Page 1 of 63

Table of Contents
Due Process.....................................................................................................................................2
(1) Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations, G.R. No. 46496, February 27, 1940.....2
(2) Ichong v. Hernandez, G.R. No. L-7995, May 31, 1957................................................4
(3) Ynot v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 74457, March 20, 1987..................6
(4) Philippine Communications Satellite Corp. v. Alcuaz, G.R. No. 84818, December
18, 1989.......................................................................................................................................8
(5) Ateneo de Manila v. Capulong, G.R. No. 99327, May 27, 1993................................13
(6) Philippine Phosphate Fertilizer Corp. v. Torres, G.R. No. 98050, March 17, 199415
(7) Aniag v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 104961, October 7, 1994..........................................17
(8) Alonte v. Savellano, G.R. No. 131652, March 9, 1998...............................................19
(9) Agabon v. National Labor Relations Commission, 442 SCRA 573.............................21
(10) Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v. Anti- Terrorism Council, 632
SCRA 146.................................................................................................................................24
Equal protection of the Laws......................................................................................................26
(11) People v. Vera, G.R. No. 45685, November 16, 1937.................................................26
(12) Ormoc Sugar Co., Inc. v. Treasurer of Ormoc City, G.R. No. L-23794, February
17, 1968.....................................................................................................................................28
(13) Villegas v. Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho, G.R. No. L-29646, November 10, 1978..........30
(14) Dumlao v. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-52245, January 22, 1980..................................32
(15) Philippine Association of Service Exporters v. Drilon, G.R. No. L-81958, June 30,
1988 35
(16) Himagan v. People, G.R. No. 113811, October 7, 1994..............................................38
(17) Almonte v. Vazquez, G.R. No. 95367, May 23, 1995..................................................42
(18) Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc.; G.R. No. 167614; March 24, 2009.....44
(19) Quinto v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 189698, February 22, 2010....................................49
(20) Biraogo v. The Philippine Truth Commission, G.R. No. 192935, December 7, 2010
51
(21) Garcia v. Drilon, G.R. No. 179267, June 25, 2013.......................................................57
(22) Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, Inc. v. Cabiles, 732 SCRA 22........................62
 Page 2 of 63

Due Process
(1) Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations, G.R. No. 46496, February 27,
1940

DOCTRINE: CARDINAL PRIMARY RIGHTS: There are cardinal primary rights which
must be respected even in proceedings of this character:

1. The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party
interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof.
“The liberty and property of the citizen shall be protected by the rudimentary
requirements of fair play.”
2. Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce
evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider
the evidence presented.
3. “While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply
a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its
decision. A decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity, a place when
directly attached.” This principle emanates from the more fundamental principle that the
genius of constitutional government is contrary to the vesting of unlimited power
anywhere. Law is both a grant and a limitation upon power.
4. Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion, but the
evidence must be “substantial.” “Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It
means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.”

FACTS:

1. Teodoro Toribio is the owner of Ang Tibay, a leather company which supplies leather
goods to the Philippine Army.
2. Toribio claimed that on September 26, 1938, there was shortage of leather soles in ANG
TIBAY making it necessary for him to temporarily lay off 89 members of the National
Labor Union Inc., (NLU).
3. However, members of NLU avers otherwise.
4. They claimed that Toribio was guilty of unfair labor practice for discriminating against
the NLU and unjustly favoring the National Workers‘ Brotherhood (NWB).
5. The NLU filed a motion for new trial asking the SC to allow the same as they were able
to obtain new evidence and documents that were not presented before the CIR as the
same were inaccessible at that time.
6. The Solicitor-General in behalf of the respondent Court of Industrial Relations in the
above entitled case has filed a motion for reconsideration and moves that, for the reasons
stated in his motion, the SC reconsider the legal conclusions of the majority opinion.

ISSUE: Whether special courts like Court of Industrial Relations should observe due process.
 Page 3 of 63

RULING:

1. Yes. The Court of Industrial Relations is not narrowly constrained by technical rules of
procedure, and Commonwealth Act No. 103 requires it to act according to justice and
equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal evidence
but may inform its mind in such manner as it may deem just and equitable.
2. There are cardinal primary rights which must be respected even in proceedings of this
character.
3. The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party
interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof.
4. Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce
evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider
the evidence presented.
5. While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply
a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its
decision.
6. Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion, but the
evidence must be substantial.
7. The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least
contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected.
8. The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his
own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply
accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision.
9. The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions, render its
decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues
involved, and the reasons for the decisions rendered.
10. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.
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(2) Ichong v. Hernandez, G.R. No. L-7995, May 31, 1957

DOCTRINE:

1. The conflict, therefore, between police power and the guarantees of due process and
equal protection of the laws is more apparent than real.
2. Properly related, the power and the guarantees are supposed to coexist.
3. The balancing is the essence or, shall it be said, the indispensable means for the
attainment of legitimate aspirations of any democratic society.
4. There can be no absolute power, whoever exercise it, for that would be tyranny.
5. Yet there can neither be absolute liberty, for that would mean license and anarchy.
6. So the State can deprive persons of life, liberty and property, provided there is due
process of law; and persons may be classified into classes and groups, provided everyone
is given the equal protection of the law.

FACTS:

1. Petitioner Inchong, for and in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien resident
corporations and partnerships adversely affected by the provisions of Republic Act. No.
1180, brought this action to obtain a judicial declaration that said Act is unconstitutional,
and to enjoin the Secretary of Finance and all other persons acting under him, particularly
city and municipal treasurers, from enforcing its provisions.
2. Inchong attacks the constitutionality of the Act, contending that:
a. it denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives of their
liberty and property without due process of law ;
b. the subject of the Act is not expressed or comprehended in the title thereof;
c. the Act violates international and treaty obligations of the Republic of the
Philippines;
d. the provisions of the Act against the transmission by aliens of their retail business
thru hereditary succession, and those requiring 100% Filipino capitalization for a
corporation or entity to entitle it to engage in the retail business, violate the spirit
of Sections 1 and 5, Article XIII and Section 8 of Article XIV of the Constitution.
3. In answer, the Solicitor-General and the Fiscal of the City of Manila contend that:
a. the Act was passed in the valid exercise of the police power of the State, which
exercise is authorized in the Constitution in the interest of national economic
survival;
b. the Act has only one subject embraced in the title;
c. no treaty or international obligations are infringed;
d. as regards hereditary succession, only the form is affected but the value of the
property is not impaired, and the institution of inheritance is only of statutory
origin.

ISSUE: Whether RA 1180 is unconstitutional since its exercise violates one’s right to due
process and equal protection as guaranteed by the Constitution.
 Page 5 of 63

RULING:

1. NO. The Court finds the enactment of RA 1180 to clearly fall within the scope of police
power of the State.
2. It is clear that the law in question was enacted to remedy a real and actual threat and
danger to the national economy posed by alien dominance and control of retail business
and free citizens and country from the said dominance and control.
3. It has been said the police power is so far - reaching in scope, that it has become almost
impossible to limit its sweep.
4. As it derives its existence from the very existence of the State itself, it does not need to be
expressed or defined in its scope; it is said to be co-extensive with self-protection and
survival, and as such it is the most positive and active of all governmental processes, the
most essential, insistent and illimitable.
5. Especially is it so under a modern democratic framework where the demands of society
and of nations have multiplied to almost unimaginable proportions; the field and scope of
police power has become almost boundless, just as the fields of public interest and public
welfare have become almost all-embracing and have transcended human foresight.
6. However, the Constitution has set forth limitations thereof and the most important of
these are: the due process clause and the equal protection clause.
7. The conflict, therefore, between police power and the guarantees of due process and
equal protection of the laws is more apparent than real.
8. Properly related, the power and the guarantees are supposed to coexist.
9. The balancing is the essence or, shall it be said, the indispensable means for the
attainment of legitimate aspirations of any democratic society.
10. There can be no absolute power, whoever exercise it, for that would be tyranny.
11. Yet there can neither be absolute liberty, for that would mean license and anarchy.
12. So the State can deprive persons of life, liberty and property, provided there is due
process of law; and persons may be classified into classes and groups, provided everyone
is given the equal protection of the law.
13. The test or standard, as always, is reason.
14. The police power legislation must be firmly grounded on public interest and welfare, and
a reasonable relation must exist between purposes and means.
15. And if distinction and classification has been made, there must be a reasonable basis for
said distinction.
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(3) Ynot v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 74457, March 20, 1987

DOCTRINE:

1. The minimum requirements of due process are notice and hearing which, generally
speaking, may not be dispensed with because they are intended as a safeguard against
official arbitrariness.
2. It is a gratifying commentary on our judicial system that the jurisprudence of this country
is rich with applications of this guaranty as proof of our fealty to the rule of law and the
ancient rudiments of fair play.
3. We have consistently declared that every person, faced by the awesome power of the
State, is entitled to "the law of the land," which Daniel Webster described almost two
hundred years ago in the famous Dartmouth College Case, 14 as "the law which hears
before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial."
4. It has to be so if the rights of every person are to be secured beyond the reach of officials
who, out of mistaken zeal or plain arrogance, would degrade the due process clause into a
worn and empty catchword.

FACTS:

1. There had been an existing law which prohibited the slaughtering of carabaos (EO 626).
To strengthen the law, Marcos issued EO 626-A which not only banned the movement of
carabaos from interprovinces but as well as the movement of carabeef.
2. On 13 Jan 1984, Ynot was caught transporting 6 carabaos from Masbate to Iloilo.
3. He was then charged in violation of EO 626-A. Ynot averred EO 626-A as
unconstitutional for it violated his right to be heard or his right to due process.
4. He said that the authority provided by EO 626-A to outrightly confiscate carabaos even
without being heard is unconstitutional.
5. The lower court ruled against Ynot ruling that the EO is a valid exercise of police power
in order to promote general welfare so as to curb down the indiscriminate slaughter of
carabaos.

ISSUE: Whether the said Executive Order is valid

RULING:

1. The SC ruled that the EO is not valid as it indeed violates due process. EO 626-A created
a presumption based on the judgment of the executive.
2. The movement of carabaos from one area to the other does not mean a subsequent
slaughter of the same would ensue.
3. Ynot should be given to defend himself and explain why the carabaos are being
transferred before they can be confiscated.
4. The SC found that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power
because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the
purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive.
 Page 7 of 63

5. Due process is violated because the owner of the property confiscated is denied the right
to be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and punished.
6. The conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the
supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the
doctrine of separation of powers.
7. There is, finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned
therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties
arbitrarily taken.
 Page 8 of 63

(4) Philippine Communications Satellite Corp. v. Alcuaz, G.R. No. 84818,

December 18, 1989

DOCTRINE:

1. The inherent power and authority of the State, or its authorized agent, to regulate the rates
charged by public utilities should be subject always to the requirement that the rates so
fixed shall be reasonable and just.
2. A commission has no power to fix rates which are unreasonable or to regulate them
arbitrarily.
3. This basic requirement of reasonableness comprehends such rates which must not be so
low as to be confiscatory, or too high as to be oppressive.

FACTS:

1. By virtue of Republic Act No. 5514, PHILCOMSAT was granted "a franchise to
establish, construct, maintain and operate in the Philippines, at such places as the grantee
may select, station or stations and associated equipment and facilities for international
satellite communications."
2. Under this franchise, it was likewise granted the authority to "construct and operate such
ground facilities as needed to deliver telecommunications services from the
communications satellite system and ground terminal or terminals."
3. Pursuant to said franchise, petitioner, since 1967, has established its earth stations and
antennas to provide direct satellite communication.
4. Since 1968, the petitioner has been leasing its satellite circuits to different telephone,
cable, and radio companies.
5. The satellite services thus provided by petitioner enable said international carriers to
serve the public with indispensable communication services, such as overseas telephone,
telex, facsimile, telegrams, high speed data, live television in full color, and television
standard conversion from European to American or vice versa.
6. Under Section 5 of Republic Act No. 5514, petitioner was exempt from the jurisdiction of
the then Public Service Commission, now respondent NTC.
7. However, Executive Order No. 196 placed the petitioner under the jurisdiction, control
and regulation of respondent NTC, including all its facilities and services and the fixing
of rates.
8. Implementing said Executive Order No. 196, respondents required petitioner to apply for
the requisite certificate of public convenience and necessity covering its facilities and the
services it renders, as well as the corresponding authority to charge rates therefor.
9. Petitioner filed with respondent NTC an application for authority to continue operating
and maintaining the same facilities it has been continuously operating and maintaining
since 1967, to continue providing the international satellite communications services it
has likewise been providing since 1967, and to charge the current rates applied for in
rendering such services.
 Page 9 of 63

10. Pending hearing, it also applied for a provisional authority so that it can continue to
operate and maintain the above-mentioned facilities, provide the services and charge
therefor the aforesaid rates therein applied for.
11. Petitioner was granted one-year provisional authority to continue operating its existing
facilities, to render the services it was then offering, and to charge the rates it was then
charging.
12. The NTC order had extended the provisional authority of the petitioner for another six (6)
months, but it directed the petitioner to charge modified reduced rates through a reduction
of fifteen percent (15%) on the present authorized rates.
13. Respondent Commissioner ordered said reduction on the ground that the Commission in
its on-going review of present service rates takes note that after an initial evaluation of
the financial statements of applicant, there is merit in a reduction in some of applicant's
rates, subject to further reductions, should the Commission find in its further evaluation
that more reduction should be effected either on the basis of a provisional authorization
or in the final consideration of the case.
14. PHILCOMSAT now assails the order. Petitioner asseverates that nowhere in the
provisions of Executive Order No. 546, providing for the creation of respondent NTC and
granting its rate-fixing powers, nor of Executive Order No. 196, placing petitioner under
the jurisdiction of respondent NTC, can it be inferred that respondent NTC is guided by
any standard in the exercise of its rate-fixing and adjudicatory powers.
15. While petitioner in its petition-in-chief raised the issue of undue delegation of legislative
power, it subsequently clarified its said submission to mean that the order mandating a
reduction of certain rates is undue delegation not of legislative but of quasi-judicial
power to respondent NTC, the exercise of which allegedly requires an express
conferment by the legislative body.
16. Respondent NTC contends that the questioned order was issued pursuant to its quasi-
judicial functions.
17. It, however, insists that notice and hearing are not necessary since the assailed order is
merely incidental to the entire proceedings and, therefore, temporary in nature.
18. Petitioner contends that the rate reduction is confiscatory in that its implementation
would virtually result in a cessation of its operations and eventual closure of business.
19. On the other hand, respondents assert that since petitioner is operating its
communications satellite facilities through a legislative franchise, as such grantee it has
no vested right therein.
20. What it has is merely a privilege or license which may be revoked at will by the State at
any time without necessarily violating any vested property right of herein petitioner.
21. While petitioner concedes this thesis of respondent, it counters that the withdrawal of
such privilege should nevertheless be neither whimsical nor arbitrary, but it must be fair
and reasonable.

