."213
Legislative Acts and the
Free Exercise Clause
Thus, in case of conflict between the free exercise clause and the State, the Court adheres to the doctrine of benevolent neutrality. This has been clearly
decided by the Court in Estrada v. Escritor, (Escritor)214 where it was stated "that benevolent neutrality-accommodation, whether mandatory or
permissive, is the spirit, intent and framework underlying the Philippine Constitution."215 In the same case, it was further explained that"
The benevolent neutrality theory believes that with respect to these governmental actions, accommodation of religion may be allowed, not to promote the
government's favored form of religion, but to allow individuals and groups to exercise their religion without hindrance. "The purpose of accommodation is
to remove a burden on, or facilitate the exercise of, a person's or institution's religion."216 "What is sought under the theory of accommodation is not a
declaration of unconstitutionality of a facially neutral law, but an exemption from its application or its 'burdensome effect,' whether by the legislature or the
courts."217
In ascertaining the limits of the exercise of religious freedom, the compelling state interest test is proper.218 Underlying the compelling state interest test is
the notion that free exercise is a fundamental right and that laws burdening it should be subject to strict scrutiny.219 In Escritor, it was written:
Philippine jurisprudence articulates several tests to determine these limits. Beginning with the first case on the Free Exercise Clause, American Bible
Society, the Court mentioned the "clear and present danger" test but did not employ it. Nevertheless, this test continued to be cited in subsequent cases on
religious liberty. The Gerona case then pronounced that the test of permissibility of religious freedom is whether it violates the established institutions of
society and law. The Victoriano case mentioned the "immediate and grave danger" test as well as the doctrine that a law of general applicability may
burden religious exercise provided the law is the least restrictive means to accomplish the goal of the law. The case also used, albeit inappropriately, the
"compelling state interest" test. After Victoriano , German went back to the Gerona rule. Ebralinag then employed the "grave and immediate danger" test
and overruled the Gerona test. The fairly recent case of Iglesia ni Cristo went back to the " clear and present danger" test in the maiden case of A merican
Bible Society. Not surprisingly, all the cases which employed the "clear and present danger" or "grave and immediate danger" test involved, in one form or
another, religious speech as this test is often used in cases on freedom of expression. On the other hand, the Gerona and German cases set the rule that
religious freedom will not prevail over established institutions of society and law. Gerona, however, which was the authority cited by German has been
overruled by Ebralinag which employed the "grave and immediate danger" test . Victoriano was the only case that employed the "compelling state interest"
test, but as explained previously, the use of the test was inappropriate to the facts of the case.
The case at bar does not involve speech as in A merican Bible Society, Ebralinag and Iglesia ni Cristo where the "clear and present danger" and "grave and
immediate danger" tests were appropriate as speech has easily discernible or immediate effects. The Gerona and German doctrine, aside from having been
overruled, is not congruent with the benevolent neutrality approach, thus not appropriate in this jurisdiction. Similar to Victoriano, the present case
involves purely conduct arising from religious belief. The "compelling state interest" test is proper where conduct is involved for the whole gamut of
human conduct has different effects on the state's interests: some effects may be immediate and short-term while others delayed and far-reaching. A test
that would protect the interests of the state in preventing a substantive evil, whether immediate or delayed, is therefore necessary. However, not any interest
of the state would suffice to prevail over the right to religious freedom as this is a fundamental right that enjoys a preferred position in the hierarchy of
rights - "the most inalienable and sacred of all human rights", in the words of Jefferson. This right is sacred for an invocation of the Free Exercise Clause is
an appeal to a higher sovereignty. The entire constitutional order of limited government is premised upon an acknowledgment of such higher sovereignty,
thus the Filipinos implore the "aid of Almighty God in order to build a just and humane society and establish a government." As held in Sherbert, only the
gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests can limit this fundamental right. A mere balancing of interests which balances a right with just a colorable
state interest is therefore not appropriate. Instead, only a compelling interest of the state can prevail over the fundamental right to religious liberty. The test
requires the state to carry a heavy burden, a compelling one, for to do otherwise would allow the state to batter religion, especially the less powerful ones
until they are destroyed. In determining which shall prevail between the state's interest and religious liberty, reasonableness shall be the guide. The
"compelling state interest" serves the purpose of revering religious liberty while at the same time affording protection to the paramount interests of the
state. This was the test used in Sherbert which involved conduct, i.e. refusal to work on Saturdays. In the end, the "compelling state interest" test, by
upholding the paramount interests of the state, seeks to protect the very state, without which, religious liberty will not be preserved. [Emphases in the
original. Underlining supplied.]
The Court's Position
In the case at bench, it is not within the province of the Court to determine whether the use of contraceptives or one's participation in the support of modem
reproductive health measures is moral from a religious standpoint or whether the same is right or wrong according to one's dogma or belief. For the Court
has declared that matters dealing with "faith, practice, doctrine, form of worship, ecclesiastical law, custom and rule of a church ... are unquestionably
ecclesiastical matters which are outside the province of the civil courts."220 The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and secular morality.
Whatever pronouncement the Court makes in the case at bench should be understood only in this realm where it has authority. Stated otherwise, while the
Court stands without authority to rule on ecclesiastical matters, as vanguard of the Constitution, it does have authority to determine whether the RH Law
contravenes the guarantee of religious freedom.
At first blush, it appears that the RH Law recognizes and respects religion and religious beliefs and convictions. It is replete with assurances the no one can
be compelled to violate the tenets of his religion or defy his religious convictions against his free will. Provisions in the RH Law respecting religious
freedom are the following:
1. The State recognizes and guarantees the human rights of all persons including their right to equality and nondiscrimination of these rights, the right to
sustainable human development, the right to health which includes reproductive health, the right to education and information, and the right to choose and
make decisions for themselves in accordance with their religious convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs, and the demands of responsible parenthood. [Section
2, Declaration of Policy]
2 . The State recognizes marriage as an inviolable social institution and the foundation of the family which in turn is the foundation of the nation. Pursuant
thereto, the State shall defend:
(a) The right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions and the demands of responsible parenthood." [Section 2,
Declaration of Policy]
3. The State shall promote and provide information and access, without bias, to all methods of family planning, including effective natural and modern
methods which have been proven medically safe, legal, non-abortifacient, and effective in accordance with scientific and evidence-based medical research
standards such as those registered and approved by the FDA for the poor and marginalized as identified through the NHTS-PR and other government
measures of identifying marginalization: Provided, That the State shall also provide funding support to promote modern natural methods of family
planning, especially the Billings Ovulation Method, consistent with the needs of acceptors and their religious convictions. [Section 3(e), Declaration of
Policy]
4. The State shall promote programs that: (1) enable individuals and couples to have the number of children they desire with due consideration to the
health, particularly of women, and the resources available and affordable to them and in accordance with existing laws, public morals and their religious
convictions. [Section 3CDJ
5. The State shall respect individuals' preferences and choice of family planning methods that are in accordance with their religious convictions and
cultural beliefs, taking into consideration the State's obligations under various human rights instruments. [Section 3(h)]
6. Active participation by nongovernment organizations (NGOs) , women's and people's organizations, civil society, faith-based organizations, the religious
sector and communities is crucial to ensure that reproductive health and population and development policies, plans, and programs will address the priority
needs of women, the poor, and the marginalized. [Section 3(i)]
7. Responsible parenthood refers to the will and ability of a parent to respond to the needs and aspirations of the family and children. It is likewise a shared
responsibility between parents to determine and achieve the desired number of children, spacing and timing of their children according to their own family
life aspirations, taking into account psychological preparedness, health status, sociocultural and economic concerns consistent with their religious
convictions. [Section 4(v)] (Emphases supplied)
While the Constitution prohibits abortion, laws were enacted allowing the use of contraceptives. To some medical practitioners, however, the whole idea of
using contraceptives is an anathema. Consistent with the principle of benevolent neutrality, their beliefs should be respected.
The Establishment Clause
and Contraceptives
In the same breath that the establishment clause restricts what the government can do with religion, it also limits what religious sects can or cannot do with
the government. They can neither cause the government to adopt their particular doctrines as policy for everyone, nor can they not cause the government to
restrict other groups. To do so, in simple terms, would cause the State to adhere to a particular religion and, thus, establishing a state religion.
Consequently, the petitioners are misguided in their supposition that the State cannot enhance its population control program through the RH Law simply
because the promotion of contraceptive use is contrary to their religious beliefs. Indeed, the State is not precluded to pursue its legitimate secular objectives
without being dictated upon by the policies of any one religion. One cannot refuse to pay his taxes simply because it will cloud his conscience. The
demarcation line between Church and State demands that one render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's and unto God the things that are God's.221
The Free Exercise Clause and the Duty to Refer
While the RH Law, in espousing state policy to promote reproductive health manifestly respects diverse religious beliefs in line with the Non-
Establishment Clause, the same conclusion cannot be reached with respect to Sections 7, 23 and 24 thereof. The said provisions commonly mandate that a
hospital or a medical practitioner to immediately refer a person seeking health care and services under the law to another accessible healthcare provider
despite their conscientious objections based on religious or ethical beliefs.
In a situation where the free exercise of religion is allegedly burdened by government legislation or practice, the compelling state interest test in line with
the Court's espousal of the Doctrine of Benevolent Neutrality in Escritor, finds application. In this case, the conscientious objector's claim to religious
freedom would warrant an exemption from obligations under the RH Law, unless the government succeeds in demonstrating a more compelling state
interest in the accomplishment of an important secular objective. Necessarily so, the plea of conscientious objectors for exemption from the RH Law
deserves no less than strict scrutiny.
In applying the test, the first inquiry is whether a conscientious objector's right to religious freedom has been burdened. As in Escritor, there is no doubt
that an intense tug-of-war plagues a conscientious objector. One side coaxes him into obedience to the law and the abandonment of his religious beliefs,
while the other entices him to a clean conscience yet under the pain of penalty. The scenario is an illustration of the predicament of medical practitioners
whose religious beliefs are incongruent with what the RH Law promotes.
The Court is of the view that the obligation to refer imposed by the RH Law violates the religious belief and conviction of a conscientious objector. Once
the medical practitioner, against his will, refers a patient seeking information on modem reproductive health products, services, procedures and methods,
his conscience is immediately burdened as he has been compelled to perform an act against his beliefs. As Commissioner Joaquin A. Bernas
(Commissioner Bernas) has written, "at the basis of the free exercise clause is the respect for the inviolability of the human conscience.222
Though it has been said that the act of referral is an opt-out clause, it is, however, a false compromise because it makes pro-life health providers complicit
in the performance of an act that they find morally repugnant or offensive. They cannot, in conscience, do indirectly what they cannot do directly. One may
not be the principal, but he is equally guilty if he abets the offensive act by indirect participation.
Moreover, the guarantee of religious freedom is necessarily intertwined with the right to free speech, it being an externalization of one's thought and
conscience. This in turn includes the right to be silent. With the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom follows the protection that should be afforded
to individuals in communicating their beliefs to others as well as the protection for simply being silent. The Bill of Rights guarantees the liberty of the
individual to utter what is in his mind and the liberty not to utter what is not in his mind.223 While the RH Law seeks to provide freedom of choice through
informed consent, freedom of choice guarantees the liberty of the religious conscience and prohibits any degree of compulsion or burden, whether direct or
indirect, in the practice of one's religion.224
In case of conflict between the religious beliefs and moral convictions of individuals, on one hand, and the interest of the State, on the other, to provide
access and information on reproductive health products, services, procedures and methods to enable the people to determine the timing, number and
spacing of the birth of their children, the Court is of the strong view that the religious freedom of health providers, whether public or private, should be
accorded primacy. Accordingly, a conscientious objector should be exempt from compliance with the mandates of the RH Law. If he would be compelled
to act contrary to his religious belief and conviction, it would be violative of "the principle of non-coercion" enshrined in the constitutional right to free
exercise of religion.
Interestingly, on April 24, 2013, Scotland's Inner House of the Court of Session, found in the case of Doogan and Wood v. NHS Greater Glasgow and
Clyde Health Board,225 that the midwives claiming to be conscientious objectors under the provisions of Scotland's Abortion Act of 1967, could not be
required to delegate, supervise or support staff on their labor ward who were involved in abortions.226 The Inner House stated "that if 'participation' were
defined according to whether the person was taking part 'directly' or ' indirectly' this would actually mean more complexity and uncertainty."227
While the said case did not cover the act of referral, the applicable principle was the same - they could not be forced to assist abortions if it would be
against their conscience or will.
Institutional Health Providers
The same holds true with respect to non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and operated by a religious group and health care service
providers. Considering that Section 24 of the RH Law penalizes such institutions should they fail or refuse to comply with their duty to refer under Section
7 and Section 23(a)(3), the Court deems that it must be struck down for being violative of the freedom of religion. The same applies to Section 23(a)(l) and
(a)(2) in relation to Section 24, considering that in the dissemination of information regarding programs and services and in the performance of
reproductive health procedures, the religious freedom of health care service providers should be respected.
In the case of Islamic Da'wah Council of the Philippines, Inc. v. Office of the Executive Secretary228 it was stressed:
Freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by the framers of our fundamental law. And this Court has consistently affirmed this preferred status,
well aware that it is "designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to believe as his conscience directs, to profess his
beliefs, and to live as he believes he ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others and with the common good."10
The Court is not oblivious to the view that penalties provided by law endeavour to ensure compliance. Without set consequences for either an active
violation or mere inaction, a law tends to be toothless and ineffectual. Nonetheless, when what is bartered for an effective implementation of a law is a
constitutionally-protected right the Court firmly chooses to stamp its disapproval. The punishment of a healthcare service provider, who fails and/or refuses
to refer a patient to another, or who declines to perform reproductive health procedure on a patient because incompatible religious beliefs, is a clear
inhibition of a constitutional guarantee which the Court cannot allow.
The Implementing Rules and Regulation (RH-IRR)
The last paragraph of Section 5.24 of the RH-IRR reads:
Provided, That skilled health professional such as provincial, city or municipal health officers, chiefs of hospital, head nurses, supervising midwives,
among others, who by virtue of their office are specifically charged with the duty to implement the provisions of the RPRH Act and these Rules, cannot be
considered as conscientious objectors.
This is discriminatory and violative of the equal protection clause. The conscientious objection clause should be equally protective of the religious belief of
public health officers. There is no perceptible distinction why they should not be considered exempt from the mandates of the law. The protection accorded
to other conscientious objectors should equally apply to all medical practitioners without distinction whether they belong to the public or private sector.
After all, the freedom to believe is intrinsic in every individual and the protective robe that guarantees its free exercise is not taken off even if one acquires
employment in the government.
It should be stressed that intellectual liberty occupies a place inferior to none in the hierarchy of human values. The mind must be free to think what it
wills, whether in the secular or religious sphere, to give expression to its beliefs by oral discourse or through the media and, thus, seek other candid views
in occasions or gatherings or in more permanent aggrupation. Embraced in such concept then are freedom of religion, freedom of speech, of the press,
assembly and petition, and freedom of association.229
The discriminatory provision is void not only because no such exception is stated in the RH Law itself but also because it is violative of the equal
protection clause in the Constitution. Quoting respondent Lagman, if there is any conflict between the RH-IRR and the RH Law, the law must prevail.
Justice Mendoza:
I'll go to another point. The RH law .. .in your Comment- in-Intervention on page 52, you mentioned RH Law is replete with provisions in upholding the
freedom of religion and respecting religious convictions. Earlier, you affirmed this with qualifications. Now, you have read, I presumed you have read the
IRR-Implementing Rules and Regulations of the RH Bill?
Congressman Lagman:
Yes, Your Honor, I have read but I have to admit, it's a long IRR and I have not thoroughly dissected the nuances of the provisions.
Justice Mendoza:
I will read to you one provision. It's Section 5.24. This I cannot find in the RH Law. But in the IRR it says: " .... skilled health professionals such as
provincial, city or municipal health officers, chief of hospitals, head nurses, supervising midwives, among others, who by virtue of their office are
specifically charged with the duty to implement the provisions of the RPRH Act and these Rules, cannot be considered as conscientious objectors." Do you
agree with this?
Congressman Lagman:
I will have to go over again the provisions, Your Honor.
Justice Mendoza:
In other words, public health officers in contrast to the private practitioners who can be conscientious objectors, skilled health professionals cannot be
considered conscientious objectors. Do you agree with this? Is this not against the constitutional right to the religious belief?
Congressman Lagman:
Your Honor, if there is any conflict between the IRR and the law, the law must prevail.230
Compelling State Interest
The foregoing discussion then begets the question on whether the respondents, in defense of the subject provisions, were able to: 1] demonstrate a more
compelling state interest to restrain conscientious objectors in their choice of services to render; and 2] discharge the burden of proof that the obligatory
character of the law is the least intrusive means to achieve the objectives of the law.
Unfortunately, a deep scrutiny of the respondents' submissions proved to be in vain. The OSG was curiously silent in the establishment of a more
compelling state interest that would rationalize the curbing of a conscientious objector's right not to adhere to an action contrary to his religious
convictions. During the oral arguments, the OSG maintained the same silence and evasion. The Transcripts of the Stenographic Notes disclose the
following:
Justice De Castro:
Let's go back to the duty of the conscientious objector to refer. ..
Senior State Solicitor Hilbay:
Yes, Justice.
Justice De Castro:
... which you are discussing awhile ago with Justice Abad. What is the compelling State interest in imposing this duty to refer to a conscientious objector
which refuses to do so because of his religious belief?
Senior State Solicitor Hilbay:
Ahh, Your Honor, ..
Justice De Castro:
What is the compelling State interest to impose this burden?
Senior State Solicitor Hilbay:
In the first place, Your Honor, I don't believe that the standard is a compelling State interest, this is an ordinary health legislation involving professionals.
This is not a free speech matter or a pure free exercise matter. This is a regulation by the State of the relationship between medical doctors and their
patients.231
Resultantly, the Court finds no compelling state interest which would limit the free exercise clause of the conscientious objectors, however few in number.
Only the prevention of an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the community can justify the infringement of religious freedom. If
the government fails to show the seriousness and immediacy of the threat, State intrusion is constitutionally unacceptable.232
Freedom of religion means more than just the freedom to believe. It also means the freedom to act or not to act according to what one believes. And this
freedom is violated when one is compelled to act against one's belief or is prevented from acting according to one's belief.233
Apparently, in these cases, there is no immediate danger to the life or health of an individual in the perceived scenario of the subject provisions. After all, a
couple who plans the timing, number and spacing of the birth of their children refers to a future event that is contingent on whether or not the mother
decides to adopt or use the information, product, method or supply given to her or whether she even decides to become pregnant at all. On the other hand,
the burden placed upon those who object to contraceptive use is immediate and occurs the moment a patient seeks consultation on reproductive health
matters.
Moreover, granting that a compelling interest exists to justify the infringement of the conscientious objector's religious freedom, the respondents have
failed to demonstrate "the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests" which could limit or override a person's fundamental right to religious
freedom. Also, the respondents have not presented any government effort exerted to show that the means it takes to achieve its legitimate state objective is
the least intrusive means.234 Other than the assertion that the act of referring would only be momentary, considering that the act of referral by a
conscientious objector is the very action being contested as violative of religious freedom, it behooves the respondents to demonstrate that no other means
can be undertaken by the State to achieve its objective without violating the rights of the conscientious objector. The health concerns of women may still be
addressed by other practitioners who may perform reproductive health-related procedures with open willingness and motivation. Suffice it to say, a person
who is forced to perform an act in utter reluctance deserves the protection of the Court as the last vanguard of constitutional freedoms.
At any rate, there are other secular steps already taken by the Legislature to ensure that the right to health is protected. Considering other legislations as
they stand now, R.A . No. 4 729 or the Contraceptive Act, R.A. No. 6365 or "The Population Act of the Philippines" and R.A. No. 9710, otherwise known
as "The Magna Carta of Women," amply cater to the needs of women in relation to health services and programs. The pertinent provision of Magna Carta
on comprehensive health services and programs for women, in fact, reads:
Section 17. Women's Right to Health. - (a) Comprehensive Health Services. - The State shall, at all times, provide for a comprehensive,
culture-sensitive, and gender-responsive health services and programs covering all stages of a woman's life cycle and which addresses the
major causes of women's mortality and morbidity: Provided, That in the provision for comprehensive health services, due respect shall be
accorded to women's religious convictions, the rights of the spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions, and
the demands of responsible parenthood, and the right of women to protection from hazardous drugs, devices, interventions, and
substances.

Access to the following services shall be ensured:

(1) Maternal care to include pre- and post-natal services to address pregnancy and infant health and nutrition;

(2) Promotion of breastfeeding;

(3) Responsible, ethical, legal, safe, and effective methods of family planning;

(4) Family and State collaboration in youth sexuality education and health services without prejudice to the primary right and
duty of parents to educate their children;

(5) Prevention and management of reproductive tract infections, including sexually transmitted diseases, HIV, and AIDS;

(6) Prevention and management of reproductive tract cancers like breast and cervical cancers, and other gynecological
conditions and disorders;

(7) Prevention of abortion and management of pregnancy-related complications;

(8) In cases of violence against women and children, women and children victims and survivors shall be provided with
comprehensive health services that include psychosocial, therapeutic, medical, and legal interventions and assistance towards
healing, recovery, and empowerment;

(9) Prevention and management of infertility and sexual dysfunction pursuant to ethical norms and medical standards;

(10) Care of the elderly women beyond their child-bearing years; and

(11) Management, treatment, and intervention of mental health problems of women and girls. In addition, healthy lifestyle
activities are encouraged and promoted through programs and projects as strategies in the prevention of diseases.

(b) Comprehensive Health Information and Education. - The State shall provide women in all sectors with appropriate, timely, complete,
and accurate information and education on all the above-stated aspects of women's health in government education and training
programs, with due regard to the following:

(1) The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth and the development of moral character and
the right of children to be brought up in an atmosphere of morality and rectitude for the enrichment and strengthening of
character;

(2) The formation of a person's sexuality that affirms human dignity; and

(3) Ethical, legal, safe, and effective family planning methods including fertility awareness.

As an afterthought, Asst. Solicitor General Hilbay eventually replied that the compelling state interest was "Fifteen maternal deaths per day, hundreds of
thousands of unintended pregnancies, lives changed, x x x."235 He, however, failed to substantiate this point by concrete facts and figures from reputable
sources.
The undisputed fact, however, is that the World Health Organization reported that the Filipino maternal mortality rate dropped to 48 percent from 1990 to
2008, 236 although there was still no RH Law at that time. Despite such revelation, the proponents still insist that such number of maternal deaths
constitute a compelling state interest.
Granting that there are still deficiencies and flaws in the delivery of social healthcare programs for Filipino women, they could not be solved by a measure
that puts an unwarrantable stranglehold on religious beliefs in exchange for blind conformity.
Exception: Life Threatening Cases
All this notwithstanding, the Court properly recognizes a valid exception set forth in the law. While generally healthcare service providers cannot be forced
to render reproductive health care procedures if doing it would contravene their religious beliefs, an exception must be made in life-threatening cases that
require the performance of emergency procedures. In these situations, the right to life of the mother should be given preference, considering that a referral
by a medical practitioner would amount to a denial of service, resulting to unnecessarily placing the life of a mother in grave danger. Thus, during the oral
arguments, Atty. Liban, representing CFC, manifested: "the forced referral clause that we are objecting on grounds of violation of freedom of religion does
not contemplate an emergency."237
In a conflict situation between the life of the mother and the life of a child, the doctor is morally obliged always to try to save both lives. If, however, it is
impossible, the resulting death to one should not be deliberate. Atty. Noche explained:
Principle of Double-Effect. - May we please remind the principal author of the RH Bill in the House of Representatives of the principle of double-effect
wherein intentional harm on the life of either the mother of the child is never justified to bring about a "good" effect. In a conflict situation between the life
of the child and the life of the mother, the doctor is morally obliged always to try to save both lives. However, he can act in favor of one (not necessarily
the mother) when it is medically impossible to save both, provided that no direct harm is intended to the other. If the above principles are observed, the loss
of the child's life or the mother's life is not intentional and, therefore, unavoidable. Hence, the doctor would not be guilty of abortion or murder. The mother
is never pitted against the child because both their lives are equally valuable.238
Accordingly, if it is necessary to save the life of a mother, procedures endangering the life of the child may be resorted to even if is against the religious
sentiments of the medical practitioner. As quoted above, whatever burden imposed upon a medical practitioner in this case would have been more than
justified considering the life he would be able to save.
Family Planning Seminars
Anent the requirement imposed under Section 15239 as a condition for the issuance of a marriage license, the Court finds the same to be a reasonable
exercise of police power by the government. A cursory reading of the assailed provision bares that the religious freedom of the petitioners is not at all
violated. All the law requires is for would-be spouses to attend a seminar on parenthood, family planning breastfeeding and infant nutrition. It does not
even mandate the type of family planning methods to be included in the seminar, whether they be natural or artificial. As correctly noted by the OSG, those
who receive any information during their attendance in the required seminars are not compelled to accept the information given to them, are completely
free to reject the information they find unacceptable, and retain the freedom to decide on matters of family life without the intervention of the State.
4-The Family and the Right to Privacy
Petitioner CFC assails the RH Law because Section 23(a) (2) (i) thereof violates the provisions of the Constitution by intruding into marital privacy and
autonomy. It argues that it cultivates disunity and fosters animosity in the family rather than promote its solidarity and total development.240
The Court cannot but agree.
The 1987 Constitution is replete with provisions strengthening the family as it is the basic social institution. In fact, one article, Article XV, is devoted
entirely to the family.
ARTICLE XV
THE FAMILY
Section 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its
total development.
Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State.
Section 3. The State shall defend:
The right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions and the demands of responsible parenthood;
The right of children to assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation and
other conditions prejudicial to their development;
The right of the family to a family living wage and income; and
The right of families or family assoc1at1ons to participate in the planning and implementation of policies and programs that affect them.
In this case, the RH Law, in its not-so-hidden desire to control population growth, contains provisions which tend to wreck the family as a solid social
institution. It bars the husband and/or the father from participating in the decision making process regarding their common future progeny. It likewise
deprives the parents of their authority over their minor daughter simply because she is already a parent or had suffered a miscarriage.
The Family and Spousal Consent
Section 23(a) (2) (i) of the RH Law states:
The following acts are prohibited:
(a) Any health care service provider, whether public or private, who shall: ...
(2) refuse to perform legal and medically-safe reproductive health procedures on any person of legal age on the ground of lack of consent or authorization
of the following persons in the following instances:
(i) Spousal consent in case of married persons: provided, That in case of disagreement, the decision of the one undergoing the procedures shall prevail.
[Emphasis supplied]
The above provision refers to reproductive health procedures like tubal litigation and vasectomy which, by their very nature, should require mutual consent
and decision between the husband and the wife as they affect issues intimately related to the founding of a family. Section 3, Art. XV of the Constitution
espouses that the State shall defend the "right of the spouses to found a family." One person cannot found a family. The right, therefore, is shared by both
spouses. In the same Section 3, their right "to participate in the planning and implementation of policies and programs that affect them " is equally
recognized.
The RH Law cannot be allowed to infringe upon this mutual decision-making. By giving absolute authority to the spouse who would undergo a procedure,
and barring the other spouse from participating in the decision would drive a wedge between the husband and wife, possibly result in bitter animosity, and
endanger the marriage and the family, all for the sake of reducing the population. This would be a marked departure from the policy of the State to protect
marriage as an inviolable social institution.241
Decision-making involving a reproductive health procedure is a private matter which belongs to the couple, not just one of them. Any decision they would
reach would affect their future as a family because the size of the family or the number of their children significantly matters. The decision whether or not
to undergo the procedure belongs exclusively to, and shared by, both spouses as one cohesive unit as they chart their own destiny. It is a constitutionally
guaranteed private right. Unless it prejudices the State, which has not shown any compelling interest, the State should see to it that they chart their destiny
together as one family.
As highlighted by Justice Leonardo-De Castro, Section 19( c) of R.A. No. 9710, otherwise known as the "Magna Carta for Women," provides that women
shall have equal rights in all matters relating to marriage and family relations, including the joint decision on the number and spacing of their children.
Indeed, responsible parenthood, as Section 3(v) of the RH Law states, is a shared responsibility between parents. Section 23(a)(2)(i) of the RH Law should
not be allowed to betray the constitutional mandate to protect and strengthen the family by giving to only one spouse the absolute authority to decide
whether to undergo reproductive health procedure.242
The right to chart their own destiny together falls within the protected zone of marital privacy and such state intervention would encroach into the zones of
spousal privacy guaranteed by the Constitution. In our jurisdiction, the right to privacy was first recognized in Marje v. Mutuc,243 where the Court,
speaking through Chief Justice Fernando, held that "the right to privacy as such is accorded recognition independently of its identification with liberty; in
itself, it is fully deserving of constitutional protection."244 Marje adopted the ruling of the US Supreme Court in Griswold v. Connecticut,245 where
Justice William O. Douglas wrote:
We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights -older than our political parties, older than our school system. Marriage is a coming together
for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred. It is an association that promotes a way of life, not causes; a
harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects. Yet it is an association for as noble a purpose as any involved in
our prior decisions.
Ironically, Griswold invalidated a Connecticut statute which made the use of contraceptives a criminal offense on the ground of its amounting to an
unconstitutional invasion of the right to privacy of married persons. Nevertheless, it recognized the zone of privacy rightfully enjoyed by couples. Justice
Douglas in Grisworld wrote that "specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give
them life and substance. Various guarantees create zones of privacy."246
At any rate, in case of conflict between the couple, the courts will decide.
The Family and Parental Consent
Equally deplorable is the debarment of parental consent in cases where the minor, who will be undergoing a procedure, is already a parent or has had a
miscarriage. Section 7 of the RH law provides:
SEC. 7. Access to Family Planning. – x x x.
No person shall be denied information and access to family planning services, whether natural or artificial: Provided, That minors will not be allowed
access to modern methods of family planning without written consent from their parents or guardian/s except when the minor is already a parent or has had
a miscarriage.
There can be no other interpretation of this provision except that when a minor is already a parent or has had a miscarriage, the parents are excluded from
the decision making process of the minor with regard to family planning. Even if she is not yet emancipated, the parental authority is already cut off just
because there is a need to tame population growth.
It is precisely in such situations when a minor parent needs the comfort, care, advice, and guidance of her own parents. The State cannot replace her natural
mother and father when it comes to providing her needs and comfort. To say that their consent is no longer relevant is clearly anti-family. It does not
promote unity in the family. It is an affront to the constitutional mandate to protect and strengthen the family as an inviolable social institution.
More alarmingly, it disregards and disobeys the constitutional mandate that "the natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for
civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government."247 In this regard, Commissioner Bernas wrote:
The 1987 provision has added the adjective "primary" to modify the right of parents. It imports the assertion that the right of parents is superior to that of
the State.248 [Emphases supplied]
To insist on a rule that interferes with the right of parents to exercise parental control over their minor-child or the right of the spouses to mutually decide
on matters which very well affect the very purpose of marriage, that is, the establishment of conjugal and family life, would result in the violation of one's
privacy with respect to his family. It would be dismissive of the unique and strongly-held Filipino tradition of maintaining close family ties and violative of
the recognition that the State affords couples entering into the special contract of marriage to as one unit in forming the foundation of the family and
society.
The State cannot, without a compelling state interest, take over the role of parents in the care and custody of a minor child, whether or not the latter is
already a parent or has had a miscarriage. Only a compelling state interest can justify a state substitution of their parental authority.
First Exception: Access to Information
Whether with respect to the minor referred to under the exception provided in the second paragraph of Section 7 or with respect to the consenting spouse
under Section 23(a)(2)(i), a distinction must be made. There must be a differentiation between access to information about family planning services, on one
hand, and access to the reproductive health procedures and modern family planning methods themselves, on the other. Insofar as access to information is
concerned, the Court finds no constitutional objection to the acquisition of information by the minor referred to under the exception in the second
paragraph of Section 7 that would enable her to take proper care of her own body and that of her unborn child. After all, Section 12, Article II of the
Constitution mandates the State to protect both the life of the mother as that of the unborn child. Considering that information to enable a person to make
informed decisions is essential in the protection and maintenance of ones' health, access to such information with respect to reproductive health must be
allowed. In this situation, the fear that parents might be deprived of their parental control is unfounded because they are not prohibited to exercise parental
guidance and control over their minor child and assist her in deciding whether to accept or reject the information received.
Second Exception: Life Threatening Cases
As in the case of the conscientious objector, an exception must be made in life-threatening cases that require the performance of emergency procedures. In
such cases, the life of the minor who has already suffered a miscarriage and that of the spouse should not be put at grave risk simply for lack of consent. It
should be emphasized that no person should be denied the appropriate medical care urgently needed to preserve the primordial right, that is, the right to
life.
In this connection, the second sentence of Section 23(a)(2)(ii)249 should be struck down. By effectively limiting the requirement of parental consent to
"only in elective surgical procedures," it denies the parents their right of parental authority in cases where what is involved are "non-surgical procedures."
Save for the two exceptions discussed above, and in the case of an abused child as provided in the first sentence of Section 23(a)(2)(ii), the parents should
not be deprived of their constitutional right of parental authority. To deny them of this right would be an affront to the constitutional mandate to protect and
strengthen the family.
5 - Academic Freedom
It is asserted that Section 14 of the RH Law, in relation to Section 24 thereof, mandating the teaching of Age-and Development-Appropriate Reproductive
Health Education under threat of fine and/or imprisonment violates the principle of academic freedom . According to the petitioners, these provisions
effectively force educational institutions to teach reproductive health education even if they believe that the same is not suitable to be taught to their
students.250 Citing various studies conducted in the United States and statistical data gathered in the country, the petitioners aver that the prevalence of
contraceptives has led to an increase of out-of-wedlock births; divorce and breakdown of families; the acceptance of abortion and euthanasia; the
"feminization of poverty"; the aging of society; and promotion of promiscuity among the youth.251
At this point, suffice it to state that any attack on the validity of Section 14 of the RH Law is premature because the Department of Education, Culture and
Sports has yet to formulate a curriculum on age-appropriate reproductive health education. One can only speculate on the content, manner and medium of
instruction that will be used to educate the adolescents and whether they will contradict the religious beliefs of the petitioners and validate their
apprehensions. Thus, considering the premature nature of this particular issue, the Court declines to rule on its constitutionality or validity.
At any rate, Section 12, Article II of the 1987 Constitution provides that the natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for
civic efficiency and development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government. Like the 1973 Constitution and the 1935 Constitution, the
1987 Constitution affirms the State recognition of the invaluable role of parents in preparing the youth to become productive members of society. Notably,
it places more importance on the role of parents in the development of their children by recognizing that said role shall be "primary," that is, that the right
of parents in upbringing the youth is superior to that of the State.252
It is also the inherent right of the State to act as parens patriae to aid parents in the moral development of the youth. Indeed, the Constitution makes
mention of the importance of developing the youth and their important role in nation building.253 Considering that Section 14 provides not only for the
age-appropriate-reproductive health education, but also for values formation; the development of knowledge and skills in self-protection against
discrimination; sexual abuse and violence against women and children and other forms of gender based violence and teen pregnancy; physical, social and
emotional changes in adolescents; women's rights and children's rights; responsible teenage behavior; gender and development; and responsible
parenthood, and that Rule 10, Section 11.01 of the RH-IRR and Section 4(t) of the RH Law itself provides for the teaching of responsible teenage behavior,
gender sensitivity and physical and emotional changes among adolescents - the Court finds that the legal mandate provided under the assailed provision
supplements, rather than supplants, the rights and duties of the parents in the moral development of their children.
Furthermore, as Section 14 also mandates that the mandatory reproductive health education program shall be developed in conjunction with parent-teacher-
community associations, school officials and other interest groups, it could very well be said that it will be in line with the religious beliefs of the
petitioners. By imposing such a condition, it becomes apparent that the petitioners' contention that Section 14 violates Article XV, Section 3(1) of the
Constitution is without merit.254
While the Court notes the possibility that educators might raise their objection to their participation in the reproductive health education program provided
under Section 14 of the RH Law on the ground that the same violates their religious beliefs, the Court reserves its judgment should an actual case be filed
before it.
6 - Due Process
The petitioners contend that the RH Law suffers from vagueness and, thus violates the due process clause of the Constitution. According to them, Section
23 (a)(l) mentions a "private health service provider" among those who may be held punishable but does not define who is a "private health care service
provider." They argue that confusion further results since Section 7 only makes reference to a "private health care institution."
The petitioners also point out that Section 7 of the assailed legislation exempts hospitals operated by religious groups from rendering reproductive health
service and modern family planning methods. It is unclear, however, if these institutions are also exempt from giving reproductive health information under
Section 23(a)(l), or from rendering reproductive health procedures under Section 23(a)(2).
Finally, it is averred that the RH Law punishes the withholding, restricting and providing of incorrect information, but at the same time fails to define
"incorrect information."
The arguments fail to persuade.
A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess its
meaning and differ as to its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord persons,
especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and
becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.255 Moreover, in determining whether the words used in a statute are vague, words must not only
be taken in accordance with their plain meaning alone, but also in relation to other parts of the statute. It is a rule that every part of the statute must be
interpreted with reference to the context, that is, every part of it must be construed together with the other parts and kept subservient to the general intent of
the whole enactment.256
As correctly noted by the OSG, in determining the definition of "private health care service provider," reference must be made to Section 4(n) of the RH
Law which defines a "public health service provider," viz:
(n) Public health care service provider refers to: (1) public health care institution, which is duly licensed and accredited and devoted primarily to the
maintenance and operation of facilities for health promotion, disease prevention, diagnosis, treatment and care of individuals suffering from illness,
disease, injury, disability or deformity, or in need of obstetrical or other medical and nursing care; (2) public health care professional, who is a doctor of
medicine, a nurse or a midvvife; (3) public health worker engaged in the delivery of health care services; or (4) barangay health worker who has undergone
training programs under any accredited government and NGO and who voluntarily renders primarily health care services in the community after having
been accredited to function as such by the local health board in accordance with the guidelines promulgated by the Department of Health (DOH) .
Further, the use of the term "private health care institution" in Section 7 of the law, instead of "private health care service provider," should not be a cause
of confusion for the obvious reason that they are used synonymously.
The Court need not belabor the issue of whether the right to be exempt from being obligated to render reproductive health service and modem family
planning methods, includes exemption from being obligated to give reproductive health information and to render reproductive health procedures. Clearly,
subject to the qualifications and exemptions earlier discussed, the right to be exempt from being obligated to render reproductive health service and modem
family planning methods, necessarily includes exemption from being obligated to give reproductive health information and to render reproductive health
procedures. The terms "service" and "methods" are broad enough to include the providing of information and the rendering of medical procedures.
The same can be said with respect to the contention that the RH Law punishes health care service providers who intentionally withhold, restrict and
provide incorrect information regarding reproductive health programs and services. For ready reference, the assailed provision is hereby quoted as follows:
SEC. 23. Prohibited Acts. - The following acts are prohibited:
(a) Any health care service provider, whether public or private, who shall:
(1) Knowingly withhold information or restrict the dissemination thereof, and/ or intentionally provide incorrect information regarding programs and
services on reproductive health including the right to informed choice and access to a full range of legal, medically-safe, non-abortifacient and effective
family planning methods;
From its plain meaning, the word "incorrect" here denotes failing to agree with a copy or model or with established rules; inaccurate, faulty; failing to
agree with the requirements of duty, morality or propriety; and failing to coincide with the truth. 257 On the other hand, the word "knowingly" means with
awareness or deliberateness that is intentional.258 Used together in relation to Section 23(a)(l), they connote a sense of malice and ill motive to mislead or
misrepresent the public as to the nature and effect of programs and services on reproductive health. Public health and safety demand that health care
service providers give their honest and correct medical information in accordance with what is acceptable in medical practice. While health care service
providers are not barred from expressing their own personal opinions regarding the programs and services on reproductive health, their right must be
tempered with the need to provide public health and safety. The public deserves no less.
7-Egual Protection
The petitioners also claim that the RH Law violates the equal protection clause under the Constitution as it discriminates against the poor because it makes
them the primary target of the government program that promotes contraceptive use . They argue that, rather than promoting reproductive health among the
poor, the RH Law introduces contraceptives that would effectively reduce the number of the poor. Their bases are the various provisions in the RH Law
dealing with the poor, especially those mentioned in the guiding principles259 and definition of terms260 of the law.
They add that the exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory reproductive health education program imposed by the RH Law renders
it unconstitutional.
In Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission,261 the Court had the occasion to expound on the concept of equal protection. Thus:
One of the basic principles on which this government was founded is that of the equality of right which is embodied in Section 1, Article III of the 1987
Constitution. The equal protection of the laws is embraced in the concept of due process, as every unfair discrimination offends the requirements of justice
and fair play. It has been embodied in a separate clause, however, to provide for a more specific guaranty against any form of undue favoritism or hostility
from the government. Arbitrariness in general may be challenged on the basis of the due process clause. But if the particular act assailed partakes of an
unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it down is the equal protection clause.
"According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights
conferred and responsibilities imposed." It "requires public bodies and inst itutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner." "The purpose
of the equal protection clause is to secure every person within a state's jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by
the express terms of a statue or by its improper execution through the state's duly constituted authorities." "In other words, the concept of equal justice
under the law requires the state to govern impartially, and it may not draw distinctions between individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant to a
legitimate governmental objective."
The equal protection clause is aimed at all official state actions, not just those of the legislature. Its inhibitions cover all the departments of the government
including the political and executive departments, and extend to all actions of a state denying equal protection of the laws, through whatever agency or
whatever guise is taken.
It, however, does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or things without distinction. What it simply requires is equality among
equals as determined according to a valid classification. Indeed, the equal protection clause permits classification. Such classification, however, to be valid
must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of
the law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the same class. "Superficial differences do not make for
a valid classification."
For a classification to meet the requirements of constitutionality, it must include or embrace all persons who naturally belong to the class. "The
classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed. It is
not necessary that the classification be made with absolute symmetry, in the sense that the members of the class should possess the same characteristics in
equal degree. Substantial similarity will suffice; and as long as this is achieved, all those covered by the classification are to be treated equally. The mere
fact that an individual belonging to a class differs from the other members, as long as that class is substantially distinguishable from all others, does not
justify the non-application of the law to him."
The classification must not be based on existing circumstances only, or so constituted as to preclude addition to the number included in the class. It must be
of such a nature as to embrace all those who may thereafter be in similar circumstances and conditions. It must not leave out or "underinclude" those that
should otherwise fall into a certain classification. [Emphases supplied; citations excluded]
To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the government's reproductive health care program is not a violation of the equal protection clause. In
fact, it is pursuant to Section 11, Article XIII of the Constitution which recognizes the distinct necessity to address the needs of the underprivileged by
providing that they be given priority in addressing the health development of the people. Thus:
Section 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach to health development which shall endeavor to make essential goods, health
and other social services available to all the people at affordable cost. There shall be priority for the needs of the underprivileged, sick, elderly, disabled,
women, and children. The State shall endeavor to provide free medical care to paupers.
It should be noted that Section 7 of the RH Law prioritizes poor and marginalized couples who are suffering from fertility issues and desire to have
children. There is, therefore, no merit to the contention that the RH Law only seeks to target the poor to reduce their number. While the RH Law admits the
use of contraceptives, it does not, as elucidated above, sanction abortion. As Section 3(1) explains, the "promotion and/or stabilization of the population
growth rate is incidental to the advancement of reproductive health."
Moreover, the RH Law does not prescribe the number of children a couple may have and does not impose conditions upon couples who intend to have
children. While the petitioners surmise that the assailed law seeks to charge couples with the duty to have children only if they would raise them in a truly
humane way, a deeper look into its provisions shows that what the law seeks to do is to simply provide priority to the poor in the implementation of
government programs to promote basic reproductive health care.
With respect to the exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory reproductive health education program under Section 14, suffice it to
state that the mere fact that the children of those who are less fortunate attend public educational institutions does not amount to substantial distinction
sufficient to annul the assailed provision. On the other hand, substantial distinction rests between public educational institutions and private educational
institutions, particularly because there is a need to recognize the academic freedom of private educational institutions especially with respect to religious
instruction and to consider their sensitivity towards the teaching of reproductive health education.
8-Involuntary Servitude
The petitioners also aver that the RH Law is constitutionally infirm as it violates the constitutional prohibition against involuntary servitude. They posit
that Section 17 of the assailed legislation requiring private and non-government health care service providers to render forty-eight (48) hours of pro bono
reproductive health services, actually amounts to involuntary servitude because it requires medical practitioners to perform acts against their will.262
The OSG counters that the rendition of pro bono services envisioned in Section 17 can hardly be considered as forced labor analogous to slavery, as
reproductive health care service providers have the discretion as to the manner and time of giving pro bono services. Moreover, the OSG points out that the
imposition is within the powers of the government, the accreditation of medical practitioners with PhilHealth being a privilege and not a right.
The point of the OSG is well-taken.
It should first be mentioned that the practice of medicine is undeniably imbued with public interest that it is both a power and a duty of the State to control
and regulate it in order to protect and promote the public welfare. Like the legal profession, the practice of medicine is not a right but a privileged burdened
with conditions as it directly involves the very lives of the people. A fortiori, this power includes the power of Congress 263 to prescribe the qualifications
for the practice of professions or trades which affect the public welfare, the public health, the public morals, and the public safety; and to regulate or
control such professions or trades, even to the point of revoking such right altogether.264
Moreover, as some petitioners put it, the notion of involuntary servitude connotes the presence of force, threats, intimidation or other similar means of
coercion and compulsion.265 A reading of the assailed provision, however, reveals that it only encourages private and non- government reproductive
healthcare service providers to render pro bono service. Other than non-accreditation with PhilHealth, no penalty is imposed should they choose to do
otherwise. Private and non-government reproductive healthcare service providers also enjoy the liberty to choose which kind of health service they wish to
provide, when, where and how to provide it or whether to provide it all. Clearly, therefore, no compulsion, force or threat is made upon them to render pro
bono service against their will. While the rendering of such service was made a prerequisite to accreditation with PhilHealth, the Court does not consider
the same to be an unreasonable burden, but rather, a necessary incentive imposed by Congress in the furtherance of a perceived legitimate state interest.
Consistent with what the Court had earlier discussed, however, it should be emphasized that conscientious objectors are exempt from this provision as long
as their religious beliefs and convictions do not allow them to render reproductive health service, pro bona or otherwise.
9-Delegation of Authority to the FDA
The petitioners likewise question the delegation by Congress to the FDA of the power to determine whether or not a supply or product is to be included in
the Essential Drugs List (EDL).266
The Court finds nothing wrong with the delegation. The FDA does not only have the power but also the competency to evaluate, register and cover health
services and methods. It is the only government entity empowered to render such services and highly proficient to do so. It should be understood that
health services and methods fall under the gamut of terms that are associated with what is ordinarily understood as "health products."
In this connection, Section 4 of R.A. No. 3 720, as amended by R.A. No. 9711 reads:
SEC. 4. To carry out the provisions of this Act, there is hereby created an office to be called the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in the Department of
Health (DOH). Said Administration shall be under the Office of the Secretary and shall have the following functions, powers and duties:
"(a) To administer the effective implementation of this Act and of the rules and regulations issued pursuant to the same;
"(b) To assume primary jurisdiction in the collection of samples of health products;
"(c) To analyze and inspect health products in connection with the implementation of this Act;
"(d) To establish analytical data to serve as basis for the preparation of health products standards, and to recommend standards of identity,
purity, safety, efficacy, quality and fill of container;
"(e) To issue certificates of compliance with technical requirements to serve as basis for the issuance of appropriate authorization and spot-
check for compliance with regulations regarding operation of manufacturers, importers, exporters, distributors, wholesalers, drug outlets, and
other establishments and facilities of health products, as determined by the FDA;
"x x x
 "(h) To conduct appropriate tests on all applicable health products prior to the issuance of appropriate authorizations to ensure safety, efficacy,
purity, and quality;
"(i) To require all manufacturers, traders, distributors, importers, exporters, wholesalers, retailers, consumers, and non-consumer users of health
products to report to the FDA any incident that reasonably indicates that said product has caused or contributed to the death, serious illness or
serious injury to a consumer, a patient, or any person;
"(j) To issue cease and desist orders motu propio or upon verified complaint for health products, whether or not registered with the FDA
Provided, That for registered health products, the cease and desist order is valid for thirty (30) days and may be extended for sixty ( 60) days
only after due process has been observed;
"(k) After due process, to order the ban, recall, and/or withdrawal of any health product found to have caused death, serious illness or serious
injury to a consumer or patient, or is found to be imminently injurious, unsafe, dangerous, or grossly deceptive, and to require all concerned to
implement the risk management plan which is a requirement for the issuance of the appropriate authorization;
x x x.
As can be gleaned from the above, the functions, powers and duties of the FDA are specific to enable the agency to carry out the mandates of the law.
Being the country's premiere and sole agency that ensures the safety of food and medicines available to the public, the FDA was equipped with the
necessary powers and functions to make it effective. Pursuant to the principle of necessary implication, the mandate by Congress to the FDA to ensure
public health and safety by permitting only food and medicines that are safe includes "service" and "methods." From the declared policy of the RH Law, it
is clear that Congress intended that the public be given only those medicines that are proven medically safe, legal, non-abortifacient, and effective in
accordance with scientific and evidence-based medical research standards. The philosophy behind the permitted delegation was explained in Echagaray v.
Secretary of Justice,267 as follows:
The reason is the increasing complexity of the task of the government and the growing inability of the legislature to cope directly with the many problems
demanding its attention. The growth of society has ramified its activities and created peculiar and sophisticated problems that the legislature cannot be
expected reasonably to comprehend. Specialization even in legislation has become necessary. To many of the problems attendant upon present day
undertakings, the legislature may not have the competence, let alone the interest and the time, to provide the required direct and efficacious, not to say
specific solutions.
10- Autonomy of Local Governments and the Autonomous Region
of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)
As for the autonomy of local governments, the petitioners claim that the RH Law infringes upon the powers devolved to local government units (LGUs)
under Section 17 of the Local Government Code. Said Section 17 vested upon the LGUs the duties and functions pertaining to the delivery of basic
services and facilities, as follows:
SECTION 17. Basic Services and Facilities. –
(a) Local government units shall endeavor to be self-reliant and shall continue exercising the powers and discharging the duties and functions
currently vested upon them. They shall also discharge the functions and responsibilities of national agencies and offices devolved to them
pursuant to this Code. Local government units shall likewise exercise such other powers and discharge such other functions and responsibilities
as are necessary, appropriate, or incidental to efficient and effective provision of the basic services and facilities enumerated herein.
(b) Such basic services and facilities include, but are not limited to, x x x.
While the aforementioned provision charges the LGUs to take on the functions and responsibilities that have already been devolved upon them
from the national agencies on the aspect of providing for basic services and facilities in their respective jurisdictions, paragraph (c) of the same
provision provides a categorical exception of cases involving nationally-funded projects, facilities, programs and services.268 Thus:
(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (b) hereof, public works and infrastructure projects and other facilities, programs and services
funded by the National Government under the annual General Appropriations Act, other special laws, pertinent executive orders, and those
wholly or partially funded from foreign sources, are not covered under this Section, except in those cases where the local government unit
concerned is duly designated as the implementing agency for such projects, facilities, programs and services. [Emphases supplied]
The essence of this express reservation of power by the national government is that, unless an LGU is particularly designated as the implementing agency,
it has no power over a program for which funding has been provided by the national government under the annual general appropriations act, even if the
program involves the delivery of basic services within the jurisdiction of the LGU.269 A complete relinquishment of central government powers on the
matter of providing basic facilities and services cannot be implied as the Local Government Code itself weighs against it.270
In this case, a reading of the RH Law clearly shows that whether it pertains to the establishment of health care facilities, 271 the hiring of skilled health
professionals,272 or the training of barangay health workers,273 it will be the national government that will provide for the funding of its implementation.
Local autonomy is not absolute. The national government still has the say when it comes to national priority programs which the local government is called
upon to implement like the RH Law.
Moreover, from the use of the word "endeavor," the LG Us are merely encouraged to provide these services. There is nothing in the wording of the law
which can be construed as making the availability of these services mandatory for the LGUs. For said reason, it cannot be said that the RH Law amounts to
an undue encroachment by the national government upon the autonomy enjoyed by the local governments.
The ARMM
The fact that the RH Law does not intrude in the autonomy of local governments can be equally applied to the ARMM. The RH Law does not infringe
upon its autonomy. Moreover, Article III, Sections 6, 10 and 11 of R.A. No. 9054, or the organic act of the ARMM, alluded to by petitioner Tillah to justify
the exemption of the operation of the RH Law in the autonomous region, refer to the policy statements for the guidance of the regional government. These
provisions relied upon by the petitioners simply delineate the powers that may be exercised by the regional government, which can, in no manner, be
characterized as an abdication by the State of its power to enact legislation that would benefit the general welfare. After all, despite the veritable autonomy
granted the ARMM, the Constitution and the supporting jurisprudence, as they now stand, reject the notion of imperium et imperio in the relationship
between the national and the regional governments.274 Except for the express and implied limitations imposed on it by the Constitution, Congress cannot
be restricted to exercise its inherent and plenary power to legislate on all subjects which extends to all matters of general concern or common interest.275
11 - Natural Law
With respect to the argument that the RH Law violates natural law,276 suffice it to say that the Court does not duly recognize it as a legal basis for
upholding or invalidating a law. Our only guidepost is the Constitution. While every law enacted by man emanated from what is perceived as natural law,
the Court is not obliged to see if a statute, executive issuance or ordinance is in conformity to it. To begin with, it is not enacted by an acceptable legitimate
body. Moreover, natural laws are mere thoughts and notions on inherent rights espoused by theorists, philosophers and theologists. The jurists of the
philosophical school are interested in the law as an abstraction, rather than in the actual law of the past or present. 277 Unless, a natural right has been
transformed into a written law, it cannot serve as a basis to strike down a law. In Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 278 the very case cited by the petitioners, it
was explained that the Court is not duty-bound to examine every law or action and whether it conforms with both the Constitution and natural law. Rather,
natural law is to be used sparingly only in the most peculiar of circumstances involving rights inherent to man where no law is applicable.279
At any rate, as earlier expounded, the RH Law does not sanction the taking away of life. It does not allow abortion in any shape or form. It only seeks to
enhance the population control program of the government by providing information and making non-abortifacient contraceptives more readily available to
the public, especially to the poor.
Facts and Fallacies
and the Wisdom of the Law
In general, the Court does not find the RH Law as unconstitutional insofar as it seeks to provide access to medically-safe, non-abortifacient, effective,
legal, affordable, and quality reproductive healthcare services, methods, devices, and supplies. As earlier pointed out, however, the religious freedom of
some sectors of society cannot be trampled upon in pursuit of what the law hopes to achieve. After all, the Constitutional safeguard to religious freedom is
a recognition that man stands accountable to an authority higher than the State.
In conformity with the principle of separation of Church and State, one religious group cannot be allowed to impose its beliefs on the rest of the society.
Philippine modem society leaves enough room for diversity and pluralism. As such, everyone should be tolerant and open-minded so that peace and
harmony may continue to reign as we exist alongside each other.
As healthful as the intention of the RH Law may be, the idea does not escape the Court that what it seeks to address is the problem of rising poverty and
unemployment in the country. Let it be said that the cause of these perennial issues is not the large population but the unequal distribution of wealth. Even
if population growth is controlled, poverty will remain as long as the country's wealth remains in the hands of the very few.
At any rate, population control may not be beneficial for the country in the long run. The European and Asian countries, which embarked on such a
program generations ago , are now burdened with ageing populations. The number of their young workers is dwindling with adverse effects on their
economy. These young workers represent a significant human capital which could have helped them invigorate, innovate and fuel their economy. These
countries are now trying to reverse their programs, but they are still struggling. For one, Singapore, even with incentives, is failing.
And in this country, the economy is being propped up by remittances from our Overseas Filipino Workers. This is because we have an ample supply of
young able-bodied workers. What would happen if the country would be weighed down by an ageing population and the fewer younger generation would
not be able to support them? This would be the situation when our total fertility rate would go down below the replacement level of two (2) children per
woman.280
Indeed, at the present, the country has a population problem, but the State should not use coercive measures (like the penal provisions of the RH Law
against conscientious objectors) to solve it. Nonetheless, the policy of the Court is non-interference in the wisdom of a law.
x x x. But this Court cannot go beyond what the legislature has laid down. Its duty is to say what the law is as enacted by the lawmaking body. That is not
the same as saying what the law should be or what is the correct rule in a given set of circumstances. It is not the province of the judiciary to look into the
wisdom of the law nor to question the policies adopted by the legislative branch. Nor is it the business of this Tribunal to remedy every unjust situation that
may arise from the application of a particular law. It is for the legislature to enact remedial legislation if that would be necessary in the premises. But as
always, with apt judicial caution and cold neutrality, the Court must carry out the delicate function of interpreting the law, guided by the Constitution and
existing legislation and mindful of settled jurisprudence. The Court's function is therefore limited, and accordingly, must confine itself to the judicial task
of saying what the law is, as enacted by the lawmaking body.281
Be that as it may, it bears reiterating that the RH Law is a mere compilation and enhancement of the prior existing contraceptive and reproductive health
laws, but with coercive measures. Even if the Court decrees the RH Law as entirely unconstitutional, there will still be the Population Act (R.A. No. 6365),
the Contraceptive Act (R.A. No. 4729) and the reproductive health for women or The Magna Carta of Women (R.A. No. 9710), sans the coercive
provisions of the assailed legislation. All the same, the principle of "no-abortion" and "non-coercion" in the adoption of any family planning method should
be maintained.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTIALLY GRANTED. Accordingly, the Court declares R.A. No. 10354 as NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL except with
respect to the following provisions which are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL:
1) Section 7 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they: a) require private health facilities and non-maternity specialty
hospitals and hospitals owned and operated by a religious group to refer patients, not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under
Republic Act No. 8344, to another health facility which is conveniently accessible; and b) allow minor-parents or minors who have suffered a
miscarriage access to modem methods of family planning without written consent from their parents or guardian/s;
2) Section 23(a)(l) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as they punish any healthcare
service provider who fails and or refuses to disseminate information regarding programs and services on reproductive health regardless of his or
her religious beliefs.
3) Section 23(a)(2)(i) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they allow a married individual, not in an emergency or life-
threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to undergo reproductive health procedures without the consent of the spouse;
4) Section 23(a)(2)(ii) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they limit the requirement of parental consent only to elective
surgical procedures.
5) Section 23(a)(3) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5.24 thereof, insofar as they punish any healthcare
 service provider who fails and/or refuses to refer a patient not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344,
to another health care service provider within the same facility or one which is conveniently accessible regardless of his or her religious beliefs;
6) Section 23(b) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as they punish any public officer
who refuses to support reproductive health programs or shall do any act that hinders the full implementation of a reproductive health program,
regardless of his or her religious beliefs;
7) Section 17 and the corresponding prov1s10n in the RH-IRR regarding the rendering of pro bona reproductive health service in so far as they
affect the conscientious objector in securing PhilHealth accreditation; and
8) Section 3.0l(a) and Section 3.01 G) of the RH-IRR, which added the qualifier "primarily" in defining abortifacients and contraceptives, as
they are ultra vires and, therefore, null and void for contravening Section 4(a) of the RH Law and violating Section 12, Article II of the
Constitution.
The Status Quo Ante Order issued by the Court on March 19, 2013 as extended by its Order, dated July 16, 2013 , is hereby LIFTED, insofar as the
provisions of R.A. No. 10354 which have been herein declared as constitutional.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
Tingnan ang aking opinyong
Sumasang-ayon at Sumasalungat
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice

See Concurring Opinion

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

With Separate concurring opinion See: Separate Concurring Opinion

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

Associate Justice Associate Justice

See Concurring and dissenting See Concurring Opinion

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice Associate Justice

See concurring and dissenting See Concurring and Dissenting Opinion

BIENVENIDO L. REYES ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice Associate Justice

See Separate dissent

MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN
Associate Justice
C E R TI F I CATI O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I hereby certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice

Footnotes
1 Islamic Da'wah Council of the Philippines, Inc. v. Office of the Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 153888, July 9, 2003; 405 SCRA 497, 504.
2 See <http://wn.com/pro-rh_ bill_vs_anti-rh_ bi ll>, last visited on November 5, 20 13; See also <http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/nation/04/ 19/
I O/h ontiveros-tatad-debate-rh-bill>, last vi sited on November 5, 201 3.
3 See <http ://news info .inqu irer.net/inquirerheadlines/nation/view/ 20110321-326743/Stickers-spread-anti-RH-bill-message>, last visited on
November 5, 2 01 3; See also <http ://www.gmanetwork.com/news/story/ 218169/news/nation/carlos-celdran-distributes-pro-rh-stickers-in-
quiapo>, last visited on November 5, 201 3.
 4 See <http ://newsinfo. inquirer.net/241 737/massive-church-rally-set-against-rh-bill>, last visited November 5, 201 3; See also
<http://www.splendorofthechurch.eom.ph/201 3/04/29/fi lipino-catholics-flex-muscles-in-poll-clout/>, last visited November 5, 2013.
5 With Prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order/ Writ of Preliminary Injunction; docketed as G.R. No. 2048 19; rollo (G.R. No.
204819), pp. 3-32.
6 With Prayer for the Urgent Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction; docketed as G.R. No. 204934;
rollo (G.R. No. 204934), pp. 3-76.
7 Also proceeding in her personal capacity a citizen and as a member of the Bar.
8 Spouses Reynaldo S. Luistro & Rosie B. Luistro, Jose S. Sandejas & Elenita S.A. Sandejas, Arturo M. Gorrez & Marietta C . Gorrez, Salvador
S. Mante, Jr. & Hazeleen L. Mante, Rolando M. Bautista & Maria Felisa S. Bautista, Desiderio Racho & Traquilina Racho, Femand Antonio A.
Tansingco & Carol Anne C. Tansingco for themselves and on behalf of their minor children, Therese Antonette C. Tansingco, Lorenzo Jose C.
Tansingco, Miguel Fernando C . Tangsingco, Carlo Josemaria C. Tansingco & Juan Paolo C. Tansingco, Spouses Mariano V. Araneta & Eileen
Z. Araneta for themselves and on behalf of their minor children, Ramon Carlos Z. Araneta & Maya Angelica Z. Araneta, Spouses Renato C.
Castor & Mildred C. Castor for themselves and on behalf of their minor children, Renz Jeffrey C. Castor, Joseph Ramil C. Castor, John Paul C.
Castor & Raphae l C. Castor, Spouses Alexander R. Racho & Zara Z. Racho for themselves a nd on behalf of their minor chi ldren Margarita
Racho, Mikaela Racho, Martin Racho, Mari Racho & Manolo Racho, Spouses Alfred R. Racho & Franc ine Y. Racho for themse lves and on
behalf of their minor children Michael Racho, Mariana Racho, Rafael Racho, Maxi Racho, C hessie Racho & Laura Racho, Spouses David R.
Racho & Armilyn A. Racho for themselves and on behalf of the ir minor child Gabrie l Racho, Mindy M. Juatas and on behalf of her minor
children Elijah General Juatas and Elian Gabriel Juatas, Salvacion M. Monteiro, Emily R. Laws, Joseph R. Laws & Katrina R. Laws
9 With Prayer for Injunction; docketed a s G.R. No. 204957.
10 With Prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order/ Writ of Preliminary Injunction; docketed as G.R. No. 204988; rollo (G.R.
No. 204988), pp. 5-3 5.
11 Through and together with its president Nestor B. Lumicao, M.D.
12 Through and together with its representative/ member of the school board Dr. Rodrigo M. Alenton, M.D.
13 Rosemarie R. Alenton, Imelda G. Ibarra, Cpa, Lovenia P. Naces, Phd. , Anthony G. Nagac, Earl Anthony C. Gambe And, Marlon I. Yap.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Baguio City
EN BANC
G.R. No. 204819 April 8, 2014
JAMES M. IMBONG and LOVELY-ANN C. IMBONG, for themselves and in behalf of their minor children, LUCIA CARLOS IMBONG and
BERNADETTE CARLOS IMBONG and MAGNIFICAT CHILD DEVELOPMENT CENTER, INC., Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and Management,
HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education, Culture and
Sports and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local Government, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 204934
ALLIANCE FOR THE FAMILY FOUNDATION PHILIPPINES, INC. [ALFI], represented by its President, Maria Concepcion S. Noche, Spouses
Reynaldo S. Luistro & Rosie B . Luistro, Jose S. Sandejas & Elenita S.A. Sandejas, Arturo M. Gorrez & Marietta C. Gorrez, Salvador S. Mante,
Jr. & Hazeleen L. Mante, Rolando M. Bautista & Maria Felisa S. Bautista, Desiderio Racho & Traquilina Racho, F emand Antonio A. Tansingco
& Carol Anne C. Tansingco for themselves and on behalf of their minor children, Therese Antonette C. Tansingco, Lorenzo Jose C. Tansingco,
Miguel F emando C. Tangsingco, Carlo Josemaria C. Tansingco & Juan Paolo C. Tansingco, Spouses Mariano V. Araneta & Eileen Z. Araneta for
themselves and on behalf of their minor children, Ramon Carlos Z. Araneta & Maya Angelica Z. Araneta, Spouses Renato C. Castor & Mildred
C. Castor for themselves and on behalf of their minor children, Renz Jeffrey C. Castor, Joseph Ramil C. Castor, John Paul C. Castor & Raphael
C. Castor, Spouses Alexander R. Racho & Zara Z. Racho for themselves and on behalf of their minor children Margarita Racho, Mikaela Racho,
Martin Racho, Mari Racho & Manolo Racho, Spouses Alfred R. Racho & Francine V. Racho for themselves and on behalf of their minor children
Michael Racho, Mariana Racho, Rafael Racho, Maxi Racho, Chessie Racho & Laura Racho, Spouses David R. Racho & Armilyn A. Racho for
themselves and on behalf of their minor child Gabriel Racho, Mindy M. Juatas and on behalf of her minor children Elijah Gerald Juatas and
Elian Gabriel Juatas, Salvacion M. Monteiro, Emily R. Laws, Joseph R . Laws & Katrina R. Laws, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO,
Secretary, Department of Education, Culture and Sports, HON. CORAZON SOLIMAN, Secretary, Department of Social Welfare and
Development, HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local Government, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD,
Secretary, Department of Budget and Management, HON. ARSENIO M. BALISACAN, Socio-Economic Planning Secretary and NEDA Director-
General, THE PHILIPPINE COMMISSION ON WOMEN, represented by its Chairperson, Remedios lgnacio-Rikken, THE PHILIPPINE
HEALTH INSURANCE CORPORATION, represented by its President Eduardo Banzon, THE LEAGUE OF PROVINCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES, represented by its President Alfonso Umali, THE LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its President
Oscar Rodriguez, and THE LEAGUE OF MUNICIPALITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its President Donato Marcos, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 204957
TASK FORCE FOR FAMILY AND LIFE VISAYAS, INC. and VALERIANO S. AVILA, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary; HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and Management;
HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Education; and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local
Government, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 204988
SERVE LIFE CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY, INC., represented by Dr. Nestor B. Lumicao, M.D., as President and in his personal capacity,
ROSEVALE FOUNDATION INC., represented by Dr. Rodrigo M. Alenton, M.D., as member of the school board and in his personal capacity,
ROSEMARIE R. ALENTON, IMELDA G. IBARRA, CPA, LOVENIAP. NACES, Phd., ANTHONY G. NAGAC, EARL ANTHONY C. GAMBE
and MARLON I. YAP, Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR.,
Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and Management; HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary,
Department of Health; HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary,
Department of Interior and Local Government, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 205003
EXPEDITO A. BUGARIN, JR., Petitioner,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, HON. SENATE PRESIDENT, HON. SPEAKER OF THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES and HON. SOLICITOR GENERAL, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 205043
EDUARDO B. OLAGUER and THE CATHOLIC XYBRSPACE APOSTOLATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioners,
vs.
DOH SECRETARY ENRIQUE T. ONA, FDA DIRECTOR SUZETTE H. LAZO, DBM SECRETARY FLORENCIO B. ABAD, DILG
SECRETARY MANUELA. ROXAS II, DECS SECRETARY ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 205138
PHILIPPINE ALLIANCE OF XSEMINARIANS, INC. (PAX), herein represented by its National President, Atty. Ricardo M . Ribo, and in his
own behalf, Atty. Lino E.A. Dumas, Romeo B. Almonte, Osmundo C. Orlanes, Arsenio Z. Menor, Samuel J. Yap, Jaime F. Mateo, Rolly Siguan,
Dante E. Magdangal, Michael Eugenio O. Plana, Bienvenido C. Miguel, Jr., Landrito M. Diokno and Baldomero Falcone, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and Management,
HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education, HON.
MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local Government, HON. CORAZON J. SOLIMAN, Secretary, Department of
Social Welfare and Development, HON. ARSENIO BALISACAN, Director-General, National Economic and Development Authority, HON.
SUZETTE H. LAZO, Director-General, Food and Drugs Administration, THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS, Philippine Health Insurance
Corporation, and THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS, Philippine Commission on Women, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 205478
REYNALDO J. ECHAVEZ, M.D., JACQUELINE H. KING, M.D., CYNTHIA T. DOMINGO, M.D., AND JOSEPHINE MILLADO-LUMITAO,
M.D., collectively known as Doctors For Life, and ANTHONY PEREZ, MICHAEL ANTHONY G. MAPA, CARLOS ANTONIO PALAD,
WILFREDO JOSE, CLAIRE NAVARRO, ANNA COSIO, and GABRIEL DY LIACCO collectively known as Filipinos For Life, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary; HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management;
HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary of the Department of Health; HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary of the Department of Education; and
HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local Government, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 205491
SPOUSES FRANCISCO S. TATAD AND MARIA FENNY C. TATAD & ALA F. PAGUIA, for themselves, their Posterity, and the rest of Filipino
posterity, Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT of the Republic of the Philippines, Respondent.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 205720
PRO-LIFE PHILIPPINES FOUNDATION, Inc., represented by Loma Melegrito, as Executive Director, and in her personal capacity, JOSELYN
B. BASILIO, ROBERT Z. CORTES, ARIEL A. CRISOSTOMO, JEREMY I. GATDULA, CRISTINA A. MONTES, RAUL ANTONIO A. NIDOY,
WINSTON CONRAD B. PADOJINOG, RUFINO L. POLICARPIO III, Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR.,
Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary,
Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education and HON. MANUEL A. ROXAS II, Secretary,
Department of Interior and Local Government, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 206355
MILLENNIUM SAINT FOUNDATION, INC., ATTY. RAMON PEDROSA, ATTY. CITA BORROMEO-GARCIA, STELLAACEDERA, ATTY.
BERTENI CATALUNA CAUSING, Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, DEPARTMENT OF
EDUCATION, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 207111
JOHN WALTER B. JUAT, MARY M. IMBONG, ANTHONY VICTORIO B. LUMICAO, JOSEPH MARTIN Q. VERDEJO, ANTONIA EMMA
R. ROXAS and LOTA LAT-GUERRERO, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and Management, HON.
ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education, Culture and Sports and
HON. MANUEL A. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local Government, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 207172
COUPLES FOR CHRIST FOUNDATION, INC., SPOUSES JUAN CARLOS ARTADI SARMIENTO AND FRANCESCA ISABELLE
BESINGA-SARMIENTO, AND SPOUSES LUIS FRANCIS A. RODRIGO, JR. and DEBORAH MARIE VERONICA N. RODRIGO, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and Management,
HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education, Culture and
Sports and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local Government, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 207563
ALMARIM CENTI TILLAH and ABDULHUSSEIN M. KASHIM, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary of the Department of Health, and HON. ARMIN A.
LUISTRO,Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management, Respondents.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
Freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by the framers of our fundamental law. And this Court has consistently affirmed this preferred status,
well aware that it is "designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to believe as his conscience directs, to profess his
beliefs , and to live as he believes he ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others and with the common good."1
To this day, poverty is still a major stumbling block to the nation's emergence as a developed country, leaving our people beleaguered in a state of hunger,
illiteracy and unemployment. While governmental policies have been geared towards the revitalization of the economy, the bludgeoning dearth in social
services remains to be a problem that concerns not only the poor, but every member of society. The government continues to tread on a trying path to the
realization of its very purpose, that is, the general welfare of the Filipino people and the development of the country as a whole. The legislative branch, as
the main facet of a representative government, endeavors to enact laws and policies that aim to remedy looming societal woes, while the executive is
closed set to fully implement these measures and bring concrete and substantial solutions within the reach of Juan dela Cruz. Seemingly distant is the
judicial branch, oftentimes regarded as an inert governmental body that merely casts its watchful eyes on clashing stakeholders until it is called upon to
adjudicate. Passive, yet reflexive when called into action, the Judiciary then willingly embarks on its solemn duty to interpret legislation vis-a-vis the most
vital and enduring principle that holds Philippine society together - the supremacy of the Philippine Constitution.
Nothing has polarized the nation more in recent years than the issues of population growth control, abortion and contraception. As in every democratic
society, diametrically opposed views on the subjects and their perceived consequences freely circulate in various media. From television debates 2 to sticker
campaigns,3 from rallies by socio-political activists to mass gatherings organized by members of the clergy 4 - the clash between the seemingly antithetical
ideologies of the religious conservatives and progressive liberals has caused a deep division in every level of the society. Despite calls to withhold support
thereto, however, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), was
enacted by Congress on December 21, 2012.
Shortly after the President placed his imprimatur on the said law, challengers from various sectors of society came knocking on the doors of the Court,
beckoning it to wield the sword that strikes down constitutional disobedience. Aware of the profound and lasting impact that its decision may produce, the
Court now faces the iuris controversy, as presented in fourteen (14) petitions and two (2) petitions- in-intervention, to wit:
(1) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,5 filed by spouses Attys. James M. Imbong and Lovely Ann C. Imbong, in their personal capacities as
citizens, lawyers and taxpayers and on behalf of their minor children; and the Magnificat Child Leaming Center, Inc., a domestic, privately-
owned educational institution (Jmbong);
(2) Petition for Prohibition,6 filed by the Alliance for the Family Foundation Philippines, Inc., through its president, Atty. Maria Concepcion S.
Noche7 and several others8 in their personal capacities as citizens and on behalf of the generations unborn (ALFI);
 (3) Petition for Certiorari,9 filed by the Task Force for Family and Life Visayas, Inc., and Valeriano S. Avila, in their capacities as citizens and
taxpayers (Task Force Family);
(4) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,10 filed by Serve Life Cagayan De Oro City, Inc.,11 Rosevale Foundation, Inc.,12 a domestic,
privately-owned educational institution, and several others,13 in their capacities as citizens (Serve Life);
(5) Petition,14 filed by Expedito A. Bugarin, Jr. in his capacity as a citizen (Bugarin);
(6) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,15 filed by Eduardo Olaguer and the Catholic Xybrspace Apostolate of the Philippines,16 in their
capacities as a citizens and taxpayers (Olaguer);
(7) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,17 filed by the Philippine Alliance of Xseminarians Inc.,18 and several others19 in their capacities as
citizens and taxpayers (PAX);
(8) Petition,20 filed by Reynaldo J. Echavez, M.D. and several others,21 in their capacities as citizens and taxpayers (Echavez);
(9) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,22 filed by spouses Francisco and Maria Fenny C. Tatad and Atty. Alan F. Paguia, in their capacities as
citizens, taxpayers and on behalf of those yet unborn. Atty. Alan F. Paguia is also proceeding in his capacity as a member of the Bar (Tatad);
(10) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,23 filed by Pro-Life Philippines Foundation Inc.24 and several others,25 in their capacities as
citizens and taxpayers and on behalf of its associates who are members of the Bar (Pro-Life);
(11) Petition for Prohibition,26 filed by Millennium Saint Foundation, Inc.,27 Attys. Ramon Pedrosa, Cita Borromeo-Garcia, Stella Acedera,
and Berteni Catalufia Causing, in their capacities as citizens, taxpayers and members of the Bar (MSF);
(12) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,28 filed by John Walter B. Juat and several others,29 in their capacities as citizens (Juat) ;
(13) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,30 filed by Couples for Christ Foundation, Inc. and several others,31 in their capacities as citizens
(CFC);
(14) Petition for Prohibition32 filed by Almarim Centi Tillah and Abdulhussein M. Kashim in their capacities as citizens and taxpayers (Tillah);
and
(15) Petition-In-Intervention,33 filed by Atty. Samson S. Alcantara in his capacity as a citizen and a taxpayer (Alcantara); and
(16) Petition-In-Intervention,34 filed by Buhay Hayaang Yumabong (B UHAY) , an accredited political party.
A perusal of the foregoing petitions shows that the petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of RH Law on the following GROUNDS:
• The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn. According to the petitioners, notwithstanding its declared policy against abortion, the
implementation of the RH Law would authorize the purchase of hormonal contraceptives, intra-uterine devices and injectables which are
abortives, in violation of Section 12, Article II of the Constitution which guarantees protection of both the life of the mother and the life of the
unborn from conception.35
• The RH Law violates the right to health and the right to protection against hazardous products. The petitioners posit that the RH Law provides
universal access to contraceptives which are hazardous to one's health, as it causes cancer and other health problems.36
• The RH Law violates the right to religious freedom. The petitioners contend that the RH Law violates the constitutional guarantee respecting
religion as it authorizes the use of public funds for the procurement of contraceptives. For the petitioners, the use of public funds for purposes
that are believed to be contrary to their beliefs is included in the constitutional mandate ensuring religious freedom.37
It is also contended that the RH Law threatens conscientious objectors of criminal prosecution, imprisonment and other forms of punishment, as it compels
medical practitioners 1] to refer patients who seek advice on reproductive health programs to other doctors; and 2] to provide full and correct information
on reproductive health programs and service, although it is against their religious beliefs and convictions.38
In this connection, Section 5 .23 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the RH Law (RH-IRR),39 provides that skilled health professionals who
are public officers such as, but not limited to, Provincial, City, or Municipal Health Officers, medical officers, medical specialists, rural health physicians,
hospital staff nurses, public health nurses, or rural health midwives, who are specifically charged with the duty to implement these Rules, cannot be
considered as conscientious objectors.40
It is also argued that the RH Law providing for the formulation of mandatory sex education in schools should not be allowed as it is an affront to their
religious beliefs.41
While the petit10ners recognize that the guarantee of religious freedom is not absolute, they argue that the RH Law fails to satisfy the "clear and present
danger test" and the "compelling state interest test" to justify the regulation of the right to free exercise of religion and the right to free speech.42
• The RH Law violates the constitutional provision on involuntary servitude. According to the petitioners, the RH Law subjects medical
practitioners to involuntary servitude because, to be accredited under the PhilHealth program, they are compelled to provide forty-eight (48)
hours of pro bona services for indigent women, under threat of criminal prosecution, imprisonment and other forms of punishment.43
The petitioners explain that since a majority of patients are covered by PhilHealth, a medical practitioner would effectively be forced to render
reproductive health services since the lack of PhilHealth accreditation would mean that the majority of the public would no longer be able to avail of the
practitioners services.44
• The RH Law violates the right to equal protection of the law. It is claimed that the RH Law discriminates against the poor as it makes them the
primary target of the government program that promotes contraceptive use. The petitioners argue that, rather than promoting reproductive health
among the poor, the RH Law seeks to introduce contraceptives that would effectively reduce the number of the poor.45
• The RH Law is "void-for-vagueness" in violation of the due process clause of the Constitution. In imposing the penalty of imprisonment
and/or fine for "any violation," it is vague because it does not define the type of conduct to be treated as "violation" of the RH Law.46
In this connection, it is claimed that "Section 7 of the RH Law violates the right to due process by removing from them (the people) the right to manage
their own affairs and to decide what kind of health facility they shall be and what kind of services they shall offer." 47 It ignores the management
prerogative inherent in corporations for employers to conduct their affairs in accordance with their own discretion and judgment.
• The RH Law violates the right to free speech. To compel a person to explain a full range of family planning methods is plainly to curtail his
right to expound only his own preferred way of family planning. The petitioners note that although exemption is granted to institutions owned
and operated by religious groups, they are still forced to refer their patients to another healthcare facility willing to perform the service or
procedure.48
• The RH Law intrudes into the zone of privacy of one's family protected by the Constitution. It is contended that the RH Law providing for
mandatory reproductive health education intrudes upon their constitutional right to raise their children in accordance with their beliefs.49
It is claimed that, by giving absolute authority to the person who will undergo reproductive health procedure, the RH Law forsakes any real dialogue
between the spouses and impedes the right of spouses to mutually decide on matters pertaining to the overall well-being of their family. In the same breath,
it is also claimed that the parents of a child who has suffered a miscarriage are deprived of parental authority to determine whether their child should use
contraceptives.50
• The RH Law violates the constitutional principle of non-delegation of legislative authority. The petitioners question the delegation by
Congress to the FDA of the power to determine whether a product is non-abortifacient and to be included in the Emergency Drugs List
(EDL).51
• The RH Law violates the one subject/one bill rule provision under Section 26( 1 ), Article VI of the Constitution.52
• The RH Law violates Natural Law.53
• The RH Law violates the principle of Autonomy of Local Government Units (LGUs) and the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao
{ARMM). It is contended that the RH Law, providing for reproductive health measures at the local government level and the ARMM, infringes
upon the powers devolved to LGUs and the ARMM under the Local Government Code and R.A . No. 9054.54
Various parties also sought and were granted leave to file their respective comments-in-intervention in defense of the constitutionality of the RH Law.
Aside from the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) which commented on the petitions in behalf of the respondents,55 Congressman Edcel C. Lagman,56
former officials of the Department of Health Dr. Esperanza I. Cabral, Jamie Galvez-Tan, and Dr. Alberto G. Romualdez,57 the Filipino Catholic Voices for
Reproductive Health (C4RH),58 Ana Theresa "Risa" Hontiveros,59 and Atty. Joan De Venecia60 also filed their respective Comments-in-Intervention in
conjunction with several others. On June 4, 2013, Senator Pia Juliana S. Cayetano was also granted leave to intervene.61
The respondents, aside from traversing the substantive arguments of the petitioners, pray for the dismissal of the petitions for the principal reasons that 1]
there is no actual case or controversy and, therefore, the issues are not yet ripe for judicial determination.; 2] some petitioners lack standing to question the
RH Law; and 3] the petitions are essentially petitions for declaratory relief over which the Court has no original jurisdiction.
Meanwhile, on March 15, 2013, the RH-IRR for the enforcement of the assailed legislation took effect.
On March 19, 2013, after considering the issues and arguments raised, the Court issued the Status Quo Ante Order (SQAO), enjoining the effects and
implementation of the assailed legislation for a period of one hundred and twenty (120) days, or until July 17, 2013.62
On May 30, 2013, the Court held a preliminary conference with the counsels of the parties to determine and/or identify the pertinent issues raised by the
parties and the sequence by which these issues were to be discussed in the oral arguments. On July 9 and 23, 2013, and on August 6, 13, and 27, 2013, the
cases were heard on oral argument. On July 16, 2013, the SQAO was ordered extended until further orders of the Court.63
Thereafter, the Court directed the parties to submit their respective memoranda within sixty (60) days and, at the same time posed several questions for
their clarification on some contentions of the parties.64
The Status Quo Ante
(Population, Contraceptive and Reproductive Health Laws
Prior to the RH Law
Long before the incipience of the RH Law, the country has allowed the sale, dispensation and distribution of contraceptive drugs and devices. As far back
as June 18, 1966, the country enacted R.A. No. 4729 entitled "An Act to Regu,late the Sale, Dispensation, and/or Distribution of Contraceptive Drugs and
Devices." Although contraceptive drugs and devices were allowed, they could not be sold, dispensed or distributed "unless such sale, dispensation and
distribution is by a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and with the prescription of a qualified medical practitioner."65
In addition, R.A. No. 5921,66 approved on June 21, 1969, contained provisions relative to "dispensing of abortifacients or anti-conceptional substances and
devices." Under Section 37 thereof, it was provided that "no drug or chemical product or device capable of provoking abortion or preventing conception as
classified by the Food and Drug Administration shall be delivered or sold to any person without a proper prescription by a duly licensed physician."
On December 11, 1967, the Philippines, adhering to the UN Declaration on Population, which recognized that the population problem should be considered
as the principal element for long-term economic development, enacted measures that promoted male vasectomy and tubal ligation to mitigate population
growth.67 Among these measures included R.A. No. 6365, approved on August 16, 1971, entitled "An Act Establishing a National Policy on Population,
Creating the Commission on Population and for Other Purposes. " The law envisioned that "family planning will be made part of a broad educational
program; safe and effective means will be provided to couples desiring to space or limit family size; mortality and morbidity rates will be further reduced."
To further strengthen R.A. No. 6365, then President Ferdinand E . Marcos issued Presidential Decree. (P.D.) No. 79, 68 dated December 8, 1972, which,
among others, made "family planning a part of a broad educational program," provided "family planning services as a part of over-all health care," and
made "available all acceptable methods of contraception, except abortion, to all Filipino citizens desirous of spacing, limiting or preventing pregnancies."
Through the years, however, the use of contraceptives and family planning methods evolved from being a component of demographic management, to one
centered on the promotion of public health, particularly, reproductive health.69 Under that policy, the country gave priority to one's right to freely choose
the method of family planning to be adopted, in conformity with its adherence to the commitments made in the International Conference on Population and
Development.70 Thus, on August 14, 2009, the country enacted R.A. No. 9710 or "The Magna Carta for Women, " which, among others, mandated the
State to provide for comprehensive health services and programs for women, including family planning and sex education.71
The RH Law
Despite the foregoing legislative measures, the population of the country kept on galloping at an uncontrollable pace. From a paltry number of just over 27
million Filipinos in 1960, the population of the country reached over 76 million in the year 2000 and over 92 million in 2010. 72 The executive and the
legislative, thus, felt that the measures were still not adequate. To rein in the problem, the RH Law was enacted to provide Filipinos, especially the poor
and the marginalized, access and information to the full range of modem family planning methods, and to ensure that its objective to provide for the
peoples' right to reproductive health be achieved. To make it more effective, the RH Law made it mandatory for health providers to provide information on
the full range of modem family planning methods, supplies and services, and for schools to provide reproductive health education. To put teeth to it, the
RH Law criminalizes certain acts of refusals to carry out its mandates.
Stated differently, the RH Law is an enhancement measure to fortify and make effective the current laws on contraception, women's health and population
control.
Prayer of the Petitioners - Maintain the Status Quo
The petitioners are one in praying that the entire RH Law be declared unconstitutional. Petitioner ALFI, in particular, argues that the government sponsored
contraception program, the very essence of the RH Law, violates the right to health of women and the sanctity of life, which the State is mandated to
protect and promote. Thus, ALFI prays that "the status quo ante - the situation prior to the passage of the RH Law - must be maintained."73 It explains:
x x x. The instant Petition does not question contraception and contraceptives per se. As provided under Republic Act No. 5921 and Republic Act No.
4729, the sale and distribution of contraceptives are prohibited unless dispensed by a prescription duly licensed by a physician. What the Petitioners find
deplorable and repugnant under the RH Law is the role that the State and its agencies - the entire bureaucracy, from the cabinet secretaries down to the
barangay officials in the remotest areas of the country - is made to play in the implementation of the contraception program to the fullest extent possible
using taxpayers' money. The State then will be the funder and provider of all forms of family planning methods and the implementer of the program by
ensuring the widespread dissemination of, and universal access to, a full range of family planning methods, devices and supplies.74
ISSUES
After a scrutiny of the various arguments and contentions of the parties, the Court has synthesized and refined them to the following principal issues:
I. PROCEDURAL: Whether the Court may exercise its power of judicial review over the controversy.
1] Power of Judicial Review
2] Actual Case or Controversy
3] Facial Challenge
4] Locus Standi
5] Declaratory Relief
6] One Subject/One Title Rule
II. SUBSTANTIVE: Whether the RH law is unconstitutional:
1] Right to Life
2] Right to Health
3] Freedom of Religion and the Right to Free Speech
4] The Family
5] Freedom of Expression and Academic Freedom
6] Due Process
7] Equal Protection
8] Involuntary Servitude
9] Delegation of Authority to the FDA
10] Autonomy of Local Govemments/ARMM
DISCUSSION
Before delving into the constitutionality of the RH Law and its implementing rules, it behooves the Court to resolve some procedural impediments.
I. PROCEDURAL ISSUE: Whether the Court can exercise its power of judicial review over the controversy.
The Power of Judicial Review
In its attempt to persuade the Court to stay its judicial hand, the OSG asserts that it should submit to the legislative and political wisdom of Congress and
respect the compromises made in the crafting of the RH Law, it being "a product of a majoritarian democratic process" 75 and "characterized by an
inordinate amount of transparency."76 The OSG posits that the authority of the Court to review social legislation like the RH Law by certiorari is "weak,"
since the Constitution vests the discretion to implement the constitutional policies and positive norms with the political departments, in particular, with
Congress.77 It further asserts that in view of the Court's ruling in Southern Hemisphere v. Anti-Terrorism Council, 78 the remedies of certiorari and
prohibition utilized by the petitioners are improper to assail the validity of the acts of the legislature.79
Moreover, the OSG submits that as an "as applied challenge," it cannot prosper considering that the assailed law has yet to be enforced and applied to the
petitioners, and that the government has yet to distribute reproductive health devices that are abortive. It claims that the RH Law cannot be challenged "on
its face" as it is not a speech-regulating measure.80
In many cases involving the determination of the constitutionality of the actions of the Executive and the Legislature, it is often sought that the Court
temper its exercise of judicial power and accord due respect to the wisdom of its co-equal branch on the basis of the principle of separation of powers. To
be clear, the separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government, which obtains not through express provision but by actual
division in our Constitution. Each department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction and is supreme within its own
sphere.81
Thus, the 1987 Constitution provides that: (a) the legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines;82 (b) the executive power shall be
vested in the President of the Philippines;83 and (c) the judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established
by law.84 The Constitution has truly blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines, the allotment of powers among the three branches of government.85
In its relationship with its co-equals, the Judiciary recognizes the doctrine of separation of powers which imposes upon the courts proper restraint, born of
the nature of their functions and of their respect for the other branches of government, in striking down the acts of the Executive or the Legislature as
unconstitutional. Verily, the policy is a harmonious blend of courtesy and caution.86
It has also long been observed, however, that in times of social disquietude or political instability, the great landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be
forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated.87 In order to address this, the Constitution impresses upon the Court to respect the acts performed by a co-
equal branch done within its sphere of competence and authority, but at the same time, allows it to cross the line of separation - but only at a very limited
and specific point - to determine whether the acts of the executive and the legislative branches are null because they were undertaken with grave abuse of
discretion.88 Thus, while the Court may not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of the RH Law, it may do so where an attendant
unconstitutionality or grave abuse of discretion results.89 The Court must demonstrate its unflinching commitment to protect those cherished rights and
principles embodied in the Constitution.
In this connection, it bears adding that while the scope of judicial power of review may be limited, the Constitution makes no distinction as to the kind of
legislation that may be subject to judicial scrutiny, be it in the form of social legislation or otherwise. The reason is simple and goes back to the earlier
point. The Court may pass upon the constitutionality of acts of the legislative and the executive branches, since its duty is not to review their collective
wisdom but, rather, to make sure that they have acted in consonance with their respective authorities and rights as mandated of them by the Constitution. If
after said review, the Court finds no constitutional violations of any sort, then, it has no more authority of proscribing the actions under review.90 This is in
line with Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution which expressly provides:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality
of the Government. [Emphases supplied]
As far back as Tanada v. Angara,91 the Court has unequivocally declared that certiorari, prohibition and mandamus are appropriate remedies to raise
constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit/nullify, when proper, acts of legislative and executive officials, as there is no other plain, speedy or
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. This ruling was later on applied in Macalintal v. COMELEC,92 Aldaba v. COMELEC,93 Magallona v.
Ermita,94 and countless others. In Tanada, the Court wrote:
In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravenes the Constitution, the petition no doubt raises a justiciable controversy.
Where an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the
judiciary to settle the dispute. "The question thus posed is judicial rather than political. The duty (to adjudicate) remains to assure that the supremacy of the
Constitution is upheld. " Once a "controversy as to the application or interpretation of constitutional provision is raised before this Court (as in the instant
case), it becomes a legal issue which the Court is bound by constitutional mandate to decide. [Emphasis supplied]
In the scholarly estimation of former Supreme Court Justice Florentino Feliciano, "judicial review is essential for the maintenance and enforcement of the
separation of powers and the balancing of powers among the three great departments of government through the definition and maintenance of the
boundaries of authority and control between them. To him, judicial review is the chief, indeed the only, medium of participation - or instrument of
intervention - of the judiciary in that balancing operation.95
Lest it be misunderstood, it bears emphasizing that the Court does not have the unbridled authority to rule on just any and every claim of constitutional
violation. Jurisprudence is replete with the rule that the power of judicial review is limited by four exacting requisites, viz : (a) there must be an actual case
or controversy; (b) the petitioners must possess locus standi; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue
of constitutionality must be the lis mota of the case.96
Actual Case or Controversy
Proponents of the RH Law submit that the subj ect petitions do not present any actual case or controversy because the RH Law has yet to be
implemented.97 They claim that the questions raised by the petitions are not yet concrete and ripe for adjudication since no one has been charged with
violating any of its provisions and that there is no showing that any of the petitioners' rights has been adversely affected by its operation. 98 In short, it is
contended that judicial review of the RH Law is premature.
An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the
decision of the court would amount to an advisory opinion.99 The rule is that courts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly
interest, however intellectually challenging. The controversy must be justiciable-definite and concrete, touching on the legal relations of parties having
adverse legal interests. In other words, the pleadings must show an active antagonistic assertion of a legal right, on the one hand, and a denial thereof, on
the other; that is, it must concern a real, tangible and not merely a theoretical question or issue. There ought to be an actual and substantial controversy
admitting of specific relief through a decree conclusive in nature, as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical
state of facts.100
Corollary to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of ripeness. 101 A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being
challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. For a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, it is a prerequisite that
something has then been accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may come into the picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence
of an immediate or threatened injury to himself as a result of the challenged action. He must show that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of
sustaining some direct injury as a result of the act complained of102
In The Province of North Cotabato v. The Government of the Republic of the Philippines,103 where the constitutionality of an unimplemented
Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) was put in question, it was argued that the Court has no authority to pass upon the issues
raised as there was yet no concrete act performed that could possibly violate the petitioners' and the intervenors' rights. Citing precedents, the Court ruled
that the fact of the law or act in question being not yet effective does not negate ripeness. Concrete acts under a law are not necessary to render the
controversy ripe. Even a singular violation of the Constitution and/or the law is enough to awaken judicial duty.
In this case, the Court is of the view that an actual case or controversy exists and that the same is ripe for judicial determination. Considering that the RH
Law and its implementing rules have already taken effect and that budgetary measures to carry out the law have already been passed, it is evident that the
subject petitions present a justiciable controversy. As stated earlier, when an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the
Constitution, it not only becomes a right, but also a duty of the Judiciary to settle the dispute.104
Moreover, the petitioners have shown that the case is so because medical practitioners or medical providers are in danger of being criminally prosecuted
under the RH Law for vague violations thereof, particularly public health officers who are threatened to be dismissed from the service with forfeiture of
retirement and other benefits. They must, at least, be heard on the matter NOW.
Facial Challenge
The OSG also assails the propriety of the facial challenge lodged by the subject petitions, contending that the RH Law cannot be challenged "on its face" as
it is not a speech regulating measure.105
The Court is not persuaded.
In United States (US) constitutional law, a facial challenge, also known as a First Amendment Challenge, is one that is launched to assail the validity of
statutes concerning not only protected speech, but also all other rights in the First Amendment.106 These include religious freedom, freedom of the press,
and the right of the people to peaceably assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. 107 After all, the fundamental right to
religious freedom, freedom of the press and peaceful assembly are but component rights of the right to one's freedom of expression, as they are modes
which one's thoughts are externalized.
In this jurisdiction, the application of doctrines originating from the U.S. has been generally maintained, albeit with some modifications. While this Court
has withheld the application of facial challenges to strictly penal statues,108 it has expanded its scope to cover statutes not only regulating free speech, but
also those involving religious freedom, and other fundamental rights.109 The underlying reason for this modification is simple. For unlike its counterpart
in the U.S., this Court, under its expanded jurisdiction, is mandated by the Fundamental Law not only to settle actual controversies involving rights which
are legally demandable and enforceable, but also to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.110 Verily, the framers of Our Constitution envisioned a proactive Judiciary,
ever vigilant with its duty to maintain the supremacy of the Constitution.
Consequently, considering that the foregoing petitions have seriously alleged that the constitutional human rights to life, speech and religion and other
fundamental rights mentioned above have been violated by the assailed legislation, the Court has authority to take cognizance of these kindred petitions
and to determine if the RH Law can indeed pass constitutional scrutiny. To dismiss these petitions on the simple expedient that there exist no actual case or
controversy, would diminish this Court as a reactive branch of government, acting only when the Fundamental Law has been transgressed, to the detriment
of the Filipino people.
Locus Standi
The OSG also attacks the legal personality of the petitioners to file their respective petitions. It contends that the "as applied challenge" lodged by the
petitioners cannot prosper as the assailed law has yet to be enforced and applied against them,111 and the government has yet to distribute reproductive
health devices that are abortive.112
The petitioners, for their part, invariably invoke the "transcendental importance" doctrine and their status as citizens and taxpayers in establishing the
requisite locus standi.
Locus standi or legal standing is defined as a personal and substantial interest in a case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a
result of the challenged governmental act.113 It requires a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure the concrete adverseness which
sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.114
In relation to locus standi, the "as applied challenge" embodies the rule that one can challenge the constitutionality of a statute only if he asserts a violation
of his own rights. The rule prohibits one from challenging the constitutionality of the statute grounded on a violation of the rights of third persons not
before the court. This rule is also known as the prohibition against third-party standing.115
Transcendental Importance
Notwithstanding, the Court leans on the doctrine that "the rule on standing is a matter of procedure, hence, can be relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs like
ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when the matter is of transcendental importance, of overreaching
significance to society, or of paramount public interest."116
In Coconut Oil Refiners Association, Inc. v. Torres,117 the Court held that in cases of paramount importance where serious constitutional questions are
involved, the standing requirement may be relaxed and a suit may be allowed to prosper even where there is no direct injury to the party claiming the right
of judicial review. In the first Emergency Powers Cases,118 ordinary citizens and taxpayers were allowed to question the constitutionality of several
executive orders although they had only an indirect and general interest shared in common with the public.
With these said, even if the constitutionality of the RH Law may not be assailed through an "as-applied challenge, still, the Court has time and again acted
liberally on the locus s tandi requirement. It has accorded certain individuals standing to sue, not otherwise directly injured or with material interest
affected by a Government act, provided a constitutional issue of transcendental importance is invoked. The rule on locus standi is, after all, a procedural
technicality which the Court has, on more than one occasion, waived or relaxed, thus allowing non-traditional plaintiffs, such as concerned citizens,
taxpayers, voters or legislators, to sue in the public interest, albeit they may not have been directly injured by the operation of a law or any other
government act. As held in Jaworski v. PAGCOR:119
Granting arguendo that the present action cannot be properly treated as a petition for prohibition, the transcendental importance of the issues involved in
this case warrants that we set aside the technical defects and take primary jurisdiction over the petition at bar. One cannot deny that the issues raised herein
have potentially pervasive influence on the social and moral well being of this nation, specially the youth; hence, their proper and just determination is an
imperative need. This is in accordance with the well-entrenched principle that rules of procedure are not inflexible tools designed to hinder or delay, but to
facilitate and promote the administration of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate, rather than
promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed. (Emphasis supplied)
In view of the seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents, not only to the public, but also to the bench and bar, the issues raised must be resolved for the
guidance of all. After all, the RH Law drastically affects the constitutional provisions on the right to life and health, the freedom of religion and expression
and other constitutional rights. Mindful of all these and the fact that the issues of contraception and reproductive health have already caused deep division
among a broad spectrum of society, the Court entertains no doubt that the petitions raise issues of transcendental importance warranting immediate court
adjudication. More importantly, considering that it is the right to life of the mother and the unborn which is primarily at issue, the Court need not wait for a
life to be taken away before taking action.
The Court cannot, and should not, exercise judicial restraint at this time when rights enshrined in the Constitution are being imperilled to be violated. To do
so, when the life of either the mother or her child is at stake, would lead to irreparable consequences.
Declaratory Relief
The respondents also assail the petitions because they are essentially petitions for declaratory relief over which the Court has no original jurisdiction. 120
Suffice it to state that most of the petitions are praying for injunctive reliefs and so the Court would just consider them as petitions for prohibition under
Rule 65, over which it has original jurisdiction. Where the case has far-reaching implications and prays for injunctive reliefs, the Court may consider them
as petitions for prohibition under Rule 65.121
One Subject-One Title
The petitioners also question the constitutionality of the RH Law, claiming that it violates Section 26(1 ), Article VI of the Constitution, 122 prescribing the
one subject-one title rule. According to them, being one for reproductive health with responsible parenthood, the assailed legislation violates the
constitutional standards of due process by concealing its true intent - to act as a population control measure.123
To belittle the challenge, the respondents insist that the RH Law is not a birth or population control measure,124 and that the concepts of "responsible
parenthood" and "reproductive health" are both interrelated as they are inseparable.125
Despite efforts to push the RH Law as a reproductive health law, the Court sees it as principally a population control measure. The corpus of the RH Law is
geared towards the reduction of the country's population. While it claims to save lives and keep our women and children healthy, it also promotes
pregnancy-preventing products. As stated earlier, the RH Law emphasizes the need to provide Filipinos, especially the poor and the marginalized, with
access to information on the full range of modem family planning products and methods. These family planning methods, natural or modem, however, are
clearly geared towards the prevention of pregnancy.
For said reason, the manifest underlying objective of the RH Law is to reduce the number of births in the country.
It cannot be denied that the measure also seeks to provide pre-natal and post-natal care as well. A large portion of the law, however, covers the
dissemination of information and provisions on access to medically-safe, non-abortifacient, effective, legal, affordable, and quality reproductive health care
services, methods, devices, and supplies, which are all intended to prevent pregnancy.
The Court, thus, agrees with the petitioners' contention that the whole idea of contraception pervades the entire RH Law. It is, in fact, the central idea of the
RH Law.126 Indeed, remove the provisions that refer to contraception or are related to it and the RH Law loses its very foundation. 127 As earlier
explained, "the other positive provisions such as skilled birth attendance, maternal care including pre-and post-natal services, prevention and management
of reproductive tract infections including HIV/AIDS are already provided for in the Magna Carta for Women."128
Be that as it may, the RH Law does not violate the one subject/one bill rule. In Benjamin E. Cawaling, Jr. v. The Commission on Elections and Rep. Francis
Joseph G Escudero, it was written:
It is well-settled that the "one title-one subject" rule does not require the Congress to employ in the title of the enactment language of such precision as to
mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein. The rule is sufficiently complied with if the title is comprehensive enough as
to include the general object which the statute seeks to effect, and where, as here, the persons interested are informed of the nature, scope and
consequences of the proposed law and its operation. Moreover, this Court has invariably adopted a liberal rather than technical construction of the rule "so
as not to cripple or impede legislation." [Emphases supplied]
In this case, a textual analysis of the various provisions of the law shows that both "reproductive health" and "responsible parenthood" are interrelated and
germane to the overriding objective to control the population growth. As expressed in the first paragraph of Section 2 of the RH Law:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. - The State recognizes and guarantees the human rights of all persons including their right to equality and nondiscrimination
of these rights, the right to sustainable human development, the right to health which includes reproductive health, the right to education and information,
and the right to choose and make decisions for themselves in accordance with their religious convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs, and the demands of
responsible parenthood.
The one subject/one title rule expresses the principle that the title of a law must not be "so uncertain that the average person reading it would not be
informed of the purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents, or which is misleading, either in referring to or indicating one subject where
another or different one is really embraced in the act, or in omitting any expression or indication of the real subject or scope of the act."129
Considering the close intimacy between "reproductive health" and "responsible parenthood" which bears to the attainment of the goal of achieving
"sustainable human development" as stated under its terms, the Court finds no reason to believe that Congress intentionally sought to deceive the public as
to the contents of the assailed legislation.
II - SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES:
1-The Right to Life
Position of the Petitioners
The petitioners assail the RH Law because it violates the right to life and health of the unborn child under Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. The
assailed legislation allowing access to abortifacients/abortives effectively sanctions abortion.130
According to the petitioners, despite its express terms prohibiting abortion, Section 4(a) of the RH Law considers contraceptives that prevent the fertilized
ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb as an abortifacient; thus, sanctioning contraceptives that take effect after fertilization and prior to
implantation, contrary to the intent of the Framers of the Constitution to afford protection to the fertilized ovum which already has life.
They argue that even if Section 9 of the RH Law allows only "non-abortifacient" hormonal contraceptives, intrauterine devices, injectables and other safe,
legal, non-abortifacient and effective family planning products and supplies, medical research shows that contraceptives use results in abortion as they
operate to kill the fertilized ovum which already has life.131
As it opposes the initiation of life, which is a fundamental human good, the petitioners assert that the State sanction of contraceptive use contravenes
natural law and is an affront to the dignity of man.132
Finally, it is contended that since Section 9 of the RH Law requires the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to certify that the product or supply is not to
be used as an abortifacient, the assailed legislation effectively confirms that abortifacients are not prohibited. Also considering that the FDA is not the
agency that will actually supervise or administer the use of these products and supplies to prospective patients, there is no way it can truthfully make a
certification that it shall not be used for abortifacient purposes.133
Position of the Respondents
For their part, the defenders of the RH Law point out that the intent of the Framers of the Constitution was simply the prohibition of abortion. They
contend that the RH Law does not violate the Constitution since the said law emphasizes that only "non-abortifacient" reproductive health care services,
methods, devices products and supplies shall be made accessible to the public.134
According to the OSG, Congress has made a legislative determination that contraceptives are not abortifacients by enacting the RH Law. As the RH Law
was enacted with due consideration to various studies and consultations with the World Health Organization (WHO) and other experts in the medical field,
it is asserted that the Court afford deference and respect to such a determination and pass judgment only when a particular drug or device is later on
determined as an abortive.135
For his part, respondent Lagman argues that the constitutional protection of one's right to life is not violated considering that various studies of the WHO
show that life begins from the implantation of the fertilized ovum. Consequently, he argues that the RH Law is constitutional since the law specifically
provides that only contraceptives that do not prevent the implantation of the fertilized ovum are allowed.136
The Court's Position
It is a universally accepted principle that every human being enjoys the right to life.137
Even if not formally established, the right to life, being grounded on natural law, is inherent and, therefore, not a creation of, or dependent upon a particular
law, custom, or belief. It precedes and transcends any authority or the laws of men.
In this jurisdiction, the right to life is given more than ample protection. Section 1, Article III of the Constitution provides:
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the
laws.
As expounded earlier, the use of contraceptives and family planning methods in the Philippines is not of recent vintage. From the enactment of R.A. No.
4729, entitled "An Act To Regulate The Sale, Dispensation, and/or Distribution of Contraceptive Drugs and Devices "on June 18, 1966, prescribing rules
on contraceptive drugs and devices which prevent fertilization,138 to the promotion of male vasectomy and tubal ligation,139 and the ratification of
numerous international agreements, the country has long recognized the need to promote population control through the use of contraceptives in order to
achieve long-term economic development. Through the years, however, the use of contraceptives and other family planning methods evolved from being a
component of demographic management, to one centered on the promotion of public health, particularly, reproductive health.140
This has resulted in the enactment of various measures promoting women's rights and health and the overall promotion of the family's well-being. Thus,
aside from R.A. No. 4729, R.A. No. 6365 or "The Population Act of the Philippines" and R.A. No. 9710, otherwise known as the "The Magna Carta of
Women" were legislated. Notwithstanding this paradigm shift, the Philippine national population program has always been grounded two cornerstone
principles: "principle of no-abortion" and the "principle of non-coercion."141 As will be discussed later, these principles are not merely grounded on
administrative policy, but rather, originates from the constitutional protection expressly provided to afford protection to life and guarantee religious
freedom.
When Life Begins*
Majority of the Members of the Court are of the position that the question of when life begins is a scientific and medical issue that should not be decided,
at this stage, without proper hearing and evidence. During the deliberation, however, it was agreed upon that the individual members of the Court could
express their own views on this matter.
In this regard, the ponente, is of the strong view that life begins at fertilization.
In answering the question of when life begins, focus should be made on the particular phrase of Section 12 which reads:
Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall
equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from conception. The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the
youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government.
Textually, the Constitution affords protection to the unborn from conception. This is undisputable because before conception, there is no unborn to speak
of. For said reason, it is no surprise that the Constitution is mute as to any proscription prior to conception or when life begins. The problem has arisen
because, amazingly, there are quarters who have conveniently disregarded the scientific fact that conception is reckoned from fertilization. They are waving
the view that life begins at implantation. Hence, the issue of when life begins.
In a nutshell, those opposing the RH Law contend that conception is synonymous with "fertilization" of the female ovum by the male sperm. 142 On the
other side of the spectrum are those who assert that conception refers to the "implantation" of the fertilized ovum in the uterus.143
Plain and Legal Meaning
It is a canon in statutory construction that the words of the Constitution should be interpreted in their plain and ordinary meaning. As held in the recent case
of Chavez v. Judicial Bar Council:144
One of the primary and basic rules in statutory construction is that where the words of a statute are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given
its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. It is a well-settled principle of constitutional construction that the language employed in
the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed. As much as possible, the words of the Constitution
should be understood in the sense they have in common use. What it says according to the text of the provision to be construed compels acceptance and
negates the power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and the people mean what they say. Verba legis non est recedendum -
from the words of a statute there should be no departure.
The raison d' etre for the rule is essentially two-fold: First, because it is assumed that the words in which constitutional provisions are couched express the
objective sought to be attained; and second, because the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer's document but essentially that of the people, in whose
consciousness it should ever be present as an important condition for the rule of law to prevail.
In conformity with the above principle, the traditional meaning of the word "conception" which, as described and defined by all reliable and reputable
sources, means that life begins at fertilization.
Webster's Third New International Dictionary describes it as the act of becoming pregnant, formation of a viable zygote; the fertilization that results in a
new entity capable of developing into a being like its parents.145
Black's Law Dictionary gives legal meaning to the term "conception" as the fecundation of the female ovum by the male spermatozoon resulting in human
life capable of survival and maturation under normal conditions.146
Even in jurisprudence, an unborn child has already a legal personality. In Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation v. Hon. Accredited Voluntary
Arbitrator Allan S. Montano,147 it was written:
Life is not synonymous with civil personality. One need not acquire civil personality first before he/she could die. Even a child inside the womb already
has life. No less than the Constitution recognizes the life of the unborn from conception, that the State must protect equally with the life of the mother. If
the unborn already has life, then the cessation thereof even prior to the child being delivered, qualifies as death. [Emphases in the original]
In Gonzales v. Carhart,148 Justice Anthony Kennedy, writing for the US Supreme Court, said that the State "has respect for human life at all stages in the
pregnancy" and "a legitimate and substantial interest in preserving and promoting fetal life." Invariably, in the decision, the fetus was referred to, or cited,
as a baby or a child.149
Intent of the Framers
Records of the Constitutional Convention also shed light on the intention of the Framers regarding the term "conception" used in Section 12, Article II of
the Constitution. From their deliberations, it clearly refers to the moment of "fertilization." The records reflect the following:
Rev. Rigos: In Section 9, page 3, there is a sentence which reads:
"The State shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from the moment of conception."
When is the moment of conception?
xxx
Mr. Villegas: As I explained in the sponsorship speech, it is when the ovum is fertilized by the sperm that there is human life. x x x.150
xxx
As to why conception is reckoned from fertilization and, as such, the beginning of human life, it was explained:
Mr. Villegas: I propose to review this issue in a biological manner. The first question that needs to be answered is: Is the fertilized ovum alive? Biologically
categorically says yes, the fertilized ovum is alive. First of all, like all living organisms, it takes in nutrients which it processes by itself. It begins doing this
upon fertilization. Secondly, as it takes in these nutrients, it grows from within. Thirdly, it multiplies itself at a geometric rate in the continuous process of
cell division. All these processes are vital signs of life. Therefore, there is no question that biologically the fertilized ovum has life.
The second question: Is it human? Genetics gives an equally categorical "yes." At the moment of conception, the nuclei of the ovum and the sperm rupture.
As this happens 23 chromosomes from the ovum combine with 23 chromosomes of the sperm to form a total of 46 chromosomes. A chromosome count of
46 is found only - and I repeat, only in human cells. Therefore, the fertilized ovum is human.
Since these questions have been answered affirmatively, we must conclude that if the fertilized ovum is both alive and human, then, as night follows day, it
must be human life. Its nature is human.151
Why the Constitution used the phrase "from the moment of conception" and not "from the moment of fertilization" was not because of doubt when human
life begins, but rather, because:
Mr. Tingson: x x x x the phrase from the moment of conception" was described by us here before with the scientific phrase "fertilized ovum" may be
beyond the comprehension of some people; we want to use the simpler phrase "from the moment of conception."152
Thus, in order to ensure that the fertilized ovum is given ample protection under the Constitution, it was discussed:
Rev. Rigos: Yes, we think that the word "unborn" is sufficient for the purpose of writing a Constitution, without specifying "from the moment of
conception."
Mr. Davide: I would not subscribe to that particular view because according to the Commissioner's own admission, he would leave it to Congress to define
when life begins. So, Congress can define life to begin from six months after fertilization; and that would really be very, very, dangerous. It is now
determined by science that life begins from the moment of conception. There can be no doubt about it. So we should not give any doubt to Congress,
too.153
Upon further inquiry, it was asked:
Mr. Gascon: Mr. Presiding Officer, I would like to ask a question on that point. Actually, that is one of the questions I was going to raise during the period
of interpellations but it has been expressed already. The provision, as proposed right now states:
The State shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from the moment of conception.
When it speaks of "from the moment of conception," does this mean when the egg meets the sperm?
Mr. Villegas: Yes, the ovum is fertilized by the sperm.
Mr. Gascon: Therefore that does not leave to Congress the right to determine whether certain contraceptives that we know today are abortifacient or not
because it is a fact that some of the so-called contraceptives deter the rooting of the ovum in the uterus. If fertilization has already occurred, the next
process is for the fertilized ovum to travel towards the uterus and to take root. What happens with some contraceptives is that they stop the opportunity for
the fertilized ovum to reach the uterus. Therefore, if we take the provision as it is proposed, these so called contraceptives should be banned.
Mr. Villegas: Yes, if that physical fact is established, then that is what is called abortifacient and, therefore, would be unconstitutional and should be banned
under this provision.
Mr. Gascon: Yes. So my point is that I do not think it is up to Congress to state whether or not these certain contraceptives are abortifacient. Scientifically
and based on the provision as it is now proposed, they are already considered abortifacient.154
From the deliberations above-quoted, it is apparent that the Framers of the Constitution emphasized that the State shall provide equal protection to both the
mother and the unborn child from the earliest opportunity of life, that is, upon fertilization or upon the union of the male sperm and the female ovum. It is
also apparent is that the Framers of the Constitution intended that to prohibit Congress from enacting measures that would allow it determine when life
begins.
Equally apparent, however, is that the Framers of the Constitution did not intend to ban all contraceptives for being unconstitutional. In fact, Commissioner
Bernardo Villegas, spearheading the need to have a constitutional provision on the right to life, recognized that the determination of whether a
contraceptive device is an abortifacient is a question of fact which should be left to the courts to decide on based on established evidence.155
From the discussions above, contraceptives that kill or destroy the fertilized ovum should be deemed an abortive and thus prohibited. Conversely,
contraceptives that actually prevent the union of the male sperm and the female ovum, and those that similarly take action prior to fertilization should be
deemed non-abortive, and thus, constitutionally permissible.
As emphasized by the Framers of the Constitution:
xxx xxx xxx
Mr. Gascon: xx xx. As I mentioned in my speech on the US bases, I am pro-life, to the point that I would like not only to protect the life of the unborn, but
also the lives of the millions of people in the world by fighting for a nuclear-free world. I would just like to be assured of the legal and pragmatic
implications of the term "protection of the life of the unborn from the moment of conception." I raised some of these implications this afternoon when I
interjected in the interpellation of Commissioner Regalado. I would like to ask that question again for a categorical answer.
I mentioned that if we institutionalize the term "the life of the unborn from the moment of conception" we are also actually saying "no," not "maybe," to
certain contraceptives which are already being encouraged at this point in time. Is that the sense of the committee or does it disagree with me?
Mr. Azcuna: No, Mr. Presiding Officer, because contraceptives would be preventive. There is no unborn yet. That is yet unshaped.
Mr. Gascon: Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer, but I was speaking more about some contraceptives, such as the intra-uterine device which actually stops the egg
which has already been fertilized from taking route to the uterus. So if we say "from the moment of conception," what really occurs is that some of these
contraceptives will have to be unconstitutionalized.
Mr. Azcuna: Yes, to the extent that it is after the fertilization.
Mr. Gascon: Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.156
The fact that not all contraceptives are prohibited by the 1987 Constitution is even admitted by petitioners during the oral arguments. There it was
conceded that tubal ligation, vasectomy, even condoms are not classified as abortifacients.157
Atty. Noche:
Before the union of the eggs, egg and the sperm, there is no life yet.
Justice Bersamin:
There is no life.
Atty. Noche:
So, there is no life to be protected.
Justice Bersamin:
To be protected.
Atty. Noche:
Under Section 12, yes.
Justice Bersamin:
So you have no objection to condoms?
Atty. Noche:
Not under Section 12, Article II.
Justice Bersamin:
Even if there is already information that condoms sometimes have porosity?
Atty. Noche:
Well, yes, Your Honor, there are scientific findings to that effect, Your Honor, but I am discussing here Section 12, Article II, Your Honor, yes.
Justice Bersamin:
Alright.
Atty. Noche:
And it's not, I have to admit it's not an abortifacient, Your Honor.158
Medical Meaning
That conception begins at fertilization is not bereft of medical foundation. Mosby s Medical, Nursing, and Allied Health Dictionary defines conception as
"the beginning of pregnancy usually taken to be the instant a spermatozoon enters an ovum and forms a viable zygote."159
It describes fertilization as "the union of male and female gametes to form a zygote from which the embryo develops."160
The Textbook of Obstetrics (Physiological & Pathological Obstetrics),161 used by medical schools in the Philippines, also concludes that human life
(human person) begins at the moment of fertilization with the union of the egg and the sperm resulting in the formation of a new individual, with a unique
genetic composition that dictates all developmental stages that ensue.
Similarly, recent medical research on the matter also reveals that: "Human development begins after the union of male and female gametes or germ cells
during a process known as fertilization (conception). Fertilization is a sequence of events that begins with the contact of a sperm (spermatozoon) with a
secondary oocyte (ovum) and ends with the fusion of their pronuclei (the haploid nuclei of the sperm and ovum) and the mingling of their chromosomes to
form a new cell. This fertilized ovum, known as a zygote, is a large diploid cell that is the beginning, or primordium, of a human being."162
The authors of Human Embryology & Teratology163 mirror the same position. They wrote: "Although life is a continuous process, fertilization is a critical
landmark because, under ordinary circumstances, a new, genetically distinct human organism is thereby formed.... The combination of 23 chromosomes
present in each pronucleus results in 46 chromosomes in the zygote. Thus the diploid number is restored and the embryonic genome is formed. The embryo
now exists as a genetic unity."
In support of the RH Bill, The Philippine Medical Association came out with a "Paper on the Reproductive Health Bill (Responsible Parenthood Bill)" and
therein concluded that:
CONCLUSION
The PMA throws its full weight in supporting the RH Bill at the same time that PMA maintains its strong position that fertilization is sacred because it is at
this stage that conception, and thus human life, begins. Human lives are sacred from the moment of conception, and that destroying those new lives is
never licit, no matter what the purported good outcome would be. In terms of biology and human embryology, a human being begins immediately at
fertilization and after that, there is no point along the continuous line of human embryogenesis where only a "potential" human being can be posited. Any
philosophical, legal, or political conclusion cannot escape this objective scientific fact.
The scientific evidence supports the conclusion that a zygote is a human organism and that the life of a new human being commences at a scientifically
well defined "moment of conception." This conclusion is objective, consistent with the factual evidence, and independent of any specific ethical, moral,
political, or religious view of human life or of human embryos.164
Conclusion: The Moment of Conception is Reckoned from
Fertilization
In all, whether it be taken from a plain meaning, or understood under medical parlance, and more importantly, following the intention of the Framers of the
Constitution, the undeniable conclusion is that a zygote is a human organism and that the life of a new human being commences at a scientifically well-
defined moment of conception, that is, upon fertilization.
For the above reasons, the Court cannot subscribe to the theory advocated by Hon. Lagman that life begins at implantation. 165 According to him,
"fertilization and conception are two distinct and successive stages in the reproductive process. They are not identical and synonymous." 166 Citing a letter
of the WHO, he wrote that "medical authorities confirm that the implantation of the fertilized ovum is the commencement of conception and it is only after
implantation that pregnancy can be medically detected."167
This theory of implantation as the beginning of life is devoid of any legal or scientific mooring. It does not pertain to the beginning of life but to the
viability of the fetus. The fertilized ovum/zygote is not an inanimate object - it is a living human being complete with DNA and 46 chromosomes. 168
Implantation has been conceptualized only for convenience by those who had population control in mind. To adopt it would constitute textual infidelity not
only to the RH Law but also to the Constitution.
Not surprisingly, even the OSG does not support this position.
If such theory would be accepted, it would unnervingly legitimize the utilization of any drug or device that would prevent the implantation of the fetus at
the uterine wall. It would be provocative and further aggravate religious-based divisiveness.
It would legally permit what the Constitution proscribes - abortion and abortifacients.
The RH Law and Abortion
The clear and unequivocal intent of the Framers of the 1987 Constitution in protecting the life of the unborn from conception was to prevent the
Legislature from enacting a measure legalizing abortion. It was so clear that even the Court cannot interpret it otherwise. This intent of the Framers was
captured in the record of the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission. Commissioner Bernardo Villegas, the principal proponent of the
protection of the unborn from conception, explained:
The intention .. .is to make sure that there would be no pro-abortion laws ever passed by Congress or any pro-abortion decision passed by the Supreme
Court.169
A reading of the RH Law would show that it is in line with this intent and actually proscribes abortion. While the Court has opted not to make any
determination, at this stage, when life begins, it finds that the RH Law itself clearly mandates that protection be afforded from the moment of fertilization.
As pointed out by Justice Carpio, the RH Law is replete with provisions that embody the policy of the law to protect to the fertilized ovum and that it
should be afforded safe travel to the uterus for implantation.170
Moreover, the RH Law recognizes that abortion is a crime under Article 256 of the Revised Penal Code, which penalizes the destruction or expulsion of the
fertilized ovum. Thus:
1] xx x.
Section 4. Definition of Terms. - For the purpose of this Act, the following terms shall be defined as follows:
xxx.
(q) Reproductive health care refers to the access to a full range of methods, facilities, services and supplies that contribute to reproductive health and well-
being by addressing reproductive health-related problems. It also includes sexual health, the purpose of which is the enhancement of life and personal
relations. The elements of reproductive health care include the following:
xxx.
(3) Proscription of abortion and management of abortion complications;
xxx.
2] xx x.
Section 4. x x x.
(s) Reproductive health rights refers to the rights of individuals and couples, to decide freely and responsibly whether or not to have children; the number,
spacing and timing of their children; to make other decisions concerning reproduction, free of discrimination, coercion and violence; to have the
information and means to do so; and to attain the highest standard of sexual health and reproductive health: Provided, however, That reproductive health
rights do not include abortion, and access to abortifacients.
3] xx x.
SEC. 29. Repealing Clause. - Except for prevailing laws against abortion, any law, presidential decree or issuance, executive order, letter of instruction,
administrative order, rule or regulation contrary to or is inconsistent with the provisions of this Act including Republic Act No. 7392, otherwise known as
the Midwifery Act, is hereby repealed, modified or amended accordingly.
The RH Law and Abortifacients
In carrying out its declared policy, the RH Law is consistent in prohibiting abortifacients. To be clear, Section 4(a) of the RH Law defines an abortifacient
as:
Section 4. Definition of Terms - x x x x
(a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that induces abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized
ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb upon determination of the FDA.
As stated above, the RH Law mandates that protection must be afforded from the moment of fertilization. By using the word " or," the RH Law prohibits
not only drugs or devices that prevent implantation, but also those that induce abortion and those that induce the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's
womb. Thus, an abortifacient is any drug or device that either:
(a) Induces abortion; or
(b) Induces the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb; or
(c) Prevents the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb, upon determination of the FDA.
Contrary to the assertions made by the petitioners, the Court finds that the RH Law, consistent with the Constitution, recognizes that the fertilized ovum
already has life and that the State has a bounden duty to protect it. The conclusion becomes clear because the RH Law, first, prohibits any drug or device
that induces abortion (first kind), which, as discussed exhaustively above, refers to that which induces the killing or the destruction of the fertilized ovum,
and, second, prohibits any drug or device the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb (third kind).
By expressly declaring that any drug or device that prevents the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb is an abortifacient (third
kind), the RH Law does not intend to mean at all that life only begins only at implantation, as Hon. Lagman suggests. It also does not declare either that
protection will only be given upon implantation, as the petitioners likewise suggest. Rather, it recognizes that: one, there is a need to protect the fertilized
ovum which already has life, and two, the fertilized ovum must be protected the moment it becomes existent - all the way until it reaches and implants in
the mother's womb. After all, if life is only recognized and afforded protection from the moment the fertilized ovum implants - there is nothing to prevent
any drug or device from killing or destroying the fertilized ovum prior to implantation.
From the foregoing, the Court finds that inasmuch as it affords protection to the fertilized ovum, the RH Law does not sanction abortion. To repeat, it is the
Court's position that life begins at fertilization, not at implantation. When a fertilized ovum is implanted in the uterine wall , its viability is sustained but
that instance of implantation is not the point of beginning of life. It started earlier. And as defined by the RH Law, any drug or device that induces abortion,
that is, which kills or destroys the fertilized ovum or prevents the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb, is an abortifacient.
Proviso Under Section 9 of the RH Law
This notwithstanding, the Court finds that the proviso under Section 9 of the law that "any product or supply included or to be included in the EDL must
have a certification from the FDA that said product and supply is made available on the condition that it is not to be used as an abortifacient" as empty as it
is absurd. The FDA, with all its expertise, cannot fully attest that a drug or device will not all be used as an abortifacient, since the agency cannot be
present in every instance when the contraceptive product or supply will be used.171
Pursuant to its declared policy of providing access only to safe, legal and non-abortifacient contraceptives, however, the Court finds that the proviso of
Section 9, as worded, should bend to the legislative intent and mean that "any product or supply included or to be included in the EDL must have a
certification from the FDA that said product and supply is made available on the condition that it cannot be used as abortifacient." Such a construction is
consistent with the proviso under the second paragraph of the same section that provides:
Provided, further, That the foregoing offices shall not purchase or acquire by any means emergency contraceptive pills, postcoital pills, abortifacients that
will be used for such purpose and their other forms or equivalent.
Abortifacients under the RH-IRR
At this juncture, the Court agrees with ALFI that the authors of the RH-IRR gravely abused their office when they redefined the meaning of abortifacient.
The RH Law defines "abortifacient" as follows:
SEC. 4. Definition of Terms. - For the purpose of this Act, the following terms shall be defined as follows:
(a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that induces abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized
ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb upon determination of the FDA.
Section 3.0l (a) of the IRR, however, redefines "abortifacient" as:
Section 3.01 For purposes of these Rules, the terms shall be defined as follows:
a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that primarily induces abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb or the prevention of the
fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb upon determination of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). [Emphasis supplied]
Again in Section 3.0lG) of the RH-IRR, "contraceptive," is redefined, viz:
j) Contraceptive refers to any safe, legal, effective and scientifically proven modern family planning method, device, or health product, whether natural or
artificial, that prevents pregnancy but does not primarily destroy a fertilized ovum or prevent a fertilized ovum from being implanted in the mother's womb
in doses of its approved indication as determined by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).
The above-mentioned section of the RH-IRR allows "contraceptives" and recognizes as "abortifacient" only those that primarily induce abortion or the
destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb.172
This cannot be done.
In this regard, the observations of Justice Brion and Justice Del Castillo are well taken. As they pointed out, with the insertion of the word "primarily,"
Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR173 must be struck down for being ultra vires.
Evidently, with the addition of the word "primarily," in Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR is indeed ultra vires. It contravenes Section 4(a) of the RH
Law and should, therefore, be declared invalid. There is danger that the insertion of the qualifier "primarily" will pave the way for the approval of
contraceptives which may harm or destroy the life of the unborn from conception/fertilization in violation of Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution. With
such qualification in the RH-IRR, it appears to insinuate that a contraceptive will only be considered as an "abortifacient" if its sole known effect is
abortion or, as pertinent here, the prevention of the implantation of the fertilized ovum.
For the same reason, this definition of "contraceptive" would permit the approval of contraceptives which are actually abortifacients because of their fail-
safe mechanism.174
Also, as discussed earlier, Section 9 calls for the certification by the FDA that these contraceptives cannot act as abortive. With this, together with the
definition of an abortifacient under Section 4 (a) of the RH Law and its declared policy against abortion, the undeniable conclusion is that contraceptives to
be included in the PNDFS and the EDL will not only be those contraceptives that do not have the primary action of causing abortion or the destruction of a
fetus inside the mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb, but also those that do not have the
secondary action of acting the same way.
Indeed, consistent with the constitutional policy prohibiting abortion, and in line with the principle that laws should be construed in a manner that its
constitutionality is sustained, the RH Law and its implementing rules must be consistent with each other in prohibiting abortion. Thus, the word "
primarily" in Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR should be declared void. To uphold the validity of Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR and prohibit
only those contraceptives that have the primary effect of being an abortive would effectively "open the floodgates to the approval of contraceptives which
may harm or destroy the life of the unborn from conception/fertilization in violation of Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution."175
To repeat and emphasize, in all cases, the "principle of no abortion" embodied in the constitutional protection of life must be upheld.
2-The Right to Health
The petitioners claim that the RH Law violates the right to health because it requires the inclusion of hormonal contraceptives, intrauterine devices,
injectables and family products and supplies in the National Drug Formulary and the inclusion of the same in the regular purchase of essential medicines
and supplies of all national hospitals.176 Citing various studies on the matter, the petitioners posit that the risk of developing breast and cervical cancer is
greatly increased in women who use oral contraceptives as compared to women who never use them. They point out that the risk is decreased when the use
of contraceptives is discontinued. Further, it is contended that the use of combined oral contraceptive pills is associated with a threefold increased risk of
venous thromboembolism, a twofold increased risk of ischematic stroke, and an indeterminate effect on risk of myocardial infarction.177 Given the
definition of "reproductive health" and "sexual health" under Sections 4(p)178 and (w)179 of the RH Law, the petitioners assert that the assailed legislation
only seeks to ensure that women have pleasurable and satisfying sex lives.180
The OSG, however, points out that Section 15, Article II of the Constitution is not self-executory, it being a mere statement of the administration's principle
and policy. Even if it were self-executory, the OSG posits that medical authorities refute the claim that contraceptive pose a danger to the health of
women.181
The Court's Position
A component to the right to life is the constitutional right to health. In this regard, the Constitution is replete with provisions protecting and promoting the
right to health. Section 15, Article II of the Constitution provides:
Section 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness among them.
A portion of Article XIII also specifically provides for the States' duty to provide for the health of the people, viz:
HEALTH
Section 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach to health development which shall endeavor to make essential goods, health
and other social services available to all the people at affordable cost. There shall be priority for the needs of the underprivileged, sick, elderly, disabled,
women, and children. The State shall endeavor to provide free medical care to paupers.
Section 12. The State shall establish and maintain an effective food and drug regulatory system and undertake appropriate health, manpower development,
and research, responsive to the country's health needs and problems.
Section 13. The State shall establish a special agency for disabled person for their rehabilitation, self-development, and self-reliance, and their integration
into the mainstream of society.
Finally, Section 9, Article XVI provides:
Section 9. The State shall protect consumers from trade malpractices and from substandard or hazardous products.
Contrary to the respondent's notion, however, these provisions are self-executing. Unless the provisions clearly express the contrary, the provisions of the
Constitution should be considered self-executory. There is no need for legislation to implement these self-executing provisions. 182 In Manila Prince Hotel
v. GSIS,183 it was stated:
x x x Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions
of the constitution are self-executing. If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature would
have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law. This can be cataclysmic. That is why the prevailing view is, as it has
always been, that –
... in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing rather than non-self-executing. . . . Unless the contrary is clearly intended, the
provisions of the Constitution should be considered self-executing, as a contrary rule would give the legislature discretion to determine when, or whether,
they shall be effective. These provisions would be subordinated to the will of the lawmaking body, which could make them entirely meaningless by simply
refusing to pass the needed implementing statute. (Emphases supplied)
This notwithstanding, it bears mentioning that the petitioners, particularly ALFI, do not question contraception and contraceptives per se. 184 In fact, ALFI
prays that the status quo - under R.A. No. 5921 and R.A. No. 4729, the sale and distribution of contraceptives are not prohibited when they are dispensed
by a prescription of a duly licensed by a physician - be maintained.185
The legislative intent in the enactment of the RH Law in this regard is to leave intact the provisions of R.A. No. 4729. There is no intention at all to do
away with it. It is still a good law and its requirements are still in to be complied with. Thus, the Court agrees with the observation of respondent Lagman
that the effectivity of the RH Law will not lead to the unmitigated proliferation of contraceptives since the sale, distribution and dispensation of
contraceptive drugs and devices will still require the prescription of a licensed physician. With R.A. No. 4729 in place, there exists adequate safeguards to
ensure the public that only contraceptives that are safe are made available to the public. As aptly explained by respondent Lagman:
D. Contraceptives cannot be
dispensed and used without
prescription
108. As an added protection to voluntary users of contraceptives, the same cannot be dispensed and used without prescription.
109. Republic Act No. 4729 or "An Act to Regulate the Sale, Dispensation, and/ or Distribution of Contraceptive Drugs and Devices" and Republic Act
No. 5921 or "An Act Regulating the Practice of Pharmacy and Setting Standards of Pharmaceutical Education in the Philippines and for Other Purposes"
are not repealed by the RH Law and the provisions of said Acts are not inconsistent with the RH Law.
110. Consequently, the sale, distribution and dispensation of contraceptive drugs and devices are particularly governed by RA No. 4729 which provides in
full:
"Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, partnership, or corporation, to sell, dispense or otherwise distribute whether for or without consideration,
any contraceptive drug or device, unless such sale, dispensation or distribution is by a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and with the
prescription of a qualified medical practitioner.
"Sec. 2 . For the purpose of this Act:
"(a) "Contraceptive drug" is any medicine, drug, chemical, or portion which is used exclusively for the purpose of preventing fertilization of the
female ovum: and
"(b) "Contraceptive device" is any instrument, device, material, or agent introduced into the female reproductive system for the primary purpose
of preventing conception.
"Sec. 3 Any person, partnership, or corporation, violating the provisions of this Act shall be punished with a fine of not more than five hundred pesos or an
imprisonment of not less than six months or more than one year or both in the discretion of the Court.
"This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
"Approved: June 18, 1966"
111. Of the same import, but in a general manner, Section 25 of RA No. 5921 provides:
"Section 25. Sale of medicine, pharmaceuticals, drugs and devices. No medicine, pharmaceutical, or drug of whatever nature and kind or device shall be
compounded, dispensed, sold or resold, or otherwise be made available to the consuming public except through a prescription drugstore or hospital
pharmacy, duly established in accordance with the provisions of this Act.
112. With all of the foregoing safeguards, as provided for in the RH Law and other relevant statutes, the pretension of the petitioners that the RH Law will
lead to the unmitigated proliferation of contraceptives, whether harmful or not, is completely unwarranted and baseless. 186 [Emphases in the Original.
Underlining supplied.]
In Re: Section 10 of the RH Law:
The foregoing safeguards should be read in connection with Section 10 of the RH Law which provides:
SEC. 10. Procurement and Distribution of Family Planning Supplies. - The DOH shall procure, distribute to LGUs and monitor the usage of family
planning supplies for the whole country. The DOH shall coordinate with all appropriate local government bodies to plan and implement this procurement
and distribution program. The supply and budget allotments shall be based on, among others, the current levels and projections of the following:
(a) Number of women of reproductive age and couples who want to space or limit their children;
(b) Contraceptive prevalence rate, by type of method used; and
(c) Cost of family planning supplies.
Provided, That LGUs may implement its own procurement, distribution and monitoring program consistent with the overall provisions of this Act and the
guidelines of the DOH.
Thus, in the distribution by the DOH of contraceptive drugs and devices, it must consider the provisions of R.A. No. 4729, which is still in effect, and
ensure that the contraceptives that it will procure shall be from a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and that the actual dispensation of
these contraceptive drugs and devices will done following a prescription of a qualified medical practitioner. The distribution of contraceptive drugs and
devices must not be indiscriminately done. The public health must be protected by all possible means. As pointed out by Justice De Castro, a heavy
responsibility and burden are assumed by the government in supplying contraceptive drugs and devices, for it may be held accountable for any injury,
illness or loss of life resulting from or incidental to their use.187
At any rate, it bears pointing out that not a single contraceptive has yet been submitted to the FDA pursuant to the RH Law. It behooves the Court to await
its determination which drugs or devices are declared by the FDA as safe, it being the agency tasked to ensure that food and medicines available to the
public are safe for public consumption. Consequently, the Court finds that, at this point, the attack on the RH Law on this ground is premature. Indeed, the
various kinds of contraceptives must first be measured up to the constitutional yardstick as expounded herein, to be determined as the case presents itself.
At this point, the Court is of the strong view that Congress cannot legislate that hormonal contraceptives and intra-uterine devices are safe and non-
abortifacient. The first sentence of Section 9 that ordains their inclusion by the National Drug Formulary in the EDL by using the mandatory "shall" is to be
construed as operative only after they have been tested, evaluated, and approved by the FDA. The FDA, not Congress, has the expertise to determine
whether a particular hormonal contraceptive or intrauterine device is safe and non-abortifacient. The provision of the third sentence concerning the
requirements for the inclusion or removal of a particular family planning supply from the EDL supports this construction.
Stated differently, the provision in Section 9 covering the inclusion of hormonal contraceptives, intra-uterine devices, injectables, and other safe, legal,
non-abortifacient and effective family planning products and supplies by the National Drug Formulary in the EDL is not mandatory. There must first be a
determination by the FDA that they are in fact safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective family planning products and supplies. There can be no
predetermination by Congress that the gamut of contraceptives are "safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective" without the proper scientific examination.
3 -Freedom of Religion
and the Right to Free Speech
Position of the Petitioners:
1. On Contraception
While contraceptives and procedures like vasectomy and tubal ligation are not covered by the constitutional proscription, there are those who, because of
their religious education and background, sincerely believe that contraceptives, whether abortifacient or not, are evil. Some of these are medical
practitioners who essentially claim that their beliefs prohibit not only the use of contraceptives but also the willing participation and cooperation in all
things dealing with contraceptive use. Petitioner PAX explained that "contraception is gravely opposed to marital chastity, it is contrary to the good of the
transmission of life, and to the reciprocal self-giving of the spouses; it harms true love and denies the sovereign rule of God in the transmission of Human
life."188
The petitioners question the State-sponsored procurement of contraceptives, arguing that the expenditure of their taxes on contraceptives violates the
guarantee of religious freedom since contraceptives contravene their religious beliefs.189
2. On Religious Accommodation and
The Duty to Refer
Petitioners Imbong and Luat note that while the RH Law attempts to address religious sentiments by making provisions for a conscientious objector, the
constitutional guarantee is nonetheless violated because the law also imposes upon the conscientious objector the duty to refer the patient seeking
reproductive health services to another medical practitioner who would be able to provide for the patient's needs. For the petitioners, this amounts to
requiring the conscientious objector to cooperate with the very thing he refuses to do without violating his/her religious beliefs.190
They further argue that even if the conscientious objector's duty to refer is recognized, the recognition is unduly limited, because although it allows a
conscientious objector in Section 23 (a)(3) the option to refer a patient seeking reproductive health services and information - no escape is afforded the
conscientious objector in Section 23 (a)(l) and (2), i.e. against a patient seeking reproductive health procedures. They claim that the right of other
individuals to conscientiously object, such as: a) those working in public health facilities referred to in Section 7; b) public officers involved in the
implementation of the law referred to in Section 23(b ); and c) teachers in public schools referred to in Section 14 of the RH Law, are also not
recognize.191
Petitioner Echavez and the other medical practitioners meanwhile, contend that the requirement to refer the matter to another health care service provider is
still considered a compulsion on those objecting healthcare service providers. They add that compelling them to do the act against their will violates the
Doctrine of Benevolent Neutrality. Sections 9, 14 and 1 7 of the law are too secular that they tend to disregard the religion of Filipinos. Authorizing the use
of contraceptives with abortive effects, mandatory sex education, mandatory pro-bono reproductive health services to indigents encroach upon the religious
freedom of those upon whom they are required.192
Petitioner CFC also argues that the requirement for a conscientious objector to refer the person seeking reproductive health care services to another
provider infringes on one's freedom of religion as it forces the objector to become an unwilling participant in the commission of a serious sin under
Catholic teachings. While the right to act on one's belief may be regulated by the State, the acts prohibited by the RH Law are passive acts which produce
neither harm nor injury to the public.193
Petitioner CFC adds that the RH Law does not show compelling state interest to justify regulation of religious freedom because it mentions no emergency,
risk or threat that endangers state interests. It does not explain how the rights of the people (to equality, non-discrimination of rights, sustainable human
development, health, education, information, choice and to make decisions according to religious convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs and the demands of
responsible parenthood) are being threatened or are not being met as to justify the impairment of religious freedom.194
Finally, the petitioners also question Section 15 of the RH Law requiring would-be couples to attend family planning and responsible parenthood seminars
and to obtain a certificate of compliance. They claim that the provision forces individuals to participate in the implementation of the RH Law even if it
contravenes their religious beliefs.195 As the assailed law dangles the threat of penalty of fine and/or imprisonment in case of non-compliance with its
provisions, the petitioners claim that the RH Law forcing them to provide, support and facilitate access and information to contraception against their
beliefs must be struck down as it runs afoul to the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom.
The Respondents' Positions
The respondents, on the other hand, contend that the RH Law does not provide that a specific mode or type of contraceptives be used, be it natural or
artificial. It neither imposes nor sanctions any religion or belief.196 They point out that the RH Law only seeks to serve the public interest by providing
accessible, effective and quality reproductive health services to ensure maternal and child health, in line with the State's duty to bring to reality the social
justice health guarantees of the Constitution,197 and that what the law only prohibits are those acts or practices, which deprive others of their right to
reproductive health.198 They assert that the assailed law only seeks to guarantee informed choice, which is an assurance that no one will be compelled to
violate his religion against his free will.199
The respondents add that by asserting that only natural family planning should be allowed, the petitioners are effectively going against the constitutional
right to religious freedom, the same right they invoked to assail the constitutionality of the RH Law.200 In other words, by seeking the declaration that the
RH Law is unconstitutional, the petitioners are asking that the Court recognize only the Catholic Church's sanctioned natural family planning methods and
impose this on the entire citizenry.201
With respect to the duty to refer, the respondents insist that the same does not violate the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom, it being a carefully
balanced compromise between the interests of the religious objector, on one hand, who is allowed to keep silent but is required to refer -and that of the
citizen who needs access to information and who has the right to expect that the health care professional in front of her will act professionally. For the
respondents, the concession given by the State under Section 7 and 23(a)(3) is sufficient accommodation to the right to freely exercise one's religion
without unnecessarily infringing on the rights of others.202
Whatever burden is placed on the petitioner's religious freedom is minimal as the duty to refer is limited in duration, location and impact.203
Regarding mandatory family planning seminars under Section 15 , the respondents claim that it is a reasonable regulation providing an opportunity for
would-be couples to have access to information regarding parenthood, family planning, breastfeeding and infant nutrition. It is argued that those who
object to any information received on account of their attendance in the required seminars are not compelled to accept information given to them. They are
completely free to reject any information they do not agree with and retain the freedom to decide on matters of family life without intervention of the
State.204
For their part, respondents De Venecia et al., dispute the notion that natural family planning is the only method acceptable to Catholics and the Catholic
hierarchy. Citing various studies and surveys on the matter, they highlight the changing stand of the Catholic Church on contraception throughout the years
and note the general acceptance of the benefits of contraceptives by its followers in planning their families.
The Church and The State
At the outset, it cannot be denied that we all live in a heterogeneous society. It is made up of people of diverse ethnic, cultural and religious beliefs and
backgrounds. History has shown us that our government, in law and in practice, has allowed these various religious, cultural, social and racial groups to
thrive in a single society together. It has embraced minority groups and is tolerant towards all - the religious people of different sects and the non-believers.
The undisputed fact is that our people generally believe in a deity, whatever they conceived Him to be, and to whom they call for guidance and
enlightenment in crafting our fundamental law. Thus, the preamble of the present Constitution reads:
We, the sovereign Filipino people, imploring the aid of Almighty God, in order to build a just and humane society, and establish a Government that shall
embody our ideals and aspirations, promote the common good, conserve and develop our patrimony, and secure to ourselves and our posterity, the
blessings of independence and democracy under the rule of law and a regime of truth, justice, freedom, love, equality, and peace, do ordain and promulgate
this Constitution.
The Filipino people in "imploring the aid of Almighty God " manifested their spirituality innate in our nature and consciousness as a people, shaped by
tradition and historical experience. As this is embodied in the preamble, it means that the State recognizes with respect the influence of religion in so far as
it instills into the mind the purest principles of morality.205 Moreover, in recognition of the contributions of religion to society, the 1935, 1973 and 1987
constitutions contain benevolent and accommodating provisions towards religions such as tax exemption of church property, salary of religious officers in
government institutions, and optional religious instructions in public schools.
The Framers, however, felt the need to put up a strong barrier so that the State would not encroach into the affairs of the church, and vice-versa. The
principle of separation of Church and State was, thus, enshrined in Article II, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution, viz:
Section 6. The separation of Church and State shall be inviolable.
Verily, the principle of separation of Church and State is based on mutual respect.1âwphi1 Generally, the State cannot meddle in the internal affairs of the
church, much less question its faith and dogmas or dictate upon it. It cannot favor one religion and discriminate against another. On the other hand, the
church cannot impose its beliefs and convictions on the State and the rest of the citizenry. It cannot demand that the nation follow its beliefs, even if it
sincerely believes that they are good for the country.
Consistent with the principle that not any one religion should ever be preferred over another, the Constitution in the above-cited provision utilizes the term
"church" in its generic sense, which refers to a temple, a mosque, an iglesia, or any other house of God which metaphorically symbolizes a religious
organization. Thus, the "Church" means the religious congregations collectively.
Balancing the benefits that religion affords and the need to provide an ample barrier to protect the State from the pursuit of its secular objectives, the
Constitution lays down the following mandate in Article III, Section 5 and Article VI, Section 29 (2), of the 1987 Constitution:
Section. 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of
religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil
or political rights.
Section 29.
xxx.
No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid, or employed, directly or indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church,
denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion, or of any priest, preacher, minister, other religious teacher, or dignitary as such, except when such
priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal institution, or government orphanage or leprosarium.
In short, the constitutional assurance of religious freedom provides two guarantees: the Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause.
The establishment clause "principally prohibits the State from sponsoring any religion or favoring any religion as against other religions. It mandates a
strict neutrality in affairs among religious groups."206 Essentially, it prohibits the establishment of a state religion and the use of public resources for the
support or prohibition of a religion.
On the other hand, the basis of the free exercise clause is the respect for the inviolability of the human conscience. 207 Under this part of religious freedom
guarantee, the State is prohibited from unduly interfering with the outside manifestations of one's belief and faith.208 Explaining the concept of religious
freedom, the Court, in Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers Union209 wrote:
The constitutional provisions not only prohibits legislation for the support of any religious tenets or the modes of worship of any sect, thus forestalling
compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form of worship (U.S. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 88 L. ed. 1148, 1153), but also assures
the free exercise of one's chosen form of religion within limits of utmost amplitude. It has been said that the religion clauses of the Constitution are all
designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to believe as his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs, and to live as
he believes he ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others and with the common good. Any legislation whose effect or purpose is to impede the
observance of one or all religions, or to discriminate invidiously between the religions, is invalid, even though the burden may be characterized as being
only indirect. (Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 10 L.ed.2d 965, 83 S. Ct. 1970) But if the state regulates conduct by enacting, within its power, a general
law which has for its purpose and effect to advance the state's secular goals, the statute is valid despite its indirect burden on religious observance, unless
the state can accomplish its purpose without imposing such burden. (Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 6 Led. 2d. 563, 81 S. Ct. 144; McGowan v.
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 444-5 and 449).
As expounded in Escritor,
The establishment and free exercise clauses were not designed to serve contradictory purposes. They have a single goal-to promote freedom of individual
religious beliefs and practices. In simplest terms, the free exercise clause prohibits government from inhibiting religious beliefs with penalties for religious
beliefs and practice, while the establishment clause prohibits government from inhibiting religious belief with rewards for religious beliefs and practices. In
other words, the two religion clauses were intended to deny government the power to use either the carrot or the stick to influence individual religious
beliefs and practices.210
Corollary to the guarantee of free exercise of one's religion is the principle that the guarantee of religious freedom is comprised of two parts: the freedom to
believe, and the freedom to act on one's belief. The first part is absolute. As explained in Gerona v. Secretary of Education:211
The realm of belief and creed is infinite and limitless bounded only by one's imagination and thought. So is the freedom of belief, including religious
belief, limitless and without bounds. One may believe in most anything, however strange, bizarre and unreasonable the same may appear to others, even
heretical when weighed in the scales of orthodoxy or doctrinal standards. But between the freedom of belief and the exercise of said belief, there is quite a
stretch of road to travel.212
The second part however, is limited and subject to the awesome power of the State and can be enjoyed only with proper regard to the rights of others. It is
"subject to regulation where the belief is translated into external acts that affect the public welfare."213
Legislative Acts and the
Free Exercise Clause
Thus, in case of conflict between the free exercise clause and the State, the Court adheres to the doctrine of benevolent neutrality. This has been clearly
decided by the Court in Estrada v. Escritor, (Escritor)214 where it was stated "that benevolent neutrality-accommodation, whether mandatory or
permissive, is the spirit, intent and framework underlying the Philippine Constitution."215 In the same case, it was further explained that"
The benevolent neutrality theory believes that with respect to these governmental actions, accommodation of religion may be allowed, not to promote the
government's favored form of religion, but to allow individuals and groups to exercise their religion without hindrance. "The purpose of accommodation is
to remove a burden on, or facilitate the exercise of, a person's or institution's religion."216 "What is sought under the theory of accommodation is not a
declaration of unconstitutionality of a facially neutral law, but an exemption from its application or its 'burdensome effect,' whether by the legislature or the
courts."217
In ascertaining the limits of the exercise of religious freedom, the compelling state interest test is proper.218 Underlying the compelling state interest test is
the notion that free exercise is a fundamental right and that laws burdening it should be subject to strict scrutiny.219 In Escritor, it was written:
Philippine jurisprudence articulates several tests to determine these limits. Beginning with the first case on the Free Exercise Clause, American Bible
Society, the Court mentioned the "clear and present danger" test but did not employ it. Nevertheless, this test continued to be cited in subsequent cases on
religious liberty. The Gerona case then pronounced that the test of permissibility of religious freedom is whether it violates the established institutions of
society and law. The Victoriano case mentioned the "immediate and grave danger" test as well as the doctrine that a law of general applicability may
burden religious exercise provided the law is the least restrictive means to accomplish the goal of the law. The case also used, albeit inappropriately, the
"compelling state interest" test. After Victoriano , German went back to the Gerona rule. Ebralinag then employed the "grave and immediate danger" test
and overruled the Gerona test. The fairly recent case of Iglesia ni Cristo went back to the " clear and present danger" test in the maiden case of A merican
Bible Society. Not surprisingly, all the cases which employed the "clear and present danger" or "grave and immediate danger" test involved, in one form or
another, religious speech as this test is often used in cases on freedom of expression. On the other hand, the Gerona and German cases set the rule that
religious freedom will not prevail over established institutions of society and law. Gerona, however, which was the authority cited by German has been
overruled by Ebralinag which employed the "grave and immediate danger" test . Victoriano was the only case that employed the "compelling state interest"
test, but as explained previously, the use of the test was inappropriate to the facts of the case.
The case at bar does not involve speech as in A merican Bible Society, Ebralinag and Iglesia ni Cristo where the "clear and present danger" and "grave and
immediate danger" tests were appropriate as speech has easily discernible or immediate effects. The Gerona and German doctrine, aside from having been
overruled, is not congruent with the benevolent neutrality approach, thus not appropriate in this jurisdiction. Similar to Victoriano, the present case
involves purely conduct arising from religious belief. The "compelling state interest" test is proper where conduct is involved for the whole gamut of
human conduct has different effects on the state's interests: some effects may be immediate and short-term while others delayed and far-reaching. A test
that would protect the interests of the state in preventing a substantive evil, whether immediate or delayed, is therefore necessary. However, not any interest
of the state would suffice to prevail over the right to religious freedom as this is a fundamental right that enjoys a preferred position in the hierarchy of
rights - "the most inalienable and sacred of all human rights", in the words of Jefferson. This right is sacred for an invocation of the Free Exercise Clause is
an appeal to a higher sovereignty. The entire constitutional order of limited government is premised upon an acknowledgment of such higher sovereignty,
thus the Filipinos implore the "aid of Almighty God in order to build a just and humane society and establish a government." As held in Sherbert, only the
gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests can limit this fundamental right. A mere balancing of interests which balances a right with just a colorable
state interest is therefore not appropriate. Instead, only a compelling interest of the state can prevail over the fundamental right to religious liberty. The test
requires the state to carry a heavy burden, a compelling one, for to do otherwise would allow the state to batter religion, especially the less powerful ones
until they are destroyed. In determining which shall prevail between the state's interest and religious liberty, reasonableness shall be the guide. The
"compelling state interest" serves the purpose of revering religious liberty while at the same time affording protection to the paramount interests of the
state. This was the test used in Sherbert which involved conduct, i.e. refusal to work on Saturdays. In the end, the "compelling state interest" test, by
upholding the paramount interests of the state, seeks to protect the very state, without which, religious liberty will not be preserved. [Emphases in the
original. Underlining supplied.]
The Court's Position
In the case at bench, it is not within the province of the Court to determine whether the use of contraceptives or one's participation in the support of modem
reproductive health measures is moral from a religious standpoint or whether the same is right or wrong according to one's dogma or belief. For the Court
has declared that matters dealing with "faith, practice, doctrine, form of worship, ecclesiastical law, custom and rule of a church ... are unquestionably
ecclesiastical matters which are outside the province of the civil courts."220 The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and secular morality.
Whatever pronouncement the Court makes in the case at bench should be understood only in this realm where it has authority. Stated otherwise, while the
Court stands without authority to rule on ecclesiastical matters, as vanguard of the Constitution, it does have authority to determine whether the RH Law
contravenes the guarantee of religious freedom.
At first blush, it appears that the RH Law recognizes and respects religion and religious beliefs and convictions. It is replete with assurances the no one can
be compelled to violate the tenets of his religion or defy his religious convictions against his free will. Provisions in the RH Law respecting religious
freedom are the following:
1. The State recognizes and guarantees the human rights of all persons including their right to equality and nondiscrimination of these rights, the right to
sustainable human development, the right to health which includes reproductive health, the right to education and information, and the right to choose and
make decisions for themselves in accordance with their religious convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs, and the demands of responsible parenthood. [Section
2, Declaration of Policy]
2 . The State recognizes marriage as an inviolable social institution and the foundation of the family which in turn is the foundation of the nation. Pursuant
thereto, the State shall defend:
(a) The right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions and the demands of responsible parenthood." [Section 2,
Declaration of Policy]
3. The State shall promote and provide information and access, without bias, to all methods of family planning, including effective natural and modern
methods which have been proven medically safe, legal, non-abortifacient, and effective in accordance with scientific and evidence-based medical research
standards such as those registered and approved by the FDA for the poor and marginalized as identified through the NHTS-PR and other government
measures of identifying marginalization: Provided, That the State shall also provide funding support to promote modern natural methods of family
planning, especially the Billings Ovulation Method, consistent with the needs of acceptors and their religious convictions. [Section 3(e), Declaration of
Policy]
4. The State shall promote programs that: (1) enable individuals and couples to have the number of children they desire with due consideration to the
health, particularly of women, and the resources available and affordable to them and in accordance with existing laws, public morals and their religious
convictions. [Section 3CDJ
5. The State shall respect individuals' preferences and choice of family planning methods that are in accordance with their religious convictions and
cultural beliefs, taking into consideration the State's obligations under various human rights instruments. [Section 3(h)]
6. Active participation by nongovernment organizations (NGOs) , women's and people's organizations, civil society, faith-based organizations, the religious
sector and communities is crucial to ensure that reproductive health and population and development policies, plans, and programs will address the priority
needs of women, the poor, and the marginalized. [Section 3(i)]
7. Responsible parenthood refers to the will and ability of a parent to respond to the needs and aspirations of the family and children. It is likewise a shared
responsibility between parents to determine and achieve the desired number of children, spacing and timing of their children according to their own family
life aspirations, taking into account psychological preparedness, health status, sociocultural and economic concerns consistent with their religious
convictions. [Section 4(v)] (Emphases supplied)
While the Constitution prohibits abortion, laws were enacted allowing the use of contraceptives. To some medical practitioners, however, the whole idea of
using contraceptives is an anathema. Consistent with the principle of benevolent neutrality, their beliefs should be respected.
The Establishment Clause
and Contraceptives
In the same breath that the establishment clause restricts what the government can do with religion, it also limits what religious sects can or cannot do with
the government. They can neither cause the government to adopt their particular doctrines as policy for everyone, nor can they not cause the government to
restrict other groups. To do so, in simple terms, would cause the State to adhere to a particular religion and, thus, establishing a state religion.
Consequently, the petitioners are misguided in their supposition that the State cannot enhance its population control program through the RH Law simply
because the promotion of contraceptive use is contrary to their religious beliefs. Indeed, the State is not precluded to pursue its legitimate secular objectives
without being dictated upon by the policies of any one religion. One cannot refuse to pay his taxes simply because it will cloud his conscience. The
demarcation line between Church and State demands that one render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's and unto God the things that are God's.221
The Free Exercise Clause and the Duty to Refer
While the RH Law, in espousing state policy to promote reproductive health manifestly respects diverse religious beliefs in line with the Non-
Establishment Clause, the same conclusion cannot be reached with respect to Sections 7, 23 and 24 thereof. The said provisions commonly mandate that a
hospital or a medical practitioner to immediately refer a person seeking health care and services under the law to another accessible healthcare provider
despite their conscientious objections based on religious or ethical beliefs.
In a situation where the free exercise of religion is allegedly burdened by government legislation or practice, the compelling state interest test in line with
the Court's espousal of the Doctrine of Benevolent Neutrality in Escritor, finds application. In this case, the conscientious objector's claim to religious
freedom would warrant an exemption from obligations under the RH Law, unless the government succeeds in demonstrating a more compelling state
interest in the accomplishment of an important secular objective. Necessarily so, the plea of conscientious objectors for exemption from the RH Law
deserves no less than strict scrutiny.
In applying the test, the first inquiry is whether a conscientious objector's right to religious freedom has been burdened. As in Escritor, there is no doubt
that an intense tug-of-war plagues a conscientious objector. One side coaxes him into obedience to the law and the abandonment of his religious beliefs,
while the other entices him to a clean conscience yet under the pain of penalty. The scenario is an illustration of the predicament of medical practitioners
whose religious beliefs are incongruent with what the RH Law promotes.
The Court is of the view that the obligation to refer imposed by the RH Law violates the religious belief and conviction of a conscientious objector. Once
the medical practitioner, against his will, refers a patient seeking information on modem reproductive health products, services, procedures and methods,
his conscience is immediately burdened as he has been compelled to perform an act against his beliefs. As Commissioner Joaquin A. Bernas
(Commissioner Bernas) has written, "at the basis of the free exercise clause is the respect for the inviolability of the human conscience.222
Though it has been said that the act of referral is an opt-out clause, it is, however, a false compromise because it makes pro-life health providers complicit
in the performance of an act that they find morally repugnant or offensive. They cannot, in conscience, do indirectly what they cannot do directly. One may
not be the principal, but he is equally guilty if he abets the offensive act by indirect participation.
Moreover, the guarantee of religious freedom is necessarily intertwined with the right to free speech, it being an externalization of one's thought and
conscience. This in turn includes the right to be silent. With the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom follows the protection that should be afforded
to individuals in communicating their beliefs to others as well as the protection for simply being silent. The Bill of Rights guarantees the liberty of the
individual to utter what is in his mind and the liberty not to utter what is not in his mind.223 While the RH Law seeks to provide freedom of choice through
informed consent, freedom of choice guarantees the liberty of the religious conscience and prohibits any degree of compulsion or burden, whether direct or
indirect, in the practice of one's religion.224
In case of conflict between the religious beliefs and moral convictions of individuals, on one hand, and the interest of the State, on the other, to provide
access and information on reproductive health products, services, procedures and methods to enable the people to determine the timing, number and
spacing of the birth of their children, the Court is of the strong view that the religious freedom of health providers, whether public or private, should be
accorded primacy. Accordingly, a conscientious objector should be exempt from compliance with the mandates of the RH Law. If he would be compelled
to act contrary to his religious belief and conviction, it would be violative of "the principle of non-coercion" enshrined in the constitutional right to free
exercise of religion.
Interestingly, on April 24, 2013, Scotland's Inner House of the Court of Session, found in the case of Doogan and Wood v. NHS Greater Glasgow and
Clyde Health Board,225 that the midwives claiming to be conscientious objectors under the provisions of Scotland's Abortion Act of 1967, could not be
required to delegate, supervise or support staff on their labor ward who were involved in abortions.226 The Inner House stated "that if 'participation' were
defined according to whether the person was taking part 'directly' or ' indirectly' this would actually mean more complexity and uncertainty."227
While the said case did not cover the act of referral, the applicable principle was the same - they could not be forced to assist abortions if it would be
against their conscience or will.
Institutional Health Providers
The same holds true with respect to non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and operated by a religious group and health care service
providers. Considering that Section 24 of the RH Law penalizes such institutions should they fail or refuse to comply with their duty to refer under Section
7 and Section 23(a)(3), the Court deems that it must be struck down for being violative of the freedom of religion. The same applies to Section 23(a)(l) and
(a)(2) in relation to Section 24, considering that in the dissemination of information regarding programs and services and in the performance of
reproductive health procedures, the religious freedom of health care service providers should be respected.
In the case of Islamic Da'wah Council of the Philippines, Inc. v. Office of the Executive Secretary228 it was stressed:
Freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by the framers of our fundamental law. And this Court has consistently affirmed this preferred status,
well aware that it is "designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to believe as his conscience directs, to profess his
beliefs, and to live as he believes he ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others and with the common good."10
The Court is not oblivious to the view that penalties provided by law endeavour to ensure compliance. Without set consequences for either an active
violation or mere inaction, a law tends to be toothless and ineffectual. Nonetheless, when what is bartered for an effective implementation of a law is a
constitutionally-protected right the Court firmly chooses to stamp its disapproval. The punishment of a healthcare service provider, who fails and/or refuses
to refer a patient to another, or who declines to perform reproductive health procedure on a patient because incompatible religious beliefs, is a clear
inhibition of a constitutional guarantee which the Court cannot allow.
The Implementing Rules and Regulation (RH-IRR)
The last paragraph of Section 5.24 of the RH-IRR reads:
Provided, That skilled health professional such as provincial, city or municipal health officers, chiefs of hospital, head nurses, supervising midwives,
among others, who by virtue of their office are specifically charged with the duty to implement the provisions of the RPRH Act and these Rules, cannot be
considered as conscientious objectors.
This is discriminatory and violative of the equal protection clause. The conscientious objection clause should be equally protective of the religious belief of
public health officers. There is no perceptible distinction why they should not be considered exempt from the mandates of the law. The protection accorded
to other conscientious objectors should equally apply to all medical practitioners without distinction whether they belong to the public or private sector.
After all, the freedom to believe is intrinsic in every individual and the protective robe that guarantees its free exercise is not taken off even if one acquires
employment in the government.
It should be stressed that intellectual liberty occupies a place inferior to none in the hierarchy of human values. The mind must be free to think what it
wills, whether in the secular or religious sphere, to give expression to its beliefs by oral discourse or through the media and, thus, seek other candid views
in occasions or gatherings or in more permanent aggrupation. Embraced in such concept then are freedom of religion, freedom of speech, of the press,
assembly and petition, and freedom of association.229
The discriminatory provision is void not only because no such exception is stated in the RH Law itself but also because it is violative of the equal
protection clause in the Constitution. Quoting respondent Lagman, if there is any conflict between the RH-IRR and the RH Law, the law must prevail.
Justice Mendoza:
I'll go to another point. The RH law .. .in your Comment- in-Intervention on page 52, you mentioned RH Law is replete with provisions in upholding the
freedom of religion and respecting religious convictions. Earlier, you affirmed this with qualifications. Now, you have read, I presumed you have read the
IRR-Implementing Rules and Regulations of the RH Bill?
Congressman Lagman:
Yes, Your Honor, I have read but I have to admit, it's a long IRR and I have not thoroughly dissected the nuances of the provisions.
Justice Mendoza:
I will read to you one provision. It's Section 5.24. This I cannot find in the RH Law. But in the IRR it says: " .... skilled health professionals such as
provincial, city or municipal health officers, chief of hospitals, head nurses, supervising midwives, among others, who by virtue of their office are
specifically charged with the duty to implement the provisions of the RPRH Act and these Rules, cannot be considered as conscientious objectors." Do you
agree with this?
Congressman Lagman:
I will have to go over again the provisions, Your Honor.
Justice Mendoza:
In other words, public health officers in contrast to the private practitioners who can be conscientious objectors, skilled health professionals cannot be
considered conscientious objectors. Do you agree with this? Is this not against the constitutional right to the religious belief?
Congressman Lagman:
Your Honor, if there is any conflict between the IRR and the law, the law must prevail.230
Compelling State Interest
The foregoing discussion then begets the question on whether the respondents, in defense of the subject provisions, were able to: 1] demonstrate a more
compelling state interest to restrain conscientious objectors in their choice of services to render; and 2] discharge the burden of proof that the obligatory
character of the law is the least intrusive means to achieve the objectives of the law.
Unfortunately, a deep scrutiny of the respondents' submissions proved to be in vain. The OSG was curiously silent in the establishment of a more
compelling state interest that would rationalize the curbing of a conscientious objector's right not to adhere to an action contrary to his religious
convictions. During the oral arguments, the OSG maintained the same silence and evasion. The Transcripts of the Stenographic Notes disclose the
following:
Justice De Castro:
Let's go back to the duty of the conscientious objector to refer. ..
Senior State Solicitor Hilbay:
Yes, Justice.
Justice De Castro:
... which you are discussing awhile ago with Justice Abad. What is the compelling State interest in imposing this duty to refer to a conscientious objector
which refuses to do so because of his religious belief?
Senior State Solicitor Hilbay:
Ahh, Your Honor, ..
Justice De Castro:
What is the compelling State interest to impose this burden?
Senior State Solicitor Hilbay:
In the first place, Your Honor, I don't believe that the standard is a compelling State interest, this is an ordinary health legislation involving professionals.
This is not a free speech matter or a pure free exercise matter. This is a regulation by the State of the relationship between medical doctors and their
patients.231
Resultantly, the Court finds no compelling state interest which would limit the free exercise clause of the conscientious objectors, however few in number.
Only the prevention of an immediate and grave danger to the security and welfare of the community can justify the infringement of religious freedom. If
the government fails to show the seriousness and immediacy of the threat, State intrusion is constitutionally unacceptable.232
Freedom of religion means more than just the freedom to believe. It also means the freedom to act or not to act according to what one believes. And this
freedom is violated when one is compelled to act against one's belief or is prevented from acting according to one's belief.233
Apparently, in these cases, there is no immediate danger to the life or health of an individual in the perceived scenario of the subject provisions. After all, a
couple who plans the timing, number and spacing of the birth of their children refers to a future event that is contingent on whether or not the mother
decides to adopt or use the information, product, method or supply given to her or whether she even decides to become pregnant at all. On the other hand,
the burden placed upon those who object to contraceptive use is immediate and occurs the moment a patient seeks consultation on reproductive health
matters.
Moreover, granting that a compelling interest exists to justify the infringement of the conscientious objector's religious freedom, the respondents have
failed to demonstrate "the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests" which could limit or override a person's fundamental right to religious
freedom. Also, the respondents have not presented any government effort exerted to show that the means it takes to achieve its legitimate state objective is
the least intrusive means.234 Other than the assertion that the act of referring would only be momentary, considering that the act of referral by a
conscientious objector is the very action being contested as violative of religious freedom, it behooves the respondents to demonstrate that no other means
can be undertaken by the State to achieve its objective without violating the rights of the conscientious objector. The health concerns of women may still be
addressed by other practitioners who may perform reproductive health-related procedures with open willingness and motivation. Suffice it to say, a person
who is forced to perform an act in utter reluctance deserves the protection of the Court as the last vanguard of constitutional freedoms.
At any rate, there are other secular steps already taken by the Legislature to ensure that the right to health is protected. Considering other legislations as
they stand now, R.A . No. 4 729 or the Contraceptive Act, R.A. No. 6365 or "The Population Act of the Philippines" and R.A. No. 9710, otherwise known
as "The Magna Carta of Women," amply cater to the needs of women in relation to health services and programs. The pertinent provision of Magna Carta
on comprehensive health services and programs for women, in fact, reads:
Section 17. Women's Right to Health. - (a) Comprehensive Health Services. - The State shall, at all times, provide for a comprehensive,
culture-sensitive, and gender-responsive health services and programs covering all stages of a woman's life cycle and which addresses the
major causes of women's mortality and morbidity: Provided, That in the provision for comprehensive health services, due respect shall be
accorded to women's religious convictions, the rights of the spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions, and
the demands of responsible parenthood, and the right of women to protection from hazardous drugs, devices, interventions, and
substances.

