Criminal Law

Table of Contents 1
Criminal Law – Bar Examinations 2023
TAB LE O F C O N TEN TS
Table of Contents .......................................................................................................................................................................1
Basic Facts...................................................................................................................................................................................4
General Principles ......................................................................................................................................................................6
Generality, territoriality, and prospectivity of penal laws ...................................................................................................6
Pro Reo doctrine ....................................................................................................................................................................7
Motive, mala in se and mala prohibita .................................................................................................................................7
Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code ..........................................................................................................................................8
Mistake of fact .......................................................................................................................................................................9
Impossible crime ................................................................................................................................................................. 10
Attempted, Frustrated, and Consummated Crimes .............................................................................................................. 10
Conspiracy ............................................................................................................................................................................... 13
Justifying Circumstances ......................................................................................................................................................... 27
Self-defense ........................................................................................................................................................................ 27
Burden and quantum of proof ...................................................................................................................................... 27
Unlawful aggression ....................................................................................................................................................... 28
Reasonable means ......................................................................................................................................................... 35
Lack of sufficient provocation ....................................................................................................................................... 36
Defense of relatives ............................................................................................................................................................ 37
Defense of a stranger ......................................................................................................................................................... 37
Fulfillment of duty .............................................................................................................................................................. 38
Entrapment and instigation ............................................................................................................................................... 38
Exempting Circumstances ....................................................................................................................................................... 39
Insanity or imbecility .......................................................................................................................................................... 39
Minority ............................................................................................................................................................................... 42
Uncontrollable fear............................................................................................................................................................. 43
Accident .............................................................................................................................................................................. 43
Mitigating Circumstances ....................................................................................................................................................... 44
General principles ............................................................................................................................................................... 44
Incomplete self-defense..................................................................................................................................................... 44
Lack of intention to commit a grave wrong ...................................................................................................................... 44
Vindication of a grave offense ........................................................................................................................................... 45
Sufficient provocation ........................................................................................................................................................ 45
Passion and obfuscation ..................................................................................................................................................... 46
Voluntary surrender ........................................................................................................................................................... 46
Voluntary plea of guilt ........................................................................................................................................................ 49
Illness ................................................................................................................................................................................... 49
Analogous causes ............................................................................................................................................................... 49
Aggravating circumstance....................................................................................................................................................... 49
Insult or disrespect of offended party’s status ................................................................................................................. 49
Nighttime ............................................................................................................................................................................ 49
Dwelling ............................................................................................................................................................................... 50
Band..................................................................................................................................................................................... 50
Abuse of strength ............................................................................................................................................................... 50
Evident premeditation ....................................................................................................................................................... 53
Disguise ............................................................................................................................................................................... 55
Treachery ............................................................................................................................................................................ 56
Cruelty ................................................................................................................................................................................. 65
Use of motor vehicle .......................................................................................................................................................... 65
Special aggravating circumstances .................................................................................................................................... 66
Alternative Circumstances ...................................................................................................................................................... 66
Participants in a Crime ............................................................................................................................................................ 67
Principals ............................................................................................................................................................................. 67
Accomplices ........................................................................................................................................................................ 68
Accessories .......................................................................................................................................................................... 71
Complex Crimes and Special Complex Crimes ....................................................................................................................... 71
Continuing Crime..................................................................................................................................................................... 73
Penalties .................................................................................................................................................................................. 74
Duty of courts and Article 5 of the RPC ............................................................................................................................. 74
Subsidiary imprisonment ................................................................................................................................................... 74
Rules on imposition of penalties ........................................................................................................................................ 74
Computation and imposition of penalties ......................................................................................................................... 77
Extinguishment of criminal liability ........................................................................................................................................ 90
Death of accused ................................................................................................................................................................ 90
#RejectMarcosAndDuterte #MarcosNoHero #NoToHistoricalDenialism

#DefendPressFreedom #SerenoIsTheFirstFemaleChiefJustice
Table of Contents 2
Condonation, pardon, and amnesty .................................................................................................................................. 90

Prescription of Prosecution and of Penalties......................................................................................................................... 91
GCTA ........................................................................................................................................................................................ 95
Probation and Parole .............................................................................................................................................................. 96
Juvenile Justice Law................................................................................................................................................................. 97
Civil Liability Ex Delicto ............................................................................................................................................................ 99
Piracy...................................................................................................................................................................................... 101
Anti-Terrorism Act ................................................................................................................................................................. 102
Criminal acts...................................................................................................................................................................... 102
Detention .......................................................................................................................................................................... 105
Arbitrary detention ............................................................................................................................................................... 106
Direct Assault and Indirect Assault ....................................................................................................................................... 106
Complex crime of direct assault with homicide .............................................................................................................. 108
Illegal Possession of Firearms under R.A. 10591 ................................................................................................................. 108
Forgery ................................................................................................................................................................................... 111
Falsification by a public officer ............................................................................................................................................. 111
Falsification by a private individual or a private document ................................................................................................ 117
Use of a falsified document .................................................................................................................................................. 121
Other acts of falsification ...................................................................................................................................................... 122
Perjury.................................................................................................................................................................................... 122
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act ................................................................................................................................. 123
Crimes ............................................................................................................................................................................... 123
Illegal sale of dangerous drugs .................................................................................................................................... 123
Illegal possession of dangerous drugs ........................................................................................................................ 132
Use of dangerous drugs ............................................................................................................................................... 136
Transportation of dangerous drugs ............................................................................................................................ 137
Visiting a drug den ....................................................................................................................................................... 140
Maintenance of a drug den ......................................................................................................................................... 141
Coddler or protector .................................................................................................................................................... 141
Chain of custody ............................................................................................................................................................... 142
General principles ........................................................................................................................................................ 142
R.A. 9165 vs R.A. 10640 ............................................................................................................................................... 145
Marking, photograph, and inventory .......................................................................................................................... 147
Presence of accused and insulating witnesses ........................................................................................................... 166
Turnover from seizing officer to investigating officer ................................................................................................ 179
Forensic examination by chemist ................................................................................................................................ 183
Delivery to court........................................................................................................................................................... 188
Justifiable ground for non-compliance ....................................................................................................................... 191
Rehabilitation .................................................................................................................................................................... 200
Anti-Gambling Law ................................................................................................................................................................ 201
Usurpation of official functions ............................................................................................................................................ 201
Bribery.................................................................................................................................................................................... 203
Malversation and Illegal Exaction ......................................................................................................................................... 204
Infidelity in the Custody of Public Documents..................................................................................................................... 210
Unlawful Appointments ........................................................................................................................................................ 211
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act ................................................................................................................................... 211
Section 3(E) ....................................................................................................................................................................... 211
Section 3(G)....................................................................................................................................................................... 254
Section 3(F) ....................................................................................................................................................................... 259
Section 3(C) ....................................................................................................................................................................... 260
Section 3(H)....................................................................................................................................................................... 260
Section 3(D) ....................................................................................................................................................................... 261
Section 3(B) ....................................................................................................................................................................... 261
Section 3(J) ........................................................................................................................................................................ 262
Section 7 ............................................................................................................................................................................ 262
Preventive suspension under R.A. 3019, Section 13 ...................................................................................................... 263
Anti-Plunder Law ................................................................................................................................................................... 263
Parricide ................................................................................................................................................................................. 265
Murder and Homicide ........................................................................................................................................................... 267
Article 247 of the RPC ........................................................................................................................................................... 276
Death in a Tumultuous Affray............................................................................................................................................... 276
Physical Injuries in a Tumultuous Affray .............................................................................................................................. 276
Illegal Discharge of Firearm .................................................................................................................................................. 277
Physical Injuries ..................................................................................................................................................................... 277
Rape ....................................................................................................................................................................................... 279
Anti-Trafficking in Persons .................................................................................................................................................... 303

Table of Contents 3
Anti-Violence against Women and their Children ............................................................................................................... 313

Acts of violence ................................................................................................................................................................. 313
Protection orders .............................................................................................................................................................. 317
Anti-Child Abuse Law ............................................................................................................................................................ 318
Definition of child/children .............................................................................................................................................. 318
Child abuse in general ...................................................................................................................................................... 318
Other acts of child abuse ................................................................................................................................................. 320
Kidnapping and Illegal Detention ......................................................................................................................................... 325
Unlawful Arrest ..................................................................................................................................................................... 330
Grave, Light, and Other Light Threats .................................................................................................................................. 331
Robbery.................................................................................................................................................................................. 332
Simple robbery.................................................................................................................................................................. 332
Robbery with Homicide .................................................................................................................................................... 334
Robbery with rape ............................................................................................................................................................ 339
Robbery with intimidation of persons ............................................................................................................................. 342
Robbery in band................................................................................................................................................................ 342
Cattle-rustling ................................................................................................................................................................... 343
Theft ....................................................................................................................................................................................... 343
Estafa ..................................................................................................................................................................................... 350
Estafa under Article 315 ................................................................................................................................................... 350
Syndicated estafa.............................................................................................................................................................. 366
Other forms of estafa ....................................................................................................................................................... 370
Bouncing Checks Law (B.P. 22) ........................................................................................................................................ 370
Arson ...................................................................................................................................................................................... 374
Malicious Mischief and Other Mischiefs .............................................................................................................................. 376
Anti-Fencing Law ................................................................................................................................................................... 376
Acts of Lasciviousness ........................................................................................................................................................... 378
Sexual Abuse and Lascivious Conduct under R.A. 7610 ...................................................................................................... 379
Sexual abuse under R.A. 7610 vs. Rape and/or acts of lasciviousness under the RPC ................................................. 385
Forcible abduction ................................................................................................................................................................ 392
Bigamy ................................................................................................................................................................................... 392
Libel, Slander, and Oral Defamation .................................................................................................................................... 393
Criminal Negligence .............................................................................................................................................................. 400

Basic Facts 4
B AS IC FAC TS
1. Marcos is no hero. In fact, his burial in the grave of heroes on the impulse of [Dictator] Duterte, would continue
the desecration of other citizens’ rights, a chilling legacy of the Marcos dictatorship and evil that survives to this
very day, long after the death of the dictator. (Dissenting Opinion of Chief Justice Sereno in Ocampo v. Enriquez,
G.R. No. 225973, November 8, 2016, En Banc)
2. Marcos’ interment at the LNMB is contrary to public policy. Marcos is a dictator forced out of office and into
exile after causing twenty years of political, economic, and social havoc in the country. In short, he was ousted
by the Filipino people. Marcos was forcibly removed from the Presidency by what is now referred to as the
People Power Revolution. This is the strongest form of dishonorable discharge from office since it is meted out
by the direct act of the sovereign people. Since the dictator was discharged dishonorably serves to convert his
burial into a private affair of the Marcos family. Hence, no public purpose is served by interring his remains at
the LNMB. (Dissenting Opinion of Justice Carpio in Ocampo v. Enriquez, G.R. No. 225973, November 8, 2016,
En Banc)
3. The ponencia’s characterization of Marcos as just a human who erred like us, trivializes the magnitude of the
suffering that he inflicted on scores of Filipinos. His errors were not errors that a President is entitled to commit.
They were exceptional in both severity and scale. They were inhuman acts. Marcos provided the atmosphere
of impunity that allowed the molestations, rape, torture, death, and disappearance of Filipinos. Marcos was the
President who, rather than preserve and protect the public trust, caused untold anguish upon thousands of
Filipino families. Marcos plundered the nation’s coffers. The systematic plunder was so exceptional and
outrageous that even after being ousted, he and his family brought more than P27 million in freshly printed
notes, 23 wooden crates, 12 suitcases and bags, and various boxes of jewelry, gold bricks, and enough clothes
to fill 57 racks with them to their exile in Hawaii. These were not accidents that humans, like us, commit. These
were deliberate and conscious acts by one who abused his power. To suggest that these were mere errors is
an attempt to erase the dictator’s accountability for the atrocities during Martial Law. It is an attempt to usher
in and guarantee impunity for them as well as for those who will commit the same in the future. Marcos is not
a hero. (Dissenting Opinion of Justice Leonen in Ocampo v. Enriquez, G.R. No. 225973, November 8, 2016, En
Banc)
4. There is sufficient basis to rule that the burial of the dictator Marcos in the LNMB will violate certain
international law principles and obligations, which the Philippines has adopted and must abide by, and R.A.
10368 which transformed the principle and State policy expressed in Article II, Section 11 of the Constitution.
(Dissenting Opinion of Justice Caguioa in Ocampo v. Enriquez, G.R. No. 225973, November 8, 2016, En Banc)
5. The very presence in LNMB of the remains of Marcos – a dictator and authoritarian; perpetrator of numerous
and gross human rights abuses involving summary execution, torture, enforced or involuntary disappearance,
arbitrary detention and other atrocities; plunderer of the Philippine economy with enormous ill-gotten wealth
and kleptocrat; dishonorably separated and evicted President by People Power, dishonorably discharged
Commander-in-Chief; fabricator of allegedly received U.S. medals and allegedly committed “heroic” actions
while being a soldier – is an affront to LNMB’s sacredness and hallowedness as the legally designated and
recognized Philippine heroes’ burial site or cemetery. It does not further the esteem and reverence that LNMB
rightly deserves as the memorial in honor of the heroism, patriotism, gallantry, and nationalism of our war dead
and fallen soldiers and military personnel. Its positive cultural and historical significance and integrity are grossly
violated. (Dissenting Opinion of Justice Caguioa in Ocampo v. Enriquez, G.R. No. 225973, August 8, 2017, En
Banc)
6. Martial law arises from necessity, when the civil government cannot maintain peace and order, and the powers
to be exercised respond to that necessity. However, under his version of martial law, Marcos placed all his
actions beyond judicial review and vested in himself the power to "legally," by virtue of his General Orders, do
anything, without limitation. It was clearly not necessary to make Marcos a dictator to enable civil government
to maintain peace and order. President Marcos also prohibited the expression of dissent, prohibiting "rallies,
demonstrations, and other forms of group actions" in the premises not only of public utilities, but schools,
colleges, and even companies engaged in the production of products of exports. Clearly, these powers were
not necessary to enable the civil government to execute its functions and maintain peace and order, but rather,
to enable him to continue as self-made dictator. Marcos' implementation of martial law was a total abuse and
bastardization of the concept of martial law. A reading of the powers which Marcos intended to exercise makes
it abundantly clear that there was no public necessity that demanded that the President be given those powers.
Martial law was a stratagem. It was an artifice to hide the weaknesses of his leadership as people rose up to
challenge him. It was ruse to perpetuate himself in power despite the term limitations in the 1973 Constitution.
(Dissenting Opinion of Justice Leonen in Lagman v. Pimentel III, G.R. No. 235935, February 6, 2018, En Banc)
7. It is no argument that this martial law is different from the martial law of the seventies. Those of us who lived
through those days were also told of the myth of the New Society or the Bagong Lipunan. Many among us were
beguiled with the narrative of a strong, brilliant, and omniscient leader — only to wake up years later with all
our democratic institutions not only undermined but also rendered impotent. The narrative of a benevolent

Basic Facts 5
authoritarian is never true. We have not learned our lessons well. The violent manifestations by those whom
we call rebels or violent extremists are the product of the abuses and inequality within our society. These are
acts of desperation delivered by corruption and a system that rewards greed and fails to make meaningful
citizens of us all. History writes of the folly of the authoritarian that keeps power through fear. Reading the
history of our people correctly, we should already know that it will be the political and economic empowerment
of our people that will assure that those who resort to violence will be dissuaded, discovered, or weakened.
The declaration of martial law and the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus over a wide
swath of territory does the exact opposite. That is why it should never be normal. It cannot be allowed to be
extended three (3) times. That is why its declaration should be scrutinized carefully, deliberately and
conscientiously, by both the Congress and this Court. It is an exceptional measure. It should not hide the lack
of professionalism, the failures of intelligence, and the inefficiencies that have spawned our troubles. Those
who dissent within a society are not necessarily its enemies, or its government's. It may just be that they
perform the role of asking those in power and in the majority to pause and listen to reason, rather than
acquiesce to the tendencies of the strongest among them. I regret that, in this case and for the fourth time, we
did not again take careful pause. Despite the woeful state of the data provided to us, the majority looked the
other way. It would have been this Court's opportunity to show that we can reason better and truly think for
ourselves. (Dissenting Opinion of Justice Leonen in Lagman v. Medialdea, G.R. No. 243522, February 19, 2019,
En Banc)
8. Justice Leonen's description of the [Dictator] Marcos' regime and its effect on the nation was based on law,
history, and jurisprudence. The Supreme Court has repeatedly described the Marcos regime as authoritarian,
referred to "the Marcoses and their cronies"; acknowledged the illegal wealth the Marcoses stashed away which
the government has been attempting to recover; and noted the suffering the Marcos regime had wrought on
the Filipino people. To recall, in their motion to inhibit, protestant and the Solicitor General quote heavily from
Justice Leonen’s dissenting opinion in Ocampo, claiming that the quoted portions demonstrate Justice Leonen’s
bias against protestant. In particular, protestant and the Solicitor General take exception to Justice Leonen's
explanation on why the [Dictator] Marcos should not have been buried in the Libingan ng mga Bayani, namely:
that he was not a hero; that he invented his supposed medals of honor; that he allowed his family, associates,
and cronies to plunder the Philippine coffers; that even the Supreme Court, throughout the decades, has
identified him to be an authoritarian and dictator, and held that Swiss deposits in the amount of
US$658,175,373.60 under the name of the Marcoses had been ill-gotten wealth, to be forfeited in favor of the
government; and that the abuses during his regime caused suffering for millions of Filipinos. Both protestant
and the Solicitor General also claim that Justice Leonen's prejudice against protestant is apparent because his
dissenting opinion mentioned the accountability of the [Dictator] Marcos' relatives for certain offenses
committed during his regime. Justice Leonen's description of the [Dictator] Marcos' regime and its effect on the
nation was based on law, history, and jurisprudence. In other words, that Marcos is a dictator is supported by
facts.
a. In Mijares v. Ranada, the Supreme Court lamented the nation’s pains in the aftermath of the Marcos
dictatorship. The Court said: “Our martial law experience bore strange unwanted fruits, and we have yet
to finish weeding out its bitter crop. While the restoration of freedom and the fundamental structures and
processes of democracy have been much lauded, according to a significant number, the changes, however,
have not sufficiently healed the colossal damage wrought under the oppressive conditions of the martial
law period. The cries of justice for the tortured, the murdered, and the desaparecidos arouse outrage and
sympathy in the hearts of the fair-minded, yet the dispensation of the appropriate relief due them cannot
be extended through the same caprice or whim that characterized the ill-wind of martial rule. The damage
done was not merely personal but institutional, and the proper rebuke to the iniquitous past has to involve
the award of reparations due within the confines of the restored rule of law.”
b. In Marcos v. Manglapus, the Supreme Court noted the hardships the nation faced in rebuilding itself after
the Marcos regime, and recognized the government’s efforts to recover the illegal wealth stashed away by
the Marcoses in foreign jurisdictions. The Court said: “This case is unique. It should not create a precedent,
for the case of a dictator forced out of office and into exile after causing twenty years of political, economic
and social havoc in the country and who within the short space of three years seeks to return, is in a class
by itself.” The Court added that: “We cannot also lose sight of the fact that the country is only now
beginning to recover from the hardships brought about by the plunder of the economy attributed to the
Marcoses and their close associates and relatives, many of whom are still here in the Philippines in a
position to destabilize the country, while the Government has barely scratched the surface, so to speak, in
its efforts to recover the enormous wealth stashed away by the Marcoses in foreign jurisdictions. Then, We
cannot ignore the continually increasing burden imposed on the economy by the excessive foreign
borrowing during the Marcos regime, which stifles and stagnates development and is one of the root
causes of widespread poverty and all its attendant ills. The resulting precarious state of our economy is of
common knowledge and is easily within the ambit of judicial notice.”
c. Galman v. Sandiganbayan illustrated how the [Dictator] Marcos’ use of his authoritarian powers corrupted
the judicial process and rue of law. The Court declared the following: “Last August 21st, our nation marked
with solemnity and for the first time in freedom the third anniversary of the treacherous assassination of
foremost opposition leader former Senator Benigno "Ninoy" Aquino, Jr. imprisoned for almost eight years
since the imposition of martial law in September, 1972 by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos, he was

General Principles 6
sentenced to death by firing squad by a military tribunal for common offenses alleged to have been
committed long before the declaration of martial law and whose jurisdiction over him as a civilian entitled
to trial by judicial process by civil courts he repudiated. The record shows suffocatingly that from beginning
to end, the then President used, or more precisely, misused the overwhelming resources of the
government and his authoritarian powers to corrupt and make a mockery of the judicial process in the
Aquino-Galman murder cases. As graphically depicted in the Report,, and borne out by the happenings (res
ipsa loquitura), since the resolution prepared by his "Coordinator," Manuel Lazaro, his Presidential
Assistant on Legal Affairs, for the Tanodbayan's dismissal of the cases against all accused was unpalatable
(it would summon the demonstrators back to the streets) and at any rate was not acceptable to the Herrera
prosecution panel, the unholy scenario for acquittal of all 26 accused after the rigged trial as ordered at
the Malacañang conference, would accomplish the two principal objectives of satisfaction of the public
clamor for the suspected killers to be charged in court and of giving them through their acquittal the legal
shield of double jeopardy.”
d. Republic v. Sandiganbayan recognized the gargantuan task the government faced in relation to the
Marcoses and their illegal wealth – referring to the Marcoses, and not only to the dictator Marcos. The
Court said: “The EDSA revolution in February 1986 swept the Marcoses out of power. One of the first official
acts of then President Corazon C. Aquino was the creation of the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG) under E.O No. 1. It was given the difficult task of recovering the illegal wealth of the
Marcoses, their family, subordinates and close associates. In due time, the Marcoses and their cronies had
to face a flurry of cases, both civil and criminal, all designed to recover the Republic's wealth allegedly
plundered by them while in power.”
e. Moreover, the assessment in Justice Leonen's dissenting opinion is supported not only by jurisprudence,
but by Republic Act No. 10368, or the Human Rights Victims Reparation and Recognition Act of 2013.
Indeed, the Solicitor General omitted the extensive discussion on the Human Rights Victims Reparation and
Recognition Act of 2013 which immediately preceded Justice Leonen's statement regarding the
accountability of the Marcoses. Like the cases before that have referred generally to the Marcoses and
their cronies, and the need to recover their illegally gotten wealth, Republic Act No. 10368 itself expressly
mentions the [Dictator] Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos, and their immediate relatives by consanguinity or
affinity, as well as their close relatives. Thus, the conclusion in Justice Leonen's dissenting opinion, that
Republic Act No. 10368 implies that Marcos' spouse, relatives, associates, cronies, and subordinates were
active participants is based on the text of Republic Act No. 10368. (Marcos v. Robredo, PET No. 005,
November 17, 2020)
9. Considering the relevant circumstances of this case, the amount of One Billion Pesos (P1,000,000,000.00) as
temperate damages is reasonable and justified. It bears stressing that this is not just an ordinary civil action for
recovery of property and damages. This is an action for recovery of ill-gotten wealth which is imbued with public
interest and concerns not only the government but every Filipino citizen, then and now. As part of the healing
process of this nation, the Freedom Constitution specifically mandates the President to prioritize the recovery
of these ill-gotten wealth. Hence, the loss or injury suffered by every Filipino due to Disini's acquisition of ill-
gotten wealth must be duly recognized and compensated. Further, the Court notes that the Filipino people
have not at all benefitted from the Bataan Nuclear Power Plant, the project harked upon by the dictator Marcos
and his druggie son, Ferdinand, Jr., as it has remained inoperable as of this writing, a proverbial White Elephant.
Obviously, a considerable amount of public funds had been invested and allocated for the construction of the
BNPP, which funds came from the blood, sweat and tears of the Filipino taxpayers. The ill-gotten wealth should
have been used and spent or and by the rightful owner thereof and not just by one person or a select group of
people in power. Also, the Republic was unduly deprived of its rights over these substantial commissions as part
of public funds, and was compelled to litigate for their recovery for more than three decades. The Court cannot
overemphasize that Disini received these ill-gotten wealth starting in 1976 when the construction of the BNPP
began. Consequently, he had profited immensely from these commissions for a significant portion of his lifetime
at the expense of the Filipinos. Taking into consideration the inflation rate and the Philippine Peso's purchasing
power at that ime, these substantial commissions, if recovered, would have been greatly valued now and could
have been used for the betterment of the Philippines. In addition, the Republic would have been entitled to
recover legal interest on the total amount of commissions received had it proved such. Undeniably, the recovery
of these illegally acquired public funds, properties and assets has great impact on every Filipino's life. Hence,
the award of One Billion Pesos (P1,000,000,000.00) temperate damages is reasonable under the circumstances
taking into consideration the rights of all Filipino citizens encroached upon by Disini's acquisition of ill-gotten
wealth and the damage caused to the Republic for its failure to make good use of the same. (Disini v. Republic
of the Philippines, G.R. No 205172, June 15, 2021, En Banc)
GEN ER AL PR IN C IPLES
GENERALITY, TERRITORIALITY, AND PROSPECTIVITY OF PENAL LAWS

1. In criminal law, the principle that penal laws which are favorable to the accused are given retroactive effect is
well-entrenched. In this case, R.A. No. 10592 (to recall, this is the Mayor Sanchez provision), which amended
Articles 29, 94, 97, 98, and 99 of the RPC, is a penal law as it addresses the rehabilitation component of the
country’s correctional system and has the purpose of reducing the length of the penalty of imprisonment. It is
General Principles 7
beneficial to the detention and convicted prisoners. (Inmates of the New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa City v. De
Lima, G.R. No. 212719, June 25, 2019, En Banc)
2. In both the RPC and RA 10951, the penalty to be imposed upon a person guilty of Estafa is based on the amount
of damage. Here, the amount defrauded is P1,440,000.00 representing the total amount of money actually
released and received by petitioner from private complainant as shown in the statement of account. Under
Article 315 of the RPC, before the amendment, the penalty for the crime of Estafa is prision correccional, in its
maximum period, to prision mayor, in its minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is over P12,000.00, but
does not exceed P22,000.00. If such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty is in its maximum period,
adding one (1) year for each additional P10,000.00. With the passage of RA 10951, the prescribed penalty as
provided under paragraph 2, Article 315 of the RPC is now prision correccional in its minimum and medium
periods if the amount does not exceed P2,400,000.00. Thus, the penalty for the crime of Estafa under RA 10951
should be given retroactive effect considering that it is more favorable to petitioner. (Brisenio v. People of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 241336, June 16, 2021, Third Division)
3. With regard to the crime of falsification, the penalty of imprisonment imposed is the same for both paragraph
1, Article 172 of the RPC and RA 10951 which is prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods. But
under the RPC, the penalty of fine to be imposed is not more than P5,000.00 while under RA 10951, the penalty
of fine to be imposed shall not exceed P1,000,000.00. Evidently, the penalty of imprisonment in the crime of
Estafa under RA 10951 is now lighter compared to the penalty of imprisonment for falsification under paragraph
1, Article 172 of the RPC. Applying the provisions of Article 48 of the RPC, the penalty for the graver offense
should be imposed in the maximum period. Thus, the penalty for Falsification by private individuals and Use of
Falsified Documents under Article 172 of the RPC should be imposed in the maximum period, being the more
serious crime than Estafa. However, the penalty of fine of not more than P5,000.00 under the old law should
be imposed against petitioner because this is more favorable to her than the penalty of fine of not more than
P1,000,000.00 under the present law. (Brisenio v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 241336, June 16, 2021,
Third Division)
PRO REO DOCTRINE

1. Given the possible ambiguity in the interpretation of the Senior Citizen’s Act and the Cooperative Code, the
Court finds that the prosecution was unable to support its claim beyond reasonable doubt that the Siliman
University Cooperative, as a restaurant operator, was obligated to issue a 20% senior citizen discount to senior
citizen members and non-members alike. Thus, petitioner must be acquitted on the ground of reasonable doubt
that the law applies to him. (Estoconing v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 231298, October 7, 2020, Third
Division)
2. From the testimonies of all the witnesses, both of the prosecution and the defense, as well as from the affidavit
of Rocero, any of the following could have happened: (a) either petitioner or Ortacido may have pulled the
trigger; and (b) the gun may have fired accidentally while petitioner and Ortacido were grappling for it. If the
testimonies of the witnesses could lead to these different conclusions, the Court cannot conclude that the
element of intent to kill is extant in the case. In other words, the pieces of evidence admit of an alternative
inference that other person, Ortacido, not necessarily petitioner, may have committed the crime. Where the
evidence admits of two interpretations, one of which is consistent with guilt, and the other with innocence, the
accused must be acquitted. (Balina v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 205950, January 12, 2021, First
Division)
MOTIVE, MALA IN SE AND MALA PROHIBITA

1. Non-remittance of GSIS and Pag-IBIG Fund premiums is malum prohibitum. What the relevant laws punish is
the failure, refusal, or delay without lawful or justifiable cause in remitting or paying the required contributions
or accounts. (Matalam v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 221849-50, April 4, 2016, Second Division)
2. It is well-established in jurisprudence that a person may be charged and convicted for both illegal recruitment
and estafa. The reason therefor is not hard to discern: illegal recruitment is malum prohibitum, while estafa is
mala in se. In the first, the criminal intent of the accused is not necessary for conviction. In the second, such
intent is imperative. Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code is committed by any
person who defrauds another by using fictitious name, or falsely pretends to possess power, influence,
qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions, or by means of similar deceits
executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of fraud. (People of the Philippines v. Racho, G.R. No.
227505, October 2, 2017, Second Division)
3. Motive is not an essential element of the crime of murder. Absence thereof does not preclude a finding of guilt.
(People of the Philippines v. Pentecostes, G.R. No. 226158, November 8, 2017, Second Division)
4. Generally, the motive of the accused in a criminal case is immaterial and does not have to be proven. Proof of
the same, however, becomes relevant and essential when, as in this case, the identity of the assailant is in
question. In People v. Vidad, the Court said that it is not indispensable to conviction for murder that the

Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code 8
particular motive for taking the life of a human being shall be established at the trial, and that in general when
the commission of a crime is clearly proven, conviction may and should follow even where the reason for its
commission is unknown; but in many criminal cases, one of the most important aids in completing the proof of
the commission of the crime by the accused is the introduction of evidence disclosing the motive which tempted
the mind to indulge in the criminal act. In the case at bar, there is no indication that Fernandez and Garino knew
each other beforehand, and as mentioned, it seems to be a matter of mere convenience that Garino zeroed in
on Fernandez as the culprit only after a conversation with Barcenas. There was also no plausible reason for
Fernandez to risk his safety and life in shooting Garino, especially with a possible witness in tow. If Fernandez
wanted to end Garino's life, it would also be strange that he would not run after Garino and finish the job, as
Garino would certainly have been hobbled as a result of the wound. (Fernandez v. People of the Philippines,
G.R. No. 241557, December 11, 2019, Second Division)
5. Section 195 of the Omnibus Election Code is mala in se. The applicable portion of Section 195 forbids the
intentional tearing or defacing of the ballot or the placement of a distinguishing mark. Accordingly, good faith
and lack of criminal intent can be raised as a valid defense against its conviction.
a. An act prohibited by a special law does not automatically make it malum prohibitum. When the acts
complained of are inherently immoral, they are deemed mala in se, even if they are punished by a special
law. The approach to distinguish between mala in se and mala prohibita crimes is the determination of the
inherent immorality or vileness of the penalized act. (Cardona v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 244544,
July 6, 2020, Third Division)
AR TIC LE 4 O F TH E R EV IS E D P EN AL C O DE
1. Adriano should be held liable for the killing of Bulanan, a bystander who was killed by a stray bullet, pursuant
to the doctrine of aberratio ictus. This is so even though Adriano had no intention to kill Bulanan. (People of the
Philippines v. Adriano, G.R. No. 205228, July 15, 2015, First Division)
2. The death of Torralba amounts to homicide. Torralba, an eight-year old boy, was at the wrong place and time
during the shooting incident. While Cruz did not intend to end the life of this child, the latter’s death is a crime
of homicide in accordance with Article 4 of the RPC and prevailing jurisprudence. Under Article 4, criminal
liability is incurred by any person committing a felony although the wrongful act done be different from that
which he intended. Accordingly, the author of the felony shall be criminally liable for the direct, natural, and
logical consequence thereof, whether intended or not. Here, Cruz committed an intentional felony when he
fired multiple shorts at Bernardo. The death of Torralba, who was hit by one of those bullets intended for
Bernardo, is a direct, natural, and logical consequence of said intentional felony. The death of Torralba is an
example of aberratio ictus.
a. For Article 4 of the RPC to apply, it must be shown that (i) an intentional felony has been committed, and
(ii) the wrong done to the aggrieved party be the direct, natural, and logical consequence of the felony
committed by the offender.
b. People v. Adriano decrees that where one of the victims was a mere by-stander hit by a stray bullet, there
is aberratio ictus. (PO2 Cruz v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 216642, September 8, 2020, First Division)
3. As for Jonabel’s death, what happened to this seven-year old was a clear case of aberratio ictus or mistake in
the blow. Under the doctrine of aberratio ictus as embodied in Article 4 of the RPC, criminal liability is imposed
for the acts committed in violation of law and for all the natural and logical consequences resulting therefrom.
Thus, while it may not have been appellant’s intention to shoot Jonabel, this fact alone will not exculpate him
of his criminal liability. Jonabel’s death was unquestionably the natural and direct consequence of appellant’s
felonious deadly assault against Gerry. (People of the Philippines v. Bendecio, G.R. No. 235016, September 8,
2020, First Division)
4. In Quinto v. Andres, the Court discussed that a person committing a felony is criminally liable for all the natural
and logical consequences resulting therefrom unless there was an efficient intervening active force that
intervened between the felony committed and the resulting injury.
a. A person committing a felony is criminally liable for all the natural and logical consequences resulting
therefrom although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended. "Natural'" refers to
an occurrence in the ordinary course of human life or events, while "logical" means that there is a rational
connection between the act of the accused and the resulting injury or damage. The felony committed must
be the proximate cause of the resulting injury. Proximate cause is that cause which in natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by an efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which
the result would not have occurred. The proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury,
either immediately, or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of
events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor.
b. There must be a relation of "cause and effect," the cause being the felonious act of the offender, the effect
being the resultant injuries and/or death of the victim. The "cause and effect" relationship is not altered or
changed because of the pre-existing conditions, such as the pathological condition of the victim (las
condiciones patologica del lesionado), the predisposition of the offended party (la predisposition del
ofendido); the physical condition of the offended party (la constitucion fisica del herido); or the concomitant

Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code 9
or concurrent conditions, such as the negligence or fault of the doctors (la falta de medicos para sister al
herido); or the conditions supervening the felonious act such as tetanus, pulmonary infection or gangrene.
(People of the Philippines v. Lalap, G.R. No. 250895, June 16, 2021, Third Division)
5. The stab wound is the proximate cause of the victim’s death.

a. Accused-appellant argues that the CA and the RTC overlooked the fact that the stab wound allegedly
sustained by the victim was not the immediate and direct cause of his death. He maintains that based on
the records, the immediate cause of the victim’s death, which occurred nine days after the stabbing
incident is cardiorespiratory arrest. However, accused-appellant’s argument holds no water.
b. The felony committed is not the proximate cause of the resulting injury when (i) there is an active force
that intervened between the felony committed and the resulting injury, and the active force is a distinct
act or fact absolutely foreign from the felonious act of the accused; or (ii) the resulting injury is due to the
intentional act of the victim.
c. While the immediate cause of the victim's death as reflected in the Medical Certificate is cardiorespiratory
arrest, the stab wound that accused-appellant inflicted on the vital part of the victim's body is the
proximate cause of the victim's death. The stab wound is the cause which in the natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by an efficient intervening cause, produces the victim's death, and without which the
result would not have occurred. Logically, there is a rational connection between the act of accused-
appellant stabbing the victim and the resulting death. Without the stab wound, the victim could not have
been hospitalized and late died therefrom. Moreover, there is no evidence that an efficient intervening
active force, not connected with or absolutely foreign to the stab wound, intervened during the nine-day
period which could have caused the victim's death. Thus, even if there was another factor but such is not
an efficient intervening cause, accused-appellant is still criminally liable for the death of the victim because
his act of stabbing the victim accelerated or contributed to the victim's death. The Medical Certificate does
not indicate the occurrence of any efficient intervening cause which broke the relation of the felony
committed by accused-appellant and the resulting death.
d. Furthermore, even for argument’s sake that the victim was previously suffering a disease or ailment,
accused-appellant is still liable because his act of stabbing the victim hastened or accelerated the victim’s
death. Garcia v. People said that although the assaulted party was previously affected by some internal
malady, if, because of a blow given with the hand or the foot, his death was hastened, beyond peradventure
he is responsible therefor who produced the cause for such acceleration as the result of a voluntary and
unlawfully inflicted injury. (People of the Philippines v. Lalap, G.R. No. 250895, June 16, 2021, Third
Division)
MISTAKE OF FACT
1. The invocation of the concept of mistake of fact faces certain failure. In the context of criminal law, a "mistake
of fact" is a misapprehension of a fact which, if true, would have justified the act or omission which is the subject
of the prosecution. Generally, a reasonable mistake of fact is a defense to a charge of crime where it negates
the intent component of the crime. It may be a defense even if the offense charged requires proof of only
general intent. The inquiry is into the mistaken belief of the defendant, and it does not look at all to the belief
or state of mind of any other person. A proper invocation of this defense requires (a) that the mistake be honest
and reasonable; (b) that it be a matter of fact; and (c) that it negates the culpability required to commit the
crime or the existence of the mental state which the statute prescribes with respect to an element of the
offense. (People of the Philippines v. Gervero, G.R. No. 206725, July 11, 2018, Third Division)
2. Mistake of fact is not availing. First, there was no reason for the accused not to recognize the victims because
they were traversing an open area which was illuminated not only by moonlight, but also by a light bulb. In
addition, the witnesses testified that the victims were conversing and laughing loudly. It must be borne in mind
that it was not the first time that the accused had seen the victims as, in fact, accused Bañes and Castigador
met Hernando just a few hours before the shooting. Moreover, they all reside in the same town and, certainly,
the accused who were all members of the CAFGU would know the residents of that town so as to easily
distinguish them from unknown intruders who might be alleged members of the NPA. Second, when Jose fell
down, Hernando identified himself and shouted, "This is Hernando!" However, instead of verifying the identities
of the victims, the accused continued to fire at them. One of them even shouted, "Birahi na!" ("Shoot now!").
Third, when the victims fell down, the accused approached their bodies. At that point, they could no longer
claim that they didn't recognize the victims; and still not contented, they sprayed them with bullets such that
Jose suffered 14 gunshot wounds, Hernando 16 gunshot wounds, and Benito 20 gunshot wounds. Fourth,
contrary to their testimonies during trial to the effect that the victims were the first to fire their weapons, Brgy.
Capt. Balinas testified that when he asked the accused whether the victims had fired at them, the accused
answered him in the negative. Fifth, the accused would like the Court to believe that the victims knew the safe
word "Amoy" which must be uttered in response to "Simoy" in order to easily determine whether they were
members of the NPA. However, the victims could not have known the safe words as accused Gervero himself
stated in his testimony that only he and his co-accused were present when their commanding officer briefed
them about the safe words to be used in their operation. All these circumstances negate accused-appellants'
claim of mistake of fact and point instead to a concerted action to eliminate the victims. (People of the
Philippines v. Gervero, G.R. No. 206725, July 11, 2018, Third Division)

Attempted, Frustrated, and Consummated Crimes 10
IMPOSSIBLE CRIME
1. The requisites of an impossible crime are (a) that the act performed would be an offense against persons or
property; (b) that the act was done with evil intent; and (c) that its accomplishment was inherently impossible,
or the means employed was either inadequate or ineffectual. (People of the Philippines v. Callao, G.R. No.
228945, March 14, 2018, Second Division)
2. Henson cannot be said to have committed an impossible crime. The victim's fact of death before he was stabbed
by Hesson was not sufficiently established by the defense. While Sario testified that he thought Fernando was
already dead after he was hacked by Junello because the former was already lying on the ground motionless,
this statement cannot sufficiently support the conclusion that, indeed, Fernando was already dead when
Hesson stabbed him. Sario's opinion of Femando's death was arrived at by merely looking at the latter's body.
No other act was done to ascertain this, such as checking of Fernando's pulse, heartbeat or breathing. Likewise,
considering that Sario was in the middle of a surely stressful and frightful event, he cannot be expected to have
focused enough and be fit to determine if Fernando was indeed dead when Sario thought he was. In other
words, Sario's opinion of Femando's death at that point in time could have easily been just an erroneous
estimation coming from a very flustered witness. More importantly, even assuming that it was Junello who
killed Fernando and that the latter was already dead when he was stabbed by Hesson, Hesson is still liable for
murder because of the clear presence of conspiracy between Hesson and Junello. As such, Junello's acts are
likewise, legally, Hesson's acts. (People of the Philippines v. Callao, G.R. No. 228945, March 14, 2018, Second
Division)
ATTEM PTE D, F R U S TR ATED, AN D C O N S U MMATED C R IMES

1. The act of killing becomes frustrated when an offender performs all the acts of execution which could produce
the crime but did not produce it for reasons independent of his or her will. Thus, in convicting the accused of
frustrated murder, it must be shown that he intentionally tried to kill private complainants, was the author of
the stab wounds obtained by private complainants, but due to the immediate medical attention given to the
private complainants, the accused was unable to fully execute the crime. (Cirera v. People of the Philippines,
G.R. No. 181843, July 14, 2014, Third Division)
2. The essential elements of an attempted felony are as follows: (a) the offender commences the commission of
the felony directly by overt acts, (b) he does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the
felony; and (c) the non-performance of all acts of execution was due to cause or accident other than his
spontanous desistance. (Fantastico v. Malicse, G.R. No. 190912, January 12, 2015, Third Division)
3. Respondents are guilty of attempted murder. Records show that respondents coordinated in assaulting
petitioner and that this assault culminated in efforts to hit his head with a stone or hollow block. Had
respondents been successful, they could have dealt any number of blows on petitioner, which could have been
fatal. That they were unable to inflict fatal blows was only because of the timely arrival of neighbors who
responded to the calls for help coming from petitioner and certain witnesses. (De Guzman v. Fuentes, G.R. No.
201310, January 11, 2016, Second Division)
4. Article 6 of the RPC states that a felony is attempted when the offender commences the commission of a felony
directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason
of some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. (People of the Philippines v. Jugueta,
G.R. No. 202124, April 5, 2016, En Banc)
5. Accused is guilty of frustrated homicide. As testified by Dr. Cordero, De Luna could have died because of the
wounds if the surgery was not conducted timely. Hence, appellant performed all the acts of execution which
could have produced the crime of murder as a consequence, but nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of
a cause independent of his will, which is, in this case, the timely and able medical attendance rendered to De
Luna. (People of the Philippines v. Gaborne, G.R. No. 210710, July 27, 2016, Third Division)
6. Appellant’s conviction for attempted murder must be upheld. Appellant commenced the commission of murder
through overt acts such as firing his firearm at the residence of the victims but did not perform all the acts of
execution which should produce murder by reason of some cause other than his own spontaneous desistance.
Appellant simply missed his target; he failed to perform all the acts of execution to kill Bryan. Appeallant is
therefore guilty of attempted murder. (People of the Philippines v. Sibbu, G.R. No. 214757, March 29, 2017,
First Division)
7. Palaganas distinguished frustrated and attempted felony.

a. In frustrated felony, the offender has performed all the acts of execution which should produce the felony
as a consequence; whereas in attempted felony, the offender merely commences the commission of a
felony directly by overt acts and does not perform all the acts of execution.
b. In frustrated felony, the reason for the non-accomplishment of the crime is some cause independent of
the will of the perpetrator; on the other hand, in attempted felony, the reason for the non-fulfillment of
the crime is a cause or accident other than the offender’s own spontaneous desistance. (Etino v. People of
the Philippines, G.R. No. 206632, February 14, 2018, First Division)
8. When the accused intended to kill his victim, as manifested by his use of a deadly weapon in his assault, and his
victim sustaiend fatal or mortal wound/s but did not die because of timely medical assistance, the crime
committed is frustrated murder or frustrated homicide depending on whether or not any of the qualifying
circumstances under Article 249 of the RPC are present. However, if the wound/s sustained by the victim in
such a case were not fatal or mortal, then the crime committed is only attempted murder or attempted
homicide. If there was no intent to kill on the part of the accused and the wound/s sustaiend by the victim were
not fatal, the crime committed may be serious, less serious, or slight physical injury. (Etino v. People of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 206632, February 14, 2018, First Division)
9. In criminal cases for frustrated homicide, the intent to kill is often inferred from, among other things, the means
the offender used and the nature, location, and number of wounds he inflicted on his victim. In this case, intent
to kill was sufficiently shown not only by the testimonies of Georgia, the victim herself, and Fred, the eyewitness,
but also by the established fact that Georgia sustained multiple deep hack wounds on her head, neck, and
abdomen, among other parts of her body. The gravity of these wounds was clearly shown by the photographs
presented by the prosecution, and the medical certificate. Dr. Kangleon even testified that Georgia could have
died if no medical attention was given to her. The medical opinion of Dr. Kangleon who is presumably an expert
in this field is clearly more convincing than the petitioner's mere say-so. That petitioner intended to kill Georgia,
and that the injuries she sustained were fatal and would have caused her death if not for the timely medical
intervention, were therefore established by proof beyond reasonable doubt. (Adlawan v. People of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 197645, April 18, 2018, Third Division)
10. As for BBB's case, the Court agrees with the RTC and CA's factual finding that the eight gunshot wounds
sustained by BBB, as contained in the Medico-Legal Certificate, would have caused his death if he was not given
timely medical attention. Furthermore, it does not appear that BBB was armed or was in a position to deflect
the attack. As a matter of fact, based on CCC's narration of the events that transpired, the suddenness of the
attack upon AAA and BBB cannot be denied. Only that, unlike AAA, BBB survived. Here, taking into consideration
the fact that BBB was shot eight times with the use of a firearm and that AAA, who was with him at that time,
was killed, convinces the Court that the malefactor intended to take BBB's life as well. However, unlike in AAA's
case, BBB survived. It was also established that he survived not because the wounds were not fatal, but because
timely medical attention was rendered to him. Definitely, BBB's survival was independent of the perpetrator's
will. As such, this Court is convinced that the attack upon BBB qualifies as frustrated murder. (People of the
Philippines v. Lababo, G.R. No. 234651, June 6, 2018, Third Division)
11. Accused are liable for attempted murder for the injury sustained by Eric. In the case at bar, petitioners, who
acted in concert, commenced the felony of murder by mauling the victim and hitting him three times with a
hollow block; they narrowly missed hitting the middle portion of his head. If Edgardo had done so, Ruben would
surely have died. As stated, the attendant circumstances here clearly show that appellant and his companions
did intend to kill the Evangelista brothers. They were able to deal multiple fatal blows on at least three (3) of
the brothers; but as for Eric, they did not spare him. He was also stabbed by Baynosa. It just so happened they
missed to hit him on a vital part like what they did to Eric's three (3) brothers. (People of the Philippines v.
Angeles, G.R. No. 224289, August 14, 2019, Second Division)
12. Accused are liable for frustrated murder for the injury sustained by Mark Ryan. Under the law, the act of killing
becomes frustrated when an offender performs all the acts of execution which could produce the crime but did
not produce it for reasons independent of his or her will. Here, taking into consideration the fact that BBB was
shot eight times with the use of a firearm and that AAA, who was with him at that time, was killed, convinces
Us that the malefactor intended to take EBB's life as well. However, unlike in AAA's case, BBB survived. It was
also established that he survived not because the wounds were not fatal, but because timely medical attention
was rendered to him. Definitely, EBB's survival was independent of the perpetrator's will. As such, this Court is
convinced that the attack upon BBB qualifies as frustrated murder. (People of the Philippines v. Angeles, G.R.
No. 224289, August 14, 2019, Second Division)
13. The crime committed was attempted murder and not less serious physical injuries since the prosecution was
able to establish that the accused had the intent to kill the victim but was unable to perform all the acts of
execution which should produce the crime of murder. (Casilac v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 238436,
February 17, 2020, First Division)
14. The CA and the RTC erred in convicting the accused for frustrated homicide. What is apparent from the records
is only that Jerry sustained gunshot wounds in the left arm, left chest, and right thumb. The full extent of Jerry’s
injuries – particularly, that they would have caused his death without timely medical assistance – was thus not
clearly established since Dr. Encilla, who issued the Medico-Legal Certificate, did not testify as to fully explain
the full extent of Jerry’s injuries. That there were pictures of Jerry on the hospital bed showing that tubes were
attached to him does not conclusively establish that the injuries were so serious that he would have died

without timely medical assistance. As there is doubt as to the existence of the second element of frustrated
homicide – that the victim sustained fatal or mortal wounds but did not die because of timely medical assistance
– Gemenez’s conviction must be modified to attempted homicide. (Gemenez v. People of the Philippines, G.R.
No. 241518, March 4, 2020, First Division)
15. Records bear the detailed narrations of Gerry and Princess about the shooting incident. Appellant fired at Gerry
but instead of hitting the latter, the bullet hit Jonabel in the chest and thereafter, Princess in the leg. Jonabel
died as a result. Although appellant, with intent to kill, fired his gun at Gerry, appellant was not able to
consummate the killing for reasons other than his own desistance – he simply missed and ended up wounding
Princess and killing Jonabel. (People of the Philippines v. Bendecio, G.R. No. 235016, September 8, 2020, First
Division)
16. Petitioner is liable for attempted homicide. Petitioner’s intent to kill AAA was evident in his acts of carrying AAA
and throwing her into the ravine of about 25 to 30 meters below the road after performing his lascivious
conduct with AAA. Apparently, petitioner did so in an attempt to conceal the sexual abuse he committed against
AAA. When asked to estimate the depth of her fall into the ravine, AAA testified that it was comparable to falling
from the third floor of a building. Remarkably, the killing of AAA would have been consummated if not for the
vines that wrapped around her body which prevented her from further rolling down the ravine. (Uddin v. People
of the Philippines, G.R. No. 249588, November 23, 2020, Third Division)
17. Accused-appellant is liable for attempted qualified rape. AAA declared that accused-appellant forcibly tried
inserting his penis into her vagina. There was no categorical declaration that accused-appellant’s penis actually
penetrated, however slightly, much less touched, her vagina. As AAA confirmed in her testimony, she resisted
accused-appellant’s advances by pushing and kicking him in order to contain him. The Court has consistently
emphasized that in rape cases, the prosecution bears the primary duty to present its case with clarity and
persuasion, to the end that conviction becomes the only logical and inevitable conclusion. As a conviction
cannot be made to rest on possibilities, both the RTC and the CA correctly observed that AAA’s testimony failed
to prove all the elements of a consummated rape. While accused-appellant was unsuccessful in penetrating
AAA due to her resistance, in attempting to do so, he nevertheless possessed the intent to penetrate her, as
manifested by the following overt acts: forcibly removing AAA’s shorts and underwear, lying on top of her,
mounting and restraining her hands and feet, and holding his penis with his left hand trying to insert it into her
vagina. The totality of these acts clearly demonstrated accused-appellant’s unmistakable objective to insert his
penis into AAA’s vagina, making him liable for the crime of rape in its attempted stage. Considering the
concurrence of the aggravating circumstances of minority and relationship, accused-appellant’s conviction for
attempted qualified rape is in place.
a. In People v. Bonaagua, the Court declared that the slightest penetration by the male organ or even its
slightest contact with the outer lip or the labia majora of the vagina already consummates the crime of
rape. In People v. Arce, Jr., the Court fond the accused guilty of attempted rape only, owing to the failure
of the victim to declare a slightest penetration into her vagina, which was necessary to consummate a rape.
On the contrary, the victim categorically stated that the accused was not able to insert his penis into her
private part because she was moving her hips away. In People v. Tolentino, the Court, in the same manner,
convicted the accused of attempted rape only, underscoring the paucity of evidence that the slightest
penetration ever took place, i.e., that the victim’s statements that the accused was “trying to force his sex
into mine” and “binundol-bundol ang kanyang ari” did not prove that the accused’s penis reached the labia
of the pudendum of the victim’s vagina. (People of the Philippines v. Manuel, G.R. No. 242278, December
9, 2020, Third Division)
18. Petitioners should be held liable for attempted murder and not frustrated murder, as the nature of the wounds
sustained by the victim were not proven by the prosecution to be fatal.
a. Petitioners hacked Glenn twice in the face and even chased after him, which are indeed indicative of an
intent to kill. However, there is no evidence that the wounds sustained by Glenn were fatal enough to cause
his death. Dr. Manaois failed to categorically state whether the wounds sustained by the victim are fatal.
This cannot be inferred from the fact alone that he was hacked in the face. In fact, it is doubtful whether
the stab wounds themselves were grave enough to cause Glenn’s death because Dr. Manaois merely
mentioned that Glenn might lose blood and it is possible for him to die because of infection or tetanus if
no timely medical attention was given. These are the only things that were testified upon.
b. It was an error for the RTC and CA to conclude that the wounds suffered by the victim were fatal based
merely on the location of the hack wounds, two of which were on the victim’s face. The rulings of the lower
courts could also run contrary to the testimony of the medico-legal officer that such injuries, without
medical timely attention, could only possibly cause death to the victim due to infection and/or tetanus.
c. It is worth emphasizing two matters in the testimony of Dr. Manaois: First, the medico-legal officer testified
that the injuries may only possibly cause the victim’s death. Second, if ever the victim would die because
of the wounds he sustained, his death would not be caused by the wounds themselves, but his injuries
might cause blood loss or he might possibly die due to infection or tetanus if timely medical attention had
not been given. (Oliveros v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 242552, March 3, 2021, First Division)

Conspiracy 13
C O N S PIR AC Y
1. Conspiracy, once proven, has the effect of attaching liability to all of the accused, regardless of their degree of
participation. (People of the Philippines v. Feliciano, Jr., G.R. No. 196735, May 5, 2014, Third Division)
2. Only Agbulos received the pieces of jewelry from Abadilla and Benito was merely present during the
negotiation. In addition, Agbulos alone issued security for the jewelry, which included the dishonored checks
and the spurious certificate of title. Benito’s mere presence when Agbulos received the jewelry does not prove
that Benito was in conspiracy with Agbulos. (Benito v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 204644, February 11,
2015, Second Division)
3. The respondents acted in a conspiracy. Records show that respondents Calilan and Lindo took hold of each of
the victim’s arms while respondent Fuentes was about to strike him with a hollow block. It is therefore apparent
that all three of them acted out of a common design as is indicative of a conspiracy. (De Guzman v. Fuentes,
G.R. No. 201310, January 11, 2016, Second Division)
4. The trial court erred in finding Danilo and Efren as mere accomplices in the crime of kidnapping. It should be
noted that at the time of the abduction, there were six persons inside the vehicle including the victim himself.
Jojo held the victim at gunpoint while the latter was waiting for the mechanics to finish fixing the flat tire of his
car and forced him to ride a Tamaraw FX. Efren and Jojo sandwiched him in the car and transported him to a
house where he was detained for six days. Rolando negotiated with the victim’s mother for the ransom
paynment. Further, the other accused-appellants set out the designated place of ransom payment. These acts
were complementary to one another and were geared toward the attainment of a common ultimate objective.
a. Each of the accused-appellants, plus Jojo, had intentional, direct, and substantial participation in Jimmy’s
kidnapping for ransom. Jimmy’s abduction, his being taken to and holed up in a house in Ilocos Norte under
guard, the ransom demand and negotiation, and finally, the ransom payout, which all happened in a span
of six days, took planning and coordination among accused-appellants and Jojo. Accused-appellant Efren,
in particular, was among the four men who abducted Jimmy in Meycauayan, Bulacan. Accused-appellant
Efren also kept guard over Jimmy for six days in Ilocos Norte. Therefore, accused-appellant Efren could not
be a mere accomplice as his presence at the scene/s of the crime was definitely more than just to give
moral support; his presence and company were indispensable and essential to the perpetration of the
kidnapping for ransom. (People of the Philippines v. Gregorio, G.R. No. 194235, June 8, 2016, First Division)
5. When conspiracy is a means to commit a crime, it is indispensable that the agreement to commit the crime
among all the conspirators, or their communtiy of criminal design must be alleged and competently shown. The
community of design to commit an offense must be a conscious one. Conspiracy transcends mere
companionship, and mere presence at the scene of the crime does not in itself amount to conspiracy. Even
knowledge of, or acquiescence in, or agreement to cooperate is not enough to constitute one a party to a
conspiracy, absent any active participation in the commission of the crime with a view to the furtherance of the
common design and purpose.
a. When conspiracy as a means to commit a crime is proved, each co-conspirator is as criminally liable as the
others, for the act of one is the act of all. A co-conspirator does not have to participate in every detail of
the execution; neither does he have to know the exact part performed by the co-conspirator in the
execution of the criminal act. Otherwise, the criminal liability of each accused is individual and
independent. (Arroyo v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 220598, July 19, 2016, En Banc)
6. Conspiracy takes two forms. The first is the express form, which requires proof of an actual agreement among
all the co-conspirators to commit the crime. The second form is implied conspiracy. An implied conspiracy exists
when two or more persons are shown to have aimed towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful object,
each doing a part so that their combined acts, though apparently independent, were in fact connected and
cooperative, indicating closeness of personal association and a concurrence of sentiment. It is proved through
the mode and manner of the commission of the offense, or from the acts of the accused before, during, and
after the commission of the crime indubitably pointing to a joint purpose, a concert of action and a community
of interest. (Arroyo v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 220598, July 19, 2016, En Banc)
7. The wheel conspiracy and the chain conspiracy are a way of appreciating conspiracy as a means to commit a
crime.
a. The wheel conspiracy occurs when there is a single person or group (the hub) dealing individually with two
or more other persons or groups (the spokes). The spokes typically interacts with the hub rather than with
another spoke. In the event that the spoke shares a common purpose to succeed, there is a single
conspiracy. However, in the instances when each spoke is unconcerned with the success of the other
spokes, there are multiple conspiracies.
b. The chain conspiracy exists when there is successive communication and cooepration in much the same
way as with legitimate business operations between manufacturer and wholesaler, then wholesaler and
retailer, and then retailer and consumer. This involves individuals linked together in a vertical chain to
achieve a criminal objective. (Arroyo v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 220598, July 19, 2016, En Banc)

Conspiracy 14
8. Record shows that the attack was well-planned and the series of events that transpired clearly established
conspiracy among them. First, the perpetrators undoubtedly acted in concert as they went to the house of
Ruben, each with his own firearms; Second, the perpetrators used Lucy Sabando and her child to trick Ruben
and ensure that he will come out of the house clueless to their presence; Third, after a moment of struggling,
Caman immediately shot Ruben Barte at the back; Fourth, perpetrators simultaneously strafed Barte’s house
for a long period to ensure that those inside the house are likewise killed; Fifth, despite Juanita Barte’s plea to
stop shooting as there were children with them, the shooting continued thus manifesting clear intent to kill;
and Sixth, when they ceased firing, they rested at the same time and fled together. (People of the Philippines
v. Libre, G.R. No. 192790, August 1, 2016, Third Division)
9. The accused all acted in concert to commit the crime of robbery with homicide. Records reveal that all of them
were present when they planned to rob the Ganzon’s residence the day before the incident. Furthermore, in
robbing the Ganzon’s residence, appellant served as a look out while the others were robbing and ransacking
the house. It was also proved that it was appellant who forcibly brought Mr. Ganzon from the bedroom to the
sala of the house before tying his hands and feet. (People of the Philippines v. Espia, G.R. No. 213380, August
10. Accused conspired to kill Antonio as shown by their collective act of mauling and beating Antonio with their
firearms despite the fact that Antonio was already bleeding from gunshot wounds. The manner by which the
accused attacked the victim clearly and convincingly shows that the accused were motivated by a common
intent to kill Antonio. The actions of accused show that they were impelled by the same motive to retaliate
against Antonio for shooting Pantaleon and Sonora. Since conspiracy is established in this case, evidence as to
who among the conspirators actually fired the fatal shots is no longer indispensable. In conspiracy, the act of
one is the act of all and each of the offender is equally guilty of the criminal act. (Cosme v. People of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 212848, August 17, 2016, Second Division)
11. The combined efforts of the accused were perpetrated with concerted coordination, indicating their common
objective to inflict injury on Roger; thus, making conspiracy present. Records disclose that upon hearing the
commotion caused by accused, Roger, who was then outside the videoke bar, yelled at them to go home. All
the accused then flashed the “dirty finger” at Roger and beckoned him to come closer to them. Roger reacted
to the taunts and approached them. When Roger got close to them, Suarez and Vivencio started raining fist
blows on him. Roger defended himself by parrying the punches with his arms. Ravena, who as positioned behind
Roger, suddenly delivered the fatal blow. After the stabbing, the three accused ran away.
a. The fact that Suarez and Vivencio only delivered punches against Roger would not exculpate them from
criminal liability considering that their overt acts were crucial in the commission of the crime. (People of
the Philippines v. Suarez, G.R. No. 224889, October 19, 2016, Second Division)
12. Ladjahasan acted in conspiracy with Mohammad. It should be noted that it was Ladjahasan who opened the
door and this must be her role in the drug trafficking operation – answer the knock on the door and verify the
intention of the one knocking. When she learned that PO1 Santiago, acting as poseur-buyer, intended to buy
shabu, she went back inside the room. Thereafter, it was Mohammad that emerged and transacted with PO1
Santiago. Clearly, when Ladjahasan went back inside the room, she relayed to Mohammad the intention of PO1
Santiago, then, Mohammad took over by transacting with Santiago who was a prospective buyer of shabu. No
other logical conclusion would follow from the concerted action of both Mohammad and Ladjahasan except
that they had a common purpose and community of interest. (People of the Philippines v. Mohammad and
Ladjahasan, G.R. No. 213221, November 9, 2016, Third Division)
13. Mere signature or approval appearing on a voucher, check or warrant is not enough to sustain a finding of
conspiracy among public officials and employees charged with defraudation.
a. It is also noteworthy that the disbursement of funds at the municipal level includes a successive process of
review and clearing that requires the participation of different public officers each with different roles and
duties. Hence, in order to establish conspiracy between petitioners, the prosecution must present evidence
other than the mere fact that the petitioners are at the opposite ends of the chain in the disbursement
process. (Maamo and Silor v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 201917, December 1, 2016, First Division)
14. The community of criminal design by the appellants and their cohorts is evident as they each played a role in
the commission of the crime. While appellant Placente and companions pointed their guns at Antonio, Elizalde
and companions simultaneously dragged Letty into their van. Thereafter, they demanded ransom mony as a
condition for her release, which, however, never materialized due to a shootout that sadly led to her death.
Consequently, therefore, appellants are equally liable for the crime of kidnapping. (People of the Philippines v.
Elizalde, G.R. No. 210434, December 5, 2016, Third Division)
15. The act of the accused-appellant in preventing Arjay from coming to the aid of AAA when she was sexually
abused by ZZZ revealed that he was acting in confederation with ZZZ. And later when he saw that Bryan too was
sexually abusing the unconscious AAA, he did nothing to stop him but instead went inside the room and closed
the door presumably to watch the dastardly deed being done. This action of accused-appellant showed his

Conspiracy 15
concurrence in the criminal design of Byran. Not to be forgotten is the fact that both AAA and Mary saw him
taking a video of ZZZ raping AAA.
a. To hold an accused guilty as co-principal by reason of conspiracy, he must be shown to have performed an
overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the complicity. Responsibility of a conspirator is not confined to
the accomplishment of a particular purpose of conspiracy but extends to collateral acts and offenses
incident to and growing out of the purpose intended. To establish the existence of conspiracy, direct proof
is not essential. Conspiracy may be inferred from the acts of the accused before, during, and after the
commission of the crime which indubitably point to and are indicative of a joint purpose, concert of action
and community of interest. (People of the Philippines v. Tuballas, G.R. No. 218572, June 19, 2017, Third
Division)
16. In the present case, conspiracy was evident from the coordinated movements of the three accused. Accused-
appellant was seen standing by the post looking at Kathlyn and the victim aboard the motorcycle. When his co-
accused approached the former, accused-appellant followed suit and was standing guard nearby, while his
companions committed their criminal acts. After the victim fell down and apparently thinking Kathlyn to be
unconscious, the trio left together taking with them the victim’s motorcycle. Clealry, the accused-appellant and
company all acted in confabulation in furtheran of their common design and purpose, i.e., to carnal the
motorcycle. (People of the Philippines v. Macaranas, G.R. No. 226846, June 21, 2017, Second Division)
17. The Sandiganbayan correctly found that there was conspiracy between petitioners as shown in their respective
participation in the alteraiton of the date on the PO in question. It was found that petitioner Reyes who
instructed accused Pandeagua to alter or change the date “4/20/2005” in the PO with “5/20/2005” to make it
appear that it was on May 20, 2005 that the procurement covered by the PO was approved by petitioner Typoco
after the conduct of a public bidding on May 18, 2005. After the bidding, petitioner Typoco immediately issued
the Notice of Award to CDMS, then a Contract for the procurement of medicines was executed by and between
the Province of Camarines Norte and CDMS. The Sandiganbayan opined that the respective acts of petitioners
– Reyes directing the alteration of the date on the PO to make it appear that the PO was approved after the
bidding was conducted on May 18, 2005, and Typoco in entering into a contract with CDMS knowing fully well
that the procurement of medicines had already been done before the bidding – are indicative of a joint purpose,
concerted action and concurrence of sentiments.
a. The chronological timeline of the preparation, approval, and issuance of the procurement documents
simply point to a concurrence of sentiments and a perfect blending of conspiratorial act to achieve a
common purpose. Hence, the unity of criminal design and execution was very patent. (Typoco, Jr. v. People
of the Philippines, G.R. No. 221857, August 16, 2017, Second Division)
18. In any case, appellant's direct participation in the conspiracy is evidenced by the findings of the CA that: (a) the
Articles of Partnership of MMG named appellant as the sole general partner with a capital contribution of
P49,750,000.00; (b) his signatures appear in the MOA entered into by the complainants and facilitated by his
co-accused Geraldine Alejandro; (c) his signatures also appear in the Secretary's Certificate and Signature Cards
which were submitted to Allied Bank when the partnership opened an account; (d) the MOA are notarized and
it was only on appeal that he denied his signatures appearing therein or questioned the authenticity and due
execution of the said documents. Indeed, it cannot be denied that accused-appellant, together with the rest of
his co-accused, participated in a network of deception. The active involvement of each in the scheme of
soliciting investments was directed at one single purpose - which is to divest complainants of their money on
the pretext of guaranteed high return of investment. Without a doubt, the nature and extent of the actions of
accused-appellant, as well as with the other persons in MMG show unity of action towards a common
undertaking. Hence, conspiracy is evidently present. (People of the Philippines v. Mateo, G.R. No. 210612,
October 9, 2017, Second Division)
19. Mere passive presence at the scene of the crime does not implicate one who is not shown to have conspired
with another in killing the victim. Knowledge of, or acquiescence in, or agreement to cooperate is not enough
to constitute one a party to a conspiracy, absent any active participation in the commission of the crime with a
view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose.
a. The circumstances listed by the lower courts, that Abaño and Escobal fled the crime scene together; that
Abaño got the firearm back from Escobal after the shooting and hid it in the house of his friend; and that
Abaño did not report the shooting to the police authority or any other proper government agency but
instead reported for duty on the following day as if nothing had happened the night before, did not
establish a conspiracy between them, or, at least, should not be taken against Abaño. For one, the
undeniable fact that Abaño and Escobal had been close friends readily explained their presence together
on that fateful occasion. The former's claim of innocently escorting the latter home was neither rebutted
nor disproved. Also, the act of Abaño's getting the gun back from Escobal after the shooting and hiding it
in the house of his friend were consistent with his being the owner or possessor of the gun. And, lastly,
Abaño's non-reporting of the shooting to the police authority, while censurable, should not implicate him
in a conspiracy to kill that he was not shown to have priorly known of. Conspiracy exists when two or more
persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony, and decide to commit it; hence,
the agreement concerning the commission of the crime must be shown to precede the decision to commit

Conspiracy 16
it. Indeed, the acts of Abaño adverted to did not necessarily reflect his community of purpose with Escobal
in the killing of the victim. The former's mere passive presence at the scene of the crime did not constitute
proof of concerted action between him and Escobal. (People of the Philippines v. Escobal and Abaño, G.R.
No. 206292, October 11, 2017, Third Division)
20. There is sufficient evidence to establish the participation of petitioners Alzate and Maglinte in the conspiracy.
While there is no direct evidence to show that accused Alzate participated in the preparation and planning of
the illegal/fictitious disbursement, the records, however, showed that when accused Zoleta called up and
informed accused Alzate of the availability of the money, the latter immediately proceeded to the vice
governor's office and there and then, without any hesitation, received the P200,000.00 from the late Vice
Governor Constantino, in the presence of Gadian, Tangan, accused Zoleta and Board Member Purisima. This
act of accused Alzate receiving his share in the misappropriation, is a clear indication that, true to the plan of
the late vice governor, he was part of the conspiracy in the anomalous transaction for the purpose of financing
accused Alzate's forthcoming wedding and hence, the "biggest" beneficiary thereof. As for Zoleta, the
prosecution established that she regularly instructed Gadian to make fictitious documents and that she directed
Gadian and Tangan to falsify the documents. She gave instructions throughout the process of obtaining the
disbursed cash, such as directing that the amounts to be given to the other officials or "suso" be doubled for
faster processing of the disbursement. She reviewed the falsified documents before they were given to
Maglinte. She instructed Tangan to accompany a dummy payee to receive and encash the disbursed check.
Once the cash was obtained, Zoleta received it from Gadian. (Escobar v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No.
205576, November 20, 2017, Third Division)
21. The quantum of proof required to prove implied conspiracy is proof beyond reasonable doubt. However,
conspracy need not even be proven as long as the existence of a band is clearly established. (Manangan v.
People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 218570, November 22, 2017, Second Division)
a. Although it is not an element of the crime charged, conspiracy, whenever alleged, must be proved with the
same quantum of evidence required to establish an element of the offense, that is, by proof beyond
reasonable doubt. Failure to establish the existence of the conspiracy renders each accused only liable for
his own specific acts. (People of the Philippines v. Palada, G.R. No. 225640, July 30, 2019, First Division)
22. The finding of conspiracy was sufficiently established. Records show that when Orozco delivered the initial stabs
to Mata’s back, the others chased, held down, and continued attacking him when he attempted to escape.
These overt acts by all the accused point to a concerted action. (People of the Philippines v. Orozco, G.R. No.
23. Mere presence of an accused at the discussion of a conspiracy, even approval of it, without any active
participation in the same, is not enough for purposes of conviction. Mere knowledge, acquiescence or approval
of the act, without the cooperation or agreement to cooperate, is not enough to constitute one party to a
conspiracy, but that there must be intentional participation in the transaction with a view to the furtherance of
the common design and purpose. (Rimando v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 229701, November 29, 2017,
Third Division)
a. The mere fact that the accused were seen together immediately after the commission of a felony does not
necessarily prove the existence of a conspiracy between them. The Prosecution must show that the
accused performed overt acts showing unanimity of design or concert of action; otherwise, each is liable
only for the consequences of his own acts. (People of the Philippines v. Salga, G.R. No. 233334, July 23,
2018, Third Division)
24. Here, the evidence presented by the prosecution fully support the charge that accused-appellant, together with
his co-accused, conspired to rape AAA. The act of Regner in approaching and covering AAA's mouth, the act of
accused-appellant in poking a bolo at her side, the act of Melvin in having sexual intercourse with AAA and then
later on followed by Regner and accused-appellant, all point to their unified and conscious design to sexually
violate AAA. Accordingly, accused-appellant should be held liable not on]y for the act of rape he perpetuated
against AAA, but also for the rape committed by his co-accused Regner and Melvin, or for three counts of rape
in all, conspiracy being extant among the three of them during the commission of each of the three violations.
(People of the Philippines v. Villanueva, Tupaz, and Regner, G.R. No. 211082, December 13, 2017, First Division)
25. Conspiracy in killing the victim was duly established. Conspiracy may be inferred from the acts of the accused
before, during and after the commission of the crime suggesting concerted action and unity of purpose among
them." In the case at bar, the evidence showed that appellant did not prevent Norada from striking the head of
the victim with the piece of wood. When the latter fell unconscious with blood oozing from his head, appellant
even helped in wrapping the body with a bedsheet and loaded him on the Suzuki multi-cab. To completely end
the life of the victim, they did not bring the victim to the hospital despite his still being alive but instead, dumped
the body in a sugarcane field at Villa Angela Subdivision. These acts of appellant during and after the killing
indubitably show that he acted in concert for a joint purpose and a community of interest with his co-accused
in killing the victim. Thus applying the basic principle in conspiracy that "the act of one is the act of all," appellant

Conspiracy 17
is guilty as a co-conspirator and regardless of his participation, is liable as co-principal. (People of the Philippines
v. Norada, G.R. No. 218958, December 13, 2017, First Division)
26. As it was not Oscar who delivered the fatal blow (or any blows, at all) it was incumbent upon the prosecution
to establish the existence of conspiracy. It must be borne in mind that the evidence required to prove conspiracy
is of the same weight of evidence needed to establish the crime itself—proof beyond reasonable doubt. Even
if the prosecution's version were to be believed, to the mind of the Court, the act of Oscar in merely hugging
the victim does not establish conspiracy in the intent to kill. It was not proven that he acted in concert with Roel
or that he even knew of Roel's intention to stab Genelito. It was not established that Oscar was hugging Genelito
deliberately to enable Roel to stab him as he had no knowledge of Roel's intention. The RTC's finding that this
constituted conspiracy is thus a mere conjecture. (People of the Philippines v. Gimpaya and Gimpaya, G.R. No.
27. Death, acquittal, or failure to charge the co-conspirators does not in any way affect the accused’s criminal
liability. (Venezuela v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 205693, February 14, 2018, Second Division)
28. The allegation of conspiracy to consummate the illegal act was likewise insufficiently proven. The elements of
conspiracy must be proven beyond reasonable doubt, similar to the physical act constituting the crime itself.
Evidence of actual cooperation, not only mere cognizance, approval, or mere presence, must be shown. In this
case, the mere statement that appellants appeared to talk about "doing something to her" should not suffice.
(People of the Philippines v. XXX, G.R. No. 229860, March 21, 2018, Third Division)
29. The Court likewise finds that conspiracy was established in this case. There is conspiracy "when the acts of the
accused demonstrate a common design towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful purpose. While
appellant did not personally have sexual intercourse with "AAA", the acts of appellant, Magbanta, Pal, and
Cutacte clearly demonstrated a common design to have carnal knowledge of "AAA". Appellant helped
Magbanta, Pal, and Cutacte in restraining "AAA" and in dragging her to a secluded grassy area. He also pointed
a knife at "AAA" and held her while Magbanta inserted his penis into "AAA's" vagina. Unmistakably, appellant
concurred in the criminal design to rape "AAA". Since there was conspiracy among appellant, Magbanta, Pal,
and Cutacte, the act of one was the act of all making them equally guilty of the crime of rape against "AAA".
(People of the Philippines v. Pal, G.R. No. 223565, June 18, 2018, First Division)
30. Accused-appellants argue that conspiracy was not proven because their actions do not establish that they were
motivated by a common desire. They assail that Allan stabbing and Michael holding Ramel were two separate
and distinct actions insufficient to prove conspiracy. There is an implied conspiracy if two or more persons aim
their acts towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful subject, each doing a part so that their combined
acts, though apparently independent, are in fact connected and cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal
association and a concurrence of sentiment and may be inferred though no actual meeting among them to
concert means is proved. The essence of conspiracy is unity of action and purpose. As early as the initial assault
against Ramel, it is readily apparent that Allan and Michael's concerted action was towards the common
purpose of hurting Ramel after they ganged up on him together with three other unidentified malefactors.
Then, accused-appellants were mutually motivated by the desire to kill Ramel after Allan stabbed Ramel while
Michael held the latter by the legs. Their concerted actions cannot be brushed aside as separate and distinct
because Michael continued to hold the victim while Allan stabbed him several times.
a. In addition, accused-appellants err in relying on People v. Pugay because unlike the said case, prior to their
attack on Ramel, animosity existed between them and the victim. Immediately prior to the stabbing
incident, they already ganged up on the deceased and beat him up. Thus, it is evident that accused-
appellants truly wanted to inflict bodily harm on Ramel, ultimately leading to his stabbing. Their desire to
hurt Ramel progressed to a desire to kill him. (People of the Philippines v. Delima, G.R. No. 222645, June
31. It bears stressing that direct proof of a previous agreement to commit a crime is not indispensable in conspiracy.
Rather, conspiracy may be deduced from the mode and manner by which the offense was perpetrated, or
inferred from the acts of the accused themselves, when such point to a joint purpose and design. Undoubtedly,
from the moment the accused-appellants met in Ortigas, went to Moeller's home, took his valuables and car,
up to the time when they were both arrested in possession of the said valuables, lead to no other conclusion
than that they hatched a criminal scheme, synchronized their acts for unity in its execution, and aided each
other for its consummation. Consequently, once a conspiracy has been established, the act of one malefactor,
is the act of all. (People of the Philippines v. Cariño and Aquino, G.R. No. 232624, July 9, 2018, Second Division)
32. To prove conspiracy, it is not needed that a meeting between the perpetrators be proven. Such conspiracy may
be inferred from the conduct before and immediately after the act of the people involved. The conduct of
appellant and "JR" in approaching the group of Alde, stabbing him and running after him, indubitably shows
that they had agreed to kill him. After the incident, appellant was also found to be in "JR"s home. It is contrary
to human experience and logic to be present at the home of a friend who had just stabbed another without
being aware of such occurrence as appellant alleges. It cannot be disputed that the acts of appellant and "JR"

Conspiracy 18
were done with a common goal of achieving the death of Alde. Their act of stabbing him cannot be interpreted
to mean anything else other than they wanted to inflict him serious harm. Such acts of stabbing done to achieve
a common goal indicate concerted action and concurrence of sentiments which is adequate in proving that a
conspiracy exists. The fact that appellant was unable to actually stab Alde, not by his own volition but due to
the parry of Alde's companion "Choy", does not preclude the existence of conspiracy. Conspiracy can rightly be
inferred and proven by the acts of stabbing committed by both appellant and "JR" jointly and concertedly. The
existence of conspiracy renders appellant as a co-principal even if he failed to actually stab Alde. Appellant's
lame attempt to refute the existence of conspiracy relying on the cases of People vs. Jorge and People vs. Iligan,
et. al. is misplaced because in those cases, the persons involved did not take part in the actual stabbing. In this
case, appellant himself took part in the stabbing. Furthermore, appellant's assertion that such crime was already
consummated by "JR" and therefore appellant can no longer be liable for conspiracy is untenable and without
basis. The fact that "JR" was able to stab Alde first does not mean that appellant who stabbed him next can be
exculpated from conspiracy. Otherwise, every conspiracy charge may be thwarted by the mere fact that one of
the conspirators beat the others to the act. (People of the Philippines v. Pilpa, G.R. No. 225336, September 5,
33. In any case, it bears stressing that while the OMB's factual findings in their entirety tend to demonstrate a
sequence of irregularities in the procurement of the LPOHs, this does not ipso facto translate into a conspiracy
between each and every person involved in the procurement process. For conspiracy to be appreciated, it must
be clearly shown that there was a conscious design to commit an offense; conspiracy is not the product of
negligence but of intentionality on the part of cohorts. Aside from the sweeping statements of the OMB, there
is a dearth of evidence on record to arrive at a conclusion that respondent Villafuerte was complicit in a
conspiracy to defraud the Government. As consistently stressed by respondent Villafuerte, the following
documents were drafted upon the instruction of his superior officer, P/SSupt. Lurimer B. Detran: (a) Negotiation
Committee Resolution No. 2009-04, (b) BAC Resolution No. 2009-36, (c) Supply Contract between the PNP and
MAPTRA; and (d) Notice to Proceed addressed to Mr. Larry B. De Vera of MAPTRA. None of the aforesaid
documents suggest that respondent Villafuerte had a material role in the awarding of the contract to MAPTRA.
In fact, the nature of the functions of the BAC Secretariat under the Amended IRR-A of RA 9184 confirms that
respondent Villafuerte does not possess recommendatory authority of any kind. Here, petitioner is imputing
liability to respondent Villafuerte on the simple fact that the award of the contract to MAPTRA was made
through the documents that he drafted. This is egregious error. Using the same logic, respondent Villafuerte's
participation in the alleged conspiracy thus becomes equivocal, to say the least, considering that he was also
the one who drafted the demand letter to MAPTRA for the replacement of the LPOHs and a complaint-affidavit
for Estafa against the officials of MAPTRA upon the instructions of P/Dir. George Quinto Piano. In other words,
petitioner cannot judge respondent Villafuerte's actions based on the end result of the documents drafted.
Based on the foregoing, petitioner miserably failed to establish a nexus between the ministerial act of drafting
the said documents and a scheme to defraud the Government. Petitioner cannot satisfy the threshold of
substantial evidence using only conjectures and suppositions; the mere fact that an irregular procurement
process was uncovered does not mean that all persons involved, regardless of rank or functions, were acting
together in conspiracy. Moreover, as already discussed above, neither does proof of criminal conspiracy
automatically impute administrative liability on all those concerned. (PNP-CIDG v. P/Supt. Villafuerte, G.R. Nos.
219771 & 219773, September 18, 2018, En Banc)
34. Jimmy and Ernesto were shown to have acted in conspiracy when they assaulted Wilfredo. Although their
agreement concerning the commission of the felony, and their decision to commit it were not established by
direct evidence, the records contained clear and firm showing of their having acted in concert to achieve a
common design – that of assaulting Wilfredo. Direct proof of the agreement concerning the commission of a
felony, and of the decision to commit it is not always accessible, but that should not be a hindrance to rendering
a finding of implied conspiracy. (People of the Philippines v. Evasco, G.R. No. 213415, September 26, 2018, First
Division)
35. The conspiracy between accused appellants was proven beyond reasonable doubt. Article 8 of the Revised
Penal Code provides that "[a] conspiracy exists when two (2) or more persons come to an agreement concerning
the commission of a felony and decide to commit it." Conspiracy may be proven by direct or circumstantial
evidence that show a "common design or purpose" to commit the crime. In upholding the Regional Trial Court's
finding of a conspiracy between accused-appellants, the Court of Appeals noted their concerted and overt acts
as evidence of their common purpose to kill and dispose of the victim's body: “In the case at bar, conspiracy
was manifestly shown through the concerted and overt acts of appellants which demonstrated their actual
cooperation in the pursuit of a common purpose and design. The trial court correctly observed that conspiracy
consisted the following acts of accused appellants: (a) while Magallano was hitting the victim with a [dos por
dos], Tapar was watching them; (b) they both chased Cristina Varilla; (c) they both returned and continued
mauling the victim; (d) Magallano threw stones at the victim while Tapar cornered the victim to prevent him
from crawling; (e) they helped each other in loading the victim into the tricycle; and (f) Magallano drove the
tricycle while Tapar stayed with the victim inside the tricycle as they fled from the crime scene." (People of the
Philippines v. Magallano, Jr., G.R. No. 220721, December 10, 2018, Third Division)

Conspiracy 19
36. In this case, the hacking acts of Efren and Edwin, when taken together with the stabbing act of Efren, reveal a
commonality and unity of criminal design. The defense cannot aver that Dioscoro and Eddie's mere act of
carrying a weapon is not an overt act reflective of conspiracy because clearly, such act is in line with the crime
of murder. Regardless of the extent and character of Dioscoro and Eddie's respective active participation, once
conspiracy is proved, all of the conspirators are liable as co-principals. The act of one is the act of all.
a. Efren and Edwin alleged in their Brief that "the facts of the case were wanting of any overt acts that are
reflective of any conspiracy amongst the five accused." However, in the same Brief, Efren and Edwin cited
the direct testimony of Eva Castaño which revealed that "after the victim was first stabbed at the back by
accused-appellant Efren, the other accused Edwin did the hacking thrust, followed by Edgar; while the
other two accused, Dioscoro and Eddie, were merely described as being there carrying a weapon." (People
of the Philippines v. Verona, G.R. No. 227748, June 19, 2019, Second Division)
37. Here, respondent was accused of being a co-conspirator in an alleged grand design to steal money from
government coffers under the guise of supposed disbursements for clothing and equipment of enlisted PMC
personnel. Respondent's purported participation in the alleged conspiracy was his act of signing the
disbursement vouchers and authorizing the transfer of funds to Maj. Jandayan who was not duly authorized to
receive, nay, disburse these funds.
a. Respondent asserts that his acts and those of the other accused did not show a concerted effort toward
achieving a common criminal goal. For they simply acted in the performance of their ministerial duty of
approving the documents relative to the proposed disbursements in light of a clear showing that these
documents had already passed the hands of several subordinate officers who had carefully reviewed and
certified them to be correct. Respondent also asserts that his only participation in the questioned
transaction was signing the disbursement vouchers for the CCIE allowances in his capacity as duly
authorized representative of the head of office. Respondent's argument does not persuade. Respondent's
culpability did not arise solely because he signed the disbursement vouchers. His culpability rather was
hinged on his act of authorizing Maj. Jandayan to receive the CCIE funds, albeit, the latter did not have the
requisite authority to receive, much less, disburse these funds. (Fact-Finding Investigation Bureau v.
Miranda, G.R. No. 216574, July 10, 2019, Second Division)
38. Here, the Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the Regional Trial Court's finding of conspiracy. It found that
accused-appellants' acts were coordinated and complementary with each other, demonstrating the existence
of conspiracy. It ruled that the prosecution was able to establish that accused-appellants came in two (2) groups.
The first group—accused-appellants Palema and Palmea, along with Manzanero—attacked Enicasio and took
his cellphone. The second group—accused-appellants Grengia and Saldua, along with Ladra—joined the fray
when they saw Enicasio fighting back. Notably, while accused-appellants denied participating in the crime, they
all admitted that they were at the Calamba Town Plaza during the incident. Moreover, their claim that they did
not come as a group, but were with other people, remains a bare allegation after they failed to present the
testimonies of the individuals who were supposedly with them that night.
a. As the Regional Trial Court correctly ruled, granting that they were merely present during the robbery, his
inaction does not exculpate him. To exempt himself from criminal liability, a conspirator must have
performed an overt act to dissociate or detach himself from the conspiracy to commit the felony and
prevent the commission thereof. Accused offered no evidence that they performed an overt act neither to
escape from the company of the assailants nor to prevent the assault from taking place. Their denial,
therefore, is of no value. Courts generally view the defenses of denial and alibi with disfavor on account of
the facility with which an accused can concoct them to suit his defense. As both evidence are negative and
self-serving, they cannot attain more credibility than the testimonies of prosecution witnesses who testify
clearly, providing thereby positive evidence on the various aspects of the crime committed. (People of the
Philippines v. Palema, G.R. No. 228000, July 10, 2019, Third Division)
39. Here, the following circumstances established conspiracy: (a) all four accused knew each other as they were
dispatchers or jeepney barkers in the area where the crime was committed; (b) they were all present at the
time of the killing; (c) they surrounded Ruben when he alighted his jeepney; (d) they took turns hitting, hacking
and stabbing Ruben with a stone, samurai and a knife; (e) Ruben sustained multiple injuries and wounds from
the attacks; and (f) all four accused immediately escaped. The acts of appellant and his co-accused were
coordinated. They were synchronized in their attacks and were motivated by a single criminal impulse - to kill
Ruben. Their spontaneous agreement to commit the crime is sufficient to create joint criminal responsibility.
Conspiracy being present, appellant is thus equally liable as his co-accused regardless of who delivered the
killing blow. For where there is conspiracy, all conspirators are liable as co-principals. The act of one is the act
of all. (People of the Philippines v. Pagapulaan, G.R. No. 216936, July 29, 2019, Second Division)
40. To successfully impute criminal liability on the ground of conspiracy, the Prosecution must show that each of
the accused performed at least an overt act that showed his concurrence in the criminal design. The mere
presence of any accused in the criminal scene, as well as the showing of his inaction to prevent the commission
of the crime, will not make him a co-conspirator because such are not the nature of overt acts essential to
incurring criminal liability under the umbrella of a conspiracy.

Conspiracy 20
a. People v. Lizada defines an overt act as some physical activity or deed, indicating the intention to commit
a particular crime, more than a mere planning or preparation, which if carried out to its complete
termination following its natural course, without being frustrated by external obstacles nor by the
spontaneous desistance of the perpetrator, will logically and necessarily ripen into a concrete offense. The
act done need not constitute the last proximate one for completion. It is necessary, however, that the
attempt must have a causal relation to the intended crime. The overt acts must have an immediate and
necessary relation to the offense. (People of the Philippines v. Raguro, G.R. No. 224301, July 30, 2019, First
Division)
41. Conspiracy exists. Here, as aptly ruled by petitioner, respondent cooperated by signing the TWG Memorandum
dated June 30, 2011 and FEO-CSAB Resolution No. 2013-027. In signing these documents, he paved the way for
the accreditation of WERFAST and, eventually, as the sole courier service provider of firearms licenses. As
chairman of the TWG, respondent favorably recommended the proposal of WERFAST despite its lack of juridical
personality and the absence of the requisite public bidding. On the other hand, as chairman of FEO-CSAB,
respondent accredited WERFAST despite the latter's non-submission of the other documents required under
the PNP's Policy on Accreditation. (Office of the Ombudsman v. Petrasanta, G.R. No. 227268, August 28, 2019,
Third Division)
42. In the case at bar, the prosecution presented credible and sufficient pieces of circumstantial evidence which,
when taken together, prove that Wennie conspired with Joel, to wit: (a) at around 1:00 p.m. of August 2, 2008,
AAA was brought by her father to Wennie's house; (b) an hour thereafter, Wennie, together with AAA, left the
house on board the former's tricycle; (c) at 3:00 p.m., Wennie came home alone; (d) AAA was never seen again;
(e) Wennie started acting suspiciously after AAA's disappearance; (f) on the night that AAA's family went looking
for her, Wennie kept secretly texting an unknown person using Patrick's cellphone; (g) Wennie admitted having
deleted the cellphone number of Joel from Patrick's cellphone; (h) Wennie kept misleading Patrick as to Joel's
correct cellphone number and deliberately gave him the wrong cellphone number; and (i) Joel's cellphone
number was found to be the same as that of the kidnapper's. It is all too apparent that Wennie's susp1cwus
acts show her complicity to the crime. To begin with, she was the last person seen with AAA. She and AAA went
outside of the house, but the former returned home alone. AAA went missing thereafter.
a. Likewise, Wennie's staunch efforts at protecting Joel were indeed questionable. It was certainly suspicious
why Wennie constantly misled Patrick as to Joel's true cellphone number. First, she deleted all of the
messages in Particle's cellphone after using the same, and then she deleted all of Patrick's contacts. Not
content, Wennie even misled Patrick, by deliberately giving a wrong number. All of these suspicious deeds
cast doubt unto Wennie's innocence, especially since it was later on discovered that Joel's cellphone
number matched that of the kidnapper's.
b. In addition, it was highly suspicious why Wennie suddenly went home to Catbalogan City - the town where
the money was wired. Also, it was discovered that Wennie was heavily indebted and had pawned pieces of
jewelry belonging to her husband Randy without this knowledge.
c. Certainly, the acts of Wennie, when taken together, reveal that she acted in concert with Joel and that their
acts emanated from the same purpose or common design showing unity in its execution. For sure, Joel
would not have been able to kidnap AAA if not for the participation of Wennie. (Gurro v. People of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 224562, September 18, 2019, Third Division)
43. Here, appellants have shown that they acted in concert to achieve one common purpose: to assault the victim,
thus: (a) Appellants and their two (2) companions arrived at the scene together on board a motorcycle; (b)
While Romeo kicked and stabbed the victim, Reynan and the others blocked the friends of the victim from
approaching and aiding him; and (c) After Romeo had stabbed the victim, he and his companions all fled
together. Indubitably, their individual and collective actions – before, during, and after the commission of the
crime – indicated a joint purpose, concerted action, and concurrence of sentiments to finish off the victim. Each
one, therefore, is equally liable for the victim's slaying. (People of the Philippines v. Padal, Jr., G.R. No. 232070,
44. Conspiracy is present. It is clear that petitioner actively participated in all the transactions. Petitioner's acts of
inducing the private complainants to invest further so as to recover their "lost" investments make him liable
through conspiracy. It must likewise be noted that petitioner was always present during all the meetings —
from the time when private complainants invested their money to the time that they sought the help of the NBI
to recover the same. Even more, petitioner received the marked money provided by the NBI, representing the
additional investment of USD 10,000.00 that petitioner, Gan, and Santias asked from Bueno. Undeniably, these
circumstances are contrary to petitioner's denial of his participation. Truly, petitioner and his cohorts have
ultimate objective, that is, to induce private complainants to part with their money. To do so, petitioner and his
cohorts misrepresented that they are in a legitimate business of buying and selling foreign currencies; that they
could invest private complainants' money with guaranteed profits; and that private complainants have the
option of withdrawing their money at any time. However, as it turned out, Valbury was not registered with the
SEC and it was not able to deliver its promises to private complainants.
a. Neither can this Court exclude petitioner from liability only because he did not participate in employing
fraud or deceit upon the private complainants when they initally gave their money to Santias. At the risk of

Conspiracy 21
being repetitive, the finding of conspiracy necessarily implies that the act of one is the act of all. It is
sufficient that they acted in concert pursuant to the same objective. Thus, it is not indispensable that
petitioner engaged with private complainants from the time that they inquired on the investment scheme
offered by Valbury to the time that they parted with their money. It is sufficient that the actions of
petitioner and his cohorts were clearly directed by a premeditated joint activity which is aimed towards a
common purpose. (Sulit v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 202264, October 16, 2019, Second Division)
45. No conspiracy exists in this case. Petitioner in essence anchors its claim of Palad's involvement in the conspiracy
on two grounds. First, the petitioner attempts to highlight that Palad's actions during the entrapment operation,
before, during, and after, are suspicious enough to warrant a well-founded belief that he was well-aware of the
goings-on attendant to the fraud. Second, Palad's identity as Amposta's brother-in-law and status as a lawyer,
for petitioner, highlights the unmistakable fact that Palad had knowledge of the scheme despite the latter's
averments to the contrary. Both reasons are grounded on hypothesis more than actuality. Mere speculation,
especially as to the state of a mind of an accused, does not pass the standards set for the finding of probable
cause, even if what is looked for is not necessarily proof beyond reasonable doubt.
a. First, Palad's presence during the entrapment operation does not in itself constitute a shady occurrence
that would automatically warrant suspicion. Even if the accused were present and agreed to cooperate
with the main perpetrators of the crime, his or her mere presence does not make him or her a party to it,
absent any active participation in the furtherance of the scheme's common design or purpose. It is
axiomatic that mere knowledge, acquiescence or approval of the act, without the cooperation and the
agreement to cooperate, is not enough to establish conspiracy.
b. Second, petitioner is vastly mistaken when it says that Palad's relationship with Amposta is an indicator of
his complicity. Suffice it to say, mere relation is not enough to attribute criminal responsibility, especially
when taken as the sole factor or even a primary one. At best, it adds to circumstantial proof that would
shed light on the motives and attributions of the parties. By itself, however, it would set a dangerous
precedent to ascribe even just reasonable link for conspiracy just because the two alleged co-conspirators
are related. Tangentially, People v. Balasa, which petitioner cites to support its claim that Palad's relation
to the alleged mastermind, Amposta, is an indicator that he was aware of the scheme, is inapplicable to
the case. In the Balasa case, the Court categorically stated that the accused therein was not implicated as
a co-conspirator solely because he was the father of the principal proponent of the perpetrated fraud, but
due to other convincing proofs such as being an actual paymaster of the fraud, funding the latter. Even if
one were to consider solely the question of relationship, the fact that the accused in People v. Balasa was
the father and husband to three of the organizers is a more convincing proof of knowledge of the scheme,
especially compared to the connection between Palad and Amposta, which is not even a blood relationship.
Amposta is merely Palad's brother-in-law, and petitioner was unable to adduce further evidence
establishing more than a theoretical link.
c. Third, petitioner pleading for the Court to include Palad in the charge sheet by opining that and defense he
may proffer as to his innocence may be presented in the course of trial, is untenable reasoning. Agreeing
with this proposition will do away with the very role and object of preliminary investigation, which is "to
secure the innocent against hasty, malicious, and oppressive prosecutions, and to protect him from open
and public accusation of crime, from the trouble, expenses and anxiety of a public trial, and also to protect
the State from useless and expensive prosecutions." (BDO Life Assurance, Inc. v. Atty. Palad, G.R. No.
237845, October 16, 2019, Third Division)
46. Conspiracy, in this case, is irrelevant as clear and convincing evidence shows that accused-appellant committed
the offenses charged. While the body of Information stated that accused-appellant conspired with Catubay in
the illegal sale of shabu, conspiracy was deemed no longer relevant considering that the former remained at
large; the court not having acquired jurisdiction over his person. Nevertheless, accused-appellant's liability does
not hinge on the presence of conspiracy. Even without the alleged conspiracy, clear and convincing evidence
was established proving that accused-appellant committed the offenses charged. The courts below were
correct in ruling that the prosecution was able to prove that the illegal sale of shabu was consummated upon
the delivery of the subject of the sale, sachet of shabu, acceptance object of the sale, and the marked money.
Settled is the rule that as long as the police officer went through the operation as a buyer and his offer was
accepted by appellant and the dangerous drugs delivered to the former, the crime is considered consummated
by the delivery of the goods. (People of the Philippines v. Catubay, G.R. No. 232083, November 27, 2019, Third
Division)
47. Conspiracy had animated the perpetrators in delivering or transporting the seized illegal drugs. As found by the
CA, Amago conspired with Vendiola in a common desire to transport the dangerous drugs using the motorcycle.
Both were positively identified to have been respectively carrying a firearm, a folding knife, an improvised tooter
and a folded strip of aluminum foil. As they approached the checkpoint sign, accused-appellants appeared
rattled and hastily executed a U-turn, which clearly manifest that they were committing some offense. They
were then apprehended for illegal possession of firearm and illegal possession of a bladed weapon. The arrest
further resulted to the confiscation of the illegal drugs in the utility box of the motorcycle. It is worth noting as
well that both the accused-appellants tested positive for shabu. (People of the Philippines v. Amago, G.R. No.
227739, January 15, 2020, First Division)

Conspiracy 22
48. A private individual may be convicted for violation of R.A. 3019, Section 3 provided that he or she acted in
conspiracy with public officers. (Canlas v. People of the Philippines, G.R. Nos. 236308-09, February 17, 2020,
Second Division)
49. The attendant facts and circumstances established that the accused-appellant exerted great dominance and
influence over Roberto, such that her words constituted an efficacious and powerful coercion for the latter to
commit the crime. The words “yariin na” is unequivocal. Literally translated in English, it means to “finish off;”
in Tagalog slang, it means “to kill.” The words are neither thoughtless nor spontaneous as they were uttered in
situation specifically sought for the purpose of killing the victim. Further, the accused-appellant’s dominance
over Roberto is evident from the fact that immediately after the words of command were uttered, Roberto was
moved into action by approaching the victim and then bringing him to a dark place and there, shooting him. At
any rate, the relative participation of the accused-appellant is immaterial in this case since she, together with
Roberto, and one unidentified male, acted in conspiracy to kill the victim. The records establish that the three
waited for the victim to arrive. After the accused-appellant identified the victim, Roberto approached him,
brought him to a dark place and fired a shot in his head, all of which happened while the accused-appellant and
their unidentified male companion were in their places acting as lookous. Afterwards, Roberto escaped with
the accused-appellant. These overt acts prove that accused-appellant and her companions acted in an implied
conspiracy to kill the victim. (People of the Philippines v. Manzanilla, G.R. No. 235787, June 8, 2020, Third
Division)
50. The accused acted in a conspiracy. Records show that Nocido, Bagon, and Ventura’s acts demonstrated a
common design to have carnal knowledge of AAA to wit: First, before AAA was brought to secluded area, Bagon
poked a knife at AAA’s neck, while Nocido and Ventura cornered her. Second, Nocido and Bagon held her arms
and dragged her to a secluded area. Third, prior to raping AAA, the three accused slapped and punched her.
Fourth, while Nocido and Bagon were removing AAA’s clothes, Ventura held the lighter to illuminate the
secluded area. Lastly, the three accused simultaneously abused AAA to satisfy their carnal desires. Accordingly,
the Court finds Nocido guilty as a co-conspirator in the crime of rape through sexual intercourse committed by
others. (People of the Philippines v. Nocido, G.R. No. 240229, June 17, 2020, First Division)
51. Conspiracy exists between appellants and Arizala based on Abella’s testimony that they were the persons who
helped each other in robbing her and the other passengers of the jeepney. She testified that they boarded the
jeepney and declared a hold-up. One of them was at the entrance of the jeepney, while the other was near the
driver and holding a knife. The third hold-upper took the belongings of the passengers of the jeepney, including
her own. After taking their belongings, the hold-uppers alighted from the jeepney. These acts of appellants and
Arizala clearly show a joint or common purpose and design, concerted action, and community of interest.
(People of the Philippines v. Casabuena, G.R. No. 246580, June 23, 2020, First Division)
52. Conspiracy exists. Accused-appellants performed overt acts for the accomplishment of a common purpose of
recruiting and transporting the victims to Angeles, Pampanga to perform indeceny acts, particularly cybersex.
It was established from the testimonies of the witnesses that accused-appellants, together and, at time,
individually, recruited them to work in an internet café in Angeles, Pampanga. To be specific, in the case of CCC,
it was Sherryl who told her that, “I will bring you to Manila and work in an internet café to dance strip wearing
only bra and panty.” Further, all the victims who became witnesses clearly established that accused-appellants
were the ones who gave them instructions and bought their tickets in going to Manila. The evidence shows that
the chain of circumstances necessarily leads to the conclusion that there was a conceited action between
accused-appellants with the objective of trafficking the minors for the purpose of pornography or sexual
exploitation. (People of the Philippines v. Leocadio and Leocadio, G.R. No. 236967, July 15, 2020, First Division)
53. The lower courts erred when it deemed as an act of conspiracy to commit murder PO1 Delos Santos’ act of
preventing Oliva from reporting the shooting incident to the police. It is settled that mere knowledge,
acquiescence, or approval of the act, without cooperation or agreement to cooperate, is not enough to
constitute one a party to a conspiracy. There must be intentional participation in the transaction with a view to
the furtherance of the common design and purpose. Here, the shooting incident transpired during a heated
argument in a drinking spree. There was no showing that PO1 Delos Santos actively participated in the
furtherance of the common design or purpose since the shooting transpired and was consummated even
without his cooperation or assistance. In the same manner, mere presence at the scene of the crime at the time
of its commission is not, by itself, sufficient to establish conspiracy in the absence of evidence of actual
cooperation rather than mere cognizance or approval of an illegal act is required. Even if the finding as regards
the presence of PO1 Delos Santos near the scene where the late Pio was shot by Galos were accurate, his mere
presence near the scene of the crime does not of itself constitute sufficient basis for concluding that he was in
conspiracy with Galos who was the actual perpetrator of the crime. (Delos Santos v. People of the Philippines,
G.R. No. 231765, August 24, 2020, Second Division)
54. The prosecution has proven beyond reasonable doubt that Roelan and Paran conspired in the commission of
the crime. Conspiracy may be deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated, or

Conspiracy 23
inferred from the acts of the accused themselves when these point to a joint purpose and design, concerted
action and community of interest. The concerted action of Roelan and Paran shows their unity of purpose – to
rob the victim, at all cost. These concerted acts manifestly disclose concurrence of wills, unity of action, joint
purpose and common design. (People of the Philippines v. Paran, G.R. No. 241322, September 8, 2020, First
Division)
55. Conspiracy attended the killing of Reynald. It was established that appellant, together with Lagrita and Mier,
arrived at Jeffrey’s store where Reynald and his companions were conversing. Lagrita then went at the back of
Reynald and without any warning, hit him with a piece of firewood which caused him to fall on the ground.
Appellant and Mier were standing in front of the victim and his companions, and undoubtedly, their presence
gave Lagrita the moral support he needed as they were of equal number with the victim’s group. Their act of
staying in close proximity while the crime is being executed served no other purpose than to lend moral support
by ensuring that no one could interfere and prevent the successful perpetration thereof. In fact, appellant did
not prevent Lagrita from hitting the victim with a piece of firewood, while Mier even uttered “Ayaw Kalampag
(don’t react or resist).” Notably, after the victim fell on the ground, Lagrita also hit Lapuz. Appellant, together
with Lagrita and Mier, ran together. While it was only Lagrita who struck Reynald which caused his death,
appellant and Mier are also liable since the act of Lagrita is the act of all co-conspirators. Indeed, one who
participates in the material execution of the crime by standing guard or lending moral support to the actual
perpetration thereof is criminally responsible to the same extent as the actual perpetrator, especially if they
did nothing to prevent the commission of the crime. Hence, appellant’s liability is based on his being a co-
conspirator. However, since mier had already been acquitted by the RTC which is already final and executory,
only appellant should be held liable as a co-conspirator. (People of the Philippines v. Lagrita, G.R. No. 233194,
September 14, 2020, First Division)
56. Conspiracy was adequately shown. The Lacsons were convincingly presented to have acted in unison in
attacking the Santoses with steel pipes. The conduct of the Lacsons, before, during, and after the commission
of the crime, showed that they possessed a joint and conceited purpose to assault the Santoses after chasing,
hurling a beer bottle at them, and witnessing the heated discussion between some of their family members and
Arnold, which escalated to a full-on attack. The Santoses had no means of defense, lacking the strength in
numbers of the Lacsons who possessed steel pipes as weapons which caused injuries to their heads and differen
parts of their bodies. Thus, the act of one becomes the act of all and the Lacsons must be held accountable for
their actions. (Lacson v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 243805, September 16, 2020, Second Division)
57. The implied conspiracy between Ronald and his three companions is evident from the mode and manner in
which they perpetrated the crime. First, Ronald and the three other men were shown to have acted in concert
not only in going together at the crime scene but also in purposely following the jeepney. It was Ronald who
robbed the passengers while his companions stood guard outside. Likewise, Ronald was armed with an ice pick
and his cohort carried a gun who pointed it at the jeepney. Second, the spontaneity of the attack and the
simultaneous actions of Ronald and his companions show that they had one objective in mind – to commit
robbery. Third, as soon as they achieved their common purpose, Ronald fled together with the three other men.
Fourth, Ronald maneuvered the tricycle around so that his companion can shoot the police officer to ensure
their escape. Fifth, Ronald did nothing after the incident. Ronald did not alert the authorities about the crime
which behavior certainly does not speak of innocence. Further, Ronald’s presence at the crime scene with his
companions is not a mere coincidence or a casual and unintended meeting. Ostensibly, they were there for a
common purpose. All these acts point to the conclusion that Ronald and the three other men are co-principals
who conspired to commit the crime. (People of the Philippines v. Laguda, G.R. No. 244843. October 7, 2020,
First Division)
58. Both driver and back-rider share the same criminal liability as they were in conspiracy with each other. Here,
both driver and back-rider were animated by the same criminal intent which is to kill Ariel and Lourdes. As one
person was driving the motorcycle, the other held the gun and fired it upon the victims. Hence, it will not matter
whether Dayrit was the one driving the motorcycle or the one that fired the shots. (People of the Philippines v.
Dayrit, G.R. No. 241632, October 14, 2020, First Division)
59. The participation and involvemet of Joel in the commission of the crime is inadequate to render him criminally
liable as a conspirator since his overt acts before, during, and after the criminal act are inadequate to hold him
criminally liable as conspirator for the crime of murder. Before the criminal act, the defense witnesses, herein
accused-appellants, testified that they were having a drinking session. There was no indication that they were
planning or conniving to commit the murder. Joel was drinking with Manuel, Poly, and Crispolo inside Manuel’s
house. The OSG argues that conspiracy was established through the testimonies of Lydia and Jonathan. But
after a thorough review of the records, the Court holds that their testimonies were insufficient to prove that
Joel conspired wih the other accused-appellants in committing the murder. More so, there is no evidence that
the accused-appellants had any enmity or grudge against the victim. In the absence of strong motives on their
part to kill the deceased, it cannot safely be concluded that they conspired to commit the crime. During and
after the criminal act, the prosecution witnesses, particularly Lydia and Jonathan, testified that Joel’s
participation was merely to drag Romy inside the house. On the other hand, all the defense witnesses testified

Conspiracy 24
that Joel was asleep after drinking two bottles of Colt45 when the incident happened. Thus, the most that the
prosecution could ascribe to Joel was his overt act of helping the other accused in dragging Romy inside the
gate. Further, the Court finds the version of Lydia’s story incredulous. Her testimony does not corroborate the
testimony of Jonathan. In her version, she was together with Romy when Manuel hit her husband with dos par
dos. But according to Jonathan, he called for Lydia when he saw that Romy was attacked. Hence, the Court
holds that the evidence of the prosecution is not strong enough to sustain a conviction as against Joel. Although
the fact of dragging Romy inside the gate appeared to be an act of helping the other accused in perpetuating
the crime, such is not sufficient to hold him principally liable as a conspirator in the crime of murder. (People of
the Philippines v. Catulang, G.R. No. 245969, November 3, 2020, First Division)
60. The State need not prove appellants’ previous agreement to commit murder and robbery because conspiracy
can be deduced from the mode and manner in which they perpetrated their criminal act. They acted in concert
in killing Pepito and taking his properties, with their individual acts manifesting a community of purpose and
design to achieve their evil purpose. All the fifteen accused as conspirators in this case are liable as co-principals.
Hence, they cannot now successfully assail their conviction as co-principals in murder and robbery. (People of
the Philippines v. Natindim, G.R. No. 201867, November 4, 2020, Third Division)
61. It is very clear that conspiracy, connivance, and unity of purpose and intention were present during the
execution of the crime. The prosecution was able to prove that at the time of the attack, accused-appellants
simultaneously fired their long firearms at the houses in the general direction of the plaza, killing Romeo in
consequence. Accused-appellants’ collective and individual acts demonstrating the existence of a common
design is also evident from the unrebutted testimony of Eugenio that he heard one of the accused-appellants
order his companions to retreat, which they all did, upon the arrival of police reinforcement from Magsaysay
Miarayon, and Talakag. (People of the Philippines v. Camarino, et al., G.R. No. 222655, December 9, 2020, Third
Division)
62. The prosecution had successfully established conspiracy among the accused including petitioners Borje and
Dela Cruz.
a. The falsification by the accused of the DVs, supporting documents, and cash invoices had a vital connection
to the chain of conspiracy or were in furtherance of the objective of the conspiracy. Without the DVs,
supporting documents, and cash invoices, the government would not have released public funds for the
reimbursement of the ghost emergency repairs and/or purchase of spare parts. Without the falsified
Equipment Pre-Inspection Reports and Job Orders signed and the falsified Reports of Waster Material and
Abstracts of Open Canvass approved by petitioner Borje, and without the falsified Cash Invoices issued by
petitioner Dela Cruz through her sole proprietorship DEB, the objective of the conspiracy would not have
been attained as these falsified documents were necessary to claim reimbursement for the ghost
transaction. Thus, since the actions of the accused, including petitioners Borje and Dela Cruz, manifest their
concurrence in the criminal design to facilitate the disbursement of public funds for the ghost emergency
repairs and/or purchase of spare parts, the Sandiganbayan correctly found that there is conspiracy.
b. Contrary to petitioner Dela Cruz’ assertions that there is doubt as to her actual participation in the criminal
scheme, there is sufficient evidence to prove her participation in the criminal scheme. To recall, petitioner
Dela Cruz argues that the prosecution did not present any evidence to prove she prepared or filled-up the
Cash Invoices that were submitted to the DPWH. She claims it is her liaison officer that prepares the Cash
Invoices. These are misplaced. As she herself admitted, she was the owner of DEB when it was a sole
proprietorship and before the registration of DEB Auto Repair Shop and Parts Supply Corporation (DEB
Corporation) with the SEC, and the Cash Invoices being used in transacting business with the DPWH was
her company’s old cash invoices where her name was indicated as proprietress. She, however, disavows
the preparation and use of these cash invoices. These self-serving allegations fail in light of the evidence
presented. Her defense is weakened by the testimony of the prosecution’s witness Jimenez that petitioner
Dela Cruz, the owner of DEB, presented a DV and other documents for him to sign, allegedly for the
payment of repairs, but he did not give any advance payment for the service and repairs. In these alleged
transactions, there were no actual repairs or services done on his service vehicle. Under the law, in a sole
proprietorship form of business, the sole proprietor is personally liable for all the debts and obligations of
the business. A sole proprietorship does not possess any juridical personality separate and apart from the
personality of the owner of the enterprise. Thus, petitioner Dela Cruz as the sole proprietress of DEB, is
criminally liable for the issuance of falsified cash invoices in the criminal scheme. (Dela Cruz v. People of
the Philippines, G.R. No. 236807, January 12, 2021, First Division)
63. Conspiracy between petitioners was sufficiently established by the prosecution. As observed by the RTC: “In
this case, conspiracy among the three accused is not hard to see. As recalled by Glenn, and corroborated by his
father, Virgilio and prosecution witness Erma delos Santos, the accused Oliver, upon arrival at the fish center
with his brother and co-accused Benjamin after being summoned through a cellular phone call by their sister
Mimielyn, endeavored to punch Glenn, and when he failed to make a hit, Oliver held Glenn from behind. While
the latter was in such position, Benjamin hacked him on the fact and forehead with a bolo. Thereafter, the three
accused, including Maximo who was at that time with Mimielyn in their meat stall located near the scene of the
incident, kicked Virgilio in different parts of his body; and when Maximo acted to hack Virgilio with a bolo given

Conspiracy 25
by him by Mimielyn, Glenn, to protect his father, parried the blow, resulting to his injury at the right hand.
Maximo then passed the bolo to Oliver who used it in hacking Glenn at the right shoulder.” (Oliveros v. People
of the Philippines, G.R. No. 242552, March 3, 2021, First Division)
64. The CA did not err in finding the existence of conspiracy between Lira and his co-accused. Conspiracy is said to
exist where two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to
commit it. It can be proven by evidence of a chain of circumstances and may be inferred from the acts of the
accused before, during, and after the commission of the crime which indubitably point to and are indicative of
a joint purpose, concert of action and community of interest. The CA correctly ruled that the prosecution
convincingly demonstrated a community of criminal design between Lira and his co-accused. The CA held that:
“The acts orchestrated by accused-appellant together with his co-accused are indicative of his active
participation in the criminal design, and the weapons used against the unarmed victims constitute direct
evidence of a deliberate plan as well as demonstrate the singularity of their purpose-to kill them. In reiteration,
accused-appellant and his co-accused were united in the execution of the crime and were synchronized in
carrying out their common resolution of taking the victims' lives. Thus, the court a quo correctly appreciated
the existence of conspiracy among them. Hence, accused-appellant ought to bear equal responsibility for the
crimes charged, even for the death of Elisa, since in conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all.” Evidence shows
that the circumstances surrounding the killings, taken together necessarily lead to the conclusion that there
was concerted action between Lira and his co-accused with the objective of killing Carlos and Elisa. (People of
the Philippines v. Lira, G.R. No. 235991, March 18, 2021, First Division)
65. The prosecution failed to establish conspiracy among petitioners.

a. To recall, in Criminal Case No. 26492, the Sandiganbayand hinged its theory of conspiracy as follows:
Accused Cabrera certified that the supplies requisitioned were necessary and would be used solely for the
purposes stated and the same RIV was approved by accused Majarais. Clearly, accused Cabrera and
Marajais’ requisition for the procurement of 10,000 bottles of paracetamol suspension for distribution to
different cities was not justified. The purchase was unnecessary and unauthorized. Accused Perez, as the
supply officer, and accused Agustin, as Accountant I, should have known of the same before signing the PO
for said medicine and certifying to the availability of funds, respectively. On the other hand, accused Du
signed the DV certifying that “adequate available funds/budgetary allotment in the amount of P192,727.27;
expenditure properly certified; supported by documents marked (x) per checklist on back hereof; account
codes proper; previous cash advance liquidated/accounted for.” Accused Cabrera signed the DV certifying
that the expenses/cash advance necessary, lawful and incurred under his direct supervision while accused
Majarais as the Director of the RFO-NCR approved the same DV. The signatures of the accused on the RIV,
the PO, and the DV made possible the payment to Aegis of Paracetamol suspension. Clearly, their
signatures unquestionably signify their assent to the transaction, a conspiracy to disburse public fund to
pay Aegis 10,000 bottles of Paracetamol suspension at P25.00 despite the fact that there was no necessity
to purchase the same at that time and despite the overprice.
b. Meanwhile, in Criminal Case No. 26493, the Sandiganbayan said: Accused Perez, as the supply officer,
accused Agustin, who certified on the availability of funds, accused Camposano who admitted placing her
initials on the PO and accused Majarais who approved the same ought to have known that there was no
justification for not conducting the public bidding relative to said purchase. Moreover, they should have
known the price of Ferrous Sulphate based on the 1994 public bidding before signing the PO. Further,
accused Agustin, Cabrera, Majarais, who are all signatories of the DV for the payment to Lumar, should
have raised the issue on the regularity or necessity of the expenditure. Clearly, the signatures of the
accused on the PO and the DV indicate conspiracy to disburse public fund to pay Lumar 1,500 bottles of
Ferrous Sulphate with Vitamin B Complex and folic acid at overpriced amount. The signatures of the
accused made possible the payment to Lumar despite the irregularity in the supporting documents. Taken
collectively, their acts sufficiently prove the existence of conspiracy.
c. However, it was a grievous and egregrious error for the Sandiganbayan to sweepingly conclude that
petitioners in this case were animated by the same purpose of defrauding the government based solely on
their respective signatures appearing on the disbursement documents.
d. Du and Agustin correctly assert that their signatures appearing in the PO and DV, with proper
documentation, to simply signify the availability of funds, do not, as they cannot, satisfy the requisite
quantum of proof to hold them as co-conspirators, much less hold them liable for the crime charged.
Similarly, Perez’ signature as supply officer, to signify that there are no more available stocks for the said
medicines, or Camposano’s initials in the PO, which was supported by proper documents and was but part
of the standard procedures, cannot be the sole basis to conclude that they intentionally took part in the
planning, preparation, and execution of the alleged conspiracy to defraud the government. To stress anew,
not every person who signs documents required in standard operating procedures automatically becomes
a conspirator in a crime. There must be other positive and clear evidence showing each of the accused’s
conscious and intentional participation in the planning, preparation, and execution of crime charged.
However, from the evidence adduced by the prosecution, the Court finds that no clear nexus exists to prove
a unity of action and purpose between and among petitioners to defraud the government. (Macarian v.
People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 215104, March 18, 2021, First Division)

Conspiracy 26
66. A mere signature or approval appearing on a document does not meet the required quantum of proof to
establish the existence of conspiracy.
a. In Arias v. Sandiganbayan, the Court ruled that to sustain a conspiracy charge and conviction, there should
be grounds other than the accused’s mere signature or approval appearing on a voucher. The prosecution
must be able to clearly show the accused’s participation in the planning, preparation, and perpetration of
the alleged conspiracy to defraud the government.
b. In Magsuci v. Sandiganbayan, the Court also found insufficient the accused’s signature appearing on the
check, accomplishment report, and disbursement voucher in relation to a fictitious transaction to hold him
liable as a co-conspirator for the crime of estafa through falsification of public document. The Court
explained that conspiracy cannot solely be predicated on the very functions that a public officer had to
discharge in the performance of his official duties, especially where there is no indication that he had
foreknowledge of the irregularity committed by his co-accused. Indeed, a public officer may have been lax
and administratively remiss in his duty by relying too much on the reports submitted by his co-accused, but
for conspiracy to exist, it is essential that there must be a conscious design to commit an offense.
Conspiracy is not the product of negligence but of intentionality on the part of cohorts.
c. In Sabiniano v. CA, the Court reiterates that a mere signature or approval appearing on a voucher, check
or warrant is not enough to sustain a finding of conspiracy among public officials and employees charged
with defraudation. There msut be proof to indicate that the accused had taken part in planning,
preparation, and perpetration of the alleged conspiracy to defraud the government. Otherwise, any
careless use of the conspiracy theory can sweep into jail even innocent persons who may have only been
made unwitting tools by the criminal minds really responsible for that irregularity.
d. In Maamo v. People, the Court held that in order to successfully prove conspiracy among the accused, the
prosecution must present evidence other than the mere fact that the accused are at the opposite ends of
the chain in the disbursement process. To sustain a conviction based on such fact alone would necessarily
require the aid of conjecture and assumptions in order to establish conspiracy. (Macarian v. People of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 215104, March 18, 2021, First Division)
67. There was no conspiracy among Ramon, Atty. Debuque, and other accused. Implied conspiracy, as correctly
ruled by the CA, must be proved through the mode and manner of the commission of the offense, or from the
acts of the accused before, during and after the commission of the crime indubitably pointing to a joint purpose,
a concert of action, and a community of action. Here, it was not shown that Ramon performed any overt act in
consonance with Atty. Debuque’s intent to defraud Nilson. That Ramon and the other accused were relatives
of Atty. Debuque and incorporators and officers of ILC, standing alone, would not suffice to warrant the finding
of implied conspiracy absent the commission of an act in furtherance of a joint purpose or community of
interest with Atty. Debuque. Being incorporators and officers of a corporation does not automatically connote
conspiracy. (Debuque v. Nilson, G.R No. 191718, May 10, 2021, Third Division)
68. Conspiracy attended the killing of SPO1 Rufino. The RTC and the CA correctly inferred from the collective acts
of accused-appellants that conspiracy exists, thus: “[F]irst, accused-appellants Roberto and Ronnie were the
ones who held SPO1 Rufino; second, accused-appellants Roberto and Rolly each used knives, while accused-
appellants Ronnie and Roger used a screwdriver and a broken bottle, respectively, in stabbing the victim to
death; third, accused-appellant Ronnie stabbed SPO1 Rufino in the forehead, while accused-appellants Roberto,
Rolly, and Roger stabbed the left and back portions of SPO1 Rufino's torso; and last, several wounds were
suffered by SPO1 Rufino which resulted in his untimely death. As can be inferred from these acts, accused-
appellants clearly manifested a concurrence of their wills, common intent, and design to end the life of SPO1
Rufino. Therefore, the act of one of the accused-appellants is the act of all accused-appellants, making all of
them guilty of Murder. Undoubtedly, accused-appellants armed with knives, broken bottle, and screwdriver, all
participated in the material execution of the crime by stabbing SPO1 Rufino. Under the circumstances, there is
no evidence to negate their material participation in the killing of the victim. As conspiracy has been adequately
proven in this case, all accused-appellants are considered as co-principals regardless of the extent and character
of their respective blows on the victim.” (People of the Philippines v. Bautista, G.R. No. 247961, June 16, 2021,
Third Division)
69. The prosecution failed to establish conspiracy. From the testimony of AAA, the alleged participation of accused-
appellants cannot be ascertained with certainty, as AAA merely saw them running away from the scene of the
crime. Although there was a positive identification of accused-appellants, there was no conclusive evidence to
prove the existence of conspiracy among the accused or was there any overt act on the part of accused-
appellants as to the commission of the crime. As testified by AAA, she only saw accused-appellants running
away after De Guzman shot her husband. As the Court has said, conspiracy transcends mere companionship
and mere presence at the scene does not in itself amount to conspiracy. Since the prosecution failed to establish
conspiracy with positive and conclusive evidence, necessarily, herein accused-appellants must be acquitted of
the crimes charged. (People of the Philippines v. De Guzman, G.R. No. 241248, June 23, 2021, Third Division)
70. The RTC and the CA were correct in ruling that conspiracy exists in this case. In the present case, the acts of
accused-appellants before, during, and after the commission of the crime clearly show that they were animated
by the same purpose of killing Bulatao. It does not matter that it was only Mendoza who actually triggered the

Justifying Circumstances 27
gun and shot Bulatao. Here, accused-appellants were present during the planning stages of the crime.
Subsequently, upon orders of Mendoza, and on separate days, Ferrer, Ocumen, Roderick, Palisoc, and Sapiera,
conducted surveillance on Bulatao. On the day of the shooting, Mendoza was the designated gunman, while
Ocumen, Palisoc, and Ferrer acted as lookouts. After Bulatao was shot, Mendoza, Roderick, and Sapiera
continued firing their guns in the air, in an apparent effort to create fear and panic among the witnesses.
Mendoza then escaped by riding the motorcycle driven by Sapiera, while Ferrer, Ocumen, and Palisoc also left
the scene by riding a tricycle driven by Ocumen. After the incident, they all met at the house of Mendoza's wife,
where they drank and celebrated. Clearly, there was unity of action and purposes among the accused in killing
Bulatao. (People of the Philippines v. Mendoza, G.R. No. 237215, June 28, 2021, Third Division)
71. The prosecution was able to establish beyond reasonable doubt the conspiracy between accused-appellants
and their co-accused Ugat, Jr. The RTC correctly found that conspiracy existed between the principals on the
totality of the circumstances of the instant case, thus: “Proof of their agreement is inferred from their conduct
before, during and after the commission of the crime disclosing a common understanding between them
relative to its commission. They showed coordination in the abduction, the collection of ransom and detention
of their victim which thus indubitably proved such conspiracy. Accused Sariego and Demetilla were caught
inside the safehouse in Kamias, Quezon City where Venilda Ho was detained. They were guarding her to
facilitate the successful denouement of the crime of kidnapping for ransom. Although it would appear that their
participation was that they merely prevented the victim from escaping, they too had a hand in the kidnapping
for ransom crime in order that she may secure her own release. Accused Ugat, Galicia, Chiva and Villarino were
together in abducting the victim. There is no doubt that they are principals by direct participation. Accused
Portugal was identified as the person who drove the Mitsubishi Adventure on the first pay-off. All thus,
cooperated in the execution of the crime.” (People of the Philippines v. Galicia, G.R. No. 238911, June 28, 2021,
Third Division)
J U S TIFY IN G C IR C U MS TAN C ES
1. An accused who pleads a justifying circumstance under Article 11 of the RPC admits to the commission of acts,
which would otherwise engender criminal liability. However, he asserts that he is justified in committing the
acts. In the process of proving a justifying circumstance, the accused risks admitting the imputed acts, which
may justify the existence of an offense were it not for the exculpating facts. Conviction follows if the evidence
for the accused fails to prove the existence of justifying circumstance. (Velasquez and Velasquez v. People of
the Philippines, G.R. No. 195021, March 15, 2017, Second Division)
SELF-DEFENSE
BURDEN AND QUANTUM OF PROOF

1. The elements of self-defense are established in this case. First, the utterance of Sumugat to kill petitioner
coupled by his act of aiming a gun at him, and his continued thrusting of the chainsaw that hit petitioner’s palm
constitute unlawful aggression. Second, the gun which petitioner grabbed from the victim was the only weapon
available to him. In addition, petitioner did not imemdiately shoot the victim when he successfully took
possession of the gun. He shot Sumugat only when the latter continued to attack him with the chainsaw.
Furthermore, petitioner’s first shot wounded the victim on the left foot and it was only when he was slashed
by the chainsaw on his left hand that petitioner fired the fatal shot. Finally, there is lack of sufficient provocation
on petitioner’s part as his act of telling the victim not to cut the trunk of the uprooted tree could hardly be
considered provocation. (Remegio v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 196945, September 27, 2017, Third
Division)
2. When the accused invokes self-defense, he or she has the burden to prove such justifying circumstance by clear
and convincing evidence. Here, the defense miserably failed to discharge its burden to prove self-defense. Its
defenses of denial and self-defense were diametrically opposed to each other. In denial, one disavows any
involvement in the crime. In contrast, in claiming self-defense, one admits of his/her participation in the crime
only that it was done in self-defense. Moreover, no specific details on the claim of self-defense were advanced
which, incidentally, was belatedly asserted only during the cross-examination of Jesus. Absent any clear and
convincing evidence to establish self-defense, the same cannot be appreciated in favor of Glen. In view of the
admission on the part of the defense of having killed the victims and the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses categorically and positively identifying Glen as the author of the crime, we entertain no doubt as to
his culpability. (People of the Philippines v. Abina, G.R. No. 220146, April 18, 2018, First Division)
3. Don failed to discharge his burden. All the requisites of self-defense are wanting in this case:
a. First, there is no unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. For unlawful aggression to be present, there
must be real danger to life or personal safety. Accordingly, the accused must establish the concurrence of
the three elements of unlawful aggression, namely: (a) there must be a physical or material attack or
assault; (b) the attack or assault must be actual, or, at least, imminent; and (c) the attack or assault must
be unlawful. None of the elements of unlawful aggression was proven by the defense. Aside from Don's
self-serving statement that it was Manuel who punched and attacked him, not one of the persons present

at the incident corroborated his account. Neither did he present any medical record showing that he
sustained any injuries as the result of the attack by Manuel.
b. Second, in the absence of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, the second requisite of self-defense
could not have been present. Even assuming that there was unlawful aggression, the means employed by
Don in repelling the alleged attack by Manuel was not reasonably necessary. Manuel was unarmed and had
his back turned while Don used a bladed weapon to "repel the attack" and stab Manuel repeatedly. Thus,
the CA was correct in ruling that the means employed by Don in repelling the attack was unreasonable.
c. Lastly, the third requisite requires the person mounting a defense to be reasonably blameless. He or she
must not have antagonized or incited the attacker into launching an assault. In this case, Don was not
entirely blameless as the reason why Manuel scolded him was because he was breaking things and making
unnecessary disturbance. It was also Don who suddenly rushed to the victim and stabbed the latter several
times in the chest. In addition, there was no sufficient provocation on the part of Manuel. Based on the
account of the witnesses of the prosecution, Manuel merely implored Don to refrain from breaking things
and making unnecessary disturbance. In fact, when Don uttered harsh words against Manuel, the latter did
not make a comment and instead turned his back from the former. (People of the Philippines v. Vega, G.R.
No. 216018, March 27, 2019, Second Division)
4. The justifying circumstances of self-defense and defense of a relative were present when Apolinario shot Lorico.
In this case, there was unlawful aggression when Lorico, knife in hand, with eyes blazing, and shouting, rushed
towards Apolinario and Jessica. It must be stressed that Lorico’s threat to inflict harm came just moments after
Apolinario was able to repel Crisanto’s unlawful aggression. In fact, Jessica was then still lying on the floor and
was in no position to defend herself from further unlawful assault. Thus, when Lorico appeared and was about
to attack them, even ignoring his command to stop his advance, Apolinario had no reason to believe that the
former was only threatening them. To his mind, the threat posed by Lorico is real and serious and he had to act
swiftly in order to repel it. Likewise, Apolinario, in shooting Lorico, did not exceed the necessary force to repel
the former’s attack. It must be reiterated that Apolinario and Jessica have just been through a life-threatening
situation when Lorico suddenly appeared and was ready to deliver fatal blows. Jessica was in no condition to
defend herself. As such, it was up to Apolinario to fend off the sudden aggression. Again, the weapon which
was available to Apolinario at that time was his service pistol. In such a scenario, to insist that Apolinario could
have disable Lorico by shooting the latter’s arm or leg would certainly be excessive. Such suggestion would
entail for Apolinario to shoot with accuracy and good concentration, which the Court does not believe he was
capable to or was in condition to do at that time. In any case, Apolinario declared that he was a police officer
and ordered Lorico to stop, yet the latter still proceeded with his assault. Lastly, there was no sufficient
provocation on the part of Apolinario. Apolinario admitted that he cursed back at Lorico. Nevertheless, the
curses are not sufficient enough for Lorico and Crisanto to invade a home and harm the people therein.
Apolinario’s expletives may have been offensive, but it certainly could not be considered a sufficient
inducement for its recipient to act violently and attack with bladed weapons. (Bayle v. People of the Philippines,
G.R. No. 210975, March 11, 2020, First Division)
5. An accused’s invocation of the justifying circumstance of self-defense frees the prosecution from the burden of
proving that the accused committed the offense charged. The burden shifts to the accused to prove the
justifying circumstance with clear and convincing evidence. (People of the Philippines v. Antonio, G.R. No.
229349, January 29, 2020, Third Division)
UNLAWFUL AGGRESSION
1. Casas cannot claim self-defense. There can be no self-defense unless the victim committed unlawful aggression
against the person who resorted to self-defense. As shown by the records, it was Cases who was actually the
aggressor, as he was the one who wielded a knife, brought it to bear on Eligio, then on Joel as he lay prostrate,
and again Eligio as he was fleeing. Being the party initiating the attack, and overbearing with a deadly weapon,
Casas cannot successfully claim that there was unlawful aggression. (People of the Philippines v. Casas, G.R. No.
212565, February 25, 2015, First Division)
2. Unlawful aggression is a condition sine qua non for self-defense to be upheld. Unlawful aggression is of two
kinds: (a) actual or material unlawful aggression; and (b) imminent unlawful aggression
a. Actual or material unlawful aggression means an attack with physical force or with a weapon, an offensive
act that positively determines the intent of the aggressor or to cause the injury.
b. Imminent unlawful aggression means an attack that is impending or at the point of happening; it must not
consist in a mere threatening attitude, nor must it be merely imaginary, but must be offensive and
positively strong. (People of the Philippines v. Dulin, G.R. No. 171284, June 29, 2015, First Division; People
of the Philippines v. Manzano, Jr., G.R. No. 217974, March 5, 2018, Third Division)
3. Dulin cannot claim incomplete self-defense because he had not credibly established that the victim had
committed unlawful aggression against him. With the victim’s aggression having already ceased from the
moment that Dulin divested him of the weapon, there would not be any incomplete self-defense. (People of
the Philippines v. Dulin, G.R. No. 171284, June 29, 2015, First Division)

4. There was still unlawful aggression after Cristina disarmed her husband. It must be noted that after she was
able to take hold of the knife from her husband, he did not stand down but, instead, continued to move towards
despite plea that he should not come nearer. He grabbed her by the arm which could have precipitated her
well-grounded belief that her life was still in danger if he would be able wrest the weapon from her. It was not
farfetched to presume that, being stronger, he could have easily overpowered her and eventually killed her.
a. It would have been a different story if Gerry, after dropping knife, walked away and Cristina still went after
him. If that were the case, she could not assert self-defense as she was already in relation for the earlier
aggression. (People of the Philippines v. Samson, G.R. No. 214883, September 2, 2015, Second Division)
5. Tuardon’s story of self-defense is incredulous. He claimed that he and Dagunan were standing beside each
other while urinating. Dagunan was near Tuardon’s left side; meaning, Tuardon was on the right side of
Dagunan. From their relative positions, according to Tuardon, Dagunan was about to draw his gun, holstered at
his right waist, when Tuardon stopped him using his left hand. And from this position, Tuardon could certainly
pin Dagunan to the wall. It is at this point that the version of the defense ceases to be believable. If Tuardon’s
story is to be believed, then the point of entry of the bullet should be at the right side of Dagunan’s head. This,
was however, belied by the findings of Dr. Ayala in his medico-legal report that Dagunan was shot at the base
of his head through and through causing brain tissue damage. Further, as illustrated in the sketch attached to
the medico-legal report, the point of entry of the bullet which killed Dagunan was at the back-left portion of his
head and the point of entry was at the right portion of his head. (People of the Philippines v. Tuardon, G.R. No.
6. Self-defense is an affirmative allegation and offers exculpation from liability only if satisfactorily proved. Having
admitted the shooting of the victims, the burden shifted to Bugarin to prove that he indeed acted in self-defense
by establishing the following with clear and convincing evidence: (a) unlawful aggression on the part of the
victims; (b) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the aggression; and (c) lack of
sufficient provocation on his party. Bugarin, however, miserably failed to discharge this burden. One who admits
killing or fatally injuring another in the name of self-defense bears the burden of proving the aforementioned
elements. While all three elements must concur, self-defense relies first and foremost on proof of unlawful
aggression on the part of the victim. If no unlawful aggression is proved, no self-defense may be successfully
pleaded. Contrary to his claims, the evidence of the case shows that there was no unlawful aggression on the
part of the victims.
a. Self-defense cannot be justifiably appreciated when it is extremely doubtful by itself. Indeed, in invoking
self-defense, the burden of evidence is shifted and the accused claiming self-defense must rely on the
strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecution. In this case, Bugarin failed to
sufficiently establish that Esmeraldo was actually carrying three firearms and that he attempted to pull
out one of his guns to shoot him. However, when asked what happened to the other firearms or where
they when Esmeraldo pulled out one of the guns, Bugarin answered that he did not know. Also, Anecita
herself testified that she did not see Esmeraldo carrying anything. He merely held the railing of their gate
when Bugarin went out of their house and shot him. Indeed, nothing in this act would reveal that there
was unlawful aggression on Esmeraldo’s part. Maria Glen also never actually struck or attempted to strike
Anecita with the steel pipe. Neither can Cristito’s alleged act of trying to slap Bugarin and thereafter staring
at the wounded body of his body on the ground be considered unlawful aggession that he must necessarily
repel. Bugarin simply assumed and imagined that Cristito would get his son’s gun to shoot him. (People of
the Philippines v. Bugarin, G.R. No. 224900, March 15, 2017, Second Division)
7. While the victim may be said to have initiated the confrontation, the former was not subjected to an unlawful
aggression within the legal meaning of the phrase. The alleged assault did not come as a surprise, as it was
preceded by a heated exchange of words between the two parties who had a history of animosity. Moreover,
the alleged drawing of a knife by the victim could not have placed the life of appellant in imminent danger. The
former might have done it only to threaten or intimidate the latter. (People of the Philippines v. Raytos, G.R.
No. 225623, June 7, 2017, First Division)
8. Based on the records and the evidence adduced by both parties, it is indisputable that Sabida failed to show
that Mawac exhibited unlawful aggression against him. Being the party initiating the attack and armed with a
deadly weapon, Sabida cannot successfully claim that there was unlawful aggression. Sabida’s self-serving claim
of self-defense coupled with the fact that he did not sustain any injury from his supposed attacker fails to
support any claim of unlawful aggression. (People of the Philippines v. Sabida, G.R. No. 208359, June 19, 2017,
Third Division)
9. The alleged attack coming from the victim, where the latter chased them and grabbed and kicked Jimmy, is not
the kind of attack that would put the person of the accused-appellants in peril. Indeed, despite the victim’s
bigger physical built, the fact that Gio, who was armed with an ice pick, already came to Jimmy’s rescue, who
notably was also armed with a Batangas knife and who had already hit the victim with a tree branch, indicates
that the threat from the supposed aggression already ceased to exist. More so, when Gio already stabbed the
victim with the ice pick causing the latter to fall on the ground, there was no more aggression to prevent or
repel. It, thus, became unnecessary for the accused-appellants to continue to inflict injuries and/or stab the

fallen victim, which caused his death. Moreover, the perceived threat to their lives due to the victim’s bigger
built and alleged knowledge of martial arts, is merely based on accused-appellants’ speculation and
imagination, not proven to be real nor imminent. (People of the Philippines v. Cosgafa, G.R. No. 218250, July
10. In Criminal Case No. 1631, the victim, Nonilon, was stabbed by appellant five times which caused Nonilon’s
death. When appellant started attacking Nonilon, the latter was already in a kneeling position with his hands
raised, indicating a position of surrender. However, appellant still hacked Nonilon, hitting him on his left
forearm. Thereafter, appellant stabbed Nonilon four more times on the right and left chest. Clearly, even if
there might be unlawful aggression on the part of Nonilon at the start, it already ceased when Nonilon ran away
and when appellant caught up with him. Nonilon, who was already kneeling with his hands raised, was quiet
helpless when appellant started stabbing him. At that moment, there was no unlawful aggression on the part
of Nonilon which amounts to actual or imminent threat to the life of appellant. Thus, the first element of
unlawful aggression is already lacking in this case. Appellant’s claim that Nonilon tried to stab him first with a
knife was belied by the testimony of another defense witness who stated that Nonilon was armed only with a
piece of wood which he picked up while running after appellant. (People of the Philippines v. Gallanosa, Jr., G.R.
No. 219885, July 17, 2017, Second Division)
11. Tica went beyond the call of self-preservation when he proceeded to inflict excessive, atrocious, and fatal
injuries to Intia, even when the allegedly unlawful aggression had already ceased the night before. Accordingly,
it was not an act of self-defense but an act of retaliation on the part of Tica. (People of the Philippines v. Tica,
12. Petitioner did not persuasively show that Amerilla had committed unlawful aggression against him as to
endanger his life and limb. The petitioner’s insistence that Amerilla had been the first to aim and fire his gun
remained uncorroborated. Verily, the claim of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim was also weak due
mainly to the failure to recover the victim’s alleged gun in the place where the shooting happened during the
ensuing investigation. Moreover, that the petitioner allegedly retaliated in his defense by firing his own gun
after the victim had supposedly fired at him once was rendered improbable by his immediately running away
from the scene of the shooting and fleeing towards his house instead of going towards the victim whom he
professed not have then recognized. The improbability rested on his being the incumbent barangay chairman
of the place, and, as such, had the heavy responsibility of keeping the peace and maintaining order thereat.
More telling was the established the fact that even before Amerilla came around, the petitioner had already
been firing his gun in order to scare Andres. (Sombilon v. People of the Philippines, September 25, 2017, Third
Division)
13. Unlawful aggression ceased to exist when Grimaldo was disarmed and he had attempted to escape from Duran
and sought help from his godmother, Quilana, as the altercation took place on the street in front of her house.
Thus, at the time that Duran shot Grimaldo, there was no unlawful aggression on the part of the latter. (People
of the Philippines v. Duran, G.R. No. 215748, November 20, 2017, Second Division)
14. Self-defense was not established since there was no unlawful aggression. Prior to the stabbing incident, an
altercation ensued between Nelson and Ramelo, which altercation ceased due to Pilapil’s intervention. In fact,
Ramelo even apologized to Nelson after they were separated. Evidently, any unlawful aggression which Nelson
may have perpetrated had effectively terminated. (People of the Philippines v. Ramelo, G.R. No. 224888,
November 22, 2017, Third Division)
15. The “looming” threat perceived by accused-appellant nor the remarks overheard by his nephew satisfies the
requirement of an actual, menacing, sudden, and expected danger to accused-appellant’s life. To constitute
imminent unlawful aggression, the attack must be at the point of happening and must not be imaginary or
consist in a mere threatening attitude. Furthermore, as the trial court found, the supposed threat overheard by
Adelardo actually made no specific or definite reference to accused-appellant. Thus, there was no real peril to
accused-appellant’s life when he killed Danilo. (People of the Philippines v. PFC Reyes, G.R. No. 224498, January
11, 2018, First Division)
16. Accused-appellant avers that in self-defense, he fired shots at Danilo, hitting the ring finger of the latter's right
hand which supposedly held a gun pointed at him. Accused-appellant thus argues that the gunshot wound
through Danilo's right ring finger as well as the lacerated wounds on his right arm prove that Danilo was in the
act of shooting and guilty of unlawful aggression. The Court is not persuaded. Said injuries do not conclusively
prove accused-appellant's theory of unlawful aggression, and accused-appellant has offered no credible
evidence to convince the Court otherwise. The testimonies of accused-appellant's own witnesses failed to
establish that the victim was aiming a gun at him. Furthermore, the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses
consistently showed that the victim was neither holding a gun nor pointing one at accused-appellant. Plainly
taken, therefore, the argument is baseless and self-serving. Besides, accused-appellant's contention only serves
to prove that the other gunshots, to the victim's head and clavicle, both fatal, were neither necessary nor

justified in the name of self-defense. (People of the Philippines v. PFC Reyes, G.R. No. 224498, January 11, 2018,
First Division)
17. Endaya miserably failed to establish unlawful aggression on the part of De Torres and/or the victims. Aside from
their absurdity, Endaya's claims are unsubstantiated by any physical evidence. The anatomical sketch, which
was taken the day after the incident, bore nothing which would be consistent with his claims that De Torres
hacked him several times. The anatomical sketch made no mention of any hack wound on Endaya's face, back,
shoulder, or any other part of his body, but merely indicated that Endaya sustained scratches, the gravest of
which being a laceration on his left hand. Contrary to his claims, these minor injuries suggest that they may
have been inflicted by Jocelyn and Marietta who resisted the attacks of their ruthless assailant. Thus, the Court
could not simply accept Endaya's bare claim that he was hacked by De Torres several times considering the
absence of wounds matching his allegation.
a. Assuming arguendo that there was indeed unlawful aggression on the part of De Torres and/or any of the
two victims, the defense failed to sufficiently explain how the victims ended up with four (4) stab wounds
each, nor to establish that the means employed by Endaya to repel the alleged unlawful aggression was
reasonable and necessary. Indeed, Endaya admitted that he stabbed Jocelyn at least twice. The fact that
the victims suffered multiple stab wounds – four each – which caused their deaths belies and negates
Endaya's claim of self-defense. If at all, these stab wounds demonstrate a criminal mind resolved to end
the life of the victims. (People of the Philippines v. Endaya, Jr., G.R. No. 225745, February 28, 2018, Third
Division)
18. Ronillo's plea of self-defense was belied by the physical evidence in the case at bench tending to show that
Lopez, Sr. did not commit unlawful aggression against said appellant. Indeed, had Lopez, Sr. mauled and
attacked Ronillo, the latter would have sustained some injury from the aggression. It remains, however, that no
injury of any kind or gravity was found on the person of Ronillo when he was brought to the Las Piñas City Health
Center by his arresting officer, PO2 Marcelino Fuller, for medical examination. The attending physician, Dr.
Joseph Aron Rey I. Manapsal (Dr. Manapsal), testified that after examining Ronillo, he found that the latter has
no external signs of physical injuries and such diagnosis was reflected in the Medical Certificate dated May 16,
2014 he issued. It is important to point out also that no medication was applied or prescribed by Dr. Manapsal
on Ronillo which further confirmed that such injuries never existed. Even granting arguendo that Ronillo
suffered injuries as claimed by the defense, such injuries were surely not serious or severe as it was not even
detected by Dr. Manapsal. The superficiality of the injuries was not an indication that appellant's life and limb
were in actual peril. In stark contrast, Lopez, Sr. suffered multiple injuries consisting of an abrasion on the
forehead, an abrasion on the left eyebrow, a hematoma on the right hand, contusion and abrasion on the right
leg and a stab wound on the chest as shown in the Medico Legal Report No. A-14-299. Prosecution witness PSI
Reah Cornelio testified that she examined the cadaver of Lopez, Sr. and noted that the cause of his death was
the single stab wound on the victim's chest because it pierced the left lung, pericardial sac and heart and
fractured the ribs. PSI Cornelio further testified that the hematoma may have been caused by punching, while
the abrasion on the forehead and left eyebrow may have been caused by fist blows. Taken in the light of the
foregoing, this Court is convinced that Lopez, Sr. was by no means the unlawful aggressor. We consider as
significant the means used by Ronillo, the gravity and location of the stab wound as well as the abrasions,
contusion and hematoma sustained by Lopez, Sr. which revealed his intent to kill, not merely an effort to
prevent or repel an alleged attack from said victim. The nature and location of the victim's wound manifest
appellant's resolve to end the life of the victim, and not just to defend himself. In any event, the question as to
who between the accused and the victim was the unlawful aggressor was a question of fact best addressed to
and left with the trial court for determination based on the evidence on record. In the case at bench, the RTC
found appellant Ronillo to be the unlawful aggressor. (People of the Philippines v. Lopez, Jr., G.R. No. 232247,
April 23, 2018, Second Division)
19. After a thorough review of the records, the Court finds that appellant failed to discharge the burden of proving
that the unlawful aggression had originated from the victim. First, it is undisputed that appellant boarded a
motorcycle and fled the situs criminis immediately after stabbing the victim at the back. Flight is a veritable
badge of guilt and negates the plea of self-defense. Second, the location, nature and seriousness of the wound
sustained by the victim is inconsistent with self-defense; rather, these factors indicate a determined effort to
kill. (People of the Philippines v. Japag and Liporada, G.R. No. 223155, July 23, 2018, First Division)
20. Since it is duly established that it was accused-appellant who attacked the victim, then no unlawful aggression
could be attributed to the victim. Consequently, his claim of self-defense must fail. (People of the Philippines v.
Caliao, G.R. No. 226392, July 23, 2018, Third Division)
21. The Court finds that Arca committed continuous and persistent unlawful aggression against Olarbe and his
common-law spouse that lasted from the moment he forcibly barged into the house and brandished his gun
until he assaulted Olarbe's common-law spouse with the bolo. Such armed assault was not a mere threatening
act. Olarbe was justified in believing his and his common-law spouse's lives to be in extreme danger from Arca
who had just fired his gun in anger outside their home and whose threats to kill could not be considered idle in
the light of his having forced himself upon their home. The imminent threat to life was positively strong enough

to induce Olarbe to act promptly to repel the unlawful and unprovoked aggression. For Olarbe to hesitate to
act as he had done would have cost him his own life. Arca's being dispossessed of his gun did not terminate the
aggression, for, although he had been hit on the head, he quickly reached for the bolo and turned his assault
towards Olarbe's common-law spouse. Olarbe was again forced to struggle for control of the bolo. The swiftness
of the action heightened Olarbe's sense that the danger to their lives was present and imminent. (People of the
Philippines v. Olarbe, G.R. No. 227421, July 23, 2018, Third Division)
22. Armando failed to discharge his burden. All the requisites of self-defense are wanting in this case. First, there is
no unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. For unlawful aggression to be present, there must be real
danger to life or personal safety. Accordingly, the accused must establish the concurrence of the three elements
of unlawful aggression, namely: (a) there must be a physical or material attack or assault; (b) the attack or
assault must be actual, or, at least, imminent; and (c) the attack or assault must be unlawful. None of the
elements of unlawful aggression was proven by the defense. Guevarra's act of pointing or cursing at Armando,
not followed by other acts, is insufficient to constitute unlawful aggression. Thus, the CA is correct in ruling that
there was no evidence proving the gravity of the utterances and the actuations allegedly made by Guevarra
that would have indicated his wrongful intent to harm Armando. Second, in the absence of unlawful aggression
on the part of the victim, the second requisite of self-defense could not have been present. Records show that
Guevarra was unarmed and it was Armando who approached the former armed with a knife. Assuming that
Guevarra had indeed shouted and cursed at him and drew out a knife, it was still not reasonably necessary for
Armando to stab the victim. Furthermore, Armando stabbed the victim three times, the last wound inflicted
when Guevarra was already on the ground asking for help. Thus, the CA was correct in ruling that the means
employed by Armando in repelling the attack was unreasonable. Lastly, the third requisite requires the person
mounting a defense to be reasonably blameless. He or she must not have antagonized or incited the attacker
into launching an assault. In this case, records show that it was actually Armando who sought out and
approached the victim with a knife. It was Armando who initiated the assault. Hence, the Court finds that
Armando failed to prove that he acted in self-defense. (People of the Philippines v. Bagabay, G.R. No. 236297,
23. In this case, the Court agrees with the courts a quo that Rodel failed to discharge his burden. Rodel failed to
show by clear and convincing evidence that Enrique committed unlawful aggression by hurling invectives at him
and attempting to stab him. Rodel's self-serving and uncorroborated claim pales in comparison to and loses
probative value when compared to the positive testimony of the prosecution's witnesses, who identified the
accused as the one who was armed with a fan knife and stabbed the victim. The Court, in Dela Cruz v. People,
ruled that the plea of self-defense cannot be justifiably entertained where it is uncorroborated by any separate
competent evidence and is in itself extremely doubtful. (People of the Philippines v. Magbuhos, G.R. No.
227865, November 7, 2018, Second Division)
24. It becomes all too apparent that the evidence on record does not support Miranda's contention that Pilo
employed unlawful aggression against him. It must be remembered that Pilo was merely throwing stones at the
house of Miranda. Miranda himself admitted during the trial that Pilo did not throw stones at him, much less,
utter any invectives, or threatening words against him. In fact, the stones Pilo threw merely hit Miranda's roof
and door. Equally telling is the fact that when Miranda asked Pilo why he was throwing stones, the latter did
not respond but simply remained mum, and threw a stone at Miranda's iron door. Miranda even further
narrated that after throwing stones, Pilo even approached him, which made him believe that Pilo was trying to
make peace with him. This certainly belies an impending threat to Miranda's life. It is all too apparent that
Miranda's life was not in grave peril. The stones were never directed against Miranda. More than this, Miranda
even believed that Pilo was going to make peace with him. Obviously, Miranda was certainly not faced with any
actual, sudden, unexpected or imminent danger for him to have the need to defend himself. Moreover, the
Court cannot lose sight of the fact that Miranda hacked Pilo four times, when the latter was completely
defenseless. This continuous hacking by Miranda constitutes force beyond what is reasonably required to repel
the private complainant's attack—and is certainly unjustified. Notably, in Espinosa v. People, which also involves
the continuous hacking by the accused even after the aggressor had been neutralized, the Court stressed that
"the act of the accused in repeatedly hacking the victim was in no way a reasonable and necessary means of
repelling the aggression allegedly initiated by the latter."
a. Additionally, even assuming for the sake of argument that Pilo stooped down to the ground, which
Miranda perceived as a threat that Pilo was going to pick up a stone, there is absolutely nothing life-
threatening in such a situation. It must be emphasized that imminent unlawful aggression must not be a
mere threatening attitude of the victim. Undoubtedly, Pilo's act of simply stooping down to the ground
was in no way a threat to Miranda's life.
b. It, likewise, bears stressing that Miranda cannot seek exoneration on the simple pretext that the attack
was initiated by Pilo. Suffice to say, in the case of People v. Dulin, the Court held that the fact that the
victim was the initial aggressor does not ipso facto show that there was unlawful aggression. The Court
elucidated that although the victim may have been the initial aggressor, he ceased to be the aggressor as
soon as he was dispossessed of the weapon. Whatever the accused did thereafter is no longer self-
defense, but retaliation, which is not the same as self-defense. In retaliation, the aggression that the victim
started already ceased when the accused attacked him, but in self-defense, the aggression was still

continuing when the accused injured the aggressor. In the instant case, Miranda continued to hack Pilo
even after the latter stopped throwing stones. Plainly, Miranda's act constituted a retaliation against Pilo.
Certainly at this point, Miranda was no longer motivated by the lawful desire of defending himself, but of
the evil intent of retaliating and harming Pilo. (Miranda v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 234528,
January 23, 2019, Third Division)
25. The fact that Benjamin did not testify to having seen appellant deliver the killing blow is not fatal to the
prosecution's case. His testimony that Roger suddenly fell on the ground is consistent with the prosecution's
theory that there was no unlawful aggression which emanated from the victim; there was nothing for appellant
to repel or defend himself from. In the absence of unlawful aggression attributable to Roger, appellant's claim
of self-defense is unavailing. (People of the Philippines v. Doca, G.R. No. 233479, October 16, 2019, Second
Division)
26. There was no unlawful aggression. Rebato’s testimony provides that after he was struck with water pump pipes
outside the bakery, he ran inside the bakery where Gunda handed him the dipang. There is nothing to show
that Remo followed him inside the bakery. Stated differently, when Rebato ran to the bakery where Gunda
handed him the dipang, Remo did not follow him inside. Instead of remaining inside the bakery to keep himself
safe from Remo, Jimmy, and Jomar, Rebato used the dipang handed to him to harm Remo. In this case, Rebato
caused harm to Remo not as an act of self-defense, but as an act of vengeance. When Rebato went inside the
bakery and Remo neither followed Rebato inside the bakery nor committed any acts of unlawful aggression,
Remo did not anymore pose any imminent threat against Rebato. At this point, the unlawful aggression on
Remo’s part has already ceased. (People of the Philippines v. Gunda, G.R. No. 242883, September 3, 2020, First
Division)
27. The claim of self-defense is unmeritorious since it was not shown that it was Bernardo, the victim, who first
drew a gun. In the absence of unlawful aggression on the part of Bernardo, the plea of self-defense must
necessarily fail. (PO2 Cruz v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 216642, September 8, 2020, First Division)
28. Armando’s claim of self-defense is unbelievable. His tale that Lilia and Ruben ganged up on him and attacked
him first is self-serving, uncorroborated, and belied by the medical records. Lilia’s autopsy indicates that she
died, due to massive bleeding caused by the wounds inflicted by Armando. Also, Ruben suffered six hacking
wounds that resulted to severe blood loss and may have caused his untimely demise, if not for the prompt
medical attention he received. On the other hand, Armando emerged ou of the alleged fight practically
unscathed. His wounds were described as “superficial” and “not fatal.” In this case, Armando attacked Lilia and
Ruben after they had peacefully parted ways. Certainly, at this point, Armando was no longer motivated by a
legitimate impulse to defend himself, but was animated with an evil desire to harm Lilia and Ruben.
a. At any rate, even assuming arguendo that Lilia initiated the attack as Armando insists, suffice to say, in the
case of People v. Dulin, the Court declared that the fact that the victim was the initial aggressor does not
ipso facto prove unlawful aggression. Although the victim may have initiated the attack, he ceased to be
the aggressor as soon as he was dispossessed of the weapon. Any subsequent act on the part of the
accused is no longer self-defense, but retaliation. As guided by Velasquez v. People, the assault inflicted by
Armando was glaringly in excess of what would have sufficed to neutralize the spouses. (People of the
Philippines v. Archivido, G.R. No. 233085, September 21, 2020, Third Division)
29. Appellant utterly failed to prove the presence of unlawful aggression. The records reveal that Archie did not
perform any actual or imminent attack upon appellant. Even assuming that he had a knife, as appellant claims,
mere possession of a weapon is not tantamount to unlawful aggression. Imminent unlawful aggression means
an attack that is impending or at the point of happening; it must not consist in a mere threatening or
intimidating attitude, nor must it be merely imaginary, but must be offensive, menacing and positively strong,
manifestly showing the wrongful intent to cause injury. Even the cocking of a rifle without aiming the firearm
at any particular target is not sufficient to conclude that one’s life was in imminent danger. Hence, a threat,
even if made with a weapon, or the belief that a person was about to be attacked, is not sufficient. It is necessary
that the intent be ostensibly revealed by an ac of aggression or by some external acts showing the
commencement of actual and material unlawful aggression. Absent unlawful aggression, there is no longer any
need to determine the presence of the other elements of self-defense. (People of the Philippines v. Maghuyop,
G.R. No. 242942, October 5, 2020, First Division)
30. Accused-appellants failed to establish that there was unlawful aggression on the part of Romy to justify the
criminal act done by them. Based on the testimonies of Manuel and Poly, Romy was already unarmed when
Poly stabbed him. Manuel and Romy were grappling with each other when Poly stabbed Romy. There was no
actual or imminent threat to the life, limbe, or right of Manuel or Poly. Manuel testified that while they were
wrestling with each other, there were times that he was on top of Romy and that Romy was on his top. This
proves that both of them had equal strength in fighting each other and that Romy did not show any threat to
him. Manuel did not testify that he was having a difficult time fighting Romy or that there was imminent peril
to his life or limb. These circumstances belie the claim that there was unlawful aggression from the victim.

a. Unlawful aggression presupposes an actual, sudden, and unexpected attack or imminent danger thereof,
and not merely a threatening or intimidating attitude. In this case, the unlawful aggression ceased when
Manuel was able to disarm Romy and they began to grapple with each other. Manuel and Poly’s acts of
attacking Romy amounted to retaliation, wherein the aggression that was begun by the injured party
already ceased to exist when the accused attacked him. Thus, there was no unlawful aggression anymore
on the part of the deceased.
b. Further, Poly continued to stab Romy on his chest despite the latter not having anything to defend himself
from such attack. Based from Poly’s testimony, he initially stabbed Romy on the back while Romy and
Manuel were grappling with each other. When Romy stood up and faced him, he continued to stab Romy
in the chest, not remembering how many stabs he inflicted to the victim. As mentioned, the unlawful
aggression already ceased to exist when Manuel was able to disarm Romy, thus Poly’s attacks to the victim
was not reasonably necessary to prevent or repel the unlawful aggression. (People of the Philippines v.
Catulang, G.R. No. 245969, November 3, 2020, First Division)
31. The CA and the RTC correctly found that petitioners failed to discharge the burden of proving unlawful
aggression on the part of Deang. Petitioners failed to present corroborating evidence other than their self-
serving statements that it was Deang who was the unlawful aggressor. Petitioners’ bare claim fell short of being
clear and convincing. On the contrary, the prosecution was able to prove through the testimonies of several
witnesses that it was petitioners’ group who was the unlawful aggressor when they first attacked an old man,
then an innocent puto-bumbong vendor and her son, and finally Deang, who was merely performing his job as
a barangay tanod in the area. As a barangay tanod, Deang had the duty to maintain peace and order in the area
and to apprehend petitioners for attacking innocent persons. (Pascual v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No.
32. The attendant circumstances indubitably speak of the real and palpable peril posed by Julwin on the lives and
limbs of petitioner and his father. The peril was certainly far from fiction or imaginary. Records show that stones
were hurled at the roofs of the adjacent hosues of petitioner and his father, Ganal, Sr. Ganal, Sr. went out to
check and saw Angelo in the company of his uncle Julwin – the deceased. The two were in the middle of the
road near the front gate. Ganal, Sr. approached and asked them to go home because his wife was suffering
from hypertension and should not be disturbed. Julwin replied that he did not care if Ganal, Sr.’s wife died, he
would kill all of them, including petitioner. Ganal, Sr. tried to pacify the two, assuring them that they would
settle whatever problem they had the following day. Julwin, then holding palm-sized stones in both hands,
managed to push open the gate. As Ganal, Sr. tried to pull back the gate, Julwin hit him with a stone on the
chest. Ganal, Sr. fell on the plant box made of hollow blocks and passed out. Petitioner, from the main door of
his house, saw what happened. Julwin, who had a knife tucked in his waistband and hold two stones, started to
advance toward him. Petitioner thus rushed inside his house, got his gun, and fired a warning shot into the air.
Ganal, Sr. this time had regained consciousness and hid near the gate. Angelo ran away but Julwin continued to
move closer and closer to petitioner who then was constrained to shoot him once. But still Julwin did not
retreat. He just kept moving closer, this time even threatening to kill everyone inside petitioner’s house.
Responding to the situation, petitioner then used up all the four (4) bullets on Julwin who, as a result, fell dead
just within a meter from petitioner’s door. (Ganal, Jr. v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 248130, December
2, 2020, Second Division)
33. As seen in the inconsistent testimonies of Rolando, it is obvious that there was no unlawful aggression on the
part of the victim. First, during his direct examination, Rolando testified that Delfin cursed at him and then
thereafter drew his gun. However, during this cross-examination, he testified that Delfin did not say anything
and just suddenly drew his gun. Furthermore, while Rolando claimed that Delfin cursed him before drawing his
gun, the testimony of defense witness Renato established that Delfin really did not shout invective words
against Rolando and merely said, “we will eat, Rolando might come.” Second, as pointed out by the RTC,
Rolando was also inconsistent as to the time when Delfin allegedly drew his gun. Third, during his direct
examination, Rolando testified that Delfin had a personal grudge against him. He further stated that there was
an incident prior to January 6, 2002 wherein Delfin hurled invective words against him, but he just ignored
Delfin at that time. However, in his cross-examination, Rolando testified that they had a good relationship prior
to the date of the killing incident. When he was asked by the prosecution why his answer in the cross-
examination was inconsistent with his answer in his direct examination, he simply answered that he does not
remember his previous answer. Fourth, Rolando testified in his direct examination that he used a “fan knife” to
stab Delfin, however during his cross-examination, Rolando said that he used a “gulukan,” not a fan knife. Thus,
it has not been adequately proven that Delfin really drew a gun. In addition, even assuming that Delfin had
really shouted invectives against Rolando, this is not the unlawful aggression contemplated by law. Thus, there
was no physical, actual or even imminent unlawful assault done by Delfin against Rolando, which would justify
Rolando’s act of stabbing Delfin. (People of the Philippines v. Aguila, G.R. No. 238455, December 9, 2020, First
Division)
34. Self-defense does not fly. In his defense, accused-appellant merely alleged that the two persons inside the
house of Tambua were about to attack him; thus he hacked them. This version of accused-appellant is way
contrary to the positive statements of Tambua, who categorically testified that accused-appellant went home

after his argument with Ramen and returned a few minutes later holding a bolo, which he hid behind his back.
He then saw accused-appellant hack Nuevo and Ranien. It is evident that accused-appellant attacked first. Even
assuming that accused-appellant was attacked first, his own testimony that he was able to wrest the bolo from
his attacker showed his disproportionate response to the aggression, meaning there was no reasonable
necessity of the means he used to prevent or repel the aggression. Moreover, the fact that accused-appellant
ran after Tambua, who fled the scene for fear that he might also be hacked proves that accused-appellant was
the aggressor. (People of the Philippines v. Zapata, G.R. No. 241952, March 17, 2021, Third Division)
35. There can be no self-defense, complete or incomplete, without the element of unlawful aggression.
a. The Court notes that Wenceslao threw a stone at petitioner only once and did not use the knife as if to
strike the latter. In fact, petitioner was not actually hit by the stone. There was also no description of the
stone’s size for the Court to conclude that the throwing of the stone was in fact an unlawful aggression on
the part of the victim for purposes of appreciating self-defense. Even assuming, without granting, that
initially there was unlawful aggression on the part of Wenceslao when he threw the stone at, and punched,
petitioner such unlawful aggression ceased to exist when petitioner left, although for the purpose of
getting a bolo. Petitioner failed to establish that at the time he was looking for a bolo, Wenceslao was still
following him, posing an imminent threat to his life.
b. Petitioner claimed that when he saw Wenceslao holding a knife in his left hand, he took a bolo for himself.
Petitioner did not mention how and where he got the bolo. In claiming that he took a bolo, the Court is
not inclined to believe that such bolo was readily available just very close to them for if it were, petitioner
would have picked it up even before facing Wenceslao. More, petitioner was admittedly at a very close
distance from Wenceslao, considering that he was allegedly punched by the latter. Had the bolo been
located just within their very location, and Wenceslao, who was armed with a knife, saw him in the act of
going for such bolo, the former would not have let him pick it up knowing it could, or would, be used
against him. The logical conclusion is that petitioner left and ran to get a bolo. The moment that he left,
unlawful aggression on the part of Wenceslao had already ceased to exist, there being no showing that
Wenceslao followed him and continued with his unlawful aggression. While the initial attack and
aggression came from Wenceslao, petitioner failed to establish that such unlawful aggression still existed
at the very moment he allegedly defended himself from Wenceslao. There was no longer a need for
petitioner to return with a bolo and pursue and kill the victim. Undeniably, when petitioner returned and
slit the neck of Wenceslao, he did so to retaliate. Further, when petitioner returned with a bolo, he
successfully had Wenceslao under his control. He poked his bolo at the neck of Wenceslao and asked what
his problem was, to which the latter allegedly answered that it would take just one bullet to have petitioner
killed. Surely, at this time, unlawful aggression no longer existed on the part of Wenceslao against which
petitioner could have legally defended himself.
c. With respect to Wenceslao’s alleged threat, the same cannot be considered as an unlawful aggression
which would justify petitioner’s act of slitting the neck of the victim. The verbal threat given by Wenceslao
does not appear to be real and imminent. Petitioner failed to establish that Wenceslao actually had in his
possession a gun to shoot him with, pointed at him, when Wenceslao made the threat, so as to claim that
the latter posed an actual and imminent threat to his life. Verily, the Court finds no justification for
petitioner’s actions considering that no unlawful aggression on the part of Wenceslao existed at the time
the former allegedly defended himself from the latter. (Dawat, Jr. v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No.
241126, April 28, 2021, Third Division)
36. There was no unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. On the contrary, it was accused-appellant who was
the aggressor based on the evidence presented. Joy vividly recalled that at the time of the incident, the victim,
his father, was taking his meal, while she was studying just beside the table where his father was. In other
words, Joy testified that it was accused-appellant who suddenly entered the house and stabbed the victim while
the latter was eating his meal before his children. (People of the Philippines v. Lalap, G.R. No. 250895, June 16,
REASONABLE MEANS
1. After taking into account the location and the number of stab wounds sustained by the victim, the accused-
appellant’s claim of self-defense crumbles. To reiterate, the first stab blow hit Severino’s back thus showing
that the victim was stabbed from behind. Then, when the victim was totally caught by surprise with the initial
attack, the second and third stab blows were delivered. Additionally, the number of wounds suffered by
Severino invalidates the accused-appellant’s allegation that he was only defending himself for the number of
wounds inflicted are demonstrative of deliberate and criminal intent to end the life of the victim. (People of the
Philippines v. Roxas, G.R. No. 218396, February 10, 2016, Third Division)
2. Self-defense cannot be appreciated because the second element, which is the presence of a reasonable
necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it, is absent. It should be noted that there is intrinsic
disproportion between a knife and a belt buckle. In addition, the depth and number of the wounds inflicted by
the accused to the victim tell that the thrusts were all meant to kill, not merely disable the victim. (Nadyahan v.
People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 193134, March 2, 2016, Third Division)

3. Even on the assumption that Elesio was the unlawful aggressor, self-defense cannot be appreciated on account
of the evident lack of reasonable means employed necessary to repel it. The post-mortem findings reveal the
Elesio sustained 11 stab and puncture wounds. Of the 11 stab and puncture wounds, at least seven are deemed
fatal having been inflicted over vital organs such as the heart, the lungs, the liver, and the intestines. The large
number of wounds sustained by the victim negates any claim of self-defense. (People of the Philippines v.
Panerio, G.R. No. 205440, January 15, 2018, Third Division)
4. Labosta’s plea of self-defense must be rejected as the number of wounds of the victim belies his claim.
Jurisprudence states that a large number of wounds inflicted on the victim can indicate a determined effort on
the part of the accused to kill the victim and may belie the reasonableness of the means adopted to prevent or
repel an unlawful act of an aggressor. (Labosta v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 243926, June 23, 2020,
First Division)
5. Petitioners did not act in self-defense; their intent to kill Deang was evident from the extent of his injuries. Dr.
Santos noted that were it not for the timely medical attention, Deang would have died from his injuries. Records
reveal that Deang sustained five incised wounds on his face, and a fatal stab wound on his chest wall which
severed a rib vessel and a stab wound at the side of his right arm. Obviously, petitioners’ claim of self-defense,
which remains unsubstantiated, is nothing more than a clear last-ditch effort to exonerate themselves. (Pascual
v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 241901, November 25, 2020, Third Division)
6. There is reasonableness of the means employed. Here, though petitioner inflicted five (5) bullet wounds and
two (2) lacerations on Julwin, the number of wounds alone should not automatically lead to the conclusion that
there was a determined effort on petitioner’s part to kill the victim. Petitioner was overcome by the instinct of
self-preservation on seeing that Julwin brashly entered into his property and even knocked his father
unconscious for getting in the way. Julwin was determined to inflict injury on petitioner – he brought two large
stones and knife for the purpose. Faced by a determined and prepared foe, who was simply drinking with his
friends, suddenly found himself in a situation where he had to defend himself and his family from serious harm
or even death. Notably, petitioner first tried to simply scare off Julwin by firing a warning shot, Julwin was
unfazed and still continued to advance toward him with malevolent intent. And even after petitioner shot
Julwin, the altter did not even falter but instead threatened to kill petitioner and his family. Petitioner must
have thought that his actions were so futile because Julwin was still standing there and shouting threats.
Petitioner, at that instant, must have felt he had to end it once and for all – kill or be killed. So, he shot Julwin
four (4) more times until the latter fell just a meter away from him. (Ganal, Jr. v. People of the Philippines, G.R.
No. 248130, December 2, 2020, Second Division)
7. Guarin went beyond the call of self-preservation when he proceeded to inflict excessive, atrocious, and fatal
injuries to Manaois. Assuming, for the sake of argument, that there was unlawful aggression, the second
element of self-defense is not present. The means employed by Guarin was not reasonably commensurate to
the nature and extent of the alleged attack that he sought to prevent. Records show that Manaois sustained a
total of 16 injuries, 12 of which were stab wouds, concentrated on the area of the heart and his other vital
organs, and the other four were abrasions and contusions, while Guarin sustained no injury. The Court held in
the past that the nature and number of wounds are constantly and unremittingly considered important indicia
which disprove a plea of self-defense. (People of the Philippines v. Guarin, G.R. No. 245306, December 2, 2020,
First Division)
LACK OF SUFFICIENT PROVOCATION

1. Accused-appellant’s self-defense is negated by his own testimony that it was not him who stabbed the victim,
but the victim’s companion or somebody else. (People of the Philippines v. Macaraig, G.R. No. 219848, June 7,
2. The third element of self-defense, lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself or
herself, is present here. The attendant circumstances indubitably speak of the real and palpable peril posed by
Julwin on the lives and limbs of petitioner and his father. The peril was certainly far from fiction or imaginary.
Records show that stones were hurled at the roofs of the adjacent hosues of petitioner and his father, Ganal,
Sr. Ganal, Sr. went out to check and saw Angelo in the company of his uncle Julwin – the deceased. The two
were in the middle of the road near the front gate. Ganal, Sr. approached and asked them to go home because
his wife was suffering from hypertension and should not be disturbed. Julwin replied that he did not care if
Ganal, Sr.’s wife died, he would kill all of them, including petitioner. Ganal, Sr. tried to pacify the two, assuring
them that they would settle whatever problem they had the following day. Julwin, then holding palm-sized
stones in both hands, managed to push open the gate. As Ganal, Sr. tried to pull back the gate, Julwin hit him
with a stone on the chest. Ganal, Sr. fell on the plant box made of hollow blocks and passed out. Petitioner,
from the main door of his house, saw what happened. Julwin, who had a knife tucked in his waistband and hold
two stones, started to advance toward him. Petitioner thus rushed inside his house, got his gun, and fired a
warning shot into the air. Ganal, Sr. this time had regained consciousness and hid near the gate. Angelo ran
away but Julwin continued to move closer and closer to petitioner who then was constrained to shoot him once.
But still Julwin did not retreat. He just kept moving closer, this time even threatening to kill everyone inside

petitioner’s house. Responding to the situation, petitioner then used up all the four (4) bullets on Julwin who,
as a result, fell dead just within a meter from petitioner’s door. In fact, both the prosecution and defense were
one in saying that it was Julwin who went to petitioner’s hosue and instigated the incident. (Ganal, Jr. v. People
of the Philippines, G.R. No. 248130, December 2, 2020, Second Division)
DEFENSE OF RELATIVES
1. The elements of a defense of a relative under Article 11(2) of the RPC requires unlawful aggression, reasonable
necessity of the means used, and in case of the provocation was given by the person attacked, the one making
the defense had no part therein.
a. The requisite of unlawful aggression is the condition sine qua non. Without unlawful aggression, defense
of relative will not have a leg to stand on and this justifying circumstance cannot and will not be
appreciated, even if the other elements are present. (Velasquez and Velasquez v. People of the Philippines,
G.R. No. 195021, March 15, 2017, Second Division)
2. The accused-appellant contends that the safety of his siblings was compromised because the threat to harm
them was not a mere stance but a positively strong act of real danger considering that Reggie has already
entered his house. Even granting for the sake of argument that the defense's version of the events be ruled as
credible, the Court still cannot find any valid justification to declare that there existed unlawful aggression on
the part of Reggie when he was stabbed by the accused-appellant. Unlawful aggression, as defined in the RPC,
contemplates assault or at least threatened assault of an immediate and imminent kind. The test therefore for
the presence of unlawful aggression under the circumstances is whether the aggression from the victim put in
real peril the life or personal safety of the person defending himself; the peril must not be imagined or an
imaginary threat. (People of the Philippines v. Advincula, G.R. No. 218108, April 11, 2018, Third Division)
3. Defense of relative was present when Apolinario shot Crisanto. There was unlawful aggression on the part of
Crisanto without any provocation on the part of Jessica. Unlawful aggression was present when Crisanto was
strangling Jessica – there was an actual physical assault by Crisanto against Jessica. Furthermore, the means
employed by Apolinario to repel Crisanto’s unlawful aggression against Jessica was reasonably necessary. Here,
Apolinario already had his service pistol in his hand when he saw his wife being strangled by Crisanto. The gun,
therefore, was already available to him at that time, and he could use it to repel the danger to his wife and
unborn child, as he did. It was instinct which impelled Apolinario to fire his gun in order to save his wife and to
prevent further harm to their unborn child. Thus, Apolinario could not be faulted when he failed to consider
other means to ward off Crisanto’s assault. (Bayle v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 210975, March 11, 2020,
First Division)
DEFENSE OF A STRANGER
1. The state of mind of the accused during an alleged act of self-defense, defense of a relative, or defense of a
stranger must be considered in determining whether his or her means of repelling an aggressor were
reasonable.
a. Although the offended party was drunk, and therefore, was not able to land his blows, his attacks were
incessant. He had already attacked three other persons – two minors as well as petitioner’s common-
law wife – and was still belligerent. While it may be true that Pamela, Pia, and Yuki had already gone
inside the house at the time of the stabbing, it appeared to the petitioner that there was no other
reasonable means to protect his family except to commit the acts alleged. It is unreasonable for courts
to demand conduct that could only have been discovered with hindsight and absent the stress caused
by the threats that the petitioner actually faced. (Mariano v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No.
224102, July 26, 2017, Second Division)
2. In defense of stranger, as in self-defense, the circumstances as the accused perceived them at the time of the
incident, not as others perceived them, should be the bases for determining the merits of the plea. (People of
the Philippines v. Olarbe, G.R. No. 227421, July 23, 2018, Third Division)
3. Based on the doubtful and inconsistent account by the defense witnesses of what had transpired during the
incident, none of the requisites of defense of a relative or defense of a stranger were proven by the defense in
the instant case.
a. The initial and crucial point of inquiry is whether there was unlawful aggression on the part of the victim
for absent this essential element, no self-defense can be successfully interposed. As correctly observed by
the RTC, whether Glenn initiated the unlawful aggression is highly uncertain and doubtful, viz: “Mimielyn,
however, said that when the Apostols spoke harsh words against her, she kept her silence and merely
turned her back. Mimielyn recalled that Benjamin and Oliver arrived at the scene separately[,] with a gap
of about five minutes, on board separate vehicles. The latter, however, testified that, upon receipt of the
call from Mimielyn, they went to the fish center together aboard a motorcycle. While Maximo recalled
having seen Glenn kicldng Mimielyn several times prior to the arrival of Benjamin and Oliver, and the latter
two accused likewise testified having witnessed said kicking incident at the lime of their arrival, Mimielyn
had not said so and merely asserted that when she turned her back from Glenn, the latter seized her and
lifted her up above his head. Mimielyn also remembered that the lifting up happened before, and was in

progress at the time of, the arrival of Benjamin and Oliver at the scene. The three accused, however,
uniformly asserted that it was actually thereafter. As to the precise moment when the hacking incident
happened, Benjamin testified that it was after Glenn attacked him that, in self-protection, he took hold of
a bolo from their meat stall and hacked Glenn. In contrast, Maximo and Mimielyn proclaimed that it was
while the latter was being lifted up by Glenn that Benjamin hacked him. For persons who witnessed the
same incident, why the foregoing variances?”
b. Furthermore, assuming arguendo that there was unlawful aggression on the part of Glenn, the second
requisite is likewise lacking because the means unsed by petitioners to prevent or repel the alleged attack
by Glenn is not reasonable. Although it is true that the law does not require perfect equality of forces
between the aggressor and the person making the defense, surely, the use of a bolo by the three
petitioners who were acting in conspiracy and helping each other against the bare hands of the victim is
not at all commensurate, even if the latter is alleged to be a karate expert. (Oliveros v. People of the
FULFILLMENT OF DUTY
1. In this case, it could not even be said that the accused acted in the performance of their duty. Indeed, Gervero
narrated that they conducted the operation on 25 November 1991, on the verbal instruction of Senior Inspector
Baldevinos who later on testified in court to corroborate this claim. However, even assuming that they were
indeed tasked to capture members of the NPA, their actions on that fateful night disprove their defense of
fulfillment of duty as shown by the way they had viciously attacked their helpless victims. The evidence speaks
in no uncertain terms that the accused, instead of fulfilling their sworn duty to protect the public in accordance
with law, allowed their personal grudges and thirst for vengeance to prevail and killed Jose, Hernando, and
Benito in cold blood.
a. In People v. Oanis, the Court set forth two requisites in order that fulfillment of duty and exercise of a right
may be considered as justifying circumstance, namely: (a) that the offender acts in the performance of a
duty or in the lawful exercise of a right; and (b) that the injury or offense committed be the necessary
consequence of the due performance of such duty or in the lawful exercise of such right or office. If one is
absent, accused is entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstance of incomplete fulfillment of duty or
lawful exercise of right or office. (People of the Philippines v. Gervero, G.R. No. 206725, July 11, 2018, Third
Division)
2. There is no merit in Cruz’s claim that he was acting in the fulfillment of his duties as a police officer at the time
of the shooting incident. It has already been established by the consistent factual findings of the RTC and the
CA, which gave more credence to the facts as narrated by the prosecution that Cruz’s act of shooting Bernardo
was without any justifiable cause. Consequently, there is no basis to conclude that Cruz’s actions were
committed in furtherance of his police duties. Moreover, the fact that he reported for duty on the day of the
incident does not necessarily prove that he was, at that time, acting by reason of and in fulfillment of his duty
as a police officer. (PO2 Cruz v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 216642, September 8, 2020, First Division)
ENTRAPMENT AND INSTIGATION

1. There are two kinds of test in determining if there was a valid entrapment operation: objective test and
subjective test.
a. In the objective test, the inquiry is focused on the inducements used by government agents, on police
conduct, not on the accused and his predisposition to commit the crime. For the goal of the defense is to
deter unlawful police conduct.
b. Meanwhile, in the subjective test, the focus of the inquiry is on the accused’s predisposition to commit the
offense charged, his state of mind and inclination before his initial exposure to government agents. (People
of the Philippines v. Casio, G.R. No. 211465, December 3, 2014, Second Division)
2. There is entrapment when law officers employ ruses and schemes to ensure the apprehension of the criminal
while in the actual commission of the crime. There is instigation when the accused is induced to commit the
crime. The difference in the nature of the two lies in the origin of the criminal intent. In entrapment, the mens
rea originates from the mind of the criminal. The idea and the resolve to commit the crime comes from him. In
instigation, the law officer conceives the commission of the crime and suggests to the accused who adopts the
idea and carries it into execution. (People of the Philippines v. Casio, G.R. No. 211465, December 3, 2014,
Second Division)
3. Prior surveillance is not a condition for an entrapment operation’s validity. (People of the Philippines v. Casio,
G.R. No. 211465, December 3, 2014, Second Division)
a. Prior surveillance is not a prerequisite for the validity of an entrapment operation, especially when the buy-
bust team is accompanied by their informant at the crime scene. Similarly, the absence of marked money
does not create a hiatus in the evidence for the prosecution provided that the prosecution has adequately
proved the sale. (People of the Philippines v. Juguillon, G.R. No. 229828, June 26, 2019, First Division)
4. Confirmatory test-buy solicitation does not constitute instigation. The solicitation of drugs from appellant by
the poseur buyer merely furnishes evidence of a course of conduct. The police received an intelligence report

Exempting Circumstances 39
that appellant habitually deals with shabu. They designated a poseur buyer to confirm the report by engaging
in a drug transaction with appellant. There was no proof that the poseur buyer induced appellant to sell illegal
drugs to him. (People of the Philippines v. Gayoso, G.R. No. 206590, March 27, 2017, First Division)
5. Contrary to accused-appellant’s claims, he was apprehended in a legitimate buy-bust operation. A police

officer’s act of soliciting drugs from the accused during a buy-bust operation, or what is known as a “decoy
solicitation,” is not prohibited by law and does not render invalid the buy-bust operation. The sale of contraband
is a kind of offense habitually committed, and the solicitation simply furnishes evidence of the criminal’s course
of conduct. As held in Sta. Maria, a “decoy solicitation” is not tantamount to inducement or instigation. (People
of the Philippines v. Alacdis, G.R. No. 220022, June 19, 2017, Third Division)
6. It was shown that there was a prior surveillance on appellant’s illegal activities and it was confirmed that indeed
appellant was selling illegal drugs, hence, a buy-bust operation was planned. The CI introduced PO2 Ricote to
appellant as a buyer of marijuana. Appellant negotiated with PO2 Ricote as to the price of the marijuana to
which the latter agreed and paid the same, and he was arrested. No doubt, what transpired was a typical buy-
bust operation which is a form of entrapment. (People of the Philippines v. Mendoza, G.R. No. 220759, July 24,
7. The sheer volume of the seized drugs consisting of 7,918.90 grams or almost eight kilograms renders the
defense of frame-up difficult to believe; the large quantity of drugs seized reduces, if not eradicates the
possibility of planting or tampering of evidence. Unlike miniscule amounts, a large quantity of drugs worth
millions is not as susceptible to planting, tampering, or alteration. (People of the Philippines v. Lung Wai Tang,
G.R. No. 238517, November 27, 2019, Third Division)
8. The claim of instigation does not stand. There is no indication that Amurao was merely forced or induced to
commit the crime. His defense is belied by his own actions in readily agreeing to procure girls for the NBI
agents/poseur-buyers and in his active recruitment of the victims. (People of the Philippines v. Amurao, G.R.
No. 229514, July 28, 2020, First Division)
9. Using both the objective and the subjective tests, the Court finds that the NBI-AHTRAD conducted a valid
entrapment operation. Accused-appellant, as a prostitute, has the predisposition to commit the offense even
before she met the NBI agents. It is likewise worthy to emphasize the statements of AAA and BBB that accused-
appellant had the history of engaging in human trafficking and exploiting young women for prostitution. AAA
and BBB testified that for the last six months, before the entrapment operation, they were peddled by accused-
appellant to perform sexual activities with various men in exchange for money. In addition, records reveal that
during a police surveillance, it was accused-appellant who approached the NBI agents and offered the services
of AAA, BBB, and other girls in exchange for money. It was accused-appellant who commenced the transaction
with Agent Follosco by calling his attention and asking him whether he and his companions wanted girls. When
the NBI agents told her that they did not have money, it was accused-appellant who gave her number so that
the agents can contact her in case they needed the sexual services of the girls. During the entrapment, accused-
appellant brought the girls to a nearby hotel, asked for P600.00 for the payment of rooms, and reminded the
NBI agents to pay her for the services of the girls. When the pre-arranged signal was sent, accused-appellant
was arrested. (People of the Philippines v. San Miguel, G.R. No. 247956, October 7, 2020, Second Division)
EXEM PTIN G C IR C U MS TAN C ES
INSANITY OR IMBECILITY
1. Under Article 12 of the RPC, an imbecile or an insane person is exempt from criminal liability, unless the latter
had acted during a lucid interval. The defense of insanity or imbecility must be clearly proved.
a. In order for the accused to be exempted from criminal liability under a plea of insanity, he must
categorically demonstrate that: (i) he was completely deprived of intelligence because of his mental
condition or illness; and (ii) such complete deprivation of intelligence must be manifest at the time or
immediately before the commission of the offense.
b. In this case, it is undisputed that (i) as early as 1999, Verdadero was brought to the Psychiatric Department
of CVMC for treatment; (ii) he was diagnosed with depression in 2001; (iii) he was diagnosed with
schizophrenia on July 21, 2003; (iv) he was confined in the psychiatric ward sometime in 2009 due to a
relapse; (v) he was in and out of psychiatric care from the time of his first confinement in 1999 until the
stabbing incident; and (vi) he was diagnosed to have suffered a relapse on March 20, 2009. While there is
no direct evidence to show Verdadero’s mental state at the exact moment the crime was committed, his
insanity was shown by circumstances immediately before and after the incident. Furthermore, the expert
opinion of the psychiatrist Dr. Pagaddu categorically testified that Verdadero was suffering a relapse at the
time of the stabbing incident and was hesitant to opine that Verdadero might have been in a lucid interval.
In addition, this expert finding is duly supported by the testimony of Maynard, Verdadero’s neighbor, who
testified that on the day of the stabbing incident, Maynard perceived that Verdadero was again of unsound
mind noting that he had reddish eyes and appeared to be drunk, which were, according to expert
testimony, symptoms of a relapse.
c. While the accused Verdadero is absolved from criminal liability, he is still liable for damages as an
exempting circumstance, by its nature, admits that criminal and civil liabilities exist, but the accused is freed
from criminal liability. (Verdadero v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 216021, March 2, 2016, Second
Division)
2. The presumption of sanity, which states that a person who has been committed to a hospital or to an asylum
for the insane is presumed to continue to be insane, must be applied because while accused-appellant was
confined in a mental institution in 2001, he was properly discharged in 2002. This proper discharge from his
confinement clearly indicates an improvement in his mental condition; otherwise, his doctors would not have
allowed his discharge from confinement. Absent any contrary evidence, then, the presumption of sanity
resumes and must prevail. (People of the Philippines v. Roa, G.R. No. 225599, March 22, 2017, Third Division)
3. The defense failed to overcome the presumption of sanity. The testimonies of Dr. Gilboy and Dr. Gerong, as the
defense’s qualified expert witnesses, failed to support appellant’s claim of insanity. It must be emphasized that
the separate psychiatric evaluations of appellant were taken in June 2009 and July 2010, which are three and
four years after the crime was committed on April 19, 2006. So states that an inquiry into the mental state of
an accused should relate to the period immediately before or at the very moment the felony is committed.
Hence, the results of the psychiatric tests done on appellant and testified to by the defense witnesses, may not
be relied upon to prove appellant’s mental condtion at the time of his commission of the crime. (People of the
Philippines v. Racal, G.R. No. 224886, September 4, 2017, Second Division)
4. Mere prior confinement into a mental institution does not automatically exonerate the accused-appellant from
criminal liability in the absence of any evidence showing that the accused-appellant was completely deprived
of reason immediately prior or at the time of the commission of the crime. There must be evidence to show
that the accused was completely deprived of his intelligence in committing the act. (People of the Philippines
v. Cacho, G.R. No. 218425, September 27, 2017, First Division)
5. His seemingly odd behavior of repeatedly going in and out of the house in the days prior to the incident does
not, in any way, demonstrate his insanity. (People of the Philippines v. Pantoja, G.R. No. 223114, November 29,
6. The testimony of the accused-appellant shows that he was hardly the mentally deranged or insane (whether
temporarily or permanently) person that he claimed he was when he stabbed Amean Banzuela (Amean) to
death. His answers to the questions propounded to him by his counsel were intelligent, responsive, and
straightforward; they were not the answers of an unintelligent person or nitwit that he says he is. In fact, he
knew where he lives - at Sto. Domingo; he knew what he did when he woke up that morning when the incident
happened - he took a stroll in the yard; he knew that he has a wife who is still alive; he remembered that after
taking a stroll in the yard, he went to a store to buy cigarettes; he recalled that after buying cigarettes, he went
back home; he also mentioned that on the way home, he happened to pass by the house of Amelita Banzuela
(Amelita) who filed a rape case against him because he violated her daughter Amean; he admitted that when
he saw Amean, he felt "confused" and stabbed the girl; he acknowledged that Amean was a daughter of Amelita;
he stabbed Amean because she told him that he would be killed, and even made the gesture of placing her
hand across her neck; he knew that the knife he used in the stabbing of Amean came from his residence; he
also recalled what transpired after the stabbing, i.e., he went back to his residence, and while inside his
bedroom, he stabbed himself using the same knife which he used in stabbing Amean; he also recalled that the
policeman forced open the door to his bedroom, which he himself locked after entering; placed him in the
porch, and thereafter took him to the municipal police station in Sto. Domingo, Albay. Against this factual
backdrop, which convincingly showed that he is an intelligent, cognitive, rational and thinking person at the
time of the stabbing, the accused-appellant's plea of insanity must be rejected because it has no leg to stand
on. (People of the Philippines v. Dagsil, G.R. No. 218945, December 13, 2017, First Division)
7. To stress, an inquiry into the mental state of an accused should relate to the period immediately before or at
the very moment the felony is committed. Thus, the diagnosis on accused-appellant long after the 11 February
2011 incident, even if this was testified to by a doctor, may not be relied upon to prove accused-appellant's
mental condition at the time of his commission of the offenses.
a. The Court takes note of the fact that based on Dr. Dinglasan's certification, she first evaluated and
examined accused-appellant only on 22 March 2011, or more than a month from the 11 February 2011
incident. The records of these cases however, are bereft of any showing as to Dr. Dinglasan's diagnosis of
accused-appellant on 22 March 2011; hence, it cannot be validly asserted that as of that day, or even earlier
than that date, accused-appellant already had the disorder. Additionally, the certification merely evinces
that it was on 6 June 2012 that Dr. Dinglasan diagnosed accused-appellant to be suffering from the
disorder. Dr. Villanueva personally examined accused-appellant on 27 September 2012, or one (1) year and
seven (7) months from the incident, and found him to be suffering from the disorder. However, no
documentary proof was presented by the defense to show how Dr. Villanueva was able to arrive at his
diagnosis. Indeed, the records only show a single medical certificate from Dr. Villanueva indicating that
accused-appellant was diagnosed with the disorder on 27 September 2012. Moreover, a review of Dr.

Villanueva's testimony will confirm that he never stated how he arrived at his diagnosis of accused-
appellant. The probability that there was but this single instance on 27 September 2012 that Dr. Villanueva
attended to accused-appellant was easily confirmed by his testimony before the RTC which basically dwelt
on his giving opinion as to what a person with the disorder would normally do; or whether the disorder
would cause a person to be violent; or whether a person with the disorder would know what he was doing;
but not as to his specific observations with regard to accused appellant's condition. The defense never even
tried to propound questions to Dr. Villanueva that would elicit certain and categorical answers relative to
accused-appellant's demeanor or disposition in relation to the disorder he was suffering from. Notably, it
cannot be ascertained even with Dr. Villanueva's testimony that accused-appellant's disorder existed at the
time of or immediately preceding the commission of the crime. Dr. Villanueva candidly admitted that Dr.
Dinglasan's diagnosis that accused-appellant was suffering from the disorder was based on the latter's
observation reckoned from accused-appellant's consultation sixteen (16) months after the 11 February
2011 incident and his last consultation. Likewise noted, Dr. Villanueva cannot state for sure that when
accused-appellant committed the crimes he was suffering from any mental illness. It is even significant that
Dr. Villanueva admitted it was possible that accused-appellant's present condition was triggered by the
massacre that he committed and not because he already had the disorder at the time he killed his victims.
(People of the Philippines v. Salvador, Jr., G.R. No. 223566, June 27, 2018, Third Division)
8. To be exempting from criminal responsibility, insanity is the complete deprivation of intelligence in committing
the criminal act. Mere abnormality of the mental faculties does not exempt from criminal responsibility. (People
of the Philippines v. Haloc, G.R. No. 227312, September 5, 2018, First Division)
9. Based on the foregoing, the accused-appellant did not establish the exempting circumstance of insanity. His
mental condition at the time of the commission of the felonies he was charged with and found guilty of was not
shown to be so severe that it had completely deprived him of reason or intelligence when he committed the
felonies charged. Based on the records, he had been administered medication to cure his mental illness, but
there was no showing that he suffered from complete deprivation of intelligence. On the contrary, the medical
professionals presented during the trial conceded that he had been treated only to control his mental condition.
There was also no showing that the accused-appellant's actions manifested his insanity immediately after the
hacking incidents. His own sister, Araceli Haloc-Ayo, declared that he had recognized her and had surrendered
the bolo to her after his deadly assault. Clearly, he had not been totally deprived of the capacity of cognition.
The accused-appellant was subjected to medical tests after the hacking incidents. According to Dr. Imelda
Escuadra, the psychiatrist of the Don Susano Memorial Mental Hospital in Cadlan, Pili, Camarines Sur, the
medications previously prescribed to him were medicines administered to a patient suffering psychosis. She did
not categorically state, however, that he had been psychotic. Nonetheless, even if the Court were to deduce
from her testimony that he had been suffering some form of psychosis, there was still no testimony to the effect
that such psychosis had totally deprived him of intelligence or reason. In view of all the foregoing, the accused-
appellant's actions and actuations prior to, simultaneously with and in the aftermath of the lethal assaults did
not support his defense of insanity. This, coupled with the presumption of law in favor of sanity, now warrants
the affirmance of his convictions, for he had not been legally insane when he committed the felonies.
a. Neither should his mental condition be considered as a mitigating circumstance. As the Court had noted,
the defense presented no evidence to show that his condition had diminished the exercise of his will power.
(People of the Philippines v. Haloc, G.R. No. 227312, September 5, 2018, First Division)
10. The claim of the exempting circumstance of insanity by reason of psychosis is belied by the fact that the accused
was sane enough to help his mother stand up after falling on the ground and seated her in front of a house and
surrendered himself and his bolo to the responding policemen. Furthermore, claim of insanity is belied by the
fact that the accused worked as a tricycle and possessed the necessary license therefor. Finally, based on the
accused’s psychological report, the psychiatric disorder is merely temproary and occurs only intermittently.
(People of the Philippines v. Marzan, G.R. No. 207397, September 24, 2018, First Division)
11. As can be gleaned from Dr. Genotiva's testimony, there was no finding whatsoever that accused-appellant
exhibited any of the myriad symptoms associated with schizophrenia immediately before or simultaneous with
the hacking of Rodolfo. Although the accused-appellant was diagnosed with schizophrenia in 2005, and again a
few months after the stabbing incident in 2008, this evidence of insanity may be accorded weight only if there
is also proof of abnormal psychological behavior immediately before or simultaneous with the commission of
the crime. The evidence on the alleged insanity must refer to the time preceding the act under prosecution or
to the very moment of execution.
a. Furthermore, the Court agrees with the CA that the accused-appellant's defense of insanity is belied by the
following circumstances: First, his claim that he has absolutely no recollection of the hacking incident
amounts to a mere general denial that can be made with facility. This, by itself, does not prove that the
accused-appellant had lost his grip on reality on that occasion. It has been held that the professed inability
of the accused to recall events before and after the stabbing incident, as in the instant case, does not
necessarily indicate an aberrant mind, but is more indicative of a concocted excuse to exculpate himself.
Second, accused-appellant's voluntary surrender the following day belies his claim of insanity. This act tends
to establish that he was well aware of what he had just committed, and that he was capable of discernment.

Lastly, Dr. Genotiva's testimony regarding accused-appellant's mental condition refers to the time he was
examined in 2005, which is three years prior to the incident and in August 15, 2008, which is three months
after the commission of the crime. The testimony of Dr. Genotiva failed to show the mental condition of
accused-appellant between 2005 and 2008. Hence, the Court cannot second guess whether the accused-
appellant was insane at the time the crime was committed. Time and again, this Court has stressed that an
inquiry into the mental state of accused-appellant should relate to the period before or at the precise
moment of doing the act which is the subject of the inquiry, and his mental condition after that crucial
period or during the trial is inconsequential for purposes of determining his criminal liability. Indubitably,
the defense failed to meet the quantum of proof required to overthrow the presumption of sanity. (People
of the Philippines v. Bacolot, G.R. No. 233193, October 10, 2018, Second Division)
12. Proof of the accused’s insanity must relate to the time immediately preceding or simultaneous with the
commission of the offense.
a. The records of the case reveal that the defense failed to prove its plea of insanity under the requirements
set by law. Although accused-appellant underwent out-patient consultation for his diagnosed condition of
schizophrenia from August 2006 until 13 June 2009, this evidence of insanity may be accorded weight only
if there is also proof of abnormal psychological behavior immediately before or simultaneous with the
commission of the crime. The evidence on the alleged insanity must refer to the time preceding the act
under prosecution or to the very moment of execution." As gleaned from his testimony, Dr. Loveria
admitted that he did not assess the effect of accused-appellant's failure to take medications vis-à-vis his
behavior during the crime. Moreover, the last consultation accused-appellant had with him was five (5)
months before the incident. Accused-appellant's behavior immediately before, during, and after the
commission of the crime were only relayed to the doctor by other witnesses. Clearly, Dr. Loveria did not
have a well-defined basis to reach the conclusion that accused-appellant was insane at the time of the
commission of the crime. (People of the Philippines v. Dela Cruz, G.R. No. 227997, October 16, 2019,
Second Division)
13. Article 12(1) of the RPC exempts insane persons from criminal liability, unless it is shown that they acted during
a lucid interval. Under the present legal regime, persons are presumed to be sane and to have intended the
ordinary consequences of their voluntary acts. Thus, the accused who invokes insanity as an exempting
circumstance is deemed to have admitted or confessed to the criminal act. The commission of the crime having
been established through admission, the pivotal issue shifts to the fact of insanity; and the burden of proving
such fact must be borne by the accused who invoked it. Moreover, the defense must prove that the accused
was insane at the time of the commission of the crime. Proof of the insanity of the accused after the commission
of the crime, especially during trial, is immaterial, unless submitted to prove that the insanity is continuous or
recurring. (People of the Philippines v. Toledo, G.R. No. 229508, March 24, 2021, First Division)
14. Both the courts a quo found that the defense failed to prove Dennis’ mental state at the time of the commission
of the crime charged against him. Crucially, the defense did not present Dennis himself; or anyone who may
have known him long enough to testify about his character, demeanor, or behavior, before or immediately after
the incident or prior to his arrest. Instead, the defense relied solely on the psychological examinations
conducted on Dennis by the NCMH staff, and the reports prepared in connection therewith. The records reveal
that Dennis was examined or interviewed by NCMH psychologists on August 4, 2004, September 8, 2004,
October 13, 2004, and February 20, 2009. All of the reports submitted by NCMH were thus based on
examinations conducted after Dennis’ arrest and detention. The initial NCMH report was prepared in December
2004, eight months after the commission of the crime; while the last report was prepared in February 2009 or
almost five years after the incident. All three witnesses for the defense were NCMH employees; two of whom
merely identified the reports as official records and had no part in the preparation of said reports. The NCMH
reports categorically state that Dennis suffers from “psychosis classified as Schizophrenia,” a finding that is
corroborated by Dr. Zarah Espinoza, the lone defense witness who was able to examine and interact with
Dennis. However, she could not categorically state that Dennis was already experiencing schizophrenia at the
time of the commission of the crime. It must be stressed that the exempting circumstance of insanity is based
on a crucial temporal parameter: the accused must be proven to be insane at the time of the commission of
the crime. Consequently, the Court cannot accept the NCMH reports as sufficient proof of Dennis’ mental state
during the incident with AAA, since these reports pertain only to his mental state at the time of the
examinations, which were both conducted months after the incident and after he has been attested. Without
a shred of evidence as to Dennis’ mental state before or during the incident, his defense of insanity cannot be
countenanced. (People of the Philippines v. Toledo, G.R. No. 229508, March 24, 2021, First Division)
MINORITY
1. As the presumption that CICL XXX acted without discernment was not successfully controverted, he must
perforce be acquitted of the charge.
a. While CICL XXX is not criminally liable for his acts because the presumption that he acted without
discernment was not overcome, he is still civilly liable for the injuries sustained by Redoquerio. It is well-
settled that every person criminally liable is also civilly liable. However, it does not follow that a person who
is not criminally liable is also free from civil liability. Exemption from criminal liability does not always

include exemption from civil liability. The foregoing liability is imposed upon CICL XXX's parents because
Article 101 of the Revised Penal Code. Libi v. IAC interpreted the above provision to mean that the civil
liability of parents for criminal offenses committed by their minor children is direct and primary.
b. Article 101 of the RPC, however, provides that the foregoing liability of CICL XXX's parents is subject to the
defense that they acted without fault or negligence. Thus, the civil aspect of this case is remanded to the
trial court, and it is ordered to implead CICL XXX's parents for reception of evidence on their fault or
negligence. (CICL XXX v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 237334, August 14, 2019, Second Division)
UNCONTROLLABLE FEAR
1. Manansala is wrong in claiming that the trial court failed to appreciate the mitigating circumstance of acting
under an impulse of uncontrollable fear because it is not among the mitigating circumstances under Article 13
of the Revised Penal Code.
a. Manansala cannot be said to be acting under an impulse of uncontrollable fear. This is because while
Manansala was apprehensive in committing a falsity in the preparation of the subject report as she did not
know the reprecussions of her actions, nothing would show that Lacanilao, or any of her superiors,
threatened her with loss of employment should she fail to do so. As there was an absence of any real and
imminent threat, intimidation, or coercion that would have compelled Manansala to do what she did, such
a circumstance cannot be appreciated in her favor. (Manansala v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No.
215424, December 9, 2015, First Division)
2. The accused cannot avail of the exempting circumstance of uncontrollable fear. The malefactors had a well-
hatched plan to commit the crime of robbery with homicide and Zuñiga was not only well-aware of every detail
thereof but likewise actively participated in its commission. As the CA found, there was no genuine, imminen,
and reasonable threat to his life and family as he was an active participant in the commission of the crime
charged. He acted on his own free will and was not under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear as he claims.
Moreover, as correctly argued by the OSG, Zuñiga had every opportunity to escape while they were passing
through the cornfields on their way to the Padre’s house. However, he did not avail of the said chance. He did
not perform any overt act to dissociate or detach himself from the conspiracy to commit the felony and prevent
the commission thereof. While he refused to kill Rachel, he nonetheless delivered the fatal blow to Manuel’s
head and stabbed Nenita at her back using a chopping knife without any prodding or compulsion from his
companions. (People of the Philippines v. Labuguen, G.R. No. 223103, February 24, 2020, Second Division)
3. Tamayo cannot be held liable for attempted homicide. The records show that the altercation between Tamayo
and BBB started when BBB saw Tamayo with AAA. In the testimony of Tamayo which the Court finds more
believable, he claimed it was BBB who first attacked Tamayo with a knife. Fearing his life, Tamayo wrestled for
possession of the knife BBB brought which accidentally hit the latter. Tamayo was left with no opportunity to
escape or defend himself in equal combat. One who acts under the compulsion of an irresistible force and under
the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury, which are considered exempting
circusmtances under paragraphs 5 and 6 of Article 12 of the RPC, acts without voluntariness and free will.
Although a crime was committed, no criminal liability arises. Therefore, Tamayo cannot be convicted of
attempted homicide. (People of the Philippines v. Tamayo, G.R. No. 234943, January 19, 2021, First Division)
ACCIDENT
1. Accused cannot raise the exempting circumstance of accident because accused had the intent to kill Auria. It
should be noted that when the crime happened, Auria screamed that she was going to be killed by the accused.
(People of the Philippines v. Macal, G.R. No. 211062, January 13, 2016, First Division)
2. Nieva cannot invoke the exempting circumstance of accident to free him from criminal liability. To start with,
Nieva was not performing a lawful act when he drew a gun and pointed it at Judy. Subsequently, Nieva fired the
gun several times. In his initial attempts, the bullet of the gun jammed; yet, Nieva did not stop until the gun
finally fired and hit its target. This clearly shows that Nieva intentionally and persistently performed the act
complained of in order to successfully maim Judy. He cannot now claim that he is without fault.
a. To successfully claim the defense of accident, the accused must show that the following circumstances are
present: (i) a person is performing a lawful act, (ii) with due care, (iii) he causes an injury to another by
mere accident, and (iv) he had no fault in or intention of causing the injury. (Nieva v. People of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 188751, November 16, 2016, Third Division)
3. Accident could not be appreciated herein as an exempting circumstance simply because the accused did not
establish that he had acted with due care, and without fault or intention of causing the injuries to the victim.
The gun was a revolver that would not fire unless there was considerable pressure applied on its trigger, or its
hammer was pulled back and released. The assertion of accident could have been accorded greater credence
had there been only a single shot fired, for such a happenstance could have been attributed to the unintentional
pulling of the hammer during the forceful grappling for control of the gun. Yet, the revolver fired twice, which
we think eliminated accident. Verily, the CA itself pointedly debunked the story of the accused as to how the
accident had occurred by characterizing such story not only incomprehensible but also contrary to human
experience and behavior.