ISSUE: Whether the questioned order violates procedural due process for having been issued
without prior notice and hearing and the rate reduction it imposes is unjust, unreasonable and
confiscatory, thus constitutive of a violation of substantive due process.

RULING:
 Page 10 of 63

1. Yes. The Court finds merit on the petitioner’s contention that the questioned order
violates procedural due process because it was issued without notice to petitioner and
without the benefit of a hearing.
2. Petitioner laments that said order was based merely on an "initial evaluation," and that the
petitioner had not been given an opportunity to present its side before the order in
question was issued.
3. Petitioner argues that the function involved in the rate fixing-power of NTC is
adjudicatory and hence quasi-judicial, not quasi- legislative; thus, notice and hearing are
necessary and the absence thereof results in a violation of due process.
4. Fundamental is the rule that delegation of legislative power may be sustained only upon
the ground that some standard for its exercise is provided and that the legislature in
making the delegation has prescribed the manner of the exercise of the delegated power.
5. Therefore, when the administrative agency concerned, respondent NTC in this case,
establishes a rate, its act must both be non- confiscatory and must have been established
in the manner prescribed by the legislature; otherwise, in the absence of a fixed standard,
the delegation of power becomes unconstitutional.
6. In case of a delegation of rate-fixing power, the only standard which the legislature is
required to prescribe for the guidance of the administrative authority is that the rate be
reasonable and just.
7. However, it has been held that even in the absence of an express requirement as to
reasonableness, this standard may be implied.
8. As previously ruled, there is a categorical classification as to when the rate-filing power
of administrative bodies is quasi-judicial and when it is legislative.
9. When there is need for cross-examination and introducing evidence to disprove the
contents of a report and/or explain or complement the same, the making of said finding of
fact, the function performed partake of a quasi-judicial character, the valid exercise of
which demands previous notice and hearing.
10. It was enunciated in another case that:
a. It is also clear from the authorities that where the function of the administrative
body is legislative, notice of hearing is not required by due process of law.
b. But where a public administrative body acts in a judicial or quasi-judicial matter,
and its acts are particular and immediate rather than general and prospective, the
person whose rights or property may be affected by the action is entitled to notice
and hearing.
11. The contention of respondent is bereft of merit.
12. While respondents may fix a temporary rate pending final determination of the
application of petitioner, such rate-fixing order, temporary though it may be, is not
exempt from the statutory procedural requirements of notice and hearing, as well as the
requirement of reasonableness.
13. Assuming that such power is vested in NTC, it may not exercise the same in an arbitrary
and confiscatory manner.
14. Categorizing such an order as temporary in nature does not perforce entail the
applicability of a different rule of statutory procedure than would otherwise be applied to
any other order on the same matter unless otherwise provided by the applicable law.
15. In the case at bar, the applicable statutory provision is Section 16(c) of the Public Service
Act which provides:
 Page 11 of 63

a. Section 16. Proceedings of the Commission, upon notice and hearing the
Commission shall have power, upon proper notice and hearing in accordance with
the rules and provisions of this Act, subject to the limitations and exceptions
mentioned and saving provisions to the contrary:

xxx xxx xxx

(c) To fix and determine individual or joint rates, ... which shall be imposed,
observed and followed thereafter by any public service; ...

16. There is no reason to assume that the aforesaid provision does not apply to respondent
NTC, there being no limiting, excepting, or saving provisions to the contrary in Executive
Orders Nos. 546 and 196.
17. The order in question which was issued by respondent Alcuaz no doubt contains all the
attributes of a quasi-judicial adjudication.
18. Further, it is premised on a finding of fact that there is merit in a reduction of some of the
rates charged- based on an initial evaluation of petitioner's financial statements-without
affording petitioner the benefit of an explanation as to what particular aspect or aspects of
the financial statements warranted a corresponding rate reduction.
19. No rationalization was offered which prompted respondents to impose as much as a
fifteen percent (15%) rate reduction.
20. It is reasonable to assume that petitioner could be in a better position to rationalize its
rates with regard to the viability of its business requirements.
21. Petitioner was not even afforded the opportunity to cross-examine the inspector who
issued the report on which respondent NTC based its order.
22. On the contention of the Petitioner that the rate reduction is confiscatory in that its
implementation would virtually result in a cessation of its operations and eventual closure
of business.
23. There is no question that petitioner is a mere grantee of a legislative franchise which is
subject to amendment, alteration, or repeal by Congress when the common good so
requires.
24. Apparently, therefore, such grant cannot be unilaterally revoked absent a showing that the
termination of the operation of said utility is required by the common good.
25. The power of the State to regulate the conduct and business of public utilities is not the
power to destroy useful and harmless enterprises, but is the power to protect, foster,
promote, preserve, and control with due regard for the interest of the public, of the utility
and of its patrons.
26. Any regulation, therefore, which operates as an effective confiscation of private property
or constitutes an arbitrary or unreasonable infringement of property rights, is void,
because it is repugnant to the constitutional guaranties of due process and equal
protection of the laws.
27. Hence, the inherent power and authority of the State, or its authorized agent, to regulate
the rates charged by public utilities should be subject always to the requirement that the
rates so fixed shall be reasonable and just.
28. A commission has no power to fix rates which are unreasonable or to regulate them
arbitrarily.
 Page 12 of 63

29. This basic requirement of reasonableness comprehends such rates which must not be so
low as to be confiscatory, or too high as to be oppressive.
30. Consequently, we hold that the challenged order, particularly on the issue of rates
provided therein, being violative of the due process clause is void and should be nullified.
31. Respondents should now proceed, as they should heretofore have done, with the hearing
and determination of petitioner's pending application for a certificate of public
convenience and necessity and in which proceeding the subject of rates involved in the
present controversy, as well as other matter involved in said application, be duly
adjudicated with reasonable dispatch and with due observance of our pronouncements
herein.
 Page 13 of 63

(5) Ateneo de Manila v. Capulong, G.R. No. 99327, May 27, 1993

DOCTRINE:

1. Respondent students argue that petitioners are not in a position to file the instant petition
under Rule 65 considering that they failed to file a motion for reconsideration first before
the trial court, thereby by passing the latter and the Court of Appeals.
2. It is accepted legal doctrine that an exception to the doctrine of exhaustion of remedies is
when the case involves a question of law, as in this case, where the issue is whether or
not respondent students have been afforded procedural due process prior to their
dismissal from petitioner university.

FACTS:

1. Leonardo H. Villa, a first-year law student of Petitioner University, died of serious

physical injuries at Chinese General Hospital after the initiation rites of Aquila Legis.
Bienvenido Marquez was also hospitalized at the Capitol Medical Center for acute renal
failure occasioned by the serious physical injuries inflicted upon him on the same
occasion.
2. Petitioner Dean Cynthia del Castillo created a Joint Administration-Faculty-Student
Investigating Committee which was tasked to investigate and submit a report within 72
hours on the circumstances surrounding the death of Lennie Villa. Said notice also
required respondent students to submit their written statements within twenty-four (24)
hours from receipt. Although respondent students received a copy of the written notice,
they failed to file a reply. In the meantime, they were placed on preventive suspension.
3. The Joint Administration-Faculty-Student Investigating Committee, after receiving the
written statements and hearing the testimonies of several witness, found a prima facie
case against respondent students for violation of Rule 3 of the Law School Catalogue
entitled "Discipline." Respondent students were then required to file their written answers
to the formal charge.
4. Petitioner Dean created a Disciplinary Board to hear the charges against respondent
students. The Board found respondent students guilty of violating Rule No. 3 of the
Ateneo Law School Rules on Discipline which prohibits participation in hazing activities.
However, in view of the lack of unanimity among the members of the Board on the
penalty of dismissal, the Board left the imposition of the penalty to the University
Administration.
5. Accordingly, Fr. Bernas imposed the penalty of dismissal on all respondent students.
6. Respondent students filed with RTC Makati a TRO since they are currently enrolled. This
was granted. A TRO was also issued enjoining petitioners from dismissing the
respondents. A day after the expiration of the temporary restraining order, Dean del
Castillo created a Special Board to investigate the charges of hazing against respondent
students Abas and Mendoza. This was requested to be stricken out by the respondents
and argued that the creation of the Special Board was totally unrelated to the original
petition which alleged lack of due process. This was granted and reinstatement of the
students was ordered.
 Page 14 of 63

ISSUE: Was there denial of due process against the respondent students.

RULING:

1. There was no denial of due process, more particularly procedural due process.
2. Dean of the Ateneo Law School, notified and required respondent students to submit their
written statement on the incident.
3. Instead of filing a reply, respondent students requested through their counsel, copies of
the charges.
4. The nature and cause of the accusation were adequately spelled out in petitioners' notices.
Present is the twin elements of notice and hearing.
5. Respondent students argue that petitioners are not in a position to file the instant petition
under Rule 65 considering that they failed to file a motion for reconsideration first before
the trial court, thereby by passing the latter and the Court of Appeals.
6. It is accepted legal doctrine that an exception to the doctrine of exhaustion of remedies is
when the case involves a question of law, as in this case, where the issue is whether or
not respondent students have been afforded procedural due process prior to their
dismissal from Petitioner University.
7. Minimum standards to be satisfied in the imposition of disciplinary sanctions in academic
institutions:
a. The students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any
accusation against them;
b. that they shall have the right to answer the charges against them with the
assistance of counsel, if desired:
c. they shall be informed of the evidence against them
d. they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and
e. the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official
designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case.
 Page 15 of 63

(6) Philippine Phosphate Fertilizer Corp. v. Torres, G.R. No. 98050, March 17,
1994

DOCTRINE:

1. The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or, as applied to

administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek
a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.

FACTS:

1. The PhilPhos Movement for Progress (PMPI), a labor organization composed of

supervisory employees of the Philippine Phosphate Fertilizer Corporation, filed a
certification election on July 7, 1989 with the Department of Labor and Employment.
2. The move was not contested by the Philippine Phosphate Fertilizer Corporation
management and in fact was supported by a position paper submitted to the Mediator-
Arbiter on August 11, 1989.
3. The management hailed the creation of a supervisor’s union provided that they meet all
the necessary legal requirements.
4. On October 13, 1989 the Mediator-Arbiter Milado issued an order for the holding of the
elections excluding the technical, professional and confidential employees.
5. Then on November15, 1989 respondent PMPI prayed for the inclusion of technical,
professional and confidential employees.
6. On December 14, 1989 both parties submitted their position papers on the said subject
matter.
7. Mr. Milado, allowing the membership of other employees as stated, granted the petition
of PMPI.
8. Petitioner then moved to have the technical, professional and confidential employees
removed from the membership of the PMPI on April 16, 1990 to the Secretary of Labor
and Employment and a decision was made on August 7, 1990 dismissing the appeal and
the subsequent motion for reconsideration.
9. Then on July 8, 1991 the Court issued a temporary restraining order against the holding
of the certification election scheduled on July 12, 1991 pending judicial review.

ISSUE: Whether PHILPHOS was denied due process when respondent Mediator-Arbiter
granted the amended petition of respondent PMPI without according PHILPHOS a new
opportunity to be heard.

RULING:

1. No. The essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard or, as applied to
administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's side or an opportunity to seek
a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.
2. Where, as in the instant case, petitioner PHILPHOS agreed to file its position paper with
the Mediator-Arbiter and to consider the case submitted for decision on the basis of the
 Page 16 of 63

position papers filed by the parties, there was sufficient compliance with the requirement
of due process, as petitioner was afforded reasonable opportunity to present its side.
3. Moreover, petitioner could have, if it so desired, insisted on a hearing to confront and
examine the witnesses of the other party.
4. But it did not; instead, it opted to submit its position paper with the Mediator-Arbiter.
5. Besides, petitioner had all the opportunity to ventilate its arguments in its appeal to the
Secretary of Labor
 Page 17 of 63

(7) Aniag v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 104961, October 7, 1994

DOCTRINE:

1. The essence of due process is the reasonable opportunity to be heard and to submit any
evidence one may have in support of his defense.
2. Due process guarantees the observance of both substantive and procedural rights,
whatever the source of such rights, be it the Constitution itself or only a statute or a rule
of court.

FACTS:

1. In preparation for the synchronized national and local elections, the COMELEC issued
Resolution No. 2323 otherwise referred to as the "Gun Ban.
2. Subsequently, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 2327 providing for the summary
disqualification of candidates engaged in gunrunning, using and transporting of firearms,
organizing special strike forces, and establishing spot checkpoints.
3. Pursuant to the "Gun Ban, petitioner instructed his driver, Ernesto Arellano, to pick up
the firearms from petitioner's house and return them to Congress.
4. The policemen manning the outpost flagged down the car driven by Arellano as it
approached the checkpoint.
5. They searched the car and found the firearms neatly packed in their gun cases and placed
in a bag in the trunk of the car.
6. Thereafter, the police referred Arellano's case to the Office of the City Prosecutor for
inquest.
7. The referral did not include petitioner as among those charged with an election offense.
8. On 15 January 1992, the City Prosecutor ordered the release of Arellano after finding the
latter's sworn explanation meritorious.
9. The City Prosecutor invited petitioner to shed light on the circumstances mentioned in
Arellano's sworn explanation.
10. The Office of the City Prosecutor issued a resolution which, among other matters,
recommended that the case against Arellano be dismissed and that the "unofficial" charge
against petitioner be also dismissed.
11. Nevertheless, upon recommendation of its Law Department, COMELEC issued
Resolution No. 92-0829 directing the filing of information against petitioner and Arellano
for violation of the Omnibus Election Code and petitioner to show cause why he should
not be disqualified from running for an elective position, pursuant to COMELEC
Resolution No. 2327.

ISSUE: Whether petitioner’s constitutional right to due process has been violated as he was
neither impleaded as party respondent in the preliminary investigation before the Office of the
City Prosecutor nor included in the charge sheet.