Access to the following services shall be ensured:

(1) Maternal care to include pre- and post-natal services to address pregnancy and infant health and nutrition;

(2) Promotion of breastfeeding;

(3) Responsible, ethical, legal, safe, and effective methods of family planning;

(4) Family and State collaboration in youth sexuality education and health services without prejudice to the primary right and
duty of parents to educate their children;

(5) Prevention and management of reproductive tract infections, including sexually transmitted diseases, HIV, and AIDS;

(6) Prevention and management of reproductive tract cancers like breast and cervical cancers, and other gynecological
conditions and disorders;

(7) Prevention of abortion and management of pregnancy-related complications;

(8) In cases of violence against women and children, women and children victims and survivors shall be provided with
comprehensive health services that include psychosocial, therapeutic, medical, and legal interventions and assistance towards
healing, recovery, and empowerment;

(9) Prevention and management of infertility and sexual dysfunction pursuant to ethical norms and medical standards;

(10) Care of the elderly women beyond their child-bearing years; and

(11) Management, treatment, and intervention of mental health problems of women and girls. In addition, healthy lifestyle
activities are encouraged and promoted through programs and projects as strategies in the prevention of diseases.
 (b) Comprehensive Health Information and Education. - The State shall provide women in all sectors with appropriate, timely, complete,
and accurate information and education on all the above-stated aspects of women's health in government education and training
programs, with due regard to the following:

(1) The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth and the development of moral character and
the right of children to be brought up in an atmosphere of morality and rectitude for the enrichment and strengthening of
character;

(2) The formation of a person's sexuality that affirms human dignity; and

(3) Ethical, legal, safe, and effective family planning methods including fertility awareness.

As an afterthought, Asst. Solicitor General Hilbay eventually replied that the compelling state interest was "Fifteen maternal deaths per day, hundreds of
thousands of unintended pregnancies, lives changed, x x x."235 He, however, failed to substantiate this point by concrete facts and figures from reputable
sources.
The undisputed fact, however, is that the World Health Organization reported that the Filipino maternal mortality rate dropped to 48 percent from 1990 to
2008, 236 although there was still no RH Law at that time. Despite such revelation, the proponents still insist that such number of maternal deaths
constitute a compelling state interest.
Granting that there are still deficiencies and flaws in the delivery of social healthcare programs for Filipino women, they could not be solved by a measure
that puts an unwarrantable stranglehold on religious beliefs in exchange for blind conformity.
Exception: Life Threatening Cases
All this notwithstanding, the Court properly recognizes a valid exception set forth in the law. While generally healthcare service providers cannot be forced
to render reproductive health care procedures if doing it would contravene their religious beliefs, an exception must be made in life-threatening cases that
require the performance of emergency procedures. In these situations, the right to life of the mother should be given preference, considering that a referral
by a medical practitioner would amount to a denial of service, resulting to unnecessarily placing the life of a mother in grave danger. Thus, during the oral
arguments, Atty. Liban, representing CFC, manifested: "the forced referral clause that we are objecting on grounds of violation of freedom of religion does
not contemplate an emergency."237
In a conflict situation between the life of the mother and the life of a child, the doctor is morally obliged always to try to save both lives. If, however, it is
impossible, the resulting death to one should not be deliberate. Atty. Noche explained:
Principle of Double-Effect. - May we please remind the principal author of the RH Bill in the House of Representatives of the principle of double-effect
wherein intentional harm on the life of either the mother of the child is never justified to bring about a "good" effect. In a conflict situation between the life
of the child and the life of the mother, the doctor is morally obliged always to try to save both lives. However, he can act in favor of one (not necessarily
the mother) when it is medically impossible to save both, provided that no direct harm is intended to the other. If the above principles are observed, the loss
of the child's life or the mother's life is not intentional and, therefore, unavoidable. Hence, the doctor would not be guilty of abortion or murder. The mother
is never pitted against the child because both their lives are equally valuable.238
Accordingly, if it is necessary to save the life of a mother, procedures endangering the life of the child may be resorted to even if is against the religious
sentiments of the medical practitioner. As quoted above, whatever burden imposed upon a medical practitioner in this case would have been more than
justified considering the life he would be able to save.
Family Planning Seminars
Anent the requirement imposed under Section 15239 as a condition for the issuance of a marriage license, the Court finds the same to be a reasonable
exercise of police power by the government. A cursory reading of the assailed provision bares that the religious freedom of the petitioners is not at all
violated. All the law requires is for would-be spouses to attend a seminar on parenthood, family planning breastfeeding and infant nutrition. It does not
even mandate the type of family planning methods to be included in the seminar, whether they be natural or artificial. As correctly noted by the OSG, those
who receive any information during their attendance in the required seminars are not compelled to accept the information given to them, are completely
free to reject the information they find unacceptable, and retain the freedom to decide on matters of family life without the intervention of the State.
4-The Family and the Right to Privacy
Petitioner CFC assails the RH Law because Section 23(a) (2) (i) thereof violates the provisions of the Constitution by intruding into marital privacy and
autonomy. It argues that it cultivates disunity and fosters animosity in the family rather than promote its solidarity and total development.240
The Court cannot but agree.
The 1987 Constitution is replete with provisions strengthening the family as it is the basic social institution. In fact, one article, Article XV, is devoted
entirely to the family.
ARTICLE XV
THE FAMILY
Section 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its
total development.
Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State.
Section 3. The State shall defend:
The right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions and the demands of responsible parenthood;
The right of children to assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation and
other conditions prejudicial to their development;
The right of the family to a family living wage and income; and
The right of families or family assoc1at1ons to participate in the planning and implementation of policies and programs that affect them.
In this case, the RH Law, in its not-so-hidden desire to control population growth, contains provisions which tend to wreck the family as a solid social
institution. It bars the husband and/or the father from participating in the decision making process regarding their common future progeny. It likewise
deprives the parents of their authority over their minor daughter simply because she is already a parent or had suffered a miscarriage.
The Family and Spousal Consent
Section 23(a) (2) (i) of the RH Law states:
The following acts are prohibited:
(a) Any health care service provider, whether public or private, who shall: ...
(2) refuse to perform legal and medically-safe reproductive health procedures on any person of legal age on the ground of lack of consent or authorization
of the following persons in the following instances:
(i) Spousal consent in case of married persons: provided, That in case of disagreement, the decision of the one undergoing the procedures shall prevail.
[Emphasis supplied]
The above provision refers to reproductive health procedures like tubal litigation and vasectomy which, by their very nature, should require mutual consent
and decision between the husband and the wife as they affect issues intimately related to the founding of a family. Section 3, Art. XV of the Constitution
espouses that the State shall defend the "right of the spouses to found a family." One person cannot found a family. The right, therefore, is shared by both
spouses. In the same Section 3, their right "to participate in the planning and implementation of policies and programs that affect them " is equally
recognized.
The RH Law cannot be allowed to infringe upon this mutual decision-making. By giving absolute authority to the spouse who would undergo a procedure,
and barring the other spouse from participating in the decision would drive a wedge between the husband and wife, possibly result in bitter animosity, and
endanger the marriage and the family, all for the sake of reducing the population. This would be a marked departure from the policy of the State to protect
marriage as an inviolable social institution.241
Decision-making involving a reproductive health procedure is a private matter which belongs to the couple, not just one of them. Any decision they would
reach would affect their future as a family because the size of the family or the number of their children significantly matters. The decision whether or not
to undergo the procedure belongs exclusively to, and shared by, both spouses as one cohesive unit as they chart their own destiny. It is a constitutionally
guaranteed private right. Unless it prejudices the State, which has not shown any compelling interest, the State should see to it that they chart their destiny
together as one family.
As highlighted by Justice Leonardo-De Castro, Section 19( c) of R.A. No. 9710, otherwise known as the "Magna Carta for Women," provides that women
shall have equal rights in all matters relating to marriage and family relations, including the joint decision on the number and spacing of their children.
Indeed, responsible parenthood, as Section 3(v) of the RH Law states, is a shared responsibility between parents. Section 23(a)(2)(i) of the RH Law should
not be allowed to betray the constitutional mandate to protect and strengthen the family by giving to only one spouse the absolute authority to decide
whether to undergo reproductive health procedure.242
The right to chart their own destiny together falls within the protected zone of marital privacy and such state intervention would encroach into the zones of
spousal privacy guaranteed by the Constitution. In our jurisdiction, the right to privacy was first recognized in Marje v. Mutuc,243 where the Court,
speaking through Chief Justice Fernando, held that "the right to privacy as such is accorded recognition independently of its identification with liberty; in
itself, it is fully deserving of constitutional protection."244 Marje adopted the ruling of the US Supreme Court in Griswold v. Connecticut,245 where
Justice William O. Douglas wrote:
We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights -older than our political parties, older than our school system. Marriage is a coming together
for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred. It is an association that promotes a way of life, not causes; a
harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects. Yet it is an association for as noble a purpose as any involved in
our prior decisions.
Ironically, Griswold invalidated a Connecticut statute which made the use of contraceptives a criminal offense on the ground of its amounting to an
unconstitutional invasion of the right to privacy of married persons. Nevertheless, it recognized the zone of privacy rightfully enjoyed by couples. Justice
Douglas in Grisworld wrote that "specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give
them life and substance. Various guarantees create zones of privacy."246
At any rate, in case of conflict between the couple, the courts will decide.
The Family and Parental Consent
Equally deplorable is the debarment of parental consent in cases where the minor, who will be undergoing a procedure, is already a parent or has had a
miscarriage. Section 7 of the RH law provides:
SEC. 7. Access to Family Planning. – x x x.
No person shall be denied information and access to family planning services, whether natural or artificial: Provided, That minors will not be allowed
access to modern methods of family planning without written consent from their parents or guardian/s except when the minor is already a parent or has had
a miscarriage.
There can be no other interpretation of this provision except that when a minor is already a parent or has had a miscarriage, the parents are excluded from
the decision making process of the minor with regard to family planning. Even if she is not yet emancipated, the parental authority is already cut off just
because there is a need to tame population growth.
It is precisely in such situations when a minor parent needs the comfort, care, advice, and guidance of her own parents. The State cannot replace her natural
mother and father when it comes to providing her needs and comfort. To say that their consent is no longer relevant is clearly anti-family. It does not
promote unity in the family. It is an affront to the constitutional mandate to protect and strengthen the family as an inviolable social institution.
More alarmingly, it disregards and disobeys the constitutional mandate that "the natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for
civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government."247 In this regard, Commissioner Bernas wrote:
The 1987 provision has added the adjective "primary" to modify the right of parents. It imports the assertion that the right of parents is superior to that of
the State.248 [Emphases supplied]
To insist on a rule that interferes with the right of parents to exercise parental control over their minor-child or the right of the spouses to mutually decide
on matters which very well affect the very purpose of marriage, that is, the establishment of conjugal and family life, would result in the violation of one's
privacy with respect to his family. It would be dismissive of the unique and strongly-held Filipino tradition of maintaining close family ties and violative of
the recognition that the State affords couples entering into the special contract of marriage to as one unit in forming the foundation of the family and
society.
The State cannot, without a compelling state interest, take over the role of parents in the care and custody of a minor child, whether or not the latter is
already a parent or has had a miscarriage. Only a compelling state interest can justify a state substitution of their parental authority.
First Exception: Access to Information
Whether with respect to the minor referred to under the exception provided in the second paragraph of Section 7 or with respect to the consenting spouse
under Section 23(a)(2)(i), a distinction must be made. There must be a differentiation between access to information about family planning services, on one
hand, and access to the reproductive health procedures and modern family planning methods themselves, on the other. Insofar as access to information is
concerned, the Court finds no constitutional objection to the acquisition of information by the minor referred to under the exception in the second
paragraph of Section 7 that would enable her to take proper care of her own body and that of her unborn child. After all, Section 12, Article II of the
Constitution mandates the State to protect both the life of the mother as that of the unborn child. Considering that information to enable a person to make
informed decisions is essential in the protection and maintenance of ones' health, access to such information with respect to reproductive health must be
allowed. In this situation, the fear that parents might be deprived of their parental control is unfounded because they are not prohibited to exercise parental
guidance and control over their minor child and assist her in deciding whether to accept or reject the information received.
Second Exception: Life Threatening Cases
As in the case of the conscientious objector, an exception must be made in life-threatening cases that require the performance of emergency procedures. In
such cases, the life of the minor who has already suffered a miscarriage and that of the spouse should not be put at grave risk simply for lack of consent. It
should be emphasized that no person should be denied the appropriate medical care urgently needed to preserve the primordial right, that is, the right to
life.
In this connection, the second sentence of Section 23(a)(2)(ii)249 should be struck down. By effectively limiting the requirement of parental consent to
"only in elective surgical procedures," it denies the parents their right of parental authority in cases where what is involved are "non-surgical procedures."
Save for the two exceptions discussed above, and in the case of an abused child as provided in the first sentence of Section 23(a)(2)(ii), the parents should
not be deprived of their constitutional right of parental authority. To deny them of this right would be an affront to the constitutional mandate to protect and
strengthen the family.
5 - Academic Freedom
It is asserted that Section 14 of the RH Law, in relation to Section 24 thereof, mandating the teaching of Age-and Development-Appropriate Reproductive
Health Education under threat of fine and/or imprisonment violates the principle of academic freedom . According to the petitioners, these provisions
effectively force educational institutions to teach reproductive health education even if they believe that the same is not suitable to be taught to their
students.250 Citing various studies conducted in the United States and statistical data gathered in the country, the petitioners aver that the prevalence of
contraceptives has led to an increase of out-of-wedlock births; divorce and breakdown of families; the acceptance of abortion and euthanasia; the
"feminization of poverty"; the aging of society; and promotion of promiscuity among the youth.251
At this point, suffice it to state that any attack on the validity of Section 14 of the RH Law is premature because the Department of Education, Culture and
Sports has yet to formulate a curriculum on age-appropriate reproductive health education. One can only speculate on the content, manner and medium of
instruction that will be used to educate the adolescents and whether they will contradict the religious beliefs of the petitioners and validate their
apprehensions. Thus, considering the premature nature of this particular issue, the Court declines to rule on its constitutionality or validity.
At any rate, Section 12, Article II of the 1987 Constitution provides that the natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for
civic efficiency and development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government. Like the 1973 Constitution and the 1935 Constitution, the
1987 Constitution affirms the State recognition of the invaluable role of parents in preparing the youth to become productive members of society. Notably,
it places more importance on the role of parents in the development of their children by recognizing that said role shall be "primary," that is, that the right
of parents in upbringing the youth is superior to that of the State.252
It is also the inherent right of the State to act as parens patriae to aid parents in the moral development of the youth. Indeed, the Constitution makes
mention of the importance of developing the youth and their important role in nation building.253 Considering that Section 14 provides not only for the
age-appropriate-reproductive health education, but also for values formation; the development of knowledge and skills in self-protection against
discrimination; sexual abuse and violence against women and children and other forms of gender based violence and teen pregnancy; physical, social and
emotional changes in adolescents; women's rights and children's rights; responsible teenage behavior; gender and development; and responsible
parenthood, and that Rule 10, Section 11.01 of the RH-IRR and Section 4(t) of the RH Law itself provides for the teaching of responsible teenage behavior,
gender sensitivity and physical and emotional changes among adolescents - the Court finds that the legal mandate provided under the assailed provision
supplements, rather than supplants, the rights and duties of the parents in the moral development of their children.
Furthermore, as Section 14 also mandates that the mandatory reproductive health education program shall be developed in conjunction with parent-teacher-
community associations, school officials and other interest groups, it could very well be said that it will be in line with the religious beliefs of the
petitioners. By imposing such a condition, it becomes apparent that the petitioners' contention that Section 14 violates Article XV, Section 3(1) of the
Constitution is without merit.254
While the Court notes the possibility that educators might raise their objection to their participation in the reproductive health education program provided
under Section 14 of the RH Law on the ground that the same violates their religious beliefs, the Court reserves its judgment should an actual case be filed
before it.
6 - Due Process
The petitioners contend that the RH Law suffers from vagueness and, thus violates the due process clause of the Constitution. According to them, Section
23 (a)(l) mentions a "private health service provider" among those who may be held punishable but does not define who is a "private health care service
provider." They argue that confusion further results since Section 7 only makes reference to a "private health care institution."
The petitioners also point out that Section 7 of the assailed legislation exempts hospitals operated by religious groups from rendering reproductive health
service and modern family planning methods. It is unclear, however, if these institutions are also exempt from giving reproductive health information under
Section 23(a)(l), or from rendering reproductive health procedures under Section 23(a)(2).
Finally, it is averred that the RH Law punishes the withholding, restricting and providing of incorrect information, but at the same time fails to define
"incorrect information."
The arguments fail to persuade.
A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess its
meaning and differ as to its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord persons,
especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and
becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.255 Moreover, in determining whether the words used in a statute are vague, words must not only
be taken in accordance with their plain meaning alone, but also in relation to other parts of the statute. It is a rule that every part of the statute must be
interpreted with reference to the context, that is, every part of it must be construed together with the other parts and kept subservient to the general intent of
the whole enactment.256
As correctly noted by the OSG, in determining the definition of "private health care service provider," reference must be made to Section 4(n) of the RH
Law which defines a "public health service provider," viz:
(n) Public health care service provider refers to: (1) public health care institution, which is duly licensed and accredited and devoted primarily to the
maintenance and operation of facilities for health promotion, disease prevention, diagnosis, treatment and care of individuals suffering from illness,
disease, injury, disability or deformity, or in need of obstetrical or other medical and nursing care; (2) public health care professional, who is a doctor of
medicine, a nurse or a midvvife; (3) public health worker engaged in the delivery of health care services; or (4) barangay health worker who has undergone
training programs under any accredited government and NGO and who voluntarily renders primarily health care services in the community after having
been accredited to function as such by the local health board in accordance with the guidelines promulgated by the Department of Health (DOH) .
Further, the use of the term "private health care institution" in Section 7 of the law, instead of "private health care service provider," should not be a cause
of confusion for the obvious reason that they are used synonymously.
The Court need not belabor the issue of whether the right to be exempt from being obligated to render reproductive health service and modem family
planning methods, includes exemption from being obligated to give reproductive health information and to render reproductive health procedures. Clearly,
subject to the qualifications and exemptions earlier discussed, the right to be exempt from being obligated to render reproductive health service and modem
family planning methods, necessarily includes exemption from being obligated to give reproductive health information and to render reproductive health
procedures. The terms "service" and "methods" are broad enough to include the providing of information and the rendering of medical procedures.
The same can be said with respect to the contention that the RH Law punishes health care service providers who intentionally withhold, restrict and
provide incorrect information regarding reproductive health programs and services. For ready reference, the assailed provision is hereby quoted as follows:
SEC. 23. Prohibited Acts. - The following acts are prohibited:
(a) Any health care service provider, whether public or private, who shall:
(1) Knowingly withhold information or restrict the dissemination thereof, and/ or intentionally provide incorrect information regarding programs and
services on reproductive health including the right to informed choice and access to a full range of legal, medically-safe, non-abortifacient and effective
family planning methods;
From its plain meaning, the word "incorrect" here denotes failing to agree with a copy or model or with established rules; inaccurate, faulty; failing to
agree with the requirements of duty, morality or propriety; and failing to coincide with the truth. 257 On the other hand, the word "knowingly" means with
awareness or deliberateness that is intentional.258 Used together in relation to Section 23(a)(l), they connote a sense of malice and ill motive to mislead or
misrepresent the public as to the nature and effect of programs and services on reproductive health. Public health and safety demand that health care
service providers give their honest and correct medical information in accordance with what is acceptable in medical practice. While health care service
providers are not barred from expressing their own personal opinions regarding the programs and services on reproductive health, their right must be
tempered with the need to provide public health and safety. The public deserves no less.
7-Egual Protection
The petitioners also claim that the RH Law violates the equal protection clause under the Constitution as it discriminates against the poor because it makes
them the primary target of the government program that promotes contraceptive use . They argue that, rather than promoting reproductive health among the
poor, the RH Law introduces contraceptives that would effectively reduce the number of the poor. Their bases are the various provisions in the RH Law
dealing with the poor, especially those mentioned in the guiding principles259 and definition of terms260 of the law.
They add that the exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory reproductive health education program imposed by the RH Law renders
it unconstitutional.
In Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission,261 the Court had the occasion to expound on the concept of equal protection. Thus:
One of the basic principles on which this government was founded is that of the equality of right which is embodied in Section 1, Article III of the 1987
Constitution. The equal protection of the laws is embraced in the concept of due process, as every unfair discrimination offends the requirements of justice
and fair play. It has been embodied in a separate clause, however, to provide for a more specific guaranty against any form of undue favoritism or hostility
from the government. Arbitrariness in general may be challenged on the basis of the due process clause. But if the particular act assailed partakes of an
unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it down is the equal protection clause.
"According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights
conferred and responsibilities imposed." It "requires public bodies and inst itutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner." "The purpose
of the equal protection clause is to secure every person within a state's jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by
the express terms of a statue or by its improper execution through the state's duly constituted authorities." "In other words, the concept of equal justice
under the law requires the state to govern impartially, and it may not draw distinctions between individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant to a
legitimate governmental objective."
The equal protection clause is aimed at all official state actions, not just those of the legislature. Its inhibitions cover all the departments of the government
including the political and executive departments, and extend to all actions of a state denying equal protection of the laws, through whatever agency or
whatever guise is taken.
It, however, does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or things without distinction. What it simply requires is equality among
equals as determined according to a valid classification. Indeed, the equal protection clause permits classification. Such classification, however, to be valid
must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of
the law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the same class. "Superficial differences do not make for
a valid classification."
For a classification to meet the requirements of constitutionality, it must include or embrace all persons who naturally belong to the class. "The
classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed. It is
not necessary that the classification be made with absolute symmetry, in the sense that the members of the class should possess the same characteristics in
equal degree. Substantial similarity will suffice; and as long as this is achieved, all those covered by the classification are to be treated equally. The mere
fact that an individual belonging to a class differs from the other members, as long as that class is substantially distinguishable from all others, does not
justify the non-application of the law to him."
The classification must not be based on existing circumstances only, or so constituted as to preclude addition to the number included in the class. It must be
of such a nature as to embrace all those who may thereafter be in similar circumstances and conditions. It must not leave out or "underinclude" those that
should otherwise fall into a certain classification. [Emphases supplied; citations excluded]
To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the government's reproductive health care program is not a violation of the equal protection clause. In
fact, it is pursuant to Section 11, Article XIII of the Constitution which recognizes the distinct necessity to address the needs of the underprivileged by
providing that they be given priority in addressing the health development of the people. Thus:
Section 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach to health development which shall endeavor to make essential goods, health
and other social services available to all the people at affordable cost. There shall be priority for the needs of the underprivileged, sick, elderly, disabled,
women, and children. The State shall endeavor to provide free medical care to paupers.
It should be noted that Section 7 of the RH Law prioritizes poor and marginalized couples who are suffering from fertility issues and desire to have
children. There is, therefore, no merit to the contention that the RH Law only seeks to target the poor to reduce their number. While the RH Law admits the
use of contraceptives, it does not, as elucidated above, sanction abortion. As Section 3(1) explains, the "promotion and/or stabilization of the population
growth rate is incidental to the advancement of reproductive health."
Moreover, the RH Law does not prescribe the number of children a couple may have and does not impose conditions upon couples who intend to have
children. While the petitioners surmise that the assailed law seeks to charge couples with the duty to have children only if they would raise them in a truly
humane way, a deeper look into its provisions shows that what the law seeks to do is to simply provide priority to the poor in the implementation of
government programs to promote basic reproductive health care.
With respect to the exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory reproductive health education program under Section 14, suffice it to
state that the mere fact that the children of those who are less fortunate attend public educational institutions does not amount to substantial distinction
sufficient to annul the assailed provision. On the other hand, substantial distinction rests between public educational institutions and private educational
institutions, particularly because there is a need to recognize the academic freedom of private educational institutions especially with respect to religious
instruction and to consider their sensitivity towards the teaching of reproductive health education.
8-Involuntary Servitude
The petitioners also aver that the RH Law is constitutionally infirm as it violates the constitutional prohibition against involuntary servitude. They posit
that Section 17 of the assailed legislation requiring private and non-government health care service providers to render forty-eight (48) hours of pro bono
reproductive health services, actually amounts to involuntary servitude because it requires medical practitioners to perform acts against their will.262
The OSG counters that the rendition of pro bono services envisioned in Section 17 can hardly be considered as forced labor analogous to slavery, as
reproductive health care service providers have the discretion as to the manner and time of giving pro bono services. Moreover, the OSG points out that the
imposition is within the powers of the government, the accreditation of medical practitioners with PhilHealth being a privilege and not a right.
The point of the OSG is well-taken.
It should first be mentioned that the practice of medicine is undeniably imbued with public interest that it is both a power and a duty of the State to control
and regulate it in order to protect and promote the public welfare. Like the legal profession, the practice of medicine is not a right but a privileged burdened
with conditions as it directly involves the very lives of the people. A fortiori, this power includes the power of Congress 263 to prescribe the qualifications
for the practice of professions or trades which affect the public welfare, the public health, the public morals, and the public safety; and to regulate or
control such professions or trades, even to the point of revoking such right altogether.264
Moreover, as some petitioners put it, the notion of involuntary servitude connotes the presence of force, threats, intimidation or other similar means of
coercion and compulsion.265 A reading of the assailed provision, however, reveals that it only encourages private and non- government reproductive
healthcare service providers to render pro bono service. Other than non-accreditation with PhilHealth, no penalty is imposed should they choose to do
otherwise. Private and non-government reproductive healthcare service providers also enjoy the liberty to choose which kind of health service they wish to
provide, when, where and how to provide it or whether to provide it all. Clearly, therefore, no compulsion, force or threat is made upon them to render pro
bono service against their will. While the rendering of such service was made a prerequisite to accreditation with PhilHealth, the Court does not consider
the same to be an unreasonable burden, but rather, a necessary incentive imposed by Congress in the furtherance of a perceived legitimate state interest.
Consistent with what the Court had earlier discussed, however, it should be emphasized that conscientious objectors are exempt from this provision as long
as their religious beliefs and convictions do not allow them to render reproductive health service, pro bona or otherwise.
9-Delegation of Authority to the FDA
The petitioners likewise question the delegation by Congress to the FDA of the power to determine whether or not a supply or product is to be included in
the Essential Drugs List (EDL).266
The Court finds nothing wrong with the delegation. The FDA does not only have the power but also the competency to evaluate, register and cover health
services and methods. It is the only government entity empowered to render such services and highly proficient to do so. It should be understood that
health services and methods fall under the gamut of terms that are associated with what is ordinarily understood as "health products."
In this connection, Section 4 of R.A. No. 3 720, as amended by R.A. No. 9711 reads:
SEC. 4. To carry out the provisions of this Act, there is hereby created an office to be called the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in the Department of
Health (DOH). Said Administration shall be under the Office of the Secretary and shall have the following functions, powers and duties:
"(a) To administer the effective implementation of this Act and of the rules and regulations issued pursuant to the same;
"(b) To assume primary jurisdiction in the collection of samples of health products;
"(c) To analyze and inspect health products in connection with the implementation of this Act;
"(d) To establish analytical data to serve as basis for the preparation of health products standards, and to recommend standards of identity,
purity, safety, efficacy, quality and fill of container;
"(e) To issue certificates of compliance with technical requirements to serve as basis for the issuance of appropriate authorization and spot-
check for compliance with regulations regarding operation of manufacturers, importers, exporters, distributors, wholesalers, drug outlets, and
other establishments and facilities of health products, as determined by the FDA;
"x x x
"(h) To conduct appropriate tests on all applicable health products prior to the issuance of appropriate authorizations to ensure safety, efficacy,
purity, and quality;
"(i) To require all manufacturers, traders, distributors, importers, exporters, wholesalers, retailers, consumers, and non-consumer users of health
products to report to the FDA any incident that reasonably indicates that said product has caused or contributed to the death, serious illness or
serious injury to a consumer, a patient, or any person;
"(j) To issue cease and desist orders motu propio or upon verified complaint for health products, whether or not registered with the FDA
Provided, That for registered health products, the cease and desist order is valid for thirty (30) days and may be extended for sixty ( 60) days
only after due process has been observed;
"(k) After due process, to order the ban, recall, and/or withdrawal of any health product found to have caused death, serious illness or serious
injury to a consumer or patient, or is found to be imminently injurious, unsafe, dangerous, or grossly deceptive, and to require all concerned to
implement the risk management plan which is a requirement for the issuance of the appropriate authorization;
x x x.
As can be gleaned from the above, the functions, powers and duties of the FDA are specific to enable the agency to carry out the mandates of the law.
Being the country's premiere and sole agency that ensures the safety of food and medicines available to the public, the FDA was equipped with the
necessary powers and functions to make it effective. Pursuant to the principle of necessary implication, the mandate by Congress to the FDA to ensure
public health and safety by permitting only food and medicines that are safe includes "service" and "methods." From the declared policy of the RH Law, it
is clear that Congress intended that the public be given only those medicines that are proven medically safe, legal, non-abortifacient, and effective in
accordance with scientific and evidence-based medical research standards. The philosophy behind the permitted delegation was explained in Echagaray v.
Secretary of Justice,267 as follows:
The reason is the increasing complexity of the task of the government and the growing inability of the legislature to cope directly with the many problems
demanding its attention. The growth of society has ramified its activities and created peculiar and sophisticated problems that the legislature cannot be
expected reasonably to comprehend. Specialization even in legislation has become necessary. To many of the problems attendant upon present day
undertakings, the legislature may not have the competence, let alone the interest and the time, to provide the required direct and efficacious, not to say
specific solutions.
10- Autonomy of Local Governments and the Autonomous Region
of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)
As for the autonomy of local governments, the petitioners claim that the RH Law infringes upon the powers devolved to local government units (LGUs)
under Section 17 of the Local Government Code. Said Section 17 vested upon the LGUs the duties and functions pertaining to the delivery of basic
services and facilities, as follows:
SECTION 17. Basic Services and Facilities. –
(a) Local government units shall endeavor to be self-reliant and shall continue exercising the powers and discharging the duties and functions
currently vested upon them. They shall also discharge the functions and responsibilities of national agencies and offices devolved to them
pursuant to this Code. Local government units shall likewise exercise such other powers and discharge such other functions and responsibilities
as are necessary, appropriate, or incidental to efficient and effective provision of the basic services and facilities enumerated herein.
(b) Such basic services and facilities include, but are not limited to, x x x.
While the aforementioned provision charges the LGUs to take on the functions and responsibilities that have already been devolved upon them
from the national agencies on the aspect of providing for basic services and facilities in their respective jurisdictions, paragraph (c) of the same
provision provides a categorical exception of cases involving nationally-funded projects, facilities, programs and services.268 Thus:
 (c) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (b) hereof, public works and infrastructure projects and other facilities, programs and services
funded by the National Government under the annual General Appropriations Act, other special laws, pertinent executive orders, and those
wholly or partially funded from foreign sources, are not covered under this Section, except in those cases where the local government unit
concerned is duly designated as the implementing agency for such projects, facilities, programs and services. [Emphases supplied]
The essence of this express reservation of power by the national government is that, unless an LGU is particularly designated as the implementing agency,
it has no power over a program for which funding has been provided by the national government under the annual general appropriations act, even if the
program involves the delivery of basic services within the jurisdiction of the LGU.269 A complete relinquishment of central government powers on the
matter of providing basic facilities and services cannot be implied as the Local Government Code itself weighs against it.270
In this case, a reading of the RH Law clearly shows that whether it pertains to the establishment of health care facilities, 271 the hiring of skilled health
professionals,272 or the training of barangay health workers,273 it will be the national government that will provide for the funding of its implementation.
Local autonomy is not absolute. The national government still has the say when it comes to national priority programs which the local government is called
upon to implement like the RH Law.
Moreover, from the use of the word "endeavor," the LG Us are merely encouraged to provide these services. There is nothing in the wording of the law
which can be construed as making the availability of these services mandatory for the LGUs. For said reason, it cannot be said that the RH Law amounts to
an undue encroachment by the national government upon the autonomy enjoyed by the local governments.
The ARMM
The fact that the RH Law does not intrude in the autonomy of local governments can be equally applied to the ARMM. The RH Law does not infringe
upon its autonomy. Moreover, Article III, Sections 6, 10 and 11 of R.A. No. 9054, or the organic act of the ARMM, alluded to by petitioner Tillah to justify
the exemption of the operation of the RH Law in the autonomous region, refer to the policy statements for the guidance of the regional government. These
provisions relied upon by the petitioners simply delineate the powers that may be exercised by the regional government, which can, in no manner, be
characterized as an abdication by the State of its power to enact legislation that would benefit the general welfare. After all, despite the veritable autonomy
granted the ARMM, the Constitution and the supporting jurisprudence, as they now stand, reject the notion of imperium et imperio in the relationship
between the national and the regional governments.274 Except for the express and implied limitations imposed on it by the Constitution, Congress cannot
be restricted to exercise its inherent and plenary power to legislate on all subjects which extends to all matters of general concern or common interest.275
11 - Natural Law
With respect to the argument that the RH Law violates natural law,276 suffice it to say that the Court does not duly recognize it as a legal basis for
upholding or invalidating a law. Our only guidepost is the Constitution. While every law enacted by man emanated from what is perceived as natural law,
the Court is not obliged to see if a statute, executive issuance or ordinance is in conformity to it. To begin with, it is not enacted by an acceptable legitimate
body. Moreover, natural laws are mere thoughts and notions on inherent rights espoused by theorists, philosophers and theologists. The jurists of the
philosophical school are interested in the law as an abstraction, rather than in the actual law of the past or present. 277 Unless, a natural right has been
transformed into a written law, it cannot serve as a basis to strike down a law. In Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 278 the very case cited by the petitioners, it
was explained that the Court is not duty-bound to examine every law or action and whether it conforms with both the Constitution and natural law. Rather,
natural law is to be used sparingly only in the most peculiar of circumstances involving rights inherent to man where no law is applicable.279
At any rate, as earlier expounded, the RH Law does not sanction the taking away of life. It does not allow abortion in any shape or form. It only seeks to
enhance the population control program of the government by providing information and making non-abortifacient contraceptives more readily available to
the public, especially to the poor.
Facts and Fallacies
and the Wisdom of the Law
In general, the Court does not find the RH Law as unconstitutional insofar as it seeks to provide access to medically-safe, non-abortifacient, effective,
legal, affordable, and quality reproductive healthcare services, methods, devices, and supplies. As earlier pointed out, however, the religious freedom of
some sectors of society cannot be trampled upon in pursuit of what the law hopes to achieve. After all, the Constitutional safeguard to religious freedom is
a recognition that man stands accountable to an authority higher than the State.
In conformity with the principle of separation of Church and State, one religious group cannot be allowed to impose its beliefs on the rest of the society.
Philippine modem society leaves enough room for diversity and pluralism. As such, everyone should be tolerant and open-minded so that peace and
harmony may continue to reign as we exist alongside each other.
As healthful as the intention of the RH Law may be, the idea does not escape the Court that what it seeks to address is the problem of rising poverty and
unemployment in the country. Let it be said that the cause of these perennial issues is not the large population but the unequal distribution of wealth. Even
if population growth is controlled, poverty will remain as long as the country's wealth remains in the hands of the very few.
At any rate, population control may not be beneficial for the country in the long run. The European and Asian countries, which embarked on such a
program generations ago , are now burdened with ageing populations. The number of their young workers is dwindling with adverse effects on their
economy. These young workers represent a significant human capital which could have helped them invigorate, innovate and fuel their economy. These
countries are now trying to reverse their programs, but they are still struggling. For one, Singapore, even with incentives, is failing.
And in this country, the economy is being propped up by remittances from our Overseas Filipino Workers. This is because we have an ample supply of
young able-bodied workers. What would happen if the country would be weighed down by an ageing population and the fewer younger generation would
not be able to support them? This would be the situation when our total fertility rate would go down below the replacement level of two (2) children per
woman.280
Indeed, at the present, the country has a population problem, but the State should not use coercive measures (like the penal provisions of the RH Law
against conscientious objectors) to solve it. Nonetheless, the policy of the Court is non-interference in the wisdom of a law.
x x x. But this Court cannot go beyond what the legislature has laid down. Its duty is to say what the law is as enacted by the lawmaking body. That is not
the same as saying what the law should be or what is the correct rule in a given set of circumstances. It is not the province of the judiciary to look into the
wisdom of the law nor to question the policies adopted by the legislative branch. Nor is it the business of this Tribunal to remedy every unjust situation that
may arise from the application of a particular law. It is for the legislature to enact remedial legislation if that would be necessary in the premises. But as
always, with apt judicial caution and cold neutrality, the Court must carry out the delicate function of interpreting the law, guided by the Constitution and
existing legislation and mindful of settled jurisprudence. The Court's function is therefore limited, and accordingly, must confine itself to the judicial task
of saying what the law is, as enacted by the lawmaking body.281
Be that as it may, it bears reiterating that the RH Law is a mere compilation and enhancement of the prior existing contraceptive and reproductive health
laws, but with coercive measures. Even if the Court decrees the RH Law as entirely unconstitutional, there will still be the Population Act (R.A. No. 6365),
the Contraceptive Act (R.A. No. 4729) and the reproductive health for women or The Magna Carta of Women (R.A. No. 9710), sans the coercive
provisions of the assailed legislation. All the same, the principle of "no-abortion" and "non-coercion" in the adoption of any family planning method should
be maintained.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTIALLY GRANTED. Accordingly, the Court declares R.A. No. 10354 as NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL except with
respect to the following provisions which are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL:
1) Section 7 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they: a) require private health facilities and non-maternity specialty
hospitals and hospitals owned and operated by a religious group to refer patients, not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under
Republic Act No. 8344, to another health facility which is conveniently accessible; and b) allow minor-parents or minors who have suffered a
miscarriage access to modem methods of family planning without written consent from their parents or guardian/s;
2) Section 23(a)(l) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as they punish any healthcare
service provider who fails and or refuses to disseminate information regarding programs and services on reproductive health regardless of his or
her religious beliefs.
3) Section 23(a)(2)(i) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they allow a married individual, not in an emergency or life-
threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to undergo reproductive health procedures without the consent of the spouse;
4) Section 23(a)(2)(ii) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they limit the requirement of parental consent only to elective
surgical procedures.
5) Section 23(a)(3) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5.24 thereof, insofar as they punish any healthcare
service provider who fails and/or refuses to refer a patient not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344,
to another health care service provider within the same facility or one which is conveniently accessible regardless of his or her religious beliefs;
6) Section 23(b) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as they punish any public officer
who refuses to support reproductive health programs or shall do any act that hinders the full implementation of a reproductive health program,
regardless of his or her religious beliefs;
7) Section 17 and the corresponding prov1s10n in the RH-IRR regarding the rendering of pro bona reproductive health service in so far as they
affect the conscientious objector in securing PhilHealth accreditation; and
8) Section 3.0l(a) and Section 3.01 G) of the RH-IRR, which added the qualifier "primarily" in defining abortifacients and contraceptives, as
they are ultra vires and, therefore, null and void for contravening Section 4(a) of the RH Law and violating Section 12, Article II of the
Constitution.
The Status Quo Ante Order issued by the Court on March 19, 2013 as extended by its Order, dated July 16, 2013 , is hereby LIFTED, insofar as the
provisions of R.A. No. 10354 which have been herein declared as constitutional.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
Tingnan ang aking opinyong
Sumasang-ayon at Sumasalungat
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice

See Concurring Opinion

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

With Separate concurring opinion See: Separate Concurring Opinion

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

Associate Justice Associate Justice

See Concurring and dissenting See Concurring Opinion

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR. JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ

Associate Justice Associate Justice
 See concurring and dissenting See Concurring and Dissenting Opinion
BIENVENIDO L. REYES ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice Associate Justice

See Separate dissent

MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN
Associate Justice
C E R TI F I CATI O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I hereby certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice

Footnotes
1 Islamic Da'wah Council of the Philippines, Inc. v. Office of the Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 153888, July 9, 2003; 405 SCRA 497, 504.
2 See <http://wn.com/pro-rh_ bill_vs_anti-rh_ bi ll>, last visited on November 5, 20 13; See also <http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/nation/04/ 19/
I O/h ontiveros-tatad-debate-rh-bill>, last vi sited on November 5, 201 3.
3 See <http ://news info .inqu irer.net/inquirerheadlines/nation/view/ 20110321-326743/Stickers-spread-anti-RH-bill-message>, last visited on
November 5, 2 01 3; See also <http ://www.gmanetwork.com/news/story/ 218169/news/nation/carlos-celdran-distributes-pro-rh-stickers-in-
quiapo>, last visited on November 5, 201 3.
4 See <http ://newsinfo. inquirer.net/241 737/massive-church-rally-set-against-rh-bill>, last visited November 5, 201 3; See also
<http://www.splendorofthechurch.eom.ph/201 3/04/29/fi lipino-catholics-flex-muscles-in-poll-clout/>, last visited November 5, 2013.
5 With Prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order/ Writ of Preliminary Injunction; docketed as G.R. No. 2048 19; rollo (G.R. No.
204819), pp. 3-32.
6 With Prayer for the Urgent Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction; docketed as G.R. No. 204934;
rollo (G.R. No. 204934), pp. 3-76.
7 Also proceeding in her personal capacity a citizen and as a member of the Bar.
8 Spouses Reynaldo S. Luistro & Rosie B. Luistro, Jose S. Sandejas & Elenita S.A. Sandejas, Arturo M. Gorrez & Marietta C . Gorrez, Salvador
S. Mante, Jr. & Hazeleen L. Mante, Rolando M. Bautista & Maria Felisa S. Bautista, Desiderio Racho & Traquilina Racho, Femand Antonio A.
Tansingco & Carol Anne C. Tansingco for themselves and on behalf of their minor children, Therese Antonette C. Tansingco, Lorenzo Jose C.
Tansingco, Miguel Fernando C . Tangsingco, Carlo Josemaria C. Tansingco & Juan Paolo C. Tansingco, Spouses Mariano V. Araneta & Eileen
Z. Araneta for themselves and on behalf of their minor children, Ramon Carlos Z. Araneta & Maya Angelica Z. Araneta, Spouses Renato C.
Castor & Mildred C. Castor for themselves and on behalf of their minor children, Renz Jeffrey C. Castor, Joseph Ramil C. Castor, John Paul C.
Castor & Raphae l C. Castor, Spouses Alexander R. Racho & Zara Z. Racho for themselves a nd on behalf of their minor chi ldren Margarita
Racho, Mikaela Racho, Martin Racho, Mari Racho & Manolo Racho, Spouses Alfred R. Racho & Franc ine Y. Racho for themse lves and on
behalf of their minor children Michael Racho, Mariana Racho, Rafael Racho, Maxi Racho, C hessie Racho & Laura Racho, Spouses David R.
Racho & Armilyn A. Racho for themselves and on behalf of the ir minor child Gabrie l Racho, Mindy M. Juatas and on behalf of her minor
children Elijah General Juatas and Elian Gabriel Juatas, Salvacion M. Monteiro, Emily R. Laws, Joseph R. Laws & Katrina R. Laws
9 With Prayer for Injunction; docketed a s G.R. No. 204957.
10 With Prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order/ Writ of Preliminary Injunction; docketed as G.R. No. 204988; rollo (G.R.
No. 204988), pp. 5-3 5.
11 Through and together with its president Nestor B. Lumicao, M.D.
12 Through and together with its representative/ member of the school board Dr. Rodrigo M. Alenton, M.D.
13 Rosemarie R. Alenton, Imelda G. Ibarra, Cpa, Lovenia P. Naces, Phd. , Anthony G. Nagac, Earl Anthony C. Gambe And, Marlon I. Yap.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 119976 September 18, 1995

IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and CIRILO ROY MONTEJO, respondents.

KAPUNAN, J.:
A constitutional provision should be construed as to give it effective operation and suppress the mischief at which it is aimed. 1 The 1987
Constitution mandates that an aspirant for election to the House of Representatives be "a registered voter in the district in which he shall be
elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the election." 2 The mischief which this provision
— reproduced verbatim from the 1973 Constitution — seeks to prevent is the possibility of a "stranger or newcomer unacquainted with the
conditions and needs of a community and not identified with the latter, from an elective office to serve that community."3
Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte with the
Provincial Election Supervisor on March 8, 1995, providing the following information in item no. 8:4
RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK TO BE ELECTED IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE
ELECTION: __________ Years and seven Months.
On March 23, 1995, private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the First District of Leyte and a candidate for
the same position, filed a "Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification"5 with the Commission on Elections alleging that petitioner did not
meet the constitutional requirement for residency. In his petition, private respondent contended that Mrs. Marcos lacked the Constitution's
one year residency requirement for candidates for the House of Representatives on the evidence of declarations made by her in Voter
Registration Record 94-No. 33497726 and in her Certificate of Candidacy. He prayed that "an order be issued declaring (petitioner)
disqualified and canceling the certificate of candidacy."7
On March 29, 1995, petitioner filed an Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy, changing the entry "seven" months to "since childhood"
in item no. 8 of the amended certificate.8 On the same day, the Provincial Election Supervisor of Leyte informed petitioner that:
[T]his office cannot receive or accept the aforementioned Certificate of Candidacy on the ground that it is filed out of
time, the deadline for the filing of the same having already lapsed on March 20, 1995. The Corrected/Amended
Certificate of Candidacy should have been filed on or before the March 20, 1995 deadline.9
Consequently, petitioner filed the Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy with the COMELEC's Head Office in Intramuros, Manila on
March 31, 1995. Her Answer to private respondent's petition in SPA No. 95-009 was likewise filed with the head office on the same day. In
said Answer, petitioner averred that the entry of the word "seven" in her original Certificate of Candidacy was the result of an "honest
misinterpretation" 10 which she sought to rectify by adding the words "since childhood" in her Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy
and that "she has always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or residence. 11 Impugning respondent's motive in filing the petition
seeking her disqualification, she noted that:
When respondent (petitioner herein) announced that she was intending to register as a voter in Tacloban City and run for
Congress in the First District of Leyte, petitioner immediately opposed her intended registration by writing a letter stating
that "she is not a resident of said city but of Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. After respondent had registered as a voter in
Tolosa following completion of her six month actual residence therein, petitioner filed a petition with the COMELEC to
transfer the town of Tolosa from the First District to the Second District and pursued such a move up to the Supreme
Court, his purpose being to remove respondent as petitioner's opponent in the congressional election in the First District.
He also filed a bill, along with other Leyte Congressmen, seeking the creation of another legislative district to remove the
town of Tolosa out of the First District, to achieve his purpose. However, such bill did not pass the Senate. Having failed
on such moves, petitioner now filed the instant petition for the same objective, as it is obvious that he is afraid to submit
along with respondent for the judgment and verdict of the electorate of the First District of Leyte in an honest, orderly,
peaceful, free and clean elections on May 8, 1995. 12
On April 24, 1995, the Second Division of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), by a vote of 2 to 1, 13 came up with a Resolution 1)
finding private respondent's Petition for Disqualification in SPA 95-009 meritorious; 2) striking off petitioner's Corrected/Amended Certificate
of Candidacy of March 31, 1995; and 3) canceling her original Certificate of Candidacy. 14 Dealing with two primary issues, namely, the
validity of amending the original Certificate of Candidacy after the lapse of the deadline for filing certificates of candidacy, and petitioner's
compliance with the one year residency requirement, the Second Division held:
Respondent raised the affirmative defense in her Answer that the printed word "Seven" (months) was a result of an
"honest misinterpretation or honest mistake" on her part and, therefore, an amendment should subsequently be allowed.
She averred that she thought that what was asked was her "actual and physical" presence in Tolosa and not residence of
origin or domicile in the First Legislative District, to which she could have responded "since childhood." In an
accompanying affidavit, she stated that her domicile is Tacloban City, a component of the First District, to which she
always intended to return whenever absent and which she has never abandoned. Furthermore, in her memorandum, she
tried to discredit petitioner's theory of disqualification by alleging that she has been a resident of the First Legislative
District of Leyte since childhood, although she only became a resident of the Municipality of Tolosa for seven months.
She asserts that she has always been a resident of Tacloban City, a component of the First District, before coming to the
Municipality of Tolosa.
Along this point, it is interesting to note that prior to her registration in Tolosa, respondent announced that she would be
registering in Tacloban City so that she can be a candidate for the District. However, this intention was rebuffed when
petitioner wrote the Election Officer of Tacloban not to allow respondent since she is a resident of Tolosa and not
Tacloban. She never disputed this claim and instead implicitly acceded to it by registering in Tolosa.
This incident belies respondent's claim of "honest misinterpretation or honest mistake." Besides, the Certificate of
Candidacy only asks for RESIDENCE. Since on the basis of her Answer, she was quite aware of "residence of origin"
which she interprets to be Tacloban City, it is curious why she did not cite Tacloban City in her Certificate of Candidacy.
Her explanation that she thought what was asked was her actual and physical presence in Tolosa is not easy to believe
because there is none in the question that insinuates about Tolosa. In fact, item no. 8 in the Certificate of Candidacy
speaks clearly of "Residency in the CONSTITUENCY where I seek to be elected immediately preceding the election."
Thus, the explanation of respondent fails to be persuasive.
From the foregoing, respondent's defense of an honest mistake or misinterpretation, therefore, is devoid of merit.
To further buttress respondent's contention that an amendment may be made, she cited the case of Alialy v. COMELEC
(2 SCRA 957). The reliance of respondent on the case of Alialy is misplaced. The case only applies to the
"inconsequential deviations which cannot affect the result of the election, or deviations from provisions intended primarily
to secure timely and orderly conduct of elections." The Supreme Court in that case considered the amendment only as a
matter of form. But in the instant case, the amendment cannot be considered as a matter of form or an inconsequential
deviation. The change in the number of years of residence in the place where respondent seeks to be elected is a
substantial matter which determines her qualification as a candidacy, specially those intended to suppress, accurate
material representation in the original certificate which adversely affects the filer. To admit the amended certificate is to
condone the evils brought by the shifting minds of manipulating candidate, of the detriment of the integrity of the election.
Moreover, to allow respondent to change the seven (7) month period of her residency in order to prolong it by claiming it
was "since childhood" is to allow an untruthfulness to be committed before this Commission. The arithmetical accuracy of
the 7 months residency the respondent indicated in her certificate of candidacy can be gleaned from her entry in her
Voter's Registration Record accomplished on January 28, 1995 which reflects that she is a resident of Brgy. Olot, Tolosa,
Leyte for 6 months at the time of the said registration (Annex A, Petition). Said accuracy is further buttressed by her letter
to the election officer of San Juan, Metro Manila, dated August 24, 1994, requesting for the cancellation of her
registration in the Permanent List of Voters thereat so that she can be re-registered or transferred to Brgy. Olot, Tolosa,
Leyte. The dates of these three (3) different documents show the respondent's consistent conviction that she has
transferred her residence to Olot, Tolosa, Leyte from Metro Manila only for such limited period of time, starting in the last
week of August 1994 which on March 8, 1995 will only sum up to 7 months. The Commission, therefore, cannot be
persuaded to believe in the respondent's contention that it was an error.
xxx xxx xxx
Based on these reasons the Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy cannot be admitted by this Commission.
xxx xxx xxx
Anent the second issue, and based on the foregoing discussion, it is clear that respondent has not complied with the one
year residency requirement of the Constitution.
In election cases, the term "residence" has always been considered as synonymous with "domicile" which imports not
only the intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in-that place, coupled with conduct indicative of
such intention. Domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent for business or pleasure, or for like
reasons, one intends to return. (Perfecto Faypon vs. Eliseo Quirino, 96 Phil 294; Romualdez vs. RTC-Tacloban, 226
SCRA 408). In respondent's case, when she returned to the Philippines in 1991, the residence she chose was not
Tacloban but San Juan, Metro Manila. Thus, her animus revertendi is pointed to Metro Manila and not Tacloban.
This Division is aware that her claim that she has been a resident of the First District since childhood is nothing more
than to give her a color of qualification where she is otherwise constitutionally disqualified. It cannot hold ground in the
face of the facts admitted by the respondent in her affidavit. Except for the time that she studied and worked for some
years after graduation in Tacloban City, she continuously lived in Manila. In 1959, after her husband was elected Senator,
she lived and resided in San Juan, Metro Manila where she was a registered voter. In 1965, she lived in San Miguel,
Manila where she was again a registered voter. In 1978, she served as member of the Batasang Pambansa as the
representative of the City of Manila and later on served as the Governor of Metro Manila. She could not have served
these positions if she had not been a resident of the City of Manila. Furthermore, when she filed her certificate of
candidacy for the office of the President in 1992, she claimed to be a resident of San Juan, Metro Manila. As a matter of
fact on August 24, 1994, respondent wrote a letter with the election officer of San Juan, Metro Manila requesting for the
cancellation of her registration in the permanent list of voters that she may be re-registered or transferred to Barangay
Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. These facts manifest that she could not have been a resident of Tacloban City since childhood up to
the time she filed her certificate of candidacy because she became a resident of many places, including Metro Manila.
This debunks her claim that prior to her residence in Tolosa, Leyte, she was a resident of the First Legislative District of
Leyte since childhood.
In this case, respondent's conduct reveals her lack of intention to make Tacloban her domicile. She registered as a voter
in different places and on several occasions declared that she was a resident of Manila. Although she spent her school
days in Tacloban, she is considered to have abandoned such place when she chose to stay and reside in other different
places. In the case of Romualdez vs. RTC (226 SCRA 408) the Court explained how one acquires a new domicile by
choice. There must concur: (1) residence or bodily presence in the new locality; (2) intention to remain there; and (3)
intention to abandon the old domicile. In other words there must basically be animus manendi with animus non
revertendi. When respondent chose to stay in Ilocos and later on in Manila, coupled with her intention to stay there by
registering as a voter there and expressly declaring that she is a resident of that place, she is deemed to have
abandoned Tacloban City, where she spent her childhood and school days, as her place of domicile.
Pure intention to reside in that place is not sufficient, there must likewise be conduct indicative of such intention.
Respondent's statements to the effect that she has always intended to return to Tacloban, without the accompanying
conduct to prove that intention, is not conclusive of her choice of residence. Respondent has not presented any evidence
to show that her conduct, one year prior the election, showed intention to reside in Tacloban. Worse, what was evident
was that prior to her residence in Tolosa, she had been a resident of Manila.
It is evident from these circumstances that she was not a resident of the First District of Leyte "since childhood."
To further support the assertion that she could have not been a resident of the First District of Leyte for more than one
year, petitioner correctly pointed out that on January 28, 1995 respondent registered as a voter at precinct No. 18-A of
Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. In doing so, she placed in her Voter Registration Record that she resided in the municipality of
Tolosa for a period of six months. This may be inconsequential as argued by the respondent since it refers only to her
residence in Tolosa, Leyte. But her failure to prove that she was a resident of the First District of Leyte prior to her
residence in Tolosa leaves nothing but a convincing proof that she had been a resident of the district for six months only.
15
In a Resolution promulgated a day before the May 8, 1995 elections, the COMELEC en banc denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration
16 of the April 24, 1995 Resolution declaring her not qualified to run for the position of Member of the House of Representatives for the First
Legislative District of Leyte. 17 The Resolution tersely stated:
After deliberating on the Motion for Reconsideration, the Commission RESOLVED to DENY it, no new substantial
matters having been raised therein to warrant re-examination of the resolution granting the petition for disqualification. 18
On May 11, 1995, the COMELEC issued a Resolution allowing petitioner's proclamation should the results of the canvass show that she
obtained the highest number of votes in the congressional elections in the First District of Leyte. On the same day, however, the COMELEC
reversed itself and issued a second Resolution directing that the proclamation of petitioner be suspended in the event that she obtains the
highest number of votes. 19
In a Supplemental Petition dated 25 May 1995, petitioner averred that she was the overwhelming winner of the elections for the
congressional seat in the First District of Leyte held May 8, 1995 based on the canvass completed by the Provincial Board of Canvassers on
May 14, 1995. Petitioner alleged that the canvass showed that she obtained a total of 70,471 votes compared to the 36,833 votes received
by Respondent Montejo. A copy of said Certificate of Canvass was annexed to the Supplemental Petition.
On account of the Resolutions disqualifying petitioner from running for the congressional seat of the First District of Leyte and the public
respondent's Resolution suspending her proclamation, petitioner comes to this court for relief.
Petitioner raises several issues in her Original and Supplemental Petitions. The principal issues may be classified into two general areas:
I. The issue of Petitioner's qualifications
Whether or not petitioner was a resident, for election purposes, of the First District of Leyte for a period of one year at the
time of the May 9, 1995 elections.
II. The Jurisdictional Issue
a) Prior to the elections
Whether or not the COMELEC properly exercised its jurisdiction in disqualifying petitioner outside the period mandated
by the Omnibus Election Code for disqualification cases under Article 78 of the said Code.
b) After the Elections
Whether or not the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal assumed exclusive jurisdiction over the question of
petitioner's qualifications after the May 8, 1995 elections.
I. Petitioner's qualification
A perusal of the Resolution of the COMELEC's Second Division reveals a startling confusion in the application of settled concepts of
"Domicile" and "Residence" in election law. While the COMELEC seems to be in agreement with the general proposition that for the
purposes of election law, residence is synonymous with domicile, the Resolution reveals a tendency to substitute or mistake the concept of
domicile for actual residence, a conception not intended for the purpose of determining a candidate's qualifications for election to the House
of Representatives as required by the 1987 Constitution. As it were, residence, for the purpose of meeting the qualification for an elective
position, has a settled meaning in our jurisdiction.
Article 50 of the Civil Code decrees that "[f]or the exercise of civil rights and the fulfillment of civil obligations, the domicile of natural persons
is their place of habitual residence." In Ong vs. Republic 20 this court took the concept of domicile to mean an individual's "permanent
home", "a place to which, whenever absent for business or for pleasure, one intends to return, and depends on facts and circumstances in
the sense that they disclose intent." 21 Based on the foregoing, domicile includes the twin elements of "the fact of residing or physical
presence in a fixed place" and animus manendi, or the intention of returning there permanently.
Residence, in its ordinary conception, implies the factual relationship of an individual to a certain place. It is the physical presence of a
person in a given area, community or country. The essential distinction between residence and domicile in law is that residence involves the
intent to leave when the purpose for which the resident has taken up his abode ends. One may seek a place for purposes such as pleasure,
business, or health. If a person's intent be to remain, it becomes his domicile; if his intent is to leave as soon as his purpose is established it
is residence. 22 It is thus, quite perfectly normal for an individual to have different residences in various places. However, a person can only
have a single domicile, unless, for various reasons, he successfully abandons his domicile in favor of another domicile of choice. In
Uytengsu vs. Republic, 23 we laid this distinction quite clearly:
There is a difference between domicile and residence. "Residence" is used to indicate a place of abode, whether
permanent or temporary; "domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to which, when absent, one has the intention
of returning. A man may have a residence in one place and a domicile in another. Residence is not domicile, but domicile
is residence coupled with the intention to remain for an unlimited time. A man can have but one domicile for the same
purpose at any time, but he may have numerous places of residence. His place of residence is generally his place of
domicile, but it is not by any means necessarily so since no length of residence without intention of remaining will
constitute domicile.
For political purposes the concepts of residence and domicile are dictated by the peculiar criteria of political laws. As these concepts have
evolved in our election law, what has clearly and unequivocally emerged is the fact that residence for election purposes is used
synonymously with domicile.
In Nuval vs. Guray, 24 the Court held that "the term residence. . . is synonymous with domicile which imports not only intention to reside in a
fixed place, but also personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention." 25 Larena vs. Teves 26 reiterated
the same doctrine in a case involving the qualifications of the respondent therein to the post of Municipal President of Dumaguete, Negros
Oriental. Faypon vs. Quirino, 27 held that the absence from residence to pursue studies or practice a profession or registration as a voter
other than in the place where one is elected does not constitute loss of residence. 28 So settled is the concept (of domicile) in our election
law that in these and other election law cases, this Court has stated that the mere absence of an individual from his permanent residence
without the intention to abandon it does not result in a loss or change of domicile.
The deliberations of the 1987 Constitution on the residence qualification for certain elective positions have placed beyond doubt the principle
that when the Constitution speaks of "residence" in election law, it actually means only "domicile" to wit:
Mr. Nolledo: With respect to Section 5, I remember that in the 1971 Constitutional Convention, there was an attempt to
require residence in the place not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the elections. So my question is:
What is the Committee's concept of residence of a candidate for the legislature? Is it actual residence or is it the concept
of domicile or constructive residence?
Mr. Davide: Madame President, insofar as the regular members of the National Assembly are concerned, the proposed
section merely provides, among others, "and a resident thereof", that is, in the district for a period of not less than one
year preceding the day of the election. This was in effect lifted from the 1973 Constitution, the interpretation given to it
was domicile. 29
xxx xxx xxx
Mrs. Rosario Braid: The next question is on Section 7, page 2. I think Commissioner Nolledo has raised the same point
that "resident" has been interpreted at times as a matter of intention rather than actual residence.
Mr. De los Reyes: Domicile.
Ms. Rosario Braid: Yes, So, would the gentleman consider at the proper time to go back to actual residence rather than
mere intention to reside?
Mr. De los Reyes: But we might encounter some difficulty especially considering that a provision in the Constitution in the
Article on Suffrage says that Filipinos living abroad may vote as enacted by law. So, we have to stick to the original
concept that it should be by domicile and not physical residence. 30
In Co vs. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, 31 this Court concluded that the framers of the 1987 Constitution obviously
adhered to the definition given to the term residence in election law, regarding it as having the same meaning as domicile. 32
In the light of the principles just discussed, has petitioner Imelda Romualdez Marcos satisfied the residency requirement mandated by Article
VI, Sec. 6 of the 1987 Constitution? Of what significance is the questioned entry in petitioner's Certificate of Candidacy stating her residence
in the First Legislative District of Leyte as seven (7) months?
It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy which ought to be decisive in determining whether or not and individual
has satisfied the constitution's residency qualification requirement. The said statement becomes material only when there is or appears to be
a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. It would be plainly ridiculous
for a candidate to deliberately and knowingly make a statement in a certificate of candidacy which would lead to his or her disqualification.
It stands to reason therefore, that petitioner merely committed an honest mistake in jotting the word "seven" in the space provided for the
residency qualification requirement. The circumstances leading to her filing the questioned entry obviously resulted in the subsequent
confusion which prompted petitioner to write down the period of her actual stay in Tolosa, Leyte instead of her period of residence in the First
district, which was "since childhood" in the space provided. These circumstances and events are amply detailed in the COMELEC's Second
Division's questioned resolution, albeit with a different interpretation. For instance, when herein petitioner announced that she would be
registering in Tacloban City to make her eligible to run in the First District, private respondent Montejo opposed the same, claiming that
petitioner was a resident of Tolosa, not Tacloban City. Petitioner then registered in her place of actual residence in the First District, which is
Tolosa, Leyte, a fact which she subsequently noted down in her Certificate of Candidacy. A close look at said certificate would reveal the
possible source of the confusion: the entry for residence (Item No. 7) is followed immediately by the entry for residence in the constituency
where a candidate seeks election thus:
7. RESIDENCE (complete Address): Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte
POST OFFICE ADDRESS FOR ELECTION PURPOSES: Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte
8. RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK TO
BE ELECTED IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE ELECTION:_________ Years and Seven Months.
Having been forced by private respondent to register in her place of actual residence in Leyte instead of petitioner's claimed domicile, it
appears that petitioner had jotted down her period of stay in her legal residence or domicile. The juxtaposition of entries in Item 7 and Item 8
— the first requiring actual residence and the second requiring domicile — coupled with the circumstances surrounding petitioner's
registration as a voter in Tolosa obviously led to her writing down an unintended entry for which she could be disqualified. This honest
mistake should not, however, be allowed to negate the fact of residence in the First District if such fact were established by means more
convincing than a mere entry on a piece of paper.
We now proceed to the matter of petitioner's domicile.
In support of its asseveration that petitioner's domicile could not possibly be in the First District of Leyte, the Second Division of the
COMELEC, in its assailed Resolution of April 24,1995 maintains that "except for the time when (petitioner) studied and worked for some
years after graduation in Tacloban City, she continuously lived in Manila." The Resolution additionally cites certain facts as indicative of the
fact that petitioner's domicile ought to be any place where she lived in the last few decades except Tacloban, Leyte. First, according to the
Resolution, petitioner, in 1959, resided in San Juan, Metro Manila where she was also registered voter. Then, in 1965, following the election
of her husband to the Philippine presidency, she lived in San Miguel, Manila where she as a voter. In 1978 and thereafter, she served as a
member of the Batasang Pambansa and Governor of Metro Manila. "She could not, have served these positions if she had not been a
resident of Metro Manila," the COMELEC stressed. Here is where the confusion lies.
We have stated, many times in the past, that an individual does not lose his domicile even if he has lived and maintained residences in
different places. Residence, it bears repeating, implies a factual relationship to a given place for various purposes. The absence from legal
residence or domicile to pursue a profession, to study or to do other things of a temporary or semi-permanent nature does not constitute loss
of residence. Thus, the assertion by the COMELEC that "she could not have been a resident of Tacloban City since childhood up to the time
she filed her certificate of candidacy because she became a resident of many places" flies in the face of settled jurisprudence in which this
Court carefully made distinctions between (actual) residence and domicile for election law purposes. In Larena vs. Teves, 33 supra, we
stressed:
[T]his court is of the opinion and so holds that a person who has his own house wherein he lives with his family in a
municipality without having ever had the intention of abandoning it, and without having lived either alone or with his
family in another municipality, has his residence in the former municipality, notwithstanding his having registered as an
elector in the other municipality in question and having been a candidate for various insular and provincial positions,
stating every time that he is a resident of the latter municipality.
More significantly, in Faypon vs. Quirino, 34 We explained that:
A citizen may leave the place of his birth to look for "greener pastures," as the saying goes, to improve his lot, and that,
of course includes study in other places, practice of his avocation, or engaging in business. When an election is to be
held, the citizen who left his birthplace to improve his lot may desire to return to his native town to cast his ballot but for
professional or business reasons, or for any other reason, he may not absent himself from his professional or business
activities; so there he registers himself as voter as he has the qualifications to be one and is not willing to give up or lose
the opportunity to choose the officials who are to run the government especially in national elections. Despite such
registration, the animus revertendi to his home, to his domicile or residence of origin has not forsaken him. This may be
the explanation why the registration of a voter in a place other than his residence of origin has not been deemed
sufficient to constitute abandonment or loss of such residence. It finds justification in the natural desire and longing of
every person to return to his place of birth. This strong feeling of attachment to the place of one's birth must be overcome
by positive proof of abandonment for another.
From the foregoing, it can be concluded that in its above-cited statements supporting its proposition that petitioner was ineligible to run for
the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC was obviously referring to petitioner's various places of (actual)
residence, not her domicile. In doing so, it not only ignored settled jurisprudence on residence in election law and the deliberations of the
constitutional commission but also the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. 881). 35
What is undeniable, however, are the following set of facts which establish the fact of petitioner's domicile, which we lift verbatim from the
COMELEC's Second Division's assailed Resolution: 36
In or about 1938 when respondent was a little over 8 years old, she established her domicile in Tacloban, Leyte
(Tacloban City). She studied in the Holy Infant Academy in Tacloban from 1938 to 1949 when she graduated from high
school. She pursued her college studies in St. Paul's College, now Divine Word University in Tacloban, where she
earned her degree in Education. Thereafter, she taught in the Leyte Chinese School, still in Tacloban City. In 1952 she
went to Manila to work with her cousin, the late speaker Daniel Z. Romualdez in his office in the House of
Representatives. In 1954, she married ex-President Ferdinand E. Marcos when he was still a congressman of Ilocos
Norte and registered there as a voter. When her husband was elected Senator of the Republic in 1959, she and her
husband lived together in San Juan, Rizal where she registered as a voter. In 1965, when her husband was elected
President of the Republic of the Philippines, she lived with him in Malacanang Palace and registered as a voter in San
Miguel, Manila.
[I]n February 1986 (she claimed that) she and her family were abducted and kidnapped to Honolulu, Hawaii. In
November 1991, she came home to Manila. In 1992, respondent ran for election as President of the Philippines and filed
her Certificate of Candidacy wherein she indicated that she is a resident and registered voter of San Juan, Metro Manila.
Applying the principles discussed to the facts found by COMELEC, what is inescapable is that petitioner held various residences for different
purposes during the last four decades. None of these purposes unequivocally point to an intention to abandon her domicile of origin in
Tacloban, Leyte. Moreover, while petitioner was born in Manila, as a minor she naturally followed the domicile of her parents. She grew up in
Tacloban, reached her adulthood there and eventually established residence in different parts of the country for various reasons. Even during
her husband's presidency, at the height of the Marcos Regime's powers, petitioner kept her close ties to her domicile of origin by establishing
residences in Tacloban, celebrating her birthdays and other important personal milestones in her home province, instituting well-publicized
projects for the benefit of her province and hometown, and establishing a political power base where her siblings and close relatives held
positions of power either through the ballot or by appointment, always with either her influence or consent. These well-publicized ties to her
domicile of origin are part of the history and lore of the quarter century of Marcos power in our country. Either they were entirely ignored in
the COMELEC'S Resolutions, or the majority of the COMELEC did not know what the rest of the country always knew: the fact of petitioner's
domicile in Tacloban, Leyte.
Private respondent in his Comment, contends that Tacloban was not petitioner's domicile of origin because she did not live there until she
was eight years old. He avers that after leaving the place in 1952, she "abandoned her residency (sic) therein for many years and . . . (could
not) re-establish her domicile in said place by merely expressing her intention to live there again." We do not agree.
First, minor follows the domicile of his parents. As domicile, once acquired is retained until a new one is gained, it follows that in spite of the
fact of petitioner's being born in Manila, Tacloban, Leyte was her domicile of origin by operation of law. This domicile was not established
only when her father brought his family back to Leyte contrary to private respondent's averments.
Second, domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must demonstrate: 37
1. An actual removal or an actual change of domicile;
2. A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one; and
3. Acts which correspond with the purpose.
In the absence of clear and positive proof based on these criteria, the residence of origin should be deemed to continue. Only with evidence
showing concurrence of all three requirements can the presumption of continuity or residence be rebutted, for a change of residence
requires an actual and deliberate abandonment, and one cannot have two legal residences at the same time. 38 In the case at bench, the
evidence adduced by private respondent plainly lacks the degree of persuasiveness required to convince this court that an abandonment of
domicile of origin in favor of a domicile of choice indeed occurred. To effect an abandonment requires the voluntary act of relinquishing
petitioner's former domicile with an intent to supplant the former domicile with one of her own choosing (domicilium voluntarium).
In this connection, it cannot be correctly argued that petitioner lost her domicile of origin by operation of law as a result of her marriage to the
late President Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1952. For there is a clearly established distinction between the Civil Code concepts of "domicile" and
"residence." 39 The presumption that the wife automatically gains the husband's domicile by operation of law upon marriage cannot be
inferred from the use of the term "residence" in Article 110 of the Civil Code because the Civil Code is one area where the two concepts are
well delineated. Dr. Arturo Tolentino, writing on this specific area explains:
In the Civil Code, there is an obvious difference between domicile and residence. Both terms imply relations between a
person and a place; but in residence, the relation is one of fact while in domicile it is legal or juridical, independent of the
necessity of physical presence. 40
Article 110 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 110. — The husband shall fix the residence of the family. But the court may exempt the wife from living with the
husband if he should live abroad unless in the service of the Republic.
A survey of jurisprudence relating to Article 110 or to the concepts of domicile or residence as they affect the female spouse upon marriage
yields nothing which would suggest that the female spouse automatically loses her domicile of origin in favor of the husband's choice of
residence upon marriage.
Article 110 is a virtual restatement of Article 58 of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 which states:
La mujer esta obligada a seguir a su marido donde quiera que fije su residencia. Los Tribunales, sin embargo, podran
con justa causa eximirla de esta obligacion cuando el marido transende su residencia a ultramar o' a pais extranjero.
Note the use of the phrase "donde quiera su fije de residencia" in the aforequoted article, which means wherever (the husband) wishes to
establish residence. This part of the article clearly contemplates only actual residence because it refers to a positive act of fixing a family
home or residence. Moreover, this interpretation is further strengthened by the phrase "cuando el marido translade su residencia" in the
same provision which means, "when the husband shall transfer his residence," referring to another positive act of relocating the family to
another home or place of actual residence. The article obviously cannot be understood to refer to domicile which is a fixed,
fairly-permanent concept when it plainly connotes the possibility of transferring from one place to another not only once, but as often as the
husband may deem fit to move his family, a circumstance more consistent with the concept of actual residence.
The right of the husband to fix the actual residence is in harmony with the intention of the law to strengthen and unify the family, recognizing
the fact that the husband and the wife bring into the marriage different domiciles (of origin). This difference could, for the sake of family unity,
be reconciled only by allowing the husband to fix a single place of actual residence.
Very significantly, Article 110 of the Civil Code is found under Title V under the heading: RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND
AND WIFE. Immediately preceding Article 110 is Article 109 which obliges the husband and wife to live together, thus:
Art. 109. — The husband and wife are obligated to live together, observe mutual respect and fidelity and render mutual
help and support.
The duty to live together can only be fulfilled if the husband and wife are physically together. This takes into account the situations where the
couple has many residences (as in the case of the petitioner). If the husband has to stay in or transfer to any one of their residences, the wife
should necessarily be with him in order that they may "live together." Hence, it is illogical to conclude that Art. 110 refers to "domicile" and not
to "residence." Otherwise, we shall be faced with a situation where the wife is left in the domicile while the husband, for professional or other
reasons, stays in one of their (various) residences. As Dr. Tolentino further explains:
Residence and Domicile — Whether the word "residence" as used with reference to particular matters is synonymous
with "domicile" is a question of some difficulty, and the ultimate decision must be made from a consideration of the
purpose and intent with which the word is used. Sometimes they are used synonymously, at other times they are
distinguished from one another.
xxx xxx xxx
Residence in the civil law is a material fact, referring to the physical presence of a person in a place. A person can have
two or more residences, such as a country residence and a city residence. Residence is acquired by living in place; on
the other hand, domicile can exist without actually living in the place. The important thing for domicile is that, once
residence has been established in one place, there be an intention to stay there permanently, even if residence is also
established in some other
place. 41
In fact, even the matter of a common residence between the husband and the wife during the marriage is not an iron-clad principle; In cases
applying the Civil Code on the question of a common matrimonial residence, our jurisprudence has recognized certain situations 42 where
the spouses could not be compelled to live with each other such that the wife is either allowed to maintain a residence different from that of
her husband or, for obviously practical reasons, revert to her original domicile (apart from being allowed to opt for a new one). In De la Vina
vs. Villareal 43 this Court held that "[a] married woman may acquire a residence or domicile separate from that of her husband during the
existence of the marriage where the husband has given cause for divorce." 44 Note that the Court allowed the wife either to obtain new
residence or to choose a new domicile in such an event. In instances where the wife actually opts, .under the Civil Code, to live separately
from her husband either by taking new residence or reverting to her domicile of origin, the Court has held that the wife could not be
compelled to live with her husband on pain of contempt. In Arroyo vs. Vasques de Arroyo 45 the Court held that:
Upon examination of the authorities, we are convinced that it is not within the province of the courts of this country to
attempt to compel one of the spouses to cohabit with, and render conjugal rights to, the other. Of course where the
 property rights of one of the pair are invaded, an action for restitution of such rights can be maintained. But we are
disinclined to sanction the doctrine that an order, enforcible (sic) by process of contempt, may be entered to compel the
restitution of the purely personal right of consortium. At best such an order can be effective for no other purpose than to
compel the spouses to live under the same roof; and he experience of those countries where the courts of justice have
assumed to compel the cohabitation of married people shows that the policy of the practice is extremely questionable.
Thus in England, formerly the Ecclesiastical Court entertained suits for the restitution of conjugal rights at the instance of
either husband or wife; and if the facts were found to warrant it, that court would make a mandatory decree, enforceable
by process of contempt in case of disobedience, requiring the delinquent party to live with the other and render conjugal
rights. Yet this practice was sometimes criticized even by the judges who felt bound to enforce such orders, and in
Weldon v. Weldon (9 P.D. 52), decided in 1883, Sir James Hannen, President in the Probate, Divorce and Admiralty
Division of the High Court of Justice, expressed his regret that the English law on the subject was not the same as that
which prevailed in Scotland, where a decree of adherence, equivalent to the decree for the restitution of conjugal rights
in England, could be obtained by the injured spouse, but could not be enforced by imprisonment. Accordingly, in
obedience to the growing sentiment against the practice, the Matrimonial Causes Act (1884) abolished the remedy of
imprisonment; though a decree for the restitution of conjugal rights can still be procured, and in case of disobedience
may serve in appropriate cases as the basis of an order for the periodical payment of a stipend in the character of
alimony.
In the voluminous jurisprudence of the United States, only one court, so far as we can discover, has ever attempted to
make a preemptory order requiring one of the spouses to live with the other; and that was in a case where a wife was
ordered to follow and live with her husband, who had changed his domicile to the City of New Orleans. The decision
referred to (Bahn v. Darby, 36 La. Ann., 70) was based on a provision of the Civil Code of Louisiana similar to article 56
of the Spanish Civil Code. It was decided many years ago, and the doctrine evidently has not been fruitful even in the
State of Louisiana. In other states of the American Union the idea of enforcing cohabitation by process of contempt is
rejected. (21 Cyc., 1148).
In a decision of January 2, 1909, the Supreme Court of Spain appears to have affirmed an order of the Audiencia
Territorial de Valladolid requiring a wife to return to the marital domicile, and in the alternative, upon her failure to do so,
to make a particular disposition of certain money and effects then in her possession and to deliver to her husband, as
administrator of the ganancial property, all income, rents, and interest which might accrue to her from the property which
she had brought to the marriage. (113 Jur. Civ., pp. 1, 11) But it does not appear that this order for the return of the wife
to the marital domicile was sanctioned by any other penalty than the consequences that would be visited upon her in
respect to the use and control of her property; and it does not appear that her disobedience to that order would
necessarily have been followed by imprisonment for contempt.
Parenthetically when Petitioner was married to then Congressman Marcos, in 1954, petitioner was obliged — by virtue of Article 110 of the
Civil Code — to follow her husband's actual place of residence fixed by him. The problem here is that at that time, Mr. Marcos had several
places of residence, among which were San Juan, Rizal and Batac, Ilocos Norte. There is no showing which of these places Mr. Marcos did
fix as his family's residence. But assuming that Mr. Marcos had fixed any of these places as the conjugal residence, what petitioner gained
upon marriage was actual residence. She did not lose her domicile of origin.
On the other hand, the common law concept of "matrimonial domicile" appears to have been incorporated, as a result of our jurisprudential
experiences after the drafting of the Civil Code of 1950, into the New Family Code. To underscore the difference between the intentions of
the Civil Code and the Family Code drafters, the term residence has been supplanted by the term domicile in an entirely new provision (Art.
69) distinctly different in meaning and spirit from that found in Article 110. The provision recognizes revolutionary changes in the concept of
women's rights in the intervening years by making the choice of domicile a product of mutual agreement between the spouses. 46
Without as much belaboring the point, the term residence may mean one thing in civil law (or under the Civil Code) and quite another thing in
political law. What stands clear is that insofar as the Civil Code is concerned-affecting the rights and obligations of husband and wife — the
term residence should only be interpreted to mean "actual residence." The inescapable conclusion derived from this unambiguous civil law
delineation therefore, is that when petitioner married the former President in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new
home, not a domicilium necessarium.
Even assuming for the sake of argument that petitioner gained a new "domicile" after her marriage and only acquired a right to choose a new
one after her husband died, petitioner's acts following her return to the country clearly indicate that she not only impliedly but expressly
chose her domicile of origin (assuming this was lost by operation of law) as her domicile. This "choice" was unequivocally expressed in her
letters to the Chairman of the PCGG when petitioner sought the PCGG's permission to "rehabilitate (our) ancestral house in Tacloban and
Farm in Olot, Leyte. . . to make them livable for the Marcos family to have a home in our homeland." 47 Furthermore, petitioner obtained her
residence certificate in 1992 in Tacloban, Leyte, while living in her brother's house, an act which supports the domiciliary intention clearly
manifested in her letters to the PCGG Chairman. She could not have gone straight to her home in San Juan, as it was in a state of disrepair,
having been previously looted by vandals. Her "homes" and "residences" following her arrival in various parts of Metro Manila merely
qualified as temporary or "actual residences," not domicile. Moreover, and proceeding from our discussion pointing out specific situations
where the female spouse either reverts to her domicile of origin or chooses a new one during the subsistence of the marriage, it would be
highly illogical for us to assume that she cannot regain her original domicile upon the death of her husband absent a positive act of selecting
a new one where situations exist within the subsistence of the marriage itself where the wife gains a domicile different from her husband.
In the light of all the principles relating to residence and domicile enunciated by this court up to this point, we are persuaded that the facts
established by the parties weigh heavily in favor of a conclusion supporting petitioner's claim of legal residence or domicile in the First District
of Leyte.
II. The jurisdictional issue
Petitioner alleges that the jurisdiction of the COMELEC had already lapsed considering that the assailed resolutions were rendered on April
24, 1995, fourteen (14) days before the election in violation of Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code. 48 Moreover, petitioner contends
that it is the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and not the COMELEC which has jurisdiction over the election of members of the
House of Representatives in accordance with Article VI Sec. 17 of the Constitution. This is untenable.
It is a settled doctrine that a statute requiring rendition of judgment within a specified time is generally construed to be merely directory, 49
"so that non-compliance with them does not invalidate the judgment on the theory that if the statute had intended such result it would have
clearly indicated it." 50 The difference between a mandatory and a directory provision is often made on grounds of necessity. Adopting the
same view held by several American authorities, this court in Marcelino vs. Cruz held that: 51
The difference between a mandatory and directory provision is often determined on grounds of expediency, the reason
being that less injury results to the general public by disregarding than enforcing the letter of the law.
In Trapp v. Mc Cormick, a case calling for the interpretation of a statute containing a limitation of thirty (30) days within
which a decree may be entered without the consent of counsel, it was held that "the statutory provisions which may be
thus departed from with impunity, without affecting the validity of statutory proceedings, are usually those which relate to
the mode or time of doing that which is essential to effect the aim and purpose of the Legislature or some incident of the
essential act." Thus, in said case, the statute under examination was construed merely to be directory.
The mischief in petitioner's contending that the COMELEC should have abstained from rendering a decision after the period stated in the
Omnibus Election Code because it lacked jurisdiction, lies in the fact that our courts and other quasi-judicial bodies would then refuse to
render judgments merely on the ground of having failed to reach a decision within a given or prescribed period.
In any event, with the enactment of Sections 6 and 7 of R.A. 6646 in relation to Section 78 of B.P. 881, 52 it is evident that the respondent
Commission does not lose jurisdiction to hear and decide a pending disqualification case under Section 78 of B.P. 881 even after the
elections.
As to the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal's supposed assumption of jurisdiction over the issue of petitioner's qualifications after
the May 8, 1995 elections, suffice it to say that HRET's jurisdiction as the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns and
qualifications of members of Congress begins only after a candidate has become a member of the House of Representatives. 53 Petitioner
not being a member of the House of Representatives, it is obvious that the HRET at this point has no jurisdiction over the question.
It would be an abdication of many of the ideals enshrined in the 1987 Constitution for us to either to ignore or deliberately make distinctions
in law solely on the basis of the personality of a petitioner in a case. Obviously a distinction was made on such a ground here. Surely, many
established principles of law, even of election laws were flouted for the sake perpetuating power during the pre-EDSA regime. We renege on
these sacred ideals, including the meaning and spirit of EDSA ourselves bending established principles of principles of law to deny an
individual what he or she justly deserves in law. Moreover, in doing so, we condemn ourselves to repeat the mistakes of the past.
WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary residence qualifications to run for a seat in the House of
Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC's questioned Resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May 11, and May 25, 1995 are
hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent COMELEC is hereby directed to order the Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the duly
elected Representative of the First District of Leyte.
SO ORDERED.
Feliciano, J., is on leave.

Separate Opinions

PUNO, J., concurring:

It was Aristotle who taught mankind that things that are alike should be treated alike, while things that are unalike should be treated unalike
in proportion to their unalikeness.1 Like other candidates, petitioner has clearly met the residence requirement provided by Section 6, Article
VI of the Constitution.2 We cannot disqualify her and treat her unalike, for the Constitution guarantees equal protection of the law. I proceed
from the following factual and legal propositions:
First. There is no question that petitioner's original domicile is in Tacloban, Leyte. Her parents were domiciled in Tacloban. Their ancestral
house is in Tacloban. They have vast real estate in the place. Petitioner went to school and thereafter worked there. I consider Tacloban as
her initial domicile, both her domicile of origin and her domicile of choice. Her domicile of origin as it was the domicile of her parents when
she was a minor; and her domicile of choice, as she continued living there even after reaching the age of majority.
Second. There is also no question that in May, 1954, petitioner married the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos. By contracting marriage, her
domicile became subject to change by law, and the right to change it was given by Article 110 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 110. The husband shall fix the residence of the family. But the court may exempt the wife from living with the
husband if he should live abroad unless in the service of the Republic.3 (Emphasis supplied)
In De la Viña v. Villareal and Geopano,4 this Court explained why the domicile of the wife ought to follow that of the husband. We
held: "The reason is founded upon the theoretic identity of person and interest between the husband and the wife, and the
presumption that, from the nature of the relation, the home of one is the home of the other. It is intended to promote, strengthen,
and secure their interests in this relation, as it ordinarily exists, where union and harmony prevail." 5 In accord with this objective,
Article 109 of the Civil Code also obligated the husband and wife "to live together."
Third. The difficult issues start as we determine whether petitioner's marriage to former President Marcos ipso facto resulted in the loss of
her Tacloban domicile. I respectfully submit that her marriage by itself alone did not cause her to lose her Tacloban domicile. Article 110 of
the Civil Code merely gave the husband the right to fix the domicile of the family. In the exercise of the right, the husband may explicitly
choose the prior domicile of his wife, in which case, the wife's domicile remains unchanged. The husband can also implicitly acquiesce to his
wife's prior domicile even if it is different. So we held in de la Viña,6
. . . . When married women as well as children subject to parental authority live, with the acquiescence of their husbands
 or fathers, in a place distinct from where the latter live, they have their own independent domicile. . . .
It is not, therefore, the mere fact of marriage but the deliberate choice of a different domicile by the husband that will change the
domicile of a wife from what it was prior to their marriage. The domiciliary decision made by the husband in the exercise of the right
conferred by Article 110 of the Civil Code binds the wife. Any and all acts of a wife during her coverture contrary to the domiciliary
choice of the husband cannot change in any way the domicile legally fixed by the husband. These acts are void not only because
the wife lacks the capacity to choose her domicile but also because they are contrary to law and public policy.
In the case at bench, it is not disputed that former President Marcos exercised his right to fix the family domicile and established it in Batac,
Ilocos Norte, where he was then the congressman. At that particular point of time and throughout their married life, petitioner lost her
domicile in Tacloban, Leyte. Since petitioner's Batac domicile has been fixed by operation of law, it was not affected in 1959 when her
husband was elected as Senator, when they lived in San Juan, Rizal and where she registered as a voter. It was not also affected in 1965
when her husband was elected President, when they lived in Malacañang Palace, and when she registered as a voter in San Miguel, Manila.
Nor was it affected when she served as a member of the Batasang Pambansa, Minister of Human Settlements and Governor of Metro
Manila during the incumbency of her husband as President of the nation. Under Article 110 of the Civil Code, it was only her husband who
could change the family domicile in Batac and the evidence shows he did not effect any such change. To a large degree, this follows the
common law that "a woman on her marriage loses her own domicile and by operation of law, acquires that of her husband, no matter where
the wife actually lives or what she believes or intends."7
Fourth. The more difficult task is how to interpret the effect of the death on September 28, 1989 of former President Marcos on petitioner's
Batac domicile. The issue is of first impression in our jurisdiction and two (2) schools of thought contend for acceptance. One is espoused by
our distinguished colleague, Mr. Justice Davide, Jr., heavily relying on American authorities.8 He echoes the theory that after the husband's
death, the wife retains the last domicile of her husband until she makes an actual change.
I do not subscribe to this submission. The American case law that the wife still retains her dead husband's domicile is based on ancient
common law which we can no longer apply in the Philippine setting today. The common law identified the domicile of a wife as that of the
husband and denied to her the power of acquiring a domicile of her own separate and apart from him. 9 Legal scholars agree that two (2)
reasons support this common law doctrine. The first reason as pinpointed by the legendary Blackstone is derived from the view that "the very
being or legal existence of the woman is suspended during
the marriage, or at least is incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband."10 The second reason lies in "the desirability of having
the interests of each member of the family unit governed by the same law."11 The presumption that the wife retains the domicile of her
deceased husband is an extension of this common law concept. The concept and its extension have provided some of the most iniquitous
jurisprudence against women. It was under common law that the 1873 American case of Bradwell v. Illinois 12 was decided where women
were denied the right to practice law. It was unblushingly ruled that "the natural and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female
sex evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life . . . This is the law of the Creator." Indeed, the rulings relied upon by Mr. Justice
Davide in CJS 13 and AM JUR 2d14 are American state court decisions handed down between the years 191715 and 1938,16 or before the
time when women were accorded equality of rights with men. Undeniably, the women's liberation movement resulted in far-ranging state
legislations in the United States to eliminate gender inequality.17 Starting in the decade of the seventies, the courts likewise liberalized their
rulings as they started invalidating laws infected with gender-bias. It was in 1971 when the US Supreme Court in Reed v. Reed,18 struck a
big blow for women equality when it declared as unconstitutional an Idaho law that required probate courts to choose male family members
over females as estate administrators. It held that mere administrative inconvenience cannot justify a sex-based distinction. These significant
changes both in law and in case law on the status of women virtually obliterated the iniquitous common law surrendering the rights of
married women to their husbands based on the dubious theory of the parties' theoretic oneness . The Corpus Juris Secundum editors did not
miss the relevance of this revolution on women's right as they observed: "However, it has been declared that under modern statutes
changing the status of married women and departing from the common law theory of marriage, there is no reason why a wife may not
acquire a separate domicile for every purpose known to the law."19 In publishing in 1969 the Restatement of the Law, Second (Conflict of
Laws 2d), the reputable American Law Institute also categorically stated that the view of Blackstone ". . . is no longer held. As the result of
statutes and court decisions, a wife now possesses practically the same rights and powers as her unmarried sister."20
In the case at bench, we have to decide whether we should continue clinging to the anachronistic common law that demeans women,
especially married women. I submit that the Court has no choice except to break away from this common law rule, the root of the many
degradations of Filipino women. Before 1988, our laws particularly the Civil Code, were full of gender discriminations against women. Our
esteemed colleague, Madam Justice Flerida Ruth Romero, cited a few of them as follows:21
xxx xxx xxx
Legal Disabilities Suffered by Wives
Not generally known is the fact that under the Civil Code, wives suffer under certain restrictions or disabilities. For
instance, the wife cannot accept gifts from others, regardless of the sex of the giver or the value of the gift, other than
from her very close relatives, without her husband's consent. She may accept only from, say, her parents, parents-in-law,
brothers, sisters and the relatives within the so-called fourth civil degree. She may not exercise her profession or
occupation or engage in business if her husband objects on serious grounds or if his income is sufficient to support their
family in accordance with their social standing. As to what constitutes "serious grounds" for objecting, this is within the
discretion of the husband.
xxx xxx xxx
Because of the present inequitable situation, the amendments to the Civil Law being proposed by the University of the
Philippines Law Center would allow absolute divorce which severes the matrimonial ties, such that the divorced spouses
are free to get married a year after the divorce is decreed by the courts. However, in order to place the husband and wife
on an equal footing insofar as the bases for divorce are concerned, the following are specified as the grounds for
absolute divorce: (1) adultery or having a paramour committed by the respondent in any of the ways specified in the
Revised Penal Code or (2) an attempt by the respondent against the life of the petitioner which amounts to attempted
parricide under the Revised Penal Code; (3) abandonment of the petitioner by the respondent without just cause for a
period of three consecutive years; or (4) habitual maltreatment.
 With respect to property relations, the husband is automatically the administrator of the conjugal property owned in
common by the married couple even if the wife may be the more astute or enterprising partner. The law does not leave it
to the spouses to decide who shall act as such administrator. Consequently, the husband is authorized to engage in acts
and enter into transactions beneficial to the conjugal partnership. The wife, however, cannot similarly bind the
partnership without the husband's consent.
And while both exercise joint parental authority over their children, it is the father whom the law designates as the legal
administrator of the property pertaining to the unemancipated child.
Taking the lead in Asia, our government exerted efforts, principally through legislations, to eliminate inequality between men and
women in our land. The watershed came on August 3, 1988 when our Family Code took effect which, among others, terminated
the unequal treatment of husband and wife as to their rights and responsibilities.22
The Family Code attained this elusive objective by giving new rights to married women and by abolishing sex-based privileges of husbands.
Among others, married women are now given the joint right to administer the family property, whether in the absolute community system or in
the system of conjugal partnership;23 joint parental authority over their minor children, both over their persons as well as their properties;24
joint responsibility for the support of the family;25 the right to jointly manage the household;26 and, the right to object to their husband's
exercise of profession, occupation, business or activity.27 Of particular relevance to the case at bench is Article 69 of the Family Code which
took away the exclusive right of the husband to fix the family domicile and gave it jointly to the husband and the wife, thus:
Art. 69. The husband and wife shall fix the family domicile. In case of disagreement, the court shall decide.
The court may exempt one spouse from living with the other if the latter should live abroad or there are other valid and
compelling reasons for the exemption. However, such exemption shall not apply if the same is not compatible with the
solidarity of the family. (Emphasis supplied)
Article 69 repealed Article 110 of the Civil Code. Commenting on the duty of the husband and wife to live together, former Madam
Justice Alice Sempio-Diy of the Court of Appeals specified the instances when a wife may now refuse to live with her husband,
thus:28
(2) The wife has the duty to live with her husband, but she may refuse to do so in certain cases like:
(a) If the place chosen by the husband as family residence is dangerous to her Life;
(b) If the husband subjects her to maltreatment or abusive conduct or insults, making common life
impossible;
(c) If the husband compels her to live with his parents, but she cannot get along with her mother-in-
law and they have constant quarrels (Del Rosario v. Del Rosario, CA, 46 OG 6122);
(d) Where the husband has continuously carried illicit relations for 10 years with different women and
treated his wife roughly and without consideration. (Dadivas v. Villanueva, 54 Phil. 92);
(e) Where the husband spent his time in gambling, giving no money to his family for food and
necessities, and at the same time insulting his wife and laying hands on her. (Panuncio v. Sula, CA,
34 OG 129);
(f) If the husband has no fixed residence and lives a vagabond life as a tramp (1 Manresa 329);
(g) If the husband is carrying on a shameful business at home (Gahn v. Darby, 38 La. Ann. 70).
The inescapable conclusion is that our Family Code has completely emancipated the wife from the control of the husband , thus
abandoning the parties' theoretic identity of interest. No less than the late revered Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes who chaired the Civil
Code Revision Committee of the UP Law Center gave this insightful view in one of his rare lectures after retirement:29
xxx xxx xxx
The Family Code is primarily intended to reform the family law so as to emancipate the wife from the exclusive control of
the husband and to place her at parity with him insofar as the family is concerned. The wife and the husband are now
placed on equal standing by the Code. They are now joint administrators of the family properties and exercise joint
authority over the persons and properties of their children. This means a dual authority in the family. The husband will no
longer prevail over the wife but she has to agree on all matters concerning the family. (Emphasis supplied)
In light of the Family Code which abrogated the inequality between husband and wife as started and perpetuated by the common
law, there is no reason in espousing the anomalous rule that the wife still retains the domicile of her dead husband . Article 110 of
the Civil Code which provides the statutory support for this stance has been repealed by Article 69 of the Family Code. By its
repeal, it becomes a dead-letter law, and we are not free to resurrect it by giving it further effect in any way or manner such as by
ruling that the petitioner is still bound by the domiciliary determination of her dead husband.
Aside from reckoning with the Family Code, we have to consider our Constitution and its firm guarantees of due process and equal
protection of
law.30 It can hardly be doubted that the common law imposition on a married woman of her dead husband's domicile even beyond his grave
is patently discriminatory to women. It is a gender-based discrimination and is not rationally related to the objective of promoting family
solidarity. It cannot survive a constitutional challenge. Indeed, compared with our previous fundamental laws, the 1987 Constitution is more
concerned with equality between sexes as it explicitly commands that the State ". . . shall ensure fundamental equality before the law of
women and men." To be exact, section 14, Article II provides: "The State recognizes the role of women in nation building, and shall ensure
fundamental equality before the law of women and men. We shall be transgressing the sense and essence of this constitutional mandate if
we insist on giving our women the caveman's treatment.
Prescinding from these premises, I respectfully submit that the better stance is to rule that petitioner reacquired her Tacloban domicile upon
the death of her husband in 1989. This is the necessary consequence of the view that petitioner's Batac dictated domicile did not continue
after her husband's death; otherwise, she would have no domicile and that will violate the universal rule that no person can be without a
domicile at any point of time. This stance also restores the right of petitioner to choose her domicile before it was taken away by Article 110
of the Civil Code, a right now recognized by the Family Code and protected by the Constitution. Likewise, I cannot see the fairness of the
common law requiring petitioner to choose again her Tacloban domicile before she could be released from her Batac domicile. She lost her
Tacloban domicile not through her act but through the act of her deceased husband when he fixed their domicile in Batac. Her husband is
dead and he cannot rule her beyond the grave. The law disabling her to choose her own domicile has been repealed. Considering all these,
common law should not put the burden on petitioner to prove she has abandoned her dead husband's domicile. There is neither rhyme nor
reason for this gender-based burden.
But even assuming arguendo that there is need for convincing proof that petitioner chose to reacquire her Tacloban domicile, still, the
records reveal ample evidence to this effect. In her affidavit submitted to the respondent COMELEC, petitioner averred:
xxx xxx xxx
36. In November, 1991, I came home to our beloved country, after several requests for my return were denied by
President Corazon C. Aquino, and after I filed suits for our Government to issue me my passport.
37. But I came home without the mortal remains of my beloved husband, President Ferdinand E. Marcos, which the
Government considered a threat to the national security and welfare.
38. Upon my return to the country, I wanted to immediately live and reside in Tacloban City or in Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, even
if my residences there were not livable as they had been destroyed and cannibalized. The PCGG, however, did not
permit and allow me.
39. As a consequence, I had to live at various times in the Westin Philippine Plaza in Pasay City, a friend's apartment on
Ayala Avenue, a house in South Forbes Park which my daughter rented, and Pacific Plaza, all in Makati.
40. After the 1992 Presidential Elections, I lived and resided in the residence of my brother in San Jose, Tacloban City,
and pursued my negotiations with PCGG to recover my sequestered residences in Tacloban City and Barangay Olot,
Tolosa, Leyte.
40.1 In preparation for my observance of All Saints' Day and All Souls' Day that year, I renovated my
parents' burial grounds and entombed their bones which had been excalvated, unearthed and
scattered.
41. On November 29, 1993, I formally wrote PCGG Chairman Magtanggol Gunigundo for permissions to —
. . . rehabilitate . . . (o)ur ancestral house in Tacloban and farmhouse in Olot, Leyte . . . to make them
livable for us the Marcos family to have a home in our own motherland.
xxx xxx xxx
42. It was only on 06 June 1994, however, when PCGG Chairman Gunigundo, in his letter to Col. Simeon Kempis, Jr.,
PCGG Region 8 Representative, allowed me to repair and renovate my Leyte residences. I quote part of his letter:
Dear Col. Kempis,
Upon representation by Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos to this Commission, that she intends to visit our
sequestered properties in Leyte, please allow her access thereto. She may also cause repairs and
renovation of the sequestered properties, in which event, it shall be understood that her undertaking
said repairs is not authorization for her to take over said properties, and that all expenses shall be for
her account and not reimbursable. Please extend the necessary courtesy to her.
xxx xxx xxx
43. I was not permitted, however, to live and stay in the Sto. Niño Shrine residence in Tacloban City where I wanted to
stay and reside, after repairs and renovations were completed. In August 1994, I transferred from San Jose, Tacloban
City, to my residence in Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, when PCGG permitted me to stay and live there.
It is then clear that in 1992 petitioner reestablished her domicile in the First District of Leyte. It is not disputed that in 1992, she first
lived at the house of her brother in San Jose, Tacloban City and later, in August 1994, she transferred her residence in Barangay
Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. Both Tacloban City and the municipality of Olot are within the First District of Leyte. Since petitioner
reestablished her old domicile in 1992 in the First District of Leyte, she more than complied with the constitutional requirement of
residence
". . . for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the election," i.e., the May 8, 1995 elections.
The evidence presented by the private respondent to negate the Tacloban domicile of petitioner is nil . He presented petitioner's Voter's
Registration Record filed with the Board of Election Inspectors of Precinct 10-A of Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte wherein she stated that her
period of residence in said barangay was six (6) months as of the date of her filing of said Voter's Registration Record on January 28,
1995.31 This statement in petitioner's Voter's Registration Record is a non-prejudicial admission. The Constitution requires at least one (1)
year residence in the district in which the candidate shall be elected. In the case at bench, the reference is the First District of Leyte.
Petitioner's statement proved that she resided in Olot six (6) months before January 28, 1995 but did not disprove that she has also resided
in Tacloban City starting 1992. As aforestated, Olot and Tacloban City are both within the First District of Leyte, hence, her six (6) months
residence in Olot should be counted not against, but in her favor. Private respondent also presented petitioner's Certificate of Candidacy filed
on March 8, 199532 where she placed seven (7) months after Item No. 8 which called for information regarding "residence in the
constituency where I seek to be elected immediately preceding the election." Again, this original certificate of candidacy has no evidentiary
value because an March 1, 1995 it was corrected by petitioner. In her Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy,33 petitioner wrote "since
childhood" after Item No. 8. The amendment of a certificate of candidacy to correct a bona fide mistake has been allowed by this Court as a
matter of course and as a matter of right. As we held in Alialy v. COMELEC,34 viz.:
 xxx xxx xxx
The absence of the signature of the Secretary of the local chapter N.P in the original certificate of candidacy presented
before the deadline September 11, 1959, did not render the certificate invalid. The amendment of the certificate,
although at a date after the deadline, but before the election, was substantial compliance with the law, and the defect
was cured.
It goes without saying that petitioner's erroneous Certificate of Candidacy filed on March 8, 1995 cannot be used as evidence
against her. Private respondent's petition for the disqualification of petitioner rested alone on these two (2) brittle pieces of
documentary evidence — petitioner's Voter's Registration Record and her original Certificate of Candidacy. Ranged against the
evidence of the petitioner showing her ceaseless contacts with Tacloban, private respondent's two (2) pieces of evidence are too
insufficient to disqualify petitioner, more so, to deny her the right to represent the people of the First District of Leyte who have
overwhelmingly voted for her.
Fifth. Section 10, Article IX-C of the Constitution mandates that "bona fide candidates for any public office shall be free from any form of
harassment and discrimination."35 A detached reading of the records of the case at bench will show that all forms of legal and extra-legal
obstacles have been thrown against petitioner to prevent her from running as the people's representative in the First District of Leyte. In
petitioner's Answer to the petition to disqualify her, she averred:36
xxx xxx xxx
10. Petitioner's (herein private respondent Montejo) motive in filing the instant petition is devious. When respondent
(petitioner herein) announced that she was intending to register as a voter in Tacloban City and run for Congress in the
First District of Leyte, petitioner (Montejo) immediately opposed her intended registration by writing a letter stating that
"she is not a resident of said city but of Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte." (Annex "2" of respondent's affidavit, Annex "2").
After respondent (petitioner herein) had registered as a voter in Tolosa following completion of her six-month actual
residence therein, petitioner (Montejo) filed a petition with the COMELEC to transfer the town of Tolosa from the First
District to the Second District and pursued such move up to the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 118702, his purpose being to
remove respondent (petitioner herein) as petitioner's (Montejo's) opponent in the congressional election in the First
District. He also filed a bill, along with other Leyte Congressmen, seeking to create another legislative district, to remove
the town of Tolosa out of the First District and to make it a part of the new district, to achieve his purpose. However, such
bill did not pass the Senate. Having, failed on such moves, petitioner now filed the instant petition, for the same
objective, as it is obvious that he is afraid to submit himself along with respondent (petitioner herein) for the judgment
and verdict of the electorate of the First District of Leyte in an honest, orderly, peaceful, free and clean elections on May
8, 1995.
These allegations which private respondent did not challenge were not lost
to the perceptive eye of Commissioner Maambong who in his Dissenting Opinion,37 held:
xxx xxx xxx
Prior to the registration date — January 28, 1995 the petitioner (herein private respondent Montejo) wrote the Election
Officer of Tacloban City not to allow respondent (petitioner herein) to register thereat since she is a resident of Tolosa
and not Tacloban City. The purpose of this move of the petitioner (Montejo) is not lost to ( sic) the Commission. In UND
No. 95-001 (In the matter of the Legislative Districts of the Provinces of Leyte, Iloilo, and South Cotabato, Out of Which
the New Provinces of Biliran, Guimaras and Saranggani Were Respectively Created), . . . Hon. Cirilo Roy G. Montejo,
Representative, First District of Leyte, wanted the Municipality of Tolosa, in the First District of Leyte, transferred to the
Second District of Leyte. The Hon. Sergio A.F. Apostol, Representative of the Second District of Leyte, opposed the
move of the petitioner (Montejo). Under Comelec Resolution No. 2736 (December 29, 1994), the Commission on
Elections refused to make the proposed transfer. Petitioner (Montejo) filed "Motion for Reconsideration of Resolution
No. 2736" which the Commission denied in a Resolution promulgated on February 1, 1995. Petitioner (Montejo) filed a
petition for certiorari before the Honorable Supreme Court (Cirilo Roy G. Montejo vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.
118702) questioning the resolution of the Commission. Believing that he could get a favorable ruling from the Supreme
Court, petitioner (Montejo) tried to make sure that the respondent (petitioner herein) will register as a voter in Tolosa so
that she will be forced to run as Representative not in the First but in the Second District.
It did not happen. On March 16, 1995, the Honorable Supreme Court unanimously promulgated a " Decision," penned by
Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno, the dispositive portion of which reads:
IN VIEW WHEREOF, Section 1 of Resolution No. 2736 insofar as it transferred the municipality of
Capoocan of the Second District and the municipality of Palompon of the Fourth District to the Third
District of the province of Leyte, is annulled and set aside. We also deny the Petition praying for the
transfer of the municipality of Tolosa from the First District to the Second District of the province of
Leyte. No costs.
Petitioner's (Montejo's) plan did not work. But the respondent (petitioner herein) was constrained to register in the
Municipality of Tolosa where her house is instead of Tacloban City, her domicile. In any case, both Tacloban City and
Tolosa are in the First Legislative District.
All these attempts to misuse our laws and legal processes are forms of rank harassments and invidious discriminations against
petitioner to deny her equal access to a public office. We cannot commit any hermeneutic violence to the Constitution by torturing
the meaning of equality, the end result of which will allow the harassment and discrimination of petitioner who has lived a
controversial life, a past of alternating light and shadow. There is but one Constitution for all Filipinos. Petitioner cannot be
adjudged by a "different" Constitution, and the worst way to interpret the Constitution is to inject in its interpretation, bile and
bitterness.
Sixth. In Gallego v. Vera,38 we explained that the reason for this residence requirement is "to exclude a stranger or newcomer,
unacquainted, with the conditions and needs of a community and not identified with the latter, from an elective office to serve that
community . . . ." Petitioner's lifetime contacts with the First District of Leyte cannot be contested. Nobody can claim that she is not
acquainted with its problems because she is a stranger to the place. None can argue she cannot satisfy the intent of the Constitution.
Seventh. In resolving election cases, a dominant consideration is the need to effectuate the will of the electorate. The election results show
that petitioner received Seventy Thousand Four Hundred Seventy-one (70,471) votes, while private respondent got only Thirty-Six Thousand
Eight Hundred Thirty-Three (36,833) votes. Petitioner is clearly the overwhelming choice of the electorate of the First District of Leyte and
this is not a sleight of statistics. We cannot frustrate this sovereign will on highly arguable technical considerations. In case of doubt, we
should lean towards a rule that will give life to the people's political judgment.
A final point. The case at bench provides the Court with the rare opportunity to rectify the inequality of status between women and men by
rejecting the iniquitous common law precedents on the domicile of married women and by redefining domicile in accord with our own culture,
law, and Constitution. To rule that a married woman is eternally tethered to the domicile dictated by her dead husband is to preserve the
anachronistic and anomalous balance of advantage of a husband over his wife. We should not allow the dead to govern the living even if the
glories of yesteryears seduce us to shout long live the dead! The Family Code buried this gender-based discrimination against married
women and we should not excavate what has been entombed. More importantly, the Constitution forbids it.
I vote to grant the petition.
Bellosillo and Melo, JJ., concur.
FRANCISCO, J., concurring:
I concur with Mr. Justice Kapunan's ponencia finding petitioner qualified for the position of Representative of the First Congressional District
of Leyte. I wish, however, to express a few comments on the issue of petitioner's domicile.
Domicile has been defined as that place in which a person's habitation is fixed, without any present intention of removing therefrom, and that
place is properly the domicile of a person in which he has voluntarily fixed his abode, or habitation, not for a mere special or temporary
purpose, but with a present intention of making it his permanent home (28 C.J.S. §1). It denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when
absent for business, or pleasure, or for like reasons one intends to return, and depends on facts and circumstances, in the sense that they
disclose intent. (Ong Huan Tin v. Republic, 19 SCRA 966, 969)
Domicile is classified into domicile of origin and domicile of choice. The law attributes to every individual a domicile of origin, which is the
domicile of his parents, or of the head of his family, or of the person on whom he is legally dependent at the time of his birth. While the
domicile of origin is generally the place where one is born or reared, it maybe elsewhere (28 C.J.S. §5). Domicile of choice, on the other
hand, is the place which the person has elected and chosen for himself to displace his previous domicile; it has for its true basis or
foundation the intention of the person (28 C.J.S. §6). In order to hold that a person has abandoned his domicile and acquired a new one
called domicile of choice, the following requisites must concur, namely, (a) residence or bodily presence in the new locality, (b) intention to
remain there or animus manendi, and (c) an intention to abandon the old domicile or animus non revertendi (Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7,
Tacloban City, 226 SCRA 408, 415). A third classification is domicile by operation of law which attributes to a person a domicile independent
of his own intention or actual residence, ordinarily resulting from legal domestic relations, as that of the wife arising from marriage, or the
relation of a parent and a child (28 C.J.S. §7).
In election law, when our Constitution speaks of residence for election purposes it means domicile (Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of
Representatives, 199 SCRA 692, 713; Nuval v. Guray, 52 Phil. 645, 651). To my mind, public respondent Commission on Elections
misapplied this concept, of domicile which led to petitioner's disqualification by ruling that petitioner failed to comply with the constitutionally
mandated one-year residence requirement. Apparently, public respondent Commission deemed as conclusive petitioner's stay and
registration as voter in many places as conduct disclosing her intent to abandon her established domicile of origin in Tacloban, Leyte. In
several decisions, though, the Court has laid down the rule that registration of a voter in a place other than his place of origin is not sufficient
to constitute abandonment or loss of such residence (Faypon v. Quirino, 96 Phil. 294, 300). Respondent Commission offered no cogent
reason to depart from this rule except to surmise petitioner's intent of abandoning her domicile of origin.
It has been suggested that petitioner's domicile of origin was supplanted by a new domicile due to her marriage, a domicile by operation of
law. The proposition is that upon the death of her husband in 1989 she retains her husband's domicile, i.e., Batac, Ilocos Norte, until she
makes an actual change thereof. I find this proposition quite untenable.
Tacloban, Leyte, is petitioner's domicile of origin which was involuntarily supplanted with another, i.e., Batac, Ilocos Norte, upon her marriage
in 1954 with then Congressman Marcos. By legal fiction she followed the domicile of her husband. In my view, the reason for the law is for
the spouses to fully and effectively perform their marital duties and obligations to one another. 1 The question of domicile, however, is not
affected by the fact that it was the legal or moral duty of the individual to reside in a given place (28 C.J.S. §11). Thus, while the wife retains
her marital domicile so long as the marriage subsists, she automatically loses it upon the latter's termination, for the reason behind the law
then ceases. Otherwise, petitioner, after her marriage was ended by the death of her husband, would be placed in a quite absurd and unfair
situation of having been freed from all wifely obligations yet made to hold on to one which no longer serves any meaningful purpose.
It is my view therefore that petitioner reverted to her original domicile of Tacloban, Leyte upon her husband's death without even signifying
her intention to that effect. It is for the private respondent to prove, not for petitioner to disprove, that petitioner has effectively abandoned
Tacloban, Leyte for Batac, Ilocos Norte or for some other place/s. The clear rule is that it is the party (herein private respondent) claiming that
a person has abandoned or lost his residence of origin who must show and prove preponderantly such abandonment or loss (Faypon v.
Quirino, supra at 298; 28 C.J.S. §16), because the presumption is strongly in favor of an original or former domicile, as against an acquired
one (28 C.J.S. §16). Private respondent unfortunately failed to discharge this burden as the record is devoid of convincing proof that
petitioner has acquired whether voluntarily or involuntarily, a new domicile to replace her domicile of origin.
The records, on the contrary, clearly show that petitioner has complied with the constitutional one-year residence requirement. After her exile
abroad, she returned to the Philippines in 1991 to reside in Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, but the Presidential Commission on Good Government which
sequestered her residential house and other properties forbade her necessitating her transient stay in various places in Manila (Affidavit p.6,
attached as Annex I of the Petition). In 1992, she ran for the position of president writing in her certificate of candidacy her residence as San
Juan, Metro Manila. After her loss therein, she went back to Tacloban City, acquired her residence certificate2 and resided with her brother in
San Jose. She resided in San Jose, Tacloban City until August of 1994 when she was allowed by the PCGG to move and reside in her
sequestered residential house in Olot, Tolosa, Leyte (Annex I, p. 6).3 It was in the same month of August when she applied for the
cancellation of her previous registration in San Juan, Metro Manila in order to register anew as voter of Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, which she did on
January 28, 1995. From this sequence of events, I find it quite improper to use as the reckoning period of the one-year residence
requirement the date when she applied for the cancellation of her previous registration in San Juan, Metro Manila. The fact which private
respondent never bothered to disprove is that petitioner transferred her residence after the 1992 presidential election from San Juan, Metro
Manila to San Jose, Tacloban City, and resided therein until August of 1994. She later transferred to Olot, Tolosa, Leyte (Annex I, p. 7). It
appearing that both Tacloban City and Tolosa, Leyte are within the First Congressional District of Leyte, it indubitably stands that she had
more than a year of residence in the constituency she sought to be elected. Petitioner, therefore, has satisfactorily complied with the one-
year qualification required by the 1987 Constitution.
I vote to grant the petition.
ROMERO, J., separate opinion:
Petitioner has appealed to this Court for relief after the COMELEC ruled that she was disqualified from running for Representative of her
District and that, in the event that she should, nevertheless, muster a majority vote, her proclamation should be suspended. Not by a
straightforward ruling did the COMELEC pronounce its decision as has been its unvarying practice in the past, but by a startling succession
of "reverse somersaults." Indicative of its shifting stance vis-a-vis petitioner's certificate of candidacy were first, the action of its Second
Division disqualifying her and canceling her original Certificate of Candidacy by a vote of 2-1 on April 24, 1995; then the denial by the
COMELEC en banc of her Motion for Reconsideration on May 7, 1995, a day before the election; then because she persisted in running, its
decision on
May 11, 1995 or three days after the election, allowing her proclamation in the event that the results of the canvass should show that she
obtained the highest number of votes (obviously noting that petitioner had won overwhelmingly over her opponent), but almost
simultaneously reversing itself by directing that even if she wins, her proclamation should nonetheless be suspended.
Crucial to the resolution of the disqualification issue presented by the case at bench is the interpretation to be given to the one-year
residency requirement imposed by the Constitution on aspirants for a Congressional seat.1
Bearing in mind that the term "resident" has been held to be synonymous with "domicile" for election purposes, it is important to determine
whether petitioner's domicile was in the First District of Leyte and if so, whether she had resided there for at least a period of one year.
Undisputed is her domicile of origin, Tacloban, where her parents lived at the time of her birth. Depending on what theory one adopts, the
same may have been changed when she married Ferdinand E. Marcos, then domiciled in Batac, by operation of law. Assuming it did, his
death certainly released her from the obligation to live with him at the residence fixed by him during his lifetime. What may confuse the
layman at this point is the fact that the term "domicile" may refer to "domicile of origin," "domicile of choice," or "domicile by operation of law,"
which subject we shall not belabor since it has been amply discussed by the ponente and in the other separate opinions.
In any case, what assumes relevance is the divergence of legal opinion as to the effect of the husband's death on the domicile of the widow.
Some scholars opine that the widow's domicile remains unchanged; that the deceased husband's wishes perforce still bind the wife he has
left behind. Given this interpretation, the widow cannot possibly go far enough to sever the domiciliary tie imposed by her husband.
It is bad enough to interpret the law as empowering the husband unilaterally to fix the residence or domicile of the family, as laid down in the
Civil Code,2 but to continue giving obeisance to his wishes even after the rationale underlying the mutual duty of the spouses to live together
has ceased, is to close one's eyes to the stark realities of the present.
At the other extreme is the position that the widow automatically reverts to her domicile of origin upon the demise of her husband. Does the
law so abhor a vacuum that the widow has to be endowed somehow with a domicile? To answer this question which is far from rhetorical,
one will have to keep in mind the basic principles of domicile. Everyone must have a domicile. Then one must have only a single domicile for
the same purpose at any given time. Once established, a domicile remains until a new one is acquired, for no person lives who has no
domicile, as defined by the law be is subject to.
At this juncture, we are confronted with an unexplored legal terrain in this jurisdiction, rendered more murky by the conflicting opinions of
foreign legal authorities. This being the state of things, it is imperative as it is opportune to illumine the darkness with the beacon light of
truth, as dictated by experience and the necessity of according petitioner her right to choose her domicile in keeping with the enlightened
global trend to recognize and protect the human rights of women, no less than men.
Admittedly, the notion of placing women at par with men, insofar as civil, political and social rights are concerned, is a relatively recent
phenomenon that took seed only in the middle of this century. It is a historical fact that for over three centuries, the Philippines had been
colonized by Spain, a conservative, Catholic country which transplanted to our shores the Old World cultures, mores and attitudes and
values. Through the imposition on our government of the Spanish Civil Code in 1889, the people, both men and women, had no choice but to
accept such concepts as the husband's being the head of the family and the wife's subordination to his authority. In such role, his was the
right to make vital decisions for the family. Many instances come to mind, foremost being what is related to the issue before us, namely, that
"the husband shall fix the residence of the family." 3 Because he is made responsible for the support of the wife and the rest of the family, 4
he is also empowered to be the administrator of the conjugal property, with a few exceptions 5 and may, therefore, dispose of the
conjugal partnership property for the purposes specified under the law;6 whereas, as a general rule, the wife cannot bind the
conjugal partnership without the husband's consent.7 As regards the property pertaining to the children under parental authority,
the father is the legal administrator and only in his absence may the mother assume his powers.8 Demeaning to the wife's dignity
are certain strictures on her personal freedoms, practically relegating her to the position of minors and disabled persons. To
illustrate a few: The wife cannot, without the husband's consent, acquire any gratuitous title, except from her ascendants,
descendants, parents-in-law, and collateral relatives within the fourth degree.9 With respect to her employment, the husband
wields a veto power in the case the wife exercises her profession or occupation or engages in business, provided his income is
sufficient for the family, according to its social standing and his opposition is founded on serious and valid grounds. 10 Most
offensive, if not repulsive, to the liberal-minded is the effective prohibition upon a widow to get married till after three hundred
days following the death of her husband, unless in the meantime, she has given birth to a child. 11 The mother who contracts a
subsequent marriage loses the parental authority over her children, unless the deceased husband, father of the latter, has
expressly provided in his will that his widow might marry again, and has ordered that in such case she should keep and exercise
parental authority over their children. 12 Again, an instance of a husband's overarching influence from beyond the grave.
All these indignities and disabilities suffered by Filipino wives for hundreds of years evoked no protest from them until the
concept of human rights and equality between and among nations and individuals found hospitable lodgment in the United
Nations Charter of which the Philippines was one of the original signatories. By then, the Spanish "conquistadores" had been
overthrown by the American forces at the turn of the century. The bedrock of the U.N. Charter was firmly anchored on this credo:
"to reaffirm faith in the fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and
women." (Emphasis supplied)
It took over thirty years before these egalitarian doctrines bore fruit, owing largely to the burgeoning of the feminist
movement. What may be regarded as the international bill of rights for women was implanted in the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) adopted by the U.N. General Assembly which
entered into force as an international treaty on September 3, 1981. In ratifying the instrument, the Philippines bound itself
to implement its liberating spirit and letter, for its Constitution, no less, declared that "The Philippines. . . adopts the
generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace,
equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity with all nations." 13 One such principle embodied in the CEDAW is
granting to men and women "the same rights with regard to the law relating to the movement of persons and the freedom
to choose their residence and domicile." 14 (Emphasis supplied).
CEDAW's pro-women orientation which was not lost on Filipino women was reflected in the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines
and later, in the Family Code, 15 both of which were speedily approved by the first lady President of the country, Corazon C.
Aquino. Notable for its emphasis on the human rights of all individuals and its bias for equality between the sexes are the
following provisions: "The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights" 16 and
"The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and shall ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women
and men."17
A major accomplishment of women in their quest for equality with men and the elimination of discriminatory provisions of law was the
deletion in the Family Code of almost all of the unreasonable strictures on wives and the grant to them of personal rights equal to that of their
husbands. Specifically, the husband and wife are now given the right jointly to fix the family domicile;18 concomitant to the spouses' being
jointly responsible for the support of the family is the right and duty of both spouses to manage the household;19 the administration and the
enjoyment of the community property shall belong to both spouses jointly;20 the father and mother shall now jointly exercise legal
guardianship over the property of their unemancipated common child21 and several others.
Aware of the hiatus and continuing gaps in the law, insofar as women's rights are concerned, Congress passed a law popularly known as
"Women in Development and Nation Building Act"22 Among the rights given to married women evidencing their capacity to act in contracts
equal to that of men are:
(1) Women shall have the capacity to borrow and obtain loans and execute security and credit arrangements under the same conditions as
men;
(2) Women shall have equal access to all government and private sector programs granting agricultural credit, loans and non material
resources and shall enjoy equal treatment in agrarian reform and land resettlement programs;
(3) Women shall have equal rights to act as incorporators and enter into insurance contracts; and
(4) Married women shall have rights equal to those of married men in applying for passports, secure visas and other travel documents,
without need to secure the consent of their spouses.
As the world draws the curtain on the Fourth World Conference of Women in Beijing, let this Court now be the first to respond to its clarion
call that "Women's Rights are Human Rights" and that "All obstacles to women's full participation in decision-making at all levels, including
the family" should be removed. Having been herself a Member of the Philippine Delegation to the International Women's Year Conference in
Mexico in 1975, this writer is only too keenly aware of the unremitting struggle being waged by women the world over, Filipino women not
excluded, to be accepted as equals of men and to tear down the walls of discrimination that hold them back from their proper places under
the sun.
In light of the inexorable sweep of events, local and global, legislative, executive and judicial, according more rights to women hitherto
denied them and eliminating whatever pockets of discrimination still exist in their civil, political and social life, can it still be insisted that
widows are not at liberty to choose their domicile upon the death of their husbands but must retain the same, regardless?
I submit that a widow, like the petitioner and others similarly situated, can no longer be bound by the domicile of the departed husband, if at
all she was before. Neither does she automatically revert to her domicile of origin, but exercising free will, she may opt to reestablish her
domicile of origin. In returning to Tacloban and subsequently, to Barangay Olot, Tolosa, both of which are located in the First District of Leyte,
petitioner amply demonstrated by overt acts, her election of a domicile of choice, in this case, a reversion to her domicile of origin. Added
together, the time when she set up her domicile in the two places sufficed to meet the one-year requirement to run as Representative of the
First District of Leyte.
In view of the foregoing expatiation, I vote to GRANT the petition.
VITUG, J., separate opinion:
The case at bench deals with explicit Constitutional mandates.
The Constitution is not a pliable instrument. It is a bedrock in our legal system that sets up ideals and directions and render steady our
strides hence. It only looks back so as to ensure that mistakes in the past are not repeated. A compliant transience of a constitution belittles
its basic function and weakens its goals. A constitution may well become outdated by the realities of time. When it does, it must be changed
but while it remains, we owe it respect and allegiance. Anarchy, open or subtle, has never been, nor must it ever be, the answer to perceived
transitory needs, let alone societal attitudes, or the Constitution might lose its very essence.
Constitutional provisions must be taken to be mandatory in character unless, either by express statement or by necessary implication, a
different intention is manifest (see Marcelino vs. Cruz, 121 SCRA 51).
The two provisions initially brought to focus are Section 6 and Section 17 of Article VI of the fundamental law. These provisions read:
 Sec. 6. No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least twenty-five years of age, able to read and write, and, except the
party-list representatives, a registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period
of not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the election.
Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral
Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by
the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case
may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or
organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall
be its Chairman.
The Commission on Election (the "COMELEC") is constitutionally bound to enforce and administer "all laws and regulations relative to the
conduct of election . . ." (Art. IX, C, Sec. 2, Constitution) that, there being nothing said to the contrary, should include its authority to pass
upon the qualification and disqualification prescribed by law of candidates to an elective office. Indeed, pre-proclamation controversies are
expressly placed under the COMELEC's jurisdiction to hear and resolve (Art. IX, C, Sec. 3, Constitution).
The matter before us specifically calls for the observance of the constitutional one-year residency requirement. The issue (whether or not
there is here such compliance), to my mind, is basically a question of fact or at least inextricably linked to such determination. The findings
and judgment of the COMELEC, in accordance with the long established rule and subject only to a number of exceptions under the basic
heading of "grave abuse of discretion," are not reviewable by this Court.
I do not find much need to do a complex exercise on what seems to me to be a plain matter. Generally, the term "residence" has a broader
connotation that may mean permanent (domicile), official (place where one's official duties may require him to stay) or temporary (the place
where he sojourns during a considerable length of time). For civil law purposes, i.e., as regards the exercise of civil rights and the fulfillment
of civil obligations, the domicile of a natural person is the place of his habitual residence (see Article 50, Civil Code). In election cases, the
controlling rule is that heretofore announced by this Court in Romualdez vs. Regional Trial Court, Branch 7, Tacloban City (226 SCRA 408,
409); thus:
In election cases, the Court treats domicile and residence as synonymous terms, thus: "(t)he term "residence" as used in
the election law is synonymous with "domicile," which imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also
personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention." "Domicile" denotes a fixed permanent
residence to which when absent for business or pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends to return. . . . . Residence thus
acquired, however, may be lost by adopting another choice of domicile. In order, in turn, to acquire a new domicile by
choice, there must concur (1) residence or bodily presence in the new locality, (2) an intention to remain there, and (3) an
intention to abandon the old domicile. In other words, there must basically be animus manendi coupled with animus non
revertendi. The purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the change of
residence must be voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must be actual.
Using the above tests, I am not convinced that we can charge the COMELEC with having committed grave abuse of discretion in
its assailed resolution.
The COMELEC's jurisdiction, in the case of congressional elections, ends when the jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunal concerned begins. It
signifies that the protestee must have theretofore been duly proclaimed and has since become a "member" of the Senate or the House of
Representatives. The question can be asked on whether or not the proclamation of a candidate is just a ministerial function of the
Commission on Elections dictated solely on the number of votes cast in an election exercise. I believe, it is not. A ministerial duty is an
obligation the performance of which, being adequately defined, does not allow the use of further judgment or discretion. The COMELEC, in
its particular case, is tasked with the full responsibility of ascertaining all the facts and conditions such as may be required by law before a
proclamation is properly done.
The Court, on its part, should, in my view at least, refrain from any undue encroachment on the ultimate exercise of authority by the Electoral
Tribunals on matters which, by no less than a constitutional fiat, are explicitly within their exclusive domain. The nagging question, if it were
otherwise, would be the effect of the Court's peremptory pronouncement on the ability of the Electoral Tribunal to later come up with its own
judgment in a contest "relating to the election, returns and qualification" of its members.
Prescinding from all the foregoing, I should like to next touch base on the applicability to this case of Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6646, in
relation to Section 72 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, each providing thusly:
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6646
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. — Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall
not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final
judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such
election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and, upon
motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation
of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.
BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 881
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 72. Effects of disqualification cases and priority. — The Commission and the courts shall give priority to cases of
disqualification by reason of violation of this Act to the end that a final decision shall be rendered not later than seven
days before the election in which the disqualification is sought.
Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for
 him shall not be counted. Nevertheless, if for any reason, a candidate is not declared by final, judgment before an
election to be disqualified, and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, his violation of
the provisions of the preceding sections shall not prevent his proclamation and assumption to office.
I realize that in considering the significance of the law, it may be preferable to look for not so much the specific instances they ostensibly
would cover as the principle they clearly convey. Thus, I will not scoff at the argument that it should be sound to say that votes cast in favor
of the disqualified candidate, whenever ultimately declared as such, should not be counted in his or her favor and must accordingly be
considered to be stray votes. The argument, nevertheless, is far outweighed by the rationale of the now prevailing doctrine first enunciated in
the case of Topacio vs. Paredes (23 Phil. 238 [1912]) which, although later abandoned in Ticzon vs. Comelec (103 SCRA 687 [1981]), and
Santos vs. COMELEC (137 SCRA 740 [1985]), was restored, along with the interim case of Geronimo vs. Ramos (136 SCRA 435 [1985]), by
the Labo (176 SCRA 1 (1989]), Abella (201 SCRA 253 [1991]), Labo (211 SCRA 297 [1992]) and, most recently, Benito (235 SCRA 436
[1994]) rulings. Benito vs. Comelec was a unanimous decision penned by Justice Kapunan and concurred in by Chief Justice Narvasa,
Justices Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Romero, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug and Mendoza (Justices Cruz and Bellosillo were
on official leave). For easy reference, let me quote from the first Labo decision:
Finally, there is the question of whether or not the private respondent, who filed the quo warranto petition, can replace
the petitioner as mayor. He cannot. The simple reason is that as he obtained only the second highest number of votes in
the election, he was obviously not the choice of the people of Baguio City.
The latest ruling of the Court on this issue is Santos v. Commission on Elections, (137 SCRA 740) decided in 1985. In
that case, the candidate who placed second was proclaimed elected after the votes for his winning rival, who was
disqualified as a turncoat and considered a non-candidate, were all disregard as stray. In effect, the second placer won
by default. That decision was supported by eight members of the Court then, (Cuevas, J., ponente, with Makasiar,
Concepcion, Jr., Escolin, Relova, De la Fuente, Alampay and Aquino, JJ., concurring.) with three dissenting (Teehankee,
Acting C.J., Abad Santos and Melencio-Herrera, JJ.) and another two reserving their vote. (Plana and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ.)
One was on official leave. (Fernando, C.J.)
Re-examining that decision, the Court finds, and so holds, that it should be reversed in favor of the earlier case of
Geronimo v. Ramos, (136 SCRA 435) which represents the more logical and democratic rule. That case, which
reiterated the doctrine first announced in 1912 in Topacio v. Paredes, (23 Phil. 238) was supported by ten members of
the Court, (Gutierrez, Jr., ponente, with Teehankee, Abad Santos, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin, Relova, De la
Fuente, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concurring) without any dissent, although one reserved his vote, (Makasiar, J.)
another took no part, (Aquino, J.) and two others were on leave. (Fernando, C.J. and Concepcion, Jr., J.) There the
Court held:
. . . it would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the constitutionally guaranteed right to
suffrage if a candidate who has not acquired the majority or plurality of votes is proclaimed a winner
and imposed as the representative of a constituency, the majority of which have positively declared
through their ballots that they do not choose him.
Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who have received the highest
number of votes cast in the election for that office, and it is a fundamental idea in all republican forms
of government that no one can be declared elected and no measure can be declared carried unless
he or it receives a majority or plurality of the legal votes cast in the election. (20 Corpus Juris 2nd, S
243, p. 676.)
The fact that the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is later declared to be disqualified or not eligible
for the office to which he was elected does not necessarily entitle the candidate who obtained the second highest
number of votes to be declared the winner of the elective office. The votes cast for a dead, disqualified, or non-eligible
person may not be valid to vote the winner into office or maintain him there. However, in the absence of a statute which
clearly asserts a contrary political and legislative policy on the matter, if the votes were cast in the sincere belief that the
candidate was alive, qualified, or eligible, they should not be treated as stray, void or meaningless. (at pp. 20-21)
Considering all the foregoing, I am constrained to vote for the dismissal of the petition.
MENDOZA, J., separate opinion:
In my view the issue in this case is whether the Commission on Elections has the power to disqualify candidates on the ground that they lack
eligibility for the office to which they seek to be elected. I think that it has none and that the qualifications of candidates may be questioned
only in the event they are elected, by filing a petition for quo warranto or an election protest in the appropriate forum, not necessarily in the
COMELEC but, as in this case, in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal. That the parties in this case took part in the proceedings
in the COMELEC is of no moment. Such proceedings were unauthorized and were not rendered valid by their agreement to submit their
dispute to that body.
The various election laws will be searched in vain for authorized proceedings for determining a candidate's qualifications for an office before
his election. There are none in the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881), in the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987 (R.A. No. 6646), or in the
law providing for synchronized elections (R.A. No. 7166). There are, in other words, no provisions for pre-proclamation contests but only
election protests or quo warranto proceedings against winning candidates.
To be sure, there are provisions denominated for "disqualification," but they are not concerned with a declaration of the ineligibility of a
candidate. These provisions are concerned with the incapacity (due to insanity, incompetence or conviction of an offense) of a person either
to be a candidate or to continue as a candidate for public office. There is also a provision for the denial or cancellation of certificates of
candidacy, but it applies only to cases involving false representations as to certain matters required by law to be stated in the certificates.
These provisions are found in the following parts of the Omnibus Election Code:
§ 12. Disqualifications. — Any person who has been declared by competent authority insane or incompetent, or has
been sentenced by final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion or for any offense for which he has been
 sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be
a candidate and to hold any office, unless he has been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty.
The disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be deemed removed upon the declaration by competent
authority that said insanity or incompetence had been removed or after the expiration of a period of five years from his
service of sentence, unless within the same period he again becomes disqualified. (Emphasis added)
§ 68. Disqualifications. — Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is a party is declared by final decision of
a competent court guilty of, or found by the Commission of having (a) given money or other material consideration to
influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing electoral functions; (b) committed acts of terrorism to
enhance his candidacy; (c) spent in his election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by this Code; (d)
solicited, received or made any contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; or (e) violated any of
Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, sub-paragraph 6, shall be disqualified from continuing as
a candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding the office. Any person who is a permanent resident of or an
immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office under this Code, unless said person has
waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the residence requirement
provided for in the election laws. (Emphasis added)
§ 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of
candidacy. — A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any
person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof
is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of
candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election. (Emphasis
added)
the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987 (R.A. No. 6646):
§ 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. — Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall
not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final
judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such
election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and; upon
motion for the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation
of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong. (Emphasis added).
§ 7. Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel a Certificate of Candidacy. — The procedure hereinabove provided shall
apply to petitions to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy as provided in Section 78 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 881.
and the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160):
§ 40. Disqualifications. — The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position:
(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1)
year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence;
(b) Those removed from office as a result of on administrative case;
(c) Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of allegiance to the Republic;
(d) Those with dual citizenship;
(e) Fugitive from justice in criminal or nonpolitical cases here or abroad;
(f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired the right to reside abroad and continue to avail
of the same right after the effectivity of this Code; and
(g) The insane or feeble-minded.
The petition filed by private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo in the COMELEC, while entitled "For Cancellation and Disqualification," contained
no allegation that private respondent Imelda Romualdez-Marcos made material representations in her certificate of candidacy which were
false, it sought her disqualification on the ground that "on the basis of her Voter Registration Record and Certificate of Candidacy, [she] is
disqualified from running for the position of Representative, considering that on election day, May 8, 1995, [she] would have resided less
than ten (10) months in the district where she is seeking to be elected." For its part, the COMELEC's Second Division, in its resolution of April
24, 1995, cancelled her certificate of candidacy and corrected certificate of candidacy on the basis of its finding that petitioner is "not
qualified to run for the position of Member of the House of Representatives for the First Legislative District of Leyte" and not because of any
finding that she had made false representations as to material matters in her certificate of candidacy.
Montejo's petition before the COMELEC was therefore not a petition for cancellation of certificate of candidacy under § 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code, but essentially a petition to declare private respondent ineligible. It is important to note this, because, as will presently be
explained, proceedings under § 78 have for their purpose to disqualify a person from being a candidate, whereas quo warranto proceedings
have for their purpose to disqualify a person from holding public office. Jurisdiction over quo warranto proceedings involving members of the
House of Representatives is vested in the Electoral Tribunal of that body.
Indeed, in the only cases in which this Court dealt with petitions for the cancellation of certificates of candidacy, the allegations were that the
respondent candidates had made false representations in their certificates of candidacy with regard to their citizenship,1 age,2 or
residence.3 But in the generality of cases in which this Court passed upon the qualifications of respondents for office, this Court did so in the
context of election protests4 or quo warranto proceedings5 filed after the proclamation of the respondents or protestees as winners.
Three reasons may be cited to explain the absence of an authorized proceeding for determining before election the qualifications of a
candidate.
First is the fact that unless a candidate wins and is proclaimed elected, there is no necessity for determining his eligibility for the office. In
contrast, whether an individual should be disqualified as a candidate for acts constituting election offenses (e.g., vote buying, over spending,
commission of prohibited acts) is a prejudicial question which should be determined lest he wins because of the very acts for which his
disqualification is being sought. That is why it is provided that if the grounds for disqualification are established, a candidate will not be voted
for; if he has been voted for, the votes in his favor will not be counted; and if for some reason he has been voted for and he has won, either
he will not be proclaimed or his proclamation will be set aside.6
Second is the fact that the determination of a candidate's eligibility, e.g., his citizenship or, as in this case, his domicile, may take a long time
to make, extending beyond the beginning of the term of the office. This is amply demonstrated in the companion case (G.R. No. 120265,
Agapito A. Aquino v. COMELEC) where the determination of Aquino's residence was still pending in the COMELEC even after the elections
of May 8, 1995. This is contrary to the summary character of proceedings relating to certificates of candidacy. That is why the law makes the
receipt of certificates of candidacy a ministerial duty of the COMELEC and its officers.7 The law is satisfied if candidates state in their
certificates of candidacy that they are eligible for the position which they seek to fill, leaving the determination of their qualifications to be
made after the election and only in the event they are elected. Only in cases involving charges of false representations made in certificates
of candidacy is the COMELEC given jurisdiction.
Third is the policy underlying the prohibition against pre-proclamation cases in elections for President, Vice President, Senators and
members of the House of Representatives. (R.A. No. 7166, § 15) The purpose is to preserve the prerogatives of the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal and the other Tribunals as "sole judges" under the Constitution of the election, returns and qualifications
of members of Congress or of the President and Vice President, as the case may be.
By providing in § 253 for the remedy of quo warranto for determining an elected official's qualifications after the results of elections are
proclaimed, while being conspicuously silent about a pre-proclamation remedy based on the same ground, the Omnibus Election Code, or
OEC, by its silence underscores the policy of not authorizing any inquiry into the qualifications of candidates unless they have been elected.
Apparently realizing the lack of an authorized proceeding for declaring the ineligibility of candidates, the COMELEC amended its rules on
February 15, 1993 so as to provide in Rule 25, § 1 the following:
Grounds for disqualification. — Any candidate who does not possess all the qualifications of a candidate as provided for
by the Constitution or by existing law or who commits any act declared by law to be grounds for disqualification may be
disqualified from continuing as a candidate.
The lack of provision for declaring the ineligibility of candidates, however, cannot be supplied by a mere rule. Such an act is equivalent to the
creation of a cause of action which is a substantive matter which the COMELEC, in the exercise of its rulemaking power under Art. IX, A, § 6
of the Constitution, cannot do. It is noteworthy that the Constitution withholds from the COMELEC even the power to decide cases involving
the right to vote, which essentially involves an inquiry into qualifications based on age, residence and citizenship of voters. (Art. IX, C, § 2(3))
The assimilation in Rule 25 of the COMELEC rules of grounds for ineligibility into grounds for disqualification is contrary to the evident
intention of the law. For not only in their grounds but also in their consequences are proceedings for "disqualification" different from those for
a declaration of "ineligibility." "Disqualification" proceedings, as already stated, are based on grounds specified in §§ 12 and 68 of the
Omnibus Election Code and in § 40 of the Local Government Code and are for the purpose of barring an individual from becoming a
candidate or from continuing as a candidate for public office. In a word, their purpose is to eliminate a candidate from the race either from the
start or during its progress. "Ineligibility," on the other hand, refers to the lack of the qualifications prescribed in the Constitution or the
statutes for holding public office and the purpose of the proceedings for declaration of ineligibility is to remove the incumbent from office.
Consequently, that an individual possesses the qualifications for a public office does not imply that he is not disqualified from becoming a
candidate or continuing as a candidate for a public office and vice versa. We have this sort of dichotomy in our Naturalization Law. (C.A. No.
473) That an alien has the qualifications prescribed in § 2 of the law does not imply that he does not suffer from any of disqualifications
provided in § 4.
Indeed, provisions for disqualifications on the ground that the candidate is guilty of prohibited election practices or offenses, like other pre-
proclamation remedies, are aimed at the detestable practice of "grabbing the proclamation and prolonging the election protest,"8 through the
use of "manufactured" election returns or resort to other trickery for the purpose of altering the results of the election. This rationale does not
apply to cases for determining a candidate's qualifications for office before the election. To the contrary, it is the candidate against whom a
proceeding for disqualification is brought who could be prejudiced because he could be prevented from assuming office even though in end
he prevails.
To summarize, the declaration of ineligibility of a candidate may only be sought in an election protest or action for quo warranto filed pursuant
to § 253 of the Omnibus Election Code within 10 days after his proclamation. With respect to elective local officials (e.g., Governor, Vice
Governor, members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, etc.) such petition must be filed either with the COMELEC, the Regional Trial Courts,
or Municipal Trial Courts, as provided in Art. IX, C, § 2(2) of the Constitution. In the case of the President and Vice President, the petition
must be filed with the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (Art. VII, § 4, last paragraph), and in the case of the Senators, with the Senate Electoral
Tribunal, and in the case of Congressmen, with the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal. (Art. VI, § 17) There is greater reason for
not allowing before the election the filing of disqualification proceedings based on alleged ineligibility in the case of candidates for President,
Vice President, Senators and members of the House of Representatives, because of the same policy prohibiting the filing of pre-
proclamation cases against such candidates.
For these reasons, I am of the opinion that the COMELEC had no jurisdiction over SPA No. 95-009; that its proceedings in that case,
including its questioned orders, are void; and that the eligibility of petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos for the office of Representative of the
First District of Leyte may only be inquired into by the HRET.
Accordingly, I vote to grant the petition and to annul the proceedings of the Commission on Elections in SPA No. 95-009, including its
questioned orders doted April 24, 1995, May 7, 1995, May 11, 1995 and May 25, 1995, declaring petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos
ineligible and ordering her proclamation as Representative of the First District of Leyte suspended. To the extent that Rule 25 of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure authorizes proceedings for the disqualification of candidates on the ground of ineligibility for the office, it
should considered void.
The provincial board of canvassers should now proceed with the proclamation of petitioner.
Narvasa, C.J., concurs.
PADILLA, J., dissenting:
I regret that I cannot join the majority opinion as expressed in the well-written ponencia of Mr. Justice Kapunan.
As in any controversy arising out of a Constitutional provision, the inquiry must begin and end with the provision itself. The controversy
should not be blurred by what, to me, are academic disquisitions. In this particular controversy, the Constitutional provision on point states
that — "no person shall be a member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, and on the day
of the election, is at least twenty-five (25) years of age, able to read and write, and except the party list representatives, a registered voter in
the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the
election." (Article VI, section 6)
It has been argued that for purposes of our election laws, the term residence has been understood as synonymous with domicile. This
argument has been validated by no less than the Court in numerous cases 1 where significantly the factual circumstances clearly and
convincingly proved that a person does not effectively lose his domicile of origin if the intention to reside therein is manifest with his personal
presence in the place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention.
With this basic thesis in mind, it would not be difficult to conceive of different modalities within which the phrase "a resident thereof (meaning,
the legislative district) for a period of not less than one year" would fit.
The first instance is where a person's residence and domicile coincide in which case a person only has to prove that he has been domiciled
in a permanent location for not less than a year before the election.
A second situation is where a person maintains a residence apart from his domicile in which case he would have the luxury of district
shopping, provided of course, he satisfies the one-year residence period in the district as the minimum period for eligibility to the position of
congressional representative for the district.
In either case, one would not be constitutionally disqualified for abandoning his residence in order to return to his domicile of origin, or better
still, domicile of choice; neither would one be disqualified for abandoning altogether his domicile in favor of his residence in the district where
he desires to be a candidate.
The most extreme circumstance would be a situation wherein a person maintains several residences in different districts. Since his domicile
of origin continues as an option as long as there is no effective abandonment (animus non revertendi), he can practically choose the district
most advantageous for him.
All these theoretical scenarios, however, are tempered by the unambiguous limitation that "for a period of not less than one year immediately
preceding the day of the election", he must be a resident in the district where he desires to be elected.
To my mind, the one year residence period is crucial regardless of whether or not the term "residence" is to be synonymous with "domicile."
In other words, the candidate's intent and actual presence in one district must in all situations satisfy the length of time prescribed by the
fundamental law. And this, because of a definite Constitutional purpose. He must be familiar with the environment and problems of a district
he intends to represent in Congress and the one-year residence in said district would be the minimum period to acquire such familiarity, if not
versatility.
In the case of petitioner Imelda R. Marcos, the operative facts are distinctly set out in the now assailed decision of the Comelec 2nd Division
dated 24 April 1995 (as affirmed by the Comelec en banc) —
In or about 1938 when respondent was a little over 8 years old, she established her domicile in Tacloban, Leyte
(Tacloban City). She studied in the Holy Infant Academy in Tacloban from 1938 to 1948 when she graduated from high
school. She pursued her college studies in St. Paul's College, now Divine Word University of Tacloban, where she
earned her degree in Education. Thereafter, she taught in the Leyte Chinese High School, still in Tacloban City. In 1952
she went to Manila to work with her cousin, the late Speaker Daniel Z. Romualdez in his office in the House of
Representatives. In 1954, she married ex-president Ferdinand Marcos when he was still a congressman of Ilocos Norte.
She lived with him in Batac, Ilocos Norte and registered there as a voter. When her husband was elected Senator of the
Republic in 1959, she and her husband lived together in San Juan, Rizal where she registered as a voter. In 1965 when
her husband was elected President of the Republic of the Philippines, she lived with him in Malacanang Palace and
registered as a voter in San Miguel, Manila.
During the Marcos presidency, respondent served as a Member of the Batasang Pambansa, Minister of Human
Settlements and Governor of Metro Manila. She claimed that in February 1986, she and her family were abducted and
kidnapped to Honolulu, Hawaii. In November 1991, she came home to Manila. In 1992 respondent ran for election as
President of the Philippines and filed her Certificate of Candidacy wherein she indicated that she is a resident and
registered voter of San Juan, Metro Manila. On August 24, 1994, respondent filed a letter with the election officer of San
Juan, Metro Manila, requesting for cancellation of her registration in the Permanent List of Voters in Precinct No. 157 of
San Juan, Metro Manila, in order that she may be re-registered or transferred to Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. (Annex 2-B,
Answer). On August 31, 1994, respondent filed her Sworn Application for Cancellation of Voter's Previous Registration
(Annex 2-C, Answer) stating that she is a duly registered voter in 157-A, Brgy. Maytunas, San Juan, Metro that she
intends to register at Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte.
On January 28, 1995 respondent registered as a voter at Precinct No. 18-A of Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. She filed with the
Board of Election Inspectors CE Form No. 1, Voter Registration Record No. 94-3349772, wherein she alleged that she
has resided in the municipality of Tolosa for a period of 6 months (Annex A, Petition).
On March 8, 1995, respondent filed with the Office of the Provincial Election Supervisor, Leyte, a Certificate of
Candidacy for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte wherein she also alleged that she has been a
resident in the constituency where she seeks to be elected for a period of 7 months. The pertinent entries therein are as
follows:
 7. PROFESSION OR OCCUPATION: House-wife/ Teacher/ Social Worker
8. RESIDENCE (complete address): Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte
Post Office Address for election purposes: Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte
9. RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHEREIN I SEEK TO BE ELECTED
IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING ELECTION: ________ Years Seven Months
10. I AM NOT A PERMANENT RESIDENT OF, OR IMMIGRANT TO, A
FOREIGN COUNTRY.
THAT I AM ELIGIBLE for said office; That I will support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and
will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; That I will obey the laws, legal orders and decrees promulgated by the
duly-constituted authorities; That the obligation imposed by my oath is assumed voluntarily, without mental reservation or
purpose of evasion; and That the facts stated herein are true to the best of my knowledge.
(Sgd.) Imelda Romualdez-Marcos
(Signature of Candidate)2
Petitioner's aforestated certificate of candidacy filed on 8 March 1995 contains the decisive component or seed of her disqualification. It is
contained in her answer under oath of "seven months" to the query of "residence in the constituency wherein I seek to be elected
immediately preceding the election."
It follows from all the above that the Comelec committed no grave abuse of discretion in holding that petitioner is disqualified from the
position of representative for the 1st congressional district of Leyte in the elections of
8 May 1995, for failure to meet the "not less than one-year residence in the constituency (1st district, Leyte) immediately preceding the day
of election
(8 May 1995)."
Having arrived at petitioner's disqualification to be a representative of the first district of Leyte, the next important issue to resolve is whether
or not the Comelec can order the Board of Canvassers to determine and proclaim the winner out of the remaining qualified candidates for
representative in said district.
I am not unaware of the pronouncement made by this Court in the case of Labo vs. Comelec, G.R. 86564, August 1, 1989, 176 SCRA 1
which gave the rationale as laid down in the early 1912 case of Topacio vs. Paredes, 23 Phil. 238 that:
. . . . Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who have received the highest number of votes
cast in the election for that office, and it is a fundamental idea in all republican forms of government that no one can be
declared elected and no measure can be declared carried unless he or it receives a majority or plurality of the legal votes
cast in the election. (20 Corpus Juris 2nd, S 243, p. 676)
The fact that the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is later declared to be disqualified or not eligible
for the office to which he was elected does not necessarily entitle the candidate who obtained the second highest
number of votes to be declared the winner of the elective office. The votes cast for a dead, disqualified, or non-eligible
person may not be valid to vote the winner into office or maintain him there. However, in the absence of a statute which
clearly asserts a contrary political and legislative policy on the matter, if the votes were cast in the sincere belief that the
candidate was alive, qualified, or eligible, they should not be treated as stray, void or meaningless.
Under Sec. 6 RA 6646, (An Act Introducing Additional Reforms in the Electoral System and for other purposes) (84 O.G. 905, 22 February
1988) it is provided that:
. . . — Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes
cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be
disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall
continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor,
may, during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of
his guilt is strong.
There is no need to indulge in legal hermeneutics to sense the plain and unambiguous meaning of the provision quoted above. As the law
now stands, the legislative policy does not limit its concern with the effect of a final judgement of disqualification only before the election, but
even during or after the election. The law is clear that in all situations, the votes cast for a disqualified candidate SHALL NOT BE COUNTED.
The law has also validated the jurisdiction of the Court or Commission on Election to continue hearing the petition for disqualification in case
a candidate is voted for and receives the highest number of votes, if for any reason, he is not declared by final judgment before an election
to be disqualified.
Since the present case is an after election scenario, the power to suspend proclamation (when evidence of his guilt is strong) is also explicit
under the law. What happens then when after the elections are over, one is declared disqualified? Then, votes cast for him "shall not be
counted" and in legal contemplation, he no longer received the highest number of votes.
It stands to reason that Section 6 of RA 6646 does not make the second placer the winner simply because a "winning candidate is
disqualified," but that the law considers him as the candidate who had obtained the highest number of votes as a result of the votes cast for
the disqualified candidate not being counted or considered.
As this law clearly reflects the legislative policy on the matter, then there is no reason why this Court should not re-examine and
consequently abandon the doctrine in the Jun Labo case. It has been stated that "the qualifications prescribed for elective office cannot be
erased by the electorate alone. The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility" most especially
when it is mandated by no less than the Constitution.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DISMISS the petition and to order the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Leyte to proclaim the candidate receiving
the highest number of votes, from among the qualified candidates, as the duly elected representative of the 1st district of Leyte.
Hermosisima, Jr. J., dissent.
REGALADO, J., dissenting:
While I agree with same of the factual bases of the majority opinion, I cannot arrive conjointly at the same conclusion drawn therefrom
Hence, this dissent which assuredly is not formulated "on the basis of the personality of a petitioner in a case."
I go along with the majority in their narration of antecedent facts, insofar as the same are pertinent to this case, and which I have simplified
as follows:
1. Petitioner, although born in Manila, resided during her childhood in the present Tacloban City, she being a legitimate
daughter of parents who appear to have taken up permanent residence therein. She also went to school there and, for a
time, taught in one of the schools in that city.
2. When she married then Rep. Ferdinand E. Marcos who was then domiciled in Batac, Ilocos Norte, by operation of law
she acquired a new domicile in that place in 1954.
3. In the successive years and during the events that happened thereafter, her husband having been elected as a
Senator and then as President, she lived with him and their family in San Juan, Rizal and then in Malacanang Palace in
San Miguel, Manila.
4. Over those years, she registered as a voter and actually voted in Batac, Ilocos Norte, then in San Juan, Rizal, and
also in San Miguel, Manila, all these merely in the exercise of the right of suffrage.
5. It does not appear that her husband, even after he had assumed those lofty positions successively, ever abandoned
his domicile of origin in Batac, Ilocos Norte where he maintained his residence and invariably voted in all elections.
6. After the ouster of her husband from the presidency in 1986 and the sojourn of the Marcos family in Honolulu, Hawaii,
U.S.A., she eventually returned to the Philippines in 1991 and resided in different places which she claimed to have been
merely temporary residences.
7. In 1992, petitioner ran for election as President of the Philippines and in her certificate of candidacy she indicated that
she was then a registered voter and resident of San Juan, Metro Manila.
8. On August 24, 1994, she filed a letter for the cancellation of her registration in the Permanent List of Voters in Precinct
No. 157 of San Juan, Metro Manila in order that she may "be re-registered or transferred to Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte."
On August 31, 1994, she followed this up with her Sworn Application for Cancellation of Voter's Previous Registration
wherein she stated that she was a registered voter in Precinct No. 157-A, Brgy. Maytunas, San Juan, Metro Manila and
that she intended to register in Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte.
9. On January 28, 1995, petitioner registered as a voter at Precinct No. 18-A of Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, for which purpose
she filed with the therein Board of Election Inspectors a voter's registration record form alleging that she had resided in
that municipality for six months.
10. On March 8, 1995, petitioner filed her certificate of candidacy for the position of Representative of the First District of
Leyte wherein she alleged that she had been a resident for "Seven Months" of the constituency where she sought to be
elected.
11. On March 29, 1995, she filed an "Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy" wherein her answer in the original
certificate of candidacy to item "8. RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK, TO BE ELECTED
IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE ELECTION:" was changed or replaced with a new entry reading "SINCE
CHILDHOOD."
The sole issue for resolution is whether, for purposes of her candidacy, petitioner had complied with the residency requirement of one year
as mandated by no less than Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
I do not intend to impose upon the time of my colleagues with a dissertation on the difference between residence and domicile. We have had
enough of that and I understand that for purposes of political law and, for that matter of international law, residence is understood to be
synonymous with domicile. That is so understood in our jurisprudence and in American Law, in contradistinction to the concept of residence
for purposes of civil, commercial and procedural laws whenever an issue thereon is relevant or controlling.
Consequently, since in the present case the question of petitioner's residence is integrated in and inseparable from her domicile, I am
addressing the issue from the standpoint of the concept of the latter term, specifically its permutations into the domicile of origin, domicile of
choice and domicile by operation of law, as understood in American law from which for this case we have taken our jurisprudential bearings.
My readings inform me that the domicile of the parents at the time of birth, or what is termed the "domicile of origin," constitutes the domicile
of an infant until abandoned, or until the acquisition of a new domicile in a different place.1 In the instant case, we may grant that petitioner's
domicile of origin, 2 at least as of 1938, was what is now Tacloban City.
Now, as I have observed earlier, domicile is said to be of three kinds, that is, domicile by birth, domicile by choice, and domicile by operation
of law. The first is the common case of the place of birth or domicilium originis, the second is that which is voluntarily acquired by a party or
domicilium propio motu; the last which is consequential, as that of a wife arising from marriage,3 is sometimes called domicilium necesarium.
There is no debate that the domicile of origin can be lost or replaced by a domicile of choice or a domicile by operation of law subsequently
acquired by the party.
When petitioner contracted marriage in 1954 with then Rep. Marcos, by operation of law, not only international or American but of our own
enactment, 4 she acquired her husband's domicile of origin in Batac, Ilocos Norte and correspondingly lost her own domicile of origin in
Tacloban City.
Her subsequent changes of residence — to San Juan, Rizal, then to San Miguel, Manila, thereafter to Honolulu, Hawaii, and back to now
San Juan, Metro Manila — do not appear to have resulted in her thereby acquiring new domiciles of choice. In fact, it appears that her
having resided in those places was by reason of the fortunes or misfortunes of her husband and his peregrinations in the assumption of new
official positions or the loss of them. Her residence in Honolulu and, of course, those after her return to the Philippines were, as she claimed,
against her will or only for transient purposes which could not have invested them with the status of domiciles of choice.5
After petitioner's return to the Philippines in 1991 and up to the present imbroglio over her requisite residency in Tacloban City or Olot,
Tolosa, Leyte, there is no showing that she ever attempted to acquire any other domicile of choice which could have resulted in the
abandonment of her legal domicile in Batac, Ilocos Norte. On that score, we note the majority's own submission 6 that, to successfully effect
a change of domicile, one must demonstrate (a) an actual removal or an actual change of domicile, (b) a bona fide intention of abandoning
the former place of residence and establishing a new one, and (c) acts which correspond with the purpose.
We consequently have to also note that these requirements for the acquisition of a domicile of choice apply whether what is sought to be
changed or substituted is a domicile of origin (domicilium originis) or a domicile by operation of law (domicilium necesarium). Since petitioner
had lost her domicilium originis which had been replaced by her domicilium necesarium, it is therefore her continuing domicile in Batac,
Ilocos Norte which, if at all, can be the object of legal change under the contingencies of the case at bar.
To get out of this quandary, the majority decision echoes the dissenting opinion of Commissioner Regalado E. Maambong in SPA 95-009 of
the Commission on Elections,7 and advances this novel proposition.
It may be said that petitioner lost her domicile of origin by operation of law as a result of her marriage to the late
President Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1952 (sic, 1954). By operation of law (domicilium necesarium), her legal domicile at
the time of her marriage became Batac, Ilocos Norte although there were no indications of an intention on her part to
abandon her domicile of origin. Because of her husband's subsequent death and through the operation of the provisions
of the New Family Code already in force at the time, however, her legal domicile automatically reverted to her domicile of
origin. . . . (Emphasis supplied).
Firstly, I am puzzled why although it is conceded that petitioner had acquired a domicilium necesarium in Batac, Ilocos Norte, the majority
insists on making a qualification that she did not intend to abandon her domicile of origin. I find this bewildering since, in this situation, it is
the law that declares where petitioner's domicile is at any given time, and not her self-serving or putative intent to hold on to her former
domicile. Otherwise, contrary to their own admission that one cannot have more than one domicile at a time,8 the majority would be
suggesting that petitioner retained Tacloban City as (for lack of a term in law since it does not exist therein) the equivalent of what is fancied
as a reserved, dormant, potential, or residual domicile.
Secondly, domicile once lost in accordance with law can only be recovered likewise in accordance with law. However, we are here being
titillated with the possibility of an automatic reversion to or reacquisition of a domicile of origin after the termination of the cause for its loss by
operation of law. The majority agrees that since petitioner lost her domicile of origin by her marriage, the termination of the marriage also
terminates that effect thereof. I am impressed by the ingeniousness of this theory which proves that, indeed, necessity is the mother of
inventions. Regretfully, I find some difficulty in accepting either the logic or the validity of this argument.
If a party loses his domicile of origin by obtaining a new domicile of choice, he thereby voluntarily abandons the former in favor of the latter.
If, thereafter, he abandons that chosen domicile, he does not per se recover his original domicile unless, by subsequent acts legally
indicative thereof, he evinces his intent and desire to establish the same as his new domicile, which is precisely what petitioner belatedly
and, evidently just for purposes of her candidacy, unsuccessfully tried to do.
One's subsequent abandonment of his domicile of choice cannot automatically restore his domicile of origin, not only because there is no
legal authority therefor but because it would be absurd Pursued to its logical consequence, that theory of ipso jure reversion would rule out
the fact that said party could already very well have obtained another domicile, either of choice or by operation of law, other than his domicile
of origin. Significantly and obviously for this reason, the Family Code, which the majority inexplicably invokes, advisedly does not regulate
this contingency since it would impinge on one's freedom of choice.
Now, in the instant case, petitioner not only voluntarily abandoned her domicile of choice (unless we assume that she entered into the marital
state against her will) but, on top of that, such abandonment was further affirmed through her acquisition of a new domicile by operation of
law. In fact, this is even a case of both voluntary and legal abandonment of a domicile of origin. With much more reason, therefore, should
we reject the proposition that with the termination of her marriage in 1989, petitioner had supposedly per se and ipso facto reacquired her
domicile of origin which she lost in 1954. Otherwise, this would be tantamount to saying that during the period of marital coverture, she was
simultaneously in possession and enjoyment of a domicile of origin which was only in a state of suspended animation.
Thus, the American rule is likewise to the effect that while after the husband's death the wife has the right to elect her own domicile, 9 she
nevertheless retains the last domicile of her deceased husband until she makes an actual change. 10 In the absence of affirmative evidence,
to the contrary, the presumption is that a wife's domicile or legal residence follows that of her husband and will continue after his death. 11
I cannot appreciate the premises advanced in support of the majority's theory based on Articles 68 and 69 of the Family Code. All that is of
any relevance therein is that under this new code, the right and power to fix the family domicile is now shared by the spouses. I cannot
perceive how that joint right, which in the first place was never exercised by the spouses, could affect the domicile fixed by the law for
petitioner in 1954 and, for her husband, long prior thereto. It is true that a wife now has the coordinate power to determine the conjugal or
family domicile, but that has no bearing on this case. With the death of her husband, and each of her children having gotten married and
established their own respective domiciles, the exercise of that joint power was and is no longer called for or material in the present factual
setting of this controversy. Instead, what is of concern in petitioner's case was the matter of her having acquired or not her own domicile of
choice.
I agree with the majority's discourse on the virtues of the growing and expanded participation of women in the affairs of the nation, with equal
rights and recognition by Constitution and statutory conferment. However, I have searched in vain for a specific law or judicial
pronouncement which either expressly or by necessary implication supports the majority's desired theory of automatic reacquisition of or
reversion to the domicilium originis of petitioner. Definitely, as between the settled and desirable legal norms that should govern this issue,
there is a world of difference; and, unquestionably, this should be resolved by legislative articulation but not by the eloquence of the well-
turned phrase.
In sum, petitioner having lost Tacloban City as her domicile of origin since 1954 and not having automatically reacquired any domicile
therein, she cannot legally claim that her residency in the political constituency of which it is a part continued since her birth up to the
present. Respondent commission was, therefore, correct in rejecting her pretension to that effect in her amended/corrected certificate of
candidacy, and in holding her to her admission in the original certificate that she had actually resided in that constituency for only seven
months prior to the election. These considerations render it unnecessary to further pass upon the procedural issues raised by petitioner.
ON THE FOREGOING PREMISES, I vote to DISMISS the petition for lack of merit.
DAVIDE, JR., J., dissenting:
I respectfully dissent from the opinion of the majority written by Mr. Justice Santiago M. Kapunan, more particularly on the issue of the
petitioner's qualification.
Under Section 7, Subdivision A, Article IX of the Constitution, decisions, orders, or rulings of the COMELEC may be brought to this Court
only by the special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court (Aratuc vs. COMELEC, 88 SCRA 251 [1979]; Dario vs.
Mison, 176 SCRA 84 [1989]).
Accordingly, a writ of certiorari may be granted only if the COMELEC has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion (Section 1, Rule 65, Rules of Court). Since the COMELEC has, undoubtedly, jurisdiction over the private respondent's petition, the
only issue left is whether it acted with grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying the petitioner.
My careful and meticulous perusal of the challenged resolution of 24 April 1995 of the COMELEC Second Division and the En Banc
resolution of 7 May 1995 discloses total absence of abuse of discretion, much less grave abuse thereof. The resolution of the Second
Division dispassionately and objectively discussed in minute details the facts which established beyond cavil that herein petitioner was
disqualified as a candidate on the ground of lack of residence in the First Congressional District of Leyte. It has not misapplied,
miscomprehended, or misunderstood facts or circumstances of substance pertinent to the issue of her residence.
The majority opinion, however, overturned the COMELEC's findings of fact for lack of proof that the petitioner has abandoned Tolosa as her
domicile of origin, which is allegedly within the First Congressional District of Leyte.
I respectfully submit that the petitioner herself has provided the COMELEC, either by admission or by documentary evidence, overwhelming
proof of the loss or abandonment of her domicile of origin, which is Tacloban City and not Tolosa, Leyte. Assuming that she decided to live
again in her domicile of origin, that became her second domicile of choice, where her stay, unfortunately, was for only seven months before
the day of the election. She was then disqualified to be a candidate for the position of Representative of the First Congressional District of
Leyte. A holding to the contrary would be arbitrary.
It may indeed be conceded that the petitioner's domicile of choice was either Tacloban City or Tolosa, Leyte. Nevertheless, she lost it by
operation of law sometime in May 1954 upon her marriage to the then Congressman (later, President) Ferdinand E. Marcos. A domicile by
operation of law is that domicile which the law attributes to a person, independently of his own intention or actual residence, as results from
legal domestic relations as that of the wife arising from marriage (28 C.J.S. Domicile § 7, 11). Under the governing law then, Article 110 of the
Civil Code, her new domicile or her domicile of choice was the domicile of her husband, which was Batac, Ilocos Norte. Said Article reads as
follows:
Art. 110. The husband shall fix the residence of the family. But the court may exempt the wife from living with the
husband if he should live abroad unless in the service of the Republic.
Commenting thereon, civilist Arturo M. Tolentino states:
Although the duty of the spouses to live together is mutual, the husband has a predominant right because he is
empowered by law to fix the family residence. This right even predominates over some rights recognized by law in the
wife. For instance, under article 117 the wife may engage in business or practice a profession or occupation. But
because of the power of the husband to fix the family domicile he may fix it at such a place as would make it impossible
for the wife to continue in business or in her profession. For justifiable reasons, however, the wife may be exempted from
living in the residence chosen by the husband. The husband cannot validly allege desertion by the wife who refuses to
follow him to a new place of residence, when it appears that they have lived for years in a suitable home belonging to the
wife, and that his choice of a different home is not made in good faith. (Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil
Code of the Philippines, vol. 1, 1985 ed., 339).
Under common law, a woman upon her marriage loses her own domicile and, by operation of law, acquires that of her husband, no matter
where the wife actually lives or what she believes or intends. Her domicile is fixed in the sense that it is declared to be the same as his, and
subject to certain limitations, he can change her domicile by changing his own (25 Am Jur 2d Domicile § 48, 37).
It must, however, be pointed out that under Article 69 of the Family Code, the fixing of the family domicile is no longer the sole prerogative of
the husband, but is now a joint decision of the spouses, and in case of disagreement the court shall decide. The said article uses the term
"family domicile," and not family residence, as "the spouses may have multiple residences, and the wife may elect to remain in one of such
residences, which may destroy the duty of the spouses to live together and its corresponding benefits" (ALICIA V. SEMPIO-DIY, Handbook
on the Family Code of the Philippines, [1988], 102).
The theory of automatic restoration of a woman's domicile of origin upon the death of her husband, which the majority opinion adopts to
overcome the legal effect of the petitioner's marriage on her domicile, is unsupported by law and by jurisprudence. The settled doctrine is
that after the husband's death the wife has a right to elect her own domicile, but she retains the last domicile of her husband until she makes
an actual change (28 C.J.S. Domicile § 12, 27). Or, on the death of the husband, the power of the wife to acquire her own domicile is
revived, but until she exercises the power her domicile remains that of the husband at the time of his death (25 Am Jur 2d Domicile § 62, 45).
Note that what is revived is not her domicile of origin but her power to acquire her own domicile.
Clearly, even after the death of her husband, the petitioner's domicile was that of her husband at the time of his death — which was Batac,
Ilocos Norte, since their residences in San Juan, Metro Manila, and San Miguel, Manila, were their residences for convenience to enable her
husband to effectively perform his official duties. Their residence in San Juan was a conjugal home, and it was there to which she returned in
1991 when she was already a widow. In her sworn certificate of candidacy for the Office of the President in the synchronized elections of
May 1992, she indicated therein that she was a resident of San Juan, Metro Manila. She also voted in the said elections in that place.
On the basis of her evidence, it was only on 24 August 1994 when she exercised her right as a widow to acquire her own domicile in Tolosa,
Leyte, through her sworn statement requesting the Election Officer of San Juan, Metro Manila, to cancel her registration in the permanent list
of voters in Precinct 157 thereat and praying that she be "re-registered or transferred to Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, the place of [her] birth and
permanent residence" (photocopy of Exhibit "B," attached as Annex "2" of private respondent Montejo's Comment). Notably, she contradicted
this sworn statement regarding her place of birth when, in her Voter's Affidavit sworn to on 15 March 1992 (photocopy of Exhibit "C," attached
as Annex "3," Id.), her Voter Registration Record sworn to on 28 January 1995 (photocopy of Exhibit "E," attached as Annex "5," Id.), and her
Certificate of Candidacy sworn to on 8 March 1995 (photocopy of Exhibit "A," attached as Annex "1," Id.), she solemnly declared that she
was born in Manila.
The petitioner is even uncertain as to her domicile of origin. Is it Tacloban City or Tolosa, Leyte? In the affidavit attached to her Answer to the
petition for disqualification (Annex "I" of Petition), she declared under oath that her "domicile or residence is Tacloban City." If she did intend
to return to such domicile or residence of origin why did she inform the Election Officer of San Juan that she would transfer to Olot, Tolosa,
Leyte, and indicate in her Voter's Registration Record and in her certificate of candidacy that her residence is Olot, Tolosa, Leyte? While this
uncertainty is not important insofar as residence in the congressional district is concerned, it nevertheless proves that forty-one years had
already lapsed since she had lost or abandoned her domicile of origin by virtue of marriage and that such length of time diminished her
power of recollection or blurred her memory.
I find to be misplaced the reliance by the majority opinion on Faypon vs. Quirino (96 Phil. 294 [1954]), and the subsequent cases which
established the principle that absence from original residence or domicile of origin to pursue studies, practice one's profession, or engage in
business in other states does not constitute loss of such residence or domicile. So is the reliance on Section 117 of the Omnibus Election
Code which provides that transfer of residence to any other place by reason of one's "occupation; profession; employment in private and
public service; educational activities; work in military or naval reservations; service in the army, navy or air force, the constabulary or national
police force; or confinement or detention in government institutions in accordance with law" is not deemed as loss of original residence.
Those cases and legal provision do not include marriage of a woman. The reason for the exclusion is, of course, Article 110 of the Civil
Code. If it were the intention of this Court or of the legislature to consider the marriage of a woman as a circumstance which would not
operate as an abandonment of domicile (of origin or of choice), then such cases and legal provision should have expressly mentioned the
same.
This Court should not accept as gospel truth the self-serving claim of the petitioner in her affidavit (Annex "A" of her Answer in COMELEC
SPA No. 95-009; Annex "I" of Petition) that her "domicile or residence of origin is Tacloban City," and that she "never intended to abandon this
domicile or residence of origin to which [she] always intended to return whenever absent." Such a claim of intention cannot prevail over the
effect of Article 110 of the Civil Code. Besides, the facts and circumstances or the vicissitudes of the petitioner's life after her marriage in
1954 conclusively establish that she had indeed abandoned her domicile of origin and had acquired a new one animo et facto (KOSSUTH
KENT KENNAN, A Treatise on Residence and Domicile, [1934], 214, 326).
Neither should this Court place complete trust on the petitioner's claim that she "merely committed an honest mistake" in writing down the
word "seven" in the space provided for the residency qualification requirement in the certificate of candidacy. Such a claim is self-serving
and, in the light of the foregoing disquisitions, would be all sound and fury signifying nothing. To me, she did not commit any mistake, honest
or otherwise; what she stated was the truth.
The majority opinion also disregards a basic rule in evidence that he who asserts a fact or the affirmative of an issue has the burden of
proving it (Imperial Victory Shipping Agency vs. NLRC, 200 SCRA 178 [1991]; P.T. Cerna Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, 221 SCRA 19 [1993]).
Having admitted marriage to the then Congressman Marcos, the petitioner could not deny the legal consequence thereof on the change of
her domicile to that of her husband. The majority opinion rules or at least concludes that "[b]y operation of law (domicilium necesarium), her
legal domicile at the time of her marriage automatically became Batac, Ilocos Norte." That conclusion is consistent with Article 110 of the Civil
Code. Since she is presumed to retain her deceased husband's domicile until she exercises her revived power to acquire her own domicile,
the burden is upon her to prove that she has exercised her right to acquire her own domicile. She miserably failed to discharge that burden.
I vote to deny the petition.
Separate Opinions
PUNO, J., concurring:
It was Aristotle who taught mankind that things that are alike should be treated alike, while things that are unalike should be treated unalike
in proportion to their unalikeness.1 Like other candidates, petitioner has clearly met the residence requirement provided by Section 6, Article
VI of the Constitution.2 We cannot disqualify her and treat her unalike, for the Constitution guarantees equal protection of the law. I proceed
from the following factual and legal propositions:
First. There is no question that petitioner's original domicile is in Tacloban, Leyte. Her parents were domiciled in Tacloban. Their ancestral
house is in Tacloban. They have vast real estate in the place. Petitioner went to school and thereafter worked there. I consider Tacloban as
her initial domicile, both her domicile of origin and her domicile of choice. Her domicile of origin as it was the domicile of her parents when
she was a minor; and her domicile of choice, as she continued living there even after reaching the age of majority.
Second. There is also no question that in May, 1954, petitioner married the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos. By contracting marriage, her
domicile became subject to change by law, and the right to change it was given by Article 110 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 110. The husband shall fix the residence of the family. But the court may exempt the wife from living with the
husband if he should live abroad unless in the service of the Republic.3 (Emphasis supplied)
In De la Viña v. Villareal and Geopano,4 this Court explained why the domicile of the wife ought to follow that of the husband. We
held: "The reason is founded upon the theoretic identity of person and interest between the husband and the wife, and the
presumption that, from the nature of the relation, the home of one is the home of the other. It is intended to promote, strengthen,
and secure their interests in this relation, as it ordinarily exists, where union and harmony prevail." 5 In accord with this objective,
Article 109 of the Civil Code also obligated the husband and wife "to live together."
Third. The difficult issues start as we determine whether petitioner's marriage to former President Marcos ipso facto resulted in the loss of
her Tacloban domicile. I respectfully submit that her marriage by itself alone did not cause her to lose her Tacloban domicile. Article 110 of
the Civil Code merely gave the husband the right to fix the domicile of the family. In the exercise of the right, the husband may explicitly
choose the prior domicile of his wife, in which case, the wife's domicile remains unchanged. The husband can also implicitly acquiesce to his
wife's prior domicile even if it is different. So we held in de la Viña,6
. . . . When married women as well as children subject to parental authority live, with the acquiescence of their husbands
or fathers, in a place distinct from where the latter live, they have their own independent domicile. . . .
It is not, therefore, the mere fact of marriage but the deliberate choice of a different domicile by the husband that will change the
domicile of a wife from what it was prior to their marriage. The domiciliary decision made by the husband in the exercise of the right
conferred by Article 110 of the Civil Code binds the wife. Any and all acts of a wife during her coverture contrary to the domiciliary
choice of the husband cannot change in any way the domicile legally fixed by the husband. These acts are void not only because
the wife lacks the capacity to choose her domicile but also because they are contrary to law and public policy.
In the case at bench, it is not disputed that former President Marcos exercised his right to fix the family domicile and established it in Batac,
Ilocos Norte, where he was then the congressman. At that particular point of time and throughout their married life, petitioner lost her
domicile in Tacloban, Leyte. Since petitioner's Batac domicile has been fixed by operation of law, it was not affected in 1959 when her
husband was elected as Senator, when they lived in San Juan, Rizal and where she registered as a voter. It was not also affected in 1965
when her husband was elected President, when they lived in Malacañang Palace, and when she registered as a voter in San Miguel, Manila.
Nor was it affected when she served as a member of the Batasang Pambansa, Minister of Human Settlements and Governor of Metro
Manila during the incumbency of her husband as President of the nation. Under Article 110 of the Civil Code, it was only her husband who
could change the family domicile in Batac and the evidence shows he did not effect any such change. To a large degree, this follows the
common law that "a woman on her marriage loses her own domicile and by operation of law, acquires that of her husband, no matter where
the wife actually lives or what she believes or intends."7
Fourth. The more difficult task is how to interpret the effect of the death on September 28, 1989 of former President Marcos on petitioner's
Batac domicile. The issue is of first impression in our jurisdiction and two (2) schools of thought contend for acceptance. One is espoused by
our distinguished colleague, Mr. Justice Davide, Jr., heavily relying on American authorities.8 He echoes the theory that after the husband's
death, the wife retains the last domicile of her husband until she makes an actual change.
I do not subscribe to this submission. The American case law that the wife still retains her dead husband's domicile is based on ancient
common law which we can no longer apply in the Philippine setting today. The common law identified the domicile of a wife as that of the
husband and denied to her the power of acquiring a domicile of her own separate and apart from him. 9 Legal scholars agree that two (2)
reasons support this common law doctrine. The first reason as pinpointed by the legendary Blackstone is derived from the view that "the very
being or legal existence of the woman is suspended during
the marriage, or at least is incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband."10 The second reason lies in "the desirability of having
the interests of each member of the family unit governed by the same law."11 The presumption that the wife retains the domicile of her
deceased husband is an extension of this common law concept. The concept and its extension have provided some of the most iniquitous
jurisprudence against women. It was under common law that the 1873 American case of Bradwell v. Illinois 12 was decided where women
were denied the right to practice law. It was unblushingly ruled that "the natural and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female
sex evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life . . . This is the law of the Creator." Indeed, the rulings relied upon by Mr. Justice
Davide in CJS 13 and AM JUR 2d14 are American state court decisions handed down between the years 191715 and 1938,16 or before the
time when women were accorded equality of rights with men. Undeniably, the women's liberation movement resulted in far-ranging state
legislations in the United States to eliminate gender inequality.17 Starting in the decade of the seventies, the courts likewise liberalized their
rulings as they started invalidating laws infected with gender-bias. It was in 1971 when the US Supreme Court in Reed v. Reed,18 struck a
big blow for women equality when it declared as unconstitutional an Idaho law that required probate courts to choose male family members
over females as estate administrators. It held that mere administrative inconvenience cannot justify a sex-based distinction. These significant
changes both in law and in case law on the status of women virtually obliterated the iniquitous common law surrendering the rights of
married women to their husbands based on the dubious theory of the parties' theoretic oneness . The Corpus Juris Secundum editors did not
miss the relevance of this revolution on women's right as they observed: "However, it has been declared that under modern statutes
changing the status of married women and departing from the common law theory of marriage, there is no reason why a wife may not
acquire a separate domicile for every purpose known to the law."19 In publishing in 1969 the Restatement of the Law, Second (Conflict of
Laws 2d), the reputable American Law Institute also categorically stated that the view of Blackstone ". . . is no longer held. As the result of
statutes and court decisions, a wife now possesses practically the same rights and powers as her unmarried sister."20
In the case at bench, we have to decide whether we should continue clinging to the anachronistic common law that demeans women,
especially married women. I submit that the Court has no choice except to break away from this common law rule, the root of the many
degradations of Filipino women. Before 1988, our laws particularly the Civil Code, were full of gender discriminations against women. Our
esteemed colleague, Madam Justice Flerida Ruth Romero, cited a few of them as follows:21
xxx xxx xxx
Legal Disabilities Suffered by Wives
Not generally known is the fact that under the Civil Code, wives suffer under certain restrictions or disabilities. For
instance, the wife cannot accept gifts from others, regardless of the sex of the giver or the value of the gift, other than
from her very close relatives, without her husband's consent. She may accept only from, say, her parents, parents-in-law,
brothers, sisters and the relatives within the so-called fourth civil degree. She may not exercise her profession or
occupation or engage in business if her husband objects on serious grounds or if his income is sufficient to support their
family in accordance with their social standing. As to what constitutes "serious grounds" for objecting, this is within the
discretion of the husband.
xxx xxx xxx
Because of the present inequitable situation, the amendments to the Civil Law being proposed by the University of the
Philippines Law Center would allow absolute divorce which severes the matrimonial ties, such that the divorced spouses
 are free to get married a year after the divorce is decreed by the courts. However, in order to place the husband and wife
on an equal footing insofar as the bases for divorce are concerned, the following are specified as the grounds for
absolute divorce: (1) adultery or having a paramour committed by the respondent in any of the ways specified in the
Revised Penal Code or (2) an attempt by the respondent against the life of the petitioner which amounts to attempted
parricide under the Revised Penal Code; (3) abandonment of the petitioner by the respondent without just cause for a
period of three consecutive years; or (4) habitual maltreatment.
With respect to property relations, the husband is automatically the administrator of the conjugal property owned in
common by the married couple even if the wife may be the more astute or enterprising partner. The law does not leave it
to the spouses to decide who shall act as such administrator. Consequently, the husband is authorized to engage in acts
and enter into transactions beneficial to the conjugal partnership. The wife, however, cannot similarly bind the
partnership without the husband's consent.
And while both exercise joint parental authority over their children, it is the father whom the law designates as the legal
administrator of the property pertaining to the unemancipated child.
Taking the lead in Asia, our government exerted efforts, principally through legislations, to eliminate inequality between men and
women in our land. The watershed came on August 3, 1988 when our Family Code took effect which, among others, terminated
the unequal treatment of husband and wife as to their rights and responsibilities.22
The Family Code attained this elusive objective by giving new rights to married women and by abolishing sex-based privileges of husbands.
Among others, married women are now given the joint right to administer the family property, whether in the absolute community system or in
the system of conjugal partnership;23 joint parental authority over their minor children, both over their persons as well as their properties;24
joint responsibility for the support of the family;25 the right to jointly manage the household;26 and, the right to object to their husband's
exercise of profession, occupation, business or activity.27 Of particular relevance to the case at bench is Article 69 of the Family Code which
took away the exclusive right of the husband to fix the family domicile and gave it jointly to the husband and the wife, thus:
Art. 69. The husband and wife shall fix the family domicile. In case of disagreement, the court shall decide.
The court may exempt one spouse from living with the other if the latter should live abroad or there are other valid and
compelling reasons for the exemption. However, such exemption shall not apply if the same is not compatible with the
solidarity of the family. (Emphasis supplied)
Article 69 repealed Article 110 of the Civil Code. Commenting on the duty of the husband and wife to live together, former Madam
Justice Alice Sempio-Diy of the Court of Appeals specified the instances when a wife may now refuse to live with her husband,
thus:28
(2) The wife has the duty to live with her husband, but she may refuse to do so in certain cases like:
(a) If the place chosen by the husband as family residence is dangerous to her Life;
(b) If the husband subjects her to maltreatment or abusive conduct or insults, making common life
impossible;
(c) If the husband compels her to live with his parents, but she cannot get along with her mother-in-
law and they have constant quarrels (Del Rosario v. Del Rosario, CA, 46 OG 6122);
(d) Where the husband has continuously carried illicit relations for 10 years with different women and
treated his wife roughly and without consideration. (Dadivas v. Villanueva, 54 Phil. 92);
(e) Where the husband spent his time in gambling, giving no money to his family for food and
necessities, and at the same time insulting his wife and laying hands on her. (Panuncio v. Sula, CA,
34 OG 129);
(f) If the husband has no fixed residence and lives a vagabond life as a tramp (1 Manresa 329);
(g) If the husband is carrying on a shameful business at home (Gahn v. Darby, 38 La. Ann. 70).
The inescapable conclusion is that our Family Code has completely emancipated the wife from the control of the husband , thus
abandoning the parties' theoretic identity of interest. No less than the late revered Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes who chaired the Civil
Code Revision Committee of the UP Law Center gave this insightful view in one of his rare lectures after retirement:29
xxx xxx xxx
The Family Code is primarily intended to reform the family law so as to emancipate the wife from the exclusive control of
the husband and to place her at parity with him insofar as the family is concerned. The wife and the husband are now
placed on equal standing by the Code. They are now joint administrators of the family properties and exercise joint
authority over the persons and properties of their children. This means a dual authority in the family. The husband will no
longer prevail over the wife but she has to agree on all matters concerning the family. (Emphasis supplied)
In light of the Family Code which abrogated the inequality between husband and wife as started and perpetuated by the common
law, there is no reason in espousing the anomalous rule that the wife still retains the domicile of her dead husband . Article 110 of
the Civil Code which provides the statutory support for this stance has been repealed by Article 69 of the Family Code. By its
repeal, it becomes a dead-letter law, and we are not free to resurrect it by giving it further effect in any way or manner such as by
ruling that the petitioner is still bound by the domiciliary determination of her dead husband.
Aside from reckoning with the Family Code, we have to consider our Constitution and its firm guarantees of due process and equal
protection of
law.30 It can hardly be doubted that the common law imposition on a married woman of her dead husband's domicile even beyond his grave
is patently discriminatory to women. It is a gender-based discrimination and is not rationally related to the objective of promoting family
solidarity. It cannot survive a constitutional challenge. Indeed, compared with our previous fundamental laws, the 1987 Constitution is more
concerned with equality between sexes as it explicitly commands that the State ". . . shall ensure fundamental equality before the law of
women and men." To be exact, section 14, Article II provides: "The State recognizes the role of women in nation building, and shall ensure
fundamental equality before the law of women and men. We shall be transgressing the sense and essence of this constitutional mandate if
we insist on giving our women the caveman's treatment.
Prescinding from these premises, I respectfully submit that the better stance is to rule that petitioner reacquired her Tacloban domicile upon
the death of her husband in 1989. This is the necessary consequence of the view that petitioner's Batac dictated domicile did not continue
after her husband's death; otherwise, she would have no domicile and that will violate the universal rule that no person can be without a
domicile at any point of time. This stance also restores the right of petitioner to choose her domicile before it was taken away by Article 110
of the Civil Code, a right now recognized by the Family Code and protected by the Constitution. Likewise, I cannot see the fairness of the
common law requiring petitioner to choose again her Tacloban domicile before she could be released from her Batac domicile. She lost her
Tacloban domicile not through her act but through the act of her deceased husband when he fixed their domicile in Batac. Her husband is
dead and he cannot rule her beyond the grave. The law disabling her to choose her own domicile has been repealed. Considering all these,
common law should not put the burden on petitioner to prove she has abandoned her dead husband's domicile. There is neither rhyme nor
reason for this gender-based burden.
But even assuming arguendo that there is need for convincing proof that petitioner chose to reacquire her Tacloban domicile, still, the
records reveal ample evidence to this effect. In her affidavit submitted to the respondent COMELEC, petitioner averred:
xxx xxx xxx
36. In November, 1991, I came home to our beloved country, after several requests for my return were denied by
President Corazon C. Aquino, and after I filed suits for our Government to issue me my passport.
37. But I came home without the mortal remains of my beloved husband, President Ferdinand E. Marcos, which the
Government considered a threat to the national security and welfare.
38. Upon my return to the country, I wanted to immediately live and reside in Tacloban City or in Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, even
if my residences there were not livable as they had been destroyed and cannibalized. The PCGG, however, did not
permit and allow me.
39. As a consequence, I had to live at various times in the Westin Philippine Plaza in Pasay City, a friend's apartment on
Ayala Avenue, a house in South Forbes Park which my daughter rented, and Pacific Plaza, all in Makati.
40. After the 1992 Presidential Elections, I lived and resided in the residence of my brother in San Jose, Tacloban City,
and pursued my negotiations with PCGG to recover my sequestered residences in Tacloban City and Barangay Olot,
Tolosa, Leyte.
40.1 In preparation for my observance of All Saints' Day and All Souls' Day that year, I renovated my
parents' burial grounds and entombed their bones which had been excalvated, unearthed and
scattered.
41. On November 29, 1993, I formally wrote PCGG Chairman Magtanggol Gunigundo for permissions to —
. . . rehabilitate . . . (o)ur ancestral house in Tacloban and farmhouse in Olot, Leyte . . . to make them
livable for us the Marcos family to have a home in our own motherland.
xxx xxx xxx
42. It was only on 06 June 1994, however, when PCGG Chairman Gunigundo, in his letter to Col. Simeon Kempis, Jr.,
PCGG Region 8 Representative, allowed me to repair and renovate my Leyte residences. I quote part of his letter:
Dear Col. Kempis,
Upon representation by Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos to this Commission, that she intends to visit our
sequestered properties in Leyte, please allow her access thereto. She may also cause repairs and
renovation of the sequestered properties, in which event, it shall be understood that her undertaking
said repairs is not authorization for her to take over said properties, and that all expenses shall be for
her account and not reimbursable. Please extend the necessary courtesy to her.
xxx xxx xxx
43. I was not permitted, however, to live and stay in the Sto. Niño Shrine residence in Tacloban City where I wanted to
stay and reside, after repairs and renovations were completed. In August 1994, I transferred from San Jose, Tacloban
City, to my residence in Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, when PCGG permitted me to stay and live there.
It is then clear that in 1992 petitioner reestablished her domicile in the First District of Leyte. It is not disputed that in 1992, she first
lived at the house of her brother in San Jose, Tacloban City and later, in August 1994, she transferred her residence in Barangay
Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. Both Tacloban City and the municipality of Olot are within the First District of Leyte. Since petitioner
reestablished her old domicile in 1992 in the First District of Leyte, she more than complied with the constitutional requirement of
residence
". . . for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the election," i.e., the May 8, 1995 elections.
The evidence presented by the private respondent to negate the Tacloban domicile of petitioner is nil . He presented petitioner's Voter's
Registration Record filed with the Board of Election Inspectors of Precinct 10-A of Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte wherein she stated that her
period of residence in said barangay was six (6) months as of the date of her filing of said Voter's Registration Record on January 28,
1995.31 This statement in petitioner's Voter's Registration Record is a non-prejudicial admission. The Constitution requires at least one (1)
year residence in the district in which the candidate shall be elected. In the case at bench, the reference is the First District of Leyte.
Petitioner's statement proved that she resided in Olot six (6) months before January 28, 1995 but did not disprove that she has also resided
in Tacloban City starting 1992. As aforestated, Olot and Tacloban City are both within the First District of Leyte, hence, her six (6) months
residence in Olot should be counted not against, but in her favor. Private respondent also presented petitioner's Certificate of Candidacy filed
on March 8, 199532 where she placed seven (7) months after Item No. 8 which called for information regarding "residence in the
constituency where I seek to be elected immediately preceding the election." Again, this original certificate of candidacy has no evidentiary
value because an March 1, 1995 it was corrected by petitioner. In her Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy,33 petitioner wrote "since
childhood" after Item No. 8. The amendment of a certificate of candidacy to correct a bona fide mistake has been allowed by this Court as a
matter of course and as a matter of right. As we held in Alialy v. COMELEC,34 viz.:
xxx xxx xxx
The absence of the signature of the Secretary of the local chapter N.P in the original certificate of candidacy presented
before the deadline September 11, 1959, did not render the certificate invalid. The amendment of the certificate,
although at a date after the deadline, but before the election, was substantial compliance with the law, and the defect
was cured.
It goes without saying that petitioner's erroneous Certificate of Candidacy filed on March 8, 1995 cannot be used as evidence
against her. Private respondent's petition for the disqualification of petitioner rested alone on these two (2) brittle pieces of
documentary evidence — petitioner's Voter's Registration Record and her original Certificate of Candidacy. Ranged against the
evidence of the petitioner showing her ceaseless contacts with Tacloban, private respondent's two (2) pieces of evidence are too
insufficient to disqualify petitioner, more so, to deny her the right to represent the people of the First District of Leyte who have
overwhelmingly voted for her.
Fifth. Section 10, Article IX-C of the Constitution mandates that "bona fide candidates for any public office shall be free from any form of
harassment and discrimination."35 A detached reading of the records of the case at bench will show that all forms of legal and extra-legal
obstacles have been thrown against petitioner to prevent her from running as the people's representative in the First District of Leyte. In
petitioner's Answer to the petition to disqualify her, she averred:36
xxx xxx xxx
10. Petitioner's (herein private respondent Montejo) motive in filing the instant petition is devious. When respondent
(petitioner herein) announced that she was intending to register as a voter in Tacloban City and run for Congress in the
First District of Leyte, petitioner (Montejo) immediately opposed her intended registration by writing a letter stating that
"she is not a resident of said city but of Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte." (Annex "2" of respondent's affidavit, Annex "2").
After respondent (petitioner herein) had registered as a voter in Tolosa following completion of her six-month actual
residence therein, petitioner (Montejo) filed a petition with the COMELEC to transfer the town of Tolosa from the First
District to the Second District and pursued such move up to the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 118702, his purpose being to
remove respondent (petitioner herein) as petitioner's (Montejo's) opponent in the congressional election in the First
District. He also filed a bill, along with other Leyte Congressmen, seeking to create another legislative district, to remove
the town of Tolosa out of the First District and to make it a part of the new district, to achieve his purpose. However, such
bill did not pass the Senate. Having, failed on such moves, petitioner now filed the instant petition, for the same
objective, as it is obvious that he is afraid to submit himself along with respondent (petitioner herein) for the judgment
and verdict of the electorate of the First District of Leyte in an honest, orderly, peaceful, free and clean elections on May
8, 1995.
These allegations which private respondent did not challenge were not lost
to the perceptive eye of Commissioner Maambong who in his Dissenting Opinion,37 held:
xxx xxx xxx
Prior to the registration date — January 28, 1995 the petitioner (herein private respondent Montejo) wrote the Election
Officer of Tacloban City not to allow respondent (petitioner herein) to register thereat since she is a resident of Tolosa
and not Tacloban City. The purpose of this move of the petitioner (Montejo) is not lost to ( sic) the Commission. In UND
No. 95-001 (In the matter of the Legislative Districts of the Provinces of Leyte, Iloilo, and South Cotabato, Out of Which
the New Provinces of Biliran, Guimaras and Saranggani Were Respectively Created), . . . Hon. Cirilo Roy G. Montejo,
Representative, First District of Leyte, wanted the Municipality of Tolosa, in the First District of Leyte, transferred to the
Second District of Leyte. The Hon. Sergio A.F. Apostol, Representative of the Second District of Leyte, opposed the
move of the petitioner (Montejo). Under Comelec Resolution No. 2736 (December 29, 1994), the Commission on
Elections refused to make the proposed transfer. Petitioner (Montejo) filed "Motion for Reconsideration of Resolution
No. 2736" which the Commission denied in a Resolution promulgated on February 1, 1995. Petitioner (Montejo) filed a
petition for certiorari before the Honorable Supreme Court (Cirilo Roy G. Montejo vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.
118702) questioning the resolution of the Commission. Believing that he could get a favorable ruling from the Supreme
Court, petitioner (Montejo) tried to make sure that the respondent (petitioner herein) will register as a voter in Tolosa so
that she will be forced to run as Representative not in the First but in the Second District.
It did not happen. On March 16, 1995, the Honorable Supreme Court unanimously promulgated a " Decision," penned by
Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno, the dispositive portion of which reads:
IN VIEW WHEREOF, Section 1 of Resolution No. 2736 insofar as it transferred the municipality of
Capoocan of the Second District and the municipality of Palompon of the Fourth District to the Third
District of the province of Leyte, is annulled and set aside. We also deny the Petition praying for the
transfer of the municipality of Tolosa from the First District to the Second District of the province of
Leyte. No costs.
Petitioner's (Montejo's) plan did not work. But the respondent (petitioner herein) was constrained to register in the
Municipality of Tolosa where her house is instead of Tacloban City, her domicile. In any case, both Tacloban City and
Tolosa are in the First Legislative District.
All these attempts to misuse our laws and legal processes are forms of rank harassments and invidious discriminations against
 petitioner to deny her equal access to a public office. We cannot commit any hermeneutic violence to the Constitution by torturing
the meaning of equality, the end result of which will allow the harassment and discrimination of petitioner who has lived a
controversial life, a past of alternating light and shadow. There is but one Constitution for all Filipinos. Petitioner cannot be
adjudged by a "different" Constitution, and the worst way to interpret the Constitution is to inject in its interpretation, bile and
bitterness.
Sixth. In Gallego v. Vera,38 we explained that the reason for this residence requirement is "to exclude a stranger or newcomer,
unacquainted, with the conditions and needs of a community and not identified with the latter, from an elective office to serve that
community . . . ." Petitioner's lifetime contacts with the First District of Leyte cannot be contested. Nobody can claim that she is not
acquainted with its problems because she is a stranger to the place. None can argue she cannot satisfy the intent of the Constitution.
Seventh. In resolving election cases, a dominant consideration is the need to effectuate the will of the electorate. The election results show
that petitioner received Seventy Thousand Four Hundred Seventy-one (70,471) votes, while private respondent got only Thirty-Six Thousand
Eight Hundred Thirty-Three (36,833) votes. Petitioner is clearly the overwhelming choice of the electorate of the First District of Leyte and
this is not a sleight of statistics. We cannot frustrate this sovereign will on highly arguable technical considerations. In case of doubt, we
should lean towards a rule that will give life to the people's political judgment.
A final point. The case at bench provides the Court with the rare opportunity to rectify the inequality of status between women and men by
rejecting the iniquitous common law precedents on the domicile of married women and by redefining domicile in accord with our own culture,
law, and Constitution. To rule that a married woman is eternally tethered to the domicile dictated by her dead husband is to preserve the
anachronistic and anomalous balance of advantage of a husband over his wife. We should not allow the dead to govern the living even if the
glories of yesteryears seduce us to shout long live the dead! The Family Code buried this gender-based discrimination against married
women and we should not excavate what has been entombed. More importantly, the Constitution forbids it.
I vote to grant the petition.
Bellosillo and Melo, JJ., concur.
FRANCISCO, J., concurring:
I concur with Mr. Justice Kapunan's ponencia finding petitioner qualified for the position of Representative of the First Congressional District
of Leyte. I wish, however, to express a few comments on the issue of petitioner's domicile.
Domicile has been defined as that place in which a person's habitation is fixed, without any present intention of removing therefrom, and that
place is properly the domicile of a person in which he has voluntarily fixed his abode, or habitation, not for a mere special or temporary
purpose, but with a present intention of making it his permanent home (28 C.J.S. §1). It denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when
absent for business, or pleasure, or for like reasons one intends to return, and depends on facts and circumstances, in the sense that they
disclose intent. (Ong Huan Tin v. Republic, 19 SCRA 966, 969)
Domicile is classified into domicile of origin and domicile of choice. The law attributes to every individual a domicile of origin, which is the
domicile of his parents, or of the head of his family, or of the person on whom he is legally dependent at the time of his birth. While the
domicile of origin is generally the place where one is born or reared, it maybe elsewhere (28 C.J.S. §5). Domicile of choice, on the other
hand, is the place which the person has elected and chosen for himself to displace his previous domicile; it has for its true basis or
foundation the intention of the person (28 C.J.S. §6). In order to hold that a person has abandoned his domicile and acquired a new one
called domicile of choice, the following requisites must concur, namely, (a) residence or bodily presence in the new locality, (b) intention to
remain there or animus manendi, and (c) an intention to abandon the old domicile or animus non revertendi (Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7,
Tacloban City, 226 SCRA 408, 415). A third classification is domicile by operation of law which attributes to a person a domicile independent
of his own intention or actual residence, ordinarily resulting from legal domestic relations, as that of the wife arising from marriage, or the
relation of a parent and a child (28 C.J.S. §7).
In election law, when our Constitution speaks of residence for election purposes it means domicile (Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of
Representatives, 199 SCRA 692, 713; Nuval v. Guray, 52 Phil. 645, 651). To my mind, public respondent Commission on Elections
misapplied this concept, of domicile which led to petitioner's disqualification by ruling that petitioner failed to comply with the constitutionally
mandated one-year residence requirement. Apparently, public respondent Commission deemed as conclusive petitioner's stay and
registration as voter in many places as conduct disclosing her intent to abandon her established domicile of origin in Tacloban, Leyte. In
several decisions, though, the Court has laid down the rule that registration of a voter in a place other than his place of origin is not sufficient
to constitute abandonment or loss of such residence (Faypon v. Quirino, 96 Phil. 294, 300). Respondent Commission offered no cogent
reason to depart from this rule except to surmise petitioner's intent of abandoning her domicile of origin.
It has been suggested that petitioner's domicile of origin was supplanted by a new domicile due to her marriage, a domicile by operation of
law. The proposition is that upon the death of her husband in 1989 she retains her husband's domicile, i.e., Batac, Ilocos Norte, until she
makes an actual change thereof. I find this proposition quite untenable.
Tacloban, Leyte, is petitioner's domicile of origin which was involuntarily supplanted with another, i.e., Batac, Ilocos Norte, upon her marriage
in 1954 with then Congressman Marcos. By legal fiction she followed the domicile of her husband. In my view, the reason for the law is for
the spouses to fully and effectively perform their marital duties and obligations to one another. 1 The question of domicile, however, is not
affected by the fact that it was the legal or moral duty of the individual to reside in a given place (28 C.J.S. §11). Thus, while the wife retains
her marital domicile so long as the marriage subsists, she automatically loses it upon the latter's termination, for the reason behind the law
then ceases. Otherwise, petitioner, after her marriage was ended by the death of her husband, would be placed in a quite absurd and unfair
situation of having been freed from all wifely obligations yet made to hold on to one which no longer serves any meaningful purpose.
It is my view therefore that petitioner reverted to her original domicile of Tacloban, Leyte upon her husband's death without even signifying
her intention to that effect. It is for the private respondent to prove, not for petitioner to disprove, that petitioner has effectively abandoned
Tacloban, Leyte for Batac, Ilocos Norte or for some other place/s. The clear rule is that it is the party (herein private respondent) claiming that
a person has abandoned or lost his residence of origin who must show and prove preponderantly such abandonment or loss (Faypon v.
Quirino, supra at 298; 28 C.J.S. §16), because the presumption is strongly in favor of an original or former domicile, as against an acquired
one (28 C.J.S. §16). Private respondent unfortunately failed to discharge this burden as the record is devoid of convincing proof that
petitioner has acquired whether voluntarily or involuntarily, a new domicile to replace her domicile of origin.
The records, on the contrary, clearly show that petitioner has complied with the constitutional one-year residence requirement. After her exile
abroad, she returned to the Philippines in 1991 to reside in Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, but the Presidential Commission on Good Government which
sequestered her residential house and other properties forbade her necessitating her transient stay in various places in Manila (Affidavit p.6,
attached as Annex I of the Petition). In 1992, she ran for the position of president writing in her certificate of candidacy her residence as San
Juan, Metro Manila. After her loss therein, she went back to Tacloban City, acquired her residence certificate2 and resided with her brother in
San Jose. She resided in San Jose, Tacloban City until August of 1994 when she was allowed by the PCGG to move and reside in her
sequestered residential house in Olot, Tolosa, Leyte (Annex I, p. 6).3 It was in the same month of August when she applied for the
cancellation of her previous registration in San Juan, Metro Manila in order to register anew as voter of Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, which she did on
January 28, 1995. From this sequence of events, I find it quite improper to use as the reckoning period of the one-year residence
requirement the date when she applied for the cancellation of her previous registration in San Juan, Metro Manila. The fact which private
respondent never bothered to disprove is that petitioner transferred her residence after the 1992 presidential election from San Juan, Metro
Manila to San Jose, Tacloban City, and resided therein until August of 1994. She later transferred to Olot, Tolosa, Leyte (Annex I, p. 7). It
appearing that both Tacloban City and Tolosa, Leyte are within the First Congressional District of Leyte, it indubitably stands that she had
more than a year of residence in the constituency she sought to be elected. Petitioner, therefore, has satisfactorily complied with the one-
year qualification required by the 1987 Constitution.
I vote to grant the petition.
ROMERO, J., separate opinion:
Petitioner has appealed to this Court for relief after the COMELEC ruled that she was disqualified from running for Representative of her
District and that, in the event that she should, nevertheless, muster a majority vote, her proclamation should be suspended. Not by a
straightforward ruling did the COMELEC pronounce its decision as has been its unvarying practice in the past, but by a startling succession
of "reverse somersaults." Indicative of its shifting stance vis-a-vis petitioner's certificate of candidacy were first, the action of its Second
Division disqualifying her and canceling her original Certificate of Candidacy by a vote of 2-1 on April 24, 1995; then the denial by the
COMELEC en banc of her Motion for Reconsideration on May 7, 1995, a day before the election; then because she persisted in running, its
decision on
May 11, 1995 or three days after the election, allowing her proclamation in the event that the results of the canvass should show that she
obtained the highest number of votes (obviously noting that petitioner had won overwhelmingly over her opponent), but almost
simultaneously reversing itself by directing that even if she wins, her proclamation should nonetheless be suspended.
Crucial to the resolution of the disqualification issue presented by the case at bench is the interpretation to be given to the one-year
residency requirement imposed by the Constitution on aspirants for a Congressional seat.1
Bearing in mind that the term "resident" has been held to be synonymous with "domicile" for election purposes, it is important to determine
whether petitioner's domicile was in the First District of Leyte and if so, whether she had resided there for at least a period of one year.
Undisputed is her domicile of origin, Tacloban, where her parents lived at the time of her birth. Depending on what theory one adopts, the
same may have been changed when she married Ferdinand E. Marcos, then domiciled in Batac, by operation of law. Assuming it did, his
death certainly released her from the obligation to live with him at the residence fixed by him during his lifetime. What may confuse the
layman at this point is the fact that the term "domicile" may refer to "domicile of origin," "domicile of choice," or "domicile by operation of law,"
which subject we shall not belabor since it has been amply discussed by the ponente and in the other separate opinions.
In any case, what assumes relevance is the divergence of legal opinion as to the effect of the husband's death on the domicile of the widow.
Some scholars opine that the widow's domicile remains unchanged; that the deceased husband's wishes perforce still bind the wife he has
left behind. Given this interpretation, the widow cannot possibly go far enough to sever the domiciliary tie imposed by her husband.
It is bad enough to interpret the law as empowering the husband unilaterally to fix the residence or domicile of the family, as laid down in the
Civil Code,2 but to continue giving obeisance to his wishes even after the rationale underlying the mutual duty of the spouses to live together
has ceased, is to close one's eyes to the stark realities of the present.
At the other extreme is the position that the widow automatically reverts to her domicile of origin upon the demise of her husband. Does the
law so abhor a vacuum that the widow has to be endowed somehow with a domicile? To answer this question which is far from rhetorical,
one will have to keep in mind the basic principles of domicile. Everyone must have a domicile. Then one must have only a single domicile for
the same purpose at any given time. Once established, a domicile remains until a new one is acquired, for no person lives who has no
domicile, as defined by the law be is subject to.
At this juncture, we are confronted with an unexplored legal terrain in this jurisdiction, rendered more murky by the conflicting opinions of
foreign legal authorities. This being the state of things, it is imperative as it is opportune to illumine the darkness with the beacon light of
truth, as dictated by experience and the necessity of according petitioner her right to choose her domicile in keeping with the enlightened
global trend to recognize and protect the human rights of women, no less than men.
Admittedly, the notion of placing women at par with men, insofar as civil, political and social rights are concerned, is a relatively recent
phenomenon that took seed only in the middle of this century. It is a historical fact that for over three centuries, the Philippines had been
colonized by Spain, a conservative, Catholic country which transplanted to our shores the Old World cultures, mores and attitudes and
values. Through the imposition on our government of the Spanish Civil Code in 1889, the people, both men and women, had no choice but to
accept such concepts as the husband's being the head of the family and the wife's subordination to his authority. In such role, his was the
right to make vital decisions for the family. Many instances come to mind, foremost being what is related to the issue before us, namely, that
"the husband shall fix the residence of the family." 3 Because he is made responsible for the support of the wife and the rest of the family, 4
he is also empowered to be the administrator of the conjugal property, with a few exceptions 5 and may, therefore, dispose of the
conjugal partnership property for the purposes specified under the law;6 whereas, as a general rule, the wife cannot bind the
conjugal partnership without the husband's consent.7 As regards the property pertaining to the children under parental authority,
the father is the legal administrator and only in his absence may the mother assume his powers.8 Demeaning to the wife's dignity
are certain strictures on her personal freedoms, practically relegating her to the position of minors and disabled persons. To
illustrate a few: The wife cannot, without the husband's consent, acquire any gratuitous title, except from her ascendants,
descendants, parents-in-law, and collateral relatives within the fourth degree.9 With respect to her employment, the husband
wields a veto power in the case the wife exercises her profession or occupation or engages in business, provided his income is
sufficient for the family, according to its social standing and his opposition is founded on serious and valid grounds. 10 Most
offensive, if not repulsive, to the liberal-minded is the effective prohibition upon a widow to get married till after three hundred
days following the death of her husband, unless in the meantime, she has given birth to a child. 11 The mother who contracts a
subsequent marriage loses the parental authority over her children, unless the deceased husband, father of the latter, has
expressly provided in his will that his widow might marry again, and has ordered that in such case she should keep and exercise
parental authority over their children. 12 Again, an instance of a husband's overarching influence from beyond the grave.
All these indignities and disabilities suffered by Filipino wives for hundreds of years evoked no protest from them until the
concept of human rights and equality between and among nations and individuals found hospitable lodgment in the United
Nations Charter of which the Philippines was one of the original signatories. By then, the Spanish "conquistadores" had been
overthrown by the American forces at the turn of the century. The bedrock of the U.N. Charter was firmly anchored on this credo:
"to reaffirm faith in the fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and
women." (Emphasis supplied)
It took over thirty years before these egalitarian doctrines bore fruit, owing largely to the burgeoning of the feminist
movement. What may be regarded as the international bill of rights for women was implanted in the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) adopted by the U.N. General Assembly which
entered into force as an international treaty on September 3, 1981. In ratifying the instrument, the Philippines bound itself
to implement its liberating spirit and letter, for its Constitution, no less, declared that "The Philippines. . . adopts the
generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace,
equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity with all nations." 13 One such principle embodied in the CEDAW is
granting to men and women "the same rights with regard to the law relating to the movement of persons and the freedom
to choose their residence and domicile." 14 (Emphasis supplied).
CEDAW's pro-women orientation which was not lost on Filipino women was reflected in the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines
and later, in the Family Code, 15 both of which were speedily approved by the first lady President of the country, Corazon C.
Aquino. Notable for its emphasis on the human rights of all individuals and its bias for equality between the sexes are the
following provisions: "The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights" 16 and
"The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and shall ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women
and men."17
A major accomplishment of women in their quest for equality with men and the elimination of discriminatory provisions of law was the
deletion in the Family Code of almost all of the unreasonable strictures on wives and the grant to them of personal rights equal to that of their
husbands. Specifically, the husband and wife are now given the right jointly to fix the family domicile;18 concomitant to the spouses' being
jointly responsible for the support of the family is the right and duty of both spouses to manage the household;19 the administration and the
enjoyment of the community property shall belong to both spouses jointly;20 the father and mother shall now jointly exercise legal
guardianship over the property of their unemancipated common child21 and several others.
Aware of the hiatus and continuing gaps in the law, insofar as women's rights are concerned, Congress passed a law popularly known as
"Women in Development and Nation Building Act"22 Among the rights given to married women evidencing their capacity to act in contracts
equal to that of men are:
(1) Women shall have the capacity to borrow and obtain loans and execute security and credit arrangements under the same conditions as
men;
(2) Women shall have equal access to all government and private sector programs granting agricultural credit, loans and non material
resources and shall enjoy equal treatment in agrarian reform and land resettlement programs;
(3) Women shall have equal rights to act as incorporators and enter into insurance contracts; and
(4) Married women shall have rights equal to those of married men in applying for passports, secure visas and other travel documents,
without need to secure the consent of their spouses.
As the world draws the curtain on the Fourth World Conference of Women in Beijing, let this Court now be the first to respond to its clarion
call that "Women's Rights are Human Rights" and that "All obstacles to women's full participation in decision-making at all levels, including
the family" should be removed. Having been herself a Member of the Philippine Delegation to the International Women's Year Conference in
Mexico in 1975, this writer is only too keenly aware of the unremitting struggle being waged by women the world over, Filipino women not
excluded, to be accepted as equals of men and to tear down the walls of discrimination that hold them back from their proper places under
the sun.
In light of the inexorable sweep of events, local and global, legislative, executive and judicial, according more rights to women hitherto
denied them and eliminating whatever pockets of discrimination still exist in their civil, political and social life, can it still be insisted that
widows are not at liberty to choose their domicile upon the death of their husbands but must retain the same, regardless?
I submit that a widow, like the petitioner and others similarly situated, can no longer be bound by the domicile of the departed husband, if at
all she was before. Neither does she automatically revert to her domicile of origin, but exercising free will, she may opt to reestablish her
domicile of origin. In returning to Tacloban and subsequently, to Barangay Olot, Tolosa, both of which are located in the First District of Leyte,
petitioner amply demonstrated by overt acts, her election of a domicile of choice, in this case, a reversion to her domicile of origin. Added
together, the time when she set up her domicile in the two places sufficed to meet the one-year requirement to run as Representative of the
First District of Leyte.
In view of the foregoing expatiation, I vote to GRANT the petition.
VITUG, J., separate opinion:
The case at bench deals with explicit Constitutional mandates.
The Constitution is not a pliable instrument. It is a bedrock in our legal system that sets up ideals and directions and render steady our
strides hence. It only looks back so as to ensure that mistakes in the past are not repeated. A compliant transience of a constitution belittles
its basic function and weakens its goals. A constitution may well become outdated by the realities of time. When it does, it must be changed
but while it remains, we owe it respect and allegiance. Anarchy, open or subtle, has never been, nor must it ever be, the answer to perceived
transitory needs, let alone societal attitudes, or the Constitution might lose its very essence.
Constitutional provisions must be taken to be mandatory in character unless, either by express statement or by necessary implication, a
different intention is manifest (see Marcelino vs. Cruz, 121 SCRA 51).
The two provisions initially brought to focus are Section 6 and Section 17 of Article VI of the fundamental law. These provisions read:
Sec. 6. No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least twenty-five years of age, able to read and write, and, except the
party-list representatives, a registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period
of not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the election.
Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral
Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by
the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case
may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or
organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall
be its Chairman.
The Commission on Election (the "COMELEC") is constitutionally bound to enforce and administer "all laws and regulations relative to the
conduct of election . . ." (Art. IX, C, Sec. 2, Constitution) that, there being nothing said to the contrary, should include its authority to pass
upon the qualification and disqualification prescribed by law of candidates to an elective office. Indeed, pre-proclamation controversies are
expressly placed under the COMELEC's jurisdiction to hear and resolve (Art. IX, C, Sec. 3, Constitution).
The matter before us specifically calls for the observance of the constitutional one-year residency requirement. The issue (whether or not
there is here such compliance), to my mind, is basically a question of fact or at least inextricably linked to such determination. The findings
and judgment of the COMELEC, in accordance with the long established rule and subject only to a number of exceptions under the basic
heading of "grave abuse of discretion," are not reviewable by this Court.
I do not find much need to do a complex exercise on what seems to me to be a plain matter. Generally, the term "residence" has a broader
connotation that may mean permanent (domicile), official (place where one's official duties may require him to stay) or temporary (the place
where he sojourns during a considerable length of time). For civil law purposes, i.e., as regards the exercise of civil rights and the fulfillment
of civil obligations, the domicile of a natural person is the place of his habitual residence (see Article 50, Civil Code). In election cases, the
controlling rule is that heretofore announced by this Court in Romualdez vs. Regional Trial Court, Branch 7, Tacloban City (226 SCRA 408,
409); thus:
In election cases, the Court treats domicile and residence as synonymous terms, thus: "(t)he term "residence" as used in
the election law is synonymous with "domicile," which imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also
personal presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention." "Domicile" denotes a fixed permanent
residence to which when absent for business or pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends to return. . . . . Residence thus
acquired, however, may be lost by adopting another choice of domicile. In order, in turn, to acquire a new domicile by
choice, there must concur (1) residence or bodily presence in the new locality, (2) an intention to remain there, and (3) an
intention to abandon the old domicile. In other words, there must basically be animus manendi coupled with animus non
revertendi. The purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the change of
residence must be voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must be actual.
Using the above tests, I am not convinced that we can charge the COMELEC with having committed grave abuse of discretion in
its assailed resolution.
The COMELEC's jurisdiction, in the case of congressional elections, ends when the jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunal concerned begins. It
signifies that the protestee must have theretofore been duly proclaimed and has since become a "member" of the Senate or the House of
Representatives. The question can be asked on whether or not the proclamation of a candidate is just a ministerial function of the
Commission on Elections dictated solely on the number of votes cast in an election exercise. I believe, it is not. A ministerial duty is an
obligation the performance of which, being adequately defined, does not allow the use of further judgment or discretion. The COMELEC, in
its particular case, is tasked with the full responsibility of ascertaining all the facts and conditions such as may be required by law before a
proclamation is properly done.
The Court, on its part, should, in my view at least, refrain from any undue encroachment on the ultimate exercise of authority by the Electoral
Tribunals on matters which, by no less than a constitutional fiat, are explicitly within their exclusive domain. The nagging question, if it were
otherwise, would be the effect of the Court's peremptory pronouncement on the ability of the Electoral Tribunal to later come up with its own
judgment in a contest "relating to the election, returns and qualification" of its members.
Prescinding from all the foregoing, I should like to next touch base on the applicability to this case of Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6646, in
relation to Section 72 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, each providing thusly:
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6646
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. — Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall
not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final
judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such
election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and, upon
motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation
of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.
BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 881
 xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 72. Effects of disqualification cases and priority. — The Commission and the courts shall give priority to cases of
disqualification by reason of violation of this Act to the end that a final decision shall be rendered not later than seven
days before the election in which the disqualification is sought.
Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for
him shall not be counted. Nevertheless, if for any reason, a candidate is not declared by final, judgment before an
election to be disqualified, and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, his violation of
the provisions of the preceding sections shall not prevent his proclamation and assumption to office.
I realize that in considering the significance of the law, it may be preferable to look for not so much the specific instances they ostensibly
would cover as the principle they clearly convey. Thus, I will not scoff at the argument that it should be sound to say that votes cast in favor
of the disqualified candidate, whenever ultimately declared as such, should not be counted in his or her favor and must accordingly be
considered to be stray votes. The argument, nevertheless, is far outweighed by the rationale of the now prevailing doctrine first enunciated in
the case of Topacio vs. Paredes (23 Phil. 238 [1912]) which, although later abandoned in Ticzon vs. Comelec (103 SCRA 687 [1981]), and
Santos vs. COMELEC (137 SCRA 740 [1985]), was restored, along with the interim case of Geronimo vs. Ramos (136 SCRA 435 [1985]), by
the Labo (176 SCRA 1 (1989]), Abella (201 SCRA 253 [1991]), Labo (211 SCRA 297 [1992]) and, most recently, Benito (235 SCRA 436
[1994]) rulings. Benito vs. Comelec was a unanimous decision penned by Justice Kapunan and concurred in by Chief Justice Narvasa,
Justices Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Romero, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug and Mendoza (Justices Cruz and Bellosillo were
on official leave). For easy reference, let me quote from the first Labo decision:
Finally, there is the question of whether or not the private respondent, who filed the quo warranto petition, can replace
the petitioner as mayor. He cannot. The simple reason is that as he obtained only the second highest number of votes in
the election, he was obviously not the choice of the people of Baguio City.
The latest ruling of the Court on this issue is Santos v. Commission on Elections, (137 SCRA 740) decided in 1985. In
that case, the candidate who placed second was proclaimed elected after the votes for his winning rival, who was
disqualified as a turncoat and considered a non-candidate, were all disregard as stray. In effect, the second placer won
by default. That decision was supported by eight members of the Court then, (Cuevas, J., ponente, with Makasiar,
Concepcion, Jr., Escolin, Relova, De la Fuente, Alampay and Aquino, JJ., concurring.) with three dissenting (Teehankee,
Acting C.J., Abad Santos and Melencio-Herrera, JJ.) and another two reserving their vote. (Plana and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ.)
One was on official leave. (Fernando, C.J.)
Re-examining that decision, the Court finds, and so holds, that it should be reversed in favor of the earlier case of
Geronimo v. Ramos, (136 SCRA 435) which represents the more logical and democratic rule. That case, which
reiterated the doctrine first announced in 1912 in Topacio v. Paredes, (23 Phil. 238) was supported by ten members of
the Court, (Gutierrez, Jr., ponente, with Teehankee, Abad Santos, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin, Relova, De la
Fuente, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concurring) without any dissent, although one reserved his vote, (Makasiar, J.)
another took no part, (Aquino, J.) and two others were on leave. (Fernando, C.J. and Concepcion, Jr., J.) There the
Court held:
. . . it would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the constitutionally guaranteed right to
suffrage if a candidate who has not acquired the majority or plurality of votes is proclaimed a winner
and imposed as the representative of a constituency, the majority of which have positively declared
through their ballots that they do not choose him.
Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who have received the highest
number of votes cast in the election for that office, and it is a fundamental idea in all republican forms
of government that no one can be declared elected and no measure can be declared carried unless
he or it receives a majority or plurality of the legal votes cast in the election. (20 Corpus Juris 2nd, S
243, p. 676.)
The fact that the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is later declared to be disqualified or not eligible
for the office to which he was elected does not necessarily entitle the candidate who obtained the second highest
number of votes to be declared the winner of the elective office. The votes cast for a dead, disqualified, or non-eligible
person may not be valid to vote the winner into office or maintain him there. However, in the absence of a statute which
clearly asserts a contrary political and legislative policy on the matter, if the votes were cast in the sincere belief that the
candidate was alive, qualified, or eligible, they should not be treated as stray, void or meaningless. (at pp. 20-21)
Considering all the foregoing, I am constrained to vote for the dismissal of the petition.
MENDOZA, J., separate opinion:
In my view the issue in this case is whether the Commission on Elections has the power to disqualify candidates on the ground that they lack
eligibility for the office to which they seek to be elected. I think that it has none and that the qualifications of candidates may be questioned
only in the event they are elected, by filing a petition for quo warranto or an election protest in the appropriate forum, not necessarily in the
COMELEC but, as in this case, in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal. That the parties in this case took part in the proceedings
in the COMELEC is of no moment. Such proceedings were unauthorized and were not rendered valid by their agreement to submit their
dispute to that body.
The various election laws will be searched in vain for authorized proceedings for determining a candidate's qualifications for an office before
his election. There are none in the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881), in the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987 (R.A. No. 6646), or in the
law providing for synchronized elections (R.A. No. 7166). There are, in other words, no provisions for pre-proclamation contests but only
election protests or quo warranto proceedings against winning candidates.
To be sure, there are provisions denominated for "disqualification," but they are not concerned with a declaration of the ineligibility of a
candidate. These provisions are concerned with the incapacity (due to insanity, incompetence or conviction of an offense) of a person either
to be a candidate or to continue as a candidate for public office. There is also a provision for the denial or cancellation of certificates of
candidacy, but it applies only to cases involving false representations as to certain matters required by law to be stated in the certificates.
These provisions are found in the following parts of the Omnibus Election Code:
§ 12. Disqualifications. — Any person who has been declared by competent authority insane or incompetent, or has
been sentenced by final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion or for any offense for which he has been
sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be
a candidate and to hold any office, unless he has been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty.
The disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be deemed removed upon the declaration by competent
authority that said insanity or incompetence had been removed or after the expiration of a period of five years from his
service of sentence, unless within the same period he again becomes disqualified. (Emphasis added)
§ 68. Disqualifications. — Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is a party is declared by final decision of
a competent court guilty of, or found by the Commission of having (a) given money or other material consideration to
influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials performing electoral functions; (b) committed acts of terrorism to
enhance his candidacy; (c) spent in his election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by this Code; (d)
solicited, received or made any contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; or (e) violated any of
Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, sub-paragraph 6, shall be disqualified from continuing as
a candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding the office. Any person who is a permanent resident of or an
immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office under this Code, unless said person has
waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the residence requirement
provided for in the election laws. (Emphasis added)
§ 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of
candidacy. — A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by any
person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof
is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of
candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election. (Emphasis
added)
the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987 (R.A. No. 6646):
§ 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. — Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall
not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final
judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such
election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and; upon
motion for the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation
of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong. (Emphasis added).
§ 7. Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel a Certificate of Candidacy. — The procedure hereinabove provided shall
apply to petitions to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy as provided in Section 78 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 881.
and the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160):
§ 40. Disqualifications. — The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local position:
(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable by one (1)
year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence;
(b) Those removed from office as a result of on administrative case;
(c) Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of allegiance to the Republic;
(d) Those with dual citizenship;
(e) Fugitive from justice in criminal or nonpolitical cases here or abroad;
(f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired the right to reside abroad and continue to avail
of the same right after the effectivity of this Code; and
(g) The insane or feeble-minded.
The petition filed by private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo in the COMELEC, while entitled "For Cancellation and Disqualification," contained
no allegation that private respondent Imelda Romualdez-Marcos made material representations in her certificate of candidacy which were
false, it sought her disqualification on the ground that "on the basis of her Voter Registration Record and Certificate of Candidacy, [she] is
disqualified from running for the position of Representative, considering that on election day, May 8, 1995, [she] would have resided less
than ten (10) months in the district where she is seeking to be elected." For its part, the COMELEC's Second Division, in its resolution of April
24, 1995, cancelled her certificate of candidacy and corrected certificate of candidacy on the basis of its finding that petitioner is "not
qualified to run for the position of Member of the House of Representatives for the First Legislative District of Leyte" and not because of any
finding that she had made false representations as to material matters in her certificate of candidacy.
Montejo's petition before the COMELEC was therefore not a petition for cancellation of certificate of candidacy under § 78 of the Omnibus
Election Code, but essentially a petition to declare private respondent ineligible. It is important to note this, because, as will presently be
explained, proceedings under § 78 have for their purpose to disqualify a person from being a candidate, whereas quo warranto proceedings
have for their purpose to disqualify a person from holding public office. Jurisdiction over quo warranto proceedings involving members of the
House of Representatives is vested in the Electoral Tribunal of that body.
Indeed, in the only cases in which this Court dealt with petitions for the cancellation of certificates of candidacy, the allegations were that the
respondent candidates had made false representations in their certificates of candidacy with regard to their citizenship,1 age,2 or
residence.3 But in the generality of cases in which this Court passed upon the qualifications of respondents for office, this Court did so in the
context of election protests4 or quo warranto proceedings5 filed after the proclamation of the respondents or protestees as winners.
Three reasons may be cited to explain the absence of an authorized proceeding for determining before election the qualifications of a
candidate.
First is the fact that unless a candidate wins and is proclaimed elected, there is no necessity for determining his eligibility for the office. In
contrast, whether an individual should be disqualified as a candidate for acts constituting election offenses (e.g., vote buying, over spending,
commission of prohibited acts) is a prejudicial question which should be determined lest he wins because of the very acts for which his
disqualification is being sought. That is why it is provided that if the grounds for disqualification are established, a candidate will not be voted
for; if he has been voted for, the votes in his favor will not be counted; and if for some reason he has been voted for and he has won, either
he will not be proclaimed or his proclamation will be set aside.6
Second is the fact that the determination of a candidate's eligibility, e.g., his citizenship or, as in this case, his domicile, may take a long time
to make, extending beyond the beginning of the term of the office. This is amply demonstrated in the companion case (G.R. No. 120265,
Agapito A. Aquino v. COMELEC) where the determination of Aquino's residence was still pending in the COMELEC even after the elections
of May 8, 1995. This is contrary to the summary character of proceedings relating to certificates of candidacy. That is why the law makes the
receipt of certificates of candidacy a ministerial duty of the COMELEC and its officers.7 The law is satisfied if candidates state in their
certificates of candidacy that they are eligible for the position which they seek to fill, leaving the determination of their qualifications to be
made after the election and only in the event they are elected. Only in cases involving charges of false representations made in certificates
of candidacy is the COMELEC given jurisdiction.
Third is the policy underlying the prohibition against pre-proclamation cases in elections for President, Vice President, Senators and
members of the House of Representatives. (R.A. No. 7166, § 15) The purpose is to preserve the prerogatives of the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal and the other Tribunals as "sole judges" under the Constitution of the election, returns and qualifications
of members of Congress or of the President and Vice President, as the case may be.
By providing in § 253 for the remedy of quo warranto for determining an elected official's qualifications after the results of elections are
proclaimed, while being conspicuously silent about a pre-proclamation remedy based on the same ground, the Omnibus Election Code, or
OEC, by its silence underscores the policy of not authorizing any inquiry into the qualifications of candidates unless they have been elected.
Apparently realizing the lack of an authorized proceeding for declaring the ineligibility of candidates, the COMELEC amended its rules on
February 15, 1993 so as to provide in Rule 25, § 1 the following:
Grounds for disqualification. — Any candidate who does not possess all the qualifications of a candidate as provided for
by the Constitution or by existing law or who commits any act declared by law to be grounds for disqualification may be
disqualified from continuing as a candidate.
The lack of provision for declaring the ineligibility of candidates, however, cannot be supplied by a mere rule. Such an act is equivalent to the
creation of a cause of action which is a substantive matter which the COMELEC, in the exercise of its rulemaking power under Art. IX, A, § 6
of the Constitution, cannot do. It is noteworthy that the Constitution withholds from the COMELEC even the power to decide cases involving
the right to vote, which essentially involves an inquiry into qualifications based on age, residence and citizenship of voters. (Art. IX, C, § 2(3))
The assimilation in Rule 25 of the COMELEC rules of grounds for ineligibility into grounds for disqualification is contrary to the evident
intention of the law. For not only in their grounds but also in their consequences are proceedings for "disqualification" different from those for
a declaration of "ineligibility." "Disqualification" proceedings, as already stated, are based on grounds specified in §§ 12 and 68 of the
Omnibus Election Code and in § 40 of the Local Government Code and are for the purpose of barring an individual from becoming a
candidate or from continuing as a candidate for public office. In a word, their purpose is to eliminate a candidate from the race either from the
start or during its progress. "Ineligibility," on the other hand, refers to the lack of the qualifications prescribed in the Constitution or the
statutes for holding public office and the purpose of the proceedings for declaration of ineligibility is to remove the incumbent from office.
Consequently, that an individual possesses the qualifications for a public office does not imply that he is not disqualified from becoming a
candidate or continuing as a candidate for a public office and vice versa. We have this sort of dichotomy in our Naturalization Law. (C.A. No.
473) That an alien has the qualifications prescribed in § 2 of the law does not imply that he does not suffer from any of disqualifications
provided in § 4.
Indeed, provisions for disqualifications on the ground that the candidate is guilty of prohibited election practices or offenses, like other pre-
proclamation remedies, are aimed at the detestable practice of "grabbing the proclamation and prolonging the election protest,"8 through the
use of "manufactured" election returns or resort to other trickery for the purpose of altering the results of the election. This rationale does not
apply to cases for determining a candidate's qualifications for office before the election. To the contrary, it is the candidate against whom a
proceeding for disqualification is brought who could be prejudiced because he could be prevented from assuming office even though in end
he prevails.
To summarize, the declaration of ineligibility of a candidate may only be sought in an election protest or action for quo warranto filed pursuant
to § 253 of the Omnibus Election Code within 10 days after his proclamation. With respect to elective local officials (e.g., Governor, Vice
Governor, members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, etc.) such petition must be filed either with the COMELEC, the Regional Trial Courts,
or Municipal Trial Courts, as provided in Art. IX, C, § 2(2) of the Constitution. In the case of the President and Vice President, the petition
must be filed with the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (Art. VII, § 4, last paragraph), and in the case of the Senators, with the Senate Electoral
Tribunal, and in the case of Congressmen, with the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal. (Art. VI, § 17) There is greater reason for
not allowing before the election the filing of disqualification proceedings based on alleged ineligibility in the case of candidates for President,
Vice President, Senators and members of the House of Representatives, because of the same policy prohibiting the filing of pre-
proclamation cases against such candidates.
For these reasons, I am of the opinion that the COMELEC had no jurisdiction over SPA No. 95-009; that its proceedings in that case,
including its questioned orders, are void; and that the eligibility of petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos for the office of Representative of the
First District of Leyte may only be inquired into by the HRET.
Accordingly, I vote to grant the petition and to annul the proceedings of the Commission on Elections in SPA No. 95-009, including its
questioned orders doted April 24, 1995, May 7, 1995, May 11, 1995 and May 25, 1995, declaring petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos
ineligible and ordering her proclamation as Representative of the First District of Leyte suspended. To the extent that Rule 25 of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure authorizes proceedings for the disqualification of candidates on the ground of ineligibility for the office, it
should considered void.
The provincial board of canvassers should now proceed with the proclamation of petitioner.
Narvasa, C.J., concurs.
PADILLA, J., dissenting:
I regret that I cannot join the majority opinion as expressed in the well-written ponencia of Mr. Justice Kapunan.
As in any controversy arising out of a Constitutional provision, the inquiry must begin and end with the provision itself. The controversy
should not be blurred by what, to me, are academic disquisitions. In this particular controversy, the Constitutional provision on point states
that — "no person shall be a member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, and on the day
of the election, is at least twenty-five (25) years of age, able to read and write, and except the party list representatives, a registered voter in
the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the
election." (Article VI, section 6)
It has been argued that for purposes of our election laws, the term residence has been understood as synonymous with domicile. This
argument has been validated by no less than the Court in numerous cases 1 where significantly the factual circumstances clearly and
convincingly proved that a person does not effectively lose his domicile of origin if the intention to reside therein is manifest with his personal
presence in the place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention.
With this basic thesis in mind, it would not be difficult to conceive of different modalities within which the phrase "a resident thereof (meaning,
the legislative district) for a period of not less than one year" would fit.
The first instance is where a person's residence and domicile coincide in which case a person only has to prove that he has been domiciled
in a permanent location for not less than a year before the election.
A second situation is where a person maintains a residence apart from his domicile in which case he would have the luxury of district
shopping, provided of course, he satisfies the one-year residence period in the district as the minimum period for eligibility to the position of
congressional representative for the district.
In either case, one would not be constitutionally disqualified for abandoning his residence in order to return to his domicile of origin, or better
still, domicile of choice; neither would one be disqualified for abandoning altogether his domicile in favor of his residence in the district where
he desires to be a candidate.
The most extreme circumstance would be a situation wherein a person maintains several residences in different districts. Since his domicile
of origin continues as an option as long as there is no effective abandonment (animus non revertendi), he can practically choose the district
most advantageous for him.
All these theoretical scenarios, however, are tempered by the unambiguous limitation that "for a period of not less than one year immediately
preceding the day of the election", he must be a resident in the district where he desires to be elected.
To my mind, the one year residence period is crucial regardless of whether or not the term "residence" is to be synonymous with "domicile."
In other words, the candidate's intent and actual presence in one district must in all situations satisfy the length of time prescribed by the
fundamental law. And this, because of a definite Constitutional purpose. He must be familiar with the environment and problems of a district
he intends to represent in Congress and the one-year residence in said district would be the minimum period to acquire such familiarity, if not
versatility.
In the case of petitioner Imelda R. Marcos, the operative facts are distinctly set out in the now assailed decision of the Comelec 2nd Division
dated 24 April 1995 (as affirmed by the Comelec en banc) —
In or about 1938 when respondent was a little over 8 years old, she established her domicile in Tacloban, Leyte
(Tacloban City). She studied in the Holy Infant Academy in Tacloban from 1938 to 1948 when she graduated from high
school. She pursued her college studies in St. Paul's College, now Divine Word University of Tacloban, where she
earned her degree in Education. Thereafter, she taught in the Leyte Chinese High School, still in Tacloban City. In 1952
she went to Manila to work with her cousin, the late Speaker Daniel Z. Romualdez in his office in the House of
Representatives. In 1954, she married ex-president Ferdinand Marcos when he was still a congressman of Ilocos Norte.
She lived with him in Batac, Ilocos Norte and registered there as a voter. When her husband was elected Senator of the
Republic in 1959, she and her husband lived together in San Juan, Rizal where she registered as a voter. In 1965 when
her husband was elected President of the Republic of the Philippines, she lived with him in Malacanang Palace and
registered as a voter in San Miguel, Manila.
During the Marcos presidency, respondent served as a Member of the Batasang Pambansa, Minister of Human
Settlements and Governor of Metro Manila. She claimed that in February 1986, she and her family were abducted and
kidnapped to Honolulu, Hawaii. In November 1991, she came home to Manila. In 1992 respondent ran for election as
President of the Philippines and filed her Certificate of Candidacy wherein she indicated that she is a resident and
registered voter of San Juan, Metro Manila. On August 24, 1994, respondent filed a letter with the election officer of San
Juan, Metro Manila, requesting for cancellation of her registration in the Permanent List of Voters in Precinct No. 157 of
San Juan, Metro Manila, in order that she may be re-registered or transferred to Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. (Annex 2-B,
Answer). On August 31, 1994, respondent filed her Sworn Application for Cancellation of Voter's Previous Registration
(Annex 2-C, Answer) stating that she is a duly registered voter in 157-A, Brgy. Maytunas, San Juan, Metro that she
intends to register at Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte.
On January 28, 1995 respondent registered as a voter at Precinct No. 18-A of Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. She filed with the
 Board of Election Inspectors CE Form No. 1, Voter Registration Record No. 94-3349772, wherein she alleged that she
has resided in the municipality of Tolosa for a period of 6 months (Annex A, Petition).
On March 8, 1995, respondent filed with the Office of the Provincial Election Supervisor, Leyte, a Certificate of
Candidacy for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte wherein she also alleged that she has been a
resident in the constituency where she seeks to be elected for a period of 7 months. The pertinent entries therein are as
follows:
7. PROFESSION OR OCCUPATION: House-wife/ Teacher/ Social Worker
8. RESIDENCE (complete address): Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte
Post Office Address for election purposes: Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte
9. RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHEREIN I SEEK TO BE ELECTED
IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING ELECTION: ________ Years Seven Months
10. I AM NOT A PERMANENT RESIDENT OF, OR IMMIGRANT TO, A
FOREIGN COUNTRY.
THAT I AM ELIGIBLE for said office; That I will support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and
will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; That I will obey the laws, legal orders and decrees promulgated by the
duly-constituted authorities; That the obligation imposed by my oath is assumed voluntarily, without mental reservation or
purpose of evasion; and That the facts stated herein are true to the best of my knowledge.
(Sgd.) Imelda Romualdez-Marcos
(Signature of Candidate)2
Petitioner's aforestated certificate of candidacy filed on 8 March 1995 contains the decisive component or seed of her disqualification. It is
contained in her answer under oath of "seven months" to the query of "residence in the constituency wherein I seek to be elected
immediately preceding the election."
It follows from all the above that the Comelec committed no grave abuse of discretion in holding that petitioner is disqualified from the
position of representative for the 1st congressional district of Leyte in the elections of 8 May 1995, for failure to meet the "not less than one-
year residence in the constituency (1st district, Leyte) immediately preceding the day of election (8 May 1995)."
Having arrived at petitioner's disqualification to be a representative of the first district of Leyte, the next important issue to resolve is whether
or not the Comelec can order the Board of Canvassers to determine and proclaim the winner out of the remaining qualified candidates for
representative in said district.
I am not unaware of the pronouncement made by this Court in the case of Labo vs. Comelec, G.R. 86564, August 1, 1989, 176 SCRA 1
which gave the rationale as laid down in the early 1912 case of Topacio vs. Paredes, 23 Phil. 238 that:
. . . . Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who have received the highest number of votes
cast in the election for that office, and it is a fundamental idea in all republican forms of government that no one can be
declared elected and no measure can be declared carried unless he or it receives a majority or plurality of the legal votes
cast in the election. (20 Corpus Juris 2nd, S 243, p. 676)
The fact that the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is later declared to be disqualified or not eligible
for the office to which he was elected does not necessarily entitle the candidate who obtained the second highest
number of votes to be declared the winner of the elective office. The votes cast for a dead, disqualified, or non-eligible
person may not be valid to vote the winner into office or maintain him there. However, in the absence of a statute which
clearly asserts a contrary political and legislative policy on the matter, if the votes were cast in the sincere belief that the
candidate was alive, qualified, or eligible, they should not be treated as stray, void or meaningless.
Under Sec. 6 RA 6646, (An Act Introducing Additional Reforms in the Electoral System and for other purposes) (84 O.G. 905, 22 February
1988) it is provided that:
. . . — Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes
cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be
disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall
continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor,
may, during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of
his guilt is strong.
There is no need to indulge in legal hermeneutics to sense the plain and unambiguous meaning of the provision quoted above. As the law
now stands, the legislative policy does not limit its concern with the effect of a final judgement of disqualification only before the election, but
even during or after the election. The law is clear that in all situations, the votes cast for a disqualified candidate SHALL NOT BE COUNTED.
The law has also validated the jurisdiction of the Court or Commission on Election to continue hearing the petition for disqualification in case
a candidate is voted for and receives the highest number of votes, if for any reason, he is not declared by final judgment before an election
to be disqualified.
Since the present case is an after election scenario, the power to suspend proclamation (when evidence of his guilt is strong) is also explicit
under the law. What happens then when after the elections are over, one is declared disqualified? Then, votes cast for him "shall not be
counted" and in legal contemplation, he no longer received the highest number of votes.
It stands to reason that Section 6 of RA 6646 does not make the second placer the winner simply because a "winning candidate is
disqualified," but that the law considers him as the candidate who had obtained the highest number of votes as a result of the votes cast for
the disqualified candidate not being counted or considered.
As this law clearly reflects the legislative policy on the matter, then there is no reason why this Court should not re-examine and
consequently abandon the doctrine in the Jun Labo case. It has been stated that "the qualifications prescribed for elective office cannot be
erased by the electorate alone. The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility" most especially
when it is mandated by no less than the Constitution.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DISMISS the petition and to order the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Leyte to proclaim the candidate receiving
the highest number of votes, from among the qualified candidates, as the duly elected representative of the 1st district of Leyte.
Hermosisima, Jr. J., dissent.
REGALADO, J., dissenting:
While I agree with same of the factual bases of the majority opinion, I cannot arrive conjointly at the same conclusion drawn therefrom
Hence, this dissent which assuredly is not formulated "on the basis of the personality of a petitioner in a case."
I go along with the majority in their narration of antecedent facts, insofar as the same are pertinent to this case, and which I have simplified
as follows:
1. Petitioner, although born in Manila, resided during her childhood in the present Tacloban City, she being a legitimate
daughter of parents who appear to have taken up permanent residence therein. She also went to school there and, for a
time, taught in one of the schools in that city.
2. When she married then Rep. Ferdinand E. Marcos who was then domiciled in Batac, Ilocos Norte, by operation of law
she acquired a new domicile in that place in 1954.
3. In the successive years and during the events that happened thereafter, her husband having been elected as a
Senator and then as President, she lived with him and their family in San Juan, Rizal and then in Malacanang Palace in
San Miguel, Manila.
4. Over those years, she registered as a voter and actually voted in Batac, Ilocos Norte, then in San Juan, Rizal, and
also in San Miguel, Manila, all these merely in the exercise of the right of suffrage.
5. It does not appear that her husband, even after he had assumed those lofty positions successively, ever abandoned
his domicile of origin in Batac, Ilocos Norte where he maintained his residence and invariably voted in all elections.
6. After the ouster of her husband from the presidency in 1986 and the sojourn of the Marcos family in Honolulu, Hawaii,
U.S.A., she eventually returned to the Philippines in 1991 and resided in different places which she claimed to have been
merely temporary residences.
7. In 1992, petitioner ran for election as President of the Philippines and in her certificate of candidacy she indicated that
she was then a registered voter and resident of San Juan, Metro Manila.
8. On August 24, 1994, she filed a letter for the cancellation of her registration in the Permanent List of Voters in Precinct
No. 157 of San Juan, Metro Manila in order that she may "be re-registered or transferred to Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte."
On August 31, 1994, she followed this up with her Sworn Application for Cancellation of Voter's Previous Registration
wherein she stated that she was a registered voter in Precinct No. 157-A, Brgy. Maytunas, San Juan, Metro Manila and
that she intended to register in Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte.
9. On January 28, 1995, petitioner registered as a voter at Precinct No. 18-A of Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, for which purpose
she filed with the therein Board of Election Inspectors a voter's registration record form alleging that she had resided in
that municipality for six months.
10. On March 8, 1995, petitioner filed her certificate of candidacy for the position of Representative of the First District of
Leyte wherein she alleged that she had been a resident for "Seven Months" of the constituency where she sought to be
elected.
11. On March 29, 1995, she filed an "Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy" wherein her answer in the original
certificate of candidacy to item "8. RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK, TO BE ELECTED
IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE ELECTION:" was changed or replaced with a new entry reading "SINCE
CHILDHOOD."
The sole issue for resolution is whether, for purposes of her candidacy, petitioner had complied with the residency requirement of one year
as mandated by no less than Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
I do not intend to impose upon the time of my colleagues with a dissertation on the difference between residence and domicile. We have had
enough of that and I understand that for purposes of political law and, for that matter of international law, residence is understood to be
synonymous with domicile. That is so understood in our jurisprudence and in American Law, in contradistinction to the concept of residence
for purposes of civil, commercial and procedural laws whenever an issue thereon is relevant or controlling.
Consequently, since in the present case the question of petitioner's residence is integrated in and inseparable from her domicile, I am
addressing the issue from the standpoint of the concept of the latter term, specifically its permutations into the domicile of origin, domicile of
choice and domicile by operation of law, as understood in American law from which for this case we have taken our jurisprudential bearings.
My readings inform me that the domicile of the parents at the time of birth, or what is termed the "domicile of origin," constitutes the domicile
of an infant until abandoned, or until the acquisition of a new domicile in a different place.1 In the instant case, we may grant that petitioner's
domicile of origin, 2 at least as of 1938, was what is now Tacloban City.
Now, as I have observed earlier, domicile is said to be of three kinds, that is, domicile by birth, domicile by choice, and domicile by operation
of law. The first is the common case of the place of birth or domicilium originis, the second is that which is voluntarily acquired by a party or
domicilium propio motu; the last which is consequential, as that of a wife arising from marriage,3 is sometimes called domicilium necesarium.
There is no debate that the domicile of origin can be lost or replaced by a domicile of choice or a domicile by operation of law subsequently
acquired by the party.
When petitioner contracted marriage in 1954 with then Rep. Marcos, by operation of law, not only international or American but of our own
enactment, 4 she acquired her husband's domicile of origin in Batac, Ilocos Norte and correspondingly lost her own domicile of origin in
Tacloban City.
Her subsequent changes of residence — to San Juan, Rizal, then to San Miguel, Manila, thereafter to Honolulu, Hawaii, and back to now
San Juan, Metro Manila — do not appear to have resulted in her thereby acquiring new domiciles of choice. In fact, it appears that her
having resided in those places was by reason of the fortunes or misfortunes of her husband and his peregrinations in the assumption of new
official positions or the loss of them. Her residence in Honolulu and, of course, those after her return to the Philippines were, as she claimed,
against her will or only for transient purposes which could not have invested them with the status of domiciles of choice.5
After petitioner's return to the Philippines in 1991 and up to the present imbroglio over her requisite residency in Tacloban City or Olot,
Tolosa, Leyte, there is no showing that she ever attempted to acquire any other domicile of choice which could have resulted in the
abandonment of her legal domicile in Batac, Ilocos Norte. On that score, we note the majority's own submission 6 that, to successfully effect
a change of domicile, one must demonstrate (a) an actual removal or an actual change of domicile, (b) a bona fide intention of abandoning
the former place of residence and establishing a new one, and (c) acts which correspond with the purpose.
We consequently have to also note that these requirements for the acquisition of a domicile of choice apply whether what is sought to be
changed or substituted is a domicile of origin (domicilium originis) or a domicile by operation of law (domicilium necesarium). Since petitioner
had lost her domicilium originis which had been replaced by her domicilium necesarium, it is therefore her continuing domicile in Batac,
Ilocos Norte which, if at all, can be the object of legal change under the contingencies of the case at bar.
To get out of this quandary, the majority decision echoes the dissenting opinion of Commissioner Regalado E. Maambong in SPA 95-009 of
the Commission on Elections,7 and advances this novel proposition.
It may be said that petitioner lost her domicile of origin by operation of law as a result of her marriage to the late
President Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1952 (sic, 1954). By operation of law (domicilium necesarium), her legal domicile at
the time of her marriage became Batac, Ilocos Norte although there were no indications of an intention on her part to
abandon her domicile of origin. Because of her husband's subsequent death and through the operation of the provisions
of the New Family Code already in force at the time, however, her legal domicile automatically reverted to her domicile of
origin. . . . (Emphasis supplied).
Firstly, I am puzzled why although it is conceded that petitioner had acquired a domicilium necesarium in Batac, Ilocos Norte, the majority
insists on making a qualification that she did not intend to abandon her domicile of origin. I find this bewildering since, in this situation, it is
the law that declares where petitioner's domicile is at any given time, and not her self-serving or putative intent to hold on to her former
domicile. Otherwise, contrary to their own admission that one cannot have more than one domicile at a time,8 the majority would be
suggesting that petitioner retained Tacloban City as (for lack of a term in law since it does not exist therein) the equivalent of what is fancied
as a reserved, dormant, potential, or residual domicile.
Secondly, domicile once lost in accordance with law can only be recovered likewise in accordance with law. However, we are here being
titillated with the possibility of an automatic reversion to or reacquisition of a domicile of origin after the termination of the cause for its loss by
operation of law. The majority agrees that since petitioner lost her domicile of origin by her marriage, the termination of the marriage also
terminates that effect thereof. I am impressed by the ingeniousness of this theory which proves that, indeed, necessity is the mother of
inventions. Regretfully, I find some difficulty in accepting either the logic or the validity of this argument.
If a party loses his domicile of origin by obtaining a new domicile of choice, he thereby voluntarily abandons the former in favor of the latter.
If, thereafter, he abandons that chosen domicile, he does not per se recover his original domicile unless, by subsequent acts legally
indicative thereof, he evinces his intent and desire to establish the same as his new domicile, which is precisely what petitioner belatedly
and, evidently just for purposes of her candidacy, unsuccessfully tried to do.
One's subsequent abandonment of his domicile of choice cannot automatically restore his domicile of origin, not only because there is no
legal authority therefor but because it would be absurd Pursued to its logical consequence, that theory of ipso jure reversion would rule out
the fact that said party could already very well have obtained another domicile, either of choice or by operation of law, other than his domicile
of origin. Significantly and obviously for this reason, the Family Code, which the majority inexplicably invokes, advisedly does not regulate
this contingency since it would impinge on one's freedom of choice.
Now, in the instant case, petitioner not only voluntarily abandoned her domicile of choice (unless we assume that she entered into the marital
state against her will) but, on top of that, such abandonment was further affirmed through her acquisition of a new domicile by operation of
law. In fact, this is even a case of both voluntary and legal abandonment of a domicile of origin. With much more reason, therefore, should
we reject the proposition that with the termination of her marriage in 1989, petitioner had supposedly per se and ipso facto reacquired her
domicile of origin which she lost in 1954. Otherwise, this would be tantamount to saying that during the period of marital coverture, she was
simultaneously in possession and enjoyment of a domicile of origin which was only in a state of suspended animation.
Thus, the American rule is likewise to the effect that while after the husband's death the wife has the right to elect her own domicile, 9 she
nevertheless retains the last domicile of her deceased husband until she makes an actual change. 10 In the absence of affirmative evidence,
to the contrary, the presumption is that a wife's domicile or legal residence follows that of her husband and will continue after his death. 11
I cannot appreciate the premises advanced in support of the majority's theory based on Articles 68 and 69 of the Family Code. All that is of
any relevance therein is that under this new code, the right and power to fix the family domicile is now shared by the spouses. I cannot
perceive how that joint right, which in the first place was never exercised by the spouses, could affect the domicile fixed by the law for
petitioner in 1954 and, for her husband, long prior thereto. It is true that a wife now has the coordinate power to determine the conjugal or
family domicile, but that has no bearing on this case. With the death of her husband, and each of her children having gotten married and
established their own respective domiciles, the exercise of that joint power was and is no longer called for or material in the present factual
setting of this controversy. Instead, what is of concern in petitioner's case was the matter of her having acquired or not her own domicile of
choice.
I agree with the majority's discourse on the virtues of the growing and expanded participation of women in the affairs of the nation, with equal
rights and recognition by Constitution and statutory conferment. However, I have searched in vain for a specific law or judicial
pronouncement which either expressly or by necessary implication supports the majority's desired theory of automatic reacquisition of or
reversion to the domicilium originis of petitioner. Definitely, as between the settled and desirable legal norms that should govern this issue,
there is a world of difference; and, unquestionably, this should be resolved by legislative articulation but not by the eloquence of the well-
turned phrase.
In sum, petitioner having lost Tacloban City as her domicile of origin since 1954 and not having automatically reacquired any domicile
therein, she cannot legally claim that her residency in the political constituency of which it is a part continued since her birth up to the
present. Respondent commission was, therefore, correct in rejecting her pretension to that effect in her amended/corrected certificate of
candidacy, and in holding her to her admission in the original certificate that she had actually resided in that constituency for only seven
months prior to the election. These considerations render it unnecessary to further pass upon the procedural issues raised by petitioner.
ON THE FOREGOING PREMISES, I vote to DISMISS the petition for lack of merit.
DAVIDE, JR., J., dissenting:
I respectfully dissent from the opinion of the majority written by Mr. Justice Santiago M. Kapunan, more particularly on the issue of the
petitioner's qualification.
Under Section 7, Subdivision A, Article IX of the Constitution, decisions, orders, or rulings of the COMELEC may be brought to this Court
only by the special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court (Aratuc vs. COMELEC, 88 SCRA 251 [1979]; Dario vs.
Mison, 176 SCRA 84 [1989]).
Accordingly, a writ of certiorari may be granted only if the COMELEC has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion (Section 1, Rule 65, Rules of Court). Since the COMELEC has, undoubtedly, jurisdiction over the private respondent's petition, the
only issue left is whether it acted with grave abuse of discretion in disqualifying the petitioner.
My careful and meticulous perusal of the challenged resolution of 24 April 1995 of the COMELEC Second Division and the En Banc
resolution of 7 May 1995 discloses total absence of abuse of discretion, much less grave abuse thereof. The resolution of the Second
Division dispassionately and objectively discussed in minute details the facts which established beyond cavil that herein petitioner was
disqualified as a candidate on the ground of lack of residence in the First Congressional District of Leyte. It has not misapplied,
miscomprehended, or misunderstood facts or circumstances of substance pertinent to the issue of her residence.
The majority opinion, however, overturned the COMELEC's findings of fact for lack of proof that the petitioner has abandoned Tolosa as her
domicile of origin, which is allegedly within the First Congressional District of Leyte.
I respectfully submit that the petitioner herself has provided the COMELEC, either by admission or by documentary evidence, overwhelming
proof of the loss or abandonment of her domicile of origin, which is Tacloban City and not Tolosa, Leyte. Assuming that she decided to live
again in her domicile of origin, that became her second domicile of choice, where her stay, unfortunately, was for only seven months before
the day of the election. She was then disqualified to be a candidate for the position of Representative of the First Congressional District of
Leyte. A holding to the contrary would be arbitrary.
It may indeed be conceded that the petitioner's domicile of choice was either Tacloban City or Tolosa, Leyte. Nevertheless, she lost it by
operation of law sometime in May 1954 upon her marriage to the then Congressman (later, President) Ferdinand E. Marcos. A domicile by
operation of law is that domicile which the law attributes to a person, independently of his own intention or actual residence, as results from
legal domestic relations as that of the wife arising from marriage (28 C.J.S. Domicile § 7, 11). Under the governing law then, Article 110 of the
Civil Code, her new domicile or her domicile of choice was the domicile of her husband, which was Batac, Ilocos Norte. Said Article reads as
follows:
Art. 110. The husband shall fix the residence of the family. But the court may exempt the wife from living with the
husband if he should live abroad unless in the service of the Republic.
Commenting thereon, civilist Arturo M. Tolentino states:
Although the duty of the spouses to live together is mutual, the husband has a predominant right because he is
empowered by law to fix the family residence. This right even predominates over some rights recognized by law in the
wife. For instance, under article 117 the wife may engage in business or practice a profession or occupation. But
because of the power of the husband to fix the family domicile he may fix it at such a place as would make it impossible
for the wife to continue in business or in her profession. For justifiable reasons, however, the wife may be exempted from
living in the residence chosen by the husband. The husband cannot validly allege desertion by the wife who refuses to
follow him to a new place of residence, when it appears that they have lived for years in a suitable home belonging to the
wife, and that his choice of a different home is not made in good faith. (Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil
Code of the Philippines, vol. 1, 1985 ed., 339).
Under common law, a woman upon her marriage loses her own domicile and, by operation of law, acquires that of her husband, no matter
where the wife actually lives or what she believes or intends. Her domicile is fixed in the sense that it is declared to be the same as his, and
subject to certain limitations, he can change her domicile by changing his own (25 Am Jur 2d Domicile § 48, 37).
It must, however, be pointed out that under Article 69 of the Family Code, the fixing of the family domicile is no longer the sole prerogative of
the husband, but is now a joint decision of the spouses, and in case of disagreement the court shall decide. The said article uses the term
"family domicile," and not family residence, as "the spouses may have multiple residences, and the wife may elect to remain in one of such
residences, which may destroy the duty of the spouses to live together and its corresponding benefits" (ALICIA V. SEMPIO-DIY, Handbook
on the Family Code of the Philippines, [1988], 102).
The theory of automatic restoration of a woman's domicile of origin upon the death of her husband, which the majority opinion adopts to
overcome the legal effect of the petitioner's marriage on her domicile, is unsupported by law and by jurisprudence. The settled doctrine is
that after the husband's death the wife has a right to elect her own domicile, but she retains the last domicile of her husband until she makes
an actual change (28 C.J.S. Domicile § 12, 27). Or, on the death of the husband, the power of the wife to acquire her own domicile is
revived, but until she exercises the power her domicile remains that of the husband at the time of his death (25 Am Jur 2d Domicile § 62, 45).
Note that what is revived is not her domicile of origin but her power to acquire her own domicile.
Clearly, even after the death of her husband, the petitioner's domicile was that of her husband at the time of his death — which was Batac,
Ilocos Norte, since their residences in San Juan, Metro Manila, and San Miguel, Manila, were their residences for convenience to enable her
husband to effectively perform his official duties. Their residence in San Juan was a conjugal home, and it was there to which she returned in
1991 when she was already a widow. In her sworn certificate of candidacy for the Office of the President in the synchronized elections of
May 1992, she indicated therein that she was a resident of San Juan, Metro Manila. She also voted in the said elections in that place.
On the basis of her evidence, it was only on 24 August 1994 when she exercised her right as a widow to acquire her own domicile in Tolosa,
Leyte, through her sworn statement requesting the Election Officer of San Juan, Metro Manila, to cancel her registration in the permanent list
of voters in Precinct 157 thereat and praying that she be "re-registered or transferred to Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, the place of [her] birth and
permanent residence" (photocopy of Exhibit "B," attached as Annex "2" of private respondent Montejo's Comment). Notably, she contradicted
this sworn statement regarding her place of birth when, in her Voter's Affidavit sworn to on 15 March 1992 (photocopy of Exhibit "C," attached
as Annex "3," Id.), her Voter Registration Record sworn to on 28 January 1995 (photocopy of Exhibit "E," attached as Annex "5," Id.), and her
Certificate of Candidacy sworn to on 8 March 1995 (photocopy of Exhibit "A," attached as Annex "1," Id.), she solemnly declared that she
was born in Manila.
The petitioner is even uncertain as to her domicile of origin. Is it Tacloban City or Tolosa, Leyte? In the affidavit attached to her Answer to the
petition for disqualification (Annex "I" of Petition), she declared under oath that her "domicile or residence is Tacloban City." If she did intend
to return to such domicile or residence of origin why did she inform the Election Officer of San Juan that she would transfer to Olot, Tolosa,
Leyte, and indicate in her Voter's Registration Record and in her certificate of candidacy that her residence is Olot, Tolosa, Leyte? While this
uncertainty is not important insofar as residence in the congressional district is concerned, it nevertheless proves that forty-one years had
already lapsed since she had lost or abandoned her domicile of origin by virtue of marriage and that such length of time diminished her
power of recollection or blurred her memory.
I find to be misplaced the reliance by the majority opinion on Faypon vs. Quirino (96 Phil. 294 [1954]), and the subsequent cases which
established the principle that absence from original residence or domicile of origin to pursue studies, practice one's profession, or engage in
business in other states does not constitute loss of such residence or domicile. So is the reliance on Section 117 of the Omnibus Election
Code which provides that transfer of residence to any other place by reason of one's "occupation; profession; employment in private and
public service; educational activities; work in military or naval reservations; service in the army, navy or air force, the constabulary or national
police force; or confinement or detention in government institutions in accordance with law" is not deemed as loss of original residence.
Those cases and legal provision do not include marriage of a woman. The reason for the exclusion is, of course, Article 110 of the Civil
Code. If it were the intention of this Court or of the legislature to consider the marriage of a woman as a circumstance which would not
operate as an abandonment of domicile (of origin or of choice), then such cases and legal provision should have expressly mentioned the
same.
This Court should not accept as gospel truth the self-serving claim of the petitioner in her affidavit (Annex "A" of her Answer in COMELEC
SPA No. 95-009; Annex "I" of Petition) that her "domicile or residence of origin is Tacloban City," and that she "never intended to abandon this
domicile or residence of origin to which [she] always intended to return whenever absent." Such a claim of intention cannot prevail over the
effect of Article 110 of the Civil Code. Besides, the facts and circumstances or the vicissitudes of the petitioner's life after her marriage in
1954 conclusively establish that she had indeed abandoned her domicile of origin and had acquired a new one animo et facto (KOSSUTH
KENT KENNAN, A Treatise on Residence and Domicile, [1934], 214, 326).
Neither should this Court place complete trust on the petitioner's claim that she "merely committed an honest mistake" in writing down the
word "seven" in the space provided for the residency qualification requirement in the certificate of candidacy. Such a claim is self-serving
and, in the light of the foregoing disquisitions, would be all sound and fury signifying nothing. To me, she did not commit any mistake, honest
or otherwise; what she stated was the truth.
The majority opinion also disregards a basic rule in evidence that he who asserts a fact or the affirmative of an issue has the burden of
proving it (Imperial Victory Shipping Agency vs. NLRC, 200 SCRA 178 [1991]; P.T. Cerna Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, 221 SCRA 19 [1993]).
Having admitted marriage to the then Congressman Marcos, the petitioner could not deny the legal consequence thereof on the change of
her domicile to that of her husband. The majority opinion rules or at least concludes that "[b]y operation of law (domicilium necesarium), her
legal domicile at the time of her marriage automatically became Batac, Ilocos Norte." That conclusion is consistent with Article 110 of the Civil
Code. Since she is presumed to retain her deceased husband's domicile until she exercises her revived power to acquire her own domicile,
the burden is upon her to prove that she has exercised her right to acquire her own domicile. She miserably failed to discharge that burden.
I vote to deny the petition.
Footnotes
1 Jarrolt v. Mabberly, 103 U.S. 580 (1881).
2 CONST, art. VI, states:
Sec. 6. No person shall be a member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least twenty-five years of age, able to read and write, and
except the party-list representatives, a registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a
resident thereof for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the election.
See, Jarrolt v. Mabberly, supra, note 1.
3 Gallego vs. Vera, 73 Phil. 453 (1941).
4 Rollo, p. 114, Annex "D".
5 Rollo, p. 110, Annex "D".
6 Rollo, p. 113.
7 Rollo, p. 111.
8 Rollo, p. 115, Annex "E".
9 Signed by Virgilo S. Oledan, Provincial Election Supervisor IV, Leyte; Rollo,
p. 116, Annex "F".
10 Rollo, p. 117, Annex "G". Petitioner explained the circumstances surrounding the filling up of the original
certificate thus:
1. On March 8, 1995, I filed my certificate of candidacy for Member of the House of Representatives
(Congresswoman) of the First Legislative District of the province of Leyte, which was drafted by Mr. Filomeno
A. Zeta.
2. I learned lately that Congressman Cirilo Montejo wants to disqualify me as I allegedly lack residence in the
constituency because of the entry of the word "SEVEN" in Item No. 8 of my certificate of candidacy.
3. I read my certificate of candidacy before signing it and thought of the word "RESIDENCE" to mean actual or
physical residence, and the word "SEVEN" merely reflected my actual and physical residence in Barangay
Olot, Tolosa, Leyte.
3.1. The word "SEVEN" was placed on my certificate of candidacy to indicate that at lease one (1) month had
passed from my registration as voter of Tolosa, Leyte, on January 28, 1995, when I wrote "06" months under
"PERIOD OF RESIDENCE" as my actual or physical residence in the town.
4. I thought then that the sense in Item No. 10 of my certificate of candidacy stating "THAT I AM eligible for
said Office" was sufficient to affirm that I possess all the qualifications, including my residence, for Member of
the House of Representatives for which I am aspiring in the May 8, 1995 elections.
5. The fact, however, is that my domicile or residence of origin is Tacloban City, a component city of the First
Legislative District of Leyte I never intended to abandon this domicile or residence of origin to which I always
intended to return whenever absent; indeed in 1992, I returned to Tacloban City to live and stay there. On
November 5, 1992; I bought my Residence Certificate No. 15226186L there, which is made an integral part
hereof as Annex "I" (Annex "2" hereof).
11 Id., at p. 120. See also, Rollo, p. 130-133, Annex "I", petitioner's Affidavit explaining her residence:
13. I established my domicile, however in Tacloban, Leyte (Tacloban City in 1938, when was little over eight (8)
years old. Shortly after my mother died on April 7, 1938, my widowed father, Vicente Orestes Romualdez,
brought me and my brothers. . .and my sisters to Tacloban, Leyte (now Tacloban City) his hometown.
xxx xxx xxx
18. I have always considered Tacloban City as my permanent residence or residence of origin have not
abandoned and have never intended to abandon my permanent residence or residence of origin there. To it I
always intend to return whenever absent.
19. In 1952, I went to Manila to work with my cousin, the late speaker
Daniel Z. Romualdez in his office in the House of Representatives.
20. In May, 1954, I married President Ferdinand E. Marcos when he was still the congressman of Ilocos, Norte.
21. As a dutiful wife who loved him deeply, I lived with him in Batac, Ilocos Norte and registered as a voter
there.
22. In 1965, my husband was elected President of the Republic of the Philippines. Together, we lived in
Malacañang Palace and I registered as a voter in San Miguel, Manila.
23. My registration as voter in Batac, Ilocos Norte; San Juan, Rizal (now San Juan, Metro Manila); and San
Miguel, Manila, was for convenience because I had to live with my husband to serve him when he was
congressman, Senator and President of the Republic of the Philippines. During those years however, I never
intended nor desired to abandon my domicile or residence of origin in Tacloban City, which I established since I
was a child.
xxx xxx xxx
33. Throughout the Marcos Presidency, I spent most of my birthday anniversaries and attended the Sto. Nini
Fiesta in Tacloban City. I regularly visited my domicile or residence of origin in Leyte and even held important
functions and entertained guests and foreign dignitaries there.
34. After President Ferdinand E. Marcos and I, together with our children and innocent grandchildren were
abducted and kidnapped to Honolulu, Hawaii, in February, 1986, my Leyte properties were sequestered by the
PCGG, and were destroyed and cannibalized.
xxx xxx xxx
38. Upon my return to the country, I wanted to immediately live and reside in Tacloban City or in Olot, Tolosa,
Leyte even if my residences there were not livable as they had been destroyed and cannibalized. The PCGG,
however, did not permit and allow me.
xxx xxx xxx
40. After the 1992 Presidential Elections, I lived and resided in the residence of my brother in San Jose,
Tacloban City, and pursued my negotiations with PCGG to recover my sequestered residences in Tacloban
 City and Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte.
12 Rollo, p. 122.
13 Commissioners Manolo B. Gorospe and Teresita Dy-Liaco Flores formed the majority opinion.
Commissioner Remedies A. Salazar-Fernando dissented.
14 Rollo, p. 64.
15 Rollo, p. 57-64.
16 Petitioner filed a "Motion to Recall Resolution Promulgated on April 24, 1995 and t
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 167011 April 30, 2008
SPOUSES CARLOS S. ROMUALDEZ and ERLINDA R. ROMUALDEZ, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and DENNIS GARAY, respondents.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This treats of the Petition for Review on Certiorari with a prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction
filed by petitioners Spouses Carlos S. Romualdez and Erlinda R. Romualdez seeking to annul and set aside the Resolutions, dated 11 June 2004 1 and 27
January 20052 of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in E.O. Case No. 2000-36. In the Resolution of 11 June 2004, the COMELEC En Banc
directed the Law Department to file the appropriate Information with the proper court against petitioners Carlos S. Romualdez and Erlinda Romualdez for
violation of Section 10(g) and (j)3 in relation to Section 45(j)4 of Republic Act No. 8189, otherwise known as The Voter’s Registration Act of 1996. 5
Petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration thereon was denied.
The factual antecedents leading to the instant Petition are presented hereunder:

On 12 July 2000, private respondent Dennis Garay, along with Angelino Apostol 6 filed a Complaint-Affidavit 7 with the COMELEC thru the Office of the
Election Officer in Burauen, Leyte, charging petitioners with violation of Section 261(y)(2) 8 and Section 261(y)(5)9 of the Omnibus Election Code,
similarly referred to as Batas Pambansa Blg. 881; and Section 1210 of Republic Act No. 8189.
Private respondent deposed, inter alia, that: petitioners are of legal ages and residents of 113 Mariposa Loop, Mariposa Street, Bagong Lipunan ng Crame,
Quezon City; on 9 May 2000 and 11 May 2000, petitioners Carlos S. Romualdez and Erlinda R. Romualdez, applied for registration as new voters with the
Office of the Election Officer of Burauen, Leyte, as evidenced by Voter Registration Record Nos. 42454095 and 07902952, respectively; in their sworn
applications, petitioners made false and untruthful representations in violation of Section 10 11 of Republic Act Nos. 8189, by indicating therein that they
are residents of 935 San Jose Street, Burauen, Leyte, when in truth and in fact, they were and still are residents of 113 Mariposa Loop, Mariposa Street,
Bagong Lipunan ng Crame, Quezon City, and registered voters of Barangay Bagong Lipunan ng Crame, District IV, Quezon City, Precinct No. 4419-A, as
evidenced by Voter Registration Record Nos. 26195824 and 26195823; and that petitioners, knowing fully well said truth, intentionally and willfully, did
not fill the blank spaces in said applications corresponding to the length of time which they have resided in Burauen, Leyte. In fine, private respondent
charged petitioners, to wit:
Respondent-spouses, Carlos Sison Romualdez and Erlinda Reyes Romualdez committed and consummated election offenses in violation of our
election laws, specifically, Sec. 261, paragraph (y), subparagraph (2), for knowingly making any false or untruthful statements relative to any
data or information required in the application for registration, and of Sec. 261, paragraph (y), subparagraph (5), committed by any person who,
being a registered voter, registers anew without filing an application for cancellation of his previous registration, both of the Omnibus Election
Code (BP Blg. 881), and of Sec. 12, RA 8189 (Voter Registration Act) for failure to apply for transfer of registration records due to change of
residence to another city or municipality."12
The Complaint-Affidavit contained a prayer that a preliminary investigation be conducted by the COMELEC, and if the evidence so warrants, the
corresponding Information against petitioners be filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for the prosecution of the same.

Petitioners filed a Joint Counter-Affidavit with Motion to Dismiss 13 dated 2 April 2001. They contended therein that they did not make any false or
untruthful statements in their application for registration. They avowed that they intended to reside in Burauen, Leyte, since the year 1989. On 9 May 2000,
they took actual residence in Burauen, Leyte, by leasing for five (5) years, the house of Juanito and Fe Renomeron at No. 935, San Jose Street in Burauen,
Leyte. On even date, the Barangay District III Council of Burauen passed a Resolution of Welcome, expressing therein its gratitude and appreciation to
petitioner Carlos S. Romualdez for choosing the Barangay as his official residence.14
On 28 November 2003, Atty. Maria Norina S. Tangaro-Casingal, COMELEC Investigating Officer, issued a Resolution, recommending to the COMELEC
Law Department (Investigation and Prosecution Division), the filing of the appropriate Information against petitioners, disposing, thus:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Law Department (Investigation and Prosecution Division), RECOMMENDS to file the necessary information
against Carlos Sison Romualdez before the proper Regional Trial Court for violation of Section 10 (g) and (j) in relation to Section 45 (j) of
Republic Act 8189 and to authorize the Director IV of the Law Department to designate a Comelec Prosecutor to handle the prosecution of the
case with the duty to submit periodic report after every hearing of the case.15
On 11 June 2004, the COMELEC En Banc found no reason to depart from the recommendatory Resolution of 28 November 2003, and ordered, viz:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Law Department is hereby directed to file the appropriate information with the proper court against
respondents CARLOS S. ROMUALDEZ AND ERLINDA ROMUALDEZ for violation of Section 10 (g) and (j) in relation to Section 45 (j) of
 the Republic Act No. 8189.16
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration thereon.

Acting on the Motion, the COMELEC found no cogent reason to disturb the assailed En Banc Resolution of 11 June 2004,17 rationalizing, thus:
However, perusal of the records reveal (sic) that the arguments and issues raised in the Motion for Reconsideration are merely a rehash of the
arguments advanced by the Respondents in [their] Memorandum received by the Law Department on 17 April 2001, the same [w]as already
considered by the Investigating Officer and was discussed in her recommendation which eventually was made as the basis for the En Banc’s
resolution.
As aptly observed by the Investigating Officer, the filing of request for the cancellation and transfer of Voting Registration Record does not
automatically cancel the registration records. The fact remains that at the time of application for registration as new voter of the herein
Respondents on May 9 and 11, 2001 in the Office of Election Officer of Burauen, Leyte their registration in Barangay 4419-A, Barangay
Bagong Lipunan ng Crame Quezon City was still valid and subsisting.18
On 12 January 2006, Alioden D. Dalaig, Director IV, Law Department of the COMELEC filed with the RTC, Burauen, Leyte, separate Informations
against petitioner Carlos S. Romualdez19 for violation of Section 10(g), in relation to Section 45(j) of Republic Act No. 8189, and against petitioner Erlinda
R. Romualdez20 for violation of Section 10(g), in relation to Section 45(j) of Republic Act No. 8189, subsequently docketed as Crim. Case No. BN-06-03-
4185 and Crim. Case No. BN-06-03-4183, respectively. Moreover, separate Informations for violation of Section 10(j), in relation to Section 45(j) of
Republic Act No. 8189 were filed against petitioners.21
Hence, petitioners come to us via the instant Petition, submitting the following arguments:
I
RESPONDENT COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF OR IN EXCESS
OF ITS JURISDICTION; and
II
COMELEC GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT PREMISED ITS RESOLUTION ON A MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS
AND FAILED TO CONSIDER CERTAIN RELEVANT FACTS THAT WOULD JUSTIFY A DIFFERENT CONCLUSION. 22

On 4 May 2006, petitioners filed a Motion Reiterating Prayer for Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and to Cite for Indirect Contempt, 23 alleging
that two separate Informations, both dated 12 January 2006, were filed with the RTC by the COMELEC against petitioner Carlos S. Romualdez for
violation of Section 10(j), in relation to Section 45(j) of Republic Act No. 8189, in Criminal Case No. BN-06-03-9184; and for violation of Section 10(g),
in relation to Section 45(j) of Republic Act No. 8189, in Criminal Case No. BN-06-03-9185. Similarly, the Motion alleged that the COMELEC filed with
the RTC, two separate Informations, both dated 12 January 2006, against petitioner Erlinda R. Romualdez, charging her with the same offenses as those
charged against petitioner Carlos S. Romualdez, and thereafter, docketed as Criminal Case No. BN-06-03-9182, and No. BN-06-03-9183.

On 20 June 2006, this Court issued a Resolution 24 denying for lack of merit petitioners’ Motion Reiterating Prayer for Issuance of Writ of Preliminary
Injunction and to Cite for Indirect Contempt.
We shall now resolve, in seriatim, the arguments raised by petitioners.
Petitioners contend that the election offenses for which they are charged by private respondent are entirely different from those which they stand to be
accused of before the RTC by the COMELEC. According to petitioners, private respondent’s complaint charged them for allegedly violating, to wit: 1)
Section 261(y)(2) and Section 261(y)(5) of the Omnibus Election Code, and 2) Section 12 of the Voter’s Registration Act; however, the COMELEC En
Banc directed in the assailed Resolutions, that they be charged for violations of Section 10(g) and (j), in relation to Section 45(j) of the Voter’s Registration
Act. Essentially, petitioners are of the view that they were not accorded due process of law. Specifically, their right to refute or submit documentary
evidence against the new charges which COMELEC ordered to be filed against them. Moreover, petitioners insist that Section 45(j) of the Voter’s
Registration Act is vague as it does not refer to a definite provision of the law, the violation of which would constitute an election offense; hence, it runs
contrary to Section 14(1)25 and Section 14(2),26 Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
We are not persuaded.
First. The Complaint-Affidavit filed by private respondent with the COMELEC is couched in a language which embraces the allegations necessary to
support the charge for violation of Section 10(g) and (j), in relation to Section 45(j) of Republic Act No. 8189.
A reading of the relevant laws is in order, thus:
Section 10(g) and Section 10(j) of Republic Act No. 8189, provide as follows:
SEC. 10 – Registration of Voters. - A qualified voter shall be registered in the permanent list of voters in a precinct of the city or municipality
wherein he resides to be able to vote in any election. To register as a voter, he shall personally accomplish an application form for registration as
prescribed by the Commission in three (3) copies before the Election Officer on any date during office hours after having acquired the
qualifications of a voter.
The application shall contain the following data:
xxxx
(g) Periods of residence in the Philippines and in the place of registration;
xxxx
(j) A statement that the application is not a registered voter of any precinct;
The application for registration shall contain three (3) specimen signatures of the applicant, clear and legible rolled prints of his left and right
 thumbprints, with four identification size copies of his latest photograph, attached thereto, to be taken at the expense of the Commission.
Before the applicant accomplishes his application for registration, the Election Officer shall inform him of the qualifications and
disqualifications prescribed by law for a voter, and thereafter, see to it that the accomplished application contains all the data therein required
and that the applicant’s specimen signatures, fingerprints, and photographs are properly affixed in all copies of the voter’s application.
Moreover, Section 45(j) of the same Act, recites, thus:
SEC. 45. Election Offense. – The following shall be considered election offenses under this Act:
xxxx
(j) Violation of any of the provisions of this Act.
Significantly, the allegations in the Complaint-Affidavit which was filed with the Law Department of the COMELEC, support the charge directed by the
COMELEC En Banc to be filed against petitioners with the RTC. Even a mere perusal of the Complaint-Affidavit would readily show that Section 10 of
Republic Act No. 8189 was specifically mentioned therein. On the matter of the acts covered by Section 10(g) and (j), the Complaint-Affidavit, spells out
the following allegations, to wit:
5. Respondent-spouses made false and untruthful representations in their applications (Annexes "B" and "C") in violation of the requirements of
Section 10, RA 8189 (The Voter’s Registration Act):
5.1 Respondent-spouses, in their sworn applications (Annexes "B" and "C", claimed to be residents of 935 San Jose [S]treet,
Burauen, Leyte, when in truth and in fact, they were and still are residents of 113 Mariposa Loop, Mariposa [S]treet, Bagong
Lipunan ng Crame, Quezon City and registered voters of Barangay Bagong Lipunan ng Crame, District IV, Quezon City, Precinct
No. 4419-A, a copy of the Certification issued by Hon. Emmanuel V. Gozon, Punong Barangay, Bagong Lipunan ng Crame, Quezon
City is hereto attached and made an integral part hereof, as Annex "D";
5.2 Respondent-spouses knowing fully well said truth, intentionally and willfully, did not fill the blank spaces in their applications
(Annexes "B" and "C") corresponding to the length of time they have resided in Burauen, Leyte;
6. Respondent-spouses, in (sic) all intents and purposes, were and still are residents and registered voters of Quezon City, as evidenced by Voter
Registration Record Nos. 26195824 and 26195823, respectively; photocopies of which are hereto attached as Annexes "E" and "F"[.] Likewise,
attached is a "Certification" (Annex "G") of Ms. Evelyn B. Bautista, Officer-in-Charge of the Office of the Election Officer, Fourth District,
Quezon City, dated May 31, 2000, together with a certified copy of the computer print-out of the list of voters of Precinct No. 4419-A (Annex
"G-1" ) containing the names of voters Carlos Romualdez and Erlinda Reyes Romualdez. The Certification reads as follows:
"THIS IS TO CERTIFY that as per office record MR. CARLOS ROMUALDEZ and MS. ERLINDA REYES ROMUALDEZ are
registered voters of Barangay Bagong Lipunan ng Crame, District IV, Quezon City, Precinct Number 4419A with voters affidavit
serial nos. 26195824 and 26195823, respectively.
This certification is issued for whatever legal purpose it may serve."
7. Respondent-spouses, registered as new voters of the Municipality of Burauen, Leyte, [in spite of] the fact that they were and still are,
registered voters of Quezon City as early as June 22, 1997;
7.1 That, Double Registration is an election offense.
A person qualified as a voter is only allowed to register once.
If a person registers anew as a voter in spite of a subsisting registration, the new application for registration will be disapproved. The
registrant is also liable not only for an election offense of double registration, but also for another election offense of knowingly
making any false or untruthful statement relative to any data or information required in the application for registration.
In fact, when a person applies for registration as a voter, he or she fills up a Voter Registration Record form in his or her own
handwriting, which contains a Certification which reads:
"I do solemnly swear that the above statements regarding my person are true and correct; that I possess all the qualifications and
none of the disqualifications of a voter; that the thumbprints, specimen signatures and photographs appearing herein are mine; and
that I am not registered as a voter in any other precinct."27
Petitioners cannot be said to have been denied due process on the claim that the election offenses charged against them by private respondent are entirely
different from those for which they stand to be accused of before the RTC, as charged by the COMELEC. In the first place, there appears to be no
incongruity between the charges as contained in the Complaint-Affidavit and the Informations filed before the RTC, notwithstanding the denomination by
private respondent of the alleged violations to be covered by Section 261(y)(2) and Section 261(y)(5) of the Omnibus Election Code and Section 12 of
Republic Act No. 8189. Evidently, the Informations directed to be filed by the COMELEC against petitioners, and which were, in fact, filed with the RTC,
were based on the same set of facts as originally alleged in the private respondent’s Complaint-Affidavit.

Petitioners buttress their claim of lack of due process by relying on the case of Lacson v. Executive Secretary.28 Citing Lacson, petitioners argue that the
real nature of the criminal charge is determined by the actual recital of facts in the Complaint or Information; and that the object of such written
accusations was to furnish the accused with such a description of the charge against him, as will enable him to make his defense. Let it be said that, in
Lacson, this court resolved the issue of whether under the allegations in the subject Informations therein, it is the Sandiganbayan or the Regional Trial
Court which has jurisdiction over the multiple murder case against therein petitioner and intervenors. In Lacson, we underscored the elementary rule that
the jurisdiction of a court is determined by the allegations in the Complaint or Information, and not by the evidence presented by the parties at the trial. 29
Indeed, in Lacson, we articulated that the real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the caption or preamble of the Information nor from the
specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, they being conclusions of law, but by the actual recital of facts in the Complaint or
Information.30
Petitioners’ reliance on Lacson, however, does not support their claim of lack of due process because, as we have said, the charges contained in private
respondent’s Complaint-Affidavit and the charges as directed by the COMELEC to be filed are based on the same set of facts. In fact, the nature of the
criminal charges in private respondent’s Complaint-Affidavit and that of the charges contained in the Informations filed with the RTC, pursuant to the
COMELEC Resolution En Banc are the same, such that, petitioners cannot claim that they were not able to refute or submit documentary evidence against
the charges that the COMELEC filed with the RTC. Petitioners were afforded due process because they were granted the opportunity to refute the
allegations in private respondent’s Complaint-Affidavit. On 2 April 2001, in opposition to the Complaint-Affidavit, petitioners filed a Joint Counter-
Affidavit with Motion to Dismiss with the Law Department of the COMELEC. They similarly filed a Memorandum before the said body. Finding that due
process was not dispensed with under the circumstances in the case at bar, we agree with the stance of the Office of the Solicitor General that petitioners
were reasonably apprised of the nature and description of the charges against them. It likewise bears stressing that preliminary investigations were
conducted whereby petitioners were informed of the complaint and of the evidence submitted against them. They were given the opportunity to adduce
controverting evidence for their defense. In all these stages, petitioners actively participated.

The instant case calls to our minds Orquinaza v. People,31 wherein the concerned police officer therein designated the offense charged as sexual
harassment; but, the prosecutor found that there was no transgression of the anti-sexual harassment law, and instead, filed an Information charging therein
petitioner with acts of lasciviousness. On a claim that there was deprivation of due process, therein petitioner argued that the Information for acts of
lasciviousness was void as the preliminary investigation conducted was for sexual harassment. The court held that the designation by the police officer of
the offense is not conclusive as it is within the competence of the prosecutor to assess the evidence submitted and determine therefrom the appropriate
offense to be charged.
Accordingly, the court pronounced that the complaint contained all the allegations to support the charge of acts of lasciviousness under the Revised Penal
Code; hence, the conduct of another preliminary investigation for the offense of acts of lasciviousness would be a futile exercise because the complainant
would only be presenting the same facts and evidence which have already been studied by the prosecutor. 32 The court frowns upon such superfluity which
only serves to delay the prosecution and disposition of the criminal complaint.33
Second. Petitioners would have this court declare Section 45(j) of Republic Act No. 8189 vague, on the ground that it contravenes the fair notice
requirement of the 1987 Constitution, in particular, Section 14(1) and Section 14(2), Article III of thereof. Petitioners submit that Section 45(j) of Republic
Act No. 8189 makes no reference to a definite provision of the law, the violation of which would constitute an election offense.
We are not convinced.
The void-for-vagueness doctrine holds that a law is facially invalid if men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its
application.34 However, this Court has imposed certain limitations by which a criminal statute, as in the challenged law at bar, may be scrutinized. This
Court has declared that facial invalidation 35 or an "on-its-face" invalidation of criminal statutes is not appropriate. 36 We have so enunciated in no uncertain
terms in Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan, 37 thus:
In sum, the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are analytical tools developed for testing "on their faces" statutes in free
speech cases or, as they are called in American law, First Amendment cases. They cannot be made to do service when what is involved is a
criminal statute. With respect to such statute, the established rule is that 'one to whom application of a statute is constitutional will not be heard
to attack the statute on the ground that impliedly it might also be taken as applying to other persons or other situations in which its application
might be unconstitutional.' As has been pointed out, 'vagueness challenges in the First Amendment context, like overbreadth challenges typically
produce facial invalidation, while statutes found vague as a matter of due process typically are invalidated [only] 'as applied' to a particular
defendant.'" (underscoring supplied)
"To this date, the Court has not declared any penal law unconstitutional on the ground of ambiguity." While mentioned in passing in some cases,
the void-for-vagueness concept has yet to find direct application in our jurisdiction. In Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, the Bookkeeping Act was found
unconstitutional because it violated the equal protection clause, not because it was vague. Adiong v. Comelec decreed as void a mere Comelec
Resolution, not a statute. Finally, Santiago v. Comelec held that a portion of RA 6735 was unconstitutional because of undue delegation of
legislative powers, not because of vagueness.
Indeed, an "on-its-face" invalidation of criminal statutes would result in a mass acquittal of parties whose cases may not have even
reached the courts. Such invalidation would constitute a departure from the usual requirement of "actual case and controversy" and
permit decisions to be made in a sterile abstract context having no factual concreteness. In Younger v. Harris, this evil was aptly pointed
out by the U.S. Supreme Court in these words:
"[T]he task of analyzing a proposed statute, pinpointing its deficiencies, and requiring correction of these deficiencies before the statute is put
into effect, is rarely if ever an appropriate task for the judiciary. The combination of the relative remoteness of the controversy, the impact on the
legislative process of the relief sought, and above all the speculative and amorphous nature of the required line-by-line analysis of detailed
statutes, x x x ordinarily results in a kind of case that is wholly unsatisfactory for deciding constitutional questions, whichever way they might
be decided."
For this reason, generally disfavored is an on-its-face invalidation of statutes, described as a "manifestly strong medicine" to be
employed "sparingly and only as a last resort." In determining the constitutionality of a statute, therefore, its provisions that have
allegedly been violated must be examined in the light of the conduct with which the defendant has been charged. (Emphasis supplied.)
At the outset, we declare that under these terms, the opinions of the dissent which seek to bring to the fore the purported ambiguities of a long list of
provisions in Republic Act No. 8189 can be deemed as a facial challenge. An appropriate "as applied" challenge in the instant Petition should be limited
only to Section 45 (j) in relation to Sections 10 (g) and (j) of Republic Act No. 8189—the provisions upon which petitioners are charged. An expanded
examination of the law covering provisions which are alien to petitioners’ case would be antagonistic to the rudiment that for judicial review to be
exercised, there must be an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for determination, and not conjectural or anticipatory.

We further quote the relevant ruling in David v. Arroyo on the proscription anent a facial challenge:38
Moreover, the overbreadth doctrine is not intended for testing the validity of a law that "reflects legitimate state interest in maintaining
comprehensive control over harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct." Undoubtedly, lawless violence, insurrection and rebellion are
considered "harmful" and "constitutionally unprotected conduct." In Broadrick v. Oklahoma, it was held:
It remains a matter of no little difficulty to determine when a law may properly be held void on its face and when such summary action is
inappropriate. But the plain import of our cases is, at the very least, that facial overbreadth adjudication is an exception to our
traditional rules of practice and that its function, a limited one at the outset, attenuates as the otherwise unprotected behavior that it
 forbids the State to sanction moves from pure speech toward conduct and that conduct even if expressive falls within the scope of
otherwise valid criminal laws that reflect legitimate state interests in maintaining comprehensive controls over harmful, constitutionally
unprotected conduct.
Thus, claims of facial overbreadth are entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only "spoken words" and
again, that "overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have been curtailed when invoked against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to
be applied to protected conduct." Here, the incontrovertible fact remains that PP 1017 pertains to a spectrum of conduct, not free speech,
which is manifestly subject to state regulation.
Second, facial invalidation of laws is considered as "manifestly strong medicine," to be used "sparingly and only as a last resort," and is
"generally disfavored;" The reason for this is obvious. Embedded in the traditional rules governing constitutional adjudication is the principle
that a person to whom a law may be applied will not be heard to challenge a law on the ground that it may conceivably be applied
unconstitutionally to others, i.e., in other situations not before the Court. A writer and scholar in Constitutional Law explains further:
The most distinctive feature of the overbreadth technique is that it marks an exception to some of the usual rules of constitutional
litigation. Ordinarily, a particular litigant claims that a statute is unconstitutional as applied to him or her; if the litigant prevails, the
courts carve away the unconstitutional aspects of the law by invalidating its improper applications on a case to case basis. Moreover,
challengers to a law are not permitted to raise the rights of third parties and can only assert their own interests. In overbreadth
analysis, those rules give way; challenges are permitted to raise the rights of third parties; and the court invalidates the entire statute "on
its face," not merely "as applied for" so that the overbroad law becomes unenforceable until a properly authorized court construes it more
narrowly. The factor that motivates courts to depart from the normal adjudicatory rules is the concern with the "chilling;" deterrent effect of the
overbroad statute on third parties not courageous enough to bring suit. The Court assumes that an overbroad laws "very existence may cause
others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or expression." An overbreadth ruling is designed to remove that
deterrent effect on the speech of those third parties.
In other words, a facial challenge using the overbreadth doctrine will require the Court to examine PP 1017 and pinpoint its flaws and defects,
not on the basis of its actual operation to petitioners, but on the assumption or prediction that its very existence may cause others not before the
Court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or expression.
Xxx xxx xxx
And third, a facial challenge on the ground of overbreadth is the most difficult challenge to mount successfully, since the challenger must
establish that there can be no instance when the assailed law may be valid. Here, petitioners did not even attempt to show whether this
situation exists.
Petitioners likewise seek a facial review of PP 1017 on the ground of vagueness. This, too, is unwarranted.
Related to the "overbreadth" doctrine is the "void for vagueness doctrine" which holds that "a law is facially invalid if men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application." It is subject to the same principles governing overbreadth
doctrine. For one, it is also an analytical tool for testing "on their faces" statutes in free speech cases. And like overbreadth, it is said that a
litigant may challenge a statute on its face only if it is vague in all its possible applications.
Be that as it may, the test in determining whether a criminal statute is void for uncertainty is whether the language conveys a sufficiently definite warning
as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practice. 39 This Court has similarly stressed that the vagueness doctrine merely
requires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld - not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude. 40

As structured, Section 4541 of Republic Act No. 8189 makes a recital of election offenses under the same Act. Section 45(j) is, without doubt, crystal in its
specification that a violation of any of the provisions of Republic Act No. 8189 is an election offense. The language of Section 45(j) is precise. The
challenged provision renders itself to no other interpretation. A reading of the challenged provision involves no guesswork. We do not see herein an
uncertainty that makes the same vague.
Notably, herein petitioners do not cite a word in the challenged provision, the import or meaning of which they do not understand. This is in stark contrast
to the case of Estrada v. Sandiganbayan42 where therein petitioner sought for statutory definition of particular words in the challenged statute. Even then,
the Court in Estrada rejected the argument.
This Court reasoned:
The rationalization seems to us to be pure sophistry. A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because general terms are used
therein, or because of the employment of terms without defining them; much less do we have to define every word we use. Besides, there
is no positive constitutional or statutory command requiring the legislature to define each and every word in an enactment. Congress is
not restricted in the form of expression of its will, and its inability to so define the words employed in a statute will not necessarily result in the
vagueness or ambiguity of the law so long as the legislative will is clear, or at least, can be gathered from the whole act, which is distinctly
expressed in the Plunder Law."
Moreover, it is a well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics that words of a statute will be interpreted in their natural, plain and
ordinary acceptation and signification, unless it is evident that the legislature intended a technical or special legal meaning to those
words. The intention of the lawmakers who are, ordinarily, untrained philologists and lexicographers to use statutory phraseology in such a
manner is always presumed.
Perforce, this Court has underlined that an act will not be held invalid merely because it might have been more explicit in its wordings or detailed in its
provisions, especially where, because of the nature of the act, it would be impossible to provide all the details in advance as in all other statutes. 43
The evident intent of the legislature in including in the catena of election offenses the violation of any of the provisions of Republic Act No. 8189, is to
subsume as punishable, not only the commission of proscribed acts, but also the omission of acts enjoined to be observed. On this score, the declared
policy of Republic Act No. 8189 is illuminating. The law articulates the policy of the State to systematize the present method of registration in order to
establish a clean, complete, permanent and updated list of voters. A reading of Section 45 (j) conjointly with the provisions upon which petitioners are
charged, i.e., Sections 10 (g) and (j) would reveal that the matters that are required to be set forth under the aforesaid sections are crucial to the
achievement of a clean, complete, permanent and updated list of voters. The factual information required by the law is sought not for mere embellishment.
There is a definitive governmental purpose when the law requires that such facts should be set forth in the application. The periods of residence in the
Philippines and in the place of registration delve into the matter of residency, a requisite which a voter must satisfy to be deemed a qualified voter and
registered in the permanent list of voters in a precinct of the city or municipality wherein he resides. Of even rationality exists in the case of the
requirement in Section 10 (j), mandating that the applicant should state that he/she is not a registered voter of any precinct. Multiple voting by so-called
flying voters are glaring anomalies which this country strives to defeat. The requirement that such facts as required by Section 10 (g) and Section 10 (j) be
stated in the voter’s application form for registration is directly relevant to the right of suffrage, which the State has the right to regulate.

It is the opportune time to allude to the case of People v. Gatchalian44 where the therein assailed law contains a similar provision as herein assailed before
us. Republic Act No. 602 also penalizes any person who willfully violates any of the provisions of the Act. The Court dismissed the challenged, and
declared the provision constitutional. The Court in Gatchalian read the challenged provision, "any of the provisions of this [A]ct" conjointly with Section 3
thereof which was the pertinent portion of the law upon which therein accused was prosecuted. Gatchalian considered the terms as all-embracing; hence,
the same must include what is enjoined in Section 3 thereof which embodies the very fundamental purpose for which the law has been adopted. This Court
ruled that the law by legislative fiat intends to punish not only those expressly declared unlawful but even those not so declared but are clearly enjoined to
be observed to carry out the fundamental purpose of the law.45 Gatchalian remains good law, and stands unchallenged.

It also does not escape the mind of this Court that the phraseology in Section 45(j) is employed by Congress in a number of our laws. 46 These provisions
have not been declared unconstitutional.

Moreover, every statute has in its favor the presumption of validity. 47 To justify its nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the
Constitution, and not one that is doubtful, speculative or argumentative. 48 We hold that petitioners failed to overcome the heavy presumption in favor of
the law. Its constitutionality must be upheld in the absence of substantial grounds for overthrowing the same.
A salient point. Courts will refrain from touching upon the issue of constitutionality unless it is truly unavoidable and is the very lis mota. In the case at bar,
the lis mota is the alleged grave abuse of discretion of the COMELEC in finding probable cause for the filing of criminal charges against petitioners.
Third. Petitioners maintain that the COMELEC En Banc, premised its finding on a misapprehension of facts, and committed grave abuse of discretion in
directing the filing of Informations against them with the RTC.
We are once again unimpressed.

The constitutional grant of prosecutorial power in the COMELEC finds statutory expression under Section 265 49 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise
known as the Omnibus Election Code. 50 The task of the COMELEC whenever any election offense charge is filed before it is to conduct the preliminary
investigation of the case, and make a determination of probable cause. Under Section 8(b), Rule 34 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, the investigating
officer makes a determination of whether there is a reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed. 51 In Baytan v. COMELEC,52 this Court,
sufficiently elucidated on the matter of probable cause in the prosecution of election offenses, viz:
It is also well-settled that the finding of probable cause in the prosecution of election offenses rests in the COMELEC's sound discretion. The
COMELEC exercises the constitutional authority to investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases for violation of election laws, including
acts or omissions constituting election frauds, offense and malpractices. Generally, the Court will not interfere with such finding of the
COMELEC absent a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion. This principle emanates from the COMELEC's exclusive power to conduct
preliminary investigation of all election offenses punishable under the election laws and to prosecute the same, except as may otherwise be
provided by law.53
It is succinct that courts will not substitute the finding of probable cause by the COMELEC in the absence of grave abuse of discretion. The abuse
of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to
act at all in contemplation of law as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility.54
According to the COMELEC En Banc, the investigating officer, in the case at bar, held that there was sufficient cause for the filing of criminal charges
against petitioners, and found no reason to depart therefrom. Without question, on May 9 and 11 of 2001, petitioners applied for registration as new voters
with the Office of the Election Officer of Burauen, Leyte, notwithstanding the existence of petitioners’ registration records as registered voters of Precinct
No. 4419-A of Barangay Bagong Lipunan ng Crame, District IV, Quezon City. The directive by the COMELEC which affirmed the Resolution 55 of 28
November 2000 of Investigating Officer Atty. Tangaro-Casingal does not appear to be wanting in factual basis, such that a reasonably prudent man would
conclude that there exists probable cause to hold petitioners for trial. Thus, in the aforesaid Resolution, the Investigating Officer, found:
A violation therefore of Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8189 is an election offense.
In the instant case, when respondents Carlos Romualdez and Erlinda Romualdez filed their respective applications for registration as new voters
with the Office of the Election Officer of Burauen, Leyte on May 9 and 11, 2001, respectively, they stated under oath that they are not registered
voters in other precinct (VRR Nos. 42454095 and 07902941). However, contrary to their statements, records show they are still registered
voters of Precinct No. 4419-A, barangay Bagong Lipunan ng Crame, District IV, Quezon City, as per VRR Nos. 26195825 and 26195823. In
other words, respondents’ registration records in Quezon City is (sic) still in existence.
While it may be true that respondents had written the City Election Officer of District IV, Quezon City for cancellation of their voter’s
registration record as voter’s (sic) therein, they cannot presume that the same will be favorably acted upon. Besides, RA 8189 provides for the
procedure in cases of transfer of residence to another city/municipality which must be complied with, to wit:
"Section 12. Change of Residence to Another City or Municipality. – Any registered voter who has transferred residence to another city or
municipality may apply with the Election Officer of his new residence for the transfer of his registration records.
The application for transfer of registration shall be subject to the requirements of notice and hearing and the approval of the Election
Registration Board, in accordance with this Act. Upon approval, of the application for transfer, and after notice of such approval to the Election
Officer of their former residence of the voter, said Election Officer shall transmit by registered mail the voter’s registration record to the
Election Officer of the voter’s new residence."
They cannot claim ignorance of the abovestated provision on the procedure for transfer of registration records by reason of transferred new
residence to another municipality. Based on the affidavit executed by one Eufemia S. Cotoner, she alleged that the refusal of the Assistant
Election Officer Ms. Estrella Perez to accept the letter of respondents was due to improper procedure because respondents should have filed the
 required request for transfer with the Election Officer of Burauen, Leyte. Despite this knowledge, however, they proceeded to register as new
voters of Burauen, Leyte, notwithstanding the existence of their previous registrations in Quezon City.
In their subsequent affidavit of Transfer of Voters Registration under Section 12 of Republic Act 8189, respondents admitted that they
erroneously filed an application as a new voter (sic) with the office of the Election Officer of Burauen, Leyte, by reason of an honest mistake,
which they now desire to correct. (underscoring ours).
Respondents lose sight of the fact that a statutory offense, such as violation of election law, is mala prohibita. Proof of criminal intent is not
necessary. Good faith, ignorance or lack of malice is beside the point. Commission of the act is sufficient. It is the act itself that is punished.
xxxx
In view of the foregoing, the Law Department respectfully submits that there is probable cause to hold respondents Carlos Romualdez and
Erlinda Romualdez for trial in violation of Section 10(g) and (j) in relation to Section 45(j) of Republic Act No. 8189. There is no doubt that
they applied for registration as new voters of Burauen, Leyte consciously, freely and voluntarily. 56
We take occasion to reiterate that the Constitution grants to the COMELEC the power to prosecute cases or violations of election laws. Article IX (C),
Section 2 (6) of the 1987 Constitution, provides:
(6) File, upon a verified complaint, or on its own initiative, petitions in court for inclusion or exclusion of voters; investigate and where
appropriate, prosecute cases or violations of election laws, including acts or omissions constituting election frauds, offenses, and malpractices.

This power to prosecute necessarily involves the power to determine who shall be prosecuted, and the corollary right to decide whom not to prosecute. 57
Evidently, must this power to prosecute also include the right to determine under which laws prosecution will be pursued. The courts cannot dictate the
prosecution nor usurp its discretionary powers. As a rule, courts cannot interfere with the prosecutor’s discretion and control of the criminal prosecution. 58
Its rationale cannot be doubted. For the business of a court of justice is to be an impartial tribunal, and not to get involved with the success or failure of the
prosecution to prosecute.59 Every now and then, the prosecution may err in the selection of its strategies, but such errors are not for neutral courts to
rectify, any more than courts should correct the blunders of the defense.60

Fourth. In People v. Delgado,61 this Court said that when the COMELEC, through its duly authorized law officer, conducts the preliminary investigation of
an election offense and upon a prima facie finding of a probable cause, files the Information in the proper court, said court thereby acquires jurisdiction
over the case. Consequently, all the subsequent disposition of said case must be subject to the approval of the court. The records show that Informations
charging petitioners with violation of Section 10(g) and (j), in relation to Section 45(j) of Republic Act No. 8189 had been filed with the RTC. The case
must, thus, be allowed to take its due course.
It may be recalled that petitioners prayed for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order or Writ of Preliminary Injunction before this Court to restrain
the COMELEC from executing its Resolutions of 11 June 2004 and 27 January 2005. In a Resolution dated 20 June 2006, this Court En Banc denied for
lack of merit petitioners’ Motion Reiterating Prayer for Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and to Cite for Indirect Contempt. Logically, the normal
course of trial is expected to have continued in the proceedings a quo.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The assailed Resolutions, dated 11 June 2004 and 27 January 2005 of the COMELEC En Banc are
AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

Dissenting Opinion
ANTONIO T. CARPIO MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice Associate Justice

*RENATO C. CORONA CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice Associate Justice

Dissenting Opinion
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice Associate Justice
 PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice Associate Justice

RUBEN T. REYES TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before
the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

Footnotes
* On leave.
1Penned by Commissioner Florentino A. Tuason, Jr. with the concurrence of Commissioners Rufino S. B. Javier, Mehol K. Sadain,
Resurreccion Z. Borra, Virgilio O. Garcillano and Manuel A. Barcelona, Jr.; Rollo, pp. 23-27.
2Penned by Commissioner Virgilio O. Garcillano with the concurrence of Commissioners Mehol K. Sadain, Resurreccion Z. Borra, Florentino
A. Tuason, Jr., and Manuel A. Barcelona, Jr. Chairman Benjamin S. Abalos and Commissioner Rufino S.B. Javier took no part. Rollo, pp. 28-30.
3SEC. 10. Registration of Voters. – A qualified voter shall be registered in the permanent list of voters in a precinct of the city or municipality
wherein he resides to be able to vote in any election. To register as a voter, he shall personally accomplish an application form for registration as
prescribed by the Commission in three (3) copies before the Election Officer on any date during office hours after having acquired the
qualifications of a voter.
The application shall contain the following data:
a) Name, surname, middle name, and/or maternal surname;
b) Sex;
c) Date, and place of birth;
d) Citizenship;
e) Civil status, if married, name of spouse;
f) Profession, occupation or work;
g) Periods of residence in the Philippines and in the place of registration;
h) Exact address with the name of the street and house number for location in the precinct maps maintained by the local office of the
Commission, or in case there is none, a brief description of his residence sitio and Barangay;
i) A statement that the applicant possesses all the qualifications of a voter;
j) A statement that the application is not a registered voter of any precinct; and
k) Such information or data as may be required by the Commission.
The application for registration shall contain three (3) specimen signatures of the applicant, clear and legible rolled prints of his left
and right thumbprints, with four identification size copies of his latest photograph, attached thereto, to be taken at the expense of the
Commission.
Before the applicant accomplishes his application for registration, the Election Officer shall inform him of the qualifications and
disqualifications prescribed by law for a voter, and thereafter, see to it that the accomplished application contains all the data therein
required and that the applicant’s specimen signatures, fingerprints, and photographs are properly affixed in all copies of the voter’s
application.
4 SEC. 45. Election Offense. – The following shall be considered election offenses under this Act.
EN BANC
SPOUSES CARLOS S. ROMUALDEZ and ERLINDA R. G. R. No. 167011
ROMUALDEZ,
Present:
Petitioners, PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
- versus -
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and DENNIS GARAY, CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
AZCUNA,
Respondents. TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
REYES,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and
BRION, JJ.
Promulgated:
December 11, 2008
x--------------------------------------------------x
RES OLUTIO N
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

For resolution is the Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioner Spouses Carlos Romualdez and Erlinda Romualdez on 26 May 2008 from the Decision
of this Court dated 30 April 2008, affirming the Resolutions, dated 11 June 2004 and 27 January 2005 of the COMELEC En Banc.
We find that petitioner has not raised substantially new grounds to justify the reconsideration sought. Instead, petitioner presents averments that are mere
rehashes of arguments already considered by the Court. There is, thus, no cogent reason to warrant a reconsideration of this Courts Decision.
Similarly, we reject the contentions put forth by esteemed colleagues Mr. Justice Dante O. Tinga in his Dissent, dated 2 September 2008, which are also
mere reiterations of his earlier dissent against the majority opinion. Mr. Justice Tingas incessant assertions proceed from the wrong premise. To be clear,
this Court did not intimate that penal statutes are beyond scrutiny. In our Decision, dated 30 April 2008, this Court emphasized the critical limitations by
which a criminal statute may be challenged. We drew a lucid boundary between an on-its-face invalidation and an as applied challenge. Unfortunately, this
is a distinction which Mr. Justice Tinga has refused to understand. Let it be underscored that on-its-face invalidation of penal statutes, as is sought to be
done by petitioners in this case, may not be allowed. Thus, we said:
The void-for-vagueness doctrine holds that a law is facially invalid if men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its
application. However, this Court has imposed certain limitations by which a criminal statute, as in the challenged law at bar, may be scrutinized. This
Court has declared that facial invalidation or an on-its-face invalidation of criminal statutes is not appropriate. We have so enunciated in no uncertain
terms in Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan, thus:
In sum, the doctrines of strict scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are analytical tools developed for testing "on their faces" statutes in free speech cases
or, as they are called in American law, First Amendment cases. They cannot be made to do service when what is involved is a criminal statute. With respect
to such statute, the established rule is that 'one to whom application of a statute is constitutional will not be heard to attack the statute on the ground that
impliedly it might also be taken as applying to other persons or other situations in which its application might be unconstitutional.' As has been pointed out,
'vagueness challenges in the First Amendment context, like overbreadth challenges typically produce facial invalidation, while statutes found vague as a
matter of due process typically are invalidated [only] 'as applied' to a particular defendant.'" (underscoring supplied)
"To this date, the Court has not declared any penal law unconstitutional on the ground of ambiguity." While mentioned in passing in some cases, the void-
for-vagueness concept has yet to find direct application in our jurisdiction. In Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, the Bookkeeping Act was found unconstitutional
because it violated the equal protection clause, not because it was vague. Adiong v. Comelec decreed as void a mere Comelec Resolution, not a statute.
Finally, Santiago v. Comelec held that a portion of RA 6735 was unconstitutional because of undue delegation of legislative powers, not because of
vagueness.
Indeed, an "on-its-face" invalidation of criminal statutes would result in a mass acquittal of parties whose cases may not have even reached the
courts. Such invalidation would constitute a departure from the usual requirement of "actual case and controversy" and permit decisions to be
made in a sterile abstract context having no factual concreteness. In Younger v. Harris, this evil was aptly pointed out by the U.S. Supreme Court in
these words:

"[T]he task of analyzing a proposed statute, pinpointing its deficiencies, and requiring correction of these deficiencies before the statute is put into effect, is
rarely if ever an appropriate task for the judiciary. The combination of the relative remoteness of the controversy, the impact on the legislative process of
the relief sought, and above all the speculative and amorphous nature of the required line-by-line analysis of detailed statutes, x x x ordinarily results in a
kind of case that is wholly unsatisfactory for deciding constitutional questions, whichever way they might be decided."
For this reason, generally disfavored is an on-its-face invalidation of statutes, described as a "manifestly strong medicine" to be employed
"sparingly and only as a last resort." In determining the constitutionality of a statute, therefore, its provisions that have allegedly been violated
must be examined in the light of the conduct with which the defendant has been charged. (Emphasis supplied.)[1]

Neither does the listing by Mr. Justice Tinga of what he condemns as offenses under Republic Act No. 8189 convince this Court to overturn its ruling.
What is crucial in this case is the rule set in our case books and precedents that a facial challenge is not the proper avenue to challenge the statute under
consideration. In our Decision of 30 April 2008, we enunciated that the opinions of the dissent which seek to bring to the fore the purported ambiguities of
a long list of provisions in Republic Act No. 8189 can be deemed as a facial challenge.[2] On this matter, we held:
An appropriate as applied challenge in the instant Petition should be limited only to Section 45 (j) in relation to Sections 10 (g) and (j) of Republic Act No.
8189the provisions upon which petitioners are charged. An expanded examination of the law covering provisions which are alien to petitioners case would
be antagonistic to the rudiment that for judicial review to be exercised, there must be an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for
determination, and not conjectural or anticipatory.[3]

In conclusion, I reiterate that the doctrine embodied in Romualdez and Estrada remains good law. The rule established in our jurisdiction is, only statutes
on free speech, religious freedom, and other fundamental rights may be facially challenged. Under no case may ordinary penal statutes be subjected to a
facial challenge. The rationale is obvious. If a facial challenge to a penal statute is permitted, the prosecution of crimes maybe hampered. No prosecution
would be possible. A strong criticism against employing a facial challenge in the case of penal statutes, if the same is allowed, would effectively go against
the grain of the doctrinal requirement of an existing and concrete controversy before judicial power may be appropriately exercised. A facial challenge
against a penal statute is, at best, amorphous and speculative. It would, essentially, force the court to consider third parties who are not before it. As I have
said in my opposition to the allowance of a facial challenge to attack penal statutes, such a test will impair the States ability to deal with crime. If
warranted, there would be nothing that can hinder an accused from defeating the States power to prosecute on a mere showing that, as applied to third
parties, the penal statute is vague or overbroad, notwithstanding that the law is clear as applied to him.
As structured, Section 45 enumerates acts deemed election offenses under Republic Act No. 8189. The evident intent of the legislature in including in the
catena of election offenses the violation of any of the provisions of Republic Act No. 8189, is to subsume as punishable, not only the commission of
proscribed acts, but also the omission of acts enjoined to be observed. On this score, the declared policy of Republic Act No. 8189 is illuminating. The law
articulates the policy of the State to systematize the present method of registration in order to establish a clean, complete, permanent and updated list of
voters.
In People v. Gatchalian, the Court had the occasion to rule on the validity of the provision of the Minimum Wage Law, which in like manner speaks of a
willful violation of any of the provisions of this Act. This Court upheld the assailed law, and in no uncertain terms declared that the provision is all-
embracing, and the same must include what is enjoined in the Act which embodies the very fundamental purpose for which the law has been adopted.
Finally, as the records would show, petitioners managed to set up an intelligent defense against the informations filed below. By clearly enunciating their
defenses against the accusations hurled at them, and denying their commission thereof, petitioners allegation of vagueness must necessarily be rejected.
Petitioners failed to overcome the heavy presumption of constitutionality in favor of the law. The constitutionality must prevail in the absence of
substantial grounds for overthrowing the same.
The phraseology in Section 45(j) has been employed by Congress in a number of laws which have not been declared unconstitutional:
1) The Cooperative Code
Section 124(4) of Republic Act No. 6938 reads:
Any violation of any provision of this Code for which no penalty is imposed shall be punished by imprisonment of not less than six (6) months nor more
than one (1) year and a fine of not less than One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) or both at the discretion of the Court.
2) The Indigenous Peoples Rights Act

Section 72 of Republic Act No. 8371 reads in part:

Any person who commits violation of any of the provisions of this Act, such as, but not limited to
3) The Retail Trade Liberalization Act

Section 12, Republic Act No. 8762, reads:

Any person who would be found guilty of violation of any provisions of this Act shall be punished by imprisonment of not less than six (6) years and one
(1) day but not more than eight (8) years, and a fine of at least One Million (P1,000,000.00) but not more than Twenty Million (P20,000,000.00).
For reasons so stated, we deny the Motion for Reconsideration.

SO ORDERED.