Mitigating Circumstances 44
a. Article 12, paragraph 4, of the Revised Penal Code exempts from criminal liability any person who, while
performing a lawful act with due care, causes an injury by mere accident without fault or intention of
causing it. The elements of this exempting circumstance are, therefore, that the accused: (a) is performing
a lawful act; (b) with due care; (c) causes injury to another by mere accident; and (d) without fault or
intention of causing it. (People of the Philippines v. Delector, G.R. No. 200026, October 4, 2017, Third
Division)
4. Aron’s invocation of “accidental firing” to support his allegation of self-defense and his reliance in Pomoy v.
People is utterly misplaced. Aron is not a member of the PNP. Simply put, the transgression of accidentally firing
the gun did not occur because Aron is in lawful performance of his duty.
c. In Pomoy, the Court said that the elements of accident are as follows: (i) the accused was at the time
performing a lawful act with due care; (ii) the resulting injury was caused by mere accident; and (iii) on the
part of the accused, there was no fault or no intent to cause the injury. From the facts, it is clear that all
these elements were present. At the time of the incident, Pomoy was a member - specifically, one of the
investigators - of the Philippine National Police (PNP) stationed at the Iloilo Provincial Mobile Force
Company. Thus, it was in the lawful performance of his duties as investigating officer that, under the
instructions of his superior, he fetched the victim from the latter's cell for a routine interrogation. Again,
it was in the lawful performance of his duty as a law enforcer that petitioner tried to defend his possession
of the weapon when the victim suddenly tried to remove it from his holster. As an enforcer of the law,
petitioner was duty-bound to prevent the snatching of his service weapon by anyone, especially by a
detained person in his custody. Such weapon was likely to be used to facilitate escape and to kill or maim
persons in the vicinity, including petitioner himself. (Anisco v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 242263,
MITIGA TIN G C IR C U MS TAN C E S
GENERAL PRINCIPLES
1. Mitigating circumstances cannot be a basis for changing the nature of the crime nor for imposing a penalty
lower than that prescribed by law, such as in the crime of murder. A mitigating circumstance can only affect the
imposable penalty, depending on the kind of penalty and the number of attendant circumstances. (People of
the Philippines v. Pantoja, G.R. No. 223114, November 29, 2017, Third Division)
INCOMPLETE SELF-DEFENSE
1. Petitioner’s claim of incomplete self-defense must fail because it was shown that there was unlawful aggression
on the part of Ambrocio. While it is true that Ambrocio had a gun tucked in his waist, it was not shown that
Ambrocio had really reached for his gun and actually taken it out. (Rustia, Jr. v. People of the Philippines, G.R.
No. 208351, October 5, 2016, First Division)
LACK OF INTENTION TO COMMIT A GRAVE WRONG

1. The mitigating circumstance is not proven. Appellant was sufficiently shown to have used brute force on Ronald
so much so that the hanger she initially used snapped. Even then, appellant did not stop; she got hold of the
broom and using its wooden handle hit Ronald in the head and all over his body. The following morning,
appellant saw Ronald's critical condition. There was vomit on his bed and on the floor. His jogging pants were
wet with urine. He was so weak he could neither get up, nor hold a spoon. He later fell to the ground. But
appellant still did not take pity on her young child. Once more, she got the broom and pushed its yantok handle
inside Ronald's mouth. Undoubtedly, appellant was motivated not by an honest desire to discipline Ronald tor
his mistake but by an evil intent to ruthlessly beat up the helpless little boy. She kept beating him up despite
seeing him already so weak and frail. Worse, appellant never showed any sign of remorse, much less, love for
her visibly dying child. She even refused to bring him to the hospital, saying he was just pretending. Appellant's
cruelty toward her young child wickedly defies human nature especially the mother's protective instinct toward
her own. In the words of the Court of Appeals, it is inexplicably tragic that the very person who brought Ronald
into this world, with the natural and unconditional obligation to protect and nurture him, was also the one who
brought his life to a premature end at the very young age of thirteen (13). Plainly, appellant's brutish acts
sufficiently produced, and did actually produce, her son's death. Appellant, therefore, cannot be credited with
the mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong (People of the Philippines v.
Gonzales, G.R. No. 217022, June 3, 2019, Second Division)
2. Anent the mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed, this
circumstance addresses itself to the intention of the offender at the particular moment when such offender
executes or commits the criminal act. In the instant case, the undeniable fact is that when accused-appellant
attacked the victim, the former used a deadly weapon and inflicted a mortal wound on the latter. While intent
to kill is purely a mental process, it may be inferred from the weapon used, the extent of the injuries sustained
by the offended party and the circumstances of the aggression, as well as the fact that the accused performed
all the acts that should have resulted in the death of the victim. Indeed the location and nature of Delia's stab
wound belie accused-appellant's claim of lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong against the victim.
(People of the Philippines v. Sabalberino, G.R. No. 241088, June 3, 2019, Third Division)
3. For accused-appellant's claim of lack of intent to commit "so grave a wrong" as a mitigating circumstance to be
appreciated, there must be a "notable and evident disproportion between the means employed... and its
consequences." In one case, the Court refused to consider this mitigating circumstance because the acts
employed by the accused were reasonably sufficient to produce and did actually produce the death of the
victim. In that case, the single stab wound -- by reason of its location and severity - was found sufficient to kill
the victim, as in fact it did kill him.
a. The act of accused-appellant in lighting the mother rocket was reasonably sufficient to cause fire to the
building. The Regional Trial Court held: “It was overwhelmingly established that Fugal arrived at FQ store
holding his own mother-rocket and a cigarette. There was a big signboard "no testing no smoking" in front
of the store to warn all customers that testing of firecrackers and smoking were strictly prohibited in the
area. But despite the warning sign, and despite the very obvious fact that FQ store was full of firework
merchandise on display, the accused still had the temerity of lighting his own firework and even pointing
its stick towards the displayed mother-rocket and many pyrotechnics at the store. This act of the accused
connotes no other meaning than malice and intention to cause fire. Unless the accused has no mind of his
own or [is] as innocent as a three-year-old boy, there is no justification for his conduct of lighting a fire-
causing firework within the surrounds of as much fire-hazard products. Also, the court notes the fact that
the accused, instead of helping the victims while on panic to put out the flame, tried to escape if not caught
by Franklin Que. He also never returned, not even apologized to the Que family for what he had caused.
This all the more shows his intent to cause the fire that gutted the building and killed the store owner.”
b. Fireworks are inherently hazardous and dangerous, and potentially destructive. They can explode
unexpectedly and can even go off in the wrong direction. It is also hard to gauge how large an explosion
may be. A reasonable person would know the devastation that fireworks can cause. Thus, it is common
knowledge that these goods must be handled with proper care and children are prohibited from playing
with or using it.
c. In this case, a signboard "no testing no smoking" was posted in front of the store, which was adequate
warning that the area was a fire-hazard. Despite this warning, accused-appellant deliberately lit the
mother rocket not only in close proximity to, but directed towards, the other firecrackers on display. The
burning of the merchandise and the building is a result that was foreseeable. Judging from his "action,
conduct and external acts," there was intent to cause damage to another's property by fire. The Court
cannot accept accused-appellant's claim that he did not intend to commit so grave a wrong as that
perpetrated. (People of the Philippines v. Pugal, G.R. No. 229103, March 15, 2021, Third Division)
VINDICATION OF A GRAVE OFFENSE

1. Although it was not witnessed by the Napones, the attack on Calib which put his life at risk must have infuriated
them. The belief that the Espelitas were responsible for the grave injuries sustained by a member of their family
created rage in their minds which clouded their judgment. Upon seeing Calib bloody, prostrate on the ground
and possibly clinging for dear life, the Napones were filled with resentment that resulted in the assault on
Salvador. Their acts, therefore, were committed in vindication of a grave offense. (Napone, Jr. v. People of the
SUFFICIENT PROVOCATION
1. Appellant’s assertion that several days before he stabbed the victim, the latter teased the appellant to be gay
and taunted him that the girl whom appellant courted rejected him cannot be considered as sufficient
provocation on the part of the victim. This is because the taunting was done by the victim occurred days before
the stabbing incident; hence the immediacy required by law was absent. In addition, calling a perosn gay is not
sufficient provocation contemplated by law that would lessen the liability of the accused.
a. As a mitigating circumstance, sufficient provocation is any unjust or improper conduct or act of the victim
adequate enough to excite a person to commit a wrong, which is accordingly proportionate in gravity. The
provocation must be immediate to the commission of the crime. (People of the Philippines v. Racal, G.R.
No. 224886, September 4, 2017, Second Division)
2. Although Pilo's act of hurling stones may not be regarded as an unlawful aggression, admittedly, however, such
deed was vexatious, improper and enough to incite Miranda into anger. The fact that Miranda was stirred to
rage was understandable considering that his wife and daughter were at his home, and were peacefully having
supper when Pilo threw the stones. In Gotis v. People, the Court held that while an act cannot be considered an
unlawful aggression for the purpose of self-defense, the same act may be regarded as sufficient provocation
for the purpose of mitigating the crime. In fact, in a long line of cases, the Court considered that although there
may have been no unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, if the latter was nonetheless deemed to have
given sufficient provocation, then the accused's liability shall be mitigated. Such acts which were deemed
vexatious range from the victim's act of challenging the accused's family while armed with a bolo; or thrusting
a bolo at the accused while threatening to kill him with the lives of the accused's wife and children placed in
peril; and the victim attempting to hack the accused. Certainly, Pilo's act of hurling stones while Miranda's family
was peacefully enjoying their supper falls within this range. Accordingly, the Court shall consider in favor of
Miranda the mitigating circumstance of sufficient provocation. (Miranda v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No.

3. Petitioner’s claim of sufficient provocation on the part of Bernardo cannot be appreciated. To recall, Cruz argues
that Bernardo’s acts of suddenly overtaking him, blocking his path and almost colliding with his motorcycle, as
well as his acts of shouting, drawing and aiming a gun at Cruz, amount to sufficient provocation. The evidence
on record, however, does not support this. Cruz failed to prove that it was Bernardo who first drew a gun. Both
the RTC and the CA gave more credence to the consistent testimonies of the prosecution witnesses who
testified that Cruz drew his gun and fired at Bernardo immediately after their short but heated exchange of
words, as corroborated by the medical observation with respect to the trajectory of the bullet that hit Bernardo.
The evidence shows that it was Cruz who first drew and fired his gun. While his firing was preceded by a short
verbal altercation, this still does not amount to sufficient provocation. The short exchange of words between
Bernardo and Cruz, though heated, is not adequate to elicit such grave reaction as the firing of a gun. Thus, the
mitigating circumstance of sufficient provocation cannot be appreciated in favor of Cruz. (PO2 Cruz v. People
of the Philippines, G.R. No. 216642, September 8, 2020, First Division)
PASSION AND OBFUSCATION

1. Passion and obfuscation as a mitigating circumstance need not be felt only in the seconds before the
commission of the crime. It may build up and strengthen over time until it can no longer be repressed and will
ultimately motivate the commission of the crime. (People of the Philippines v. Oloverio, G.R. No. 211159, March
2. Gulane not only threatened to molest accused’s daughter but also accused him in public of having incestuous
relations with his mother. Gulane was said to have insulted accused in full view of his immediate superior, the
barangay captain. In addition, Gulane had repeatedly insulted the accused. Thus, the accused is entitled to the
mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation. (People of the Philippines v. Oloverio, G.R. No. 211159,
March 18, 2015, Second Division)
3. Petitioner is not entitled to the application of the mitigating circumstance of passion and/or obfuscation. The
mitigating circumstance of passion or obfuscation only applies if the act of the victim is both unlawful and
sufficient to produce such condition of mind. A child who fell asleep while attending to a business establishmen
is not an offense at all and could not give rise to an impulse sufficiently powerful to naturally produce a justified
diminution of an adult’s self-control. (Del Poso v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 210810, December 7, 2016,
Third Division)
4. It has been held that there is passional obfuscation when the crime was committed due to an uncontrollable
burst of passion provoked by prior unjust or improper acts, or due to a legitimate stimulus so powerful as to
overcome reason. The obfuscation must originate from lawful feelings. The turmoil and unreason which
naturally result from a quarrel or fight should not be confused with the sentiment or excitement in the mind of
a person injured or offended to such a degree as to deprive him of his sanity and self-control. The excitement
which is inherent in all persons who quarrel and come to blows does not constitute obfuscation.In the present
case, the prosecution was able to establish that the crime was precipitated by a quarrel between accused-
appellant and the victim. However, such kind of argument, no matter how heated or serious it was, is not the
kind that would cause the passion or obfuscation contemplated under the law. (People of the Philippines v.
Sabalberino, G.R. No. 241088, June 3, 2019, Third Division)
5. The mitigating circumstances of passion or obfuscation should not be appreciated in favor of petitioners. Due
to the inconsistent testimonies of the defense witnesses, aside from the phone call from Mimielyn that she was
allegedly being attacked by Glenn, there is no clear evidence that petitioners witnessed Glenn initiate any attack
against Mimielyn, which would have given rise to passion or obfuscation on the part of petiitoners. What is sure
though is that petitioners and the victim had a quarrel or a fight. (Oliveros v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No.
242552, March 3, 2021, First Division)
VOLUNTARY SURRENDER
1. Voluntary surrender, as a mitigating circumstance, requires an element of spontaneity. The accused’s act of
surrendering to the authorities must have been impelled by the acknowledgment of guilt or a desire to save
the authorities the trouble and expense that may be incurred for his or her search and capture. Based on the
evidence on record, there is no showing that petitioner’s act of submitting his person to the authorities was
motivated by an acknowledgment of his guilt. (Bacerra v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 204544, July 3,
2017, Second Division; People of the Philippines v. Aseniero, G.R. No. 218209, April 10, 2019, Second Division)
2. Junior’s claim that he surrendered to the police authorities was not disputed by the prosecution. Hence, Junior
is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. (Napone, Jr. v. People of the Philippines, G.R.
No. 193085, November 29, 2017, Third Division)
3. The Court finds no merit in appellant's contention that he ran after the stabbing incident because he intended
to voluntarily surrender himself at the barangay. He could have easily surrendered to Milagros Reyes, one of

the barangay tanods chasing after him, but he kept on running away until he was eventually subdued by Edgardo
Reyes. (People of the Philippines v. Gajila, G.R. No. 227502, July 23, 2018, First Division)
4. Voluntary surrender should not be appreciated as there was no showing that accused-appellant unconditionally
and voluntarily surrendered himself to the authorities either because he acknowledged his guilt or because he
wished to save them the trouble and expense in looking for and capturing him. (People of the Philippines v.
Marzan, G.R. No. 207397, September 24, 2018, First Division)
5. In the present case, Mercado did not actually surrender. Instead, he simply did not offer any resistance when
so arrested. The records of the case reveal that when Evelyn was transported to the hospital, Mercado stayed
in a nearby house where he watched as their house was engulfed in flames. While he was observing the fire,
someone approached him and handcuffed him – to which act he did not resist. In this connection, the Court
quotes with approval the following ratiocination by the CA: “Indeed, there was no spontaneity in the alleged
surrender. It will be observed that accused-appellant had no conscious effort to surrender. In fact, had accused-
appellant not been arrested, he would not have surrendered himself to the authorities. The mere fact that
accused-appellant did not resist his arrest cannot be equated with voluntary surrender. For, as the Supreme
Court has ruled, to be voluntary, a surrender must be spontaneous and deliberate; that is, there must be an
intent to submit oneself unconditionally to the authorities.” (People of the Philippines v. Mercado, G.R. No.
6. Tadena claims that the SB erred in not appreciating the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, which
he did before the First Division Clerk of Court upon learning of the criminal case against him. For voluntary
surrender to be appreciated, the following requisites should be present: (a) the offender has not been actually
arrested; (b) the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority or the latter's agent; and (c) the
surrender was voluntary. The essence of voluntary surrender is spontaneity and the intent of the accused is
give oneself up and submit to the authorities either because he/she acknowledges his/her guilt or he/she wishes
to save the authorities the trouble and expense that may be incurred for his/her search and capture. Without
these elements, and where the clear reasons for the supposed surrender are the inevitability of arrest and the
need to ensure his safety, the surrender is not spontaneous and, therefore, cannot be characterized as
"voluntary surrender" to serve as a mitigating circumstance. Here, the records disclose that a warrant of arrest
had been issued on August 1, 2014, before Tadena posted bail on August 20, 2014. He also admitted in this
petition that upon learning of the issuance of a warrant of arrest against him, he surrendered to the First
Division Clerk of Court. With Tadena's arrest being inevitable, his surrender cannot be regarded as voluntary or
spontaneous. Therefore, his claim of mitigating circumstance does not deserve merit. (Tadena v. People of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 228610, March 20, 2019, Second Division)
7. With regard to the presence of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, the Court agrees with both
the RTC and the CA that Lumahang is entitled to the same. In De Vera v. De Vera, the Court held that for
voluntary surrender to be appreciated, the following requisites should be present: (a) the offender has not been
actually arrested; (b) the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority or the latter's agent; and (c) the
surrender was voluntary. The essence of voluntary surrender is spontaneity and the intent of the accused to
give himself up and submit himself to the authorities either because he acknowledges his guilt or he wishes to
save the authorities the trouble and expense that may be incurred for his search and capture. Without these
elements, and where the clear reasons for the supposed surrender are the inevitability of arrest and the need
to ensure his safety, the surrender is not spontaneous and, therefore, cannot be characterized as "voluntary
surrender" to serve as a mitigating circumstance. In the present case, Lumahang voluntarily surrendered to the
barangay officers on the same night the incident happened because he was convinced to do so by his aunt. This
satisfies all the aforementioned three requisites, thus entitling Lumahang to claim the mitigating circumstances
of voluntary surrender. (People of the Philippines v. Lumahang, G.R. No. 218581, March 27, 2019, Second
Division)
8. As to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, the same can be appreciated if the accused
satisfactorily complies with three requisites, to wit: (a) he has not been actually arrested; (b) he surrendered
himself to a person in authority or the latter's agent; and (c) the surrender is voluntary. There must be a showing
of spontaneity and an intent to surrender unconditionally to the authorities, either because the accused
acknowledges his guilt or he wishes to spare them the trouble and expense concomitant to his capture. In the
instant case, there was no showing of spontaneity on the part of accused-appellant as it was not he who asked
for the police to go to their house. Neither was there proof that he acknowledged his guilt when apprehended
by the police authorities. While it appears that he did not resist when the police officers brought him to the
police station for questioning, such lack of resistance does not necessarily equate to his voluntary surrender.
The voluntariness of one's surrender should denote a positive act and not a mere compliant or submissive
behavior in the presence of authorities. (People of the Philippines v. Sabalberino, G.R. No. 241088, June 3, 2019,
Third Division)
9. Here, after accused-appellant Malinis had been informed that accused-appellant Lita was a suspect in Hipolito's
killing, both appeared at the municipal hall and were later detained. Upon arraignment, they both pleaded not

guilty to the charge of murder and continue to maintain their innocence. Thus, it cannot be said that they
surrendered themselves as an acknowledgment of guilt. Without this element, the surrender cannot be
deemed spontaneous and, thus, falls short of establishing their supposed voluntary surrender as a mitigating
circumstance. (People of the Philippines v. Lita, G.R. No. 227755, August 14, 2019, Third Division)
10. This Court finds, as the Court of Appeals did, that voluntary surrender should be credited in favor of appellant.
The facts clearly show that appellant was not arrested; he surrendered to Brgy. Captain Palattao who brought
him to the police station; and he surrendered voluntarily. Although the Court of Appeals appreciated the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender, it nonetheless held that it could not modify appellant's
indivisible penalty of reclusion perpetua. But since this Court downgraded appellant's crime to homicide,
appellant may now benefit from the attendant mitigating circumstance (People of the Philippines v. Doca, G.R.
No. 233479, October 16, 2019, Second Division)
11. Petitioner was able to prove all the requisites of voluntary surrender. The claim of petitioner that he voluntarily
presented himself to the Sibonga Police Station, upon the persuasion of his father and the arrangement made
by his sister, was not controverted by the prosecution. It is clear that there was a manifestation on the part of
the petitioner to freely submit himself to the police authorities for the killing of Ryn Loui. (Casilac v. People of
the Philippines, G.R. No. 238436, February 17, 2020, First Division)
12. Petitioner is not entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender since he belatedly raised the
issue of whether he is entitled to said mitigating circumstance. No question will be entertained on appeal unless
it has been raised in the proceedings below. This is because if such mitigating circumstance was considered by
the CA, or this Court for that matter, the prosecution would be denied due process as it would have been denied
the opportunity to present evidence to disprove that petitioner did surrender spontaneously and voluntarily to
the authorities. (Talabis v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 214647, March 4, 2020, Second Division)
13. The mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender should be appreciated in favor of Fruelda. When Fruelda
found out that AAA had lodged a complaint against him, he immediately went to the Batangas Criminal
Investigation and Detention Group to surrender. Acknowledgment of guilt is not a condition sine qua non of the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. It is sufficient that the accused spontaneously submits himself
to the authorities because he wishes to save them the trouble and expenses necessary for his search and
capture. (People of the Philippines v. Fruelda, G.R. No. 242690, September 3, 2020, First Division)
14. Voluntary surrender can be appreciated. The Booking Sheet and Arrest Report as well as the Crime Report were
admitted by and offered in evidence by the prosecution. These pieces of evidence clearly and convincingly
establish the fact that Cruz had not been actually arrested, but had instead immediately and voluntarily
surrendered himself and his service firearm to a person in authority. (PO2 Cruz v. People of the Philippines, G.R.
No. 216642, September 8, 2020, First Division)
15. Armando is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. After the attack, Armando
voluntarily went to the barangay hall to surrender to the proper authorities to save them the trouble and
expense for his search and capture. However, since there was no one present there, he proceeded to the police
station. On his way, he met Tanod Morada. He offered no resistance and surrendered to be taken to the police
station. Added to this, SPO1 Lamadrid confirmed that after Armando had been discharged from the hospital,
he voluntarily returned to the police station. Certainly, these acts evince a sincere desire to surrender to the
proper authorities. (People of the Philippines v. Archivido, G.R. No. 233085, September 21, 2020, Third Division)
16. The mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender cannot be appreciated in appellant’s favor. It is undisputed
that appellant fled to Dungangon, Carmen, Cotabato after the commission of the crime and only surrendered
a week later after being conviced to do so by the Barangay Captain of Dungangon. When asked on direct
examination whether he voluntarily submitted himself to the authorities in Carmen, Cotabato, he merely
replied that they approached him in the place where he was resting. This hardly inspires any belief that his
surrender was spontaneous or voluntary. (People of the Philippines v. Maghuyop, G.R. No. 242942, October 5,
17. Voluntary surrender must be appreciated. First, accused-appellants were not yet arrested at the time that the
barangay officials arrived at the scene. Second, Purok Leader Eutequio testified that Crispolo and Manuel
surrendered to them when they arrived. As established, Purok Leader Eutequio is an agent of a person in
authority for being a barangay tanod to maintain public order and security within their purok or district. Lastly,
Crispolo surrendered himself voluntarily, spontaneously and without any influence from the barangay tanods.
Moreover, Crispolo even pointed to Purok Leader Eutequio where the bolo, used as weapon, could be located.
The same elements were established with the other accused, Poly. (People of the Philippines v. Catulang, G.R.
No. 245969, November 3, 2020, First Division)
18. The RTC and the CA correctly disregarded Pascual’s plea for voluntary surrender as a mitigating circumstance.
Here, a warrant of arrest has been issued on April 1, 1998 against all four accused, but they remained at large.

Aggravating circumstance 49
This prompted the trial judge to archive the cases subject to revival upon the arrest of the accused. It was only
on August 30, 2000 that Pascual filed a motion for voluntary surrender. Case law stresses that the essence of
voluntary surrender is spontaneity and the intent of the accused is give oneself up and submit to the authorities
either because he or she acknowledges his or her guilt or he or she wishes to save the authorities the trouble
and expense that may be incurred for his or her search and capture. Evidently, the surrender cannot be
regarded as voluntary or spontaneous. (Pascual v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 241901, November 25,
19. The requisites of voluntary surrender were proven by Guarin. The established facts show that immediately after
the incident, Guarin voluntarily surrendered himself and the weapon to Barangay Kagawad Rosario after
realizing that he had hurt Manaois. In turn, Barangay Kagawad Rosario reported the incident to the police and
endorsed him to their custody upon information that it was Guarin who killed Manaois. It is clear that the there
was a manifestation on the part of Guarin to freely submit himself to the barangay official, Barangay Kagawad
Rosario, and to the police authorities for the killing of Manaois. (People of the Philippines v. Guarin, G.R. No.
20. Pereira is not entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. The facts established herein parlay
that the barangay authorities had to search for Pereira ad go to the places where he fled to. Only then was he
arrested. (People of the Philippines v. Pereira, G.R. No. 220749, January 20, 2021, Third Division)
VOLUNTARY PLEA OF GUILT

1. Anent the supposed voluntary plea of guilt on appellant’s part, it is settled that a plea of guilty made after
arraignment and after trial had begun does not entitle the accused to have such plea considered as a mitigating
circumstance.
a. The voluntary plea of guilt required by law is one that is made by the accused in cognizance of the grievous
wrong he has committed and must be done as an act of repentance and respect for the law. (People of the
Philippines v. Racal, G.R. No. 224886, September 4, 2017, Second Division)
ILLNESS
1. The CA is correct in appreciating the mitigating circumstance of illness as would diminish the exercise of
willpower of appellant without, however, depriving him of the consciousness of his acts, pursuant to Article
13(9) and (10) of the RPC, as he was found by his examining doctors to have diminished capacity to discern
what was wrong or right at the time of the commission of the crime. (People of the Philippines v. Racal, G.R.
2. While the evidence of accused-appellant does not show that he was completely deprived of intelligence or
consciousness of his acts when he committed the crime, there is sufficient indication that he was suffering from
some impairment of his mental faculties; thus, he may be credited with the mitigating circumstance of
diminished willpower. (People of the Philippines v. Pantoja, G.R. No. 223114, November 29, 2017, Third
Division)
ANALOGOUS CAUSES
1. Ellano's testimony indicates that around 6:30 in the morning on August 13, 1990, before the shooting incident,
he received a call from accused-appellant asking for police assistance as his family was reportedly in danger.
The prosecution's evidence showed that after the incident, accused-appellant went back to his house and the
policemen later on arrived. Ellano confirmed that as he and his team of policemen approached the gate of
accused-appellant's residence, the latter appeared and surrendered himself, his firearm and Danilo's revolver.
The confluence of the foregoing circumstances justifies the appreciation of a mitigating circumstance of a
similar nature or analogous to voluntary surrender, under number 10, Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code.
Indeed, it would appear that accused-appellant returned home following the incident and resolved to remain
there, knowing that the police was on its way to his house. And as the policemen approached his home, he
directly gave himself up to them. If accused-appellant wanted to abscond, he could have readily done so but
this, he did not do. (People of the Philippines v. PFC Reyes, G.R. No. 224498, January 11, 2018, First Division)
AGGR AV ATIN G C IR C U MS TAN C E
INSULT OR DISRESPECT OF OFFENDED PARTY’S STATUS

1. For this aggravating circumstance to be appreciated, the accused must know that the person attacked was a
person in authority or his agent in the exercise of his duties. This is because the accused must have the intention
to offend, injure, or assault the offended party as a person in authority or agent of a person in authority. (Guelos
v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 177000, June 19, 2017, Third Division)
NIGHTTIME
1. The aggravating circumstance of nighttime as strong indications show that the accused specifically sought it to
facilitate the commission of the crime. (People of the Philippines v. Sisracon, G.R. No. 226494, February 14,
DWELLING
1. Dwelling aggravates the felony because it has been established that appellant’s group violated the victims’
home by destroying the same and attacking his entire family therein, without provocation on the part of the
latter. (People of the Philippines v. Jugueta, G.R. No. 202124, April 5, 2016, En Banc)
2. Had it been alleged in the informations, the aggravating circumstance of dwelling can be appreciated
considering that the victims were inside their dwelling when the crimes were committed. (People of the
Philippines v. Libre, G.R. No. 192790, August 1, 2016, Third Division)
3. The aggravating circumstance of dwelling should be taken into account. Although the triggerman fired the shot
from outside the house, the victims were at their azotea in their house. (People of the Philippines v. Sibbu, G.R.
4. The aggravating circumstance of dwelling need not be "deliberately and purposely intended" by an accused for
it to be appreciated. Rather, it aggravates the felony when the crime was committed in the residence of the
offended party and the latter did not give any provocation. It is considered an aggravating circumstance
primarily because of the sanctity of privacy accorded to the human abode. (People of the Philippines v.
Kalipayan, G.R. No. 229829, January 22, 2018, Third Division)
5. Dwelling aggravates a felony if it is committed in the victim's home without the latter's provocation. It is an
aggravating circumstance because of the sanctity of privacy which the law accords to the human abode. Here,
it was amply established that Pagkatipunan just barged into the dwelling of AAA and her family, took advantage
of the moment while his neighbors' minor daughter was sleeping alone in the sala, and sexually ravaged her
right there and then. His blatant violation of the sanctity of AAA and her family's dwelling aggravated the crime
of rape. For the commission of a crime in another's dwelling shows worse perversity and produces graver harm.
He who goes to another's house to hurt him or do him wrong is more guilty than he who offends him elsewhere.
(People of the Philippines v. Pagkatipunan, G.R. No. 232393, August 14, 2019, Second Division)
6. The aggravating circumstance of dwelling can be appreciated since it was established that the crime of robbery
with homicide was committed inside the victim’s house without provocation of the latter. (People of the
Philippines v. Lignes, G.R. No. 229087, June 17, 2020, First Division)
BAND
1. If robbery with homicide is committed by a band, the indictable offense is still denominated as robbery with
homicide under Article 294(1) of the RPC. The element of band would be appreciated as an ordinary aggravating
circumstance. (People of the Philippines v. Espia, G.R. No. 213380, August 10, 2016, Third Division)
ABUSE OF STRENGTH
1. Even though the lower courts found that abuse of superior strength attended the commission of the crime, it
was not appreciated as a qualifying or aggravating circumstance because it cannot serve to qualify or aggravate
the felony at issue since it is jurisprudentially settled that when the circumstance of abuse of superior strength
concurs with treachery, the former is absorbed by the latter. (People of the Philippines v. Edaño, G.R. No.
206970, July 29, 2015, First Division)
2. The element of abuse of superior strength can be appreciated in the killing of Laude. Pemberton is a member
of the US Marine Corps, which is known to have the strictest recruitment standards among the Uniformed
Services of the US Armed Forces. In view of the rigorous physical and mental training requirements for
enlistment, all members of the Marine Corps possess superior strength and exceptional combat skills. On the
other hand, Laude, albeit biologically a man, is a transgender who chose to adopt a woman’s physical
appearance and behavior. Thus, it is clear that there is manifest physical disparity between respondent and
Laude and that the former took advantage of his superior strength to cause the death of Laude, as evidenced
by the multiple abrasions and contusions found on the latter. (Pemberton v. De Lima, G.R. No. 217508, April
3. The fact that there were two persons who attacked the victim does not per se establish that the crime was
committed with abuse of superior strength, there being no proof of the relative strength of the aggressors and
the victim. The evidence must establish that the assailants purposely sought the advantage, or that they had
the deliberate intent to use this advantage. (People of the Philippines v. Avila, G.R. No. 201584, June 15, 2016,
Third Division)
4. The trial court mistakenly appreciated the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength. The
prosecution failed to proffer proof as to the relative disparity in age, size and strength, or force, except the
showing that three assailants, one of them armed with a pointed object, attacked Roger. Neither did it present
evidence to show that Roger suffered from an inferior physical condition from which the circumstance could
be inferred. In fact, there was evidence that Roger was able to parry the fist blows delivered by Suarez and

Vivencio. (People of the Philippines v. Suarez, G.R. No. 224889, October 19, 2016, Second Division; People of
the Philippines v. Aquino, G.R. No. 203435, April 11, 2018, Third Division; People of the Philippines v. Miraña,
G.R. No. 219113, April 25, 2018, Third Division)
5. The circumstance of abuse of superior strength is present. Records disclose that during the commission of the
offense, Nicanor Vallecera was hogtied by three of the perpetrators while Erlinda Vallecera, a woman, was
successivelya nd fatally injured using a samurai sword and a long knife. Clearly, the means employed by the
culprits were patently excessive, there being no indication of retaliation from the spouses Vallecera as their
means of defense were greatly, if not absolutely, diminished. (People of the Philippines v. Olazo, G.R. No.
220761, October 3, 2016, First Division)
6. Mere superiority in number does not ipso facto indicate an abuse of superior strength. The determination must
take into account all the tools, skills and capabilities available to the accused and to the victim to justify a finding
of disproportionality; otherwise, abuse of superior strength is not appreciated as an aggravating circumstance.
(People of the Philippines v. Villanueva, G.R. No. 226475, March 13, 2017, Third Division; People of the
Philippines v. Evasco, G.R. No. 213415, September 26, 2018, First Division)
7. The sole fact that there were two persons who attacked the victim does not per se establish that the crime was
committed with abuse of superior strength, especially when their respective attacks were in fact done
alternately, one after the other. (People of the Philippines v. Santillan and Borromeo, G.R. No. 227878, August
8. Abuse of superior strength attended Diego’s killing. Diego was 72 years old when he was killed. His assailants –
Pastor, Rene Boy, and Junnel – were respectively 50, 27, and 18 years old. Given the disparity in their ages, the
assailants were physically stronger than the victim. Additionally, the manner by which the assailants killed Diego
– they took turns in beating and hitting him - reflects how they took advantage of their superior strength to
weaken the defense and guarantee execution of the offense.
a. When treachery and abuse of superior strength coincides, abuse of superior strength is absorbed by
treachery. (People of the Philippines v. Dimapilit, G.R. No. 210802, August 9, 2017, Second Division)
9. The evidence adduced by the prosecution established that only Cresencio approached Leon while the latter
was in his bodega. Thereafter, Cresencio, following an argument, stabbed Leon multiple times. It was only when
Leon escaped from Cresencio that Emilio appeared and stabbed the victim on his chest. Considering that the
perpetrators attacked the victim alternatively and did not combine their superior strength to overwhelm the
victim, they could not be said to have taken advantage of their superior strength. (People of the Philippines v.
Campit, G.R. No. 225794, December 6, 2017, Third Division)
10. Abuse of superior strength is not to be considered as an aggravating circumstance in view of the existence of
the conspiracy; thus, the same is deemed inherent. (People of the Philippines v. Sisracon, G.R. No. 226494,
February 14, 2018, Second Division)
11. The qualifying element of abuse of superior strength was established. Here, it has been established that the
two victims were defenseless old women – Romana at 74 years old, and Leonila at 65 years old. In contrast,
Manuel was shown armed with a deadly weapon. Further, at the time of the incident, Manuel was around 36
years old, in the prime of his years. Thus, the trial and appellate courts correctly convicted Manuel of two (2)
counts of murder for the deaths of Romana and Leonila. (People of the Philippines v. Corpus, G.R. No. 215320,
February 28, 2018, Third Division)
12. While abuse of superior strength is absorbed in treachery and thus cannot be appreciated as a separate
qualifying or aggravating circumstance, it may be appreciated as a distinct circumstance when treachery is
absent. (People of the Philippines v. Reyes, G.R. No. 227013, June 17, 2019, Second Division)
13. Here, it is evident that appellant and his co-accused took advantage of their number and weapons to put the
victim at a notorious disadvantage. The four (4) accused took turns in hacking Ruben with the samurai. They
also stabbed him with a knife and hit his nape with a rock causing his head to crack. The balance of strength
excessively tilted in their favor. Appellant and his co-accused overwhelmed the victim with their sudden
synchronized assault. A disparity in strength and number was clear. The fact that Ruben attempted to fend off
Pagapulaan with a samurai did not automatically negate abuse of superior strength. For when the four (4)
accused ganged up on him during the squabble, they managed to disarm Ruben. In contrast, they armed
themselves with the samurai, a knife and a stone. Obviously, the force they used far exceeded the means of
defense available to Ruben. All told, abuse of superior strength qualified his killing to murder. (People of the
Philippines v. Pagapulaan, G.R. No. 216936, July 29, 2019, Second Division)
14. Two armed assailants as against an unarmed victim and companions constitute taking advantage of superior
strength. (People of the Philippines v. Pespenian, G.R. No. 242413, September 4, 2019, Second Division)

15. Abuse of superior strength and employment of means are taken as one and the same aggravating circumstance.
Further, it appears that employment of means to weaken the defense is, at the very least, subsumed under the
qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength. Thus, in determining whether the qualifying
circumstance of employing means to weaken the defense is present in this case the Court shall be guided by
the same standard in determining the presence of abuse of superior strength, i.e., "notorious inequality of
forces between the victim and the aggressor/s that is plainly and obviously advantageous to the aggressor's and
purposely selected or taken advantage of to facilitate the commission of the crime."
a. Here, Alma's testimony is clear as to how appellants stabbed Michael successively using their respective
weapons. The fact that Michael was unarmed, that he as ganged up by appellants, and that the latter were
equipped with and took advantage of their respective knives and kawit in inflicting fatal wounds on
Michael, show a notorious inequality of forces which was obviously advantageous to the appellants.
(People of the Philippines v. Maron, G.R. No. 232339, November 20, 2019, Second Division)
16. Accused-appellant’s abuse of his strength over Carmen qualifies his crime to frustrated murder, considering
that it is no longer absorbed by the now nonexistent circumstance of treachery. In several cases, the Court
consistently held that an attack made by a man with a deadly weapon upon an unarmed and defenseless woman
constitutes the circumstance of abuse of that superiority which his sex and the weapon used in the act afforded
him, and from which the woman was unable to defend herself. The pieces of evidence show that at the time of
her attack, Carmen was unarmed and without any means to fend off accused-appellant's attacks with his bolo.
(People of the Philippines v. Enojo, G.R. No. 240231, November 27, 2019, Third Division)
17. There is abuse of superior strength when nine (9) persons attacked Feliciano, Sr. (People of the Philippines v.
Pigar, G.R. No. 247658, February 17, 2020, First Division)
18. The qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength cannot be appreciated since none of the prosecution
witnesses saw how the killing was perpetrated. The testimonies of the witnesses do not establish that appellant
made any conscious effort to use his age, size, or strength to facilitate the commission of the crime. (People of
the Philippines v. Bacares, G.R. No. 243024, June 23, 2020, First Division)
19. The lower courts correctly held that there was inequality of forces between Pangcatan and Richelle because his
height and built were superior to hers. He was armed with a gun during the incident while Richelle was
defenseless. Richelle could not have put up any effective resistance when she was dragged by the hair from the
tricycle and suddenly shot. Thus, the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength was properly
considered. (People of the Philippines v. Pangcatan, G.R. No. 245921, October 5, 2020, Third Division)
20. The killing of Romy was attended by abuse of superior strength. There was numerical superiority with the
accused and the force exerted by them to commit the crime was out of proportion to the means of defense
available to the victim. Romy was attacked by several men, particularly Manuel, Poly and Crispolo, who had
weapons including dos por dos, screwdriver, and bolo. The accused took advantage of their superior strength
to assault and kill Romy who was alone and defenseless. The attack made by Manuel and Poly were likewise
out of proportion to the means avaialbe to Romy. As established by the prosecution, Romy was already
unarmed when the accused attacked him. (People of the Philippines v. Catulang, G.R. No. 245969, November
21. Abuse of superior strength cannot be appreciated. It is beyond doubt that petitioner was superior to AAA in
terms of age, size, and strength. Nonetheless, the records fail to show that petitioner purposely selected or
took advantage of such inequality to facilitate the commission of the crime. As held in People v. Evasco, the
assailant must be shown to have consciously sought the advantage or to have the deliberate intent to use his
superior advantage. Thus, to take advantage of superior strength means to purposely use force excessively out
of proportion to the means of defense available to the person attacked. In his attempt to kill AAA after
performing his lascivious acts, petitioner did not purposely use and take advantage of his superior strength.
After petitioner and AAA pulled each other for about 35 minutes, petitioner merely carried AAA and threw her
into the deep ravine. There is no showing that he used force excessively out of proportion before throwing her
into the ravine. Observably, while the Information alleges that AAA sustained multiple abrasions in the upper
and lower extremities, the examination conducted by Dr. Cristobal-Gonzalo was only on the hymen of AAA.
Likewise, no evidence was offered by the prosecution to prove the physical injuries allegedly sustained by AAA.
Thus, the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength does not obtain. (Uddin v. People of the
22. The RTC and the CA were correct in ruling that the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength
attended the commission of the crime. The Court quotes with approval the following ratiocination of the CA:
“This Court noted the testimony of the victim that while Oliver was holding him, Benjamin took the opportunity
and hacked him. His testimony was corroborated by the testimony of Irma that while Oliver and Glenn were
fighting, Benjamin hacked the latter on the face. The victim further stated that Oliver and Benjamin, together
with Maximo mauled and kicked Glenn. This Court observed that the appellants’ moves are in unity and
indicative of how they took advantage of their superior strength. We are of the same view with the OSG that

appellants did not only take advantage of their numerical superiority, they also armed themselves with bolos
to render their victim defenseless as there was a huge disparity and inequality of forces between them.”
(Oliveros v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 242552, March 3, 2021, First Division)
23. Abuse of superior strength is not established. The fact that accused-appellants, all armed with dangerous
weapons, ganged up on SPO1 Rufino does not automatically merit the conclusion that the victim's killing was
attended by the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength. Jurisprudence provides that for abuse
of superior strength to be appreciated, the evidence must establish that the assailants purposely sought the
advantage, or that they had the deliberate intent to use this advantage. To take advantage of superior strength
means to purposely use excessive force out of proportion to the means of defense available to the person
attacked. In this case, there is no clear showing that accused-appellants deliberately and specifically sought the
use of knives, screwdriver, and a broken bottle, so as to be able to take advantage of their superior strength
against SPO1 Rufino. As can be gleaned from the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, there was already
an ensuing affray between Eric and accused-appellants. One of the accused-appellants stepped on his neck,
while Ronnie attempted to stab him with a screw driver. Fortunately, Eric's uncle, Mangaliman, came to his
rescue, and immediately prevented accused-appellants from further harming him. The prosecution also
established that SPO1 Rufino came to the crime scene after hearing Eric's cry for help. In fact, SPO1 Florence
categorically declared that she met Eric on her way to following her husband SPO1 Rufino to the crime scene.
By this turn of events, it cannot be reasonably deduced that accused-appellants deliberately and specifically
sought the use of deadly weapons so as to be able to take advantage of their superior strength. As accused-
appellants' conviction cannot be made to rest on such possibility, the killing of the victim cannot be qualified by
abuse of superior strength, which must be proved with the same quantum of evidence as the crime itself, that
is, beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, accused-appellants are guilty of only homicide, not murder. (People of the
Philippines v. Bautista, G.R. No. 247961, June 16, 2021, Third Division)
EVIDENT PREMEDITATION
1. To appreciate evident premeditation, the following must be proven beyond reasonable doubt: (a) the time
when the accused determiend to commit the crime; (b) an act manifestly indicating that the accused clung to
his determination; and (c) sufficient lapse of time between such determination and execution to allow him to
reflect upon the circumstances of his act. (People of the Philippines v. Salahuddin, G.R. No. 206291, January 18,
2. The prosecution failed to satisfy the requisites of evident premeditation. The records contain no evidence
regarding the planning and preparation of the killing of Janjoy. It was likewise not shown that accused-appellant
clung to his determination to kill Janjoy. In fact, the only thing established by the prosecution witness’ testimony
was accused-appelllant’s plan to kill Rovic Vasquez, not Janjoy. Thus, it cannot be said that accused-appellant
had a preconceived plan to kill Janjoy. (People of the Philippines v. Avila, G.R. No. 201584, June 15, 2016, Third
Division)
3. Evident premeditation attended the killing. The fact that they asked Lucy Sabando to lead them to Barte’s
house, and on a 2-kilometer walk, showed their determination to commit the crime and clung to it all the time
they were on the way to Barte’s house. (People of the Philippines v. Libre, G.R. No. 192790, August 1, 2016,
Third Division)
4. Evident premeditation was not established because, first, the prosecution evidence only referred to the matters
that happened during the incident, and not to the preparations undertaken by Dorado beforehand to kill
Ronald. There was no evidence on record which would indicate how and when Dorado hatched his plan to kill
Ronald. The mere fact that Dorado was seen with a sumpak at the beginning of the altercation does not
unequivocally establish that he earlier devised a deliberate plot to murder Ronaldo. Second, the prosecution
failed to show a sufficient lapse of time between such determination and execution to allow Dorado to reflect
upon the circumstances of his act. Lastly, Dorado did not have a cool thought and reflection when he shot
Ronald. (Dorado v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 216671, October 3, 2016, Second Division)
5. Evident premeditation cannot be appreciated. The prosecution failed to present any evidence showing that the
acts of the assailants were preceded by a reflection that led to a determined plan to kill Diego after sufficient
time had passed from the inception of the plan. In the absence of clear and positive evidence, mere
presumptions and inferences of evident premeditation, no matter how logical and probable, are insufficient.
(People of the Philippines v. Dimapilit, G.R. No. 210802, August 9, 2017, Second Division)
6. To qualify the killing of a person to the crime of murder, evident premeditation must be proven with reasonable
certainty. Facts regarding how and when the plan to kill was hatched are indispensable. The requirement of
deliberate planning should not be based merely on inferences and presumptions but on clear evidence. (People
of the Philippines v. Ordona, G.R. No. 227863, September 20, 2017, Third Division)

7. Evident premeditation cannot be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance in the crime of robbery with
homicide because the lements of which are already in the crime. Evident premeditation is inherent in crimes
against property. (People of the Philippines v. Layug, G.R. No. 223679, September 27, 2017, Second Division)
8. Mere animosity or mere existence of ill feelings or grudges between the parties is not sufficient to sustain
conclusion of premeditated killing. Furthermore, it cannot be said that enough time has passed to allowed
accused-appellant to reflect upon the consequence of his act. (People of the Philippines v. PFC Reyes, G.R. No.
9. Though accused-appellant went into the house in a sudden and unexpected manner, presumably to attack
Glaiza, there is no proof beyond reasonable doubt that he decided to do so and clung to this amounting to
evident premeditation. The Court cannot fully subscribe to the RTC's theory that accused-appellant planned to
confront Glaiza but did not plan to kill her. On the contrary, the evidence shows that when he swiftly entered
the house and went straight to the kitchen, he already had a decision to harm Glaiza. However, the element
that there was a sufficient lapse of time between the decision to commit the crime and its actual commission
was not proven satisfactorily inasmuch as it would qualify the killing as murder. The testimonies and object
evidence do not necessarily yield the conclusion that he clung to the determination to kill Glaiza. The decision
to kill prior to the moment of its execution must have been the result of meditation, calculation, reflection or
persistent attempts. This aspect was not proven by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt and as such,
evident premeditation cannot be said to be present here. (People of the Philippines v. Kalipayan, G.R. No.
10. In this case, evident premeditation was not established because the prosecution's evidence was limited to what
transpired at 6:00 in the evening of December 24, 2005, when Gerry came to his brother's house yelling and
threatening to kill them all. The prosecution, however, did not present any proof showing when and how Gerry
planned and prepared to kill Pelita. Also, the mere fact that the accused was armed at the beginning of the
altercation does not unequivocally establish that he earlier devised a deliberate plot to murder the victim. To
qualify an offense, the circumstance must not merely be "premeditation" but must be "evident premeditation."
Hence, absent a clear and positive proof of the overt act of planning the crime, mere presumptions and
inferences thereon, no matter how logical and probable, would not be enough. Evident premeditation cannot
be appreciated to qualify the offense in this case. (People of the Philippines v. Agramon, G.R. No. 212156, June
11. What was clearly shown was the presence of the three accused at the kiosk the day before and the very day of
the fatal incident. The CA held that their presence at the kiosk was to study the neighborhood and the
surroundings and make the kiosk a staging area for their plan to kill the victim. However, these were all
inferences devoid of any basis. No clear and convincing evidence was adduced to establish that these were the
purpose why the accused were at the kiosk before and on the day of the incident. As a matter of fact, the
prosecution even narrated that one of the accused, Lalamunan, even introduced himself as nephew of Palalon,
and also introduced Vertudez and petitioner Saldua. On that day, the three accused stayed at the kiosk from
10:00 a.m. to 12:00 noon then came back again at 2:00 p.m. They went back the day after. Verily, it leaves us
in doubt why the accused would volunteer their true identity and flaunt their faces in the neighborhood if they
were indeed hatching a plan to kill someone in the vicinity. In the absence of clear and positive evidence, mere
presumptions and inferences of evident premeditation, no matter how logical and probable, are insufficient.
(Saldua v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 210920, December 10, 2018, Third Division)
12. There is also no basis for the Court to appreciate the qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation. There
is evident premeditation when the following elements concur: (a) the time when the accused determined to
commit the crime; (b) an act manifestly indicating that the accused had clung to his determination to commit
the crime; and (c) the lapse of a sufficient length of time between the determination and execution to allow
him to reflect upon the consequences of his act. In this case, evident premeditation was not established because
the prosecution's evidence was limited to what transpired in the house of Leyden at 9:40 in the evening of July
19, 2004, when accused-appellant Edgar stabbed Leonora, while the latter was having a conversation with
Leyden. The prosecution did not present any proof showing when and how accused-appellant Edgar planned
and prepared to kill Leonora. (People of the Philippines v. Gayon, G.R. No. 230221, April 10, 2019, Second
Division)
13. Evident premeditation did not attend the killing. The victim's slaying was more spontaneous than planned.
Eyewitnesses testified that when appellant saw the victim pinned on the ground by Porfirio, he walked to them
and shot Jerry twice. Hence, there was no showing that the killing was plotted or that there was enough time
for appellant to reflect on the consequences of killing his victim before actually carrying it out. (People of the
Philippines v. Corpuz, G.R. No. 220486, June 26, 2019, Second Division)
14. Here, while appellants did threaten to kill Eusebio two (2) days before they actually killed him, the prosecution
failed to adduce evidence that appellants performed any overt act to follow through their threats. Although
appellants could have really intended to kill Eusebio when they threatened to kill him two (2) days before they

actually gunned him down, their threat alone, without outward acts showing they clung to their threat to kill
does not equate to evident premeditation. (People of the Philippines v. Galam, G.R. No. 224222, October 9,
15. When it is not shown as to how and when the plan to kill was hatched or what time had elapsed before it was
carried out, evident premeditation cannot be considered. To reiterate, evident premeditation must be based
on external acts and must be evident, not merely suspected, indicating deliberate planning. (People of the
Philippines v. Manansala, G.R. No. 233104, September 2, 2020, Second Division)
16. Evident premeditation was not established. The prosecution failed to show that Pangcatan plotted to kill
Richelle. Though the prosecution presented an audio recording from the cell phone recovered from Richelle
tending to imply that they had an argument prior to the date of the inciden, the prosecution failed to correlate
the audio recording with the shotting incident. The prosecution was not able to identify any external or outward
act that reveals Pangcatan’s intent to kill her. There could not have been any lapse of time as contemplated by
the RPC because the shooting incident occurred while they were in the heat of an argument. Thus, there was
no opportunity for Pangcatan to coolly deliberate on the consequences of his actions. (People of the Philippines
v. Pangcatan, G.R. No. 245921, October 5, 2020, Third Division)
17. There was evident premeditation. Dayrit initially monitored the presence of Ariel and subsequently drove back
and forth on Anak-Delita Street, ensuring that Ariel was still in the area. Dayrit was also seen wearing a black
jacket and helmet for him not to be recognized and he secretly followed Ariel and Lourdes while they were on
their way to a tricycle. Further, it was clearly shown that Dayrit and his companion planned the means on how
to carry out and facilitate the killing of the victims. The essence of evident premeditation is that the execution
of the criminal act is preceded by cool thought and reflection upon the resolution to carry out the criminal
intent within a space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment. In this case, the time that had elapsed while
monitoring the victims and while waiting for the perfect opportunity to execute the shooting is indicative of a
cool thought and reflection on the part of Dayrit to carry out his criminal intent. (People of the Philippines v.
Dayrit, G.R. No. 241632, October 14, 2020, First Division)
18. The aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation is present. The following circumstances indicated the
presence of evident premeditation: (a) the meeting of all the accused at 3 o’clock in the afternoon of July 29,
1997 at Binago Forest, Salimbal, Tinagpoloan to plan the killing of Pepito; (b) the act of buying and drinking
alcohol and arming themselves with four homemade guns, an improvised pistol, and bolos; and (c) a sufficient
lapse of time, that is, six hours from the time of their meeting at 3 o’clock in the afternoon until the time of
killing of Pepito at 9 o’clock in the evening. Undoubtledy, the appellants were determined to commit the crime.
The commission of the crime was clearly not a product of accident, as it was evident that they planned to kill
Pepito. However, being merely a generic aggravating circumstance, evident premeditation cannot qualify the
killing into murder. To reiterate, since treachery was sufficiently alleged in the Information and duly proven by
the prosecution, the killing of Pepito constitutes Murder and not merely Homicide as contended by the
appellants. Moreover, the prosecution failed to specifically allege in the Information the acts constituting
evident premeditation and as a result, cannot qualify the killing. Nevertheless, evident premeditation is to be
considered merely as a generic aggravating circumstance which is necessary in the correct imposition of
penalty. (People of the Philippines v. Natindim, G.R. No. 201867, November 4, 2020, Third Division)
19. Evident premeditation was not established beyond reasonable doubt. It was not proven that Rolando made a
previous decision to commit the crime. Neither was it shown that Rolando’s overt acts manifestly indicate that
he had clung to his determination to kill the victim. Lastly, the facts do not show the time when Rolando resolved
to commit the crime. The date and, if possible, the time when the malefactor determined to commit the crime
is essential, because the lapse of time for the purpose of the third requisite is computed from such date and
time. (People of the Philippines v. Aguila, G.R. No. 238455, December 9, 2020, First Division)
20. The killing was not premeditated. The eyewitness account of the incident simply failed to establish when the
assailants decided to commit the offense and the lapse of sufficient time from such decision until the
commission of the offense, necessary for the assailants to have reflected on their actions. (People of the
Philippines v. Toro, G.R. No. 245922, January 25, 2021, Second Division)
21. The prosecution failed to identify the time when Quijano decided to shoot Andong. Without this crucial data, it
is impossible to conclude that indeed, there was a sufficient period of time that passed between the former’s
determination to kill and his actual execution, which allowed him to mediate and reflect on his plans. Although
Andong claimed that Quijano mauled him a day prior to the shooting incident, this allegation was not sufficiently
proven. The alleged mauling was not witnessed by any other person. There was no police blotter or barangay
incident report that would support Andong’s allegation. In fact, during the trial, Andong admitted that he cannot
produce a barangay incident report. Certainly, these lingering doubts must be resolved in favor of Quijano.
(Quijano v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 202151, February 10, 2021, First Division)
DISGUISE

1. Wearing of masks in the commission of the crime falls within the aggravating circumstance of disguise because
there was a concealment of identity by the accused. (People of the Philippines v. Feliciano, Jr., G.R. No. 196735,
May 5, 2014, Third Division; People of the Philippines v. Feliciano, Jr., G.R. No. 196735, August 3, 2016, Special
Third Division)
2. The use of disguise was likewise correctly appreciated as an aggravating circumstance. The accused covered his
face with a bonnet during the shooting incident. There could be no other possible purpose for wearing a bonnet
over his face but to conceal his identity, especially since the witnesses and the accused lived in the same
barangay and are familiar with each other. (People of the Philippines v. Sibbu, G.R. No. 214757, March 29, 2017,
First Division)
TREACHERY
1. There is treachery when a group of fraternity men attacked the unarmed victims who were then eating lunch
on campus. The swiftness and suddenness of the attack gave no opportunity for the victims to retaliate even to
defend themselves. (People of the Philippines v. Feliciano, Jr., G.R. No. 196735, May 5, 2014, Third Division)
2. The unexpectedness of an attack cannot be the sole basis of a finding of treachery even if the attack was
intended to kill another as long as the victim’s position was merely accidental. The means adopted must have
been a result of a determination to ensure success in committing the crime. (Cirera v. People of the Philippines,
G.R. No. 181843, July 14, 2014, Third Division; People of the Philippines v. Francisco, G.R. No. 216728, June 4,
2018, Third Division; People of the Philippines v. Guro, G.R. No. 230619, April 10, 2019, Second Division)
a. The mere suddenness of an attack does not necessarily equate to treachery. The accused must have
knowingly, deliberately, and consciously adopted the means or method to ensure the execution of his
criminal purpose without risk to himself arising from the defense which the victim might offer, for the same
to be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance. (People of the Philippines v. Dela Cruz, G.R. No. 227997,
3. There is no treachery when, before the accused stabbed the private complainants, there has been immediate
altercation between the accused and one of the private complainants and when the accused was dismissed by
the other private complainant when the former asked him for money. The actions of the accused were his
impulsive reactions to the situation, which negate the existence of treachery. For treachery to be appreciated,
it must be shown that the accused consciously adopted or reflected on the means, method, or form of attack
to secure his unfair advantage. (Cirera v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 181843, July 14, 2014, Third
Division; People of the Philippines v. Aseniero, G.R. No. 218209, April 10, 2019, Second Division; People of the
Philippines v. Menil, G.R. No. 233205, June 26, 2019, Second Division)
4. There is no treachery when the victim had the opportunity to flee or defend himself. In this case, the records
show that a fistfight ensured between Eligio and Casas. Joel, seeing that Casas had stabbed Eligio, wanted to
help the latter by using a bamboo pole but slipped and feel. As he was lying prostrate on the floor, Casas
delivered the blows that ended Joel’s life. Under these circumstances, Joel was fully aware of the danger posed
in assisting Eligio. He knew that Casas was armed with a knife and had just used the same on Eligio. Joel elected
to intervene, and even armed himself with a bamboo pole. It was thus obvious that Joel was aware of the danger
to his life. Further, acting on the heat of the moment, and there being no showing that no appreciable interval
of time had elapsed from Joel’s mishap to his stabbing so as to allow for the assailant’s careful reflection, it does
not equally appear that Casas deliberately adopted means in order to ensure that Joel had no opportunity to
defend himself or retaliate. Casas just happened to stab Joel as the latter had just slipped on the floor when the
former caught up with him. Thus, treachery as a qualifying circumstance is discounted. (People of the
Philippines v. Casas, G.R. No. 212565, February 25, 2015, First Division)
5. The accused stabbed Gulane while Gulane was facing him. In addition, Gulane had been insulting the accused
and mocking him in a loud voice which had been sufficient provocation for accused to stab him. Thus, there is
no treachery. (People of the Philippines v. Oloverio, G.R. No. 211159, March 18, 2015, Second Division)
6. In this case, the accused, upon meeting Lumbera by the roadside, suddenly fired a sumpak against the latter,
leaving him unable to defend himself or evade the attack. The assault on Lumbera ensured that accused-
appellant would be able to consummate the crime without risk to his own person, hence, the qualifying
circumstance of treachery. (People of the Philippines v. Inciong, G.R. No. 213383, June 22, 2015, First Division)
7. Ambush exemplifies the nature of treachery as it is carried out to ensure that the victim is killed and at the same
time, to eliminate any risk from any possible defenses or retaliation from the victim. (People of the Philippines
v. Adriano, G.R. No. 205228, July 15, 2015, First Division)
8. Treachery, in this case, is evident from the fact that the method employed by the accused rendered Leonardo
helpless. Both of Leonardo’s arms were held by Nestor while accused-appellant was stabbing him. Clearly, this
manner of execution left the victim with no opportunity to defend himself or even to retaliate. (People of the
Philippines v. Edaño, G.R. No. 206970, July 29, 2015, First Division)

9. Treachery is evident. For one, the use of a shotgun against an unarmed victim is undoubtedly treacherous, as it
denies the victim the chance to fend off the offender. For another, the fact that accused-appellant hid first and
then blindsided the victim shows his conscious effort to adopt a deliberate attack which affords no warning to
the victim. (People of the Philippines v. Llobera, G.R. No. 203066, August 5, 2015, First Division)
10. Treachery is present when the accused shot Enrique at the back while he was deep in thought and listening to
the burial service. (People of the Philippines v. Villariez, G.R. No. 211160, September 2, 2015, Second Division)
11. Accused-appellant employed treachery when he killed the victim with a bolo at night time and while he was
sleeping. Clearly, the victim was not in a position to defend himself. In addition, accused-appellant consciously
and deliberately waited for the victim to sleep, returned to the house late at night, and armed himself with a
bolo to ensure the success of his atrocious act. (People of the Philippines v. Babor, G.R. No. 215319, October
12. The fatal shooting of Atty. Segundo was attended by treachery because he was then totally unaware that he
will be shot just 200 meters away from his residence. In addition, he was unarmed and was not given any
opportunity to defend himself or to escape from the deadly assault. (People of the Philippines v. Salahuddin,
G.R. No. 206291, January 18, 2016, Third Division)
13. Treachery is present when the accused stabbed Severino while the Severino and Vicente were conversing at
that time. In addition, the strategy employed by the accused in carrying out the attack guaranteed that he will
not be exposed to any risk which may arise from the defense the victim might make. (People of the Philippines
v. Roxas, G.R. No. 218396, February 10, 2016, Third Division)
14. Treachery attended accused’s sudden attack on Corazon inside her apartment. Corazon could not have been
aware that her life was in imminent danger inside the comforts of her own home. In addition, when accused
barged in, Corazon was having coffee with Joan, totally unaware that she would be attacked inside the confines
of her own house. Additionally, when accused grabbed her neck and stabbed her in the back, Corazon was
afforded no chance to defend herself and retaliate or repel the attack. (People of the Philippines v. De La Cruz,
G.R. No. 207389, February 17, 2016, Second Division)
15. Killing of hapless children is attended by treachery. (People of the Philippines v. Jugueta, G.R. No. 202124, April
5, 2016, En Banc; People of the Philippines v. Ohayas, G.R. No. 207516, June 19, 2017, Third Division)
16. For treachery to be considered, it must be present and seen by the witness right at the inception of the attack.
Where no particulars are known as to how the killing began, the perpetration of an attack with treachery cannot
be presumed. Here, Adolfo merely saw the victim being chased by two armed men and he could not describe
how the aggression began and who started it. (People of the Philippines v. Vargas, G.R. No. 208446, April 6,
17. Treachery attended the killing of Laude. Evidence reveals that respondent choked him from behind, thus
showing that the manner of attack employed by Pemberton rendered Laure unable to defend himself or to
retaliate. In addition, there was no provocation on the part of Laure to warrant such vicious attack as he went
with Pemberton on his own volition to engage in sexual acts in exchange of money. (Pemberton v. De Lima, G.R.
No. 217508, April 18, 2016, Second Division)
18. Treachery attended the commission of the crime. Evidence on record showed that the appellants assaulted and
killed Ilao while he was face down on the ground. The appellants took advantage of their victim’s helpless and
defenseless position to inflict the fatal stab wounds, giving their victim no chance at all to retaliate or defend
himself. As shown, Camposano went on top of Ilao and held him by the neck and stabbed him on the chest. De
los Reyes, on the other hand, stabbed the victim in his lower back. (People of the Philippines v. Camposano and
De los Reyes, G.R. No. 207659, April 20, 2016, Second Division)
19. The fact that the shooting of the three victims had occurred in quick succession fully called for a finding of the
attendance of treachery in the attacks against all the victims. Montegrico, Tamanu, and Paleg were drinking
together outside their bunkhouse prior to the shooting when the accused suddenly appeared from the rear of
the dump truck, walked towards their table, and shot Montegrico without any warning. The first shot was
quickly followed by more shots. In that situation, none of the three victims was aware of the imminent deadly
assault by the accused, for they were just enjoying their drinks outside their bunkhouse. They were unarmed,
and did not expect to be shot, when the accused came and shot them. (People of the Philippines v. Oandasan,
Jr., G.R. No. 194605, June 14, 2016, En Banc)
20. Treachery is present when the arms of the victim were held by Leopoldo and Algel when he was stabbed in the
back by accused Morales. In addition, Morales’ attack came without warning and without the slightest

provocation from the victim. (People of the Philippines v. Concepcion, G.R. No. 212206, July 4, 2016, Third
Division)
21. The victims were unaware that they would be attacked by accused with a hail of bullets from their firearms. In
fact, they were already in bed when Lucy Sabando called for help which prompted Ruben Barte to come out of
the house. Hence, the subsequent shooting was deliberate, unexpected, swift, and sudden which foreclosed
any escape, resistance or defense coming from the victims. (People of the Philippines v. Libre, G.R. No. 192790,
August 1, 2016, Third Division)
22. The element of treachery attended the shooting against Willy. Joven suddenly alighted from the motorcycle,
pointed his gun at Willy, and immediately shot him. The attack was sudden and unexpected. Willy, who was
unarmed, had no inkling that he would be shot such that he did not have any real chance to defend himself.
(People of the Philippines v. Geron, G.R. No. 208758, August 24, 2016, Third Division)
23. Treachery did not attend the killing of Ambrocio. It should be noted that the incident was precipitated by the
heated argument between petitioners and Ambrocio. Tempers were already high when the four of them were
leaving the barangay hall. At that point, Benjamin, Jr. grappled with Ambrocio for the control of the gun that
Ambrocio had brought with him. While the shooting was sudden, Ambrocio could not be said to have been
defenseless at that point as he was struggling and fighting back.
a. The killing of Ambrocio had been done in the heat of the moment and accordingly, renders inexistent the
conscious and deliberate adoption of the means, method, or form of the fatal shooting in order to ensure
the execution of the criminal design to kill. (Rustia, Jr. v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 208351, October
24. The shooting of Flores was not treacherous because it was done on impulse. Records show that Tuardon shot
Flores only because the latter was rushing towards him. While the attack was sudden, it was not deliberate as
Flores was not at the scene earlier. (People of the Philippines v. Tuardon, G.R. No. 225644, March 1, 2017,
Second Division)
a. Treachery is not appreciated agains the accused despite the attack being sudden and unexpected when
the meeting between him and the victim was casual, and the attack was done impulsively. (People of the
Philippines v. Petalino, G.R. No. 213222, September 24, 2018, First Division)
25. Treachery does not require that the perpetrator attack his victim from behind. Even a frontal attack could be
treacherous when unexpected and on an unarmed victim who would be in no position to repel the attack or
avoid it. (People of the Philippines v. Bugarin, G.R. No. 224900, March 15, 2017, Second Division)
26. It is true that after having seen what Bugarin had done to her husband and father-in-law, Maria Glen was already
forewarned of the danger to her life. She actually managed to flee and hide after she was shot. While such
ability to avoid greater harm by running away may be an indicator that no treachery exists, treachery may still
be appreciated where the victim was unarmed, defenseless, and unable to flee at the time of the infliction of
the coup de grace, as in this case. Bugarin already commenced his attack with a manifest intent to kill Maria
Glen but faailed to perform all the acts of execution by reason of causes independent of his will, i.e., poor aim.
Maria Glen was likewise not in any position to defend herself or repel the attack since she was unarmed. Thus,
the trial court aptly appreciated treachery as a circumstance to qualify the crimes to murder and attempted
murder. (People of the Philippines v. Bugarin, G.R. No. 224900, March 15, 2017, Second Division)
27. Treachery is present when the accused, armed with a sharp bladed weapon, attacked and repeatedly stabbed
the victim who, without slightest provocation and an opportunity to defend himself, was at that time sixty years
old and inferior in size and built. (People of the Philippines v. Ambatang, G.R. No. 205855, March 29, 2017,
Second Division)
28. Diego’s killing was qualified by treachery. Diego went to Pastor’s house, believing in good faith that Pastor would
just borrow his tricycle. Diego was never forewarned that danger awaits his destination. He even assured
Magdalena that he would immediately return since he would be sending off his brother to Mindoro. Not
expecting any peril for his life, he proceeded to Pastor’s house unarmed and alone. The four accused took turns
in beating and hitting him. Trapped and obviously outnumbered, Diego was undoubtedly put in a position where
he was helpless and unable to protect himself. When Junnel beat Diego, he tried to escape but Joel grabbed
him. Joel then punched him on the face. Consequently, Pastor hit him with a piece of wood rendering him
unconscious. Despite this, however, Rene Boy still proceeded to hit him with a crowbar. Rene Boy seemingly
assured himself that Diego would not be able to endure the attack. With these, the four accused succeeded in
killing him wihtout risk to themselves. (People of the Philippines v. Dimapilit, G.R. No. 210802, August 9, 2017,
Second Division)
29. Treachery cannot qualify the crime of robbery with homicide because robbery with homicide is classified as a
crime against property. Nevertheless, treachery is a generic aggravating circumstance in said crime if the victim

of the homicide is killed treacherously. (People of the Philippines v. Layug, G.R. No. 223679, September 27,
30. There was no treachery in this case. The prosecution did not prove that Duran intentionally sought the victim
for the purpose of killing him. The confrontation between Duran and Grimaldo appears to have been a chance
encounter. It was also not proven that Duran deliberately and consciously employed means, methods, or forms
in the execution of the criminal act to ensure that Grimaldo coild not defend himself. (People of the Philippines
v. Duran, G.R. No. 215748, November 20, 2017, Second Division)
31. Treachery qualified the killing of Mata. Records show that, apart from Orozco’s act of swiftly stabbing Mata
from behind, Mata was helpless against a group of persons with knives, who ganged up on him and held his
hands while stabbing him. (People of the Philippines v. Orozco, G.R. No. 211053, November 29, 2017, Third
Division)
32. While many of the stab and puncture wounds were frontally made, it is notable that Glaiza sustained posterior
wounds, which strengthens Josephine's claim that Glaiza was first struck in the back. Given this, and
uncontroverted by convincing evidence, the only reasonable conclusion that can be made is that the attack was
attended by treachery. Furthermore, the above details show that Glaiza was not expecting the attack. She was
also rendered helpless and unprotected not only by the swiftness of the attack, but also because she was
already stabbed in the back before even becoming fully aware that a reprehensible act was being committed
against her. From this, the first element of treachery is demonstrated without question. In addition, the time
and place, and manner of attack were deliberately chosen and accused-appellant was immediately cloaked with
impunity to ensure its successful execution. The time of the attack, at around 5:30 p.m., was a time in which
people usually prepare their supper and households are buzzing with activity. Accused-appellant's mode of
attack, of suddenly entering the house and going straight to where Glaiza was while the latter was preparing
food, is also clearly indicative of his nefarious plan to attack when Glaiza was not in a position to defend herself.
(People of the Philippines v. Kalipayan, G.R. No. 229829, January 22, 2018, Third Division)
33. In this case, appellant, coming from behind the victim, suddenly held the latter's neck using his left hand, and
with his right hand, stabbed the victim three to four times using a yellowish pointed metal. Clearly, the attack
was attended by treachery, considering that the means of execution of the attack gave the victim no
opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and said means of execution was deliberately adopted by
appellant. (People of the Philippines v. Condino, G.R. No. 219591, February 19, 2018, First Division)
34. In the instant case, Dennis had no inkling that an attack was forthcoming. Although Dennis and Rodolfo had an
altercation, they shook hands before parting ways. The said gesture assuaged Dennis into believing that their
issues have been sorted. However, to Dennis' surprise, Rodolfo came back after 15 minutes, this time
accompanied by three other armed men. Dennis, who was unarmed, was completely unaware of the imminent
peril to his life. In a rapid motion, the men, including Alex, suddenly shot Dennis with their sumpak. The
onslaught was so sudden and unexpected that Dennis had no chance to run, mount a defense or evade the
bullets. The deliberate stealth and swiftness of the attack employed by Alex and his cohorts, significantly
diminished the risk of retaliation from Dennis. Indubitably, there is no denying that the collective acts of the
accused and Alex reek of treachery. In fact, the medico-legal report confirmed that Dennis sustained multiple
gunshot wounds on various parts of his body. More so, the manner of the attack was witnessed by Noel, who
was seated seven meters away from the commotion. (People of the Philippines v. Grabador, Jr., G.R. No.
227504, June 13, 2018, Second Division)
35. That the attack was frontal does not rule out the existence of treachery; because it was so sudden and
unexpected that Bitoy, unarmed and had no chance to defend himself, was felled down by Siega's repeated
hacking blows. (People of the Philippines v. Siega, G.R. No. 213273, June 27, 2018, Second Division)
36. Here, it is unquestionable that Ramel was in no position to defend himself when Allan stabbed him. He was
previously mauled by five persons and at the time of the stabbing, Michael was holding him by his legs. Ramel's
weakened state and restricted movement rendered him unable to parry the lethal blows Allan inflicted on him.
Nevertheless, Ramel's defenseless state alone does not suffice to appreciate the existence of treachery. After
all, not only must the victim be shown defenseless, but it must also be shown that the accused deliberately and
consciously employed the means and method of attack. Similarly, when Jose came out of Anthony's house,
Allan and Michael, together with the other unknown assailants, were already assaulting Ramel. The aggression
continued until ultimately Allan stabbed Ramel. Jose never saw how the commotion commenced. As a result,
there is doubt whether accused-appellants consciously and deliberately adopted the means employed to kill
Ramel. It is doctrinal that all doubts must be resolved in favor of the accused. Consequently, treachery could
not be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance. (People of the Philippines v. Delima, G.R. No. 222645, June 27,
37. The witnesses were all consistent in declaring that accused-appellants suddenly fired at the three unsuspecting
victims who never had a chance to mount a defense. The victims, who were on their way to attend a wake and

happily conversing with one another, were caught off guard when all of a sudden, they were met with multiple
gunshots. In such a rapid motion, accused-appellants shot the victims, affording the latter no opportunity to
defend themselves or fight back. Without any doubt, the manner of execution was deliberately adopted by the
accused who were all armed with heavily powered firearms. They positioned themselves in what they termed
as "ambush position," at a distance where their victims could not easily see them, thereby ensuring that they
hit and terminate their targets. (People of the Philippines v. Gervero, G.R. No. 206725, July 11, 2018, Third
Division)
38. In this case, appellant and two others held the victim in place, while Jimbo delivered the stabbing thrusts on
the victim's body. And of the five punctured wounds sustained by the victim, three were fatal the victim's left
and right lungs, as well as his thoracic cavity, were punctured during the stabbing incident. Clearly, the victim's
stabbing was attended by treachery, considering that (a) the means of execution of the attack gave the victim
no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and (b) said means of execution was deliberately adopted by
appellant and his co-accused. (People of the Philippines v. Collamat, G.R. No. 218200, August 15, 2018, First
Division)
39. Indeed, it does not always follow that if the attack was sudden and unexpected, it should necessarily be deemed
as an attack attended with treachery. In fact, the wounds of the victim show that the attack was frontal, which
indicates that the deceased was not totally without opportunity to defend himself. Moreover, the stabbing,
based on the evidence, appears to be the result of a rash and impetuous impulse of the moment arising from
the commotion between Bobby and Rene which Ricky witnessed, rather than from a deliberated act of the will.
As far as the prosecution's evidence is concerned, it was only able to establish the following: (a) a commotion
was caused when Rene and Bobby were taunting each other; (b) Rene punched Bobby and (c) Ricky went out
of the plaza and stabbed Bobby. Considering the foregoing, it was not proven that Ricky deliberately and
consciously employed means, methods, or forms in the execution of the criminal act to ensure that Bobby could
not defend himself. Thus, it is not possible to appreciate treachery against Ricky. (People of the Philippines v.
Gonzales, G.R. No. 218946, September 5, 2018, Second Division)
40. The sudden attack on the victim who was then at home, bedridden, recuperating from sickness, completely
unaware of any danger and unable to defend himself constituted treachery because the accused-appellant was
thereby ensured that the victim would not be in any position to ward off or evade his blows, or strike back at
him. Evidently, the attack was executed in a manner that the victim was rendered defenseless and unable to
retaliate. There is thus no doubt that treachery attended the killing. Hence, the Court is in accord with the RTC
and the CA in giving credence to the testimony of the prosecution witnesses and finding that the prosecution
has aptly discharged its burden of proving, with moral certainty, the guilt of accused-appellant for the crime of
murder. (People of the Philippines v. Marzan, G.R. No. 207397, September 24, 2018, First Division)
41. It must also be observed that except for the RTC's presumption that Belludo was behind Ojeda at the time of
the shooting due to the location of the gunshot wound he sustained, no other proof was submitted and
considered by the trial court before drawing the conclusion that treachery was employed in Ojeda's killing. In
fact, the RTC did not fully discuss its appreciation of the circumstance of treachery. It merely held that rhe
gunshot wound as reflected in the Autopsy Report and as testified by Dr. Borja is at the "left Occipital bone of
the skull lacerating the Occipital lobe of the brain." In addition, the RTC added that this means that when the
accused shoot the victim, he was positioned behind or at the rear of the victim, thus, considering that the victim
was jogging and unarmed, he was not able to put up a defense. Verily, the gap in the prosecution's evidence
cannot be substituted by mere suppositions, as the trial court apparently did. Treachery cannot be appreciated
absent any particulars as to the manner in which the aggression commenced or how the act unfolded and
resulted in the death of the victim. Treachery cannot be presumed, but must be proven positively. Any doubt
as to its existence must be resolved in favor of accused-appellant. (People of the Philippines v. Belludo, G.R. No.
42. In the case at bar, the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses reveal that the melee was only a chance
encounter between the warring groups. More importantly, the deceased Wilbert "was just passing by after
making a phone call at a nearby site" when he was hit in the head by Serad with a piece of wood and then later
on continually hit by Bulutano. The foregoing thus negates the existence of the second requisite for treachery
to be appreciated, namely, that the offenders deliberately and consciously adopted the particular means,
method or form of attack employed by him. The meeting between the parties – Bulutano, Serad, and the victim
Wilbert – was casual, and the attack was done impulsively. Therefore, the killing could not have been attended
by treachery. (People of the Philippines v. Bulutano, G.R. No. 232649, November 28, 2018, Second Division)
43. The prosecution failed to show the presence of treachery as a qualifying circumstance. Pineda's testimony
began when accused-appellants were in the middle of mauling the victim, and there was no testimony to prove
that the victim did not provoke them or expect their attack. The prosecution did not present evidence that
would show that accused-appellants reflected on and decided on the form of their attack to secure an unfair
advantage over the victim. Even when accused-appellants returned after chasing the screaming woman and hit
the crawling victim with rocks, treachery is still absent. This is because the second attack was not a surprise, as

shown by the victim's attempt to go back to the safety of his own house. (People of the Philippines v. Magallano,
Jr., G.R. No. 220721, December 10, 2018, Third Division)
44. For this Court to appreciate treachery, it must be shown that offenders employed means, methods, or forms in
the execution of the crime that tend directly and especially to ensure its execution without risk to themselves
arising from the defense which the victim might make. In the instant case, the accused-appellants invited the
victim under the pretense of butchering a duck and brought him to a place where there were no houses nearby
in the middle of the night; the victim was unarmed while accused-appellants wielded a knife and an ice pick;
the victim was stabbed multiple times on the chest, held by the arms by the other, and again stabbed multiple
times on the back even after he had fallen down. These circumstances indubitably prove treachery; execution
of the attack gave the victim no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate, and said means of execution was
deliberately adopted by accused-appellants. (People of the Philippines v. Casemiro, G.R. No. 231122, January
45. The deceased victim, Carillero, was caught off guard when Ampo stabbed him. He thought all along that Ampo
and Calo merely wanted a ride. The stealth and swiftness by which the attack was carried out gave Carillero no
opportunity to evade when Ampo suddenly thrust the knife to his abdomen. Likewise, the assault was executed
in a methodical manner since Ampo made it certain that Carillero was already very near before he stabbed him.
The fact that Carillero was facing Ampo is of no moment. Even a frontal attack could be treacherous when
unexpected and on an unarmed victim who would be in no position to repel the attack or avoid it. (People of
the Philippines v. Ampo, G.R. No. 229938, February 27, 2019, Third Division)
46. The following circumstances negate the presence of treachery: First, the stabbing incident happened during a
drinking spree in which Don was already a part of. He did not deliberately seek the presence of Manuel as he
was already in the same vicinity as Manuel, joining the merriment when he stabbed the latter. Second, in killing
Manuel, Don merely picked up a bladed weapon from his table - there was no mention in the records as to who
owned the said weapon. In a similar case, the Court held that treachery cannot be presumed merely from the
fact that the attack was sudden. The suddenness of an attack does not, of itself, suffice to support a finding of
alevosia, even if the purpose was to kill, so long as the decision was made all of a sudden and the victim's
helpless position was accidental. Based on the first and second circumstances abovementioned, Don's decision
to attack Manuel was more of a sudden impulse on his part than a planned decision. Lastly, as testified to by
the witnesses of the prosecution, the incident happened during a drinking spree where there were more or less
15 people, excluding Don and Manuel. If Don wanted to make certain that no risk would come to him, he could
have chosen another time and place to stab Manuel. In another case, the Court held that when aid was easily
available to the victim, such as when the attendant circumstances show that there were several eyewitnesses
to the incident, no treachery could be appreciated because if the accused indeed consciously adopted means
to insure the facilitation of the crime, he could have chosen another place or time. Thus, the Court can
reasonably conclude that Don acted impetuously in suddenly stabbing Manuel. (People of the Philippines v.
Vega, G.R. No. 216018, March 27, 2019, Second Division)
47. Similar to Caliao, there is no showing in this case that accused appellant Edgar carefully and deliberately planned
the killing in the manner that would ensure his safety and success. Moreover, the testimony of the eyewitness
confirmed that Leonora was attacked at the place familiar to her and in the presence of other people who are
related to the victim. Under these circumstances, the Court finds it difficult to agree with the courts a quo that
accused-appellant Edgar deliberately chose a particular mode of attack that purportedly ensured the execution
of the criminal purpose without any risk to himself arising from the defense that the victim might offer. To
reiterate, the victim was with people who could have helped her repel the attack. The Court therefore fails to
see how the mode of attack chosen by accused-appellant Edgar, in a place familiar to the victim and in the
presence of the latter's relatives, supposedly guaranteed the execution of the criminal act without risk on his
end. In addition, the Court notes that the attack against Leonora was frontal. While a frontal attack, by itself,
does not negate the existence of treachery, when the same is considered along with the other circumstances
as previously discussed, it already creates a reasonable doubt in the existence of the qualifying circumstance.
As earlier stated, treachery must be proven as fully and convincingly as the crime itself; and any doubt as to
existence must be resolved in favor of the accused. (People of the Philippines v. Gayon, G.R. No. 230221, April
48. Here, appellants did not launch a surprise or sudden attack on Eusebio. The immediately preceding heated
argument between appellants, on one hand, and Eusebio, on the other, including appellants' threat to kill
Eusebio on the same occasion was sufficient warning to Eusebio of the impending fatal assault on his person.
Notably, right before he was gunned down, Eusebio even challenged Lito to fire the gun pointed on him "Sige,
iputok mo!" Eusebio, therefore, was not an "unsuspecting victim," nay, one who was completely oblivious of
the impending danger to his life coming from his assailants. Further, there was no showing that appellants
consciously or deliberately adopted any particular means, method, or form of attack to ensure the commission
of the crime without affording the victim any means to defend himself. The fact that Lito shot Eusebio in the
chest by itself does not mean it was consciously and deliberately employed. The use of gun, does not necessarily
imply treachery. (People of the Philippines v. Galam, G.R. No. 224222, October 9, 2019, Second Division)

49. Treachery attends the killing where the accused attacks the victim while the latter is asleep and unable to
defend himself. Absolutely, a sleeping victim is not in a position to defend himself, take flight, or otherwise
avoid the assault, thus ensuring that the crime is successfully executed without any risk to the attacker. In this
case, Ernie categorically stated that his father was sleeping inside the nipa hut when accused-appellant stabbed
him using a “pinuti.” Olipio was lying on his stomach, with his face down, and it was in that position that he was
killed by accused-appellant. Under such circumstance, there is no doubt that he was not in a position to put up
any form of defense against his assailant. (People of the Philippines v. Dela Peña, G.R. No. 238120, February 12,
50. Elements of treachery have been established. First, at the time of the attack Ryn Loui and Ramil were not in the
position to defend themselves. On board their motorcycle, they were not aware of any kind of risk or threat to
their lives until they reached the curved portion of the road when they saw the petitioner. They were rendered
defenseless at the time when the petitioner surprisingly fired successive shots at them while they were driving
and traversing the road. Second, the petitioner consciously adopted an attack that was deliberate, swift, and
sudden. To be exact, the petitioner did an “ambush” when he made a surprise attack upon Ryn Loui and Ramil
from a concealed position, which is the curved portion of the road. (Casilac v. People of the Philippines, G.R.
No. 238436, February 17, 2020, First Division)
51. Treachery attended the attack on Mijares. To recall, appellant’s sudden attack on Mijares happened while the
latter was asleep in his own home. Mijares had no inkling of the impending attack that night; or any peril to his
person as he felt secured in his home. Mijares was not able to put up an effective defense. Although he kicked
and pushed the appellant out of their room, this did not negate the presence of treachery. In addition, appellant
consciously and deliberately adopted the particular means, methods or forms of attack in order to ensure the
execution of the crime as he stabbed Mijares several times so that he would not be a risk to himself. He lodged
a bladed weapon on the victim’s chest and back. (People of the Philippines v. Moreno, G.R. No. 191759, March
52. There is treachery in this case. Based on the testimony of Lipusan, when the motorcycle driven by the victim
arrived, her back seat passenger alighted from the motorcycle and suddenly stabbed the victim from behind.
Then the passengers of the motorcycle who arrived earlier, helped in clubbing the victim. Later on, Alcala shot
the victim. This was supported by the medical report finding incised wounds on the victim’s back scapular area
or shoulder blade, lumbar area, and at the level of his back retinae. Also, there was a gunshot on the victim’s
back occipital area at the base of his skull. Inasmuch as the wounds were directed at the back of the victim, it
is then apparent that the attacks were made while the victim was not facing the assailants and, thus, was made
in a sudden and unexpected manner. The number of wounds inflicted on the victim and the way they attacked
underscores not only the culprits’ intent to kill him, but also their intention to deny him the chance to defend
himself or escape the attack. (People of the Philippines v. Atamosa, G.R. No. 233319, July 7, 2020, First Division)
53. The RTC and the CA correctly ruled that the prosecution was able to prove that treachery attended the killing
of the victim. As found by the RTC, the victim was already hit on his upper left arm when he sat on the stairs
leading to the comfort room. Without prior altercation or exchange of blows between the victim and accused-
appellant, the victim was unable to defend himself and was unaware when accused-appellant shot him. On the
other hand, accused-appellant knew fully well that the victim was already injured and in no position to defend
himself. Accused-appellant made sure that his objective would be accomplished by deliberately approaching
the injured and unarmed victim and when he was already near and surely would not miss, shot the victim on
the chest when the victim was almost standing up. Evidently, the form of attack employed by accused-appellant
ensured the commission of the crime without risk to himself. (People of the Philippines v. Silvederio III, G.R. No.
54. The elements of treachery are present. Records show that Manansala stealthily entered the house of the victim
and shot him while he was going upstairs. The fatal wound was inflicted from behind since the entry poi was
located at the back lumbar region while the exit point was at the front portion of the victim’s body with the
trajectory traversing upwards. These clearly indicate that the victim was going upstairs with his back towards
the assailant when he was shot. Incidentally, treachery was also proven by the CCTV footages presented in court
and testified on by witness Asas. (People of the Philippines v. Manansala, G.R. No. 233104, September 2, 2020,
Second Division)
55. Treachery attended the killing of Reynald. Here, Reynald was just talking to Pesania and Lapuz in front of the
store when appellant Lagrita and Mier arrived. Lagrita then went at Reynald’s back and without any warning,
hit him on his nape with a piece of firewood. Reynald was completely unaware that such attack was coming,
hence, he had no opportunity at all to defend himself. Lagrita deliberately and consciously adopted such mode
of attack in order to avoid any risk to himself which may arise from any defense that Reynald might make.
(People of the Philippines v. Lagrita, G.R. No. 233194, September 14, 2020, First Division)

56. Treachery cannot be appreciated once it appears that the victim was forewarned of the danger he was in, and
instead of fleeing from it, met it and was killed or serious injured as a result. This is because treachery
presupposes a sudden, unexpected, and unforeseen attack on the victim. (People of the Philippines v. Archivido,
G.R. No. 233085, September 21, 2020, Third Division)
57. Treachery has nothing to do with the number of times that an assailant stabs a victim. That appellant stabbed
the victim only once does not mean that the act was done at the spur of the moment. In determining the
presence of treachery, it is not necessary that the mode of attack insure the consummation of the offense. The
treacherous character of the means employed in the aggression does not depend upon the result thereof but
upon the means itself, in connection with the aggressor’s purpose in employing it. Granting that one stab on is
own may not be as fatal as multiple stabs, the fact that appellant chose to stab the victim in his right abdomen
where vital organs reside shows that he consciousl and deliberately adopted a mode of attack intended to
ensure the killing. More so, that the prosecution witnesses were not able to stop or prevent the stabbing, even
if they were merely a few meters away from appellant and the victim, bolsters the fact that the attack upon the
latter was executed so suddenly and swiftly. Further, the victim was in a seated position when he was stabbed
him from a standing position. The victim did not have any idea that he was vulnerable to an attack, considering
that he was merely enjoying a drinking session with friends, oblivious to the sinister intent of appellant. (People
of the Philippines v. Maghuyop, G.R. No. 242942, October 5, 2020, First Division)
58. The prosecution has established that the qualifying circumstance of treachery is present. Records show that in
the evening of August 31, 2013, Ariel and Lourdes were merely boarding a tricycle, unaware of the danger. All
of a sudden, Dayrit, while on board a motorcycle, launched an attack, shooting at his victims successively. It was
clear that the manner of attack employed by Dayrit was deliberate and unexpected. Likewise, there was no
opportunity to defend themselves. With the given circumstances, it is impossible for the victims to retaliate.
(People of the Philippines v. Dayrit, G.R. No. 241632, October 14, 2020, First Division)
59. There was treachery. The prosecution was able to establish the fact that at the time of the attack, Cumahig was
unarmed and in the comforts of their home with their common children. In this case, the swift and sudden
stabbing done by Ivero left Cumahig with no sufficient means to put up a defense as there were no items found
in the scene of the crime other than the kitchen knife used by Ivero. Cumahig was rendered helpless by the
situation and all she could do is muster the strength to seek succor from her neighbors after the stabbing
incident. The suddenness of the attack may be inferred from the testimony of Sadic, the neighbor separated by
a thin piece of plywood, who only heard the cry for help of the victim only after the stabbing. The absence of
any verbal or physical squabble prior to the attack proves that Cumahig was not able to put up a fight and did
not provoke the attack of the accused. Further, the fact that there was no defense wound bolsters the fact that
the attack was unexpected. Also, the fact that all five stab wounds were frontal does not negate treachery. Even
a frontal attack could be treacherous when unexpected and on an unarmed victim who would be in no position
to repel the attack or avoid it. (People of the Philippines v. Ivero, G.R. No. 236301, November 3, 2020, First
Division)
60. Treachery absorbs the aggravating circumstances of abuse of superior strength, in aid of armed men, and
nighttime as these are necessarily included in the qualifying aggravating circumstance of treachery.
d. Unless the aggravating circumstance of nighttime was purposely sought and founded on different factual
bases, then nighttime can be considered as a separate generic aggravating circumstance, which is however
not present in this case. The prosecution failed to prove by sufficient evidence that nighttime was
purposely and deliberately sought by the appellants. (People of the Philippines v. Natindim, G.R. No.
61. When aid was easily available to the victim, no treachery could be appreciated.
d. Treachery was not established beyond reasonable doubt. As testified to by the witnesses of the
prosecution, the incident happened in broad daylight during the wedding reception of Cristina in a public
place where there were plenty of other people present who could have offered their help. If Rolando
waned to make certain that no risk would come to him, he could have chosen another time and place to
stab the victim. In a similar case, the Court held that when aid was easily available to the victim, such as
when the attendant circumstances show that there were several eyewitnesses to the incident, including
the victim’s family, no treachery could be appreciated because if the accused indeed consciously adopted
means to insure the facilitation of the crime, he could have chosen another place or time. (People of the
Philippines v. Aguila, G.R. No. 238455, December 9, 2020, First Division)
62. The uniform finding of the RTC and the CA that Capongol suddenly and unexpectedly shot Josephine inside the
restaurant remains undisputed. The fact that Capongol casually entered and ordered iced tea before firing
successive shots could not have forewarned Josephine of the harm that Capongol was about to inflict upon her.
That alevosia or treachery attended the killing of the victim was apparent from the fact that Capongol
deliberately made it appear that he was a regular customer, thereby ensuring that Josephine would not suspect
or put on a defense against the attack. (People of the Philippines v. Capongol and Bio, G.R. No. 239783, January

63. The elements of treachery were present: at the time of the attack, Bagan was not in a position to defend himself
from the suddenness and swiftness thereof. He had no inkling that an attack was forthcoming and had no
opportunity to mount a defense. While Bagan was seated on the floor watching TV with his back towards the
screen door, Perreira surreptitiously entered the Bagans’ house and immediately wrapped his left arm around
Bagan’s neck, and with the knife in his right hand repeatedly stabbed him in the chest. Palpably, from the pieces
of evidence passed upon by the trial court, the facts show that treachery was employed by Perreira. The attack
was sudden and unexpected, as testified to by Virgie. On the whole, treachery was correctly appreciated as a
circumstance to qualify the crime to murder. (People of the Philippines v. Pereira, G.R. No. 220749, January 20,
64. The lower courts erroneously appreciated treachery. Here, the lone prosecution eyewitness saw his father
being held by Cahusay while appellant stabbed him 33 times. Certainly, the number of wounds inflicted reveals
a determined intent to kill. Of the 33 stab wounds inflicted, 10 of which were fatal as they got inflicted near the
heart while the other three ruptured the victim’s lungs. But, Espiña, Jr. was not able to witness the
commencement of the aggression or initial attack, hence, he was not able to testify thereon. He did not give an
account either on how the attack resulted in the victim’s death. As it was, his eyewitness account was limited
to the stabbing incident itself. There was no mention at all that the attack was sudden and unexpected, leaving
the victim totally unable to defend himself or even ran away. Treachery, therefore, cannot be appreciated to
qualify the killing to murder. The victim’s son only chanced upon a slim portion or momentary episode of the
attack against his father, raising doubt whether the victim was indeed deprived the opportunity to defend
himself. In People v. Enriquez, Jr., the Court refused to appreciate treachery because the prosecution witness,
Luisa and Jessica, did not see how the attack commenced or how the events leading to the victim’s death
unfolded as the attack started inside the victim’s house. The evidence presented by the prosecution only proved
the events after the initial attack had already happened, i.e., they merely saw Dela Cruz, already bloodied,
coming out of his house. Treachery, according to the Court, cannot be considered where the lone witness did
not see the commencement of the assault.
a. At best, the prosecution merely proved that appellant and Cahusay took advantage of their superior
strength and employed means to weaken the victim’s defense – circumstances which would have qualified
the killing of murder were they alleged in the Information. The Court, nevertheless, is not precluded from
considering this circumstance in awarding exemplary damages pursuant to People v. Jugueta. (People of
the Philippines v. Toro, G.R. No. 245922, January 25, 2021, Second Division)
65. The qualifying circumstance of treachery was proven. Records show that accused lured his young sweetheart
to meet him in a very secluded place which was the cemetery on the promise that he was giving her a surprise
gift which he claimed to be a necklace. It appears that once they were in that place, he blindfolded the victim.
At this juncture, instead of giving the girl a gift, he hacked her with a bolo and then banged her head against a
concrete tomb. Clearly, the victim did not even know what hit her. There was no way the girl could have
defended herself from the sudden and unexpected attack on her person. She did not even have the chance to
run away because she was blindfolded. It is well-settled that an unexpected and sudden attack under
circumstances which render the victim unable and unprepared to defend himself/herself, as in the case of
herein victim Rose Yuzon, constitutes treachery. (People of the Philippines v. Masilang, G.R. No. 246466,
January 26, 2021, First Division)
66. A scrutiny of the records reveals that Quijano attacked Andong in an unexpected and rapid manner. Quijano
banged the door of Andong’s home and shouted the latter’s name. This sudden intrusion occurred at the dead
of night, while Andong and his family were asleep. In fact, Quijano swiftly shot Andong immediately after the
latter rose from the bed. The onslaught was so sudden and swift that Andong had no chance to mount a
defense. He had no inkling that an attack was forthcoming and was completely unaware of the imminent peril.
In turn, the deliberate swiftness of the attack significantly diminished the risk to Quijano that may be caused by
Andong’s retaliation. Furthermore, Quijano deliberately and consciously adopted such vicious mode of attack.
He used a firearm to easily neutralize Andong and fired from a position of relative safety. Moreover, he had a
flashlight to ensure the success of his attack. Thus, there can be no denying that Quijano’s assault reeks of
treachery.
a. Treachery can still be appreciated even if the victim was forewarned of the attack. The decisive factor is
that despite the warning, the execution of the attack made it impossible for the victim to defend himself
or to retaliate. The same holds true if the prior warning did not diminish the suddenness of the attack.
b. In the same regard, the existing animosity between the parties does not negate treachery. It has been ruled
that treachery is not dispelled by a prior grudge between the parties if the victim had no inkling that an
attack was forthcoming or was not in a position to defend himself. (Quijano v. People of the Philippines,
G.R. No. 202151, February 10, 2021, First Division)
67. In this case, accused-appellant hid the bolo behind his back and attacked Nuevo and Ranien who were caught
unaware and unable to defend themselves or to retaliate. The acts of accused-appellant clearly indicate that
the attack was sudden, unexpected, and consciously adopted. The lower courts did not err in ruling that

treachery attended the commission of the crimes and qualified them to Murder. (People of the Philippines v.
Zapata, G.R. No. 241952, March 17, 2021, Third Division)
68. The fact that Santiago was positioned at a particular location and particular time while holding a rifle, showed
that he consciously and deliberately adopted the means to commit the crime. Thus, Santiago’s sudden attack
on Artemio, Sr. constitutes treachery thereby qualifying the killing to the crime of Murder. (People of the
Philippines v. Panis, G.R. No. 234780, March 17, 2021, Third Division)
69. Treachery can be appreciated against accused-appellant because the manner of attack was “deliberate, sudden,
and unexpected,” when he stabbed Marvin from behind while the latter was obliviously dancing. His actions
satisfied the two elements of treachery which are (a) at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position
to defend himself; and (b) the accused consciously and deliberately adopted the particular means, methods, or
forms of attack employed by him. (People of the Philippines v. Seguisabal, G.R. No. 250330, March 18, 2021,
First Division)
70. Treachery was clearly proven by the prosecution. Here, accused-appellant suddenly entered the door of the
victim's kitchen and immediately stabbed the victim while the latter was having his meal. The unexpectedness
of the attack deprived the victim of any chance to defend himself, thereby ensuring the consummation of the
offense without risk to accused-appellant arising from the defense that the victim might make. It is well to
emphasize the fact that accused-appellant was already armed with a bladed weapon when he entered the
victim's house using the kitchen door is a clear indication that such mode of attack was preconceived by
accused-appellant. In other words, accused-appellant employed means in the commission of the crime which
directly ensured its execution. The weapon used, the time of execution, and the choice of entry to the house of
the victim by using the kitchen door instead of the main door were employed by accused-appellant to ensure
the killing of the unsuspecting victim. (People of the Philippines v. Lalap, G.R. No. 250895, June 16, 2021, Third
Division)
71. Treachery was not established. As established by the prosecution, Rolly, upon seeing SPO1 Florence shoot his
brother, (Ronnie), quickly went at the back of the basketball court and then stabbed SPO1 Florence from behind.
Considering these prior and simultaneous circumstances, as portrayed by the prosecution, there are no
indications that Rolly deliberately planned to stab the victim at that moment and place. The quickness of his act
in defending his brother confirms that the attack he made on SPO1 Florence was neither preconceived nor
deliberately adopted. Such swiftness necessarily negates that he reflected on the means, method, or form of
the attack to secure his unfair advantage. A reasonable conclusion, thus, that Rolly, upon seeing SPO1 Florence
shoot his brother, acted quickly and decided to stab the victim from behind, is not hard to deduce. Following
the rule that treachery must be indubitably proved beyond reasonable doubt as the crime itself, Rolly cannot
be convicted of the crime charged in its qualified form. (People of the Philippines v. Bautista, G.R. No. 247961,
June 16, 2021, Third Division)
CRUELTY
1. Laude’s killing was attended by cruelty. The autopsy results that Laude died of asphyxia due to drowning and
strangulation shows that while he was still breathing, respondent drowned him by forcefully submerging his
head in the water inside the toilet bowl. This grisly scenario, coupled with Laude’s other major injuries, clearly
show that he suffered excessively prior to his death. Drowning Laude in a toilet bowl evidently indicates
Pemberton’s intention to degrade him. (Pemberton v. De Lima, G.R. No. 217508, April 18, 2016, Second
Division)
2. Cruelty was correctly appreciated for the three killings as it was established that the victims were kicked, boxed,
and pistol-whipped before having been killed. Such acts constitute deliberate augmentation of a wrong by
causing another wrong not necessary for its commission. (People of the Philippines v. Dongail, G.R. No. 217972,
3. Ignominy cannot be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance because it was not alleged in the Information.
This holds even if the aggravating circumstance of ignomin was proved. (People of the Philippines v. Nocido,
G.R. No. 240229, June 17, 2020, First Division)
USE OF MOTOR VEHICLE

1. The use of a motor vehicle is aggravating when it is used either to commit the crime or to facilitate escape, but
not when the use thereof was merely incidental and was not purposely sought to facilitate the commission of
the offense or to render the escape of the offender easier and his apprehension difficult. (People of the
Philippines v. Salahuddin, G.R. No. 206291, January 18, 2016, Third Division)
2. The generic aggravating circumstance of use of motor vehicle attended the commission of the crime. Accused
was riding a motorcycle behind the unknown driver when he twice shot Atty. Segundo who thus lost control of
his owner-type jeep and crashed into the interlink wire fence beside the road. The motorcycle then stopped

Alternative Circumstances 66
near the jeep, and appellant shot Atty. Segundo again thrice, before leaving the crime scene aboard the
motorcycle. (People of the Philippines v. Salahuddin, G.R. No. 206291, January 18, 2016, Third Division)
3. The CA correctly considered the generic aggravating circumstance of use of a motor vehicle that attended the
commission of the crime. The use of a motor vehicle is aggravating when it is used either to commit the crime
or to facilitate escape. Here, it was established that Dayrit was riding a motorcycle when he followed and fatally
shot Ariel and Lourdes. Afterwards, he fled the crime scene on board the motorcycle. Clearly, a motor vehicle
was used as a means to commit the crime and to facilitate his escape after the consummation of his plan to kill
Ariel and Lourdes. (People of the Philippines v. Dayrit, G.R. No. 241632, October 14, 2020, First Division)
SPECIAL AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES

1. The term unlicensed firearm, which is a special aggravating circumstance, includes the unauthorized use of
licensed firearm in the commission of the crime. Assuming arguendo that the actual firearm used by appellant
was licensed, he still failed to prove that he was so authorized to use it by the duly licensed owner. (People of
the Philippines v. Salahuddin, G.R. No. 206291, January 18, 2016, Third Division)
2. Where murder results from the use of an unlicensed firearm, the crime is not qualified illegal possession but,
murder. In such a case, the use of the unlicensed firearm is not considered as a separate crime but is appreciated
as a mere aggravating circumstance. Thus, since it was proven that accused-appellant was not a licensed firearm
holder, the use of the unlicensed firearm in the commission of the crimes of murder and frustrated murder
should be considered as an aggravating circumstance thereof. (People of the Philippines v. Gaborne, G.R. No.
210710, July 27, 2016, Third Division)
3. The trial court should not have appreciated the use of the unlicensed firearm as a special aggravating
circumstance since at the time the tragic incident took place, R.A. 8294 on illegal possession of firearm was then
the applicable law and as held in Ladjaalam, the use of unlicensed firearm may only be considered if the same
is used in the killing. (People of the Philippines v. Bugarin, G.R. No. 224900, March 15, 2017, Second Division)
4. The special aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed firearm was correctly appreciated. Under R.A. 8294,
Section 1, if homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed
firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance. There are two requisites to establish such
circumstance, namely (a) the existence of the subject firearm; and (b) the fact that the accused who owned or
possessed the gun did not have the corresponding license or permit to carry it outside his residence. The onus
probandi of establishing these elements as alleged in the Informaiton lies with the prosecution. In the past, the
Court has ruled that the existence of the firearm can be established by testimony even without the presentation
of the firearm. In this case, Licupa categorically narrated that accused-appellant used a homemade shotgun in
killing the victim. Moreover, the prosecution presented a Certification dated April 7, 2009 issued by the Firearms
and Explosive Division of the PNP stating that accused-appellant is not a licensed firearm holder. (People of the
Philippines v. Bernardo, G.R. No. 216056, December 2, 2020, First Division)
ALTER N ATIV E C IR C U MS TAN C ES

1. For intoxication to be appreciated as a mitigating circumstance, the intoxication of the accused must neither
be habitual nor subsequent to the plan to commit a felony. Moreover, it must be shown that the mental
faculties and willpower of the accused were impaired in such a way that would diminish the accused’s capacity
to understand the wrongful nature of his or her acts. The bare assertion that one is inebriated at the time of
the commission of the crime is insufficient. There must be proof of the act of intoxication and the effect of
intoxication on the accused. (Bacerra v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 204544, July 3, 2017, Second
Division)
2. Intoxication cannot be appreciated as a mitigating circumstance. There is no sufficient evidence that would
show that petitioner was intoxicated at the time of the commission of the crime. a considerable amount of time
had lapsed from petitioner’s drinking spree up to the burning of the nipa hut within which he could have
regained control of his actions. (Bacerra v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 204544, July 3, 2017, Second
Division)
3. In this case, other than his bare allegation that he blacked out, Oscar failed to present sufficient evidence that
would show that he was in a state of intoxication as would blur his reason. This uncorroborated and self-serving
statement as to his state of intoxication is devoid of any probative value. On the contrary, there is sufficient
reason to believe that Oscar recognized the injustice of his acts. After stabbing her mother-in-law to death,
Oscar proceeded to the roadside and waited for a taxi in an apparent attempt to escape. His excuse that he was
there because he was going to work is not worthy of any belief. Thus, the trial and appellate courts did not err
in not appreciating the alternative circumstance of intoxication in favor of Oscar. (People of the Philippines v.
Mat-an, G.R. No. 215720, February 21, 2018, Third Division)
4. Much ado is made about Philip's alleged intoxication. Rommel highlights that according to the BMC Medical
Certificate, he was drunk at that time the incident happened and he even admitted the same during his
Participants in a Crime 67
testimony. As such, accused-appellant believes that Philip's credibility is questionable in the light of his
condition. It is noteworthy that the medical certificate merely noted that Philip's breath smelled of alcohol. No
other tests were conducted on him to determine his blood alcohol level, which could help establish his degree
of intoxication. In addition, Philip merely testified that he was drunk because he had imbibed some alcoholic
beverage that night. The certification and Philip's testimony, however, do not prove that Philip was such in a
drunken stupor that his faculties had been greatly impaired or diminished. In People v. Dee, the Court explained
that a witness being positive for alcohol breath does not detract his positive identification of the accused
because there was no showing that the level of intoxication impaired his senses and prevented him from
positively identifying the accused — the law presumes every person is of sound mind unless proven otherwise.
Even assuming that Philip's testimony is an admission of drunkenness at the time of the incident; still, in the
absence of satisfactory proof that his intoxication had clouded his sense and perception rendering his testimony
unreliable, it should be presumed that Philip was sober enough to have processed and to vividly recall the
gruesome incident he had witnessed. (People of the Philippines v. Bermudo, G.R. No. 225322, July 4, 2018,
Third Division)
PAR TIC IPAN TS IN A C R IME
PRINCIPALS
1. Petitioner could have been held guilty for homicide as principal by inducement when he uttered “Sige, yan pala
ang gusto me. Mga kasama banatan na ninyo yan,” before his bodyguards opened fire at the victims. However,
there are inconsistencies in the testimonies which create reasonable doubt on petitioner’s criminal liability.
a. The conviction of a person as a principal by inducement requires (i) that the inducement be made with the
intention of procuring the commission of the crime, and (ii) that such inducement be the determining cause
of the commisison by the material executor. (Ambagan, Jr. v. People of the Philippines, G.R. Nos. 204481-
82, October 14, 2015, Third Division)
2. Accused-appellant cannot be considered a principal by indispensable cooperation nor an accomplice in the

crime of murder. The cooperation that the law punishes is the assistance knowingly or intentionally rendered
which cannot exist without previous cognizance of the criminal act intended to be executed. Thus, to be held
liable either as principal by indispensable cooperation or as an accomplice, the accused must unite with the
criminal design of the principal by direct participation. In this case, nothing in the records shows that accused-
appellant knew Menieva was going to stab Ortigosa, thus creating a doubt as to accused-appellant’s criminal
intent. (People of the Philippines v. Jesalva, G.R. No. 227306, June 19, 2017, Third Division)
3. Despite his physical absence from the scene of the crime, Chua was liable as a principal by inducement, and
also for the violence committed by Lato and Reyes during the execution of the crimes. Records show that it was
Chua who had earlier referred his co-accused Lato and Reyes to Gerry Ormesa for purposes of employing them.
But Lato and Reyes stopped receiving the salaries due to them. After the commission of the crimes, Chua
himself, along with his common-law spouse, left his residence in the neighborhood where the house of
complainant Ravago was (being only about 20 meters away from the latter’s residence). Before he transferred,
however, he warned Ravago to keep quiet about the robbery, or else harm would befall him and his family.
Chua was also the person who later on sold the vehicle subject of the carnapping for P40,000.00 to Laguidao
who partially paid him P20,000.00 with the balance of P20,000.00 to be given upon Chua’s presentation of the
certificate of registration. In the meantime, Ravago learned from a couple who were residing in the place where
Chua had transferred that the latter had brought the vehicle subject of the carnapping to Bani, Pangasinan.
Thus, Ravago, with the help from the local police station, successfully recovered the vehicle, already dismantled,
from the motor shop of one Jessie Tugas located in that place. Laguidao, Chua's buyer, was the brother-in-law
of Tugas, who himself recalled that Chua, in the company of two men, had brought the vehicle to his shop
claiming to be the owner of the vehicle. Chua and his common-law spouse then lived in a nipa hut near the
motor shop. It was hardly coincidental that at the time of the recovery of the vehicle, Ravago's Betamax unit
was recovered from Chua's nipa hut. The foregoing circumstances were sufficient and competent to prove that
Chua masterminded the robbery and carnapping. As the mastermind, he directly induced Lato and Reyes –
principals by direct participation – to commit the robbery and the carnapping. His inducement of them was not
merely casual but influential and controlling. Lato and Reyes could not have committed the crimes without
Chua’s inducement and plotting. In that capacity, Chua was a principal by inducement.
a. During the recovery of the vehicle, another stolen item, the Betamax, was found in the place where Chua
and his live-in partner had stayed. A disputable presumption exists that a person found in possession of a
thing taken in the doing of a recent wrongful act is the taker and the doer of the whole act. Appellants
offered no evidence to overcome or contradict such presumption. (Chua v. People of the Philippines, G.R.
No. 172193, September 13, 2017, Third Division)
4. Per the records, it was established that appellants, together with their co-accused, entered the victim's yard
where they took the victim's personal effects by means of force, and with an obvious intent to gain. That they
cooperated with each other to achieve this purpose was plainly manifested by their actions. Since it was not
shown that appellants had endeavored to prevent the victim's killing, they are both liable as principals of the

crime of robbery with homicide. (People of the Philippines v. Labagala and Labagala, G.R. No. 221427, July 30,
5. The nature of the accused-appellant’s participation is irrelevant in view of the existence of conspiracy. This is
because in a conspiracy, a person is guilty as co-principal when he or she performs an overt act, that is, either
by actively participating in the actual commission of the crime, by lending moral assistance to his co-
conspirators by being present at the scene of the crime, or by extending moral ascendancy over the rest of the
conspirators as to move them to executing the conspiracy. (People of the Philippines v. Manzanilla, G.R. No.
235787, June 8, 2020, Third Division)
ACCOMPLICES
1. In order that a person may be considered an accomplice, three elements must concur: (a) that there be a
community of design, that is, knowing the criminal design of the principal by direct participation, he concurs
with the latter in his purpose; (b) that he cooperates in the execution by previous or simultaneous act, with the
intention of supplying material or moral aid in the execution of the crime in an efficacious way; and (c) that
there be a relation between the acts done by the principal and those attributed to the person charged as
accomplice. (Rustia, Jr. v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 208351, October 5, 2016, First Division)
2. The cooperation that the law punishes is the assistance knowingly or intentionally rendered that cannot exist
without previous cognizance of the criminal act intended to be executed. But it cannot be said that Benjamin,
Sr. and Faustino knew that Benjamin, Jr. would shoot the victim. The fatal shooting was done in the heat of the
moment, not premeditated or preconceived. Their group was making its way out of the barangay hall when
Benjamin, Jr. suddenly grabbed Ambrocio around the waist, and the two of them started to wrestle with each
other. Up to that point, nothing indicated that Benjamin, Jr. intended to grab Ambrocio’s gun and use it against
him. From their point of view, Benjamin, Sr. and Faustino were witnessing their closes of kin suddenly engaged
in the physical struggle with Ambrocio whom they knew was armed with a gun. Going to the aid of Benjamin,
Jr. was but their most natural reaction. That their going to the latter’s aid might have enhanced the chances of
Benjamin, Jr. in gaining control of the victim’s firearm, but such did not unavoidably mean that they had
themselves intended such outcome. Nor did they contemplate such outcome in the absence of any clear
showing that they deliberately went to his aid to ensure his seizure of the firearm from Ambrocio.As things
stood, their acts could also mean that they were only trying to stop the grappling from escalating into violence.
Until the time when Benjamin, Jr.’s intention became known to them that is, when he finally had full control of
the gun, he cocked it and pointed it at the victim, nothing in the records established that Benjamin, Sr. and
Faustino continued to provide material and moral aid to Benjamin, Jr. Accordingly, it is unclear whether or not
they were cognizant of Benjamin, Jr.’s felonious intention and as a result, must be absolved of criminal liability
as accomplice. (Rustia, Jr. v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 208351, October 5, 2016, First Division)
3. Edgar cannot be held liable only as an accomplice to the crime of consummated homicide. Edgar's act which
ensued prior to the shooting of Salvador did not necessarily demonstrate his concurrence with Junior's criminal
purpose. There was no showing that Edgar committed the deed knowing that Junior would shoot or otherwise
harm Salvador moments after. Community of design was lacking. Thus, Edgar could not be held liable as an
accomplice to the consummated homicide because the cooperation which the law punishes is the assistance
knowingly or intentionally given and which is not possible without previous knowledge of the principal's criminal
purpose. (Napone, Jr. v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 193085, November 29, 2017, Third Division)
4. Nevertheless, while Edgar's complicity and participation in the consummated homicide was not sufficiently
shown, he should still be held liable for his participation in and concurrence with Senior's criminal purpose. It
has been established that the Napones arrived at the scene of the crime at the same time on board a jeepney.
It is also beyond dispute that Edgar threw a stone at Salvador during the latter’s struggle with Senior which fact
the defense had admitted but with the assertion in defense of a relative. Hence, it can be said that Edgar, who
witnessed his father’s assault on Salvador, was knowledgeable of his criminal design. The simultaneous act of
throwing a stone at Salvador was made to assist Senior in achiving his criminal purpose. Thus, Edgar’s assent
and participation to the criminal acts of his father were sufficiently established. As Edgar’s participation was not
indispensable to the felony, he must be held lialbe as an accomplice to the criminal acts of Senior. Therefore,
Edgar is guilty as an accomplice to the crime of attempted homicide. (Napone, Jr. v. People of the Philippines,
5. At the time the crime of homicide was committed, it was established that petitioner Saldua, who was armed,
was present, as he was behind Vertudez when the latter fired his gun. However, mere presence does not make
one a co-conspirator in the crime. The rule is that the existence of conspiracy cannot be presumed. Just like the
crime itself, the elements of conspiracy must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. Because witnesses are rarely
present when several accused come to an agreement to commit a crime, such agreement is usually inferred
from their "concerted actions" while committing it. Indeed, the line that separates a conspirator by concerted
action from an accomplice by previous or simultaneous acts is slight. Accomplices do not decide whether the
crime should be committed; but they assent to the plan and cooperate in its accomplishment. Other than being
present, it was not established what petitioner's purpose was when he stood behind Vertudez bearing a firearm.

By merely standing behind Vertudez, it cannot be ascertained whether petitioner had prior knowledge of the
criminal design of the principal perpetrator or that he was there to give moral support. What was clear is that
he was armed and he did not stop Vertudez from shooting the victim. The mere fact that a person is present
when a crime is committed, when such presence does not have the purpose of encouraging the criminal and
when there is no previous agreement between them as to the commission of the crime, will make the former
responsible only as accomplice in the crime committed. This conclusion is in keeping with the principle that
when there is doubt, such doubt should be resolved in favor of the accused. Thus: “It was held that when there
is doubt as to whether a guilty participant in a homicide performed the role of principal or accomplice, the Court
should favor the "milder form of responsibility." He should be given the benefit of the doubt and can be
regarded only as an accomplice. x x x Hence, in the case at bar, the accused x x x should be granted the benefit
of doubt and should be considered merely as accomplices and should be meted a penalty one degree lower
than that to be imposed on accused x x x who is unequivocally the principal.”
a. In this case, lacking sufficient evidence of conspiracy, and there being doubt as to whether petitioner acted
as principal or just a mere accomplice, the doubt should be resolved in his favor and, thus, he should be
held liable only as an accomplice. (Saldua v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 210920, December 10, 2018,
Third Division)
6. Bautista is an accomplice in the crime of sexual abuse under Section 5(b), R.A. 7610. Records show that Estong
committed sexual abuse on BBB. According to BBB's testimony, Estong undressed her, mashed and sucked her
breasts and caressed her vagina. Bautista cooperated in the commission of the sexual abuse against BBB by
inviting BBB, by assisting in the commission of the crime, and by assisting in Estong's escape. Galvez, the
neighbor, confirmed BBB's testimony. Galvez testified that she saw Estong sitting on a chair while BBB was
holding his, penis and his other hand was mashing BBB's breast. Galvez confirmed that Bautista was likewise
inside the room and was washing and slicing meat. Galvez testified that she did not see any indication that
Bautista tried to stop or prevent Estong from sexually abusing BBB. According to Galvez, she heard Bautista
utter the words: "patay nahuli tayo ni Ate Eva." When the barangay official arrived, Bautista also helped Estong
escape which led to the pursuit by BSF Aranda. Eventually, BSF Aranda caught Estong in Maybunga. (People of
the Philippines v. Chavez, G.R. No. 235783, September 25, 2019, Second Division)
7. Pascual is liable as an accomplice. It must be emphasized that the incident started after Glicerio had a verbal
altercation with Rabang and his companions. Then, Ceasico and petitioners crossed the street to know why
Glicerio was having a verbal altercation with Rabang. When Rabang cursed Glicerio, Pascual punched him and
immediately chased Apostol. Thereafter, a brawl ensued between petitioners’ group and Rabang’s group. When
Pascual retreated because Apostol was already holding a piece of wood, he returned to where Glicerio and
Rabang were standing. It was when Rabang was cornered that petitioners aided Glicerio in stabbing him. From
this unexpected scuffle between the two groups, it cannot be concluded that petitioners’ group had a previous
agreement or community of intention to kill Rabang. The incident was a result of a sudden burst of emotions
which led to the killing of Rabang. In other words, Pascual, knowing the criminal design of Glicerio, cooperated
by supplying material or moral aid for the efficacious execution of the crime. As can be gleaned from the
records, the crime might still have been consummated even without the participation of Pascual. His role in the
perpetration of the crime is of a minor character and not indispensable in its consummation.
a. The CA correctly ruled as follows: “Although there was no evidence showing a prior agreement among the
two accused-appellants and the two accused, the following chain of events show their commonality of
purpose: first, accused-appellant Pascual chased Apostol but when he failed to catch up with the latter,
he returned to the place where the victim Rabang and accused Bartolome were left; second, accused
Ceasico and accused-appellant Sarmiento ran after Robles and Palad, but they also returned to where
Ernanie was left when they also failed to catch Robles and Palad; third, Palad testified that from his house,
he could see that victim Rabang was surrounded by Bartolome, Ceasico, and accused-appellants Pascual
and Sarmiento; and fourth, Apostol testified that he saw Glicerio stab Rabang. At this point, there could
be no other conclusion except that accused-appellant Pascual was fully aware of accused Bartolome’s
intent to kill the victim, and that he assented to, and cooperated in the accomplishment of the crime. It is
an essential condition to the existence of complicity, not only that there should be a relation between the
acts done by the principal and those attributed to the person charged as an accomplice, but it is
furthermore necessary that the latter, with knowledge of the criminal intent, should cooperate with the
intention of supplying material or moral aid in the execution of the crime in an efficacious way. In cases of
doubt as to whether persons acted as principals or accomplices, the doubt must be resolved in their favor
and they should be held guilty as accomplices.”
b. It was proven during trial that prior to the fatal stabbing of Rabang, Alan, and Richard saw Pascual hitting
Rabang after cursing him. When Glicerio stabbed Rabang, Pascual was likewise seen together with
Sarmiento, Ceasico, and Glicerio cornering Rabang and preventing the latter’s escape. Pascual, fully aware
of the criminal design of his cohorts, cooperated in the execution of acts which led to the death of Rabang.
He was not an innocent spectator; he was at the locus criminis to aid or abet the commission of the crime.
These facts, however, did not make him a conspirator; at most he was only an accomplice. Indeed, the line
that separates a conspirator by concerted action from an accomplice by previous or simultaneous acts is
slight. Accomplices do not decide whether the crime should be committed, but they assent to the plan
and cooperate in its accomplishment.

c. Pascual could not be held as principal by direct participation as there were doubts whether there was a
prior agreement or community of intention among petitioners’ group in killing Rabang. In case of doubt as
to the accused’s participation, the doubt should be resolved in his favor. The rationale for this is that where
the quantum of proof required to establish conspiracy is lacking, the doubt created as to whether accused
acted as principal or accomplice will always be resolved in favor of the milder form of criminal liability, that
of a mere accomplice. Besides, in several cases wherein the Court confirmed the existence of conspiracy,
some accused were held liable as mere accomplices only because their role in the commission of the crime
was not indispensable; in other words, minor. (Pascual v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 241901,
8. Apura is indeed an accomplice. He struck the victim in the head with a beer bottle, an act that indicates that he
cooperated in the execution of the crime by a previous act that is not indispensable in the killing of the victim,
but, nevertheless, aided accused Que in pursuing his criminal design. As aptly ruled by the RTC: “The evidence
shows that Apura struck Enriquez with a beer bottle in the head from behind. In fact, he was the first to assault
the victim. Thus, even if he was not a co-conspirator, the incontrovertible fact remains that he did an act which
started the chain of events that culminated in the shooting of the victim by Que. By his act of striking Enriquez
with a beer bottle in the head, he is deemed by this court to have cooperated in the execution of the offense
by a previous act, albeit not indispensable as it was not necessary for him to do it in order that Que could carry
out his criminal design to kill Enriquez. This fixes Apura's criminal liability in this case as that of an accomplice in
the commission of the offense under Article 18 of the Revised Penal Code and comformably to the ruling of the
Supreme Court in People vs. Templonuevo. Under Article 18, Revised Penal Code, accomplices are those persons
who, not being included in Article 17, cooperate in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous
acts". In People vs. Templonuevo, where it was shown that appellant struck the deceased on the forehead with
a piece of wood, rendering the latter unconscious, thereby facilitating the subsequent slaying of the deceased
by appellant's co-accused, the Supreme Court held that said appellant must be deemed responsible as an
accomplice in the killing. He cooperated in it by previous or simultaneous acts, albeit non-indispensable ones,
as his co-accused could have killed the victim with his bolo even if appellant had not intervened.” Thus, all the
elements for one to be an accomplice are present in this case. The cooperation that the law punishes is the
assistance knowingly or intentionally rendered that cannot exist without previous cognizance of the criminal
act intended to be executed, and the prosecution was able to prove such cooperation. The unity of purpose
with that of the accused Que was also proven by the prosecution. The CA, thus, appropriately ruled:
“[Petitioner] Apura's insistence that the ruling in People v. Rustico Tilos and Mateo Mahinay (at-large) is
applicable, fails to convince Us. In that case, the Supreme Court noted that of the three prosecution witnesses,
only one stated that the attacks of accused-appellant and accused-at-large on the victim immediately followed
one another. The Supreme Court observed that the daughter and wife of the victim declared that the accused
at-large attacked the victim through fistic blows on the face and nape only after the victim's wife arrived and
pulled him (victim) away from accused-appellant. It was the accused-appellant who first inflicted fistic blows on
the abdomen of the victim. In the Tilos case, the Supreme Court held that such inconsistency in the sequence
of events posed a significant doubt on the unity of purpose between the two accused so that the accused-
appellant cannot be considered as an accomplice. We do not find the facts in the Tilos case similar to the instant
appeal. Immediately before the victim in this case was shot at the back of his head by appellant Que, he was
first struck by [petitioner] Apura in the head using a bottle. The acts occurred in close proximity with each other
and after the shooting, [petitioner] Apura was seen leaving the locus criminis with [accused] Que and the others.
These circumstances constitute convincing evidence of unity of purpose with the principal (appellant Que) that
makes [petitioner] Apura an accomplice.” (Apura v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 222892, March 18, 2021,
First Division)
9. The CA correctly affirmed the RTC’s ruling that accused Billones is liable only as an accomplice. The RTC's ruling,
as affirmed by the CA, that accused Billones can only be held as an accomplice is under the factual evidence of
the instant case. Billones was aware of the criminal design of the principals (accused-appellants) and he
knowingly cooperated by previous or simultaneous acts. When the principals blocked Venilda's van, he passively
opened the window of the car which facilitated the entry of the kidnappers. It is likewise not logical why he
surfaced the following day of the abduction. It is beyond belief why he was left in the van despite the allegation
that he was also a kidnapping victim. Moreover, there is no evidence to support his claims that he was forcibly
taken by the kidnappers to a nearby province. He failed to offer a substantial and convincing explanation as
regards his allegations. However, the circumstances do not make him a principal by direct participation but
merely an accomplice by previous or simultaneous acts. In other words, his participation was minor as his
actions only gave the principals easy access to Venilda's vehicle to kidnap her.
a. Accused Billones could not be held as a principal by direct participation as there were doubts whether he
was part of accused-appellants' prior agreement or community of intention in kidnapping Venilda. In case
of doubt, as to the accused's participation, the doubt should be resolved in his favor. The rationale for this
is that where the quantum of proof required to establish conspiracy is lacking, the doubt created as to
whether accused acted as principal or accomplice will always be resolved in favor of the milder form of
criminal liability, that of a mere accomplice. Besides, in several cases wherein the Court confirmed the
existence of a conspiracy, some accused were held liable as mere accomplices only because their role in

Complex Crimes and Special Complex Crimes 71
the commission of the crime was not indispensable; in other words, minor. (People of the Philippines v.
Galicia, G.R. No. 238911, June 28, 2021, Third Division)
ACCESSORIES
1. Petitioners cannot be held liable as accessories to the violation of illegal possession of lumber because the crime
had already been discovered at the time the petitioners took the truck. This discovery led to the confiscation of
the truck and the loaded lumber. For one to be punished as an accessory to the crime, the punished acts should
have been committed for the purpose of preventing the discovery of the crime. However, this is not present in
this case as petitioners took the truck after its confiscation. (Padiernos v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No.
181111, August 17, 2015, Second Division)
2. Excel is guilty as an accessory to the crime of kidnapping for ransom with homicide. While Excel is prosecuted
as accomplice, the prosecution failed to prove, much less allege, any overt act on Excel's part showing his direct
participation in the kidnapping itself. It must be remembered that for one to be regarded as an accomplice, it
must be shown that (a) he knew the criminal design of the principal by direct participation, and concurred with
the latter in his purpose; (b) he cooperated in the execution by previous or simultaneous acts, with the intention
of supplying material or moral aid in the execution of the crime in an efficacious way; and (c) his acts bore a
direct relation with the acts done by the principal. There was no showing that Excel actually cooperated or
assisted in kidnapping AAA and detaining the latter. At best, Excel's participation in the incident was limited to
acts committed after the abduction was already consummated. Particularly, Excel retrieved the ransom money
from Metrobank and, thereafter, immediately forwarded the same to Joel, through four money transfer
transactions through ML Kwarta Padala remittance on August 4, 2008, merely two hours after Arnel wired the
ransom money to the kidnappers. This was established through the documents presented by Atty. Heidi Caguioa
(Atty. Caguioa), Compliance Officer of ML Kwarta Padala. Atty. Caguioa presented photocopies of Excel's
identification card and the accomplished "Know-Your-Customer Form" of Joel, as well as the Payout Receipts
issued to Joel. Likewise, there is no doubt that Excel was aware of the crime Joel committed. His actuations are
certainly suspect. He deceived Jackielou by telling her that his cousin Joel will be depositing P20,000.00 to her
account for his tuition fee. However, he later on texted Jackielou that the amount was P183,000.00. He did not
express any shock or surprise about suddenly receiving a hefty sum. Moreover, he immediately forwardede
money to Joel, two hours after the said amount was deposited by Arnel. (Gurro v. People of the Philippines,
3. Accessories to the crime are described in Article 19 as those who, having knowledge of the commission of the
crime, and without having participated therein, either as principals or accomplices, take part subsequent to its
commission in any of the following manners: (a) by profiting themselves or assisting the offender to profit by
the effects of the crime; (b) by concealing or destroying the body of the crime, or the effects or instruments
thereof, in order to prevent its discovery; and/or (c) by harboring, concealing, or assisting in the escape of the
principals of the crime, provided the accessory acts with abuse of his public functions or whenever the author
of the crime is guilty of treason, parricide, murder, or an attempt to take the life of the Chief Executive, or is
known to be habitually guilty of some other crime. (Gurro v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 224562,
September 18, 2019, Third Division)
4. Accused-appellant Eduardo cannot be considered as an accessory (i.e., he helped his son dispose of Bohol’s
body). The prosecution eyewitness categorically pointed to Eduado as also having a direct hand in Bohol’s
death. (People of the Philippines v. Canillo and Canillo, G.R. No. 244051, April 28, 2021, Third Division)
C O MPLEX C R IMES AN D S PEC IAL C O MPLEX C R IMES

1. In the special complex crime of robbery with homicide, homicide is committed in order to: (a) facilitate the
robbery or the escape of the culprit, (b) preserve the possession by the culprit of the loot, (c) to prevent
discovery of the commission of the robbery, or (d) eliminate the witnesses to the commission of the crime.
However, 21 stab wounds would belie the existence of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide.
(People of the Philippines v. Chavez, G.R. No. 207950, September 22, 2014, Second Division)
2. A composite crime, also known as special complex crime, is composed of two or more crimes but is treated by
law as a single indivisible and unique offense for being the product of one criminal impulse. It is a specific crime
with a specific penalty provided by law, and is to be distinguished from a compound or complex crime under
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code.
a. In a composite crime, the composition of the offenses is fixed by law, but in a complex or compound crime,
the combination of the offenses is not specified but generalized, that is, grave and/or less grave, or one
offense being the necessary means to commit the other.
b. In a composite crime, the penalty for the specified combination of crimes is specific, but in a complex or
compound crime the penalty is that corresponding to the most serious offense, to be imposed in the
maximum period.
c. A light felony that accompanies a composite crime is absorbed while a light felony that accompanies the
commission of a complex or compound crime may be made the subject of a separate information. (People
of the Philippines v. Esugon, G.R. No. 195244, June 22, 2015, First Division)
Complex Crimes and Special Complex Crimes 72
3. The facts surrounding the shooting incident clearly show that appellant and the two others, in firing successive
and indiscriminate shots at the family of Norberto from their respective firearms, intended to kill not only
Norberto, but his entire family. When several gunmen, as in this case, indiscriminately fire a series of shots at a
group of people, it shows their intention to kill several individuals. Hence, they are committing not only one
crime. Thus, appellant and his cohorts cannot be said to have committed a complex crime because each act by
each gunman pulling the trigger of their respective firearms, aiming each particular moment at different
persons, constitute distinct and individual acts which cannot give rise to a complex crime. (People of the
Philippines v. Jugueta, G.R. No. 202124, April 5, 2016, En Banc)
4. In this case, two separate informations were filed against petitioner, namely: (a) an Information dated
September 22, 2004 charging him of violation of P.D. 1829, Section 1(a) before the MCTC-Jagna for allegedly
preventing Magsigay from appearing and testifying in a preliminary investigation hearing, and (b) an
Information dated August 27, 2004 charging him of violation of Section 1(f) of the same law before the MCTC-
Tagbilaran for allegedly presenting a false affidavit. While the Informations pertain to acts that were done days
apart and in different locations, petitioner should only be charged and held liable for a single violation of P.D.
1829. This is because the alleged acts, albeit separate, were motivated by a single criminal impulse – that is, to
obstruct or impede the preliminary investigation in I.S. Case No. 04-1238, which was, in fact, eventually
dismissed by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor – Bohol. The foregoing conclusion is premised on the
principle of delito continuado, which envisages a single crime committed through a series of acts arising from
one criminal intent or resolution.
a. In this case, petitioner’s act of allegedly preventing Ms. Magsigay from appearing and testifying in a
preliminary investigation proceeding and offering in evidence a false affidavit were clearly motivated by a
single criminal impulse in order to realize only one criminal objective, which is to obstruct or impede the
preliminary investigation proceeding in I.S. Case No. 04-1238. Thus, applying the principle of delito
continuado, petitioner should only be charged with one count of violation of P.D. 1829 which may be filed
either in Jagna, Bohol where Ms. Magsigay was allegedly prevented from appearing and testifying in I.S.
Case No. 04-1238, or in Tagbilaran City, Bohol where petitioner allegedly presented a false affidavit in the
same case. However, since he was already charged – and in fact, convicted in a Judgment dated July 3,
2007 – in the MTCC-Tagbilaran, the case in MCTC-Jagna should be dismissed as the events that transpired
in Jagna, Bohol should only be deemed as a partial execution of petitioner’s single criminal design.
b. Santiago explains the principle of delito continuado requires a plurality of acts performed during a period
of time; unity of personal provision violated; and unity of criminal intent or purpose, which means that two
or more violations of the same penal provisions are united in one and the same intent or resolution leading
to the perpetration of the same criminal purpose of aim. Gamboa instructs that delito continuado is a single
crime consisting of a series of acts arising from a single criminal resolution or intent not susceptible of
division. (Navaja v. De Castro, G.R. No. 180969, September 11, 2017, Second Division)
5. Accused-appellant was convicted of the crime of Double Murder but the sanction, particularly the
imprisonment imposed by the trial court, is only for a single crime of murder. Hence, the CA modified the
penalty and sentence accused-appellant Patrick John Mercado to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua for
each Murder he committed. The ruling of the CA is erroneous. The correct penalty on Mercado was imposed
by the RTC as the crime committed is a complex crime, there being only a single criminal act that resulted in
the commission of multiple crimes. The CA incorrectly modified the penalty to impose on Mercado two counts
of reclusion perpetua because there were two victims. The Court must perforce modify the penalty once again
to conform with Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. Mercado is thus liable only for a single count of reclusion
perpetua for both of the deaths of Evelyn and Alicia. (People of the Philippines v. Mercado, G.R. No. 218702,
6. It is evident that the primary considerations in adjudging whether a series of criminal acts should be considered
a continuous crime, are: the singularity in criminal intent and penal law violation, and the period of time the act
was committed. Verily, when the criminal acts are performed on various dates, the presumption is that every
act is performed on the motivation of separate criminal intents. Thus, the tendency is for the Court to treat
each act as a separate and independent criminal violation. However, this is not a hard and fast rule but are
merely guidelines. Ultimately, whether or not a continuous crime exists depends on the circumstances of each
case. The two (2) Informations charging the petitioner for violation of Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019 are strikingly
identical except with respect to the name of the property owner, TCT No., affected area, and its value. The
place, time, and manner of the commission of the offense are the same. The petitioner in the performance of
the alleged criminal act is impelled by a singular purpose– the realization of the Balite Falls development project.
Consequently, the acts alleged in the two (2) Informations constitute only one offense which should have been
consolidated in one Information. This does not mean however that both cases must be dismissed as petitioner
suggests. Considering that there is but one offense, there is no place for the issue of double jeopardy to arise
in the first place. The only implication of this pronouncement would be that the accused should, if found guilty,
be meted with penalty for a single offense. (Ambagan, Jr. v. People of the Philippines, G.R. Nos. 233443-44,
November 28, 2018, Second Division)

Continuing Crime 73
7. Corrollarily, after the existence of falsification of commercial documents has been established, the Court also
finds that the falsification of loan documents was a necessary means to commit estafa. In general, the elements
of estafa are: (a) that the accused defrauded another by abuse of confidence or by means of deceit; and (b)
that damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation is caused to the offended party or third person.
Deceit is the false representation of a matter of fact, whether by words or conduct, by false or misleading
allegations, or by concealment of that which should have been disclosed; and which deceives or is intended to
deceive another so that he shall act upon it, to his legal injury.
a. In the instant case, Desmoparan used the falsified documents bearing the name and qualifications of
Cordura in fraudulently applying for a salary loan, which resulted in the eventual release and withdrawing
of the cash advance amounting to a total of P40,000.00 from CFI. Clearly, Desmoparan employed deceit by
falsifying loan documents in order to take hold of the money and, thereafter, convert it to his own personal
use and benefit, resulting in the damage and prejudice of CFI and Cordura. It must be emphasized anew
that when the offender commits on a public, official, or commercial document any of the acts of
falsification enumerated in Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code as a necessary means to commit another
crime like estafa, the two crimes form a complex crime. Under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, there
are two classes of a complex crime. A complex crime may refer to a single act which constitutes two or
more grave or less grave felonies or to an offense as a necessary means for committing another.
b. In Domingo v. People, the Court have held that falsification of a commercial document may be a means of
committing estafa because, before the falsified document is actually utilized to defraud another, the crime
of falsification has already been consummated; damage or intent to cause damage not being an element
of the crime of falsification of public, official or commercial document. In other words, the crime of
falsification has already existed. Actually utilizing that falsified public, official or commercial document to
defraud another is estafa. But the damage is caused by the commission of estafa, not by the falsification of
the document.
c. In this case, Desmoparan could not have succeeded in getting hold of the money without falsifying the loan
documents bearing the name and qualifications of Cordura, and make it appear that he is actually the real
Cordura. The falsification was, therefore, a necessary means to commit estafa, and falsification was already
consummated even before the falsified documents were used to defraud CFI. (Desmoparan v. People of
the Philippines, G.R. No. 233598, March 27, 2019, Third Division)
8. The crimes of murder and arbitrary detention cannot be complexed. However, the accused can still be convicted
for the separate crimes of murder and arbitrary detention even if they were indicted for the complex crime of
arbitrary detention with murder in the Information, provided that the elements of the crimes are established.
a. In this case, Salabas, Suganob, and Lomoljo, were taken by accused appellants because they were the
subject of surveillance for Salabas’ alleged involvement in the illegal drug trade. In examining the events
that transpired prior to the killing of the three, it was not proved that their arbitrary detention was used as
a means of killing them because they could have been killed even without abducting them considering that
accused-appellants were all police officers and have the means to instantly kill Salabas, Suganob, and
Lomoljo. Rather, what accused-appellants did was to forcibly abduct the three, brought them to various
motels and interrogated them before finishing off Suganob and Lomoljo. Salabas, on the other hand, was
even brought to a different province in a pump boat and stayed with accused-appellants for fifteen days
before getting killed. Hence, when the three were abducted and placed in the custody of accused-
appellants, the felony of arbitrary detention had already been consummated. Thereafter, when they were
boxed, kicked, pistol-whipped and ultimately shot a close range while being handcuffed and without means
to defend themselves, another separate crime of murder was committed. (People of the Philippines v.
Dongail, G.R. No. 217972, February 17, 2020, Third Division)
9. There is no crime of robbery with homicide and frustrated homicide. The offense should have been designated
as robbery with homicide alone, regardless of the number of homicides or injuries committed. (People of the
Philippines v. Labuguen, G.R. No. 223103, February 24, 2020, Second Division)
10. Article 48 of the RPC states that there is a complex crime when a single act constitutes two (2) or more grave
or less grave felonies. Here, appellant’s single act of firing his gun constituted the crime of attempted murder,
with respect to Gerry, and the crime of murder, as regards Jonabel. Article 48 of the RPC likewise provides that
the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period. Here,
the most serious crime of the crime charged, i.e., complex crime murder with attempted murder, is murder.
Hence, the imposable penalty is that of murder in its maximum period. (People of the Philippines v. Bendecio,
G.R. No. 235016, September 8, 2020, First Division)
C O N TIN U IN G C R IME
1. The crime of unfair competition is a continuing crime and cannot be considered as delito continuado. For a
crime to be considered as delito continuado (continued or continuous crime), there must be plurality of acts
committed by the actor against different parties on the same occasion with the same criminal intent or purpose
of violating the same penal provision. A delito continuado is a continuous, unlawful act or series of acts set on
food by a single impulse and operated by an unintermittent force, however long a time it may occupy. Here,
respondents did not commit on the same occasion several acts of passing off their gas tanks as that of Petron

Penalties 74
or other parties. Rather, respondents only continued or repeated the alleged singular crime committed in Cavite
and all the way up to Makati. Hence, unfair competition does not fall under the criterion of a delito continuado.
a. And there are also no two separate crime of unfair competition allegedly committed by respondents.
Records show that the Petron owned gasul tanks were allegedly refilled by respondents at their Trece
Martires City refilling plant and were sold therein. thus, the crime of unfair competition was already
consummated in Trece Martires City. However, respondents continued to pass off the Petron gasul tanks
as their own by subsequently selling the same in Makati City, hence, there is a continuing violation of the
law. Therefore, the sales made in Cavite and Makati City cannot be considered as separate offenses of
unfair competition as they merely constitute the ingredients of the crime. (Petron Corporation v. Yao, Sr.,
PEN ALTI ES
DUTY OF COURTS AND ARTICLE 5 OF THE RPC

1. Considering that the penalty of reclusion perpetua will be suffered by the driver and the helpers while the
operator of the illegal logging business has not been apprehended, executive clemency is recommended in
accordance with Article 5 of the Revised Penal Code. However, the law must still be applied in full force. (Idanan
v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 193313, March 16, 2016, Third Division)
2. Even if the trial court finds incongruence in the application of penalties for the crime of fencing in light of the
enactment of R.A. 10951 which failed to include adjustment of values under P.D. 1612, the trial court must
apply the law as it is as the determination of penalties is a policy matter that belongs to the legislative branch
of the government. However, the court should furnish both Houses of Congress, as well as the President of the
Republic of the Philippines, through the DOJ, a copy of its decision in order to alert them on the aforestated
incongruence of penalties and to arrive at the proper solution to the predicament. (Cahulogan v. People of the
3. There is grave abuse of discretion when a trial court imposes a sentence based on a repealed or non-existing
provision of law since imposing a sentence based on a repealed law is a legally baseless act. More so, imposing
a legally baseless sentence is not only a serious deviation of a judge’s duty under the Rules of Court, but a clear
violation of the separation of powers, a doctrine that is of utmost importance in a democratic republic. In lune
with such a doctrine, judges cannot arrogate upon themselves the role of lawmakers. They are prohibited from
legislating and imposing penalties out of thin air. It is an arbitrary act based on the judge’s will alone and not
upon any course of reasoning and exercise of lawful judgment. It is precisely this kind of error that the RTC
committed in imposing a sentence that no longer exists under R.A. 1161, which had already been amended by
R.A. 8282. Here, the RTC rendered a judgment of conviction for violation of Section 28(b) of R.A. 1161 without
taking into account the amendment by R.A. 8282 as to penalties by sentencing the accused to suffer the
penalties of imprisonment of one (1) year and a fine in the amount of P5,000.00. The sentence imposed by the
RTC being invalid, the penalty should be corrected in conformity with R.A. 8282. (People of the Philippines v.
Celorio, G.R. No. 226335, June 23, 2021, First Division)
SUBSIDIARY IMPRISONMENT
1. In this case, the judgment of conviction did not provide subsidiary imprisonment in case of failure to pay the
penalty of fine. Thus, subsidiary imprisonment may not be imposed without violating the RPC and the
constitutional provision on due process. (People of the Philippines v. Alapan, G.R. No. 199527, January 10, 2018,
Third Division)
RULES ON IMPOSITION OF PENALTIES

1. The effects of the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification are: (a) the deprivation of the public
offices and employments which the offender may have held even if conferred by popular election; (b) the
deprivation of the right to vote in any election for any popular office or to be elected to such office; (c) the
disqualification for the offices or public employments and for the exercise of any of the rights mentioned; and
(d) the loss of all rights to retirement pay or other pension for any office formerly held. (Atty. Mateo v. Romulo,
G.R. No. 177875, August 8, 2016, First Division)
2. A.C. No. 12-2000 merely establishes a rule of preference in the application of the penal provisions of B.P. 22, to
wit: (a) imprisonment of not less than 30 days but not more than one year; or (b) a fine of not less than but not
more than double the amount of the check which fine shall not in no case exceed P200,000.00; or (c) both such
fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the court.
a. The trial court may impose both fine and imprisonment in B.P. 22 cases. (Ang Higa v. People of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 185473, August 17, 2016, Third Division)
3. Administrative Circular No. 08-2008 or the Guidelines in the Observance of a Rule of Preference in the
Imposition of Penalties in Libel Cases sets down the rule of preference on the matter of imposition of penalties
for the crime of libel bearing in mind the following principles: (a) This Administrative Circular does not remove
imprisonment as an alternative penalty for the crime of libel under Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code; (b)
Penalties 75
the judges concerned may, in the exercise of sound discretion, and taking into consideration the peculiar
circumstances of each case, determine whether the imposition of a fine alone would best serve the interests of
justice or whether forbearing to impose imprisonment would depreciate the seriousness of the offense, work
violence on the social order, or otherwise be contrary to the imperative of justice; and (c) should only a fine be
imposed and the accused be unable to pay the fine, there is no legal obstacle to the application of the RPC
provision on subsidiary imprisonment. (Belen v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 211120, February 13, 2017,
Second Division)
a. A review of A.C. No. 08-08 reveals that it was issued to embody the Court's preference, as espoused in
previous jurisprudence, to impose only a fine for conviction of libel. The said circular, however, does not
remove the discretion of courts to sentence to imprisonment the accused in libel cases should the
circumstances warrant. In other words, judicial policy states a fine alone is generally acceptable as a penalty
for libel. Nevertheless, the courts may impose imprisonment as a penalty if, under the circumstances, a
fine is insufficient to meet the demands of substantial justice or would depreciate the seriousness of the
offense. Thus, pursuant to the policy in A.C. No. 08-08, the Court finds that the imposition of a fine, instead
of imprisonment, is sufficient in the present case. It is noteworthy that Visitacion is a first-time offender
with no other criminal record under her name. Further, the degree of publication is not that widespread
considering that the libelous letter was circulated only to a few individuals. (Punongbayan –Visitacion v.
People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 194214, January 10, 2018, Third Division)
4. In imposing the penalty of parricide, bearing in mind that the penalty of parricide consists of two indivisible
penalties, i.e., reclusion perpetua to death, Article 63, and not Article 64, applies. (People of the Philippines v.
Brusola, G.R. No. 210615, July 26, 2017, Second Division)
5. The amendments under RA 10951 were passed with the primary objective of adjusting the amounts or the
values of the property and damage on which a penalty is based for various crimes committed under the RPC,
including estafa. Section 85 of RA 10951 makes mention of PD 1689 as one of the laws which amends Article
315 of the RPC. On the other hand, it should be considered that PD 1689 is a special law which was enacted for
the specific purpose of defining syndicated estafa and imposing a specific penalty for the commission of the
said offense. Notably, the first paragraph of PD 1689 penalizes offenders with life imprisonment to death
regardless of the amount or value of the property or damage involved, provided that a syndicate committed
the crime. Moreover, from the provisions of RA 10951, there appears no manifest intent to repeal or alter the
penalty for syndicated estafa. If there was such an intent, then the amending law should have clearly so
indicated because implied repeals are not favored. Thus, unlike the specific amendments introduced by RA
10951 to the penalties on estafa committed by means of bouncing checks, as defined under Article 315 (2)(d)
and amended by Republic Act No. 4885 and Presidential Decree No. 818, nowhere in RA 10951 was it clearly
shown that the legislature intended to repeal or amend the provisions of PD 1689. As much as possible, effect
must be given to all enactments of the legislature. A special law cannot be repealed, amended or altered by a
subsequent general law by mere implication. Furthermore, for an implied repeal, a pre-condition must be
found, that is, a substantial conflict should exist between the new and prior laws. Absent an express repeal, a
subsequent law cannot be construed as repealing a prior one unless an irreconcilable inconsistency or
repugnancy exists in the terms of.the new and old laws. The two laws, in brief, must be absolutely incompatible.
In the instant case, the Court finds neither inconsistency nor absolute incompatibility in the existing provisions
of PD 1689 and the amendatory provisions of RA 10951. As such, the amendatory provisions under RA 10951
are not applicable to the present case. (People of the Philippines v. Mateo, G.R. No. 210612, October 9, 2017,
Second Division)
6. Under Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, murder shall be punishable by the
penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, which are indivisible penalties. In view of the mitigating circumstance
of diminished willpower and in the absence of any aggravating circumstance, the application of Article 63(c) of
the Revised Penal Code is warranted. Article 63(c) of the RPC states that when the commission of the act is
attended by some mitigating circumstance and there is no aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty of
reclusion perpetua shall be applied. (People of the Philippines v. Pantoja, G.R. No. 223114, November 29, 2017,
Third Division)
7. The following are the applicable laws and imposable penalties for acts of lasciviousness committed against a
child under Article 336 of the RPC, in relation to R.A. 7610:
a. Under 12 years old - Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. 7610, in relation to Article 336 of the RPC, as amended
by R.A. 8353, applies and the imposable penalty is reclusion temporal in its medium period, instead of
prision correccional. In People v. Fragante, Imbo v. People of the Philippines, and People of the Philippines
v. Santos, the accused were convicted of acts of lasciviousness committed against victims under 12 years
old, and were penalized under Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. 7 610, and not under Article 336 of the RPC,
as amended.
b. For 12 years old and below 18, or 18 or older under special circumstances under Section 3(a) of R.A. 7610
– Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. 7610 in relation to Article 336 of the RPC, as amended, applies and the
penalty is reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua. This is because the proviso under
Section 5(b) appl[ies] only if the victim is under 12 years old, but silent as to those 12 years old and below

Penalties 76
18; hence, the main clause thereof still applies in the absence of showing that the legislature intended a
wider scope to include those belonging to the latter age bracket. The said penalty was applied in People of
the Philippines v. Bacus had People of the Philippines v. Baraga where the accused were convicted of acts
of lasciviousness committed against victims 12 years old and below 18, and were penalized under Section
5(b ), Article III of R.A. 7610. But, if the acts of lasciviousness is not covered by lascivious conduct as defined
in R.A. 7610, such as when the victim is 18 years old and above, acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of
the RPC applies and the penalty is prision correccional. (People of the Philippines v. Dagsa, G.R. No. 219889,
January 29, 2018, Second Division)
8. When the offense is a complex crime, the penalty for which is that for the graver offense, to be imposed in the
maximum period.
a. For the complex crime of Direct Assault with Murder in Criminal Case Nos. 17646-B and 17647-B, the graver
offense is Murder. Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) provides for the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death for the felony of murder; thus, the imposable penalty should have been death. However,
considering that the imposition of death penalty has been prohibited by Republic Act No. 9346, entitled
"An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines"; the penalty of reclusion perpetua
should be imposed upon appellants. In addition, the qualification "without eligibility for parole" should be
affixed to qualify reclusion perpetua pursuant to A.M. No. 15-08-02-SC. Thus, the CA has properly imposed
upon appellants the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole.
b. In Criminal Case No. 17648-B for the complex crime of Direct Assault with Attempted Murder, the penalty
to be imposed on appellants should be that for Attempted Murder, which is the more serious crime. The
penalty for Attempted Murder is two degrees lower than that prescribed for the consummated felony
under Article 51 of the RPC. Accordingly, the imposable penalty is prision mayor. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum shall be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, i.e.,
prision correccional, in any of its periods, or anywhere from six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years
while the maximum penalty should be from ten (10) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years of prision
mayor, the maximum period of the imposable penalty. This Court deems it proper to impose on the
appellants the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as
minimum, to ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum. (People of the Philippines v.
Vidal, Jr., G.R. No. 229678, June 20, 2018, Second Division)
9. The Court cannot apply the provisions of R.A. 10951 to the Anti-Fencing Law (P.D. 1612) since the latter is a
special penal law. (Estrella v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 212942, June 17, 2020, Second Division)
10. Under R.A. 11362 (Community Service Act), the Court may, in its discretion, and lieu of service in jail, require
that the penalties of arresto menor and arresto mayor be served by the defendant by rendering community
service in the place where the crime was committed, and under such terms as the court shall determine, taking
into consideration the gravity of the offense and the circumstances of the case. Clearly, the judge may require
that the penalties for arresto menor and arresto mayor be served by the petitioner by rendering community
service in the place where the crime was committed. The above-mentioned law likewise provides that the
privilege of rendering community service in lieu of service in jail shall only be availed once.
d. It must be emphasized that the imposition of the penalty of community service is still within the
discretion of the Court and should not be taken as an unbridled license to commit minor offenses. It is
merely a privilege since the offended cannot choose it over imprisonment as a matter of right.
Furthermore, in requiring community service, the Court shall consider the welfare of the society and
the reasonable probability that the person sentenced shall not violate the law while rendering the
service. With the enactment of R.A. 11362, apart form the law’s objective to improve public work
participation and promote public service, it is expected that the State’s policy to promote restorative
justice and to decongest jails will be achieved. (Realiza v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 228745,
11. Considering that accused-appellant was convicted of 14 counts of qualified theft with the corresponding 14
prison sentences, Article 70 of the RPC on successive service of sentences will be observed. Applying said article,
despite the 14 counts of qualified theft with corresponding prison sentence for each count, the maximum
duration of accused-appellant’s sentence shall not be more than three-fold the length of time corresponding
to the most severe of the penalties imposed upon her, and the maximum period shall in no case exceed 40
years. However, it must be emphasized that the application of Article 70 of the RPC should not yet to be taken
into account in the court’s imposition of the appropriate penalty. Article 70 speaks of “service” of sentence,
“duration” of penalty and penalty “to be inflicted.” Nowhere in the article is anything mentioned about the
“imposition of penalty.” It merely provides that the prisoner cannot be made to serve more than three times
the most severe of these penalties the maximum of which is forty years. Thus, courts should still impose as
many penalties as there are separate and distinct offenses committed, since for every individual crime
committed, a corresponding penalty is prescribed by law. Each single crime is an outrage against the State for
which the latter, thru the courts of justice, has the power to impose the appropriate penal sanctions. (People
of the Philippines v. Santos, G.R. No. 237982, October 14, 2020, First Division)

Penalties 77
12. Even if the Court considers their voluntary surrender as a mitigating circumstance in addition to their voluntary
confession of guilt, one mitigating circumstance may offset the generic aggravating circumstance of evident
premeditation as to leave appellant Edimar with only one mitigating circumstance which is voluntary confession
of guilt. Appellant Carlito is left with no other attending circumstance. This, however, will still not reduce by one
degree the penalty imposed by the RPC for murder, that is, reclusion perpetua to death. Regardless of the
number of ordinary mitigating circumstances and despite the absence of an aggravating circumstance, the
penalty cannot be reduced to any degree. The reduction applies only when the sentence imposed by law is a
divisible penalty which is either a single divisible penalty or three different penalties which are divisible into
three periods which is not the case here. Hence, the contention of the appellants that the penalty for Edimar
and Carlito should be within the range of prision mayor as minimum to reclusion temporal as maximum is
without basis in law. (People of the Philippines v. Natindim, G.R. No. 201867, November 4, 2020, Third Division)
COMPUTATION AND IMPOSITION OF PENALTIES

1. Anent the penalty for qualified rape, due to Section 3 of R.A. 9346, accused Comboy is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua, without eligibility for parole for each count of Qualified Rape. (People of the
Philippines v. Comboy, G.R. No. 218399, March 2, 2016, First Division)
2. Article 249 of the RPC prescribes for the crime of homicide, the penalty of reclusion temporal. Since there is
incomplete self-defense which partakes of privileged mitigating circumstance, under Article 69 of the Revised
Penal Code, the penalty is reduced by one or two degrees than that prescribed by law. Thus, there being an
incomplete self-defense, the penalty should be one degree lower or from reclusion temporal to prision mayor,
to be imposed in its minimum period, considering the presence of one ordinary mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the proper penalty is four years and two
months of prision correccional medium, as minimum, to eight years of prision mayor minimum, as maximum.
(Nadyahan v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 193134, March 2, 2016, Third Division)
3. The penalty for robbery in one of the dependencies of an inhabited house committed by breaking a wall, where
the value taken exceeds P250.00 and the offender does not carry arms under Article 299(a)(2)(4) of the RPC, is
prision mayor. In view of the absence of any aggravating or mitigating circumstances, the penalty becomes
prision mayor in its medium period in accordance with Article 64(1) of the RPC. Applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, the range of the penalty is prision correccional in any of its periods as minimum to prision mayor
medium as its maximum. The penalty imposable upon the accused should be anywhere between six (6) months
and one day to six (6) years, as minimum, and eight (8) years and one day to 10 years, as maximum. (Teñido v.
People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 211642, March 9, 2016, Third Division)
4. Minors John, Mark, and Jaypee are found to have acted with discernment and are convicted as charged, but
are entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority. Pursuant to Article 68(2) of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, the penalty to be imposed upon a person under eighteen (18) but above fifteen (15) years
of age for a crime shall be the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law. The imposable penalty for rape
committed by two or more persons, without any modifying circumstance, is reclusion perpetua. Therefore, the
imposable penalty on the three accused-appellants, who were either 17 or 16 years old at the time of the rapes,
is reduced by one degree from reclusion perpetua, which is reclusion temporal, for every count. Being a divisible
penalty, the Indeterminate Sentence Law is applicable. There being no modifying circuumstance attendant to
each crime, the maximum of the indeterminate penalty, i.e., reclusion temporal, is imposed in its medium
period, which ranges from 14 years, eight months, and 1 day to 17 years and four months. To set the minimum
of the indeterminate penalty, reclusion temporal is reduced by one degree to prision mayor, which ranges from
six years and one day to 12 years. The minimum of the indeterminate penalty is taken from the full range of
prision mayor. (People of the Philippines v. Wile, G.R. No. 208066, April 12, 2016, First Division)
5. Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon, the penalty shall be reclusion
perpetua to death. The prosecution was able to sufficiently allege in the information and establish during trial
that a knife was used in the commission of rape. Considering that no aggravating or mitigating circumstance
attended the commission of the crime, the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua was correctly imposed by the
lower court. (People of the Philippines v. Ulanday, G.R. No. 216010, April 20, 2016, Third Division)
6. The courts properly appreciated the circumstances of minority and relationship that qualify the crime of rape
and increase the severity of the penalty. AAA was 11 years old at the time of the rape incidents and appellant
is her father. The passage of R.A. 9346 however debars the imposition of the death penalty without declassifying
the crime of qualified rape as heinous. Thus, the appellate court correctly reduced the penalty from death
penalty to reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole for each count of rape. (People of the Philippines v.
Suedad, G.R. No. 211026, June 8, 2016, Third Division)
7. Under Article 248 of the RPC, the penalty for the crime of murder is reclusion perpetua to death. With both
penalties being indivisible and there being no aggravating circumstance other than the qualifying circumstances
of treachery and evident premeditation, the lower of the two penalties, which is reclusion perpetua was
properly imposed on the accused-appellant for each count of murder. However, Libre is not eligible for parole

Penalties 78
under the provisions of the ISLAW. As to the frustrated murders, the penalty lesser by one degree shall be
imposed on appellant. Thus, the penalty that must be imposed is reclusion temporal for each count of frustrated
murder. Applying the ISLAW and in the absence of modifying circumstances other than the qualifying
circumstance of treachery and evident premeditation, the maximum penalty shall be taken from the medium
period of reclusion temporal, which has a range of 14 years, eight months and one day to 17 years and four
months, while the minimum shall be taken from the penalty next lower in degree which is prision mayor in any
of its periods, the range of which is from six years and one day to 12 yars. The prison term imposed on appellant
must, therefore, be modified to six years and one day of prision mayor minimum, as minimum, to 14 years,
eight months, and one day of reclusion temporal medium, as maximum, for each count of frustrated murder.
(People of the Philippines v. Libre, G.R. No. 192790, August 1, 2016, Third Division)
8. In Criminal Case No. 6899-99-C, Article 51 of the RPC states that the corresponding penalty for attempted
murder shall be two degrees lower than that prescribed for consummated murder under Article 248. Thus,
applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum penalty should be taken from any of the periods of
prision correccional and the maximum penalty should be taken from prision mayor in its medium period. Thus,
appellant should serve an indeterminate sentence ranging from two years, four months and one day of prision
correccional, as minimum, to eight years and one day of prision mayor in its medium period, as maximum.
(People of the Philippines v. Prado, G.R. No. 214450, August 10, 2016, Third Division)
9. Based on R.A. 9165, Section 11, illegal possession of less than five grams of shabu is penalized with
imprisonment of 12 years and one day to 20 years and a fine ranging from P300,000.00 to P400,000.00. The
evidence adduced by the prosecution established beyond reasonable doubt that Eda possessed a total of 0.08
gram of shabu without any legal authority. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum period of
the imposable penalty shall not fall below the minimum period set by law and the maximum period shall not
exceed the maximum period allowed under the law. Taking that into consideration, the penalty shall be
imprisonment of 12 years, four months, and one day as minimum to 14 years and six months as maximum, and
a fine of P300,000.00. (People of the Philippines v. Eda, G.R. No. 220715, August 24, 2016, Third Division)
10. In petitioner’s case, the maximum imposable penalty is prision mayor in its minimum period. The minimum
period is further subdivided into three, to wit: (a) 6 years and 1 day to 6 years and eight months, as minimum;
(b) 6 years, 8 months, and 1 day to 7 years and 4 months, as medium; and (c) 7 years, 4 months, and 1 day to 8
years as maximum. As there was no established attendant mitigating or aggravating circumstances, the penalty
of 6 years, 8 months and 1 day is imposed as maximum of the indeterminate sentence. As to the minimum
sentence, the Indeterminate Sentence Law provides that it shall be within the range of the penalty next lower
to that prescribed for the offense. The penalty next to prision mayor in its minimum period is prision
correccional maximum. Thus, the minimum of the indeterminate sentence should be 4 years, 9 months, and 11
days of prision correccional, which falls within the maximum range thereof. Thus, the indeterminate sentence
is four (4) years, nine (9) months, and 11 days of prision correccional, as minimum, to six (6) years, eight (8)
months, and one (1) days of prision mayor, as maximum. (Mabunot v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No.
204659, September 19, 2016, Third Division)
11. There being no treachery, the crime committed by Benjamin, Jr. was only homicide, which is penalized with
reclusion temporal. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, and in the absence of any modifying
circumstances, the maximum of the indeterminate sentence is taken from the medium period of reclusion
temporal, which is from 14 years, eight months, and one day to 17 years and four months, while the minimum
is taken from prision mayor, the penalty next lower, which is from six years and one day to 12 years. Accordingly,
the indeterminate sentence of eight years of prision mayor, as minimum, to 14 years, eight months and one
day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, is imposed. (Rustia, Jr. v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 208351,
October 5, 2016, First Division; People of the Philippines v. Moreno, G.R. No. 217889, March 14, 2018, Third
Division
12. Statutory rape, penalized under Article 266-A, paragraph 1(d) of the RPC, as amended, carries the penalty of
reclusion perpetua under Article 266(B) of the same Code, unless attended by qualifying circumstances defined
therein, among which is “when the offender knew of the mental disability, emotional disorder, and/or physical
handicap of the offended party at the time of the commission of the crime, in which case the death penalty
shall be imposed. In this case, the victim, AAA, is considered below 12 years old at the time of the commission
of the crime. Moreover, it was alleged in the Information and established by the prosecution that accused-
appellant had knowledge of her mental disability. In fact, accused-appellant never denied knowledge of such
fact. Thus, because of the presence of this qualifying circumstance, the imposable penalty is death. However,
the passage of R.A. 9346 prohibits the imposition of the death penalty without, nonetheless, declassifying the
crime of qualified rape as heinous. Thus, the trial court correctly reduced the penalty from death to reclusion
perpetua, without eligibility for parole. (People of the Philippines v. Deniega, G.R. No. 212201, June 28, 2017,
Second Division; People of the Philippines v. Amar, G.R. No. 223513, July 5, 2017, Third Division)
13. The prescribed penalty for estafa under Article 315 of the RPC is prision correccional maximum to prision mayor
minimum, if the amount of the fraud is over P12,000.00 but does not exceed P22,000.00. If the amount exceeds

Penalties 79
P22,000.00, the penalty shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional
P10,000.00, provided that the total penalty shall not exceed 20 years. In this case, since the amount exceeded
P22,000.00, the penalty shall be imposed in its maximum period which is six years, eight months, and 21 days
to eight years. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum term shall be within the range of the
penalty next lower to that prescribed by the RPC, or anywhere within prision correccional in its minimum and
medium periods or six months and one day to four years and two months. Thus, the minimum term to be
imposed should be four years and two months of prision correccional. The maximum term, on the other hand,
shall be that which could be properly imposed under the rule sof the RPC, which in this case shall be six years,
eight months, and 21 days to eight years. The incremental penalty shall be added to the maximum period of
the prescribed penalty, which is anywhere between six years, eight months, and 21 days to eight years. (People
of the Philippines v. Dela Cruz, G.R. No. 214500, June 28, 2017, Second Division)
14. The trial court erred in imposing the penalty for reckless imprudence. Less grave felonies are those which the
law punishes with penalties which in their maximum period are correctional. Correctional penalties include
prision correccional, arresto mayor, suspension, and destierro. The MTCC considered the physical injuries
suffered by Arambala as serious since he required medical attendance for more than a period of 30 days. Under
Article 263(4) of the RPC, the penalty for serious physical injuries, when the injuries inflicted caused incapacity
for more than 30 days, is arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period;
the maximum period of the foregoing penalty – prision correccional in its minimum period – is merely a
correctional penalty and, thus, should be considered a less grave felony. Accordingly, pursuant to Article 365 of
the RPC, Paman should be sentenced to suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods
or from one month and one day to four months. Since the maximum term of imprisonment does not exceed
one year, the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law find no application and Paman should be meted a
straight penalty taken from arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods. In view of the lack of any
modifying circumstances, Paman should be made to suffer the straight penalty of imprisonemnt of two months
and one day of arresto mayor. (Paman v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 210129, July 5, 2017, Third Division)
15. The RTC correctly set the penalty of reclusion perpetua for rape. However, since the victim was under 12 years
of age at the time of the crime, the imposable penalty for lascivious conduct should have been within the range
of 14 years, 8 months and 1 day to 17 years and 4 months of reclusion temporal in its medium period, as
mandated by R.A. 7610. Instead, the RTC imposed the range of 14 years and 4 months to 17 years and 4 months.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law and with the presence of the alternative aggravating circumstance
of relationship, the maximum term of the sentence to be imposed should be taken from the maximum period
of the imposable penalty, that is reclusion temporal maximum, which ranges from 17 years, 4 months and 1
day to 20 years. The minimum term under the Indeterminate Sentence Law shall be within the range of one
degree lower than reclusion temporal, which is prision mayor with a total range of six years and 1 day to 12
years. (People of the Philippines v. Divinagracia, Jr., G.R. No. 207765, July 26, 2017, Second Division)
16. As to the proper penalty to be imposed on Peralta, the courts a quo erred in sentencing him to suffer the penalty
of imprisonment for a period of six years and 1 day of prision mayor, as minimum, to eight years of prision
mayor, as maximum. As may be gleaned from P.D. 1866, Section 1, as amended, the prescribed penalties for
the crime Peralta committed is prision mayor in its minimum, or imprisonment for a period of six years and 1
day up to eight years. Notably, while such crime is punishable by a special penal law, the penalty provided
therein is taken from the technical nomenclature in the RPC. Simon provides that where although the offense
is defined in a special penal law but the penalty therefor is taken from the technical nomenclature in the RPC,
the ascertainment of the indeterminate sentence will be based on the rules applied for those crimes punishable
under the RPC. Accordingly, the correct penalty is an indeterminate sentence of four years, nine months, and
11 days of prision correccional, as minimum, to six years, eight months, and 1 day of prision mayor, as maximum.
(Peralta v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 221991, August 30, 2017, Second Division)
17. Anent the penalty, both lower courts appreciated the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender in favor
of the petitioner. Their appreciation is upheld considering that the petitioner voluntarily surrendered himself
to the police authorities in Looc, Romblon on the morning following the shooting; hence, the penalty is reduced
to the minimum period. Accordingly, the penalty of reclusion temporal, which Article 249 of the RPC prescribes
for homicide, is imposed in its minimum period, which ranges from 12 years and one day to 14 years and eight
months. In its decision, however, the CA meted the indeterminate sentence of eight years of prision mayor, as
the minimum, to 14 years and eight months of reclusion temporal, as the maximum. Such imposition of the
ceiling of the minimum period of reclusion temporal as the maximum is unexplained, contrary to the seventh
rule in Article 64 of the RPC. Accordingly, the correct indeterminate sentence to be meted on the petitioner
should be eight years of prision mayor, as the minimu, to 12 years and one day of reclusion temporal, as the
maximum. (Sombilon v. People of the Philippines, September 25, 2017, Third Division)
18. As to the penalty for the crime charged in Criminal Case No. RTC 2003-0294, considering that BBB was under
12 years old when appellant threatened her with a knife, forcibly removed her shorts and panty, and inserted
his finger into her vagina on April 13, 1998, the imposable penalty for acts of lasciviousness under Art. 336 of
the RPC, in relation to Section 5(b), Art. III of R.A. No. 7610, is reclusion temporal in its medium period which

Penalties 80
ranges from Fourteen (14) years, Eight (8) months and One (1) day to Seventeen (17) years and Four (4) months.
Since the perpetrator of the offense is the father of the victim, and such alternative circumstance of relationship
was alleged in the Information and proven during trial, the same should be considered as an aggravating
circumstance for the purpose of increasing the period of the imposable penalty. There being no mitigating
circumstance to offset the said alternative aggravating circumstance, the penalty provided shall be imposed in
its maximum period. This is also in consonance with Section 31(c), Art. XII of R.A. No. 7610. Accordingly,
appellant should be sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of Fourteen (14) years and Eight (8) months
of reclusion temporal in its minimum period, as minimum, to Seventeen (17) years and Four (4) months of
reclusion temporal in its medium period, as maximum. A fine in the amount of P15,000.00 should also be
imposed upon appellant in accordance with Section 31(f), Art. XII of the same law. The award of civil indemnity,
moral damages and exemplary damages in the amount of P30,000.00 each is reduced to P20,000.00 for civil
indemnity, and to P15,000.00 each for moral and exemplary damages, in line with Quimvel v. People. (People
of the Philippines v. Macapagal, G.R. No. 218574, November 22, 2017, Second Division)
19. Edgar is liable as an accomplice to the attempted homicide and thus, the penalty to be meter must be three
degrees lower than that prescribed by the RPC for homicide. Furthermore, the mitigating circumstance of
vindication of a grave offense shall be credited in his favor. Thus, Edgar is sentenced to suffer imprisonment of
two months of arresto mayor. (Napone, Jr. v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 193085, November 29, 2017,
Third Division)
20. Junior is liable as principal for the crime of homicide with the prescribed penalty of reclusion temporal.
Considering, however, that the two mitigating circumstances of voluntary surrender and vindication of a grave
offense could be credited in his favor, and no aggravating circumstance attended the commission of the felony,
the imposable penalty is prision mayor. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence law, Junior suffers an
indeterminate penalty of four years and two months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight years and 1
day prision mayor, as maximum. (Napone, Jr. v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 193085, November 29, 2017,
Third Division)
21. Given that the value of the stolen personal properties in this case was not determined by reliable evidence
independent of the prosecution's uncorroborated testimonies, this Court is constrained to apply the minimum
penalty under Article 309(6) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 81 of Republic Act No. 10951,
which is arresto mayor. However, in view of Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code concerning qualified theft,
accused-appellant must be meted a penalty two (2) degrees higher, i.e., prision correccional in its medium and
maximum periods with a range of two (2) years, four (4) months, and one (1) day to six (6) years. Also applying
the Indeterminate Sentence Law, where there are no modifying circumstances and the minimum of the
indeterminate penalty is computed from the full range of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision
correccional in its minimum period and the maximum of the indeterminate penalty is reckoned from the
medium of prision correccional in its medium and maximum period, accused-appellant must only suffer a
minimum indeterminate penalty of four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor to a maximum of three
(3) years, six (6) months, and twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional. (People of the Philippines v. Mejares,
22. The crime was committed prior to the effectivity of Republic Act (RA) No. 7659, during the suspension of the
death penalty. Before RA No. 7659 took effect on December 31, 1993 reimposing the death penalty, the penalty
for murder was reclusion temporal, in its maximum period, to death. Since the crime in this case was not
attended by the generic aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation, and the mitigating circumstance
analogous to voluntary surrender is credited in accused-appellant's favor, the minimum penalty for murder,
i.e., reclusion temporal in its maximum period, shall be imposed pursuant to Article 64(2) of the Revised Penal
Code. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, accused-appellant is sentenced to ten (10) years and one (1)
day of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal, as maximum. (People of the Philippines v. PFC Reyes, G.R. No. 224498, January 11, 2018, First
Division)
23. Thus, applying the provisions of RA 10951, as well as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, and taking into
consideration that the aggregate value of the misappropriated jewelry is P439,500.00, Rivac must be sentenced
to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for the indeterminate period of three (3) months of arresto mayor, as
minimum, to one (1) year and eight (8) months of prision correccional, as maximum, there being no aggravating
and mitigating circumstances present in this case. Finally, Rivac must be ordered to pay the value of the
misappropriated pieces of jewelry, plus legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality
of this ruling until fully paid. (Rivac v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 224673, January 22, 2018, Second
Division)
24. In view of the recent enactment of RA 10951, there is a need to modify the penalties imposed by the CA insofar
as the two counts of estafa, docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 27592-R and 27602-R, are concerned. For
committing estafa involving the amounts of P440,000.00 and P350,000.00, Article 315 of the RPC, as amended
by RA 10951, now provides that the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in

Penalties 81
its minimum period shall be imposed if the amount involved is over P40,000.00 but does not exceed
P1,200,000.00. There being no mitigating and aggravating circumstance, the maximum penalty should be one
(1) year and one (1) day of prision correccional. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum term
of the indeterminate sentence is: arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods, the range of which is one
(1) month and one (1) day to four (4) months. Thus, the indeterminate penalty for each count of estafa should
be modified to a prison term of two (2) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to one (1) year
and one (1) day of prision correccional, as maximum. (People of the Philippines v. Dejolde, Jr., G.R. No. 219238,
25. In this case, it was established that the appellant and his armed companions boarded the victims' pump boat
and seized 13 sacks of copra, the boat's engine, propeller tube, and tools, as well as the contents of Julita's bag.
Hence, from the provision above, the proper imposable penalty should be death. However, due to Republic Act
No. 9346, which prohibits the imposition of the death penalty, the Court thus finds that the penalty imposed
by the RTC, which was reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole, was correct since the seizure of the
vessel and its cargo was accomplished by boarding the vessel. (People of the Philippines v. Dela Peña, G.R. No.
26. Under the old law, the proper penalty for the amount Venezuela malversed is reclusion temporal in its maximum
period to reclusion perpetua. However, with the amendment introduced under R.A. No. 10951, the proper
imposable penalty corresponding to the amount Venezuela malversed, is the lighter sentence of reclusion
temporal in its medium and maximum periods. Additionally, Venezuela enjoys the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender, due to his partial restitution of the amount malversed. Following the rule in Article 64 of
the RPC, if a mitigating circumstance is present in the commission of the act, the Court shall impose the penalty
in the minimum period. Furthermore, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, an indeterminate sentence
shall be imposed, consisting of a maximum term, which is the penalty under the RPC properly imposed after
considering any attending circumstance; while the minimum term is within the range of the penalty next lower
than that prescribed by the RPC for the offense committed. Accordingly, Venezuela shall be sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty often (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years,
eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum. (Venezuela v. People of the Philippines,
27. The Information charged appellant with rape through sexual assault under Article 266-A, paragraph 2 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC) and the same is punishable with reclusion temporal if committed with any of the
aggravating/qualifying circumstances mentioned in Article 266-B of the RPC. In this case, the Information
specifically mentioned that "AAA" was a four-year old minor; "AAA's" age was likewise established during trial.
Thus, the qualifying circumstance in paragraph 5 of Article 266-B of the RPC, i.e., when the victim is a child
below seven years old, should be considered in the imposition of the penalty. Reclusion temporal ranges from
twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years. There being no other modifying circumstance, the
penalty must be imposed in its medium period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty next
lower in degree is prision mayor, which ranges from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years, Thus, the
proper imposable penalty upon appellant should be eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as
minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum. Thus,
the maximum period of the indeterminate penalty imposed by the CA must be modified. (People of the
Philippines v. Garin, G.R. No. 222654, February 21, 2018, First Division)
28. The accused-appellant is guilty of murder. However, taking into consideration the mitigating circumstance of
voluntary surrender and following Art. 63 of the RPC, the penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon
accused-appellant. (People of the Philippines v. Salvador, Jr., G.R. No. 223566, June 27, 2018, Third Division)
29. It must be noted that the Information charging the accused-appellants with carnapping under R.A. No. 6539, as
amended, failed to allege that the carnapping was committed by means of violence against, or intimidation of,
any person, or force upon things. While these circumstances were proven at the trial, they cannot be
appreciated because they were not alleged in the Information. Hence, pursuant to the strict constitutional
mandate that an accused must always be informed of the nature and the cause of the accusation against him,
the accused-appellants may only be convicted of simple carnapping. Accordingly, the CA was correct in
modifying the maximum sentence of life imprisonment originally imposed by the RTC, and reducing the same
to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months, as
maximum. This term of imprisonment imposed by the CA is likewise in consonance with Section 1 of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law which ordains that if the offense committed is punishable by a special law, the
court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate penalty expressed at a range whose maximum term shall
not exceed the maximum fixed by the special law, and the minimum term not be less than the minimum
prescribed. (People of the Philippines v. Cariño and Aquino, G.R. No. 232624, July 9, 2018, Second Division)
30. Under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act (RA) No. 7659, the penalty for
parricide is reclusion perpetua to death. Under the prevailing circumstances, the proper imposable penalty is
reclusion perpetua there being no modifying circumstances alleged or proved. Hence, both the RTC and the CA

Penalties 82
correctly imposed upon appellant the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Pursuant to Section 3 of RA No. 9346,
appellant is not eligible for parole. (People of the Philippines v. Espinosa, G.R. No. 228877, August 29, 2018,
First Division)
31. Anent the proper penalty to be imposed on Jennie, it is well to stress that pending the final resolution of this
case, Republic Act No. (RA) 10951 was enacted into law. As may be gleaned from the law's title, it adjusted the
value of the property and the amount of damage on which various penalties are based, taking into consideration
the present value of money, as opposed to its archaic values when the RPC was enacted in 1932. While it is
conceded that Jennie committed the crime way before the enactment of RA 10951, the newly-enacted law
expressly provides for retroactive effect if it is favorable to the accused, as in this case. Thus, applying the
provisions of RA 10951, the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the increase of the aforesaid penalty by two (2)
degrees in instances of Qualified Theft under the RPC, and considering further the absence of any mitigating or
aggravating circumstances and the fact that the aggregate value of the stolen items amounts to P1,189,000.00,
the Court finds it proper to sentence Jennie to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for an indeterminate period
of seven (7) years, four (4) months, and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to eleven (11) years, six (6)
months, and twenty-one (21) days of reclusion temporal, as maximum. (People of the Philippines v. Manlao,
G.R. No. 234023, September 3, 2018, Second Division)
32. Under Article 315 of the RPC, as amended by R.A. 10951, the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period
to prision correccional in its minimum period is imposed if such amount is over Forty Thousand Pesos
(P40,000.00) but does not exceed One million two hundred thousand pesos (P1.2 million). The penalty
prescribed under Section 85 of Republic Act No. 10951 is arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision
correccional in its minimum period, that is, four (4) months and one (1) day to two (2) years and four (4) months.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty imposable should be an indeterminate penalty whose
minimum term should be within the range of the penalty next lower in degree, which is arresto menor in its
maximum period to arresto mayor in its medium period or thirty (30) days to two (2) months and one (1) day.
In view of the attending circumstances and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, this Court rules that the
minimum penalty be modified to arresto menor in its maximum period or thirty (30) days and the maximum
penalty to prision correccional in its minimum period or two (2) years and four (4) months. (Osental v. People
of the Philippines, G.R. No. 225697, September 5, 2018, Second Division)
33. As to the penalty, the special complex crime of robbery with homicide is punishable by reclusion perpetua to
death under Article 294 (1) of the RPC, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659. Article 63 of the same Code, as
amended, states that when the law prescribes a penalty consisting of two (2) indivisible penalties, and the crime
is neither attended by mitigating nor aggravating circumstances, the lesser penalty shall be imposed.
Considering that there was no modifying circumstance which attended the commission of the crime, the RTC
and the CA correctly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua. At this stage, the Court notes that, on the
occasion of the robbery, aside from Homer being killed, the Spouses Acob also sustained injuries by reason of
the gunshots fired by Garcia. It bears to reiterate at this point that the component crimes in a special complex
crime have no attempted or frustrated stages because the intention of the offender/s is to ·commit the principal
crime which is to rob but in the process of committing the said crime, another crime is committed. "Homicide,"
in the special complex crime of robbery with homicide, is understood in its generic sense and forms part of the
essential element of robbery, which is the use of violence or the use of force upon anything. Stated differently,
all the felonies committed by reason of or on the occasion of the robbery are integrated into one and indivisible
felony of robbery with homicide. Thus, as in the present case where, aside from the killing of Homer, the
Spouses Acob, on the occasion of the same robbery, also sustained injuries, regardless of the severity, the crime
committed is still robbery with homicide as the injuries sustained by the Spouses Acob are subsumed under the
generic term "homicide" and, thus, become part and parcel of the special complex crime of robbery with
homicide. (People of the Philippines v. Dillatan, Sr., G.R. No. 212191, September 5, 2018, Third Division)
34. Under Article 27 of the RPC, the penalty of arresto menor spans from one (1) day to thirty (30) days. The
Indeterminate Sentence Law does not apply since the said law excludes from its coverage cases where the
penalty imposed does not exceed one (1) year. In the absence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance,
the imposable penalty shall be arresto menor in its medium period, which ranges from eleven (11) days to
twenty (20) days. Consequently, the Court imposes upon petitioner a straight sentence of fifteen (15) days of
arresto menor. (Yap v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 234217, November 14, 2018, Third Division)
35. The Court holds that Cezar should be held liable for one (1) count of Homicide for the killing of Efren, and for
four (4) counts of Murder for the killings of Mario, Minda, Baby, and Jocelyn, respectively defined and penalized
under Articles 249 and 248 of the RPC. Under the said Code, the crime of Homicide is punishable by reclusion
temporal, the range of which is from twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law and there being no modifying circumstance, it is proper to sentence him with the
penalty of imprisonment for the indeterminate period of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
minimum, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months, and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum. As to
the crime of Murder, the same is penalized with reclusion perpetua to death. However, since both penalties are
indivisible and there are no aggravating circumstance other than the qualifying circumstance of treachery, the

Penalties 83
lower of the two (2) penalties, which is reclusion perpetua, should be properly imposed for each count of
Murder. (People of the Philippines v. Cortez, G.R. No. 239137, December 5, 2018, Second Division)
36. Under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal. Since petitioner is
only an accomplice, the imposable penalty is one degree lower than that imposable for the principal, i.e., prision
mayor. There being neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances, the said penalty shall be imposed in its
medium period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, petitioner Saldua is, accordingly, sentenced to suffer
the prison term of four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight
(8) years and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor,
as maximum. (Saldua v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 210920, December 10, 2018, Third Division)
37. Article 249 of the RPC states that the penalty for homicide shall be reclusion temporal. Considering that the
crime committed was frustrated homicide, then the penalty imposed shall be one degree lower than reclusion
temporal, which is prision mayor in its minimum term, in view of the presence of the mitigating circumstance
of sufficient provocation. Furthermore, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, an indeterminate sentence
shall be imposed, consisting of a maximum term, which is the penalty under the RPC properly imposed after
considering any attending circumstance; while the minimum term is within the range of the penalty next lower
than that prescribed by the RPC for the offense committed. Accordingly, the CA correctly meted the penalty of
four (4) years of prision correccional, as minimum, to seven (7) years of prision mayor, as maximum. (Miranda
v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 234528, January 23, 2019, Third Division)
38. As for the penalties and damages for the crimes charged herein, the Court rules as follows. In Criminal Case No.
04-0200 for Lascivious Conduct under Section 5 (b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610, the penalty imposed by the
courts below must be modified. Section 5, Article III of R.A. No. 7610 provides that the penalty of reclusion
temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon those who commit the act of sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse. Here,
in the absence of mitigating or aggravating circumstances, the maximum term of the sentence shall be taken
from the medium period thereof. Moreover, notwithstanding the fact that R.A. No. 7610 is a special law, Basa
may still enjoy the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law. In applying the provisions thereof, the minimum
term shall be taken trom within the range of the penalty next lower in degree, which is prision mayor in its
medium period to reclusion temporal in its minimum period. Thus, Basa shall suffer the indeterminate sentence
of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and
one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, for violation of the said provision of R.A. No. 7610. Likewise,
and conformably with prevailing jurisprudence, he is directed to pay AAA the amounts of P20,000.00 as civil
indemnity, P15,000.00 as moral damages, P15,000.00 as exemplary damages, and P15,000.00 as fine, pursuant
to Section 31 (f), Article XII of R.A. No. 7610, all of which shall earn interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per
annum from the date of finality of this judgment until full payment. Meanwhile, with respect to Criminal Case
No. 04-0201 for rape under Article 266-A, paragraph (1), the Court affirms the penalty imposed and the amount
of damages awarded by the courts a quo. Thus, Basa is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua
and is ordered to pay AAA the amounts of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and
P75,000.00 as exemplary damages, pursuant to People v. Jugueta, all of which shall likewise earn interest at the
rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of finality of this judgment until full payment. (People of the
Philippines v. Basa, Jr., G.R. No. 237349, February 27, 2019, Third Division)
39. Under Section 5, Article II of RA 9165, the penalty for illegal sale of dangerous drugs, such as marijuana,
regardless of its quantity and purity, is life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from P500,000.00 to P10
million. However, in light of the effectivity of RA 9346, the imposition of the penalty of death has been
proscribed. Thus, the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of P500,000.00 imposed on appellant by the RTC
as affirmed by the CA for the illegal sale of marijuana was in order.
a. For the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs, Section 11, Article II of RA 9165 provides the penalty
of imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years and a fine ranging from
P300,000.00 to P400,000.00 for less than 300 grams of marijuana. In this case, appellant was found in
possession of marijuana with an aggregate weight of more or less 55.8873 grams, which is less than 300
grams. Thus, the penalty of twelve (12) years and one (1) day as minimum to thirteen (13) years as
maximum, and a fine of P300,000.00 imposed on appellant by the RTC and affirmed by the CA, was also in
order. (People of the Philippines v. Sevilla, G.R. No. 227187, March 4, 2019, First Division)
40. As to the Slight Physical Injuries committed against Pornelos, the Court upholds the sentence of twenty (20)
days of arresto menor imposed by the CA, as the generic aggravating circumstance of treachery was offset by,
the generic mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. (People of the Philippines v. Lumahang, G.R. No.
41. From the given comparisons, both under the Revised Penal Code and RA 10951, the imposable penalty for
estafa is based on the amount of damage. In this case, the amount defrauded is Forty Thousand Pesos
(P40,000.00), representing the total amount of money actually released and received by Desmoparan from CFI.
As such, the prescribed penalty as provided under paragraph 4, Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, as

Penalties 84
amended by RA 10951, is arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods, since the amount does not exceed
Forty Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00). Meanwhile, under the old provisions of the Revised Penal Code, the
imposable penalty is prision correccional, in its maximum period, to prision mayor, in its minimum period, if the
amount of the fraud is over Twelve Thousand Pesos (P12,000.00), but does not exceed Twenty-Two Thousand
Pesos (P22,000.00); and, if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be
imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00). Thus,
the penalty for estafa under the new law should be given retroactive effect, being more favorable to the
petitioner. In contrast, for falsification of a commercial document, the penalty of imprisonment is the same for
both Article 172 (1), in relation to Article 171 (2), of the Revised Penal Code and RA 10951 which is prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods, albeit, the imposable fine is different. Under the Revised
Penal Code, the imposable fine is not more than Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00); while under RA 10951, the
imposable fine is not more than One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00).
a. Thus, the penalty of imprisonment in the crime of estafa under RA 10951 is now lighter than the penalty
of imprisonment for falsification of commercial documents. Applying then the provisions of Article 48 of
the Revised Penal Code for the complex crime of estafa through falsification of commercial documents, the
penalty for the graver offense should be imposed in the maximum period. Thus, the penalty for falsification
of commercial documents should be imposed in the maximum period, being the more serious crime than
estafa. However, the penalty of fine of not more than Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) under the old law
should be imposed because this is more favorable to the petitioner than the penalty of fine of not more
than One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) under the present law.
b. The Court, thus, modifies the indeterminate sentence imposable on Desmoparan so that the minimum
term should, come from the penalty next lower in degree which is arresto mayor, maximum, to prision
correccional, minimum (4 months and 1 day to 2 years and 4 months), and the maximum term should come
from prision correccional, medium, to prision correccional, maximum, in its maximum period (4 yeeirs, 9
months and 11 days to 6 years). (Desmoparan v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 233598, March 27,
42. As for the penalty for the crime charged herein, considering that AAA was more than twelve (12) years old, but
less than eighteen (18) years old when Manuel threatened to kill her should she tell anyone of his lascivious
advances, forcibly placed his hand inside her shorts and underwear, and inserted his finger into her vagina,
moving it in and out for about five (5) minutes, the imposable penalty is reclusion temporal, in its medium
period, to reclusion perpetua. Since the perpetrator of the offense is the father of the victim, and such
alternative circumstance of relationship was alleged in the Information and proven during trial, the same should
be considered as an aggravating circumstance for the purpose of increasing the period of the imposable penalty.
There being no mitigating circumstance to offset the said alternative aggravating circumstance, the penalty
provided shall be imposed in its maximum period, i.e., reclusion perpetua. This is also in consonance with Section
31(c), Article XII of R.A. No. 7610 which expressly provides that the penalty shall be imposed in its maximum
period when the perpetrator is, inter alia, the parent of the victim. Moreover, Manuel should be ordered to pay
the victim, AAA, civil indemnity, moral damages and exemplary damages in the amount of P75,000.00 each,
pursuant to People v. Jugueta and People v. Salvador Tulagan, with interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per
annum from the date of finality of judgment until fully paid, and a fine in the amount of P15,000.00, pursuant
to Section 31(f), Article XII of R.A. No. 7610. (Ramilo v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 234841, June 3, 2019,
Third Division)
43. As such, appellant should be meted the penalty of reclusion perpetua in Criminal Case Nos. 6264 and 6266. This
is so because the penalty imposable for Lascivious Conduct under Section S(b) of R.A. No. 7610 is reclusion
temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua. In this case, the maximum penalty should be imposed due
to the presence of the aggravating circumstance of relationship, the victim being the sister of the perpetrator,
and without any mitigating circumstance to offset such. There is no need, however, to qualify the sentence to
reclusion perpetua with the phrase "without eligibility for parole" because, under A.M. No. 15-08-02-SC, in cases
where the death penalty is not warranted, it is understood that convicted persons penalized with an indivisible
penalty are not eligible for parole. (People of the Philippines v. Moya, G.R. No. 228260, June 10, 2019, Third
Division)
44. Petitioner is convicted of violation of R.A. 6713, Section 7(d). However, the Court deems it appropriate to modify
the penalty imposed against petitioner, considering that the penalty of five (5) years imprisonment - the
maximum prison sentence under the law - is not commensurate to the gravity of her offense, which is
essentially, the act of obtaining loans from an entity whose transactions and operations ordinarily fall under the
regulatory powers of her office. To be sure, Section 11 of RA 6713 provides that a violation of Section 7, among
others, shall be punishable with imprisonment not exceeding five (5) years, or a fine not exceeding five thousand
pesos (P5,000), or both, and, in the discretion of the court of competent jurisdiction, disqualification to hold
public office. In light of the above-stated circumstances and the fact that petitioner's acts were not shown to
have been attended by any ill motive or bad faith, the Court deems it apt to instead, mete the maximum fine
of P5,000.00. (Villanueva v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 237738, June 10, 2019, Second Division)

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45. Acts falling under Section 5(h) and Section 5(i) of R.A. 9262 shall be punished by prision mayor. If the acts are
committed while the woman or child is pregnant or committed in the presence of her child, the penalty to be
applied shall be the maximum period of penalty prescribed in this section. In addition to imprisonment, the
perpetrator shall (a) pay a fine in the amount of not less than One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) but
not more than Three hundred thousand pesos (P300,000.00); (b) undergo mandatory psychological counseling
or psychiatric treatment and shall report compliance to the court. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
the minimum term of the indeterminate penalty shall be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, i.e.,
prision correccional, or anywhere from six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years, while the maximum term
shall be that which could be properly imposed under the law, which is eight (8) years and one (1) day to ten
(10) years of prision mayor, there being no aggravating or mitigating circumstances attending the commission
of the crime. This Court deems it proper to impose on petitioner Reyes the indeterminate penalty of four (4)
years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor, as maximum. (Reyes v. People of the Philippines, G.R. no. 232678, July 3, 2019, Third Division)
46. Murder is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death if committed through any of the attendant circumstances
mentioned in Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by RA 7659. Applying Article 63(2) of the
Revised Penal Code, the lesser of the two (2) indivisible penalties, i.e., reclusion perpetua, shall be imposed
provided there is no mitigating or aggravating circumstance which attended the killing, as in this case. Verily,
both the trial court and the Court of Appeals correctly sentenced appellant to reclusion perpetua. (People of
the Philippines v. Almosara, G.R. No. 223512, July 24, 2019, Second Division)
47. The imposable penalty for the crime of rape with homicide is death. Under Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code,
if the penalty prescribed by law is composed of two (2) indivisible penalties, the lesser penalty shall be imposed
if neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances are present in the commission of the crime. Absent any
aggravating circumstances, the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua is imposable. Furthermore, since accused-
appellant was a minor when he committed the crime, he is entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstance
of minority under Article 68(2) of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, the proper imposable penalty on him is
reclusion temporal. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the indeterminate penalty has a minimum period
within the range of prision mayor-the penalty one (1) degree lower to that provided in Article 249-and a
maximum period within the range of reclusion temporal in its medium period. Hence, the indeterminate
sentence of 10 years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to 17 years and four (4) months of reclusion
temporal, as maximum, should be imposed. (People of the Philippines v. ZZZ, G.R. No. 228828, July 24, 2019,
Third Division)
48. Art. 171 of the RPC provides for a single divisible penalty of prision mayor to public officers or employees who,
taking advantage of their official positions, shall cause it to appear that persons have participated in any act or
proceeding when they did not in fact participate. And where neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstance
attended the execution of the offense, as here, the imposable penalty is, according to Art. 64 of the RPC, that
of the medium period provided. The medium period for prision mayor is from eight (8) years and one (1) day to
ten (10) years. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty imposable would be that of a degree
lower than the medium period of prision mayor as minimum, and the maximum is any period included in the
medium period of prision mayor. The degree lower than the medium period of prision mayor is the medium
period of prision correccional which ranges from two (2) years, four (4) months, and one (1) day to four (4) years
and two (2) months. Applying Goma, we sentence petitioner to two (2) years, four (4) months, and one (1) day,
as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day, as maximum. (Liwanag, Sr. v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No.
49. The penalty for falsification of public documents is imprisonment of prision mayor and a fine not exceeding
P5,000.00. In the absence of mitigating and aggravating circumstances, the penalty shall be imposed in its
medium period, which is 8 years and 1 day to 10 years. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the petitioner
is entitled to a minimum term which shall be taken within the range of the penalty next lower to what is
prescribed by law which is prision correccional, the range of which is 6 months and 1 day to 6 years. Meanwhile,
the maximum term of the penalty shall be that which is imposed by law considering any attending
circumstances. (Torres v. CA, G.R. No. 241164, August 14, 2019, Third Division)
50. The imposable penalty for Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC in relation to Section 5 of RA
7610, if the victim is below twelve (12) years old when the offense was committed, is reclusion temporal in its
medium period. Considering the presence of the aggravating circumstance of dwelling, the penalty shall be
imposed in its maximum period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the Court of Appeals correctly
sentenced appellant to thirteen (13) years, nine (9) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as minimum
to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal as maximum. The imposition of P15,000.00
as fine in accordance with Section 31 (f) of RA 7610 is also proper. In accordance with our pronouncement in
People v. Tulagan, however, the awards of civil indemnity should be increased from P20,000.00 to P50,000.00,
moral damages from P15,000.00 to P50,000.00, and exemplary damages from P15,000.00 to P50,000.00. These
amounts shall earn six percent (6%) interest per annum from finality of this decision until fully paid. (People of
the Philippines v. Pagkatipunan, G.R. No. 232393, August 14, 2019, Second Division)

Penalties 86
51. Having thus established the guilt of Wennie as Joel's co-conspirator in the special complex crime of Kidnapping
for Ransom with Homicide, she shall be meted with the penalty of death. However, in view I of R.A. No. 9346,
which suspended the imposition of the death penalty, she shall be sentenced to the penalty of reclusion
perpetua without eligibility for parole. On the other hand, Excel, as an accessory to the crime, shall be punished
with a penalty two degrees lower than reclusion perpetua, which shall be prision mayor. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty shall be two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision
correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum. (Gurro v. People of
the Philippines, G.R. No. 224562, September 18, 2019, Third Division)
52. With regard to the penalty and monetary awards in Criminal Case No. 31439-MN for the crime of acts of
lasciviousness, since the elements of Article 336 of the RPC as well as that of lascivious conduct under RA No.
7610 (given that the victim was below 12 years old) were clearly proven in this case, the imposable penalty is
reclusion temporal in its medium period. Furthermore, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law (ISL), and in
the absence of mitigating or aggravating circumstances, the minimum term shall be taken from the penalty next
lower to reclusion temporal medium, which is reclusion temporal minimum, which ranges from twelve (12)
years and one (1) day to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months. The maximum term shall be taken from the
medium period of the imposable penalty, i.e., reclusion temporal in its medium period, which ranges from
fifteen (15) years, six (6) months and twenty (20) days to sixteen (16) years, five (5) months and nine (9) days.
Accordingly, the prison term is modified to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal in its
minimum period as minimum, to fifteen (15) years, six (6) months and twenty (20) days of reclusion temporal
in its medium period as maximum. (People of the Philippines v. Eulalio, G.R. No. 214882, October 16, 2019,
Third Division)
53. Accused are convicted of the crime of malicious mischief. Records show that the value of the damage cause to
private complainant by petitioners is only P7,500.00. Consequently, pursuant to Article 329 of the RPC, as
amended by R.A. 10951, petitioners' original sentence of a straight penalty of imprisonment of four (4) months
should be reduced to arresto menor or imprisonment of one (1) day to thirty (30) days. (Grana v. People of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 202111, November 25, 2019, Second Division)
54. Article 255, in relation to Article 248 of the RPC, provides that the offense of infanticide is punishable by
reclusion perpetua in its maximum period to death. Applying Article 63(2) of the RPC, the lesser of the two
indivisible penalties shall be imposed when there is no mitigating or aggravating circumstance which attended
the killing, as in this case.
a. Accused cannot claim that the lesser penalty of prision correccional should be imposed on her. There is
absolutely no evidence on record showing that appellant killed her child supposedly to conceal her
dishonor for being an unwed mother or a woman who bore a child although she did not have a boyfriend.
This alleged circumstance, not being found on the record, cannot be used to benefit appellant by reducing
the imposable penalty from reclusion perpetua to prision correccional. Finally, it is unnecessary to specify
that appellant is not eligible for parole. Under A.M. No. 15-08-02-SC, the qualification “without eligibility
for parole” is only specified when the proper penalty would have been death were it not for the enactment
of R.A. 9346. Here, in view of the absence of any aggravating circumstance, appellant should be sentenced
to reclusion perpetua only, not death. (People of the Philippines v. Adalia, G.R. No. 235990, January 22,
55. As to the charges of arbitrary detention of Suganob and Lomoljo whose detention did not exceed three days,
the CA correctly imposed two prison terms of four months as minimum to 1 year and 8 months as maximum.
As to the detention of Salabas, which did not exceed 15 days, the prison term of 2 years and 4 months as
minimum to 4 years and 9 months as maximum is also in order. (People of the Philippines v. Dongail, G.R. No.
217972, February 17, 2020, Third Division)
56. As to the penalty, Article 248 of the RPC provides that the penalty for murder is reclusion perpetua to death.
Article 63(3) of the RPC provides that when the commission of the act is attended by some mitigating
circumstance and there is no aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied. In the present case,
considering that the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender was found to be present, and in the
absence of any ordinary aggravating circumstance, the RTC correctly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
As to attempted murder, applying Article 51, in relation to the second paragraph, Article 61 of the same Code,
the penalty is two degrees lower than reclusion perpetua, which is prision mayor. Since the mitigating
circumstance of voluntary surrender is present, the maximum penalty shall be taken from the minimum period
of prision mayor which is six (6) years and one (1) day to eight (8) years. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, the minimum penalty shall be taken from any of the periods of the penalty next lower in degree which is
prision correccional. Thus, the penalty of two (2) years and four (4) months of prision correccional, as minimum,
to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum, would be appropriate. (Casilac v. People of the

