CASE DIGEST: TANADA V. ANGARA, G.R. NO.

118295, May 2, 1997

MARCH 1, 2023

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE:

Where an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it
becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute.

In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravenes the Constitution,
the petition no doubt raises a justiciable controversy. Where an action of the legislative branch is
seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of
the judiciary to settle the dispute. “The question thus posed is judicial rather than political. The duty (to
adjudicate) remains to assure that the supremacy of the Constitution is upheld.” Once a “controversy as
to the application or interpretation of a constitutional provision is raised before this Court (as in the
instant case), it becomes a legal issue which the Court is bound by constitutional mandate to decide.”

FACTS

This is a case petition by Sen. Wigberto Tanada, together with other lawmakers, taxpayers, and various
NGO’s to nullify the Philippine ratification of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement.

Petitioners believe that this will be detrimental to the growth of our National Economy and against to
the “Filipino First” policy. The WTO opens access to foreign markets, especially its major trading
partners, through the reduction of tariffs on its exports, particularly agricultural and industrial products.
Thus, provides new opportunities for the service sector cost and uncertainty associated with exporting
and more investment in the country. These are the predicted benefits as reflected in the agreement and
as viewed by the signatory Senators, a “free market” espoused by WTO.

Petitioners also contends that it is in conflict with the provisions of our constitution, since the said
Agreement is an assault on the sovereign powers of the Philippines because it meant that Congress
could not pass legislation that would be good for national interest and general welfare if such legislation
would not conform to the WTO Agreement.

ISSUES

1. Whether or not the petition present a justiciable controversy.

2. Whether or not the provisions of the ‘Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization and
the Agreements and Associated Legal Instruments included in Annexes one (1), two (2) and three (3) of
that agreement’ cited by petitioners directly contravene or undermine the letter, spirit and intent of
Section 19, Article II and Sections 10 and 12, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.

3. Whether or not certain provisions of the Agreement unduly limit, restrict or impair the exercise
of legislative power by Congress.

4. Whether or not certain provisions of the Agreement impair the exercise of judicial power by this
Honorable Court in promulgating the rules of evidence.

5. Whether or not the concurrence of the Senate ‘in the ratification by the President of the
Philippines of the Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization’ implied rejection of the treaty
embodied in the Final Act.
HELD

1. In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravenes the
Constitution, the petition no doubt raises a justiciable controversy. Where an action of the legislative
branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact
the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute.

As explained by former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, “the judiciary is the final arbiter on the
question of whether or not a branch of government or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction
or in excess of jurisdiction or so capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess
of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this nature.”

2. While the Constitution indeed mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services, labor and
enterprises, at the same time, it recognizes the need for business exchange with the rest of the world on
the bases of equality and reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino enterprises only against foreign
competition and trade practices that are unfair. In other words, the Constitution did not intend to pursue
an isolationist policy. It did not shut out foreign investments, goods and services in the development of
the Philippine economy. While the Constitution does not encourage the unlimited entry of foreign
goods, services and investments into the country, it does not prohibit them either. In fact, it allows an
exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity, frowning only on foreign competition that is unfair.

3. By their inherent nature, treaties really limit or restrict the absoluteness of sovereignty. By their
voluntary act, nations may surrender some aspects of their state power in exchange for greater benefits
granted by or derived from a convention or pact. After all, states, like individuals, live with coequals, and
in pursuit of mutually covenanted objectives and benefits, they also commonly agree to limit the
exercise of their otherwise absolute rights.

As shown by the foregoing treaties Philippines has entered, a portion of sovereignty may be waived
without violating the Constitution, based on the rationale that the Philippines “adopts the generally
accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of
cooperation and amity with all nations.”

4. The provision in Article 34 of WTO agreement does not contain an unreasonable burden,
consistent as it is with due process and the concept of adversarial dispute settlement inherent in our
judicial system.