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice Associate Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice Associate Justice
 RENATO C. CORONA CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice Associate Justice

ADOLFO S. AZCUNA DANTE O. TINGA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

FACTS:
Petitioners Jose Jesus M. Disini, Jr., Rowena S. Disini, Lianne Ivy P. Medina, Janette Toral and Ernesto Sonido, Jr., as taxpayers, file a Petition for
Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the petitioners seek to 1) nullify Sections 4(c)(4), 6, 7, 12 and 19 of RA
10175, otherwise known as the “Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012” for violating the fundamental rights protected under the Constitution; and 2) prohibit
the Respondents, singly and collectively, from enforcing the afore-mentioned provisions of the Cybercrime Act.
Named as Respondents are the Secretary of Justice, the Secretary of the Interior and Local Government, the Executive Director of the Information
Communications Technology Office, the Chief of the Philippine National Police, and the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation.
ISSUES/GROUNDS:
1. Sections 4(c)(4), 6, 7, 12 and 19 of The Cybercrime Act violate the petitioners’ constitutionally protected rights to freedom of expression, due
process, equal protection, privacy of communications, as well as the Constitutional sanctions against double jeopardy, undue delegation of
legislative authority and the right against unreasonable searches and seizure;
• • Sections 6 and 7 of the Cybercrime Act more than doubles the liability for imprisonment for any violation of existing penal laws are
in violation of the petitioners’ right against Double Jeopardy;
• • Section 12 of the Cybercrime Act, which permits the NBI and the PNP “with due cause” to engage in real time collection of traffic
data without the benefit of the intervention of a judge, violates the Petitioners’ Constitutionally-protected right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizure as well as the right to the privacy of communications;
• • Section 19 of the Cybercrime Act, which authorizes the Respondent Secretary of DOJ to block or restrict access to any content
upon a prima facie finding that the same violates the law, contains an undue delegation of legislative authority, infringes upon the
judicial power of the judiciary, and violates the Petitioners’ Constitutionally-protected right to due process and freedom of
expression; and
• • Section 4(c)(4) defines libel as a cybercrime and in relation to Section 6 of the law increased the penalty from 6 months to 4
years and 2 months to the greater period of 6 years to 10 years, infringes upon the right to freedom of expression and also restricts
the freedom of the press. Under Section 12, a prima facie finding by the Secretary of DOJ can trigger an order directed at service
providers to block access to the said material without the benefit of a trial or a conviction. Thus, RA 10175 infringes upon the right to
freedom of expression and also restricts the freedom of the press. The increased penalties, plus the ease by which allegedly libelous
materials can be removed from access, work together as a “chilling effect” upon protected speech.
2. No other plain, speedy, or adequate remedy in the court of law, and that this Petition is therefore cognizable by the SC’s judicial power under
Article VIII, Section 1 par. 2 of the Constitution and pursuant to Rule 65, Sec. 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.
ARGUMENTS/DISCUSSIONS:
1. The Cybercrime Act Violates Free Speech:
• • imposes heavier penalties for online libel than paper-based libel; single act of online libel will result in two convictions penalized
separately under the RP and the Cybercrime Act;
• online libel under the Cybercrime Act will ensure the imprisonment of the accused and for a much longer period. Such changes will
result in a chilling effect upon the freedom of speech;
• • with the passage of the Cybercrime Act, Senator Vicente Sotto III’s earlier threat to criminally prosecute all bloggers and internet
users who were critical of his alleged plagiarism of online materials for use in his speech against the Reproductive Health Bill
became real; threat of criminal prosecution under RA 10175 will work to preclude people such as Petitioners from posting social
commentaries online, thus creating a “chilling effect” upon the freedom of expression;
• • gives the DOJ Secretary blanket authority to restrain and block access to content whether authored by private citizens or the
organized press sans any hearing of any kind but merely upon a mere prima facie showing that a particular Internet article constitutes
online libel;
• • respondents must demonstrate how the Cybercrime Act will fare under strict scrutiny
2. Sections 6 and 7 of the Cybercrime Act violate the Double Jeopardy and Equal Protection Clauses of the Constitution:
• • Persons who commit crimes using information and communication technologies (ICTs) face the possibility of being imprisoned
more than double the imprisonment laid down in the RPC or special law, simply by the passage of the Cybercrime Act;
• • the cybercrimes defined and punished under Section 6 of the Act are absolutely identical to the crimes defined in the RPC and
special laws which raises the possibility that an accused will be punished twice for the same offense in violation of the Constitution;
• • Congress created a class of offenders who commit crimes “by, through or with the use” of ICTs in violation of the equal protection
clause
3. The Real Time Collection of Traffic Date Violate the Right to Privacy and the Right Against Unreasonable Searches and Seizure:
 • • No compelling state interest that justifies real time collection of data; the authority vested on the Philippine National Police and the
National Bureau of Investigation to collect data is not bounded by any reasonable standard except “due cause” which presumably, the
PNP and NBI will determine for itself;
• • While the privacy of suspected terrorists, through the Human Security Act, are protected by the intervention of the Court of Appeals
before surveillance operations are conducted, the privacy of all citizens may be infringed without judicial participation in the
Cybercrime Act;
• • Neither the PNP nor the NBI is required to justify the incursion into the right to privacy;
• No limits imposed upon the PNP or the NBI since they can lawfully collect traffic data at all times without interruption;
• • No stated justification for this warrant-free unlimited incursion into the privacy of citizens
4. The Respondent DOJ Secretary’s Take Down Authority under Section 19 of the Cybercrime Act violates Due Process and is an Undue
Delegation of Legislative Authority
• • The DOJ Secretary’s overwhelming powers to order the restriction or blocking of access to certain content upon a mere prima facie
finding without any need for a judicial determination is in clear violation of petitioners’ Constitutionally protected right to due
process;
• • The Cybercrime Act contemplates that the respondent DOJ Secretary will be “judge, jury and executioner” of all cybercrime-related
complaints;
• To consider that all penal provisions in all specials laws are cybercrimes under Section 6, it • follows that:
1. Complaints filed by intellectual property rights owners may be acted upon the Respondent DOJ Secretary to block access
to websites and content upon a mere prima facie showing of an infringement;
2. Foreign sites (e.g. Amazon.com) offering goods on retail to Philippine citizens may be blocked for violating the Retail
Trade Law;
3. Foreign service providers such as Skype may be blocked from offering voice services without securing a license from the
National Telecommunications Communication;
4. YouTube video may be blocked for presumably violating the IP Code.
• • The Cybercrime Act fails the two tests laid down by the Court in Abakada Guro Party List v. Purisima (GR No. 166715) to
determine the validity of delegation of legislative power: (1) the completeness test and (2) the sufficient standard test
1. Nowhere in the Cybercrime Act’s declaration of policy does it lay down the legislative policy with respect to the blocking
of content. No limits upon the takedown power of the respondent DOJ Secretary;
2. Prima facie standard is not enough to prevent the DOJ Secretary from exercising infinite discretion and becoming the
supreme authority in the Philippine Internet landscape.
PRAYER:
1. Declare null and void, for being unconstitutional, Sections 4(c)(4), 6, 7, 12 and 19 of RA 10175;
2. Prohibit all Respondents from implementing Sections 4(c)(4), 6, 7, 12 and 19 of RA 10175;
3. Issue a TRO enjoining the Respondents from implementing Sections 4(c)(4), 6, 7, 12 and 19 of RA 10175; and
4. Issue other reliefs, just and equitable in the premises.
Case Analysis

Case Summary and Outcome

The Supreme Court of Philippines declared Sections 4(c)(3), 12, and 19 of the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012 as unconstitutional. It held that Section
4(c)(3) violated the right to freedom of expression by prohibiting the electronic transmission of unsolicited commercial communications. It found Section
12 in violation of the right to privacy because it lacked sufficient specificity and definiteness in collecting real-time computer data. It struck down Section
19 of the Act for giving the government the authority to restrict or block access to computer data without any judicial warrant.

Facts
The case arises out of consolidated petitions to the Supreme Court of the Philippines on the constitutionality of several provisions of the Cybercrime
Prevention Act of 2012, Act No. 10175.
The Petitioners argued that even though the Act is the government’s platform in combating illegal cyberspace activities, 21 separate sections of the Act
violate their constitutional rights, particularly the right to freedom of expression and access to inforamtion.

In February 2013, the Supreme Court extended the duration of a temporary restraining order against the government to halt enforcement of the Act until the
adjudication of the issues.
Decision Overview
Justice Abad delivered the Court’s opinion.
The government of Philippines adopted the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012 for the purpose of regulating access to and use of cyberspace. Several
sections of the law define relevant cyber crimes and enable the government to track down and penalize violators.

Among 21 challenged sections, the Court declared Sections 4(c)(3), 12, and 19 of the Act as unconstitutional.

Section 4(c)(3) prohibits the transmission of unsolicited commercial electronic communications, commonly known as spams, that seek to advertise, sell, or
offer for sale of products and services unless the recipient affirmatively consents, or when the purpose of the communication is for service or
administrative announcements from the sender to its existing users, or “when the following conditions are present: (aa) The commercial electronic
communication contains a simple, valid, and reliable way for the recipient to reject receipt of further commercial electronic messages (opt-out) from the
same source; (bb) The commercial electronic communication does not purposely disguise the source of the electronic message; and (cc) The commercial
electronic communication does not purposely include misleading information in any part of the message in order to induce the recipients to read the
message.”
The government argued that unsolicited commercial communications amount to both nuisance and trespass because they tend to interfere with the
enjoyment of using online services and that they enter the recipient’s domain without prior permission.

The Court first noted that spams are a category of commercial speech, which does not receive the same level of protection as other constitutionally
guaranteed forms of expression ,”but is nonetheless entitled to protection.” It ruled that the prohibition on transmitting unsolicited
communications “would deny a person the right to read his emails, even unsolicited commercial ads addressed to him.” Accordingly, the Court declared
Section4(c)(3) as unconstitutional.

Section 12 of the Act authorizes the law enforcement without a court warrant “to collect or record traffic data in real-time associated with specified
communications transmitted by means of a computer system.” Traffic data under this Section includes the origin, destination, route, size, date, and
duration of the communication, but not its content nor the identity of users.
The Petitioners argued that such warrantless authority curtails their civil liberties and set the stage for abuse of discretion by the government. They also
claimed that this provision violates the right to privacy and protection from the government’s intrusion into online communications.

According to the Court, since Section 12 may lead to disclosure of private communications, it must survive the rational basis standard of whether it is
narrowly tailored towards serving a government’s compelling interest. The Court found that the government did have a compelling interest in preventing
cyber crimes by monitoring real-time traffic data.

As to whether Section 12 violated the right to privacy, the Court first recognized that the right at stake concerned informational privacy, defined as “the
right not to have private information disclosed, and the right to live freely without surveillance and intrusion.” In determining whether a communication is
entitled to the right of privacy, the Court applied a two-part test: (1) Whether the person claiming the right has a legitimate expectation of privacy over the
communication, and (2) whether his expectation of privacy can be regarded as objectively reasonable in the society.

The Court noted that internet users have subjective reasonable expectation of privacy over their communications transmitted online. However, it did not
find the expectation as objectively reasonable because traffic data sent through internet “does not disclose the actual names and addresses (residential or
office) of the sender and the recipient, only their coded Internet Protocol (IP) addresses.”

Even though the Court ruled that real-time traffic data under Section 12 does not enjoy the objective reasonable expectation of privacy, the existence of
enough data may reveal the personal information of its sender or recipient, against which the Section fails to provide sufficient safeguard. The Court
viewed the law as “virtually limitless, enabling law enforcement authorities to engage in “fishing expedition,” choosing whatever specified communication
they want.”
Accordingly, the Court struck down Section 12 for lack of specificity and definiteness as to ensure respect for the right to privacy.
Section 19 authorizes the Department of Justice to restrict or block access to a computer data found to be in violation of the Act. The Petitioners argued
that this section also violated the right to freedom of expression, as well as the constitutional protection against unreasonable searches and seizures.

The Court first recognized that computer data constitutes a personal property, entitled to protection against unreasonable searches and seizures. Also, the
Philippines’ Constitution requires the government to secure a valid judicial warrant when it seeks to seize a personal property or to block a form of
expression. Because Section 19 precluded any judicial intervention, the Court found it unconstitutional.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 212398 November 25, 2014
EMILIO RAMON "E.R." P. EJERCITO, Petitioner,
vs.
HON. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and EDGAR "EGA Y" S. SAN LUIS, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Contested in this petition for certiorari under Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court (Rules), is the May 21, 2014 Resolutio 1 of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) En Banc in SPA No. 13-306 (DC), which affirmed the September 26, 2013 Resolution2 of the COMELEC First
Division granting the petition for disqualification filed by private respondent Edgar "Egay" S. San Luis (San Luis) against petitioner Emilio Ramon "E.R."
P. Ejercito (Ejercito). Three days prior to the May 13, 2013 National and Local Elections, a petition for disqualification was filed by San Luis before the
Office of the COMELEC Clerk in Manila against Ejercito, who was a fellow gubernatorial candidate and, at the time, the incumbent Governor of the
Province of Laguna.3 Alleged in his Petition are as follows:
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
5. [Ejercito], during the campaign period for 2013 local election, distributed to the electorates of the province of Laguna the so-called "Orange
Card" with an intent to influence, induce or corrupt the voters in voting for his favor. Copy thereof is hereto attached and marked as Annex "C"
and made as an integral part hereof;
6. In furtherance of his candidacy for the position of Provincial Governor of Laguna, [Ejercito] and his cohorts claimed that the said "Orange
Card" could be used in any public hospital within the Province of Laguna for their medical needs as declared by the statements of witnesses
which are hereto attached and marked as Annex "D" as integral part hereof;
7. The so-called "Orange Card" is considered a material consideration in convincing the voters to cast their votes for [Ejercito’s] favor in clear
violation of the provision of the Omnibus Election Code which provides and I quote:
"Sec. 68. Disqualifications. – Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is a party is declared by final decision by a competent court
guilty of, or found by the Commission of having (a) given money or other materialconsideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or
public officials performing electoral functions; (b) committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy; (c) spent in his election campaign an
amount in excess of that allowed by this Code; (d) solicited, received or made any contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and
104; or (e) violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86, and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, subparagraph 6, shall be disqualified from continuing
as a candidate, or if hehas been elected, from holding the office. Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country
shall not be qualified to run for any elective office under this Code, unless said person has waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant
of a foreign country in accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the election laws." (emphasis ours)
8. Thus, pursuant to the mandate of the aforesaid law, [Ejercito] should be disqualified;
SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
9. Based on the records of the Provincial COMELEC, the Province of Laguna has a total of 1,525,522 registered electorate. A certification
issued by the Provincial Election Supervisor is hereto attached and marked as Annex "E" as an integral part hereof;
10. In this regard, par. (a), Section 5 of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615, otherwise known as the Rules and Regulations Implementing FAIR
ELECTION ACT provides and I quote:
"Authorized Expenses of Candidates and Parties. –The aggregate amount that a candidate or party may spent for election campaign shall be as
follows:
a. For candidates – Three pesos (₱3.00) for every voter currently registered in the constituency where the candidate filed his
certificate of candidacy.
b. For other candidates without any political party and without any support from any political party – Five pesos ( ₱5.00) for every
voter currently registered in the constituency where the candidate filed his certificate of candidacy.
c. For Political Parties and party-list groups – Five pesos (₱5.00) for every voter currently registered in the constituency or
constituencies where it has official candidates. (underscoring mine for emphasis)
11. Accordingly, a candidate for the position of Provincial Governor of Laguna is only authorized to incur an election expense amounting to
FOUR MILLION FIVE HUNDRED SEVENTY-SIX THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED SIXTY-SIX (₱4,576,566.00) PESOS.
12. However, in total disregard and violation of the afore-quoted provision of law, [Ejercito] exceeded his expenditures in relation to his
campaign for the 2013 election. For television campaign commercials alone, [Ejercito] already spent the sum of Ph ₱23,730.784 based on our
party’s official monitoring on the following dates[:] April 28, May 4 & May 5, 2013.

Network Date Program Time Duration Amount*

4 minutes
ABS-CBN April 28, 2013 TV Patrol 5:58 p.m. ₱3,297,496
(approximately)

Sundays Best 4 minutes

ABS-CBN April 28, 2013 10:40 p.m. ₱3,297,496
(local specials) (approximately)

Sunday Night 3 minutes

GMA April 28, 2013 10:46 p.m. ₱2,635,200
Box Office (approximately)

Sunday Night 4 minutes

GMA April 28, 2013 11:06 p.m. ₱2,635,200
Box Office (approximately)
 Sunday Night 4 minutes
GMA April 28, 2013 11:18 p.m. ₱2,635,200
Box Office (approximately)

Sunday Night 4 minutes

GMA April 28, 2013 11:47 p.m. ₱2,635,200
Box Office (approximately)

4 minutes
ABS-CBN May 4, 2013 TODA MAX 11:26 p.m. ₱3,297,496
(approximately)

4 minutes
ABS-CBN May 5, 2013 Rated K 8:06 p.m. ₱3,297,496
(approximately)

Total ₱23,730.784
* Total cost based on published rate card;
13. Even assuming that [Ejercito] was given 30% discount as prescribed under the Fair Election Act, he still exceeded in the total allowable
expenditures for which he paid the sum of ₱16,611,549;
14. In view of the foregoing disquisitions, it is evident that [Ejercito] committed an election offense as provided for under Section 35 of
COMELEC Resolution No. 9615, which provides and I quote:
"Election Offense. – Any violation of R.A. No. 9006 and these Rules shall constitute an election offense punishable under the first and second
paragraph of Section 264 of the Omnibus Election Code in addition to administrative liability, whenever applicable. x x x"
15. Moreover, it is crystal clear that [Ejercito] violated Sec. 68 of the Omnibus Election Code which provides and I quote:
"Sec. 68. Disqualifications. – Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is a party is declared by final decision by a competent court
guilty of, or found by the Commission of having (a) given money or other material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or
public officials performing electoral functions; (b) committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy; (c) spent in his election campaign an
amount in excess of that allowed by this Code; (d) solicited, received or made any contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and
104; or (e) violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86, and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, subparagraph 6, shall be disqualified from continuing
asa candidate, or if he has been elected, from holding the office. Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country
shall not be qualified to run for any elective office under this Code, unless said person has waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant
of a foreign country in accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the election laws." (emphasis ours)
16. On the other hand, the effect of disqualification is provided under Sec. 6 of Republic Act No. 6646, which states and I quote:
"Effect of Disqualification Case. – Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the
votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and
he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of
the action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of
the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of [his] guilt is strong." (emphasis mine)
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully prayed that:
1. Upon filing of this petition, a declaration by the Honorable Commission of the existence of probable cause be made against [Ejercito] for
violating the afore-quoted provisions of laws;
2. In the event that [Ejercito] will beable to get a majority vote of the electorate of the Province of Laguna on May 13, 2013, his proclamation be
suspended until further order of the Honorable Commission pursuant to Sec. 6 of Republic Act No. 6646;
3. Lastly, a criminal case for VIOLATION OF ELECTION LAWS be filed against [Ejercito] before the proper court[;] [and]
4. Other relief, just and equitable underthe premises, are also prayed for.4
Subsequently, on May 16, 2013, San Luis filed a Very Urgent ExParte Motion to Issue Suspension of Possible Proclamation of Respondent and
Supplemental to the Very Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Issue Suspension of Possible Proclamation of Respondent.5 However, these were not acted upon by
the COMELEC. The next day, Ejercito and Ramil L. Hernandez were proclaimed by the Provincial Board of Canvassers as the duly-elected Governor and
Vice-Governor, respectively, of Laguna.6 Based on the Provincial/District Certificate of Canvass, Ejercito obtained 549,310 votes compared with San Luis’
471,209 votes.7
The COMELEC First Division issued a Summons with Notice of Conference on June 4, 2013. 8 Ejercito then filed his Verified Answeron June 13, 2013
that prayed for the dismissal of the petition due to procedural and substantive irregularities and taking into account his proclamation as Provincial
Governor.9 He countered that the petition was improperly filed because, based on the averments and relief prayed for, it is in reality a complaint for
election offenses; thus, the case should have been filed before the COMELEC Law Department, or the election registrar, provincial election supervisor or
regional election director, or the state, provincial or city prosecutor in accordance with Laurel v. Presiding Judge, RTC, Manila, Br. 10. 10 Assuming that
the petition could be given due course, Ejercito argued that San Luis failed to show, conformably with Codilla, Sr. v. Hon. De Venecia,11 that he (Ejercito)
was previously convicted or declared by final judgment of a competent court for being guilty of, or found by the COMELEC of having committed, the
punishable acts under Section 68 of Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Bilang 881, or the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines, as amended (OEC).12
As to the acts he allegedly committed, Ejercito claimed that the same are baseless, unfounded, and totally speculative. He stated that the Health Access
Program or the E.R. "Orange Card" was a priority project of his administration as incumbent Governor of Laguna and was never intended to influence the
electorate during the May 2013 elections. He added that the "Orange Card," which addressed the increasing need for and the high cost of quality health
services, provides the Laguneños not only access to medical services but also the privilege to avail free livelihood seminars to help them find alternative
sources of income. With respect to the charge of having exceeded the total allowable election expenditures, Ejercito submitted that the accusation deserves
no consideration for being speculative, self-serving, and uncorroborated by any other substantial evidence.
Citing Sinaca v. Mula,13 Ejercito asserted that the petition questioning his qualification was rendered moot and academic by his proclamation as the duly-
elected Provincial Governor ofLaguna for the term 2013-2016. He perceived that his successful electoral bid substantiates the fact that he was an eligible
candidate and that his victory is a testament that he is more than qualified and competent to hold public office.
Lastly, Ejercito considered San Luis’ petition for disqualification as purely frivolous and with no plain and clear purpose but to harass and cause undue
hardship. According to him, the fact that it was filed only a few days before the May 13, 2013 elections evidently shows that it was lodged as a last-ditch
effort to baselessly derail and obstruct his assumption of office and function as the duly-elected Laguna Governor.
The scheduled case conference between the parties on June 13, 2013 was reset to June 27, 2013. 14 In the latter date, all the documentary exhibits were
marked in evidence and the parties agreed to file their respective memorandum within ten (10) days.15
San Luis substantially reiterated the content of the Petitionin his Memorandum.16 Additionally, he alleged that:
15. After the election, [San Luis] was able to secure documents from the Information and Education Department of the Commission on Elections showing
that [Ejercito] have incurred advertising expenses with ABS-CBN in the amount of [ ₱20,197,170.25] not to mention his advertisement with GMA 7.
Copies of the summary report, media purchase order, advertising contract[,] and official receipt are marked as EXHS. "B-1", "B-2", "B-3", and"B-4"
(Annexes "A", "B", "C", and "D", supplemental to the very urgent ex-parte motion)[.]17
It was stressed that the case is a "Special Action for Disqualification" seeking to disqualify Ejercito as gubernatorial candidate for violation of Section 68
(a) (c) of the OEC. He prayed that "[t]he Petition BE GRANTED [and] x x x [Ejercito] BE DISQUALIFIED, and PREVENTED from further holding
office as Governor of Laguna."18 In refutation of Ejercito’s defenses, San Luis argued that it is precisely because of the commission of the election
offenses under Section 68 of the OEC that he (Ejercito) should be disqualified. Also, citing Section 6 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6646, 19 San Luis
contended that Ejercito’s proclamation and assumption of office do not affect the COMELEC’s jurisdiction to continue with the trial and hearing of the
action until it is finally resolved.
For his part, Ejercito filed a Manifestation (In Lieu of Memorandum)20 restating all the arguments set forth in his Verified Answer.
On September 26, 2013, the COMELEC First Division promulgated a Resolution, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission (First Division) RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to:
(1) GRANTthe Petition for Disqualification filed against respondent Emilio Ramon "E.R." P. Ejercito;
(2) DISQUALIFY respondent Ejercito from holding the Office of the Provincial Governor of Laguna, pursuant to Section 68 of the Omnibus
Election Code;
(3) ORDER respondent Ejercito to CEASE and DESIST from performing the functions of the Office of the Provincial Governor of Laguna;
(4) DECLARE a permanent VACANCY in the Office of the Provincial Governor of Laguna;
(5) DIRECT the duly elected Vice Governor of Laguna to assume the Office of the Provincial Governor by virtue of succession as provided in
Section 44 of the Local Government Code; and
(6) DIRECT the Campaign Finance Unit to coordinate with the Law Department of this Commission for the conduct of a preliminary
investigation into the alleged violations of campaign finance laws, rules and regulations committed by respondent Ejercito.
SO ORDERED.21
On procedural matters, the COMELEC First Division held that the title of San Luis’ petition and its reliance on Section 68 (a) (c) of the OEC as grounds
for his causes of action clearly show that the case was brought under Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, 22 as amended by COMELEC
Resolution No. 9523,23 which allows petitions for disqualification to be filed "any day after the last day for filing of certificates of candidacy, but not later
than the date of proclamation." No credence was given to Ejercito’s contention that the petition was mooted by his proclamation as Governor of Laguna.
The COMELEC First Division opined that the case of Sinacais inapplicable, because it was not about Sinaca’s eligibility or whether he committed any of
the acts enumerated in Section 68 of the OEC. Consistent with Maquiling v. Commission on Elections,24 it was declared that Ejercito’s garnering of more
votes than San Luis in the May 2013 elections is not tantamount to condonation of any act or acts that he committed which may be found to bea ground for
disqualification or election offense.
The COMELEC First Division settled the substantive issues put forth in the petition for disqualification in this wise:
Anent [San Luis’] first cause of action, [San Luis] presented the Sworn Statement dated [May 7, 2013]of a certain Mrs. Daisy A. Cornelio, together with
the "Orange Card" issued to Mrs. Cornelio, marked respectively as Exhibits "A-4" and "A-3" as per [San Luis’] Summary of Exhibits– to prove that
[Ejercito] committed the act described in Section 68 (a) of the OEC. After reviewing Mrs. Cornelio’s Sworn Statement, we do not find any averment to the
effect that the Orange Card was given to the affiant to influence or induce her to vote for [Ejercito]. Affiant only stated that she was given the Orange Card
"last April of this year" and that she was "not able to use it during those times when [she] or one of [her] family members got sick and needed hospital
assistance." Aside from Mrs. Cornelio’s Sworn Statement, there is no other evidence to support [San Luis’] claim, leading us to reject[San Luis’] first cause
of action.
With respect to the second cause of action, [San Luis] presented Exhibits "B-1" to "B-4", which are submissions made by the ABS-CBN Corporation as
mandated by Section 6 of Republic Act No. 9006 ("RA 9006" or the "Fair Election Act"), implemented through Section 9 (a) of Resolution No. 9615.
Exhibit "B-3" is an Advertising Contractbetween ABS-CBN Corporation and Scenema Concept International, Inc. ("SCI"). The details of the Contractare
as follows:

Payor/Advertiser Scenema Concept International, Inc.

Beneficiary Jeorge "ER" Ejercito Estregan

Broadcast Schedule April 27, 28, May 3, 4, 10 & 11, 2013

Number of Spots 6 spots of 3.5 minutes each

 Unit Cost per Spot PhP 3,366,195.04

Total Cost of Contract PhP 20,197,170.25 plus VAT

The Contract contains the signature of [Ejercito] signifying his acceptance of the donation by SCI, the latter represented by its Executive Vice President,
Ms. Maylyn Enriquez. In addition to the advertising contract, Exhibit "B-4" was submitted, which is a photocopy of an Official Receipt issued by ABS-
CBN for the contract, with the following details:

Date of the Receipt [April 26, 2013]

Received From Scenema Concept International, Inc.

Amount Received PhP 6,409,235.28

Official Receipt No. 278499

Upon verification of the submitted Exhibits "B-1" to "B-4" with this Commission’s Education and Information Department (EID), the latter having custody
of all advertising contracts submitted by broadcast stations and entities in relation tothe [May 13, 2013] National and Local Elections, we find the said
Exhibits tobe faithful reproductions of our file copy of the same. A comparison of [Ejercito’s] signature on the Advertising Contractand that on his
Certificate of Candidacy show them to be identical to each other, leading us to the conclusion that [Ejercito] had indeed accepted the PhP 20,197,170.25
donation in the form of television advertisements to be aired on ABS-CBN’s Channel 2. Even if we were to assume that only PhP 6,409,235.28 was
actually paid out of PhP 20,197,170.25 advertising contract, thisamount is still more than PhP 4,576,566.00, which is [Ejercito’s] total authorized aggregate
amount allowed for his election campaign, computed as follows:

Number of registered Authorized expense Total amount of

voters for the whole x per voter registered = spending allowed
Province of Laguna in the constituency for election campaign

1,525,522 registered
x PhP 3.00 per voter = PhP 4,576,566.00
voters in Laguna
While not presented as evidence in this case, we cannot deny the existence of another Advertising Contract dated [May 8, 2013]for one (1) spot of a 3.5-
minute advertisement scheduled for broadcast on [May 9, 2013], amounting to PhP 3,366,195.05. This Contract also contains the signature of [Ejercito]
accepting the donation from SCI and is accompanied by an ABS-CBN-issued Official Receipt No. 279513 dated [May 7, 2013] in SCI’s name for PhP
6,409,235.28. If we add the amounts from both contracts, we arrive at a total cost of PhP 23,563,365.29, which, coincidentally, is the product of:

Number of spots x Unit cost per spot = Total contract cost

Seven (7) spots x PhP 3,366,195.04 = PhP 23,563,365.28

This matches the data gathered by the Commission’s EID from the reports and logs submitted by broadcast stations as required by the Fair Election Act.
According to the 99-page Daily Operations Log for Channel 2 submitted by ABS-CBN covering the period of [April 27, 2013] to [May 11, 2013],
[Ejercito’s] 3.5-minute or 210-second advertisement was aired seven (7) times. The specific details on the dates of airing, program or time slot when the
advertisements were aired, and the time when the advertisements as culled from the 99-page Daily Operations Logare summarized as thus:

Date aired Program/Time Slot Airtime

28 Apr 2013 TV Patrol Linggo/5:20-5:30 pm 05:54:40 PM

28 Apr 2013 Harapan: Senatorial Debate/9:30-11:30 pm 10:40:13 PM

04 May 2013 TODA MAX/10:30-11:15 pm 11:26:43 PM

05 May 2013 Rated K-Handa Na Ba Kayo/7:15-8:15 pm 08:06:42 PM

09 May 2013 TV Patrol/6:30-7:45 pm 07:35:56 PM

10 May 2013 TV Patrol/6:30-7:45 pm 07:44:50 PM

11 May 2013 TV Patrol Sabado/5:30-6:00 pm 06:12:30 PM

Source: Pages 6, 8, 43, 47, 75, 84, and 93 of ABS-CBN Channel 2 Daily Operations Log for [April 27, 2013] to [May 11, 2013].
Assuming arguendo, that the actual cost of both contracts only amounted to PhP 12,818,470.56 as substantiated by the two (2) Official Receipt sissued by
the ABS-CBN on [April 26] and [May 7, 2013], or even if we were only to consider Exhibit ["B-4"] or the Php 6,409,235.28 payment to ABS-CBN on
[April 26, 2013], it nevertheless supports our finding that [Ejercito] exceeded his authorized expenditure limit of PhP 4,576,566.00 which is a ground for
disqualification under Section 68 (c) and concurrently an election offense pursuant to Section 100 in relation to Section 262 of the Omnibus Election
Code.25
Only Ejercito filed a Verified Motion for Reconsideration before the COMELEC En Banc.26 After the parties’ exchange of pleadings,27 the Resolution of
the COMELEC First Division was unanimously affirmed on May 21, 2014.
The COMELEC En Bancagreed with the findings of its First Division that San Luis’ petition is an action to disqualify Ejercito, reasoning that:
x x x First, the title of the petition indicating that it is a petition for disqualification clearly expresses the objective of the action. Second, it is manifest from
the language of the petition that the causes of action have relied primarily on Section 68 (a) and (c) of the OEC[,] which are grounds for disqualification x
x x. Third, notwithstanding that the relief portion of the petition sounded vague in its prayer for the disqualification of Ejercito, the allegations and
arguments set forth therein are obviously geared towards seeking his disqualification for having committed acts listed as grounds for disqualification in
Section 68 of OEC. Lastly, as correctly observed by the COMELEC First Division, San Luis’ Memorandum addresses and clarifies the intention of the
petition when it prayed for Ejercito to "be disqualified and prevented from holding office as Governor of Laguna." While there is a prayerseeking that
Ejercito be held accountable for having committed election offenses, there can be no doubt that the petition was primarily for his disqualification.
Section 68 of the OEC expressly grants COMELEC the power to take cognizance of an action or protest seeking the disqualification of a candidate who
has committed any of the acts listed therein from continuing as one, or if he or she has been elected, from holding office. One ground for disqualification
listed in Section 68 is spending in an election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by law. It is exactly on said ground that San Luis is seeking the
disqualification of Ejercito. The jurisdiction of COMELEC over the petition, therefore, is clear.28
The alleged violation of Ejercito’s constitutional right to due process was also not sustained: Ejercito insists that he was deprived of his right to notice and
hearing and was not informed of the true nature of the case filed against him when San Luis was allegedly allowed in his memorandum to make as
substantial amendment in the reliefs prayed for in his petition. San Luis was allegedly allowed to seek for Ejercito’s disqualification instead of the filing of
an election offense against him.
As discussed above, the allegations in the petition, particularly the causes of action, clearly show that it is not merely a complaint for an election offense
but a disqualification case against Ejercito as well. San Luis’ memorandum merely amplified and clarified the allegations and arguments in his petition.
There was no change in the cause or causes of action. Ejercito[,] therefore, cannot claim that he was not aware of the true nature of the petition filed against
him.
Likewise, Ejercito cannot complainthat he was deprived of his right to notice and hearing. He cannot feign ignorance that the COMELEC First Division,
throughout the trial, was hearing the petition as a disqualification case and not as an election offense case. He was served with Summons with Notice of
Conference on [June 4, 2013] and was given a copy of the petition. He likewise submitted to the jurisdiction of the Commission when he filed his Verified
Answer. He also participated in the Preliminary Conference on [June 27, 2013] wherein he examined evidence on record and presented his own
documentary exhibits. Lastly, he filed a Manifestation (in lieu of Memorandum) incorporating all his allegations and defenses.
Ejercito contends that amending the reliefs prayed for is prohibited under Section 2, Rule 9 of the 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure. He asserts that the
relief prayed for in the memorandum is not the same as that in the petition. However, a scrutiny of said amendment shows that no new issues were
introduced. Moreover, there was no departure from the causes of action and no material alterations on the grounds of relief. The amendment[,] therefore[,]
is not substantial as it merely rectifies or corrects the true nature of reliefs being prayed for as set forth in the petition. The records of the case will show
that Ejercito has been afforded the opportunity to contest and rebut all the allegations against him. He was never deprived of his right to have access to the
evidence against him. He was adequately aware of the nature and implication of the disqualification case against him. Thus, Ejercito cannot say that he was
denied of his constitutional right to due process.
It is important to note at this point that Ejercito, in his motion for reconsideration, deliberately did not tackle the merit and substance of the charges against
him. He limited himself to raising procedural issues. This is despite all the opportunity that he was given to confront the evidence lodged against him.
Therefore, there is no reason for the COMELEC En Bancto disturb the findings of the COMELEC First Division on whether Ejercito indeed over-spent in
his campaign for governorship of Laguna in the [May 13, 2013] National and Local Elections.29
Anchoring on the case of Lanot v. Commission on Elections,30 the COMELEC En Banclikewise debunked Ejercito’s assertion that the petition was
prematurely and improperly filed on the ground that the filing of an election offense and the factual determination on the existence of probable cause are
required before a disqualification case based on Section 68 of the OEC may proceed. It held:
As discussed in the case of Lanot vs. Comelec, each of the acts listed as ground for disqualification under Section 68 of the OEC has two aspects –
electoral and criminal which may proceed independently from each other, to wit:
x x x The electoral aspect of a disqualification case determines whether the offender should be disqualified from being a candidate or from holding office.
Proceedings are summary in character and require only clear preponderance of evidence. An erring candidate may be disqualified even without prior
determination of probable cause in a preliminary investigation. The electoral aspect may proceed independently of the criminal aspect, and vice-versa.
The criminal aspect of a disqualification case determines whether there is probable cause to charge a candidate for an election offense. The prosecutor is
the COMELEC, through its Law Department, which determines whether probable cause exists. If there is probable cause, the COMELEC, through its Law
Department, files the criminal information before the proper court. Proceedings before the proper court demand a full-blown hearing and require proof
beyond reasonable doubt to convict. A criminal conviction shall result in the disqualification of the offender, which may even include disqualification from
holding a future public office." (Emphasis supplied)31
The petition for disqualification against Ejercito for campaign over-spending before the Commission isheard and resolved pursuant to the electoral aspect
of Section 68 of the OEC. It is an administrative proceeding separate and distinct from the criminal proceeding through which Ejercito may be made to
undergo in order to determine whether he can be held criminally liable for the same act of over-spending. It is through this administrative proceeding that
this Commission, initially through its divisions, makes a factual determination on the veracity of the parties’ respective allegations in a disqualification
case. There is no need for a preliminary investigation finding on the criminal aspect of the offenses in Section 68 before the Commission can act on the
administrative or electoral aspect of the offense. All that is needed is a complaint or a petition. As enunciated in Lanot, "(a)n erring candidate may be
disqualified even without prior determination of probable cause in a preliminary investigation. The electoral aspect may proceed independently of the
criminal aspect, and vice-versa."
Moreover, Ejercito’s reliance on Codilla is misplaced. The COMELEC En Banc opined that the portion of the Codilla decision that referred to the necessity
of the conduct of preliminary investigation pertains to cases where the offenders are charged with acts not covered by Section 68 of the OEC, and are,
therefore, beyond the ambit of the COMELEC’s jurisdiction. It said that the decision refers to this type of cases as criminal (not administrative) in nature,
and,thus, should be handled through the criminal process.
Further rejected was Ejercito’s argument that the COMELEC lost its jurisdiction over the petition for disqualification the moment he was proclaimed as the
duly-elected Governor of Laguna. For the COMELEC En Banc, its First Division thoroughly and sufficiently addressed the matter when it relied on
Maquiling instead of Sinaca. It maintained that Section 5 of COMELEC Resolution No. 9523, not COMELEC Resolution No. 2050, 32 is relevant to the
instant case as it states that the COMELEC shall continue the trial and hearing of a pending disqualification case despite the proclamation of a winner. It
was noted that the proper application of COMELEC Resolution No. 2050 was already clarified in Sunga v. COMELEC.33
Finally, the COMELEC En Bancruled on one of San Luis’ contentions in his Comment/Oppositionto Ejercito’s motion for reconsideration. He argued that
he becomes the winner in the gubernatorial election upon the disqualification of Ejercito. Relying on Maquiling, San Luis declared that he was not the
second placer as he obtained the highest number of valid votes cast from among the qualified candidates. In denying that Maquiling is on all fours with this
case, the COMELEC En Bancsaid:
In the instant case, Ejercito cannot be considered as a noncandidate by reason of his disqualification under Section 68 of the OEC. He was a candidate who
filed a valid certificate of candidacy which was never cancelled.
Ejercito was a bona fide candidate who was disqualified, not because of any ineligibility existing at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, but
because he violated the rules of candidacy. His disqualifying circumstance, thatis, his having over-spent in his campaign, did not exist at the time of the
filing of his certificate of candidacy. It did not affect the validity of the votes cast in his favor. Notwithstanding his disqualification, he remains the
candidate who garnered the highest number of votes.
Ejercito cannot be on the same footing with Arnado in the Maquiling case. Arnado was disqualified from running for Mayor of Kauswagan, Lanao Del Sur
because he was a dual citizen not qualified to run for election. His disqualification existed at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy. The
effect, pursuant to the Maquiling case, is that the votes he garnered are void, which in turn resulted in having considered the "second placer" – Maquiling –
asthe candidate who obtained the highest number of valid votes cast.
San Luis is in a different circumstance. The votes for the disqualified winning candidate remained valid. Ergo, San Luis, being the second placer in the vote
count, remains the second placer. He cannot[,] thus[,] be named the winner.
Section 6, Rule 25 of the COMELEC Resolution No. 9523, which governs Section 68 petitions for disqualification, enunciates the rule succinctly, to wit:
Section 6. Effect of Granting of Petition.– In the event a Petition to disqualify a candidate is granted by final judgment as defined under Section 8 of Rule
23 and the disqualified candidate obtains the highest number of votes, the candidate with the second highest number of votes cannot be proclaimed and the
rule of succession, if allowed by law, shall be observed. In the event the rule of succession is not allowed, a vacancy shall exist for such position.34
On May 23, 2014, Ejercito filed before this Court a Petition for certiorari with application for the issuance of a status quo ante order or temporary
restraining order (TRO)/writ of preliminary injunction (WPI).35 Without issuing a TRO/WPI, the Honorable Chief Justice, Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno,
issued on May 28, 2014 an order to respondents to comment on the petition within a non-extendible period of ten (10) days from notice. 36 Such order was
confirmed nunc pro tunc by the Court En Bancon June 3, 2014.37
Meantime, on May 26, 2014, Ejercito filed before the COMELEC En Bancan Omnibus Motion to suspend proceedings and to defer the implementation of
the May 21, 2014 Resolution.38 On the same day, San Luis also filed an Extremely Urgent Motion to Declare COMELEC En Banc Resolution of May 21,
2014 and First Division Resolution of September 26, 2013 Final and Executory and to Issue Forthwith Writ of Execution or Implementing Order 39
invoking Paragraph 2, Section 8 of COMELEC Resolution No. 9523, in relation to Section 13 (b), Rule 18 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. 40 On
May 27, 2014, the COMELEC En Bancissued an Order denying Ejercito’s omnibus motion, granted San Luis’ extremely urgent motion, and directedthe
Clerk of the Commission to issue the corresponding writ of execution.41 On even date, Vice-Governor Hernandez was sworn in as the Governor of Laguna
at the COMELEC Main Office in Manila. The service of the writ was deemed completed and validly served upon Ejercito on May 28, 2014.42
In his petition before Us, Ejercito raised the following issues for resolution:
THE COMMISSION COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN THAT:

(I) IT VIOLATED THE RIGHT OF PETITIONER TO DUE PROCESS WHEN IT RULED FOR THE DISQUALIFICATION
OF PETITIONER EVEN IF IT WAS NEVER PRAYED FOR IN THE PETITION. WORSE, THERE IS YET NO FINDING
OFGUILT BY A COMPETENT COURT OR A FINDING OF FACT STATING THAT PETITIONER ACTUALLY
COMMITTED THE ALLEGED ELECTION OFFENSE OF OVERSPENDING;

(II) IT RELIED ON A DOCUMENTARY EXHIBIT (ADVERTISING CONTRACT) WHICH WAS NOT EVEN
FORMALLY OFFERED AS EVIDENCE; [AND]

(III) IT DISQUALIFIED PETITIONER FOR AN ACT DONE BY A THIRD PARTY WHO SIMPLY EXERCISED ITS
RIGHT TO FREE EXPRESSION WITHOUT THE KNOWLEDGE AND CONSENT OF PETITIONER[.]43

The petition is unmeritorious.

A special civil action for certiorari under Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, is an independent action that is available only if there is no appeal or any other
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.44 It is a legal remedy that is limited to the resolution of jurisdictional issues and is not
meant to correct simple errors of judgment.45 More importantly, it will only prosper if grave abuse of discretion is alleged and isactually proved to exist.46
Grave abuse of discretion arises when a lower court or tribunal violates the Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence. It means such capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment as would amount to lack of jurisdiction; it contemplates a situation where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic
manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty
enjoined by law. x x x.47
Ejercito failed to prove that the COMELEC rendered its assailed Resolution with grave abuse of discretion.
We now explain.
The petition filed by San Luis
against Ejercito is for the
latter’s disqualification and
prosecution for election offense
Ejercito insists that his alleged acts of giving material consideration in the form of "Orange Cards" and election overspending are considered as election
offenses under Section 35 of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615,48 in relation to Section 1349 of R.A. No. 9006, and punishable under Section 26450 of the
OEC. Considering that San Luis’ petition partakes of the nature of a complaint for election offenses, the COMELEC First Division has no jurisdiction over
the same based on COMELEC Resolution No. 938651 and Section 26552 of the OEC.
Still, Ejercito contends that the COMELEC erroneously sanctioned a change in San Luis’ cause of action by the mere expedient of changing the prayer in
the latter’s Memorandum. According to him, San Luis’ additional prayer for disqualification in the Memorandum is a substantial amendment to the
Petitionas it constitutes a material deviation from the original cause of action – from a complaint for election offenses to a petition for disqualification.
Since such substantial amendment was effected after the case was set for hearing, Ejercito maintains that the same should have been allowed only with
prior leave of the COMELEC First Division pursuant to Section 2, Rule 953 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, which San Luis never did.
The arguments are untenable.
The purpose of a disqualification proceeding is to prevent the candidate from running or, if elected, from serving, or to prosecute him for violation of the
election laws.54 A petition to disqualifya candidate may be filed pursuant to Section 68 of the OEC, which states:
SEC. 68. Disqualifications.-- Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is a party is declared by final decision of a competent court guilty of,
or found by the Commission of having: (a) given money or other material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public officials
performing electoral functions; (b) committed acts of terrorism to enhance his candidacy; (c) spent in his election campaign an amount in excess of that
allowed by this Code; (d) solicited, received or made any contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; or (e) violated any of Sections 80,
83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, sub-paragraph 6, shall be disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if he has been elected, from
holding the office. Any person who is a permanent resident of or animmigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office under
this Code, unless said person has waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the residence requirement
provided for in the election laws.
The prohibited acts covered by Section 68 (e) refer to election campaign or partisan political activityoutside the campaign period (Section 80); removal,
destruction or defacement of lawful election propaganda (Section 83); certain forms of election propaganda (Section 85); violation of rules and regulations
on election propaganda through mass media; coercion of subordinates (Section 261 [d]); threats, intimidation, terrorism, use of fraudulent device or other
forms of coercion (Section 261 [e]); unlawful electioneering (Section 261 [k]); release, disbursement or expenditure of public funds (Section 261 [v]);
solicitation of votes or undertaking any propaganda on the day of the election within the restricted areas (Section 261 [cc], sub-par.6). All the offenses
mentioned in Section 68 refer to election offenses under the OEC, not toviolations of other penal laws. In other words, offenses that are punished in laws
other than in the OEC cannot be a ground for a Section 68 petition. Thus, We have held:
x x x [T]he jurisdiction of the COMELEC to disqualify candidates is limited to those enumerated in Section 68 of the [OEC]. All other election offenses
are beyond the ambit of COMELEC jurisdiction. They are criminal and not administrative in nature. Pursuant to Sections 265 and 268 of the [OEC], the
power of the COMELEC is confined to the conduct of preliminary investigation on the alleged election offenses for the purpose of prosecuting the alleged
offenders before the regular courts of justice, viz:
"Section 265. Prosecution. – The Commission shall, through its duly authorized legal officers, have the exclusive power to conduct preliminary
investigation of all election offenses punishable under this Code, and to prosecute the same. The Commission may avail of the assistance of other
prosecuting arms of the government: Provided, however, That in the event that the Commission fails to act on any complaint within four months from its
filing, the complainant may file the complaint with the office of the fiscal or with the Ministry of Justice for proper investigation and prosecution, if
warranted.
xxx xxx xxx
Section 268. Jurisdiction. – The regional trial court shall have the exclusive original jurisdiction to try and decide any criminal action orproceeding for
violation of this Code, except those relating to the offense of failure to register or failure to vote which shall be under the jurisdictions of metropolitan or
municipal trial courts. From the decision of the courts, appeal will lie as in other criminal cases."55
In the case at bar, the COMELEC First Division and COMELEC En Banc correctly ruled that the petition filed by San Luis against Ejercito is not just for
prosecution of election offense but for disqualification as well. Indeed, the following are clear indications:
1. The title of San Luis’ petition shows that the case was brought under Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, as amended by
COMELEC Resolution No. 9523.56 This expresses the objective of the action since Rule 25 is the specific rule governing the disqualification of
candidates.
2. The averments of San Luis’ petition rely on Section 68 (a) and (c) of the OEC as grounds for its causes of action. Section 68 of the OEC
precisely enumerates the grounds for the disqualification of a candidate for elective position and provides, as penalty, that the candidate shall be
disqualified from continuing as such, or if he or she has been elected, from holding the office.
3. Paragraph 2 of San Luis’ prayer in the petition states that "[in the event that [Ejercito] will be ableto get a majority vote of the electorate of
the Province of Laguna on May 13, 2013, his proclamation be suspended until further order of the Honorable Commission." San Luis reiterated
this plea when he later filed a Very Urgent Ex-Parte Motion toIssue Suspension of Possible Proclamation of Respondent and Supplemental to
the Very Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Issue Suspension of Possible Proclamation of Respondent. The relief sought is actually pursuant to Section
657 of R.A. No. 6646 and Section 5 Rule 2558 of COMELEC Resolution No. 9523, both of which pertain to the effect of a disqualification case
when the petition is unresolved by final judgment come election day.
4. San Luis’ Memorandum emphasized that the case is a "Special Action for Disqualification," praying that "[t]he Petition BE GRANTED [and]
x x x [Ejercito] BE DISQUALIFIED, and PREVENTED from further holding office as Governor of Laguna."
With the foregoing, Ejercito cannot feign ignorance of the true nature and intent of San Luis’ petition. This considering, it is unnecessary for Us to discuss
the applicability of Section 2,Rule 9 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, there being no substantial amendment to San Luis’ petition that constitutes a
material deviation from his original causes of action. Likewise, COMELEC Resolution No. 9386 and Section 265 of the OEC do not apply since both refer
solely to the prosecution of election offenses. Specifically, COMELEC Resolution No. 9386 is an amendment to Rule 34 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure on the prosecution of election offenses, while Section 265 of the OEC is found under Article XXII of said law pertaining also to election
offenses.
The conduct of preliminary
investigation is not required in
the resolution of the electoral
aspect of a disqualification case
Assuming, arguendo, that San Luis’ petition was properly instituted as an action for disqualification, Ejercito asserts that the conduct of preliminary
investigation to determine whether the acts enumerated under Section 68 of the OEC were indeed committed is a requirement prior to actual
disqualification. He posits that Section 5, Rule 25 of COMELEC Resolution No. 9523 is silent on the matter of preliminary investigation; hence, the clear
import of this is that the necessity of preliminary investigation provided for in COMELEC Resolution No. 2050 remains undisturbed and continues to bein
full force and effect.
We are not persuaded.
Section 5, Rule 25 of COMELEC Resolution No. 9523 states:
Section 5. Effect of Petition if Unresolved Before Completion of Canvass.– If a Petition for Disqualification is unresolved by final judgment on the day of
elections, the petitioner may file a motion with the Division or Commission En Banc where the case is pending, to suspend the proclamation of the
candidate concerned, provided that the evidence for the grounds to disqualify is strong. For this purpose, atleast three (3) days prior to any election, the
Clerk of the Commission shall prepare a list of pending cases and furnish all Commissioners copies of said the list.
In the event that a candidate with an existing and pending Petition to disqualify is proclaimed winner, the Commission shall continue to resolve the said
Petition.
It is expected that COMELEC Resolution No. 9523 is silent on the conduct of preliminary investigation because it merely amended, among others, Rule 25
of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, which deals with disqualification of candidates. In disqualification cases, the COMELEC may designate any of its
officials, who are members of the Philippine Bar, to hear the case and to receive evidence only in cases involving barangay officials. 59 As aforementioned,
the present rules of procedure in the investigation and prosecution of election offenses in the COMELEC, which requires preliminary investigation, is
governed by COMELEC Resolution No. 9386. Under said Resolution, all lawyers in the COMELEC who are Election Officers in the National Capital
Region ("NCR"), Provincial Election Supervisors, Regional Election Attorneys, Assistant Regional Election Directors, Regional Election Directors and
lawyers of the Law Department are authorized to conduct preliminary investigation of complaints involving election offenses under the election lawswhich
may be filed directly with them, or which may be indorsed to them by the COMELEC.60
Similarly, Ejercito’s reliance on COMELEC Resolution No. 2050 is misplaced. COMELEC Resolution No. 2050, which was adopted on November 3,
1988, reads:
WHEREAS, there remain pending before the Commission, a number of cases of disqualification filed by virtue of the provisions of Section 68 of the
Omnibus Election Codein relation to Section 6 of R.A. 6646, otherwise known as the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987;
WHEREAS, opinions of the members of the Commission on matters of procedure in dealing with cases of this nature and the manner of disposing of the
same have not been uniform;
WHEREAS, in order to avoid conflicts of opinion in the disposition [of] disqualification cases contemplated under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election
Code in relation to Section 6 of Rep. Act 6646, there is a strongly felt need to lay down a definite policy in the disposition of this specific class of
disqualification cases;
NOW, THEREFORE, on motion duly seconded, the Commission en banc:
RESOLVED, as it hereby resolves, to formulate the following rules governing the disposition of cases of disqualification filed by virtue of Section 68 of
the Omnibus Election Code in relation to Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646, otherwise known as the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987:
1. Any complaint for the disqualification of a duly registered candidate based upon any of the grounds specifically enumerated under Section 68 of the
Omnibus Election Code, filed directly with the Commission before an election in which the respondent is a candidate, shall be inquired into by the
Commission for the purpose of determining whether the acts complained of have in fact been committed. Where the inquiry by the Commission results in a
finding before election, that the respondent candidate did in factcommit the acts complained, the Commission shall order the disqualification of the
respondent candidate from continuing as such candidate.
In case such complaint was not resolved before the election, the Commission may motu proprio, or [on] motion of any of the parties, refer the complaint to
the [Law] Department of the Commission as the instrument of the latter in the exercise of its exclusive power to conduct a preliminary investigation of all
cases involving criminal infractions of the election laws. Such recourse may be availed of irrespective of whether the respondent has been elected orhas
lost in the election.
2. Any complaint for disqualification based on Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code in relation to Section 6 of Rep. Act No. 6646 filed after the
election against a candidate who has already been proclaimed as winner shall be dismissed as a disqualification case. However, the complaint shall be
referred for preliminary investigation to the Law Department of the Commission.
Where a similar complaint is filed after election but before proclamation of the respondent candidate, the complaint shall, nevertheless, be dismissed as a
disqualification case. However, the complaint shall be referred for preliminary investigation to the Law Department. If, before proclamation, the Law
Department makes a prima faciefinding of guilt and the corresponding information has been filed with the appropriate trial court, the complainant may file
a petition for suspension of the proclamation of the respondent with the court before which the criminal case is pending and the said court may order the
suspension of the proclamation ifthe evidence of guilt is strong.
3. The Law Department shall terminate the preliminary investigation within thirty(30) days from receipt of the referral and shall submit its study, report
and recommendation to the Commission en banc within five (5) days from the conclusion of the preliminary investigation. If it makes a prima faciefinding
of guilt, it shall submit with such study the Information for filing with the appropriate court.61
In Bagatsing v. COMELEC,62 the Court stated that the above-quoted resolution covers two (2) different scenarios:
First, as contemplated in paragraph 1, a complaint for disqualification filed before the election which must be inquired into by the COMELEC for the
purpose of determining whether the acts complained of have in fact been committed. Where the inquiry results in a finding before the election, the
COMELEC shall order the candidate's disqualification. In case the complaint was not resolved before the election, the COMELEC may motu propioor on
motion of any of the parties, refer the said complaint to the Law Department of the COMELEC for preliminary investigation.
Second, as laid down in paragraph 2, a complaint for disqualification filed after the election against a candidate (a) who has not yet been proclaimed as
winner, or (b) who has already been proclaimed as winner. In both cases, the complaint shall be dismissed as a disqualification case but shall be referred to
the Law Department of the COMELEC for preliminary investigation. However, if before proclamation, the Law Department makes a prima facie finding
of guilt and the corresponding information has been filed with the appropriate trial court, the complainant may file a petition for suspension of the
proclamation of the respondent with the court before which the criminal case is pending and the said court may order the suspension of the proclamation if
the evidence of guilt is strong.63
However, with respect to Paragraph 1 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2050, which is the situation in this case, We held in Sunga:
x x x Resolution No. 2050 as interpreted in Silvestre v. Duavitinfringes on Sec. 6 of RA No. 6646, which provides:
SEC. 6. Effects of Disqualification Case. - Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes
cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for
and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or
protestand, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate
whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong (italics supplied).
Clearly, the legislative intentis that the COMELEC should continue the trial and hearing of the disqualification case to its conclusion, i.e.,until judgment is
rendered thereon. The word "shall" signifies that this requirement of the law is mandatory, operating to impose a positive duty which must be enforced. The
implication is that the COMELEC is left with no discretion but to proceed with the disqualification case even after the election. Thus, in providing for the
outright dismissal of the disqualification case which remains unresolved after the election, Silvestre v. Duavitin effect disallows what RA No. 6646
imperatively requires. This amounts to a quasi-judicial legislation by the COMELEC which cannot be countenanced and is invalid for having been issued
beyond the scope of its authority. Interpretative rulings of quasi-judicial bodies or administrative agencies must always be in perfect harmony with statutes
and should be for the sole purpose of carrying their general provisions into effect. By such interpretative or administrative rulings, of course, the scope of
the law itself cannot be limited. Indeed, a quasi-judicial body or an administrative agency for that matter cannot amend an act of Congress. Hence, in case
of a discrepancy between the basic law and an interpretative or administrative ruling, the basic law prevails.
Besides, the deleterious effect of the Silvestre ruling is not difficult to foresee. A candidate guilty of election offenses would be undeservedly rewarded,
instead of punished, by the dismissal of the disqualification case against him simply because the investigating body was unable, for any reason caused upon
it, to determine before the election if the offenses were indeed committed by the candidate sought to be disqualified. All that the erring aspirant would need
to do is toemploy delaying tactics so that the disqualification case based on the commission of election offenses would not be decided before the election.
This scenario is productive of more fraud which certainly is not the main intent and purpose of the law.64
The "exclusive power [of the COMELEC] to conduct a preliminary investigation of all cases involving criminal infractions of the election laws" stated in
Par. 1 of COMELEC Resolution No. 2050 pertains to the criminal aspect of a disqualification case. It has been repeatedly underscored that an election
offense has its criminal and electoral aspects. While its criminal aspect to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused cannot be the subject of summary
hearing, its electoral aspect to ascertain whether the offender should be disqualified from office can be determined in an administrative proceeding that is
summaryin character. This Court said in Sunga:
It is worth to note that an election offense has criminal as well as electoral aspects. Its criminal aspect involves the ascertainment of the
guilt or innocence of the accused candidate. Like in any other criminal case, it usually entails a full-blown hearing and the quantum of
proof required to secure a conviction is beyond reasonable doubt. Its electoral aspect, on the other hand, is a determination of whether the
offender should be disqualified from office. This is done through an administrative proceeding which is summary in character and
requires only a clear preponderance of evidence. Thus, under Sec. 4 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, petitions for disqualification
"shall be heard summarily after due notice." It is the electoral aspect that we are more concerned with, under which an erring candidate
may be disqualified even without prior criminal conviction.65

and equally in Lanot:

x x x The electoral aspect of a disqualification case determines whether the offender should be disqualified from being a candidate or
from holding office. Proceedings are summary in character and require only clear preponderance of evidence. An erring candidate may be
disqualified even without prior determination of probable cause in a preliminary investigation. The electoral aspect may proceed
independently of the criminal aspect, and vice-versa.

The criminal aspect of a disqualification case determines whether there is probable cause to charge a candidate for an election offense.
The prosecutor is the COMELEC, through its Law Department, which determines whether probable cause exists. If there is probable
cause, the COMELEC, through its Law Department, files the criminal information before the proper court. Proceedings before the proper
court demand a full-blown hearing and require proof beyond reasonable doubt to convict. A criminal conviction shall result in the
disqualification of the offender, which may even include disqualification from holding a future public office.

The two aspects account for the variance of the rules on disposition and resolution of disqualification cases filed before or after an
election. When the disqualification case is filed before the elections, the question of disqualification is raised before the voting public. If
the candidate is disqualified after the election, those who voted for him assume the risk that their votes may be declared stray or invalid.
There isno such risk if the petition is filed after the elections. x x x.66

We cannot accept Ejercito’s argument that Lanot did not categorically pronounce that the conduct of a preliminary investigation exclusively pertains to the
criminal aspect of anaction for disqualification or that a factual finding by the authorized legal officers of the COMELEC may be dispensed with in the
proceedings for the administrative aspect of a disqualification case. According to him,a close reading of said case would reveal that upon filing of the
petition for disqualification with the COMELEC Division, the latter referred the matter to the Regional Election Director for the purpose of preliminary
investigation; therefore, Lanot contemplates two referrals for the conduct of investigation – first, to the Regional Election Director, prior to the issuance of
the COMELEC First Division’s resolution, and second, to the Law Department, following the reversal by the COMELEC En Banc.
For easy reference, the factual antecedents of Lanot are as follows:
On March 19, 2004, a little less than two months before the May 10, 2004 elections, Henry P. Lanot, et al. filed a Petition for Disqualification under
Sections 68 and 80 of the OEC against then incumbent Pasig City Mayor Vicente P. Eusebio. National Capital Region Director Esmeralda Amora-Ladra
conducted hearings on the petition. On May 4, 2004, she recommended Eusebio’s disqualification and the referral of the case to the COMELEC Law
Department for the conduct of a preliminary investigation on the possible violation of Section 261 (a) of the OEC. When the COMELEC First Division
issued a resolution adopting Director Ladra’s recommendations on May 5, 2004, then COMELEC Chairman Benjamin S. Abalos informed the pertinent
election officers through an Advisory dated May 8, 2004. Eusebio filed a Motion for Reconsideration on May 9, 2004. On election day, Chairman Abalos
issued a memorandum to Director Ladra enjoining her from implementing the May 5, 2004 COMELEC First Division resolution. The petition for
disqualification was not yet finally resolved at the time of the elections. Eusebio's votes were counted and canvassed. After which, Eusebio was proclaimed
as the winning candidate for city mayor. On August 20, 2004, the COMELEC En Banc annulled the COMELEC First Division's order to disqualify
Eusebio and referred the case to the COMELEC Law Department for preliminary investigation.
When the issue was elevated to Us, the Court agreed with Lanot that the COMELEC En Banc committed grave abuse of discretion when it ordered the
dismissal of the disqualification case pending preliminary investigation of the COMELEC Law Department. Error was made when it ignored the electoral
aspect of the disqualification case by setting aside the COMELEC First Division's resolution and referring the entire case to the COMELEC Law
Department for the criminal aspect. We noted that COMELEC Resolution No. 2050, upon which the COMELEC En Banc based its ruling, is procedurally
inconsistent with COMELEC Resolution No. 6452, which was the governing rule at the time. The latter resolution delegated to the COMELEC Field
Officials the hearing and reception of evidence of the administrative aspect of disqualification cases in the May 10, 2004 National and Local Elections. In
marked contrast, in the May 2013 elections, it was only in cases involving barangay officials that the COMELEC may designate any of its officials, who
are members of the Philippine Bar, to hear the case and to receive evidence.67
The COMELEC En Banc
properly considered as
evidence the Advertising
Contract dated May 8, 2013
Ejercito likewise asserts that the Advertising Contract dated May 8, 2013 should not have been relied upon by the COMELEC. First, it was not formally
offered in evidence pursuant to Section 34, Rule 13268 of the Rules and he was not even furnished with a copy thereof, depriving him of the opportunity to
examine its authenticity and due execution and object to its admissibility. Second, even if Section 34, Rule 132 does not apply, administrative bodies
exercising quasi-judicial functions are nonetheless proscribed from rendering judgment based on evidence that was never presented and could not be
controverted. There is a need to balance the relaxation of the rules of procedure with the demands of administrative due process, the tenets of which are
laid down in the seminal case of Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations.69 And third,the presentation of the advertising contracts, which are highly
disputable and on which no hearing was held for the purpose of taking judicial notice in accordance with Section 3, Rule 12970 of the Rules, cannot be
dispensed with by COMELEC’s claim that it could take judicial notice. Contrary to Ejercito’s claim, Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules is inapplicable.
Section 4, Rule 171 of the Rules of Court is clear enough in stating that it shall not apply to election cases except by analogy or in a suppletory character
and whenever practicable and convenient. In fact, nowhere from COMELEC Resolution No. 9523 requires that documentary evidence should be formally
offered in evidence.72 We remind again that the electoral aspect of a disqualification case is done through an administrative proceeding which is summary
in character.
Granting, for argument’s sake, that Section 4, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court applies, there have been instances when We suspended the strict application of
the rule in the interest of substantial justice, fairness, and equity.73 Since rules of procedure are mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice, it
is well recognized that the Court is empowered to suspend its rules or to exempt a particular case from the application of a general rule, when the rigid
application thereof tends to frustrate rather than promote the ends of justice.74 The fact is, even Sections 3 and 4, Rule 1 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure fittingly declare that "[the] rules shall be liberally construed in order to promote the effective and efficient implementation of the objectives of
ensuring the holding of free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections and to achieve just, expeditious and inexpensive determination and disposition
of every action and proceeding brought before the Commission" and that "[in] the interest of justice and in order to obtain speedy disposition ofall matters
pending before the Commission, these rules or any portion thereof may be suspended by the Commission." This Court said in Hayudini v. Commission on
Elections:75
Settled is the rule that the COMELEC Rules of Procedure are subject to liberal construction. The COMELEC has the power to liberally
interpret or even suspend its rules of procedure in the interest of justice, including obtaining a speedy disposition of all matters pending
before it. This liberality is for the purpose of promoting the effective and efficient implementation of its objectives – ensuring the holding
of free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections, as well as achieving just, expeditious, and inexpensive determination and
disposition of every action and proceeding brought before the COMELEC. Unlike an ordinary civil action, an election contest is imbued
with public interest. It involves not only the adjudication of private and pecuniary interests of rival candidates, but also the paramount
need of dispelling the uncertainty which beclouds the real choice of the electorate. And the tribunal has the corresponding duty to
ascertain, by all means withinits command, whom the people truly chose as their rightful leader.76

Further, Ejercito’s dependence on Ang Tibay is weak. The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or, as applied to administrative
proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek for a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. 77 Any seeming
defect in its observance is cured by the filing of a motion for reconsideration and denial of due process cannot be successfully invoked by a party who had
the opportunity to be heard thereon.78 In this case, it is undisputed that Ejercito filed a motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC En Banc. Despite
this, he did not rebut the authenticity and due execution of the advertising contracts when he decided not to discuss the factual findings of the COMELEC
First Division on the alleged ground that it may be construed as a waiver of the jurisdictional issues that he raised.79
We agree with San Luis and the Office of the Solicitor General that, pursuant to Section 2, Rule 129, 80 the COMELEC has the discretion to properly take
judicial notice of the Advertising Contract dated May 8, 2013. In accordance with R.A. No. 9006, the COMELEC, through its Campaign Finance Unit, is
empowered to:
a. Monitor fund raising and spending activities;
b. Receive and keep reports and statements of candidates, parties, contributors and election contractors, and advertising contracts of mass media
entities;
c. Compile and analyze the reports and statements as soon as they are received and make an initial determination of compliance;
d. Develop and manage a recording system for all reports, statements, and contracts received by it and todigitize information contained therein;
e. Publish the digitized information gathered from the reports, statements and contracts and make themavailable to the public;
f. Develop a reportorial and monitoring system;
 g. Audit all reports, statements and contracts and determine compliance by the candidates, parties, contributors, and election contractors,
including the inspection of Books and records of candidates, parties and mass media entities and issue subpoenas in relation thereto and submit
its findings to the Commission En Banc;
h. Coordinate with and/or assist other departments/offices of the Commission receiving related reports on Campaign Finance including
prosecution of violators and collection of fines and/or imposition of perpetual disqualification; and
i. Perform other functions as ordered by the Commission.81
The COMELEC may properly takeand act on the advertising contracts without further proof from the parties herein. Aside from being considered as an
admission82 and presumed to be proper submissions from them, the COMELEC already has knowledge of the contracts for being ascertainable from its
very own records. Said contracts are ought to be known by the COMELEC because of its statutory function as the legal custodian of all advertising
contracts promoting or opposing any candidate during the campaign period. As what transpired in this case, the COMELEC has the authority and
discretion to compare the submitted advertising contracts with the certified true copies of the broadcast logs, certificates of performance or other analogous
records which a broadcast station or entity is required to submit for the review and verification of the frequency, date, time and duration of advertisements
aired.
To be precise, R.A. No. 9006 provides:
Sec. 4. Requirements for Published or Printed and Broadcast Election Propaganda. –

xxxx

4.3 Print, broadcast or outdoor advertisements donated to the candidate or political party shall not be printed, published, broadcast or
exhibited without the written acceptance by the said candidate or political party. Such written acceptance shall be attached to the
advertising contract and shall be submitted to the COMELEC as provided in Subsection 6.3 hereof.

Sec. 6. Equal Access to Media Time and Space. – All registered parties and bona fidecandidates shall have equal access to media time and
space. The following guidelines may be amplified on by the COMELEC:

xxxx

6.2

xxxx

(b.) Each bona fide candidate or registered political party for a locally elective office shall be entitled to not more than sixty (60) minutes
of television advertisement and ninety (90) minutes of radio advertisement whether by purchase or donation.

For this purpose, the COMELEC shall require any broadcast station or entity to submit to the COMELEC a copy of its broadcast logs and
certificates of performance for the review and verification of the frequency, date, time and duration of advertisements broadcast for any
candidate or political party.

6.3 All mass media entities shall furnish the COMELEC with a copy of all contracts for advertising, promoting or opposing any political
party or the candidacy of any person for public office within five (5) days after its signing. x x x.

The implementing guidelines of the above-quoted provisions are found in Rule 5 of COMELEC Resolution No. 9476 –
Section 2. Submission of Copies of Advertising Contracts. – All media entities shall submit a copy of its advertising and or broadcast
contracts, media purchase orders, booking orders, or other similar documents to the Commission through its Campaign Finance Unit,
accompanied by a summary report in the prescribed form (Annex "E") together with official receipts issued for advertising, promoting or
opposing a party, or the candidacy of any person for public office, within five (5) days after its signing, through:

a. For Media Entities in the NCR The Education and Information Department (EID), which shall furnish copies thereof to the
Campaign Finance Unit of the Commission.

b. For Media Entities outside of the NCR The City/Municipal Election Officer (EO) concerned who shall furnish copies
thereof to the Education and Information Department of the Commission within five (5) days after the campaign periods. The
EID shall furnish copies thereof to the Campaign Finance Unit of the Commission.

xxxx

It shall be the duty of the EID to formally inform media entities that the latter’s failure to comply with the mandatory provisions of this
Section shall be considered an election offense punishable pursuant to Section 13 of Republic Act No. 9006. [RA 9006, Secs. 6.3 and 13]
and in COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 –

SECTION 9. Requirements and/or Limitations on the Use of Election Propaganda through Mass Media. – All parties and bona fide
 candidates shall have equal access to media time and space for their election propaganda during the campaign period subject to the
following requirements and/or limitations:

a. Broadcast Election Propaganda

xxx

Provided, further, that a copy of the broadcast advertisement contract be furnished to the Commission, thru the Education and
Information Department, within five (5) days from contract signing.

xxx

d. Common requirements/limitations:

xxx

(3) For the above purpose, each broadcast entity and website owner or administrator shall submit to the Commission a certified true copy
of its broadcast logs, certificates of performance, or other analogous record, including certificates of acceptance as required in Section
7(b) of these Guidelines,for the review and verification of the frequency, date, time and duration of advertisements aired for any
candidate or party through:

For Broadcast Entities in the NCR – The Education and Information Department (EID) which in turn shall furnish copies thereof to the
Campaign Finance Unit (CFU) of the Commission within five days from receipt thereof.

For Broadcast Entities outside of the NCR – The City/Municipal Election Officer (EO) concerned, who in turn, shall furnish copies
thereof to the Education and Information Department (EID) of the Commission which in turn shall furnish copies thereof to the
Campaign Finance Unit (CFU) of the Commission within five (5) days from the receipt thereof.

For website owners or administrators – The City/Municipal Election Officer (EO) concerned, who in turn, shall furnish copies thereof to
the Education and Information Department (EID) of the Commission which in turn shall furnish copies thereof to the Campaign Finance
Unit (CFU) of the Commission within five (5) days from the receipt thereof.

All broadcast entities shall preserve their broadcast logs for a period of five (5) years from the date of broadcast for submission to the
Commission whenever required.

Certified true copies of broadcast logs, certificates of performance, and certificates of acceptance, or other analogous record shall be
submitted, as follows:

Candidates for National Positions 1st Report 3 weeks after start of campaign period March 4 - 11
2nd Report 3 weeks after 1st filing week April 3 - 10
3rd Report 1 week before election day May 2 - 9
Last Report Election week May 14 - 17
Candidates for Local Positions 1st Report 1 week after start of campaign period April 15 - 22
2nd Report 1 week after 1st filing week April 30 - May 8
3rd Report Election week May 9 - 15
Last Report 1 week after election day May 16 - 22
For subsequent elections, the schedule for the submission of reports shall be prescribed by the Commission.

Ejercito should be disqualified

for spending in his election
campaign an amount in excess
of what is allowed by the OEC
Ejercito claims that the advertising contracts between ABS-CBN Corporation and Scenema Concept International, Inc. were executed by an identified
supporter without his knowledge and consent as, in fact, his signature thereon was obviously forged. Even assuming that such contract benefited him,
Ejercito alleges that he should not be penalized for the conduct of third parties who acted on their own without his consent. Citing Citizens United v.
Federal Election Commission83 decided by the US Supreme Court, he argues that every voter has the right to support a particular candidate in accordance
with the free exercise of his or her rights of speech and of expression, which is guaranteed in Section 4, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. 84 He believes
that an advertising contract paid for by a third party without the candidate’s knowledge and consent must be considered a form of political speech that must
prevail against the laws suppressing it, whether by design or inadvertence. Further, Ejercito advances the view that COMELEC Resolution No. 947685
distinguishes between "contribution" and "expenditure" and makes no proscription on the medium or amount of contribution. 86 He also stresses that it is
clear from COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 that the limit set by law applies only to election expenditures of candidates and not to contributions made by
third parties. For Ejercito, the fact that the legislature imposes no legal limitation on campaign donations is presumably because discussion of public issues
and debate on the qualifications of candidates are integral to the operation of the government.
We refuse to believe that the advertising contracts between ABS-CBN Corporation and Scenema Concept International, Inc. were executed without
Ejercito’s knowledge and consent. As found by the COMELEC First Division, the advertising contracts submitted in evidence by San Luis as well as those
in legal custody of the COMELEC belie his hollow assertion. His express conformity to the advertising contracts is actually a must because non-
compliance is consideredas an election offense.87
Notably, R.A. No. 9006 explicitly directs that broadcast advertisements donated to the candidate shall not be broadcasted without the written acceptance of
the candidate, which shall be attached to the advertising contract and shall be submitted to the COMELEC, and that, in every case, advertising contracts
shall be signed by the donor, the candidate concerned or by the duly-authorized representative of the political party. 88 Conformably with the mandate of
the law, COMELEC Resolution No. 9476 requires that election propaganda materials donated toa candidate shall not be broadcasted unless it is
accompanied by the written acceptance of said candidate, which shall be in the form of an official receipt in the name of the candidate and must specify the
description of the items donated, their quantity and value, and that, in every case, the advertising contracts, media purchase orders or booking orders shall
be signed by the candidate concerned or by the duly authorized representative of the party and, in case of a donation, should be accompanied by a written
acceptance of the candidate, party or their authorized representatives.89 COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 also unambiguously states thatit shall be
unlawful to broadcast any election propaganda donated or given free of charge by any person or broadcast entity to a candidate withoutthe written
acceptance of the said candidate and unless they bear and be identified by the words "airtime for this broadcast was provided free of charge by" followed
by the true and correct name and address of the donor.90
This Court cannot give weight to Ejercito’s representation that his signature on the advertising contracts was a forgery. The issue is a belated claim, raised
only for the first time in this petition for certiorari. It is a rudimentary principle of law that matters neither alleged in the pleadings nor raised during the
proceedings below cannot be ventilated for the first time on appeal before the Supreme Court. 91 It would be offensive to the basic rules of fair play and
justice to allow Ejercito to raise an issue that was not brought up before the COMELEC.92 While it is true that litigation is not a game of technicalities, it
is equally truethat elementary considerations of due process require that a party be duly apprised of a claim against him before judgment may be
rendered.93
Likewise, whether the advertising contracts were executed without Ejercito’s knowledge and consent, and whether his signatures thereto were fraudulent,
are issues of fact. Any factual challenge has no place in a Rule 65 petition. This Court is nota trier of facts and is not equipped to receive evidence and
determine the truth of factual allegations.94
Instead, the findings of fact made by the COMELEC, or by any other administrative agency exercising expertise in its particular field of competence, are
binding on the Court. As enunciated in Juan v. Commission on Election:95
Findings of facts of administrative bodies charged with their specific field of expertise, are afforded great weight by the courts, and in the absence of
substantial showing that such findings are made from an erroneous estimation of the evidence presented, they are conclusive, and in the interest of stability
of the governmental structure, should not be disturbed. The COMELEC, as an administrative agency and a specialized constitutional body charged with the
enforcement and administration of all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall, has more
than enough expertise in its field that its findings orconclusions are generally respected and even given finality. x x x.96
Having determined that the subject TV advertisements were done and broadcasted with Ejercito’s consent, it follows that Citizens United does not apply. In
said US case, a non-profit corporation sued the Federal Election Commission, assailing, among others, the constitutionality of a ban on corporate independ
entexpenditures for electioneering communications under 2 U.S.C.S. § 441b. The corporation released a documentary film unfavorable of then-Senator
Hillary Clinton, who was a candidate for the Democratic Party's Presidential nomination. It wanted to make the film available through video-on-demand
withinthirty (30) days of the primary elections, and it produced advertisements to promote the film. However, federal law prohibits all corporations –
including non-profit advocacy corporations – from using their general treasury funds to make independent expenditures for speech that is an
"electioneering communication"97 or for speech that expressly advocates the election or defeat of a candidate within thirty (30) days of a primary election
and sixty (60) days of a general election. The US Supreme Court held that the ban imposed under § 441b on corporate independent expenditures violated
the First Amendment98 because the Government could not suppress political speech on the basis of the speaker's identity as a non-profit or for-profit
corporation. It was opined: Section 441b's prohibition on corporate independent expenditures is thus a ban on speech. As a "restriction on the amount of
money a person or group can spend on political communication during a campaign," that statute "necessarily reduces the quantity of expression by
restricting the number of issues discussed, the depth of their exploration, and the size of the audience reached." Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19, 96 S. Ct.
612, 46 L. Ed. 2d 659 (1976) (per curiam).Were the Court to uphold these restrictions, the Government could repress speech by silencing certain voices at
any of the various points in the speech process. See McConnell, supra, at 251, 124 S. Ct. 619, 517 L. Ed. 2d 491 (opinion of Scalia, J.) (Government could
repress speech by "attacking all levels of the production and dissemination of ideas," for "effective public communication requires the speaker to make use
of the services of others"). If §441 be applied to individuals, no one would believe that it is merely a time, place, or manner restriction on speech. Its
purpose and effect are to silence entities whose voices the Government deems to be suspect.
Speech is an essential mechanism of democracy, for it is the means to hold officials accountable to the people. See Buckley, supra, at 14-15, 96 S. Ct. 612,
46 L. Ed. 2d 659 ("In a republic where the people are sovereign, the ability of the citizenry to make informed choices among candidates for office is
essential"). The right of citizens to inquire, to hear, to speak, and to use information to reach consensus is a precondition to enlightened self-government
and a necessary means to protect it. The First Amendment "'has its fullest and most urgent application' to speech uttered during a campaign for political
office." Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Central Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 223, 109 S. Ct. 1013, 103 L. Ed. 2d 271 (1989)(quoting Monitor Patriot
Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272, 91 S. Ct. 621, 28 L. Ed. 2d 35 (1971)); see Buckley, supra, at 14, 96 S. Ct. 612, 46 L. Ed. 2d 659 ("Discussion of public
issues and debate on the qualifications of candidates are integral to the operation of the system of government established by our Constitution").
For these reasons, political speech must prevail against laws that would suppress it, whether by design orinadvertence. Laws that burden political speech
are "subject to strict scrutiny," which requires the Government to prove that the restriction "furthers a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to
achieve that interest." WRTL, 551 U.S., at 464, 127 S. Ct. 2652, 168 L. Ed. 2d 329(opinion of Roberts, C. J.). While it might be maintained that political
speech simply cannot be banned or restricted as a categorical matter, see Simon & Schuster, 502 U.S., at 124, 112 S. Ct. 501, 116 L. Ed. 2d 476(Kennedy,
J., concurring in judgment), the quoted language from WRTL provides a sufficient framework for protecting the relevant First Amendment interests in this
case. We shall employ it here.
Premised on mistrust of governmental power, the First Amendment stands against attempts to disfavor certain subjects or viewpoints. See, e.g., United
States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813, 120 S. Ct. 1878, 146 L. Ed. 2d 865 (2000) (striking down content based restriction).
Prohibited, too, are restrictions distinguishing among different speakers, allowing speech by some but not others. See First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,
435 U.S. 765, 784, 98 S. Ct. 1407, 55 L. Ed. 2d 707 (1978). As instruments to censor, these categories are interrelated: Speech restrictions based on the
identity of the speaker are all too often simply a means to control content.
Quite apart from the purpose or effect of regulating content, moreover, the Government may commit a constitutional wrong when by law it identifies
certain preferred speakers. By taking the right to speak from some and giving it to others, the Government deprives the disadvantaged person or class of the
right to use speech to strive to establish worth, standing, and respect for the speaker's voice. The Government may not by these means deprive the public of
the right and privilege to determine for itself what speech and speakers are worthy of consideration. The First Amendment protects speech and speaker, and
the ideas that flow from each.
The Court has upheld a narrow class of speech restrictions that operate to the disadvantage of certain persons, but these rulings were based on an interest in
allowing governmental entities to perform their functions. See, e.g., Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683, 106 S. Ct. 3159, 92 L. Ed. 2d
549 (1986) (protecting the "function of public school education"); Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 129, 97 S. Ct. 2532,
53 L. Ed. 2d 629 (1977) (furthering "the legitimate penological objectives of the corrections system" (internal quotation marks omitted)); Parker v. Levy,
417 U.S. 733, 759, 94 S. Ct. 2547, 41 L. Ed. 2d 439 (1974)(ensuring "the capacity of the Government to discharge its [military] responsibilities" (internal
quotation marks omitted)); Civil Service Comm'n v. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 557, 93 S. Ct. 2880, 37 L. Ed. 2d 796 (1973)("[F]ederal service should
depend upon meritorious performance rather than political service"). The corporate independent expenditures at issue in this case, however, would not
interfere with governmental functions, so these cases are inapposite. These precedents stand only for the proposition that there are certain governmental
functions that cannot operate without some restrictions on particular kinds of speech. By contrast, it is inherent in the nature of the political process that
voters must be free to obtain information from diverse sources in order to determine how to cast their votes. At least before Austin, the Court had not
allowed the exclusion of a class of speakers from the general public dialogue.
We find no basis for the proposition that, in the context of political speech, the Government may impose restrictions on certain disfavored speakers. Both
history and logic lead us to this conclusion.
The previous decisions of the US Supreme Court in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce99 (which ruled that political speech may be banned based
on the speaker's corporate identity) and the relevant portion of McConnell v. Federal Election Commission 100 (which upheld the limits on electioneering
communications in a facial challenge) were, in effect, overruled by Citizens United.
Like Citizens Unitedis the 1976 case of Buckley v. Valeo.101 In this much earlier case, the US Supreme Court ruled, among other issues elevated to it for
resolution, on a provision of the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, as amended, (FECA) 102 which limits independent political expenditures by an
individual or group advocating the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate for federal office to $1,000 per year. Majority of the US Supreme
Court expressed the view that the challenged provision is unconstitutional as it impermissibly burdens the right of free expression under the First
Amendment, and could not be sustained on the basis of governmental interests in preventing the actuality or appearance of corruption or in equalizing the
resources of candidates.103
Even so, the rulings in Citizens United and Buckley find bearing only on matters related to "independent expenditures," an election law concept which has
no application in this jurisdiction. In the US context, independent expenditures for or against a particular candidate enjoy constitutional protection. They
refer to those expenses made by an individual, a group or a legal entity which are not authorized or requested by the candidate, an authorized committee of
the candidate, oran agent of the candidate; they are expenditures that are not placed in cooperation with or with the consent of a candidate, his agents, or an
authorized committee of the candidate.104 In contrast, there is no similar provision here in the Philippines. In fact, R.A. No. 9006105 and its implementing
rules and regulations106 specifically make it unlawful to print, publish, broadcast or exhibit any print, broadcast or outdoor advertisements donated to the
candidate without the written acceptance of said candidate.
If at all, another portion of the Buckley decision is significant to this case. One of the issues resolved therein is the validity of a provision of the FECA
which imposes $1,000 limitation on political contributions by individuals and groups to candidates and authorized campaign committees.107 Five justices
of the nine-member US Supreme Court sustained the challenged provision on the grounds that it does not violate First Amendment speech and association
rights or invidiously discriminate against non-incumbent candidates and minority party candidates but is supported by substantial governmental interests in
limiting corruption and the appearance of corruption. It was held:
As the general discussion in Part I-A, supra, indicated, the primary First Amendment problem raised by the Act's contribution limitations is their restriction
of one aspect of the contributor's freedom of political association. The Court's decisions involving associational freedoms establish that the right of
association is a "basic constitutional freedom," Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. at 57, that is "closely allied to freedom of speech and a right which, like free
speech, lies at the foundation of a free society." Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 486 (1960). See, e.g., Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 522-523 (1960);
NAACP v. Alabama, supra at 460-461; NAACP v. Button, supra, at 452(Harlan, J., dissenting). In view of the fundamental nature of the rightto associate,
governmental "action which may have the effect of curtailing the freedom to associate is subject to the closest scrutiny." NAACP v. Alabama, supra, at
460-461. Yet, it is clear that "[n]either the right to associate nor the right to participate in political activities is absolute." CSC v. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S.
548, 567 (1973). Even a "significant interference' with protected rights of political association" may be sustained if the State demonstrates a sufficiently
important interest and employs means closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgment of associational freedoms. Cousins v. Wigoda, supra, at 488;
NAACP v. Button, supra, at 438; Shelton v. Tucker, supra, at 488.
Appellees argue that the Act's restrictions on large campaign contributions are justified by three governmental interests. According to the parties and amici,
the primary interest served by the limitations and, indeed, by the Act as a whole, is the prevention of corruption and the appearance of corruption spawned
by the real or imagined coercive influence of large financial contributions on candidates' positions and on their actions if elected to office. Two "ancillary"
interests underlying the Act are also allegedly furthered by the $ 1,000 limits on contributions. First, the limits serve to mute the voices of affluent persons
and groups in the election process and thereby to equalize the relative ability of all citizens to affect the outcome of elections. Second, it is argued, the
ceilings may to some extent act as a brake on the skyrocketing cost of political campaigns and thereby serve to open the political systemmore widely to
candidates without access to sources of large amounts of money.
It is unnecessary to look beyond the Act's primary purpose -- to limit the actuality and appearance of corruption resulting from large individual financial
contributions -- in order to find a constitutionally sufficient justification for the $ 1,000 contribution limitation. Under a system of private financing of
elections, a candidate lacking immense personal or family wealth must depend on financial contributions from others to provide the resources necessary to
conduct a successful campaign. The increasing importance of the communications media and sophisticated mass-mailing and polling operations to
effective campaigning make the raising of large sums of money an ever more essential ingredient of an effective candidacy. To the extent that large
contributions are given to secure political quid pro quo's from current and potential office holders, the integrity of our system of representative democracy
is undermined. Although the scope of such pernicious practices can never be reliably ascertained, the deeply disturbing examples surfacing after the 1972
election demonstrate that the problem is not an illusory one. Of almost equal concern as the danger of actual quid pro quo arrangements is the impact of the
appearance of corruption stemming from public awareness of the opportunities for abuse inherent in a regime of large individual financial contributions. In
CSC v. Letter Carriers, supra, the Court found that the danger to "fair and effective government" posed by partisan political conduct on the part of federal
employees charged with administering the law was a sufficiently important concern to justify broad restrictions on the employees' right of partisan political
association. Here, as there, Congress could legitimately conclude that the avoidance of the appearance of improper influence "is also critical... if confidence
in the system of representative Government is not to be eroded to a disastrous extent." 413 U.S. at 565.
Appellants contend that the contribution limitations must be invalidated because bribery laws and narrowly drawn disclosure requirements constitute a less
restrictive means of dealing with "proven and suspected quid pro quo arrangements." But laws making criminal the giving and taking of bribes deal
withonly the most blatant and specific attempts of those with money to influence governmental action. And while disclosure requirements serve the many
salutary purposes discussed elsewhere in this opinion, Congress was surely entitled to conclude that disclosure was only a partial measure,and that
contribution ceilings were a necessary legislative concomitant to deal with the reality or appearance of corruption inherent in a system permitting unlimited
financial contributions, even when the identities of the contributors and the amounts of their contributions are fully disclosed.
The Act's $ 1,000 contribution limitation focuses precisely on the problem of large campaign contributions-- the narrow aspect of political association
where the actuality and potential for corruption have been identified -- while leaving persons free to engage in independent political expression, to
associate actively through volunteering their services, and to assist to a limited but nonetheless substantial extent in supporting candidates and committees
with financial resources. Significantly, the Act's contribution limitations in themselves do not undermine to any material degree the potential for robust and
effective discussion of candidates and campaign issues by individual citizens, associations, the institutional press, candidates, and political parties.
We find that, under the rigorous standard of review established by our prior decisions, the weighty interests served by restricting the size of financial
contributions to political candidates are sufficient to justify the limited effect upon First Amendment freedoms caused by the $ 1,000 contribution ceiling.
(Emphasis supplied)
Until now, the US Supreme Court has not overturned the ruling that, with respect to limiting political contributions by individuals and groups, the
Government’s interest in preventing quid pro quo corruption or its appearance was "sufficiently important" or "compelling" so that the interest would
satisfy even strict scrutiny.108
In any event, this Court should accentuate that resort to foreign jurisprudence would be proper only if no law or jurisprudence is available locally to settle a
controversy and that even in the absence of local statute and case law, foreign jurisprudence are merely persuasive authority at best since they furnish an
uncertain guide.109 We prompted in Republic of the Philippines v. Manila Electric Company:110
x x x American decisions and authorities are not per se controlling in this jurisdiction. At best, they are persuasive for no court holds a patent on correct
decisions.Our laws must be construed in accordance with the intention of our own lawmakers and such intent may be deduced from the language of each
law and the context of other local legislation related thereto. More importantly, they must be construed to serve our own public interest which is the be-all
and the end-all of all our laws. And it need not be stressed that our public interest is distinct and different from others.111
and once more in Central Bank Employees Assoc., Inc. v. Bangko Sentral Ng Pilipinas:112
x x x [A]merican jurisprudence and authorities, much less the American Constitution, are of dubious application for these are no longer controlling within
our jurisdiction and have only limited persuasive merit insofar as Philippine constitutional law is concerned.... [I]n resolving constitutional disputes, [this
Court] should not be beguiled by foreign jurisprudence some of which are hardly applicable because they have been dictated by different constitutional
settings and needs." Indeed, although the Philippine Constitution can trace its origins to that of the United States, their paths of development have long
since diverged.113
Indeed, in Osmeña v. COMELEC,114 this Court, in reaffirming its ruling in National Press Club v. Commission on Elections115 that Section 11 (b) of
R.A. No. 6646116 does not invade and violate the constitutional guarantees comprising freedom of expression, remarked in response to the dissent of
Justice Flerida Ruth P. Romero:
On the other hand, the dissent of Justice Romero in the present case, in batting for an "uninhibited market place of ideas," quotes the following from
Buckley v. Valeo:
[T]he concept that the government may restrict the speech of some elements in our society in order to enhance the relative voice of the others is wholly
foreign to the First Amendment which was designed to "secure the widest possible dissemination ofinformation from diverse and antagonistic sources" and
"to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people."
But do we really believe in that? That statement was made to justify striking down a limit on campaign expenditure on the theory that money is speech. Do
those who endorse the view that government may not restrict the speech of some in order to enhance the relative voice of others also think that the
campaign expenditure limitation found in our election laws is unconstitutional? How about the principle of one person, one vote, is this not based on the
political equality of voters? Voting after all is speech. We speak of it as the voiceof the people – even of God. The notion that the government may
restrictthe speech of some in order to enhance the relative voice of othersmay be foreign to the American Constitution. It is not to the Philippine
Constitution, being in fact an animating principle of that document.
Indeed, Art. IX-C, §4 is not the only provision in the Constitution mandating political equality. Art. XIII, §1 requires Congress to give the "highest priority"
to the enactment of measures designed to reduce political inequalities, while Art. II, §26 declaresas a fundamental principle of our government "equal
access to opportunities for public service." Access to public office will be deniedto poor candidates if they cannot even have access to mass media in order
to reach the electorate. What fortress principle trumps or overrides these provisions for political equality? Unless the idealism and hopes which fired the
imagination of those who framed the Constitution now appeardim to us, how can the electoral reforms adopted by them to implement the Constitution, of
which §11(b) of R.A. No. 6646, in relation to §§90 and 92 are part, be considered infringements on freedom of speech? That the framers contemplated
regulation of political propaganda similar to §11(b) is clear from the following portion of the sponsorship speech of Commissioner Vicente B. Foz:
MR. FOZ. . . . Regarding the regulation by the Commission of the enjoyment or utilization of franchises or permits for the operation of transportation and
other public utilities, media of communication or information, all grants, special privileges or concessions granted by the Government, there is a provision
that during the election period, the Commission may regulate, among other things, the rates, reasonable free space, and time allotments for public
information campaigns and forums among candidates for the purpose of ensuring free, orderly, honest and peaceful elections. This has to do with the media
of communication or information.117 Proceeding from the above, the Court shall now rule on Ejercito’s proposition that the legislature imposes no legal
limitation on campaign donations. He vigorously asserts that COMELEC Resolution No. 9476 distinguishes between "contribution" and "expenditure" and
makes no proscription on the medium or amount of contribution madeby third parties in favor of the candidates, while the limit set by law, as appearing in
COMELEC Resolution No. 9615, applies only to election expenditures of candidates.
We deny.
Section 13 of R.A. No. 7166118 sets the current allowable limit on expenses of candidates and political parties for election campaign, thus:
SEC. 13. Authorized Expenses of Candidates and Political Parties. – The aggregate amount that a candidate or registered politicalparty may spend for
election campaign shall be as follows:
(a) For candidates – Ten pesos (₱10.00) for President and Vice President; and for other candidates, Three pesos ( ₱3.00) for every voter currently
registered in the constituency where he filed his certificate of candidacy: Provided, That, a candidate without any political party and without
support from any political party may be allowed to spend Five pesos (₱5.00) for every such voter; and
(b) For political parties - Five pesos (₱5.00) for every voter currently registered in the constituency or constituencies where it has official
candidates.
Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, any contribution in cash or in kind to any candidate or political party or coalition of parties for
campaign purposes, duly reported to the Commission, shall not be subject to the payment of any gift tax.119
Sections 100, 101, and 103 of the OEC are not repealed by R.A. No. 7166.120 These provisions, which are merely amended insofar as the allowable
amount is concerned, read:
SECTION 100. Limitations upon expenses of candidates.– No candidate shall spend for his election campaign an aggregate amount exceeding one peso
and fifty centavos for every voter currently registered in the constituency where he filed his candidacy: Provided, That the expenses herein referred to shall
include those incurred or caused to be incurred by the candidate, whether in cash or in kind, including the use, rental or hire of land, water or aircraft,
equipment, facilities, apparatus and paraphernalia used in the campaign: Provided, further, That where the land, water or aircraft, equipment, facilities,
apparatus and paraphernalia used is owned by the candidate, his contributor or supporter, the Commission is hereby empowered toassess the amount
commensurate with the expenses for the use thereof, based on the prevailing rates in the locality and shall be included in the total expenses incurred by the
candidate.
SECTION 101. Limitations upon expenses of political parties.– A duly accredited political party may spend for the election of its candidates in the
constituency or constituencies where it has official candidates an aggregate amount not exceeding the equivalent of one peso and fifty centavos for every
voter currently registered therein. Expenses incurred by branches, chapters, or committees of such political party shall be included in the computation of
the total expenditures of the political party.
Expenses incurred by other political parties shall be considered as expenses of their respective individual candidates and subject to limitation under Section
100 of this Code.
SECTION 103. Persons authorized to incur election expenditures.– No person, except the candidate, the treasurer of a political party or any person
authorized by such candidate or treasurer, shall make any expenditure in support of or in opposition to any candidate or political party. Expenditures duly
authorized by the candidate or the treasurer of the party shall be considered as expenditures of such candidate or political party.
The authority to incur expenditures shall be in writing, copy of which shall be furnished the Commission signed by the candidate or the treasurer of the
party and showing the expenditures so authorized, and shall state the full name and exact address of the person so designated. (Emphasis supplied)121
The focal query is: How shall We interpret "the expenses herein referred to shall include those incurred or caused to be incurred by the candidate"and
"except the candidate, the treasurer of a political party or any person authorized by such candidate or treasurer"found in Sections 100 and 103, respectively,
of the OEC? Do these provisions exclude from the allowable election expenditures the contributions of third parties made with the consent of the
candidate? The Court holds not.
When the intent of the law is not apparent as worded, or when the application of the law would lead to absurdity, impossibility or injustice, extrinsic aids of
statutory construction may be resorted to such as the legislative history of the law for the purpose of solving doubt, and that courts may take judicial notice
of the origin and history of the law, the deliberations during the enactment, as well as prior laws on the same subject matter in order to ascertain the true
intent or spirit of the law.122
Looking back, it could be found that Sections 100, 101, and 103 of the OEC are substantially lifted from P.D. No. 1296,123 as amended. Sections 51, 52
and 54 of which specifically provide:
Section 51. Limitations upon expenses of candidates. No candidate shall spend for his election campaign an amount more than the salary or the equivalent
of the total emoluments for one year attached to the office for which he is a candidate: Provided, That the expenses herein referred to shall include those
incurred by the candidate, his contributors and supporters,whether in cash or in kind, including the use, rental or hire of land, water or air craft, equipment,
facilities, apparatus and paraphernalia used in the campaign: Provided, further,That, where the land, water or air craft, equipment, facilities, apparatus and
paraphernalia used is owned by the candidate, his contributor or supporter, the Commission is hereby empowered to assess the amount commensurate with
the expenses for the use thereof, based on the prevailing rates in the locality and shall be included in the total expenses incurred by the candidate.
In the case of candidates for the interim Batasang Pambansa, they shall not spend more than sixty thousand pesos for their election campaign.
Section 52. Limitation upon expenses of political parties, groups or aggrupations.A political party, group or aggrupation may not spend for the election of
its candidates in the constituency or constituencies where it has official candidates anaggregate amount more than the equivalent of fifty centavos for every
voter currently registered therein: Provided, That expenses incurred by such political party, group or aggrupation not duly registered with the Commission
and/or not presenting or supporting a complete list of candidates shall be considered as expenses of its candidates and subject to the limitation under
Section 51 of this Code. Expenses incurred by branches, chapters or committees of a political party, group or aggrupation shall be included in the
computation of the total expenditures of the political party, group or aggrupation. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 54. Persons authorized to incur election expenditures.No person, except the candidate or any person authorized by him or the treasurer of a political
party, group or aggrupation, shall make any expenditure in support of, or in opposition to any candidate or political party, group or aggrupation.
Expenditures duly authorized by the candidate of the treasurer of the party, group or aggrupation shall be considered as expenditure of such candidate or
political party, group or aggrupation.
The authority to incur expenditures shall be in writing, copy of which shall be furnished the Commission, signed by the candidate or the treasurer of the
party, group or aggrupation and showing the expenditure so authorized, and shall state the full nameand exact address of the person so designated.
(Emphasis supplied)
Prior to P.D. No. 1296, R.A. No. 6388 (otherwise known as the "Election Code of 1971") was enacted. 124 Sections 41 and 42 of which are relevant, to
quote:
Section 41. Limitation Upon Expenses of Candidates.– No candidate shall spend for his election campaign more than the total amount of salary for the full
term attached to the office for which he is a candidate.
Section 42. Limitation Upon Expenses of Political Parties and Other Nonpolitical Organizations.– No political party as defined in this Code shall spend for
the election of its candidates an aggregate amount more than the equivalent of one peso for every voter currently registered throughout the country in case
of a regular election, orin the constituency in which the election shall be held in case of a special election which is not held in conjunction with a regular
election. Any other organization not connected with any political party, campaigning for or against a candidate, or for or against a political party shall not
spend more than a total amount of five thousand pesos. (Emphasis supplied)
Much earlier, Section 12 (G) of R.A. No. 6132,125 which implemented the resolution of both Houses ofCongress calling for a constitutional convention,
explicitly stated:
Section 12. Regulations of Election Spending and Propaganda. The following provisions shall govern election spending and propaganda in the election
provided for in this Act:
xxx
(G) All candidates and all other persons making or receiving expenditures, contributions or donations which in their totality exceed fifty pesos, in order to
further or oppose the candidacy of any candidate, shall file a statement of all such expenditures and contributions made or received on such dates and
withsuch details as the Commission on Elections shall prescribe by rules. The total expenditures made by a candidate, or by any other person with the
knowledge and consent of the candidate, shall not exceed thirty-two thousand pesos. (Emphasis supplied)
In tracing the legislative history of Sections 100, 101, and 103 of the OEC, it can be said, therefore, that the intent of our lawmakers has been consistent
through the years: to regulate not just the election expenses of the candidate but also of his or her contributor/supporter/donor as well as by including in the
aggregate limit of the former’s election expenses those incurred by the latter.1awp++i1 The phrase "those incurred or caused to be incurred by the
candidate"is sufficiently adequate to cover those expenses which are contributed or donated in the candidate’s behalf. By virtue of the legal requirement
that a contribution or donation should bear the written conformity of the candidate, a contributor/supporter/donor certainly qualifies as "any person
authorized by such candidate or treasurer." Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguere debemus.126 (Where the law does not distinguish, neither should
We.) There should be no distinction in the application of a law where none is indicated.
The inclusion of the amount contributed by a donor to the candidate’s allowable limit of election expenses does not trample upon the free exercise of the
voters’ rights of speech and of expression under Section 4, Artticle III of the Constitution. As a content-neutral regulation,127 the law’s concern is not to
curtail the message or content of the advertisement promoting a particular candidate but to ensure equality between and among aspirants with "deep
pockets" and those with less financial resources. Any restriction on speech or expression is only incidentaland is no more than necessary to achieve the
substantial governmental interest of promoting equality of opportunity in political advertising. It bears a clear and reasonable connection with the
constitutional objectives set out in Section 26, Article II, Section 4, Article IX-C, and Section 1, Art. XIII of the Constitution.128
Indeed, to rule otherwise would practically result in an unlimited expenditure for political advertising, which skews the political process and subverts the
essence of a truly democratic form of government.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The May 21, 2014 Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc in SPA No. 13-306 (DC), which upheld the September
26, 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC First Division, granting the petition for disqualification filed by private respondent Edgar "Egay" S. San Luis
against petitioner Emilio Ramon "E.R." P. Ejercito, is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
THIRD DIVISION
CRISTINELLI S. FERMIN,
G.R. No. 157643
Petitioner, Present:

- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.,

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Acting Chairperson,

Respondent. TINGA,*

CHICO-NAZARIO,

NACHURA, and

REYES, JJ.
 Promulgated:

March 28, 2008

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Before us is a petition[1] for review on certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, of the Decision[2] dated September 3, 2002 and the Resolution[3]
dated March 24, 2003 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 20890 entitled People of the Philippines v. Cristenelli S. Fermin and Bogs C.
Tugas.

On complaint of spouses Annabelle Rama Gutierrez and Eduardo (Eddie) Gutierrez, two (2) criminal informations for libel[4] were filed against
Cristinelli[5] S. Fermin and Bogs C. Tugas before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 218. Except for the name of the complainant,[6]
the informations uniformly read

That on or about the 14th day of June, 1995 in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named accused CRISTENELLI SALAZAR FERMIN, publisher, and
BOGS C. TUGAS, Editor-in-Chief of Gossip Tabloid with offices located at 68-A Magnolia Tulip St., Roxas District, Quezon City, and circulated in
Quezon City and other parts of Metro Manila and the whole country, conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping each other, publicly and
acting with malice, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously print and circulate in the headline and lead story of the said GOSSIP TABLOID
issue of June 14, 1995 the following material, to wit:
MAS MALAKING HALAGA ANG NADISPALKO NILA SA STATES, MAY MGA NAIWAN DING
ASUNTO SI ANNABELLE
IMPOSIBLENG NASA AMERIKA NGAYON SI ANNABELLE DAHIL SA KALAT DIN ANG ASUNTO
NILA DUN, BUKOD PA SA NAPAKARAMING PINOY NA HUMAHANTING SA KANILA MAS
MALAKING PROBLEMA ANG KAILANGAN NIYANG HARAPIN SA STATES DAHIL SA PERANG
NADISPALKO NILA, NAGHAHANAP LANG NG SAKIT NG KATAWAN SI ANNABELLE KUNG SA
STATES NGA NIYA MAIISIPANG PUMUNTA NGAYON PARA LANG TAKASAN NIYA SI LIGAYA
SANTOS AT ANG SINTENSIYA SA KANYA
when in truth and in fact, the accused very well knew that the same are entirely false and untrue but were publicly made for no other
purpose than to expose said ANNABELLE RAMA GUTIERREZ to humiliation and disgrace, as it depicts her to be a fugitive from
justice and a swindler, thereby causing dishonor, discredit and contempt upon the person of the offended party, to the damage and
prejudice of the said ANNABELLE RAMA GUTIERREZ.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[7]
Upon arraignment, petitioner and co-accused Bogs C. Tugas (Tugas) both pleaded not guilty. Thereafter, a joint trial ensued.

After trial on the merits, the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 218, in its Joint Decision[8] dated January 27, 1997, found petitioner and Tugas guilty of libel.
The dispositive portion of the Joint Decision reads

WHEREFORE, prosecution having established the guilt of the accused, judgment is hereby rendered finding CRISTENELLI S. FERMIN and BOGS C.
TUGAS GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt, of libel, punishable under Art. 355 of the Revised Penal Code and sentences them to an indeterminate penalty
of three (3) months and eleven (11) days of arresto mayor, as minimum, to one (1) year, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional,
as maximum, for each case.
Likewise, accused Cristenelli S. Fermin and Bogs Tugas are sentenced to pay jointly and solidarily:
a) moral damages of:
1. P500,000.00 to Annabelle Rama in Criminal Case No. Q-95-62823; and
2. P500,000.00 to Eddie Gutierrez in Criminal Case No. Q-95-62824;
b) attorneys fees of P50,000.00.
SO ORDERED.[9]
Aggrieved, petitioner and Tugas appealed to the CA. The appellate court, in its Decision dated September 3, 2002, affirmed the conviction of petitioner, but
acquitted Tugas on account of non-participation in the publication of the libelous article. The fallo of the Decision reads
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1. The appealed decision as against the accused-appellant BOGS C. TUGAS is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and another is entered
ACQUITTING him of the crime charged and ABSOLVING him from any civil liability; and
2. The same appealed decision as against accused-appellant CRISTENELLI S. FERMIN is AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that the award of
moral damages is REDUCED to P300,000.00 for EACH offended party, and the award of attorneys fees is DELETED.
Costs against the appellant FERMIN.
SO ORDERED.[10]
The CA denied petitioners motion for reconsideration for lack of merit in the Resolution dated March 24, 2003. Hence, this petition, raising the following
arguments:

I.
THE RULING IN VS. , PEOPLE VS. TOPACIO AND , VS. MADRIGAL AND VS. AND THE HOLDING IN VS. OCAMPO AS
CLARIFIED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS IN PEOPLE VS. BELTRAN AND SOLIVEN REQUIRING KNOWLEDGE,
PARTICIPATION AND COMPLICITY BY THE PUBLISHER IN THE PREPARATION AND APPROVAL OF THE LIBELOUS
ARTICLE TO SUSTAIN THE LATTERS CONVICTION FOR LIBEL ARE APPLICABLE IN THE PRESENT CASE.
II.
ART. 360 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE WHICH MAKES A PUBLISHER LIABLE FOR LIBEL TO THE SAME EXTENT
AS IF HE WERE THE AUTHOR THEREOF MERELY CREATES A DISPUTABLE PRESUMPTION WHICH MAY BE
REBUTTED BY CONTRARY EVIDENCE.
III.
THE QUESTIONED ARTICLE IS NOT LIBELOUS.
 IV.
THE QUESTIONED ARTICLE IS PROTECTED BY THE MANTLE OF THE FREEDOM OF THE PRESS AND IS WITHIN
THE REALM OF FAIR AND HONEST COMMENT.[11]
Being interrelated, we shall discuss the first and the second issues jointly, then the third and the fourth issues together.

Petitioner posits that, to sustain a conviction for libel under Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, it is mandatory that the publisher knowingly
participated in or consented to the preparation and publication of the libelous article. This principle is, allegedly, based on our ruling in U.S. v. Taylor,[12]
People v. Topacio and Santiago,[13] U.S. v. Madrigal,[14] U.S. v. Abad Santos,[15] and U.S. v. Ocampo,[16] as purportedly clarified in People v. Beltran
and Soliven.[17] She submits that these cases were applied by the CA in acquitting her co-accused Tugas, and being similarly situated with him, she is also
entitled to an acquittal. She claims that she had adduced ample evidence to show that she had no hand in the preparation and publication of the offending
article, nor in the review, editing, examination, and approval of the articles published in Gossip Tabloid.

The arguments are too simplistic and the cited jurisprudence are either misplaced or, in fact, damning.

Foremost, U.S. v. Madrigal and U.S. v. Abad Santos are not applicable to the present case. U.S. v. Madrigal pertains to a criminal prosecution under Section
30 of Act No. 1519 for fraudulently representing the weight or measure of anything to be greater or less than it is, whereas U.S. v. Abad Santos refers to
criminal responsibility under the Internal Revenue Law (Act. No. 2339).

The other cases are more in point, but they serve to reinforce the conviction of, rather than absolve, petitioner.

In U.S. v. Taylor, the accused was indicted under Section 6 of Act No. 277 which provides that: Every author, editor or proprietor of any book, newspaper,
or serial publication is chargeable with the publication of any words contained in any part of said book or number of each newspaper or serial as fully as if
he were the author of the same. However, proof adduced during the trial showed that accused was the manager of the publication without the
corresponding evidence that, as such, he was directly responsible for the writing, editing, or publishing of the matter contained in the said libelous article.
[18]

In People v. Topacio and Santiago, reference was made to the Spanish text of Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code which includes the verb publicar.
Thus, it was held that Article 360 includes not only the author or the person who causes the libelous matter to be published, but also the person who prints
or publishes it.

Based on these cases, therefore, proof of knowledge of and participation in the publication of the offending article is not required, if the accused has been
specifically identified as author, editor, or proprietor or printer/publisher of the publication, as petitioner and Tugas are in this case.

The rationale for the criminal culpability of those persons enumerated in Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code [19] was enunciated in U.S. v. Ocampo,[20]
to wit:

According to the legal doctrines and jurisprudence of the United States, the printer of a publication containing libelous matter is liable for the same by
reason of his direct connection therewith and his cognizance of the contents thereof. With regard to a publication in which a libel is printed, not only is the
publisher but also all other persons who in any way participate in or have any connection with its publication are liable as publishers.
xxxx
In the case of State vs. Mason (26 L.R.A., 779; 26 Oreg., 273, , 629), the question of the responsibility of the manager or proprietor of a newspaper was
discussed. The court said, among other things (pp. 782, 783):
The question then recurs as to whether the manager or proprietor of a newspaper can escape criminal responsibility solely on the ground that the libelous
article was published without his knowledge or consent. When a libel is published in a newspaper, such fact alone is sufficient evidence prima facie to
charge the manager or proprietor with the guilt of its publication.
The manager and proprietor of a newspaper, we think ought to be held prima facie criminally for whatever appears in his paper; and it should be no defense
that the publication was made without his knowledge or consent, x x x
One who furnishes the means for carrying on the publication of a newspaper and entrusts its management to servants or employees whom he selects and
controls may be said to cause to be published what actually appears, and should be held responsible therefore, whether he was individually concerned in
the publication or not, x x x. Criminal responsibility for the acts of an agent or servant in the course of his employment necessarily implies some degree of
guilt or delinquency on the part of the publisher; x x x.
We think, therefore, the mere fact that the libelous article was published in the newspaper without the knowledge or consent of its proprietor or manager is
no defense to a criminal prosecution against such proprietor or manager.
In the case of Commonwealth vs. Morgan (107 , 197), this same question was considered and the court held that in the criminal prosecution of a publisher
of a newspaper in which a libel appears, he is prima facie presumed to have published the libel, and that the exclusion of an offer by the defendant to prove
that he never saw the libel and was not aware of its publication until it was pointed out to him and that an apology and retraction were afterwards published
in the same paper, gave him no ground for exception. In this same case, Mr. Justice Colt, speaking for the court, said:
It is the duty of the proprietor of a public paper, which may be used for the publication of improper communications, to use reasonable caution in the
conduct of his business that no libels be published. (Whartons Criminal Law, secs. 1627, 1649; 1 Bishops Criminal Law, secs. 219, 221; People vs. Wilson,
64 Ill., 195; Commonwealth vs. Damon, 136 Mass., 441.)
The above doctrine is also the doctrine established by the English courts. In the case of Rex vs. Walter (3 Esp., 21) Lord Kenyon said that he was clearly of
the opinion that the proprietor of a newspaper was answerable criminally as well as civilly for the acts of his servants or agents for misconduct in the
management of the paper.
This was also the opinion of Lord Hale, Mr. Justice Powell, and Mr. Justice Foster.
Lofft, an English author, in his work on Libel and Slander, said:
An information for libel will lie against the publisher of a paper, although he did not know of its being put into the paper and stopped the sale as soon as he
discovered it.
In the case of People vs. Clay (86 , 147) the court held that
A person who makes a defamatory statement to the agent of a newspaper for publication, is liable both civilly and criminally, and his liability is shared by
the agent and all others who aid in publishing it.
It is worthy to note that petitioner was not only the publisher, as shown by the editorial box of Gossip Tabloid,[21] but also its president and chairperson as
she herself admitted on the witness stand.[22] She also testified that she handled the business aspect of the publication, and assigns editors to take charge of
everything.[23] Obviously, petitioner had full control over the publication of articles in the said tabloid. Her excuse of lack of knowledge, consent, or
participation in the release of the libelous article fails to persuade. Following our ruling in Ocampo, petitioners criminal guilt should be affirmed, whether
or not she had actual knowledge and participation, having furnished the means of carrying on the publication of the article purportedly prepared by the
members of the Gossip Reportorial Team, who were employees under her control and supervision.

Petitioner argues that Ocampo has been clarified by the CA in People v. Beltran and Soliven such that Maximo V. Soliven, as publisher of The Philippine
Star, was acquitted by the appellate court in view of the lack of evidence that he knew and approved the article written by Luis D. Beltran about then
President Corazon C. Aquino in the newspapers October 12, 1987 issue. Petitioner submits that People v. Beltran and Soliven serves as a guide to this
Court regarding the criminal liability of the publisher of the newspaper where a libelous article is published. Put differently, it appears that petitioner wants
this Court to follow the CA decision and adopt it as judicial precedent under the principle of stare decisis.

The doctrine of stare decisis, embodied in Article 8[24] of the Civil Code, is enunciated, thus:

The doctrine of stare decisis enjoins adherence to judicial precedents. It requires courts in a country to follow the rule established in a decision of the
Supreme Court thereof. That decision becomes a judicial precedent to be followed in subsequent cases by all courts in the land. The doctrine of stare
decisis is based on the principle that once a question of law has been examined and decided, it should be deemed settled and closed to further argument.
[25] (Emphasis supplied)
Unfortunately, the Beltran decision attained finality at the level of the CA. Thus, if the CA seemingly made a new pronouncement regarding the criminal
liability of a publisher under Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, that ruling cannot bind this Court unless we purposely adopt the same. Be that as it
may, we find no compelling reason to revisit U.S. v. Ocampo; to modify it would amount to judicial legislation. Article 360 is clear and unambiguous, and
to apply People v. Beltran and Soliven, which requires specific knowledge, participation, and approval on the part of the publisher to be liable for the
publication of a libelous article, would be reading into the law an additional requirement that was not intended by it.

In the same vein, we note that the CA erred in acquitting Tugas. Tugas cannot feign lack of participation in the publication of the questioned article as was
evident from his and petitioners Joint Counter-Affidavit,[26] and as gleaned from his testimony before the trial court, to wit:

WITNESS: As editor-in-chief, I have no participation in the writing of the questioned article and my only participation in the publication is the handling of
the physical lay-outing, indication and allocation of type-size of the body of the article, before the same was printed and published in GOSSIP Tabloid.
Q: You do not deny the statements in this publication as executed by you in the counter-affidavit and sworn in before the City Prosecutor, is this correct?
A: Yes, that is correct.
ATTY. ALENTAJAN:
That is all for the witness, your Honor.
COURT: Do we get it right from you, if you were acting as you were, you will not allow the said publication of this same article or same stories?
A: If I were, if I was physically present, honestly I will because if you can see the article, your Honor, it is according to our source, it is not a direct
comment.
COURT: So whether you are there or not, [the] same article leading to them (sic) will still find its way to come out?
A: Yes, your honor.[27]
Tugas testimony, in fact, confirms his actual participation in the preparation and publication of the controversial article and his approval thereof as it was
written. Moreover, his alibi, which was considered meritorious by the CA, that he was confined at the Mother of Perpetual Help Clinic in Angeles City, is
unavailing, in view of the testimony of his attending physician that Tugas medical condition did not prevent him from performing his work, thus

Q: How would you describe the condition of the patient on ?

A: He is in stable condition.
Q: You said he was in severe pain, from your opinion, was that condition sufficient to enable him to work?
A: Yes, in my opinion.[28]
Q: You said your impression of the patient was urethral colic and this was caused by spasm?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: When you say spasm, it is not sustained, it comes every now and then and [intermittently], it is not sustained?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Now you said he was in stable condition?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: That means that his ailment is not life-threatening?
A: Correct.
Q: In fact, visitors were allowed to see him?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: He can also write?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: He was allowed to [receive] friends?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: According to you, he was able to work also, he is not totally incapacitated in performing certain chores in the hospital room?
A: No, sir.
Q: Now, prior to in the morning of , you did not see Mr. Bogs Tugas?
A: I saw him, he was admitted at but I saw him before.
Q: How long before were you able to see him?
A: That is about 2 hours.
Q: About in the morning?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Who was his companion when you saw him?
A: He was boarding in my place.
Q: So, you brought him to the hospital?
A: Both of us went to the hospital.
Q: Which boarding house are you referring [to]? In ?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Do you know that Mr. Bogs Tugas works here in as editor-in-chief of a newspaper tabloid?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And some of his work is done in your boarding house?
A: I do not know about it.
Q: How did you know that he is working on his paper works in ? Did you see him do that?
A: I only know he goes to everyday.
Q: In your boarding house, you saw him read and write?
A: Probably yes.[29]
But, of course, we cannot reinstate the ruling of the trial court convicting Bogs Tugas because with his acquittal by the CA, we would run afoul of his
constitutional right against double jeopardy.

Anent the third and fourth issues, petitioner argues that the subject article in the June 14, 1995 issue of Gossip Tabloid is not libelous, is covered by the
mantle of press freedom, and is merely in the nature of a fair and honest comment. We disagree.

The banner headlines of the offending article read:

KUNG TOTOONG NAKATAKAS NA SI ANNABELLE RAMA, IMPOSIBLENG SA STATES SIYA NAGPUNTA!

MAS MALAKING HALAGA ANG NADISPALKO NILA SA STATES, MAY MGA NAIWAN DING ASUNTO DUN SI ANNABELLE!
On the first page of the same issue of Gossip Tabloid, written in smaller but bold letters, are:

HINDI SIYA MAKAKAPUNTA SA AMERIKA DAHIL NAPAKARAMI RIN NIYANG ASUNTONG INIWAN DUN NOON PA, NAKAPAG-ABROAD
MAN SIYA, E, PIHADONG HINDI SIYA SA AMERIKA NAGTULOY, SA AMERIKA PA KAYA SIYA MAGTATAGO, E, ILANG TAON NA RIN
SIYANG INAABANGAN DUN NG NGA KABABAYAN NATING NILOKO NIYA, IN ONE WAY OR ANOTHER?... NAAALALA PA BA NINYO
YUNG MGA MAMAHALING KALDERO NA IBINEBENTA NILA NOON SA AMERIKA, DUN SILA NAGKAPROBLEMA, MILYON-MILYON
ANG INVOLVED, KAYA KINAILANGAN NILANG UMUWI SA PILIPINAS !
The rest of the article, which continued to the entire second page of the tabloid, follows

Mainit na pinag-uusapan ngayon ang ibat ibang posibilidad na maaaring gawin ni Annabelle Rama Gutierrez para lang hindi matuloy ang pag-aresto at
pagkukulong sa kanya ng mga awtoridad kaugnay ng sintensiyang ipinapataw sa kanya ni -RTC Judge Rodolfo Palattao.
Mula noong June 8, nabatid ng Gossip Tabloid, ay wala pang sinumang nakapagtuturo kung saan talaga naroon ang ina ni Ruffa Gutierrez na hindi
pinayagang makapagpiyansa ng Branch 33 para sa pansamantala niyang kalayaan.
May mga nagpapalagay na sa pamamagitan ng tinatawag na back-door exit, ang pag-alis ng bansa sa paraang hindi na kailangan pang dumaan sa NAIA, ay
nakaalis na si Annabelle pang nakaraang Biyernes, June 9, patungong Amerika.
Pero isang mapagkakatiwalaang source ng Gossip Tabloid ang nagsabing napaka-imposibleng sa Amerika nagtungo si Annabelle dahil doon man ay may
mga nakahanda nang awtoridad na handang magkulong kay Annabelle, sakaling mapatunayang naroon nga siya.
Hindi siya makapupunta sa Amerika dahil napakarami rin niyang asuntong iniwan doon pa!
Nag-abroad man siya, e pihadong hindi siya sa Amerika nagtuloy dahil nakaabang na rin ang sangkatutak niyang maniningil dun ngayon!
Sa Amerika pa kaya siya magtatago, samantalang ilang taon na rin siyang inaabangan dun ng mga kababayan nating niloko niya, in one way or another?
simula ng source ng Gossip Tabloid.
Niliwanag ng naturang source na ang dahilan ng biglaang pag-uwi ng pamilya Gutierrez sa bansa ilang taon na ang nakararaan ay may kinalaman sa
malaking halagang hindi nabayaran nina Eddie at Annabelle sa ilang kababayan natin sa Amerika.
Naaalala pa ba ninyo yung mga kalderong ibinebenta nina Eddie at Annabelle sa States?
Mga mamahaling kaldero yun, hindi basta-basta kaldero ang ibinebenta nila dun, kaya talagang ang ganda-ganda na ng buhay nilang mag-anak dun
hanggang sa dumating yung point na sinisingil na sila nung mismong kompanya ng kaldero!
Malaki ang halagang involved, milyon-milyon, kaya nung kinasuhan na sila, e kinailangan nilang umalis sa Amerika para bumalik na dito.
Isa si Bert Leroy, Jr. sa mga Pilipinong nagkaroon ng malaking problema kina Eddie at Annabelle, alam ba nyo yun?
Ang ganda-ganda ng samahan nila nung una sa Amerika, yumaman sila nang dahil sa mga mamahaling kaldero na ibinebenta nila, kaso, sumabit sina
Eddie at Annabelle dun sa mismong company na pinagkukunan nila ng produkto!
Bukod sa napakarami na nilang isinabit na Pinoy sa Amerika dahil sa mga kalderong yun, e sumabit pa sila nang malaking halaga sa mismong
manufacturer nung mga ibinebenta nilang mamahaling kaldero!
Yun ang dahilan kung bakit bigla-biglang umuwi sa Pilipinas ang pamilya ni Eddie!
Ang ikinakatwiran nilang mag-asawa , e gusto raw kasi nilang lumaking Pilipinong-Pilipino ang kanilang mga anak, pero ang totoo, e, napakalaki ng
problemang iniwan nila sa Amerika! mahabang simula ng source ng Gossip Tabloid.
Masamang-masama diumano ang loob ng mga Pilipinong kinatalo roon nina Eddie at Annabelle, lalo na si Annabelle, na bukod sa mataray na ay may
kayabangan pa.
Dati nang ganyan si Annabelle! Mataray siya na wala sa lugar. Nung nasa Amerika pa silang mag-anak, e, yun din ang madalas nilang pag-awayan dun ni
Eddie!
Madalas silang magkagalit, kaya si Eddie, para lang makapagpalipas ng mga sama niya ng loob, e, dun nag-i-stay sa bahay ng mga kaibigan niyang Pinoy!
Grabe ang naging problema nila dun, kaya wala silang choice that time kung di ang umuwi na lang sa Pilipinas!
Ang halagang involved sa pagbebenta nila ng kaldero, e, hindi basta-basta, milyunan yon!
Kaso yung pinagbebentahan nila, yung halagang dapat sana, e, ibigay nila sa kompanya dahil porsiyentuhan lang naman sila dun, nagastos nila!
Nawala ang pera, at ang balita nga sa States, e, si Annabelle ang dahilan kung bakit nalubog sila sa utang sa States!
Nag-casino pala si Annabelle! Grabe raw kung magpatalo siya, kaya pati yung kinita nila sa pagbebenta ng mamahaling kaldero, e, natunaw! sabi uli ng
source ng Gossip Tabloid.
Maraming Pilipino ang sinabitan doon ng mag-asawa, ayon pa sa source ng Gossip Tabloid, kaya ngayong may asunto naman si Annabelle dito sa Pilipinas
ay napaka-imposibleng sa Amerika pa rin siya tatakbo.
Paano siya magpupunta dun para tuluyan nang manirahan, e, ang dami-dami ring Pinoy na naghihintay sa kanya dun para maningil sa kanya?
Alam nyo ba, bukod sa galit na galit na sa kanila ang mga Pinoy na nandun, e, may mga nakaabang na ring asunto para kay Annabelle.
So, malabong sa Amerika pa siya tumuloy ngayong napapabalitang nasa abroad siya dahil sa mga naghihintay na kaso sa kanya dun.
Ang alam namin, e, sa Europe nagbabalak pumunta ang pamilya ni Eddie.
Di bat ilang beses nang nagpapabalik-balik dun sina Ruffa. Noon pa, e, pinag-aralan na nina Eddie at Annabelle ang posibilidad ng mga gagawin nila!
Alam nila na hindi sila puwedeng mag-stay sa States dahil kalat din ang asunto nila dun, bukod pa sa napakaraming Pinoy na huma-hunting sa kanila!
Kaya kung totoong nakalusot na nga si Annabelle ngayon para makatakas siya sa pagkakulong, imposibleng sa States siya nagpunta!
Mas malaking problema ang kailangan niyang harapin sa States dahil sa perang nadispalko nila, bukod pa sa asuntong iniwan nilang nakatiwangwang dun!
Naghahanap ng sakit ng katawan si Annabelle kung sa States nga niya maisipang pumunta ngayon para lang malusutan si Ligaya Santos at ang sintensiya
sa kanya ni Judge Palattao! madiin pang pahayag ng mapagkakatiwalaang source ng Gossip Tabloid.[30]
A libel is defined as a public and malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary; or any act, omission, condition, status, or
circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the memory of one who is dead.[31] In
determining whether a statement is defamatory, the words used are to be construed in their entirety and should be taken in their plain and ordinary meaning
as they would naturally be understood by persons reading them, unless it appears that they were used and understood in another sense.[32]

To say that the article, in its entirety, is not libelous disturbs ones sensibilities; it would certainly prick ones conscience. There is evident imputation of the
crime of malversation (that the complainants converted for their personal use the money paid to them by fellow Filipinos in America in their business of
distributing high-end cookware); of vices or defects for being fugitives from the law (that complainants and their family returned to the Philippines to
evade prosecution in America); and of being a wastrel (that Annabelle Rama Gutierrez lost the earnings from their business through irresponsible gambling
in casinos). The attribution was made publicly, considering that Gossip Tabloid had a nationwide circulation. The victims were identified and identifiable.
More importantly, the article reeks of malice, as it tends to cause the dishonor, discredit, or contempt of the complainants.

Petitioner claims that there was no malice on her part because, allegedly, the article was merely a fair and honest comment on the fact that Annabelle Rama
Gutierrez was issued a warrant of arrest for her conviction for estafa before then Judge Palattaos court. She even cited as proof of her lack of malice the
purported absence of any ill will against complainants, as shown by the article she wrote about complainants daughter Sharmaine Ruffa Gutierrez in the
June 15, 1995 issue of the same tabloid where she expressed her sympathy and admiration for the latter.

Notably, however, the complainants successfully refuted the imputations during the trial. Complainants proved that they could return anytime to the United
States of America after the publication of the article,[33] and that they remained on good terms with the manufacturing company of the cookware.[34] To
the contrary, both petitioner and Tugas failed to adduce evidence to show the truth of the allegations in the article despite the opportunity to do so.

Further worthy of mention is the admission of petitioner before the trial court that she had very close association with then Congressman Golez and
mayoralty candidate Joey Marquez, and that she would use her skills as a writer to campaign for them. Complainant Eddie Gutierrez ran against then
incumbent Golez for the congressional seat in Paraaque City. Petitioner testified in this wise

Q: When you acted as writer during the campaign, as you said, for Joey Marquez and Golez, of course you did not give your services for free to these
candidates, were you paid?
A: I was not paid, Sir.
Q: You just wanted to help them, am I correct?
A: Yes, because they are my friends, Sir.
Q: And you wanted them to win the election, thru your being a writer, is that correct?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: You were campaigning hard for Golez and Marquez, right?
A: Right, Sir.
Q: When you say hard, you wanted your candidates to win, is it not?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: Who was the opponent of Joey Marquez at that time?
A: The former Mayor Olivares, Sir.
Q: How about the opponent of Congressman Golez?
A: One of them is Eddie Gutierrez, Sir.
Q: And the tandem of Marquez and Golez versus the tandem of Olivares and Eddie Gutierrez, am I correct?
A: Actually, that was the situation at that time, Sir.
Q: Of course, the tandem of Joey Marquez was working hard to win over their opponent, is it not?
A: Whatever their problems were, I am out.
Q: As a hard campaigner, you wanted your team to win over the other, is this correct?
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: Of course you understand what PRO work is, it includes propaganda, is that correct?
A: I am sorry I dont accept PR work, Sir.
Q: Do you understand PRO work?
A: Yes, Sir, I know.
Q: In propaganda, for your side, you promote it as against the other, right?
A: Yes, Sir.[35]
It can be gleaned from her testimony that petitioner had the motive to make defamatory imputations against complainants. Thus, petitioner cannot, by
simply making a general denial, convince us that there was no malice on her part. Verily, not only was there malice in law, the article being malicious in
itself, but there was also malice in fact, as there was motive to talk ill against complainants during the electoral campaign.

Neither can petitioner take refuge in the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech and of the press. Although a wide latitude is given to critical
utterances made against public officials in the performance of their official duties, or against public figures on matters of public interest, such criticism
does not automatically fall within the ambit of constitutionally protected speech. If the utterances are false, malicious or unrelated to a public officers
performance of his duties or irrelevant to matters of public interest involving public figures, the same may give rise to criminal and civil liability. [36]
While complainants are considered public figures for being personalities in the entertainment business, media people, including gossip and intrigue writers
and commentators such as petitioner, do not have the unbridled license to malign their honor and dignity by indiscriminately airing fabricated and
malicious comments, whether in broadcast media or in print, about their personal lives.[37]

We must however take this opportunity to likewise remind media practitioners of the high ethical standards attached to and demanded by their noble
profession. The danger of an unbridled irrational exercise of the right of free speech and press, that is, in utter contempt of the rights of others and in willful
disregard of the cumbrous responsibilities inherent in it, is the eventual self-destruction of the right and the regression of human society into a veritable
Hobbesian state of nature where life is short, nasty and brutish. Therefore, to recognize that there can be no absolute unrestraint in speech is to truly
comprehend the quintessence of freedom in the marketplace of social thought and action, genuine freedom being that which is limned by the freedom of
others. If there is freedom of the press, ought there not also be freedom from the press? It is in this sense that self-regulation as distinguished from self-
censorship becomes the ideal mean for, as Mr. Justice Frankfurter has warned, [W]ithout x x x a lively sense of responsibility, a free press may readily
become a powerful instrument of injustice.
Lest we be misconstrued, this is not to diminish nor constrict that space in which expression freely flourishes and operates. For we have always strongly
maintained, as we do now, that freedom of expression is mans birthright constitutionally protected and guaranteed, and that it has become the singular role
of the press to act as its defensor fidei in a democratic society such as ours. But it is also worth keeping in mind that the press is the servant, not the
master, of the citizenry, and its freedom does not carry with it an unrestricted hunting license to prey on the ordinary citizen.[38]
In view of the foregoing disquisitions, the conviction of petitioner for libel should be upheld.

With respect to the penalty to be imposed for this conviction, we note that on January 25, 2008, the Court issued Administrative Circular No. 08-2008,
entitled Guidelines in the Observance of a Rule of Preference in the Imposition of Penalties in Libel Cases. The Circular expresses a preference for the
imposition of a fine rather than imprisonment, given the circumstances attendant in the cases[39] cited therein in which only a fine was imposed by this
Court on those convicted of libel. It also states that, if the penalty imposed is merely a fine but the convict is unable to pay the same, the Revised Penal
Code provisions on subsidiary imprisonment should apply.

However, the Circular likewise allows the court, in the exercise of sound discretion, the option to impose imprisonment as penalty, whenever the
imposition of a fine alone would depreciate the seriousness of the offense, work violence on the social order, or otherwise be contrary to the imperatives of
justice.

In the case at bench, the Court considers the publics speculations as to the whereabouts of Annabelle Rama Gutierrez with the issuance of the warrant of
arrest after her initial conviction for estafa. Petitioner fueled these speculations through her article. However, her article went overboard and exceeded the
bounds of fair comment. This warrants her conviction. Nonetheless, in light of the relatively wide latitude given to utterances against public figures such as
private complainants, and consonant with Administrative Circular No. 08-2008, the Court deems it proper to modify the penalty of imprisonment to a fine
in the amount of P6,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, in each case. But the award of moral damages for each of the private
complainants in the amount of P500,000.00, as ordered by the trial court, should be restored on account of the serious anxiety and the wounded feelings
suffered by complainants from the libelous article, particularly taking into account the fact that petitioner and the private complainants were on relatively
good terms with each other, and complainants gave no cause or offense which could have provoked the malicious publication.

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated September 3, 2002 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20890 is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION
that in lieu of imprisonment, petitioner Cristinelli S. Fermin is sentenced to pay a fine in the amount of P6,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, in each case. The award of moral damages, in the amount of P300,000.00 each in favor of complainants Annabelle Rama Gutierrez and
Eduardo Gutierrez, is increased to P500,000.00. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson
DANTE O. TINGA MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice
ATT E S TAT I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts
Division.
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson, Third Division
 C E RT I FI CAT I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

* In lieu of Associate Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago per Special Order No. 497, dated .
[1] Rollo, pp. 3-43.
[2] Penned by Associate Justice Salvador J. Valdez, Jr., with Associate Justices Mercedes Gozo-Dadole and Amelita G. Tolentino, concurring; id. at 45-60.
[3] at 62-67.
[4] Both entitled People of the Philippines v. Cristenelli S. Fermin and Bogs C. Tugas and docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. Q-95-62823 and Q-95-62824.
[5] Also referred in the records as Cristenelli.
[6] Annabelle Rama Gutierrez in one, and Eduardo (Eddie) Gutierrez in the other.
[7] Records, pp. 2-3.
[8] at 181-194.
[9] at 193-194.
[10] Rollo, pp. 59-60.
[11] at 7-8.
[12] 28 Phil. 599 (1914).
[13] 59 Phil. 356 (1934).
[14] 27 Phil. 347 (1914).
[15] 36 Phil. 243 (1917).
[16] 18 Phil. 1 (1910).
[17] CA-G.R. CR No. 13561, .
[18] Supra note 12, at 604-605. (Emphasis supplied.)
[19] Art. 360. Persons responsible. Any person who shall publish, exhibit, or cause the publication or exhibition of any defamation in writing or by
similar means, shall be responsible for the same.
The author or editor of a book or pamphlet, or the editor or business manager of a daily newspaper, magazine or serial publication, shall be responsible
for the defamations contained therein to the same extent as if he were the author thereof. x x x (Emphasis supplied)
[20] Supra note 16, at 50-52.
[21] Exhibit A-8; records, p. 60.
[22] TSN, , p. 61.
[23] at 29.
[24] Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the constitution shall form part of the legal system of the .
[25] Castillo v. Sandiganbayan, 427 Phil. 785, 793 (2002).
[26] Records, p. 17.
[27] Cross-examination of Bogs Tugas; TSN, , pp. 36-37.
[28] Direct examination of Dr. Richard U. Velez; TSN, , pp. 7-8.
[29] Cross-examination of Bogs Tugas; TSN, , pp. 15-18.
[30] Records, p. 59.
[31] REVISED PENAL CODE, Art. 353.
[32] Novicio v. Aggabao, 463 Phil. 510, 516 (2003).
[33] Exhibits E-4 to E-8; records, pp. 75-76.
[34] Testimony of Eddie Gutierrez; TSN, , pp. 66-68, 85-87.
[35] Cross-examination of Cristinelli Fermin; TSN, , pp. 54-59.
[36] Brillante v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 118757 & 121571, October 19, 2004, 440 SCRA 541, 574.
[37] Soriano v. Intermediate Appellate Court, No. L-72383, , 167 SCRA 222, 231 (1988).
[38] Borjal v. Court of Appeals, 361 Phil. 1, 28 (1999).
[39] In Sazon v. Court of Appeals (325 Phil. 1053, 1068 [1996]), the Court modified the penalty imposed upon petitioner, an officer of a homeowners
association, for the crime of libel from imprisonment and fine in the amount of P200.00, to fine only of P3,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, for the reason that he wrote the libelous article merely to defend his honor against the malicious messages that earlier circulated around the
subdivision, which he thought was the handiwork of the private complainant.
In Mari v. Court of Appeals (388 Phil. 269, 279 [2000]), in which the crime involved is slander by deed, the Court modified the penalty imposed on
petitioner, an ordinary government employee, from imprisonment to a fine of P1,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, on the ground
that the latter committed the offense in the heat of anger and in reaction to a perceived provocation.
In Brillante v. Court of Appeals (G.R. Nos. 118757 & 121571, November 11, 2005, 474 SCRA 480, 484), the Court deleted the penalty of imprisonment
imposed upon petitioner, a local politician, but maintained the penalty of fine of P4,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, in each of
the five (5) cases of libel, on the ground that the intensely feverish passions evoked during the election period in 1988 must have agitated petitioner into
writing his open letter, and that incomplete privileged communication should be appreciated in favor of petitioner, especially considering the wide latitude
traditionally given to defamatory utterances against public officials in connection with or relevant to their performance of official duties or against public
figures in relation to matters of public interest involving them.
In Buatis, Jr. v. People (G.R No. 142509, March 24, 2006, 485 SCRA 275, 292), the Court opted to impose upon petitioner, a lawyer, the penalty of fine
only for the crime of libel considering that it was his first offense and he was motivated purely by his belief that he was merely exercising a civic or moral
duty to his client when he wrote the defamatory letter to private complainant.
Republic of the
SUPREME COURT
SECOND DIVISION
ERWIN TULFO, G.R. No. 161032
Petitioner,
Present:
- versus - QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,
CARPIO MORALES,
VELASCO, JR.,
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES NACHURA,* and
and ATTY. CARLOS T. SO, BRION, JJ.
Respondents.
x-------------------------------------------x
SUSAN CAMBRI, REY SALAO, G.R. No. 161176
JOCELYN BARLIZO, and
PHILIP PICHAY,
Petitioners,
- versus -
COURT OF APPEALS, PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, and Promulgated:
CARLOS SO,
Respondents. September 16, 2008
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The freedom of the press is one of the cherished hallmarks of our democracy; but even as we strive to protect and respect the fourth estate, the freedom it
enjoys must be balanced with responsibility. There is a fine line between freedom of expression and libel, and it falls on the courts to determine whether or
not that line has been crossed.

The Facts
On the complaint of Atty. Carlos Ding So of the Bureau of Customs, four (4) separate informations were filed on September 8, 1999 with the Regional
Trial Court in (RTC) Pasay City. These were assigned to Branch 112 and docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 99-1597 to 99-1600, and charged petitioners
Erwin Tulfo, as author/writer, Susan Cambri, as managing editor, Rey Salao, as national editor, Jocelyn Barlizo, as city editor, and Philip Pichay, as
president of the Carlo Publishing House, Inc., of the daily tabloid Remate, with the crime of libel in connection with the publication of the articles in the
column Direct Hit in the issues of May 11, 1999; May 12, 1999; May 19, 1999; and June 25, 1999.[1] The four informations read as follows:

Criminal Case No. 99-1598

That on or about the 11th day of May, 1999 in Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another, being then the columnist, publisher and managing editor, respectively of
REMATE, a tabloid published daily and of general circulation in the Philippines, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and with
malicious intent to discredit or dishonor complainant, ATTY. CARLOS DING SO, and with the malicious intent of injuring and exposing said complainant
to public hatred, contempt and ridicule, write and publish in the regular issue of said publication on May 11, 1999, its daily column DIRECT HIT, quoted
hereunder, to wit:
PINAKAMAYAMAN SA CUSTOMS
Ito palang si Atty. Ding So ng Intelligence Division ng Bureau of Customs and [sic] pinakamayaman na yata
na government official sa buong bansa sa pangungurakot lamang diyan sa South Harbor.
Hindi matibag ang gagong attorney dahil malakas daw ito sa Iglesia ni Kristo.
Hoy, So! . . nakakahiya ka sa mga INC, ikaw na yata ang pinakagago at magnanakaw na miyembro nito.
Balita ko, malapit ka nang itiwalag ng nasabing simbahan dahil sa mga kalokohan mo.
Abangan bukas ang mga raket ni So sa BOC.
WHEREIN said complainant was indicated as an extortionist, a corrupt public official, smuggler and
having illegally acquired wealth, all as already stated, with the object of destroying his reputation,
discrediting and ridiculing him before the bar of public opinion.[2]
Criminal Case No. 99-1599

That on or about the 12th day of May, 1999 in Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another, being then the columnist, publisher and managing editor, respectively of
REMATE, a tabloid published daily and of general circulation in the Philippines, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and with
malicious intent to discredit or dishonor complainant, ATTY. CARLOS DING SO, and with the malicious intent of injuring and exposing said complainant
to public hatred, contempt and ridicule, write and publish in the regular issue of said publication on May 12, 1999, in daily column DIRECT HIT, quoted
hereunder, to wit:
SI ATTY. SO NG BOC
LINTEK din sa pangungurakot itong Ding So ng Bureau of Customs Intelligence Unit sa .
Daan-daang libong piso ang kinikita ng masiba at matakaw na si So sa mga importer na ayaw ideklara ang
totoong laman ng mga container para makaiwas sa pagbayad ng malaking customs duties at taxes.
Si So ang nagpapadrino sa mga pag-inspection ng mga container na ito. Siyempre-binibigyan din niya ng
salapi yung ibang mga ahensiya para pumikit na lang at itikom ang kanilang nga [sic] bibig diyan sa mga
buwayang taga BOC.
Awang-awa ako sa ating gobyerno. Bankrupt na nga, ninanakawan pa ng mga kawatan tulad ni So.
Ewan ko ba rito kay Atty. So, bakit hindi na lang tumayo ng sarili niyang robbery-hold-up gang para kumita
ng mas mabilis.
Hoy So.. hindi bagay sa iyo ang pagiging attorney . . . Mas bagay sa iyo ang pagiging buwayang naka korbata
at holdaper. Magnanakaw ka So!!
WHEREIN said complainant was indicated as an extortionist, a corrupt public official, smuggler and
having illegally acquired wealth, all as already stated, with the object of destroying his reputation,
discrediting and ridiculing him before the bar of public opinion.[3]
Criminal Case No. 99-1600

That on or about 19th day of May, 1999 in Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another, being then the columnist, publisher and managing editor, respectively of
REMATE, a tabloid published daily and of general circulation in the Philippines, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and with
malicious intent to discredit or dishonor complainant, ATTY. CARLOS DING SO, and with the malicious intent of injuring and exposing said complainant
to public hatred, contempt and ridicule, write and publish in the regular issue of said publication on May 19, 1999, in daily column DIRECT HIT, quoted
hereunder, to wit:
xxxx
Tulad ni Atty. Ding So ng Bureau of Customs Intelligence Division, saksakan din ng lakas itong si Daniel
Aquino ng Presidential Anti-Smuggling Unit na nakatalaga sa .
Tulad ni So, magnanakaw na tunay itong si Aquino.
Panghihingi ng pera sa mga brokers, ang lakad nito.
Pag hindi nagbigay ng pera ang mga brokers, maiipit ang pagre-release ng kanilang kargamento.
WHEREIN said complainant was indicated as an extortionist, a corrupt public official, smuggler and having illegally acquired wealth, all as already stated,
with the object of destroying his reputation, discrediting and ridiculing him before the bar of public opinion.[4]
Criminal Case No. 99-1597

That on or about 25th day of June, 1999 in Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another, being then the columnist, publisher and managing editor, respectively of
REMATE, a tabloid published daily and of general circulation in the Philippines, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and with
malicious intent to discredit or dishonor complainant, ATTY. CARLOS DING T. SO, and with the malicious intent of injuring and exposing said
complainant to public hatred, contempt and ridicule, write and publish in the regular issue of said publication on June 25, 1999, its daily column DIRECT
HIT, quoted hereunder, to wit:
xxxx
Nagfile ng P10 M na libel suit itong si Atty. Carlos So ng Bureau of Customs laban sa inyong lingkod at ilang
opisyales ng Remate sa Pasay City Court. Nagalit itong tarantadong si Atty. So dahil binanatan ko siya at
inexpose ang kagaguhan niya sa BOC.
Hoy, So . . . dagdagan mo pa ang pagnanakaw mo dahil hindi kita tatantanan. Buhay ka pa sinusunog na ang
iyong kaluluwa sa impyerno.
WHEREIN said complainant was indicated as an extortionist, a corrupt public official, smuggler and
having illegally acquired wealth, all as already stated, with the object of destroying his reputation,
discrediting and ridiculing him before the bar of public opinion.[5]
On November 3, 1999, Tulfo, Salao, and Cambri were arraigned, while Barlizo and Pichay were arraigned on December 15, 1999. They all pleaded not
guilty to the offenses charged.

At pre-trial, the following were admitted by petitioners: (1) that during the four dates of the publication of the questioned articles, the complaining witness
was not assigned at South Harbor; (2) that the accused and complaining witness did not know each other during all the time material to the four dates of
publication; (3) that Remate is a newspaper/tabloid of general circulation in the Philippines; (4) the existence and genuineness of the Remate newspaper;
(5) the column therein and its authorship and the alleged libelous statement as well as the editorial post containing the designated positions of the other
accused; and (6) the prosecutions qualified admission that it is the duty of media persons to expose corruption.[6]

The prosecution presented four witnesses, namely: Oscar M. Ablan, Atty. James Fortes, Jr., Gladys Fontanilla, and complainant Atty. So. The prosecution
presented documentary evidence as well.

Ablan testified that he had read the four columns written by Tulfo, and that the articles were untrue because he had known Atty. So since 1992 and had
worked with him in the Customs Intelligence and Investigation Service Division of the Bureau of Customs. He further testified that upon reading the
articles written by Tulfo, he concluded that they referred to Atty. So because the subject articles identified Atty. Carlos as Atty. Ding So of the Customs
Intelligence and Investigation Service Division, Bureau of Customs and there was only one Atty. Carlos Ding So of the Bureau of Customs.[7]

Fontanilla, Records Officer I of the Bureau of Customs, testified that she issued a certification in connection with these cases upon the request of Atty. So.
[8] This certification stated that as per records available in her office, there was only one employee by the name of Atty. Carlos T. So who was also known
as Atty. Ding So in the Intelligence Division of the Customs Intelligence and Investigation Service or in the entire Bureau of Customs.[9]

Atty. Fortes testified that he knew Atty. So as a fellow member of the Iglesia Ni Kristo and as a lawyer, and that having read the articles of Tulfo, he
believed that these were untrue, as he knew Atty. Carlos Ding So.[10]

Atty. So testified that he was the private complainant in these consolidated cases. He further testified that he is also known as Atty. Ding So, that he had
been connected with the Bureau of Customs since October 1981, and that he was assigned as Officer-in-Charge (OIC) of the Customs Intelligence and
Investigation Service Division at the Manila International Container Port since December 27, 1999. He executed two complaint-affidavits, one dated June
4, 1999 and the other dated July 5, 1999, for Criminal Case Nos. 99-1598 to 99-1600. Prior to this, he also filed 14 cases of libel against Raffy Tulfo,
brother of petitioner Erwin Tulfo. He testified that petitioner Tulfos act of imputing upon him criminality, assailing his honesty and integrity, caused him
dishonor, discredit, and contempt among his co-members in the legal profession, co-officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, co-members and peers
in the Iglesia ni Kristo, his co-officers and employees and superior officers in the Bureau of Customs, and among ordinary persons who had read said
articles. He said it also caused him and his family sleepless nights, mental anguish, wounded feelings, intrigues, and embarrassment. He further testified
that he included in his complaint for libel the officers of Remate such as the publisher, managing editor, city editor, and national editor because under
Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), they are equally responsible and liable to the same extent as if they were the author of the articles. He also
testified that Ding is his nickname and that he is the only person in the entire Bureau of Customs who goes by the name of Atty. Carlos T. So or Atty.
Carlos Ding So.[11]

In his defense, petitioner Tulfo testified that he did not write the subject articles with malice, that he neither knew Atty. So nor met him before the
publication of the articles. He testified that his criticism of a certain Atty. So of the South Harbor was not directed against the complainant, but against a
person by the name of Atty. Ding So at the South Harbor. Tulfo claimed that it was the practice of certain people to use other peoples names to advance
their corrupt practices. He also claimed that his articles had neither discredited nor dishonored the complainant because as per his source in the Bureau of
Customs, Atty. So had been promoted. He further testified that he did not do any research on Atty. So before the subject articles, because as a columnist, he
had to rely on his source, and that he had several sources in the Bureau of Customs, particularly in the South Harbor.[12]
Petitioner Salao testified that he came to know Atty. Carlos Ding So when the latter filed a case against them. He testified that he is an employee of Carlo
Publishing House, Inc.; that he was designated as the national editor of the newspaper Remate since December 1999; that the duties of the position are to
edit, evaluate, encode, and supervise layout of the news from the provinces; and that Tulfo was under the supervision of Rey Briones, Vice President for
Editorial and Head of the Editorial Division. Salao further testified that he had no participation in the subject articles of Tulfo, nor had he anything to do
with the latters column.[13]

Petitioner Cambri, managing editor of Remate, testified that she classifies the news articles written by the reporters, and that in the Editorial Division, the
officers are herself; Briones, her supervisor; Lydia Bueno, as news and city editor; and Salao as national editor. She testified that petitioner Barlizo is her
subordinate, whose duties and responsibilities are the typesetting, editing, and layout of the page assigned to her, the Metro page. She further testified that
she had no participation in the writing, editing, or publication of the column of Tulfo because the column was not edited. She claimed that none among her
co-accused from the Remate newspaper edited the columns of Tulfo, that the publication and editing of the subject articles were the responsibility of Tulfo,
and that he was given blanket authority to write what he wanted to write. She also testified that the page wherein Tulfos column appeared was supervised
by Bueno as news editor.[14]

Petitioner Pichay testified that he had been the president of Carlo Publishing House, Inc. since December 1998. He testified that the company practice was
to have the columnists report directly to the vice-president of editorials, that the columnists were given autonomy on their columns, and that the vice-
president for editorials is the one who would decide what articles are to be published and what are not. He further testified that Tulfo was already a regular
contributor.[15]

The Ruling of the RTC

In a Decision dated November 17, 2000, the RTC found petitioners guilty of the crime of Libel. The dispositive portion reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused ERWIN TULFO, SUSAN CAMBRI, REY SALAO, JOCELYN BARLIZO and PHILIP PICHAY guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of four (4) counts of the crime of LIBEL, as defined in Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code, and penalized by prision
correccional in its minimum and medium periods, or a fine ranging from P200.00 Pesos to P6,000.00 Pesos or both, under Article 355 of the same Code.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the Court hereby sentences EACH of the accused to suffer imprisonment of SIX (6) MONTHS of arresto
mayor, as minimum, to FOUR (4) YEARS and TWO (2) MONTHS of prision correccional, as maximum, for EACH count with accessory penalties
provided by law.
Considering that the accused Erwin Tulfo, Susan Cambri, Rey Salao, Jocelyn Barlizo and Philip Pichay wrote and published the four (4) defamatory
articles with reckless disregard, being, in the mind of the Court, of whether it was false or not, the said articles libelous per se, they are hereby ordered to
pay, jointly and severally, the sum of EIGHT HUNDRED THOUSAND (P800,000.00) PESOS, as actual damages, the sum of ONE MILLION PESOS
(P1,000,000.00), as moral damages, and an additional amount of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P500,000.00), by way of exemplary damages,
all with subsidiary imprisonment, in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.[16]
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Before the Court of Appeals (CA), Tulfo assigned the following errors:

1. THE ERRED IN IGNORING THE UNREBUTTED TESTIMONY OF THE APPELLANT THAT HE DID NOT CRITICIZE THE PRIVATE
COMPLAINANT WORKING AT THE NAIA. HE CRITICIZED ANOTHER PERSON WORKING AT THE . HENCE, THE ELEMENT OF IDENTITY
IS LACKING.
2. THE ERRED IN IGNORING THE LACK OF THE ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF DISCREDIT OR DISHONOR, AS DEFINED BY
JURISPRUDENCE.
3. THERE WAS NO MALICE AGAINST THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT ATTY. CARLOS DING SO.[17]
His co-accused assigned the following errors:

A
The trial court seriously erred in holding accused Susan Cambri, Rey Salao, Jocelyn Barlizo and Philip Pichay liable for the defamations contained in the
questioned articles despite the fact that the trial court did not have any finding as to their participation in the writing, editing and/or publication of the
questioned articles.
B
The trial court seriously erred in concluding that libel was committed by all of the accused on the basis of its finding that the elements of libel have been
satisfactorily established by evidence on record.
C
The trial court seriously erred in considering complainant to be the one referred to by Erwin Tulfo in his articles in question.[18]
In a Decision[19] dated June 17, 2003, the Eighth Division of the CA dismissed the appeal and affirmed the judgment of the trial court. A motion for
reconsideration dated June 30, 2003 was filed by Tulfo, while the rest of his co-accused filed a motion for reconsideration dated July 2, 2003. In a
Resolution dated December 11, 2003, both motions were denied for lack of merit.[20]

Petitions for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45

Tulfo brought this petition docketed as G.R. No. 161032, seeking to reverse the Decision of the CA in CA-G.R. CR No. 25318 which affirmed the decision
of the RTC. Petitioners Cambri, Salao, Barlizo, and Pichay brought a similar petition docketed as G.R. No. 161176, seeking the nullification of the same
CA decision.

In a Resolution dated March 15, 2004, the two cases were consolidated since both cases arise from the same set of facts, involve the same parties, assail the
same decision of the CA, and seek identical reliefs.[21]

Assignment of Errors

Petitioner Tulfo submitted the following assignment of errors:

I
Assuming that the Prosecution presented credible and relevant evidence, the Honorable CA erred in not declaring the assailed articles as privileged; the CA
erred in concluding that malice in law exists by the courts having incorrectly reasoned out that malice was presumed in the instant case.
II
Even assuming arguendo that the articles complained of are not privileged, the lower court, nonetheless, committed gross error as defined by the provisions
of Section 6 of Rule 45 by its misappreciation of the evidence presented on matters substantial and material to the guilt or innocence of the petitioner.[22]
Petitioners Cambri, Salao, Barlizo, and Pichay submitted their own assignment of errors, as follows:

A - The Court of Appeals Seriously Erred In Its Application of Article 360 Of The Revised Penal Code By Holding Cambri, Salao And Barlizo Liable For
The Defamatory Articles In The May 11, 12, 19 And June 25, 1999 Issues Of Remate Simply Because They Were Managing Editor, National Editor And
City Editor Respectively Of Remate And By Holding Pichay Also Liable For Libel Merely Because He Was The President Of Carlo Publishing House, Inc.
Without Taking Into Account The Unrebutted Evidence That Petitioners Had No Participation In The Editing Or Publication Of The Defamatory Articles In
Question.
B - The Court Of Appeals Committed Grave Abuse Of Discretion In Manifestly Disregarding The Unrebutted Evidence That Petitioners Had No
Participation In The Editing Or Publication Of The Defamatory Articles In Question.
C - The Court Of Appeals Seriously Misappreciated The Evidence In Holding That The Person Referred To In The Published Articles Was Private
Complainant Atty. Carlos So.[23]
Our Ruling
The petitions must be dismissed.

The assignment of errors of petitioner Tulfo shall be discussed first.

In his appeal, Tulfo claims that the CA erred in not applying the ruling in Borjal v. Court of Appeals.[24] In essence, he argues that the subject articles fall
under qualifiedly privileged communication under Borjal and that the presumption of malice in Art. 354 of the RPC does not apply. He argues that it is the
burden of the prosecution to prove malice in fact.

This case must be distinguished from Borjal on several points, the first being that Borjal stemmed from a civil action for damages based on libel, and was
not a criminal case. Second, the ruling in Borjal was that there was no sufficient identification of the complainant, which shall be differentiated from the
present case in discussing the second assignment of error of Tulfo. Third, the subject in Borjal was a private citizen, whereas in the present case, the subject
is a public official. Finally, it was held in Borjal that the articles written by Art Borjal were fair commentaries on matters of public interest.[25] It shall be
discussed and has yet to be determined whether or not the articles fall under the category of fair commentaries.

In passing, it must be noted that the defense of Tulfos articles being qualifiedly privileged communication is raised for the first time in the present petition,
and this particular issue was never brought before either the RTC or the CA. Thus, neither the RTC nor the CA had a chance to properly consider and
evaluate this defense. Tulfo now draws parallels between his case and that of Art Borjal, and argues that the prosecution should have proved malice in fact,
and it was error on the part of the trial and appellate courts to use the presumption of malice in law in Art. 354 of the RPC. This lays an unusual burden on
the part of the prosecution, the RTC, and the CA to refute a defense that Tulfo had never raised before them. Whether or not the subject articles are
privileged communications must first be established by the defense, which it failed to do at the level of the RTC and the CA. Even so, it shall be dealt with
now, considering that an appeal in a criminal proceeding throws the whole case open for review.

There is no question of the status of Atty. So as a public official, who served as the OIC of the Bureau of Customs Intelligence and Investigation Service at
the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) at the time of the printing of the allegedly libelous articles. Likewise, it cannot be refuted that the goings-
on at the Bureau of Customs, a government agency, are matters of public interest. It is now a matter of establishing whether the articles of Tulfo are
protected as qualified privileged communication or are defamatory and written with malice, for which he would be liable.

Freedom of the Press v. Responsibility of the Press

The Court has long respected the freedom of the press, and upheld the same when it came to commentaries made on public figures and matters of public
interest. Even in cases wherein the freedom of the press was given greater weight over the rights of individuals, the Court, however, has stressed that such
freedom is not absolute and unbounded. The exercise of this right or any right enshrined in the Bill of Rights, indeed, comes with an equal burden of
responsible exercise of that right. The recognition of a right is not free license for the one claiming it to run roughshod over the rights of others.

The Journalists Code of Ethics adopted by the National Union of Journalists of the Philippines shows that the press recognizes that it has standards to
follow in the exercise of press freedom; that this freedom carries duties and responsibilities. Art. I of said code states that journalists recognize the duty to
air the other side and the duty to correct substantive errors promptly. Art. VIII states that journalists shall presume persons accused of crime of being
innocent until proven otherwise.

In the present case, it cannot be said that Tulfo followed the Journalists Code of Ethics and exercised his journalistic freedom responsibly.

In his series of articles, he targeted one Atty. Ding So of the Bureau of Customs as being involved in criminal activities, and was using his public position
for personal gain. He went even further than that, and called Atty. So an embarrassment to his religion, saying ikaw na yata ang pinakagago at
magnanakaw sa miyembro nito.[26] He accused Atty. So of stealing from the government with his alleged corrupt activities. [27] And when Atty. So filed a
libel suit against him, Tulfo wrote another article, challenging Atty. So, saying, Nagalit itong tarantadong si Atty. So dahil binabantayan ko siya at in-
expose ang kagaguhan niya sa [Bureau of Customs].[28]

In his testimony, Tulfo admitted that he did not personally know Atty. So, and had neither met nor known him prior to the publication of the subject
articles. He also admitted that he did not conduct a more in-depth research of his allegations before he published them, and relied only on his source at the
Bureau of Customs.

In his defense before the trial court, Tulfo claimed knowledge of people using the names of others for personal gain, and even stated that he had been the
victim of such a practice. He argued then that it may have been someone else using the name of Atty. So for corrupt practices at the South Harbor, and this
person was the target of his articles. This argument weakens his case further, for even with the knowledge that he may be in error, even knowing of the
possibility that someone else may have used Atty. Sos name, as Tulfo surmised, he made no effort to verify the information given by his source or even to
ascertain the identity of the person he was accusing.

The trial court found Tulfos accusations against Atty. So to be false, but Tulfo argues that the falsity of contents of articles does not affect their privileged
character. It may be that the falsity of the articles does not prove malice. Neither did Borjal give journalists carte blanche with regard to their publications.
It cannot be said that a false article accusing a public figure would always be covered by the mantle of qualified privileged communication. The portion of
Borjal cited by Tulfo must be scrutinized further:

Even assuming that the contents of the articles are false, mere error, inaccuracy or even falsity alone does not prove actual malice. Errors or misstatements
are inevitable in any scheme of truly free expression and debate. Consistent with good faith and reasonable care, the press should not be held to account,
to a point of suppression, for honest mistakes or imperfections in the choice of language. There must be some room for misstatement of fact as well as for
misjudgment. Only by giving them much leeway and tolerance can they courageously and effectively function as critical agencies in our democracy. In
Bulletin Publishing Corp. v. Noel we held
A newspaper especially one national in reach and coverage, should be free to report on events and
developments in which the public has a legitimate interest with minimum fear of being hauled to court by one
group or another on criminal or civil charges for libel, so long as the newspaper respects and keeps within the
standards of morality and civility prevailing within the general community.
To avoid the self-censorship that would necessarily accompany strict liability for erroneous statements, rules governing liability for injury to reputation are
required to allow an adequate margin of error by protecting some inaccuracies. It is for the same reason that the New York Times doctrine requires that
liability for defamation of a public official or public figure may not be imposed in the absence of proof of actual malice on the part of the person making
the libelous statement.[29] (Emphasis supplied.)
Reading more deeply into the case, the exercise of press freedom must be done consistent with good faith and reasonable care. This was clearly abandoned
by Tulfo when he wrote the subject articles. This is no case of mere error or honest mistake, but a case of a journalist abdicating his responsibility to verify
his story and instead misinforming the public. Journalists may be allowed an adequate margin of error in the exercise of their profession, but this margin
does not expand to cover every defamatory or injurious statement they may make in the furtherance of their profession, nor does this margin cover total
abandonment of responsibility.

Borjal may have expanded the protection of qualified privileged communication beyond the instances given in Art. 354 of the RPC, but this expansion
does not cover Tulfo. The addition to the instances of qualified privileged communications is reproduced as follows:

To reiterate, fair commentaries on matters of public interest are privileged and constitute a valid defense in an action for libel or slander. The doctrine of
fair comment means that while in general every discreditable imputation publicly made is deemed false, because every man is presumed innocent until his
guilt is judicially proved, and every false imputation is deemed malicious, nevertheless, when the discreditable imputation is directed against a public
person in his public capacity, it is not necessarily actionable. In order that such discreditable imputation to a public official may be actionable, it must
either be a false allegation of fact or a comment based on a false supposition. If the comment is an expression of opinion, based on established facts,
then it is immaterial that the opinion happens to be mistaken, as long as it might reasonably be inferred from the facts.[30] (Emphasis supplied.)
The expansion speaks of fair commentaries on matters of public interest. While Borjal places fair commentaries within the scope of qualified privileged
communication, the mere fact that the subject of the article is a public figure or a matter of public interest does not automatically exclude the author from
liability. Borjal allows that for a discreditable imputation to a public official to be actionable, it must be a false allegation of fact or a comment based on a
false supposition. As previously mentioned, the trial court found that the allegations against Atty. So were false and that Tulfo did not exert effort to verify
the information before publishing his articles.