Penalties 87
57. Under Article 249 of the RPC, in relation to Article 51, Gemenez, who was convicted of attempted homicide,
should suffer the penalty of prision correccional. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, prision correccional
should only constitute the maximum of the penalty to be imposed by the Court. Considering all the foregoing,
the Court imposes on Gemenez the indeterminate penalty of four (4) months of arresto mayor as minimum, to
four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum. (Gemenez v. People of the Philippines,
58. Section 68 of P.D. 705, as amended, refers to Articles 309 and 310 of the RPC for the penalties to be imposed
on violators. Violations of P.D. 705, Section 68, as amended, are punished as qualified theft. The law treats
cutting, gathering, collecting, and possessing timber or other forest products without license as an offense as
grave as and equivalent to the felony of qualified theft. The RTC found that the value of the cut trees was
P22,496.76. With the value of the trees exceeding P20,000.00, the basic penalty is prision correccional in its
minimum and medium periods. This penalty shall be impsed in its medium period. Considering that the crime
of violation of P.D. 705, Section 68, as amended, is punished as qualified theft under Article 310 of the RPC,
pursuant to the said decree, the imposable penalty shall be increased by two degrees, that is, prision
correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period. Owing to petitioner’s advanced age,
the penalty shall be imposed in its minimum period pursuant to Article 64(2) of the RPC. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, petitioner’s sentence is an indeterminate penalty of 1 year, 8 months, and 20
days of prision correccional, as minimum, to 5 years, 5 months, and 10 days of prision correccional, as maximum.
(Talabis v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 214647, March 4, 2020, Second Division)
59. Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code prescribes the penalty of prision mayor in its medium and maximum
periods and a fine not less than three times the value of the gift with the accessory penalty of special temporary
disqualification. Thus, taking ino consideration the provision of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the SB
correctly sentenced Mangulabnan to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment for a period of 4 years,
2 months and 1 day of prision correccional as minimum, to 9 years, 4 months, and 1 day of prision mayor as
maximum, and a fine in the amount of P60,000.00, with special temporary disqualification from holding public
office. (Mangulabnan v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 236848, June 8, 2020, Second Division)
60. Petitioners are found guilty of unlawful arrest under Article 269 of the RPC. There being no aggravating or
mitigating circumstance, the penalty for unlawful arrest should be taken from the medium period of arresto
mayor, which is 2 months and 1 day to 4 months. In addition, the Indeterminate Sentence Law does not apply
since the maximum term of imprisonment does not exceed one year. (Duropan v. People of the Philippines,
G.R. No. 230825, June 10, 2020, Third Division)
61. In view of the attendant ordinary aggravating circumstance of dwelling, the penalty must be modified. Robbery
with homicide is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death. Article 63 of the RPC provides that in all cases in
which he law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties and when in the commission of the
deed there is present only one aggravating circumstance, the greater penalty shall be applied. Thus, with an
ordinary aggravating circumstance of dwelling, the imposable penalty is death. However, pursuant to R.A. 9346,
which proscribed by imposition of the death penalty, the penalty to be imposed should be reclusion perpetua
without eligibility for parole. (People of the Philippines v. Lignes, G.R. No. 229087, June 17, 2020, First Division)
62. For committing rape through sexual assault under Article 266-A(2) of the RPC in relation to R.A. 7610, Section
5(b), petitioner is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of 12 years, 10 months and 21 days of reclusion
temporal, as minimum, to 15 years, six months, and 20 days of reclusion temporal, as maximum. (Miranda v.
People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 232192, June 22, 2020, Third Division)
63. R.A. 9262 imposes the penalty of prision mayor for violation of Section 5(i) thereof. Applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, the minimum term of the indeterminate penalty shall be taken from the penal next lower in
degree, i.e., prision correccional, or anywhere from six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6) years. There being
no aggravating or mitigating circumstances attending the commission of the crime, the maximum term shall be
the medium period of the penalty provided by the law, which is eight (8) years and one (1) day to ten (10) years
of prision mayor. Therefore, accused-appellant should suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) months and
one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as
maximum. In addition, accused-appellant should undergo psychological counseling or treatment as this is a
penalty set by R.A. 9262, Section 6 in addition to imprisonment and fine. (People of the Philippines v. ZZZ, G.R.
64. Article 310 of the RPC prescribes penalties next higher by two degrees than those specified in Article 309 if the
theft was committed with, among others, grave abuse of confidence. Article 309, as amended by R.A. 10951,
now prescribes the penalty of prision correctional in its minimum and medium periods, if the value of the
property stolen is more than P20,000.00, but does not exceed P600,000.00. Applying Article 309, as amended,
and Article 310, qualified theft involving the amount of P134,462.90 is now punishable by prision mayor in its
medium and maximum periods. After computing the periods for this adjusted penalty per Article 65 of the RPC
and since no aggravating or mitigating circumstance is present, the imposable penalty is from 9 years, 4 months

Penalties 88
and 1 day to 10 years and 8 months. As this duration exceeds one year, the Indeterminate Sentence Law
becomes applicable. Thus, the Court sets the maximum term of 9 years, 4 months and 1 day of prision mayor.
The minimum term is, thus, set at 5 years, 5 months, and 11 days of prision correccional, which is within the
range of penalty next lower to that prescribed by the RPC for qualified theft. (Reside v. People of the Philippines,
G.R. No. 210318, July 28, 2020, First Division)
65. Since the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority applies to petitioner, the penalty next lower in degree
should be imposed, i.e. prision correccional. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, petitioner should be
sentenced to six months of arresto mayor as minimum to four years and two months of prision correccional as
maximum. In accordance, however, with R.A. 9344 and Deliola, petitioner, although he is now more than 21
years old, is still entitled to be confined in an agricultural camp instead of serving sentence in a regular jail.
More, the total period which petitioner initially served from his arrest on August 29, 2013 up till he got released
on bail on October 13, 2014 shall be credited in his favor. (BBB v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 249307,
August 27, 2020, First Division)
66. Petitioner is guilty of theft. While the prosecution claimed that the total unremitted amount is P308,880.00,
the prosecution did not amend the Information stating that the total unremitted amount is P304,040.00. Since
petitioner and Baliuag admitted that petitioner made a partial payment of P110,000.00, the said amount should
be deducted from the total unremitted amount as charged in the Information. Therefore, petitioner is liable to
return to Baliuag the amount of P194,040.00, representing the balance of the unremitted amount as charged
in the Information. As provided for under Article 309(3) of the RPC, as amended by R.A. 10951, when the value
of the property stolen exceeds P20,000.00 but does not exceed P600,000.00, the penalty prescribed is prision
correccional in its minimum and medium periods. Considering that there is no mitigating or aggravating
circumstance, the penalty should be imposed in its medium period, or one year, eight months, and 21 days to
two years, 11 months, and 10 days. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum of the period
should be taken within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by law, or within the range of
arresto mayor medium to maximum or two months and one day to six months. (Libunao v. People of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 194359, September 2, 2020, Third Division)
67. With respect to the charge of illegal recruitment, the same was proven to have been committed against three
victims, and therefore constitutes illegal recruitment in large scale and is further deemed to constitute
economic sabotage. The penalties in R.A. 8042, Section 7 have already been amended by R.A. 10022, Section 6
and have been increased to a fine of not less than P2 million but not more than P5 million. However, since the
crime was committed in 2008, the Court applies the penalties in the old law, R.A. 8042. (People of the
Philippines v. Bautista, G.R. No. 218582, September 3, 2020, First Division)
68. The defrauded amounts involved in this case are: P43,500.00 in Criminal Case No. 10-276566; P37,500.00 in
Criminal Case No. 10-276565; and P34,000.00 in Criminal Case No. 10-276568. Under R.A. 10951, when the
amount involved is over P40,000.00 but not exceeding P1.2 million, the prescribed penalty is only arresto
mayor, in its maximum period, to prision correccional, in its minimum period. However, applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum term should be taken from arresto mayor, in its minimum and
medium periods, i.e., one month and one day to four months, while the maximum term should be within the
medium period of the prescribed penalty, i.e., one year and one day to one year and eight months, there being
no aggravating or mitigating cirumcstances present in this case. Thus, the Court finds it proper to impose a
penalty of four months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to one year and one month of prision correccional, as
maximum. On the other hand, if the amount involved is less than P40,000.00, the imposable penalty is only
arresto mayor, in its medium and maximum periods, i.e., two months and one day to six months, as is applicable
to Criminal Case Nos. 10-276565 and 10-276568. The provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law no longer
apply because the imposable penalty is less than one year. Thus, a straight penalty of six months of arresto
mayor, in its maximum period is proper. (People of the Philippines v. Palicpic, G.R. No. 240694, September 7,
69. The information alleged that the accused-appellant took one portable DVD worth P2,500.00 and one TCL 21
inches television. The Court finds such allegation insufficient to prove the amount of the property taken for the
purpose of fixing the penalty imposable against the accused-appellant. The prosecution must prove such value
by an independent and reliable estimate. An uncorroborated estimate is not enough. The prosecution failed on
this score. In the absence of factual and legal bases, jurisprudence instructs that the Courty may either apply
the minimum penalty or fix the value of the property taken based on the attendant circumstances of the case.
In the exercise of such discretion, the Court imposes the minimum penalty under Article 299 of the RPC, as
warranted by the circumstances. Moreover, in the crime of robbery by the use of force upon things, the
breaking of the jalousies in BBB’s house is a means of committing the crime and as such can no longer be
considered to increase the penalty. Similarly, with the separation of the crimes committed and the crime of
robbery established is with the use of force upon things, the aggravating circumstance of dwelling can no longer
be considered as it is inherent in the offense. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, there being no
attendant mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the maximum penalty shall be within the medium period of
prision mayor minimum or 6 years, 8 months, and 1 day to 7 years and 4 months. The minimum penalty on the

Penalties 89
other hand shall be anywhere within the range of prision correccional in its maximum period or 4 years, 2
months and 1 day to 6 years, the penalty next lower in degree to prision mayor minimum.
a. However, in view of the separation of robbery and rape through sexual assault, the aggravating
circumstance of dwelling may be appreciated as an aggravating circumstance. (People of the Philippines v.
Barrera, G.R. No. 230549, December 1, 2020, En Banc)
70. Given that the value involved in this case is P59,120.00, the penalty under Article 309 of the RPC, as amended
by Section 81 of R.A. 10951, is prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods which ranges from six
months and 1 day to four years and 2 months. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum term
of the penalty shall be taken from the penalty next lower in degree i.e., arresto mayor in its medium and
maximum periods, or anywhere from two months and one day to six months. Hence, petitioner must suffer a
minimum indeterminate penalty of four months and 20 days of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two years, 11
months, and 10 days of prision correccional, as maximum. Moreover, in accordance with prevailing
jurisprudence, the amount of P59,120.00 shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum from finality of the
Decision until fully paid. (Pante v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 218969, January 18, 2021, Third Division)
71. Here, considering that the penalty for parricide consists of two indivisible penalties – reclusion perpetua to
death, the penalty of reclusion perpetua is proper regardless of the mitigating circumstances invoked by
accused-appellant, there being no aggravating circumstance that would call for the imposition of the maximum
penalty of death. Otherwise put, even if it may be contended that both the CA and the RTC erred in considering
the mitigating circumstances of intoxication and passion and obfuscation, the penalty of reclusion perpetua
remains. This is clear from Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that the exclusion of said
mitigating circumstances does not result to a different penalty since the presence of only one mitigating
circumstance, which is voluntary surrender, with no aggravating circumstance, as in this case, is sufficient for
the imposition of reclusion perpetua as the proper prison term. (People of the Philippines v. Padilla, G.R. No.
247603, May 5, 2021, Third Division)
72. Article 48 of the RPC requires that the penalty for a complex crime is the maximum penalty of the graver
offense. Under Article 249 of the RPC, the penalty for homicide is reclusion temporal. For frustrated homicide,
the imposable penalty is one degree lower than that imposed in homicide or prision mayor. On the other hand,
the penalty for direct assault is prision correccional. Thus, th proper penalty to be imposed for the complex
crime of direct assault with frustrated homicide is prision mayor in its maximum period, subject to the
Indeterminate Sentence Law. There being no modifying circumstance, the maximum imposable penalty is
within the medium range of prision mayor in its maximum period, or ten (10) years, eight (8) months and one
(1) day to ten (10) years and sixteen (16) months [or eleven (11) years and four (4) months]. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum term of the penalty is prision correccional in any of its periods. Thus,
as modified, Rolly is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) years of prision correccional,
as minimum, to eleven (11) years of prision mayor, as maximum. (People of the Philippines v. Bautista, G.R. No.
73. As regards the proper penalty, Article 315 of the RPC, as amended by R.A. 10591, provides that the imposable
penalty is arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods, which ranges from two months and one day to
six months when the amount of fraud does not exceed P40,000.00. Considering that there is no mitigating and
aggravating circumstance present in this case, the proper penalty should be within the range of three months
and eleven days to four months and 20 days. The Indeterminate Sentence Law is not applicable in this case
since the maximum term of imprisonment does not exceed one year. Thus, in view of R.A. 10951 and
considering the amount involved, it is proper to impose upon the petitioner the penalty of three months and
eleven days of arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods. (Barlin v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No.
74. The Court deems it proper to modify the imposed penalties for each count. The penalty for sexual abuse under
Section 5 (b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610 is reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua.
Considering that no aggravating or mitigating circumstance is present, the penalty should be imposed in its
medium period. Moreover, notwithstanding the fact that R.A. 7610 is a special law, petitioner may still enjoy
the benefits of the Indeterminate Sentence Law. In applying its provisions, the minimum term shall be taken
from within the range of the penalty next lower in degree, which is prision mayor in its medium period to
reclusion temporal in its minimum period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, Carlos should be
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of prision mayor in its medium period to reclusion temporal in its
minimum period (eight years and one day to fourteen years and eight months), as minimum, and reclusion
temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua in its medium period (seventeen years, four months and
one day to twenty years), as maximum. (Carlos v. AAA and People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 243034, June 28,
75. The penalty imposed upon Billones is also accurate. Being an accomplice, he shall suffer the penalty next lower
in degree than that prescribed for the principals in Kidnapping for Ransom. The RPC provides that when the
penalty prescribed for the felony is single and indivisible, such as reclusion perpetua as imposed on the principals

Extinguishment of criminal liability 90
in this case, the penalty next lower in degree shall be that immediately following that indivisible penalty in the
respective graduated scale prescribed in Article 71. Thus, the imposition of the penalty of reclusion temporal in
its medium period against Billones is correct considering the absence of any aggravating or mitigating
circumstances. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty imposed upon Billones which is the
penalty ranging from prision mayor, as minimum, to reclusion temporal in its medium period, as maximum, or
ten (10) years of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal,
as maximum is accurate. (People of the Philippines v. Galicia, G.R. No. 238911, June 28, 2021, Third Division)
EXTIN GU IS HMEN T O F C R IMIN AL LI AB ILITY
DEATH OF ACCUSED
1. The death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability, as well as his civil
liability ex delicto. (People of the Philippines v. Dionaldo, G.R. No. 207949, September 9, 2015, First Division;
People of the Philippines v. Cenido, G.R. No. 210801, July 18, 2016, First Division; People of the Philippines v.
Egagamao, G.R. No. 218809, August 3, 2016, First Division; Hernandez v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No.
205871, September 28, 2016, Second Division; People of the Philippines v. Toukyo, G.R. No. 225593, March 20,
2017, First Division; People of the Philippines v. Jao, G.R. No. 225634, June 7, 2017, First Division; People of the
Philippines v. Dimaala, G.R. No. 225054, July 17, 2017, Special Third Division; People of the Philippines v.
Calomia, G.R. No. 229856, November 20, 2017, First Division; People of the Philippines v. Antido, G.R. No.
208651, March 14, 2018, Special First Division; People of the Philippines v. Robles, G.R. No. 229943, March 18,
2019, Special Second Division; People of the Philippines v. Gallardo, G.R. No. 238748, March 18, 2019, Special
Second Division; People of the Philippines v. Robles, G.R. No. 229943, July 10, 2019, Special Second Division;
People of the Philippines v. Andes, G.R. No. 217031, August 14, 2019, Special First Division; People of the
Philippines v. Monroyo, G.R. No. 223708, October 9, 2019, Special First Division; People of the Philippines v.
Corrobella, G.R. No. 231878, October 14, 2020, Special Second Division; People of the Philippines v. De Atras,
G.R. No. 197252, June 23, 2021, Special First Division; Montejo v. People of the Philippines, G.R. Nos. 248086-
a. Death of Dela Cruz extinguished his criminal liability. However, Dela Cruz’s death does not affect the
criminal liability of Cruz and Carpio. (Cruz v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 197142, October 9, 2019,
Second Division)
b. In light of Cortez’ supervening death, the Court is constrained to dismiss the instant criminal actions against
him inasmuch as he can no longer stand as an accused therein. In the same vein, the civil action impliedly
instituted for the recovery of the civil liability ex delicto is likewise ipso facto dismissed, grounded as it is on
the criminal action. However, it is well to clarify that Cortez’ civil liability, if any, in connection with his acts
against the victims, may be based on sources other than delicts; in which case, the victims’ heirs may file
separate civil actions against Cortez’ esate, as may be warranted by law and procedural rules. (People of
the Philippines v. Bernardo, G.R. No. 242696, November 11, 2020, Second Division)
2. Accused-appellant’s death prior to the promulgation of the appellate court’s decision extinguished his criminal
liability. (People of the Philippines v. Lipata, G.R. No. 200302, April 20, 2016, Second Division; People of the
Philippines v. Layag, G.R. No. 214875, October 17, 2016, First Division; People of the Philippines v. De Chavez,
Jr., G.R. No. 229722, December 13, 2017, First Division; People of the Philippines v. Crispo, G.R. No. 230065,
March 14, 2018, Second Division; People of the Philippines v. Sayo, G.R. No. 227704, April 10, 2019, Second
Division; People of the Philippines v. Santiago, G.R. No. 228819, July 24, 2019, Special Second Division; People
of the Philippines v. Maylon, G.R. No. 240664, June 22, 2020, Special Second Division)
3. Upon accused-appellant’s death pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal action is extinguished inasmuch
as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused; the civil action instituted therein for the recovery of
the civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal action. However, the
accused-appellant’s civil liability in connection with his acts against the victim, AAA, may be based on sources
other than delicts; in which case, AAA may file a separate civil action against the estate of accused-appellant,
as may be warranted by law and procedural rules. (People of the Philippines v. Culas, G.R. No. 211166, June 5,
CONDONATION, PARDON, AND AMNESTY

1. The executive clemency extended by PGMA on June 3, 2010 to a number of prisoners including petitioner was
made subject to the conditions indicated in the individual pardon papers. However, no individual pardon papers
were issued in petitioner’s favor, thereby rendering the grant of executive clemency to him as incomplete and
ineffective.
a. The necesssity for the individual pardon papers is best explained by the nature of a conditional pardon,
which is a contract between the sovereign power or the Chief Executive and the convicted criminal to the
effect that the former will release the latter subject to the condition that if he does not comply with the
terms of the pardon, he will be recommited to prison to serve the unexpired portion of the sentence or an
additional one. By the pardonee’s consent to the terms stipulated in this contract, the pardonee has
thereby placed himself under the supervision of the Chief Executive or his delegate, who is duty-bound to
see to it that the pardonee complies with the terms and conditions of the pardon.
Prescription of Prosecution and of Penalties 91
b. The individual pardon papers, therefore contain the terms and conditions of the contract of pardon, the
compliance of which is essential to the pardonee’s freedom from recommitment to prison. (Tiu v. Dizon,
G.R. No. 211269, June 15, 2016, First Division)
2. Laws granting condonation constitute an act of benevolence on the government’s part, similar to tax amnesty
laws. Thus, if petitioner desires to be covered under the SSS Condonation Law, it must show that it is qualified
to avail of its provisions. (PICOP Resources, Inc. v. Social Security Commission, G.R. No. 206936, August 3, 2016,
Second Division)
3. In Osental's petition for review, she alleged that the execution of the compromise agreement and her payment
of the amount of P345,000.00 representing the principal amount and litigation expenses extinguished her civil
as well as criminal liability. This is clearly erroneous. It is a fundamental rule that criminal liability is not subject
to compromise. A criminal case is committed against the People and parties cannot waive or agree on the
extinguishment of criminal liability. The Revised Penal Code does not include compromise as a mode of
extinguishing criminal liability. (Osental v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 225697, September 5, 2018,
Second Division)
PR ES C R IPTIO N O F PR O S EC U TIO N AN D O F PEN ALTI ES

1. The following are the guidelines in the determination of the reckoning point for the period of prescription of
violations of R.A. 3019: (a) as a general rule, prescription begins to run from the date of the commission of the
offense; (b) if the date of the commission of the violation is not known, it shall be counted from the date of
discovery thereof; and (c) in determining whether it is the general rule or the exception that should apply in a
particular case, the availability or suppression of the information relative to the crime should first be
determined. If the necessary information, data, or records based on which the crime could be discovered is
readily available to the public, the general rule applies. Prescription shall, therefore, run from the date of the
commission of the crime. Otherwise, should martial law prevent the filing thereof or should information about
the violation be suppressed, possibly through connivance, then the exception applies and the period of
prescription shall be reckoned from the date of discovery thereof.
a. In this case, involving as it does the grant of behest loans which the Court recognized as a violation that, by
their nature, could be concealed from the public eye by the simple expedient of suppressing their
documentation, the second mode applies. The Court, therefore, counts the running of the prescriptive
period from the date of discovery thereof on January 4, 1993, when he Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding
Committee reported to the President its findings and conclusions anent RHC’s loans. This being the case,
the filing by the PCGG of its Affidavit-Complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman on January 6, 2003,
a little over ten (10) years from the date of discovery of the crimes, is clearly belated. Undoubtedly, the
ten-year period within which to institute the action has already lapsed, making it proper for the
Ombudsman to dismiss petitioner’s complain on he ground of prescription. Simply put, and as correctly
held by the Ombudsman, prescription has already set it when petitioner PCGG filed the Affidavit-Complaint
on January 6, 2003. (PCGG v. Carpio-Morales, G.R. No. 206357, November 12, 2014, Third Division)
2. Evasion of service of sentence is an essential element for penalties to prescribe. Thus, the penalty has not
prescribed as the accused was never brought to prison or placed in confinement despite being sentenced to
imprisonment by final judgment. (Basilonia v. Villaruz, G.R. Nos. 191370-71, August 10, 2015, Third Division)
3. The action for estafa under Article 315(2)(a) has not yet been barred by prescription. In this case, the total
amount allegedly swindled by respondent is P203,999.00 for the buying of garments and workers’ salaries plus
$1,000.00 for the plane tickets which exceeds P22,000.00. Taking into consideration the whole amount with
the additional year for each additional P10,000.00, the penalty imposable on respondent shall be prision mayor
in its maximum to reclusion temporal, the total penalty not exceeding 20 years, which penalty is considered as
afflictive under Article 25 of the RPC. Article 90 of the RPC states that crimes punishable by afflictive penalties,
such as estafa, prescribe in 15 years. Thus, the fifteen-year prescriptive period commenced in April 1996 when
the petitioner discovered that one of the checks that respondent issued as payment was dishonored for having
been drawn against insufficient funds. At around that time, petitioner likewise discovered that there was no
buying, selling, and exportation of garments or any other transactions that took place in the US. However, the
fifteen-year period was interrupted on February 7, 2011 when petitioner filed a complaint for estafa against
respondent and Anne Kristine before the OCP of Quezon City. As of the filing of the complaint on February 7,
2011, the prescriptive period had run for 14 years and 10 months. Thus, the fifteen-year period has not yet
prescribed.
a. Olarte states that the filing of the complaint, even if it be merely for purposes of preliminary examination
or investigation interrupts the period of prescription of the criminal responsibility, even if the court where
the complaint or information is filed cannot try the case on its merits. (Orbe v. Miaral, G.R. No. 217777,
August 16, 2017, Second Division)
4. The crime of falsification of a public document, punishable under Article 172 of the RPC, charged against
petitioners already prescribed.

a. Petitioners were accused of making it appear that Quintin, who died on September 16, 1996, participated
in a board meeting with Pentel's Board of Directors occurring three (3) years after his death, or on February
25, 2000. This was accomplished by falsifying the signature of Quintin on Board Resolution 2000-001. The
crime was fully consummated through the execution of the Secretary's Certificate dated February 29, 2000,
which certified under oath that such meeting happened with the participation of Quintin, and that Board
Resolution 2000-001 was passed with his approval. Since the above-quoted Secretary's Certificate dated
February 29, 2000 was notarized, it is considered a public document pursuant to Section 19(b), Rule 132
of the Revised Rules on Evidence. As this involves the crime of falsification of a public document, the
imposable penalty under the RPC is prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine of
not more than P5,000.00. This falls within the purview of a correctional penalty, which prescribes in ten
(10) years.
b. Since the registration of all the documentary requirements for transfer of title, including the falsified
Secretary's Certificate dated February 29, 2000, was made on March 29, 2000, this is the proper reckoning
point from which the prescription of the crime of falsification of a public document began to run. From this
date of registration, there was constructive notice of the falsification to the entire world, including the
complainant Lucy. She and all other persons were charged with the knowledge of the falsified Secretary's
Certificate dated February 29, 2000, beginning on March 29, 2000.
c. Article 90 of the RPC provides that the period tor the prescription of offenses commences from the day on
which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents. But if the offense is
falsification of a public document punishable under Article 172 of the RPC, as in this case, the period for
prescription commences on the date of registration of the forged or falsified document. As consistently
applied in land registration proceedings, the act of registration serves as a constructive notice to the entire
world, charging everyone with knowledge of the contents of the document.
d. It is well-settled that the filing of the complaint in the fiscal's office interrupts the prescriptive period.
Unfortunately, the records of this case do not show the date when Lucy's Affidavit of Complaint was filed.
This Court notes, however, that the Affidavit of Complaint was executed on September 21, 2010, or more
than ten (10) years from the time that prescription commenced to run on March 29, 2000. Considering
that Lucy's complaint could not have been tiled earlier than its date of execution, prescription already set
in by March 29, 2010, or approximately five (5) months before the execution of the complaint on
September 21, 2010. As a result, by the time the criminal Information charging the petitioners with
falsification of a public document was filed on May 15, 2012, their criminal liability was already
extinguished. On this ground alone, the case against the petitioners should have been dismissed. The State
already lost its right to prosecute and punish the petitioners for the crime subject of Criminal Case No.
467715-CR then filed with the MeTC.
e. Prescription of the offense may be raised even for the first time on appeal. (Lim v. People of the Philippines,
G.R. No. 226590, April 23, 2018, Second Division)
5. The discovery rule or the blameless ignorance doctrine does not apply in causes of action based on SALNs. This
is because R.A. 6713, Section 8 stipulates the accessibility of the SALNs to the public for copying or inspection
at reasonable hours. When there are reasonable means to be aware of the commission of the offense, the
discovery rule should not be applied. To prosecute an offender for an offense not prosecuted on account of the
lapses on the part of the Government and the officials responsible for the prosecution thereof or burdened
with the duty of making sure that the laws are observed would have the effect of condoning their indolence
and inaction.
a. Under the blameless ignorance doctrine, the statute of limitations runs only upon discovery of the fact of
the invasion of a right which will support a cause of action.
b. The guidelines summarized in PCGG v. Carpio-Morales already settled how to determine the proper
reckoning points for the period of prescription. Whether it is the general rule or the exception that should
apply in a particular case depends on the availability or the suppression of information relative to the crime
should first be ascertained. If the information, data, or records from which the crime is based could be
plainly discovered or were readily available to the public, the general rule should apply, and prescription
should be held to run from the commission of the crime; otherwise, the discovery rule is applied. (Del
Rosario v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 199930, June 27, 2018, Third Division)
6. The offenses charged against petitioner have already prescribed. R.A. 6713 does not expressly state the
prescriptive period for the violation of its requirements for the SALNs. Hence, Act No. 3326 – the law that
governs the prescriptive periods for offenses defined and punished under special laws that do not set their own
prescriptive periods – is controlling, which states that violations penalized by imprisonment for two years or
more but less than six years prescribe after eight years. Here, the complaint charging petitioner with the
violations was filed only October 28, 2004, or 13 years after the April 30, 1991 deadline for the submission of
the SALN for 1991. With the offenses charged against the petitioner having already prescribed after eight years
in accordance with Act No. 3326, Section 1, the Informations filed against petitioner were validly quashed.
Moreover, there was no reason to apply the discovery rule (blameless ignorance doctrine) since the
information, data, or records from which the crime is based could be plainly discovered or were readily available
to the public, as in the case of petitioner herein, prescription should be held to run from the commission of the
crime. In addition, the CSC and the Office of the Ombudsman both issued memorandum circulars in 1994 and

1995 to announce guidelines or procedures relative to the filing of the SALNs pursuant to R.A. 6713.
Ombudsman Memorandum Circular No. 95-13 (Guidelines/Procedures on the Filing of SALN and Disclosure of
Business Interests and Financial Connections with the Office of the Ombudsman Required under Section 8,
Republic Act No. 6713) publicized that the Office of the Ombudsman would create a task force that would
maintain a computerized database of all public officials and employees required to file SALNs and that such task
force would monitor full compliance with the law. The circular further provided that the
administrative/personnel division shall likewise prepare a report indicating therien the list of officials and
employees who failed to submit their respective SALN and disclosure of business interests and financial
connections. Considering that the memorandum circulars took effect prior to the commission of the violations
by the petitioner, it would be warranted to hold that the Office of the Ombudsman could not have known of
her omissions on the due dates themselves of the filing of the SALNs. The Court stresses that the prescriptive
period under Act No. 3326 was long enough for the Office of the Ombudsman and the CSC to investigate and
identify the public officials and employees who did not observe the requirement for the submission or filing of
the verified SALNs – information that was readily available to the public.
a. The Court fully concurs with the observations of the RTC to the effect that the offenses charged against
petitioner were not susceptible of concealment. As such, the offenses could have been known within the
eight-year period starting from the moment of their commission. Indeed, the Office of the Ombudsman or
the CSC, the two agencies of the Government invested with the primary responsibility of monitoring the
compliance with R.A. 6713, should have known of her omissions during the period of prescription.
b. R.A. 6713, Section 8 mandates the submission of the sworn SALNs by all public officials and employees,
stating therein all the assets, liabilities, net worth and financial and business interests of their spouses, and
of their unmarried children under 18 years of age living in their households. Section 8(A) sets three
deadlines for he submission of the sworn SALNs, specificially (a) within 30 das from the assumption of office
by the officials or employees; (b) on or before April 30 of every year thereafter; and (c) within 30 days after
the separation from the service of officials or employees. (Del Rosario v. People of the Philippines, G.R.
No. 199930, June 27, 2018, Third Division)
7. The date of discovery was April 4, 1994, the date of the Terminal Report that was submitted to President Fidel
V. Ramos. The Terminal Report classified the subject BISUDECO loans as behest loans. Records show that the
PCGG filed its affidavit-complaint before the Ombudsman only on January 28, 2005 or a little more than 10
years from the date of discovery. Clearly, the crimes imputed to private respondents for loans transacted in the
years 1971 to 1981 have already prescribed. As to the loans covered by the years 1982 to 1985, the 15-year
prescriptive period shall apply since B.P. Blg. 195 was then already in effect. Thus, insofar as the 1982 to 1985
loan transactions are concerned, the complaint was filed on time and without a doubt, within the prescriptive
period.
a. It should be stressed that R.A. No. 3019, Section 11 provides that all offenses punishable under said law
shall prescribe in ten (10) years. This period was later increased to fifteen (15) years with the passage of
Batas Pambansa (BP) Bilang 195, which took effect on March 16, 1982. When the subject transactions took
place, the period of prescription for all offenses punishable under R.A. No. 3019 was ten (10) years. As to
which of the two periods should apply, the Court in People v. Pacificador explained that in the prescription
of crimes, the period which appears more favorable to the accused is to be adopted.
b. The loan transactions subject of this case were granted by the PNB to BISUDECO from 1977-1985. Applying
this Court's pronouncement in Pacificador, the period of prescription for offenses committed prior to the
passage of B.P. Blg. 195 is ten (10) years. The new 15-year period cannot be applied to acts done prior to
its effectivity in 1982 because to do so would violate the prohibition against ex post facto laws. Transactions
entered into and consummated prior to the effectivity of B.P. Blg. 195 on March 16, 1982 are exempt from
its amendments. The new 15-year period shall only be applied to acts done after its effectivity. (PCGG v.
Gutierrez, G.R. No. 189800, July 9, 2018, Second Division)
8. Here, it was undisputed that the respondent stands charged with violation of R.A. No. 7877, a special law
otherwise known as the Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995. The prescriptive period for violations of R.A. No.
7877 is three (3) years. (People of the Philippines v. Lee, Jr., G.R. No. 234618, September 16, 2019, Third
Division)
9. Prescription has not set in by the time Gamallo filed her Complaint-Affidavit on September 4, 2004. Escandor’s
acts of sexual harassment persisted until December 2003, the end of Gamallo’s employment with the NEDA
Region 7. By the time she filed her complaint-affidavit, only about nine (9) months had lapsed. This is well-within
the three (3) years permitted by R.A. 7877, Section 7 within which an action under the same statute may be
pursued. (Escandor v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 211962, July 6, 2020, Third Division)
10. The Ombudsman is correct in ruling that Casayuran can no longer be penalized for nonfiling of her SALNs for
CYs 1995, 1997, and 1998 under R.A. 6713. In Del Rosario v. People, the Court explained that the prescriptive
period for filing an action for violation of R.A. 6713, Section 8 is eight (8) years pursuant to Act 3326, Section 1.
Based on Section 2 of the same law, the period shall begin to run either from the day of the commission of the
violation of the law or, if the violation be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution
of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment. The second mode is an exception to the first and

is known as the discovery rule or the blameless ignorance doctrine. In Del Rosario, the Court refused to apply
the blameless ignorance doctrine in determining when prescription should run against the petitioner who failed
to file her SALN. R.A. 6713, Section 8 itself makes the SALNs accessible to the public for copying or inspection a
reasonable hours. The basis of the crime could thus be plainly discovered or were readily available to the public.
That being the case, prescription shall run from the commission of the offense, which in this case was the non-
filing of the SALN. The DOF-RIPS filed their complaint on October 17, 2013, or more than a decade after
Casayuran failed to file her 1995, 1997, and 1998 SALN. Consequently, the Ombudsman was correct in ruling
that the action for such violation has prescribed. (Department of Finance-Revenue Integrity Protection Service
v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 240137, September 9, 2020, Third Division)
11. The prescription of offenses defined in special penal laws generally begins upon the commission of the offense.
a. Since Perez was charged with the violation of R.A. 3019, Section 3(e), the prescriptive period of the offense
is found in Section 11 of the same law, which provides that all offenses punishable under R.A. 3019
prescribes in 15 years. This provision was later amended by R.A. 10910, increasing the prescriptive period
from 15 to 20 years. The amendatory law took effect on July 21, 2016. As such, this longer period of
prescription may not be retroactively applied to crimes committed prior to the passage of R.A. 10910. The
applicable prescriptive period of the offense charged against Perez is therefore 15 years.
b. In resolving issues concerning the prescription of offenses, the Court must determine the following: (i) the
prescriptive period of the offense; (ii) when the period commenced to run; and (iii) when the period was
interrupted.
c. R.A. 3019 does not explicitly provide when the period begins to run. For this purpose, reference should be
made to Act 3326, which governs the prescription of offenses punishable by special penal laws. As a general
rule, Act No. 3326, Section 2 prescribes that prescription is triggered by the commission of the crime. An
exception is the “blameless ignorance” doctrine. As an exception, the “blameless ignorance” principle
applies when the plaintiff is unable to know or has no reasonable means of knowing the existence of a
cause of action. It cannot always be invoked to extend the prescriptive period of the offense. (Perez v.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 245862, November 3, 2020, First Division)
12. The Court does not agree with the Sandiganbayan’s reliance on the “blameless ignorance” principle to rule that
the offense here has not prescribed. The posting requirements under the LGC constitute sufficient notice of the
LGU’s contractual obligations. In line with this, information was readily available as regards the execution of the
MOA with ECCE, especially since any funds disbursed for the payment of ECCE’s services should have been
posted at the end of the fiscal year. If there were irregularities in the execution of the MOA or the procurement
of ECCE’s services, including the absence of competitive bidding, such irregularities could have been discovered
without substantial delay. Reference to the posted copies of the MOA and the other publicly available
documents regarding the transaction provides the State with reasonable means of knowing the existence of
the crime. As the Court adequately clarified in PCGG v. Carpio Morales, if the necessary information, data or
records based on which the crime could be discovered is readily available to the public, the general rule applies.
Thus, the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion when it misapplied the discovery rule. There was neither
any allegation nor evidence that Perez deliberately concealed the MOA with ECCE from the public, such that it
would be impossible for the State to discover the anomalies in the contract. For this reason, prescription began
to run upon the execution of the MOA between the Municipality of Binan and ECCE on November 12, 2001, or
when the violation of R.A. 3019, Section 3(e) was allegedly committed.
a. Nonetheless, the filing of the complaint with the OMB on April 27, 2016 against Perez effectively
commenced the preliminary investigation proceedings. It was at that point that the prescriptive period was
interrupted approximately 14 years and five months after the commission of the alleged offense. Since the
OMB carries the mandate of investigating acts or omissions of public officers or employees, the
Sandiganbayan was correct in ruling that the prescriptive period was interrupted by the filing of the
complaint with the OMB. The OMB’s conduct of a preliminary investigation carries the same effect as that
originally contemplated in Act No. 3326, which is the institution of proceedings for the investigation and
subsequent punishment of the offender. Although the complaint was filed at the eleventh hour, so to
speak, it is still made within the 15-year period under R.A. 3019, Section 11.
b. Under the Local Government Code, the local chief executive may enter into contracts on behalf of the local
government unit, with the prior authorization from the concerned sanggunian. Legible copies of the
contracts are required to be posted at a conspicuous place in the provincial capitol, or the city, municipal,
or barangay hall. The concerned local government unit is further required to post a summary of the
revenues and disbursements of funds for the preceding fiscal year, in at least three publicly accessible and
conspicuous places in the LGU, within 30 days from the end of the fiscal year. (Perez v. Sandiganbayan, G.R.
No. 245862, November 3, 2020, First Division)
13. The prescriptive period for violation of R.A. 6713 should be counted from the date of commission, specifically,
the date of filing of the SALN.
a. R.A. 6713 is a special law, thus, the computation of prescriptive periods for violation of R.A. 6713 is
governed by Act 3326, in particular, Section 1(c) thereof, which provides for an 8-year prescriptive period.
b. In Del Rosario v. People, the Court held that the prescriptive period should be reckoned from the filing, or
non-filing, of the SALN. There were reasonable means for the OMB and the CSC to be aware of the

GCTA 95
commission of the offense being the agencies invested with the primary responsibility of monitoring
compliance with R.A. 6713. Moreover, the SALNs of government employees and officials are accessible to
the public for copying or inspection at reasonable hours, thus, the Court ruled in Del Rosario that the State
had no reason not to be presumed to know of therein petitioner’s omissions within the eight-year period
of prescription. The ruling in Del Rosario was echoed in Department of Finance-Revenue Integrity Protection
v. Office of the Ombudsman and Casayuran, where it was held that prescription shall run from the
commission of the offense, which was the non-filing of the SALN and that prescription has set in as DOF-
RIPS filed its complaint after more than a decade from Casayuran’s failure to file her 1995, 1997, and 1998
SALN. (Department of Finance-Revenue Integrity Protection Service v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No.
238660, February 3, 2021, First Division)
14. The prescriptive period for violation of Article 183 of the RPC, or perjury, is ten (10) years upon filing of the
SALN. To recall, the imposable penalty for perjury under Article 183 of the RPC is arresto mayor in its maximum
period to prision correccional in its minimum period, which are correctional penalties. Thus, in relation to Article
90 of the RPC, perjury prescribes in ten (10) years. The prescriptive period for crimes punishable under the RPC
are counted from the time of discovery pursuant to Article 91 of the RPC. In this case, however, discovery should
be reckoned from the time of filing of the SALN because upon filing, perjury is deemed consummated. Once
the SALN is filed, it is subject to review by the proper authorities. It is during the conduct of the review that
errors or inaccuracies in the SALN may be determined. Ten (10) years is more than enough time to discover any
errors or inaccuracies. Further, the date of filing as the date when the prescriptive period begins to run
harmonizes the provisions of the RPC and R.A. 6713, Section 8(C)(4), which states that any statement filed under
R.A. 6713 is available to the public for a period of ten (10) years after receipt of the statement and after such
period, the statement may be destroyed unless needed in an ongoing investigation. That “the statement may
be destroyed unless needed in an ongoing investigation” after 10 years implies that the investigation should
have commenced prior to the end of the ten-year period. In this case, the lifestyle check on private respondent
was commenced in 2015 and the Joint Complaint-Affidavit was filed on May 30, 2016. Since more than 10 years
had lapsed, prosecution for perjury for private respondent’s SALNs for the years 2002-2005 is now barred by
prescription. (Department of Finance-Revenue Integrity Protection Service v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R.
No. 238660, February 3, 2021, First Division)
15. The prescriptive period for violation of R.A. 6713 shall begin to run from the date of commission – the date of
filing of the SALN. Accordingly, in this case, considering that 10 years had lapsed since the submission of
respondent's 2005 SALN, and 18 years had lapsed after the submission of the 1997 SALN, when the complaint
against respondent was filed on July 13, 2016, the Ombudsman correctly held that the offenses have already
prescribed, pursuant to Section 1 of Act No. 3326. (The Department of Finance – Revenue Integrity Protection
Service v. Enerio, G.R. No. 238630, May 12, 2021, Third Division)
GC TA
1. While a “colonist” under R.A. 10592, Section 7(b) is enitled to the automatic reduction of the life sentence
imposed on the colonist to a sentence of 30 years, the word “automatic” does not imply that the reduction of
sentence occurs as a natural consequence by the mere conferral of a “colonist” status. Act No. 2489, Section 5
specifically requires an executive approval before such kind of benefit may be allowed. Tiu v. Dizon expounds
the indispensability of an executive approval on the act of classifying a prisoner as a colonist. Here, nowhere in
the records does it show that the President signified his approval to the release of petitioner in view of his status
as a colonist. Thus, there is no reason to allow the release of petitioner based on such ground. Moreover,
petitioner’s reliance in the case of Cruz II does not hold water since it involved the release of Go from prison
not because of the automatic reduction privilege as a colonist, but because of the application of the provisions
of Articles 70 and 97 of the RPC, which allow the reduction or commutation of sentences based on the
computation of GCTA.
a. Nevertheless, petitioner’s entitlement to the benefits of R.A. No. 10592, which has been given retroactive
effect in Inmates of the New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa City, must be examined in view of the attendant
factual circumstances. Based on petitioner’s Prison Records, it appears that he earned regular GCTA; time
allowance for study, teaching and mentoring; and credit for preventive imprisonment under R.A. 6127.
Moreover, based on respondent’s Comment, petitioner’s time served with GCTA in prison is 32 years, 10
months, and 7 days. However, these were all computed prior the promulgation of the Inmates of the New
Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa City. The determination of the legality of petitioner’s confinement based on R.A.
10592 necessitates the recomputation of the time allowances due for petitioner.
b. A colonist is a prisoner who is (i) at least a first class inmate; (ii) has served one year immediately preceding
the completion of the period specified in the following qualifications; and (iii) has served imprisonment
with good conduct for a period equivalent to 1/5 of the maximum term of his prison sentence, or seven
years in the case of a life sentence. (In the Matter of the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus of Franco, G.R.
2. Reyes and Evangelista are not qualified to any GCTA. Rule IV, Section 2 of the 2019 Revised IRR of R.A. 10592
provides that recidivists, habitual delinquents, escapees, and persons deprived of liberty convicted of heinous
crimes. Reyes and Evangelista, who were found guilty of illegal sale of dangerous drugs exceeding 200 grams,

Probation and Parole 96
have committed a heinous crime. This is in consonance with R.A. 7659, which includes the distribution or sale
of dangerous drugs as heinous for being a grievous, odious, and hateful offense and which, by reason of its
inherent or manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity, and perversity is repugnant and outrageous to the
common standards and norms of decency and morality in a just, civilized, and ordered society. Accordingly, the
writ of habeas corpus cannot be issued and the discharge of Reyes and Evangelista from imprisonment should
not be authorized. (In Re: In the Matter of the Issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus of Inmates Reyes and
Evangelista, G.R. No. 251954, June 10, 2020, Third Division)
PR O B ATIO N AN D PAR O LE
1. The fact that Roque was still a probationer when he applied for the position of Utility Worker and accomplished
his Personal Data Sheet did not disqualify him from applying for the position. Moreno clarified that the grant of
probation suspends the imposition of the principal penalty of imprisonment as well as the accessory penalties
of suspension from public office and from the right to follow a profession or calling, and that of perpetual special
disqualification from the right of suffrage. Hence, when Roque was granted probation, not only was the
imposition of the principal penalty of imprisonment suspended, but the accessory penalty of suspension from
the right to follow a profession or calling was also suspended. Accordingly, Roque retained the right to seek
employment and was, therefore, not disqualified to apply for the position of utility worker in the court when
he was still a probationer. However, Roque had the obligation to disclose the fact that he had been formally
charged and convicted of an offense in his PDS and cannot justify his non-disclosure of such fact by invoking the
confidentiality of his records under the Probation Law. (Re: Anonymous Letter Complaint, A.M. No. MTJ-16-
1870, June 6, 2017, En Banc)
2. As a final matter, a pending incident in this case is accused-appellant's Letter dated March 20, 2017, which was
received by this Court on March 25, 2017, in which he pleads for the withdrawal of his appeal, asserting that
he is eligible for parole and/or probation. The Court denies accused-appellant's prayer for withdrawal of his
appeal as he is ineligible to apply for either parole or probation. Accused-appellant, as he is sentenced herein
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, cannot apply for parole because Section 3 of R.A. No. 9346 explicitly
states that "[p]ersons convicted of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua, or whose sentences will be
reduced to reclusion perpetua, by reason of this Act, shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4103,
otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended."
a. Accused-appellant is likewise disqualified from applying for probation as Section 9(a) of the Probation Law
is clear that the benefits of probation shall not extend to those sentenced to serve a maximum term of
imprisonment of more than six (6) years. Irrefragably, the sentence of reclusion perpetua imposed on
accused-appellant in this case exceeds six (6) years of imprisonment.
b. Moreover, Section 4 of the Probation Law, as amended, intends to put a stop to the practice of appealing
from judgments of conviction even if the sentence is probationable, for the purpose of securing an acquittal
and applying for the probation only if the accused fails in his bid. An accused must not have appealed his
conviction before he can avail himself of probation. Jurisprudence treats appeal and probation as mutually
exclusive remedies because the law is unmistakable about it. The law is very clear and a contrary
interpretation would counter its envisioned mandate. Thus, even assuming that herein accused-appellant
is qualified to apply for parole, he has already availed himself of the remedy of appeal twice, by appealing
the RTC judgment of conviction before the Court of Appeals, and then appealing the Court of Appeals
decision affirming his conviction before this Court, which already proscribes him from applying for
probation. (People of the Philippines v. Galuga, G.R. No. 221428, February 13, 2019, Third Division)
3. Probation is a special privilege granted by the State to penitent qualified offenders who immediately admit their
liability and thus renounce their right to appeal. The grant of probation rests solely upon the discretion of the
court which is to be exercised primarily for the benefit of organized society, and only incidentally for the benefit
of the accused. (Ching v. Ching, G.R. No. 240843, June 3, 2019, Second Division)
4. In this case, the Court noted that the RTC granted petitioner's application for probation mainly on the ground
that petitioner has no disqualifications under the Probation Law. In contrast, the CA and the MeTC ruled
otherwise, albeit their reasons for denial are different. In denying petitioner's application for probation, the CA
opined, inter alia, that since petitioner committed an election offense under Section 261 of the OEC, then he
shall not be subject to probation, as provided by Section 264 of the OEC. On the other hand, the MeTC denied
petitioner's application for probation in view of the PPO-Manila's "denial" of the same. After a judicious perusal
of the records, the Court disagrees with the reasons proferred by the CA and the MeTC in denying petitioner's
application for probation, as will be explained hereunder.
a. Anent the reason proferred by the CA, the Court finds that while petitioner's act of falsifying his voter's
registration with the COMELEC by making it appear that he is a citizen of the Philippines, when in truth, he
is a Chinese citizen who has yet to acquire Filipino citizenship, may be considered as an election offense
under Section 261 (y) (2) of the OEC, petitioner's conviction in this case does not involve this election
offense. Rather, a plain reading of the Information, as well as the MeTC Decision dated August 14, 2015,
would readily show that he was tried and subsequently found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of Falsification of a Public Document Committed by a Private Individual, defined and penalized under Article

Juvenile Justice Law 97
1 72 in relation to Article 171 of the RPC. Hence, the CA erred in applying the disqualification for probation
found under Section 264 of the OEC as he was not adjudged guilty of an election offense in this case.
b. As to the MeTC's Decision, the Court agrees with the RTC's finding that the MeTC gravely abused its
discretion when it denied petitioner's application for probation and issued a warrant for his arrest based
solely on the recommendation of the PPO-Manila as indicated in the PSIR without conducting its own
investigation on the matter. It is settled that the grant of probation is discretionarv upon the court, and in
exercising such discretion, it must consider the potentiality of the offender to reform, together with the
demands of justice and public interest, along with other relevant circumstances. It should not limit the
basis of its decision to the report or recommendation of the probation officer, which Is at best only
persuasive. Otherwise stated, in determining whether or not to grant the application for probation, the
court must not merely rely on the PSIR - as what the MeTC did in this case - but rather, it must make its
own findings as to the merits of the application, considering that the Probation Law vests upon it the power
to make a final decision on the matter. Had the MeTC thoroughly evaluated the merits of the application,
it would have determined that petitioner is not a disqualified offender under the Probation Law and that
there is a possibility that he can be reformed outside of a correctional institution. (Ching v. Ching, G.R. No.
5. It is clear from both R.A. 9165, Section 24 and the provisions of the probation law that in applying for probation,
what is essential is not the offense charged but the offense to which the accused is ultimately found guilty of.
In this regard, it is worth emphasizing that upon acceptance of a plea bargain, the accused is actually found
guilty of the lesser offense subject of the plea. Thus, regardless of what the original charge was in the
Information, the judgment would be for the lesser offense to which the accused pled guilty. This means that
the penalty to be meted out, as well as the attendant accessory penalties, and other consequences under the
law, including eligibility for probation and parole, would be based on such lesser offense. Necessarily, even if
Pascua was originally charged with violation of R.A. 9165, Section 5, he was ultimately convicted with the lower
offense of violation of Section12. Since the foregoing effectively removed Pascua’s case from the coverage of
R.A. 9165, Section 24, he should, at the very least, be allowed to apply for probation. The foregoing
notwithstanding, it is well to clarify that this ruling does not, per se, make Pascua eligible for probation. This
ruling is limited to the deletion of the RTC’s pronouncement that Pascua is ineligible to apply for probation,
thereby allowing him to file such application. (Pascua v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 250578, September
6. Celorio is disqualified from applying for and availing of the benefits of probation since the penalty for the crime
which respondent Celorio has been convicted of is six years and one day to 12 years. Under Section 9 of the
Probation Law, P.D. 968, as amended, provides that the benefits of probation does not extend to those
sentenced to serve a maximum term of imprisonment of more than six years. (People of the Philippines v.
Celorio, G.R. No. 226335, June 23, 2021, First Division)
J U V EN ILE J U S TIC E LAW

1. R.A. 9344, Section 6 provides that the following minors are exempt from criminal liability: (a) those below 15
years of age at the time of the commission of the crime, and (b) those above 15 years but below 18 years of
age who acted without discernment. If a child falls under the above-cited ages, he or she shall be released and
shall be subjected to an intervention program as may be determined by a local social welfare and development
officer, pursuant to R.A. 9344, Section 20. (Dorado v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 216671, October 3,
2. Under R.A. 9344, only a child above 15 years but below 18 years of age who acted with discernment shall not
be exempted from criminal liability. Nevertheless, the said child does not immediately proceed to trial. Instead,
he or she may undergo a diversion, which refers to an alternative, child-appropriate process of determining the
responsibility and treatment of the child in conflict with the law (CICL) without resorting to formal court
proceedings. If the diversion is unsuccessful or if the other grounds provided by law are present, then the CICL
shall undergo the appropriate preliminary investigation of his or her criminal case, and trial before the courts
may proceed. Once the CICL is found guilty of the offense charged, the court shall not immediately execute its
judgment; rather, it shall place the CICL under suspended sentence. Notably, the suspension shall still be applied
even if the juvenile is already 18 years of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of his or her guilt.
During the suspension, the court shall impose the appropriate disposition measures as provided in the SC Rule
on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law. If the disposition measures are successful, then the court shall discharge
the CICL. Conversely, if unsuccessful, then the court has the following options to: (a) discharge the child, (b)
order execution of sentence, or (c) extend the suspended sentence for a certain specified period or until the
child reaches the maximum age of 21 years. (Dorado v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 216671, October 3,
3. R.A. 9344, Section 57-A is clear, categorical, and unambiguous. It states that no penalty shall be imposed on
children for violations of juvenile status offenses. Thus, imposing the sanctions of reprimand, fine, and/or
imprisonment on minors for curfew violations directly conflicts with R.A. 9344, Section 57-A and hence, invalid.

Juvenile Justice Law 98
On the other hand, impositions of community service programs and admonition of the minors are allowed as
they do not constitute penalties. (SPARK v. Quezon City, G.R. No. 225442, August 8, 2017, En Banc)
a. Status offenses involve conduct that would not be a crime if it were committed by an adult. (SPARK v.
Quezon City, G.R. No. 225442, August 8, 2017, En Banc)
4. It is indisputable and proven in court that the appellants, except appellant Roberto, are all minors when the
crime was committed. Jomar was then 17 years and 4 months old, Mark was 17 years and 10 months old, Adonis
was 15 years and 11 months old, and Luis was 16 years and 11 months old. According to R.A. 9344, Section 6,
the minor appellants herein, all above 15 but below 18 years of age shall only be exempt from criminal liability
if they acted with discernment.
a. In this case, the minor appellants committed the crime of rape with discernment taking into consideration
the following circumstances, namely: (i) appellants took advantage of AAA's helplessness when she was
intoxicated resulting to her unconsciousness; (ii) appellants prevented her from going home when
appellants Jomar and Adonis blocked her way out of the apartment while John guarded the door; (iii) Randy
acted as lookout to warn his co-accused of any intrusion as would prevent the commission of the crime;
and (iv) appellants are fully aware that the crime they were about to commit is rape, which is a heinous
crime. All these circumstances point to a conclusion that the appellants were all aware that they were
committing a wrongful act.
b. The CA, therefore, did not err modifying the penalties iniposable on the same minor appellants. As ruled
by the CA, pursuant to Article 68 (2) of the RPC, when the offender is over 15 and under 18 years of age,
the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law is imposed. Based on Article 61 (2) of the RPC, reclusion
temporal is the penalty next lower than reclusion perpetua to death. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence
Law and Article 64 of the RPC, therefore, the range of the penalty of imprisonment imposable on appellants
Jomar, Mark, Adonis, and Luis should be prision mayor in any of its periods, as the minimum period, to
reclusion temporal in its medium period, as the maximum period. Accordingly, the proper indeterminate
penalty that should be imposed upon the herein minor appellants should range from six (6) years and one
(1) day of prision mayor, as the minimum period, to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months, and one (1) day
of reclusion temporal, as the maximum period.
c. R.A. 9344, Section 38 on automatic suspension of sentence does not apply in this case since the appellants
have already reached the maximum age of 21 years old. Thus, the case should be remanded to the court
of origin to effect appellant’s confinement in an agricultural camp or other training facility in accordance
with R.A. 9344, Section 51. (People of the Philippines v. Sisracon, G.R. No. 226494, February 14, 2018,
Second Division)
5. FFF, being a minor at the time of the commission of the offense, should benefit from a suspended sentence
pursuant to Section 38 of RA 9344, or the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006. Said provision reads that
once the child who is under eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the commission of the offense is found
guilty of the offense charged, the court shall determine and ascertain any civil liability which may have resulted
from the offense committed. However, instead of pronouncing the judgment of conviction, the court shall place
the child in conflict with the law under suspended sentence, without need of application. However, suspension
of sentence shall still be applied even if the juvenile is already eighteen years (18) of age or more at the time of
the pronouncement of his/her guilt.
a. It is well to recall that Section 38 of the law applies regardless of the imposable penalty, since R.A. No. 9344
does not distinguish between a minor who has been convicted of a capital offense and another who has
been convicted of a lesser offense. The Court, therefore, should also not distinguish and should apply the
automatic suspension of sentence to a child in conflict with the law who has been found guilty of a heinous
crime.
b. Furthermore, the age of the child in conflict with the law at the time of the promulgation of judgment of
conviction is immaterial. What matters is that the offender committed the offense when he/she was still
of tender age. The promotion of the welfare of a child in conflict with the law should extend even to one
who has exceeded the age limit of twenty-one (21) years, so long as he/she committed the crime when
he/she was still a child. The offender shall be entitled to the right to restoration, rehabilitation and
reintegration in accordance with the Act in order that he/she is given the chance to live a normal life and
become a productive member of the community. FFF may thus be confined in an agricultural camp or any
other training facility in accordance with Section 51 of Republic Act No. 9344, which provides that a child
in conflict with the law may, after conviction and upon order of the court, be made to serve his/her
sentence, in lieu of confinement in a regular penal institution, in an agricultural camp and other training
facilities that may be established, maintained, supervised and controlled by the BUCOR, in coordination
with the DSWD. The case shall thus be remanded to the court of origin to effect appellant's confinement
in an agricultural camp or other training facility, following the Court's pronouncement in People v. Sarcia.
(People of the Philippines v. Lababo, G.R. No. 234651, June 6, 2018, Third Division)
6. Here, accused-appellant argues that even if he were guilty of raping AAA, he must still be exempt from criminal
liability since he was only 15 years old when he committed the offense and the prosecution failed to prove that
he acted with discernment. The trial court and the Court of Appeals found that accused-appellant acted with
discernment in carrying out the crime. First, he perpetrated the crime in a dark and isolated place. Second, after

Civil Liability Ex Delicto 99
knowing that he had been tagged as the suspect, he evaded authorities by fleeing to Tarlac and concealing his
identity. Third, as confirmed by the social worker assigned to him, he knew and understood the consequences
of his acts. Lastly, Dr. Bandonill concluded that AAA was raped by means of force, as evidenced by the
contusions all over her body and by the tear from her vaginal area. As can be gleaned from these facts, accused-
appellant committed the crime with an understanding of its depravity and consequences. He must suffer the
full brunt of the penalty of the crime.
a. Considering that accused-appellant is already over 30 years old when he was convicted, the automatic
suspension of the sentence provided under Section 38 of Republic Act No. 9344, in relation to Section 40,
may no longer be applied. While the suspension of sentence still applies even if the child in conflict with
the law is already of the age of majority at the time his conviction was rendered, the suspension applies
only until the minor reaches the maximum age of 21. (People of the Philippines v. ZZZ, G.R. No. 228828,
C IV IL L IAB ILITY EX DELI CTO

1. Civil liability ex delicto is the indemnity in criminal law for the offended party, in the amount authorized by
prevailing judicial policy and apart from other proven actual damages, which itself is equivalent to actual or
compensatory damages in civil law. This award stems from Article 100 of the RPC which states that every person
criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. (People of the Philippines v. Jugueta, G.R. No. 202124, April 5,
2016, En Banc)
2. Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. The civil liability ex delicto may be recovered
through a civil action which, under the Rules of Court, is deemed instituted with the criminal action. While they
are actions mandatorily fused, they are, in truth, separate actions whose existences are not dependent on each
other. Thus, civil liability ex delicto survives an acquittal in a criminal case for failure to prove guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. However, the Rules of Court limits this mandatory fusion to a civil action for the recovery of
civil liability ex delicto. It, by no means, includes a civil liability arising from a different source of obligation, as in
the case of a contract. Where the civil liability is ex contractu, the court hearing the criminal case has no
authority to award damages.
a. Whenever the elements of estafa are not established and that the delivery of any personal property was
made pursuant to a contract, any civil liability arising from the estafa cannot be awarded in the criminal
case. This is because the civil liability arising from the contract is not civil liability ex delicto, which arises
from the same act or omission constituting the crime. Thus, civil liability ex contractu is not the type of civil
action deemed instituted in the criminal case, and consequently must be filed separately. Additionally, civil
liability ex delicto cannot be awarded as it cannot be awarded as it cannot be soruced from something that
does not exist.
b. When the court finds that the source of obligation is in fact, a contract, as in a contract of loan, it takes a
position completely inconsistent with the presence of estafa. In estafa, a person parts with his money
because of abuse of confidence or deceit. In a contract, a person willingly binds himself or herself to give
something or to render aomw service. In estafa, the accused’s failure to account for the property received
amounts to criminal fraud. In a contract, a party’s failure to comply with his obligation is only a contractual
breach.
c. In the case of an obligation arising from contract, as in this case, the cause of action in an initiatory pleading
will involve the duties of the parties to the contract, and what particular obligation was breached. On the
other hand, when the obligation arises from an act or omission constituting a crime, the cause of action
must necessarily be different. In such a case, the initiatory pleading will assert a cause of action the act or
omission of respondent, and the specific criminal statute or he or she violated. Where the initiatory
pleading fails to state a cause of action, the respondent may file a motion to dismiss even before a trial.
(Dy v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 189081, August 10, 2016, Third Division)
3. Under Article 105 of the RPC, Hermin is obliged to return to AAA the personal properties, as alleged in the
Information and proven during the trial, that she was unlawfully deprived of, whenever possible, with allowance
for any deterioration or diminution of value as determined by the trial court. Consistent with Article 106 of the
RPC, if the accused-appellant can no longer return the things stolen, he is obliged to make reparation for their
value. The trial court shall determine the amount of damage, taking into consideration the price of the thing,
whenever possible, and its special sentimental value. That the determination of the amount of the deterioration
or of the diminution of value, as well as of the damages and losses, has been commended by the law entirely
to the discretion of the courts does not mean that proofs are unnecessary and useless. On the contrary,
evidence should, whenever possible, be produced to enlighten the discernment of the judge, but with or
without proofs, the determination of the question always depends finally upon judicial discretion. (People of
the Philippines v. Romobio, G.R. No. 227705, October 11, 2017, Second Division)
4. Under Article 104 of the RPC, civil liability includes: (a) restitution, (b) reparation of the damage caused, and (c)
indemnification of the consequential damages. Restitution means the return or the restoration of a thing or
condition back to its original status, wherever or whatever it may be. Unlike indemnification, as when the court
orders the offender to pay for damages for the loss incurred by the offended party, in restitution, the offender
is forced to give up the thing or condition that he/she had gained back to the situation before he/she became

Civil Liability Ex Delicto 100
the owner/possessor of the thing or benefited from the condition that had already occurred or happened.
Restitution of the thing or the subject matter of the action instituted must be made whenever possible, with
allowance for any deterioration, or diminution of value, as determined by the court. Furthermore, even though
the thing may be found in the possession of third parties, who acquired it by lawful means, it may be recovered
and its possession may be restored to its original owner or possessor, as the case may be. (Auro v. Yasis, G.R.
5. Acquittal of accused in a criminal case for failure of the prosecution to prove his/her guilt beyond reasonable
doubt does not automatically preclude a judgment against him/her on the civil aspect of the case. While the
evidence presented does not establish the fact of the crime with moral certainty, the civil action still prevails
for as long as the greater weight of evidence tilts in favor of a finding of liability.
a. In this case, while the trial court had ruled that the prosecution had failed to prove Jorge’s guilt beyond
reasonable doubt to the felony of falsification, it had nevertheless presented sufficient preponderance of
evidence to establish the invalidity of the tax declaration issued in his name. It is undisputed that the Deed
of Sale was not validly notarized by an existing notary public in Quezon City or anywhere in the Philippines
in 2005. Well-settled is the rule that deeds, conveyances, encumbrances, discharges, and other voluntary
instruments, whether affecting registered or unregistered lands, should be notarized in order to be
registrable. Since the enabling document, i.e., the Deed of Sale was not validly notarized, it remains to be
a private document that could not affect or cause the transfer of ownership of the tax declaration to the
name of Jorge. Contrary to petitioners’ contention, the cancellation of the tax declaration is a necessary
and direct consequence of the finding that the unnotarized Deed of Sale cannot give rise to any transfer of
ownership to Jorge. (Auro v. Yasis, G.R. No. 246674, June 30, 2020, First Division)
6. At best, the prosecution merely proved that appellant and Cahusay took advantage of their superior strength
and employed means to weaken the victim’s defense – circumstances which would have qualified the killing of
murder were they alleged in the Information. The Court, nevertheless, is not precluded from considering this
circumstance in awarding exemplary damages pursuant to People v. Jugueta. (People of the Philippines v. Toro,
7. The award of civil liability ex delicto cannot be awarded in a criminal case where the elements of the crime were
not duly proven.
a. In this case, there was no crime of estafa. Thus, there is no delict. Consequently, the award of a civil liability
ex delicto cannot be imposed. Since the civil liability arises from another source of obligation, in this case
a contract, a separate civil action must be instituted by Bangit to claim such civil liability ex contractu. As
such, the award of civil liability is deleted without prejudice to the filing of a separate civil action which may
be filed to claim civil liability arising from the contract subject to the rules on prescription.
b. According to People v. Pantig, People v. Singson, and Dy v. People, whenever the elements of estafa were
not duly proven, any civil liability arising from the estafa cannot be awarded in the criminal case because
the civil liability arising from the contract is not civil liability ex delicto. (Spouses Tayamen v. People of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 246986, April 28, 2021, Third Division)
8. As regards the monetary awards, the CA correctly awarded P100,000.00 as civil indemnity, P100,000.00 as
moral damages, and P100,000.00 as exemplary damages in line with existing jurisprudence. [ The monetary
awards shall earn an interest of 6% per annum from the finality of this Decision until fully paid. However, after
a judicious scrutiny of the apportionment of the civil liability of all accused, as principals and accomplice, made
by the RTC and affirmed by the CA, the Court finds it unjust to apportion ¼ of the total monetary awards for
Billones as an accomplice, and ¾ of which for the principals. Although the RTC and the CA correctly cited People
v. Tampus, et al. in making the apportionment of ¾ for the principals and ¼ for the accomplice, the computation
made by the RTC and CA, however, is in contravention with the rationale behind the formula provided in
Tampus. The CA ruling imposing P225,000.00 as the civil liability of accused-appellants and Ugat, Jr., while
imposing P75,000.00 as the civil liability of Billones is unjust to the latter.
a. In Tampus, the Court stressed that the court’s discretion in awarding the civil liability in criminal cases
should not be untrammeled and must be guided by the principle behind differing liabilities for persons with
varying roles in the commission of the crime. The Court said: “We must stress, however, that the courts'
discretion should not be untrammelled and must be guided by the principle behind differing liabilities for
persons with varying roles in the commission of the crime. The person with greater participation in the
commission of the crime should have a greater share in the civil liability than those who played a minor
role in the crime or those who had no participation in the crime but merely profited from its effects. Each
principal should shoulder a greater share in the total amount of indemnity and damages than every
accomplice, and each accomplice should also be liable for a greater amount as against every accessory.
Care should also be taken in considering the number of principals versus that of accomplices and
accessories. If for instance, there are four principals and only one accomplice and the total of the civil
indemnity and damages is P6,000.00, the court cannot assign two-thirds (2/3) of the indemnity and
damages to the principals and one-third (1/3) to the accomplice. Even though the principals, as a class,
have a greater share in the liability as against the accomplice — since one-third (1/3) of P6,000.00 is
P2,000.00, while two-thirds (2/3) of P6,000.00 is P4,000.00 — when the civil liability of every person is

Piracy 101
computed, the share of the accomplice ends up to be greater than that of each principal. This is so because
the two-thirds (2/3) share of the principals — or P4,000.00 — is still divided among all the four principals,
and thus every principal is liable for only P1,000.00.”
b. The apportionment of ¾ for the principals and ¼ for the accomplice would result in an absurd situation
wherein Billones, as an accomplice, will end up paying a greater amount of P75,000.00 (1/4 of P300,000.00)
than that of each of the principal who will pay only P37,500.00 each (P225,000.00 divided by six principals
after excluding Villarino). This apportionment is not what is contemplated in the Court's ruling in Tampus
wherein it emphasized that care should also be taken in considering the number of principals versus that
of accomplices or accessories, so as not to arrive at a solution wherein the accomplices or accessories will
be paying a greater amount than that of the principals. Each principal should shoulder the greater share of
the civil liability than that of each accomplice or accessory.
c. In the case, however, only the following are the accused-appellants, namely: Galicia, Demetilla, Sariego,
Chiva, and Portugal. Accused Billones, who was adjudged as the accomplice did not appeal the RTC
Decision. Accused Ugat, Jr., a principal to the crime, did not appeal the CA Decision. On the other hand,
accused-appellant Villarino died pending the instant appeal. In short, the respective civil liabilities of the
accused-appellants will vary depending on a computation that is fair and reasonable as regards their
participation as principals and as an accomplice. To be sure, there are eight participants in the commission
of the crime of Kidnapping with Ransom in the case. The total civil liability to be paid by the
accused/participants is P300,000.00 (P100,000.00 each for civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary
damages). Thus, the ratio of liability should be 1:1/2 whereby the liability of the accused adjudged as an
accomplice should only be one half of the liability of the principal. The amount P300,000.00 is to be divided
by the eight accused/participants in the Kidnapping for Ransom, the result of which is equal to P37,500.00.
But considering that Billones is merely an accomplice, his liability of P37,500.00 will be only ½ more or less
of the principal's liability which is P18,750.00; and the balance of P18,750.00 to be apportioned and added
to the liability of each accused/participant (principal and accomplice) which amount is (P18,750.00 divided
by 8) is equal to 2,343.75. Thus, the civil liability of each accused/participant is as follows:
Principals:
Galicia - P37,500.00 plus P 2,343.75 = P39,843.75
Demetilla - P37,500.00 plus P 2,343.75 = P39,843.75
Sariego - P37,500.00 plus P 2,343.75 = P39,843.75
Chiva - P37,500.00 plus P 2,343.75 = P39,843.75
Portugal - P37,500.00 plus P 2,343.75 = P39,843.75
Ugat, Jr. - P37,500.00 plus P 2,343.75 = P39,843.75
Villarino - P37,500.00 plus P 2,343.75 = P39,843.75
Accomplice:
Billones - P18,750.00 plus P2,343.75 = P21,093.75
Total = P300,000.00
Indeed, when the civil liability of each of the principal is added to the civil liability of the accomplice, the
sum total would be the amount of P300,000.00, the civil liability of all the accused in the commission of
the crime of Kidnapping for Ransom.
d. To reiterate, (i) Billones did not appeal his conviction from the RTC to the CA; (ii) Ugat, Jr., did not appeal
the CA decision to the Court; and (iii) Villarino died pending the instant appeal. Thus, the RTC Decision
became final and executory as far as accused Billones is concerned; the CA Decision became final and
executory also as far as Ugat, Jr. is concerned; and the criminal liability of Villarino is extinguished by reason
of his death pending appeal. (People of the Philippines v. Galicia, G.R. No. 238911, June 28, 2021, Third
Division)
PIR AC Y
1. Piracy, under P.D. 532, Section 2(d), refers to any attack upon or seizure of any vessel, or the taking away of the
whole or part thereof or its cargo, equipment, or the personal belongings of its complement or passengers,
irrespective of the value thereof, by means of violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things,
committed by any person, including a passenger or member of the complement of said vessel, in Philippine
waters.
a. A river is considered part of Philippine waters for purposes of punishing piracy. (People of the Philippines
v. Dela Peña, G.R. No. 219581, January 31, 2018, First Division)
2. The Information clearly alleges the elements of piracy. It was alleged that the incident happened along the river
bank of Brgy. San Roque, Villareal, Samar. In addition, it was clearly alleged that the vessel’s cargo, equipment,
and personal belongings of the passengers were taken by the appellant and his armed companion. It stated, in
no uncertain terms, that 13 sacks of copra were taken by the appellant through force and intimidation.
Undoubtedly, these sacks of copra were part of the vessel’s cargo. The information likewise stated that the
vessel’s equipment which consisted of the engine, propeller tube, and tools were taken and carried away by
the appellant. Furthermore, the Information stated that the personal belongings of the passengers consisting
of two watches, jewelry, cellphone, and cash money were taken by the appellant and his armed companions.
The appellant was able to seize these items when he, along with armed companions, boarded the victims’ pump
Anti-Terrorism Act 102
boat and seized control of the same. Armed with firearms, appellant and his companions tied Jose’s hands,
covered his head, and operated their pump boat. They travelled to an island in Samar where they unloaded the
sacks of copra. Thereafter, appellant and his armed companions travelled to another island where the engine,
propeller tube, and tools of the pump boat were taken out and loaded on appellant’s boat. From the foregoing,
the prosecution was able to establish that the victim’s pump boat was in Philippine waters when appellant and
his armed companions boarded the same and seized its cargo, equipment, and the personal belongings of the
passengers. (People of the Philippines v. Dela Peña, G.R. No. 219581, January 31, 2018, First Division)
AN TI -TER R O R IS M AC T
CRIMINAL ACTS
1. When deconstructed, Section 4 of the ATA has two distinct ports – the main part provides the actus reus, the
mens rea, and the corresponding imposable penalty for the crime of terrorism, while the second part is the
proviso. The main part of Section 4 is subdivided into three components. The first component enumerates the
conduct which consists of the actus reus of terrorism, i.e., Section 4(a) to (e), or the overt acts that constitute
the crime. The second component enumerates the purposes or intents of any of the actus reus, i.e, to intimidate
the general public or a segment thereof; to create an atmosphere or spread a message of fear; to provoke or
influence by intimidation the government or any international organization; to seriously destabilize or destroy
the fundamental political, economic, or social structures of the country, or create a public emergency or
seriously undermine public safety. This is the mens rea of terrorism, which is inferred from the nature and
context of the actus reus. The third component provides the imposable penalty for the crime of terrorism, i.e.,
life imprisonment without the benefit of parole and the benefits of R.A. 10592. On the other hand, the proviso,
if rephrased into its logical inverse, purports to allow for advocacies, protests, dissents, stoppages of work,
industrial or mass actions, and other similar exercises of civil and political rights to be punished as acts of
terrorism if they are intended to cause death or serious physical harm to a person, to endanger a person’s life,
or to create a serious risk to public safety. On the basis of this deconstruction, it is evident that the main part
chiefly pertains to conduct, while the proviso, by the clear import of its language and its legislative history,
innately affects the exercise of the freedom of speech and expression. (Atty. Calleja v. Executive Secretary, G.R.
No. 252578, December 7, 2021, En Banc)
2. Terrorism, as defined in Section 4 of the ATA, is not impermissibly vague. In the case of Section 4(a), it should
be clarified that the crime proven is not terrorism if all that the prosecution is able to prove is that the accused
committed an act intended to cause death, serious bodily injury, or danger to a person’s life. Section 4(a) does
not punish the very act of intending death, serious bodily injury, or danger to a person’s life. Such a reading
improperly dissects that portion of Section 4, and reads it in a vacuum; one should not be completely impervious
to terrorism’s overarching concept which is, essentially, to cause or threaten to cause damage or harm of
sufficient magnitude in order to achieve the actor’s intended result/purpose, such as to intimidate the general
public, create an atmosphere or spread a message of fear, or intimidate or destabilize the government. The
same observation rings true for the acts mentioned under Section 4(b) to (e).
a. The phrase “regardless of the stage of execution” is not unconstitutionally vague. To recall, Section 4
penalizes any of the enumerated acts under subsections (a) to (e) regardless of the stage of execution, i.e.,
attempted, frustrated, and consummated. Any attempt to commit or the frustrated commission of any of
the enumerated acts may be somehow regarded as inchoate crimes, i.e., crimes that were initiated but not
completed, or acts that assist in the commission of another crime. It must be noted that no law can punish
a man for what he thinks, imagines, or creates in his mind. Since Section 4(a) to (e) is an enumeration of
acts, then the phrase “regardless of the stage of execution” that immediately follows can only refer to
“external acts” and specifically, the acts of execution. Moreover, the assailed phrase itself – i.e,, the stages
of execution – are defined under Article 6 of the RPC.
b. The qualifying clause “when the purpose of such act, by its nature and context” is not unconstitutionally
vague. “Nature” in Section 4 cannot be reasonably interpreted to mean “instinct, appetite, desire,” “a
spontaneous attitude,” “external world in its entirety,” because such definitions would render the word
“nature” absurd in connection with the other terms in Section 4. Therefore, “nature,” as used in Section 4,
can only refer to the inherent character of the act committed. By a similar process of elimination, “context”
can only refer to the interrelated conditions in which any of the acts enumerated in Section 4(a) to (e) was
committed. These are the standards which law enforcement agencies, the prosecution, and the courts may
use in determining whether the purpose of or intent behind any of the acts in Section 4(a) to (e) is to
intimidate the public or a segment thereof, create an atmosphere or spread a message of fear, to provoke,
or influence by intimidation the government or any international organization, etc.
c. The Court further notes that the ATA’s definition of terrorism under the main part of Section 4 is congruent
with the UN’s proposed Comprehensive Convention on International Terrorism.
d. In any event, concerned citizens are not left without a remedy since any perceived vagueness or
overbreadth of the terms used in the main part of Section 4 may still be assailed in the appropriate actual
cases that may be brought before the courts at the proper time beyond the auspices of the present
delimited facial challenge.
e. The “Not Intended Clause” of Section 4’s proviso (i.e., “which are not intended to cause death or serious
physical harm to a person, to endanger a person’s life, or to create a serious risk to public safety”) is
unconstitutional under the strict scrutiny test, as well as the void for vagueness and overbreadth doctrines.
The “Not Intended Clause” shifts the burden upon the accused to prove that his advocacy, protest, dissent,
or any other exercise of his civil and political rights was not tainted with intent to cause death or serious
physical harm to a person, to endanger a person’s life, or to create a serious risk to public safety. More
significantly, the “Not Intended Clause” causes serious ambiguity since there are no sufficient parameters
that render it capable of judicial construction. To demonstrate this ambiguity, one may dangerously
suppose that “intent to cause death or serious physical harm to a person, to endanger a person’s life, or to
create a serious risk to public safety” may be inferred from the strong public clamor attendant to protests,
mass actions, or other similar exercises of civil and political rights. However, by their very definition, these
types of speeches are intended to express disapproval against someone else’s proposition or stance on a
given issue and corollary to that, to advance one’s own proposition and thus, should not be considered as
terrorist conduct. Without any sufficient parameters, people are not guided whether or not their
impassioned and zealous propositions or the intense manner of government criticism or disapproval are
intended to cause death or serious physical harm to a person, to endanger a person’s life, or to create a
serious risk to public safety. Notably, these types of speech essentially refer to modes of communication
by which matters of public interest may be discussed truthfully and brought to the attention of the public.
They are vehicles by which the core of civil liberties in a democracy are exercised. On this score, it is thus
important to highlight that, more dangerous than the proviso’s post-indictment effects are its pre-
indictment effects. Even prior to a court action being filed against the protester or dissenter, the proviso
creates confusion as to whether the exercise of civil and political rights might be interpreted by law
enforcers as acts of terrorism and on that basis, lead to his incarceration or tagging as a terrorist. In
addition, the vagueness is magnified by the fact that there are also threat, proposal, and inciting to
terrorism provisions in the ATA. If speech is to be penalized, then threat, proposal, and inciting, are not the
proper offenses to cover the punishable speech. Furthermore, the “Not Intended Clause” renders the
proviso overbroad. By virtue of the said clause, Section 4 supposes that speech that is “intended to cause
death or serious physical harm to a person, to endanger a person’s life, or to create a serious risk to public
safety” is punishable as terrorism. This abridges free expression, since this kind of speech ought to remain
protected for as long as it does not render the commission of terrorism imminent as per the Brandenburg
standard, which is the proper standard to delimit the prohibited speech provisions, such as inciting to
terrorism, proposal, and threat.
f. More so, the government has not shown that the “Not Intended Clause” passes strict scrutiny. While there
appears to be a compelling state interest, such as to forestall possible terrorist activities in light of the
global efforts to combat terrorism, punishing speech intended “to cause death or serious physical harm to
a person, to endanger a person’s life, or to create a serious risk to public safety” is not the least restrictive
means to achieve the same. To the Court, for speech to be penalized, it must pass the Brandenburg
standard, which the “Not Intended Clause” completely discounts. Furthermore, there are already
provisions that subsume such standard, such as the provision on Inciting to Terrorism. Thus, as it stands,
the ”Not Intended Clause” only blurs the distinction between terroristic conduct and speech, and hence, is
not narrowly tailored to subserve the aforesaid State interest. (Atty. Calleja v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No.
252578, December 7, 2021, En Banc)
3. Threat to Commit Terrorism, as penalized under Section 5, of the ATA is neither unconstitutionally vague nor
overbroad. According to the IRR, there is threat to commit terrorism when an intent to commit terrorism as
defined in Section 4 of the Act is communicated by any means to another person or entity under circumstances
which indicate the credibility of the threat. Contrary to petitioners’ claim, in Reyes v. People, a statement
becomes a threat when the speaker is successful in making the hearer or recipient believe that the threat would
be carried out. Since Reyes, the Court decided other seminal cases discussing the circumstances when a
statement becomes a “threat” as contemplated by law. In US v. Paguirigan, the Court said that a threat made
in jest or in the heat of anger, under circumstances which show that the intention to which the threat gave
utterance was not persisted in, is only a misdemeanor. While in Caluag v. People, the Court appreciated the
hostile events that occurred preceding the threat, as well as the acts of the accused simultaneous to his
utterance. Based on the foregoing, the Court appears to have consistently interpreted threat to refer only to
those “credible” threat statements, the determination of which shall be based on the circumstances under
which the statements were made. Notably, Rule 4.5 of the IRR appears to have adopted the “credible” threat
standard when it restricts the application of Section 5 only to communications made “under circumstances
which indicate the credibility of the threat” consistent with the foregoing judicial interpretation. More
significantly, in the interpretation and application of the provisions of Section 5, the Brandenburg standard,
which the Court deems incorporated in its reading, should be applied. Thus, statements or communication can
only be penalized as threats when they are: (a) directed to producing imminent terrorism; and (b) is likely to
produce such action. (Atty. Calleja v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 252578, December 7, 2021, En Banc)
4. Participating “in the x x x training x x x in the commission of terrorism” under Section 6 is neither
unconstitutionally vague nor overbroad. Section 3(k) defines training as the “giving of instruction or teaching
designed to impart a specific skill in relation to terrorism as defined hereunder, as opposed to general
knowledge.” Properly construed with this definition, training may be penalized under Section 6 only when: (a)

the “training” is with the purpose of committing terrorism; (b) the training is intentionally designed to impart a
skill in relation to terrorism; and (c) the skill imparted has specific relation to a projected act of terrorism, not
mere general knowledge. Thus, in order to be punishable under Section 6, the transfer of knowledge must be
demonstrated to have been done knowingly and willfully with the specific aim of capacitating the trainee to
commit an act of terrorism. Accordingly, the foregoing construction should foreclose any interpretation that
would include “skill” as ordinarily and broadly understood, especially considering that the teaching of “general
knowledge,” as in classroom instruction done for purely academic purposes and in good faith, is expressly
excluded from the definition of training under Section 3(k). The parameters found in Section 3(k) betrays a
legislative intent to put a stop to the knowing and deliberate transfer of specific skills in connection with the
projected terrorist acts, and not the imparting of knowledge in the general and broad sense. Moreover, in the
interpretation and application of the provisions of Section 6 in relation to training, the Brandenburg standard is
deemed incorporated. Thus, teaching or the giving of instructions can only be penalized as training within the
ambit of Section 6 when they are (a) directed to producing imminent terrorism, and (b) is likely to produce such
action. Accordingly, as construed under the lens of Brandenburg, Section 6 in relation to Section 3(k) only
pertains to “training” which is directed to produce the commission of terrorism and is likely to produce such
action. In Brandenburg, the US Supreme Court said that “the mere abstract teaching x x x of the moral propriety
or even moral necessity; for a resort to force and violence, is not the same as preparing a group for violent
action and steeling it to such action.” (Atty. Calleja v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 252578, December 7, 2021,
En Banc)
5. Proposal to Commit Terrorism under Section 8 of the ATA is neither unconstitutionally vague nor overbroad.
a. The Court finds that Section 8 of the ATA is the controlling provision as it is what actually penalizes the act
of proposal. According to Article 8 of the RPC, which has supplementary application to special laws,
conspiracy and proposal to commit felony are punishable only in the cases in which the law specially
provides a penalty therefor. In this case, Section 8 penalizes proposal only when the crime being proposed
are those that are defined in Section 4. It does not provide for a penalty for proposal of the other acts
prohibited under the ATA. This reading also appears to be the official understanding of the government
because Rule 4.8 of the IRR refers only to Section 4. Therefore, Section 3(g) should not be construed
expanding the scope of the crime of proposal to all the other provisions of the ATA.
b. This notwithstanding, Section 3(g) serves an important purpose in clarifying and delineating the punishable
speech covered by Section 8. Section 3(g) provides that proposal to commit terrorism, as penalized under
Section 8, is committed when a person who has decided to commit terrorism “proposes its execution to
some other person or persons.” Notably, this definition is virtually a copy of the definition of proposal in
Article 8 of the RPC. Evidently, “deciding to commit” is not superfluous. It is an element which the State
must prove in prosecuting cases under Section 8 of the ATA. Without this necessary element, the speech
does not equally fall within the Brandenburg standard – that is, that the same is directed to producing
imminent lawless action and is likely to produce such action. Thus, without the element of “deciding to
commit” in Section 3(g), the concept of “proposal” in Section 8 would indeed be overly broad. (Atty. Calleja
v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 252578, December 7, 2021, En Banc)
6. Inciting to Commit Terrorism under Section 9 of the ATA is not facially unconstitutional. Speech or statements
can be penalized as inciting under Section 9 only if they are: (a) direct and explicit – not merely vague, abstract,
equivocal – calls to engage in terrorism; (b) made with the intent to promote terrorism; and (c) directly and
casually responsible for increasing the actual likelihood of terrorist attacks. To the Court’s mind, these
parameters have been largely incorporated in the detailed guidelines found in Rule 4.9 of the IRR for the
prosecution of incitement under Section 9. These guidelines are conspicuously similar to the Rabat Plan of
Action which refers to an internationally-recognized high threshold for defining restrictions on freedom of
expression. The six-part threshold test takes into consideration the following factors: (a) the social and political
context, (b) status of the speaker, (c) intent to incite the audience against a target group, (d) content and form
of the speech, (e) extent of its dissemination, and (f) likelihood of harm, including imminence. (Atty. Calleja v.
Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 252578, December 7, 2021, En Banc)
7. To be penalized under the third paragraph of Section 10, it is required that a person shall: (a) voluntarily and
knowingly join an organization, association, or group; and (b) have knowledge that the organization, association,
or group is (i) proscribed under Section 26 of the ATA, (ii) designated by the UNSC, or (iii) organized for the
purpose of engaging in terrorism. Based on this definition, Section 10 punishes membership under three
instances: first, when a person voluntarily and knowingly joins any organization, knowing that such organization
is proscribed under Section 26 of the ATA; second, when a person voluntarily and knowingly joins any
organization, knowing that such organization has been designated by the UNSC as a terrorist organization; and
third, when a person voluntarily and knowingly joins any organization, knowing that such organization has been
organized for the purpose of engaging in terrorism.
a. The Court finds no impermissible vagueness in the first and second instances. The Court observes that
under these two instances, persons are sufficiently given fair notice of the conduct to avoid, and law
enforcers are not given unbridled discretion to determine who should be prosecuted and penalized. Under
the first two instances, only those who voluntarily and knowingly join an organization, association, or group,
knowing that the said organization, association, or group is a proscribed organization or has been

designated by the UNSC, is in violation of Section 10. The wording of the statute is plain enough to inform
individuals what conduct or act is prohibited, and what would make them criminally liable. Moreover, the
publication requirement for proscription and designation ensures that the status of the organization,
association, or group is readily ascertainable to the general public.
b. The Court also finds that penalizing membership under the first two instances are not overbroad. The
restriction does not sweep unnecessarily and broadly towards protected freedoms, because to reiterate,
only those who voluntarily and knowingly join an organization, association, or group despite knowing that
the said organization, association, or group is a proscribed organization or has been designated by the
UNSC, may be penalized. Given these parameters provided under the law, the Court is therefore not
convinced that Section 10 invades the protected freedom of association, which remains sacrosanct only
when its exercise is for purposes not contrary to law.
c. Moreover, it must be stressed the mere membership is not penalized under the third paragraph of Section
19. The requirement under the provision is that a person shall voluntarily and knowingly join a judicially
proscribed or a UNSC designated organization, despite knowing the status or nature of the organization or
group as such. Section 10 unmistakably has a scienter element: the offender who sought to join an
organization, association, or group has an awareness of the status and nature of such organization,
association, or group as judicially proscribed or UNSC-designated, but he or she still knowingly and
voluntarily joins anyway. Thus, the membership penalized under Section 10 must be a knowing
membership, as distinguished from a nominal or per se membership.
d. Furthermore, the first instance of membership punished under Section 10, i.e., membership in a proscribed
organization, association or group of persons under Section 26, recognizes that proscription involves court
intervention and fair notice before an organization, association or group of persons is outlawed. Knowingly
joining despite the fact that it has been outlawed by the court is precisely the evil sought to be prevented
by the ATA. There is no comprehensible justification to knowingly or intentionally join or maintain
membership under this instance. Thus, this is not an unreasonable restraint in the exercise of the right to
association. In the same vein, the second instance of membership punished under Section 10, i.e.,
membership in a designated terrorist organization, association or group of persons, is limited only to those
organizations, associations or groups designated under the first mode of Section 25, through the automatic
adoption of the designation or listing made by the UNSC. When the third paragraph of Section 10 is taken
together with the Court's analysis on Section 25, which will be explained in full in later discussions, it is clear
that the law seeks to punish the reprehensible act of knowingly joining an internationally-recognized
terrorist organization or association. This is also a permissible restriction on the exercise of the right to
association.
e. The phrase “organized for the purpose of engaging in terrorism” in the third mode should be read together
with Section 4. Section 4 circumscribes Sec. 10, including the act of “voluntarily and knowingly joining any
organization, association, or group of persons knowing that such organization, association, or group of
persons is organized for the purpose of engaging in terrorism.” There is no disagreement that overt acts of
terrorism are clearly defined in Section 4. Consequently, any ordinary man on the street, including
petitioners, would know that Section 10 pinpoints to organizations whose purpose is to engage in any of
the five types of overt acts defined under Section 4 as terrorism. Moreover, when interpreted in its entirety
and in relation to Section 4, Section 10 is a reasonable means to attain the purpose of the ATA. (Atty. Calleja
v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 252578, December 7, 2021, En Banc)
DETENTION
1. Section 29 of the ATA supplements Article 125 of the RPC and is the specific rule applicable for offenses
penalized under the ATA. It must also be highlighted that Section 29 does not allow warrantless arrest based
on mere suspicion because probable cause must be observed.
a. when Section 29 is harmonized with the provisions of the IRR, it is clear that the contested written authority
to be issued by the ATC is not in any way akin to a warrant of arrest. To be operative, there must have been
a prior valid warrantless arrest of an alleged terrorist that was effected pursuant to Section 5, Rule 113 of
the Rules of Court by the arresting officer applying for the written authority under Section 29. This
conclusion is apparent from the substantial similarity between Rule 9.2 and Section 5, Rule 113, though
the former may be narrower in scope as it applies only to offenses under the ATA. As discussed, Section 5,
Rule 113 enumerates the long-recognized exceptions to the constitutional mandate requiring the issuance
of a judicial warrant for the arrest of individuals.
b. Under Section 29 and Rule 9.2, a person arrested without a warrant may be detained for up to 14 days if
the ATC issues a written authorization in favor of the law enforcement officer or military personnel after
the arrest is made. The issuance of the authorization after the arrest is implied by the requirement under
Rule 9.1 of the IRR for the arresting officer to submit a sworn statement stating the details of the person
suspected of committing acts of terrorism and the relevant circumstances as basis for taking custody of the
said person without a judicial warrant. If the ATC does not issue any written authorization, then the person
arrested should be delivered to the proper judicial authority within 36 hours as provided under Article 125,
considering that Sections 4 to 12 of the ATA are "crimes, or offenses punishable by afflictive or capital
penalties, or their equivalent". Thus, there is no reason to believe that the "written authorization" that the
ATC can issue under Section 29 is equivalent to a warrant of arrest that transgresses a function solely vested

Arbitrary detention 106
with the judiciary and may be abused by the executive to chill free speech. The power to issue warrants of
arrest remains with the courts, pursuant to Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution.
c. The written authority under Section 29 is not an authority to arrest a person suspected of committing acts
in violation of the ATA. Instead, there must first be a valid warrantless arrest under Section 5, Rule 113 of
the Rules. Therefore, unlike the ASSO, the written authorization does not replace any warrant of arrest that
only the courts may issue.
d. A careful analysis of the purpose of the written authorization in Section 29 reveals that it actually serves as
a safeguard to ensure that only individuals who are probably guilty of committing acts punishable under
the ATA may be subjected to prolonged detention under Section 29. The pre-requisite of the ATC's written
authorization for such prolonged detention serves to spare individuals who may have committed felonies
defined under the RPC or offenses made punishable by special penal laws from prolonged detention. As
stressed by the OSG, Section 29 provides protection to the detained person because the arresting officer
must show proof that facts exist showing the propriety of the 14-day or extended 10-day detention before
it may be given effect. (Atty. Calleja v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 252578, December 7, 2021, En Banc)
2. Detention for up to 14 days cannot be done by the arresting officer without the written authorization of the
ATC. In effect, the ATC's written authorization is what narrows the application of Section 29. This must be so
because it is the ATC's function under Section 46 (d) to "monitor the progress of the investigation and
prosecution of all persons accused and/or detained for any crime defined and penalized under the [ATA]."
Moreover, the ATC is expected to be more knowledgeable of terrorist activities than the ordinary law enforcer
because under Section 46 (e), it must "establish and maintain comprehensive database information systems on
terrorism, terrorist activities, and counter terrorism operations." Had Congress not required the ATC's written
authorization, it would be up to any law enforcement officer from any local precinct or any military personnel
to decide for himself that a detention of up to 14 or 24 days is necessary. It is not farfetched to see how this
power, when merely localized, may be abused to serve personal or parochial interests. Worse, it could result in
inordinate detention for crimes not punished under the ATA. Consequently, without the involvement of the
ATC - which again is an executive agency comprised of high-ranking national security officials -Section 29 would
have a broader scope and may result in inconsistent, if not, abusive application. After an arrest has been made
and the written authorization of the ATC is secured under Section 29, there are safeguards that must be
observed during the detention of suspected terrorists. The Court is mindful that a detainee is practically under
the mercy of the government. Such a great imbalance between the power of the State and the individual is
often the breeding ground for abuses. In 2014, the UN Counter-Terrorism Task Force, under the auspices of the
UN Secretary General, published "Guiding Principles and Guidelines" relating to detention in the context of
countering terrorism. It recognized that "[t]he implementation of counter-terrorism measures through the
detention of persons leads to interference with individuals' full enjoyment of a wide range of civil, political,
economic, social and cultural rights." In particular, detention may potentially violate, amongst others, the right
to personal liberty and the right to personal security and integrity. (Atty. Calleja v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No.
252578, December 7, 2021, En Banc)
AR B ITR AR Y DETEN TIO N

1. Arbitrary detention is committed by any public officer or employee who, without legal grounds, detains a
person. Thus, the elements of the crime are: (a) the offender is a public officer or employee, (b) he detains a
person, and (c) the detention is without legal basis. (People of the Philippines v. Dongail, G.R. No. 217972,
2. Accused-appellants committed the crime of arbitrary detention becaused they were police officers who
deprived the three victims of liberty on a mere surveillance and without legal grounds. (People of the Philippines
v. Dongail, G.R. No. 217972, February 17, 2020, Third Division)
DIR EC T AS S AU LT AN D IN DIR EC T AS S AU LT
1. Petitioners cannot be found guilty of direct assault because said charge was not sufficiently alleged in the
Information. The Information alleged the following: (a) that on or about June 4, 1995, the petitioners, conspiring
and confederating together and mutually helping Nestor, who was armed with an armalite rifle, attacked,
assaulted, and shot the victims SPO2 Andaya and P/C Insp. Camacho; (b) that said victims are bona fide member
sof the PNP assigned at the Tanauan Police Station, and one of them was the current Chief of Police of Tanauan,
Batangas; and (c) the victims were, at that time, engaged in the performance of their official duties. It was not
alleged that petitioners knew that the victims were agents of a person in authority. It was only established
during the course of the trial. However, the establishment of the fact that the petitioners came to know that
the victims were agents of a person in authority cannot cure the lack of allegaiton in the Informations that such
fact was known to the accused which renders the same defective.
a. Said fact, which was established during the course of the trial, cannot be considered as a generic aggravaint
circumstance under Article 14(3) of the RPC for acts committed with insult or in disregard of the respect
due the offended party on account of his rank to justify the imposition of an increased penalty against
petitioners. This is because the accused must have knowledge that the person attacked was a person in
authority or his agent in the exercise of his duties, because the accused must have the intention to offend,
injure, or assault the offended party as a person in authority or agent of a person in authority.
Direct Assault and Indirect Assault 107
b. Since the Information charges the complex crime of Direct Assault upon an agent of a person in authority
with homicide, and for reasons above stated, the petitioners can only be convicted of the crime of
homicide.
c. The elements of the second form of direct assault are: (i) that the offender makes an attack, employs force,
makes a serious intimidation, or makes a serious resistance; (ii) that the person assaulted is a person in
authority; (iii) that at the time of the assault, the person in authority or his agent is engaged in the actual
performance of official duties, or is assaulted by reason of the past performance of official duties; (iv) that
the offender knows that the one he is assaulting is a person in authority or his agent in the exercise of his
duties; and (v) that there is no public uprising. (Guelos v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 177000, June
2. Appellants committed the second form of assault, the elements of which are: 1) that there must be an attack,
use of force, or serious intimidation or resistance upon a person in authority or his agent; 2) the assault was
made when the said person was performing his duties or on the occasion of such performance; and 3) the
accused knew that the victim is a person in authority or his agent, that is, that the accused must have the
intention to offend, injure or assault the offended party as a person in authority or an agent of a person in
authority. Here, Mayor Arcillas was a duly elected mayor of Sta. Rosa, Laguna and thus, was a person in authority
while PO2 Rivera and PO3 Almendras were agents of a person in authority. There is no dispute that all of the
three victims were in the performance of their official duties at the time of the shooting incident. Mayor Arcillas
was inside the Sta. Rosa City Hall officiating a mass wedding, and thereafter, while he was walking along the
hallway from the COA office to his office, he was shot and killed. Victim PO2 Rivera and private complainant
PO3 Almendras were likewise performing their duty of protecting and guarding Mayor Arcillas at the time of
the shooting incident. Appellants' conduct of attacking the victims inside the Sta. Rosa City Hall clearly showed
their criminal intent to assault and injure the agents of the law.
a. When the assault results in the killing of an agent or of a person in authority for that matter, there arises
the complex crime of Direct Assault with murder or homicide. Here, treachery qualified the killing of Mayor
Arcillas and PO2 Rivera to murder. Treachery also attended the shooting of PO3 Almendras. There is
treachery when the following essential elements are present, viz.: (i) at the time of the attack, the victim
was not in a position to defend himself; and (ii) the accused consciously and deliberately adopted the
particular means, methods or forms of attack employed by him. The essence of treachery lies in the
suddenness of the attack by an aggressor on the unsuspecting victim, depriving the latter of any chance to
defend himself and thereby ensuring the commission of the offense without risk to the offender arising
from the defense which the offended party might make. In the case at bench, the shooting was deliberate
and without a warning, done in a swift and unexpected manner. Mayor Arcillas, PO2 Rivera and PO3
Almendras were absolutely unaware of the imminent deadly assaults, and were for that reason in no
position to defend themselves or to repel their assailants. Vibal and David, who were armed with guns,
suddenly appeared in front and at the back of Mayor Arcillas, PO2 Rivera and PO3 Almedras and shot the
three victims. The gunshots that came from the front of the victims were fired by Vibal, while those that
came from behind them were fired by David. Said manner of attack clearly revealed appellants' deliberate
design to thereby ensure the accomplishment of their purpose to kill or injure the three victims without
any possibility of their escape or of any retaliation from them.
b. Conspiracy is very much evident from the actuations of the appellants. They were synchronized in their
approach to shoot Mayor Arcillas and his group. The concerted efforts of the appellants were performed
with closeness and coordination, indicating a single criminal impulse - to kill the victims. Conspiracy may
be deduced from the mode and manner in which the offense was perpetrated, or inferred from the acts of
the accused themselves when these point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action and community
of interest. The ascertainment of who among appellants actually hit, killed and/or caused injury to the
victims already becomes immaterial. Where conspiracy has been adequately proven, as in the present case,
all the conspirators are liable as co-principals regardless of the extent and character of their participation
because, in contemplation of law, the act of one is the act of all. (People of the Philippines v. Vidal, Jr., G.R.
No. 229678, June 20, 2018, Second Division)
3. The Court affirms the conclusion of the CA that the appellants should be held criminally liable for the complex
crime of Direct Assault with Attempted Murder in Criminal Case No. 17648-B. It is well-settled that when the
accused intended to kill his victim, as manifested by his use of a deadly weapon in his assault, and his victim
sustained fatal or mortal wounds but did not die because of timely medical assistance, the crime committed is
frustrated murder or frustrated homicide depending on whether or not any of the qualifying circumstances
under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code are present. But, if the wounds sustained by the victim in such a
case were not fatal or mortal, then the crime committed is only attempted murder or attempted homicide.
Here, the use of firearms and the manner of the commission of the crime by the appellants unmistakably show
that they intended to kill PO3 Almendras and that treachery was present. However, no evidence was adduced
to show that the nature of gunshot wounds sustained by PO3 Almedras was sufficient to cause the latter's death
without timely medical intervention. We note that the attending physician of PO3 Almendras was not called to
the witness stand to testify on the gravity or character of the gunshot wounds inflicted on the said victim. Also,
no evidence was introduced to prove that PO3 Almendras would have died from his gunshot wounds without
timely medical attendance. Where there is nothing in the evidence to show that the wound would be fatal if

Illegal Possession of Firearms under R.A. 10591 108
not medically attended to, the character of the wound is doubtful; hence, the doubt should be resolved in favor
of the accused and the crime committed by him may be declared as attempted, not frustrated, murder. (People
of the Philippines v. Vidal, Jr., G.R. No. 229678, June 20, 2018, Second Division)
4. When a person is being apprehended by a police officer resists or uses force that is not dangerous, grave, or
severe, the offense is not direct assault under Article 148 of the RPC. Instead, the proper offense is resistance
and disobedience to an agent of a person in authority, penalized under Article 151 of the RPC.
a. A police officer, such as PO2 Navarro, is an agent of a person in authority. An agent of a person in authority
is one who, by direct provision of law or by election or by appointment by competent authority, is charged
with the maintenance of public order and the protection and security of life and property.
b. To be considered as direct assault, the laying of hands or the use of physical force against the agent of a
person in authority must be serious. While petitioner grabbed the shirt of PO2 Navarro and then slapped
and kicked him several times, PO2 Navarro admitted that the kick done to him by petitioner was not really
hard. Thus, instead of direct assault, petitioner is guilty of resistance or disobedience. (Mallari v. People of
the Philippines, G.R. No. 224679, February 12, 2020, Third Division)
COMPLEX CRIME OF DIRECT ASSAULT WITH HOMICIDE

1. The crime committed is the complex crime of direct assault with frustrated homicide.
a. It is undisputed that Rolly intended to kill SPO1 Florence when he used a knife in quickly stabbing SPO1
Florence from behind. He even tried to squeeze the knife into her body, making an upward motion. The
injury sustained by SPO1 Florence was also proven to be fatal which could have caused her death were it
not for the timely medical attention rendered by her doctor. Clearly, the crime of frustrated homicide is
present.
b. Also, the component crime of direct assault cannot be denied. Direct assault may be committed in two
ways: first, by "any person or persons who, without a public uprising, shall employ force or intimidation for
the attainment of any of the purposes enumerated in defining the crimes of rebellion and sedition;" and
second, by any person or persons who, without a public uprising, "shall attack, employ force, or seriously
intimidate or resist any person in authority or any of his agents, while engaged in the performance of official
duties, or on occasion of such performance." In this case, Rolly committed the second form of assault, the
elements of which are: "(i) that there must be an attack, use of force, or serious intimidation or resistance
upon a person in authority or his agent; (ii) the assault was made when the said person was performing his
duties or on the occasion of such performance; and (iii) the accused knew that the victim is a person in
authority or his agent, that is, that the accused must have the intention to offend, injure or assault the
offended party as a person in authority or an agent of a person in authority." As established by the
prosecution, SPO1 Florence, armed with her service firearm, responded to a commotion at the crime scene
upon hearing Eric's cry for help. Upon reaching the area and seeing that SPO1 Rufino being attacked by
accused-appellants, SPO1 Florence fired warning shots to stop them. Unheeded, SPO1 Florence shot the
lower portion of Ronnie's body. As aptly observed by the CA, SPO1 Florence's actions are clearly indicative
that she was performing her duties as a police officer, rather than as a wife of SPO1 Rufino; otherwise, she
could have immediately shot to death her husband's attackers without any warning shots. (People of the
Philippines v. Bautista, G.R. No. 247961, June 16, 2021, Third Division)
ILLEGAL PO S S ES S IO N O F FIR EAR MS U N DER R .A. 105 91

1. A distinction must be made between criminal intent and intent to possess. While mere possession, without
criminal intent, is sufficient to convict a person for illegal possession of a firearm, it must still be shown that
there was animus possidendi or an intent to possess on the part of the accused.
a. Hence, in order that one may be found guilty of a violation of the illegal firearms law, it is sufficient that
the accused had no authority or license to possess a firearm, and that he intended to possess the same,
even if such possession was made in good faith and without criminal intent.
b. A temporary, incidental, casual, or harmless possession or control of a firearm cannot be considered a
violation of a statute prohibiting the possession of this kind of weapon. Thus, although there is physical or
constructive possession, for as long as the animus possidendi is absent, there is no offcense committed.
(Dela Cruz v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 209387, January 11, 2016, Second Division)
2. Petitioner claims that someone must have planted the firearms when he left his bag with the porter. He did not
identify who this person could have been and he did not state any motive for this person to plant the firearms
in his possession, even if there was indeed an opportunity to plant the firearms. However, owing to the nature
of his work, petitioner was a frequent traveler who is well-versed with port security measure. An average
reasonable person aware of travel security measures would not leave his belongings with a stranger for a
relatively long period of time. In addition, records show that petitioner had only one bag. There was no evidence
to show that a robust young man like petitioner would have been need of the porter’s services. (Dela Cruz v.
People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 209387, January 11, 2016, Second Division)
3. The courts a quo erred in convicting accused-appellants of Murder with the use of an unlicensed firearm. Under
R.A. 8294, Section 1, if homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of
unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance.
a. While it is undisputed that Rolando sustained five gunshot wounds which led to his demise, it is unclear
from the records: (a) whether or not the police officers were able to recover the firearm used as a murder
weapon; and (b) assuming arguendo that such firearm was recovered, whether or not such firearm was
licensed. As the information alleged that accused-appellants used an unlicensed firearm in killing Rolando,
the prosecution was duty-bound to prove this allegation. Having failed in this respect, the use of an
unlicensed firearm as an aggravating circumstance cannot be appreciated. (Ramos v. People of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 218466, January 23, 2017, First Division)
4. The corpus delicti in the crime of illegal possession of firearms is the accused’s lack of license or permit to
possess or carry the firearm, as possession itself is not prohibited by law. To establish the corpus delicti, the
prosecution has the burden of proving that: (a) the firearm exists, and (b) the accused who owned or possessed
it does not have the corresponding license or permit to possess or carry the same. In this case, the prosecution
had proven beyond reasonable doubt the existence of the aforesaid elements, considering that: (a) the police
officers positively identified Peralta as the one holding a .45 caliber pistol with Serial Number 4517488 with
magazine and live ammunitions, which was seized from and later on, marked, identified, offered, and properly
admitted as evidence at the trial; and (b) the Certification dated August 10, 2011 issued by the Firearms and
Explosives Office of the PNP which declared that Peralta is not a licensed/registered firearm holder of any kind
and calibre, specifically of said firearm.
a. That the prosecution failed to present the results of the paraffin test made on Peralta is inconsequential
since it is not indicative of his guilt or innocence of the crime charged. (Peralta v. People of the Philippines,
5. The petitioner was indicted of the crime of illegal possession of firearms, as defined and penalized by P.D. No.
1866, as amended by R.A. No. 8294. The elements for the prosecution of which crime are: (a) the existence of
subject firearm; and (b) the fact that the accused who possessed or owned the same does not have the
corresponding license for it. Verily, ownership is not an essential element of the crime of illegal possession of
firearms. What is merely required is either actual or constructive possession coupled with animus possidendi or
intent to possess. In this controversy, while the existence of the firearm and the absence by the petitioner of
the license to own the same may be conceded, the absence on the part of the petitioner of animus possidendi
is sufficient to cause his acquittal.
a. In the case of People v. De Gracia, the Court held that while mere possession, without criminal intent, is
sufficient to convict a person for illegal possession of a firearm, it must still be shown that there was animus
possidendi or an intent to possess on the part of the accused. Otherwise stated, to be convicted of illegal
possession of firearms it is sufficient that the accused had no authority or license to possess a firearm, and
that he intended to possess the same, even if such possession was made in good faith and without criminal
intent. Thus, the Court continued: that a temporary, incidental, casual, or harmless possession or control
of a firearm cannot be considered a violation of a statute prohibiting the possession of this kind of weapon,
such as Presidential Decree No. 1866. Thus, although there is physical or constructive possession, for as
long as the animus possidendi is absent, there is no offense committed. Animus possidendi is a concept
that eludes specific standards to indicate its existence. Being a state of mind, animus possidendi is
determined on a case to case basis, taking into consideration the prior and contemporaneous acts of the
accused and the surrounding circumstances. "What exists in the realm of thought is often disclosed in a
range of action."
b. The petitioner claims that he was not aware that the subject firearm and ammunitions were inside the
motorcycle's compartment. This was corroborated by Carpio, the firearm's owner. Carpio's testimony was
succinctly summarized by the CA, viz.: “Anthony admitted and corroborated the testimony of accused-
appellant, among others, that the firearm and ammunition were owned and licensed in his name, that he
placed the bag containing the said firearm and ammunition in the compartment of the motorcycle without
the knowledge of accused-appellant. He further testified that he happened to bring the firearm as he
intended to sell it to his co-worker who failed to arrive that day in Brgy. Santol. However, he forgot about
the firearm in the motorcycle when he left the accused-appellant at the drinking session. It was only the
following day that he learned of the arrest of the accused-appellant for possessing the firearm.
Immediately, he proceeded to the police station. He saw the accused-appellant in jail and presented to the
chief of police his license to possess said firearm.” The consistency of the story and the manner in which
Carpio acted coupled with the fact that the petitioner was merely charged to be the driver on the night of
the incident bolsters the conclusion that the petitioner was indeed not aware of the presence of the firearm
and ammunitions inside the motorcycle compartment. Not being the owner of the motorcycle, the
petitioner cannot even be remotely charged with or presumed to have knowledge of the subject firearm.
Knowledge is an essential component of intent. Without awareness or knowledge of the existence of the
subject firearm and ammunitions, it cannot be said that the petitioner has the intent to possess. While
absence of knowledge on the part of the petitioner cannot be established with absolute certainty in this
case, possibilities abound that constrain the Court to acquit the accused. It is both well settled and
elementary principle in criminal law that when the facts and evidence are susceptible to two or more
interpretations, one of which consistent with the innocence of the accused, and the other with his guilt,
acquittal must ensue. As in that case, the prosecution is regarded to not have hurdled the test of moral

certainty required for conviction. (Mendoza v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 234196, November 21,
6. The essential elements in the prosecution for the crime of illegal possession of firearms, which include
explosives, ammunitions or incendiary devices, are: (a) the existence of subject firearm, and (b) the fact that
the accused who possessed or owned the same does not have the corresponding license for it. Associated with
the essential elements of the crime, the term "corpus delicti" means the "body or substance of the crime and,
in its primary sense, refers to the fact that the crime has been actually committed." Its elements are: (a) that a
certain result has been proved (e.g., a man has died); and (b) that some person is criminally responsible for the
act. In the crime of illegal possession of firearms, the corpus delicti is the accused's lack of license or permit to
possess or carry the firearm, as possession itself is not prohibited by law. To establish the corpus delicti, the
prosecution has the burden of proving that the firearm exists and that the accused who owned or possessed it
does not have the corresponding license or permit to possess or carry the same. However, even if the existence
of the firearm must be established, the firearm itself need not be presented as evidence for it may be
established by testimony, even without the presentation of the said firearm. (People of the Philippines v. Olarte,
7. Juan's conviction of violation of P.D. 1866, based solely on the testimony of arresting officer PO2 Guerrero, is
erroneous. The Court cannot ignore the possibility that the shotgun, ammunitions, and knife confiscated from
Juan were merely planted. It is too coincidental that at the very moment the police conducted a follow-up
operation and made a protective search at the room where Juan was staying, he was caught packing a bag filled
with the seized items. As pointed out by the defense, PO2 Guerrero only admitted the fact of Juan's arrest and
nothing more. There was no admission with regard to the confiscation of a shotgun or sumpak, ammunitions
or fan knife from Juan's possession. Juan cannot be convicted solely on the basis of the self-serving statement
of PO2 Guerrero who was not even presented during trial. Even the shotgun and the ammunitions confiscated
were not presented during the trial. The non-presentation of PO2 Guerrero and the seized items was suspicious,
and should have alerted the lower courts to be more circumspect in examining the records, considering the
persistent claim of Juan of having been a victim of frame-up. In view of the possibility of that the shotgun and
ammunitions were planted, the Court finds PO2 Guerrero's statement insufficient to convict Juan of violation
of P.D. 1866. Furthermore, even if the weapons seized from Juan were not planted, it does not follow that the
prosecution proved Juan's purported participation in the crimes charged against him. Contrary to what the
prosecution would like the Court to believe, there appears to be no direct relation between the seized articles
and the weapons used to inflict the stab wounds on Evangeline and Antonio. It was not shown during trial that
the weapons allegedly confiscated from Juan were the same objects used in stabbing Evangeline and Antonio.
In view of the dismissal of the criminal cases for murder and frustrated murder, there is no reason to consider
the items seized from Juan during an alleged protective search on the person of Juan pursuant to a follow-up
operation PO2 Guerrero conducted. (People of the Philippines v. Credo, G.R. No. 230778, July 22, 2019, First
Division)
8. To convict an accused for illegal possession of an explosive devise under P.D. No. 1866, as amended,
jurisprudence has held that two (2) essential elements must be indubitably established: (a) the existence of the
subject firearm or explosive which may be proved by the presentation of the subject firearm or explosive or by
the testimony of witnesses who saw accused in possession of the same, and (b) the negative fact that the
accused had no license or permit to own or possess the firearm or explosive which fact may be established by
the testimony or certification of a representative of the Philippine National Police Firearms and Explosives Unit
that the accused has no license or permit to possess the subject firearm or explosive. While it is beyond serious
dispute that accused-appellant Velasco had no license or permit to possess a fragmentation hand grenade, thus
satisfying the second requisite stated above, a close examination of the evidence on record reveals that the
evidence presented by the prosecution failed to establish that the MK-2 fragmentation hand grenade identified
and admitted into evidence during the trial was the same object allegedly retrieved from the person of accused-
appellant Velasco. Simply stated, the prosecution was clearly unsuccessful in establishing an unbroken chain of
custody of the allegedly confiscated fragmentation hand grenade, creating serious doubt as to the corpus delicti
of the crime charged.
a. Jurisprudence explains that the chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an exhibit be preceded
by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to
be. This would include testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up
to the time it was offered in evidence, in such a way that every person who touched the exhibit would
describe how and from whom it was received, where it was and what happened to it while in the witness'
possession, the condition in which it was received and the condition in which it was delivered to the next
link in the chain. These witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been
no change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession
of the same.
b. Applying the foregoing in the instant case, the prosecution's witness, PO1 Bacani testified that after the
apprehension of accused-appellant Velasco, the fragmentation hand grenade was turned over to the
investigator. However, the testimonies of the prosecution's witnesses and the documentary evidence
presented by the prosecution are completely silent as to how the investigator handled and stored the

Forgery 111
evidence, and the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change in the condition of the item.
In connection with the foregoing, striking is the testimony of PO3 Taguba, who readily admitted on cross-
examination that the authorities failed to execute a chain of custody form when the grenade was turned
over to the investigator. (People of the Philippines v. Velasco, G.R. No. 231787, August 19, 2019, Second
Division)
9. The crimes of illegal possession of explosives and illegal possession of firearms and ammunition were not proven
beyond reasonable doubt. Under the law, to secure a conviction for illegal possession of explosives and illegal
possession of firearms and ammunition, the elements of the offenses are as follows: (a) the existence of the
firearm, ammunition, or explosive; (b) ownership or possession of the firearm, ammunition, or explosive; and
(c) lack of license to own or possess. Here, despite Pangcatan’s own admission that he brought the confiscated
firearm and ammunition for self-defense purposes, he cannot be held liable for violation of R.A. 9516 and
violation of Section 28(e)(1) in relation to Section 28(a) of R.A. 10591. However, Pangcatan’s warrantless arrest
was declared unlawful. Due to the inadmissibility of the hand grenade, firearm, and ammunition confiscated
during the warrantless search made on Pangcatan, the corpus delicti of both crimes were not established.
(People of the Philippines v. Pangcatan, G.R. No. 245921, October 5, 2020, Third Division)
10. Accused should be acquitted.

a. There is no question as to the presence of the first element (i.e., the existence of subject firearm), namely
the existence of the M16 baby armalite with magazine and 17 rounds of live ammunition. The M16 baby
armalite with serial no. 418831 was offered in evidence as Exhibit “J” while its magazine was offered in
Exhibit “K.” The 17 live ammunitions were offered in evidence as Exhibit “L.” The Clerk of Court of the RTC
acknowledged receipt of these items on September 26, 2012.
b. The same cannot be said for the second element (i.e., the fact that the accused who possessed or owned
the same does not have the corresponding license for it). The second element requires two factors: (i) the
accused possessed or owned the firearm and (ii) he or she does not have the corresponding license for it.
Possession covers not only actual physical possession but also constructive possession or the subjection of
the thing to one’s control and management. In addition, possession must be coupled with the intent to
possess on the part of the accused. The RTC and the CA found that the evidence presented by respondent
sufficiently proved that Ruben was in possession of the M16 baby armalite with magazine and live
ammunition, and that he has no corresponding license to possess it. While it was admitted by the parties
that the firearm is unlicensed, the Court is not convinced that Ruben was in possession of the subject
firearm. Ruben's account of what transpired on December 25, 2010 is more credible than that of
respondent's. Ruben was on his way home when Dionisio, George, and Roman attacked him. Silverio
witnessed this incident. Felisa likewise said that Ruben came home with blood on his face. Neither of them
saw Ruben with a firearm on the day of the incident. Dr. Danao confirmed that he examined Ruben and
found a two-centimeter lacerated wound on his right eyebrow. The parties even admitted that Ruben
sought medical treatment on December 25, 2010. Notably, Dionisio is the godfather of Felisa's child, but
both Felisa and Silverio do not appear to be related to Ruben. They are disinterested parties who simply
recounted what they saw on December 25, 2010. To the Court’s mind, Ruben was able to establish that he
was not carrying a firearm with magazine and live ammunition. In fact, he was mauled on his way home.
The courts a quo therefore erred in relying on the testimonies of Dionisio and Ramil. PO1 Callueng and
SPO3 Calimag's testimonies cannot be given weight as well because they merely relied on what was
reported to them and arrested Ruben without verifying if it is true. (De Guzman v. People of the Philippines,
G.R. No. 248907, April 26, 2021, First Division)
FO R GER Y
1. The elements of Article 168 of the RPC which defines and punishes illegal possession and use of false treasury
or bank notes and toher instruments of credit are as follows: (a) that any treasury or bank note or certificate or
other obligaiton and security payable to bearer, or any instrument payable to order or other document of credit
not payable to bearer is forged or falsified by another person; (b) that the offender knows that any of the said
instruments is forged or falsified; and (c) that he either used or possessed with intent to use any of such forged
or falsified instruments. In this case, none of these elements are present. The prosecution was not able to prove
that she was even aware of the counterfeit US$ notes. Moreover, there was no showing that petitioner had a
hand or active participation in the consummation of the illegal transaction. In fact, petitioner was not present
during the test-buy operation conducted by the team of Alex Muñez nor was she spotted during the
surveillance. (Rimando v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 229701, November 29, 2017, Third Division)
FALS IFIC ATIO N B Y A PU B LIC O FFIC ER

1. Article 171(4) of the Revised Penal Code requires that (a) the offender makes in a public document untruthful
statements in a narration of facts, (b) the offender has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts
narrated by him, and (c) the facts narrated by the offender are absolutely false. In addition, it must also be
proven that the public officer or employee had taken advantage of his official position in making the falsification.
In falsification of public document, the offender is considered to have taken advantage of his official position
when (a) he has the duty to make or prepare or otherwise to intervene in the preparation of a document, or
(b) he has the official custody of the document which he falsifies.
Falsification by a public officer 112
a. Petitioner should be acquitted. While petitioner is a public officer, being the Municipal Mayor of Cuyapo,
Nueva Ecija, and duly authorized by law to solemnize marriages, at the time such alleged criminal offense
was committed, the testimonial and documentary evidence offered by the prosecution were unable to
dispute the presumption of regularity of an official function and authenticity and due execution of the
public instruments issued by petitioner as the Municipal Mayor. As can be gleaned from the narration of
facts, there is no showing that an actual appearance by the concerned parties before petitioner as their
solemnizing officer did not occur or happen. In other words, contrary to the allegations of the prosecution,
the couples appeared before petitioner. (Corpuz, Jr. v. People of the Philippines, G.R. Nos. 212656-57,
2. It was sufficiently shown that Purchase Order No. 0628 was actually prepared on April 21, 2005 prior to the
conduct of public bididng, and that petitioner Reyes gave the directive to change the original date in the subject
PO only on May 23, 2005 after the conduct of public bidding. The original date of the PO is essential because it
affects not only the veracity or effect thereof but also determinative of the time when it was prepared and
approved so that the change or alteration made the document speak something false. Hence, the changing of
the date in the subject PO from April 21, 2005 to May 20, 2005 was not a mere correction but an act of
falsification to make it appear that a bidding was conducted prior to ordering the medicines from CDMS.
a. The act of altering true dates requires that: (i) the date mentioned in the document is essential; and (ii) the
alteration of the date in a document must affect either the veracity of the document or the effects thereof.
On the other hand, making alteration or intercalation in a genuine document requires a showing that: (ii)
there be an alteration (or change) or intercalation (or insertion) on a document; (ii) it was made on a
genuine document; (iii) the alteration or intercalation has changed the meaning of the document; and (iv)
the change made the document speak something false.
b. In falsification of a public document, idea of gain or intent to injure a third person is immaterial. This is
because what is punished is the violation of the public faith and the destruction of the truth as therein
solemnly proclaimed.
c. Typoco cannot rely on the Arias doctrine because the falsification of the documents in it was not apparent.
Aside from the alteration in the subject PO, the other documents were also obviously tampered which
could not have escaped his attention. Case law states that when a matter is irregular on the document’s
face, so much so that a detailed examination becomes warranted, the Arias doctrine is unavailing. (Typoco,
Jr. v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 221857, August 16, 2017, Second Division)
3. Petitioners were correctly charged with crime of falsification of a public document. Upon review of the
Information, it is apparent that the subject matter of the falsification is the Secretary's Certificate dated
February 29, 2000-a notarized document certifying that Pentel's Board of Directors passed Board Resolution
2000-001 in the meeting held on February 25, 2000. Specifically, the Information accused the petitioners of
conspiring with one another in falsifying the Secretary's Certificate dated February 29, 2000 and Board
Resolution 2000-001, because Quintin, one of Pentel's directors, already died on September 16, 1996-long
before the documents were executed with his supposed approval. It was further alleged that the petitioners
falsified these documents through the following aces: (a) counterfeiting the signature of Quintin; (b) causing it
to appear that Quintin participated in the preparation of these documents; and (c) by making an untruthful
statement in a narration of facts. While a board resolution is indeed not a public document within the
contemplation of Section 19(b), Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, the Secretary's Certificate dated
February 29, 2000 squarely falls under this category. And, since the said Secretary's Certificate specifically
contained not only the supposed resolution passed by Pentel's Board of Directors, but also the signatures of all
the board members who approved such resolution, then it can be concluded that all of the petitioners
participated in the execution of the falsified Secretary's Certificate. Verily, the petitioners were correctly
charged and convicted with the falsification of a public document, punishable under Article 172(1) of the RPC.
To be clear, Quintin was indisputably dead by the time Board Resolution 2000-001 was passed with his
participation on February 25, 2000. For this reason, Pentel's Corporate Secretary, in conspiracy with the other
petitioners, falsified a public document by certifying under oath that Quintin was present during this board
meeting and making it appear that he signed the resolution contained in the Secretary's Certificate, when in
truth and in fact, he could not, as he was already dead at the time of its execution. This is the main act of
falsification committed by the petitioners, especially Shirley, who was the Corporate Secretary at that time. The
fact that Quintin's signature appeared on the Secretary's Certificate corroborates this charge. (Lim v. People of
the Philippines, G.R. No. 226590, April 23, 2018, Second Division)
4. Specific to the fourth mode in Article 171, i.e., making untruthful statements in a narration of facts, the elements
are: first, the offender makes in a [public] document untruthful statements in a narration of facts; second, the
offender has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated by him or her; and, third, the facts that
he or she narrated are absolutely false. Further, to be convicted under Article 171, the public officer must have
taken advantage of his or her official position to commit the falsification either because he or she has the duty
to make or prepare or otherwise to intervene in the preparation of a document, or because he or she has the
official custody of the falsified document. Petitioner Solis contends that the second element is absent because
he had no legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts that he narrated in his February 12, 1998 Letter to
Solicitor General Galvez. At best, what he made was an inaccurate opinion on whether a portion of the property

described in BL Plan II-6752 is outside Fort Magsaysay as described m Presidential Proclamation No. 237. At any
rate, the February 12, 1998 Letter was allegedly prepared by Fabian, and that petitioner Solis signed it on the
assumption that Fabian properly performed his duty. Therefore, based on Arias v. Sandiganbayan, where this
Court said that "all heads of offices have to rely to a reasonable extent on their subordinates, petitioner Solis
contends that he should be exonerated from the falsification charge. Contrary to petitioner Solis' argument, he
did not make a mere opinion but deliberately made an untruthful statement in his February 12, 1998 Letter. To
recall, he wrote that “findings disclosethat the military reservation is not located in the topographic map sheets
referred to in the technical description in Proclamation No. 237," referring to the findings of Remote Sensing
Technologists Valencia and Viernes in their Summary Report. Nothing in the Summary Report, however,
indicates that the property described in BL Plan II-6752 is outside the military reservation as described in
Presidential Proclamation No. 237. After re-surveying Fort Magsaysay, Valencia and Viernes actually confirmed
that they were able to relocate the actual ground positions of comers 6 and 7 of Fort Magsaysay. They found
that the Bureau of Lands Location Monuments remained in the position as earlier computed and plotted in the
topographic map referred to in Presidential Proclamation No. 237, indicating that the actual ground location of
Fort Magsaysay conformed with the technical description in Presidential Proclamation No. 237. It is ridiculous
to say that petitioner Solis had no legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts as he narrated in his February
12, 1998 Letter. On the contrary, inherent in the very nature and purpose of the document was petitioner Solis'
obligation, as NAMRIA Administrator, to disclose the truth of the facts as he narrated. NAMRIA is the
government agency responsible for conducting geophysical surveys as well as managing resource information
needed by both the public and private sectors. Because of the agency's special competence, petitioner Solis
was requested by the Republic, through the Solicitor General, to conduct a re-survey of Fort Magsaysay. He was
informed at the outset that his agency's findings would determine whether or not the government would enter
into a compromise with petitioner Garcia-Diaz. To allow petitioner Solis to claim that he had no legal obligation
to disclose the truth in his letter will be contrary to NAMRIA's functions. It will erode the public's confidence in
NAMRIA and all its issuances and research findings.
a. It is true that this Court said in Arias that all heads of offices have to rely to a reasonable extent on their
subordinates and on the good faith of those who enter into negotiations. However, as earlier found, it was
never established that a subordinate prepared the February 12, 1998 Letter and that petitioner Solis merely
signed it perfunctorily. The Sandiganbayan even found that it did not pass the usual procedure, not being
signed by an assistant director, a director, and a deputy administrator. Furthermore, petitioner Solis
testified on direct examination that he examined it and its attachments. It must be presumed that
petitioner Solis prepared it, not a subordinate. Arias, therefore, does not apply.
b. Petitioner Solis is guilty of falsification of public document. Petitioner Solis, then NAMRIA Administrator,
wrote the February 12, 1998 Letter, an official correspondence to the Solicitor General, and therefore, a
public document. He had the legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated in it for he was fully
aware that his findings would determine whether 4,689 hectares of the property covered by BL Plan II-
6752, claimed to be located outside Fort Magsaysay, may be the subject of a compromise. Lastly, as
established, the narration of facts was absolutely false and contrary to the findings of the foresters who re-
surveyed Fort Magsaysay. There being no modifying circumstance in this case, the indeterminate penalty
of two (2) years, four (4) months, and one (1) day of prisión correccional medium as minimum to six (6)
years and one (1) day of prisión mayor medium as maximum is in order. (Garcia-Diaz v. Sandiganbayan,
5. A municipal mayor, who changed the wordings of a municipal ordinance, is guilty of falsification by a public
officer of a public document. The elements of the crime under Article 171(6) of the Revised Penal Code are
present.
a. The first element, that the offender is a public officer, is indisputably present as the parties stipulated
during pre-trial that Tadena was the municipal mayor of Sto. Domingo, Ilocos Sur when the falsification
took place
b. The second element is taking advantage of official position in falsifying a document, when (1) the offender
has the duty to make, prepare, or intervene in the preparation of a document, or (2) he/she has the official
custody of the document which he/she falsifies. These two aspects are evident in this case. As for the first
aspect, the SB correctly pointed out that Section 54 of the Local Government Code (LGC) states that a local
chief executive participates in the enactment of an ordinance either by approval or veto. Either of the acts
are connected with the performance of his duties as municipal mayor, and constitute as intervention in
enacting an ordinance. Tadena justifies that he made the changes as part of the local legislation process.
The Court strongly disagrees. Section 54 of the LGC limits the participation of a local chief executive in the
enactment of ordinance to two acts, either approval or veto. The provision does not include the power to
make changes on an ordinance. At most, the local chief executive may veto the ordinance and submit his
objections to the sanggunian. However, Tadena neither approved nor vetoed the ordinance. He intervened
in the process by changing the wordings of the 4th Whereas Clause of the municipal ordinance. As for the
second aspect, Tadena has official custody of the Second Version of Municipal Ordinance 2001-013,
because Tagorda transmitted it to his office for appropriate action. Tadena admitted receiving the
municipal ordinance in the Statement of Facts in his petition With the two aspects both evident in this case,
it is unmistakable that Tadena took advantage of his position as municipal mayor when he falsified the
municipal ordinance.

c. The third element is falsification of a document by making any alteration or intercalation in a genuine
document which changes its meaning, which is obtaining in this case. (Tadena v. People of the Philippines,
6. The third element of falsification under Article 171(6) of the RPC are as follows: (a) an alteration (change) or
intercalation (insertion) on a document; (b) it was made on a genuine document; (c) the alteration or
intercalation has changed the meaning of the document; and (d) the change made the document speak
something false.
a. The alteration changed the meaning of the Second Version of the municipal ordinance and represented a
false intention of the local legislative body. The SB correctly observed that the Sangguniang Bayan originally
wanted the creation of the municipal administrator's office to be dependent on the implementation of the
2% of the 5% mandatory salary increase for 2002. However, after the alteration, Tadena made it appear
that the creation of the municipal administrator's office was independent from the implementation of the
mandatory salary increase. Clearly, the alteration departed from the intention of the Sangguniang Bayan,
removed the condition imposed, and conveyed an untruthful idea. (Tadena v. People of the Philippines,
7. Before one can be held criminally liable for falsification of public documents, it is essential that the document
allegedly falsified is a public document. (Atty. Constantino v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 225696, April
8. With respect to the falsification by a public officer, employee, or a notary public under Article 171 of the RPC,
the following are the elements of this crime: (a) the offender is a public officer, employee, or a notary public;
(b) the offender takes advantage of his or her official position; and (c) the offender falsifies a document by
committing any of the acts of falsification under Article 171. Article 171 (2) provides that "[c]ausing it to appear
that persons have participated in any act or proceeding when they did not in fact so participate" is an act of
falsification. As resolved by the Ombudsman, the foregoing elements were met when it seemingly appeared in
the Notice of Award, Abstract of Bids as Read, and Minutes of Opening of Bids that Oro Cars, Eves Display
Center, and Catmon Car Sales participated in the procurement of the subject vehicle yet these establishments
categorically denied participation in the bidding process. The Ombudsman elucidated that petitioners had
control over the said documents in their respective capacities and that they signed these notwithstanding the
utter falsities therein. (Chipoco v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 239416, July 24, 2019, Third Division)
9. Here, petitioner was indicted for and convicted of falsification of public document under Article 171 (par. 4) of
the Revised Penal Code because when he issued TOP No. 02774452-A he made untruthful statements in a
narration of facts, i.e. (a) he entered his son's name "Ruben Rubio Liwanag, Jr." on the TOP; (b) he made a false
entry pertaining to his son's birthdate i.e. June 27, 1974 instead of June 27, 1977 (his son's true birthdate); and
(c) he altered his badge number from "04580" to "50480," thus, making it appear that he had authority to issue
the subject TOP. To be convicted under Article 171(par. 4) of the Revised Penal Code, the following elements
must concur: (a) the offender makes in a public document untruthful statements in a narration of facts; (b) he
has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated by him; and (c) the facts narrated by him are
absolutely false. Petitioner does not deny the presence of these elements here. He, nonetheless, insists on his
plea that he had no malicious or wrongful intent to injure a third person. On this score, suffice it to state that
intent to gain or intent to injure is not an element of the crime of falsification of public document. Nor is it a
valid defense. (Liwanag, Sr. v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 205260, July 29, 2019, Second Division)
10. As to the third element of Article 171 of the RPC, i.e., the offender falsifies a document by committing any of
the acts of falsification under Article 171 of the Code, as correctly found by the CA, evidence presented by the
prosecution established that petitioner's continuous absence since September 21, 2010 prompted an
investigation against her which led to the discovery of the subject DTRs and Applications for Leave. The subject
DTRs included the purported signatures of Embido and Minguez. However, both officers certified that the
signatures appearing on the subject DTRs are not theirs. Furthermore, the Questioned Document Report No.
69-211,[29] or the results of the handwriting examination conducted by the NBI Questioned Documents Division,
shows that the signatures on the subject DTRs and the sample signatures of Embido and Minguez were not
written by the same person. Additionally, the testimony of Minguez established that he had not seen petitioner
report for work for six (6) months. Anent the Applications for Leave, a Certification from Corazon A. Villas, Chief
of the NBI - Personnel Division indicates that the said division has not received any application for any leave of
absence from petitioner for the period of September 21, 2010 to December 8, 2010. The Application for Leave
for the period of October 4 to 29, 2010 further indicates that the same was received by the Personnel Division
on January 18, 2011, establishing that the same was not filed on September 17, 2010 as written thereon. Verily,
the totality of evidence presented by the prosecution established that petitioner, a public officer, has taken
advantage of her official position and falsified her DTRs and Applications for Leave by counterfeiting or imitating
the signatures of Embido and Minguez, making it appear that the said officers verified her DTRs. Through the
subject DTRs, petitioner likewise made untruthful statements in making it appear that she regularly reported
for work in September, October, and November, when she actually stopped showing up for work after
September 21, 2010. Petitioner likewise altered true dates on her Applications for Leave, making it appear that

she had tiled the same on September 17, 2010 when they were actually filed on January 18, 2011. (Torres v.
CA, G.R. No. 241164, August 14, 2019, Third Division)
11. Falsification of a public document cannot be commited by means of culpa; thus, there can be no crime of
reckless imprudence resulting to falsification of public document. It must be stressed that in falsification of
public document, the offender is considered to have taken advantage of his official position in making the
falsification when (a) he has the duty to make or prepare or, otherwise, to intervene in the preparation of a
document, or (b) he has the official custody of the document which he falsifies. By “legal obligation,” it means
that there is a law requiring the disclosure of the truth of the facts narrated. In falsification of public or official
documents, it is not necessary that there be present the idea of gain or the intent to injure a third person
because in the falsification of a public document, what is punished is the violation of the public faith and the
destruction of the truth as therein solemnly proclaimed. (Office of the Ombudsman v. Santidad, G.R. No.
12. Santidad cannot be held criminally culpable for Falsification of Public Documents by making untruthful
statements in a narration of facts (Article 171, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code) inasmuch as the records
do not show that the prosecution was able to prove the existence of malicious intent when he affixed his
signature on the IRPs certifying the transfer of the subject Mitsubishi Delica vans to Cong. Abaya of the 4 th
District of Isabela. To be criminally liable for falsification by making untruthful statements in a narration of facts,
the person making the narration of facts must be aware of the falsity of the facts narrated by him. Here, there
is dearth of evidence to show that Santidad knew that there were no deliveries of vans to the recipients at the
time he signed the IRPs. No matter how gross the nature and gravity of the imprudence or negligence
attributable to Santidad, the same would not shatter the fine distinction between dolo and culpa so as to
consider Santidad's act as one committed with malicious intent. (Office of the Ombudsman v. Santidad, G.R.
No. 207154, December 5, 2019, First Division)
13. Casayuran cannot be held liable under Article 171(4) of the RPC. While there is no question that Casayuran is a
public officer, her failure to declare the Sentra in her SALNs for 2007, 2010, 2011, and 2012 is not tantamount
to taking advantage of her position as Customs Operations Officer III. A public officer is said to have taken
advantage of his or her position if he or she has the duty to make or prepare or otherwise to intervene in the
preparation of a document or if her or she has the official custody of the document which he or she falsifies. In
People v. Sandiganbayan, the Court held that failure to show the involvement of one of the accused, Mayor
Saludaga, in the issuance of the official receipt subject of the complaint means that there was also failure to
establish that he took advantage of his position. Accordingly, he cannot be held liable for falsification of public
documents.
a. Except for those who serve in an honorary capacity, laborers and casual or temporary workers, every public
officer or employee is required to file their SALN pursuant to the Constitution, R.A. 3019, and R.A. 6713.
Thus, Casayuran’s position is irrelevant with respect to the requirements of filing a SALN because she must
file it so long as she is a public officer or employee. Her position as a Customs Operations Officer III does
not give her any specific power or function when it comes to her SALN. She is similarly situated with every
other public officer or employee. Hence, it cannot be said that Casayuran took advantage of her position
when she failed to declare the Sentra in her SALNs for 2007, 2010, 2011, and 2012. Due to the absence of
the element of taking advantage of one’s position, there can be no finding of porbable cause agains
Casayuran for violation of Article 171. (Department of Finance-Revenue Integrity Protection Service v.
Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 240137, September 9, 2020, Third Division)
14. The elements of falsification for making untruthful narration of facts were lacking.
a. Office of the Ombudsman v. Santidad lists the following as elements of falsification has the following
elements: (i) the offender is a public officer, employee, or notary public; (ii) he takes advantage of his official
position; and (iii) he falsifies a document by committing any of the acts enumerated in Article 171 of the
RPC. To warrant conviction for Falsification of Public Documents by making untruthful statements in a
narration of facts under Article 171(4) of the RPC, the prosecution must establish beyond reasonable doubt
the following elements: (i) the offender makes in a public document untruthful statements in a narration
of facts; (ii) he has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated by him; and (iii) the facts
narrated by him are absolutely false.
b. The element of taking advantage of one’s position is patently lacking. There is no showing that private
respondent had the duty to make or prepare, or otherwise, to intervene in the preparation of the SALNs,
or he had the official custody of the same. Taking advantage of one’s official position for the purpose of
committing falsification of public document under Article 171 is considered present when the offender
falsifies a document in connection with the duties of his office which consist of either making or preparing
or otherwise intervening in the preparation of a document. A public officer is said to have taken advantage
of his or her position if he or she has the duty to make or prepare or otherwise intervene in the preparation
of a document or if he or she has the official custody of the document which or she falsifies. The preparation
and filing of a SALN is not a special duty of any particular office. It is not based on rank or salary grade. The
preparation and filing of a SALN is required of all public officers and employees except thos who serve in

an honorary capacity, laborers, and casual or temporary workers. Hence, when it comes to the preparation
of SALNs, no office has an advantage over the other.
c. Private respondent is a security guard. To be sure, the documents he is required to make or prepare as part
of the official duties of his position are security reports and attendance reports. These are the documents
that he could prepare to give undue advantage to himself since he controls these reports. The SALN is a
document he is required to prepare not because of the specific duties of a security guard, but by virtue of
private respondent being a government employee. Hence, private respondent’s failure to disclose in his
SALNs several other real properties is not tantamount to taking advantage of his position as customs
security guard. (Department of Finance-Revenue Integrity Protection Service v. Office of the Ombudsman,
15. Petitioner is guilty of falsification.

a. As to the second element, an offender is considered to have taken advantage of his official position when
(i) he has the duty to make or prepare or otherwise to intervene in the preparation of a document, or (ii)
he has the official custody of the document which he falsifies. As the Regional Director of DepEd RO-IX
Zamboanga City, petitioner is likewise the head of the procuring entity for the BAC of DepEd-RO IX and is
in charge of approving all the BAC Resolutions to be carried out in the procurement. He was therefore duty
bound to intervene in the preparation of the documents pertaining to the transaction in dispute.
b. As to the third element, the BAC Resolution dated April 11, 2006 appears to have been signed by Harpi,
Pilar, and Virginia. It was made to appear that on such date, at around 9:00 am, they intervened and met
as BAC members at the DepEd-RO IX in Pagadian City. It was also made to appear that they recommended
to petitioner the use of the alternative methods of procurement for the IT packages which shall be
distributed to some local schools. However, as stated by the witnesses and affirmed by the Sandiganbayan,
there is no truth to these circumstances.
c. Finally, it was established that petitioner used the falsified BAC Resolution in order to secure funds from
the DBM to pay its external creditors as evidenced by the list of due and demandable accounts payable-
external creditor and the advice/authority to debit account. Significantly, not only was the receipt of the
funds not recorded, the transaction in question was not included in the department’s books of account.
Petitioner initially denied the availability of documents relative to the subject transaction to justify the
failure of his office to record the receipt and disbursement of P4.7 million. It was only after having received
a subsequent notice of suspension for his unsatisfactory explanation that petitioner suddenly came up with
documents purportedly supporting his transaction with Felta. To the Court’s mind, the submission of the
documents was a mere afterthought and a last ditch effort by petitioner to evade accountability under the
law. (Nieves v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 237432-33, April 28, 2021, Third Division)
16. The elements of the crime under Article 171(6) of the RPC.
a. First, Jalandoni caused the alteration and intercalation on the issuances of the Office of the Ombudsman.
These were carried out by tampering the names and signatures of the approving authorities with patches
of paper that bear Jalandoni's name and signature.
b. Second, the tampering was made on genuine documents.
c. As to the third and fourth elements, the Office of the Ombudsman reasoned that the tampering changed
the documents' meaning to express something false. Jalandoni submits that the tampering did not change
their meaning because they did not alter the body and dispositive portion. However, as the Office of the
Ombudsman explained, the mere alteration and intercalation of the signatures changed the documents.
The approving authority's signature bears its own import apart from the body and dispositive portion of an
issuance.
d. Concomitantly, changing the signatory of a document alters the import of the issuance, making it express
something false and different from its initial form. As the Office of the Ombudsman listed, the tampering
of signatures evinced falsities, such as the following: (i) the previous signing authority's decision was set
aside; (ii) the execution of the issuance was put on hold; and (iii) it appeared that Jalandoni was the only
final approving authority who reviewed and resolved the issuance. (Jalandoni v. The Office of the
Ombudsman, G.R. No. 211751, May 10, 2021, Third Division)
17. There is no probable cause to charge Macasil with falsification under Article 171(4) of the RPC. The
Ombudsman's finding that Macasil made an untruthful statement when he certified in the SWAs that the
reported and paid accomplishments of the infrastructure projects were in accordance with the approved plans
and specifications is not moored on evidence. As intimated earlier, Macasil did not certify on the work
accomplished for the infrastructure projects nor was he the responsible officer to make such certification. To
stress, Macasil is a Materials Engineer who only certified on the quality of the materials incorporated into the
projects, and their compliance with the requirements of the DPWH Standard Specifications for Highways,
Bridges, Airports, and the schedule of Minimum Testing Requirements. More importantly, criminal intent must
be present in felonies committed by means of dolo, such as falsification. However, there was nothing willful or
felonious in Macasil's actions that satisfies the requisite criminal intent or mens rea.
a. The crime has the following elements, namely: (i) that the offender makes in a document statements in a
narration of facts; (ii) that he has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated by him: (iii)
that the facts narrated by the offender are absolutely false; and (iv) that the perversion of truth in the

Falsification by a private individual or a private document 117
narration of facts was made with the wrongful intent of injuring a third person. In addition, it must be
proven that the public officer or employee had taken advantage of his official position in making the
falsification. In falsification of public document, the offender is considered to have taken advantage of his
official position when: (i) he has the duty to make or prepare or otherwise to intervene in the preparation
of a document; or (ii) he has the official custody of the document which he falsifies. (Macasil v. Fraud Audit
and Investigation Office, G.R. No. 226898, May 11, 2021, En Banc)
18. Petitioner took advantage of his official position. An officer is said to have taken advantage of his official position
in the falsification of a document if he had the duty to make or prepare or otherwise intervene in the
preparation of the document or he had official custody of the document. In this case, it was petitioner himself
who informed the department heads about his intention to use the funds for the Isang Bayan, Isang Produkto,
Isang Milyong Pisong Programa ni GMA. Per testimonies of de Jesus and Musca, there was a “reversed-process”
in the preparation of documents with petitioner pre-signing and pre-approving the release of funds before the
responsible officers affixed their signatures. Worse, de Jesus testified that when the duplicate copies of the
checks were returned to her office, the acknowledgment receipts falsely stated that the checks were received
from her. (Alpay v. People of the Philippines, G.R. Nos. 240402-20, June 28, 2021, Third Division)
19. Petitioner’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt was established by the following pieces of evidence considered by
the Sandiganbayan.
a. First, it is not disputed that petitioner was a public officer at the time material to the case. Specifically, he
was the Mayor of Unisan, Quezon.
b. Second, petitioner took advantage of his official position. An officer is said to have taken advantage of his
official position. An officer is said to have taken advantage of his official position in the falsification of a
document if he had the duty to make or prepare or otherwise intervene in the preparation of the document
or he had official custody of the document. In this case, it was petitioner himself who informed the
department heads about his intention to use the funds for the Isang Bayan, Isang Produkto, Isang Milyong
Pisong Programa ni GMA. Per testimonies of de Jesus and Musca, there was a “reversed-process” in the
preparation of documents with petitioner pre-signing and pre-approving the release of funds before the
responsible officers affixed their signatures. Worse, de Jesus testified that when the duplicate copies of the
checks were returned to her office, the acknowledgment receipts falsely stated that the checks were
received from her.
c. Third, the prosecution witnesses Virginia Buhat, Romeo delos Santos, Samuel Padilla, Sofronio Matriano,
Gernan Gollena, and Guillermo Nepomuceno denied having signed the subject documents and receiving
the hand tractors or motor engines. They did not, in fact, participate in the program. As for other witnesses
who recanted, absent any special circumstance attendant to this case, the recantation of some of the
witness-beneficiaries fails to cast doubt on the truth and veracity of their earlier testimonies as well as to
the collective statements of all of the prosecution witnesses as a whole.
d. Fourth, significantly, records of the case established a paper trail of documents and participation of
petitioner in the subject transactions. Petitioners intervened in the preparation of the documents and even
participated in the distribution of the proceeds of the vouchers. From the time of the preparation of the
disbursement up to the time of the distribution of the checks and the submission of the acknowledgment
receipts, he had custody of the subject documents and initiated their circulation. The Sandiganbayan
explained: “First as testified to by witness municipal accountant Musca[,] the disbursement vouchers
originated from the Office of the Mayor and the accused had already signed boxes A and D of the vouchers,
contrary to established procedure. He approved the subject of the vouchers even without the signatures
of the municipal auditor and treasurer. This confirms that he had already committed irregularities with
respect to the vouchers and he had physical possession of the vouchers. Second, it appears that the
accused caused the preparation and circulation of the disbursement vouchers. x x x, the accused initiated
the circulation of the falsified documents. After the municipal treasurer issued the checks, the accused had
possession of the documents. He held these documents until the distribution of the equipment. The
accused knew that the proceeds of the vouchers should be given to the beneficiaries. Yet, when he
supposedly called the beneficiaries, he gave away equipment instead of the checks. In the time the accused
possessed the documents, the arrangement to convert the funds to equipment was carried out.” Notably,
the series of transactions from the issuance of the disbursement vouchers up to the receipt of the
equipment and machines by the beneficiaries, all transpired only in one day – on petitioner’s last day of
term as Mayor. To make the situation worse, petitioner made it appear that the distribution of the proceeds
of the fund was a direct financial assistance when in truth, the beneficiaries received either a hand tractor
or a motor engine – a clear violation of EO 176.
e. In the end, there is no greater proof of the crime than the direct testimony of the heads of the municipal
government and the beneficiaries that the amounts distributed by petitioner to the alleged fishermen-
farmers/beneficiaries were not distributed to the deserving SMEs as EO 176 required. (Alpay v. People of
the Philippines, G.R. Nos. 240402-20, June 28, 2021, Third Division)
FALS IFIC ATIO N B Y A PR IV ATE IN DIV IDU AL O R A PR IV ATE DO C U MEN T

1. Manansala is guilty of the crime of Falsification of Private Documents, defined and penalized under Article
172(2), in relation to Article 171(4), of the Revised Penal Code. Records show that Manansala is UMC’s Petty

Cash Custodian and as such is legally obligated to disclose only truthful statements in the documents she
prepares in connection with her work, such as the subject report. She knew all along that Siy never made any
cash advance nor utilized the proceeds thereof for her personal use. In addition, despite such knowledge, she
still proceeded in revising the subject report by inserting therein a statement that Siy made such a cash advance.
As a result, she caused great prejudice to Siy as the latter was terminated from her job on account of the falsified
report that she prepared. (Manansala v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 215424, December 9, 2015, First
Division)
2. A court interpreter who simulated a court order purportedly issued in a non-existent judicial proceeding of the
court he worked for is guilty of falsification by a private individual. He is guilty under Article 172 of the RPC, and
not under Article 171, because the court interpreter does not have the duty to prepare or intervene in the
preparation of the subject document, neither does the accused have official custody of the documents falsified.
It is not also his duty to certify the document released or issued from the court. In addition, the aggravating
circumstance of taking advantage of his public office as a court interpreter could not be appreciated against
him because his public office did not facilitate the commission of the crime. It is worth noting that his work for
the court that had supposedly issued the order is of no consequence to his criminal liability, for the crime could
have been committed even by any other individual, including one who did not work in the court in any official
capacity. (Garong v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 172539, November 16, 2016, First Division)
3. The conviction of Alid for falsification of a private document under Article 172(2) of the RPC from an indictment
under Article 171 is not valid. Article 171 – the basis of the indictment of Alid – punishes public officers for
falsifying a document by making any alteration or intercalation in a genuine document which changes its
meaning. Meanwhile, Article 172(2) was the basis of Alid’s conviction. Comparing the two provisions and the
elements of falsification, it is readily apparent that the two felonies are different. Falsification under Article
172(2) goes beyond the elements of falisification under Article 171. The former requires additional independent
evidence of damage or intention to cause the same to a third person. Simply out, Article 171, damage is not an
element of the crime; but in Article 172(2), damage is an element necessary for conviction. (Malabanan v.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 186329, August 2, 2017, First Division)
4. The elements of the crime of falsification of commercial documents under Article 172 (1), in relation to Article
171, of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. (RA) 10951, are: (a) that the offender is a
private individual; (b) that the offender committed any of the acts of falsification enumerated in Article 171 of
the Revised Penal Code; and, (c) that the act of falsification is committed in a commercial document."
a. All the above-mentioned elements were sufficiently established. First, Desmoparan is a private individual;
second, the acts of falsification consisted in Desmoparan's act of causing it to appear that Cordura had
participated in the act of applying for a loan when, in fact, he did not do so; and third, the falsification was
committed in a loan application, a deed of assignment, and a promissory note dated February 27, 2012,
which are all commercial documents considering that, in general, these documents or instruments are
"used by merchants or businessmen to promote or facilitate trade or credit transactions." Promissory notes
facilitate credit transactions, while a check is a means of payment used in business, in lieu of money, for
convenience in business transactions. While Desmoparan alleged that the prosecution failed to prove that
he was the perpetrator of the falsified loan documents, we note that he never denied, however, that he
was actually the one who personally came to CFI to apply for a salary loan using Cordura's name. He also
never denied to be the one in possession of the falsified loan documents which were submitted to CFI to
support the loan application purportedly under Cordura's name. He likewise never denied that he
fraudulently used Cordura's name and qualifications to apply for the salary loan.
b. It must be likewise stressed that the loan clerks who processed the loan transactions were consistent in
their testimonies that it was Desmoparan, and not Cordura, who: (i) personally applied for the salary loan;
(ii) submitted the documentary requirements under the name of Cordura; (iii) presented an I.D. with his
photo, but bearing the name of Cordura; (iv) received the initial cash advances amounting to a total of
P40,000.00; and (v) signed Cordura's name on the cash voucher. It cannot be said that just because none
of the prosecution witnesses actually saw Desmoparan do the act of falsifying, the latter cannot be held
liable for falsification. Clearly, given the enumerated circumstances, and considering that Desmoparan had
in his possession the falsified loan documents and had actually took advantage of and profited from them,
the presumption is that he is the material author of the falsification.
c. The absence of a direct proof that Desmoparan was the author of the falsification is of no moment for the
rule remains that whenever someone has in his possession falsified documents and uttered or used the
same for his advantage and benefit, the presumption that he authored it arises. This is especially true if the
use or uttering of the forged documents was so closely connected in time with the forgery that the user or
possessor may be proven to have the capacity of committing the forgery, or to have close connection with
the forgers, and therefore, had complicity in the forgery.
d. In the absence of a satisfactory explanation, as in this case, one who is found in possession of a forged
document and who used or uttered it is presumed to be the forger. (Desmoparan v. People of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 233598, March 27, 2019, Third Division)

5. For a notary public to be found guilty of falsifying a notarial will, the prosecution must prove that he or she has
falsified or simulated the signatures of the testator or the instrumental witnesses to make it appear that they
participated in the execution of the document when they did not.
a. Here, the first element has already been proven since both the prosecution and the defense stipulate that
petitioner is a notary public. The second element is presumed when the alleged falsity committed by the
notary public pertains to the notarization, since only notaries public have the duty and authority to notarize
documents. Thus, the elements that remain to be proven by the prosecution are: (i) that petitioner falsified
a document "by causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding"; and (ii) that
"such person or persons did not in fact so participate in the proceeding."
b. The due execution of a notarized will is proven through the validity of its attestation clause. The prosecution
must prove that either the testator could not have authored the instrument, or the instrumental witnesses
had no capacity to attest to the due execution of the will. This requires that the notary public must have
falsified or simulated the signatures appearing on the attestation clause. Here, petitioner was found to
have falsely certified in the Joint Acknowledgment that Dr. Asuncion was an instrumental witness to the
execution of Severino's Last Will and Testament since he did not sign it in petitioner's presence.
c. The trial court and the Court of Appeals, however, disregarded one crucial detail from its finding of facts:
Dr. Asuncion signed the Joint Acknowledgment after it was notarized by petitioner. Based on the findings
of the trial court, at the time petitioner notarized the Last Will and Testament, only three (3) witnesses had
signed it. The trial court, however, did not make any finding that petitioner had falsified the participation
of the three (3) witnesses who attested and subscribed to its due execution. It likewise found that Dr.
Asuncion signed the document at the urging of Saliganan's son-in-law, Ferrer, and that petitioner seemed
unaware that Dr. Asuncion later signed the document. Dr. Asuncion also admitted that his signature was
genuine and that he was aware of what he was signing. Since Dr. Asuncion did not sign the Joint
Acknowledgment before it was notarized, HE CANNOT BE CONSIDERED AS HAVING ATTESTED AND
SUBSCRIBED TO ITS DUE EXECUTION AT THE TIME OF ITS NOTARIZATION. Thus, when petitioner
certified that the persons who attested and subscribed to the document were present before him, there
could have been no falsity. It was not petitioner who made it appear that Dr. Asuncion participated in the
execution of the Joint Acknowledgment, but Ferrer and Dr. Asuncion himself. Petitioner, therefore, must
be acquitted. (Atty. Constantino v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 225696, April 8, 2019, Third Division)
6. There can be no complex crime of falsification of private documents and estafa because the element of damage
essential in both is the same. Batulanon states that as there is no complex crime of estafa through falsification
of private document, it is important to ascertain whether the offender is to be charged with falsification of a
private document or with estafa. If the falsification of a private document is committed as a means to commit
estafa, the proper crime to be charged is falsification. If the estafa can be committed without the necessity of
falsifying a document, the proper crime to be charged is estafa. Thus, in People v. Reyes, the accused made it
appear in the time book of the Calamba Sugar Estate that a laborer, Ciriaco Sario, worked 21 days during the
month of July, 1929, when in reality he had worked only 11 days, and then charged the offended party, the
Calamba Sugar Estate, the wages of the laborer for 21 days. The accused misappropriated the wages during
which the laborer did not work for which he was convicted of falsification of private document. In US. v. Infante,
the accused changed the description of the pawned article on the face of the pawn ticket and made it appear
that the article is of greatly superior value, and thereafter pawned the falsified ticket in another pawnshop for
an amount largely in excess of the true value of the article pawned. He was found guilty of falsification of a
private document. In U.S. v. Chan Tiao, the accused presented a document of guaranty purportedly signed by
Ortigas Hermanos for the payment of P2,055.00 as the value of 150 sacks of sugar, and by means of said falsified
documents, succeeded in obtaining the sacks of sugar, was held guilty of falsification of a private document.
a. The aforequoted allegations indicate that the petitioners signed the billing statements and requested
payments on the basis that Acme Investigation Service, Inc. (Acme) had actually rendered security services
to Jade Bank, prompting Jade Bank to pay. In other words, the amended information claimed that the fraud
could not have been committed without the falsification of the private documents. Under such alleged
circumstances, the crime charged was falsification of private documents instead of estafa.
b. Absolving the petitioners of the crime of falsification of a private document likewise clears them of the
crime of estafa. As held, in the falsification of a private document, there is no crime unless another fact,
independent of that of falsifying the document, is proved: i.e. damage or intent to cause it. Therefore, when
one makes use of a private document, which he falsified, to defraud another, there results only one crime:
the falsification of a private document. The damage to another is caused by the commission of the crime
of falsification of falsification of private document. The intent to defraud in using the falsified private
document is part and parcel of the crime, and cannot give rise to the crime of estafa, because the damage,
if it resulted, was caused by, and became the element of, the crime of falsification of private document.
The crime of estafa in such case was not committed, as it could not exist without its own element of
damage. (Co v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 233015, October 16, 2019, First Division)
7. The first element of the crime of falsification of a private document was not established beyond reasonable
doubt. Several circumstances the Court outlines hereafter show why.
a. First of all, the testimonial and documentary evidence adduced herein did not reliably establish the
authorship by either petitioner of the billing statements that would have stemmed from the non-existent

contract of security services. Although Prosecution witness Catalina Zamora, the former Chief Accountant
of Jade Bank, attested that she had seen petitioner Alvin Co sign the billing statements over the printed
name of Arturo dela Cruz, the managing director of Acme, and insisted that such billing statements would
have proved the fictitiousness of the contract averred in the amended information, we have noted the
observation by the RTC that on her cross examination Zamora had denied actually witnessing petitioner
Alvin Co affixing his signature over the printed name Arturo dela Cruz in the billing statements. It thus
appeared that Zamora's only basis to declare that petitioner Alvin Co had authored the fictitious and
falsified billing statements was her impression about the signatures of Arturo dela Cruz and petitioner Alvin
Co looking similar. Zamora's impression on the similarity in the signatures, which was clearly not derived
from objective facts but upon her opinion, was testimony that had no probative value by virtue of its being
the opinion of an ordinary witness. Indeed, the Prosecution did not show that her opinion came under any
of the exceptions enumerated in Section 50, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.
b. Secondly, Zamora declared that petitioner Alvin Co had used the aliases of Nelson Sia and Al Mendoza; and
that petitioner Luis Co had used the alias of Antonio Santos. Her declarations became relevant to enable
the tracing of the money back to the petitioners. But because she apparently had no personal knowledge
on the use of the aliases by the petitioners, her declarations to that effect were hearsay and unreliable.
c. Thirdly, Zamora stated that petitioner Luis Co had ordered her to fill out the application card to open an
account at Citytrust's Reina Regente Branch; and that petitioner Luis Co and three others had signed the
card in her presence. Her statement did not suffice to incriminate the petitioners in the crime of falsification
simply because there was no showing that the card thus filled out and signed had actually been used to
open the Citytrust account. The doubt against Zamora's statement became pronounced in view of her
admission that she had not herself delivered the card to Citytrust. Moreover, although in most situations
corroboration is not necessary for as long as the details of the crime have already been proved with
sufficient clarity, we should point out that Zamora's statement, standing alone, did not credibly establish
the receipt by the petitioners of the proceeds of the fraud. As such, corroboration by other evidence
became necessary herein to substantiate Zamora's statement if the objective therefor was to enable the
traceback of the proceeds of the fraud to either of the petitioners. The lack of corroboration accented that
the Prosecution had been remiss in discharging its duty by leaving its proof of guilt inconclusive and
incomplete. It also exposed her incrimination of the petitioners to be far from reliable and clear.
d. Fourthly, the Prosecution presented bank officers as witnesses against the petitioners. However, it was
notable that said witnesses did not categorically certify that petitioner Alvin Co, on one hand, and either
Nelson Sia or Al Mendoza, on the other, were one and the same person.
e. Lastly, Raul Permejo, another witness for the Prosecution, recalled that petitioner Alvin Co had instructed
him to deposit checks in the accounts held in Citytrust and Metrobank; and that petitioner Alvin Co had
used the name Nelson Sia in several bank transactions. Yet, Permejo was discredited as an unreliable
witness in the face of his candid admission that he had received money from the counsel after each time
he had testified in court against the petitioners. The financial incentives cast grave doubts on his sincerity
and truthfulness, and negated the credibility of his recollections as a witness. The money was possibly a
sufficient incentive for him to pervert his recollection and capacity for truth telling, rendering him
untrustworthy for being fully biased against the petitioners. In this connection, a witness is said to be biased
when his relation to the cause or to the parties is such that he has an incentive to exaggerate or give false
color to his statements, or to suppress or to pervert the truth, or to state what is false.
f. Faced with all the foregoing circumstances, the Court cannot but consider doubtful and suspicious the
proof on the existence of the first element of the crime of falsification of a private document. A further
discussion of the remaining elements of the offense has become unnecessary. Acquittal of the petitioners
of the crime of falsification of a private document for failure to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt should
follow. (Co v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 233015, October 16, 2019, First Division)
8. The fact that the loan application was actually signed by Malang, not by petitioner, could not belie his direct
hand in perpetrating the crime. It was established that the loan application was signed by Malang in blank and
processed through petitioner’s instructions, to make it appear that Malang purportedly participated in applying
for the subject loan, despite the fact that the purported loan application was withdrawn by Malang. It was
likewise established that it was petitioner’s scheme that made the issuance of the check in the name of Malang,
and thereafter, the checks in the names of Rayo and Villacorta, possible. Hence, one of the acts of falsification
under Article 171 of the RPC, particularly paragraph 2 thereof – causing it to appear that a person has
participated in any act when he did not in fact participate – is present. (Soriano v. People of the Philippines, G.R.
No. 240458, January 8, 2020, First Division)
9. A conviction for falsification of a public document by a private person will not be sustained when the facts found
are consistent with good faith.
a. Petitioner was not motivated by malicious intent and in fact, she issued the Secretary’s Certificate in good
faith. The Court gives credence to the claim of petitioner that she merely acted based on the instruction of
Paolo, son of Lorna and Antonio Quisumbing, and her immediate superior, in preparing the Secretary’s
Certificate allowing the issuance of checks with only one signatory, after being informed of the problems
encountered by the company because of the introduction of the two signatory policy in the issuance of
checks. The Court did not find fault in relying on the oral instruction of Paolo to issue the subject Secretary’s

Use of a falsified document 121
Certificate without first requiring whether Paolo really consulted with the other members of the family.
Petitioner, as a mere employee, is expected to obey, respect, and not doubt the instructions of her
superior. Besides, since being appointed as corporate secretary, petitionr never attended board meetings
because no actual meetings never took place. Her job was merely to execute secretary’s certificate for
corporate actions that the Board members instruct her to do. Hence, petitioner’s issuance of the August
25, 2003 Secretary’s Certificate which was only upon the instruction of Paolo is not a manifestation of bad
faith and malice on her part and cannot be taken against her. Additionally, petitioner did not gain materially
nor financially from the issuance of the subject Secretary’s Certificate. In fact, in executing it, petitioner
was motivated by the desire to help the company cope with its liquidity problems and with the difficulty in
paying its suppliers. One of the effects of the Secretary’s Certificate allowing only one signature was for
Loran Industries to stay financially afloat.
b. The Board of Directors of Loran Industries knew of the existence of the August 25, 2003 Secretary’s
Certificate and they benefitted from it. Based on the evidence and testimonies presented during the trial,
the Court is convinced that despite knowledge of the existence of the subject Secretary’s Certificate, the
Board of Directors of Loran Industries did not recall it and worse, they made use of the same not only for
their own benefit but for the benefit of the corporation as well. It cannot be denied that from August 2003
to August 2004 when the Secretary’s Certificate allowing the release of checks even with only one signatory
was effective, Loran Industries was able to issue checks with two signatories as well as checks bearing only
one signature. In fact, as testified to by Astillero and Sarol, on different occasions, Loran Industries
contracted loans from them in order to infuse cash to the company, when it experienced liquidity problems.
As security for the loans, Loran Industries, through Anton as the lone signatory, issued checks to cover for
the cash involved. Further, petitioner was able to show a list of checks issued with only one signature
wherein the signatory is also the payee thereof. This proves that Anton and Paolo are aware that some
checks bear one signature while the others have two signatures. There can only be one interpretation for
what appears to be an inconsistent stance of the members of the Board of Directors of Loran Industries:
the two policies – the one signatory policy and two-signatory policy – co-existed and complemented each
other. This is the reason why there are checks which bear only one signature while there are others bearing
two signatures. Because of this, it cannot be said that petitioner was guilty of falsification of the August 25,
2003 Secretary’s Certificate.
c. The essence of falsification is the alteration of truth. There was no alteration of truth in his case because
the Board of Directors of Loran Industries knew and in fact instructed petitioner, through Paolo, to issue
the subject Secretary’s Certificate allowing the release of checks with only one signatory. Moreover, the
Board of Directors of Loran Industries benefited from the subject Secretary’s Certificate. (Gimenez v.
People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 214231, September 16, 2020, Third Division)
U S E O F A FALS IFIE D DO C U MEN T

1. The last paragraph of Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code penalizes two acts: first, the introduction of a
falsified document as evidence in any judicial proceeding; and second, the use of a falsified document in any
other transaction. The second punishable act presupposes that the person who used the falsified document is
not the one who falsified such document. Thus, the elements of the crime of use of falsified document in any
transaction (other than as evidence in a judicial proceeding) are: (a) the offender knew that a document was
falsified by another person; (b) the false document is embraced in Article 171 or in any of subdivisions Nos. 1
and 2 of Article 172; (c) he used such document (not in judicial proceedings); and (d) the use of the false
document caused damage to another or at least it was used with intent to cause such damage. A person who
falsified a document and used such falsified document shall be punished for the crime of falsification.
a. The information in Criminal Case No. C-06-15995-10 alleges that respondent prepared and executed an
affidavit of loss of OR-CR by "imitating the signature of Rosemarie Bowden y Eribal therein making it appear
that she signed the same" and submits it to the LTO which resulted in the issuance of a second OR-CR in
the name of petitioner. The information in Criminal Case No. C-06-15996-10 meanwhile states that
respondent executed a deed of sale in his favor imitating petitioner's signature and thereafter, submits said
deed to the LTO. Consequently, the LTO issued a new CR, this time, in the name of respondent as the owner
of the subject vehicle. Obviously, the averments in the informations implicate respondent as the person
who falsified the affidavit of loss and the deed of sale and used said falsified documents to the damage of
petitioner. But it is striking to note that in the crime of use of falsified document, the person who used the
falsified document is different from the one who falsified it such that "[i]f the one who used the falsified
document is the same person who falsified it, the crime is only falsification and the use of the same is not
a separate crime." Falsification of a public document and use of false document by the same person who
falsified it constitute but a single crime of falsification. It follows, therefore, that with the dismissal of the
case for falsification of public documents, the case for use of falsified documents has no leg to stand on.
(Bowden v. Bowden, G.R. No. 228739, July 17 2019, Second Division)
2. The elements of the crime of use of falsified documents are present in this case. It is undisputed that Vicente
died on October 4, 2004. Araceli Villavicencio, Registration Officer II of the LCR of Iloilo City, presented before
the MTCC the original copy of the Certificate of Death of Vicente Capero on file with the LCR Office. However,
Vicente appeared to have signed the SPA dated March 30, 2009, granting petitioner the authority to mortgage
the subject property. There is thus no doubt that the SPA was spurious. There is lack of direct evidence in this

Other acts of falsification 122
case that petitioner knew that Vicente was already dead when the SPA was executed and notarized. But the
factual backdrop of the case renders it difficult for the Court to see how the petitioner could not have learned
of Vicente’s death. As employee of the mortgagee-bank, petitioner is naturally expected to know the
requirements, procedure, and processes in obtaining loans, including the consequences of non-compliance.
The SPA which petitioner requested from the spouses Capero is an official bank form. Petitioner knew that the
SPA must bear his signature as attorney-in-fact including the signatures of Vicente and Elisa as principals. She
was aware that she and the spouses Capero should sign the document in the presence of two witnesses. She
also understood that as part of the loan approval process, the SPA should be notarized. The manager of the
Rural Bank of Marayo admitted that she could not attest as to the authenticity of Vicente’s signature because
the SPA was only “sent” to Vicente in Mindanao. This notwithstanding, the bank manager still affixed her
signature in the SPA as witness and even facilitated the notarization of the document and the mortgage
contract. It appears likely, that the presence of the required persons during the notarization were not secured
for had the regular procedure been observed, petitioner would readily discover that Vicente could not have
signed the SPA because he was already dead. These irregularities should have put petitioner, as employee of
the mortgagee-bank and as borrower/beneficiary, on guard and caused her to inquire about Vicente whom she
never met since she requested for the SPA. To the mind of the Court, petitioner knew that Vicente’s signature
in the SPA was not genuine yet she went to use it enabling her to mortgage the subject property and receive
the proceeds of the loan.
a. In the crime of falsified document, the person who used the forged document is different from the one
who falsified it such that if the one who used the falsified document is the same person who falsified it, the
crime is only falsification and the use of the same is not a separate crime. Falsification of a public document
and use of false document by the same person who falsified it constitute but a single crime of falsification.
(Jayme v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 248827, August 27, 2020, First Division)
O THER AC TS O F FALS IFIC ATIO N

1. The mere act of authenticating photocopies of the blotter entries cannot be equated to committing the crime
of False Certification under Article 174 of the Revised Penal Code. (Cariaga v. Sapigao, G.R. No. 223844, June
PER J U R Y
1. The elements of the crime of perjury are: (a) that the accused made a statement under oath or executed an
affidavit upon a material matter; (b) that the statement or affidavit was made before a competent officer,
authorized to receive and administer oath; (c) that in the statement or affidavit, the accused made a willful and
deliberate assertion of a falsehood; and (d) that the sworn statement or affidavit containing the falsity is
required by law or made for a legal purpose. (Paran v. Maguiat, G.R. Nos. 200021-22, August 28, 2019, Second
Division)
2. In finding for probable cause, the Ombudsman in effect ruled that these elements of Perjury are likely present
in this case. There is no compelling reason for the Court to interfere with these findings.
a. First, it is not disputed that SPO1 Paran executed an affidavit wherein he declared that he personally
informed Lary that his father was killed. It is also not disputed that SPO1 Paran executed the said affidavit
after he learned that Lary executed an affidavit claiming that he witnessed how his father and uncle were
killed. As observed by the Ombudsman, SPO1 Paran's affidavit in effect refuted the statements made by
Lary by suggesting that the latter did not actually witness the incident and that in fact he was in shock at
that time. The purpose of SPO1 Paran's affidavit, therefore, is to attack the credibility of Lary, who claims
to be an eyewitness. Thus, there is reason to believe that SPO1 Paran's affidavit was executed upon a
material matter.
b. Second, it is clear from SPO1 Paran's affidavit that the same was sworn before the Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor of the Province of Batangas, a person authorized to receive an oath. Further, it is also clear that
it was filed before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Batangas in Tanauan City, Batangas.
c. Third, there is reason to believe that SPO1 Paran made a willful and deliberate assertion of a falsehood in
his affidavit. As pointed out by the Ombudsman, Lary's statement that he only talked with SPO2 Landicho,
and no one else, was corroborated by SPO2 Landicho himself in his own affidavit. Further, contrary to SPO1
Paran's allegations, Lary's admission that SPO2 Landicho indeed went to his house on March 23, 2008 at
around 2:00 a.m. did not automatically confirm his own insinuation that Lary's actuation at that time was
of a person who was shocked to learn of his father's death rather than a person who had witnessed the
incident. In his affidavit, SPO2 Landicho stated that Lary did not immediately say anything after he told him
of his father's demise. Instead, Lary only replied later that he will just go after them to Brgy. Solis. While it
is true that Lary's reaction may be interpreted as shock, the same reaction may also be viewed in other
ways, such as fear. Lary's reaction may even be interpreted as a realization, after confirmation by the police
officers, that what he had witnessed was indeed the brutal killing of his father. What is clear is that Lary's
response to SPO2 Landicho, as well as his initial non-response, are insufficient to conclude that Lary only
learned of the incident from SPO2 Landicho. Consequently, the likelihood that SPO1 Paran deliberately lied
in his affidavit to discredit the statements made by Lary still subsists. This likelihood is sufficient for
purposes of filing of the Information as probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing evidence
or proof beyond reasonable doubt. It is enough that the pieces of evidence engenders a well-founded belief
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act 123
that a crime has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held for
trial.
d. Lastly, it is clear that SPO1 Paran's affidavit was made for a legal purpose. After all, he would not have filed
the subject affidavit before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Batangas if this was not the case. In
fine, the Court opines that there is sufficient basis for the Ombudsman's finding of probable cause for
Perjury against SPO1 Paran. Further, SPO1 Paran failed to show that the assailed Ombudsman resolution
and order were tainted by grave abuse of discretion. Instead, the instant petition is bereft of any statement
or sufficient allegation purportedly showing that the Ombudsman exercised its power in an arbitrary or
despotic manner by reason of passion or hostility. Consequently, the instant petition must be denied.
(Paran v. Maguiat, G.R. Nos. 200021-22, August 28, 2019, Second Division)
3. The elements of perjury under Article 183 of the RPC are present. First, the accused executed an affidavit upon
a material matter. Here, Saulo executed a Complaint-Affidavit charging Alberto with qualified theft. The
allegations in the subject Complaint-Affidavit have the material effect or tendency to influence the Prosecutor
in the determination of the existence of probable cause for the filing of information before the courts. Saulo
asserted therein, among others, that Alberto surreptitiously and unlawfully took five checks drawn agains
Khumbmela’s account and thereafter illegally filled them up to defraud the company. Second, the subject
Complaint-Affidavit was subscribed and sworn o by Saulo himself before Assistant City Prosecutor Labastida, an
officer authorized to administer oath. The Complaint-Affidavit is required by law. Finally, there was willful and
deliberate assertion of a falsehood in the statement or affidavit as it was proven during trial that contrary to
Saulo’s allegations, the checks issued by Saulo in favor of Alberto were duly supported by vouchers signed by
her, by complainant Alberto, and accused Saulo.
a. The term “material matter” under the first element pertains to the main fact subject of the inquiry, or any
circumstance which tends to prove that fact, or any fact or circumstance which tends to corroborate or
strengthen the testimony related to the subject of the inquiry, or which legitimately affects the credence
of any witness who testified.
b. The third element of perjury requires that the accused must make a willful and deliberate assertion of a
falsehood. In the statement or affidavit. A mere assertion of a false objective fact, a falsehood, is not
enough. The assertion must be deliberate and willful. Perjury being a felony by dolo, there must be malice
on the part of the accused. (Saulo v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 242900, June 8, 2020, First Division)
4. Casayuran cannot be held liable under Article 183 of the RPC. The disclosure of a public officer or employee’s
properties is required under R.A. 6713, Section 8. Failure to comply with this provision is punishable by
imprisonment of five (5) years or a fine not exceeding P5,000.00 or both, at the discretion of the court, under
R.A. 6713, Section 11. The same provision provides that “if the violation is punishable by a heavier penalty under
another law, he shall be prosecuted under the latter statute.” Casayuran may also be held liable for her failure
to disclose all her properties in her SALNs for 2007, 2010, 2011, and 2012 under Article 183 of the RPC.
Casayuran certified in her SALNs for 2007, 2010, 2011, and 2012 that her properties are limited to those stated
in her SALNs even though she also owns the Sentra. Her SALN were required by law and were subscribed and
sworn to before a person administering the oath. Article 183 imposes a penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum
period to prision correccional in its minimum, or four months and one day to two years and four months. This
is clearly less than the penalty imposed under R.A. 6713. Pursuant to Section 11 of R.A. 6713, Casayuran cannot
be prosecuted under Article 183. (Department of Finance-Revenue Integrity Protection Service v. Office of the
Ombudsman, G.R. No. 240137, September 9, 2020, Third Division)
C O MPR EHEN S IV E DAN GER O U S DR U GS AC T

1. Coordination with the PDEA is not an indispensable requirement before police authorities may carry out a buy-
bust operation. In fact, even the absence of coordination with the PDEA will not invalidate a buy-bust operation.
(People of the Philippines v. Havana, G.R. No. 198450, January 11, 2016, Second Division)
CRIMES
ILLEGAL SALE OF DANGEROUS DRUGS

1. All the elements for the illegal sale of shabu were established. PO1 Signap, the poseur-buyer, positively
identified appellant as the person who sold him the white crystalline substance in one plastic sachet which was
later proven to be positive for shabu. In exchange for this plastic sachet, PO1 Signap handed the marked money
as payment. The delivery of the contraband to the poseur-buyer and the receipt by the seller of the marked
money successfully consummated the buy-bust transaction. (People of the Philippines v. Casacop, G.R. No.
210454, January 13, 2016, First Division; People of the Philippines v. Ando, G.R. No. 212632, August 24, 2016,
Third Division)
2. Appellant is guilty of illegal sale of dangerous drugs. Appellant was apprehended, indicted and convicted by way
of a buy-bust operation. He was caught red-handed delivering one heat sealed plastic sachet containing white
crystalline substance to PO2 Cruz, the poseur buyer, in exchange for P500.00. PO2 Cruz positively identified in
open court to be the same perosn who sold to him the item which upon examination was confirmed to be

shabu. (People of the Philippines v. Enriquez, G.R. No. 214503, June 22, 2016, Third Division; People of the
Philippines v. Fernandez, G.R. No. 210617, December 7, 2016, Third Division)
3. Accused-appellant cannot be found guilty for illegal sale of dangerous drugs under Section 5, Article II of R.A.
9165 because no sale was consummated as the consideration, much less its receipt by accused-appellant, were
not established. (People of the Philippines v. Bulawan, G.R. No. 204441, June 8, 2016, Third Division)
4. The commission of the offense of illegal sale of dangerous drugs, like shabu, merely requires the consummation
of the selling transaction which happens the moment the buyer receives the drug from the seller. The crime is
already consummated once the police officer has gone through the operation as a buyer whose offer was
accepted by the accused, followed by the delivery of the dangerous drugs to the former. (People of the
Philippines v. Zacaria, G.R. No. 214238, September 14, 2016, Third Division; People of the Philippines v. Cloma,
G.R. No. 215943, November 16, 2016, Second Division)
a. Appellant was caught in flagrante delicto delivering two plastic sachets containing white crystalline
substance to PO1 Marmonejo, the poseur-buyer, in exchange for P200.00. PO1 Marmonejo positively
identified appellant in open court to be the same person who sold to him the items which upon
examination was confirmed to be shabu. Upon presentation of the same in open court, another member
of the buy-bust team, PO1 Mendoza, duly identified the items to be the same objects sold to the poseur-
buyer by appellant. (People of the Philippines v. Sonjaco, G.R. No. 196962, June 8, 2016, Third Division)
5. Accused-appellant cannot be found guilty of illegal sale of dangerous drugs and illegal possession of dangerous
drugs because the prosecution failed to establish the indispensable element of corpus delicti of the drug cases
as it did not proffer, identity, and submit in court the two shabu sachets allegedly confiscated from her.
a. The Chemistry Report is inadequate to establish the existence of the dangerous drugs seized from appellant
because it only tends to prove that the said sachets tested positive for shabu. Likewise, the Certificate of
Inventory and the Chain of Custody Form are insufficient to prove the corpus delicti because they merely
state that the said marked sachets were seized from appellant and were then turned over by PO2 Libo-on
to the Provincial Crime Laboratory. Anent the photograph pointing to the items recovered from her, such
evidence shows the presence of 2 tiny plastic sachets containing suspected shabu, but not the markings
“RSG-1” and “RSG-2” which identifies them as the items seized from her. (People of the Philippines v.
Garrucho, G.R. No. 220449, July 4, 2016, Third Division)
6. Accused-appellant committed illegal sale of dangerous drugs. Records show that IO1 Palapar positively
identified accused-appellant as the person who sold shabu to the confidential informant. He testified that he
saw the confidential informant giving the buy-bust money to accused-appellant and in return, accused-
appellant handed to the confidential informant two plastic sachets believed to contain shabu. The prosecution
also established through testimony and evidence, the object of the sale, which consisted of two heat-sealed
transparent plastic sachets containing shabu and the two marked P500.00 bills, as the consideration thereof.
Finally, the delivery of the shabu sold and its payment were clearly testified to by IO1 Palapar. (People of the
Philippines v. Ygot, G.R. No. 210715, July 18, 2016, Third Division)
7. The illegal sale of dangerous drugs is not consummated when the seller fails to deliver the illegal drug to the
buyer. Hence, when the 30 ecstacy tablets which Mitch was meant to deliver to SI Oliver wer confiscated when
she was arrested before she could go to the restroom of Café Adriatico, the crime of illegal sale of prohibited
drugs was not consummated. However, under the rule on variance, Mitch committed attempted sale of
dangerous drugs since she intended to sell ecstasy and in fact, commenced by overt acts the commission of the
intended crime by showing the substance to SI Oliveros. (People of the Philippines v. Tumulak, G.R. No. 206054,
July 25, 2016, Second Division)
8. While it appeared that it was PSI Llamas who initially dealt with appellant regarding the sale of shabu, it also
appeared that PSI Llamas had designated PO3 Rimando as his representative in the sale transaction with
appellant. Notably, PO3 Rimando was instructed by PSI Llamas to wait at the specified area where appellant
would be the first to approach him for the sale of shabu, which established the fact that appellant was already
informed beforehand as to the person she was to deal with regarding the sale of shabu. Indeed, appellant
approached PO3 Rimando who was waiting at the designated area and upon receipt from him of the payment
of P200,000.00, the former handed to the latter the two sachets of shabu. The identity of appellant as seller, as
well as the object and consideration for the sale transaction, had been duly proven. In addition, appellant
committed illegal possession of dangerous drugs. PO3 Rimando, the person who had direct knowledge of the
seizure and confiscation of the shabu from the appellant, testified that he was also able to recover another
plastic sachet of shabu which appellant was holding with her left hand, which testimony was corroborated by
PO2 Aficial. (People of the Philippines v. Arenas, G.R. No. 213598, July 27, 2016, Third Division)
9. It is inconsequential that the text messages between Chumanao and Belban pertaining to all communications
prior to the alleged consummation of the illegal sale of marijuana were not presented as evidence. What
matters is the proof; that the transaction or sale transpired, coupled with the presentation in court of the

prohibited drug, the corpus delicti, as evidence. (People of the Philippines v. Sic-Open, G.R. No. 211680,
10. Even if illegal sale of dangerous drugs punished under R.A. 9165, Section 5 – the offense charged – might
necessarily include the illegal possession of dangerous drugs under R.A. 9165, Section 11, the accused could
only be found guilty of the first offense vis-à-vis the shabu contained in the pack marked JR-B. He could not be
held guilty of the illegal possession of dangerous drugs in violation of R.A. 9165, Section 11 because no
information had been filed to charge such offense. It is fundamental that a person is to be tried and found guilty
only of the offense charged in the information, or of the offense proved that is necessarily included in the
offense charged, pursuant to Rule 120, Section 4 of the Rules of Court. (People of the Philippines v. Reyes, G.R.
11. Appellant committed sale of prohibited drugs. Appellant was caught in flagrante delicto of selling shabu to PO2
Garcia, the poseur-buyer. PO2 Garcia’s testimony had established that a sale transaction took place between
him and appellant. PO2 Garcia narrated that he and the informant approached the appellant to buy P200.00
worth of shabu at Tambunting Street in Manila. PO2 Garcia first handed the marked P200.00 bill to appellant.
Appellant, in turn, took out one plastic sachet of white crystalline substance from his right pocket and gave it
to PO2 Garcia.
a. In addition, appellant violated illegal possession of dangerous drugs. Upon appellant’s arrest, PO2 Garcia
frisked him and recovered two plastic sachets of white crystalline substance from his right pocket.
Appellant was clearly not authorized to possess the same. Moreover, possession of dangerous drugs
constitutes prima facie evidence of knowledge or animus possidendi, which is sufficient to convict an
accused in the absence of a satisfactory explanation of such possession. Appellant did not present any
explanation that he did not freely or consciously possess the seized plastic sachets containing shabu.
(People of the Philippines v. Lopez, G.R. No. 221465, November 16, 2016, Third Division)
12. While prior coordination with the PDEA is not necessary to make a buy-bust operation valid, the non-
presentation of the poseur-buyer is fatal to the cause of the prosecution. (People of the Philippines v. Amin,
G.R. No. 215942, January 18, 2017, First Division)
13. There is no need to present the informant/poseur-buyer/police asset in order to convict the accused of illegal
sale of dangerous drugs provided that his testimony is not absolutely essential in the prosecution and the
accused’s identity has been identified by the police officers who have personal knowledge of the transaction.
(People of the Philippines v. Tripoli, G.R. No. 207001, June 7, 2017, Third Division)
14. The sheer volume of marijuana found indicates the intent to deliver the same. Here, accused-appellant was
found in possession of almost 110 kilos of marijuana. That, in itself, is a clear indicia of one’s purpose and intent
to sell, distribute, and transport the same. (People of the Philippines v. Alacdis, G.R. No. 220022, June 19, 2017,
Third Division)
15. The prosecution had established Jao’s criminal liability for illegal delivery of dangerous drugs and illegal
possession of dangerous drugs, considering that: (a) Jao himself delivered a plastic sachet containing 0.01 gram
of shabu to the informant during a legitimate buy-bust operation, and (b) upon his arrest, the arresting officers
searched Jao and found six more plastic sachets containing shabu with an aggregate weight of 0.06 grams.
Similarly, there was no break in the chain of custody of the sachets seized from Jao as SI Manzanaris had sole
possession of such sachets from the time of Jao’s arrest until he turned them over to PO1 Tan, who in turn,
handed it over to Forensic Chemist PCI Llena for qualitative examination. (People of the Philippines v. Jao, G.R.
16. Non-recording of the buy-bust money in the police blotter is not essential, since they are not elements in the
illegal sale of dangerous drugs. (People of the Philippines v. Mendoza, G.R. No. 220759, July 24, 2017, Second
Division)
a. A conviction for violating Section 5, Article II of R.A. 9165 does not always require the presentation of the
marked money. (People of the Philippines v. Maralit, G.R. No. 232381, August 1, 2018, Second Division)
17. Evaluation of the records applying the "objective test" will prove that the prosecution was able to establish
beyond moral certainty the details of the transaction that took place between Villanueva and Ariel from the
offer to purchase shabu until the consummation of the sale. Consequently, the claim of Ariel that the poseur -
buyer failed to present evidence on how the illegal drugs were recovered - raising doubts about a buy-bust
having been actually conducted and warranting a suspicion that the prohibited drugs were planted – miserably
weakened in the light of the convincing and credible testimony of the prosecution witnesses
a. The "objective" test in buy-bust operations demands that the details of the purported transaction must be
clearly and adequately shown. This must start from the initial contact between the poseur-buyer and the
pusher, the offer to purchase, the promise or payment of the consideration until the consummation of the
sale by the delivery of the illegal drug subject of the sale. The manner by which the initial contact was made,
whether or not through an informant, the offer to purchase the drug, the payment of the "buy-bust"

money, and the delivery of the illegal drug, whether to the informant alone or the police officer, must be
the subject of strict scrutiny by courts to insure that law-abiding citizens are not unlawfully induced to
commit an offense. Criminals must be caught but not at all costs. At the same time, however, examining
the conduct of the police should not disable courts into ignoring the accused's predisposition to commit
the crime. If there is overwhelming evidence of habitual delinquency, recidivism or plain criminal proclivity,
then this must also be considered. Courts should look at all factors to determine the predisposition of an
accused to commit an offense in so far as they are relevant to determine the validity of the defense of
inducement. (People of the Philippines v. Calvelo, G.R. No. 223526, December 6, 2017, Third Division)
18. It is clear that the elements of illegal sale of dangerous drugs are present. SPO1 Germodo was categorical that
he witnessed the exchange of marked money and sachet of shabu from a distance of five meters. (People of
the Philippines v. Ejan, G.R. No. 212169, December 13, 2017, First Division)
19. The crime of illegal sale of dangerous drugs was not established since the prosecution witnesses presented
inconsistent dates regarding the occurrence of the alleged drug transaction. In addition, the prosecution failed
to establish that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized item was preserved. (People of the Philippines
v. Dela Rosa, G.R. No. 230228, December 13, 2017, Third Division)
20. The preservation of the chain of custody is essential in a successful prosecution for the illegal sale of dangerous
drugs. (People of the Philippines v. Macud, G.R. No. 219175, December 14, 2017, First Division)
21. It is clear from the testimony of PO1 Coldas that he had witnessed first hand the drug transaction between the
police asset and the appellant. He was able to positively identify the appellant as the seller of the shabu due to
the fact that the transaction happened right in front of him at a distance of about one meter. PO1 Coldas was
also able to see the object of the transaction, which was 0.1 gram of shabu, as well as its consideration. He
witnessed the delivery made by the appellant and the payment of the asset for the shabu. (People of the
Philippines v. Flor, G.R. No. 216017, January 19, 2018, First Division)
22. The prosecution was able to establish that the buy-bust was conducted at around 6:20 p.m. in a squatters' area.
The prosecution also explained that they were not able to invite representatives from the media, the DOJ, or
an elected public official because they could not find anyone available and that they were pressed for time.
These are justifiable reasons for non-compliance with the requirements. And considering that the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized items were properly preserved, as shown by the unbroken chain of custody of
the seized items, said non-compliance did not render void or invalid such seizure and custody over the illegal
drugs. (People of the Philippines v. Pundugar, G.R. No. 214779, February 7, 2018, First Division)
23. The prosecution has established beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of the crimes of illegal sale of
dangerous drugs and illegal possession of dangerous drugs. As for the sale of dangerous drugs, IO1 Diocampo
recounted how she posed as "Kat-Kat" and bought a sachet of shabu from accused-appellant Sanchez in
exchange for a total of P1,000.00. Thus, her testimony establishes the elements of: the identities of the buyer,
the seller, and the object and the consideration; and the delivery of the shabu and the payment for it. IO1
Diocampo further testified that apart from the sachet sold to her, another sachet containing 0.211 grams of
methamphetamine hydrochloride was obtained from accused-appellant Sanchez, establishing the
prosecution's case for possession of dangerous drugs. Accused-appellant Sanchez had no authority to possess
shabu, a dangerous drug he freely and consciously possessed. (People of the Philippines v. Sanchez, G.R. No.
216014, March 14, 2018, Third Division)
24. It is important that the sale transaction is properly established and that the object of the transaction, the seized
drugs, be presented in court and identified as the same items seized from the accused. PO2 Bernil's testimony
shows that the members of the buy-bust team apprehended accused-appellant based on the pre-arranged
signal from the poseur-buyer that the transaction with accused-appellant had been consummated. However,
the prosecution did not present the poseur-buyer during the trial to describe the said transaction. The records
also show that it was PO2 Bernil who was tasked to monitor the movements of accused-appellant and the
poseur-buyer and was positioned the closest to the subject transaction, but he was located ten (10) meters
away from the transaction. While it is true that the non-presentation of the poseur-buyer is fatal only if there
is no other eyewitness to the illicit transaction, PO2 Bernil and the other members of the buy-bust team cannot
be considered as eyewitnesses to the illegal sale of drugs because their distance raises doubt that they could
confirm whether what transpired was actually a sale, considering the legal characterizations of the act
constituting the crime. (People of the Philippines v. Palaras, G.R. No. 219582, July 11, 2018, Third Division)
25. PO1 Italin gave an unequivocal account of the sale that took place on September 2, 2011 leading to the arrest
of the appellant. PO1 Italin testified that he was assigned to accompany the confidential informant who acted
as the poseur-buyer in a buy-bust operation conducted at the northern part of the Vigan City Public Market;
that upon reaching the target site, he and the confidential informant proceeded in front of Pardo's Lechon
Manok, while the rest of the team strategically positioned themselves around the parking area of the market;
that after a few minutes, Aspa arrived and led the informant to an alley; that he followed them closely as he

was then only 2 to 3 meters away from the two; that he heard the informant asked Aspa if he has the marijuana,
to which Aspa answered in the affirmative; and, that Aspa handed the three sachets containing dried marijuana
leaves to the informant who, in turn, gave the buy bust money consisting of three P100.00 bills with the marking
"DR," the initials of PO2 Dennis Reoliquio, the one who prepared the buy-bust money. SPO1 Somera and PO2
Reoliquio corroborated the testimony of PO1 Italin in its material points having also seen how the transaction
between Aspa and the confidential informant took place. This Court notes that the accounts of these Police
operatives of the incident dovetailed each other and uniformly testified of having apprehended Aspa in the
entrapment operation. The Court finds that the credible and positive testimonies of PO1 Italin, SPO1 Somera
and PO2 Reoliquio are sufficient to prove that an illegal transaction or sale of marijuana took place. Also, when
the corpus delicti (three plastic sachets containing 7.8471 grams of marijuana) were presented in court, PO1
Italin and SPO1 Somera positively identified the same as the sachets of marijuana leaves that Aspa sold to the
confidential informant during the entrapment operation. Each bears the marking of "AES", the initials of SPO1
Amado Somera, Jr. The totality of the evidence presented during trial clearly points to Aspa as being engaged
in the illegal sale of marijuana at the time he was arrested. (People of the Philippines v. Aspa, Jr., G.R. No.
26. In this case, there is serious doubt that the sale of the 0.01 gram of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu
between appellant and the poseur-buyer ever took place. The poseur-buyer, whose testimony would have
clearly established that the illegal transaction occurred, was not presented before the court. While the
prosecution argues that the non-presentation of the poseur-buyer was not fatal to its case because there were
eyewitnesses, we deem otherwise. The ten or seven meter distance between the police officers waiting for the
pre-arranged signal from the poseur-buyer and the appellant made it difficult for the supposed eyewitnesses
to see (and hear) what exactly was happening between appellant and the poseur-buyer. While PO2 Libo-on
testified that he saw appellant and the poseur-buyer "transacting" and that appellant "took something from his
right side," he failed to describe clearly what he actually saw. PO2 Libo-on merely stated that he "believed that
[the something] was shabu," without giving any description of the "something." In other words, PO2 Libo-on's
testimony hardly qualifies as an eyewitness account of what kind of "transaction" actually transpired between
appellant and the poseur-buyer. Specifically, PO2 Libo-on's testimony did not clearly establish that he saw and
heard that appellant was selling shabu to the poseur-buyer, and the latter was buying shabu from appellant.
While PO2 Bernil testified, on direct-examination, that "the subject person (appellant) gave the suspected
shabu to the poseur buyer" after the poseur-buyer gave the money to the appellant, and on cross-examination,
that he "saw the actual exchange between the poseur buyer and the suspect," there was nothing in his
testimony describing what exactly he saw. In fact, there was no description of the appearance or condition of
the "suspected shabu," which was handed to the poseur-buyer. This is precisely because PO2 Bernil and PO2
Libo-on were positioned approximately ten meters away from the appellant and the poseur-buyer. (People of
the Philippines v. Conlu, G.R. No. 225213, October 3, 2018, Second Division)
27. The Information filed against Reyes has the following accusatory portion: “That on or about 12:15 in the early
dawn of July 5, 2011 in Brgy. Malindong, Binmaley, Pangasinan and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, did, then and there, wilfully and unlawfully sell Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride or "shabu", a dangerous drug, without any authority to sell the same.” Contrary to Section 5,
Article II, of RA 9165.” Reyes was thus supposedly charged with the crime of illegal sale of dangerous drugs,
defined and penalized under Section 5, Article II of RA 9165 – the prosecution of which requires that the
following elements be proven: (a) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object and the consideration; and
(b) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. The Information filed against Reyes, however, makes
a conclusion of law – that he did sell dangerous drugs – without specifically stating (a) the identity of the buyer;
(b) the amount of dangerous drugs supposedly traded by Reyes; and (c) the consideration for the sale. In the
case at bar, the Information filed against Reyes failed to sufficiently identify therein all the components of the
first element of the crime of sale of dangerous drugs, namely: the identity of the buyer, the object, and the
consideration. Much similar to the case of Posada, therefore, the prosecution in this case likewise deprived
Reyes of his right to be informed of the offense charged against him. To repeat, for this reason alone, Reyes
should already be acquitted.
a. In People v. Posada, the Information filed therein erroneously lumped together the objects of illegal sale
and illegal possession of dangerous drugs. In ruling that the said Information was defective, the Court in
the said case held that it must be pointed out that the prosecution filed a defective Information. An
Information is fatally defective when it is clear that it does not really charge an offense or when an essential
element of the crime has not been sufficiently alleged. In the instant case, while the prosecution was able
to allege the identity of the buyer and the seller, it failed to particularly allege or identify in the Information
the subject matter of the sale or the corpus delicti. The Court must remember that one of the essential
elements to convict a person of sale of prohibited drugs is to identify with certainty the corpus delicti. Here,
the prosecution took the liberty to lump together two sets of corpora delicti when it should have separated
the two in two different informations. To allow the prosecution to do this is to deprive the accused-
appellants of their right to be informed, not only of the nature of the offense being charged, but of the
essential element of the offense charged; and in this case, the very corpus delicti of the crime. (People of
the Philippines v. Reyes, G.R. No. 225736, October 15, 2018, Second Division)