5. The assailed Senate Resolution No. 97 expressed concurrence in exactly what the Final Act
required from its signatories, namely, concurrence of the Senate in the WTO Agreement. Moreover, the
Senate was well-aware of what it was concurring in as shown by the members’ deliberation on August
25, 1994. After reading the letter of President Ramos dated August 11, 1994, the senators of the
Republic minutely dissected what the Senate was concurring in.
AIR FRANCE VS. SAKS

Legal Basis cited:

Article 17 and 18 of the Warsaw Convention

Article 17

"The carrier shall be liable for damage sustained in the event of the death or wounding of a passenger
or any other bodily injury suffered by a passenger,

if the accident which caused the damage so sustained took place on board the aircraft or in the course of
any of the operations of embarking or disembarking.

Article 18

"(1) The carrier shall be liable for damage sustained in the event of the destruction or loss of, or of
damage to, any checked baggage or any goods, if the occurrence which caused the damage so sustained
took place during the transportation by air."

The 1966 Montreal Agreement

(a private agreement among airlines that has been approved by the Federal Government)

Annex 13 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation the Case

On March 04, 1985, the Supreme Court issued a 8-0 decision stating that the case of Air France v. Saks
(docket no. 83-1785) should be reversed and remanded and upholding the law in question [Treaty] as
constitutional. The judgment rested on the Court's authority over statutory construction. It was decided
by an opinion of the court (orally argued) and was conservative in nature. The Court undertook review of
the case via cert, citing federal court conflict as its reason for taking up the case, and heard the case on
January 15, 1985. The case originated in the California Central U.S. District Court and was reviewed by
the U.S. Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit before reaching the U.S. Supreme Court. Justice Sandra Day
O'Connor authored the majority opinion. (O'CONNOR, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which all
other Members joined, except POWELL, J., who took no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
The case originated in the California Central U.S. District Court. It was then appealed to the U.S. Court of
Appeals, Ninth Circuit, which ruled in a liberal direction and stated that the earlier decision be reversed.

FACTS:

On November 16, 1980, respondent Valerie Saks boarded an Air France jetliner in Paris for a12-hour
flight to Los Angeles. The flight went smoothly in all respects until, as the aircraft descended to Los
Angeles, Saks felt severe pressure and pain in her left ear. The pain continued after the plane landed, but
Saks disembarked without informing any Air France crew member or employee of her ailment. Five days
later, Saks consulted a doctor, who concluded that she had become permanently deaf in her left ear.

Saks filed suit against Air France in California state court, alleging that her hearing loss was caused by
negligent maintenance and operation of the jetliner's pressurization system. She argued that "accident"
should be defined as a "hazard of air travel," and that her injury had indeed been caused by such a
hazard. Air France moved for summary judgment on the ground that respondent could not prove that
her injury was caused by an "accident" within the meaning of the Warsaw Convention. The term
"accident," according to Air France, means an "abnormal, unusual or unexpected occurrence aboard the
aircraft. “All the available evidence, including the postflight reports, pilot's affidavit, and passenger
testimony, indicated that the aircraft's pressurization system had operated in the usual manner.
Accordingly, the airline contended that the suit should be dismissed because the only alleged cause of
respondent's injury -- normal operation of a pressurization system -- could not qualify as an "accident."
Relying on precedent that defines the term "accident" in Article 17 as an "unusual or unexpected"
happening, the District Court granted summary judgment to petitioner.
The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that: the language, history, and policy of the Warsaw Convention
and the Montreal Agreement (a private agreement among airlines that has been approved by the
Federal Government) impose absolute liability on airlines for injuries proximately caused by the risks
inherent in air travel; and that normal cabin pressure changes qualify as an "accident" within the
definition contained in Annex 13 to the Convention on International Civil Aviation as meaning "an
occurrence associated with the operation of an aircraft.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a loss of hearing proximately caused by normal operation of the aircraft's pressurization
system is an 'accident' within the meaning of Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention which would render
Air France liable.