Tulfo offered no proof for his accusations. He claimed to have a source in the Bureau of Customs and relied only on this source for his columns, but did no
further research on his story. The records of the case are bereft of any showing that Atty. So was indeed the villain Tulfo pictured him to be. Tulfos articles
related no specific details or acts committed to prove Atty. So was indeed a corrupt public official. These columns were unsubstantiated attacks on Atty. So,
and cannot be countenanced as being privileged simply because the target was a public official. Although wider latitude is given to defamatory utterances
against public officials in connection with or relevant to their performance of official duties, or against public officials in relation to matters of public
interest involving them, such defamatory utterances do not automatically fall within the ambit of constitutionally protected speech.[31] Journalists still bear
the burden of writing responsibly when practicing their profession, even when writing about public figures or matters of public interest. As held in In Re:
Emil P. Jurado:

Surely it cannot be postulated that the law protects a journalist who deliberately prints lies or distorts the truth; or that a newsman may ecape liability who
publishes derogatory or defamatory allegations against a person or entity, but recognizes no obligation bona fide to establish beforehand the factual basis of
such imputations and refuses to submit proof thereof when challenged to do so. It outrages all notions of fair play and due process, and reduces to
uselessness all the injunctions of the Journalists Code of Ethics to allow a newsman, with all the potential of his profession to influence popular belief and
shape public opinion, to make shameful and offensive charges destructive of personal or institutional honor and repute, and when called upon to justify the
same, cavalierly beg off by claiming that to do so would compromise his sources and demanding acceptance of his word for the reliability of those sources.
[32]
The prosecution showed that Tulfo could present no proof of his allegations against Atty. So, only citing his one unnamed source. It is not demanded of
him that he name his source. The confidentiality of sources and their importance to journalists are accepted and respected. What cannot be accepted are
journalists making no efforts to verify the information given by a source, and using that unverified information to throw wild accusations and besmirch the
name of possibly an innocent person. Journalists have a responsibility to report the truth, and in doing so must at least investigate their stories before
publication, and be able to back up their stories with proof. The rumors and gossips spread by unnamed sources are not truth. Journalists are not storytellers
or novelists who may just spin tales out of fevered imaginings, and pass them off as reality. There must be some foundation to their reports; these reports
must be warranted by facts.

Jurado also established that the journalist should exercise some degree of care even when writing about public officials. The case stated:

Clearly, the public interest involved in freedom of speech and the individual interest of judges (and for that matter, all other public officials) in the
maintenance of private honor and reputation need to be accommodated one to the other. And the point of adjustment or accommodation between these two
legitimate interests is precisely found in the norm which requires those who, invoking freedom of speech, publish statements which are clearly defamatory
to identifiable judges or other public officials to exercise bona fide care in ascertaining the truth of the statements they publish. The norm does not require
that a journalist guarantee the truth of what he says or publishes. But the norm does prohibit the reckless disregard of private reputation by publishing or
circulating defamatory statements without any bona fide effort to ascertain the truth thereof. That this norm represents the generally accepted point of
balance or adjustment between the two interests involved is clear from a consideration of both the pertinent civil law norms and the Code of Ethics adopted
by the journalism profession in the .[33]
Tulfo has clearly failed in this regard. His articles cannot even be considered as qualified privileged communication under the second paragraph of Art. 354
of the RPC which exempts from the presumption of malice a fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any judicial,
legislative, or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or any statement, report, or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any
other act performed by public officers in the exercise of their functions. This particular provision has several elements which must be present in order for
the report to be exempt from the presumption of malice. The provision can be dissected as follows:

In order that the publication of a report of an official proceeding may be considered privileged, the following conditions must exist:
(a) That it is a fair and true report of a judicial, legislative, or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of a statement,
report or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by a public officer in the exercise of his functions;
(b) That it is made in good faith; and
(c) That it is without any comments or remarks.[34]
The articles clearly are not the fair and true reports contemplated by the provision. They provide no details of the acts committed by the subject, Atty. So.
They are plain and simple baseless accusations, backed up by the word of one unnamed source. Good faith is lacking, as Tulfo failed to substantiate or
even attempt to verify his story before publication. Tulfo goes even further to attack the character of the subject, Atty. So, even calling him a disgrace to his
religion and the legal profession. As none of the elements of the second paragraph of Art. 354 of the RPC is present in Tulfos articles, it cannot thus be
argued that they are qualified privileged communications under the RPC.

Breaking down the provision further, looking at the terms fair and true, Tulfos articles do not meet the standard. Fair is defined as having the qualities of
impartiality and honesty.[35] True is defined as conformable to fact; correct; exact; actual; genuine; honest. [36] Tulfo failed to satisfy these requirements,
as he did not do research before making his allegations, and it has been shown that these allegations were baseless. The articles are not fair and true reports,
but merely wild accusations.

Even assuming arguendo that the subject articles are covered by the shield of qualified privileged communication, this would still not protect Tulfo.

In claiming that his articles were covered by qualified privileged communication, Tulfo argues that the presumption of malice in law under Art. 354 of the
RPC is no longer present, placing upon the prosecution the burden of proving malice in fact. He then argues that for him to be liable, there should have
been evidence that he was motivated by ill will or spite in writing the subject articles.

The test to be followed is that laid down in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,[37] and reiterated in Flor v. People, which should be to determine whether the
defamatory statement was made with actual malice, that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.[38]

The trial court found that Tulfo had in fact written and published the subject articles with reckless disregard of whether the same were false or not, as
proven by the prosecution. There was the finding that Tulfo failed to verify the information on which he based his writings, and that the defense presented
no evidence to show that the accusations against Atty. So were true. Tulfo cannot argue that because he did not know the subject, Atty. So, personally, there
was no malice attendant in his articles. The test laid down is the reckless disregard test, and Tulfo has failed to meet that test.

The fact that Tulfo published another article lambasting respondent Atty. So can be considered as further evidence of malice, as held in U.S. vs. Montalvo,
[39] wherein publication after the commencement of an action was taken as further evidence of a malicious design to injure the victim. Tulfo did not relent
nor did he pause to consider his actions, but went on to continue defaming respondent Atty. So. This is a clear indication of his intent to malign Atty. So, no
matter the cost, and is proof of malice.

Leaving the discussion of qualified privileged communication, Tulfo also argues that the lower court misappreciated the evidence presented as to the
identity of the complainant: that Tulfo wrote about Atty. Ding So, an official of the Bureau of Customs who worked at the South Harbor, whereas the
complainant was Atty. Carlos So who worked at the NAIA. He claims that there has arisen a cloud of doubt as to the identity of the real party referred to in
the articles.

This argument is patently without merit.

The prosecution was able to present the testimonies of two other witnesses who identified Atty. So from Tulfos articles. There is the certification that there
is only one Atty. So in the Bureau of Customs. And most damning to Tulfos case is the last column he wrote on the matter, referring to the libel suit against
him by Atty. So of the Bureau of Customs. In this article, Tulfo launched further attacks against Atty. So, stating that the libel case was due to the exposs
Tulfo had written on the corrupt acts committed by Atty. So in the Bureau of Customs. This last article is an admission on the part of Tulfo that Atty. So
was in fact the target of his attacks. He cannot now point to a putative Atty. Ding So at South Harbor, or someone else using the name of Atty. So as the real
subject of his attacks, when he did not investigate the existence or non-existence of an Atty. So at South Harbor, nor investigate the alleged corrupt acts of
Atty. So of the Bureau of Customs. Tulfo cannot say that there is doubt as to the identity of the Atty. So referred to in his articles, when all the evidence
points to one Atty. So, the complainant in the present case.

Having discussed the issue of qualified privileged communication and the matter of the identity of the person referred to in the subject articles, there
remains the petition of the editors and president of Remate, the paper on which the subject articles appeared.

In sum, petitioners Cambri, Salao, Barlizo, and Pichay all claim that they had no participation in the editing or writing of the subject articles, and are thus
not liable.

The argument must fail.

The language of Art. 360 of the RPC is plain. It lists the persons responsible for libel:
Art. 360. Persons responsible.Any person who shall publish, exhibit, or cause the publication or exhibition of any defamation in writing or by similar
means, shall be responsible for the same.
The author or editor of a book or pamphlet, or the editor or business manager of a daily newspaper, magazine or serial publication, shall be responsible for
the defamations contained therein to the same extent as if he were the author thereof.
The claim that they had no participation does not shield them from liability. The provision in the RPC does not provide absence of participation as a
defense, but rather plainly and specifically states the responsibility of those involved in publishing newspapers and other periodicals. It is not a matter of
whether or not they conspired in preparing and publishing the subject articles, because the law simply so states that they are liable as they were the author.

Neither the publisher nor the editors can disclaim liability for libelous articles that appear on their paper by simply saying they had no participation in the
preparation of the same. They cannot say that Tulfo was all alone in the publication of Remate, on which the subject articles appeared, when they
themselves clearly hold positions of authority in the newspaper, or in the case of Pichay, as the president in the publishing company.

As Tulfo cannot simply say that he is not liable because he did not fulfill his responsibility as a journalist, the other petitioners cannot simply say that they
are not liable because they did not fulfill their responsibilities as editors and publishers. An editor or manager of a newspaper, who has active charge and
control of its management, conduct, and policy, generally is held to be equally liable with the owner for the publication therein of a libelous article.[40] On
the theory that it is the duty of the editor or manager to know and control the contents of the paper,[41] it is held that said person cannot evade
responsibility by abandoning the duties to employees,[42] so that it is immaterial whether or not the editor or manager knew the contents of the
publication.[43] In Fermin v. People of the Philippines,[44] the Court held that the publisher could not escape liability by claiming lack of participation in
the preparation and publication of a libelous article. The Court cited U.S. v. Ocampo, stating the rationale for holding the persons enumerated in Art. 360 of
the RPC criminally liable, and it is worth reiterating:

According to the legal doctrines and jurisprudence of the United States, the printer of a publication containing libelous matter is liable for the same by
reason of his direct connection therewith and his cognizance of the contents thereof. With regard to a publication in which a libel is printed, not only is the
publisher but also all other persons who in any way participate in or have any connection with its publication are liable as publishers.
xxxx
In the case of State vs. Mason (26 L.R.A., 779; 26 Oreg., 273, , 629), the question of the responsibility of the manager or proprietor of a newspaper was
discussed. The court said, among other things (pp. 782, 783):
The question then recurs as to whether the manager or proprietor of a newspaper can escape criminal responsibility solely on the ground that the libelous
article was published without his knowledge or consent. When a libel is published in a newspaper, such fact alone is sufficient evidence prima facie to
charge the manager or proprietor with the guilt of its publication.
The manager and proprietor of a newspaper, we think ought to be held prima facie criminally for whatever appears in his paper; and it should be no defense
that the publication was made without his knowledge or consent, x x x.
One who furnishes the means for carrying on the publication of a newspaper and entrusts its management to servants or employees whom he selects and
controls may be said to cause to be published what actually appears, and should be held responsible therefore, whether he was individually concerned in
the publication or not, x x x. Criminal responsibility for the acts of an agent or servant in the course of his employment necessarily implies some degree of
guilt or delinquency on the part of the publisher; x x x.
We think, therefore, the mere fact that the libelous article was published in the newspaper without the knowledge or consent of its proprietor or manager is
no defense to a criminal prosecution against such proprietor or manager.
In the case of Commonwealth vs. Morgan (107 Mass., 197), this same question was considered and the court held that in the criminal prosecution of a
publisher of a newspaper in which a libel appears, he is prima facie presumed to have published the libel, and that the exclusion of an offer by the
defendant to prove that he never saw the libel and was not aware of its publication until it was pointed out to him and that an apology and retraction were
afterwards published in the same paper, gave him no ground for exception. In this same case, Mr. Justice Colt, speaking for the court, said:
It is the duty of the proprietor of a public paper, which may be used for the publication of improper communications, to use reasonable caution in the
conduct of his business that no libels be published. (Whartons Criminal Law, secs. 1627, 1649; 1 Bishops Criminal Law, secs. 219, 221; People vs. Wilson,
64 Ill., 195; Commonwealth vs. Damon, 136 Mass., 441.)
The above doctrine is also the doctrine established by the English courts. In the case of Rex vs. Walter (3 Esp., 21) Lord Kenyon said that he was clearly of
the opinion that the proprietor of a newspaper was answerable criminally as well as civilly for the acts of his servants or agents for misconduct in the
management of the paper.
This was also the opinion of Lord Hale, Mr. Justice Powell, and Mr. Justice Foster.
Lofft, an English author, in his work on Libel and Slander, said:
An information for libel will lie against the publisher of a papers, although he did not know of its being put into the paper and stopped the sale as soon as
he discovered it.
In the case of People vs. Clay (86 , 147) the court held that
A person who makes a defamatory statement to the agent of a newspaper for publication, is liable both civilly and criminally, and his liability is shared by
the agent and all others who aid in publishing it.[45]
Under Art. 360 of the RPC, as Tulfo, the author of the subject articles, has been found guilty of libel, so too must Cambri, Salao, Barlizo, and Pichay.
Though we find petitioners guilty of the crime charged, the punishment must still be tempered with justice. Petitioners are to be punished for libel for the
first time. They did not apply for probation to avoid service of sentence possibly in the belief that they have not committed any crime. In Buatis, Jr. v.
People,[46] the Court, in a criminal case for libel, removed the penalty of imprisonment and instead imposed a fine as penalty. In Sazon v. Court of
Appeals,[47] the accused was merely fined in lieu of the original penalty of imprisonment and fine. Freedom of expression as well as freedom of the press
may not be unrestrained, but neither must it be reined in too harshly. In light of this, considering the necessity of a free press balanced with the necessity of
a responsible press, the penalty of a fine of PhP 6,000 for each count of libel, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, should suffice.[48]
Lastly, the responsibilities of the members of the press notwithstanding, the difficulties and hazards they encounter in their line of work must also be taken
into consideration.

The award of damages by the lower court must be modified. Art. 2199 of the Civil Code provides, Except as provided by law or by stipulation, one is
entitled to an adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved. Such compensation is referred to as actual or
compensatory damages. There was no showing of any pecuniary loss suffered by the complainant Atty. So. Without proof of actual loss that can be
measured, the award of actual damages cannot stand.

In Del Mundo v. Court of Appeals, it was held, as regards actual and moral damages:

A party is entitled to an adequate compensation for such pecuniary loss actually suffered by him as he has duly proved. Such damages, to be recoverable,
must not only be capable of proof, but must actually be proved with a reasonable degree of certainty. We have emphasized that these damages cannot be
presumed, and courts, in making an award must point out specific facts which could afford a basis for measuring whatever compensatory or actual
damages are borne.
Moral damages, upon the other hand, may be awarded to compensate one for manifold injuries such as physical suffering, mental anguish, serious anxiety,
besmirched reputation, wounded feelings and social humiliation. These damages must be understood to be in the concept of grants, not punitive or
corrective in nature, calculated to compensate the claimant for the injury suffered. Although incapable of exactness and no proof of pecuniary loss is
necessary in order that moral damages may be awarded, the amount of indemnity being left to the sound discretion of the court, it is imperative,
nevertheless, that (1) injury must have been suffered by the claimant, and (2) such injury must have sprung from any of the cases expressed in Article 2219
and Article 2220 of the Civil Code. A causal relation, in fine, must exist between the act or omission referred to in the Code which underlies, or gives rise
to, the case or proceeding on the one hand, and the resulting injury, on the other hand; i.e. the first must be the proximate cause and the latter the direct
consequence thereof.[49]
It was the articles of Tulfo that caused injury to Atty. So, and for that Atty. So deserves the award of moral damages. Justification for the award of moral
damages is found in Art. 2219(7) of the Civil Code, which states that moral damages may be recovered in cases of libel, slander, or any other form of
defamation. As the cases involved are criminal cases of libel, they fall squarely within the ambit of Art. 2219(7).

Moral damages can be awarded even in the absence of actual or compensatory damages. The fact that no actual or compensatory damage was proven
before the trial court does not adversely affect the offended partys right to recover moral damages.[50]

And while on the subject of moral damages, it may not be amiss to state at this juncture that Tulfos libelous articles are abhorrent not only because of its
vilifying and demeaning effect on Atty. So himself, but also because of their impact on members of his family, especially on the children and possibly even
the childrens children.

The Court can perhaps take judicial notice that the sense of kinship runs deeply in a typical Filipino family, such that the whole family usually suffers or
rejoices at the misfortune or good fortune, as the case may be, of any of its member. Accordingly, any attempt to dishonor or besmirch the name and
reputation of the head of the family, as here, invariably puts the other members in a state of disrepute, distress, or anxiety. This reality adds an imperative
dimension to the award of moral damages to the defamed party.

The award of exemplary damages, however, cannot be justified. Under Art. 2230 of the Civil Code, In criminal offenses, exemplary damages as a part of
the civil liability may be imposed when the crime was committed with one or more aggravating circumstances. Such damages are separate and distinct
from fines and shall be paid to the offended party. No aggravating circumstances accompanied the commission of the libelous acts; thus, no exemplary
damages can be awarded.

Conclusion

The press wields enormous power. Through its widespread reach and the information it imparts, it can mold and shape thoughts and opinions of the people.
It can turn the tide of public opinion for or against someone, it can build up heroes or create villains.

It is in the interest of society to have a free press, to have liberal discussion and dissemination of ideas, and to encourage people to engage in healthy
debate. It is through this that society can progress and develop.

Those who would publish under the aegis of freedom of the press must also acknowledge the corollary duty to publish responsibly. To show that they have
exercised their freedom responsibly, they must go beyond merely relying on unfounded rumors or shadowy anonymous sources. There must be further
investigation conducted, some shred of proof found to support allegations of misconduct or even criminal activity. It is in fact too easy for journalists to
destroy the reputation and honor of public officials, if they are not required to make the slightest effort to verify their accusations. Journalists are supposed
to be reporters of facts, not fiction, and must be able to back up their stories with solid research. The power of the press and the corresponding duty to
exercise that power judiciously cannot be understated.

But even with the need for a free press, the necessity that it be free does not mean that it be totally unfettered. It is still acknowledged that the freedom can
be abused, and for the abuse of the freedom, there must be a corresponding sanction. It falls on the press to wield such enormous power responsibly. It may
be a clich that the pen is mightier than the sword, but in this particular case, the lesson to be learned is that such a mighty weapon should not be wielded
recklessly or thoughtlessly, but always guided by conscience and careful thought.

A robust and independently free press is doubtless one of the most effective checks on government power and abuses. Hence, it behooves government
functionaries to respect the value of openness and refrain from concealing from media corruption and other anomalous practices occurring within their
backyard. On the other hand, public officials also deserve respect and protection against false innuendoes and unfounded accusation of official wrongdoing
from an abusive press. As it were, the law and jurisprudence on libel heavily tilt in favor of press freedom. The common but most unkind perception is that
government institutions and their officers and employees are fair game to official and personal attacks and even ridicule. And the practice on the ground is
just as disconcerting. Reports and accusation of official misconduct often times merit front page or primetime treatment, while defenses set up, retraction
issued, or acquittal rendered get no more, if ever, perfunctory coverage. The unfairness needs no belaboring. The balm of clear conscience is sometimes not
enough.

Perhaps lost in the traditional press freedom versus government impasse is the fact that a maliciously false imputation of corruption and dishonesty against
a public official, as here, leaves a stigmatizing mark not only on the person but also the office to which he belongs. In the ultimate analysis, public service
also unduly suffers.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 161032 and 161176 are DISMISSED. The CA Decision dated June 17, 2003 in CA-
G.R. CR No. 25318 is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS that in lieu of imprisonment, the penalty to be imposed upon petitioners shall be
a fine of six thousand pesos (PhP 6,000) for each count of libel, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, while the award of actual damages and
exemplary damages is DELETED. The Decision dated November 17, 2000 of the RTC, Branch 112 in Pasay City in Criminal Case Nos. 99-1597 to 99-
1600 is modified to read as follows:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused ERWIN TULFO, SUSAN CAMBRI, REY SALAO, JOCELYN BARLIZO, and PHILIP PICHAY guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of four (4) counts of the crime of LIBEL, as defined in Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code, and sentences EACH of the
accused to pay a fine of SIX THOUSAND PESOS (PhP 6,000) per count of libel with subsidiary imprisonment, in case of insolvency.
Considering that the accused Erwin Tulfo, Susan Cambri, Rey Salao, Jocelyn Barlizo, and Philip Pichay wrote and published the four (4) defamatory
articles with reckless disregard whether it was false or not, the said articles being libelous per se, they are hereby ordered to pay complainant Atty.
Carlos T. So, jointly and severally, the sum of ONE MILLION PESOS (PhP 1,000,000) as moral damages. The claim of actual and exemplary
damages is denied for lack of merit.
Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice Associate Justice
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
ATT E S TAT I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts
Division.

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice

Chairperson

C E RT I FI CAT I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had
been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

* Additional member as per August 27, 2008 raffle.

[1] Rollo (G.R. No. 161032), p. 39.
[2] at 38-39.
[3] at 39-40.
[4] at 40-41.
[5] at 41-42.
[6] at 42.
[7] at 43.
[8] at 44.
[9] Rollo (G.R. No. 161176), p. 88.
[10] Rollo (G.R. No. 161032), p. 44.
[11] at 45-46.
[12] at 46-47.
[13] at 48-49.
[14] at 49-50.
[15] at 50-51.
[16] at 38-39.
[17] at 52.
[18] at 53.
[19] Penned by Associate Justice Mercedes Gozo-Dadole and concurred in by Associate Justices Conrado M. Vasquez, Jr. and Rosemari D. Carandang.
[20] Rollo (G.R. No. 161032), p. 68.
[21] Rollo (G.R. No. 161176), p. 168.
[22] Rollo (G.R. No. 161032), pp. 16-17.
[23] Rollo (G.R. No. 161176), p. 20.
[24] G.R. No. 126466, , 301 SCRA 1.
[25] at 22.
[26] Rollo (G.R. No. 161032), p. 10.
[27] at 11.
[28] at 12.
[29] Supra note 24, at 30-31.
[30] Borjal, supra at 23.
[31] Brillante v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 118757 & 121571, October 19, 2004, 440 SCRA 541, 574.
[32] A.M. No. 93-2-037 SC, , 243 SCRA 299, 332.
[33] at 327.

[34] 2 Reyes, Luis B., THE REVISED PENAL CODE 858 (13th ed., 1993).
[35] BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 595 (6th ed., 1990).
[36] at 1508.

[37] 376 US 254, 11 L ed. 2nd 686.

[38] G.R.
No. 139987,
EN BANC March 31,
2005, 454
FRANCISCO CHAVEZ, G.R. No. 168338 SCRA 440,
456.
[39] 29 Phil.
Petitioner, Present: 595 (1915).
[40] Smith v.
Utley, 92
- versus - PUNO, C.J., 133, 65 NW
744;
Faulkner v.
RAUL M. GONZALES, QUISUMBING, Martin, 133
NJL 605, 45
A2d 596;
in his capacity as the YNARES-SANTIAGO, World Pub.
Co. v.
Minahan, 70
Secretary of the SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, 107, 173 P
815.
[41]
Department of Justice; CARPIO, Faulkner,
supra.
[42] World
and NATIONAL AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, Pub. Co.,
TELECOMMUNICATIONS supra.

COMMISSION (NTC), CORONA, [43]

Faulkner,
supra;
Goudy v.
Respondents. CARPIO MORALES, Dayron
Newspapers,
Inc., 14 App
AZCUNA, 2d 207, 43
Ohio Ops 2d
444, 237
TINGA, NE2d 909.
[44] G.R.
No. 157643,
CHICO-NAZARIO, March 20,
2008.
[45] U.S. v.
VELASCO, JR., Ocampo, 18
Phil. 1, 50-
52 (1910).
NACHURA, [46] G.R.
No. 142409,
March 24,
REYES, and 2006, 485
SCRA 275.

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, JJ. [47] G.R.

No. 120715,
March 29,
Promulgated:

February 15, 2008

1996, 255 SCRA 692.
[48] Administrative Circular No. 08-2008. See Fermin v. People, G.R. No. 157643, March 28, 2008.
[49] G.R. No. 1045676, , 240 SCRA 348, 356-357.
[50] Patricio v. Leviste, G.R. No. 51832, April 26, 1989, 172 SCRA 774, 781.

EN BANC
FRANCISCO CHAVEZ, G.R. No. 168338

Petitioner, Present:

- versus - PUNO, C.J.,

RAUL M. GONZALES, QUISUMBING,

in his capacity as the YNARES-SANTIAGO,

Secretary of the SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,

Department of Justice; CARPIO,

and NATIONAL AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,

TELECOMMUNICATIONS
COMMISSION (NTC), CORONA,

Respondents. CARPIO MORALES,

AZCUNA,

TINGA,

CHICO-NAZARIO,

VELASCO, JR.,

NACHURA,

REYES, and

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, JJ.

Promulgated:

February 15, 2008

 x-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
PUNO, C.J.:
A. Precis

In this jurisdiction, it is established that freedom of the press is crucial and so inextricably woven into the right to free speech and free expression, that any
attempt to restrict it must be met with an examination so critical that only a danger that is clear and present would be allowed to curtail it.

Indeed, we have not wavered in the duty to uphold this cherished freedom. We have struck down laws and issuances meant to curtail this right, as in
Adiong v. COMELEC,[1] Burgos v. Chief of Staff,[2] Social Weather Stations v. COMELEC,[3] and Bayan v. Executive Secretary Ermita.[4] When on its
face, it is clear that a governmental act is nothing more than a naked means to prevent the free exercise of speech, it must be nullified.

B. The Facts

1. The case originates from events that occurred a year after the 2004 national and local elections. On June 5, 2005, Press Secretary Ignacio Bunye told
reporters that the opposition was planning to destabilize the administration by releasing an audiotape of a mobile phone conversation allegedly between the
President of the Philippines, Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, and a high-ranking official of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). The conversation was
audiotaped allegedly through wire-tapping.[5] Later, in a Malacaang press briefing, Secretary Bunye produced two versions of the tape, one supposedly
the complete version, and the other, a spliced, doctored or altered version, which would suggest that the President had instructed the COMELEC official to
manipulate the election results in the Presidents favor. [6] It seems that Secretary Bunye admitted that the voice was that of President Arroyo, but
subsequently made a retraction. [7]

2. On June 7, 2005, former counsel of deposed President Joseph Estrada, Atty. Alan Paguia, subsequently released an alleged authentic tape recording of
the wiretap. Included in the tapes were purported conversations of the President, the First Gentleman Jose Miguel Arroyo, COMELEC Commissioner
Garcillano, and the late Senator Barbers.[8]

3. On June 8, 2005, respondent Department of Justice (DOJ) Secretary Raul Gonzales warned reporters that those who had copies of the compact disc
(CD) and those broadcasting or publishing its contents could be held liable under the Anti-Wiretapping Act. These persons included Secretary Bunye and
Atty. Paguia. He also stated that persons possessing or airing said tapes were committing a continuing offense, subject to arrest by anybody who had
personal knowledge if the crime was committed or was being committed in their presence.[9]

4. On June 9, 2005, in another press briefing, Secretary Gonzales ordered the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to go after media organizations
found to have caused the spread, the playing and the printing of the contents of a tape of an alleged wiretapped conversation involving the President about
fixing votes in the 2004 national elections. Gonzales said that he was going to start with Inq7.net, a joint venture between the Philippine Daily Inquirer
and GMA7 television network, because by the very nature of the Internet medium, it was able to disseminate the contents of the tape more widely. He then
expressed his intention of inviting the editors and managers of Inq7.net and GMA7 to a probe, and supposedly declared, I [have] asked the NBI to conduct
a tactical interrogation of all concerned. [10]

5. On June 11, 2005, the NTC issued this press release: [11]

NTC GIVES FAIR WARNING TO RADIO AND TELEVISION OWNERS/OPERATORS TO OBSERVE ANTI-
WIRETAPPING LAW AND PERTINENT CIRCULARS ON PROGRAM STANDARDS
xxx xxx xxx
Taking into consideration the countrys unusual situation, and in order not to unnecessarily aggravate the same, the NTC
warns all radio stations and television network owners/operators that the conditions of the authorization and permits
issued to them by Government like the Provisional Authority and/or Certificate of Authority explicitly provides that said
companies shall not use [their] stations for the broadcasting or telecasting of false information or willful misrepresentation.
Relative thereto, it has come to the attention of the [NTC] that certain personalities are in possession of alleged taped
conversations which they claim involve the President of the Philippines and a Commissioner of the COMELEC regarding
supposed violation of election laws.
These personalities have admitted that the taped conversations are products of illegal wiretapping operations.
Considering that these taped conversations have not been duly authenticated nor could it be said at this time that the tapes
contain an accurate or truthful representation of what was recorded therein, it is the position of the [NTC] that the
continuous airing or broadcast of the said taped conversations by radio and television stations is a continuing violation of
the Anti-Wiretapping Law and the conditions of the Provisional Authority and/or Certificate of Authority issued to these
radio and television stations. It has been subsequently established that the said tapes are false and/or fraudulent after a
prosecution or appropriate investigation, the concerned radio and television companies are hereby warned that their
broadcast/airing of such false information and/or willful misrepresentation shall be just cause for the suspension,
revocation and/or cancellation of the licenses or authorizations issued to the said companies.
In addition to the above, the [NTC] reiterates the pertinent NTC circulars on program standards to be observed by radio
 and television stations. NTC Memorandum Circular 111-12-85 explicitly states, among others, that all radio broadcasting
and television stations shall, during any broadcast or telecast, cut off from the air the speech, play, act or scene or other
matters being broadcast or telecast the tendency thereof is to disseminate false information or such other willful
misrepresentation, or to propose and/or incite treason, rebellion or sedition. The foregoing directive had been reiterated by
NTC Memorandum Circular No. 22-89, which, in addition thereto, prohibited radio, broadcasting and television stations
from using their stations to broadcast or telecast any speech, language or scene disseminating false information or willful
misrepresentation, or inciting, encouraging or assisting in subversive or treasonable acts.
The [NTC] will not hesitate, after observing the requirements of due process, to apply with full force the provisions
of said Circulars and their accompanying sanctions on erring radio and television stations and their
owners/operators.
6. On June 14, 2005, NTC held a dialogue with the Board of Directors of the Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster sa Pilipinas (KBP). NTC allegedly assured
the KBP that the press release did not violate the constitutional freedom of speech, of expression, and of the press, and the right to information.
Accordingly, NTC and KBP issued a Joint Press Statement which states, among others, that: [12]

NTC respects and will not hinder freedom of the press and the right to information on matters of public concern. KBP
& its members have always been committed to the exercise of press freedom with high sense of responsibility and
discerning judgment of fairness and honesty.
NTC did not issue any MC [Memorandum Circular] or Order constituting a restraint of press freedom or censorship.
The NTC further denies and does not intend to limit or restrict the interview of members of the opposition or free
expression of views.
What is being asked by NTC is that the exercise of press freedom [be] done responsibly.
KBP has program standards that KBP members will observe in the treatment of news and public affairs programs.
These include verification of sources, non-airing of materials that would constitute inciting to sedition and/or rebellion.
The KBP Codes also require that no false statement or willful misrepresentation is made in the treatment of news or
commentaries.
The supposed wiretapped tapes should be treated with sensitivity and handled responsibly giving due consideration to
the process being undertaken to verify and validate the authenticity and actual content of the same.
C. The Petition

Petitioner Chavez filed a petition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court against respondents Secretary Gonzales and the NTC, praying for the issuance of the
writs of certiorari and prohibition, as extraordinary legal remedies, to annul void proceedings, and to prevent the unlawful, unconstitutional and oppressive
exercise of authority by the respondents.[13]

Alleging that the acts of respondents are violations of the freedom on expression and of the press, and the right of the people to information on matters of
public concern,[14] petitioner specifically asked this Court:

[F]or [the] nullification of acts, issuances, and orders of respondents committed or made since June 6, 2005 until the present that curtail the
publics rights to freedom of expression and of the press, and to information on matters of public concern specifically in relation to information
regarding the controversial taped conversion of President Arroyo and for prohibition of the further commission of such acts, and making of such
issuances, and orders by respondents. [15]
Respondents[16] denied that the acts transgress the Constitution, and questioned petitioners legal standing to file the petition. Among the arguments they
raised as to the validity of the fair warning issued by respondent NTC, is that broadcast media enjoy lesser constitutional guarantees compared to print
media, and the warning was issued pursuant to the NTCs mandate to regulate the telecommunications industry. [17] It was also stressed that most of the
[television] and radio stations continue, even to this date, to air the tapes, but of late within the parameters agreed upon between the NTC and KBP. [18]

D. THE PROCEDURAL THRESHOLD: LEGAL STANDING

To be sure, the circumstances of this case make the constitutional challenge peculiar. Petitioner, who is not a member of the broadcast media, prays that we
strike down the acts and statements made by respondents as violations of the right to free speech, free expression and a free press. For another, the
recipients of the press statements have not come forwardneither intervening nor joining petitioner in this action. Indeed, as a group, they issued a joint
statement with respondent NTC that does not complain about restraints on freedom of the press.

It would seem, then, that petitioner has not met the requisite legal standing, having failed to allege such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy
as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the Court so largely depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions. [19]

But as early as half a century ago, we have already held that where serious constitutional questions are involved, the transcendental importance to the
public of these cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside if we must, technicalities of procedure. [20] Subsequently, this
Court has repeatedly and consistently refused to wield procedural barriers as impediments to its addressing and resolving serious legal questions that
greatly impact on public interest,[21] in keeping with the Court's duty under the 1987 Constitution to determine whether or not other branches of
government have kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the laws and that they have not abused the discretion given to them.

Thus, in line with the liberal policy of this Court on locus standi when a case involves an issue of overarching significance to our society,[22] we
therefore brush aside technicalities of procedure and take cognizance of this petition,[23] seeing as it involves a challenge to the most exalted of all the
civil rights, the freedom of expression. The petition raises other issues like the extent of the right to information of the public. It is fundamental,
however, that we need not address all issues but only the most decisive one which in the case at bar is whether the acts of the respondents abridge
freedom of speech and of the press.

But aside from the primordial issue of determining whether free speech and freedom of the press have been infringed, the case at bar also
gives this Court the opportunity: (1) to distill the essence of freedom of speech and of the press now beclouded by the vagaries of motherhood
statements; (2) to clarify the types of speeches and their differing restraints allowed by law; (3) to discuss the core concepts of prior restraint,
content-neutral and content-based regulations and their constitutional standard of review; (4) to examine the historical difference in the treatment
of restraints between print and broadcast media and stress the standard of review governing both; and (5) to call attention to the ongoing blurring
of the lines of distinction between print and broadcast media.

E. RE-EXAMINING THE LAW ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH,

OF EXPRESSION AND OF THE PRESS
No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and
petition the government for redress of grievances.[24]
Freedom of expression has gained recognition as a fundamental principle of every democratic government, and given a preferred right that stands on a
higher level than substantive economic freedom or other liberties. The cognate rights codified by Article III, Section 4 of the Constitution, copied almost
verbatim from the First Amendment of the U.S. Bill of Rights,[25] were considered the necessary consequence of republican institutions and the
complement of free speech.[26] This preferred status of free speech has also been codified at the international level, its recognition now enshrined in
international law as a customary norm that binds all nations.[27]

In the Philippines, the primacy and high esteem accorded freedom of expression is a fundamental postulate of our constitutional system. [28] This right
was elevated to constitutional status in the 1935, the 1973 and the 1987 Constitutions, reflecting our own lesson of history, both political and legal, that
freedom of speech is an indispensable condition for nearly every other form of freedom.[29] Moreover, our history shows that the struggle to protect the
freedom of speech, expression and the press was, at bottom, the struggle for the indispensable preconditions for the exercise of other freedoms.[30] For it is
only when the people have unbridled access to information and the press that they will be capable of rendering enlightened judgments. In the oft-quoted
words of Thomas Jefferson, we cannot both be free and ignorant.

E.1. ABSTRACTION OF FREE SPEECH

Surrounding the freedom of speech clause are various concepts that we have adopted as part and parcel of our own Bill of Rights provision on this basic
freedom.[31] What is embraced under this provision was discussed exhaustively by the Court in Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, [32] in which it was
held:

At the very least, free speech and free press may be identified with the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully any matter of public interest
without censorship and punishment. There is to be no previous restraint on the communication of views or subsequent liability whether in
libel suits, prosecution for sedition, or action for damages, or contempt proceedings unless there be a clear and present danger of substantive
evil that Congress has a right to prevent. [33]
Gonzales further explained that the vital need of a constitutional democracy for freedom of expression is undeniable, whether as a means of assuring
individual self-fulfillment; of attaining the truth; of assuring participation by the people in social, including political, decision-making; and of maintaining
the balance between stability and change.[34] As early as the 1920s, the trend as reflected in Philippine and American decisions was to recognize the
broadest scope and assure the widest latitude for this constitutional guarantee. The trend represents a profound commitment to the principle that debate on
public issue should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open. [35]

Freedom of speech and of the press means something more than the right to approve existing political beliefs or economic arrangements, to lend support to
official measures, and to take refuge in the existing climate of opinion on any matter of public consequence.[36] When atrophied, the right becomes
meaningless.[37] The right belongs as well -- if not more to those who question, who do not conform, who differ. [38] The ideas that may be expressed
under this freedom are confined not only to those that are conventional or acceptable to the majority. To be truly meaningful, freedom of speech and of the
press should allow and even encourage the articulation of the unorthodox view, though it be hostile to or derided by others; or though such view induces a
condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger.[39] To paraphrase Justice Holmes, it is freedom for the
thought that we hate, no less than for the thought that agrees with us. [40]

The scope of freedom of expression is so broad that it extends protection to nearly all forms of communication. It protects speech, print and assembly
regarding secular as well as political causes, and is not confined to any particular field of human interest. The protection covers myriad matters of public
interest or concern embracing all issues, about which information is needed or appropriate, so as to enable members of society to cope with the exigencies
of their period. The constitutional protection assures the broadest possible exercise of free speech and free press for religious, political, economic,
scientific, news, or informational ends, inasmuch as the Constitution's basic guarantee of freedom to advocate ideas is not confined to the expression of
ideas that are conventional or shared by a majority.

The constitutional protection is not limited to the exposition of ideas. The protection afforded free speech extends to speech or publications that are
entertaining as well as instructive or informative. Specifically, in Eastern Broadcasting Corporation (DYRE) v. Dans,[41] this Court stated that all forms of
media, whether print or broadcast, are entitled to the broad protection of the clause on freedom of speech and of expression.

While all forms of communication are entitled to the broad protection of freedom of expression clause, the freedom of film, television and radio
broadcasting is somewhat lesser in scope than the freedom accorded to newspapers and other print media, as will be subsequently discussed.

E.2. DIFFERENTIATION: THE LIMITS & RESTRAINTS OF FREE SPEECH

From the language of the specific constitutional provision, it would appear that the right to free speech and a free press is not susceptible of any limitation.
But the realities of life in a complex society preclude a literal interpretation of the provision prohibiting the passage of a law that would abridge such
freedom. For freedom of expression is not an absolute, [42] nor is it an unbridled license that gives immunity for every possible use of language and
prevents the punishment of those who abuse this freedom.

Thus, all speech are not treated the same. Some types of speech may be subjected to some regulation by the State under its pervasive police power, in
order that it may not be injurious to the equal right of others or those of the community or society. [43] The difference in treatment is expected because the
relevant interests of one type of speech, e.g., political speech, may vary from those of another, e.g., obscene speech. Distinctions have therefore been made
in the treatment, analysis, and evaluation of the permissible scope of restrictions on various categories of speech. [44] We have ruled, for example, that in
our jurisdiction slander or libel, lewd and obscene speech, as well as fighting words are not entitled to constitutional protection and may be penalized.[45]

Moreover, the techniques of reviewing alleged restrictions on speech (overbreadth, vagueness, and so on) have been applied differently to each category,
either consciously or unconsciously. [46] A study of free speech jurisprudencewhether here or abroadwill reveal that courts have developed different tests
as to specific types or categories of speech in concrete situations; i.e., subversive speech; obscene speech; the speech of the broadcast media and of the
traditional print media; libelous speech; speech affecting associational rights; speech before hostile audiences; symbolic speech; speech that affects the
right to a fair trial; and speech associated with rights of assembly and petition. [47]

Generally, restraints on freedom of speech and expression are evaluated by either or a combination of three tests, i.e., (a) the dangerous tendency doctrine
which permits limitations on speech once a rational connection has been established between the speech restrained and the danger contemplated; [48] (b)
the balancing of interests tests, used as a standard when courts need to balance conflicting social values and individual interests, and requires a conscious
and detailed consideration of the interplay of interests observable in a given situation of type of situation; [49] and (c) the clear and present danger rule
which rests on the premise that speech may be restrained because there is substantial danger that the speech will likely lead to an evil the government has a
right to prevent. This rule requires that the evil consequences sought to be prevented must be substantive, extremely serious and the degree of imminence
extremely high. [50]

As articulated in our jurisprudence, we have applied either the dangerous tendency doctrine or clear and present danger test to resolve free speech
challenges. More recently, we have concluded that we have generally adhered to the clear and present danger test. [51]

E.3. IN FOCUS: FREEDOM OF THE PRESS

Much has been written on the philosophical basis of press freedom as part of the larger right of free discussion and expression. Its practical importance,
though, is more easily grasped. It is the chief source of information on current affairs. It is the most pervasive and perhaps most powerful vehicle of
opinion on public questions. It is the instrument by which citizens keep their government informed of their needs, their aspirations and their grievances. It
is the sharpest weapon in the fight to keep government responsible and efficient. Without a vigilant press, the mistakes of every administration would go
uncorrected and its abuses unexposed. As Justice Malcolm wrote in United States v. Bustos:[52]

The interest of society and the maintenance of good government demand a full discussion of public affairs. Complete liberty to comment on
the conduct of public men is a scalpel in the case of free speech. The sharp incision of its probe relieves the abscesses of officialdom. Men in
public life may suffer under a hostile and unjust accusation; the wound can be assuaged with the balm of clear conscience.
Its contribution to the public weal makes freedom of the press deserving of extra protection. Indeed, the press benefits from certain ancillary rights. The
productions of writers are classified as intellectual and proprietary. Persons who interfere or defeat the freedom to write for the press or to maintain a
periodical publication are liable for damages, be they private individuals or public officials.
 E.4. ANATOMY OF RESTRICTIONS: PRIOR RESTRAINT, CONTENT-NEUTRAL AND CONTENT-BASED REGULATIONS

Philippine jurisprudence, even as early as the period under the 1935 Constitution, has recognized four aspects of freedom of the press. These are (1)
freedom from prior restraint; (2) freedom from punishment subsequent to publication; [53] (3) freedom of access to information; [54] and (4) freedom of
circulation.[55]

Considering that petitioner has argued that respondents press statement constitutes a form of impermissible prior restraint, a closer scrutiny of this principle
is in order, as well as its sub-specie of content-based (as distinguished from content-neutral) regulations.

At this point, it should be noted that respondents in this case deny that their acts constitute prior restraints. This presents a unique tinge to the present
challenge, considering that the cases in our jurisdiction involving prior restrictions on speech never had any issue of whether the governmental act or
issuance actually constituted prior restraint. Rather, the determinations were always about whether the restraint was justified by the Constitution.

Be that as it may, the determination in every case of whether there is an impermissible restraint on the freedom of speech has always been based on the
circumstances of each case, including the nature of the restraint. And in its application in our jurisdiction, the parameters of this principle have been
etched on a case-to-case basis, always tested by scrutinizing the governmental issuance or act against the circumstances in which they operate, and
then determining the appropriate test with which to evaluate.

Prior restraint refers to official governmental restrictions on the press or other forms of expression in advance of actual publication or dissemination. [56]
Freedom from prior restraint is largely freedom from government censorship of publications, whatever the form of censorship, and regardless of whether it
is wielded by the executive, legislative or judicial branch of the government. Thus, it precludes governmental acts that required approval of a proposal to
publish; licensing or permits as prerequisites to publication including the payment of license taxes for the privilege to publish; and even injunctions against
publication. Even the closure of the business and printing offices of certain newspapers, resulting in the discontinuation of their printing and publication,
are deemed as previous restraint or censorship. [57] Any law or official that requires some form of permission to be had before publication can be made,
commits an infringement of the constitutional right, and remedy can be had at the courts.

Given that deeply ensconced in our fundamental law is the hostility against all prior restraints on speech, and any act that restrains speech is presumed
invalid,[58] and any act that restrains speech is hobbled by the presumption of invalidity and should be greeted with furrowed brows, [59] it is important
to stress not all prior restraints on speech are invalid. Certain previous restraints may be permitted by the Constitution, but determined only upon a
careful evaluation of the challenged act as against the appropriate test by which it should be measured against.

Hence, it is not enough to determine whether the challenged act constitutes some form of restraint on freedom of speech. A distinction has to be made
whether the restraint is (1) a content-neutral regulation, i.e., merely concerned with the incidents of the speech, or one that merely controls the time, place
or manner, and under well defined standards;[60] or (2) a content-based restraint or censorship, i.e., the restriction is based on the subject matter of the
utterance or speech. [61] The cast of the restriction determines the test by which the challenged act is assayed with.

When the speech restraints take the form of a content-neutral regulation, only a substantial governmental interest is required for its validity.[62] Because
regulations of this type are not designed to suppress any particular message, they are not subject to the strictest form of judicial scrutiny but an
intermediate approachsomewhere between the mere rationality that is required of any other law and the compelling interest standard applied to content-
based restrictions.[63] The test is called intermediate because the Court will not merely rubberstamp the validity of a law but also require that the
restrictions be narrowly-tailored to promote an important or significant governmental interest that is unrelated to the suppression of expression. The
intermediate approach has been formulated in this manner:

A governmental regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the Government, if it furthers an important or
substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incident
restriction on alleged [freedom of speech & expression] is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest. [64]
On the other hand, a governmental action that restricts freedom of speech or of the press based on content is given the strictest scrutiny in light of its
inherent and invasive impact. Only when the challenged act has overcome the clear and present danger rule will it pass constitutional muster,[65] with
the government having the burden of overcoming the presumed unconstitutionality.

Unless the government can overthrow this presumption, the content-based restraint will be struck down.[66]

With respect to content-based restrictions, the government must also show the type of harm the speech sought to be restrained would bring about
especially the gravity and the imminence of the threatened harm otherwise the prior restraint will be invalid. Prior restraint on speech based on its content
cannot be justified by hypothetical fears, but only by showing a substantive and imminent evil that has taken the life of a reality already on ground.[67] As
formulated, the question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present
danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree.[68]

The regulation which restricts the speech content must also serve an important or substantial government interest, which is unrelated to the suppression of
free expression. [69]

Also, the incidental restriction on speech must be no greater than what is essential to the furtherance of that interest. [70] A restriction that is so broad that
it encompasses more than what is required to satisfy the governmental interest will be invalidated. [71] The regulation, therefore, must be reasonable and
narrowly drawn to fit the regulatory purpose, with the least restrictive means undertaken. [72]

Thus, when the prior restraint partakes of a content-neutral regulation, it is subjected to an intermediate review. A content-based regulation,[73]
however, bears a heavy presumption of invalidity and is measured against the clear and present danger rule. The latter will pass constitutional muster
only if justified by a compelling reason, and the restrictions imposed are neither overbroad nor vague. [74]

Applying the foregoing, it is clear that the challenged acts in the case at bar need to be subjected to the clear and present danger rule, as they are
content-based restrictions. The acts of respondents focused solely on but one objecta specific content fixed as these were on the alleged taped
conversations between the President and a COMELEC official. Undoubtedly these did not merely provide regulations as to the time, place or manner of the
dissemination of speech or expression.

E.5. Dichotomy of Free Press: Print v. Broadcast Media

Finally, comes respondents argument that the challenged act is valid on the ground that broadcast media enjoys free speech rights that are lesser in scope to
that of print media. We next explore and test the validity of this argument, insofar as it has been invoked to validate a content-based restriction on broadcast
media.

The regimes presently in place for each type of media differ from one other. Contrasted with the regime in respect of books, newspapers, magazines
and traditional printed matter, broadcasting, film and video have been subjected to regulatory schemes.

The dichotomy between print and broadcast media traces its origins in the United States. There, broadcast radio and television have been held to have
limited First Amendment protection,[75] and U.S. Courts have excluded broadcast media from the application of the strict scrutiny standard that they
would otherwise apply to content-based restrictions.[76] According to U.S. Courts, the three major reasons why broadcast media stands apart from print
media are: (a) the scarcity of the frequencies by which the medium operates [i.e., airwaves are physically limited while print medium may be limitless];
[77] (b) its pervasiveness as a medium; and (c) its unique accessibility to children.[78] Because cases involving broadcast media need not follow precisely
the same approach that [U.S. courts] have applied to other media, nor go so far as to demand that such regulations serve compelling government interests,
[79] they are decided on whether the governmental restriction is narrowly tailored to further a substantial governmental interest,[80] or the
intermediate test.

As pointed out by respondents, Philippine jurisprudence has also echoed a differentiation in treatment between broadcast and print media. Nevertheless, a
review of Philippine case law on broadcast media will show thatas we have deviated with the American conception of the Bill of Rights[81] we
likewise did not adopt en masse the U.S. conception of free speech as it relates to broadcast media, particularly as to which test would govern
content-based prior restraints.

Our cases show two distinct features of this dichotomy. First, the difference in treatment, in the main, is in the regulatory scheme applied to broadcast
media that is not imposed on traditional print media, and narrowly confined to unprotected speech (e.g., obscenity, pornography, seditious and inciting
speech), or is based on a compelling government interest that also has constitutional protection, such as national security or the electoral process.

Second, regardless of the regulatory schemes that broadcast media is subjected to, the Court has consistently held that the clear and present danger test
applies to content-based restrictions on media, without making a distinction as to traditional print or broadcast media.

The distinction between broadcast and traditional print media was first enunciated in Eastern Broadcasting Corporation (DYRE) v. Dans,[82] wherein it
was held that [a]ll forms of media, whether print or broadcast, are entitled to the broad protection of the freedom of speech and expression clause. The test
for limitations on freedom of expression continues to be the clear and present danger rule[83]

Dans was a case filed to compel the reopening of a radio station which had been summarily closed on grounds of national security. Although the issue had
become moot and academic because the owners were no longer interested to reopen, the Court still proceeded to do an analysis of the case and made
formulations to serve as guidelines for all inferior courts and bodies exercising quasi-judicial functions. Particularly, the Court made a detailed exposition
as to what needs be considered in cases involving broadcast media. Thus:[84]
xxx xxx xxx
(3) All forms of media, whether print or broadcast, are entitled to the broad protection of the freedom of speech and expression clause.
The test for limitations on freedom of expression continues to be the clear and present danger rule, that words are used in such
circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that the
lawmaker has a right to prevent, In his Constitution of the Philippines (2nd Edition, pp. 569-570) Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando cites
at least nine of our decisions which apply the test. More recently, the clear and present danger test was applied in J.B.L. Reyes in behalf of
the Anti-Bases Coalition v. Bagatsing. (4) The clear and present danger test, however, does not lend itself to a simplistic and all embracing
interpretation applicable to all utterances in all forums.

Broadcasting has to be licensed. Airwave frequencies have to be allocated among qualified users. A broadcast corporation cannot simply
appropriate a certain frequency without regard for government regulation or for the rights of others.

All forms of communication are entitled to the broad protection of the freedom of expression clause. Necessarily, however, the freedom of
television and radio broadcasting is somewhat lesser in scope than the freedom accorded to newspaper and print media.

The American Court in Federal Communications Commission v. Pacifica Foundation (438 U.S. 726), confronted with a patently offensive
and indecent regular radio program, explained why radio broadcasting, more than other forms of communications, receives the most
limited protection from the free expression clause. First, broadcast media have established a uniquely pervasive presence in the lives of all
citizens, Material presented over the airwaves confronts the citizen, not only in public, but in the privacy of his home. Second,
broadcasting is uniquely accessible to children. Bookstores and motion picture theaters may be prohibited from making certain material
available to children, but the same selectivity cannot be done in radio or television, where the listener or viewer is constantly tuning in and
out.

Similar considerations apply in the area of national security.

The broadcast media have also established a uniquely pervasive presence in the lives of all Filipinos. Newspapers and current books are
found only in metropolitan areas and in the poblaciones of municipalities accessible to fast and regular transportation. Even here, there are
low income masses who find the cost of books, newspapers, and magazines beyond their humble means. Basic needs like food and shelter
perforce enjoy high priorities.

On the other hand, the transistor radio is found everywhere. The television set is also becoming universal. Their message may be
simultaneously received by a national or regional audience of listeners including the indifferent or unwilling who happen to be within
reach of a blaring radio or television set. The materials broadcast over the airwaves reach every person of every age, persons of varying
susceptibilities to persuasion, persons of different I.Q.s and mental capabilities, persons whose reactions to inflammatory or offensive
speech would be difficult to monitor or predict. The impact of the vibrant speech is forceful and immediate. Unlike readers of the printed
work, the radio audience has lesser opportunity to cogitate analyze, and reject the utterance.

(5) The clear and present danger test, therefore, must take the particular circumstances of broadcast media into account. The supervision
of radio stations-whether by government or through self-regulation by the industry itself calls for thoughtful, intelligent and sophisticated
handling.

The government has a right to be protected against broadcasts which incite the listeners to violently overthrow it. Radio and television
may not be used to organize a rebellion or to signal the start of widespread uprising. At the same time, the people have a right to be
informed. Radio and television would have little reason for existence if broadcasts are limited to bland, obsequious, or pleasantly
entertaining utterances. Since they are the most convenient and popular means of disseminating varying views on public issues, they also
deserve special protection.

(6) The freedom to comment on public affairs is essential to the vitality of a representative democracy. In the 1918 case of United States v.
Bustos (37 Phil. 731) this Court was already stressing that.

The interest of society and the maintenance of good government demand a full discussion of public affairs. Complete liberty to comment
on the conduct of public men is a scalpel in the case of free speech. The sharp incision of its probe relieves the abscesses of officialdom.
Men in public life may suffer under a hostile and an unjust accusation; the wound can be assuaged with the balm of a clear conscience. A
public officer must not be too thin-skinned with reference to comment upon his official acts. Only thus can the intelligence and dignity of
the individual be exalted.

(7) Broadcast stations deserve the special protection given to all forms of media by the due process and freedom of expression clauses of
the Constitution. [Citations omitted]

It is interesting to note that the Court in Dans adopted the arguments found in U.S. jurisprudence to justify differentiation of treatment (i.e., the scarcity,
pervasiveness and accessibility to children), but only after categorically declaring that the test for limitations on freedom of expression continues to
be the clear and present danger rule, for all forms of media, whether print or broadcast. Indeed, a close reading of the above-quoted provisions would
show that the differentiation that the Court in Dans referred to was narrowly restricted to what is otherwise deemed as unprotected speech (e.g., obscenity,
national security, seditious and inciting speech), or to validate a licensing or regulatory scheme necessary to allocate the limited broadcast frequencies,
which is absent in print media. Thus, when this Court declared in Dans that the freedom given to broadcast media was somewhat lesser in scope than the
freedom accorded to newspaper and print media, it was not as to what test should be applied, but the context by which requirements of licensing, allocation
of airwaves, and application of norms to unprotected speech. [85]

In the same year that the Dans case was decided, it was reiterated in Gonzales v. Katigbak,[86] that the test to determine free expression challenges was the
clear and present danger, again without distinguishing the media.[87] Katigbak, strictly speaking, does not treat of broadcast media but motion pictures.
Although the issue involved obscenity standards as applied to movies,[88] the Court concluded its decision with the following obiter dictum that a less
liberal approach would be used to resolve obscenity issues in television as opposed to motion pictures:

All that remains to be said is that the ruling is to be limited to the concept of obscenity applicable to motion pictures. It is the consensus of
this Court that where television is concerned, a less liberal approach calls for observance. This is so because unlike motion pictures where
the patrons have to pay their way, television reaches every home where there is a set. Children then will likely be among the avid viewers of
the programs therein shown..It cannot be denied though that the State as parens patriae is called upon to manifest an attitude of caring for
the welfare of the young.
More recently, in resolving a case involving the conduct of exit polls and dissemination of the results by a broadcast company, we reiterated that the clear
and present danger rule is the test we unquestionably adhere to issues that involve freedoms of speech and of the press.[89]

This is not to suggest, however, that the clear and present danger rule has been applied to all cases that involve the broadcast media. The rule
applies to all media, including broadcast, but only when the challenged act is a content-based regulation that infringes on free speech, expression and the
press. Indeed, in Osmena v. COMELEC,[90] which also involved broadcast media, the Court refused to apply the clear and present danger rule to a
COMELEC regulation of time and manner of advertising of political advertisements because the challenged restriction was content-neutral.[91] And in a
case involving due process and equal protection issues, the Court in Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines v. COMELEC[92]
treated a restriction imposed on a broadcast media as a reasonable condition for the grant of the medias franchise, without going into which test would
apply.

That broadcast media is subject to a regulatory regime absent in print media is observed also in other jurisdictions, where the statutory regimes in place
over broadcast media include elements of licensing, regulation by administrative bodies, and censorship. As explained by a British author:

The reasons behind treating broadcast and films differently from the print media differ in a number of respects, but have a common
historical basis. The stricter system of controls seems to have been adopted in answer to the view that owing to their particular impact on
audiences, films, videos and broadcasting require a system of prior restraints, whereas it is now accepted that books and other printed media
do not. These media are viewed as beneficial to the public in a number of respects, but are also seen as possible sources of harm.[93]
Parenthetically, these justifications are now the subject of debate. Historically, the scarcity of frequencies was thought to provide a rationale. However,
cable and satellite television have enormously increased the number of actual and potential channels. Digital technology will further increase the number
of channels available. But still, the argument persists that broadcasting is the most influential means of communication, since it comes into the home, and
so much time is spent watching television. Since it has a unique impact on people and affects children in a way that the print media normally does not, that
regulation is said to be necessary in order to preserve pluralism. It has been argued further that a significant main threat to free expressionin terms of
diversitycomes not from government, but from private corporate bodies. These developments show a need for a reexamination of the traditional notions of
the scope and extent of broadcast media regulation. [94]

The emergence of digital technology -- which has led to the convergence of broadcasting, telecommunications and the computer industry -- has likewise
led to the question of whether the regulatory model for broadcasting will continue to be appropriate in the converged environment. [95] Internet, for
example, remains largely unregulated, yet the Internet and the broadcast media share similarities, [96] and the rationales used to support broadcast
regulation apply equally to the Internet.[97] Thus, it has been argued that courts, legislative bodies and the government agencies regulating media must
agree to regulate both, regulate neither or develop a new regulatory framework and rationale to justify the differential treatment. [98]

F. The Case At Bar

Having settled the applicable standard to content-based restrictions on broadcast media, let us go to its application to the case at bar. To recapitulate, a
governmental action that restricts freedom of speech or of the press based on content is given the strictest scrutiny, with the government having the
burden of overcoming the presumed unconstitutionality by the clear and present danger rule. This rule applies equally to all kinds of media, including
broadcast media.

This outlines the procedural map to follow in cases like the one at bar as it spells out the following: (a) the test; (b) the presumption; (c) the burden of
proof; (d) the party to discharge the burden; and (e) the quantum of evidence necessary. On the basis of the records of the case at bar, respondents who have
the burden to show that these acts do not abridge freedom of speech and of the press failed to hurdle the clear and present danger test. It appears that the
great evil which government wants to prevent is the airing of a tape recording in alleged violation of the anti-wiretapping law. The records of the case at
bar, however, are confused and confusing, and respondents evidence falls short of satisfying the clear and present danger test. Firstly, the various
statements of the Press Secretary obfuscate the identity of the voices in the tape recording. Secondly, the integrity of the taped conversation is also suspect.
The Press Secretary showed to the public two versions, one supposed to be a complete version and the other, an altered version. Thirdly, the evidence of
the respondents on the whos and the hows of the wiretapping act is ambivalent, especially considering the tapes different versions. The identity of the wire-
tappers, the manner of its commission and other related and relevant proofs are some of the invisibles of this case. Fourthly, given all these unsettled
facets of the tape, it is even arguable whether its airing would violate the anti-wiretapping law.

We rule that not every violation of a law will justify straitjacketing the exercise of freedom of speech and of the press . Our laws are of different
kinds and doubtless, some of them provide norms of conduct which even if violated have only an adverse effect on a persons private comfort but does not
endanger national security. There are laws of great significance but their violation, by itself and without more, cannot support suppression of free speech
and free press. In fine, violation of law is just a factor, a vital one to be sure, which should be weighed in adjudging whether to restrain freedom of speech
and of the press. The totality of the injurious effects of the violation to private and public interest must be calibrated in light of the preferred status
accorded by the Constitution and by related international covenants protecting freedom of speech and of the press. In calling for a careful and calibrated
measurement of the circumference of all these factors to determine compliance with the clear and present danger test, the Court should not be
misinterpreted as devaluing violations of law. By all means, violations of law should be vigorously prosecuted by the State for they breed their own evil
consequence. But to repeat, the need to prevent their violation cannot per se trump the exercise of free speech and free press, a preferred right
whose breach can lead to greater evils. For this failure of the respondents alone to offer proof to satisfy the clear and present danger test, the Court has no
option but to uphold the exercise of free speech and free press. There is no showing that the feared violation of the anti-wiretapping law clearly endangers
the national security of the State.

This is not all the faultline in the stance of the respondents. We slide to the issue of whether the mere press statements of the Secretary of Justice and of
the NTC in question constitute a form of content-based prior restraint that has transgressed the Constitution. In resolving this issue, we hold that it is not
decisive that the press statements made by respondents were not reduced in or followed up with formal orders or circulars. It is sufficient that the
press statements were made by respondents while in the exercise of their official functions. Undoubtedly, respondent Gonzales made his statements as
Secretary of Justice, while the NTC issued its statement as the regulatory body of media. Any act done, such as a speech uttered, for and on behalf of
the government in an official capacity is covered by the rule on prior restraint. The concept of an act does not limit itself to acts already converted
to a formal order or official circular. Otherwise, the non formalization of an act into an official order or circular will result in the easy
circumvention of the prohibition on prior restraint. The press statements at bar are acts that should be struck down as they constitute impermissible
forms of prior restraints on the right to free speech and press.

There is enough evidence of chilling effect of the complained acts on record. The warnings given to media came from no less the NTC, a regulatory
agency that can cancel the Certificate of Authority of the radio and broadcast media. They also came from the Secretary of Justice, the alter ego of the
Executive, who wields the awesome power to prosecute those perceived to be violating the laws of the land. After the warnings, the KBP inexplicably
joined the NTC in issuing an ambivalent Joint Press Statement. After the warnings, petitioner Chavez was left alone to fight this battle for freedom of
speech and of the press. This silence on the sidelines on the part of some media practitioners is too deafening to be the subject of misinterpretation.

The constitutional imperative for us to strike down unconstitutional acts should always be exercised with care and in light of the distinct facts of each case.
For there are no hard and fast rules when it comes to slippery constitutional questions, and the limits and construct of relative freedoms are never set in
stone. Issues revolving on their construct must be decided on a case to case basis, always based on the peculiar shapes and shadows of each case. But in
cases where the challenged acts are patent invasions of a constitutionally protected right, we should be swift in striking them down as nullities per se. A
blow too soon struck for freedom is preferred than a blow too late.

In VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is GRANTED. The writs of certiorari and prohibition are hereby issued, nullifying the official statements made by
respondents on June 8, and 11, 2005 warning the media on airing the alleged wiretapped conversation between the President and other personalities, for
constituting unconstitutional prior restraint on the exercise of freedom of speech and of the press

SO ORDERED.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
Associate Justice
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES ADOLFO S. AZCUNA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

DANTE O. TINGA MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

RUBEN T. REYES TERESITA LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice Associate Justice
 C E RT I FI CAT I O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

[1] G.R. No. 103956, March 31, 1992, 207 SCRA 712.
[2] 218 Phil. 754 (1984).
[3] G.R. No. 147571, May 5, 2001, 357 SCRA 496.
[4] G.R. No. 169838, April 25, 2006, 488 SCRA 226.
[5] Rollo, pp. 6-7 (citing the Philippine Daily Inquirer (PDI), June 7, 2005, pp. A1, A18; PDI, June 14, 2005, p. A1); and p. 58.
[6] Id. at 7-8 (citing the Manila Standard, June 10, 2005, p. A2); and 58.
[7] Id. at 7-8 and 59.
[8] Id.
[9] Id. at 8-9 and 59.
[10] Id. at 9.
[11] Id. at 10-12, 43-44, 60-62.
[12] Id. at 62-63, 86-87.
[13] Id. at 6.
[14] Respondents have committed blatant violations of the freedom of expression and of the press and the right of the people to information on matters of
public concern enshrined in Article III, Sections 4 and 7 of the 1987 Constitution. Id. at 18. Petitioner also argued that respondent NTC acted beyond its
powers when it issued the press release of June 11, 2005. Id.
[15] Id. at 6.
[16] Through the Comment filed by the Solicitor-General. Id. at 56-83.
[17] Id. at 71-73.
[18] Id. at 74-75.
[19] The Court will exercise its power of judicial review only if the case is brought before it by a party who has the legal standing to raise the constitutional
or legal question. Legal standing means a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a
result of the government act that is being challenged. The term interest is material interest, an interest in issue and to be affected by the decree, as
distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. Pimentel v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 158088, July 6, 2005,
462 SCRA 622, citing Joya vs. Presidential Commission on Good Government, G.R. No. 96541, August 24, 1993, 225 SCRA 568. See Kilosbayan, Inc. v.
Morato, G.R. No. 118910, July 17, 1995, 246 SCRA 540, 562563; and Agan v. PIATCO (Decision), 450 Phil. 744 (2003).
[20] Araneta v. Dinglasan, 84 Phil. 368, 373 (1949), cited in Osmea v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 100318, July 30, 1991, 199 SCRA 750.
[21] See Agan v. PIATCO (Decision), 450 Phil. 744 (2003).
[22] Philconsa v. Jimenez, 122 Phil. 894 (1965); Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 83896, February 22, 1991, 194 SCRA 317;
Guingona v. Carague, G.R. No. 94571, April 22, 1991, 196 SCRA 221; Osmea v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 100318, July 30, 1991, 199 SCRA 750; Basco v.
PAGCOR, 274 Phil. 323 (1991); Carpio v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 96409, February 14, 1992, 206 SCRA 290; Del Mar v. PAGCOR, 400 Phil. 307
(2000).
[23] Basco v. PAGCOR, 274 Phil. 323 (1991), citing Kapatiran ng mga Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas Inc. v. Tan, G.R. No. L-81311, June 30,
1988, 163 SCRA 371.
[24] 1987 PHIL. CONST. Art. III, 4.
[25] U.S. Bill of Rights, First Amendment. (Congress shall make no lawabridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.)
[26] The First Amendment was so crafted because the founders of the American government believed -- as a matter of history and experience -- that the
freedom to express personal opinions was essential to a free government. See LARRY KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR
CONSTITUTION AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004).
[27] Article 19 of the 1948 Universal Declaration on Human Rights (UDHR) states: Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right
includes the right to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of
frontiers. Although the UDHR is not binding as a treaty, many of its provisions have acquired binding status on States and are now part of customary
international law. Article 19 forms part of the UDHR principles that have been transformed into binding norms. Moreover, many of the rights in the UDHR
were included in and elaborated on in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), a treaty ratified by over 150 States, including the
Philippines. The recognition of freedom of expression is also found in regional human rights instruments, namely, the European Convention on Human
Rights (Article 10), the American Convention on Human Rights (Article 10), and the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights (Article 9).
[28] Gonzales v. COMELEC, 137 Phil. 471, 492 (1969).
[29] Salonga v. Cruz-Pano, G.R. 59524, February 18, 1985, 134 SCRA 458-459; Gonzales v. COMELEC, 137 Phil. 489, 492-3 (1969); Philippine
Blooming Mills Employees Organization v. Philippine Blooming Mills Co., 151-A Phil. 676-677 (1973); National Press Club v. COMELEC, G.R. No.
102653, March 5, 1992, 207 SCRA 1, 9; Adiong v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 103956, March 31, 1992, 207 SCRA 712, 715.
[30] Indeed, the struggle that attended the recognition of the value of free expression was discussed by Justice Malcolm in the early case United States v.
Bustos, 37 Phil. 731, 739 (1918). Justice Malcolm generalized that the freedom of speech as cherished in democratic countries was unknown in the
Philippine Islands before 1900. Despite the presence of pamphlets and books early in the history of the Philippine Islands, the freedom of speech was alien
to those who were used to obeying the words of barangay lords and, ultimately, the colonial monarchy. But ours was a history of struggle for that specific
right: to be able to express ourselves especially in the governance of this country. Id.
[31] Id.
[32] 137 Phil. 471, 492 (1969).
[33] Id.
[34] Id. at 493, citing Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 Yale Law Journal 877 (1963).
[35] Id. citing New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 US 254, 270 (1964).
[36] Id.
[37] Id.
[38] Id.
[39] Id. citing Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 US 1, 4 (1949).
[40] Id. citing U.S. v. Schwimmer, 279 US 644, 655 (1929).
[41] G.R. No. L-59329, July 19, 1985, 137 SCRA 628.
[42] Gonzales v. COMELEC, 137 Phil. 471, 494(1969).
[43] HECTOR S. DE LEON, I PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND CASES 485 (2003) [Hereinafter DE LEON,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW].

[44] See JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 16.1, 1131 (7th ed.2000 [Hereinafter NOWAK & ROTUNDA,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW].
[45] DE LEON, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW at 485. Laws have also limited the freedom of speech and of the press, or otherwise affected the media and
freedom of expression. The Constitution itself imposes certain limits (such as Article IX on the Commission on Elections, and Article XVI prohibiting
foreign media ownership); as do the Revised Penal Code (with provisions on national security, libel and obscenity), the Civil Code (which contains two
articles on privacy), the Rules of Court (on the fair administration of justice and contempt) and certain presidential decrees. There is also a shield law, or
Republic Act No. 53, as amended by Republic Act No. 1477. Section 1 of this law provides protection for non-disclosure of sources of information,
without prejudice to ones liability under civil and criminal laws. The publisher, editor, columnist or duly accredited reporter of a newspaper, magazine or
periodical of general circulation cannot be compelled to reveal the source of any information or news report appearing in said publication, if the
information was released in confidence to such publisher, editor or reporter unless the court or a Committee of Congress finds that such revelation is
demanded by the security of the state.

[46] See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 16.1, 1131 (7th ed.2000).
[47] Id.
[48] Cabansag v. Fernandez, 102 Phil. 151 (1957); Gonzales v. COMELEC, 137 Phil. 471 (1969). See People v. Perez, 4 Phil. 599 (1905); People v.
Nabong, 57 Phil. 455 (1933); People v. Feleo, 57 Phil. 451 (1933).
[49] This test was used by J. Ruiz-Castro in his Separate Opinion in Gonzales v. COMELEC, 137 Phil. 471, 532-537 (1969).
[50] Cabansag v. Fernandez, 102 Phil. 151 (1957).
[51] ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corp. v. COMELEC, 380 Phil. 780, 794 (2000).
[52] See U.S. v. Bustos, 37 Phil. 731 (1918).
[53] The aspect of freedom from liability subsequent to publication precludes liability for completed publications of views traditionally held innocent.
Otherwise, the prohibition on prior restraint would be meaningless, as the unrestrained threat of subsequent punishment, by itself, would be an effective
prior restraint. Thus, opinions on public issues cannot be punished when published, merely because the opinions are novel or controversial, or because they
clash with current doctrines. This fact does not imply that publishers and editors are never liable for what they print. Such freedom gives no immunity from
laws punishing scandalous or obscene matter, seditious or disloyal writings, and libelous or insulting words. As classically expressed, the freedom of the
press embraces at the very least the freedom to discuss truthfully and publicly matters of public concern, without previous restraint or fear of subsequent
punishment. For discussion to be innocent, it must be truthful, must concern something in which people in general take a healthy interest, and must not
endanger some important social end that the government by law protects. See JOAQUIN G. BERNAS, S.J., THE 1987 CONSTITUTION OF THE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES: A COMMENTARY, 225 (2003 ed.).
[54] Freedom of access to information regarding matters of public interest is kept real in several ways. Official papers, reports and documents, unless held
confidential and secret by competent authority in the public interest, are public records. As such, they are open and subject to reasonable regulation, to the
scrutiny of the inquiring reporter or editor. Information obtained confidentially may be printed without specification of the source; and that source is closed
to official inquiry, unless the revelation is deemed by the courts, or by a House or committee of Congress, to be vital to the security of the State. Id.
[55] Freedom of circulation refers to the unhampered distribution of newspapers and other media among customers and among the general public. It may
be interfered with in several ways. The most important of these is censorship. Other ways include requiring a permit or license for the distribution of media
and penalizing dissemination of copies made without it;[55] and requiring the payment of a fee or tax, imposed either on the publisher or on the distributor,
with the intent to limit or restrict circulation. These modes of interfering with the freedom to circulate have been constantly stricken down as unreasonable
limitations on press freedom. Thus, imposing a license tax measured by gross receipts for the privilege of engaging in the business of advertising in any
newspaper, or charging license fees for the privilege of selling religious books are impermissible restraints on the freedom of expression. Id. citing
Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943), and American Bible Society v. City of Manila, 101
Phil. 386 (1957). It has been held, however, even in the Philippines, that publishers and distributors of newspapers and allied media cannot complain when
required to pay ordinary taxes such as the sales tax. The exaction is valid only when the obvious and immediate effect is to restrict oppressively the
distribution of printed matter.
[56] Id at 225.
[57] Burgos v. Chief of Staff, 218 Phil. 754 (1984).
[58] Gonzales v. COMELEC, 137 Phil. 471 (1969); ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corp. v. COMELEC, 380 Phil. 780, 795 (2000) (Doctrinally, the Court has
always ruled in favor of the freedom of expression, and any restriction is treated an exemption.); Social Weather Stations v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 147571,
May 5, 2001, 357 SCRA 496 ([A]ny system of prior restraint comes to court bearing a heavy burden against its constitutionality. It is the government
which must show justification for enforcement of the restraint.). See also Iglesia ni Cristo v. Court of Appeals, 328 Phil. 893 (1996) (religious speech falls
within the protection of free speech).
[59] Iglesia ni Cristo v. CA, 328 Phil. 893, 928 (1996), citing Near v. Minnesota, 283 US 697 (1931); Bantam Books Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 US 58 (1963);
New York Times v. United States, 403 US 713 (1971).
[60] See J.B.L. Reyes v. Bagatsing, 210 Phil. 457 (1983), Navarro v. Villegas, G.R. No. L-31687, February 18, 1970, 31 SCRA 730; Ignacio v. Ela, 99 Phil.
346 (1956); Primicias v. Fugosa, 80 Phil. 71 (1948).
[61] Determining if a restriction is content-based is not always obvious. A regulation may be content-neutral on its face but partakes of a content-based
restriction in its application, as when it can be shown that the government only enforces the restraint as to prohibit one type of content or viewpoint. In this
case, the restriction will be treated as a content-based regulation. The most important part of the time, place, or manner standard is the requirement that the
regulation be content-neutral both as written and applied. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 16.1, 1133 (7th ed.2000).
[62] See Osmea v. COMELEC, 351 Phil. 692, 718 (1998). The Court looked to Adiong v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 103456, March 31, 1992, 207 SCRA 712,
which had cited a U.S. doctrine, viz. A governmental regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the Government, if it
furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incident
restriction on alleged [freedom of speech & expression] is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.

[63] NOWAK & ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 16.1, 1133 (7th ed.2000). This was also called a deferential standard of review in Osmea v.
COMELEC, 351 Phil. 692, 718 (1998). It was explained that the clear and present danger rule is not a sovereign remedy for all free speech problems,
and its application to content-neutral regulations would be tantamount to using a sledgehammer to drive a nail when a regular hammer is all that is needed.
Id. at 478.
[64] Osmea v. COMELEC, 351 Phil. 692, 717, citing Adiong v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 103956, March 31, 1992, 207 SCRA 712. It was noted that the test
was actually formulated in United States v. OBrien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), which was deemed appropriate for restrictions on speech which are content-
neutral.
[65] Iglesia ni Cristo v. Court of Appeals, 328 Phil. 893 (1996). In this case, it was found that the act of respondent Board of Review for Motion Pictures
and Television of rating a TV program with X on the ground that it offend[s] and constitute[s] an attack against other religions which is expressly
prohibited by law was a form of prior restraint and required the application of the clear and present danger rule.
[66] Iglesia ni Cristo v. Court of Appeals, 328 Phil. 893 (1996); Gonzales v. COMELEC, 137 Phil. 471 (1969); ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corp. v.
COMELEC, 380 Phil. 780 (2000); Social Weather Stations v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 147571, May 5, 2001, 357 SCRA 496.
[67] Iglesia ni Cristo v. Court of Appeals, 328 Phil. 893 (1996).
[68] Schenke v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (19191), cited in Cabansag v. Fernandez, 102 Phil. 151 (1957); and ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corp. v.
COMELEC, 380 Phil. 780, 794 (2000).
[69] Adiong v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 103956, March 31, 1992, 207 SCRA 712, cited in ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corp. v. COMELEC, 380 Phil. 780, 795
(2000).
[70] See Adiong v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 103956, March 31, 1992, 207 SCRA 712, and Gonzales v. COMELEC, 137 Phil. 471 (1969), cited in ABS-CBN
Broadcasting Corp. v. COMELEC, 380 Phil. 780, 795 (2000).
[71] See Adiong v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 103956, March 31, 1992, 207 SCRA 712.
[72] See Osmea v. COMELEC, 351 Phil. 692 (1998).
[73] Parenthetically, there are two types of content-based restrictions. First, the government may be totally banning some type of speech for content (total
ban). Second, the government may be requiring individuals who wish to put forth certain types of speech to certain times or places so that the type of
speech does not adversely affect its environment. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 16.1, 1131 (7th ed.2000). Both types of conten-
based regulations are subject to strict scrutiny and the clear and present danger rule.
[74] Iglesia ni Cristo v. Court of Appeals, 328 Phil. 893 (1996); Gonzales v. COMELEC, 137 Phil. 471 (1969); ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corp. v.
COMELEC, 380 Phil. 780 (2000); Social Weather Stations v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 147571, May 5, 2001, 357 SCRA 496.
[75] This is based on a finding that broadcast regulation involves unique considerations, and that differences in the characteristics of new media justify
differences in the First Amendment standards applied to them. Red Lion Broad. Co. v. Federal Communications Commission [FCC], 395 U.S. 367, 386
(1969). See generally National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 219 (1943) (noting that the public interest standard denoted to the FCC is
an expansive power).
[76] See Federal Communications Commission [FCC] v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978); Sable Communications v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989);
and Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union [ACLU], 521 U.S. 844, 874 (1997). In these cases, U.S. courts disregarded the argument that the offended
listener or viewer could simply turn the dial and avoid the unwanted broadcast [thereby putting print and broadcast media in the same footing], reasoning
that because the broadcast audience is constantly tuning in and out, prior warnings cannot protect the listener from unexpected program content.
[77] Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386 (1969). Red Lion involved the application of the fairness doctrine and whether someone personally
attacked had the right to respond on the broadcast medium within the purview of FCC regulation. The court sustained the regulation. The Court in Red
Lion reasoned that because there are substantially more individuals who want to broadcast than there are frequencies available, this scarcity of the
spectrum necessitates a stricter standard for broadcast media, as opposed to newspapers and magazines. See generally National Broadcasting v. United
States, 319 U.S. 190, 219 (1943) (noting that the public interest standard denoted to the FCC is an expansive power).
[78] See Federal Communications Commission v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978); Sable Communications v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989); and
Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union [ACLU], 521 U.S. 844, 874 (1997). In FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, involving an FCC decision to require
broadcasters to channel indecent programming away from times of the day when there is a reasonable risk that children may be in the audience, the U.S.
Court found that the broadcast medium was an intrusive and pervasive one. In reaffirming that this medium should receive the most limited of First
Amendment protections, the U.S. Court held that the rights of the public to avoid indecent speech trump those of the broadcaster to disseminate such
speech. The justifications for this ruling were two-fold. First, the regulations were necessary because of the pervasive presence of broadcast media in
American life, capable of injecting offensive material into the privacy of the home, where the right "to be left alone plainly outweighs the First Amendment
rights of an intruder." Second, the U.S. Court found that broadcasting "is uniquely accessible to children, even those too young to read." The Court
dismissed the argument that the offended listener or viewer could simply turn the dial and avoid the unwanted broadcast, reasoning that because the
broadcast audience is constantly tuning in and out, prior warnings cannot protect the listener from unexpected program content.
[79] FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 376 (1984).
[80] Id. at 380.
[81] See Estrada v. Escritor (Resolution), A.M. No. P-02-1651, June 22, 2006 (free exercise of religion); and Osmea v. COMELEC, 351 Phil. 692, 718
(1998) (speech restrictions to promote voting rights). The Court in Osmea v. COMELEC, for example, noted that it is a foreign notion to the American
Constitution that the government may restrict the speech of some in order to enhance the relative voice of others [the idea being that voting is a form of
speech]. But this Court then declared that the same does not hold true of the Philippine Constitution, the notion being in fact an animating principle of that
document. 351 Phil. 692, 718 (1998).
[82] G.R. No. L-59329, July 19, 1985, 137 SCRA 628.
[83] Id.
[84] Id. at 634-637.
[85] There is another case wherein the Court had occasion to refer to the differentiation between traditional print media and broadcast media, but of limited
application to the case at bar inasmuch as the issues did not invoke a free-speech challenge, but due process and equal protection. See Telecommunications
and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. v. COMELEC, 352 Phil. 153 (1998) (challenge to legislation requiring broadcast stations to provide
COMELEC Time free of charge).
[86] G.R. No. L-69500, July 22, 1985, 137 SCRA 717. In this case, the classification of a movie as For Adults Only was challenged, with the issue focused
on obscenity as basis for the alleged invasion of the right to freedom on artistic and literary expression embraced in the free speech guarantees of the
Constitution. The Court held that the test to determine free expression was the clear and present danger rule. The Court found there was an abuse of
discretion, but did not get enough votes to rule it was grave. The decision specifically stated that the ruling in the case was limited to concept of obscenity
applicable to motion pictures. Id. at 723-729.
[87] Id. at 725.
[88] Id.
[89] ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corp. v. COMELEC, 380 Phil. 780, 794 (COMELEC Resolution restraining ABS-CBN, a corporation engaged in broadcast
media of television and radio, from conducting exit surveys after the 1998 elections). Although the decision was rendered after the 1998 elections, the
Court proceeded to rule on the case to rule on the issue of the constitutionality of holding exit polls and the dissemination of data derived therefrom. The
Court ruled that restriction on exit polls must be tested against the clear and present danger rule, the rule we unquestionably adhere to. The framing of the
guidelines issued by the Court clearly showed that the issue involved not only the conduct of the exit polls but also its dissemination by broadcast media.
And yet, the Court did not distinguish, and still applied the clear and present danger rule.
[90] 351 Phil. 692 (1998) (challenge to legislation which sought to equalize media access through regulation).
[91] Id. at 718.
[92] Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. v. COMELEC, 352 Phil. 153 (1998) (challenge to legislation requiring broadcast
stations to provide COMELEC Time free of charge).

[93] HELEN FENWICK, CIVIL LIBERTIES AND HUMAN RIGHTS 296 (3rd ed. 2002).
[94] Id.
[95] Stephen J. Shapiro, How Internet Non-Regulation Undermines The Rationales Used To Support Broadcast Regulation, 8-FALL MEDIA L. & POL'Y
1, 2 (1999).
[96] Technological advances, such as software that facilitates the delivery of live, or real-time, audio and video over the Internet, have enabled Internet
content providers to offer the same services as broadcasters. Indeed, these advancements blur the distinction between a computer and a television. Id. at 13.
[97] Id.
[98] The current rationales used to support regulation of the broadcast media become unpersuasive in light of the fact that the unregulated Internet and the
regulated broadcast media share many of the same features. Id. In other words, as the Internet and broadcast media become identical, for all intents and
purposes, it makes little sense to regulate one but not the other in an effort to further First Amendment principles. Indeed, as Internet technologies advance,
broadcasters will have little incentive to continue developing broadcast programming under the threat of regulation when they can disseminate the same
content in the same format through the unregulated Internet. In conclusion, "the theory of partial regulation, whatever its merits for the circumstances of
the last fifty years, will be unworkable in the media landscape of the future." Id. at 23.
SECOND DIVISION
NEWSOUNDS BROADCASTING G.R. Nos. 170270 &
NETWORK INC. and CONSOLIDATED 179411
BROADCASTING SYSTEM, INC.,
Petitioners,
Present:
QUISUMBING,
- versus - Chairperson,
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA,
VELASCO, JR., and
HON. CEASAR G. DY, FELICISIMO PERALTA, JJ.*
G. MEER, BAGNOS MAXIMO, RACMA
FERNANDEZ-GARCIA and THE CITY
OF CAUAYAN,
Respondents. Promulgated:
April 2, 2009
x---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
Whenever the force of government or any of its political subdivisions bears upon to close down a private broadcasting station, the issue of free speech
infringement cannot be minimized, no matter the legal justifications offered for the closure. In many respects, the present petitions offer a textbook
example of how the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech, expression and of the press may be unlawfully compromised. Tragically, the lower
courts involved in this case failed to recognize or assert the fundamental dimensions, and it is our duty to reverse, and to affirm the Constitution and the
most sacred rights it guarantees.

Before us are two petitions for review involving the same parties, the cases having been consolidated by virtue of the Resolution of this Court dated 16
June 2008.[1] Both petitions emanated from a petition for mandamus[2] filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of docketed as Special Civil Action No.
Br. 20-171, the petition having been dismissed in a Decision dated by the Cauayan City RTC, Branch 20.[3] Consequently, petitioners filed with the Court
of Appeals a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 and an appeal to the RTC decision. The appellate court ruled against petitioners in both instances. The
petition in G.R. No. 170270 assails the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 87815,[4] while the petition in G.R. 179411 assails the
decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 88283.[5]

I.

Bombo Radyo (Bombo Radyo) operates several radio stations under the AM and FM band throughout the . These stations are operated by corporations
organized and incorporated by Bombo Radyo, particularly petitioners Newsounds Broadcasting Network, Inc. (Newsounds) and Consolidated
Broadcasting System, Inc. (CBS). Among the stations run by Newsounds is Bombo Radyo DZNC Cauayan (DZNC), an AM radio broadcast station
operating out of , Isabela. CBS, in turn, runs Star FM DWIT Cauayan (Star FM), also operating out of , airing on the FM band. The service areas of DZNC
and Star FM extend from the of to throughout Region II and the Cordillera region.[6]

In 1996, Newsounds commenced relocation of its broadcasting stations, management office and transmitters on property located in Minante 2, , Isabela.
The property is owned by CBS Development Corporation (CDC), an affiliate corporation under the Bombo Radyo network which holds title over the
properties used by Bombo Radyo stations throughout the country.[7] On , CDC was issued by the then municipal government of Cauayan a building permit
authorizing the construction of a commercial establishment on the property.[8] On , the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) issued a
Zoning Decision certifying the property as commercial.[9] That same day, the Office of the Municipal Planning and Development Coordinator (OMPDC)
of Cauayan affirmed that the commercial structure to be constructed by CDC conformed to local zoning regulations, noting as well that the location is
classified as a Commercial area.[10] Similar certifications would be issued by OMPDC from 1997 to 2001.[11]

A building was consequently erected on the property, and therefrom, DZNC and Star FM operated as radio stations. Both stations successfully secured all
necessary operating documents, including mayors permits from 1997 to 2001.[12] During that period, CDC paid real property taxes on the property based
on the classification of the land as commercial.[13]

All that changed beginning in 2002. On 15 January of that year, petitioners applied for the renewal of the mayors permit. The following day, the City
Assessors Office in noted on CDCs Declaration of Real Property filed for 2002 confirmed that based on the existing file, CDCs property was classified as
commercial.[14] On 28 January, representatives of petitioners formally requested then City Zoning Administrator-Designate Bagnos Maximo (Maximo) to
issue a zoning clearance for the property.[15] Maximo, however, required petitioners to submit either an approved land conversion papers from the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) showing that the property was converted from prime agricultural land to commercial land, or an approved
resolution from the Sangguniang Bayan or Sangguniang Panglungsod authorizing the re-classification of the property from agricultural to commercial
land.[16] Petitioners had never been required to submit such papers before, and from 1996 to 2001, the OMPDC had consistently certified that the property
had been classified as commercial.

Due to this refusal by Maximo to issue the zoning clearance, petitioners were unable to secure a mayors permit. Petitioners filed a petition for
mandamus[17] with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of to compel the issuance of the 2002 mayors permit. The case was raffled to Branch 19 of the
Cauayan City RTC. When the RTC of Cauayan denied petitioners accompanying application for injunctive relief, they filed a special civil action for
certiorari with the Court of Appeals,[18] but this would be dismissed by the appellate court due to the availability of other speedy remedies with the trial
court. In February of 2003, the RTC dismissed the mandamus action for being moot and academic.[19]

In the meantime, petitioners sought to obtain from the DAR Region II Office a formal recognition of the conversion of the CDC property from agricultural
to commercial. The matter was docketed as Adm. Case No. A-0200A-07B-002. Then DAR Region II Director Abrino L. Aydinan (Director Aydinan)
granted the application and issued an Order that stated that there remains no doubt on the part of this Office of the non-agricultural classification of subject
land before the effectivity of Republic Act No. 6657 otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988. [20] Consequently, the DAR
Region II Office ordered the formal exclusion of the property from the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program, and the waiver of any requirement for
formal clearance of the conversion of the subject land from agricultural to non-agricultural use.[21]

On , petitioners filed their applications for renewal of mayors permit for the year 2003, attaching therein the DAR Order. Their application was approved.
However, on , respondent Felicisimo Meer, Acting City Administrator of Cauayan City, wrote to petitioners claiming that the DAR Order was spurious or
void, as the for Land Use Policy Planning and Implementation (RCLUPPI) supposedly reported that it did not have any record of the DAR Order. A series
of correspondences followed wherein petitioners defended the authenticity of the DAR Order and the commercial character of the property, while
respondent Meer demanded independent proof showing the authenticity of the Aydinan Order. It does not appear though that any action was taken against
petitioners by respondents in 2003, and petitioners that year paid realty taxes on the property based on the classification that said property is commercial.
[22]

The controversy continued into 2004. In January of that year, petitioners filed their respective applications for their 2004 mayors permit, again with the
DAR Order attached to the same. A zonal clearance was issued in favor of petitioners. Yet in a letter dated , respondent Meer claimed that no record existed
of DAR Adm. Case No. A-0200A-07B-002 with the Office of the Regional Director of the DAR or with the RCLUPPI.[23] As a result, petitioners were
informed that there was no basis for the issuance in their favor of the requisite zoning clearance needed for the issuance of the mayors permit.[24]

Another series of correspondences ensued between Meer and the station manager of DZNC, Charmy Sabigan (Sabigan). Sabigan reiterated the authenticity
of the DAR Order and the commercial character of the property, while Meer twice extended the period for application of the mayors permit, while
reminding them of the need to submit the certifications from the DAR or the Sangguniang Panlalawigan that the property had been duly converted for
commercial use.

The deadline for application for the mayors permit lapsed on , despite petitioners plea for another extension. On 17 February 2004, respondents Meer and
Racma Fernandez-Garcia, City Legal Officer of Cauayan City, arrived at the property and closed the radio stations. Petitioners proceeded to file a petition
with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) seeking enforcement of the Omnibus Election Code, which prohibited the closure of radio stations during
the then-pendency of the election period. On , the COMELEC issued an order directing the parties to maintain the status prevailing before , thus allowing
the operation of the radio stations, and petitioners proceeded to operate the stations the following day. Within hours, respondent Mayor Ceasar Dy issued a
Closure Order dated , stating therein that since petitioners did not have the requisite permits before , the status quo meant that the stations were not in fact
allowed to operate.[25] Through the intervention of the COMELEC, petitioners were able to resume operation of the stations on . On 9 May 2004, or two
days before the general elections of that year, the COMELEC denied the petition filed by petitioners and set aside the status quo order.[26] However, this
Resolution was reconsidered just 9 days later, or on , and the COMELEC directed the maintenance of the status quo until , the date of the end of the
election period.

Petitioners were thus able to continue operations until , the day when respondents yet again closed the radio stations. This closure proved to be more
permanent.

By this time, the instant legal battle over the sought-after mayors permits had already been well under way. On , petitioners filed a petition for mandamus,
docketed as SCA No. 20-171, with the RTC of Cauayan City, Branch 20. The petition was accompanied by an application for the issuance of temporary
restraining order and writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction, both provisional reliefs being denied by the RTC through an Order dated . Respondents
duly filed an Answer with Counterclaims on . Due to the aforementioned closure of the radio stations on , petitioners filed with the RTC a Motion for the
Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction dated , praying that said writ be issued to allow petitioners to resume operations of the radio
stations. No hearing would be conducted on the motion, nor would it be formally ruled on by the RTC.

On , the RTC rendered a Decision denying the petition for mandamus.[27] The RTC upheld all the arguments of the respondents, including their right to
deny the sought after mayors permit unless they were duly satisfied that the subject property has been classified as commercial in nature. The Decision
made no reference to the application for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, [28] citing the trial
courts failure to hear and act on the motion for preliminary mandatory injunction as a violation of the right to due process, and disputing the RTCs
conclusions with respect to their right to secure the mayors permit. This motion was denied in an Order dated .

Petitioners initiated two separate actions with the Court of Appeals following the rulings of the RTC. On , they filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65,
docketed as CA G.R. No. 87815, raffled to the Fourteenth Division.[29] This petition imputed grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC for denying
their application for preliminary mandatory injunction. On the same day, petitioners also filed a Notice of Appeal with the RTC, this time in connection
with the denial of their petition for mandamus. This appeal was docketed as CA G.R. SP No. 88283 and raffled to the Eleventh Division.

Petitioners lost both of their cases with the Court of Appeals. On , the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. No. 87815 dismissed the Petition for Certiorari, ruling
that the RTC did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in impliedly denying the application for preliminary mandatory injunction. On , the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 88283 denied the appeal by certiorari, affirming the right of the respondents to deny petitioners their mayors permits. On both
occasions, petitioners filed with this Court respective petitions for review under Rule 45 the instant petitions, now docketed as G.R. Nos. 170270 and
179411.

On , the Court in G.R. No. 170270 issued a writ of preliminary injunction, enjoining respondents from implementing the closure order dated , or otherwise
interfering with the operations of Bombo Radyo DZNC Cauayan (NBN) and STAR FM DWIT Cauayan (CBS) in until final orders from this Court.[30] On
, the Court resolved to consolidate G.R. No. 170270 with G.R. No. 179411, which had been initially dismissed outright but was reinstated on even date.
[31]

Certiorari lies in both instances.

II.

The fundamental constitutional principle that informs our analysis of both petitions is the freedom of speech, of expression or the press.[32] Free speech
and free press may be identified with the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully any matter of public interest without censorship and punishment. There is
to be no previous restraint on the communication of views or subsequent liability whether in libel suits, prosecution for sedition, or action for damages, or
contempt proceedings unless there be a clear and present danger of substantive evil that Congress has a right to prevent.[33]

Petitioners have taken great pains to depict their struggle as a textbook case of denial of the right to free speech and of the press. In their tale, there is
undeniable political color. They admit that in 2001, Bombo Radyo was aggressive in exposing the widespread election irregularities in Isabela that appear
to have favored respondent Dy and other members of the Dy political dynasty.[34] Respondent Ceasar Dy is the brother of Faustino Dy, Jr., governor of
Isabela from 2001 until he was defeated in his re-election bid in 2004 by Grace Padaca, a former assistant station manager at petitioners own DZNC
Bombo Radyo.[35] A rival AM radio station in , DWDY, is owned and operated by the Dy family. [36] Petitioners likewise direct our attention to a article
printed in the Philippine Daily Inquirer where Dy is quoted as intending to file disenfranchisement proceedings against DZNC-AM.[37]

The partisan component of this dispute will no doubt sway many observers towards one opinion or the other, but not us. The comfort offered by the
constitutional shelter of free expression is neutral as to personality, affinity, ideology and popularity. The judges tasked to enforce constitutional order are
expected to rule accordingly from the comfort of that neutral shelter.

Still, it cannot be denied that our Constitution has a systemic bias towards free speech. The absolutist tenor of Section 4, Article III testifies to that fact. The
individual discomforts to particular people or enterprises engendered by the exercise of the right, for which at times remedies may be due, do not diminish
the indispensable nature of free expression to the democratic way of life.

The following undisputed facts bring the issue of free expression to fore. Petitioners are authorized by law to operate radio stations in , and had been doing
so for some years undisturbed by local authorities. Beginning in 2002, respondents in their official capacities have taken actions, whatever may be the
motive, that have impeded the ability of petitioners to freely broadcast, if not broadcast at all. These actions have ranged from withholding permits to
operate to the physical closure of those stations under color of legal authority. While once petitioners were able to broadcast freely, the weight of
government has since bore down upon them to silence their voices on the airwaves. An elementary school child with a basic understanding of civics
lessons will recognize that free speech animates these cases.

Without taking into account any extenuating circumstances that may favor the respondents, we can identify the bare acts of closing the radio stations or
preventing their operations as an act of prior restraint against speech, expression or of the press. Prior restraint refers to official governmental restrictions
on the press or other forms of expression in advance of actual publication or dissemination.[38] While any system of prior restraint comes to court bearing
a heavy burden against its constitutionality,[39] not all prior restraints on speech are invalid.[40]

Nonetheless, there are added legal complexities to these cases which may not be necessarily accessible to the layperson. The actions taken by respondents
are colored with legal authority, under the powers of local governments vested in the Local Government Code (LGC), or more generally, the police powers
of the State. We do not doubt that Local Government Units (LGU) are capacitated to enact ordinances requiring the obtention of licenses or permits by
businesses, a term defined elsewhere in the LGC as trade or commercial activity regularly engaged in as a means of livelihood or with a view to profit.

And there is the fact that the mode of expression restrained in these cases broadcast is not one which petitioners are physically able to accomplish without
interacting with the regulatory arm of the government. Expression in media such as print or the Internet is not burdened by such requirements as
congressional franchises or administrative licenses which bear upon broadcast media. Broadcast is hampered by its utilization of the finite resources of the
electromagnetic spectrum, which long ago necessitated government intervention and administration to allow for the orderly allocation of bandwidth, with
broadcasters agreeing in turn to be subjected to regulation. There is no issue herein that calls into question the authority under law of petitioners to engage
in broadcasting activity, yet these circumstances are well worth pointing out if only to provide the correct perspective that broadcast media enjoys a
somewhat lesser degree of constitutional protection than print media or the Internet.

It emerges then that there exists tension between petitioners right to free expression, and respondents authority by law to regulate local enterprises. What
are the rules of adjudication that govern the judicial resolution of this controversy?

B.

That the acts imputed against respondents constitute a prior restraint on the freedom of expression of respondents who happen to be members of the press
is clear enough. There is a long-standing tradition of special judicial solicitude for free speech, meaning that governmental action directed at expression
must satisfy a greater burden of justification than governmental action directed at most other forms of behavior.[41] We had said in SWS v. COMELEC:
Because of the preferred status of the constitutional rights of speech, expression, and the press, such a measure is vitiated by a weighty presumption of
invalidity. Indeed, any system of prior restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity. . . . The
Government 'thus carries a heavy burden of showing justification for the enforcement of such restraint. There is thus a reversal of the normal presumption
of validity that inheres in every legislation.[42]

At the same time, jurisprudence distinguishes between a content-neutral regulation, i.e., merely concerned with the incidents of the speech, or one that
merely controls the time, place or manner, and under well defined standards; and a content-based restraint or censorship, i.e., the restriction is based on
the subject matter of the utterance or speech.[43] Content-based laws are generally treated as more suspect than content-neutral laws because of judicial
concern with discrimination in the regulation of expression.[44] Content-neutral regulations of speech or of conduct that may amount to speech, are subject
to lesser but still heightened scrutiny.[45]

Ostensibly, the act of an LGU requiring a business of proof that the property from which it operates has been zoned for commercial use can be argued,
when applied to a radio station, as content-neutral since such a regulation would presumably apply to any other radio station or business enterprise within
the LGU.
However, the circumstances of this case dictate that we view the action of the respondents as a content-based restraint. In their petition for mandamus filed
with the RTC, petitioners make the following relevant allegations:

6.1. With specific reference to DZNC, Newsounds, to this date, is engaged in discussing public issues that include, among
others, the conduct of public officials that are detrimental to the constituents of Isabela, including . In view of its wide
coverage, DZNC has been a primary medium for the exercise of the people of Isabela of their constitutional right to free
speech. Corollarily, DZNC has always been at the forefront of the struggle to maintain and uphold freedom of the press, and the
peoples corollary right to freedom of speech, expression and petition the government for redress of grievances.
6.2. Newsounds only rival AM station in Cauayan and the rest of Isabela, DWDY, is owned and operated by the family of
respondent Dy.[46]
xxxx
35. Respondents closure of petitioners radio stations is clearly tainted with ill motives.
35.1. It must be pointed out that in the 2001 elections, Bombo Radyo was aggressive in exposing the widespread election
irregularities in Isabela that appear to have favored respondent Dy and other members of the Dy political dynasty. It is just too
coincidental that it was only after the 2001 elections (i.e., 2002) that the Mayors Office started questioning petitioners
applications for renewal of their mayors permits.
35.2. In an article found in the Philippine Daily inquirer dated , respondent Dy was quoted as saying that he will disenfranchise
the radio station. Such statement manifests and confirms that respondents denial of petitioners renewal applications on the
ground that the Property is commercial is merely a pretext and that their real agenda is to remove petitioners from Cauayan
City and suppress the latters voice. This is a blatant violation of the petitioners constitutional right to press freedom.
A copy of the newspaper article is attached hereto as Annex JJ.
35.3. The timing of respondents closure of petitioners radio stations is also very telling. The closure comes at a most critical
time when the people are set to exercise their right of suffrage. Such timing emphasizes the ill motives of respondents.[47]
In their Answer with Comment[48] to the petition for mandamus, respondents admitted that petitioners had made such exposes during
the 2001 elections, though they denied the nature and truthfulness of such reports.[49] They conceded that the Philippine Daily
Inquirer story reported that Dy said he planned to file disenfranchisement proceedings against [DZNC]-AM.[50] While respondents
assert that there are other AM radio stations in Isabela, they do not specifically refute that station DWDY was owned by the Dy
family, or that DZNC and DWDY are the two only stations that operate out of Cauayan.[51]

Prior to 2002, petitioners had not been frustrated in securing the various local government requirements for the operation of their stations. It was only in the
beginning of 2002, after the election of respondent Ceasar Dy as mayor of Cauayan, that the local government started to impose these new requirements
substantiating the conversion of CDCs property for commercial use. Petitioners admit that during the 2001 elections, Bombo Radyo was aggressive in
exposing the widespread election irregularities in Isabela that appear to have favored Respondent Dy and other members of the Dy political dynasty. [52]
Respondents efforts to close petitioners radio station clearly intensified immediately before the May 2004 elections, where a former employee of DZNC
Bombo Radyo, Grace Padaca, was mounting a credible and ultimately successful challenge against the incumbent Isabela governor, who happened to be
the brother of respondent Dy. It also bears notice that the requirements required of petitioners by the government are frankly beyond the pale and not
conventionally adopted by local governments throughout the .

All those circumstances lead us to believe that the steps employed by respondents to ultimately shut down petitioners radio station were ultimately content-
based. The United States Supreme Court generally treats restriction of the expression of a particular point of view as the paradigm violation of the First
Amendment.[53] The facts confronting us now could have easily been drawn up by a constitutional law professor eager to provide a plain example on how
free speech may be violated.

The Court is of the position that the actions of the respondents warrant heightened or strict scrutiny from the Court, the test which we have deemed
appropriate in assessing content-based restrictions on free speech, as well as for laws dealing with freedom of the mind or restricting the political process,
of laws dealing with the regulation of speech, gender, or race as well as other fundamental rights as expansion from its earlier applications to equal
protection.[54] The immediate implication of the application of the strict scrutiny test is that the burden falls upon respondents as agents of government to
prove that their actions do not infringe upon petitioners constitutional rights. As content regulation cannot be done in the absence of any compelling reason,
[55] the burden lies with the government to establish such compelling reason to infringe the right to free expression.

III.

We first turn to whether the implicit denial of the application for preliminary mandatory injunction by the RTC was in fact attended with grave abuse of
discretion. This is the main issue raised in G.R. No. 170270.

To recall, the RTC on 20 April 2004 issued an order denying the prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, claiming that [t]here is
insufficiency of allegation[t]here is no certainty that after the election period, the respondents will interfere with the operation of the radio stations x x x
which are now operating by virtue of the order of the COMELEC.[56] Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, which the RTC denied on . The
refusal of the RTC to grant provisional relief gave way to the closure of petitioners radio stations on , leading for them to file a motion for the issuance of a
writ of preliminary mandatory injunction on . This motion had not yet been acted upon when on , the RTC promulgated its decision denying the petition for
mandamus.

Among the arguments raised by petitioners in their motion for reconsideration before the RTC was against the implied denial of their motion for the
issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, claiming in particular that such implicit denial violated petitioners right to due process of law since
no hearing was conducted thereupon. However, when the RTC denied the motion for reconsideration in its Order, it noted that its implied denial of the
motion for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction was not a ground for reconsideration of its decision.

Petitioners maintain that the RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion when it impliedly denied their motion for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
mandatory injunction without any hearing. The Court of Appeals pointed out that under Section 5 of Rule 58 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, it is the
granting of a writ of preliminary injunction that mandatorily requires a hearing. The interpretation of the appellate court is supported by the language of the
rule itself:

SEC. 5. Preliminary injunction not granted without notice; exception.― No preliminary injunction shall be granted without hearing and prior
notice to the party or person sought to be enjoined. If it shall appear from facts shown by affidavits or by the verified application that great or
irreparable injury would result to the applicant before the matter can be heard on notice, the court to which the application for preliminary
injunction was made, may issue ex parte a temporary restraining order to be effective only for a period of twenty (20) days from service on the
party or person sought to be enjoined, except as herein provided. x x x
Section 5 of Rule 58 prescribes a mandatory hearing and prior notice to the party or person sought to be enjoined if preliminary injunction should be
granted. It imposes no similar requirement if such provisional relief were to be denied. We in fact agree with the Court of Appeals that if on the face of the
pleadings, the applicant for preliminary injunction is not entitled thereto, courts may outrightly deny the motion without conducting a hearing for the
purpose.[57] The Court is disinclined to impose a mandatory hearing requirement on applications for injunction even if on its face, injunctive relief is
palpably without merit or impossible to grant. Otherwise, our trial courts will be forced to hear out the sort of litigation-happy attention-deprived
miscreants who abuse the judicial processes by filing complaints against real or imaginary persons based on trivial or inexistent slights.

We do not wish though to dwell on this point, as there is an even more fundamental point to consider. Even as we decline to agree to a general that the
denial of an application for injunction requires a prior hearing, we believe in this case that petitioners deserved not only a hearing on their motion, but the
very writ itself.

As earlier stated, the burden of presuming valid the actions of respondents sought, fraught as they were with alleged violations on petitioners constitutional
right to expression, fell on respondents themselves. This was true from the very moment the petition for mandamus was filed. It was evident from the
petition that the threat against petitioners was not wildly imagined, or speculative in any way. Attached to the petition itself was the Closure Order
dated issued by respondents against petitioners.[58] There was no better evidence to substantiate the claim that petitioners faced the live threat of
their closure. Moreover, respondents in their Answer admitted to issuing the Closure Order.[59]

At the moment the petition was filed, there was no basis for the RTC to assume that there was no actual threat hovering over petitioners for the closure of
their radio stations. The trial court should have been cognizant of the constitutional implications of the case, and appreciated that the burden now fell on
respondents to defend the constitutionality of their actions. From that mindset, the trial court could not have properly denied provisional relief without any
hearing since absent any extenuating defense offered by the respondents, their actions remained presumptively invalid.

Our conclusions hold true not only with respect to the implied denial of the motion for preliminary injunction, but also with the initial denial without
hearing on 20 April 2004 of the prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order. Admittedly, such initial denial is not the object
of these petitions, yet we can observe that such action of the RTC was attended with grave abuse of discretion, the trial court betraying ignorance of the
constitutional implications of the petition. With respect to the subsequent implied denial of the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, the grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the trial court is even more glaring. At that point, petitioners radio stations were not merely under threat of closure, they
were already actually closed. Petitioners constitutional rights were not merely under threat of infringement, they were already definitely infringed.

The application of the strict scrutiny analysis to petitioners claims for provisional relief warrants the inevitable conclusion that the trial court cannot deny
provisional relief to the party alleging a prima facie case alleging government infringement on the right to free expression without hearing from the
infringer the cause why its actions should be sustained provisionally. Such acts of infringement are presumptively unconstitutional, thus the trial court
cannot deny provisional relief outright since to do so would lead to the sustention of a presumptively unconstitutional act. It would be necessary for the
infringer to appear in court and somehow rebut against the presumption of unconstitutionality for the trial court to deny the injunctive relief sought for in
cases where there is a prima facie case establishing the infringement of the right to free expression.

Those above-stated guidelines, which pertain most particularly to the ex parte denial of provisional relief in free expression cases, stand independently of
the established requisites for a party to be entitled to such provisional reliefs. With respect to writs of preliminary injunction, the requisite grounds are
spelled out in Section 3 of Rule 58 of the Rules of Court.

It may be pointed out that the application for preliminary mandatory injunction after petitioners radio stations had been closed was mooted by the RTC
decision denying the petition for mandamus. Ideally, the RTC should have acted on the motion asking for the issuance of the writ before rendering its
decision. Given the circumstances, petitioners were entitled to immediate relief after they filed their motion on , some two and a half months before the
RTC decision was promulgated on . It is not immediately clear why the motion, which had been set for hearing on , had not been heard by the RTC, so we
have no basis for imputing bad faith on the part of the trial court in purposely delaying the hearing to render it moot with the forthcoming rendition of the
decision. Nonetheless, given the gravity of the constitutional question involved, and the fact that the radio stations had already been actually closed, a
prudent judge would have strived to hear the motion and act on it accordingly independent of the ultimate decision.

Since the prayer for the issuance of a writ of mandatory injunction in this case was impliedly denied through the decision denying the main action, we have
no choice but to presume that the prayer for injunction was denied on the same bases as the denial of the petition for mandamus itself. The time has come
for us to review such denial, the main issue raised in G.R. No. 179411.

IV.

The perspective from which the parties present the matter for resolution in G.R. No. 179411 is whether the property of CDC had been duly converted or
classified for commercial use, with petitioners arguing that it was while respondents claiming that the property remains agricultural in character. This
perspective, to our mind, is highly myopic and implicitly assumes that the requirements imposed on petitioners by the government are in fact legitimate.

The LGC authorizes local legislative bodies to enact ordinances authorizing the issuance of permits or licenses upon such conditions and for such purposes
intended to promote the general welfare of the inhabitants of the LGU.[60] A municipal or city mayor is likewise authorized under the LGC to issue
licenses and permits and suspend or revoke the same for any violation of the conditions upon which said licenses or permits had been issued, pursuant to
law or ordinance.[61] Generally, LGUs have exercised its authority to require permits or licenses from business enterprises operating within its territorial
jurisdiction.

A municipal license is essentially a governmental restriction upon private rights and is valid only if based upon an exercise by the municipality of its police
or taxing powers.[62] The LGC subjects the power of sanggunians to enact ordinances requiring licenses or permits within the parameters of Book II of the
Code, concerning Local Taxation and Fiscal Matters. It also necessarily follows that the exercise of this power should also be consistent with the
Constitution as well as the other laws of the land.

Nothing in national law exempts media entities that also operate as businesses such as newspapers and broadcast stations such as petitioners from being
required to obtain permits or licenses from local governments in the same manner as other businesses are expected to do so. While this may lead to some
concern that requiring media entities to secure licenses or permits from local government units infringes on the constitutional right to a free press, we see
no concern so long as such requirement has been duly ordained through local legislation and content-neutral in character, i.e., applicable to all other
similarly situated businesses.

Indeed, there are safeguards within the LGC against the arbitrary or unwarranted exercise of the authority to issue licenses and permits. As earlier noted,
the power of sanggunians to enact ordinances authorizing the issuance of permits or licenses is subject to the provisions of Book Two of the LGC. The
power of the mayor to issue license and permits and suspend or revoke the same must be exercised pursuant to law or ordinance.[63]

In the case of Cauayan , the authority to require a mayors permit was enacted through Ordinance No. 92-004, enacted in 1993 when Cauayan was still a
municipality. We quote therefrom:

Sec. 3A.01. Imposition of Fee. There shall be imposed and collected an annual fee at the rates provided hereunder for the issuance of Mayors Permit to
every person that shall conduct business, trade or activity within the of .
The permit fee is payable for every separate or distinct establishment or place where the business trade or activity is conducted. One line of business or
activity does not become exempt by being conducted with some other business or activity for which the permit fee has been paid.
xxxx
Sec. 3A.03. Application for Mayors Permit False Statements.― A written application for a permit to operate a business shall be filed with the Office of the
Mayor in three copies. The application form shall set forth the name and address of the applicant, the description or style of business, the place where the
business shall be conducted and such other pertinent information or data as may be required.
Upon submission of the application, it shall be the duty of the proper authorities to verify if the other Municipal requirements regarding the operation of the
business or activity are complied with. The permit to operate shall be issued only upon such compliance and after the payment of the corresponding taxes
and fees as required by this revenue code and other municipal tax ordinances.
Any false statement deliberately made by the applicant shall constitute sufficient ground for denying or revoking the permit issued by the Mayor, and the
applicant or licensee may further be prosecuted in accordance with the penalties provided in this article.
A Mayors Permit shall be refused to any person:
(1) Whose business establishment or undertaking does not conform with zoning regulations and safety, health and other requirements of the Municipality;
(2) that has an unsettled tax obligations, debt or other liability to the Municipal Government; and (3) that is disqualified under any provision of law or
ordinance to establish, or operate the business for which a permit is being applied.[64]
Petitioners do not challenge the validity of Ordinance No. 92-004. On its face, it operates as a content-neutral regulation that does not impose any special
impediment to the exercise of the constitutional right to free expression. Still, it can be seen how under the veil of Ordinance No. 92-004 or any other
similarly oriented ordinance, a local government unit such as may attempt to infringe on such constitutional rights.

A local government can quite easily cite any of its regulatory ordinances to impose retaliatory measures against persons who run afoul it, such as a business
owned by an opponent of the government, or a

crusading newspaper or radio station. While the ill-motives of a local government do not exempt the injured regulatory subject from complying with the
municipal laws, such laws themselves do not insulate those ill-motives if they are attended with infringements of constitutional rights, such as due process,
equal protection and the right to free expression. Our system of laws especially frown upon violations of the guarantee to free speech, expression and a free
press, vital as these are to our democratic regime.

Nothing in Ordinance No. 92-004 requires, as respondents did, that an applicant for a mayors permit submit either an approved land conversion papers
from the DAR showing that its property was converted from prime agricultural land to commercial land, or an approved resolution from the Sangguniang
Bayan or Sangguniang Panglungsod authorizing the re-classification of the property from agricultural to commercial land.[65] The aforecited provision
which details the procedure for applying for a mayors permit does not require any accompanying documents to the application, much less those sought
from petitioners by respondents. Moreover, Ordinance No. 92-004 does not impose on the applicant any burden to establish that the property from where
the business was to operate had been duly classified as commercial in nature.

According to respondents, it was only in 2002 that the more diligent Respondent Bagnos Maximo discovered the mistake committed by his predecessor in
the issuance of the Petitioners Zoning Certifications from 1996 to 2001.[66] Assuming that were true, it would perhaps have given cause for the local
government in requiring the business so affected to submit additional requirements not required of other applicants related to the classification of its
property. Still, there are multitude of circumstances that belie the claim that the previous certifications issued by the OMPDC as to the commercial
character of CDCs property was incorrect.

On , the HLURB issued a Zoning Decision that classified the property as Commercial.[67] The HLURB is vested with authority to review, evaluate and
approve or disapprovethe zoning component of subdivisions, condominiums or estate development projects including industrial estates, of both the public
and private sectors.[68] In exercising such power, the HLURB is required to use Development Plans and Zoning Ordinances of local governments herein.
[69] There is no reason to doubt that when the HLURB acknowledged in 1996 that the property in question was commercial, it had consulted the
development plans and zoning ordinances of Cauayan.

Assuming that respondents are correct that the property was belatedly revealed as non-commercial, it could only mean that even the HLURB, and not just
the local government of Cauayan erred when in 1996 it classified the property as commercial. Or, that between 1996 to 2002, the property somehow was
reclassified from commercial to agricultural. There is neither evidence nor suggestion from respondents that the latter circumstance obtained.

Petitioners are also armed with six certifications issued by the OMPDC for the consecutive years 1996 to 2001, all of which certify that the property is
classified as commercial areain conformity with the Land Use Plan of this municipality and does not in any way violate the existing Zoning Ordinance of
Cauayan, Isabela.[70] In addition, from 1997 to 2004, petitioners paid real property taxes on the property based on the classification of the property as
commercial, without any objections raised by respondents.[71] These facts again tend to confirm that contrary to respondents assertions, the property has
long been classified as commercial.

Petitioners persuasively argue that this consistent recognition by the local government of Cauayan of the commercial character of the property constitutes
estoppel against respondents from denying that fact before the courts. The lower courts had ruled that the government of is not bound by estoppel, but
petitioners point out our holding in Republic v. Sandiganbayan[72] where it was clarified that this concept is understood to refer to acts and mistakes of its
officials especially those which are irregular.[73] Indeed, despite the general rule that the State cannot be put in estoppel by the mistake or errors of its
officials or agents, we have also recognized, thus:

Estoppels against the public are little favored. They should not be invoked except in a rare and unusual circumstances, and may not be invoked
where they would operate to defeat the effective operation of a policy adopted to protect the public. They must be applied with circumspection and
should be applied only in those special cases where the interests of justice clearly require it. Nevertheless, the government must not be allowed to
deal dishonorably or capriciously with its citizens, and must not play an ignoble part or do a shabby thing; and subject to limitations . . ., the
doctrine of equitable estoppel may be invoked against public authorities as well as against private individuals.[74]
Thus, when there is no convincing evidence to prove irregularity or negligence on the part of the government official whose acts are being disowned other
than the bare assertion on the part of the State, we have declined to apply State immunity from estoppel. [75] Herein, there is absolutely no evidence other
than the bare assertions of the respondents that the government had previously erred when it certified that the property had been zoned for commercial use.
One would assume that if respondents were correct, they would have adduced the factual or legal basis for their contention, such as the local governments
land use plan or zoning ordinance that would indicate that the property was not commercial. Respondents did not do so, and the absence of any evidence
other than bare assertions that the 1996 to 2001 certifications were incorrect lead to the ineluctable conclusion that respondents are estopped from asserting
that the previous recognition of the property as commercial was wrong.

The RTC nonetheless asserted that the previous certifications, issued by Deputy Zoning Administrator Romeo N. Perez (Perez), were incorrect as he had no
authority to make the conversion or reclassification of the land from agricultural to commercial.[76] Yet contrary to the premise of the RTC, the
certifications issued by Perez did no such thing. Nowhere in the certifications did it state that Perez was exercising the power to reclassify the land from
agricultural to commercial. What Perez attested to in those documents was that the property is classified as Commercial area, in conformity with the Land
Use Plan of this municipality and does not in any way violate the existing Zoning Ordinance of Cauayan, Isabela. What these certifications confirm is that
according to the Land Use Plan and existing zoning ordinances of Cauayan, the property in question is commercial.

Compounding its error, the RTC also stated that following Section 65[77] of Rep. Act No. 6657, or the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, only the
DAR, upon proper application can authorize the reclassification or conversion of the use of the land from agricultural to residential, commercial or
industrial. The citation is misleading. Section 4 of the same law provides for the scope of the agrarian reform program under the CARL as covering all
public and private agricultural lands, as provided in Proclamation No. 131 and Executive Order No. 229, including other lands of the public domain
suitable for agriculture.[78] Section 3(c) defines agricultural lands as land devoted to agricultural activity as defined in this Act and not classified as
mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial land.[79] Obviously, if the property had already been classified as commercial land at the time of the
enactment of the CARL, it does not fall within the class of agricultural lands which may be subject of conversion under Section 65 of that law. Section 65,
as relied upon by the trial court, would have been of relevance only if it had been demonstrated by respondents that the property was still classified as
agricultural when the CARL was enacted.

It is worth emphasizing that because the acts complained of the respondents led to the closure of petitioners radio stations, at the height of election season
no less, respondents actions warrant strict scrutiny from the courts, and there can be no presumption that their acts are constitutional or valid. In
discharging the burden of establishing the validity of their actions, it is expected that respondents, as a condition sine qua non, present the legal basis for
their claim that the property was not zoned commercially the proclaimed reason for the closure of the radio stations. The lower courts should have known
better than to have swallowed respondents unsubstantiated assertion hook, line and sinker.

We can also point out that aside from the evidence we have cited, petitioners contention that the property had been duly classified for commercial use finds
corroboration from the Order dated issued by DAR Region II Director Aydinan in Adm. Case No. A-0200A-07B-002. The Order stated, viz:

Official records examined by this Office indicate continued use of subject land for purposes other than agricultural since 1986. Back when Cauayan was
still a municipality, the Office of the Planning and Development Coordinator documented subject land under a commercial classification. The Zoning
Administrator deputized by the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board certified in 1998 that subject lands attribution to the Commercial Zone is in
conformity with the Land Use Plan of this municipality and does not in any way violate any existing Zoning Ordinance of Cauayan, Isabela adding the
stipulation that a 15 meter setback from the centerline of the National Road has to be observed.
If the area in which subject land is found was already classified non-agricultural even before urban growth saw Cauayan became a city in 2001, assuming
its reversion to the agricultural zone now taxes logic. In any case, such a dubious assumption can find no support in any current land use plan for Cauayan
approved by the National Economic Development Authority.[80]
Petitioners citation of this Order has been viciously attacked by respondents, with approval from the lower courts. Yet their challenges are quite off-base,
and ultimately irrelevant.

The Order has been characterized by respondents as a forgery, based on a certification issued by the Head of the RCLUPPI Secretariat that his office has no
official record nor case docketed of the petition filed by CBS Development Corporation, represented by Charmy Sabigan and the order issued bearing
Docket No. ADM. Case No. A-02200A-07B-002 of the subject case, did not emanate from RCLUPPI which has its own docketing system to applications
for conversion/exemption under DOJ Opinion No. 44, Series of 1990.[81] Respondents thus hint at a scenario where petitioners scrambled to create the
Order out of nowhere in order to comply with the sought-after requirements. However, an examination of the Order reveals an explanation that attests to
the veracity of the Order without denigrating from the truthfulness of the RCLUPPI certification.

The Order notes that the petition had been filed by CDC with the DAR Region II to, in effect, officially remove from the agrarian reform sub-zone, in
particular, and the broad agricultural, in general, Petitioners land holding embraced by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-254786 which is located in
[B]arangay Minante II of x x x.[82] It goes on to state:

Herein petition can go through the normal procedure and, after the submission of certain documentary supports that have to be gathered yet from various
agencies, should be granted as a matter of course. However, a new dimension has been introduced when the unformalized conversion of the use of subject
land from an agricultural to a non-agricultural mode has provided an excuse to some official quarters to disallow existing commercial operation, nay, the
broadcast activities of Petitioner and, thus, perhaps threaten an essential freedom in our democratic setting, the liberty of mass media organizations to
dispense legitimate information to the public unhampered by any extraneous obstacles. Hence, overarching public interest has made an official declaration
of subject landholdings removal from the agricultural zone most urgent and, thus immediate action on the case imperative.
To the extent that legitimate social interest are unnecessarily prejudiced otherwise, procedural rules laid down by Government must yield to the living
reason and to common sense in the concrete world as long as the underlying principles of effective social-justice administration and good governance are
not unduly sacrificed. Thus, it is incumbent upon the Department of Agrarian Reform, or DAR for brevity, to take into account in decision-making with
respect to the case at hand more basic principles in order to uphold the cause of conscientious and timely public service.
Needless to say, this Office, given the latitude of discretion inherent to it, can simultaneously address the Petition and the procedural concerns collateral to
it when subordinate offices tend to treat such concerns as factors complicating the essential question or questions and view the Petition as one that it is not
amenable to ready problem-solving and immediate decision-making. To forestall a cycle of helpless inaction or indecisive actions on the part of the
subordinate offices as customarily happens in cases of this nature, this Office shall proceed to treat the petition at hand as a matter of original jurisdiction in
line with its order of Assumption of Direct Jurisdiction of 03 December 2001, a prior action taken, in general, by this Office over cases of Land-Tenure
Improvement, Failure, Problematic Coverage, Land-Owners and Special Concerns, Other Potential Flash Points of Agrarian Conflict, and Long-Standing
Problems Calling for Discretionary Decision Making.[83]
In so many words, DAR Region II Director Aydinan manifested that he was assuming direct jurisdiction over the petition, to the exclusion of subordinate
offices such as that which issued the certification at the behest of the respondents, the RCLUPPI of the DAR Region II Office. Thus, the RCLUPPI could
have validly attested that the subject case did not emanate from the RCLUPPI which has its own docketing system to applications for
conversion/exemption under DOJ Opinion No. 44, Series of 1990. One could quibble over whether Director Aydinan had authority to assume direct
jurisdiction over CDCs petition to the exclusion of the RCLUPPI, but it would not detract from the apparent fact that the Director of the DAR Region II
Office did issue the challenged Order. Assuming that the Order was issued without or in excess of jurisdiction, it does not mean that the Order was forged
or spurious, it would mean that the Order is void.

How necessary is it for us to delve into the validity or efficacy of the Aydinan Order? Certainly, any conclusions we draw from the said Order are
ultimately irrelevant to the resolution of these petitions. The evidence is compelling enough that the property had already been duly classified for
commercial use long before the Aydinan Order was issued. Respondents, who had the burden of proving that they were warranted in ordering the closure of
the radio stations, failed to present any evidence to dispute the long-standing commercial character of the property. The inevitable conclusion is that
respondents very well knew that the property, was commercial in character, yet still proceeded without valid reason and on false pretenses, to refuse to
issue the mayors permit and subsequently close the radio stations. There is circumstantial evidence that these actions were animated by naked political
motive, by plain dislike by the powers-that-be of the content of the broadcast emanating in particular from DZNC, which had ties to political opponents of
the respondents. Respondents were further estopped from disclaiming the previous consistent recognition by the government that the property was
commercially zoned unless they had evidence, which they had none, that the local officials who issued such certifications acted irregularly in doing so.

It is thus evident that respondents had no valid cause at all to even require petitioners to secure approved land conversion papers from the DAR showing
that the property was converted from prime agricultural land to commercial land. That requirement, assuming that it can be demanded by a local
government in the context of approving mayors permits, should only obtain upon clear proof that the property from where the business would operate was
classified as agricultural under the LGUs land use plan or zoning ordinances and other relevant laws. No evidence to that effect was presented by the
respondents either to the petitioners, or to the courts.

V.

Having established that respondents had violated petitioners legal and constitutional rights, let us now turn to the appropriate reliefs that should be granted.

At the time petitioners filed their special civil action for mandamus on , their radio stations remained in operation despite an earlier attempt by respondents
to close the same, by virtue of an order rendered by the COMELEC. The mandamus action sought to compel respondents to immediately issue petitioners
zoning clearances and mayors permit for 2004. During the pendency of the action for mandamus, respondents finally succeeded in closing the radio
stations, and it was possible at that stage for petitioners to have likewise sought the writs of prohibition and/or certiorari. Petitioners instead opted to seek
for a writ or preliminary mandatory injunction from the trial court, a viable

recourse albeit one that remains ancillary to the main action for mandamus.

We had previously acknowledged that petitioners are entitled to a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction that would have prevented the closure of the
radio stations. In addition, we hold that the writ of mandamus lies. Mandamus lies as the proper relief whenever a public officer unlawfully neglects the
performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use
and enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.[84]
For the year 2004, petitioners had duly complied with the requirements for the issuance of the same mayors permit they had obtained without issue in years
prior. There was no basis for respondents to have withheld the zoning clearances, and consequently the mayors permit, thereby depriving petitioners of the
right to broadcast as certified by the Constitution and their particular legislative franchise.

We turn to the issue of damages. Petitioners had sought to recover from respondents P8 Million in temperate damages, P1 Million in exemplary damages,
and P1 Million in attorneys fees. Given respondents clear violation of petitioners constitutional guarantee of free expression, the right to damages from
respondents is squarely assured by Article 32 (2) of the Civil Code, which provides:

Art. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual, who directly or indirectly obstructs, defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or
impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another person shall be liable to the latter for damages:

xxxx

(2) Freedom of speech;

We noted in Lim v. Ponce de Leon that [p]ublic officials in the past have abused their powers on the pretext of justifiable motives or good faith in the
performance of their duties [and] the object of [Article 32 of the Civil Code] is to put an end to official abuse by plea of the good faith.[85] The application
of Article 32 not only serves as a measure of pecuniary recovery to mitigate the injury to constitutional rights, it likewise serves notice to public officers
and employees that any violation on their part of any persons guarantees under the Bill of Rights will meet with final reckoning.

The present prayer for temperate damages is premised on the existence of pecuniary injury to petitioner due to the actions of respondents, the amount of
which nevertheless being difficult to prove.[86] Temperate damages avail when the court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount
can not, from the nature of the case, be proved with certainty.[87] The existence of pecuniary injury at bar cannot be denied. Petitioners had no way of
knowing it when they filed their petition, but the actions of respondents led to the closure of their radio stations from June 2004 until this Court issued a
writ of preliminary injunction in January 2006.[88] The lost potential income during that one and a half year of closure can only be presumed as substantial
enough. Still, despite that fact, possibly unanticipated when the original amount for claimed temperate damages was calculated, petitioners have
maintained before this Court the same amount, P8 Million, for temperate damages. We deem the amount of P4 Million reasonable under the circumstances.
[89]

Exemplary damages can be awarded herein, since temperate damages are available. Public officers who violate the Constitution they are sworn to uphold
embody a poison of wickedness that may not run through the body politic.[90] Respondents, by purposely denying the commercial character of the
property in order to deny petitioners the exercise of their constitutional rights and their business, manifested bad faith in a wanton, fraudulent, oppressive
and malevolent manner.[91] The amount of exemplary damages need not be proved where it is shown that plaintiff is entitled to temperate damages, [92]
and the sought for amount of P1 Million is more than appropriate. We likewise deem the amount of P500 Thousand in attorneys fees as suitable under the
circumstances.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. The assailed decisions of the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Court of Cauayan City, Branch 24, are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The instant petition for mandamus is hereby GRANTED and respondents are directed to immediately issue
petitioners zoning clearances and mayors permits for 2004 to petitioners

Respondents Caesar G. Dy, Felicisimo G. Meer, Bagnos Maximo, and Racma Fernandez-Garcia are hereby ORDERED to pay petitioners JOINTLY AND
SEVERALLY the following amounts in damages:

(1) FOUR MILLION PESOS (P4,000,000.00) as TEMPERATE DAMAGES[93];

(2) ONE MILLION PESOS (P1,000,000.00) as EXEMPLARY DAMAGES;

(3) FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P 500,000.00) as ATTORNEYS FEES.

Costs against respondents.

SO ORDERED.

DANTE O. TINGA Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
 Associate Justice
Chairman
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice Associate Justice
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts
Division.
LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairman, Second Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairmans Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above
Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

*Additional member as replacement of Justice Arturo D. Brion who is on official leave per Special Order No. 587.
[1]Rollo (G.R. No. 179411) pp. 1351-1352.
[2] at 166-190.
[3] at 296-302. Decision penned by Judge Henedino P. Eduarte.
[4] at 636-662. Decision penned by Court of Appeals Associate Justice E. Sundiam, concurred in by Associate Justice M. Villarama, Jr. and J. Dimaampao.
[5]Decision penned by Court of Appeals Associate Justice F. Lampas Peralta and concurred in by Associate Justices E. Cruz and N. Pizarro.
[6]Rollo (G.R. No. 179411), p. 13.
[7]
[8] at 90.
[9] at 91.
[10] at 92.
[11] at 93-97.
[12] at 98-102.
[13] at 103-110.
[14] at 103.
[15] at 111.
[16] at 18-19.
[17]Supra note 2. Docketed as Spl. Civil Action No. 19-124 with the , Branch 19.
[18]See rollo (G.R. No. 170270), p. 21; Docketed as C.A. G.R. No. 70361.
[19]Rollo, p. 22.
[20] at 111.
[21] at 115.
[22]Rollo (G.R. No. 179411), pp. 21-22.
[23]Rollo, p. 171.
[24]
[25] at 198.
[26] at 203-208. Resolution signed by Chairman Benjamin S. Abalos, Sr., and Commissioners Rufino S.B. Javier, Mehol K. Sadain, Resurreccion Z. Borra,
Florentino A. Tuason, Jr., and Virgilio O. Garcillano. Commisioner Manuel A. Barcelona dissented.
[27] at 339-348.
[28] at 349-379.
[29] at 386-449.
[30]Rollo (G.R. No. 170270), pp. 677-678.
[31]Rollo (G.R. No. 179411), p. 1198.
[32]Article 3, Sec. 4.
[33]Gonzales v. COMELEC, 137 Phil. 471, 492 (1969).
[34]Rollo (G.R. No. 170270), p. 27.
[35]See TJ Burgonio, Isabela gov who ended a dynasty wins RM prize, Philippine Daily Inquirer (), at
http://opinion.inquirer.net/inquireropinion/letterstotheeditor/view /20080801-151950/Isabela-gov-who-ended-a-dynasty-wins-RM-prize
[36]Rollo (G.R. No. 170270), p. 17.
[37]Rollo (G.R. No. 179411), p. 142.
[38]Chavez v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 168338, , 545 SCRA 441, 491.
[39]Social Weather Stations, Inc. v. COMELEC, 409 Phil. 571, 585 (2001); citing New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714, 29 L. Ed. 2d 822,
824 (1971).
[40]Chavez v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 168335, , 545 SCRA 441, 492.
[41]GUNTHER, et al., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (14th ed., 2001), at 964.
[42]SWS v. COMELEC, supra note 39.
[43]Chavez v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 168338, , 545 SCRA 441, 493.
[44]GUNTHER, et al., supra note 44.
[45] at 957.
[46]Rollo (G.R. No. 179411), p. 170.
[47] at 178-179.
[48] at 204-239.
[49] at 207.
[50]
[51] at 205.
[52] at 26.
[53]GUNTHER et. al., supra note 44.
[54]See White Light v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 122846, January 2009.
[55]Osmea v. COMELEC, 351 Phil. 692, 711 (1998).
[56]Rollo (G.R. No. 179411), p. 191.
[57]Rollo (G.R. No. 170270), p. 120.
[58]Rollo (G.R. No. 179411), p. 210.
[59] at 247.
[60]LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE (1991), Secs. 447(3) & 458(3).
[61]See note 43.
[62]ANGELES, RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW ON LOCAL GOVERNMENTS (2005 ed.), at 124; citing 9 MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL
CORPORATIONS, 26.01.10 (3rd ed.); In re Wan Yin, 22 F 701; Father Basils Lodge, Inc. v. Chicago, 393 Ill 246, 65 NE2d 805.
[63]See note 43.
[64]Rollo (G.R. No. 179411), pp. 300-301.
[65]Supra note 16.
[66]Rollo (G.R. No. 179411), p. 771.
[67]Rollo, p. 91.
[68]See Executive Order No. 648 (1991), Article IV, Sec. 5(b).
[69]
[70]Rollo (G.R. No. 179411), pp. 92-97.
[71] at 103-107, 126-127, 140-141.
[72]G.R. No. 108292, , 226 SCRA 314.
[73] at 325-326. See also Republic v. Court of Appeals, 361 Phil. 319 (1999); PCGG v. Sandiganbayan, 353 Phil. 80 (1998); H. de Leon, PHILIPPINE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, at 781.
[74]Republic v. Court of Appeals, supra note 76 at 329; citing 31 CJS 675-676.
[75]PCGG v. Sandiganbayan, supra note 76.
[76]Rollo (G.R. No. 179411), p. 302.
[77] SECTION 65. Conversion of Lands. After the lapse of five (5) years from its award, when the land ceases to be economically feasible and sound for
agricultural purposes, or the locality has become urbanized and the land will have a greater economic value for residential, commercial or industrial
purposes, the DAR, upon application of the beneficiary or the landowner, with due notice to the affected parties, and subject to existing laws, may
authorize the reclassification or conversion of the land and its disposition: provided, that the beneficiary shall have fully paid his obligation.
[78]Republic Act No. 6657 (1988), Sec. 4.
[79]Republic Act No. 6657 (1988), Sec. 3(c).
[80] at 113-114.
[81]See CA rollo (G.R. No. 170270), p. 234.
[82]Rollo (G.R. No. 179411), p. 112.
[83] at 112-113.
[84]RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE (1997), Rule 65, Sec. 3.
[85]160 Phil. 991, 1001 (1975). See also MHP Garments, Inc., v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 86720, , 236 SCRA 227, 235.
[86]Rollo (G.R. No. 179411), p. 183.
[87]See CIVIL CODE, Art. 2224.
[88]According to an article posted on the official website of Bombo Radyo, DZNC accordingly resumed broadcast on . See
http://www.bomboradyo.com/archive/ new/stationprofile /bombocauayan/index.htm (last visited, )
[89]See CIVIL CODE, Art. 2225.
[90][Exemplary damages] are an antidote so that the poison of wickedness may not run through the body politic. Octot v. Ybaez, etc., et al., 197 Phil. 76, 82
(1982).
[91][The award of exemplary damages] would be allowed only if the guilty party acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner.
Octot v. Ybaez, supra note 87, at 85; citing Ong Yiu v. CA, 91 SCRA 223.
[92]Patricio v. Hon. Leviste, G.R. No. L-51832, .
[93]While may have been impleaded as a respondent in the petition for mandamus, liability for damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code falls only on
the public officers and employees who infringed petitioners constitutional rights.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-21049 December 22, 1923
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ISAAC PEREZ, defendant-appellant.
Mario Guariña for appellant.
Attorney-General Villa Real for appellee.

MALCOLM, J.:
Isaac Perez, the municipal secretary of Pilar, Sorsogon, and Fortunato Lodovice, a citizen of that municipality, happening to meet on the morning of April
1, 1992, in the presidencia of Pilar, they became engaged in a discussion regarding the administration of Governor-General Wood, which resulted in Perez
shouting a number of times: "The Filipinos, like myself, must use bolos for cutting off Wood's head for having recommended a bad thing for the Filipinos,
for he has killed our independence." Charged in the Court of First Instance of Sorsogon with a violation of article 256 of the Penal Code having to do with
contempt of ministers of the Crown or other persons in authority, and convicted thereof, Perez has appealed the case to this court. The question presented
for decision is, What crime, if any, did the accused commit?
A logical point of departure is the information presented in this case. It reads in translation as follows:
That on or about April 1, 1922, in the municipality of Pilar, Province of Sorsogon, Philippine Islands, the said accused, Isaac Perez, while
holding a discussion with several persons on political matters, did criminally, unlawfully and wilfully and with knowledge that Honorable
Leonard Wood was the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands and in the discharge of his functions as such authority, insult by word,
without his presence, said Governor-General, uttering in a loud voice and in the presence of many persons, and in a public place, the following
 phrases: "Asin an mangña filipinos na caparejo co, maninigong gumamit nin sundang asin haleon an payo ni Wood huli can saiyang
recomendacion sa pag raot con Filipinas," which in English, is as follows: "And the Filipinos, like myself, must use bolos for cutting off Wood's
head for having recommended a bad thing for the Philippines.
Contrary to article 256 of the Penal Code.
At the trial of the case, two witnesses were called on behalf of the prosecution and three witnesses on behalf of the defense. According to the first witness
for the Government, Juan Lumbao, the municipal president of Pilar, what Perez said on the occasion in question was this:
"The Filipinos, like myself, should get a bolo and cut off the head of Governor-General Wood, because he has recommended a bad administration in these
Islands and has not made a good recommendation; on the contrary, he has assassinated the independence of the Philippines and for this reason, we have not
obtained independence and the head of that Governor-General must be cut off." Higinio J. Angustia, justice of the peace of Pilar, in a written statement, and
Gregorio Cresencio, another witness for the prosecution, corroborated the testimony of the first witness. Cresencio understood that Perez invited the
Filipinos including himself to get their bolos and cut off the head of Governor-General Wood and throw it into the sea.
The witnesses for the defense did not deny that an altercation took place on the morning of April 1, 1922, in which the accused participated. But they
endeavored to explain that the discussion was between Perez and one Severo Madrid, the latter maintaining that the fault was due to the Nacionalista Party,
while Perez argued that the Governor-General was to blame. The accused testified that the discussion was held in a peaceful manner, and that what he
wished to say was that the Governor-General should be removed and substituted by another. On the witness stand, he stated that his words were the
following: "We are but blaming the Nacionalista Party which is in power but do not take into account that above the representatives there is Governor-
General Wood who controls everything, and I told him that the day on which the Democrats may kill that Governor-General, then we, the Filipinos will
install the government we like whether you Democratas want to pay or not to pay taxes."
The trial judge found as a fact, and we think with abundant reason, that it had been proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused made use of the
language stated in the beginning of this decision and set out in the information. The question of fact thus settled, the question of law recurs as to the crime
of which the accused should be convicted.
It should be recalled that the fiscal named, in the information, article 256 of the Penal Code as having been infringed and the trial judge so found in his
decision. The first error assigned by counsel for the appellant is addressed to this conclusion of the lower court and is to the effect that article 256 of the
Penal Code is no longer in force.

In the case of United States vs. Helbig ([1920], R. G. No. 14705 1), the accused was charged with having uttered the following language: "To hell with the
President of the United States and his proclamation!" Mr. Helbig was prosecuted under article 256, and though the case was eventually sent back to the
court of origin for a new trial, the appellate court by majority vote held as a question of law that article 256 is still in force.
In the case of People vs. Perfecto ([1922], 43 Phil., 887), the accused was charged with having published an article reflecting on the Philippine Senate and
its members in violation of article 256 of the Penal Code. In this court, Mr. Perfecto was acquitted by unanimous vote, with three members of the court
holding that article 256 was abrogated completely by the change from Spanish to American sovereignty over the Philippines, and with six members
holding that the Libel Law had the effect of repealing so much of article 256 as relates to written defamation, abuse, or insult, and that under the
information and the facts, the defendant was neither guilty of a violation of article 256 of the Penal Code nor of the libel Law. In the course of the main
opinion in the Perfecto case, is found this significant sentence: "Act No. 292 of the Philippine Commission, the Treason and Sedition Law, may also have
affected article 256, but as to this point, it is not necessary to make a pronouncement."
It may therefore be taken as settled doctrine, to which those of us who retain a contrary opinion must bow with as good grace as we can muster, that until
otherwise decided by higher authority, so much of article 256 of the Penal Code as does not relate to ministers of the Crown or to writings coming under
the Libel Law, exist and must be enforced. To which proposition, can properly be appended a corollary, namely: Seditious words, speeches, or libels,
constitute a violation of Act No. 292, the Treason and Sedition Law, and to this extent, both the Penal Code and the Libel Law are modified.
Accepting the above statements relative to the continuance and status of article 256 of the Penal Code, it is our opinion that the law infringed in this
instance is not this article but rather a portion of the Treason and Sedition Law. In other words, as will later appear, we think that the words of the accused
did not so much tend to defame, abuse, or insult, a person in authority, as they did to raise a disturbance in the community.
In criminal law, there are a variety of offenses which are not directed primarily against individuals, but rather against the existence of the State, the
authority of the Government, or the general public peace. The offenses created and defined in Act No. 292 are distinctly of this character. Among them is
sedition, which is the raising of commotions or disturbances in the State. It is a revolt against legitimate authority. Though the ultimate object of sedition is
a violation of the public peace or at least such a course of measures as evidently engenders it, yet it does not aim at direct and open violence against the
laws, or the subversion of the Constitution. (2 Bouvier's Law Dictionary, 974; U.S. vs. Abad [1902], 1 Phil., 437; People vs. Cabrera [1922], 43 Phil., 64.)
It is of course fundamentally true that the provisions of Act No. 292 must not be interpreted so as to abridge the freedom of speech and the right of the
people peaceably to assemble and petition the Government for redress of grievances. Criticism is permitted to penetrate even to the foundations of
Government. Criticism, no matter how severe, on the Executive, the Legislature, and the Judiciary, is within the range of liberty of speech, unless the
intention and effect be seditious. But when the intention and effect of the act is seditious, the constitutional guaranties of freedom of speech and press and
of assembly and petition must yield to punitive measures designed to maintain the prestige of constituted authority, the supremacy of the constitution and
the laws, and the existence of the State. (III Wharton's Criminal Law, pp. 2127 et seq.; U.S. vs. Apurado [1907], 7 Phil., 422; People vs. Perfecto, supra.)
Here, the person maligned by the accused is the Chief Executive of the Philippine Islands. His official position, like the Presidency of the United States and
other high offices, under a democratic form of government, instead, of affording immunity from promiscuous comment, seems rather to invite abusive
attacks. But in this instance, the attack on the Governor-General passes the furthest bounds of free speech was intended. There is a seditious tendency in the
words used, which could easily produce disaffection among the people and a state of feeling incompatible with a disposition to remain loyal to the
Government and obedient to the laws.
The Governor-General is an executive official appointed by the President of the United States by and with the advice and consent of the Senate of the
United States, and holds in his office at the pleasure of the President. The Organic Act vests supreme executive power in the Governor-General to be
exercised in accordance with law. The Governor-General is the representative of executive civil authority in the Philippines and of the sovereign power. A
seditious attack on the Governor-General is an attack on the rights of the Filipino people and on American sovereignty. (Concepcion vs. Paredes [1921], 42
Phil., 599; U.S. vs. Dorr [1903], 2 Phil., 332.)
Section 8 of Act No. 292 of the Philippine Commission, as amended by Act No. 1692, appears to have been placed on the statute books exactly to meet
such a situation. This section reads as follows:
Every person who shall utter seditious words or speeches, or who shall write, publish or circulate scurrilous libels against the Government of the
United States or against the Government of the Philippine Islands, or who shall print, write, publish utter or make any statement, or speech, or
do any act which tends to disturb or obstruct any lawful officer in executing his office or in performing his duty, or which tends to instigate
others to cabal or meet together for unlawful purposes, or which suggests or incites rebellious conspiracies or which tends to stir up the people
against the lawful authorities, or which tends to disturb the peace of the community or the safety or order of the Government, or who shall
knowingly conceal such evil practices from the constituted authorities, shall be punished by a fine not exceeding two thousand dollars United
States currency or by imprisonment not exceeding two years, or both, in the discretion of the court.
In the words of the law, Perez has uttered seditious words. He has made a statement and done an act which tended to instigate others to cabal or meet
together for unlawful purposes. He has made a statement and done an act which suggested and incited rebellious conspiracies. He has made a statement and
done an act which tended to stir up the people against the lawful authorities. He has made a statement and done an act which tended to disturb the peace of
the community and the safety or order of the Government. All of these various tendencies can be ascribed to the action of Perez and may be characterized
as penalized by section 8 of Act No. 292 as amended.
A judgment and sentence convicting the accused of a violation of section 8 of Act No. 292 as amended, is, in effect, responsive to, and based upon, the
offense with which the defendant is charged. The designation of the crime by the fiscal is not conclusive. The crime of which the defendant stands charged
is that described by the facts stated in the information. In accordance with our settled rule, an accused may be found guilty and convicted of a graver
offense than that designated in the information, if such graver offense is included or described in the body of the information, and is afterwards justified by
the proof presented during the trial. (Guevarra's Code of Criminal Procedure, p. 9; De Joya's Code of Criminal Procedure, p. 9.)
The penalty meted out by the trial court falls within the limits provided by the Treason and Sedition Law, and will, we think, sufficiently punish the
accused.
That we have given more attention to this case than it deserves, may be possible. Our course is justified when it is recalled that only last year, Mr. Chief
Justice Taft of the United States Supreme Court, in speaking of an outrageous libel on the Governor of the Porto Rico, observed: "A reading of the two
articles removes the slightest doubt that they go far beyond the "exuberant expressions of meridional speech," to use the expression of this court in a
similar case in Gandia vs. Pettingill (222 U.S. , 452, 456). Indeed they are so excessive and outrageous in their character that they suggest the query
whether their superlative vilification has not overleapt itself and become unconsciously humorous." (Balzac vs. Porto Rico [1922], 258 U.S., 298.) While
our own sense of humor is not entirely blunted, we nevertheless entertain the conviction that the courts should be the first to stamp out the embers of
insurrection. The fugitive flame of disloyalty, lighted by an irresponsible individual, must be dealt with firmly before it endangers the general public peace.
The result is to agree with the trial Judge in his findings of fact, and on these facts to convict the accused of a violation of section 8 of Act No. 292 as
amended. With the modification thus indicated, judgment is affirmed, it being understood that, in accordance with the sentence of the lower court, the
defendant and appellant shall suffer 2 months and 1 day's imprisonment and pay the costs. So ordered.
Street, Ostrand, Johns and Romualdez, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

JOHNSON, J., concurring:

I agree with the opinion of Mr. Justice Villamor. I cannot give assent to a doctrine which permits a complaint to be presented upon one theory and the trial
to be carried through upon that theory and then to condemn the defendant upon a theory which he nor the prosecution ever dreamed of.
VILLAMOR, J., concurring and dissenting:
I agree in that the accused should be sentenced to suffer two months and one day of arresto mayor with costs, as imposed by the court a quo, under the
provisions of article 256 of the Penal Code, but not under section 8 of Act No. 292. The accused, in my opinion, should not be convicted of the crime of
sedition because there is no allegation in the complaint nor proof in the record, showing that when the accused uttered the words that gave rise to these
proceedings, he had the intention of inciting others to gather for an illicit purpose, or to incite any conspiracy or rebellion, or to disturb the peace of the
community or the safety and order of the Government which are the acts penalized by section 8 of Act No. 292. On the contrary, having due regard to the
place and time when the discussion arose between Lodovice and the accused, the political rivalry between them and the difference of opinion that they
entertained regarding the administration of the Governor-General, the Honorable Leonard Wood, it would appear evident that the accused expressed
himself in biting and poignant language, unbecoming and improper of a law abiding citizen and highly detrimental and insulting to the authority of the
Governor-General which is the thing prohibited and punished by article 256 of the Penal Code.
Avanceña and Johnson, JJ., concurs.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-59329 July 19, 1985
EASTERN BROADCASTING CORPORATION (DYRE) petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. JOSE P. DANS, JR., MINISTER OF TRANSPORTATION & COMMUNICATIONS, THE HON. CEFERINO S. CARREON,
COMMISSIONER, NATIONAL TELECOM., COMMISSION, ET AL., respondents.
 RESOLUTION

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

This petition was filed to compel the respondents to allow the reopening of Radio Station DYRE which had been summarily closed on
grounds of national security.
The petitioner contended that it was denied due process when it was closed on the mere allegation that the radio station was used to incite
people to sedition. it alleged that no hearing was held and not a bit of proof was submitted to establish a factual basis for the closure. The
petitioner was not informed beforehand why administrative action which closed the radio station was taken against it. No action was taken by
the respondents to entertain a motion seeking the reconsideration of the closure action. The petitioner also raised the issue of freedom of
speech. It appears from the records that the respondents' general charge of "inciting people to commit acts of sedition" arose from the
petitioner's shift towards what it stated was the coverage of public events and the airing of programs geared towards public affairs.
On March 25, 1985, before the Court could promulgate a decision squarely passing upon all the issues raised, the petitioner through its
president, Mr. Rene G. Espina suddenly filed a motion to withdraw or dismiss the petition.
The petitioner alleged:
1. Petitioner Eastern Broadcasting Corporation has already sold its radio broadcasting station in favor of Manuel B.
Pastrana as well as its rights and interest in the radio station DYRE in Cebu including its right to operate and its
equipment;
2. Respondent National Telecommunications Commission has expressed its willingness to grant to the said new owner
Manuel B. Pastrana the requisite license and franchise to operate the said radio station and to approve the sale of the
radio transmitter of said station DYRE;
3. In view of the foregoing, petitioner has no longer any interest in said case, and the new owner, Manuel B. Pastrana is
likewise not interested in pursuing the case any further.
The case, therefore, has become moot and academic. However, for the guidance of inferior courts and administrative tribunals exercising
quasi-judicial functions, the Court issues the following guidelines:
(1) The cardinal primary requirements in administrative proceedings laid down by this Court in Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations (69
Phil. 635) should be followed before a broadcast station may be closed or its operations curtailed. 1
(2) It is necessary to reiterate that while there is no controlling and precise definition of due process, it furnishes an unavoidable standard to
which government action must conform in order that any deprivation of life, liberty, or property, in each appropriate case, may be valid
(Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association v. City Mayor, 20 SCRA 849).
(3) All forms of media, whether print or broadcast, are entitled to the broad protection of the freedom of speech and expression clause. The
test for limitations on freedom of expression continues to be the clear and present danger rule — that words are used in such circumstances
and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that the lawmaker has a right
to prevent, In his Constitution of the Philippines (2nd Edition, pp. 569-570) Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando cites at least nine of our
decisions which apply the test — (Primicias v. Fugoso [80 Phil. 71], American Bible Society v. City of Manila [101 Phil. 386], Cabansag v.
Fernandez [102 Phil. 152], Vera v. Arca [28 SCRA 351], Navarro v. Villegas [31 SCRA 931], Imbong v. Ferrer [35 SCRA 28], Badoy v.
Commission on Elections [35 SCRA 285], People v. Ferrer [48 SCRA 382], and the Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization v.
Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc. [51 SCRA 189]. More recently, the clear and present danger test was applied in J.B.L. Reyes in behalf of
the Anti-Bases Coalition v. Bagatsing [125 SCRA 553].
(4) The clear and present danger test, however, does not lend itself to a simplistic and all embracing interpretation applicable to all
utterances in all forums.
Broadcasting has to be licensed. Airwave frequencies have to be allocated among qualified users. A broadcast corporation cannot simply
appropriate a certain frequency without regard for government regulation or for the rights of others.
All forms of communication are entitled to the broad protection of the freedom of expression clause. Necessarily, however, the freedom of
television and radio broadcasting is somewhat lesser in scope than the freedom accorded to newspaper and print media.
The American Court in Federal Communications Commission v. Pacifica Foundation (438 U.S. 726), confronted with a patently offensive and
indecent regular radio program, explained why radio broadcasting, more than other forms of communications, receives the most limited
protection from the free expression clause. First, broadcast media have established a uniquely pervasive presence in the lives of all citizens,
Material presented over the airwaves confronts the citizen, not only in public, but in the privacy of his home. Second, broadcasting is
uniquely accessible to children. Bookstores and motion picture theaters may be prohibited from making certain material available to children,
but the same selectivity cannot be done in radio or television, where the listener or viewer is constantly tuning in and out.
Similar considerations apply in the area of national security.
The broadcast media have also established a uniquely pervasive presence in the lives of all Filipinos, Newspapers and current books are
found only in metropolitan areas and in the poblaciones of municipalities accessible to fast and regular transportation. Even here, there are
low income masses who find the cost of books, newspapers, and magazines beyond their humble means. Basic needs like food and shelter
perforce enjoy high priorities.
On the other hand, the transistor radio is found everywhere. The television set is also becoming universal. Their message may be
simultaneously received by a national or regional audience of listeners including the indifferent or unwilling who happen to be within reach of
a blaring radio or television set. The materials broadcast over the airwaves reach every person of every age, persons of varying
susceptibilities to persuasion, persons of different I.Q.s and mental capabilities, persons whose reactions to inflammatory or offensive
speech would be difficult to monitor or predict. The impact of the vibrant speech is forceful and immediate. Unlike readers of the printed work,
the radio audience has lesser opportunity to cogitate analyze, and reject the utterance.
(5) The clear and present danger test, therefore, must take the particular circumstances of broadcast media into account. The supervision of
radio stations-whether by government or through self-regulation by the industry itself calls for thoughtful, intelligent and sophisticated
handling.
The government has a right to be protected against broadcasts which incite the listeners to violently overthrow it. Radio and television may
not be used to organize a rebellion or to signal the start of widespread uprising. At the same time, the people have a right to be informed.
Radio and television would have little reason for existence if broadcasts are limited to bland, obsequious, or pleasantly entertaining
utterances. Since they are the most convenient and popular means of disseminating varying views on public issues, they also deserve
special protection.
(6) The freedom to comment on public affairs is essential to the vitality of a representative democracy. In the 1918 case of United States v.
Bustos (37 Phil. 731) this Court was already stressing that.
The interest of society and the maintenance of good government demand a full discussion of public affairs. Complete
liberty to comment on the conduct of public men is a scalpel in the case of free speech. The sharp incision of its probe
relieves the abscesses of officialdom. Men in public life may suffer under a hostile and an unjust accusation; the wound
can be assuaged with the balm of a clear conscience. A public officer must not be too thin-skinned with reference to
comment upon his official acts. Only thus can the intelligence and dignity of the individual be exalted.
(7) Broadcast stations deserve the special protection given to all forms of media by the due process and freedom of expression clauses of
the Constitution.
WHEREFORE, the case having become moot and academic, the petitioner's motion to withdraw or dismiss the petition is hereby GRANTED.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin Relova, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.
Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr. and De la Fuente, JJ., concur in the result (the case having become moot and academic).
Aquino, J., took no part.

Separate Opinions

FERNANDO, C.J., concurring:

I concur in the ponencia of Justice Gutierrez, Jr., notable for its reiteration of the clear and present danger principle as the standard of
limitation on free speech and press, as decided by a unanimous court in J.B.L. Reyes v. Bagatsing. 1
As may be gleaned from the voting of the Justices, the majority favors the view that even if a case were moot and academic, a statement of
the governing principle is appropriate in the resolution of dismissal for the guidance not only of the parties but of others similarly situated.
There are three Justices, however, Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr. and de la Fuente, who would strictly adhere to the concept that the case being
moot and academic, the appropriate disposition is that of simply dismissing the action. That is to abide by the teaching of orthodox learning.
The Philippines, however, has deviated from such a strict view. Nor is this approach of recent vintage. As early as Alejandrino v. Quezon 2
decided in 1924, this Court, notwithstanding the absence of jurisdiction, expressed through Justice Malcolm what principle of law should
govern. Similarly in Osmena, Jr. v. Pendatun, 3 notwithstanding well-founded doubts as to jurisdiction and a finding that the case should be
dismissed for being moot and academic, this Court, through the then Justice, later Chief Justice Bengzon, passed upon the legal question
raised. In that sense, the Philippines has followed an approach distinct from that of the United States, notwithstanding the influence of
American Constitutional law on our legal system.
Also let me state for the record that the original opinion prepared by Justice Gutierrez, Jr. could not have been released in April after the
petitioner on March 25, 1985 "filed a motion to withdraw or dismiss the petition." After that date, some members of the Court wanted the
matter discussed anew as to its appropriate disposition. That is the explanation why such an opinion was never sent to the Office of the Chief
Justice. Nor is it to be forgotten that even if a decision signed by all the other members were thus submitted. the practice traditionally
followed is for whoever is Chief Justice to take a few days for the expression of his views if minded to do so.

TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:

Prefatory Statement: As stated in the resolution penned by Mr. Justice Gutierrez, the release in early April of this year of the Court's decision
declaring null and void respondent commission's challenged summary order for closure of petitioner's radio station ("definitely attended by
complete absence of any hearing before or after the closure itself") and granting the petition for issuance of a writ of mandatory injunction for
the reopening of the station, was overtaken by petitioner's "suddenly filed" motion to withdraw or dismiss the petition.
Initially, Mr. Justice Gutierrez was for applying the Salonga a formula and releasing nevertheless his sixteen-page extended opinion and
decision on the merits. He was of the view, fully shared by me, b that "(T)he need for guiding principles on constitutionalism is particularly
keen in critical times and in periods of transition. There is then a tendency to be impulsive in the exercise of power. The use of illegal
shortcuts and the breakdown of traditional restraints and discipline, unfortunately, is most pronounced in troubled times. It becomes
necessary for the Court to emphasize the importance of adherence to the mandates of the Constitution. The efforts, no matter how well
meaning, to quell a rebellion or to stave off economic disaster cannot succeed if they transgress basic rights and, therefore, alienate our
people." But since such approach did not gain the concurrence of the majority, he has replaced his original ponencia with the abbreviated
Resolution (of a little over four pages) now released, which carries the required majority and issues guidelines "for the guidance of inferior
courts and administrative tribunals exercising quasi-judicial functions."
While withdrawal of the petition for loss of interest on petitioner's part may be granted, still the Court should unequivocally set forth the
guiding and controlling precepts or doctrines in pursuance of its symbolic function of educating bench and bar as in Salonga on the
protection and preservation of basic constitutional rights. As stated in my separate concurring opinion, infra, public respondents' summary
closure of petitioner's radio station failed to observe the special protection given to all forms of media by the due process and freedom of
press and media clauses of the Constitution, as well as the basic clear and present danger test. As stated by the now Chief Justice in De la
Camara vs. Enage,' c the fact that the case has become moot "should not preclude this Tribunal from setting forth in language clear and
unmistakable ... for the guidance of lower court judges [and other public officers] the controlling and authoritative doctrines that should be
observed," so that full respect may be accorded to basic constitutional rights.
My separate concurring opinion which follows hereinafter was prepared and scheduled for promulgation on or about April 9, 1985 upon its
return on said date to the ponente, Mr. Justice Gutierrez, for transmittal to the Office of the Chief Justice for the purpose. But this was
overtaken by the filing of petitioner's motion for withdrawal or dismissal of the petition. Hence, my said concurring opinion should be read in
such time context (in the same manner as in the 1974 martial law cases of Aquino, Jr. and Diokno vs. Enrile, 59 SCRA 183, 309, September
17, 1974, wherein the promulgation of the decision and separate opinions originally schedule for September 12, 1974 was deferred to the
following week with the intervening release from detention of Senator Jose W Diokno).
xxx xxx xxx
The main opinion reaffirms in language unmistakable that broadcast media (radio and television) while subject to government licensing (for
allocation of the use of airwaves and frequencies) and regulation (considering their pervasive presence and instant impact) are equally
protected by the preferred freedoms of speech and of the press and by the rudimentary requirements of due process against arbitrary
deprivation of life, liberty and property; that the basic standard for restricting or punishing the exercise of these preferred freedoms is the
clear and present danger test — danger of a serious and imminent evil sought to be prevented; that the summary closure in October, 1980 of
petitioner's radio station ("definitely attended by complete absence of any hearing before or after the closure itself ") violated its constitutional
rights and must therefore be declared null and void, and consequently, the writ of mandatory injunction for the reopening of the station, as
prayed for, must issue.
Congratulations are due the ponente Justice Hugo Gutierrez, Jr. who secured the Court's near-unanimous concurrence in the recent case of
Salonga vs. Pano 1 which went back to the fundamentals and stressed, in discharge of the Court's "symbolic function of educating bench
and bar on the extent of protection given by constitutional guarantees" that "(I)nfinitely more important than conventional adherence to
general rules of criminal procedure is respect for the citizen's right to be free not only from arbitrary arrest and punishment but also from
unwarranted and vexatious prosecution. The integrity of a democratic society is corrupted if a person is carelessly included in the trial of
around forty persons when on the very face of the record no evidence linking him to the alleged conspiracy exists," that " ... if there is any
principle of the Constitution that more imperatively calls for attachment than any other it is the principle of free thought — not free thought for
those who agree with us but freedom for the thought that we hate;" that "freedom of expression is a 'preferred' right and therefore stands on
a higher level than substantive economic or other liberties," that "this must be so because the lessons of history, both political and legal,
illustrate that freedom of thought and speech is the indispensable condition of nearly every other form of freedom. Protection is especially
mandated for political discussions. This Court is particularly concerned when allegations are made that restraints have been imposed upon
mere criticisms of government and public officials. Political discussion is essential to the ascertainment of political truth. It cannot be the
basis of criminal indictments;" that there must be tolerance of political hyperbole since "debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust,
and wide open and it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials,"
that "the constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or prescribe advocacy of the use of force or
of law in violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce
such action;" that "political discussion even among those opposed to the present administration is within the protective clause of freedom of
speech and expression. The same cannot be construed as subversive activities per se or as evidence of membership in a subversive
organization" in the absence of proof that "such discussion was in furtherance of any plan to overthrow the government through illegal
means;" that, "respondent court should have taken these factors into consideration before concluding that a prima facie case exists against
the petitioner. Evidence must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but it must be credible in itself such as the common
experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances;" and that "judge or fiscal, therefore, should not
go on with the prosecution in the hope that some credible evidence might later turn up during trial for this would be a flagrant violation of a
basic right which the courts are created to uphold. It bears repeating that the judiciary lives up to its mission by vitalizing and not denigrating
constitutional rights. So it has been before. It should continue to be so."
The same ponente has now likewise obtained the Court's near-unanimous approval of the decision at bar, 2 which restates basic and
established constitutional principles under the Rule of Law that public officials do not possess absolute power to summarily close down a
broadcasting station nor to arbitrarily deny its application for renewal of license; that their broad and peremptory regulatory powers "must be
exercised with punctilious regard for the due process clause" which in the words of the Chief Justice signifies "freedom from arbitrariness
[and] is the embodiment of the sporting Idea of fair play; 3 that radio and television which "would have little reason for existence if broadcasts
are limited to bland, obsequious, or pleasantly entertaining utterances" deserve the special protection of the preferred right of free press and
speech; that comment on and criticism of public officials in the conduct of public affairs is not to be taken as "inciting to sedition or subversive
acts" — that to curb or to punish the exercise of such preferred right of comment and criticism there must exist the clear and present danger
of a substantive and grave evil that the State has a clear right to prevent, and hence, there must be a clear showing to this effect of "the
words used and when and how they were used;" that since the 1918 case of U.S. vs. Bustos, 4 the Court has taught that "the interest of
society and the maintenance of good government demand a full discussion of public affairs. Complete liberty to comment on the conduct of
public men is a scalpel in the case of free speech. The sharp incision of its probe relieves the abcesses of officialdom; " that the guarantee of
free speech is a safety valve "allowing parties the opportunity to give vent to their views, even if contrary to the prevailing climate of opinion"
which is grounded on "faith in the power of an appeal to reason by all the peaceful means for gaining access to the mind" and "serves to
avert force and explosions due to restrictions upon rational modes of communication;" 5 and that through the rights of free expression, free
assembly and petition, "the citizens can participate not merely in the periodic establishment of the government through their suffrage but also
in the administration of public affairs as well as in the discipline of abusive public officers" and that since "the threat of sanctions may deter
the exercise [of these 'delicate and vulnerable ... and supremely precious freedoms'] almost as potently as the actual application of
sanctions, they 'need breathing space to survive' permitting government regulation only 'with narrow specificity. 6
The late Justice Jose Abad Santos, martyr of the Japanese occupation, left us over half a century ago the legacy of his dissent against what
he deemed were unjustified "invasions on the part of the government and its employees of the sanctities of a man's home and the privacies
of life" in People vs. Rubio 7 that the "commendable zeal (of internal revenue agents) if allowed to override constitutional limitations would
become 'obnoxious to fundamental principles of liberty.' And if we are to be saved from the sad experiences of some countries which have
constitutions only in name, we must insist that governmental authority be exercised within constitutional limits; for, after all, what matters is
not so much what the people write in their constitutions as the spirit in which they observe their provisions."
In the same vein, the late Chief Justice Ricardo Paras in the landmark case of Primicias vs. Fugoso 8 enjoined all to abide by the teaching of
the 1907 sedition case of U. S. vs. Apurado 9 that instances of "disorderly conduct by individual members of a crowd [be not seized] as an
excuse to characterize the assembly as a seditious and tumultuous rising against the authorities," for "if the prosecution be permitted to seize
upon every instance of such disorderly conduct by individual members of a crowd as an excuse to characterize the assembly as a seditious
and tumultous rising against the authorities, then the right to assemble and to petition for redress of grievances would become a delusion
and snare and the attempt to exercise it on the most righteous occasion and in the most peaceable manner would expose all those who took
part therein to the severest and most unmerited punishment, if the purposes which they sought to attain did not happen to be pleasing to the
prosecuting authorities. If instances of disorderly conduct occur on such occasions, the guilty individuals should be sought out and punished
therefor."
Indeed, as I stressed in my dissenting opinion in the recent case of German vs. Barangan, 10 to require the citizen at every step to assert his
rights and to go to court is to render illusory his rights. All concerned, the governors as well as the governed, must observe what they have
written in their constitution in their very spirit and intent, so that as written by Justice Makasiar in the PBM case 11 "the Bill of Rights [might
not turn out to be] a useless attempt to limit the power of government and cease to be an efficacious shield against the tyranny of officials, of
majorities, of the influential and powerful, and of oligarchs — political, economic or otherwise."
The Court's decision makes short shrift of respondents' procedural arguments that non-renewal of petitioner's license has made the petition
"moot and academic" (brushed aside as "an afterthought or substitute for the respondents' original position that the closure was due to
national security") and that mandamus would not lie to compel the reopening of the radio station brought about by their inaction on
petitioner's timely application for renewal of the license. It serves notice that in the exercise of the judicial power vested in it by the
Constitution, it will issue the equitable writs of certiorari and mandamus to do substantial justice and restore the status quo. In this case, the
summary closure of petitioner's radio station in 1980 having been declared null and void and no valid ground for non-renewal of its license
having been shown, it is as if the said license has been duly extended up to the end of the current term or year. It is expected that
respondents will forthwith return the crystal of the transmitter and place no further obstacle to the prompt reopening of the radio station so
that petitioner may pick up the broken pieces and rightfully resume its operations (after almost five years of closure) in accordance with the
judgment at bar.

ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring:

The petitioner has filed a motion to withdraw its petition for the reasons stated in its motion. The Court has granted the motion but this
circumstance should not deter the Court from educating those who wield power which if exercised arbitrarily will make a mockery of the Bill
of Rights.
The closure of the petitioner's radio station on grounds of national security without elaboration of the grounds and without hearing deserves
to be condemned in no uncertain terms for it is manifest that due process was not observed. If there is an Idea which should be impressed in
the minds of those who wield power it is that power must be used in a reasonable manner. Arbitrariness must be eschewed. The main
opinion, that of Justice Teehankee and the case of Ang Tibay vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 69 Phil. 635 [1940], should be made required
reading materials for public officials who huff and puff with power making themselves not merely obnoxious but dangerous as well.

Separate Opinions
FERNANDO, C.J., concurring:
I concur in the ponencia of Justice Gutierrez, Jr., notable for its reiteration of the clear and present danger principle as the standard of
limitation on free speech and press, as decided by a unanimous court in J.B.L. Reyes v. Bagatsing. 1
As may be gleaned from the voting of the Justices, the majority favors the view that even if a case were moot and academic, a statement of
the governing principle is appropriate in the resolution of dismissal for the guidance not only of the parties but of others similarly situated.
There are three Justices, however, Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr. and de la Fuente, who would strictly adhere to the concept that the case being
moot and academic, the appropriate disposition is that of simply dismissing the action. That is to abide by the teaching of orthodox learning.
The Philippines, however, has deviated from such a strict view. Nor is this approach of recent vintage. As early as Alejandrino v. Quezon 2
decided in 1924, this Court, notwithstanding the absence of jurisdiction, expressed through Justice Malcolm what principle of law should
govern. Similarly in Osmena, Jr. v. Pendatun, 3 notwithstanding well-founded doubts as to jurisdiction and a finding that the case should be
dismissed for being moot and academic, this Court, through the then Justice, later Chief Justice Bengzon, passed upon the legal question
raised. In that sense, the Philippines has followed an approach distinct from that of the United States, notwithstanding the influence of
American Constitutional law on our legal system.
Also let me state for the record that the original opinion prepared by Justice Gutierrez, Jr. could not have been released in April after the
petitioner on March 25, 1985 "filed a motion to withdraw or dismiss the petition." After that date, some members of the Court wanted the
matter discussed anew as to its appropriate disposition. That is the explanation why such an opinion was never sent to the Office of the Chief
Justice. Nor is it to be forgotten that even if a decision signed by all the other members were thus submitted. the practice traditionally
followed is for whoever is Chief Justice to take a few days for the expression of his views if minded to do so.

TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:

Prefatory Statement: As stated in the resolution penned by Mr. Justice Gutierrez, the release in early April of this year of the Court's decision
declaring null and void respondent commission's challenged summary order for closure of petitioner's radio station ("definitely attended by
complete absence of any hearing before or after the closure itself") and granting the petition for issuance of a writ of mandatory injunction for
the reopening of the station, was overtaken by petitioner's "suddenly filed" motion to withdraw or dismiss the petition.
Initially, Mr. Justice Gutierrez was for applying the Salonga a formula and releasing nevertheless his sixteen-page extended opinion and
decision on the merits. He was of the view, fully shared by me, b that "(T)he need for guiding principles on constitutionalism is particularly
keen in critical times and in periods of transition. There is then a tendency to be impulsive in the exercise of power. The use of illegal
shortcuts and the breakdown of traditional restraints and discipline, unfortunately, is most pronounced in troubled times. It becomes
necessary for the Court to emphasize the importance of adherence to the mandates of the Constitution. The efforts, no matter how well
meaning, to quell a rebellion or to stave off economic disaster cannot succeed if they transgress basic rights and, therefore, alienate our
people." But since such approach did not gain the concurrence of the majority, he has replaced his original ponencia with the abbreviated
Resolution (of a little over four pages) now released, which carries the required majority and issues guidelines "for the guidance of inferior
courts and administrative tribunals exercising quasi-judicial functions."
While withdrawal of the petition for loss of interest on petitioner's part may be granted, still the Court should unequivocally set forth the
guiding and controlling precepts or doctrines in pursuance of its symbolic function of educating bench and bar as in Salonga on the
protection and preservation of basic constitutional rights. As stated in my separate concurring opinion, infra, public respondents' summary
closure of petitioner's radio station failed to observe the special protection given to all forms of media by the due process and freedom of
press and media clauses of the Constitution, as well as the basic clear and present danger test. As stated by the now Chief Justice in De la
Camara vs. Enage,' c the fact that the case has become moot "should not preclude this Tribunal from setting forth in language clear and
unmistakable ... for the guidance of lower court judges [and other public officers] the controlling and authoritative doctrines that should be
observed," so that full respect may be accorded to basic constitutional rights.
My separate concurring opinion which follows hereinafter was prepared and scheduled for promulgation on or about April 9, 1985 upon its
return on said date to the ponente, Mr. Justice Gutierrez, for transmittal to the Office of the Chief Justice for the purpose. But this was
overtaken by the filing of petitioner's motion for withdrawal or dismissal of the petition. Hence, my said concurring opinion should be read in
such time context (in the same manner as in the 1974 martial law cases of Aquino, Jr. and Diokno vs. Enrile, 59 SCRA 183, 309, September
17, 1974, wherein the promulgation of the decision and separate opinions originally schedule for September 12, 1974 was deferred to the
following week with the intervening release from detention of Senator Jose W Diokno).
xxx xxx xxx
The main opinion reaffirms in language unmistakable that broadcast media (radio and television) while subject to government licensing (for
allocation of the use of airwaves and frequencies) and regulation (considering their pervasive presence and instant impact) are equally
protected by the preferred freedoms of speech and of the press and by the rudimentary requirements of due process against arbitrary
deprivation of life, liberty and property; that the basic standard for restricting or punishing the exercise of these preferred freedoms is the
clear and present danger test — danger of a serious and imminent evil sought to be prevented; that the summary closure in October, 1980 of
petitioner's radio station ("definitely attended by complete absence of any hearing before or after the closure itself ") violated its constitutional
rights and must therefore be declared null and void, and consequently, the writ of mandatory injunction for the reopening of the station, as
prayed for, must issue.
Congratulations are due the ponente Justice Hugo Gutierrez, Jr. who secured the Court's near-unanimous concurrence in the recent case of
Salonga vs. Pano 1 which went back to the fundamentals and stressed, in discharge of the Court's "symbolic function of educating bench
and bar on the extent of protection given by constitutional guarantees" that "(I)nfinitely more important than conventional adherence to
general rules of criminal procedure is respect for the citizen's right to be free not only from arbitrary arrest and punishment but also from
unwarranted and vexatious prosecution. The integrity of a democratic society is corrupted if a person is carelessly included in the trial of
around forty persons when on the very face of the record no evidence linking him to the alleged conspiracy exists," that " ... if there is any
principle of the Constitution that more imperatively calls for attachment than any other it is the principle of free thought — not free thought for
those who agree with us but freedom for the thought that we hate;" that "freedom of expression is a 'preferred' right and therefore stands on
a higher level than substantive economic or other liberties," that "this must be so because the lessons of history, both political and legal,
illustrate that freedom of thought and speech is the indispensable condition of nearly every other form of freedom. Protection is especially
mandated for political discussions. This Court is particularly concerned when allegations are made that restraints have been imposed upon
mere criticisms of government and public officials. Political discussion is essential to the ascertainment of political truth. It cannot be the
basis of criminal indictments;" that there must be tolerance of political hyperbole since "debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust,
and wide open and it may well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials,"
that "the constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or prescribe advocacy of the use of force or
of law in violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce
such action;" that "political discussion even among those opposed to the present administration is within the protective clause of freedom of
speech and expression. The same cannot be construed as subversive activities per se or as evidence of membership in a subversive
organization" in the absence of proof that "such discussion was in furtherance of any plan to overthrow the government through illegal
means;" that, "respondent court should have taken these factors into consideration before concluding that a prima facie case exists against
the petitioner. Evidence must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but it must be credible in itself such as the common
experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances;" and that "judge or fiscal, therefore, should not
go on with the prosecution in the hope that some credible evidence might later turn up during trial for this would be a flagrant violation of a
basic right which the courts are created to uphold. It bears repeating that the judiciary lives up to its mission by vitalizing and not denigrating
constitutional rights. So it has been before. It should continue to be so."
The same ponente has now likewise obtained the Court's near-unanimous approval of the decision at bar, 2 which restates basic and
established constitutional principles under the Rule of Law that public officials do not possess absolute power to summarily close down a
broadcasting station nor to arbitrarily deny its application for renewal of license; that their broad and peremptory regulatory powers "must be
exercised with punctilious regard for the due process clause" which in the words of the Chief Justice signifies "freedom from arbitrariness
[and] is the embodiment of the sporting Idea of fair play; 3 that radio and television which "would have little reason for existence if broadcasts
are limited to bland, obsequious, or pleasantly entertaining utterances" deserve the special protection of the preferred right of free press and
speech; that comment on and criticism of public officials in the conduct of public affairs is not to be taken as "inciting to sedition or subversive
acts" — that to curb or to punish the exercise of such preferred right of comment and criticism there must exist the clear and present danger
of a substantive and grave evil that the State has a clear right to prevent, and hence, there must be a clear showing to this effect of "the
words used and when and how they were used;" that since the 1918 case of U.S. vs. Bustos, 4 the Court has taught that "the interest of
society and the maintenance of good government demand a full discussion of public affairs. Complete liberty to comment on the conduct of
public men is a scalpel in the case of free speech. The sharp incision of its probe relieves the abcesses of officialdom; " that the guarantee of
free speech is a safety valve "allowing parties the opportunity to give vent to their views, even if contrary to the prevailing climate of opinion"
which is grounded on "faith in the power of an appeal to reason by all the peaceful means for gaining access to the mind" and "serves to
avert force and explosions due to restrictions upon rational modes of communication; " 5 and that through the rights of free expression, free
assembly and petition, "the citizens can participate not merely in the periodic establishment of the government through their suffrage but also
in the administration of public affairs as well as in the discipline of abusive public officers" and that since "the threat of sanctions may deter
the exercise [of these 'delicate and vulnerable ... and supremely precious freedoms'] almost as potently as the actual application of
sanctions, they 'need breathing space to survive' permitting government regulation only 'with narrow specificity. 6
The late Justice Jose Abad Santos, martyr of the Japanese occupation, left us over half a century ago the legacy of his dissent against what
he deemed were unjustified "invasions on the part of the government and its employees of the sanctities of a man's home and the privacies
of life" in People vs. Rubio 7 that the "commendable zeal (of internal revenue agents) if allowed to override constitutional limitations would
become 'obnoxious to fundamental principles of liberty.' And if we are to be saved from the sad experiences of some countries which have
constitutions only in name, we must insist that governmental authority be exercised within constitutional limits; for, after all, what matters is
not so much what the people write in their constitutions as the spirit in which they observe their provisions."
In the same vein, the late Chief Justice Ricardo Paras in the landmark case of Primicias vs. Fugoso 8 enjoined all to abide by the teaching of
the 1907 sedition case of U. S. vs. Apurado 9 that instances of "disorderly conduct by individual members of a crowd [be not seized] as an
excuse to characterize the assembly as a seditious and tumultuous rising against the authorities," for "if the prosecution be permitted to seize
upon every instance of such disorderly conduct by individual members of a crowd as an excuse to characterize the assembly as a seditious
and tumultous rising against the authorities, then the right to assemble and to petition for redress of grievances would become a delusion
and snare and the attempt to exercise it on the most righteous occasion and in the most peaceable manner would expose all those who took
part therein to the severest and most unmerited punishment, if the purposes which they sought to attain did not happen to be pleasing to the
prosecuting authorities. If instances of disorderly conduct occur on such occasions, the guilty individuals should be sought out and punished
therefor."
Indeed, as I stressed in my dissenting opinion in the recent case of German vs. Barangan, 10 to require the citizen at every step to assert his
rights and to go to court is to render illusory his rights. All concerned, the governors as well as the governed, must observe what they have
written in their constitution in their very spirit and intent, so that as written by Justice Makasiar in the PBM case 11 "the Bill of Rights [might
not turn out to be] a useless attempt to limit the power of government and cease to be an efficacious shield against the tyranny of officials, of
majorities, of the influential and powerful, and of oligarchs — political, economic or otherwise."
The Court's decision makes short shrift of respondents' procedural arguments that non-renewal of petitioner's license has made the petition
"moot and academic" (brushed aside as "an afterthought or substitute for the respondents' original position that the closure was due to
national security") and that mandamus would not lie to compel the reopening of the radio station brought about by their inaction on
petitioner's timely application for renewal of the license. It serves notice that in the exercise of the judicial power vested in it by the
Constitution, it will issue the equitable writs of certiorari and mandamus to do substantial justice and restore the status quo. In this case, the
summary closure of petitioner's radio station in 1980 having been declared null and void and no valid ground for non-renewal of its license
having been shown, it is as if the said license has been duly extended up to the end of the current term or year. It is expected that
respondents will forthwith return the crystal of the transmitter and place no further obstacle to the prompt reopening of the radio station so
that petitioner may pick up the broken pieces and rightfully resume its operations (after almost five years of closure) in accordance with the
judgment at bar.

ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring:

The petitioner has filed a motion to withdraw its petition for the reasons stated in its motion. The Court has granted the motion but this
circumstance should not deter the Court from educating those who wield power which if exercised arbitrarily will make a mockery of the Bill
of Rights.
The closure of the petitioner's radio station on grounds of national security without elaboration of the grounds and without hearing deserves
to be condemned in no uncertain terms for it is manifest that due process was not observed. If there is an Idea which should be impressed in
the minds of those who wield power it is that power must be used in a reasonable manner. Arbitrariness must be eschewed. The main
opinion, that of Justice Teehankee and the case of Ang Tibay vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 69 Phil. 635 [1940], should be made required
reading materials for public officials who huff and puff with power making themselves not merely obnoxious but dangerous as well.
Footnotes
1 The requirements are: (1) the right to a hearing, which includes the right to present one's case and submit evidence in
support thereof; (2) the tribunal must consider the evidence presented; (3) the decision must have something to support
itself; (4) the evidence must be substantial. Substantial evidence means such reasonable evidence as a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion; (5) the decision must be based on the evidence presented at the
hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected; (6) the tribunal or body or any of its
judges must act on its or his own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy and not simply
accept the views of a subordinate; (7) the board or body should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such
a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decision
rendered.
FERNANDO, C.J.
1 G.R.No.65366, November 9,1983,125 SCRA 553.
2 46 Phil. 83.
3 109 Phil. 863 (1960).
 TEEHANKEE, J.
a In Salonga vs. Patio, G.R. No. 59524, February 18, 1985, while the prosecutors had secured the dismissal by the trial
court of the questioned criminal charges against petitioner Jovito Salonga before our decision ordering such dismissal
could be promulgated, the Court nevertheless issued the decision ruling squarely on the merits "cognizant of the need to
educate prosecutors and judges that they must be zealously concerned for the rights of the accused before a criminal
prosecution is initiated."
b See my separate opinions in Caliete, G.R. No. 63776, promulgated August 16, 1984, and Sarmiento, G.R. No. 62119,
promulgated August 27, 1984, where on the issue of the effect of a decision of acquittal upon a PCO I dissented from the
perfunctory majority resolution dismissing the case as moot because the acquitted defendants were finally released
several agonizing months after their acquittal, on the ground that such "decisive and fundamental issue of public interest
and importance affecting the very liberties of the people . . . demands to be resolved, rather than emasculated with a
dismissal of the case as moot, for the guidance of public respondents and all concerned. "
c 41 SCRA 1, 4 (1971); see also PACU vs. Secretary of Education, 97 Phil. 806; Gonzales vs. Marcos, 65 SCRA 624;
and Aquino vs. Enrile, 59 SCRA 183.
1 G.R. No. 59524, Feb. 18, 1985. Eleven members concurred with abstentions of Justices Aquino, De la Fuente and
Alampay.
2 Twelve members concurred, with abstentions of Justices Aquino and Concepcion, Jr.
3 Ermita-Malate Hotel & Motel Operators' Ass'n. vs. City Mayor, 20 SCRA 849.
4 37 Phil. 731.
5 J.B.L. Reyes vs. Bagatsing, 125 SCRA 553 (1983), per Fernando, C.J.
6 PBM Employees Organization vs. PBM Co., Inc., 51 SCRA 189, per Makasiar, J.
7 57 Phil. 384 (1932).
8 80 Phil. 71 (1948).
9 7 Phil. 422, 426, per Carson, J.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 205728 January 21, 2015
THE DIOCESE OF BACOLOD, REPRESENTED BY THE MOST REV. BISHOP VICENTE M. NAVARRA and THE BISHOP HIMSELF IN
HIS PERSONAL CAPACITY, Petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND THE ELECTION OFFICER OF BACOLOD CITY, ATTY. MAVIL V. MAJARUCON, Respondents.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
"The Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from
them." – Article II, Section 1, Constitution

All governmental authority emanates from our people. No unreasonable restrictions of the fundamental and preferred right to expression of the electorate
during political contests no matter how seemingly benign will be tolerated.
This case defines the extent that our people may shape the debates during elections. It is significant and of first impression. We are asked to decide whether
the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) has the competence to limit expressions made by the citizens — who are not candidates — during elections.
Before us is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition with application for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order 1 under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court seeking to nullify COMELEC’s Notice to Remove Campaign Materials2 dated February 22, 2013 and letter3 issued on February 27,
2013.
The facts are not disputed.
On February 21, 2013, petitioners posted two (2) tarpaulins within a private compound housing the San Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod. Each tarpaulin
was approximately six feet (6') by ten feet (10') in size. They were posted on the front walls of the cathedral within public view. The first tarpaulin contains
the message "IBASURA RH Law" referring to the Reproductive Health Law of 2012 or Republic Act No. 10354. The second tarpaulin is the subject of the
present case.4 This tarpaulin contains the heading "Conscience Vote" and lists candidates as either "(Anti-RH) Team Buhay" with a check mark, or "(Pro-
RH) Team Patay" with an "X" mark.5 The electoral candidates were classified according to their vote on the adoption of Republic Act No. 10354,
otherwise known as the RH Law.6 Those who voted for the passing of the law were classified by petitioners as comprising "Team Patay," while those who
voted against it form "Team Buhay":7

TEAM BUHAY TEAM PATAY

Estrada, JV Angara, Juan Edgardo

 Honasan, Gregorio Casiño, Teddy

Magsaysay, Mitos Cayetano, Alan Peter

Pimentel, Koko Enrile, Jackie

Trillanes, Antonio Escudero, Francis

Villar, Cynthia Hontiveros, Risa

Party List Buhay Legarda, Loren

Party List Ang Pamilya Party List Gabriela

Party List Akbayan

Party List Bayan Muna

Party List Anak Pawis

During oral arguments, respondents conceded that the tarpaulin was neither sponsored nor paid for by any candidate. Petitioners also conceded that the
tarpaulin contains names ofcandidates for the 2013 elections, but not of politicians who helped in the passage of the RH Law but were not candidates for
that election.
On February 22, 2013, respondent Atty. Mavil V. Majarucon, in her capacity as Election Officer of Bacolod City, issued a Notice to Remove Campaign
Materials8 addressed to petitioner Most Rev. Bishop Vicente M. Navarra. The election officer ordered the tarpaulin’s removal within three (3) days from
receipt for being oversized. COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 provides for the size requirement of two feet (2’) by three feet (3’).9
On February 25, 2013, petitioners replied10 requesting, among others, that (1) petitioner Bishop be given a definite ruling by COMELEC Law Department
regarding the tarpaulin; and (2) pending this opinion and the availment of legal remedies, the tarpaulin be allowed to remain.11
On February 27, 2013, COMELEC Law Department issued a letter12 ordering the immediate removal of the tarpaulin; otherwise, it will be constrained to
file an election offense against petitioners. The letter of COMELEC Law Department was silenton the remedies available to petitioners. The letter provides
as follows:
Dear Bishop Navarra:

It has reached this Office that our Election Officer for this City, Atty. Mavil Majarucon, had already given you notice on February 22,
2013 as regards the election propaganda material posted on the church vicinity promoting for or against the candidates and party-list
groups with the following names and messages, particularly described as follows:

Material size : six feet (6’) by ten feet (10’)

Description : FULL COLOR TARPAULIN

Image of : SEE ATTACHED PICTURES

Message : CONSCIENCE VOTE (ANTI RH) TEAM

BUHAY; (PRO RH) TEAM PATAY

Location : POSTED ON THE CHURCH VICINITY

OF THE DIOCESE OF BACOLOD CITY

The three (3) – day notice expired on February 25, 2013.

Considering that the above-mentioned material is found to be in violation of Comelec Resolution No. 9615 promulgated on January 15,
2013 particularly on the size (even with the subsequent division of the said tarpaulin into two), as the lawful size for election propaganda
material is only two feet (2’) by three feet (3’), please order/cause the immediate removal of said election propaganda material,
otherwise, we shall be constrained to file an election offense case against you.

We pray that the Catholic Church will be the first institution to help the Commission on Elections inensuring the conduct of peaceful,
orderly, honest and credible elections.

Thank you and God Bless!

[signed]
ATTY. ESMERALDA AMORA-LADRA
Director IV13
Concerned about the imminent threatof prosecution for their exercise of free speech, petitioners initiated this case through this petition for certiorari and
prohibition with application for preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order.14 They question respondents’ notice dated February 22, 2013 and
letter issued on February 27, 2013. They pray that: (1) the petition be given due course; (2) a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or a writ of
preliminary injunction be issued restraining respondents from further proceeding in enforcing their orders for the removal of the Team Patay tarpaulin; and
(3) after notice and hearing, a decision be rendered declaring the questioned orders of respondents as unconstitutional and void, and permanently
restraining respondents from enforcing them or any other similar order.15
After due deliberation, this court, on March 5, 2013, issued a temporary restraining order enjoining respondents from enforcing the assailed notice and
letter, and set oral arguments on March 19, 2013.16
On March 13, 2013, respondents filed their comment17 arguing that (1) a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed
before this court is not the proper remedy to question the notice and letter of respondents; and (2) the tarpaulin is an election propaganda subject to
regulation by COMELEC pursuant to its mandate under Article IX-C, Section 4 of the Constitution. Hence, respondents claim that the issuances ordering
its removal for being oversized are valid and constitutional.18
During the hearing held on March 19, 2013, the parties were directed to file their respective memoranda within 10 days or by April 1, 2013, taking into
consideration the intervening holidays.19
The issues, which also served as guide for the oral arguments, are:20
I.

WHETHER THE 22 FEBRUARY 2013 NOTICE/ORDER BY ELECTION OFFICER MAJARUCON AND THE 27 FEBRUARY 2013
ORDER BY THE COMELEC LAW DEPARTMENT ARE CONSIDERED JUDGMENTS/FINAL ORDERS/RESOLUTIONS OF THE
COMELEC WHICH WOULD WARRANT A REVIEW OF THIS COURT VIA RULE 65 PETITION[;]

A. WHETHER PETITIONERS VIOLATED THE HIERARCHY OF COURTS DOCTRINE AND JURISPRUDENTIAL

RULES GOVERNING APPEALS FROM COMELEC DECISIONS;

B. ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE AFOREMENTIONED ORDERS ARE NOT CONSIDERED

JUDGMENTS/FINAL ORDERS/RESOLUTIONS OF THE COMELEC, WHETHER THERE ARE EXCEPTIONAL
CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH WOULD ALLOW THIS COURT TO TAKE COGNIZANCE OF THE CASE[;]

II.

WHETHER IT IS RELEVANT TODETERMINE WHETHER THE TARPAULINS ARE "POLITICAL ADVERTISEMENT" OR

"ELECTION PROPAGANDA" CONSIDERING THAT PETITIONER IS NOT A POLITICAL CANDIDATE[;]

III.

WHETHER THE TARPAULINS ARE A FORM OR EXPRESSION (PROTECTED SPEECH), OR ELECTION

PROPAGANDA/POLITICAL ADVERTISEMENT[;]

A. ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE TARPAULINS ARE A FORM OF EXPRESSION, WHETHER THE COMELEC
POSSESSES THE AUTHORITY TO REGULATE THE SAME[;]

B. WHETHER THIS FORM OF EXPRESSION MAY BE REGULATED[;]

IV.

WHETHER THE 22 FEBRUARY 2013 NOTICE/ ORDER BY ELECTION OFFICER MAJARUCON AND THE 27 FEBRUARY 2013
ORDER BY THE COMELEC LAW DEPARTMENT VIOLATES THE PRINCIPLE OF SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE[;]
[AND]

V.

WHETHER THE ACTION OF THE PETITIONERS IN POSTING ITS TARPAULIN VIOLATES THE CONSTITUTIONAL
PRINCIPLE OF SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE.

I
PROCEDURAL ISSUES
I.A
This court’s jurisdiction over COMELEC cases
Respondents ask that this petition be dismissed on the ground that the notice and letter are not final orders, decisions, rulings, or judgments of the
COMELEC En Banc issued in the exercise of its adjudicatory powers, reviewable via Rule 64 of the Rules of Court.21
Rule 64 is not the exclusive remedy for all acts of the COMELEC. Rule 65 is applicable especially to raise objections relating to a grave abuse of
discretion resulting in the ouster of jurisdiction.22 As a special civil action, there must also be a showing that there be no plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of the law.
Respondents contend that the assailed notice and letter are not subject to review by this court, whose power to review is "limited only to final decisions,
rulings and orders of the COMELEC En Banc rendered in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial power." 23 Instead, respondents claim that the
assailed notice and letter are reviewable only by COMELEC itself pursuant to Article IX-C, Section 2(3) of the Constitution 24 on COMELEC’s power to
decide all questions affecting elections.25 Respondents invoke the cases of Ambil, Jr. v. COMELEC,26 Repol v. COMELEC,27 Soriano, Jr. v.
COMELEC,28 Blanco v. COMELEC,29 and Cayetano v. COMELEC,30 to illustrate how judicialintervention is limited to final decisions, orders, rulings
and judgments of the COMELEC En Banc.31
These cases are not applicable.
In Ambil, Jr. v. COMELEC, the losing party in the gubernatorial race of Eastern Samar filed the election protest. 32 At issue was the validity of the
promulgation of a COMELEC Division resolution.33 No motion for reconsideration was filed to raise this issue before the COMELEC En Banc. This court
declared that it did not have jurisdiction and clarified:
We have interpreted [Section 7, Article IX-A of the Constitution]34 to mean final orders, rulings and decisionsof the COMELEC rendered in the exercise
of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers." This decision must be a final decision or resolution of the Comelec en banc, not of a division, certainly not an
interlocutory order of a division.The Supreme Court has no power to review viacertiorari, an interlocutory order or even a final resolution of a Division of
the Commission on Elections.35 (Emphasis in the original, citations omitted)
However, in the next case cited by respondents, Repol v. COMELEC, this court provided exceptions to this general rule. Repolwas another election protest
case, involving the mayoralty elections in Pagsanghan, Samar.36 This time, the case was brought to this court because the COMELEC First Division issued
a status quo ante order against the Regional Trial Court executing its decision pending appeal.37 This court’s ponencia discussed the general rule
enunciated in Ambil, Jr. that it cannot take jurisdiction to review interlocutory orders of a COMELEC Division.38 However, consistent with ABS-CBN
Broadcasting Corporation v. COMELEC,39 it clarified the exception:
This Court, however, has ruled in the past that this procedural requirement [of filing a motion for reconsideration] may be glossed over to prevent
miscarriage of justice, when the issue involves the principle of social justice or the protection of labor, when the decision or resolution sought to be set
aside is a nullity, or when the need for relief is extremely urgent and certiorari is the only adequate and speedy remedy available.40
Based on ABS-CBN, this court could review orders and decisions of COMELEC — in electoral contests — despite not being reviewed by the COMELEC
En Banc, if:
1) It will prevent the miscarriage of justice;
2) The issue involves a principle of social justice;
3) The issue involves the protection of labor;
4) The decision or resolution sought tobe set aside is a nullity; or
5) The need for relief is extremely urgent and certiorari is the only adequate and speedy remedy available.
Ultimately, this court took jurisdiction in Repoland decided that the status quo anteorder issued by the COMELEC Division was unconstitutional.
Respondents also cite Soriano, Jr. v. COMELEC.This case was also an election protest case involving candidates for the city council of Muntinlupa City.41
Petitioners in Soriano, Jr.filed before this court a petition for certiorari against an interlocutory order of the COMELEC First
Division.42 While the petition was pending in this court, the COMELEC First Division dismissed the main election protest case.43 Sorianoapplied the
general rule that only final orders should be questioned with this court. The ponencia for this court, however, acknowledged the exceptions to the general
rule in ABS-CBN.44
Blanco v. COMELEC, another case cited by respondents, was a disqualification case of one of the mayoralty candidates of Meycauayan, Bulacan. 45 The
COMELEC Second Division ruled that petitioner could not qualify for the 2007 elections due to the findings in an administrative case that he engaged in
vote buying in the 1995 elections.46 No motion for reconsideration was filed before the COMELEC En Banc. This court, however, took cognizance of this
case applying one of the exceptions in ABS-CBN: The assailed resolution was a nullity.47
Finally, respondents cited Cayetano v. COMELEC, a recent election protest case involving the mayoralty candidates of Taguig City.48 Petitioner assailed a
resolution of the COMELEC denying her motion for reconsideration to dismiss the election protest petition for lack of form and substance.49 This court
clarified the general rule and refused to take cognizance of the review of the COMELEC order. While recognizing the exceptions in ABS-CBN, this court
ruled that these exceptions did not apply.50
Ambil, Jr., Repol, Soriano, Jr., Blanco, and Cayetano cited by respondents do not operate as precedents to oust this court from taking jurisdiction over this
case. All these cases cited involve election protests or disqualification cases filed by the losing candidate against the winning candidate.
In the present case, petitioners are not candidates seeking for public office. Their petition is filed to assert their fundamental right to expression.
Furthermore, all these cases cited by respondents pertained to COMELEC’s exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial power. This case pertains to acts
of COMELEC in the implementation of its regulatory powers. When it issued the notice and letter, the COMELEC was allegedly enforcingelection laws.
I.B
Rule 65, grave abuse of discretion,
and limitations on political speech
The main subject of thiscase is an alleged constitutional violation: the infringement on speech and the "chilling effect" caused by respondent COMELEC’s
notice and letter.
Petitioners allege that respondents committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the notice 51 dated February
22,2013 and letter52 dated February 27, 2013 ordering the removal of the tarpaulin.53 It is their position that these infringe on their fundamental right to
freedom of expression and violate the principle of separation of church and state and, thus, are unconstitutional.54
The jurisdiction of this court over the subject matter is determined from the allegations in the petition. Subject matter jurisdiction is defined as the authority
"to hear and determine cases of the general class to which the proceedings in question belong and is conferred by the sovereign authority which organizes
the court and defines its powers."55 Definitely, the subject matter in this case is different from the cases cited by respondents.
Nothing less than the electorate’s political speech will be affected by the restrictions imposed by COMELEC. Political speech is motivated by the desire to
be heard and understood, to move people to action. It is concerned with the sovereign right to change the contours of power whether through the election of
representatives in a republican government or the revision of the basic text of the Constitution. The zeal with which we protect this kind of speech does not
depend on our evaluation of the cogency of the message. Neither do we assess whether we should protect speech based on the motives of COMELEC. We
evaluate restrictions on freedom of expression from their effects. We protect both speech and medium because the quality of this freedom in practice will
define the quality of deliberation in our democratic society.
COMELEC’s notice and letter affect preferred speech. Respondents’ acts are capable of repetition. Under the conditions in which it was issued and in view
of the novelty of this case,it could result in a "chilling effect" that would affect other citizens who want their voices heard on issues during the elections.
Other citizens who wish to express their views regarding the election and other related issues may choose not to, for fear of reprisal or sanction by the
COMELEC. Direct resort to this court is allowed to avoid such proscribed conditions. Rule 65 is also the procedural platform for raising grave abuse of
discretion.
Both parties point to constitutional provisions on jurisdiction. For petitioners, it referred to this court’s expanded exercise of certiorari as provided by the
Constitution as follows:
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to
determine whether ornot there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality
of the Government.56 (Emphasis supplied)
On the other hand, respondents relied on its constitutional mandate to decide all questions affectingelections. Article IX-C, Section 2(3) of the Constitution,
provides:
Sec. 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions:
....
(3) Decide, except those involving the right to vote, all questions affecting elections, including determination of the number and location of polling places,
appointment of election officials and inspectors, and registration of voters.
Respondents’ reliance on this provision is misplaced.
We are not confronted here with the question of whether the COMELEC, in its exercise of jurisdiction, gravely abused it. We are confronted with the
question as to whether the COMELEC had any jurisdiction at all with its acts threatening imminent criminal action effectively abridging meaningful
political speech.
It is clear that the subject matter of the controversy is the effect of COMELEC’s notice and letter on free speech. This does not fall under Article IX-C,
Section 2(3) of the Constitution. The use of the word "affecting" in this provision cannot be interpreted to mean that COMELEC has the exclusive power to
decide any and allquestions that arise during elections. COMELEC’s constitutional competencies during elections should not operate to divest this court of
its own jurisdiction.
The more relevant provision for jurisdiction in this case is Article VIII, Section 5(1) of the Constitution.This provision provides for this court’s original
jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari and prohibition. This should be read alongside the expanded jurisdiction of the court in Article VIII, Section 1 of
the Constitution.
Certainly, a breach of the fundamental right of expression by COMELEC is grave abuse of discretion. Thus, the constitutionality of the notice and letter
coming from COMELEC is within this court’s power to review.
During elections, we have the power and the duty to correct any grave abuse of discretion or any act tainted with unconstitutionality on the part of any
government branch or instrumentality. This includes actions by the COMELEC. Furthermore, it is this court’s constitutional mandate to protect the people
against government’s infringement of their fundamental rights. This constitutional mandate out weighs the jurisdiction vested with the COMELEC.
It will, thus, be manifest injustice if the court does not take jurisdiction over this case.
I.C
Hierarchy of courts
This brings us to the issue of whether petitioners violated the doctrine of hierarchy of courts in directly filing their petition before this court.
Respondents contend that petitioners’ failure to file the proper suit with a lower court of concurrent jurisdiction is sufficient ground for the dismissal of
their petition.57 They add that observation of the hierarchy of courts is compulsory, citing Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog v. Melicor. 58 While respondents claim
that while there are exceptions to the general rule on hierarchy of courts, none of these are present in this case.59
On the other hand, petitioners cite Fortich v. Corona60 on this court’s discretionary power to take cognizance of a petition filed directly to it if warranted
by "compelling reasons, or [by] the nature and importance of the issues raised. . . ."61 Petitioners submit that there are "exceptional and compelling reasons
to justify a direct resort [with] this Court."62
In Bañez, Jr. v. Concepcion,63 we explained the necessity of the application of the hierarchy of courts:
The Court must enjoin the observance of the policy on the hierarchy of courts, and now affirms that the policy is not to be ignored without serious
consequences. The strictness of the policy is designed to shield the Court from having to deal with causes that are also well within the competence of the
lower courts, and thus leave time to the Court to deal with the more fundamental and more essential tasks that the Constitution has assigned to it. The Court
may act on petitions for the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus only when absolutely necessary or when serious and important
reasons exist to justify an exception to the policy.64
In Bañez, we also elaborated on the reasons why lower courts are allowed to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus, citing Vergara v.
Suelto:65
The Supreme Court is a court of lastresort, and must so remain if it is to satisfactorily perform the functions assigned to it by the fundamental charter and
immemorial tradition. It cannot and should not be burdened with the task of dealing with causes in the first instance. Its original jurisdiction to issue the so-
called extraordinary writs should be exercised only where absolutely necessary or where serious and important reasons exist therefore. Hence, that
jurisdiction should generally be exercised relative to actions or proceedings before the Court of Appeals, or before constitutional or other tribunals, bodies
or agencies whose acts for some reason or another are not controllable by the Court of Appeals. Where the issuance of an extraordinary writ is also within
the competence of the Court of Appeals or a Regional Trial Court, it is in either of these courts that the specific action for the writ’s procurement must be
presented. This is and should continue to be the policy in this regard, a policy that courts and lawyers must strictly observe.66 (Emphasis omitted)
The doctrine that requires respect for the hierarchy of courts was created by this court to ensure that every level of the judiciary performs its designated
roles in an effective and efficient manner. Trial courts do not only determine the facts from the evaluation of the evidence presented before them. They are
likewise competent to determine issues of law which may include the validity of an ordinance, statute, or even an executive issuance in relation to the
Constitution.67 To effectively perform these functions, they are territorially organized into regions and then into branches. Their writs generally reach
within those territorial boundaries. Necessarily, they mostly perform the all-important task of inferring the facts from the evidence as these are physically
presented before them. In many instances, the facts occur within their territorial jurisdiction, which properly present the ‘actual case’ that makes ripe a
determination of the constitutionality of such action. The consequences, of course, would be national in scope. There are, however, some cases where resort
to courts at their level would not be practical considering their decisions could still be appealed before the higher courts, such as the Court of Appeals.
The Court of Appeals is primarily designed as an appellate court that reviews the determination of facts and law made by the trial courts. It is collegiate in
nature. This nature ensures more standpoints in the review of the actions of the trial court. But the Court of Appeals also has original jurisdiction over most
special civil actions. Unlike the trial courts, its writs can have a nationwide scope. It is competent to determine facts and, ideally, should act on
constitutional issues thatmay not necessarily be novel unless there are factual questions to determine.
This court, on the other hand, leads the judiciary by breaking new ground or further reiterating — in the light of new circumstances or in the light of some
confusions of bench or bar — existing precedents. Rather than a court of first instance or as a repetition of the actions of the Court of Appeals, this court
promulgates these doctrinal devices in order that it truly performs that role.
In other words, the Supreme Court’s role to interpret the Constitution and act in order to protect constitutional rights when these become exigent should not
be emasculated by the doctrine in respect of the hierarchy of courts. That has never been the purpose of such doctrine.
Thus, the doctrine of hierarchy of courts is not an iron-clad rule.68 This court has "full discretionary power to take cognizance and assume jurisdiction
[over] special civil actions for certiorari . . .filed directly with it for exceptionally compelling reasons 69 or if warranted by the nature of the issues clearly
and specifically raised in the petition."70 As correctly pointed out by petitioners,71 we have provided exceptions to this doctrine:
First, a direct resort to this court is allowed when there are genuine issues of constitutionality that must be addressed at the most immediate time. A direct
resort to this court includes availing of the remedies of certiorari and prohibition toassail the constitutionality of actions of both legislative and executive
branches of the government.72
In this case, the assailed issuances of respondents prejudice not only petitioners’ right to freedom of expression in the present case, but also of others in
future similar cases. The case before this court involves an active effort on the part of the electorate to reform the political landscape. This has become a
rare occasion when private citizens actively engage the public in political discourse. To quote an eminent political theorist:
[T]he theory of freedom of expression involves more than a technique for arriving at better social judgments through democratic procedures. It
comprehends a vision of society, a faith and a whole way of life. The theory grew out of an age that was awakened and invigorated by the idea of new
society in which man's mind was free, his fate determined by his own powers of reason, and his prospects of creating a rational and enlightened civilization
virtually unlimited. It is put forward as a prescription for attaining a creative, progressive, exciting and intellectually robust community. It contemplates a
mode of life that, through encouraging toleration, skepticism, reason and initiative, will allow man to realize his full potentialities.It spurns the alternative
of a society that is tyrannical, conformist, irrational and stagnant.73
In a democracy, the citizen’s right tofreely participate in the exchange of ideas in furtherance of political decision-making is recognized. It deserves the
highest protection the courts may provide, as public participation in nation-building isa fundamental principle in our Constitution. As such, their right to
engage in free expression of ideas must be given immediate protection by this court.
A second exception is when the issuesinvolved are of transcendental importance.74 In these cases, the imminence and clarity of the threat to fundamental
constitutional rights outweigh the necessity for prudence. The doctrine relating to constitutional issues of transcendental importance prevents courts from
the paralysis of procedural niceties when clearly faced with the need for substantial protection.
In the case before this court, there is a clear threat to the paramount right of freedom of speech and freedom of expression which warrants invocation of
relief from this court. The principles laid down in this decision will likely influence the discourse of freedom of speech in the future, especially in the
context of elections. The right to suffrage not only includes the right to vote for one’s chosen candidate, but also the right to vocalize that choice to the
public in general, in the hope of influencing their votes. It may be said that in an election year, the right to vote necessarily includes the right to free speech
and expression. The protection of these fundamental constitutional rights, therefore, allows for the immediate resort to this court.
Third, cases of first impression75 warrant a direct resort to this court. In cases of first impression, no jurisprudence yet exists that will guide the lower
courts on this matter. In Government of the United States v. Purganan,76 this court took cognizance of the case as a matter of first impression that may
guide the lower courts:
In the interest of justice and to settle once and for all the important issue of bail in extradition proceedings, we deem it best to take cognizance of the
present case. Such proceedings constitute a matter of first impression over which there is, as yet, no local jurisprudence to guide lower courts.77
This court finds that this is indeed a case of first impression involving as it does the issue of whether the right of suffrage includes the right of freedom of
expression. This is a question which this court has yet to provide substantial answers to, through jurisprudence. Thus, direct resort to this court is allowed.
Fourth, the constitutional issues raisedare better decided by this court. In Drilon v. Lim,78 this court held that:
. . . it will be prudent for such courts, if only out of a becoming modesty, to defer to the higher judgmentof this Court in the consideration of its validity,
which is better determined after a thorough deliberation by a collegiate body and with the concurrence of the majority of those who participated in its
discussion.79 (Citation omitted)
In this case, it is this court, with its constitutionally enshrined judicial power, that can rule with finality on whether COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion or performed acts contrary to the Constitution through the assailed issuances.
Fifth, the time element presented in this case cannot be ignored. This case was filed during the 2013 election period. Although the elections have already
been concluded, future cases may be filed that necessitate urgency in its resolution. Exigency in certain situations would qualify as an exception for direct
resort to this court.
Sixth, the filed petition reviews the act of a constitutional organ. COMELEC is a constitutional body. In Albano v. Arranz,80 cited by petitioners, this court
held that "[i]t is easy to realize the chaos that would ensue if the Court of First Instance ofeach and every province were [to] arrogate itself the power to
disregard, suspend, or contradict any order of the Commission on Elections: that constitutional body would be speedily reduced to impotence."81
In this case, if petitioners sought to annul the actions of COMELEC through pursuing remedies with the lower courts, any ruling on their part would not
have been binding for other citizens whom respondents may place in the same situation. Besides, thiscourt affords great respect to the Constitution and the
powers and duties imposed upon COMELEC. Hence, a ruling by this court would be in the best interest of respondents, in order that their actions may be
guided accordingly in the future.
Seventh, petitioners rightly claim that they had no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law that could free them from the
injurious effects of respondents’ acts in violation of their right to freedom of expression.
In this case, the repercussions of the assailed issuances on this basic right constitute an exceptionally compelling reason to justify the direct resort to this
court. The lack of other sufficient remedies in the course of law alone is sufficient ground to allow direct resort to this court.
Eighth, the petition includes questionsthat are "dictated by public welfare and the advancement of public policy, or demanded by the broader interest of
justice, or the orders complained of were found to be patent nullities, or the appeal was consideredas clearly an inappropriate remedy." 82 In the past,
questions similar to these which this court ruled on immediately despite the doctrine of hierarchy of courts included citizens’ right to bear arms,83
government contracts involving modernization of voters’ registration lists,84 and the status and existence of a public office.85
This case also poses a question of similar, if not greater import. Hence, a direct action to this court is permitted.
It is not, however, necessary that all of these exceptions must occur at the same time to justify a direct resort to this court. While generally, the hierarchy of
courts is respected, the present case falls under the recognized exceptions and, as such, may be resolved by this court directly.
I.D
The concept of a political question
Respondents argue further that the size limitation and its reasonableness is a political question, hence not within the ambit of this court’s power of review.
They cite Justice Vitug’s separate opinion in Osmeña v. COMELEC86 to support their position:
It might be worth mentioning that Section 26, Article II, of the Constitution also states that the "State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for
public service, and prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law." I see neither Article IX (C)(4) nor Section 26, Article II, of the Constitution to be
all that adversarial or irreconcilably inconsistent with the right of free expression. In any event, the latter, being one of general application, must yield to
the specific demands of the Constitution. The freedom of expression concededly holds, it is true, a vantage point in hierarchy of constitutionally-enshrined
rights but, like all fundamental rights, it is not without limitations.
The case is not about a fight between the "rich" and the "poor" or between the "powerful" and the "weak" in our society but it is to me a genuine attempt on
the part of Congress and the Commission on Elections to ensure that all candidates are given an equal chance to media coverage and thereby be equally
perceived as giving real life to the candidates’ right of free expression rather than being viewed as an undue restriction of that freedom. The wisdom in the
enactment of the law, i.e., that which the legislature deems to be best in giving life to the Constitutional mandate, is not for the Court to question; it is a
matter that lies beyond the normal prerogatives of the Court to pass upon.87
This separate opinion is cogent for the purpose it was said. But it is not in point in this case.
The present petition does not involve a dispute between the rich and poor, or the powerful and weak, on their equal opportunities for media coverage of
candidates and their right to freedom of expression. This case concerns the right of petitioners, who are non-candidates, to post the tarpaulin in their private
property, asan exercise of their right of free expression. Despite the invocation of the political question doctrine by respondents, this court is not proscribed
from deciding on the merits of this case.
In Tañada v. Cuenco,88 this court previously elaborated on the concept of what constitutes a political question:
What is generally meant, when it is said that a question is political, and not judicial, is that it is a matter which is to be exercised by the people in their
primary political capacity, or that it has been specifically delegated to some other department or particular officer of the government, withdiscretionary
power to act.89 (Emphasis omitted)
It is not for this court to rehearse and re-enact political debates on what the text of the law should be. In political forums, particularly the legislature, the
creation of the textof the law is based on a general discussion of factual circumstances, broadly construed in order to allow for general application by the
executive branch. Thus, the creation of the law is not limited by particular and specific facts that affect the rights of certain individuals, per se.
Courts, on the other hand, rule on adversarial positions based on existing facts established on a specific case-to-case basis, where parties affected by the
legal provision seek the courts’ understanding of the law.
The complementary nature of the political and judicial branches of government is essential in order to ensure that the rights of the general public are upheld
at all times. In order to preserve this balance, branches of government must afford due respectand deference for the duties and functions constitutionally
delegated to the other. Courts cannot rush to invalidate a law or rule. Prudence dictates that we are careful not to veto political acts unless we can craft
doctrine narrowly tailored to the circumstances of the case.
The case before this court does not call for the exercise of prudence or modesty. There is no political question. It can be acted upon by this court through
the expanded jurisdiction granted to this court through Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution.
A political question arises in constitutional issues relating to the powers or competence of different agencies and departments of the executive or those of
the legislature. The political question doctrine is used as a defense when the petition asks this court to nullify certain acts that are exclusively within the
domain of their respective competencies, as provided by the Constitution or the law. In such situation, presumptively, this court should act with deference.
It will decline to void an act unless the exercise of that power was so capricious and arbitrary so as to amount to grave abuse of discretion.
The concept of a political question, however, never precludes judicial review when the act of a constitutional organ infringes upon a fundamental
individual or collective right. Even assuming arguendo that the COMELEC did have the discretion to choose the manner of regulation of the tarpaulin in
question, it cannot do so by abridging the fundamental right to expression.
Marcos v. Manglapus90 limited the use of the political question doctrine:
When political questions are involved, the Constitution limits the determination to whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the official whose action is being questioned. If grave abuse is not established, the Court will not substitute its
judgment for that of the official concerned and decide a matter which by its nature or by law is for the latter alone to decide.91
How this court has chosen to address the political question doctrine has undergone an evolution since the timethat it had been first invoked in Marcos v.
Manglapus. Increasingly, this court has taken the historical and social context of the case and the relevance of pronouncements of carefully and narrowly
tailored constitutional doctrines. This trend was followed in cases such as Daza v. Singson92 and Coseteng v. Mitra Jr.93
Daza and Coseteng involved a question as to the application of Article VI, Section 18 of the 1987 Constitution involving the removal of petitioners from
the Commission on Appointments. In times past, this would have involved a quint essentially political question as it related to the dominance of political
parties in Congress. However, in these cases, this court exercised its power of judicial review noting that the requirement of interpreting the constitutional
provision involved the legality and not the wisdom of a manner by which a constitutional duty or power was exercised. This approach was again reiterated
in Defensor Santiago v. Guingona, Jr.94
In Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora,95 this court declared again that the possible existence ofa political question did not bar an examination of
whether the exercise of discretion was done with grave abuse of discretion. In that case, this court ruled on the question of whether there was grave abuse
of discretion in the President’s use of his power to call out the armed forces to prevent and suppress lawless violence.
In Estrada v. Desierto,96 this court ruled that the legal question as to whether a former President resigned was not a political question even if the
consequences would be to ascertain the political legitimacy of a successor President.
Many constitutional cases arise from political crises. The actors in such crises may use the resolution of constitutional issues as leverage. But the expanded
jurisdiction of this court now mandates a duty for it to exercise its power of judicial review expanding on principles that may avert catastrophe or resolve
social conflict.
This court’s understanding of the political question has not been static or unbending. In Llamas v. Executive Secretary Oscar Orbos,97 this court held:
While it is true that courts cannot inquire into the manner in which the President's discretionary powers are exercised or into the wisdom for its exercise, it
is also a settled rule that when the issue involved concerns the validity of such discretionary powers or whether said powers are within the limits prescribed
by the Constitution, We will not decline to exercise our power of judicial review. And such review does not constitute a modification or correction of the
act of the President, nor does it constitute interference with the functions of the President.98
The concept of judicial power in relation to the concept of the political question was discussed most extensively in Francisco v. HRET. 99 In this case, the
House of Representatives arguedthat the question of the validity of the second impeachment complaint that was filed against former Chief Justice Hilario
Davide was a political question beyond the ambit of this court. Former Chief Justice Reynato Puno elaborated on this concept in his concurring and
dissenting opinion:
To be sure, the force to impugn the jurisdiction of this Court becomes more feeble in light of the new Constitution which expanded the definition of
judicial power as including "the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable,
and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government." As well observed by retired Justice Isagani Cruz, this expanded definition of judicial power considerably constricted
the scope of political question. He opined that the language luminously suggests that this duty (and power) is available even against the executive and
legislative departments including the President and the Congress, in the exercise of their discretionary powers.100 (Emphasis in the original, citations
omitted)
Francisco also provides the cases which show the evolution of the political question, as applied in the following cases:
In Marcos v. Manglapus, this Court, speaking through Madame Justice Irene Cortes, held: The present Constitution limits resort to the political question
doctrine and broadens the scope of judicial inquiry into areas which the Court,under previous constitutions, would have normally left to the political
departments to decide. x x x
In Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, through Justice Teodoro Padilla, this Court declared:
The "allocation of constitutional boundaries" is a task that this Court must perform under the Constitution. Moreover, as held in a recent case, "(t)he
political question doctrine neither interposes an obstacle to judicial determination of the rival claims. The jurisdiction to delimit constitutional boundaries
has been given to this Court. It cannot abdicate that obligation mandated by the 1987 Constitution, although said provision by no means does away with the
applicability of the principle in appropriate cases." (Emphasis and italics supplied)
And in Daza v. Singson, speaking through Justice Isagani Cruz, this Court ruled:
In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even less tenable and decisive. The reason is that, even if we were to assume that the issue
presented before us was political in nature, we would still not be precluded from resolving it under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that now
covers, in proper cases, even the political question.x x x (Emphasis and italics supplied.)
....
In our jurisdiction, the determination of whether an issue involves a truly political and non-justiciable question lies in the answer to the question of whether
there are constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon political bodies. If there are, then our courts are duty-bound to examine
whether the branch or instrumentality of the government properly acted within such limits.101 (Citations omitted)
As stated in Francisco, a political question will not be considered justiciable if there are no constitutionally imposed limits on powers or functions
conferred upon political bodies. Hence, the existence of constitutionally imposed limits justifies subjecting the official actions of the body to the scrutiny
and review of this court.
In this case, the Bill of Rights gives the utmost deference to the right to free speech. Any instance that this right may be abridged demands judicial scrutiny.
It does not fall squarely into any doubt that a political question brings.
I.E
Exhaustion of administrative remedies
Respondents allege that petitioners violated the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies. Respondents insist that petitioners should have first
brought the matter to the COMELEC En Banc or any of its divisions.102
Respondents point out that petitioners failed to comply with the requirement in Rule 65 that "there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law."103 They add that the proper venue to assail the validity of the assailed issuances was in the course of an administrative
hearing to be conducted by COMELEC.104 In the event that an election offense is filed against petitioners for posting the tarpaulin, they claim that
petitioners should resort to the remedies prescribed in Rule 34 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.105
The argument on exhaustion of administrative remedies is not proper in this case.
Despite the alleged non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, it is clear that the controversy is already ripe for adjudication. Ripeness is the "prerequisite
that something had by then been accomplished or performed by either branch [or in this case, organ of government] before a court may come into the
picture."106
Petitioners’ exercise of their rightto speech, given the message and their medium, had understandable relevance especially during the elections.
COMELEC’s letter threatening the filing of the election offense against petitioners is already an actionable infringement of this right. The impending threat
of criminal litigation is enough to curtail petitioners’ speech.
In the context of this case, exhaustion of their administrative remedies as COMELEC suggested in their pleadings prolongs the violation of their freedom
of speech.
Political speech enjoys preferred protection within our constitutional order. In Chavez v. Gonzales,107 Justice Carpio in a separate opinion emphasized:
"[i]f everthere is a hierarchy of protected expressions, political expression would occupy the highest rank, and among different kinds of political
expression, the subject of fair and honest elections would be at the top."108 Sovereignty resides in the people.109 Political speech is a direct exercise of the
sovereignty. The principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies yields in order to protect this fundamental right.
Even assuming that the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies is applicable, the current controversy is within the exceptions to the principle. In
Chua v. Ang,110 this court held:
On the other hand, prior exhaustion of administrative remedies may be dispensed with and judicial action may be validly resorted to immediately: (a) when
there is a violation of due process; (b) when the issue involved is purely a legal question; (c) when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction; (d) when there is estoppel on the part ofthe administrative agency concerned; (e) when there is irreparable injury; (f) when
the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as analter ego of the President bear the implied and assumed approval of the latter; (g) when to require
exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable; (h) when it would amount to a nullification of a claim; (i) when the subject matter is a
private land in land case proceedings; (j) whenthe rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy; or (k) when there are circumstances
indicating the urgency of judicial intervention."111 (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)
The circumstances emphasized are squarely applicable with the present case. First, petitioners allegethat the assailed issuances violated their right to
freedom of expression and the principle of separation of church and state. This is a purely legal question. Second, the circumstances of the present case
indicate the urgency of judicial intervention considering the issue then on the RH Law as well as the upcoming elections. Thus, to require the exhaustion of
administrative remedies in this case would be unreasonable.
Time and again, we have held that this court "has the power to relax or suspend the rules or to except a case from their operation when compelling reasons
so warrant, or whenthe purpose of justice requires it, [and when] [w]hat constitutes [as] good and sufficient cause that will merit suspension of the rules is
discretionary upon the court".112 Certainly, this case of first impression where COMELEC has threatenedto prosecute private parties who seek to
participate in the elections by calling attention to issues they want debated by the publicin the manner they feel would be effective is one of those cases.
II
SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES
II.A
COMELEC had no legal basis to regulate expressions made by private citizens
Respondents cite the Constitution, laws, and jurisprudence to support their position that they had the power to regulate the tarpaulin. 113 However, all of
these provisions pertain to candidates and political parties. Petitioners are not candidates. Neither do theybelong to any political party. COMELEC does not
have the authority to regulate the enjoyment of the preferred right to freedom of expression exercised by a non-candidate in this case.
II.A.1
First, respondents cite Article IX-C, Section 4 of the Constitution, which provides:
Section 4. The Commission may,during the election period, supervise or regulate the enjoyment or utilization of all franchises or permits for the operation
of transportation and other public utilities, media of communication or information, all grants, special privileges, or concessions granted by the
Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or controlled corporation or its subsidiary. Such
supervision or regulation shall aim to ensure equal opportunity, time, and space, and the right to reply, including reasonable, equal rates therefor, for public
information campaigns and forums among candidates in connection with the objective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections. 114
(Emphasis supplied)
Sanidad v. COMELEC115 involved the rules promulgated by COMELEC during the plebiscite for the creation of the Cordillera Autonomous Region.116
Columnist Pablito V. Sanidad questioned the provision prohibiting journalists from covering plebiscite issues on the day before and on plebiscite day. 117
Sanidad argued that the prohibition was a violation of the "constitutional guarantees of the freedom of expression and of the press. . . ." 118 We held that the
"evil sought to be prevented by this provision is the possibility that a franchise holder may favor or give any undue advantage to a candidate in terms of
advertising space or radio or television time."119 This court found that "[m]edia practitioners exercising their freedom of expression during plebiscite
periods are neither the franchise holders nor the candidates[,]"120 thus, their right to expression during this period may not be regulated by
COMELEC.121
Similar to the media, petitioners in the case at bar are neither franchise holders nor candidates. II.A.2
Respondents likewise cite Article IX-C, Section 2(7) of the Constitution as follows:122
Sec. 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions:
....
(7) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to minimize election spending, including limitation of places where propaganda materials shall be
posted, and to prevent and penalize all forms of election frauds, offenses, malpractices, and nuisance candidates. (Emphasis supplied) Based on the
enumeration made on actsthat may be penalized, it will be inferred that this provision only affects candidates.
Petitioners assail the "Notice to Remove Campaign Materials" issued by COMELEC. This was followed bythe assailed letter regarding the "election
propaganda material posted on the church vicinity promoting for or against the candidates and party-list groups. . . ."123
Section 9 of the Fair Election Act124 on the posting of campaign materials only mentions "parties" and "candidates":
Sec. 9. Posting of Campaign Materials. - The COMELEC may authorize political parties and party-list groups to erect common poster areas for their
candidates in not more than ten (10) public places such as plazas, markets, barangay centers and the like, wherein candidates can post, display or exhibit
election propaganda: Provided, That the size ofthe poster areas shall not exceed twelve (12) by sixteen (16) feet or its equivalent. Independent candidates
with no political parties may likewise be authorized to erect common poster areas in not more than ten (10) public places, the size of which shall not
exceed four (4) by six (6) feet or its equivalent. Candidates may post any lawful propaganda material in private places with the consent of the owner
thereof, and in public places or property which shall be allocated equitably and impartially among the candidates. (Emphasis supplied)
Similarly, Section 17 of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615, the rules and regulations implementing the Fair Election Act, provides as follows:
SECTION 17. Posting of Campaign Materials. - Parties and candidates may post any lawful campaign material in:
a. Authorized common poster areasin public places subject to the requirements and/or limitations set forth in the next following section; and
b. Private places provided it has the consent of the owner thereof.
The posting of campaign materials in public places outside of the designated common poster areas and those enumerated under Section 7 (g) of these Rules
and the like is prohibited. Persons posting the same shall be liable together with the candidates and other persons who caused the posting. It will be
presumed that the candidates and parties caused the posting of campaign materials outside the common poster areas if they do not remove the same within
three (3) days from notice which shall be issued by the Election Officer of the city or municipality where the unlawful election propaganda are posted or
displayed.
Members of the PNP and other law enforcement agencies called upon by the Election Officeror other officials of the COMELEC shall apprehend the
violators caught in the act, and file the appropriate charges against them. (Emphasis supplied)
Respondents considered the tarpaulin as a campaign material in their issuances. The above provisions regulating the posting of campaign materials only
apply to candidates and political parties, and petitioners are neither of the two.
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9006on "Lawful Election Propaganda" also states that these are "allowed for all registered political parties, national,
regional, sectoral parties or organizations participating under the party-list elections and for all bona fide candidates seeking national and local elective
positions subject to the limitation on authorized expenses of candidates and political parties. . . ." Section 6 of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 provides
for a similar wording. These provisions show that election propaganda refers to matter done by or on behalf of and in coordination with candidates and
political parties. Some level of coordination with the candidates and political parties for whom the election propaganda are released would ensure that these
candidates and political parties maintain within the authorized expenses limitation.
The tarpaulin was not paid for byany candidate or political party.125 There was no allegation that petitioners coordinated with any of the persons named in
the tarpaulin regarding its posting. On the other hand, petitioners posted the tarpaulin as part of their advocacy against the RH Law. Respondents also cite
National Press Club v. COMELEC126 in arguing that its regulatory power under the Constitution, to some extent, set a limit on the right to free speech
during election period.127
National Press Club involved the prohibition on the sale and donation of space and time for political advertisements, limiting political advertisements to
COMELEC-designated space and time. This case was brought by representatives of mass media and two candidates for office in the 1992 elections. They
argued that the prohibition on the sale and donation of space and time for political advertisements is tantamount to censorship, which necessarily infringes
on the freedom of speech of the candidates.128
This court upheld the constitutionality of the COMELEC prohibition in National Press Club. However, this case does not apply as most of the petitioners
were electoral candidates, unlike petitioners in the instant case. Moreover, the subject matter of National Press Club, Section 11(b) of Republic Act No.
6646,129 only refers to a particular kind of media such as newspapers, radio broadcasting, or television.130 Justice Feliciano emphasized that the provision
did not infringe upon the right of reporters or broadcasters to air their commentaries and opinions regarding the candidates, their qualifications, and
program for government. Compared to Sanidadwherein the columnists lost their ability to give their commentary on the issues involving the plebiscite,
National Press Clubdoes not involve the same infringement.
In the case at bar, petitioners lost their ability to give a commentary on the candidates for the 2013 national elections because of the COMELEC notice and
letter. It was not merelya regulation on the campaigns of candidates vying for public office. Thus, National Press Clubdoes not apply to this case.
Finally, Section 79 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code, defines an"election campaign" as follows:
....
(b) The term "election campaign" or "partisan political activity" refers to an act designed to promote the election or defeat of a particular candidate or
candidates to a public office which shall include:
(1) Forming organizations, associations, clubs, committees or other groups of persons for the purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any
campaign for or against a candidate;
(2) Holding political caucuses, conferences, meetings, rallies, parades, or other similar assemblies, for the purpose of soliciting votes and/or
undertaking any campaign or propaganda for or against a candidate;
(3) Making speeches, announcements or commentaries, or holding interviews for or against the election of any candidate for public office;
(4) Publishing or distributing campaign literature or materials designed to support or oppose the election of any candidate; or
(5) Directly or indirectly soliciting votes, pledges or support for or against a candidate.
The foregoing enumerated acts ifperformed for the purpose of enhancing the chances of aspirants for nomination for candidacy to a public office by a
political party, aggroupment, or coalition of parties shall not be considered as election campaign or partisan election activity. Public expressions or opinions
or discussions of probable issues in a forthcoming electionor on attributes of or criticisms against probable candidates proposed to be nominated in a
forthcoming political party convention shall not be construed as part of any election campaign or partisan political activity contemplated under this Article.
(Emphasis supplied)
True, there is no mention whether election campaign is limited only to the candidates and political parties themselves. The focus of the definition is that the
act must be "designed to promote the election or defeat of a particular candidate or candidates to a public office."
In this case, the tarpaulin contains speech on a matter of public concern, that is, a statement of either appreciation or criticism on votes made in the passing
of the RH law. Thus, petitioners invoke their right to freedom of expression.
II.B
The violation of the constitutional right
to freedom of speech and expression
Petitioners contend that the assailed notice and letter for the removal of the tarpaulin violate their fundamental right to freedom of expression.
On the other hand, respondents contend that the tarpaulin is an election propaganda subject to their regulation pursuant to their mandate under Article IX-
C, Section 4 of the Constitution. Thus, the assailed notice and letter ordering itsremoval for being oversized are valid and constitutional.131
II.B.1
Fundamental to the consideration of this issue is Article III, Section 4 of the Constitution:
Section 4. No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and
petition the government for redress of grievances.132
No law. . .
While it is true that the present petition assails not a law but an opinion by the COMELEC Law Department, this court has applied Article III, Section 4 of
the Constitution even to governmental acts.
In Primicias v. Fugoso,133 respondent Mayor applied by analogy Section 1119 of the Revised Ordinances of 1927 of Manila for the public meeting and
assembly organized by petitioner Primicias.134 Section 1119 requires a Mayor’s permit for the use of streets and public places for purposes such as athletic
games, sports, or celebration of national holidays.135 What was questioned was not a law but the Mayor’s refusal to issue a permit for the holding of
petitioner’s public meeting.136 Nevertheless, this court recognized the constitutional right to freedom of speech, to peaceful assembly and to petition for
redress of grievances, albeit not absolute,137 and the petition for mandamus to compel respondent Mayor to issue the permit was granted.138
In ABS-CBN v. COMELEC, what was assailed was not a law but COMELEC En Banc Resolution No. 98-1419 where the COMELEC resolved to approve
the issuance of a restraining order to stop ABS-CBN from conducting exit surveys.139 The right to freedom of expression was similarly upheld in this case
and, consequently, the assailed resolution was nullified and set aside.140
. . . shall be passed abridging. . .
All regulations will have an impact directly or indirectly on expression. The prohibition against the abridgment of speech should not mean an absolute
prohibition against regulation. The primary and incidental burden on speech must be weighed against a compelling state interest clearly allowed in the
Constitution. The test depends on the relevant theory of speech implicit in the kind of society framed by our Constitution.
. . . of expression. . .
Our Constitution has also explicitly included the freedom of expression, separate and in addition to the freedom of speech and of the press provided in the
US Constitution. The word "expression" was added in the 1987 Constitution by Commissioner Brocka for having a wider scope:
MR. BROCKA: This is a very minor amendment, Mr. Presiding Officer. On Section 9, page 2, line 29, it says: "No law shall be passed abridging the
freedom of speech." I would like to recommend to the Committee the change of the word "speech" to EXPRESSION; or if not, add the words AND
EXPRESSION after the word "speech," because it is more expansive, it has a wider scope, and it would refer to means of expression other than speech.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.Bengzon): What does the Committee say?
FR. BERNAS: "Expression" is more broad than speech. We accept it.
MR. BROCKA: Thank you.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.Bengzon): Is it accepted?
FR. BERNAS: Yes.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.Bengzon): Is there any objection? (Silence) The Chair hears none; the amendment is approved.
FR. BERNAS: So, that provision will now read: "No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, expression or of the press . . . ." 141 Speech may
be said to be inextricably linked to freedom itself as "[t]he right to think is the beginning of freedom, and speech must be protected from the government
because speech is the beginning of thought."142
II.B.2
Communication is an essential outcome of protected speech.143 Communication exists when "(1) a speaker, seeking to signal others, uses conventional
actions because he orshe reasonably believes that such actions will be taken by the audience in the manner intended; and (2) the audience so takes the
actions."144 "[I]n communicative action[,] the hearer may respond to the claims by . . . either accepting the speech act’s claims or opposing them with
criticism or requests for justification."145
Speech is not limited to vocal communication. "[C]onduct is treated as a form of speech sometimes referred to as ‘symbolic speech[,]’" 146 such that
"‘when ‘speech’ and ‘nonspeech’ elements are combined in the same course of conduct,’ the ‘communicative element’ of the conduct may be ‘sufficient to
bring into play the [right to freedom of expression].’"147
The right to freedom of expression, thus, applies to the entire continuum of speech from utterances made to conduct enacted, and even to inaction itself as a
symbolic manner of communication.
In Ebralinag v. The Division Superintendent of Schools of Cebu,148 students who were members of the religious sect Jehovah’s Witnesses were to be
expelled from school for refusing to salute the flag, sing the national anthem, and recite the patriotic pledge.149 In his concurring opinion, Justice Cruz
discussed how the salute is a symbolic manner of communication and a valid form of expression.150 He adds that freedom of speech includes even the
right to be silent:
Freedom of speech includes the right to be silent. Aptly has it been said that the Bill of Rights that guarantees to the individual the liberty to utter what is in
his mind also guarantees to him the liberty not to utter what is not in his mind. The salute is a symbolic manner of communication that conveys its
messageas clearly as the written or spoken word. As a valid form of expression, it cannot be compelled any more than it can be prohibited in the face of
valid religious objections like those raised in this petition. To impose it on the petitioners is to deny them the right not to speak when their religion bids
them to be silent. This coercion of conscience has no place in the free society.
The democratic system provides for the accommodation of diverse ideas, including the unconventional and even the bizarre or eccentric. The will of the
majority prevails, but it cannot regiment thought by prescribing the recitation by rote of its opinions or proscribing the assertion of unorthodox or
unpopular views as inthis case. The conscientious objections of the petitioners, no less than the impatience of those who disagree with them, are protected
by the Constitution. The State cannot make the individual speak when the soul within rebels.151
Even before freedom "of expression" was included in Article III, Section 4 of the present Constitution,this court has applied its precedent version to
expressions other than verbal utterances.
In the 1985 case of Gonzalez v. Chairman Katigbak,152 petitioners objected to the classification of the motion picture "Kapit sa Patalim" as "For Adults
Only." They contend that the classification "is without legal and factual basis and is exercised as impermissible restraint of artistic expression." 153 This
court recognized that "[m]otion pictures are important both as a medium for the communication of ideas and the expression of the artistic impulse." 154 It
adds that "every writer,actor, or producer, no matter what medium of expression he may use, should be freed from the censor." 155 This court found that
"[the Board’s] perception of what constitutes obscenity appears to be unduly restrictive."156 However, the petition was dismissed solely on the ground that
there were not enough votes for a ruling of grave abuse of discretion in the classification made by the Board.157
II.B.3
Size does matter
The form of expression is just as important as the information conveyed that it forms part of the expression. The present case is in point.
It is easy to discern why size matters.
First, it enhances efficiency in communication. A larger tarpaulin allows larger fonts which make it easier to view its messages from greater distances.
Furthermore, a larger tarpaulin makes it easier for passengers inside moving vehicles to read its content. Compared with the pedestrians, the passengers
inside moving vehicles have lesser time to view the content of a tarpaulin. The larger the fonts and images, the greater the probability that it will catch their
attention and, thus, the greater the possibility that they will understand its message.
Second, the size of the tarpaulin may underscore the importance of the message to the reader. From an ordinary person’s perspective, those who post their
messages in larger fonts care more about their message than those who carry their messages in smaller media. The perceived importance given by the
speakers, in this case petitioners, to their cause is also part of the message. The effectivity of communication sometimes relies on the emphasis put by the
speakers and onthe credibility of the speakers themselves. Certainly, larger segments of the public may tend to be more convinced of the point made by
authoritative figures when they make the effort to emphasize their messages.
Third, larger spaces allow for more messages. Larger spaces, therefore, may translate to more opportunities to amplify, explain, and argue points which the
speakers might want to communicate. Rather than simply placing the names and images of political candidates and an expression of support, larger spaces
can allow for brief but memorable presentations of the candidates’ platforms for governance. Larger spaces allow for more precise inceptions of ideas,
catalyze reactions to advocacies, and contribute more to a more educated and reasoned electorate. A more educated electorate will increase the possibilities
of both good governance and accountability in our government.
These points become more salient when it is the electorate, not the candidates or the political parties, that speaks. Too often, the terms of public discussion
during elections are framed and kept hostage by brief and catchy but meaningless sound bites extolling the character of the candidate. Worse, elections
sideline political arguments and privilege the endorsement by celebrities. Rather than provide obstacles to their speech, government should in fact
encourage it. Between the candidates and the electorate, the latter have the better incentive to demand discussion of the more important issues. Between the
candidates and the electorate, the former have better incentives to avoid difficult political standpoints and instead focus on appearances and empty
promises.
Large tarpaulins, therefore, are not analogous to time and place.158 They are fundamentally part of expression protected under Article III, Section 4 of the
Constitution.
II.B.4
There are several theories and schools of thought that strengthen the need to protect the basic right to freedom of expression.
First, this relates to the right ofthe people to participate in public affairs, including the right to criticize government actions.
Proponents of the political theory on "deliberative democracy" submit that "substantial, open, [and] ethical dialogue isa critical, and indeed defining,
feature of a good polity."159 This theory may be considered broad, but it definitely "includes [a] collective decision making with the participation of all
who will beaffected by the decision."160 It anchors on the principle that the cornerstone of every democracy is that sovereignty resides in the people. 161
To ensure order in running the state’s affairs, sovereign powers were delegated and individuals would be elected or nominated in key government positions
to represent the people. On this note, the theory on deliberative democracy may evolve to the right of the people to make government accountable.
Necessarily, this includes the right of the people to criticize acts made pursuant to governmental functions.
Speech that promotes dialogue on publicaffairs, or airs out grievances and political discontent, should thus be protected and encouraged.
Borrowing the words of Justice Brandeis, "it is hazardous to discourage thought, hope and imagination; that fear breeds repression; that repression breeds
hate; that hate menaces stable government; that the path of safety lies in the opportunity to discuss freely supposed grievances and proposed remedies."162
In this jurisdiction, this court held that "[t]he interest of society and the maintenance of good government demand a full discussion of public affairs." 163
This court has, thus, adopted the principle that "debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust,and wide open . . . [including even] unpleasantly
sharp attacks on government and public officials."164
Second, free speech should be encouraged under the concept of a market place of ideas. This theory was articulated by Justice Holmes in that "the ultimate
good desired is better reached by [the] free trade in ideas:"165
When men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their own
conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas - that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in
the competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried out.166
The way it works, the exposure to the ideas of others allows one to "consider, test, and develop their own conclusions." 167 A free, open, and dynamic
market place of ideas is constantly shaping new ones. This promotes both stability and change where recurring points may crystallize and weak ones may
develop. Of course, free speech is more than the right to approve existing political beliefs and economic arrangements as it includes, "[t]o paraphrase
Justice Holmes, [the] freedom for the thought that we hate, no less than for the thought that agrees with us."168 In fact, free speech may "best serve its high
purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger." 169 It is in this context that
we should guard against any curtailment of the people’s right to participate in the free trade of ideas.
Third, free speech involves self-expression that enhances human dignity. This right is "a means of assuring individual self-fulfillment," 170 among others.
In Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization v. Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc,171 this court discussed as follows:
The rights of free expression, free assembly and petition, are not only civil rights but also political rights essential to man's enjoyment of his life, to his
happiness and to his full and complete fulfillment.Thru these freedoms the citizens can participate not merely in the periodic establishment of the
government through their suffrage but also in the administration of public affairs as well as in the discipline of abusive public officers. The citizen is
accorded these rights so that he can appeal to the appropriate governmental officers or agencies for redress and protection as well as for the imposition of
the lawful sanctions on erring public officers and employees.172 (Emphasis supplied)
Fourth, expression is a marker for group identity. For one, "[v]oluntary associations perform [an] important democratic role [in providing] forums for the
development of civil skills, for deliberation, and for the formation of identity and community spirit[,] [and] are largely immune from [any] governmental
interference."173 They also "provide a buffer between individuals and the state - a free space for the development of individual personality, distinct group
identity, and dissident ideas - and a potential source of opposition to the state."174 Free speech must be protected as the vehicle to find those who have
similar and shared values and ideals, to join together and forward common goals.
Fifth, the Bill of Rights, free speech included, is supposed to "protect individuals and minorities against majoritarian abuses perpetrated through [the]
framework [of democratic governance]."175 Federalist framers led by James Madison were concerned about two potentially vulnerable groups: "the
citizenry at large - majorities - who might be tyrannized or plundered by despotic federal officials" 176 and the minorities who may be oppressed by
"dominant factions of the electorate [that] capture [the] government for their own selfish ends[.]" 177 According to Madison, "[i]t is of great importance in
a republic not only to guard the society against the oppression of its rulers, but to guard one part of the society against the injustice of the other part." 178
We should strive to ensure that free speech is protected especially in light of any potential oppression against those who find themselves in the fringes on
public issues.
Lastly, free speech must be protected under the safety valve theory.179 This provides that "nonviolent manifestations of dissent reduce the likelihood of
violence[.]"180 "[A] dam about to burst . . . resulting in the ‘banking up of a menacing flood of sullen anger behind the walls of restriction’" 181 has been
used to describe the effect of repressing nonviolent outlets.182 In order to avoid this situation and prevent people from resorting to violence, there is a need
for peaceful methods in making passionate dissent. This includes "free expression and political participation" 183 in that they can "vote for candidates who
share their views, petition their legislatures to [make or] change laws, . . . distribute literature alerting other citizens of their concerns[,]" 184 and conduct
peaceful rallies and other similar acts.185 Free speech must, thus, be protected as a peaceful means of achieving one’s goal, considering the possibility that
repression of nonviolent dissent may spill over to violent means just to drive a point.
II.B.5
Every citizen’s expression with political consequences enjoys a high degree of protection. Respondents argue that the tarpaulinis election propaganda,
being petitioners’ way of endorsing candidates who voted against the RH Law and rejecting those who voted for it. 186 As such, it is subject to regulation
by COMELEC under its constitutional mandate.187 Election propaganda is defined under Section 1(4) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 as follows:
SECTION 1. Definitions . . .
....
4. The term "political advertisement" or "election propaganda" refers to any matter broadcasted, published, printed, displayed or exhibited, in any medium,
which contain the name, image, logo, brand, insignia, color motif, initials, and other symbol or graphic representation that is capable of being associated
with a candidate or party, and is intended to draw the attention of the public or a segment thereof to promote or oppose, directly or indirectly, the election
of the said candidate or candidates to a public office. In broadcast media, political advertisements may take the form of spots, appearances on TV shows
and radio programs, live or taped announcements, teasers, and other forms of advertising messages or announcements used by commercial advertisers.
Political advertising includes matters, not falling within the scope of personal opinion, that appear on any Internet website, including, but not limited to,
social networks, blogging sites, and micro-blogging sites, in return for consideration, or otherwise capable of pecuniary estimation.
On the other hand, petitioners invoke their "constitutional right to communicate their opinions, views and beliefs about issues and candidates."188 They
argue that the tarpaulin was their statement of approval and appreciation of the named public officials’ act of voting against the RH Law, and their criticism
toward those who voted in its favor.189 It was "part of their advocacy campaign against the RH Law,"190 which was not paid for by any candidate or
political party.191 Thus, "the questioned orders which . . . effectively restrain[ed] and curtail[ed] [their] freedom of expression should be declared
unconstitutional and void."192
This court has held free speech and other intellectual freedoms as "highly ranked in our scheme of constitutional values."193 These rights enjoy precedence
and primacy.194 In Philippine Blooming Mills, this court discussed the preferred position occupied by freedom of expression:
Property and property rights can belost thru prescription; but human rights are imprescriptible. If human rights are extinguished by the passage of time,
then the Bill of Rights is a useless attempt to limit the power of government and ceases to be an efficacious shield against the tyranny of officials, of
majorities, ofthe influential and powerful, and of oligarchs - political, economic or otherwise.
In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free expression and of assembly occupy a preferred position as they are essential to the preservation and
vitality of our civil and political institutions; and such priority "gives these liberties the sanctity and the sanction not permitting dubious intrusions."195
(Citations omitted)
This primordial right calls for utmost respect, more so "when what may be curtailed is the dissemination of information to make more meaningful the
equally vital right of suffrage."196 A similar idea appeared in our jurisprudence as early as 1969, which was Justice Barredo’s concurring and dissenting
opinion in Gonzales v. COMELEC:197
I like to reiterate over and over, for it seems this is the fundamental point others miss, that genuine democracy thrives only where the power and right of the
people toelect the men to whom they would entrust the privilege to run the affairs of the state exist. In the language of the declaration of principles of our
Constitution, "The Philippines is a republican state. Sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them" (Section 1, Article
II). Translating this declaration into actuality, the Philippines is a republic because and solely because the people in it can be governed only by officials
whom they themselves have placed in office by their votes. And in it is on this cornerstone that I hold it tobe self-evident that when the freedoms of speech,
press and peaceful assembly and redress of grievances are being exercised in relation to suffrage or asa means to enjoy the inalienable right of the qualified
citizen to vote, they are absolute and timeless. If our democracy and republicanism are to be worthwhile, the conduct of public affairs by our officials must
be allowed to suffer incessant and unabating scrutiny, favorable or unfavorable, everyday and at all times. Every holder of power in our government must
be ready to undergo exposure any moment of the day or night, from January to December every year, as it is only in this way that he can rightfully gain the
confidence of the people. I have no patience for those who would regard public dissection of the establishment as an attribute to be indulged by the people
only at certain periods of time. I consider the freedoms of speech, press and peaceful assembly and redress of grievances, when exercised in the name of
suffrage, as the very means by which the right itself to vote can only be properly enjoyed.It stands to reason therefore, that suffrage itself would be next to
useless if these liberties cannot be untrammelled [sic] whether as to degree or time.198 (Emphasis supplied)
Not all speech are treated the same. In Chavez v. Gonzales, this court discussed that some types of speech may be subject to regulation:
Some types of speech may be subjected to some regulation by the State under its pervasive police power, in order that it may not be injurious to the equal
right of others or those of the community or society. The difference in treatment is expected because the relevant interests of one type of speech, e.g.,
political speech, may vary from those of another, e.g., obscene speech. Distinctionshave therefore been made in the treatment, analysis, and evaluation
ofthe permissible scope of restrictions on various categories of speech. We have ruled, for example, that in our jurisdiction slander or libel, lewd and
obscene speech, as well as "fighting words" are not entitled to constitutional protection and may be penalized.199 (Citations omitted)
We distinguish between politicaland commercial speech. Political speech refers to speech "both intended and received as a contribution to public
deliberation about some issue,"200 "foster[ing] informed and civicminded deliberation."201 On the other hand, commercial speech has been defined as
speech that does "no more than propose a commercial transaction."202 The expression resulting from the content of the tarpaulin is, however, definitely
political speech. In Justice Brion’s dissenting opinion, he discussed that "[t]he content of the tarpaulin, as well as the timing of its posting, makes it subject
of the regulations in RA 9006 and Comelec Resolution No. 9615."203 He adds that "[w]hile indeed the RH issue, by itself,is not an electoralmatter, the
slant that the petitioners gave the issue converted the non-election issue into a live election one hence, Team Buhay and Team Patay and the plea to support
one and oppose the other."204
While the tarpaulin may influence the success or failure of the named candidates and political parties, this does not necessarily mean it is election
propaganda. The tarpaulin was not paid for or posted "in return for consideration" by any candidate, political party, or party-list group.
The second paragraph of Section 1(4) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615, or the rules and regulations implementing Republic Act No. 9006 as an aid to
interpret the law insofar as the facts of this case requires, states:
4. The term "political advertisement" or "election propaganda" refers to any matter broadcasted, published, printed, displayed or exhibited, in any medium,
which contain the name, image, logo, brand, insignia, color motif, initials, and other symbol or graphic representation that is capable of being associated
with a candidate or party, and is intended to draw the attention of the public or a segment thereof to promote or oppose, directly or indirectly, the election
of the said candidate or candidates to a public office. In broadcast media, political advertisements may take the form of spots, appearances on TV shows
and radio programs, live or taped announcements, teasers, and other forms of advertising messages or announcements used by commercial advertisers.
Political advertising includes matters, not falling within the scope of personal opinion, that appear on any Internet website, including, but not limited to,
social networks, blogging sites, and micro-blogging sites, in return for consideration, or otherwise capable of pecuniary estimation. (Emphasis supplied)
It is clear that this paragraph suggests that personal opinions are not included, while sponsored messages are covered.
Thus, the last paragraph of Section 1(1) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 states:
SECTION 1. Definitions - As used in this Resolution:
1. The term "election campaign" or "partisan political activity" refers to an act designed to promote the election or defeat of a particular candidate or
candidates to a public office, and shall include any of the following:
....
Personal opinions, views, and preferences for candidates, contained in blogs shall not be considered acts of election campaigning or partisan
politicalactivity unless expressed by government officials in the Executive Department, the Legislative Department, the Judiciary, the Constitutional
Commissions, and members of the Civil Service.
In any event, this case does not refer to speech in cyberspace, and its effects and parameters should be deemed narrowly tailored only in relation to the
facts and issues in this case. It also appears that such wording in COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 does not similarly appear in Republic Act No. 9006, the
law it implements.
We should interpret in this manner because of the value of political speech.
As early as 1918, in United States v. Bustos,205 this court recognized the need for full discussion of public affairs. We acknowledged that free speech
includes the right to criticize the conduct of public men:
The interest of society and the maintenance of good government demand a full discussion of public affairs. Complete liberty to comment on the conduct of
public men is a scalpel in the case of free speech. The sharp incision of its probe relieves the abscesses of official dom. Men in public life may suffer under
a hostile and an unjust accusation; the wound can be assuaged with the balm of a clear conscience. A public officer must not be too thin-skinned with
reference to comment upon his official acts. Only thus can the intelligence and dignity of the individual be exalted.206
Subsequent jurisprudence developed the right to petition the government for redress of grievances, allowing for criticism, save for some exceptions.207 In
the 1951 case of Espuelas v. People,208 this court noted every citizen’s privilege to criticize his or her government, provided it is "specific and therefore
constructive, reasoned or tempered, and not a contemptuous condemnation of the entire government set-up."209
The 1927 case of People v. Titular210 involved an alleged violation of the Election Law provision "penaliz[ing] the anonymous criticism of a candidate by
means of posters or circulars."211 This court explained that it is the poster’s anonymous character that is being penalized.212 The ponente adds that he
would "dislike very muchto see this decision made the vehicle for the suppression of public opinion."213
In 1983, Reyes v. Bagatsing214 discussed the importance of allowing individuals to vent their views. According to this court, "[i]ts value may lie in the fact
that there may be something worth hearing from the dissenter [and] [t]hat is to ensurea true ferment of ideas."215
Allowing citizens to air grievances and speak constructive criticisms against their government contributes to every society’s goal for development. It puts
forward matters that may be changed for the better and ideas that may be deliberated on to attain that purpose. Necessarily, it also makes the government
accountable for acts that violate constitutionally protected rights.
In 1998, Osmeña v. COMELEC found Section 11(b) of Republic Act No. 6646, which prohibits mass media from selling print space and air time for
campaign except to the COMELEC, to be a democracy-enhancing measure.216 This court mentioned how "discussion of public issues and debate on the
qualifications of candidates in an election are essential to the proper functioning of the government established by our Constitution."217
As pointed out by petitioners, "speech serves one of its greatest public purposes in the context of elections when the free exercise thereof informs the
people what the issues are, and who are supporting what issues."218 At the heart of democracy is every advocate’s right to make known what the people
need to know,219 while the meaningful exercise of one’s right of suffrage includes the right of every voter to know what they need to know in order to
make their choice.
Thus, in Adiong v. COMELEC,220 this court discussed the importance of debate on public issues, and the freedom of expression especially in relation to
information that ensures the meaningful exercise of the right of suffrage:
We have adopted the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide open and that it may well include vehement, caustic and
sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials. Too many restrictions will deny to people the robust, uninhibited, and wide open
debate, the generating of interest essential if our elections will truly be free, clean and honest.
We have also ruled that the preferred freedom of expression calls all the more for the utmost respect when what may be curtailed is the dissemination of
information to make more meaningful the equally vital right of suffrage.221 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
Speech with political consequences isat the core of the freedom of expression and must be protected by this court.
Justice Brion pointed out that freedomof expression "is not the god of rights to which all other rights and even government protection of state interest must
bow."222
The right to freedom of expression isindeed not absolute. Even some forms of protected speech are still subjectto some restrictions. The degree of
restriction may depend on whether the regulation is content-based or content-neutral.223 Content-based regulations can either be based on the viewpoint of
the speaker or the subject of the expression.
II.B.6
Content-based regulation
COMELEC contends that the order for removal of the tarpaulin is a content-neutral regulation. The order was made simply because petitioners failed to
comply with the maximum size limitation for lawful election propaganda.224
On the other hand, petitioners argue that the present size regulation is content-based as it applies only to political speech and not to other forms of speech
such as commercial speech.225 "[A]ssuming arguendo that the size restriction sought to be applied . . . is a mere time, place, and manner regulation, it’s
still unconstitutional for lack of a clear and reasonable nexus with a constitutionally sanctioned objective."226
The regulation may reasonably be considered as either content-neutral or content-based.227 Regardless, the disposition of this case will be the same.
Generally, compared with other forms of speech, the proposed speech is content-based.
As pointed out by petitioners, the interpretation of COMELEC contained in the questioned order applies only to posters and tarpaulins that may affect the
elections because they deliver opinions that shape both their choices. It does not cover, for instance, commercial speech.
Worse, COMELEC does not point to a definite view of what kind of expression of non-candidates will be adjudged as "election paraphernalia." There are
no existing bright lines to categorize speech as election-related and those that are not. This is especially true when citizens will want to use their resources
to be able to raise public issues that should be tackled by the candidates as what has happened in this case. COMELEC’s discretion to limit speech in this
case is fundamentally unbridled.
Size limitations during elections hit ata core part of expression. The content of the tarpaulin is not easily divorced from the size of its medium.
Content-based regulation bears a heavy presumption of invalidity, and this court has used the clear and present danger rule as measure.228 Thus, in Chavez
v. Gonzales:
A content-based regulation, however, bears a heavy presumption of invalidity and is measured against the clear and present danger rule. The latter will pass
constitutional muster only if justified by a compelling reason, and the restrictions imposedare neither overbroad nor vague.229 (Citations omitted)
Under this rule, "the evil consequences sought to be prevented must be substantive, ‘extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high.’"230
"Only when the challenged act has overcome the clear and present danger rule will it pass constitutional muster, with the government having the burden of
overcoming the presumed unconstitutionality."231
Even with the clear and present danger test, respondents failed to justify the regulation. There is no compelling and substantial state interest endangered by
the posting of the tarpaulinas to justify curtailment of the right of freedom of expression. There is no reason for the state to minimize the right of non-
candidate petitioners to post the tarpaulin in their private property. The size of the tarpaulin does not affect anyone else’s constitutional rights.
Content-based restraint or censorship refers to restrictions "based on the subject matter of the utterance or speech." 232 In contrast, content-neutral
regulation includes controls merely on the incidents of the speech such as time, place, or manner of the speech.233
This court has attempted to define "content-neutral" restraints starting with the 1948 case of Primicias v. Fugoso.234 The ordinance in this case was
construed to grant the Mayor discretion only to determine the public places that may be used for the procession ormeeting, but not the power to refuse the
issuance of a permit for such procession or meeting.235 This court explained that free speech and peaceful assembly are "not absolute for it may be so
regulated that it shall not beinjurious to the equal enjoyment of others having equal rights, nor injurious to the rights of the community or society."236
The earlier case of Calalang v. Williams237 involved the National Traffic Commission resolution that prohibited the passing of animal-drawn vehicles
along certain roads at specific hours.238 This court similarly discussed police power in that the assailed rules carry outthe legislative policy that "aims to
promote safe transit upon and avoid obstructions on national roads, in the interest and convenience of the public."239
As early as 1907, United States v. Apurado240 recognized that "more or less disorder will mark the public assembly of the people to protest against
grievances whether real or imaginary, because on such occasions feeling is always wrought to a high pitch of excitement. . . ." 241 It is with this backdrop
that the state is justified in imposing restrictions on incidental matters as time, place, and manner of the speech.
In the landmark case of Reyes v. Bagatsing, this court summarized the steps that permit applicants must follow which include informing the licensing
authority ahead of time as regards the date, public place, and time of the assembly. 242 This would afford the public official time to inform applicants if
there would be valid objections, provided that the clear and present danger test is the standard used for his decision and the applicants are given the
opportunity to be heard.243 This ruling was practically codified in Batas Pambansa No. 880, otherwise known as the Public Assembly Act of 1985.
Subsequent jurisprudence have upheld Batas Pambansa No. 880 as a valid content-neutral regulation. In the 2006 case of Bayan v. Ermita, 244 this court
discussed how Batas Pambansa No. 880 does not prohibit assemblies but simply regulates their time, place, and manner. 245 In 2010, this court found in
Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Atienza246 that respondent Mayor Atienza committed grave abuse of discretion when he modified the rally permit by
changing the venue from Mendiola Bridge to Plaza Miranda without first affording petitioners the opportunity to be heard.247
We reiterate that the regulation involved at bar is content-based. The tarpaulin content is not easily divorced from the size of its medium.
II.B.7
Justice Carpio and Justice Perlas-Bernabe suggest that the provisions imposing a size limit for tarpaulins are content-neutral regulations as these "restrict
the mannerby which speech is relayed but not the content of what is conveyed."248
If we apply the test for content-neutral regulation, the questioned acts of COMELEC will not pass the three requirements for evaluating such restraints on
freedom of speech.249 "When the speech restraints take the form of a content-neutral regulation, only a substantial governmental interest is required for its
validity,"250 and it is subject only to the intermediate approach.251
This intermediate approach is based on the test that we have prescribed in several cases.252 A content-neutral government regulation is sufficiently
justified:
[1] if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; [2] if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; [3] if the governmental
interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and [4] if the incident restriction on alleged [freedom of speech & expression] is no greater than
is essential to the furtherance of that interest.253
On the first requisite, it is not within the constitutional powers of the COMELEC to regulate the tarpaulin. As discussed earlier, this is protected speech by
petitioners who are non-candidates. On the second requirement, not only must the governmental interest be important or substantial, it must also be
compelling as to justify the restrictions made.
Compelling governmental interest would include constitutionally declared principles. We have held, for example, that "the welfare of children and the
State’s mandate to protect and care for them, as parens patriae,254 constitute a substantial and compelling government interest in regulating . . . utterances
in TV broadcast."255
Respondent invokes its constitutional mandate to ensure equal opportunity for public information campaigns among candidates in connection with the
holding of a free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible election.256
Justice Brion in his dissenting opinion discussed that "[s]ize limits to posters are necessary to ensure equality of public information campaigns among
candidates, as allowing posters with different sizes gives candidates and their supporters the incentive to post larger posters[,] [and] [t]his places candidates
with more money and/or with deep-pocket supporters at an undue advantage against candidates with more humble financial capabilities."257
First, Adiong v. COMELEC has held that this interest is "not as important as the right of [a private citizen] to freely express his choice and exercise his
right of free speech."258 In any case, faced with both rights to freedom of speech and equality, a prudent course would be to "try to resolve the tension in a
way that protects the right of participation."259
Second, the pertinent election lawsrelated to private property only require that the private property owner’s consent be obtained when posting election
propaganda in the property.260 This is consistent with the fundamental right against deprivation of property without due process of law. 261 The present
facts do not involve such posting of election propaganda absent consent from the property owner. Thus, this regulation does not apply in this case.
Respondents likewise cite the Constitution262 on their authority to recommend effective measures to minimize election spending. Specifically, Article IX-
C, Section 2(7) provides:
Sec. 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions:
....
(7) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to minimize election spending, including limitation of places where propaganda materials shall be
posted, and to prevent and penalize all forms of election frauds, offenses, malpractices, and nuisance candidates. (Emphasis supplied) This does not qualify
as a compelling and substantial government interest to justify regulation of the preferred right to freedom of expression.
The assailed issuances for the removal of the tarpaulin are based on the two feet (2’) by three feet (3’) size limitation under Section 6(c) of COMELEC
Resolution No. 9615. This resolution implements the Fair Election Act that provides for the same size limitation.263
This court held in Adiong v. COMELEC that "[c]ompared to the paramount interest of the State in guaranteeing freedom of expression, any financial
considerations behind the regulation are of marginal significance."264 In fact, speech with political consequences, as in this case, should be encouraged
and not curtailed. As petitioners pointed out, the size limitation will not serve the objective of minimizing election spending considering there is no limit on
the number of tarpaulins that may be posted.265
The third requisite is likewise lacking. We look not only at the legislative intent or motive in imposing the restriction, but more so at the effects of such
restriction, if implemented. The restriction must not be narrowly tailored to achieve the purpose. It must be demonstrable. It must allow alternative avenues
for the actor to make speech.
In this case, the size regulation is not unrelated to the suppression of speech. Limiting the maximum sizeof the tarpaulin would render ineffective
petitioners’ message and violate their right to exercise freedom of expression.
The COMELEC’s act of requiring the removal of the tarpaulin has the effect of dissuading expressions with political consequences. These should be
encouraged, more so when exercised to make more meaningful the equally important right to suffrage.
The restriction in the present case does not pass even the lower test of intermediate scrutiny for content-neutral regulations.
The action of the COMELEC in thiscase is a strong deterrent to further speech by the electorate. Given the stature of petitioners and their message, there
are indicators that this will cause a "chilling effect" on robust discussion during elections.
The form of expression is just as important as the message itself. In the words of Marshall McLuhan, "the medium is the message." 266 McLuhan’s
colleague and mentor Harold Innis has earlier asserted that "the materials on which words were written down have often counted for more than the words
themselves."267
III
Freedom of expression and equality
III.A
The possibility of abuse
Of course, candidates and political parties do solicit the help of private individuals for the endorsement of their electoral campaigns.
On the one extreme, this can take illicit forms such as when endorsement materials in the form of tarpaulins, posters, or media advertisements are made
ostensibly by "friends" but in reality are really paid for by the candidate or political party. This skirts the constitutional value that provides for equal
opportunities for all candidates.
However, as agreed by the parties during the oral arguments in this case, this is not the situation that confronts us. In such cases, it will simply be a matter
for investigation and proof of fraud on the part of the COMELEC.
The guarantee of freedom of expression to individuals without any relationship to any political candidate should not be held hostage by the possibility of
abuse by those seeking to be elected. It is true that there can be underhanded, covert, or illicit dealings so as to hide the candidate’s real levels of
expenditures. However, labelling all expressions of private parties that tend to have an effect on the debate in the elections as election paraphernalia would
be too broad a remedy that can stifle genuine speech like in this case. Instead, to address this evil, better and more effective enforcement will be the least
restrictive means to the fundamental freedom.
On the other extreme, moved by the credentials and the message of a candidate, others will spend their own resources in order to lend support for the
campaigns. This may be without agreement between the speaker and the candidate or his or her political party. In lieu of donating funds to the campaign,
they will instead use their resources directly in a way that the candidate or political party would have doneso. This may effectively skirt the constitutional
and statutory limits of campaign spending.
Again, this is not the situation in this case.
The message of petitioners in thiscase will certainly not be what candidates and political parties will carry in their election posters or media ads. The
message of petitioner, taken as a whole, is an advocacy of a social issue that it deeply believes. Through rhetorical devices, it communicates the desire of
Diocese that the positions of those who run for a political position on this social issue be determinative of how the public will vote. It primarily advocates a
stand on a social issue; only secondarily — even almost incidentally — will cause the election or non-election of a candidate.
The twin tarpaulins consist of satire of political parties. Satire is a "literary form that employs such devices as sarcasm, irony and ridicule to deride
prevailing vices or follies,"268 and this may target any individual or group in society, private and government alike. It seeks to effectively communicate a
greater purpose, often used for "political and social criticism"269 "because it tears down facades, deflates stuffed shirts, and unmasks hypocrisy. . . .
Nothing is more thoroughly democratic than to have the high-and-mighty lampooned and spoofed."270 Northrop Frye, wellknown in this literary field,
claimed that satire had two defining features: "one is wit or humor founded on fantasy or a sense of the grotesque and absurd, the other is an object of
attack."271 Thus, satire frequently uses exaggeration, analogy, and other rhetorical devices.
The tarpaulins exaggerate. Surely, "Team Patay" does not refer to a list of dead individuals nor could the Archbishop of the Diocese of Bacolod have
intended it to mean that the entire plan of the candidates in his list was to cause death intentionally. The tarpaulin caricatures political parties and parodies
the intention of those in the list. Furthermore, the list of "Team Patay" is juxtaposed with the list of "Team Buhay" that further emphasizes the theme of its
author: Reproductive health is an important marker for the church of petitioners to endorse.
The messages in the tarpaulins are different from the usual messages of candidates. Election paraphernalia from candidates and political parties are more
declarative and descriptive and contain no sophisticated literary allusion to any social objective. Thus, they usually simply exhort the public to vote for a
person with a brief description of the attributes of the candidate. For example "Vote for [x], Sipag at Tiyaga," "Vote for [y], Mr. Palengke," or "Vote for [z],
Iba kami sa Makati."
This court’s construction of the guarantee of freedom of expression has always been wary of censorship or subsequent punishment that entails evaluation
of the speaker’s viewpoint or the content of one’s speech. This is especially true when the expression involved has political consequences. In this case, it
hopes to affect the type of deliberation that happens during elections. A becoming humility on the part of any human institution no matter how endowed
with the secular ability to decide legal controversies with finality entails that we are not the keepers of all wisdom.
Humanity’s lack of omniscience, even acting collectively, provides space for the weakest dissent. Tolerance has always been a libertarian virtue whose
version is embedded in our Billof Rights. There are occasional heretics of yesterday that have become our visionaries. Heterodoxies have always given us
pause. The unforgiving but insistent nuance that the majority surely and comfortably disregards provides us with the checks upon reality that may soon
evolve into creative solutions to grave social problems. This is the utilitarian version. It could also be that it is just part of human necessity to evolve
through being able to express or communicate.
However, the Constitution we interpret is not a theoretical document. It contains other provisions which, taken together with the guarantee of free
expression, enhances each other’s value. Among these are the provisions that acknowledge the idea of equality. In shaping doctrine construing these
constitutional values, this court needs to exercise extraordinary prudence and produce narrowly tailored guidance fit to the facts as given so as not to
unwittingly cause the undesired effect of diluting freedoms as exercised in reality and, thus, render them meaningless.
III.B.
Speech and equality:
Some considerations We first establish that there are two paradigms of free speech that separate at the point of giving priority to equality vis-à-vis
liberty.272
In an equality-based approach, "politically disadvantaged speech prevails over regulation[,] but regulation promoting political equality prevails over
speech."273 This view allows the government leeway to redistribute or equalize ‘speaking power,’ such as protecting, even implicitly subsidizing,
unpopular or dissenting voices often systematically subdued within society’s ideological ladder.274 This view acknowledges that there are dominant
political actors who, through authority, power, resources, identity, or status, have capabilities that may drown out the messages of others. This is especially
true in a developing or emerging economy that is part of the majoritarian world like ours.
The question of libertarian tolerance
This balance between equality and the ability to express so as to find one’s authentic self or to participate in the self determination of one’s communities is
not new only to law. It has always been a philosophical problematique.
In his seminal work, Repressive Tolerance, philosopher and social theorist Herbert Marcuse recognized how institutionalized inequality exists as a
background limitation, rendering freedoms exercised within such limitation as merely "protect[ing] the already established machinery of
discrimination."275 In his view, any improvement "in the normal course of events" within an unequal society, without subversion, only strengthens existing
interests of those in power and control.276
In other words, abstract guarantees of fundamental rights like freedom of expression may become meaningless if not taken in a real context. This tendency
to tackle rights in the abstract compromises liberties. In his words:
Liberty is self-determination, autonomy—this is almost a tautology, but a tautology which results from a whole series of synthetic judgments. It stipulates
the ability to determine one’s own life: to be able to determine what to do and what not to do, what to suffer and what not. But the subject of this autonomy
is never the contingent, private individual as that which he actually is or happens to be; it is rather the individual as a human being who is capable of being
free with the others. And the problem of making possible such a harmony between every individual liberty and the other is not that of finding a
compromise between competitors, or between freedom and law, between general and individual interest, common and private welfare in an established
society, but of creating the society in which man is no longer enslaved by institutions which vitiate self-determination from the beginning. In other words,
freedom is still to be created even for the freest of the existing societies.277 (Emphasis in the original)
Marcuse suggests that the democratic argument — with all opinions presented to and deliberated by the people — "implies a necessary condition, namely,
that the people must be capable of deliberating and choosing on the basis of knowledge, that they must have access to authentic information, and that, on
this basis, their evaluation must be the result of autonomous thought."278 He submits that "[d]ifferent opinions and ‘philosophies’ can no longer compete
peacefully for adherence and persuasion on rational grounds: the ‘marketplace of ideas’ is organized and delimited by those who determine the national and
the individual interest."279 A slant toward left manifests from his belief that "there is a ‘natural right’ of resistance for oppressed and overpowered
minorities to use extralegal means if the legal ones have proved to be inadequate."280 Marcuse, thus, stands for an equality that breaks away and
transcends from established hierarchies, power structures, and indoctrinations. The tolerance of libertarian society he refers to as "repressive tolerance."
Legal scholars
The 20th century also bears witness to strong support from legal scholars for "stringent protections of expressive liberty,"281 especially by political
egalitarians. Considerations such as "expressive, deliberative, and informational interests,"282 costs or the price of expression, and background facts, when
taken together, produce bases for a system of stringent protections for expressive liberties.283
Many legal scholars discuss the interest and value of expressive liberties. Justice Brandeis proposed that "public discussion is a political duty." 284 Cass
Sustein placed political speech on the upper tier of his twotier model for freedom of expression, thus, warranting stringent protection.285 He defined
political speech as "both intended and received as a contribution to public deliberation about some issue."286
But this is usually related also tofair access to opportunities for such liberties.287 Fair access to opportunity is suggested to mean substantive equality and
not mere formal equalitysince "favorable conditions for realizing the expressive interest will include some assurance of the resources required for
expression and some guarantee that efforts to express views on matters of common concern will not be drowned out by the speech of betterendowed
citizens."288 Justice Brandeis’ solution is to "remedy the harms of speech with more speech."289 This view moves away from playing down the danger as
merely exaggerated, toward "tak[ing] the costs seriously and embrac[ing] expression as the preferred strategy for addressing them." 290 However, in some
cases, the idea of more speech may not be enough. Professor Laurence Tribe observed the need for context and "the specification of substantive values
before [equality] has full meaning."291 Professor Catherine A. MacKinnon adds that "equality continues to be viewed in a formal rather than a substantive
sense."292 Thus, more speech can only mean more speech from the few who are dominant rather than those who are not.
Our jurisprudence
This court has tackled these issues.
Osmeña v. COMELEC affirmed National Press Club v. COMELEC on the validity of Section 11(b) ofthe Electoral Reforms Law of 1987. 293 This section
"prohibits mass media from selling or giving free of charge print space or air time for campaign or other political purposes, except to the Commission on
Elections."294 This court explained that this provision only regulates the time and manner of advertising in order to ensure media equality among
candidates.295 This court grounded this measure on constitutional provisions mandating political equality:296 Article IX-C, Section 4
Section 4. The Commission may, during the election period, supervise or regulate the enjoyment or utilization of all franchises or permits for the operation
of transportation and other public utilities, media of communication or information, all grants, special privileges, or concessions granted by the
Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or controlled corporation or its subsidiary. Such
supervision or regulation shall aim to ensure equal opportunity, time, and space, and the right to reply, including reasonable, equal rates therefor, for public
information campaigns and forums among candidates in connection with the objective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections.
(Emphasis supplied)
Article XIII, Section 1
Section 1. The Congress shall give highest priorityto the enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right of all the people to human dignity,
reducesocial, economic, and political inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the common good.
To this end, the State shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use, and disposition of property and its increments. (Emphasis supplied)
Article II, Section 26
Section 26. The State shall guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service, and prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by law. (Emphasis
supplied)
Thus, in these cases, we have acknowledged the Constitution’s guarantee for more substantive expressive freedoms that take equality of opportunities into
consideration during elections.
The other view
However, there is also the other view. This is that considerations of equality of opportunity or equality inthe ability of citizens as speakers should not have
a bearing in free speech doctrine. Under this view, "members of the public are trusted to make their own individual evaluations of speech, and government
is forbidden to intervene for paternalistic or redistributive reasons . . . [thus,] ideas are best left to a freely competitive ideological market."297 This is
consistent with the libertarian suspicion on the use of viewpoint as well as content to evaluate the constitutional validity or invalidity of speech.
The textual basis of this view is that the constitutional provision uses negative rather than affirmative language. It uses ‘speech’ as its subject and not
‘speakers’.298 Consequently, the Constitution protects free speech per se, indifferent to the types, status, or associations of its speakers. 299 Pursuant to
this, "government must leave speakers and listeners in the private order to their own devices in sorting out the relative influence of speech."300
Justice Romero’s dissenting opinion in Osmeña v. COMELEC formulates this view that freedom of speech includes "not only the right to express one’s
views, but also other cognate rights relevant to the free communication [of] ideas, not excluding the right to be informed on matters of public concern." 301
She adds:
And since so many imponderables may affect the outcome of elections — qualifications of voters and candidates, education, means of transportation,
health, public discussion, private animosities, the weather, the threshold of a voter’s resistance to pressure — the utmost ventilation of opinion of men and
issues, through assembly, association and organizations, both by the candidate and the voter, becomes a sine qua non for elections to truly reflect the will of
the electorate.302 (Emphasis supplied)
Justice Romero’s dissenting opinion cited an American case, if only to emphasize free speech primacy such that"courts, as a rule are wary to impose
greater restrictions as to any attempt to curtail speeches with political content,"303 thus:
the concept that the government may restrict the speech of some elements in our society in order to enhance the relative voice of the others is wholly
foreign to the First Amendment which was designed to "secure the widest possible dissemination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources"
and "to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people."304
This echoes Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’ submission "that the market place of ideas is still the best alternative to censorship."305
Parenthetically and just to provide the whole detail of the argument, the majority of the US Supreme Court in the campaign expenditures case of Buckley v.
Valeo "condemned restrictions (even if content-neutral) on expressive liberty imposed in the name of ‘enhanc[ing] the relative voice of others’ and thereby
‘equaliz[ing] access to the political arena."306 The majority did not use the equality-based paradigm.
One flaw of campaign expenditurelimits is that "any limit placed on the amount which a person can speak, which takes out of his exclusive judgment the
decision of when enough is enough, deprives him of his free speech."307
Another flaw is how "[a]ny quantitative limitation on political campaigning inherently constricts the sum of public information and runs counter to our
‘profound national commitment that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open.’"308
In fact, "[c]onstraining those who have funds or have been able to raise funds does not ease the plight of those without funds in the first place . . . [and]
even if one’s main concern isslowing the increase in political costs, it may be more effective torely on market forces toachieve that result than on active
legal intervention."309 According to Herbert Alexander, "[t]o oppose limitations is not necessarily to argue that the sky’s the limit [because in] any
campaign there are saturation levels and a point where spending no longer pays off in votes per dollar."310
III. C.
When private speech amounts
to election paraphernalia
The scope of the guarantee of free expression takes into consideration the constitutional respect for human potentiality and the effect of speech. It valorizes
the ability of human beings to express and their necessity to relate. On the other hand, a complete guarantee must also take into consideration the effects it
will have in a deliberative democracy. Skewed distribution of resources as well as the cultural hegemony of the majority may have the effect of drowning
out the speech and the messages of those in the minority. In a sense, social inequality does have its effect on the exercise and effect of the guarantee of free
speech. Those who have more will have better access to media that reaches a wider audience than those who have less. Those who espouse the more
popular ideas will have better reception than the subversive and the dissenters of society.To be really heard and understood, the marginalized view
normally undergoes its own degree of struggle.
The traditional view has been to tolerate the viewpoint of the speaker and the content of his or her expression. This view, thus, restricts laws or regulation
that allows public officials to make judgments of the value of such viewpoint or message content. This should still be the principal approach.
However, the requirements of the Constitution regarding equality in opportunity must provide limits to some expression during electoral campaigns.
Thus clearly, regulation of speech in the context of electoral campaigns made by candidates or the members of their political parties or their political
parties may be regulated as to time, place, and manner. This is the effect of our rulings in Osmeña v. COMELEC and National Press Club v. COMELEC.
Regulation of speech in the context of electoral campaigns made by persons who are not candidates or who do not speak as members of a political party
which are, taken as a whole, principally advocacies of a social issue that the public must consider during elections is unconstitutional. Such regulation is
inconsistent with the guarantee of according the fullest possible range of opinions coming from the electorate including those that can catalyze candid,
uninhibited, and robust debate in the criteria for the choice of a candidate.
This does not mean that there cannot be a specie of speech by a private citizen which will not amount toan election paraphernalia to be validly regulated by
law.
Regulation of election paraphernalia will still be constitutionally valid if it reaches into speech of persons who are not candidates or who do not speak as
members of a political party if they are not candidates, only if what is regulated is declarative speech that, taken as a whole, has for its principal object the
endorsement of a candidate only. The regulation (a) should be provided by law, (b) reasonable, (c) narrowly tailored to meet the objective of enhancing the
opportunity of all candidates to be heard and considering the primacy of the guarantee of free expression, and (d) demonstrably the least restrictive means
to achieve that object. The regulation must only be with respect to the time, place, and manner of the rendition of the message. In no situation may the
speech be prohibited or censored onthe basis of its content. For this purpose, it will notmatter whether the speech is made with or on private property.
This is not the situation, however, in this case for two reasons. First, as discussed, the principal message in the twin tarpaulins of petitioners consists of a
social advocacy.
Second, as pointed out in the concurring opinion of Justice Antonio Carpio, the present law — Section 3.3 of Republic Act No. 9006 and Section 6(c) of
COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 — if applied to this case, will not pass the test of reasonability. A fixed size for election posters or tarpaulins without any
relation to the distance from the intended average audience will be arbitrary. At certain distances, posters measuring 2 by 3 feet could no longer be read by
the general public and, hence, would render speech meaningless. It will amount to the abridgement of speech with political consequences.
IV
Right to property
Other than the right to freedom of expression311 and the meaningful exercise of the right to suffrage,312 the present case also involves one’s right to
property.313
Respondents argue that it is the right of the state to prevent the circumvention of regulations relating to election propaganda by applying such regulations to
private individuals.314 Certainly, any provision or regulation can be circumvented. But we are not confronted with this possibility. Respondents agree that
the tarpaulin in question belongs to petitioners. Respondents have also agreed, during the oral arguments, that petitioners were neither commissioned nor
paid by any candidate or political party to post the material on their walls.
Even though the tarpaulin is readily seen by the public, the tarpaulin remains the private property of petitioners. Their right to use their property is likewise
protected by the Constitution.
In Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation v. Alcuaz:315
Any regulation, therefore, which operates as an effective confiscation of private property or constitutes an arbitrary or unreasonable infringement of
property rights is void, because it is repugnant to the constitutional guaranties of due process and equal protection of the laws.316 (Citation omitted)
This court in Adiong held that a restriction that regulates where decals and stickers should be posted is "so broad that it encompasses even the citizen’s
private property."317 Consequently, it violates Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution which provides thatno person shall be deprived of his property
without due process of law. This court explained:
Property is more than the mere thing which a person owns, it includes the right to acquire, use, and dispose of it; and the Constitution, in the 14th
Amendment, protects these essential attributes.
Property is more than the mere thing which a person owns. It is elementary that it includes the right to acquire, use, and dispose of it. The Constitution
protects these essential attributes of property. Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 391, 41 L. ed. 780, 790, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 383. Property consists of the free
use, enjoyment, and disposal of a person’s acquisitions without control or diminution save by the law of the land. 1 Cooley’s Bl. Com. 127. (Buchanan v.
Warley 245 US 60 [1917])318
This court ruled that the regulation in Adiong violates private property rights:
The right to property may be subject to a greater degree of regulation but when this right is joined by a "liberty" interest, the burden of justification on the
part of the Government must be exceptionally convincing and irrefutable. The burden is not met in this case.
Section 11 of Rep. Act 6646 is so encompassing and invasive that it prohibits the posting or display of election propaganda in any place, whether public or
private, except inthe common poster areas sanctioned by COMELEC. This means that a private person cannot post his own crudely prepared personal
poster on his own front dooror on a post in his yard. While the COMELEC will certainly never require the absurd, there are no limits to what overzealous
and partisan police officers, armed with a copy of the statute or regulation, may do.319 Respondents ordered petitioners, who are private citizens, to
remove the tarpaulin from their own property. The absurdity of the situation is in itself an indication of the unconstitutionality of COMELEC’s
interpretation of its powers.
Freedom of expression can be intimately related with the right to property. There may be no expression when there is no place where the expression may be
made. COMELEC’s infringement upon petitioners’ property rights as in the present case also reaches out to infringement on their fundamental right to
speech.
Respondents have not demonstrated thatthe present state interest they seek to promote justifies the intrusion into petitioners’ property rights. Election laws
and regulations must be reasonable. It must also acknowledge a private individual’s right to exercise property rights. Otherwise, the due process clause will
be violated.
COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 and the Fair Election Act intend to prevent the posting of election propaganda in private property without the consent of
the owners of such private property. COMELEC has incorrectly implemented these regulations. Consistent with our ruling in Adiong, we find that the act
of respondents in seeking to restrain petitioners from posting the tarpaulin in their own private property is an impermissible encroachments on the right to
property.
V
Tarpaulin and its message are not religious speech
We proceed to the last issues pertaining to whether the COMELEC in issuing the questioned notice and letter violated the right of petitioners to the free
exercise of their religion.
At the outset, the Constitution mandates the separation of church and state.320 This takes many forms. Article III, Section 5 of the Constitution, for
instance provides:
Section 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of
religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference, shall forever be allowed. Noreligious test shall be required for the exercise of civil
or political rights.
There are two aspects of this provision.321 The first is the none stablishment clause.322 Second is the free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession
and worship.323
The second aspect is atissue in this case.
Clearly, not all acts done by those who are priests, bishops, ustadz, imams, or any other religious make such act immune from any secular regulation. 324
The religious also have a secular existence. They exist within a society that is regulated by law.
The Bishop of Bacolod caused the posting of the tarpaulin. But not all acts of a bishop amounts to religious expression. This notwithstanding petitioners’
claim that "the views and position of the petitioners, the Bishop and the Diocese of Bacolod, on the RH Bill is inextricably connected to its Catholic
dogma, faith, and moral teachings. . . ."325
The difficulty that often presents itself in these cases stems from the reality that every act can be motivated by moral, ethical, and religious considerations.
In terms of their effect on the corporeal world, these acts range from belief, to expressions of these faiths, to religious ceremonies, and then to acts of a
secular character that may, from the point of view of others who do not share the same faith or may not subscribe to any religion, may not have any
religious bearing.
Definitely, the characterizations ofthe religious of their acts are not conclusive on this court. Certainly, our powers of adjudication cannot be blinded by
bare claims that acts are religious in nature.
Petitioners erroneously relied on the case of Ebralinag v. The Division Superintendent of Schools of Cebu 326 in claiming that the court "emphatically"
held that the adherents ofa particular religion shall be the ones to determine whether a particular matter shall be considered ecclesiastical in nature. 327 This
court in Ebralinagexempted Jehovah’s Witnesses from participating in the flag ceremony "out of respect for their religious beliefs, [no matter how]
"bizarre" those beliefsmay seem to others."328 This court found a balance between the assertion of a religious practice and the compelling necessities of a
secular command. It was an early attempt at accommodation of religious beliefs.
In Estrada v. Escritor,329 this court adopted a policy of benevolent neutrality:
With religion looked upon with benevolence and not hostility, benevolent neutrality allows accommodation of religion under certain circumstances.
Accommodations are government policies that take religion specifically intoaccount not to promote the government’s favored form of religion, but to allow
individuals and groups to exercise their religion without hindrance. Their purpose or effect therefore is to remove a burden on, or facilitate the exercise of,
a person’s or institution’s religion. As Justice Brennan explained, the "government [may] take religion into account . . . to exempt, when possible, from
generally applicable governmental regulation individuals whose religious beliefs and practices would otherwise thereby be infringed, or to create without
state involvement an atmosphere in which voluntary religious exercise may flourish."330
This court also discussed the Lemon test in that case, such that a regulation is constitutional when: (1) it has a secular legislative purpose; (2) it neither
advances nor inhibits religion; and (3) it does not foster an excessive entanglement with religion.331
As aptly argued by COMELEC, however, the tarpaulin, on its face, "does not convey any religious doctrine of the Catholic church." 332 That the position
of the Catholic church appears to coincide with the message of the tarpaulin regarding the RH Law does not, by itself, bring the expression within the
ambit of religious speech. On the contrary, the tarpaulin clearly refers to candidates classified under "Team Patay" and "Team Buhay" according to their
respective votes on the RH Law.
The same may be said of petitioners’ reliance on papal encyclicals to support their claim that the expression onthe tarpaulin is an ecclesiastical matter. With
all due respect to the Catholic faithful, the church doctrines relied upon by petitioners are not binding upon this court. The position of the Catholic religion
in the Philippines as regards the RH Law does not suffice to qualify the posting by one of its members of a tarpaulin as religious speech solely on such
basis. The enumeration of candidates on the face of the tarpaulin precludes any doubtas to its nature as speech with political consequences and not religious
speech.
Furthermore, the definition of an "ecclesiastical affair" in Austria v. National Labor Relations Commission333 cited by petitioners finds no application in
the present case. The posting of the tarpaulin does not fall within the category of matters that are beyond the jurisdiction of civil courts as enumerated in
the Austriacase such as "proceedings for excommunication, ordinations of religious ministers, administration of sacraments and other activities
withattached religious significance."334
A FINAL NOTE
We maintain sympathies for the COMELEC in attempting to do what it thought was its duty in this case. However, it was misdirected.
COMELEC’s general role includes a mandate to ensure equal opportunities and reduce spending among candidates and their registered political parties. It
is not to regulate or limit the speech of the electorate as it strives to participate inthe electoral exercise.
The tarpaulin in question may be viewed as producing a caricature of those who are running for public office.Their message may be construed
generalizations of very complex individuals and party-list organizations.
They are classified into black and white: as belonging to "Team Patay" or "Team Buhay."
But this caricature, though not agreeable to some, is still protected speech.
That petitioners chose to categorize them as purveyors of death or of life on the basis of a single issue — and a complex piece of legislation at that — can
easily be interpreted as anattempt to stereo type the candidates and party-list organizations. Not all may agree to the way their thoughts were expressed, as
in fact there are other Catholic dioceses that chose not to follow the example of petitioners.
Some may have thought that there should be more room to consider being more broad-minded and non-judgmental. Some may have expected that the
authors would give more space to practice forgiveness and humility.
But, the Bill of Rights enumerated in our Constitution is an enumeration of our fundamental liberties. It is not a detailed code that prescribes good conduct.
It provides space for all to be guided by their conscience, not only in the act that they do to others but also in judgment of the acts of others.
Freedom for the thought we can disagree with can be wielded not only by those in the minority. This can often be expressed by dominant institutions, even
religious ones. That they made their point dramatically and in a large way does not necessarily mean that their statements are true, or that they have basis,
or that they have been expressed in good taste.
Embedded in the tarpaulin, however, are opinions expressed by petitioners. It is a specie of expression protected by our fundamental law. It is an
expression designed to invite attention, cause debate, and hopefully, persuade. It may be motivated by the interpretation of petitioners of their ecclesiastical
duty, but their parishioner’s actions will have very real secular consequences. Certainly, provocative messages do matter for the elections.
What is involved in this case is the most sacred of speech forms: expression by the electorate that tends to rouse the public to debate contemporary issues.
This is not speechby candidates or political parties to entice votes. It is a portion of the electorate telling candidates the conditions for their election. It is
the substantive content of the right to suffrage.
This. is a form of speech hopeful of a quality of democracy that we should all deserve. It is protected as a fundamental and primordial right by our
Constitution. The expression in the medium chosen by petitioners deserves our protection.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The temporary restraining order previously issued is hereby made permanent. The act of the COMELEC
in issuing the assailed notice dated February 22, 2013 and letter dated February 27, 2013 is declared unconstitutional.
SO ORDERED.
MARVIC M.V.F. LEONEN
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
Chief Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO ARTURO D. BRION*

Associate Justice Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO MARTN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice Associate Justice
 BIENVENIDO L. REYES ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice Associate Justice

No Part
FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA**
Associate Justice
C E R TI F I CATI O N
I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
Chief Justice

Footnotes
* On official leave. ·
** No part.
1 Rollo, pp. 3–18.
2 Id. at 19.
3 Id. at 23.
4 Id. at 6.
5 Id. at 155.
6 Id. at 6–7.
7 Id.
8 Id. at 19.
9 See COMELEC Resolution No. 9615 (2013), sec. 6(c).
10 Rollo, pp. 20–22.
11 Id. at 21.
12 Id. at 23.
13 Id. at 23.
14 Id. at 15–16.
15 Id. at 16.
16 Id. at 24.
17 Id. at 32–49.
18 Id. at 35.
19 Id. at 50-C.
20 Id. at 94–96.
21 Id. at 62–64.
22 See Macabago v. Commission on Elections,440 Phil. 683, 690–692 (2002) [Per J. Callejo, Sr., En Banc].
23 Rollo, p. 63.
24 CONST., art. IX-C, sec. 2(3):
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-6025 May 30, 1964
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
AMADO V. HERNANDEZ, ET AL., accused,
AMADO V. HERNANDEZ, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
-----------------------------
G.R. No. L-6026 May 30, 1964
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
BAYANI ESPIRITU, ET AL., accused,
BAYANI ESPIRITU and TEOPISTA VALERIO, defendants-appellants.
LABRADOR, J.:
This is the appeal prosecuted by the defendants from the judgment rendered by the Court of First Instance of Manila, Hon. Agustin P. Montesa, presiding,
in its Criminal Case No. 15841, People vs. Amado V. Hernandez, et al., and Criminal Case No. 15479, People vs. Bayani Espiritu, et al. In Criminal Case
No. 15841 (G.R. No. L-6026) the charge is for Rebellion with Multiple Murder, Arsons and Robberies; the appellants are Amado V. Hernandez, Juan J.
Cruz, Genaro de la Cruz, Amado Racanday, Fermin Rodillas and Julian Lumanog; Aquilino Bunsol, Adriano Samson and Andres Baisa, Jr. were among
those sentenced in the judgment appealed from, but they have withdrawn their appeal. In Criminal Case No. 15479 (G.R. No. L-6026) the charge is for
rebellion with murders, arsons and kidnappings; the accused are Bayani Espiritu Teopista Valerio and Andres Balsa, Jr.; they all appealed but Andres Balsa,
Jr. withdrew his appeal.
The information filed against defendants Hernandez and others in Criminal Case No. 15481 alleged:
I. That on or about March 15, 1945, and for some time before the said date and continuously thereafter, until the present time, in the City of
Manila, Philippines, and the place which they had chosen as the nerve center of all their rebellious activities in the different parts of the
Philippines, the said accused, conspiring, confederating and cooperating with each other, as well as with the thirty-one (31) defendants charged
in Criminal Cases Nos. 19071, 14082, 14270, 14315 and 14344 of the Court of First Instance of Manila (decided May 11, 1951) and also with
others whose whereabouts and identities are still unknown, the said accused and their other co-conspirators, being then high ranking officers
and/or members of, or otherwise affiliated with the Communist Party of the Philippines (P.K.P.), which is now actively engaged in an armed
rebellion against the Government of the Philippines thru act theretofore committed and planned to be further committed in Manila and other
places in the Philippines, and of which party the "Hukbong Mapagpalaya Ng Bayan"(H.M.B.) otherwise or formerly known as the
"Hukbalahaps" (Huks), unlawfully and did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously help, support, promote, maintain, cause, direct
and/or command the "Hukbong Mapagpalaya Ng Bayan" (H.M.B.) or the "Hukbalahaps" (Huks) to rise publicly and take arms against the
Republic of the Philippines, or otherwise participate in such armed public uprising, for the purpose of removing the territory of the Philippines
from the allegiance to the government and laws thereof as in fact the said "Hukbong Mapagpalaya Ng Bayan" or "Hukbalahaps" have risen
publicly and taken arms to attain the said purpose by then and there making armed raids, sorties and ambushes, attacks against police,
constabulary and army detachments as well as innocent civilians, and as a necessary means to commit the crime of rebellion, in connection
therewith and in furtherance thereof, have then and there committed acts of murder, pillage, looting, plunder, arson, and planned destruction of
private and public property to create and spread chaos, disorder, terror, and fear so as to facilitate the accomplishment of the aforesaid purpose,
as. follows, to wit: (Enumeration of thirteen attacks on government forces or civilians by Huks on May 6, 1946, August 6, 1946, April 10, 1947,
May 9, 1947, August 19, 1947, June, 1946, April 28, 1949, August 25, 1950, August 26, 1950, August 25, 1950, September 12, 1950, March 28,
1950 and March 29, 1950.)
II. That during the period of time and under the same circumstances herein-above indicated the said accused in the above-entitled case,
conspiring among themselves and with several others as aforesaid, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously organized, established, led and/or
maintained the Congress of Labor Organizations (CLO), formerly known as the Committee on Labor Organizations (CLO), with central offices
in Manila and chapters and affiliated or associated labor unions and other "mass organizations" in different places in the Philippines, as an active
agency, organ, and instrumentality of the Communist Party of the Philippines (P.K.P.) and as such agency, organ, and instrumentality, to fully
cooperate in, and synchronize its activities — as the CLO thus organized, established, led and/or maintained by the herein accused and their co-
conspirators, has in fact fully cooperated in and synchronized its activities with the activities of the "Hukbong Mapagpalaya Ng Bayan"
(H.M.B.) and other organs, agencies, and instrumentalities of the Communist Party of the Philippines (P.K.P.), to thereby assure, facilitate, and
effect the complete and permanent success of the above-mentioned armed rebellion against the Government of the Philippines.
The information filed against the defendants in Criminal Case No. 15479, Bayani Espiritu Andres Baisa, Jr. and Teopista Valerio, alleges:
That on or about the 6th day of May, 1946, and for sometime prior and subsequent thereto and continuously up to the present time, in the City of
Manila, the seat of the government of the Republic of the Philippines, which the herein accused have intended to overthrow, and the place
chosen for that purpose as the nerve center of all their rebellious atrocities in the different parts of the country, the said accused being then high
ranking officials and/or members of the Communist Party of the Philippines (P.K.P.) and/or of the "Hukbong Mapagpalaya Ng Bayan" (H.M.B.)
otherwise or formerly known as the "Hukbalahaps" (HUKS), the latter being the armed forces of said Communist Party of the Philippines;
having come to an agreement with the 29 of the 31 accused in Criminal Cases Nos. 14071, 14082, 14270, 14315, 14344 of the Court of First
Instance of Manila and decided to commit the crime of rebellion, and therefore, conspiring and confederating with all of the 29 accused in said
criminal cases, acting in accordance with their conspiracy and in furtherance thereof, together with many others whose whereabouts and
identities are still unknown up to the filing of this information, and helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
promote maintain, cause, direct and/or command the "Hukbong Mapagpalaya Ng Bayan", (HMB) or the Hukbalahaps (HUKS) to rise publicly
and take Arms against the Government or otherwise participate therein for the purpose of overthrowing the same, as in fact, the said "Hukbong
Mapagpalaya Ng Bayan" or Hukbalahap (HUKS) have risen publicly and taken arms against the Government, by then and there making armed
raids, sorties and ambushes, attacks against police, constabulary and army detachment, and as a necessary means to commit the crime of
rebellion, in connection therewith and in furtherance thereof, by then and there committing wanton acts of murder, spoilage, looting, arson,
kidnappings, planned destruction of private and public buildings, to create and spread terrorism in order to facilitate the accomplishment of the
aforesaid purpose, as follows to wit: (Enumeration of thirteen attacks on Government forces or civilians by Huks on May 6, 1946. August 6,
1946, April 10, 1947, May 9, 1947, August 19, 1947, June 1946, April 28, 1949, August 25, 1950, August 26, 1950, August 25, 1950, September
12, 1950, March 28, 1950 and March 29, 1950).
A joint trial of both cases was held, after which the court rendered the decision subject of the present appeals.
APPEAL OF AMADO V. HERNANDEZ
After trial the Court of First Instance found, as against appellant Amado V. Hernandez, the following: (1) that he is a member of the Communist Party of
the Philippines and as such had aliases, namely, Victor or Soliman; (2) that he was furnished copies of "Titis", a Communist publication, as well as other
publications of the Party; (3) that he held the position of President of the Congress of Labor Organizations; (4) that he had close connections with the
Secretariat of the Communist Party and held continuous communications with its leaders and its members; (5) that he furnished a mimeographing machine
used by the Communist Party, as well as clothes and supplies for the military operations of the Huks; (6) that he had contacted well-known Communists
coming to the Philippines and had gone abroad to the WFTU conference Brussels, Belgium as a delegate of the CLO, etc. Evidence was also received by
the court that Hernandez made various speeches encouraging the people to join in the Huk movement in the provinces.
The court also found that there was a close tie-up between the Communist Party and the Congress of Labor Organizations, of which Hernandez was the
President, and that this Congress was organized by Hernandez in conjunction with other Huks, namely: Alfredo Saulo, Mariano Balgos, Guillermo
Capadocia, etc.
We will now consider the nature and character of both the testimonial as well as the documentary evidence, independently of each other, to find out if the
said evidence supports the findings of the court.
Testimonial Evidence
Amado V. Hernandez took the oath as member of the Communist Party in the month of October, 1947, at the offices of the Congress of Labor
Organizations at 2070 Azcarraga in the presence of Guillermo Capadocia, Ramon Espiritu, Pedro Castro, Andres Balsa, etc. As a Communist he was given
the pseudonyms of Victor and Soliman, and received copies of the Communist paper "Titis". He made various speeches on the following dates and
occasions:
(1) On August 29, 1948 before the Democratic Peace Rally of the CLO at Plaza Miranda, in which he announced that the people will soon meet
their dear comrade in the person of Comrade Luis Taruc.
(2) On September 4, 1948 he conferred with Hindu Khomal Goufar at the Escolta, at which occasion Balgos told Goufar that the PKM, CLO
and the Huks are in one effort that the PKM are the peasants in the field and the Huks are the armed forces of the Communist Party; and the
CLO falls under the TUD of the Communist Party. 1äwphï1.ñët
(3) On October 2, 1948 he went abroad to attend the Second Annual Convention of the World Federation of Trade Unions and after arrival from
abroad a dinner was given to him by the people of Gagalangin, at which Hernandez delivered a speech and he said that he preferred to go with
the Huks because he felt safer with them than with the authorities of the Government.
(4) In April, 1949, he made a speech before a group of tenants in Malabon attacking the frauds in the 1947 elections, graft and corruption in the
elections and that if improvement cannot be made by the ballots, they could be made by bullets; and enjoined the people to go to the hills and
join Luis Taruc the head of the dissidents in the Philippines.
(5) On October 2, 1949 he delivered a speech on the occasion of the commemoration of the World Peace at the CLO headquarters at 330 P.
Campa. He attacked the city mayor and incited the people to go to Balintawak and see Bonifacio there and thereafter join four comrades under
the leadership of Luis Taruc.
(6) On October 16, 1949 he delivered a speech before a convention of the unemployed at 330 P. Campa. He asked the unemployed to approve a
resolution urging the Government to give them jobs. In conclusion he said that if the Government fails to give them jobs the only way out was
to join the revolutionary forces fighting in the hills. He further said that Mao Tse Tung, leader of the People's Army in China, drove Chiang Kai
Shek from his country, and that Luis Taruc was also being chased by Government forces run by puppets like Quirino, etc.
(7) On January 13, 1950 there was another meeting at 330 P. Campa. In his talk Hernandez expressed regret that two foremost leaders of the
CLO, Balgos and Capadocia, had gone to the field to join the liberation army of the HMB, justifying their going out and becoming heroes by
fighting in the fields against Government forces until the ultimate goal is achieved.
The above evidence was testified to by Florentino Diolata who was the official photographer of the CLO since August, 1948.
On the tie-up between the Communist Party and the CLO Guillermo Calayag, a Communist and a Huk from 1942 to 1950, explained:
(1) The ultimate goal of the Communist Party is to overthrow the president government by force of aims and violence; thru armed revolution
and replace it with the so-called dictatorship of the proletariat the Communist Party carries its program of armed overthrow of the present
government by organizing the HMB and other forms of organization's such as the CLO, PKM, union organizations, and the professional and
intellectual group; the CLO was organized by the Trade Union Division TUD of the Communist Party.
(2) A good majority of the members of the Executive Committee and the Central Committee of the CLO were also top ranking officials of the
Communist Party; activities undertaken by the TUD - the vital undertaking of the TUD is to see that the directives coming from the
organizational bureau of the Communist Party can be discussed within the CLO especially the Executive Committee. And it is a fact that since a
good majority of the members of the Executive Committee are party members, there is no time, there is no single time that those directives and
decisions of the organizational department, thru the TUD are being objected to by the Executive Committee of the CLO. These directives refer
to how the CLO will conduct its functions. The executive committee is under the chairmanship of accused Amado V. Hernandez.
(3) The CLO played its role in the overall Communist program of armed overthrow of the present government and its replacement by the
dictatorship of the proletariat by means of propaganda - by propagating the principles of Communism, by giving monetary aid, clothing,
medicine and other forms of material help to the HMB. This role is manifested in the very constitution of the CLO itself which expounded the
theory of classless society and the eradication of social classes (par. 5, Sec. 1, Art. 2, page 18 of the CLO Constitution contained in the Fourth
Annual Convention Souvenir Program of the CLO Exh. "V-1579"). Thru propaganda, the CLO promoted the aims of Communist Party and
disseminated Communist ideas by:
(a) The conspicuous display of the portrait or, pictures of Crisanto Evangelista (Exh. V-1662), founder of Communism in the
Philippines, in the session hall of the CLO headquarters at 2070 Azcarraga and then at 330 P. Campa;
(b) The distribution of foreign communist reading materials such as the World Federation of Trade Union Magazine, International
Union of Students magazine, Voice magazine of the marine cooks of the CLO, World Committee of the Defenders of the Peace
magazine, Free Bulgaria magazine, Soviet Russia Today magazine and World Federation of Democratic Youth magazine (Exhs. V-
911, V-907, V-910, V-899, V-912, V-853, W-996 and V-967);
(c) The publication and distribution of some local subversive publications such as the "Titis", "Bisig", Kidlat", which are Communist
Party organs; "The Philippine Labor Demands Justice" and "Hands Off Korea" authored by accused Amado V. Hernandez;
(d) Principles of Communism were also propagated thru lectures, meetings, and by means of organization of committees in the
 educational department as well as researches in the Worker's Institute of the CLO.
(4) The CLO also helped carry out the program of the Communist Party thru infiltration of party members and selected leaders of the HMB
within the trade unions under the control of the CLO. The Communist Party thru the CLO assigned Communist Party leaders and organizers to
different factories in order to organize unions. After the organization of the union, it will affiliate itself with the CLO thru the Communist
leaders and the CLO in turn, will register said union with the Department of Labor; and the orientation and indoctrination of the workers is
continued in the line of class struggle. After this orientation and infiltration of the Communist Party members and selected leaders of the HMB
with the trade unions under the control of the CLO is already achieved and the group made strong enough to carry out its aims, they will begin
the sporadic strikes and the liquidation of anti-labor elements and anti-Communist elements and will create a so-called revolutionary crisis. That
revolutionary crisis will be done for the party to give directives to the HMB who are fighting in the countrysides and made them come to the
city gates. The entry of the HMB is being paved by the simultaneous and sporadic strikes, by ultimate general strikes thru the management of
the CLO.
Important Documents Submitted at Trial
1. Documents which proved that Amado V. Hernandez used the aliases "Victor", or was referred to as "Victor" or "Soliman".
(a) Letter dated April 23, 1950 (signed) by Victor addressed to Julie telling the latter of his sympathies for other communists,
describing his experiences with Communists abroad, telling Julie to dispose of materials that may be sent by Victor. (Exh. D-2001-
2004)
(b) "Paano Maisasagawa, etc." — mentions different groups of labor unions of which Victor heads one group, consisting of the
MRRCO, PTLD, PGWU, EMWU and IRWU (Exh. C-2001-2008) Cadres assigned to different industries. (Exh. V-40-41)
(c) Handwritten certificate of Honofre Mangila states that he knew Amado Hernandez as Victor from co-party members Hugo and
Ely. (Exh. LL)
(d) Letter of Elias to Ka Eto requesting the latter to deliver attached letter to Victor. (Exh. 1103)
(e) Saulo's letter about his escape, asks Victor why his press statement was not published in the newspapers. (Exh. C-362) Letter was
however published by Hernandez in the Daily Mirror.
(f) Letter of Taruc to Maclang directing the latter to give copy of Huk Story to Victor. (Exh. D-463-64)
(g) Notes of Salome Cruz, Huk courier, stating that she went to Soliman at Pampanga St. to bring to the latter communications from
the Communist Party. (Exh. D-1203) That Soliman was given copies of "Titis". (Exh. D-1209)
(h) SEC directions to Politburo members, Soliman not to be involved with Nacionalista Rebels. (Exh. F-92-93. SEC)
(i) Letter of SEC to Politburo reporting that Saulo be sent out and Soliman has "tendencies of careerism and tendency to want to deal
with leaders of the party"; that he should be asked to choose to go underground or fight legally. (Exh. F-562)
(j) Explanation given by Hernandez why he did not join Saulo in going underground. (Exh. V-87) (1) His election as councilor until
December, 1951. (Exhs. V-42, W-9) (2) His election as President of CLO until August of following year. (Exhs. V-42, W-9)
2. Letters and Messages of Hernandez.
(a) To Lyden Henry and Harry Reich, tells Huks still fighting. (Exh. V-80)
(b) To SOBSI Jakarta — that Filipinos are joining other communist countries of the East. (Exh. V-82)
(c) Press release on Saulo's disappearance published by Amado Hernandez. (Exh. W-116-120)
(d) To Hugh and Eddie, July 8, 1949 — Extends greetings to National Union of Marine Cooks and Stewards, states that labor has one
common struggle — "the liberation of all the peoples from the chains of tyranny, fascism and imperialism". (Exh. V-259)
(e) To Kas. Pablo and Estrada - talks of the fight - fight of labor. (Exh. V-85-89)
(f) Appeal to the Women and Asia. (Exh. V-5-10)
(g) Letter to Julie (Exh. V-2001-2004)
(h) Letter to Chan Lieu - states that leaders during the war are being persecuted, like Taruc. Tells of reward of P100,000.00 on Taruc's
head. (Exh. X-85-88)
(i) Letter to John Gates of the Daily Worker — condemns Wall Street maneuvers; corruption and graft in Quirino administration, etc.
(Exh. V-83)
(j) Cablegram: CLO join ILWU commends Harry Bridges, US Communist. (Exh. V-79)
(k) Communication of Hernandez to CLO at MRRCO — Praises Balgos and Capadocia for joining the Huks. (Exhs. V-12-22, V-289)
(l) "Philippine labor Demands Justice" — Attacks czars of Wall Street and U.S. Army and Government. (Exh. V-94) .
(m) Letter to Taruc — June 28, 1948.-States solidarity among the CLO Huks and PKM. Attacks North Atlantic Pact. Praises Mao Tse
Tung (contained in Exh. V-94)
(n) "Philippines Is Not A Paradise" — States of a delegation to Roxas attacking unemployment. (Exh. V-90-93)
(o) Article "Progressive Philippines" — (Exh. V-287)
(p) Article "Hands Off Korea" — (Exhs. V-488-494, 495-501, 509-515, W-25-26)
(q) "Limang Buwang Balak Sa Pagpapalakas Ng Organisasyon". (Exh. X-35-38)
 (r) Press statement of Hernandez — opposes acceptance of decorations from Greece by Romulo. (Exh. V-72)
3. Other Activities of Hernandez.
(a) Hernandez received clothes from Pres. Lines thru P. Campa, which clothes he sent to the field. Letters show of sending of
supplies to Huks. (Exh. S-383)
(b) Hernandez was asked to furnish portable typewriter, which he did furnish to Huks. (Exh. C-364)
(c) Hernandez brought Taruc's letter about facts and incidents about Huks to Bulosan for inclusion in Bulosan's book. (Exh. FF-1)
(d) Had conference with Kumar Goshal a Hindu, about the Huks and their armed forces. (Photographs, Exhs. X-6 RR-54-55A)
(e) Supervised taking of pictures of sons of Capadocia and Joven. (Photographs, Exhs. T-1, RR-136-138A)
(f) Had knowledge of the going underground of Capadocia and Balgos and issued press release about their going underground. (Exh.
F-91)
(g) Victor mentioned to continue as contact for Chino. (Exh. C-362)
(h) Taruc's letter to Maclang shows that Soliman had sent 7 lessons to Taruc. (Exh. D-451-451-A)
(i) Associated with fellow ranking Communist leaders.
The Court upon consideration of the evidence submitted, found (1) that the Communist Party was fully organized as a party and in order to carry out its
aims and policies a established a National Congress, a Central Committee (CC), Politburo PB, Secretariat (SEC), Organization Bureau (OB), and National
Courier or Communication Division (NCD), each body performing functions indicated in their respective names; (2) that in a meeting held on August 11,
1950 the SEC discussed the creation of a Military Committee of the Party and a new GHQ, under which on September 29, 1950 the SEC organized a
special warfare division, with a technological division; (3) that on May 5, 1950 a body known as the National Intelligence Division was created, to gather
essential military intelligence and, in general, all information useful for the conduct of the armed struggle (4) that a National Finance Committee was also
organized as a part of the Politburo and answerable to it; (5) that the country was divided into 10 Recos, the 10th Reco comprising the Manila and suburbs
command; (6) that since November, 1949 the CPP had declared the existence of a revolutionary situation and since then the Party had gone underground
and the CPP is leading the armed struggle for national liberation, and called on the people to organize guerrillas and coordinate with the HMB on the
decisive struggle and final overthrow of the imperialist government; (7) that in accordance with such plan the CPP prepared plans for expansion and
development not only of the Party but also of the HMB; the expansion of the cadres from 3,600 in July 1950 to 56,000 in September 1951, the HMB from
10,800 in July 1950 to 172,000 in September 1951, et seq.
Around the month of January, 1950 it was decided by the CPP to intensify HMB military operations for political purposes. The Politburo sanctioned the
attacks made by the Huks on the anniversary of the HMB on March 25, 1950. The HMB attacks that were reported to the PB were those made in May,
1946; June, 1946; April 10, 1947; May 9, 1947; August 19, 1947; August 25, 1950; August 26, 1950; October 15 and 17, 1950; May 6, 1946; August 6,
1946; April 10, 1947; May 9, 1947; August 19, 1947; April 29, 1949; August 25, 1950; August 26, 1950; September 12, 1950; March 26, 1950; March 29,
1950.
The theory of the prosecution, as stated in the lower court's decision, is as follows:
The evidence does not show that the defendants in these cases now before this Court had taken a direct part in those raids and in the commission
of the crimes that had been committed. It is not, however, the theory of the prosecution that they in fact had direct participation in the
commission of the same but rather that the defendants in these cases have cooperated, conspired and confederated with the Communist Party in
the prosecution and successful accomplishment of the aims and purposes of the said Party thru the organization called the CLO (Congress of
Labor Organizations).
The Court found that the CLO is independent and separate from the CPP, organized under the same pattern as the CPP, having its own National Congress, a
Central Committee (which acts in the absence of and in representation of the National Congress), an Executive Committee (which acts when the National
Congress and the Executive Committee are not in session), and seven permanent Committees, namely, of Organization, Unemployment and Public
Relations, Different Strikes and Pickets, Finance, Auditing, Legislation and Political Action. Members of the Communist Party dominate the committees of
the CLO. The supposed tie-up between CPP and the CLO of which Hernandez was the President, is described by the court below in finding, thus:
Just how the CLO coordinates its functions with the Communist Party organ under which it operates was explained by witness Guillermo S. Calayag, one-
time ranking member of the Communist Party and the CLO who typewrites the "Patnubay sa Education" from a handwritten draft of Capadocia, which is
one of the texts used in the Worker's institute of the CLO. According to him, the CLO plays its role by means of propaganda, giving monetary aid, clothing,
medicine and other material forms of help to the HMB, which constitutes the armed forces of the Communist Party. Propaganda is done by lectures,
meetings, and the organization of committees of the educational department as well as researches at the CLO Worker's Institute.
Another way of helping the Communist Party of the Philippines is by allowing the Communist Party leaders to act as organizers in the different
factories in forming a union. These Party Members help workers in the factories to agitate for the eradication of social classes and ultimately
effect the total emancipation of the working classes thru the establishment of the so-called dictatorship of the proletariat. It is the duty of these
Communist Party members to indoctrinate uninitiated workers in the union to become proselytes of the Communist Party ideology. After the
right number is secured and a union is formed under a communist leader, this union is affiliated with the CLO and this in turn registers the same
with the Department of Labor. The orientation and indoctrination of the masses is continued with the help of the CLO. The primary objective of
the CLO is to create what is called a revolutionary crisis. It seeks to attain this objective by first making demands from the employers for
concessions which become more and more unreasonable until the employers would find it difficult to grant the same. Then a strike is declared.
But the strikes are only preparation for the ultimate attainment of the Communist goal of armed overthrow of the government. After the workers
in the factories have already struck in general at the behest of the Communist Party thru the CLO a critical point is reached when a signal is
given for the armed forces of the Communist Party, the HMB, to intervene and carry the revolution now being conducted outside to within the
city.
On the basis of the above findings, the court below found Hernandez guilty as principal of the crime charged against him and sentenced him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua with the accessories provided by law, and to pay the proportionate amount of the costs.
Our study of the testimonial and documentary evidence, especially those cited by the Court in its decision and by the Solicitor General in his brief,
discloses that defendant-appellant Amado V. Hernandez, as a Communist, was an active advocate of the principles of Communism, frequently exhorting
his hearers to follow the footsteps of Taruc and join the uprising of the laboring classes against capitalism and more specifically against America and the
Quirino administration, which he dubbed as a regime of puppets of American imperialism. But beyond the open advocacy of Communistic Theory there
appears no evidence that he actually participated in the actual conspiracy to overthrow by force the constituted authority.
Hernandez is the founder and head of the CLO. As such, what was his relation to the rebellion? If, as testified to by Guillermo S. Calayag, the CLO plays
merely the role of propagation by lectures, meetings and organization of committees of education by Communists; if, as stated, the CLO merely allowed
Communist Party leaders to act as organizers in the different factories, to indoctrinate the CLO members into the Communist Party and proselytize them to
the Communist ideology; if, as also indicated by Calayag, the CLO purports to attain the ultimate overthrow of the Government first by making demands
from employers for concessions until the employers find it difficult to grant the same, at which time a strike is declared; if it is only after the various strikes
have been carried out and a crisis is thereby developed among the laboring class, that the Communist forces would intervene and carry the revolution — it
is apparent that the CLO was merely a stepping stone in the preparation of the laborers for the Communist' ultimate revolution. In other words, the CLO
had no function but that of indoctrination and preparation of the members for the uprising that would come. It was only a preparatory organization prior to
revolution, not the revolution itself. The leader of the CLO therefore, namely Hernandez, cannot be considered as a leader in actual rebellion or of the
actual uprising subject of the accusation. Hernandez, as President of the CLO therefore, by his presidency and leadership of the CLO cannot be considered
as having actually risen up in arms in rebellion against the Government of the Philippines, or taken part in the conspiracy to commit the rebellion as
charged against him in the present case; he was merely a propagandist and indoctrinator of Communism, he was not a Communist conspiring to commit
the actual rebellion by the mere fact of his presidency of the CLO.
The court below declares that since November 1949 the Communist Party of the Philippines had declared the existence of the revolutionary situation and
since then the Party had gone underground, with the CPP leading the struggle for national integration and that in the month of January 1950, it was decided
by the said Party to intensify the HMB military operations for political purposes. The court implicates the appellant Hernandez as a co-conspirator in this
resolution or acts of the Communist Party by his mere membership thereto. We find this conclusion unwarranted. The seditious speeches of Hernandez
took place before November, 1949 when the CPP went underground. The court below has not been able to point out, nor have We been able to find among
all acts attributed to Hernandez, any single fact or act of his from which it may be inferred that he took part in the deliberations declaring the existence of a
revolutionary situation, or that he had gone underground. As a matter of fact the prosecution's evidence is to the effect that Hernandez refused to go
underground preferring to engage in what they consider the legal battle for the cause.
We have also looked into the different documents which have been presented at the time of the trial and which were confiscated from the office of the
Politburo of the Communist Party. The speeches of Hernandez were delivered before the declaration by the Communist Party of a state of revolutionary
situation in 1949. Neither was it shown that Hernandez was a member of the Executive Committee, or of the SEC, or of the Politburo of the Communist
Party; so NO presumption can arise that he had taken part in the accord or conspiracy declaring a revolution. In short, there has been no evidence, direct or
indirect, to relate or connect the appellant Hernandez with the uprising or the resolution to continue or maintain said uprising, his participation in the
deliberations leading to the uprising being inferred only from the fact that he was a communist.
The practice among the top Communists, as declared by the trial court appears to have been for important members, if they intend actually to join the
rebellion, to go underground, which meant leaving the city, disappearing from sight and/or secretly joining the forces in the field.
The document, Exhibit F-562, which is quoted in the decision, contains the directive of the SEC of September 1, 1950, to Saulo and Hernandez, which
reads:
11. In view of the new developments in the city, send out Elias who prefers to work outside. Present problem of fighting legally to Com.
Soliman. If Soliman is prepared for martyrdom, retain him to fight legally. If not, send him out with Elias. Same goes with Com. Mino and other
relatively exposed mass leaders.
And the lower court itself found that whereas Saulo went underground and joined the underground forces outside the City, Hernandez remained in the City,
engaged in the work of propaganda, making speeches and causing the publication of such matters as the Communist Party leaders directed him to publish.
That Hernandez refused to go underground is a fact which is further corroborated by the following reasons (excuses) given by him for not going
underground, namely (1) that his term of councilor of the City of Manila was to extend to December, 1951; and (2) that he was elected President of the
CLO for a term which was to end the year 1951.
As a matter of fact the SEC gave instructions to Hernandez not to be involved with Nacionalista Rebels, and reported to the Politburo that Hernandez "has
tendencies of careerism, and tending to want to deal with leaders of the Nacionalista Party instead of following CPP organizational procedures."
The court below further found that Hernandez had been furnishing supplies for the Huks in the field. But the very document dated December 3, 1949,
Exhibit D-420422, cited in the decision (printed, p. 49), is to the effect that clothes and shoes that Hernandez was supposed to have sent have not been
received. It is true that some clothes had been sent thru him to the field, but these clothes had come from a crew member of a ship of the American
President Lines. He also, upon request, sent a portable typewriter to the SEC or Politburo. Furthermore, a certain Niagara Duplicating machine received by
Hernandez from one Rolland Scott Bullard a crew member of the SS President Cleveland, appease later to have been forwarded by him to the officers of
the SEC or the Politburo.
Lastly, it further appears that Taruc and other CPP leaders used to send notes to appellant Hernandez, who in turn issued press releases for which he found
space in the local papers. His acts in this respect belong to the category of propaganda, to which he appears to have limited his actions as a Communist.
The acts of the appellant as thus explained and analyzed fall under the category of acts of propaganda, but do not prove that he actually and in fact
conspired with the leaders of the Communist Party in the uprising or in the actual rebellion, for which acts he is charged in the information. And his refusal
to go underground because of his political commitments occasioned by his term of election as president of the CLO and the impressions caused by his acts
on the Communist leaders, to the effect that he was in direct communication or understanding with the Nacionalista Party to which he was affiliated,
creates in Us the reasonable doubt that it was not his Communistic leanings but his political ambitions, that motivated his speeches sympathizing with the
Huks. For which reason We hold that the evidence submitted fails to prove beyond reasonable doubt that he has conspired in the instigation of the rebellion
for which he is held to account in this criminal case.
The question that next comes up for resolution is: Does his or anyone's membership in the Communist Party per se render Hernandez or any Communist
guilty of conspiracy to commit rebellion under the provisions of Article 136 of the Revised Penal Code? The pertinent provision reads:
ART. 136. Conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion or insurrection. — The conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion or insurrection
shall be punished, respectively, by prision correccional in its maximum period and a fine which shall not exceed 5,000 pesos, and by prision
 correccional in its medium period and a fine not exceeding 2,000 pesos.
The advocacy of Communism or Communistic theory and principle is not to be considered as a criminal act of conspiracy unless transformed or converted
into an advocacy of action. In the very nature of things, mere advocacy of a theory or principle is insufficient unless the communist advocates action,
immediate and positive, the actual agreement to start an uprising or rebellion or an agreement forged to use force and violence in an uprising of the
working class to overthrow constituted authority and seize the reins of Government itself. Unless action is actually advocated or intended or contemplated,
the Communist is a mere theorist, merely holding belief in the supremacy of the proletariat a Communist does not yet advocate the seizing of the reins of
Government by it. As a theorist the Communist is not yet actually considered as engaging in the criminal field subject to punishment. Only when the
Communist advocates action and actual uprising, war or otherwise, does he become guilty of conspiracy to commit rebellion. Borrowing the language of
the Supreme Court of the United States:
In our jurisprudence guilt is personal, and when the imposition of punishment on a status or on conduct can only be justified by reference to the
relationship of that status or conduct to other concededly criminal activity (here advocacy of violent overthrow), that relationship must be
sufficiently substantial to satisfy the concept of personal guilt in order to withstand attack under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment. Membership, without more, in an organization engaged in illegal advocacy, it is now said, has not heretofore been recognized by
this Court to be such a relationship. ... .
What must be met, then, is the argument that membership, even when accompanied by the elements of knowledge and specific intent, affords an
insufficient quantum of participation in the organization's alleged criminal activity, that is, an insufficiently significant form of aid and
encouragement to permit the imposition of criminal sanctions on that basis. It must indeed be recognized that a person who merely becomes a
member of an illegal organization, by that "act" alone need be doing nothing more than signifying his assent to its purposes and activities on one
hand, and providing, on the other, only the sort of moral encouragement which comes from the knowledge that others believe in what the
organization is doing. It may indeed be argued that such assent and encouragement do fall short of the concrete, practical impetus given to a
criminal enterprise which is lent for instance by a commitment on the part of the conspirator to act in furtherance of that enterprise. A member,
as distinguished from a conspirator, may indicate his approval of a criminal enterprise by the very fact of his membership without thereby
necessarily committing himself to further it by any act or course of conduct whatever. (Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 6 L. ed. 782)
The most important activity of appellant Hernandez appears to be the propagation of improvement of conditions of labor through his organization, the
CLO. While the CLO of which he is the founder and active president, has communistic tendencies, its activity refers to the strengthening of the unity and
cooperation between labor elements and preparing them for struggle; they are not yet indoctrinated in the need of an actual war with or against Capitalism.
The appellant was a politician and a labor leader and it is not unreasonable to suspect that his labor activities especially in connection with the CLO and
other trade unions, were impelled and fostered by the desire to secure the labor vote to support his political ambitions. It is doubtful whether his desire to
foster the labor union of which he was the head was impelled by an actual desire to advance the cause of Communism, not merely to advance his political
aspirations.
Insofar as the appellant's alleged activities as a Communist are concerned, We have not found, nor has any particular act on his part been pointed to Us,
which would indicate that he had advocated action or the use of force in securing the ends of Communism. True it is, he had friends among the leaders of
the Communist Party, and especially the heads of the rebellion, but this notwithstanding, evidence is wanting to show that he ever attended their meetings,
or collaborated and conspired with said leaders in planning and encouraging the acts of rebellion, or advancing the cause thereof. Insofar as the furnishing
of the mimeograph machine and clothes is concerned, it appears that he acted merely as an intermediary, who passed said machine and clothes on to others.
It does not appear that he himself furnished funds or material help of his own to the members of the rebellion or to the forces of the rebellion in the field.
But the very act or conduct of his in refusing to go underground, in spite of the apparent desire of the chief of the rebellion, is clear proof of his non-
participation in the conspiracy to engage in or to foster the rebellion or the uprising.
We next consider the question as to whether the fact that Hernandez delivered speeches of propaganda in favor of Communism and in favor of rebellion
can be considered as a criminal act of conspiracy to commit rebellion as defined in the law. In this respect, the mere fact of his giving and rendering
speeches favoring Communism would not make him guilty of conspiracy, because there was no evidence that the hearers of his speeches of propaganda
then and there agreed to rise up in arms for the purpose of obtaining the overthrow of the democratic government as envisaged by the principles of
Communism. To this effect is the following comment of Viada:
CUESTION 10. El que hace propaganda entre sus convecinos, induciendoles a que el dia que se anunciara la subasta de consumes se echaran a
la calle para conseguir aunque fuera preciso acudir a la fuerza el reparto entre los vecinos ricos solamente, sera responsable de un delito de
conspiracion para la sedicion? — El Tribunal Supreme ha resuelto la negative al casar cierta sentencia de la Audiencia de Valencia, que entendio
lo contrario: "Considerando que, con areglo a lo que dispone el art. 4. del Codigo Penal, hay conspiracion cuando dos o mas personas se
conciertan para la execution de un delito y resuelven cmeterlo; y no constando que existiera ese concierto en cuanto a los hechos que se refieren
en la tercera pregunta del veredicto, pues en ella solo se habla de los actos de induccion que el procesado realizo, sin expresar el efecto que la
mismo produjo en el animo de las personas a quienes se dirigian, ni si estas aceptaron o no lo que se las propuso, resulta evidence que faltan los
clementos integrantes de la conspiracion, etc." (Se. de 5 de Julio de 1907, Gaceta de 7 de Enero de 1909.) (Viada, Tomo I, Codigo Penal, p. 152)
In view of all the above circumstances We find that there is no concrete evidence proving beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant (Hernandez) actually
participated in the rebellion or in any act of conspiracy to commit or foster the cause of the rebellion. We are constrained, in view of these circumstances,
to absolve, as We hereby absolve, the appellant Amado V. Hernandez from the crime charged, with a proportionate share of the costs de oficio.
APPEAL OF OTHER DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS
All the other defendants were found guilty as accomplices in the crime of rebellion as charged in the information and were each sentenced to suffer the
penalty of 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor, with the accessories provided by law, and to pay their proportionate share of the costs.
Legal Considerations. — Before proceeding to consider the appeals of the other defendants, it is believed useful if not necessary to lay dawn the
circumstances or facts that may be determinative of their criminal responsibility or the existence or nature thereof. To begin with, as We have exhaustively
discussed in relation to the appeal of Hernandez, we do not believe that mere membership in the Communist Party or in the CLO renders the member
liable, either of rebellion or of conspiracy to commit rebellion, because mere membership and nothing more merely implies advocacy of abstract theory or
principle without any action being induced thereby; and that such advocacy becomes criminal only if it is coupled with action or advocacy of action,
namely, actual rebellion or conspiracy to commit rebellion, or acts conducive thereto or evincing the same.
On the other hand, membership in the HMB (Hukbalahap) implies participation in an actual uprising or rebellion to secure, as the Huks pretend, the
liberation of the peasants and laboring class from thraldom. By membership in the HMB, one already advocates uprising and the use of force, and by such
membership he agrees or conspires that force be used to secure the ends of the party. Such membership, therefore, even if there is nothing more, renders the
member guilty of conspiracy to commit rebellion punishable by law.
And when a Huk member, not content with his membership, does anything to promote the ends of the rebellion like soliciting contributions, or acting as
courier, he thereby becomes guilty of conspiracy, unless he takes to the field and joins in the rebellion or uprising, in which latter case he commits
rebellion.
In U.S. v. Vergara, infra, the defendants organized a secret society commonly known as the "Katipunan", the purpose of which was to overthrow the
government by force. Each of the defendants on various times solicited funds from the people of Mexico, Pampanga. The Court held that the defendants
were guilty of conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion or insurrection and not of rebellion or insurrection itself. Thus, the Court ruled that:
From the evidence adduced in this case we are of the opinion that the said defendants are guilty, not of inciting, setting or foot, or assisting or
engaging in rebellion, but rather of the crime of conspiring to overthrow, put down, and destroy by force the Government of the United States in
the Philippine Islands, and therefore we find that said defendants, and each of them, did, together with others, in the months of February and
March, 1903, in the Province of Pampanga, Philippine Islands, conspire to overthrow, put down, and to destroy by force the Government of the
United States in the Philippine Islands. (U.S. v. Vergara, et al., 3 Phil. 432, 434.)
JUAN J. CRUZ
The court found him to be a Communist with various aliases, a member of the Central Committee of the CLO member of the Central Committee of the
CPP and as such committed to the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat To the same effect is the testimony of Guillermo Calayag.
There is no evidence to connect him with the rebellion or to the conspiracy to commit rebellion. He should therefore be absolved of the charges contained
in the information.
AMADO RACANDAY
The trial court found him guilty as a Communist, a Secretary and Executive Committee member of the CLO a communications center of the Communist
Party, having been found in possession of letters from Federico Maclang to Salome Cruz, and solicitor of contributions for the Huks.
Racanday admits being a member of the Executive Committee of the CLO Editor of the Kidlat of the Government Workers Union, receiving copies of the
Titis. Calayag testified that he was a member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party entrusted with the duty of receiving directives of the
Regional Committee of the Communist Party.
The letters found in his possession are dated February 14, 1950, before the Communist Party went underground. We have been unable to find the evidence
upon which the court bases its conclusion that he received contributions for the Huks. With these circumstances in mind, We are not convinced beyond
reasonable doubt that as a Communist he took part in the conspiracy among the officials of the Communist Party to take part and support the rebellion of
the Huks.
We are, therefore, constrained to absolve him of the charges filed against him.
GENARO DE LA CRUZ
The court found him to be a Communist since 1945, an officer of an organized Communist branch in Pasay City, a member of the Central Committee and
Treasurer of the CLO. He admitted his membership and his position as member of the executive committee and treasurer of the CLO these facts being
corroborated by the witness Guillermo Calayag.
His membership in the Communist Party dates as far back as the year 1945. As a communist, Genaro de la Cruz received quotas and monetary
contributions coming from the areas under his jurisdiction, and one time he made a receipt from a member from Caloocan at the CLO headquarters at
Azcarraga signing the receipt as "Gonzalo" which is one of his aliases. He also distributed copies of the "Titis" magazine. `
While his membership in the Communist Party plus his having received contributions for the party indicate that he is an active member, it was not shown
that the contributions that he received from Communist Party members were received around the year 1950 when the Central Committee of the Communist
Party had already agreed to conspire and go underground and support the Huk rebellion. Under these circumstances We cannot find him guilty of
conspiracy to commit rebellion because of the lack of evidence to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
JULIAN LUMANOG
The court found him to be an organizer of HMB among the mill workers, solicited contributions for the HMB and Central Committee member of the CLO
as per Testimony of Guillermo Calayag.
He admitted that he joined the Communist Party because he was made to believe that the Party is for the welfare of the laborers. He also admitted being a
member of the Central Committee of the CLO Calayag testified that Lumanog organized the HMB units of the Communist Party in the Lumber Unions and
attended a Communist meeting held by Maclang.
Domingo Clarin testified that he (Julian Lumanog) used to give the money collected by him to one Nicasio Pamintuan, one of the members of the HMB
Special Unit Trigger Squad) in Manila for the use of the said unit.
Considering that the HMB was engaged in a rebellion to overthrow the government, it is evident that by giving his contributions he actually participated in
the conspiracy to overthrow the government and should, therefore, be held liable for such conspiracy, and should be sentenced accordingly.
FERMIN RODILLAS
The trial court found that Fermin Rodillas was a member of the CPP and the CLO that his activities consisted in soliciting contributions, in cash and in
kind, from city residents for the use of the HMB, turning over said collections to the Party; that he has given asylum to a wanted Hukbalahap at his house
at Juan Luna St., Gagalangin, which house was used as Military post. The above findings of the court are fully supported by the testimony of Domingo
Clarin.
Considering that while he has not actually taken part in the rebellion, he has shown sympathy with the cause by soliciting contributions for it and had given
shelter to the Huks. We feel that the court was fully justified in finding him guilty, but We hold that he should be declared liable merely as a co-conspirator
in the crime of conspiracy to commit rebellion, and should be sentenced accordingly.
BAYANI ESPIRITU
This appellant was found by the court to be a Communist, he having admitted membership in the Communist Party since 1945; that his duties as a
Communist was to help in the office of the National Finance Committee, assorting papers and written documents; that sometimes he accompanied the
purchaser of medicines, shoes, papers, foodstuffs and clothing to be given to the Huks; that he is a member of the Communication Division of the CPP in
Manila, in charge of distribution of letters or communications; that he admits having written to Salome Cruz, courier of the Communist Party, when he
asked for his necessities, such as money and shoes, etc.
The facts found by the court are sufficiently supported by the communications and evidence submitted by the prosecution. The exhibits show that he was in
constant communication with the communists; serving them as courier. His oath as a member of the Communist Party was submitted in court and in it he
admits obedience to all orders of the Party and to propagate the stability of the PKP.
Considering that the PKP was engaged in an actual uprising against the constituted Government and that Bayani Espiritu was in constant communication
with the Communist Party and served it as courier, We believe that the court was fully justified in finding him guilty. However, We believe that not having
actually taken up arms in the uprising he may only be declared guilty of conspiracy to commit rebellion.
TEOPISTA VALERIO
The court below found that this appellant joined the Communists in 1938 in San Luis, Pampanga, under Casto Alejandrino, who later became her common-
law husband; that her aliases are "Estrella" and "Star"; that she was found in possession of various documents written to top Communists like Alejandrino,
Lava and Romy, as well as a letter from Taruc congratulating her for the delivers, of a son.
Jose Taguiang testified that she was a member of the Provincial Committee of the CPP in Nueva Ecija, later Chairman of the Finance Department, and then
promoted to Finance Officer of the Central Luzon Committee. Alicia Vergara, a Huk courier, testified that she delivered letter from the mountains to
Teopista Valerie, who was in turn also a courier.
Without considering the close relationship that she had with top Communist Casto Alejandrino, We are satisfied that she herself was, aside from being a
Huk courier, also a Huk, a member of the HMB from 1942 to 1951. As she was a Communist and at the same time a member of the HMB, and considering
that the HMB was engaged in an uprising to uproot the legitimate government, there cannot be any question that she was in conspiracy with the other
members of her Party against the constituted government. We hold, therefore, that the evidence proves beyond reasonable doubt that she is guilty of
conspiracy to commit rebellion.
DEFENDANTS NOT INCLUDED IN DECISION
In Crim. Case No. 15841 (G.R. No. L-6025) the charge against Guillermo Capadocia, Mariano P. Balgos, Alfredo B. Saulo and Jacobo Espino was
dismissed because they have not been apprehended at the time of the trial.
PEOPLE VS. EVANGELISTA, 57 PHIL. 354 AND
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 1700, DISTINGUISHED
In the case at bar the prosecution is for actual rebellion which consists in rising publicly and taking aims against the Government for the purpose of
removing from the allegiance to said Government or its laws, the territory of the Philippines, or any part thereof, etc., a crime defined in Article 134 of the
Revised Penal Code; whereas Evangelista was charged and convicted for inciting to rebellion under Art. 138, Revised Penal Code (formerly Sec. 2, Act
No. 292). As the specific charge against appellants is that of rising up in arms in actual rebellion against the Government, they cannot be held guilty of
inciting the people to arms under Article 138, which is a different offense.
On the other hand, Rep. Act 1700, known as the Anti-subversion Act, which penalizes membership in any organization or association committed to subvert
the Government, cannot be applied to the appellants because said Act was approved on June 20, 1957 and was not in force at the time of the commission of
the acts charged against appellants (committed 1945-1950) ; the Anti-Subversion Act punishes participation or membership in an organization committed
to overthrow the duly constituted Government, a crime district from that of actual rebellion with which appellants are charged.
CONCLUSION
WHEREFORE, in Criminal Case No. 15841 (G.R. No. L-6025) defendants-appellants Amado V. Hernandez, Juan J. Cruz, Amado Racanday and Genaro
de la Cruz are absolved from the charges contained in the information, with their proportionate share of the costs de oficio. The defendants-appellants
Julian Lumanog and Fermin Rodillas in Criminal Case No. 15841 (G.R. No. L-6025) and the defendants-appellants Bayani Espiritu and Teopista Valerio in
Criminal Case No. 15479 (G.R. No. L-6026) are hereby found guilty of the crime of conspiracy to commit rebellion, as defined and punished in Article
136 of the Revised Penal Code, and each and everyone of them is hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment for five years, four months and twenty-one days
of prision correccional, and to pay a fine of P5,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay their proportional share of the costs.
So ordered.
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes, Dizon and Makalintal, JJ., concur.
Padilla, Barrera and Regala, JJ., took no part.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-4974 May 16, 1969
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
JOSE LAVA, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
-----------------------------
G.R. No. L-4975 May 16, 1969
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
LAMBERTO MAGBOO, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
-----------------------------
G.R. No. L-4976 May 16, 1969
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
SIMEON G. RODRIGUEZ, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
-----------------------------
G.R. No. L-4977 May 16, 1969
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
HONOFRE MANGILA, ET AL., defendants-appellants.
-----------------------------
G.R. No. L-4978 May 16, 1969
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
MAGNO PONTILLERA BUENO, ET AL., defendants-appellees.
Office of the Assistant Solicitor General Pacifico P. de Castro and Solicitor Jorge Coquia for plaintiff-appellee.
Recto Law Office, Juan T. David, Crispin D. Baizas and Delgado, Flores, Macapagal and Dizon for defendant-appellant Jose Lava.
Cipriano C. Manansala for defendants-appellants Federico Maclang, Lamberto Magboo, Honofre D. Magila, Marcos Medina, Cenon Bungay and Magno
P. Bueno.
R. M. Paterno for defendants-appellants Marciano de Leon and Cesareo Torres.
Irineo M. Cabrera for defendant-appellant Iluminada Calonje.
Salonga, Ordoñez and Associates for defendants-appellants Angel Baking and Arturo Baking.
Jose P. Laurel Law Office for defendant-appellant Simeon Rodriguez.
J. Antonio Araneta, Claudio Teehankee and Manuel O. Chan for defendant-appellant Federico Bautista.
Ismael T. Torres for defendant-appellant Felipe Engreso.
Meliton Soliman for defendant-appellant Nicanor Razon, Sr.