28. The delivery of the dangerous drug to the poseur-buyer by the accused as the seller, and the receipt by the
latter of the marked money during the buy-bust transaction are the acts that consummate the crime of illegal
sale of the dangerous drug. Considering that there can be no sale without the delivery, the act of delivery must
be proved in order to hold the accused guilty of the crime of illegal sale of the dangerous drug. (People of the
Philippines v. Yagao, G.R. No. 216725, February 18, 2019, First Division)
29. The absence of money and the non-presentation of a marked money as evidence does not negate the
commission of the offense under R.A. 9165, Section 5. De la Cruz states that the presentation of the marked
money, as well as the fact that the money was paid in exchange for the delivery of dangerous drugs, were
unnecessary to consummate the crime. In this case, PO2 Olea was informed by his asset prior to their operation
that no money or any form of consideration would be exchanged for the shabu that he would be obtaining from
appellant, hence, there was no marked money prepared by the police officers. (People of the Philippines v.
Arago, Jr., G.R. No. 233833, February 20, 2019, Third Division)
30. The Court is convinced that no buy bust operation occurred. The collective testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses, PO3 Dizon and PO2 Yambao, failed to present a coherent narration of how the supposed buy bust
operation was conducted. This Court notes the inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses,
as pointed out by Alberto, which cast serious doubt on the truthfulness of their allegations. The Court also finds
the claim of PO3 Dizon that PO2 Yambao put an initial marking of "RY", the initial of his name, on the second
sachet of shabu difficult to believe. It is unusual to put a person's initial on items not confiscated by the same
person. Here, PO3 Dizon's claim is belied by the confiscation receipt he prepared himself where it was stated
that the second sachet of shabu had the initial marking "DSD-2", signifying that it was PO3 Dizon who
confiscated it. (People of the Philippines v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 233544, March 25, 2019, First Division)
31. The elements of Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs under Section 5, Article II of RA 9165 are: (a) the identity of the
buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (b) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment;
while the elements of Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs under Section 11, Article II of RA 9165 are: (a) the
accused was in possession of an item or object identified as a prohibited drug; (b) such possession was not
authorized by law; and (c) the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug. Here, the courts a quo
correctly found that all the elements of the crimes charged are present, as the records clearly show that Piñero
was caught in flagrante delicto selling shabu to the poseur-buyer, PO2 Avila, during a legitimate buy-bust
operation by the SOG-NOPPO; and that fourteen (14) more plastic sachets containing shabu were recovered
from him during the search made incidental to his arrest. Since there is no indication that the said courts
overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied the surrounding facts and circumstances of the case, the Court finds
no reason to deviate from their factual findings. In this regard, it should be noted that the trial court was in the
best position to assess and determine the credibility of the witnesses presented by both parties. (People of the
Philippines v. Piñero, G.R. No. 242407, April 1, 2019, Second Division)
32. Element of payment is required in the charge of illegal sale of dangerous drugs. (People of the Philippines v.
Posos, G.R. No. 226492, October 2, 2019, Second Division)
33. According to the prosecution, the subject of the sale is P350,000.00 worth of shabu. The alleged buy-bust
money, as testified by IO1 Tactac and IO2 Advincula, consisted of two genuine 500-peso bills placed on the top
and at the bottom of the boodle money consisting of cut newspapers in the size of a peso bill. It is incredulous
that the boodle money is sandwiched between two genuine 500-peso bills, which cannot be stacked neatly like
new and crisp 500-peso bills without Desiree noticing it. It is more in accord with human experience that with
only two genuine 500-peso bills in between the cut-out newspapers as boodle money would be clearly obvious
to Nida and Desiree, who would have been alerted that Desiree was receiving a stack of cut-out newspapers
placed inside an orange bag. Cut-out newspapers cannot even approximate the color scheme of any genuine
money bill. Be it a 20-peso bill, 50-peso bill, 100-peso bill, 500-peso bill, or a 1000-peso bill. The narration of
the PDEA officers that Nida and Desiree accepted the boodle money as payment for the sale of about 50 grams
of shabu, without raising any alarm, is highly unbelievable. Further, it is highly impossible that a sale of
dangerous drugs between the poseur-buyer and the seller would be consummated without a specific quantity
of dangerous drugs agreed beforehand. For drug pushers, shabu is a very precious commodity that even a speck
of it has money value. Thus, the testimony of the PDEA officers that the subject of the sale would only involve
P350,000.00 worth of shabu without any previous agreement as to the specific quantity is dubious and not
worthy of belief. (People of the Philippines v. Guillermo, G.R. No. 229515, November 27, 2019, Third Division)
34. According to PO1 Panggoy, the payment he gave to Aguilar consisted of one P500.00 bill and bogus money
made of cut manila paper. He explained that the bogus money was as thick as a bundle of P510,000.00, albeit
the payment due to Aguilar was only P20,000.00. It is incredulous that PO1 Panggoy's payment was handed to
him even though the bulk of it consists of cut-out manila paper and, therefore, evidently fake. That Aguilar
would part with the dangerous drugs after PO1 Panggoy merely flashed the payment to him is doubtful
considering the sum involved. The police's version of a legitimate buy-bust operation lacks credence. An
exchange of a few pieces of peso bills for a small volume of shabu can be believable but for more than five
grams of shabu worth P20,000.00 with one genuine bill and a bundle of cut-out manila paper to be accepted

by the accused without question, and about to be counted by him, is certainly incredulous. The Court, thus,
finds the veracity of the prosecution's version of what transpired on August 18, 2015 questionable. (People of
the Philippines v. Aguilar, G.R. No. 243793, November 27, 2019, Third Division)
35. The courts a quo correctly found that Dela Cruz committed the crime of Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs, as the
records clearly show that he was caught in flagrante delicto to be selling shabu to the poseur-buyer, PO1 Disono,
during a legitimate buy-bust operation conducted by the Balanga City Police Station. Similarly, the courts a quo
also correctly ruled that Forbes committed the crime of Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs as he freely and
consciously possessed the plastic sachet containing shabu given to him by Dela Cruz prior to the latter’s arrest.
(People of the Philippines v. Dela Cruz, G.R. No. 238212, January 27, 2020, Second Division)
36. Reasonable doubt on the actual sale of illegal drugs exists. Notably, PO2 Cadawan who testified that the police
officers conducted surveillance prior to the buy-bust operation, did not describe the particular acts being
committed by accused-appellants at the time which led him and the other police officers to conclude that the
latter were involved in a crime. Aside from the fact that there was no record of the surveillance, PO2 Cadawan
palpably failed to identify the activities to which the series of information allegedly provided by a confidential
informant pertained. His testimony lacks the bare essentials to justify the conduct of a buy-bust operation. In
fact, if the prosecutor did not use the term “drug dealings” in one of his questions, there would have been no
indication whatsoever of the crime that accused-appellants were supposed to be committing. As part of the
surveillance team, PO2 Cadawan could not have neglected to describe the illegal activities that he witnessed –
if indeed he witnessed any. It is considerably uncharacteristic of a polic officer who had monitored a crime to
omit basic information on what he had perceived, particularly when testifying in court where such information
is most crucial. (People of the Philippines v. Casilang, G.R. No. 242159, February 5, 2020, Third Division)
37. There is merit in the accused’s argument that the prosecution’s failure to present the confidential asset turned
poseur-buyer in court was fatal to its cause. It is worthy to note that said informant was the only witness to the
crime of illegal sale. He/she alone approached the accused, made an offer to purchase, and received the
supposed drug thereby consummating the sale. Fajardo, in his testimony, confirmed that he was positioned
about 8 to 10 meters away. Evidently, in the instant case, the poseur-buyer was the witness competent to prove
that the buy-bust actually took place considering that Fajardo, et al were positioned about 8 to 10 meters away
from the accused and the poseur-buyer. People v. Guzon decreed that although one of the members of the
buy-bust team testified during the trial on the supposed sale, such information was based only on conjecture,
as may be derived from the supposed actions of the accused and the poseur-buyer, or at most, hearsay, being
information that was merely relayed by the alleged poseur-buyer. Also, People v. Tadepa states that the police
officer, who admitted that he was 7 to 8 meters away from where the actual transaction took place, could not
be deemed an eyewitness to the crime. Thus, the absence of neither the poseur-buyer’s nor of any eyewitness’
testimony on the illegal transaction inevitably weakens the prosecution’s evidence.
a. Admittedly, the Court, in several instances, has affirmed an accused’s conviction notwithstanding the non-
presentation of the poseur-buyer in the buy-bust operation. Nevertheless, such failure is excusable only
when the poseur-buyer’s testimony is merely corroborative, there being some other eyewitness who is
competent to testify on the sale transaction. (People of the Philippines v. Deliña, G.R. No. 243578, June 30,
38. The sale was already consummated by the time the brick of marijuana and the sachet of shabu were delivered
and received by PO2 Dela Cruz after the buy-bust money was handed to Meneses, through the other accused,
Balila, as payment for the illegal drugs. By the time of relinquishing the physical possession of the illegal drugs,
Meneses effectively accepted the offer of PO2 Dela Cruz of P500.00 as his payment for the illegal drugs.
Regardless of the amount of the consideration, in the illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the most important part
of the buy-bust operation is the actual exchange of the buy-bust money and the subject drug.
a. In a way, Meneses, in arguing that the prosecution failed to prove the existence of an agreed consideration
in the illegal sale of drugs, is admitting that there was an actual transaction of illegal sale of dangerous
drugs and the only thing that was missing was the agreement as to the value of the consideration. Meneses’
argument that the sale is null and void as if no sale had transpired between him and PO2 Dela Cruz is
unmeritorious. To be clear, the Civil Code will not apply. Technically, the sale was really null and void as the
object of the sale is expressly prohibited by law. To emphasize, what only needs to be proven is that there
should be a transaction or sale that had taken place. Accordingly, the punishable act was the act of selling
the illegal drugs which cannot be negated by mere technicalities of a contract of sale. (People of the
Philippines v. Limson, G.R. No. 233533, June 30, 2020, First Division)
39. The elements of illegal sale of dangerous drugs have been established. It is clear from the records that
appellants Tat and Lee were caught in flagrante delicto of selling a dangerous drug, ephedrine, to PO3 Mabanglo
on July 26, 2012. The appellants sold and delivered the plastic sachet containing ephedrine to PO3 Mabanglo
posing as buyer. There was an actual exchange of the marked money and the plastic sachet containing
ephedrine. Further, the appellants were positively identified in open court by the prosecution witnesses as the
persons who sold the dangerous drugs to PO3 Mabanglo.

a. The difference between the drugs that were supposedly bought and the drugs that were actually bought
is irrelevant. To recall, appellants question the finding of guilt by the trial court on the ground that the
drugs that were supposedly bought, seized, recovered, confiscated, and inventoried are shabu but the
prosecution presented ephedrine. The Court finds this to be inconsequential and does not affect the finding
of guilt by the accused. Even if the police transaced for the sale of shabu, the fact that the seized drugs are
ephedrine, will not warrant a reversal of the finding of guilt of the accused. In any case, the charge in the
information was clearly for violation of Section 5 in relation to Section 26(b), Article II of R.A. 9165. It is
immaterial whether the allegation was for shabu or ephedrine, since both are dangerous drugs. Moreover,
the matter was already settled in People v. Noque, where the Court held that an accused can be convicted
for the sale of shabu, despite the fact that what was established and proven was the sale of ephedrine.
(People of the Philippines v. Siu Ming Tat, G.R. No. 246577, July 13, 2020, First Division)
40. The elements of illegal sale of dangerous drugs were adequately and satisfactorily established by the
prosecution. A perusal of the proceedings before the trial court shows that in the afternoon of March 30, 2014
the police operatives of PNP Iriga City held a briefing for the conduct of a buy-bust operation against Lopez, the
details of which are reduced in the Pre-Operation Report dated March 30, 2014. PO1 Buenaflor, together with
their confidential informant, acted as the poseur-buyer of the operation and took custody of the marked money
to be used. The marked money used in this operation was accounted, photographed, photocopied, and
positively identified before the trial court. PO1 Buenaflor positively identified Lopez during trial as the same
person who approached them after being contacted by their confidential informant for a possible sale. Upon
meeting PO1 Buenaflor and the confidential informant, it was Lopez who asked them how much they would be
buying. Lopez made the offer and PO1 Buenaflor, as poseur-buyer, accepted. It was Lopez as well who received
the marked money from PO1 Buenaflor, and who handed over a heat-sealed transparent sachet containing a
crystalline substance. Considering that there is positive testimony, corroborated in its material points, and
supporting documentary evidence identifying Lopez as the one who offered to sell, and in fact sold, the
dangerous drug in exchange for P2,000.00 and who, upon receipt of the consideration, delivered the dangerous
drug to the poseur-buyer, it is clear that all elements of the crime of illegal sale of dangerous drugs had been
proven. (People of the Philippines v. Lopez, G.R. No. 247974, July 13, 2020, First Division)
41. There is reasonable doubt with regard to the identities of the buyer and the seller. Normally, the identities of
the seller and the buyer are proven by the testimonies of the apprehending officers, especially in cases involving
buy bust operations where the accused was caught in flagrante delicto. This case, however, is peculiar, in that
accused-appellant was not himself found in possession of the illegal drugs subject of the attempted sale.
Instead, the entire basis of the charge against him – and of his eventual conviction as well – was the testimony
of Caparas, a fellow inmate in whose custody the shabu was actually found and who named accused-appellant
as the source/seller thereof. Caparas likewise identified another inmate, Cua, as the intended recipient/buyer
of the shabu. However, Caparas’ bare testimony ascribing criminal liability upon accused-appellant is neither
trustworthy nor sufficient to convict the latter. Lest it be forgotten, it was Caparas himself who was found in
possession of the illegal drugs. To the Court’s mind, therefore, it was convenient for Caparas to have named
accused-appellant as the source/seller of the illegal drugs in order to evade criminal liability, as he has evidently
done. Curiously, records are bereft of showing that despite having been accosted by JO Romana in custody of
the illegal drugs, Caparas had not been charged with illegal possession together with accused-appellant.
Parenthetically, the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, ruled that in the absence of allegations of conspiracy between
Caparas and accused-appellant, the case had to be judged on the basis of their individual acts. If such is the
case, accused-appellant cannot be found guilty based on the mere statements of Caparas sans any other
independent evidence indubitably pointing to him as the source/seller of the illegal drugs subject of this case.
Contrary to the findings of the courts a quo, the testimonies of JO Romana and Warden Pajarillo did not
corroborate Caparas' identification of accused-appellant as the source/seller of the said illegal drugs, containing
as it did only details of the latter's arrest and the proceedings that transpired thereafter. As it stands, aside from
the bare testimony of Caparas, there is no other evidence to prove beyond moral certainty that it was accused-
appellant who instructed Caparas to give the note and the shabu to Cua. To accept Caparas' testimony on this
score would be to countenance convictions based on empty accusations, as well as evasions of criminal liability,
in the case of Caparas, who, was in actual possession of the illegal drugs. It is worthy to emphasize that even
the note that was seized from Caparas does not categorically reflect the names of either accused-appellant as
the seller or Cua as the recipient/buyer. (People of the Philippines v. Quiñones, G.R. No. 250908, November 23,
42. The prosecution failed to establish the buy-bust operation through the objective test.
a. In People v. Doria, the Court explained that the objective test requires the details of the purported
transaction during the buy-bust operation to be clearly and adequately shown, i.e., the initial contact
between the poseur-buyer and the pusher, the offer to purchase the drug, and the promise or payment of
the consideration, payment using the buy-bust or marked money, up to the consummation of the sale by
the delivery of the illegal drug subject of the sale whether to the informant alone or the police officer. All
these details must be subject of strict scrutiny by courts to ensure that citizens are not unlawfully induced
to commit an offense.

b. Here, the prosecution failed to clearly establish the details of the purported sale. Nothing in the records
shows the initial contact between the poseur-buyer and the seller, and the manner by which the initial
contact was made. The offer to buy, the willingness to sell, and the agreed purchase price were not
satisfactoriy shown. PO2 Jose’s testimony as to the details that led to the consummation of the sale is
lacking in detail to satisfy the rigid requirements of the objective test. What is more, considering that PO2
Jose admitted that it was the confidential informant who transacted with Jasper, he was not privy to the
entire transaction. There was no indication that PO2 Jose directly saw an illegal drug being sold to the
poseur-buyer. According to PO2 Jose, he went to Jasper’s house with PO2 Cesar Maghinay, SPO4 Orlando
Villabito, SPO3 Abunda, and SPO1 Abrasaldo. He gave two (2) 100-peso bills, marked with his initials, to the
informant who acted as poseur-buyer. The police officers were hiding when the transaction occurred at
the gate of Jasper’s house. They were positioned 10 to 15 meters away from Jasper and the informant, but
PO2 Jose said he saw Jasper gave the informant shabu in exchange for P200.00. No witness who had
personal knowledge of the alleged transaction which took place between the poseur-buyer and Jasper was
presented the police officers could not hear or see what was happening between the poseur-buyer and
Jasper, considering the distance of their position from the location of the transaction along with the size of
the subject of this transaction. The Court finds it doubtful that PO2 Jose was able to reasonably ascertain
what was said, if any, between Jasper and the poseur-buyer, and what was handed by Jasper, if any, to the
poseur-buyer. In several cases, the Court took into account the distance of the officers from the location
where the transaction occurred in acquitting the accused. In People v. Deliña, the police officers were about
8 to 10 meters away. Likewise, in People v. Conlu, the police officers were approximately 10 meters away.
The Court found that police officer was “merely an observer” when he testified that he was more or less 7
meters away in People v. Casacop. In these cases, the Court found that the police officers had no personal
knowledge of the transaction, their testimonies were insufficient, and the non-presentation of the poseur-
buyer proved fatal.
c. The poseur-buyer would have established what transaction took place, but he was not presented. While it
is true that a conviction may be confirmed notwithstanding the non-presentation of the poseur-buyer in
the buy-bust operation, such non-presentation is excusable only when the poseur-buyer's testimony is
merely corroborative, there being some other eyewitness who is competent to testify on the sale
transaction. Such cannot be said in this case. Even if coming from a police officer who enjoys the
presumption of regularity, PO2 Jose's testimony is insufficient to induce moral certainty. The presumption
of regularity of performance of duty cannot prevail over the constitutional presumption of innocence of
the accused. While the Court recognizes that there is a need to hide the informant's identity and preserve
his invaluable service to the police, since the poseur-buyer and the confidential informant were one and
the same, without the poseur-buyer's testimony, the State did not credibly incriminate Jasper.
d. Again, the "objective test" requires that the prosecution paint a clear picture of how the initial contact
between the buyer and the pusher was made. It is not enough to show that there was an exchange of
money and illegal drugs. The details that led to such exchange must be clearly and adequately accounted
for. Failing in which will certainly cast a doubt on the veracity of the whole buy-bust operation. On this note
alone, the guilt of Jasper as to illegal sale of dangerous drugs is already doubtful. Nonetheless, the lapses
that the buy-bust team committed in this case are worth mentioning. (Tan v. People of the Philippines, G.R.
43. All the elements of illegal sale and possession of dangerous drugs were present.
a. Based on the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, appellant was the seller and SPO2 Taldo was the
buyer in the illegal sale of dangerous drugs subject of this case. SPO2 Taldo was supposed to purchase four
(4) kilos of cocaine but only two (2) bricks were delivered to him before the buy bust team arrested
appellant. in exchange for these two (2) bricks of cocaine, SPO2 Taldo handed appellant a bag containing
six (6) 500 bills and 60 bundles of boodle money dusted with ultraviolet powder as payment. The sale of
illegal drugs was therefore consummated.
b. Here, appellant had possession of the two (2) bricks of cocaine recovered from behind the driver seat of
his vehicle upon his arrest. Though he did not have immediate physical possession of these items, he had
constructive possession thereof. Only he had dominion of these items. The two (2) bricks of cocaine were
under his control and disposal. Appellant cannot deny knowledge of the two (2) additional bricks of cocaine
inside his car. Obviously, he was about to sell them to SPO2 Taldo to complete the latter’s order of four (4)
kilos of cocaine. But before he could physically deliver the rest of his merchandise to SPO2 Taldo, the buy
bust team moved in and effected his arrest. (People of the Philippines v. SPO1 Estabillo, G.R. No. 252902,
June 16, 2021, Second Division)
44. The arresting officer’s failure to test appellant for ultraviolet powder is not fatal to the prosecution’s case. For
the law does not require buy-bust money and boodle money used in anti-drug operations to be dusted with
ultraviolet powder for purposes of proving delivery of payment. This second element may be established
through other means, such as the testimony of the poseur-buyer himself, as here. To reiterate, SPO2 Taldo
categorically testified that he had delivered payment to appellant. Both the trial court and the CA found this
testimony to be credible. (People of the Philippines v. SPO1 Estabillo, G.R. No. 252902, June 16, 2021, Second
Division)

ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF DANGEROUS DRUGS

1. Accused is guilty of illegal possession of dangerous drugs because when he was chanced upon by PO3
Capangyarihan, the former was caught red-handed in the illegal possession of shabu and was not shown to
possess any authority to possess the dangerous drugs. (Palo v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 192075,
2. Accused did not commit illegal possession of equipment, instrument, apparatus and other paraphernalia for
dangerous drugs under Section 12 of R.A. 9165 because there is no evidence showing that the aluminum foil,
tube, and lighters found in the petitioner’s house were fit or intended for introducing any dangerous drug into
the body. In addition, there were no traces of shabu on any of these alleged drug paraphernalia. Under the law,
the elements of illegal possession of equipment, instrument, apparatus, and other paraphernalia for dangerous
drugs under Section 12 of R.A. 9165 are: (a) possession or control by the accused of any equipment, apparatus,
or other paraphernalia fit or intended for smoking, consuming, administering, injecting, ingesting, or
introducing any dangerous drug into the body, and (b) such possession is not authorized by law. (Derilo v. People
of the Philippines, G.R. No. 190566, April 18, 2016, Second Division)
3. Mere possession of a prohibited drug constitutes prima facie evidence of knowledge or animus possidendi
sufficient to convict an accused in the absence of any satisfactory explanation of such possession. The burden
to explain the absence of animus possidendi rests upon the accused, and in the case at bar, this the appellant
failed to do. (People of the Philippines v. Rafols, G.R. No. 214440, June 15, 2016, Third Division)
4. It remains unrefuted that, at the time of the search, appellant was the owner and possessor of the rest house
based on established facts and evidence. As owner of the cock farm and the rest house, appellant clearly had
full control and dominion over all the rooms located therein, including the bedroom where the thing seized
were located. Possession, under the law, includes not only actual possession, but also constructive possession.
Actual possession exists when the drug is in the immediate possession or control of the accused. On the other
hand, constructive possession exists when the drug is under the dominion and control of the accused or when
he has the right to exercise dominion and control over the place where it [was] found. Exclusive possession or
control is not necessary. The accused cannot avoid conviction if his right to exercise control and dominion over
the place where the contraband is located is shared with another. "The finding of illicit drugs and paraphernalia
in a house or building owned or occupied by a particular person raises the presumption of knowledge and
possession thereof which, standing alone, is sufficient to convict." In the present case, appellant failed to rebut
by sufficient evidence that he did not in fact exercise power and control over the place searched and the items
seized and that he did not intend to do so. Appellant also failed to adduce evidence that he was authorized by
law to possess the same. (People of the Philippines v. Obias, Jr., G.R. No. 222187, March 25, 2019, First Division)
5. All the elements of illegal possession of dangerous drugs were present, as the records clearly showed that: first,
appellant was caught in flagrante delicto selling one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing shabu
to PO2 Esteves, the poseur-buyer, for the amount of P500.00 during a legitimate buy-bust operation; and
second, three (3) other heat-sealed, plastic sachets containing shabu with an aggregate weight of 0.3102 gram
were recovered from appellant during the search made incidental to his arrest. Absent any indication that both
courts had overlooked, misunderstood or misconstrued the real import or significance of the facts and
circumstances adduced in these cases, the Court finds no reason to overturn their factual findings. (People of
the Philippines v. Soria, G.R. No. 229049, June 6, 2019, First Division)
6. There is no question that the dangerous drugs were found in a coin purse on top of the refrigerator in the first-
floor living room of Rowena and in a plastic container box inside a cabinet in the bedroom of Ryan. These
findings were witnessed by a media representative, a DOJ representative and a barangay official who were
present during the seizure and confiscation of the dangerous drugs until the conduct of the inventory and taking
of photographs. They also did not offer any satisfactory explanation to overcome the presumption that the
seized items belong to them. Hence, the CA was correct in ruling that petitioners had constructive possession
of the illegal drugs since they were shown to enjoy dominion and control over the premises they occupied. The
fact that there were other people living in their house is of no consequence. All told, the Court is convinced that
petitioners are indeed guilty of violating Section 11, Article II of RA 9165. (Santos v. People of the Philippines,
7. The alleged seized drug specimens were not actually possessed by accused-appellant Baer. The transparent
plastic bags and sealed decks allegedly containing shabu were not found on the person of accused-appellant
Baer. As held by the CA, the drug specimens were considered to have been under the constructive possession
of accused-appellant Baer. However, based on the evidence on record, the Court disagrees with the findings of
the RTC and CA. The Court finds that the supposed drug specimens were not constructively possessed by
accused-appellant Baer. According to the testimony of the prosecution's witness, SPO1 dela Cruz, seven big
sachets and 142 sealed decks of shabu were found inside the locked steel box retrieved from the place where
the search warrant was executed. On cross-examination, SPO1 dela Cruz readily admitted that when the
authorities confronted accused-appellant Baer as to the locked steel box, accused-appellant Baer made it clear
to the apprehending team that the said box was not his. He had no knowledge as to the contents of the steel

box and was not capable of opening the said container because it was owned by one Ondo Notarte (Notarte).
The prosecution does not refute or contest that the steel box which allegedly contained the supposed
confiscated drug specimen was owned by Notarte and not owned by accused-appellant Baer, and that the latter
was not capable of opening the same. In fact, much emphasis must be placed on the admitted fact that it was
the members of the PANU who were able to open the steel box, considering that accused-appellant Baer did
not own the container and that the latter had no ability to open it. The key that was used to open the steel box
did not come from accused-appellant Baer. Strikingly, as testified under oath by SPO1 dela Cruz, the key that
was used to open the steel box came from the authorities and not accused-appellant Baer.
a. Constructive possession exists only when the illegal drug is under the dominion and control of the accused
or when he has the right to exercise dominion and control over the place where it is found. The Court finds
that the alleged drug specimens retrieved were not under the dominion and control of accused-appellant
Baer. The container where such specimens were supposedly found, i.e., the steel box owned by Notarte,
was likewise not under the dominion and control of accused-appellant Baer. Therefore, the Court finds that
accused-appellant Baer did not constructively possess the supposed drug specimens retrieved by the
authorities. On this point alone, the Court finds sufficient reason to acquit accused-appellant Baer on the
crime charged. (People of the Philippines v. Baer, G.R. No. 228958, August 14, 2019, Second Division)
8. Insofar as the crime of illegal possession of dangerous drugs is concerned, the prosecution was able to prove
the guilt of accused-appellant with moral certainty as it duly established the existence of the following elements
of the offense, viz.: (a) that the accused was in possession of the object identified as a prohibited or regulatory
drug; (b) that such possession was not authorized by law; and (c) that the accused freely and consciously
possessed the said drug. Apart from the sachet of shabu sold to the poseur-buyer, the buy-bust team was able
to seize from accused-appellant's possession the buy-bust money and two (2) additional pieces of properly
marked plastic sachets containing shabu which accused-appellant freely and consciously possessed prior to his
apprehension without any authority or license to possess the same. (People of the Philippines v. Catubay, G.R.
9. The elements of illegal possession of dangerous drugs were established when accused-appellant was caught in
possession of 7,918.90 grams of shabu by members of the PNP Narcotics Group during the implementation of
a search warrant at Unit 310 of SJB Condominium in Quezon City. Prosecution witness P/Insp. Roger Fuentes
positively identified accused-appellant as the person who opened the door of Unit 310. Upon conducting a
search, the police officers found several plastic bags containing white crystalline substance of suspected shabu.
After inventory and marking, the seized items were brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination. The
forensic chemist and prosecution witness P/Insp. Cirox T. Omero conducted a chemical examination of the
seized items and the results confirmed the seized white crystalline substance as 7,918.90 grams of
methamphetamine hydrochloride, commonly known as shabu. (People of the Philippines v. Lung Wai Tang, G.R.
10. Appellant proved animus possidendi. Appellant’s are likewise unnatural and contrary to man’s common
experience. His actuations in fact indicate a guilty mind. During the commotion inside the city jail involving
Tulipat and the bag in question, Tulipat suddenly handed the bag to appellant who readily and unquestionably
accepted it. Under normal circumstances, appellant should have already become suspicious when he saw and
heard JO2 Briones calling for Tulipat because of the bag she was holding at that time. In fact, appellant himself
said Tulipat’s possession of the bag already caused a commotion inside the city jail. In any event, when JO2
Briones also called for appellant himself, like Tulipat, the latter hesitated and even tried to pass on the bag back
to Tulipat who refused to accept it. And when appellant finally came face to face with JO2 Briones, appellant
did not immediately surrender the bag to the former nor denied his ownership of the bag or knowledge of the
shabu found inside. Even during the investigation, appellant was not shown to have interposed any such
disclaimer. Surely, these circumstances altogether negate appellant’s pretense of lack of animus possidendi.
a. However, due to the lack of compliance of the chain of custody rule, appellant was acquitted. (People v.
Quijano, G.R. No. 247558, February 19, 2020, First Division)
11. The elements of illegal possession of dangerous drugs are present. The courts a quo correctly held that: (a) by
virtue of SW No. 10-2015, a valid search warrant, the police officers recovered, among others, 14 heat-sealed
transparent plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance which later tested positive for shabu; (b) such
possession is not authorized by law as Pis-an himself admitted during the pre-trial; and (c) the prohibited drugs
were uncovered from Pis-an’s house which was a prima facie evidence of knowledge or animus possidendi.
a. The maximum penalty of life imprisonment may only be imposed when the crime of illegal possession was
committed in the presence of two or more persons or in a social gathering pursuant to R.A. 9165, Section
13. Here, it was not shown Pis-an was caught possessing the dangerous drugs during a party, or at a social
gathering or meeting, or in the proximate company of at least two persons, the maximum penalty should
be below life imprisonment. (People of the Philippines v. Pis-an, G.R. No. 242692, July 13, 2020, First
Division)
12. To qualify possession of illegal drugs as warranting the imposition of stiffer penalties pursuant to R.A. 9165,
Section 13, such possession must have occurred: (a) during a party; or (b) at a social gathering or meeting; or

(c) in the proximate company of at least two persons. As may be gleaned from the explicit wording of the
provision, nowhere does the law qualify that the above-stated instances must have been intended for the
purpose of using illegal drugs. In fact, under Section 13, Article II of the IRR of R.A. 9165, the phrase “company
of at least two persons” was defined to mean the accused or suspect plus at least two others, who may or may
not be in possession of any dangerous drugs. This means that the only qualification for the provision to trigger
is that the accused or suspect possessed illegal drugs in the proximate company of such persons who may or
may not be in possession of any dangerous drugs. Thus, the CA unduly restricted the meaning of the phrase “in
the proximate company of at least two persons” under R.A. 9165, Section 13 to merely contemplate “pot
session.” (Plan, Jr. v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 247589, August 24, 2020, Second Division)
13. Possession under the law includes not only actual possession but also constructive possession. Actual
possession exists when the drug is in the immediate physical possession or control of the accused. On the other
hand, constructive possession exists when the drug is under the dominion and control of the accused or when
he has the right to exercise dominion and control over the place where it is found. Exclusive possession or
control is not necessary. The accused canno avoid conviction if his control and dominion over the place where
the contraband is located were shared with another.
a. Appellant contends that he could not be guilty of illegal possession of dangerous drugs in view of the
prosecutions’ alleged failure to prove that he owned or controlled the house and the store where the
confiscated items were found. Appellant asserts that it was his girlfriend who rented the place subject of
the search and she lived there alone. The CA correctly rejected this argument. It was plainly stated in
appellant’s own counter-affidavits that he resided in the address specified in the search warrant and where
the search was actually conducted. Although, on the witness stand, appellant subsequently disavowed
certain portions of his counter-affidavits, the recanted statements did not include appellant’s address nor
the fact that he and Cheche were living together. Appellant is now estopped from claiming otherwise. He
is bound by the admissions in his sworn statements duly identified and marked in court. (People of the
Philippines v. Magayon, G.R. No. 238873, September 16, 2020, First Division)
14. The RTC and the CA correctly found that accused-appellant committed the offense of illegal possession of
dangerous drugs as the records clearly show that he was caught in flagrante possessing shabu following a buy-
bust operation conducted by PAIDSOTG. They also aptly deemed accused-appellant to have knowledge of the
possession as he failed to discharge the burden of explaining why he was in possession of the dangerous drugs.
(People of the Philippines v. Dejos, G.R. No. 237423, October 12, 2020, Second Division)
15. In this case, the illegal drugs were found in the cabinet inside petitioner’s room which she admittedly shared
with Miguel. The fact that petitioner shared with Miguel the room where the illegal drugs were found, will not
exculpate her from criminal liability. First, petitioner Emily exercised control and dominion over the said room
where the illegal drugs were found as she was the occupant. Petitioner herself admitted that Miguel did not
permanently stay therein as he normally would stay out for two to three months. Lastly, she testified that when
the search was condcuted, she was sleeping inside the room where the illegal drugs were found while accused
Miguel was in another room. These circumstances sufficiently lead to the conclusion that petitioner knew of
the existence of the illegal drugs in her room and had constructive possession of the seized illegal drugs.
Petitioner cannot feign ignorance of the existence of the illegal drugs since she admittedly has full access to the
room and cabinet. Her disclaimer is simply unpersuasive. Her mere denial is insufficient to overcome the
presumption of ownership.
a. When a prohibited drug is found in a house or other building belonging to and occupied by a particular
person, the presumption arises that such person is in possession of such drugs in violation of law. The fact
of finding the said illegal drug is sufficient to convict. In other words, the finding of illegal drugs in a house
owned by the accused, or in this case, the room occupied and shared by petitioner and accused Miguel,
raises the presumption of knowledge and, standing alone, was sufficient to convict. Petitioner failed to
present any evidence to rebut the existence of animus possidendi over the illegal drugs found in the cabinet
inside her room. Her claim that she was unaware that illegal drugs were in her room fails to convince. Mere
denial cannot prevail over the positive testimony of a witness. It is a self-serving negative evidence which
cannot be accorded greater evidentiary weight than the declaration of credible witnesses who testify on
affirmative matters.
b. The prosecution must prove that the accused had the intent to possess (animus posidendi) the drugs.
Possession, under the law, includes not only actual possession, but also constructive possession. Actual
possession exists when the drug is in the immediate physical possession or control of the accused. On the
other hand, constructive possession exists when the drug is under the dominion and control of the accused
or when he has the right to exercise dominion and control over the place where it is found. Exclusive
possession or control is not necessary. The accused cannot avoid conviction if his right to exercise control
and dominion over the place where the contraband is located, is shared with another. Thus, conviction
need not be predicated upon exclusive possession, and a showing of non-exclusive possession would not
exonerate the accused. Such fact of possession may be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence and
any reasonable inference drawn therefrom. However, the prosecution must prove that the accused had
knowledge of the existence and presence of the drug in the place under his control and dominion and the
character of the drug. Since knowledge by the accused of the existence and character of the drugs in the

place where he exercises dominion and control is an internal act, the same may be presumed from the fact
that the dangerous drugs is in the house or place over which the accused has control or dominion, or within
such premises in the absence of any satisfactory explanation. (Estores v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No.
16. The prosecution failed to satisfy the required quantum of evidence that would show that petitioner Luna had
knowledge as to the contents of the bag seized by the police. The prosecution failed to establish beyond
reasonable doubt that there was animus possidendi on the part of petitioner Luna.
a. The concept of possession under R.A. 9165, Section 11 goes beyond the mere actual and physical
possession of the drug specimen. Otherwise, an unsuspecting person who is victimized by the planting of
evidence will be unjustly prosecuted based on the sheer fact that the illegal drugs were found to be in his
possession. It must be proven that the person in whose possession the drug specimen was found knew
that he/she was possessing illegal drugs. Therefore, to prosecute an accused for illegally possessing illegal
drugs, it is not enough to show that the accused knowingly and intentionally possessed the bag or
receptacle that contained illegal drugs. The prosecution must go beyond and provide evidence that the
accused knowingly, freely, consciously, and intentionally possessed illegal drugs.
b. After a careful review of the evidence on record, the Court believes that there is, at the very least,
reasonable doubt as to whether petitioner Luna possessed the bag with any knowledge, consciousness,
and awareness that the said bag contained the allegedly seized packs of drug specimen. Otherwise stated,
the surrounding factual circumstances, as established by the evidence on record, fail to clearly establish
that there was animus possidendi on the part of petitioner Luna. During the trial, petitioner Luna testified
under oath that he is engaged in a lawful livelihood as a driver. He is an on-call driver for a construction
company, a part-time driver for his aunt who is engaged in the jewelry business, and occasionally drives for
a woman named Susan Lagman (Lagman) and the latter's clients. On July 28, 2005, the day of the buy-bust
operation, he was engaged by Lagman to drive for her client, an unknown woman with the alias Sexy, using
Lagman's vehicle, i.e., a Toyota Revo. After driving Sexy to the Sandiganbayan complex along
Commonwealth Avenue, the latter instructed petitioner Luna to proceed to Hap Chan Restaurant without
her and to meet with a certain Mike who would get Sexy's bag, which the latter placed on the backseat of
the Toyota Revo. The testimony of petitioner Luna establishes that the bag retrieved from the vehicle
during the buy-bust operation did not come from and was not owned by petitioner Luna. Neither has it
been indubitably established that the said bag and its contents were under the effective control and
dominion of petitioner Luna. It was Sexy who placed the bag at the backseat of the vehicle. It was also Sexy
who instructed petitioner Luna to immediately proceed to Hap Chan Restaurant and allow a certain Mike
to get the said bag. In short, the person who effectively wielded control over the bag was Sexy and not
petitioner Luna.
c. The RTC seriously erred in convicting petitioner Luna. In convicting petitioner Luna, the RTC stressed the
disputable presumption created under Section 3(j) of Rule 131 that "things which a person possesses or
exercises acts of ownership over, are owned by him." Further, citing prevailing jurisprudence, the RTC
explained that: “[s]ince knowledge by the accused of the existence and character of the drugs in the place
where he exercises dominion and control is an internal act, the same may be presumed from the fact that
the dangerous drug is in the house or place over which the accused has control or dominion, or within such
premises in the absence of any satisfactory explanation.” In finding that petitioner Luna had control or
dominion over the vehicle where the alleged packs of drug specimen were retrieved, the RTC reasoned
that "[n]o documentary evidence was submitted by [petitioner Luna] to prove that the Revo was owned by
one Susan Lagman."
d. The RTC manifestly overlooked that one of the prosecution's witness, SPO3 Ronald Parreño (SPO3 Parreño),
unequivocally admitted that the Toyota Revo is registered under the name of a certain Carol Bulacan and
not petitioner Luna. SPO3 Parreño also readily admitted that the vehicle where the drug specimen was
allegedly retrieved is a private vehicle for hire. Therefore, with petitioner Luna not being the owner of the
vehicle where the alleged drug specimen was recovered, which is an undeniable fact, and with petitioner
Luna being a mere driver for hire who was simply engaged by other persons and merely followed the
instructions of his principal, Lagman, and the latter's client, Sexy, which, on their face, were lawful
instructions, it cannot be said that petitioner Luna exercised control and dominion over the vehicle where
the bag of specimen was recovered. Necessarily, the presumption of animus possidendi did not arise.
e. Further, the Court finds that the RTC incorrectly upheld the presumption of animus possidendi on the basis
of Rule 131, Section 3(j). Based on the RTC's line of reasoning, since the bag was in the possession of
petitioner Luna, the aforesaid rule on evidence creates the presumption that the alleged packs of drug
specimen found inside the bag are owned by petitioner Luna, and therefore, the presumption of animus
possidendi is established. On this point, the RTC seriously erred yet again. Striking is the clear and
categorical admission by SPO3 Parreño on cross-examination that petitioner Luna is not the owner of the
alleged illegal drugs found inside the bag. SPO3 Parreño likewise testified that the bag was not really and
effectively controlled by petitioner Luna as he was merely acting under the instructions of Sexy. Therefore,
with the unequivocal admission by the prosecution that the alleged bag of drug specimen is not owned and
controlled by petitioner Luna, the RTC's reliance on the presumption of animus possidendi should be
reversed.

f. Neither can it be said that the factual circumstances in the instant case would have created some suspicion
on the part of any reasonable person that would ordinarily lead such person to verify for himself/herself
the contents of the bag. Petitioner Luna had no capacity to check the contents of the bag left by Sexy, not
only because he had no right to do so as he was not the owner of the bag and that he was merely a hired
driver of a car that was not owned by him, but because it was physically impossible for him to do so as he
was driving the vehicle and the bag was simply left by Sexy at the backseat of the car that was not easily
accessible to him. Further, petitioner Luna had already previously driven for Sexy on several occasions
without any incident. Hence, the factual circumstances are not enough to have seriously alerted petitioner
Luna that the bag he was asked to deliver on behalf of Sexy contained illegal drugs. This is in sharp contrast
with People v. Peñaflorida, Jr., where the accused therein was convicted for illegal possession of drugs,
even if the latter testified that he lacked knowledge as to the contents of the package he delivered, because
the edges of the marijuana leaves were plainly evident from the outside of the package, which should have
thus reasonably alerted the accused therein as to the presence of illegal drugs. Such analogous
circumstance is not present in the instant case. The circumstances of the instant case are likewise vastly
different to those in People v. Lacerna, where the conviction of the accused therein was upheld because
"[h]is bare, unpersuasive, feeble and uncorroborated disavowal — that the plastic bag was allegedly given
to him by his uncle without his knowing the contents — amounts to a denial which by itself is insufficient
to overcome this presumption." In the instant case, petitioner Luna does not merely rely on his own denial.
The prosecution itself, through SPO3 Parreño, admitted that the alleged drug specimen was not owned
and was not controlled by petitioner Luna. Simply stated, the evidence on record lead to the reasonable
but inescapable conclusion that petitioner Luna had no knowledge and consciousness whatsoever as to the
contents of the bag and that he had no intention whatsoever to possess illegal drugs.
g. Considering that petitioner Luna enjoys the presumption of innocence, it was incumbent upon the
prosecution to show that there were prior or contemporaneous acts committed by petitioner Luna, as well
as surrounding circumstances, which show that petitioner Luna freely and intentionally possessed the bag
with full knowledge that it contained illegal drugs. The prosecution failed to do so. On cross-examination,
SPO3 Parreño, a witness for the prosecution who was part of the buy-bust team, testified that, according
to the information gathered by the authorities prior to the buy-bust operation, petitioner Luna was never
identified to be a part of the group of Peter Angeles and Sexy, the persons alleged to be involved in illegal
drugs. In fact, SPO3 Parreño expressly admitted under oath that petitioner Luna bad nothing to do with the
transaction, referring to the supposed sale of illegal drugs. To further bolster petitioner Luna's defense that
he in fact had no knowledge that the bag contained illegal drugs and that he had no intention whatsoever
to possess illegal drugs, SPO3 Parreño testified that during the buy-bust operation, petitioner Luna merely
told him that he was just instructed by Sexy to deliver the bag, revealing that there was no clear indication
that petitioner Luna actually knew the contents of the bag retrieved. These admissions on the part of the
prosecution reinforce the defense's theory that petitioner Luna really had no knowledge as to the contents
of the bag he was asked to deliver to Mike as he was merely a hired driver asked to deliver items in behalf
of his clients. Simply stated, there is a dearth of evidence on record showing that petitioner Luna had actual
knowledge of the contents of the bag or that there is reasonable expectation to believe that petitioner
Luna knew or should have known what was inside the bag. Necessarily, without knowledge as to the
contents of the bag, petitioner Luna could not have intended to possess illegal drugs. (Luna v. People of
the Philippines, G.R. No. 231902, June 30, 2021, First Division)
USE OF DANGEROUS DRUGS

1. Section 15 does not apply when a person charged with violation of Section 15, Article II, RA 9165 on use of
dangerous drugs, is also found to have possession of such quantity of drugs provided under Section 11 of the
same law. This means that appellant may not be charged separately of violation of Section 11 on illegal
possession of dangerous drugs and of Section 15 on use of dangerous drug since it is clear from the above that
the provisions of Section 11 shall apply. Illegal possession of dangerous drugs absorbs the use of dangerous
drugs. This is especially true in this case since appellant was not caught in the act of using drugs. Instead he was
caught in the act of possessing drugs and drug paraphernalia. For this reason, the Court dismisses Criminal Case
No. 14823-D against appellant on use of dangerous drugs as the same is absorbed by Section 11 on illegal
possession of dangerous drugs. (People of the Philippines v. Galicia, G.R. No. 218402, February 14, 2018, First
Division)
2. The information, quoted above, against respondent is straightforward: respondent "wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously use methamphetamine hydrochloride, otherwise known as shabu, which is a dangerous drug and
found positive for use, after a confirmatory test." The essential element, i.e. the accused was apprehended or
arrested, was not specifically alleged. Moreover, nowhere in the information was Section 36 mentioned. Urging
the inclusion of Section 36 in accusing the respondent of the crime will deprive the latter of the opportunity to
prepare his defense and violate his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him. An information must be complete, fully state the elements of the specific offense alleged to have
been committed as an information is a recital of the essentials of a crime, delineating the nature and cause of
the accusation against the accused. Convicting an accused of a ground not alleged while he is concentrating his
defense against the ground alleged would plainly be unfair and underhanded. (People of the Philippines v. PO1
Sullano, G.R. No. 228373, March 12, 2018, Third Division

3. In Criminal Case No. IR-10614, Lopez stood charged for illegal use of dangerous drugs, defined and penalized
under Section 15, Article II or R.A. 9165. While Section 15 penalizes a person apprehended or arrested for
unlawful acts listed under Article II of R.A. 9165 and who is found to be positive for use of any dangerous drug,
a conviction presupposes the prior conduct of an initial screening test and a subsequent confirmatory test both
yielding positive results for illegal drug use. R.A. 9165, Section 36 provides in part that the drug testing shall
employ, among others, two testing methods, the screening test which will determine the positive result as well
as the type of the drug used and the confirmatory test which will confirm a positive screening test. Meanwhile,
R.A. 9165, Section 38 states that subject to Section 15 of R.A. 9165, any person apprehended or arrested for
violating the provisions of this Act shall be subjected to screening laboratory examination or test within 24 hours
and if found to be positive, the results of the screening laboratory examination or test shall be challenged within
15 days after receipt of the result through a confirmatory test conducted in any accredited analytical laboratory
equipment with a gas chromatograph/mass spectrometry equipment or some such modern and accepted
method, if confirmed the same shall be prima facie evidence that such person has used dangerous drugs. Finally,
a positive screening laboratory test must be confirmed for it to be valid in a court of law. From the foregoing,
two distinct drug tests are required: a screening test and a confirmatory test. A positive screening test must be
confirmed for it to be valid in a court of law.
a. Here, the evidence for the prosecution, however, shows the conduct of only one test. While PSI Malong
mentions the conduct of a screening test and a confirmatory test on the urine sample, his testimony on
the actual test conduct on the sample as well as the chemical laboratory report presented in court show
otherwise. The test conducted on the urine specimen of the accused-appellant was a Thin Layer
Chromatography or TLC – a screening test. A screening test is statutorily defined as a rapid test performed
to establish potential/presumptive positive result. It refers to the immunoassay test to eliminate a
“negative” specimen, i.e., one without the presence of dangerous drugs, from further consideration and
to identify the presumptively positive specimen that requires confirmatory test. Under existing regulations
of the Dangerous Drugs Board, the TLC is a screening test that is subject to further confirmatory
examinations if it yields a positive result. When the urine sampel recovered from Lopez yielded a positive
result, the specimen should have been subjected to a second test – the confirmatory test. R.A. 9165
describes the confirmatory test as an analytical test using a device, tool or equipment with a different
chemical or physical principle that is more specific which will validate and confirm the result of the
screening test. It is the second or further analytical procedure to more accurately determine the presence
of dangerous drugs in the specimen. The records are silent on any reference to a second, more specific,
examination on the urine sample. Considering that Chemistry Report No. DTC-081-2014 merely contains
the results of the screening test conducted, the same cannot be valid before any court of law absent the
required confirmatory test report. Without the requisite confirmatory test, the accused-appellant cannot
be held criminally liable for illegal use of dangerous drugs under R.A. 9165, Section 15. An acquittal for this
charge follows as a necessary consequence. (People of the Philippines v. Lopez, G.R. No. 247974, July 13,
TRANSPORTATION OF DANGEROUS DRUGS

1. Accused-appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of attempting to transport dangerous drugs. The
prosecution proved the essential element of the crime: accused-appeallant would have successfully moved
13.96 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride from Manila to Cebu had she not been apprehended at the
initial check-in area at the Manila Domestic Airport Terminal 1. The prosecution need not present the airline
ticket to prove accused-appellant’s intention to board an aircraft; she submitted herself to body frisking at the
airport when 13.96 grams of the dangerous drug was found in her person. (People of the Philippines v. Dimaano,
2. The crime of illegal transportation of dangerous drugs was established. Here, it was well established during trial
that appellant was caught carrying a backpack and sack with bundles of marijuana when he was flagged down
on board his motorcycle. The prosecution had proven in the trial the fact of transportation of dangerous drugs.
Appellant's denial and defense of frame-up cannot be given credence. The Court has ruled that these defenses
like alibi, has been invariably viewed by the courts with disfavor for it can just as easily be concocted. The Court
agrees with the lower courts that appellant's unsubstantiated lone testimony cannot prevail over the positive
testimonies of the police officers in view of the presumption of regularity in the performance of their duty and
in the absence of any improper motive. (People of the Philippines v. Suico, G.R. No. 229940, September 10,
3. The prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that accused appellant was indeed transporting the illegal
drugs. Although she had initially denied ownership of the luggage and illegal drugs found, accused appellant's
claim is disputed by the evidence on record. In the ordinary course of business, check-in officers attach airline
bag tags to the owner's check-in luggage at the airport of origin. As appreciated by both the trial court and the
Court of Appeals, the luggage had a bag tag attached to its handle clearly bearing the name "Lina Achieng Noah."
Accused-appellant exercised control and took possession of the luggage and its corresponding claim stub. It
must be stressed that the act of transporting illegal drugs is a malum prohibitum. Consequently, proof of
ownership and intent are not essential elements of the crime. Accused-appellant was apprehended inside the

airport upon her arrival from Ethiopia to Manila via Dubai. Shabu was found in her possession, contained in
seven (7) packs of vacuum-sealed aluminum foil and concealed in a laptop bag inside her luggage. This satisfies
the elements of the crime because she was found transporting illegal drugs to the Philippines. (People of the
Philippines v. Noah, G.R. No. 228880, March 6, 2019, Third Division)
4. The prosecution failed to prove the fact of “transport” of illegal drugs. First, while it may be true that, per the
confidential information relayed by PSI Ramos to PCI Juaneza, a white multi-cab vehicle bearing plate number
NBD-279 and the name "Jarus Jeth" on its body traversed the highway and approached the police checkpoint
at Purok 1, Barangay Tibanban, Governor Generoso, Davao Oriental, none of the prosecution witnesses was
able to identify any of the passengers of the said vehicle. In fact, the first time the police officers were able to
see the petitioners was after they had given chase and found the multi-cab vehicle parked close to a nearby
hut, inside which petitioners were standing. Moreover, one of the team members, PO3 Blaya, likewise testified
that they did not see petitioners aboard the multi-cab when they caught up with it. Considering the foregoing
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, it is clear that the identities of the petitioners as the persons who
were driving and/or riding the multi-cab purportedly used to transport illegal drugs have not been established
with absolute certainty. This identification is material because failure to establish that petitioners were driving
or onboard the multi-cab vehicle at any time raises reasonable doubt that they were transporting illegal drugs
as charged. The fact that they were standing in a hut close to where the multi-cab was parked when the police
officers caught up with them does not prove that they were, at any time, inside the vehicle; necessarily, it does
not automatically suggest that they transported illegal drugs. Second, the inconsistent and flip-flopping
testimonies of the police officers as to what really transpired at the checkpoint, among others, raise serious
doubt on the veracity of the prosecution evidence. When he testified at the bail hearing, SPO2 Alvarez declared
that when they saw the multi-cab approaching the checkpoint, they flagged it down but it merely ran through
without stopping. However, at the presentation of the prosecution's evidence in chief during trial, he
completely changed his testimony and stated that the subject vehicle changed direction and avoided the
checkpoint altogether. When confronted with his contradictory statements by the defense counsel, SPO2
Alvarez merely asserted that his testimony in the direct examination was "what really happened" without,
however, offering any explanation for the conflicting statements. Further, SPO2 Alvarez initially claimed having
seen two (2) persons in front and one (1) person at the back of the multi-cab; subsequently, however, he again
changed his testimony and stated that he did not see any passengers at all. Again, no explanation had been
forthcoming for the wholly contrasting statements given by SPO2 Alvarez. In view of the foregoing statements,
the Court entertains reasonable doubt that petitioners transported illegal drugs as charged. The evidence of
the prosecution fell short of proving that petitioners were actually on board the multi-cab which, per
confidential information, will be supposedly used to transport illegal drugs or that petitioners travelled from
Pagalungan, Maguindanao to Governor Generoso for the said purpose. Indeed, the prosecution failed to show
that any distance was travelled by petitioners with the drugs in their possession. That petitioners were standing
in a hut located within the vicinity of the multi-cab does not prove with certainty that they were the driver and
passengers of the vehicle. Undeniably, the conclusion that they were transporting drugs merely because of their
proximity to the multi-cab when they were arrested has no basis and is pure speculative at best. It bears
stressing that the guilt of the accused must be proved with moral certainty. It is the responsibility of the
prosecution to prove the element of transport of dangerous drugs, namely, that transportation had taken place,
or that the accused had moved the drugs some distance, which does not obtain in this case.
a. "Transport" as used under the Dangerous Drugs Act means "to carry or convey from one place to another."
The essential element of the charge is the movement of the dangerous drug from one place to another.
There is no definitive moment when an accused "transports" a prohibited drug. When the circumstances
establish the purpose of an accused to transport and the fact of transportation itself, there should be no
question as to the perpetration of the criminal act. The fact that there is actual conveyance suffices to
support a finding that the act of transporting was committed.
b. Nevertheless, the police officers testified that they were able to confiscate a heat-sealed transparent plastic
sachet containing 18.4349 grams of white crystalline substance in the possession of Abdilla, which, upon
qualitative examination, was determined to contain Methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.
In view thereof, petitioners may, in theory, still be held liable for Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs
under Section 11, Article II of RA 9165 by virtue of the variance doctrine as enunciated in Section 4, Rule
120 of the Rules of Court. The rule is that when there is a variance between the offense charged in the
complaint or information, and that proved or established by the evidence, and the offense as charged
necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved included in
that which is charged. An offense charged necessarily includes that which is proved, when some of the
essential elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the
latter. On this score, the transport of the illegal drugs would necessarily entail the possession thereof. A
conviction for Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs requires the confluence of the following elements: (i)
the accused was in possession of dangerous drugs; (ii) such possession was not authorized by law; and (iii)
the accused was freely and consciously aware of being in possession of dangerous drugs. The dangerous
drug seized from the accused constitutes the corpus delicti of the offense. It is thus paramount for the
prosecution to establish that the identity and integrity of the seized drug were duly preserved in order to
sustain a conviction. Otherwise, there would be no basis to convict for Illegal Possession of Dangerous
Drugs because the mere fact of unauthorized possession will not suffice to create in a reasonable mind the

moral certainty required to sustain a finding of guilt. More than just the fact of possession, the fact that
the substance illegally possessed in the first place is the same substance offered in court as exhibit must
also be established with the same unwavering exactitude as that requisite to make a finding of guilt.
Nevertheless, due to noncompliance with the chain of custody rule, accused was acquitted. (Musa v. People
of the Philippines, G.R. No. 242132, September 25, 2019, First Division)
5. It is inconsequential to prove that the illegal drugs were delivered or transported to another person in
prosecution of the crime of transport of illegal drugs. The only thing that had to be proven was the movement
of the illegal drugs from one place to another. The evidence on record established beyond reasonable doubt
that accused-appellants were in possession of the illegal drugs and drug paraphernalia. The items were found
inside the vehicle they were using at the time they were apprehended. In fact, accused-appellants tried to evade
arrest by making an abrupt U-turn before reaching the checkpoint. They were also in possession of an illegal
firearm and a bladed weapon. It is worthy to note that they both tested positive for the use of illegal drugs.
Taking into consideration all the circumstances of the present case, there is no doubt that accused-appellants
were transporting illegal drugs.
a. Transport as used under R.A. 9165 means to carry or convey from one place to another. The essential
element of the charge is the movement of the dangerous drug from one place to another. There is no
definitive moment when an accused transports a prohibited drug. When the circumstances establish the
purpose of an accused to transport and the fact of transportation itself, there should be no question as to
the perpetration of the criminal act. The fact that there is actual conveyance suffices to support a finding
that the act of transporting was committed. (People of the Philippines v. Amago, G.R. No. 227739, January
6. The prosecution’s evidence clearly shows that Lacson intended to transport the seized prohibited drugs. Based
on the information gathered by IO2 Alarde, Lacson planned to transport the seized prohibited drugs to Malaysia
through the use of drug couriers in the person of the confidential informant and IO2 Alarde. To recall, the
entrapment operation was put into motion following the recruitment of the confidential informant and IO2
Alarde as supposed drug courier, and after there had been confirmation that the confidential informant is
already scheduled to fly to Malaysia, to be followed by IO2 Alarde. Said purpose or intention to transport
prohibited drugs was confirmed by the incidents and circumstances attending the entrapment operation that
led to the arrest of Lacson – i.e., the confidential informant and IO2 Alarde were summoned to be given
instructions regarding the transportation of certain luggage to Malaysia; the confidential informant and IO2
Alarde were brought by Lacson to Room 429 of Hostel 1632; Lacson and Runana entered the same room while
lugging the seized Fendi and Ngoom trolley bags; and, the prohibited drugs were discovered to be neatly
concealed in the lining of each bag. At that point, the crime of transportation of prohibited drugs is already at
its attempted stage since the offender commences the commission of a felony, directly by overt acts, but does
not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or accident
other than his own spontaneous desistance. Moreover, the identity of the corpus delicti of the crime was clearly
established, with its integrity and evidentiary value maintained.
a. The essential element of the charge of illegal transportation of dangerous drugs is the movement of the
dangerous drug is the movement of the dangerous drugs from one place to another. Even in the absence
of actual conveyance, an attempt to transport prohibited drugs is meted the same penalty prescribed for
the commission thereof under R.A. 9165, Section 26. (People of the Philippines v. Runana and Lacson, G.R.
7. Appellant was in the act of transporing the drugs when the police officers flagged him down at checkpoint. In
fact, he had already been moving the drugs from one place to another as he drove his vehicle from his point of
origin up until he reached the checkpoint where the drugs were seized and he and his co-accused got arrested.
People v. Asislo states that there is no definitive moment when an accused transports a prohibited drug. When
the circumstances establish the purpose of an accused to transport and the fact of transporting itself, there
should be no question as to the perpetration of the criminal act. The fact that there is actual conveyance suffices
to support a finding that the act of transporting was committed. In fact, the Court ruled that the intent to
transport illegal drugs is presumed whenever a huge volume thereof is found in the possession of the accused
until the contrary is proved, such as in this case where five plastic bags containing marijuana bricks were found
in appellant’s owner-type jeep.
a. The following are the undisputed facts: (i) On August 2, 2010, the San Gabriel Police together with PSI Soria
put a checkpoint at Sitio Quilat, Brgy. Bumbuneg, San Gabriel, La Union afer PSI Soria received a text
message from a concerned citizen that men and women on board a jeep were transporting a large volume
of marijuana leaves; (ii) In the evening of August 2, 2010, appellant drove his owner-type jeep from his
residence Balballayang, San Gabriel, La Union to fetch Puklis who asked for his help to bring his sick child
to the hospital; (iii) Puklis, Dayao, and Pakoyan boarded appellant’s vehicle for the purpose of bringing the
child to the hospital; (iv) En route the hospital early morning of the next day, they were flagged down as
they reached the checkpoint at Sitio Quilat, Brgy. Bumbuneg, San Gabriel, La Union; (v) PSI Soria
approached appellant, Puklis, Dayao, and Pakoyan and asked them to alight from the vehicle; (vi) When he
proceeded to the back of the owner-type jeepney, he readily smelled the distinctive odor of marijuana
leaves; (vii) PSI Soria instantly saw one slightly opened bag inside; (viii) When he looked inside the bag, he

saw marijuana bricks wrapped with a yellow tape; and (ix) This led the police officers to do a thorough
search of appellant’s owner-type jeep which yielded four more plastic bags containing marijuana bricks.
(People of the Philippines v. Baterina, G.R. No. 236259, September 16, 2020, First Division)
8. Intent to transport illegal drugs is presumed whenever a huge volume thereof is found in the possession of the
accused until the contrary is proved. Here, 48,565.68 grams or more than 48 kilos of marijuana is by no means
a miniscule amount clearly indicating appellant’s intent to deliver and transport them in violation of R.A. 9165,
Section 5.
a. In People v. Asislo, the Court found three plastic bags of marijuana leaves and seeds as a considerable
quantity of drugs and that possession of a similar amount of drugs showed appellant’s intent to sell,
distribute, and deliver the same.
b. In People v. Alacdis, appellant was found in possession of almost 110 kilos of marijuana. The Court ruled
that such sheer volume by itself is a clear indicium of one’s purpose to transport these drugs. (People of
the Philippines v. Baterina, G.R. No. 236259, September 16, 2020, First Division)
9. It is undisputed that upon her entry into the Philippines from Hong Kong, Veloo was caught in possession of
prohibited drugs found inside the Dibola bag. While Veloo claimed that she mistook said bag as hers and that
the same belongs to Nadarajan, the Court is not persuaded considering that as testified by the prosecution
witnesses and as seen from one of the pictures taken during the inventory, one of the bags is visibly smaller
than the other. Veloo even confirmed on cross-examination that while they were of similar height, they looked
different. While it is not impossible for one to accidentally take a bag that is not his or hers from the conveyor,
it is contrary to human experience for a traveler not to check whether a bag is indeed his or hers, especially in
this case where both bags are of different brands, look different, and bear different baggage tags. The fact that
she disclaimed ownership thereof only after it was opened in front of the customs officer leads this Court to
believe that, at the very least, she intended to possess the same. In People v. Burton, the Court held that an
explanation, standing by itself, which is too trite and hackneyed to be accepted at its face value, since it is
obviously contrary to human experience, is insufficient to overcome prima facie evidence that accused had
knowledge of his or her possession of prohibited drugs. In the transport of illegal drugs, intent and proof of
ownership of the prohibited substances, much less of the receptacles thereof, are not essential elements of the
crime. The crime is complete when it is shown that a person brings into the Philippines a regulated drug without
legal authority. The crime of transporting illegal drugs being malum prohibitum, the accused's intent, motive,
or knowledge thereof need not be shown. Under the Rules of Evidence (Sec. 3[j], Rule 131, Rules of Court),
"things which a person possesses, or exercises acts of ownership over, are owned by him or her." Such
disputable presumption is based upon the principle that direct proof of facts of this nature is rarely available,
except in cases of confession. In several cases, the Court has held that possession of a considerable quantity of
marijuana cannot indicate anything except the intention of the accused to sell, distribute and deliver said
prohibited drug. If we were to give credence to Veloo's accidental taking of Nadarajan's Dibola bag, this would
also mean that Nadarajan accidentally took Veloo's Phoenix bag which he, in fact, claimed to be his. For both
of them to take each other's bag despite the above-mentioned differences only shows that they did so on
purpose. This concerted effort is further revealed by the fact that their respective e-ticket receipts bore glaring
similarities, such as the same reservation code, issuing agent, issuance date, and consecutive ticket number
pattern, which can only lead to the conclusion that they were simultaneously booked. Curiously, their respective
Booking Sheets/Arrest Reports, which they signed, also indicate a common relative with a common address.
While the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were not free from inconsistencies, the same are minor
compared to the glaring differences in the testimonies of each of the accused. For instance, while Veloo claimed
that Nadarajan was her husband at the airport customs area, she left the field "No. of Accompanying Family
Members" in her Customs Declaration Form blank and later claimed in her direct testimony that she did not
arrive with any companion. Even Nadarajan testified that he does not know why Veloo claimed that he is her
husband. He also averred that he met her for the first time on the plane and does not know why Veloo knows
his name, which contradicts Veloo's claim that they asked for each other's names while they were seated beside
each other during the flight. Nadarajan would not have taken pains to deny any relation with Veloo had Veloo
not claimed so. The foregoing circumstances lead the Court to conclude that regardless of whether they are
related, they intended to travel together to the Philippines, which would explain why it did not seem to matter
to them that they had switched bags at the conveyor. Moreover, Nadarajan did not even deny ownership of
the Dibola bag despite Veloo's claim that it belongs to him as indicated by the label on said bag. In People v.
Tang Wai Lan, the Court held that since the luggage tag bore the name of the accused, he is presumed to be
the owner thereof unless proven otherwise. Hence, even disregarding the Phoenix bag for doubt as to the
integrity of the drug specimens found therein, both Veloo and Nadarajan are accountable for the transport of
the drug specimens found in the Dibola bag. (People of the Philippines v. Veloo, G.R. No. 252144, March 4,
VISITING A DRUG DEN

1. Before a person may be convicted of violation of R.A. 9165, Section 7(b) which penalizes the act of knowingly
visiting a drug den, it must be shown that he or she knew that the place visited was a drug den, and still visited
the place despite this knowledge.

a. Respondent maintains that because the petitioners’ drug tests were conducted right after their arrest, it
was proven that drugs were used at the drug den itself. Moreover, the use of drugs at a drug den
automatically implies that the drug users were aware of the nature of the place as a drug den before visiting
it. This position is untenable. True, the drug test results sufficiently proved that petitioners had used drugs
some time before their arrest. However, assuming that petitioners were, in fact, at the alleged drug den
before their arrest, there was no showing how long petitioners were at the alleged drug den, or how long
the drugs had been in their system. In other words, there is no basis to assume that petitioners used drugs
at the moment immediately before arrest, and this, at the location of the arrest. Assuming that persons
who test positive for drugs used them at the place of arrest is not sufficient to show that they were aware
of the nature of the suspected drug den before visiting it, absent any other circumstancial evidence.
b. There was no attempt to show that petitioners knew the nature of the alleged drug den, or even that they
used drugs in the premises. The petitioners were not found to be in possession of any drugs. When
petitioners were arrested, nobody was found in the act of using, selling or buying illegal drugs, nor
packaging nor hiding nor transporting the same. There were no acts alleged or evidence found, which
would tend to show a familiarity with the nature of the place as a drug den. (Coronel v. People of the
MAINTENANCE OF A DRUG DEN

1. For an accused to be convicted of maintenance of a drug den under Section 6 of R.A. No. 9165, the prosecution
must establish with proof beyond reasonable doubt that the accused is "maintaining a den" where any
dangerous drug is administered, used, or sold. Hence, two things must be established: (a) that the place is a
den — a place where any dangerous drug and/or controlled precursor and essential chemical is administered,
delivered, stored for illegal purposes, distributed, sold, or used in any form; and (b) that the accused maintains
the said place. It is not enough that the dangerous drug or drug paraphernalia were found in the place. More
than a finding that dangerous drug is being used thereat, it must also be clearly shown that the accused is the
maintainer or operator or the owner of the place where the dangerous drug is used or sold.
a. The general reputation of the house was not established since Valencia, who allegedly used drugs inside
appellant’s house, was never presented as a witness by the prosecution. Moreover, the declaration made
by Valencia to SPO2 Navarro, who testified on his behalf, is hearsay and does not establish the general
reputation of the house.
b. A drug den is a lair or hideaway where prohibited or regulated drugs are used in any form or are found. Its
existence may br proved not only by direct evidence but may also be established by proof off acts and
circumstances, including evidence of the general reputation of the house, or its general reputation among
police officers. (People of the Philippines v. Cariño, G.R. No. 234155, March 25, 2019, First Division)
2. The prosecution failed to establish beyond reasonable doubt that Garbo is maintaining a drug den.
a. First, a drug den is a lair or hideaway where prohibited or regulated drugs are used in any form or are
found. its existence may be proved not only by direct evidence but may also be established by proof of
facts and circumstances, including evidence of the general reputation of the house, or its general
reputation among police officers. People v. Galicia ordained that the prosecution must establish that the
alleged drug den is a place where dangerous drugs are regularly sold to and/or used by customers of the
maintainer of the den. The word “regular” means doing the same thing in uniform intervals, or something
that is a common occurrence. Here, PO2 Antillon, Jr. testified that Garbo invited him inside her house where
the sale of illegal drugs between him and Andanar took place. Thereafter, Garbo offered PO2 Antillon, Jr.
that he could already use the drug he just bought for an additional fee of P20.00. If at all, this only proves
an isolated illegal drug transaction involving SPO2 Antillon, Jr., Andanar, and Garbo. There was nothing on
record, however, showing that Garbo’s house was frequently used as a drug den. Neither did the
prosecution prove that Garbo’s house had a general reputation as such. Surely, the prosecution had only
presented a singular occurrence of the so-called illegal drug activity in Garbo’s house. The same does not
satisfy the requirement in Galicia. Garbo, therefore, cannot be considered a maintainer of drug den.
Besides, the supposed corpus delicti was not even established in view of the clear violation of the chain of
custody rule, compromising its integrity.
b. Second, SPO2 Antillon, Jr. testified that while inside Garbo’s house, he saw Gutierrez using shabu, thus,
making Garbo’s house a drug den. The Court disagrees. At the moment SPO2 Antillon, Jr. saw Gutierrez
allegedly sniffing something, he only assumed it was shabu. More, nothing in the records show that
Gutierrez underwent a laboratory examination and was found positive for drug use. Thus, the Court will
not convict an accused, sans any supporting evidence. Mere assumptions or conjectures cannot substitute
the required quantum of evidence in criminal prosecution. In any case, a single isolated occasion where
one sees another person sniffing shabu inside a residence, even if true, does not automatically convert that
residence into a den. The element of regularity is conspicuously absent. (People of the Philippines v.
Andanar, G.R. No. 246284, June 16, 2021, Second Division)
CODDLER OR PROTECTOR
1. On the basis of the foregoing and the evidence adduced by the prosecution, there is no iota of doubt that
Borromeo is a co-conspirator under the provisions of Section 8, in relation to Section 26(d), Article II of R.A. No.
9165. It, likewise, bears stressing that although the prosecution, at the time of the filing of the Information,
used the words "protector" or "coddler" to specify Borromeo's participation in the conspiracy, the Court
considers the terminology as immaterial there being a clear finding of conspiracy. The use of the words
"protector" or "coddler" should not be taken to mean that his liability as co-conspirator is automatically negated
or reduced. Here, both the First and Second Amended Informations charged all the accused with violation of
Section 26(d), Article II of R.A. No. 9165 in relation to Section 8, Article II of the same law, or conspiracy to
manufacture dangerous drugs. The first amendment was made to include the name of P/Supt. Borromeo,
among others, and specified his participation in the said conspiracy, i.e., as protector or coddler. The
Information was later further amended to include the name of SPO1 Abang as co-conspirator. It must be
emphasized, however, that although the final amendment no longer specified the role or participation of each
accused in the conspiracy, it does not alter the fact that P/Supt. Borromeo's participation as co-conspirator,
specifically as protector or coddler, was proven beyond reasonable doubt.
a. The evidence on record clearly showed that the participation of P/Supt. Borromeo, who at that time
occupied a position in the government moreso the PNP, was diabolical in all respects as he used his power
and influence and had a major participation as co-operator in the maintenance of the clandestine shabu
laboratory. P/Supt. Borromeo's participation was not limited to merely protecting the violators nor
facilitating their escape. His co-respondent and co-conspirators regularly reported to and updated him of
the operations in the shabu laboratory. He monitored all the illegal activities through Dante, who acted
under his control and carried out specific instructions coming from him. These acts sufficiently established
his pivotal role in the conspiracy. Thus, there was no logical reason for the CA to downgrade his liability
from that of a co-conspirator to a mere coddler or protector.
b. As to the participation and liability of SPO1 Abang, the Court is convinced that he is also a co-conspirator.
Contrary to the RTC's findings, SPO1 Abang was not just acting on orders of his boss, P/Supt. Borromeo.
SPO1 Abang was, in fact, ensuring the regular and orderly operations of the Bimmotobot shabu factory.
Moreover, the evidence adduced by the prosecution sufficiently established his knowledge of and active
participation in the conspiracy, to wit: (i) SPO1 Abang was the recruiter and handler of Dante; (ii) Dante
reported to both private respondents; (iii) SPO1 Abang regularly checked and inquired about Dante's work
at Upper Bimmotobot. On one occasion, Dante attempted to leave his job in the shabu laboratory, but
SPO1 Abang employed force and threatened his life. He allegedly told Dante, "Just stay in your work
because that is an easy job, you just watch over the place, if you will not do it, I will kill you"; (iv) SPO1
Abang was also the bodyguard of P/Supt. Borromeo. SPO1 Abang's participation ensured the success of the
operations of the clandestine shabu laboratory. As such, he cannot be considered a mere accessory to the
involvement of P/Supt. Borromeo. (People of the Philippines v. CA, G.R. No. 227899, July 10, 2019, Third
Division)
CHAIN OF CUSTODY
GENERAL PRINCIPLES
1. The importance of the State establishing a preserved chain of custody in every criminal prosecution for the
illegal sale of dangerous drugs cannot be understated. The accused cannot be pronounced guilty of the offense
if all the links of the chain of custody of the drug subject of the illegal sale – the corpus delicti itself – are not
shown. (People of the Philippines v. Alagarme, G.R. No. 184789, February 23, 2015, First Division; People of the
Philippines v. Yepes, G.R. No. 206766, April 6, 2016, Third Division; People of the Philippines v. Gayoso, G.R. No.
206590, March 27, 2017, First Division; People of the Philippines v. Salenga, G.R. No. 239903, September 11,
2. In ascertaining the identity of the illegal drugs and/or drug paraphernalia in court as the ones actually seized
from the accused, the prosecution must show that: (a) the prescribed procedure under Section 21(1), Article II
of R.A. 9165 has been complied with or falls within the saving clause provided in Section 21(a), Article II of the
IRR of R.A. 9165; and (b) there was an unbroken link, not a perfect link, in the chain of custody with respect to
the confiscated items. (Saraum v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 205472, January 25, 2016, Third Division;
People of the Philippines v. Tamaño and Gulmatico, G.R. No. 208643, December 5, 2016, Third Division; People
of the Philippines v. Alvaro, G.R. No. 225596, January 10, 2018, Second Division; People of the Philippines v.
Gidoc, G.R. No. 230553, August 13, 2018, First Division; Concepcion v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No.
243345, March 11, 2019, Second Division; People of the Philippines v. Orcullo, G.R. No. 229675, July 8, 2019,
Second Division; People of the Philippines v. Castillo, G.R. No. 238339, August 7, 2019, Third Division)
3. The links that must be established in the chain of custody in a buy-bust situation are: first, the seizure and
marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer; second, the
turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating offer; third, the turnover by
the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth, the
turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized from the forensic chemist to the court. (People of
the Philippines v. Sapitula, G.R. No. 209212, February 10, 2016, Third Division; People of the Philippines v.
Amaro, G.R. No. 207517, June 1, 2016, Third Division; People of the Philippines v. Prudencio, G.R. No. 205148,
November 16, 2016, Second Division; People of the Philippines v. Villar, G.R. No. 215937, November 9, 2016,
Third Division; People of the Philippines v. Mahinay, G.R. No. 210656, December 7, 2016, Third Division; People
of the Philippines v. Arposeple, G.R. No. 205787, November 22, 2017, Third Division; People of the Philippines

v. Santos, G.R. No. 223142, January 17, 2018, Third Division; People of the Philippines v. Gajo, G.R. No. 217026,
January 22, 2018, First Division; People of the Philippines v. Alboka, G.R. No. 212195, February 21, 2018, Third
Division; People of the Philippines v. Villarta, G.R. No. 217887, March 14, 2018, First Division; People of the
Philippines v. Sanchez, G.R. No. 221458, September 5, 2018, Third Division; People of the Philippines v.
Macaumbang, G.R. No. 208836, April 1, 2019, First Division; People of the Philippines v. Muhammad, G.R. No.
218803, July 10, 2019, First Division; People of the Philippines v. Omamos, G.R. No. 223036, July 10, 2019,
Second Division; People of the Philippines v. Nabua, G.R. No. 235785, August 14, 2019, Second Division; People
of the Philippines v. Lacdan, G.R. No. 232161, August 14, 2019, Second Division; People of the Philippines v.
Galisim, G.R. No. 231305, September 11, 2019, Second Division; People of the Philippines v. Tulod, G.R. No.
227993, September 25, 2019, Second Division; People of the Philippines v. Bombasi, G.R. No. 230555, October
9, 2019, Second Division; People of the Philippines v. Diamante, G.R. No. 231980, October 9, 2019, Second
Division; People of the Philippines v. Bolado, G.R. No. 227356, October 16, 2019, Second Division; People of the
Philippines v. Macaspac, G.R. No. 246165, November 28, 2019, First Division; People of the Philippines v. Valdez,
G.R. No. 233321, December 5, 2019, First Division; People of the Philippines v. De Lumen, G.R. No. 240749,
December 11, 2019, Second Division)
4. While the failure of the policemen to make a physical inventory and to photograph the confiscated items are
not fatal to the prosecution’s case, there is a need for strict compliance with the legal requirements to protect
the integrity of the chain of custody, more so when the miniscule quantity of the confiscated substance – 0.064
grams, in this case – underscores the need for exacting compliance with Section 21. (Tuano v. People of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 205871, June 27, 2016, Second Division; People of the Philippines v. Jaafar, G.R. No.
219829, January 18, 2017, Second Division; People of the Philippines v. Segundo, G.R. No. 205614, July 26,
2017, Second Division; People of the Philippines v. Saragena, G.R. No. 210677, August 23, 2017, Third Division;
People of the Philippines v. Sagana, G.R. No. 208471, August 2, 2017, Second Division; People of the Philippines
v. Cabañero, G.R. No. 207229, September 20, 2017, Third Division; Aparente v. People of the Philippines, G.R.
No. 205695, September 27, 2017, Third Division; People of the Philippines v. Sta. Cruz, G.R. No. 244256,
November 25, 2019, First Division; People of the Philippines v. Asaytuno, Jr., G.R. No. 245972, December 2,
2019, Third Division; Palencia v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 219560, July 1, 2020, Third Division)
5. Appellant failed to contest the admissibility in evidence of the seized item during trial. In fact, at no instance
did she manifest or even hint that there were lapses on the part of the police officers in handling the seized
item which affected its integrity and evidentiary value. Records bear that the police operatives’ alleged non-
compliance with Section 21, Article II of R.A. 9165 was raised for the first time on appeal before the CA.
However, it is beyond cavil that the prosecution was able to establish the necessary links in the chain of custody
of the specimen subject of the sale from the moment it was seized from appellant, the delivery of the same to
the crime laboratory up to the time it was presented during trial as proof of the corpus delicti. (People of the
Philippines v. Abenes, G.R. No. 210878, July 7, 2016, Second Division)
6. The prosecution was able to demonstrate that the integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated drug had
not been compromised because it established the crucial link in the chain of custody of the seized item from
the time it was first discovered until it was brought to the court for examination. The chain of custody rule
requires the identification of the persons who handled the confiscated items for the purpose of duly monitoring
the authorized movements of the illegal drugs and/or paraphernalia from the time they were seized from the
accused until the time they are presented in court. (People of the Philippines v. Badilla, G.R. No. 218578, August
31, 2016, Third Division; People of the Philippines v. Arce, G.R. No. 217979, February 22, 2017, First Division)
7. The State does not need to prove the chain of custody of the shabu because of petitioner’s immediate admission
of the possession of the shabu following her arrest in flagrante delicto. (Luy v. People of the Philippines, G.R.
8. The following links must be established in the chain of custody: first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of
the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer; second, the turnover of the illegal
drug seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the turnover by the investigating
officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth, the turnover and
submission of the marked illegal drug seized from the forensic chemist to the court. (People of the Philippines
v. Guillergan, G.R. No. 218952, October 19, 2016, Second Division; Mapandi v. People of the Philippines, G.R.
No. 200075, April 4, 2018, Third Division)
9. In the prosecution of criminal cases involving drugs, it is settled in our jurisprudence that the narcotic substance
itself constitutes the corpus delicti, the body or substance of the crime, and the fact of its existence is a condition
sine qua non to sustain a judgment of conviction. It is essential that the prosecution must prove with certitude
that the narcotic substance confiscated from the suspect is the same drug offered in evidence before the court.
As such, the presentation in court of the corpus delicti establishes the fact that a crime has actually been
committed. (Dacanay v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 199018, September 27, 2017, First Division)

10. Questions pertaining to the integrity of the evidence, the chain of custody, or evidence of bad faith or ill will on
the part of the police must be raised during the trial. (People of the Philippines v. Beringuil, G.R. No. 220141,
a. The arresting team’s compliance with the chain of custody rule may be reviewed by the Court although the
appellant has not raised it as an issue in his appeal. (People of the Philippines v. Dizon, G.R. No. 223562,
September 4, 2019, Second Division)
11. The following must be observed in drug-related cases: (a) in the sworn statement/affidavits, the
apprehending/seizing officers must state their compliance with the requirements of Section 21(1) of R.A. 9165,
as amended, and its IRR; (b) in case of non-observance of the provision, the apprehending/seizing officers must
state the justification or explanation therefor as well as the steps they have taken in order to preserve the
integrity and evidentiary value of the seized/confiscated items; (c) if there is no justification or explanation
expressly declared in the sworn statements or affidavits, the investigating fiscal must not immediately file the
case before the court. Instead, he or she must refer the case for further preliminary investigation in order to
determine the non-existence of probable cause; and (d) if the investigating fiscal filed the case despite such
absence, the court may exercise its discretion to either refuse to issue a commitment order or warrant of arrest
or dismiss the case outright for lack of probable cause in accordance with Rule 112, Section 5. (People of the
Philippines v. Romy Lim, G.R. No. 231989, September 4, 2018, En Banc; People of the Philippines v. Addin, G.R.
No. 223682, October 9, 2019, Third Division)
a. The seizing or apprehending officers must state in their affidavit of arrest their compliance with the
requirements of R.A. 9165, Section 21, as amended, and its IRR; or in case of non-compliance with the chain
of custody rule, the justification or explanation of the steps undertaken to preserve the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized or confiscated item. (People of the Philippines v. Romy Lim, G.R. No. 231989,
September 4, 2018, En Banc)
12. Chain of custody of the dangerous drugs in a crime of maintaining a drug den must be established. (People of
the Philippines v. Cariño, G.R. No. 234155, March 25, 2019, First Division)
13. Failure to comply with the chain of custody requirements in drugs cases will result in an accused’s acquittal.
(People of the Philippines v. Turemutsa, G.R. No. 227497, April 10, 2019, Third Division)
14. Lapses in the compliance with the statutory safeguards for preserving the chain of custody of the confiscated
dangerous drugs lead to doubt about the integrity of the evidence of the corpus delicti. Hence, the lapses, if
unexplained by the arresting officers, raise doubt about the integrity of the evidence of guilt, and the accused
must be acquitted on ground of reasonable doubt. (People of the Philippines v. Ygoy, G.R. No. 215712, August
7, 2019, First Division; People of the Philippines v. Cardenas, G.R. No. 229046, September 11, 2019, Second
Division; People of the Philippines v. Abdulwahab, G.R. No. 242165, September 11, 2019, First Division)
15. Unless a broken chain of custody over items allegedly seized during drug operations is established, the
constitutional right to be presumed innocent prevails. Ultimately, doubt in the corpus delicti – the drugs and
drug paraphernalia that were the alleged objects of a drug offense – impels the acquittal of an accused. (People
of the Philippines v. Sultan, G.R. No. 225210, August 7, 2019, Third Division)
16. The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs of 2002 spells out strict chain of custody requirements. Noncompliance
with these requirements may only be excused upon a showing of justifiable grounds and specific measures
taken by law enforcers to preserve the integrity of items allegedly seized from an accused. The prosecution’s
failure to demonstrate these amounts to its failure to establish the corpus delicti of drug offenses. The accused’s
acquittal must then ensue. (People of the Philippines v. Sumilip, G.R. No. 223712, September 11, 2019, Special
First Division; Saranillas-Dela Cruz v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 193862, October 1, 2019, First Division)
17. The campaign against dangerous drugs, no matter how relentlessly and vigorously it is pursued, can never be
won by resorting to shortcuts, quick fixes, and convenient circumventions of the law. It can only be won through
the conduct of well-prepared and well-organized operations that strictly comply with the mandatory
requirements of the law. Otherwise, by disregarding the rule of law as a means of curtailing the proliferation of
illegal drugs, the war on drugs becomes a self-defeating enterprise that ends up assaulting the very persons it
aims to protect from harm – the Filipino people. (People of the Philippines v. Ordiz, G.R. No. 206767, September
18. Appellant’s inculpatory admissions sustain his conviction and the chain of custody rule will not come into play.
Records indubitably show that appellant had frankly admitted his possession of the enormous amount of
prohibited drugs which was found in and seized from his residence. In addition, it is immaterial that appellant’s
counter-affidavit did not specify the amount of drugs found in his possession. This does not negate the
applicability of Regalado. A plain reading of his second counter-affidavit readily shows that he admitted to
owning all 381.3065 grams of marijuana recovered during the search. Notably, when he executed his second
counter-affidavit on February 2, 2005, about six monhs after he got arrested, he already knew by then that he

was being charged with illegal possession of 381.3065 grams of marijuana. Yet he still admitted ownership
thereof without qualification as to its quantity.
a. In Regalado v. People, Regalado admitted that he possessed the seized marijuana but contended that the
apprehending officers did not fully comply with R.A. 9165, Section 21. The Court held that Regalado’s
damning admission warranted the affirmance of his conviction. (People of the Philippines v. Magayon, G.R.
R.A. 9165 VS R.A. 10640

1. R.A. 9165, Section 21(a), as amended, puts in place requirements of time, witnesses, and proof of inventory
with respect to the custody of seized dangerous drugs, to wit: (a) the initial custody must be done immediately
after seizure or confiscation; and (b) the physical inventory and photographing must be done in the presence
of the accused or his representative or counsel, and the required witness which include a representative from
the media and the DOJ and any elected public official for offenses committed during the effectivity of R.A. 9165
and prior to its amendment by R.A. 10640, as in this case, or an elected public official and a representative of
the National Prosecution Service of the DOJ or the media for offenses committed during the effectivity of R.A.
10640. (People of the Philippines v. Luna, G.R. No. 219164, March 21, 2018, Second Division; People of the
Philippines v. Paming, G.R. No. 241091, January 14, 2019, Second Division)
2. To establish the identity of the dangerous drug with moral certainty, the prosecution must be able to account
for each link of the chain of custody from the moment the drugs are seized up to their presentation in court as
evidence of the crime. As part of the chain of custody procedure, the law requires, inter alia, that the marking,
physical inventory, and photography of the seized items be conducted immediately after seizure and
confiscation of the same. In this regard, case law recognizes that marking upon immediate confiscation
contemplates even marking at the nearest police station or office of the apprehending team. Hence, the failure
to immediately mark the confiscated items at the place of arrest neither renders them inadmissible in evidence
nor impairs the integrity of the seized drugs, as the conduct of marking at the nearest police station or office of
the apprehending team is sufficient compliance with the rules on chain of custody. The law further requires
that the said inventory and photography be done in the presence of the accused or the person from whom the
items were seized, or his representative or counsel, as well as certain required witnesses, namely: (i) if prior to
the amendment of RA 9165 by RA 10640, a representative from the media and the DOJ, and any elected public
official; or (ii) if after the amendment of RA 9165 by RA 10640, an elected public official and a representative of
the National Prosecution Service or the media. The law requires the presence of these witnesses primarily to
ensure the establishment of the chain of custody and remove any suspicion of switching, planting, or
contamination of evidence. (People of the Philippines v. Cuevas, G.R. No. 238906, November 5, 2018, Second
Division; People of the Philippines v. Bambico, G.R. No. 238617, November 14, 2018, Second Division; Matabilas
v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 243615, November 11, 2019, Second Division; Asis v. People of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 241602, November 20, 2019, Second Division)
3. Prior to the passage of R.A. No. 10640, after the seizure and confiscation of the dangerous drugs, the
apprehending team was required to immediately conduct a physical inventory and to photograph the same in
the presence of (a) the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or
his/her representative or counsel, (b) a representative from the media and (c) the DOJ, and (d) any elected
public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof. It is assumed
that the presence of these three persons will guarantee against the planting of evidence and a frame up,
insulating the apprehension and incrimination proceedings from any taint of illegitimacy or irregularity. At
present, R.A. No. 10640 mandates that the conduct of physical inventory and photographing of the seized items
must be in the presence of (a) the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or
seized, or his/her representative or counsel, (b) with an elected public official, and (c) a representative of the
National Prosecution Service or the media who shall sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy
thereof. The present case is governed by R.A. No. 10640 since the buy-bust operation took place on 18 July
2015 after this law took effect. (People of the Philippines v. Roales, G.R. No. 233656, October 2, 2019, Second
Division; Pinga v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 245368, June 21, 2021, Second Division)
4. A comparison of the original and amended provisions of Section 21 shows that the amendments introduced by
R.A. No. 10640 reduced the number of witnesses required to be present during the inventory and taking of
photographs from three to two - (i) an elected public official and (ii) a representative of the National Prosecution
Service (DOJ) or the media. These witnesses must be present during the inventory stage and are likewise
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy of the same, to ensure that the identity and
integrity of the seized items are preserved and that the police officers complied with the required procedure.
Failure of the arresting officers to justify the absence of any of the required witnesses, i.e., the representative
from the media or the DOJ and any elected official shall constitute as a substantial gap in the chain of custody.
(Mesa v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 241135, October 14, 2019, Third Division; Hedreyda v. People of
the Philippines, G.R. No. 243313, November 27, 2019, Second Division; People of the Philippines v. De Dios,
G.R. No. 243664, January 22, 2020, Second Division; People of the Philippines v. Abueva, G.R. No. 243633, July
15, 2020, First Division; People of the Philippines v. Balbarez, G.R. No. 246999, July 28, 2020, First Division)

5. The Court notes that RA 10640 amended RA 9165 by modifying Section 21(1) thereof, which, among others,
reduced the required witnesses to the physical inventory and photographing of the seized drugs to two: an
elected public official and a representative of the NPS or the media during the physical inventory. Nevertheless,
since the incidents herein occurred prior to RA 10640, Section 21(1), Article II of RA 9165 as originally worded
still applies. Baculio disputes the integrity of the corpus delicti and the various non-compliance by the
apprehending officers with Section 21, Article II of RA 9165, to wit: (a) the item which was allegedly the subject
of the sale was not immediately marked after confiscation at the place of arrest; (b) there was no witness from
the DOJ; (c) the mandatory witnesses were not present during the actual conduct of the operation; and (d)
there is no evidence as to the identity of the person who had custody and safekeeping of the seized items after
examination pending presentation in court. To justify the foregoing acts, the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) alludes to the saving clause as contained in the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA 9165
which essentially allows noncompliance with Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 so as not to automatically render
void and invalid the seizure and custody of the seized items under justifiable grounds as long as the integrity
and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team. While
the Court recognizes that strict compliance with the requirements of Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 may not
always be possible under varied field conditions, and testimony about a perfect chain is not always possible to
obtain, jurisprudence specifically requires a more exacting standard before narcotic substances are accepted
as evidence. The saving clause applies only (1) where the prosecution recognized the procedural lapses, and
thereafter explained the cited justifiable grounds, and (2) when the prosecution established that the integrity
and evidentiary value of the evidence seized had been preserved. Indubitably, the rules require more than a
statement by the apprehending officers of a justifiable ground for non-compliance. This ground must also be
clearly indicated in their sworn affidavit, coupled with statements as to how the integrity of the seized item was
preserved. With greater reason, a more rigid adherence to Section 21 must be observed in cases where the
quantity of illegal drugs seized is minuscule, as in the instant case, since it is highly susceptible to planting,
tampering, or alteration. Based on the records of the case, the provisions of Section 21 were not observed.
Although both IO1 Avila and IO1 Taghoy testified that there was a marking of the evidence, there was no definite
statement as to where the marking of the seized items took place. There is nothing in their Joint Affidavit that
point to the actual place of marking. The testimonies of the arresting officers, IO1 Avila and IO1 Taghoy, failed
to explicitly demonstrate as to what point during the arrest and the exact place where the marking of the seized
items was undertaken. (People of the Philippines v. Baculio, G.R. No. 233802, November 20, 2019, Second
Division)
6. The law directs that the inventory and photography be done in the presence of the accused from whom the
items were seized, or his representative or counsel, as well as certain required witnesses, namely: (i) if prior to
the amendment of RA 9165 by RA 10640, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ),
and any elected public official; or (ii) if after the amendment of RA 9165 by RA 10640, an elected public official
and a representative of the National Prosecution Service (NPS) or the media. Evidently, before the amendment
of RA 9165, three witnesses are required to be present during inventory and photography of the seized items.
After such amendment, only two witnesses are required to be present, it could either be an elected public
official and representative of the NPS or a representative from the media. The presence of these witnesses is
intended to ensure the establishment of the chain of custody and remove any suspicion of switching, planting,
or contamination of evidence. (People of the Philippines v. Angeles, G.R. No. 224223, November 20, 2019,
Second Division; People of the Philippines v. Cabriole, G.R. No. 248418, May 5, 2021, First Division)
7. The chain, of custody rule set out in Section 21 of R.A. 9165, as amended by R.A. 10640 must be strictly
observed. R.A. 10640 applies in this case because the law became effective on July 23, 2014 and the buy-bust
operation took place on February 26, 2015. Under R.A. 10640, the marking, physical inventory and
photographing of the seized items by the apprehending team shall be conducted immediately after seizure and
confiscation, and in the presence of the accused or the persons from whom such items were confiscated and/or
seized, or his/her representative or counsel. The law also mandates that the foregoing be witnessed by specific
persons, namely: (i) an elected public official; and (ii) a representative of the National Prosecution Service or
the media. (People of the Philippines v. Ruiz, G.R. No. 243635, November 27, 2019, Third Division)
8. Since the alleged offense was committed on August 28, 2015, or after the amendment of R.A. 9165 by R.A.
10640 on July 15, 2014, the Court is constraiend to evaluate the apprehending officers’ compliance with the
chain of custody requirement in accordance with R.A. 9165, Section 21, as it was amended. Thus, the
apprehending team having initial custody of the drugs shall conduct a physical inventory of the drugs and take
photographs thereof in the presence of (a) the person from whose those items were seized confiscated, (b) an
elected public official, and (c) a representative of the National Prosecution Service or the media, who shall be
required to sign the inventory and be given copies thereof. (People of the Philippines v. Mejia, G.R. No. 241778,
June 15, 2020, First Division)
9. This case is an exemplar of how strict compliance with the requirements of R.A. 9165, Section 21 can easily be
done. As exemplified in this case, which is decided prior to R.A. 10640, the apprehending officers were able to
meet the requirements mandated by law in spite of them having barely 24 hours to plan the entrapment
operation. Particularly commendable is the fact that they ensured the presence of the three insulating

witnesses who witnessed the marking of the seized prohibited drugs and other seized items, the preparation
of the corresponding inventories, and the taking of the photographs. Noteworthy also is the fact that the
marking, preparation of the inventory, and taking of the photographs of the seized drugs and items took place
immediately after the arrest and seizure. Thereafter, the seized prohibited drugs were turned over by IO2
Alarde to Chemist Arcos within 24 hours and the latter came up with her report within 24 hours after receipt
of the request. Without question, therefore, all the links in the chain of custody in this case were duly
established which leaves no doubt as to the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized prohbiited drugs which
were later on presented before the trial court. (People of the Philippines v. Runana and Lacson, G.R. No. 229055,
July 15, 2020, First Division)
10. Records show that after petitioners were arrested on March 31, 2017 – or after R.A. 10640 took effect – PO1
de Guzman immediately took custody of the illegal drugs from petitioners’ possession, and conducted the
requisite marking, inventory, and photography thereof, in the presence of an elected public official, Kgd.
Dordas, and media representatives, Bringas, Pelenio, and Alegre, right at the place where petitioners were
arrested. He retained custody while petitioners, together with the seized items, were brought to the police
station, until he brought the seized items to the laboratory, and personally turned them over to PCI Roque who
performed the necessary examination thereon. During the trial, he also positively identified the seized items
bearing his initials. In light of the foregoing, the Court rules that the chain of custody over the seized dangerous
drugs remained unbroken. (Plan, Jr. v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 247589, August 24, 2020, Second
Division)
11. Since the alleged crime was committed in the 2013, the old provisions of R.A. 9165, Section 21 and its IRR are
applicable which provide that after seizure and confiscation of the drugs, the apprehending team is required to
immediately conduct a physical inventory and photograph the seized items in the presence of (a) the accused
or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel;
(b) a representative from the media; (c) from the DOJ; and (d) any elected public official who shall be required
to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.
a. In this case, the police officers committed unjustified deviations from the prescribed chain of custody rule.
The required witnesses were not present at the time of apprehension. The physical inventory of the
allegedly seized items was done only in the presence of the two barangay kagawads. Furthermore, the
physical inventory of the seized articles was not witnessed by the petitioner or his representative or
counsel, by a representative from the media, and a representative from the DOJ. Hence, the mandate of
R.A. 9165, Section 21(1) was not complied. The prosecution did not even bother explain the non-
compliance with the required number of witnesses. Verily, the prosecution bears the burden of proof to
show valid cause for non-compliance with the procedure laid down in R.A. 9165, Section 21. (Tabingo v.
People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 241610, February 1, 2021, First Division)
12. In this case, there was a deviation from the required witnesses rule as the conduct of inventory and
photography were not witnessed by a representative from the DOJ, a fact admitted to by the arresting officer
himself in his testimony. Notably, the seizure of the marijuana occurred on September 8, 2012, prior to the
amendment introduced by RA 10640. Consequently, the applicable law then requires the presence of the
following witnesses: (a) a representative from the media; (b) a representative from the DOJ; and (c) an elected
public official. While the inventory and the accompanying photographs show the presence of two (2) elected
public officials and a representative from the media, it is clear that there was no representative from the DOJ.
(David v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 253336, May 10, 2021, Second Division)
MARKING, PHOTOGRAPH, AND INVENTORY

1. The seizing officer’s act of keeping one of the seized items in his right pocket and the rest in his left pocket lends
doubt on the integrity of the items. The chain of custody rule was therefore not met. (People of the Philippines
v. Dela Cruz, G.R. No. 205821, October 1, 2014, Second Division)
2. While the seizing officer wrote on the marked money, he did not mark the seized sachet of alleged dangerous
drugs. In addition, his testimony is silent as to where the seized sachet was marked. Finally, the prosecution did
not, at the very least, identify the person who turned the seized sachet over to the PNP Crime Laboratory when
it was submitted for examination. Thus, there is doubt on the integrity of the seized drugs. (People of the
Philippines v. Casacop, G.R. No. 208685, March 9, 2015, Second Division; People of the Philippines v. Patricio,
3. The chain of custody rule was not complied with since the identity of the one who actually marked the drugs
seized from the accused and whose initials are “LQE” was not identified. In addition, there was no evidence to
show that the drugs seized from the accused were marked in the accused’s presence. (People of the Philippines
v. Enad, G.R. No. 205764, February 3, 2016, Third Division; People of the Philippines v. Ameril, G.R. No. 203293,
a. Failure to present the officer who marked the sachet to testify on how he handled the seized item
constitutes a break in the chain of custody. (People of the Philippines v. Victoria, G.R. No. 238613, August

4. The prosecution failed to establish that the drug specimens presented in court are those allegedly seized from
petitioner. Records are bereft of any evidence that would show that the 12 plastic sachets supposedly
containing the shabu were ever marked by SPO1 Evasco, whether at the scene or at the police station, and that
they were marked in the presence of the petitioner. In addition, there is only one set of markings on the 12
plastic sachets, which was made a day after the items were seized. (Derilo v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No.
190566, April 18, 2016, Second Division)
5. Consistency with the chain of custody rule requires that the marking should be done in the presence of the
apprehended violator and immediately upon confiscation. These requirements were complied with the marking
of the seized items in appellant’s presence at the PDEA office. Dir. Ortiz explained that the marking had to be
made there to ensure his men’s safety as there were only six of them who effected the arrest iin a slum area.
Marking upon immediate confiscation has been interpreted to include marking at the nearest police station, or
herein, the office of the apprehending, team. In any event, what is of utmost importance is the preservation of
the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items because the same will be utilized in ascertaining the guilt
or innocence of the accused. (People of the Philippines v. Rafols, G.R. No. 214440, June 15, 2016, Third Division)
6. The identity of the seized drug was not established since the first, third and fourth links were not sufficiently
complied with. The first link in the chain of custody was not sufficiently established. Other than the markings
PO1 Ranile placed, it is clear that no physical inventory and no photograph of the seized items were taken in
the presence of the accused-appellant or his counsel, a representative from the media and the DOJ, and an
elective official. As for the third link, while the Request for Laboratory Examination was received by PO1 Abesia,
it was not established who received the seized substance from PO1 Ranile. In addition, it was not shown how
the specimen was handled while in the custody of PO1 Abesia and how the same was subsequently turned over
to Jude Mendoza, the chemist who conducted the examination. Finally, as to the fourth link, it was not
established who turned over the specimen to Prosecutor Geromo. Since there was no showing that precautions
were taken to ensure that there was no change in the condition of the specimen and no opportunity for
someone not in the chain to have possession thereof, it can be concluded that the integrity of the corpus delicti
was not preserved. (People of the Philippines v. Siaton, G.R. No. 208353, July 4, 2016, Third Division)
7. Records utterly fail to show that, the police officers who arrested Cayas complied with the provisions of the
chain of custody rule. The apprehending officers failed to conduct a physical inventory and photograph of the
confiscated item. All they did was to turn over the three plastic sachets containing shabu to PO3 Genuino, who
was not even part of the buy-bust team, at the police station. (People of the Philippines v. Cayas, G.R. No.
8. Although it may be true that the place of marking is not an essential element, the failure to establish with
certainty where the seized sachets were marked affects the integrity of the chain of custody of the corpus
delicti. In this case, the integrity of the corpus delicti is in doubt because the police officers cannot even state
with certainty where the seized sachets were marked. (People of the Philippines v. Caiz, G.R. No. 215340, July
9. The integrity of the seized dangerous drugs cannot be ascertained. It should be noted that the plastic sachet of
shabu the confidential informant bought from Ramos and the other 10 plastic sachets inside the Vicks Vaporub
jar recovered from her were surrendered to one SPO1 Navales. Furthermore, the police operatives conducted
not only one buy-bust operation that day. The testimony of one of the arresting officers reveals that they saw
the confidential informant negotiate two transactions that day – one was with Ramos and the other was with
Porponio. Thus, considering that the confiscated items were only marked at the police station and absent any
evidence on how the confidential informant possessed the drugs before turning them over, there cannot be
absolutely sure that what was marked as evidence against Ramos was not the plastic sachet the confidential
informant also bought from Porponio. (People of the Philippines v. Ramos, G.R. No. 206906, July 25, 2016,
Second Division)
10. The prosecution failed to sufficiently establish the first link in the chain of custody. There was a failure to mark
the drugs immediately after the items were seized from Bartolini. The items were marked only at the police
station and the prosecution offered no reasonable explanation as to why the items were not immediately
marked after seizure. In addition, the failure to immediately mark the seized items, taken together with the
absence of a representative from the media to witness the inventory, without any justifiable explanation, casts
doubt on whether the chain of custody is truly unbroken. (People of the Philippines v. Bartolini, G.R. No. 215192,
July 27, 2016, Second Division; People of the Philippines v. Guanzon, G.R. No. 233653, September 5, 2018, First
Division; Jocson v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 199644, June 19, 2019, Second Division; People of the
Philippines v. Burdeos, G.R. No. 218434, July 17, 2019, Second Division; People of the Philippines v. Dela Torre,
G.R. No. 225789, July 29, 2019, Second Division)
11. There are gaps in the chain of custody since there was a break in the very first link of the chain when SPO1
Rodriguez failed to mark the sachets of shabu immediately upon seizing them from appellant. According to

SPO1 Rodriguez, after finding sachets of shabu in appellant’s possession, he turned the drugs over to the desk
officer. SPO1 Rodriguez did not even explain why he failed to mark or why could not have marked the seized
items immediately upon confiscation. Allegedly, the desk officer, after receiving the seized items from SPO1
Rodriguez, in turn handed them over to PO2 Tan. Notably, this desk officer was not presented in court thereby
creating another break in the chain of custody. Again, no explanation was offered for the non-presentation of
the desk officer or why he himself did not mark the seized items. It was only upon receipt by PO2 Tan, allegedly
from the desk officer, of the seized drugs that the same were marked at the police station. This means that
from the time the drugs were seized from appellant until the time PO2 Tan marked the same, there was already
a significant gap in the chain of custody. (People of the Philippines v. Ismael, G.R. No. 208093, February 20,
12. The prosecution failed to demonstrate substantial compliance by the apprehending officers with the safeguards
provided by R.A. 9165 as regards the rule on chain of custody. Records are bereft of any showing that an
inventory of the seized items was made. Neither does it appear on record that the apprehending team
photographed the contraband in accordance with law. (People of the Philippines v. Hementiza, G.R. No. 227398,
March 22, 2017, Second Division; People of the Philippines v De Leon, G.R. No. 227867, June 26, 2019, First
Division)
13. The prosecution was able to preserve the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized illegal substance. As
correctly observed by the CA, PO1 Piano immediately put the markings “ISP” on the one heat-sealed transparent
plastic sachet of shabu at the scene of the operation and in the presence of the accused-appellant. Then,
accused-appellant was brought to the Barangay Hall for inventory and for issuance of certification that a buy-
bust operation was duly conducted. PO1 Piano prepared the letter request for laboratory examination and
delivered the same together with seized illegal substance to the PNP Crime Laboratory. It yielded a positive
result for shabu, a dangerous drug, per Chemistry Report No. D-464-2005, and as testified by Police Senior
Inspector Guinanao in open court. Thus, the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized illegal substance from
accused-appellant are shown to have been properly preserved and the crucial links in the chain of custody were
shown to be unbroken. (People of the Philippines v. Cabiles, G.R. No. 220758, June 7, 2017, Third Division;
People of the Philippines v. Cutara, G.R. No. 224300, June 7, 2017, Third Division)
14. In the initial step of the chain of custody, a gap already occurred. The seized item was not marked immediately
at the place where accused-appellant was arrested. Neither was it marked in the house of the barangay captain
where the seized item and the buy-bust money were recorded and listed by PO1 Mayores. The seized item was
marked only after the recording/listing and only at the RSAC-TF. Therefore, the integrity and evidentiary value
of the seized item was already compromised. The prosecution was not able to establish an unbroken chain of
custody. From the time of the seizure of the dangerous drugs up to the time that the same was brought to the
office of the RSAC-TF, alteration, substitution, or contamination of the seized item could have happened. In
fact, the Receipt of Confiscated or Seized Articles does not mention any markings on the seized item. (People
of the Philippines v. Diputado, G.R. No. 213922, July 5, 2017, Third Division; People of the Philippines v. Dela
Cruz, G.R. No. 234151, December 5, 2018, Second Division; People of the Philippines v. Garcia, G.R. No. 215344,
June 10, 2019, Second Division; People of the Philippines v. Haya, G.R. No. 230718, September 16, 2020, Second
Division)
15. While the prosecution was able to present the inventory of the confiscated items, which was apparently
prepared by PO3 Rodil, and attested to by Ocampo, Sr., of Kill Droga, the same could not be given credence.
Readily apparent from the said inventory is the fact that it is undated. Hence, the requirement that the inventory
must be made immediately after seizure was not satisfied. Further, none of the persons required to sign the
inventory, as enumerated under the law, were made to sign the same. While the prosecution witnesses testified
that the seized items were physically inventoried and photographed in the presence of the accused-appellants
and Gargullo, they were not made to sign the inventory. Instead, a certain Ocampo, Sr. was made to sign the
inventory. It must be noted that Ocampo, Sr. is not among those persons required by the law to witness and
sign the inventory as he did not represent the accused-appellants, themedia, or the DOJ. Neither was he an
elected public official. (People of the Philippines v. Del Mundo and Del Mundo, G.R. No. 208095, September 20,
16. An examination of the records reveals that the police officers committed a procedural lapse in the first link of
the chain. While the prosecution was able to show that PO2 Oruga was able to mark the seized shabu with his
initials "GAO," it did not establish whether or not the requisite inventory and photography were properly
conducted by the police officers. During the direct examination of PO2 Oruga, he claimed that he marked the
seized shabu immediately after the conduct of buy-bust operation and subsequently brought the item, together
with Calibod, to the crime laboratory. Based on his testimony, PO2 Oruga immediately proceeded to the crime
laboratory after marking the seized shabu. He did not state if the marking was done within the view of Calibod,
an elected public official, and a representative from the DOJ or media. He likewise did not mention whether the
said witnesses were present during the buy-bust operation or immediately thereafter. Moreover, it was not
shown if PO2 Oruga actually conducted a physical inventory and photography of the seized shabu – either at
the place of the arrest or at the nearest police station or office of the apprehending team - and in the presence

of Calibod, an elected public official and a representative from the DOJ or the media. Despite the non-
observance of these requirements, the prosecution did not even proffer a plausible explanation therefor.
Perforce, the Court is constrained to rule that the police officers' unjustified non-compliance with the
prescribed procedure under Section 21 of RA 9165 constitutes a fatal flaw which affects the integrity and
evidentiary value of the corpus delicti. (People of the Philippines v. Calibod, G.R. No. 230230, November 20,
2017, Second Division; People of the Philippines v. Mama, G.R. No. 237204, October 1, 2018, Second Division)
17. While it appears that the specimen presented in court, namely, the aluminum foil and the white substance
identified as shabu, were marked with the initials "NR, AC, EC, NM," (presumably the initials of the accused) it
was not shown who marked the same and when it was done, and whether it was done by the apprehending
team upon seizure and before submission to the crime laboratory for examination or not. It is also worth noting
that while SPO3 Padilla readily admits that he was the one who requested the laboratory examination on the
seized items, none of the prosecution witnesses recounted which apprehending officer seized the items and
had possession and control thereof after said confiscation and while in transit to the police station. The above-
mentioned circumstances created a gap in the initial stage of the chain of custody from the time of seizure until
the request for examination, wherein the seized item could have been altered, substituted, or contaminated,
inadvertently or otherwise. (Calahi v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 195043, November 20, 2017, Third
Division)
18. As the poseur-buyer, PO2 Padilla first held the first sachet purportedly containing shabu when it was handed to
him by Calma. However, instead of marking the first sachet immediately after the successful buy-bust operation,
the buy-bust team brought the first sachet together with the second sachet recovered from the motorcycle
compartment to the Solano police station where both were marked with the initials "R.E.L." by SPO3 Labiano
who was, unfortunately, not a member of the buy-bust team. (Calma v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No.
19. The two sachets of shabu presented before the RTC were marked with “NBS," the initials of PO1 de Sagun. It
makes no sense that the sachet of shabu taken by PO2 Magpantay from Guadayo be marked with PO1 de
Sagun's initials. As the documentary evidence of the prosecution itself showed, the sachet of shabu supposedly
seized from Guadayo was appropriately marked "AAM-1," presumably, PO2 Magpantay's initials. Hence, it could
not be said that one of the two sachets of shabu presented against Hilario during the trial before the RTC was
purportedly seized from Guadayo. (People of the Philippines v. Hilario, G.R. No. 210610, January 11, 2018, First
Division)
20. IO1 Bautista admits that he marked the confiscated items in Quezon City, almost one (1) hour away from the
crime scene. Considering that PO1 Bautista was the only PDEA agent who was there at the time of seizure, none
of the other PDEA operatives could attest that they saw him take custody of the confiscated items. Also, they
rode in separate vehicles going to Quezon City. Even granting that IO1 Bautista did mark the sachets, breaks in
the chain of custody had already taken place: (a) when he confiscated the sachets without marking them at the
place of apprehension; and (b) as he was transporting them to Quezon City, thus casting serious doubt upon
the value of the said links to prove the corpus delicti.
a. Under these circumstances, the Court cannot apply the presumption of regularity of performance of official
duty. The presumption may only arise when there is a showing that the apprehending officer/team
followed the requirements of Section 21 or when the saving clause found in the IRR is successfully triggered.
Judicial reliance on the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty despite the lapses in
the procedures undertaken by the agents of the law is fundamentally unsound because the lapses
themselves are affirmative proofs of irregularity. More importantly, the presumption of regularity cannot
prevail over the constitutional presumption of innocence and it cannot by itself constitute proof of guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. The presumption of regularity is just a mere presumption disputable by contrary
proof. Without the presumption of regularity, the testimonies of the police witnesses must stand on their
own merits and the defense cannot be hurdled having to dispute these testimonies.
b. Here, the time and distance from the scene of the arrest before the drugs were marked are too substantial
that the Court cannot but think that the alleged evidence could have been tampered with. (People of the
Philippines v. Ramirez and Lachica, G.R. No. 225690, January 17, 2018, Third Division; People of the
Philippines v. Yagao, G.R. No. 216725, February 18, 2019, First Division; People of the Philippines v. Martin,
21. In the present case, the records show that the buy-bust team did not observe even the most basic requirements
of the prescribed procedures. While the markings, 'AOC-BB/17-02-03,' were made in the small plastic sachet
allegedly seized from the accused-appellant, the evidence does not show the identity of the person who made
these markings and the time and place where these markings were made. Notably, PO1 Carlos' testimony failed
to disclose whether a physical inventory and photograph of the illegal drug had been done. Further, nothing in
the records also indicates whether the physical inventory and photograph, if done at all, were in the presence
of the accused-appellant or his representatives or within the presence of any representative from the media,
DOJ or any elected official. Then again, PO1 Carlos' testimony also failed to show that any of these people has
been required to sign the copies of the physical inventory, or that any of them was subsequently given a copy

of the physical inventory. (People of the Philippines v. Abelarde, G.R. No. 215713, January 22, 2018, First
Division; Anyayahan v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 229787, June 20, 2018, Second Division)
22. Records reveal that the prosecution did not present any photographs of the supposed conduct of inventory
during trial. More apparent is the failure of the witnesses to state or mention whether or not any photographs
were indeed taken. When asked during his cross-examination, PO3 Balagasay merely stated that he "cannot
recall already if there was a photograph of the evidence." Observably, the procedural lapses committed by the
police officers, which were unfortunately unacknowledged and unexplained by the State, militate against a
finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt against the accused, as the integrity and evidentiary value of the
corpus delicti had been compromised. It is well-settled that the procedure in Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 is
a matter of substantive law, and cannot be brushed aside as a simple procedural technicality; or worse, ignored
as an impediment to the conviction of illegal drug suspects. As such, since the prosecution failed to provide
justifiable grounds for non-compliance with Section 21, Article II of RA 9165, as well as its IRR, Paz's acquittal is
perforce in order. (People of the Philippines v. Paz, G.R. No. 229512, January 31, 2018, Second Division)
23. The prosecution here failed to account for the intervening period between the supposed handover of the sachet
from accused-appellant to PO3 Lim, to the marking of the sachets by SPO4 Tubo. Likewise, it absolutely failed
to identify measures taken during transit from the target area to the police station to ensure the integrity of
the sachets allegedly obtained and to negate any possibility of adulteration or substitution. The prosecution
rested its case without presenting SPO4 Tubo. Not that he would have singularly won the case for the
prosecution, but the prosecution could have at least supported its claims about the conduct of the marking
even as it was the apprehending officers, not the investigating officer, who should have done this. As it stands,
even the claims of PO3 Lim and SPO1 Jacinto that the sachets weremarked remained suspect. SPO4 Tubo's
testimony, too, would have shed light on the second and third links identified in Nandi. The prosecution's
predicament would not be so dire if accused-appellant, or his representative or counsel, and the third-party
witnesses required by Section 21(1) of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act, were present during and had
attested to an inventory as reduced to writing. (People of the Philippines v. Que, G.R. No. 212994, January 31,
24. Both SPO1 Puasan and P/Supt. Baldevieso claimed to have placed the markings "AB" on the sachet. Notably,
the records did not indicate that there were two "AB" markings on the specimen. Based on the surrounding
circumstances, the Court finds it more plausible and logical to conclude that it was P/Supt. Baldevieso who
placed the "AB" marking considering that "'AB" were her initials. Besides, it would be rather odd for P/Supt.
Baldevieso to use a mark similar to the one that was already previously placed in the seized item. The purpose
of placing a mark was precisely to distinguish it from similar items and to indicate that said item had been under
her temporary custody. On such premise, the assertion of SPO1 Puasan that she marked the seized item with
"AB” immediately after confiscation is without merit. In fine, the evidence tends to show that SPO1 Puasan did
not mark the seized sachet at the outset. Evidently, such failure to immediately mark the specimen constitutes
a missing link in the chain of custody. With such missing link, there was no assurance that the item subsequently
turned over to the Crime Laboratory, and eventually presented in court, was the same one recovered from the
accused-appellant. (People of the Philippines v. Bugtong, G.R. No. 220451, February 26, 2018, First Division)
25. The chain of custody rule was not complied with. It is undisputed that the police officers did not immediately
mark the sachets of shabu at the place of confiscation during the buy-bust operation or at the nearest police
station. Instead, they proceeded to the house of Crispian to implement the subject search warrant and only
thereafter, conducted the marking. To justify the deviation, they proffered that that they could not "allow the
accused's companions to escape and bring the possible huge amount of shabu." Thus, they marked the items
"only after the search of the house of the parents of Crispian." However, PO1 Dumaguit himself admitted that
the actual marking of drugs would only take a short time, particularly less than five (5) minutes. He likewise
mentioned that there were around nine (9) to ten (10) police operatives at the scene. Hence, if the police
officers themselves admitted that the marking would only take less than five (5) minutes, and that there were
around nine (9) to ten (10) police companions to secure the same, then there appears to be no appreciable
reason as to why the marking could not have been made immediately after the drugs sachets were seized. By
the police officers' own account, this short period of time would have barely affected their impending
implementation of the subject warrant. More so, it was not claimed that the safety of the police officers would
have been prejudiced if the marking was done at the place of seizure. Hence, the police officers were not
justified in not following the procedure set in the law. To reiterate, the rule requires that [marking] should be
done in the presence of the apprehended violator and immediately upon confiscation to ensure that they are
the same items that enter the chain and are eventually the ones offered in evidence. (People of the Philippines
v. Lumaya, G.R. No. 231983, March 7, 2018, Second Division)
26. IO1 Ibarra marked the seized sachet and prepared the certificate of inventory at the PDEA Office. Notably, these
were not done in the presence of Dela Victoria since at that time, he was being held inside the PDEA vehicle
while waiting for the barangay captain to arrive. In this relation, it deserves pointing out that the said marking
and preparation of inventory were not even done at the place of arrest or at the nearest police station. While
Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 allows the same to be conducted at the nearest office of the apprehending

team, if practicable, the prosecution in this case, did not even claim that the PDEA Office was the nearest office
from the tinsmith's shop where the drugs were seized. Per the testimony of IO1 Ibarra, the Langihan Police
Station and the San Ignacio Barangay Hall have a closer proximity to the place of arrest than the PDEA Office.
IO1 Ibarra's explanation that it is "not [their] practice to pass by the police station" hardly justifies a deviation
from the rule. In fact, contrary to IO1 Ibarra's claim, the barangay captain admitted that he was actually at the
barangay hall when he was summoned by the PDEA operatives on the date of the incident. Thus, transporting
the seized items all the way to the PDEA Office for marking and inventory, when the same could have been
immediately done at the Langihan Police Station or at the San Ignacio Barangay Hall, casts serious doubts on
the integrity of the confiscated drug. (People of the Philippines v. Dela Victoria, G.R. No. 233325, April 16, 2018,
Second Division)
27. While Cayabyab witnessed the seizure of a sachet of alleged shabu from Mola, he did not see the actual marking
and physical inventory of all the confiscated items. As SPO4 Columbino admitted, he (Cayabyab) was not present
at the PCP Tondaligan, where the procedures required by law were done. His only participation was that he
signed, by writing his name in printed form, the accomplished confiscation/inventory receipt at his store.
Despite SPO4 Columbino's claim that the sachet of shabu was in his possession when he returned to Cayabyab's
place, there was no testimony that he had shown the same to him. These considering, it cannot be said with
certainty that Cayabyab could attest to the fact that the marked sachet of shabu was the same item that was
seized from Mola at the time of his arrest. Moreover, in dispensing with the testimony of the forensic chemist,
it is evident that the prosecution failed to show another link in the chain of custody. Since her testimony was
limited to the result of the examination she conducted and not on the source of the substance, PS/Insp. Malojo-
Todeño failed to certify that the chemical substance presented for laboratory examination and tested positive
for shabu was the very same substance recovered from Mola. The turnover and submission of the marked illegal
drugs seized from the forensic chemist to the court was also not established. Neither was there any evidence
to indicate how the sachet of shabu was handled during and after the laboratory examination and on the
identity of the person/s who had custody of the item before it was presented to the court as evidence. Without
the testimonies or stipulations stating the details on when and how the seized sachet of shabu was brought
from the crime laboratory to the court, as well as the specifics on who actually delivered and received the same
from the crime laboratory to the court, it cannot be ascertained whether the seized item presented in evidence
was the same one confiscated from Mola upon his arrest. This gap in the chain of custody creates doubt as to
whether the corpus delicti of the crime had been properly preserved. (People of the Philippines v. Mola, G.R.
28. The buy-bust team admittedly failed to comply with the foregoing requirements. First, the conduct of the
inventory was not conducted immediately at the place of seizure and apprehension; indeed, the police officers
even contradicted each other as to where the inventory was supposedly conducted. This creates a very serious
doubt in the Court's mind as to whether an inventory was actually even conducted. If the members of the buy-
bust team have markedly different versions of what transpired after the seizure of the items, the Court cannot
rely on their testimonies on the conduct of the inventory and photographing. Second, even assuming an
inventory had been conducted, the prosecution failed to comply with the requirement that the photographing
be also done at the place of arrest. The prosecution's excuse of not having a camera is flimsy as they had planned
the operation. In the 1999 Philippine National Police Drug Enforcement Manual, the buy-bust team is required
to bring a camera in the conduct of buy-bust operations. The reason that the buy-bust team did not have a
camera is thus exposed to be nothing more than a convenient excuse that is belied by the foregoing
requirements that the team ought to have followed. What makes this reason to be more incredible is that in
2009, mobile phones with cameras were already widely available. Thus, the buy-bust team's failure to even take
photographs of the seized drugs at the scene of their seizure gives credence to the assertions of the accused-
appellant that no buy-bust had actually taken place, and that the charge against her was completely fabricated.
Finally, and most revealing as to whether or not a buy-bust actually took place is the prosecution's abject and
complete failure to comply with the requirement of bringing along the required three witnesses from the media,
the DOJ, and any elected public official. To be certain, these witnesses should already have been present at the
time of apprehension and the drugs' seizure, as this is a requirement the buy-bust team could easily have
complied with given the nature of a buy-bust operation as a planned activity. (People of the Philippines v. Sood,
G.R. No. 227394, June 6, 2018, Second Division; People of the Philippines v. Gabriel, Jr., G.R. No. 228002, June
29. On the first link, the prosecution was able to establish that Viernes marked the confiscated heat-sealed
transparent plastic sachets with the markings Exhibits "A" and "B" and his initials "BFV" and the date "08-12-
06" in the presence of the accused-appellants. It must be stressed however, that equally required pursuant to
Sec. 21, Art. II of R.A. No. 9165 is that the apprehending team shall, among others, immediately after seizure
and confiscation conduct a physical inventory and photograph the seized items in the presence of the accused
or the person from whom the items were seized, or his representative or counsel, a representative from the
media and the Department of Justice, and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of
the inventory and be given a copy of the same. While it would appear from the certificate of inventory that the
inventory was witnessed by "Ding Bermudez" (Bermudez) of the Press Corps and barangay kagawad "Artemio
P. Torres" (Torres), the prosecution never tried to elicit from Viernes how and when these witnesses to the

inventory affixed their respective signatures on the certificate. Neither were Bermudez and Torres called to the
witness stand to testify on the manner by which they signed the certificate. Additionally, the prosecution was
not able to prove that the seized items were inventoried and photographed in the presence of the accused-
appellants and that copies thereof were furnished them. Indeed, the records do not show any photograph
depicting the confiscated items. Worse, the certificate of inventory was not even signed by the accused-
appellants or their representatives which would only lend truth to the probability that, in actuality, the inventory
was never done in their presence. (People of the Philippines v. Ferrer, G.R. No. 213914, June 6, 2018, Third
Division)
30. The conduct of the physical inventory and photograph shall be done at the (i) place where the search warrant
is served; or (ii) nearest police station; or (iii) nearest office of the apprehending officer or team, whichever is
practicable, in case of warrantless seizure. (People of the Philippines v. Supat, G.R. No. 217027, June 6, 2018,
Second Division; People of the Philippines v. Catinguel, G.R. No. 229205, March 6, 2019, First Division)
31. There was no physical inventory of the seized item. Without such inventory, a doubt is created whether the
shabu was really taken from appellant. There were also no photographs taken of the inventory in the presence
of appellant or his representative or counsel and the required witnesses under Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165, to
wit: a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official. In
fact, it was not established at all that the police officers exerted any effort to secure the presence of the required
witnesses. The presence of the persons who should witness the post-operation procedures is necessary to
insulate the apprehension and incrimination proceedings from any taint of illegitimacy or irregularity. The
insulating presence of such witnesses would have preserved an unbroken chain of custody. The marking of the
seized item by PO1 Juaño at the police station is not sufficient to establish the chain of custody. It has been held
that the mere marking of the seized item without the required physical inventory and photographs of the same
in the presence of the witnesses mentioned under Section 21 was not enough compliance with the law. (People
of the Philippines v. Battung, G.R. No. 230717, June 20, 2018, Second Division; People of the Philippines v.
Reyes, G.R. No. 238594, November 5, 2018, Second Division)
32. Another crucial deviation from the procedure required by law was the failure to take photographs of the seized
items. This fact was admitted by the prosecution during the request for admission by the defense. The
photographs were intended by law as another means to confirm the chain of custody of the dangerous drugs.
Indeed, Section 21(a) of the IRR, as amended by RA 10640, provides a saving clause in the procedure outline
under Section 21 (1) of RA 9165. However, before this saving clause to apply, the prosecution is bound to
recognize the procedural lapses, provide justifiable grounds for its non-compliance and thereafter to establish
the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the items seized. In the present case, the prosecution
offered no explanation on why the procedure was not followed or whether there was a justifiable ground for
failing to do so. The prosecution did not bother to justify its lapses by conducting re-direct examination or
through rebuttal evidence despite the defense raising such matters during the trial. These lapses effectively
produced serious doubts on the integrity and identity of the corpus delicti especially in the face of allegation of
frame-up. (People of the Philippines v. Seguiente, G.R. No. 218253, June 20, 2018, First Division)
33. Carna claimed that it was at the police station that the inventory and the taking of pictures of the confiscated
items took place. Records, however, do not show any inventory or pictures of the seized items. In fact, the
prosecution did not offer any physical evidence to justify Carna's claim that there were an inventory and
photographs of the seized items. On the one hand, Sabellina admitted that, instead of an inventory and pictures
taken of the seized items, the fact that there were items confiscated from the accused-appellant during the
buy-bust operation was entered in the blotter. It must be noted however, that Sec. 21(a) of the IRR of R.A. No.
9165 does not provide that the entry in the blotter relative to a buy-bust operation is a valid substitute for the
requirement of an inventory and taking of photographs of the seized items. Considering that the police officers
in these cases had obviously failed to comply with the procedure laid out in Sec. 21 of R.A. No. 9165 and its IRR,
the burden is with the prosecution to prove that there was justifiable ground for the noncompliance by the
police officers, and that the integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated items were properly preserved. A
review of the records will show that the prosecution was unsuccessful in eliciting from its witnesses the
justification for their apparent failure to comply with Sec. 21 of the Act and its IRR. It must be emphasized that
the justifiable ground for noncompliance must be proven as a fact, because the Court cannot presume what
these grounds are or that they even exist. (People of the Philippines v. Belmonte, G.R. No. 224588, July 4, 2018,
Third Division)
34. Although there was a photograph showing accused-appellant, Rueda, and the barangay official with the seized
items, the requirement specified in Sec. 21(a) of the IRR of R.A. No. 9165 was not complied with. A reading of
the testimony of PO1 Cruz and PO2 Llorente will readily show that the physical inventory envisioned in the IRR
was substituted by the police officers with the recording of the incident in the barangay blotter. It must be
stressed, however, that this alternate method resorted to by the police officers is not sanctioned by R.A. No.
9165. It was only during the cross-examination and after he was reminded of the provisions of Sec. 21 of R.A.
No. 9165 that PO1 Cruz belatedly claimed that a physical inventory of the seized items was conducted after the
buy bust operation. However, no physical evidence was presented and formally offered by the prosecution to

prove that the police officers actually undertook an inventory of these items. Indeed, PO1 Cruz's admission that
the alleged inventory was not submitted to the prosecutors' office or attached to the records of these cases
buttresses the logical conclusion that no inventory had taken place. (People of the Philippines v. Lumagui, G.R.
No. 224293, July 23, 2018, Third Division)
35. There were unjustified deviations committed. by the police officers in the handling of the confiscated items
after petitioner's arrest in breach of the chain of custody procedure as discussed above. First, while it is true
that a physical inventory of the seized items was prepared by the investigating officer, SPO3 Fernando Moran
(SPO3 Moran), no photographs thereof were taken. Second, although it appears that the physical inventory had
been prepared in the presence of petitioner who merely refused to sign, it was not shown that a representative
from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), as well as an elected public official had been present
during the inventory. If any of them had been present, they should have signed the physical inventory itself and
been given a copy thereof. (Santos v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 232950, August 13, 2018, Second
Division)
36. Based on IO1 Siglos' testimony, it can be deduced, that at the outset, even before the buy-bust team initiated
its operation on Madria and De Ala, no arresting officer was so minded to mark or even take a photo of the
possible contraband that they may recover from both accused. This is manifested by the fact that none of them
had a ball pen, sign pen, masking tape and camera - basic tools that can be used to mark the seized items. To
put it differently, the allegation regarding the arresting officers' supposed security being compromised was
already predetermined. Obviously, right from the start, the arresting officers had no intention to comply with
the law by marking the seized items in the presence of the accused and immediately upon confiscation. Due to
this break in the chain of custody, it was possible that the seized item subject of the sale transaction was
swapped with the seized items subject of the illegal possession case, while the contraband was being
transported from the crime scene to the PDEA office. This is material considering that the imposable penalty
for illegal possession of shabu depends on the quantity or weight of the seized drug. The Court has previously
held that, failure to mark the drugs immediately after they were seized from the accused casts doubt on the
prosecution evidence warranting an acquittal on reasonable doubt. In short, the marking immediately upon
confiscation or recovery of the dangerous drugs or related items is indispensable in the preservation of their
integrity and evidentiary value. (People of the Philippines v. Madria, G.R. No. 233207, August 20, 2018, First
Division)
37. Several observations jump out as red flags to be considered. The marking of the sachets allegedly recovered
from accused appellant was conducted at the police station, with no statement that it was done in the presence
of accused-appellant and absent any indication as to why it was not done in the vicinity of the arrest.
Furthermore, it is undisputed that no inventory of the seized drugs was made by the arresting team, nor were
there photographs taken of the seized evidence, whether at the site of the arrest and seizure or at the police
station. There was no media representative, elected official, or representative from the Department of Justice
to witness even the initial marking of the evidence. No explanation was proffered to justify the lapses. Worse,
the evidence for the prosecution yields no plausible reason for the deviation. Finally, there was no attempt to
show what measures the arresting team had taken to ensure that the seized specimens subjected to laboratory
testing and presented during trial were the very same substances allegedly recovered from accused-appellant.
Considering that the buy-bust team ostensibly underwent a pre-operation briefing, with ample time to prepare,
it is baffling that not a single member of the arresting team could secure the presence of even a single barangay
kagawad at the place of arrest and seizure. It may be recalled that other team members were assigned to
secure the perimeter. Both the planning and the arrest took place at regular hours of the day. While it is alleged
that accused-appellant resisted arrest, he was unarmed, alone, outnumbered, and was easily overcome. Such
an incident could not have gone unnoticed by barangay officials, yet the marking of the seized drugs was not
promptly conducted at or near the place of arrest and seizure, like the barangay hall. The Zamboanga City Police
Station could not have been without resources to properly conduct an inventory and/or photograph the
evidence. (People of the Philippines v. Asdali, G.R. No. 219835, August 29, 2018, First Division)
38. Per the prosecution's evidence, the Zamboanga City Police conducted a buy-bust operation against accused-
appellant; in the course of said operation, PO2 Seril bought a packet of shabu from accused-appellant for
P100.00, while SPO1 Jacinto seized from accused-appellant's possession, during body search, two more sachets
of shabu and the marked P100.00-bill paid by PO2 Seril; the apprehending team brought accused-appellant to
the police station, where PO2 Seril and SPO1 Jacinto turned over the sachets of shabu seized from accused-
appellant to P/Insp. Tubo, the investigator-in-charge; and P/Insp. Tubo marked the sachets with his initials.
However, the prosecution's evidence failed to establish that the buy-bust team complied with the directives
under Republic Act No. 9165 and its IRR. The markings on the three sachets of shabu, purportedly seized or
confiscated from accused-appellant, was done not by any of the members of the buy-bust team who
apprehended accused-appellant, but by P/Insp. Tubo, the assigned investigating officer, at the police station
where accused-appellant was brought following his arrest. In addition, there is totally no proof that the
markings were done in the presence of accused-appellant.
a. Moreover, the records do not bear any stipulation between the parties, or a statement in the affidavits of
the buy-bust team members, or an averment in the prosecution witnesses' testimonies that a physical

inventory and photograph of the seized drugs were actually taken immediately upon accused-appellant's
arrest or even later on at the police station. No certificate of inventory or inventory receipt or photograph
of the seized drugs is attached to the records of the case. There is also no showing at all that representatives
from the media and the DOJ and an elected public official were present at the place of arrest or at the
police station to witness, together with accused-appellant or his representative or counsel, the conduct of
the physical inventory and taking of photographs of the seized drugs. (People of the Philippines v. Asjali,
39. While the prosecution presented photographs depicting the post-buy-bust operation inventory which the CAID-
SOTG conducted in the presence of the required witnesses, a more circumspect examination of the
photographs reveals that the plastic sachet shown therein bears the marking "GBB," which is the plastic sachet
obtained from the test-buy operation; and that the plastic sachet with the marking "RCB" purportedly seized
from the buy-bust operation is not in the photographs. Thus, SPO1 Badua readily admitted their mistake in
taking pictures of the plastic sachet obtained from the test-buy operation, i.e., the one with the "GBB" marking,
instead of the one supposedly recovered from the buy-bust operation, i.e., the one with the "RCB" marking.
When pressed to explain such irregularity, SPO1 Badua insisted that photographs containing the latter sachet
exists, but was nevertheless evasive and elected instead to require the defense counsel to subpoena his
office/Chief to produce the vital photographs. (People of the Philippines v. Sembrano, G.R. No. 238829, October
40. It is glaring from the records that after Cuevas was arrested during the buy-bust operation and subsequently
searched, the buy-bust team immediately took custody of the seized plastic sachets and conducted the marking
thereof at the place where Cuevas was arrested. Thereafter, the buy-bust team proceeded to the barangay hall
to conduct the inventory and photography of the seized items in the presence of an elected public official, a
DOJ representative, and a media representative. The plastic sachets were then secured, taken to the police
station, and thereafter, to the crime laboratory where they tested positive for shabu. Finally, the same
specimens were duly identified in court. In view of the foregoing, the Court holds that there is sufficient
compliance with the chain of custody rule, and thus, the integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti
have been preserved. Perforce, Cuevas' conviction must stand. People of the Philippines v. Cuevas, G.R. No.
41. To start with, no photographs of the seized drugs were taken at the place of seizure or at the police station
where the inventory was conducted. To be sure, the taking of photographs of the seized drugs is not a menial
requirement that can be easily dispensed with. Photographs provide credible proof of the state or condition of
the illegal drugs and/or paraphernalia recovered from the place of apprehension to ensure that the identity and
integrity of the recovered items are preserved. Neither were the inventory and marking of the alleged seized
items in this case done in the presence of accused Musor. There was no justifiable ground offered by the
prosecution on why the marking was not done in his presence. The absence of the accused in the marking and
inventory of the alleged seized items and the lack of photographing as required by law without justifiable ground
would open the alleged seized items to tampering, alteration or even planting of evidence against him. Thus,
the integrity and evidentiary value of the alleged seized items were not preserved by the apprehending team.
More importantly, there was no compliance with the three-witness rule. Based on the narrations of PO2
Bautista, not one of the witnesses required under Section 21 was present at the time the plastic sachets were
allegedly seized from Musor. They were only present during the conduct of inventory in the police station.
There was also no explanation as to their absence during the apprehension and their belated appearance at the
police station. (People of the Philippines v. Musor, G.R. No. 231843, November 7, 2018, Second Division; People
of the Philippines v. Fatallo, G.R. No. 218805, November 7, 2018, Second Division; People of the Philippines v.
Pacnisen, G.R. No. 234821, November 7, 2018, Second Division; People of the Philippines v. Dumanjug, G.R. No.
42. The chain of custody rule was not complied for the following reasons. First, records show that the apprehending
team did not conduct an inventory nor did it photograph the confiscated item in the presence of the accused-
appellant or his representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the DOJ, and any elected public
official. PO1 Reyes, the poseur buyer, merely testified that the subject specimen was marked and inventoried
in the same place it was seized only in the presence of the police officers. They did not even state that they
exerted earnest efforts to ensure the presence of the required witnesses. Neither did they explain the absence
of the three required witnesses. Second, the inventory was not prepared by the police officer who recovered
the prohibited item. It was prepared by PO1 Jimenez who was not present at the time and place of apprehension
as he was the designated driver of the team waiting in the car. He was merely called to go to the crime scene
after the apprehension and seizure were already done. Clearly, the law requires that the marking and inventory
of the seized drugs should be done by the apprehending officer himself or the poseur-buyer. Third, no
photographs of the seized drug were taken at the place of seizure or at the police station where the inventory
was conducted. To be sure, the taking of photographs of the seized drug is not a menial requirement that can
be easily dispensed with. Photographs provide credible proof of the state or condition of the illegal drugs and/or
paraphernalia recovered from the place of apprehension to ensure that the identity and integrity of the
recovered items are preserved. The explanation of the members of the buy-bust team, that the reason they

could not take photographs was because there were people blocking the alley and throwing stones at them is
hollow and not worthy of belief. Notably, the buy-bust team was composed of seven armed police officers. And
if it was able to conduct the inventory at the place of apprehension, it could easily have also taken photographs
at the same time. Moreover, the police officers were able to wait for PO1 Jimenez who came from his car to do
the inventory, therefore there was no sense of urgency for them to leave the place of apprehension. Thus, the
explanation of the members of the buy-bust team that there were people blocking the way and throwing stones
at them deserves scant consideration. To the mind of the Court, this excuse is untrue and conjured up to cover
the team's failure to follow the procedure set by law — assuming there was even a buy-bust that really
happened. Lastly, the prosecution did not even attempt to offer any justification for the failure of the
apprehending team to follow the prescribed procedures in the handling of the seized drug. The prosecution
also did not bother to explain how the subject specimen was safely turned over from PO1 Reyes to PO2 Ortiz.
These failures certainly cast doubt on the corpus delicti of the offense. The police officers did not even
coordinate with the PDEA after the apprehension of Bricero and seizure of the prohibited drug. The Court
stresses that the justifiable grounds for non-compliance must be adequately explained; the Court cannot
presume what these grounds are or that they even exist. (People of the Philippines v. Bricero, G.R. No. 218428,
43. The buy-bust team utterly failed to comply with the prescribed procedure under Section 21(a). For one thing,
the arresting officers had failed to mark the confiscated plastic sachets immediately after seizure either at the
place of arrest or at the nearest police station. The records, in fact, disclose that the arresting officers first took
appellants to the Ospital ng Maynila for a physical examination before proceeding to the police station where
the seized sachets were finally marked, not by PO2 Jimenez (the poseur-buyer/arresting officer) but by PO1
Casupli (the investigating officer) who was not present during the buy-bust operation. For another, the records
do not show that the seized items were ever inventoried or photographed in the presence of appellants or their
representatives, a representative from the media and the DOJ, and any elected public official. To repeat, neither
a physical inventory sheet nor photographs of the seized plastic sachets can be found anywhere in the records.
(People of the Philippines v. Balles, G.R. No. 226143, November 21, 2018, First Division)
44. The irregularities in this case pertained to such initial handling of the confiscated items. While a photograph of
the pieces of evidence forms part of the case records, there is no testimony indicating the circumstances as to
when and where it was taken. The prosecution failed to establish that it was made at the place and in the
presence of the persons enumerated under the law. The required inventory was also not conducted by PO2
Baturi upon his arrival at the precinct. It was not made until after he and Gutierrez later went to the barangay
hall of Barangay Maybimga, apparently only because the barangay official was in the hall at that time. The
required number of witnesses to the inventory was also not satisfied because other than Gutierrez, only the
barangay kagawad was there to observe it. A representative of the National Prosecution Service or the media
was not present, with PO2 Baturi attempting to justify the deficiency by mere general statements that do not
offer persuasive reasons. It is clear from the foregoing that there were no concrete efforts on the police officers'
part to have any representative from the media who could witness the inventory. Moreover, even granting that
they really did not have a contact with the media, then they could have at least coordinated with the National
Prosecution Service. PO2 Baton, however, offered an absurd answer when he was asked during the trial for an
excuse for such failure. (Gutierrez v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 235956, December 5, 2018, Second
Division)
45. The buy-bust team failed to comply with the requirements of Section 21(1) of RA 9165. First, no photographs
of the seized drugs were taken at the place of seizure. Even if there were photographs taken at the barangay
hall, this is still not what the law contemplates as the photographing should be done at the place of
apprehension, unless a justifiable reason to do it in some other place has been established. Second, neither was
the inventory and marking of the alleged seized items done at the place of apprehension. There was no
justifiable ground offered by the prosecution on why the marking of the seized drugs was done in the barangay
hall and not at the place of apprehension of accused appellant Christopher. Lastly, there was no compliance
with the three-witness rule. Based on the narrations of the buy-bust team, not one of the witnesses required
under Section 21 was present at the time the plastic sachets were allegedly seized from accused-appellant
Christopher. The media representative and barangay captain were only present during the conduct of the
inventory in the barangay hall. Moreover, there were only two witnesses present - a barangay official and a
media representative - when the law explicitly requires three witnesses. Neither did the police officers nor the
prosecution during the trial - offer any viable or acceptable explanation for the police officers' deviation from
the law. (People of the Philippines v. Ilagan, G.R. No. 227021, December 5, 2018, Second Division)
46. The illegal drugs seized from accused-appellants were not marked immediately upon seizure and confiscation.
Records show that three (3) plastic sachets were recovered from accused-appellants: one (1) sachet was bought
by the confidential informant and two (2) sachets were confiscated by PO3 Vicente; but the markings were
made not in the place of seizure and not by the police officer who recovered the seized drugs. The person who
marked the seized drugs, SPO1 Tarre, was not even part of the buy-bust team who conducted the operation.
(People of the Philippines v. Labsan, G.R. No. 227184, February 6, 2019, Second Division)

47. IO1 Labajo transported a total of eight plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance suspected to be
shabu from the place of apprehension to the PDEA Office. While in transit, the seized plastic sachets of illegal
drugs did not have markings or labels as to render them readily identifiable. According to the RTC, the possibility
of mix-up is remote since "the packs of shabu, subject of possession were all placed in one plastic pack separate
from the shabu sold.” But the RTC failed to show that the belated marking did not expose the seized illegal
drugs to the threat of alteration, substitution, or tampering by accident or otherwise - the dangers that the
marking requirement seeks to avert. Other than IO1 Labajo's claim that he himself handled the illegal drugs and
transported them from the place of arrest and seizure to the place of marking and inventory at the PDEA Office,
no convincing evidence was offered to prove that the items marked were in fact the plastic sachet bought from
Tampan and the sachets seized from Tampan's possession. In the same vein, IO1 Labajo failed to ventilate the
precautionary measures taken in preserving the identity of the seized items given that they were unmarked
when they were transported. Clearly, the probability that the integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti
had been compromised is extant in the first link of the chain of custody.
a. Also, the Court cannot turn a blind eye on the absence of a representative from the media, a representative
from the DOJ, and an elected public official: (i) at the time of apprehension and seizure; and (ii) at or near
the place of apprehension and seizure. (People of the Philippines v. Tampan, G.R. No. 222648, February
48. Although PO1 Santos had written his initials on the two plastic sachets submitted to the PNP Crime Laboratory
Office for examination, it was not indubitably shown by the prosecution that PO1 Santos immediately marked
the seized drugs in the presence of appellant after their alleged confiscation. There is doubt as to whether the
substances seized from appellant were the same ones subjected to laboratory examination and presented in
court. (People of the Philippines v. Royol, G.R. No. 224297, February 13, 2019, Third Division)
49. That they had to type on the inventory form at their office is not acceptable. The apprehending team should be
prepared with their inventory forms even before the buy-bust operation took place. (People of the Philippines
v. Rodriguez, G.R. No. 238516, February 27, 2019, First Division)
50. The prosecution established that the buy-bust team fully complied with the requirements under Section 21, RA
9165, as amended. In particular, after the buy-bust operation and at the place of incident, PO3 Cayabyab
immediately marked with his initials and their corresponding numbers ("RGC1," "RGC2," and "RGC3") the item
subject of the buy-bust sale as well as the two sachets recovered from appellant. He also promptly conducted
an inventory of these items at the place of incident. Such marking and inventory were made in the presence of
an elective public official (Barangay Kagawad Dizon) and a representative from the DOJ (Prosecutor Catungal).
Added to these, PO2 Naungayan took pictures of the marking and inventory of the recovered items. Thereafter,
at the police station, PO3 Cayabyab turned over to their Duty Investigator PO2 Naungayan the seized sachets;
in turn, the investigator prepared the necessary request for the examination of these items; thereafter, PO3
Cayabyab brought the Request and the items to the Crime Laboratory; PCSI Roderos, the Forensic Chemist at
the Crime Laboratory received the Request and the sachets with these initials: "RGC1," "RGC2," and "RGC3;"
she placed thereat the control number (D-217-2013L), the names of the specimens (A-1, A-2, A-3), their
respective weight (0.1 gram, 0.04 gram, and 0.03 gram), as well as her initials ("EBR"). PCSI Roderos testified
that the subject items tested positive for the presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride, and that the
specimens presented in court were the same ones she earlier examined at the Crime Laboratory. (People of the
Philippines v. Angeles, G.R. No. 229099, February 27, 2019, First Division)
51. It appears that IOI Tabuyo acted as the apprehending officer and the investigating officer. He was in possession
of the plastic sachet of shabu, buy-bust money, and boodle money when the arresting team proceeded to the
PDEA office. There, he prepared the requests for laboratory examination of the drug evidence and medical
examination of Magalong. All the while, the plastic sachet of shabu was in his custody as it was placed in the
buy-bust kit he was holding. (People of the Philippines v. Magalong, G.R. No. 231838, March 4, 2019, Third
Division)
52. At the witness stand, both IO1 Binwag and IO1 Cabanilla admitted that they conducted the physical inventory
and taking of photograph of the seized illegal drugs in their office at Camp Adduru, Tuguegarao City. When
asked for the reason for departing from the rule, they simply averred that it was "the discretion" of their team
leader "to avoid being compromised in the area." But the apprehending team did not elaborate how the
conduct of the physical inventory and photographing at the place of seizure would unduly put its members or
the buy-bust operation at risk. Neither did the team clarify the dangers that immediate inventory and
photographing entail. In the same breath, IO1 Binwag and/or IO1 Cabanilla, without rhyme or reason, did not
mark the seized plastic sachets of suspected shabu at the place of arrest even if they could have easily done so.
True, the conduct of the marking, physical inventory and photographing are not limited to the place of
apprehension. In cases of warrantless seizure such as the one at bar, they may be performed at the nearest
police station or nearest office of the apprehending officer. However, even if one were to consider the conduct
of inventory and photographing at the PDEA Office acceptable, the apprehending team still veered away from
the three-witness rule required by Section 21. The prosecution admitted, that no DOJ representative was
present during the physical inventory and photographing of the seized items. IO1 Cabanilla justified the absence

of the DOJ representative stating that they tried to contact the DOJ but nobody arrived since the buy-bust
operation fell on a Sunday, a non-working day. Equally worth noting is that Barangay Chairman Pagulayan did
not actually witness the physical inventory of the seized items. (People of the Philippines v. Tomas, G.R. No.
53. The testimony of PO3 Reycitez and SI2 Tablate failed to demonstrate the stability in the links that the
prosecution should have established, namely: (a) the seizure and marking of the illegal drug recovered from the
accused by the apprehending officer; (b) the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to
the investigating officer; (c) the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist
for laboratory examination; and (d) the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized from the
forensic chemist to the court. First, it is unclear as to who between PO3 Reycitez and SI2 Tablate initially had
possession of the seized drug when the same was confiscated. They also failed to explain why the seized drug
was not immediately marked by PO3 Reycitez when he was the designated poseur-buyer who was with the
confidential informant when the transaction took place. The records show that it was SI2 Tablate who placed
the markings thereon. Since the marking appears to have been belatedly done, it is also unclear whether or not
the marking was done in the presence of Reyes, immediately after he was arrested. Second, apart from a
general averment that photographs of Reyes and the seized drug were taken, there was no express mention
that the same were done in the presence of the witnesses, as mandated by Section 21, Article II of RA No. 9165.
(Reyes v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 226053, March 13, 2019, Third Division)
54. The seized items were not inventoried immediately after seizure or confiscation. NBI Agent Dungog admitted,
during his cross-examination, that there was no inventory conducted at the place of apprehension except for
the markings made on the sachets of the seized items by SI Kintanar. In the Joint Affidavit of Arrest dated
January 22, 2010, executed by the apprehending officers, it was stated that they decided to continue the
inventory at the NBI Office due to the difficulty of conducting the inventory at the scene. They also testified
that although the place was lighted, it was not considered sufficient for us to do the proper conduct of the
inventory and given the "presence of so many people at that time. There were also no photographs of the
seized drugs that were taken at the place of seizure. Photographs were taken only at the NBI Office. Moreover,
none of the three required witnesses was present at the time of seizure and apprehension. Although Brgy.
Kagawad Harold Baroy (Baroy) arrived at the place of apprehension, it was already after the arrest of Abilla was
executed. (Abilla v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 227676, April 3, 2019, Second Division; People of the
Philippines v. Claudel, G.R. No. 219852, April 3, 2019, Second Division)
55. First, PO1 Caacoy testified that the police officers only made an inventory receipt at the place of the arrest, and
he marked the two plastic sachets recovered from appellant in the police station. PO1 Caacoy did not provide
any explanation as to why he did not immediately mark the seized items. In People v. Bartolini, the Court has
held that the failure to mark the drugs immediately after seizure from the accused cast doubt on the
prosecution's evidence, which warrants an acquittal on reasonable doubt. The non-explanation of this failure
creates doubt on whether the buy-bust team was able to preserve the integrity and evidentiary value of the
items seized from the accused. Second, the RTC aptly held that no photographs were taken during the conduct
of the inventory. The police officers failed to explain the reason for their non-compliance with this requirement.
And, third, a representative of the DOJ, media, and public elective official were not present during the conduct
of the physical inventory of the seized items. There was no signature of any representative of the DOJ, media,
and public elective official in the inventory receipt, although both PO1 Caacoy and PO2 Icalina claimed that
there were barangay officials present. The Receipt of Property Seized was only signed by PO1 Caacoy, PO2
Icalina, and three neighbors of the appellant, according to the police officers. It was only during the testimony
of PO2 Icalina that the lack of the three witnesses mandated by RA 9165 was addressed. (People of the
Philippines v. Cadungog, G.R. No. 229926, April 3, 2019, Second Division)
56. The failure of law enforcers in buy-bust operations to photograph seized drugs in accordance with Article II,
Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165, combined with the prosecution's failure to address this omission, raises
doubt on the identity of the drugs seized, especially when the amount of dangerous drugs allegedly taken from
the accused is minuscule. (People of the Philippines v. Ternida, G.R. No. 212626, June 3, 2019, Third Division)
57. The police officers failed to comply with the prescribed chain of custody rule, thereby putting into question the
identity and evidentiary value of the items purportedly seized from Escaran. First, while PO1 Montebon and
PO1 Veraño narrated that SPO1 Enriquez marked the items recovered from Escaran, there is no evidence as to
when and where the seized drugs were marked and whether the marking was made in Escaran's presence. In
People v. Ameril, the Court stressed that marking of the seized items should be done immediately upon seizure
and in the presence of the accused to ensure that they are the same items that enter the chain and are
eventually the ones offered in evidence. Second, PO1 Veraño admitted that after the alleged sale of drugs was
consummated and Escaran was arrested and apprised of his constitutional rights, the latter was immediately
brought to the police station for interrogation. The buy-bust team did not make any inventory nor did it take
photographs of the items seized from Escaran. (People of the Philippines v. Escaran, G.R. No. 212170, June 19,

58. The chain of custody rule was not met when the police officers did not conduct the marking, photography, and
inventory of the seized items at the place of arrest. Without having any valid excuse for the deferment of the
conduct, the marking, photography, and inventory at the police station does not comply with the strictures of
law. (People of the Philippines v. Buniag, G.R. No. 217661, June 26, 2019, Second Division; People of the
Philippines v. Kasan, G.R. No. 238334, July 3, 2019, Second Division; People of the Philippines v. Refe, G.R. No.
233697, July 10, 2019, Third Division; People of the Philippines v. Merando, G.R. No. 232620, August 5, 2019,
Third Division; People of the Philippines v. Banding, G.R. No. 233470, August 14, 2019, Third Division)
59. While PO1 Millanes undertook to mark the allegedly seized three (3) plastic sachets of shabu at the scene of
the supposed buy-bust operation, the said marking was patently irregular. As admitted by PO1 Millanes on
cross-examination, the time and place of the marking were not indicated in the markings made. Second, it must
be emphasized that PO1 Millanes, again on cross-examination, admitted point blank that there was no
certificate of inventory prepared by the police. Third, as revealed again during the cross-examination of PO1
Millanes, there were no pictures taken during the supposed buy-bust as the apprehending team failed to bring
a camera. The pictures of the supposed seized specimen were taken only in the police station. Fourth, PO1
Millanes testified that upon reaching the police station, an inventory of the evidence allegedly seized was not
conducted. Nor were there any witnesses present. Upon reaching the police station, the police merely prepared
the necessary documents for the crime laboratory. In fact, PO1 Millanes himself revealed that upon reaching
the police station, the assigned investigator did not even inspect closely the allegedly recovered specimens.
(People of the Philippines v. Dagdag, G.R. No. 225503, June 26, 2019, Second Division)
60. When there is doubt on whether the seized drugs were photographed, the same must be resolved in favor of
the accused. (People of the Philippines v. Narvas, G.R. No. 241254, July 8, 2019, Second Division)
61. IO1 Asaytono did not mark the seized item at the place of arrest but inside the service vehicle allegedly in the
presence of the two accused. The physical inventory and photograph taking were not conducted immediately
after the subject specimen was confiscated but only when they arrived at their office in Camp Vicente Lim in
Canlubang, Laguna at around 6:00 p.m. The prosecution reasoned that the commotion inside the Jollibee outlet
prevented IO1 Asaytono from complying with the rule that the marking, inventory, and photograph taking must
be made immediately after seizure and confiscation. Existing jurisprudence clarifies the phrase "immediately
after seizure and confiscation" to purport an ideal scenario of conducting the physical inventory and
photographing of the drugs immediately after, or at the place of apprehension. However, if, on the ground of
impracticability, immediate marking, inventory, and photographing were not feasible, Section 21 (a) of the IRR
of R.A. No. 9165 authorizes that the same be done at the nearest police station or the nearest office of the
apprehending officer/team. The Court is not unaware that, in drugs cases, the phrase "existence of a
commotion" has been the apprehending team's most convenient excuse to justify its non-compliance with the
procedural safeguards encapsulated in Section 21. While it is not beyond the realms of possibility, its mere
invocation does not ipso facto operate as substantial compliance with the law especially when it is not
supported by the evidence on record, as in this case. After the prosecution alleged that a commotion ensued
when accused Tayan and accused-appellant Sampa were arrested, it did not attempt to provide its details and
the circumstances that prompted the buy-bust team to delay the marking, inventory, and photograph taking.
Neither did it point out the measures carried out by the members of the entrapment team to ensure that the
plastic sachet of shabu seized from accused Tayan and accused-appellant Sampa was the same item marked
inside the vehicle and subjected to physical inventory and photographing in Camp Vicente Lim considering the
absence of the three insulating witnesses required by Section 21. (People of the Philippines v. Tayan, G.R. No.
62. A careful examination of the records would show that the inventory receipt was not presented as evidence.
Thus, it cannot be determined whether or not during the physical inventory and photograph of the items seized,
the representatives required by law are present. Such was also not testified to that the police officers complied
with the same provisions of the law. (People of the Philippines v. Sarip, G.R. No. 231917, July 8, 2019, Third
Division)
63. The chain of custody rule was not complied with. First. The drug item was not marked at the place where it was
seized. A similar circumstance obtained in People v. Ramirez wherein the Court acquitted appellant therein
holding that the marking should be done in the presence of the apprehended violator immediately upon
confiscation to truly ensure that they are the same items that enter the chain of custody. The Court noted that
the time and distance from the scene of the arrest until the drugs were marked at the barangay hall were too
substantial that one could not help but think that the evidence could have been tampered. Here, appellant was
arrested along Agham Road corner Quezon Avenue, Quezon City. The arresting officers did not do anything
more in that place. They immediately boarded appellant into a parked car and took her to the Kamuning Police
Station, Quezon City. En route, the seized item remained unmarked. It was exposed to switching, planting, and
contamination during the entire trip. The seized item was only marked at the Kamuning Police Station. By that
time, it was no longer certain that what was shown to investigating officer PO2 Prado was the same item seized
from appellant. Neither SPO1 Eufemio nor back-up officer PO1 Hega offered any justification for this procedural
lapse. Second. No DOJ representative and elected public official was present during the inventory. SPO1

Eufemio's testimony reveals that among the three (3) required witnesses, only media representative Rey Argana
was present during the inventory. The prosecution tried to explain the absence of a barangay representative
during the inventory, by claiming that because it was already 8:30 o'clock in the evening when appellant got
arrested and brought to the police station, there was no more barangay official present at the barangay hall. It
bears emphasis, however, that as early as 5 o'clock in the afternoon, the apprehending team already knew they
would conduct a buy-bust operation on appellant. By that time, they should have already alerted the barangay
officials regarding the need for at least one (1) of them to be present during the inventory in case the buy-bust
operation on appellant pushed through. At any rate, other elected public official, not necessarily a barangay
elected official, could have also been alerted and invited to witness the inventory. As it was, the buy-bust team
failed to secure their presence during the inventory itself. In any event, another representative who was not
present during the inventory was from the DOJ. (People of the Philippines v. Baltazar, G.R. No. 229037, July 29,
64. While the marking was done immediately after seizure at the place of arrest, the inventory was done at the
police station. In fact, the Confiscation Report was prepared at the police station. Furthermore, there were also
no photographs taken at the scene, only at the police station. As such, there is a break in the chain of custody,
in view of the absence of a valid justification. (People of the Philippines v. Dungo, G.R. No. 229720, August 19,
65. Keeping one of the seized items in his right pocket and the rest in his left pocket is a doubtful and suspicious
way of ensuring the integrity of the items. Contrary to the Court of Appeals' finding that PO1 Bobon took the
necessary precautions, the Court finds his actions reckless, if not dubious.
a. As the Court reviewed the submissions of both the prosecution and the defense, the Court found that PO1
Rosal was candid enough to testify that he placed in his pocket the miniscule amount of seized shabu. The
seized shabu was in his pocket from the time of seizure until the alleged marking and inventory at the police
station. In a similar case, the Court considered such act as "doubtful and suspicious," "reckless," "dubious,"
"fraught with dangers," as well as "blatantly irregular." The circumstance of PO1 Bobon keeping narcotics
in his own pockets precisely underscores the importance of strictly complying with Section 21. His
subsequent identification in open court of the items coming out of his own pockets is self-serving. The
prosecution effectively admits that from the moment of the supposed buy-bust operation until the seized
items' turnover for examination, these items had been in the sole possession of a police officer. In fact, not
only had they been in his possession, they had been in such close proximity to him that they had been
nowhere else but in his own pockets. Even without referring to the strict requirements of Section 21,
common sense dictates that a single police officer's act of bodily-keeping the item(s) which is at the crux
of offenses penalized under the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, is fraught with dangers. One
need not engage in a meticulous counter-checking with the requirements of Section 21 to view with
distrust the items coming out of PO1 Bobon's pockets. That the Regional Trial Court and the Court of
Appeals both failed to see through this and fell — hook, line, and sinker — for PO1 Bobon's avowals is mind-
boggling.
b. Moreover, PO1 Bobon did so without even offering the slightest justification for dispensing with the
requirements of Section 21. (People of the Philippines v. Mamuyac, Jr., G.R. No. 234035, August 19, 2019,
Second Division)
66. As admitted by the prosecution witnesses themselves, the seized item was not immediately marked upon the
arrest of appellant. The Court held in People v. Ramirez that marking of the seized item immediately after
seizure is vital to ensure its integrity and veracity by preventing switching, planting, or contamination of
evidence. Here, PO3 Yaris testified to placing the seized item in his pocket without marking them immediately
upon confiscation. The marking was only done when Valdez and Lim arrived around ten (10) minutes following
appellant's arrest. During this ten (10)-minute interval, the corpus delicti remained in PO3 Yaris' pocket without
any way of differentiating it from other drug items that may have been in PO3 Yaris' possession, too, at that
time. This cast serious doubt on the identity of the item that was later marked and inventoried. For we cannot
foreclose the possibility that what PO3 Yaris retrieved from his pocket was the same item allegedly sold by
appellant. Even media representative Valdez admitted that he was unsure of the integrity of the corpus delicti.
Thus, the rationale behind the marking requirement was defeated when PO3 Yaris placed the corpus delicti in
his pocket for ten (10) minutes before marking it. The arresting officers failed to guarantee that what PO3 Yaris
recovered from his pocket and eventually marked was the same drug item he supposedly received from
appellant during the buy-bust operation. (People of the Philippines v. Garcia, G.R. No. 230983, September 4,
67. The Barangay Hall of Brgy. San Dionisio is not one of the allowed alternative places provided under Section 21
of the IRR. Despite suggesting in the Joint Affidavit that the target area was near the police station and claiming
that they rode a car going to the target area, the buy-bust team unjustifiably decided to ignore the prescribed
procedure and conduct the inventory and photographing of the seized items in a place not allowed under the
rules. (People of the Philippines v. Quilatan, G.R. No. 218107, September 9, 2019, Second Division)

68. The records provide that the inventory of the illicit drugs was made in the PDEA Office in Camp Vicente Lim in
Calamba City, Laguna when the buy-bust operation was conducted in San Pedro, Laguna or some 20 kilometers
away from the former. Further, the inventory was only witnessed by the accused, a representative from the
media, and an elected public official. The illicit drug was not even photographed as required by Section 21.
There was no explanation offered as to: (i) why the inventory was made in Calamba City and not in San Pedro;
(ii) why there was no photograph of the illicit drug; and (iii) why the inventory was not witnessed by a
representative from the DOJ. These glaring non-compliance with the provisions of Section 21 of R.A. 9165
render the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items to be highly compromised, consequently
warranting accussed-appellants' acquittal. (People of the Philippines v. Lacdan, G.R. No. 208472, October 14,
69. The prosecution failed to comply with Section 21, Article II of RA 9165. Other than SPO2 Briñas bare allegation,
the records are bereft of proof that an inventory was actually conducted after appellant's arrest on June 29,
2006. In lieu of the inventory, the prosecution presented a Certification dated June 30, 2006 stating that
appellant was apprehended by the anti-illegal drugs task group on June 29, 2006, and that marijuana leaves
were seized from him. The Certification adduced by the prosecution cannot serve as proof of the required
inventory under Section 21 of RA 9165. Being dated June 30, 2006, the Certification only signifies that no
inventory was conducted on June 29, 2006-the day of appellant's arrest and alleged seizure of marijuana. The
Certification did not bear all the signatures of the three insulating witnesses. Only two elective officials, namely
Kagawad Gerson M. Nietes and Kagawad Wiliiam D. Diocson, signed the Certification. This clearly indicates that
no representative from the media or from the DOJ actually came to witness the alleged inventory and
photographing of the allegedly seized marijuana.
a. While the absence of the insulating witnesses required by Section 21 of RA 91 65 does not itself render the
confiscated items in admissible, a justifiable reason for the failure or a showing of a genuine and sufficient
effort to secure them must be adduced. The prosecution must show that earnest efforts were employed
in contacting the representatives enumerated under the law. Mere statements of their unavailability,
absent actual serious attempts to secure the required witnesses., are unacceptable and do not justify non-
compliancte. These considerations arise from the fact that police officers are ordinarily given sufficient
time —beginning from the moment they have received the information about activities of the accused until
the time of his arrest-to prepare for a buy-bust operation and to make necessary arrangements to strictly
comply with the procedure prescribed by Section 21 of RA 9165. As such, police officers are compelled not
only to state reasons for their non-compliance, but must in fact, also convince the Court that they exerted
earnest efforts to comply with the mandated procedure, and that under the given circumstances, their
actions were reasonable. Here, not only did the prosecution fail to proffer any explanation for their non-
compliance with the three witness rule, there was even no effort on their part to observe the law. As stated
by SPO2 Briñas in his Affidavit, the police operatives conducted a two-week surveillance of appellant.
During the two-week period, they had every opportunity to arrange and secure the presence of the
required insulating witnesses, but they failed to do so. This signifies the police officers' lack of effort to
comply with the safeguards of Section 21 of RA 9165, adversely affecting the authenticity of the allegedly
seized marijuana. (People of the Philippines v. Paran, G.R. No. 220447, November 25, 2019, Second
Division)
70. The marking, inventory and photographing of the seized items were not done immediately. The testimony of
Veñalon shows that the police officers waited for some time for an elected official to show up. When it seemed
that no elected official was coming, they decided to mark the inventory in the presence of a Bantay Bayan desk
officer instead. The marking and inventory of the seized items were not attended and witnessed by any
representative from the media and the DOJ, as well as any elected official, all in violation of the requirements
in Section 21 of RA 9165. True, Fernando, the Bantay Bayan desk officer, was present. But he is not an elected
public official and, thus, not one of the required witnesses in the law. (People of the Philippines v. Ambrosio,
71. The chain of custody remained unbroken. Records show that after accused-appellant was arrested, IO1 Balbada
immediately took custody of the seized drug and personally conducted the requisite marking, inventory, and
photography right at the place of arrest in the presence of accused-appellant himself, as well as an elected
public official, i.e., Brgy. Captain Abucejo, media representatives, i.e., Licup and Brangan, and a DOJ
representative, i.e., Bedrijo. Subsequently, the illegal drug was delivered by IO1 Balbada to the crime laboratory
for examination, and later brought to court for safekeeping, where it was duly presented, identified, and
admitted as evidence. Accordingly, the chain of custody over the seized drug remained unbroken. (People of
the Philippines v. Esguerra, G.R. No. 243986, January 22, 2020, Second Division)
72. In this case, the prosecution offered no reason as to why the marking of the seized marijuana labelled “BOK-1”
was not immediately done after confiscation, but rather only after a considerable lapse of time thereto when
the poseur-buyer was able to leave the area of operation: away from the sight of the accused. Moreover, they
particularly failed to explain why the police officers could not have promptly marked the item in the presence
of Suating, if only to remove any uncertainty that the marijuana cigarette marked by PO2 Libo-on, and later
subjected to laboratory testing, was the very same one allegedly sold by the accused to the poseur-buyer. Here,

an apparent break in the chain of custody already existed before the item was even marked. Additionally, the
prosecution’s failure to present the poseur-buyer is prejudicial to their cause. To emphasize, the negotiations
during the assailed transaction was intimately between the poseur-buyer and Suating. PO2 Bernil whose exact
location from the area of operation was not specifically stated, was merely observing from a distance.
Considering that the poseur-buyer was the one who has personal knowledge of the illegal sale transaction since
he was the one who conducted the same, his testimony is not merely corroborative to that of the police officers.
The quantity of dangerous drugs here is so small that the reason for not presenting the poseur-buyer does not
square with such a miniscule amount. (People of the Philippines v. Suating, G.R. No. 220142, January 29, 2020,
Third Division)
73. There was a break in the chain of custody. The physical inventory and photograph, as evidenced by the
Certificate of Inventory, were done at the PDEA Regional Office 9, Upper Calarian, Zamboanga City, and not
where the buy-bust operation was conducted. Although these processes may be excused in cases where the
safety and security of the apprehending officers, witnesses, required by law, and item seized are threatened by
immediate danger, the present case is not one of those. The allegation that the physical inventory and
photograph were not done in the crime scene because of security reason will not suffice. The prosecution failed
to expound what security threats the law enforcement agencies were facing at the time of the buy-bust
operation. In the Joint Affidavit of Arrest of IO1 Lanza and IO2 Natividad, it was mentioned that it was only after
Sali was brought to their office, which is at the PDEA, Regional Office 9, when the proper documentation
happened and not immediately upon seizure and arrest. There is also no justification contained in the Joint
Affidavit of Arrest of why the physical inventory and photograph were done away from the crime scene. It is
hard to imagine that the apprehending officers were able to mark the items seized at the crime scene but were
not able to photograph the same. Moreover, it is apparent from the Certificate of Inventory that it was signed
by the representatives from the media and the DOJ, and by an elected public official, but there is no signature
of Sali or his representative. No evidence was proffered to indicate that the inventory was conducted in the
presence of Sali or his duly authorized representative. The photographs submitted as evidence could not
conclusively determine whether Sali was present during the inventory. Hence, the prosecution failed to prove
valid causes for non-compliance with the procedure laid down in Section 21 of R.A. 9165, as amended. Worse,
there is no showing that earnest efforts were done to secure the attendance of Sali’s representative. The
witnesses’ testimonies in open cour and in the joint Affidavit miserably failed to mention the causes for non-
compliance with Section 21. (People of the Philippines v. Sali, G.R. No. 236596, January 29, 2020, First Division)
74. Records disclose glaring and unjustifiable deviations from the chain of custody procedure. First, there is doubt
as to where the physical inventory was made or whether there was an inventory at all. It must be noted that in
lieu of an inventory form, the police officers only provided a Certification from the barangay office which was
made by Kagawad Dela Cruz. However, the Certification cannot be considered as an equivalen of an inventory
form for purposes of complying the rules. Second, there was no representative from the media or the National
Prosecution Service. The certification, while also being an irregulari in itself, showed only the signatures of
certain barangay officials and nothing more. There was no representative from the media or the NPS which the
law requires. Worse, there was no justification offered by the prosecution as to the non-compliance. (People
of the Philippines v. Mejia, G.R. No. 241778, June 15, 2020, First Division)
75. There was a total lack of compliance with R.A. 9165, Section 21 since the buy-bust team completely ignored the
procedure under the law. They failed to conduct a physical inventory of the seized items and to photograph the
same. Moreover, the presence of the representatives required by law to witness the apprehension of appellant
and seizure of the illegal drugs were not secured by the buy-bust team. Neither can the prosecution rely on the
saving clause of R.A. 9165, Section 21 since it was no shown that the prosecution even recognized that the buy-
bust team in this case committed major lapses in handling the seized drugs from appellant. (People of the
Philippines v. Del Rosario, G.R. No. 235658, June 22, 2020, Third Division)
76. The police officers faithfully executed their duty in complying with the requirements on the seizure, initial
custody, and handling of the seized items pursuant to Section 21 of R.A. 9165. As shown by the prosecution,
immediately after seizure of the suspected packs of marijuana, PO1 Rubion did a physical inventory and marked
the packs with the date, time, initials, and placed his signature. Also, PO1 Rubion took three pictures, at the
place of arrest, in the presence of the two accused and three required witnesses from the media, DOJ, and the
barangay captain. At the police station, PO2 Hervas documented the inventory and again took three more
pictures in the presence of the two accused and the three required witnesses. Afterwards, the seized items and
the Request for Laboratory Examination signed by PSI Regidor, the OIC of the Sto. Tomas Police Station, were
personally delivered by PO1 Rubion to the PNP Provincial Crime Laboratory and received by PO1 Federe. Then
Forensic Chemist Bajade confirmed that the marked items yielded a positive result of the dangerous drug
marijuana as embodied in Chemistry Report No. D-149-2013. Clearly, from the sequence of events, the police
officers sufficiently complied with the chain of custody rule and they were able to preserve the identity,
integrity, and evidentiary value of the seized items.
a. However, given that the charge is for Illegal Sale of Dangerous Drugs and did not include R.A. 9165, Section
11 on the Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs, then the Court agrees with the appellate court that the
Anicoy is guilty in selling only two packs of marijuana marked as “TBR1” and TBR2” in the total weight of

6.3685 grams. PO1 Rubion’s testimony during the direct examination disclosed that he only bought from
Anicoy two packs of marijuana, which was the subject of the sale transaction, and not the entire six packs,
which were seized after the consummation of the sale. The other four packs should have been separately
charged under R.A. 9165, Section 11. Regardless, Anicoy is still guilty for the crime of Illegal Sale of
Dangerous Drugs.(People of the Philippines v. Anicoy, G.R. No. 240430, July 6, 2020, Second Division)
77. Records show that R.A. 9165, Section 21 was not complied with by the arresting officers. It was testified that
the arresting officers failed to immediately do the inventory at the scene of the buy-bust operation. Moreover,
the explanation provided by the arresting officer falls short of the standard that would consider the action of
the police officers as substantial compliance with the provisions of Section 21. (People of the Philippines v.
Sanico, G.R. No. 240431, July 7, 2020, First Division)
78. The apprehending officers committed various irregularities which constitute as deviations from the chain of
custody rule. First, while the Court finds that the arresting officers were justified in not immediately conducting
the marking, inventory, and photography of the seized item at the place of arrest as people had started to
gather around them, it is highly irregular for them to stop the vehicle on the highway in order to mark the seized
item, before arriving at the PDEA Regional Office, Davao City to conduct the same thereat. Second, while the
Court finds justifiable the conduct of inventory and photography of the seized item the following morning in
order for the arresting officers to secure the presence of the required witnesses, the Court finds it irregular that
instead of bringing the required witnesses to the PDEA Regional Office, Davao City, they needlessly transported
accused-appellant and the seized item to the crime laboratory in Ecoland, Davao City for the conduct of such
activities. As aforestated, the marking, inventory and photography of the seized item must be made either
immediately after the arrest, or if there are justifiable reasons, at the nearest police station or at the nearest
office of the apprehending team. Unfortunately, the prosecution failed to acknowledge, much less, justify the
foregoing deviations. Third, after the conduct of the inventory and photography in the crime laboratory in
Ecoland, Davao City, which is geographically located in Davao Del Sur, they again needlessly transported
accused-appellant and the seized item to the PNP Provincial Crime Laboratory in Tagum City, Davao Del Norte.
In an attempt to justify such course of action, the arresting officers reasoned that the seized item needs to
undergo qualitative examination in the province where the buy-bust operation was implemented. However,
contrary to the actuations of the arresting officers, there is nothing in R.A. 9165 or its IRR which requires that
the crime laboratory of the province where the buy-bust operation was implemented should be the one which
shall conduct qualitative examination of the items seized therefrom. (People of the Philippines v. Suarez, G.R.
79. The prosecution sufficiently established all the links in the chain of custody and proved that the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized drugs had not been compromised. A perusal of the records clearly reveals how
PO3 Mabanglo, assisted by PI Salmingo, effected the arrests immediately after appellants Tat and Lee sold to
him the plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance. Thereafter, he immediately marked the seized
item with “EAM 07-26-2012 EXH. A.” The same was inventoried and photographed in the presence of the
appellants, ACP Tuvera, Brgy. Chairman Que, and Marco Gutierez, a media representative from ABS-CBN.
Clearly, the requirements provided under Section 21(1) of R.A. 9165 as amended by R.A. 10640 was faithfully
complied with by the apprehending team. Following that, the seized item was brought to the police station and
was turned over to the duty investigator, SPO1 Calva. After making the proper documentation, the specimen
was brought to the crime laboratory for qualitative examination which was received by PCI Ballesteros. Upon
receipt of the specimen, consisting of one heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet with markits “EAM 07-26-
2012 EXH. A” containing 426. 30 grams of white crystalline substance, PCI Ballesteros conducted the
examination thereof. The said specimen tested positive for ephedrine, a dangerous drug, as shown in the
Chemistry Report No. D-220-12 dated July 26, 2012. The ephedrine subject of the sale was brought to and duly
identified in open court. (People of the Philippines v. Siu Ming Tat, G.R. No. 246577, July 13, 2020, First Division)
80. The subsequent inventory and photographing of the seized items at the police station in the presence of
appellant, Barangay Kagawad Zabala, and DOJ representative Sanchez did not validate the incipiently defective
marking, and failure to conduct the inventory and photographing themselves at the situs criminis. In addition,
PO1 Pajarin admitted sliding one seized sachet into his left pocket and another into his right pocket and keeping
them the whole time until their turnover to the laboratory for examination. In Dela Cruz, the Court rejected the
segregation in two different pockets of the seized dangerous drugs as a sufficient measure to preserve the
integrity of the illicit drugs. Placing the confiscated drugs, even if marked, inside the pocket of one of the
arresting police officers is not the proper way of securing the seized drugs. (People of the Philippines v. Leaño,
81. There were material discrepancies in the marking of the seized items. The trial court itself, in its own summary
of the prosecution evidence, stated that JO3 Leonor placed the markings “GTL” on the open plastic sachet. Even
the Solicitor General, in his Comment, stated that JO3 Leonor confiscated the seized plastic sachet with
marijuana and marked it with his initial “GTL.” More confusion arises as the foregoing markings starkly differ
from the common statement in the Information and the dispositive portion of the RTC decision which say that
petitioner was found in possession of one opened transparent plastic sachet marked as “GTL-07-10-14.” Upon

further perusal of the records, the Chain of Custody and Inventory sheets showed another glaring discrepancy
because the documentary exhibits indicated that the plastic sachet was marked “GTL III 07-10-14.” The
markings as appearing in the Information, the inventor, the decisions of the RTC and the CA, as well as the
allegation of facts by the parties, are different. Needless to say, the fact that the prosecution, the RTC and the
appellate court themselves could not agree on what the true marking on the seized item was already casts a
shadow of doubt on the integrity and identity of the item seized. (Quilet v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No.
82. The fact that the physical inventory and photograph of the illegal drug were not immediately done at the place
of Buesa’s arrest cannot alter the outcome of this case. Records show that while the marking of the evidence
was doen at the palce of arrest, the police officers had to conduct the inventory and photograph at the police
station because the place where Buesa was arrested was a dangerous and accident-prone area. In People of the
Philippines v. Magalong, the Court sustained the conviction of the accused therein despite the fact that the
inventory was conducted not at the place of arrest but at the PDEA, sustaining the explanation of the police
officers that they needed to avoid commotion and ensure their own safety. Indeed, as long as the integrity and
evidentiary value of an illegal drug were not compromised, non-compliance with R.A. 9165 and its IRR may be
excused. As sufficiently shown by the prosecution’s evidence, Buesa was clearly identified as the person who
sold and possessed the illegal substances during the conduct of a valid buy-bust operation. As soon as the sale
was consummated and the body of Buesa was frisked, PO2 Abad arrested Buesa and marked the seized items
immediately at the place of arrest. Subsequently, due to the fact that said place of arrest was accident-prone,
the police officers brought Buesa and the seized items to the police station to conduct the inventory and taking
of photographs in the presence of the witnesses required by law. Then, the seized items were brought to the
crime laboratory where they tested positive for shabu. (People of the Philippines v. Buesa, G.R. No. 237850,
83. The prosecution failed to account the details on how the confiscated items were marked. PO1 Amante testified
that he marked the sachet of shabu he bought with “NICO,” and the two sachets he recovered during frisking
with “NICO-1” and “NICO-2.” Yet, there was no showing where and when the seized drugs were marked. PO1
Amante simply stated in his affidavit that the drugs were “later marked” without providing the details
surrounding the initial handling of the drugs. Neither was the issue clarified during PO1 Amante’s testimony in
open court. In other words, the place of marking remains unknown. Corollarily, lacking material details
regarding the marking of the seized drugs, the prosecution failed to remove any suspicion of tampering,
switching, or planting of evidence. Similarly, the inventory and photograph were not made immediately at the
place of arrest but at the barangay hall. The police officers only made a general statement that the place of
arrest was hostile without elaborating any threat on their security. (People of the Philippines v. Mazo, G.R. No.
84. Records of the case failed to disclose that photographs of the allegedly seized shabu and drug paraphernalia
were taken after their confiscation in the presence of the insulating witnesses. Neither of the two PDEA agents
testified anent such photographing of the confiscated narcotics and drug paraphernalia. Agent Sanchez testified
that they took photographs and place markings only on the .45 caliber pistol. The prosecution did not submit
any photos as proof that this requirement had been complied with. (People of the Philippines v. Policarpio, G.R.
No. 227868, January 20, 2021, Special Second Division)
85. The prosecution failed to establish the circumstances of the markings of the items seized. Nowhere did PO2
Jose narrate who did the marking, and when and where the items seized were marked. (Tan v. People of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 232611, April 26, 2021, Second Division)
86. Moreover, the prosecution failed to prove that same substance recovered from the accused was the same
substance presented in court. The prosecution failed to account for the lapse. Nowhere in PO2 Jose’s testimony
did he identify the seized items to be the same ones presented in corut as he did not identify the seized items.
Inarguably, these gaps in the chain of custody render the identity and integrity of the corpus delicti dubious.
The Court also notes that in Criminal Case No. 11265, the Information states that the shabu weighs 0.10 grams.
However, according to PSI Susan, the net weight of the shabu is 0.0628 grams, and its gross weight is 0.1629
grams. With respect to Criminal Case No. 11266, the Information states the shabu weighs 2.74 grams but PSI
Susan stated that the net weight of the shabu was 2.0946, and its gross weight is 2.7643 grams. The Court
cannot gloss over these discrepancies in the weight of the seized drugs. (Tan v. People of the Philippines, G.R.
87. PO1 Dono had failed to immediately mark the plastic sachet allegedly bought from accused-appellant. He
testified that after receiving the shabu, he walked away with his confidential informant, proceeded to the road,
and blended with the crowd. He likewise admitted that he did not mark the sachet of drug that was inside his
pocket. From his testimony, it can be gleaned that the confiscated item subject of the sale was not immediately
marked upon seizure. Worse, PO1 Doño failed to ventilate the precautionary measures taken in preserving the
identity of the seized item given that he did not mark it when he left the area where the buy-bust operation
took place, to the area where he dropped the confidential informant in a safe location, to the time when he

blended in with the crowd, until he finally delivered the seized item to PO3 Javier. In other words, the
confiscated item remained unmarked while in the custody of PO1 Doño. Clearly, the probability that the
integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti being compromised existed, as it was easily susceptible to
tampering, alteration, or substitution. PO1 Doño admitted that he placed the plastic sachet seized from
accused-appellant inside his right pocket before handing it over to PO1 Javier for marking and inventory. This
calls into question the identity of the item that was later marked and inventoried, for the third-party witnesses
would not have known whether the seized item delivered by PO1 Doño being marked and inventoried in their
presence was actually confiscated from accused-appellant. The belated marking adversely affected the integrity
and evidentiary value of the seized drug subject of the sale. As stated above, PO1 Doño even brought the
confiscated item to a different location before proceeding to deliver it to PO3 Javier. The circumstance of PO1
Doño putting the drugs inside his right pocket and keeping it for an indefinite period of time and bringing it to
the place where he dropped the confidential informant is an odd and irregular way of handling the confiscated
item. This Court cannot foreclose the possibility that the seized item had been tampered with, altered, or
substituted before it was marked and inventoried. People v. Dela Cruz is instructive: keeping one of the seized
items in his right pocket and the rest in his left pocket is doubtful and suspicious way of ensuring the integrity
of the items. (People of the Philippines v. Cabriole, G.R. No. 248418, May 5, 2021, First Division)
88. The police officers sufficiently complied with the chain of custody rule, and they were able to preserve the
integrity, identity and evidentiary value of the seized items subject of Criminal Case No. 2016-6623 for violation
of R.A. 9165, Section 11, as amended.
a. First, when accused-appellant attempted to elude arrest, he was apprehended by the arresting team and
brought back to the place where the buy-bust operation took place. Thereat, PO3 Javier asked the
witnesses to search him before he proceeded to search accused-appellant. PO3 Javier eventually found
three plastic sachets in the right lower middle pocket of accused-appellant. Immediately after the seizure
of the suspected packs of illicit drugs, PO3 Javier marked and inventoried the items. Also, SPO1 Pensinabes
took photographs in the presence of accused-appellant and the two required witnesses — the
representative from the media and the barangay kagawad — in conformity with the amended witness
requirement under R.A. No. 10640.
b. Second, it was PO3 Javier who held custody of the seized items after the operation. At the police station,
PO3 Javier then personally delivered all the seized items to PCI Esber for laboratory examination.
c. Third, PCI Esber personally received the suspected sachets of shabu at the Crime Laboratory, and he
confirmed that the items yielded a positive result of the dangerous drug shabu as embodied in Chemistry
Report No. D-98-2016 MIS OR. PCI Esber, in turn, brought the specimens to evidence custodian PO3
Dagatan for safekeeping. (People of the Philippines v. Cabriole, G.R. No. 248418, May 5, 2021, First Division)
89. The first link is established. Here, SPO2 Taldo immediately marked the two (2) bricks of cocaine in the Otto
shoebox he received from appellant with LPP 06152315 2010 and LPP1 06152315 2010 together with his
signature at the place of operation. Meanwhile, PO3 Perida recovered a yellow Mario D’Boro box containing
two (2) more bricks of suspected cocaine from behind the driver seat which he, too, immediately marked as
LPP2 06152315 2010 and LPP3 06152315 2010 with his signature. The marking was done in the presence of
Barangay Kagawad Santos and two (2) representatives from the media. An inventory of the seized items was
then prepared in the presence of appellant and the witnesses. Photographs were taken during the marking and
inventory. (People of the Philippines v. SPO1 Estabillo, G.R. No. 252902, June 16, 2021, Second Division)
90. The prosecution failed to establish an unbroken chain of custody. For one, the venue for making the inventory
and photograph be conducted immediately after seizure and confiscation, thus, it must be done at the place of
arrest. Here, SPO2 Antillon, Jr. testified that upon appellants’ arrest, they were immediately brought to the
police station where an inventory photographing of the seized items were conducted. He explained, however,
that a crowd had already gathered at the situs criminis, thus, they had to go back to the police station. In People
v. Dumanjug, the Court rejected the buy-bust team’s argument that it failed to conduct the marking, inventory,
photography of the seized drug immediately at the place of arrest because a crowd of two (200) people have
gathered creating a dangerous environment. Indeed, a bare invocation of inconvenience does not translate to
compliance with the chain of custody rule. Second, the physical inventory and photography were not done in
the presence of a DOJ representative, a media representative, and a local elected official. People v. Lim stressed
the importance of the presence of the three insulating witnesses or in the alternative, the prosecution must
allege and prove the reasons for their absence and show that earnest efforts were made to secure their
attendance. Here, while the prosecution admitted that marking, inventory, and photographing were not made
in the presence of a DOJ representative, a media representative, and a local elected official, it made no effort
at all to explain or justify why these required witnesses were absent nor did it show that earnest efforts were
exerted to secure their attendance. (People of the Philippines v. Andanar, G.R. No. 246284, June 16, 2021,
Second Division)
91. The first crucial link in the chain of custody starts with the seizure from Mila of the dangerous drugs and tis
subsequent marking. As culled from the assailed Decision of the CA, after recovering the plastic bag of shabu
from Mila, the buy-bust team decided to conduct the marking and inventory at the PDEA Office to avoid any
commotion since Mila was then already hysterical. Upon arrival at the PDEA Office, Agent Sarausa marked the

seized item, "EXH A-2 RGS 6/22/15" with her signature. Furthermore, the inventory of the seized item was
conducted in the presence of Brgy. Kagawad Maritess Palma of Brgy. Pinyahan, Quezon City and Alex Mendoza
of Hataw media. After the inventory, Agent Sarausa brought the seized item to Forensic Chemist Perez to
determine the presence of dangerous drugs. Forensic Chemist Perez conducted an examination of the
specimen, the results of which showed that the seized item contained methamphetamine hydrochloride or
shabu, a dangerous drug.
a. In this case, the Court finds that the PDEA operatives committed justified deviations from the prescribed
chain of custody rule, thereby preserving the integrity and evidentiary value of the items purportedly seized
from Mila. As can be gainsaid, the buy-bust team decided to conduct the marking and inventory at the
PDEA Office to avoid any commotion since Mila was hysterical, let alone that the buy-bust operation was
conducted in a shopping mall where dozens of people are around. Indubitably, the requirement under
Section 21, Article II of RA 9165, as amended by RA 10640, that the marking and inventory be performed
in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or
his/her representative or counsel, an elected public official and a representative of the National
Prosecution Service OR the media who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a
copy thereof, was satisfied. Needless to stress, the quantity of drugs involved in this case is not miniscule
as to easily facilitate "planting" or switching. (People of the Philippines v. Somira, G.R. No. 252152, June 23,
92. That the arresting officers “were exhausted at that time” do not warrant a departure of the mandatory rules of
procedure under the law. (Luna v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 231902, June 30, 2021, First Division)
PRESENCE OF ACCUSED AND INSULATING WITNESSES

1. While the buy-bust operation team allegedly conducted an inventory of the seized items, it is unclear if this
inventory was limited to those seized pursuant to the enforcement of the search warrant or was inclusive of
whatever items seized during the buy-bust operation. In any case, this inventory was discredited as one of the
co-accused was acquitted of the charge of illegal possession of drug paraphernalia because the inventory was
found to be unreliable vis-à-vis the testimony of PO2 Castulo. The paraphernalia to which PO2 Castulo testified
to in court were different from those indicated in the inventory supposedly made when the search warrant was
enforced. In addition, the “barangay official” and “media people” who were allegedly present during the
inventory have neither been identified nor presented as witnesses. Hence, there are doubts on the integrity of
the seized sachet. (People v. Hogaldo and Misarez, G.R. No. 207992, August 11, 2014, Third Division)
2. The CA correctly emphasized that during trial, the requirements of the law were sufficiently complied with. The
testimonies of the members of the PDEA team, found by the trial court to be credible, established that there
was physical inventory, marking, and taking of photographs of the seized items. During the process, the
following were found present: (a) Brgy. Kagawad Oga Hernandez and Herald Santos, (b) Asst. City Prosecutor of
Pasay and Fiscal Angel Marcos, (c) media representative Jimmy Mendoza, and (d) petitioners themselves. The
inventory of seized properties or items bore the signature of these witnesses, and was presented and formally
offered as evidence. The defense did not present any evidence to controvert the case of the prosecution. In
addition, the non-presentation of the forensic chemist is of no moment since the defense agreed during the
preliminary conference on the competency and qualifications of the forensic chemist who examined the
specimen subject of this case and that the specimen subject of the case was the same item subject of a request
for laboratory examination and that the same specimen was examined by the forensic chemist. (Coronel v.
People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 214536, January 11, 2016, Second Division)
3. Despite the prosecution’s allegation that a buy-bust operation was carefully planned and carried out, it
admitted that Section 21(1) of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act was not faithfully complied with. While
an inventory was supposed to have been conducted, this was done neither in the presence of petitioner, the
person from whom the drugs were supposedly seized, nor in the presence of his counsel or representative.
Likewise, not one of the persons required to be presented – an elected public official, and a representative of
the National Prosecution Service or the media – was shown to have been around during the inventory and
photographing. (Lescano v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 214490, January 13, 2016, Second Division;
People of the Philippines v. Beniedo, G.R. No. 206927, July 13, 2016, Third Division; Gamboa v. People of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 220333, November 14, 2016, First Division; People of the Philippines v. Geronimo, G.R. No.
225500, September 11, 2017, Second Division; People of the Philippines v. Mamangon, G.R. No. 229102,
January 29, 2018, Second Division; People of the Philippines v. Jugo, G.R. No. 231792, January 29, 2018, Second
Division; People of the Philippines v. Ahmad, G.R. No. 228955, March 14, 2018, Second Division; People of the
Philippines v. Labadan, G.R. No. 237769, March 11, 2019, First Division; People of the Philippines v. Laway, G.R.
No. 227741, March 27, 2019, First Division; People of the Philippines v. Visperas, G.R. No. 231010, June 26,
2019, First Division; People of the Philippines v. Wisco, G.R. No. 237977, August 19, 2019, Third Division; People
of the Philippines v. Antonio, G.R. No. 243936, September 16, 2019, First Division)
a. Even though neither the accused nor any of her representatives was present during the marking, inventory,
and photographing, the police officers substantally complied with the rules as media representatives and
barangay officials were present during the search. (People of the Philippines v. Pangan, G.R. No. 206965,

b. The law requires the presence of an elected public official, as well as a representative from the DOJ and
the media in order to ensure the establishment of the chain of custody and remove any suspicion of
switching, planting, or contamination of evidence. Despite the non-observance of this requirement, the
prosecution did not even proffer a plausible explanation therefor. No practicable reasons were given by
the police officers, such as a threat to their safety and security or the time and distance which the other
witnesses might need to consider. Thus, considering the police officers’ unjustified non-compliance with
the prescribed procedure under R.A. 9165, Section 21, the integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated
drugs are clearly put into question. (People of the Philippines v. Miranda, G.R. No. 229671, January 31,
2018, Second Division; People of the Philippines v. Guieb, G.R. No. 233100, February 14, 2018, Second
Division; People of the Philippines v. Manansala, G.R. No. 229092, February 21, 2018, Second Division;
People of the Philippines v. Magsano, G.R. No. 231050, February 28, 2018, Second Division; People of the
Philippines v. Sanchez, G.R. No. 231383, March 7, 2018, Second Division; People of the Philippines v. Crispo,
G.R. No. 230065, March 14, 2018, Second Division; People of the Philippines v. Otico, G.R. No. 231133,
June 6, 2018, Second Division; People of the Philippines v. Delociembre, G.R. No. 226485, June 6, 2018,
Special First Division; People of the Philippines v. Andrada, G.R. No. 232299, June 20, 2018, Second Division;
People of the Philippines v. Allingag, G.R. No. 233477, July 30, 2018, Second Division; People of the
Philippines v. Baptista, G.R. No. 225738, August 20, 2018, Second Division; People of the Philippines v.
Jimenez, G.R. No. 230721, October 15, 2018, Third Division; People of the Philippines v. Jamila, G.R. No.
206398, November 5, 2018, First Division; People of the Philippines v. Lazaro, G.R. No. 229219, November
21, 2018, Second Division; People of the Philippines v. Alconde, G.R. No. 238117, February 4, 2019, Second
Division; Regalado v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 216632, March 13, 2019, Third Division; People of
the Philippines v. Briones, G.R. No. 239077, March 20, 2019, Second Division; People of the Philippines v.
Fulinara, G.R. No. 237975, June 19, 2019, Second Division; People of the Philippines v. Cañete, G.R. No.
242018, July 3, 2019, Second Division; People of the Philippines v. Galuken, G.R. No. 216754, July 17, 2019,
Second Division; People of the Philippines v. Nazareno, G.R. No. 231875, July 29, 2019, Second Division;
People of the Philippines v. Sarabia, G.R. No. 243190, August 28, 2019, Second Division; People of the
Philippines v. De Castro, G.R. No. 243386, September 2, 2019, Second Division; People of the Philippines v.
Cohayco, G.R. No. 241324, September 11, 2019, First Division; People of the Philippines v. Vertudes and
Vertudes, G.R. No. 220725, October 16, 2019, Second Division; Grefaldo v. People of the Philippines, G.R.
No. 246362, November 11, 2019, Second Division; People of the Philippines v. Divinagracia, G.R. No.
240230, November 28, 2019, First Division; People of the Philippines v. Globa, G.R. No. 241251, December
10, 2019, First Division; People of the Philippines v. Ramos, G.R. No. 236455, February 19, 2020, First
Division)
c. Time, safety, location and availability of the required witnesses are some of the factors that must be
considered in determining whether or not to apply the saving clause found in Section 21. In addition to the
grounds relied upon, the arresting officers must also prove that earnest efforts were made to comply with
the requirements of Section 21 otherwise the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty
will not stand. In the present case, there is nothing in the records that would suggest that the arresting
officers intentionally deviated from the standard conduct of official duty as provided for in the law.
Moreover, it is clear that from the time the subject drug was confiscated by PO2 Dajac from the accused-
appellant, the former continued to be in custody of the drugs until it was turned over to the PNP Crime
Laboratory for qualitative and. quantitative examination and subsequently presented in court as evidence.
(People of the Philippines v. Guadaña, G.R. No. 234160, July 23, 2018, Second Division)
d. While the Court agrees with the courts a quo that the buy-bust team was justified in conducting the
marking, inventory, and photography at the PDEA-RO 7 Office due to security reasons, i.e., a crowd was
already forming at the place of Arciaga's arrest, it is nevertheless apparent that, as seen in the Certificate
of Inventory dated June 26, 2012, the inventory of the seized' items was not conducted in the presence of
a DOJ representative, contrary to the afore-described procedure. This was confirmed by no less than the
poseur-buyer, Intelligence Officer I Edd Ryan Dayuha (IO1 Dayuha), in his testimony during cross-
examination. (People of the Philippines v. Arciaga, G.R. No. 239471, January 14, 2019, Second Division)
e. Presence of the three witnesses must be secured not only during the inventory but more importantly, at
the time of the warrantless arrest. It is at this point in which the presence of the three witnesses is most
needed, as it is their presence at the time of seizure and confiscation that would belie as to the source,
identity, and integrity of the seized drug. (People of the Philippines v. Fayo, G.R. No. 239887, October 2,
2019, Second Division; People of the Philippines v. Kamad, G.R. No. 238174, February 5, 2020, Second
Division)
f. There is a lapse in the chain of custody when PO1 Sugayen testified that he only marked the seized items
at the police station, only in the presence of petitioner and SPO1 Alonzo. Verily, not one of the required
insulating persons witnessed the marking of the seized items. Neither was there an attempt on the
arresting officers to secure their presence for the marking, inventory, and photograph of the seized
dangerous drug after the buy bust operation. (Barayuga v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 248382, July
g. R.A. 9165, prior to its amendment by R.A. 10640 on July 15, 2014, is the law applicable as the alleged crimes
in this case were committed on May 23, 2013. The original version of Section 21 requires the presence of
three witnesses during the inventory and photograph taking: (i) media representative; (ii) representative
from the DOJ; and (iii) any elected public official. (People of the Philippines v. Arellaga, G.R. No. 231796,

August 24, 2020, Second Division; People of the Philippines v. Soriano, G.R. No. 248010, September 8,
4. There was a gap in the chain of custody of the seized drug at the very beginning. The prosecution’s lone witness
omitted to testify to whom the poseur buyer which was already bought from appellant during the buy-bust
operation. After testifying about the poseur buyer buying the shabu from appellant, the witness no longer
mentioned the succeeding actions of the poseur buyer, particularly to whom the poseur buyer gave the shabu
for custody. The only conclusion from this omission is that the witness did not witness the subsequent acts of
the poseur buyer, especially with regard to the custody of the shabu. In addition, the marking of the sachet of
shabu was not done in the presence of the appellant. (People of the Philippines v. Quim, G.R. No. 213919, June
5. The rule on chain of custody was not complied with because the apprehending team never conducted an
inventory nor did they photograph the seized drugs in the presence of the appellants or their counsel, a
representative from the media and the Department of Justice, or an elective official either at the place of the
seizure, or at the police station. (People of the Philippines v. Miranda, Jr., G.R. No. 206880, June 29, 2016, Third
Division; Ramos v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 227336, February 26, 2018, Third Division; People of the
Philippines v. Alvarado, G.R. No. 234048, April 23, 2018, Third Division)
6. The prosecution was able to establish that PO3 Ardedon (with respect to the sachet handed over by
Macapundag to him) and SPO1 Victoriano (with respect to the three sachets recovered from Macapundag upon
his arrest) marked the seized items immediately at the place of arrest. However, the prosecution’s witnesses
failed to state whether or not the police officers inventoried and photographed the seized sachets in the
presence of Macapundag or his representative. Likewise, they were silent as to the presence of the other
required witnesses, i.e., a representative from the DOJ, any elected public official, and a member of the press.
In fact, the prosecution did not even offer any inventory of the seized items or photographs thereof as evidence.
In this relation, the Evidence Acknowledgment Receipt and the Affidavit of Attestation, which form part of the
evidence of the prosecution, likewise failed to disclose that the seized items were actually inventories or
photographed in accordance with the parameters provided by R.A. 9165, Section 21 and its IRR; thus, their
submission cannot constitute with the law. In addition, the prosecution did not even bother to explain why the
inventory and photograph of the seized evidence were not made either in the place of seizure and arrest or at
the police station, as required by the IRR in case of warrantless arrests, or why the marking of the seized item
was not made at the place of seizure in the presence of Macapundag. It was also silent on the absence of a
representative from the DOJ, the media, and an elected public official to witness the inventory and receive
copies of the same. Similarly unexplained was the lack of inventory and photographs of the seized items.
Accordingly, the plurality of the breaches of procedure committed by the police officers, unacknowledged and
unexplained by the State, militate against a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt against the accused, as
the integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti had been compromised. (People of the Philippines v.
Macapundag, G.R. No. 225965, March 13, 2017, First Division)
7. While it may be true that the seized items were marked and inventoried in the presence of a media
representative, an elected barangay official, and a representative from the DOJ, there is no evidence showing
that these procedures were done in the presence of accused-appellant or her authorized representative or
counsel. Moreover, none of the witnesses to the marking and inventory of the seized items was presented in
court to testify. Further, it appears that the authorities failed to take photographs of the seized items. No
photograph of the seized dangerous drugs was presented and offered as evidence before the trial court. More
tell is the finding of the CA that although there were photographs taken at Camp Simeon Ola, these were not
photographs of the seized items. Hence, when a miniscule amount of dangerous drugs – 0.0496 grams and
0.0487 grams of shabu – is seized, law enforcers should not trifle with the legal requirement to ensure integrity
in the chain of custody of seized dangerous drugs and drug paraphernalia. Unfortunately, in this case, said legal
requirements were not complied with. (People of the Philippines v. Saunar, G.R. No. 207396, August 9, 2017,
Second Division)
8. Presence of the so-called insulating witnesses required under Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 should also either
be present during marking or their absence should be with a valid justification. Otherwise, a lapse with respect
thereto would also result in a gap in the chain of custody. (People of the Philippines v. Gaylon, G.R. No. 219086,
March 19, 2018, First Division; People of the Philippines v. Callejo, G.R. No. 227427, June 6, 2018, Second
Division; People of the Philippines v. Binasing, G.R. No. 221439, July 4, 2018, First Division; People of the
Philippines v. Pagsigan, G.R. No. 232487, September 3, 2018, First Division; People of the Philippines v. Rivera,
G.R. No. 225768, November 14, 2018, Second Division; People of the Philippines v. Malana, G.R. No. 233747,
December 5, 2018, Second Division; People of the Philippines v. Tampus, G.R. No. 221434, February 6, 2019,
Second Division; People of the Philippines v. Espejo, G.R. No. 240914, March 18, 2019, Second Division; People
of the Philippines v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 229352, April 10, 2019, Third Division; People of the Philippines v. Flores,
G.R. No. 220464, June 10, 2019, Second Division; People of the Philippines v. Nieves, G.R. No. 239787, June 19,
2019, Second Division; People of the Philippines v. Ressurreccion, G.R. No. 231361, July 3, 2019, Second
Division; People of the Philippines v. Cepeda, G.R. No. 229833, July 29, 2019, Second Division; People of the

Philippines v. Rasos, Jr., G.R. No. 243639, September 18, 2019, Second Division; People of the Philippines v.
Dalupang, G.R. No. 235469, October 2, 2019, Second Division; Edangalino v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No.
235110, January 8, 2020, First Division; People of the Philippines v. Padua, G.R. No. 239781, February 5, 2020,
First Division; People of the Philippines v. Manansala, G.R. No. 228825, July 28, 2020, First Division)
a. PO3 Reyes explained that the buy-bust operation happened so fast; hence, they were unable to summon
the required witnesses. The justification, however, fails to persuade. The allegation that the operation
happened quickly was belied by the testimony of PO3 Reyes himself. Records show that the police officers
had ample time, or eight hours to be exact, to summon the attendance of the required witnesses but they
failed to do so. The explanation provided fails to justify the lapse. (People of the Philippines v. Balderrama,
9. Mere signature or presence of the insulating witness at the time of signing is not enough to comply with what
is required under Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165. What the law clearly mandates is that they be present while the
actual inventory and photographing of the seized drugs are happening. If we were to allow such circumvention
of this requirement, we would open the floodgates to more mistaken drug convictions especially when planting
evidence is a common practice. (People of the Philippines v. Bintaib, G.R. No. 217805, April 2, 2018, Third
Division; People of the Philippines v. Bombio, G.R. No. 234291, October 3, 2018, Second Division; People of the
Philippines v. Cariño, G.R. No. 233336, January 14, 2019, Second Division; People of the Philippines v. Caranto,
10. The requirements stated in Section 21 of R.A. 1965 have not been followed. There was no representative from
the media and the National Prosecution Service present during the inventory and no justifiable ground was
provided as to their absence. It must be emphasized that the prosecution must be able to prove a justifiable
ground in omitting certain requirements provided in Sec. 21 such as, but not limited to the following: (a) media
representatives are not available at that time or that the police operatives had no time to alert the media due
to the immediacy of the operation they were about to undertake, especially if it is done in more remote areas;
(b) the police operatives, with the same reason, failed to find an available representative of the National
Prosecution Service; (c) the police officers, due to time constraints brought about by the urgency of the
operation to be undertaken and in order to comply with the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code
in the timely delivery of prisoners, were not able to comply with all the requisites set forth in Section 21 of R.A.
9165. (People of the Philippines v. Reyes, G.R. No. 219953, April 23, 2018, Second Division; People of the
Philippines v. Sipin, G.R. No. 224290, June 11, 2018, Second Division; People of the Philippines v. Bangalan, G.R.
11. Adobar’s flight serves as a waiver of his right to be present during the initial custody requirements of R.A. 9165,
Section 21, but does not excuse compliance by the buy-bust team with the presence of three insulating
witnesses therein. (People of the Philippines v. Ga-a, G.R. No. 222559, June 6, 2018, Second Division)
12. The police officers committed unjustified deviations from the prescribed chain of custody rule, thereby putting
into question the integrity and evidentiary value of the items purportedly seized from Mercader. First, records
reveal that the marking of the seized items was not done in the presence of any elected public official, as well
as a representative from the DOJ and the media. Despite the failure to observe this requirement, no justifiable
ground was given to explain such lapse. In fact, there is actually no mention of these required witnesses in this
case. Second, no physical inventory, as well as photography, of the seized items were taken. PO1 Anos admitted
the lack of inventory. Notably, PO2 Daño contradictorily testified that PO1 Anos prepared a written inventory
which Mercader signed. He likewise stated that photographs were taken of the items and existed in the file.
Despite the seemingly conflicting statements made by the police officers, it remains that nothing on the record
shows that the required inventory or photography of the seized items was conducted. Besides, neither of the
said documents mentioned by PO2 Daño were offered in evidence before the trial court. (People of the
Philippines v. Mercader, G.R. No. 233480, June 20, 2018, Second Division)
13. The Court notes that the buy-bust team had more than thirty minutes to secure the attendance of the required
witnesses during the inventory and photographing of the seized items. As testified by PO1 Balbin, the
confidential informant arrived at the SAID-SOTG office as early as 9:00 o'clock in the morning of February 1,
2011. However, the actual buy-bust operation was conducted at 7:00 o'clock in the evening of the same day.
Thus, they had at least ten hours from the time they received the tip until the buy-bust team proceeded to the
agreed location. This appears to be more than enough time for the buy-bust team to contact and request for
the presence of the required witnesses. (People of the Philippines v. Bobotiok, Jr., G.R. No. 237804, July 4, 2018,
Third Division)
14. Anent the compliance with the requirement of marking, PO3 Albert Santiago informed Reynaldo of his arrest
upon the completion of their exchange. The drugs subject of the illegal sale remained in the hands of PO3
Santiago from that time onwards. On the other hand, SPO3 Ireneo Bunac was the officer who had effected the
arrest of Reynaldo, and had recovered in the process of frisking him another sachet of shabu. The arresting
lawmen immediately left the scene with Reynado and stopped at the Barangay Hall of Camino Nuevo to do the
physical inventory of the seized drugs. SPO3 Bunac took the inventory in the presence of Barangay Captain