RULING:

The US Supreme Court disagreed with the definition of "accident" adopted by the Court of Appeals, and
reversed the latter’s decision.

Air France is liable to a passenger under the terms of the Warsaw Convention only if the passenger
proves that an "accident" was the cause of her injury.

Liability under Article 17 arises only if a passenger's injury is caused by an unexpected or unusual event
or happening that is external to the passenger, and not where the injury results from the passenger's
own internal reaction to the usual, normal, and expected operation of the aircraft.

(a) The text of the Warsaw Convention suggests that the passenger's injury must be so caused. The
difference in the language of Article 17, imposing liability for injuries to passengers caused by an
"accident" and Article 18, imposing liability for destruction or loss of baggage by an "occurrence,"
implies that the drafters of the Convention understood the word "accident" to mean something different
than the word" occurrence."

- Moreover, Article 17 refers to an accident which caused the passenger's injury, and not to an
accident which is the passenger's injury. The text thus implies that; however, "accident" is
defined, it is the cause of the injury that must satisfy the definition, rather than the occurrence
of the injury alone.
- And, since the Warsaw Convention was drafted in French by continental jurists, further guidance
is furnished by the French legal meaning of "accident"-- when used to describe a cause of injury,
rather than the event of injury – as being a fortuitous, unexpected, unusual, or unintended
event.

(b) The above interpretation of Article 17 is consistent with the negotiating history of the Warsaw
Convention, the conduct of the parties thereto, and the weight of precedent in foreign and American
courts.

(c) Enforcement of Article 17's "accident" requirement cannot be circumvented by reference to the
Montreal Agreement. That Agreement, while requiring airlines to waive "due care" defenses under
Article 20(1) of the Warsaw Convention, did not waive Article17's "accident" requirement. Nor can
enforcement of Article 17 be escaped by reference to the equation of "accident" with "occurrence" in
Annex 13, which, with its corresponding Convention, expressly applies to aircraft accident investigations,
and not to principles of liability to passengers under the Warsaw Convention.

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
NICARAGUA V. UNITED STATES

Citation. I.C.J. 1984 I.C.J. 39

Brief Fact Summary.

Nicaragua (P) brought a suit against the United States (D) on the ground that the United States (D) was
responsible for illegal military and paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua. The jurisdiction of the
International Court of Justice to entertain the case as well as the admissibility of Nicaragua’s (P)
application to the I.C.J. was challenged by the United States (D).

Synopsis of Rule of Law.

Nicaragua (P) brought a suit against the United States (D) on the ground that the United States (D) was
responsible for illegal military and paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua. The jurisdiction of the
International Court of Justice to entertain the case as well as the admissibility of Nicaragua’s (P)
application to the I.C.J. was challenged by the United States (D).

Facts.

The United States (D) challenged the jurisdiction of the I.C.J when it was held responsible for illegal
military and paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua (P) in the suit the plaintiff brought against
the defendant in 1984. Though a declaration accepting the mandatory jurisdiction of the Court was
deposited by the United States (D) in a 1946, it tried to justify the declaration in a 1984 notification by
referring to the 1946 declaration and stating in part that the declaration “shall not apply to disputes with
any Central American State….”

Apart from maintaining the ground that the I.C.J lacked jurisdiction, the States (D) also argued that
Nicaragua (P) failed to deposit a similar declaration to the Court. On the other hand, Nicaragua (P) based
its argument on its reliance on the 1946 declaration made by the United states (D) due to the fact that it
was a “state accepting the same obligation” as the United States (D) when it filed charges in the I.C.J.
against the United States (D). Also, the plaintiff intent to submit to the compulsory jurisdiction of the
I.C.J. was pointed out by the valid declaration it made in 1929 with the I.C.J’s predecessor, which was the
Permanent Court of International Justice, even though Nicaragua had failed to deposit it with that court.
The admissibility of Nicaragua’s (P) application to the I.C.J. was also challenged by the United States (D).