RULING:
 Page 18 of 63

1. YES. The manner by which COMELEC proceeded against petitioner runs counter to the
due process clause of the Constitution.
2. The facts show that petitioner was not among those charged by the PNP with violation of
the Omnibus Election Code.
3. Nor was he subjected by the City Prosecutor to a preliminary investigation for such
offense.
4. The non-disclosure by the City Prosecutor to the petitioner that he was a respondent in
the preliminary investigation is violative of due process which requires that the procedure
established by law should be obeyed.
5. The fact that petitioner was invited to enlighten the City Prosecutor regarding the
circumstances leading to the arrest of his driver, and that petitioner in fact submitted a
sworn letter of explanation regarding the incident does not satisfy the requirement of due
process.
6. The essence of due process is the reasonable opportunity to be heard and to submit any
evidence one may have in support of his defense.
7. Due process guarantees the observance of both substantive and procedural rights,
whatever the source of such rights, be it the Constitution itself or only a statute or a rule
of court.
8. Petitioner then was made to believe that he was not a party respondent in the case, so that
his written explanation on the incident was only intended to exculpate Arellano, not
petitioner himself.
9. Hence, it cannot be seriously contended that petitioner was fully given the opportunity to
meet the accusation against him as he was not apprised that he was himself a respondent
when he appeared before the City Prosecutor.
10. In Go v. Court of Appeals,33 the court held that —
11. While the right to preliminary investigation is statutory rather than constitutional in its
fundament, since it has in fact been established by statute, it is a component part of due
process in criminal justice.
12. The right to have a preliminary investigation conducted before being bound over to trial
for a criminal offense and hence formally at risk of incarceration or some other penalty is
not a mere formal or technical right; it is a substantive right . . . . [T]he right to an
opportunity to avoid a process painful to anyone save, perhaps, to hardened criminals is a
valuable right.
13. To deny petitioner's claim to a preliminary investigation would be to deprive him of the
full measure of his right to due process.
14. Finally, it must be pointed out too that petitioner's filing of a motion for reconsideration
with COMELEC cannot be considered as a waiver of his claim to a separate preliminary
investigation for himself.
15. The motion itself expresses petitioner's vigorous insistence on his right.
 Page 19 of 63

(8) Alonte v. Savellano, G.R. No. 131652, March 9, 1998

DOCTRINE:

1. Waiver of due process - The standard of waiver requires that it “not only must be
voluntary, but must be knowing, intelligent, and done with sufficient awareness of the
relevant circumstances and likely consequences.”
2. Mere silence of the holder of the right should not be so construed as a waiver of right,
and the courts must indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver.

FACTS:

1. Bayani M. Alonte, incumbent Mayor of Biñan, Laguna, was accused of raping Juvie-Lyn
Punongbayan with accomplice Buenaventura Concepcion.
2. It was alleged that Concepcion befriended Juvie and had later lured her into Alonte’s
house.
3. The case was brought before the Regional Trial Court of Biňan.
4. The counsel and the prosecutor later moved for a change of venue due to alleged
intimidation.
5. While the change of venue was pending, Juvie executed an affidavit of desistance.
6. The prosecutor continued on with the case and the change of venue was done
notwithstanding opposition from Alonte.
7. The case was raffled to the Manila Regional Trial Court under J. Savellano. Savellano
later found probable cause and had ordered the arrest of Alonte and Concepcion.
8. Thereafter, the prosecution presented Juvie and had attested the voluntariness of her
desistance the same being due to media pressure and that they would rather establish new
life elsewhere.
9. Case was then submitted for decision and Savellano sentenced both accused to reclusion
perpetua.
10. Savellano commented that Alonte waived his right to due process when he did not cross
examine Juvie when clarificatory questions were raised about the details of the rape and
on the voluntariness of her desistance.
11. They did not take the witness stand to refute or deny under oath the truth of the contents
of the private complainant’s aforementioned affidavit which she expressly affirmed and
confirmed in court, but, instead, thru their respective lawyers, they rested and submitted
the case for decision merely on the basis of private complainant’s “desistance” which, to
them, was sufficient enough for their purposes.
12. They left everything to the so called “desistance”.

ISSUE: Whether or not Alonte has been denied criminal due process.

RULING:
 Page 20 of 63

1. The respondent judge rendered a decision in the case without conducting a trial on the
facts which would establish that complainant was raped by the petitioner, a clear
manifestation of denial of due process.
2. The Supreme Court ruled that Savellano should inhibit himself from further deciding on
the case due to animosity between him and the parties.
3. There is no showing that Alonte waived his right.
4. The standard of waiver requires that it “not only must be voluntary, but must be knowing,
intelligent, and done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely
consequences.”
5. Mere silence of the holder of the right should not be so construed as a waiver of right,
and the courts must indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver.
6. Savellano has not shown impartiality by repeatedly not acting on numerous petitions filed
by Alonte.
7. The case is remanded to the lower court for retrial and the decision earlier promulgated is
nullified.
8. Jurisprudence acknowledges that due process in criminal proceedings, in particular,
require:
a. that the court or tribunal trying the case is properly clothed with judicial power to
hear and determine the matter before it;
b. that jurisdiction is lawfully acquired by it over the person of the accused;
c. that the accused is given an opportunity to be heard; and
d. that judgment is rendered only upon lawful hearing. The above constitutional and
jurisprudential postulates, by now elementary and deeply imbedded in our own
criminal justice system, are mandatory and indispensable. The principles find
universal acceptance and are tersely expressed in the oft-quoted statement that
procedural due process cannot possibly be met without a “law which hears before
it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and renders judgment only after trial.”
 Page 21 of 63

(9) Agabon v. National Labor Relations Commission, 442 SCRA 573

DOCTRINE:

1. Procedurally,
a. if the dismissal is based on a just cause under Article 282, the employer must give
the employee two written notices and a hearing or opportunity to be heard if
requested by the employee before terminating the employment: a notice
specifying the grounds for which dismissal is sought a hearing or an opportunity
to be heard and after hearing or opportunity to be heard, a notice of the decision to
dismiss; and
b. if the dismissal is based on authorized causes under Articles 283 and 284, the
employer must give the employee and the Department of Labor and Employment
written notices 30 days prior to the effectivity of his separation.

FACTS:

1. Private respondent Riviera Home Improvements, Inc. is engaged in the business of

selling and installing ornamental and construction materials.
2. It employed petitioners Virgilio Agabon and Jenny Agabon as gypsum board and cornice
installers on January 2, 1992 until February 23, 1999 when they were dismissed for
abandonment of work.
3. Petitioners then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and payment of money claims and
on December 28, 1999, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision declaring the dismissals
illegal and ordered private respondent to pay the monetary claims.
4. It was found out from the investigations that the abandonment from work by the
petitioners was because they subcontracted with another company to which they have
been remanded before when they committed the same initially.
5. The petitioners alleged that due process has not been observed.

ISSUES:

1. Whether petitioners dismissal are illegal.

2. Whether they are entitled to pay.

RULING:

1. No. To dismiss an employee, the law requires not only the existence of a just and valid
cause but also enjoins the employer to give the employee the opportunity to be heard and
to defend himself.
a. Article 282 of the Labor Code enumerates the just causes for termination by the
employer:
i. serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful
orders of his employer or the latters representative in connection with the
employees work;
 Page 22 of 63

ii. gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties;

iii. fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his
employer or his duly authorized representative;
iv. commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the person of
his employer or any immediate member of his family or his duly
authorized representative; and
v. other causes analogous to the foregoing.
b. Abandonment is the deliberate and unjustified refusal of an employee to resume
his employment.
c. It is a form of neglect of duty, hence, a just cause for termination of employment
by the employer. For a valid finding of abandonment, these two factors should be
present:
i. the failure to report for work or absence without valid or justifiable reason;
and
ii. a clear intention to sever employer-employee relationship, with the second
as the more determinative factor which is manifested by overt acts from
which it may be deduced that the employees has no more intention to
work.
d. The intent to discontinue the employment must be shown by clear proof that it
was deliberate and unjustified.
e. Procedurally,
i. if the dismissal is based on a just cause under Article 282, the employer
must give the employee two written notices and a hearing or opportunity
to be heard if requested by the employee before terminating the
employment: a notice specifying the grounds for which dismissal is sought
a hearing or an opportunity to be heard and after hearing or opportunity to
be heard, a notice of the decision to dismiss; and
ii. if the dismissal is based on authorized causes under Articles 283 and 284,
the employer must give the employee and the Department of Labor and
Employment written notices 30 days prior to the effectivity of his
separation.
f. The dismissal should be upheld.
g. While the procedural infirmity cannot be cured, it should not invalidate the
dismissal.
h. However, the employer should be held liable for non-compliance with the
procedural requirements of due process.
2. Yes. The rule thus evolved: where the employer had a valid reason to dismiss an
employee but did not follow the due process requirement, the dismissal may be upheld
but the employer will be penalized to pay an indemnity to the employee.
a. This became known as the Wenphil or Belated Due Process Rule.
b. An employer is liable to pay indemnity in the form of nominal damages to an
employee who has been dismissed if, in effecting such dismissal, the employer
fails to comply with the requirements of due process.
c. The violation of the petitioners right to statutory due process by the private
respondent warrants the payment of indemnity in the form of nominal damages.
 Page 23 of 63

d. The amount of such damages is addressed to the sound discretion of the court,
taking into account the relevant circumstances.
e. Considering the prevailing circumstances in the case at bar, we deem it proper to
fix it at P30,000.00.
f. We believe this form of damages would serve to deter employers from future
violations of the statutory due process rights of employees.
g. At the very least, it provides a vindication or recognition of this fundamental right
granted to the latter under the Labor Code and its Implementing Rules.
 Page 24 of 63

(10) Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v. Anti- Terrorism

Council, 632 SCRA 146

TOPIC: Doctrines of void-for-vagueness and overbreadth

DOCTRINES:

1. The Court stated that "the overbreadth and the vagueness doctrines have special
application only to free-speech cases," and are "not appropriate for testing the validity of
penal statutes."
2. A facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one which is overbroad
because of possible "chilling effect" upon protected speech.
3. This rationale does not apply to penal statutes.
4. Criminal statutes have general in terrorem effect resulting from their very existence, and,
if facial challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the State may well be prevented from
enacting laws against socially harmful conduct.
5. The confusion apparently stems from the interlocking relation of the overbreadth and
vagueness doctrines as grounds for a facial or as-applied challenge against a penal statute
(under a claim of violation of due process of law) or a speech regulation (under a claim of
abridgement of the freedom of speech and cognate rights).
6. To be sure, the doctrine of vagueness and the doctrine of overbreadth do not operate on
the same plane.
7. A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible
standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and
differ as to its application.
8. It is repugnant to the Constitution in two respects:
a. it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted
by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and
b. it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and
becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.
9. The overbreadth doctrine, meanwhile, decrees that a governmental purpose to control or
prevent activities constitutionally subject to state regulations may not be achieved by
means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected
freedoms.
10. A "facial" challenge is likewise different from an "as-applied" challenge.
11. Distinguished from an as-applied challenge which considers only extant facts affecting
real litigants, a facial invalidation is an examination of the entire law, pinpointing its
flaws and defects, not only on the basis of its actual operation to the parties, but also on
the assumption or prediction that its very existence may cause others not before the court
to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or activities.

FACTS:

1. Six petitions were filed challenging the constitutionality of RA 9372, otherwise known as
the Human Security Act of 2007 for being intrinsically vague and impermissibly broad.
 Page 25 of 63

2. They argue that the definition of the crime of terrorism under RA 9372 in that terms like
“widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the populace” and “coerce the
government to give in to an unlawful demand” are nebulous, leaving law enforcement
agencies with no standard to measure the prohibited acts.

ISSUE: Whether the doctrines of void-for-vagueness and overbreadth finds application in

RA9372?

RULING:

1. No, it does not.

2. A facial invalidation of a statute is allowed only in free speech cases, wherein certain
rules of constitutional litigation are rightly excepted.
3. RA 9372 regulates conduct, not speech. Criminal statutes( penalizing conduct) have
general in terrorem effect resulting from their very existence, and, if facial challenge is
allowed for this reason alone, the State may well be prevented from enacting laws against
socially harmful conduct.
4. In the area of criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the area of free speech.
5. Since a penal statute may only be assailed for being vague as applied ( as-applied
challenge considers only extant facts affecting real litigants) to petitioners, a limited
vagueness analysis of the definition of "terrorism" in RA 9372 is legally impermissible
absent an actual or imminent charge against them.
6. Since petitioners have established neither an actual charge nor a credible threat of
prosecution under RA 9372.
7. Even a limited vagueness analysis of the assailed definition of "terrorism" is thus legally
impermissible.
8. The Court reminds litigants that judicial power neither contemplates speculative
counseling on a statute’s future effect on hypothetical scenarios nor allows the courts to
be used as an extension of a failed legislative lobbying in Congress.
 Page 26 of 63

Equal protection of the Laws

(11) People v. Vera, G.R. No. 45685, November 16, 1937

DOCTRINE:

1. A law may appear to be fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet, if it permits of
unjust and illegal discrimination, it is within the constitutional prohibition.

FACTS:

1. Mariano Cu Unjieng was convicted in the case People v. Co Unjieng et al. GR No.
41200. Unjieng applied for probation on the said criminal case.
2. Thereafter, the Court rendered a judgment of conviction sentencing the defendant
Mariano Cu Unjieng to indeterminate penalty ranging from four years and two months of
prision correccional to eight years of prision mayor, to pay the costs and with reservation
of civil action to the offended party, the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation.
3. Unjieng filed a motion for reconsideration.
4. Judge Jose Vera set the hearing on the petition for probation.
5. The private prosecution opposed alleging that Act No. 4221 is nevertheless violative of
section 1, subsection (1), Article III of the Constitution guaranteeing equal protection of
the laws for the reason that its applicability is not uniform throughout the Islands and
because section 11 of the said Act endows the provincial boards with the power to make
said law effective or otherwise in their respective or otherwise in their respective
provinces.
6. The private prosecution also filed a supplementary opposition elaborating on the alleged
unconstitutionality on Act No. 4221, as an undue delegation of legislative power to the
provincial boards of several provinces (sec. 1, Art. VI, Constitution).
7. The City Fiscal concurred in the opposition of the private prosecution except with respect
to the questions raised concerning the constitutionality of Act No. 4221.
8. Further, Act 4221 provides probation only to those provinces with available funds for the
salary of probation officers, and the province referred to has no sufficient funds.