ZALDIVAR, J.:
These are appeals from the joint decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila in its Criminal Cases Nos. 14071, 14082, 14270, 14315 and 14344.
In Criminal Case No. 14071, the defendants were Jose Lava, Federico Bautista, Federico Maclang, Ramon Espiritu, Salome Cruz y Adriano, Rosario C.
viuda de Santos and Angel Baking. The appeal from the decision in this case is now in G.R. No. L-4974 before this Court.
In Criminal Case No. 14082, the defendants were Lamberto Magboo, Nicanor Razon, Sr., Esteban Gonzales y la Torre, Marcos Medina, Cesario Torres,
Rosenda Canlas Reyes, and Arturo Baking y Calma. The appeal from the decision in this case is now in G.R. No. L-4975 before this Court.
In Criminal Case No. 14270, the defendants were Simeon Gutierrez y Rodriguez, Julita Rodriguez y Gutierrez, and Victorina Rodriguez y Gutierrez, and
Marciano de Leon. The appeal from the decision in this case is now in G.R. No. L-4976 before this Court.
In Criminal Case No. 14315, the defendants were Honofre D. Mangila and Cenon Bungay y Bagtas. The appeal from the decision in this case is now in
G.R. No. L-4977 before this Court.
In Criminal Case No. 14344 the defendants were Magno Pontillera Bueno, Nicanor Capalad, Rosalina Quizon, Pedro Vicencio, Julia Mesina, Felipe
Engreso, Elpidio Acuño Adime, Josefina Adelan y Abusejo, Conrado Domingo, Aurora Garcia, and Naty Cruz. The appeal from the decision in this case is
now in G.R. No. L-4978 before this Court.
All the above-named defendants were charged with having committed the complex crime of rebellion with murders and arsons under an identical
information, filed in each of the five cases, which reads as follows: .
That on or about the 6th day of May, 1946, and for sometime prior and subsequent thereto and continuously up to the present time, in the City of Manila,
the seat of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines which the herein accused have intended to overthrow, and the place they have chosen for that
purpose as the nerve center of all their rebellious activities in the different parts of the country, the said accused being then high ranking officers or
otherwise members of the Communist Party of the Philippines (PKP) of which the "Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan" (HMB) otherwise or formerly
known as the Hukbalahap (Huks), is its armed forces, having come to an agreement and decided to commit the crime of rebellion, and therefore, conspiring
and confederating together, acting with many more others whose whereabouts and identities are still unknown up to the filing of this information, and
helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously promote, maintain, cause, direct and/or command the Hukbong Mapagpalaya
ng Bayan (HMB) or the Hukbalahaps (Huks) to rise publicly and take arms against the Government or otherwise participate therein for the purpose of
overthrowing the same, as in fact the said Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan or Hukbalahaps (Huks) have risen publicly and taken arms against the
Government, by then and there making armed raids, sorties and ambushes, attacks against police, constabulary and army detachments, and as a necessary
means to commit the crime of rebellion, in connection therewith and in furtherance thereof, by then and there committing wanton acts of murder, spoilage,
looting, arson, planned destruction of private and public buildings, to create and spread terrorism in order to facilitate the accomplishment of the aforesaid
purpose, as follows, to wit:
(1) On May 6, 1946, the 10th MPC Co. led by First Lt. Mamerto Lorenzo while on patrol duty in the barrio of Santa Monica, Aliaga, Nueva
Ecija, was with evident premeditation on the part of the huks ambushed and treacherously attacked by a band of well-armed dissidents or rebels.
Ten enlisted men of the MP company were killed. First Lt. Mamerto Lorenzo was captured and beheaded by the rebels.
 (2) On August 6, 1946, a group of more than 30 Huks under the leadership of Salvador Nolasco armed with guns of different calibers raided the
municipal building of Majayjay, Laguna. They were able to get one Garand, one carbine, one Thompson GMG, and one pistol. They also took
one typewriter and stationery (NR Laguna, dated Sept. 2, 1946).
(3) On April 10, 1947, 14 EM under the command of Lt. Pablo C. Cruz, while on their way to investigate a holdup in the barrio of San Miguel
na Munti, Talavera, Nueva Ecija were with evident premeditation and treachery on the part of the Huks ambushed and fired upon by Huks
armed with 30-caliber rifles, machine guns, and grenades. Lt. Pablo Cruz and Pvt. Santiago Mercado were killed and 6 others were wounded.
(4) On May 9, 1947, Huks numbering around 100 under Lomboy and Liwayway raided the town proper of Laur and forced Municipal Treasurer
Jose A. Viloria to open the treasury safe and obtained therefrom more than P600. Policeman Fermin Sanchez was taken by the bandits with one
Springfield rifle. Bandits robbed the towns people of their money, personal belongings, rice and carabaos (WITR May 10, 1947). .
(5) On August 19, 1947, Capt. Jose Gamboa, First Lt. Celestino Tiansec, and Second Lt. Marciano Lising, all from the 115th Co., while riding
in a jeep following an armored car, were treacherously fired upon by a group of about 100 dissidents armed with automatic rifles, Thompsons,
and Garands and lined up on both sides of Highway No. 5 near the cemetery of San Miguel, Bulacan. First Lt. Celestino Tiansec and Second Lt.
Marciano Lising were killed.
(6) In or about the month of June, 1946, Alejandro Viernes, alias Stalin, commander of Joint Forces No. 108 with about 180 men, entered the
town of Pantabangan, Nueva Ecija, and raised their Huk flag for more than twenty-four hours. The Municipal officials did not offer any
resistance because of the superiority in number of the Huks. After demanding from the civilians foodstuffs such as rice, chickens, goats, and
carabaos, they left the town, admonishing the civilians always to support the Huk organization. The MP forces under Capt. Ponciano Hanili, S-
3, Capt. Federico C. Olares, then Asst. S-3, of Nueva Ecija province, proceeded to Pantabangan with forces of the 112th MP Co. under Capt.
Nicanor Garcia, to verify the information, but were not able to contact the dissidents at Pantabangan. They proceeded to the barrio of Marikit,
between Pantabangan and Laur, where they engaged some dissidents. When our forces were on their way home, they were pocketed by the
dissidents at the zigzag road, but owing to the initiative of our forces, they were able to extricate themselves from their precarious position and
were able to fire their mortars and Cal. 50 and .30 machineguns. Investigations made on the field of battle showed that the Huks suffered heavy
casualties which was verified later to have been seven cart loads of dead men. (Special Report, PC Nueva Ecija, dated February 23, 1948.)
(7) Mrs. Aurora Aragon Quezon and party were with evident premeditation and treachery on the part of the Huks ambushed at about 10:30, 28
April 49 by an undetermined number of dissidents under Commanders Viernes, Marzan, Lupo and Mulong at kilometer 62, barrio Salubsob,
Bongabong, Nueva Ecija. PC escort exchanged fire with the dissidents. Patrol of the First Heavy Weapons Company, 1st PC Battalion was
dispatched to reinforce the PC escort. The following persons were killed: Mrs. Quezon, Baby Quezon, Mayor P. Bernardo, Major P. San
Agustin, A. San Agustin, Lt. Lasam, Philip Buencamino III, and several soldiers. General Jalandoni and Capt. Manalang sustained slight
wounds.
(8) On August 25, 1950, Camp Macabulos, Tarlac, Tarlac was attacked, raided and set fire to and among the casualties therein were Major D. E.
Orlino, Capt. T. D. Cruz, Lt. G. T. Manawis, Lt. C. N. Tan, Lt. Eusebio Cabute, Sgt. Isabelo Vargas, Sgt. Bernardo Cadoy, Sgt. Bienvenido
Bugay, Sgt. Samuel Lopez, Cpl. Vicente Awitan, Cpl. Ruiz Ponce, Cpl. Eugenio Ruelra, Pvt. Agustin Balatbat, Saturnino Guarin, E. Cabanban,
Antonio Monte, Felix Quirin, Gregoria Balcoco, Jose Mojica, Cornelio Melegan, Carlos Bojade, Rodrigo Espejo and Rosario Sotto, a Red Cross
nurse.
Counsel for defendants Jose Lava and Federico Bautista filed a motion to quash the information against them upon the grounds that the information did not
conform to the prescribed form, that it charged the defendants with more than one offense, and that the court had no jurisdiction over the offense charged.
Also filed was a petition for provisional liberty under bail of 14 of the defendants, upon the grounds that (1) the evidence of guilt was not strong and (2) the
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus under Proclamation No. 210, dated October 22, 1950, by the President of the Philippines was unconstitutional.
Both motion and petition were denied by the trial court in an order dated November 1, 1950.
Upon agreement of the prosecution and the defense, and with the conformity of all the defendants, the five cases were tried jointly, with the understanding
that each defendant could present his/her separate and independent defenses. Notwithstanding the fact that several witnesses had already testified in the
first two cases (Criminal Cases Nos. 14071 and 14082) at the time the other three cases (Criminal Cases Nos. 14270, 14315 and 14344) were filed, the
defendants in the latter three cases expressed their conformity to a joint trial with the first two cases and agreed that the evidence already taken in the first
two cases be reproduced in the latter three cases.
While the joint trial was being held, the prosecution, after a reinvestigation of the cases, moved that the case with respect to defendant Julia Mesina be
dismissed upon the ground of insufficiency of evidence. After the trial and before the cases were submitted for decision, the prosecution also moved for the
dismissal of the case against defendant Rosenda Canlas Reyes upon the ground that the evidence on record was not sufficient to support her conviction.
Both motions were granted by the trial court.
After the joint trial, the trial court rendered a joint decision in the five cases, dated May 11, 1951.
In Criminal Case No. 14071, the court found defendants FEDERICO MACLANG alias Eto alias O. Beria alias Olibas alias Mariano Cruz alias Ambrosio
Reyes alias Manuel Santos; RAMON ESPIRITU alias Johnny alias Ka Johnny; ILUMINADA CALONJE alias Salome Cruz alias Luming; JOSE LAVA
alias Harry alias Felix Cruz alias Gaston Silayan alias Gaston alias Gregorio Santayana alias Greg alias Gavino; FEDERICO M. BAUTISTA alias
Freddie alias Fred; ANGEL BAKING alias Angel alias Boriz alias Bayan; and ROSARIO VDA. DE SANTOS alias Charing, guilty as principals of the
complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder, arsons, and robberies, and pursuant to Article 248, subsections 1 and 3 of the Revised Penal Code, in
connection with its Article 48, sentenced defendants Federico Maclang, Ramon Espiritu and Iluminada Calonje to the capital penalty of death; and
defendants Jose Lava, Federico M. Bautista, Angel Baking, and Rosario C. Vda de Santos to reclusion perpetua. The defendants were also ordered to pay
the costs in this case.
In imposing the death penalty upon Federico Maclang, Ramon Espiritu and Iluminada Calonje, the court took into consideration not only the very nature of
the crime committed but also the aggravating circumstance that the said three defendants secured the aid of persons under 15 years of age in the
commission of the crime.
In Criminal Case No. 14082, the court found defendants CESAREO TORRES alias Cesareo Yacat, alias Leo alias Leodones; ARTURO BAKING Y
CALMA alias Arturo C. Baking alias A. C. Baking alias Arturo Calma Baking alias Eduardo Santos, and MARCOS MEDINA alias Hiwara guilty as
principals of the complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder, arsons, and robberies and sentenced the said defendants to reclusion perpetua. The court
also found defendants LAMBERTO MAGBOO alias Berting alias Eddie and NICANOR RAZON, SR., alias Elias Ruvi, as accomplice in the commission
of the said crime and were sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of ten (10) years of prision mayor as minimum to seventeen (17) years of reclusion
temporal as maximum.
The court did not find sufficient evidence to establish the guilt of the defendant ESTEBAN GONZALES Y LA TORRE, alias Esteban La Torre Gonzales,
either as principal or accomplice in the commission of the said crime. The court, however, found him guilty as member of the Communist Party in the
Philippines, which is an illegal association, and pursuant to Article 147 of the Revised Penal Code, the said defendant was sentenced to four (4) months of
arresto mayor. All the defendants were ordered to pay costs.
In Criminal Case No. 14270, the court found defendants SIMEON GUTIERREZ Y RODRIGUEZ alias Simeon Rodriguez alias Sammy alias S. G. R.
alias Lakindanum; MARClANO DE LEON Y ESPIRITU alias Marciano E. de Leon alias Marcial alias Mar, guilty as principals in the commission of the
complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder, arsons, and robberies; and JULITA RODRIGUEZ Y GUTIERREZ alias Judith alias Juling alias Juliet
alias Julie, as accomplice in the commission of the said crime, and sentenced defendants Simeon Gutierrez y Rodriguez, and Marciano de Leon y Espiritu
to reclusion perpetua; and defendant Julita Rodriguez y Gutierrez to an indeterminate prison term of ten (10) years of prision mayor as minimum to
seventeen (17) years of reclusion temporal as maximum. These defendants were ordered to pay the costs.
The court acquitted defendant VICTORINA RODRIGUEZ Y GUTIERREZ alias Vicky alias Toring.
In Criminal Case No. 14315, the court found defendants CENON BUNGAY Y BAGTAS alias Ruping alias Commander Ruping alias Bagtas and
HONOFRE D. MANGILA alias Onofre Mangila alias Tommy alias Miller guilty as principals of the complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder,
arsons and robberies, and pursuant to the provision of Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code the said defendant Cenon Bungay y Bagtas and Honofre D.
Mangila were sentenced to death. In arriving at this decision the court took into consideration the gravity of their participation in the said complex crime,
the first being a Huk squadron commander, who led and took part in several raids and ambuscades conducted by the HMB and caused the killing of Major
Leopoldo Alicbusan of the PC Detachment at San Pablo City, Laguna, and the second (Mangila) being a member of the powerful Central Committee of the
Communist Party in the Philippines, which elects the Politburo members. The said defendants were also ordered to pay the costs.
In Criminal Case No. 14344, the court found defendant MAGNO PONTILLERA BUENO alias Magno Bueno alias Mamerto Banyaga alias Narding,
guilty as principal of the complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder, arsons, and robberies and sentenced the said defendant to death. The court,
likewise found defendants ROSALINA V. QUIZON alias Regina Quiambao; PEDRO VICENCIO alias Pedring; FELIPE ENGRESO alias Ipe;
JOSEFINO ADELAN Y ABUSEJO alias Fely; ELPIDIO ACUÑO ADIME alias Rolly, alias Rolly Enriquez alias Rol alias Pidiong, and NATY CRUZ
alias Natie alias Naty alias Spring, and CONRADO DOMINGO alias Adong guilty beyond reasonable doubt as accomplices in the commission of the said
crime and sentenced the said Rosalina Quizon and Pedro Vicencio to an indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years of prision mayor as minimum to seventeen
(17) years of reclusion temporal as maximum; and Felipe Engreso, Josefina Adelan and Conrado Domingo to an indeterminate prison term of four (4)
years of prision correccional as minimum to ten (10) years of prision mayor as maximum. The last three accused were declared entitled to the privileged
mitigating circumstance of minority, they being under 18 years of age.
With respect to defendants Elpidio Acuño Adime and Naty Cruz, they being under 16 years of age, further proceedings were suspended and pursuant to the
provision of Article 80 of the Revised Penal Code, the court ordered that the said Elpidio Acuño Adime be committed to the Boys' Training School and
Naty Cruz to the Girls' Training School at Mandaluyong, Rizal under the custody and supervision of the Commissioner of Social Welfare or his authorized
representatives until they reach the age of majority or until further orders of the court. The Commissioner of Social Welfare was directed to submit to the
court every four months a written report on the good or bad conduct of the said minors, on the moral and intellectual progress made by them during the
period of their confinement in said institutions.
The court acquitted defendants NICANOR CAPALAD alias Canor and AURORA GARCIA alias Laring.
All the defendants except Nicanor Capalad and Aurora Garcia were ordered to pay the costs.
In imposing the capital penalty on Magno Pontillera Bueno the Court took into account not only his being a member of the powerful Central Committee of
the Communist Party jointly with Federico Maclang and Honofre Mangila but also his being an instructor on Military Tactics in the "Stalin University", the
military training school for Huks in the mountains.
The rights to file a civil action to recover indemnity for the death of the victims of the murders specifically referred to in these cases were reserved to the
heirs of the said victims.
Thus, of the original 31 defendants in these five criminal cases, five were acquitted, namely: Julia Mesina, Rosenda Canlas Reyes, Victorina Rodriguez y
Gutierrez, Nicanor Capalad and Aurora Garcia. Of the 26 who were convicted, all appealed to this Court except defendant Esteban Gonzales la Torre.
Later, defendants Rosalina Quizon, Elpidio Acuño Adime, Josefina Adelan Abusejo, Conrado Domingo and Naty Cruz withdrew their appeal. During the
pendency of the appeal, defendants Julita Rodriguez y Gutierrez and Magno Pontillera Bueno died. The appeals now before this Court, therefore, involve
only 18 defendants, namely: Jose Lava, Federico Bautista, Federico Maclang, Ramon Espiritu, Salome Cruz, Rosario Vda. de Santos, Angel Baking,
Lamberto Magboo, Nicanor Razon, Marcos Medina, Cesareo Torres, Arturo Baking, Simeon G. Rodriguez, Marciano de Leon, Honofre Mangila, Cenon
Bungay, Pedro Vicencio, and Felipe Engreso.
Upon petition by the Deputy Chief, Military Intelligence Service (MIS) of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, this Court, by order of March 7, 1952,
appointed the MIS the custodian of the exhibits and documents that were presented as evidence in these five criminal cases before the trial court. This step
was taken because those documents and exhibits were needed also as evidence in other courts in the prosecution of other members of the HMB (Hukbong
Mapagpalaya ng Bayan). Later, by order of April 14, 1955, this Court appointed the Staff Judge Advocate of the Philippine Constabulary the custodian of
the same documents and exhibits. Those documents and exhibits were kept at the headquarters of the Philippine Constabulary at Camp Crame, Quezon
City. On September 10, 1958 the headquarters of the PC was destroyed by fire, and all those documents and exhibits were burned. Upon a petition for the
reconstitution of the said documents and exhibits, this Court appointed Deputy Clerk of Court Bienvenido Ejercito as Commissioner to receive evidence
for the reconstitution of those documents and exhibits. The Commissioner, after due hearing, submitted his report, dated October 6, 1959, recommending
that the documents and exhibits that were burned be declared reconstituted by the photostatic copies of the originals of those documents and exhibits. The
Commissioner stated in his report that those photostatic copies were duly identified during the hearings on the reconstitution. Over the objection of
counsels for the defendants-appellants, this Court approved the report of the Commissioner.
Counsels for the appellants were allowed by the Court all the time that they needed to prepare the briefs for the appellants. The last brief for the appellants
was filed on January 22, 1963. The Solicitor General filed the brief for the appellee (People of the Philippines) on June 29, 1963. These appeals were set
for hearing on oral argument on August 28, 1963. On that date counsel for some of the defendants-appellants argued the case for their clients; and counsels
for other defendants-appellants were given a period of 20 days to submit a memorandum in lieu of oral argument. The Solicitor General was likewise
granted leave to submit a reply memorandum within 20 days from the receipt of the copies of the appellants' memoranda. Upon the filing of the
memoranda these cases were considered submitted for decision.
These cases have been pending for decision in this Court since October, 1963, and it would seem that this Court has not acted with dispatch in the
disposition of these cases. It must be known, however, that this Court has been swamped with cases appealed from the lower courts and from
administrative bodies and officials, as provided by law, and despite the arduous labors by the members of this Court the docket of this Court has been, and
still is, clogged. There are numerous criminal cases appealed to this Court ahead of these five cases. Certainly the appellants in those earlier appealed
criminal cases deserve the same concern from this Court that the appellants in these five cases expect for themselves. The record of these five cases,
consisting of the "rollos", the transcript of the stenographic notes taken during the trial and the documentary exhibits, is so voluminous that when piled
vertically it would stand almost three feet high. The record has to be meticulously examined and studied by the members of this Court, working as a
collegiate body. In deciding cases, this Court inclines more to careful study and deliberation rather than to dispatch.
Existence and activities of the CPP and HMB
We have thoroughly examined the testimonial and documentary evidence in the present cases, and We find it conclusively proved, as did the lower court,
that as of the year 1950 when elements of the police and armed forces of the Government arrested the defendants in these five cases there was already a
nationwide organization of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), and that said party had a well-organized plan to overthrow the Philippine
Government by armed struggle and to establish in the Philippines a communist form of government similar to that of Soviet Russia and Red China. The
Communist Party of the Philippines had as its military arm the organization known as the "Hukbong Mapagpalaya ng Bayan" (HMB), otherwise or
formerly known as the Hukbalahaps (Huks). It is established that the rebellious activities of the HMB, and the commission of common crimes in different
parts of the country by the HMB, were directed by the Communist Party of the Philippines through its Politburo (PB) and/or Secretariat (SEC). The
Politburo and/or the Secretariat gave orders to the field through its general headquarters (GHQ) and its regional commands (RECOS), and reports to the
Politburo and/or Secretariat were made regarding the activities of the HMB, giving accounts of the sorties or ambushes and attacks against elements of the
police, the Philippine Constabulary and the army, and of killings, lootings and destruction's of property. It is also established that the plan of the
Communist Party was not only to overthrow the Philippine Government but also to kill officials of the Government and private individuals who refused to
cooperate with the rebels, and orders to this effect were transmitted to the HMB.
Among the documentary evidence presented during the trial is the Constitution of the Communist Party of the Philippines, one of the documents seized in
one of the raids when some of the appellant were arrested. In this document it is shown that the CPP has a National Congress (NC) which is the highest
Authority in the party. The National Congress formulates the policies of the party, and determines the functions of the party and of the standing
committees; it renders decisions on all problems regarding organizations and tactics, and on appeals brought before it; and it elects the members of the
Central Committee (CC). The Central Committee, which is the highest authority when the National Congress is not in session, enforces the Constitution,
implements the policies formulated by the National Congress, promulgates Rules and regulations, supervises all political and organizational work of the
party, takes charge of financial matters and renders an accounting thereof to the National Congress, and elects the General Secretary (SEC) and all the
members of the Politburo. The Politburo (PB) is the real executive body of the party, and is responsible for the execution of the powers and duties of the
Central Committee when the latter is not in session. The General Secretary and the Politburo are responsible to the Central Committee for all their
decisions and actions. Then there are departments, bureaus, committees and other organizational units. There is the National Education Department (NED),
the educational Department (ED), the Organization Bureau (OB), the Organizational Department (OD), the District Organization Committee (DOC) the
Peasants' Organization (PO), the Trade Union Department (TUD), the Sanggunian Tanggulang Baryo (STB), the Military Committee (MC), the General
Headquarters (GHQ), the Regional Command (RECO), the Field Command (FC), the Battalion (BN), the Company, (CO), the Platoon (PLN), and the
Squad (SQD). There is also the National Finance Committee (NFC) in charge of the financial matters of the Party, the RECO Finance Committee (RFC),
the District Finance Committee (DFC), the Field Command Supply Officer (FC-G-4), the Battalion Supply Officer (Bn-G-4), the Company Supply Officer
(Co-G-4), the Platoon Supply Officer (Pln-S-4), the National Courier Division (NCD), the Reco Courier Division (RCB), the Central Post (CP), and Field
Command Courier (FC-Courier).
The Secretariat provisionally assumed the functions of the GHQ which was abolished by the Politburo in its conference in January 1950. The Secretariat
alone has final authority to impose the death penalty in court martial cases where SECCOM (National Committee) cadres are involved. Several SEC
transmissions to the Politburo members assigned to regional commands indicate that the Secretariat discussed plans of attack by the HMB, distributes
forces, and supplies intelligence information.
There is the National Courier (or Communication) Division (NCD), which is in charge of the communication system of the CPP, and the distribution of
supplies to the different regional commands in the field. There is a Special Warfare Division, in charge of operating technological warfare against the
enemy such as the use of homemade bombs, molotov cocktails, land mine traps, etc. There is the Technical Group (TG) which attends to the manufacture
of homemade firearms and other weapons. This group includes chemists and engineers. Then there is the National Intelligence Division, in charge of
gathering military intelligence, as well as political and economic intelligence.
For purposes of regional commands, the Philippines was divided geographically into ten regions in order to facilitate the political, military, and economic
administration by the Communist Party of the Philippines. Those regional commands are as follows: .
RECO 1 — Nueva Ecija, Pangasinan and lower Mt. Province.
RECO 2 — Pampanga, Tarlac, Zambales and Bataan.
RECO 3 — Bulacan and Rizal, except the towns under City Command.
RECO 4 — Laguna, Batangas, Quezon and Cavite.
RECO 5 — Camarines Norte, Camarines Sur, Albay and Sorsogon.
RECO 6 — Panay, Negros, Cebu, Samar, Leyte, Bohol and Palawan.
RECO 7 — Davao, Lanao, Cotabato, Zamboanga and Agusan.
RECO 8 — Cagayan Valley provinces and Nueva Viscaya.
RECO 9 — Ilocos Norte, Ilocos Sur, Abra, and La Union.
CITY COMMAND — Manila, Malabon, Caloocan, Navotas, San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City, Mandaluyong, San Juan, Marikina, Pasig,
Guadalupe, Pasay, Baclaran, Parañaque, Muntinglupa and Alabang.
The Communist Party of the Philippines has a flag, colored red, with the symbols of the hammer and the sickle (Exhibit A), and a newspaper organ called
"TITIS". In the general plan to indoctrinate the masses into communistic ideas and principles, communist schools — some of them called "Stalin
University" — were set up in a number of places in the mountain fastnesses, where trained instructors gave lectures and taught lessons in the principles of
Karl Marx, Frederich Engels, Joseph Stalin and Nicolai Lenin. .
As has been stated, the CPP has an armed force, which is the HMB. The predecessor of the HMB was the HUKBALAHAP, an organization created by the
party during the Japanese occupation to resist the Japanese forces. Upon liberation of the Philippines, the members of the Hukbalahap continued their
activities, the organization was renamed HMB, and its members were indoctrinated in communistic principles. The members of the HMB are known as
"Huks".
The tie-up between the CPP and the HMB is established beyond doubt by the evidence. It is shown that the heads of the CPP were in regular
communication with the leaders of the HMB, and the raids, ambushes, burnings, lootings and killings were planned and authorized by the CPP. Appellant
Federico Maclang, who is a member of the Politburo, in his testimony, admitted that the HMB is the armed force of the CPP. Luis Taruc, who at the time
was the head of the HMB, participated in the meetings and deliberations of the CPP. Some instances may be cited: (1) When Luis Taruc, leader of the
HMB, was interviewed by Manuel Manahan representing the newspaper "Bagong Buhay", sometime in July 1950, the said interview was planned,
approved and authorized by the Secretariat of the Communist Party. The purpose of the interview was to make Taruc declare about the true status of the
leadership in the HMB and the CPP, and belie reports of division among the leaders; (2) When appellant Simeon Rodriguez, a member of the Politburo and
a ranking member of the National Finance Committee, was arrested at 268 Pasaje Rosario, Paco, Manila on October 18, 1950, there were found in his
possession 65 P100-bills and 60 P50-bills and also P145 circulating notes and $312 in paper currency whose serial numbers (except two dollars) tallied
with the serial numbers of part of the money (amounting to more than P80,000) that was taken by the Huks from the safe of the office of the Provincial
Treasurer when they raided Sta. Cruz, Laguna, on August 26, 1950. Provincial Treasurer Balbino Kabigting of Laguna had a record of the serial numbers of
the money taken by the Huks, and he even issued a warning to the public about the loss of the money — mentioning in the warning the serial numbers of
the money taken. There are documents showing that this money taken from the provincial treasury of Laguna was the subject of communications between
Luis Taruc and appellant Federico Maclang and other members of the Secretariat.
Written articles and official publications of the CPP and HMB, which were presented as evidence, show the tie-up between the CPP and HMB. Following
are some excerpts from those publications:
As the situation now stands, it can be assumed that the HMB under Communist leadership, already enjoys a quantitative edge over the
Nationalista Party ... (Exh. K-211, p. 7, "Struggle against Awaitism". Emphasis supplied).
The enemy was caught by surprise. The CPP and the HMB it is leading scored a tremendous political victory ... (Exh. O-33, "Twenty Years of
Struggle of the CPP." Emphasis supplied)
Documentary and testimonial evidence establish that the various raids and ambuscades perpetrated by the HMB were planned, directed and supported by
the CPP. Thus, in the "Milestones in the History of the CPP", written by appellant Jose Lava, it is stated that at the enlarged Politburo conference of
January, 1950, it was decided to intensify HMB military operations for political and organizational purposes. The widespread raids and attacks on the
occasion of the 8th HMB anniversary (March 28-29, 1950) was decided at the PB conference:
The conference specifically decided to launch coordinated military operations on the occasion of the eight anniversary of the HMB. (Exh. 249,
Folder of Exhibits, Vol. V.)
The CPP ordered the HMB to fight the Philippine Constabulary and attack government installations. Thus testified Benjamin Advincula, a former high
ranking HMB member, who said that when he was Secretary of RECO No. 4, he received orders for transmission to the HMB to fight the Philippine
Constabulary. Attacks by the HMB were also reported to the CPP. The accomplishments, for instance, of RECO 2 during the attacks at dawn on March 29,
1950 were reported in Enteng's (Luis Taruc) letter to the Secretariat on April 1, 1950. This letter reported the ambush and liquidation of Captain Dumlao
and others; the attack and burning of the CG (Civilian Guard) camp at Manibong, Porac, and the capture of arms and ammunitions thereat; the losses on
the enemy side; the burning of 12 houses and the liquidation of 2 spies at Mabalacat, Pampanga. A similar report was furnished by a certain Pedring of
RECO 2 in a letter to Eto (Federico Maclang) dated April 2, 1950.
It was, in fact, the Communist Party that celebrated the eighth anniversary of the HMB, as appears in the Communist Party document "Twenty Years of
Struggle of the CPP" in which we read about the simultaneous attacks of the HMB on March 29, 1950 the following:
In quick succession, the Party celebrated the eighth anniversary of the HMB by the coordinated military operations from the far north down to
southern Luzon ... (Exh. O-33, Folder of Exhibits, Vol. V)
The Secretariat issued the following instructions in connection with the May 1, 1950 (Labor Day) attack:
... Repeat March 29 simultaneous attacks to time with May 1 celebration to convince the workers of the peasants' unity in struggle with them.
Party and HMB messages to be sent. (Exh. O-313, Folder of Exhibits, Vol. V)
Replying to said order (Exh. 0-313), the Politburo representative of Regional Command No. 3 wrote Gaston (Jose Lava of the Secretariat) and said:
Ukol sa Plan for May lst OK. We will try our best to accomplish our part without hesitation. (Exh. M-179, Folder of Exhibits, Vol. III).
The May 1, 1950 attack was followed by simultaneous attacks by the HMB on August 26, 1950, in commemoration of the first "Cry of Balintawak." These
attacks were again decided, planned and directed by the Communist Party of the Philippines as shown by transmissions from the Secretariat to the
Politburo members in the field. (Exhs. O-93; par. 2; O-102, par. 6). The attacks on August 26, 1950 were also ordered by the Secretariat, because the
evidence shows that the Secretariat required submission of complete report thereof, and reports were in fact submitted by Taruc (Enteng) on September 9,
1950 (Exhs. O-638, par. 8; O-278).
The Communist Party also planned the attack for November 7, 1950, the 20th anniversary of the CPP, which required bigger operations than the attack of
August 26, because towns were to be captured, barracks and jails were to be raided and political enemies were to be liquidated. The SEC assigned and
allocated the forces to different phases and places of operations. In hand-written notes identified by expert witness to have been written by appellant Jose
Lava, the following appears in connection with the plans for November 7:
... Coordinated — Core: Capture of towns near Manila, but near Mt. bases — Coordination of RECO 2, 3 & 4, Rizal — Cavite. Pol liquidation
in City. Bringing fight near strategic political, military and economic centers Supporting RECO 1 in ILOCOS & CAGAYAN. RECO 5 in
BICOL & RECO 6 in VISAYAS. (Exh. O-12.)
As We have stated, the primordial objective of the Communist Party of the Philippines and of its armed force, the HMB, was to overthrow the Philippine
Government by armed struggle. To attain this objective, the CPP also envisioned the following expansion: of the cadres from 3,600 in July, 1950 to 56,000
in September 1951; of the party members from 10,900 in July, 1950 to 172,800 in September, 1951; of HMB members from 10,800 in July, 1950 to
172,800 in September, 1951; and of the organized masses from 30,000 in July, 1950 to 2,430,000 in September, 1951.
The Communist Party declared the existence of a revolutionary situation in November, 1949 and went underground. This appears in the following excerpts
from documents that were presented as evidence during the trial.
Quickly sizing up the existence of a revolutionary situation, arising from the merger ... of the crises of production due to the imperialist-feudal
domination of our economy, and the parliamentary crises due to fraud and terrorism in the 1949 elections, the CPP openly called on the people
to overthrow the Liberal Party puppets of the American imperialists. (Exh. O-32, "Twenty Years of Struggle of the CPP", Exh. O-12 [hh])
In the Philippines, the CPP has already declared the existence of a revolutionary situation; and it is concentrating all its energies towards the
hastening of the maturity of the revolutionary situation into a crisis leading to the overthrow of the imperialist puppets and the achievement of
the NEW DEMOCRACY. (Exh. O-949, "Strategy and Tactics," Exhs. O-126-141) .
The CPP has declared the existence of a revolutionary situation; since November, 1949, as a result of the merger of the crisis in production of
our imperialist feudal dominated economy and the crisis of the burgeois parliamentarism ... Since then, the CPP went completely underground,
and openly called on the people for the armed overthrow of the power of American imperialism and its allies in the Philippines exercised
through its puppets ... (Exh. O-65)
The Communist Party of the Philippines is leading the armed struggle for national liberation and the establishment of a New Democracy in
order to crush the power of the exploiters, achieve power for the exploited classes, and who are disposed to accept the new society ..." (Exh. O-
119 "Accounting for the Peoples' Fund Received and Spent to Finance the Revolution"; see also Exhs. K-12 (u), N-570-573, M-1574, K-244, O-
749-56, Documents approved by SEC in its meeting on February 15, 1950. Exh. O-312, par. 3. See Vol. III, Folder of Exhibits)
... The Communist Party marks the 54th anniversary of the CRY OF BALINTAWAK calling on the people to join the HMB in annihilating the
enemy today, no different from the enemy denounced by Bonifacio. (Exh. M-1524, Vol. III, Folder of Exhibits).
We find that the criminal acts, consisting of attacks against Philippine Constabulary, murders, robberies, kidnapping, arson, etc. alleged in the information
are duly proved by evidence presented during the trial. It is noteworthy that the appellants did not attempt to disprove the evidence regarding the
commission of these crimes. Besides those alleged in the information, there were other acts of attacks against the Philippine Constabulary, murders,
robberies, etc. that were committed by the Huks that are proved by the evidence — also not disproved by the appellants — as follows:
(1) On March 29, 1950, a band of armed Huks carrying a communist flag raided San Pablo, Laguna. An encounter with the 27th PC Company
ensued, and several members of the PC were injured. The Huks looted several Chinese stores.
(2) At about 3 o'clock in the morning of August 26, 1950, approximately 400 Huk dissidents armed with machine guns and rifles attacked Santa
Cruz, Laguna. The cashier of the office of the Provincial Treasurer was forced at gun point, to open the vault from which the Huks took more
than P80,600. The Huks also took typewriters and office supplies from the office of the Provincial Treasurer. The Huks, after forcing the warden
to give the keys, opened the provincial jail and released the prisoners. The provincial jail was later burned. The Huks looted houses and took
rice, cigarettes and clothes, and burned five buildings.
(3) On March 29, 1950, several Huks raided San Mateo, Rizal, opened the safe in the municipal building and took money. They also got food
and medicines from the townspeople.
(4) On August 28, 1950, Huks attacked the municipal building of Arayat, Pampanga, and forced the municipal mayor at the point of a gun to
give P3,629.31 in cash and some documentary stamps. Killed during the incident was one Atty. Samia.
(5) On March 28, 1950, about 80 to 100 Huks attacked San Rafael, Montalban, killing 4 and wounding all soldiers. After the attack, the Huks
left communist propaganda leaflets.
(6) On August 30, 1949, upon receiving a report that there was a concentration of Huks at Kamog, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan, Lt. Restituto A.
Bisda organized a patrol of 20 enlisted men. On the way the patrol was fired upon by the Huks. After the encounter, one Huk member was found
dead and from his body were taken several documents.
(7) On October 15 and 17, 1950, P.C. Lt. Velasquez led three platoons of soldiers to the southwestern slope of Mount Malipuño at Lipa City
upon receipt of a report that about 200 Huks were gathered in that place. While climbing the mountain they were suddenly attacked and fired
upon by the dissidents killing one soldier and wounding others. When they retaliated, the Huks retreated leaving behind a wounded Huk. The
Huks abandoned their hideouts in the place. Upon inspection, Lt. Velasquez found a hut with several blackboards, papers and other school
supplies inside and a red hammer-and-sickle flag displayed on the wall with letters "STALIN U" (Stalin University), which indicated that the
place is one of the military schools for the Huks. (The flag was produced in court and marked Exhibit "A" for the prosecution. This flag had
been identified by a witness for the prosecution, a former Huk Colonel named Benjamin Advincula, to be the official flag of the HMB in their
military training school in the mountains wherein he had also undergone Huk military training.)
(8) At about midnight on March 29, 1950, Huk dissidents entered the town of Tanauan, Batangas. According to George Collantes, the municipal
mayor, there was shooting in the town, and later the industrial center and market were burned after they were raided. Mayor Collantes saw a red
flag hoisted by the dissidents. Two of the Huk dissidents were killed.
Issues raised by appellants
The appellants, in their defense in the present appeals, have raised issues that are common to them all, and also issues particular to each one of them. The
issues particular to individual appellants will be discussed at the latter part of this opinion when we deal with their respective appeals.
1. The appellants are charged with having committed the crime of rebellion with murders and arsons. The trial court declared some of them guilty as
principals, and some as accomplices, in the commission of the crime of rebellion complexed with multiple murder, arsons and robberies.
The law pertinent to the determination of the criminal responsibility of the appellants are Articles 134, 135, and 136 of Revised Penal Code, as follows: .
ART 134. Rebellion or insurrection — How committed. — The crime of rebellion or insurrection is committed by rising publicly and taking
arms against the Government for the purpose of removing from the allegiance to said Government or its laws, the territory of the Philippine
Islands or any part thereof, of any body of land, naval or other armed forces, or of depriving the Chief Executive or the Legislature, wholly or
 partially, of any of their powers or prerogatives.
ART. 135. Penalty for rebellion or insurrection. — Any person who promotes, maintains, or heads a rebellion or insurrection, or who, while
holding any public office or employment takes part therein, engaging in war against the forces of the Government, destroying property or
committing serious violence, exacting contributions or diverting public funds from the lawful purpose for which they have been appropriated,
shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor and a fine not to exceed 20,000 pesos.
Any person merely participating or executing the commands of others in a rebellion shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum
period.
When the rebellion or insurrection shall be under the command of unknown leaders, any person who in fact directed the others, spoke for them,
signed receipts and other documents issued in their name, or performed similar acts, on behalf of the rebels shall be deemed the leader of such
rebellion.
ART. 136. Conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion or insurrection. — The conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion or insurrection
shall be punished, respectively, by prision correccional in its maximum period and a fine which shall not exceed 5,000 pesos, and by prision
correccional in its medium period and a fine not exceeding 2,000 pesos.
It is the common contention of the appellants that the trial court erred in declaring that the crime committed by the appellants was that of "rebellion
complexed with multiple murder, arsons, and robberies."
We uphold the contention of the appellants. The question, of whether or not a person may be prosecuted and held guilty of the crime of rebellion
complexed with murder, arson, robbery and/or other common crimes, is now settled. In the case of People vs. Hernandez, etc., et al., 1 this Court held that
the crime of rebellion cannot be complexed with other common crimes. The accused in the Hernandez case were charged, as are appellants in the instant
cases, "with the crime of rebellion with multiple murder, arsons, and robberies." This Court ruled that:
One of the means by which rebellion may be committed, in the words of said Article 135, is by "engaging in war against the forces of the
government" and "committing serious violence" in the prosecution of said "war". These expressions imply everything that war connotes,
namely; resort to arms, requisition of property and services, collection of taxes and contributions, restraint of liberty, damage to property,
physical injuries and loss of life, and the hunger, illness and unhappiness that war leaves in its wake — except that very often, it is worse than
war in the international sense, for it involves internal struggle, a fight between brothers, with a bitterness and a passion or ruthlessness seldom
found in a contest between strangers. Being within the purview of "engaging in war" and "committing serious violence", said resort to arms,
with the resulting impairment or destruction of life and property, constitutes not two or more offenses, but only one crime — that of rebellion
plain and simple. Thus, for instance, it has been held that "the crime of treason may be committed" by executing either a single or similar
intentional overt acts, different or similar but distinct, and for that reason, it may be considered one single continuous offense. (Guinto vs. Veluz,
77 Phil. 801, 44 Off. Gaz., 909.)" (People vs. Pacheco, 93 Phil. 521.).
Inasmuch as the acts specified in said Article 135 constitute, we repeat, one single crime, it follows necessarily that said acts offer no occasion
for the application of Article 48, which requires therefor the commission of, at least, two crimes. Hence, this court has never in the past,
convicted any person of the "complex crime of rebellion with murder". What is more, it appears that in every one of the cases of rebellion
published in the Philippine Reports, the defendants were convicted of simple rebellion, although they had killed several persons, sometimes
peace officers. (U.S. vs. Lagnason, 3 Phil. 472; U.S. vs. Baldello, 3 Phil. 509; U.S. vs. Ayala, 6 Phil. 151; League vs. People, 73 Phil. 155)
xxx xxx xxx
There is one other reason — and a fundamental one at that — why Article 48 of our Penal Code cannot be applied in the case at bar. If murder
were not complexed with rebellion, and the two crimes punished separately (assuming that this could be done), the following penalties would be
imposable upon the movant, namely: (1) for the crime of rebellion, a fine not exceeding P20,000 and prision mayor, in the corresponding
period, depending upon the modifying circumstances present, but never exceeding 12 years of prision mayor; and (2) for the crime of murder,
reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death, depending upon the modifying circumstances present. In other words, in the absence of
aggravating circumstances, the extreme penalty could not be imposed upon him. However, under Article 48, said penalty would have to be
meted out to him, even in the absence of a single aggravating circumstance. Thus, said provision, if construed in conformity with the theory of
the prosecution, would be unfavorable to the movant.
Upon the other hand, said Article 48 was enacted for the purpose of favoring the culprit, not of sentencing him to a penalty more severe than that
which would be proper if the several acts performed by him were punished separately. In the words of Rodriguez Navarro:
La unificacion de penas en los casos de concurso de delitos a que hace referencia este articulo (75 del Codigo de 1932), esta basado
francamente en el principio pro reo. (II Doctrina Penal del Tribunal Supremo de España, p. 2168.)
... It is evident to us that the policy of our statutes on rebellion is to consider all acts committed in furtherance thereof — as specified in Article
134 and 135 of the Revised Penal Code — as constituting only one crime, punishable with one single penalty — namely, that prescribed in said
Article 135. ....
... In conclusion, we hold that, under the allegations of the amended information against defendant-appellant Amado V. Hernandez, the murders,
arsons and robberies described therein are mere ingridients of the crime of rebellion allegedly committed by the said defendants, as means
"necessary" (4) for the perpetration of said offense of rebellion; that the crime charged in the aforementioned amended information is, therefore,
simple rebellion, not the complex crime of rebellion with multiple murder, arsons and robberies; that the maximum penalty imposable under
such charge cannot exceed twelve (12) years of prision mayor and a fine of P20,000; and that, in conformity with the policy of this court in
dealing with accused persons amenable to a similar punishment, said defendant may be allowed to bail." The foregoing ruling was adhered to in
the decisions of this Court in the cases of People vs. Geronimo, G.R. No. L-8936, October 23, 1956; People vs. Togonon, G.R. No. L-8926, June
29, 1957; People vs. Romagosa, G.R. No. L-8476, February 28, 1958; and People vs. Santos, G.R. No. L-11813, September 17, 1958.
In People vs. Geronimo, supra, this Court further elaborated on the Hernandez ruling, as follows:
As in treason, where both intent and overt act are necessary, the crime of rebellion is integrated by the coexistence of both the armed uprising
for the purposes expressed in Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code, and the overt acts of violence described in the first paragraph of Article
135. That both purpose and overt acts are essential components of one crime, and that without either of them the crime of rebellion legally does
not exist is shown by the absence of any penalty attached to Article 134. It follows, therefore, that any or all of the acts described in Article 135,
 when committed as a means to or in furtherance of the subversive ends described in Article 134, becomes absorbed in the crime of rebellion,
and cannot be regarded or penalized as distinct crimes in themselves. In law they are part and parcel of the rebellion itself, and cannot be
considered as giving rise to a separate crime, that, under Article 48 of the Code, would constitute a complex one with that of rebellion.
And in People vs. Aquino, et al., L-13789, June 30, 1960, 57 O.G. 9180, this Court said:
On the other hand, from the very testimony of Filomeno Casal, another witness for the prosecution, it can be gathered that the one who killed or
ordered the killing of Mendoza was Commander Silva who, according to Casal, ordered Mendoza to lie down and when the latter refused he
shot him. If we are to believe the testimony of this witness the only one responsible for Mendoza's death is Commander Silva for there is
nothing to show that his companions who were under his command knew that his design was to liquidate him. At any rate, since it appears that
the killing was committed not because of any personal motive on the part of the accused but merely in pursuance of the huk movement to
overthrow the duly constituted authorities, the proper charge against them would be rebellion and not murder ....
The reason for this was already given by this Court in People vs. Hernandez, et al., supra, to wit:
In short, political crimes are those directly aimed against the political order, as well as such common crimes as may be committed to achieve a
political purpose. The decisive factor is the intent or motive. If a crime usually regarded as common, like homicide, is perpetrated for the
purpose of removing from the allegiance "to the Government the territory of the Philippine Islands or any part thereof," then said offense
becomes stripped of its "common" complexion, inasmuch as, being part and parcel of the crime of rebellion, the former acquires the political
character of the latter."2
The Solicitor General, in behalf of the appellee, The People of the Philippines, asks this Court to reexamine the ruling in the Hernandez case "based not
only on grounds of public policy but also to interpret the law in order to have justice and adequacy into the Philippine law on rebellion on the basis of
prevailing jurisprudential schools of thought such as the sociological theory on the natural law doctrine and ... the policy science theory." 3 This Court has
given this plea of the Solicitor General a very serious consideration, but after a mature deliberation the members of this Court have decided to maintain that
ruling in the Hernandez case and to adhere to what this Court said in that case, as follows:
The Court is conscious of the keen interest displayed, and the considerable efforts exerted, by the Executive Department in the apprehension and
prosecution of those believed to be guilty of crimes against public order, of the lives lost, and the time and money spent in connection therewith,
as well as of the possible implications or repercussions in the security of the State. The careful consideration given to said policy of a coordinate
and co-equal branch of the Government is reflected in the time consumed, the extensive and intensive research work undertaken, and the many
meetings held by the members of the court for the purpose of elucidating on the question under discussion and of settling the same.
The role of the judicial department under the Constitution is, however, clear — to settle justiciable controversies by the application of the law.
And the latter must be enforced as it is — with all its flaws and defects, not affecting its validity — not as the judges would have it. In other
words, the courts must apply the policy of the State as set forth in its laws, regardless of the wisdom thereof.
xxx xxx xxx
Thus the settled policy of our laws on rebellion, since the beginning of the century, has been one of decided leniency, in comparison with the
laws in force during the Spanish regime. Such policy has not suffered the slightest alteration. Although the Government has, for the past five or
six years, adopted a more vigorous course of action in the apprehension of violators of said law and in their prosecution, the established policy
of the State, as regards the punishment of the culprits has remained unchanged since 1932. It is not for us to consider the merits and demerits of
such policy. This falls within the province of the policy-making branch of the Government — the Congress of the Philippines ...
xxx xxx xxx
Such evils as may result from the failure of the policy of the law punishing the offense to dovetail with the policy of the law enforcing agencies
in the apprehension and prosecution of the offenders are matters which may be brought to the attention of the departments concerned. The
judicial branch cannot amend the former in order to suit the latter. The Court cannot indulge in judicial legislation without violating the
principles of separation of powers, and, hence, undermining the foundation of our republican system. In short, we cannot accept the theory of
the prosecution without causing much bigger harm than that which would allegedly result from the adoption of the opposite view.
2. The appellants also contend that the informations against them charge more than one offense, in violation of Section 12, Rule 106 of the old Rules of
Court (now Section 12, Rule 117 of the new Rules of Court). This contention has no merit. A reading of the informations reveals the theory of the
prosecution that the accused had committed the complex crime of rebellion with murders, robberies and arsons, enumerating therein eight counts regarding
specific acts of murder, robbery and arson. These acts were committed, to quote the information, "to create and spread terrorism in order to facilitate the
accomplishment of the aforesaid purpose", that is, to overthrow the Government. The appellants are not charged with the commission of each and every
crime specified in the counts as crimes separate and distinct from that of rebellion. The specific acts are alleged merely to complete the narration of facts,
thereby specifying the way the crime of rebellion was allegedly committed, and to apprise the defendants of the particular facts intended to be proved as
the basis for a finding of conspiracy and/or direct participation in the commission of the crime of rebellion. 4 An information is not duplicitous if it charges
several related acts, all of which constitute a single offense, although the acts may in themselves be distinct offenses. 5 Moreover, this Court has held that
acts of murder, arson, robbery, physical injuries, etc. are absorbed by, and form part and parcel of, the crime of rebellion if committed as a means to or in
furtherance of the rebellion charged. 6
3. Another contention of appellants is that the trial court, the Court of First Instance of Manila, did not have jurisdiction to try the cases against them
because the acts enumerated in the eight counts in the information were committed outside the territorial jurisdiction of the court. This contention is also
without merit. Section 14 of Rule 110 of the Rules of Court provides that the criminal action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or
province where the offense was committed or any one of the essential ingredients thereof took place. The informations allege that Manila is the seat of the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines which the appellants sought to overthrow and that Manila was chosen by the accused as the nerve center of
all their rebellious activities in the different parts of the country. While it is true that the murders, robberies and arsons alleged in the information were
committed outside the City of Manila, in the informations it is alleged that it was in Manila where the accused had decided and agreed to commit the crime
of rebellion and it was in Manila where they promoted, maintained, caused, directed and/or commanded the HMB to rise publicly and take arms against the
Government, as in fact the HMB had risen publicly, making armed raids, sorties, ambushes, and committing wanton acts of murder, arson, looting, etc. An
essential ingredient of the crime of which appellants were charged, therefore, took place in Manila.
4. Some of the appellants contend that their constitutional rights were violated because the documentary evidence presented against them were illegally
seized or had come from doubtful sources. This claim has no merit. We have carefully examined the record, and We find that search warrants were properly
secured by the peace officers before raids were effected and that the documents, articles and effects seized from each place raided were listed, inventoried
and marked. It even appears that statements were signed by some of the appellants certifying that the search warrants were executed in an orderly and
peaceful manner by the raiding parties.
5. The appellants assail the reconstitution of the exhibits that were destroyed, and claim that the reconstituted exhibits should not be considered in this
appeal. We have stated at the earlier part of this opinion that the exhibits (documentary and other articles) were placed in the custody of the Philippine
Constabulary because they had to be presented as evidence in the trial of rebellion cases pending in other courts. Most of the originals of the documentary
evidence were burned during the fire that gutted the headquarters of the Philippine Constabulary on September 10, 1958. The Solicitor General filed a
petition for the reconstitution of the burned exhibits. The petition was given due course by this Court, and the Deputy Clerk of this Court was
commissioned to receive the evidence on the reconstitution of the burned documents. The list of reconstituted exhibits is Exhibit C-Reconstitution. In his
report, dated October 6, 1959, the Commissioner recommended the admission of all the reconstituted exhibits.
We find that the reconstitution was made in accordance with the provisions of Act 3110, which provides for the procedure in the reconstitution of court
records. Section 59 of said act provides that destroyed documentary evidence shall be reconstituted by means of secondary evidence which may be
presented to any Justice of the Supreme Court or any other officer commissioned by the Court. Section 14 of the act provides that the destroyed or lost
documentary evidence shall be replaced by secondary evidence. A photostatic copy of an original document is admissible as a secondary evidence of the
contents of the originals and they constitute evidence of a satisfactory nature. 7 The record shows that the photostatic copies of the destroyed exhibits,
which were presented before the Commissioner during the reconstitution proceedings, were taken before the originals were destroyed by fire. The
photostatic copies had been compared with the originals, properly checked and recorded, by the officer who was the custodian of the exhibits.
The certified typewritten copies made from the original documents that were hand written in ink are also secondary evidence of the contents of the latter.
Sgt. Aquilino Tingco, assigned as assistant to the document officer in charge of the court of exhibits in the rebellion cases, testified that he was the one who
furnished the typists the original documents, and after those originals were copied on the typewriter he compared the typewritten copies with the originals,
proofread them, stamped them and had them certified as true copies. This witness further testified that before the certified copies were presented in court as
evidence said copies were compared with their originals. 8
During the reconstitution proceedings, counsel for appellants objected to the admission of some of the reconstituted documents upon the ground that they
were not sufficiently identified. The Commissioner, however, admitted all there constituted documents, and We find that the Commissioner rightly did so.
We find that Exhibits R-X-6 to R-P-73-79, the admission of which was objected to, were properly identified. Captain Enrique L. Reyes of the PC, who was
entrusted with the custody of the documents, had the list of all the exhibits that were burned, which were inventoried and verified; as well as a list of those
exhibits that were presented in these cases, of which photostatic copies had been taken; and when asked where the photostatic copies were, Capt. Reyes
said that he had the photostatic copies, and pointed to a bundle of folders containing them. These exhibits were checked and counter-checked with the
record of the present cases in the Supreme Court. 9 Sgt. Aquilino Tingco, who brought the exhibits to the different courts where they were presented as
evidence, and who personally supervised the taking of the microfilm and the photostatic copies that were presented in the courts in lieu of the originals,
when asked to show to the Commissioner the photostats made of the documents which were used the Politburo cases, extracted from a folder a bundle of
papers and presented the list of exhibits (Exh. C-Reconstitution) along with photostatic copies of those listed exhibits, and he testified on them. The witness
was asked to consult the list of exhibits (Exhibit C-Reconstitution) and he pointed to the Commissioner the exhibits to be marked according to the list,
which the Commissioner himself marked. The witness testified that the contents of the documents thus marked were the same as those of the originals. The
Commissioner considered the documents properly identified and he admitted the documents over the objection of counsel for the appellants, and he
recommended to this Court the admission of all of them. This Court approved the report of the Commissioner.
We have carefully examined and analyzed these reconstituted exhibits and We believe that they constitute a competent evidence to be considered in
arriving at a decision in these cases.
6. The appellants also claim that they were not afforded the time and freedom to prepare for their defense. This claim of appellants is not borne by the
record. The record shows, that the trial of these cases took months; all the defendants were represented by counsel, either de officio or de parte, who did
their best to defend the appellants during the trial. In fact the defense lawyers were commended by the trial court for their efforts in defense of the
appellants. None of the appellants was deprived of his day in court. Everyone was given an opportunity testify and/or adduce evidence in his behalf. All the
appellants, except Jose Lava and Nicanor Razon, Sr., testified in court in their own defense. The record does not show that appellant Razon had testified or
had presented any evidence in his behalf. Appellant Jose Lava voluntarily refrained from taking the witness stand, but, instead, he presented witnesses who
vouched for his good moral character and exemplary conduct as a citizen. We find no merit in the claim that the appellants were not afforded ample time
and opportunity to prepare for their defense.
Having thus resolved the common issues raised by the appellants, We now proceed to determine the criminal responsibility, if any, of the individual
appellants.
The lower court found some of the appellants guilty as principals, and some as accomplices, in the commission of the complex crime of rebellion with
multiple murder, arsons and robberies. We have already declared in this opinion that the crime of rebellion cannot be complexed with murder, robbery and
other common crimes. Our task, therefore, is to determine the degree of responsibility of each of the appellants in the commission of the crime of simple
rebellion as defined and penalized under the provisions of Articles 134, 135 and 136 of the Revised Penal Code.
1. The appeal of Jose Lava
Upon a careful study of the evidence, We find:
That appellant Jose Lava was known under these aliases: Harry, Felix Cruz, Gaston, Gaston Silayan, Greg, Gregorio Santayana and Gavino. Jose Lava
became a member of the Communist Party of the Philippines during the Japanese occupation. In a self-appraisal which he wrote, and published in
mimeograph form with the approval of the Secretariat, he stated that although he was a new Party member he had been entrusted with responsible positions
in the Party and that due to his high sense of responsibility and initiative he could rank with the best in the party. Lava was not only, a confirmed
communist; he was a ranking leader of the CPP, being a member of the Central Committee (CC) of the CPP and he participated in the Politburo meetings.
In the Politburo conference in Manila in January 1947 he proposed armed struggle to overthrow the Government. His participation therein was described in
Exhibit O-228-229, as follows:
... There was an attempt in the conference to give it a character of a CC conference notwithstanding the fact that there were only eleven CC
members, out of thirty-five, present in the conference. There was also an attempt to isolate some CC members who were easily available, as
evidenced by the non-invitation of Coms VY, Harry and Pacing known for their views in support of the Nacionalista-Democratic Alliance
 coalition, and for an early resumption of the armed struggle. It was only later in the conference, when their absence was noted by certain
comrades, that Com Harry was invited to the conference ....
Com Harry proposed that the conference declare that armed struggle be the main form of struggle ....
Other documents show that Jose Lava had been attending meetings of the Secretariat (SEC) since October, 1949. He signed, under the alias "Gaston
Silayan", the Secretariat's transmission to the Politburo members in the field, under date of October 22, 1949. He issued under different aliases, for and in
behalf of the Secretariat, Secretariat transmissions up to October 14, 1950. He signed as "Gaston" the Secretariat's transmission dated December 24, 1949;
he signed as "Greg" those of July 22, 1950, of September 23, 1950, of September 30, 1950, of October 7, 1950, and of October 14, 1950; and signed as
"Gavino" the transmission dated September 25, 1950.
Jose Lava's membership in the Secretariat of the CPP is shown in various documents (Exh. C-1313 and Exhs. O-269-270). In another exhibit, N-1015-
1017, Kas. Gaston was addressed as the General Secretary.
As member of the SEC, and as General Secretary, Jose Lava attended SEC meetings and transmitted the decisions of the SEC to the comrades of the
Politburo in the regional commands. His direct participation in the meetings of the SEC was mentioned in several SEC transmissions. In one such
transmission he (Gaston) advocated the overthrow of the corrupt Liberal Party administration because of the wholesale fraud and terrorism during the
elections of 1949. In the meeting of May 5, 1950, he (Gaston) disagreed with Eto (Federico Maclang) and Johnny (Ramon Espiritu) on the way of giving
money to deserving families, saying that:
Even if we have a million pesos now, we still would need same to buy arms and ammo, decisively improve our propaganda to spread our
influence over all the country, improve the diet of our fighting soldiers to increase their fighting efficiency, all with a view to hastening the
people's victory and end their suffering earlier. (Exh. O-91, par. 2)
In the SEC meeting of September 29, 1950 "Greg" (Jose Lava) dissented from the majority decision rejecting the proposal that Boris (Angel Baking) be
allowed to attend the Military Committee (MC) meeting. (Exh. O-339, par. 15).
Apart from his routinary duties as General Secretary, other duties were assigned to Jose Lava under his aliases. Thus, as "Gaston", he was designated in the
SEC's meeting of December 20, 1949 to take care of the editorial of the "TITIS", the official organ of the Communist Party; he was given supervision over
women matters, and over political and educational matters, in the meetings of February 15, 1950 and April 14, 1950. "Gaston" was also in charge of Direct
Party Propaganda, Curriculum and Analysis. As "Greg", he was appointed by the SEC as one of the 15 members of the Military Committee (MC). He was
to supervise, as decided in the SEC meeting of April 14, 1950, the newly organized Technological Group. He was instructed by the SEC, in its meeting of
September 15, 1950, to prepare a draft of the resolution for discussion before the Military Committee. In the meeting of the SEC on September 22, 1950,
he was given power to review all the minutes and decisions of the National Education Commission (NEC) and only matters which he did not approve were
to be taken up by the Secretariat.

Jose Lava also attended and presided at meetings of the Communists and the HMB in his house in Tejeron, Makati. 10
Jose Lava was the author of many articles and/or writings, among them: "Self-Appraisal by Gregorio Santayana," a handwritten outline; "Struggle against
Awaitism, by Gregorio Santayana", also a handwritten outline, with a typewritten copy; "Outline of Strategy and Tactics"; "Strategy and Tactics"; "Twenty
Years of Struggle of the CPP"; "Outline on Milestones in the History of the CPP"; "Milestones in the History of the CPP", which is a part of the curriculum
in the secondary course of the schools conducted by the CPP. The "Outline on Strategy and Tactics" and "Strategy and Tactics" were also in the secondary
curriculum texts of the CPP. He is also the author of "Finance Opportunism, Its Basic Causes and Remedies", a portion of which reads: .
... There is no question that we cannot drastically eradicate finance opportunism within the Party and the National liberation movement it is
leading, and thereby hasten the maturity of the revolutionary crisis and prepare the Party to create a clear and honest body of administrators and
state functionaries and thereby maintain the power of the NEW DEMOCRACY that we are set to establish.
Another work of Jose Lava is "Accounting of the People's Funds Received and Spent to Finance the Revolutions", a portion of which reads as follows:
The Communist Party of the Philippines is leading the armed struggle for national liberation and the establishment of a New Democracy in
order to crush the power of the exploiters, achieve power for the exploited classes and exercise such power for their benefit, and for those who
are disposed to accept the new society ....
Jose Lava also wrote other documents, among them his handwritten notes containing the territorial extent of Recos 1 to 7, and a plan of attack on the
November 7, 1950 celebration; a list containing several persons (aliases) assigned to Recos 1 to 7 and to the Military, Pol-Ed, organizational and GHQ
organs; a letter to Eto (Federico Maclang) on the reverse of a list containing names of Malaca_¤_an special agents. He also wrote letters to Party members
concerning the activities of the Party and/or HMB — unmistakably indicating conspiracy or connection between him and other top HMB and CPP leaders
in the field. Thus, "Gaston" (Lava) wrote a letter to Leo (Cesareo Torres) informing the latter that the stencils for "Ang Komunista" were already sent by
NED-Out and that if Leo needed funds, he could ask from the NFC. In a letter of September 4, 1950 to Eto (Federico Maclang), "Gaston" (Lava)
transmitted to Maclang three letters, on the reverse side of one which was a note of O. Beria (Maclang) asking who the writers were. In his letter of
September 26, 1950 "Gaston" advised Eto (Maclang) to circularize all Recos about the conference of the RECO-Ed and G-3 before October 15. In his letter
of September 12, Gaston asked the addressee Johnny (Ramon Espiritu) about the latter's self-appraisal, the Hospital Group, and the selection of two
additional members to help Luming (Iluminada Calonje or Salome Cruz).
The foregoing findings of this Court are based mainly on documents presented as evidence during the trial. Those documents were taken: some from the
third floor of the Mayflower Apartments, at Estrada and Pennsylvania Streets in Manila, which was then rented by appellant Lava when it was raided by
peace officers on June 23, 1950; and the other documents from the different places that were raided by the MIS agents and the Manila Police on October
18, 1950, where most of the accused in these five cases were arrested. One of the places raided on October 18, 1950 was 683 Pasaje Rosario, Paco, Manila,
where appellant Lava was arrested along with his co-accused Federico Bautista, Simeon Rodriguez, Victorina G. Rodriguez and Pedro Vicencio. Numerous
documents, books, and articles were seized at that place where Lava was arrested, and those documents were used as evidence during the trial of these five
cases in the court below.
Some of the documents thus seized, and which were presented as evidence, were in appellant Lava's handwriting, or were signed by him using his alias
names. This is clearly established by the testimony of a handwriting expert that was presented by the prosecution. The conclusion of the handwriting expert
was based on the specimens of Lava's handwriting which were used as standards in comparing with the handwriting and/or signature (in alias) of the
appellant that appear in the documents that were presented as evidence against him. It is contended by appellant's counsel that no genuine specimen of
Lava's handwriting was presented as standard for comparison. We do not see merit in this contention. We find that the standards for comparison that were
used were the documents marked Exhibits FF-1 and FF-2. 11 Exhibit FF-1 is an application for employment signed by Jose Lava. The signature thereon
was testified to by witness Eduardo Romualdez (now Secretary of Finance) as looking "like the signature of Jose Lava." Eduardo Romualdez was
acquainted with the handwriting of Jose Lava, having received reports (Exh. FF), parts of which were in the handwriting of Jose Lava "not less than three
or four times" while Jose lava, was a bank examiner. 12 Exhibit FF-2 is a cardboard containing a list of books requested by Jose Lava while the latter was
detained in Bilibid Prison. Buenaventura Villanueva, to whom the list was given, testified that he saw Lava writing the list on the cardboard. What appears
on Exhibit FF-2 is certainly a genuine specimen of Lava's handwriting.
The handwriting of a person may be proved by any witness who believes it to be the handwriting of such person, and has seen the person write. Evidence
respecting the handwriting may also be given by comparison, made by the witness or the court, with writings admitted or treated as genuine by the party
against whom the evidence is offered, or proved to be genuine to the satisfaction of the judge. 13 The handwriting expert who made the comparison in this
case positively identified the handwriting of Jose Lava on the documents presented as evidence against said appellant, specially the handwritten names of
Gregorio Santayana, Gaston, Gaston Silayan, Gavino and Greg. 14
Appellant Jose Lava did not take the witness stand to testify in his own behalf. Instead, he presented witnesses to testify on his good moral character, his
strong convictions and his good citizenship. An accused, however, is not entitled to an acquittal simply because of his previous good moral character and
exemplary conduct. When a court believes that an accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged, it must convict him notwithstanding
evidence of his good moral character and previous exemplary conduct. 15
We find that the evidence adduced during the trial has proved beyond reasonable doubt that appellant Jose Lava was one of the top leaders of the CCP, and
that he was not only working to propagate the doctrine of communism in the Philippines but was actually promoting an armed uprising against the
Government. He did not actually take to the field and participate in the armed attacks against constituted authorities, but in the positions that he held in the
CCP, he actually promoted, maintained, and even directed the armed activities of the HMB which were aimed at overthrowing the Government and
implanting a new system of government in the Philippines. As General Secretary of the CCP he signed, in his aliases, the communications or transmissions
of the Secretariat to the HMB and CCP leaders in the field. As We have stated in this opinion, there was a tie-up between the CCP and the HMB, and that
the HMB was the military arm of the CCP. The CCP went underground sometime in November 1949. It was precisely during the latter part of 1949 and
during the year 1950 (before the arrests of the accused in these five cases on October 18, 1950) when the HMB was most active in its armed operations
against the Government — or against the elements of the Army, the PC and the Police, and against public officials and even against civilians. The evidence
against appellant Lava shows that it was in 1949 and 1950 when he, in his capacity as one of the top leaders of the CPP, actively participated in the armed
struggle being carried on by the HMB by sending directives and other communications to the leaders of the HMB and to the heads of the regional
commands of the CPP who were operating in the field. He was, in fact, one of the leaders of the rebellion. He planned the attack for the November 7,
(1950) anniversary celebration, which was to include the capture of towns near Manila and the liquidation of enemies in the City by the different regional
commands.
We agree with the finding of the lower court that appellant Jose Lava is guilty as principal in the commission of the crime of rebellion, and he should be
punished accordingly.
2. Appeal of Federico Bautista
We find it conclusively shown by the evidence that:
Appellant Federico Bautista had used, or was known under, the aliases: F. Payat, Fred, Freddie, and Freding. He was arrested by the MIS agents and the
police on October 18, 1950 at 683 Pasaje Rosario, Paco, Manila, along with his co-accused Jose Lava, Simeon Rodriguez, Victorina G. Rodriguez and
Pedro Vicencio. He joined the CPP on August 8, 1949. Testifying in his own behalf, he said that he joined the CPP because of the failure of the
administration then to carry out the terms of the Amnesty Proclamation which he helped to bring about; and also because, of the ouster of six members of
Congress from the central Luzon provinces who were elected in the 1946 elections, of the frauds and terrorism committed in subsequent elections and the
graft and corruption in the government.

He was a member of the National Finance Committee of the CPP, 16 of which committee Ramon Espiritu (co-accused) was the chairman, and Simeon
Rodriguez (co-accused) was a ranking member. As such member of the National Finance Committee part of his duties and responsibilities was the
procurement of supplies, such as arms, ammunitions, medicine, office supplies, clothing, etc., for the dissidents' (both of the CPP and of the HMB)
organizations in the field. He became a member of the Military Committee of the CPP, with special assignment as Chief of Intelligence, GHQ. 17 He was
also assigned to, and exercised authority over, the armed forces (AF [HMB]) in Manila and suburbs, which was called the City Command. He also had
supervisory powers over the National Courier Division. 18
This appellant did not actually take to the field and participated in the armed operations of the HMB, but he did staff work which to promote, maintain and
direct the operations of the HMB. Thus, there was presented in evidence a letter 19 written by this appellant to Leo (co-accused Cesareo Torres), under date
of July 10, 1950, transmitting the latest party decision regarding authorized daily subsistence allowance of personnel of the CPP organs, ranging from
P1.00 to P1.20. Cesareo Torres is the head of the Technical Office in charge of propaganda. In a handwritten tabulation prepared by him, 20 which was sort
of a financial statement, there is shown an amount spent for communications and for intelligence. It appears that of the total income of P8,006.80 for April,
May and June 1950, 20% was allotted for ammunitions and 10% for intelligence. This financial statement, as finally published, was certified to by Johnny
(co-accused Ramon Espiritu) as head of the National Finance Committee, and audited and approved by Tommy (co-accused Honofre Mangila). This
document once more indicates clearly that the HMB was being supported by the CPP.

There is a document labelled "Memorandum on Intelligence", 21 a typewritten draft, which was shown to bear the pencil handwritten insertions and
corrections made by appellant Federico Bautista, indicating that this draft was prepared by him. Portion of this document reads:
Without deviating from the general orientation of expanding evenly along the four branches of intelligence, viz.: Political, economic, cultural
and military, the emphasis for the present is on military intelligence both strategic and tactical. This is in conformity with and in direct
pursuance of the Party's program of "all for expansion and the armed struggle." The mechanics of wresting power will eventually be a military
struggle, we must have a continual basis by which we can estimate what the enemy intends to do and the tenacity with which they will
implement these intentions singly and collectively.

Appellant Federico Bautista was identified with the high councils of the CPP. He attended Politburo conferences. 22 Along with Ramon Espiritu and one
Nicasio Pamintuan, he sat to try, and found guilty, one Domingo Clarin, a member of the HMB Trigger Squad, who was charged with having squealed
regarding the hold-up of the Naric in Pulilan. Appellant Federico Bautista had previously assigned Clarin to guard Jose Lava. 23
We have carefully studied the evidence for the prosecution and defense, as well as the argument of the counsel in the appellant's brief, and We believe that
it is proved beyond reasonable doubt that appellant Federico Bautista is one of the leaders of the rebellion jointly undertaken by the CPP and HMB. We
agree with the finding of the lower court that this appellant is guilty as principal in the commission of the crime of rebellion, and he should be punished
accordingly.
3. Appeal of Federico Maclang
Appellant Federico Maclang was arrested on October 18, 1950 by agents of the MIS and the Manila Police at 1938 Interior 7, Felix Huertas, Manila, along
with Julita Rodriguez and Felipe Engreso — the latter two being among those convicted by the lower court in these five cases, but Julita Rodriguez
withdrew her appeal. He used the aliases: O. Beria, Eto, Olibas, Manuel Santos, Manuel Santa Fe and Ambrosia Reyes.
The evidence conclusively shows that this appellant is a ranking communist, and he was responsible for the organization of the CPP in Manila and Rizal.
He issued directives, plans and instructions to the different units of the CPP in the field that were working in close collaboration with the HMB in the
latter's armed operations. By his own testimony he revealed that he is a confirmed communist. He declared that he was one of the organizers of the PKM (a
peasants' organization) in Luzon, that he became a communist after studying thoroughly the principles of communism in relation to the economic and
political conditions of the country; that he believes in the overthrow of "imperialism" and the establishment of a "new democracy" in the Philippines.
It is shown by the evidence that:

Appellant Maclang joined the CPP sometime in 1939; and he was a member of the Politburo from 1944 up to the time of his arrest on October 18, 1950. 24

In the document labelled "Pagtuya sa Sarile", shown to have been written by him, 25 it appears that he was the Chief of the Organizational Bureau (OB) of
the CPP from 1948 until the time of his arrest, and that as an organizer he was responsible for the organization of the Regional Commands (Recos) of the
party. He was also one of the members of the Secretariat, and as such he actively participated in the deliberations and decisions of the body.
In several letters of Enteng (Luis Taruc) to him, which were identified during the trial, as well as in his letter to Enteng, a copy of which was found in his
possession and was identified by him, 26 his membership in the Secretariat is clearly shown. As a member of the Secretariat he was assigned the
supervision on all organizational matters, on the youth problems and activities, and also on military affairs. Likewise, he was assigned supervision over the
Trade Union Division (TUD) and the trade union struggle; also he had supervision over the news section of the TITIS; and he was authorized by the
Secretariat to review the decisions of the Regional Command (RECO) and, like appellant Jose Lava, only those decisions which he did not approve were
taken up by the Secretariat. 27 As chief of the Organizational Bureau he issued, or approved the issuance of, circulars, plans, and directives to the different
organs of the CPP. 28

This appellant prepared the document entitled "Impiltrasyon". 29 In this document he discussed the problems of infiltration and the methods or techniques
to be followed by party members in infiltrating government offices, the armed forces, and the ranks of anti-communist groups, in connection with the
underground work of the CPP and the HMB. He also prepared "Pakikibaka sa Pagani" 30 where he urged the peasants to fight for bigger crop shares, and
the workers to fight for better wages, pointing out that the government cannot meet the demands of the working class so that the only alternative is to
support the "People's Liberation Movement" and effect changes through armed struggle. He wrote the "Pangatawanan ang Kampanya sa Pagpalawak ng
Ating Patanim at Pagpalitaw sa Inuhi". 31 where he states the policy of the CPP regarding the expansion of the production areas and the production of more
crops to maintain and support the revolution and to prepare the masses for self-government.
Likewise, he wrote the "Ang Kompiskasyon", a circular issued by the Organizational Bureau (OB), of which he was the head, to all the organizational units
of the CPP, explaining the Party's theory of confiscation. This circular authorizes confiscation as a means to raise revenue for the "People's Liberation
Movement". This circular lists the classes of individuals who are considered enemies of the revolution and whose properties may be confiscated. 32
When this appellant was arrested on October 18, 1950, there were found in his possession documents which indubitably show the high positions that he
occupied in the CPP and the direct connections that he had with the operations of the HMB. Thus, there is Exhibit N-52, which is a partial report of Reco 2
regarding military operations during the "Cry of Balintawak" celebration. In this report are stated the simultaneous HMB attacks at Camp Makabulos,
Tarlac, and at Arayat in the evening of August 25, 1950. There are also Exhibits N-56-57 which are the reports from Reco 2 of the HMB attacks at barrio
Capalad, Arayat on September 12, 1950, and at San Luis on September 13, 1950. There was found in his possession, when he was arrested, a file copy
(Exh. N-202) of a letter addressed to his comrades in Regional Command No. 4, dated October 14, 1950. The original of this letter (Exh. M-292) was
found at 1608-B Andalucia, apparently in transit through the National Courier Division. It should be noted that it is in 1608-B Andalucia where Salome
Cruz, the Chairman of the National Courier Division, had her headquarters. In this letter appellant Maclang wrote:
I received a letter to the SEC from Com Bonifacio, PBS, R-5, dated Oct. 10, 1950. Because of the urgency and because the Comca is leaving at 12:00 a.m.
this day, I, as in charge of military matters of the SEC, in the absence of the SEC meeting I have rendered the following decision:
xxx xxx xxx
ORDER: I hereby order to R-4 to take all action concerning all the requests of the letter of Com. Bonifacio to the SEC. Reject the idea of
sending back these deserters (men and officers) to R-5 and I am giving full authority to R-4 to arrest and try all these said deserters. All actions
should be based on our military rulings.
The letter of Comrade Bonifacio referred to in the above-quoted letter of appellant Maclang was found in his possession at the time of his arrest. A copy of
this letter was found in the possession of the appellant Jose Lava when the latter was arrested at 683 Pasaje Rosario, Paco, Manila, on October 18, 1950. 33
It was shown during the trial that this letter of appellant Maclang was transcribed from the stenographic notes taken down by Julita Rodriguez on her
notebook (Exh. M-31-E). This Julita Rodriguez worked as a clerk with appellant-Maclang, and she was also arrested on October 18, 1950 along with
Maclang and Felipe Engreso, another employee of Maclang. Both Julita Rodriguez and Felipe Engreso were also accused in these cases. The authority of
appellant Maclang on military matters is made manifest in the above-mentioned letter.
In another letter of appellant Maclang, which was his reply to the letter he received from one Plaridel, regarding the plan for attack on November 7, 1950
celebration, 34 he said:
Re-celebration, I am glad that you are actively preparing to achieve the SEC objectives. We have no objections on the towns that you have
stated including Mcy. Our only doubt here is Mrqn, because this is very near enemy camp, however, proceed to your preparation and we will
help you on intelligence operations on said localities. In this connection, we have the opinion that Com. Pacing will cooperate with you in this
task as we have been informed that he is coming to your place.
 Re-request on arms and ammos, we are not yet in a position to give you the assurance of aid, however, we are dealing with the smugglers to
purchase these ammos to supply such operations. Because it is not very sure, it will be better for the Recos to cooperate on the preparation of
ammos.
There are letters of appellant Maclang to Luming (Salome Cruz), one of the accused, which were presented in evidence, where he gave her orders and
instructions regarding the dispatch of couriers to the regional commands and the activities of the National Courier Division. 35 Documents were also
presented, which appear to have been issued or approved by the Organizational Bureau of which this appellant was the chief, dealing with the methods of
improving the communication system of the CPP. 36 All these indicate that appellant Maclang had also supervision over the National Courier Division
(NCD) of the CPP.
Appellant Maclang, in his defense, denied knowledge about the HMB raids and ambushes. We find, however, overwhelming evidence that disproves his
claim. The evidence clearly shows that he participated directly in planning, coordinating, supporting, and approving the HMB raids, attacks and ambushes.
He was a member of the Secretariat of the CPP and participated in its meetings. He was in charge of the military affairs of the CPP; he gave orders to the
Recos to attack the government forces; he approved the plans of attack against the City of Manila and towns around Manila on November 7, 1959; he
received reports of HMB raids and attacks. All these make him, in contemplation of law, a leader of the rebellion.
There is, to Us, no doubt that by the high positions he held in the CPP, appellant Federico Maclang was one of the leaders of the CPP that promoted,
maintained and directed the armed operations of the HMB to overthrow the Philippine government. We agree with the finding of the lower court that this
appellant is guilty as principal in the commission of the crime of rebellion, and he should be punished accordingly.
4. Appeal of Ramon Espiritu
Appellant Ramon Espiritu was arrested by the agents of the MIS and the Manila Police on October 18, 1950 at 1608-B Andalucia Street, Manila, along
with Salome Cruz, Rosario Vda. de Santos, Naty Cruz, Aurora Garcia, Lamberto Magboo and Josefina Adelan. He was known by the alias "Johnny".

In his written statement, 37 he admitted that he was a member of the Politburo and the Chairman of the National Finance Committee of the CPP. The
evidence shows that he was a member of the Secretariat of the CPP, and he participated in the deliberations and decisions of that body. 38 He was also one
of the 15 members of the Military Committee (MC). 39 He was the Politburo and Secretariat Supervisor of the National Courier Division. 40 He had been
assigned to various important positions in the CPP, like the supervision of Trade Union Division (TUD) and the trade union struggle, together with his co-
accused Federico R. Maclang. 41 He was also assigned to the City Committee to reorganize the City Committee and the City Command. 42 He was likewise
assigned to supervise Luming (co-accused Salome Cruz) in taking care of the sick comrades coming from provinces. 43 He attended meetings of the
Communists and HMB. He was one of those who tried Huk member Domingo Clarin, assigned to the Trigger Squad of the HMB, and found him guilty of
having squealed regarding the holdup of the NARIC at Pulilan. 44
In his defense appellant Espiritu testified that he had nothing to do with the HMB raids and ambushes. Seemingly, to justify his membership in the
Communist Party, this appellant discussed the general history of labor and its unsavory relations with capital, for which he blamed the feudal economy that
had pervaded the economic life of the Filipino people. He candidly recounted his efforts in trying to understand the cause of the people's economic ills, and
the efforts of labor unions in demanding better wages and living conditions for laborers.
Considering the tie-up between the CPP and the HMB, there can hardly be any question that appellant Ramon Espiritu, member of the Politburo, of the
Secretariat, and of the Military Committee, of the CPP, had actively participated in promoting and maintaining the armed operations of the HMB, along
with top CPP leaders, Jose Lava, Federico Bautista, Federico Maclang, and others. We agree, also, with the finding of the lower court that this appellant is
guilty as principal in the commission of the crime of rebellion, and he should be punished accordingly.
5. Appeal of Salome Cruz
Appellant Salome Cruz, wife of appellant Ramon Espiritu, was arrested on October 18, 1950 at 1608-B, Andalucia St., Manila. She was known by her two
aliases: Luming, and Iluminada Calonje in her written statement, she admitted that she was the Chairman of the National Communication Division (NCD)
of the CPP from November, 1949 to May, 1950. 45
Documentary evidence shows her various positions in the CPP, namely: Acting Chief of the Central Post of the Communications Division and in charge of
Sub-Posts; In-charge of Couriers; In-charge of finance from November, 1949 to May 17, 1950; In-charge of all Central Committee cadres when they came
to Manila for medical attention; In-charge of sick comrades coming from provinces under the supervision of Johnny (Ramon Espiritu) in the National
Commission; and Chairman of the Hospital Group to take care of the sick and wounded from the City and provinces. 46
The evidence further shows that Salome Cruz wrote several notes and/or documents showing her activities in the National Communication Division,
Hospital Group and other party organs. Thus, on July 4, 1950, she made handwritten notes on " Sub-Posts" containing names (aliases) of regular and
irregular couriers of RECO 1 to 7, Dist. No. 5 and Pangasinan; on July 5, 1950, she also made notes on "Regular na Dating at alis ng mga Korriers sa NCD
napunta sa bawat Recos", which show the dates of arrivals and departures of the couriers for Recos 1 to 7 Dist. No. 4 Pangasinan and Cavite; on May 5,
1950 she wrote a letter to Johnny (Ramon Espiritu) informing the latter of the arrival and departure of couriers of RECO 1 and the availability for
distribution of the April 12 and 30 issues of TITIS; she also wrote letters to Beria (co-accused Federico Maclang), Payat and Fred (co-accused Federico
Bautista), and Berting (co-accused Lamberto Magboo), regarding couriers and the activities of the National Communication Division (NCD). 47 She also
made handwritten notes on the National Communication Division (NCD) Consolidated Report, showing the income and expenses from May 1 to May 17,
1950 of the Central Post and the Outposts; and a letter to Charing (co-accused Rosario C. Vda. de Santos) on May 17, 1950 instructing the latter to check
up the Sub-Posts. 48
In her brief, appellant Salome Cruz claimed, among other things, that the trial court erred in convicting her as principal, despite the fact that her
participation was only on inconsequential details, and her guilt had not been established beyond reasonable doubt.
There is no evidence to show that appellant Salome Cruz actually took part in the raids, attacks and ambushes perpetrated by the HMB. It cannot be said,
however, that her role in the plan to overthrow the Government was inconsequential, she having been in charge of communications, transmitting orders and
directives of the Politburo and Secretariat to the HMB in the field until May 1950; she being in charge of couriers, making notes of regular and irregular
couriers, their arrivals and departures; she being in charge of the Hospital group to take care of the sick and wounded from the city and provinces. These
facts show that she was cooperating actively in promoting and maintaining the armed activities of the HMB, considering the tie-up between the CPP and
the HMB. The maintenance of communications between the top leaders of the CPP and the units operating in the field is very essential in the success of the
rebellion. It is in this connection that this appellant played a very important role.
We agree with the finding of the lower court that appellant Salome Cruz is guilty as principal in the commission of the crime of rebellion, and she should
be punished accordingly.
6. Appeal of Rosario C. Vda. de Santos
Appellant Rosario C. Vda. de Santos was arrested by the agents of the MIS and the Manila Police, together with co-accused Ramon Espiritu, Salome Cruz,
Naty Cruz, Aurora Garcia, Lamberto Magboo, and Josefina Adelan, in these five cases, at 1608-B Andalucia, Sampaloc, Manila, on October 18, 1950.
The evidence shows that:
Appellant Rosario C. Vda. de Santos uses the alias "Charing". In her testimony, however, she claims that her real name is Aurelia Cayetano. She was
designated by the Secretariat of the CPP In-charge of Outpost of the National Communication Division, with the duty to maintain discipline among
couriers coming from without. 49 She worked under Salome Cruz (Luming) who was the Chairman of the National Communications Division (NCD) of
the CPP. This appellant was in charge of checking the irregular couriers for Regional Commands, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and Pangasinan. 50 She was a staff member of
the NCD, and she participated in the NCD meetings, took down minutes, and rendered reports. She made reports to the head of the NCD. One such report
says: 51
Naisasagawang maayos na pagtanggap sa lahat ng dumating at maayos na pagalis ng couriers.

Another report was that one she made on July 12, 1950, about the outpost: 52
(a) Reco 1, means of communication still good and 2 couriers arrived June 25 and departed July 4.
(b) Reco 2, — The road is still clear and the couriers of Pangasinan were already established there, thru Com. Piping.
(c) Reco 3 — The road is difficult that is the reason why the Post at San Jose is no longer used but that of San Rafael.
(d) Reco 4 — The road is difficult connection severed but D-4 is already connected. (Exh. 159-162).

As chief of the Outpost, she made, on August 19, 1950, the following report: 53
(a) Reco 1 — Couriers did not arrive, so no report.
(b) Reco 2 — Couriers arrived as the PC are out daily in the field ....
(c) Reco 3 — Road is also difficult.
(d) Reco 4 — Road is not difficult, but no definite Post for the couriers.
(e) District No. 4 — 2 weeks no arrival of couriers but special couriers in Com. Amat (now under arrest) arrived on 12 July '50.
(f) Cavite — Did not arrive last Sunday while the agreement was Saturday.
In a letter to her co-accused Luming (Salome Cruz), she stated that she knew the circumstances surrounding the killing, and the murderers of Norberto
Icasiano, Mayor of Bulacan. 54 She even mentioned that she met the deceased's brother in a school house in Malolos, Bulacan, and that she had to hide her
face behind her umbrella in order to avoid being recognized.

Various documents were shown during the trial which were written by her, and that they were written during meetings of the leaders of the CPP. 55
In her defense, this appellant testified that her co-accused Ramon Espiritu requested her to stay with him as a household help with a salary of P10.00 a
month; that besides preparing food, she was also assigned the duty of recording the letters delivered to and received at that place; that her real name is
Aurelia Cayetano, but she was using the name of Rosario C. Vda. de Santos because she was a wanted woman by the Japanese during the occupation for
having aided the guerillas, and she was known by that name among her friends even after the liberation. She admitted that the name "Charing" was hers,
but claimed that she did not know the persons writing to her and that they were writing to her because she was the one always in the house.
We find it proven that this appellant was a staff member of the National Courier (or Communication) Division of the CPP, and that she checked and made
reports on the arrival and dispatch of couriers. The lower court declared her guilty as principal in the commission of the crime of rebellion. In Our appraisal
of the evidence, however, We find that she was merely executing the orders or commands of others who are superior to her in the organizational set-up of
the CPP. Considering that her activities took place while the CPP was underground, and during the period when the armed operations of the HMB were
taking place, We find her guilty as a mere participant in the commission of the crime of rebellion under the second paragraph of Article 135 of the Revised
Penal Code, and should be punished accordingly.
7. Appeal of Angel Baking
Appellant Angel Baking was arrested by the agents of the MIS and of the Manila Police in his office at Room 504 Samanillo Building, Escolta, Manila, on
October 19, 1950, along with Marciano de Leon who is also one of the accused in these cases. His house at No. 1518 Calixto Dayco, Paco, Manila, was
also raided. From his office and his residence many books, documents, and other papers were seized, which proved that this appellant was a confirmed
communist and was having close connections with leaders of the CPP. Some of the books found in his residence are: "The Third Five Year Plan" by V.
Molotov; "Reminiscence of Lenin" by C. Zetkin; Marx and Engels (Selected correspondence); "Heroic Lenin-grad"; "Theory of the Agrarian Question
(Lenin); "Stalin" (G. I. R., James; "Constitution of the Kirghis Soviet Socialist Republic"; "The Class Struggle in France"; "Biographical Compilation of
Communist Leaders outside the Soviet Unions", etc. There are also found reading materials labelled: "Comparative Outlines of Communism and
Capitalism showing advantages of communistic ideology"; "Blue Record containing outline of the Taruc story" (this contains draft of Taruc story for
filming and publication); "Political Economy" (typewritten — this was shown to be used as text for HMB studies); "Stalin and the National Colonial
Question" by John Blake; etc.
We find, by the evidence, that:
Appellant Angel Baking used the aliases: Bayan, B. and Boriz. He joined the communist party in April, 1949, although he had been identified with the
leaders of the CPP since the early part of 1944. 56 He had been associated with top communists like Jorge Frianeza, Luis Taruc, Federico Bautista, Simeon
Rodriguez and Jose Lava. When the Technological Group (TG) of the CPP was organized, it was placed under the immediate supervision of Boriz (Angel
Baking) although the final supervision was under Greg (Jose Lava). 57
In the meeting of the Secretariat of the CPP on September 29, 1950, the attendance of Boriz in the meeting of the Military Committee was discussed, and it
appears in the record: "Com. Boriz is a competent technologist, is ready to go out and ready to stay in the field as the Party decides." 58 The Secretariat of
the CPP assigned him to head the Special Warfare Division under the GHQ. 59 As head of the Special Warfare Division under the GHQ, appellant Angel
Baking wrote a memorandum for the Secretariat regarding the immediate installation of a wireless communication system between the GHQ and the
Secretariat. Some paragraphs of the memorandum read as follows:
Briefly the main point to be dealt with pertains to equipment, its procurement, technical description, distribution, installation, operation and
maintenance; technical personnel who will participate in the solution of the technical aspects of the problems; the Code system, which is an
integral part of the WCS; and the non-technical implications of the problems.
Because of the underground nature of the system, several problems not met in the legal installation of this system creep to the surface. The
equipment itself is conditioned by abnormal factors which are not met ordinarily; the personnel is difficult to enlist; and the installation,
operation and maintenance of the system become unduly handicapped and difficult to perform.
Since the transmitting unit in Manila cannot be fully used without risking its immediate detection by the enemy, transmissions to the field from
HQ (Manila) may partly be coursed thru the legitimate radio stations. This has always been done before, and there is no reason why it cannot be
developed now. The essential requirements for this measure would be:
(1) A cadre to infiltrate the Corps of broadcasters in the radio stations, which may be assigned to the Cultural Group. This cadre
should get a position as broadcaster at specific hours, either as station announcer or newscaster for the newspaper or time buyers at
the stations;

(2) This cadre should be given a code system thru which whatever message to be transmitted, may be coursed. 60
Appellant Baking admitted having prepared the foregoing draft but he claimed, in his testimony, that draft was prepared way back in May 1948
at the request of one Jorge Frianesa who was a ranking member of the CCP. It appears, however, that when his office in the Samanillo building
was raided by the agents of the MIS and the Manila Police this document was found torn inside a waste basket, and this circumstance made the
lower court conclude that he wrote the draft not in 1948 but shortly before the raid on October 19, 1950. The lower court further pointed out that
his explanation was filmsy because of the numerous evidence which showed that he supervised the Technological Group and the Special
Warfare Division at the GHQ of the CCP. We agree with the conclusions of the lower court in this respect.
Besides there were found in his office at Room 504 Samanillo Building at the time of the raid several U.S. Army technical manuals on Cipher
Systems and Advanced Military Cryptography, and these manuals have connection with the recommendation in his memorandum for the use of
the code system for transmitting messages thru legitimate radio stations.
There are still other documents which clearly indicate appellant Baking's cooperation with the leaders of the CCP in the furtherance of the plan
to seize power. In the document, marked Exhibit L-33s, he made the following statement:
To forestall errors in the planning for the future, the training of leading Cadres as economists should be intensified. It is more than
likely that by the time CCP seized power, the struggle in Asia shall have been resolved.
There was found in the possession of Simeon G. Rodriguez (one of the appellants in these cases), the document marked Exhibit O-254 where it
appears that appellant Angel Baking acknowledged having received from the National Finance Committee of the CCP the sum of P45.00 for the
Technological Group (TG) of which he was a member. Simeon G. Rodriguez is a member of the National Finance Committee of the CCP.
At the time of his arrest, appellant Angel Baking was a foreign affairs officer in the Department of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of the
Philippines. That he was using his position in the Department of Foreign Affairs for intelligence work — and the lower court calls this a
manifestation of his "scheming mind" — may be gathered from what he wrote in his diary as follows:
There was a tactical error in my transfer to the new office room. The office was supposed to be occupied by ambassadors and high-
ranking officials. I transferred to it without insuring my hold on the important men of the department. Thus I opened my flank and
left my rear unprotected, and made myself extremely vulnerable.
Because of this, I find myself unprepared to handle that problem. Peter ordered Quiamco that I be transferred back to where I came
from.
I also forgot that the important thing to remember is the unbroken and steady ....
AGB (Exh. L-78e).
There is another document found in Baking's residence at 518-B Calixto Dayco which was admitted by him to be his. This document contains
entries which indicate his dealings with the CCP organizations and its members. The entries are as follows:
The "NFC" has been shown to stand for National Finance Committee of the CCP, and "SGR" for Simeon G. Rodriguez, a member of the NFC of the CCP,
who is also one of the appellants in the present cases. There were sheets of blank papers seized from 742 Colorado Street, Manila, the printing office of
TITIS and the working place of Cesario Torres, also one of the appellants in the present cases, bearing signatures of "Apolinario", "Mariano P. Balgos" and
"Luis Taruc".
Considering the facts We have hereinabove-stated, We have no doubt in our mind that appellant Angel Baking as a confirmed communist, had aided in the
efforts of the leaders of the CPP to promote and maintain the armed operations of the HMB to overthrow the government. The lower court found this
appellant guilty as principal in the commission of the crime of rebellion. We have noted that the role played by this appellant was that of a technician or
adviser. Considering that he participated in the rebellion efforts of the CPP while he was holding a public office. We agree with the finding of the lower
court, and he should be punished under the first paragraph of Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code.
8. Appeal of Lamberto Magboo
Appellant Lamberto Magboo was arrested by the agents of the MIS and of the Manila Police at 1608-B Andalucia, Manila, on October 18, 1950, along
with the accused Ramon Espiritu, Salome Cruz, Rosario C. Vda. de Santos, Naty Cruz, Aurora Garcia and Josefina Adelan. It must be noted that the place,
1608-B Andalucia, is the headquarters of Salome Cruz who was the Chief of the National Courier Division of the CPP. The evidence shows that the other
persons who were arrested in that place namely, Naty Cruz, and Josefina Adelan worked as couriers under Salome Cruz. Rosario C. Vda. de Santos also
worked under Salome Cruz as in-charge of outpost. Aurora Garcia was employed by her aunt, Rosario Vda. de Santos, as a maid and that she was selling
the TITIS.
The evidence shows that:
Appellant Lamberto Magboo used the aliases Berting and Eddie. He admitted that he was a courier of the CPP, and that he actually mailed letters and
packages at the Bureau of Posts and at the post office at the Far Eastern University; and he delivered letters, boxes of medicines, canned goods, lanterns,
and shoes, from 1608-B Andalucia Street (house of appellant Salome Cruz) to the La Mallorca Bus station, to the LTB station, at Altura Street, Sta. Mesa,
at Divisoria Street, and at Celeridad Street in Pasay City. 61 He was a checker of the regular and irregular couriers of Recos 1, 4, 5, 6 and 7 and Dist. No. 4
Pangasinan, and was also a special courier of Dist. No. 4, c/o Reco 4. 62
Considering that the Recos are the units of the CPP that are operating with the HMB in the field, such that the person who acts as courier from the
headquarters of the National Courier Division of the CPP in Manila to these Recos was actually working and cooperating with the armed operations to
overthrow the government. We find appellant Lamberto Magboo guilty as a mere participant in the commission of the crime of rebellion, under the second
paragraph of Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code, and he should be punished accordingly.
9. Appeal of Nicanor Razon, Sr.
Appellant Nicanor Razon, Sr., known also by the alias Elias Rubi, admitted that he had been a member of the CPP since July 1, 1945. Among the
documents found at 1608-B Andalucia, Sampaloc, Manila, was the cadre registration and oath of this appellant as a member of the CPP. He was the
secretary of Barangay I SECCOM (Sectional Committee) II of the District of Tondo, and later rose to the position of treasurer in the same committee. He
helped in distributing the TITIS, the official organ of the CPP. 63
The record does not show that this appellant had testified in his behalf, nor presented any evidence in his defense. In his brief before this Court, however,
this appellant claims that the lower court erred in finding him guilty as an accomplice in the commission of the crime of rebellion, no evidence having been
adduced to show that he had performed any act, which would constitute a cooperation in promoting the rebellion jointly undertaken by the CPP and the
HMB.
We find merit in the contention of this appellant. We find that the evidence against this appellant only shows that he is a member of the Communist Party,
and that he had been secretary and later treasurer of SECCOM II of the District of Tondo. There is no evidence regarding his actual participation in the
efforts of the leaders of the CPP and the HMB to promote the rebellion. His having distributed the TITIS, the official organ of the CPP, is at most an act in
the category of a propaganda which in itself does not show that he advocated actual uprising against the Government. It has not been shown that he
collaborated in the efforts to advance the cause of the rebellion. The fact that he is a member of the Communist Party and an officer of one of its
committees is not a sufficient basis for declaring him guilty as an accomplice in the commission of the crime of rebellion.
In the case of People vs. Hernandez, G. R. Nos. L-6025-6026 this Court held:
... We do not believe that mere membership in the Communist Party or in the CLO renders the members liable either of rebellion or of
conspiracy to commit rebellion, because mere membership and nothing more merely implied advocacy of abstract theory or principle without
any action being induced thereby; and that such advocacy becomes criminal only if it is coupled with action or advocacy of action, namely
actual rebellion or conspiracy to commit rebellion, or acts conducive thereto or evincing the same.
We, therefore, declare that appellant Nicanor Razon, Sr. is not guilty as an accomplice in the commission of the crime of rebellion, nor can We hold him
guilty of the crime of conspiracy to commit rebellion. He should, therefore, be absolved of the charge against him in the information.
Neither can We find him guilty of having committed a crime under the Anti-Subversion Law (R.A. No. 1700) which outlaws the Communist Party of the
Philippines, because this law was enacted only in the year 1957, whereas the information against this appellant was filed on October 27, 1950. Again, in
the case of People vs. Hernandez, supra, this Court held:
On the other hand, Rep. Act 1700, known as the Anti-Subversion Act, which penalizes membership in any organization or association
committed to subvert the Government, cannot be applied to the appellants because said Act was approved on June 20, 1957 and was not in force
at the time of the commission of the acts charged against appellants (committed 1945-1950); the Anti-Subversion Act punishes participation or
membership in an organization committed to overthrow the duly constituted Government, a crime distinct from that of actual rebellion with
which appellants are charged.
10. Appeal of Marcos Medina
Appellant Marcos Medina was arrested by MIS agents on October 17, 1950 at 1028-B, Quezon Boulevard. He used the alias Hiwara. He admitted in his
written statement 64 that he was a member of the Hukbalahap Squadron 25 with headquarters at Kandating, Candaba; that he became a corporal of the
Huks in 1944; and that he was a member of the Organizational Committee, Reco 4, Laguna, from 1946 to 1949. 65 In 1949, he studied at the Central
Institute of Technology, and while studying, he used to help HMB couriers Lydia ( alias of Alicia Villegas), and Celong (alias of Marcelino Calma) in
carrying things for delivery to Commander REG of Reco 4. 66 In his testimony he stated that the Organizational Committee, of which he was a member,
had the duty to go to the barrios to teach and convince the people to join the HMB. 67

Testifying in his behalf, this appellant said that he was maltreated at Camp Murphy to make him sign the statement marked as Exhibits EE to EE-4. 68
However, Sotero Morales, who was the one who investigated him, testified that Marcos Medina did not complain of any maltreatment when he was
investigated. 69
We do not agree with the finding of the lower court that this appellant is guilty as principal in the commission of the crime of rebellion. There is no
evidence that he actually participated in any of the raids and ambushes alleged in the information although he admitted that he was a Huk. The evidence
shows that he simply helped HMB couriers. We hold, however, that his being a member of the HMB is a sufficient basis to find him guilty of the crime of
conspiracy to commit rebellion, punishable under Article 136 of the Revised Penal Code. In the case of People vs. Hernandez, supra, this Court held:.
On the other hand, membership in the HMB (Hukbalahap), implies participation in an actual uprising or rebellion to secure, as the Huks
pretend, the liberation of the peasants and laboring class from thraldom. By membership in the HMB, one already advocates uprising and the
use of force, and by such membership he agrees or conspires that force be used to secure the ends of the party. Such membership, therefore,
even if there is nothing more, renders the member guilty of conspiracy to commit rebellion punishable by law.
And when a Huk member, not content with his membership, does anything to promote the ends of the rebellion like soliciting contributions, or
acting as courier, he thereby becomes guilty of conspiracy, unless he takes to the field and joins in the rebellion of uprising, in which latter case
he commits rebellion.
We therefore declare appellant Marcos Medina guilty of the crime of conspiracy to commit rebellion, and he should be punished accordingly.
11. Appeal of Cesario Torres
Appellant Cesario Torres was arrested by the agents of the MIS and the Manila Police on October 19, 1950 at his residence at 742 Colorado St., Manila,
along with his wife, Rosenda Canlas Torres, and his co-accused, Arturo Baking. From his house the agents seized subversive documents, and articles
including a typewriter, a mimeographing machine, mimeographing ink, stencils, coupon bond papers. Some of these coupon bond papers were blank but
bore the signature of Luis M. Taruc.
The evidence shows that:
Appellant Cesario Torres used the aliases: Leo and Leodones, and he was also known as Cesario Yacat Torres. He admitted being a member of the HMB
and of the CPP, that he was head of the Technical Office under the Propaganda Branch of the CPP, and as the head of that office he was in charge of typing
and mimeographing the CPP documents and leaflets, and the TITIS which was the official organ of the CPP. 70
Documents were presented during the trial which clearly prove that this appellant was in regular communication with Federico Maclang, one of the top
leaders of the CPP and of the rebellion. Thus, in one letter, he explained to Maclang why the issue of the TITIS for the previous week did not come out;
and in another letter he informed Maclang that he would try to make the TITIS come out every Sunday morning. 71 In a letter to Maclang dated April 6,
1950, he inquired for the number of copies of "Suliranin ng mga Familia" that should be printed; and in another letter he was requesting from Maclang
P18.40 for the printing of 600 copies of the "Mapagpalaya", the official organ of the HMB. 72 Using the name Leodones, this appellant wrote subversive
poems calculated to arouse popular support for the cause of the CPP and the HMB. One such poem, entitled "Ang Dalawangpung Taon Buhay ng PKP",
eulogized the CPP, advocated armed revolt against the government and the liquidation of Liberals, Nacionalistas, and priests. The other poems were
"Gumising Ka Kabataan", "Maiksing Kasaysayan ng Kilusang Magbubukid sa Filipinas", "Ang Ikawalong Taong Kaarawan ng Hukbong Magpapalaya ng
Bayan", and "Ang Sigaw ng Bayan Api". All these poems were published in the different issues of the TITIS. 73
We find that appellant Cesario Torres played a very vital role in the promotion of the armed struggle that was jointly prosecuted by the CPP and the HMB.
He was admittedly a member of both the CPP and the HMB. His membership with the HMB alone is a sufficient basis to hold him guilty of the crime of
conspiring to commit rebellion. We believe, however, that he did more than to conspire with the leaders of the HMB and the CPP to commit rebellion. He
was in charge of the publication and circulation of the TITIS which was the official organ the CPP, and of the "Mapagpalaya" which was the official organ
of the HMB. It is through these two organs that the people were being aroused to support the armed struggle against the government. While it is true that
this appellant did not go to the field to take up arms, the provocative poems and articles that he wrote and published in the official organs of the CPP and
the HMB were just as effective to prosecute the rebellion as the guns and other weapons used by the HMB in the field.
We agree with the finding of the lower court that this appellant is guilty as principal in the commission of the crime of rebellion, and he should be punished
accordingly.
12. Appeal of Arturo Baking
Appellant Arturo Baking was arrested by the agents of MIS and the Manila Police on October 19, 1950 at 742 Colorado St., Manila, along with his co-
accused Cesario Torres and the latter's wife, Rosenda Canlas Torres. He is the nephew of appellant Angel Baking.
It is shown by the evidence that:

Appellant Arturo Baking used the aliases Red Bell, Eduardo Santos, Arturo Calma and Ed. He became a member of the CPP in December 1949. 74 In
August 1950 he was employed by his co-accused Cesario Torres as assistant in the publication center of the CPP at 742 Colorado St., Manila. He was one
of those assigned as typist in the Educational Department of the CPP, it having been admitted by him that the publication center was under the Educational
Department of the CPP. As assistant to Cesario Torres he helped in the printing, mimeographing and distribution of the TITIS, the official organ of the
CPP; as well as in the printing, mimeographing and distribution of HMB documents. His work included the procurement of office supplies, and the
keeping of records of CPP documents that had been printed and distributed to the different officials and organizational units of the CPP. 75 This appellant
had studied and finished the prescribed secondary course of the Communist Party, and was given a certificate, "Katibayan sa Pagaaral", attesting to his
having satisfactorily completed such subjects as the "History of National Liberation Movement", "Dialektika ng Materialismo", "Political Economy",
"Estado at Himagsikan", and "Ang Pagkakatatag ng Partido". 76 By his own declaration this appellant admitted having made studies about communism,
took rigid tests in order to be accepted to the CPP, and that he believed a communist government should be implanted in the Philippines. In his testimony,
he stated that he had developed a deep-seated hatred against the agents of the law because of the predatory acts that were committed by them on poor
fishermen, and that on several occasions, especially at various checkpoints, he saw the harsh treatment done by the Constabulary soldiers to civilians. He
bewailed the graft and corruption in the government. 77
We have no doubt that this appellant is a confirmed communist, and that he was in full sympathy with the armed struggle being promoted by the leaders of
the CPP and the HMB in order to overthrow the existing government of the Philippines. Upon appraisal of the evidence, however, We cannot agree with
the finding of the lower court that this appellant is guilty as principal in the commission of the crime of rebellion. We find that he was the assistant of
appellant Cesario Torres, who was entrusted with the publication and distribution of the official organs of the CPP and the HMB, as well as of the printing
and distribution of the documents of these two organizations. Being an assistant of appellant Cesario Tores whom We have declared to be a principal in the
commission of the crime of rebellion, We hold that appellant Arturo Baking is guilty as a mere participant in the commission of the crime of rebellion,
under the second paragraph of the Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code, and he should be punished accordingly.
13. Appeal of Simeon G. Rodriguez
Appellant Simeon G. Rodriguez was arrested by the agents of the MIS and the Manila Polioe in his house at 683 Pasaje Rosario, Paco, Manila, on October
18, 1950, along with Jose Lava, Federico Bautista, Victorina G. Rodriguez and Pedro Vicencio.
The evidence shows that:
Appellant Simeon G. Rodriguez used two aliases: Lakindanum (Laquindanum) and Sammy. He was a member of the National Finance Committee of the
CPP since October 21, 1949. 78 When he was arrested on October 18, 1950 there were found in his house some P42,376.00 in paper currency in different
denominations. Of the money that was found in his house, it was conclusively shown that 65 P100-bills, 60 P50-bills, P145.00 in PNB circulating notes
and $310.00 formed part of the money that were taken from the office of the Provincial Treasurer in Sta. Cruz, Laguna, when the HMB raided that town in
the night of August 26, 1950. We have stated at the early part of this opinion that on the night of August 26, 1950 some 400 Huks raided Sta. Cruz. The
cashier of the office of the Provincial Treasurer was forced by the Huks at gun point to open the vault of the provincial treasury from which the Huks took
some P80,600.00. It happened that the Provincial Treasurer of Laguna, Mr. Balbino Kabigting, had a record of the serial numbers of the paper money that
was deposited in the provincial treasury which were taken by the Huks, and after that raid Mr. Kabigting even issued a warning to the public about the loss
of the money — mentioning in the warning the serial numbers of the money taken. It was found out that the serial numbers of the 65 P100-bills, of the 60
P50-bills, of the P145.00 PNB circulating notes, and of the $310 found in the house of appellant Rodriguez tallied with the serial numbers of the paper
currency that was taken from the provincial treasury of Laguna. This appellant, in his testimony, declared that the paper money whose serial numbers
tallied with those paper money that were taken from the provincial treasury of Laguna formed part of the money that Jose Lava (one of the appellant
herein) brought to his house. Considering the high position that appellant Lava held in the CPP and the fact that the armed operations of the HMB were
promoted and directed by the Secretariat of the CPP, of which Lava was a member, and the fact that appellant Simeon Rodriguez was a member of the
National Finance Committee, it is easy to understand why Jose Lava brought to this appellant that money which was taken by the HMB from the provincial
treasury of Laguna. Significantly, one of the evidence presented during the trial was a receipt, dated October 5, 1950, signed by Lakindanum in favor of
Com. Torres (Casto Alejandrino, a well-known HMB commander) of Reco 4, acknowledging receipt of P32,740, $310, and P145 in PNB circulating notes.
79 It could be that Jose Lava made Rodriguez prepare that receipt when he delivered the money, and the receipt was intended to be sent to Com. Torres to
assure the latter that the money was delivered to Rodriguez. That receipt was among the papers seized when these appellants were arrested. This is a clear
indication of the connection of appellant Simeon Rodriguez to the armed operations of the HMB, and the coordinated work of the leaders of the CPP and of
the HMB in the armed uprising.
There are other documents clearly indicating the connection of appellant Rodriguez to the HMB commanders in the field: (1) There is a letter dated
October 13, 1950, addressed to Com. Lakindanum (Simeon G. Rodriguez) coming from Com. Torres (Casto Alejandrino) wherein the latter acknowledged
receipt of the letter and articles that were sent to him by Com. Lakindanum. This letter also instructed Lakindanum not to send the watches to Reco 4. 80 (2)
There is another letter dated October 13, 1950, of Com. Lanao, addressed to Com. Lakindanum, wherein the former was requisitioning from Lakindanum a
radio set. In this letter Com. Lanao, among others, said: "We would make the attempt to provide you with an extra ration of camote leaves when you visit
us again". 81 This statement in the letter of Com. Lanao indicates that appellant Simeon Rodriguez used to visit the men in the field. (3) There is still
another letter that came from Com. Amor, addressed to Com. Lakindanum, wherein the former acknowledged receipt of all the things, including a radio
tester costing P30.00, that the latter had sent to him. 82 (4) Then there is a letter written by herein appellant to Com. Beria (Federico Maclang) stating that
he delivered the tester to Com. Reg in the absence from camp of Com. Torres. 83 (5) There is a receipt showing that appellant Rodriguez signed in the name
of the National Finance Committee, acknowledging receipt of the amount of P705.00. 84 (6) There is still another receipt signed by herein appellant
acknowledging receipt of P1,200 from the National Finance Committee, which was prepared for accounting purposes. 85
This appellant admitted, in his testimony, his close association with Jose Lava. He also said that he was inclined to believe in the tenets of communism and
the use of force in case the people decide to take political power in their hands.
We have carefully examined the evidence of the prosecution against this appellant, and also the evidence which he presented in his defense — consisting of
his own testimony mainly denying the positive evidences against him and of the testimonies of witnesses vouching for his good character and the fact that
he was a businessman — and We have arrived at the conclusion that this appellant is one of the top communist leaders who had promoted and maintained
the armed operations of the HMB in the field. We agree with the finding of the lower court that appellant Simeon G. Rodriguez is guilty as principal in the
commission of the crime of rebellion; and he should be punished accordingly.
14. Appeal of Marciano de Leon
Appellant Marciano de Leon was arrested, together with Angel Baking at Room 504, Samanillo Building, Escolta, Manila, on October 19, 1950. He used
the aliases Mar and Marcial. At the time of his arrest, he worked in the Personnel Section at the Headquarters of the Philippine Constabulary. He admitted
having supplied his co-accused Federico Bautista with government documents and confidential information regarding the HMB from the PC Headquarters.
These were: 86
1. Memorandum to all PC Commander re Huk infiltration.
2. Memorandum to all PC Commanders re Loyalty Status of all PC personnel.
 3. Memorandum on PC-Civilian Relations.
4. List of PC Agents and their addresses.
5. List of persons wanted by the PC.
6. Letter on the subject: "Yellow Journalism."
7. U.S. Army Technical Manuals and Field Manuals.
We concur with what the lower court said about this appellant: "Considering the nature of the documents he admitted in his confession to have been
furnished by him to Federico Bautista, the contents of his confession and the accessibility to him of those documents by reason of his position in the
Personnel Section of the Philippine Constabulary, the Court is inclined to believe that he also took part in the conspiracy to overthrow the government by
armed struggle and did his bit by furnishing Federico Bautista with information and records regarding the HMB activities obtainable from the PC
Headquarters." We do not agree with the lower court, however, that this appellant is guilty as principal in the commission of the crime of rebellion.
Considering the top position of Federico Bautista in the CPP hierarchy, it cannot be denied that appellant Marciano de Leon, by giving the information
hereinabove stated to Federico Bautista, had cooperated or helped in the prosecution of the armed rebellion. We hold this appellant guilty as a mere
participant in the commission of the crime of rebellion, under the second paragraph of Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code, and should be punished
accordingly.
15. Appeal of Honofre Mangila
We find, by the evidence, that:
Appellant Honofre Mangila was arrested on November 22, 1950 at 215 Leveriza, Pasay City. He used the aliases Miller and Tommy. He admitted being a
communist — in fact, he said he was proud to be a communist — and being a member of the Central Committee of the CPP. He was also a member of the
Trade Union Division (TUD) of the CPP. In the meeting of the Secretariat of the CPP on September 1, 1950, appellant Mangila was appointed auditor of
funds and books of account of the National Finance Commission (NFC). 87 He actually audited the financial statements of the NFC for the months of
April, May and June, 1950; Mangila's auditing of the National Finance Commission's account was approved by the Secretariat in its meeting of September
22, 1950. He was also the chairman of the organizational department (OD) for Manila under the Organizational Bureau of the CPP. 88
There is no question that this appellant is one of the top men in the hierarchy of the CPP. He was a member of the Central Committee which is the body
second only to the National Congress of the CPP. When the National Congress is not in session it is this Central Committee that makes decisions for the
party. While testifying in his behalf he revealed his strong communist party discipline when he declined to reveal, upon being cross-examined, the identity
of the other members of the Central Committee, and the members of the National Congress and of the Politburo. While testifying he was very outspoken in
indicting the existing economic and social order in the country, and asserted that it is only under the Communist Party when the laboring class can expect a
bright future.
During the trial letters signed by "Miller" or "Tommy", were presented in evidence. Those were letters addressed to Johnny (Ramon Espiritu) and to
Luming (Salome Cruz) concerning financial matters, meetings and other activities in the CPP. 89
Considering that it is the CPP, as We have shown, that promotes and maintains the armed operations of the HMB against the government, and considering
that appellant Honofre Mangila is a member of the Central Committee which is the most powerful body in the CPP when its National Congress is not in
session, and considering further that this appellant was even appointed auditor to audit the funds of the CPP, We believe that this appellant is one of the
principal leaders of the rebellion as charged in the information. We agree with the finding of the lower court that appellant Honofre Mangila is guilty as
principal in the commission of the crime of rebellion and that he should be punished accordingly.
16. Appeal of Cenon Bungay
We find, by the evidence, that:
Appellant Cenon Bungay was arrested by Vicente Roco of the 20th BCT and some members of the Manila Police on November 21, 1950, at 432 Isabel,
Sampaloc, Manila. This appellant used the alias Rufing.
In written statements, he admitted that he joined the Huks in 1946, and at the time of his arrest on November 21, 1950 he was the commander of the HMB
in the province of Batangas and the G-3 of Field Command (FC) No. 3 of the HMB. While testifying in open court, he declared that as the HMB
commander he had 1,300 fully armed men (equivalent to 4 HMB battalions) under him, and as a Huk commander he had been receiving directives from the
higher authorities of the HMB. He revealed that Luis Taruc was the Supreme of the HMB. 90 He also admitted his direct participation in an encounter
between the HMB and the government forces in Plaridel, Bulacan, on March 27, 1950. He stated that in obedience to an order from Regional Command
No. 4, he led his unit in the raid of San Pablo City on March 29, 1950, resulting in the death of Maj. Alicbusan. He said that their purpose was to overthrow
the government by force, and to establish the "New Democracy." 91 He also declared that he joined the Huks in 1942 because of poverty; that his parents
were tenants in Hacienda Bahay Pare at Candaba, Pampanga; that he stopped schooling after the 7th grade in order to help support his parents and ten
brothers and sisters; that realizing the miserable conditions of the tenants, he joined the "Aguman Ding Talapagobra" (ADT), the aim of which was the
amelioration of the tenants; that through this organization he realized that the tenants must organize to promote their welfare and to prevent the abuses of
landlords. He further declared that in spite of the sacrifices of the Huks for 3 years during the Japanese occupation, the Huks representing the countless
tenants, were ignored by the U.S. armed forces and by the Commonwealth Government; and having been harassed, persecuted and frustrated in their aims
to ameliorate the condition of the masses, the Huks went underground. According to him the Huks felt more persecuted when Luis Taruc, the successful
congressional candidate in 1946 of the Democratic Alliance, was denied his seat in Congress, and that they lost faith in the government due to the frauds
and terrorism perpetrated in the elections that followed. 92
Appellant Bungay admitted that the HMB had to use force in order to change the administration. He said that the men under him used arms given by the
American soldiers and Communist sympathizers. He also revealed that while he was the Huk commander at Cavite, he had two encounters with
government forces, one at Aliang, Malabon on February 18, 1950; and the other at Alfonso, Cavite, on February 22, 1950. These admissions were fully
corroborated by Benjamin Advincula, a ranking officer and Secretary of Reco Command No. 4 of the HMB and by Ronald Dorsey, a former Huk member.
93

There is no doubt that Cenon Bungay, as Huk commander, was also a leader in the rebellion. We agree with the finding of the lower court that this
appellant is guilty as principal in the commission of the crime of rebellion, and he should be punished accordingly.
17. Appeal of Pedro T. Vicencio
Appellant Pedro T. Vicencio was arrested on October 18, 1950 at 683 Pasaje Rosario, Paco, Manila, along with Jose Lava, Federico Bautista, Simeon
Rodriguez and Victorina Rodriguez. He was also known as Pedring. In a statement, signed by him at Camp Murphy after his arrest, he admitted that he
used to run errands, bringing foodstuffs, medicines and other supplies intended for the HMB, and also delivering packages that were labelled R-1, R-2, R-
3, R-4 and R-5, which stood for Reco-1, Reco-2, etc., respectively, to Andalucia Street where Rosario Vda. de Santos received them. 94 We have found, in
this decision, that Rosario Vda. de Santos was working under Salome Cruz who was the chairman of the National Communications Division (NCD) of the
CPP, and that she was in charge of an outpost, checking the irregular couriers for Recos 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and Pangasinan, and she was staying at 1608-B
Andalucia, Sampaloc, Manila.
Testifying in his own behalf, appellant Vicencio denied being a member of the CPP nor of the HMB, although he stated that at the time of his arrest, he was
studying the principles of communism, and that he sympathized with the Huks. At the time of his arrest this appellant was 20 years old, and he was a first
year Liberal Arts student. He admitted in his testimony that he delivered to Angel Baking notes sent by Simeon Rodriguez. 95
While it is not shown that this appellant actually took part in the armed operations of the HMB, his having delivered foodstuffs, medicines and other
supplies which were intended for the HMB, and his having delivered packages to Rosario Vda. de Santos who was in charge of the outpost where couriers
go to deliver, or to get, letters or articles intended for RECOS in the field, clearly indicate that this appellant was actively cooperating in the efforts of those
promoting the rebellion. Being 20 years of age and a college student, it can be expected that he knew that he was doing something for the communists and
the Huks. More so, because he was living with Simeon G. Rodriguez, one of the top leaders of the CPP. He admitted having delivered notes sent by
Simeon Rodriguez to Angel Baking, another top leader of the CPP. The house of Rodriguez was the meeting place of CPP leaders.lawphil.ñet
We find this appellant guilty as a mere participant in the commission of the crime of rebellion, under the second paragraph of Article 135 of the Revised
Penal Code, and he should be punished accordingly.
18. Appeal of Felipe Engreso
Appellant Felipe Engreso was arrested on October 18, 1950 at 1938 Int. 7, Felix Huertas St., Manila, along with Federico Maclang and Julita Rodriguez. At
the time of his arrest, he was about 15 years old, and was living as a houseboy of one known to him as Ambrosio Reyes.
It appears that in a written statement that he signed before the MIS agents, this appellant admitted having delivered letters to Mr. Espiritu (Ramon Espiritu)
at Andalucia St., Manila; to Cesar (Cesario Torres) at 742 Colorado, Manila; and to Gaston (Jose Lava) at Celeridad St., Pasay City. It also appears in that
statement that he used to get the TITIS from Colorado St. (residence of Cesario Torres and the CPP publication center) to deliver them to Andalucia Street
(residence of Ramon Espiritu, Salome Cruz and Rosario Vda. de Santos) and retained one copy for Ambrosio Reyes. 96
Testifying in his behalf, appellant Engreso declared that before his arrest he never knew that his master, Ambrosio Reyes, is the accused Federico Maclang.
He came to know his master to be Federico Maclang only when they were already detained at Muntinglupa. 97
Upon a careful study of the evidence against this appellant, We have come to the conclusion that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt.
This appellant was only around 15 years old. We accept his testimony that he did not know that his master was Federico Maclang, and that all the time he
knew him to be Ambrosio Reyes. He was simply a houseboy of Maclang. He had to obey orders to deliver letters or deliver copies of TITIS. There is no
showing that he knew the contents of the letters that he was made to deliver, or that he knew the addressees to be communists. The Solicitor General
recommends the acquittal of this appellant upon the ground that there is no sufficient evidence to show his criminal intent. We agree with the Solicitor
General. We, therefore, acquit appellant Felipe Engreso of the charge against him in the information.
xxx xxx xxx
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from should be, as it is hereby, modified, as follows:
1. In G.R. No. L-4974
Appellants Jose Lava, Federico Bautista, Federico Maclang, Ramon Espiritu, Salome Cruz and Angel Baking are found guilty as principals in the
commission of the crime of simple rebellion under the first paragraph of Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code, and every one of them is hereby sentenced
to suffer imprisonment for ten (10) years of prision mayor, and a fine of P20,000, with the accessories provided by law, but without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay their proportionate shares of the costs.
Appellant Rosario C. Vda. de Santos is found guilty as a participant in the commission of the crime of simple rebellion under the second paragraph of
Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code, and she is hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment of seven (7) years and four (4) months of prision mayor, with
the accessories provided by law, and to pay her proportionate share of the costs.
2. In G.R. No. L-4975
Appellant Cesario Torres is found guilty as principal in the commission of the crime of simple rebellion under the first paragraph of Article 135 of the
Revised Penal Code, and he is hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment of ten (10) years of prision mayor, and a fine of P20,000, with the accessories
provided by law, but without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay his proportionate share of the costs.
Appellants Lamberto Magboo and Arturo Baking are found guilty as participants in the commission of the crime of simple rebellion under the second
paragraph of Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code, and every one of them is hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment of seven (7) years and four (4)
months of prision mayor, with the accessories provided by law, and to pay their proportionate shares of the costs.
Appellant Marcos Medina is found guilty of the crime of conspiracy to commit rebellion under Article 136 of the Revised Penal Code, and he is hereby
sentenced to suffer imprisonment of five (5) years, four (4) months, and twenty (20) days of prision correccional and a fine of P2,000, with the accessories
provided by law, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay his proportionate share of the costs.
Appellant Nicanor Razon, Sr. is hereby acquitted, with costs de oficio.
3. In G.R. No. L-4976
Appellant Simeon G. Rodriguez is found guilty as principal in the commission of the crime of simple rebellion under the first paragraph of Article 135 of
the Revised Penal Code, and is hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment of ten (10) years of prision mayor and a fine of P20,000, with the accessories
provided by law, but without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay his proportionate share of the costs.
Appellant Marciano de Leon is found guilty as a participant in the commission of the crime of simple rebellion under the second paragraph of Article 135
of the Revised Penal Code, and is hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment of seven (7) years and four (4) months of prision mayor with the accessories
provided by law, and to pay his proportionate share of the costs.
4. In G.R. No. L-4977
Appellants Honofre Mangila and Simeon Bungay are found guilty as principals in the commission of the crime of simple rebellion under the first
paragraph of Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code, and every one of them is sentenced to suffer imprisonment of ten (1O) years of prision mayor, and a
fine of P20,000, with the accessories provided by law, but without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay their proportionate shares of
the costs.
5. In G.R. No. L-4978
Appellant Pedro T. Vicencio is found guilty as a participant in the commission of the crime of simple rebellion under the second paragraph of Article 135
of the Revised Penal Code, and is sentenced to suffer imprisonment of seven (7) years and four (4) months of prision mayor, with the accessories provided
by law, and to pay his proportionate share of the costs.
Appellant Felipe Engreso is hereby acquitted, with costs de oficio.
The Court takes judicial notice, that, except for appellants Lamberto Magboo, Nicanor Razon, Sr., Pedro T. Vicencio, and Felipe Engreso who are on
provisional liberty under bail, all the rest of these appellants are detained, and their detention dates back as of August, October or November, of the year
1950, as the case may be. The Director of the Bureau of Prisons is hereby directed to determine the period of detention that should be credited to the
appellants who are under detention, pursuant to the provisions of Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code, and to release immediately those appellants who
are entitled to be credited with the period of their detention equal to the penalty of imprisonment imposed upon them in this decision. It is so ordered.
Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Sanchez and Capistrano, JJ., concur.
Teehankee and Barredo, JJ., took no part.
Concepcion, C.J., and Castro, J., are on leave.

Separate Opinions

FERNANDO, J., concurring:

I join my colleagues in giving assent to the well-written and exhaustive opinion of Justice Zaldivar, speaking for this Court, distinguished as it is by grasp
of the relevant facts meticulously examined and narrated with clarity as well as of the controlling legal principles that call for application. Particularly
noteworthy to my mind is the re-affirmation of our doctrine in People v. Hernandez, 1 with the present Chief Justice, who penned the opinion, stressing the
primacy of liberty even when the offense charged is against the security of the state.
Precisely because of what I deem to be high estate that must be accorded liberty even in times of trouble and distress, I feel that additional words might not
be amiss. It would appear to me that the prosecution of the accused herein having been started at a time when there appeared to be a clear danger to
democratic institutions, the belief seemed to have gained credence in certain circles that as far as these accused were concerned, there was no need to apply
with rigor their constitutional rights.
That to me is a false thesis. It implies the weakness of a democracy to defend itself democratically. Under such view, a government could be spared the
threat from internal subversion, but what is saved is no longer the government contemplated by the framers and the people who adopted the Constitution.

Well has Justice Bengzon observed in his separate opinion in Nava v. Gatmaitan: 2 "And in my opinion, one of the surest means to ease the uprising is a
sincere demonstration of this Government's adherence to the principles of the Constitution together with an impartial application thereof to all citizens,
whether dissidents or not. Let the rebels have no reason to apprehend that their comrades now under custody are being railroaded into Muntinglupa,
without benefit of those fundamental privileges which the experience of the ages has deemed essential for the protection of all persons accused of crime
before the tribunals of justice. Give them the assurance that the judiciary, ever mindful of its sacred mission will not, thru faulty cogitation or misplaced
devotion, uphold any doubtful claims of Governmental power in diminution of individual rights, but will always cling to the principle uttered long ago by
Chief Justice Marshall that when in doubt as to the construction of the Constitution, "the Courts will favor personal liberty" ..."
Justice Tuason in another opinion rendered in that case would apply the constitutional rights with undeviating rigidity: "To the plea that the security of the
State would be jeopardized by the release of the defendants on bail, the answer is that the existence of danger is never a justification for courts to tamper
with the fundamental rights expressly granted by the Constitution. These rights are immutable, inflexible, yielding to no pressure of convenience,
expediency, or the so-called "judicial statesmanship." The legislature itself cannot infringe them, and no court conscious of its responsibilities and
limitations would do so. If the Bill of Rights are incompatible with stable government and a menace to the Nation, let the Constitution be amended, or
abolished. It is trite to say that, while the Constitution stands, the courts of justice as the repository of civil liberty are bound to protect and maintain
undiluted individual rights." 3
It is extremely difficult to find cause for disagreement with the above views for they accord with the fundamental postulate of this Government, namely,
that the Constitution is supreme and this Court, as its ultimate guardian, is called upon to apply its provisions in the determination of actual cases and
controversies before it. Well has it been observed that it exists precisely to assure the protection of the citizen and the maintenance of his constitutional
rights. The exercise of this official duty requires that it gives effect to the supreme law even to the extent in clear cases of setting aside legislative and
executive action.
This is not to say that the judicial process takes place in a social void. The existence of an emergency is not a factor to be reckoned with lightly. The task of
this Court in adjusting or harmonizing individual rights with the safety of the state, ordinarily one of utmost delicacy, then becomes even more formidable.
The fact remains however that the regime established here is one of liberty of justice and of democracy. Belief in the theory of liberty is not merely an echo
of a discredited past. It remains a fighting faith. It is a proclamation of the vitality of the democratic process. It rests on the conviction deeply and
profoundly held that given the choice, a free people will prefer to remain free.
This is not to deny that force has to be met with force. This is not to deny that the courts are not to hamper the efforts of the executive agencies to put down
subversion in whatever form it may manifest itself and wherever it may make its appearance. This is not to deny that on the executive and its agents is
conferred the authority to cope with rebellious activities. Such authority must be equal to the grave responsibility thus confronting it.
Nonetheless, even under such circumstances, our duty is clear. It is not for us to abdicate our constitutional function. We cannot, just because of the danger
sanction every step the executive authorities might take. If we do so, we would lend comfort to the very forces seeking to undermine the government. They
can assert, and with plausibility, that the Constitution no longer obtains. It is precisely in times of emergency that the role of the judiciary as guardian of
constitutional rights becomes more pressing and inescapable, if the faith and confidence of the people in democracy in action are to be preserved
unimpaired.
Since to my mind such a view is implicit in the opinion of Justice Zaldivar, even if not expressly avowed, I yield my concurrence.