Issue.

(1) Is the jurisdiction to entertain a dispute between two states, if they both accept the Court’s
jurisdiction, within the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice?

(2) Where no grounds exist to exclude the application of a state, is the application of such a state to the
International Court of Justice admissible?

Held.

(1) Yes. The jurisdiction of the Court to entertain a dispute between two states if each of the States
accepted the Court’s jurisdiction is within the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice. Even
though Nicaragua (P) declaration of 1929 was not deposited with the Permanent Court, because of the
potential effect it had that it would last for many years, it was valid.

Thus, it maintained its effect when Nicaragua became a party to the Statute of the I.C.J because the
declaration was made unconditionally and was valid for an unlimited period. The intention of the current
drafters of the current Statute was to maintain the greatest possible continuity between it and the
Permanent Court. Thus, when Nicaragua (P) accepted the Statute, this would have been deemed that
the plaintiff had given its consent to the transfer of its declaration to the I.C.J.
(2) Yes. When no grounds exist to exclude the application of a state, the application of such a state to the
International Court of Justice is admissible. The five grounds upon which the United States (D)
challenged the admissibility of Nicaragua’s (P) application were that the plaintiff failed because there is
no “indispensable parties” rule when it could not bring forth necessary parties, Nicaragua’s (P) request
of the Court to consider the possibility of a threat to peace which is the exclusive province of the
Security Council, failed due to the fact that I.C.J. can exercise jurisdiction which is concurrent with that
of the Security Council, that the I.C.J. is unable to deal with situations involving ongoing armed conflict
and that there is nothing compelling the I.C.J. to decline to consider one aspect of a dispute just because
the dispute has other aspects due to the fact that the case is incompatible with the Contadora process to
which Nicaragua (P) is a party.

Discussion.

Although the questions of jurisdiction and admissibility are primarily based on the principle that the I.C.J.
has only as much power as that agreed to by the parties, these can be quite complicated. The 1946
declaration of the United States and the 1929 declaration of Nicaragua was the main focus of the case on
declaration and each of these declarations pointed out the respective parties’ intent as it related to the
I.C.J’s jurisdiction.

NORTH SEA CONTINENTAL SHELF CASES (FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY V. DENMARK; FEDERAL
REPUBLIC OF GERMANY V. NETHERLANDS)

Citation. I.C.J. 1969 I.C.J. 3

Brief Fact Summary.

The view that customary rules of international law determined the boundaries of areas located on the
continental shelf between their countries and the Federal Republic of Germany (D) was contended by
Denmark (P) and the Netherlands (P).

Synopsis of Rule of Law.

For a custom to become binding as international law, it must amount to a settled practice and must be
rendered obligatory by a rule requiring it.

Facts.

That the boundaries between their respective areas of the continental shelf in the North Sea and the
area claimed by the Federal Republic of Germany (D), should be determined by the application of the
principle of equidistance as set forth in Article 6 of the Geneva Convention of 1958 on the Continental
Shelf, which by January 1, 1969 had been ratified or acceded to by 39 states but to which Germany was
not a party, was the basis of Denmark’s (D) and the Netherland’s (P) contention.

Because the use of the delimitation method was not merely a conventional obligation, but a rule that
was part of the corpus of general international law and like other rules of general or customary
international law, which was binding automatically on Germany (D), independent of any specific assent,
direct or indirect, given by Germany (D), Denmark (P) and the Netherland’s (P) contended that Germany
(D) was bound to accept the delimitation on an equidistance basis.

Issue.
Must delimitation be the object of an equitable agreement between the states involved?

Held.