ISSUE: Whether Act 4221 violates equal protection guarantee

RULING:

1. YES. The probation act is in violation of the said constitutional guarantee.

2. It constitutes as a class legislation which discriminates against persons of the same class
and favor others.
3. Person‘s with similar circumstances may be afforded with the privilege of probation
merely due to the discretion of the provincial officers.
4. Hence, the Court ruled that the said order is not constitutional.
 Page 27 of 63

5. In the case at bar, however, the resultant inequality may be said to flow from the
unwarranted delegation of legislative power, although perhaps this is not necessarily the
result in every case.
6. Adopting the example given by one of the counsel for the petitioners in the course of his
oral argument, one province may appropriate the necessary fund to defray the salary of a
probation officer, while another province may refuse or fail to do so.
7. In such a case, the Probation Act would be in operation in the former province but not in
the latter.
8. This means that a person otherwise coming within the purview of the law would be liable
to enjoy the benefits of probation in one province while another person similarly situated
in another province would be denied those same benefits.
9. This is obnoxious discrimination.
10. Contrariwise, it is also possible for all the provincial boards to appropriate the necessary
funds for the salaries of the probation officers in their respective provinces, in which case
no inequality would result for the obvious reason that probation would be in operation in
each and every province by the affirmative action of appropriation by all the provincial
boards.
11. On that hypothesis, every person coming within the purview of the Probation Act would
be entitled to avail of the benefits of the Act.
12. Neither will there be any resulting inequality if no province, through its provincial board,
should appropriate any amount for the salary of the probation officer — which is the
situation now — and, also, if we accept the contention that, for the purpose of the
Probation Act, the City of Manila should be considered as a province and that the
municipal board of said city has not made any appropriation for the salary of the
probation officer.
13. These different situations suggested show, indeed, that while inequality may result in the
application of the law and in the conferment of the benefits therein provided, inequality is
not in all cases the necessary result.
14. But whatever may be the case, it is clear that in section 11 of the Probation Act creates a
situation in which discrimination and inequality are permitted or allowed.
15. There are, to be sure, abundant authorities requiring actual denial of the equal protection
of the law before court should assume the task of setting aside a law vulnerable on that
score, but premises and circumstances considered, we are of the opinion that section 11
of Act No. 4221 permits of the denial of the equal protection of the law and is on that
account bad. We see no difference between a law which permits of such denial.
16. A law may appear to be fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet, if it permits of
unjust and illegal discrimination, it is within the constitutional prohibitions.
17. Section 11 of Act. 4221 permits of the denial of the equal protection of the law and is on
that account bad.
18. There is no difference ―BETWEEN A LAW WHICH DENIES EQUAL PROTECTION
and a ―LAW WHICH PERMITS OF SUCH DENIAL.
 Page 28 of 63

(12) Ormoc Sugar Co., Inc. v. Treasurer of Ormoc City, G.R. No. L-23794,
February 17, 1968

DOCTRINE:

1. The equal protection clause applies only to persons or things identically situated and does
not bar a reasonable classification of the subject of legislation.
2. A classification is reasonable where
a. it is based on substantial distinctions which make real differences;
b. these are germane to the purpose of the law;
c. the classification applies not only to present conditions but also to future
conditions which are substantially identical to those of the present;
d. the classification applies only to those who belong to the same class.

FACTS:

1. Municipal Board of Ormoc City passed an ordinance imposing "on any and all
productions of centrifugal sugar milled at the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., in Ormoc
City a municipal tax of 1% per export sale to the United States of America and other
foreign countries.
2. Payments for said tax were made, under protest, by Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc.
3. Ormoc Sugar Company filed before the CFI of Leyte a complaint against the City of
Ormoc as well as its Treasurer, Municipal Board and Mayor, alleging that the afore-
stated ordinance is unconstitutional for being violative of the equal protection clause
(Sec. 1[1], Art. III, Constitution) and the rule of uniformity of taxation (Sec. 22[1], Art.
VI, Constitution).
4. CFI rendered a decision that upheld the constitutionality of the ordinance and declared
the taxing power of defendant-chartered city broadened by the Local Autonomy Act to
include all other forms of taxes, licenses or fees not excluded in its charter.

ISSUE: Whether the ordinance is violative of the constitutional provision on equal protection

RULING:

1. Yes, the challenged ordinance is declared unconstitutional for being violative of the equal
protection clause.
2. The equal protection clause applies only to persons or things identically situated and does
not bar a reasonable classification of the subject of legislation.
3. A classification is reasonable where
a. it is based on substantial distinctions which make real differences;
b. these are germane to the purpose of the law;
c. the classification applies not only to present conditions but also to future
conditions which are substantially identical to those of the present;
d. the classification applies only to those who belong to the same class.
 Page 29 of 63

4. A perusal of the requisites instantly shows that the questioned ordinance does not meet
the requisites of a valid classification as it taxes only centrifugal sugar produced and
exported by the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. and none other.
5. At the time of the taxing ordinance’s enactment, Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., it is true,
was the only sugar central in the city of Ormoc.
6. Still, the classification, to be reasonable, should be in terms applicable to future
conditions as well.
7. The taxing ordinance should not be singular and exclusive as to exclude any subsequently
established sugar central, of the same class as plaintiff, from the coverage of the tax.
8. As it is now, even if later a similar company is set up, it cannot be subject to the tax
because the ordinance expressly points only to Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. as the entity
to be levied upon.
 Page 30 of 63

(13) Villegas v. Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho, G.R. No. L-29646, November 10,
1978

DOCTRINE:

1. While it is true that the Philippines as a State is not obliged to admit aliens within its
territory, once an alien is admitted, he cannot be deprived of life without due process of
law.
2. This guarantee includes the means of livelihood.
3. The shelter of protection under the due process and equal protection clause is given to all
persons, both aliens and citizens.

FACTS:

1. The Ordinance No. 6537 was passed by the Municipal Board of Manila on February 22,
1968 and signed by the herein petitioner who prohibits aliens from being employed or to
engage or participate in any position or occupation or business enumerated therein,
whether permanent, temporary or casual, without first securing an employment permit
from the Mayor of Manila and paying the permit fee of P50.00 except persons employed
in the diplomatic or consular missions of foreign countries, or in the technical assistance
programs of both the Philippine Government and any foreign government, and those
working in their respective households, and members of religious orders or
congregations, sect or denomination, who are not paid monetarily or in kind.
2. Violations of this ordinance is punishable by an imprisonment of not less than three (3)
months to six (6) months or fine of not less than P100.00 but not more than P200.00 or
both such fine and imprisonment, upon conviction.
3. Private respondent who was employed in Manila, filed a petition with the praying for the
issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction and restraining order to stop the
enforcement of Ordinance No. 6537 as well as for a judgment declaring said Ordinance
No. 6537 null and void.
4. Trial court rendered judgment in favor of the petitioner, hence this case.

ISSUE: Whether the Petitioner’s ordinance is arbitrary, oppressive and unreasonable, being
applied only to aliens who are thus, deprived of their rights to life, liberty and property and
therefore, violates the due process and equal protection clauses of the Constitution.

RULING:

1. Yes, While it is true that the first part which requires that the alien shall secure an
employment permit from the Mayor involves the exercise of discretion and judgment in
the processing and approval or disapproval of applications for employment permits and
therefore is regulatory in character the second part which requires the payment of P50.00
as employee’s fee is not regulatory but a revenue measure.
2. There is no logic or justification in exacting P50.00 from aliens who have been cleared
for employment.
 Page 31 of 63

3. It is obvious that the purpose of the ordinance is to raise money under the guise of
regulation.
4. It is unreasonable not only because it is excessive but because it fails to consider valid
substantial differences in situation among individual aliens who are required to pay it.
5. The Ordinance does not lay down any criterion or standard to guide the Mayor in the
exercise of his discretion.
6. It has been held that where an ordinance of a municipality fails to state any policy or to
set up any standard to guide or limit the mayor’s action, expresses no purpose to be
attained by requiring a permit, enumerates no conditions for its grant or refusal, and
entirely lacks standard, thus conferring upon the Mayor arbitrary and unrestricted power
to grant or deny the issuance of building permits, such ordinance is invalid, being an
undefined and unlimited delegation of power to allow or prevent an activity per se lawful.
7. Requiring a person before he can be employed to get a permit from the City Mayor of
Manila who may withhold or refuse it at will is tantamount to denying him the basic right
of the people in the Philippines to engage in a means of livelihood.
8. While it is true that the Philippines as a State is not obliged to admit aliens within its
territory, once an alien is admitted, he cannot be deprived of life without due process of
law.
9. This guarantee includes the means of livelihood.
10. The shelter of protection under the due process and equal protection clause is given to all
persons, both aliens and citizens.
 Page 32 of 63

(14) Dumlao v. COMELEC, G.R. No. L-52245, January 22, 1980

DOCTRINE:

1. The equal protection clause does not forbid all legal classification.
2. What is proscribes is a classification which is arbitrary and unreasonable.
3. That constitutional guarantee is not violated by a reasonable classification based upon
substantial distinctions, where the classification is germane to the purpose of the law and
applies to all those belonging to the same class.

FACTS:

1. The Petition alleges that petitioner, Patricio Dumlao, is a former Governor of Nueva
Vizcaya, who has filed his certificate of candidacy for said position of Governor.
Petitioner Igot is a taxpayer and a member of the Bar who, as such, has taken his oath to
support the Constitution. Petitioner Salapantan, Jr., is a qualified voter, and a resident of
San Miguel, Iloilo.
2. Dumlao specifically questions the constitutionality of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg.
52 as discriminatory and contrary to the equal protection and due process guarantees of
the Constitution. Said Section 4 provides:
a. Sec. 4. Special Disqualification in addition to violation of section 10 of Art. XI I-
C of the Constitution and disqualification mentioned in existing laws, which are
hereby declared as disqualification for any of the elective officials enumerated in
section 1 hereof.
b. Any retired elective provincial city or municipal official who has received
payment of the retirement benefits to which he is entitled under the law, and who
shall have been 65 years of age at the commencement of the term of office to
which he seeks to be elected shall not be qualified to run for the same elective
local office from which he has retired.
3. For their part, petitioners Igot and Salapantan, Jr. assail the validity of the following
statutory provisions:
a. Sec 7. Terms of Office — Unless sooner removed for cause, all local elective
officials hereinabove mentioned shall hold office for a term of six (6) years,
which shall commence on the first Monday of March 1980. (Batas Pambansa Blg.
51)
b. Sec. 4. ...
c. Any person who has committed any act of disloyalty to the State, including acts
amounting to subversion, insurrection, rebellion or other similar crimes, shall not
be qualified to be a candidate for any of the offices covered by this Act, or to
participate in any partisan political activity therein:
i. provided that a judgment of conviction for any of the aforementioned
crimes shall be conclusive evidence of such fact and the filing of charges
for the commission of such crimes before a civil court or military tribunal
after preliminary investigation shall be prima fascie evidence of such fact.
(Batas Pambansa Blg. 52)
 Page 33 of 63

ISSUE: Whether the statutory provisions challenged be declared null and void for being
violative of the Constitution.

RULING:

1. Petitioner Dumlao's contention that section 4 of BP Blg. 52 as discriminatory against him

personally is belied by the fact that several petitions for the disqualification of other
candidates for local positions based on the challenged provision have already been filed
with the COMELEC.
2. This tellingly overthrows Dumlao's contention of intentional or purposeful
discrimination.
3. The assertion that Section 4 of BP Blg. 52 is contrary to the safer guard of equal
protection is neither well taken.
4. The constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws is subject to rational
classification.
5. If the groupings are based on reasonable and real differentiations, one class can be treated
and regulated differently from another class.
6. For purposes of public service, employees 65 years of age, have been validly classified
differently from younger employees.
7. Employees attaining that age are subject to compulsory retirement, while those of
younger ages are not so compulsorily retirable.
8. In respect of election to provincial, city, or municipal positions, to require that candidates
should not be more than 65 years of age at the time they assume office, if applicable to
everyone, might or might not be a reasonable classification although, as the Solicitor
General has intimated, a good policy of the law would be to promote the emergence of
younger blood in our political elective echelons.
9. On the other hand, it might be that persons more than 65 years old may also be good
elective local officials.
10. In the case of a 65-year old elective local official, who has retired from a provincial, city
or municipal office, there is reason to disqualify him from running for the same office
from which he had retired, as provided for in the challenged provision.
11. The need for new blood assumes relevance.
12. The tiredness of the retiree for government work is present, and what is emphatically
significant is that the retired employee has already declared himself tired and unavailable
for the same government work, but, which, by virtue of a change of mind, he would like
to assume again.
13. It is for this very reason that inequality will neither result from the application of the
challenged provision.
14. Just as that provision does not deny equal protection neither does it permit of such denial.
15. Persons similarly situated are similarly treated.
16. In so far as the petition of Igot and Salapantan are concerned, the second paragraph of
section 4 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52, may be divided in two parts.
17. The first provides:
a. judgment of conviction or any of the aforementioned crimes shall be conclusive
evidence of such fact ...
 Page 34 of 63

18. Explicit is the constitutional provision that, in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by
himself and counsel.
19. An accusation, according to the fundamental law, is not synonymous with guilt.
20. The challenged proviso contravenes the constitutional presumption of innocence, as a
candidate is disqualified from running for public office on the ground alone that charges
have been filed against him before a civil or military tribunal.
21. It condemns before one is fully heard. In ultimate effect, except as to the degree of proof,
no distinction is made between a person convicted of acts of disloyalty and one against
whom charges have been filed for such acts, as both of them would be ineligible to run
for public office.
22. A person disqualified to run for public office on the ground that charges have been filed
against him is virtually placed in the same category as a person already convicted of a
crime with the penalty of arresto, which carries with it the accessory penalty of
suspension of the right to hold office during the term of the sentence (Art. 44, Revised
Penal Code).
23. And although the filing of charges is considered as but prima facie evidence, and
therefore, may be rebutted, yet. there is "clear and present danger" that because of the
proximity of the elections, time constraints will prevent one charged with acts of
disloyalty from offering contrary proof to overcome the prima facie evidence against
him.
24. The first paragraph of section 4 of Batas pambansa Bilang 52 is hereby declared valid.
25. That portion of the second paragraph of section 4 of Batas Pambansa Bilang 52 providing
that "... the filing of charges for the commission of such crimes before a civil court or
military tribunal after preliminary investigation shall be prima facie evidence of such
fact", is hereby declared null and void, for being violative of the constitutional
presumption of innocence guaranteed to an accused.
 Page 35 of 63

(15) Philippine Association of Service Exporters v. Drilon, G.R. No. L-

81958, June 30, 1988

DOCTRINE:

1. It is well-settled that "equality before the law" under the Constitution does not import a
perfect Identity of rights among all men and women.
2. It admits of classifications, provided that
a. such classifications rest on substantial distinctions;
b. they are germane to the purposes of the law;
c. they are not confined to existing conditions; and
d. they apply equally to all members of the same class.