FRepublic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-59524 February 18, 1985
JOVITO R. SALONGA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ERNANI CRUZ PAÑO, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal Branch XVIII (Quezon City), HON. JUDGE
RODOLFO ORTIZ, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXXI (Quezon City) CITY FISCAL SERGIO
APOSTOL of Quezon City; COL. BALBINO DIEGO and COL. ROMAN MADELLA, respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

The petitioner invokes the constitutionally protected right to life and liberty guaranteed by the due process clause, alleging that no prima facie
case has been established to warrant the filing of an information for subversion against him. Petitioner asks this Court to prohibit and prevent
the respondents from using the iron arm of the law to harass, oppress, and persecute him, a member of the democratic opposition in the
Philippines.
The background of this case is a matter of public knowledge.
A rash of bombings occurred in the Metro Manila area in the months of August, September and October of 1980. On September 6, 1980, one
Victor Burns Lovely, Jr., a Philippine-born American citizen from Los Angeles, California, almost killed himself and injured his younger
brother, Romeo, as a result of the explosion of a small bomb inside his room at the YMCA building in Manila. Found in Lovely's possession
by police and military authorities were several pictures taken sometime in May, 1980 at the birthday party of former Congressman Raul Daza
held at the latter's residence in a Los Angeles suburb. Petitioner Jovito R. Salonga and his wife were among those whose likenesses
appeared in the group pictures together with other guests, including Lovely.
As a result of the serious injuries he suffered, Lovely was brought by military and police authorities to the AFP Medical Center (V. Luna
Hospital) where he was placed in the custody and detention of Col. Roman P. Madella, under the over-all direction of General Fabian Ver,
head of the National Intelligence and Security Authority (NISA). Shortly afterwards, Mr. Lovely and his two brothers, Romeo and Baltazar
Lovely were charged with subversion, illegal possession of explosives, and damage to property.
On September 12, 1980, bombs once again exploded in Metro Manila including one which resulted in the death of an American lady who
was shopping at Rustan's Supermarket in Makati and others which caused injuries to a number of persons.
On September 20, 1980, the President's anniversary television radio press conference was broadcast. The younger brother of Victor Lovely,
Romeo, was presented during the conference. In his interview, Romeo stated that he had driven his elder brother, Victor, to the petitioner's
house in Greenhills on two occasions. The first time was on August 20, 1980. Romeo stated that Victor did not bring any bag with him on that
day when he went to the petitioner's residence and did not carry a bag when he left. The second time was in the afternoon of August 31,
1980 when he brought Victor only to the gate of the petitioner's house. Romeo did not enter the petitioner's residence. Neither did he return
that day to pick up his brother.
The next day, newspapers came out with almost Identical headlines stating in effect that petitioner had been linked to the various bombings
in Metro Manila.
Meanwhile, on September 25, 1980, Lovely was taken out of the hospital's intensive care unit and transferred to the office of Col. Madella
where he was held incommunicado for some time.
On the night of October 4, 1980, more bombs were reported to have exploded at three big hotels in Metro Manila, namely: Philippine Plaza,
Century Park Sheraton and Manila Peninsula. The bombs injured nine people. A meeting of the General Military Council was called for
October 6, 1980.
On October 19, 1980, minutes after the President had finished delivering his speech before the International Conference of the American
Society of Travel Agents at the Philippine International Convention Center, a small bomb exploded. Within the next twenty-four hours, arrest,
search, and seizure orders (ASSOs) were issued against persons who were apparently implicated by Victor Lovely in the series of bombings
in Metro Manila. One of them was herein petitioner. Victor Lovely offered himself to be a "state witness" and in his letter to the President, he
stated that he will reveal everything he knows about the bombings.
On October 21, 1980, elements of the military went to the hospital room of the petitioner at the Manila Medical Center where he was
confined due to his recurrent and chronic ailment of bronchial asthma and placed him under arrest. The arresting officer showed the
petitioner the ASSO form which however did not specify the charge or charges against him. For some time, the petitioner's lawyers were not
permitted to visit him in his hospital room until this Court in the case of Ordoñez v. Gen. Fabian Ver, et al., (G.R. No. 55345, October 28,
1980) issued an order directing that the petitioner's right to be visited by counsel be respected.
On November 2, 1980, the petitioner was transferred against his objections from his hospital arrest to an isolation room without windows in
an army prison camp at Fort Bonifacio, Makati. The petitioner states that he was not informed why he was transferred and detained, nor was
he ever investigated or questioned by any military or civil authority.
Subsequently, on November 27, 1980, the petitioner was released for humanitarian reasons from military custody and placed "under house
arrest in the custody of Mrs. Lydia Salonga" still without the benefit of any investigation or charges.
On December 10, 1980, the Judge Advocate General sent the petitioner a "Notice of Preliminary Investigation" in People v. Benigno Aquino,
Jr., et al. (which included petitioner as a co-accused), stating that "the preliminary investigation of the above-entitled case has been set at
2:30 o'clock p.m. on December 12, 1980" and that petitioner was given ten (10) days from receipt of the charge sheet and the supporting
evidence within which to file his counter-evidence. The petitioner states that up to the time martial law was lifted on January 17, 1981, and
despite assurance to the contrary, he has not received any copies of the charges against him nor any copies of the so-called supporting
evidence.
On February 9, 1981, the records of the case were turned over by the Judge Advocate General's Office to the Ministry of Justice.
On February 24, 1981, the respondent City Fiscal filed a complaint accusing petitioner, among others of having violated Republic Act No.
1700, as amended by P.D. 885 and Batas Pambansa Blg. 31 in relation to Article 142 of the Revised Penal Code. The inquest court set the
preliminary investigation for March 17, 1981.
On March 6, 1981, the petitioner was allowed to leave the country to attend a series of church conferences and undergo comprehensive
medical examinations of the heart, stomach, liver, eye and ear including a possible removal of his left eye to save his right eye. Petitioner
Salonga almost died as one of the principal victims of the dastardly bombing of a Liberal Party rally at Plaza Miranda on August 20, 1971.
Since then, he has suffered serious disabilities. The petitioner was riddled with shrapnel and pieces still remain in various parts of his body.
He has an AV fistula caused by a piece of shrapnel lodged one millimeter from his aorta. The petitioner has limited use of his one remaining
hand and arms, is completely blind and physical in the left eye, and has scar like formations in the remaining right eye. He is totally deaf in
the right ear and partially deaf in the left ear. The petitioner's physical ailments led him to seek treatment abroad.
On or around March 26, 1981, the counsel for petitioner was furnished a copy of an amended complaint signed by Gen. Prospero Olivas,
dated March 12, 1981, charging the petitioner, along with 39 other accused with the violation of R.A. 1700, as amended by P.D. 885, Batas
Pambansa Blg. 31 and P.D. 1736. Hearings for preliminary investigation were conducted. The prosecution presented as its witnesses
Ambassador Armando Fernandez, the Consul General of the Philippines in Los Angeles, California, Col. Balbino Diego, PSC/NISA Chief,
Investigation and Legal Panel of the Presidential Security Command and Victor Lovely himself.
On October 15, 1981, the counsel for petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the charges against petitioner for failure of the prosecution to
establish a prima facie case against him.
On December 2, 1981, the respondent judge denied the motion. On January 4, 1982, he issued a resolution ordering the filing of an
information for violation of the Revised Anti-Subversion Act, as amended, against forty (40) people, including herein petitioner.
The resolutions of the respondent judge dated December 2, 1981 and January 4, 1982 are now the subject of the petition. It is the contention
of the petitioner that no prima facie case has been established by the prosecution to justify the filing of an information against him. He states
that to sanction his further prosecution despite the lack of evidence against him would be to admit that no rule of law exists in the Philippines
today.
After a painstaking review of the records, this Court finds the evidence offered by the prosecution utterly insufficient to establish a prima facie
case against the petitioner. We grant the petition.
However, before going into the merits of the case, we shall pass upon a procedural issue raised by the respondents.
The respondents call for adherence to the consistent rule that the denial of a motion to quash or to dismiss, being interlocutory in character,
cannot be questioned by certiorari; that since the question of dismissal will again be considered by the court when it decides the case, the
movant has a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law; and that public interest dictates that criminal prosecutions
should not be enjoined.
The general rule is correctly stated. However, the respondents fail to appreciate or take into account certain exceptions when a petition for
certiorari is clearly warranted. The case at bar is one such exception.
In the case of Mead v. Angel (115 SCRA 256) the same contentions were advanced by the respondents to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
... Respondents advert to the rule that when a motion to quash filed by an accused in a criminal case shall be denied, the
remedy of the accused-movant is not to file a petition for certiorari or mandamus or prohibition, the proper recourse
being to go to trial, without prejudice to his right to reiterate the grounds invoked in his motion to quash if an adverse
judgment is rendered against him, in the appeal that he may take therefrom in the manner authorized by law. ( Mill v.
People, et al., 101 Phil. 599; Echarol v. Purisima, et al., 13 SCRA 309.)
On this argument, we ruled:
There is no disputing the validity and wisdom of the rule invoked by the respondents. However, it is also recognized that,
under certain situations, recourse to the extraordinary legal remedies of certiorari, prohibition or mandamus to question
the denial of a motion to quash is considered proper in the interest of "more enlightened and substantial justice", as was
so declared in "Yap v. Lutero, G.R. No. L-12669, April 30, 1969."
Infinitely more important than conventional adherence to general rules of criminal procedure is respect for the citizen's right to be free not
only from arbitrary arrest and punishment but also from unwarranted and vexatious prosecution. The integrity of a democratic society is
corrupted if a person is carelessly included in the trial of around forty persons when on the very face of the record no evidence linking him to
the alleged conspiracy exists. Ex-Senator Jovito Salonga, himself a victim of the still unresolved and heinous Plaza Miranda bombings, was
arrested at the Manila Medical Center while hospitalized for bronchial asthma. When arrested, he was not informed of the nature of the
charges against him. Neither was counsel allowed to talk to him until this Court intervened through the issuance of an order directing that his
lawyers be permitted to visit him (Ordonez v. Gen. Fabian Ver, et al., G.R. No. 55345, October 28, 1980). Only after four months of detention
was the petitioner informed for the first time of the nature of the charges against him. After the preliminary investigation, the petitioner moved
to dismiss the complaint but the same was denied. Subsequently, the respondent judge issued a resolution ordering the filing of an
information after finding that a prima facie case had been established against an of the forty persons accused.
In the light of the failure to show prima facie that the petitioner was probably guilty of conspiring to commit the crime, the initial disregard of
petitioner's constitutional rights together with the massive and damaging publicity made against him, justifies the favorable consideration of
this petition by this Court. With former Senator Benigno Aquino, Jr. now deceased, there are at least 38 other co-accused to be tried with the
petitioner. The prosecution must present proof beyond reasonable doubt against each and every one of the 39 accused, most of whom have
varying participations in the charge for subversion. The prosecution's star witness Victor Lovely and the only source of information with
regard to the alleged link between the petitioner and the series of terrorist bombings is now in the United States. There is reason to believe
the petitioner's citation of international news dispatches * that the prosecution may find it difficult if not infeasible to bring him back to the
Philippines to testify against the petitioner. If Lovely refused to testify before an American federal grand jury how could he possibly be made
to testify when the charges against the respondent come up in the course of the trial against the 39 accused. Considering the foregoing, we
find it in the interest of justice to resolve at this stage the issue of whether or not the respondent judge gravely abused his discretion in
issuing the questioned resolutions.
The respondents contend that the prosecution will introduce additional evidence during the trial and if the evidence, by then, is not sufficient
to prove the petitioner's guilt, he would anyway be acquitted. Yes, but under the circumstances of this case, at what cost not only to the
petitioner but to the basic fabric of our criminal justice system?
The term "prima facie evidence" denotes evidence which, if unexplained or uncontradicted, is sufficient to sustain the proposition it supports
or to establish the facts, or to counter-balance the presumption of innocence to warrant a conviction. The question raised before us now is:
Were the evidences against the petitioner uncontradicted and if they were unexplained or uncontradicted, would they, standing alone,
sufficiently overcome the presumption of innocence and warrant his conviction?
We do not think so.
The records reveal that in finding a case against the petitioner, the respondent judge relied only on the testimonies of Col. Balbino Diego and
Victor Lovely. Ambassador Armando Fernandez, when called upon to testify on subversive organizations in the United States nowhere
mentioned the petitioner as an organizer, officer or member of the Movement for Free Philippines (MFP), or any of the organizations
mentioned in the complaint. Col. Diego, on the other hand, when asked what evidence he was able to gather against the petitioner depended
only on the statement of Lovely "that it was the residence of ex-Senator Salonga where they met together with Renato Tañada, one of the
brains of the bombing conspiracy ... and the fact that Sen. Salonga has been meeting with several subversive personnel based in the U.S.A.
was also revealed to me by Victor Burns Lovely; 11 and on the group pictures taken at former Congressman Raul Daza's birthday party. In
concluding that a conspiracy exists to overthrow by violent means the government of the Philippines in the United States, his only bases
were "documentary as well as physical and sworn statements that were referred to me or taken by me personally," which of course negate
personal knowledge on his part. When asked by the court how he would categorize petitioner in any of the subversive organizations, whether
petitioner was an organizer, officer or a member, the witness replied:
A. To categorize former Senator Salonga if he were an organizer, he is an officer or he is a member, your Honor, please,
we have to consider the surrounding circumstances and on his involvement: first, Senator Salonga wanted always to
travel to the United States at least once a year or more often under the pretext of to undergo some sort of operation and
participate in some sort of seminar. (t.s.n., April 21, 1981, pp- 14-15)
Such testimony, being based on affidavits of other persons and purely hearsay, can hardly qualify as prima facie evidence of subversion. It
should not have been given credence by the court in the first place. Hearsay evidence, whether objected to or not, -has no probative value
as the affiant could not have been cross-examined on the facts stated therein. (See People v. Labinia, 115 SCRA 223; People v. Valero, 112
SCRA 661). Moreover, as Victor Lovely, himself, was personally examined by the court, there was no need for the testimony of Col. Diego.
Thus, the inquest judge should have confined his investigation to Victor Burns Lovely, the sole witness whose testimony had apparently
implicated petitioner in the bombings which eventually led to the filing of the information.
Lovely's account of the petitioner's involvement with the former's bombing mission is found in his sworn statement made before Col. Diego
and Lt. Col. Madella and taken on October 17, 1980 at the AFP Medical Center. Lovely was not presented as a prosecution or state witness
but only as a defense witness for his two younger brothers, Romeo and Baltazar, who were both included in the complaint but who were later
dropped from the information. Victor Lovely was examined by his counsel and cross-examined by the fiscal. In the process, he Identified the
statement which he made before Col. Diego and Lt. Col. Madella. After Lovely's testimony, the prosecution made a manifestation before the
court that it was adopting Lovely as a prosecution witness.
According to Lovely's statement, the following events took place:
36. Q. Did Psinakis tell you where to stay?
A. Yes, at first he told me to check-in at Manila Hotel or the Plaza Hotel where somebody would
come to contact me and give the materials needed in the execution of my mission. I thought this was
not safe so I disagreed with him. Mr. Psinakis changed the plan and instead told me to visit the
residence of Ex-Sen. Jovito Salonga as often as I can and someone will meet me there to give the
materials I needed to accomplish my mission
37. Q. Did you comply as instructed?
A. Yes, I arrived in Manila on August 20, 1980 and stayed at the residence of Mr. Johnny Chua,
husband of my business partner, then I went to the Hospital where I visited my mother and checked-
in at Room 303 of the YMCA at Concepcion Street, Manila.
 38. Q. Did you visit the residence of former Senator Jovito Salonga as directed by Psinakis?
A. I visited Sen. Salonga's place three (3) times, the first visit was August 20 or 21, and the last was
4:00 P.M. of August 31, 1980. In addition to these visits, I TALKED to him on the phone about three
or four times. On my first visit, I told him "I am expecting an attache case from somebody which will
be delivered to your house," for which Sen. Salonga replied "Wala namang nagpunta dito at wala
namang attache case para sa iyo." However, if your attache case arrives, I'll just call you." I gave him
my number. On my second visit, Salonga said, "I'll be very busy so just come back on the 31st of
August at 4 P.M." On that date, I was with friends at Batulao Resort and had to hurry back to be at
Salonga's place for the appointment. I arrived at Salonga's place at exactly 4 P.M.
39. Q. What happened then?
A. I was ushered to the sala by Mrs. Salonga and after five minutes, Sen. Salonga joined me in the
sala. Sen. Salonga informed me that somebody will be coming to give me the attache case but did
not tell me the name.
40. Q. Are there any subject matters you discuss while waiting for that somebody to deliver your
materials?
A. Yes, Salonga asked if Sen. Aquino and I have met, I explained to him the efforts of Raul Daza in
setting up that meeting but I have previous business commitments at Norfolk, Virginia. I told him,
however, that through the efforts of Raul Daza, I was able to talk with Ninoy Aquino in the airport
telephone booth in San Francisco. He also asked about Raul Daza, Steve Psinakis and the latest
opposition group activities but it seems he is well informed.
41. Q. How long did you wait until that somebody arrived?
A. About thirty (30) minutes.
41. Q. What happened when the man arrived?
A. This man arrived and I was greatly surprised to see Atty. Renato Tañada Jovy Salonga was the
one who met him and as I observed parang nasa sariling bahay si Tañada nung dumating. They
talked for five (5) minutes in very low tones so I did not hear what they talked about. After their
whispering conversations, Sen. Salonga left and at this time Atty. "Nits" Tañada told me "Nasa akin
ang kailangan mo, nasa kotse."
43. Q. Were the materials given to you?
A. When Sen. Salonga came back, we asked to be permitted to leave and I rode in Atty. "Nits"
Tañadas old Pontiac car colored dirty brown and proceeded to Broadway Centrum where before I
alighted, Atty. Tañada handed me a "Puma" bag containing all the materials I needed.
xxx xxx xxx
45. Q. What were the contents of the Puma bag?
A. Ten (10) pieces of Westclox pocket watch with screw and wirings, ten (10) pieces electrical
blasting caps 4" length, ten (10) pieces non-electrical blasting caps 1 " length, nine (9) pieces volts
dry cell battery, two (2) improvised electrical testers. ten (10) plastic packs of high explosive about 1
pound weight each.
However, in his interview with Mr. Ronnie Nathanielz which was aired on Channel 4 on November 8, 1980 and which was also offered as
evidence by the accused, Lovely gave a different story which negates the above testimony insofar as the petitioner's participation was
concerned:
xxx xxx xxx
Q. Who were the people that you contacted in Manila and for what purpose?
A. Before I left for the Philippines, Mr. Psinakis told me to check in at the Manila Hotel or the Plaza
Hotel, and somebody would just deliver the materials I would need. I disapproved of this, and I told
him I would prefer a place that is familiar to me or who is close to me. Mr. Psinakis suggested the
residence of Sen. Salonga.
And so, I arrived in Manila on August 20, 1980, 1 made a call to Sen. Salonga, but he was out. The
next day I made a call again. I was able to contact him. I made an appointment t  see him. I went to
Sen. Salonga's house the following day. I asked Sen. Salonga if someone had given him an attache
case for me. He said nobody. Afterwards, I made three calls to Sen. Salonga. Sen. Salonga told me
"call me again on the 31st of August. I did not call him, I just went to his house on the 31st of August
at 4 P.M. A few minutes after my arrival Atty. Renato Tañada arrived. When he had a chance to be
near me, he (Atty. Tanada) whispered to me that he had the attache case and the materials I needed
in his car. These materials were given to me by Atty. Tanada When I alighted at the Broadway
Centrum. (Emphasis supplied)
During the cross-examination, counsel for petitioner asked Lovely about the so-called destabilization plan which the latter mentioned in his
sworn statement:
Q. You mentioned in your statement taken on October 17, 1980, marked Exhibit "G" about the so-
called destabilization plan of Aquino. When you attended the birthday party of Raul Daza wherein
 Jovito Salonga was also present, was this destabilization plan as alleged by you already formulated?
WITNESS:
A. Not to my knowledge.
COURT TO WITNESS:
Q. Mr. Witness, who invited you to the party?
A. Raul Daza, your Honor.
Q. Were you told that Mr. Salonga would be present in the party.
A. I am really not quite sure, your Honor.
Q. Alright. You said initially it was social but then it became political. Was there any political action
taken as a result of the party?
A. Only political discussion, your Honor. (TSN, July 8, 1981, pp. 69-84).
Counsel for petitioner also asked Lovely whether in view of the latter's awareness of the physical condition of petitioner, he really implicated
petitioner in any of the bombings that occurred in Metro Manila. The fiscal objected without stating any ground. In sustaining the objection,
the Court said:
Sustained . . . The use of the word 'implicate' might expand the role of Mr. Salonga. In other words, you are widening the
avenue of Mr. Salonga's role beyond the participation stated in the testimony of this witness about Mr. Salonga, at least,
as far as the evidence is concerned, I supposed, is only being in the house of Mr. Salonga which was used as the
contact point. He never mentions Mr. Salonga about the bombings. Now these words had to be put in the mouth of this
witness. That would be unfair to Mr. Salonga. (TSN. July 8, 1981, p. 67)
Respondent judge further said:
COURT:
As the Court said earlier, the parts or portions affecting Salonga only refers to the witness coming to
Manila already then the matter of . . . I have gone over the statement and there is no mention of
Salonga insofar as activities in the United States is concerned. I don't know why it concerns this
cross-examination.
ATTY. YAP:
Because according to him, it was in pursuance of the plan that he came to Manila.
COURT:
According to him it was Aquino, Daza, and Psinakis who asked him to come here, but Salonga was
introduced only when he (Lovely) came here. Now, the tendency of the question is also to connect
Salonga to the activities in the United States. It seems to be the thrust of the questions.
COURT:
In other words, the point of the Court as of the time when you asked him question, the focus on
Salonga was only from the time when he met Salonga at Greenhills. It was the first time that the
name of Salonga came up. There was no mention of Salonga in the formulation of the destabilization
plan as affirmed by him. But you are bringing this up although you are only cross-examining for
Salonga as if his (Lovely's) activities in the United States affected Salonga. (TSN. July 8, 1981, pp.
73-74).
Apparently, the respondent judge wanted to put things in proper perspective by limiting the petitioner's alleged "participation" in the bombing
mission only to the fact that petitioner's house was used as a "contact point" between Lovely and Tañada, which was all that Lovely really
stated in his testimony.
However, in the questioned resolution dated December 2, 1981, the respondent judge suddenly included the "activities" of petitioner in the
United States as his basis for denying the motion to dismiss:
On the activities of Salonga in the United States, the witness, Lovely, in one of his statements declared: 'To the best of
my recollection he mentioned of some kind of violent struggle in the Philippines being most likely should reforms be not
instituted by President Marcos immediately.
It is therefore clear that the prosecution's evidence has established facts and circumstances sufficient for a finding that
excludes a Motion to Dismiss by respondent Salonga. The Movement for Free Philippines is undoubtedly a force born on
foreign soil it appears to rely on the resources of foreign entities, and is being (sic) on gaining ascendancy in the
Philippines with the use of force and for that purpose it has linked itself with even communist organizations to achieve its
end. It appears to rely on aliens for its supporters and financiers.
The jump from the "contact point" theory to the conclusion of involvement in subversive activities in the United States is not only inexplicable
but without foundation.
The respondents admit that no evidence was presented directly linking petitioner Salonga to actual acts of violence or terrorism. There is no
proof of his direct participation in any overt acts of subversion. However, he is tagged as a leader of subversive organizations for two
reasons-
(1) Because his house was used as a "contactpoint"; and
(2) Because "he mentioned some kind of violent struggle in the Philippines being most likely should reforms be not instituted by President
Marcos immediately."
The "contact point" theory or what the petitioner calls the guilt by visit or guilt by association" theory is too tenuous a basis to conclude that
Senator Salonga was a leader or mastermind of the bombing incidents. To indict a person simply because some plotters, masquerading as
visitors, have somehow met in his house or office would be to establish a dangerous precedent. The right of citizens to be secure against
abuse of governmental processes in criminal prosecutions would be seriously undermined.
The testimony of Victor Lovely against petitioner Salonga is full of inconsistencies. Senator Salonga and Atty. Renato Tañada could not have
whispered to one another because the petitioner is almost totally deaf. Lovely could not have met Senator Salonga at a Manglapus party in
Washington, D.C. in 1977 because the petitioner left for the United States only on November, 1978. Senator Salonga denies having known
Mr. Lovely in the United States or in the Philippines. He states that he has hundred of visitors from week to week in his residence but cannot
recall any Victor Lovely.
The presence of Lovely in a group picture taken at Mr. Raul Daza's birthday party in Los Angeles where Senator Salonga was a guest is not
proof of conspiracy. As stated by the petitioner, in his many years in the turbulent world of politics, he has posed with all kinds of people in
various groups and various places and could not possibly vouch for their conduct. Commenting on the matter, newspaper columnist Teodoro
Valencia stated that Filipinos love to pose with important visitors and the picture proves nothing.
It is likewise probable that a national figure and former politician of Senator Salonga's stature can expect guests and visitors of all kinds to be
visiting his home or office. If a rebel or subversive happens to pose with the petitioner for a group picture at a birthday party abroad, or even
visit him with others in his home, the petitioner does not thereby become a rebel or subversive, much less a leader of a subversive group.
More credible and stronger evidence is necessary for an indictment. Nonetheless, even if we discount the flaws in Lovely's testimony and
dismiss the refutations and arguments of the petitioner, the prosecution evidence is still inadequate to establish a prima facie finding.
The prosecution has not come up with even a single iota of evidence which could positively link the petitioner to any proscribed activities of
the Movement for Free Philippines or any subversive organization mentioned in the complaint. Lovely had already testified that during the
party of former Congressman Raul Daza which was alleged to have been attended by a number of members of the MFP, no political action
was taken but only political discussion. Furthermore, the alleged opinion of the petitioner about the likelihood of a violent struggle here in the
Philippines if reforms are not instituted, assuming that he really stated the same, is nothing but a legitimate exercise of freedom of thought
and expression. No man deserves punishment for his thoughts. Cogitationis poenam memo meretur. And as the late Justice Oliver W.
Holmes stated in the case of U.S. v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, " ... if there is any principle of the Constitution that more imperatively calls for
attachment than any other it is the principle of free thought not free thought for those who agree with us but freedom for the thought that we
hate."
We have adopted the concept that freedom of expression is a "preferred" right and, therefore, stands on a higher level than substantive
economic or other liberties. The primacy, the high estate accorded freedom of expression is a fundamental postulate of our constitutional
system. (Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, 29 SCRA 835). As explained by Justice Cardozo in Palko v. Connecticut (302 U.S. 319) this
must be so because the lessons of history, both political and legal, illustrate that freedom of thought and speech is the indispensable
condition of nearly every other form of freedom. Protection is especially mandated for political discussions. This Court is particularly
concerned when allegations are made that restraints have been imposed upon mere criticisms of government and public officials. Political
discussion is essential to the ascertainment of political truth. It cannot be the basis of criminal indictments.
The United States Supreme Court in Noto v. United States (367 U.S. 290) distinguished between the abstract teaching of the moral propriety
or even moral necessity for a resort to force and violence and speech which would prepare a group for violent action and steel it to such
action. In Watts v. United States (394 U.S. 705), the American court distinguished between criminal threats and constitutionally protected
speech.
It stated:
We do not believe that the kind of political hyperbole indulged in by petitioner fits within that statutory term. For we must
interpret the language Congress chose against the background of a profound national commitment to the principle that
debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide open and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and
sometimes unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan (376 U.S.
254). The language of the political arena, like the language used in labor disputed is often vituperative abusive, and
inexact. We agree with petitioner that his only offense was a kind of very crude offensive method of stating a political
opposition to the President.
In the case before us, there is no teaching of the moral propriety of a resort to violence, much less an advocacy of force or a conspiracy to
organize the use of force against the duly constituted authorities. The alleged remark about the likelihood of violent struggle unless reforms
are instituted is not a threat against the government. Nor is it even the uninhibited, robust, caustic, or unpleasantly sharp attack which is
protected by the guarantee of free speech. Parenthetically, the American case of Brandenburg v. Ohio (395 U.S. 444) states that the
constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law
violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such
action. The words which petitioner allegedly used according to the best recollections of Mr. Lovely are light years away from such type of
proscribed advocacy.
Political discussion even among those opposed to the present administration is within the protective clause of freedom of speech and
expression. The same cannot be construed as subversive activities per se or as evidence of membership in a subversive organization.
Under Presidential Decree No. 885, Section 3, paragraph 6, political discussion will only constitute, prima facie evidence of membership in a
subversive organization if such discussion amounts to:
(6) Conferring with officers or other members of such association or organization in furtherance of any plan or enterprise
thereof.
As stated earlier, the prosecution has failed to produce evidence that would establish any link between petitioner and any subversive
organization. Even if we lend credence to Lovely's testimony that a political discussion took place at Daza's birthday party, no proof
whatsoever was adduced that such discussion was in furtherance of any plan to overthrow the government through illegal means. The
alleged opinion that violent struggle is likely unless reforms are instituted by no means shows either advocacy of or incitement to violence or
furtherance of the objectives of a subversive organization.
Lovely also declared that he had nothing to do with the bombing on August 22, 1980, which was the only bombing incident that occurred
after his arrival in Manila on August 20, and before the YMCA explosion on September 6, 1980. (See TSN, pp. 63-63, July 8, 1981). He
further testified that:
WITNESS:
Actually, it was not my intention to do some kind of bombing against the government. My bombing
mission was directed against the particular family (referring to the Cabarrus family [TSN, p. 11, July
9, 1981] [Rollo, p. 10].
Such a statement wholly negates any politically motivated or subversive assignment which Lovely was supposed to have been
commissioned to perform upon the orders of his co- accused and which was the very reason why they answer charged in the first place. The
respondent judge also asked Lovely about the possible relation between Cabarrus and petitioner:
COURT:
Q. Did you suspect any relation between Cabarrus and Jovito Salonga, why did you implicate Jovito
Salonga?
A. No, your Honor. I did not try to implicate Salonga.
It should be noted that after Lovely's testimony, the prosecution manifested to the court that it was adopting him as a prosecution witness.
Therefore, the prosecution became irreversively bound by Lovely's disclaimers on the witness stand, that it was not his intention "to do some
kind of bombing against the government" and that he "did not try to implicate Salonga", especially since Lovely is the sole witness adopted
by the prosecution who could supposedly establish the link between the petitioner and the bombing incidents.
The respondent court should have taken these factors into consideration before concluding that a prima facie case exists against the
petitioner. Evidence must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but it must be credible in itself such as the common
experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances. (People v. Dayad, 56 SCRA 439). In the case at
bar, the prosecution cannot even present a credible version of the petitioner's role in the bombings even if it ignores the subsequent
disclaimers of Lovely and without relying on mere affidavits including those made by Lovely during his detention.
The resolution dated January 4, 1982 suffers from the same defect. In this resolution, Lovely's previous declarations about the bombings as
part of the alleged destabilization plan and the people behind the same were accorded such credibility by the respondent judge as if they had
already been proved beyond reasonable doubt.
The purpose of a preliminary investigation is to secure the innocent against hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecution, and to protect him
from an open and public accusation of crime, from the trouble, expense and anxiety of a public trial, and also to protect the state from
useless and expensive trials. (Trocio v. Manta, 118 SCRA 241; citing Hashim v. Boncan, 71 Phil. 216). The right to a preliminary investigation
is a statutory grant, and to withhold it would be to transgress constitutional due process. (See People v. Oandasa, 25 SCRA 277) However, in
order to satisfy the due process clause it is not enough that the preliminary investigation is conducted in the sense of making sure that a
transgressor shall not escape with impunity. A preliminary investigation serves not only the purposes of the State. More important, it is a part
of the guarantees of freedom and fair play which are birthrights of all who live in our country. It is, therefore, imperative upon the fiscal or the
judge as the case may be, to relieve the accused from the pain of going through a trial once it is ascertained that the evidence is insufficient
to sustain a prima facie case or that no probable cause exists to form a sufficient belief as to the guilt of the accused. Although there is no
general formula or fixed rule for the determination of probable cause since the same must be decided in the light of the conditions obtaining
in given situations and its existence depends to a large degree upon the finding or opinion of the judge conducting the examination, such a
finding should not disregard the facts before the judge nor run counter to the clear dictates of reasons (See La Chemise Lacoste, S.A. v.
Fernandez, 129 SCRA 391). The judge or fiscal, therefore, should not go on with the prosecution in the hope that some credible evidence
might later turn up during trial for this would be a flagrant violation of a basic right which the courts are created to uphold. It bears repeating
that the judiciary lives up to its mission by vitalizing and not denigrating constitutional rights. So it has been before. It should continue to be
so. Mercado v. Court of First Instance of Rizal, 116 SCRA 93).
The Court had already deliberated on this case, a consensus on the Court's judgment had been arrived at, and a draft ponencia was
circulating for concurrences and separate opinions, if any, when on January 18, 1985, respondent Judge Rodolfo Ortiz granted the motion of
respondent City Fiscal Sergio Apostol to drop the subversion case against the petitioner. Pursuant to instructions of the Minister of Justice,
the prosecution restudied its evidence and decided to seek the exclusion of petitioner Jovito Salonga as one of the accused in the
information filed under the questioned resolution.
We were constrained by this action of the prosecution and the respondent Judge to withdraw the draft ponencia from circulating for
concurrences and signatures and to place it once again in the Court's crowded agenda for further deliberations.
Insofar as the absence of a prima facie case to warrant the filing of subversion charges is concerned, this decision has been rendered moot
and academic by the action of the prosecution.
Respondent Fiscal Sergio Apostol correctly points out, however, that he is not precluded from filing new charges for the same acts because
the petitioner has not been arraigned and double jeopardy does not apply. in that sense, the case is not completely academic.
Recent developments in this case serve to focus attention on a not too well known aspect of the Supreme Court's functions.
The setting aside or declaring void, in proper cases, of intrusions of State authority into areas reserved by the Bill of Rights for the individual
as constitutionally protected spheres where even the awesome powers of Government may not enter at will is not the totality of the Court's
functions.
The Court also has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional principles, precepts, doctrines, or rules. It has the symbolic
function of educating bench and bar on the extent of protection given by constitutional guarantees.
In dela Camara v. Enage (41 SCRA 1), the petitioner who questioned a P1,195,200.00 bail bond as excessive and, therefore, constitutionally
void, escaped from the provincial jail while his petition was pending. The petition became moot because of his escape but we nonetheless
rendered a decision and stated:
The fact that the case is moot and academic should not preclude this Tribunal from setting forth in language clear and
unmistakable, the obligation of fidelity on the part of lower court judges to the unequivocal command of the Constitution
that excessive bail shall not be required.
In Gonzales v. Marcos (65 SCRA 624) whether or not the Cultural Center of the Philippines could validly be created through an executive
order was mooted by Presidential Decree No. 15, the Center's new charter pursuant to the President's legislative powers under martial law.
Stan, this Court discussed the constitutional mandate on the preservation and development of Filipino culture for national Identity. (Article XV,
Section 9, Paragraph 2 of the Constitution).
In the habeas corpus case of Aquino, Jr., v. Enrile, 59 SCRA 183), during the pendency of the case, 26 petitioners were released from
custody and one withdrew his petition. The sole remaining petitioner was facing charges of murder, subversion, and illegal possession of
firearms. The fact that the petition was moot and academic did not prevent this Court in the exercise of its symbolic function from
promulgating one of the most voluminous decisions ever printed in the Reports.
In this case, the respondents agree with our earlier finding that the prosecution evidence miserably fails to establish a prima facie case
against the petitioner, either as a co-conspirator of a destabilization plan to overthrow the government or as an officer or leader of any
subversive organization. They have taken the initiative of dropping the charges against the petitioner. We reiterate the rule, however, that this
Court will not validate the filing of an information based on the kind of evidence against the petitioner found in the records.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for having become moot and academic.
SO ORDERED.
Fernando, C.J., Teehankee, Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin, Relova and Cuevas, JJ., concur.
Aquino, De la Fuente and Alampay, JJ., took no part.

Separate Opinions

ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring

Del Castillo vs. Ponce Enrile, G.R. No. 62119, August 27, 1984, 131 SCRA 405, was a petition for the writ of habeas corpus. Before this
Court could finally act on the petition, the subject was released and for that reason the majority of this Court resolved to dismiss the petition
for having become moot and academic. Justice Teehankee and the undersigned disagreed with the majority; we expressed the view that
despite the release of the subject, the petition should have been resolved on the merits because it posed important legal questions.
Babst et al. vs. National Intelligence Board, Special Committee No. 2, et al., G.R. No. 62992, Sept. 2, 1984, was a petition for prohibition to
restrain the respondents from interrogating the petitioners, members of the print media, on various aspects of their works, feelings,
sentiments, beliefs, associations and even their private lives. Again the majority of this Court dismissed the petition because the assailed
proceedings had come to an end thereby rendering the petition moot and academic. In dismissing the petition a short and mild note of
concern was added. And again Justice Teehankee and the undersigned disagreed with the majority. We expressed the view that this Court
should rule squarely on the matters raised in the petition rather than dismiss it for having become moot and academic.
I am glad that this Court has abandoned its cavalier treatment of petitions by dismissing them on the ground that they have become moot
and academic and stopped there. I am glad it has reverted to De la Camara vs. Enage, Gonzales vs. Marcos and Aquino v. Enrile which are
mentioned in the ponencia of Justice Gutierrez.
I agree with the ponencia of Justice Gutierrez that because the subversion charges against the petitioner had been dropped by the trial court
on January 18, 1985, there is no longer any need to prohibit the respondents from prosecuting Criminal Case No. Q-18606 insofar as he is
concerned.
I am not revealing any confidential matter by saying that the initial action of this Court was to grant the petition, i.e. prohibit the prosecution of
the petitioner. This is manifest from the ponencia of Justice Gutierrez. I regret that on this matter the Court has been preempted by a "first
strike" which has occurred once too often.
Justice Gutierrez states that, "The Court had already deliberated on this case, and a consensus on the Court's judgment had been arrived
at." Let me add that the consensus had taken place as early as October 24, 1984, and the decision started to circulate for signature on
November 2, 1984. Alas, on January 18, 1985, the decision was still circulating overtaken by events. The decision could have had a greater
impact had it been promulgated prior to the executive action.

Separate Opinions
ABAD SANTOS, J., concurring
Del Castillo vs. Ponce Enrile, G.R. No. 62119, August 27, 1984, 131 SCRA 405, was a petition for the writ of habeas corpus. Before this
Court could finally act on the petition, the subject was released and for that reason the majority of this Court resolved to dismiss the petition
for having become moot and academic. Justice Teehankee and the undersigned disagreed with the majority; we expressed the view that
despite the release of the subject, the petition should have been resolved on the merits because it posed important legal questions.
Babst et al. vs. National Intelligence Board, Special Committee No. 2, et al., G.R. No. 62992, Sept. 2, 1984, was a petition for prohibition to
restrain the respondents from interrogating the petitioners, members of the print media, on various aspects of their works, feelings,
sentiments, beliefs, associations and even their private lives. Again the majority of this Court dismissed the petition because the assailed
proceedings had come to an end thereby rendering the petition moot and academic. In dismissing the petition a short and mild note of
concern was added. And again Justice Teehankee and the undersigned disagreed with the majority. We expressed the view that this Court
should rule squarely on the matters raised in the petition rather than dismiss it for having become moot and academic.
I am glad that this Court has abandoned its cavalier treatment of petitions by dismissing them on the ground that they have become moot
and academic and stopped there. I am glad it has reverted to De la Camara vs. Enage, Gonzales vs. Marcos and Aquino v. Enrile which are
mentioned in the ponencia of Justice Gutierrez.
I agree with the ponencia of Justice Gutierrez that because the subversion charges against the petitioner had been dropped by the trial court
on January 18, 1985, there is no longer any need to prohibit the respondents from prosecuting Criminal Case No. Q-18606 insofar as he is
concerned.
I am not revealing any confidential matter by saying that the initial action of this Court was to grant the petition, i.e. prohibit the prosecution of
the petitioner. This is manifest from the ponencia of Justice Gutierrez. I regret that on this matter the Court has been preempted by a "first
strike" which has occurred once too often.
Justice Gutierrez states that, "The Court had already deliberated on this case, and a consensus on the Court's judgment had been arrived
at." Let me add that the consensus had taken place as early as October 24, 1984, and the decision started to circulate for signature on
November 2, 1984. Alas, on January 18, 1985, the decision was still circulating overtaken by events. The decision could have had a greater
impact had it been promulgated prior to the executive action.
Footnotes
* In the Philippines Daily Express, dated December 8, 1981, Lovely was quoted as having said in the United States that
"I was not the bomber, I was bombed."
Lovely, who was granted immunity in the United States, reportedly would not testify before a San Francisco federal grand
jury and instead said, "Your Honor, I came back to tell what happened in the Philippines. I was not the bomber, I was
bombed."
The United Press International dispatch from San Francisco, U.S., written by Spencer Sherman, gives a fuller account,
thus:
With the grand jury present in the courtroom Lovely alleged it was Philippine authorities who were responsible for his
injuries. It was they, not him, who placed the bomb in his hotel room, he said.
I came back to the States to tell what happened in the Philippines. I was not the bomber. I was bombed. There are so
many secrets that will come out soon. I cannot (testify) even if I will be jailed for lifetime. I welcome that."
— UPO press dispatch from
San Francisco, November 24, 1981.
The Philippine News, a San Francisco-based weekly, in its issue of December 23, 1981, contains the same account, with
the following words:
"Your Honor . . . I am not going to participate I was almost murdered. I cannot continue. My friends were murdered
before I came to the United States . . . I came back to the United States to tell what happened in the Philippines. I was
not the bomber, I was bombed. There are many secrets that will come out very soon I cannot. Even if I will be jailed for
lifetime. I welcome that."
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-69500 July 22, 1985
JOSE ANTONIO U. GONZALEZ in behalf of MALAYA FILMS, LINO BROCKA, JOSE F. LACABA, and DULCE Q. SAGUISAG,
petitioners,
vs.
CHAIRMAN MARIA KALAW KATIGBAK, GENERAL WILFREDO C. ESTRADA (Ret.), and THE BOARD OF REVIEW FOR MOTION
PICTURES AND TELEVISION (BRMPT), respondents.
Irene R. Cortes, Perfecto V. Fernandez, Haydee Yorac and Joker P. Arroyo for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondents.

FERNANDO, C.J.:
In this case of first impression, a certiorari proceeding filed on January 10, 1985, there is a persuasive ring to the invocation of the
constitutional right to freedom of expression 1 of an artist—and for that matter a man of letters too—as the basis for a ruling on the scope of
the power of respondent Board of Review for Motion Pictures and Television and how it should be exercised. The dispute between the
parties has been narrowed down. The motion picture in question, Kapit sa Patalim was classified "For Adults Only." There is the further issue
then, also one of first impression, as to the proper test of what constitutes obscenity in view of the objections raised. Thus the relevance of
this constitutional command: "Arts and letters shall be under the patronage of the State.2
The principal petitioner is Jose Antonio U. Gonzalez, 3 President of the Malaya Films, a movie production outfit duly registered as a single
proprietorship with the Bureau of Domestic Trade. The respondent is the Board of Review for Motion Pictures and Television, with Maria
Kalaw Katigbak as its Chairman and Brig. Gen. Wilfredo C. Estrada as its Vice-Chairman, also named respondents.
In a resolution of a sub-committee of respondent Board of October 23, 1984, a permit to exhibit the film Kapit sa Patalim under the
classification "For Adults Only," with certain changes and deletions enumerated was granted. A motion for reconsideration was filed by
petitioners stating that the classification of the film "For Adults Only" was without basis. 4 Then on November 12, 1984, respondent Board
released its decision: "Acting on the applicant's Motion for Reconsideration dated 29 October 1984, the Board, after a review of the
resolution of the sub-committee and an examination of the film, Resolves to affirm in toto the ruling of the sub-committee. Considering,
however, certain vital deficiencies in the application, the Board further Resolves to direct the Chairman of the Board to Withheld the issuance
of the Permit to exhibit until these deficiencies are supplied. 5 Hence this petition.
This Court, in a resolution of January 12, 1985, required respondent to answer. In such pleading submitted on January 21, 1985, as one of
its special and affirmative defenses, it was alleged that the petition is moot as "respondent Board has revoked its questioned resolution,
replacing it with one immediately granting petitioner company a permit to exhibit the film Kapit without any deletion or cut [thus an]
adjudication of the questions presented above would be academic on the case." 6 Further: "The modified resolution of the Board, of course,
classifies Kapit as for-adults-only, but the petition does not raise any issue as to the validity of this classification. All that petitioners assail as
arbitrary on the part of the Board's action are the deletions ordered in the film. 7 The prayer was for the dismissal of the petition.
An amended petition was then filed on January 25, 1985. The main objection was the classification of the film as "For Adults Only." For
petitioners, such classification "is without legal and factual basis and is exercised as impermissible restraint of artistic expression. The film is
an integral whole and all its portions, including those to which the Board now offers belated objection, are essential for the integrity of the
film. Viewed as a whole, there is no basis even for the vague speculations advanced by the Board as basis for its classification. 8 There was
an answer to the amended petition filed on February 18, 1985. It was therein asserted that the issue presented as to the previous deletions
ordered by the Board as well as the statutory provisions for review of films and as to the requirement to submit the master negative have
been all rendered moot. It was also submitted that the standard of the law for classifying films afford a practical and determinative yardstick
for the exercise of judgment. For respondents, the question of the sufficiency of the standards remains the only question at issue.
It would be unduly restrictive under the circumstances to limit the issue to one of the sufficiency of standards to guide respondent Board in
the exercise of its power. Even if such were the case, there is justification for an inquiry into the controlling standard to warrant the
classification of "For Adults Only." This is especially so, when obscenity is the basis for any alleged invasion of the right to the freedom of
artistic and literary expression embraced in the free speech and free press guarantees of the Constitution.
1. Motion pictures are important both as a medium for the communication of Ideas and the expression of the artistic impulse. Their effects on
the perception by our people of issues and public officials or public figures as well as the prevailing cultural traits is considerable. Nor as
pointed out in Burstyn v. Wilson9 is the "importance of motion pictures as an organ of public opinion lessened by the fact that they are
designed to entertain as well as to inform. 10 There is no clear dividing line between what involves knowledge and what affords pleasure. If
such a distinction were sustained, there is a diminution of the basic right to free expression. Our recent decision in Reyes v. Bagatsing11
cautions against such a move. Press freedom, as stated in the opinion of the Court, "may be Identified with the liberty to discuss publicly and
truthfully any matter of public concern without censorship or punishment. 12 This is not to say that such freedom, as is the freedom of
speech, absolute. It can be limited if "there be a 'clear and present danger of a substantive evil that [the State] has a right to prevent. 13
2. Censorship or previous restraint certainly is not all there is to free speech or free press. If it were so, then such basic rights are
emasculated. It is however, except in exceptional circumstances a sine qua non for the meaningful exercise of such right. This is not to deny
that equally basic is the other important aspect of freedom from liability. Nonetheless, for the purposes of this litigation, the emphasis should
rightly be on freedom from censorship. It is, beyond question, a well-settled principle in our jurisdiction. As early as 1909, in the case of
United States v. Sedano, 14 a prosecution for libel, the Supreme Court of the Philippines already made clear that freedom of the press
consists in the right to print what one chooses without any previous license. There is reaffirmation of such a view in Mutuc v. Commission on
Elections, 15 where an order of respondent Commission on Elections giving due course to the certificate of candidacy of petitioner but
prohibiting him from using jingles in his mobile units equipped with sound systems and loud speakers was considered an abridgment of the
right of the freedom of expression amounting as it does to censorship. It is the opinion of this Court, therefore, that to avoid an
unconstitutional taint on its creation, the power of respondent Board is limited to the classification of films. It can, to safeguard other
constitutional objections, determine what motion pictures are for general patronage and what may require either parental guidance or be
limited to adults only. That is to abide by the principle that freedom of expression is the rule and restrictions the exemption. The power to
exercise prior restraint is not to be presumed, rather the presumption is against its validity.16
3. The test, to repeat, to determine whether freedom of excession may be limited is the clear and present danger of an evil of a substantive
character that the State has a right to prevent. Such danger must not only be clear but also present. There should be no doubt that what is
feared may be traced to the expression complained of. The causal connection must be evident. Also, there must be reasonable
apprehension about its imminence. The time element cannot be ignored. Nor does it suffice if such danger be only probable. There is the
require of its being well-nigh inevitable. The basic postulate, wherefore, as noted earlier, is that where the movies, theatrical productions
radio scripts, television programs, and other such media of expression are concerned — included as they are in freedom of expression —
censorship, especially so if an entire production is banned, is allowable only under the clearest proof of a clear and present danger of a
substantive evil to public public morals, public health or any other legitimate public interest. 17 There is merit to the observation of Justice
Douglas that "every writer, actor, or producer, no matter what medium of expression he may use, should be freed from the censor. 18
4. The law, however, frowns on obscenity and rightly so. As categorically stated by Justice Brennan in Roth v. United States 19 speaking of
the free speech and press guarantee of the United States Constitution: "All Ideas having even the slightest redeeming social importance —
unorthodox Ideas, controversial Ideas, even Ideas hateful to the prevailing climate of opinion — have the full protection of the guaranties,
unless excludable because they encroach upon the limited area of the First Amendment is the rejection of obscenity as utterly without
redeeming social importance. 20 Such a view commends itself for approval.
5. There is, however, some difficulty in determining what is obscene. There is persuasiveness to the approach followed in Roth: "The early
leading standard of obscenity allowed material to be judged merely by the effect of an isolated excerpt upon particularly susceptible persons.
Regina v. Hicklin [1868] LR 3 QB 360. Some American courts adopted this standard but later decisions have rejected it and substituted this
test: whether to the average person, applying contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole
appeals to prurient interest. The Hicklin test, judging obscenity by the effect of isolated passages upon the most susceptible persons, might
well encompass material legitimately treating with sex, and so it must be rejected as unconstitutionally restrictive of the freedoms of speech
and press. On the other hand, the substituted standard provides safeguards adequate to withstand the charge of constitutional infirmity. 21
6. The above excerpt which imposes on the judiciary the duty to be ever on guard against any impermissible infringement on the freedom of
artistic expression calls to mind the landmark ponencia of Justice Malcolm in United States v. Bustos, 22 decided in 1918. While recognizing
the principle that libel is beyond the pale of constitutional protection, it left no doubt that in determining what constitutes such an offense, a
court should ever be mindful that no violation of the right to freedom of expression is allowable. It is a matter of pride for the Philippines that it
was not until 1984 in New York Timer v. Sullivan, 23 thirty-years later, that the United States Supreme Court enunciated a similar doctrine.
7. It is quite understandable then why in the Roth opinion, Justice Brennan took pains to emphasize that "sex and obscenity are not
synonymous. 24 Further: "Obscene material is material which deals with sex in a manner appealing to prurient interest. The portrayal of sex,
e.g., in art, literature and scientific works, is not itself sufficient reason to deny material the constitutional protection of freedom of speech and
press. Sex, a great and mysterious motive force in human life has indisputably been a subject of absorbing interest to mankind through the
ages; it is one of the vital problems of human interest and public concern. 25
8. In the applicable law, Executive Order No. 876, reference was made to respondent Board "applying contemporary Filipino cultural values
as standard, 26 words which can be construed in an analogous manner. Moreover, as far as the question of sex and obscenity are
concerned, it cannot be stressed strongly that the arts and letters "shall be under the patronage of the State. 27 That is a constitutional
mandate. It will be less than true to its function if any government office or agency would invade the sphere of autonomy that an artist enjoys.
There is no orthodoxy in what passes for beauty or for reality. It is for the artist to determine what for him is a true representation. It is not to
be forgotten that art and belleslettres deal primarily with imagination, not so much with ideas in a strict sense. What is seen or perceived by
an artist is entitled to respect, unless there is a showing that the product of his talent rightfully may be considered obscene. As so wen put by
Justice Frankfurter in a concurring opinion, "the widest scope of freedom is to be given to the adventurous and imaginative exercise of the
human spirit" 28 in this sensitive area of a man's personality. On the question of obscenity, therefore, and in the light of the facts of this case,
such standard set forth in Executive Order No. 878 is to be construed in such a fashion to avoid any taint of unconstitutionality. To repeat,
what was stated in a recent decision 29 citing the language of Justice Malcolm in Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 30 it is "an elementary, a
fundamental, and a universal role of construction, applied when considering constitutional questions, that when a law is susceptible of two
constructions' one of which will maintain and the other destroy it, the courts will always adopt the former. 31 As thus construed, there can be
no valid objection to the sufficiency of the controlling standard and its conformity to what the Constitution ordains.
9. This being a certiorari petition, the question before the Court is whether or not there was a grave abuse of discretion. That there was an
abuse of discretion by respondent Board is evident in the light of the difficulty and travail undergone by petitioners before Kapit sa Patalim
was classified as "For Adults Only," without any deletion or cut. Moreover its perception of what constitutes obscenity appears to be unduly
restrictive. This Court concludes then that there was an abuse of discretion. Nonetheless, there are not enough votes to maintain that such
an abuse can be considered grave. Accordingly, certiorari does not lie. This conclusion finds support in this explanation of respondents in its
Answer to the amended petition: "The adult classification given the film serves as a warning to theater operators and viewers that some
contents of Kapit are not fit for the young. Some of the scenes in the picture were taken in a theater-club and a good portion of the film shots
concentrated on some women erotically dancing naked, or at least nearly naked, on the theater stage. Another scene on that stage depicted
the women kissing and caressing as lesbians. And toward the end of the picture, there exists scenes of excessive violence attending the
battle between a group of robbers and the police. The vulnerable and imitative in the young audience will misunderstand these scenes." 32
Further: "Respondents further stated in its answer that petitioner company has an option to have the film reclassified to For-General-
Patronage if it would agree to remove the obscene scenes and pare down the violence in the film." 33 Petitioners, however, refused the "For
Adults Only" classification and instead, as noted at the outset, filed this suit for certiorari.
10. All that remains to be said is that the ruling is to be limited to the concept of obscenity applicable to motion pictures. It is the consensus of
this Court that where television is concerned: a less liberal approach calls for observance. This is so because unlike motion pictures where
the patrons have to pay their way, television reaches every home where there is a set. Children then will likely will be among the avid viewers
of the programs therein shown. As was observed by Circuit Court of Appeals Judge Jerome Frank, it is hardly the concern of the law to deal
with the sexual fantasies of the adult population. 34 it cannot be denied though that the State as parens patriae is called upon to manifest an
attitude of caring for the welfare of the young.
WHEREFORE, this Court, in the light of the principles of law enunciated in the opinion, dismisses this petition for certiorari solely on the
ground that there are not enough votes for a ruling that there was a grave abuse of discretion in the classification of Kapit sa Patalim as "For-
Adults-Only."
Teehankee, Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin, Relova, Gutierrez, Jr., Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.
Aquino, J., concurs in the result.
De la Fuente, J., took no part.
Abad Santos, J., is on leave.

Footnotes
1 The Constitution provides: "No law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the
people peaceably to assemble and petition the Government for redress of grievances.
2 Article XV Section 9. par. (2) reads in full: "Filipino culture shall be preserved and developed for national Identify. Arts
 and letter shall be under the patronage of the State. ..
3 The other petitioners are Lino Brocka. Jose F. Lacaba and Dulce Q. Saguisag.
4 Petition, par. 3.33.
5 Ibid, par. 3.35.
6 Answer, 9-10.
7 Ibid, 10.
8 Amended Petition, 20.
9 343 US 495 (1942).
10 Ibid, 501.
11 G.R. No. 65366. November 9, 1983, 125 SCRA 553. Cf Winters v. New York, 333 US 507 (1948).
12 Ibid, 560.
13 Ibid, 561.
14 14 Phil. 338. Cf. US v. Sotto, 38 Phil. 666 (1918).
15 L-32717, November 26, 1970, 36 SCRA 228.
16 Cf. Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivans, 372 US 58 (1962); Organization for Better Austria v. Keafe, 402 US 415 (1971).
17 Cf. Reyes v. Bagatsing, 125 SCRA 553, 562.
18 Superior Films v. regents of University of State of New York, 346 US 587, 589 (1954), Douglas, J., concurring.
19 354 US 476 (1957).
20 Ibid, 484-485. There was reference to international agreement of over 50 nations and the obscenity laws of all the
then 48 States of the Union as well as 20 obscenity laws enacted by the Congress of the United States from 1842 to
1956. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 US 568 (1942) was also cited.
21 Ibid, 488-489.
22 37 Phil. 731.
23 376 US 254.
24 Roth v. United States, 354 US 476, 487 (1957).
25 Ibid.
26 Executive Order No. 876, Section 3(c) (1963).
27 Article XV, Section 9, par. (2), last sentence of the Constitution.
28 Kingsley v. Regents, 360 US 684, 695 (1959).
29 Lopez, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 65022, May 31, 1985.
30 47 Phil. 385 (1925).
31 Ibid, 415.
Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila
EN BANC
IN THE MATTER OF THE A.M. No. 07-09-13-SC
ALLEGATIONS CONTAINED
IN THE COLUMNS OF MR. Present:
AMADO P. MACASAET
PUBLISHED IN MALAYA PUNO, C.J.,
DATED SEPTEMBER 18, 19, QUISUMBING,
20 AND 21, 2007 YNARES-SANTIAGO,*
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
 CARPIO MORALES,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
REYES,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and
BRION, JJ.
Promulgated:
August 8, 2008
x--------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
REYES, R.T., J.:
FREEDOM of the press and judicial independence (kalayaan ng pamamahayag at kalayaang panghukuman) two constitutional values which
unfortunately clash in this case for indirect contempt of court have to be weighed and balanced against each other.

The Antecedents

The case stemmed from certain articles that appeared in the Business Circuit column of Amado P. Macasaet in the Malaya, a newspaper of general
circulation of which he is the publisher. The articles, containing statements and innuendoes about an alleged bribery incident in the Supreme Court, came
out in four (4) issues of the newspaper on September 18, 19, 20 and 21, 2007, reproduced as follows:

September 18, 2007

Bribery in the Court
A lady justice (I have not been told whether she is from the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals) did not report for a day last week.
Her secretary received a gift-wrapped box about the size of two dozen milk cans.
Believing that the gift might be something perishable, she opened the box. Indeed, it was a gift estimated at P10 million. Posthaste, the secretary informed
the magistrate about the gift. She thought she was doing her job. The lady justice fired her instead.
She would not have anybody catch her accepting a bribe. But she practically did.
The stupidity here is that the bribe-giver what else would we call him or her did not check whether the lady justice was in the office or not. Better still he or
she could have the box full of money delivered to her home. But then her family would get to know about and ask who was the kind soul that was so
liberal with money a boxful of it.
The Supreme Court cannot let this pass. A full investigation should be conducted. The magistrate who was sent the bribe should be impeached.
The gift gives proof to the pernicious rumor that the courts are dirty. This time, the lady justice is with a higher court.
The court is like a basket of apples. There a few which are rotten that makes the whole basket rotten.
The names and reputation of highly-respected jurists must be saved from suspicions they are thieves.
Heres the clue
The Court employee who was fired by the lady jurist is a niece of another lady justice who earlier retired. The worker was inherited by the incumbent lady
justice.
My problem with this report is that while my source is definite about the employee opening a gift-wrapped box that contained at least P10 million, he wont
confide to me the identity of the jurist.
Unless the employee who was fired talks against her boss and she should as a matter of duty we will never know who this justice really is. The members of
the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan are all called justices.
The head of the Office of Government Corporate Counsel is also honored by being addressed as such. So is the head of the Court of Tax Appeals.
Since the employee was fired for opening the box which she thought contained perishable goods but turned out there was an estimated P10 million in it,
she should be loyal to her duty of telling the truth.
That way, she would have rendered a great service to the justice system. Without her talking, every lady with the title of Justice is suspect. There are more
than a dozen of them in different courts but only one was caught red-handed taking a bribe. Her name should be known so that the Supreme Court can act
swiftly on a clear case of bribery.
Otherwise, this case becomes one where the pot calls the kettle black. Or is that the reason the employee would not talk, that her former boss could spill the
beans on her peers?
September 19, 2007
The Bribe Giver
I learned from some lawyers that the bribe money given to a lady justice came from a Chinese-Filipino businessman who has been criminally charged.
It is funny that the delivery of five boxes of money (I said only one earlier) coincided on the day the lady justice, obviously acting as ponente, acquitted the
prospect.
The secretary of the lady justice who took the bribe made five trips to the guardhouse to pick up the boxes.
Incidentally, this secretary is a namesake of her aunt, a deceased associate justice of the Supreme Court.
I dare say that if her name is Cecilia, it is entirely possible that the lady justice is a member of the Supreme Court. The late justice Cecilia Muoz-Palma is
the only lady justice I know who retired and died at a ripe old age and left behind a reputation of decency and integrity.
We are coming closer and closer to the truth. The lady justice shamed her court. She should resign or be impeached.
That is the only way the soiled reputation of the could be restored.
September 20, 2007
Cecilia, please save the court
I have established the lady justices secretary who opened one of the five milk boxes containing bribe money is a niece of the late, respected and honorable
Associate Justice Cecilia Muoz Palma from Batangas.
The secretary is a niece of the late justice and a namesake.
Cecilia, you have a duty to honor the memory of your aunt, who, during her stay in the court, was known for having balls.
More important than that, you have a duty to save the sagging reputation of the Supreme Court.
Cecilia, you must tell the Court en banc everything you know about the money that was sent in five boxes to your boss.
Not in retaliation for your dismissal, but for no other reason than as a duty to your country and, I must again say, to honor the memory of your late
illustrious aunt, a legal luminary and staunch defender of the Constitution.
The other reason you must spill the beans is that if you do not, other lady justices are suspects. That is not fair to them.
September 21, 2007
Wrong date, same facts
On verification, I discovered that the secretary of a lady justice of the Supreme Court who was said to have accepted five milk boxes of money, was fired
as early as March. Not last week as I mistakenly reported.
It turns out that Cecilia Muoz-Delis from Bicol picked up the last five boxes several times in March.
She never opened the first four boxes which she picked up from the guardhouse of the Court.
She opened the last and saw the money because the lady justice was absent on that day. Forthwith, she was fired. Cecilia, who is from Bicol, never opened
any of the first four boxes delivered on various dates (I have not been told when). She picked up all of them from the Supreme Court guardhouse and left
them with the lady justice. She wouldnt dare open the first four because the lady justice was in her office. She opened the fifth one because the lady justice
did not report for work on that day.
Cecilia thought that the gift-wrapped box contained some perishables like food. What she found was money instead. She was fired.
Whenever a gift for lady justice comes, she would order Cecilia to pick it up from the guardhouse. So the fifth she picked up was one of those errands.
Where is Cecilia?
I cannot get any information on the present whereabouts of Cecilia. However, if the Supreme Court has intentions to investigate what I have been saying,
maybe the Chief Justice himself should find out where she could be sent an invitation to appear before an investigation group in the Court.
Better still, as I said, yesterday, Cecilia should disclose everything she knows regarding the box before the Court en banc.
Farthest thing from my mind is to embarrass the lady justice whose identity I do not know up to now.
It is my conviction that the Court should investigate reports of wrongdoing by any of its peers. Justice is served that way.
The Chief Justice and the rest of the justices should not have a problem finding out who she is.
It is a simple job of asking a clerk to go to personnel department of the Court and find out who Cecilia worked for.[1]
The September 18, 2007 article, the first of the series of articles, caught the attention of Assistant Court Administrator (ACA) Jose Midas P. Marquez,
Chief of the Supreme Court Public Information Office, in the course of his monitoring the daily news reports and columns in major newspapers. However,
since it was vague about which court was being referred to, whether the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, or the Court of Tax
Appeals,[2] ACA Marquez opted to merely note it.[3]

The succeeding two articles, however, gave an indication that the supposed bribery happened in the Supreme Court. Respondent Macasaet, in his
September 19, 2007 article, wrote, among others, that I dare say that if her name is Cecilia, it is entirely possible that the lady justice is a member of the
Supreme Court x x x. We are coming closer and closer to the truth. The lady justice shamed her court. She should resign or be impeached. That is the only
way the soiled reputation of the Highest Court could be restored.
Similarly, in his September 20, 2007 article, respondent said that Cecilia had a duty to save the sagging reputation of the Supreme Court.

Also on September 20, 2007, at around 6:00 p.m., Marites Daguilan-Vitug, Editor in Chief of Newsbreak, faxed a letter to Supreme Court Associate Justice
Consuelo Ynares-Santiago asking for three things

1. In (sic) , you concurred with a decision penned by Justice Romeo Callejo, Sr. ruling that the Sandiganbayan Fifth Division did not commit a grave abuse
of discretion by finding probable cause against Henry Go. However, five months later (), acting on Gos motion for reconsideration, you reversed yourself
and ordered the dismissal of the graft case against Go. Please explain the circumstances that led to this reversal.
2. We have gathered from three sources that you received a cash gift of P10 million after you issued the decision early September. Please comment.
3. Were checking if this is accurate. Your secretary, who opened the gift-wrapped box thinking that it contained perishable items, found cash instead. It was
after this incident that you removed her.[4]
Upon receipt of the faxed letter, Mme. Justice Ynares-Santiago called for ACA Marquez, showed him the letter of Daguilan-Vitug, and requested him to
tell Daguilan-Vitug that she (Mme. Justice Ynares-Santiago) had been consistent on her position in the Go case, that she never reversed herself, that she
never received a cash gift, and that no secretary was terminated for opening a gift-wrapped box containing money. Accordingly, ACA Marquez went back
to his office, called up Daguilan-Vitug and told her what Mme. Justice Ynares-Santiago told him.[5]

That same evening, at around seven, Daguilan-Vitug faxed the corrected version of the earlier letter

1. On , you dissented against the decision penned by Justice Romeo Callejo, Sr. ruling that the Sandiganbayan Fifth Division did not commit a grave abuse
of discretion by finding probable cause against Henry Go. The vote was 3-2 in favor of Callejas (sic) decision. Five months later (), acting on Gos motion
for reconsideration (by that time, Callejo had already retired), you ordered the dismissal of the graft case against Go. I understand the exchanges were bitter
and the deliberations long. Please explain the contentious issues.
2. We have gathered from three sources that you received a cash gift of P10 million in March 2007 in the midst of deliberations on the case. Please
comment.
3. Were checking if this is accurate. Your secretary, who opened the gift-wrapped box thinking that it contained perishable items, found cash instead. It was
after this incident that you removed her in March 2007.[6]
The following day, September 21, 2007, respondent Macasaet, in his column, named the supposed secretary who was forthwith x x x fired allegedly after
opening the box of money: It turns out that Cecilia Muoz Delis from Bicol picked up the last five boxes several times in March.

From the foregoing series of articles, respondent Macasaet has painted a clear picture: a Chinese-Filipino businessman who was acquitted of a crime
supposedly left P10 million in five different boxes with the security guard at the Supreme Court guardhouse, which was picked up by Cecilia Muoz Delis
who was forthwith fired for opening one of the boxes.

Upon the request of Mme. Justice Ynares-Santiago, the Chief Justice instructed ACA Marquez to have the 18 th, 19th, 20th, and 21st September 2007
Business Circuit columns of respondent Macasaet included in the September 25, 2007 agenda of the Court En Banc,[7] which case was docketed as A.M.
No. 07-09-13-SC. (Re: In the Matter of the Allegations Contained in the Columns of Mr. A.P. Macasaet Published in Malaya dated September 18, 19, 20,
and 21, 2007).

On September 24, 2007, Daisy Cecilia Muoz Delis, accompanied by the Clerk of Court En Banc, Hon. Ma. Luisa D. Villarama, went to see Mme. Justice
Ynares-Santiago and gave the latter copies of her letter to respondent Macasaet and her affidavit. Delis, in her letter to respondent Macasaet, described his
articles as baseless reports. In other words, she wrote respondent Macasaet, the scenario you painted and continue to paint is improbable and could only
have emanated from a polluted source, who, unfortunately, chose me to be a part of this fictional charge. She clarified that she was a Judicial Staff Officer,
and not a secretary as the articles claimed she was; that she voluntarily resigned from office and was not fired; that as a matter of procedure, she would not
have been tasked to receive boxes, as such was a duty assigned to their utility personnel; that it was highly unlikely for something as blatant as [a] bribery
attempt to have been done right in the doors of the Court.[8] Delis ended her letter to respondent Macasaet with a plea

My family and I have been suffering ever since your article came out last Tuesday, because I was being alluded to. This suffering has increased because the
name of my beloved aunt x x x has been drawn into a controversy that should not have involved me or any member of my family in the first place.
And so, I ask you, Sir, to please cease from mentioning my name or any of my relatives, living or deceased, in order to promote your tabloid journalism. If
your source is as reliable as you believe, I suggest you practice better judgment and journalistic responsibility by verifying your data before printing
anything and affecting the lives of innocent people. If this is some kind of war you are waging against the lady justice, we do not want to be collateral
damage.[9]
In her affidavit, Delis stated that she had nothing to do with, nor did x x x have any knowledge of such alleged attempted bribery, [10] and that she executed
her affidavit to allow Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago to defend her honor,[11] and for the purpose of correcting the erroneous information of Mr.
Macasaet.[12]

That same morning, too, despite the prior telephone conversation between ACA Marquez and Daguilan-Vitug, Newsbreak posted an on-line article written
by Danguilan-Vitug herself and Aries Rufo, which was regularly updated, entitled Supreme Court Justice Suspected of Accepting Payoff (update)[13] with
the picture of Mme. Justice Ynares-Santiago

We pieced the story of the alleged bribery from accounts of various sources within and outside the Supreme Court who have requested not to be named
because of their sensitive disclosures.
In March this year, Ynares-Santiago fired her staff member, Cecilia Delis, supposedly after the latter opened a gift-wrapped box delivered to their office,
thinking that it contained perishable items. Delis, however, found wads of peso bills instead. The amount, two sources say, is estimated at P10 million.[14]
Later that morning, Mme. Justice Ynares-Santiago called ACA Marquez to her office and gave him copies of her written statement categorically deny(ing)
the accusations and insinuations, all malicious and unfounded, published in Malaya and in Newsbreak; and underscoring that these are blatant lies clearly
aimed at smearing and maligning my character and person, and the integrity of the Judiciary which (she has) been faithfully serving for 34 years now. [15]
Mme. Justice Ynares-Santiago also gave ACA Marquez copies of Delis letter to respondent Macasaet and her affidavit, which Delis herself had brought to
Mme. Justice Ynares-Santiago earlier that morning.[16]

In the afternoon of September 24, 2007, ACA Marquez held a press conference and released to the media copies of Delis letter to respondent Macasaet, her
affidavit, and the written statement of Mme. Justice Santiago.[17]

On September 25, 2007, the Court En Banc issued a resolution stating

Upon evaluation of the columns Business Circuit of Amado P. Macasaet in the , 20, and 21, 2007 issues of the Malaya, it appears that certain statements
and innuendoes therein tend, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice, within the purview of Section 3(d), Rule 71
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
WHEREFORE, Amado P. Macasaet is ORDERED to EXPLAIN why no sanction should be imposed on him for indirect contempt of court in accordance
with Section 3(d), (Rule 71) of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, within five (5) days from receipt hereof. Ynares-Santiago, J., no part.[18]
The following day, September 26, 2007, Newsbreak posted its on-line article entitled Supreme Court Orders Malaya Publisher to Explain Stories with a
banner headline, This is not meant to chill the media.

On October 16, 2007, the Court En Banc noted respondent Macasaets Explanation dated October 1, 2007,[19] and directed the Clerk of Court to include
in the records of the case the affidavit of Delis dated September 24, 2007. The High Court also created an investigating committee composed of retired
Supreme Court justices, namely, Justice Carolina Grio-Aquino as Chairperson; and Justices Vicente V. Mendoza and Romeo J. Callejo, Sr., as members, to
receive the evidence from all parties concerned. The Committee may, on its own, call such persons who can shed light on the matter. It shall be endowed
with all the powers necessary to discharge its duty. The Committee was likewise directed to submit its report and recommendation within thirty (30) days
from the start of its hearing.[20] Retired Justices Mendoza and Callejo, however, both begged off and were eventually replaced by retired Supreme Court
Justices Jose C. Vitug[21] and Justo P. Torres.[22]

The Investigation

From October 30, 2007 to March 10, 2008, the Investigating Committee held hearings and gathered affidavits and testimonies from the parties concerned.

The Committee invited respondent Macasaet, Daguilan-Vitug, Delis, and ACA Marquez to a preliminary meeting, in which they were requested to submit
their respective affidavits which served as their testimonies on direct examination.[23] They were then later cross-examined on various dates: respondent
Macasaet on January 10, 2008, Daguilan-Vitug on January 17, 2008, Delis on January 24, 2008, and ACA Marquez on January 28, 2008. The Chief of the
Security Services and the Cashier of the High Court likewise testified on January 22 and 24, 2008, respectively.

According to the Committee

AMADO P. MACASAET testified on but, as expected, he invoked his right under R.A. No. 53, as amended by R.A. No. 1477 to refuse to disclose the
source/s of his story regarding the rumored bribery of a Lady Justice (later identified as Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago) of a high court (later revealed
as the Supreme Court) who allegedly received Php 10 million contained in a gift-wrapped Carnation carton box (later changed to five [5] gift-wrapped
boxes), for deciding a criminal case in favor of a rich Chinese-Filipino businessman. (Pls. see columns of September 18 and 19, 2007)
The pay-off was allegedly discovered when Cecilia Muoz-Delis (not the Lady Justices secretary but a judicial staff officer V of the PET or Presidential
Electoral Tribunal) who is a niece and namesake of retired Supreme Court Justice Cecilia Muoz Palma, allegedly opened the last box (according to his
column of titled Wrong date same facts); but the first (according to his testimony on , pp. 71, 89, 92, 125, tsn).
By his own conclusion, the boxes of money were delivered on different dates because I dont think a bribe giver will deliver five boxes at the same time
(87, tsn, ).
Macasaet testified that his source is not a relative of his, nor a government employee, certainly not an employee of the judiciary, and, that he (Macasaet)
has known him for some 10 to 15 years (12-20, tsn, ).
Significantly, in his column of , Macasaet revealed that he did not have only one source, but several sources, i.e., some lawyers, who told him that the bribe
money given to a lady justice came from a Chinese-Filipino businessman who has been criminally charged.
He emphatically declared on the witness chair that he trusts his source with my heart and soul and believes his word as coming straight out of the Bible
(94, 113, tsn, ; 14, tsn, ). But because this source did not have direct knowledge of the bribery (26, tsn, ), he allegedly tried to verify from other sources the
information he had received, but I could not get confirmation (29, tsn, ).
Notwithstanding the lack of confirmation and the paucity of details as to the identity of the Lady Justice and of the High Court where she sits, Macasaet
believes that the bribery had actually taken place because I trust my source with my heart and soul (93-94, 113, tsn, ).
He decided to go ahead and publish the story because he thought that eventually my effort at consistently x x x exposing the alleged bribery, one day
sooner or later somebody will come up and admit or deny (it). And I think that (was) what really happened (29, tsn, ).
He found out that the Lady Justice involved is Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago of the Supreme Court, after he received a letter dated from Cecilia Muoz-
Delis, the Cecilia mentioned in his columns, denying any knowledge of the alleged bribery or boxes of money for she had already resigned (not
dismissed) from the Court on , six (6) months before the alleged bribery supposedly occurred a week before Macasaet wrote about it in his column of .
(Annex A, Letter dated of Cecilia Delis to Macasaet)
So, when did the bribery happen? The date was never made certain, for in his first column of , Macasaet stated that the gift-wrapped box of money was
delivered to the office of the Lady Justice, a day last week when the Lady Justice did not report for work. That must have been sometime on the week
before .
However, the next day, , he wrote in his column that the delivery of five boxes (not just one box) of money, coincided on the day that the Lady Justice,
acting as ponente, dismissed the criminal case against Chinese-Filipino businessman Henry T. Go in the Sandiganbayan. That must be because the
Resolution in G.R. No. 172602 Henry T. Go versus The Fifth Division, Sandiganbayan, et al. was promulgated on that date. This he affirmed when he
testified on (46, 74, tsn, ).
However, when he returned to the witness chair on , after going back to his informant (on his own request) to ascertain the dates when the boxes of money
were delivered to the Office of Justice Santiago, so that the Investigating Committee could subpoena the relevant logbooks of the Security Services of the
Court to verify the truth of the alleged deliveries, Macasaet again changed his earlier testimonies on date/dates of the deliveries. He informed the
Committee that, according to his informant, the deliveries were made between November 2006 and March 2007; before Cecilia Delis resigned or was
dismissed from the Court.[24]
On March 11, 2008 the Investigating Committee submitted to the Office of the Chief Justice its March 10, 2008 Report and Recommendation, [25] with the
following findings of facts on the subject columns

The following statements in Macasaets columns appear to the Supreme Court to be innuendoes (that) tend, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct,
or degrade the administration of justice, within the purview of Section 3(d), Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
1) From the column of
The gift gives proof to the pernicious rumor that the courts are dirty. This time, the lady justice is with a
higher court.
The court is like a basket of apples. There (are) a few which are rotten. That makes the whole basket
rotten.
The names and reputation of highly-respected jurists must be saved from suspicion that they are thieves.
Her name should be known so that the Supreme Court can act swiftly on a clear case of bribery. Otherwise,
this case becomes one where the pot calls the kettle black. Or, is that the reason the employee would not talk,
that her former boss could spill the beans on her peers?
2) From the column of
The lady justice shamed her court. She should resign or be impeached. That is the only way the soiled
reputation of the could be restored.
3) From the column of
Cecilia x x x you have a duty to save the sagging reputation of the Supreme Court.
Inasmuch as Macasaets snide remarks about the courts, particularly the Highest Court, and about the justices
being suspected as thieves, appear to have [been] provoked by the rumored bribery in the Court, the
Investigating Committee was constrained to find out how true the accusations were and whether the columnist
had exercised due care and diligence in checking out the credibility of his informant and the veracity of the
derogatory information fed to him before he published it in his columns in the Malaya.[26]
Additional observations and conclusion were submitted, like the following

The Committee finds that neither Macasaets columns in Malaya, nor Ms. Vitugs story in Newsbreak, about the pay-off of Php 10 million to Justice
Consuelo Ynares-Santiago for rendering a Resolution favorable to Henry T. Go in his petition against the Sandiganbayan (according to Macasaet), or, a
decision favoring Barque against Manotok in a big land case (according to Ms. Vitug), have a leg to stand on. As Justice Vitug has observed during the
last hearing before the Committee, everything that has been heard thus far would appear to be hearsay. Ms. Vitug admitted there is no paper trail to
support the charge of bribery against Justice Santiago, for although her sources had pointed to Cecilia Muoz Delis as the root source of the story, the
information she received was second-hand or may be third-hand because none of her sources had talked with Delis herself (70, 72 tsn ). Delis had refused
to be interviewed by her, and had emphatically denied in her letter and affidavit any knowledge of the alleged bribery because she was no longer working
in the Court when it supposedly happened.
Macasaets sources likewise fed him double hearsay information from a source that refused to reveal the identity of the Lady Justice nor a high court but
alleged that the Php 10 million bribe was discovered by her secretary named Cecilia, a niece and namesake of the late Justice Cecilia Muoz Palma, who
was fired from her job on account of it.
The Committee observed that Macasaets story about the bribery and of Cecilias role in supposedly discovering it, is full of holes, inconsistencies, and
contradictions, indicating that he did not exercise due diligence, patience, and care in checking the veracity of the information fed to him, before
giving it publicity in his columns. Nor was he bothered by the damage that his columns would inflict on the reputation of a member of the Highest
Court and on the Court itself. In fact, he was happy that he wrote the columns (103 tsn ). Even if he failed to get confirmation of the bribery, one day
sooner or later, somebody would come up and admit or deny it. He did not care that he smeared the whole Judiciary to fish her out, because after she is
fished out, the suspicion on the rest would be removed (29-30 tsn ).[27] (Emphasis supplied)
The Committee likewise noted the inconsistencies and assumptions of Macasaet, betraying lack of veracity of the alleged bribery

1. For instance, he said that he could not get confirmation of the bribery story given to him by his source. Later, he said that his sources told me they had
personal knowledge but would not reveal the name of the Lady Justice (65, tsn, ).
2. His allegation that the Lady Justice (later identified as Justice Santiago) did not report for work last week, i.e., the week before his first column came out
on , was refuted by the Courts Public Information Officer () Atty. Midas Marquez, who testified that no Lady Justice was absent that week.
3. The date when the gift-wrapped box of money was allegedly opened by Cecilia is also uncertain because of Macasaets conflicting allegations about it.
Macasaets first column of , stated that it happened last week, i.e., sometime in the week of .
The next day, , he, however, wrote in his column that the five boxes (not one) of money were delivered on the day () when the Lady Justice, acting as
ponente, acquitted the accused Henry T. Go.
But again, because his story about Cecilias role in the discovery of the bribery in September 2007, was contradicted by the record of Cecilias resignation
from the Court on (Annexes D and D-1, Cecilia Delis Letter of Resignation & Clearance), Macasaet, after consulting his source again, changed his story
when he testified on . He said that, according to his source, the boxes of money were delivered, not any one time in September 2007, but on different
dates in November 2006 up to March 2007, before Cecilia resigned or was fired from the office of Justice Santiago (5-6, tsn, ).
That allegation is, however, refuted by the logbooks of the Security Services for the period of November 2006 to March 2007 which contain no record of
the alleged deliveries of boxes of money to the office of Justice Santiago. Danilo Pablo, head of the Courts Security Services affirmed that in his ten (10)
years of service in the Court, he has not received any report of boxes of money being delivered to any of the Justices (45-46, tsn, ).[28]
The Committee further wondered which of the five (5) boxes was opened and yielded money. It found

1. x x x In his column of , Macasaet alleged that Cecilia picked up the five boxes of money several times in March (not last week as I mistakenly reported),
and she never opened the first four boxes x x x she opened the last and saw the money because the Lady Justice was absent on that day.
But when he testified before the Committee on , Macasaet alleged that it was the first one that was opened according to his source (71, 89, 92, 125, tsn, ).
2. Contradicting his published story that five (5) boxes of money were delivered on the day the Lady Justice acquitted Henry Go, Macasaet testified at the
investigation that they were delivered on different occasions according to my source (70, tsn, ).
But no sooner had he attributed that information to my source than he admitted that it was only my own conclusion x x x I assumed that the giver of the
money is not so stupid as to have them delivered all in one trip. As a matter of fact, I even wondered why said boxes were not delivered in the home of the
Lady Justice (72, tsn, ).
3. The amount of the bribe is also questionable. For while in his own column of , Macasaet stated that the gift was estimated at Php 10 million, he later
testified on that the amount was my own calculation because I talked to people, I said this kind of box how much money in One Thousand Pesos bills can
it hold, he told me it is ten (million). So that was a calculation (77, tsn, ).
He also merely assumed that the money was in one thousand pesos bills (78, tsn, ). No one really knows their denomination.
He said he was told that the size of the box where the money was placed was this milk called carnation in carton (79, tsn, ). But, at the final hearing on ,
he denied that said that, I never said carnation boxes; I said milk boxes that should make a lot of difference (84, tsn, ).
4. Since only one gift-wrapped box of money was opened, Macasaet admitted that he has no knowledge of whether the four (4) other boxes were also
opened, when and where they were opened, and by whom they were opened (90, tsn, ). Therefore, no one knows whether they also contained money.
That the five (5) boxes contained a total of ten million pesos, is just another assumption of Macasaets. It is a calculation based on estimates obtained from
friends and how much five boxes can hold in one thousand peso bills, more or less ten million, he explained (91, tsn, ).
The sin of assumption which is a cardinal sin in Newsbreaks Guide to Ethical Journalistic Conduct was repeatedly committed by Macasaet in writing his
story about the bribery of a Lady Justice of the Supreme Court. (Annex E, page 1, Newsbreak Guide to Ethical Journalistic Conduct).[29]
Consequently, the Committee concluded

In view of its tenuous underpinnings, we find the bribery story in Macasaets columns of , and in Ms. Vitugs Newsbreak issue of , unbelievable. Why
should five boxes supposedly containing a total of Php 10 million as bribe money be delivered to the office of a Lady Justice in the Supreme Court, where
it would have to pass examination by the security guards and the quizzical eyes of her own employees? Why not to her home? Or at some agreed meeting
place outside the Court and her home? Or why not quietly deposit it in her bank account? And why was she absent from her office on the day of the
presumably agreed date for the payment of the bribe? If the bribe was for dismissing the information against Henry Go in the Sandiganbayan, why was it
paid prematurely in November 2006-March 2007 when the case of Henry Go was still up in the air and, in fact, was decided against him on ? The favorable
resolution on his motion for reconsideration, penned by Justice Santiago, was promulgated on , almost one year after the pay-off, if there was such a pay-
off?
xxxx
The Committee considers this case not just another event that should pass unnoticed for it has implications far beyond the allocated ramparts of free
speech. Needless to say, that while we espouse the enjoyment of freedom of expression by media, particularly, it behooves it to observe great
circumspection so as not to destroy reputations, integrity and character so dear to every individual, more so to a revered institution like the Supreme Court.
Everyone deserves respect and dignity.[30]
Finding sufficient basis to hold respondent Macasaet in indirect contempt of court, the Committee recommended

The Committee finds that the statements of respondent Amado P. Macasaet about the Supreme Court in his Business Circuit columns in the issues of the
newspaper Malaya, maligning and degrading the Supreme Court and tending directly or indirectly to impede, obstruct, or degrade the
administration of justice, to be utterly unjustified.
WHEREFORE, the Committee believes there exist valid grounds for this Honorable Court, if it is so minded, to cite Amado P. Macasaet for indirect
contempt within the purview of Section 3(d), Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.[31] (Emphasis supplied)
Our Ruling

IN view of respondents invocation of his right to press freedom as a defense, it is essential to first examine the nature and evolution of this preferred
liberty, together with the countervailing interest of judicial independence, which includes the right to due process of law, the right to a fair trial, and the
preservation of public confidence in the courts for the proper administration of justice.

Nature and History of Press Freedom

Freedom of expression, which includes freedom of speech and of the press, is one of the hallmarks of a democratic society. It has been recognized as such
for centuries.

The history of press freedom dates back to the English Magna Carta, promulgated in 1215, which established the principle that not even the lawmaker
should be above the law. Through the years, many treatises on press freedom arose in reaction to various measures taken to curtail it.

In the 17th Century, John Milton wrote Areopagitica, a philosophical defense of the right to free speech. It was a reaction to the Licensing Order of June
14, 1643, which declared that no book, pamphlet, paper, nor part of any such book, pamphlet, or paper, shall from henceforth be printed, bound, stitched or
put to sale by any person or persons whatsoever, unless the same be first approved of and licensed under the hands of such person or persons as both, or
either of the said Houses shall appoint for the licensing of the same. Milton advocated that a written work should not be suppressed before publication.
Writers of treacherous, slanderous, or blasphemous materials should first be tried according to law. Only after it has been established that their writings are
of a treacherous, slanderous, or blasphemous nature should they be subsequently punished for their wrongful acts.

Sir William Blackstone, 19th Century English jurist, in his still widely cited historical and analytical treatise on English common law, aptly described the
twin aspects of press freedom:

x x x Every freeman has an undoubted right to lay what sentiments he pleases before the public: to forbid this is to destroy the freedom of the press: but if
he publishes what is improper, mischievous, or illegal, he must take the consequences of his own temerity. To subject the press to the restrictive power of a
licenser, as was formerly done, both before and since the Revolution, is to subject all freedom of sentiment to the prejudices of one man, and make him the
arbitrary and infallible judge of all controverted points in learning, religion and government. But to punish as the law does at present any dangerous or
offensive writings, which, when published, shall on a fair and impartial trial be adjudged of a pernicious tendency, is necessary for the preservation of
peace and good order, of government and religion, the only solid foundations of civil liberty. Thus, the will of individuals is still left free: the abuse only of
that free will is the object of legal punishment. Neither is any restraint hereby laid upon freedom of thought or inquiry: liberty of private sentiment is still
left; the disseminating, or making public, of bad sentiments destructive to the ends of society, is the crime which society corrects.[32] (Emphasis supplied)
In the United States, press freedom was first put into organic law with the First Amendment to its Constitution, declaring that Congress shall make no law x
x x abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press. This set in stone the basis for virtually all contemporary laws and jurisprudence on the subject of press
freedom.

Our Constitutions and jurisprudence are no different. Section 4, Article III, 1987 Constitution, which in part provides that [n]o law shall be passed
abridging the freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press x x x x, is a provision found in the 1935 and the 1973 Constitutions.[33]

Media and Its Multiplying Roles in Democracy

Due to their preferred position in the hierarchy of civil liberties, the freedoms of speech, of expression, and of the press have progressed dramatically. As
early as 1942, even before the advent of television, the distinguished U.S. appellate court Judge Learned Hand had already observed that [t]he hand that
rules the press, the radio, the screen, and the far-spread magazine, rules the country. He concluded that medias power was an unchangeable fact of life:
Whether we like or not, we must learn to accept it. There is much truth today in those statements.

One of the notable features of recent years is the accelerated development of the media. They have grown from strength to strength, and have substantially
influenced people, either favorably or unfavorably, towards those in government. The use of information technology has firmed up the media networks
hold on power. Traditional media for mass communication newspapers, magazines, radio, and standard television have been joined by satellite and cable
television, electronic mail, short messaging and multi-media service, and the internet, giving rise to new opportunities for electronic news and information
companies to even intensify their influence over the general public.

Studies show that people rely heavily on the media for their knowledge of events in the world and for impressions that form the basis for their own
judgments. The media exert a strong influence on what people think and feel. Certainly, the power of Philippine media is of no small measure

The power of the press to influence politics is proven. Policy issues and the implementation of government programs requiring greater public discussion
are sometimes displaced in the government agenda by matters that have been given more importance in the news. Public officials are obliged to attend to
media queries even if these are not necessarily the most important questions of the day. Nowhere in are government officials so accessible to the press.
Cabinet ministers are available from the earliest hours to answer questions from radio show hosts on the news of the day involving their responsibilities.
Furthermore, television news programs have spawned media celebrities whose popularity with the masses has catapulted their entry into politics. Medias
focus on celebrity has infected the political culture with exaggerated concern for personality and color, and the kind of impact associated with sports and
entertainment. Political parties have tended to recruit popular figures from these fields to assure they have winners in the race for seats in Congress.[34]
The reach of Philippine media is quite extensive

In the radio has the biggest audience among all the mass media (85 percent), followed by television at 74 percent, and print, 32 percent. Print, however, has
an 82 percent reach in Metropolitan Manila, which has a population of some 10 million and is the countrys business, political, and cultural center. Print
may thus be surmised to be as influential in the capital as television, which has a reach of 96 percent among residents.[35]
The mass media in a free society uphold the democratic way of life. They provide citizens with relevant information to help them make informed decisions
about public issues affecting their lives. Affirming the right of the public to know, they serve as vehicles for the necessary exchange of ideas through fair
and open debate. As the Fourth Estate in our democracy, they vigorously exercise their independence and vigilantly guard against infringements. Over the
years, the Philippine media have earned the reputation of being the freest and liveliest in Asia.[36]

Members of Philippine media have assumed the role of a watchdog and have been protective and assertive of this role. They demand accountability of
government officials and agencies. They have been adversarial when they relate with any of the three branches of government. They uphold the citizens
right to know, and make public officials, including judges and justices, responsible for their deeds or misdeeds. Through their watchdog function, the media
motivate the public to be vigilant in exercising the citizens right to an effective, efficient and corrupt-free government.

Open Justice and Judicial Independence

Closely linked with the right to freedom of speech and of the press is the public right to scrutinize and criticize government. The freedom to question the
government has been a protected right of long-standing tradition throughout American history. There is no doubt that the fundamental freedom to criticize
government necessarily includes the right to criticize the courts, their proceedings and decisions. Since the drafting of their Constitution over 200 years
ago, American judges have anticipated and sometimes even encouraged public scrutiny of themselves, if not of the judiciary as a whole.[37]

This open justice principle, which is as fundamental to a democratic society as freedom of speech, has been an accepted doctrine in several jurisdictions. It
is justified on the ground that if the determination of justice cannot be hidden from the public, this will provide: (1) a safeguard against judicial
arbitrariness or idiosyncrasy, and (2) the maintenance of the publics confidence in the administration of justice.[38]

While most agree that the right to criticize the judiciary is critical to maintaining a free and democratic society, there is also a general consensus that
healthy criticism only goes so far.[39] Many types of criticism leveled at the judiciary cross the line to become harmful and irresponsible attacks. These
potentially devastating attacks and unjust criticism can threaten the independence of the judiciary.

The debate over the independence of the judiciary is nothing new. More than 200 years ago, the Founding Fathers of the American Constitution engaged in
heated arguments, both before and after the Constitutional Convention, focusing on the extent and nature of the judiciarys role in the newly-formed
government.[40] The signers of the Declaration of Independence, well aware of the oppressive results of the unchecked political power of the King of
England who established absolute tyranny over American colonies, recognized the importance of creating a stable system of justice to protect the people.

Cognizant of the need to create a system of checks and balances to ensure that the rule of law shall rule, the resulting Constitution provided for a three-
tiered system of government, so structured that no branch holds limitless power.

The judicial branch is described as the least dangerous branch of government.[41] But it holds a special place in the tripartite system, as it is primarily
responsible for protecting basic human liberties from government encroachment. It completes the nations system of checks and balances. It serves as an
arbiter of disputes between factions and instruments of government.

In our constitutional scheme and democracy, our courts of justice are vested with judicial power, which includes the duty x x x to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government. [42] The present judicial system allows the people to rely upon
our courts with substantial certainty; it encourages the resolution of disputes in courtrooms rather than on the streets.

To accomplish these tasks, an independent judiciary is very vital. Judicial independence is the backbone of democracy. It is essential not only to the
preservation of our justice system, but of government as well. Chief Justice Shirley Abrahamson of the Wisconsin Supreme Court has observed that
judicial independence encompasses two distinct but related concepts of independence.[43]

One concept is individual judicial independence, which focuses on each particular judge and seeks to insure his or her ability to decide cases with
autonomy within the constraints of the law. A judge has this kind of independence when he can do his job without having to hear or at least without having
to take it seriously if he does hear criticisms of his personal morality and fitness for judicial office. The second concept is institutional judicial
independence. It focuses on the independence of the judiciary as a branch of government and protects judges as a class.

A truly independent judiciary is possible only when both concepts of independence are preserved - wherein public confidence in the competence and
integrity of the judiciary is maintained, and the public accepts the legitimacy of judicial authority. An erosion of this confidence threatens the maintenance
of an independent Third Estate.

For sure, judicial criticism can be constructive, uncovering and addressing a problem that merits public attention. Public awareness, debate, and criticism
of the courts ensure that people are informed of what they are doing that have broad implications for all citizens. Informed discussion, comment, debate
and disagreement from lawyers, academics, and public officials have been hallmarks of a great legal tradition and have played a vital role in shaping the
law.

But there is an important line between legitimate criticism and illegitimate attack upon the courts or their judges. Attacks upon the court or a judge not only
risk the inhibition of all judges as they conscientiously endeavor to discharge their constitutional responsibilities; they also undermine the peoples
confidence in the courts.

Personal attacks, criticisms laden with political threats, those that misrepresent and distort the nature and context of judicial decisions, those that are
misleading or without factual or legal basis, and those that blame the judges for the ills of society, damage the integrity of the judiciary and threaten the
doctrine of judicial independence. These attacks do a grave disservice to the principle of an independent judiciary and mislead the public as to the role of
judges in a constitutional democracy, shaking the very foundation of our democratic government.

Such attacks on the judiciary can result in two distinct yet related undesirable consequences.[44] First, the criticism will prevent judges from remaining
insulated from the personal and political consequences of making an unpopular decision, thus placing judicial independence at risk. Second, unjust
criticism of the judiciary will erode the publics trust and confidence in the judiciary as an institution. Both judicial independence and the publics trust and
confidence in the judiciary as an institution are vital components in maintaining a healthy democracy.

Accordingly, it has been consistently held that, while freedom of speech, of expression, and of the press are at the core of civil liberties and have to be
protected at all costs for the sake of democracy, these freedoms are not absolute. For, if left unbridled, they have the tendency to be abused and can
translate to licenses, which could lead to disorder and anarchy.

Thus, in Gonzales v. Commission on Elections,[45] this Court ruled that [f]rom the language of the specific constitutional provision, it would appear that
the right (to free expression) is not susceptible of any limitation. No law may be passed abridging the freedom of speech and of the press. The realities of
life in a complex society preclude, however, a literal interpretation. Freedom of expression is not absolute. It would be too much to insist that, at all times
and under all circumstances, it should remain unfettered and unrestrained. There are other societal values that press for recognition.[46]

In Lagunzad v. Vda. De Gonzales,[47] it was held that while the right of freedom of expression occupies a preferred position in the hierarchy of civil
liberties, it is not without limitations. As the revered Holmes once said, the limitation on ones right to extend ones fist is when it hits the nose of another.

Indeed, freedom of speech cannot be absolute and unconditional. In legal, political, and philosophical contexts, it is always regarded as liable to be
overridden by important countervailing interests, such as state security, public order, safety of individual citizens, protection of reputation, and due process
of law, which encompasses not only the right to a fair trial, but also the preservation of public confidence in the proper administration of justice.

As early as 1930, this Court, speaking through Mr. Justice George Malcolm, declared that [a]s important as is the maintenance of an unmuzzled press and
the free exercise of the rights of the citizen is the maintenance of the independence of the judiciary.[48]

In Zaldivar v. Gonzalez,[49] the Court said that freedom of speech and expression, like all constitutional freedoms, is not absolute and that freedom of
expression needs on occasion to be adjusted to and accommodated with requirements of equally important public interests. One of these fundamental
public interests is the maintenance of the integrity and orderly functioning of the administration of justice. There is no antinomy between free expression
and the integrity of the system of administering justice. For the protection and maintenance of freedom of expression itself can be secured only within the
context of a functioning and orderly system of dispensing justice, within the context, in other words, of viable independent institutions for delivery of
justice which are accepted by the general community.

As Mr. Justice Felix Frankfurter put it:

x x x A free press is not to be preferred to an independent judiciary, nor an independent judiciary to a free press. Neither has primacy over the other; both
are indispensable to a free society.
The freedom of the press in itself presupposes an independent judiciary through which that freedom may, if necessary, be vindicated. And one of the potent
means for assuring judges their independence is a free press.[50]
Even the major international and regional human rights instruments of civil and political rights the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR),[51] the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR),[52] the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR),[53] and the African Charter
on Human and Peoples Rights (ACHPR)[54] protect both freedom of expression and the administration of justice. Freedom of expression is protected
under Article 19 of the ICCPR

(1) Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference.
(2) Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds,
regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice.
However, Article 19 of the ICCPR is made subject to Article 14(1), which guarantees the right of individuals to be equal before the courts and tribunals and
be entitled to a fair x x x hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal, where [t]he press and the public may be excluded from all or part of a
trial for reasons of morals, public order (order public) or national security in a democratic society, or when the interest of the private lives of the Parties so
requires, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice x x x.

Article 10(2) of the ECHR goes further by explicitly mentioning the maintenance of the authority and impartiality of the judiciary

The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as
are prescribed by law and necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of
disorder or crime, for the protection of health morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing disclosure of information
received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary. (Emphasis supplied)
Judges have an affirmative duty to defend and uphold the integrity and independence of the judiciary. The courts need to be able to sanction those who
obstruct their processes. The judiciary itself must continue to be a voice that explains and preserves its own independence. The respect accorded to judges
is an adjunct of the social-contract necessity for impartial judges in the creation of a civil society. In the words of the great political philosopher John Locke

The great and chief end, therefore, for mens uniting into commonwealths, and putting themselves under government, is the preservation of their property,
to which in the state of nature there are many things wanting x x x there wants an established, settled, known law x x x there wants a known and
indifferent judge, with authority to determine all differences according to the established law x x x there often wants power to back and support the
sentence when right, and to give it due execution.[55] (Emphasis supplied)
A Survey of Philippine Jurisprudence

The very first case decided by the Supreme Court, In the matter of the proceedings against Marcelino Aguas for contempt of the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga,[56] was a contempt proceeding. Before, as it is now, this Court had to use this power to impress upon contemnors the legal theory and
constitutional premises of judicial legitimacy complementing popular sovereignty and public interest. Writing for the Court, Mr. Justice James Smith stated
that contempt proceedings against a contemnor were against someone who had done an act or was about to do such act which was disrespectful to the court
or offensive to its dignity.[57]

Through the years, the Court has punished contemnors for a variety of offenses that have attempted to degrade its dignity and impeded the administration
of justice.

In 1916, Amzi B. Kelly was fined P1,000 and sentenced to six months in prison for contempt of court after he published a letter to the editor of The
Independent criticizing the Court for its decision to hold him in contempt for having published a book stating that various government officials, including
the members of the Supreme Court, were guilty of politically assassinating General Mariano Noriel, who was executed for the killing of a political rival in
1915.[58]

In 1949, Atty. Vicente Sotto was fined P1,000.00 for publishing a statement in the Manila Times objecting to one of the High Courts decisions, citing that
such decision by the majority was but another evidence of the incompetency or narrow-mindedness of the majority of its members and called for the
resignation of the Courts entire membership in the wake of so many mindedness of the majority deliberately committed during these last years.[59]

In 1987, Eva Maravilla-Ilustre,[60] in almost identical letters dated October 20, 1986 sent to four (4) Justices of the Supreme Court (all members of the
First Division), stated among others

It is important to call your attention to the dismissal of (case cited) by an untenable minute-resolution x x x which we consider as an unjust resolution
deliberately and knowingly promulgated by the First Division of the Supreme Court of which you are a member.
We consider the three minute-resolutions x x x railroaded with such hurry/promptitude unequalled in the entire history of the SC under circumstances that
have gone beyond the limits of legal and judicial ethics.
There is nothing final in this world. We assure you that this case is far from finished by a long shot. For at the proper time, we shall so act and bring this
case before another forum where the members of the Court can no longer deny action with minute resolutions that are not only unjust but are knowingly
and deliberately promulgated x x x.

Please understand that we are pursuing further remedies in our quest for justice under the law. We intend to hold responsible members of the First Division
who participated in the promulgation of these three minute-resolutions in question x x x.
In our quest for justice, we wish to avoid having injustice to anyone, particularly the members of the First Division, providing that they had no hand in the
promulgation of the resolution in question. x x x If, however, we do not hear from you after a week, then we will consider your silence that you supported
the dismissal of our petition. We will then be guided accordingly.[61]
The letter to one of the Justices further stated

We leave the next move to you by informing us your participation x x x. Please do not take this matter lightly. x x x The moment we take action in the
plans we are completing, we will then call a press conference with TV and radio coverage. Arrangements in this regard are being done. The people should
or ought to know why we were thwarted in our quest for plain justice.[62]
These letters were referred by the First Division en consulta to the Court en banc.

True to her threats, after having lost her case before the Supreme Court, Ilustre filed on December 16, 1986 an affidavit-complaint before the Tanodbayan,
charging, among others, some Justices of both the Supreme Court and the CA with knowingly and deliberately rendering unjust resolutions.

On January 29, 1987, the Supreme Court en banc required Ilustre to show cause why she should not be held in contempt for her foregoing statements,
conduct, acts, and charges against the Supreme Court and/or official actions of the justices concerned which, unless satisfactorily explained, transcended
the permissible bounds of propriety and undermined and degraded the administration of justice.

In her answer, Ilustre contended, inter alia, that she had no intention to affront the honor and dignity of the Court; that the letters to the individual justices
were private in character; that the Court was estopped, having failed to immediately take disciplinary proceedings against her; and that the citation for
contempt was a vindictive reprisal against her.

The Supreme Court found her explanation unsatisfactory. The claim of lack of evil intention was disbelieved in the face of attendant circumstances.
Reliance on the privacy of communication was likewise held as misplaced. Letters addressed to individual Justices in connection with the performance of
their judicial functions become part of the judicial records and are a matter of public concern for the entire Court. (Underscoring supplied)

The Court likewise stated that it was only in the exercise of forbearance that it refrained from immediately issuing a show-cause order, expecting that she
and her lawyer would realize the unjustness and unfairness of their accusations. Neither was there any vindictive reprisal involved. The Courts authority
and duty under the premises is unmistakable. It must act to preserve its honor and dignity from the scurrilous attacks of an irate lawyer, mouthed by his
client, and to safeguard the morals and ethics of the legal profession.

In resum, the Court found that Ilustre had transcended the permissible bounds of fair comment and criticism to the detriment of the orderly administration
of justice: (a) in her letters addressed to the individual Justices, quoted in the show-cause Resolution, particularly the underlined portions thereof; (b) in the
language of the charges she filed before the Tanodbayan quoted in the same Resolution; (c) in her statement, conduct, acts, and charges against the
Supreme Court and/or official actions of the Justices concerned and her description of improper motives; and (d) in her unjustified outburst that she could
no longer expect justice from the Court.

The fact that said letter was not technically considered pleadings nor the fact that they were submitted after the main petition had been finally resolved does
not detract from the gravity of the contempt committed. The constitutional right of freedom of speech or right to privacy cannot be used as a shield for
contemptuous acts against the Court.[63]
Ilustre was fined P1,000.00 for contempt, evidently considered as indirect, taking into account the penalty imposed and the fact that the proceedings taken
were not summary in nature.

In Perkins v. Director of Prisons,[64] the Court had an occasion to examine the fundamental foundations of the power to punish for contempt: The power
to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts; its existence is essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings and to the enforcement of
judgments, orders, and mandates of the courts, and, consequently, to the due administration of justice.[65]

The Court there held that the exercise of this power is as old as the English history itself, and has always been regarded as a necessary incident and
attribute of courts. Being a common-law power, inherent in all courts, the moment the courts of the United States were called into existence they became
vested with it. It is a power coming to us from the common law, and, so far as we know, has been universally admitted and recognized.[66]

After World War II, this Court reiterated it had an inherent power to punish for contempt, to control in the furtherance of justice the conduct of ministerial
officers of the Court including lawyers and all other persons connected in any manner with a case before the Court.[67] This power to punish for contempt
is necessary for its own protection against improper interference with the due administration of justice x x x. It is not dependent upon the complaint of any
of the parties-litigant.[68] These twin principles were to be succinctly cited in the later case of Zaldivar v. Gonzales.[69]

Of course, the power to punish for contempt is exercised on the preservative principle. There must be caution and hesitancy on the part of the judge
whenever the possible exercise of his awesome prerogative presents itself. The power to punish for contempt, as was pointed out by Mr. Justice Malcolm in
Villavicencio v. Lukban,[70] should be exercised on the preservative and not on the vindictive principle. Only occasionally should the court invoke its
inherent power to retain that respect without which the administration of justice must falter or fail. But when called for, most especially when needed to
preserve the very existence and integrity of no less than the Highest Court, this principle bears importance.

In the 1995 case People v. Godoy,[71] the Court, citing In Re: Vicente Sotto,[72] had the opportunity to define the relations of the courts and of the press.
Quoting the statements made by Judge Holmes in U.S. v. Sullen,[73] the Court said:

The administration of justice and the freedom of the press, though separate and distinct, are equally sacred, and neither should be violated by the other. The
press and the courts have correlative rights and duties and should cooperate to uphold the principles of the Constitution and laws, from which the former
receives its prerogative and the latter its jurisdiction. x x x In a clear case where it is necessary in order to dispose of judicial business unhampered by
publications which reasonably tend to impair the impartiality of verdicts, or otherwise obstruct the administration of justice, the Court will not
hesitate to exercise undoubted power to punish for contempt. This Court must be permitted to proceed with the disposition of its business in an orderly
manner free from outside interference obstructive of its constitutional functions. This right will be insisted upon as vital to an impartial court, and, as a last
resort, as an individual exercises the right of self-defense, it will act to preserve its existence as an unprejudiced tribunal.[74] (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, while the Court in Godoy agreed that our Constitution and our laws recognize the First Amendment rights of freedom of speech and of the press,
these two constitutional guaranties must not be confused with an abuse of such liberties. Quoting Godoy further

Obstructing, by means of the spoken or written word, the administration of justice by the courts has been described as an abuse of the liberty of the speech
or the press such as will subject the abuser to punishment for contempt of court.[75]
Finally, in the more recent 2007 case Roxas v. Zuzuarregui,[76] the Court en banc in a unanimous per curiam resolution imposed a P30,000 fine on Atty.
Romeo Roxas for making unfair and unfounded accusations against a member of this Court, and mocking the Court for allegedly being part of the
wrongdoing and being a dispenser of injustice. We found the letter of Atty. Roxas full of contemptuous remarks that tended to degrade the dignity of the
Court and erode public confidence that should be accorded to it. We also said that his invocation of free speech and privacy of communication will not,
however, free him from liability. As already stated, his letter contained defamatory statements that impaired public confidence in the integrity of the
judiciary. The making of contemptuous statements directed against the Court is not an exercise of free speech; rather, it is an abuse of such right.
Unwarranted attacks on the dignity of the courts cannot be disguised as free speech, for the exercise of said right cannot be used to impair the
independence and efficiency of courts or public respect therefore and confidence therein. Free expression must not be used as a vehicle to satisfy ones
irrational obsession to demean, ridicule, degrade and even destroy this Court and its magistrates. Accordingly, Atty. Roxas was found guilty of indirect
contempt of court and fined P30,000.00, with a warning that a repetition of a similar act would warrant a more severe penalty.

Application of Existing Jurisprudence to the Case at Bar

In determining the liability of the respondent in this contempt proceeding, we weigh the conflicting constitutional considerations respondents claim of his
right to press freedom, on one hand; and, on the other hand, ensuring judicial independence by upholding public interest in maintaining the dignity of the
judiciary and the orderly administration of justice both indispensable to the preservation of democracy and the maintenance of a just society.

The apparently conflicting constitutional considerations summed up by a distinguished former Judge of the Supreme Court of India, Justice H.R. Khanna,
bears a hand in resolving the issue

There are one or two matters to which I would like to make pointed reference in the context of the freedom of the press. One of them relates to the danger
of trial by the press. Certain aspects of a case are so much highlighted by the press that the publicity gives rise to strong public emotions. The inevitable
effect of that is to prejudice the case of one party or the other for a fair trial. We must consider the question as to what extent are restraints necessary and
have to be exercised by the press with a view to preserving the purity of judicial process. At the same time, we have to guard against another danger. A
person cannot x x x by starting some kind of judicial proceedings in respect of matter of vital public importance stifle all public discussions of that matter
on pain of contempt of court. A line to balance the whole thing has to be drawn at some point. It also seems necessary in exercising the power of contempt
of court x x x vis--vis the press that no hyper-sensitivity is shown and due account is taken of the proper functioning of a free press in a democratic society.
This is vital for ensuring the health of democracy. At the same time, the press must also keep in view its responsibility and see that nothing is done as may
bring the courts x x x into disrepute and make people lose faith in these institution(s). One other matter which must not be lost sight of is that while
comment is free, facts are sacred.[77]
We have no problems with legitimate criticisms pointing out flaws in our decisions, judicial reasoning, or even how we run our public offices or public
affairs. They should even be constructive and should pave the way for a more responsive, effective and efficient judiciary.

Unfortunately, the published articles of respondent Macasaet are not of this genre. On the contrary, he has crossed the line, as his are baseless scurrilous
attacks which demonstrate nothing but an abuse of press freedom. They leave no redeeming value in furtherance of freedom of the press. They do nothing
but damage the integrity of the High Court, undermine the faith and confidence of the people in the judiciary, and threaten the doctrine of judicial
independence.

A veteran journalist of many years and a president of a group of respectable media practitioners, respondent Macasaet has brilliantly sewn an incredible
tale, adorned it with some facts to make it lifelike, but impregnated it as well with insinuations and innuendoes, which, when digested entirely by an
unsuspecting soul, may make him throw up with seethe. Thus, he published his highly speculative articles that bribery occurred in the High Court, based on
specious information, without any regard for the injury such would cause to the reputation of the judiciary and the effective administration of justice. Nor
did he give any thought to the undue, irreparable damage such false accusations and thinly veiled allusions would have on a member of the Court.

The Investigating Committee could not have put it any better when it found respondent feigning his highest respect for this Court

Macasaets diatribes against the Court generate public distrust in the administration of Justice by the Supreme Court, instead of promoting respect for its
integrity and honor. They derogate his avowal of highest respect for this Court (10, tsn, ); his declaration that he has always upheld the majesty of the law
as interpreted by the Court (96, tsn, ); that his opinion of the Court has actually been elevated ten miles up because of its decisions in the cases involving
Proclamation No. 1017, the CPR, EO 464, and the Peoples Initiative (97, tsn, ); that he has done everything to preserve the integrity and majesty of the
Court and its jurists (84-85, tsn, ); that he wants the integrity of the Court preserved because this is the last bastion of democracy (32, tsn, ).
These tongue-in cheek protestations do not repair or erase the damage and injury that his contemptuous remarks about the Court and the Justices have
wrought upon the institutional integrity, dignity, and honor of the Supreme Court. As a matter of fact, nowhere in his columns do we find a single word of
respect for the Court or the integrity and honor of the Court. On the contrary, what we find are allegations of pernicious rumor that the courts are
dirty, suspicions that the jurists are thieves, that the Highest Court has a soiled reputation, and that the Supreme Court has a sagging reputation.
He admitted that the rumor about the courts being dirty referred specifically (to) the Supreme Court (100, tsn, ) and was based on personal conclusion
which (was), in turn, based on confidential information fed to me. It is in that respect that I thought that I have (a) duty to protect and keep the Honor of
this Court (98, tsn, ).
He unburdened his heretofore hidden anger, if not disgust, with the Court when he clarified that the word dirty x x x is not necessarily related to money
(101, tsn, ). It is my belief that lack of familiarity with the law is x x x kind of dirty referring to then Associate Justice Artemio Panganibans support for,
and Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr.s act of swearing into office then Vice-President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as Acting President of the Philippines even
while then President Joseph Estrada was still in Malacaang, which Macasaet believed to be quite a bit of dirt (102-106, tsn, ).[78]
To reiterate the words of the Committee, this case is not just another event that should pass unnoticed for it has implications far beyond the allocated
ramparts of free speech.[79] To allow respondent to use press freedom as an excuse to capriciously disparage the reputation of the Court and that of
innocent private individuals would be to make a mockery of this liberty.

Respondent has absolutely no basis to call the Supreme Court a court of thieves and a basket of rotten apples. These publications directly undermine the
integrity of the justices and render suspect the Supreme Court as an institution. Without bases for his publications, purely resorting to speculation and
fishing expeditions in the hope of striking or creating a story, with utter disregard for the institutional integrity of the Supreme Court, he has committed acts
that degrade and impede the orderly administration of justice.

We cannot close our eyes to the comprehensive Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Committee. It enumerated the inconsistencies
and assumptions of respondent which lacked veracity and showed the reckless disregard of whether the alleged bribery was false or not.[80]

Indeed, the confidential information allegedly received by respondent by which he swears with his heart and soul[81] was found by the Investigating
Committee unbelievable. It was a story that reeked of urban legend, as it generated more questions than answers.[82]

Respondent Macasaets wanton disregard for the truth was exhibited by his apathetic manner of verifying the veracity of the information he had gathered
for his September 18, 19, 20, and 21, 2007 articles concerning the alleged bribery of a Lady Justice. His bases for the amount of money, the number of
boxes, the date of delivery of the boxes, among other important details, were, by his own admission founded on personal assumptions. This nonchalant
attitude extended to his very testimony before the investigating committee

Justice Aquino: You did not endeavor to verify the information given by your
source before publishing the story about the bribery?
Mr. Macasaet: I tried, I could not get confirmation, I thought that eventually my
effort at consistently trying or exposing the alleged bribery one day sooner or later
somebody will come up and admit or deny.
xxxx
Justice Vitug: Do you confirm the fact of authorship of the columns of , 20, and 21,
2007?
Mr. Macasaet: On a stack of Bible, I confirm it.
Justice Vitug: Does that mean that you also confirm the accuracy of those
information that were said?
Mr. Macasaet: I am not confirming the accuracy of the information and I think that
is precisely the reason for this hearing, I must repeat that the purpose is to fish [the
Lady Justice] out so that the rest of the Lady Justices in all the Courts suspicion can
be removed from them. I failed in the sense that one denied, she felt alluded to and
said she is not involved.[83]
Respondent thus admits to having written his articles as means to fish out the Lady Justice involved in an alleged bribery fed to him by his source, with
reckless disregard of whether or not such bribery indeed took place. It defies reason why any responsible journalist would go on to publish any material in
a newspaper of general circulation without having ascertained even the five Ws and one H of the story.[84]

That he could not, through his extensive network of informants, confirm the approximate date when the alleged bribery took place, the identities of the
persons involved, or any other important detail, before he began his series of articles only leads to the rational conclusion that he did not care whether or
not the story he published was true. His aim, as he admits, was to go on a fishing expedition to see if someone would confirm or deny his now clearly
baseless accusations. This practice of fishing for information by publishing unverified information in a manner that leads the reading public to believe such
is true cannot be tolerated.

Aggravating respondents affront to the dignity of the Court is his unwillingness to show any remorse or repentance for his contemptuous acts. In fact, as he
made clear in his testimony before the Investigating Committee when asked what his thoughts were about his having published the instant articles, he
replied that he was happy in the sense that [he] did a job in [his] best lights and the effort ended up in the creation of [the investigating panel].[85]

However, such assertions of having acted in the best interest of the Judiciary are belied by the fact that he could have caused the creation of an
investigating panel to look into such allegations in a more rational and prudent manner. In the words of the Investigating Committee

If he had no malice toward the Court, if, as he professes, the purpose of his columns was to save the integrity and honor of the Court, Macasaet should, and
could, have reported the rumored bribery directly to the Chief Justice and asked for its investigation. He should have refrained from calling the Court
names, before giving it a chance to act on his report and on his suggestion to investigate the matter. Since he knew the name of the Court employee who
allegedly discovered the bribe money, the Court could have begun its investigation with her to ascertain the identity of the nameless Lady Justice and the
veracity of the rumored bribery. His disparaging remarks about the Court and jurists in conjunction with his unverified report on the alleged bribery were
totally uncalled for and unjustified.[86]
It is precisely because of his failure to abide by the tenets of responsible journalism that we accept the findings of the Investigating Committee in holding
respondent Macasaet guilty of indirect contempt of court. He must be made accountable for his complete failure to exercise even a single vestige of
responsible journalism in publishing his unfounded and ill-thought diatribes against the Judiciary and the honorable people who serve it.

Respondent also asserts that the subject matter of his articles is within the exclusive jurisdiction of Congress. He cites Section 2, Article XI of the 1987
Constitution which partly states that x x x members of the Supreme Court x x x may be removed from office, on impeachment for, and conviction of x x x
bribery x x x and Section 3(1), Article XI, which provides that [t]he House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power to initiate all case of
impeachment.

We cannot agree. What Macasaet conveniently forgets is that no impeachment complaint has been filed against Mme. Justice Ynares-Santiago. Thus, his
cited constitutional provisions do not come into play.

Respondent claims that there is a violation of his right to due process. From the time his articles were published, no formal charge has been filed against
him as required under Section 3, Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

Respondent fails to see, however, that under Section 4 of the same Rule, proceedings for indirect contempt may be initiated motu proprio by the court
against which the contempt was committed, by an order or any other formal charge requiring respondent to show why he should not be punished for
contempt. Our Resolution dated September 25, 2007 satisfies the Rule. He cannot validly claim that such resolution is vague. He cannot feign ignorance of
the contents of his September 18, 19, 20, and 21, 2007 articles in the Malaya.

Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure pertinently provides:

. 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing. After a charge in writing has been filed, and an opportunity given to the respondent to
comment thereon within such period as may be fixed by the court and to be heard by himself or counsel, a person guilty of any of the following acts may
be punished for indirect contempt.
xxxx
(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of
justice;
xxxx
. 7. Punishment for indirect contempt. If the respondent is adjudged guilty of indirect contempt committed against a Regional Trial Court or a court of
equivalent or higher rank, he may be punished by a fine not exceeding thirty thousand pesos or imprisonment not exceeding six (6) months, or both. x x x
(Underscoring supplied)
We are not unaware of the vigorous dissent of then Associate Justice, now our Chief Justice, Reynato S. Puno, in an earlier case, [87] in which he so lucidly
argued for the right to journalistic shield, behind which the Dissenting Opinion of an esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice Carpio, and respondent Macasaet,
take full refuge. While we hold his thesis in high regard, the case at bar does not fall within his erudite defense of press freedom. The critical issues then
were the right of newsmen to refuse subpoenas, summons, or invitations to appear in administrative investigations, and not to reveal their confidential
sources of information under R.A. No. 53, as amended. None of these are the issues at hand. Be that as it may, elementary decision-making teaches that we
cite the majority opinion as precedent, not lonely dissenting opinions.[88]

In his Dissenting Opinion, Mr. Justice Carpio assails the Committee proceedings as fatally defective for patent denial of due process[89] because when the
witnesses the Committee summoned testified, the Committee monopolized the right to propound questions to the witnesses, denying to Macasaet such
right.[90] He continues to say that [w]ith the procedure the Committee adopted, Macasaet was reduced to a passive participant, unable to subject the
testimonies of adverse witnesses to rigorous probing under cross-examination. As matters stand, Macasaet will be subjected to punitive sanctions based on
evidence he had no opportunity to scrutinize.[91]

We disagree on triple grounds.

First, the proceedings of the Committee are presumed to be regular. Thus, the onus probandi to prove otherwise rests on Macasaet, not on the Committee.
Suffice it to say that the Dissenting Opinion which cites People v. Godoy as to the criminal character of a contempt proceeding,[92] fails to state what
Godoy likewise instructs

Strictly speaking however, they are not criminal proceedings or prosecutions, even though the contemptuous act involved is also a crime. The proceeding
has been characterized as sui generis, partaking of some of the elements of both a civil and criminal proceeding, but really constituting neither. In general,
criminal contempt proceedings should be conducted in accordance with the principles and rules applicable to criminal cases, in so far as such procedure is
consistent with the summary nature of contempt proceedings. So it has been held that the strict rules that govern criminal prosecutions apply to a
prosecution for criminal contempt, that the accused is to be afforded many of the protections provided in regular criminal cases, and that proceedings under
statutes governing them are to be strictly construed. However, criminal proceedings are not required to take any particular form so long as the substantial
rights of the accused are preserved.[93]
Second, assuming arguendo that Macasaet was not able to cross-examine his witnesses, this does not necessarily mean that his right to due process of law
was violated.

The right of an accused to cross-examine the witnesses against him, although an adjunct of the Constitutional right to meet the witnesses face to face, [94]
can be waived when not timely asserted. In the case of Macasaet, never did he assert his right to cross-examine the witnesses against him despite the
opportunity to do so. During the entire course of the proceedings in the Committee, respondent was vigorously represented by counsel de parte.
Respondent or his counsel could have moved to cross-examine the adverse witnesses. Respondent had every opportunity to do so. Lamentably, he failed to
exercise the said right.

Interestingly, during the last hearing date, counsel for respondent requested that respondent be allowed to say something, which the Committee granted.
Respondent then proceeded with a lengthy discourse, all of 45 pages, on everything and anything, except his right to cross-examination. [95] Verily, it
cannot be validly claimed now that his right to cross-examine was violated.

Third, the Court is bereft of any power to invoke the right to cross-examine the witnesses against respondent, for and in his behalf. Otherwise, the Court
will be acting as his counsel, which is absurd.

Just a Word More

A free press is regarded as a key pillar of democracy. Reporters must be free to report, expose, and hold government officials and agencies including an
independent judiciary accountable. Press attention surrounding the judiciary ensures public accountability. Such publicity acts as a check on judicial
competence and integrity, exposes inefficiencies and irregularities, keeps vigil over various public interest cases, and puts pressure on responsible judicial
officials. This freedom has been used and has benefited the cause of justice. The press has become an important actor a judicial watchdog in the ongoing
judicial transformation. When properly validated, its acts are protected speech from an accepted function.

Freedom, however, has not guaranteed quality journalism. The press has been vulnerable to a host of legitimate criticisms such as incompetence,
commercialism, and even corruption. By disproportionately informing the public about specific court processes, or by spreading unsubstantiated
allegations about corruption and other forms of judicial misconduct, the press dramatically undermines the publics faith in the courts and threatens the very
foundation of our democratic government.

Oftentimes, journalists writing about the judiciary and court cases lack basic knowledge of the law and judicial procedures, on the basis of which they draw
faulty conclusions which they pass on to their readers as gospel truths. Trial by publicity also influences the independence of judges as the public is fed
with partial information and vocal opinions, and judges are pressured to decide in accordance with the public opinion. Faith in the judiciary is undermined
when judges rule against the expectations of the public which has been brainwashed by dramatic reports and graphic comments. In some cases, unchecked
rumors or allegations of irregularities are immediately published because journalists lack professional competence to verify the information, or are simply
eager to break the news and attract a wider readership.

The role of the press in relation to the judiciary needs to be regulated. This can be done through voluntary codes of conduct on the part of the press and
through judicial policies, such as the rule on sub judice and contempt of court rulings. The absence of clear voluntary codes developed by the press, as its
self-regulator, strengthens the need for the Court to use its power in the meantime to cite critics for contempt. This is necessary in cases where such
criticism is obviously malicious or in violation of the sub judice rule, or where there is an evident attempt to influence the outcome of a case. Judges have
the duty to defend and uphold the integrity and independence of the judiciary. They should sanction those who obstruct or impede the judicial processes.
The effective administration of justice may only be realized with the strong faith and confidence of the public in the competence and integrity of the
judiciary, free from political and popular pressure.

Criticism at every level of government is certainly welcome. After all, it is an essential part of the checks and balances in our republican system of
government. However, criticisms should not impede or obstruct an integral component of our republican institutions from discharging its constitutionally-
mandated duties.

As the Court said in In Re: Almacen:[96]

Courts and judges are not sacrosanct. They should and expect critical evaluation of their performance. For like the executive and the legislative branches,
the judiciary is rooted in the soil of democratic society, nourished by the periodic appraisal of the citizen whom it is expected to serve.
xxxx
But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm
exists between fair criticism, on the one hand, and abuse and slander of courts and the judges thereof, on the other. x x x[97]
All told, illegitimate and uninformed criticisms against the courts and judges, those which cross the line and attempt to subvert the judicial process, must be
avoided. They do a great disservice to the Constitution. They seriously mislead the public as to the proper functioning of the judiciary. While all citizens
have a right to scrutinize and criticize the judiciary, they have an ethical and societal obligation not to cross that too important line.

Senator Ernesto Maceda, the seasoned politician who has graced both the executive and the legislative departments in various capacities, in a Privilege
Speech, once appealed for voluntary self-restraint with respect to this Court

There are proper procedures for dealing with instances of official misdemeanor without setting an entire institution on fire. Arson is not the best means for
pest-control.
In case of possibility of corruption in the Supreme Court, one possible means is the initiation of impeachment proceedings against specifically identified
justices. A move for impeachment, of course, requires much sobriety and solid evidence. Whatever charges are brought forward must be substantiated.
Those who dare prosecute must come into the open and append their names to the accusations they make, with courage and conviction. This is the manner
civil society conserves its civility x x x.
The ends of justice are not served by heckling nor by crude insinuation or by irresponsible reporting. The house of democracy is never strengthened by
those who choose to throw rocks under the cover of darkness and anonymity. The institutions of our liberty are never enriched by the irresponsible
accusations of the uninformed. The bedrocks of our Republic are not reinforced by those who evade responsibility under the veil of freedom.[98]
During interpellation, he went on to say

x x x And in the context of what I have just said, I think that all newspapers, all media are welcome to do their worse, criticize the members of the
Executive Department, Members of the Senate, and any other agency of the Government. But I am just suggesting that when it comes to the judiciary, and
specifically to the Supreme Court, that a different policy, one of more caution, should be adopted precisely because x x x people may lose faith in the
Executive or the President; they may lose faith in Congress, the Congressmen and the Senators, but as long as they have their faith unshaken and complete
in the last bulwark of democracy x x x which is the Supreme Court, then our democracy will survive.[99]
Each of us has important responsibilities in a constitutional democracy. We, judges, will continue to discharge our judicial functions with fairness. We urge
all and sundry to abide by theirs. We need to respect each other. As the golden rule goes let us not do to others what we do not want others to do to us.
Igalang natin ang isat-isa. Huwag nating gawin sa iba ang ayaw nating gawin nila sa atin.

Given the gravity of respondent Macasaets improper conduct, coupled with the recalcitrant manner in which he responded when confronted with the reality
of his wrongdoing, a penalty of fine in the amount of P20,000.00 would be right and reasonable.

Disposition

WHEREFORE, the Court declares respondent Amado P. Macasaet GUILTY of indirect contempt of court and sentences him to pay a fine of P20,000.00,
in accordance with Sections 3(d) and 7, Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

SO ORDERED.

RUBEN T. REYES
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 133486. January 28, 2000]
ABS-CBN BROADCASTING CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The holding of exit polls and the dissemination of their results through mass media constitute an essential part of the freedoms of speech and of the press.
Hence, the Comelec cannot ban them totally in the guise of promoting clean, honest, orderly and credible elections. Quite the contrary, exit polls --
properly conducted and publicized -- can be vital tools in eliminating the evils of election-fixing and fraud. Narrowly tailored countermeasures may be
prescribed by the Comelec so as to minimize or suppress the incidental problems in the conduct of exit polls, without transgressing in any manner the
fundamental rights of our people.
The Case and the Facts
Before us is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing Commission on Elections (Comelec) en banc Resolution No. 98-
1419[1] dated April 21, 1998. In the said Resolution, the poll body
"RESOLVED to approve the issuance of a restraining order to stop ABS-CBN or any other groups, its agents or representatives from
conducting such exit survey and to authorize the Honorable Chairman to issue the same."
The Resolution was issued by the Comelec allegedly upon "information from [a] reliable source that ABS-CBN (Lopez Group) has prepared a project, with
PR groups, to conduct radio-TV coverage of the elections x x x and to make [an] exit survey of the x x x vote during the elections for national officials
particularly for President and Vice President, results of which shall be [broadcast] immediately."[2] The electoral body believed that such project might
conflict with the official Comelec count, as well as the unofficial quick count of the National Movement for Free Elections (Namfrel). It also noted that it
had not authorized or deputized Petitioner ABS-CBN to undertake the exit survey.
On May 9, 1998, this Court issued the Temporary Restraining Order prayed for by petitioner. We directed the Comelec to cease and desist, until further
orders, from implementing the assailed Resolution or the restraining order issued pursuant thereto, if any. In fact, the exit polls were actually conducted and
reported by media without any difficulty or problem.
The Issues
Petitioner raises this lone issue: "Whether or not the Respondent Commission acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to a lack or excess of
jurisdiction when it approved the issuance of a restraining order enjoining the petitioner or any [other group], its agents or representatives from conducting
exit polls during the x x x May 11 elections."[3]
In his Memorandum,[4] the solicitor general, in seeking to dismiss the Petition, brings up additional issues: (1) mootness and (2) prematurity, because of
petitioner's failure to seek a reconsideration of the assailed Comelec Resolution.
The Court's Ruling
The Petition[5] is meritorious.
Procedural Issues: Mootness and Prematurity
The solicitor general contends that the petition is moot and academic, because the May 11, 1998 election has already been held and done with. Allegedly,
there is no longer any actual controversy before us.
The issue is not totally moot. While the assailed Resolution referred specifically to the May 11, 1998 election, its implications on the people's fundamental
freedom of expression transcend the past election. The holding of periodic elections is a basic feature of our democratic government. By its very nature,
exit polling is tied up with elections. To set aside the resolution of the issue now will only postpone a task that could well crop up again in future elections.
[6]
In any event, in Salonga v. Cruz Pano, the Court had occasion to reiterate that it "also has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional
principles, precepts, doctrines, or rules. It has the symbolic function of educating bench and bar on the extent of protection given by constitutional
guarantees."[7] Since the fundamental freedoms of speech and of the press are being invoked here, we have resolved to settle, for the guidance of posterity,
whether they likewise protect the holding of exit polls and the dissemination of data derived therefrom.
The solicitor general further contends that the Petition should be dismissed for petitioner's failure to exhaust available remedies before the issuing forum,
specifically the filing of a motion for reconsideration.
This Court, however, has ruled in the past that this procedural requirement may be glossed over to prevent a miscarriage of justice,[8] when the issue
involves the principle of social justice or the protection of labor,[9] when the decision or resolution sought to be set aside is a nullity,[10] or when the need
for relief is extremely urgent and certiorari is the only adequate and speedy remedy available.[11]
The instant Petition assails a Resolution issued by the Comelec en banc on April 21, 1998, only twenty (20) days before the election itself. Besides, the
petitioner got hold of a copy thereof only on May 4, 1998. Under the circumstances, there was hardly enough opportunity to move for a reconsideration
and to obtain a swift resolution in time for the May 11, 1998 elections. Moreover, not only is time of the essence; the Petition involves transcendental
constitutional issues. Direct resort to this Court through a special civil action for certiorari is therefore justified.
Main Issue: Validity of Conducting Exit Polls
An exit poll is a species of electoral survey conducted by qualified individuals or groups of individuals for the purpose of determining the probable result
of an election by confidentially asking randomly selected voters whom they have voted for, immediately after they have officially cast their ballots. The
results of the survey are announced to the public, usually through the mass media, to give an advance overview of how, in the opinion of the polling
individuals or organizations, the electorate voted. In our electoral history, exit polls had not been resorted to until the recent May 11, 1998 elections.
In its Petition, ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation maintains that it is a responsible member of the mass media, committed to report balanced election-
related data, including "the exclusive results of Social Weather Station (SWS) surveys conducted in fifteen administrative regions."
It argues that the holding of exit polls and the nationwide reporting of their results are valid exercises of the freedoms of speech and of the press. It submits
that, in precipitately and unqualifiedly restraining the holding and the reporting of exit polls, the Comelec gravely abused its discretion and grossly violated
the petitioner's constitutional rights.
Public respondent, on the other hand, vehemently denies that, in issuing the assailed Resolution, it gravely abused its discretion. It insists that the issuance
thereof was "pursuant to its constitutional and statutory powers to promote a clean, honest, orderly and credible May 11, 1998 elections"; and "to protect,
preserve and maintain the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot." It contends that "the conduct of exit surveys might unduly confuse and influence the voters,"
and that the surveys were designed "to condition the minds of people and cause confusion as to who are the winners and the [losers] in the election," which
in turn may result in "violence and anarchy."
Public respondent further argues that "exit surveys indirectly violate the constitutional principle to preserve the sanctity of the ballots," as the "voters are
lured to reveal the contents of ballots," in violation of Section 2, Article V of the Constitution;[12] and relevant provisions of the Omnibus Election Code.
[13] It submits that the constitutionally protected freedoms invoked by petitioner "are not immune to regulation by the State in the legitimate exercise of its
police power," such as in the present case.
The solicitor general, in support of the public respondent, adds that the exit polls pose a "clear and present danger of destroying the credibility and integrity
of the electoral process," considering that they are not supervised by any government agency and can in general be manipulated easily. He insists that these
polls would sow confusion among the voters and would undermine the official tabulation of votes conducted by the Commission, as well as the quick
count undertaken by the Namfrel.
Admittedly, no law prohibits the holding and the reporting of exit polls. The question can thus be more narrowly defined: May the Comelec, in the exercise
of its powers, totally ban exit polls? In answering this question, we need to review quickly our jurisprudence on the freedoms of speech and of the press.
Nature and Scope of Freedoms of Speech and of the Press
The freedom of expression is a fundamental principle of our democratic government. It "is a 'preferred' right and, therefore, stands on a higher level than
substantive economic or other liberties. x x x [T]his must be so because the lessons of history, both political and legal, illustrate that freedom of thought
and speech is the indispensable condition of nearly every other form of freedom."[14]
Our Constitution clearly mandates that no law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech or of the press.[15] In the landmark case Gonzales v.
Comelec,[16] this Court enunciated that at the very least, free speech and a free press consist of the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully any matter of
public interest without prior restraint.
The freedom of expression is a means of assuring individual self-fulfillment, of attaining the truth, of securing participation by the people in social and
political decision-making, and of maintaining the balance between stability and change.[17] It represents a profound commitment to the principle that
debates on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide open.[18] It means more than the right to approve existing political beliefs or economic
arrangements, to lend support to official measures, or to take refuge in the existing climate of opinion on any matter of public consequence. And
paraphrasing the eminent justice Oliver Wendell Holmes,[19] we stress that the freedom encompasses the thought we hate, no less than the thought we
agree with.
Limitations
The realities of life in a complex society, however, preclude an absolute exercise of the freedoms of speech and of the press. Such freedoms could not
remain unfettered and unrestrained at all times and under all circumstances.[20] They are not immune to regulation by the State in the exercise of its police
power.[21] While the liberty to think is absolute, the power to express such thought in words and deeds has limitations.
In Cabansag v. Fernandez[22] this Court had occasion to discuss two theoretical tests in determining the validity of restrictions to such freedoms, as
follows:
"These are the 'clear and present danger' rule and the 'dangerous tendency' rule. The first, as interpreted in a number of cases, means
that the evil consequence of the comment or utterance must be 'extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely high'
before the utterance can be punished. The danger to be guarded against is the 'substantive evil' sought to be prevented. x x x"[23]
"The 'dangerous tendency' rule, on the other hand, x x x may be epitomized as follows: If the words uttered create a dangerous
tendency which the state has a right to prevent, then such words are punishable. It is not necessary that some definite or immediate
acts of force, violence, or unlawfulness be advocated. It is sufficient that such acts be advocated in general terms. Nor is it necessary
that the language used be reasonably calculated to incite persons to acts of force, violence, or unlawfulness. It is sufficient if the
natural tendency and probable effect of the utterance be to bring about the substantive evil which the legislative body seeks to
prevent."[24]
Unquestionably, this Court adheres to the "clear and present danger" test. It implicitly did in its earlier decisions in Primicias v. Fugoso[25] and American
Bible Society v. City of Manila;[26] as well as in later ones, Vera v. Arca,[27] Navarro v. Villegas,[28] Imbong v. Ferrer,[29] Blo Umpar Adiong v.
Comelec[30] and, more recently, in Iglesia ni Cristo v. MTRCB.[31] In setting the standard or test for the "clear and present danger" doctrine, the Court
echoed the words of justice Holmes: "The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to
create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and
degree."[32]
A limitation on the freedom of expression may be justified only by a danger of such substantive character that the state has a right to prevent. Unlike in the
"dangerous tendency" doctrine, the danger must not only be clear but also present. "Present" refers to the time element; the danger must not only be
probable but very likely to be inevitable.[33] The evil sought to be avoided must be so substantive as to justify a clamp over one's mouth or a restraint of a
writing instrument.[34]
Justification for a Restriction
Doctrinally, the Court has always ruled in favor of the freedom of expression, and any restriction is treated an exemption. The power to exercise prior
restraint is not to be presumed; rather the presumption is against its validity.[35] And it is respondent's burden to overthrow such presumption. Any act that
restrains speech should be greeted with furrowed brows,[36] so it has been said.
To justify a restriction, the promotion of a substantial government interest must be clearly shown.[37] Thus:
"A government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the government, if it furthers an important
or substantial government interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the
incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest."[38]
Hence, even though the government's purposes are legitimate and substantial, they cannot be pursued by means that broadly, stifle fundamental personal
liberties, when the end can be more narrowly achieved.[39]
The freedoms of speech and of the press should all the more be upheld when what is sought to be curtailed is the dissemination of information meant to
add meaning to the equally vital right of suffrage.[40] We cannot support any ruling or order "the effect of which would be to nullify so vital a
constitutional right as free speech."[41] When faced with borderline situations in which the freedom of a candidate or a party to speak or the freedom of the
electorate to know is invoked against actions allegedly made to assure clean and free elections, this Court shall lean in favor of freedom. For in the ultimate
analysis, the freedom of the citizen and the State's power to regulate should not be antagonistic. There can be no free and honest elections if, in the efforts
to maintain them, the freedom to speak and the right to know are unduly curtailed.[42]
True, the government has a stake in protecting the fundamental right to vote by providing voting places that are safe and accessible. It has the duty to
secure the secrecy of the ballot and to preserve the sanctity and the integrity of the electoral process. However, in order to justify a restriction of the
people's freedoms of speech and of the press, the state's responsibility of ensuring orderly voting must far outweigh them.
These freedoms have additional importance, because exit polls generate important research data which may be used to study influencing factors and trends
in voting behavior. An absolute prohibition would thus be unreasonably restrictive, because it effectively prevents the use of exit poll data not only for
election-day projections, but also for long-term research.[43]
Comelec Ban on Exit Polling
In the case at bar, the Comelec justifies its assailed Resolution as having been issued pursuant to its constitutional mandate to ensure a free, orderly, honest,
credible and peaceful election. While admitting that "the conduct of an exit poll and the broadcast of the results thereof [are] x x x an exercise of press
freedom," it argues that "[p]ress freedom may be curtailed if the exercise thereof creates a clear and present danger to the community or it has a dangerous
tendency." It then contends that "an exit poll has the tendency to sow confusion considering the randomness of selecting interviewees, which further
make[s] the exit poll highly unreliable. The probability that the results of such exit poll may not be in harmony with the official count made by the
Comelec x x x is ever present. In other words, the exit poll has a clear and present danger of destroying the credibility and integrity of the electoral
process."
Such arguments are purely speculative and clearly untenable. First, by the very nature of a survey, the interviewees or participants are selected at random,
so that the results will as much as possible be representative or reflective of the general sentiment or view of the community or group polled. Second, the
survey result is not meant to replace or be at par with the official Comelec count. It consists merely of the opinion of the polling group as to who the
electorate in general has probably voted for, based on the limited data gathered from polled individuals. Finally, not at stake here are the credibility and the
integrity of the elections, which are exercises that are separate and independent from the exit polls. The holding and the reporting of the results of exit polls
cannot undermine those of the elections, since the former is only part of the latter. If at all, the outcome of one can only be indicative of the other.
The Comelec's concern with the possible noncommunicative effect of exit polls -- disorder and confusion in the voting centers -- does not justify a total ban
on them. Undoubtedly, the assailed Comelec Resolution is too broad, since its application is without qualification as to whether the polling is disruptive or
not.[44] Concededly, the Omnibus Election Code prohibits disruptive behavior around the voting centers.[45] There is no showing, however, that exit polls
or the means to interview voters cause chaos in voting centers. Neither has any evidence been presented proving that the presence of exit poll reporters near
an election precinct tends to create disorder or confuse the voters.
Moreover, the prohibition incidentally prevents the collection of exit poll data and their use for any purpose. The valuable information and ideas that could
be derived from them, based on the voters' answers to the survey questions will forever remain unknown and unexplored. Unless the ban is restrained,
candidates, researchers, social scientists and the electorate in general would be deprived of studies on the impact of current events and of election-day and
other factors on voters' choices.
In Daily Herald Co. v. Munro,[46] the US Supreme Court held that a statute, one of the purposes of which was to prevent the broadcasting of early returns,
was unconstitutional because such purpose was impermissible, and the statute was neither narrowly tailored to advance a state interest nor the least
restrictive alternative. Furthermore, the general interest of the State in insulating voters from outside influences is insufficient to justify speech regulation.
Just as curtailing election-day broadcasts and newspaper editorials for the reason that they might indirectly affect the voters' choices is impermissible, so is
regulating speech via an exit poll restriction.[47]
The absolute ban imposed by the Comelec cannot, therefore, be justified. It does not leave open any alternative channel of communication to gather the
type of information obtained through exit polling. On the other hand, there are other valid and reasonable ways and means to achieve the Comelec end of
avoiding or minimizing disorder and confusion that may be brought about by exit surveys.
For instance, a specific limited area for conducting exit polls may be designated. Only professional survey groups may be allowed to conduct the same.
Pollsters may be kept at a reasonable distance from the voting center. They may be required to explain to voters that the latter may refuse to be interviewed,
and that the interview is not part of the official balloting process. The pollsters may further be required to wear distinctive clothing that would show they
are not election officials.[48] Additionally, they may be required to undertake an information campaign on the nature of the exercise and the results to be
obtained therefrom. These measures, together with a general prohibition of disruptive behavior, could ensure a clean, safe and orderly election.
For its part, Petitioner ABS-CBN explains its survey methodology as follows: (1) communities are randomly selected in each province; (2) residences to be
polled in such communities are also chosen at random; (3) only individuals who have already voted, as shown by the indelible ink on their fingers, are
interviewed; (4) the interviewers use no cameras of any sort; (5) the poll results are released to the public only on the day after the elections.[49] These
precautions, together with the possible measures earlier stated, may be undertaken to abate the Comelec's fear, without consequently and unjustifiably
stilling the people's voice.
With the foregoing premises, we conclude that the interest of the state in reducing disruption is outweighed by the drastic abridgment of the
constitutionally guaranteed rights of the media and the electorate. Quite the contrary, instead of disrupting elections, exit polls -- properly conducted and
publicized -- can be vital tools for the holding of honest, orderly, peaceful and credible elections; and for the elimination of election-fixing, fraud and other
electoral ills.
Violation of Ballot Secrecy
The contention of public respondent that exit polls indirectly transgress the sanctity and the secrecy of the ballot is off-tangent to the real issue. Petitioner
does not seek access to the ballots cast by the voters. The ballot system of voting is not at issue here.
The reason behind the principle of ballot secrecy is to avoid vote buying through voter identification. Thus, voters are prohibited from exhibiting the
contents of their official ballots to other persons, from making copies thereof, or from putting distinguishing marks thereon so as to be identified. Also
proscribed is finding out the contents of the ballots cast by particular voters or disclosing those of disabled or illiterate voters who have been assisted.
Clearly, what is forbidden is the association of voters with their respective votes, for the purpose of assuring that the votes have been cast in accordance
with the instructions of a third party. This result cannot, however, be achieved merely through the voters' verbal and confidential disclosure to a pollster of
whom they have voted for.
In exit polls, the contents of the official ballot are not actually exposed. Furthermore, the revelation of whom an elector has voted for is not compulsory, but
voluntary. Voters may also choose not to reveal their identities. Indeed, narrowly tailored countermeasures may be prescribed by the Comelec, so as to
minimize or suppress incidental problems in the conduct of exit polls, without transgressing the fundamental rights of our people.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED, and the Temporary Restraining Order issued by the Court on May 9, 1998 is made PERMANENT. Assailed
Minute Resolution No. 98-1419 issued by the Comelec en banc on April 21, 1998 is hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., CJ., Bellosillo, Puno, Quisumbing, Purisima, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, and De Leon Jr., JJ., concur.
Melo, J., joins separate opinion of J. Vitug.
Vitug, J., see separate opinion.
Kapunan, J., see dissenting opinion.
Mendoza, J., joins separate opinion of J. Vitug.
Pardo, J., no part.

[1] Rollo, p. 14.

[2] Ibid. Words in parentheses in the original; those in brackets supplied.
[3] Petition, p. 4.
[4] Rollo, p. 78 et seq.
[5] This case was deemed submitted for resolution on January 19, 1999, upon receipt by the Court of the Memorandum for the Respondent
[6] See Gamboa Jr. v. Aguirre Jr., GR No. 134213, July 20, 1999.
[7] 134 SCRA 438, 463, February 18, 1985; per Gutierrez Jr., J.
[8] Solis v. NLRC, 263 SCRA 629, October 28, 1996.
[9] Zurbano Sr. v. NLRC, 228 SCRA 556, December 17, 1993.
[10] Alfante v. NLRC, 283 SCRA 340, December 15, 1997; Saldana v. Court of Appeals, 190 SCRA 386, October 11, 1990.
[11] Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 269 SCRA 316, March 7, 1997; Gelmart Industries Phils., Inc. v. NLRC, 176 SCRA 295, August 10, 1989; Philippine Air
Lines Employees Association v. Philippine Air Lines, Inc., 111 SCRA 215, January 30, 1982.
[12] "Sec. 2. The congress shall provide a system for securing the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot x x x."
[13] Citing 195, 196, 207 and 261 (z-5, 7 & 16)
[14] Salonga v. Cruz Pao, supra, pp. 458-459. See also Gonzales v. Comelec, 27 SCRA 835, 849, 856-857, April 18, 1969; Philippine Blooming Mills
Employees Organization v. Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc., 51 SCRA 191, June 5, 1973; National Press Club v. Comelec, 207 SCRA 1, 9, March 5,
1992; Blo Umpar Adiong v. Comelec, 207 SCRA 712, 715, March 31, 1992.
[15] 4, Art. III of the Constitution.
[16] Supra, p. 856, per Fernando, J. (later CJ)
[17] Ibid., p. 857; citing Emerson, toward a General Theory of the First Amendment (1966)
[18] Ibid., citing New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 US 254, 270 (1964)
[19] US v. Schwimmer, 279 US 644 (1929)
[20] Ibid., p. 858.
[21] Badoy Jr. v. Comelec, 35 SCRA 285, 289, October 17, 1970.
[22] 102 Phil 152, October 18, 1957, per Bautista-Angelo, J.
[23] Ibid., p. 161.
[24] Ibid., citing Gitlow v. New York, 268 US 652, 69 L ed. 1138 (1925)
[25] 80 Phil 71 (1948)
[26] 101 Phil 386 (1957)
[27] 28 SCRA 351, May 26, 1969.
[28] 31 SCRA 731, February 26, 1970.
[29] 35 SCRA 28, September 11, 1970.
[30] Supra.
[31] 259 SCRA 529, July 26, 1996.
[32] Cabansag v. Fernandez, supra; citing Schenck v. US, 249 US 47 (1919)
[33] Gonzales v. Comelec, supra, pp. 860-861.
[34] Adiong v. Comelec, supra.
[35] Iglesia ni Cristo v. Court of Appeals, supra; Gonzales v. Katigbak, 137 SCRA 717, July 22, 1985.
[36] Iglesia ni Cristo v. Court of Appeals, supra, pp. 545-546; citing Near v. Minnesota, 283 US 697 (1931); Bantam books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 US 58
(1963); and New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, supra.
[37] Blo Umpar Adiong v. Comelec, supra. See also National Press Club v. Comelec, supra.
[38] Adiong v. Comelec, supra.
[39] Gonzales v. Comelec, supra, p. 871, citing Shelton v. Tucker, 364 US 479, 488.
[40] Mutuc v. Comelec, 36 SCRA 228, 233-34, November 26, 1970; per Fernando, J. (later CJ)
[41] Ibid., p. 236.
[42] Adiong v. Comelec, supra.
[43] Exit Polls and the First Amendment, 98 Harvard Law Review 1927 (1985)
[44] See CBS v. Smith, 681 F. Supp. 794 (SD Fla. 1988)
[45] See 261 (d, e, f, k & z-11). See also Arts. 148, 149 & 153 of the Revised Penal Code.
[46] 838 F 2d 380 (9th Cir. 1988)
[47] Ibid., citing Mills v. Alabama, 384 US 214, 218-20, 86 S Ct. 1434, 1436-37, 16 L Ed. 2d 484 (1966); Vanasco v. Schwartz, 401 F Supp. 87, 100
(SDNY 1975), affd mem., 423 Us 1041, 96 S Ct. 763, 46 L Ed. 2d 630 (1976)
[48] Exit Polls and the First Amendment, supra, p. 1935.
[49] Petitioners Memorandum, p. 15.

FIRST DIVISION
CONCERNED BOHOLANOS FOR LAW AND ORDER,
A.M. No. RTJ-01-1621
Complainants, (formerly OCA IPI No. 01-1121-RTJ)

- versus - Present:

JUDGE DIONISIO R. CALIBO, JR., RTC, BRANCH 50,PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,

LOAY, BOHOL,

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
Respondent.

CORONA,

AZCUNA, and

GARCIA, JJ.
 Promulgated:

September 27, 2007

x --------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

In an anonymous complaint dated August 28, 2000 filed by Concerned Boholanos for Law and Order, Judge Dionisio R. Calibo, Jr., of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 50, Loay, Bohol, is charged with conduct unbecoming a judge and highly unethical act for publicly speaking on radio and in public
fora regarding his bias and parochial views on certain controversial issues against public personalities and public officials.

Required to comment, respondent claimed that the complaint was initiated by the alter ego of the provincial governor because of his objection to the sale of
the performing assets of the provincial government of Bohol disadvantageous to the latter.

Then Court Administrator Alfredo L. Benipayo designated retired Justice Pedro A. Ramirez of the Court of Appeals, former Consultant in the Office of the
Court Administrator, as Hearing Officer to investigate the complaint. On August 5, 2005, he submitted his Report and Recommendation.

After a review of Justice Ramirezs Report and Recommendation, the Court RESOLVES to ADOPT and APPROVE his findings of facts and conclusions of
law reproduced as follows:

Respondent Judge relates the antecedents of the controversy. He states that a very questionable and controversial project was being pursued by the
Provincial Governor which was to sell the two major performing assets of the Province of Bohol, the Provincial Electrical System (PES) and the Provincial
Waterworks System (PWS) of the Provincial Utilities Division (PPUD), without consulting its customers in Tagbilaran and Dauis, Bohol, which are the
places served by these two utilities. It was shocking to the people because it was of public knowledge that these were the only major profitable ventures of
the province. It was no surprise, therefore, that the residents of these two towns went on the air over the three radio stations vigorously protesting this move
of the Governor.
Respondent Judge narrates that although he is one of the consumers affected by the projected sale, he kept silent. He claims that since his appointment, he
had distanced himself from the media even if he was previously the head of the Department of Public Information. However, when it became apparent that
the Governor was ignoring the legitimate issues presented by the people, he decided to take part in the debate. He studied the documents and concluded
that indeed it was a contract that would be very disadvantageous to the province. He joined the oppositors and admits having gone on the air. Although the
Governor did not do anything to stop him, other provincial officials tried to suppress respondents revelations on the air reasoning that being a Judge,
respondent should not involve himself in controversy. The concerned consumers filed a petition to stop the projected sale at auction and respondent admits
having taken the stand for the petitioners. As regards the statement of Judge Melicor in his order quoted above, the respondent Judge made no mention of it
in his Comment.
It was probably because of this Order of Judge Melicor describing the acts of respondent Judge attempting to influence another Judge who was presiding
the injunction petition that prompted DCA Bernardo T. Ponferrada to recommend, despite the fact that the complaint is not under oath, that an investigation
be conducted to determine the extent of Judge Calibos liability.
xxx
x x x As it can be seen, the letter complaint is anonymous. For this reason, the undersigned is submitting this Report based on the pleadings extant on the
record.
As regards going on the air to express ones opinion over a matter of public concern, the undersigned believes that respondent Judge cannot be held to
answer administratively simply because he was only exercising his constitutional right to be heard in a petition for the redress of grievances. As a consumer
and as a member of the body politic, it was his right, nay his duty to air what he honestly believed to be an incipient irregularity.
However, his two telephone calls to Judge Achilles L. Melicor who was presiding the court where the petition to stop the governor was pending, definitely
violates the Code of Judicial Conduct, particularly Section 3 of Canon I, which states that Judges shall refrain from influencing in any manner the outcome
of litigation or dispute pending before another court or administrative agency.
Rule 140, Section 7, classifies gross misconduct constituting violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct as a serious offense and penalizes the same with
dismissal from the service, with forfeiture of benefits and with prejudice to reemployment; suspension from office without salary for more than three (3)
but not exceeding six (6) months; or a fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00.
Considering the inappropriateness of the calls made by respondent Judge to another Judge who was presiding the Court where the case was being heard, it
is respectfully recommended that said respondent Judge Dionisio R. Calibo, Jr., be made to pay a fine of P25,000.00.
We observed, however, that this is the first time respondent Judge has been charged administratively. This is a mitigating circumstance. Hence, the
recommended penalty of fine of P25,000.00 is reduced to only P20,000.00.

ACCORDINGLY, and as recommended by Justice Pedro A. Ramirez, Judge Dionisio R. Calibo, Jr. of the RTC, Branch 50, Loay, Bohol, is declared guilty
of serious misconduct and is ordered to pay a FINE of P20,000.00, payable to this Court within ten (10) days from notice.

SO ORDERED.
ANGELINA SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

Chairperson

RENATO C. CORONA ADOLFO S. AZCUNA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

CANCIO C. GARCIA

Associate Justice

FIRST DIVISION
INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES represented byG.R. No. 175241
its National President, Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz, H. HARRY L.
ROQUE, and JOEL RUIZ BUTUYAN,
Present:

Petitioners,
PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
CARPIO MORALES,
- versus - LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,

HONORABLE MAYOR JOSE LITO ATIENZA, BERSAMIN, and

Respondent. VILLARAMA, JR., JJ.

Promulgated:

February 24, 2010

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Petitioners Integrated Bar of the Philippines[1] (IBP) and lawyers H. Harry L. Roque and Joel R. Butuyan appeal the June 28, 2006 Decision [2] and the
October 26, 2006 Resolution[3] of the Court of Appeals that found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent Jose Lito Atienza, the then mayor
of Manila, in granting a permit to rally in a venue other than the one applied for by the IBP.

On June 15, 2006, the IBP, through its then National President Jose Anselmo Cadiz (Cadiz), filed with the Office of the City Mayor of Manila a letter
application[4] for a permit to rally at the foot of Mendiola Bridge on June 22, 2006 from 2:30 p.m. to to be participated in by IBP officers and members,
law students and multi-sectoral organizations.

Respondent issued a permit[5] dated allowing the IBP to stage a rally on given date but indicated therein Plaza Miranda as the venue, instead of , which
permit the IBP received on .

Aggrieved, petitioners filed on before the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 94949.[6] The petition having been
unresolved within 24 hours from its filing, petitioners filed before this Court on a petition for certiorari docketed as G.R. No. 172951 which assailed the
appellate courts inaction or refusal to resolve the petition within the period provided under the Public Assembly Act of 1985.[7]

The Court, by Resolutions of July 26, 2006, August 30, 2006 and November 20, 2006, respectively, denied the petition for being moot and academic,
denied the relief that the petition be heard on the merits in view of the pendency of CA-G.R. SP No. 94949, and denied the motion for reconsideration.

The rally pushed through on at , after discussed with P/Supt. Arturo Paglinawan whose contingent from the Manila Police District (MPD) earlier barred
petitioners from proceeding thereto. Petitioners allege that the participants voluntarily dispersed after the peaceful conduct of the program.

The MPD thereupon instituted on a criminal action,[8] docketed as I.S. No. 06I-12501, against for violating the Public Assembly Act in staging a rally at a
venue not indicated in the permit, to which charge filed a Counter-Affidavit of .

In the meantime, the appellate court ruled, in CA-G.R. SP No. 94949, by the first assailed issuance, that the petition became moot and lacked merit. The
appellate court also denied petitioners motion for reconsideration by the second assailed issuance.

Hence, the filing of the present petition for review on certiorari, to which respondent filed his Comment of which merited petitioners Reply of .

The main issue is whether the appellate court erred in holding that the modification of the venue in IBPs rally permit does not constitute grave abuse of
discretion.

Petitioners assert that the partial grant of the application runs contrary to the Pubic Assembly Act and violates their constitutional right to freedom of
expression and public assembly.

The Court shall first resolve the preliminary issue of mootness.

Undoubtedly, the petition filed with the appellate court on became moot upon the passing of the date of the rally on .

A moot and academic case is one that ceases to present a justiciable controversy by virtue of supervening events, so that a declaration thereon would be of
no practical use or value. Generally, courts decline jurisdiction over such case or dismiss it on ground of mootness. However, even in cases where
supervening events had made the cases moot, this Court did not hesitate to resolve the legal or constitutional issues raised to formulate controlling
principles to guide the bench, bar and public. Moreover, as an exception to the rule on mootness, courts will decide a question otherwise moot if it is
capable of repetition, yet evading review.[9]

In the present case, the question of the legality of a modification of a permit to rally will arise each time the terms of an intended rally are altered by the
concerned official, yet it evades review, owing to the limited time in processing the application where the shortest allowable period is five days prior to the
assembly. The susceptibility of recurrence compels the Court to definitively resolve the issue at hand.

Respecting petitioners argument that the issues presented in CA-G.R. SP No. 94949 pose a prejudicial question to the criminal case against , the Court
finds it improper to resolve the same in the present case.

Under the Rules,[10] the existence of a prejudicial question is a ground in a petition to suspend proceedings in a criminal action. Since suspension of the
proceedings in the criminal action may be made only upon petition and not at the instance of the judge or the investigating prosecutor,[11] the latter cannot
take cognizance of a claim of prejudicial question without a petition to suspend being filed. Since a petition to suspend can be filed only in the criminal
action,[12] the determination of the pendency of a prejudicial question should be made at the first instance in the criminal action, and not before this Court
in an appeal from the civil action.

In proceeding to resolve the petition on the merits, the appellate court found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent because the Public
Assembly Act does not categorically require respondent to specify in writing the imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil which warrants the denial
or modification of the permit and merely mandates that the action taken shall be in writing and shall be served on respondent within 24 hours. The
appellate court went on to hold that respondent is authorized to regulate the exercise of the freedom of expression and of public assembly which are not
absolute, and that the challenged permit is consistent with Plaza Mirandas designation as a freedom park where protest rallies are allowed without permit.

The Court finds for petitioners.

Section 6 of the Public Assembly Act reads:

Section 6. Action to be taken on the application -

(a) It shall be the duty of the mayor or any official acting in his behalf to issue or grant a permit unless there is clear and convincing evidence that the
public assembly will create a clear and present danger to public order, public safety, public convenience, public morals or public health.
(b) The mayor or any official acting in his behalf shall act on the application within two (2) working days from the date the application was filed, failing
which, the permit shall be deemed granted. Should for any reason the mayor or any official acting in his behalf refuse to accept the application for a permit,
said application shall be posted by the applicant on the premises of the office of the mayor and shall be deemed to have been filed.
(c) If the mayor is of the view that there is imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil warranting the denial or modification of the permit, he shall
immediately inform the applicant who must be heard on the matter.
(d) The action on the permit shall be in writing and served on the application [sic] within twenty-four hours.
(e) If the mayor or any official acting in his behalf denies the application or modifies the terms thereof in his permit, the applicant may contest the decision
in an appropriate court of law.
(f) In case suit is brought before the Metropolitan Trial Court, the Municipal Trial Court, the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, the Regional Trial Court, or the
Intermediate Appellate Court, its decisions may be appealed to the appropriate court within forty-eight (48) hours after receipt of the same. No appeal bond
and record on appeal shall be required. A decision granting such permit or modifying it in terms satisfactory to the applicant shall, be immediately
executory.
(g) All cases filed in court under this Section shall be decided within twenty-four (24) hours from date of filing. Cases filed hereunder shall be immediately
endorsed to the executive judge for disposition or, in his absence, to the next in rank.
(h) In all cases, any decision may be appealed to the Supreme Court.
(i) Telegraphic appeals to be followed by formal appeals are hereby allowed. (underscoring supplied)
In Bayan, Karapatan, Kilusang Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP) v. Ermita,[13] the Court reiterated:

x x x Freedom of assembly connotes the right of the people to meet peaceably for consultation and discussion of matters of public concern. It is entitled to
be accorded the utmost deference and respect. It is not to be limited, much less denied, except on a showing, as is the case with freedom of expression,
of a clear and present danger of a substantive evil that the state has a right to prevent. Even prior to the 1935 Constitution, Justice Malcolm had
occasion to stress that it is a necessary consequence of our republican institutions and complements the right of free speech. To paraphrase the opinion of
Justice Rutledge, speaking for the majority of the American Supreme Court in Thomas v. Collins, it was not by accident or coincidence that the rights to
freedom of speech and of the press were coupled in a single guarantee with the rights of the people peaceably to assemble and to petition the government
for redress of grievances. All these rights, while not identical, are inseparable. In every case, therefore, where there is a limitation placed on the exercise of
this right, the judiciary is called upon to examine the effects of the challenged governmental actuation. The sole justification for a limitation on the
exercise of this right, so fundamental to the maintenance of democratic institutions, is the danger, of a character both grave and imminent, of a
serious evil to public safety, public morals, public health, or any other legitimate public interest.[14] (emphasis supplied)
The Court in Bayan stated that the provisions of the Public Assembly Act of 1985 practically codified the 1983 ruling in Reyes v. Bagatsing.[15] In
juxtaposing Sections 4 to 6 of the Public Assembly Act with the pertinent portion of the Reyes case, the Court elucidated as follows:

x x x [The public official concerned shall] appraise whether there may be valid objections to the grant of the permit or to its grant but at another public
place. It is an indispensable condition to such refusal or modification that the clear and present danger test be the standard for the decision reached. If he is
of the view that there is such an imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil, the applicants must be heard on the matter. Thereafter, his decision,
whether favorable or adverse, must be transmitted to them at the earliest opportunity. Thus if so minded, they can have recourse to the proper judicial
authority.[16] (italics and underscoring supplied)
In modifying the permit outright, respondent gravely abused his discretion when he did not immediately inform the IBP who should have been heard first
on the matter of his perceived imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil that may warrant the changing of the venue. The opportunity to be heard
precedes the action on the permit, since the applicant may directly go to court after an unfavorable action on the permit.

Respondent failed to indicate how he had arrived at modifying the terms of the permit against the standard of a clear and present danger test which, it bears
repeating, is an indispensable condition to such modification. Nothing in the issued permit adverts to an imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil,
which blank denial or modification would, when granted imprimatur as the appellate court would have it, render illusory any judicial scrutiny thereof.

It is true that the licensing official, here respondent Mayor, is not devoid of discretion in determining whether or not a permit would be granted. It is not,
however, unfettered discretion. While prudence requires that there be a realistic appraisal not of what may possibly occur but of what may probably occur,
given all the relevant circumstances, still the assumption especially so where the assembly is scheduled for a specific public place is that the permit must be
for the assembly being held there. The exercise of such a right, in the language of Justice Roberts, speaking for the American Supreme Court, is not
to be "abridged on the plea that it may be exercised in some other place.[17] (emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Notably, respondent failed to indicate in his Comment any basis or explanation for his action. It smacks of whim and caprice for respondent to just impose
a change of venue for an assembly that was slated for a specific public place. It is thus reversible error for the appellate court not to have found such grave
abuse of discretion and, under specific statutory
provision, not to have modified the permit in terms satisfactory to the applicant.[18]

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 94949 are REVERSED. The Court DECLARES that
respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in modifying the rally permit issued on insofar as it altered the venue from to Plaza Miranda.

SO ORDERED.

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Chairperson
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO LUCAS P. BERSAMIN

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the above decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

[1] Represented by its National President Jose Anselmo Cadiz.

[2] Penned by Justice Myrna Dimaranan Vidal with Justice Eliezer R. De Los Santos and Justice Fernanda Lampas Peralta concurring; rollo, pp. 50-54.
[3] Penned by Justice Myrna Dimaranan Vidal with Justice Amelita G. Tolentino and Justice Fernanda Lampas Peralta concurring; id. at 56.
[4] at 62-63.
[5] at 64. It was signed by Business Promotion and Development Office Director Gerino Tolentino, Jr. by authority of the Mayor.
[6] at 65-74.
[7] BATAS PAMBANSA Blg. 880 (), Sec. 6(g).
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 205956 February 12, 2014
P/SUPT. HANSEL M. MARANTAN, Petitioner,
vs.
ATTY. JOSE MANUEL DIOKNO and MONIQUE CU-UNJIENG LA'O, Respondents.
RESOLUTION
MENDOZA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition to cite respondents in contempt of Court.
Petitioner P/Supt. Hansel M. Marantan (Marantan) is the respondent in G.R. No. 199462,1 a petition filed on December 6, 2011, but already dismissed
although the disposition is not yet final. Respondent Monique Cu-Unjieng La'O (La ‘O) is one of the petitioners in the said case, while respondent Atty.
Jose Manuel Diokno (Atty. Diokno) is her counsel therein.
G.R. No. 199462 relates to Criminal Case Nos. 146413-PSG, 146414-PSG and 146415-PSG, entitled "People of the Philippines v. P/SINSP Hansel M.
Marantan, et al.," pending before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 265 (RTC), where Marantan and his co-accused are charged with
homicide. The criminal cases involve an incident which transpired on November 7, 2005, where Anton Cu-Unjieng (son of respondent La’O), Francis
Xavier Manzano, and Brian Anthony Dulay, were shot and killed by police officers in front of the AIC Gold Tower at Ortigas Center, which incident was
captured by a television crew from UNTV 37 (Ortigas incident).
In G.R. No. 199462, La’O, together with the other petitioners, prayed, among others, that the resolution of the Office of the Ombudsman downgrading the
charges from murder to homicide be annulled and set aside; that the corresponding informations for homicide be withdrawn; and that charges for murder be
filed.
In the meantime, on January 6, 2013, a shooting incident occurred in Barangay Lumutan, Municipality of Atimonan, Province of Quezon, where Marantan
was the ground commander in a police-military team, which resulted in the death of thirteen (13) men (Atimonan incident). This encounter, according to
Marantan, elicited much negative publicity for him.
Marantan alleges that, riding on the unpopularity of the Atimonan incident, La’O and her counsel, Atty. Diokno, and one Ernesto Manzano, organized and
conducted a televised/radio broadcasted press conference. During the press conference, they maliciously made intemperate and unreasonable comments on
the conduct of the Court in handling G.R. No. 199462, as well as contumacious comments on the merits of the criminal cases before the RTC, branding
Marantan and his co-accused guilty of murder in the Ortigas incident.
On January 29, 2013, this interview was featured in "TV Patrol," an ABS-CBN news program. Marantan quotes2 a portion of the interview, as follows:
Atty. Diokno
So ang lumabas din sa video that the actual raw footage of the UNTV is very long. Ang nangyari, you see the police officers may nilalagay sila sa loob ng
sasakyan ng victims na parang pinapalabas nila that there was a shootout pero ang nangyari na yon e tapos na, patay na.
Ernesto Manzano
Kung sinasabi nilang carnapper dapat huliin nilang buhay yong mga mahal naming sa buhay and kinasuhan pero ang ginawa nila, sila mismo na ang
nagbigay ng hatol.
Monique Cu-Unjieng La’o
Sinasabi nila na may kinarnap siya, tinutukan ng baril, hindi magagawa yong kasi kilala ko siya, anak ko yon e x x x he is already so arrogant because they
protected him all these years. They let him get away with it. So even now, so confident of what he did, I mean confident of murdering so many innocent
individuals.
Atty. Diokno
Despite the overwhelming evidence, however, Supt. Marantan and company have never been disciplined, suspended or jailed for their participation in the
Ortigas rubout, instead they were commended by their superiors and some like Marantan were even promoted to our consternation and disgust. Ang
problema po e hangang ngayon, we filed a Petition in the Supreme Court December 6, 2011, humihingi po kami noon ng Temporary Restraining Order, etc.
– hangang ngayon wala pa pong action ang Supreme Court yong charge kung tama ba yong pag charge ng homicide lamang e subalit kitang kita naman na
they were killed indiscriminately and maliciously.
Atty. Diokno
Eight years have passed since our love ones were murdered, but the policemen who killed them led by Supt. Hansel Marantan the same man who is
involved in the Atimonan killings – still roam free and remain unpunished. Mr. President, while we are just humble citizens, we firmly believe that police
rub-out will not stop until you personally intervene.
Ernesto Manzano
Up to this date, we are still praying for justice.
Monique Cu-Unjieng La’o
Ilalaban namin ito no matter what it takes, we have the evidence with us, I mean everything shows that they were murdered.
(Emphasis supplied by petitioner)
Marantan submits that the respondents violated the sub judice rule, making them liable for indirect contempt under Section 3(d) of Rule 71 of the Rules of
Court, for their contemptuous statements and improper conduct tending directly or indirectly to impede, obstruct or degrade the administration of justice.
He argues that their pronouncements and malicious comments delved not only on the supposed inaction of the Court in resolving the petitions filed, but
also on the merits of the criminal cases before the RTC and prematurely concluded that he and his co-accused are guilty of murder. It is Maranta’s position
that the press conference was organized by the respondents for the sole purpose of influencing the decision of the Court in the petition filed before it and
the outcome of the criminal cases before the RTC by drawing an ostensible parallelism between the Ortigas incident and the Atimonan incident.
The respondents, in their Comment,3 argue that there was no violation of the sub judice rule as their statements were legitimate expressions of their
desires, hopes and opinions which were taken out of context and did not actually impede, obstruct or degrade the administration of justice in a concrete
way; that no criminal intent was shown as the utterances were not on their face actionable being a fair comment of a matter of public interest and concern;
and that this petition is intended to stifle legitimate speech.
The petition must fail.
The sub judice rule restricts comments and disclosures pertaining to the judicial proceedings in order to avoid prejudging the issue, influencing the court,
or obstructing the administration of justice. A violation of this rule may render one liable for indirect contempt under Sec. 3(d), Rule 71 of the Rules of
Court,4 which reads:
Section 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and hearing. – x x x a person guilty of any of the following acts may be punished for indirect
contempt:
xxx
(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice[.]
The proceedings for punishment of indirect contempt are criminal in nature.5 This form of contempt is conduct that is directed against the dignity and
authority of the court or a judge acting judicially; it is an act obstructing the administration of justice which tends to bring the court into disrepute or
disrespect. Intent is a necessary element in criminal contempt, and no one can be punished for a criminal contempt unless the evidence makes it clear that
he intended to commit it.6
For a comment to be considered as contempt of court "it must really appear" that such does impede, interfere with and embarrass the administration of
justice.7 What is, thus, sought to be protected is the all-important duty of the court to administer justice in the decision of a pending case.8 The specific
rationale for the sub judice rule is that courts, in the decision of issues of fact and law should be immune from every extraneous influence; that facts should
be decided upon evidence produced in court; and that the determination of such facts should be uninfluenced by bias, prejudice or sympathies.91âwphi1
The power of contempt is inherent in all courts in order to allow them to conduct their business unhampered by publications and comments which tend to
impair the impartiality of their decisions or otherwise obstruct the administration of justice. As important as the maintenance of freedom of speech, is the
maintenance of the independence of the Judiciary. The "clear and present danger" rule may serve as an aid in determining the proper constitutional
boundary between these two rights.10
The "clear and present danger" rule means that the evil consequence of the comment must be "extremely serious and the degree of imminence extremely
high" before an utterance can be punished. There must exist a clear and present danger that the utterance will harm the administration of justice. Freedom
of speech should not be impaired through the exercise of the power of contempt of court unless there is no doubt that the utterances in question make a
serious and imminent threat to the administration of justice. It must constitute an imminent, not merely a likely, threat.11
The contemptuous statements made by the respondents allegedly relate to the merits of the case, particularly the guilt of petitioner, and the conduct of the
Court as to its failure to decide G.R. No. 199462.
As to the merits, the comments seem to be what the respondents claim to be an expression of their opinion that their loved ones were murdered by
Marantan. This is merely a reiteration of their position in G.R. No. 199462, which precisely calls the Court to upgrade the charges from homicide to
murder. The Court detects no malice on the face of the said statements. The mere restatement of their argument in their petition cannot actually, or does not
even tend to, influence the Court.
As to the conduct of the Court, a review of the respondents' comments reveals that they were simply stating that it had not yet resolved their petition. There
was no complaint, express or implied, that an inordinate amount of time had passed since the petition was filed without any action from the Court. There
appears no attack or insult on the dignity of the Court either.
"A public utterance or publication is not to be denied the constitutional protection of freedom of speech and press merely because it concerns a judicial
proceeding still pending in the cou1is, upon the theory that in such a case, it must necessarily tend to obstruct the orderly and fair administration of
justice."12 By no stretch of the imagination could the respondents' comments pose a serious and imminent threat to the administration of justice. No
criminal intent to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice can be inferred from the comments of the respondents.
Freedom of public comment should, in borderline instances, weigh heavily against a possible tendency to influence pending cases. 13 The power to punish
for contempt, being drastic and extraordinary in its nature, should not be resorted to unless necessary in the interest of justice. 14 In the present case, such
necessity is wanting.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
Chairperson

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA ROBERTO A. ABAD

Associate Justice Associate Justice
MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN
Associate Justice
ATT E S TAT I O N
I attest that the conclusions in the above Resolution had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court's Division.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
C E R TI F I CATI O N
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the above Resolution
had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice

Footnotes
1 Jennifer Eloise V. Mazano and Monique Cu-Unjieng La’O v. Hon. Conchita Carpio-Morales. in her capacity as Ombudsman: Hon. Orlando