Antonio T. Delles. Afterwards, they left the Barangay Hall to proceed to their office where PO3 Santiago marked
the seized drugs with his own initials of "AGS" and SPO3 Bunac marked the sachet of shabu he had recovered
from Reynaldo with his own initials of "IPB." The foregoing account indicates that the arresting lawmen
committed very serious lapses that broke the chain of custody right at its inception. To start with, PO3 Santiago
and SPO3 Bunac gave no explanation as to why they did not mark the seized drugs right after the arrest of the
accused, or even during the taking of the inventory at the Barangay Hall. Their omissions exposed the seized
drugs to the possibility of switching or tampering while in transit to the police office, or to planting of evidence,
the very dangers that the marking was intended to preclude. Secondly, the unmarked sachet of shabu left the
hands of PO3 Santiago when the same was inventoried by SPO3 Bunac. In that situation, the two officers did
nothing to ensure that the sachet of shabu seized by PO3 Santiago would be differentiated and segregated from
the sachet of shabu SPO3 Bunac seized from Reynaldo's possession. The practical problem of ascertaining which
of the sachets of shabu was involved in the illegal sale or in the illegal possession naturally arose, putting in
doubt the proof of the corpus delicti. And, thirdly, no witness testified on the circumstances surrounding the
making of the marking - whether the marking was made in the presence of Reynaldo, or of the other witnesses
whose presence was required by law (namely, the representative of the Department of Justice [DOJ], an elective
official, and the representative of the media). In this regard, although PO3 Santiago stated that the inventory
had been taken in the presence of Reynaldo, nothing was offered to corroborate his statement. What appears
in the records instead is the inventory that was not signed by Reynaldo despite the law itself requiring the
accused to sign the same. (People of the Philippines v. Rojas, G.R. No. 222563, July 23, 2018, Third Division)
15. Although the first link was duly observed; that is, the seized shabu was properly marked, the second link in the
chain of custody lacks detail. After the appellant was arrested and informed of his constitutional rights, he was
brought to the police station and the seized items consisting of one (1) heat-sealed transparent sachet, buy-
bust money and cellular phone were marked, inventoried and photographed. It must be observed that during
the inventory and photograph of these seized items, no representatives from the media or the DOJ were
present. The inventory and photography were witnessed only by appellant, barangay kagawads Bautista and
Baggayan and Pacallagan, who was neither a representative of the media nor DOJ but a court interpreter of the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Solana-Enrile, Cagayan. Sec. 1 (A.1.6) of the chain of custody IRR explicitly
provides that a representative of the National Prosecution Service of the DOJ is anyone from its employees.
Certainly, Pacallagan is not one of those required by law to witness the inventory and photography of the seized
shabu and sign the corresponding inventory report. It is not enough for the apprehending officers to mark the
seized sachet of shabu; the buy-bust team must also conduct a physical inventory and take photographs of the
confiscated shabu in the presence of these persons required by law. (People of the Philippines v. Balubal, G.R.
16. Initially, it would appear that the arresting officers complied with the witness requirement during inventory, as
seen in the Receipt of Property Seized dated September 22, 2005 which contains the signatures of the required
witnesses, i.e., a public elected official, a representative from the DOJ, and a representative from the media.
However, no less than PO3 Germodo admitted in open court that they actually conducted two (2) separate
inventories in different places and in the presence of different witnesses. From the foregoing testimony, it is
clear that the arresting officers conducted two (2) separate inventories, both of which are glaringly non-
compliant with the required witnesses rule: (i) in the inventory conducted at the Ayungon Police Station, only
a public elected official – Brgy. Kagawad Raul Fausto – was present thereat; and (ii) on the other hand, the
inventory conducted at the Dumaguete Police Station was witnessed only by representatives from the DOJ and
the media. To make matters worse, the arresting officers attempted to cover up such fact by preparing a single
inventory sheet signed by the witnesses at different times and places. Verily, the chain of custody rule laid down
by RA 9165 and its IRR contemplates a situation where the inventory conducted on the seized items is witnessed
by the required personalities at the same time. The wordings of the law leave no room for any piecemeal
compliance with the required witnesses rule as what happened in this case. Otherwise, the avowed purpose of
the required witnesses rule – which is to prevent the evils of switching, planting, or contamination of the corpus
delicti resulting in the tainting of its integrity and evidentiary value – will be greatly diminished or even
completely negated. (People of the Philippines v. Cabrellos, G.R. No. 229826, July 30, 2018, Second Division;
People of the Philippines v. Sioson, G.R. No. 242686, July 7, 2020, First Division)
17. While the inventory and the photography of the seized items were made in the presence of Feriol and an
elected public official, the records do not show that the said inventory and photography were done before any
representative from the DOJ and the media. The apprehending officers did not bother to acknowledge or
explain such lapse, as the records even fail to disclose that there was an attempt to contact of secure these
witnesses’ presence. (People of the Philippines v. Feriol, G.R. No. 232154, August 20, 2018, Second Division;
People of the Philippines v. Misa, G.R. No. 236838, October 1, 2018, Second Division; People of the Philippines
v. Dela Rosa, G.R. No. 238338, October 1, 2018, Second Division; People of the Philippines v. Sanchez, G.R. No.
239000, November 5, 2018, Second Division; People of the Philippines v. Abdula, G.R. No. 212192, November
21, 2018, Third Division; Loayan v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 232940, January 14, 2019, Second Division;
People of the Philippines v. Dela Torre, G.R. No. 238519, June 26, 2019, Third Division; People of the Philippines
v. Maganon, G.R. No. 234040, June 26, 2019, First Division; Valdez v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 238349,
August 14, 2019, First Division; People of the Philippines v. Bumanglag, G.R. No. 228884, August 19, 2019,

Second Division; People of the Philippines v. Doctolero, Jr., G.R. No. 243940, August 20, 2019, First Division;
Duarte v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 238971, August 28, 2019, First Division; People of the Philippines
v. Mamarinta, G.R. No. 243589, September 9, 2019, First Division; People of the Philippines v. Sendad, G.R. No.
18. A review of the records reveals that the police officers did not follow the procedural safeguards prescribed by
law, and thereby created serious gaps in the chain of custody of the confiscated dangerous drug. SPO3 Del
Rosario, the only Prosecution witness who testified, readily admitted that the officers did not coordinate with
any media representative, Department of Justice (DOJ) representative, or elected official during the physical
inventory. Worse, SPO3 Del Rosario did not show that the marking and the inventory of the seized dangerous
drugs were done in the presence of the accused-appellant or her representative. There was also no proof that
any photograph was taken to document the evidence seized. The Court further notes that the "TURN OVER
RECEIPT/INVENTORY OF SEIZED ITEMS" allegedly prepared by SPO1 Antonio Marcos had not been signed by
SPO1 Marcos, or by the accused-appellant, or by any of the personalities required by law to witness the
inventory and the photographing of the confiscated dangerous drugs (namely: the media representative, the
representative from the DOJ, and an elective official). The absence of SPO1 Marcos' signature from the
document engendered doubts about the proper custody and handling of the dangerous drug after leaving the
hands of SPO3 Del Rosario. Indeed, there was no way of ascertaining whether or not SPO1 Marcos had truly
received the dangerous drug from SPO3 Del Rosario unless there was evidence from which to check such
information. It is notable that the inventory itself – being dated June 28, 2008 – was faulty by virtue of its being
dated prior to the apprehension of the accused-appellant on July 1, 2008. (People of the Philippines v.
Peromingan, G.R. No. 218401, September 24, 2018, First Division)
19. It is glaring from the records that after Baradi was arrested during the buy-bust operation and subsequently
searched, the poseur-buyer, SPO1 Andulay, immediately took custody of the seized plastic sachets and
conducted the marking, inventory, and photography thereof in the presence of a public elected official, a DOJ
representative, and a media representative right at the place where Baradi was arrested. Thereafter, SPO1
Andulay secured the seized plastic sachets and delivered the same to the forensic chemist at the crime
laboratory, who in turn, personally brought the items to the RTC for identification. In view of the foregoing, the
Court holds that there is sufficient compliance with the chain of custody rule, and thus, the integrity and
evidentiary value of the corpus delicti have been preserved. Perforce, Baradi's conviction must stand. (People
of the Philippines v. Baradi, G.R. No. 238522, October 1, 2018, Second Division)
20. Under RA 9165, the law prevailing at that time, the physical inventory and photography must be witnessed by
three necessary witnesses. In this case, PO2 Sulmerin conducted an inventory of the seized items in the
presence of appellant, Manilyn, media person Curameng, and Chief Tanod Bugaoisan, who, as aptly pointed out
by Justice Bernabe, was not even an elected public official. There was also no DOJ representative present at the
time. Thus, strictly speaking, there was only one valid witness, media person Curanmeng, who signed the
Receipt of Properties/Article Seized. The Court has carefully reviewed the records and found that no explanation
was also offered by the prosecution to explain the absence of the DOJ representative and an elected public
official, nor did it show that earnest efforts were exerted to secure the presence of the same. In view of the
foregoing, the Court is constrained to reverse the conviction of the appellant due to the failure of the
prosecution to provide a justifiable reason for the non-compliance with the Chain of Custody Rule, which
creates doubt as to the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized plastic sachet of shabu. (People of the
Philippines v. Pascua, G.R. No. 227707, October 8, 2018, First Division)
21. SPO1 Vaquilar, during cross-examination, admitted that the buy-bust team deliberately excluded the member
of the media from the physical inventory of the seized drug. Notably, the confidential character of the buy-bust
operation is not a justifiable reason to exclude any required witness from the physical inventory under the law.
Section 21 of RA 9165, as amended, requires that the three witnesses must be present during the physical
inventory "immediately after seizure and confiscation" of the seized drug. Thus, the buy-bust team may inform
the member of the media prior to the buy-bust operation or after the accused's arrest. In both instances, the
law requires that the member of the media be present during the physical inventory of the seized drug, when
the seized drug is photographed, and sign copies of the inventory of the seized drug. During the buy-bust
operation, the buy-bust team may bring along the representative of the National Prosecution Service or the
media without giving the representative details of the buy-bust operation. The buy-bust team may also contact
the representative from the National Prosecution Service or the media to go to the buy-bust site immediately
after the arrest and seizure. Either approach will not result in leakage of the planned buy-bust operation.
However, upon the arrest of appellant, a representative from the National Prosecution Service or the media
must be present to witness the physical inventory and sign the copies of the inventory receipt. Evidently, in this
case, the buy-bust team decided to proceed with the physical inventory without the required witness from the
National Prosecution Service or the media as mandated under Section 21 of RA 9165, as amended. Further,
there was no justification or explanation for the non-observance of the three witness rule under Section 21 of
RA 9165, as amended, in the Affidavit of Arrest or in other sworn statements or affidavits submitted by the
prosecution. Thus, following Section 21 of RA 9165, as amended, the Chain of Custody Implementing Rules and
Regulations, and the guidelines of this Court in People v. Lim, this Court finds that appellant should be acquitted

based on reasonable doubt. (People of the Philippines v. Mendoza, G.R. No. 225061, October 10, 2018, Second
Division)
22. During the physical inventory and photograph of the items seized there were no representatives from the media
and the DOJ, and there was no elected public official present. Instead, only a security guard of the mall
witnessed the said inventory. An explanation of the absence of the required witnesses is also not provided nor
was there any evidence to prove that the police officers exerted any effort to seek their presence. The absence
of the witnesses has been admitted by PO3 More. There being no justifiable reason in this case for the non-
compliance of Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165, this Court finds it necessary to acquit the appellant for failure of the
prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. (People of the Philippines v. Señeres, Jr., G.R. No.
23. Although nothing appears in the records that the conduct of the required physical inventory of the subject
evidence and the taking of a photograph thereof were made in the presence of an elected public official and a
representative of the National Prosecution Service, under the same proviso, non-compliance with the stipulated
procedure, under justifiable grounds, shall not render void and invalid such seizure of and custody over the said
item, for as long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the same are properly preserved by the apprehending
officers. The prosecution did not present any other witness who offered a version different from the above. In
fact, in their Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee, the police officers themselves impliedly admitted to committing the
following irregularities: (a) conducting the inventory in the police station, instead at the place of the arrest,
without offering an explanation as to why it was not practicable that the same be done immediately at the place
of the arrest; and (b) conducting the inventory without any of the required witnesses, namely a representative
from the DOJ, a media representative, and an elective official. In this regard, there was also no explanation as
to why none of the three required witness was present in the buy-bust operation conducted against Angeles.
The prosecution did not also address the issue in their pleadings, and the RTC and the CA instead had to rely
only on the presumption that police officers performed their functions in the regular manner to support
accused-appellant's conviction. It bears emphasis that the presence of the required witnesses at the time of
the apprehension and inventory is mandatory, and that the law imposes the said requirement because their
presence serves an essential purpose. (People of the Philippines v. Angeles, G.R. No. 237355, November 21,
24. The belated attendance of a media representative at the police station and the earlier inventory conducted at
the barangay hall, the latter being itself a delayed activity, are highly irregular and do not at all comply with the
mandate of the law. The presence of a third-party witness is imperative, not only during the physical inventory
and the taking of pictures, but also during the actual seizure of items. The requirement to conduct the inventory
and to take photographs "immediately after seizure and confiscation" necessarily means that the required
witnesses must also be present during the seizure. That the buy-bust operation was conducted early at around
6:30 in the evening, upon a tip-off from the confidential informant barely two hours earlier, is no excuse for
failing to secure the presence of these third-party representatives. The incident took place in 2011 long after
R.A. No. 9165 and its IRR had become effective. "In this light, it is judicious to conclude the possibility of seizure
or arrest at nighttime and dawn had been anticipated including the likelihood of sudden receipt of information
from confidential agents, hence[,] it is reasonable for the persons charged with the implementation [of the buy-
bust operations] to have put a system in place to ensure compliance with the pertinent laws and regulations
during such situations." Under the Revised PNP Manual on Anti-Illegal Drugs Operations and Investigation on
specific rules and procedures for planned operations such as a buy-bust operation, the designated team leader
is bound to see to it that he has the contact numbers of representatives from the DOJ, the Media, and any local
elected official in the area for inventory purposes as required under Sec. 21, Art. II of R.A. No. 9165. Thus,
securing the presence of these three (3) witnesses is not impossible. (People of the Philippines v. Marcelo, G.R.
25. An examination of the records reveals that the buy-bust team failed to comply with the mandatory witnesses'
rule. Here, none of the three (3) required witnesses under Section 21 was present at the time the subject drug
was allegedly seized from accused-appellant Casco or during the conduct of the inventory at the police station.
As admitted by PO1 Kalbi himself, only the buy-bust team and their confidential asset were present at the place
of arrest. Moreover, the inventory of the seized drug was made not in the presence of accused-appellant Casco
or his representative or counsel, an elected public official, a representative from media and a representative
from the DOJ, as mandated by Section 21. To be sure, the only witnesses who signed the Inventory Receipt
were the police officers themselves – PO3 Leonardo Ramos and SPO2 Arnold H. Yu. (People of the Philippines
v. Casco, G.R. No. 212819, November 28, 2018, Second Division)
26. It is important to point out that the members of the apprehending team in this case had more than ample time
to comply with the requirements established by law. By their own version of the facts, as previously narrated,
they received the information from their confidential informant at 9:30 a.m. on August 16, 2011, and they had
ample discretion as to when to conduct the buy-bust operation because the confidential informant supposedly
had direct contact with Cabezudo. They even had time to prepare a Pre-Operation Report and coordinate with
their Regional Office before the operation was actually conducted. The officers, therefore, could have complied

with the requirements of the law had they intended to. However, the apprehending officers in this case did not
exert even the slightest of effort to secure the attendance of two of the three required witnesses. Worse,
neither the police officers nor the prosecution – during the trial – offered any explanation for their deviation
from the strict requirements of the law. It is worth emphasizing that Section 21, RA 9165 and its IRR requires
the apprehending team to conduct the physical inventory of the seized items and the photographing of the
same in the presence of the required witness, all of whom shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory
and be given a copy thereof. In this case, clear from the afore-quoted testimonies is the fact that while the
inventory was conducted at the place of the apprehension, it was conducted only in the presence of the
barangay official. To repeat, the representatives from the media and the DOJ were only "called-in" to sign the
inventory receipt at the barangay hall. Parenthetically, even the place where the other witnesses were "called-
in" was improper, for the rules require the inventory to be conducted at the place of the arrest or, if
impracticable, at the nearest police station. (People of the Philippines v. Cabezudo, G.R. No. 232357, November
27. Since the buy-bust operation against appellant was conducted in 2012, or prior to the enactment of RA 10640
in 2014, the physical inventory and taking of photograph of the seized items must be witnessed by the following
persons: (a) any elected public official; (b) a DOJ representative; and (c) a media representative. However, while
SPO1 De los Santos marked the seized items in the presence of Kagawad Cuesta and Kagawad Disini, the
prosecution failed to establish that the physical inventory and taking of photograph were made in the presence
of the appellant or his representative, as well as representatives from the DOJ and media. In fact, the members
of the buy-bust team deliberately did not invite members of the media to avoid leakage of the impending
operation. Thus, it is clear that the arresting officers did not comply with the rule requiring the presence of
representatives from both the DOJ and the media. (People of the Philippines v. Torio, G.R. No. 225780,
December 3, 2018, First Division)
28. There was a deviation from the witness requirement as the conduct of inventory and photography was not
witnessed by an elected public official and a DOJ representative. This may be easily gleaned from the Inventory
of Drug Seized/Items which only proves the presence of a media representative, i.e., Santos. Such finding is
confirmed by the testimony of PO3 Rana, the police officer who made a request to call Medina's relatives, a
media representative, and an elected public official to witness the aforesaid conduct. It is incumbent upon the
prosecution to account for these witnesses' absence by presenting a justifiable reason therefor or, at the very
least, by showing that genuine and sufficient efforts were exerted by the apprehending officers to secure their
presence. Here, while PO3 Rana requested the presence of a media representative and an elected public official
to witness the conduct of inventory and photography of the seized item, he admitted that only a media
representative arrived, without any justification as to the absence of the two (2) other required witnesses, i.e.,
an elected public official and a DOJ representative. In fact, it may even be implied from PO3 Rana's aforesaid
statement that he did not even bother to secure the presence of a DOJ representative during the conduct of
inventory and photography. In view of this unjustified deviation from the chain of custody rule, the Court is
therefore constrained to conclude that the integrity and evidentiary value of the item purportedly seized from
Medina was compromised, which consequently warrants his acquittal. (People of the Philippines v. Medina,
G.R. No. 225747, December 5, 2018, Second Division; Badio v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 236023,
February 20, 2019, Second Division; People of the Philippines v. Bahoyo, G.R. No. 238589, June 26, 2019, Third
Division; Padas v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 244327, October 14, 2019, First Division)
29. After an examination of the records, the Court finds that the prosecution failed to comply with the above-
described procedure since the inventory and photography of the seized item were not conducted in the
presence of a media representative. As evinced by the Inventory of Seized Properties/Items, only Allas (an
elected public official) and Gaffuy (a representative from the DOJ) were present to witness these activities.
Although the prosecution in its Pre-Trial Brief averred that no media representatives were present despite
efforts to secure their presence, nothing else on record appears to substantiate the same. Indeed, this general
averment, without more, cannot be accepted as a proper justification to excuse non-compliance with the law.
As earlier discussed, prevailing jurisprudence requires the prosecution to account for the absence of any of the
required witnesses by presenting a justifiable reason therefor or, at the very least, by showing that genuine and
sufficient efforts were exerted by the apprehending officers to secure their presence. Clearly, these standards
were not observed in this case. (People of the Philippines v. Dela Cruz, G.R. No. 225741, December 5, 2018,
Second Division)
30. It is glaring from the records that after Camiñas was arrested, the buy-bust team immediately took custody of
the seized items. They likewise conducted the marking, inventory, and photography of the seized items at the
place of arrest in the presence of an elected public official, i.e., Kagawad Chico and a media representative, i.e.,
Oresto, in conformity with the amended witness requirement under RA 10640. PO2 Trinidad then secured the
seized items and personally delivered the same to PCI Bacani of the Quezon City Police District Crime laboratory
for laboratory examination, who in turn, brought the specimen to Evidence Custodian Ducad for safekeeping.
In view of the foregoing, the Court holds that there is sufficient compliance with the chain of custody rule and,
thus, the integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti have been preserved. Perforce, Camiñas's
conviction must stand. (People of the Philippines v. Camiñas, G.R. No. 241017, January 7, 2019, Second Division)

31. P/Insp. Cabaddu testified that the seized illegal drugs were physically inventoried and photographed in the
presence of Malazo and an elected public official at the place of arrest. However, there were no representatives
from the media and the DOJ, and the elected public official failed to sign the copies of the inventory, in this case
the confiscation receipt, and was not given copies thereof, as required by Section 21 of RA 9165 and its IRR.
Moreover, after a perusal of the records of this case, the Court finds that the apprehending team not only failed
to secure the attendance of persons from the media and the DOJ, and to secure the signature of the elected
public official on the copies of the inventory, the prosecution also failed to state the justification for non-
compliance and the explanation that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items were properly
preserved by the apprehending team. Although P/Insp. Cabbadu and the rest of the apprehending team were
not directly questioned about the initial control and custody of the seized drugs, we can infer from the
testimony above that the apprehending team failed to follow the requirements under Section 21(1) of RA 9165
and Section 21(a) of the IRR. On this ground, the Court has no recourse but to reverse the Court of Appeals
since the seizure and custody of the drugs were void and invalid. (People of the Philippines v. Malazo, G.R. No.
223713, January 7, 2019, Second Division; People of the Philippines v. Guerrero, G.R. No. 228881, February 6,
32. The absence of a representative of the National Prosecution Service or the media during the inventory of the
seized items was not justifiably explained by the prosecution. A review of the Transcript of Stenographic Notes
does not yield any testimony from the arresting officers as to the reason why there was no representative from
the DOJ or the media. The only one present to witness the inventory and the marking was an elected official,
Barangay Captain Evelyn Villamor. Neither was there any testimony to show that any attempt was made to
secure the presence of the required witness. (People of the Philippines v. Oliva, G.R. No. 234156, January 7,
2019, Third Division; People of the Philippines v. Duran, G.R. No. 233251, March 13, 2019, Third Division; People
of the Philippines v. Bayang, G.R. No. 234038, March 13, 2019, Third Division; People of the Philippines v. Paz,
G.R. No. 233466, August 7, 2019, Third Division; People of the Philippines v. Fulgado, G.R. No. 246193, February
33. A perusal of the Inventory of Seized/Confiscated Item/Property dated January 15, 2014 readily reveals that
while the inventory of the plastic sachet purportedly seized from accused-appellants was conducted in the
presence of a media representative, it was nevertheless done without the presence of any elected public official
and DOJ representative, contrary to the afore-described procedure. Moreover, it is incumbent upon the
prosecution to account for these witnesses' absence by presenting a justifiable reason therefor or, at the very
least, by showing that genuine and sufficient efforts were exerted by the apprehending officers to secure their
presence. Here, PO3 Salonga tried to justify their deviation from procedure by offering the perfunctory excuse
that their team leader tried to invite the required witnesses but to no avail, without really expounding on the
same. Neither did the prosecution press on PO3 Salonga to determine how such earnest efforts were exerted,
or even attempt to call the buy-bust team leader to the witness stand to determine whether or not earnest
efforts were really done in order to ensure the required witnesses' presence during the inventory. (People of
the Philippines v. Aure, G.R. No. 237809, January 14, 2019, Second Division; People of the Philippines v. Vistro,
34. The inventory was not conducted in their presence as the apprehending policemen already prepared the
Inventory/Receipt of Property Seized when they arrived at the scene of arrest and only made them sign the
same. As discussed, the witness requirement mandates the presence of the witnesses during the conduct of
the inventory, so as to ensure that the evils of switching, planting, or contamination of evidence will be
adequately prevented. Hence, non-compliance therewith puts the onus on the prosecution to provide a
justifiable reason therefor, especially considering that the rule exists to ensure that protection is given to those
whose life and liberty are put at risk. Unfortunately, no such explanation was proferred by the prosecution to
justify this glaring procedural lapse. In view of this unjustified deviation from the chain of custody rule, the Court
is therefore constrained to conclude that the integrity and evidentiary value of the items purportedly seized
from Cariño were compromised, which consequently warrants his acquittal. (People of the Philippines v. Cariño,
35. There was a deviation from the witness requirement as the conduct of the inventory and photography was not
witnessed by a media representative. Moreover, while SPO1 Umali acknowledged the absence of a media
representative during the conduct of inventory, he failed to offer any reasonable justification for the same.
(People of the Philippines v. Barrion, G.R. No. 240541, January 21, 2019, Second Division)
36. While admittedly there was marking, inventory and photographing of the seized items, all these were done only
in the presence of the elected public officials and media representative. No representative from the
Department of Justice (DOJ) appeared as witness thereto as required by law. In addition, the witnesses present
during the inventory were not given copies thereof, another mandatory procedural safeguard outlined by the
law. (People of the Philippines v. Gumban, G.R. No. 224210, January 23, 2019, First Division; People of the
Philippines v. Acabo, G.R. No. 241081, February 11, 2019, Second Division; People of the Philippines v. Roxas,
G.R. No. 242817, September 16, 2019, First Division; People of the Philippines v. De Motor, G.R. No. 245486,

November 27, 2019, Second Division; People of the Philippines v. Baluyot, G.R. No. 243390, October 5, 2020,
Second Division)
37. It is glaring from the records that after accused-appellants were arrested, the buy-bust team immediately took
custody of the seized plastic sachets and marked them at the place of arrest. Thereafter, they went to the
nearest police station where the inventory and photography of the seized plastic sachets were conducted in
the presence of two (2) elected public officials (Kagawad Publiko and Councilor Acuña) and a media
representative (media representative Barquilla). While such inventory and photography were not done at the
place of arrest but at the police station, the same was warranted under the circumstances. As testified by PO3
Olveda, they had to move to the nearest police station because the relatives of accused-appellants started to
cause a commotion. Moreover, it is well to note Associate Justice Alfredo Benjamin S. Caguioa's observations
during deliberations that the buy-bust team had already secured the presence of an elected public official and
a media representative even before they implemented the buy-bust operation, thereby confirming that the
amended witnesses requirement under RA 10640 was duly complied with. Finally, PO3 Olveda and PO3
Calanoga, Jr. then personally delivered all the evidence seized to Police Chief Inspector Margarita M. Libres of
the Eastern Police District Crime Laboratory who performed the necessary tests thereon. (People of the
Philippines v. Maylon, G.R. No. 240064, March 11, 2019, Second Division)
38. The apprehending team plainly failed to comply with the witness requirements under the law, i.e., that the
photographing and inventory of the seized items be witnessed by a representative from the media, the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official. The records are clear: only two (2) barangay officials
were present to witness the operation, as observed by the RTC. (Dizon v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No.
39. While PO3 Ramos testified that before they conducted the buy-bust operation, their team leader, SPO2 Nagera,
called up the DOJ and the media, but was told that nobody was available that time; however, he admitted on
cross-examination that he had no personal knowledge about the call allegedly made by their team leader to the
media and DOJ representatives as he was only told that nobody was available. Any evidence, whether oral or
documentary, is hearsay if its probative value is not based on the personal knowledge of the witness. Section
36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that a witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his
own personal knowledge, that is, which are derived from his own perception; otherwise, such testimony would
be hearsay. The Court found no plausible explanation or justification on record why the presence of the required
witnesses under Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 was not procured. The justifiable ground for non-compliance must
be proven as a fact because the Court cannot presume what these grounds are or that they even exist. (People
of the Philippines v. Jodan, G.R. No. 234773, June 3, 2019, Third Division)
40. The prosecution failed to prove both requisites. While the inventory and photograph of the seized shabu were
done in the presence of a barangay captain, who is an elected public official, there was no mention that the
same was conducted in the presence of a representative from media and the DOJ. The signatures of the
representative from the media and the representative from the DOJ do not even appear in the Inventory
Receipt. And no reason at all has been advanced for the complete failure of the arresting officers to secure the
attendance of these required witnesses. On top of these, there is nothing on record to indicate that the
arresting team exerted a genuine and sufficient attempt to secure their presence. In the absence of the
representative from the media and from the DOJ during the physical inventory and the photographing of the
seized shabu, the evils of switching, "planting'" or contamination of the evidence create serious lingering doubts
as to its integrity and evidentiary value. In the context of these circumstances, the conviction of the appellant
cannot be upheld. (People of the Philippines v. Cadiente, G.R. No. 228255, June 10, 2019, First Division; Veriño
41. Failure of Barangay Tanod Bosque to mark the dangerous drug engendered serious doubts on whether the
sachet of shabu which petitioner allegedly flicked in the air and which Barangay Tanod Bosque retrieved from
the ground was indeed the very same item indicated in the Chemistry Report. (Largo v. People of the Philippines,
G.R. No. 201293, June 19, 2019, Second Division)
42. Further, although it appears that the Inventory of Seized/Confiscated Items (Exhibit "B") was signed by the
representatives from the DOJ, media and a barangay kagawad, PO3 Rodillo and SPO3 Eleazar failed to declare
that said receipt had been signed in the presence of Bermejo or of his representative. In fact, SPO3 Eleazar
testified that the representatives from the DOJ, media and a barangay kagawad signed the receipt the day after
the arrest or on February 13, 2003, indicating the absence of Bermejo at the time they signed the same. (People
of the Philippines v. Bermejo, G.R. No. 199813, June 26, 2019, First Division)
43. The physical inventory and the taking of photographs of the seized items were allegedly witnessed by the crew
members of Imbestigador and Barangay Tanods Rodriguez and Caeg. Their presence, however, cannot be
considered substantial compliance. To begin with, although present during the physical inventory and taking of
photographs, the crew members of Imbestigador did not sign the inventory sheet. As to the barangay tanods,
who were present and who signed the inventory sheets, their presence is immaterial because barangay tanods

are not elected public officials. Also, no DOJ representative was present at that time. Thus, strictly speaking, the
rule requiring the insulating witnesses to be present during the physical inventory and the taking of the
photographs and to sign the inventory sheet was not complied with. (People of the Philippines v. Rodriguez,
44. Records show that after petitioner was arrested, the police officers immediately took custody of the seized
items. They also conducted the requisite marking, inventory, and photography thereof in the presence of an
elected public official, i.e., Brgy. Chairman Mendoza; a media representative, i.e., Griño; and a DOJ
representative, i.e., Buhay, right at the place where petitioner was arrested. Subsequently, PO1 Togonon
delivered the seized items to PSI Llacuna for laboratory examination, who, in turn, brought the same to EC
Barcelona for safekeeping. In light of the foregoing, the Court holds that the chain of custody over the seized
dangerous drugs remained unbroken, and that the integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti have
been properly preserved. Perforce, petitioner's conviction must stand. (Aranas v. People of the Philippines, G.R.
45. Although there may have two elected officials, the two remaining witnesses – the representative of the media
and the DOJ – were absent. Thus, the requirements of Section 21 of R.A. 9165, as amended, were not complied
with. (People of the Philippines v. Retada, G.R. No. 239331, July 10, 2019, Second Division)
46. As a rule, a barangay tanod is not one of those witnesses required by law to be present. He cannot replace any
of the three required witnesses. (People of the Philippines v. Miranda, G.R. No. 218216, July 10, 2019, Second
Division)
47. The inventory was not conducted in the presence of Dela Cruz, as the arresting policemen already prepared the
inventory form days before it was brought to him for his signature. As discussed, the witness requirement
mandates the presence of the required witnesses during the conduct of the inventory, so as to ensure that the
evils of switching, planting, or contamination of evidence will be adequately prevented. Hence, non-compliance
therewith puts the onus on the prosecution to provide a justifiable reason therefor, especially considering that
the rule exists to ensure that protection is given to those whose life and liberty are put at risk. Unfortunately,
no such explanation was proferred by the prosecution to justify this glaring procedural lapse. In view of this
unjustified deviation from the chain of custody rule, the Court is therefore constrained to conclude that the
integrity and evidentiary value of the items purportedly seized from Gabunada were compromised, which
consequently warrants her acquittal. (People of the Philippines v. Gabunada, G.R. No. 242827, September 9,
48. Only the agents of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) were present in the conduct of the buy-bust
operation, and that the inventory was not immediately conducted and was only done subsequently at the PDEA
office. Worse, only two of the three required witnesses — the media representative and the elected official —
were present in the conduct of the inventory done at the PDEA office. Moreover, the records of this case are
bereft of any explanation as to why no representative from the DOJ was present in the inventory. The
prosecution, despite its burden to prove the officers' compliance with the procedure outlined in Section 21, did
not address the issue in their pleadings, and the RTC and the CA instead had to rely on supposed substantial
compliance with the rules to justify Moreno's conviction. (People of the Philippines v. Moreno, G.R. No. 234273,
49. It is beyond serious dispute that all of the mandatory procedures required under R.A. 9165, Section 21 have
been violated by the buy-bust team. First, not even one of the required witnesses witnessed the buy-bust
operation and the inventory and photographing of the alleged drug specime supposed retrieved from Doria.
Second, the inventory receipt produced by the prosecution, i.e., the handwritten Confiscation Receipt dated
January 15, 2008, contains the lone signature of PO2 De Vera. Third, while testifying that the Confiscation
Receipt was prepared at the place of the incident, in the same breath, the prosecution’s main witness, PO2 De
Vera, testified that the recording, disposition, and inventory of the supposedly confiscated drug specimen were
conducted at the Dagupan City Police Station and not at the place of apprehension. (People of the Philippines
v. Doria, G.R. No. 227854, October 9, 2019, Second Division)
50. The physical inventory and taking of photographs of the seized item were done in the presence of accused-
appellant and a mere representative from the media as witness. In People v. Seguiente, the Court acquitted the
accused because of the absence of a DOJ representative during the conduct of inventory and taking of
photographs. In said case, the Court keenly noted that the prosecution failed to recognize said deficiency and
concluded that said lapse, among others, effectively produced serious doubts on the integrity and identity of
the corpus delicti. (People of the Philippines v. Alon-Alon, G.R. No. 237803, November 27, 2019, Third Division)
51. Only one of the required witnesses was present during the inventory stage – the barangay captain of Ungot.
Neither was it shown nor alleged by the police officers that earnest efforts were made to secure the attendance
of these witnesses. (Tolentino v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 227217, February 12, 2020, Second Division)

52. There was no unbroken chain of custody. In this case, only an elected public official signed the inventory of
evidence. There was no attempt on the part of the buy-bust team to comply with the law and its implementing
rules. The operatives likewise failed to provide any justification showing that the integrity of the evidence had
all along been preserved. They did not describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change
in the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of the same.
While the seizing officers acknowledge the importance of the presence of insulating witnesses, they did not
offer any justification for non-compliance. (People of the Philippines v. Gandawali, G.R. No. 242516, June 8,
53. The absence of a representative of the National Prosecution Service or the media as an insulating witness to
the inventory and photograph of the seized item puts serious doubt as to the integrity of the chain of custody.
To be sure, only an elected public official signed the inventory of evidence at the place of arrest. Worse, the
items were photographed at the police station without the presence of any insulating witness. However, the
operatives failed to provide any justification for non-compliance showing that the integrity of the evidence had
all along been preserved. They did not describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change
in the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of the same.
The utter disregard of the required procedures created a huge gap in the chain of custody. (People of the
Philippines v. Padua, G.R. No. 244287, June 15, 2020, First Division)
54. While there was an inventory made after the seizure and confiscation of the items allegedly recovered from
the accused-appellant, the said inventory cannot be said to have been compliant with the strict requirements
of the original provision of Section 21. Barangay Kagawad Santos revealed in his testimony that he was not
present when the alleged shabu were being searched. In addition, he was not present in the inventory in clear
contravention of the mandatory requirements under R.A. 9165 and its implementing rules and regulations
which require the presence of the required witnesses during the conduct of the inventory. Here, the inventory
was already finished and prepared when Barangay Kagawad Santos came and was only asked to sign the
inventory making it appear that he was present all througout the whole process. Furthermore, the testimony
of SI Almerino provides that there was no witness from the DOJ and the representative of the media in the
inventory. (Villana v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 243375, June 30, 2020, First Division)
55. Buesa asserts the nullity of his arrest due to the absence of a representative of the National Prosecution Service.
He failed to state, however, that a media representative was present during the conduct of the inventory. As
the records clearly reveal, PO2 Abad conducted an inventory of the seized items in the presence of Buesa,
Barangay Kagawad Perez of Brgy. Puypuy, and media representative of Efren Chavez. Accordingly, the Court
sustains the appellate court’s finding that this constitutes due compliance with the mandate under the law.
Indeed, the amendment under R.A. 10640 uses the disjunctive “or,” i.e., with an elected public official and a
representative of the NPS or the media. Thus, a representative from the media and a representative from the
NPS are now alternatives to each other. (People of the Philippines v. Buesa, G.R. No. 237850, September 16,
the inventory and photograph of the seized items, puts serious doubt as to the integrity of the confiscated
items. Admittedly, only an elected public official signed the inventory of evidence. There was no attempt on the
part of the entrapment team to comply with the law and its implementing rules despite the planned buy-bust
operation. The operatives also failed to provide any justification showing that the integrity of the evidence had
all along been preserved. Worse, it appears that the barangay official was absent when the drugs were seized.
The prosecution stipulated that Kagawad Cabo “had no personal knowledge as to the circumstances regarding
the alleged confiscation of the items.” On this point, it must be stressed that the presence of the witnesses
must be secured not only during the inventory but, more importantly, at the time of the warrantless arrest.
(People of the Philippines v. Mazo, G.R. No. 242273, November 23, 2020, Second Division)
57. The Court observes that the physical inventory of the confiscated narcotics and drug paraphernalia was not
witnessed by a representative from the media and by a DOJ official. The Court notes that in the Joint Affidavit
of Arrest dated April 13, 2007, IO3 Asayco and Agent Sanchez stated that the conduct of the inventory of the
seized items was done in the presence of the barangay officials and the representative from the media. IO3
Asayco even testified that the confiscation receipt was signed by Policarpio, the barangay officials and the
media. A perusal of the nine (9) confiscation receipts, however, would show that the same were signed only by
CI Natividad, Policarpio, Barangay Chairman Tangonan, and Barangay Kagawad Calimag. The confiscation
receipts did not bear the signature of the representative from the media, which cast doubt as to whether the
latter was indeed present during the inventory. Meanwhile, Agent Sanchez knew nothing as to what transpired
during the inventory because after turning over the confiscated items to CI Natividad, he went out of the hosue.
No DOJ official attended the inventory of the allegedly confiscated shabu and drug paraphernalia. To the Court’s
mind, the credibility and trustworthiness of the April 12, 2007 search and seizure, as well as the incrimination
of appellant Policarpio, have not been adequately protected in view of the absence of the representative from
the media and the DOJ during the conduct of the physical inventory. Lastly, there is no clear showing that

Policarpio was given a copy of the nine confiscation receipts. (People of the Philippines v. Policarpio, G.R. No.
227868, January 20, 2021, Special Second Division)
58. Upon arrival at the NBI office, the black trolley bag was placed on top of a table and accused-appellants were
seated beside the table. SI Escurel remained in the office and guarded accused-appellants while waiting for the
witnesses. When the bag was searched, it was in the presence of accused appellants, DOJ Senior State
Prosecutor Villanueva, Brgy. Kgwd. Ilejay, Brgy. Tanod Sadasip, Jr., and William. The marking and inventory were
also conducted by SI Escurel in their presence. On the same day, SI Escurel turned over the envelopes marked
as MEE-2 and MEE-3 containing heroin to the NBI Forensic Chemistry Division where it was examined by Calalo.
Calalo found that the contents of the brown envelopes were positive for heroin. The heroin contained in two
envelopes marked as MEE-2 and MEE-3 was duly identified in court by SI Escurel. The heroin inside the
envelopes marked as MEE-2 and MEE-3 was offered by plaintiff-appellee as evidence and was admitted by the
RTC. It is noteworthy that accused-appellants' counsel admitted that the NBI operatives complied with Section
21 of R.A. 9165. (People of the Philippines v. Alberto II, G.R. No. 247906, February 10, 2021, First Division)
the inventory and photograph of the seized item puts serious doubt as to the integrity of the first link. (Reyes,
Jr. v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 244545, February 10, 2021, Second Division)
60. In this case, records reveal that the inventory and photography of the seized items were conducted only in
Lindongan's presence and absent the presence of the required witnesses as stated above. Considering the date
of the buy-bust operation on December 21, 2009, the applicable law at the time requires the presence of the
following witnesses: (a) a representative from the media; (b) a representative from the DOJ; and (c) an elected
public official. Here, there is dearth of evidence to show that any one of the said witnesses was present at the
photography and inventory, or that the arresting officers attempted, at the very least, to secure the presence
of any one of them. PO3 Ventura's testimony that he brought the seized items, as well as the Confiscation
Receipt, for the signature of Barangay Captain Gerola miserably fails to satisfy the chain of custody
requirements, as the mere signature of the required witnesses therein does not suffice - the law requires the
actual and physical presence of said witnesses. Finally, even assuming arguendo that Barangay Captain Gerola
was present during the photograph y and inventory, this still falls short of the mandate of RA 9165 which
requires the presence of all the aforesaid witnesses. As it stands, there was complete and unjustified non-
compliance with the chain of custody rule, which therefore constrains the Court to rule that the integrity and
evidentiary value of the items purportedly seized from Lindongan have been compromised. (Lindongan v.
People of the Philippines, UDK-16615, February 15, 2021, Second Division)
61. The absence of the required insulating witnesses during the inventory and photograph of the seized item puts
serious doubt as to the integrity of the chain of custody. Admittedly, there was no representative from the
media and the DOJ, and any elected public official. Worse, there was no attempt on the part of the buy-bust
team to comply with the law and its implementing rules. (Quiap v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 229183,
62. In the case at bar, the absence of a DOJ representative during the inventory and photographing of the seized
drugs in an airport environment is strange considering that it is of common knowledge that officers of the
Bureau of Immigration (BI)-a government agency under the jurisdiction of the DOJ-are assigned and present at
the international terminals of the NAIA such as the terminal where appellants were apprehended. The Court
stresses that R.A. No. 9165 does not require that the DOJ representative be from the DOJ itself but may come
from any of its attached agencies, including the BI. Nonetheless, while the Bureau of Customs is no longer an
attached agency of the DOJ, the presence of its officers, who are likewise State agents comparable to members
of the DOJ, during the seizure of the drugs involved in this case can be deemed sufficient to take the place of
the DOJ representative. (People of the Philippines v. Veloo, G.R. No. 252144, March 4, 2021, First Division)
63. In the present case, only a representative from the media was present in the conduct of the inventory, as shown
by the Certification of Inventory dated April 16, 2010 wherein only Mr. Nick Luares from The Laguna Expose
Star signed as a witness to the inventory. That only a media representative witnessed the inventory was likewise
confirmed by the testimonies of both PO1 Ramos and PO de Leon. Moreover, the police officers and the
prosecution were unable, nor did they attempt to explain the deviations from the requirements of Section 21
of R.A. No. 9165. Thus, the prosecution simply failed to establish the integrity of the seized items – the corpus
delicti of the crime in drugs cases such as this one. The acquittal of the Casilag must thus perforce follow. (Casilag
v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 213523, March 18, 2021, First Division)
64. It is readily apparent that the rule requiring three required witnesses – a media representative, a DOJ
representative, and an elected official – was not complied with. While marking and inventory was done, the
same is rendered defective, as the only witnesses present were two barangay officials, and a media
representative. In the case of People v. Lim, the accused was acquitted in view of the absence of the three
required witnesses and the prosecution’s failure to demonstrate that earnest efforts were made to secure their

attendance. Here, there was not even an honest attempt whatsoever by the prosecution, through the
testimonies of the police officers, to explain the failure to comply with the requirement.
a. It also appears that the required witnesses were not present at the time when Calleja was apprehended.
In People v. Tomawis, the Corut held that the presence of third-party witnesses required by Section 21
must be present as early as the time of apprehension. As admitted by no less than SPO2 Joven, one of the
officers who participated in the buy-bust operation, the witnesses were not present in the actual operation
itself. Instead, they remained in the Kababayan Center or police outpost. Ostensibly, having third-party
witnesses present only during the subsequent physical inventory and photographing renders the whole
requirement of their presence futile. Given their absence in the most crucial stages of the operation, it is
clear that the required witnesses themselves had no personal knowledge of the supposed sale and
subsequent apprehension, search, and seizure. After all, the parties merely stipulated to the fact that the
witnesses were only present during the inventory of the items, as well as the fact of signing the receipt of
property seized and inventory. (People of the Philippines v. Calleja, G.R. No. 250865, June 16, 2021, Third
Division)
65. The absence of the representative from the DOJ during the operation does not affect compliance with the chain
of custody rule. For one, the arresting officers offered adequate explanation for the absence of a DOJ
representative during the inventory. As the CA keenly observed, the arresting officers exerted earnest effort to
secure a witness from the DOJ but to no avail. Verily, there was simply no prosecutor from the DOJ who was
available to witness the inventory at that very late hour in the evening. The Court also considers the immediacy
of performing the marking and inventory of seized items which ought not be delayed. In People v. Maralit, the
Court took these twin circumstances into consideration in affirming the verdict of conviction against therein
appellant despite the absence of a DOJ representative during the marking and inventory. At any rate, the Court
keenly notes that as in Maralit, the arresting officers here were likewise able to preserve the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized items which were marked, inventoried, and photographed in front of an elected
official and the two (2) media representatives. To be clear though, a media representative is no substitute for
a DOJ representative under R.A. 9165 prior to its amendment. However, the arresting officers’ decision to invite
additional witnesses than required is cogent proof of their good faith, if not earnest efforts to comply with the
witness requirement under R.A. 9165, Section 21, and more important, to ensure transparency and dispel any
kind of suspicion on the legitimacy of the operation. For another, it was not Perillo’s job as insulating witness to
look for white powdery substance which could possibly be dangerous drugs. For the insulating witnesses do not
guarantee that the items seized from an accused are indeed dangerous drugs. They only needed to confirm
that the items seized from appellant as appearing in the inventory, regardless of whether they are dangerous
drugs or simply mundane things, are the same items offered in evidence before the trial court. (People of the
Philippines v. SPO1 Estabillo, G.R. No. 252902, June 16, 2021, Second Division)
66. In this case, the seizure of the two (2) transparent plastic sachets containing methamphetamine hydrochloride
occurred on December 17, 2014, subsequent to the amendment introduced by RA 10640. Consequently, the
current applicable law requires the presence of the following witnesses: (a) an elected public official; and (b) a
representative of the NPS or the media. However, the records clearly show that none of the foregoing
requirements were present. While the apprehending officer stated that they tried to secure a barangay official,
none responded. She further admitted that no attempt at all was made to secure either a representative of the
NPS or a member of the media. Under the law, it is incumbent upon the prosecution to account for these
witnesses' absence by presenting a justifiable reason therefor or, at the very least, by showing that genuine and
sufficient efforts were exerted by the apprehending officers to secure their presence. Here, there was no
attempt to secure either a representative of the NPS or the media contrary to the clear requirements of the
law. In view of the complete and unjustified non-compliance with the chain of custody rule, the Court is
therefore constrained to conclude that the integrity and evidentiary value of the items purportedly seized from
Saban were compromised, which warrants her acquittal. (Saban v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 253812,
TURNOVER FROM SEIZING OFFICER TO INVESTIGATING OFFICER

1. The prosecution was able to establish the crucial links in the chain of custody of the seized sachet of shabu.
After PO2 Rodil received the plastic sachet of white crystalline substance from appellant, she was in possession
of the shabu up to the time appellant was brought to the police station for investigation. With the buy-bust
team and appellant at the police station were Kill Droga Provincial President, Ocampo, and Barangay Councilor
Almazan. PO2 Rodil made an inventory of the seized item which was attested by Ocampo. She also marked the
seized items with her initials “MDR.” Appellant’s photos were also taken pointing to the plastic sachet. PO2
Rodil prepared and signed the request for laboratory examination and brought the letter-request and the seized
items to the Regional Crime Laboratory for qualitative analysis. The specimen was received at the laboratory at
5:00 p.m. of the same day. PI Alviar examined the white crystalline substance contained in a heat-sealed plastic
transparent plastic sachet with marking “MDR” on the same right and issued Chemistry Report No. D-025-05
wherein she stated that the specimen was tested positive for shabu. The staple-sealed brown enveloped with
PI Alviar’s initials which contained one rectangular transparent plastic sachet sealed with masking tape with the
same marking was offered in evidence and identified in court by PI Alviar. (People of the Philippines v. Miranba,

G.R. No. 205639, January 18, 2016, Third Division; People of the Philippines v. De Asis, G.R. No. 225219, June
11, 2018, First Division; People of the Philippines v. Espera, G.R. No. 227313, November 21, 2018, First Division)
2. The chain of custody rule was substantially complied with. This is because: (a) when Piad was arrested, PO1
Arevalo marked the confiscated drugs at the crime scene; (b) when Villarosa, Carbo, and Davis were arrested,
PO1 Bayot immediately marked the seized items at the crime scene; (c) the items were brought to the Pasig
City Police Station where PO1 Bayot was designated as evidence custodian; (d) P/Insp. Sabio then prepared the
requests for laboratory examination and drug test, which were brought by PO1 Bayot, together with the drugs,
to the Eastern Police District Crime Laboratory; and (e) PSI Ebuen, received the confiscated items for
examination, which tested positive for methylamphetamine hydrochloride. (People of the Philippines v. Piad,
3. There are no broken links in the chain of custody over the seized drug. Records reveal that after the arrest of
the accused-appellant, the seizure of the suspected shabu and recovery of the marked money in the latter’s
possession, PO1 Eclipse, with the assistance of the other members of the buy-bust team, brought accused-
appellant to the police station. Upon their arrival at the police station, PO1 Eclipse handed the marked money
and the confiscated plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance to their investigator, PO3 Taguinod.
PO3 Taguinod marked the plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance with the words “WAT,”
representing the initials of his name. Therafter, PO3 Taguinod turned over the confiscated plastic sachet and
the marked money to the desk officer so that the incident and the confiscated items wil be recorded in their
blotter. PO3 Taguinod also prepared a letter-request addressed to the PNP Crime Laboratory to have the
contents of the plastic sachet examined for presence of illegal drugs. PO3 Taguinod then handed the said letter-
request, together with the confiscated plastic sachet, to PO3 Rolando Domingo who brought the same to the
PNP Crime Laboratory. Said letter-request and the plastic sachet were received by PO1 Janson of the PNP Crime
Laboratory. PSI Quintero, forensic chemist of the PNP Crime Laboratory, performed qualitative examination of
the contents of the plastic sachet with the markings “WAT.” Said examination proved that the confiscated
plastic sachet contained 0.07 grams of shabu. (People of the Philippines v. Domingo, G.R. No. 211672, June 1,
4. Records reveal that it was PO3 Dimacali who seized two (2) plastic sachets each containing crystalline substance
from Lintag. Thus, it is clear that PO3 Dimacali had custody of the seized items from the time of seizure until
their arrival at the police station. Thereupon, PO3 Dimacali marked the seized items and, subsequently, turned
them over to SPO2 Gonzales. The items were then delivered to the PNP Crime Laboratory for a confirmatory
test on their contents. However, as indicated in the PNP Crime Laboratory’s receiving stamp on the request for
laboratory examination, it was SPO3 Valdez – and not SPO2 Gonzales – who delivered such request and
presumably, the seized plastic sachets as well, to Forensic Chemical Officer PI Mariano. This immediately puts
into question how SPO3 Valdez came into possession of the seized items, which was neither explained by the
prosecution through the presentation of testimonial or documentary evidence, nor sufficiently addressed by
the coruts a quo. Thus, absent any adequate explanation on the matter, there arises a substantial gap in the
chain of custody of the plastic sachets seized from Lintag, therefore compromising the integrity and evidentiary
value of the corpus delicti of the crime charged. (People of the Philippines v. Lintag, G.R. No. 219855, September
6, 2016, First Division; People of the Philippines v. Goco, G.R. No. 219584, October 17, 2016, First Division)
5. The prosecution failed to establish who delivered the drugs to investigating officer, PO3 dela Cruz. The second
link in the chain of custody is the transfer of the seized drugs by the apprehending officer to the investigating
officer. Usually, the police officer who seizes the suspected substance turns it over to a supervising officer, who
will then send it by courier to the police crime laboratory for testing. This is a necessary step in the chain of
custody because it will be the investigating officer who shall conduct the proper investigation and prepare the
necessary documents for the developing criminal case. Certainly, the investigating officer must have possession
of the illegal drugs to properly prepare the required documents. In this case, the investigating officer was PO3
dela Cruz. However, the prosecution's witnesses and documents did not clarify who delivered the seized drugs
to the investigating officer. While the suspected drugs were in the pocket of PO3 Valderama when these were
transported to the police station, he never stated in his testimony that he was the one who indorsed the said
items to PO3 dela Cruz. Verily, there is doubt that the purported seized items from petitioner and Bautista were
the same items investigated by PO3 dela Cruz. (Ramos v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 227336, February
6. Only the following circumstances were established: the drugs were seized from Tomawis at Starman, Alabang;
the inventory and photographing were not conducted there because a commotion ensued when Tomawis was
arrested; the buy bust team brought Tomawis to the barangay hall of Brgy. Pinyahan; the inventory was
conducted by the designated Inventory Officer, IO1 Alfonso; barangay councilors Burce and Gaffud were
present at the barangay hall; after the inventory, the buy-bust team, together with Tomawis, proceeded to the
PDEA office; IO1 Alejandro delivered the seized drugs to the laboratory for testing. There are lacking information
and glaring inconsistencies in the statements of IO1 Alejandro and IO1 Lacap. IO1 Alejandro testified that only
she handled the seized drug. However, IO1 Lacap mentioned that he also recovered the seized drug from IO1
Alejandro. IO1 Alejandro testified that she handed the seized drug to IO1 Alfonso for inventory and he was the

one who kept the seized drug since it was brought to the barangay hall and before bringing it to PDEA
laboratory; but IO1 Lacap also testified that IO1 Alejandro was the one who kept the drugs until they were
delivered to the laboratory. There are unexplained gaps in the custody of the seized drugs. The transfer and
movement of the seized drugs between IO1 Alejandro, IO1 Lacap, and IO1 Alfonso was not established. It is
unclear as to who held custody of the seized drugs from the place of arrest in Starman, Alabang to Brgy.
Pinyahan, Quezon City and from Brgy. Pinyahan, Quezon City to the PDEA office. It was not clarified as to how
and when the seized drugs were returned to IO1 Alejandro after the inventory was conducted by IO1 Alfonso.
There was also no testimony as to who received the seized drugs from IO1 Alejandro at the laboratory, and to
whom they were given after the testing was conducted. (People of the Philippines v. Tomawis, G.R. No. 228890,
April 18, 2018, Second Division)
7. The Court notes the serious evidentiary gaps in the second, third and fourth links in the chain of custody over
the seized dangerous drugs. Based on the records, the seized evidence was turned over by SI Escurel to the
Forensic Chemistry Division of the NBI for a quantitative and qualitative examination on September 2, 2004, at
6:30 p.m. In this regard, the prosecution failed to disclose the identities of: (a) the person who had custody of
the seized items after they were turned over by SI Escurel; (b) the person who turned over the items to Forensic
Chemist Aranas; and (c) the person who had custody thereof after they were examined by the forensic chemist
and before they were presented in court. The totality of these circumstances – the failure to mark the 323
plastic sachets supposedly containing marijuana, the discrepancy in the description of the seized dangerous
drugs, and the prosecution's failure to disclose the identities of the persons who had custody of said items after
they were turned over by SI Escurel – broke the chain of custody and tainted the integrity of the seized
marijuana ultimately presented as evidence before the trial court. Given the prosecution's failure to prove the
indispensable element of corpus delicti, appellant must necessarily be acquitted on the ground of reasonable
doubt. (People of the Philippines v. Veedor, Jr., G.R. No. 223525, June 25, 2018, First Division)
8. While PO2 Ortega testified that he turned over the seized item to PO3 Gibe and PO1 Tamayo, neither of these
investigators were presented in court to testify to the circumstances surrounding their receipt of the seized
drug. Since they did not testify to confirm the receipt and turnover of the seized item, a gap in the chain of
custody is thereby created. Not only this, the Court observes that the person who received the items at the
crime laboratory was not identified by both PO1 Villamayor and PO2 Ortega in their respective testimonies.
Notably, the testimony of the forensic chemist was dispensed with by the prosecution. While there was a
stipulation on the testimony of P/I Plantilla, it merely covers the result of the examination conducted on the
specimen submitted to the forensic chemist. Evidently, the prosecution's non-presentation of the necessary
witnesses constituted gaps in the chain of custody of the seized prohibited drug. Plainly the seized drug was
not properly handled, from the time of its confiscation to its turnover in the police station, including its transfer
to the crime laboratory. Indeed, every person who takes possession of seized drugs must show how it was
handled and preserved while in his or her custody to prevent any switching or replacement. Aside from the
gaps in the chain of custody of the seized specimen, the Court observes that no photograph and inventory of
the seized item were made in the presence of an elected public official, a representative of the Department of
Justice (DOJ) and of the media. Section 21 of Article II of RA 9165 clearly requires the apprehending team to
mark, conduct a physical inventory, and to photograph the seized item in the presence of the accused or his
representative or counsel, and witnessed by an elected public official and representatives of DOJ and the media.
The law mandates that the insulating witnesses be present during the marking, the actual inventory, and the
taking of photographs of the seized items to deter the common practice of planting evidence. While strict
compliance may not always be possible, the prosecution has the burden to prove justifiable reasons for non-
compliance. No explanation was, however, offered for non-compliance with Section 21 of RA 9165. Clearly, with
the foregoing lapses and gaps in the chain of custody, the evidentiary value and integrity of the illegal drug have
been compromised. Indeed, the Court cannot determine with certainty whether the supposed marijuana seized
from appellants were the same ones submitted to the crime laboratory, and eventually, presented in court.
Consequently, appellants' guilt for illegal sale of drugs has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. (People
of the Philippines v. Managat, Jr., G.R. No. 230615, March 4, 2019, First Division)
9. The integrity and evidentiary value of the seized shabu had been preserved. The record shows that Agent Revilla
immediately put the markings "JIR-11/28/12" on the seized heat-sealed, transparent plastic sachet while still at
the scene and in the presence of appellant. Moreover, Agent Revilla, who had retained custody over the heat-
sealed, transparent plastic sachet from the time of confiscation, personally delivered said plastic sachet
together with the request for laboratory examination to P/SI Pabustan at the PNP Regional Crime Laboratory.
After the laboratory examination, P/SI Pabustan marked and sealed the subject specimen and turned it over to
the evidence custodian. Clearly, the prosecution's evidence sufficiently established an unbroken chain of
custody over the seized sachet of shabu from the entrapment team to the crime laboratory, to the evidence
custodian for safekeeping, up to the time it was offered in evidence before the court. (People of the Philippines
v. Goyena, G.R. No. 229680, June 6, 2019, First Division)
10. The second link in the chain of custody is the transfer of the seized drugs by the apprehending officer to the
investigating officer. Usually, the police officer who seizes the suspected substance turns it over to a supervising
officer, who will then send it by courier to the police crime laboratory for testing. This is a necessary step in the

chain of custody because it will be the investigating officer who shall conduct the proper investigation and
prepare the necessary documents for the developing criminal case. Certainly, the investigating officer must
have possession of the illegal drugs to properly prepare the required documents. The investigator in this case
was a certain SPO4 Jamisolamin. Surprisingly, there was no testimony from the witnesses as to the turnover of
the seized items to SPO4 Jamisolamin. It is highly improbable for an investigator in a drug-related case to
effectively perform his work without having custody of the seized items. Again, the case of the prosecution is
forcing this Court to resort to guesswork as to whether PO2 Corpuz and SPO1 Lieu gave the seized drugs to
SPO4 Jamisolamin as the investigating officer or they had custody of the marijuana all night while SPO4
Jamisolamin was conducting his investigation on the same items. In People v. Remigio, the Court noted the
failure of the police officers to establish the chain of custody as the apprehending officer did not transfer the
seized items to the investigating officer. The apprehending officer kept the alleged shabu from the time of
confiscation until the time he transferred them to the forensic chemist. The deviation from the links in the chain
of custody led to the acquittal of the accused in the said case. (People of the Philippines v. Villojan, Jr., G.R. No.
11. IO1 Estrellado testified that on July 28, 2010, or around 12 midnight of July 27, 2010, a buy-bust operation was
conducted resulting in the receipt of two (2) plastic sachets of suspected drugs from Bonifacio in exchange for
two (2) P500.00 bills as the buy-bust money. When he was asked by the prosecutor as to who gave him the
plastic sachets, he gave the names of Bonifacio and appellant. He clarified that one (1) small heat-sealed
transparent plastic sachet given as the "responde" came from Bonifacio, while the other plastic sachet, was
given to him by appellant. However, when he marked these two (2) plastic sachets at the area with his initials,
he did so without identifying which of the two (2) plastic sachets was received from appellant and which was
from Bonifacio as "responde." The Court finds that IO1 Estrellado failed to distinguish the two (2) plastic sachets,
which were separately received from appellant and Bonifacio, at the time of marking of the evidence as shown
in the Certificate of Inventory. In other words, the Court can no longer identify which sachet came from
Bonifacio and which came from the appellant. In People vs. Salonga, the Court held that "[t]he marking of the
evidence serves to separate the marked evidence from the corpus of all other similar or related evidence from
the time they are seized from the accused until they are disposed of at the end of criminal proceedings,
obviating switching, planting, or contamination of evidence." This procedural lapse on the part of IO1 Estrellado
is aggravated by the lack of chain of custody form in the records of this case. The form, if properly accomplished
and made an integral part of the records of this case, could have assisted the Court in identifying which sachet
came from the appellant. Unfortunately, it appears that the police officers either failed to fill out a chain of
custody form or the prosecution failed to present it in court.
a. Worse, there was no representative from the DOJ during the inventory and taking of photographs. As
testified to by IO1 Estrellado, they requested for a DOJ representative, through a text message sent by IO1
Lasay, but to no avail because it was conducted during an unholy hour. However, IO1 Estrellado's testimony
on the matter is hearsay as its probative value is not based on his personal knowledge. And while IO1 Lasay
also took the witness stand, there is nothing in the records that would show that he testified on the matter
of requesting the presence of a DOJ representative. Besides, even if the Court admits IO1 Estrellado's
testimony on the matter, the Court finds his explanation insufficient. (People of the Philippines v. Honasan,
G.R. No. 240922, August 7, 2019, Third Division)
12. There is no testimony as to the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the
investigating officer. PO1 Cadag testified that he turned over the illegal drug he purchased from accused-
appellant to PO1 Dennis Montemayor (PO1 Montemayor). However, as PO1 Montemayor was killed in a police
operation, no other witness was presented to prove custody of the illegal drugs from the time of seizure until
the marking at the police station Anent the third link, PO1 Cadag testified that they brought the seized items to
the crime laboratory for examination but there was no testimony as to who actually delivered the said items.
Moreover, the testimony of the forensic chemist, Police Senior Inspector Lourdes Cejes, was stipulated upon
by the parties but only as to the fact that she conducted the examination of the specimens and the same tested
positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. Records are bereft of any evidence as to the proper
safeguards undertaken by those who handled the shabu after they were examined and until they were
presented in court. Clearly, there was a breach in the chain of custody with the absence of the testimony of the
prosecution witness as to how and from whom the seized evidence were received, the condition in which they
were delivered to the next link in the chain, and the precautions taken to ensure their integrity. (People of the
Philippines v. Zapanta, G.R. No. 230227, November 6, 2019, Third Division)
13. In this case, PO1 Corpuz had clearly established that he marked the plastic sachet which he bought from the
appellant with "AC" and put the markings "AC-1" and "AC-2" on the two plastic sachets which were recovered
from the appellant's possession at the place of arrest and in the presence of the appellant, Barangay Kagawad
Aquino and media representative Nuqui, and the other arresting officers; and that they all signed the inventory
receipt and photographs were taken. PO1 Corpuz was in possession of the seized items from the time of the
appellant's arrest up to the police station and until he turned them over to the Forensic Chemist, PSI Angel,
who testified having received the seized items contained in three plastic sachets with markings from the former.
Thus, the Court finds no merit to the appellant's claim that there was a likelihood that the sachet bought and

recovered from him were interchanged. (People of the Philippines v. Guarin, G.R. No. 252857, March 18, 2021,
First Division)
14. In Criminal Case No. 11265, it is unclear how the item subject of the buy-bust operation was turned over to the
police officers. PO2 Jose did not testify that he received the item subject of the sale at the place of the buy-bust
operation as the next time the poseur-buyer was mentioned in PO2 Jose's narration was when the police officers
brought Jasper to the police station and the poseur-buyer was there as well. What happened to the item in the
possession of the poseur-buyer was left unexplained since PO2 Jose's testimony did not describe this gap in the
chain of custody. As to Criminal Case No. 11266, PO2 Jose testified that they "turned over the confiscated shabu
to the person who issued the warrant," meaning, their office made a compliance and returned the search
warrant to the Court that issued the search warrant. Thereafter, PO2 Jose caused the weighing of the shabu
confiscated in Agencia Dipolog, where a certain Elma Bacho weighed the shabu and a certification was issued.
The items were weighed including the wrapper. However, upon cross-examination, PO2 Jose could not clarify
who made the handwritten entries on the certification as to the weight of the shabu. He said the entries were
made by someone who worked at Elma Bacho's Pawnshop, but he also stated that the entry was made at the
police station. After the items were weighed, it was likewise unclear how these were delivered to the forensic
chemist. PO2 Jose testified that he sent the items to the Crime Lab in Zamboanga City. However, the
prosecution also alleged that the Chief of Police of Dipolog City sent a transmittal letter addressed to the
Regional Crime Laboratory of the PNP with a request to conduct qualitative laboratory examination on the drug
specimens attached thereto. The letter-request, however, was first coursed through the Officer-in-Charge of
the Provincial Crime Laboratory who subsequently endorsed the letter request to the PNP Regional Crime
Laboratory in Zamboanga City. (Tan v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 232611, April 26, 2021, Second
Division)
15. The second link is established. Records show that SPO2 Taldo and PO3 Perida turned over the seized items to
SPO3 Caluag, the designated investigator for the case. This was established through the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses as well as the Turn-Over of Confiscated/Seized Evidence. At any rate, appellant did not
raise any specific argument against the second link which is, therefore, deemed proved. (People of the
Philippines v. SPO1 Estabillo, G.R. No. 252902, June 16, 2021, Second Division)
16. As for the second and third links in the chain of custody, records show that while Agent Sarasua, who is the
apprehending officer, did not turn-over the seized item to the investigating officer, it was, however, established
that she took sole custody of the seized item until she personally delivered the same to Forensic Chemist Perez.
From the testimony of Agent Sarasua, the seized item did not change hands until its delivery to Forensic Chemist
Perez. (People of the Philippines v. Somira, G.R. No. 252152, June 23, 2021, Third Division)
FORENSIC EXAMINATION BY CHEMIST

1. Although it was not specified who received the items in the laboratory in the testimony of the prosecution
witnesses, the fact that the minute details of the seized items described in the chemistry report coincide with
the specifications in the inventory prepared by the PDEA leaves no doubt that the bricks of marijuana received
by the laboratory for examination were the same drugs seized by the PDEA agents against Asislo. Thus, the
requirements under R.A. 9165 had been sufficiently complied with. (People of the Philippines v. Asislo, G.R. No.
2. The chain of custody rule was not met. PO1 Signap categorically testified that he marked the seized substance
placed in a small heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet with the appellant’s initial “M.B.” However, when the
same substance was brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination, per written request, the specimen
submitted bore a different marking “MB-B.” There was no explanation given on the discrepancy in the markings.
(People of the Philippines v. Bombasi, G.R. No. 211608, September 7, 2016, Second Division)
3. It is well to note that the delivery of the seized items to the PNP Crime Laboratory was made way beyond the
prescribed twenty four (24)-hour period from seizure. To reiterate, the drugs/paraphernalia were seized during
the buy-bust operation on June 29, 2003, but were delivered to the PDEA and the PNP crime laboratory only
ten (10) days later, or on July 9, 2003. In People v. Gamboa, the Court explained that when police officers do
not turn over dangerous drugs to the laboratory within twenty-four (24) hours from seizure, they must identify
its custodian, and the latter must be called to testify. The custodian must state the security measures in place
to ensure that the integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated items were preserved, which did not take
place in this case. (People of the Philippines v. Ching, G.R. No. 223556, October 9, 2017, Second Division)
4. It is very evident that the prosecution in dispensing with the testimonies of SPO1 Gallego, the investigating
officer, and PCI Diestro, the forensic chemist, failed to show every link of the chain of custody. Without the
testimonies or stipulations stating the details on when and how the seized vials were brought to the crime
laboratory, and thereafter, to the court, as well as the details on who actually delivered and received the same
from the police station to the crime laboratory, and later, to the court for the prosecution's presentation of
evidence, the Court cannot ascertain whether the seized vials presented in evidence were the same vials seized
from appellant when he was arrested. These gaps in the chain of custody create doubt as to whether the corpus

delicti of the crime had been properly preserved. And more importantly, although appellant was charged with
violation of Section 5, Article II of RA 9165 for selling vials of morphine and Nandrolone Decanoate, the parties
however stipulated, per August 4, 2008 Order of the RTC, that the items seized from appellant yielded positive
results for the presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. Clearly, the identity of the corpus delicti
of the crime had not been properly established. (People of the Philippines v. Dumagay, G.R. No. 216753,
5. The third and fourth links in the chain of custody are sorely lacking. PO2 Saez's lone testimony leaves several
questions unanswered. What happened to the drugs from the time Relos received it from PO2 Saez until it was
eventually transmitted to the forensic chemist for examination? Were there other persons who came into
contact with the drugs before the forensic chemist subjected it to examination? Who handed the drugs to the
forensic chemist? How did Relos and the forensic chemist handle the drugs? Who ultimately transmitted the
drugs seized from Angeles to the trial court to be used as evidence against him? The necessary details to prove
the preservation of the integrity of the drugs recovered from Angeles remain a mystery. All these are left open
to the realm of possibilities such that the evidentiary value of drugs presented in court was unduly prejudiced;
considering that it cannot be said with certainty that the drugs were never compromised or tampered with.
(People of the Philippines v. Angeles, G.R. No. 218947, June 20, 2018, Third Division)
6. It appears that the chain of custody of the seized items was actually tainted by irregular circumstances. In
particular, records show that the time of apprehension on April 8, 2005 was at 1:50 p.m. As disclosed by PO3
Sebastian during trial, the said items were not delivered to the crime laboratory immediately because there
was no chemist present in the afternoon of April 8, 2005, a Friday. In addition, the items seized from Cordova
and Eguiso were merely stored in the locker of PO3 Sebastian. The request for laboratory examination was only
received at 11:10 a.m. of April 11, 2005 by a certain non-uniformed personnel by the name of Edwin Albarico.
Thus, three (3) days had already passed since the items were seized from accused-appellants, during which they
were merely stored in PO3 Sebastian's locker. To note, the prosecution failed to explain what security measures
were employed to ensure that the integrity and evidentiary value of the items seized would not be
compromised during the interim. (People of the Philippines v. Cordova, G.R. No. 231130, July 9, 2018, Second
Division; People of the Philippines v. San Jose, G.R. No. 179148, July 23, 2018, Third Division)
7. Because of this discrepancy between the marking on the sachet seized by PO1 Abubo and the marking on the
sachet submitted to the crime laboratory, it could not be reasonably and safely concluded that they are one
and the same. Indeed, it is possible that the forensic chemist committed a typographical error when she typed
the marking "A JA" instead of "JA" in her chemistry report. The Court, however, could not just accept this
supposition considering that the prosecution gave no explanation for this glaring and obvious variance. As such,
there is reasonable doubt that the third link in the chain of custody - the transfer of the sachet from the
investigating officer to the forensic chemist - was not complied with. Finally, compliance with the fourth link in
the chain of custody was not satisfactorily demonstrated by the prosecution. It must be recalled that the trial
court dispensed with the testimony of PI Ordoño, the forensic chemist, in view of the stipulation entered into
by the prosecution and the defense during the hearing of the case on 18 September 2008. (People of the
Philippines v. Ubungen, G.R. No. 225497, July 23, 2018, Third Division)
8. Similar to Pornillos, the pieces of evidence submitted reveal a significant discrepancy of 39% between the
weight of the drugs allegedly confiscated from De Vera and those subjected to examination by the forensic
chemist. In dismissing this irregularity, the CA accepted the prosecution's explanation that the quantity of the
seized items as indicated in the Request and Inventory are "approximate" weights only, not "true" weights.
Likewise, the seized drugs were marked anyway, hence, switching, planting or contamination thereof was
obviated. The Court takes exception to the CA's conclusions. The dismissive explanation of the prosecution does
not remove the doubts created on the identity of the drugs seized and examined. The weight discrepancy is
rather significant and apart from the nomenclature used in the Request and Inventory which refers only to
approximate weights, no other explanation was advanced. In the case of People v. Aneslag, the prosecution
went to great lengths to explain the 12.5% variance between the weight of the seized drugs as alleged in the
Information (240 grams) and that as determined by the forensic chemist (210 grams). This explanation was,
thus, duly noted and given credence and weight by the Court. Moreover, the fact that there was marking at the
point of seizure does not work to excuse irregularities attending the rest of the links in the chain of custody. At
any rate, as had been previously discussed, the marking itself of the seized drugs was erroneous for not having
been witnessed by the accused. (People of the Philippines v. De Vera, G.R. No. 218914, July 30, 2018, Second
Division)
9. As to the fourth link, when P/Sr. Insp. Sta. Maria was called to the witness stand, the prosecution and the
defense decided to enter into a stipulation regarding what P/Sr. Insp. Sta. Maria would be testifying on if he
were presented. Yet, all they stipulated was that he would identify the request for laboratory examination,
request for drug test, the subject sachets of shabu, and the chemistry reports. These pieces of evidence failed
to identify the person who personally brought the seized shabu to the Bulacan Provincial Crime Laboratory
Office. It also failed to identify who received the shabu at the crime laboratory and who exercised custody and
possession before and after it was examined. Neither was there evidence to show how the seized shabu were

handled, stored, and safeguarded pending its presentation in court. (People of the Philippines v. Plaza, G.R. No.
235467, August 20, 2018, Third Division)
10. The prosecution erected its case upon the testimonies of PO3 Briones who stated that he turned over the sachet
of shabu to the assigned investigator, PO2 Saez, who in turn claimed that he delivered the seized item to the
crime laboratory and was received by PO2 Manuel. Quite significantly, however, neither PO2 Saez nor PO2
Manuel was ever presented in court to testify to the circumstances surrounding the alleged receipt of the seized
drug. Equally significant, the testimony of the forensic chemist, PCI Mangalip, was dispensed with by the
prosecution. True, it was stipulated that the testimony of PCI Mangalip would be dispensed with, but it is no
less true that this stipulation merely covered the result of the examination conducted on the specimen
submitted to the forensic chemist. Indeed, every person who takes possession of seized drugs must show how
it was handled and preserved while in his or her custody to prevent any switching or replacement. In People v.
Hementiza, this Court stressed that every person who touched the item must describe his or her receipt thereof,
what transpired while the same was in his or her possession, and its condition when delivered to the next link.
Evidently, here, there was failure to show every link of the chain of custody. Independently of the gap in the
chain of custody of the seized specimen which is already fatal to the prosecution's case, the Court likewise
observes that neither photograph nor inventory of the seized item had been made in the presence of an elected
public official, a representative of the DOJ and of the media. Section 21 of Article II of RA 9165, prior to its
amendment by RA 10640 on July 15, 2014, which is the law applicable at the time of the commission of the
offense, clearly requires the apprehending team to mark, conduct a physical inventory, and to photograph the
seized item in the presence of the accused or his representative or counsel, with an elected public official and
a representative of DOJ and the media. The law mandates that the insulating witnesses be present during the
marking, the actual inventory, and the taking of photographs of the seized items to deter the common practice
of planting evidence. While strict compliance may not always be possible, the police officers, nonetheless,
should give justifiable reasons for non-compliance. Regrettably, in the instant case, no justifiable reason had
been proffered for this fatal omission. The explanation of PO3 Briones that no photographs were taken because
he had no camera at the time is a lame one and will not hold. More than that, there was no showing that there
was any effort to procure the presence of a representative of media, when no barangay official came to the
place of arrest and after they were declined by the DOJ. Law enforcers should be mindful of the procedures
required in the seizure, handling and safekeeping of confiscated drugs; otherwise, there will be wastage of
efforts and resources in the apprehension and prosecution of violators of our drug laws. (People of the
Philippines v. Tumangong, G.R. No. 227015, November 26, 2018, First Division)
11. Petitioner is charged with Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs. However, records disclose glaring and
unjustifiable deviations from the chain of custody procedure, as follows: First, prosecution witnesses PO1
Forastero and SPO1 Madriaga both testified that they were in possession of the plastic sachets confiscated from
petitioner and Calotes, with SPO1 Madriaga keeping in his possession the two (2) plastic sachets seized from
petitioner. They likewise testified that they marked the seized items in the police station and after a request for
laboratory examination had been prepared, both of them went to the PNP Crime Laboratory to deliver the said
request and the seized items. Unfortunately, PO1 Forastero and SPO1 Madriaga failed to identify who received
the request for laboratory examination and the seized items at the crime laboratory. Records show that before
the specimens were handled by and subjected to qualitative examination by P/Insp. Bonifacio, the forensic
chemist, the items were received by a certain "Relos," as clearly reflected on the lower left hand portion of the
request for laboratory examination. Neither has it been established who handled the same before and after
P/Insp. Bonifacio rendered her findings until the same had been presented in court as evidence for purposes of
identification. Second, although the arresting officers prepared a Certificate of Inventory at the police station
immediately after the arrest, the records are bereft of evidence showing that 1the seized items were
photographed, much more in the presence of petitioner, or his representative or counsel, as well as the
witnesses required by law. And finally, there was also a deviation from the witness requirement as the conduct
of inventory was not witnessed by an elected public official, a DOJ representative, and a media representative.
This may be gleaned from the Certificate of Inventory which shows that the same was witnessed only by City
Architect Gianan, who is not considered as an elected public official. This fact is further confirmed by SPO1
Madriaga. (Fuentes v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 228718, January 7, 2019, Second Division)
12. Although PO2 Caballero testified with regard to the seizure and marking of the illegal drug recovered from the
accused-appellant and his turnover of the illegal drug seized to the investigating officer, he failed to establish
the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination.
First, PO2 Caballero did not name the investigator but the Spot Report submitted by the prosecution shows
that the investigator was PO2 Ireneo Salazar. However, as can be gleaned from the Request for Laboratory
Examination, the request and the specimen were delivered to the crime laboratory by PSI Johnny Gaspar and
received by Forensic Chemist PSI Erickson Calabocal. Thus, there is a missing link as to how the specimen came
into the possession of PSI Gaspar. It must be emphasized that neither PO2 Ireneo Salazar nor PSI Gaspar was
presented as witness by the prosecution. PO2 Caballero did not have personal knowledge as to the handling of
the seized drug after he turned over the same to the investigator. Hence, his testimony is insufficient to
establish the unbroken link in the chain of custody. Consequently, the prosecution failed to prove that the item

confiscated by PO2 Caballero is the same item presented in court. (People of the Philippines v. Advincula, G.R.
13. Even if forensic chemist Sr. Insp. Stella Ebuen testified herein that she had conducted the laboratory
examination of the seized drug, and for which she had issued Physical Sciences Report No. D-415-07, the break
in the chain of custody could not be ignored considering that PO1 Malonzo had supposedly turned over the
seized drug to the chemistry laboratory for examination but the person to whom he had precisely turned over
the drug was not the same person conducting the test and testified on such test in court. The lack of any written
record of the movement of the seized drug from the time it had been delivered-to the chemistry laboratory
until it had been presented in court as evidence was not also suitably explained, depriving the court from
determining the reasonableness of the lapse. The Court further notes that the members of the buy-bust team
committed other procedural lapses in the handling of the seized drug that surely affected the preservation of
the chain of custody. They did not conduct a physical inventory of the seizure, and did not photograph the
seized drug in the presence of a representative of the Department of Justice, a representative from the media,
and an elected public official. Such presence was precisely called for under Sec. 21 of R.A. No. 9165 and its
implementing rules in order to insulate the seizure from the known risks of tampering, substitution or planting
of evidence. The foregoing lapses, in the absence of any valid justification being made by the arresting officers,
gave rise to the disturbing uncertainty about the identity and integrity of the seized shabu. The Court should
not ignore the lapses because the proper handling of the seized drug was of paramount significance in the
preservation of the chain of custody. Without the chain of custody being preserved, the integrity of the evidence
of the corpus delicti became suspect. (People of the Philippines v. Oliveros, G.R. No. 212202, July 30, 2019, First
Division)
14. As regards the absence of a testimony from P03 Avila as to how he handled the seized item from receipt until
he brought it to the crime laboratory, said testimony is imperative. To be sure, the probability on the integrity
and identity of the corpus delicti being compromised is present in every storage or transportation of the
prohibited item, be it from the Philippine National Police crime laboratory directly to the court or otherwise.
Also, the non-presentation of the evidence custodian in court is similarly fatal to the prosecution's cause. In
People v. Ubungen, the Court ruled that absent any testimony on the management, storage, and preservation
of the seized illegal drug, the fourth link in the chain of custody could not be reasonably established. (People of
the Philippines v. Alon-Alon, G.R. No. 237803, November 27, 2019, Third Division)
15. In People v. Pajarin, the Court ruled that in ease the parties agreed to dispense with the attendance and
testimony of the forensic chemist, it should be stipulated that the forensic chemist would have testified that he
had taken the precautionary steps required to preserve the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized item,
thus: (a) that the forensic chemist received the seized article as marked, properly sealed, and intact; (b) that he
resealed it after examination of the content; and (c) that he placed his own marking on the same to ensure that
it could not be tampered with pending trial. Here, the stipulations do not reflect the manner of handling the
drugs (a) after “PO2 J Rodriguez” received the items from PO3 Bernabe; (b) when he turned them over to PCI
Reyes; and (c) after PCI Reyes completed his qualitative examination and before they were presented in court.
It was simply declared that PCI Reyes received the specimens from PO3 Bernabe and after examination, she
presented the specimens to the prosecutor and the defense counsel. The Court stresses that in order that the
seized items may be considered credible, the prosecution must show, by records or testimony, the continuous
whereabouts of the exhibit, from the moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered into evidence; in
such a way that every person who touched the exhibit would described how and from whom, it was received,
where it was and what happened to it while in the witness’ possession; the condition in which it was received
and the condition it was delivered to the next link in the chain. Such is not the case here. (People of the
Philippines v. Buniel, G.R. No. 243796, September 8, 2020, First Division)
16. At the PNP Regional Crime Laboratory, Forensic Chemist Manuel received the request for laboratory
examination and the specimens. Per her Chemistry Report No. D-073-10 dated August 3, 2010, she confirmed
that the specimens yielded positive results for marijuana. She also testified that the seized items presented as
evidence in court where the same items she subjected to qualitative examination. Her Chemistry Report
conformed with the details found in the inventory prepared by PO2 Olete. Thus, the prosecution’s formal offer
of evidence indicated that Exhibits H to H-3, H-4 to H-5, H-6 to H-13, H-14 to H-18, H-19 to H-22, and H-23 to
H-27 represented the seized drugs themselves weighing 48,565.68 grams. Notably, the defense admitted the
genuineness and due execution of Forensic Chemist Manuel’s Report and that the seized items reflected in her
report were the same items presented in court as evidence. Indubitably, the identity and integrity of the
marijuana bricks remained intact at the time they were seized from appellant up until they were turned over
to the forensic chemist for qualitative examination and finally presented as evidence in court. (People of the
Philippines v. Baterina, G.R. No. 236259, September 16, 2020, First Division)
17. The police officers should have submitted the drug paraphernalia for forensic examination. While it is true that
R.A. 9165, Section 12 punishes the possession of dangerous drugs, but it must first be proven that what the
accused possessed was indeed dangerous drugs. In prosecutions involving R.A. 9165, Section 12, forensic
testing should thus still be done, especially in cases like the present case where the allegation is that one of the

syringes was used to inject nubain and there were also confiscated empty bottles which could be confirmed to
have contained nubain through forensic testing. (Cuico v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 232293, December
18. Moreover, the link between the investigating officer and the forensic chemist was not established with
certainty. The police officers did not describe the precautions taken to ensure that there had been no change
in the condition of the seized item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of the
dangerous drug. The records show that SPO2 Macabajon received the specimen from PO3 Sales. Yet SPO2
Macabajon did not testify on how the seized item fell into the hands of the forensic chemist PSI Bombasi. The
stipulated testimony of PSI Bombasi is insufficient to explain this gap. In People v. Pajarin, this Court identified
the following matters which are ordinarily covered by the testimony of the forensic chemist who examines the
seized items: (i) that he received the seized article as marked, properly sealed, and intact; (ii) that he resealed
it after examination of the content; and (iii) that he placed his own marking on the same to ensure that it could
not be tampered pending trial. Should the parties decide to dispense with the attendance of the police chemist,
they should stipulate that the latter would have testified that he took the precautionary steps mentioned.
Nonetheless, these circumstances were not stipulated by the parties. (Quiap v. People of the Philippines, G.R.
No. 229183, February 17, 2021, Second Division)
19. The prosecution sufficiently established how PSI Angel, the Forensic Chemist, handled the specimens upon his
receipt thereof, how he conducted the examination, and how he preserved the integrity of the seized drugs.
PSI Angel testified that he personally received from PO1 Corpuz the three heat-sealed plastic sachets containing
white crystalline substances with black ink markings "AC", "AC-1", and "AC-2." He conducted three different
types of qualitative examinations on the contents of the three plastic sachets. He then prepared Chemistry
Report No. D-092-15 where he stated that specimen A (marked as AC-03-23-15) with a weight of 0.097 grams,
specimen B (marked as AC-1 03-23-15) with a weight 0.100 grams, and specimen C (marked as AC-2 03-23-15)
with a weight of 0.065 grams were all found positive for the presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride, a
dangerous drug. After his examination, PSI Angel resealed the three plastic sachets with a masking tape to seal
the openings he made thereon and marked them with a red ink. He then placed the three sachets containing
the shabu inside a brown envelope which he totally sealed and put the marking "D-092-15 ASA", which stood
for the Chemistry Report Number and his initials; and that he also affixed his signature at the back of the
envelope. And when the envelope was opened in court, he identified all the sachets of shabu with his markings
thereon. Notably, while the defense counsel would not admit the prosecution's observation that there was no
sign of any tampering on the envelope, however, the former admitted that both ends of the envelope were
sealed when presented in court. Indeed, PSI Angel had adequately established that the plastic sachets with
white crystalline substances marked as "AC", "AC-1" and "AC-2" brought by PO1 Corpuz to the crime laboratory
for chemical analysis and which upon his examination yielded positive results for shabu were the same
substances eventually offered in court as evidence. Thus, the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized
drugs were preserved. (People of the Philippines v. Guarin, G.R. No. 252857, March 18, 2021, First Division)
20. The third link is established. Records show that on June 16, 2010, at 1:30 in the morning, SPO3 Caluag turned
over the seized items to PCI Ortiz of the PNP Crime Laboratory who was present at the operation. Thereafter,
PSI Ballesteros received the seized items from PCI Ortiz for laboratory examination at 2:55 that same morning.
Per Chemistry Report No. D-43-10, all four (4) bricks tested positive for cocaine. Moreover, the prosecution’s
failure to present the testimony of PCI Ortiz did not diminish the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized
items. What makes the seized items here even more peculiar was that they were wrapped in masking tape and
distinctly marked during the operation with LPP 06152315 2010, LPP1 06152315 2010, LPP2 06152315 2010,
and LPP3 06152315 2010 together with the signature of the arresting officers. Photos of these four (4) bricks
were also taken, allowing confirmation on whether the same bricks of cocaine seized from appellant landed on
the hands of PSI Ballesteros. This would not have been possible had the case involved miniscule amounts.
a. In any event, the presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions operates in favor of the
arresting officers. Unless there is clear and convincing evidence that the police officers were inspired by
any improper motive or did not properly perform their duty, their testimonies on the operation deserves
full faith and credit. Thus, unless the presumption is rebutted, it becomes conclusive. Here, the arresting
officers were not impelled by any improper motive to perform the buy-bust and arrest appellant other than
their genuine desire to properly perform their functions. In fact, they did not hastily act on the report from
their confidential informant and conducted a test buy to verify the information they received. When it
yielded positive results, they immediately hatched the buy-bust operation. There were no serious lapses
during its conduct. At most, no DOJ representative was present during the inventory but even this was
justified. The presumption of regularity, should therefore be upheld to fill the supposed gap in the chain of
custody.
b. As for the double request for laboratory examination, this too was adequately explained. The request from
PCI Ortiz was due to the fact that he was the one who personally delivered the seized items to PSI
Ballesteros. But PCI Ortiz also worked at the PNP Crime Laboratory and was actually PSI Ballesteros’
superior. Though present at the scene, PCI Ortiz was not part of the buy bust team, the actual party who
would be interested in the results of the laboratory examination for purposes of filing a criminal case
against appellant. Thus, SPO3 Caluag prepared his own request for laboratory examination so that their

station would directly receive the results of said examination within 24 hours as required under R.A. 9165,
Section 21. (People of the Philippines v. SPO1 Estabillo, G.R. No. 252902, June 16, 2021, Second Division)
DELIVERY TO COURT
1. PSI Todeno confirmed receiving the narcotic substance from PO3 Carvajal for testing, and added that her
specimen was then handed to one PO2 Manuel, the evidence custodian, for safekeeping. However, this is where
the chain breaks. It was therefore imperative for the prosecution to have presented as witness PO2 Manuel,
and anyone else for that matter who may have handled the drug after him. For during the interim time – from
when the specimen was placed under his custody until the time it was brought to court – the threat of
tampering, alteration, or substitution of the corpus delicti still existed. Without PO2 Manuel’s testimony, there
is no guarantee that the corpus delicti of the offense had been preserved. (People of the Philippines v. Carlit,
G.R. No. 227309, August 16, 2017, Third Division)
2. The fourth link in the chain of custody, i.e. the turnover of the seized items from the forensic chemist to the
court, presents an unusual twist in the prosecution's evidence in this case. Notably, the forensic chemist did
not testify in court. Instead, the prosecution and the defense stipulated on her testimony as follows: (a) that
Arlyn Dascil is a Forensic Chemist assigned at the PNP Crime Laboratory in Olongapo City; (b) that she examined
the specimen subject matter of [the] case; (c) that based on her examination, the specimen suqject of [the]
case was tbund positive for marijuana as shown by Chemistry Report No. D-074-2009, marked as Exhibit "H";
and (d) that upon the request of the City Prosecutor's Office, the Evidence Custodian of [the] PNP Crime
Laboratory turned over the specimen subject matter of [the] case to the Prosecutor's Office. It appears, based
on the prosecution's evidence no less, that for reasons unknown, the PNP Crime Laboratory agreed to turn over
custody of the seized items to an unnamed receiving person at the City Prosecutor's Office before they were
submitted as evidence to the trial court. It should be emphasized that the City Prosecutor's Office is not, nor
has it ever been, a part of the chain of custody of seized dangerous drugs. It has absolutely no business in taking
custody of dangerous drugs before they are brought before the court. (People of the Philippines v. De Guzman,
3. The prosecution offered and the defense admitted that PCI Ebuen is an expert witness; that on 19 May 2009,
she received two small heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets including the subject of this case, with marking
"MCV/LD BUY BUST"; and that the contents of the sachet yielded positive results for methylamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu after the laboratory examination thereon. Although herein stipulations satisfied the first
requisite as stated in People v. Pajarin, they failed to cover the second and third requisites required to establish
that, after the laboratory examination, there would have been no change in the condition of the seized drug
and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession of and to tamper with the same. Absent
any testimony regarding these precautions, doubt, that the illegal drug allegedly confiscated from the accused
is not the same as that presented in court, remains. As a result, this reasonable doubt would prevent the
prosecution from overcoming the presumption of innocence in favor of the accused.
a. In People v. Pajarin, the Court ruled that in case of a stipulation by the parties to dispense with the
attendance and testimony of the forensic chemist, it should be stipulated that the forensic chemist would
have testified that he had taken the precautionary steps required to preserve the integrity and evidentiary
value of the seized item, thus: (i) that the forensic chemist received the seized article as marked, properly
sealed, and intact; (ii) that he resealed it after examination of the content; and (iii) that he placed his own
marking on the same to ensure that it could not be tampered with pending trial. (People of the Philippines
v. Cabuhay, G.R. No. 225590, July 23, 2018, Third Division)
4. Contrary to appellant's assertion, the failure of SFC Purificando to turn-over the shabu he examined to an
"evidence custodian," prior to submitting the, same to the court, did not render doubtful the integrity of the
shabu so submitted. The Court finds that such failure did not create a gap in the chain of custody of the shabu
retrieved from the appellant: First. The act of SFC Purificando in taking custody of the specimen he examined
and submitting the same to the court himself did not, strictly speaking, violate any mandatory provision of law
pertaining to the custody of illegal drugs seized in an entrapment operation. Indeed, Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165
— the leading law governing the custody and disposition of confiscated drugs and contrabands — actually
prescribed no particular intermediary between the forensic chemist who examined the specimens seized from
the buy-bust operation and the court to whom such specimens must be submitted. The provision also did not
specifically prohibit the forensic chemist from acting as the safekeeper of the specimens he examined pending
their transmission to the court. Second. From the perspective of case law, on the other hand, it would seem
that — for the purpose of establishing the chain of custody over an illegal drug — a direct submission of such
drug from the forensic chemist to the court may be allowed. If we may remember, in the Kamad case cited
above, the submission of the seized illegal drug by the forensic chemist to the court was recognized as the last
link needed to complete an unbroken chain of custody over such drug. Third. Since neither law nor
jurisprudence specifically condemns a direct submission of drug evidence by the forensic chemist to the court,
the Court cannot ipso facto make the conclusion that the shabu submitted by SFC Purificando is no longer
reliable solely on the ground that he by-passed the evidence custodian of the NBI. This holds true even though
such action by SFC Purificando may have constituted a deviation from a "standard practice" of the NBI. Again,
there is simply no law or jurisprudence that renders a drug evidence inadmissible just because it was not

forwarded to an "evidence custodian'' and was instead submitted directly to the court by the forensic chemist.
Fourth. The integrity of the illegal drug presented to the court, to Our mind, has less to do with the title of the
law enforcement officer that made the submission than it does with evidence of how such officer, in truth,
performed his duty as safekeeper of the drug in question. And, in this case, there is actual ample evidence to
show that SFC Purificando had taken proper precautions to ensure that the shabu it examined was protected
from any possibility of contamination or substitution while in his custody. (People of the Philippines v. Dampak,
G.R. No. 237209, April 10, 2019, Third Division)
5. There was no detailed account on the handling of the seized drug from the time it was confiscated up to its
presentation in court, hence, putting the integrity of the corpus delicti in question. Consider the following: (a)
the prosecution failed to adduce evidence how the seized item was handled from the time it was (i) confiscated
from appellants; (ii) while it was being transported en route the police station; and (iii) after the forensic chemist
had examined it; (b) per Amended Information dated October 14, 2011, the weight of the seized illegal drug
was 0.0415 gram. While per stipulation, the parties recognized that it was SPO2 Flojo who received from SPO4
Ancheta the illegal drug which weighed more or less 0.2 gram; (c) SPO2 Sugayen testified that he marked the
plastic sachet containing the illegal drug with initials "JBS;" while the parties stipulated that SPO2 Flojo received
the seized item with markings "LCPS ACDV." As the records show, SPO2 Flojo merely stated in his proffered
testimony that the markings "LCPS ACDV" were already written on the specimen when he received the same.
The prosecution did not provide any explanation on the differences in the markings nor did the defense object
to this substantial discrepancy; and (d) SPO2 Flojo allegedly received the seized item from SPO4 Ancheta at 1:30
in the afternoon of October 9, 2011 and delivered it to forensic chemist PS/Insp. Baligod at 2 o'clock in the
afternoon. Chemistry Report No. D-051-2011 dated October 9, 2011, however, indicated that PS/Insp. Baligod
received the item at 1:30 in the afternoon. The foregoing substantial discrepancies on the identity of the alleged
drug itself and the evidence of the buy-bust operation created serious doubt that the illegal drug allegedly
seized from appellants and transmitted to the investigating officer and then to the forensic chemist are one
and the same. (People of the Philippines v. De Vera and Cacal, G.R. No. 229364, October 16, 2019, Second
Division)
6. The police officers duly complied with the chain of custody rule. Records reveal that right after Pis-an was
arrested, the police officers immediately took custody of the seized items and marked them right there and
then. They also conducted the requisite inventory and photography in the presence of all three insulating
witness as required by R.A. 9165 prior to its amendment. Thereafter, PO2 Calumba delivered the confiscated
drugs to PCInsp. Llena for laboratory examination. Later, confirmatory tests on all 14 heat-sealed transparent
plastic sachets would yield a positive finding for the presence of shabu. Clearly, therefore, the chain of custody
over the seized drugs remained unbroken as the recovery and proper handling of the corpus delicti were
sufficiently shown. (People of the Philippines v. Pis-an, G.R. No. 242692, July 13, 2020, First Division)
7. As regards the fourth link, case law provides that it is of paramount necessity that the forensic chemist testifies
on the details pertaining to the handling and analysis of the dangerous drug submitted for examination, i.e.,
when and from whom the dangerous drug was received; what identifying labels or other things accompanied
it; description of the specimen; and the container it was in. Further, the forensic chemist must also identify the
name and method of analysis used in determining the chemical composition of the subject specimen. Thus, as
a rule, the forensic chemist must testify as to the foregoing matters in order to show compliance with the fourth
link.
a. It must be recalled that during trial, the parties opted to dispense with the testimony of PCI Libres, the
forensic chemist, and in lieu thereof, entered into the following stipulations of facts: (i) that she is the same
Police Chief Inspector Forensic Chemist Margarita Libres of the PNP Eastern Police District Crime
Laboratory with Office at Marikina Sports Complex, Brgy. Sta. Elena, Marikina City; (ii) that on September
22, 2014, she received a Request for Laboratory Examination on seized evidence from the Director of the
PNP Crime Laboratory, Marikina City for the examination of the items allegedly confiscated from accused
Rivera and Estanislao; (iii) that she received the following specimens: (1) one piece of heat-sealed
transparent plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance suspected as shabu marked as “BUYBUST
AGA & GRACE 9/22/14” weighing 0.11 grams; (2) one piece heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet
containing white crystalline substance suspected as shabu marked as "MGE-1 9/22/14" weighing 2.10
grams; (3) one (1) piece heat sealed transparent plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance
suspected as shabu marked as "MGE-2 9/22/14" weighing 0.40 gram; (4) one (1) piece heat sealed
transparent plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance suspected as shabu marked as "MGE-3
9/22/14" weighing 0.10 gram; (5) one (1) piece heat sealed transparent plastic sachet containing white
crystalline substance suspected as shabu marked as "MGE-4 9/22/14" weighing 0.10 gram; (6) one (1) piece
heat sealed transparent plastic sachet containing white crystalline substance suspected as shabu marked
as "MGE-5 9/22/14" weighing 0.10 gram; (7) one (1) piece disposable lighter, color white, with markings
"MGE-14 9/22/14''; (8) one (1) piece disposable lighter, color green, with markings '"MGE-15 9/22/14"; (9)
one (1) piece improvised water pipe with markings "MGE-12 9/22/14"; and (10) one (1) piece improvised
water pipe with markings "MGE-13 9/22/14"; (iv) that pursuant to the said laboratory examination request,
she conducted examination of the above-stated specimens "A", "B", "C", "D", "E", ''F", "G", "H", "I'' and "J";
(v) that after a qualitative examination conducted by her, the substances contained in the specimens "A",

"B", "C", "D", "E", "F", "I" and "J" gave positive result to the tests for the presence of Methamphetamine
Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug; (vi) that the results of her findings with regard to the specimens "A", "B",
"C", "D", ''E", "F", "I" and "J" were reduced into writing under Physical Science Report No. MCSO-D-111-14
dated September 22, 2014; (vii) that the specimens ''A", "B"', "C", "D", "E", "F", "I" and "J" were the same
items that were turned over to her by PO3 Deogracias Basang; (viii) that after a qualitative examination
conducted by her, the specimens "G" and "H" gave negative results to the tests for the presence of
dangerous drugs; and (ix) that the specimens "G" and "H" were the same items that were turned over to
her by PO3 Deogracias Basang.
b. From the foregoing, it would then appear that while the parties stipulated as to the manner the seized
items were received by the chemist and as to the results of the examination thereof, there were no such
stipulations as to the manner the seized items were managed, stored, preserved or handled at the crime
laboratory after it was examined by PCI Libres and before it was delivered to the trial court for
identification. Absent these required stipulations, the fourth link of the chain of custody could not be
reasonably established. The lapses committed by the prosecution and the law enforcers herein could not
be considered minor. Indeed, establishing every link in the chain of custody is crucial to the preservation
of the integrity, identity, and evidentiary value of the seized items. Failure to demonstrate compliance with
even just one of these links creates reasonable doubt that the items confiscated from the accused are the
same items offered in evidence, as in this case. (People of the Philippines v. Rivera, G.R. No. 252886, March
8. In this case, while the prosecution successfully established the first to the third links, it however failed to show
compliance with the fourth link of the chain of custody. Records show that during the trial, the prosecution and
the defense stipulated on the intended testimony of prosecution witness P/S Insp. Pascual, thus: (a) that he is
an expert witness; (b) that pursuant to the Request for Laboratory Examination from the Escalante City Police
Station, P/SInsp. Pascual conducted the qualitative examination on the specimens submitted to them; (c) that
after conducting the required examination, he reduced his findings in Chemistry Report No. D-549-2015; and
(d) that he can identify the specimens which he subjected to examination. However, in dispensing with his
testimony, the prosecution failed to prove the manner by which the specimens were handled before P/SInsp.
Pascual received them, how he examined the items, and how these were stored or kept in custody until they
were brought and presented in court as evidence.
a. In drug related cases, "it is of paramount necessity that the forensic chemist testifies on the details
pertaining to the handling and analysis of the dangerous drug submitted for examination, i.e., when and
from whom the dangerous drug was received; what identifying labels or other things accompanied it;
description of the specimen; and the container it was in. Further, the forensic chemist must also identify
the name and method of analysis used in determining the chemical composition of the subject specimen."
b. Should the parties opt to stipulate and dispense with the attendance of the forensic chemist, the Court
clarified in People v. Ubungen that "it should be stipulated that the forensic chemist would have testified
that he took the precautionary steps required in order to preserve the integrity and evidentiary value of
the seized item, thus: (i) the forensic chemist received the seized article as marked, properly sealed, and
intact; (ii) he resealed it after examination of the content; and (iii) he placed his own marking on the same
to ensure that it could not be tampered pending trial." Here, the parties' stipulation did not mention that
any one of these precautionary steps were in fact done by the forensic chemist, from the time he received
the seized items for laboratory examination and before they were delivered to the trial court for
identification, leaving a gap in the chain of custody of said seized items.
c. Clearly, absent any of the afore-mentioned conditions, the fourth link in the chain of custody of the said
illegal drug could not be reasonably established. The lapses committed by the prosecution and the law
enforcers herein could not be considered minor. Indeed, establishing every link in the chain of custody is
crucial to the preservation of the integrity, identity, and evidentiary value of the seized illegal drug. Failure
to demonstrate compliance with even just one of these links creates reasonable doubt that the substance
confiscated from the accused is the same substance offered in evidence, as in this case. Accordingly, since
the prosecution failed to account for the fourth link in the chain of custody of the items purportedly seized
from accused-appellant, its integrity and evidentiary value were already compromised, thereby warranting
accused-appellant's acquittal. (People of the Philippines v. Villalon, Jr., G.R. No. 249412, March 15, 2021,
Second Division)
9. Accused-appellant posits that the prosecution did not adduce evidence as to how the alleged seized drugs were
handled, stored, and safeguarded pending their offer in court. The evidence on record belies this argument.
The Court notes that there was no break in the last link of the chain of custody. PCI Esber has sufficiently
demonstrated how the items were handled pending their presentation in court. After his examination, PCI Esber
tape-sealed the three plastic sachets and labeled them with his markings. PCI Esber further testified that PO3
Dagatan's role was simply to place the confiscated shabu inside a steel cabinet for safekeeping, of which only
PO3 Dagatan had sole custody of the keys. While PCI Esber had access to the steel cabinet and the evidence
room, he could only access the same together with the evidence custodian. PCI Esber even saw PO3 Dagatan
keep the specimens inside the steel cabinet, and he also saw him retrieve them from the steel cabinet on the
day of his testimony in court. More importantly, on the day of his testimony, PCI Esber confirmed that the items
were in the same condition when he handed them over to PO3 Dagatan after the laboratory examination as

when he retrieved them from PO3 Dagatan for presentation in court. With this, the evidentiary value and
integrity of the seized sachets containing shabu found in accused- appellant's possession were thus proven to
have been properly preserved.
a. Accused-appellant’s argument that the last link is broken because PO3 Dagatan, to whom PCI Esber turned
over the seized items after the laboratory examination, was not presented in court does not persuade. It
is not necessary to present all persons who came into contact with the seized drug to testify in court. As
long as the chain of custody of the seized drug was clearly established to have not been broken and the
prosecution did not fail to identify properly the drugs seized, it is not indispensable that each and every
person who came into possession of the drugs should take the witness stand. The non-presentation as
witness of the evidence custodian is not a crucial point against the prosecution since it has the discretion
as to how to present its case and the right to choose whom it wishes to present as witnesses. (People of
the Philippines v. Cabriole, G.R. No. 248418, May 5, 2021, First Division)
10. The fourth link in the chain was incipiently broken. The testimony of PS1 Malong was dispensed with, as the
defense admitted his proposed testimony. His testimony, however, contains inadequate stipulation, as it only
covered his findings on the drug sample submitted by PO2 Joven. Verily, he did not discuss how he handled the
dangerous drug from the time it was received until it was presented in court. Neither does the initial laboratory
report proffered in evidence bear a description of the method utilized in analyzing the chemical composition of
the drug sample. As iterated by the Court in People v. Dahil, the Court acquitted the accused in view of the
absence of the testimony of the forensic chemist on how she handled the dangerous drug submitted to her for
examination. (People of the Philippines v. Calleja, G.R. No. 250865, June 16, 2021, Third Division)
11. The fourth link is established. Here, PSI Ballesteros brought the seized items to the trial court during the pre-
trial conference and hearing on appellant’s petition for bail. Said items were marked as exhibits in open court
in the presence of appellant himself and counsel. (People of the Philippines v. SPO1 Estabillo, G.R. No. 252902,
12. Anent the fourth link, during the hearing on May 12, 2016, it was Forensic Chemist Perez who turned over to
the trial court the subject specimen. Thereafter, Agent Sarasua positively identified the said specimen to be the
same illegal drugs seized from Mila. (People of the Philippines v. Somira, G.R. No. 252152, June 23, 2021, Third
Division)
JUSTIFIABLE GROUND FOR NON-COMPLIANCE

1. The failure to strictly comply with the requirements of Section 21 of R.A. 9165 was satisfactorily explained by
the apprehending officers. They testified that a commotion erupted when accused-appellant resisted and
shouted for help while she was being arrested. The commotion eventually gave accused-appellant the
opportunity to run and elude arrest. The arresting officers further alleged that the people who gathered around
them were already aggressive prompting them to decide to immediately proceed to the police station for their
safety. In fact, the arresting officers even had to fire a warning shot and arrest Ortega, the person who
intervened in the arrest of the accused, in order to pacify the people around them. (People of the Philippines
v. Dela Cruz, G.R. No. 212171, September 7, 2016, Third Division)
a. The justifiable ground for non-compliance must be proven as a fact because the Court cannot presume
what these grounds are or that they even exist. (People of the Philippines v. Barrera, G.R. No. 232337,
August 1, 2018, First Division; People of the Philippines v. Alunen, G.R. No. 236540, October 8, 2018, First
Division; People of the Philippines v. Silayan, G.R. No. 229362, June 19, 2019, Second Division; People of
the Philippines v. Dayon, G.R. No. 229669, November 27, 2019, Third Division)
b. It is incumbent upon the prosecution to account for these witnesses' absence by presenting a justifiable
reason therefor or, at the very least, by showing that genuine and sufficient efforts were exerted by the
apprehending officers to secure their presence. Here, the justification offered by PO2 Genova – that they
suspect Velasco to have connections with the barangay which could jeopardize the buy-bust operation
against him – was not only flimsy, but also self-serving and unsubstantiated. In fact, PO2 Genova himself
admitted that the buy-bust team did not even bother to check if Velasco indeed had such connections. As
these justifications would not pass the foregoing standard to trigger the operation of the saving clause, the
Court is therefore constrained to conclude that the integrity and evidentiary value of the items purportedly
seized from Velasco were compromised, which consequently warrants his acquittal. (People of the
Philippines v. Velasco, G.R. No. 233084, October 8, 2018, Second Division; People of the Philippines v.
Pantallano, G.R. No. 233800, March 6, 2019, Third Division)
c. It is not enough for the prosecution to claim that deviation from the statutory procedure was warranted
on account of the preservation of the integrity and identity of the drugs seized. It must be sufficiently
established that justifiable grounds existed to warrant non-compliance because the courts cannot presume
that the departure from the prescribed rule was acceptable. (People of the Philippines v. Malabanan, G.R.
d. The mere fact that the witnesses contacted by the police officers failed to appear at their office within a
brief period of two (2) hours is not reasonable enough to justify non-compliance with the requirements of
the law. Indeed, the police officers did not even bother to follow up on the persons they contacted, thus,

it cannot be said that genuine and sufficient efforts were exerted to comply with the witness requirement.
(Limbo v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 238299, July 1, 2019, Second Division)
e. The prosecution only explained why the apprehending officers failed to mark the seized evidence and
conduct the inventory of the items at the place where the buy-bust operation took place. The prosecution
explained that the side street where the buy-bust operation took place was quickly filled by people after
the incident, and the team needed to secure the items they seized from appellant. The prosecution also
explained that the barangay hall where they took appellant was just 30 meters away from the street where
the buy-bust operation transpired. However, there was no explanation why only Chairperson Ureña was
present during the inventory, which constitutes non-compliance with the three-witness rule. (People of
the Philippines v. Labini, G.R. No. 229212, September 4, 2019, Second Division)
f. The requirements for the preservation of the chain of custody in drug-related prosecutions are to be
dispensed with upon justifiable reasons, and only if the integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated
dangerous drugs are properly preserved by the apprehending officers. (People of the Philippines v. Carpio,
2. The presumption of regularity in the performance of duties of public officers does not do away with the chain
of custody rule because it is a matter of judicial notice that buy-bust operations are susceptible to police abuse.
(People of the Philippines v. Barte, G.R. No. 179749, March 1, 2017, Third Division; People of the Philippines v.
Ameril, G.R. No. 222192, March 13, 2019, Third Division; People of the Philippines v. Urbano, G.R. No. 216941,
a. The integrity of the evidence is presumed to be preserved unless there is showing of bad faith, ill-will, or
proof that the evidence has been tampered with. The appellant bears the burden to make some showing
that the evidence was tampered or meddled with to overcome a presumption of regularity in the handling
of exhibits by public officers and a presumption that the public officers properly discharged their duties.
(People of the Philippines v. Banguilay, G.R. No. 231981, August 20, 2018, First Division)
b. Whenever there is an unjustified noncompliance with the chain of custody requirements, the prosecution
cannot invoke the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty to conveniently disregard
such lapse. Noncompliance obliterates proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt, warranting an accused’s
acquittal. Thus, the constitutional right to presumption of innocence prevails. (People of the Philippines v.
Dela Cruz, G.R. No. 229053, July 17, 2019, Third Division)
c. The presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions cannot substitute for compliance
and mend the broken links. There can be no presumption of regularity in this case when records were
replete with details of the policemen’s serious lapses. For to allow the presumption to prevail
notwithstanding clear errors on the part of the police is to negate the safeguards precisely placed by law
to ensure that no abuse is committed. Here, the presumption was amply overturned by compelling
evidence of the multiple breaches of the chain of custody rule. (People of the Philippines v. Salmeron, G.R.
3. The identity, integrity, and evidentiary value of the dangerous drugs confiscated from the accused were
preserved, notwithstanding the absence of the representatives from the media and the DOJ at the time of the
arrest and taking of inventory. Notably, the absence of media representatives at the time Ominga prepared the
inventory was sufficiently explained by her during her cross-examination when she testified that when
contacted, the media representatives told them that they were still far from the area and would not be able to
arrive on time. As regard the absence of the DOJ representative, Gapasin, the DOJ clerk who signed the
inventory, explained that it has been the practice in their office for him to go to the PDEA office to sign the
inventories instead of going to the site of the crime. While this is not ideal and the Court by no means condones
it, the Court is also cognizant of the fact that this is not the fault of the apprehending officers. Verily, under
varied field conditions, the strict compliance with the requirements of R.A. 9165, Section 21 may not always be
possible. What is of utmost importance is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the
seized items, as the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the accused.
(Belmonte v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 224143, June 28, 2017, First Division)
4. The justification given by PO3 Delos Santos was insufficient for the saving-clause to apply. His claim that the
instant buy-bust operation is a “confidential matter” which requires them “not to tell other person about it,”
not even an elected public official and a representative from the DOJ or the media, cannot be given credence,
as the law mandates their presence to ensure the proper chain of custody and to avoid the possibility of
switching, planting, or contamination of evidence. Moreover, PO3 Delos Santos did not satisfactorily explain
why compliance with the said rule “will not prove productive,” not to mention the exigent circumstances which
would actually show that they were “running out of time to inform” the said required witnesses,
notwithstanding the fact that buy-bust operations are usually planned out ahead of time. Neither did the police
officers provide any other explanation for their non-compliance, such as threat to their safety and security or
the time and distance, which other witnesses would have had to consider. (People of the Philippines v. Ceralde,
G.R. No. 228894, August 7, 2017, First Division; People of the Philippines v. Gamboa, G.R. No. 233702, June 20,

5. The non-disclosure of the justification by the members of the buy-bust team underscored the uncertainty about
the identity and integrity of the shabu admitted as evidence against the accused. The unavoidable consequence
of the non-disclosure of the justification was the non-establishment of the chain of custody, which, in turn,
raised serious doubts on whether or not the shabu presented as evidence was the shabu supposedly sold by
Lumudag, or whether or not shabu had really been sold by him. (People of the Philippines v. Lumudag, G.R. No.
201478, August 23, 2017, Third Division; People of the Philippines v. Geronimo, G.R. No. 180447, August 23,
2017, Third Division; People of the Philippines v. Año, G.R. No. 230070, March 14, 2018, Second Division; People
of the Philippines v. Calates, G.R. No. 214759, April 4, 2018, Third Division; People of the Philippines v. Cornel,
G.R. No. 229047, April 16, 2018, Second Division; People of the Philippines v. Suarez, G.R. No. 223141, June 6,
2018, First Division; Mariñas v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 232891, July 23, 2018, Second Division; Ramos
v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 233572, July 30, 2018, Second Division; People of the Philippines v.
Lumumba, G.R. No. 232354, August 29, 2018, First Division; People of the Philippines v. Nepomuceno, G.R. No.
216062, September 19, 2018, First Division; People of the Philippines v. Abadilla, G.R. No. 232496, October 8,
2018, Second Division; People of the Philippines v. Isla, G.R. No. 237352, October 15, 2018, Second Division;
People of the Philippines v. Rendon, G.R. No. 227873, November 14, 2018, Second Division; People of the
Philippines v. Corral, G.R. No. 233883, January 7, 2019, Second Division; People of the Philippines v. Bangcola,
G.R. No. 237802, March 18, 2019, First Division; People of the Philippines v. Martin, G.R. No. 233750, June 10,
2019, Third Division; People of the Philippines v. Placiente, G.R. No. 213389, August 14, 2019, First Division)
a. Although the implementing rules of R.A. 9165 offers a saving clause allowing leniency whenever there are
justifiable grounds to deviate from established protocol so long as the integrity and evidentiary value of
the seized items are properly preseved, the prosecution must still explain and show that earnest efforts
were done to comply with the chain of custody rule. (People of the Philippines v. Caray, G.R. No. 245391,
6. The law does not expressly require that the marking, photographing, and inventorying be always made at the
site of the buy-bust operation, and that the elected officials be always from the place where the buy-bust arrest
occurred. Article II, Section 21(a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. 9165 address the
contingency of the law enforcers being unable to literally meet the requirements – like marking, photographing
and inventorying at the place of the arrest and seizure – by providing the saving mechanism that non-
compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value
of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer or team, shall not render void and invalid
such seizures of and custody over said items. As the terms of the saving mechanism state, the justifiable grounds
for the non-compliance must be explained during the trial. (People of the Philippines v. Lamama, G.R. No.
7. Too much reliance on the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties on the part of the
arresting officers in the prosecution of drug-related offenses is unwarranted if the records show noncompliance
with the affirmative safeguards prescribed to preserve the chain of custody of the contraband. The presumption
of regularity applies only when there is no showing of non-compliance. (Casona v. People of the Philippines,
G.R. No. 179757, September 13, 2017, Third Division; People of the Philippines v. Velasco, G.R. No. 219174,
February 21, 2018, Third Division; People of the Philippines v. Lozano, G.R. No. 227700, August 28, 2019, Second
Division)
8. In this case, the policemen were justified in marking the sachets of shabu at the office. Accused-appellant was
struggling and trying to get away from the police, as testified by defense witness Esconas. Accused-appellant
himself testified that he even elbowed one of the arresting officers as he was resisting arrest. The priority of
the arresting officers is to apprehend the offender. They would have had difficulty, if not impossibility, in
marking the corpus delicti at the scene of the crime considering that the accused-appellant was quite out of
control. Likewise, the absence of a physical inventory and the lack of a photograph of the seized items are not
sufficient justifications to acquit the accused-appellant as the Court in several cases has affirmed convictions
despite the failure of the arresting officers to strictly comply with the Chain of Custody Rule as long as the
integrity and identity of the corpus delicti of the crime are preserved. (People of the Philippines v. Villahermoso,
G.R. No. 218208, January 24, 2018, First Division)
9. The combined weight of the seized specimens, which initially weighed 0.2934 gram during the first qualitative
examination, decreased to 0.2406 during the re-examination by the second forensic chemist. These were the
same items that IO1 Dealagdon identified in court as those that he had previously marked. Although the
discrepancy of 0.0528 in the amounts may be considered negligible, the prosecution, nonetheless, did not even
venture to explain how the discrepancy came about. As already adverted to, the saving clause applies only (a)
where the prosecution recognized the procedural lapses, and thereafter explained the cited justifiable grounds,
and (b) when the prosecution established that the integrity and evidentiary value of the evidence seized had
been preserved. The prosecution, thus, loses the benefit of invoking the presumption of regularity and bears
the burden of proving — with moral certainty — that the illegal drug presented in court is the same drug that
was confiscated from the accused during his arrest. (People of the Philippines v. Ramos, G.R. No. 233744,

10. The seized items may be marked in the nearest police station. Records show that it was reasonable for the
police officers not to conduct the marking immediately at the place of the arrest and seizure. Evidently,
petitioner is a flight risk because he immediately ran away at the sight of SPO2 Suagen. To conduct the marking
in an unsecured location may result in the escape of petitioner. Also, the seized baggage contained large
quantities of marijuana. It would be impractical, if not dangerous, for merely two police officers to conduct the
marking of such drugs in broad daylight and in open public, without the assistance and security of other police
officers. Accordingly, it was prudent and rational for the police officers to conduct the marking in the police
station. As stated earlier, PO1 Falolo and PSI Biadang were able to identify all the marked items in open court.
Further, there was no opportunity of tampering when PO1 Falolo and SPO2 Suagen ran after petitioner. As
properly discussed by the RTC, there was no considerable time that elapsed from the moment that petitioner
ran away from his baggage up to the time the police officers arrested him. The distance between the Sta. Rita
Church, where petitioner was caught, and the COMPAC, where the baggage was left, was only about 500
meters. Thus, the police officers were able to immediately return to the baggage once they arrested petitioner.
It would be the height of absurdity to require the police officers to simply wait at the tricycle while they freely
allow petitioner to escape even though there was probable cause to believe that he was transporting illegal
drugs. (Macad v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 227366, August 1, 2018, Third Division)
11. Contrary to the accused-appellant's claim that there was a "break" in the chain of custody, a perusal of the
records reveal that the arresting officers complied with the requirements of Section 21. First, it is not disputed
that IO2 Laynesa had custody of the seized items from the time of seizure up to the time it was brought to the
crime laboratory for examination. Second, the requirements of marking, inventory and photograph were
complied with and was conducted in the presence of the accused-appellant and the required witnesses, namely:
Borigas (DOJ representative), Nisolada (elected public official), and Agor (media representative). Third, the sole
reason why IO2 Laynesa was unable to immediately turnover the seized item to the crime laboratory was
because it was already 3:00 a.m. - clearly beyond office hours. Moreover, the seized items remained in her
custody as she locked it up in the meantime and had the lone key to the drawer. The fact that she brought it to
the crime laboratory for testing that very same morning negates the accused-appellant's claim that such
deviation destroyed the presumption of regularity in the performance of duty. (People of the Philippines v.
Arbuis, G.R. No. 234154, July 23, 2018, Second Division)
12. The refusal of the members of the media to sign the inventory of the seized items as testified to by PO1 Llacuna
can be considered by the Court as a valid ground to relax the requirement. (People of the Philippines v. Ocampo,
13. PO3 Meniano himself admitted that no public elected official, e.g., barangay officials, was present during the
inventory because "they were not around" and that he simply forgot to let the media representatives sign the
inventory receipt because he forgot to do so. Verily, these flimsy excuses do not justify a deviation from the
required witnesses rule, hence, the Court is impelled to conclude that the integrity and evidentiary value of the
items purportedly seized from Patacsil – which constitute the corpus delicti of the crimes charged – have been
compromised. It is well-settled that the procedure in Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 is a matter of substantive
law, and cannot be brushed aside as a simple procedural technicality; or worse, ignored as an impediment to
the conviction of illegal drug suspects. As such, since the prosecution failed to provide justifiable grounds for
non-compliance with the aforesaid procedure, Patacsil's acquittal is perforce in order. (People of the Philippines
v. Patacsil, G.R. No. 234052, August 6, 2018, Second Division)
14. The prosecution managed to demonstrate the necessity of doing the marking, inventory and photography-
taking belatedly and not at the scene of the crime. As remarked by the CA, in this instance, Agent Subang
testified that they had to hastily leave the crime scene as Plaza was able to call his brother through his cellphone.
At the moment when Plaza's brother arrived along with several individuals, the buy-bust team feared for their
safety and thus decided to do the marking, photographing and inventory at the police station to prevent any
untoward incident. The evidence offered also show that there were some PDEA agents who suffered hematoma
and contusion due to the scuffle between the law enforcement agents and accused-appellants. Thus, PDEA
Agent Subang's actions were warranted since their safety was compromised and they had to suppress the
struggle put up by accused-appellants. Accordingly, the first link in the chain was supported by convincing proof
and testimony. The second and third links were also adequately demonstrated. PDEA Agent Subang's
statements showed that he was the arresting and investigating officer, and he had exclusive custody of the drug
subject of the buy-bust operation which he personally brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory. (People of the
Philippines v. Plaza, G.R. No. 235467, August 20, 2018, Third Division)
15. it is glaring from the records that the buy-bust team comprising of PDEA operatives conducted the marking,
physical inventory, and photography of the item seized from Quilang at their office, i.e., PDEA Region 2 Office,
and in the presence of a public elected official, a DOJ representative, and a media representative. Moreover,
the poseur-buyer, IO1 Benjamin Binwag, Jr., positively identified during trial the item seized from Quilang during
the buy-bust operation. In view of the foregoing, the Court holds that there is sufficient compliance with the
chain of custody rule, and thus, the integrity and evidentiary value of the corpus delicti has been preserved.

Perforce, Quilang's conviction must stand. (People of the Philippines v. Quilang, G.R. No. 232619, August 29,
16. While the police officers were not able to explain why only two of the three required witnesses were at the
place of arrest – and why no elected official was available – the police officers nevertheless showed earnest
efforts to comply with the mandated procedure. To ensure that the integrity of the seized items were
preserved, the police officers conducted a preliminary inventory at the place of the arrest as preferred by law.
Recognizing that what was done was not strictly compliant with the law, the police officers conducted another
inventory, this time in the police station where all the three required witnesses were available and were, in fact,
present. While the Court emphasizes the importance of strictly following the procedure outlined in Section 21,
it likewise recognizes that there may be instances where a slight deviation from the said procedure is justifiable
and subsequent earnest efforts were made to comply with the mandated procedure, much like in this case
where the officers showed that they did their duties bearing in mind the requirements of the law. In short, it
would be error for the Court not to reward such compliance. It must also be pointed out that the apprehending
officers in this case not only followed the procedure on inventory, but they were likewise able to follow the rest
of the procedure outlined in Section 21. PO2 Ayunting testified that immediately after the inventory, specifically
forty-five minutes thereafter, they turned over the seized items to the Provincial Crime Laboratory for
qualitative and quantitative examination. This is well-within the 24-hour period provided under Section 21. A
day after, or on January 11, 2011, the Provincial Crime Laboratory issued the forensic laboratory examination
results, as proved by Chemistry Report No. D-004-11 attached in the records. This is likewise within the second
24-hour period provided in Section 21. Prior to the submission to the RTC of the seized items, it was kept by the
forensic chemist in the crime laboratory where only she had access to. She then submitted the seized items and
her chemistry reports to the RTC on February 1, 2011. It is indubitable, therefore, that the integrity of the
dangerous drugs in this case was properly preserved as the prosecution was able to convincingly show an
unbroken link in the chain of custody of the seized items. As the corpus delicti of the crime – and the transaction
in which it was sold – was properly established in evidence, then the RTC and the CA could not have erred in
holding that Wacky is guilty beyond reasonable doubt. (People of the Philippines v. Serad, G.R. No. 224894,
17. The Court holds that the chain of custody rule was duly observed following the prescribed procedure under RA
9165, as amended by RA 10640, which applies to this case considering that the seizure, marking, inventory, and
photography were all conducted on May 30, 2015, after the effectivity of the latter law. Records show that after
the buy-bust transaction, the plastic sachet containing shabu seized from Gutierrez was immediately marked,
photographed, and inventoried in the latter's presence, the backup officers of the PNP, the Provincial
Prosecutor, and the barangav officials. Thereafter, PO1 Tadeo brought Gutierrez, together with the seized
items, to the Binmaley Police Station, where the incident was recorded in the blotter, and thereafter to the
Pangasinan Provincial Crime Laboratory for examination, where the seized plastic sachet was turned over and
personally received by PCI Todeño. PO1 Tadeo's testimony on this point was corroborated by PCI Todeño who
testified that at around 4:20 in the afternoon of May 30, 2015, he delivered the seized sachet marked with
"ATT2 5 30 15" for qualitative examination, which yielded positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride, a
dangerous drug, as contained in her initial and final chemistry report. PCI Todeño also gave a clear account of
the procedure she had undertaken after the examination to secure the integrity and evidentiary value of the
specimen, and testified that she personally turned it over to the evidence custodian for safekeeping, who
likewise affixed his signature upon receipt. Notably, while the Court observes that the media representative,
i.e., Soriano from ABS-CBN, failed to witness the inventory and photography of the seized items, her presence
during the said activities was not actually necessary since the witness requirement under RA 10640 had already
been complied with. As earlier stated, under RA 10640, the presence of an elected public official and a
representative of the National Prosecution Service or the media, and of course, the accused himself, during the
conduct of the inventory and photography is required. This is in contrast to the witness requirement prior to
the effectivity of RA 10640, wherein the presence of a representative from the media and the DOJ, and any
elected public official, as well as the accused, was required. In this case, the presence of the Provincial
Prosecutor and the barangay officials during the inventory and photography conducted on May 30, 2015
already sufficiently complied with the procedure laid down in the amendatory law. At any rate, it deserves
pointing out that the absence of the media representative was both recognized and sufficiently explained by
PO1 Tadeo who testified that he previously informed ABS-CBN's Soriano of the planned buy-bust operation and
invited her to witness the same. It was, however, unfortunate that Soriano could not make it in time to witness
the inventory considering that she was in an area far from the buy-bust site. Nonetheless, it is undisputed that
Soriano still came, albeit late, and just proceeded to the Binmaley, Police Station as the conduct of the inventory
was already over. Thus, based on these circumstances, the Court finds that the police officers' efforts to comply
with the required procedure, whether during or prior to the amendments of RA 10640 as discussed-above,
were genuine which, hence, justifies the media representative's absence. (People of the Philippines v. Gutierrez,
G.R. No. 236304, November 5, 2018, Second Division)
18. The discrepancy in the combined weight of the white crystalline substance in the plastic sachets confiscated
from petitioner, which weighed 16.6 grams in the original information, decreased to 15.3723 grams in the
amended information was not explained. True, the amendment of the information is allowed before an accused

enters his plea, which obtains in this case. However, and although the discrepancy of 1.2277 grams may be
considered a minuscule amount, the prosecution's failure to sufficiently explain such discrepancy militates
against the integrity of the corpus delicti. (Cunanan v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 237116, November
19. SPO1 Lumabao's explanation that he could not mark the plastic sachet recovered from accused-appellant De
Leon at the place of apprehension because of the weather condition is nothing but a flimsy excuse. It should
not be hard for SPO1 Lumabao to immediately mark the seized item because only one (1) plastic sachet was
recovered from accused-appellant De Leon and considering further that the buy-bust team was able to pull off
the entire operation, which only took about ten (10) minutes, under the same weather condition. (People of
the Philippines v. De Leon, G.R. No. 214472, November 28, 2018, Second Division)
20. The prosecution was able to prove, through the documentary and testimonial evidence, that the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized items were properly preserved in every step of the way. Upon confiscation of
the two rolled sticks of dried marijuana leaves from Eanna, SSO Suguitan put them on the nearby screening
table in front of Eanna and PO1 Manadao, Jr. The sticks were the only items placed on the table. Thereafter,
the seized items were turned-over by SSO Suguitan to PO3 Javier, who placed them on a tray together with he
other belongings of Eanna. It must be emphasized that SSO Suguitan is an airport screening officer and not a
police officer who is authorized to "arrest" or "apprehend" Eanna. Hence, he should not be considered as the
"apprehending officer" who must immediately mark and conduct the physical inventory and photograph of the
seized items conformably with Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR).
PO3 Javier was the only one in possession of the two rolled sticks of dried marijuana leaves from the time he
took custody of the same at the airport up to the time he submitted the same to the crime laboratory office. At
the PNP-ASG office, the confiscated illegal drug was marked, physically inventoried, and photographed in front
of Eanna, with SSO Suguitan, a Barangay Chairman, a Barangay Kagawad, and an ABS-CBN cameraman as
witnesses. Per Request for Laboratory Examination, the specimens were personally delivered by PO3 Javier to
the Ilocos Norte Provincial Crime Laboratory Service where PO3 Padayao received them. Finally, based on the
Chemistry Report of Police Inspector Navarro and the stipulation of facts agreed upon by the parties, the
specimens tested positive for the presence of marijuana after a qualitative examination. The specimens
contained in the Ziploc re-sealable plastic bag that were marked, tested, and presented in court were positively
identified not only by PO3 Javier but also by SSO Suguitan as the same two rolled sticks of dried marijuana leaves
seized from Eanna. Hence, it would be immaterial even if, as Eanna argues, PO3 Javier had no personal
knowledge of their possession by Eanna and their seizure by SSO Suguitan.
a. Eanna contends that the two sticks of rolled paper allegedly containing marijuana were not marked
immediately and were just laid bare on a table at the PNP-ASG office. According to him, the ABS-CBN video
footage taken shortly before midnight, which Badua submitted and which was already edited following the
news report format, showed that the two sticks were without markings at first and then with markings later
on. The Court notes that the compact disk showing the video of what transpired inside the PNP-ASG office
does not contain the full footage that Badua had taken. It was already edited for purposes of news report.
Assuming that there is truth to the allegation that the two sticks of marijuana were not immediately
marked, such fact does not automatically result in an acquittal. As long as the integrity and evidentiary
value of an illegal drug were not compromised, non-compliance with Section 21 (1) of R.A. No. 9165 and
its IRR may be excused. In several cases, the Court affirmed the conviction of the accused-appellant despite
recognizing that the seized illegal drug was not immediately marked at the place of arrest. Likewise, in
People v. Sic-open, the Court sustained the conviction of the accused-appellant even if the physical
inventory and photograph of the illegal drug were not immediately done at the place where it was
confiscated. Here, the reason for the non-observance with the rule is justified. Immediate marking, physical
inventory, and photograph of the confiscated drug cannot be done at the final checkpoint area because it
started to become crowded by the constant comings and goings of departing passengers. The seized items
were fittingly brought by PO3 Javier to the PNP-ASG office where it was made sure that the barangay
officials and a media man were in attendance to witness the regularity of the entire proceedings.
b. The peculiar situation in airports calls for a different treatment in the application of Section 21 (1) of R.A.
No. 9165 and its IRR. To require all the time the immediate marking, physical inventory, and photograph of
the seized illegal drug will definitely have a domino effect on the entire airport operation no matter how
brief the whole procedure was conducted. Stuck passengers will cause flight delays, resulting not just
economic losses but security threats as well. Besides, to expect the immediate marking, physical inventory,
and photograph of the dangerous drug at the place of arrest is to deny the reality that the persons required
by law to witness the procedure are unavailable at the moment of arrest. Unlike in a buy-bust operation
which is supposed to be pre-planned and already coordinated in order to ensure the instant presence of
necessary witnesses, arrests and seizures in airports due to illegal drugs are almost always spontaneous
and unanticipated. In our view, the period of waiting for the arrival of the witnesses did not affect the
integrity and evidentiary value of the subject illegal drug, on the following grounds: First, the airport police
ensured that only authorized personnel were inside the PNP-ASG office during the investigation. PO3 Javier
claimed that he was with SPO3 Domingo, PO1 Manadao, Jr., PO2 Caole, Jr., SSO Suguitan, SSO Bal-ot, and
P/Supt. Apias. It was only the members of the PNP-ASG and of the Laoag City PNP, the media, and the two
barangay officials who were allowed to stay inside the room. The defense counsel recognized that the PNP-

ASG office has a limited space and not big in size, estimating it to be around three by four meters (although
PO1 Terson approximated it to be five by seven meters). Second, the airport police made sure that no one
could touch the confiscated drug even if it was in full view of everyone. PO3 Javier testified that the two
rolled sticks of dried marijuana leaves were placed on the investigation table where everybody could look
but not hold. Eanna could also see any attempt to switch or alter the evidence as he was seated just in
front of the table while the others guarded him. Interestingly, instead of being concerned at the time of
the risk of substitution, he even requested to smoke so he was allowed to go out of the PNP-ASG office.
Although the apprehending officers could have exercised a better judgment, they are under no obligation
to explain why the accused was permitted to leave the office in order to smoke. Such fact should not be
taken against them as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are not automatically rendered
infirmed. Certainly, we consider the totality of eircumstanees present in this case. Eanna's right to be
presumed innocent until proven otherwise includes the constitutional right to enjoy his liberty, albeit in a
restricted sense due to his arrest. He retains his (limited) freedom of movement during the course of the
investigation. Likewise, it must be added that the natural tendeney of an innocent person aceused of
committing a crime is not to rest easy by ensuring that the evidence being used against him is not altered,
tampered or swapped. In this case, Eanna's resolve to smoke outside notwithstanding a pending concern
either shows that he was adamant in his claim that what was confiscated from him were merely flavored
tobaeco or that he was already resigned to the fact that he was busted possessing marijuana. The Court
cannot speeulate or engage in guesswork. And third, the plausibility of tampering with the evidence is nil
as the airport police were preoccupied in accomplishing the necessary documentation relative to the arrest
and seizure. PO3 Javier shared that while waiting for the arrival of the barangay offieials, their group were
busy preparing documents which mainly consist of reports regarding the incident. The trial court equally
noted that there were a lot of things they were doing like the preparation of the spot report that they
would forward to Manila such that their Deputy Chief even helped them. It is precisely for this reason that
the two sticks of marijuana appear to have been submitted to the crime lab only at 12:50 a.m. of the
following day, July 15, 2013.
c. It has been raised that the drug evidence should have been placed in a sealed container. Eanna asserts that
the evidence was rendered susceptible to alteration, tampering and swapping because the Ziploc was not
sealed by an adhesive tape or any means other than the natural, built-in re-sealable feature of the plastic
bag. Contrary to his allegation, however, the specimens that were submitted to the RTC were actually
placed in a big transparent resealable Hefty One Zip plastic bag sealed with a masking tape with markings.
Even if there is truth to his representation, the specimens contained in the Ziploc re-sealable plastic bag
that were marked, tested, and presented in court were positively identified by SSO Suguitan and PO3 Javier,
who both testified under oath, as the same two rolled sticks of dried marijuana leaves that were seized
from Eanna. Raising a mere possibility is not enough. Eanna should have shown with particularity how the
drug evidence was altered, tampered or swapped. The nature of illegal drugs as fungible things is not new
to him. He is not a stranger to prohibited drugs, claiming to be familiar with marijuana since he is employed
or attached to a drug addiction center and has been in 22 different countries and spent hours in customs.
As the RTC opined, he could have submitted for laboratory examination the tiny grains of dried leaves and
seeds that were found in his camera bag in order to prove that the alleged sticks of marijuana seized from
him were in fact flavored tobacco that he used to smoke all the time. The same reasoning as above can be
said even if we are to admit that PO3 Padayao placed his own marking on the specimens he received from
PO3 Javier and before he turned them over to the forensic chemist. A marking made on the corpus delicti
itself is not automatically considered a form of contamination which irreversibly alters its physical state and
compromises its integrity and evidentiary value.
d. Where a defendant identifies a defect in the chain of custody, the prosecution must introduce sufficient
proof so that the judge could find that the item is in substantially the same condition as when it was seized,
and may admit the item if there is a reasonable probability that it has not been changed in important
respects. However, there is a presumption of integrity of physical evidence absent a showing of bad faith,
ill will, or tampering with the evidence. Merely raising the possibility of tampering or misidentification is
insufficient to render evidence inadmissible. Absent some showing by the defendant that the evidence has
been tampered with, it will not be presumed that those who had custody of it would do so. Where there is
no evidence indicating that tampering with the exhibits occurred, the courts presume that the public
officers have discharged their duties properly. (People of the Philippines v. O’Cochlain, G.R. No. 229071,
December 10, 2018, Third Division)
21. The prosecution had established that the buy-bust team fully complied with the required chain of custody of
the seized drug such that there is no basis to depart from the lower courts' ruling that he was guilty of the illegal
sale of dangerous drugs. To stress, after the conclusion of the buy-bust operation, the police operatives, along
with the appellant, proceeded to the nearby Panabo Police Station, where SPO1 Ellevera marked the sachets of
shabu he bought from appellant with his initials (ERA), signature, and the date and time of the buybust. The
marking of the seized items at the police station, not at the place of incident, did not impair the chain of custody
of the drug evidence. For one, the marking at the nearest police station is allowed whenever the same is availed
of due to practical reason[s]. For another, the prosecution had explained the failure of the buy-bust team to
immediately mark these items at the place where the buy-bust operation was conducted. These justifications
include: (a) because of security reasons — there were many people in the place of incident, which was a public

transport terminal, and the buy-bust team was uncertain if appellant had any companion; (b) after the buy-bust
was concluded, appellant was resisting arrest and consequently, people were asking what had happened and a
commotion transpired; and (c) as mentioned, the buy-bust happened in a bus terminal, which was a busy place
where buses were going out at the very exit where the actual buy-bust took place. To put it simply, as a rule,
marking of the illegal drugs must be done immediately upon confiscation. "Immediate confiscation," however,
has no exact definition; and in case there is such a practical reason, the marking at the nearest police station
falls within the concept of immediate marking of the seized drugs. For indeed, "[m]arking upon 'immediate'
confiscation can reasonably cover marking done at the nearest police station or office of the apprehending
team, especially when the place of seizure is volatile and could draw unpredictable reactions from its
surroundings," as in this case. Clearly, there are more than sufficient justifications on why the marking (as well
as the succeeding procedures incidental to establishing the chain of custody) was conducted at the police
station which was a mere kilometer away from the place of incident.
a. Moreover, at the Panabo Police Station, PO3 Collado conducted an inventory of the recovered sachets of
shabu. The inventory of these items was done in the presence of appellant and the necessary witnesses -
an elective official, Brgy. Kagawad Joselito Ohaylan; a media representative, Gilbert P. Bacarro; as well as
a representative from the DOJ, Ian R. Dionola. At the same time, pictures were taken during the inventory
of these items.
b. In addition, there was nothing irregular in the turnover of the seized illegal drugs to the Crime Laboratory.
Note that it was established that, within 24 hours from the seizure of the shabu, SPO1 Ellevera delivered
them to the Crime Laboratory. PO1 Cambalon received, weighed, and labelled them and, thereafter, turned
them over to their Forensic Chemist, PCI Gucor. In turn, upon examination by the Forensic Chemist, these
specimens tested positive of methamphetamine hydrochloride. In fact, the counsels of the parties
stipulated on the Chain of Custody document and even dispensed with the testimonies of PO1 Cambalon
and PCI Gucor as well as that of PO1 Federe, who delivered the drug evidence to the court. These matters
only proved that even the defense had, early on, agreed to the full compliance with the Chain of Custody
Rule by the buy-bust team.
c. Furthermore, SPO1 Ellevera and PO3 Collado identified in court that the items presented thereat were the
same ones they recovered during the buy-bust operation against appellant. (People of the Philippines v.
Sahibil, G.R. No. 228953, January 28, 2019, First Division)
22. State agents must strictly comply with the legal safeguards established in Section 21 of R.A. 9165, as amended,
for the custody and disposition of seized illegal drugs, to ensure that the evidence was not tampered with,
substituted, or planted. For the saving clause in Section 21 to apply, the prosecution must prove beyond
reasonable doubt that noncompliance was justified and that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized
item were preserved. (People of the Philippines v. Acub, G.R. No. 220456, June 10, 2019, Third Divisions; People
of the Philippines v. Manansala, G.R. No. 229509, July 3, 2019, First Division)
23. The Court finds that the police officers were justified in conducting the markings, inventory, and photography
of the seized items at the police station instead of the place of arrest, considering that there were a lot of people
at the latter area in view of the ongoing town fiesta activities in Ginatilan, Cebu. Nonetheless, it appears that
the inventory and photography of the seized items were not conducted in the presence of representatives
either from the DOJ or the media, contrary to the express mandate of RA 9165, as amended by RA 10640. This
fact may not only be gleaned from the Certificate of Inventory which was only signed by two (2) elected public
officials, but also from the testimony of the poseur-buyer himself, Police Officer 2 Ruben Catubig. (People of
the Philippines v. Flores, G.R. No. 241261, July 29, 2019, Second Division)
24. In buy-bust oerations, the apprehending team’s inadequate preparations are not justifiable grounds for its
noncompliance with the requirements of the chain of custody rule. (People of the Philippines v. Ramos, G.R.
No. 225325, August 28, 2019, Third Division)
25. It is clear from the records that after the conduct of the buy-bust operation, bystanders had already started to
crowd the place of arrest, prompting the PDEA operatives to immediately bring Tecson to their office in Quezon
City, where IO1 Allosada conducted the requisite marking, inventory, and photography of the seized drugs in
the presence of Tecson herself, as well as an elected public official, i.e., Kgd. Palma, and a media representative,
i.e., Mendoza. Subsequently, the seized drugs were delivered by IO1 Allosada to the PDEA crime laboratory,
where they were received and examined by Ronald Jefferson A. Narceda, then turned over to evidence
custodian Jag Soliven, who took custody of the same until it was brought to court for presentation as evidence.
As earlier stated, the failure to immediately conduct the marking, inventory, and photography at the place of
arrest does not impair the integrity of the confiscated drugs, as their accomplishment at the office of the
apprehending team, whenever practicable is deemed sufficient compliance with the chain of custody rule.
Moreover, the absence of a DOJ representative as a witness is not fatal since the crime took place on September
9, 2014, after the effectivity of 10640, which merely requires that the inventory and photography of the seized
drugs be witnessed by an elected public official and a representative of the National Prosecution Service or the
media, which was complied with in this case. (People of the Philippines v. Tecson, G.R. No. 243786, October 9,

26. Both the marking and the inventory were conducted in Camp Karingal, without any explanation as to the
distance from the nearest police station or nearest office of the apprehending team. The only explanation given
was that the police officers were simply avoiding any unrest or disturbance in Jollibee. To the Court's mind,
though, neither the heavy rainfall nor the possibility of commotion in the area will justify the deviation. Any
untoward incident is, at best, speculative. In fact, in one case, the Court considered as a hollow excuse the
explanation of the apprehending officer who conducted the inventory at the nearest police station because he
was the "only one" in the area and that "there were many persons there." In the same way, in People v. Sood
and People v. Cornel (Cornel), the Court ruled that the buy-bust team's excuse of the existence of a commotion
was not a justifiable reason for failing to conduct the inventory at the place of seizure. In Cornel, especially, the
Court pointed out that seven armed members of the buy-bust team could have easily contained any
commotion; thus, they should have been able to conduct the marking and inventory at the place of seizure.
(People of the Philippines v. Luminda, G.R. No. 229661, November 20, 2019, Second Division)
27. The arresting officers' acts of performing the marking, inventory, and photography of the seized items not at
the place of arrest but at the police station were justified as a crowd was already forming at the place of arrest.
This notwithstanding, the Court observes that there was still a deviation from the witness requirement as the
conduct of inventory and photography was not witnessed by a representative from the NPS or the media. This
may be easily gleaned from the Inventory of Seized Properties/Items which only confirms the presence of an
elected public official, i.e., Kgd. Dawat. Markedly, such finding was also admitted by the poseur-buyer, Police
Officer 3 Allan T. Vizconde (PO3 Vizconde), on direct and cross-examination, who explained that despite their
efforts at contacting representatives from the DOJ and the media, no one was available, so they decided to
proceed with the conduct of inventory and photography without their presence. The sheer statement of PO3
Vizconde that representatives from the DOJ and the media had been contacted but were simply unavailable,
without more, cannot be deemed reasonable enough to justify a deviation from the mandatory directives of
the law. Indeed, as earlier stated, mere claims of unavailability, absent a showing that actual and serious
attempts were employed to contact the required witnesses, are unacceptable as they fail to show that genuine
and sufficient efforts were exerted by police officers. In view of the foregoing, the Court is impelled to conclude
that the integrity and evidentiary value of the items purportedly seized from accusedappellant, which constitute
the corpus delicti of the crimes charged, have been compromised; hence, her acquittal is perforce in order.
(People of the Philippines v. Santos, G.R. No. 243627, November 27, 2019, Second Division)
28. Just because a community outside of Mindanao is predominantly Muslim does not mean that it should be
considered presumptively “notorious.” The Solicitor General’s averments cannot be condoned. This is
insufficient justification of the chain of custody rule as the Court fails to see how a Muslim community can be
threatening or dangerous, that would put law enforcers’ lives to peril. (People of the Philippines v. Sebilleno,
a. Islamophobia, the hatred against the Islamic community, can never be a valid reason to justify an officer’s
failure to comply with R.A. 9165, Section 21. (People of the Philippines v. Abdulah, G.R. No. 243941,
March 11, 2020, Third Division)
29. There is sufficient compliance with the chain of custody rule, thus, the integrity and evidentiary value of the
corpus delicti have been preserved. Records show that after the arrest and subsequent search on Dadang during
the buy-bust operation, PO3 Baillo, who took custody of the seized items, immediately marked the two sachets
of shabu, as well as the drug paraphernalia and the gun, at the place of arrest in the presence of Dadang.
Thereafter, an inventory and photograph of the seized items were made in the presence of Dadang and
witnessed by Barangay Kagawad Rommel Monte Pimentel of Brgy. Nazareth and a media representative in the
name of Ronde D. Alicaya of RMN, DXCC. The seized items were secured under the custody of PO3 Baillo. The
team then proceeded to the police station, requested for the drug test of Dadang and the laboratory
examination of the seized items. PO3 Baillo and SPO1 Destura, together with Dadang, brought the said request,
the 2 heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets of drugs and drug paraphernalia to the crime laboratory. SPO2
Aldao and Forensic Chemist PSI Caceres received the said request with the seized items and as per PSI Caceres’
report, the two heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets were positive for the presence of shabu, while the drug
paraphernalia have traces of shabu. After the examination, the seized items were deposited to PO2 Gamaya,
the crime laboratory custodian, who deposited the same in their evidence room for safekeeping until such time
that the forensic chemist testified in court. Finally, the same specimens were identified in court by PSI Caceres.
(People of the Philippines v. Dadang, G.R. No. 242880, January 22, 2020, First Division)
30. Compliance with the chain of custody rule may be excused when the accused invokes and avails of his or her
Miranda right not to sign the inventory, provided that the Certificate of Inventory shows that the accused
refused to sign the Certificate of Inventory and that the barangay official, media representative, and the DOJ
representation were shown to have witnessed the actual buy-bust operation and signed the Certificate of
Inventory. (Pimentel v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 239772, January 29, 2020, Third Division)
31. There was no genuine and sufficient effort on the part of the apprehending police officers to look for the said
representatives pursuant to R.A. 9165, Section 21(1). A sheer statement that representatives were unavailable
– without so much as an explanation on whether serious attempts were employed to look for other
representatives, given the circumstances – is to be regared as a flimsy excuse. Here, the officers could have
complied with the requirements of the law had they intended to, as they had days to secure the attendance of
the required witnesses. Particularly, they even had the time to conduct both surveillances and a test-buy prior
to the actual buy-bust. The fact that the apprehending team had days to plan and do surveillances renders the
absence of the insulating witnesses at the place of operation inexcusable. That the prosecution failed to even
acknowledge this lapse let alone justify it leaves excusing it unlikely. (Tañamor v. People of the Philippines, G.R.
32. In this case, the Court acknowledges that there was a threat to the security of the entrapment team which
forced them to immediately proceed to the nearest police station. At that time, a crowd was forming and their
presence might cause a commotion. Moreover, Diego could potentially resist arrest with help from his relatives.
Nevertheless, the absence of the required insulating witnesses during the inventory and photograph of the
seized items puts serious doubt as to the integrity of the chain of custody. Here, there was no representative
from the media and the DOJ, and any elected public official. Admittedly, the buy-bust team no longer waited
for the required witnesses so they can timely deliver the suspected rugs to the crime laboratory. Thus, a
representative from the City Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Office signed the inventory. This is
unacceptable considering that members of the buy-bust teamhave ample opportuniy to prepare and make
necessary arrangements to observe the rigidities of R.A. 9165, Section 21. This non-compliance of the required
procedure created a serious gap in the chain of custody. (People of the Philippines v. Flores, G.R. No. 246471,
June 16, 2020, First Division)
33. The lower courts should not have given any weight on the explanation given by SPO1 Dulay that he contacted
media and barangay representatives immediately after the arrest, but none came. The required witnesses could
not ordinarily be expected to appear on short notice. Compliance should not be an afterthought, but made part
of the planning stage as far it is practicable. To do otherwise is to leave more questions than answers, as in this
case. Scouring through the records, no attempt was made by the prosecution to show any effort to obtain the
presence of the required witnesses at the point of sale, given that the buy-bust transaction was supposedly
scheduled the day before the arrest. Relative to this, the Court have emphasized that the justifiable ground for
non-compliance must be proven as a fact, because the Court cannot presume what these grounds are or that
they even exist. In addition, according to SPO1 Dulay, he could not complete the marking and inventory at the
place of arrest because there was a growing crowd of onlookers. This is no justification for the deviation because
it was not shown that the said crowd was interfering in any way with the arrest or inventory. Furthermore, the
marking, physical inventory, and photographing of the evidence at the initial stage were never intended to be
conducted in secrecy or absolute privacy. It is also strange that, in this age of camera phones, none of the
arresting officers photographed the marked sachet of shabu at the place of arrest, to establish that it was indeed
the object of the sale. (People of the Philippines v. Abbas, G.R. No. 248333, September 8, 2020, First Division)
34. The sachet of marijuana was not marked immediately at the place of arrest. The offered justifications that there
was a commotion perpetration by petitioner’s relatives and the place of the incident was dimly lit and spectators
were drawn to the sight, which prompted them to conduct the inventory at the barangay hall, which was only
a walking distance away, are flimsy and hollow. The police officers could have easily controlled the commotion
caused by petitioner’s relatives, namely, his wife and sister, and the people surrounding the officers.
Noteworthy is the fact that they are composed of six officers who are armed. In People v. Cornel, the Court
ruled that the buy-bust team’s excuse of the existence of a commotion was not a justifiable reason for failing
to conduct the inventory at the place of seizure. Also, the fact that place is dimly lit can hardly be a justification
to deviate from the rules. A buy-bust operation is a planned activity, therefore, the officers should have
foreseen the fact that the place is dimly lit and the officers could have easily addressed the situation by bringing
adequate lighting equipment. (Cha v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 246550, September 16, 2020, First
Division)
35. The sheer allegation that the police officers tried to contact the mandatory witnesses but that no one arrived
cannot be deemed reasonable enough to justify a deviation from the mandatory directives of the law. As
aforesaid, mere claims of unavailability, absent a showing that actual and serious attempts were employed to
contact the required witnesses, are unacceptable as they fail to show that genuine and sufficient efforts were
exerted by police officers. (Sayson v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 249289, September 28, 2020, Second
Division)
REHABILITATION
1. Under the law, a person who has substance use disorder may seek for rehabilitation, and may be entitled to the
benefits of probation.
a. The process for voluntary submission to treatment or rehabilitation should commence through an
application to the Dangerous Drugs Board, who shall then endorse the application to the trial court.
Afterwards, the court shall order the examination of the applicant for drug dependency. Should the
examination confirm that the applicant is drug dependent, the court shall order treatment and
rehabilitation for a period from six (6) months to one (1) year. The Dangerous Drugs Board shall then assess
whether further confinement is necessary.
Anti-Gambling Law 201
b. After the drug dependent is discharged from the voluntary submission program, he may then apply for
exemption from criminal liability under Section 55, in relation to Section 15 of RA 9165. Otherwise, he may
then be charged and shall be placed under probation in lieu of imprisonment and or fine, without prejudice
to the decision in any pending case filed in court.
c. It is at once apparent that respondent Judge's actions were unwarranted and violative of Sections 54 and
57 of RA 9165. As correctly noted by the OCA, the orders of respondent Judge committing some of the
accused to rehabilitation lacked the required endorsement of the Dangerous Drugs Board and examination
conducted by a Department of Health-accredited physician. Moreover, those transferred to the custody of
the Provincial Parole and Probation Office did not appear to have undergone voluntary rehabilitation.
Finally, there is nothing in the law which sanctions transfer of custody or detention of those accused of
illegal drug offenses to the Parole and Probation office. Under Presidential Decree No. 968, or the Probation
Law of 1976, the Provincial/City Parole and Probation Offices under the Parole and Probation
Administration (Administration), are tasked to: (i) investigate application for parole or executive clemency
referred to it by the courts or the Administration; (ii) rehabilitate probationers, parolees, pardonees, first-
time minor drug offenders; and (iii) prepare a list of qualified residents of the province or city where he is
assigned who are willing to act as probation aides; (iv) train and supervise probation aides; (v) perform such
other duties as assigned by the Regional Director. It is not authorized to hold persons who have pending
criminal cases. (Anonymous Complaint against Hon. Jose S. Jacinto, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-21-003, May 11, 2021,
En Banc)
AN TI -GA MB LIN G LAW

1. The alleged act of issuing masiao tickets to a customer or bettor for a consideration falls within the scope of a
“collector or agent” under Section 2(g), in relation to Section 3(c), of R.A. 9287. Section 2(g) states that a
collector or agent refers to any person who collects, solicits, or produces bets in behalf of his/her principal for
any illegal numbers game who is usually in possession of gambling paraphernalia. (Bustillo v. People of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 216933, March 15, 2021, Third Division)
2. Illegal gambling paraphernalia is the very corpus delicti of the crime charged and the concomitant failure to
establish this element raises doubts as to its origins. The inconsistency and absurdity of the arresting officers’
conduct from the handling and marking of the evidence, until its identification before the trial court, cast doubt
on the veracity of their claims. This shows the prosecution’s failure to establish the commission of crime.
a. A review of the records reveals that there are improbabilities in the testimonies of the prosecution, upon
which the conviction is based. There is reasonable doubt that the accused committed the crime he was
charged with. First, the prosecution witnesses’ testimonies differed as to their operations in the area. SPO2
Cerna claimed that he received an anonymous tip but his companions were unaware of this operation,
narrating that they were merely conducting a preventive patrol. However, SPO2 Cerna later admitted that
while the anonymous tip should be recorded as an alarm report, there was no recorded report in their
police blotter. On the other hand, PO1 Tanggol and PO2 Berry claimed that they only chanced upon
petitioner while roving around the area. SPO2 Cerna also mentioned that he saw petitioner surrounded by
many persons while writing on a piece of paper. However, they failed to arrest even one of these
individuals. Further, it remains uncertain how and who handled and marked the evidence. When the
evidence was presented before the trial court, the prosecution witnesses could not identify the
paraphernalia allegedly confiscated from the petitioner. During SPO2 Cerna’s testimony, he claimed that
he confiscated the masiao paraphernalia from the petitioner and turned them over to Tanggol, who was
their evidence custodian. He alleged that the paraphernalia was marked “PKB-02-06-08” but when it was
presented to him during his testimony, he could not identify the evidence. Meanwhile, PO1 Tanggol claim
that it was PO2 Berry who recovered the paraphernalia, who then marked the items in his presence.
However, PO1 Tanggol likewise failed to identify the evidence when it was presented to him because he
allegedly forgot the markings. The questionable circumstances surrounding the arrest and, more
important, the seizure, marking, and identification of the evidence before the trial court, show the
prosecution’s failure to establish petitioner’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
b. Even considering the other pieces of evidence, the Court finds it questionable that a masiao agent will only
have a meager collection of P146.00. if petitioner was indeed a masiao agent, it should have been
considerably higher. (Bustillo v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 216933, March 15, 2021, Third Division)
U S U R PATIO N O F O FFIC IAL FU N C TIO N S

1. Usurpation of official functions has the following elements: (a) the offender may be a private person or public
officer; (b) the offender performs any act pertaining to any person in authority or public officer of the Philippine
government, any of its agencies, or of a foreign government; (c) the offender performs the act under pretense
of official functions; and (d) the offender performs the act without being legally entitled to do so. (Tiongco v.
People of the Philippines, G.R. Nos. 218709-10, November 14, 2018, Second Division)
2. The elements of usurpation of official functions are present.

a. First, it has been conclusively established that Tiongco was a public officer at the time of the commission
of the crime. She herself admitted such in her Counter-Affidavit dated 10 October 2006, where she stated
that she was then "currently the Acting Senior Vice President of the PCIC with a salary grade of 27.
Usurpation of official functions 202
b. Second, she performed an act that rightfully pertained to the President of PCIC as head of the agency, and
not to her as Acting Senior Vice President. Based on evidence she herself presented, Tiongco's designation
as Acting Senior Vice President, Regional Management Group, carried with it the following responsibilities:
(i) plans, organizes, directs and controls the activities and operations of the Regional Management Group;
(ii) exercises direct supervision over the operation of the Regional Offices; (iii) directs the conduct of
actuarial studies and research on risk, loss rates, adequacy of premiums, re-insurance and other pertinent
information on existing coverage; (iv) directs the preparation of expansion/feasibility studies and insurance
packages for new product lines; (v) directs the development of corporate plans and programs including
marketing plans and promotional activities in line with the priorities and policies defined by the President
and Board of Directors; (vi) prepares and submits for consideration of the Board, President, and operational
plans and programs for the Regional Offices; (vii) prepares and submits reports of corporation's operation
of the Regional Offices to the President; and (viii) performs other related functions as may be assigned by
the Board/President. None of the functions pertain to approving the release of retirement gratuity. While
Tiongco's claim that Barbin "asked for help" in running the agency, which was the reason for her
designation as Acting Senior Vice President, she has not shown any specific assignment or conferment of
authority related to approving release of retirement benefits. Meanwhile, OMB MC No. 10 specifically
states that in the event the certification presented states that the prospective retiree has a pending case,
the responsibility of determining whether to release his retirement benefits, as well as the imposition of
necessary safeguards to ensure restitution thereof in the event retiree is found guilty, rests upon and shall
be left at the sound discretion of the head of the department, office or agency concerned. Hence, the
assignment cannot be presumed or inferred from the general statement in number 8 of the above-quoted
list of responsibilities. It must be specifically granted in light of the explicit mandate of OMB MC No. 10 and
that conferment of authority must be clearly shown. Tiongco has not done so.
c. Third, that Tiongco signed Estacio's disbursement voucher "under pretense of official function" is clear.
Tiongco argues that she believed she had the authority to sign and that her acts "are indicative of good
faith.” However, Tiongco cannot claim good faith because it has been established that she had "knowledge
of circumstances which ought to put [her] upon inquiry." She admitted that she saw the notation "no
pending cases except OMB-0-00-0898 and 0-00-1697" in Estacio's request for clearance. Tiongco also
admitted that she was well aware of the provisions of OMB MC No. 10. She said she did it because Barbin
was always absent, an admission that she knew the authority was vested in the PCIC President. She
nonetheless arrogated such authority unto herself, justifying her action with urgency of the situation
bringing Section 20.4 of the PCIC CASA into effect. However, even acting under that authority was wrong,
as will be discussed later. Next, PCIC Board Resolution No. 2006-012 states: “RESOLVED to approve, as it
hereby approves the application for retirement of Mr. BENITO F. ESTACIO, JR. former PCIC President,
effective the close of office hours of April 20, 2006 under RA 1616, subject to the submission of clearance
from money and property accountabilities from the PCIC, clearance from the GSIS, submission of statement
of assets and liabilities in accordance with the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and clearance from the
Office of the Ombudsman.” While OMB MC No. 10 requires only certification, the PCIC Board required a
clearance from the Office of the Ombudsman. In other words, the approval of Estacio's retirement was
conditional – "subject to" fulfillment of the requirements the Board of Directors set. Since Estacio only
presented a certification, which stated that he had two pending cases, he had not met the requirements
of the Board of Directors. In cases of such non-fulfillment, OMB MC No. 10 gives the discretion to allow a
prospective retiree to retire and receive benefits only to the "head of the department, office or agency."
Thus, in cases where the head is absent or the agency currently has no president, the authority is granted
to whoever is designated officer-in-charge or acting as head of agency, not to the one designated merely
as Acting Senior Vice President.
d. Fourth, Tiongco was legally not entitled to act on the release of Estacio's retirement gratuity. As discussed
above, the authority was vested in Barbin as head of PCIC under OMB MC No. 10. Tiongco, however, argues
that she acted pursuant to PCIC's CASA, Section 20.4, which states that in case the President is absent or
an urgent matter needs his signature, "any two Class A signatories or any Class A signatory signing with any
Class B signatory may approve/sign the transaction in behalf of the President." Moreover, the absence of
Barbin was not such that he could no longer exercise his discretionary powers. He continued to perform
his functions, although he admitted that he was not physically present at the PCIC premises at times. He,
however, testified that he regularly went to the PCIC office during that period. Further, the release of
Estacio's retirement gratuity was not an urgent matter. At that time, he was not yet entitled to its release
pending compliance with the Board's requirement of an Ombudsman clearance. (Tiongco v. People of the
Philippines, G.R. Nos. 218709-10, November 14, 2018, Second Division)
3. In his Complaint, petitioner alleged that private respondent "falsely and knowingly represented himself to have
the authority of President Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III" when he wrote the June 19, 2012 letter-advice revoking
the issuance of the Special Allotment Release Order. What petitioner posits is that by signing the letter, private
respondent led the addressee to believe that he had the authority to do so when he did not, which constitutes
usurpation of authority. He is incorrect. The punishable act in usurpation of authority is false and knowing
representation, i.e. the malicious misrepresentation as an agent, officer, or representative of the government.
Private respondent did not maliciously misrepresent himself as an agent, officer, or representative of the
government. He is a public official himself, the Department's Undersecretary for Operations, whom public

Bribery 203
respondent had found to have signed the letter in his own name and under the words, "By Authority of the
Secretary." Clearly, the facts presented by petitioner do not constitute the crime of usurpation of authority.
Public respondent was not in grave abuse of discretion when it found that there was no sufficient evidence to
support an indictment for usurpation of authority against private respondent.
a. The crime of usurpation of authority punishes the act of knowingly and falsely representing oneself to be
an officer, agent, or representative of any department or agency of the government. (Degamo v. Office of
the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 212416, December 5, 2018, Third Division)
4. The crime of usurpation of official functions punishes any person who, under pretense of official position,
performs any act pertaining to any person in authority or public officer of the Philippine Government or any
foreign government, or any agency thereof, without being lawfully entitled to do so. Under Article 177 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, the elements of the crime of usurpation of official functions are when a
person: (a) performs any act pertaining to any person in authority or public officer of the Philippine Government
or any foreign government, or any agency thereof; (b) acts under pretense of official position; and (c) acts
without being lawfully entitled to do so. The assailed act is the private respondent's withdrawal of the Special
Allotment Release Order through the June 19, 2012 letter-advice. This constitutes the first element, that a
person performs an act pertaining to a person in authority or public officer. As discussed, the public respondent
found that private respondent signed the letter in his own name as the Undersecretary for Operations, and
under the words, "By Authority of the Secretary." Petitioner did not dispute this finding. However, he argues
that respondent acted without legal authority and usurped the Executive Secretary's function, as the latter is
the only one who can write and speak for and on behalf of the President. At the onset, private respondent did
not claim to write for and on behalf of the President in the letter. This Court fails to see how he usurped the
Executive Secretary's function when there was no attempt to represent the President in the letter. In any case,
petitioner insists that only the President can withdraw the Special Allotment Release Order from his provincial
government.
a. In Ruzol v. Sandiganbayan, this Court acquitted Leovegildo R. Ruzol (Ruzol), then Mayor of Nakar, Quezon,
who issued 221 permits for the transportation of salvaged products. The Sandiganbayan convicted him of
usurpation of official functions of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources. However, this
Court found that the government agency did not have the sole authority to issue the questioned permits,
and that local government units may likewise exercise such power under the general welfare clause.
Moreover, the permit that Ruzol issued was not intended to replace the one required by the government
agency. He was found to have acted in good faith and was acquitted. Following Ruzol, an inquiry must be
made on whether private respondent may exercise the power to withdraw the Special Allotment Release
Order through a letter-advice, and whether he acted in good faith.
b. Private respondent argues that he acted under Abad's authority, under the August 18, 2011 Department
Order No. 2011-11. A scrutiny of this document confirms that private respondent himself was designated
to sign documents on Abad's behalf, which explicitly includes the Special Allotment Release Order, the
Notice of Cash Allocation, and the letter-advice to agencies. While petitioner does not dispute the
Department's authority in approving or disapproving Special Allotment Release Orders, he claims that this
power does not include revoking, canceling, or suspending what has been approved by the President.
However, petitioner failed to refute private respondent's allegations that the act was upon the instructions
of the President. It appears that private respondent was acting on behalf of Abad, upon the instructions of
the President. Under the doctrine of qualified political agency, department secretaries may act for and on
behalf of the President on matters where the President is required to exercise authority in their respective
departments.
c. Thus, this Court rules that private respondent, under Abad's authority, may exercise the power to withdraw
the Special Allotment Release Order through the letter-advice sent to petitioner. Finally, this Court finds
that private respondent acted in good faith. The records fail to show that private respondent acted in bad
faith in withdrawing the Special Allotment Release Order. On the contrary, it appears it was petitioner who
acted in bad faith. Private respondent claims that despite the notice of withdrawal and the directive to
return the public fund to the National Treasury pending compliance with the rules, petitioner brazenly
procured various infrastructure projects. Petitioner was the only one among the local chief executives who
disregarded the order from the Executive Department. (Degamo v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. no.
212416, December 5, 2018, Third Division)
B R IB ER Y
1. In her Comment dated 29 July 2019, wherein she directly addressed the charges made against her, Abadies
stated that she could not be held liable for indirect bribery under Article 211 of the Revised Penal Code, because,
as stated in the NBI Final Report dated 11 February 2019, she had returned the money which she had received
from Mr. Tambio through Andres. The Court finds this contention devoid of merit. The fact that Abadies
returned the money that she had received does not exculpate her from being held liable for indirect bribery
under Article 211 of the Revised Penal Code. Article 211 of the Revised Penal Code penalizes the crime of
indirect bribery, which has the following elements: (a) the offender is a public officer; (b) the offender accepts
gifts; and (c) the said gifts are offered to the offender by reason of his or her office. In the present case, Abadies
is a public offer, being a court employee, specifically working in the JRO, and accepted gifts, in the form of
money, from Mr. Tambio, by reason of her office. If it were not for the fact that Abadies was a clerk in the JRO,

Malversation and Illegal Exaction 204
Mr. Tambio would not have given her money and visited her on several occasions, hoping to be able to secure
status updates on his case. It does not matter that Abadies returned the money that she had accepted, because
the crime of indirect bribery was already consummated upon the concurrence of the aforementioned three
elements under Article 211 of the Revised Penal Code.
a. In addition to the abovementioned, Abadies is liable for violating Section 7(d) of Republic Act No. 6713 or
the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees. (Re: Investigation relative to
the Fake Decision in G.R. No. 211483, A.M. No. 19-03-16-SC, August 14, 2019, En Banc)
2. The crime of direct bribery consists of the following elements: (a) that the accused is a public officer; (b) that
he received directly or through another some gift or present, offer, or promise; (c) that such gift, present, or
promise has been given in consideration of his commission of some crime, or any act not constituting a crime,
or to refrain from doing something which is his official duty to do; and (d) that the crime or act relates to the
exercise of his functions as a public officer. (Catubao v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 227371, October 2,
3. The third element, however, was not duly proven. The third element of the crime requires that the gift be given
in consideration of the accused's commission of some crime, or any act not constituting a crime, or to refrain
from doing something which it is his official duty to do. In the present case, the prosecution claimed, and the
Sandiganbayan believed, that the P3,000.00 was solicited by Catubao in exchange for finally acting on the estafa
cases filed against Ragasa that were then pending before Catubao. Catubao, on the other hand, claims that it
was only (a) a "return of favor" because he previously lent Atty. Perito P1,000.00, and (b) a "balato" because
Atty. Perito told him that Atty. Perito just won another case. Apart from the testimonial evidence of Atty. Perito
and Ragasa, the prosecution presented no other evidence that the money was solicited by Catubao and that it
was given in consideration of the latter finally acting on the case. The existence of the third element, therefore,
boils down to the credibility of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses.
a. The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses failed to establish beyond reasonable doubt the third
element. This is so because the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were so marred by inconsistencies
that they are no longer believable. For instance, Atty. Perito testified that the first time Catubao asked
money from him was around December 16, 17, or 18, 2008. On direct examination, he said that Catubao
demanded money from him via phone call, and that he called Ragasa after to tell him that Catubao was
demanding money. Yet, on cross-examination, Atty. Perito was so confused about the supposed incident
as to when Catubao actually demanded money.
b. Verily, the crime charged against Catubao was Direct Bribery and it has specific elements which are
different from a violation of Section 7(d) of RA 6713. While the standard provided in Section 7(d) of RA
6713 may be the ideal for all public officials, the Sandiganbayan nevertheless erred in adjudging the guilt
of Catubao on the basis of the same standard when, to recall, Direct Bribery requires that the gift be in
consideration of his commission of some crime, or any act not constituting a crime, or to refrain from doing
something which is his official duty to do. (Catubao v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 227371, October
4. While a prosecutor's receipt of a "balato" from a party litigant may indeed be reprehensible from the lens of
public service, such act, at the end of the day, is not punishable as Direct Bribery. (Catubao v. People of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 227371, October 2, 2019, Second Division)
5. Mangulabnan is guilty of direct bribery under Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code as the co-conspirator of
Judge Flores. Firstly, the conspiracy between the two accused has been duly proven by the findings of Judge
Medina and by Mangulabnan’s own admision. When conspiracy is established, the responsibility of the
conspirators is collective, not individual, rendering all of them equally liable regardless of the extent of their
respective participations. Secondly, the elements of direct bribery have been sufficiently established
considering that (a) Mangulabnan and Judge Flores were indisputably public officers, being the Court
Interpreter and Presiding Judge, respectively, of the MTCC of the City of San Fernando Pampanga, Branch 2 at
the time of the offense, (b) she acted as Judge Flores’ middleman in committing the crime, specifically by
receiving P20,000.00 from Manalastas and delivering it to Judge Flores, (c) the amount was given in exchange
for the rendition of a judgment favorable to Manalastas, as may be inferred from Mangulabnan’s own admission
that Judge Flores ordered the release of the decision only after receiving P20,000.00, and (d) the rendition of
the judgment relates to the function of Judge Flores.
a. The elements of the crime of direct bribery under Article 210 of the RPC are: (i) the offender is a public
officer, (ii) he accepts an offer or promise or receives a gift or present by himself or through another, (iii)
such offer or promise be accepted or gift or present be received by the public officer with a view to
committing some crime, or in consideration of the execution of an act which does not constitute a crime
but the act must be unjust, or to refrain from doing something which it is his official duty to do, and (iv) the
act which the offender agrees to perform or which he executes is connected with the performance of his
official duties. (Mangulabnan v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 236848, June 8, 2020, Second Division)
MALV ER S ATIO N AN D ILL EGAL EXAC TIO N

1. The elements of the crime of malversation of public funds were duly established: First, the petitioner was a
public officer with the position of Local Treasurer Officer I of Caloocan City; second, by reason of his position,
he was tasked to collect fees and taxes regularly levied by the Mini City Hall, including market fees,
miscellaneous fees, real property taxes, and the subject patubig collection; third, all of the fees and taxes
collected were unquestionably public funds for which he was accountable; and fourth, petitioner failed to have
the patubig collection duly forthcoming upon demand by the duly authorized officer and thus a prima facie
evidence that he had put such missing fund to personal use. (Mesina v. People of the Phillipines, G.R. No.
162489, June 17, 2015, First Division)
2. The accused are guilty of the complex crime of malversation of public funds through falsification of public
documents: First, all the accused, except Bahilidad, are all public officers as they are the Vice-Governor of
Sarangani, Executive Assistant at the Office of the Vice-Governor, Provincial Accountant, and Provincial Board
Member. Second, the funds misappropriated are public in character as they were funds belonging to the
Province of Sarangani. Third, the Vice-Governor and the Provincial Accountant were accountable public officers
as their signatures were needed before any disbursement of public funds can be made. Finally, the Vice-
Governor and the Provincial Accountant appropriated, took, misappropriated or consent, or through
abandonment or negligence, permitted another person to take the public funds when they signed the
disbursement voucher. In addition, the signatures of the Vice-Governor and the Provincial Accountant also
appeared on the Allotment and Obligation Slip and in the Land Bank check, which allowed Bahilidad to encash
P20,000.00. Finally, falsification was a necessary means to commit the crime of malversation as the petitioner
ordered another to sign above the name of the supposed recipient, a Secretary of a cooperative, in the letter-
request to make it appear that the Secretary consented to the request for financial assistance.
a. There is conspiracy in this case. The concurrence of wills or unity of purpose and action is apparent. First,
the petitioner signed the letter-request for financial assistance and this was approved by the Provincial
Board Member and the Vice-Governor. Second, the ALOBS was signed by the Provincial Accountant. Third,
the disbursement voucher was signed by the Vice-Governor, the Provincial Board Member, and the
Provincial Accountant. Finally, the Land Bank check was signed by the Vice-Governor. Their connivance was
made more glaring when the entire transaction – from the letter-request to the approval of the
disbursement voucher until the processing and release of the check – was completed in only one day.
b. Bahilidad’s acquittal does not affect the criminal liability of the remaining accused as they were shown to
have participated in the preparation and processing of the disbursement voucher, as evidenced by their
respective signatures affixed there. (Zoleta v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 185224, July 29, 2015, Second
Division)
3. Petitioner, who is the municipal mayor, cannot be convicted of malversation under Article 217 of the Revised
Penal Code in the absence of any showing that he had custody or control of the funds or property by reason of
the duties of his office, even for a temporary basis. Thus, petitioner was not accountable for any public funds
or property simply because it never became his duty as the municipal mayor to collect money or property from
the public. Thus, petitioner could not have appropriated, taken, misappropriated or consented or, through
abandonment or negligence, permitted another person to take them. (Panganiban v. People of the Philippines,
G.R. No. 211543, December 9, 2015, Third Division)
4. The prosecution admitted that no demand for the alleged malversed funds had been made. Thus, considering
that the prosecution never established such material fact, the burden of evidence was never shifted to the
accused to prove their innocence, there being no prima facie presumption of misappropriation under the facts
obtaining. Thus, following Estino, the prosecution had the additional burden to prove malversation by direct
evidence, which it had failed to do so.
a. The mere absence of a name in the Time Book and Payroll does not automatically translate to the non-
existence of the alleged worker. Contrary to the conclusions of the Sandiganbayan, there are other logical
explanations for such omission, one of which is the explanation proffered by the petitioners, i.e., that what
was presented during trial were the third original carbon copies on which the carbon paper did not work
to copy those names listed on the first page. Indeed, it is also entirely possible that the person responsible
simply forgot to write down the name of the payee-laborer even as he secured their signatures. In addition,
the allegation that petitioenrs hired “ghost employees” must be weighed against the fac that the Time
Book and Payrolls were found to be in order. (Maamo and Silor v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No.
5. All the elements for the crime of malversation were sufficiently proven by the prosecution beyond reasonable
doubt. Records show that Venezuela was a public officer, being then the Municipal Mayor of Pozorrubio,
Pangasinan from 1997 to 1998, the period relevant to the time of the crime charged. Notably, he falls within
the definition of a public officer, stated in the RPC as "any person who, by direct provision of the law, popular
election, or appointment by competent authority, shall take part in the performance of public functions in the
Government of the Philippine Islands, or shall perform in said Government or in any of its branches public duties
as an employee, agent, or subordinate official, of any rank or class." Likewise, during Venezuela's tenure as the
municipal mayor, he incurred unliquidated cash advances amounting to Php 2,872,808.00. These unliquidated
cash advances constituted funds belonging to the Municipality of Pozorrubio, and earmarked for use by the said

municipality. Undoubtedly, as the municipal mayor, Venezuela had control of the subject funds, and was
accountable therefor. Finally, anent the last element for the crime of malversation of public funds, Venezuela
failed to return the amount of Php 2,572,808.00, upon demand. His failure or inability to return the shortage
upon demand created a prima facie evidence that the funds were put to his personal use, which Venezuela
failed to overturn.
a. Venezuela is an accountable officer under the law. People v. Pantaleon, Jr., et al. states that a municipal
mayor, being the chief executive of his respective municipality, is deemed an accountable officer, and is
thus responsible for all the government funds within his jurisdiction. In addition, Section 340 of the LGC
states that any officer of the local government unit whose duty permits or requires the possession or
custody of local government funds shall be accountable and responsible for the safekeeping thereof in
conformity with the provisions of the LGC. Other local officials, though not accountable by the nature of
their duties, may likewise be similarly held accountable and responsible for local government funds through
their participation in the use or application thereof. In addition, municipal mayors, pursuant to the Local
Government Code, are chief executives of their respective municipalities. Under Section 102 of the
Government Auditing Code of the Philippines, he is responsible for all government funds pertaining to the
municipality: (Venezuela v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 205693, February 14, 2018, Second Division)
6. Payment or reimbursement is not a defense in malversation. It neither extinguishes the accused’s criminal
liability nor relieve the accused from the penalty prescribed by the law. At best, such acts of reimbursement
may only affect the offender’s civil liability, and may be credited in his favor as a mitigating circumstance
analogous to voluntary surrender. However, the claim of payment or reimbursement must be proven with
certainty. (Venezuela v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 205693, February 14, 2018, Second Division)
7. The Ombudsman also found probable cause to charge the petitioners for Malversation of Public Funds. It
discussed that based on Section 340 of the Local Government Code, Padaca is accountable for public funds
through her individual participation in the use and application thereof. The Ombudsman held that Padaca's
giving preference to EDWINLFI in the release of P25 Million without stipulations in the MOA as to the amount
of the contract, the cost estimates, and terms of reference with respect to the scope of services for the
implementation of the provincial rice program, including terms of repayment of the funds in favor of the
provincial government and accountability of EDWINLFI for such funds, is as good as permitting, through
abandonment or negligence, the latter to take such funds. Again, the charge against Soriano and Pine was due
to their personal and deliberate participation in the transaction. (Padaca v. Carpio Morales, G.R. No. 201800,
8. The crime of Technical Malversation has three (3) elements: (a) that the offender is an accountable public
officer; (b) that he applies public funds or property under his administration to some public use; and (c) that
the public use for which such funds or property were applied is different from the purpose for which they were
originally appropriated by law or ordinance.
a. In finding probable cause for the crime of Technical Malversation, the Ombudsman based its findings on
the strength of the evidence submitted by the private complainant, as well as the weak defense of the
petitioners, thus: “Respondents were public officers who received from Occidental Mindoro's
Congressional Representative a portion of the province's share in the revenue from the tobacco excise tax
for proper administration. Pursuant to RA 8240, the local government unit's share in the proceeds should
be used solely for cooperative, livelihood and/or agro-industrial projects that enhance the quality of
agricultural products, develop alternative farming systems, or enable tobacco farmers to manage and own
post-harvest enterprises like cigarette manufacturing and byproduct utilization. The clear intention to limit
the use of such proceeds to the above-mentioned specific purposes was further made known to and
disseminated among Governors, Municipal and City Mayors, Sanggunian Members and all other concerned
officials through Joint Circular No. 2009-1 dated 3 November 2009 entitled "Guidelines and Procedure on
the Release of the Share of Local Government Units Producing Burley and Native Tobacco Products from
the Fifteen Percent (15%) of the Incremental Revenue Collected from the Excise Tax on Tobacco Products."
Notwithstanding the mandate of the law and the circular, respondents applied the fund to the purchase of
vehicles, Christmas lights, meals and snacks of newly-elected Barangay Captains and SK Chairpersons,
medicines, and gravel and sand. They also used said fund for the maintenance of a PNP vehicle and other
service vehicle, for bus rentals, and various other municipal activities. (Villarosa v. Ombudsman, G.R. No.
9. Illegal exactions as penalized under Article 213(2) of the RPC consist of the following elements: first, that the
offender is a public officer who is entrusted with the collection of taxes, licenses, fees, and other imposts; and,
second, that he or she engages in any of the three specified acts or omissions under Article 213(2), to wit: (a)
demanding, directly or indirectly, the payment of sums different from or larger than those authorized by law;
(b) failing voluntarily to issue a receipt, as provided by law, for any sum of money collected by him officially; or
(c) collecting or receiving, directly or indirectly, by way of payment or otherwise, things or objects of a nature
different from that provided by law. (Reynes v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 223405, February 20, 2019,
Third Division)

10. There is probable cause to indict Amores for illegal exactions under Article 213(2) of the RPC. As punong
barangay, private respondent Amores was chief executive of a local government unit. She was head of Barangay
Marigondon, administered it, and oversaw the discharge of all its functions. She was tasked with enforcing all
laws and ordinances which are applicable within the barangay; maintaining public order; and promoting the
general welfare of the barangay. More on point, it was her duty to enforce laws and regulations relating to
pollution control and protection of the environment, and ensure the delivery of basic services as mandated
under Section 17 of the Local Government Code. Among these basic services are services and facilities related
to general hygiene and sanitation, beautification, and solid waste collection. Private respondent Amores'
engagement with solid waste management was official, direct, and unequivocal. This involvement spanned all
dimensions of solid waste management, including the marshaling of resources, financial or otherwise. Her
functions were sufficiently broad as to encompass facilitating the levying of charges for services rendered by
the Barangay. It is then not difficult to see, precisely as petitioner asserts, how private respondent Amores could
have used her office as an artifice for demanding the payment of sums different from or larger than those
authorized by law."
a. One might indulge private respondent Amores' seemingly inevitable exoneration by pointing to Section
395(e) of the Local Government Code and noting how the barangay treasurer is tasked with collecting and
issuing official receipts for taxes, fees, contributions, monies, materials, and all other resources accruing to
the barangay. However, it is improper to conveniently negate her possible culpability by the veneer of
detachment just because she held a position different from, or superior to, that of a barangay treasurer.
Private respondent Amores cannot evade liability by feigning incidental, ancillary, or tangential
involvement, and pointing to subalterns as the persons who actually effected the assailed collections.
(Reynes v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 223405, February 20, 2019, Third Division)
11. Atty. Mernado began his assailed Resolution's one (1)-paragraph ratio decidendi by saying that petitioner failed
to present the Ordinance on garbage fees. From this singular premise, he proceeded to state that "there is lack
of evidence that [private] respondent Amores demanded payment of sums different from or larger than that
authorized by law." Atty. Mernado’s reasoning is an error that is as grievous as it is mind-boggling. Petitioner's
position is precisely that there was no ordinance or any other regulation that enabled the levying of garbage
collection fees. To demand that he produce one (1) such ordinance was a farcically futile exercise. Atty.
Mernado would have had him go on a fool's errand. Lest petitioner reveal himself to be untruthful and admit
that there was indeed an enabling ordinance, there was no other reasonable outcome than for him to to be
unable to present such an ordinance.
a. Atty. Mernado failed to realize that Article 213(2)'s injunction against the "payment of sums different from
or larger than those authorized by law" and against "receiving objects of a nature different from that
provided by law" admits of situations when no payment is ever permitted, or no collection of any object is
ever allowed. These situations may arise through an explicitly stated legal prohibition, or through a law's
mere silence. In the latter case, the law plainly declines to name any authorized manner of payment or
collection. By its reticence, it signals that there is no permissible payment or collection. When the law
enables no form whatsoever of payment or collection, a public officer's demand for payment of any sum,
or insistence on collecting any object, is a legal breach. It is a punishable violation of Article 213(2). Such
was petitioner's exact contention: that private respondent Amores violated Article 213(2) by her mere act
of demanding payment—regardless of the amount—because she was, to begin with, not allowed to
demand anything. Petitioner's entire cause was anchored on the assertion that because no ordinance, law,
or regulation has ever permitted private respondent Amores to receive anything, yet she collected
something, she violated Article 213(2). (Reynes v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 223405, February
12. As the records show, Fajardo was a public officer, being the Cashier V and OIC, Division Chief III, Prize Payment
(Teller) Division of the Treasury Department of PCSO. Her duties as such required her to handle cash, as in fact,
at the time material to this case, Fajardo was authorized to draw a cash advance in the amount of P3M intended
as payments for sweepstakes and lotto low-tier prizes and the PCSO - POSC Scratch IT Project. By reason thereof,
Fajardo had in her custody public funds in the total amount of P3M for which she was clearly accountable.
Unfortunately, part of the said funds went missing while in her custody. After the conduct of two (2) spot audits
on her account, a total deficit in the amount of P1,877,450.00 was discovered, which she failed to explain or
produce upon demand. Her failure to account for the said moneys thereby gave rise to the presumption that
she had converted the funds to her personal use, which presumption she failed to rebut with competent
evidence. Accordingly, her conviction for the crime under Article 217 of the RPC stands. (Fajardo v. People of
the Philippines, G.R. No. 239823, September 25, 2019, First Division)
13. The elements of malversation of public funds through negligence have been esablished. First, petitioner is a
public officer since she was then a revenue officer of the BIR assigned at Alabel, Sarangani Province. Second,
the cash shortage in the amount of P188,671.40 in petitioner’s recorded collection are public in character, as
said amount were public funds which must be remitted to the Government. Third, petitioner is an accountable
officer since petitioner had the control and responsibility of her collections, including the cash shortage in the
amount of P188,671.40 in public funds and was accountable therefor. As being a Revenue Officer I, petitioner’s
responsibilities include to collect revenue for the Government, which must be duly recorded, and to remit such

collection to the Government Treasury. Finally, the prosecution was able to establish that petitioner failed to
return the amount of P188,671.40, the recorded cash shortage, upon demand. Her failure to return said cash
shortage upon demand, without offering a justifiable explanation for such shortage, created a prima facie
evidence that public funds were put to her personal use, which petitioner failed to rebut and overturn. (Corpuz
v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 241383, June 8, 2020, First Division)
14. Restitution is a mitigating circumstance in crimes of malversation of public funds. Restitution amounts to a
voluntary surrender. (Corpuz v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 241383, June 8, 2020, First Division)
15. The Court rejects petitioner’s argument that he cannot be charged with malversation because he was not an
accountable officer, under Section 340 of the LGC, who had custody of the funds appropriated by him. To recall,
under Section 340 of the LGC, it is clear that only those with actual possession or custody of the local
government funds are considered accountable persons. Local government officials become accountable public
officers either because of the nature of their functions, or on account of their participation in the use or
application of public funds. Here, despite not having actual custody of the municipality’s funds, petitioner
participated in their use or application by directing how the funds should actually be applied. In petitioner’s
case, his certification that the supposed beneficiaries were indigent and in need of financial assistance led to
the use of the funds for the “Aid to the Poor” program. Petitioner cannot pass the blame to the Provincial Social
Work and Development Office, the office that allegedly had actual custody of the funds and approved of his
reimbursement requests. Were it not for his certification in the Disbursement Vouchers and Reimbursement
Expense Receipts, the Provincial Social Work and Development Office would not have approved the application
for reimbursement. (Baya v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 204978-83, July 6, 2020, Third Division)
16. Contrary to his allegation, petitioner, who was then elected Municipal Mayor of Daet, is an accountable officer.
a. Section 340 of the LGC provides that local government officials are accountable public officers because of
the nature of their functions, or on account of their participation in the use or application of public funds.
In this case, the funds paid to Markbilt form part of the internal revenue allotment of the Municipality of
Daet and are by virtue thereof, under the collective custody of the municipal officials who had to act
together to disburse the funds for their intended municipal use. Consequently, they are public funds for
which the petitioner as Municipal Mayor is accountable.
b. More unequivocal, PD 1445 (Government Accounting Code) states that municipal mayors are immediately
and primarily responsible for all government funds and property pertaining to their municipality.
c. As required standard procedure, and evidently from petitioner’s own narration, any disbursement or
release of funds requires his approval as Mayor. In this case, payment in favor of Markbilt was released
only after petitioner’s signature in the disbursement voucher and the corresponding Landbank check. This
signifies that petitioner, in his capacity as Municipal Mayor, ahd control and responsibility over the subject
funds and thus satisfies the second and third elements of the crime of malversation. ()
17. On the last element, the Court agrees with the Sandiganbayan that the petitioner, through gross inexcusable
negligence, permitted Markbilt to receive partial payment of price escalation despite not being entitled thereto.
a. A disbursement voucher shows on what account or by what authority a particular payment has been made,
or that services have been performed which entitle the party to whom it is issued to payment. Thus, when
petitioner signed the disbursement voucher in favor of Markbilt, in effect, he certified to the correctness
of the entries therein; and warranted that the expenses incurred were necessary and lawful, the supporting
documents were complete, and the availability of cash therefor. By approving the disbursement voucher
and signing the Landbank check payable to Markbilt, despite the absence of funding and failure to comply
with the requirements of R.A. 9184, Section 61, he permitted Markbilt to receive public funds to which he
is not entitled. Otherwise, the petitioner’s approval and signature in respect facilitated the illegal release
of funds, constitutive of the act of malversation.
b. It is a basic principle that no contract involving the expenditure of public funds shall be entered into unless
there is an appropriation therefor which is sufficient to cover the proposed expenditure. Correspondingly,
no revenue funds shall be paid out of the public treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation law or
specific statutory authority. The act of petitioner in approving Disbursement Voucher No. 08041239 and
signing Landbank check No. 0272388 in violation of the said elementary principles are flagrant and palpable
breach of duty tantamount to gross negligence.
c. In this case, as correctly ruled by the Sandiganbayan, the payment of price escalation is not supported by
an appropriation. Pursuant to the Contract Agreement dated December 29, 2003, relative to the Phase II
construction of the Daet Public Market, petitioner and Markbilt agreed for the construction to completed
within a period of 365 calendar days for the amount of P71,499,875.29. The statement of such amount
constitutes the specific appropriation required by law for a specific expenditure, that is, the entirety of the
Daet Public Market (Phase II) construction project. The basis of Markbilt's claim for price escalation is based
on the same contract, particularly, clause no. 4. The provision authorizes the claim for price escalation,
without any reference as to the source of funds for its satisfaction. To the Court, it is a vague recognition
of Markbilt's right to collect over and beyond the contract price. A cursory reading thereof shows that it
does not provide additional rights in favor of Markbilt. It merely mentions what is evident and otherwise
impliedly included in the contract, i.e., that pertinent laws and rules apply in the event of the need to adjust

contract price arises. As the Court sees it, the invocation of this clause in the Contract Agreement is a vain
attempt to circumvent the requirement that there be a specific appropriation for any disbursement.
d. What is crucial is that in the absence of appropriation or designation of source of funds, the aforestated
clause cannot be considered as a source of an enforceable right in favor of Markbilt. Section 85 in relation
to Section 86 of P.D. No. 1445, requires the existence of a prior sufficient appropriation, as certified by the
proper accounting official, before any contract for expenditure of public funds is authorized. The only
appropriation in this case is the original contract price of P71,499,875.29. Consequently, no payment can
be made beyond such amount. In the same way, as there is no funding to support the price escalation
clause in the said Contract Agreement, no public funds can be disbursed in payment thereof. The clause is
void and of no effect. It cannot be enforced and the public officer who entered into the contract without
such appropriation and certification shall be liable for any resulting damage to the government.
e. For the sake of argument, even assuming the validity of the contract clause authorizing price escalation,
the Court nonetheless finds that the additional budget certified and approved does not provide for
payment of price escalation in favor of Markbilt. Petitioner argues that Supplemental Budget No. 1 signed
by the Municipal Budget Officer Laborte and approved by Municipal Administrator Nagera, on his authority,
and of the Sangguniang Bayan, provided for appropriation m the amount of P1M in favor of Markbilt
Construction. Contrary to the submission of the petitioner, a cursory reading of the appropriation
ordinance clearly shows that it does not cover the payment for price escalation. Understood by its plain
and ordinary meaning, the supplemental budget refers to the further construction of the Daet public
market. It pertains to future works to be done, and not of past work performed. Had it been the intention
of the Sangguniang Bayan to pay for the price escalation on completed works, it could have employed a
more direct language than that employed, such as "works done." In the absence of evidence showing
legislative intent of the Sangguniang Bayan to the contrary, the Court cannot stretch the meaning of the
law. An appropriation may be used only for the specific purpose for which they are appropriated. The Court
quotes with approval the Sandiganbayan’s elucidation: “Appropriation Ordinance No. 1 contained no
appropriate for the payment of the amount of P1 million to Markbilt. Appropriation Ordinance No. 1 shows
that the appropriation was for the construction of the public market. There was no appropriation to pay
for the contract price escalation, an obligation supposedly incurred in the already completed construction
of the Daet Public Market. Accused Sarion and his witnesses point to the deliberations of the Sangguniang
Bayan. But the intent to tpay the alleged contract price escalation allegedly manifested during the
deliberations are not reflected in Appropriation Ordinance No. 1. Notably, no documentary evidence was
offered to prove the alleged deliberations.”
f. To recapitulate, Section 86 of PD 1445 requires the existence of a prior specific appropriation, as certified
by the proper accounting official, before any contract for expenditure of public funds is authorized. In this
sense, therefore, it is the absence of certification as to the availability of or source of funds pertaining
specifically to the payment of price escalation, that rendered the clause void and the subsequent approval
by the petitioner of the disbursement voucher invalid. It is this irregularity which rendered the payment in
favor of Markbilt illegal. In turn, it is the transgression of the same basic principle in disbursement of public
funds which translates to gross negligence in the part of the petitioner. With this, the elements of the
offense sufficiently alleged and proven in the Information, there is no obstacle in convincting the petitioner
of the crime of malversation.
g. As correctly ruled by the Sandiganbayan, in addition to the requirement of appropriation and certification
of availability of funds, price escalation during the implementation of a contract must comply with the
requirements of RA 9184 or the Government Procurement Reform Act. It must be recalled that the
Contract Agreement between parties was executed on December 29, 2003. At that time, the law in effect
is RA 9184. By express repeal, the Act, which took effect on January 26, 2003, superseded PD No. 1594.
Section 61 of RA 9184 explicitly provides that any given scope of work in the contract as awarded shall be
for the fixed price specified therein. Any increase in the contract price is subject to prior determination by
the NEDA of the existence of an extraordinary circumstance and approval of the GPPB. It is only after which
that contract price escalation may be authorized and paid. Evidently, price escalation in a contract for public
works is not immediately executory by mere specification in contract. There is a procedure to be followed.
A recommendation must first be made by the procuring entity of the existence of an extraordinary
circumstance. Then, the NEDA would make a determination confirming the justification offered by the
procuring entity. After finding that an extraordinary circumstance exists thus justifying the payment of price
escalation, the request would have to be forwarded to the GPPB for approval. It is only after the GPPB
signifies its approval of the price escalation claim that the payment can be processed and released by the
government entity concerned to the contractor.
h. In this case, it is not contested that the petitioner failed to observe the foregoing procedure prior to his
approval of the disbursement voucher and signing of the Landbank check in favor of Markbilt. This is
supported by a Certification dated July 25, 2012 issued by the NEDA to the effect that it had not received
any request from the Municipality of Daet for exemption and/or approval for the payment of escalation
price.
i. The Arias ruling does not apply. The Court finds the existence of such circumstances which would have
alerted the petitioner to inquire further prior to his approval of the disbursement voucher, beyond the
certifications and documents issued by the municipal officials. To recall, the Contract Agreement for the
construction of the Daet Public Market (Phase II) was entered into on December 29, 2003, during the

Infidelity in the Custody of Public Documents 210
petitioner's term as Municipal Mayor. Actual construction commenced in January 2005. Months thereafter
or in December 2005, allegedly on account of spiraling costs of materials during the construction period,
Markbilt filed a claim for the adjustment of contract price pursuant to the price escalation clause of the
Contract Agreement. During the intervening period or in May 2004, Mayor Panotes was elected as
Municipal Mayor of Daet It was sometime in June 2005, during his term, that the Phase II construction
project was completed. Thereafter, Markbilt continued to file several letter-requests reiterating its claim
for price escalation. However, then Mayor Panotes refused to act upon the claims until the end of his term
in June 2007. It was when the petitioner was re-elected that Markbilt's claim was processed and eventually
paid in May 2008. Considering that two years had passed since the project's completion and more than
three years since the first demand for payment of price escalation was made by Markbilt, the petitioner
could have inquired into the circumstances attending the demand and the construction project and why
the same was unacted upon by his predecessor. Instead of immediately instructing Administrator Nagera
to look for sources of funds, he should have sought the opinion of the Municipal Engineer. Petitioner should
have at the very least referred the documents relative to construction project to the appropriate municipal
officials for study in order to verify the basis of Markbilt's claim. This is particularly relevant as majority of
the project was undertaken and ultimately completed prior to his term. As well, the amount appropriated
for the Daet Public Market (Phase II) construction project has already been fully released. Markbilt's
demand is over and beyond the contract price and dependent upon the cost of materials almost three
years passed. Simply, the propriety of Markbilt's additional claim depends upon the prevailing market
prices at the time they were purchased vis-à-vis the costs when the contract was entered into. In this
regard, prudence dictates that further verification be conducted as to the veracity of the amount claimed
by Markbilt. The amount involved is by no means trivial; it involves millions of pesos of public funds.
Petitioner, as head of office, should have taken this precaution in order to safeguard the government funds
for which he is responsible and to protect the interests of the municipality.
j. In this case, after receiving Markbilt's demand, petitioner immediately referred the same to Administrator
Nageta and instructed him to look for sources of funds in order to satisfy the same, without taking steps
first in order to verify the propriety of Markbilt's additional claim for payment. It is this act which set the
process in motion. Ultimately, it was the petitioner's signature on the disbursement voucher and Landbank
check that allowed Markbilt to encash the P1,000,000.00 partial payment for contract price escalation,
despite not being entitled thereto. This satisfied the last element of the offense and rendered the crime of
malversation complete. (Sarion v. People of the Philippines, G.R. Nos. 243029-30, March 18, 2021, First
Division)
18. Petitioner Feliciano must also be acquitted on the criminal charge for malversation. Considering that there is
basis upon which the BOD of LMWD passed the Resolution in increasing its salary, there is no reason for
petitioner Feliciano not to approve the release of payment pursuant to the authority of the board. After all, the
powers of General Manager emanates and is secondary to that of the BOD. To a certain extent, therefore, the
processing of the release of payment pursuant to Resolution No. 98-33 is ministerial on the part of petitioner
Feliciano. In fine, in malversation there must be improper appropriation or use, whether directly or indirectly,
of public funds; the same is lacking in the case at bar. The disbursement voucher had been completely
accomplished and all the necessary supporting documents attached, all in accordance with Resolution No. 98-
33 of the BOD of LMWD. While the period covers January 1, 1998 to September 26, 1998, during the period of
the LWUA takeover, there is basis in good faith to believe that he is entitled to such salary considering that the
terms of takeover relates only to the satisfaction of LMWD's financial obligation to LWUA. The documents
related to such loan obligation does not empower the LWUA to exercise managerial prerogatives relating to
personnel management. Even assuming arguendo that LWUA has such powers, it is understood that its
"takeover" of the operations of LMWD is merely temporary or only until full satisfaction of the latter's
obligation. Thus, the General Manager appointed by LMWD retains its position and is entitled to remuneration,
this "practice" has in fact been recognized by LWUA. In view of these, at that time, there is no reason for
petitioner Feliciano to refuse to process and sign the release and accept payment. (Feliciano v. People of the
Philippines, G.R. Nos. 219681-82, March 18, 2021, First Division)
IN FIDELITY IN THE C U S TO DY O F PU B LIC D O C U MEN TS

1. The charges of infidelity in the custody of public documents committed by means of concealment have
reasonable basis. The elements of the crime are the following: (a) the offender must be a public officer; (b)
there must be a document abstracted, destroyed, or concealed; (c) the document destroyed or abstracted must
be entrusted to such public officer by reason of his office; and (d) damage or prejudice to the public interest or
to that of a third person must be a caused by the removal, destruction or concealment of such document.
(Jalandoni v. The Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 211751, May 10, 2021, Third Division)
2. The Office of the Ombudsman found the elements present. First, Jalandoni is a public officer, and second, the
documents were entrusted to him by reason of his office. As to the other elements, it explained that the act of
patching the documents led to their concealment because they were essentially put on hold despite being ready
for release. This delay was prejudicial to public interest and to third persons. (Jalandoni v. The Office of the
Ombudsman, G.R. No. 211751, May 10, 2021, Third Division)

Unlawful Appointments 211
U N LAWFU L APPO IN TM EN TS
1. The elements of the crime of unlawful appointments under Article 244 of the RPC are: (a) the offender is a
public officer; (b) he or she nominates or appoints a person to a public office; (c) such person lacks the legal
qualifications therefor; and (d) the offender knows that his or her nominee or appointee lacks the qualifications
at the time he or she made the nomination or appointment. (Anacta, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 219352,
2. Petitioner cannot feign ignorance of Alconaba's ineligibility when he appointed him as director of the Borongan
Water District. That he knew of Alconaba's disqualification for appointment to any public office is established
by petitioner's own testimony. Petitioner evidently knew that Alconaba was ineligible for appointment to any
public office since Alconaba lost in the May 2004 elections when he ran as councilor of Borongan under
petitioner's ticket. Petitioner knew that the one-year prohibition imposed on losing candidates as provided
under Section 6, Article IX-B of the Constitution and Section 94(b) of R.A. No. 7160 applied to Alconaba. In
People v. Sandiganbayan (Fourth Division), the Court held that legal disqualification under Article 244 of the
RPC includes temporary disqualification such as the one-year prohibition provided under Section 6, Article IX-B
of the Constitution and Section 94(b) of R.A. No. 7160.
a. It is undisputed that petitioner appointed Alconaba in January 2005 as director of the Borongan Water
District. At the time of his appointment, Alconaba, who ran and lost in the May 2004 elections, was not
eligible for appointment to any office in the government or government-owned or controlled corporation
by virtue of the one-year prohibition under Section 6, Article IX-B of the Constitution and Section 94(b) of
R.A. No. 7160. The Borongan Water District is a government-owned or controlled corporation, created
under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 198. In Davao City Water District v. CSC, the Court categorically ruled
that local water districts are government-owned or controlled corporations with original charter. Under
Section 3(b) of P.D. No. 198, petitioner, as the Municipal Mayor of Borongan in 2005, was the appointing
authority or the person empowered to appoint the members of the Board of Directors of the Borongan
Water District. Petitioner knew that when he appointed Alconaba, who ran and lost under his ticket in the
May 2004 elections, the latter was covered by the one-year prohibition and thus not qualified for.
appointment to any public office. Clearly, the Sandiganbayan did not err in finding petitioner guilty of the
crime of unlawful appointments defined and penalized under Article 244 of the RPC. (Anacta, Jr. v.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 219352, November 14, 2018, Second Division)
AN TI-GR AFT AN D C O R R U PT PR AC TIC ES AC T
SECTION 3(E)
1. The accused violated Section 3(e) of RA 3019: First, Maderazo and Veruen were public officers discharging
administrative functions at that time. Maderazo was the Acting Mayor while Veruen was the Acting Municipal
Accountant. Second, Maderazo and Veruen acted with evident bad faith. Maderazo processed the Request of
Obligation and Allotment instead of the municipal engineer, received the amount of P160,000.00 and covered
up the non-existent tapping saddles by belatedly effecting the delivery of the tapping saddles, which did not
even conform to the Job Contract. In addition, Veruen approved the Disbursement Voucher despite the lack of
supporting documents in violation of his duties. Last, the tapping saddles were not delivered upon payment,
thus causing undue injury to the Government. (Maderazo and Veruen, Jr. v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No.
2. Atty. Cleofe cannot be punished for Section 3(e), RA 3019 because he was not actuated with malice or bad faith
in issuing the new TCT in the name of Robles, and did not gain any pecuniary benefit from his issuance of the
new TCT pursuant to the order of the RTC. Atty. Cleofe was rather guided by the ruling in LRA Consulta Case
No. 2402 to the effect that the requirement for the payment of transfer tax, capital gains tax, and documentary
stamp tax, and for the submission of a real estate tax clearance did not apply to a transfer pursuant to a court
order. (Soriano v. Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon, G.R. No. 168157, August 19, 2015, First Division)
3. The Sandiganbayan erred in ruling that Giangan and his co-accused had acted with gross bad faith and manifest
partiality when they removed the wooden posts of the fence of Bernadas. On the contrary, their actuations
evinced good faith. Giangan as the barangay chairman acted upon the honest and sincere belief that he was
then summarily abating the nuisance that a regular user of the obstructed road had just reported to him
especially when it blocked the access through the road that had long been permitted. A further indication of
Giangan’s good faith was the turning over of the wooden posts to the police station, manifesting that the
accused were acting within the scope of their authority. (Giangan v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 169385,
4. Accused is guilty of violation of R.A. 3019, Section 3(e). This is because no delivery under P.O. No. 0005031 was
made, resulting to a loss of P861,600.00 on the part of the government for which the accused must be held
liable. As the general services officer concerned, accused participated in the issuance of documents which
facilitated the payment of undelivered compost equipment. (Caunan v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No.
183529, February 24, 2016, Third Division)

Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act 212
5. Respondents may be held guilty of violation of R.A. 3019, Sections 3(e) and 3(g). Records show that the fact
that PNB appeared to be unduly exposing its finances by extending iniquitous loans to HMOI, despite the latter
being undercapitalized and notwithstanding the inadequacy of the collaterals being offered to secure the loans,
should have been sufficient basis for the Ombudsman to find probable cause. The HMOI loans appear to bear
the badges of a behest loan, as indicated by following circumstances: HMOI was undercapitalized, the loans
extended to it by PNB were undercollateralized, its officers were identified as cronies, the dictator Marcos had
a marginal note or endorsement on Atayde’s March 10, 1981 letter which facilitated the approval of another
loan in favor of HMOI, and the loans were approved with extraordinary speed. (PCGG v. Office of the
Ombudsman, G.R. No. 193176, February 24, 2016, First Division)
6. Ferdinand is not liable for violation of R.A. 3019, Section 3(e). It should be noted that Ferdinand is a mere
consultant for the provincial government. As such, Ferdinand was not required to take an oath of office because
he rendered consultancy services for the provincial government not by virtue of an appointment or election to
a specific public office or position by a contractual engagement.
a. The provincial governor cannot be held liable for entering into consultancy services with Ferdinand. First,
there was no undue injury amounting to actual damages to the government as it was not disputed that
Ferdinand performed the tasks and duties required of him under the questioned contracts and, thus, the
payment of honoraria to him was in order and did not cause damage to or result in prejudice to the
provincial government. Second, there was no manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable
negligence in entering into the consultancy contracts with Ferdinand because Governor Umali relied on
the issuances of the Civil Service Commission and the opinions of the DILG and the Provincial Legal Office
in good faith before proceeding to engage Ferdinand.
b. Governor Umali cannot be held liable for violation of Article 244 of the RPC for unlawful appointment. This
is because Umali believed in good faith that Ferdinand’s dismissal from the service did not disquaify him
from being hired as a consultant. For one to be held liable for violation of Article 244 of the RPC, one must
knowingly appoint the disqualified person. (Joson v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. Nos. 210220-21, April
7. Although Fuentes relied upon the certification of his subordinates, he, as head of the office responsible for the
issuance of motor vehicle clearances, he must be held liable for any act committed in violation of the purpose
for which the office was made. Had it not been for the clearances issued by Fuentes declaring that the cars
being sold were indeed acquired through legitimate means, Lim and Lazon would not have parted with their
hard-earned monney. Put differently, as the clearance officer, Fuentes is accountable in a situation where a
person was able to obtain clearance for a stolen vehicle from Iligan TMG since the system could not be
considered as having been effectively and faithfully implemented. Indubitably, Fuentes’ funciton was not purely
ministerial as he, in fact, had to exercise good judgment in issuing vehicle clearances. It must be stressed that
the TMG clearance is specifically intended to protect the buyer from buying stolen/carnapped vehicles. (Lim v.
Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the MOLEO, G.R. No. 201320, September 14, 2016, Third Division)
8. Tan, the president of International Builders Corporation, cannot be convicted of violation of R.A. 3019, Section
3(e). While Tan, a private person, was charged with violation of R.A. 3019, Section 3(e) because of the alleged
conspiracy between her and her co-accused public officals of Maasin, Iloilo, in commiting the said offense. But,
a perusal of the Sandiganbayan Decision showed no instance how petitioner could have conspired with her co-
accused public officials. According to the Sandiganbayan, the prosecution has proven her complicity by her act
of signing the MOA ostensibly dated June 28, 1996 but was actually executed sometime after September 1997
which act indicates a common purpose to make it appear that accused Mondejar had the authority to enter
into said MOA with Tan’s IBC. It can be gleaned fromt eh aforesaid Sandiganbayan disposition that their only
basis in declaring that the MOA was actually executed sometime after September 1997 was their finding that
the falsified Minutes of the Regular Session of the Sangguniang Bayan of Maasin, Iloilo, was executed only
sometime in 1997. However, there was no iota of evidence ever presented that would prove that the MOA
entered into between Mondejar and Tan was actually executed on a date other than January 27, 1996. There
was also nothing on the face of the MOA that would show any irregularity in its execution. It should be noted
that the MOA signed by Tan dated June 27, 1996 was duly notarized on June 28, 1996. Rule 132, Section 30 of
the Rules of Court provides that every instrument duly acknowledged or proved and certified as provided by
law, may be presented in evidence without further proof, the certificate of acknowledgment being prima facie
evidence of the execution of the instrument or document involved. With that notarial act, the MOA became a
public document and thus becomes a perfect evidence of the fact which gives rise to its execution and of its
date so long as the act which the officer witnessed and certified to or the date written by him is not shown to
be false. Furthermore, the parties stipulated that the MOA was entered into on June 27, 1996. Thus, the
Sandiganbayan is precluded from ruling that the MOA was actually executed sometime in September 1997.
Having established that the MOA was entered into on June 27, 1996 and not in September 1997, Tan’s act of
signing the same did not in anyway prove that she had conspired with her co-accused public officials in
committing the offense charged as there is nothing in the MOA that would apprise Tan of any irregularity or
illegality that led to its execution. (Tan v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 218902, October 17, 2016, Third
Division)

9. Fuentes’ acts were not only committed with manifest partiality, but also with bad faith.
a. As can be gleaned from the records, Fuentes himself testified that according to the rumors he heard, all
five ship chandlers operating in the Port of Isabel were allegedly involved in smuggling and drug trading.
Yet, it was only Valenzuela’s chandling operations through Triple A that was refused issuance of a Business
Permit, as evidenced by Busienss Permits issued to two other chandling services operators in the said port.
Moreover, if Fuentes truly believed that Valenzuela was indeed engaged in illegal smuggling and drug
trading, then he would not have issued Business Permits to the latter’s other businesses. However, Fuentes
issued a Business Permit to Valenzuela’s other business, Gemini Security, which provides security services
to the vessels in the Port of Isabel. Thus, Fuentes’ refusal to issue a business permit to Valenzuela’s Triple
A was indeed committed with manifest partiality.
b. As regards bad faith, while it is within the municipal mayor’s prerogative to suspend, revoke, or refuse to
issue Business Permits, it must nevertheless be emphasized that (i) the power to suspend or revoke is
premised on the violation of the conditions specified therein, and (ii) the power to refuse issuance is
premised on non-compliance with the pre-requisites for said issuance. In the exercise of these powers, the
mayor must observe due process in that it must afford the applicant or licensee notice and opportunity to
be head. Here, it is clear that Valenzuela complied with all the pre-requisites for the issuance of a Business
Permit for Triple A, as her application already contained the prior approval of the other concerned officials
of the LGU. In fact, Valenzuela even submitted numerous certifications issued by various law enforcement
agencies clearing her of any kind of participation from the alleged illegal smuggling and drug trading
activities in the Port of Isabel. Despite these, Fuentes still refused to issue a Business Permit for Valenzuela’s
Triple A without affording her an opportunity to controvert the rumors against her. Quite plainly, if Fuentes
truly believed the rumors that Valenzuela was indeed engaged in illegal activities in the Port of Isabel, then
he should have already acted upon it in the years 1999, 2000, and 2001, or when he allegedly first heard
them. (Fuentes v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 186421, April 17, 2017, First Division)
10. There is insufficient evidence to prove undue injury, which, in contemplation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019, has
been defined as equivalent to actual damages in civil law, on either Gervacio or the Provincial Government of
Nueva Ecija. The evidence shows that there was, for the benefit of the Provincial Government of Nueva Ecija, a
catered reception in the Nueva Ecija Convention Center, for which payment was made by the Provincial
Government to the caterer pursuant to a purchase order and under the terms specified therein. (Joson v. Office
of the Ombudsman, G.R. Nos. 197433 & 197435, August 9, 2017, Second Division)
11. There was no justification or adequate reason for Pundaodaya, Adiong, Cedeño, and the other accused public
officers to process the full payment for the desks. The truth that Pundaodaya, Adiong, Cedeño, and their co-
accused were able to have the DVs processed through the execution of documents, i.e., IRs, MRs, and DRs, to
evidence full deliveries of the desks despite the inexistent and short deliveries, clearly prove that they have
acted in bad faith in the discharge of their duties in order to attain a common purpose, i.e, to extend undue
advantage and unwarranted benefits to the suppliers, causing great disadvantage and injury to the government.
(Cedeño v. People of the Philippines, G.R. Nos. 193020 & 193040-193042, November 8, 2017, Third Division)
12. Saunar's conduct neither constitutes a violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. In order to be liable for violating
the said provision, the following elements must concur: (a) the accused must be a public officer discharging
administrative, judicial or official functions; (b) he must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or
inexcusable negligence; and (c) that his action caused any undue injury to any party, including the government,
or giving any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions.
Saunar's action was not tantamount to inexcusable or gross negligence considering that there was no intention
to abandon his duty as an NBI officer. (Saunar v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 186502, December 13, 2017,
Third Division)
13. Sandiganbayan warranted the acquittal of Sabio due to insufficiency of evidence engendering reasonable doubt
on whether Sabio committed the offenses charged. Records show that after taking into consideration the
testimonies and evidence of both parties, Sandiganbayan arrived at a conclusion that the participation of Sabio
with respect to the P10,350,000.00 was limited to the act of signing of the transmittal letter, checks and
vouchers. The court likewise opined that the alleged untransmitted amount of P10,350,000.00 appearing in the
breakdown of P50,350,000.00 as "remittance to the National Treasury for 2006" was misleading. The amount
was never intended for remittance to the BOT but for the operational expenses of the PCGG. As can be inferred
from the testimony of Escorpizo, the cash advance of P10,350,000.00 was put in the name of Sabio since he
was the Chairperson of PCGG under the instructions of PCGG Commissioners Abcede and Conti, who in turn
promised Escorpizo that they will issue a board resolution for the authorization of the cash advance. On the
other hand, the charge of malversation was likewise dismissed due to the prosecution's failure to prove that
Sabio failed to liquidate or settle the cash advance of P1,550,862.03 despite demand. Clearly, an action for
certiorari will not lie to reverse the judgment of acquittal which was rendered after the court's appreciation of
evidence. (People of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 228494-96, March 21, 2018, Second Division)
14. As found by the OMB, to which the Court fully agrees, the elements of evident bad faith, manifest partiality
and/or gross inexcusable negligence are lacking in the instant case; and petitioner failed to prove that the

questioned foreign currency loans granted by the DBP to PPRC were grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to
the government. While petitioner alleged that the subject foreign currency loans were undercollateralized and
PPRC was undercapitalized, it failed to sufficiently establish that indeed the transactions were either grossly
and manifestly disadvantageous to the government or that there was evident bad faith, manifest partiality or
gross inexcusable negligence on the part of private respondents. (PCGG v. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 195962, April
15. The second element provides the modalities by which a violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 may
be committed. "Manifest partiality," "evident bad faith," or "gross inexcusable negligence" are not separate
offenses, and proof of the existence of any of these three (3) "in connection with the prohibited acts is enough
to convict. These terms were defined in Uriarte v. People: There is "manifest partiality" when there is a clear,
notorious or plain inclination or predilection to favor one side or person rather than another. "Evident bad faith"
connotes not only bad judgment but also palpably and patently fraudulent and dishonest purpose to do moral
obliquity or conscious wrongdoing for some perverse motive or ill will. It contemplates a state of mind
affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some motive or self-interest or ill will or for ulterior purposes.
"Gross inexcusable negligence" refers to negligence characterized by the want of even the slightest care, acting
or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally,
with conscious indifference to consequences insofar as other persons may be affected.
a. The second punishable act under Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 is the giving of unwarranted
benefits, advantage, or preference to a private party. This does not require actual damage as it is sufficient
that the accused has given "unjustified favor or benefit to another." The terms "unwarranted benefits,
advantage or preference" were defined in Uriarte: Unwarranted means lacking adequate or official
support; unjustified; unauthorized; or without justification or adequate reasons. Advantage means a more
favorable or improved position or condition; benefit or gain of any kind; benefit from course of action.
Preference signifies priority or higher evaluation or desirability; choice or estimation above another.
(Abubakar v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 202408, June 27, 2018, Third Division)
16. Petitioners are guilty of violation of R.A. 3019, Section 3(e). Records show that the certificates of mobilization,
which were issued at least one (1) week before the date of public bidding, categorically identified HMB
Construction and Supply, Kutawato Construction, Al Mohandiz Construction, JM Construction, PMA
Construction, Al-Aziz-Engineering, and MGL Construction as contractors for some portions of the Awang-Nuro
Road and Cotabato-Lanao Road Projects. The acts of identifying certain contractors ahead of the scheduled
public bidding and of allowing the advanced deployment of their equipment through the issuance of certificates
of mobilization are glaring irregularities in the bidding procedure that engender suspicion of favoritism and
partiality towards the seven (7) contractors. These irregularities create a reasonable, if not conclusive,
presumption that the concerned public officials had no intention of complying with the rules on public bidding
and that the results were already predetermined. Although petitiOner Baraguir concedes that contractors can
only commence work after they receive a notice to proceed, he justifies the irregularity on an alleged "risk-
taking strategy' employed by some contractors. This appears to be a flimsy excuse. There is no justifiable reason
why contractors should be allowed to deploy their equipment in advance considering that it would defeat the
very purpose of competitive public bidding. Benefits derived from this practice, if any, would certainly not
redound to the government. Aside from this, the alleged purpose of the contractors in mobilizing their
equipment ahead of public bidding is speculative. Prospective contractors are required to possess the technical
capability to execute the implementation of a given project. Section 3(b) of Presidential Decree No. 1594 lists
as a condition for all bidders the "[a]vailability and commitment of the contractor's equipment to be used for
the subject project." The PreQualification Bids and Awards Committee is mandated under the implementing
rules and regulations to look into the "suitability of [the contractor's] available construction equipment" in
assessing technical capability. The screening process ensures that bidders have the necessary equipment and
personnel to carry out the implementation of a particular government project. In this regard, it may not even
be possible for a winning bidder to lease equipment from another contractor after it has won because technical
capability is evaluated before the submission of the bids. Assuming that prospective bidders would be permitted
to sublease their equipment from other entities, the sublease agreement should already be finalized prior to
the conduct of public bidding. Clearly, petitioners Baraguir and Guiani gave seven (7) contractors unwarranted
benefits and advantage through manifest partiality. Petitioner Baraguir also gave unwarranted benefits and
advantage to the contractors through gross inexcusable negligence. Admittedly, he failed to check the dates on
the certificates of mobilization when they were presented to him for his signature.
a. In the present case, the Arias doctrine cannot exonerate petitioners Abubakar, Baraguir, or Guiani from
criminal liability. There were circumstances that should have prompted them to make further inquiries on
the transactions subject of this case. In Criminal Case Nos. 24963-24969 on the early mobilization of
contractors, the irregularity was already apparent on the face of the certificates of mobilization, which bore
dates earlier than the scheduled public bidding. This should have already roused suspicion from petitioners
Baraguir and Guiani, who were the last signatories and final approving authorities. The same can be said
for Criminal Case No. 24970. The Contract of Survey Work, which was used as the primary supporting
document for the disbursement of the 30% mobilization fee to Arce Engineering Services, contained a
patently illegal stipulation. Petitioner Guiani cannot blame his subordinates and claim that he acted in good
faith considering that he entered into the contract with Arce Engineering Services. Petitioners should have

also made further inqmnes regarding the P14,400,000.00 advance payment for sub-aggregates. There
were no appropriate documents such as purchase orders and delivery receipts to support this
disbursement. The rules on public bidding and on public funds disbursement are imbued with public
interest. The positions and functions of petitioners Abubakar, Baraguir, and Guiani impose upon them a
greater responsibility in ensuring that rules on these matters are complied with. They are expected to
exercise a greater degree of diligence. (Abubakar v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 202408, June 27,
17. PCGG failed to allege in the complaint and in the present petition the particular acts of private respondents
which constitutes a violation of Sections 3(e) and (g) of R.A. No. 3019. It is not sufficient for PCGG to merely
provide a list of names of the PNB Board members for the years covering the subject loans absent proof of the
latter's individual participation in the approval thereof. (PCGG v. Gutierrez, G.R. No. 189800, July 9, 2018,
Second Division)
18. In concluding that there is probable cause to indict Estrada for 11 counts of violation of Section 3(e) RA 3019,
the Ombudsman likewise examined the evidence on record in finding that it is reasonably apparent that the
elements of the crime are present:
a. First, respondents Senator Estrada and Labayen were all public officers at the time material to the charges.
Their respective roles in the processing and release of PDAF disbursements were in the exercise of their
administrative and/or official functions. Senator Estrada himself chose, in writing, the Napoles-affiliated
NGO to implement projects funded by his PDAF. His trusted authorized staff: respondent Labayen, then
prepared indorsement letters and other communications relating to the PDAF disbursements addressed to
the DBM and the IAs (NABCOR, TRC and NLDC). This trusted staff member also participated in the
preparation and execution of MOAs with the NGOs and the IAs, inspection and acceptance reports,
disbursement reports and other PDAF documents. From the accounts of witnesses Luy, Sula and Suñas as
well as of Tuason, Napoles made a business proposal to Labayen regarding the Senator's PDAF, which
Labayen accepted. Senator Estrada later chose NGOs affiliated with/controlled by Napoles to implement
his PDAF-funded projects.
b. Second, Senator Estrada and respondent-public officers of the IAs were manifestly partial to Napoles, her
staff and the NGOs affiliated she controlled. That Napoles and the NGOs affiliated with/controlled by her
were extended undue favor is manifest. Senator Estrada repeatedly and directly chose the NGOs headed
or controlled by Napoles and her cohorts to implement his projects without the benefit of a public bidding,
and without being authorized by an appropriation law or ordinance. As correctly pointed out by the FIO,
the Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 9184 states that an NGO may be contracted only when so
authorized by an appropriation law or ordinance. National Budget Circular (NBC) No. 476, as amended by
NBC No. 479, provides that PDAF allocations should be directly released only to those government agencies
identified in the project menu of the pertinent General Appropriations Act (GAAs). The GAAs in effect at
the time material to the charges, however, did not authorize the direct release of funds to NGOs, let alone
the direct contracting of NGOs to implement government projects. This, however, did not appear to have
impeded Estrada's direct selection of the Napoles affiliated or controlled NGOs, and which choice was
accepted in toto by the IAs. Even assuming arguendo that the GAAs allowed the engagement of NGOs to
implement PDAF-funded projects, such engagements remain subject to public bidding requirements. The
aforementioned laws and rules, however, were disregarded by public respondents, Senator Estrada having
just chosen the Napoles-founded NGOs. Such blatant disregard of public bidding requirements is highly
suspect, especially in view of the ruling in Alvarez v. People. Notatu dignum is the extraordinary speed
attendant to the examination, processing and approval by the concerned NABCOR, NLDC and TRC officers
of the PDAF releases to the Napoles-affiliated or controlled NGOs. In most instances, the DVs were
accomplished, signed and approved on the same day. Certainly, the required, careful examination of the
transaction's supporting documents could not have taken place if the DV was processed and approved in
one day. In addition to the presence of manifest partiality on the part of respondent public officers alluded
to, evident bad faith is present. That several respondent public officers unduly benefitted from the
diversion of the PDAF is borne by the records. As earlier mentioned, Tuason claimed that she regularly
remitted significant portions (around 50%) of the diverted sums to Estrada, which portions represented
Senator Estrada's "share" or "commission" in the scheme. Notably, Tuason admitted having received a 5%
commission for acting as liaison between Napoles and Senator Estrada. Witness Luy's business ledgers
validate Tuason's claim that Labayen did, from time to time, receive money from Napoles that was intended
for Estrada. Indubitably, repeatedly receiving portions of sums of money wrongfully diverted from public
coffers constitutes evident bad faith.
c. Third, the assailed PDAF-related transactions caused undue injury to the Government in the aggregate
amount of PHP278,000,000.00. Based on the 2007-2009 COA Report as well as on the independent field
verification conducted by the FIO, the projects supposedly funded by Senator Estrada's PDAF were "ghosts"
or inexistent. There were no livelihood kits distributed to beneficiaries. Witnesses Luy, Sula and Sufias
declared that, per directive given by Napoles, they made up lists of fictitious beneficiaries to make it appear
that the projects were implemented, albeit none took place. Instead of using the PDAF disbursements
received by them to implement the livelihood projects, respondent De Asis as well as witnesses Luy, Sula
and Suñas, all acting for Napoles, continuously diverted these sums amounting to PHP278,000,000.00 to

the pocket of Napoles. Certainly, these repeated, illegal transfers of public funds to Napoles' control,
purportedly for projects which did not exist, and just as repeated irregular disbursements thereof,
represent quantifiable, pecuniary losses to the Government, constituting undue injury within the context
of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019.
d. Fourth, respondents Estrada, Labayen granted respondent Napoles unwarranted benefits. That they
repeatedly failed to observe the requirements of R.A. No. 9184, its implementing rules and regulations,
GPPB regulations as well as national budget circulars shows that unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference were given to private respondents. The NGOs selected by Estrada did not appear to have the
capacity to implement the undertakings to begin with. At the time material to the charges, these entities
did not possess the required accreditation to transact with the Government, let alone possess a track
record in project implementation to speak of. (Estrada v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. Nos. 212761-62,
July 31, 2018, En Banc)
19. Based on its investigation, the Ombudsman found that Padaca engaged the services of EDWINLFI to manage
Isabela's provincial rice program without due regard to the rules on government procurement and
notwithstanding that the MOA was yet to be ratified by the SP. The Ombudsman also noted that the fact that
EDWINLFI's officers include Soriano (Municipal Councilor) and Atty. Lamorena (Provincial Government's Legal
Officer), engenders a suspicion as to the regularity of the transaction. Thus, the Ombudsman concluded that
there is probable cause to believe that through manifest partiality, Padaca gave unwarranted preference and
benefits to EDWINLFI in the discharge of her official function as governor of the Province of Isabela, which is
penalized under Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. Concomitantly, Soriano and Pine were charged based on their
collaborative actions in the implementation of the Provincial Rice Program, which according to the
Ombudsman, indicate the existence of common design to obtain unwarranted benefits at the expense of the
Provincial Government. (Padaca v. Carpio Morales, G.R. No. 201800, August 8, 2018, Second Division)
20. The Court finds that Tiongco acted with manifest partiality and evident bad faith in this case. Tiongco's partiality
is clear. Her willingness to disregard the PCIC Board's directive and OMB MC No. 10 in order to grant Estacio's
request speaks of such partiality. Her actions all point to facilitating whatever course of action would be
favorable to Estacio. The Court also finds, in this case, an inclination by Tiongco to take advantage of Barbin's
absence from the premises of PCIC to accommodate Estacio, who is, not insignificantly, her former boss.
Tiongco made her own determination and characterized Estacio's request for retirement gratuity as urgent,
knowing that doing so, taken with Barbin's absence, would trigger the mechanism under Section 20.4 of the
PCIC CASA that would allow her and another Class "A" signatory (in this case, Mordeno, who had fled and left
her to suffer the consequences) to sign on the request.
a. In Antonino v. Desierto, the Court held that bad faith per se is not enough for one to be held liable under
the law; bad faith must be evident. Bad faith does not simply connote bad moral judgment or negligence.
There must be some dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong, a breach
of a sworn duty through some motive or intent or ill will. As discussed above, Tiongco's bad faith was clearly
exhibited in her willful disregard for OMB MC No. 10 and for the requirements of the PCIC Board. It is clear
as well that she knowingly encroached on Barbin's authority to approve the payment of retirement gratuity
to one who has pending cases before the Ombudsman. She herself admitted that she was faced with a
difficult question of law. Yet, instead of seeking guidance from PCIC's legal counsel or from Barbin himself,
she simply decided on her own and took her own course of action that did not conform to established
rules. Moreover, her failure to ensure restitution from Estacio in case he is found guilty in his pending cases
is clearly a breach of her sworn duty as a government official tasked with safeguarding the interest of the
service. (Tiongco v. People of the Philippines, G.R. Nos. 218709-10, November 14, 2018, Second Division)
21. Undue injury to the government was caused by the unauthorized disbursement of P1,522,849.48 in public
funds, in that, first, the person who approved said disbursement did not have the authority to do so, and second,
because the beneficiary was not yet entitled to the release of the retirement gratuity. As such, Estacio also
enjoyed an unwarranted benefit because non-compliance with the requirements under OMB MC No. 10
disqualified him to receive his retirement gratuity at that time. On top of that, Estacio was given said
unwarranted benefit through Tiongco's usurpation of Barbin's official functions and the violation of OMB MC
No. 10. Estacio's former position afforded him access to the highest officials of the agency, the same ones who
were in a position to know how to work through PCIC's processes. Tiongco's overreach was obviously targeted
to expedite the process in favor of the former president.
a. It is also important to point out that the dismissal of the cases against Estacio is irrelevant. The letter being
presented by petitioner to this Court was not considered by the Sandiganbayan since it was never
presented at trial or at any time before the denial of her motion for reconsideration. Tiongco submitted
the same, through a Manifestation and Motion, only four days after the resolution of her motion for
reconsideration. The Sandiganbayan ruled that the letter is a "mere scrap of paper barren of probative
value." It held that the letter was not newly discovered evidence, nor was Tiongco presenting it as such,
since it could have been easily obtained during the course of the trial, or even filed with her motion for
reconsideration. Further, it said that even if the court can concede that the same is a public document, it
was never presented in evidence and was, thus, not part of the records when the case was submitted for
decision. As such, this letter is being offered for its evidentiary value for the first time before this Court.