FACTS:

1. The petitioner, Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc (PASEI), is a firm

engaged in principally in the recruitment of Filipino workers, for overseas placement,
challenged the Constitutional validity of Department Order No. 1 series of 1998,
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), in the character of "GUIDELINES
GOCERNING THE TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF DEPLOYMENT OF FILIPINO
DOMESTIC AND HOUSEHOLD WORKERS."
2. It alleged that:
a. The D.O. is discriminatory against males or females;
b. That it "does not apply to all Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and
females with similar skills;
c. That it is violative of the right to travel.
3. Further, it contended that it was an invalid exercise of the lawmaking power, in a sense
that the police power being legislative, and not executive, in character. In its supplement
to the petition, PASEI invokes Section 3 of Article XIII of the Constitution providing for
worker participation "in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and
benefits as may be provided by law."
4. Moreover, they argued that Department Order No. 1 was passed in the absence of prior
consultations.
5. It was claimed to be in violation of the Charter's non-impairment clause, that it would
cause "great and irreparable injury' that PASEI members would face should the Order be
further enforced.
6. On the other hand, the Solicitor General on behalf of the respondent Secretary of Labor
and Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration on May 25,
1988 filed a Comment informing the Court that on March 8, 1988, the respondent Labor
Secretary lifted the deployment ban in the states of Iraq, Qatar, Canada, Hongkong,
United States, Italy, Norway, Austria and Switzerland. The Solicitor General invokes the
police power in submitting the validity of the challenged "guideline".

ISSUE: Whether the assailed Department Order is unconstitutional as it is contrary to the equal
protection clause.
 Page 36 of 63

RULING:

1. No. Department Order No. 1 s. 1998 is valid in view of the need to extend protection to
female domestics who were most prone to exploitation and abuse by their foreign
employers.
2. The court ruled that, the petitioner has shown no satisfactory reason why the contested
measure should be nullified.
3. There is no question that Department Order No. 1 applies only to "female contract
workers," but it does not thereby make an undue discrimination between the sexes.
4. It is well-settled that "equality before the law" under the Constitution does not import a
perfect Identity of rights among all men and women.
5. It admits of classifications, provided that
a. such classifications rest on substantial distinctions;
b. they are germane to the purposes of the law;
c. they are not confined to existing conditions; and
d. they apply equally to all members of the same class.
6. The Court is satisfied that the classification made-the preference for female workers —
rests on substantial distinctions.
7. Further, the Court finds, finally, the impugned guidelines to be applicable to all female
domestic overseas workers.
8. That it does not apply to "all Filipina workers" is not an argument for unconstitutionality.
9. Had the ban been given universal applicability, then it would have been unreasonable and
arbitrary.
10. For obvious reasons, not all of them are similarly circumstanced.
11. What the Constitution prohibits is the singling out of a select person or group of persons
within an existing class, to the prejudice of such a person or group or resulting in an
unfair advantage to another person or group of persons.
12. To apply the ban, say exclusively to workers deployed by A, but not to those recruited by
B, would obviously clash with the equal protection clause of the Charter.
13. It would be a classic case of what Chase refers to as a law that "takes property from A
and gives it to B."
14. It would be an unlawful invasion of property rights and freedom of contract and needless
to state, an invalid act.
15. The court, provided that the Constitution declares on Sec. 3.
16. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and
unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for
all.
17. However, "Protection to labor" does not signify the promotion of employment alone.
18. What concerns the Constitution more paramountly is that such an employment be above
all, decent, just, and humane.
19. It is bad enough that the country has to send its sons and daughters to strange lands
because it cannot satisfy their employment needs at home.
20. Under these circumstances, the Government is duty-bound to insure that our toiling
expatriates have adequate protection, personally and economically, while away from
home.
 Page 37 of 63

21. In this case, the Government has evidence, an evidence the petitioner cannot seriously
dispute, of the lack or inadequacy of such protection, and as part of its duty, it has
precisely ordered an indefinite ban on deployment.
22. Thus, the non-impairment clause of the Constitution, invoked by the petitioner, must
yield to the loftier purposes targetted by the Government.
23. Lastly, the Court understood the grave implications the questioned Order has on the
business of recruitment.
24. The concern of the Government, however, is not necessarily to maintain profits of
business firms.
25. In the ordinary sequence of events, it is profits that suffer as a result of Government
regulation.
26. The interest of the State is to provide a decent living to its citizens.
27. The Government has convinced the Court in this case that this is its intent.
28. The Court did not find the impugned Order to be tainted with a grave abuse of discretion
to warrant the extraordinary relief prayed for.
 Page 38 of 63

(16) Himagan v. People, G.R. No. 113811, October 7, 1994

DOCTRINES:

1. If a suspended policeman criminally charged with a serious offense is reinstated to his

post while his case is pending, his victim and the witnesses against him are obviously
exposed to constant threat and thus easily cowed to silence by the mere fact that the
accused is in uniform and armed. The imposition of preventive suspension for over 90
days under Section 47 of R.A. 6975 does not violate the suspended policeman's
constitutional right to equal protection of the laws.
2. The equal protection clause exists to prevent undue favor or privilege. It is intended to
eliminate discrimination and oppression based on inequality. Recognizing the existence
of real differences among men, the equal protection clause does not demand absolute
equality. It merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like
circumstances and conditions both as to the privileges conferred and liabilities enforced.
3. Thus, the equal protection clause does not absolutely forbid classifications. If the
classification is based on real and substantial differences; is germane to the purpose of the
law; applies to all members of the same class; and applies to current as well as future
conditions, the classification may not be impugned as violating the Constitution's equal
protection guarantee. A distinction based on real and reasonable considerations related to
a proper legislative purpose such as that which exists here is neither unreasonable,
capricious nor unfounded.

FACTS:

1. Petitioner, a policeman assigned with the medical company of the Philippine National
Police Regional Headquarters at Camp Catitigan, Davao City, was implicated in the
killing of Benjamin Machitar, Jr. and the attempted murder of Bernabe Machitar.
2. After the informations for murder and attempted murder were filed with the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 11, Davao City, the trial court issued an Order suspending petitioner
until the termination of the case on the basis of Section 47, R.A. 6975, otherwise known
as Department of Interior and Local Government Act of 1990, which provides:
a. Sec. 47. Preventive Suspension Pending Criminal Case. — Upon the filing of a
complaint or information sufficient in form and substance against a member of the
PNP for grave felonies where the penalty imposed by law is six (6) years and one
(1) day or more, the court shall immediately suspend the accused from office until
the case is terminated. Such case shall be subject to continuous trial and shall be
terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment of the accused (Emphasis
ours).
3. Petitioner filed a motion to lift the order for his suspension, relying on Section 42 of P.D.
807 of the Civil Service Decree, that his suspension should be limited to ninety (90) days
and, also, on our ruling in Deloso v. Sandiganbayan, and Layno v. Sandiganbayan. In his
order dated December 14, 1993 respondent judge denied the motion pointing out that
under Section 47 of R.A. 6975, the accused shall be suspended from office until his case
is terminated.
 Page 39 of 63

4. The motion for reconsideration of the order of denial was, likewise, denied.
5. Hence, the petition for certiorari and mandamus to set aside the orders of respondent
Judge and to command him to lift petitioner's preventive suspension.

ISSUE: Whether an imposition of preventive suspension of over 90 days is contrary to the Civil
Service Law and would be a violation of constitutional right to equal protection of laws.

RULING:

1. No. The petitioner's reliance on Layno and Deloso is misplaced.

2. These cases all stemmed from charges in violation of R.A. 3019 (1060), otherwise known
as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act which, unlike R.A. 6975, is silent on the
duration of the preventive suspension.
3. Sec. 13 of R.A. 3019 reads as follows:
a. Suspension and loss of benefits. — Any public officer against whom any criminal
prosecution under a valid information under this Act or under the provisions of
the Revised Penal Code on bribery is pending in court, shall be suspended from
office. Should he be convicted by final judgment, he shall lose all retirement or
gratuity benefits under any law, but if he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to
reinstatement and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during
suspension, unless in the meantime administrative proceedings have been filed
against him.
4. In the case of Layno, the duly elected mayor of Lianga, Surigao del Sur, was preventively
suspended after an information was filed against him for offenses under R.A. 3019
(1060), the Anti-Graft Corrupt Practices Act.
5. He had been suspended for four (4) months at the time he filed a motion to lift his
preventive suspension.
6. It was held that his indefinite preventive suspension violated the "equal protection clause"
and shortened his term of office.
7. Thus:
a. Petitioner is a duly elected municipal mayor of Lianga, Surigao del Sur. His term
of office does not expire until 1986.
b. Were it not for this information and the suspension decreed by the Sandiganbayan
according to the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, he would have been all this
while in the full discharge of his functions as such municipal mayor.
c. He was elected precisely to do so. As of October 26, 1983, he has been unable to.
It is a basic assumption of the electoral process implicit in the right of suffrage
that the people are entitled to the services of elective officials of their choice.
d. For misfeasance or malfeasance, any of them could, of course, be proceeded
against administratively or, as in this instance, criminally. In either case, his
culpability must be established.
e. Moreover, if there be a criminal action, he is entitled to the constitutional
presumption of innocence.
f. A preventive suspension may be justified.
g. Its continuance, however, for an unreasonable length of time raises a due process
question.
 Page 40 of 63

h. For even if thereafter he were acquitted, in the meanwhile his right to hold office
had been nullified. Clearly, there would be in such a case an injustice suffered by
him. Nor is he the only victim.
i. There is injustice inflicted likewise on the people of Lianga.
j. They were deprived of the services of the man they had elected to serve as mayor.
k. In that sense, to paraphrase Justice Cardozo, the protracted continuance of this
preventive suspension had outrun the bounds of reason and resulted in sheer
oppression.
l. A denial of due process is thus quite manifest. It is to avoid such an
unconstitutional application that the order of suspension should be lifted.
8. Nor is it solely the denial of procedural due process that is apparent. There is likewise an
equal protection question.
9. If the case against petitioner Layno were administrative in character the Local
Government Code would be applicable.
10. It is therein clearly provided that while preventive suspension is allowable for the causes
therein enumerated, there is this emphatic limitation on the duration thereof:
a. "In all cases, preventive suspension shall not extend beyond sixty days after the
start of said suspension."
11. It may be recalled that the principle against indefinite suspension applies equally to
national government officials.
12. So it was held in the leading case of Garcia v. Hon. Executive Secretary.
13. According to the opinion of Justice Barrera:
a. "To adopt the theory of respondents that an officer appointed by the President,
facing administrative charges, can be preventively suspended indefinitely, would
be to countenance a situation where the preventive suspension can, in effect, be
the penalty itself without a finding of guilt after due hearing, contrary to the
express mandate of the Constitution and the Civil Service law."
b. Further: "In the guise of a preventive suspension, his term of office could be
shortened and he could in effect, be removed without a finding of a cause duly
established after due hearing, in violation of the Constitution.
c. Clearly then, the policy of the law mandated by the Constitution frowns at a
suspension of indefinite duration.
d. In this particular case, the mere fact that petitioner is facing a charge under the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act does not justify a different rule of law.
e. To do so would be to negate the safeguard of the equal protection guarantee.
14. The case of Deloso, likewise, involved another elective official who was preventively
suspended as provincial governor, also under RA 3019 the Anti-Graft Law.
15. This Court, faced with similar factual circumstances as in Layno, applied the ruling in the
latter case "in relation to the principles of due process and equal protection."
16. It is readily apparent that Section 13 of R.A. 3019 upon which the preventive suspension
of the accused in Layno and Deloso was based is silent with respect to the duration of the
preventive suspension, such that the suspension of the accused therein for a prolonged
and unreasonable length of time raised a due process question. Not so in the instant case.
17. Petitioner is charged with murder under the Revised Penal Code and it is undisputed that
he falls squarely under Sec. 47 of R.A. 6975 which categorically states that his
suspension shall last until the case is terminated. The succeeding sentence of the same
 Page 41 of 63

section requires the case to be subjected to continuous trial which shall be terminated
within ninety (90) days from arraignment of the accused.
18. As previously emphasized, nowhere in the law does it say that after the lapse of the 90-
day period for trial, the preventive suspension should be lifted.
19. The law is clear, the ninety (90) days duration applies to the trial of the case not to the
suspension.
20. Nothing else should be read into the law.
21. When the words and phrases of the statute are clear and unequivocal, their meaning
determined from the language employed and the statute must be taken to mean exactly
what it says.
22. The foregoing discussions reveal the legislative intent to place on preventive suspension a
member of the PNP charged with grave felonies where the penalty imposed by law
exceeds six years of imprisonment and which suspension continues until the case against
him is terminated.
23. The reason why members of the PNP are treated differently from the other classes of
persons charged criminally or administratively insofar as the application of the rule on
preventive suspension is concerned is that policemen carry weapons and the badge of the
law which can be used to harass or intimidate witnesses against them, as succinctly
brought out in the legislative discussions.
 Page 42 of 63

(17) Almonte v. Vazquez, G.R. No. 95367, May 23, 1995

DOCTRINE:

1. Allowing the Ombudsman to start an investigation based on an anonymous letter does not
violate the equal protection clause.
2. The Office of the Ombudsman is different from other investigatory and prosecutory
agencies of government because those subject to its jurisdiction are public officials who,
through official pressure and influence, can quash, delay or dismiss investigations against
them - Hence, there is a valid classification.