Yes. Delimitation must be the object of an equitable agreement between the states involved. As
stipulated in Article 6 of the Geneva Convention, equidistance principle is not part of customary
international law. Article 6 makes the obligation to use the equidistance method a secondary one which
comes into play only when agreements between the parties are absent. Although the principle of
equidistance is not given a fundamental norm-creating character by Article 6, which is necessary to the
formation of a general rule of law.

In this case, after taking into consideration all relevant circumstances, the delimitation here is to be
excused by equitable agreement.

Dissent.

(Lachs, J.) not only the states who are parties to the Convention on the Continental Shelf have accepted
the principles and rules enshrined in the Convention including the equidistance rule, but by other states
who that have subsequently followed it in agreements, or in their legislation, or have acquiesced in it
when faced with legislative acts of other affecting them. This can be seen as evidence of a practice
widespread enough to satisfy the criteria for a general rule of law.

Discussion.

The concept of opinion juris analyzed by the dissent is in consonance with the position taken by some
legal scholars who maintain that opinio juris may be presumed from uniformities of practice regarding
matters viewed normally as involving legal rights and obligations. A contrary position maintains that the
practice of states must be accompanied by or consist of statements that something is law before it can
become law

THE ASYLUM CASE (COLOMBIA V. PERU) DIGEST

ICJ Judgment of 20 November 1950

Facts

A military rebellion broke out in Peru. Haya was denounced as responsible and his arrest was ordered. In
January 1949, Haya sought diplomatic asylum in the Colombian Embassy in Lima, Peru. The Ambassador
of Colombia (“The Ambassador”) requested that Haya be given safe passage to leave Peru.

Peru – a territorial State;

Colombia – a State of Refuge. Specifically, her ambassador granting asylum to Victor Rayl Haya dela Torre
(“Haya”).

Colombia asked Peru for a safe passage conduct, hence, the filing of this case before th ICJ.

Colombia’s arguments:

(1) Bolivarian Agreement of 1911 on Extradition; (2) Havana Convention of 1928 on Asylum; (3)
Montevideo Convention of 1933 on Political Asylum; (4) American International Law. According to these,
Colombia is entitled to qualify the nature of the offence for the purposes of asylum, therefore, Haya is
qualified to be accommodated in their embassy.

ICJ Ruling

On the unilateral qualification made by Colombia

Colombia claimed the right of unilateral and definitive qualification binding upon Peru. The Bolivarian
Agreement did not entail the right of unilateral qualification; When it laid down rules for extradition,
conclusions of diplomatic asylum cannot be deduced from them. The refugee was on the territory of the
State of refuge. Here, Haya was in the territorial state (where he allegedly committed crimes) and
Colombia’s grant of asylum disrespected/derogated the sovereignty of Peru (territorial State) and
removed the offender, Haya, from the jurisdiction of Peru.

On Havana Convention

Neither it did recognize the right of unilateral qualification either explicitly or implicitly.

On Montevideo Convention

Had not been ratified by Peru and therefore could not be invoked against Peru.

On American International Law

Colombia argued that there existed a regional custom allowing Colombia to unilaterally qualify the status
of the a person as a refugee. But Colombia had not proved the existence of a constant and uniform
practice of unilateral qualification as a right of the State of refuge and an obligation upon Peru (territorial
State). The facts submitted had too much contradiction, and fluctuation to discern usage peculiar to
Latin America accepted as law.

Therefore, Colombia not competent to qualify the nature of the offence by a unilateral and definitive
decision binding on Peru.

Class discussion

Colombia relied on 3 written texts, and 1 custom.

As for Bolivian Agreement, was its argument to unilaterally qualify tenable? No right to unilaterally
qualify. Same with Havana Convention. Court did not look at the Montevideo Convention because Peru
did not ratify.

What was ICJ’s statement regarding AIL? What was the exact term of the court in describing the custom?

Constant and uniform practice – consistent and observed by member states in a very uniform,
concerted, manner, there must be commonality.

There is the earliest decision of ICJ in relation to a custom. No need for a practice to be observed in a
global scale. It is sufficient that it is practiced regionally. A custom may exist nevertheless it is practiced
regionally or locally.