This being a petition for review under Rule 45, the Court is limited to determining questions of law and
could not consider evidence belatedly presented by Tiongco. Moreover, it will not change the ruling of the
Court since it has been already determined that the elements of violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 were
proven in this case. (Tiongco v. People of the Philippines, G.R. Nos. 218709-10, November 14, 2018, Second
Division)
22. The Informations sufficiently allege the elements for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. While the words
used vary, the implication remains the same, that the acts alleged therein were performed by the petitioner in
pursuance of, and that the same necessarily related to his functions as Mayor. In fact, it is undisputed that the
petitioner, as then municipal mayor of Amadeo, Cavite was then performing public functions at the time of the
acts complained of. Consequently, it is of no moment that the exact nomenclature of the law has not been used
in the Information, considering that the statements therein clearly indicate what offense has been committed,
and enable the court to make proper judgment. This is particularly true as the Informations did not simply allege
that the offense was committed in relation to petitioner's office or that he took advantage of his position, but
as well contain specific factual allegations that would indicate the close intimacy between the discharge of the
offender's official duties and the commission of the offense charged.
a. The Court finds no merit in the petitioner's submissions that the second and third elements of the offense,
previously enumerated, are not present. To merit conviction under Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, it is not
enough that undue injury was caused, the act must be performed through manifest partiality, evident bad
faith, or gross inexcusable negligence. Pertinent to the issue at hand, "bad faith" in this sense, does not
simply connote bad judgment or negligence; it imputes a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and
conscious doing of a wrong; a breach of sworn duty through some motive or intent or ill will; it partakes of
the nature of fraud. Petitioner's violation is manifested by his act of ordering that construction works be
done on the property belonging to the Heirs of Simplicio and that of Calixto prior to any agreement with
the said parties or expropriation proceedings. The petitioner does not dispute that no expropriation
proceeding was initiated. In fact, it is the petitioner's submission that expropriation was never intended by
the SB. This was corroborated by Municipal Councilor Joel V. Iyaya (Iyaya), submitting that the local
government merely intended to enter into joint ventures with the owners of the subject properties.
However, he later affirmed that the joint venture never materialized but the municipal government
nonetheless proceeded with the project and is solely profiting therefrom. The position is erroneous. It has
been established that there was "taking" of portions of the subject properties which therefore demands
the institution of expropriation proceedings. Records establish that of the 24,000 square meters of the
property, around 3,900 sq m form the pavilion, while an unknown portion of it was made into a parking
lot. The testimony of Geodetic Engineer Herminigildo L. Vidallon, confirmed that the construction works
initiated by the petitioner was within the subject registered owners' property lines. In his sketch plans,
submitted in evidence and identified by him during his testimony, 3,892 sq m were bulldozed and scraped,
while 3,898 sq m of the subject properties were affected by the construction. Clearly, this constitutes
undue injury. In the recent case of Roberto P. Fuentes v. People of the Philippines, the Court speaking
through Associate Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe, reiterated prevailing case law in that in proving undue
injury, proof of the extent of damage is not essential, it being sufficient that the injury suffered or the
benefit received is perceived to be substantial enough and not merely negligible.
b. Evident bad faith on the part of the petitioner is, on the other hand, manifested by his active participation
in the Balite Falls Development Project and that despite meetings conducted wherein he was directly and
personally informed by the owners of the subject properties of their disagreement to the utilization and/or
inclusion of their properties, he nonetheless consciously proceeded with the project.
c. Petitioner's defense that the development of the Balite Falls is a project of the Department of Tourism and
not of the Local Government does not absolve him for liability. Regardless of who authored the project,
the fact remains that it is the petitioner who supervised and administered the construction on the subject
properties, and continue to benefit therefrom as established by the testimonies of Municipal Councilors
Donn Clarence L. Bayot and Iyaya, that the facility is operated by the Municipal Government. (Ambagan, Jr.
v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 233443-44, November 28, 2018, Second Division)
23. According to the Ombudsman, the very act of technical malversation falls under the definition of manifest
partiality, if not gross inexcusable negligence. This Court rules otherwise. For an act to be considered as
exhibiting "manifest partiality," there must be a showing of a clear, notorious or plain inclination or predilection
to favor one side rather than the other. "Partiality" is synonymous with "bias" which "excites a disposition to
see and report matters as they are wished for rather than as they are." "Gross negligence has been so defined
as negligence characterized by the want of even slight care, acting or omitting to act in a situation where there
is a duty to act, not inadvertently but wilfully and intentionally with a conscious indifference to consequences
in so far as other persons may be affected. It is the omission of that care which even inattentive and thoughtless
men never fail to take on their own property."
a. The finding of the Ombudsman falls short of that quantum of proof necessary to establish the fact that
petitioners acted with manifest partiality or there was a failure to show that there was a clear, notorious
or plain inclination or predilection on the part of the petitioners to favor one side rather than the other.
Contrary to the view of the Ombudsman, the mere act of using government money to fund a project which
is different from what the law states you have to spend it for does not fall under the definition of manifest

partiality nor gross inexcusable negligence. It must always be remembered that manifest partiality and
gross inexcusable negligence are not elements in the crime of Technical Malversation and simply alleging
one or both modes would not suffice to establish probable cause for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No.
3019, for it is well-settled that allegation does not amount to proof. Nor can we deduce any or all of the
modes from mere speculation or hypothesis since good faith on the part of petitioners as with any other
person is presumed. The facts themselves must demonstrate evident bad faith which connotes not only
bad judgment, but also palpably and patently fraudulent and dishonest purpose to do moral obliquity or
conscious wrongdoing for some perverse motive or ill will. (Villarosa v. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 221418,
24. It is worthy to emphasize that petitioner itself admits that the basis for the inclusion of Relampagos, et al. in
the criminal cases were their participation in the preparation and issuance of the SAROs. Contravening such
allegation is the subject SARO itself which was factually found to have been signed and issued by then DBM
Secretary Andaya, and not by Relampagos, et al. In fact, in Cambe v. Office of the Ombudsman and its
consolidated cases, the Court gave value to these pieces of evidence or circumstances only with respect to the
SAROs and NCAs which were found to have been issued by the Office of Relampagos as DBM Undersecretary
where Nuñez, Paule, and Bare were all working. Moreover, a perusal of the Ombudsman's Resolution and Joint
Order shows a painfully limited demonstration as to how Relampagos, et al. probably expedited the preparation
and release of SARO No. ROCS-07-05450.
a. In finding probable cause for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, the Ombudsman merely held that
(i) Relampagos, et al. processed the SAROs and NCAs pertaining to Jaraula's PDAF projects; and (ii) their
partiality was manifest because the processing of the requisite SAROs and NCAs in Relampagos's office
were expedited through the assistance provided by Nuñez, Paule, and Bare. Less definite was the
Ombudsman's ratiocination for indicting Relampagos, et al. for the crime of malversation of public funds
as it loosely held that DBM transferred funds to the implementing agency so as to facilitate the release of
said funds to the Napoles-controlled NGO.
b. It is clear that the supposed irregular processing and issuance of the SAROs could have probably been
undertaken by Relampagos, et al. only with respect to the SAROs that were signed and issued by the Office
of the Undersecretary for Operations. As the Ombudsman itself observed, Relampagos, et al. could not
have feigned ignorance of the follows-up made by Luy for the expedited release of the SAROs and NCAs
which were issued by the Office of the Undersecretary for Operations. The same conclusion, however,
cannot be readily reached with respect to the SARO issued by then Secretary Andaya. The dearth of
allegation or finding as to how Relampagos, et al. could have participated in or expedited the preparation
and issuance of SAROs emanating from the Office of the Secretary itself renders their participation, insofar
as SARO No. ROCS-07-05450 is concerned, highly improbable.
c. In view of the finding that Relampagos, et al. could not have participated in the preparation and processing
of SARO No. ROCS-07-05450, there is no need to discuss, at this point, petitioner's contention that
Relampagos, et al. failed to comply with the documentary requirements under DBM National Budget
Circular No. 476 nor that of Relampagos, et al.'s counter-argument that the SAROs were not issued by their
office based on the PDAF Process Flow. (People of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 219824-25,
February 12, 2019, En Banc)
25. DPI's bare allegations were neither supported by sufficient evidence nor corroborated by any witness on its
material points. DPI heavily relied on Manese's affidavit to demonstrate its accusations against respondents. As
aptly explained by the Ombudsman, however, the statements made by Manese in his affidavit were severely
lacking and unconvincing. Manese stated that he had no idea what the respondents did inside the warehouse.
Thus, the Ombudsman is justified when it ruled that Manese failed to corroborate DPI's allegations that the
respondents unlawfully took its private properties, that they planted incriminating evidence therein, and that
they violated Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019.
a. Likewise, DPI's claim that respondents also robbed Manese and Seciban of their cellular phones does not
find support in Manese's affidavit. As observed by the Ombudsman, Manese admitted that his cellular
phone was confiscated by the respondents. That Manese's cellular phone was confiscated, instead of
stolen, is consistent with the respondents' claim that what transpired was a legitimate police operation.
Further, the dismissal of the cases for Other Forms of Trespass and Grave Coercion were also reasonable.
Indeed, the respondents' entry inside the subject warehouse and the command to Manese and Seciban for
them to lie down on the ground are still very much consistent with the presumption of regularity in the
performance of the respondents' official duties as police officers. (Digital Paradise, Inc. v. Casimiro, G.R.
26. Probable cause for violation of R.A. 3019, Section 3(e) is established. From the evidence adduced by petitioner,
there is basis to maintain a reasonable belief that private respondent Abella enabled the cancellation of the
Original Certificate of Title and issuance of new transfer certificates of title. This was despite manifest and
unequivocal deficiencies, most notably in the owner's duplicate copy, the Certificate Authorizing Registration,
and the Deed of Conveyance that had been presented to him. Private respondent Abella admitted canceling
Original Certificate of Title No. 15609 after he was presented an owner's duplicate that "consists of only two
pages which is somewhat defaced/torn." In contrast, the original copy, which was on file in his own office,

consisted of four (4) pages. Not only did the duplicate presented to him not correspond with the original on file;
it was also severely mutilated, with the effect—rather curiously—that identifying features could no longer be
perused. As pointed out by petitioner, "[a]ll possible markings of the nature and origin" of the alleged owner's
duplicate were torn off: (a) the serial number of the page in the registry book in which the title is recorded; (b)
the free patent number; (c) the lot number; (d) the signature of the Survey Division chief who attested to the
technical description; and (e) the signature of the "person who verified or checked the technical description[.]"
It is not just that these were missing. What is more dubious is that the duplicate Original Certificate of Title
presented to Abella had holes and tears exactly where these pieces of information would have been indicated,
even as the remainder of the informational portions of the title remained intact. It strains credulity that
whatever fortuitous forces occasioned those holes and tears would be so focused on specifically removing only
the title's identifying features.
a. Petitioner also pointed out that the Deed of Conveyance, though dated 1972, was presented for
registration only after 39 years and only after the death of Hubahib, the purported seller.
b. None of the plethora of deficiencies across several documents has been disavowed by any of the
respondents. Public respondent, in its Comment, merely reiterated the assailed Consolidated Evaluation
Report's thesis that "determining first the lawful owner of the subject property is necessary before the
Office of the Ombudsman could act on the complaint." Private respondent Abella's two (2)-page Comment
merely adverted to the existence of a "pre-judicial (sic) question" on ownership. In addition, Abella made
generic assertions of innocence: the owner's duplicate . . . appeared to respondent as authentic[;] [h]e did
not suspect that it was not genuine." In her Comment, private respondent Macrina recalled the supposed
circumstances through which Genaro was supposed to have acquired ownership and how she, as attorney-
in-fact, sought to effect the transfer. However, she did not specifically address any of the deficiencies noted
by petitioner.
c. As things stand, the evidence weighs far more heavily in favor of petitioner's cause. Even granting that he
did not act with a deliberately malevolent design, he still appears to have acted with grossly inexcusable
negligence that he practically evaded his duties as a registrar of deeds. Private respondent Abella was
equipped with skills and training to identify irregularities in property registration. More important, it was
his solemn duty to not facilitate registrations attended by manifest aberrations. The palpable defects of
the documents presented to him should have prompted him to desist with the cancellation of the Original
Certificate of Title. Instead, he went so far as to issue new transfer certificates of title. In so doing, he caused
undue injury to Hubahib's heirs and extended unwarranted benefits to Genaro. He, with Macrina, must
rightly stand trial for violation of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. (Tupaz v. Office
of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas, G.R. Nos. 212491-92, March 6, 2019, Third Division)
27. Section 3(e) requires "manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence" and the element
of arbitrariness and malice in taking risks must be palpable. Here, the Office Correspondences show that these
loans were granted for an envisioned rehabilitation of Continental Manufacturing. Thus, there is no showing
that respondents acted with manifest partiality, evidence bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence. The loans
were approved and granted after the consideration of the financial situation, extensive evaluation of the terms
and conditions, and several securities for the accommodation requested. They were granted in the exercise of
sound business discretion. (PCGG v. Gutierrez, G.R. No. 193398, June 3, 2019, Third Division; Republic of the
Philippines v. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 198366, June 26, 2019, Third Division)
28. The SB correctly found that the prosecution was able to establish beyond reasonable doubt the existence of
the foregoing elements, as it was shown that: first, petitioners are all public officers occupying key positions in
the BCS, namely Finance and Administrative Division OIC, Accounting Section OIC, Publications and Productions
Chief, Special Productions Division Chief, and Administrative Officer V, and they were designated as
Chairperson, Vice-Chairperson, and members of the BCS BAC; second, they, in conspiracy with one another,
acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence in the procurement of the
printing machine because they knowingly proceeded with the transaction despite the absence of capital outlay
and competitive bidding, doing so by improperly utilizing the bureau's MOOE account, in clear violation of the
basic and well-known principle that no money shall be paid out of any public treasury, except in pursuance of
an appropriation made by law; and third, petitioners gave Ernest Printing unwarranted advantage and
preference by failing to conduct a public bidding, thereby precluding other suppliers from submitting bids which
might be more beneficial fur the government, accepting an offer of a 20-year-old, second-hand printing
machine over an offer of a brand new one for a measly difference of P50,000.00, recommending the execution
of a lease-purchase contract which requires the government to immediately pay in full an equipment it was
supposed to be renting, and dispensing with the post-qualification requirements under the law, thus resulting
in undue injury to the government.
a. In an attempt to absolve themselves from criminal liability, petitioners insist that: (i) their resort to limited
source bidding cannot result in prejudice to the government as it was a permitted practice under Section
49 of RA 9184, and even assuming arguendo that the resort to such mode of procurement was improper,
the absence of a public bidding per se does not make them criminally liable absent a clear showing that
they indeed acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or inexcusable negligence; (ii) their use of the
bureau's MOOE account was in accordance with AO 103, which allows them to use savings to fund capital
programs, reliance on which is an indication of good faith; (iii) by accepting Ernest Printing's second-hand

printing machine in the amount of P850,000.00 over Union Service's offer in the amount of P900,000.00,
they did not give the former undue preference because the former was still indisputably lower than the
latter, and that there was no competent proof to establish that the unit offered by Union Service was
indeed brand new; (iv) their acquittal in this criminal case is justified, considering that in the counterpart
administrative case for Dishonesty and Grave Misconduct, the Office of the Ombudsman downgraded their
administrative liability to only Simple Neglect of Duty, finding that their failure to observe proper
procurement rules and procedure was not tainted with malice and/or bad faith; (v) their right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against them was violated when the SB discussed the
concept of "capital outlay," a term which does not appear in the Information; and (vi) the SB erred in
appreciating the existence of conspiracy, absent proof of the same. Petitioners' arguments are untenable.
As the SB accurately ratiocinated, the crime charged in the Information is not one for violation of budgetary,
auditing or accounting rules, per se, but rather, one for violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, the elements
of which have already been established in this case, as afore-discussed. Further, the SB also correctly
pointed out that petitioners' reliance on AO 103 is misplaced as it must be read in conjunction with existing
laws pertaining to government spending and auditing. As an executive issuance, Section 1 (f) of AO 103
merely authorizes the realignment of savings to fund capital programs of the government. It does not
authorize the use of government funds for capital acquisitions without corresponding appropriations, in
violation of the fundamental constitutional precept that "[n]o money shall be paid out of the Treasury
except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law." Here, as the SB observed, petitioners knew very
well from the start that the acquisition of the printing machine had no approved capital outlay;
nonetheless, they still persisted in proceeding with the illegal transaction.
b. Moreover, the SB correctly opined that the ruling in the counterpart administrative case holds no water in
the instant criminal case, as it is hornbook doctrine in administrative law that administrative cases are
independent from criminal actions for the same acts or omissions. Given the differences in the quantum
of evidence required, the procedures actually observed, the sanctions imposed, as well as the objective of
the two (2) proceedings, the findings and conclusions in one should not necessarily be binding on the other.
Hence, the exoneration in the administrative case is not a bar to a criminal prosecution for the same or
similar acts which were the subject of the administrative complaint or vice versa.
c. Finally, the SB did not err in declaring that there was no violation of petitioners' constitutional right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against them by the use of the term "capital outlay" in
its Decision without mentioning the same in the Information, as such right merely requires that an
Information only state the ultimate facts constituting the offense and not the finer details of why and how
the crime was committed. Similarly, the Court observes that the SB likewise did not err in concluding that
Section 106 of PD 1445 cannot be applied in favor of Josue and Villarosa as the notice required under the
law should be given "prior to that act." Here, petitioners had belatedly sent the notice of irregularity in the
transaction, i.e., ·after the bidding process had already begun. (Josue v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No.
29. The elements of R.A. 3019, Section 3(e) are present in this case. The petitioner is a public officer, being then
the Assistant Director of the Bureau of Equipment of DPWH, discharging administrative and official functions.
Petitioner and his co-accused acted with evident bad faith by falsifying official documents to defraud the DPWH
into paying the claims for fictitious emergency repairs or purchase of spare parts under the name of Julio
Martinez. The act of petitioner caused undue injury or damage to the government in the total amount of
P5,166,539.00. Petitioner acted with evident bad faith when he affixed his signature to the falsified documents
in order to induce the government to pay the claim for fictitious emergency repairs and purchases of spare
parts of certain vehicles. Bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence; it imputes a dishonest
purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong; a breach of sworn duty through some motive
or intent or ill will; it partakes of the nature of fraud. (Arias v. People of the Philippines, G.R. Nos. 237106-07,
30. After a judicious review of the case, the Court is convinced that the SB correctly convicted Ferrer of the crime
charged. The elements constituting a violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 have been sufficiently established
considering that: (a) Ferrer was indisputably a public officer at the time of the commission of the offense,
discharging his administrative and official functions as the IA Administrator; (b) he acted with gross inexcusable
negligence when he knowingly allowed OCDC to commence construction on the Intramuros Walls without the
required permits or clearances; and (c) by his actions, he gave unwarranted benefits to a private party, i.e.,
OCDC, to the detriment of the public insofar as the preservation and development plans for Intramuros are
concerned.
a. Insisting on his innocence, Ferrer argues that the allegations in the Information, i.e., "the construction of
new structures in said leased areas without any building permit or clearance x x x[,]" were not actually
proved during trial. He posits that what was involved was mere renovation, and the SB even conceded that
clearances were eventually issued. Ferrer's arguments are untenable. As the SB correctly pointed out, even
if a development clearance was belatedly granted to OCDC, the construction had already reached 75%
completion by then. As the IA Administrator, Ferrer is presumed aware of the requirements before any
construction work may be done on the Intramuros Walls. This is also palpably clear in the tenor of the lease
agreement which provides that the Lessor will "[a]ssist the Lessee in securing all required government

permits and clearances for the successful implementation of this agreement and to give its conformity to
such permits and clearances or permits whenever necessary." Despite knowing the requirements and
conditions precedent mandated by law, he knowingly allowed OCDC to proceed with construction without
such permits or clearances. This amounted to gross inexcusable negligence on his part. Gross negligence
has been defined as "negligence characterized by the want of even slight care, acting or· omitting to act in
a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but wilfully and intentionally with a conscious
indifference to consequences in so far as other persons may be affected. It is the omission of that care
which even inattentive and thoughtless men never fail to take on their own property. (Ferrer, Jr. v. People
of the Philippines, G.R. No. 240209, June 10, 2019, Second Division)
31. The only element of violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act under dispute here is whether
respondents caused undue injury, either to the government or to petitioner, when they hauled the lahar
deposits from petitioner's property. To constitute undue injury under Section 3(e), the injury must quantifiable
and demonstrable. This Court notes that there could have been some injury to petitioner since: (a) as a
landowner, he could have been granted a gratuitous permit to extract the lahar deposits under Section 50 of
the Philippine Mining Act; and (b) the law contemplates compensating a surface owner like petitioner for
damages done by mining right holders when conducting mining operations on the privately-owned land.
However, the possibility of injury to petitioner is not sufficient to find grave abuse of discretion on the part of
public respondent. Moreover, Section 50 of the Philippine Mining Act only provides that a landowner may be
granted a gratuitous permit, but does not provide for any priority to be accorded to a landowner. This Court
cannot assume that petitioner would have been granted a private gratuitous permit. By ignoring and bypassing
the laws on lahar extraction, respondents eliminated the possibility of petitioner applying for a gratuitous
permit. This injury to petitioner, however, is not quantifiable. There could have been quantifiable and
demonstrable injury to petitioner by reason of damage to the surface level of his property, but given the
evidence presented and arguments raised, it was not grave abuse of discretion on the part of public respondent
when it found otherwise.
a. Petitioner did not present evidence or significant arguments relating to the undue injury of the government
before public respondent. Similarly, his initial Complaint did not mention any mining laws, as it was
premised on his claimed ownership over the lahar. This theory ignored injury to the State. This Court
entertains the idea that some injury to the government may have existed—there may have been fees and
taxes for the quarrying of the lahar deposits, or the local government may have paid the full price of the
road development, despite the lahar deposits having been obtained without any fee. However, the
arguments and the paucity of evidence set forth here are insufficient to reverse the finding of public
respondent on this matter. While it may have been preferable for public respondent to further address or
investigate the possible injury to the government, its decision not to do so, given the arguments and
evidence presented, cannot be the basis of granting the Petition. (Batac v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R.
32. In the instant case, there was bad faith on the part of Sabio in entering into the subject lease agreements based
on the following: (a) for not undertaking the required procurement process; and (b) subjecting government
funds to unnecessary expenditure without pre-allocation and the necessity for the same. The lease agreements
between the PCGG and UCPB Leasing involving the eleven (11) vehicles in the years 2007-2009 were awarded
to the latter without conducting public bidding. This is a clear violation of R.A. No. 9184. Moreover, it was shown
that there was no allotment for the lease of the subject vehicles. Petitioner clearly disregarded the law meant
to protect public funds from irregular or unlawful utilization. In fact, petitioner admitted that the lease
agreements were not subjected to public bidding, because it is their position that the PCGG is exempted from
the procurement law and that they were merely following the practice of their predecessors. This is totally
unacceptable, considering that the PCGG is charged with the duty, among others, to institute corruption
preventive measures. As such, they should have been the first to follow the law. Sadly, however, they failed.
Moreover, at the time of the execution of the lease agreements, Sabio was a member of the Board of Directors
of the UCPB, the parent company of UCPB Leasing. This fact bolstered the presence of the fourth element, that
there was unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference given to UCPB Leasing. As correctly ruled by the
Sandiganbayan, Sabio's acts unmistakably reflect "a dishonest purpose or some moral obliquity and conscious
doing of a wrong; a breach of sworn duty through some motive or intent or ill will." (Sabio v. Sandiganbayan,
G.R. Nos. 233853-54, July 15, 2019, Third Division)
33. As to the violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, the Ombudsman explained how the said elements were met
in this case. First, Chipoco, Buganutan, Sabijon, Eslabon, and Villamil were public officers performing official
functions at the time of the negotiations and sale. Even if Antoque was just an observer during the proceedings
in the BAC, she failed to submit a report as legally required thereby assenting to the irregularities. Second, the
Ombudsman found that there was bad faith on the part of Chipoco, Sabijon, Antoque, Eslabon, and Villamil
when they specifically procured, in violation of Section 18 of R.A. No. 9184, the subject vehicle previously owned
by Balais and when they made it appear in the documents that a bidding was conducted even if there was none.
On the part of Buganutan, it was found that she allowed the disbursement and procurement notwithstanding
the obvious infirmity of the supporting documents. Last, it was clarified that there was unwarranted benefit
when petitioners recommended the award of the sale of the subject vehicle to Ayunting/Oro Cars even if the

latter did not submit its bid. As aptly put by the Ombudsman, "they gave it a benefit without justification."
(Chipoco v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 239416, July 24, 2019, Third Division)
34. As can be read from the Information, petitioners are charged of violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 under
the second punishable act which is giving unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference to a private party,
through manifest partiality, bad faith and gross inexcusable negligence. Indeed, the choice of DLI as the grantee
of the medicines, in the absence of public bidding, shows that petitioners gave unwarranted benefit, advantage
or preference in favor of DLI. In the instant case, there is no sufficient justification or adequate reasons why
DLI was favorably chosen. DLI was awarded the procurement contract without the benefit of a fair system in
determining the best possible price for the government. And the only way to ascertain the best possible price
advantageous to the government is through competitive public bidding. Indeed, public bidding is the accepted
method for arriving at a fair and reasonable price and it ensures that overpricing and favoritism, and other
anomalous practices are eliminated or minimized To circumvent this requirement outside the valid exceptions,
is evidence of bad faith. As held by this Court, the further discovery that the procurements were made by the
petitioners from DLI without them first ensuring that the local government would be acquiring the medicines
at the lowest possible price is sufficient to negate any presumption of good faith, especially since such failure
prima facie constitutes a contravention of the Local Government Code. It was established in this case and
admitted by petitioners, that DLI is a corporation whose stockholders, directors and officers are the relatives of
Librado. Petitioners' refusal to conduct public bidding and to award the contract to the winning bidder, smack
of favoritism and bias in favor of DLI. Indeed, nothing demonstrates manifest partiality more than the awarding
of procurement contract to second degree relatives, either by consanguinity or affinity, without the benefit of
competitive public bidding. By choosing DLI without public bidding, petitioners evidently give unwarranted
benefit, advantage or preference in favor of private persons, through manifest partiality.
a. Petitioners admit that they have dispensed with the requirement of public bidding. They justify non-
compliance with the bidding process by claiming that the purchases were emergency purchases as certified
to by the Head of the Municipal Health Office, and that the purchases were all directly from the
manufacturer or exclusive distributor of Philippine-manufactured drugs. They averred that DLI was
considered as such in the case of Casanova v Cabrera decided by Office of the Ombudsman for Luzon. The
Court agrees with the Sandiganbayan that these justifications are not sufficient to forego the conduct of
public bidding. Indeed, it is incumbent upon a party who invokes coverage under the exception, to a general
rule to prove fulfillment of the requisites thereof. In this case, petitioners fail to adduce evidence that their
purchases of the medicines fall under the exceptions. As ruled by the Sandiganbayan, certain legal
requirements as provided in the IRR of the LGC of 1991, must be observed in order for a
purchase/procurement of supplies to be categorized as (i) emergency purchase; and (ii) direct purchase
from duly licensed manufacturer. Article 437 of the IRR of the LGC of 1991. For failure to comply with the
procedure, petitioners' case does not qualify under the exceptions provided by law. Thus, petitioners
should have conducted a competitive public bidding on the procurement of the medicines for the
municipality in order to avoid suspicions of irregularity. Petitioners, as mayors, should have acted in a
circumspect manner to observe the law in order to promote transparency in the handling of government
funds. As things stand, there was no public bidding that was conducted. (Cabrera v. People of the
Philippines, G.R. Nos. 191611-14, July 29, 2019, Second Division)
35. It bears to stress that mere unauthorized travel does not automatically equate to violation of Section 3(e) of RA
No. 3019. There must be proof that the said unauthorized travel caused undue injury to the government or that
it amounts to giving unwarranted benefit or advantage to a private person or to oneself for that matter. The
act of petitioners in approving the disbursement vouchers without compliance with the disbursement
procedures (i.e., necessary supporting documents, written permission of the government authorizing their
travel) constitute bad faith and gross inexcusable negligence in observing the law, causing undue injury to the
Municipality of Taal. The Municipality of Taal was effectively deprived of the amounts of P27,651.83 and
P170,987.66 which petitioners Librado and Fe respectively reimbursed for themselves. Indeed, there is no
greater proof of undue injury to the government when public funds are used for an unjustified expense. All told,
the Court is convinced that the guilt of the petitioners were beyond reasonable doubt and that the
Sandiganbayan did not err in its findings and conclusion. The totality of the facts and circumstances
demonstrate that they committed the crime of violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 by causing undue injury
to the government and giving unwarranted benefits to DLI through manifest partiality; and to themselves
through evident bad faith and gross inexcusable negligence.
a. As established, at the time the disbursement voucher was approved by petitioners, there was yet no
sufficient basis that would justify the reimbursement of travel expenses. The validity, propriety and legality
of the claimed travel expense can be justified if the travel itself is with the written permission/approval of
the Governor as mandated by the LGC of 1991. At that moment when petitioners were claiming
reimbursements, the required permissions of the Governor for petitioners' travels to Manila were yet to
be obtained and despite that, petitioners still proceeded to approve the disbursement vouchers. This was
the reason why a special audit was conducted in December 1999, as the reimbursements made were
questionable Even the local accountant noted beside her signature as to the absence of the required travel
order. Evidently, there was circumvention of the rules and the procedure in claiming reimbursements.
Given that the travels made by petitioners were unauthorized at the time of reimbursements, then there

was no legal obligation on the part of the municipality to disburse the said claimed travel expenses to the
benefit of petitioners.
b. Petitioners raised the defense that the unauthorized travels were subsequently ratified. They claimed that
they were able to subsequently obtain the permission/approval of the Governor such that, the
unauthorized travels become authorized. True enough, the Governor issued a Certification to the effect
that he gave his subsequent approval to petitioners' previous travel. The Governor even confirmed, in no
uncertain terms, that he indeed gave his permission to petitioners for the travels which they made.
However, the subsequent approval given by the governor did not save the day for the petitioners. As the
anti-graft court observed, the permissions were not secured before the travels were made, not even right
after the travels. They were not also secured at the time the reimbursements of expenses were sought;
permissions were not secured even at the time accused approved the disbursement vouchers for the
claimed reimbursements. Subsequently, when a special audit was conducted in December 1999, these
reimbursements were put in question. It was only on 14 December 2000 that a purported
confirmation/consent was secured. At that point, the permission sought was already for the purpose of
avoiding the liability from the violation that was already consummated. The Court cannot fault the
Sandiganbayan for brushing aside the Governor's permissions which were not timely obtained. True, things
got complicated when petitioners sought reimbursements of the travel expenses which they advanced
from their personal funds. It is worthy to note that petitioners, as claimants seeking reimbursements, are
also the ones approving the disbursement vouchers, in their capacity as the Chief Executives of the
Municipality of Taal during their respective terms. This is the mandate of Article 454 (k) of the IRR of the
LGC of 1991, that approval of the disbursement vouchers shall be made by the local chief executive himself.
(Cabrera v. People of the Philippines, G.R. Nos. 191611-14, July 29, 2019, Second Division)
36. Petitioners cannot be held liable for violation of R.A. 3019, Section 3(e) for conducting a negotiated
procurement. It must be noted that, considering the existence of the extreme weather conditions then
prevailing in the country that even warranted the proclamation by the President of the state of national
calamity, and in view of the announcement by the DND and PAGASA of more of such cyclones to be expected,
it definitely behooved the Office of the Ombudsman to assiduously assess and appreciate the established
conditions in their proper light, instead of ignoring them. The resort to the negotiated procurement with Four
Petals was seemingly justified by such conditions, which swayed the petitioners in G.R. No. 225188 and G.R. No.
225277 as members of the MG BAC to consider the need for the PCCs to be urgent enough as to warrant the
resort to the negotiated purchase as an alternative to the regular bidding process that had already been
commenced. For sure, Section 53 of R.A. No. 9184 allows the conduct of negotiated procurement in times of
calamity that posed imminent danger to lives and property.
a. In addition, the records plainly show that Four Petals turned out to be the only supplier following the
disqualification of the other supposed supplier on the basis of its being an unregistered partnership; and
that the MG BAC considered Four Petals as a qualified supplier for purposes of the procurement based on
its submission of the several required documents for the qualification process. As earlier mentioned, the
documents included Four Petals' registration with the DTI; its verified information sheet dated January 26,
2009; the certification of its personnel; the location map of its office address; its business permits for the
years 2009 and 2010 issued by Parañaque City; its certificate of registration with the BIR; its BIR tax
clearances for 2008 and 2010; its certificate of registration dated August 12, 2009 issued by the
Procurement Service of the DBM; its license to engage in afloat ship repair dated April 4, 2007 issued by
the MARINA; and various certificates of good standing issued by the MG, PNP Traffic Management Group,
PNP Office of the Legal Service, and PNP Police Community Relations Group. Accordingly, the MG BAC was
the body legally tasked to vet such qualifications. The Office of the Ombudsman should not supplant the
determination of Four Petals' qualifications with its hindsight finding that Four Petals was "not a technically,
legally and financially capable supplier'' based only on the grounds that the address given was a residential
address, and that Four Petals had no company website; or that Four Petals was not a "supplier known for
coastal crafts or a company known for coastal craft-building;" or that Four Petals was "simply a trading
company;" or that the internet search revealed nothing about Four Petals except its involvement in the
"current controversy." For one, it was not shown that there were standing prior criteria requiring the
address of the potential supplier not to be residential, or for the potential supplier to maintain a company
website, or to have internet presence, or not to be a mere trading company, or to be "known for coastal
crafts or [to be] a company known for coastal craft-building."
b. It rather seems that the standards by which the Office of the Ombudsman sought to prosecute the
petitioners in G.R. No. 225188 and G.R. No. 225277 as members of the MG BAC for the violation of Section
3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 were open-ended and arbitrarily set post facto. The Office of the Ombudsman ignored
the extreme and destructive weather conditions that obtained at the time when the petitioners acted to
determine the qualifications of Four Petals as a supplier of the PCCs. The records also established that
during the period of the negotiations on the procurement the MG BAC found that Four Petals had been a
previous supplier, contractor or consultant in good standing, a status that boosted the qualifications of
Four Petals for the procurement of the PCCs.
c. Plainly enough, subjecting the petitioners in G.R. No. 225188 and G.R. No. 225277 to liability for not
applying the non-existent specifications was unfair. The failure to comply with the specification laid down
by the NAPOLCOM should not be a factor for determining the potential liability of the petitioners in G.R.

No. 225188 and G.R. No. 225277. To recall, the PNP NHQ BAC had delegated the procurement of the PCCs
to the MG to give the latter experience in procurement, put the delegation did not expressly require the
MG to await the specifications for the PCCs that were yet to be issued by the NAPOLCOM. At the start of
the procurement process, when the absence of specifications from the NAPOLCOM was noticed, a
representative of the NAPOLCOM assured the MG BAC that the existing specifications for motorized banca
as stated in NAPOLCOM Resolution No. 98-151 could still apply. Thus, the MG BAC applied the
specifications for motorized banca to the procurement of the 16 PCCs. As stated earlier, Director Sumanga
of the NAPOLCOM certified in his affidavit, among others, that NAPOLCOM Resolution No. 98-151 dated
June 2, 1998, as amended by NAPOLCOM Resolution No. 2005-64 dated February 2, 2005, had prescribed
the standard specifications for motorized banca as basis for the procurement during the public bidding. By
the time the NAPOLCOM adopted the new specifications on January 26, 2010 through Resolution No. 2010-
065, the MG BAC had already completed the negotiated procurement with Four Petals. It is relevant to
point out, moreover, that Resolution No. 2010-065 laid down the specifications for the use by the various
PNP units, not only for the use of the MG in procuring the 16 PCCs. (Duque v. Ombudsman, G.R. Nos.
224648 & 224806-07, August 28, 2019, Special Third Division)
37. The finding of probable cause by the Office of the Ombudsman to charge PSupt. Duque with the violation of
Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 based on the acceptance of the defective PCCs and the issuance of the reportorial
documents related thereto should be upheld. The Office of the Ombudsman's finding on the delivery of the
defective PCCs was upon evidence showing PSupt. Duque's signing of the report indicating that the PCCs had
been inspected and found to be in good order or condition. He thus had an active participation in the
acceptance of the PCCs. As it turned out, the PCCs were defective, a condition that he ought to have been aware
of if only he had taken due care. His claim that the report had been made in good faith because he had relied
on PO3 Dy for that purpose could not be accepted at this point. It was not disputed that his signing of the report
was in conjunction with the discharge of his official responsibility as the officer-in-charge of the Management
Division of the Office of the Directorate for Comptrollership, and such official capacity required him not to sign
the report unquestioningly. In short, he was expected to have become aware of the defective condition of the
PCCs if he had been alert and cautious as demanded by his position. His reliance on the regularity of his
subordinate's discharge of responsibility could not be favorably appreciated because patent irregularities
tainted the report itself. Surely, the Government thereby suffered injury because: Four Petals received
unwarranted benefits from the acceptance of its delivery of the PCCs despite their defects. (Duque v.
Ombudsman, G.R. Nos. 224648 & 224806-07, August 28, 2019, Special Third Division)
38. The Sandiganbayan, however, found that petitioner committed gross inexcusable negligence when he approved
Olympic Mines' SSMP PLW No. 37.1, considering that Olympic Mines violated the terms and conditions of SSMP
PLW No. 37. Petitioner, as the local chief executive, had the duty to act within the best interests of his
constituents and to safeguard the environment's natural resources. The dry metric ton threshold set by the law
ensures that small scale mining activities will not result in environmental damage. Petitioner's gross inexcusable
negligence, thus, caused undue injury to the Province of Palawan, as it exposed the province to various
environmental threats resulting from irresponsible mining. There was, thus, no error in the Sandiganbayan's
finding that petitioner was guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act. Under Section 9 of the law, the offense is punishable by "imprisonment for not less than
six years and one month nor more than fifteen years [and] perpetual disqualification from public office[.]" The
Sandiganbayan, therefore, did not err in imposing the indeterminate penalty of six (6) years and one (1) month
as minimum to eight (8) years as maximum with perpetual disqualification from public office.
a. Contrary to petitioner's contention, the "implied repeal" only became a controversy when Department of
Justice Opinion No. 74 was issued on November 30, 2006, or after the mining activities in this case had
occurred from May 2005 to April 2006. At the time the mining activities occurred, mining companies were
aware of the existence of the 50,000-dry metric ton threshold. Petitioner, as the local chief executive, is
presumed to have been aware of it as well. In this case, the Sandiganbayan found that from May 30, 2005
to April 3, 2006, Platinum Group transported a total of 203,399.135 dry metric tons of nickel ore under
Olympic Mines' SSMP PLW No. 37 and Platinum Group's SSMP PLW No. 39 This is clearly beyond the
100,000-dry metric ton threshold of the combined permits, a fact that petitioner does not dispute. His act
of renewing Olympic Mines' Small Scale Mining Permits, despite a blatant violation of the terms of the
permit, was correctly characterized as gross inexcusable negligence.
b. In an attempt to disclaim liability, petitioner argues that he merely relied on the recommendation of the
Provincial Mining Regulatory Board to renew Olympic Mines' permit. This argument, however, is
unmeritorious. Samson A. Negosa (Negosa), a member of the Provincial Mining Regulatory Board from
1993 to 2010, appeared on petitioner's behalf and testified that the role of PMRB is only recommendatory.
The PMRB's recommendation is not automatically approved by the Governor. The Governor issues the
SSMP on the basis of the PMRB's recommendation. The Governor has the prerogative to review the
recommendation of PMRB. Thus, while the Provincial Mining Regulatory Board is the technical body that
recommends the approval of applications for small scale mining permits, the provincial governor still has
the correlative duty to review its recommendation. The duty to approve was, therefore, discretionary on
petitioner, not ministerial. Negosa, petitioner's own witness, likewise testified that the Provincial Mining
Regulatory Board did not have jurisdiction over ore transport permits. Thus, when the Provincial Mining

Regulatory Board recommended the permit's renewal, it would have been unaware that Olympic Mines
had already exhausted its extraction limit. Negosa stated that he has no personal knowledge of the
contents, veracity and truthfulness of Ore Transport Permits (OTPs) issued before 2007 because the PMRJB
had no jurisdiction over OTPs prior to 2007.
c. In contrast, petitioner, as provincial governor, signs the ore transport permits of small scale miners.
Therefore, it can be presumed that unlike the Provincial Mining Regulatory Board, petitioner was aware of
the amounts of ore being transported by Olympic Mines. Had he taken the slightest care, he would have
taken the Provincial Mining Regulatory Board's recommendation together with the amounts in the Ore
Transport Permits and realized that he should not have renewed Olympic Mines' Small Scale Mining Permit
after all.
d. The controversy in SR Metals, by contrast, arose because a provincial governor questioned the over-
extraction of minerals by mining companies within his province. This Court recognized that irresponsible
mining activities posed an environmental threat. It must be emphasized that mining, whether small or
large-scale, raises environmental concerns. To allow such a scenario will further cause damage to the
environment such as erosion and sedimentation, landslides, deforestation, acid rock drainage, etc. As
correctly argued by the Solicitor General, extracting millions of DMTs of run-of-mine ore will mean
irreversible degradation of the natural resources and possible landslides and flashfloods. (Reyes v. People
of the Philippines, G.R. No. 237172, September 18, 2019, Third Division)
39. Petitioners’ acts were clearly committed with evident bad faith. The demolition of private complainants' houses
was precipitated by the refusal of Engr. Roño to issue a building permit for failure of the 93 families to secure a
development permit. The summary removal of private complainants' makeshift homes constructed in their
private property by the demolition team headed by Brgy. Chairman Simbulan and Capt. Evasco upon the
instruction of Mayor Cuerpo was made in blatant disregard of private complainants' right to due process and
was done without observance of the applicable laws on demolition. The summary demolition took place on
September 22, 2003, a few hours after private complainants moved into their property. It went on the following
day, September 23, 2003, when the demolition team confiscated the remaining construction materials leaving
only private complainants' personal belongings. On October 23, 2003, Mayor Cuerpo issued a Memorandum
addressed to Engr. Roño, Brgy. Chairman Simbulan and Capt. Evasco ordering them to undertake a second
demolition on October 24, 2003, but actually took place on October 28, 2003. Said demolition was also without
prior notice or court order and was aggravated by the confiscation by the demolition team of private
complainant's lumber, tarpaulin and some appliances. Clearly, their action contemplates ill will, which
constitutes evident bad faith and in blatant disregard of the state policy to uphold the constitutionally
guaranteed rights of private complainants as part of the disadvantaged sector of the society.
a. Records are bereft of information that any of the 93 families as members of the Samahan, including private
complainants, were identified by the Local Government Unit as squatter families, thus, they cannot be
considered professional squatters or members of a squatting syndicate. Neither can they be considered
new squatter families because the construction of makeshift homes was made on their own property. Also,
private complainants who were just evicted from their previous dwelling place for squatting may be
considered "underprivileged and homeless citizens" or individuals or families residing in urban and
urbanizable areas whose income or combined household income falls within the poverty threshold as
defined by the National Economic and Development Authority and who do not own housing facilities. This
shall include those who live in makeshift dwelling units and do not enjoy security of tenure. With no other
place to go, private complainants were forced to transfer to the lot they were able to purchase using the
settlement money for voluntarily vacating the property where they used to live. Unfortunately, on the day
of their transfer, the temporary shelters they constructed which were made of lumber and tarpaulin were
summarily demolished for their failure to present a building and development permit.
b. Granting that private complainants' shanties were constructed without the necessary building or
development permits, this fact does not automatically necessitate the summary demolition. "[P]roperty
rights are involved, thereby needing notices and opportunity to be heard as provided for in the
constitutionally guaranteed right of due process."[44] Without compliance with the laws allowing for
eviction and demolition, petitioners were not justified in employing procedural sidesteps in displacing
private complainants from their property by a mere Memorandum ordering for summary demolition issued
by Mayor Cuerpo. Petitioners should have undergone the appropriate proceeding as set out in the law.
(Cuerpo v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 203382, September 18, 2019, Third Division)
40. The undue injury caused to the private complainant is evident from the testimonies of the witnesses that the
demolition team confiscated some of the private complainants' construction materials, appliances, and
personal belongings. As testified to, the private complainants' sustained undue injury as a result of the summary
demolition and confiscation in the following quantifiable amounts: Nanay - P101,600.00; Barsubia -
P100,000.00; Ramirez - P30,000.00; Oxina -P120,000.00; and Ebio - P45,000.00. These were not controverted
by the petitioners. Moreover, proof of the extent of damage is not essential, it being sufficient that the injury
suffered or the benefit received is perceived to be substantial enough and not merely negligible. (Cuerpo v.

41. None of the elements of manifest partiality, evident bad faith, and/or gross inexcusable negligence is present
in the case of petitioners Cruz and Carpio. Apart from sweeping conclusions, the prosecution failed to present
evidence of evident bad faith, manifest partiality and gross inexcusable negligence on the part of Cruz and
Carpio. There is also no showing that they actively participated in granting Halili unwarranted benefits. The only
evidence of the prosecution against petitioners is their presence at the demolition site and the municipal hall
to accompany Mayor Dela Cruz. Prosecution witness, Sherriff Pagulayan, identified Cruz and Carpio, as part of
the group, together with the policemen, who accompanied Mayor Dela Cruz at the demolition site, showed him
a sketch/plan and a piece of paper, and explained to him that the building sought to demolished is not included
in the property ordered by the court. Sheriff Pagulayan further narrated that he was allegedly forced by the
group to ride the police car to proceed to the municipal hall, where they went to see Judge Ortiguerra to report
the incident.
a. As the Court sees it, these do not qualify as overt acts made in pursuance or in furtherance of the
conspiracy. It must be stressed that the community of design to commit an offense must be a conscious
one. Conspiracy transcends companionship. Mere knowledge of, or acquiescence in, or agreement to
cooperate, by themselves, are not enough to implicate a party in a conspiracy to commit a crime. It is
necessary that the overt act should have been the ultimate step towards the consummation of the design.
It must have an immediate and necessary relation to the offense.
b. Petitioners Cruz's and Carpio's assistance to Mayor Dela Cruz, in the ordinary course of things, could not
have prevented the implementation of the subject writs; and thus, cannot be said to have an immediate
and necessary relation to the supposed grant of unwarranted benefits to Halili. The Sandiganbayan
overlooked Sheriff Pagulayan's assertion that he would not stop the implementation of the demolition
without a court order; as well as the Order[ dated March 5, 1993 issued by Judge Ortiguerra, holding in
abeyance the demolition "to help the Court and the sheriff to pinpoint the exact location of the land subject
matter of the case and in order to ascertain the exact structures to be demolished." Said Order explained
the real reason why Sheriff Pagulayan decided not to proceed with the enforcement of the Writ of
Demolition.
c. All told, the evidence of the prosecution does not meet the test of moral certainty in order to establish
petitioners Cruz's and Carpio's participation in a conspiracy. The prosecution failed to prove by evidence
beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of petitioners Cruz and Carpio for violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019,
as amended. (Cruz v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 197142, October 9, 2019, Second Division)
42. To convict for the violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019, the State must allege in the information and establish
beyond reasonable doubt during the trial that the accused acted in the discharge of his official, administrative,
or judicial functions through manifest partiality or evident bad faith, or with gross inexcusable negligence in
order to cause undue injury to any party, including the Government, or to give any private party any
unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference. The mere allegation of such modes, not being evidence, is not
competent as proof of guilt. (Rivera v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 228154, October 16, 2019, First
Division)
43. The accused must be acquitted from the charge of violation of R.A. 3019, Section 3(e). To start with, no specific
showing was made to the effect that R. Magaway had obtained advance information or had been given any
definite information on the proposed procurement; or that, if such was the case, the petitioners had assisted
in his obtention of such advance information. Thereby, the Sandiganbayann apparently indulged in plain
conjecture. Secondly, the Court’s impression after review indicates that the non-publication of the IAEB in a
newspaper of general circulation was the outcome of the confusion in the minds of the petitioners as members
of the PSC-BAC about the necessity for publication in respect of the particular procurement. It is not contested
that Rivera had twice inquired from Noel Salumbides of the BAC Secretariat if the IAEB still had to be published
in a newspaper of general circulation given the ABC of less than P5,000,000.00, and the latter had answered in
the negative each time with the explanation that one of his subordinates had learned during a seminar about
the new guideline of the Government Procurement Policy Board (GPPB) that effectively dispensed with the
requirement for publication in a newspaper of general circulation for a procurement with an ABC of less than
P5,000,000.00. The fact that Rivera directly inquired from the BAC Secretariat on the requirement to publish in
a newspaper of general circulation surely indicated the sincere intention to satisfy the requirement for
publication. In other words, the non-publication did not at all result from the petitioners' evident bad faith or
gross inexcusable negligence towards Elixir, or from their gross inexcusable negligence as members of the PSC-
BAC. In all likelihood, the non-publication might have been engendered also by the petitioners already regarding
the actual publication of the IAEB in the PhilGEPS, and its posting in the PSC's website itself as well as in
conspicuous places like the PSC-BAC's bulletin board as sufficient compliance with the requirement for the
publication. As we see it, the actual posting of the IAEB in the PhilGEPS and in the PSC-BAC's bulletin board was
entirely consistent with the legal requirement for making the procurement as public as possible, instead of
being concealed. Even if hindsight wisdom may enlighten us now that the petitioners did not faithfully discharge
their responsibility as PSC-BAC members, it is not fair or reasonable to judge them as grossly negligent or having
acted with evident bad faith under the circumstances obtaining at the time of the procurement. Thirdly, that
only Elixir submitted its bid in the end would not warrant the conclusion that Elixir had obtained or been given
advance notice of the procurement. It is not at all amiss to point out that the records tended to indicate that
eight suppliers had attended the pre-bid conference, a detail that revealed some degree of public awareness

of the forthcoming procurement for the cycling equipment. Such other suppliers, had they been interested and
qualified, could have submitted bids of their own. Fourthly, the procurement process was subjected to an audit
by the Commission on Audit (COA). Based on its report dated March 11, 2008, the COA audit team found no
irregularity in the procurement, and certified that the procurement had complied with relevant laws and rules.
The regularity and validity of the procurement process thereby became indisputable. The Sandiganbayan should
not have accepted and bowed to the audit findings considering that the COA was the constitutionally-mandated
audit arm of the Government vested with broad powers over all accounts pertaining to public revenue and
expenditures and the uses of public funds and property. And, lastly, the observations by Sandiganbayan that
the PSC-BAC members had exhibited manifest partiality in favor of Elixir during the post-qualification
proceedings by declaring Elixir as a qualified bidder despite being organized as a partnership only on November
20, 2006 for being in contravention of the requirement for bidders to have been in existence and doing business
for at least three years were unwarranted. As mentioned, the COA report considered the procurement regular
and valid. As such, the declaration of Elixir as a qualified bidder in the post-qualification proceedings despite
the supposed defects, standing alone, could not be competent evidence of manifest partiality. Moreover, it
would appear from the records that Elixir had been actually converted into the partnership of the Magaways
from its earlier status as the sole proprietorship of one of them, and the sole proprietorship had dealt with the
PSC as a supplier for more than the required period. To be underscored is that the mere allegation that the
petitioners as PSC-BAC members had accorded preferential treatment in favor of Elixir would not suffice to
prove guilt for violation of Section 3(e). To hold otherwise is to let suppositions based on mere presumptions,
not established facts, constitute proof of guilt. That holding is constitutionally impermissible, for suppositions
would not amount to proof beyond reasonable doubt by virtue of their nature as conjectural and speculative.
They do not overcome the strong presumption of innocence in favor of the petitioners as the accused. (Rivera
v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 228154, October 16, 2019, First Division)
44. Atty. Querrer was not shown to have engaged in any conspiracy to give unwarranted benefit to Judge Alzate’s
wife. The fact alone that she was the clerk of court assigned to the sala of Judge Alzate does not make her a co-
conspirator of Judge Alzate on matters pending before the latter. Besides, there is no evidence whatsoever
showing that Judge Alzate exerted influence or instructed Atty. Querrer in any way for the purpose of ensuring
a favorable acion on the application of his wife. Too, the fact that Atty. Querrer may have received all the
documents submitted by Judge Alzate’s wife to the court in connection with her application for notarial
commission, is harly a suspicious, nay irregular action. It was, in fact, done in the performance of Atty. Querrer’s
duty as clerk of court of the branch presided by Judge Alzate. (Sindon v. Judge Alzate, A.M. No. RTJ-20-2576,
45. The second and third elements of R.A. 3019, Section 3(e) are absent.
a. The acts of the petitioner do not manifest partiality. First, the contents of BAC Resolution No. 09-G-06
already contained a list of selected dealers. Petitioner himself did not have any participation in the
procurement proceedings nor in the actual selection of said dealers. His participation was limited to the
approval of the recommendation of the PLM BAC. In Sistoza v. Desierto, the Court discussed at length how
misguided it would be to ascribe fraudulent and corrupt intent, solely on the basis of a signature on a
purchase order. It categorically rejected the contention that the mere act of affixing one’s signature, even
if coupled with repeated endorsement of the award to the bidder who did not offer the lowest price is a
clear sign of evident bad faith. Morover, as held in Sistoza, simply alleging each or all of these methods is
not enough to establish probable cause, for it is well settled that allegation does not amount to proof. Nor
can the Court deduce any or all of the modes from mere speculation or hypothesis since good faith on the
part of petitioner as with any other person is presumed. The facts themselves must demonstrate evident
bad faith, which connotes not only bad judgment but also palpably and patently fraudulent and dishonest
purpose to do moral obliquity or conscious wrongdoing for some perverse motive or ill will. Thus, despite
petitioner’s signature on the BAC Resolution and the Purchase Order, the Court cannot automatically infer
malice or fraudulent intent on the former’s part. As to the alleged gross inexcusable negligence, it is
important to point out that it was PLM who purchased the Starex van according to the price and technical
specifications set by the PLM BAC. The money which was allotted for its purchase was used according to
its purpose. It is undisputed that petitioner did not partake in the discussion of the procurement of the
requested vehicle.
b. As for the third element, assuming arguendo that petitioner was negligent by relying on the acts of the
PLM BAC, which had the expertise over procurement processes, any omissions committed by the petitioner
along the way were due only to either mere inadvertence, or simple over-eagerness to proceed with the
purchase of the vehicle, or placing too much confidence in the declarations of his subordinates. His
omission would result, at worst, only to gross negligence, which is want or absence of reasonable care and
skill. (Roy III v. Honorable Ombudsman, G.R. No. 225718, March 4, 2020, Second Division)
46. The elements of R.A. 3019, Section 3(e) are present. First, accused-appellant was a public officer acting in her
official capacity as City Government Department Head II of the Pasig CENRO. Second, accused-appellant acted
with manifest partiality and evident bad faith in the procurement of Enviserve’s consultancy services, having
accepted the latter’s proporsal to organize and conduct the Environmental Congress notwithstanding (a) the
absence of a competitive bidding, (b) her knowledge that Enviserve was operating as a corporate entity without

proper SEC registration, and (c) her close ties to Enviserve – being listed as the contact person in the latter’s
corporate cover sheet, and the one who ordered the registration of its articles of incorporation, as well as her
sister being one of is incorporator. Finally, accused-appellant’s act of procuring Enviserve’s services without the
requisite competitive bidding pursuant to R.A. 9184 gave the latter unwarranted benefits, advantage, and
preference, especially considering that the latter was able to derive income through the collection of
registration fees from business establishments in Pasig City.
a. The requirement of competitive bidding applies in the transaction in question. Accused-appellant’s
acceptance of Enviserve’s proposal, on behalf of the Pasig City Government, to organize and conduct the
Environmental Congress, as well as to provide technical experts and resource persons for such purpose,
amounted to a “procurement” of “consulting services” as respectively defined under paragraphs (i) and
(aa), Section 5 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. 9184. Particularly, the primary purpose
of the agreement, which was for Enviserve to train and equip Pasig CENRO personnel and business
establishments operating in the city with specialized knowledge on topics related to environmental
protection, falls within the definition of “design and execution of training programs,” one of the recognized
kinds of consulting services, as provided under Item 6, Annex “B” of the aforementioned IRR. Notably, the
Court observes that the Environmental Congress was organized and conducted under the authority of the
Pasig City Government, given for the benefit of Pasig CENRO personnel and business establishments
operating in the city. The proposal to conduct the same was addressed to the Pasig CENRO, and was
accepted by accused-appellant in her official capacity as head of the aforementioned office. Such finding
is further bolstered by accused-appellant’s directive to enjoin attendance in the event as a mandatory
requirement for businesses to successfully obtain an Environmental Permit to Operate from her office.
Hence, as a procurement of consulting services made for the benefit of the Pasig City Government as a
procuring entity, the transaction in question fell within the scope of R.A. 9184, and absent the applicability
of any of the recognized exceptions to such rule, as in this case, the same should have been the subject of
a competitive bidding. (People of the Philippines v. Naciongayo, G.R. No. 243897, June 8, 2020, Second
Division)
47. R.A. 9184 and R.A. 3019 are distinct laws with distinct requisites for violation. A violation of one does not ipso
facto result in the violation of the other. Hence, even granting that there may be violations of the applicable
procurement laws, the same does not mean that the elements of violation of R.A. 3019, Section 3(e) are already
present as a matter of course. For there to be a violation under R.A. 3019, Section 3(e) based on a breach of
applicable procurement laws, one cannot solely rely on the mere fact that a violation of procurement laws has
been committed. It must be shown that (a) the violation of procurement laws caused undue injury to any party
or gave any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference; and (b) the accused acted with
evident bad faith, manifest partiality, or gross inexcusable negligence.
a. The Ombudsman, in its March 20, 2017 Resolution, failed to sufficiently show that, more likely than not,
petitioner in his capacity as BAC member, acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross
inexcusable negligence in recommending the award of the procurement contract to RDAK. The
Ombudsman solely relied on the numerous irregularities that attended the procurement of the hydraulic
excavator without carefully examining the sufficiency of the allegations and evidence presented vis-à-vis
the elements of violation of R.A. 3019, Section 3(e).Lozada anchored his charge against petitioner on the
fact that he was a BAC member during the procurement process. But there was no clear showing how
petitioner and other BAC members exhibited manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or inexcusable
negligence when the contract was awarded to RDAK. It may even be well to point out that petitioner’s only
participation in the procurement was to sign the abstract of bids which generally contains a summary of
information on the procurement at hand, to wit: (i) the name of the contract and its location; (ii) the time,
date, and place of bid opening; and (iii) the names of bidders and their corresponding calculated bid prices
arranged from lowest to highest, the amount of bid security and the name of the issuing entity. As aptly
posited by petitioner, when he signed the abstract of bids, he merely attested to the truthfulness of the
names of the bidders and their bid prices. Petitioner did not even affix his signature on the resolution
declaring the lowest calculated bidder. Indubitably, the essential ingredients of manifest partiality, evident
bad faith, or inexcusable negligence are wanting in this case. (Sabaldan, Jr. v. Office of the Ombudsman for
Mindanao, G.R. No. 238014, June 15, 2020, First Division)
48. There is no sufficient evidence to prove that the municipal mayor is guilty of evident bad faith. The prosecution
was unable to present sufficient evidence to prove that in issuing the questioned extraction permits, petitioner
was moved by a clear, notorious, or plain inclination or predilection to favor one side or person rather than
another or of palpably and patently fraudulent and dishonest purpose operating with furtive design to do moral
obliquity or conscious wrongdoing.
a. First, since he was not furnished copies of the cease-and-desist orders nor was he previously notified of
their issuance, petitioner was the one who took initiative in clarifying the validity of the said CDOs by writing
a letter to Soledad and informing him of his position on the issue and the legal bases for such position.
b. Second, from the tenor of his letter to Soledad and the Sangguniang Panlalalwigan of Occidental Mindoro,
petitioner was very emphatic in his belief and reasoning, albeit mistakenly, that, under the LGC, he wields
authority as Municipal Mayor, to issue the questioned permits. In fact, he even raised a legitimate question
on the validity of the Provincial Tax Ordinance of Occidental Mindoro which governs, among others, the

issuance of permits to extract and dispose of resources of the province. In other words, his claim and
argument are not without any legal basis. However, he was mistaken in his reliance on the provisions of
the LGC as to his authority to issue the subject extraction permits. Such mistake, nonetheless, is not
tantamount to evident bad faith, manifest partiality or gross inexcusable negligence as contemplated under
the law as to make him liable under R.A. 3019, Section 3(e).
c. Third, there is no showing that petitioner personally gained anything by his issuance of the questioned
extraction permits. In fact, it was not disputed that all the pertinent taxes and fees in the issuance of the
said permits were collected and the respective shares of the Provincial Government and the barangay were
properly remitted and appropriated by them.
d. Fourth, there could have been no furtive design to issue the questioned permits because it is likewise
undisputed that the application, the processing and the approval of the said permits went through the
regular process. The applications were filed with the MENRO, which were then forwarded to the Municipal
Administrator who, then, recommended its approval to the Mayor. Upon approval by the Mayor, the
applicant paid the extraction fee to the Municipal Treasurer who issued Official Receipts. There was no
evidence to show that there were favored applicants whose permits were surreptitiously issued for any
ulterior motive or purpose. (Villarosa v. People of the Philippines, G.R. Nos. 233155-63, June 23, 2020, En
Banc)
49. Petitioner’s issuance of the questioned permits proceeds from his belief, erroneous as it is, that he is authorized
under Section 444(b)(3)(iv) of the Local Government Code to issue the same. A cursory reading of this provision
would readily show that there is, in fact, basis to conclude the respondent, as municipal mayor, has authority
to issue permits and licenses, although such power is not applicable in the present case. Hence, it would be
inaccurate to say that petitioner’s act of granting permits has no basis, whatsover, in law as to make petitioner
guilty of evident bad faith. Moreover, petitioner’s supposed brash act of granting permits without legal basis
could not have given rise to a presumption of bad faith. There is no such thing as presumpion of bad faith in
cases involving violations of R.A. 3019. On the contrary, as in all cases, the law presumes the accused innocent
until proven guilty. (Villarosa v. People of the Philippines, G.R. Nos. 233155-63, June 23, 2020, En Banc)
50. There is no sufficient evidence to prove that the persons in whose favor herein petitioner-municipal mayor
issued the subject extraction permits received unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference. At the time of
issuing the subject permits, petitioner was justified by his honest belief that he is authorized by law to issue the
said permits. Moreover, there is no dispute that the recipients of the permits went through the regular process
in applying for the said permits and that they paid the taxes and fees imposed by the Municipal Government of
San Jose. Neither was there any showing that they were given preference over other applicants. To stress, for
one to be guilty under the second mode (i.e., giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference in the discharge by the accused of his official, administrative, or judicial functions), it suffices that
the accused has given unjustified favor or benefit to another in the exercise of his official, administrative, or
judicial functions. The word “unwarranted” means lacking adequate or official support; unjustified;
unauthorized or without justification or adequate reason. “Advantage” means a more favorable or improved
condition; benefit, profit or gain of any kind; benefit from some course of action. “Preference” signifies priority
or higher evaluation or desirability; choice or estimation above another. (Villarosa v. People of the Philippines,
G.R. Nos. 233155-63, June 23, 2020, En Banc)
a. Under current jurisprudence, in order to be guilty for giving any unwarranted benefit, advantage, or
preference, it is enough that the public officer has given an unauthorized or unjustified favor or benefit to
another, in the exercise of his official, administrative, or judicial functions. By giving any private party
unwarranted benefit, advantage, or preference, damage is not required. It suffices that the public officer
has given unjustified favor or benefit to another in the exercise of his official functions. Proof of the extent
or quantum of damage is not even essential, it being sufficient that the injury suffered or benefit received
could be perceived to be substantial enough and not merely negligible. However, the foregoing
understanding of “unwarranted benefit, advantage, or preference” is too broad that every single misstep
committed by public officers that result in benefits to private parties falls under the definition and would
thus possibly be criminally punishable. Every little error – no matter how minor – would satisfy the element
as the threshold is simply that the benefit be “unjustified,” “unauthorized,” or “without justification.” For
instance, a contract awarded in good faith based on an interpretation of the law that would later on be
judicially declared incorrect would be sufficient basis for affirming the existence of this element, which may
lead to the incarceration of a public officer simply because a private party received a benefit “without
justification,” yet was revealed to be so only in hindsight. It is simply absurd to criminally punish every
minute mistake that incidentally caused a benefit to private parties even when these acts were not done
with corrupt intent. In other words, the element of unwarranted benefit is inextricably linked wih the
malefactor’s purposeful and deliberate intent to give preference or benefit to another. Applying the
foregoing to the instant case, Villarosa’s act of issuing the extraction permits was, to reiterate, not
motivated by the desire to favor one operator over another or to unduly receive any pecuniary benefit.
Villarosa’s acts were simply driven by his honest, yet incorrect, belief that he had the ample authority to
issue the permits. (Concurring Opinion of Justice Caguioa in Villarosa v. People of the Philippines, G.R. Nos.
233155-63, June 23, 2020, En Banc)

51. Petitioner cannot be convicted on the basis of gross inexcusable negligence since it was not alleged in the
Information. While all three modalities may be alleged simultaneously in a single information for violation of
R.A. 3019, Section 3(e), an allegation of only one modality without mention of the others necessarily means the
exclusion of those not mentioned. This is because each modality of violating R.A. 3019, Section 3(e) is actually
distinct from the others. Thus, an accusation for a violation of R.A. 3019, Section 3(e) committed through
evident bad faith only, cannot be considered as synonymous to, or includes an accusation of violation of R.A.
3019, Section 3(e) committed through gross inexcusable negligence. (Villarosa v. People of the Philippines, G.R.
Nos. 233155-63, June 23, 2020, En Banc)
52. A violation of a law that is not penal in nature does not, as it cannot, automatically translate into a violation of
R.A. 3019, Section 3(e). (Concurring Opinion of Justice Caguioa in Villarosa v. People of the Philippines, G.R. Nos.
233155-63, June 23, 2020, En Banc)
53. Coloma was properly convicted of the crime of violation of R.A. 3019, Section 3(e). There is no question that at
the time the offense was committed, Coloma was a public officer discharging his function as the Deputy Director
of the PNPA and, incidentally, as Special Assistant to the PPSC President on Real Property Acquisition Projects.
Moreover, Coloma gave unwarranted benefit, advantage, or preference to Engr. Lim of ACLC and his wife, Mrs.
Lim. As correctly found by the Sandiganbayan, no explanation was given as to how Engr. Lim and/or ACLC
entered ino the picture and was chosen as the contractor for the RTS-9 project. After the public bidding was
declared a failure, ACLC was unilaterally chosen. The following circumstances clearly show Coloma’s
participation or involvement thereat: (a) Tabrilla testified that it was Coloma who communicated with ACLC to
provide labor and materials for the RTS-9 project; and (b) during the investigation, Engr. Lim admitted that he
and Coloma were close friends. Then, Coloma just conveniently suggested purchasing a 10,000-square meter-
property purportedly owned by the Spouses Lim as the site for the construction of the RTS-9 project, which
likewise partakes of undue injury or damage caused to the government. Coloma reported that Mrs. Lim was
willing o donate the said land to PPSC. However, this is belied by Mrs. Lim herself in her Sinumpaang Salaysay
dated December 17, 2002 stating that she received P1.5 million from PPSC for the property. Further, the
Sandiganbayan aptly observed that Coloma’s After-Mission Report dated October 10, 2001 stated that a total
of P5,727,278.59 was released to the contractors and out of such disbursement, certain expenses were
incurred. What’s more, as it turned out, the purchase amount of P1.5 million was grossly overpriced considering
that, at the time, the market value of the property per hectare was only P9,730.00 as per a provincial ordinance
passed by the local government of Tawi-Tawi in 2001. Finally, as to the element of manifest partiality and
evident bad faith, the Sandiganbayan properly found Coloma to have acted with both manifest partiality and
evident bad faith. Coloma acted with manifest partiality in favoring Engr. Lim and/or ACLC, choosing it to be the
contractor of the RTS-9 project, negotiating for the purchase of the property of Engr. Lim’s wife instead of
choosing other properties made available to PPSC for free, and using PPSC funds to pay for Lim’s property,
instead of utilizing all of it for the construction of the training facilities. Bad faith was likewise manifestly shown
by Coloma when he orchestrated the immediate transfer of the funds to the bank accounts of the contractors,
to prevent these funds from revering back to the national treasury. This was done without a single disbursement
voucher being approved or any supporting document being submitted. Coloma likewise accorded himself
control over the funds by making himself co-signatory to the checking account over these funds, and disbursing
the said funds to the contractors. From the onset, there was evident intent to deceive the government. After
the funds were removed from the control of PPSC, Coloma continued to perpetrate his conscious doing of a
wrong by subsequently reporting that the project was completed, when in fact, it was not. In accounting for the
funds, he made it appear that the money paid for the land was part of the cost of materials purchased for the
construction of the training buildings, since there is nothing in the budget providing for an acquisition of land.
(Coloma v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 233152, July 13, 2020, First Division)
54. Appellant did not act with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, and/or gross inexcusable negligence when he
received P17,512.50 from the PhilHealth Capitation Fund as honorarium despite his alleged non-entitlement
thereto. Section v(G) of PhilHealth Circular No. 010, s. 2012 provides that five percent (5%) of the total
PhilHealth honoraria was allocated to the non-health professionals or staff of the PCB Provider. As to who these
non-health professionals mentioned, they were not specifically identified. The rule does not expressly indicate
whether they need be part of the official roll of employees of the Municipal Health Office. Non-health
professionals include the rank and file employees or administrative staff of the Municipal Health Office who are
not among the front liners providing access to health care. It also covers volunteers and community members
of health teams. This led appellant to honestly believe, albeit mistakenly, that the office of the municipal mayor
which exercises control and supervision over the Municipal Health Office and its personnel may likewise be
covered by the term “non-health professional.” Consequently, he acted in good faith when he received the
P17,512.50 honorarium, anchored as it was on the honest belief that he was legally entitled to the benefit. At
any rate, bad faith per se is not enough for one to be held criminally liable for violation of R.A. 3019, Section
3(e); bad faith must be evident. It must partake the nature of fraud. It contemplates a state of mind affirmatively
operating with furtive design or some motive or ill will for ulterior purposes. In short, it is a manifest deliberate
intent on the part of the accused to do wrong or to cause damage unlike here. In Ysidoro v. Leonardo-De Castro,
the Court decreed that an erroneous interpretation of a provision of law, absent any showing of some dishonest
or wrongful purpose, does not constitute and does not necessarily amount to bad faith.

a. Neither could appellant’s receipt of the honorarium amount to manifest partiality. There is manifest
partiality when there is a clear, notorious or plain inclination or predilection to favor one side or person
rather than another. Appellant could not have been predisposed to favor himself when his basis for his
receipt of the honorarium was his honest belief of his entitlement thereto.
b. Lastly, appellant did not act with gross inexcusable negligence. Gross inexcusable negligence refers to
negligence characterized by the want of even the slightest care, acting or omitting to act in a situation
where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally, with conscious indifference
to consequence insofar as other persons may be affected. Here, gross inexcusable negligence cannot be
imputed on appellant for his erroneous interpretation of the provision of law. He did not carve out from
empty space his supposed entitlement thereto because he had legal basis, albeit, it was a mistaken
interpretation of Section V(G) of PhilHealth Circular No. 010 s. 2012. (People of the Philippines v. Bacaltos,
55. There was lack of probable cause to charge petitioners with the violation of R.A. 3019, Section 3(e) since the
ERC did not act with evident bad faith or manifest partiality. A perusal of Resolution No. 1-2016, would readily
show that the ERC temporarily deferred the implementation of the CSP in order to ensure that there were
suitable guidelines for its execution in light of the concerns raised by the power industry’s various stakeholders.
Among these stakeholders are: (a) SMC Global Power which requested, through a Letter dated November 25,
2015, that they be allowed to file their PSCs because the requirements imposed pursuant to the CSP
Implementations were non-existent when their PSCs were evaluated and signed; (b) Philippine Rural Electric
Cooperative Association, Inc., which requested for exemption from coverage of Department Circular No.
DC2015-06-0008, via a Letter dated December 1, 2015; (c) Agusan del Norte Electric Cooperative, Inc., which
requested, per Letter dated December 10, 2015, confirmation that any extension of PSAs or Energy Supply
Agreements previously approved is outside the scope of ERC Resolution No. 13-2015; (d) Astronergy
Development, which requested, through a Letter dated December 15, 2015, a meeting to discuss their situation
following the issuance of Resolution No. 13-2015; (e) Camarines Sur IV Electric Cooperative, Inc. and Unified
Leyte Geothermal Energy, Inc., which requested for an extension to file their joint application for the approval
of a PSA in their Letter dated December 21, 2015; and (f) Aklan Electric Cooperative, Inc. which sent a letter
dated March 9, 2016 inquiring about the CSP requirement. The presence of these other stakeholders with their
respective concerns, weaken the reasoning that petitioners acted with manifest partiality or evident bad faith.
Indeed, Resolution No. 1-2106 was available to all industrial players and electric cooperatives alike not just to
MERALCO. A reading of Resolution No. 1-2016 would also show that not only did it extend the transition period,
it also addressed pressing concerns affecting the impact of the CSP upon the power industry and resolved other
matters that involved the other stakeholders, abovementioned. The issuance of the subject resolution was in
the exercise of the ERC’s sound judgment as a regulator and pursuant to its mandate under the EPIRA to protect
the public interest as it is affected by the rates and services of electric utilities and other providers of electric
power. Thus, it cannot be classified as arbitrary, whimsical, or capricious. The transition period, together with
the clarifications provided in Resolution No. 1-2016, constitute a reasonable response to the various concerns
posed by DUs, GenCos, and electric cooperatives. The Court further notes that in G.R. No. 227670, the Court,
through the ponencia of Justice Carpio, declared that the issuance of Resolution No. 1-2016 was attended with
grave abuse of discretion. It should be stressed however that said case centered on the constitutionality of
Resolution No. 1-2016. Even though wrongful, the error of the concerned Commissioners in issuing Resolution
no. 1-2016 should not be automatically deemed as criminal. (Non v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 239168,
a. Absent any other circumstance showing that some illicit interest was involved in the issuance of Resolution
No. 1, series of 2016, the concerns of the various stakeholders of the power industry evince the good faith
of petitioners and in turn, negate the existence of probable cause anent the element of manifest partiality
or evident bad faith on their part. Neither can it be said that the said resolution was issued with gross
inexcusable negligence since, as may be seen from the varied opinions in G.R. No. 227670, captioned as
Alyansa Para sa Bagong Pilipinas, Inc. v. ERC, the matter regarding the propriety of extending the CSP
requirement did not involve simple questions of law; hence, their eventual mistake in extending the CSP
may be said to have been done in good faith. Jurisprudence states that a mistake upon a doubtful or difficult
question of law may properly be the basis of good faith, as in petitioners’ mistaken extension of the CSP
requirement, especially when considered with the fact that they were only prompted to suspend the
implementation of the CSP in light of the pressing and legitimate queries coming the various stakeholders
in the power industry. (Concurring Opinion of Justice Perlas-Bernabe in Non v. Office of the Ombudsman,
G.R. No. 239168, September 15, 2020, En Banc)
b. “Manifest partiality” requires that there be a clear, notorious, or plain inclination or predilection to favor
one side or person rather than another. It is abundantly clear that the evidence or proof that had been
submitted by the ERC Commissioners, not to mention the recitals of Resolution No. 1-2016, showed that
there was no manifest partiality to favor one side, i.e., MERALCO. The same is true with respect to the
Ombudsman’s finding of gross inexcusable negligence and evident bad faith in its Resolution: its existence
is not supported by any evidence. In particular, there could be no evident bad faith on the part of the ERC
Commissioners in issuing Resolution No. 1-2016 because it is quite evident from the chronology of events
outlined by the Ombudsman itself that they believed, in good faith, that they possessed powers granted
under the EPIRA to issue Resolution No. 1. There is good faith in this case because not only is there a

presumption that official duty has been regularly performed, but also because mistakes committed upon
a doubtful or difficult question of law may be the basis of good faith. (Concurring Opinion of Justice Caguioa
in Non v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 239168, September 15, 2020, En Banc)
56. Petitioner failed to establish that respondents exhibited manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross
inexcusable negligence in demolishing petitioner’s house inside the Bataan Economic Zone. To recall, under the
law, the PEZA general manager and authorized representatives may summarily demolish structures within
PEZA-owned or administered areas if constructed without a permit. Here, according to the Office of the
Ombudsman, records showed that respondents complied with the due notice requirement under R.A. 7916,
Section 14(i). Moreover, the law does not require PEZA to obtain a demolition permit before structures within
its jurisdiction could be demolished. There is also no showing that the respondents acted in an unjust and
inhumane way in the demolition. (Oliveros v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 210597, September 28, 2020,
Third Division)
57. The prosecution failed to establish beyond doubt the third element of evident bad faith as charged under the
Informations levelled against petitioner. In particular, the case the prosecution built fails on two fatal points:
first, the Court agrees with petitioner’s observation that a variance does exist between the mode of commission
petitioner was charged with (i.e., evident bad faith) vis-à-vis the one he was convicted with (gross inexcusable
negligence); and second, and even granting in arguendo the prosecution’s claim that the gross inexcusable
negligence was discussed by the Sandiganbayan merely to flesh out the element evident bad faith, and that no
variance as to the mode of commission existed, the Court finds, after a careful contemplation of the entire body
of evidence, that the prosecution failed to prove that petitioner’s assailed acts were attended by evident bad
faith.
a. To recall, the Informations alleged that petitioner committed two counts of violation of Section 3(e)
through evident bad faith. Against and inconsistent with this singular modality as charged, however, the
Sandiganbayan’s conviction of petitioner significantly grounded its finding of fault on the discussion of
petitioner’s gross inexcusable negligence, which is separate and distinct from the modality of evident bad
faith petitioner was charged with in the Informations. This stark variance is violative of petitioner’s
constitutional right to due process, specifically his right to be informed of the nature of the accusation
against him. As held in Villarosa v. People, an allegation of only one modality without mention of the others
necessarily means the exclusion of those not mentioned. Therefore, petitioner may not be convicted on
the basis of gross inexcusable negligence, since the said modality was not included in the charge levelled
against him on both counts.
b. Petitioner’s act of imposing the pass way fees was not attended by evident bad faith. To recap, the
Sandiganbayan found evident bad faith on the first count in petitioner’s acts of (i) imposing the pass way
fees even though he knew “fully well” that he had no authority to do so, (ii) authorizing Tabernero to collect
the pass way fees in behalf of the Municipal Treasurer, and (iii) imposing the pass way fees in a confiscatory
and excessive manner for having gone beyond the usually estimated amount per cubic meter cost under
the defunct resolution. For the second count, evident bad faith was similarly appreciated in petitioner’s act
of instructing and impounding of RMDC’s trucks for the latter’s failure to pay the pass way fees even before
he authorized Tabernero to receive said fees. After a careful consideration, the Court finds there was
insufficient evidence to persuade a finding of evident bad faith in the contemplation of R.A. 3019, Section
3(e). Still conversely, the Court finds a considerable number of factual instances that negate evident bad
faith and convince that petitioner clearly erred not pursuant to a surreptitious design, but out of an honest
but misplaced reliance on an inoperative resolution.
c. First, contrary to the summary finding that petitioner knew that Kapasiyahan 89A-055/Kautusang Bayan
029 had been earlier revoked, and nevertheless persisted in imposing the pass way fees said resolution
imposed, petitioner was consistent and unwavering in his denial that at the time he allowed the imposition
of said fees, he was under the assured information from both the Municipal Treasurer and the Sangguniang
Bayan Secretary that said resolution subsisted and was in force. Both on direct and cross examination,
petitioner’s testimony maintained that he was not aware of the revocation, as the same was never
transmitted. But even if one believes that the revocation of the Kautusan had, in point of fact, been actually
transmitted, petitioner’s testimony reveals, if anything, that as a new local government head who has only
assumed the mayoralty, he perhaps even conducted himself with the extra caution that was required in his
efforts to first verify that such pass way fees were legally covered by a resolution or other issuance, before
he authorized Tabernero to collect the same.
d. Second, with respect to the Sandiganbayan’s finding that petitioner acted in gross negligence amounting
to bad faith when he authorized Tabernero to act in behalf of the Municipal Treasurer in collecting the pass
way fees from RMDC, petitioner in his testimony was, on the contrary, able to fully explain the reason for
the same. Petitioner amply testified that Tabernero, although not an official of the Municipal Hall, was
nevertheless employed by the local government of San Miguel under a job order arrangement, and that he
was the one who manned the Municipality’s Sibul Springs Resort, which was where RMDC’s trucks would
pass. Petitioner explained that Tabernero out of an accommodation for Constantino, since his trucks would
pass by the roads during hauling at night, and for convenience, it was Tabernero who was authorized to
collect the pass way fees so that RMDC’s trucks need not go all the way to the Municipal Hall to pay the
fees there.

e. Third, the Sandiganbayan found that even if Kapasiyahan 89A-055/Kautusang Bayan 029 were still valid,
petitioner imposed the pass way fees in a manner that was excessive and confiscatory. But this finding is
completely belied by petitioner who testified that the computation of the total pass way fee per truck,
based on a per-cubic meter cost, was not one which was within his tasks, and therefore could not be
properly attributed to him.
f. Finally, with respect to the evident bad faith appreciated in petitioner’s act of giving instructions for the
impounding of the trucks before he even authorized Tabernero to receive the pass way fees, the Court is
unpersuaded that this factual ruling holds in the face of petitioner’s vehement denial that he ordered said
impounding, as supported by the fact that the memorandum the prosecution submitted to prove the same
did not bear any signature that would trace authorship of the same to petitioner. The Court further rules
that the Certificate of Blotter dated August 23, 2004, which is the prosecution’s main evidence to establish
that petitioner ordered the impounding of RMDC’s hauling trcuks, failed to prove the same. AS the Court
has held before, absent any other corroborative evidence, the certificate of blotter may not be considered
as sufficient proof to trace the authorship of the impounding of RMDC’s trucks to petitioner. It is also worth
noting that it was not disputed that the proceeds of the collection of pass way fees during petitioner’s term
were, in fact, remitted to the Municipal Treasury and deposited to the municipality’s bank accounts, as
attested to by petitioner and Marciano, and that there was no color of allegation that the proceeds were
in any way misappropriated or otherwise diverted to petitioner’s personal account.
g. In sum, the prosecution was unable to present sufficient evidence to prove that petitioner, in imposing the
pass way fees, was moved by a clear, notorious, evident bad faih to consciously inflict injury on RMDC.
Further, since there can be no presumption of bad faith, including cases involving violations of R.A. 3019,
failure to adequately impute evident bad faith as required by its Section 3(e) must result in finding
petitioner innocent as he is constitutionally presumed. (Buencamino v. People of the Philippines, G.R. Nos.
216745-46, November 10, 2020, First Division)
58. Contrary to the evident bad faith or gross negligence that Section 3(e) requires, the records reveal that private
respondents considered entering into the Compromise Agreement in order to settle the longstanding case once
and for all, and secure for the province a majority interest over the subject properties that, otherwise, would
have remained in legal limbo. The whereas caluse of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan’s Resolution No. 38, which
authorized private respondent Garcia to negotiate the said Compromise Agreement, provides for private
respondents’ purpose. From the whereas clauses, the impetus of private respondents in authorizing private
respondent Garcia to enter into the Compromise Agreement is the farsighted view of what may be predictably
be a long-drawn litigation over the subject properties, without any assurance that the interest of the province
would prevail. Conceivably, therefore, what becomes more evident is that private respondents entered into the
Compromise Agreement in order to secure and guarantee the province’s interest, against the prospect of
protracted uncertainty. Without showing any evil motive on the part of private respondents, this act appears
to be in full consonance with their sworn duties and authority. Still more, private respondents’ act of entering
into the Compromise Agreement with the purpose of ensuring the general welfare of the province by
guaranteeing the province’s proprietary interest over the subject properties is most consistent with the
authorities granted to their offices under Sections 18 and 22 of R.A. 7160.
a. In order to challenge and interfere with this corporate prerogative of the local government unit, ill motive
must be shown. To be sure, such ill motive was not shown, much less alleged, in petitioner’s submissions.
What’s more, the Court finds that the records of the case at bar are bereft of any showing of ill motive that
may have underpinned private respondents’ act of negotiating and entering into the Compromise
Agreement. Absent a showing of such, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan’s exercise of its discretion in
authorizing private respondent Garcia, as the local chief executive, to negotiate and enter into the
Compromise Agreement may not be made a basis for criminal prosecution.
b. As held in Ferrer, Jr. v. Bautista, the general welfare caluse must be liberally interpreted in order to afford
local government units with a wide latitude, i.e., to give more powers to LGUs in accelerating economic
development and upgrading the quality of life for the people in the community. Stated differently, local
chief executives and local legislative bodies are necessarily given enough elbow room to navigate and
respond to the different community-based needs and challenges that vary per constituency. The crucial
flexibility of these offices, designed no less by R.A. 7160, is defeated when each decision that they make
on behalf of their constituency pursuant to their corporate powers are constantly threatened by prospects
of criminal backlash after the fact. (People of the Philippines v. Hon. Sandiganbayan (Third Division), G.R.
Nos. 190728-29, November 18, 2020, First Division)
59. The elements of violation of R.A. 3019, Section 3(e) are present. First, accused Arias, Borje, Castillo, Favorito,
Quarto, and San Jose are undoubtedly public officers discharging administrative or official functions. Second,
all the aforementioned accused, in conspiracy with one another and with accused Dela Cruz, acted with evident
bad faith in falsifying official documents to deceive the DPWH into paying the claims for the fictitious emergency
repairs or purchases of spare parts in the name of deceased accused Martinez. Third, the actions of the accused
caused undue injury or damage to the government in the total amount of P5.16 million.
a. Contrary to Dela Cruz’ argument that she could not be held liable since she is a mere private individual and
that conspiracy was not proven, petitioner Dela Cruz was proved to be in conspiracy with the other co-
accused. Without the participation of petitioner Dela Cruz in the falsification of Cash Invoices through her

sole proprietorship DEB, the reimburseents amounting to P5.16 million would not have been facilitated.
Thus, since petitioner Dela Cruz is in conspiracy with the other co-accused, it is of no moment that she is
not a public officer. She is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of R.A. 3019, Section 3(e). Moreover,
the issue on liability of private individuals under R.A. 3019, Section 3(e) has already been settled. As held
in Balmadrid v. Sandiganbayan, the fact that the accused are private persons is of no consequence,
considering that the rule of collective criminal responsibility includes even private individuals who
participate with public officers in the perpetration of offenses ordinarily particularly applicable to the latter.
(Dela Cruz v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 236807, January 12, 2021, First Division)
60. Estacio is a public officer.

a. To be a public officer, one must be: (i) taking part in the performance of public functions in the government,
or performing in said government or any of its branches public duties as an employee, agent, or subordinate
official, of any rank or class; and (ii) that his authority to take part in the performance of public functions
or to perform public duties must be by direct provision of the law, by popular election, or by appointment
by competent authority.
b. In Javier v. Sandiganbayan, the Court held that persons from the private sector who are invested with some
portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised by them for the benefit of the public,
are public officers. In that case, the petitioner was appointed by the President of the Philippines to sit as
member of the National Book Development Board. The NBDB was created pursuant to R.A. 8047 or the
“Book Publishing Industry Development Act.” Though she came from the private sector, the Court held that
petitioner’s appointment to the Board made her a “public officer” as she was invested with some of the
sovereign functions to achieve the government objective of cultivating the book publishing industry. The
same is true in the case of Estacio. As in Javier, Estacio was appointed by the President of the Philippines
as a public officer. Then President Macapagal-Arroyo wrote a letter addressed to former PCGG Chairman
Camilo Sabio expressing her desire for Estacio to be elected as a member of the Independent Realty
Corporation Group of Companies (IRC) board of directors. To recall, IRC is composed of various
corporations surrendered by former Marcos crony Campos to the government and presently supervised
by the PCGG. In Maligalig v. Sandiganbayan, the Court probed into the nature of such “Desire Letter,” and
ruled against petitioner’s contention that he is not a public officer. The Court quoted with approval the
PCGG’s position that members of the board of directors of sequestered companies, like BASECO, were
elected by virtue of “Desire Letters” issued by the President of the Republic of the Philippiens. The
petitioner in that case sat as President and Director of BASECO by virtue of the appointing power of the
President, and as such, he is considered a public officer exercising functions for public benefit, namely,
management of sequestered corporation and earning income from the government.
c. While IRC was organized under the Corporation Code, it is a sequestered corporation subject to the fiscal
supervision of the PCGG and is a GOCC which is under the direct supervision of the Office of the President.
In Leyson, Jr. v. Office of the Ombudsman, the Court broke down the definition of GOCC into three
requisites: (i) any agency organized as a stock or non-stock corporation, (ii) vested with functions relating
to public needs whether governmental or proprietary in nature, and (iii) owned by the Government directly
or through its instrumentalities either wholly, or, where applicable as in the case of stock corporations, to
the extent of at least 51% of its capital stock. The first requisite is present as it is undisputed that IRC is a
stock corporation organized under the Corporation Code. IRC also meets the second requisite. Like
BASECO, the income and assets of IRC as a sequestered corporation are remitted to the PCGG and then
turned over to the Bureau of Treasury. This means that the individual running the affairs of the IRC is
invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised by him for the
benefit of the public, and this makes Estacio a public officer. Lastly, the Court have long recognized in
Cuenca v. PCGG that IRC is among the several corporations organized, established, and managed for, and
on behalf of the dictator Marcos, by Mr. Jose Y. Campos. The shares of IRC were later surrendered and
turned over to PCGG, which effectively transferred ownership thereof to the Government. This satisfies
the third requisite on government ownership. (Quiogue v. Estacio, Jr., G.R. No. 218530, January 13, 2021,
Second Division)
61. Contrary to petitioner’s claim that Estacio’s act of participating in the approval of the IRC board resolution
granting separation pay benefits to the corporate officers and his receipt of the ensuing emoluments amounts
to evident bad faith since Estacio’s motive in voting fr and approving Board Resolution No. 2010-05-181 was
really to benefit himself, Estacio’s participation in the approval of the board resolution cannot be construed as
bad faith and his consequence of his service to the corporation. It is undisputed that the board resolution which
granted separation pay benefits is a corporate act and Estacio is only one among the board of directors of IRC.
Also, a simple reading of the board resolution reveals that the corporation has previously granted separation
benefits to all employees of IRC exclusive of its offiers. In issuing the board resolution, the IRC board of directors
simply recognized that it is equitable to grant the same separation benefits being enjoyed by IRC employees to
its officers. How can there be evident bad faith when the perceived benefit has long been enjoyed by all
employees of IRC before it was granted to the officers such as Estacio. There is no evident bad faith or some
perverse motive or ill will on the part of Estacio as there was no showing that he was unduly favored by the
issuance of the board resolution. Moreover, Estacio’s participation in the approval of the board resolution
cannot be construed as bad faith, and his consequence of his service to the corporation. Any benefit which he

may have derived from the board resolution is purely incidental to the position he was then occupying and
cannot be deemed as an act which is intended to cause undue injury to any party or the government. Indeed,
there is no such thing as presumption of bad faith involving violations of R.A. 3019. (Quiogue v. Estacio, Jr., G.R.
No. 218530, January 13, 2021, Second Division)
62. Asserting evident bad faith as a method of commission is not enough to establish probable cause because
allegation does not amount to proof. Nor can the Court deduce these modes from mere speculation or
hypothesis given that good faith on the part of a public officer is presumed. Applying this standard, the Court
agrees with the Ombudsman that it is not enough for petitioner to simply alleged the presence of bad faith. The
facts themselves must demonstrate evident bad faith. This connotes not only bad judgment, but entails a
manifest deliberate intent ont eh part of the accused to do wrong or to cause damage. The Ombudsman cannot
readily assume evident bad faith as it must be shown that the accused as spurred by a corrupt motive. Mistakes,
no matter how patently clear, committed by a public officer are not actionable absent any clear showing that
they were motivated by malice or gross negligence amounting to bad faith. (Quiogue v. Estacio, Jr., G.R. No.
63. Petitioner did not act in gross inexcusable negligence when he appointed his children as student leaders since
petitioner was in good faith. As established during trial, there were two (2) Student Labor Programs available
to ISCOF students: the Special Program for Employment of Students under the DOLE, and the Regular College
Student Labor Program covered by DBM Circular No. 11-96. R.A. 7323 ordains that any person or entity
employing at least 50 persons may during the summer and/or Christmas vacation employ poor but deserving
students 15 years of age but not more than 25 years old, paying them a salary or wage not lower than the
minimum wage provided by law and other applicable labor rules and regulations and that employment should
be at the Labor Exchange Center of the DOLE. On the other hand, DBM Circular No. 11-96 decrees that any
school administered and supervised by the DepEd, CHED, and/or TESDA, as well as state universities and
colleges, may resort to utilization of student labor for services needed provided that it should not exceed four
hours a day. Here, petitioner’s children were hired as student laborers in November 1997, February 1998, April
1998, and May 1998. They were assigned to the Office of the ISCOF President and the IFS where they were
supposed to work from 6 o’clock until 7:30 in the morning and from 3 o’clock to 5 o’clock or 5 o’clock to 6
o’clock in the afternoon. Notably, ISCOF hires student laborers even during the semester, for shifts not
exceeding four hours a day, and pay them P10.00 per hour. These circumstances point to the fact that
petitioner’s children were hired as student laborers under DBM Circular No. 11-96, not R.A. 7323. Prosecution
witnesses and ISCOF Student Laborer Supervisor Grappa himself identified DBM Circular No. 11-96 as the basis
for hiring petitioner’s children as student laborers. Both he and Armentia testified that petitioner did not deviate
from DBM Circular No. 11-96. Curiously, the Sandiganbayan even cited DBM Circular Letter No. 11-96 as basis
for ordering petitioner to return the P5,100.00 allowance that his children received despite holding that R.A.
7323 governed their employment as student laborers. This only affirms DBM Circular Letter No. 11-96.
a. Respondent People nevertheless counters that DBM Circular Letter No. 11-96 was being implemented
through College Order No. 8-A, series of 1996, which in turn, was only approved on November 23, 2000.
Thus, it could not have governed the appointment of petitioner’s children in 1997 and 1998. Too, DBM
Circular No. 11-96 must yield to R.A. 7323 insofar as the latter prescribes standards in hiring student
laborers. The Court is not persuaded. For one, Exhibit 6 and series for the defense pertained to the Time
Book and Payroll of ISCOF student laborers as early as 1981. These pieces of evidence were not successfully
controverted by the prosecution, lending credence to petitioner’s claim that ISCOF had long been
implementing the Regular College Student Laborer. The program was simply formalized in 2000 but was
already in effect 11 years before R.A. 7323 was enacted and 12 years before petitioner got appointed as
President of ISCOF. Verily, petitioner was merely following a decade of practice in ISCOF when he appointed
student laborers under the Regular College Student Laborer Program. He was even responsible for
formalizing the program during his term. At the very least, this only shows that petitioner was not impelled
by any ill-motive nor did he act in gross inexcusable negligence in appointing his children as student
laborers. He simply believed that the decade of practice was aboveboard, considering too DBM Circular
No. 11-96.
b. For another, prosecution witness Grappa confirmed in his testimony that ISCOF has been implementing
two (2) types of Student Labor Programs. The Regular College Student Labor Program governed by DBM
Circular Letter No. 11-96 is different from the Special Program for the Employment of Students under the
DOLE. The prosecution failed to establish, however, that the criteria being observed in hiring students for
the Special Program also covered the Regular Program. Notably, Grappa even admitted during the trial that
he was responsible for checking the qualifications of the applicants for student laborers and forwarding
their applications to the Administrative Officer. Yet he did not exercise his authority as Student Laborer
Supervisor and bring to fore the supposed ineligibility of petitioner’s children to avail of the program.
c. In fine, petitioner acted in good faith when he appointed his children as student laborers. (Locsin, Jr. v.
People of the Philippines, G.R. Nos. 221787 & 221800-02, January 13, 2021, Second Division)
64. The prosecution failed to establish that petitioner acted in gross inexcusable negligence when he signed his
children’s DTR. The only evidence the prosecution offered to prove that petitioner’s children did not actually
render labor services were the testimonies of Grappa and Armentia that they always saw them playing

basketball or riding their bicycles. Too, Grappa claimed that Gelner Keats was enrolled in WVCST and could not
have therefore rendered labor services during his schedule. These testimonies hardly satisfy the quantum of
evidence required to sustain a conviction. Grappa merely made a sweeping declaration that petiitoner’s
children did not render actual labor services during his direct examination testimony. More, his sweeping
statement even got stricken out from the records. Neither is Grappa’s singular statement during cross that he
saw petitioner’s children playing basketball and riding their bicycles inside the campus sufficient to sustain a
verdict of conviction. His vague testimony did not even say who among petitioner’s children he saw playing
basketball and riding bicycles. He did not say how often he saw them and when. It bears stressing that
petitioner’s children enrolled in ISCOF for four (4) years each while the charges here involve only four (4) work
hours per day for four months of the entire time they were enrolled. It was therefore incumbent upon Grappa
to assert, nay establish, that he saw petitioner’s children gallivanting during their supposed tour of duty.
Grappa’s claim that it was physically impossible for Gelner Keats to have rendered labor services during the
summer of 1998 is just as unconvincing. The one-and-a-half-hour travel between ISCOF and WVCST did not
preclude Gelner Keats from rendering labor services during his tour of duty. For as Sobrepena testified for the
defense, Gelner Keats attended class in WVCST for only three (3) days. Meanwhile, Grappa admitted that he
never went to petitioner’s office to check on the student laborers. On the other hand, prosecution witness
Armentia only saw petitioner’s children playing basketball or riding their bicycles for about five (5) minutes a
day for about one to three times a week. Assuming this to be true, this is still not sufficient to conclusively
establish that petitioner’s children did not render labor services. For one, Armentia’s testimony similarly lacked
material details just as Grappa’s statement did. For another, petitioner’s children were only required to render
labor services for at least 50 hours every month. With a tour of duty from 6:00 to 7:30 a.m. and from 3:00 to
5:00 p.m. or 5:00 p.m. to 6:00 p.m. in the afternoon, petitioner’s children would have completed their quota
within 14 to 20 days. This leaves enough opportunity for Armentia to observe them play basketball or ride their
bicycles for five (5) minuts a day for about one to three times a week.
a. Consider, too, that Grappa and Armentia had ill motive to testify against petitioner. They admitted during
the trial that they had already filed several complaints against petitioner for various reasons, most of which
had already been dismissed. Armentia also represented private complainant Mendoza before ISCOF’s
Grievance Committee to discuss the problem between her and petitioner. He had been vocal in his belief
that petitioner’s decision to terminate Mendoza was unjust though said decision had already been
sustained by the CSC on appeal. (Locsin, Jr. v. People of the Philippines, G.R. Nos. 221787 & 221800-02,
January 13, 2021, Second Division)
65. Tio acted with manifest partiality and gross inexcusable negligence in awarding the road concreting project to
Double A, in the absence of public bidding, which gave unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference to Double
A. Both Tio and Cadiz acted with gross inexcusable negligence in causing the payment of P2.5 million to Double
A despite the incomplete supporting documents, giving unwarranted benefit, advantage, or preference in favor
of Double A.
a. When Tio awarded the contract to Double A without public bidding, he acted with manifest partiality. He
failed to justify his reason for selecting Double A to supply the construction materials, and to rent the
construction equipment to the Municipality. These showed Tio’s clear bias over Double A. As regards
whether there is gross inexcusable negligence on the part of Tio, Ampil v. Office of the Ombudsman states
that as a municipal mayor, he ought to implement the law to the letter and as a local chief executive, he
should have been the first to follow the law and see to it that it was followed by his constituency. Here,
there was gross inexcusable negligence on Tio’s part when he approved the Disbursement Voucher despite
the lack of supporting documents. Through this, he showed his indifference as to the repercussions of his
act because it was done with disregard to the requirements under the law. Being the local chief executive
and having administrative control of the local funds, it is his duty to ensure that public funds are disbursed
only after having complied with the law.
b. Through Tio, the Municipality directly contracted with Double A for the procurement of construction
materials and rent of construction equipment. Despite the existence of a MOA between the Municipality
and the Province wherein the latter will release P5 million worth of funds for the road concreting project
to be undertaken by the former, there was no written contract between the Municipality and Double A.
However, there were documents to show the transaction between the Municipality and Double A. These
are: (i) Disbursement Voucher No. 400-2008-07-068; (ii) LBP Check No. LBP0000370239 issued to Double
A; and (iii) the Official Receipt No. 1309 issued to the Municipality. Being the local chief executive, head of
the procuring entity, and representative of the Municipality in business transactions, it can be gleaned that
Mayor Tio personally entered into a contract with Double A, or at the very least, the contract was
undertaken with his approval.
c. As a rule, procurement shall be done through public bididng. In this case, there were no documents
presented to show that public bidding was conducted. The members of the BAC appear to have been
unaware of the road concreting project until after its completion. In addition, Tio admitted that the
Municipality opted a direct purchase from Double A rather than passing through the Municipality’s pre-
qualification BAC because the Assistance Fund promised by the Governor of the Province of Isabela did not
reach the Municipality. Since there was no public bidding, it shall be determined whether the absence of
public bidding is justified. The Court is not convinced that the absence of public bidding is justified. Under
Section 53.2 of the IRR, in emergency cases, the Procuring Entity (Municipality of Luna), has the option to

undertake Infrastructure Projects through (i) negotiated procurement, or (ii) by administration. The
implementation of an infrastructure is “by administration” if it is carried out under the administration and
supervision of the concerned agency, through its own personnel. Since it was in the year 2008 when the
MOA between the Municipality and the Province to undertake the infrastructure project was perfected,
and it was also in the year 2008 when the procurement of construction materials and rental of equipment
from Double A were undertaken, the applicable GPBB Resolution is GPPB Resolution No. 018-2006.
Pertinent portions of Section 3 of GPPB Resolution No. 018-2006 provides that to undertake projects by
administration, the implementing agency must have a track record of having completed, or supervised a
project, by administration or by contract, similar to and with a cost of at least 50% of the project at hand,
and own the tools and construction equipment to be used or have access to such tools and equipment
owned by other government agencies. In addition, said GPPB resolution states that any project costing P5
million or less may be undertaken by administration and if the project costs at least P5 million to P20
million, the DPWH Secretary must give his prior authority. In order for an infrastructure project to be
undertaken by administration, the project must be included in the Annual Procurement Plan (APP). Under
GPPB Resolution No. 20-2015, it cited EO No. 662, series of 2007, as amended. EO No. 662, as amended,
was the applicable law at the time when the road concreting project was perfected, and when purchase of
construction materials and rent of construction equipment were undertaken by the Municipality. It
prescribes the contents of the APP. In other words, the implementing agency (Municipality of Luna) must
also have a track record of having completed, or supervised a project by administration or by contract,
similar to and with a cost of at least 50% of the project on hand; and that the Municipality must own the
tools and construction equipment to be used or have access to such tools and equipment owned by other
government agencies. A prior authority from the DPWH Secretary is also needed if the infrastructure
project costs at least P5 million to P20 million.
d. Based on the exhibits submitted by the prosecution and the defense, the requirements under Section 3 of
GPPB Resolution No. 018-2006 were not met. First, there was no APP submitted before the court. The 2008
Infrastructure Project of Luna, Exhibit is not the APP contemplated by law because it merely enumerated
the infrastructure projects to be undertaken in 2008 by the Municipality. Second, the Municipality did not
show that it has a track record of having completed, or supervised a project by administration or by
contract, similar to and with a cost of at least 50% of the project on hand. Third, since the Municipality
rented construction materials from Double A, the requirement that the former must either own the tools
and construction equipment to be used, or has access to such tools and equipment owned by other
government agencies, was not met. Fourth, there was no showing that a prior authority from the DPWH
was secured for the road concreting project which costs P5 million. Since the conditions provided under
the law and GPPB Resolution No. 018-2006 were not met, the implementation of the road concreting
project “by administration” was not justified. Resort to the alternative method of “by administration” was
not proper. The road concreting project, the purchase of construction materials and the rentail of
equipment must have been subjected to public bidding.
e. According to Tio, the MOA required 50% of the project to be completed before the funds are released.
However, upon examination of the MOA, the purported provision does not exist.
f. Tio is correct in his claim that public bidding was not possible at the time, because Municipality did not
have the funds. R.A. 9184 requires the availability of funds prior to public bidding, and before the
commencement of the procurement of a government project. As early as the conception of the Approved
Budget for Contract, the procuring entity is mandated by law to ensure that its budget is within the General
Appropriations Act and/or continuing appropriation. During the procurement planning stage, the
procurement must be within its approved budget. As to the pre-procurement conference, this is a required
process prior to the issuance of the invitation to bid, in order to confirm the certification by the proper
accounting official and auditor, that the funds for the government project are available. In sum, the
requirements before a government can enter into a contract are (i) an appropriation law authorizing the
expenditure required in the contract; and (ii) a certification by the proper accounting official and auditor,
attached to the contract, attesting that the funds have been appropriated by law and such funds are
available. Non-compliance with any of these requirements shall render the contract void. Here, Tio,
knowing fully well that public bidding could not be conducted because the municipality did not have the
funds, still proceeded with the road concreting project. Neither was there an explanation for the haste in
implementing the project, nor was it shown that construction of the road was urgently needed. There was
nothing in the MOA requiring that the project be finished within a certain period or a specific date.
g. Since neither the person who purportedly did the canvass of suppliers was presented as witness, nor was
there a document presented to show that a canvass of suppliers was actually made, Tio’s claim that Double
A was the only willing and qualified supplier of the construction materials, is not convincing. Section 21 of
R.A. 9184 provides that public bidding includes the publication of the invitation to bid. Through the public
bidding and the publication of the invitation to bid, the Municipality could have determined if there were
other qualified suppliers. The absence of public bidding renders the contract between the Municipality and
Double A void. (Tio v. People of the Philippines, G.R. Nos. 230132 & 230252, January 19, 2021, First Division)
66. Tio caused the partial payment of P2.5 million despite the absence or lack of supporting documents.
a. According to Section 344 of the LGC, the mayor must approve the Disbursement Voucher whenever local
funds are disbursed. Here, Mayor Tio approved the Disbursement Voucher and caused the payment of P2.5

million to Double A despite the incompleteness of the voucher, and the supporting documents. In the
Disbursement Voucher, the signatures of the Municipal Treasurer in Box B and the accounting entries in
the lower portion of the voucher are absent. Despite these, Tio still signed the voucher. Tio also pointed
out that the Municipal Treasurer signed the check even if the latter failed to sign the Disbursement
Voucher. However, a copy of the LBP Check No. 0000370239 bears only the signature of Tio.
b. The absence of the Municipal Treasurer’s signature on the Disbursement Voucher should have made Tio
vigilant in making a more careful examination of the Disbursement Voucher before approving it. There was
also an absence of the attachment of supporting documents to the Disbursement Voucher. Auditor Reyes,
who conducted the audit of the transactions of the Municipality in the year 2008, testified before the
Sandiganbayan, that the necessary attachments to a Disbursement Voucher were absent. In addition, by
further examination of the Disbursement Voucher, Tio could have discovered the incomplete supporting
documents.
c. On the other hand, Section 338 of the LGC prohibits advance payments, and requires prior delivery of
goods. Even if there was a delivery of the construction materials, and the road concreting project was
finished, it was not shown that there was a delivery of construction materials prior to the approval of the
Disbursement Voucher.
d. Further, neither the bidding documents nor the documents showing that resort to any of the alternative
mdoes of procurement was justified, were attached to the Disbursement Voucher. (Tio v. People of the
Philippines, G.R. Nos. 230132 & 230252, January 19, 2021, First Division)
67. The prosecution was able to establish Cadiz’s participation in the release of the P2.5 million to Double A. When
Cadiz signed Box A of the Disbursement Voucher, she certified that the supporting documents were complete,
and the allotment of the P2.5 million is for the purpos specificed in the Disbursement Voucher. However, the
allotment had not been obligated, as affirmed and testified by Auditor Reyes, before the Sandiganbayan. Cadiz
signed the Disbursement Voucher despite the question mark in place of the entries in the voucher, and even if
the allotment had not been obligated. Since there was no proof that she made any objection as to her signing
the voucher, there is a presumption that she voluntarily signed the voucher. When she made the certification,
she participated in the unlawful disbursement of public funds. Jaca v. People emphasized the role of a local
accountant in ensuring that local funds are properly accounted for. In this case, Cadiz should not have signed
the Disbursement Voucher, in the absence or lack of supporting documents. By doing so, there was unlawful
disbursement. As a result, there was failure on the part of Cadiz to perform her duty as Municipal Accountant,
which is to ensure that public funds are disbursed only after the requirements of the law are complied with.
She was remiss of her duty as Municipal Accountant, constitutes gross inexcusable negligence.
a. According to Jaca v. People, foremost of the duties of a city accountant is to ensure that the local funds of
which the salaries of local government employees would be paid are properly accounted for. The creation
of the Office of the City Accoutnant serves as an important function of pre-audit in the chain of processing
cash advances of individual paymasters. A pre-audit is an examination of financial transactions before their
consumption or payment; a pre-audit seeks to determine, among others, that the claim is duly supported
by authentic underlying pieces of evidence. If the setup then prevailing in the Cebu City government
directly conflicts with the COA regulations, Jaca should have, at the very least, informed the City Mayor of
the risk in the process of disbursement of local funds or at least she should have set up an internal audit
system – as was her duty – to check against possible malversation of funds by the paymaster. (Tio v. People
of the Philippines, G.R. Nos. 230132 & 230252, January 19, 2021, First Division)
68. As for the third element, the Court finds that the prosecution was not able to prove that the government, or
any party suffered undue injury. Despite the irregularities in the procurement of construction materials and
rent of construction equipment, Tio was able to prove that the road concreting project was completed. There
was actual delivery of the construction materials, and rent of construction equipment, which facilitated the
completion of the road concreting project. For these reasons, Tio and Cadiz did not cause undue injury to the
government or any party.
a. However, the other mode of violating R.A. 3019, Section 3(e) is present when Tio awarded the contract to
Double A without public bidding and when he and Cadiz caused the payment of P2.5 million to Double A
despite the incomplete documents, they gave Double A unwarranted benefits, advantage, and preference.
(Tio v. People of the Philippines, G.R. Nos. 230132 & 230252, January 19, 2021, First Division)
69. Violation of procurement laws does not ipso facto give rise rise to violation of R.A. 3019.
a. In this case, petitioners justify the eschewing of competitive bididng in procuring the subject vehicles on
the reasoning that these were goods of foreign origin that may only be procured directly from the exclusive
Philippine distributors or agents. Under the LGC, in case of supplies of foreign origin, LGUs may do away
with competitive bidding and procure directly from the exclusive Philippine distributors or agents, subject
to certain conditions: (i) that the Philippine distributor has no subdealers selling at lower prices; and (ii)
that no suitable substitutes or substantially the same quality are available at lower prices. Under Section
105 of COA Circular No. 92-386, a certification to the effect that the distributor has no subdealers selling
at lower price must be secured from the principal and/or exclusive distributor. Similarly, Section 50(c) of
R.A. 9184 provides that direct contracting may be resorted to with respect to those sold by an exclusive

dealer or manufacturer, which does not have sub-dealers selling at lower prices and for which no suitable
substitute can be obtained at more advantageous terms to the government.
b. In this case, it is not disputed that the procurement of the subject vehicles did not undergo competitive
public bidding. Petitioners justify their not resorting to bidding by asserting that the procurement of the
subject vehicles was allowed by way of direct purchase from exclusive distributors. They maintain that
there were no suitable substitutes of substantially the same quality as those of the subject vehicles
available at lower prices. Procurement law defines a “suitable substitute” as an article which would serve
substantially the same purpose or produce substantially the same results as the brand, type, or make of
article originally desired or requisitioned. According to petitioners, the purpose of the subject procurement
was to provide vehicles for use of the Governor and Vice Governor in transporting people and goods
throughout the Province in rough roads, well-paved roads, and not so well-paved roads. Bautista, Jr.
clarified that the purpose for the procurement of the subject vehicles was for the general need for pick-up
trucks. Hence, the resort to direct contracting would have been legally permissible only if there were no
other vehicles that may have served the general need of the Governor and Vice Governor for pick-up trucks
aside from the specific vehicle brands and makes purchased.
c. In asserting that there are no other suitable vehicles that satisfy the abovementioned purposes, petitioners
primarily relied on certifications issued by the three suppliers of the subject vehicles, i.e., Toyota Davao,
Kar Asia, and Ford Davao. However, at most, these certifications merely state that the aforesaid car dealers
are the exclusive dealers of Toyota Hilux, Mitsubishi L300 Exceed, and Ford Davao. These certifications do
not purport to show whatsoever that there are no suitable and more affordable vehicle brands and makes
that may serve as viable service vehicles of the Governor and Vice Governor.
d. Aside from the foregoing, another relevant procurement rule that comes into play is the rule on the
referencing of brand names in indicating the specifications for the procurement of goods. Under Section
24 of COA Circular No. 92-386, the description and specification of the supplies or property called for in
the requisition shall include only the technical specifications which will fill and satisfy the needs of the
requisitioner. Similarly, under R.A. 9184, Section 18, specifications for the procurement of goods shall be
based on relevant characteristics and/or performance requirements and reference to brand names shall
not be allowed. COA Circular No. 92-386 itself provides the definition of “specification” as the technical
description of supplies or property being requisitioned or ordered, which should be clear and complete,
including if necessary, the specific uses therefor and how acceptability thereof can be determined. Hence,
when the LGU undertakes the process of requisition of supplies or properties, which the procurement law
defines as the formal requesting of supplies or property made through a written request or order, only the
technical description of the supplies or properties shall be included. The particular brand names of the
goods cannot be specified in the requisition. Here, in the requisition of the subject vehicles, the specific
brands and makes of the subject vehicles were indicated. The Purchase Requests dated January 24, 2003,
February 13, 2003, and July 15, 2003 which prompted the requisition of the subject vehicles, specified the
particular vehicle brands and makes. The technical descriptions of these vehicles, such as the engine
displacement, braking system, and other exact specifications, were not identified in the Purchase Requests.
e. In refutation, petitioners argue that under Section 54 of COA Circular No. 92-386, reference to the
manufacturer’s brand name is permissible, and that when such reference is made, the reference is
intended to be merely descriptive and not restrictive. Section 54 of COA Circular No. 92-386 states that
whenever reference to a manufacturer’s brand-name is indicated in the call for bids, it shall be intended to
be descriptive, not restrictive, and shall be understood to merely indicate to prospective bidders that
brand-names other than those specified, if of equal quality, may be considered, regardless of whether a
statement to that effect is made in the tender. However, the non-restrictive reference to brand name
referred to in the foregoing provision applies to references made in the calls for bids, which refers to the
act of the office of the provincial or city general services officer to call bids for open public competition. In
this case, considering that direct purchase was chosen as the mode of procurement from the outset, there
was no call for bids made as there was no public bidding that was even commenced. Hence, Section 54 of
COA Circular No. 92-386 does not find any application in this case. On the other hand, as already discussed,
in issuing the purchase requests, procurement law unequivocally mandates that LGUs shall only indicate
the technical specifications and not specify the particular brand names and makes.
f. From the foregoing discussion, it is evident that there were irregularities in the procurement of the subject
vehicles, in violation of the applicable procurement laws. However, the prosecution failed to establish
evident bad faith, manifest partiality, or gross inexcusable negligence in relation to the subject
procurements.
g. The prosecution failed to establish evident bad faith. To recall, because evident bad faith entails manifest
deliberate intent on the part of the accused to do wrong or to cause damage, it must be shown that the
accused was spurred by any corrupt motive. Here, while petitioners may have violated the pertinent laws
and rules on procurement, there is reasonable doubt that they consciously and intentionally did so in order
to commit fraud, to purposely commit a crime, or to gain profit for themselves so as to amount to fraud.
The testimony of the prosecution’s witness was able to demonstrate that violations of procurement law
were committed by the petitioners. However, that was all that the evidence proved. There was no evidence
presented whatsoever showing that petitioners were animated by fraudulent motives. On the contrary,
the evidence shows that petitioners honestly believed that their resort to direct purchase was proper. To
recall, Section 371 of the LGC allows direct purchase of supplies of foreign origin from exclusive Philippine

agents or distributors, subject to the following conditions: (i) that the Philippine distributor has no
subdealers selling at lower prices, and (ii) that no suitable substitutes or substantially the same quality are
available at lower prices. As to why petitioners chose the mode of direct purchase, the testimonies of
petitioners show that prior to the direct purchase of the subject vehicles, the Provincial Government had
already acquired seven vehicles through direct purchase and at no instance were these purchases of the
seven vehicles questioned or the subject of AOM, NS, or ND by the COA; that they made a study of the
surrounding circumstances of the earlier procured seven vehicles through direct purchase; that the public
bidding were all declared as failed bidding; that because the negotiated purchase would require a longer
period of time as this would still require the approval of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan and several
meetings of the BAC resulting to the delay in the delivery; and that with the advice of the COA, the seven
vehicles were procured through direct purcase. As can be gleaned above, it cannot be said that petitioners
were spurred by any ill or corrupt motive in resorting to direct purchase of the subject vehicles. After
studying the previous procurement experiences of the Provincial Government, which were all not
questioned by the COA despite having been done through direct purchase, petitioners deemed direct
purchase to be a viable and allowed mode of procurement for the subject vehicles in this case. Indeed, the
absence of any adverse findings from the Provincial Auditor should be likewise be considered in their favor.
In particular, Bautista averred that the Province waited for any notice of disallowance or notice of
suspension before making payments to the suppliers and that since the Provincial Auditor never issued any
Notice of Disallowance or Notice of Suspension, the Disbursement Vouchers were approved and the
corresponding checks were issued. Thus, the evidence does not support the conclusion that petitioners
possessed a state of mind operating with furtive design or some motive of self-interest or ill will for ulterior
purposes.
h. The prosecution failed to establish manifest partiality. According to jurisprudence, there is manifest
partiality when there is a clear, notorious or plain inclination or predilection to favor one side or person
rather than another. In other words, as applied in this case, it must be proven that the accused had
malicious and deliberate intent to bestow unwarranted partiality upon Toyota Davao, Kar Asia, and Ford
Davao. Here, petitioners’ act of specifying the brands of the subject vehicles in the Purchase Requests – by
and of itself – is not enough to conclude beyond reasonable doubt that there was manifest partiality as
conceptualized under Section 3(e). Otherwise stated, the evidence on record fails to establish beyond
reasonable doubt that petitioners were animated with malicious intent, and consistently pursued a
notorious scheme to deliberately favor Toyota Davao City, Inc., Kar Asia, Inc., and Ford Davao. The evidence
presented by the prosecution is simply not enough to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the subject
procurements were pursued purposely and intently by petitioners to fraudulently benefit themselves and
the said car dealers. The testimony of the prosecution’s witness did not establish in any manner any
deceitful intent and motivation behind the procuring of the subject vehicles from the three car dealers.
There was no evidence whatsoever showing that petitioners were animated by fraudulent and devious
motives. On the other hand, petitioners’ unrefuted testimonies before the Sandiganbayan reveal that their
decision not to follow the competitive bidding requirement of procurement law was motivated not by any
evil scheme to profit, but by their honest, albeit mistaken, belief that the alternative mode of direct
contracting was warranted. As for the specification of the brands, petitioners’ reliance on Section 54 of
COA Circular No. 92-386, i.e., specification of the brand-name is allowed as it is intended to be merely
deceptive and not restrictive, although mistaken as this only applies to calls for bids, nonetheless reveals a
measure of good faith on their part. To be sure, for the identification of the specific brands involved,
Bautista explained that he merely specified his brand preference in his request – but that there is no
evidence that he persisted and insisted on sticking to this preferred brand. Verily, even the Sandiganbayan
stated in its Decision that whether Bautista’s signing the PRs specifying the brand of the vehicle was merely
recommendatory or not, remains disputed. This further strengthens Bautista’s claim that he did not insist
on the preferred brands and left it to the BAC to determine whether these vehicles would satisfy the needs
of the Province. Hence, while there appears to be a degree of preference for a specific brand, a preference
for the brand’s performance record and reliability, this preference does not give rise to the level of manifest
partiality that would show an ulterior motive or purpose on the part of petitioners. Therefore, the
conviction of petitioners based on manifest partiality cannot stand as the required threshold of proof
beyond reasonable doubt was not met by the prosecution.
i. The prosecution failed to establish gross inexcusable negligence. At this juncture, it must be stressed that
gross inexcusable negligence under R.A. 3019, Section 3(e), a culpable felony, does not require fraudulent
intent or ill-will. A public officer is guilty of gross inexcusable negligence when there is a breach of duty that
is committed flagrantly, palpably, and with willful indifference. Hence, a public officer who seriously
breaches his or her duty in a blatant and extremely careless manner is guilty of gross inexcusable negligence
under Section 3(e) regardless of whether such breach of duty was done with malicious intent. The records
show that petitioners, as BAC members, did not conduct a study, albeit limited and not reduced to writing.
Moreover, they no longer considered public bidding based on their past experiences and the belief that
direct purchase was availing. While it is arguable that a more thorough study would have led petitioners to
conclude that direct purchase was not proper for the subject procurements, their actions cannot be
characterized as without even slight care and conscious indifference as to the compliance with their duties
so as to make them liable for gross inexcusable negligence. Hence, they cannot be held liable for violation

of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 on account of gross inexcusable negligence. (Martel v. People of the Philippines,
G.R. No. 224720-23, February 2, 2021, En Banc)
70. Violations of R.A. 3019 must be grounded on graft and corruption. As the R.A. 3019’s title implies, and as what
can be gleaned from the deliberations of Congress, R.A. 3019 was crafted as an anti-graft and corruption
measure. At the heart of the acts punishable under R.A. 3019 is corruption. As explained by one sponsors of the
law,Senator Arturo Tolentino, “while we are trying to penalize, the main idea of the bill is graft and corrupt
practices. x x x Well, the idea of graft is the one emphasized.” Graft entails the acquisition of gain in dishonest
ways. In this case, petitioners’ act of pursuing the subject procurements was motivated not by any corrupt
intent to favor one car dealer over another or to unduly receive any pecuniary benefit. Based on the evidence
on record, petitioners’ actuations were simply based on their honest belief that direct procurement was legally
permissible. There was no showing that graft and corruption actually transpired. As a matter of fact, there is no
issue at all on overpricing. To reiterate, petitioners believed in good faith that direct purchase as the mode of
procurement was justified under Section 371 of the LGC. Moreover, the procurement documents were
transmitted to the Provincial Auditor of the COA prior to the procurement precisely to give the COA a chance
to say if such procurement was not allowed. It was only when the COA did not give any adverse comment that
the purchase proceeded. These circumstances strengthen the conclusion that petitioners were not animated
by any corrupt motive. Indeed, while public office is a public trust, the Court is called upon to refrain from
interpreting the laws to effectively be a disincentive to individuals in joining the public service. It is simply absurd
to criminally punish every minute mistake that incidentally caused a benefit to private parties even when these
acts were not done with corrupt intent. (Martel v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 224720-23, February 2,
2021, En Banc)
71. Petitioner acted with both manifest partiality and evident bad faith when he took advantage of his public office
to secure unwarranted benefits for himself, allowing Quezon’s bid deposit to be credited to his personal
purchase price; and causing the equipment he personally bought to be transported using the transport
arrangement of Quezon without him spending anything therefor. Petitioner knew fully well that UAI
erroneously credited Quezon’s bid deposit to his personal purchase which, as a result, got reduced from P1.67
million to P1.57 million. He was informed by Toledo of UAI’s Statement of Account reflecting these amounts.
He cannot, therefore, feign ignorance of this fact. Besides, petitioner himself attended the auction and
submitted his personal bid for the hydraulic excavator and the front cut with cabin and even paid for the same.
He knew he did not make any deposit for his personal bid and purchase. As the Sandiganbayan observed,
“Leonardo personally attended the auction and placed the bid on behalf of LGU Quezon and on his behalf, using
the same bid deposit of P100,000.00. He successfully bid for five (5) trucks intended for LGU Quezon and for
one (1) unit hydraulic excavator and one (1) unit front cut with cabin (truck head) as his personal purchase. On
the other hand, Leonardo paid the amount of P1.57 million for the hydraulic excavator and truck head instead
of the total price of P1.67 million. The difference of P100,000.00 turned out to be the bid deposit which was
deducted from the price for the equipment that Leonardo himself purchased instead of from the total price of
the trucks that LGU Quezon bought at the auction.” Petitioner’s personal participation during the auction
negates his purported lack of knowledge of crediting the P100,000.00-bid deposit for the two (2) equipment
bought by him. By only paying P1.57 million for equipment valued at P1.67 million, petitioner was well aware
that the P100,000.00-bid deposit, which amount is considered public funds at the account of the Municipality
of Quezon, was instead, credited to him, thus resulting in unwarranted benefits. This bolster the conclusion
that he acted with evident bad faith or manifest partiality. More, the deeds of sale of the items purchased,
including the two (2) equipment petitioner had personally purchased, were all placed in Quezon’s name as
vendee. The fact that the deeds of sale for the two (2) equipment were not made in petitioner’s name shows
that the transactions were fronted under Quezon’s name in order for petitioner to utilize the P100,000.00-bid
deposit of said municipality. Notably, although the deeds of sale were made in Quezon’s name, two (2) receipts
were issued: one amounting to P6,387,500.00 for the items bought by Quezon, and one amounting to
P1,570,000.00 for petitioner’s equipment. Petitioner, therefore, kept a receipt for his own equipment while
fronting the purchase of the same under the deeds of sale in Quezon’s name. Again, this is a badge of
petitioner’s evident bad faith or manifest partiality. Indeed, there is no doubt that petitioner manifestly,
unjustly, and intentionally took advantage of his public office to gain unwarranted benefits for himself, to the
prejudice of Quezon. (Leonardo v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 246451, February 3, 2021, Second
Division)
72. Quezon sustained damage when money was taken from its coffers for petitioner’s personal use without paying
interest therefor and without any authority. Although petitioner eventually refunded Quezon the bid deposit
of P100,000.00, he did so only five (5) months after public funds had already been disbursed for his own
personal advantage or gain and after repeated demands from the Municipal Accountant. Moreover, while
petitioner alleges that he did pay for the transportation expenses for the equipment by paying P30,000.00 in
order to support his claim of good faith, record, however, shows that he did not actually pay said amount in
order to personally shoulder the costs of transporting his purchased equipment. Instead, he considered such
payment as a loan to Quezon to complete the transportation of the trucks, including his own equipment. This
is evinced by the fact that petitioner eventually sought reimbursement for the entire P30,000.00, which he

himself confirmed during his cross-examination. (Leonardo v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 246451,
73. The Court agrees with the Sandiganbayan that the element of manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross
negligence was negated by the evidence on record. To be sure, the City Government of Valenzuela, through
Mayor Gatchalian, Atty. Padayao and Carreon, acted on the basis of Ordinance No. 62, as well as the relevant
issuances of the DILG, the BFP, and the DTI. The Sandiganbayan correctly discussed: “The records do not show
that the accused acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence. The accused
merely followed the existing memorandum circulars and ordinances on the streamlined procedure for the
issuance of business permits. The accused did not state that these issuances dispense with the FSIC
requirement. The issuances am as follows: (a) Joint Memorandum Circular No. 1 which aimed to reduce the
steps and processing time for business permits, and allowed the Local Government Units to issue "temporary"
permits that gave the applicants a period of time to comply with other requirements; (b) Joint DILG-DTI
Department Administrative Order No. 10-07 which created a- Business One-Stop Shop (BOSS) to receive and
process applications for business registration thru a streamline system; (c) DILG Memorandum Circular No.
2011-05 which reiterated the need for fire safety inspection to be conducted promptly, to be completed before
the end of the year, arid requiring the City/Municipal Fire Marshall to submit a written report notifying the Local
Chief Executive of the names of non-compliant establishments and recommending the non-issuance or
revocation of permits, as the case maybe; (d) BFP Memorandum dated 24 September 2012 which provided for
the safety inspection of any structure two (2) or three (3) months in advance before the scheduled renewal of
any permits issued by the BPLO, without need for the submission or referral of the application for business
permits before such inspection is conducted; and (e) BFP Operational Procedures Manual ("BFP Manual") which
provides that only after the business permits are issued that the applications are forwarded to-the. FSES. of the
BFP-for scheduling of fire safety inspections, and eventually, the issuaiice of the fire safety inspection
certificates.” (Office of the Ombudsman v. Gatchalian, G.R. No. 230679, February 10, 2021, First Division)
74. The Information charges the accused with both acts. Mayor Gatchalian, Atty. Padayao and Carreon caused
undue injury to the victims in the amount of approximately P3.7 million. They likewise allegedly gave Kentex
unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference when they issued Busienss Permit for the year 2015, and their
failure to revoke the same, after Kentex failed to submit the requirements within the prescribed period.
a. Undue injury in the context of R.A. 3019, Section 3(e) is equated with actual damage in civil law. In this
regard, it is important that the injury, was produced by the proximate cause, defined as that which, in
natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening causes, produces injury, and
without which the result would not have occurred. The proximate cause of the fire which resulted to the
death and injury of the victims was the stockpiling of 400 sacks or ten tons of Supercell Blowing Agent
known as Azodicarbonamide, in an area not intended for slich storage and adjacent to the welding activities
near the stockpile. The molten slags from the welding rod came into contact with one of the sacks. There
is no causal connection between the issuance of the business permit and the fire which resulted to the
death and injury of the victims.
b. On the other hand, there is no showing that Kentex was given undue advantage, preference, or any
unwarranted benefits. It is not shown that with respect to Kentex, the LGU of Valenzuela deviated from
the procedures applied to other business establishments. While issuing the business permit “despite its
delinquent status and without requiring a Fire Inspection Certificate” would have amounted to
unwarranted benefit, advantage,or preference, it must be noted that there is no evidence on record to
show that respondents were aware of the delinquent status of Kentex. (Office of the Ombudsman v.
Gatchalian, G.R. No. 230679, February 10, 2021, First Division)
75. There is no sufficient evidence to hold Suba criminally liable under R.A. 3019, Section 3(e).
a. Jurisprudence instructs that bad faith referred to under Section 3(e) of RA. No. 3019 does not simply
connote bad judgment or negligence but of having a palpably and patently fraudulent and dishonest
purpose to do some moral obliquity or conscious wrongdoing for some perverse motive, or ill will. It
connotes a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some motive or self-interest or
ill will or for ulterior purposes. It is a breach of sworn duty through some motive or intent or ill will and
partakes of the nature of fraud. In People v. Bacaltos, the Court explained that bad faith per se is not enough
for one to be held criminally liable for violation of R.A. 3019, Section 3(e). Bad faith must be evident and
must partake the nature of fraud. That is, it is a manifest deliberate intent on the part of the accused to do
wrong or to cause damage.
b. Here, it is undisputed that Suba and Navida attended an aviation conference on aircraft maintenance in
Beijing, China, which was relevant to their functions as VP for Operations and President of PADC,
respectively. The cash that was disbursed to Suba and Navida were actually used in connection with their
attendance in said conference. Navida also assured Suba that they have a travel authority from the DOTC
Secretary and that the PADC Board, where the DOTC Secretary sits as Chairman, had previously approved
foreign travels of PADC officials. Subsequently, Suba restituted the subject amount, after the COA Notice
of Disallowance became final and executory. Given these circumstances, it cannot be said that Suba acted
with a palpably and patently fraudulent and dishonest purpose or with some perverse or ill motive, that is
tantamount to "evident bad faith" which the Anti-Graft Law seeks to punish. There was a legitimate

purpose. There was a prior and general approval by the PADC Board. There was a verbal assurance from
his superior and travel companion that they have the approval of the DOTC Secretary. Suba also returned
the disallowed amount after his appeal was denied, which in some cases was deemed a badge of good
faith. Since evident bad faith entails deliberate intent on the part of the accused to do wrong or to cause
damage, it must be shown that the accused was spurred by corrupt motive. Here, the circumstances
established do not show beyond reasonable doubt that Suba was spurred by corrupt or ill motive.
c. The Information charged Suba and Navida of proceeding with the trip "despite fully knowing the existence
of a letter/order from the [DOTC] denying their application for a travel authority." Suba has consistently
denied however that he was aware of Asst. Sec. Cruz's letter of disapproval when they left for Beijing. A
cursory reading of the said letter would readily show that the letter was addressed to "Roberto R. Navida"
who was then the President of PADC, and not to Suba. Atty. Ramos of the OMB who conducted the field
investigation also admitted that they did not trace or find out if Navida actually received the said letter.
Similarly, there was no proof that herein petitioner, Suba, received the DOTC letter of disapproval. It should
be stressed at this point that there is no such thing as presumption of bad faith in cases involving violations
of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. On the contrary, the law presumes the accused innocent, until
proven guilty. Well entrenched in our jurisprudence is the rule that the conviction of the accused must rest,
not on the weakness of the defense, but on the strength of the evidence for the prosecution. The burden
is on the prosecution to prove the accused's guilt beyond reasonable doubt, not on the accused to prove
his innocence. The administration of justice is not a matter of guesswork. Since a person's liberty is at stake
here, all measures must be taken to ensure the protection of his fundamental rights. (Suba v.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 235418, March 3, 2021, First Division)
76. The Court concurs with the ruling of the courts a quo that all the elements of violation of Section 3(e) of R.A.
3019 were proved by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt: (a) petitioner was then working as Records
Officer I of the Land Registration Authority at the time of the commission; (b) petitioner made it appear to
Malibiran that she had the authority and the capacity to facilitate the issuance of the approved plan, tax
declaration, and the certificate of title on Fernando Mamaril’s land when she had neither; (c) petitioner asked
Malibiran to pay her the total amount of P640,000.00 when she knew that she could not deliver on her
representation to Malibiran; and (d) relying on petitioner’s misrepresentations Malibiran handed over to the
petitioner the total amount of P640,000.00, to his undue injury. (Umpa v. People of the Philippines, G.R. Nos.
246265-66, March 15, 2021, Third Division)
77. Petitioner is guilty of gross inexcusable negligence amounting to bad faith. There is gross inexcusable negligence
when a public officer commits a breach of duty in a blatant and extremely careless manner; or when the
violation of law is serious, flagrant, palpable, or there is willful indifference in complying with the same. Here,
petitioner was remiss in his duty when he failed to exercise diligence in ensuring compliance with the basic
requirements demanded by the law, rules, and regulations in the disbursement of public funds. First, as the
signatory in the Contract Agreement with Markbilt, he is presumed to know the contents thereof. On its face,
the instrument only provides for a single appropriation for the construction project; there is no separate funding
to support the contract price escalation clause therein. In the statement of the said clause, the parties covenant
to comply with relevant rules and regulations with respect to the same. Albeit unnecessary, they explicitly
incorporated the relevant guidelines with respect to the adjustment of contract prices. Thus, upon receipt of
Markbilt’s demand for price escalation, prudence dictates for the petitioner to first verify the propriety of the
said claim and whether the said claim satisfies the requirements of applicable laws. It is only then that the
possibility of satisfying the claim can even be entertained. It is highly irregular and unusual to rely merely on
the representation of the contractor as to the amount due, without validating whether the amount so claimed
is accurate and correct. Likewise, it must be noted that petitioner was already confronted with Markbilt's
demands for price escalation as early as January 21, 2008. Even so, there was no evidence on record of any
effort on the part of the petitioner to direct municipal officials to inquire on the basis of Markbilt's claims vis-à-
vis the Contract Agreement which is cited as basis therefor, when he had every opportunity to do so prior to
release of Legal Officer Deveza's opinion and the preparation of the Supplemental Budget. This step could have
easily alerted the petitioner or the municipal officials of the requirements of price escalation under the law,
particularly that provided for under Sec. 61 of R.A. No. 9184. Had the petitioner undertaken these steps, he
would have realized, for reasons previously stated in this decision, that Markbilt's claim should be denied. The
petitioner's failure to observe sufficient diligence under these circumstances, which led to violation of the law
and the rules relating to disbursement of public funds amounts to gross inexcusable negligence. (Sarion v.
People of the Philippines, G.R. Nos. 243029-30, March 18, 2021, First Division)
78. The basis of the criminal charges against the petitioners is the authorization and release of increase of salary in
favor of petitioner Feliciano as General Manager of LMWD. Nonetheless, the prosecution was not able to prove
beyond reasonable doubt, and on the strength of its own evidence, that the approval of the Resolution
authorizing such increase and the processing of documents which facilitated the payment was tinged with
manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or inexcusable negligence. In the passage of the resolution, the Court finds
that the BOD acted on the "honest belief" that the BOD of LMWD has the authority to increase the salary of
petitioner Feliciano as General Manager pursuant to Section 23 of P.D. No. 198 or the Provincial Water Utilities
Act of 1973. Notably, at the time of passage of Resolution No. 98-33 on November 6, 1998, there was no

categorical pronouncement as to whether the salary of the General Manager of a water district is covered by
the Salary Standardization Law (SSL). It was only in 2013, in the case of Engr. Mendoza v. Commission on Audit
that the Court was able to examine and reconcile the grant of authority in favor of water districts to fix the
compensation of its General Manager under P.D. No. 198 vis-a-vis the coverage of the SSL. In Mendoza, the
Court had the occasion to evaluate and trace, on the basis of government entities covered by the SSL and those
exempted from its application under certain laws, the applicability of the SSL to local water districts. The Court
noted that exemption under the SSL by GOCCs must be specifically provided for under the charter of the GOCC.
In the case of water districts, the Court held that P.D. No. 198 contains no such exemption clause. Thus, while
the BODs of water districts have the power to fix the salary of their General Manager, the same must be in
accordance with the position classification under the SSL. From the Court's elaborate disquisition in Mendoza,
it can be inferred that there is a real question as to the limitation in the power of the BOD of water districts in
fixing the salary of its General Manager. Accordingly, it cannot be said evident bad faith, manifest partiality, or
gross negligence attended the issuance of Resolution No. 98-33 in 1998, as at that time, there was only the
express grant of authority by P.D. No. 198 and no other prohibition for the BOD of LMWD to authorize such
increase in the salary of its General Manager. On the part of petitioner Feliciano, it is significant to note that he
took no part in the passing of the Resolution which ordered the increase of his salary. In approving the release
of funds, he merely acted on the basis of the authority given by Resolution No. 98-33, which as discussed, was
passed by the BOD of LMWD on the honest belief, based on Section 23 of P.D. No. 198, that it had absolute
authority to fix the salary of its General Manager. Clearly, petitioners cannot be held liable under R.A. No. 3019.
(Feliciano v. People of the Philippines, G.R. Nos. 219681-82, March 18, 2021, First Division)
79. There is no showing that the act of petitioner was done through manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross
inexcusable negligence, or that she gave any unwarranted benefit, advantage, or preference to another, or that
undue injury was caused to the government.
a. By the very language of R.A. 3019, Section 3(e), which defines “corrupt practices of public officers,” the
elements of manifest partiality, evident bad faith, and gross inexcusable negligence and of giving
unwarranted benefit, advantage, or preference to another must go hand in hand with a showing of
fraudulent intent and corrupt motives.
b. Evident bad faith does not simply connote bad judgment or negligence but of having a palpably and
patently fraudulent and dishonest purpose to do moral obliquity or conscious wrongdoing for some
perverse motive or ill will. It contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or
with some motive or self-interest or ill will or for ulterior purposes. Manifest partiality, on the other hand,
is defined as a clear, notorious, or plain inclination or predilection to favor one side or person rather than
another, while gross inexcusable negligence is defined as negligence characterized by the want of even the
slightest care. It presupposes acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not
inadvertently, but willfully and intentionally, with conscious indifference to consequences insofar as other
persons may be affected.
c. Here, the pieces of evidence against petitioner relied upon by the Ombudsman for the alleged irregularities
in facilitating payments to Pandrol Korea consist of the (i) memorandum Andal had sent to petitioner
directing her to effect the payment of the peso equivalent of US$1.155 million to be charged to PNR’s PVB
Checking Account; (ii) letter petitioner had sent to the PVB in compliance with the memorandum of Andal;
and (iii) two debit advices by the PNB to the PNR that its account had been debited on given dates
(Decemebr 2009 and March 2010). Petitioner correctly points out in her Reply that among these four pieces
of documents, the only one that she signed was her letter to the manager of PVB in compliance with the
directive of Andal. Apart from this letter, petitioner admitted signing a similar one addressed to PNB. These
letters purportedly authorized the full debit of the peso equivalent of the dollar sums representing the
contract price which was allegedly not in accord with the schedule of payment. But as petitioner clearly
explains, she made the letters upon the instructions of Andal and that they merely authorized the opening
of an LC, which was in accordance with the stipulation in the contract. The assailed Joint Resolution brushed
aside the explanation of petitioner concerning her compliance with the instructions of Andal as flimsy, but
it never addressed nor contested her other explanation with regard to the opening of the LCs. Petitioner
explains that the actual disbursement of the funds would still depend on fulfillment of the terms of said
LCs and the contract, specifically on submission of documents, between PNR and Pandrol Korea. In other
words, payments were not effected by the mere authorization to open said LCs. This explanation of
petitioner is, as it should have been, well-taken in her favor.
d. In PNB v. Sandiganbayan, the Court made it clear that the mere opening of an LC does not involve a specific
appropriation of a sum of money in favor of the beneficiary. It only signifies that the beneficiary may be
able to draw funds upon the LC up to the designated amount specified therein. It does not even convey
the notion that a particular sum of money has been specifically reserved or has been held in trust. In this
case, aside from the letters petitioner sent to the banks, there is no other documentary proof mentioned
in the Joint Resolution to show that payments were actually made to Pandrol Korea upon her mere
execution of the authorization to open the LC. In her petition, petitioner had emphasized on this, pointing
out that the LC for the US$1.155 million contract, for instance, was issued on June 19, 2009, or more than
a week after she had sent the subject June 8, 2009 letter to the PVB which the Ombudsman wrongfully
interpreted to have already authorized the full payment to Pandrol Korea. It was only from June 25 to
October 3, 2009, when Pandrol Korea availed itself of the LC to secure payments of its deliveries to PNR.

From this period, the sums released to Pandrol Korea were apparently in installments and not for the full
amount of US$1.155 million.
e. Furthermore, and more importantly, even proceeding from the view that the act charged under Section
3(e) of R.A. 3019 must have been done maliciously or with corrupt motives, the Ombudsman miserably
failed to demonstrate such fact beyond its mere say so in its Joint Resolution. It should not suffice that
there was a mere violation of a law – or in this case, a contract – however clear or elementary it might be.
Simply put, the failure to observe the schedule of payment in the contract is not indicative per se of evident
bad faith, manifest partiality, or gross inexcusable negligence, of causing undue injury to any party, or of
giving unwarranted benefit, advantage, or preference to antoher. Even on the assumption that the
schedule of payment in the contract between PNR and Pandrol Korea was violated – which it was not – it
still behooved the Ombudsman to show, to justify a probable cause finding, that said violation was attended
with corrupt motives or fraudulent intent. All that its Joint Resolution relies upon as “indicative” of evident
bad faith, manifest partiality, and gross inexcusable negligence in the discharge of her functions that
resulted in unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference to Pandrol Korea is the purported
abandonment by petitioner of her duties to see to it that the schedule of payment was observed and her
relationship with Jaewoo Chung. No strong and specific correlation, however, has been sufficiently
established. As with Non, the Ombudsman in this case simply made blanket claims and conjectures. In other
words, the assailed Joint Resolution totally fails in demonstrating how petitioner acted with evident bad
faith, manifest partiality, or gross inexcusable negligence. As well, there is also no clear and positive
showing how an injury was caused to the government, or how any unwarranted benefit, advantage or
preference was given to another with the criminal or corrupt motives required by R.A. 3019, Section 3(e).
f. Additionally, the inference sought to be drawn by the Ombudsman with petitioner’s relationship with
Jaewoo Chung is even unavailing given its own finding, in the very same Joint Resolution, that there was no
evidence that petitioner exerted any undue influence in awarding the contract to Pandrol Korea. There is
absolutely no reason to extend the foregoing refusal of the Ombudsman to make an inference of undue
influence against petitioner in connection with the awarding of the contract to Pandrol Korea to the matter
of the alleged payments made under the contract, especially in light of its own determination to dismiss
the criminal charges against Jaewoo Chung on the ground that complainant failed to allege a particular act
or present any evidence that he connived with any of the respondents, including herein petitioner, to
perpetuate the crime under R.A. 3019, Section 3(e).
g. Indeed, the relationship alone of petitioner with Jaewoo Chung should not be determinative of the liability
of petitioner, absent any kind of showing that it was used improperly or with corrupt motives to the
disadvantage of the government. The element of “unwarranted benefits” must be understood in the
context of corruption. As its name implies, and as what can be gleaned from the deliberations of Congress,
R.A. 3019 was crafted as an anti-graft and corruption measure. At the heart of the acts punishable under
R.A. 3019 is corruption. Graft entails the acquisition of gain in dishonest ways. Hence, in saying that a public
officer gave “unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference,” it is not enough that the benefits,
advantage, or preference was obtained in transgression of laws, rules, and regulations. Such benefits must
have been given by the public officer to the private party with corrupt intent, a dishonest design, or some
unethical interest. This is in alignment with the spirit of R.A. 3019, which centers on the concept of graft.
h. Equally important, the assailed Joint Resolution likewise declares that there was no substantial evidence
on the alleged shortage of delivery to PNR of Pandrol products. Thus, there is no undue injury to the
government. (Chung v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 239871, March 18, 2021, First Division)
80. In assessing whether there was overpricing, a specific comparison with the same brand, features, and
specifications as those purchased in the questioned transaction should be made. Further, the report upon which
the proof of overpricing is based should include a canvass of the different suppliers of the identical product with
their corresponding prices. Absent this evidence, the Court cannot reasonably conclude that the price of the
goods subject of the questioned transaction was actually exorbitant.
a. Caunan v. People is instructive. Caunan involved Parañaque City's alleged overpriced procurement of walis
tingting for the years 1996-1998 without the benefit of public bidding. In convicting former Paranaque City
Mayor Joey P. Marquez (Marquez) and his co-accused for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019, the
Sandiganbayan relied heavily on the report of the Commission on Audit Special Audit Team for its finding
of overpricing. In ruling in favor of Marquez and his co-accused, the Court dismissed the claim of overpricing
because the prosecution failed to prove the actual price of the identical goods subject of the questioned
transaction. In finding that the walis tingting purchase contracts were grossly and manifestly
disadvantageous to the government, the Sandiganbayan relied on the COA's finding of overpricing which
was, in turn, based on the special audit team's report. The audit team's conclusion on the standard price
of a walis tingting was pegged on the basis of the following documentary and object evidence: (i) samples
of walis tingting without handle actually used by the street sweepers; (ii) survey forms on the walis tingting
accomplished by the street sweepers; (iii) invoices from six merchandising stores where the audit team
purchased walis tingting; (iv) price listing of the DBM Procurement Service; and (v) documents relative to
the walis tingting purchases of Las Piñas City. These documents were then compared with the documents
furnished by petitioners and the other accused relative to Parañaque City's walis tingting transactions.
Notably, however, and this the petitioners have consistently pointed out, the evidence of the prosecution
did not include a signed price quotation from the walis tingting suppliers of Parañaque City. In fact, even

the walis tingting furnished the audit team by petitioners and the other accused was different from the
walis tingting actually utilized by the Parañaque City street sweepers at the time of ocular inspection by
the audit team. At the barest minimum, the evidence presented by the prosecution, in order to
substantiate the allegation of overpricing, should have been identical to the walis tingling purchased in
1996-1998. Only then could it be concluded that the walis tingting purchases were disadvantageous to the
government because only then could a determination have been made to show that the disadvantage was
so manifest and gross as to make a public official liable under Section 3 (g) of R.A. No. 3019.
b. In Miranda v. Sandiganbayan, the Court also found insufficient the allegation of overpricing because the
evidence showing the prices of other suppliers did not pertain to the very same item subject of the assailed
transaction.The Court stressed that, pursuant to COA Circular No. 85-55A, the term "excessive
expenditure" pertains to the variables of price and quality. As to the price, the circular provides that it is
excessive if "it is more than the 10% allowable price variance between the price for the item bought and
the price of the same item per canvass of the auditor." Undoubtedly, what was required to be canvassed
was the very same item subject of the assailed transaction. Evaluated against this COA definition, it cannot
be validly maintained that the prices of D'Implacable were excessive considering that the items bought by
DECS-Davao Oriental were obviously not the very same items "canvassed" by the team.
c. In Sajul v. Sandiganbayan, the Court found a quotation from only one enterprise insufficient to establish
that the price of the purchased goods was exorbitant. According to the Court, to establish overpricing,
there must be a canvass of different suppliers showing their respective prices of the goods subject of the
transaction. The Court said: “The comparison of prices between Bato-[B]ato Enterprises with that of Zodiac
Trading is rather unacceptable. In the first place, Zodiac [T]rading was not properly identified as a company
dealing with fire extinguishers or a leading company selling fire extinguishers, for that matter. Nobody from
the company appeared in court to testify about [the] company or its product. The components of its fire
extinguishers were not actually proven to be the same as that of Bato-Bato Enterprises. The quotation of
Zodiac Trading was merely solicited and stated in the briefing memorandum of Cadores dated May 8, 1985
submitted to Director Andres Sajul. The veracity of such quotation was not proven. Considering all these
circumstances, it is rather unfair to compare the prices of Bato-Bato Enterprises with that of Zodiac Trading
when the basis of the comparison has not been established. The respondent court hastily concluded that
there was an overpricing of the fire extinguishers when there was only one company singled out which
apparently quoted a lower price than that of Bato-Bato Enterprises. It must be noted that Bato-Bato
Enterprises had long been supplying the Central Office since 1982 after winning in a competitive bidding.
Its price in 1982 and that in 1985 remained the same. No evidence was adduced to show that there were
other fire extinguishers which cost less than that of Bato-Bato Enterprises in 1982. In order to show that
there was an overpricing in the subject transaction, a canvass of different suppliers with their
corresponding prices should have been procured which could readily show the differences in the price
quotations. Absent this competent evidence, it is rather unfair to conclude that the price of BatoBato
Enterprises was exorbitant on the basis alone of a submitted quotation of one company and to further rule
that the contract was grossly injurious to the government.” (Macarian v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No.
81. The prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that petitioners are indeed guilty of evident bad faith
and manifest partiality.
a. First, it has been settled that the absence of public bidding in the procurement of goods does not
automatically equate to evident bad faith and manifest partiality. The guilt of an accused charged with
violation of R.A. 3019 must be determined through the lens of the anti-graft and corruption law and not
the procurement law. Thus, in Sabaldan, Jr. v. Office of the Ombudsman for Mindanao, the Court clarified
that a violation of procurement law does not mean that all the elements of a violation of R.A. 3019 are
present. In the recent case of Martel v. People, the Court held that in order to successfully prosecute the
accused under R.A. 3019, Section 3(e) based on a violation of procurement laws, the prosecution cannot
solely rely on the fact that a violation of procurement laws has been committed. The prosecution must
prove beyond reasonable doubt that (i) the violation of procurement laws caused undue injury to any party,
including the government, or gave any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference, and
(ii) the accused acted with evident bad faith, manifest partiality, or gross inexcusable negligence.
b. Here, even if it were to be conceded that the failure to conduct the requisite public bidding for the
questioned transactions was unjustified, no other evidence was presented to establish that petitioners’
actions were animated by malicious motive or fraudulent intent to defraud the government.
c. To begin with, petitioners were able to show that their resort to direct purchase for the questioned
transactions was based on their honest belief that the same was warranted under the circumstances.
Petitioners explained that the questioned transactions were emergency purchases, and that following
DOH-NCR’s policy of adopting the results of the previous winning bidder, the subject medicines were
procured from Aegis and Lumar, who were the winning bidders in the bidding conducted by DOH-NCR for
the years 1995 and 1994, respectively. Hence, the PO for Paracetamol Suspension clearly stated that the
purchase from Aegis was subject to the terms and conditions of RFO-NCR public bidding for drugs and
medicines 1995 public bidding and the PO for Ferrous Sulfate with Vitamin B Complex and Folic Acid
indicates that the purchase from Lumar was subject to the terms and conditions of the RFO/NCR 1994
public bidding. This practice or policy of adopting the results of the previous bidding for future

procurements or subsequent purchases was in fact acknowledged by the one of the prosecution witnesses
as one fo the reasons why the DOH prepares a price list of the previous winning bidders. According to
Palisco, the DOH tabulates the results of a public bidding, which are then distributed to district officers and
other offices, to be used as reference in the latter’s own procurement or in case no public bidding is
conducted, to serve as guidelines for purchases that would be advantageous to the government.
d. Despite the foregoing explanation, which was never rebutted by the prosecution as indeed one of its
witnesses admitted the same, the Sandiganbayan nonetheless still held petitioners liable on the reasoning
that petitioners should have referred to the price list issued by the DOH-Central since there was no public
bidding in DOH-NCR in 1996. This is but one of the egregrious errors committed by the Sandiganbayan as
it overlooks the established and undisputed fact that the "Price List for the 11 hospitals (January 1996 to
June 1996) December 19, 1995 public bidding" (DOH-Central Price List), which petitioners "should have
supposedly used as reference" in the procurement of 10,000 bottles of Paracetamol Suspension, was
prepared by the DOH-Central only on May 24, 1996. In plain terms, the said price list could not have been
used as reference for the simple fact that it was inexistent when the DOH-NCR purchased from Aegis 10,000
bottles of Paracetamol Suspension on May 9, 1996. This error of the Sandiganbayan becomes more
manifest considering that there is absolutely nothing on record which shows that the said price list was
actually sent to and received by the DOH-NCR. Thus, since petitioners had no knowledge of the said DOH-
Central Price List when the questioned transaction was made, no bad faith or partiality may be imputed to
them for not using the supposedly lower prices suggested in the DOH-Central Price List. Clearly, it cannot
be said that petitioners' acts of procurement of Paracetamol Suspension from Aegis and Ferrous Sulfate
with Vitamin B Complex and Folic Acid from Lumar, without the benefit of a public bidding, were spurred
by a corrupt or ill motive. Petitioners' reliance on the policy of adopting the results of the previous public
bidding, does not satisfy that patent and palpable fraudulent purpose necessary to constitute evident bad
faith and manifest partiality under Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. It bears to note that this policy was
adopted by the agency to ensure that future purchases would be beneficial to the government. Indeed,
mistakes committed by a public officer, no matter how patently clear, are not actionable under R.A. No.
3019, absent any clear showing that they were motivated by malice or some perverse motive or ill will.
e. Second, the Court finds that the prosecution failed to sufficiently establish the so-called “overpricing” of
the purchased medicines. Jurisprudence teaches that in assessing whether there was overpricing, a specific
comparison with the same brand, features and specifications as those purchased in the questioned
transaction should be made. Further, the report upon which the proof of overpricing is based should
include a canvass of the different suppliers of the identical product with their corresponding prices. Absent
this evidence, the Court cannot reasonably conclude that the price of the goods subject of the questioned
transaction was actually exorbitant. To prove that the Paracetamol Suspension purchased from Aegis was
overpriced, the prosecution presented the DOH-Central Price List. Palisoc testified that the DOH-Central
Price List reflects the result of the public bidding conducted by the agency in December 1995. This price
list served to guide purchases of the 11 hospitals under the jurisdiction of the DOH-Central for January
1996 to June 1996. On the other hand, to prove that the Ferrous Sulfate with Vitamin B Complex and Folic
Acid purchased from Lumar was overpriced, Ringpis testified that he obtained a copy of the 1994 Abstract
of Bids of the public bidding conducted by the DOH-NCR in 1994 because the PO contained a notation that
the purchase of Ferrous Sulfate with Vitamin B Complex and Folic Acid was subject to the terms and
conditions of the 1994 public bidding. Said Abstract of Bids indicates that Foramen offered a lower price of
P73.37 compared to the offer of Lumar of P220.00; thus, Ringpis concluded that there was an overprice.
The Court, however, notes that these documents are mere reports of the result of a public bidding
conducted by the DOH for years not covered by the questioned transactions. Also, these reports do not
reflect an actual canvass of the prices from different suppliers of the same medicines purchased by DOH-
NCR in 1996. Without said canvass, it would be hasty for the Court to conclude that the medicines subject
of the questioned transactions were indeed overpriced.
f. Moreover, the DOH-Central Price List is a mere photocopy. The records also show that the prosecution did
not invoke any of the exceptions to justify the admission of a secondary evidence in lieu of the original.
Thus, the DOH-Central Price List submitted by the prosecution cannot even be given any probative value
In addition, even if the Court disregards this procedural rule, the DOH-Price List still fails to establish that
the Paracetamol Suspension purchased from Aegis was exorbitant There is no indication whatsoever
whether the prices in Item No. 278 of the DOH-Central Price List - that is, P5.63 and P9.50 - pertain to the
same brand, features, specifications as those actually purchased by the DOH-NCR from Aegis. For one, the
price list does not clearly show the suppliers of the medicine with the prices of P5.63 and P9.50. Also, while
the price list indicates paracetamol syrup/suspension, it is highly improbable that the prices P5.63 and
P9.50 pertain to both when the prosecution itself admitted that Paracetamol Syrup is different from
Paracetamol Suspension.
g. The Court, in fact, finds that petitioners were able to sufficiently establish that Paracetamol Syrup and
Paracetamol Suspension have different specifications, which could account for the difference in their
prices. Ma. Teresita Florentino Ocampo, wife of petitioner Ocampo and the Assistant General Manager of
Aegis in charge of product research, formulation and registration with the Bureau of Food and Drugs,
clarified the difference between the two. Further, on questions from the Sandiganbayan, petitioner
Ocampo, the General Manager of Aegis in charge of product pricing, testified: “That he had been engaged
in the pharmacy business since the 1960s. x x x He directly manufactured all their products and imported

all raw materials. In explaining the difference between a syrup and suspension, accused Ocampo said that
syrup is transparent while suspension is opaque because it has more sugar, more flavors and it undergoes
a "cold process." In terms of production, suspension is more expensive because they have to use brand
new bottles unlike in syrup where recycled bottles may be used because of its alcohol content. Both have
the same shelf life and efficacy but syrup has more side effects because of its alcohol contents. More
doctors prescribe suspension because of its palatability and safe use. Flavors are not used in syrup because
it makes the alcohol more evident.” The prosecution failed to adduce any clear and convincing proof to
controvert the spouses Ocampo's testimony. Apart from insisting that Paracetamol Syrup and Paracetamol
Suspension have the same price in the DOH-Price List, no other evidence was offered by the prosecution
to show that Paracetamol Syrup and Paracetamol Suspension actually have the same specifications and
features. Again, it must be stressed that the determination of overpricing must be based on a canvass or
comparison of the prices of goods identical to that purchased in the questioned transaction.
h. As regards the prices indicated in the 1994 Abstract of Bids, the Court finds the same unreliable considering
that petitioners were able to establish that Lumar in fact won in the 1994 public bidding conducted by the
DOHNCR. Camposano testified that she was designated chairperson of the BAC in 1994. She explained that
Lumar's bid was considered because Foramen did not qualify because it offered Ferrous Fumarate which
is a different drug and that its Certificate of Product Registration was already expired. Camposano's
testimony is supported by the Notice of Award dated October 21, 1994 issued in favor of Lumar. The
prosecution, however, failed to controvert petitioners' claim that Lumar in fact won the 1994 public bidding
of DOH-NCR and that Foramen was not qualified. Thus, following the Court's ruling in Sajul, it would be
unfair to conclude that Lumar's medicines were overpriced on the basis alone of the bid price of only one
company, the qualifications of which have not been sufficiently established. It is worse, as the
Sandiganbayan held, to conclude an overprice by using as comparison the price of one who was
disqualified, i.e., Foramen.
i. These pieces of evidence presented by petitioners - all unrebutted and unrefuted by the prosecution - cast
serious doubt on the sufficiency of the prosecution's evidence and should have led the Sandiganbayan to
question the veracity of the prosecution's allegation that the purchased medicines were overpriced.
Indeed, "[t]he legal teaching in our jurisprudence is that the evidence adduced must be closely examined
under the lens of the judicial microscope" such that conviction must rest no less than on hard evidence
showing that the accused, with moral certainty, is guilty of the crime charged. If the evidence is susceptible
of two interpretations, one consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his
guilt, then the Court is duty bound to acquit the accused. The overriding consideration in criminal cases is
not whether the Court doubts the innocence of the accused but whether it entertains a reasonable doubt
as to his guilt - if there exists even one iota of doubt, this Court is "under a long-standing legal injunction"
to resolve the doubt in favor of the accused. (Macarian v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 215104, March
82. The third element of R.A. 3019, Section 3(e) was not proven in the instant consolidated cases. It cannot
reasonably be said that the purchase of 10,000 bottles of Paracetamol Suspension and 1,500 bottles of Ferrous
Sulfate with Vitamin B Complex and Folic Acid gave Aegis and Lumar unwarranted benefits because, as
discussed, the prosecution failed to prove evident bad faith and manifest partiality on the part of petitioners.
Neither is there proof beyond reasonable doubt of the undue injury or damage caused to the government in
the amounts of P193,700.00 and P219,945.00, as alleged in the Informations, because the prosecution also
failed to establish with moral certainty that the questioned transactions were actually overpriced. It bears
emphasis that the evidence in this case supports petitioners' assertion that their acts were simply based on
their honest belief that the questioned transactions were warranted. The procurement of 10,000 bottles of
Paracetamol Suspension and 1,500 bottles of Ferrous Sulfate with Vitamin B Complex and Folic Acid were
emergency purchases and were based on the results of the previous bidding conducted by the DOH-NCR - a
policy adopted by the agency to ensure that all future purchases are advantageous to the government. There
is likewise no iota of proof that petitioners in this case profited from the questioned transactions. Following
Martel, it is not enough that unwarranted benefits were given to another or that there was damage to the
government as a result of a violation of a law, rule or regulation. The acts constituting the elements of a violation
of R.A. 3019 must be effected with corrupt intent, a dishonest design, or some unethical interest – which are
clearly wanting in this case.
a. The granting of unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference or the causing of undue injury to the
government must be inextricably linked to the existence of fraudulent or corrupt motive on the part of the
accused. (Macarian v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 215104, March 18, 2021, First Division)
83. Petitioner acted with manifest partiality and evident bad faith in the procurement of Felta’s products due to
the absence of a competitive bidding as well as his defiance of the DepEd’s moratorium on the purchase of IT
packages. The Sandiganbayan explained: “Besides, the accused cannot successfully seek refuge under the above
provisions of the procurement law and justify the acquisition of the subject instructional materials because he
was precisely precluded from doing so pursuant to the directive of the DepEd national head office. Therefore,
there cannot be any dispute that the accused acted with evident bad faith for his blatant defiance of an
outstanding official directive which caused the government to suffer damages in the amount of P4,776,786.00.
What made the matter worse is the fact that the accused has not been able to come up with any reliable proof

to show that the procured items had at all been delivered. The three (3) Delivery Receipts Nos. 19134, 19135
and 19136 all dated July 20, 2007 which the accused mentioned in his verified answer to the notice of
suspension were never produced during trial, much less formally offered, which thus precludes the court from
treating them as evidence. Neither did the defense present any of the supposed beneficiaries of the said items
to debunk the findings in the audit report which negate that delivery of the same has ever been made. Even if
it will be conceded for the nonce that accused did not have a clear apprehension of what he was then doing, it
behooves upon him somehow to have exercised reasonable degree of caution and sound judgment before
stamping his approval on the official documents. It should be stressed that the amount involved is not
insignificant thus, it should not have been too much to make prior consultations with other concerned officials
if only to ensure that the prospective transaction would be devoid of any irregularity. However, the accused
clearly failed to exercise any modicum of precaution and appeared to have callously disregarded the pernicious
consequence of his action. At the very least then, his act can be characterized as constitutive of gross
inexcusable negligence.” (Nieves v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 237432-33, April 28, 2021, Third Division)
84. Petitioner is mistaken when he maintained that the lack of public bidding alone did not constitute evident bad
faith especially in the absence of proof beyond reasonable doubt that the government suffered undue injury
from the transaction with Felta.
a. It is explicit from R.A. 9184 that all procurement by all branches of the government, its departments, offices
and agencies, including GOCCs and LGUs shall be done through competitive bidding, excepts those
provided under Article XVI of the law. Obviously, the law covers procurement by the DepEd, a department
under the Executive Branch.
b. Besides, to justify resort to any of the alternative methods of procurement, the following conditions must
exist: (i) there is prior approval of the Head of the Procuring Entity on the use of alternative methods of
procurement, as recommended by the BAC; (ii) the conditions required by law for the use of alternative
methods are present; and (iii) the method chosen promotes economy and efficiency, and that the most
advantageous price for the government is obtained.
c. Aside from the bare assertion that the transaction involves the procurement of goods of proprietary nature,
petitioner miserably failed to prove the other conditions. There was no allegation that direct contracting
was justified by the advantagrous price for the government. Worse, there is no legitimate BAC Resolution
allowing the use of the alternative methods of procurement inasmuch as the DepEd already issued an
earlier order imposing a ban on the purchase of research materials. (Nieves v. People of the Philippines,
G.R. No. 237432-33, April 28, 2021, Third Division)
85. The Information charged petitioner with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 when, through his actions,
characterized by manifest partiality, Felta was given unwarranted benefit, advantage, and preference. In order
to be guilty under this mode, it suffices that the accused has given unjustified favor or benefit to another, in the
exercise of his official, administrative, or judicial functions. Lamentably for petitioner, he did just that. The fact
that he failed to observe the requirements of R.A. 9184, not to mention the moratorium imposed by the DepEd,
proves that unwarranted benefit, advantage, or preference was given to the winning supplier, Felta. To stress,
the IT packages were procured without the benefit of a fair system in determining the best possible price for
the government. Felta was able to proft from the transaction absent any showing that its prices were the most
beneficial to the government. For that, petitioner must now face the consequences of his acts. (Nieves v. People
of the Philippines, G.R. No. 237432-33, April 28, 2021, Third Division)
86. None of the modes (i.e., manifest partiality, evident bad faith, and gross inexcusable negligence) were
established in this case.
a. Foremost, the SWAs attached to the records would reveal that Macasil was not the officer who certified
the percentage of completion of the infrastructure projects and their compliance with the approved plans
and specifications. The SWAs contained three certifications signed by the contractor, the project engineer,
and the materials engineer. As can be gleaned from the certifications, it is the contractor who certified that
the amount and work accomplished are correct while it is the Project Engineer who certified that the work
items have been accomplished in accordance with the approved plans and specifications of the project.
Incidentally, DPWH Department Order No. 115, series of 2018, provides that the duty to check/verify
statement of work accomplished, among others, pertains to the Project Engineer. DPWH's Department
Memorandum dated April 12, 1994 (Circular No. 49) also states that a project shall be the responsibility of
the Project Engineer.
b. In addition, the Memorandum listed down the tasks of a Materials Engineer for the purpose of fixing the
responsibility where quality and quantity of construction materials are concerned. Macasil's name appears
on the third certification which guarantees the quality of the materials used, and the fact that such
materials underwent and passed the required tests. Pertinently, the DPWH Staffing Manual enumerates
the duties and responsibilities of a Materials Engineer, namely: (i) ascertain that all materials incorporated
into the work pass the requirements of the DPWH Standard Specifications for Highways, Bridges, Airports,
and to strictly comply with the schedule of Minimum Testing Requirements; (ii) advise the Project Engineer
on the acceptance or rejection of construction materials intended for use in the project, based on test
results; (iii) recommend to the Project Engineer remedial measures for the correction of unsatisfactory
conditions of materials; (iv) check/certify design mixes prepared by contractors for concrete and

bituminous mixtures; (v) fully acquaint himself with the standard procedures of sampling, testing and
control; (vi) see that the field laboratory is adequately equipped such that the progress of the work will not
be impeded to laboratory testing and non-performance of tests should not be a cause of delay in the
prosecution of the work; (vii) keep a record of the daily activities ready for inspection anytime; and (viii)
submit within the required time frame test reports and other pertinent papers to the Regional Office
concerned.
c. Thus, the DPWH's Department Memorandum and Staffing Manual has delineated the scope of the
functions of a Materials Engineer which mainly revolves around ensuring the quality of materials used in
an infrastructure project. In this case, there is no controversy with regard to the quality of the materials
used in the questioned infrastructure projects. To reiterate, the charges leveled against Macasil refer to
the overstatement in the SWAs and the non-compliance of the projects with the approved plans and
specifications. Hence, if would be unjust and unreasonable to indict Macasil simply because he was part of
the supposed anomalous projects, even if the alleged illegal act is beyond the scope of his functions. The
sheer volume of the projects is likewise insufficient to deduce any illegal act, absent specific facts that
demonstrate Macasil's manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or inexcusable negligence. At any rate, it is
axiomatic that good faith is always presumed, unless convincing evidence to the contrary is adduced. The
party alleging bad faith has the burden of proof. Absent clear evidence of bad faith, the presumption of
good faith prevails. (Macasil v. Fraud Audit and Investigation Office, G.R. No. 226898, May 11, 2021, En
Banc)
87. Manifest partiality and evident bad faith are not proven. In this case, Roque as the procurement officer, issued
the purchase orders subject of the transactions after it had undergone various layers of review from his
superiors. When the paper work reached him, various certifications accompanied the requisitions including the
prescription of branded medicines made by the doctors from the technical personnel division, certificate of
zero stocks of the medicines, as well as certifications that the suppliers are the exclusive distributors of the
prescribed branded medicines. Renales, as price monitoring officer, merely stated that the prices of the
branded medicines were not canvassed because the medicines listed in the requisition and issue vouchers were
under sole or exclusive distributorship as evidenced by certifications issued by the suppliers. To this Court's
mind, Roque's and Renales' reliance on the certification and specification issued by the doctors from the
Medical Therapeutic Board as well as the technical personnel division, who have medical background and are
more familiar or knowledgeable with pharmaceutical products, cannot be stretched to mean that they acted in
evident bad faith and/or with manifest partiality. Reliance on the expertise of appropriate personnel cannot be
equated with fraudulent and corrupt design. In the absence of clear evidence showing the elements of evident
bad faith and /or manifest partiality, Roque and Renales cannot be convicted of the crime charged.
a. In Sistoza v. Desierto, the Court held that mere bad faith or partiality are not enough for one to be held
liable under the law since the act of bad faith or partiality must be evident or manifest, respectively. For an
act to be considered as exhibiting “manifest partiality,” there must be a showing of a clear, notorious, or
plain inclination or predilection to favor one side rather than the other. “Evident bad faith,” on the other
hand, contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design, or some motive of self-
interest or ill will for ulterior purpose. Evident bad faith connotes a manifest and deliberate intent on the
part of the accused to do wrong or cause damage. Because evident bad faith entails manifest deliberate
intent to do wrong, it must be shown that the accused was spurred by any corrupt motive.
b. In Villarosa v. People of the Philippines, Villarosa, who was a municipal mayor, rroneously believed that he
has the power to issue extraction permits to several quarry operators in the area. However, under the Local
Government Code (LGC), only the Provincial Governor may issue extraction permits. Hence, the action of
Villarosa is contrary to the LGC and therefore, illegal. Be that as it may, this Court acquitted Villarosa from
violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 upon finding that Villarosa did not act in bad faith. This Court held
that a violation of the LGC does not automatically equate to evident bad faith as an element of Section 3(e)
of R.A. 3019. This Court stressed that an independent finding of furtive and fraudulent design should still
be established beyond reasonable doubt. (Renales v. People of the Philippines, G.R. Nos. 231530-33, June
88. The third element of violation of R.A. 3019, Section 3(e) is likewise unproven.
a. In this case, it can be observed that the prosecution failed to prove any undue injury suffered by the
Government because of the emergency purchase of the medicines from the five suppliers. The
Sandiganbayan itself even acknowledged that the prosecution failed to prove the fact of overpricing in the
medicines purchased by the accused. To be able to show that indeed the government suffered damage,
the prosecution should have canvassed and should have compared the prices of the branded medicines
purchased by the accused to the exact brands sold by other suppliers. The difference of the prices, if any,
would prove the presence of undue injury to the government. However, this was not done. Hence, there
is no actual basis for Sandiganbayan to conclude that the government suffered undue injury because of the
emergency purchase of the subject medicines.
b. Even under the second mode, which is by giving any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage, or
preference, the prosecution failed to prove that the five suppliers of the subject medicines were favored.
In this case, it cannot be said that Roque and Renales, by undertaking their specific duties as procurement
officer and price monitoring officer, respectively, gave unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference to

the medicine suppliers. As comprehensively discussed, Roque and Renales merely relied on the
certifications of the doctors from the Medical Therapeutic Board and the technical division. They did not
personally choose from whom to purchase the medicines. The prosecution did not even attempt to show
any connection between Roque, Renales, and their co-accused, on one hand, and the medicine suppliers,
on the other, to back the claim that the accused preferred the suppliers.
c. In Martel v. People, the Court held that in cases of violation of R.A. 3019, Section 3(e) by giving any private
party any unwarranted benefit, advantage, or preference, it is not enough that the benefits, advantage, or
preference was obtained in transgression of laws, rules, and regulations, such as the procurement laws.
The benefits must have been given by the accused public officer to the private party with corrupt intent,
dishonest design, or some unethical interest, to be consistent with the spirit of R.A. 3019, which centers
on the concept of graft and corruption. In this case, Roque, Renales, and their co-accused did not deny the
absence of public bidding and their resort to emergency mode of procurement. However, this alone is not
sufficient to conclude that the suppliers were preferred. Based on the evidence on record, there is no
showing that pecuniary benefit went to the Roque, Renales, and their co-accused or to any other person
or entity. Hence, no graft and corruption transpired. The fact that the Sandiganbayan itself was not able to
find over pricing in the purchase of medicines is a strong indication that Roque and Renales were not
motivated by corrupt intent, dishonest motive, and ill-will as procurement officer and price monitoring
officer, respectively. The absence of these elements debunks the finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt
upon Roque and Renales. (Renales v. People of the Philippines, G.R. Nos. 231530-33, June 16, 2021, First
Division)
89. The lack of public bidding alone, or the violation of procurement laws, is not enough to support the conviction
of a public official for violation of R.A. 3019, Section 3(e). The burden to prove that all the elements of the crime
are present beyond reasonable doubt rests on the prosecution. (Renales v. People of the Philippines, G.R. Nos.
231530-33, June 16, 2021, First Division)
90. In the case at bar, the Ombudsman correctly found that Jamorabo could not be held liable for violating Section
3(e) through the first mode because the loan had been paid in full. Well settled is the rule that in a prosecution
for violation of Section 3(e) through causing undue injury, proof of actual injury or damage must be shown.
Contrary to the BSP's position, undue injury in Sec. 3(e) cannot be presumed even after a wrong or a violation
of a right has been established. While Jamorabo's loan is indeed a violation of R.A. No. 7653, the BSP was unable
to show how such violation caused actual damage or injury to any party, much less to RBKSI.
a. The BSP argues that Jamorabo should still be charged with violating Section 3(e) through the second mode.
It argues that Jamorabo's loan arrangement with RBKSI conferred the latter with the unwarranted benefit
of escaping BSP detection and sanction for the unauthorized loan, specifically by deliberately designating
his wife as the principal borrower and scheduling the loan payments before the next scheduled regular
examination of RBKSI. On this point, the Court approvingly cites the Ombudsman's findings: “As for the
alleged giving of unwarranted benefits to the bank, this Office finds the same unmeritorious. There was no
showing of any concrete benefit given to the Rural Bank of Kiamba, Inc. at the time respondent's loan was
granted. The bank officers' silence or inaction over the matter resulting in the non-discovery of the loan,
cannot be considered an unwarranted benefit but rather an irregular act or lapse of judgment on their
part.” It bears repeating that both Nero and Falgui – who were the general manager and the president of
RBKSI, respectively – objected to Jamorabo's loan application. As alleged in Nero's affidavit, Falgui only
approved the loan out of fear of offending Jamorabo. Furthermore, RBKSI did not really gain the benefit of
escaping detection since it reported the loan to the BSP in the course of its next regular examination.
(Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. N. 201069, June 16, 2021, First Division)
91. The guilt of accused-appellant Yabut and petitioner Montejo were proven beyond reasonable doubt.
a. At the time of the questioned transactions, the governing law is R.A. 7160, which requires that
procurements should be done through a public bidding except when the circumstances allow for the
alternative methods of procurement. Section 356 of R.A. 7160 states that, as a general rule, acquisition of
supplies by LGUs shall be through competitive bidding. Section 366 meanwhile provides that the
procurement of supplies may be made without the benefit of public bidding under any of the following
modes: (i) personal canvass of responsible merchants, (ii) emergency purchase, (iii) negotiated purchase,
(iv) direct purchase from manufacturers or exclusive distributors, and (v) purchase from other government
entities.
b. In SB-06-CRM-0457 and 0458, the Court affirms the findings of the Sandiganbayan that no actual bidding
took place for the constructive purchases of the desk fans. The purchases were made with evident bad
faith and carried out with manifest partiality on the part of the accused public officials to favor Raechel
Shopper’s Plaza, a pre-determined supplier, which is owned by accused-appellant Yabut. In fact, none of
the supposed substitute members to the Committee on Awards were able to explain in detail how they
were informed of the bidding allegedly held on November 19, 2002. On record, one witness claimed that
she received the notice on November 18, 2002, but retracted her testimony when it was made known to
her that their office only received the notice on November 19, 2002, or on the same day of the bidding. As
aptly found by the Sandiganbayan, while there was a Notice to Bid (notice) attached to DV No. 221-2002-
11-065 pertaining to the purchase of the desk fans subject of SB-06-CRM-0457, the notice stated “Drugs

and Medicines, Tires, and Tube” wit the words “and others” but were typed in a different font indicating
that it was a mere afterthought. Acaylar, the person who prepared the notice denied knowledge of the
apparent difference in the font used in the words “and others,” and admitted that she had no knowledge
as to how the prospective bidders were notified.
c. Notably, Sections 357(a) and 365 of R.A. 7160 are instructive as to what constitutes the “lowest complying
and responsible bid.” Section 357(a) states that it refers to the proposal of one who offers the lowest price,
meets all the technical specifications and requirements of the supplies desired and, as a dealer in the line
of supplies involved, maintains a regular establishment, and has complied consistently with previous
commitments. Section 365 further states that awards in the procurement of supplies shall be given to the
lowest complying and responsible bid which meets all the terms and conditions of the contract or
undertaking. In this case, the notice made no mention of the quantity, specifications, and technical
descriptions of the desk fans sought to be purchased by the Province. Clearly, the notice is insufficient in
form as to properly notify the suppliers including accused-appellant Yabut of the bidding, quantity,
specifications, and technical descriptions of the desk fans. More importantly, the bidding was done hastily
only after a day from its posting at the GSO. Indubitably, from the words of the Sandiganbayan, “the lack
of specifications for the desk fans begs the question as to how the accused were able to determine which
bids were most advantageous to the Government.” If the procedures laid down in Articles 432 to 434 and
436 of Rule XXXV of the IRR of R.A. 7160 were followed, then the supporting documents starting from the
purchase request would have been sequentially dated, which is not the case herein. In SB-16-CRM-0457,
the dates of the supporting documents attached to D.V. No. 221200211065 are jumbled, showing that the
process as mentioned above, was not followed and thereby reinforcing the prosecution’s claim that no
bidding was actually conducted. In particular, the purchase request was dated November 13 2002; the
Notice of Bidders was dated November 13, 2002; the date of bidding or abstract was dated November 19,
2002; the purchase order was dated November 21, 2002; the Delivery Receipt was dated November 19,
2002; the Sales invoice was dated November 20, 2002; the Inspection and Acceptance Report was dated
November 22, 2022; the Disbursement Voucher was dated November 22, 2002; and the Check was dated
November 25, 2002. Meanwhile, in SB-06-CRM-0458, involving the purchase of 1,000 desk fans, the
supporting documents to D.V. No. 221-2002-12-083 are as follows: the purchase request was dated
December 10, 2002; the date of bidding was dated December 17, 2002; the purchase order was dated
December 18, 2002; the delivery receipt was dated December 16 and 19, 2002; the sales invoice was dated
“18 December ___;” the inspection and acceptance report was dated December 16, 2002; the
disbursement voucher was dated December 19, 2002; the Check was dated December 20, 2002; and the
requisition and issue slip was dated December 19, 2002. In SB-16-CRM-0457, it is obvious that there was
delivery before there was purchase, per DR dated November 19, 2002 which was ahead of the purchase of
the purchase per PO dated November 21, 2002. Worse, from the records, the delivery happened on the
same day of the alleged bidding.
d. The Sandiganbayan also rightfully observed substantial discrepancies in the testimonies of the accused and
their witnesses. Accused-appellant Yabut claimed that he had a representative who attended the bids
subject of SB-06-CRM-0457 and 0458, and he was immediately informed that they won the bid. Yet, his
testimony was contradicted by the testimonies of other defense witnesses such as Acaylar, who testified
that no bidders actually attended the bidding. During cross-examination, Ms. Pelayo testified that on the
bidding allegedly held on November 19, 2002, only her, Daganzo, Villacorte, and petitioner Montejo were
present, while the bidding allegedly conducted on December 17, 2002 was only attended by Daganzo,
Mahinay, Pelayo, and petitioner Montejo. Similarly, the invitation to bid stated that bids were to be
submitted on November 17, 2002, or two days before the bidding on November 19, 2002. However, as
testified to by Januario Arnaiz, the Publisher and Editor-in-Chief of Samar Reporter in 2002, the notice was
published in the Samar Reporter on November 19, 2002, or on the same day of the alleged bidding, which
is in clear violation of the IRR of R.A. 7160 that requires publication of calls for bids at least ten (10) calendar
days prior to the opening of bids, unless otherwise directed by the committee on awards. Publication must
also be made in at least three (3) publicly accessible and conspicuous places in the provincial capitol, or
city, municipal, or barangay hall. As the Sandiganbayan accurately puts it, “it would have been practically
impossible for bidders to have been properly informed of the bidding, especially considering that only one
posting was made for the same, and that the said notice did not even mention or include desk fans.”
Veritably, in SB-06-CRM-0458, what is apparent is that there there was no notice to bidders. There was no
notice published in a newspaper of general circulation in the locality, or posted in conspicuous places in
the Province in compliance with the requirements for procurement under the IRR of RA 7160. Further, a
closer look at the supporting documents as aforementioned would reveal that the inspection of the
procured items took place on December 16, 2002 or ahead of the bidding which was allegedly held on
December 17, 2002. The DR also carries an intercalation showing that the delivery happened either 16 or
19 of December 2002. Thus, the Court adheres to the findings of the Sandiganbayan that the prosecution
was able to establish that there was no public bidding that actually took place for the consecutive purchases
of the desk fans, and that there was connivance between the pre-determined suppliers, one of which was
accused-appellant Yabut as the owner of Raechel Shopper's Plaza, and the public officials involved. There
was a manifest partiality towards accused-appellant Yabut who was able to supply the desk fans despite
the notice's lack of specifications, technical descriptions, and quantity of the items sought to be purchased
by the Province.