FACTS:

1. Ombudsman Vasquez required Rogado and Rivera of Economic Intelligence and

Investigation Bureau (EIIB) to produce all documents relating to Personal Service Funds
for the year 1988 and all evidence for the whole plantilla of EIIB for the said year.
2. The subpoena duces tecum was issued in connection with the investigation of funds
representing savings from unfilled positions in the EIIB which were illegally disbursed.
Petitioner Jose T. Almonte, who was formerly Commissioner of the EIIB, and Villamor
C. Perez, who is Chief of the EIIB's Budget and Fiscal Management Division.
3. Almonte denied the anomalous activities that circulate around the EIIB office.
4. The subpoena duces tecum was issued by the Ombudsman in connection with their
investigation of an anonymous letter alleging that funds representing savings from
unfilled positions in the EIIB had been illegally disbursed.
5. The letter, purporting to have been written by an employee of the EIIB and a concerned
citizen.
6. Petitioners Almonte and Perez moved to quash the subpoena and the subpoena duces
tecum.
7. They claim privilege of an agency of the Government on the ground that "knowledge of
EIIB's documents relative to its Personal Services Funds and its plantilla . . . will
necessarily [lead to] knowledge of its operations, movements, targets, strategies, and
tactics and the whole of its being" and this could "destroy the EIIB."
8. Ombudsman granted the motion to quash the subpoena in view of the fact that there were
no affidavits filed against petitioners, however they denied their motion to quash the
subpoena duces tecum.

ISSUE: Whether the Ombudsman may start an investigation on the basis of an anonymous letter
without violating the equal protection clause.

RULING:

1. YES. It was held that the fact that the Ombudsman may start an investigation on the basis
of an anonymous letter does not violate the equal protection clause.
2. In proceedings before the Office of the Ombudsman, anonymous letters suffice to start an
investigation.
 Page 43 of 63

3. There can be no objection to this procedure because it is provided in the Constitution

itself.
4. It is apparent that in permitting the filing of complaints "in any form and in a manner,"
the framers of the Constitution took into account the well-known reticence of the people
which keep them from complaining against official wrongdoings.
5. As this Court had occasion to point out, the Office of the Ombudsman is different from
the other investigatory and prosecutory agencies of the government because those subject
to its jurisdiction are public officials who, through official pressure and influence, can
quash, delay or dismiss investigations held against them.
6. On the other hand, complainants are more often than not poor and simple folk who
cannot afford to hire lawyers.
 Page 44 of 63

(18) Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc.; G.R. No. 167614; March
24, 2009

DOCTRINE:

1. Section 1, Article III of the Constitution guarantees:

a. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law
nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the law.
2. Section 18, Article II and Section 3, Article XIII accord all members of the labor sector,
without distinction as to place of deployment, full protection of their rights and welfare.
3. To Filipino workers, the rights guaranteed under the foregoing constitutional provisions
translate to economic security and parity: all monetary benefits should be equally enjoyed
by workers of similar category, while all monetary obligations should be borne by them
in equal degree; none should be denied the protection of the laws which is enjoyed by, or
spared the burden imposed on, others in like circumstances.
4. Such rights are not absolute but subject to the inherent power of Congress to incorporate,
when it sees fit, a system of classification into its legislation; however, to be valid, the
classification must comply with these requirements:
a. it is based on substantial distinctions;
b. it is germane to the purposes of the law;
c. it is not limited to existing conditions only; and
d. it applies equally to all members of the class.

FACTS:

1. Petitioner was hired by Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and Marlow Navigation Co., Ltd.
(respondents) under a (POEA)-approved Contract of Employment with the duration of 12
months as a Chief Officer with a basic monthly salary of US$1,400.00.
2. On March 19, 1998, the date of his departure, petitioner was constrained to accept a
downgraded employment contract for the position of Second Officer with a monthly
salary of US$1,000.00, upon the assurance and representation of respondents that he
would be made Chief Officer by the end of April 1998.
3. Respondents did not deliver on their promise to make petitioner Chief Officer. Hence,
petitioner refused to stay on as Second Officer and was repatriated to the Philippines on
May 26, 1998.
4. Petitioner's employment contract was for a period of 12 months or from March 19, 1998
up to March 19, 1999, but at the time of his repatriation on May 26, 1998, he had served
only 2 months and 7 days of his contract, leaving an unexpired portion of 9 months and
23 days.
5. Petitioner filed with the Labor Arbiter (LA) a Complaint against respondents for
constructive dismissal and for payment of his money claims in the total amount of
US$26,442.73 (included is his the salary of the unexpired term).
6. Petitioner claims that the last clause violates the OFWs' constitutional rights in that it
impairs the terms of their contract, deprives them of equal protection and denies them due
process.
 Page 45 of 63

7. Sec. 10. Money Claims. - x x x In case of termination of overseas employment without

just, valid or authorized cause as defined by law or contract, the workers shall be entitled
to the full reimbursement of his placement fee with interest of twelve percent (12%) per
annum, plus his salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment contract or for three
(3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less.
8. LA declared the dismissal illegal but payment of salary be made to petitioner only the
three months of the unexpired portion of the contract employment.
9. NLRC reduces the payment made by LA. CA affirmed the NLRC’s ruling.

ISSUE: Is the subject clause "or for three months for every year of the unexpired term,
whichever is less" in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042 be DECLARED
UNCONSTITUTIONAL for being violative of the equal protection clause?

RULING:

1. YES. Congress retains its wide discretion in providing for a valid classification, and its
policies should be accorded recognition and respect by the courts of justice except when
they run afoul of the Constitution.
2. The deference stops where the classification violates a fundamental right, or prejudices
persons accorded special protection by the Constitution.
3. When these violations arise, this Court must discharge its primary role as the vanguard of
constitutional guaranties, and require a stricter and more exacting adherence to
constitutional limitations. Rational basis should not suffice.
4. Equality is one ideal which cries out for bold attention and action in the Constitution.
5. The Preamble proclaims "equality" as an ideal precisely in protest against crushing
inequities in Philippine society.
6. The command to promote social justice in Article II, Section 10, in "all phases of national
development," further explicated in Article XIII, are clear commands to the State to take
affirmative action in the direction of greater equality.
7. x x x [T]here is thus in the Philippine Constitution no lack of doctrinal support for a more
vigorous state effort towards achieving a reasonable measure of equality.
8. Our present Constitution has gone further in guaranteeing vital social and economic
rights to marginalized groups of society, including labor.
9. Under the policy of social justice, the law bends over backward to accommodate the
interests of the working class on the humane justification that those with less privilege in
life should have more in law.
10. And the obligation to afford protection to labor is incumbent not only on the legislative
and executive branches but also on the judiciary to translate this pledge into a living
reality.
11. Social justice calls for the humanization of laws and the equalization of social and
economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively secular
conception may at least be approximated.
12. In fine, the Government has failed to discharge its burden of proving the existence of a
compelling state interest that would justify the perpetuation of the discrimination against
OFWs under the subject clause.
 Page 46 of 63

13. Assuming that, as advanced by the OSG, the purpose of the subject clause is to protect
the employment of OFWs by mitigating the solidary liability of placement agencies, such
callous and cavalier rationale will have to be rejected.
14. There can never be a justification for any form of government action that alleviates the
burden of one sector, but imposes the same burden on another sector, especially when the
favored sector is composed of private businesses such as placement agencies, while the
disadvantaged sector is composed of OFWs whose protection no less than the
Constitution commands.
15. The idea that private business interest can be elevated to the level of a compelling state
interest is odious.
16. Moreover, even if the purpose of the subject clause is to lessen the solidary liability of
placement agencies vis-a-vis their foreign principals, there are mechanisms already in
place that can be employed to achieve that purpose without infringing on the
constitutional rights of OFWs.
17. The POEA Rules and Regulations Governing the Recruitment and Employment of Land-
Based Overseas Workers, dated February 4, 2002, imposes administrative disciplinary
measures on erring foreign employers who default on their contractual obligations to
migrant workers and/or their Philippine agents.
18. These disciplinary measures range from temporary disqualification to preventive
suspension.
19. The POEA Rules and Regulations Governing the Recruitment and Employment of
Seafarers, dated May 23, 2003, contains similar administrative disciplinary measures
against erring foreign employers.
20. Resort to these administrative measures is undoubtedly the less restrictive means of
aiding local placement agencies in enforcing the solidary liability of their foreign
principals.
21. Thus, the subject clause in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042 is violative
of the right of petitioner and other OFWs to equal protection.
22. Further, there would be certain misgivings if one is to approach the declaration of the
unconstitutionality of the subject clause from the lone perspective that the clause directly
violates state policy on labor under Section 3, Article XIII of the Constitution.
23. While all the provisions of the 1987 Constitution are presumed self-executing, there are
some which this Court has declared not judicially enforceable, Article XIII being one,
particularly Section 3 thereof, the nature of which, this Court, in Agabon v. National
Labor Relations Commission, has described to be not self-actuating:
24. Thus, the constitutional mandates of protection to labor and security of tenure may be
deemed as self-executing in the sense that these are automatically acknowledged and
observed without need for any enabling legislation.
25. However, to declare that the constitutional provisions are enough to guarantee the full
exercise of the rights embodied therein, and the realization of ideals therein expressed,
would be impractical, if not unrealistic.
26. The espousal of such view presents the dangerous tendency of being overbroad and
exaggerated.
27. The guarantees of "full protection to labor" and "security of tenure", when examined in
isolation, are facially unqualified, and the broadest interpretation possible suggests a
blanket shield in favor of labor against any form of removal regardless of circumstance.
 Page 47 of 63

28. This interpretation implies an unimpeachable right to continued employment-a utopian

notion, doubtless-but still hardly within the contemplation of the framers.
29. Subsequent legislation is still needed to define the parameters of these guaranteed rights
to ensure the protection and promotion, not only the rights of the labor sector, but of the
employers' as well.
30. Without specific and pertinent legislation, judicial bodies will be at a loss, formulating
their own conclusion to approximate at least the aims of the Constitution.
31. Ultimately, therefore, Section 3 of Article XIII cannot, on its own, be a source of a
positive enforceable right to stave off the dismissal of an employee for just cause owing
to the failure to serve proper notice or hearing.
32. As manifested by several framers of the 1987 Constitution, the provisions on social
justice require legislative enactments for their enforceability.
33. Thus, Section 3, Article XIII cannot be treated as a principal source of direct enforceable
rights, for the violation of which the questioned clause may be declared unconstitutional.
34. It may unwittingly risk opening the floodgates of litigation to every worker or union over
every conceivable violation of so broad a concept as social justice for labor.
35. It must be stressed that Section 3, Article XIII does not directly bestow on the working
class any actual enforceable right, but merely clothes it with the status of a sector for
whom the Constitution urges protection through executive or legislative action and
judicial recognition.
36. Its utility is best limited to being an impetus not just for the executive and legislative
departments, but for the judiciary as well, to protect the welfare of the working class.
37. And it was in fact consistent with that constitutional agenda that the Court in Central
Bank (now Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas) Employee Association, Inc. v. Bangko Sentral
ng Pilipinas, penned by then Associate Justice now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno,
formulated the judicial precept that when the challenge to a statute is premised on the
perpetuation of prejudice against persons favored by the Constitution with special
protection -- such as the working class or a section thereof -- the Court may recognize the
existence of a suspect classification and subject the same to strict judicial scrutiny.
38. The view that the concepts of suspect classification and strict judicial scrutiny formulated
in Central Bank Employee Association exaggerate the significance of Section 3, Article
XIII is a groundless apprehension.
39. Central Bank applied Article XIII in conjunction with the equal protection clause.
40. Article XIII, by itself, without the application of the equal protection clause, has no life or
force of its own as elucidated in Agabon.
41. Along the same line of reasoning, the Court further holds that the subject clause violates
petitioner's right to substantive due process, for it deprives him of property, consisting of
monetary benefits, without any existing valid governmental purpose.
42. The argument of the Solicitor General, that the actual purpose of the subject clause of
limiting the entitlement of OFWs to their three-month salary in case of illegal dismissal,
is to give them a better chance of getting hired by foreign employers.
43. This is plain speculation.
44. As earlier discussed, there is nothing in the text of the law or the records of the
deliberations leading to its enactment or the pleadings of respondent that would indicate
that there is an existing governmental purpose for the subject clause, or even just a
pretext of one.
 Page 48 of 63

45. The subject clause does not state or imply any definitive governmental purpose; and it is
for that precise reason that the clause violates not just petitioner's right to equal
protection, but also her right to substantive due process under Section 1, Article III of the
Constitution.
46. The subject clause being unconstitutional, petitioner is entitled to his salaries for the
entire unexpired period of nine months and 23 days of his employment contract, pursuant
to law and jurisprudence prior to the enactment of R.A. No. 8042.
 Page 49 of 63

(19) Quinto v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 189698, February 22, 2010

DOCTRINE:

1. The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class
privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality.
2. It is not intended to prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is
directed or by territory within which it is to operate.
3. It does not demand absolute equality among residents; it merely requires that all persons
shall be treated alike under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges
conferred and liabilities enforced.
4. The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those
persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class
and reasonable ground exists for making a distinction between those who fall within such
class and those who do not.
5. Substantial distinctions clearly exists between elective officials and appointive officials.
6. Elective officials occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate.
7. Appointive officials hold their office by virtue of their designation by an appointing
authority.

FACTS:

1. The court declared as unconstitutional the second provisio in the third paragraph of sec
13 of RA 9369, Sec 66 of the Omnibus Election Code and Sec 4 of the COMELEC
Resolution 8679 that they violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
2. Dec 1, 2009 The Court declared the second provisio in the third paragraph of sec 13 of
RA 9369, Sec 66 of the Omnibus Election Code and Sec 4 of the COMELEC Resolution
8679 as unconstitutional.
3. Dec 14, 2009 COMELEC filed the motion for reconsideration.
4. The second provisio in the third paragraph of sec 13 of RA 9369, Sec 66 of the Omnibus
Election Code and Sec 4 of the COMELEC Resolution 8679:
a. “Any person holding a public appointive office or position, including active
members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and officers and employees in
GOCCs shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon filling of his
certificate of candidacy“

ISSUE: Whether the second provisio in the third paragraph of sec 13 of RA 9369, Sec 66 of the
Omnibus Election Code and Sec 4 of the COMELEC Resolution 8679, violate the equal
protection clause of the constitution.