There’s another case filed against Raul Haya dela Torre. Search for his name.

FISHERIES JURISDICTION (UNITED KINGDOM V. ICELAND)

Citation. I.C.J., 1973 I.C.J. 3

Brief Fact Summary.

Because some circumstances changed, Iceland (D) claimed that a fishing treaty it had with the United
Kingdom (P) was no longer applicable.

Synopsis of Rule of Law.

In order that a change of circumstances may give rise to the premise calling for the termination of a
treaty, it is necessary that it has resulted in a radical transformation of the extent of the obligations still
to be performed.

Facts.

Iceland’s (D) claim to a 12-mile fisheries limit was recognized by the United Kingdom (P) in 1961 in return
for Iceland’s (D) agreement that any dispute concerning Icelandic fisheries jurisdiction beyond the 12-
mile limit be referred to the International Court of Justice. An application was filed before the I.C.J. when
Iceland (D) proposed to extend its exclusive fisheries jurisdiction from 12 to 50 miles around its shores in
1972. By postulating that changes in circumstances since the 12-mile limit was now generally recognized
was the ground upon which Iceland (D) stood to argue that the agreement was no longer valid. Iceland
(D) also asserted that there would be a failure of consideration for the 1961 agreement.

Issue.

In order that a change of circumstances may give rise to a ground for invoking the termination of a
treaty, is it necessary that it has resulted in a radical transformation of the extent of the obligation still to
be performed?

Held.

Yes. In order that a change of circumstances may give rise to the premise calling for the termination of a
treaty, it is necessary that it has resulted in a radical transformation of the extent of the obligations still
to be performed.

The change of circumstances alleged by Iceland (D) cannot be said to have transformed radically the
extent of the jurisdictional obligation that was imposed in the 1961 Exchange of Notes.

Discussion.

Recourse to the I.C.J. in the event of a dispute was the original agreement between the parties. The
economy of Iceland (D) is dependent on fishing. The merit of Iceland (D) argument was not reached by
the Court in this case, however, but rather dealt with the jurisdictional issues.

ss

GABCIKOVO-NAGYMAROS PROJECT (HUNGARY/SLOVAKIA)

Citation. 1997 I.C.J. 7, reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 162 (1998)

Brief Fact Summary.

Hungary (P) claimed that Czechoslovakia (D) violated the provisions of a treaty when it appropriated the
waters of the Danube River to construct a dam.

Synopsis of Rule of Law.

Watercourse states shall participate in the use, development and protection of an international
watercourse in an equitable and reasonable manner.

Facts.

In 1977, Hungary (P) and Czechoslovakia (D) signed a Treaty for the construction of dams and other
projects along the Danube River that bordered both nations. Czechoslovakia (D) began work on
damming the river in its territory when Hungary (P) stopped working on the project and negotiation
could not resolve the matter which led Hungary (P) to terminate the Treaty. Hungary (P) based its action
on the fact that the damming of the river had been agreed to only on the ground of a joint operation and
sharing of benefits associated with the project, to which Czechoslovakia (D) had unlawfully unilaterally
assumed control of a shared resource.

Issue.

Shall watercourse states participate in the use, development and protection of an international
watercourse in an equitable and reasonable manner?

Held.

Yes. Watercourse states shall participate in the use, development and protection of an international
watercourse in an equitable and reasonable manner. Hungary (P) was deprived of its rights to an
equitable and reasonable share of the natural resources of the Danube by Czechoslovakia (D) and also
failed to respect the proportionality that is required by international law. Cooperative administration
must be reestablished by the parties of what remains of the project.

Discussion.

The Court’s decision was that the joint regime must be restored. In order to achieve most of the Treaty’s
objectives, common utilization of shared water resources was necessary. Hence, the defendant was not
authorized to proceed without the plaintiff’s consent.