e. With regard to SB-06-CRM-0459 to 0464, the main issue is whether the procurement of assorted goods
subject of SB-06-CRM-0459 and 0462 to 0464 and of asserted medicines subject of SB-06-CRM-0460 and
0461 are classified as emergency purchases that would no longer require a public bidding. As summarized
by the Sandiganbayan, the following are the series of events that are material to the resolution of SB-06-
CRM-0459 to 0464, to wit: (i) on 2 October 2001, the Local Health Board of Gandara, Samar, approved a
"Resolution Requesting Funds from Hon. Mila Tan, Provincial Governor, Province of Samar, needed for the
Procurement of Medicines;" (ii) on 7 November 2001 Public Storm Signal No. 2 was raised over the Province
of Western Samar in view of Tropical Depression Nanang; (iii) from 9 November 2001 to 13 November 2001
relief goods consisting of rice, noodles, and sardines were distributed by the Provincial Government to
affected constituents; (iv) on 13 November 2001, accused Tan sent a letter to the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan, requesting for a resolution declaring the Province of Samar as a calamity area in view of the
damage brought about by "Typhoon Nanang," and another resolution seeking financial assistance from the
Office of the President through the Chairman of the National Disaster Coordinating Council (NDCC); (v) on
21 November 2001, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan approved Resolution No. 88-2001 dated 15 November
2001 entitled "Resolution Declaring the Entire Province of Samar as a Calamity Area Caused by Typhoon
Nanang," recognizing that the said typhoon hit the Province of Samar on 6 November 2001, causing
damage to crops and infrastructure; (vi) between 4 to 7 December 2001, Tropical Storm Quedan passed
through the south of Samar. At its strongest. Storm Signal No. 2 was raised over the Province. This was at
around 8:00 p.m. of 4 December 2001. There is no evidence of any Resolution issued by the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of Samar or the NDCC declaring the Province to be under a state of calamity; (vii) on 2
December 2001, accused Tan signed a Purchase Request for the procurement of 3,000 sacks of commercial
rice, 502 boxes of Hakata sardines, and 564 boxes of Maggi noodles for distribution to barangays affected
by "Typhoon Kidang." The mode of procurement was by means of emergency purchase, and the winning
supplier was determined to be Wilmart's Minimart, which is located in Tacloban City and owned by Marilou
G. Ty. The quotation, release of the ALOBS, purchase delivery, and inspection of the said items were all
dated on the same day; (viii) on 14 December 2001, accused Tan signed two Purchase Requests for the
procurement of assorted medicine, all of which the Provincial Government was able to eventually procure
through emergency purchase; (ix) separate purchases were purportedly made from Rilem Pharmacy and
Medic Aid Distributors through Alex Sotto, who allegedly offered the lowest prices per canvass; (x) on 18,
19, and 20 December 2001, accused Tan signed Purchase Requests for the Procurement of the certain
items; and (xi) all of the said purchases for assorted goods were made from Wilmar's Minimart.
f. When Luz Cabuenas Tacal, the Provincial Social Welfare Development Officer testified as to the
procurement of assorted goods and medicines, she admitted that it was the Tropical Depression Nanang
that hit Samar on November 7, 2001 which brought forth the destruction of the Province, but she also
clarified that the relief operations started on November 9, 2001 and ended on November 13, 2001. Thus,
the procurement of the assorted goods and medicines which were allegedly intended to address the
emergency and calamity caused by the Tropical Depression Nanang becomes highly suspect because
clearly, the questioned purchases happened on December 14, 18, and 19, 2001, or after the relief and
distribution operations already ended. While it is true that another weather disturbance named Typhoon
Kidang hit the Province on December 4, 2001, however, the Province was not placed under a state of
calamity making the alleged emergency purchases more doubtful. From the words of the Sandiganbayan,
thus: “x x x the prosecution's evidence proves that there was no actual calamity or emergency that justified
the resort to emergency purchases. While reference is made to a "Typhoon Kidang," accused failed to
present evidence that the Province was placed under a state of calamity, or even that requests for relief
were made because of Tropical Storm Quedan. In other words, the evidence shows that the emergency
purchases were attended by evident bad faith, and resorted to only to avoid competitive public bidding.”
g. The Court finds that while there is reasonable doubt on the undue injury caused to the Government by
reason of the questioned purchases, the prosecution established that accused gave any private party any
unwarranted benefit, advantage, or preference. In this case, there were no personal canvasses from the
other suppliers which would otherwise support the allegation that the items procured from the alleged
winning bidders were overpriced. In other words, there is no way for the Court to compare the prices of
these questionable purchases. Hence, the allegation that the Province could have bought the items at the
lowest bid price possible lacks merit. Further, the testimonies of accused Legaspi and accused Bardaje, Jr.
regarding the absence of deliveries of the purchased items at the time they did an inspection does not
negate the possibility that there could have been subsequent deliveries at a much later date. However,
petitioner Montejo is likewise charged with having given unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference to
private suppliers. Under the second mode, no damage is required for successful prosecution thereof, thus:
“However, in SB-06-CRM-0457 and 0458, the fact that no legitimate public biddings were conducted for
the purchase of desk fans clearly show that undue preference or unjustified favor was accorded to Raechel
Shopper's Plaza, owned by accused Yabut. The same is true win respect to the purchase of medicine in SB-
06-CRM-0460 and 0461 end assorted goods in SB-06-CRM-0459 and 0462 to 0464, although the Court
notes that the favored suppliers – Alex L. Sotto, from when the medicines were said to have been
purchased, and Marilou C. Ty, proprietor of Wilmar's Mini Mart from where the assorted good were
purchased - have not been impleaded as accused. Such fact, however, is not fatal to the prosecution of
accused public officials for their respective liabilities.”

h. Petitioner Montejo, as Provincial Administrative Officer IV, is expected to know the general rule on
procurement under RA 7160 and its IRR and is bound by law to strictly follow the procedure, inasmuch as
accused Gov. Tee Tan is. In this case, it is well-founded that both accused Gov. Tee Tan and petitioner
Montejo, in the discharge of their official functions, blatantly failed to follow the procedure to favor private
suppliers, who were personally chosen, which included accused-appellant Yabut. As the Sandiganbayan
puts it, the process provided under RA 7160 is to assure transparency and to make sure that a competitive
public bidding is conducted. Petitioner Montejo and accused Gov. Tee Tan, having clearly deviated from
the procedure, must discharge the burden of providing the Court with explanations or justifications for
their noncompliance, which they failed to do so. Accordingly, the knowledge and active participation of
herein petitioner Montejo, being the Provincial Administrative Officer IV, in facilitating the signing of the
documents in the absence of a public bidding, noncompliance with the requirements of RA 7160, and
despite the lack of actual inspection and delivery of the purchased items, made him liable for violation of
Section 3(e) of RA 3019 in SB-06-CRM-0457 and 0458; and in SB-06-CRM-0459 to 0464. To strengthen
further his guilt in the purchase of desk fans, petitioner Montejo appeared to be the only accused to have
attended and facilitated the simulated biddings. Consequently, unwarranted benefit, advantage or
preference was given to accused-appellant Yabut who supplied the desk fans without the benefit of a fair
system to determine the best possible price for the government. In the absence of proof that his prices
were the most beneficial to the government, accused-appellant Yabut is presumed to have profited from
the transactions.
i. Under the foregoing circumstances, accused-appellant Yabut is equally guilty in the commission of the
wrongful acts by accused public officials. His unlawful participation as the pre-designated bidder was
specifically manifested in his act of making the bidding documents appear that the questionable purchases
were made through a legitimate public bidding, despite noncompliance with RA 7160 and its IRR, coupled
with his eventual receipt of payment therefor despite lack of actual delivery of the desk fans at the time of
inspection. (Montejo v. People of the Philippines, G.R. Nos. 248086-93, June 28, 2021, Third Division)
SECTION 3(G)
1. Petitioner Dela Cruz erred in asserting that, as a private individual, she cannot be held liable under Section 3(g)
of R.A. 3019. Private persons acting in conspiracy with public officers who entered into a contract or transaction
on behalf of the government, with such contract or transaction being grossly and manifestly disadvantageous
to the government, may be held liable for violation of R.A. 3019, Section 3(g). (Granada v. People of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 184092, February 22, 2017, Second Division; Garcia-Diaz v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No.
2. Petitioners cannot be said to have violated R.A. 3019, Section 3(g) since the evidence has not established that
the transactions could have been disadvantageous to the government. The evidence of the prosecution only
confirmed that sampel SLTDs were secured from three different divisions of RegionXI, but not from DECS-Davao
Oriental whichw as the subject of its audit; and that SLTDs, at a unit each, were purchased from Berovan and
AMESCO.
a. The term “manifest” means that it is evident to the senses, open, obvious, notorious, and unmistakable.
On the other hand, “disadvantageous” is defined as unfavorable or prejudicial. (Miranda v. Sandiganbayan,
G.R. Nos. 144760-61, August 2, 2017, Second Division)
3. The crime of violation of R.A. 3019, Section 3(g) was not committed. Records show that respondents held a
public bidding twice before it agreed to the bid price of Wong. The price falls within the amount that it is
authorized to sell. They also sought the clearance of the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel before
pushing through with the sale. Their acts show that they exercised due diligence and sound business judgment
before executing the sale. There is likewise no showing that they violated any rule or process in granting the
sale of the properties to Wong. And although it is not an element to the offense, the sale does not seem to be
tainted with any partiality, bad faith, or negligence. The law requires that the contract must be grossly and
manifestly disadvantageous to the government or that it be entered into with malice. It does not find guilt on
the mere entering of a contract by mistake. Thus, it cannot be said that the contract was grossly
disadvantageous to the government. (Canlas v. Bongolan, G.R. No. 199625, June 6, 2018, Third Division)
4. There was gross and manifest disadvantage caused to the Province of Quirino when Governor Co purchased
the reconditioned heavy equipment, contrary to Resolution No. 120 and Resolution No. 06-A. In addition,
Provincial Engineer Ringor’s recommendation did not justify her deviation from the terms of the
aforementioned resolutions. A resolution is a declaration of the will of a municipal corporation or local
government unit on a given matter. In the case at bar, the inclination of the Province of Quirino, as shown by
Resolution No. 120 and Resolution No. 06-A, was evidently to procure brand new heavy machinery. To its
prejudice, however, Gov. Co caused the expenditure of public funds allotted for that purpose on reconditioned
equipment instead. Worse, she did so knowingly. When she entered into the loan with the PNB and the sale
with Nakajima Trading, she was well aware of the existence and tenor of Resolution No. 120. She likewise knew,
prior to the sale, that the subject equipment was merely reconditioned and not brand new as required by the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan. Nonetheless, to the detriment of the province, she pushed through with the
transaction. To the Court, this act clearly caused gross and manifest disadvantage to the government. The

record shows that even prior to the date of the loan, the Office of the Provincial Engineer had already informed
Gov. Co that the province could not afford brand new equipment. In a letter dated October 31, 1995, Engr.
Ringor recommended that the province purchase reconditioned machinery due to insufficiency of funds. Given
the foregoing recommendation of Engr. Ringor, Gov. Co was duty-bound to inform the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan that the funds allotted by the province were insufficient for brand new heavy equipment. She was
likewise obliged to defer contracting with Nakajima Trading until the province had given her the appropriate
authority to purchase reconditioned equipment. However, in defiance of the unequivocal will of the province,
she proceeded with the sale.
a. In her defense, Gov. Co turned to Engr. Ringor's recommendation. Gov. Co posited that she bought
reconditioned equipment because the provincial engineer raised the insufficiency of the stun loaned from
the PNB and recommended that the province acquire reconditioned machinery. Invoking Arias vs.
Sandiganbayan, she argued that her reliance on his statement should serve as a basis for exoneration. She
stated that when the allegedly disadvantageous agreement reached her, the same was already prepared
and that it was prepared at the Office of the Provincial Engineer. She thus maintained that she should not
be faulted for her good faith reliance on Engr. Ringor's recommendation. Her argument is bereft of merit.
Under the Arias doctrine, all heads of offices have to rely to a reasonable extent on their subordinates and
on the good faith of those who prepare bids, purchase supplies, or enter into negotiations. In this case, the
Court finds that Resolution No. 120 should have prompted Gov. Co to be more circumspect in transacting
with Nakajima Trading. To reiterate, the resolution clearly directed her to procure brand new heavy
equipment. Notwithstanding the tenor of the resolution, however, she contracted with Nakajima Trading
for reconditioned equipment and effected the consequent expenditure of public funds thereon. All this, to
the prejudice of the Province of Quirino. Gov. Co cannot now plead her innocence by simply shifting the
blame to Engr. Ringor. Knowing that the resolution explicitly granted her authority to purchase brand new
equipment, she should have dealt with Nakajima Trading more prudently. Between the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan, which authorized her to purchase brand new equipment, on one hand and the Office of the
Provincial Engineer, which recommended reconditioned equipment due to insufficiency of funds, on the
other, she owed obedience to the former, the same being the legislative branch of the local government
unit of which she was the chief executive.
b. In another attempt to escape liability, Gov. Co introduced into evidence Sangguniang Panlalawigan
Resolution No. 205, which, according to her, ratified the contract with Nakajima Trading and showed that
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan approved the change from brand new to reconditioned machinery.
Nevertheless, the Sandiganbayan found that Resolution No. 205 was not a ratification of the sale by the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan. According to the anti-graft court, the said resolution merely re-appropriated
the unutilized portion of the loan proceeds for payment of loan amortizations, insurance and registration
fees of the acquired equipment, and personnel services benefits for casual employees of the province.
Nowhere in the resolution did it appear that the loan was for the purchase of reconditioned equipment.
To encapsulate, by purchasing reconditioned instead of brand new heavy equipment in contravention of
the terms of her authority, Gov. Co entered into a contract grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the
Province of Quirino. Such disadvantage was brought about because the province had set aside public funds
for brand new heavy machinery only to receive used albeit reconditioned equipment. Now, she cannot lay
the blame on Engr. Ringor by arguing that her actions were precipitated by his recommendation. The
evidence distinctly revealed that Gov. Co was well aware of the terms of her authority and of the fact that
Nakajima Trading was offering only reconditioned equipment. Nevertheless, she pushed through with the
transaction to the prejudice of the province. For this, she must be held accountable. Thus, on this ground
alone, Gov. Co's petition must fail. (Castillo-Co v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 184766, August 15, 2018, Second
Division)
5. The third element of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019, i.e., that such contract or transaction is grossly and manifestly
disadvantageous to the government, is present. In this case, the Sandiganbayan finds, and that Court agrees,
that the following acts caused gross and manifest disadvantage to the Province of Quirino: First, entering into
an agreement to purchase reconditioned heavy equipment, contrary to the terms of Sangguniang Panlalawigan
Resolution No. 120, which authorized Gov. Co to purchase only brand new heavy equipment; second, advancing
forty (40%) percent of the total contract price to Nakajima Trading, in violation of Section 338 of the Local
Government Code, which explicitly prohibits advance payments; and third, paying the balance, or sixty (60%)
percent of the total contract price, despite non-compliance by Nakajima Trading with a provision in the
agreement, which provided that delivery had to be effected within ninety (90) days from payment.
a. Anent the first act, it was settled at the trial that on December 23, 1995, when the loan agreement with
the PNB was entered into, and on January 11, 1996, when the sale with Nakajima Trading was contracted,
Gov. Co possessed authority to purchase brand new equipment on behalf of the Province of Quirino. The
local government unit granted her such authority through two resolutions enacted by its provincial
legislative council or Sangguniang Pan1alawigan. These resolutions were presented into evidence by the
prosecution to prove Gov. Co's want of authority to purchase reconditioned equipment. The first resolution
was Sangguniang Panlalawigan Resolution No. 120 dated October 20, 1995, which expressly authorized
Gov. Co to negotiate with and obtain a loan from the PNB to fund the purchase of brand new machinery.
The province manifested its intent to purchase heavy equipment through this resolution, which, in no
uncertain terms, provided that such equipment had to be brand new. Moreover, the Sandiganbayan found

that on December 23, 1995, the PNB granted the loan to the province on the basis of the aforementioned
resolution.The record also shows that subsequent resolutions of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan confirmed
that the province indeed planned to purchase brand new, and not reconditioned, heavy equipment. The
second resolution presented by the prosecution was Sangguniang Panlalawigan Resolution No. 06-A dated
January 12, 1996. This resolution, which was enacted a day after the perfection of the agreement with
Nakajima Trading, was likewise an unequivocal grant of authority to purchase brand new heavy equipment.
The foregoing clearly shows that the Provincial Government of Quirino intended to acquire only brand new
heavy equipment. Resolution No. 120 pre-dated the loan agreement and Resolution No. 06-A was enacted
a day after the sale was perfected. Thus, during the periods prior and subsequent to both the loan and the
sale, the Province of Quirino made manifest its intent to obtain brand new machinery.
b. Anent the second act, the evidence of the prosecution showed that the telegraphic transfer of 40% of the
total contract price was effected on January 24, 1996, while the heavy equipment was initially delivered on
April 10, 1996. Thus, the Provincial Government of Quirino paid public funds to Nakajima Trading before
the latter delivered to it the heavy machinery subject of the contract. The prosecution argued that this
advance payment, which violated Section 338 of the Local Government Code, caused gross and manifest
disadvantage. The said provision prohibits local government units from making payments for goods not yet
delivered and services not yet rendered. Gov. Co in fact admitted that this advance was made. However,
in her defense, she maintained that she made the payment only after consulting Atty. Primitivo Marcos
(Atty. Marcos), her private lawyer, who was not at that time in the employ of the province. Atty. Marcos
advised Gov. Co that Section 338 did not apply to the transaction with Nakajima Trading because the
advance was necessary for the Japanese supplier to begin reconditioning the equipment. She argued, once
again on the basis of Arias, that her reliance in good faith on the opinion of Atty. Marcos should exonerate
her from the charge of making an advance payment.
c. Anent the third act, the findings of the Sandiganbayan show that Nakajima Trading failed to comply with a
stipulation in the agreement, which provided that the complete delivery of the heavy equipment had to be
within ninety (90) days from the date payment was received. The record reveals that, through a letter of
credit, full payment had been effected on February 14, 1996. Thus, the Japanese supplier had until May
14, 1996 to perform its obligation under the contract. However, it failed to do so. Nakajima Trading
delivered the equipment in three (3) separate shipments. According to the Sandiganbayan, these
shipments were made on April 10, 1996, June 10, 1996, and June 24, 1996. Clearly, therefore, complete
delivery was not made in accordance with the terms of the contract. More, the prosecution established
that, despite full payment of the contract price, the provincial government did not receive every unit of
equipment due under the contract. Specifically, the evidence revealed that Nakajima Trading never
delivered the set of tools and spare parts and that it failed to deliver the Ingersol-Rand SP 100 Vibratory
Road Roller in accordance with the terms of the agreement. The record shows that Provincial Engineer
Ringor inspected the machine upon delivery and that his inspection revealed that it was not in the condition
agreed upon, the same being laden with dents and scratches. To the Court, this act only highlights Gov.
Co's wanton negligence in the handling of public funds. Despite the lapse of the final day for delivery, Gov.
Co chose to sit idly and wait for over a month for Nakajima Trading to ship the equipment that the province
ordered. This shows that the governor was undoubtedly remiss in her duty to exercise heightened
responsibility in dealing with public funds. This is precisely the lax attitude R.A. No. 3019 seeks to repress
this is, in every way, the cavalier disposition that a public officer cannot display and that the Court cannot
countenance. (Castillo-Co v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 184766, August 15, 2018, Second Division)
6. The advance of 40% of the total contract price, in violation of Section 338 of the LGC, caused manifest and
gross disadvantage to the Province of Quirino. Moreover, Governor Co had no right to rely on the legal
opinion of Atty. Marcos, her private counsel. In the case at bench, Gov. Co effected the payment of
P15,881,115.50, or 40% percent of the total contract price, before delivery by Nakajima Trading. The
prosecution maintained that the advance payment was a clear and unequivocal breach of Section 338 of the
Local Government Code. The Sandiganbayan, for its part, held that this constituted gross and manifest
disadvantage to the government. The Court finds no reason to deviate from the Sandiganbayan's ruling. As
correctly pointed out by Gov. Co herself, the purpose of the prohibition against advance payments is to
ensure the receipt of goods or the performance of services. Section 338 of the Local Government Code seeks
to prevent situations where private suppliers can easily abscond with public funds. When a local government
unit makes an advance payment, it risks pecuniary loss in the event of non-delivery or non-performance by
the party with which it contracts. Such advances directly place the government at a disadvantage by
effectively putting the supplier in control of the transaction, thus opening up the possibility that the latter will
not make good its obligations ultimately leading to the pilferage of the public coffers. Gov. Co also maintained
that the prohibition against advance payments does not apply to cases where the government contracts with
foreign suppliers. It was her position that these suppliers would naturally require earnest money as proof that
the buyer was serious about pursuing with the transaction. However, contrary to Gov. Co's stance, the
consequences of making an advance payment are even more dire when, as in this case, the government
contracts with a foreign supplier. Unlike local suppliers, which may be made subject of coercive processes
issued by Philippine courts, foreign suppliers may readily abscond with impunity. There would be no way to
recover, through domestic channels, the funds disbursed in favor of foreign entities; local government units
would thus be left without recourse against suppliers without any presence or assets in the Philippines. This is

without a doubt disadvantageous to the government. The Court finds that, here, the mere risk of losing such a
substantial amount of money (i.e., P15,881,115.50) caused gross and manifest disadvantage to the Province
of Quirino. As mentioned earlier, she advanced public funds in the amount of P15,881,115.50 in favor of
Nakajima Trading, blatantly disregarding Section 338 of the Local Government Code. She neglected to abide
by the law, which she, as a public officer, is bound to uphold. Thus, the Court holds that the Sandiganbayan
did not err when it ruled that the advance of 40% of the total purchase price caused gross and manifest
disadvantage to the Province of Quirino.
a. Gov. Co argued that she merely depended in good faith on the judgment of Atty. Marcos, who opined that
the transaction with Nakajima Trading was exempt from Section 338 of the Local Government Code. Again
citing Arias, she maintained that she cannot be faulted for her reliance on his opinion because the question
of whether the advance payment violated the Local Government Code was not within her competence
since she is not a lawyer. Thus, she concluded that her good faith reliance on the legal opinion of Atty.
Marcos should exonerate her from the charge. The argument deserves scant consideration. The
subordinates contemplated by the Arias doctrine are those public officers and employees who are actually
under the control or supervision of the head of office concerned, or those who answer directly or indirectly
to their superiors, who are in the employ of the same government agency. In other words, for the Arias
doctrine to find application, both the superior and the subordinate must be public officers working for the
same government office or agency. Given the foregoing admission, the Court cannot extend the protection
afforded by the Arias doctrine to Gov. Co. (Castillo-Co v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 184766, August 15, 2018,
Second Division)
7. Here, the common scheme was to make it appear that part of the property described in BL Plan II-6752 is
outside Fort Magsaysay as described in Presidential Proclamation No. 237, and hence, alienable, disposable,
and can be the subject of a compromise. So while it is true that petitioner Solis was not the party who entered
into the Compromise Agreement on behalf of the government, it was his recommendation in his February 12,
1998 Letter that served as the basis for its execution. In the words of petitioner Solis, “findings disclose that the
military reservation is not located in the topographic map sheets referred to in the technical description in
Proclamation No. 237.” Without this recommendation, there would be nothing to compromise on in the first
place. Petitioner Solis' recommendation was indispensable for the existence of the second element. It was also
the recommendation of petitioner Solis that caused the existence of the third element. The segregation of 4,689
hectares of land of the public domain, to be registered in the name of a private person, was grossly and
manifestly disadvantageous to the government. It is immaterial that the registration in the name of petitioner
Garcia-Diaz did not push through. Petitioner Solis remains liable because "the core element" of Section 3(g) is
that the engagement in a transaction or contract is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government.
Section 3(g) is unlike Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, which requires actual injury to the
government. Surely, surrendering 4,689 hectares of public domain is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous
to the government.
a. To exonerate himself, petitioner Solis contended that he only relied on his subordinates when he signed
the said February 12, 1998 letter, because it had already passed the 5 offices of the NAMRIA, as shown by
the routing slip. He did not thoroughly examine the attachments to the letter but relied on his technical
people. However, the conformity to the contents of these offices to the letter, dated February 12, 1998,
could not be ascertained on the face of the routing slip. In fact, in item no. 4, Basa merely requested
accused Fabian of the Land Classification Division a briefing before the records would be forwarded to
petitioner Solis. Nonetheless, the said briefing did not happen, as could be gleaned from Basa's testimony
that the papers directly went to accused Bonnevie. Moreover, Basa testified, which accused Solis failed to
rebut, that the February 12, 1998 letter did not pass through the usual procedure. Except for the initial of
accused Fabian under accused Solis' name, the letter did not bear the signatures of the Assistant Director
and Deputy Administrator Vinia. In fact, the letter appears to have been drafted even before the routing
slip reached Basa on February 16, 1998. As to petitioner Solis' testimony that he did not examine the
attachments to the letter but depended on his technical people, the same is inconsistent with his statement
on direct examination. He claimed that he studied the letter the first time he saw it, because of the map
and several documents attached thereto. This simply means that he also scrutinized the attachments
because these were the very reason why he studied the letter. He was also the one who ordered the
relocation survey, thus, it is impossible that he did not peruse the survey report or the field notes.
Moreover, to represent that 4,689 hectares of BL Plan II-6752 are outside the military reservation is
certainly a decision of great importance, as it would decide the fate of the compromise settlement.
Petitioner Solis knew this, having been told by the Office of the Solicitor General of the purpose of the
relocation survey. Thus, we find it incredible that he only signified his conformity without bothering to
examine the attachments, unless, such decision had been a foregone conclusion Therefore, petitioner Solis
cannot put the blame on any of his subordinates as to the contents of his February 12, 1998 Letter. Further,
it is immaterial that petitioner Solis knew Solicitor General Galvez and petitioner Garcia-Diaz personally.
Their collective acts nevertheless show the common purpose of giving the Compromise Agreement a
semblance of legitimacy. Petitioners Garcia-Diaz and Solis remain equally liable as co-conspirators. In sum,
the prosecution established beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of petitioners Garcia-Diaz and Solis. They
conspired to make it appear that a 4,689-hectare portion of the property described in BL Plan II-6752 is
outside the reservation described in Presidential Proclamation No. 237. Garcia-Diaz cannot claim good faith

because as early as 1975, this Court held in Director of Lands v. Reyes that the source of her supposed
ownership—Possessory Information Title No. 216—does not exist. As for petitioner Solis, he issued his
February 12, 1998 Letter as basis to claim that the 4,689 hectares of land described in BL Plan II-6752 are
located outside Fort Magsaysay, knowing fully well that this statement is false. Petitioners Garcia-Diaz and
Solis are liable for violation of Section 3(g) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, and the sentence of
six (6) years and one (1) month to 10 years, with perpetual disqualification from office, conforms with the
penal provision of the statute and with the Indeterminate Sentence Law. (Garcia-Diaz v. Sandiganbayan,
8. The charges of violation of R.A. 3019, Sections 3(g) and 3(e) fall. In particular, at the time private respondents
entered into the Compromise Agreement, the Province of Bataan did not enjoy any vested right over the subject
properties, and therefore, private respodnents could not have injured a right or interest that did not exist.
a. The absence of a vested right over the subject properties in favor of the Province of Bataan rises on two
levels of pendency of issues and inconclusiveness of rights, given the pendency of Civil Case No. 212-ML
(annulment of tax sale) and Civil Case No. 0010 (sequestration case).
b. First, the validity of the tax delinquency sale which transferred the title over the subject properties from
BASECO to the Province of Bataan remains in question, as the PCGG’s petition for annulment of said tax
sale is still pending with the RTC Makati in Civil Case No. 212-ML. To date and as far as the records show,
the last resolution made in this case is the RTC Makati recalling its Summary Judgment and ordering further
reception of evidence for the PCGG. There is therefore, as yet no final determination of whether the
transfer of the subject properties to the Province of Bataan was valid, to begin with. It is also important to
note that from the RTC Makati’s Order for reception of evidence for the PCGG, both the Province of Bataan
and the PCGG resorted to the Court and, upon the Court’s instruction, eventually entered into a
Compromise Agreement. Contrary to petitioner’s submission therefore, the right of the Province of Bataan
over the subject properties is far from vested. Instead, said right over the subject properties has always
been in dispute.
c. Second, even if a finding of a vested right in favor of the Province of Bataan is obtained in Civil Case No.
212-ML, such right nevertheless remains subject to the pendency and resolution of the 1986 sequestration
case in Civil Case No. 0010, which covers BASECO properties including the subject properties in this case.
With the sequestration order annotated in the memorandum of encumbrances in the TCTs issued in favor
of BASECO, the final resolution of the sequestration case therefore remains a legal caveat to all parties who
may deal with the subject properties. In this case, the Province of Bataan’s ownership over the subject
properties, apart from it being disputed in Civil Case No. 212-ML, is likewise still subject to the resolution
of the sequestration case in Civil Case No. 0010.
d. Given these two tiers of pendency of determination of rights which cover the subject properties, the
Province of Bataan cannot be deemed to have enjoyed vested rights over the same. Contrary to petitioner’s
reasoning, Civil Case No. 212-ML and Civil Case No. 0010 are not immaterial to the validity and propriety
of the Compromise Agreement, as they are tightly interwoven with the issue at hand.
e. More so, the Province of Bataan may not be considered to have enjoyed vested rights so certain that a
reduction of the same could support a criminal prosecution. Once more, since the Province of Bataan did
not have a right in esse over the subject properties, its interest could not be said to have been so permanent
that the concessions made by it in the Compromise Agreement were grossly disadvantageous to its
interests as to merit the criminal prosecution of private respondents for violation of Section 3(e) and (g) of
R.A. 3019. Lastly, the issue of propriety and good faith in private respondents’ act of entering into the
Compromise Agreement was not an isolated incident that only took into consideration the duties of their
public office vis-à-vis the property interests of their province. Contrarily, said question found itself within a
farsighted and complext context of other simultaneous legal disputes that included the validity of a tax sale
and the more penultimate dispute of sequestration and recovery of suspected ill-gotten wealth.
f. Since the propriety of the terms of the Compromise Agreement rise and fall on the nature of the right that
the Province of Bataan enjoyed over the subject propertie, and since said right has been adjudged as
questionable or otherwise in dispute, the criminal prosecution of herein private respondents stand on
shifting factual grounds, and was therefore correctly dismissed. (People of the Philippines v. Hon.
Sandiganbayan (Third Division), G.R. Nos. 190728-29, November 18, 2020, First Division)
9. It cannot be inferred that the loan was undercollateralized or that a grossly disadvantageous contract to the
government in violation of Section 3(g) of Republic Act No. 3019 was entered into. Development Bank's total
exposure of P63,202,884.44 was secured by the following: personal and real properties amounting to
P46,822,362.00; assignment to Development Bank of sales contracts worth P13,413,000.00; personal
undertakings by members of the Hofileña and Yaptinchay families and other Pioneer Glass stockholders; and
the assignment to Development Bank of Luis' mining claims. Clearly, the loans were suitably secured when they
were taken out. Section 3, paragraphs (e) and (g) of Republic Act No. 3019 should not be interpreted in such a
way that they will prevent Development Bank, through its managers, to take reasonable risks in relation to its
business. Profit, which will redound to the benefit of the public interests owning Development Bank, will not be
realized if our laws are read constraining the exercise of sound business discretion. Thus, Section 3(e) requires
"manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence" and the element of arbitrariness and
malice in taking risks must be palpable. Likewise, there must be a showing of "undue injury" to the government.

Section 3(g), on the other hand, requires a showing of a "contract or transaction manifestly and grossly
disadvantageous to the government." Definitely, this means that it must not only be proven that Development
Bank suffered business losses but that these losses, in the ordinary course of business and with the exercise of
sound judgment, were inevitably unavoidable. Public respondent's findings did not transgress these
requirements. (PCGG v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No. 187794, November 28, 2018, Third Division)
10. The Sandiganbayan did not err in ruling that petitioner Lee is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of
Section 3(e) and (g) of R.A. 3019. As aptly ruled by the Sandiganbayan, before direct contracting under R.A.
9184, Section 50(c) can be resorted to, it is required that the goods must be sold by an exclusive dealer or
manufacturer; the exclusive dealer or manufacturer does not have sub-dealers selling at lower prices; and no
suitable substitute can be obtained from the market at more advantageous terms to the Government. Here,
the prosecution established that there were other suppliers in the market selling the same product at a much
lower price. Likewise, it was established that there were liquid fertilizers available in the market which were
suitable substitutes of Bio Nature Liquid Fertilizer. Considering that the same Bio Nature Liquid Fertilizer by
Feshnan Phils. Inc. and suitable substitutes available in the market at a very much lower price compared to the
ones procured by the Province of Sorsogon, the Provincial Government of Sorsogon indeed extended
unwarranted benefit to Feshnan Phils. Inc. The term “unwarranted” means lacking adequate or official support;
unjustified; unauthorized; or without justification or adequate reasons. Advantage means a more favorable or
improved position or condition; benefit or gain of any kind; benefit from course of action. Preference signifies
priority or higher evaluation or desirability; choice or estimation above another. As aptly ruled by the
Sandiganbayan, there is no showing that the Province’s direct purchase from Feshnan Phils. Inc. at an
unconscionable price of more than 500% of the same product, or at least 900% more of the suitable substitutes
is justified. Thus, the procurement resulted to the undue injury to the government.
a. The circumstances obtaining in Caunan v. People which involved the procurement of walis tingting are
different from the case at bar, which involved the procurement of fertilizers. The manufacture, production,
sale, distribution, and importation of fertilizers is regulated by law. The Fertilizer and Pesticides Authority
is mandated to implement such regulation. As such, FPA maintains a list of license fertilizer handlers and
registered fertilizers that can be sold and distributed in the market. It likewise regularly conducts price
monitoring of fertilizers in the market and prepares a list of average fertilizer prices. Thus, data required in
the determination of the existence of other fertilizers in the market as suitable substittues are readily
available. There is no such regulation with respect to a walis tingting. There is no such agency that prepares
and keeps relevant data for a walis tingting. Thus, data with which to determine the prevailing prices of a
walis tingting is not available and must be supplanted by competent evidence. Here, the purchases of the
fertilizer were made sometime in May and June 2004. COA made several price canvasses in the same year
and at the approximate time when the purchases were made (November 2004 and February 2005).
Further, the FPA Price Monitor in September and October 2004 is approximate in time with May and June
2004. Thus, the COA canvasses as well as the FPA data that were presented and admitted in evidence by
the Sandiganbayan are reasonable representations of the actual prices of fertilizers at the time the
purchases were made. These competent pieces of evidence show that the contract entered by the Province
of Sorsogon was grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the Government. (Lee v. Hon. Sandiganbayan
First Division, G.R. Nos. 234664-67, January 12, 2021, First Division)
SECTION 3(F)
1. The elements of the offense under R.A. 3019, Section 3(f) are the following: (a) the offender is a public officer,
(b) the said officer has neglected or has refused to act without sufficient justification after due demand or
request has been made to him, (c) reasonable time has elapsed from such demand or request without the
public officer having acted on the matter pending before him, and (d) such failure to do so is for the purpose of
obtaining, directly or indirectly, from any person interested in the matter some pecuniary or material benefit
or advantage in favor of an interested party, or discriminating against another.
a. Petitioner violated Section 3(f) of R.A. 3019 when she refused to act on Fermina’s application for a mayor’s
permit. While petitioners’ power to issue license and permits is a discretionary, its exercise must be
pursuant to law and ordinance. The mayor must act on the application for a business permit, and the action
expected of the mayor either to approve or disapprove the same. In this case, when petitioner referred to
her lawyer, Atty. Pangilinan, the transmittal letter of Atty. Calderon, to which Fermina’s application for
mayor’s permit and supporting documents were attached, petitioner did not act according to law or
ordinance. Indeed, she failed to cite any law or ordinance which required her to do so. Her purported good
faith belief that the case which Fermina had filed against her and her husband had a bearing on Fermina’s
application for mayor’s permit is not borne out, and actually belied, by Atty. Pangilinan’s reply to Atty.
Calderon’s letter which made no mention of those pending cases.
b. The reply letter emphasized that Fermina had no pending application and considering the non-existence
of her application, how could petitioner act on a non-existing application; and advised Fermina to re-apply
for a business permit. But, the reply letter ignored Atty. Calderon’s supplication: “We hope that by this
transmittal letter, action on Ms. Santos’ application will not be attended with dispatch.” The reply letter
even made no reference to the application of Fermina and supporting requirements that were attached to
Atty. Calderon’s transmittal letter. There is no question then that petitioner simply ignored Fermina’s
application for mayor’s permit and its supporting documents. There is likewise no doubt that the act of

petitioner in referring the matter to her lawyer was merely a ploy to mask her refusal to act and avoid
possible sanction for her inaction.
c. The purported advice for Fermina to re-apply for a business permit in the fact of the duly filled-up
application and supporting documents attached to Atty. Calderon’s letter, as well as the express
supplication for an action with dispatch on the application unequivocally show the intentional inaction or
deliberate refusal to act on petitioner’s part. (Lacap v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 198162, June 21, 2017,
First Division)
SECTION 3(C)
1. As may be gleaned from above, the elements of the crime under R.A. 3019, Section 3(c) are as follows: (a) the
offender is a public officer; (b) he has secured or obtained, or would secure or obtain, for a person any
government permit or license; (c) he directly or indirectly requested or received from said person any gift,
present or other pecuniary or material benefit for himself or for another; and (d) he requested or received the
gift, present or other pecuniary or material benefit in consideration for help given or to be given. After a
judicious review of the case, the Court is convinced that the SB correctly convicted Lucman for violating Section
3 (c) of RA 3019. It is undisputed that Lucman was a public officer at the time the offense was committed, then
being the OIC-RED of the DENR, Region XII. As the OIC-RED, he had the authority to grant applications for Free
Patents, such as the ones filed by private complainants. It was likewise established through the testimony of
Bualan and the evidence on record that Lucman demanded Two Million Five Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P2,500,000.00) and actually received One Million Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P1,500,000.00) from private
complainants, and that these amounts were for and in consideration of the grant of their applications. In view
of the foregoing, the Court finds no reason to overturn the SB's findings, as there is no showing that it
overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied the surrounding facts and circumstances of this case, and
considering further the fact that it was in the best position to assess and determine the credibility of the parties'
witnesses. As such, Lucman's conviction for violation of Section 3 (c) of RA 3019 must stand.
a. As regards the proper penalty to be imposed on Lucman, Section 9 (a) of RA 3019, as amended, states that
the prescribed penalties for a violation of the said crime includes, inter alia, imprisonment for a period of
six (6) years and one (1) month to fifteen (15) years and perpetual disqualification from public office. Taking
into consideration the provision of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, which states that "in imposing a prison
sentence for an offense punished by acts of the Philippine Legislature, otherwise than by the Revised Penal
Code, the court shall order the accused to be imprisoned for a minimum term, which shall not be less than
the minimum term of imprisonment provided by law for the offense, and for a maximum term which shall
not exceed the maximum fixed law," the Court deems it proper to modify Lucman's sentence to
imprisonment for an indeterminate period of six (6) years and one (1) month, as minimum, to nine (9)
years, as maximum, with perpetual disqualification to hold public office. (Lucman v. People of the
SECTION 3(H)
1. Accused should be acquitted of the crime of R.A. 3019, Section 3(h). Under the facts obtaining in this case,
indirect pecuniary benefit cannot be presumed from the mere fact of assistance being rendered by Zurbano to
her sister in obtaining the award at TESDA-Cavite. Article 291 of the Civil Code cannot be made to apply in this
case, since the record is bereft of proof that Zurbano was obliged to financially support or that she was, in fact,
providing financial support to her sister. or that the latter was financially dependent on the former. What is
borne by the evidence was that Zurbano's sister is the registered owner of CDZ Enterprises. Hence, Zurbano's
sister is presumed to be financially independent from Zurbano. There is, likewise, absence of evidence that
Zurbano has financial interests in the said company. As admitted in the dissenting opinion, "a close family
relationship does not conclusively entail financial interest in each other's successes. After all, a person may
assist her sibling out of love or some concept of familial duty, without necessarily contemplating any monetary
gain."
a. With regard to the failure of the Sandiganbayan to consider the alleged explicit ruling of the Supreme Court
in the Tuvera case concerning the establishment of the presumption of indirect pecuniary benefit by reason
of relationship and the "muddling" of the said case, the Court has not read in the text of Tuvera, the
pronouncement of the Court "which expressly found that a relationship, in and of itself, can establish the
indirect pecuniary interest of someone charged with violation of Republic Act No. 3019, Section (h)." In the
Tuvera case, the Court imposed the burden upon Mr. Tuvera the presumption that he indirectly benefitted
financially from the transaction of Twin Peaks' request for timber license because of the evidence on record
which showed that there was "failure to undergo public bidding or to comply with the requisites for the
grant of such agreement by negotiation, and in favor of a corporation that did not appear legally
capacitated to be granted such agreement." Said the Court, "Certainly, the circumstances presented by the
evidence of the prosecution are sufficient to shift the burden of evidence to Tuvera in establishing that he
did not violate the provisions of the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act in relation to the Twin Peaks'
'request'." The burden was shifted to Mr. Tuvera because he waived his right to present evidence to
disprove that he violated the allegations against him.
b. None of the foregoing circumstances were present in Zurbano's case. Unlike in the Tuvera case where the
totality of the prosecution evidence created a presumption of indirect pecuniary benefit against the
accused, the Sandiganbayan ruled that the prosecution failed to show the connection of Zurbano to CDZ
Enterprises or how Zurbano's intervention led to her acquisition of any financial interest or benefit. As
stated earlier, the assistance rendered to a sibling maybe by reason of love or some other concept of
familial duty, without not necessarily contemplating any monetary gain.
c. On the matter of "muddling" of the Tuvera case, it maybe conceded that the Sandiganbayan misread the
import of the discussions of the Court on delicadeza in the said case. However, the Sandiganbayan's
acquittal of Zurbano was not only based on the Tuvera ruling. In fact, petitioner's position, in the instant
petition, was that the Sandiganbayan misapplied, in the assailed decision, the case of Jaime Domingo vs.
Sandiganbayan, et., al., and insisted on the application of the Tuvera case. Evidently, the Sandiganbayan
reviewed the entire case after Zurbano filed a Motion for Reconsideration and acquitted her because of its
subsequent finding that the prosecution failed to prove all the elements of the crime charged. Its basis for
the acquittal was that, in this case, the prosecution merely assumed the pecuniary interest of the accused
when her sister's company, CDZ Enterprises, was able to submit the lowest price quotations for the
contracts due to the accused's intervention. This Court finds that the existence of relationship per se does
not automatically translate to having direct or indirect financial interest in the subject contracts. The
prosecution was not able to present evidence that the accused received any financial benefit from these
transactions. Mere allegation that the parties are related to each other is not conclusive proof of such
pecuniary interest. Unlike the Domingo case, there was an apparent lack of factual basis in this case that
the accused has direct or indirect pecuniary interest in her sister's contract with TESDA-Cavite. To reiterate,
the prosecution merely relied on the existence of relationship of the accused and her sister as basis of
pecuniary interest. The intervention of the accused in the procurement process definitely favored and
benefitted her sister's company. Nonetheless, in order to be liable for violation of Section 3(h) of R.A. No.
3019, the prosecution must also sufficiently show that the accused has a pecuniary interest over the
contracts which she intervened in." (People of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 233280-92,
SECTION 3(D)
1. All the elements of R.A. 3019, Section 3(d) are present and duly proven. The elements are: (a) the accused is a
public officer; (b) he or she accepted or has a member of his or her family who accepted employment in a
private enterprise; and (c) such private enterprise has a pending official business with the public officer during
the pendency of official business or within one year from its termination.
a. Firstly, Edwin was the Provincial Director of TESDA – Aklan Province at the time of the commission of the
crime, which occurred in 2010. He was appointed on October 26, 2006 until his dismissal from the service
after 2012. His wife Nida, though a private citizen, can be validly charged in conspiracy with her husband
in the commission of the crime. Itt has long been settled that private individuals may be sued and indicted
together with the co-conspiring public officer in abidance with the policy of R.A. 3019.
b. Secondly, it is undisputed that Nida accepted employment in RACE, which is a private enterprise, as an In-
House Competency Assessor for the period June 1, 2010 until June 1, 2012. She is not only an employee
but also an incorporator or part owner of the said entity. In the present case, herein petitioners asseverate
that RACE, being a non-stock and non-profit TESDA accredited educational association, may not be within
the purview of the private enterprise indicated in R.A. 3019, Section 3(b). According to petitioners, the
enterprise referred to in the law connotes an entity primarily organized for profit. Nonetheless, the law is
very clear and straightforward. A public officer or any member of his family cannot accept employment in
a private enterprise with whom such public officer has a pending official business with during the pendency
thereof or within one year from its termination as it is considered a corrupt practice. Regardless if the
enterprise is for profit or not, stock or non-stock, the law does not distinguish. Thus, the mere acceptance
by Nida, a family member, of employment with RACE, which is a private non-stock and non-profit
enterprise, renders petitioners liable under the law.
c. Thirdly, it was duly established that during the time that Nida accepted employment with RACE, the latter
had a pending official business with TESDA over which Edwin had control and supervision as Provincial
Director thereof. Upon the commencement of the incorporation of RACE with SEC, RACE’s official business
with TESDA likewise started when petitioner Edwin issued an indorsement dated March 31, 2010 to SEC
(with regard to RACE’s application for registration and incorporation with SEC). During the pendency of
RACE’s accreditation proceedings before TESDA, Nida entered into a Contract of Employment with RACE
on September 20, 2020, RACE’s accreditation with TESDA was approved on November 10, 2020. To
reiterate, there is no doubt that Nida’s act of accepting employment occurred when RACE, a private
enteprise, has a pending official business with TESDA-Aklan, which is under Edwin’s control and supervision.
Edwin’s claim that he merely performed a ministerial function when he signed the indorsement letter of
RACE and when he approved its TESDA accreditation cannot be given credence. The issuance of the subject
indorsement letter to SEC and even the signing of the RACE’s TESDA accreditation cannot be deemed a
ministerial act on the part of Edwin. It is a discretionary act or function of a TESDA Provincial Director to
sign the foregoing Indorsement Letter in accordance with certain laws. (Villanueva v. People of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 237864, July 8, 2020, Second Division)
SECTION 3(B)
1. Collao was correctly convicted of the crime of violation of R.A. 3019, Section 3(b).

a. The elements of violation of Section 3(b) of R.A. 3019 are as follows: (i) the offender is a public officer; (ii)
who requested or received a gift, a present, a share, or benefit; (iii) on behalf of the offender or any other
person; (iv) in connection with a contract or transaction with the government; (v) in which the public
officer, in an official capacity under the law, has the right to intervene.
b. At the time material to the case, Callao was the barangay Chairman of Barangay 780. As barangay
Chairman, his signature in the presented Purchase Order No. 01-12, was necessary to effect payment to
the contractor, FRCGE, for the delivery of construction materials for a basketball court, school supplies,
and other sports equipment for the Sangguniang Kabataan. That being the case, the right of Callao to
intervene in his official capacity is undisputed. Therefore, elements 1, 4, and 5 of the imputed offense are
present.
c. Anent elements 2 and 3, suffice it to say that the prosecution was able to establish that Callao requested
for a share or commission in the said barangay project for his behalf. Worth emphasizing that the RTC in
its Decision declared: “Collao, with his protestations, would have this court believe that someone else, an
impostor who pretended to be him had encashed the check. But this is one speculation that would be
unduly stretching credulity, involving as it does the intricate deception of a master impostor. Notably,
Collao had admitted that his driver’s license number was also 499-437123, the same number appearing on
the check’s dorsal portion. As the court observed, the driver’s license number consisted of a total of nine
(9) digits. Surely, an ordinary impostor would not have known, much less memorized such a number, would
he? More succinctly put, he would not have access to Collao’s driver’s license, be privy to the license
number, be able to copy the likeness of Collao appearing therein, and thereafter, for the finale, actually
impersonate Collao – by looking like him, so as to convince the bank teller that he is that same person
whose picture appears in the driver’s license, would he? This impostor had somehow again managed to
“forge” Collao’s driver’s license, meant he has access of it. Notably, Collao never mentioned that his driver’s
license was, at any time, lost. In sum, Collao’s puny defense consisted of a string of alleged “forgeries” –
his allegedly “forged” signature on the acknowledgment receipt, his allegedly “forged” signature on the
check, and presumably his forged driver’s license. These are too many allegations of forgery with not a
single corroborative evidence to back them up. (Collao v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 242539,
2. The information alleged the essential elements of the crime charged since it was already able to include all the
essential elements of a violation of R.A. 3019, Section 3(b). First, it alleged that appellant was a public officer,
i.e., a low ranking public officer with salary grade 14, being a Barangay Chairman, Barangay 780, Zone 85, District
V, Manila. Second, the elements of requesting and receiving a share, for his own behalf, were also included. In
particular, it was alleged that he unlawfully and criminally demanded/solicited and accepted from FRCGE
Trading and/or Franco G.C. Espiritu the total sum of P40,000.00, covered by BDO Check No. 14017 dated March
22, 2012 as share/commission. Third, the said share’s connection to a contract with the government in which
appellant, as a public officer, had the right to intervene was likewise alleged. In particular, it was stated that “on
the barangay project for the purchase of supplies and materials in which accused intervened in his official
capacity as barangay chairman by approving the corresponding purchase order, acceptance and inspection
report, and Disbursement Voucher No. 12-04-06 to effect payment of the delivered supplies and materials to
FRCGE Trading and/or Franco G.C. Espiritu.” Clearly, the information in the present case is sufficient as the
requirements under the Rules, specifically, Rule 110, Section 6, were complied with. The fact that the date on
the Purchase Order came after the encashment of the BDO check is of no consequence since the law punishes
the very act of requesting and/or receiving a share in connection with a contract. When the contract was dated
is not an essential element for the commission of the crime in the present case, moreover, it is a detail of the
act that appellant committed which is an evidentiary matter that need not be alleged in the Information. (Collao
v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 242539, February 1, 2021, Third Division)
SECTION 3(J)
1. To be liable for violation of R.A. 3019, Section 3(j), it must be shown that respondents knew that Kentex was
not qualified, and despite that knowledge, they still issued such permit. To the point of sounding like a broken
record, there would be no way for respondents to know that Kentex had no FSIC for the year 2014, since the
BFP did not give the necessary report. On another perspective, the absence of the report or the FSIC at the
issuance of the 2014 Business Permit does not make Kentex “not qualified for” or “not legally entitled to such
permit.” As the Sandiganbayan correctly ruled, the procedures then being followed allow for the issuance of
business permits, even without securing first the required FSIC.
a. The elements of R.A. 3019, Section 3(j), as amended are: (a) knowingly approving or granting any license,
permit, privilege, or benefit; and (b) in favor of any person who is not qualified for, or not legally entitled
to such license, permit, privilege, or advantage; and (c) a mere representative or dummy of one who is not
so qualified or entitled. (Office of the Ombudsman v. Gatchalian, G.R. No. 230679, February 10, 2021, First
Division)
SECTION 7
1. Under R.A. 3019, Section 7, every public officer is directed to file a true, detailed, and sworn statement of assets
and liabilities, including among others, a statement of the amounts and sources of his or her income and/or
earnings. Petitioners assert that aside from the salaries and allowances, they received as government elective

Anti-Plunder Law 263
officials, they derived other incomes and/or earnings from the fishponds, farm and coconut lots, and rural
banking business they own. The record speaks for itself. Petitioners’ SALNs for 2001-2009 are totally devoid of
any single entry supposedly representing additional income or earnings derived from petitioner’s aforesaid
assets. Surely, this omission, by itself, is a violation of R.A. 3019, in relation to R.A. 6713, Section 8. (Tumbocon
v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. Nos. 238103 & 238223, January 6, 2020, First Division)
PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION UNDER R.A. 3019, SECTION 13

1. The rule on preventive suspension under R.A. 3019, Section 13 is not limited to cases where there has been a
violation of R.A. 3019 or Title 7, Book II of the RPC. The same rule applies for any offense involving fraud upon
government or public funds or property.
a. In Bustillo v. Sandiganbayan, the Court has settled that the term “fraud” as used in R.A. 3019, Section 13,
is understood in its generic sense, that is, referring to “an instance or an act of trickery or deceit especially
when involving misrepresentation.” In addition, Bolastig v. Sandiganbayan (Third Division), the Court
underscored the mandatory nature of preventive suspension when a public officer is charged with a valid
information involving violation of R.A. 3019, Title 7, Book II of the RPC, or offenses involving fraud upon
government, public funds, or property.
b. Here, the Information filed against petitioner charged her and her co-accused with violation of R.A. 6713,
Section 7(d) by soliciting money and gifts from private individuals and entities for supposed tourism
activities and projects of the City Government of Puerto Princesa, Palawan while in the performance of
their functions and taking advantage of their positions as tourism officers. It is clear from the foregoing
that the act of petitioner (and her co-accused) involves fraud upon public funds as such money and gifts
solicited were collected for the purpose of funding the tourism activities of the City Government of Puerto
Princesa, Palawan. It is noteworthy that petitioner did not assail the validity of such information. In fact, in
her Manifestation and Compliance before the Sandiganbayan, petitioner begged exception to the
suspension pendente lite that she admitted should be imposed on her under a valid information. Since
petitioner is charged with an offense that clearly falls under R.A. 3019, Section 13, her suspension pendente
lite is justified. The Sandiganbayan has no other option but to order the suspension of the petitioner when
it is convinced that the information charges her with acts of fraud involving government funds. According
to Section 13 of R.A. 3019, the rule on preventive. (Amurao v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 249168,
April 26, 2021, Third Division)
AN TI -PLU N D ER LAW
1. The elements of a plunder are: (a) the offender is a public officer who acts by herself or in connivance with
members of her family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates, or other person;
(b) the offender amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten weath through a combination or series of the
following overt or criminal acts: (i) through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public
funds or raids on the public treasury; (ii) by receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share,
percentage, kickback, or any other form of pecuniary benefits from any person and/or entity in connection with
any government contract or project or by reason of the office or position of the public officer; (iii) by the illegal
or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the National Government or any of its
subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities or GOCCs or their subsidiaries; (iv) by obtaining, receiving or
accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity, or any other form of interest or participation
including the promise of future employment in any business enterprise or undertaking; (v) by establishing
agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other combinations and/or implementation of decrees and
orders intended to benefit particular persons or special interests; or (vi) by taking advantage of the official
position, authority, relationship, connection or influence to unjustly enrich himself or themselves at the expense
and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines; and (c) that the
aggregate amount or total value of the ill-gotten wealth amassed, accumulated or acquired is at least P50
million. (Macapagal-Arroyo v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 220598, July 19, 2016, En Banc)
2. The corpus delicti of plunder is the amassment, accumulation or acquisition of ill-gotten wealth valued at not
less than P50 million. The failure to establish the corpus delicti should lead to the dismissal of the criminal
prosecution. (Macapagal-Arroyo v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 220598, July 19, 2016, En Banc)
3. The handwritten unqualified “Ok” by the President of the Philippines in a fund release voucher cannot be
considered as an overt act of plunder. In criminal law, an overt act refers to some physical activity or deed,
indicating the intention to commit a particular crime and will logically and necessarily ripen into a concrete
offense. In fact, the handwritten unqualified “Ok” is a common and legal practice of signifying approval of a
fund release by the President and as a result, cannot be considered an overt act. (Macapagal-Arroyo v. People
of the Philippines, G.R. No. 220598, July 19, 2016, En Banc)
4. In a criminal charge for plunder against several individuals, there must be a main plunderer and his or her con-
conspirators. The main plunderer can be identified either by allegation of the wheel conspiracy or express
conspiracy, or by implied conspiracy.
a. If conspiracy cannot be proven, the presumption is that the accused acted individually; hence, the amount
alleged to be have been plundered is divided among them. Thus, if, after the division of the plundered
Anti-Plunder Law 264
amount, the amount falls short of the jurisdictional amount of P50 million, there is no crime of plunder.
(Macapagal-Arroyo v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 220598, July 19, 2016, En Banc)
5. The requirements for the identification of the main plunderer and for personal benefit in the predicate act of
raids on the public treasury have been written in R.A. 7080 itself as well as embedded in pertinent
jurisprudence.
a. Indeed, because plunder is a crime that only a public official can commit by amassing, accumulating, or
acquiring ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount or total value of at least P50 million, the identification
in the information of such public official as the main plunderer among the several individuals thus charged
is logically necessary under the law itself. In particular reference to Criminal Case No. SB-12-CRM-0174, the
individuals charged therein – including the petitioners were 10 public officials; hence, it was only proper to
identify the main plunderer or plunderers among the 10 accused who herself or himself had amassed,
accumulated, or acquired ill-gotten wealth with the total value of at least P50 million. (Macapagal-Arroyo
v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 220598, April 18, 2017, En Banc)
6. The Ombudsman did not abuse its discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in finding probable
cause to indict Estrada for one count of plunder and 11 counts of violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019. In its
Joint Resolution dated 28 March 2014, the Ombudsman found that probable cause exists to indict Estrada for
plunder, after finding that the elements of the crime charged are reasonably apparent based on the evidence
on record:
a. First, it is undisputed that Senator Estrada was a public officer at the time material to the charges.
b. Second, he amassed, accumulated or acquired ill-gotten wealth. As disclosed by the evidence, he
repeatedly received sums of money from Janet Napoles for endorsing her NGOs to implement the projects
to be funded by his PDAF. As outlined by witnesses Luy, Sula and Suñas which Tuason similarly claimed,
once a PDAF allocation becomes available to Senator Estrada, his staff Labayen would inform Tuason of
this development. Tuason, in turn, would relay the information to either Napoles or witness Luy. Napoles
or Luy would then prepare a listing of the projects available where Luy would specifically indicate the IAs.
This listing would be sent to Labayen who would then endorse it to the DBM under her authority as Deputy
Chief-of-Staff of Senator Estrada. After the listing is released by the Office of Senator Estrada to the DBM,
Napoles would give Tuason or Labayen a down payment for delivery to Senator Estrada. After the SARO
and/or NCA is released, Napoles would give Tuason the full payment for delivery to Senator Estrada through
Labayen or by Tuason. It bears noting that money was paid and delivered to Senator Estrada even before
the SARO and/or NCA is released. Napoles would advance Senator Estrada's down payment from her own
pocket upon the mere release by his Office of the listing of projects to the DBM, with the remainder of the
amount payable to be given after the SARO representing the legislator's PDAF allocation is released by the
DBM and a copy of the SARO forwarded to Napoles. Significantly, after the DBM issues the SARO, Senator
Estrada, through Labayen, would then write another letter addressed to the IAs which would identify and
indorse Napoles' NGOs as his preferred NGO to undertake the PDAF-funded project, thereby effectively
designating in writing the Napoles-affiliated NGO to implement projects funded by his PDAF. Along with
the other PDAF documents, the indorsement letter of Senator Estrada is transmitted to the IA, which, in
turn, handles the preparation of the MOA concerning the project, to be entered into by the Senator's
Office, the IA and the chosen NGO. As previously discussed, the indorsements enabled Napoles to gain
access to substantial sums of public funds. The collective acts of Senator Estrada, Napoles, et al. allowed
the illegal diversion of public funds to their own personal use. It cannot be gainsaid that the sums of money
received by Senator Estrada amount to "kickbacks" or "commissions" from a government project within
the purview of Sec. 1 (d) (2) of RA 7080. He repeatedly received commissions, percentage or kickbacks
representing his share in the project cost allocated from his PDAF, in exchange for his indorsement of
Napoles' NGOs to implement his PDAF-funded projects. Worse, the evidence indicates that he took undue
advantage of his official position, authority and influence to unjustly enrich himself at the expense, and to
the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines, within the purview of
Sec. 1 (d) (6) of RA 7080. He used and took undue advantage of his official position, authority and influence
as a Senator of the Republic of the Philippines to access his PDAF and illegally divert the allocations to the
possession and control of Napoles and her cohorts, in exchange for commissions, kickbacks, percentages
from the PDAF allocations. Undue pressure and influence from Senator Estrada's Office, as well as his
endorsement of Napoles' NGOs, were brought to bear upon the public officers and employees of the IAs.
The evidence evinces that Senator Estrada used and took undue advantage of his official position, authority
and influence as a Senator to unjustly enrich himself at the expense and to the damage and prejudice of
the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines. The PDAF was allocated to Senator Estrada by virtue
of his position, hence, he exercised control in the selection of his priority projects and programs. He
indorsed Napoles' NGOs in consideration for the remittance of kickbacks and commissions from Napoles.
These circumstances were compounded by the fact that the PDAF-funded projects were "ghost projects"
and that the rest of the PDAF allocation went into the pockets of Napoles and her cohorts. Undeniably,
Senator Estrada unjustly enriched himself at the expense, and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino
people and the Republic of the Philippines.
c. Third, the amounts earned by Senator Estrada through kickbacks and commissions amounted to more than
Fifty Million Pesos (P50,000,000.00). The aggregate amount or total value of the ill-gotten wealth amassed,

Parricide 265
accumulated or acquired by Senator Estrada stands at Php183,793,750.00, at the very least. The sums were
received by the Senator either personally or through his Deputy Chief-Of-Staff, Labayen, as earlier
discussed. Napoles provided those kickbacks and commissions. Witnesses Luy and Suñas, not to mention
Tuason, stated that Napoles was assisted in delivering the kickbacks and commissions by her employees
and cohorts John Raymond de Asis, Ronald John Lim and Tuason. Senator Estrada's commission of the acts
covered by Section 1 (d) (2) and Section 1 (d) (6) of RA No. 7080 repeatedly took place over the years 2004
to 2012. This shows a pattern – a combination or series of overt or criminal acts – directed towards a
common purpose or goal, which is to enable Senator Estrada to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten
wealth. Senator Estrada, taking undue advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection or
influence as a Senator acted, in connivance with his subordinate-authorized representative Labayen, to
receive commissions and kickbacks for indorsing the Napoles NGOs to implement his PDAF-funded project;
and likewise, in connivance with Napoles, with the assistance of her employees and cohorts Tuason, de
Asis and Lim who delivered the kickbacks to him. These acts are linked by the fact that they were plainly
geared towards a common goal which was to amass, acquire and accumulate ill-gotten wealth amounting
to at least Php183,793,750.00 for Senator Estrada. (Estrada v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. Nos. 212761-
62, July 31, 2018, En Banc)
7. There is probable cause to indict Sombero, Argosino, and Robles for plunder. As correctly found by the OMB,
the presence of the first element is undisputed for Argosino and Robles were serving as BI Deputy
Commissioners at the time relevant to the case. Next, based on the documentary evidence adduced, Argosino
and Robles, in connivance with Sombero, came into possession of ill-gotten wealth through a series of overt
acts committed on a single day – in the wee hours of November 27, 2016, they received or collected a sum of
money on two instances in consideration for their supposed intercession or assistance in the release of the
detained Chinese nationals. Lastly, on the strength of Ng and Yu’s affidavits and of Robles’ own admission in his
Counter-Affidavit, the total aggregate amount involved is P50 million.
a. Anent the requirement of a main plunderer, it is not required in OMB Consolidated Resolution and
Consolidated Order as the same is required only in the Information. (Sombero, Jr. v. Office of the
Ombudsman, G.R. Nos. 237888 & 237904, July 28, 2020, First Division)
8. The plea bargaining agreement entered into by Garcia and the Office of the Special Prosecutor after the latter
rested its case and which allows Garcia to plead guilty for direct bribery from the crime of plunder is valid. This
is because the prosecution’s evidence is insufficient to prove the crime of plunder. To recall, there is no quibble
that Garcia was a public officer, being a general with the AFP, at the time the alleged plunder took place. Clarita’s
letters likewise show that respondent Garcia received gifts in connection with his position as army comptroller.
However, the letters do not show that the gifts he received amounted to more than P50 million. The
prosecution’s failure to provide evidence of ill-gotten wealth within the threshold for plunder is primarily due
to its failure to find a military contractor or supplier who could provide concrete and supporting details to
Clarita’s admissions, as shown in the hearing for the OSG’s motion for intervention before the Sandiganbayan.
Even Mendoza’s testimony over the missing funds of the AFP could not be directly attributed to Garcia’s misuse.
Further, witnesses from the AFP belied Mendoza’s testimony that P50 million from the P200 million by the AFP
from the UN was missing. Instead, they testified that the entire amoun had been accounted for and had
eventually been used for the AFP contingent to East Timor. (Republic of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan, G.R.
Nos. 207340 & 207349, September 16, 2020, Third Division)
PAR R IC IDE
1. Accused is guilty of parricide. First, the spousal relationship between Auria and the accused was duly proven by
the defense’s admission that Auria was the legitimate wife of the accused during the pre-trial and a copy of the
couple’s marriage certificate which the defense admitted to be a genuine and faithful reproduction of the
original. Second, the fact of Auria’s death was duly proven. Finally, accused acknowledged that he himself
stabbed Auria which caused her death. (People of the Philippines v. Macal, G.R. No. 211062, January 13, 2016,
First Division)
2. Carlito is the killer of his wife. The post-mortem examination conducted by Dr. Vertido disclosed that the cause
of Ma. Theresa’s death was asphyxia by litigature strangulation, not suicide. She was found lying lifeless near
the bathroom door with a plastic hose wrapped around her neck. It was found that she suffered a confused
abrasion and hematoma on the forehead which may be caused by banging or beating. Appraising the physical
surroundings, it was very unlikely that she committed suicide because the bathroom door was too low to allow
her to hang herself. What was undisputed was the fact that Carlito and his wife had a marital relationship that
was far from being harmonious and peaceful. They frequently quarreled because of his womanizing. In fact,
they argued and shouted at each other the night before the horrible incident happened. Their frequent quarrels
could be the motive of the slaying. In addition, when Rizza, Carlito’s sister-in-law, loosened the plastic hose
around her neck and tried to revive her, he only watched her and told her, “wala nayan.” Rizza then insisted
that they bring her to the hospital but he only replied, “Hindi kailangang dalhin natin ito sa ospital.” It was Rizza
and Nelio, father of Ma. Theresa, who rushed her to the hospital. (People of the Philippines v. Tayao, G.R. No.

Parricide 266
3. The crime of parricide may be established by extrajudicial confession of the accused, provided that the
extrajudicial confession is admissible in evidence. (People of the Philippines v. Dacanay, G.R. No. 216064,
November 7, 2016, First Division)
4. Accused’s act of hitting his wife at the head with a maso (mallet) constitutes parricide.
a. The promise of forever is not an authority for the other to own one’s spouse. It is an obligation to love and
cherish despite his or her imperfections. To be driven by anger, rage, or murder due to jealousy is not a
manifestation of this sacred understanding. One who professes love should act better than this. (People of
the Philippines v. Brusola, G.R. No. 210615, July 26, 2017, Second Division)
5. With appellant's failure to prove self-defense, the inescapable conclusion is that he is guilty of Parricide as
correctly found by the RTC and affirmed by the CA. Parricide is committed when: (a) a person is killed; (b) the
deceased is killed by the accused; and (c) the deceased is the father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or
illegitimate, or a legitimate other ascendants or other descendants, or the legitimate spouse of the accused. All
these elements were duly established and proven by the prosecution. The fact of death by Lopez, Sr. was shown
in the medico-legal report and the victim's death certificate; Ronillo admitted that he killed Lopez, Sr. by
stabbing the latter with a kitchen knife; and the relationship between appellant and Lopez, Sr. as son and father
was established through the former's birth certificate and the marriage certificate of his parents. (People of the
Philippines v. Lopez, Jr., G.R. No. 232247, April 23, 2018, Second Division)
6. The prosecution was able to prove the crime of parricide by circumstantial evidence. In the instant case, the
circumstances already identified and enumerated by the appellate court bear restating. First, appellant was the
only adult present at the time of the incident. Second, Junel suffered several hematomas and cigarette burns
on different parts of his body which were inconsistent with the alleged accidental falling off the cradle. Third,
the medico-legal report revealed that Junel had sustained injuries which could not have been caused by mere
falling off the cradle. (People of the Philippines v. Espinosa, G.R. No. 228877, August 29, 2018, First Division)
7. Parricide is committed when (a) a person is killed; (b) the accused is the killer; and (c) deceased is either the
legitimate spouse of the accused, or any legitimate or illegitimate parent, child, ascendant or descendant of the
accused.
a. The presence of the third element is undisputed. Appellant is Ronald's mother. Ronald's birth certificate
(Exhibit "C") showed this fact.
b. As for the first and second elements, appellant's minor children Rhey and Racel Gonzales categorically
identified appellant as the person who killed Ronald. They each gave an eyewitness account of how
appellant inflicted multiple blows on Ronald's head and body, first using a hanger until it snapped, and
then, the broom's wooden handle. The testimonies of Rhey and Racel Gonzales pointing to their own
mother as the person who, without mercy, beat up their thirteen-year old brother on the night of
September 16, 2009, and again the next morning, deserve full faith and credence. These children would
not impute such a heinous crime as parricide on their own mother if it were not true. More so because
these children, young as they were, only had appellant to take care of them as their father had already
died. The testimonies of children against their own flesh and blood are given great weight, especially when
no ill will is shown, as in this case. (People of the Philippines v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 217022, June 3, 2019,
Second Division)
8. The outright admission of accused-appellant in open court, that he delivered the fatal stabbing blow that ended
Delia's life, established the second element of the crime. Among the three elements enumerated above, the
relationship between the offender and the victim is the most crucial. This relationship is what actually
distinguishes the crime of parricide from homicide. In parricide involving spouses, the best proof of the
relationship between the offender and victim is their marriage certificate. Oral evidence may also be considered
in proving the relationship between the two as long as such proof is not contested. In the present case, the
spousal relationship between Delia and the accused-appellant is beyond dispute. The defense has admitted,
during the preliminary conference, that Delia was the legitimate wife of the accused-appellant. Such admission
was reiterated by the accused-appellant in the course of the trial of the case. The prosecution, on its part,
produced a copy of the couple's Certificate of Marriage, which the defense did not oppose. Hence, the key
element that qualifies the killing to parricide was satisfactorily proven in this case. Clearly, thus, all the elements
of the crime of parricide, as defined in Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code, are present in this case. (People
of the Philippines v. Sabalberino, G.R. No. 241088, June 3, 2019, Third Division)
9. The presence of the third element of the crime of parricide, i.e., the deceased is either the legitimate spouse of
the accused, or any legitimate or illegitimate parent, child, ascendant, or descendant of the accused, is
undisputed. Appellant himself admitted and declared under oath that the deceased Paulino, Sr. is his father. He
also stipulated this fact during the pre-trial. That appellant’s certificate of live birth was not presented in
evidence does not negate his culpability. For oral evidence of the fact of his filial relationship with the victim
may be considered. In People v. Ayuman, the accused admitted during the trial that the victim was his son.
Although the victim’s birth certificate was not presented, the Court considered as competent evidence the

Murder and Homicide 267
accused’s admission of his filiation to the victim and convicted him of parricide. (People of the Philippines v.
Delos Santos, Jr., G.R. No. 248929, November 9, 2020, Second Division)
10. The Court sees no cogent reason to deviate from the congruent factual findings of the RTC and the CA that
accused-appellant killed his wife. Parricide is committed when: (a) a person is killed; (b) the deceased is killed
by the accused; and (c) the deceased is the father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or a
legitimate other ascendants or other descendants, or the legitimate spouse of the accused. In this case,
Marcelina died on 3 November 2014 as shown in the autopsy report. Moreover, one of the facts that was
proposed by the prosecution for stipulation and was admitted by the defense during the preliminary conference
and the pre-trial was the validity and existence of marriage of Marcelina and the accused-appellant at the time
of the incident. More so, when the accused-appellant was presented anew during the trial of the case, he
admitted that he stabbed Marcelina. This is consistent with the testimony of defense witness Richard who
testified that his father told him that he might have seriously harmed Marcelina. Again, the admission of the
accused-appellant is consistent with the testimony of prosecution witness Brgy. Capt. Martin who testified that
the accused-appellant uttered to him "I do not know what had happened, I might have killed her." Albeit the
admission of the accused-appellant that he stabbed Marcelina, the defense raised mitigating circumstances
that must be appreciated in his favor. In fact, in the instant appeal, the accused-appellant does not anymore
question the finding of the RTC that he is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of parricide and assails only the RTC's
appreciation of mitigating circumstances. (People of the Philippines v. Padilla, G.R. No. 247603, May 5, 2021,
Third Division)
MU R DER AN D HO MIC ID E
1. It is illogical to presume that despite the swiftness and suddenness of the attack, the attackers intended to kill
only Venturina, Natalicio, and Fortes, and only intended to injure Lachica, Mangrobang, and Gaston. Since the
intent to kill was evident from the moment the accused-appellants took their first swing, all of them were liabile
for that intent to kill. (People of the Philippines v. Feliciano, Jr., G.R. No. 196735, May 5, 2014, Third Division)
2. In murder or homicide, the offender must have intent to kill. If there is no intent to kill on the part of the
offender, he or she is liable only for physical injuries. The accused’s intent to kill, in this case, is evident from his
attempt to stab private complainants more than once. He even chased private complainants after they had
tried to flee from him. The wounds inflicted by accused were also shown to have been fatal if no medical
attention had been given to private complainants immediately after the incident. (Cirera v. People of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 181843, July 14, 2014, Third Division)
3. 21 stab wounds strengthens an intention to kill. However, absent any qualifying circumstance, the crime is
homicide, and not murder. (People of the Philippines v. Chavez, G.R. No. 207950, September 22, 2014, Second
Division)
4. The intent to kill is established not only by the number of stab wounds found on Gulane, but also by accused-
appellant’s own admission that he stabbed Gulane. (People of the Philippines v. Oloverio, G.R. No. 211159,
5. Appellant is guilty of murder. It was shown that the accused have shot the deceased, Judge Velasco. The victim
was hit three times while on board a motorcycle at around 7:00 p.m. Judge Velasco was approaching his house
while coming from a birthday party when he was shot. He was unarmed and accompanied by Garabato, his
wife, and Christopher Iway. Clearly, Judge Velasco was unaware of any attack that Gilbert planned against him.
(People of the Philippines v. Caballero, G.R. No. 210673, June 29, 2016, Third Division)
6. The elements necessary to sustain a conviction for homicide were positively established by the prosecution, to
wit: (a) PO1 Pinion was killed; (b) Saluta killed him without any justifying circumstance; (c) Saluta had the
intention ot kill; and (d) the killing was not attended by any of the qualifying circumstances of murder, or by
that of parricide or infanticide. (Saluta v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 181335, July 27, 2016, Third
Division)
7. All the elements of the crime of murder were present in this case. First, it was established that Robert, the
victim, was killed. Second, accused-appellants killed the victim as testified by the prosecution witnesses, who
saw how the victim was simultaneously hacked and stabbed by them. Third, the killing was attended by the
qualifying circumstance of outraging or scoffing at the victim’s person or corpse because after the victim was
hacked and stabbed, accused Frankie decapitated his head threw the same in the ”lubluban ng kalabaw.” Lastly,
the killing of the victim neither constituted parricide or infanticide. (People of the Philippines v. Gerero, G.R.
8. Accused-appellant committed murder because the killing was attended by treachery. It was shown that the
victim was merely unwarily texting inside the tent when the two men held him from behind so that the appellant
can deliver blows to his abdomen. The victim was too unprepared and helpless to defend himself against these
three men. Furthermore, appellant’s acts of dragging him to the nearby hut and using a lead pipe (sumpak)

evidently shows that he consciously adopted means to ensure the execution of the crime. (People of the
Philippines v. Buenafe, G.R. No. 212930, August 3, 2016, Third Division)
9. Accused-appellant committed murder because he killed the victim who was already old and blind. (People of
the Philippines v. Colorada, G.R. No. 215715, August 31, 2016, Third Division)
10. In the prosecution of the crime of murder as defined in Article 248 of the RPC, the following elements must be
established: (a) that a person was killed, (b) that the accused killed that person, (c) that the killing was attended
by treachery, and (d) that the killing is not infanticide or parricide.(People of the Philippines v. Santuille, G.R.
No. 214772, November 21, 2016, Third Division; People of the Philippines v. San Jose, G.R. No. 206916, July 3,
11. The killing was qualified by treachery and thus qualifies the same as murder. The evidence unequivocally shows
that the attack against Basilio, which came from behind, was sudden, deliberate and unexpected. The victim
was completely unaware of any threat to his life as he was merely walking home with his son. The use of a
firearm showed deliberate intent to kill Basilio and the location and number of gunshot wounds rendered him
defenseless and incapable of retaliation. (People of the Philippines v. Dayaday, G.R. No. 213224, January 16,
12. Absent clear and convincing evidence on how the attack was perpetrated, the conclusion that there was
treachery is nothing but an assumption. Thus, the crime is homicide, not murder. (People of the Philippines v.
Calinawan, G.R. No. 226145, February 13, 2017, Second Division)
13. When the victim was alerted to the impending lethal attack due to the preceding heated argument between
him and the accused, with the latter even uttering threats against the former, treachery cannot be appreciated
as an attendant circumstance. When the resolve to commit the crime was immediately followed by its
execution, evident premeditation cannot be appreciated. Hence, the crime is homicide, not murder. (People of
the Philippines v. Macaspac, G.R. No. 198954, February 22, 2017, Third Division)
14. Romeo had approached Aurelio in Lorega to ask to be accompanied to a certain place, and they were standing
side by side when accused-appellant approached them and suddenly pulled out a knife and stabbed Romeo.
Clearly, neither Aurelio nor Romeo was aware of the impending assault from accused-appellant. Both Aurelio
and Romeo were also unarmed. This made them all the more vulnerable and defenseless in the face of accused
appellant's sudden attack. In fact, having been stabbed by accused-appellant, Romeo was unable to retaliate
and had to run away from accused appellant to escape any further assault, but accused-appellant still gave
chase. Aurelio also testified that because of the suddenness of accused appellant's attack, he was unable to
make any move to defend his cousin the moment the latter was stabbed. The foregoing circumstances are
manifestly indicative of the presence of the conditions under which treachery may be appreciated, i.e., the
employment of means of execution that gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to
retaliate, and that said means of execution was deliberately or consciously adopted. (People of the Philippines
v. Pulgo, G.R. No. 218205, July 5, 2017, Third Division)
15. All the elements of the crime of murder does not exist. While the qualifying circumstances of treachery, evident
premeditation, and nighttime were alleged in the Information, the prosecution failed to prove the same during
the trial. In fact, the prosecution failed to present any evidence showing the existence of the circumstances
which would qualify the crime to murder. The mere fact that the accused-appellant pleaded the defense of
insanity and as a consequence admitted the commission of the crime, the same should not be construed as an
abdication of the prosecution’s duty to prove with certainty the existence of the qualifying circumstances in the
Information. Since the prosecution was not able to prove the existence of the qualifying circumstances of
treachery, evident premeditaiton, and nighttime, accused-appellant can only be convicted of the crime of
homicide. (People of the Philippines v. Cacho, G.R. No. 218425, September 27, 2017, First Division)
16. The failure of the information supposedly charging murder to aver the factual basis for the attendant
circumstance of treachery forbids the appreciation of the circumstance as qualifying the killing; hence, the
accused can only be found guilty of homicide. To merely state in the informaiton that treachery was attendant
is not enough because the usage of such term is not a factual averment but a conclusion of law. (People of the
Philippines v. Dasmariñas, G.R. No. 203986, October 4, 2017, Third Division; People of the Philippines v.
Delector, G.R. No. 200026, October 4, 2017, Third Division)
17. The prosecution has not proven that the killing was committed with treachery. Indeed, other than their
respective findings that Daroya "suddenly appeared" and continuously punched Rolando, while holding a piece
of metal wrapped in a towel, until the latter fell to the ground, the lower courts failed to indicate any
circumstance which would show that Daroya consciously adopted such mode of attack to facilitate the
perpetration of the killing without risk to himself. The prosecution has likewise failed to present any evidence
showing that Daroya specifically chose to punch Rolando in his plan to kill him. It appears that Daroya's decision
to punch Rolando, which eventually caused the latter's death, appears to be the result of a rash and impetuous

impulse of the moment brought about by their argument as to who among them should be first in line among
the pedicab drivers. It is basic that a killing done at the spur of the moment is not treacherous. Accordingly, the
Court is compelled to disregard the finding of the existence of treachery by the lower courts. Daroya's guilt is
thus limited to the crime of homicide. (People of the Philippines v. Daroya, G.R. No. 229502, November 8, 2017,
Second Division)
18. The findings of facts of both the RTC and the CA are thoroughly supported by the evidence on record. Both
courts are in agreement that the appellant had been positively identified by prosecution witness Fernando
Porlas Huerta (Fernando), a son of the victim, who testified that he in fact had a face-to-face confrontation or
meeting with the appellant at the sugarcane plantation in Brgy. Tinag-an, Albuera, Leyte, that very evening of
June 9, 2010; that this face-to-face encounter or meeting occurred after he saw the burst of gunfire that caused
his father to fall on the ground while his father, his other brother and he were at the waiting shed that early
evening of June 9, 2010; that armed with his father's knife, he went after a man wearing a hat and an army
jacket and who was the source of the gunfire; that when he caught up with him, he stabbed the man with his
father's knife there at the sugarcane plantation; that the appellant attempted to shoot him (witness Fernando)
but the appellant's gun malfunctioned, and they grappled for possession of the gun; and, that he did not press
his attack against the appellant when he noticed that the latter had a companion nearby. (People of the
Philippines v. Polangcus, G.R. No. 216940, December 13, 2017, First Division)
19. The victim was struck on the head by Norada with a piece of wood which resulted to his death. However, the
records are bereft of any evidence that appellant and his co-accused made some preparation to kill the vicitm
in such as manner as to ensure the execution of the crime or to make it impossible or hard for the victim to
defend himself. Furthermore, none of the prosecution witnesses saw how the killing was perpetrated and thus
abuse of superior strength cannot be appreciated. Accordingly, the crime committed was homicide. (People of
the Philippines v. Norada, G.R. No. 218958, December 13, 2017, First Division)
20. Deliberate intent to kill Casipit can be inferred from the location and number of stab wounds he sustained, and
even though he was able to run after the first sstab wound, accused-appellant was able to subdue and stab him
further, rendering him defenseless and incapable of retaliation. (People of the Philippines v. Cirbeto, G.R. No.
231359, February 7, 2018, Second Division)
21. Oscar is guilty of murder since the killing was qualified by abuse of superior strength, and also of slight physical
injury. In this case, the prosecution was able to establish that Oscar abused his superiority when he killed Minda.
Indeed, it was sufficiently shown that Oscar was armed with a knife, a deadly weapon, while Minda was then
burdened by a child and had no means to defend and repel the attacks of her assailant. Furthermore, the trial
court noted that Oscar was of heavy build and stood at 5'10" in contrast to Minda's 4'11" frame. Clearly, Oscar
abused his superiority afforded him by his sex, height, and build and a weapon when he attacked Minda who
was then carrying a child. Thus, the trial and appellate courts correctly convicted him of murder. The Court also
concurs that Oscar can be held guilty only of slight physical injuries with respect. to Anthonette. The prosecution
failed to present any evidence which would show that Oscar also intended to kill Anthonette. Without the
element of intent to kill, Oscar could only be convicted for physical injury; and considering that Anthonette's
wound was only superficial, the appellate court correctly convicted Oscar of slight physical injury. (People of
the Philippines v. Mat-an, G.R. No. 215720, February 21, 2018, Third Division)
22. The accused-appellant cannot be held liable for murder since the qualifying circumstance of treachery is absent.
While Glen suddenly and unexpectedly attacked Anthony, there was no showing that he deliberately and
consciously adopted such mode of attack in order to facilitate the killing without any risk to himself arising from
any defense that Anthony might have adopted. Glen suddenly shot Anthony in the presence of the latter's wife
and the other guests at the party. If Glen deliberately intended that no risk would come to him, he could have
chosen another time and place to attack Anthony. As it is, the location and time of the attack did not discount
the possibility of retaliation coming from the other guests. In addition, the shooting and stabbing incident
transpired at around 5:00 p.m. or during such time that Glen could still be easily seen and recognized as the
perpetrator of the crime. From all indications, it thus appeared that Glen did not consciously intend to employ
a particular mode of attack to kill Anthony. The attack was a spur of the moment decision caused by sheer
annoyance when Anthony and his wife left while the party was still on-going. (People of the Philippines v.
Abina, G.R. No. 220146, April 18, 2018, First Division)
23. There is no doubt that the act of Ardin in shooting the victim through the bamboo slats qualifies the crime with
alevosia. Florencio was having supper when he was shot. He had no suspicion that he was to be assaulted; and
the sudden, swift attack gave him no opportunity to defend himself. Therefore, this Court agrees with the
tribunals a quo that the crime committed was murder. (People of the Philippines v. Cadampog, G.R. No. 218244,
24. The prosecution clearly established that the accused-appellants, taking advantage of their number, purposely
resorted to holding Larry by the armpit so that all the knife-wielders would be free to stab him, albeit
successively. In People v. Garchitorena, the Court en banc appreciated the qualifying circumstance of abuse of

superior strength after finding that therein accused-appellants, armed with a deadly weapon, immobilized the
victim and stabbed him successively using the same deadly weapon. Moreover, in terms of numbers, Larry was
with his lone companion, Eduardo, while the assailants, totaling five, participated in the attack. A disparity in
strength and size was thus apparent. (People of the Philippines v. Flores, G.R. No. 228886, August 8, 2018, First
Division)
25. The following circumstances negate the presence of treachery: First, the stabbing incident happened during a
drinking spree in which accused-appellant was a part. He did not deliberately seek the presence of the victim
as he was already in the same vicinity as the latter when he hacked the victim. Second, in killing the victim,
accused-appellant did not even use his own weapon – he merely took a scythe from Arnulfo, who was sitting
beside him. In a similar case, the Court held that treachery cannot be presumed merely from the fact that the
attack was sudden. The suddenness of an attack does not, of itself, suffice to support a finding of alevosia, even
if the purpose was to kill, so long as the decision was made suddenly and the victim's helpless position was
accidental. Based on the first and second circumstances abovementioned, accused-appellant's decision to
attack the victim was more of a sudden impulse on his part than a planned decision. Considering the foregoing,
it was not proven that the means Renato used in killing Rodolfo was deliberately and consciously adopted by
the former. The incident, which happened at the spur of the moment, negates the possibility that accused-
appellant consciously adopted the means to execute the crime committed. Thus, it is not possible to appreciate
treachery against Renato. (People of the Philippines v. Bacolot, G.R. No. 233193, October 10, 2018, Second
Division)
26. A reading of the Information readily reveals that while the "use of fire" was not explicitly mentioned as a
qualifying circumstance, the Information nevertheless narrate with sufficiency that Mercado was being accused
of "causing third degree burns against the victims which directly caused their instantaneous death." It escapes
the mind of the Court how one could be accused of "causing third degree burns" without necessarily saying
that he or she used fire in the process. The RTC and the CA thus correctly held that the crime committed was
Murder instead of merely Homicide. (People of the Philippines v. Mercado, G.R. No. 218702, October 17, 2018,
Second Division)
27. Miranda’s intent to kill was clearly established by the nature and number of wounds sustained by Pilo. The
records show that Miranda used a bolo measuring 1 ½ feet. The hacking wound was about five inches long, and
1 inch deep fracturing Pilo's skull in the parietal area. Relentless in his attack, Miranda continuously made
several thrusts against Pilo, while the latter was already sprawled on the ground. This caused Pilo to sustain two
additional wounds. These deep gashes measured four inches long by one-inch deep, and 1.5 inch long by one-
inch deep in Pilo's forearm. In fact, these continuous attacks were stopped only when Damaso arrived and
grappled with the weapon. Undoubtedly, the manner of attack and the injuries sustained show forth a clear
resolve to end Pilo's life. Indeed, these injuries cannot simply be brushed aside as grazing injuries, especially
considering that one of which, was an injury to the head of Pilo, which may have caused the latter's untimely
demise, if not for the timely medical assistance. (Miranda v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 234528, January
28. Alberto and Josephine were walking uphill totally unaware of the impending attack upon their person. Suddenly,
appellant and Pael waylaid them. Appellant thereafter shot Alberto who fell downhill. Appellant then fired a
second shot to ensure his death. Certainly, Alberto had no opportunity to defend himself. He was unaware of
the attack and was caught off guard when his assailant suddenly approached and shot him with a gun. The
stealth by which the attack was carried out gave Alberto no chance to evade the same. Indeed, the unexpected
assault upon the victim and the fact that the assailant did not sustain any injury evinces treachery. Undoubtedly,
appellant consciously adopted the mode of attacking Alberto who had no inkling of the forthcoming attack and
was completely defenseless. The attack was executed in such a manner as to ensure the killing of Alberto
without risk to appellant. The fact that Alberto had a bolo tucked in his waist was of no consequence. What is
decisive is that the attack was executed in a manner that the victim was rendered defenseless and unable to
retaliate. (People of the Philippines v. Acabo, G.R. No. 229823, February 27, 2019, First Division)
29. Narido testified that after the victim refused to give appellant more coins a second time, appellant left but
returned shortly after. Appellant then approached the parked kuliglig where Narido and the victim were seated.
Pretending to be a kind soul, appellant handed cigarette to the victim who even praised him "mabait ka naman
pala." But like a wolf in sheep clothing, appellant, without any warning, stepped back a bit obviously for
momentum and instantly thrust a knife into the chest of the unsuspecting hapless victim. Appellant's sudden,
swift and unexpected attack rendered the victim totally unable to retaliate or defend himself. The means
employed by appellant ensured the commission of the crime without exposing him to any risk which may come
from the victim's act of retaliation or defense. This is treachery. The essence of treachery is that the attack
comes without a warning and in a swift, deliberate, and unexpected manner, affording the victim no chance to
resist or escape. What is decisive is that the execution of the attack made it impossible for the victim to defend
himself or herself or retaliate, ensuring its commission without risk to the aggressor. (People of the Philippines
v. Saltarin, G.R. No. 223715, June 3, 2019, Second Division)

30. Accused-appellant is liable for murder. In the instant case, Rodolfo and Bernardo were walking side by side
when they were accosted by accused-appellant who suddenly stabbed Rodolfo with a short bolo. Both Rodolfo
and Bernardo were unarmed and were totally unaware of the impending assault from the accused-appellant.
(People of the Philippines v. Arpon, G.R. No. 229859, June 10, 2019, First Division)
31. Treachery is absent in this case. Here, although Jun and the Reyes brothers got into an argument in the morning
of August 5, 2007, the same appeared to have ended several hours before the killing took place. In fact,
according to Jun's wife Catherine, they had packed up their things and prepared to go home in the late
afternoon of August 5, 2007. Jun, however, walked back to Hidalgo Street for the shoulder bag he left earlier.
There is no showing, as none was shown, that appellants and their co-accused knew Jun was going back to the
area at that late time of the day and that they had planned to attack Jun there and then. On the contrary,
appellants and their co-accused appeared to have spontaneously acted as soon as they saw Jun back in the
area. They instantaneously pursued him, one hit him with a plastic chair in the head, two alternately whipped
him with broomstick handles, one waylaid and stabbed him in the side of his body, and later, in his arm. People
of the Philippines vs. Cañaveras ruled that treachery is not present when the killing is not premeditated or where
the sudden attack is not preconceived and deliberately adopted, but is just triggered by a sudden infuriation on
the part of the accused as a result of a provocative act of the victim, or when the killing is done at the spur of
the moment. Another point, even after Jun fell to the ground and appellants alternately hit him with broomstick
handles, he still managed to get back on his feet and run for his life. And although Argie subsequently waylaid
and stabbed him in the left side of his body, he did not stop running. The only time he did was when Argie
caught up and stabbed him another time. Evidently, although Jun did not expect the sudden and concerted
attack of his assailants who were each armed with either a chair, broomstick handles, or a knife, he was not
rendered totally defenseless or prevented from escaping his assailants. In fact, he was able to get back on his
feet and run for his life, albeit in the end, he still lost his life due to the stab wound he sustained in his trunk.
(People of the Philippines v. Reyes, G.R. No. 227013, June 17, 2019, Second Division)
32. Accused is not liable for murder since treachery was not proven. In this case, the following circumstances negate
the presence of treachery. First, although the attack was sudden and unexpected as he was hacked from behind,
the prosecution did not prove that Corpin deliberately chose the particular mode of attack he used to ensure
the execution of the criminal purpose without any risk to himself. As testified by the witnesses of the
prosecution, the incident happened in a public market where there were numerous other people, including the
witnesses, who could have offered their help. In a similar case, the Court held that when aid is easily available
to the victim, such as when the attendant circumstances show that there were several eyewitnesses to the
incident, no treachery could be appreciated because if the accused indeed consciously adopted the particular
means he used to insure the facilitation of the crime, he could have chosen another place or time. Moreover,
after he was attacked by Corpin, Paulo was able to run away and escape, which shows that the victim had the
opportunity to defend himself. Second, Corpin did not deliberately seek the presence of the victim. As testified
by the prosecution witnesses and Corpin himself, he and Paulo have been working as meat vendors in the same
public market for several years. In addition, the weapon he used to kill the victim was a butcher's knife that he
regularly used for his work. In this connection, the Court ruled in another case that the fact that the victim and
the accused were already within the same vicinity when the attack happened and that the accused did not
deliberately choose the particular weapon he used to kill the victim as he merely picked it up from within his
reach is proof that there is no treachery involved. (People of the Philippines v. Corpin, G.R. No. 232493, June
33. The elements of treachery were not proven by clear and convincing evidence in the case at bar. As Luisa and
Jessica were only able to witness the events that transpired after the initial attack inside the house, it was not
established whether Enriquez deliberately or consciously employed the particular method he used so as to
deprive the victim any opportunity to defend himself. Even more telling is the fact that the victim was able to
escape from Enriquez and even ask for help from his uncle's house before collapsing. (People of the Philippines
v. Enriquez, Jr., G.R. No. 238171, June 19, 2019, Second Division)
34. Treachery attended the killing. Here, Jerry was wrestling with his nephew Porfirio after a heated verbal
altercation which became physical. They both fell and Porfirio was able to pin his uncle down. Appellant
suddenly came carrying a gun and shot Jerry twice. Appellant's act of shooting the victim while the latter was
pinned down by another effectively denied the victim the chance to defend himself or to retaliate against his
perpetrators.23 Further, the victim was shot twice, as if making sure he would be mortally injured or killed.
(People of the Philippines v. Corpuz, G.R. No. 220486, June 26, 2019, Second Division)
35. Intent to kill, being a state of mind, is discerned by the courts only through external manifestations. In Rivera v.
People, the Court held that intent to kill must be proved by either direct or circumstantial evidence which may
consist of: (a) the means used by the malefactor; (b) the nature, location, and number of wounds sustained by
the victim; (c) the conduct of the malefactor before, during, or immediately after the killing of the victim; and
(d) the circumstances under which the crime was committed. We have also considered as determinative factors
the motive of the offender and the words he uttered at the time of inflicting the injuries on the victim. The
factual circumstances surrounding Ernando's death clearly showed appellant's intent to kill. He left the drinking

spree and shortly after, he came back and showed off his gun to his drinking companions. Then, he pointed it
to Ernando posing two (2) queries: "Ano gusto? Patay buhay?" And right off, he shot the unarmed victim in the
right chest. Appellant's vicious attack was unprovoked. He just shot Ernando in the right chest during the
drinking spree. The Medico Legal Report stated that Ernando sustained one (1) gunshot wound, through and
through, causing laceration of his right lung, diaphragm, liver, and stomach. The cause of death was: "Gunshot
wound, trunk.'" It has been settled that if the victim died because of a deliberate act of the malefactor, intent
to kill is conclusively presumed. Verily, appellant's intent to kill Ernando was amply established on record.
(People of the Philippines v. Espina, G.R. No. 219614, July 10, 2019, Second Division)
36. Appellant's group and the locals were drawn into an altercation when Marlon approached to pacify them. Then,
appellant suddenly shot Marlon in the chest. Though sudden, the attack did not amount to treachery. For at
that moment, appellant was enraged and did not have time to reflect on his actions. There was no showing that
he consciously launched the sudden attack to facilitate the killing without risk to himself. Hence, appellant may
only be convicted of homicide. (People of the Philippines v. Albino, G.R. No. 229928, July 22, 2019, Second
Division)
37. Manzo was shot and there were only two (2) other people in the car with him. Undeniably, one of them must
be the killer. To absolve Jaen in this case would be to set a murderer on the streets on the faintest of doubts
which have already been contradicted by the totality of the circumstantial evidence. (People of the Philippines
v. Jaen, G.R. No. 241946, July 29, 2019, Second Division)
38. The victim was about to start the engine of his motorcycle in front of a store shortly before the shooting
incident. Naive and unwary of what would befall him, he did not have the faintest idea that his aggressor was
just standing near a guyabano tree within the area, deliberately waiting and closely monitoring him. Little did
the victim know that an attack was forthcoming. Upon seeing the victim in his motorcycle, appellant cunningly
proceeded to the store to buy a cigarette and, apparently, time to prepare for the execution of his evil plan.
Thereafter, he walked towards the victim, stopped right at his back, cursed him, and shot him at close range in
an unguarded position hitting him on his trunk. Clearly, the swiftness and suddenness of the aggression carried
out by appellant deprived Palumbarit the chance to ward off the attack or run or, at the very least, mount a
defense. Moreover, to ensure that it would be impossible for Palumbarit to strike back and escape death,
appellant consciously chose as weapon an improvised shotgun that can fire a number of small pellets at once
to attack the victim. He pulled the trigger right after he cursed Palumbarit giving the latter no time to repel the
attack. He even attempted to further shoot Palumbarit until he was told that the latter was already dead.
Indeed, treachery is present in the case at bar. (People of the Philippines v. Torres, G.R. No. 241012, August 28,
39. The qualifying circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation are absent. In this case, records show that
the killing of the victim was preceded by two (2) noisy episodes, particularly: (a) when Aquiles initiated a noisy
raucous in the compound by loudly shouting for Charles to come out and threatening to kill him; and (b) after
being driven away by Charles' relative, the group returned moments later to instigate another raucous where
Aquiles, once again, challenged Charles to come out and face him in a fight. Evidently, the attack was not sudden
nor unexpected since, from the inception of the first raucous, Charles was already put on guard and had been
forewarned of the danger he was in. Moreover, it cannot be said that Ronald deliberately nor consciously
adopted particular means of carrying out the attack as the evidence on record reveals that his companion,
Aquiles, initially wanted to have a mere face-off with Charles, and it was only when the latter failed to come out
that Aquiles and Ronald tried to shoot the victim with their sumpak. Similarly, there is nothing on the records
that would show that Ronald's attack on Charles was premeditated, i.e., that his commission of the crime was
preceded by cool thought and a reflection with the resolution to carry out the criminal intent during a span of
time sufficient to arrive at the hour of judgment. Verily, evident premeditation cannot be appreciated absent
any proof as to how and when the plan to kill was hatched or the amount of time elapsed before it was carried
out. (People of the Philippines v. Jaurigue, G.R. No. 232380, September 4, 2019, First Division)
40. The factual circumstances which were considered by the RTC and the C A in ruling that accused-appellant
committed the killings of Mabel, Clark, and Medirose were as follows: (a) loud screams were heard by witnesses
Arnold and Bernard; (b) the screams came from the house of Mabel; (c) Bernard and Arnold saw four to five
men coming out of the house of Mabel; (d) Bernard positively identified accused-appellant as one of the men;
(e) Bernard and Arnold discovered the dead bodies of Mabel, Clark, and Medirose. The foregoing narration
failed to establish that accused-appellant was the one who committed the killings. The evidence linking accused-
appellant to the crime of murder, as held by the CA, was the fact that he was seen by both Bernard and Arnold
coming out of Mabel's house after hearing the screams therefrom. However, it is significant to consider that
Bernard likewise, testified that there were three to four persons, aside from accused-appellant, who came out
from Mabel's house. Thus, the presence of other men does not exclude the possibility that they were the
perpetrators. Also, a considerable amount of time had lapsed from the time that Bernard and Arnold saw
accused-appellant and his alleged cohorts, to the time that they actually saw the lifeless bodies of the victims.
Both Bernard and Arnold testified that they went to the house of Mabel hours after they saw accused-appellant
with three or four others. It was unclear as to whether the victims were already dead when they saw accused-

appellant and others coming out of Mabel's house or there were others who went inside or outside said house.
The endless possibilities which may arise in this case sanction reasonable doubt on accused-appellant's guilt.
The conclusion of the RTC and the CA that it was indeed accused-appellant who was the perpetrator of the
crime, is a mere speculation and based on conjecture. (People of the Philippines v. Enero, G.R. No. 242213,
41. In any event, the Court conforms with the findings of the trial court and Court of Appeals that "use of motor
vehicle" qualified the victim's killing to murder. Records show that appellants on board a motorcycle chased the
victim while the latter was running away for his life. For sure, appellants' use of a fast means of transportation,
they easily gained advantage, outsped, and in no time caught up with the victim who was running for his life.
Appellants later left the scene of the crime together on board the same motor vehicle. Clearly, therefore, the
motorcycle was used as a means to facilitate the commission of the crime and to enable appellants' escape
after they accomplished their mission to kill the victim. In People v. Ong and Quintos, the Court held that the
use of motor vehicle aided in the commission of murder by enabling the accused to easily caught up with victim,
directing the latter to the crime scene, and utilizing it to abscond, as in this case. (People of the Philippines v.
Padal, Jr., G.R. No. 232070, October 2, 2019, Second Division)
42. The fact that Eusebio's body was already embalmed when Dr. Carlos examined it does not negate the accuracy
of the medical findings pertaining to Eusebio's injuries and cause of death. In People v. Gallego, et al., the Court
held that although the victim's body was already embalmed when the medico-legal officer examined it, the
number, locations, and depths of the wounds sustained by the victim as indicated in the medical findings were
considered as sufficient proofs of the accused's intent to kill the victim. (People of the Philippines v. Galam, G.R.
43. The prosecution’s failure to present as evidence the shirt that he was wearing and prove that the same was
indeed stained with blood, as testified to by the witnesses, and the weapon used to kill the victim is not fatal to
the case. Corpus delicti is the body, foundation or substance of a crime. It refers to the fact of the commission
of the crime, not the physical body of the deceased. Because corpus delicti may be proven by circumstantial
evidence, it is not necessary for the prosecution to present direct evidence to prove the corpus delicti.
Nevertheless, the prosecution must present the following elements: (a) that a certain result or fact has been
established, i.e., that a man has died; and (b) that some person is criminally responsible for it. In this case, the
prosecution was able to prove the death of the victim and that the circumstances presented proved that
appellant caused such death. (People of the Philippines v. Bacares, G.R. No. 243024, June 23, 2020, First
Division)
44. The elements for frustrated homicide were duly established. First, direct and positive testimonies of
prosecution witnesses established that Joseph suffered a heavy blow on the head caused by a blunt object like
a pipe wrench. Certainly, the nature of the head injury sustained by him demonstrates petitioners’ intent to kill.
Second, the blunt force trauma sustained by Joseph was fatal. In technical medical terms, Joseph was found to
have endured “T/C Diffuse Axonal Injury and Subarachnoid Hemorrhage Fracture, Left Frontal, and Medial or
Left Orbit Secondary to Mauling.” In plain terms, “nabugbog;” an internal brain injury. The blow was so sharp
and serious that Joseph laid unconscious in the hospital for 14 days. As testified to by Dr. Marzan, Joseph would
have succumbed to death due to the said head trauma if not for the timely medical attention. Third, no
qualifying circumstance for murder was alleged in the Information whereby petitioners were formally charged.
(Naag, Jr. v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 228638, July 13, 2020, First Division)
45. The crime committed by Felimon was murder qualified by abuse of superior strength. Records show that the
quarrel between Felimon and Sionita started when the latter refused to lend money to Felimon, which was then
followed by an exchange of curse words, “Putang-ina mo.” After, Felimon left and came back carrying with him
a bolo. Through the categorical testimony of Jonathan, the prosecution was able to establish that Felimon
purposely sought an advantage of using a bolo and had the intent to use the same in killing Sionita. The
notorious inequality of forces between Sionita and Felimon, was highlighted in (a) Felimon being a male; (b)
Felimon’s use of a bolo; and (c) the physical position of unarmed Sionita, where she was not able to defend
herself. (People of the Philippines v. Serafin, G.R. No. 246197, July 29, 2020, Second Division)
46. The killing was attended by treachery. To emphasize, Remo was an innocent-passerby, who was caught off
guard, at the time of the attack. The stealth, swiftness, and methodical manner by which the attack was carried
out did not give Remo a chance to evade when Rebato stabbed Remo, below the latter’s right nipple of the
midclavicular line, and the left quadrant of his abdomen. There is no doubt that Rebato’s sudden and
unexpected attack upon the victim evidences treachery. The fact that Rebato was facing Remo when the latter
was stabbed is of no consequence. Even a frontal attack could be treacherous when unexpected on an unarmed
victim who would be in no position to repel the attack or avoid it. (People of the Philippines v. Gunda, G.R. No.
242883, September 3, 2020, First Division)
47. Records undeniably prove that Gerry was the intended victim of the shooting. When Gerry went home and
tried to close the front door, he noticed appellant standing right outside the doorway. Suddenly, appellant drew

a gun, aimed at him, and fired. Appellant, however, missed hitting Gerry and ended up injuring Princess and
killing Jonabel. The qualifying circumstance of treachery attended the attempted killing of Gerry. In People v.
Amora, the Court held that the qualifying circumstance of treachery does not require that the perpetrator
attack his or her victim from behind. Even a frontal attack could be treacherous when unexpected and on an
unarmed victim who would be in no position to repel the attack or avoid it. This is the case for Gerry. As shown,
appellant commenced the commission of murder by suddenly firing his gun towards Gerry who was then
unarmed and was not in a position to defend himself. Gerry, however, did not die as a result because appellant
simply missed. (People of the Philippines v. Bendecio, G.R. No. 235016, September 8, 2020, First Division)
48. In addition, the qualifying circumstance of treachery attended Jonabel’s killing. Although appellant did not
intend to kill Jonabel, teachery may still be appreciated in aberratio ictus, pursuant to the Court’s ruling in
People v. Flora. Just because Jonabel was not the intended victim does not make appellant’s sudden attack any
less treacherous. (People of the Philippines v. Bendecio, G.R. No. 235016, September 8, 2020, First Division)
49. No evidence was presented to show that petitioner consciously adopted or reflected on the means, method,
or form of attack to secure his unfair advantage. The attack might have been done on impulse or as a reaction
to an actual or imagined provocation offered by the victim. In this case, it is crystal clear from the testimonies
of Jessie and Warren that prior to the stabbing, there was already a commotion that was happening involving
accused-appellants, Oca, Anthon, and Jessie. Warren suddenly came in the middle of a heated argument
involving his brother and tried to pacify the situation. Thereafter, when they turned their backs to leave, Warren
was stabbed by Oca. While the attack was sudden, such act cannot be equated to treachery because there was
a provocation that triggers it. The manner of attack might not have been motivated by a determination to
ensure success in committing the crime. What was more likely the case was that the accused-appellants’ action
was an impulsive reaction to being pacified by Warren, the commotion in general involving the group and
Warren’s attempt to summon Jessie home. Case law states that this type of provocation negates the existence
of treachery. Accordingly, accused-appellants could not be properly convicted of murder, but only of homicide
and frustrated homicide. (People of the Philippines v. Ukay, G.R. No. 246419, September 16, 2020, Second
Division)
50. Intent to kill is evident from the use of a deadly weapon which in this case is a gun. In Etino v. People, the Court
considered the following factors to determine the presence of intent to kill, namely: (a) the means used by the
malefactors, (b) the nature, location, and number of wounds sustained by the victim, (c) the conduct of the
malefactors before, at the time, or immediately after the killing of the victim; (d) the circumstances under which
the crime was committed; and (e) the motives of the accused. (Anisco v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No.
51. All the elements of the crime of murder qualified by treachery were present in this case. Romeo was killed and
it was established by the prosecution, through the testimony of eyewitness Eugenio, that accused-appellants
killed Romeo when they indiscriminately fired at the houses in the vicinity of the plaza, including Elito’s store
where Romeo was buying cigarette. Romeo was unarmed and unprepared for the attack. Also, the execution
fo the crime was without risk on the part of the accused-appellants and there was no doubt that Romeo could
not mount a defense for himself. He had no chance to resist or escape. (People of the Philippines v. Camarino,
et al., G.R. No. 222655, December 9, 2020, Third Division)
52. When the identity of the accused is unclear, the element of intent to kill is also wanting. (Balina v. People of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 205950, January 12, 2021, First Division)
53. The prosecution established the essential elements of murder. The prosecution proved the first element that
Rose Yuzon was killed by submitting in evidence her death certificate, and presenting eyewitness Edgardo
Gamboa who testified that he saw the killing of Rose Yuzon. The accused-appellant admitted the death of the
victim during pre-trial. The prosecution also proved the second and third elements that the accused-appellant
killed Rose Yuzon and that the killing was attended by treachery through the testimony of eyewitness Edgardo
Gamboa, which was given credence by the trial court and the CA and sustained by the Supreme Court. The
fourth element of murder was proved by the prosecution through the stipulation of the prosecution and the
defense at the pre-trial that accused-appellant and the victim were sweethearts, which was also admitted by
appellant during his testimony; hence, their relationship would show that the killing is not parricide or
infanticide. In fine, the prosecution established all the essential elements of murder to warrant the conviction
of appellant. (People of the Philippines v. Masilang, G.R. No. 246466, January 26, 2021, First Division)
54. Quijano is guilty of attempted murder. Quijano’s intent to kill Andong is evident from the treacherous manner
of his assault. It is likewise glaring from his choice of weapon, and his conduc at the time of the attack. In
addition, he hit Andong at a vital spot in his body. Yet, the evidence fails to prove with moral certainty that
Andong would have died from the gunshot wound without timely medical intervention. Unfortunately, the
prosecution failed to present Dr. Manubag, the physician who treated Andong and administered the alleged
life-saving procedure. The Medical Certificate alone, without the testimony of Dr. Manubag, is inadequate proof
to the nature and extent of Andong’s injury. This lacuna may not be filled with the testimony of the expert

witness, Dr. Paradela. The testimony of Dr. Paradela clearly shows that the lone reason given by her in
concluding that Andong’s wound would have been fatal without timely medical intervention was simply
“because this wound would kill the patient if no medical intervention like close tube or CPT is applied.” Such a
general and vague statement is insufficient to prove beyong reasonable doubt that Andong’s wound would
have been fatal without timely medical intervention. Likewise, the conclusion that the wound would have been
mortal, was merely based on the fact that Dr. Manubag applied CPT. Worse, Dr. Paradela did not elaborate
what a close tube or CPT is, how this type of procedure saved Andong’s life, or Andong’s condition prior to and
during the operation. Moreover, a scrutiny of Dr. Paradela’s entire testimony fails to reveal any other statement
regarding the fatal nature of Andong’s wound. Furthermore, while it is true that the prosecution and the
defense stipulated on the qualification of Dr. Paradela, this stipulation does not in any way mean that the Court
must accord probative value and weight to his testimony. The stipulation solely pertained to the physician’s
qualification “as an expert witness being a medical doctor.” It did not dispense with the prosecution’s burden
to prove the elements of the crime. (Quijano v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 202151, February 10, 2021,
First Division)
55. Intent to kill was sufficiently proven by the prosecution. As pointed out by the RTC and affirmed by the CA,
unsatified with just mauling the victim, petitioners also hacked Glenn three (3) times. Two of the three hacks
were directed at Glenn’s face. In addition, even as when Glenn was wounded and was no longer a threat to
them, petitioners still hacked him at the shoulder. As if still not enough, petitioners further kicked and mauled
Glenn. In fact, when Glenn was able to escape, petitioners still gave chase to him. (Oliveros v. People of the
56. The prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that accused-appellants hacked Bohol to death. However, it
failed to prove that father and son reflected on the means or form of their attack to ensure lack of retaliation
from their victim. It likewise failed to prove that treachery attended the commencement of the attack on Bohol.
Both prosecution and defense evidence show that the altercation began inside the house. Clearly, the attack
on Bohol outside the house was a continuation of the altercation inside the house. It cannot be seen as a
separate act which was attended by treachery, because treachery cannot happen midstream of an attack. Thus,
accused-appellant Anthony’s act of waylaying an escaping Bohol out on the street, even if he appeared to have
deliberately positioned himself right in Bohol’s path to catch him off guard, cannot be appreciation as a
qualifying circumstance of treachery. People v. Tigle instructs that for treachery to qualify a killing to murder, it
must be present at the inception of the attack.
a. Nevertheless, the accused-appellants were still properly convicted of murder, as the prosecution was able
to prove beyond reasonable doubt the qualifying circumstance of taking advantage of superior strength.
The prosecution was able to show the notorious inequality of forces, as it proved beyond reasonable doubt
that accused-appellants used their combined strength and weapons to corner Bohol and then hack him to
death. Even the way accused-appellants positioned themselves against Bohol – Anthony in front of the
victim and Eduardo behind – showed how they used their advantage to ensure Bohol’s gruesome death.
The Court of Appeals found: “When the victim was cornered, a fatal hacking blow on the head was
immediately released by Anthony. Knowing that Alberto was already defenseless and severely hurt,
Eduardo still hacked him on the right side of his neck and even continued to stab him even when the victim
collapsed on the gound.”
b. Treachery must be present at the inception of an attack to qualify a killing to murder. A treacherous act
that happens during an attack or subsequent to it cannot be appreciated as a qualifying or generic
aggravating circumstance. (People of the Philippines v. Canillo and Canillo, G.R. No. 244051, April 28, 2021,
Third Division)
57. The prosecution was able to adequately establish all the elements of murder. First, Bulatao was killed. Second,
Viray positively identified Mendoza as the one who shot Bulatao. Third, the killing was attended by treachery
and evident premeditation. Last, the killing was neither parricide nor infanticide as there was no relationship
between Bulatao and accused-appellant.
a. The RTC and the CA correctly appreciated the qualifying circumstance of treachery. The RTC found that
Mendoza shot Bulatao at close range at the back of his head while the latter was engaged in a conversation
with other people. The essence of treachery is the swiftness and the unexpectedness of the attack upon
the unsuspecting and unarmed victim. What is decisive is that the execution of the attack made self-
defense or retaliation impossible on the part of the victim. Since Bulatao was not facing Mendoza, he did
not, in any way, expect the attack, and was not able to do anything to protect himself. Moreover, the fact
that Bulatao was shot on the head shows that it was deliberately adopted to ensure that he was killed
instantly, without any risk to Mendoza. Treachery was, therefore, present.
b. In addition, there is the qualifying circumstance of evident premeditation. Accused-appellants decided to
commit the crime as early as December 10, 2003, when they agreed to the offer of Soriano to kill Bulatao
in exchange for a reward. On December 11-14, 2003, they met and conducted surveillance on the person
of Bulatao, hoping to find him and execute their plan. These acts show that they clung to their
determination to commit the crime. On December 15, 2003, accused-appellants finally located Bulatao,
who was then shot by Mendoza on the spot. It is thus obvious that from December 10, 2003, until
December 15, 2003, when the crime was actually committed, there was sufficient lapse of time to allow

Article 247 of the RPC 276
accused-appellants to reflect upon the consequences of their act. (People of the Philippines v. Mendoza,
G.R. No. 237215, June 28, 2021, Third Division)
AR TIC LE 24 7 O F TH E R PC
1. Article 247 is an absolutory cause that recognizes the commission of a crime but for reasons of public policy
and sentiment, there is no penalty imposed. The defense must prove the concurrence of the following
elements: (a) that a legally married person surprises his spouse in the act of committing sexual intercourse with
another person; (b) that he kills any of them or both of them in the act or immediately thereafter; and (c) that
he has not promoted or facilitated the prostitution of his wife (or daughter) or that he or she has not consented
to the infidelity of the other spouse. Among the three elements, the most vital is that the accused must prove
to the court that he killed his wife and her paramour in the act of sexual intercourse or immediately thereafter.
a. Accused cannot avail of the absolutory cause under Article 247 because he admitted that when he saw
Auria with a man, the two were just seated beside each other and were simply talking. (People of the
Philippines v. Macal, G.R. No. 211062, January 13, 2016, First Division)
2. For Article 247 to apply, the defense must prove the concurrence of the following elements: (a) that a legally
married person surprises his spouse in the act of committing sexual intercourse with another person; (b) that
he kills any of them or both of them in the act or immediately thereafter; and (c) that he has not promoted or
facilitated the prostitution of his wife (or daughter) or that he or she has not consented to the infidelity of the
other spouse. Among the three elements, the most vital is that the accused-appellant must prove to the court
that he killed his wife and her paramour in the act of sexual intercourse or immediately thereafter. Accused
must prove these elements by clear and convincing evidence, otherwise his defense would be untenable.
(People of the Philippines v. Sabalberino, G.R. No. 241088, June 3, 2019, Third Division)
3. Accused-appellant failed to prove his allegation to the satisfaction of both courts that he indeed chanced upon
his wife in the vilest act of infidelity and that he was blinded by impulse and acted out of rage when he stabbed
the victim. Both courts held that accused-appellant's uncorroborated claim pales in comparison to the
consistent testimonies of their daughters, Angela and Jessica, that at the time of the stabbing incident, and
immediately prior thereto, no person, other than the family members, was inside their house and that the killing
of the victim was immediately preceded by an argument between her and accused-appellant. This Court,
likewise, agrees with both the RTC and the CA that the defense failed to prove that the accused-appellant's and
the victim's daughters were motivated by malice or ill-will in testifying against their father. As such, the
testimonies of Angela and Jessica, having been found credible by the RTC and the CA, are sufficient to establish
the guilt of accused-appellant. (People of the Philippines v. Sabalberino, G.R. No. 241088, June 3, 2019, Third
Division)
DEATH IN A TU MU LTU O U S AFFR AY

1. There was no tumultuous affray between groups of persons in the course of which Aro died. On the contrary,
the evidence clearly established that there were only two (2) persons, Wacoy and Quibac, who picked on one
defenseless individual, Aro, and attacked him repeatedly, taking turns in inflicting punches and kicks on the
poor victim. There was no confusion and tumultuous quarrel or affray, nor was there a reciprocal aggression in
that fateful incident. Since Wacoy and Quibac were even identified as the ones who assaulted Aro, the latter’s
death cannot be said to have been cause in a tumultuous affray. Thus, Wacoy and Quibac are criminally liable
for homicide. (Wacoy v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 213792, June 22, 2015, First Division)
PHY S IC AL IN J U R IES IN A TU MU LTU O U S AFFR AY

1. The crime of physical injuries in a tumultuous affray was not committed. The dispute was between two distinct
groups of individuals – the Santoses and the Lacsons. The records provide that the Santoses, namely Gary,
Arnold, Eliza, and Joyce Ann were chased and stoned by some members of the Lacson family. Upon reaching
their house, they told the rest of the Santos family, namely Romeo, Rommel, Richard, and Albert what
happened. Arnold then ran ahead to the Lacsons’ house and had a heated discussion with Hernani and Elizer.
Eduardo, armed with a steel pipe given by Deborah, hit Arnold on the head and proceeded to hit the other
members of the Santos family. The Lacsons, who by then had more steel pipes at their disposal, attacked the
Santoses, who were not able to fight back and defend themselves. Clearly, this was a definite attack on the
Santoses by the Lacsons, an identified group, and not a case of tumultuous affray where the assault occurred
in a confused and disorganized manner, resulting in death or injuries of the ones involved, and the person
responsible could not be determined. Here, Eduardo was sufficiently identified as the person who first hit
Arnold on the head using a steel pipe then continued on to inflict injuries to the other members of the Santos
family, with the help of the Lacsons. Thus, Eduardo is guilty of the crime of less serious physical injuries under
Article 265 of the RPC.
a. Wacoy v. People states that a tumultuous affray takes place when a quarrel occurs between several persons
and they engage in a confused and tumultuous affray, in the course of which some person is killed or
wounded and the author thereof cannot be ascertained. (Lacson v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No.
243805, September 16, 2020, Second Division)

Illegal Discharge of Firearm 277
ILLEGAL DIS C HAR GE O F F IR E AR M

1. The elements of illegal discharge of firearm under Article 254 o the RPC are: (a) that the offender discharges a
firearm against or at another person; and (b) that the offender has no intention to kill that person. (Carpio v.
People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 211691, April 28, 2021, First Division)
2. Discharge of a firearm, even without a casualty and intention to kill, is punishable act under our penal laws. The
existence of the bullet hole, or the damage created by illegal firing of a gun, is not an essential element
necessary for prosecution and conviction.
a. The Court is convinced that Clarion and Fuentes sufficiently established that petitioner fired her gun at
Clarion. The Court cannot give credit to petitioner’s insistence that Fuentes could not have witnessed the
crime since she arrived five minutes from the time of the gunshot. Indeed, as found by the CA, Fuentes
merely estimated the time it took her to run from her residence to Clarion’s house. In any case, the
trustworthiness of Fuentes’ testimony is apparent from her testimony. From Fuentes’ testimony, it is clear
that Fuentes arrived immediately after the first gunshot and was able to see petitioner still pointing her
gun at Clarion. She candidly explained where she was in reference to petitioner and Clarion and why she
did not run after seeing the incident. Evidently, Fuentes’ failure to give the exact time it took her to run
from her house to the Clarions’ did not diminish the veracity of her identification of petitioner and her
narration of what she saw when she arrived at the scene. Absent a showing of ill-motive on her part, the
Court gives her testimony full credence.
b. Despite proof of petitioner’s act of firing a gun at Clarion, her intent to kill was not alleged and established.
There is no evidence proferred to show that petitioner aimed to kill the victim. Intent to kill cannot be
automatically drawn from the mere fact that the use of firearms is dangerous to life. Animus interficendi
must be established with the same degree of certainty as is required of the other elements of the crime.
The inference of intent to kill should not be drawn in the absence of circumstances sufficient to prove such
intent beyond reasonable doubt.
c. Meanwhile, the alleged inconsistencies as to how many shots were fired, whether Clarion dropped to the
ground after the shot was fired, or whether Gabelino was arrested by the police, and the lack of a gunshot
hole in the wall, pertain to collateral or minor matters which do not at all touch upon the commission of
the crime itself. (Carpio v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 211691, April 28, 2021, First Division)
PHY S IC AL IN J U R IES
1. Petitioner's alleged intent to kill Ang cannot be clearly inferred from the surrounding circumstances. As to the
means used by petitioner, there is no evidence to show that he carried with him any deadly weapon during his
meeting with Ang. The rolling pin which he used as a weapon to hit Ang was already inside the latter's car when
they met. Also, if petitioner really intended to kill Ang, he would have hit the latter several times. However, the
physician, who examined Ang and was presented as a witness by the prosecution, testified that the injuries
sustained by Ang were only caused by a single blow to the forehead. As to the nature, location and number of
wounds, contrary to the conclusion of the CA, there is no evidence to show that Ang's wounds were serious and
severe. He did not obtain any head fracture and his injuries proved to be superficial as they only consisted of a
hematoma, contusion and laceration. In fact, the laceration is only about an inch in length. Moreover, Ang was
fully treated within two hours and was immediately sent home. The superficiality of the injuries sustained by
the private complainant is a clear indication that his life and limb were never in actual peril. With respect to the
conduct of petitioner, and the surrounding circumstances before and during the time that Ang was injured,
there is no clear evidence of petitioner's intent to kill the former. In fact, even at the time that he testified in
court, Ang was still at a loss why petitioner wanted to harm him. Based on the foregoing circumstances, while
it is clear that petitioner really intended to harm Ang, it cannot be concluded nor inferred beyond doubt that in
causing the injuries of Ang, petitioner had intended to kill him. When such intent is lacking but wounds are
inflicted upon the victim, the crime is not attempted murder but physical injuries only.
a. Article 266 of the RPC provides that the crime of slight physical injuries shall be punished by arresto menor
when the offender has inflicted physical injuries which shall incapacitate the offended party for labor from
one to nine days, or shall require medical attendance during the same period." Indeed, although the charge
in the instant case is for attempted murder, a finding of guilt for the lesser offense of slight physical injuries
is proper, considering that the latter offense is necessarily included in the former, as the essential
ingredients of slight physical injuries constitute and form part of those constituting the offense of murder.
As earlier discussed, evidence on record shows that Ang was brought to the Ospital ng Maynila for medical
treatment immediately after the incident. Right after receiving medical treatment, Ang was then released
as an out-patient. There was no competent evidence to establish that he was incapacitated for labor and/or
required medical attendance for more than nine days. Without such evidence, the offense is only slight
physical injuries. (Yap v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 234217, November 14, 2018, Third Division)
2. While petitioner is not liable for child abuse, he is liable for slight physical injuries for intentionally inflicting
physical harm on BBB. Records show that petitioner hit BBB with a broomstick. Notably, the medical
examination shows that BBB sustained left cheek abrasions which may have been caused by a sharp object like
a fingernail or a broomstick as well as hematoma on his left ear, which may also have been caused by contact
with a broomstick. When there is no evidence of actual incapacity of the offended party for labor or of the
required medical attendance, or when there is a proof as to the period of the offended party’s incapacity for
Physical Injuries 278
labor or of the required medical attendance, the offense is only slight physical injuries. As for AAA, petitioner
cannot be held liable for slight physical injuries. To recall, petitioner was merely trying to stop two of his
students from fighting over food during the class. AAA, a mere onlooker, was not involved in the fight. There
was no evidence showing petitioner ever intended to harm in any way. The attendant circumstances showed
that as a teacher, petitioner only tried to restore peace in the class by stopping his students from fighting. Verily,
petitioner cannot be held criminally liable for the abrasions AAA sustained on that occasion. These
circumstances, taken together, negate the presence of criminal intent on the part of petitioner. As held in
Villareal v. People, mere infliction of physical injuries, absent malicious intent, does not make a person
automatically liable for an intentional felony. (Javarez v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 248729, September
3. Eduardo is guilty of the crime of less serious physical injuries under Article 265 of the RPC. The prosecution
established that the injuries suffered by the victims required varying periods of healing from two (2) weeks to
eight (8) weeks. Dr. Cordero, the attending physician, testified and gave a detailed description of the injuries
that they suffered and the accompanying amount of time they needed to rest and heal from such injuries. Since
the Santoses suffered physical injuries incapacitating them for a longer time of two weeks to eight weeks, the
duration of the penalty of arresto mayor is for the maximum period of six months. (Lacson v. People of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 243805, September 16, 2020, Second Division)
4. With respect to the attack and injury suffered by Anastacia, accused-appellant can only be held liable for slight
physical injuries and not frustrated murder. The crime of frustrated murder requires that accused-appellant
intended to kill Anastacia. The prosecution, however, failed to establish this as a fact. Too, Dr. Palmero, the
physician who examined Anastacia, testified that she only suffered a non-fatal wound. Without the element of
intent to kill, accused-appellant can only be convicted for physical injury. And considering that Anastacia’s
wound was only superficial or “mababaw,” the CA correctly upheld accused-appellant’s conviction for slight
physical injuries. (People of the Philippines v. Perez, G.R. No. 241779, December 9, 2020, Third Division)
5. Serious physical injuries contemplate physical deformity or the loss of a body part resulting in the alteration of
one’s physical appearance. The loss of a tooth may, in most cases, be later repaired or replaced with an artificial
tooth by a competent dentist. Thus, for the loss of a tooth to be considered within the scope of serious physical
injuries, the circumstances surrounding its loss and whether it caused a physical deformity or permanent
alteration of one’s physical appearance must be examined on a case-to-case basis
a. Due to respondent Calubiran’s fractured tooth, petitioner was charged with violation of Article 263(3) of
the RPC, with the MTC, RTC, and the CA concluding that the tooth fracture is a permanent deformity, since
it had to extracted and replaced by an artificial tooth. These conclusions were based on the 1934 case of
People v. Balubar. In Balubar, the accused had struck the victim on the mouth with an “iron instrument
used for cranking the engine of a motor truck,” breaking four of the victim’s front teeth and inflicting a
wound on his upper lip. The broken teeth had to be extracted because they hurt the victim’s gums. The
trial court judge had observed, during trial, that there was a visible disfigurement to the victim’s mouth.
b. The Court could not possibly continue upholding Balubar’s rationale. The physical injury, as stated in the
RPC, must be of such serious nature that it cannot be restored through medical means. As Justice Malcolm
pointed out, the deformity contemplated by law is disfigurement or visible ugliness, permanent, and visible
physical abnormality.
c. Deformity or the loss of any other part of the body under Article 263(3), therefore, should be properly
interpreted to mean the loss of an eye, an ear, or any of the limbs – all of which would visibly alter one’s
physical appearance and body functions. The loss of an eye results in blindness that artificial eyes cannot
restore. The loss of an ear will alter one's head shape and may result in deafness. Persons with artificial
limbs will have different postures and gaits. Osseointegration, or "a direct structural and functional
connection between ordered living bone and the surface of a load-carrying implant," has been used for
prosthetic limbs by integrating "titanium implants into the medullary cavity of the bone [where] the
implants extend from the bone, emerging through the skin to create an anchor for the prosthetic limb."
This process can lead to infection and metal corrosion. Moreover, modern prosthetics also involve the
connection of a socket to the residual limb, which can sometimes lead to instability, tissue damage, and
pain. The socket's structural design must take into account "ratio of muscle, the movement of the femur,
and movement of the residual limb, all of which would affect gait and other gross functional movements."
In contrast, artificial teeth are so common that they are known to the general public by its colloquial term:
pustiso (dentures). In some cases, they are even used to beautify one's appearance. As far back as 1934, it
has already been observed that the loss of a tooth is not a serious affair, considering "the ease with which
an injury of this nature could be remedied by any reputable dentist."
d. It is conceded that there may be cases where the loss of teeth would cause a physical deformity that can
no longer be remedied by science. In those instances, it should be the duty of courts to impose the proper,
and graver, penalties required by the law. Trial courts should consider all the factual circumstances
surrounding the injury and the resulting consequences. They should not equate, for example, the loss of a
fingernail with the loss of a hand. Thus, it is inequitable for this Court to arbitrarily apply the Balubar
doctrine in all cases where a tooth has been chipped or fractured and then later medically repaired in a
manner where no visible deformity could be seen. Article 263 itself provides for a gradation of penalties

Rape 279
according to the factual circumstances surrounding the injury, from the extent of the injury to the
consequences suffered by the offended party. There is no reason for this Court to stubbornly declare that
the loss of a tooth is immediately classified as a serious physical injury, without taking into account all the
circumstances that may affect the nature and consequences of the injury. (Ruego v. People of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 226745, May 3, 2021, Third Division)
6. In determining whether the loss of a tooth could be considered a serious physical injury under Article 263, there
must first be a factual determination during trial that the loss of the tooth resulted in a visible deformity. Where
deformity is not apparent at trial, whether as a result of a lesser injurious act or through medical intervention,
a lesser penalty should be imposed.
a. In this case, Dr. Owen Jaen Lebaquin opined that respondent Calubiran's tooth fracture had caused a
permanent deformity and that the tooth had to be extracted. Respondent Calubiran was asked to show to
the trial court his tooth, to which the trial court noted that it was already an artificial tooth. More
accurately, the trial court observed that his tooth had "already [been] repaired by means of a modern
dental technological procedure that has not been revealed in the evidence[.]" In other words, respondent
Calubiran's face had no visible disfigurement that would warrant petitioner's conviction of serious physical
injuries under Article 263(3) of the Revised Penal Code.
b. The evidence, however, does not reveal how many days it took for the dentist to replace respondent
Calubiran's fractured tooth. The 1934 case of People v. Oh Suilay had categorized the offense as less serious
physical injuries under Article 265 of the Revised Penal Code and imposed a penalty of arresto mayor.
Taking into account that respondent Calubiran did not appear to have any visible deformity at trial, this
Court is constrained to categorize this offense as slight physical injuries under Article 266 of the Revised
Penal Code. (Ruego v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 226745, May 3, 2021, Third Division)
R APE
1. Carnal knowledge is still possible even if the minor-victim failed to cry out for help. (People of the Philippines v.
Gutierez, G.R. No. 208007, April 2, 2014, Third Division; People of the Philippines v. Entrampas, G.R. No. 212161,
2. Statutory rape is committed when (a) the offended party is under 12 years of age and (b) the accused has carnal
knowledge of her, regardless of whether there was force, threat or intimidation; whether the victim was
deprived of reason or consciousness; or whether it was done through fraud or grave abuse of authority. It is
enough that the age of the victim is proven and that there was sexual intercourse. (People of the Philippines v.
Gutierez, G.R. No. 208007, April 2, 2014, Third Division; People of the Philippines v. Castañas, G.R. No. 192428,
April 20, 2016, Third Division; People of the Philippines v. Medina, G.R. No. 214473, June 22, 2016, Third
Division; People of the Philippines v. Manson, G.R. No. 215341, November 28, 2016, Third Division; People of
the Philippines v. Marmol, G.R. No. 217379, November 23, 2016, Third Division; People of the Philippines v.
Baay, G.R. No. 220143, June 7, 2017, Third Division; People of the Philippines v. Balanza, G.R. No. 207943,
September 11, 2017, First Division; People of the Philippines v. Agoncillo, G.R. No. 229100, November 20, 2017,
Third Division; People of the Philippines v. Bagsic, G.R. No. 218404, December 13, 2017, Third Division; People
of the Philippines v. Ramirez, G.R. No. 219863, March 6, 2018, First Division; People of the Philippines v. Tanglao,
G.R. No. 219963, June 13, 2018, Third Division; People of the Philippines v. De Guzman, G.R. No. 234190,
a. Proof of force, intimidation, and consent is unnecessary in statutory rape since none of those is an element
of statutory rape. The only subject of inquiry is the age of the woman and whether carnal knowledge took
place. (People of the Philippines v. Bugho, G.R. No. 208360, April 6, 2016, Third Division; People of the
Philippines v. Rebanuel, G.R. No. 208475, June 8, 2016, First Division)
b. AAA verbally and physically manifested her resistance towards Dela Cruz’s advances – at one point she
even cried. Nonetheless, he persisted and ultimately consummated his desire to have carnal knowledge of
her. The degree of force he employed becomes immaterial in view of AAA’s minority and the fact that her
intoxication impaired her physical strength. (People of the Philippines v. Dela Cruz, G.R. No. 219088, June
c. The law presumes absence of free consent when the victim is below the age of 12; as such, it is not
necessary to prove force, intimidation, or consent as they are not elements of statutory rape. (People of
the Philippines v. Roy, G.R. No. 225604, July 23, 2018, First Division)
3. The elements of qualified rape are: (a) sexual congress; (b) with a woman; (c) done by force and without
consent; (d) the victm is under 18 years of age at the time of the rape; and (e) the offender is a parent,
ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the
common law spouse of the parent of the victim. (People of the Philippines v. Buclao, G.R. No. 208173, June 11,
2014, Third Division; People of the Philippines v. Lagbo, G.R. No. 207535, February 10, 2016, Third Division;
People of the Philippines v. Villamor, G.R. No. 202187, February 10, 2016, Third Division; People of the
Philippines v. Panes, G.R. No. 215730, September 11, 2017, First Division; People of the Philippines v. EEE, G.R.
No. 227185, September 27, 2017, Second Division; People of the Philippines v. ABC, G.R. No. 244835, December

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a. If the information does not allege the elements of victim’s minority and her relationship to the perpetrator,
the perpetrator can only be charged and convicted of the crime of simple rape, not qualified rape. (People
of the Philippines v. Armodia, G.R. No. 210654, June 7, 2017, Second Division; People of the Philippines v.
Gaa, G.R. No. 212934, June 7, 2017, Third Division)
4. The absence of hymenal lacerations does not necessarily negate the commission of rape. This is because
hymenal lacerations or any other external signs or physical injuries on the complainant’s body are not an
element of the crime of rape. (People of the Philippines v. Buclao, G.R. No. 208173, June 11, 2014, Third
Division; People of the Philippines v. Quintos, G.R. No. 199402, November 12, 2014, Second Division; People of
the Philippines v. Bangsoy, G.R. No. 204047, January 13, 2016, Second Division; People of the Philippines v.
Cruz, G.R. No. 205200, September 21, 2016, Third Division; People of the Philippines v. Belen, G.R. No. 215331,
January 23, 2017, Second Division; People of the Philippines v. Sta. Ana, G.R. No. 202863, February 21, 2018,
Third Division; People of the Philippines v. Matutina, G.R. No. 227311, September 26, 2018, Third Division;
People of the Philippines v. Bay-od, G.R. No. 238176, January 14, 2019, Third Division; People of the Philippines
v. XXX, G.R. No. 242216, September 22, 2020, First Division)
a. However, the presence of healed lacerations is the best physical evidence of forcible defloration, provided
that it is strongly corroborated by testimonial evidence. (People of the Philippines v. Francica, G.R. No.
208625, September 6, 2017, Third Division; People of the Philippines v. Bugna, G.R. No. 218255, April 11,
2018, Third Division; People of the Philippines v. [Redacted Name], G.R. No. 225339, July 10, 2019, Second
Division)
b. Lack of bleeding of the victim’s genitals is not element of rape. This bears significance considering that the
slightest penetration of the female genitalia consummates rape; as a mere touching of the external
genitalia by the penis is capable of consummating the sexual act and thus, constitutes rape. (People of the
Philippines v. Gozo, G.R. No. 225605, July 23, 2018, Third Division)
c. Complete or full penetration of the complainant’s private part or the rupture of the hymen is not necessary
in rape cases. What is essential to be proved is the entrance, or at least the introduction of the male organ
into the labia of the pudendum. (People of the Philippines v. ABC, G.R. No. 219170, November 13, 2019,
Second Division)
d. The presence of a hymenal laceration at 3 o’clock position due to penetration further strengthens AAA’s
testimony that she was raped. It is worthy to note that the results of AAA’s physical examination which was
conducted on the very same day that the rape incident happened corroborates her testimony that she was
sexually molested by the appellant. Dr. Yap even categorically stated that AAA’s vagina was still bleeding
when she was brought to him for personal examination, thus proving that the act of rape was
consummated. (People of the Philippines v. Catig, G.R. No. 225729, March 11, 2020, Second Division;
People of the Philippines v. XXX, G.R. No. 230981, July 15, 2020, Second Division)
5. The complainant’s delay in reporting the alleged rape incidents does not signal the falsity of the rape allegations.
(People of the Philippines v. Buclao, G.R. No. 208173, June 11, 2014, Third Division; People of the Philippines v.
Mayola, G.R. No. 214470, December 7, 2016, Third Division; People of the Philippines v. Opeña, G.R. No.
220490, March 21, 2018, First Division; People of the Philippines v. Mendoza, G.R. No. 239892, June 10, 2020,
First Division; People of the Philippines v. AAA, G.R. No. 248777, July 7, 2020, First Division)
a. However, when it took the victim almost two years to tell her mother about the alleged incidents for no
reasonable and explained justification, and in view of the inconsistencies in her testimony, this delay may
discredit the victim. (People of the Philippines v. Arces, Jr., G.R. No. 225624, October 3, 2018, Second
Division)
b. The Court is not persuaded. It is well settled that delay in making a criminal accusation does not impair the
credibility of a witness if such delay is satisfactorily explained. In People v. Historillo (Historillo), the Court
held that failure of the complainant to immediately report the rape to the police authorities does not
detract from her credibility. Further, the Court in the said case considered (i) the victim's age, (ii) the
accused's moral ascendancy over the victim, and (iii) his threats against her, in excusing the delay in filing
the case. The same reasons justify the delay in the present case. Similar to the victim in Historillo, AAA was
also just 12 years old when the first rape incident was committed, and was 13 years old when the same
heinous act was repeated. Likewise, a threat was similarly made by the accused-appellant in this case
which, no matter how much he tried to downplay its extent and the effect of the same on the victim,
became a significant factor in both the victim's surrender to his lewd designs and her delay in reporting the
crime to the proper authorities. These, along with the fact that, as will be further discussed later, the
accused had moral ascendancy over the victim, the Court holds that the delay in reporting the rapes to the
authorities was justified in this case. (People of the Philippines v. Villaros, G.R. No. 228779, October 8, 2018,
Second Division)
c. Delay in the reporting of the fifteen instances of rape perpetrated by her father does not signal falsity of
the rape allegations. (People of the Philippines v. Navasero, Sr., G.R. No. 234240, February 6, 2019, Third
Division)
d. The fact that it took private complainant more than three (3) months to report the incidents of assault on
her does not affect her credibility in the slightest. She was left under accused-appellant Eliseo’s care, lived
in his house for months, and depended on him for the basic necessities of life. The moral ascendanc
accused-appellant Eliseo had over her is enough to explain why she neither resisted the abuse as it was

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happening nor reported it afterwards for fear of being deprived of food, water, or a roof over her head.
(People of the Philippines v. Sumayod, G.R. No. 230626, March 9, 2020, Third Division)
e. Complainant’s long and unexplained silence for nine years does not render her original testimony
implausible. Records show that appellant threatened complainant with an icepick after the rape, warning
her not to tell anyone. Complainant said that she did not tell anyone about the rape because she was scared
of appellant. She did not report the rape even when appellant was no longer living with them because she
lost hope and lacked courage to do so. She finally revealed to her mother in October 2008 that appellant
had raped her because her mother, who then working in Australia, was insisting that she lives in the house
of her maternal grandparents where appellant was residing. Complainant refused to live in the same house
with appellant because she had raped her. Complainant and her father filed the case for rape in 2009 after
she revealed to her father that she was raped by appellant. (People of the Philippines v. XXX, G.R. No.
6. Rape does not make a distinction with regard to an accused’s relationship with the victim. It only requires that
sexual congress be forced by a man upon another person. In addition, wives, former wives, co-parents, and
sweethearts may be raped by their husbands, former husbands, co-parents, or sweetheatrs by stating that
committing acts of rape against these persons are considered violence against women. (People of the
Philippines v. Quintos, G.R. No. 199402, November 12, 2014, Second Division)
7. Resistance is not an element of the crime of rape. The main element of rape is “lack of consent.” Consent does
not mean absence of resistance. Consent implies agreement, voluntariness, and willfulness. Meanwhile,
absence of resistance only implies passivity. (People of the Philippines v. Quintos, G.R. No. 199402, November
12, 2014, Second Division; People of the Philippines v. Barberan and Delos Santos, G.R. No. 208759, June 22,
2016, Third Division; People of the Philippines v. Bensurto, Jr., G.R. No. 216061, December 7, 2016, Third
Division; People of the Philippines v. Palanay, G.R. No. 224583, February 1, 2017, Third Division; People of the
philippines v. Gonzales, Pader, Jr., and Antonio, G.R. No. 223113, February 19, 2018, First Division; People of
the Philippines v. Nievera, G.R. No. 242830, August 28, 2019, Second Division; People of the Philippines v.
Evardone, G.R. No. 248204, August 24, 2020, Third Division; People of the Philippines v. Dechoso, G.R. No.
a. By whatever manner the rape victim reacts, the same is immaterial because it is not an element of rape.
Absent any other adequate proof that the victim clearly assented to the sexual act perpetrated by the
accused, a victim shall not be condemned solely on the basis of her reactions against the same. (People of
the Philippines v. Cabales, G.R. No. 213831, September 25, 2019, Third Division; People of the Philippines
v. XXX, G.R. No. 246194, November 4, 2020, Third Division)
b. AAA’s failure to resist or flee from accused-appellant’s clutches, and to immediately seek help or resort the
incident to the authorities, does not impair the truthfulness of her testimony. (People of the Philippines v.
XXX, G.R. No. 233463, February 19, 2020, Third Division)
8. If the purpose of presenting mental incapacity is to prove AAA’s incapacity to give consent, the fact of being
mentally incapacitated need not be alleged. The rule is different however if the fact of being mentally
incapacitated is offered to qualify the crime of rape. (People of the Philippines v. Quintos, G.R. No. 199402,
9. The absence of spermatozoa in XXX’s anal orifice does not negate the possibility of an erection and penetration.
(Ricalde v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 211002, January 21, 2015, Second Division; People of the
Philippines v. Alberca, G.R. No. 217459, June 7, 2017, Third Division; People of the Philippines v. Manlolo, G.R.
No. 227841, August 19, 2020, First Division; People of the Philippines v. Salazar, G.R. No. 239138, February 17,
10. Rape can be committed in a cramped dwelling despite the probable presence of other occupants because
seclusion is not an element of the crime. (People of the Philippines v. Nuyok, G.R. No. 195424, June 15, 2015,
First Division)
a. Rape may be committed even at the seashore where there are many houses along said area. This is because
that lust is no respecter of time and place. (People of the Philippines v. CCC, G.R. No. 231925, November
b. It is not improbable for appellant to have raped complainant in their house where 11 family members
reside. (People of the Philippines v. XXX, G.R. No. 236562, September 22, 2020, First Division)
11. Accused Tuando is guilty of qualified rape. It was proven that Tuando had sexual intercourse with AAA, the then
13-year old daughter of his common-law wife, against her will. It was also shown that the accused had carnal
knowledge of the victim under 18 years of age at the time of rape and said act was accomplished (a) through
the use of force when he boxed her hand while inserting his penis into AAA’s private organ, (b) through the
threat of killing AAA’s family, and (c) through intimidation being the common-law spouse of the victim’s mother.
(People of the Philippines v. Tuando, G.R. No. 207816, February 24, 2016, Third Division)

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12. It is not necessary that the extent and degree of the clinical, laboratory and psychometric tests applied on AAA
should be shown in detail in order to sustain a proper conclusion that she was indeed mentally deficient. The
rape victim’s mental retardation can be established by a neuro-psychiatric examination and evaluation by a
psychologist on the victim and said psychologist can identify the tests she administered and sufficiently explain
the results of the tests to the court. (People of the Philippines v. Rodriguez, G.R. No. 208406, February 29, 2016,
Third Division)
a. There is no doubt that AAA is a mental retardate. Ladrigan, the social worker who conducted the case
study, testified that AAA suffered from typhoid fever for almost a month when she was three years old.
She had convulsion episode and was confined at the hospital for treatment. Due to her severe illness, AAA’s
mental development was affected. AAA is likewise illiterate, unable to read and write, and onluy reached
Grade 1 level due to difficulty in comprehension. Notably, appellant even admitted that he knew of AAA’s
mental state. Dr. Yap also declared that AAA’s physical built clearly manifested that she is indeed mentally
retardate. Further, the trial court judge duly observed that she was suffering from mental impairment
based on her demeanor and manner of answering he questions propounded to her during her examination
while in the witness stand. Such observation was even reflected in April 8, 2014 Decision of the RTC. It must
be repeated that it is not required for a victim to undergo a comprehensive medical examination so as to
prove that he/she is a mental retardate. Mental retardation can be proven by evidence other than
medical/clinical evidence, such as the testimony of witnesses and even the observation by the trial court.
However, although it was proven and admitted during trial that appellant knew of AAA’s mental
retardation, the same cannot be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance for it was not specifically alleged
in the Information that he was aware of AAA’s mental retardation. (People of the Philippines v. Catig, G.R.
No. 225729, March 11, 2020, Second Division)
13. Carnal knowledge is consummated by the slightest penetration of the female genitalia by a penis capable of
consummating the sexual act. In this case, carnal knowledge is consummated because AAA testified that she
felt pain when accused rubbed his penis against her vagina. (People of the Philippines v. Padit, G.R. No. 202978,
a. Full penetration is not necessary for rape to be consummated. (People of the Philippines v. Bandoquillo,
14. The award of P75,000.00 is dependent on the existence of a qualifying circumstance that would warrant the
imposition of the death penalty. In this case, however, said award is not justified as there was no mention of
any attending qualifying circumstance in the commission of the crime. (People of the Philippines v. Perez, G.R.
No. 208071, March 9, 2016, Third Division)
15. Carnal knowledge of a woman who is a mental retardate is rape under Article 266-A(1)(b) of the Revised Penal
Code. This is because a mentally deficient person is automatically considered incapable of giving consent to a
sexual act. Thus, what needs to be proven are the facts of sexual intercourse between the accused and the
victim, and the victim’s mental retardation. (People of the Philippines v. Umanito, G.R. No. 208648, April 13,
2016, Third Division; People of the Philippines v. Vañas, G.R. No. 225511, March 20, 2019, First Division)
16. When a victim’s testimony is corroborated by medical findings of penetration, there is sufficient basis for
concluding that sexual intercourse did take place. (People of the Philippines v. Menaling, G.R. No. 208676, April
13, 2016, Third Division; People of the Philippines v. Brioso, G.R. No. 209344, June 27, 2016, Third Division;
People of the Philippines v. Fuentes, Jr., G.R. No. 212337, July 4, 2016, Third Division; People of the Philippines
v. Ballacillo, G.R. No. 201106, August 3, 2016, Third Division; People of the Philippines v. Pitalla, Jr., G.R. No.
223561, October 19, 2016, Third Division; People of the Philippines v. Tubillo, G.R. No. 220718, June 21, 2017,
Second Division; People of the Philippines v. Gunsay, G.R. No. 223678, July 5, 2017, Third Division; People of
the Philippines v. Ronquillo, G.R. No. 214762, September 20, 2017, Third Division; People of the Philippines v.
De Chavez, G.R. No. 218427, January 31, 2018, First Division; People of the Philippines v. XXX, G.R. No. 225059,
July 23, 2018, Second Division; People of the Philippines v. YYY, G.R. No. 234825, September 5, 2018, Third
Division; Granton v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 226045, October 10, 2018, Second Division; Posadas v.
CA, G.R. No. 228223, June 10, 2019, Third Division; People of the Philippines v. De Guzman, G.R. No. 229714,
June 19, 2019, First Division; People of the Philippines v. XXX, G.R. No. 230334, August 19, 2019, Second
Division; People of the Philippines v. ZZZ, G.R. No. 224584, September 4, 2019, Second Division; People of the
Philippines v. XXX, G.R. No. 244047, December 10, 2019, First Division; People of the Philippines v. Ibañez, G.R.
No. 231984, July 6, 2020, Third Division; People of the Philippines v. XXX, G.R. No. 239906, August 26, 2020,
Second Division; People of the Philippines v. XXX, G.R. No. 225781, November 16, 2020, Third Division; People
of the Philippines v. Cabales, G.R. No. 249149, December 2, 2020, First Division; People of the Philippines v.
XXX, G.R. N. 243191, June 21, 2021, Third Division)
a. A medical report is not material for purposes of proving rape as it is merely corroborative in character and,
thus, can be dispensed with accordingly. (People of the Philippines v. Rusco, G.R. No. 212157, September
28, 2016, Third Division; People of the Philippines v. Labraque, G.R. No. 225065, September 13, 2017,
Second Division; People of the Philippines v. Vibar, G.R. No. 215790, March 12, 2018, Third Division; People
of the Philippines v. Manaligod, G.R. No. 218584, April 25, 2018, Third Division; People of the Philippines v.
YYY, G.R. No. 224626, June 27, 2018, Third Division; People of the Philippines v. Cabilida, Jr., G.R. No.

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222964, July 11, 2018, First Division; People of the Philippines v. Batalla, G.R. No. 234323, January 7, 2019,
Third Division; People of the Philippines v. XXX, G.R. No. 225793, August 14, 2019, Second Division; People
of the Philippines v. XXX, G.R. No. 236562, September 22, 2020, First Division; People of the Philippines v.
Salazar, G.R. No. 239138, February 17, 2021, Third Division; People of the Philippines v. XXX, G.R. No.
b. There is no dispute that there was no full penile penetration of the victim's vagina as narrated by AAA
herself. However, it is also undisputed that accused-appellant's erect penis touched the victim's labia
majora as corroborated by the medical findings. Thus, the Court finds no reason to reverse the conviction
of accused-appellant of statutory rape. (People of the Philippines v. Baguion, G.R. No. 223553, July 4, 2018,
Third Division)
c. When the victim alleged force and a medico-legal report is presented to corroborate this allegation, the
medico-legal report must contain any reference to any injury to her hands or any other part of her body.
Otherwise, there were enough doubt on the veracity of the victim’s testimony. (People of the Philippines
v. Sangcajo, Jr., G.R. No. 229204, September 5, 2018, First Division)
d. Dr. Guno’s medical findings that there was no laceration on the victim’s hymen are insufficient to disprove
the crime of rape. The absence of hymenal laceration is inconsequential since it is not an element of the
crime of rape. (People of the Philippines v. Bueza, G.R. No. 242513, November 18, 2020, Third Division)
e. The fact that appellant’s penis touched AAA’s vagina is supported by the medico-legal report stating that
her labia minora was reddish in color, which could have been caused by introduction of a blunt object like
an erect penis. (People of the Philippines v. Ordaneza, G.R. No. 250640, May 5, 2021, Third Division)
17. Carnal knowledge is proven by proof of the entry or introduction of the male organ into the female organ; the
touching or entry of the penis into the labia majora or the labia minora of the pudendum of the victim’s genitalia
constitutes consummated rape. (People of the Philippines v. Mendoza, G.R. No. 214349, April 20, 2016, Third
Division)
18. Knowledge of the offender of the mental disability of the victim at the time of the commission of the crime of
rape qualifies the crime and makes it punishable by death under Article 266-B(10) of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended. In this case, such knowledge was properly alleged in the Information filed against the appellant,
and was sufficiently proven by the prosecution as appellant in fact had lived with AAA and BBB for a considerable
period of time. (People of the Philippines v. Dela Rosa, G.R. No. 206419, June 1, 2016, Third Division)
19. To determine the innocence or guilt of the accused in rape cases, the courts are guided by three well-
entrenched principes: (a) an accusation of rape can be made with facility and while the accusation is difficult to
prove, it is even more difficult for the accused, though innocent, to disprove; (b) considering that in the nature
of things, only two persons are usually involved in the crime of rape, the testimony of the complainant should
be scrutinized with great caution; and (c) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits
and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense. Accordingly, in
resolving rape cases, the primordial or single most important consideration is almost always given to the
credibility of the victim’s testimony. A rape victim’s testimony is entitled to greated weight when she accuses a
close relative of having raped her, as in the case of a daughter against her father. (People of the Philippines v.
Balmes, G.R. No. 203458, June 6, 2016, Third Division)
20. The following circumstances combined to establish that Lupac consummated the rape of AAA, namely: (a) when
AAA went to take her afternoon nap, the only person inside the house with her was Lupac; (b) about an hour
into her sleep, she woke up to find herself already stripped named as to expose her private parts; (c) she
immediately felt her body aching and her vaginal region hurting upon her regaining consciousness; (d) all doors
and windows were locked from within the house, with only her and the brief-clad Lupac inside the house; (e)
he exhibited a remorseful demeanor in unilaterally seeking her forgiveness, even spontaneously explaining that
he did not really intend to do that to her, showing his realization of the gravity of the crime he had just
committed against her; (f) her spontaneous, unhesitating, and immediate denunciation of the rape to Tita Terry
and her mother; and (g) the medico-legal findings proving the recency of infliction of her vaginal injuries.
(People of the Philippines v. Polonio, G.R. No. 211604, June 8, 2016, First Division)
21. Neither the presence nor use of a deadly weapon nor the employment of physical violence by the accused upon
the victim are essential to the finding that force or intimidation existed at the time the rape was committed.
The fact that Galagati used force, threat, and intimidation in order to have sexual intercourse with AAA is
demonstrated by the latter’s continuous crying while the dastardly act was being committed against her. The
victim’s act of crying during the rape was sufficient indication that the offender’s act was against her will.
(People of the Philippines v. Galagati, G.R. No. 207231, June 29, 2016, Third Division)
22. AAA clearly and consistently communicated how accused-appellant forced or intimidated her into having sexual
congress with him. He put his penis in her mouth (rape through sexual assault) and inserted his penis into her
vagina (rape through carnal knowledge). He mashed her breasts and kissed her on the lips and on her vagina
(child abuse through acts of lasciviousness). The lacerations sustained by AAA in her vagine, which, as Dr.
Palermo testified, could have been caused by a penetration, show that carnal knowledge happened. As the

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circumstances qualifying rape, the prosecution established that the victim is under 18 years old and that the
offender is her guardian. Dr. Tolentino’s testimony and AAA’s dental record prove AAA’s minority. AAA’s cousin,
BBB, also confirmed this on the basis of the birth certificate that BBB obtained from her grandmother, which
the defense never refuted. AAA is accused-appellant’s foster daughter. She, her mother, and accused-appellant
resided in his house. After AAA’s mother passed away, accused-appellant took AAA in his custody. Soon
accused-appellant took AAA’s aunt, CCC, as his common-law spouse. They all lived together. The prosecution
also esablished that accused-appellant knew that AAA was intellectually challenged at the time of the offense.
BBB testified that accused-appellant knew that AAA was intellectually challenged even before the incident. In
addition, the Sexual Crime Protocol and Dr. Palermo’s testimony show that AAA’s mental age to be nine years
old. The act is, therefore, classified as statutory rape. (People of the Philippines v. Pusing, G.R. No. 208009, July
23. At the time of the rape incident, AAA was only 14 years old. However, the qualifying circumstance of relationship
was not proven. Thus, accused-appellant was correctly convicted of the crime of simple rape. (People of the
Philippines v. Arcillo, G.R. No. 211028, July 13, 2016, Third Division)
24. Accused-appellant’s defense that he and AAA are lovers and that both AAA and BBB are his wives must be
sufficiently supported by evidence other than the accused-appellant’s own testimony. (People of the Philippines
v. Salvador, G.R. No. 217381, July 20, 2016, Third Division)
25. Accused-appellant committed the crime of rape by sexual assault for inserting his finger inside his daughter’s
vagina. (People of the Philippines v. Bolo, G.R. No. 217024, August 15, 2016, Third Division; People of the
Philippines v. Dizon, G.R. No. 217982, July 10, 2017, First Division)
26. While AAA’s mental retardation was proven during trial, it cannot be considered as it was not specifically alleged
in the Information charging Bagamano of Rape. (People of the Philippines v. Bagamano, G.R. No. 222658, August
27. Caga did have sexual intercourse with AAA when she was asleep and still under the influence of alcohol, thus
failling under the provision of when the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious. It is
altogether immaterial that the prosecution’s evidence failed to establish the presence of physical force, threat,
or intimidation because, as the evidence shows, Caga raped an unconscious and extremely intoxicated woman
– a fact that was duly alleged in the Information and duly established during the trial. Thus, physical force,
threat, or intimidation is not necessary for the simple reason that an unconscious and extremely intoxicated
woman, cannot freely and voluntarily give her consent to engaging in sexual intercourse. (People of the
Philippines v. Caga, G.R. No. 206878, August 22, 2016, Second Division)
28. Rape may still be established even in the absence of a medical report. (People of the Philippines v. Batuhan,
29. Absence of the sense of sight in itself does not completely disable a person from performing sexual congress.
In the absence of any allegation to the contrary, for all intents and purposes, he remains a sensual man in
complete possession of faculties to gratify one’s corporeal needs. (People of the Philippines v. Ausa, G.R. No.
30. The date and time of the rape need not be precisely proved, considering that it is not a material element of the
offense. (People of the Philippines v. Tuboro, G.R. No. 220023, August 8, 2016, Third Division; People of the
Philippines v. Gerola, G.R. No. 217973, July 19, 2017, First Division; People of the Philippines v. De Guzman, G.R.
No. 228248, August 9, 2017, Third Division; People of the Philippines v. Pagamucan, G.R. No. 207772, November
8, 2017, Third Division; People of the Philippines v. Quiapo, G.R. No. 218804, August 6, 2018, First Division)
31. Statutory rape is committed by sexual intercourse with a woman below 12 years of age regardless of her
consent, or the lack of it to the sexual act. Proof of force, intimidation, or consent is unnecessary. These are not
elements of statutory rape as the absence of free consent is conclusively presumed when the victim is below
the age of 12. Hence, to convict an accused of the crime of statutory rape, the prosecution carries the burden
of proving the age of the complainant, the identity of the accused, and the sexual intercourse between the
accused and the complainant. (People of the Philippines v. Deliola, G.R. No. 200157, August 31, 2016, Third
Division; People of the Philippines v. Regalado, G.R. No. 210752, August 17, 2016, Third Division)
a. Full penile penetration of the female genitalia is not required because carnal knowlefge is simply the act of
a man having sexual bodily connections with a woman. In other words, the mere touching of the external
genitalia by the penis capable of consummating the sexual act is sufficient to constitute carnal knowledge.
(People of the Philippines v. Sonido, G.R. No. 208646, June 15, 2016, Third Division)
32. In a special complex crime of rape with homicide, the following elements must concur: (a) the appellant had
carnal knowledge of a woman; (b) carnal knowledge of a woman was achieved by means of force, threat, or
intimiation; and (c) by reason or on occasion of such carnal knowledge by means of force, threat, or

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intimidation, the appellant killed a woman. The foregoing elements are present. Rape was committed by
appellant against AAA. Reports likewise reveal that AAA sustained abrasions on her throat and neck affirms that
appellant was choking the woman during the rape. (People of the Philippines v. Reyes, G.R. No. 207946,
a. Rape can still be established if the eyewitness, an 8-year-old boy, testified that appellant inserted his penis
inside AAA’s anus since said eyewitness is not expected to distinguish an anus from a vagina. (People of the
Philippines v. Balisong, G.R. No. 218086, August 10, 2016, Third Division)
33. AAA’s failure to shout for help can be attributed to the fact that she was threatened by Jonery with a knife while
she was being ravished. This continuing intimidation had certainly cowed AAA into submission. The failure of
Alexander to wake up to come to AAA’s aid was sufficiently explained by his intoxication. Finally, rape may even
be committed in the same room where other family members also sleep. (People of the Philippines v. Gito, G.R.
34. The following are the guidelines in appreciating age as an element of the crime or as an aggravating or qualifying
circumstance:
a. The best evidence to prove the age of the offended party is an original or certified true copy of the
certificate of live birth of such party.
b. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, similar authentic documents such as baptismal certificate and
school records which show the date of birth of the victim would suffice to prove age.
c. If the certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been lost or destroyed or otherwise
unavailable, the testimony, if clear and credible, of the victim’s mother or a member of the family either
by affinity or consanguinity who is qualified to testify on matters respecting pedigree such as the exact age
or date of birth of the offended party pursuant to Rule 130, Section 40 of the Rules of Court shall be
sufficient under the following circumstances: (i) if the victim is alleged to be below 3 years of age and what
is sought to be proved is that she is less than 7 years old, (ii) if the victim is alleged to be below 7 years of
age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 12 years old, or (iii) if the victim is alleged to be
below 12 years of age and what is sought to be proved is that she is less than 18 years old.
d. In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic document, or the testimony of the victim’s mother or
relatives concerning the victim’s age, the complainant’s testimony will suffice provided that it is expressly
and clearly admitted by the accused.
e. It is the prosecution that has the burden of proving the age of the offended party. The failure of the accused
to object to the testimonial evidence regarding age shall not be taken against him.
f. The trial court should always make a categorical finding as to the age of the victim. (People of the
Philippines v. Lastrollo, G.R. No. 212631, November 7, 2016, First Division)
35. The prosecution established that appellant was an 18-year old man who had sexual intercourse with “AAA,” a
woman who was 24 years old during the incident. However, there was no evidence to prove that appellant used
force, threat, or intimidation during his sexual congress with “AAA.” Thus, appellant must be acquitted. (People
of the Philippines v. Tionloc, G.R. No. 212193, February 15, 2017, First Division)
36. Denial, in the face of the positive testimony, of the charge of rape is weak. (People of the Philippines v. Gabriel,
37. Proof of force and violence is unnecessarily when accused is an ascendant or a blood relative of the victim. The
moral and physical domination of the ascendant or blood relative is sufficient to intimidate the victim. (People
of the Philippines v. Mendoza, G.R. No. 224295, March 22, 2017, Third Division; People of the Philippines v.
Gacusan, G.R. No. 207776, April 26, 2017, Second Division; People of the Philippines v. Agudo, G.R. No. 219615,
June 7, 2017, Third Division; People of the Philippines v. De Guzman, G.R. No. 228248, August 9, 2017, Third
Division; People of the Philippines v. Deloso, G.R. No. 215194, December 14, 2017, First Division)
a. A stepfather’s moral ascendancy or influence over his stepdaughter, who grew up knowing him as the only
father she has ever had, supplants the element of violence or intimidation in a charge of rape. In this case,
such influence over the stepdaughter is the reason why she silently endured years of sexual abuse without
fighting back or confiding in anyone. (People of the Philippines v. Austria, G.R. No. 210568, November 8,
b. When the offender is the victim’s father, as in this case, there need not be actual force, threat, or
intimidation because when a father commits the crime of rape against his own daughter, who was also a
minor at the time of the commission of the offenses, his moral ascendancy or influence over the latter
substitutes for violence and intimidation. Nevertheless, as found by the RTC in this case, accused-appellant
also used intimidation or threat to inflict harm on private complainants with the use of a bolo if they would
resist his sexual advances. (People of the Philippines v. DDD, G.R. No. 243583, September 3, 2020, First
Division)
c. Taking advantage of AAA’s minority, XXX was able to put his penis inside said victim’s vagina to satisfy his
lust. Considering the discrepancy between the ages of XXX and AAA, and that said appellant is the victim’s
uncle who frequented her house and exercised influence over her, it need no longer be belabored upon
that the sexual molestation was committed by threat, force, or intimdation because moral ascendanc or

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influence takes the place of violence and intimidation. (People of the Philippines v. XXX, G.R. No. 242216,
38. It is not fair and just to quickly reject the defense of consensual sexual intercourse interposed by the accused.
To be noted first and foremost is that he and AAA were adults capable of consenting to the sexual intercourse.
The established circumstances – their having agreed to go on a lovers’ date; their travelling together a long way
from their meeting place on board the jeepney; their alighting on Rizal Avenue to take a meal together; their
walking together to the motel, and checking in together at the motel without the complainant manifesting
resistance; and their entering the designated room without protest from her – indicated beyond all doubt that
they had consented to culminate their lovers’ date in bed inside the motel. Although she claimed that he had
held her by the hand and pulled her upstairs, there is no evidence showing that she resisted in that whole time,
or exhibited a reluctance to enter the motel with him. Instead, she appeared to have walked with him towards
the motel, and to have entered it without hesitation. What she did not do was eloquent proof of her consent.
(People of the Philippines v. Claro, G.R. No. 199894, April 5, 2017, Third Division)
39. Close proximity of other relatives at the rape does not negate the commission of the crime. Rape can be
committed even in places where people congregate, in parks, along the roadside, within school premises, inside
a house where there are other occupants, and even in the same room where other members of the family are
also sleeping. (People of the Philippines v. Descartin, Jr., G.R. No. 215195, June 7, 2017, Third Division; People
of the Philippines v. Primavera, G.R. No. 223138, July 5, 2017, Third Division; People of the Philippines v.
Elimancil, G.R. No. 234951, January 28, 2019, Third Division; People of the Philippines v. CCC, G.R. No. 239336,
June 3, 2019, Third Division; People of the Philippines v. Siscar, G.R. No. 218571, June 3, 2019, Second Division;
People of the Philippines v. Dumdum, G.R. No. 221436, June 26, 2019, Second Division; People of the Philippines
v. XXX, G.R. No. 225793, August 14, 2019, Second Division; People of the Philippines v. Suwalat, G.R. No. 227749,
September 22, 2020, First Division; People of the Philippines v. Licaros, G.R. No. 238622, December 7, 2020,
Third Division)
a. Anent XXX’s contention that it is improbable that he could sexually molest AAA inside a place adjacent to
the house where his mother was, suffice it to state that lust is no respecter of time and place. The Court
has repeatedly held that rape can be committed in places where people congregate, in parks along
roadsides, in school premises, in a house where there are other occupants, in the same room where other
members of the family are also sleeping, and even in places which to many, would appear unlikely and high
risk venues for its commission. (People of the Philippines v. XXX, G.R. No. 242216, September 22, 2020,
First Division)
40. The inability of AAA to remember the time and date when the crime was committed is not detrimental to the
case of the prosecution. The date and time of the commission of the crime of rape becomes important only
when it creates serious doubt as to the commission of the rape itself or the suffciency of the evidence for
purposes of conviction. In other words, the date of the commission of the rape becomes relevant only when
the accuracy and truthfulness of the complainant’s narration practically hinge on the date of the commission
of the crime. Moreover, the date of the commission of the rape is not an essential element of the crime. (People
of the Philippines v. Bentayo, G.R. No. 216938, June 5, 2017, Second Division)
41. AAA’s failure to shout or to tenaciously resist accused-appellant should not be taken against her since such
negative assertion would not ipso facto make her submission to accused-appellant’s criminal act. In rape, the
force and intimidation must be viewed in the light of the victim’s perception at the time of the commisison of
the crime. (People of the Philippines v. Bisora, G.R. No. 218942, June 5, 2017, Third Division; People of the
Philippines v. Napoles, G.R. No. 215200, July 26, 2017, First Division; People of the Philippines v. Licaros, G.R.
No. 238622, December 7, 2020, Third Division)
42. Failure to resist does not necessarily amount to consent to accused-appellant’s criminal acts. (People of the
Philippines v. Amoc, G.R. No. 216937, June 5, 2017, Third Division; People of the Philippines v. Salaver, G.R. No.
223681, August 20, 2018, First Division)
43. The elements of qualified rape are sufficiently alleged in the four Informations, to wit: (a) AAA was still a minor
on the day of the alleged rape, and (b) accused-appellant is AAA’s father. The foregoing elements are also
sufficiently proved by the prosecution. That AAA was a minor during the commission of the separate incidents
of rape and that accused-appellant is AAA’s father were established by AAA’s Certificate of Live Birth and
accused-appellant’s admission before the RTC. (People of the Philippines v. Pacayra, G.R. No. 216987, June 5,
44. AAA’s act of confiding her experience to her classmates and friends rather than her family does not negate
rape. (People of the Philippines v. Carillo, G.R. No. 212814, July 12, 2017, Third Division)
45. It is immaterial that it took AAA more than two years before divulging the sexual abuse she experienced at her
father’s hands. The records show that the day following her abuse, AAA immediately told her mother but CCC
did not believe her. This lack of support from the very person she was expecting it from naturally made AAA

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wary of whom she could trust. It was only when she became close to and felt safe with Sister Mary Ann and
after she was no longer in Cebu under her father’s control that she found the courage to reveal her traumatic
experience. This is consistent with the normal reaction of a child raped by her father. (People of the Philippines
v. Divinagracia, Jr., G.R. No. 207765, July 26, 2017, Second Division)
46. It is apparent from the testimony of AAA that she suffered sexual abuses at the hands of accused-appellant, her
own uncle. The first instance occurred in April 2011, on their way to Camp YYY to buy bananas when accused-
appellant pushed AAA to the grassy portion and raped her. After satisfying his lust, accused-appellant warned
her not to relate the incident to anybody, otherwise, he would evict her family and he would kill her. Evidently,
accused-appellant used threats and intimidation against AAA, which caused her to suffer silently in fear until
she finally disclosed her ordeal to her teacher. Further, AAA was only 11 years old at the time of the rape
incident, as evidence by her birth certificate. (People of the Philippines v. Udtohan, G.R. No. 228887, August 2,
47. That a man and a woman are living in the same house is not enough to rule out the bestial act of forced sexual
intercourse. In addition, the fact of cohabitation is immaterial to the charge of rape especially when
cohabitation took place after the alleged incidents. (People of the Philippines v. Bongonga, G.R. No. 214771,
48. Rape by sexual assault is not subsumed in rape through sexual intercourse. This is due to the substantial
distinctions between these two modes of rape. In the first mode (rape by sexual intercourse), the offender is
always a man, the offended party is always a woman, the rape is committed through penile penetration of the
vagina, and the penalty is reclusion perpetua. In the second mode (rape by sexual assault), the offender may
be a man or woman, the offended party may be a man or a woman, rape is committed by inserting the penis
into another person’s mouth or anal orifice or any instrument or object into the genital or anal orifice of another
person, and the penalty is prision mayor. Due to the material distinctions between the two modes of rape, the
variance doctrine cannot be applied to convict an accused of rape by sexual assault if the crime charged is rape
through sexual intercourse. (People of the Philippines v. Caoili, G.R. No. 196342, August 8, 2017, En Banc)
a. However, the variance doctrine can be applied to convict Caoili of the crime of acts of lasciviousness under
R.A. 7610, Section 5(b), even though he was charged with rape through sexual intercourse in violation of
Article 266-A of the RPC and R.A. 7610, provided that the elements of lascivious conduct under R.A. 7610,
Section 5(b) has been proved. The constitutional right of an accused to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation is not violated when the accused charged with rape through sexual intercourse under
Article 266-A in relation to R.A. 7610 is convicted of lascivious conduct under R.A. 7610, Section 5(b)
provided that the information sufficiently alleges facts and omissions constituting an offense that includes
the offense established to have been committed by the accused, which is, in this case, lascivious conduct
under R.A. 7610, Section 5(b). (People of the Philippines v. Caoili, G.R. No. 196342, August 8, 2017, En Banc)
b. While there is a variance between the offense charged (rape by sexual intercourse) and those offenses
proved (sexual abuse under R.A. 7610, Section 5(b) and rape by sexual assault), Caoili can be convicted of
sexual abuse under R.A. 7610 because it was the offense proved during trial, and it is necessairly included
in the crime of acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC which, under settled jurisprudence, is
necessarily included in rape. However, the crime of rape by sexual intercourse is not necessarily included
in rape by sexual assault, vice versa. (Separate Concurring Opinion of Justice Peralta in People of the
Philippines v. Caoili, G.R. No. 196342, August 8, 2017, En Banc)
49. The sweetheart theory is an affirmative defense raised to prove the non-attendance of force or intimidation. It
is effectively an admission of carnal knowledge of the victim and consequently places on accused-appellant the
burden of proving the alleged relationship by substantial evidence.
a. Rubillar’s allegation of relationship with AAA was overwhelmingly corroborated by his other witnesses.
First, Odiongan testified that prior to the alleged incident, AAA introduced Rubillar to him as his new
boyfriend and that he saw them in an intimate embrace. Second, Laguardia recalled that Rubillar
introduced AAA to him as his girlfriend through a text message, then, borrowed his motorcycle, which
Rubillar and AAA used for about an hour. Third and most relevant is the testimony of Kalan, AAA’s long time
friend, who testified that AAA explicitly told her that Rubillar was his boyfriend once before the alleged
incident and a second tme after AAA ran away from home. Considering that the defense had sufficiently
established the fact of relationship, AAA’s version of what happened on the day of the incident now appears
incredulous. (People of the Philippines v. Rubillar, Jr., G.R. No. 224631, August 23, 2017, Second Division)
50. Mental abnormality of a rape victim may be established by evidence other than medical evidence or psychiatric
evaluation; it may be established by the testimonies of witnesses. (People of the Philippines v. Tayaban, G.R.
51. Knowledge of the offender of the mental disability of the victim during the commission of the crime of rape is
a special qualifying circumstance, which makes it punishable by death. Such qualifying circumstance, however,
must be sufficiently alleged in the indictment and proved during trial to be properly appreciated by the trial
court. It must be proved with equal certainty and clearness as the crime itself; otherwise, there can be no

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conviction of the crime in its qualified form. In this case, while the qualifying circumstance of knowledge of
Niebres of AAA's mental retardation was specifically alleged in the Information, no supporting evidence was
adduced by the prosecution. The fact that Niebres did not dispute AAA's mental retardation during trial is
insufficient to qualify the crime of rape, since it does not necessarily create moral certainty that he knew of her
disability at the time of its commission. It is settled that the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on
its own merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense. On
that score, the prosecution cannot simply profit from Niebres's omission, as it must rely on its own evidence to
prove his knowledge of AAA's mental disability beyond reasonable doubt. Additionally, mere relationship by
affinity between Niebres and AAA does not sufficiently create moral certainty that the former knew of the
latter's disability. (People of the Philippines v. Niebres, G.R. No. 230975, December 4, 2017, Second Division)
52. The “women’s honor” doctrine put forth by People v. Taño places the accused at an unfair disadvantage. This
is because while the factual setting back then would have been appropriate to say it is natural for a woman to
be reluctant in disclosing a sexual assault; today, the Court simply cannot be stuck to the Maria Clara stereotype
of a demure and reserved Filipino woman. Thus, the testimony of the private complainant of rape must be
evaluated without gender bias or cultural misconception. (People of the Philippines v. Amarela and Racho, G.R.
No. 225642-43, January 17, 2018, Third Division)
a. The Court did not completely abandon the women’s honor doctrine in Amarela, but has tempered the
application of the doctrine according to the times. In fact, the women’s honor doctrine was considered by
the Court in jurisprudence promulgated after Amarela, such as People v. Tuyor and People v. Nocido.
Notably, Amarela was decided by the Third Division of the Court. The Constitution provides that no doctrine
or principle of law laid down by the court in a decision rendered en banc or in division may be modified or
reversed except by the court sitting en banc. Thus, since Amarela was not decided by the Supreme Court
en banc, it cannot be considered to have completely abandoned the women’s honor doctrine introduced
sometime in 1960 by the Court in People v. Taño. (CICL XXX, Child in Conflict with the Law v. People of the
53. The Court observes that a specific location of a vaginal laceration cannot distinguish consensual from non-
consensual sex. Rather, other factors should be considered (such as, the frequency of lacerations and whether
they are located in different positions) to determine whether the sexual act was consensual or not. If the
frequency of lacerations is located in different areas of the vaginal orifice, then it would be a good indicator
that there was sexual abuse. On the other hand, if the lacerations are found in a specific area, it could indicate
forced rape, but could also suggest consensual intercourse. In the instant case, the lacerations were found only
at the 9 o'clock and 3 o'clock positions of the hymen. Considering the locality of these lacerations, the Court
cannot completely rule out the probability that AAA voluntarily had sex that night. Moreover, the absence of
bruises on AAA's thighs-when she said she was punched there twice-reinforces the theory that AAA may have
had consensual intercourse. (People of the Philippines v. Amarela and Racho, G.R. No. 225642-43, January 17,
54. The elements of rape had been clearly and effectively proven by the prosecution. Records will confirm that AAA
was able to positively identify accused-appellant as the person who surreptitiously entered her house. She knew
accused-appellant because they were neighbors. Her husband was the godfather of accused-appellant's eldest
son, thus, he called her "marehan." On the early dawn of 3 July 2005, AAA was roused from her sleep when she
heard a noise coming through the bamboo slats floor of her house. Because the room where AAA and her
children were sleeping was lighted, she was able to distinctly see accused-appellant armed with a bolo and
standing beside the mosquito net. She saw accused-appellant turn off the light and get inside the mosquito net.
Indeed, even if accused-appellant turned off the light, she was sure that it was he who got inside the mosquito
net because she clearly recognized his voice, viz: when he threatened her not to make any noise, otherwise, he
would kill her and her children; when he told her that he needed only her; when he ordered her to remove her
panty; and when he instructed her to breastfeed her youngest child who was then crying. (People of the
Philippines v. Empuesto, G.R. No. 218245, January 17, 2018, Third Division)
55. The foregoing revelations of "AAA'' and "BBB" show that the evidence adduced by the prosecution did not
conclusively establish the element of carnal knowledge. In the aforementioned cases, there is no categorical
proof of entrance or introduction of appellant's male organ into the labia of the pudendum of "AAA.'' Neither
is there evidence to show that appellant made an attempt to penetrate "AAA's" vagina. The prosecution’s
evidence lacks definite details regarding penile penetration. On the contrary, "AAA'' and "BBB" stated that
appellant merely "brushed or rubbed" his penis on their respective private organs. While "BBB" testified that
appellant tried to insert his penis into her vagina, she nevertheless failed to state for the record that there was
the slightest penetration into it. What is clear on record is that appellant merely brushed it.
a. To conclude that there was penile penetration simply because they felt pain when appellant tried to insert
his penis into her vagine is engaging in the realm of speculation.
b. People v. Butiong held that "the labia majora must be entered for rape to be consummated, and not merely
for the penis to stroke the surface of the female organ. Thus, a grazing of the surface of the female organ
or touching the mons pubis of the pudendum is not sufficient to constitute consummated rape. Absent any
showing of the slightest penetration of the female organ, i.e., touching of either the labia of the pudendum

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by the penis, there can be no consummated rape; at most, it can only be attempted rape, if not acts of
lasciviousness." While ''the mere touching of the external genitalia by the penis capable of consummating
the sexual act is sufficient to constitute carnal knowledge," the act of touching should be understood here
as inherently part of the entry of the penis into the labias of the female organ and not mere touching alone
of the mons pubis or the pudemdum." Indeed, the grazing of the victims' private organ caused pain, but it
cannot be presumed that carnal knowledge indeed took place by reason thereof. (People of the Philippines
v. Bejim, G.R. No. 208835, January 19, 2018, First Division)
56. Absent any showing that there was actual insertion of petitioner’s finger into AAA’s vagina, petitioner cannot
be held liable for consummated rape by sexual assault. In fact, petitioner’s overt act of touching AAA’s vagina
by constantly moving his middle finger cannot convincingly be interpreted as demonstrating an intent to
actually insert his finger inside AAA’s sexual organ which, to reiterate, was still then protectively covered, much
less an intent to have carnal knowledge with the victim. An inference of attempted rape by sexual intercourse
or attempted rape by sexual assault cannot therefore be successfully reached based on petitioner’s act of
touching AAA’s genitalia and upon ceasing from doing so when AAA swayed off his hand.
a. Instead, petitioner’s lewd act of fondling AAA’s sexual organ consummates the felony of acts of
lasciviousness. Since there was neither an insertion nor an attempt to insert petitioner’s finger into AAA’s
genitalia, petitioner can only be held guilty of the lesser crime of acts of lasciviousness following the
variance doctrine under Rule 120, Section 4 in relation to Section 4 of the Rules of Court. Acts of
lasciviousness, the offense proved, is included in rape, the offense charged. (Lutap v. People of the
57. Moreover, the fact that the rooms were adjacent and divided merely by plywood and any adjacent noise could
be heard such that it was unlikely for accused-appellant to commit the rape is of no moment. As the appellate
court correctly noted: "Jurisprudence teaches us that rape may be committed even in places where people
congregate. Thus, it is not impossible or unlikely that rape is perpetrated inside a room adjacent to a room
occupied by other persons, as in this case." (People of the Philippines v. Bauit, G.R. No. 223102, February 14,
58. There is reasonable doubt insofar as the commission of the crime of rape. There was no allegation that appellant
was actually seen inside the house before the alleged incident and the only occupant before she went to sleep.
(People of the Philippines v. Ramirez, G.R. No. 218701, February 14, 2018, First Division)
59. Records will confirm that the prosecution was able to establish beyond reasonable doubt that the accused-
appellant had carnal knowledge of AAA against her will through threat and intimidation. Armed with a knife,
the accused-appellant threatened AAA not to tell anyone, otherwise, he would kill her. To avoid any resistance
on the part of AAA and to ensure that he would be able to successfully carry out his bestial acts, the accused
appellant even tied her hands at the back. (People of the Philippines v. Sta. Ana, G.R. No. 202863, February 21,
60. "AAA" clearly testified that when she was awakened on January 20, 2007, she found herself naked and
appellant, who was also naked, was on top of her. During that time, appellant's penis was inside her. "AAA"
pushed him twice but to no avail; and, a certain Ronald even held her hands preventing her from moving; and,
after a while, she lost consciousness. Indeed, the straightforward and categorical testimony of "AAA" and her
positive identification of appellant proved that the latter had carnal knowledge of "AAA" against her will and
without her consent. (People of the Philippines v. Gomez, G.R. No. 220892, February 21, 2018, First Division)
61. The gravamen of rape under Article 266-A(1) is carnal knowledge of a woman against her will or without her
consent. On the one hand, jurisprudence imparts the following definitions of "force" and "intimidation," to wit:
Force, as an element of rape, must be sufficient to consummate the purposes which the accused had in mind.
On the other hand, intimidation must produce fear that if the victim does not yield to the bestial demands of
the accused, something would happen to her at that moment or even thereafter as when she is threatened
with death if she reports the incident. "Intimidation includes the moral kind as the fear caused by threatening
the girl with a knife or pistol." (People of the Philippines v. Agalot, G.R. No. 220884, February 21, 2018, Third
Division)
62. Sexual congress with a mental retardate is rape. In addition, purported romantic relations between the accused
and the victim, as well as the accused’s lack of awareness of the victim’s mental condition, shall not exonerate
the accused from the charge. (People of the Philippines v. Martinez and Granada, G.R. No. 226394, March 7,
63. A cursory reading of the two Informations reveals with pristine clarity that each contained elements of both
crimes of rape defined under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code and of child abuse defined and penalized
under Section 5(b) of RA 7610. However, the offender cannot be accused of both crimes for the same act
without traversing his right against double jeopardy. In People v. Abay, it was explained that if the victim is 12
years or older, as in this case, the offender should be charged with either sexual abuse under Section 5(b) of RA

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7610 or rape. In the two cases under consideration, the victim was 14 years old when the crimes were
committed. Following Abay, appellant may either be charged with violation of Section 5(b) of RA 7610 or with
rape under Article 266-A of the RPC. Here, appellant was charged with violation of Section 5(b) of RA 7610. In
the recent case of People v. Tubillo, it was held that "[a] reading of the information would show that the case
at bench involves both the elements of Article 266-A(1) of the RPC and Section 5(b) of RA 7610. As elucidated
in People v. Abay and People v. Pangilinan, in such instance, the court must examine the evidence of the
prosecution, whether it focused on the specific force or intimidation employed by the offender or on the
broader scope of coercion or influence to have carnal knowledge with the victim." In the present case, the
evidence of the prosecution in no uncertain terms focused on the force or intimidation employed by appellant
against "AAA" under Article 266-A (1)(a) of the RPC. The prosecution, through the steadfast declaration of
"AAA", was able to establish that the appellant forced her to lie down on a grassy ground and, at knifepoint,
inserted his penis into her vagina. (People of the Philippines v. Nuyte, G.R. No. 219111, March 12, 2018, First
Division; People of the Philippines v. Mabalo, G.R. No. 238839, February 27, 2019, Third Division)
64. While it is true that results of the DNA test showing that accused-appellant fathered AAA’s child are not essential
elements to prove the fact of rape, proof of paternity of a rape victim’s child establishes the fact that the
accused-appellant, who is a biological match with the victim’s child, had carnal knowledge of the victim, which
is an element of rape when it is done against the latte’rs will and without her consent. (People of the Philippines
v. Clemeno, G.R. No. 215202, March 14, 2018, Third Division)
65. Hence, the act of accused-appellant holding a knife clearly produced fear in AAA's mind that the former would
kill her if she would not submit to his sexual design. The act of holding a knife by itself is strongly suggestive of
force or, at least, intimidation, and threatening the victim with a knife is sufficient to bring a woman into
submission. (People of the Philippines v. Banayat, G.R. No. 215749, March 14, 2018, Third Division)
66. A catena of cases sustains the ruling that the conduct of the victim immediately following the alleged sexual
assault is of utmost importance in tending to establish the truth or falsity of the charge of rape. In this case,
after the accused-appellant had carnal knowledge of her, AAA immediately left his house and proceeded to her
brother's house where she narrated what had happened to her. On that same day, AAA went to the barangay
to report the incident, then to the police station to give her statements, and subsequently to the crime
laboratory to submit herself to physical examination. The act of AAA in wasting no time in reporting her ordeal
to the authorities validates the truth of her charge against the accused-appellant. (People of the Philippines v.
Ganaba, G.R. No. 219240, April 4, 2018, Third Division)
67. The absence of any threat to AAA from accused-appellant at the waiting shed does not disprove the fact that
he had carnal knowledge of her. It will be noted that pursuant to Art. 266-A of the RPC, rape is committed when
a man has carnal knowledge of a woman either through force, or threat, or intimidation, among other
circumstances. Thus, proof that the offense was committed either through any of the three means, i.e., force,
threat, or intimidation, will suffice to warrant a conviction as long as this is satisfactorily proven by the
prosecution.
a. Force, as an element of rape, must be sufficient to consummate the purposes which the accused had in
mind. On the other hand, intimidation must produce fear that if the victim does not yield to the bestial
demands of the accused, something would happen to her at that moment or even thereafter as when she
is threatened with death if she reports the incident." In this case, AAA was able to credibly narrate that it
was through force that accused-appellant was able to carry out his evil desire by dragging her from the
shed to the coconut plantation and there pushing her to the ground to abuse her. In the same vein, the
circumstance of intimidation was demonstrated by accused-appellant's threat that he would kill her
mother and her siblings once she revealed to BBB what he did to her.
b. Whether AAA was raped twice or for several more times by accused-appellant is immaterial to this case
considering that this is neither an issue nor a material element for the successful prosecution of the offense
of rape. (People of the Philippines v. Rupal, G.R. No. 222497, June 27, 2018, Third Division)
68. The prosecution proved through AAA's testimony that: (a) Laguerta chanced upon her, poked a knife at her
neck and threatened her; (b) he covered her mouth with a handkerchief, which caused her head and nose to
ache; (c) she was rendered unconscious; and (d) upon waking up, she found herself lying half-naked on the bed,
with a sharp pain in her vagina and thighs, with her undergarment and shorts lain on the side. Added to this,
AAA prematurely gave birth seven months after the rape incident. All these interwoven circumstances form an
unbroken chain that unerringly point to Laguerta, and no other, as the man who had carnal knowledge against
AAA. (People of the Philippines v. Laguerta, G.R. No. 233542, July 9, 2018, Second Division)
69. The moral ascendancy of the accused took the place of the element of violence and intimidation. When the
offender is the victim's father, there need not be actual force, threat or intimidation. When a father commits
the odious crime of rape against his own daughter, as in this case, was a minor at the time of the commission
of the offenses, his moral ascendancy or influence over the latter substitutes for violence and intimidation.
(People of the Philippines v. CCC, G.R. No. 220492, July 11, 2018, Third Division)

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70. AAA sufficiently explained that despite the fact that no weapon was poked at her body at the time the actual
rapes were committed, she was of the belief that maybe Andes was still holding the weapon and that she could
not ascertain where the weapon was because it was dark. It is established that the law does not impose on the
rape victim the burden of proving resistance. In rape, the force and intimidation must be viewed in the light of
the victim's perception and judgment at the time of the commission of the crime and not by any hard and fast
rule. (People of the Philippines v. Andes, G.R. No. 227738, July 23, 2018, Second Division)
71. It was found that the element of force, threat, and intimidation exists in this case. The victim did not board the
vehicle of her own accord, but was forced to go with accused-appellant because of his threat to kill her parents.
Also, right before penetrating the victim's vagina, accused-appellant made another threat, this time against the
life of the victim. Accused-appellant also exerted physical force upon the victim to ensure consummation of the
act. All these taken together satisfy the requirements to establish that indeed the victim was raped by accused-
appellant. (People of the Philippines v. Jaime, G.R. No. 225332, July 23, 2018, Third Division)
72. The absence of abrasions and contusions in AAA’s body or her failure to scream and flee do not prove consent
to the sexual act. (People of the Philippines v. Ramos, G.R. No. 210435, August 15, 2018, Second Division)
a. Absence of physical injuries does not negate commission of rape. (People of the Philippines v. ZZZ, G.R.
73. The Court holds that there exists reasonable doubt that XXX committed the crime charged against him. To
reiterate, XXX was charged with Statutory Rape for allegedly having sexual intercourse with his then 10-year old
daughter "sometime in 2003." The records would reveal, however, that the evidence presented by the
prosecution failed to establish that he indeed had sexual intercourse with AAA in 2003, or at the time she was
still 10 years old. Neither could XXX be convicted through his admission that he had sexual intercourse with AAA
in 2007. This is because the Information filed in this case accused XXX of having sexual intercourse with AAA
"sometime in July 2003." While it is true, as the RTC and the CA held, that the exact place and time of the
commission of the crime is not an element of the crime of Rape, XXX still could not be convicted of the crime
for to do so would be to offend the basic tenets of due process in criminal prosecutions.
a. The Information specifically accused XXX of having sexual intercourse with AAA "sometime in July 2003."
The date, in this case, is essential because in July 2003, AAA was only 10-years old; thus, making the
accusation against him that for Statutory Rape instead of Simple Rape – which, as previously discussed,
imposes on the prosecution different elements to prove. To repeat, in cases of Statutory Rape, the element
of proving force and intimidation is dispensed with considering that the absence of free consent is
conclusively presumed when the victim is below the age of 12. Thus, the prosecution only needs to prove
the age of the victim, and the fact that sexual intercourse happened. In contrast, in Simple Rape, the
prosecution has the burden of proving another element, namely, that the accused employed force and
intimidation, for example, in order to have sexual intercourse with the victim. Therefore, as the two crimes
have different elements – and would therefore entail different defenses on the part of the accused – the
courts cannot thus equate one with the other. To do so would be to offend the due process rights of the
accused. Applying the foregoing to the present case, the Court cannot therefore use the "admission" by
XXX, as his admission pertains to his having sexual intercourse with AAA in 2007, or when AAA was already
14 years old – beyond the age set for Statutory Rape. Consequently, for this act to be considered Rape, the
prosecution needed to prove that XXX employed force and intimidation to cow AAA into submission. The
prosecution, however, was unable to do so simply because it was not legally allowed to do so. Again, the
Information charges the accused for the events in 2003, not 2007. It cannot therefore offer evidence for
events other than what happened in 2003.
b. What the testimony of AAA proves is that, when she was 10 years old, XXX got a hold of her hand and
placed it on top of his penis. Undoubtedly then, the established facts in this case complies with the
elements needed to be proved to reach a conviction for acts of lasciviousness, specifically, that there is an
act of lasciviousness or lewdness committed against a person who is under 12 years old. The crime
committed would thus be Acts of Lasciviousness, in relation to Section 5(b), R.A. 7610, as the current
prevailing jurisprudence holds that the said law "finds application when the victims of abuse, exploitation
or discrimination are children." (People of the Philippines v. XXX, G.R. No. 226467, October 17, 2018,
Second Division)
74. The CA should not have taken into account the qualifying circumstance of the use of a deadly weapon against
AAA. Case law states that the penalty for the crime of Rape is increased from reclusion perpetua to death if it is
committed "with the use of a deadly weapon." In order for the qualifying circumstance of "use of a deadly
weapon" - if the same is sufficiently alleged in the Information - to be appreciated, it must be proven that the
deadly weapon was used to make the victim submit to the will of the offender. Even the act of molding a bladed
instrument, by itself, is strongly suggestive of force or, at least, intimidation, and threatening the victim with
the same is sufficient to bring her into submission. In this case, contrary to the finding of the CA that the rape
was committed through force and intimidation given that Tagle threatened AAA with a knife and forced her to
submit to his bestial designs, a close scrutiny of the records reveals that Tagle's act of threatening AAA with a
knife actually happened after the commission of rape and not before or during the incident. Pertinently, the
knife was not used to cause AAA to submit to Tagle's bestial designs, as in fact, it was only used to threaten her

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into silence, so she would not report the incident to anyone. (People of the Philippines v. Tagle, G.R. No. 229348,
75. In Criminal Case Nos. 13002 and 13003, the RTC correctly convicted accused-appellant for two counts of rape
by sexual assault instead of statutory rape as erroneously designated in the corresponding Information. As
narrated by AAA, she was still a minor when accused-appellant inserted his finger into her vagina on October
25 and 28, 2004, or roughly a month before he raped her by sexual intercourse. (People of the Philippines v.
Talib-og, G.R. No. 238112, December 5, 2018, First Division)
76. The fact that some of the details testified to by AAA did not appear in her Sinumpaang Salaysay does not mean
that the sexual assault did not happen. AAA was still able to narrate all the details of the sexual assault she
suffered in Tulagan's hands. AAA's account of her ordeal being straightforward and candid and corroborated by
the medical findings of the examining physician, as well as her positive identification of Tulagan as the
perpetrator of the crime, are, thus, sufficient to support a conviction of rape. (People of the Philippines v.
Tulagan, G.R. No. 227363, March 12, 2019, En Banc)
77. Failure to shout for help does not disprove rape. (People of the Philippines v. [Redacted Name], G.R. No.
78. The Court sustains the conviction of accused-appellant for the crime of qualified rape in relation to RA No. 7610
in Criminal Case No. 09-1119. The elements necessary to sustain a conviction for rape are: (a) that the accused
had carnal knowledge of the victim; and (b) that said act was accomplished (i) through the use of force or
intimidation, or (ii) when the victim is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or (iii) when the victim is
under 12 years of age or is demented. Moreover, rape is qualified when "the victim is under eighteen (18) years
of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within
the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim." A thorough review of the records
of the case supports the conclusion that the prosecution had sufficiently established the presence of all the
elements of qualified rape. AAA clearly testified that it was her own biological father, the herein accused-
appellant, who sexually assaulted her on November 4, 2009, without her consent, while she was still a 17-year
old minor. The accused-appellant's paternal relations with AAA and her minority were in fact stipulated upon
by the parties during the pre-trial stage. Moreover, AAA's account of the rape was corroborated by Dr. Apin,
who testified that his examination revealed that AAA suffered hymenal lacerations. (People of the Philippines
v. De Vera, G.R. No. 230624, June 6, 2019, First Division)
79. It is indisputable that appellant is the brother of AAA and that AAA testified that she and appellant had carnal
knowledge through force and intimidation on July 27, 2008 (Criminal Case No. 6263), making the appellant
guilty of Qualified Rape. To sustain a conviction for qualified rape, the following elements must concur: (a) the
victim is a female over 12 years, but under 18 years of age; (b) the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent,
guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the
parent of the victim; and (c) the offender has carnal knowledge of the victim either through force, threat or
intimidation; or when she was deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious; or by means of fraudulent
machinations or grave abuse of authority. Likewise, AAA testified that she was sexually assaulted on August 14,
2008 (Criminal Case No. 6265) when appellant inserted his finger into her vagina. (People of the Philippines v.
Moya, G.R. No. 228260, June 10, 2019, Third Division)
80. The victim apparently consented to the act, which thus negates the commission of rape. It must be noted that
the prosecution alleged that the victim cannot give consent since she was a mental retardate. However, the
prosecution failed to establish her mental retardation.
a. Similar to Dalandas, the records of the present case are likewise bereft of any evidence conclusively
establishing AAA's mental retardation. If at all, the only evidence offered to prove the said fact were: (i)
BBB's testimony that AAA has had mental retardation since birth; (ii) Barangay Captain CCC's testimony
that he has known AAA to have mental retardation and that she went to a special school; and (iii) Dr.
Barasona's testimony that AAA "probably" has Down Syndrome. Following Dalandas, however, BBB and
CCC's testimonies are but mere conclusions that do not establish the fact of AAA's mental retardation.
Likewise, Dr. Barasona's testimony cannot be the basis for such as the said findings were inconclusive.
(People of the Philippines v. Padilla, G.R. No. 234947, June 19, 2019, Second Division)
81. The letter was left by AAA when she ran away from home sometime after the alleged incidents, which began
on the wake of BBB's mother as referred to by AAA in the letter. BBB herself testified that she noticed a change
in behavior in AAA. However, even if the Court admits and appreciates the testimony of BBB regarding AAA's
change in behavior, it does not by itself prove the guilt of CCC. Likewise, the handwritten letter of AAA does not
prove that CCC indeed raped his daughter. In the handwritten letter, AAA accuses her own father of being a
"MANYAK" and that "7 Bises NIYA IYON GINAWA SA AKIN SIMULA NG NAMATAY SI LOLA." However, AAA never
explained what her father did to her. Characterizing her father as a "manyak" does not automatically mean that
he raped her, as it may pertain to other acts which are lascivious that do not necessarily constitute rape.