RULING:

1. The Court reversed their previous decision and declared the second provisio in the third
paragraph of sec 13 of RA 9369, Sec 66 of the Omnibus Election Code and Sec 4 of the
COMELEC Resolution 8679 as constitutional.
 Page 50 of 63

2. These laws and regulations implement Sec 2 Art IX-B of the 1987 Constitution which
prohibits civil service officers and employees from engaging in any electioneering or
partisan political campaign.
3. The intention to impose a strict limitation on the participation of civil service officers and
employees in partisan political campaign is unmistakable.
4. The equal protection of the law clause in the constitution is not absolute, but is subject to
reasonable classification if the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that
make real differences, one class may be treated and regulated different from the other.
5. The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class
privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality.
6. It is not intended to prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is
directed or by territory within which it is to operate.
7. It does not demand absolute equality among residents; it merely requires that all persons
shall be treated alike under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges
conferred and liabilities enforced.
8. The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those
persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class
and reasonable ground exists for making a distinction between those who fall within such
class and those who do not.
9. Substantial distinctions clearly exists between elective officials and appointive officials.
10. Elective officials occupy their office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate.
11. Appointive officials hold their office by virtue of their designation by an appointing
authority.
 Page 51 of 63

(20) Biraogo v. The Philippine Truth Commission, G.R. No. 192935,

December 7, 2010

DOCTRINE:

1. “According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply requires that all persons
or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and
responsibilities imposed.”
2. It requires public bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar
manner.”
3. “The purpose of the equal protection clause is to secure every person within a state’s
jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the
express terms of a statue or by its improper execution through the state’s duly constituted
authorities.”
4. “In other words, the concept of equal justice under the law requires the state to govern
impartially, and it may not draw distinctions between individuals solely on differences
that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective.”
5. The equal protection clause is aimed at all official state actions, not just those of the
legislature.
6. Its inhibitions cover all the departments of the government including the political and
executive departments, and extend to all actions of a state denying equal protection of the
laws, through whatever agency or whatever guise is taken.
7. It, however, does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or things
without distinction.
8. What it simply requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid
classification.
9. Indeed, the equal protection clause permits classification.
10. Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness.
11. The test has four requisites:
a. The classification rests on substantial distinctions;
b. It is germane to the purpose of the law;
c. It is not limited to existing conditions only; and
d. It applies equally to all members of the same class.81 “Superficial differences do
not make for a valid classification.”
12. For a classification to meet the requirements of constitutionality, it must include or
embrace all persons who naturally belong to the class.
13. “The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not
similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed. It is not necessary
that the classification be made with absolute symmetry, in the sense that the members of
the class should possess the same characteristics in equal degree. Substantial similarity
will suffice; and as long as this is achieved, all those covered by the classification are to
be treated equally. The mere fact that an individual belonging to a class differs from the
other members, as long as that class is substantially distinguishable from all others, does
not justify the non-application of the law to him.”
 Page 52 of 63

14. The classification must not be based on existing circumstances only, or so constituted as
to preclude addition to the number included in the class.
15. It must be of such a nature as to embrace all those who may thereafter be in similar
circumstances and conditions.
16. It must not leave out or “underinclude” those that should otherwise fall into a certain
classification.

FACTS: The genesis of the foregoing cases:

1. The first case is G.R. No. 192935, a special civil action for prohibition instituted by
petitioner Louis Biraogo (Biraogo) in his capacity as a citizen and taxpayer. Biraogo
assails Executive Order No. 1 for being violative of the legislative power of Congress
under Section 1, Article VI of the Constitution6 as it usurps the constitutional authority of
the legislature to create a public office and to appropriate funds therefor.
2. The second case, G.R. No. 193036, is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition
filed by petitioners Edcel C. Lagman, Rodolfo B. Albano Jr., Simeon A. Datumanong,
and Orlando B. Fua, Sr. (petitioners-legislators) as incumbent members of the House of
Representatives.
3. Ican be traced to the events prior to the historic May 2010 elections, when then Senator
Benigno Simeon Aquino III declared his staunch condemnation of graft and corruption
with his slogan, “Kung walang corrupt, walangmahirap.” The Filipino people, convinced
of his sincerity and of his ability to carry out this noble objective, catapulted the good
senator to the presidency.
4. To transform his campaign slogan into reality, President Aquino found a need for a
special body to investigate reported cases of graft and corruption allegedly committed
during the previous administration.
5. Thus, at the dawn of his administration, the President on July 30, 2010, signed Executive
Order No. 1 establishing the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (Truth Commission).
6. The Philippine Truth Commission (PTC) is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office
of the President with the primary task to investigate reports of graft and corruption
committed by third-level public officers and employees, their co-principals, accomplices
and accessories during the previous administration, and thereafter to submit its finding
and recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman. Though it has
been described as an “independent collegial body,” it is essentially an entity within the
Office of the President Proper and subject to his control. Doubtless, it constitutes a public
office, as an ad hoc body is one.
7. Position of Petitioners
a. The petitioners assail Executive Order No. 1 because it is violative of this
constitutional safeguard.
b. They contend that it does not apply equally to all members of the same class such
that the intent of singling out the “previous administration” as its sole object
makes the PTC an “adventure in partisan hostility.”
c. Thus, in order to be accorded with validity, the commission must also cover
reports of graft and corruption in virtually all administrations previous to that of
former President Arroyo.
 Page 53 of 63

d. The petitioners argue that the search for truth behind the reported cases of graft
and corruption must encompass acts committed not only during the administration
of former President Arroyo but also during prior administrations where the “same
magnitude of controversies and anomalies” were reported to have been committed
against the Filipino people.
e. They assail the classification formulated by the respondents as it does not fall
under the recognized exceptions because first, “there is no substantial distinction
between the group of officials targeted for investigation by Executive Order No. 1
and other groups or persons who abused their public office for personal gain; and
second, the selective classification is not germane to the purpose of Executive
Order No. 1 to end corruption.”
f. In order to attain constitutional permission, the petitioners advocate that the
commission should deal with “graft and grafters prior and subsequent to the
Arroyo administration with the strong arm of the law with equal force.”
8. Position of Respondents
a. According to respondents, while Executive Order No. 1 identifies the “previous
administration” as the initial subject of the investigation, following Section 17
thereof, the PTC will not confine itself to cases of large scale graft and corruption
solely during the said administration.
b. Assuming arguendo that the commission would confine its proceedings to
officials of the previous administration, the petitioners argue that no offense is
committed against the equal protection clause for “the segregation of the
transactions of public officers during the previous administration as possible
subjects of investigation is a valid classification based on substantial distinctions
and is germane to the evils which the Executive Order seeks to correct.”
9. To distinguish the Arroyo administration from past administrations, it recited the
following:
a. First. E.O. No. 1 was issued in view of widespread reports of large scale graft and
corruption in the previous administration which have eroded public confidence in
public institutions.
i. There is, therefore, an urgent call for the determination of the truth
regarding certain reports of large scale graft and corruption in the
government and to put a closure to them by the filing of the appropriate
cases against those involved, if warranted, and to deter others from
committing the evil, restore the people’s faith and confidence in the
Government and in their public servants.
b. Second. The segregation of the preceding administration as the object of fact-
finding is warranted by the reality that unlike with administrations long gone, the
current administration will most likely bear the immediate consequence of the
policies of the previous administration.
c. Third. The classification of the previous administration as a separate class for
investigation lies in the reality that the evidence of possible criminal activity, the
evidence that could lead to recovery of public monies illegally dissipated, the
policy lessons to be learned to ensure that anti-corruption laws are faithfully
executed, are more easily established in the regime that immediately precede the
current administration.
 Page 54 of 63

d. Fourth. Many administrations subject the transactions of their predecessors to

investigations to provide closure to issues that are pivotal to national life or even
as a routine measure of due diligence and good housekeeping by a nascent
administration like the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG),
created by the late President Corazon C. Aquino under Executive Order No. 1 to
pursue the recovery of ill-gotten wealth of her predecessor former President
Ferdinand Marcos and his cronies, and the Saguisag Commission created by
former President Joseph Estrada under Administrative Order No, 53, to form an
ad-hoc and independent citizens’ committee to investigate all the facts and
circumstances surrounding “Philippine Centennial projects” of his predecessor,
former President Fidel V. Ramos.

ISSUE: Whether Executive Order No. 1 violates the equal protection clause

RULING:

1. Yes, the Court finds difficulty in upholding the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1
in view of its apparent transgression of the equal protection clause enshrined in Section 1,
Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution. Section 1 reads:
a. Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
2. Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal protection clause.
The clear mandate of the envisioned truth commission is to investigate and find out the
truth “concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous
administration” only.
3. The intent to single out the previous administration is plain, patent and manifest.
4. Mention of it has been made in at least three portions of the questioned executive order.
5. Specifically, these are:
a. WHEREAS, there is a need for a separate body dedicated solely to investigating
and finding out the truth concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption
during the previous administration, and which will recommend the prosecution of
the offenders and secure justice for all;
b. SECTION 1. Creation of a Commission
c. SECTION 2. Powers and Functions.
6. In this regard, it must be borne in mind that the Arroyo administration is but just a
member of a class, that is, a class of past administrations.
7. It is not a class of its own.
8. Not to include past administrations similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness which the
equal protection clause cannot sanction.
9. Such discriminating differentiation clearly reverberates to label the commission as a
vehicle for vindictiveness and selective retribution.
10. The fact remains that Executive Order No. 1 suffers from arbitrary classification.
11. The PTC, to be true to its mandate of searching for the truth, must not exclude the other
past administrations.
12. The PTC must, at least, have the authority to investigate all past administrations.
 Page 55 of 63

13. While reasonable prioritization is permitted, it should not be arbitrary lest it be struck
down for being unconstitutional.
14. While the thrust of the PTC is specific, that is, for investigation of acts of graft and
corruption, Executive Order No. 1, to survive, must be read together with the provisions
of the Constitution.
15. To exclude the earlier administrations in the guise of “substantial distinctions” would
only confirm the petitioners’ lament that the subject executive order is only an “adventure
in partisan hostility.”
16. In the case of US v. Cyprian,95 it was written:
a. “A rather limited number of such classifications have routinely been held or
assumed to be arbitrary; those include: race, national origin, gender, political
activity or membership in a political party, union activity or membership in a
labor union, or more generally the exercise of first amendment rights.”
17. The reports of widespread corruption in the Arroyo administration cannot be taken as
basis for distinguishing said administration from earlier administrations which were also
blemished by similar widespread reports of impropriety.
18. They are not inherent in, and do not inure solely to, the Arroyo administration.
19. As Justice Isagani Cruz put it, “Superficial differences do not make for a valid
classification.
20. The Court is not unaware that “mere underinclusiveness is not fatal to the validity of a
law under the equal protection clause.”
21. “Legislation is not unconstitutional merely because it is not all-embracing and does not
include all the evils within its reach.”
22. It has been written that a regulation challenged under the equal protection clause is not
devoid of a rational predicate simply because it happens to be incomplete.
23. In several instances, the underinclusiveness was not considered a valid reason to strike
down a law or regulation where the purpose can be attained in future legislations or
regulations.
24. These cases refer to the “step by step” process.101 “With regard to equal protection
claims, a legislature does not run the risk of losing the entire remedial scheme simply
because it fails, through inadvertence or otherwise, to cover every evil that might
conceivably have been attacked.”
25. In Executive Order No. 1, however, there is no inadvertence.
26. That the previous administration was picked out was deliberate and intentional as can be
gleaned from the fact that it was underscored at least three times in the assailed executive
order.
27. It must be noted that Executive Order No. 1 does not even mention any particular act,
event or report to be focused on unlike the investigative commissions created in the past.
28. “The equal protection clause is violated by purposeful and intentional discrimination.”
29. To disprove petitioners’ contention that there is deliberate discrimination, the OSG
clarifies that the commission does not only confine itself to cases of large scale graft and
corruption committed during the previous administration.
30. The OSG points to Section 17 of Executive Order No. 1, which provides:
a. SECTION 17. Special Provision Concerning Mandate. If and when in the
judgment of the President there is a need to expand the mandate of the
Commission as defined in Section 1 hereof to include the investigation of cases
 Page 56 of 63

and instances of graft and corruption during the prior administrations, such
mandate may be so extended accordingly by way of a supplemental Executive
Order.
31. The Court is not convinced. Although Section 17 allows the President the discretion to
expand the scope of investigations of the PTC so as to include the acts of graft and
corruption committed in other past administrations, it does not guarantee that they would
be covered in the future.
32. Such expanded mandate of the commission will still depend on the whim and caprice of
the President.
33. If he would decide not to include them, the section would then be meaningless.
34. This will only fortify the fears of the petitioners that the Executive Order No. 1 was
“crafted to tailor-fit the prosecution of officials and personalities of the Arroyo
administration.”
35. WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 1 is hereby declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it is violative of the equal protection clause of the
Constitution.
 Page 57 of 63

(21) Garcia v. Drilon, G.R. No. 179267, June 25, 2013

DOCTRINE: Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated
should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed.

FACTS:

1. Jaype-Garcia (private respondent) filed, for herself and in behalf of her minor children, a
verified petition before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City for the issuance
of a Temporary Protection Order (TPO) against her husband, Jesus C. Garcia (petitioner),
pursuant to R.A. 9262.
2. She claimed to be a victim of physical abuse; emotional, psychological, and economic
violence as a result of marital infidelity on the part of petitioner, with threats of
deprivation of custody of her children and of financial support.
3. Private respondent married petitioner in 2002 and they have three (3) children.
4. Private respondent described herself as a dutiful and faithful wife, whose life revolved
around her husband.
5. On the other hand, petitioner, who is of Filipino-Chinese descent, is dominant,
controlling, and demands absolute obedience from his wife and children.
6. He forbade private respondent to pray, and deliberately isolated her from her friends.
7. Things turned for the worse when petitioner took up an affair with a bank manager of
Robinson's Bank, Bacolod City, who is the godmother of one of their sons.
8. Petitioner admitted to the affair when private respondent confronted him about it in 2004.
9. Petitioner's infidelity spawned a series of fights that left private respondent physically
and emotionally wounded.
10. In one of their quarrels, petitioner grabbed private respondent on both arms and shook her
with such force that caused bruises and hematoma.
11. At another time, petitioner hit private respondent forcefully on the lips that caused some
bleeding.
12. Petitioner sometimes turned his ire on their daughter, Jo-Ann, who had seen the text
messages he sent to his paramour and whom he blamed for squealing on him.
13. He beat Jo-Ann on the chest and slapped her many times.
14. When private respondent decided to leave petitioner, Jo-Ann begged her mother to stay
for fear that if the latter leaves, petitioner would beat her up.
15. Even the small boys are aware of private respondent's sufferings.
16. Their 6-year-old son said that when he grows up, he would beat up his father because of
his cruelty to private respondent.
17. All the emotional and psychological turmoil drove private respondent to the brink of
despair that she even attempted suicide by cutting her wrist.
18. She was found by her son bleeding on the floor.
19. Petitioner simply fled the house instead of taking her to the hospital.
20. Private respondent was hospitalized for about seven (7) days in which time petitioner
never bothered to visit, nor apologized or showed pity on her.
21. Since then, private respondent has been undergoing therapy almost every week and is
taking anti-depressant medications.
 Page 58 of 63

22. When private respondent informed the management of Robinson's Bank that she intends
to file charges against the bank manager, petitioner got angry with her for jeopardizing
the manager's job.
23. He then packed his things and told private respondent that he was leaving her for good.
24. He even told private respondent's mother, who lives with them in the family home, that
private respondent should just accept his extramarital affair since he is not cohabiting
with his paramour and has not sired a child with her.
25. Private respondent is determined to separate from petitioner but she is afraid that he
would take her children from her and deprive her of financial support.
26. Petitioner had previously warned her that if she goes on a legal battle with him, she
would not get a single centavo.
27. Petitioner controls the family businesses involving mostly the construction of deep wells.
28. He is the President of three corporations, of which he and private respondent are both
stockholders.
29. In contrast to the absolute control of petitioner over said corporations, private respondent
merely draws a monthly salary of ₱20,000.00 from one corporation only.
30. On the other hand, petitioner receives a monthly salary of ₱60,000.00 from Negros
Rotadrill Corporation, and enjoys unlimited cash advances and other benefits in hundreds
of thousands of pesos from the corporations.
31. After private respondent confronted him about the affair, petitioner forbade her to hold
office at JBTC Building, Mandalagan, where all the businesses of the corporations are
conducted, thereby depriving her of access to full information about said businesses.
32. Until the filing of the petition a quo, petitioner has not given private respondent an
accounting of the businesses the value of which she had helped raise to millions of pesos.
33. Finding reasonable ground to believe that an imminent danger of violence against the
private respondent and her children exists or is about to recur, the RTC issued a TPO on
March 24, 2006 effective for thirty (30) days.
34. Petitioner filed an Opposition to the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Renewal of the TPO
seeking the denial of the renewal of the TPO on the grounds that it did not (1) comply
with the three-day notice rule, and (2) contain a notice of hearing.
35. Subsequently, petitioner moved for the modification of the TPO to allow him visitation
rights to his children.
36. The TPO was renewed and extended yet again, but subject only to the modifications
prayed for by private respondent.
37. Claiming that petitioner continued to deprive them of financial support; failed to
faithfully comply with the TPO; and committed new acts of harassment against her and
their children, private respondent filed another application for the issuance of a TPO ex
parte.
38. She alleged interalia that petitioner contrived a replevin suit against himself by J-Bros
Trading, Inc., of which the latter was purportedly no longer president, with the end in
view of recovering the Nissan Patrol and Starex Van used by private respondent and the
children.
39. A writ of replevin was served upon private respondent by a group of six or seven
policemen with long firearms that scared the two small boys, Jessie Anthone and Joseph
Eduard.
 Page 59 of 63

40. While Joseph Eduard, then three years old, was driven to school, two men allegedly
attempted to kidnap him, which incident traumatized the boy resulting in his refusal to go
back to school.
41. On another occasion, petitioner allegedly grabbed their daughter, Jo-Ann, by the arm and
threatened her.
42. The incident was reported to the police, and Jo-Ann subsequently filed a criminal
complaint against her father for violation of R.A. 7610, also known as the "Special
Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act."
43. Aside from the replevin suit, petitioner's lawyers initiated the filing by the housemaids
working at the conjugal home of a complaint for kidnapping and illegal detention against
private respondent.
44. This came about after private respondent, armed with a TPO, went to said home to get
her and her children's belongings.
45. Finding some of her things inside a housemaid's (Sheryl Jamola) bag in the maids' room,
private respondent filed a case for qualified theft against Jamola.
46. The RTC issued a TPO, effective for thirty (30) days. In its Order, the trial court
extended the aforequoted TPO for another ten (10) days, and gave petitioner a period of
five (5) days within which to show cause why the TPO should not be renewed, extended,
or modified.
47. Upon petitioner's manifestation, however, that he has not received a copy of private
respondent's motion to modify/renew the TPO, the trial court directed in its previous
order that petitioner be furnished a copy of said motion.
48. Nonetheless, an Order dated a day earlier, October 5, had already been issued renewing
the TPO dated August 23, 2006. During the pendency of Civil Case No. 06-797,
petitioner filed before the Court of Appeals (CA) a petition34 for prohibition (CA-G.R.
CEB-SP. No. 01698), with prayer for injunction and temporary restraining order,
challenging (1) the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 for being violative of the due process
and the equal protection clauses, and (2) the validity of the modified TPO issued in the
civil case for being "an unwanted product of an invalid law."
49. The appellate court issued a 60-day Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) against the
enforcement of the TPO, the amended TPOs and other orders pursuant thereto.
50. Subsequently, however, the appellate court dismissed the petition for failure of petitioner
to raise the constitutional issue in his pleadings before the trial court in the civil case,
which is clothed with jurisdiction to resolve the same.
51. Secondly, the challenge to the validity of R.A. 9262 through a petition for prohibition
seeking to annul the protection orders issued by the trial court constituted a collateral
attack on said law.

ISSUE: Whether R.A. 9262 is violative of the equal protection and due process clauses, and an
undue delegation of judicial power to barangay officials.

RULING:

1. It is settled that courts are not concerned with the wisdom, justice, policy, or expediency
of a statute.
 Page 60 of 63

2. Hence, we dare not venture into the real motivations and wisdom of the members of
Congress in limiting the protection against violence and abuse under R.A. 9262 to
women and children only.
3. No proper challenge on said grounds may be entertained in this proceeding.
4. Congress has made its choice and it is not our prerogative to supplant this judgment.
5. The choice may be perceived as erroneous but even then, the remedy against it is to seek
its amendment or repeal by the legislative.
6. By the principle of separation of powers, it is the legislative that determines the necessity,
adequacy, wisdom and expediency of any law.
7. We only step in when there is a violation of the Constitution.
8. However, none was sufficiently shown in this case.
9. R.A. 9262 does not violate the guaranty of equal protection of the laws.
10. Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be
treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed.
11. The oft-repeated disquisition in the early case of Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers'
Union is instructive:
12. The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the
application of the laws upon all citizens of the state.
13. It is not, therefore, a requirement, in order to avoid the constitutional prohibition against
inequality, that every man, woman and child should be affected alike by a statute.
14. Equality of operation of statutes does not mean indiscriminate operation on persons
merely as such, but on persons according to the circumstances surrounding them.
15. It guarantees equality, not identity of rights.
16. The Constitution does not require that things which are different in fact be treated in law
as though they were the same.
17. The equal protection clause does not forbid discrimination as to things that are different.
18. It does not prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is directed
or by the territory within which it is to operate.
19. The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification.
Classification in law, as in the other departments of knowledge or practice, is the
grouping of things in speculation or practice because they agree with one another in
certain particulars.
20. A law is not invalid because of simple inequality.
21. The very idea of classification is that of inequality, so that it goes without saying that the
mere fact of inequality in no manner determines the matter of constitutionality.
22. All that is required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the
classification should be based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences;
that it must be germane to the purpose of the law; that it must not be limited to existing
conditions only; and that it must apply equally to each member of the class.
23. This Court has held that the standard is satisfied if the classification or distinction is
based on a reasonable foundation or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary.
24. Measured against the foregoing jurisprudential yardstick, we find that R.A. 9262 is based
on a valid classification as shall hereinafter be discussed and, as such, did not violate the
equal protection clause by favoring women over men as victims of violence and abuse to
whom the State extends its protection.
 Page 61 of 63

25. The unequal power relationship between women and men; the fact that women are more
likely than men to be victims of violence; and the widespread gender bias and prejudice
against women all make for real differences justifying the classification under the law.
26. As Justice McIntyre succinctly states, "the accommodation of differences ... is the
essence of true equality."
27. While there are, indeed, relatively few cases of violence and abuse perpetrated against
men in the Philippines, the same cannot render R.A. 9262 invalid.
28. Moreover, the application of R.A. 9262 is not limited to the existing conditions when it
was promulgated, but to future conditions as well, for as long as the safety and security of
women and their children are threatened by violence and abuse.
29. There is no undue delegation of judicial power to barangay officials.
30. The parties may be accompanied by a non-lawyer advocate in any proceeding before the
Punong Barangay.
31. As clearly delimited by the aforequoted provision, the BPO issued by the Punong
Barangay or, in his unavailability, by any available Barangay Kagawad, merely orders
the perpetrator to desist from (a) causing physical harm to the woman or her child; and
(2) threatening to cause the woman or her child physical harm. Such function of the
Punong Barangay is, thus, purely executive in nature, in pursuance of his duty under the
Local Government Code to "enforce all laws and ordinances," and to "maintain public
order in the barangay."114
32. We have held that "(t)he mere fact that an officer is required by law to inquire into the
existence of certain facts and to apply the law thereto in order to determine what his
official conduct shall be and the fact that these acts may affect private rights do not
constitute an exercise of judicial powers."
33. We need not even belabor the issue raised by petitioner that since barangay officials and
other law enforcement agencies are required to extend assistance to victims of violence
and abuse, it would be very unlikely that they would remain objective and impartial, and
that the chances of acquittal are nil.
34. As already stated, assistance by barangay officials and other law enforcement agencies is
consistent with their duty to enforce the law and to maintain peace and order.
35. Before a statute or its provisions duly challenged are voided, an unequivocal breach of, or
a clear conflict with the Constitution, not merely a doubtful or argumentative one, must
be demonstrated in such a manner as to leave no doubt in the mind of the Court.
36. In other words, the grounds for nullity must be beyond reasonable doubt.
37. In the instant case, however, no concrete evidence and convincing arguments were
presented by petitioner to warrant a declaration of the unconstitutionality of R.A. 9262,
which is an act of Congress and signed into law by the highest officer of the co-equal
executive department.
38. As we said in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, courts must assume that the legislature is ever
conscious of the borders and edges of its plenary powers, and passed laws with full
knowledge of the facts and for the purpose of promoting what is right and advancing the
welfare of the majority.
39. WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby DENIED for lack of
merit.
 Page 62 of 63

(22) Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, Inc. v. Cabiles, 732 SCRA 22

DOCTRINES:

1. Equal protection of the law is a guarantee that persons under like circumstances and
falling within the same class are treated alike, in terms of “privileges conferred and
liabilities enforced.”
2. It is a guarantee against “undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile
discrimination or the oppression of inequality.”
3. In creating laws, the legislature has the power “to make distinctions and classifications.”
4. In exercising such power, it has a wide discretion.
5. The equal protection clause does not infringe on this legislative power.
6. A law is void on this basis, only if classifications are made arbitrarily.
7. There is no violation of the equal protection clause if the law applies equally to persons
within the same class and if there are reasonable grounds for distinguishing between
those falling within the class and those who do not fall within the class.
8. A law that does not violate the equal protection clause prescribes a reasonable
classification.
9. A reasonable classification
a. must rest on substantial distinctions;
b. must be germane to the purposes of the law;
c. must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
d. must apply equally to all members of the same class.

FACTS:

1. Petitioner, Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, Inc., is a recruitment and placement

agency.
2. Respondent Joy Cabiles was hired thus signed a one-year employment contract for a
monthly salary of NT$15,360.00. Joy was deployed to work for Taiwan Wacoal, Co. Ltd.
(Wacoal) on June 26, 1997.
3. She alleged that in her employment contract, she agreed to work as quality control for
one year.
4. In Taiwan, she was asked to work as a cutter.
5. Sameer claims that on July 14, 1997, a certain Mr. Huwang from Wacoal informed Joy,
without prior notice, that she was terminated and that “she should immediately report to
their office to get her salary and passport.” She was asked to “prepare for immediate
repatriation.”
6. On October 15, 1997, Joy filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the NLRC against
petitioner and Wacoal. LA dismissed the complaint.
7. NLRC reversed LA’s decision. CA affirmed the ruling of the National Labor Relations
Commission finding respondent illegally dismissed and awarding her three months’
worth of salary, the reimbursement of the cost of her repatriation, and attorney’s fees.
 Page 63 of 63

8. The Court held that the award of the three-month equivalent of respondent’s salary
should be increased to the amount equivalent to the unexpired term of the employment
contract.

ISSUE: Whether the clause “or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term,
whichever is less” that was reinstated in Republic Act No. 8042 upon promulgation of Republic
Act No. 10022 in 2010 is in violation of the equal protection clause.

RULING:

1. YES. The phrase "or for three (3) months of every year of the unexpired term, whichever
is LESS" is in violation of the equal protection clause.
2. In Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and Marlow Navigation Co., Inc., the court
ruled that the clause “or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term,
whichever is less” is unconstitutional for violating the equal protection clause and
substantive due process.
3. In the hierarchy of laws, the Constitution is supreme.
4. No branch or office of the government may exercise its powers in any manner
inconsistent with the Constitution, regardless of the existence of any law that supports
such exercise.
5. The Constitution cannot be trumped by any other law. All laws must be read in light of
the Constitution.
6. Any law that is inconsistent with it is a nullity.
7. Thus, when a law or a provision of law is null because it is inconsistent with the
Constitution, the nullity cannot be cured by reincorporation or reenactment of the same or
a similar law or provision.
8. A law or provision of law that was already declared unconstitutional remains as such
unless circumstances have so changed as to warrant a reverse conclusion.
9. The Court observed that the reinstated clause, this time as provided in Republic Act. No.
10022, violates the constitutional rights to equal protection and due process.
10. Petitioner as well as the Solicitor General have failed to show any compelling change in
the circumstances that would warrant us to revisit the precedent.
11. The Court declared, once again, the clause, “or for three (3) months for every year of the
unexpired term, whichever is less” in Section 7 of Republic Act No. 10022 amending
Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042 is declared unconstitutional and, therefore, null and
void.