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Without proving the very acts that CCC did to AAA, the Court cannot uphold the conviction of CCC. (People of
the Philippines v. CCC, G.R. No. 228822, June 19, 2019, Second Division)
82. More, AAA was physically examined twice: first by a doctor at Danao General Hospital, and second by Dr.
Liwayway Reyes of VSMMC. Dr. Reyes found that AAA sustained deep notches at 3, 7, 10, and 12 o'clock
positions. Medical expert Dr. Naomi Poca of VSMMC testified that a finding of 7 o'clock notch is suggestive of
an injury caused by a blunt instrument. Dr. Poca further opined that if the subject had no history of operation
or accident, said notch could have been caused by sexual abuse. Verily, therefore, AAA's assertion that she had
been sexually ravished at least twice in 1999, as charged in Criminal Case Nos. DNO-3393 and DNO-3394, solidly
conforms with the medical certificate and Dr. Poca's expert testimony. Indeed, where the victim's testimony is
corroborated by physical findings of penetration, there is sufficient basis for concluding that sexual intercourse
did take place. (People of the Philippines v. [Redacted Name], G.R. No. 229836, July 17, 2019, Second Division)
83. At the outset, AAA and BBB were young girls under the age of eighteen (18) when they were sexually ravished
by appellant in 2009. All three (3) Informations bore the twin circumstances of minority and relationship. As
proven by the prosecution's documentary evidence. AAA was born on August 12, 1993 and BBB, on February
7, 1996. In 2009, AAA was fifteen (15) and BBB, fourteen (14). As for the element of relationship, the
prosecution and the defense stipulated that AAA and BB were appellant's legitimate children.
a. Regarding the elements of carnal knowledge and force or intimidation, or exertion of moral ascendancy,
the trial court aptly summarized AAA's testimony on how she was sexually ravished by appellant on March
14, 2009. It stated that there is adequate and satisfactory evidence that on March 14, 2009, at around 1:00
o'clock in the afternoon, AAA was resting on the sofa after washing clothes, when her father ordered her
to go to the room. While inside the room, accused lied (sic) down on the bed beside her and undressed
her. Accused then took off his shorts and inserted his penis into her vagina. AAA felt pain and blood came
out of her private part but she could not do anything other than cry. After the sexual act, accused told AAA
to put on her dress. AAA narrated in detail that appellant ordered her to go inside a room, lay on the bed
beside her, and inserted his penis in her vagina. Although appellant did not threaten or force AAA to engage
in sexual congress with him, it is settled that where the rape is committed by a close kin, such as the victim's
father, stepfather, uncle, or the common-law spouse of her mother, it is not necessary that actual force or
intimidation be employed; moral influence or ascendancy takes the place of violence or intimidation.
(People of the Philippines v. XXX, G.R. No. 235662, July 24, 2019, Second Division)
84. In the absence of direct evidence, a resort to circumstantial evidence is usually necessary in proving the
commission of rape. This is because the crime is generally unwitnessed and very often only the victim is left to
testify for him or herself. It becomes even more difficult when the complex crime of rape with homicide is
committed because the victim could no longer testify. (People of the Philippines v. ZZZ, G.R. No. 228828, July
85. It would appear that the sexual intercourse that transpired between petitioner and AAA was consensual at the
time — with AAA admitting that she loved petitioner — but when she learned that the object of her affection
was about to leave for the province, she felt jaded and could not accept it. Hence, she attempted to commit
suicide, as evidenced by the suicide note and the afore-quoted letter for petitioner, and threatened not just to
break his family apart but also, to charge him with rape. As it is, the present case against petitioner is based
merely on trumped-up allegations meant as retaliation. That the sexual intercourse between the parties
appears to be consensual is bolstered by the fact that AAA failed to cry or shout for help, or at the very least,
offer some kind of resistance against petitioner's advances. She claimed to have tried to shout but petitioner
allegedly covered her mouth; still, under the circumstances, and fully aware that petitioner was about to defile
her, she could have made any kind of noise in order to alert her sister BBB and CCC, who were upstairs at the
time. While it is true that the failure of the victim to shout for help or resist the sexual advances of the rapist is
not tantamount to consent, in this case it created a serious doubt when taken together with the other pieces
of evidence tending to show that AAA consented to the sexual congress and merely fabricated the rape charge
against petitioner. Neither can the Court accept AAA's explanation that she was afraid of petitioner because
she recalled an incident in 2013 when petitioner allegedly poked a knife against BBB's neck; at the particular
moment when AAA alleged that petitioner forced himself upon her, there was no immediate threat of bodily
harm or injury as to rouse fear or panic in AAA.
a. As regards the CA's conviction of petitioner for violation of Section 5 (b), Article III of RA 7610 on the
premise that consent is immaterial under such charges, it bears to point out that "consent of the child is
material and may even be a defense in criminal cases" involving the aforesaid violation when the offended
party is 12 years old or below 18 years old, as in AAA's case. The concept of consent under Section 5 (b),
Article III of RA 7610 peculiarly relates to the second element of the crime – that is, the act of sexual
intercourse is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse. A child
is considered "exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse" when the child is pre-disposed
to indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct because of money, profit or any other consideration
or due to the coercion of any adult, syndicate, or group, which was not shown in this case; hence,
petitioner's conviction for the said crime cannot be sustained. (Monroy v. People of the Philippines, G.R.

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86. The prosecution did not present AAA's birth certificate. Instead, they presented a photocopy of AAA's Baptismal
Certificate, and both AAA and BBB testified as regards AAA's age. As pointed out by XXX, however, these pieces
of evidence were not compliant with the Pruna guidelines and thus do not suffice to establish AAA's age. The
prosecution was unable to comply with the first guideline because, as mentioned, they did not present AAA's
birth certificate which could have been the best evidence that she was only eight years old at the time of the
incident complained of. The second guideline was likewise not complied with, as the Baptismal Certificate
submitted in evidence was a mere photocopy and no one was presented to authenticate the same. The third
guideline was likewise not sufficiently complied with. While BBB, AAA's older sister, testified as to AAA's age,
the resort to such testimony was not proper because the guideline provides that such testimony may be
admitted only after the "certificate of live birth or authentic document is shown to have been lost or destroyed
or otherwise unavailable” In People v, Hilarion, the Court did not appreciate the mother's testimony as to her
daughter's age because her testimony failed to show how the birth certificate or other authentic documents
were lost, destroyed, or were otherwise unavailable. (XXX v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 243151,
87. Appellant admitted that he knew that AAA is mute and mentally retarded. Since appellant knew of AAA's mental
disability when appellant raped her, the proper designation of the crime committed is qualified rape. The
imposable penalty for qualified rape is death. However, in view of Republic Act No. 9346, which prohibits the
imposition of death penalty, appellant's penalty is reduced to reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole.
(People of the Philippines v. GGG, G.R. No. 224595, September 18, 2019, Second Division)
88. The prosecution failed to establish that the carnal knowledge between Estong and AAA was accompanied by
force or intimidation on the part of Estong. The action of Estong in placing an x-rated film which both Estong
and AAA watched, if any, amounts to inducement or enticement under sexual abuse cases under RA 7610 but
not to force or intimidation as an element of rape under the Revised Penal Code. In this case, what is clear is
that AAA was aware of previous sexual advances by Estong and yet AAA still heeded the invitation of Estong.
Moreover, AAA admitted that she repeatedly went to Estong's house whenever he would call her. Such is not
the usual conduct of a rape victim. In fact, if there were indeed previous sexual encounters against her will,
under ordinary circumstances, AAA would have avoided Estong and would have stayed away from Estong's
house. The existence of willingness on the part of the victim, AAA, shows reasonable doubt that the carnal
knowledge between AAA and Estong was not un-consensual. Accordingly, Estong must be acquitted of the
charge of rape.
a. Nevertheless, Estong is guilty of the crime of sexual abuse under Section 5(b) of R.A. 7610 against BBB. The
prosecution established beyond reasonable doubt that Estong committed sexual abuse on BBB. According
to BBB's testimony, Estong undressed her, mashed and sucked her breasts and caressed her vagina. (People
of the Philippines v. Chavez, G.R. No. 235783, September 25, 2019, Second Division)
89. There is no force, threat, or intimidation. Records show that despite the alleged previous sexual advances made
by appellant, AAA still voluntarily went with him because she trusted him. AAA's voluntary acts of separating
from her friends and going with appellant because she trusted him negate the presence of force, threat, or
intimidation in the commission of the alleged rape. (People of the Philippines v. Oropesa, G.R. No. 229084,
90. The existence of a romantic relationship between two (2) persons does not discount the commission of rape
for it can be committed by one spouse against the other. But here, AAA's credibility is seriously being put in
question vis-à-vis the testimony of her mother BBB, her sister CCC, and DDD, an impartial witness together with
her two (2) handwritten messages to appellant --- plainly indicating she was not honest after all about the rape
charges she initiated against appellant. (People of the Philippines v. XXX, G.R. No. 229677, October 2, 2019,
Second Division)
91. It was alleged in the Informations that De Guzman was AAA's "stepfather." A "stepfather" is the "husband of
one's mother by virtue of a marriage subsequent to that of which the person spoken of is the offspring. It
presupposes a legitimate relationship between the appellant and the victim's mother." However, during trial,
the prosecution failed to establish this stepparent-stepdaughter relationship between De Guzman and AAA. No
proof of marriage was presented in order to establish De Guzman's legal relationship with BBB. In other words,
De Guzman cannot be considered as the stepfather of AAA as alleged in the Informations. On the contrary,
records show that De Guzman was actually the common-law spouse of BBB as he was not legally married to
her. Since De Guzman's relationship with AAA as alleged in the Informations was not proven beyond reasonable
doubt, De Guzman cannot be convicted of Qualified Rape, only Simple Statutory Rape and Simple Rape. Stated
differently, "the crime is only simple rape, although the State successfully proves the common-law relationship,
where the information does not properly allege the qualifying circumstance of relationship between the
accused and the female. This is because the right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him is inviolable.” According to People v. Begino, the "qualifying circumstances must be
properly pleaded in the indictment. If the same are not pleaded but proved, they shall be considered only as
aggravating circumstances since the latter admit of proof even if not pleaded. It would be a denial of the right

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of the accused to be informed of the charges against him and consequently, a denial of due process, if he is
charged with simple rape and be convicted of its qualified form, although the attendant circumstance qualifying
the offense and resulting in the capital punishment was not alleged in the indictment on which he was
arraigned." Since the qualifying circumstance of relationship was not properly pleaded and proved in the case
at bench, De Guzman should only be convicted of Simple Statutory Rape and Simple Rape under paragraph 1
of Article 266-A of the RPC. (People of the Philippines v. De Castro, G.R. No. 224212, November 27, 2019,
Second Division)
92. A conviction for rape may be sustained based on the medical-legal report and testimonial evidence of the victim
and the medico-legal officer. (People of the Philippines v. Gratela, G.R. No. 225961, January 6, 2020, First
Division)
93. The claim that AAA was threatened at knife-point while on her way to a sayawan is starkly different and
absolutely inconsistent with the claim that accused-appellant befriended her in a peryahan and thereafter
invited her to his house. While seemingly immaterial, the contradictory statements that (a) accused-appellant
and AAA took a tricycle to the scene of the crime; (b) accused-appellant and AAA walked for about an hour
while talking; and (c) accused-appellant and AAA walked for a period of time that AAA could no longer recall,
all the while under the threat of violence – taken with all other evident discrepancies such as where the
purported crime was committed and where AAA was found after the alleged rape, undoubtedly calls AAA’s
credibility into question. (People of the Philippines v. Dolandolan, G.R. No. 232157, January 8, 2020, First
Division)
94. Deniaga and Niebres defined “deprived of reason” and “demented.” “Deprived of reason” is associated with
insanity or madness. It means that a person deprived of reason has mental abnormalities that affect his or her
reasoning and perception of reality and, therefore, his or her capacity to resist, make decisions, and give
consent. “Demented” refers to a person who suffers from a mental condition called dementia. However, the
terms “deprived of reason” and “demented” are different from the term “mentally retarded” or “intellectually
disabled.” An intellectually disabled person is not necessarily deprived of reason or demented. Additionally,
Quintos holds that when the victim is a mental retardate whose mental age is that of a person below 12 years
old, the rape should be classified as statutory rape under Article 266-A(1)(d) of the RPC. (People of the
Philippines v. Castillo, G.R. No. 242276, February 18, 2020, En Banc; People of the Philippines v. XXX, G.R. No.
95. The elements of the crime of rape are all present. AAA and BBB categorically testified as to how the accused-
appellant had carnal knowledge of them on numerous occasions between the years 2004 and 2011: six times
in the case of AAA and 12 times in the case of BBB. AAA narrated how, during the onset of a typhoon in May
2004, accused-appellant undressed her while she was lying down, pulled down his shorts, and inserted his penis
into her vagina while on top of her. Her testimony remained consistent as she narrated how accused-appellant
repeated the said actions on five more occasions. Meanwhile BBB candidly testified that on the evening of July
24, 2008, accused-appellant made her face him, placed her left leg over his, and kissed her mouth. He then
unzipped his pants, pulled down BBB’s shorts and underwear, and inserted his penis into her vagina. Like her
sister, BBB’s testimony remained straightforward as she testified to having suffered the horrific acts of her
father 11 more times thereafter. As to minority, AAA’s certificate of live birth discloses that she was eight years
old when she was first raped by accused-appellant, the last reported sexual abuse having occurred when she
was 11 years of age. Whereas, BBB’s Certificate of Live Birth reveals that she was raped by accused-appellant
when she was only seven years old, the last incident of rape having been committed when she was about 10
years of age. Furthermore, both private complainants claimed to having been afraid of accused-appellant who
was their biological father, with AAA testifying that the latter had threatened to kill her once. On this score, it
bears stressing that even without the use of force or intimidation or failure to prove the presence thereof, the
moral ascendancy that exists with accused-appellant being the private complainants’ father is sufficient. In
cases of incestuous rape of a minor, it has been established that moral ascendancy of the ascendant substitutes
force or intimidation. (People of the Philippines v. XXX, G.R. No. 244288, March 4, 2020, Second Division)
96. Accused-appellant’s sweetheart defense is untenable. For one, such claim was not substantiated by the
evidence on record. The only evidence adduced by accused-appellant were his and his witnesses’ testimonies.
According to Alfredo, he knows of his their relationship because accused-appellant told him so. While Ruther
and Zenaida testified that they saw accused-appellant and AAA very sweet and happily talking and embracing
each other. These are not enough to prove a romantic relationship existed between accused-appellant and
AAA. People v. Napudo declares that the fact alone that two people were seen beside each other, conversing
during a jeepney ride, without more, cannot give rise to the inference that they were sweethearts. Intimacies
such as loving caresses, cuddling, tender smiles, sweet murmurs, or any other affectionate gestures that one
bestows upon his or her lover would have been seen and are expected to indicate the presence of the
relationship. Other than accused-appellant’s self-serving assertions and those of his witnesses which were
rightly discredited by the trial court, nothing supports accused-appellant’s claim that he and AAA were indeed
lovers. A sweetheart defense, to be credible, should be substantiated by some documentary or other evidence

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of relationship such as notes, gifts, mementos and the like. Accused-appellant failed to discharge this burden.
(People of the Philippines v. Quinto, G.R. No. 246460, June 8, 2020, First Division)
97. The victim’s failure to shout for help does not affect her credibility since there is no clear-cut behavior to be
expected from a person being raped or has been raped. In addition, the absence of external signs of physical
injuries does not necessarily negate rape. In rape, force need not always produce physical injuries. What is
important is that the victim was able to give a credible and clear testimony as to the presence of the intimidation
that was employed. Thus the argument of appellant that the prosecution was not able to prove the presence
of force, intimidation, or threat is inconsequential. (People of the Philippines v. Mendoza, G.R. No. 239892, June
98. That the medical examination showed no laceration, erythema, and abrasion in the victim’s vaginal orifice is
immaterial. Accused-appellant’s inability to maintain an erection firm enough for continuous penetration will
not save him from punishment. To stress, in rape cases, the slightest penetration is sufficient. As long as the
attempt to insert the penis results in contact with the lips of the vagina, even without rupture or laceration of
the hymen, the rape is consummated. This is based from the physical fact that the labias are physically situated
beneath the mons pubis or the vaginal surface, such that for the penis to touch either of them is to attain some
degree of penetration beneath the surface of the female genitalia.
a. The crime of rape is consummated the moment the penis touches the labia, regardless of the extent of
erection. (People of the Philippines v. Agan, G.R. No. 228947, June 22, 2020, Second Division)
99. The sweetheart defense does not hold water. Jurisprudence declares that the “sweetheart” defense must be
proven by compelling evidence: first, that the accused and the victim were lovers; and second, that she
consented to the alleged sexual relations. The second is as important as the first, because the Court has held
often enough that love is not a license for lust. Thus, Briones can offer love letters to prove that FFF was his
lover, but the fact that they were sweethearts does not necesarrily establish FFF’s consent to the sexual act. To
repeat, FFF categorically testified in open court that she tried pushing Briones away and even pleaded for him
to stop.
a. To corroborate his “sweetheart defense,” Briones presented his cousin, Mary Ann, who allegedly witnessed
their love affair. But the Court sustains with approval the appellate court’s finding that Mary Ann never
testified that the sexual relations between Briones and FFF were the latter’s consent. Records merely show
that all Mary Ann testified to was that there was one time when FFF and Briones went inside the latter’s
bedroom for about thirty (30) minutes. Unfortunately for Briones, however, Mary Ann’s testimony can
barely save his plight. First of all, she categorically stated that she did not know what happened therein.
Second, this encouner that Mary Ann testified to was, in fact, not the act FFF complained of in this case.
Indeed, a testimony as to an apparent sweetness between two people does not instantly prove consent to
a sexual encounter. It cannot be denied, therefore, that the evidence on record is bereft of any indication
that FFF consented to Briones’ bestial acts.
b. It must be borne in mind that FFF was only 12 years old when Briones, 19, raped her. Thus, Briones’ claim
that the element of force, threat, or intimidation was not proven in this case as shown by the fact that FFF
did not shout during the incident must be rejected. To reiterate, it is only necessary that the force or
intimdation be sufficient to consummate the purpose which the accused had in mind. (People of the
Philippines v. Briones, G.R. No. 240217, June 23, 2020, First Division)
c. The fat that accused-appellant and AAA were sweethearts does not necessarily negate AAA’s lack of
consent to the sexual encounters with accused-appellant. Having a relationship with the victim is not a
license to have sexual intercourse against her will, and will not exonerate the accused from the criminal
charge of rape as being sweethearts does not prove consent to the sexual act. The fact that AAA and
accused-appellant were sweethearts was no excuse in the eyes of the law for him to employ force and
intimidation in gratifying his carnal desires. (People of the Philippines v. Ovani, Jr., G.R. No. 247624, June
100. There is no question that Tamano easily consummated his bestial desire by subduing AAA. AAA testified that
she struggled to repel Tamano’s advances but was too weak to ward him off. She fought and pushed him, but
felt defenseless and weak against his strong body. Worse, from the very moment Tamano met AAA, he
employed a dastardly scheme to lure her and weaken her. He called her cellphone, but specifically warned her
not to tell the others that she was talking to him. Then he ordered her to go to Jollibee, all the while dangling
the prospect that he will return her cellphone. Once at Jollibee, he cajoled her into having a meal with him. As
soon as AAA drank the Coke Tamano offered, she instantly felt weak and dizzy. Everything was suddenly hazy.
Next thing she knew, she was dragged along a dark, nasty-looking alley. Thereafter, she found herself in a place
with numbers, a bed, mirror, and towels. He abused her vulnerability then used his brute strength to overpower
her.
a. The amount of force necessary to overpower the victim is relative. It is a well-entrenched principle that the
force used in the commission of rape need not be overpowering or absolutely irresistible. Certainly,
tenacious resistance against rape is not required; neither is a determined or a persistent physical struggle
on the part of the victim necessary. After all, resistance is not an element of rape. Accordingly, a rape victim
is not obliged to prove that she did all within her power to resist the force employed against her. As

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contemplated by law, force in the commission of rape depends on the age, size, and strength of the parties.
It is likewise assessed from the perception and judgment of the vulnerable victim. What remains essential
is that the force employed was sufficient to enable the offender to consummate his lewd purpose. Notably,
in People v. Ramos, the Court considered the relative size of the victim as against that of her predator.
Particularly, it gave credence to the trial court’s observation that the victim was frail and petite, while the
offender had a heavy built, thereby bolstering to the former’s testimony that the latter easily succeeded in
pinning her down amidst her persistent struggling. (People of the Philippines v. Tamano, G.R. No. 227866,
101. AAA’s conduct prior to and after the rape incident, her failure to seek help, or flee, do not establish consent to
the sexual act. Certainly, it is unfair to demand a rational reaction from AAA, or fault her for failing to ask for
help or expect her to escape. Tamano’s accusation that AAA acted as if nothing happened is absolutely baseless.
The records show that Tamano devised ways to keep AAA by his side. In fact, she had to ask permission to go
to the bathroom. Although he allowed her to go, he ordered her to leave her things to prevent her from
escaping. In the end, what matters is that she sought help, and reported the rape, as soon as she had escaped
from Tamano’s watchful glare. In the same vein, AAA may not be blamed for going with Tamano to Festive Mall
after the rape incident. It must be remembered that prior to the incident, she was groggy and unaware of her
surroundings. All that she vaguely remembered was being dragged to a dark and nasty alley, followed by finding
herself inside a room with Tamano. Weak, unaware, and trapped in an unfamiliar situation, she cannot be
expected to devise a rational plan to flee. (People of the Philippines v. Tamano, G.R. No. 227866, July 8, 2020,
Third Division)
102. The inconsistency as regards the place of the commission of the offense is not material so as to render AAA’s
testimony incredible. The alleged inconsistency on the place where the crime happened is a minor inconsistency
which should generally be given liberal appreciation considering that the place of the commission of the crime
in rape cases is after all not an essential element thereof. What is decisive is that appellant’s commission of the
crime charged has been sufficiently proved, a condition that had been satisfied in this case. The review of AAA’s
testimony revealed the same to be a clear and categorical account of how the appellant had carnal of her. AAA
bluntly recalled that appellant inserted both the “daga” and a fish ball stick. The alleged inconsistency brought
about by AAA’s statement that appellant inserted a fish ball stick is more imagined than real. AAA categorically
testified that appellant inserted two objects: his penis a.k.a. “daga” and a fish ball stick. Simply because AAA
failed to mention one of these items one time during the trial does not mean that she was lying during all the
other times when she clearly conveyed that she was raped. (People of the Philippines v. Fetalco, G.R. No.
241249, July 28, 2020, First Division)
103. Failure to give a detailed account on how AAA was abused does not militate against her credibility. (People of
the Philippines v. Manlolo, G.R. No. 227841, August 19, 2020, First Division)
104. All the elements of Rape by Sexual Assault under Article 266-A(2) of the RPC are present. Notwithstanding her
youth and innocence, AAA was able to narrate in detail her traumatic experience in the hands of HHH who
ravished and sexually molested her. She convincingly recounted her harrowing experience on May 13, 2014. At
7:00 a.m., HHH made her lie on a mat, instructed her to hold his penis and threatened to burn her left cheek
with a cigarette if she did not follow. When she refused to obey him, HHH used a cigarette to her left cheek.
When AAA refused to hold HHH’s penis, he spanked her with a thick wood. HHH made her lie on her stomach.
Thereafter, he inserted his penis in the anal orifice of AAA and licked her vagina. At around 12:00 pm on May
13, 2014, HHH again instructed AAA to hold his penis. AAA did as instructed for fear that HHH would hurt her
again. She held his penis tightly as instructed. He then held AAA’s hands while holding his penis to masturbate.
After semen came out of his penis, he inserted his penis into AAA’s vagina. Before HHH left the house at around
7:00 pm, he again instructed AAA to clean the room. While inside the room, HHH told AAA to lie down and
inserted his fingers inside her vagina. (People of the Philippines v. HHH, G.R. No. 248245, August 26, 2020, Third
Division)
105. The Court finds accused-appellant’s claim that there is absence of physical abuse or injuries negates AAA’s claim
of being raped unworthy of consideration. The gravamen of the crime of rape is carnal knowledge of a woman
by force or intimidation and against her will or without her consent. What consummates the felony is penile
contact, however slight, with the labia of the victim’s vagina without her consent. Consequently, it is not
required that lacerations be found on the private complainant’s hymen. Nor is it necessary to show that the
victim had a reddening of the external genitalia or sustained a hematoma on other parts of her body to sustain
the possibility of a rape charge. For it is well-settled that the absence of external injuries does not negate. This
is because in rape, the important consideration is not the presence of injuries on the victim’s body, but penile
contact with the female genitalia without the woman’s consent. (People of the Philippines v. Masubay, G.R. No.
106. Fruelda is guilty of sexual assault. Here, AAA testified that while Fruelda was moving his finger in and out of her
private parts through the opening of her pants’ zipper, he took out his penis and massaged the same. Shortly
thereafter, AAA lost consciousness. When she woke up, she was seated on the floor with her underwear and

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pants pulled down to her knees. Based on the foregoing, the crime committed by Fruelda is sexual assault.
Although it is possible that Fruelda had carnal knowledge of AAA while the latter was unconscious, her cannot
be convicted of the crime of rape by carnal knowledge based on a mere possibility. (People of the Philippines
v. Fruelda, G.R. No. 242690, September 3, 2020, First Division)
107. The sweetheart defense cannot be appreciated since there was no independent proof to prove the same.
Records show that to prove his relationship with AAA, Fruelda presented Elida and Pandi. Elida testified that he
often saw Fruelda and AAA flirting with each other. Pandi, on the other hand, testified to how she had the
impression that Fruelda and AAA were in a relationship based on events that happened three to four years prior
to April 28, 2014. Absent independent proof of his alleged relationship with AAA, Fruelda’s self-serving
testimony and the speculative testimonies of his witnesses, fall short of substantiating his sweetheart defense.
To reiterate, for the Court to even consider giving credence to such a defense, it must be proven by compelling
evidence. The defense cannot just present testimonial evidence in support of the theory, as in the instant case.
Independent proof is required – such as tokens, mementos, and photographs. (People of the Philippines v.
Fruelda, G.R. No. 242690, September 3, 2020, First Division)
108. The prosecution may have been unable to present AAA’s birth certificate or other authentic document such as
a baptismal certificate during trial, however, such failure to present relevant evidence will not deter the Corut
from upholding that statutory rape was indeed committed by accused-appellant because he himself in his
testimony in open court that AAA was only nine (9) years old at the time of the rape incident. In the Court’s
view, this admission from accused-appellant, taken with the testimony of AAA, sufficiently proved that AAA was
under 12 years of age at the time of the rape incident. (People of the Philippines v. Jagdon, Jr., G.R. No. 242882,
109. The fact that the subject rape incident happened in a place which was open to the view of their neighbors,
particularly in a pigpen, does not negate the fact that accused-appellant indeed raped AAA. For another, the
fact that AAA immediately joined and played with the children in the area after the rape incident does not run
counter to AAA’s claim that she was ravished by accused-appellant. The Court notes AAA’s testimony that she
was ravished by accused-appellant several times and the rape incident subject of this instant case only pertains
to the last one, which may have produced lesser pain on the part of AAA compared to the first few incidents.
Too, although the conduct of the victim immediately following the alleged sexual assault is of utmost
importance as it tends to establish the truth or falsity of the charge, it is, however, inaccurate to say that there
is a typical reaction or norm of behavior among rape victims. (People of the Philippines v. Jagdon, Jr., G.R. No.
110. Complainant’s claim that she was intimidated into submitting herself to appellant’s lewd designs is incredible.
It is true that intimidation is peculiarly addressed to the mind of the person against whom it may be employed,
and its presence is basically incapable of being tested by any hard and fast rule. Intimidation is normally best
viewed in the light of the perception and judgment of the victim at the time and occasion of the crime. Here,
complainant was already 20 years old at the time and she was of sound body since she was able to work as a
helper at a nearby canteen. She may be illiterate, but the same cannot be considered as equivalent to mental
retardation. She is of sufficient mental aptitude and is perfectly capable of at least resisting appellant’s
advances, if indeed his advances were unwanted. The record is bereft of any evidence that a comprehensive
medical evaluation was had to properly determine complainant’s mental status. There is as well no allegation
about of deficiencies in her mental state. In the absence of a weapon, appellant’s threat of killing her would
have been an idle threat, or at least considerably less threatening. Complainant never once mentioned that
appellant forcibly held her or pushed her to a lying position. Appellant only laid his hands on her when he
covered her mouth and seemingly took his time in taking off her clothes. Also, nowhere is it indicated in her
testimony that appellant continually threatened to kill her if she did not comply with his wishes. Not once did
she resist appellant’s advances. The Court notes that appellant threatened complainant only once and before
he made his move on her. The Court simply notes that appellant threatened complainant only once and before
he made his move on her. The Court simply finds it implausible that a single threat, a weak one at that, would
immediately deprive a woman of her free will and immediately subject her to the whims and caprices of a man
without even giving the slightest resistance. Complainant’s total passivity is baffling. Her narration of the events
simply does not make sense and makes her testimony incredible. (People of the Philippines v. Rapiz, G.R. No.
111. Moral ascendancy cannot be appreciated here. Complainant is a full grown 20-year old woman at the time of
her alleged sexual ravishment. More, appellant is not even considered a close kin under the law, being her
mother’s cousin. Veril, moral ascendancy cannot be taken into account and considered as substitute for threat
or intimidation. (People of the Philippines v. Rapiz, G.R. No. 240662, September 16, 2020, First Division)
112. The clear, straightforward, and categorical testimony of a rape victim, who is a minor, prevails over the defenses
of alibi and denial. (People of the Philippines v. BBB, G.R. No. 243987, September 23, 2020, Third Division)

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113. Complainant’s graphic account of the inciden shows the element of penile penetration, viz: “he was only able
to remove my lower garments, sir;” “he was forcing to insert his penis into my vagina;” “I felt pain, sir.” When
appellant’s penis was already insider her vagina, “sabi niya magpapalabas muna siya bago niya tatanggalin.”
Her story is supported by the doctor’s finding of multiple lacerations and abrasions in her hymenal and
perihymenal area which strongly indicated sexual intercourse. (People of the Philippines v. XXX, G.R. No.
232308, October 7, 2020, First Division)
114. ZZZ cannot escape culpability by highlighting AAA’s intimate relationship with her boyfriend. Premarital
relationships do not necessarily entail sexual intimacy. Neither can the sexual behavior of a rape victim reverse
her violator’s criminal culpability. It must always be remembered that the lack of consent is the line crossed in
non-statutory rape. Romantic affairs voluntarily engaged into by a rape victim, whether before, during, or after
the rape incident, will not overwrite the established fact that her violator forcibly obtained carnal knowledge of
her without her consent. (People of the Philippines v. ZZZ, G.R. No. 226144, October 14, 2020, Second Division)
115. An uncle’s moral ascendancy or influence over his minor niece supplants the element of violence or intimidation
in a charge of rape. In this case, such influence, together with his reputation for violence, was why the victim
did not shout or struggle while her uncle sexually abused her. (People of the Philippines v. XXX, G.R. No. 246499,
116. An accused’s bare invocation of the sweetheart defense can never suffice without proof establishing the
purported romantic relationship with the victim. For a plausible defense of sweetheart theory, the relationship
must be proven by other evidence like love letters, documents, photographs, or any concrete proof of a
romantic nature. None of them are present here. Moreover, from his actuations, accused-appellant’s claim that
there was a pre-arrangement elopement spurs disbelief. Since he was claiming that AAA’s mother was against
the relationship, it is incredulous that, instead of being discreet, he even opted to fetch AAA at home where
BBB would surely be present. This makes his claim even more doubtful. (People of the Philippines v. Pingol,
117. There are no material inconsistencies in AAA’s statements. While AAA may not have been able to move her
entire body when accused-appellant dragged her to the rice field, it is not impossible for her to turn her head
and see accused-appellant’s face. As testified by AAA, she was able to see accused-appellant’s face through the
light from her cellphone when she turned her head while being dragged by the accused-appellant to the rice
field. Moreover, it is inconsequential that AAA did not mention during the direct examination that accused-
appellant made push and pull movements. What is material is that AAA categorically testified that accused-
appellant was able to forcibly insert part of his penis into her vagina. Certainly, the claimed inconsistencies in
AAA’s testimony are not of a nature that would impair AAA’s credibility as a witness. They do not touch upon
the elements of the crime of rape. They are minor details which are irrelevant to the elements of the crime and
cannot be considered grounds for accused-appellant’s acquittal. (People of the Philippines v. Talmesa, G.R. No.
118. The RTC and CA considered the following circumstantial evidence in convicting accused-appellant for rape: (a)
accused-appellant was positively identified as the person who was with the victim AAA upon the discovery of
the incident; (b) accused-appellant immediately fled after the commission of the crime; (c) accused-appellant
never denied the charges against him; (d) there were bloodstains on the underwear of accused-appellant at the
time of his arrest; and (e) the medical examination conducted on AAA showed that she had engaged in the
sexual intercourse, but that it was highly impossible for the same to be consensual. These interwoven
circumstances formed an unbroken chain clearly pointing to accused-appellant, and no other, as the man who
forcefully had carnal knowledge of AAA.
a. Contrary to accused-appellant’s claim, the element of force was sufficiently established by the injuries AAA
sustained. To recall, accused-appellant argues that the combination of these five circumstances do not
constitute an unbroken chain that leads to the finding of his guilt for the crime of rape and that the
prosecution failed to establish the use of force to support the finding of rape. To emphasize, AAA sustained
not only contusions and abrasions on her body, she also had profuse vaginal bleeding due to severe
laceration of the vaginal wall and her anal orifice even sustained a hyperemia. (People of the Philippines v.
Pedido, G.R. No. 238451, November 18, 2020, First Division)
119. The Court sees no reason to depart from the factual findings of the RTC that the accused-appellant committed
acts of sexual assault against AAA by licking and inserting his tongue inside her vagina. (People of the Philippines
v. Barrera, G.R. No. 230549, December 1, 2020, En Banc)
120. Both the RTC and the CA correctly found that all the elements of raper were established by the prosecution.
The prosecution sufficiently established beyond reasonable doubt that on August 26, 2009, accused-appellant
had carnal knowledge with AAA, and inserted his finger inside AAA’s genitalia, while Biboy acted as look-out. It
was also proven that accused-appellant employed force, threat, and intimidation upon AAA when he
continuously poked a knife at AAA’s left side. (People of the Philippines v. Dereco, G.R. No. 243625, December

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121. Failure of AAA to immediately report to her mother or the police authorities the incidents of rape does not
tarnish her credibility. As observed by the RTC, BBB’s constant threats upon AAA’s life and her family in all the
instances of rape were enough to cower her into silence and keep her from immediately reporting the incidents.
The Corut has held that delay in reporting a rape does not negate its occurrence nor affect the credibility of the
victim. In the face of constant threats of violence and death, not just on the victim but extending to her kin, a
victim may be excued for tarrying in reporting her ravishment. (People of the Philippines v. BBB, G.R. No.
122. The prosecution established beyond reasonable doubt the elements of rape under Article 266-A(1)(a), i.e.,
accused-appellant had carnal knowledge of AAA through intimidation. AAA testified that accused-appellant
began sexually abusing her in various ways, i.e., by injecting her with some substance and touching her breasts,
inserting his finger into her vagina, when she was only seven years old. She could not, however, recall the
specific dates. When she refused to obey him, AAA testified that accused-appellant would get angry, and create
trouble at their residence. She said that when she did not follow him, he would get angry and she would see
him watching her such that she could not sleep at night. During her direct and cross-examination, she
unequivocally stated that she did not tell her parents because accused-appellant threatened that he would kill
her and her family. AAA unequivocally testified that accused-appellant called her inside the comfort room,
removed her clothes, kissed her vagina, and inserted his penis into her vagina on October 3, 2010. AAA revealed
these incidents to her mother soon after. The fact that the foregoing traumatic incidents occurred on several
occasions was corroborated by AAA’s younger sister. (People of the Philippines v. Martinez, G.R. No. 248016,
123. All the elements necessary to sustain a conviction for simple rape are present: (a) that accused-appellant had
carnal knowledge of AAA; and (b) that said act was accomplished through the use of force or intimidation. It
was sufficiently established by the testimony of AAA that there was carnal knowledge between her and accused-
appellant. This was corroborated by the medical findings of Dr. Lacorte which showed vaginal lacerations.
Regarding the element of force or intimidation, or exertion of moral ascendancy, the RTC aptly concluded that
although the rape was committed without physical force or intimidation, the moral ascendancy of accused-
appellant over AAA renders it unnecessary to prove force or intimidation. It is settled that where the rape is
committed by a close kin, such as the victim’s father, stepfather, uncle, or the common-law spouse of her
mother, it is not necessary that actual force or intimidation be employed; moral influence or ascendancy takes
the place of violence or intimidation.
a. Accused-appellant cannot be convicted for qualified rape. To justify the imposition of the death penalty,
the twin circumstances of minority and relationship must be alleged in the Information and proved during
the trial. Here, AAA’s minority was alleged in the Information and proven by the prosecution’s documentary
evidence that she was born on September 20, 1999. She was under the age of 18 when she was sexually
abused by accused-appellant in 2012. Her relationship with the accused-appellant however, as properly
observed by the RTC, was not specified in the Information. Hence, although the prosecution ahs duly
established that accused-appellant is the common-law spouse of BBB, AAA’s mother, which, however, was
not alleged in the Information, such circumstance could not be appreciated to qualify a crime from simple
rape to qualified rape. Thus, although AAA’s minority went uncontroverted, the element of relationship
was not competently established. (People of the Philippines v. Padin, G.R. No. 250418, December 9, 2020,
Third Division)
124. The RTC correctly convicted accused-appellant of qualified rape under Article 266-A(1)(d), in relation to Article
266-B(1) of the RPC. AAA vividly recalled her harrowing ordeal in the hands of accused-appellant in August
2010. Her testimony was straightforward and spontaneous, as she intimidated to the RTC how accused-
appellant removed her shorts and underwear while she was still sleeping, and forcibly inserted his penis into
her vagina. In addition, as disclosed by her birth certificate, AAA was 11 years old when accused-appellant
ravished her. Such fact supplants the element of force, threat or intimidation, as the same is not essential for
rape against a victim under 12 years old. Also, the qualifying circumstance of relationship was, likewise,
satisfactorily proved by BBB who declared that accused-appellant was her common-law spouse, which was
admitted by accused-appellant himself. Accused-appellant’s moral ascendancy attends, as the child victim had
known and identified accused-appellant as her father since she was just 3 years old. (People of the Philippines
v. Manuel, G.R. No. 242278, December 9, 2020, Third Division)
125. AAA’s behavior during and immediately after each incident cannot be taken against her. The fact that AAA failed
to shout or otherwise make a provocative reaction to accused-appellant’s sexual advances, as well as her act of
staying in their house after the first and succeeding incidents, is totally understandable. It must be emphasized
that the child victim was 9 and 11 years old, respectively, when accused-appellant sexually violated her. Truly,
such a tender age cannot demand from the child the kind of reaction suggested by accused-appellant. Neither
did the presence of BBB and their two other children in the same room where the incidents took place discount
rape or sexual abuse. The Court has consistently held that rape can be committed even in places where people
congregate, in parks, along the roadside, within school premises and even inside a house where there are other
occupants, or where other members of the family are also sleeping. Indeed, lust is no respecter of time or place.

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Lastly, the lack of any specific injuries indicated in AAA’s medical certificate does not negate her claims. As
correctly ruled by the RTC and the CA, such medical report is not material for the purpose of proving the
commission of rape or sexual abuse as the same is merely corroborative in character. (People of the Philippines
v. Manuel, G.R. No. 242278, December 9, 2020, Third Division)
126. The DNA examination conducted revealed that the offspring of AAA is indeed the child of the accused-appellant.
While it is true that paternity is not an essential element ot prove the fact of rape, proof of paternity of a rape
victim’s child establishes the fact that the accused-appellant, who is a biological match with the victim’s child,
had carnal knowledge of the victim, which is an element of rape when it is done against the latter’s will and
without her consent. (People of the Philippines v. XXX, G.R. No. 242684, February 17, 2021, First Division)
127. In rape cases, victims are not burdened to show physical resistance when they are intimidated. Intimidation is
addressed to the victim’s perception and is, therefore, subjective. The Court will not burden victims of rape of
proving physical resistance, especially when their assailants assaulted them and coerced them with a lethal
weapon.
a. As determined by the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals, AAA was threatened and forced to
yield to accused-appellant's lust. When they reached the house, accused-appellant threatened and poked
AAA with a metal stick to make her lie down. Moreover, contrary to accused-appellant's contention, AAA
tried to resist and stop him from removing her clothes, but the accused-appellant punched her in the
abdomen. The testimony of AAA reveals that she was forced, threatened, and intimidated, rendering her
subservient to accused-appellant's control. The alleged absence of resistance is belied by the fact that
accused-appellant had to punch AAA in the abdomen for him to be able to remove her clothes. Fearing for
her life, accused-appellant was able to have carnal knowledge with AAA against her will. Her failure to call
for help is not because she consented to the sexual intercourse, but because she was paralyzed by terror.
Although the pair of scissors was not pointed at her, accused-appellant's actions leading to the incident
already created fear in the mind of AAA. Clearly, accused-appellant was able to have sexual intercourse
with AAA because he forced and intimidated her. AAA's subsequent failure to scream for help or run away
cannot be taken against her. As clarified by jurisprudence, people react differently to distressing situations.
This Court will not burden victims of rape with the proof of physical resistance, especially when their
assailants assaulted them and coerced them with a lethal weapon. (People of the Philippines v. Salazar,
G.R. No. 239138, February 17, 2021, Third Division)
128. The lack of fresh hymenal lacerations and spermatozoa in the Medico-Legal Report does not negate rape. As
explained by the CA, the finding of “not fresh but shallow healed” laceration is not incompatible with the
evidence of rape. (People of the Philippines v. Salazar, G.R. No. 239138, February 17, 2021, Third Division)
129. Rape of an intellectually disabled person whose mental age is below 12 years old is statutory rape punishable
under Article 266-A, Paragraph 1(d) of the RPC, as amended. (People of the Philippines v. Villena, G.R. No.
130. AAA is criminally liabe for simple rape by sexual intercourse, and not statutory rape in Criminal Case No. 12524.
In the case at bench, the prosecution adduced in evidence an unauthenticated photocopy of the certificate of
live birth of BBB, which was marked as Exhibit "C", to prove that she was below twelve (12) years old at the time
of the commission of the crime. We note that in its Opposition to the Offer of Exhibits, the defense objected to
the admissibility of Exhibit "C" because it was not authenticated by any competent person. We likewise note
that while at the witness stand, BBB claimed that she is eight (8) years old. A careful review of the transcript of
the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses shows that neither of BBB's siblings, CCC and DDD, nor her father,
EEE, testified as to her age at the time of the rape incident. Neither was there an observation from the RTC to
the effect that at the time BBB took the witness stand, she, on basis of her body and facial features, appeared
to be below (12) years old. Measured against the yardstick enunciated in the Pruna case, the Court holds that
the unauthenticated photocopy of BBB's birth certificate and the allegation of BBB that she is eight years old
while at the witness stand do not constitute sufficient proof of her exact age during the rape incident. In People
v. Belen, a photocopy of the victim's birth certificate was not accorded probative weight. While in People v.
Lastrollo, the victim's testimony on her age was considered insufficient since it was not clearly and expressly
admitted by the accused. True, the prosecution and the defense stipulated that BBB was still a minor on August
23, 2007. But was she below twelve (12) years old when the rape happened? The evidence on records does not
say so. Certainly, minority does not only mean one is below twelve (12) years old. It means that one has not
reached the age of majority - eighteen (18) years old. From the foregoing, it is clear that AAA placed BBB on the
ground, removed her jogging pants and underwear, touched her vagina twice, forced himself on her and
inserted his penis into her vagina. She felt immense pain during the sexual attack. She tried to scream, but AAA's
hands covered her mouth. She merely cried in silence. Thus, the Court is convinced that AAA had employed
force to subjugate BBB's will. BBB was a defenseless girl subdued into submission through the use of force by a
very much older man, as AAA was then 28 years old, who had lust in his heart and his loins. (People of the
Philippines v. AAA, G.R. No. 247007, March 18, 2021, First Division)

Rape 302
131. Eugene’s contention that AAA did not shout and cry for help before and during the ordeal even if she had the
opportunity to do so, does not negate the finding that sexual intercourse with AAA was done against her will.
(People of the Philippines v. Seguisabal, G.R. No. 240424, March 18, 2021, First Division)
132. The CA was correct in finding that the accused is guilty of attempted rape with homicide, because the doctor
did not declare that there was the slightest penetration of the victim’s vagina and the whitish discharge found
by the doctor on the victim’s vaginal canal was not tested for chemical analysis. First, the appellate court found
that BBB positively identified accused as the last person seen with the victim. She also expressed fear of being
made to go with the accused, which made her run away. Thereafter, she felt the need to ask her father to look
for AAA. Jurisprudence dictates that testimonies of a child are normally given full weight and credit for youth
and immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity, especially in the absence of indubitable proof that
the accused could not have committed the rape. Second, prosecution witness Abonge corroborated BBB’s
testimony that the accused was seen walking with AAA and BBB along the same pathway and the accused had
a bolo tucked in his waist. The minor inconsistency in the testimony of the witnesses, such as the kind of top
the accused was wearing and its color, does not in any way affect their credibility, especially that there are other
pieces of evidence that strongly corroborate said testimony. Third, PO3 Zartiga testified that the bolo recovered
from the accused, which was turned over to him along with the body of the accused, smelled of blood. He also
saw a stain in the lower part of the shirt of accused. More so, based on the hematoma on the left inguinal area,
as well as the perineal area of the victim’s vagina, the position of the victim when she sustained the hematoma
and the removed underwear one meter away from the victim, the Court is convinced that, at the very least,
there was an attempt to rape the victim. Dr. Solis testified that the perpetrator could have been trying his best
to rape the victim. No other evidence indicates that the accused succeeded in having a carnal knowledge of the
victim. (People of the Philippines v. Cabornay, G.R. No. 250649, March 24, 2021, First Division)
133. The Court finds to be unacceptable accused-appellant’s contention that he could not have sexually abused AAA
since he could no longer have an erection due to his old age, 67 years old at the time of the rape, and considering
the cyst near his inner thigh. Suffice it to state that neither of the lower courts gave credence to accused-
appellant’s unsubstantiated claim. Accused-appellant did not present documentary evidence such as a medical
certificate attesting to the physical impossibility of his having an erection and incapacity of raping AAA. (People
of the Philippines v. ZZZ, G.R. No. 232329, April 28, 2021, Third Division)
134. A trial court’s factual findings, especially on the credibility of a rape survivor, are accorded great weight and
respect. A conviction for rape may be upheld based on the survivor’s testimony when it is credible, natural,
convincing, and consistent with human nature and the normal course of things.
a. Both the RTC and the CA found that the prosecution has proved that accused-appellants committed the
crime of rape. In particular, the force, threat, or intimidation against AAA were shown in accused-appellant
Vina’s threats of bodily harm if she resisted, and accused-appellant Torres’ physical restraint of AAA. The
RTC gave credence to AAA’s testimony, finding her version of events clear and convincing: “In the instant
case, AAA's testimony was clear, convincing and free from material contradiction and clearly established
both the accused's guilt beyond reasonable doubt overcoming the constitutional presumption of
innocence. AAA was explicit, unequivocal and unswerving in accusing Leopoldo of inserting his penis inside
her vagina while Maricel was holding her and sucking her nipples. Her account of how both accused
conspired to accomplish said rape was straightforward, convincing and consistent on all material points,
both in her Sinumpaang Salaysay subscribed on November 13, 2002 and testimony in court. She positively
identified and pointed to the accused as her rapists, dispelling any doubt as to their positive identification.”
Similarly, the CA found that the defense’s claims of inconsistencies in AAA’s testimonies were insubstantial
and did not warrant overturning the trial court’s findings on the material allegation of rape. (People of the
Philippines v. Viñas, G.R. No. 234514, April 28, 2021, Third Division)
135. In Criminal Case No. 806-M-2010, the crime is qualified statutory rape. In the case, the testimonies of the
witnesses and the evidence presented show that accused-appellant, who is the uncle of AAA, had carnal
knowledge of AAA on November 5, 2008. He used force upon AAA, who was merely seven years old at that time
and was unable to resist. Moreover, accused-appellant's threat to kill AAA's father naturally rendered her
helpless. Being AAA's uncle, accused-appellant exercised moral ascendancy or influence over her which
constituted the force and intimidation against AAA. Similarly, the medical findings of hymenal lacerations
corroborated her narration. When the testimony of a rape victim consistent with the medical findings, there is
sufficient basis to conclude that there has been carnal knowledge. Laceration, whether healed or fresh, is the
best physical evidence of forcible defloration. (People of the Philippines v. BBB, G.R. No. 249260, May 5, 2021,
Third Division)
136. As regards rape of a mental retardate, the Court holds that when the victim is a mental retardate whose mental
age is that of a person below 12 years old, the rape should be classified as statutory rape under Article 266-
A(1)(d) of the RPC, as amended. (People of the Philippines v. Manuel, Jr., G.R. No. 247976, May 14, 2021, First
Division)

Anti-Trafficking in Persons 303
137. The elements of rape may be proved by the victim’s testimony, provided that the same is credible. Here, the
RTC correctly ruled that AAA’s testimony is credible. She was able to describe how the crime of rape was
committed by appellant. Her narrations of the incident were clear and detailed as she vividly remembered the
harrowing experience that she had in the hands of appellant. Time and again, the Court has ruled in numerous
cases that the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies are matters best undertaken by the trial court,
because of its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and to note their demeanor, conduct and
attitude. Findings of the trial court on such matters are binding and conclusive on the appellate court, unless
some facts or circumstances of weight and substance have been overlooked, misapprehended or
misinterpreted. Appellant has shown no reason why this Court should depart from the findings and conclusion
of the trial court, in light of this well-settled doctrine, and indeed the Court finds none. It is also an established
principle that in rape cases the accused may be convicted solely on the testimony, as and when sufficiently
credible, given by the rape victim. (People of the Philippines v. Soriano, G.R. No. 247631, June 14, 2021, Third
Division)
138. AAA was unable to shout for help and put up a forceful resistance because accused-appellant threatened her.
AAA could not do anything against accused-appellant’s physical strength and the psychological intimidation
because of accused-appellant’s threat to destroy her life by telling everyone of what happened to them. In
People v. Briones, the Court emphasized that force and intimidation as an element of Rape need not be
irresistible. Briones said that what is necessary is that the force or intimidation be sufficient to consummate the
purpose that the accused had in mind or is of such a degree as to impel the defenselessness and hapless victim
to bow into submission. (People of the Philippines v. Ovani, Jr., G.R. No. 247624, June 16, 2021, Third Division)
139. AAA’s testimony that accused-appellant inserted his penis into her vagina is consistent with the findings of the
medico-legal officer, i.e., that AAA suffered deep healed hymenal lacerations which is a clear evidence of blunt
penetrating trauma to the hymen. Thus, there is no doubt that sexual intercourse took place. (People of the
Philippines v. Ovani, Jr., G.R. No. 247624, June 16, 2021, Third Division)
140. The accused argues that since the examination was done three days after the incident, the lacerations found
on AAA’s vagina only prove that she had sexual intercourse but not that she was assaulted. It is settled, however,
that the absence of physical injuries or fresh lacerations does not negate rape. Moreover, although medical
results may not indicate physical abuse or hymenal lacerations, rape can still be established since medical
findings or proof of injuries are not among the essential elements in the prosecution for rape. (People of the
Philippines v. Brillo, G.R. No. 250934, June 16, 2021, Third Division)
AN TI-TR AFFIC KIN G IN PER S O N S

1. Under R.A. 10364, the elements of trafficking in persons are: (a) the act of recruitment, obtaining, hiring,
providing, offering, transportation, transfer, maintaining, harboring, or receipt of persons with or without the
victim’s consent or knowledge, within or across national borders; (b) the means used include by means of
threat, or use of force, or other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of position,
taking advantage of the vulnerability of the person, or the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve
the consent of a person having control over another person; and (c) the purpose of trafficking includes the
exploitation or the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery,
servitude, or the removal or sale of organs. (People of the Philippines v. Casio, G.R. No. 211465, December 3,
2014, Second Division; People of the Philippines v. Rodriguez, G.R. No. 211721, September 20, 2017, Third
Division)
a. Under R.A. 9208, the elements of trafficking in persons are: (i) the act of recruitment, transportation,
transfer or harbouring, or receipt of persons with or without the victim’s consent or knowledge, within or
across national borders; (ii) the means used which include threat or use of force, or other forms of coercion,
abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of position, taking advantage of the vulnerability of the
person, or the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control
over another; and (iii) the purpose of trafficking is exploitation which includes exploitation or the
prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery, servitude or
the removal or sale of organs. (People of the Philippines v. Maycabalong, G.R. No. 215324, December 5,
2. Accused performed all the elements in the commission of the offense of trafficking in persons when she peddled
AAA and BBB and offered their services to decoys PO1 Veloso and PO1 Luardo in exchange for money. The
offense was also qualified because the trafficked persons – AAA and BBB – were minors. The act of sexual
intercourse need not have been consummated for the mere transaction of solicitation for sex and the handing
over of the bust money already consummated the said act. (People of the Philippines v. Casio, G.R. No. 211465,
December 3, 2014, Second Division)
3. Accused committed trafficking in persons. It should be noted that the complainants, all minors, were hired as
GROs and tasked to entertain customers to the extent of even having sexual intercourse with them, and being
paid commissions for said services. The bar was likewise deisnged with a stage where the GROs were made to
dance in provocative outfits. It had a VIP room where the customers could caress and grope the girls, and a

super VIP room where they could completely satisfy their lust. Even if the claims regarding the rules prohibiting
flirting and lascivious conduct between the GROs and the customers were true, the same would still not absolve
accused-appellants from any liability. Said rules were merely posted as meaningless warnings and were never
really intended to be implemented, as evidenced by the fact that said prohibited acts had actually been
committed, tolerated, and perpetuated at Kiray. (People of the Philippines v. Spouses Ybañez, G.R. No. 220461,
4. The prosecution failed to prove the third element – that the recruiting, maintaining, or harboring of persons is
for the purpose of exploitation. Curiously, AAA was seen by the prosecution witnesses at the videoke bar only
on the day the rescue operation was conducted. That AAA was exploited could not be proven by her mere
presence at the videoke bar during the rescue operation. The prosecution should have presented evidence as
to the nature of work done by AAA, if any. (People of the Philippines v. Villanueva, G.R. No. 210798, September
5. The information filed against Hirang sufficiently alleged the recruitment and transportation of the minor victims
for sexual activities and exploitation, with the offender taking advantage of the vulnerability of the young girls
through the guarantee of a good time and financial gain. Pursuant to Section 6 of R.A. 9208, the crime
committed by Hirang was qualified trafficking, as it was committed in a large scale and his four victims were
under 18 years of age.
a. The presence of the crime’s elements was established by the prosecution witnesses who testified during
the trial. The young victims themselves testified on their respective ages, and how they were lured by
Hirang to participate in the latter’s illicit sex trade. Hirang recruited the girls to become victims of sexual
abuse and exploitation. Mainly upon a promise of financial benefit, the girls agreed and, thus, joined him
on June 27, 2007 in meeting with the Korean customers in search for prostitutes. Police authorities
personally witnessed Hirang’s unlawful activity, as they conducted the entrapment operations and arrested
him after Hirang transacted with the supposed customers and received payments therefor.
b. Instigation by officers is not established. It was proven during trial that Hirang had been recruiting and
deploying young girls for customers in the sex trade. The IJM personnel approached him for girls precisely
because of his illicit activities. Also, Hirang was not first approached for prostitutes by police or government
authorities, but by investigators of IJM, which is a non-profit and non-governmental organization. IJM only
sought coordination with the police officers after Hirang, Sarmiento, and Villagracia had determined to
meet on June 27, 2007 for the transaction with the purported Korean customers. (People of the Philippines
v. Hirang, G.R. No. 223528, January 11, 2017, Third Division)
6. Private complainants' testimonies show that accused-appellants lured them into prostitution with the promise
of financial benefit, the chance to use shabu and to travel abroad. Aguirre expressly induced BBB and DDD to
have sex with foreigners in exchange for money and shabu. Paralejas fetched DDD from her home and brought
her to Arabit's house. Together with AAA and CCC, who had likewise been enticed with money to go drinking
with foreigners, and six other girls, they were made to gather at Arabit's house where accused-appellants
instructed them to primp themselves to look good for the foreigners. Accused-appellants subsequently had all
ten girls board a van and transported them from Arabit's house in XXX to an apartment in Quezon City from
which they would proceed to a hotel to meet the foreigners. En route to Quezon City, Aguirre told the girls that
the foreigners would take them abroad. When they arrived at the apartment, accused-appellants forbade the
girls from leaving and instructed them anew to fix their clothes and make-up. Later, Arabit and Aguirre offered
all the girls what appeared to be shabu as payment for sex with the foreigners in addition to money. Accused-
appellants' actions clearly indicate their intention to exploit private complainants. They establish beyond
reasonable doubt that accused appellants recruited and transported private complainants for purposes of
prostitution and sexual exploitation.
a. The presence of the trafficker's clients is not an element of the crime of recruitment or transportation of
victims under Sections 3(a) and 4(a) of RA 9208. In the same vein, the law does not require that the victims
be transported to or be found in a brothel or a prostitution den for such crime of recruitment or
transportation to be committed. In fact, it has been held that the act of sexual intercourse need not have
been consummated for recruitment to be said to have taken place. It is sufficient that the accused has
lured, enticed or engaged its victims or transported them for the established purpose of exploitation, which
includes prostitution, sexual exploitation, forced labor, slavery, and the removal or sale of organs. In this
case, the prosecution has satisfactorily established accused-appellants' recruitment and transportation of
private complainants for purposes of prostitution and sexual exploitation. (People of the Philippines v.
Aguirre, G.R. No. 219952, November 20, 2017, First Division)
7. The trial and appellate courts gave the same factual findings that established the foregoing. The prosecution
witnesses who testified during the trial included the minor child AAA, Special Investigator Doriente Durian of
the NBI-AHTRAD and Intelligence Agent Gay of the DOJ-IACAT, whose testimonies matched as to how De Dios
committed the crime on the evening of August 29, 2013. AAA, then still a minor, was among the girls offered in
the illicit sexual trade upon the promise of financial gain for their services. The conduct of the entrapment
operation became the culmination of a surveillance operation that was conducted by the NBI-AHTRAD. It was
De Dios who approached and proposed a "gimik" to Gay, and when the latter pretended to accede to the

proposal, De Dios readily accepted prepared marked money as consideration for the service. (People of the
Philippines v. De Dios, G.R. No. 234018, June 6, 2018, Second Division)
8. It did not matter that there was no threat, force, coercion, abduction, fraud, deception or abuse of power that
was employed by De Dios when she involved AAA in her illicit sexual trade. AAA was still a minor when she was
exposed to prostitution by the prodding, promises and acts of De Dios. Trafficking in persons may be committed
also by means of taking advantage of the persons' vulnerability as minors, a circumstance that applied to AAA,
was sufficiently alleged in the information and proved during the trial. This element was further achieved
through the offer of financial gain for the illicit services that were provided by AAA to the customers of De Dios.
(People of the Philippines v. De Dios, G.R. No. 234018, June 6, 2018, Second Division)
9. The information filed against Nangcas sufficiently alleged the recruitment and transportation of Judith and
three (3) other minor victims for forced labor or services, with Nangcas taking advantage of the vulnerability of
the young girls through her assurance and promises of good salary, accessibility of place of work to their
respective residences, and weekly dayoff. Pursuant to Section 6 of R.A. No. 9208, the crime committed by
Nangcas was qualified trafficking, as it was committed in a large scale and three (3) of her victims were under
18 years of age. The presence of the crime's elements was established by the prosecution witnesses who
testified during the trial. The testimonies of Judith and three (3) other minor victims established that Nangcas
employed deception and fraud in gaining both the victims and their parents' trust and confidence.
a. From the factual milieu, it is clear that actual fraud and deception are present in this case, such as when
Nangcas induced and coaxed the victims to go with her. She promised the victims and their parents that
their daughters would be working within Cagayan De Oro City, with an enticing salary of P1,500.00 per
month. At the outset, the intent of Nangcas was obvious. She specifically employed several deceptive
tactics to lure the victims and their parents into agreeing to take the victims, who were mostly minors, and
bring them allegedly to Camella Homes in Cagayan De Oro City, to serve as house helpers. Nangcas
represented to Judith and her parents that Judith would be employed as a house helper, would be allowed
to go home once a week, and would be paid P1,500.00 monthly. After having convinced Judith and her
parents, Nangcas used Judith to entice some more of her friends to go with her as house helpers in Cagayan
De Oro City. After recruiting Judith and the three other minor victims, Nangcas immediately boarded them
in a jeepney to Cagayan De Oro City supposedly to bring Judith and her friends to their employer at Camella
Homes. The record shows that Nangcas' decision to bring the victims to Marawi City was planned, contrary
to her defense that she only took them there after the supposed employer in Iligan changed her mind to
accept them as her house helpers. It was sufficiently established that in Marawi City, Nangcas already had
Baby and Cairon ready and waiting for her to bring the recruits to them and collect her fees. Nangcas'
failure to notify the victims' parents of their whereabouts bolsters the allegation that it was really her
intention to conceal the fact that the work was actually in Marawi City and not in Cagayan de Oro; her acts
thus constitute deceit and fraud as defined by law.
b. The victims were sold for force labor, slavery, or involuntary servitude. Slavery is defined as the extraction
of work or services from any person by enticement, violence, intimidation or threat, use of force or
coercion, including deprivation of freedom, abuse of authority or moral ascendancy, debt bondage or
deception. In this case, Judith and the three (3) other minor victims were enticed to work as house helpers
after Nangcas had told them of their supposed salary and where they would be working; only to discover
that they were brought to another place without their consent. In Marawi, the victims were constrained to
work with the intention to save money for their fare going back home; however, when they asked for their
salary they were told that it had already been given to Nangcas. (People of the Philippines v. Nangcas, G.R.
10. Accused-appellants are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of three (3) counts of Qualified Trafficking in Persons
under Section 4 (e) in relation to Section 6 (a) and (d) of RA 9208 as the prosecution had established beyond
reasonable doubt that: (a) they admittedly are the biological parents of AAA, BBB, and CCC, who were all minors
when the crimes against them were committed; (b) they made their children perform acts of cybersex for
different foreigner customers, and thus, engaged them in prostitution and pornography; (c) they received
various amounts of money in exchange for the sexual exploitation of their children; and (d) they achieved their
criminal design by taking advantage of their children's vulnerability as minors and deceiving them that the
money they make from their lewd shows are needed for the family's daily sustenance. In the same manner, the
courts a quo likewise correctly convicted XXX of one (1) count of the same crime, this time under Section 4 (a)
in relation to Section 6 (a) and (d) of RA 9208, as it was shown that XXX transported and provided her own minor
biological child, AAA, to a foreigner in Makati City for the purpose of prostitution, again under the pretext that
the money acquired from such illicit transaction is needed for their family's daily sustenance. (People of the
Philippines v. XXX and YYY, G.R. No. 235652, July 9, 2018, Second Division)
11. Based on circumstantial evidence, petitioner is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense charged against
him. It ruled that: “Guided by the foregoing decisional and reglementary yardsticks, and based on the evidence
presented, the Court finds that, through circumstantial evidence, the prosecution has sufficiently established
that the XXX Lodge, with the full knowledge and permission of accused-appellant Planteras, was used for
promoting trafficking in persons. The material circumstances that led the Trial Court to the same conclusion are

as follows: Admittedly, Antonio Jr. owns and manages the XXX Lodge which is engaged in the business of renting
out rooms to lodgers/transients. It was issued a Mayor's Business Permit and a Sanitary Permit. The evidence
has established that the pimps and prostitutes who hang around at the premises or sidewalk outside XXX Lodge
bring and engage their customers in sexual intercourse at the said lodge. The customer pays Php50.00 per hour.
The payment is received by Antonio Jr. who stays at the counter or, at times, by his wife Christina. This goes on
night after night, various prostitutes, different customers. Antonio Jr. cannot feign ignorance because he is
always there. He sees it when the negotiation or transaction takes place between the pimp, the prostitute and
the customer. Definitely, he knew that the lodge was being used for prostitution or trafficking in persons and
he allowed it. Yet, the most damning evidence against Antonio Jr. was the testimony of AAA that at one time
he requested her to accommodate a customer for sex. In the case at bar, the negotiation between Marlyn,
Marichu and the girls, on the one hand, and the poseur customers (police), on the other, for the use of the girls
for sexual intercourse happened in the Lodge, right in the presence of Antonio Jr. Thus, he knew it. If he did not
approve of it or that it be done at the lodge, he could have easily told them to go somewhere else. That he did
nothing about it only means that he acquiesced and consented to it as he has been wont to do. Of the foregoing
circumstances, We agree with the Trial Court that the most telling is accused-appellant Planteras' own act of
pimping in a not so distant past AAA herself. This occasion was vividly narrated by AAA on the stand. This
circumstance further leads to the logical inference that accused-appellant Planteras knows AAA and her trade.
With accused appellant Planteras being only 1.5 m. from where the indecent proposal was taking place among
PO3 Dumaguit and PO1 Llanes, on one hand, and accused-appellants Buhisan and Tawi, on the other, the
presence of AAA herself, accused-appellant Planteras' feigned ignorance of the real nature of the transaction
taxes credulity too much. The totality of these circumstances constitutes an unbroken chain leading to the
inescapable conclusion that accused-appellant Planteras, through his acts and omissions, knew that the
transaction happening within his hearing distance is for prostitution, and he knowingly permitted the use of his
establishment therefor. The Court, therefore, finds, as did the Trial Court, that the prosecution has, through
testimonial, documentary, and object evidence, overwhelmingly proved the elements of Promoting Trafficking
in Persons with moral certainty against accused-appellant Plateras.” Moreover, it is indisputable that petitioner
owns and manages the XXX Lodge. Evidence was also presented to establish that the pimps, customers and
prostitutes who hang out near the said place utilize the same place for their illegal activities. Petitioner's
knowledge about the activities that are happening inside his establishment was also properly established by the
prosecution, most notably, through the testimony of AAA.
a. As to the claim of petitioner that AAA freely engaged in prostitution, thus, no trafficking in person was
committed, such is unmeritorious. Knowledge or consent of the minor is not a defense under Republic Act
No. 9208. The victim's consent is rendered meaningless due to the coercive, abusive, or deceptive means
employed by perpetrators of human trafficking. Even without the use of coercive, abusive, or deceptive
means, a minor's consent is not given out of his or her own free will. (Planteras, Jr. v. People of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 238889, October 3, 2018, Third Division)
12. The prosecution was able to establish the presence of all the elements of the crime by testimonial and
documentary evidence. As to the first element and third elements, the testimony of AAA established that it was
Kenny Joy who recruited her to engage in prostitution by offering her rakets where she could earn money by
having sexual relations with clients the latter had found. AAA further averred that Kenny Joy accompanied her
to meet such clients, waited for her, and received money after her relations with the clients concluded.
Meanwhile, the testimony of NBI Agent Señora established that Ludivico (under the name Jhanne David),
provides the sexual services of women through a Facebook account. It was Ludivico, together with Kenny Joy,
who brought AAA to meet Agent Señora during the entrapment operation. The down payment, consisting of
four Php 500.00 bills dusted with fluorescent powder, was paid by Agent Señora to Ludivico. During the latter's
arrest, the said entrapment money was recovered from him as evidenced by the results of the Fluorescent
Powder Examination where Ludivico and the bills were found positive for the presence of fluorescent powder.
As to the second element, while AAA did not immediately accede to the proposition initially made by Kenny Joy,
she eventually yielded and asked for a raket because she needed the money. It is, thus, apparent that the
accused-appellants took advantage of AAA's and her family's abject poverty in recruiting her to engage in
prostitution. Lastly, AAA's Certificate of Live Birth evidenced the fact that she was born on April 9, 1995 and was
only 17 years old, a minor, at the time the crime was committed on November 8, 2012.
a. Consent of the minor is not a defense under R.A. No. 9208. Contrary to the accused-appellants' submission,
the fact that AAA had asked Kenny Joy for a raket and that she visited the said accused-appellant in prison
does not negate their criminal liability. As previously cited, Section 3(a) of R.A. No. 9208 clearly states that
trafficking in persons may be committed with or without the victim's consent or knowledge. Furthermore,
in Casio, the Court ruled that the victim's consent is rendered meaningless due to the coercive, abusive, or
deceptive means employed by perpetrators of human trafficking. Even without the use of coercive,
abusive, or deceptive means, a minor's consent is not given out of his or her own free will.
b. In addition, knowledge of private complainant’s minority is immaterial. Accused-appellants likewise argue
that the prosecution failed to prove their knowledge of AAA's minority at the time the crime was
committed. As observed by the CA, under Section 6(a) of R.A. No. 9208, Trafficking in Persons automatically
becomes qualified upon proof that the trafficked person is a minor or a person below 18 years of age.
Evidently, knowledge of the accused-appellants with regard to AAA's minority is inconsequential with
respect to qualifying the crime of Trafficking in Persons. Accordingly, the Court finds that all elements of

the crime of Violation of Section 4(a), in relation to Section 6(a), of R.A. No. 9208 were duly established by
the prosecution. (People of the Philippines v. Bandojo, Jr., G.R. No. 234161, October 17, 2018, Second
Division)
13. Accused-appellant was charged with having violated qualified trafficking in relation to Section 4(e) of Republic
Act No. 9208, which provides that it is unlawful for anyone "[t]o maintain or hire a person to engage in
prostitution or pornography[.]" The prosecution established that on the night of December 5, 2009, accused-
appellant approached PO1 Nemenzo and offered him the sexual services of four (4) girls, two (2) of whom were
minors, for P2,400.00. The police operation had been the result of previous surveillance conducted within the
area by the Regional Anti-Human Trafficking Task Force. Both minor victims testified that this incident was not
the first time that accused-appellant pimped them out to customers, and that any payment to them would
include the payment of commission to accused-appellant This Court in People v. Rodriguez acknowledged that
as with Casio, the corroborating testimonies of the arresting officer and the minor victims were sufficient to
sustain a conviction under the law. In People v. Spouses Ybanez, et al., this Court likewise affirmed the conviction
of traffickers arrested based on a surveillance report on the prostitution of minors within the area. In People v.
XXX and YYY, this Court held that the exploitation of minors, through either prostitution or pornography, is
explicitly prohibited under the law. Casio also recognizes that the crime is considered consummated even if no
sexual intercourse had taken place since the mere transaction consummates the crime.
a. Accused-appellant cannot use as a valid defense either BBB's and AAA's consent to the transaction, or that
BBB received the payment on her behalf. In Casio, the victim's consent is rendered meaningless due to the
coercive, abusive, or deceptive means employed by perpetrators of human trafficking. Even without the
use of coercive, abusive, or deceptive means, a minor's consent is not given out of his or her own free will.
Similarly, in People v. De Dios, the Court said that it did not matter that there was no threat, force, coercion,
abduction, fraud, deception or abuse of power that was employed by De Dios when she involved AAA in
her illicit sexual trade. AAA was still a minor when she was exposed to prostitution by the prodding,
promises and acts of De Dios. Trafficking in persons may be committed also by means of taking advantage
of the persons' vulnerability as minors, a circumstance that applied to AAA, was sufficiently alleged in the
information and proved during the trial. This element was further achieved through the offer of financial
gain for the illicit services that were provided by AAA to the customers of De Dios. Accused-appellant hired
children to engage in prostitution, taking advantage of their vulnerability as minors. AAA's and BBB's
acquiescence to the illicit transactions cannot be considered as a valid defense. (People of the Philippines
v. Ramirez, G.R. No. 217978, January 30, 2019, Third Division)
14. All the elements of human trafficking, relating to the act, the means, and the purpose, are present in this case.
Accused-appellant makes much of the fact that there is no evidence that he transacted directly with AAA's
clients. Examining the aforecited elements of human trafficking, however, readily reveal that the offering or
providing of persons using any of the enumerated means for the purpose of exploitation, is only one among
several ways of committing the offense. In People v. Rodriguez, the Court also clarified that the gravamen of
the crime of human trafficking is not so much the offer of a woman or child; it is the act of recruiting or using,
with or without consent, a fellow human being for sexual exploitation. Here, AAA transferred from Valenzuela
City to move in with accused-appellant in Manila with the expectation that he would provide for her studies
and because they were already lovers. As it turned out, accused-appellant manipulated and coerced AAA into
engaging in prostitution with foreign men, from which income he also benefited.
a. Accused-appellant himself admitted that his earnings were not enough to support himself and AAA when
he took her under his wing. Despite the fact that they could barely afford to pay their rent and basic
necessities, AAA eventually acquired an iPad and a laptop computer. The Court finds it incredible that
accused-appellant was turning a blind eye to the source of these items, or that he also had no hand in AAA's
engagement in prostitution. Initiation into the flesh trade with foreign clients requires a level of familiarity
with its ways and inner workings that an untrained minor, particularly one living under the same roof and
under the economic control of her middle-aged lover, would not have stumbled into on her own. (People
of the Philippines v. Monsanto, G.R. No. 241247, March 20, 2019, Second Division)
15. Only violations of Section 4 on Trafficking in Persons can be qualified. Section 5 on Acts that Promote Trafficking
in Persons, being separate and distinct offenses, cannot be qualified as the law does not expressly provide
therefor. (People of the Philippines v. Sayo, G.R. No. 227704, April 10, 2019, Second Division)
16. The elements of trafficking in persons can be derived from its definition under Section 3 (a) of Republic Act No.
9208, thus: (a) the act of recruitment, transportation, transfer or harbouring, or receipt of persons with or
without the victim's consent or knowledge, within or across national borders; (b) The means used which include
threat or use of force, or other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of position,
taking advantage of the vulnerability of the person, or, the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve
the consent of a person having control over another; and (c) The purpose of trafficking is exploitation which
includes "exploitation or the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or
services, slavery, servitude or the removal or sale of organs." On February 6, 2013, the law was amended by
Republic Act No. 10364. Casio, likewise, enumerated the elements of the crime under the expanded definition.
Under Republic Act No. 10364, the elements of trafficking in persons have been expanded to include the

following acts: (a)The act of recruitment, obtaining, hiring, providing, offering, transportation, transfer,
maintaining, harboring, or receipt of persons with or without the victim's consent or knowledge, within or
across national borders; (b) the means used include by means of threat, or use of force, or other forms of
coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of position, taking advantage of the vulnerability of
the person, or, the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control
over another person; and (c) The purpose of trafficking includes "the exploitation or the prostitution of others
or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery, servitude or the removal or sale of
organs.
a. Here, the offense was committed on September 30, 2011, prior to the amendment. Thus, the original
provisions of Republic Act No. 9208 are applicable.
b. The Information charged petitioner with violation of Section 4(c), in relation to Section 6(c) of the law.
Section 4(c) punishes the act of offering or contracting marriage, real or simulated, for the purpose of
acquiring, buying, offering, selling, or trading them to engage in prostitution, pornography, sexual
exploitation, forced labor or slavery, involuntary servitude or debt bondage. However, a perusal of the
allegations in the Information reveals that petitioner was sufficiently charged with the crime of trafficking
in persons under Section 4(a). The provision does not allow any person to recruit, transport, transfer,
harbor, provide, or receive a person by any means, including those done under the pretext of domestic or
overseas employment or training or apprenticeship, for the purpose of prostitution, pornography, sexual
exploitation, forced labor, slavery, involuntary servitude or debt bondage.
c. The trial court correctly convicted petitioner for violation of Section 4(a), instead of Section 4(c) of Republic
Act No. 9208. The Information sufficiently averred that: (i petitioner committed an act of qualified
trafficking in persons by offering AAA to David for sex or exploitation; (ii) the act was done for a fee; and
(iii) for prostitution, sexual exploitation, forced labor, slavery, involuntary servitude, or debt bondage.
(Santiago, Jr. v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 213760, July 1, 2019, Third Division)
17. In the prosecution of the crime of trafficking in persons, the confidential asset or the informant’s testimony is
not indispensable. It is enough that there is proof that the accused has lured, enticed, or engaged its victims or
transported them for the established purpose of exploitation. (Santiago, Jr. v. People of the Philippines, G.R.
18. Mora and Polvoriza are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged as the prosecution had clearly
established the existence of the elements thereof, as seen in the following: (a) Mora, through deception and by
taking advantage of AAA's vulnerability as a minor, was able to "convince" the latter to go to Buraburan, Buhi,
Camarines Sur; (b) upon arrival thereat, Mora took AAA to Polvoriza's videoke bar, i.e., Otoy's, and left her there;
and (c) since then and for the next eight (8) months, Polvoriza forced AAA to work as a prostitute in Otoy's,
coercing her to perform lewd acts on a nightly basis, such as dancing naked in front of male customers and even
having sex with them. In this regard, the courts a quo correctly found untenable Mora and Polvoriza's insistence
that it was AAA who voluntarily presented herself to work as an entertainer/sex worker in Otoy's, as trafficking
in persons can still be committed even if the victim gives consent - most especially in cases where the victim is
a minor. In this regard, case law instructs that "[t]he victim's consent is rendered meaningless due to the
coercive, abusive, or deceptive means employed by perpetrators of human trafficking. Even without the use of
coercive, abusive, or deceptive means, a minor's consent is not given out of his or her own free will." (People
of the Philippines v. Mora, G.R. No. 242682, July 1, 2019, Second Division)
19. Section 3 (a) of RA 9208 defines the term "Trafficking in Persons" as the "recruitment, transportation, transfer
or harboring, or receipt of persons with or without the victim's consent or knowledge, within or across national
borders by means of threat or use of force, or other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of
power or of position, taking advantage of the vulnerability of the persons, or, the giving or receiving of payments
or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person for the purpose of
exploitation which includes at a minimum, the exploitation or the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual
exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery, servitude or the removal or sale of organs." The same provision
further provides that "[t]he recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt of a child for the purpose
of exploitation shall also be considered as 'trafficking in persons' even if it does not involve any of the means
set forth in the preceding paragraph." The crime becomes qualified when any of the circumstances found under
Section 6 of the law is present.
a. It must be clarified that Section 3 (a) of RA 9208 merely provides for the general definition of "Trafficking
in Persons" as the specific acts punishable under the law are found in Sections 4 and 5 of the same
(including Sections 4-A, 4-B, and 4-C if the amendments brought about by RA 10364 are taken into
consideration). This is evinced by Section 10 which provides for the penalties and sanctions for committing
the enumerated acts therein. Notably, Section 10 (c) of RA 9208 (renumbered as Section 10 [e] under RA
10364) of the law also provides for penalties for "Qualified Trafficking in Persons" under Section 6.
Nonetheless, since Section 6 only provides for circumstances which would qualify the crime of "Human
Trafficking," reference should always be made to Sections 4, 4-A, 4-B, 4-C, or 5 of the law. Hence,
convictions for "Qualified Trafficking in Persons" shall rest on: (i) the commission of any of the acts provided
under Sections 4, 4-A, 4-B, 4-C, or 5; and (ii) the existence of any of the circumstances listed under Section
6. Otherwise stated, one cannot be convicted of "Qualified Trafficking in Persons" if he is not found to have

committed any of the punishable acts under the law. (Arambullo v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No.
20. While petitioner correctly pointed out that he cannot be convicted under Section 4 (k) (4) of RA 9208 as
amended by RA 10364 since said provision was only enacted on February 28, 2013, or after the period stated
in the Information when he committed the acts imputed against him, this will not ipso facto result in his
acquittal, as his acts of recruiting minors for the purpose of committing a series of robberies reasonably fall
under Section 4 (a) of RA 9208 in its original form. Relatedly, Section 3 (d) of RA 9208 in its original form defines
the term "forced labor and slavery" as "the extraction of work or services from any person by means of
enticement, violence, intimidation or threat, use of force or coercion, including deprivation of freedom, abuse
of authority or moral ascendancy, debt-bondage or deception."
a. In this case, the courts a quo correctly found - through the consistent, direct, unequivocal, and thus,
credible testimonies of AAA, BBB, and CCC - that the prosecution had clearly established the existence of
the elements of violation of Section 4 (a) in relation to Section 6 (a) and (c) of RA 9208 in its original form,
as evinced by the following: (i) petitioner, through his minor son, Dominique, recruited three (3) other
minors AAA, BBB, and CCC; (ii) based on AAA, BBB, and CCC's testimonies, petitioner was able to do so by
taking advantage of their vulnerability as minors, particularly through enticement, violence, and use of
force and coercion; and (iii) petitioner recruited them for the purpose of engaging them to perform illicit
work/services, i.e., commit a series of robberies. Notably, the ultimate facts constitutive of these
circumstances were clearly alleged and contained in the Information. In this regard, case law instructs that
"[t]he victim's consent is rendered meaningless due to the coercive, abusive, or deceptive means employed
by perpetrators of human trafficking. Even without the use of coercive, abusive, or deceptive means, a
minor's consent is not given out of his or her own free will."
b. In light of the foregoing, the Court finds no reason to deviate from the factual findings of the trial court, as
affirmed by the CA, as there is no indication that it overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied the
surrounding facts and circumstances of the case. In fact, the trial court was in the best position to assess
and determine the credibility of the witnesses presented by both parties, and hence, due deference should
be accorded to the same. Hence, petitioner's conviction for Qualified Trafficking in Persons - not under
Section 4 (k) (4) of RA 9208 as amended by RA 10364 as erroneously ruled by the CA, but under Section 4
(a) of RA 9208 in its original form in relation to Section 6 (a) and (c) of the same law - must be upheld.
(Arambullo v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 241834, July 24, 2019, Second Division)
21. This Court emphasizes that "recruitment," as an element of trafficking in persons, includes the accused's acts
of providing the conditions for prostituting a minor. Here, accused-appellant's admissions as to her relationship
with Kim, and to having introduced him to AAA in a prior meeting, further convince this Court that she recruited,
transferred, and provided AAA as a prostitute for Kim. In this case, accused-appellant was found to have
"transferred and provided AAA to Kim in exchange for money, through threats and by taking advantage of her
vulnerability." Accused-appellant failed to forward any arguments that would cast reasonable doubt on her
conviction. Accordingly, this Court affirms her conviction.
a. By highlighting the absence of the February 2013 incident from AAA's sworn statement, accused-appellant
seemingly attempts to exculpate herself by showing that AAA consented to what was done to her, and that
she voluntarily met with Kim on March 6, 2013. However, Casio teaches that an accused cannot use the
minor's consent as a defense. In Casio, the victim was alleged to have engaged in prostitution prior to the
incident subject of the case, and to have been "predisposed to having sex with 'customers' for money."
This was deemed irrelevant to the commission of the crime. Accused claims that AAA admitted engaging
in prostitution even before May 2, 2008. She concludes that AAA was predisposed to having sex with
"customers" for money. For liability under our law, this argument is irrelevant. As defined under Section 3
(a) of Republic Act No. 9208, trafficking in persons can still be committed even if the victim gives consent.
The recruitment transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt of a child for the purpose of exploitation
shall also be considered as "trafficking in persons" even if it does not involve any of the means set forth in
the preceding paragraph....The victim 's consent is rendered meaningless due to the coercive, abusive, or
deceptive means employed by perpetrators of human trafficking. Even without the use of coercive,
abusive, or deceptive means, a minor's consent is not given out of his or her own free will. (People of the
Philippines v. Dela Rosa, G.R. No. 227880, November 6, 2019, Third Division)
22. The existence of the elements of Qualified Trafficking in Persons was sufficiently established by the prosecution,
to wit: (a) that AAA was a minor when the offense against her was committed; (b) that accused-appellant
introduced AAA to different customers on several occasions to engage in sexual intercourse; and (c) that
accused-appellant received money in exchange for the sexual exploitation of AAA. The offense is Qualified
Trafficking in Persons because AAA was a minor. The means used to commit the offense becomes immaterial.
At any rate, it may not be denied that accused-appellant took advantage of the vulnerability of AAA who was a
minor.
a. The Court finds no merit in accused-appellant’s plea for acquittal on the ground that the acts she allegedly
committed on August 5, 2011 merely amounted to an attempt to commit the offense as it was aborted by
her subsequent arrest, and that such attempt to commit the offense was not punishable under R.A. 9208
and became so punishable only upon the amendment introduced by R.A. 10364 on February 6, 2013. As

discussed, the allegations in the Information filed against accused-appellan clearly refer to the
consummated acts of trafficking in persons she committed on July 10 and July 24, 2011. However, as
correctly held by the CA, accused-appellant cannot be convicted of the two counts of the offense proved,
as the Information charges only one offense. (People of the Philippines v. Daguno, G.R. No. 235660, March
23. All the elements of qualified trafficking in persons under R.A. 9208 were established. BBB’s testimony shows
that Lopez was responsible for recruiting her and facilitating her transportation to engage in prostitution and
sexual exploitation with the promise of financial gain. BBB’s testimony likewise reveals that Lopez facilitated
BBB’s involvement in the sexual incidents on August 30, 2011 and September 9, 2011. He brought her to
McDonald’s to meet the male clients on both dates and instructed her to board the taxi and to go with them to
the Grand Polo Motel to have sex. Lopez himself negotiated with the male clients to finalize the deal and
accepted their payments. Said circumstances established the first element of qualified trafficking. As for the
second element, it was established considering that the means used by Lopez involved taking advantage of
BBB’s vulnerability and enticing her with payments and benefits. In both the August 30, 2011 and September 9,
2011 incidents, Lopez took advantage of BBB’s vulnerable state as a minor who had stowed away, and paid her
P1,000.00 for each sexual incident. The third element is present since the purpose of the trafficking was for
BBB’s prostitution and sexual exploitation. It was clear BBB went with the male client, upon Lopez’ instruction,
to the Grand Polo Motel to have sex. (People of the Philippines v. Lopez, G.R. No. 234157, July 15, 2020, Third
Division)
24. Oledan’s conviction must be sustained as the prosecution was able to establish his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt under R.A. 9208, Section 4(a). In particular, it was established that: (a) Oledan was able to recruit AAA, a
minor; (b) Oledan was even the one who transported AAA to Laoag City and brought her to Saigon Disco; (c)
Oledan recruited AAA for the purpose of engaging her to perform illicit work, i.e., as a GRO at Saigon Disco and
perform lewd acs thereat and with customers even outside the establishment; and (d) AAA workd as a GRO at
Saigon Disco for about three months. Moreover, as found by the CA, it was duly established by proof beyond
reasonable doubt that he recruited, transported, and provided AAA to numerous customers on different
occasions at Saigon Disco in exchange for money under the pretext of a “bar fine,” by taking advantage of her
vulnerability, sometime in September until December of 2009. It was equally proved that she maintained,
provided and hired her to engage in prostitution activities at Saigon Disco. It was indubitably established that
both appellants managed all the GROs at Saigon Disco, provided for their customers and received the “bar fine”
for the services rendered by the said GROs. (People of the Philippines v. Garcia and Oledan, G.R. No. 240692,
July 15, 2020, Second Division)
25. Accused-appellants are liable for qualified trafficking in persons. At the outset, it must be stressed that the
prosecution established the elements of the crime of trafficking in persons. Accused-appellants recruited the
victims to work in Angeles, Pampanga. They used the means of taking advantage of the vulnerability of the
victims, although this is not material as the victims were all minors, except for BBB. Lastly, their purpose of
trafficking was prostitution or sexual exploitation. Based on the definition of trafficking in persons, accused-
appellants performed all the elements in the commission of the offense. The crime of qualified trafficking in
persons is committed when, among others, the trafficked person is a child or the crime is committed by a
syndicate, or in a large scale. Trafficking is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of three
(3) or more persons conspiring or confederating with one another. It is deemed committed in large scale if
committed against three (3) or more persons, individually or as a group. Here, the evidence of the prosecution
clearly established that all the twelve (12) victims were minors, except for BBB. According to the definition laid
down in R.A. 9208, Section 3(b), a child refers to a person below eighteen (18) years of age. Considering that
eleven (11) of the victims were minors, the offense becomes qualified as the persons being trafficked were
children. In addition, if the crime was committed in a large scale as it was committed against three (3) or more
persons, individually or as a group, it is also qualified. In this case, records show that it was committed against
twelve individuals, hence, it is qualified.
a. On the second element of the crime, i.e., the means used which include threat or use of force, or other
forms of coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of position, taking advantage of the
vulnerability of the person, or the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a
person having control over another, it is apparent from this case that no threat, force, or coercion was
employed by accused-appellants in the trafficking of the victims. However, they took advantage of the
vulnerability of the victims to secure the consent of their parents. They are vulnerable in the sense that
they are underprivileged and it is apparent from their testimonies that they needed to earn mone. In the
case of CCC, both her parents are fishermen and she has seven (7) siblings. For DDD, her father works as a
repairman of a banca, her mother is a housewife, and she is 2nd among five (5) siblings. AAA, meanwhile,
testified that she is an out-of-school youth, her father is a fisherman, her mother is a housewife, and she
has seven (7) siblings. On the other hand, BBB is just an elementary graduate because her parents cannot
afford to send her to school as her father is a fisherman and her mother is a housewife. Considering that
the victims came from poverty-stricken families, it renders the victims vulnerable to trafficking. Trafficking
in persons can still be committed even if the victim gives consent. In Planteras, Jr. v. People of the
Philippines, the Court ruled that knowledge or consent of the minor is not a defense under R.A. 9208. The

victim’s consent is rendered meaningless due to coercive, abusive, or deceptive means employed by
perpetrators of human trafficking. Even without the use of coercive, abuse, or deceptive means, a minor’s
consent is not given out of his or her own free will.
b. The fact that there were no actual indecent shows that were performed by the victims, except for BBB, is
immaterial. It is not necessary that the victims have performed or are performing the act of prostitution or
sexual exploitation at the time when the perpetrators were apprehended. The material fact in the crime
charged is that the purpose of the perpetrators is to engage the victims in the said act of prostitution or
sexual exploitation. (People of the Philippines v. Leocadio and Leocadio, G.R. No. 236967, July 15, 2020,
First Division)
26. All of the elements of trafficking in persons have been established. Both the RTC and the CA found that AAA
and BBB were recruited and offered for sexual exploitation in exchange for money to the NBI agents who merely
acted as poseur-customers. Accused-appellant was engaged in the business of providing women to customers
for money. The actions of accused-appellant established beyond reasonable doubt that she recruited AAA and
BBB for purposes of prostitution. (People of the Philippines v. San Miguel, G.R. No. 247956, October 7, 2020,
Second Division)
27. The prosecution was able to establish that Estonilo had indeed befriended the two minors in order to recruit
them and thereafter, pimp them to his clients. For this purpose, he was able to take advantage of AAA and
BBB’s minority and coerce them into committing sexual acts with one another, under the pretext that they
needed to learn how to perform such acts with fellow males so that they can earn monetary consideration for
the same. Hence, the Court finds no reason to overturn the findings of the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, as there
was no showing that they overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied the surrounding facts and circumstances
of the case.
a. The CA erred in opining that no trafficking existed as “there was no person to whom Estonilo endorsed or
recruited his victims,” and further stressing that the sexual acts transpired not between AAA or BBB and
any of Estonilo’s clients, but between AAA and BBB themselves. However, neither the presence of the
trafficker’s clients, nor their intercourse with the victim/s, is required to support a finding of trafficking.
Thus, the fact that neither AAA nor BBB had sexual contact with any of Estonilo’s clients will not affect the
latter’s criminal liability for Qualified Trafficking in Persons. To be sure, the gravamen of the crime of
trafficking is the act of recruiting or using, with or without consent, a fellow human being for sexual
exploitation – which, as already discussed, was established to have been committed by Estonilo. (People
of the Philippines v. Estonilo, G.R. No. 248694, October 14, 2020, Second Division)
28. Petitioner is guilty of qualified trafficking in persons.

a. At the outset, it must be noted that the offense was committed on November 28, 2011, or prior to the
amendment. Hence, the original provisions of R.A. 9208 apply.
b. The existence of the elements of qualified trafficking in persons was established by the prosecution witness,
AAA, during trial. Her lone testimony proved that petitioner recruited her for the purpose of prostitution.
The offense is qualified trafficking in persons because AAA, at that time was a minor. The criminal
Information filed specifically alleged that AAA, was only 14 years old at the time of the commission of the
offense, having been born on May 1, 1997, as evidenced by her birth certificate.
c. The trafficked victim’s testimony that she had been sexually exploited was material to the cause of the
prosecution. Relative to this principle, it is likewise settled that the testimonies of child-victims are given
full weight and credit, since youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth. Here, the RTC found AAA’s
testimony to be straightforward and consistent, which the CA even affirmed on appeal. While AAA
admitted that she acceded with petitioner’s offer to find means to provide for herself, her consent may
not be used by petitioner as a valid defense. It is well to note that a child is presumed by law to be incapable
of giving rational consent to any sexual intercourse. The victim’s consent is rendered meaningless due to
the coercive, abusive, or deceptive means employed by perpetrators of human trafficking. Even without
the use of coercive, abusive, or deceptive means, a minor’s consent is not given out of his or her own free
will.
d. The medical findings of the examining physician did corroborate AAA’s claim that she engaged in sexual
congress, as borne by the fact that there were lesions found in her hymen. Jurisprudence holds that when
a victim’s testimony is corroborated by the medical findings of the examining physician, the same is
sufficient to sustain a verdict of conviction. (Brozoto v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 233420, April 28,
29. The Demurrer to Evidence lacks basis. In fact, the prosecution was able to establish that petitioners were
engaged in human trafficking.
a. To recall, the RTC granted the Demurrer mainly on the basis of the supposed “discrepancies,
inconsistencies, and irregularities in the performance of the assigned duties of said policemen.” The RTC
hinged its granting of the Demurrer on the following: (i) the fact that the police officers still used a
confidential informant on the actual operation despite claiming that they conducted prior surveillance; (ii)
PO3 Lace, in particular, seemed unaware that Marcos Highway and Sumulong Highway are different; (iii)
the police officers coordinated with the Cainta, Rizal Police Station even if the entrapment operation was

conducted in a fastfood restaurant in Marikina; (iv) PSSupt. Guyguyon's supposed testimony that on the
prior surveillance conducted, they did not observe Raya and Borromeo doing any illegal activity; (v) it was
unclear from the affidavits executed by the police officers whether PSSupt. Guyguyon participated in the
surveillance; (vi) failure of the police officers to list in their log-book the serial numbers of the marked
money used in the entrapment operation; and (vii) CCC's supposed failure to testify that she was being
prostituted by Raya and Borromeo.
b. The majority of the grounds relied upon by the RTC, however, pertain to matters which were immaterial
to the crime charged. The fact that the police officers still used an informant in the conduct of the
entrapment operation despite having conducted prior surveillance is purely a law enforcement matter - a
matter of police wisdom - that is, and should have been best left to the discretion of the police operatives.
PO3 Lace's perceived lack of knowledge in geography, and PSSupt. Guyguyon's presence or absence in the
prior surveillance, are simply non-sequitur - facts that are grossly irrelevant on whether Raya and Borromeo
committed the crime. Likewise, taking note of the serial numbers of the marked money is not an element
of the crime charged.
c. Clear from the foregoing is the RTC's complete lack of basis in granting the Demurrer. Not only did the
police officers clearly testify as to the conduct of surveillance and the entrapment operation, it was likewise
corroborated by one of the women who were being prostituted that night. It was manifest error therefore
on the part of the RTC to focus on particular portions of the prosecution's evidence - instead of considering
the totality of the evidence presented -and using these truncated portions as supposed bases for granting
the Demurrer. (Raya and Borromeo v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 237798, May 5, 2021, First
Division)
30. The elements of the offense of trafficking in persons were sufficiently established by the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses. First, AAA categorically stated that Bawalan instructed her to go with PO1 Intoy, who
was then acting as a poseur-customer, after Bawalan received money from the latter. This fact was
corroborated by Officer Pabion, who saw PO1 Intoy hand the marked money to Bawalan. AAA further stated it
was not the first time she was sexually exploited by accused-appellants. According to her, it would happen
often, whenever their family had nothing to eat. AAA also stated that in the previous incidents, she would be
taken to the cemetery and motel, was videotaped naked, and had sexual intercourse with her customers.
Evidently, accused-appellants took advantage of her vulnerability when she was made to engage in sexual
activities with customers in exchange for money.
a. The fact that the poseur customer, PO1 Intoy, was not presented as a witness is of no moment. Contrary
to accused-appellants' claim, the victim of the crime is in the best position to state that the accused had
recruited and used her by giving her payment in exchange for her sexual exploitation.
b. With respect to the circumstances which qualify the offense, we affirm the pronouncements of the courts
below. It is undisputed that BBB is the mother of AAA, and CCC is her fatherly figure whom she calls "Papa
CCC." Taking into consideration the circumstances on how AAA was sexually exploited, all three accused-
appellants conspired and acted together in perpetrating the crime. While the prosecution failed to prove
the victim's minority due to the absence of her birth certificate, it however established that the crime was
committed by a group of three persons, and by an ascendant and a person exercising authority over the
victim. Consequently, the crime still falls under Qualified Trafficking in Persons under Sections 6(c) and (d)
of RA 9208. (People of the Philippines v. Bawalan, G.R. No. 232358, May 12, 2021, Third Division)
31. The CA and the RTC correctly convicted accused-appellants for qualified trafficking of CCC, whose minority was
proved ruing trial. Simbillo was also rightfully convicted for trafficking HHH, whose age was not established.
a. As a rule, the corroborating testimonies of the arresting officer and the minor victim suffice to convict the
accused in cases of trafficking in persons. Here, PO3 Mendoza narrated his team’s prior surveillance, which
led to the May 27, 2014 entrapment operation. The victims also deceived them into going with them that
night. As the CA and the RTC found, accused-appellants approached the confidential asset and peddled
CCC and HHH for sexual exploitation in exchange for money.
b. It is then reasonable to deduce that PO3 Mendoza was not designated as the poseur-client, considering
that the top that the officers received, and the surveillance, revealed that accused-appellants pimp
unsuspecting women to foreign clients. As the circumstances called for, PO3 Mendoza could only join the
foreigner asset and take on a more passive role in the entrapment, which is not an irregularity. There is no
requirement that the arresting officer must act as the poseur-client himself, or that the confidential asset
be presented as witness during trial.
c. There is overwhelming evidence against accused-appellants which include (i) the victim’s positive
identification; (ii) PO3 Mendoza’s clear recollection of the surveillance and the ensuing entrapment
operation; (iii) the news footage depicting accused-appellants’ habitual engagement in the illegal trade;
and (iv) their failure to substantiate their defenses. (People of the Philippines v. Valencia, G.R. No. 234013,
32. The courts a quo correctly found – through the consistent, direct, unequivocal, and thus, credible testimony of
private complainant and the other witnesses – that the prosecution had clearly established the existence of the
elements of violation of Section 5(e) of R.A. 9208, as evinced by the fact that petitioner facilitated and assisted
the private complainant in her foiled attempt to depart from the country through NAIA Terminal 3, after

Anti-Violence against Women and their Children 313
providing her with fraudulent travel documents for the purpose of her employment in Beijing, China. This was
corroborated by Agent Follosco and his co-agent, who heard petitioner giving instructions to the private
complainant before the latter approached the immigration counter. IO Lagman also found out that the
documents she was carrying were spurious, fake, and tampered because it did not show private complainant’s
relationship with Daquigan who was supposedly her sponsor for her departure after conducting further
inspection. (Marajas v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 244001, June 23, 2021, Third Division)
33. The accused were correctly convicted of the offense of qualified trafficking in persons.
a. First, AAA was recruited by YYY and hired by XXX to work for the purpose of prostitution or sexual
exploitation. AAA and other young girls working there danced on stage and performed other sexually
exploitative acts to lure customers to go to the VIP rooms. The girls working were offered to customers and
patrons of the bar to perform sexual services in exchange for a fee. AAA attested to the work she
performed. It matters not that AAA subsequently testified that XXX and YYY had no control over her sexual
transactions with customers inside the VIP rooms. In fact, AAA testified that she independently transacted
with customers regarding her sexual performances inside the VIP rooms. Yet, clearly, straight out of the
mouth of recanting witness AAA, she performed various sexual services for customers inside the bar’s VIP
rooms for a fee.
b. Second, at the time AAA was hired in April 2005 until her rescue during the entrapment operation on May
31, 2005, she was a child, below 18 years of age. AAA’s minority was never challenged or refuted by
accused-appellants. Further, conclusive evidence of AAA’s minority was established upon the presentation
of her Certificate of Live Birth showing that she was born on July 17, 1987, below 18 years of age in April
to June 1, 2005, the period of her employment. R.A. 9208, Section 3(a) clearly provides that the recruitment
and receipt of a child for purposes of exploitation, even if it does not involve the means listed in the same
provision, will be considered “Trafficking in Persons.”
c. Third, XXX was a police officer, a fact that was stipulated on during the Pre-Trial before the RTC. XXX was
likewise the owner-proprietor of the bar. Several official records pertain to XXX as owner-proprietor of the
bar such as the Business Permit issued in XXX’s name and the Certification from the Office of the City
Treasurer of Manila of XXX’s payment thereof and other taxes of the bar. In addition, BBB testified that on
the night of his surveillance on May 26, 2005, XXX introduced himself as a police officer and the owner of
the bar, and even gave BBB his business card.
d. Fourth, YYY and XXX similarly offered the sexual services of AAA and other girls working at the bar to
customers. BBB and PO3 Ong both testified that YYY, on separated occasions, offered BBB and PO3 Ong,
who were posing as customers, the use of the VIP rooms for all kinds of sexual entertainment and pleasure
with girls whom they fancied. Moreover, consistent with his ownership of the bar and the hiring of the girls
who work there, BBB personally transacted with XXX regarding the bar fine arrangement.
e. BBB’s testimony is corroborated by video footage of his discussions with XXX and YYY at the bar the
separate nights of May 26 and 31, 2005. These video recordings were viewed by the trial court during BBB’s
testimony and thereafter submitted in evidence. Notably, accused-appellants YYY and XXX both confirmed
to an apprehensive BBB that the bar fine arrangement could be facilitated with impunity because XXX, a
police officer, could accompany BBB’s group with the girls back to BBB’s hotel and AAA could deny her
minority should any questions arise. (People of the Philippines v. XXX and YYY, G.R. No. 225288, June 28,
AN TI -V IO LEN C E A GAIN S T WO M EN AN D T HEIR C HILDR EN
ACTS OF VIOLENCE
1. The elements of psychological violence under R.A. 9262, Section 5(i) are: (a) the offended party is a woman
and/or her child or children; (b) the woman is either the wife or former wife of the offender, or is a woman with
whom the offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or is a woman with whom such offender has a
common chid. As for the woman’s child or children, they may be legitimate or illegitimate, or living within or
without the family abode; (c) the offender causes on the woman and/or child mental or emotional anguish; and
(d) the anguish is caused through acts of public ridicule or humiliation, repeated verbal and emotional abuse,
denial of financial support or custody of minor children or access to the children or similar such acts or
omissions. (AAA v. BBB, G.R. No. 212448, January 11, 2018, First Division; XXX v. People of the Philippines, G.R.
a. What R.A. 9262 criminalizes is not the marital infidelity per se but the psychological violence causing mental
or emotional suffering on the wife. Otherwise stated, it is the violence inflicted under the said
circumstances that the law seeks to outlaw. Marital infidelity as cited in the law is only one of the various
acts by which psychological violence may be committed. Moreover, depending on the circumstances of the
spouses and for a myriad of reasons, the illicit relationship may or may not even be causing mental or
emotional anguish on the wife. Thus, the mental or emotional suffering of the victim is an essential and
distinct element in the commission of the offense. (AAA v. BBB, G.R. No. 212448, January 11, 2018, First
Division)
2. In this case, the courts a quo correctly found that all the elements of violation of Section 5 (e) of RA 9262 are
present, as it was established that: (a) Melgar and AAA had a romantic relationship, resulting in BBB's birth; (b)
Melgar freely acknowledged his paternity over BBB; (c) Melgar had failed to provide BBB support ever since the
latter was just a year old; and (d) his intent of not supporting BBB was made more apparent when he sold to a
third party his property which was supposed to answer for, among others, his support-in-arrears to BBB. Thus,
the Court finds no reason to deviate from the factual findings of the trial court, as affirmed by the CA, as there
is no indication that it overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied the surrounding facts and circumstances of the
case. In fact, the trial court was in the best position to assess and detennine the credibility of the witnesses
presented by both parties and, hence, due deference should be accorded to the same.
a. Melgar cannot argue that he was charged of violation of Section 5(i) of R.A. 9262 as the Information alleged
that the acts complained of caused mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to AAA and
her son. BBB; and thus, cannot be convicted of violation of R.A. 9262, Section 5(e). This is because while
the prosecution had established that Melgar indeed deprived AAA and BBB of support, no evidence was
presented to show such deprivation caused either AAA or BBB any mental or emotional anguish. Therefore,
Melgar cannot be convicted of violation of Section 5(i) of R.A. 9262.
b. Section 5 (i) of RA 9262, a form of psychological violence, punishes the act of "causing mental or emotional
anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her child, including, but not limited to, repeated
verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of financial support or custody of minor children or denial of access
to the woman's child/children." Notably, "[p]sychological violence is an element of violation of Section 5 (i)
just like the mental or emotional anguish caused on the victim. Psychological violence is the means
employed by the perpetrator, while mental or emotional anguish is the effect caused to or the damage
sustained by the offended party. To establish psychological violence as an element of the crime, it is
necessary to show proof of commission of any of the acts enumerated in Section 5 (i) or similar acts. And
to establish mental or emotional anguish, it is necessary to present the testimony of the victim as such
experiences are personal to this party." Thus, in cases of support, it must be first shown that the accused's
denial thereof - which is, by itself, already a form of economic abuse - further caused mental or emotional
anguish to the woman-victim and/or to their common child. (Melgar v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No.
3. The trial court observed that private complainant was " so hurt and humiliated." Augmenting the pain brought
about by the situation was that petitioner "abandoned her and their children." The CA, for its part, remarked
that petitioner admitted to pushing private complainant. CCC also testified that the incident was not isolated,
as similar arguments and even physical abuse had already happened between them. Evidently, the above
portions of private complainant's testimony, as well as the other statements made by private complainant
mentioned in the CA and RTC decisions, all prove petitioner had caused mental and emotional anguish upon
private complainant. Finally, private complainant's anguish was clearly caused by acts of petitioner parallel to
those provided by the law. Private complainant's suffering was due to petitioner's denying the use of the
appliances and furniture commonly owned by the family. Anguish causes distress to someone, or makes
someone suffer intense pain or sorrow. It is doubtless that private complainant, by her own recount of the
situation, was thoroughly distressed by petitioner's acts, contrary to petitioner's averments.
a. The elements of the crime under R.A. 9262, Section 5(i) are as follows: (i) the offended party is a woman
and/or her child or children; (ii) the woman is either the wife or former wife of the offender, or is a woman
with whom the offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or is a woman with whom such offender
has a common child. As for the woman’s child or children, they may be legitimate or illegitimate, or living
within or without the family abode; (iii) the offender causes on the woman and/or child mental or
emotional anguish; and (iv) the anguish is caused through acts of public ridicule or humiliation, repeated
verbal and emotional abuse, denial of financial support, or custody of minor children or access to the
children or similar such acts or omissions. (AAA v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 229762, November
4. The June 5, 2006 Information stated in no uncertain terms that: (a) the offended party, AAA, is the wife of the
offender Reyes; (b) AAA sustained mental and emotional anguish; and (c) such anguish is inflicted by offender
Reyes when he deliberately and unlawfully denied AAA with financial support. Psychological violence is certainly
an indispensable element of violation of Section 5(i) of R.A. No. 9262. Equally essential is the element of the
mental or emotional anguish which is personal to the complainant. Psychological violence is the means
employed by the perpetrator, while mental or emotional suffering is the effect caused to or the damage
sustained by the offended party. To establish psychological violence, it is necessary to adduce proof of the
commission of any of the acts enumerated in Section 5(i) or similar of such acts. We concur with the similar
findings of the courts a quo that the prosecution had duly proved, through the clear and convincing testimonies
of AAA and her daughter, that Reyes committed psychological violence against AAA when he deprived her of
financial support beginning July 2005 and onwards which caused her to experience mental and emotional
suffering to the point that even her health condition was adversely affected.
a. Reyes argues that he cannot be held liable for violation of R.A No. 9262 because he has no obligation to
financially support AAA since he never contracted marriage with her. Petitioner is mistaken. The Court finds
that the National Statistics Office certified copy of a marriage certificate presented by the prosecution
serves as positive evidence of the existence of the marriage between Reyes and AAA. The certified copy of
the marriage contract, issued by a public officer in custody thereof, is admissible as the best evidence of its
contents. The marriage contract plainly indicates that a marriage was celebrated between Reyes and AAA

on May 15, 1969, and it should be accorded the full faith and credence given to public documents. As
correctly pointed out by the CA, their marriage is deemed valid until declared otherwise in a judicial
proceeding. Hence, Reyes is obliged to support his wife, AAA, the amount of which shall be in proportion
to the resources or means of the said petitioner and to the needs of the latter.
b. Reyes will not be exonerated even assuming that his marriage is declared void ab initio by the court. R.A.
No. 9262 defines and criminalizes violence against women and their children perpetrated by the woman's
husband, former husband or any person against whom the woman has or had a sexual or dating
relationship with, or with whom the woman has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate
or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or likely to result in, inter alia, economic
abuse or psychological harm or suffering. Thus, the offender need not be related or connected to the victim
by marriage or former marriage, as he could be someone who has or had a sexual or dating relationship
only or has a common child with the victim. In the case at bench, it is undisputed that AAA had borne Reyes
four children out of their relationship. (Reyes v. People of the Philippines, G.R. no. 232678, July 3, 2019,
Third Division)
5. The Court agrees with the observation of the CA that if properly indicted, Reyes can also be convicted of
violation of Section 5(e), par. 2 for having committed economic abuse against AAA. Section 5(e), par. 2 identifies
the act or acts that constitute the violence of economic abuse. Indeed, criminal liability for violation of Section
5(e) of R.A. No. 9262 attaches when the accused deprives the woman of financial support which she is legally
entitled to. Deprivation or denial of support, by itself, is already specifically penalized therein.
a. Here, the Court notes that Reyes, although gainfully employed after June 2005, deliberately refused to
provide financial support to AAA. According to Reyes, he stopped giving monetary support to AAA because
she filed a Bigamy case against him. The Court finds his excuse unacceptable and will not at all exculpate
him from criminal liability under the VAWC. It is noteworthy that AAA charged Reyes with Bigamy not
merely to torment or harass him but to enforce her right and protect her interest as petitioner's legal wife
considering that he contracted a second marriage with one Marilou Osias Ramboanga during the
subsistence of his marriage with AAA. Evidently, the denial of financial support is designed to subjugate
AAA's will and control her conduct, either to pressure her to withdraw said criminal case for Bigamy or
dissuade her from pursuing it, or at least, to discourage her from filing additional cases against him. (Reyes
v. People of the Philippines, G.R. no. 232678, July 3, 2019, Third Division)
6. The Court sustains the finding that accused-appellant is guilty of violations of Sections 5(a) and (i) of R.A. 9262.
The trial court observed that the berating and mauling incident not only caused physical injury to AAA but also
mental anguish and humiliation. By his own account, he was distressed and hurt by accused-appellant’s acts,
which started when he was young. Contrary to accused-appellant’s claim, the prosecution presented AAA’s
medical certificate showing that AAA sustained physical injury from the incident. (People of the Philippines v.
ZZZ, G.R. No. 232500, July 28, 2020, First Division)
7. The CA was correct in ruling that Araza committed psychological violence upon his wife AAA by committing
marital infidelity, which caused AAA to suffer emotional anguish and mental suffering. To recall, the prosecution
has established Araza’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt by proving that Araza was living with another woman.
AAA narrated how she received several information about Araza’s affair with Fabillar; how she was able to
confirm the affair herself which led to the filing of the complaint for concubinage; and despite the complaint
being settled and that both Araza and Fabillar agreed to stop living together, Araza repeated his affair with
Fabillar. Moreover, AAA’s testimony that she suffered mental and emotional anguish due to Araza’s acts was
categorical and straightforward. Finally, while Araza denied that he committed marital infidelity against AAA,
he would later on admit that he left his wife AAA to live with Fabillar, and that he was fully aware that AAA
suffered emotionally and psychologically because of his decision.
a. Psychological violence is an indispensable element of violation of R.A. 9262, Section 5(i). Equally essential
is the element of emotional anguish and mental suffering, which are personal to the complainant.
Psychological violence is the means employed by the perpetrator, while emotional anguish or mental
suffering are the effects caused to or the damage sustained by the offended party. The law does not require
proof that the victim became psychologically ill due to the psychological violence done by her abuser.
Rather, the law only requires emotional anguish or mental suffering to be proven. To establish emotional
anguish or mental suffering, jurisprudence only requires that the testimony of the victim to be presented
in court, as such experiences are personal to this party.
b. Marital infidelity, which is a form of psychological violence, is the proximate cause of AAA’s emotional
anguish and mental suffering, to the point that even her health condition was adversely affected. (Araza v.
People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 247429, September 8, 2020, First Division)
8. In a prosecution under R.A. 9262, Section 5(i), the victim’s testimony must be presented to establish or
emotional anguish, as these experiences are personal to the party. (People of the Philippines v. BBB, G.R. No.
9. The elements of violation of R.A. 9262, Section 5(i) are present in this case. The first and second elements of
the offense are uncontested. The offended party is a woman and her child or children. YYY is the wife of

petitioner with whom they have five children. One of their children, AAA, testified in court about the infidelity
of her father and how his mistress lived with them in her parents’ conjugal home. As to the third and fourth
elements, it is duly established that petitioner committed psychological violence through marital infidelity and
public ridicule or humiliation, which caused mental anguish and emotional suffering upon his wife. In particular,
YYY testified that she and her children were driven out of their home and thereafter she learned through her
daughter AAA that her husband, petitioner, is having an affair with Pearl, who eventually lived with her husband
and their children in their conjugal home. Moreover, both the RTC and the CA gave due credence to the
testimony of YYY that due to petitioner’s marital infidelity, she suffered mental anguish and emotional suffering.
More so, the fact that the wife was not bodily present to witness the unfaithfulness of her husband, it does not
negate the emotional pain and anguish his infidelity caused her. (XXX v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No.
10. The prosecution failed to prove the crime of psychological violence as defined under Section 5(i) of R.A. 9262.
Records show that petitioner was willing to provide support and in 2005, had attempted to negotiate with AAA
as to the amount both at the barangay and before the City Prosecution Office. Thus, it appears that petitioner
was not unwilling to provide support per se, but could not do so because the amount he could offer was not
sufficient for AAA to realize the aspirations she had set for CCC, e.g., that the latter be schooled privately. While
the Court cannot fault AAA for setting such aspirations for her child, it remains that petitioner was not in a
position to meet such. That petitioner attempted to find a way to provide support within his emans indicates
that he did not willfully set out to cause psychological violence upon AAA, even when the latter was constantly
harassing him, which later on caused his PTSD. Consequently, the Court cannot conclude beyond reasonable
doubt that he caused AAA’s emotional distress.
a. Esguerra’s PTSD and paranoia incapacitated him from performing normally. Furthermore, in her judicial
affidavit, Mortejo testified that Esguerra’s PTSD and paranoia were a direct result of AAA’s actions. On
cross-examination, Mortejo was resolute on her findings and testified that because of his incurable PTSD
and paranoid thinking, XXX cannot be expected to work normally, unless he undergoes treatment.
However, upon clarification by the trial judge, it was established that XXX is not insane. However, Montejo
testified that while he is not insane, he does not have the cognitive strength to overcome his paranoia.
Because of this, he is only capable of functioning normally at home with his mother. The Court agrees that
XXX is not insane, but that is beside the point, because he did not raise such a defense to begin with.
b. It is a well-settled principle in criminal law that while criminal intent need not be proved in the prosecution
of acts mala prohibita which are generally punishable in such special penal laws as R.A. 9262, the
prosecution still has the burden to prove that the prohibited act was intentional or voluntary. There is a
well-settled distinction between intent to commit the crime and intent to perpetrate the act. A person may
not have consciously intended to commit a crime; but if he did intend to commit an act – and that act is,
by the very nature of things, the crime itself – then he can be held liable for the malum prohibitum.
Conversely, if a person did not intend to perpetrate an act which has been defined by law to be the crime
itself, then he is not guilty of the act. Here, the evidence shows that petitioner could not provide support
because (i) AAA prevented him from doing so by refusing what he could offer; and (ii) he was suffering from
an incurable mental illness which, though not sufficient to be considered a form of insanity, was to a degree
that effectively incapacitated him from earning. (XXX v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 252807,
11. The accused cannot be found guilty under Section 5(e) of R.A. 9262 because it was not upon his own volition
that he could not provide support. (XXX v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 252807, February 10, 2021, First
Division)
12. Economic abuse refers to acts that make or attempt to make a woman financially dependent which includes,
but is not limited to the following: (a) withdrawal of financial support or preventing the victim from engaging in
any legitimate profession, occupation, business, or activity, except in cases wherein the other spouse/partner
objects on valid, serious, and moral grounds as defined in Article 73 of the Family Code; (b) deprivation or threat
of deprivation of financial resources and the right to the use and enjoyment of the conjugal, community, or
property owned in common; (c) destroying household property; and (d) controlling the victim’s own money or
properties or solely controlling the conjugal money or property.
a. Specifically, Section 5(e)(2) of R.A. 9262 penalizes the deprivation of financial support legally due the
woman or child, which is a continuing offense. (XXX v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 221370, June 28,
13. As correctly found by the courts a quo, all the elements of a violation of Section 5 (e)(2) of RA 9262 are present,
as it was established that: (a) XXX and AAA were married after being pregnant with BBB; (b) XXX acknowledged
BBB as his child; (c) he failed to provide sufficient support for BBB; (d) he withheld financial support for BBB due
to the ire he felt towards his wife; (e) he only provided financial support after the complaint against him in the
Prosecutor's Office was filed.
a. Under Article 195 (4) of the Family Code, a parent is obliged to support his child, comprising everything
indispensable for sustenance, dwelling clothing, medical attendance, education, and transportation, in

keeping with the financial capacity of the family. The amount of support shall be in proportion to the
necessity of the recipient and the means of the person obliged to give support.
b. In the case at bar, XXX deliberately deprived his son BBB of financial support for the latter's sustenance,
clothing, medical, and educational expenses. From the moment the child was born until the case was filed,
petitioner was only able to give a total of about P10,000.00 in a span of five years. To the mind of this Court,
this does not meet the necessity of BBB's expenses, considering that the child is suffering from Congenital
Torch Syndrome, resulting in delayed development and hearing impairment. This especially holds true since
petitioner is capable of giving support based on his Income Tax Return for the year 2009 when his gross
compensation was P234,565.79.
c. Petitioner attempts to impress upon this Court that he complied with his obligation to give support as
evidenced by receipts from 2010 to 2013. However, it only bolsters AAA's claim that XXX only started to
provide support after the filing of the instant case against him. As admitted by petitioner himself, he failed
to provide support from 2005 to 2008 after he got angry at AAA for the latter's failure to bring BBB to him
on Christmas day. However, it should be BBB's best interest that should prevail over the spouses' conflict
with each other. The Court echoes the pronouncement of the appellate court in this wise: “xxx However,
while one can understand his annoyance at his wife, there is no justification for him to terminate giving
support to their child on the basis of his anger toward his spouse. In cases of support, the best interest of
the child must always be considered and if the pattern of revenge shown by the accused-appellant is
condoned by this Court, it would violate the State's mandate to protect those that cannot protect
themselves.”
d. Moreover, his claims that it was AAA who prevented him from complying with his obligation to give support
and that she forced him to sign a kusunduan to stay away from them under threat of a restraining order
remain unsubstantiated. Petitioner could have submitted evidence of his attempts to give support to BBB
as well as the kusunduan itself. However, nothing on record supports this fact aside from XXX's bare
assertion.
e. There is also no merit in petitioner's argument that the absence of malice on his part should warrant his
acquittal. Since RA 9262 or the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004 is a special
law, the act of deprivation of financial support is considered malum prohibitum. Petitioner's argument of
absence of malice or intent is immaterial and the only inquiry to be made is whether or not XXX committed
the act. (XXX v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 221370, June 28, 2021, Third Division)
PROTECTION ORDERS
1. The mother of a victim of violence against women and their children is expressly given personality by Section
9(b) of R.A. 9262 to file a civil action petitioning for the issunace of a protection order for her child. In filing such
a petition, she avails of a remedy that is distinct from the criminal action under Section 5 of the same law. In
addition, the mere filing of such a criminal complaint, without the subsequent filing of an information in court,
does not occasion litis pendentia that precludes the filing of a petition for the issuance of a protection order.
a. The right of a mother and of other persons mentioned in Section 9 to file such a petition is suspended when
the victim has filed a petition for herself. However, the mother of the victim, such as in this case, is not
precluded from filing said petition when her daughter’s complaint-affidavit had already been dismissed. It
should be noted that the filing of said complaint-affidavit did not commence proceedings on the petition
for the issuance of a protection order. Preliminary investigation, or proceedings at the level of the
prosecutor, does not form part of trial. (Pavlow v. Mendenilla, G.R. No. 181489, April 19, 2017, Second
Division)
2. R.A. 9262 allows for the issuance of three kinds of protection orders: a Barangay Protection Order, a Temporary
Protection Order, and a Permanent Protection order. A barangay protection order is issued by the Punong
Barangay or by a Barangay Kagawad. Meanwhile, temporary protection orders and permanent protection
orders are judicial issuances obtained through trial courts. A temporary protection order is a provisional relief.
It is effective for 30 days, following a court’s ex parte determination that such order should be issued. Within
these 30 days, a hearing to determine the propriety of issuing permanent protection order must be conducted.
The temporary protection order itself shall include the notice of the date of the hearing on the merits of the
issuance of a permanent protection order. Following the conduct of a hearing, a permanent protection order
may be issued and shall be effective until revoked by a court upon application of the person in whose favor the
order was issued.
a. When a case is of particular urgency, a trial cort may ex parte issue a temporary protection order, granting
the reliefs under Section 8 of the Anti-VAWC Law in the interim, that is, for a 30-day period. Section 15 of
said law includes a stipulation that the temporary protection order must be immediately personally
servedon the respondent. However, the temporary protection order and summons may be served through
substituted service of summons such as when respondent, who is an American citizen and a resident of the
Philippines, was not in the country when the summons was attempted to be personally served on him.
(Pavlow v. Mendenilla, G.R. No. 181489, April 19, 2017, Second Division)
3. The concept of SLAPP is inapplicable in cases of domestic violence against women and children under R.A. 9262.
The allegation of SLAPP is set up as a defense in those cases claimed to have been filed merely as a harassment
suit against environmental actions. Hence, the rules governing SLAPP cannot apply since R.A. 9262, which

Anti-Child Abuse Law 318
involves cases of violence against women and their children, is not among those laws included under the scope
of A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC.
a. SLAPP refers to an action, whether civil, administrative, or criminal, brought against any person, institution,
or any government agency or LGU or its officials and employees, with the intent to harass, vex, exert undue
pressure or stifle any legal recourse that such person, institution, or government agency has taken or may
take in the enforcement of environmental laws, protection of the environment or assertion of
environmental rights. (Mercado v. Lopena, G.R. No. 230170, June 6, 2018, Second Division)
4. A stay-away directive in a protection order may cover members of the household, including a couple’s common
children, if it is shown that the offender commits violence against the victim through the household members.
a. When the law speaks of family members in the context of protection orders, it also covers descendants as
a whole class – even those who are no longer considered “children” under Section 3(h) of R.A. 9262. Under
the Rule on Violence against Women and their Children, Section 4(c), “members of the family” shall include
husband and wife, parents and children, the ascendants or descendants, brothers and sisters, whether of
the full or half blood, whether living together or not.
b. In Go-Tan v. Tan, where the parents-in-law conspired with their son to inflict violence on the wife, the Court
deemed fit to allow them to remain impleaded in the case – breathing life to the spirit of R.A. 9262, which
is to protect the victim from further violence. The same reasoning applies here. In this case, petitioner both
directly and indirectly inflicted violence on respondent. When he could not get any response from her, he
used their children to contact and harass her, sending them text messages and demeaned their mother.
He even copy furnished respondent with these messages to make sure that she knew what he told their
children. This adds further insult to the words. At any rate, the messages were targeted, albeit indirectly,
at respondent to harass her. Just an in Go-Tan, the trial court here deemed it fit to include the children in
the Permanent Protection Order, as this would give life to the law’s policy of protecting respondent from
the violence committed against her.
c. From the above, petitioner’s harassment of respondent through their childen is a classic case of coercive
control. To recall, back when they still cohabited, petitioner would verbally and physically abuse
respondent in front of their children. His threats to kill her were so real that even their children advised to
leave the conjugal home because they feared for her life. When he no longer had contact with her,
petitioner resorted to using their children as pawns. He would use this passive-aggressive behavior to assert
his perceived dominance over respondent when he could not get what he wanted. All of these can be
characterized as psychological violence committed against respondent, which have disrupted respondent’s
life. Nonetheless, whether petitioner committed acts of violence against his children is beside the point.
That the children were exploied so that he could indirectly harass respondent is sufficient basis for their
inclusion in the stay-away directive. To begin with, petitioner dragged their children in the controversy.
With the stay-away directive, petitioner can no longer use their children to inflict violence on respondent.
d. Petitioner argues the lack of their children’s consent to being included in the Permanent Protection Order.
While Section 8(k) of R.A. 9262 requires the consent of family and household members, this requirement
must only be met in instances when a court grants a relief not mentioned in the law. This is replicated in
the last paragraph of Section 11 of the Rule on Violence Against Women and Their Children. (Estacio v.
Estacio, G.R. No. 211851, September 16, 2020, Third Division)
AN TI -C HILD AB U S E L AW
DEFINITION OF CHILD/CHILDREN
1. The fact that XXX was only 10 years old when the incident happened was established by his birth certificate,
and this was admitted by the defense. His age of 10 years old was alleged in the Information. The higher penalty
under R.A. 7610 applies therefore. This is because having sex with a 10-year old is child abuse and is punished
by a special alw. (Ricalde v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 211002, January 21, 2015, Second Division)
2. It is without question that, despite his chronological age, Larry is a child under the law. He has a mild mental
deficiency rendering him incapable of making crucial decisions on his own, let alone fend for himself. At the
time of the vasectomy, he had a mental age of an 8-year-old. Based on the distinction set forth in Section 3(a),
a person who has a cognitive disability would be considered a child under Republic Act No. 7610 based on his
or her mental age, not chronological age. (Versoza v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 184535, September 3,
2019, En Banc)
3. Presentation of a birth certificate or other pieces of evidence is not at all times necessary to prove the age or
minority of the victim. The trial courts may take judicial notice of the victim’s minority especially if the victim is
of tender age and it is quite manifest or obvious in the physical appearance of the child. (Mendoza v. People of
the Philippines, G.R. No. 239756, September 14, 2020, Second Division)
CHILD ABUSE IN GENERAL

1. Jabalde cannot be guilty of child abuse because she had no intent to debase, degrade, or demean the intrinsic
worth and dignity of Lin as a human being. While Jabalde slapped and struck Lin, which hit the latter on his
nape, and immediately therafter choked said offender party, Jabalde’s act of laying of hands on Lin was an
offshot of Jabalde’s emotional outrage after being informed that her daughter’s head was punctured, and
whom she thought was already dead. In fact, her vision got blurred and she fainted. The spontaneity of the acts
of Jabalde against Lin is just a product of the instinctive reason of a mother to rescue her own child from harm
and danger as manifested only by mild abrasions, scratches, or scrapes suffered by Lin, thus, negating any
intention on inflicting physical injuries. Having lost the strength of her mind, Jabalde lacked that specific intent
that was so essential in the crime of child abuse. (Jabalde v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 195224, June
2. Respondent’s act of whipping AAA is child abuse because AAA was a child when the incident occurred. (Salera
v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 206627, January 18, 2017, Second Division)
3. Strangulating, severly pinching, and beating an eight-year-old child to cause her to limp are intrinsically cruel
and excessive. These acts of abuse impair the child’s dignity and worth as a human being and infringe upon her
right to grow up in a safe, wholesome, and harmonious place. The repeated physical abuse from petitioner
prejudiced the child’s social, moral, and emotional development.
a. The crime under R.A. 7610 is malum prohibitum. Hence, the intent to debase, degrade, or demean the
minor is not the defining mark. Any act of punishment that debases, degrades, and demeans the intrinsic
worth and dignity of a child constitutes the offense.
b. The facts in Bongalon are markedly different from this case. In Bongalon, a father was overwhelmed by his
parental concern for the personal safety of his own minor daughters who had just suffered harm at the
hands of the minor complainants and hit the minor complainant’s back with his hand and slapped his left
cheek. In this case, AAA was maltreated by petitioner through repeated acts of strangulation, pinching, and
beating. These are clearly extreme measures of punishment not commensurate with the discipline of an
eight-year old child. Discipline is a loving response that seeks the positive welfare of a child. Petitioner’s
actions are diametrically opposite. They are abuse, causing not only physical injuries as evidenced by the
physical marks on different parts of AAA’s body and the weakness of her left knee upon walking, but also
emotional trauma on her. (Lucido v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 217764, August 7, 2017, Second
Division)
4. A cursory review of the Informations in the instant case, however, reveals no similar allegation that Patulot's
acts debased, degraded, or demeaned the intrinsic worth and dignity of AAA and BBB as human beings. Instead,
they charged Patulot for willfully committing acts of child abuse on AAA and BBB "by throwing on [them] a (sic)
boiling oil, thereby inflicting upon said victim-minor physical injuries, which acts are inimical and prejudicial to
the child's normal growth and development." Accordingly, the RTC and the CA duly found that this allegation in
the Informations was adequately established by the prosecution. It bears stressing that Patulot did not even
deny the fact that she threw boiling oil on CCC which likewise fell on AAA and BBB. Clearly, her actuations
causing physical injuries on babies, who were merely three (3) years old and two (2) months old at the time,
are undeniably prejudicial to their development. In the words of the trial court, Patulot's acts, which practically
burned the skin of AAA and BBB, left visible scars that are most likely to stay on their faces and bodies for the
rest of their lives. She cannot, therefore, be allowed to escape liability arising from her actions.
a. Neither can Patulot argue that in the absence of intention on her part to harm AAA and BBB, she cannot
be convicted of child abuse because she merely intended on committing physical injuries against CCC. Our
pronouncement in Mabunot v. People is squarely on point. in the instant case, Patulot's criminal intent is
not wanting for as she expressly admitted, she intended on pouring hot cooking oil on CCC. As such, even
granting that it was not her intention to harm AAA and BBB, she was performing an unlawful act when she
threw the hot oil from her casserole on CCC. She cannot, therefore, escape liability from the same in view
of the settled doctrine mentioned in Mabunot that a person incurs criminal liability although the wrongful
act done be different from that which he intended. As defined in the law, child abuse charged against
Patulot is physical abuse of the child, whether the same is habitual or not. To the Court, her act of pouring
hot oil on AAA and BBB falls squarely within this definition. Thus, in view of the fact that her acts were
proven to constitute child abuse under the pertinent provisions of the law, she must be held liable therefor.
(Patulot v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 235071, January 7, 2019, Third Division)
5. R.A. 7610 does not criminalize vasectomy. (Versoza v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 184535, September 3,
2019, En Banc)
a. The vasectomy on Larry – someone with cognitive disability – without his or her consent, is both an act of
cruelty and an act prejudicial to the perosn’s development. The unconsented vasectomy on Larry is clearly
a case of cruelty, not so much for the manner it was done, but because of the circumstances surrounding
its commission and the resulting limitations to the way Larry will be able to live the rest of his life. (Separate
Opinion of Justice Leonen in Versoza v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 184535, September 3, 2019, En
Banc)
b. The vasectomy of Larry is not child abuse since there was no intent to debase, degrade or demean his
intrinsic worth. The intent to debase, degrade or demean one’s intrinsic worth is essential in prosecution
of child abuse. (Separate Opinion of Justice Peralta in Versoza v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 184535,

6. Records are bereft of any evidence showing that petitioner’s utterance of the phrase: “Huwag mong pansinin
yan. At putang ina yan. Mga walang kwenta yan. Mana-mana lang yan!” was specifically intended to debase,
degrade or demean AAA’s intrinsic worth and dignity as a human being. To the contrary, it appears that
petitioner’s harsh utterance were brought about by the spur of the moment, particularly, out of her anger and
annoyance at AAA’s reprimand at EEE. In other words, it is apparent that petitioner merely voiced the alleged
utterances as offhand remarks out of parental concern for her child. In view of the absence of a specific intent
to debase, degrade, or demean the victim’s intrinsic worth and dignity, petitioner cannot be held liable for child
abuse. (Talocod v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 250671, October 7, 2020, Second Division)
OTHER ACTS OF CHILD ABUSE

1. Petitioner was convicted of violation of Section 10(a), Article VI of R.A. 7610, a special law. However, physical
abuse of a child is inherently wrong, rendering material the existence of a criminal intent on the part of the
offender. In petitioner’s case, criminal intent is not wanting. Even if it were to be considered that petitioner had
no design to harm Shiva when he swang his arms, he was not performing a lawful act. He clearly intended to
injure another person. However, it was not Dennis but Shiva, who ended up with a fracture rib. Nonetheless,
the petitioner cannot escape liability for his error. Indeed, criminal liablity shall be incurred by any person
committing a felony although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended. (Mabunot v.
2. R.A. 7610, Section 10(a) provides that any person who commits any other acts of child abuse, cruelty, or
exploitation or be responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the child’s development including those
covered by P.D. 603, Article 59, but not covered by the RPC, is liable for child abuse.
a. The prosecution was able to prove the elements of the violation of said law, namely: (a) the minority of
VVV, (b) the accused employing the use of a heated flat iron as an act constituting physical abuse,
committed by petitioner against VVV; and (c) the said acts are clearly punishable under R.A. 7610.
b. As gleaned from the foregoing, the provision punishes not only those enumerated under P.D. 603, Article
59, but also four distinct acts, i.e., (i) child abuse, (ii) child cruelty, (iii) child exploitation, and (iv) being
responsible for conditions prejudicial to the child’s development. The Rules and Regulations of the
questioned statute distinctly and separately defined child abuse, cruelty, and exploitation just to show that
these three acts are different from one another and from the act prejudicial to the child’s development.
Contrary to petitioner’s assertion, an accused can be prosecuted and be convicted under Section 10(a),
Article VI of R.A. 7610 if he commits any of the four acts therein. The prosecution need not prove that the
acts of child abuse, child cruelty, and child exploitation have resulted in the prejudice of the child because
an act prejudicial to the development of the child is different from the former acts. (Del Poso v. People of
the Philippines, G.R. No. 210810, December 7, 2016, Third Division)
3. R.A. 7610, Section 10(a) punishes four distinct offenses. These are: (a) child abuse, (b) child cruelty, (c) child
exploitation, and (d) being responsible for conditions prejudicial to the child’s development. The element that
the acts must be prejudicial to the child’s development pertains only to the fourth offense. Thus, the
prosecution need not prove that the acts of child abuse, child cruelty, and child exploitation have resulted in
the prejudice of the child because an act prejudicial to the development of the child is different from the former
acts. The element of resulting prejudice to the child’s development cannot be interpreted as a qualifying
condition to the other acts of child abuse, child cruelty, and child exploitation. (Lucido v. People of the
4. When it is shown that the minors suffered physical injuries from petitioner, petitioner is liable for violation of
R.A. 7610, Section 10(a). (Fernandez v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 217542, November 21, 2018, Third
Division)
5. In this case, the Court finds that the act of petitioner in shouting invectives against private complainants does
not constitute child abuse under the foregoing provisions of R.A. No. 7610. Petitioner had no intention to
debase the intrinsic worth and dignity of the child. It was rather an act carelessly done out of anger. The
circumstances surrounding the incident proved that petitioner's act of uttering invectives against the minors
AAA, BBB, and CCC was done in the heat of anger. It is clear that petitioner's utterances against private
complainants were made because there was provocation from the latter. AAA, BBB, and CCC were throwing
ketchup sachets at petitioner's daughter Perlin. The latter evaded this by getting inside their house, so that
private complainants hit petitioner on the head and feet, instead. The complainants continued to throw these
sachets which angered petitioner. Evidently, petitioner's statements "bobo, walang utak, putang ina" and the
threat to "ipahabol" and "ipakagat sa aso" were all said out of frustration or annoyance. Petitioner merely
intended that the children stop their unruly behavior. On the other hand, the prosecution failed to present any
iota of evidence to prove petitioner's intention to debase, degrade or demean the child victims. The record
does not show that petitioner's act of threatening the private complainants was intended to place the latter in
an embarrassing and shameful situation before the public. There was no indication that petitioner had any
specific intent to humiliate AAA, BBB, and CCC; her threats resulted from the private complainants' vexation.
Verily, as the prosecution failed to specify any intent to debase the "intrinsic worth and dignity" of complainants

as human beings, or that she had intended to humiliate or embarrass AAA, BBB, and CCC; thus, petitioner cannot
be held criminally liable under Sec. 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610.
a. The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses reveal that the alleged hacking gestures and profanities
subsequently hurled by petitioner were not directed against private complainants but towards DDD.
Petitioner's ensuing outbursts were due to DDD's confronting her. AAA clearly testified that the threats
stated by petitioner were aimed towards DDD. Notably, DDD filed a separate criminal complaint for grave
threats against petitioner because petitioner brandished a bolo against her. The present case is only
concerned with the acts committed by petitioner against private complainants; and not those committed
against DDD which purportedly constituted grave threats. Further, DDD conceded that the profanity hurled
by petitioner was directed at her. The expression "putang ina mo" is a common enough utterance in the
dialect that is often employed, not really to slander but rather to express anger or displeasure. In fact, more
often, it is just an expletive that punctuates one’s expression of profanity. Thus, it cannot be held with
moral certainty that the purported hacking gestures and profanities subsequently hurled by petitioner
were intended for private complainants.
b. However, petitioner is liable for the crime of Other Light Threats under Article 285(2) of the RPC. (Escolano
v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 226991, December 10, 2018, Third Division)
6. Section 10(a) of R.A. 7610 requires an intent to debase, degrade, or demean the intrinsic worth of a child victim.
a. However, even though there was no intent to debase, degrade or demean, the Court affirms the findings
of the RTC and the CA that petitioner struck AAA with a stone on his shoulder and hit BBB, causing physical
injuries. While there may be some minor inconsistencies in the exact location of the injuries based on the
testimonies of AAA and BBB and the medical findings of Dr. Castaños, it was established that petitioner
assaulted AAA and BBB. Petitioner even admitted that he swung a bamboo stick towards AAA and BBB in
the altercation. In Criminal Case No. 4877-R, petitioner is found guilty of slight physical injuries under the
RPC for assaulting AAA. The prosecution was not able to present any evidence of actual incapacity of AAA
for labor or of a required medical attendance as a result; nor was there proof as to the period of AAA's
incapacity for labor or of a required medical attendance. Nevertheless, under Art. 266 of the RPC, an
offender may still commit slight physical injury even if the inflicted injuries did not require medical
assistance or there was no proof of the victim's incapacity. On the other hand, in Criminal Case No. 4878-
R, the CA found that BBB was no longer a minor on the date of the incident on October 31, 2004, because
he was already eighteen (18) years old. However, the CA's finding is incorrect. BBB's Certificate of Live Birth
shows that he was born on September 21, 1987. Thus, he was a minor being only seventeen (17) years,
one (1) month, and ten (10) days old at the time of the incident. Nonetheless, even if BBB was still a minor,
the Court affirms that petitioner is guilty of the crime of slight physical injuries in Criminal Case No. 4878-
R because the prosecution failed to prove the specific intent to debase, degrade or demean the intrinsic
worth of the child. Petitioner's act of hitting BBB resulted in the latter's injuries requiring medical
attendance for one (1) to nine (9) days, which is within the definition of slight physical injuries. (Calaoagan
v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 222974, March 20, 2019, First Division)
7. The accosting and laying of hands are deliberately intended by Delos Santos and his group. As interpreted by
the CA, the word “pagtripan” signified an intention to debase or degrade that did not result from an unexpected
event. The acts of Delos Santos were offshoots of an intent to take revenge arising from the conflict existing
between his mother and AAA’s mother. Delose Santos did not lose his self-control and the acts were not done
at the spur of the moment. (Delos Santos v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 227581, January 15, 2020, First
Division)
8. The following circumstances reveal the intent of Delos Santos to debase or degrade the intrinsic worth of AAA:
(a) AAA and Daluro testified that Delos Santos’ group approached them and Bob said “nag-iinit na ako.” The
initial move came from Delos Santos’ group without provocation on the part of AAA or Daluro. The act of
approaching with the words “nag-iinit na ako” indicates that there was intent to confront or to challenge AAA
and Daluro to a fight. This is contrary to Delos Santos’ claim that the incident was accidental; (b) Bob threatened
to hit Daluro with a stone and Delos Santos attempted to punch him, which unfortunately landed on AAA. Then
Bob punched AAA on the chest causing her to hit a wall. These acts are obviously aimed to hurt, harass, and to
cause harm, either physically, mentally, emotionally, or psychologically, on AAA and Daluro; (c) Bob said “tama
lang yan sa inyo pagtripan dahil dinemenda n’yo kami.” Then Delos Santos hurled invectives at AAAA and Daluro.
Their words reveal that they were motivated by revenge, which is their justification for their actions. Hurling
invectives on a person is debasing, degrading, and demeaning as it reduces a person’s worth; (d) Delos Santos’
group followed AAA and Daluro home, which implies that they had no intention to stop their misdeeds had it
not been for the timely intervention of AAA’s mother; and (e) Delos Santos and Bob did not apologize to AAA
and to Daluro during the confrontation at the barangay. If indeed the incident was unintentional, they could
have explained so during the confrontation. However, there was no trace of remorse from them. In sum, Delos
Santos and Bob’s words and actions characterized physical and psychologicaly child abuse, and emotional
maltreatment, all o which debase, degrade, and demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human
being. (Delos Santos v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 227581, January 15, 2020, First Division)

9. Petitioner is not liable under R.A. 7610, Section 10(a) since there was lack of intent to debase, degrade, or
demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human being. As for BBB, records show that for while
hitting BBB with a broomstick is reprehensible, petitioner did so only to stop BBB and another classmate from
fighting over pop rice. As for AAA, records show that in his effort to stop his two other students from fighting
over food during his afternoon class, petitioner got to push AAA, one of the onlookers, as a result of which, AAA
fell on the floor with his face down. Surely, petitioner did not intend to maltreat nor debase AAA’s dignity as a
human being. He was simply trying to stop his students from fighting. However, while petitioner is not liable for
child abuse, he is liable for slight physical injuries for intentionally inflicting physical harm on BBB. As for AAA,
petitioner cannot be held liable for slight physical injuries. To recall, petitioner was merely trying to stop two of
his students from fighting over food during the class. AAA, a mere onlooker, was not involved in the fight. There
was no evidence showing petitioner ever intended to harm in any way. The attendant circumstances showed
that as a teacher, petitioner only tried to restore peace in the class by stopping his students from fighting. Verily,
petitioner cannot be held criminally liable for the abrasions AAA sustained on that occasion. These
circumstances, taken together, negate the presence of criminal intent on the part of petitioner. As held in
Villareal, mere infliction of physical injuries, absent malicious intent, does not make a person automatically
liable for an intentional felony.
a. In Bongalon v. People, the Court said that there is child abuse only when it is shown beyond reasonable
doubt that the accused laid his or her hands on the child with actual intent to debase, degrade, or demean
the intrinsic worth and dignity of the child as a human being should it be punished as child abuse, otherwise,
it should be punished under the RPC. In Bongalon, the records showed the laying of hands on Jayson to
have been done at the spur of the moment and in anger. With the loss of his self-control, he lacked that
specific intent to debase, degrade, or demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human being
that was so essential in the crime of child abuse.
b. In Jabalde v. People, the Court held petitioner only liable for slight physical injuries since petitioner laid her
hands on the victim as a mere offshoot of her emotional outrage after being informed that he daughter’s
head was punctured and thinking that her daughter was already dead. The spontaneity of petitioner’s acts
against the victim was just a product of the instinctive reaction of a mother to rescue her own child from
harm. Having lost the strength of her mind, she lacked that specific intent to debase, degrade, or demean
the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human being that is so essential in the crime of child abuse.
(Javarez v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 248729, September 3, 2020, First Division)
10. The act of masturbation is punishable under R.A. 7610, Section 10(a) as it constitutes psychological abuse on
the minor victim.
a. In this case, the Information alleged sufficiently all the elements constituting the crime of other forms of
child abuse penalized under R.A. 7610, Section 10(a), namely: (i) minority of the victim, and (ii) acts
constituting physical or psychological abuse committed by petitioner against the victim – petitioner fondled
his penis and masturbated in the presence of the victim thereby prejudicing her psychological and physical
development and further debasing, degrading, and demeaning her intrinsic worth and dignity. Thus,
despite the absence of the attendance of coercion and influence in petitioner’s act to constitute other
sexual abuse, which is punishable under R.A. 7610, Section 5(b), the CA properly ruled that the act is still
punishable as other forms of child abuse under R.A. 7610, Section 10(a).
b. As regards petitioner’s insistence that he should be convicted with the crime of unjust vexation, this
contention is utterly without merit. The purpose of the crime of unjust vexation is to cause annoyance,
irritation, torment, distress, or disturbance to the mind of the person to whom it was directed. However,
there is overwhelming evidence on record and applicable jurisprudence which support the ruling of the CA
that the act of masturbating is not just an act to vex the minor victim, but such was done intentionally to
excite crude sexual desire on account of the minor victim. The law specifically classifies masturbation as a
lascivious conduct, which basically aims to satiate the sexual desire of the doer.
c. The fact that the act of masturbation was done by him (an employee of an educational institution) while
the student was taking an examination clearly establishes that the act was intentional and directed toward
the minor victim. Notwithstanding that the lewd act was done without the participation of the minor victim
and even if petitioner was facing the bookshelf, it is worthy to emphasize that petitioner was fully aware
that the minor victim was only an arm’s length away from him in a small room. This leads to the conclusion
that the act of masturbating was not merely a personal and private act of pleasure on the part of the
petitioner nor can it be deemed to have been done to cause vexation or annoyance on the victim, rather it
was done with lewd designs.
d. Other than the psychological abuse caused by petitioner’s masturbation, the Court concurs with the RTC
and the CA that such act is debasing, degrading, demeaning, and is prejudicial to the child’s development.
To debase is to reduce the quality or purity of something. To degrade is to lessen the quality or character
of the person. And to demean is to lower the character or condition of a person. Indeed, a student is
expected to feel secure within the school premises and under the care of the school’s faculty and
employees. The feeling of being violated and the anxiety suffered by the minor student upon witnessing a
school employee masturbating in her presence inside the school campus undoubtedly tarnished her purity,
quality, character, and dignity. Moreover, as held in Lucido v. People, the crime committed under R.A. 7610
is mala prohibita, thus, the intent to debase, demean and/or degrade is not a defining mark. Any lascivious
conduct that results to the debasing, demeaning, and degrading of the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child

is deemed to constitute the offense, as in this case. (De Vera v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 246231,
11. Joaquin sexually abused AAA. He took advantage of AAA and forced himself upon her, a minor by his own
admission, even though he is old enough to be her grandfather. Though the incident occurred only once, it is
enough to qualify as “other sexual abuse” because sexual maltreatment need not be habitual. (Joaquin v. People
of the Philippines, G.R. No. 244570, February 17, 2021, First Division)
12. Petitioner’s acts of courting BBB, and in another occasion, touching her thighs in front of her classmates, while
order CCC and her boyfriend to kiss in front of him surely debase, degrade, and demean their intrinsic worth
and dignity as children. These acts are manifestly prejudicial to their normal development, in light of their
mental incapacity and emotional maturity as minors. (Dela Cruz v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 245516,
13. There is no crime of grave oral defamation in relation to Section 10(a) of R.A. 7610. Section 10(a) is clear in that
it punishes acts of child abuse which are not covered by the Revised Penal Code. Hence, on this point, Briñas is
correct – she cannot be convicted of grave oral defamation under the RPC in relation to Section 10(a) of R.A.
7610. From the plain language of Section 10(a), the acts punished under it and those punished under the RPC
are mutually exclusive. Acts which are already covered by the RPC are excluded from the coverage of Section
10(a). (Briñas v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 254005, June 23, 2021, First Division)
14. A conviction for child abuse under Section 10(a) in relation to Section 3(b)(2) of R.A. 7610 requires the presence
of intent to debase, degrade, or demean the intrinsic worth of the child as a human being.
a. The requirement of specific intent was established in Bongalon v. People. Therein, the accused was charged
under Section 10(a) because he struck and slapped the face of a minor, after finding out that the latter
threw stones at the accused’s own minor daughters and burnt the hair of one of them. The Court therein
ruled that the laying of hands against a child, when done at the spur of the moment and in anger, cannot
be deemed as an act of child abuse under Section 10(a), as the essential element of intent to debase,
degrade, or demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of the child as a human being is not present.
b. In Jabalde v. People, the accused, after the Court determined her to have lacked the specific intent to
debase the minor child, was convicted only of slight physical injuries under the RPC instead of child abuse
under R.A. 7610, for which she was charged. Therein, the accused, after being informed that her daughter’s
head was punctured, thought the latter was already dead. The accused fainted and when she regained
consciousness, she slapped and choked the minor victim who she believed had harmed her daughter. The
Court held that the spontaneity of the accused’s acts and the fact that the victim suffered only minor
abrasions show that the laying of hands was an offshoot of the accused’s emotional outrage and a desire
to rescue her own child from harm; hence, there was no specific intent to debase the intrinsic worth of the
child.
c. The specific intent was likewise found missing in Calaoagan v. People wherein the accused inflicted injuries
in the heat of an argument, during an altercation between the accused’s group and that of the minor as
they met on the street without any prior confrontation.
d. In Torres v. People, the Court affirmed the presence of this intent when accused, with excessive force,
whipped the child’s neck with a wet t-shirt, not just once but three times, causing the child to fall down the
stairs and sustain a contusion. The Court said that if the only intention of the accused was to discipline the
child and stop him from interfering in the conciliation proceedings, he could have resorted to other less
violent means.
e. In Tacolod v. People, the accused, right after being informed by her own child that the minor victim had
berated the former, immediately confronted the victim and furiously shouted: “huwag mong pansisin yan.
At putang ina yan. Mga walang kwenta yan, mana-mana lang yan!” The Court acquitted the accused of the
charge of child abuse for failure of the prosecution to prove that the utterances were specifically intended
to debase the child, they being only offhand remarks brought about by the spur of the moment and out of
parental concern for her child.
f. Escolano v. People likewise involved the hurling of expletive remarks at a child. Here, the Court acquitted
the accused for child abuse, noting that she lacked the intent to debase the child, her acts having been
done only in the heat of anger and in order to stop the unruly behavior of the children who were throwing
ketchup sachets at her.
g. As demonstrated by the cases above, the presence or absence of specific intent to debase the child in child
abuse cases may be drawn from the circumstances of the case and the manner by which the accused
inflicted the physical or psychological injuries upon the minor. For instance, lack of intent to debase may
be proven by demonstrating that the allegedly abusive acts were solely out of emotional outrage in the
spur of the moment, as the Court held in Bongalon, Jabalde, Calaoagan, and Talocod.
h. Another defense that may refute the attendance of intent to debase the child is that the accused, in
committing the acts complained of, merely intended to discipline or correct a wrongful behavior of the
minor. This holds especially true in cases wherein the accused is legally entrusted with the care and
discipline of the minor victim such as the latter's teacher. In Rosaldes v. People, similar to the present case,
the accused was the school teacher of the child victim, a Grade 1 student. The accused was drowsing off

on a sofa as the child entered and accidentally bumped her. The accused then pinched the child on the
thigh, held him in the armpits and threw him on the floor causing the child to hit a desk and lose
consciousness. Instead of feeling any remorse, the accused then held the child by his ears and pushed him
again to the floor. The child sustained severe injuries. The accused interposed the defense that she had no
intention to debase the victim, her acts of maltreatment being merely aimed at disciplining the child which
she, as a schoolteacher, could reasonably do under the doctrine of in loco parentis. The Court, while
recognizing the right of a teacher to discipline his or her pupils, nevertheless convicted the accused of child
abuse, ruling that her acts were unnecessary and excessive which caused the child severe injuries. This
effectively refuted the accused's claim that she merely intended to discipline the child. Moreover, the Court
noted that such infliction of physical harm constitutes corporal punishment which is expressly prohibited
by the Family Code. In convicting the accused, the Court likewise considered the fact that the accused's
maltreatment of the victim was not an isolated case. One of the prosecution witnesses who was also a
pupil of the accused revealed on cross-examination that she had likewise experienced the accused's
cruelty. Moreover, it was shown that the accused was already previously convicted by the RTC for
maltreatment of another child in another case. The Court held that such previous incidents manifested that
the accused had "a propensity for violence." Finally, the Court considered the emotional trauma of the
child, who was compelled to transfer school out of fear of the accused.
i. In Lucido v. People, the accused, who was a neighbor of the minor's family, was entrusted with the custody
of the minor upon the accused's request as the latter was living alone. While with the accused, the minor
suffered physical abuse through repeated strangulation, beating, and pinching by the former, causing the
child to limp. The accused interposed the defense that her actuations were merely intended to discipline
the minor. The Court rejected the defense, noting that the abusive acts of the accused were extreme
measures of punishment not commensurate with the discipline of an eight-year-old child.
j. Hence, based on the foregoing case law, a prosecution for child abuse under Section 10(a) in relation to
Section 3(b)(2) requires the presence of a specific intent to debase, degrade or demean the intrinsic worth
and dignity of a child as a human being. Such specific intent may be refuted by proof that the acts were
merely offshoots of emotional outrage in the spur of the moment and/or that the accused merely intended
to discipline the child. In the case where the defense of disciplining a child is advanced, the Court may
likewise consider if the disciplining acts are commensurate to, and may reasonably address, the
misbehavior of the child being dealt with. If the alleged disciplinary measures are excessive and run counter
to the purpose of disciplining a child, then the defense will be rejected and the accused may be held liable
for child abuse. (Briñas v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 254005, June 23, 2021, First Division)
15. Briñas cannot be held liable for child abuse under Section 10(a) in relation to Section 3(b)(2) because the
prosecution failed to prove the presence of intent to debase, degrade, or demean the intrinsic worth of the
private complainants as human beings.
a. The evidence presented shows that Briñas' acts (uttering the words “pinakamalandi, pinakamalilibog,
pinakamahadera, at hindot,” and “mga putang ina kayo”) were only done in the heat of anger, made after
she had just learned that the private complainants had deceivingly used her daughter's name to send a text
message to another student, in what Briñas thought was part of a bigger and harmful scheme against the
student body. She had also then just learned that the mother of the student who received the misleading
text message had confronted the private complainants for quarreling with the former's daughter. It
appears, thus, that Briñas' acts were fueled by her anger and frustration at the private complainants'
mischief which caused distress not only to her and her daughter but also to another student and parent.
b. The present case is similar to the above-discussed case of Talocod wherein the accused shouted expletives
at the minors as a response to the latter's beratement of her own child. The cases of Bongalon and Jabalde
likewise come to mind, wherein the accused parents physically laid hands on the minors, in the midst of
passionate anger and under the impression that their own children were harmed by the minor
complainants. In all these cases showing that the physical or verbal mistreatments were committed in the
heat of anger out of parental concern for their own children, the accused were acquitted of the charge of
child abuse under Section 10(a) for absence of intent to debase, degrade or demean the minors. Notably,
in the present case, the prosecution failed to prove other circumstances which may indicate said intent to
debase, degrade or demean. The alleged subsequent acts of expulsion, suspension and withholding of the
school records of the private complainants by Briñas were not proven sufficiently. No documentary
evidence was presented, such as the written notice of suspension or expulsion or the letter of DepEd
admonishing Challenger's actions. On the other hand, Briñas vehemently denies that the private
complainants were expelled, suspended and that their school documents were withheld.
c. Indeed, even assuming that the private complainants were suspended and expelled and that their school
records were unjustly withheld, no proof was presented that such acts were committed by Briñas herself
or that she participated in their commission. The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses on this matter
are conflicting and confusing. Elizabeth, mother of Keziah, testified that her daughter was expelled by
Napoleon Briñas, Challenger's president and husband of Briñas. Christian, father of Micolle, did not specify
who committed these acts. He merely asked Micolle's adviser if the latter was suspended and the adviser
answered, "yes." It must be stressed that the acts of Briñas' husband or even those of Challenger's, in which
she serves as a school directress, cannot be imputed to Briñas without evidence of her participation in said
acts, or conspiracy with the perpetrators.

Kidnapping and Illegal Detention 325
d. Hence, the only acts proven to have been committed by Briñas are the hurling of invectives, made in a spur
of the moment and in the heat of anger, against the private complainants, after she learned of the latter's
mischief against her own daughter. Unfortunately for the prosecution, these acts, by themselves, do not
show intent to debase, degrade or demean the minors which is an indispensable element of the crime
charged. In a criminal case, the prosecution is burdened to establish beyond reasonable doubt all of the
elements of the crime charged, consistent with the basic principle that an accused is presumed innocent
until proven guilty. (Briñas v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 254005, June 23, 2021, First Division)
KIDN AP PIN G AN D IL L EGAL DET EN TIO N

1. Appellant committed the crime of kidnapping because the victim, AAA, was deprived of his liberty when he
yielded to the dictates of appellant and did not leave the house out of fear. Appellant instilled such fear into
AAA making him believe that he is a Sultan who has bodyguards constantly watching AAA’s every move. The
minor AAA thus realized he was already being detained being under the control of his captor, appellant, who
will prevent him from leaving should he attempt to do so.
a. The fact that AAA voluntarily went with appellant to Antipolo, upon appellant’s pretension that he had to
open the vault of his house, is immaterial. What is controlling is the act of the accused in detaining the
victim against his or her will after the offender is able to take the victim in his custody. (People of the
Philippines v. De Guzman, G.R. No. 214502, November 25, 2015, Third Division)
2. Accused-appellant admitted that she took the child away from her mother and that accused-appellant curiously
had quietly left the house with the child and did not inform Anniban of her plans to head for the pier and show
the baby to her boyfriend. Thus, accused-appellant is guilty of kidnapping. (People of the Philippines v. Lerio,
G.R. No. 209039, December 9, 2015, First Division)
3. The elements of kidnapping have been established by the prosecution. Edward positively identified Gomez and
Pepino – both private individuals – as among the three persons who entered his office and pretended to be
Kilton Motors’ customers. He further declared that Pepino pointed a gun at him, and forcibly took him against
his will. Edward further declared on the witness stand that Pepino, Gomez, and their other co-accused brought
him to a safe house in Quezon City; detained him there for four (4) days; and demanded ransom from his family.
(People of the Philippines v. Pepino and Gomez, G.R. No. 174471, January 12, 2016, En Banc)
4. The corpus delicti in the crime of kidnapping for ransom is the fact that an individual has been in any manner
deprived of his liberty for the purpose of extorting ransom from the victim or any other person. (People of the
Philippines v. Gonzales, Jr., G.R. No. 192233, February 17, 2016, Third Division)
5. Accused are guilty of kidnapping for ransom. It was shown that accused Vicente and Devincio abducted the
victim from the gate of the latter’s house, brought him to a hut somewhere in the south, chained him to a bed,
essentially deprived him of liberty without lawful cause for four days, and extorted ransom from his family.
(People of the Philippines v. Lugnasin and Guerrero, G.R. No. 208404, February 24, 2016, First Division)
6. Accused-appellants kidnapped Jimmy so that they could collect ransom in exchange for Jimmy’s release. In
addition, that the PACER Manhunt Team was unable to recover from accused-appellants part of the ransom
amount to P1 million is immaterial, it being sufficient that accused-appellants’ motive for kidnapping Jimmy,
i.e., collection of ransom, is duly established. (People of the Philippines v. Gregorio, G.R. No. 194235, June 8,
7. The elements of serious illegal detention are: (a) the offender is a private individual, (b) he kidnaps or detains
another or in any other manner deprives the latter of his liberty; (c) the act of detention or kidnapping is illegal;
and (d) in the commission of the offense, any of the following circumstances are present: (i) the kidnapping or
detention lasts more than 3 days; or (ii) it is committed by simulating public authority; or (iii) any serious physical
injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are made; or (iv) the person
kidnapped or detained is a minor, female, or a public officer. (Napoles v. De Lima, G.R. No. 213429, July 13,
8. The elements of the special complex crime of kidnapping with rape were established. The crime of kidnapping
was proven. Accused-appellants, who are private individuals, forcibly took and detained AAA at their house
where she was deprived of her liberty for 12 days. AAA was consistently threatened by the couple. Whenever
the couple would leave the house, they would padlock the door to prevent AAA from escaping. In addition, the
crime of rape was established when AAA testified that accused Mary Joy inserted her finger into AAA’s vagina
(sexual assault), followed by accused Orlando who had carnal knowledge of AAA by inserting his penis into
AAA’s vagina and succeeded in doing so through the use of threat and intimidation.
a. However, the accused-appellants can only be convicted of the crime of kidnapping. It should be noted that
three Informations were filed against them: Criminal Case No. 134484-H charging Orlando with rape;
Criminal Case No. 134485-H charging Mary Joy with rape through sexual assault; and Criminal Case No.
134486-H accusing them of kidnapping. Considering that the existing Informations do not contain the
essential and material ingredients for the commission of kidnapping with rape, accused-appellants cannot

be convicted for that special complex crime. Appellants can only be convicted of the separate offenses of
kidnapping and rape, both of which were duly proven. However, due to the actions of the trial court in
discussing the crime of rape in Criminal Case No. 134486-H, the charge of rape will no longer prosper. It
was because of the trial court’s mistaken notion that Criminal Case No. 134486-H charges accused-
appellants of kidnapping with rape.
b. The trial court discussed and found accused-appellants guilty of rape in Criminal Case No. 134486-H. It thus
acquitted accused-appellants in Criminal Case Nos. 134484-H and 134485-H based on its flawed reliance
to an information which it though was sufficient to charge and convict appellants of the crime of kidnapping
with rape. The judgment of acquittal in favor of an accused necessarily ends the case in which he is
prosecuted and the same cannot be appealed or reopened because of the doctrine of double jeopardy.
Accused-appellants have been erroneously but formally acquitted by the trial court. Said error
unfortunately downgrades the crime of kidnapping and completely takes rape out of the picture albeit
proven during trial. (People of the Philippines v. Cilot and Brigole, G.R. No. 208410, October 19, 2016, Third
Division)
9. The fact that the victim voluntarily went with the accused does not remove the element of deprivation of liberty
if the victim went with the accused on a false inducement without which the victim would not have done so.
Rizaldo would not have gone with the accused-appellants had they not misrepresented themselves as PDEA
agents who allegedly caught him selling illegal drugs. Accused-appellants also told Rizaldo that he would only
be released if Alfonso paid them P150,000.00. The act of holding a person for a proscribed purpose necessarily
implies and unlawful physical or mental restraint against the person’s will, and with a willful intent to so confine
the victim. If Rizaldo was indeed free to leave, there would have been no reason for Alfonso to come rushing to
his son’s aid. Rizaldo was also able to come home only after Alfonso negotiated his release. (People of the
Philippines v. Avancena, G.R. No. 200512, June 7, 2017, Second Division)
10. Leaving a child in a place from which he did not know the way home, even if he had the freedom to roam around
the place of detention, would still amount to deprivation of liberty. Under such a situation, the child’s freedom
remains at the mercy and control of the abductor.
a. The prevailing jurisprudence on kidnapping and illegal detention is that the curtailment of the victim’s
liberty need not involve any physical restraint upon the victim’s person. For kidnapping to exist, it is not
necessary that the offender kept the victim in an enclosure or treated him harshly. (People of the
Philippines v. Fabro, G.R. No. 208441, July 17, 2017, Third Division)
11. Ronalyn was clearly deprived of her liberty. She was forcibly taken inside a vehicle accused-appellant and his
cohorts and was driven around Quezon City for at least five hours. In addition, accused-appellant and his
companions deprived the victim of her libety to extort ransom from her family. Finally, accused-appellant’s
membership in the Philippine National Police does not automatically preclude the filing of an information of
kidnapping or serious illegal detention against him, as it was shown that he committed acts unrelated to the
functions of his office.
a. The essence of the crime of kidnapping is the actual deprivation of the victim’s liberty coupled with the
intent of the accused to effect it. The deprivation of a person’s liberty is met as long as there is a showing
that the victim’s liberty of movement is restricted. (People of the Philippines v. PO3 Borja, G.R. No. 199710,
12. The crime of serious illegal detention was committed by Siapno because he, a private individual, knowingly and
without lawful authority detained a minor, causing deprivation of the victim’s liberty and of the mother’s
custody over her child. (People of the Philippines v. Siapno, G.R. No. 218911, August 23, 2017, Second Division)
13. The elements of the crime are as follows: (a) the offender is a private individual; (b) he kidnaps or detains
another, or in any manner deprives the latter of his liberty; (c) the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal;
and (d) in the commission of the offense any of the following circumstances is present: (i) the kidnapping or
detention lasts for more than three days; (ii) it is committed by simulating public authority; (iii) any serious
physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are made; or (iv) the
person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female, or a public officer. Notably, the duration of detention is
immaterial if the victim is a minor, or if the purpose of the kidnapping is to extort ransom.
a. The prosecution must establish the deprivation of liberty of the victim under any of the above-mentioned
circumstances coupled with indubitable proof of intent of the accused to effect the same. There must be
a purposeful or knowing action by the accused to forcibly restrain the victim coupled with intent. (People
of the Philippines v. Lidasan, G.R. No. 227425, September 4, 2017, Second Division)
14. Period of detention is immaterial if the victim is a female. This is because deprivation of liberty is qualified to
serious illegal detention if at least one of the circumstances exists. One of the circumstances include that the
victim is a minor, female, or public officer. (People of the Philippines v. Ali, G.R. No. 222965, December 6, 2017,
Third Division)

15. The totality of the prosecution's evidence failed to sufficiently establish the offense of kidnapping in this case.
There was no concrete evidence whatsoever to establish or from which it can be inferred that appellant and his
cohorts intended to actually deprive the victim of his liberty for some time and for some purpose. There was
also no evidence that they have thoroughly planned the kidnapping of the victim. There was lack of motive to
resort in kidnapping the victim for they were bent to kidnap his friend Truck. The fact alone of waiting for the
victim to fall asleep and then and there tying his hands and feet, based on Norada's account, was not
determinant of intent to actually detain the victim or deprive his liberty. As such, the trial court was indulging
in speculation when it held that the victim "will either be taken away or simply be kept in the hotel and
thereafter ransom will be demanded from the Canadian Ray Truck for his release." (People of the Philippines v.
Norada, G.R. No. 218958, December 13, 2017, First Division)
16. The elements of slight illegal detention are all present here. Accused-appellant is a private individual. The Court
of Appeals found that after raping AAA, accused-appellant continued to detain her and to deprive her of her
liberty. It also appreciated AAA's testimony that accused-appellant placed electrical wires around the room to
electrocute anyone who might attempt to enter it. He refused to release AAA even after his supposed demands
were met. The detention was illegal and not attended by the circumstances that would render it serious illegal
detention. Thus, this Court finds accused-appellant guilty of the crime of slight illegal detention.
a. After raping AAA, accused-appellant continued to detain her and refused to release her even after raping
her. Thus, although the initial abduction of AAA may have been absorbed by the crime of rape, the
continued detention of AAA after the rape cannot be deemed absorbed in it. Likewise, since the detention
continued after the rape had been completed, it cannot be deemed a necessary means for the crime of
rape.
b. The elements of slight illegal detention are as follows: (a) that the offender is a private individual; (b) that
he kidnaps or detains another, or in any other manner deprives him or his liberty; (c) that the act of
kidnapping or detention is illegal; and (d) that the crime is committed without the attendance of any of the
circumstances enumerated in Article 267 of the RPC. (People of the Philippines v. Concepcion, G.R. No.
214886, April 4, 2018, Third Division)
17. There is sufficient evidence to establish that Fajardo and his co-accused had illegally deprived Tony of his liberty.
They were able to do so by simulating public authority when they misrepresented themselves as NBI personnel.
Further, Fajardo and his cohorts detained Tony for more than five (5) days because he was only able to escape
captivity after 37 days. These facts alone were sufficient to convict Fajardo of the crime of serious illegal
detention.
a. There is evidence to establish conspiracy independent of the extrajudicial confession of his co-accused.
Tony's testimony clearly illustrated how Fajardo and his cohorts acted together to achieve their common
purpose of detaining him. He narrated the exact participation of the assailants in his abduction. Fajardo,
Manzanero, and Mario were the ones who forcibly pushed him into a van where the driver Tanyag was
waiting; and all of them were wearing NBI uniforms. Thus, it is readily apparent that Fajardo and his co-
accused performed their coordinated actions with the common understanding or intent to detain Tony and
demand ransom for his release. (People of the Philippines v. Manzanero, G.R. No. 216005, April 18, 2018,
Third Division)
18. The elements of kidnapping as embodied in Article 267 of RPC have been sufficiently proven in the case at
bench. It is undisputed that Damayo is a private individual, and that he took Jerome from his school at Sucat
Elementary School, Barangay Sucat, Muntinlupa City on August 7, 2008 at 12:00 noon, brought said victim to
his house at No. 301 Telabastaga, San Fernando, Pampanga, and kept him there until he was safely recovered
by his parents and the police officers on August 9, 2008. That Damayo had no justification whatsoever to detain
Jerome is undeniable. Although it was not established that Jerome was placed inside an enclosure or was locked
up, he was nonetheless deprived of his liberty because he cannot leave the place where Damayo brought him
as the latter remained outside and kept watch of him. This only goes to show that Jerome was constantly
guarded by Damayo during the period of his captivity. Also, let it be underscored that leaving a child in a place
from which he did not know the way home, even if he had the freedom to roam around the place of detention,
would still amount to deprivation of liberty inasmuch as under this situation, the child's freedom remains at the
mercy and control of the abductor. Here, bringing minor Jerome to a house located somewhere in Pampanga,
a place which is totally unfamiliar to him and very far from his residence at Sucat, Muntinlupa City, would
constitute denial of the said victim's liberty. Even if Jerome had the freedom of locomotion inside the house of
Damayo, he did not have the freedom to leave the same at will or escape therefrom because he did not know
where to go and could not possibly go back home to his mother Edna as he didn't know how to do so. Jerome
was merely waiting and hoping that he would be brought home or that his parents would fetch him. Verily, the
prosecution has established beyond reasonable doubt that Damayo intended to deprive Jerome of his liberty,
and his parents, with the custody of their minor son.
a. Still, Damayo denies that he kidnapped Jerome. In a crude effort to muddle the case for the prosecution,
Damayo asserts that he and Edna were lovers and that he took Jerome from his school and brought him to
Pampanga upon Edna's request. Damayo explains that he and Edna had considered transferring Jerome to
a school in Pampanga. He claims that it had been the practice for Edna and Jerome to spend their weekends
with him at their rented home in Pampanga. Damayo's contention is nothing more than a futile maneuver

and a vain attempt to provide a viable excuse for taking Jerome from his school and bringing him to his
house in Pampanga where he detained said victim for three days. What destroys the veracity of Damayo's
claims is the categorical and credible declaration of Jerome that he and his mother have never stayed in
Pampanga with Damayo at any given time, and that he has never been in Pampanga before the kidnapping
incident. Case law has it that testimonies of child victims are given full weight and credit, and that the
testimony of children of sound mind is likely to be more correct and truthful than that of older persons.
Moreover, as aptly observed by the RTC, if the trip to Pampanga was indeed planned as claimed by Damayo,
then Jerome would have brought with him certain personal belongings which he will use during his. stay at
appellant's house. Or, if Edna and Jerome really spend their weekends at Pampanga, there would have
been clothes available for use at Damayo's place. Evidence on record, however, showed that for the entire
duration of his detention, Jerome only wore his school uniform and only had with him his school bag. Edna,
on the other hand, vehemently denied that she and Damayo were lovers and that she gave him an
instruction to bring Jerome to Pampanga. We agree with the courts a quo that Edna has not given her
consent for Damayo to take and keep her son. This is evident from the fact that Edna, together with her
husband, wasted no time and went through the trouble of going to Jerome's school to look for their son
when the latter failed to go home at around 4 o'clock in the afternoon on August 7, 2008 and in having the
incident of the taking of Jerome by a male person to be blottered before the Barangay Office of the Sucat,
Muntinlupa City. This is, likewise, clear from the plea of Edna, via cellular phone, for Damayo to bring home
her son. Apart from Damayo's bare assertion, no other evidence was adduced by the defense to
substantiate his claim that he and Edna were lovers. Records show that the testimony of defense witness
Edwin Alcantara, appellant's son-in-law, confirming the alleged love affair between Damayo and Edna, was
ordered by the RTC to be expunged from the records due to the failure of this witness to appear and testify
for cross-examination.
b. Granting arguendo that Edna and Damayo were indeed sweethearts, the same does not negate the
commission of kidnapping. Such a romantic relationship, even if true, does not give Damayo the authority
to remove Jerome from his school and detain him for three days at San Fernando, Pampanga away from
his parents. In any event, the Court notes that Edna's reactions consisting of immediately reporting the
kidnapping of his son to the Muntinlupa City Police and identifying the culprit to be herein appellant,
cooperating with the police for the apprehension of Damayo, and testifying against him before the RTC,
are certainly not consistent with the conduct of a woman deeply in love with appellant. Besides, if it was
really true that Edna and Damayo are lovers, then she should have conveniently joined appellant and
Jerome in Pampanga instead. More importantly, Damayo's defense of denial was not corroborated nor
bolstered by any competent and independent evidence testimony or other evidence and, hence, cannot
be sustained in the face of Jerome's unwavering testimony and of his positive and firm identification of
Damayo as the perpetrator. Denial is a self-serving negative evidence, which cannot be given greater
weight than that of the declaration of a credible witness who testifies on affirmative matters. It bears
stressing that Damayo utterly failed to allege, much less, prove any ill or ulterior motive on the part of
Jerome and Edna to fabricate a story and to falsely charge Damayo with such a very serious crime. Where
there is no evidence to show any dubious or improper motive why a prosecution witness should bear false
witness against the accused or falsely implicate him in a heinous crime, the testimony is worthy of full faith
and credit.
c. Lastly, the Court determines that the qualifying circumstance of extortion of ransom being the purpose of
Damayo in kidnapping Jerome was duly alleged in the Information and has been sufficiently established by
the prosecution. Edna clearly testified that on August 8, 2008 at around 8 o'clock in the morning, she
received a call from Damayo who demanded that he be given P150,000.00 in exchange for the safe release
of Jerome and that the ransom payout shall be held at the Dau Terminal, Mabalacat, Pampanga. Damayo
never rebutted this particular testimony of Edna. The fact that he did not receive the ransom payment is
of no consequence. Actual payment of ransom is not necessary for the crime to be committed. It is enough
that the kidnapping was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom. (People of the Philippines v.
Damayo, G.R. No. 232361, September 26, 2018, Third Division)
19. Actual taking indicates an intention to deprive the victim of his liberty. (People of the Philippines v. Chan, G.R.
No. 226836, December 5, 2018, First Division)
20. Appellants, however, insist that the element of restraint was not clearly established as the prosecution allegedly
failed to establish actual confinement, detention, or restraint of the victim. The Court does not agree. Actual
confinement, detention, and restraint of the victim is the primary element of the crime of kidnapping. Thus, in
order to sustain a conviction, the prosecution must show "actual confinement or restriction of the victim, and
that such deprivation was the intention of the malefactor." In this case, Ernesto testified that he saw appellants:
(a) hit the victim on the neck and other body parts using bamboo sticks causing the victim to fall down on the
ground unconscious; (b) retrieve a sack from their yard; (c) place the victim inside the sack; and (e) carry him to
their yard. Clearly, the acts of appellants of hitting the victim until he was unconscious, of putting him inside
the sack, and of carrying him to their yard showed their intention to immobilize the victim and deprive him of
his liberty. Thus, contrary to the claim of appellants, the element of restraint was clearly established. As aptly
pointed out by the CA, actual restraint of the victim was evident from the moment appellants clubbed the victim
on the neck and other parts of his body and thereafter placed him inside a sack. Not only was the victim's]

freedom of movement restricted, he was immobilized because the blows rendered him unconscious. Putting
him inside the sack completely rendered the victim powerless to resist. (People of the Philippines v. Chan, G.R.
No. 226836, December 5, 2018, First)
21. The elements of kidnapping have been established. Appellant is a private individual who deprived Pugeda of his
liberty by restraining him and not allowing him to leave and go home unless and until ransom was paid in
exchange for his freedom. Appellant was positively identified as one of the kidnappers by Pugeda himself.
Pugeda had the opportunity to see appellant’s face when his blindfold was removed. He heard appellant’s voice
and saw how he moved for they were onboard the same vehicle for many hours. (People of the Philippines v.
Santos, G.R. No. 229658, August 28, 2019, Second Division)
22. The deprivation required under Article 267 of the RPC means not only imprisonment in, but also the deprivation
of complainant’s liberty in whatever form and for whatever length of time. It involves a situation where the
victim cannot leave the place of confinement or detention or is restricted or impeded in his or her liberty to
move around. The essence of serious illegal detention is the actual deprivation of the victim’s liberty, coupled
with indubitable proof of the intent of the accused to effect such deprivation. Here, the prosecution failed to
prove that appellant actually deprived complainant of her liberty or otherwise restrained her freedom of
movement. The mere fact that appellant wanted to stay and participate in the flagellation rites, standing alone,
did not amount to an intention to deprive, restrain, let alone, detain complainant against her will.
a. Complainant’s assertions that she was helpless because she did not know her whereabouts and did not
know how to get home lack merit. It must be underscored that complainant was already 17 years old high
school graduate at that time. Although she was a minor, it was not shown that she was incapable of
ascertaining her whereabouts and determining the possible ways by which she could go back home.
Complainant was definitely old enough to read and understand how the transportation system works. She
was already possessed of more than sufficient discretion and aptitude to formulate a plan on how to get
home. Also, she was not detained or restrained. She was free to leave and was capable of leaving the
complany of accused, his friends, and his relatives in Pampanga. (People of the Philippines v. Carreon, G.R.
No. 229086, January 15, 2020, First Division)
23. The prosecution was able to prove the elements of Kidnapping for Ransom with Homicide.
a. Firstly, appellants’ intent to deprive Arturo of his liberty was evident from the moment his freedom of
movement was forcibly curtailed on May 3, 2005 at 2:30 in the morning, wherein appellants poked a gun
at him and his wife Carmelita while they were both about to board their car and made Arturo take the back
seat of the car. Thereafter, Arturo was taken against his will to Angono, Rizal.
b. Secondly, the prosecution was able to prove the actual deprivation of his liberty. Prosecution witness
Mendoza testified that on May 3, 2005, appellants brought Arturo to a small house in Angono, Rizal. He
further witnessed that Arturo’s hands were tied at the back with a chain. In addition, he testified that he,
together with some of the accused, guarded Arturo for several days until he was shot by accused Bitangol
on May 6, 2005.
c. Thirdly, the prosecution was able to prove that ransom money was demanded for the release of Arturo.
Carmelita testified that on May 3, 2005, at 10:30 in the morning, she received a call informing her that
Arturo was held captive and will only be released upon payment of P5 million. Several negotiations were
had between the kidnappers and Carmelita during the period of May 3 to May 5, 2005. Eventually, the
kidnappers agreed to the amount of P470,000.00 which Carmelita was able to raise. Thereafter, she was
instructed to wrap the money in two separate batches – P150,000.00 in one newspaper and the remaining
P320,000.00 in another newspaper, and to place them in a blue plastic bag. On May 6, 2005, Carmelita and
her son-in-law, John, received several instructions from the kidnappers as to where to proceed with the
money, which they followed. Finally, she was ordered to go to Purok 6, Manggahan, to deliver the money.
In turn, she requested John to go to said place. In addition, John testified in relation to the ransom money.
According to him, he rode a motorcycle and went to Purok 6, Manggahan as per instruction of the
kidnappers. On his wau to the said place, the kidnappers made several calls and instructions. Upon his
arrival at the meeting place, the kidnappers called again and instructed him to give the ransom money to
the person who will eventually approach him. When said person arrived, John handed him the ransom
money. He later identified the man as accused Bathan. However, Arturo was not released by his kidnappers
despite the delivery and receipt of the ransom money.
d. Finally, Arturo was killed in the course of the detention. About a month after the delivery and receipt of
the ransom money, Carmelita and John were informed by a police officer from the Angono Police Station
that a dead boy had been found in Brgy. San Isidro, Angono, Rizal. On May 28, 2005, Carmelita and John
went to the Angono Police Station and pleaded for the police to dig up the corpse of Arturo. Together with
the police, Carmelita and John went to the Angono Municipal Cemetery. After the body was exhumed,
Carmelita and John confirmed that it was Arturo. (People of the Philippines v. Cornista, G.R. No. 218915,
24. The prosecution has proven with moral certainty that it was accused-appellants who conspired to kidnap the
victims Yasar and Reymond, and they did so for the purpose of extorting money from Yasar’s father.

Unlawful Arrest 330
a. Under the Revised Penal Code, the following elements of kidnapping are: (i) the offender is a private
individual, (ii) he kidnaps or detains another, or in any manner deprives the latter of his liberty, (iii) the act
of detention or kidnapping must be illegal, and (iv) in the commission of the offense any of the following
circumstances is present: (1) the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than three days, (2) it is committed
by simulating public authority, (3) any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or
detained or threats to kill are made, or (4) the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female or public
officer. Significantly, if the victim is kidnapped and illegally detained for the purpose of extorting ransom,
the duration of his detention is immaterial. (People of the Philippines v. Mendoza, G.R. No. 247712, June
25. Accused-appellants are guilty of the special complex crime of kidnapping for ransom with homicide. The
prosecution has established the elements of the crime. Anent the elements of intent on the part of the accused
to deprive the victim of his/her liberty and actual deprivation of the victim of his/her liberty, accused-appellants
and their co-accused intended and later on, were able to actually deprive Dr. Andres, Sr. of his liberty when the
latter went missing after meeting a group of people in Sta. Lucia Mall on July 2, 1988. Such actual deprivation
of Dr. Andres, Sr.’s libery was confirmed by no less than Galamay who informed Dr. Andres. Jr. of such fact via
a phone call. As to the element of motive of the accused, which is extorting ransom for the release of the victim,
their motive, which is to extort ransom in exchange for Dr. Andres, Sr.’s release was manifest in Galamay’s
phone call to Dr. Andres, Jr. in order to demand ransom; Bernardo, Time, Pacpaco, Ramirez and Cabesa’s receipt
of the ransom money from Dr. Andres, Jr. on July 4, 1998 at Espana, Manila as witnessed by the members of
the PNP CIDG; and Cabesa’s delivery of the ransom money to Flores, Cortez, and Antonio who were all caught
while counting the same. Finally, the element that the person kidnapped is killed in the course of the detention,
is present as Dr. Andres, Sr. was killed while in detention and his body was found in Mabitac, Laguna.
a. The elements of Kidnapping for Ransom under Article 267 of the RPC, as amended, are as follows: (i) intent
on the part of the accused to deprive the victim of his/her liberty; (ii) actual deprivation of the victim of
his/her liberty; and (iii) motive of the accused, which is extorting ransom for the release of the victim. In
the special complex crime of Kidnapping for Ransom with Homicide, the person kidnapped is killed in the
course of the detention, regardless whether the killing was purposely sought or was merely an
afterthought. (People of the Philippines v. Bernardo, G.R. No. 242696, November 11, 2020, Second
Division)
26. The prosecution established beyond reasonable doubt the existence of all elements of Kidnapping for Ransom.
Accused-appellants are private persons. Venilda categorically narrated how they deprived her of her liberty
from the time the kidnappers forcibly abducted and detained her in two safehouses up until her rescue by the
PACER agents. The fact that Venilda was free to roam around the premises of the two safehouses is of no
moment. What is material is the curtailment of her liberty and the demands of money for her release. It is
likewise beyond doubt that the purpose of kidnapping was to extort money from her. Records disclose that the
accused-appellants first demanded a ransom amounting to P50 million which was later reduced to P500,000.00
as a condition for Venilda’s rescue. Out of the P500,000.00, a ransom of P242,500.00 was delivered by William
on May 14, 2003 along the South Expressway, near Alabang Exit, Alabang, Muntinlupa City. (People of the
Philippines v. Galicia, G.R. No. 238911, June 28, 2021, Third Division)
U N LAWFU L AR R ES T
1. The crime of unlawful arrest punishes an offender’s act of arresting or detaining another to deliver him or her
to the proper authorities, when the arrest or detention is not authorized, or that there is no reasonable ground
to arrest or detain the other.
a. People v. Malasugui declares that a public officer may be held liable or exculpated from the crime of
unlawful arrest under specific circumstances. Malasugui inferred that a public officer who does not have
the authority to arrest shall be criminally liable. Even when a public officer is authorized to arrest, he or she
must have a judicial warrant. However, when the enumerated circumstances exist, the absence of a judicial
warrant is justified and does not expose the public officer to criminal liability.
b. In the crime of unlawful arrest, the offender who arrested or detained another intended to deliver the
apprehended person to the proper authorities, considering he or she does not have the authority. This act
of conducting the apprehended persons to the proper authorities takes the offense out of the crime of
illegal detention.
c. For unlawful arrest, the added element to be proved is whether from the overt facts of the case, there was
a clear intent to submit the persons arrested or detained for the purpose of prosecution. The prosecutor
could have also charged illegal detention, which means that the intent to present for legal detention and
prosecution need not be proven
d. The following elements must concurn to successfully the accused of the crime of unlawful arrest: (i) the
offender arrests or detains another person, (ii) the arrest or detention is to deliver the person to the proper
authorities, and (iii) the arrest or detention is not authorized by law or that there is no reasonable ground
to. (Duropan v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 230825, June 10, 2020, Third Division)
2. Despite petitioners’ challenge, the prosecution established that petitioners arrested Pacis to bring him to the
proper authorities. On one hand, the petitioners’ claim that they merely invited Pacis to the police station to

Grave, Light, and Other Light Threats 331
investigate whetther he had the authority to harvest nipa. On the other hand, they contend that he got violent
which led them to arrest him. Whatever the reason for the apprehension, it is apparenly conceded that Pacis
was brought to Maribojoc police station, the proper authorities contemplated in Article 269 of the RPC.
Moreover, he was arrested, within the meaning of the same article. Arrest is defined as the taking of a person
into custody in order that he may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense. It is an actual restraint
of a person to be arrested, or by his submission to the custody of the person making the arrest. However,
jurisprudence instructs hat there need not be an actual restrain for curtailment of liberty to be characterized
as an arrest. In fact, although denominated as requests, invitations from high-ranking officials to a hearing in a
military camp were deemed arrests.
a. In Babst v. National Intelligence Board, which involved the National Intelligence Board’s invitations to and
subsequen interrogations of several journalists, the Court ruled that where the invitation comes from a
powerful group composed predominantly of ranking military officers issued at a time when the country has
just emerged from martial rule and when the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus has
not entirely been lifted, and the designated interrogation site is a military camp, the same can easily be
taken not as a strictly voluntary invitation which it purports to be, but as an authoritative command which
one can only defy at his peril, especially where, as in the instant case, the invitation carries the ominous
warning that failure to appear shall be considered as a waiver and this Committee will be constrained to
proceed in accordance with law.
b. In Sanchez v. Demetriou, the Court declared that application of actual force, manual touching of the body,
physical restraint or a formal declaration of arrest is not required. It is enough that there be an intent on
the part of one of the parties to arrest the other and an intent on the part of the other to submit, under
the belief and impression that submission is necessary.
c. Intent to arrest must be clearly established. People v. Milado considered as arrest when appellant therein
had already been deprived of his liberty and taken into custody after the policemen told him to stay inside
the jeepney and instructed the driver to drive them to the police station. According to the Court, the term
“invited” may have been used by the police, but it was obviously a command coming from three law
enforcers who appellant could hardly be expected to defy. Homar v. People declared that there was an
arrest as the records would reveal that the petitioners therein arrested the private complainant as this fact
was admitted by both of them and they arrested him for the purpose of bringing him to the proper
authorities. (Duropan v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 230825, June 10, 2020, Third Division)
3. Petitioners are guilty of unlawful arrest. To recall, petitioner Duropan was a barangay kagawad while petitioner
Coloma was a barangay tanod of Lincod, Maribojoc, Bohol. A barangay kagawad is a member of the legislative
council of the sangguniang barangay, which enacts laws of local application. He or she is a person in authority,
per Section 388 of the LGC. Meanwhile, a barangay tanod is deemed as an agent of persons in authority whose
duties are described in Section 388 of the LGC. While deemed as persons in authority and agents of persons in
authority, respectively, the barangay kagawad and barangay tanod are not the public officers whose official
duty is to arrest or detain persons contemplated within the purview of Article 269 of the RPC. In addition, the
arrest of Pacis was not made pursuant to a judicial warrant. Neither was there a valid warrantless arrests of
stop and frisk search nor an in flagrante delicto since there was no suspicious behavior on the part of Pacis or
any overt act committed by Pacis in their presence which hinted that Pacis was committing a crime. (Duropan
GR AV E, LIGHT , AN D O THER LIGH T THR EA TS

1. Nevertheless, though the prosecution failed to prove the intent to debase, degrade or demean the intrinsic
worth of private complainants, petitioner still uttered insults and invectives at them. Specifically, petitioner's
statement "Putang ina ninyo, gago kayo, wala kayong pinag-aralan, wala kayong utak, subukan ninyong
bumaba dito, pakakawalan ko ang aso ko, pakakagat ko kayo sa aso ko," were directed against private
complainants. In this regard, AAA testified that this particular utterance from petitioner was scary. DDD also
corroborated said claim that private complainants were too traumatized even to go downstairs because of their
fear that petitioner might release her dog to chase and bite them. However, it must also be emphasized that,
as discussed, petitioner's utterances were made in the heat of her anger because private complainants had
thrown ketchup sachets at her. Petitioner merely intended that private complainants stop their rude behavior.
Thus, petitioner committed the crime of Other Light Threats under Article 285(2) of the RPC. Here, the threat
made by petitioner of releasing her dogs to chase private complainants was expressed in the heat of anger.
Petitioner was merely trying to make private complainants stop throwing ketchup sachets at her. However,
instead of doing so, private complainants still continued to throw ketchup sachets against petitioner, which
infuriated the latter causing her to utter invectives against private complainants. Given the surrounding
circumstances, the offense committed falls under Article 285, par. 2 (other light threats) since: (a) threat does
not amount to a crime, and (b) the prosecution did not establish that petitioner persisted in the idea involved
in her threat.
a. Assuming arguendo that private complainants were also affected and distressed by the threat made by
petitioner against DDD in brandishing a bolo, such act is still within the ambit of Other Light Threats under
Article 285(1). Insofar as private complainants are concerned, petitioner committed an act of threatening
their mother with a weapon in a quarrel. As discussed earlier, the present case is only concerned with the
threats that affected private complainants; it should not refer to the threats specifically aimed towards

Robbery 332
DDD. The criminal complaint for grave threats against petitioner filed by DDD should be resolved in a
separate action.
b. Thus, for threatening private complainants, petitioner is criminally liable for Other Light Threats under
Article 285 of the Revised Penal Code. She must suffer the straight penalty of imprisonment of 10 days of
arresto menor and to pay the costs of suit. (Escolano v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 226991,
December 10, 2018, Third Division)
2. The crime of grave threats was consummated as soon as the victim heard Bueza utter his threatening remarks,
i.e. “Humanda ka sa susunod nating pagkikita, papatayin na kita.” To recall, Article 282 of the RPC holds liable
for grave threats, any person who shall threaten another with the infliction upon the person, honor, or property
of the latter or of his family or any wrong amounting to a crime. The crime is consummated as soon as the
threats come to the knowledge of the person threatened. In this case, it is clear that accused-appellant’s threat
to kill the private complainant is a wrong on the person amounting to, at the very least, homicide under the
RPC. The felony of grave threats was consummated the moment she heard Bueza utter his threatening remarks.
The appellate court correctly ruled that it was inconsequential that the threat was made in the presence of a
number of people since the offense does not require that it be committed in private. (People of the Philippines
v. Bueza, G.R. No. 242513, November 18, 2020, Third Division)
R O B B ERY
SIMPLE ROBBERY
1. If there have been serious doubts on whether the victim was intimidated during the unlawful taking, the
accused must be acquitted. (Macayan, Jr. v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 175842, March 18, 2015, Second
Division)
2. The aggravating circusmtance of evident premeditation, while inherent in the crime of robbery, may be
considered in the special complex crime of robbery with homicide if there is premeditation to kill besides
stealing. Here, the evidence clearly established how and when Charito and his co-conspirators hatched their
malevolent plan to rob the spouses Vallecer and likewise kill Dionesia’s master. As discussed, the first attempt
of the malefactors to carry out their scheme was foiled and it was only on their second attempt that they were
able to consummate the conspiracy. Hence, that there were persistent attempts made by the accused
sufficiently demonstrate how determined they were to adhere to their agreement despite the sufficient lapse
of time. Moreover, that Charito and his cohorts went to great lengths to hire Joseph to ferry them back and
forth to the scene of the crime shows the sobriety and circumspection surrounding their decision. Such
circumstances therefore show that the crime committed was a product of intent and coordination among the
accused. Hence, the aggravating circusmtance of evident premeditation is present. (People of the Philippines
v. Olazo, G.R. No. 220761, October 3, 2016, First Division)
3. Rizal’s ordeal did not end with his release from captivity. While reporting the crime to AIDSOTF in Camp Crame,
Alfonso received a call from accused-appellant Avancena demanding the payment of P150,000.00. Because of
the continued demands for payment, NAKTAF had the opportunity to set up an entrapment operation. Alfonso
gave AIDSOTF P6,000.00 which NAKTAF prepared as marked money and placed in a plastic bag. During the
entrapment operation, accused-appellants arrived in the designated place in a white Toyota Revo, Accused-
appellant Avancena approached Alfonso and received the marked money from him. When they drove away,
NAKTAF agents followed them and were able to apprehend them. NAKTAF was able to recover the marked
money from them. In this instance, there was a taking of personal property belonging to Alfonso by means of
intimidaiton. Taking is considered complete from the moment the offender gains possession of the thing, even
if the offender has no opportunity to dispose of the thing. The marked money was recovered from the accused-
appellants when they were arrested, which proves that they were able to gain possession of Alfonso’s money.
(People of the Philippines v. Avancena, G.R. No. 200512, June 7, 2017, Second Division)
4. During the commission of robbery, Reyes, the taller between him and Lato, stabbed Ravago four times. Ravago
escaped further harm only by running to the bathroom and locking himself in. In that time, the robbers
demanded to know from him the hiding place of the jewelry and the commission earned from the sale of a
fishpond that Ravago had brokered. The latter ignored the demand and just stayed inside the bathroom until
after they had left, and his wife opened the bathroom door. She rushed him to the Yanga Clinic for treatment.
He was confined in the Yanga Clinic for five days, and incurred expenses of about P17,000.00. Yet, the physical
injuries inflicted by the stabbing in the course of the execution of the robbery did not constitute any of the
serious physical injuries mentioned under Article 263 of the Revised Penal Code as required by Article 294(2)(3)
and (4) of the Revised Penal Code. Specifically, the physical injuries inflicted on him did not render him insane,
imbecile, impotent or blind; he did not also lose the use of speech or the power to hear or to smell, or an eye,
a hand, a foot, an arm or a leg; or the use of any of such member; he did not also become incapacitated for the
work in which he was theretofore habitually engaged; he did not become deformed; he did not lose any other
part of his body, or the use thereof; he did not become ill or incapacitated for the performance of the work in
which he was habitually engaged for a period of more than 90 days; or he did not become ill or incapacitated
for labor for more than 30 days. The crime is simple robbery under Article 294(5) of the Revised Penal Code.
Robbery 333
a. Being the mastermind, Chua was as responsible for the consequences of the acts committed by Lato and
Reyes, the principals by direct participation. This is because of the conspiracy among the three of them.
The informations had properly charged them as co-conspirators in robbery and carnapping. Once their
conspiracy was established, the act of each of the conspirators became the act of all. Indeed, Chua could
not escape responsibility for the acts done by his co-conspirators. The very nature of the planned robbery
as a crime that entailed violence against persons warranted holding Chua fully responsible for all the
consequences of the criminal plot. (Chua v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 172193, September 13,
5. Having established that the personal properties of the victims were unlawfully taken by the accused-appellant,
intent to gain was sufficiently proven. Intent to gain, or animus lucrandi, as an element of the crime of robbery,
is an internal act; hence, presumed from the unlawful taking of things. Thus, the first three elements of the
crime were clearly established. (People of the Philippines v. Bongos, G.R. No. 227698, January 31, 2018, Second
Division)
6. In this case, intention to rob was revealed as soon as the robbers announced the hold up. This was fortified
when the robbers, particularly accused-appellant's companion started to take the passengers' belongings. It is
likewise certain that Jovel was shot while he and accused-appellant's companion was struggling to get hold of
Jovel's bag. (People of the Philippines v. Madrelejos, G.R. No. 225328, March 21, 2018, First Division)
7. In the present case, there is no doubt that the prosecution successfully established all the elements of the crime
charged. France, the private complainant categorically testified that that petitioner demanded and eventually
received from him the amount of Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00) in exchange for the release of his driver's
license. When the marked money was placed inside petitioner's drawer, who counted it afterwards, he was
deemed to have taken possession of the money. This amount was unlawfully taken by petitioner from France
with intent to gain and through intimidation. As aptly observed by the CA, petitioner was a police officer
assigned as an investigator at the Traffic Sector of Kamuning Police Station whose main duties and
responsibilities included conducting inquiries involving traffic law violations and making reports of his
investigation. While petitioner had the authority to confiscate the driver's license of traffic violators, nowhere
in the law is he authorized to keep an offender's license and receive any payment for its return.
a. The Court likewise agrees with the courts a quo that petitioner employed intimidation to obtain the amount
of P2,000.00 from France as the act performed by the latter caused fear in the mind of the former and
hindered the free exercise of his will. Here, petitioner confiscated the driver's license of France after
figuring in a vehicular accident. He then issued a TVR but demanded from France the amount of P2,000.00
for the return of his driver's license. When France could not produce the said amount, petitioner informed
him to return on the evening of June 29, 2000 as he was then on night shift duty. For France whose daily
living depends on his earnings from driving a taxi, the thought of not having his driver's license back and
the possibility that he might not be able to drive a taxi and earn a living for his family prompted him to give
the amount demanded. Petitioner succeeded in forcing France to choose between parting with his money
or have his driver's license confiscated or cancelled.
b. The presence of ultraviolet fluorescent powder is not an indispensable evidence to prove that the appellant
received the marked money. Moreover, there is no rule requiring that the police officers must apply
fluorescent powder to the buy-bust money to prove the commission of the offense. In fact, the failure of
the police operatives to use fluorescent powder on the boodle money is not an indication that the
entrapment operation did not take place. Both the courts a quo did not even give much weight on the
laboratory report. The CA instead stressed on the straightforward, candid and categorical testimony of
France, corroborated by PO2 Ilao, as to how petitioner took the money of France in exchange for the latter's
driver's license. The laboratory report is merely a corroborative evidence which is not material enough to
alter the judgment either way. (PO2 Flores v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 222861, April 23, 2018,
Third Division)
8. The accused-appellants' unexplained possession of the stolen articles gave rise to the presumption that they
were the taker and the doer of the robbery. This presumption applies considering that (a) the property was
stolen; (b) the crime was committed recently; (c) the stolen property was found in their possession; and (d)
they were unable to explain their possession satisfactorily. It must be noted that during their arrest, the police
officers found Moeller's camera, video camera and charger in their hideout. They were unable to offer any
satisfactory and believable explanation justifying their possession of the subject articles. All that they did to
rebut this presumption was to question the ownership of the said articles. This defense fails considering that
Taro identified the said items and confirmed that they indeed belonged to Moeller. Her familiarity with the said
items cannot be doubted considering that she was the personal maid of the victim for several years, and had
cleaned the said items on a regular basis. (People of the Philippines v. Cariño and Aquino, G.R. No. 232624, July
9. For the requisite of violence to obtain in cases of simple robbery, the victim must have sustained less serious
physical injuries or slight physical injuries in the occasion of the robbery. In this case, Snyder did not sustain any
kind of injury at all. And as already mentioned, her testimony was bereft of any showing that violence was used

Robbery 334
against her by petitioner and his co-accused in that she was pushed, or otherwise harmed on the occasion of
the robbery. While one can only imagine how pulling three necklaces at the same time from the victim's neck
could not have caused any mark, bruise, or pain to the latter, suffice it to state that such a matter must have
been adequately proved by the prosecution during trial as the Court cannot rely on mere assumptions,
surmises, and conjectures especially when it is the life and liberty of the petitioner which is at stake. As to
intimidation, its non-existence in this case is not in dispute. And even if otherwise, the Court will just the same
rule against it. Per the victim's testimony, the act of the perpetrators in grabbing her necklaces so sudden.
Hence, it could not have produced fear or duress in the victim's mind as to deprive her of the exercise of her
will.
a. Since the fourth requisite of the crime of robbery is not obtaining considering that the prosecution failed
to sufficiently establish that the taking of the necklaces was with violence against or intimidation of
persons, petitioner must be held liable only for the crime of theft, not robbery. (Ablaza v. People of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 217722, September 26, 2018, First Division)
10. Taking of personal property was established through direct evidence. Records show that appellant, by means
of violence and intimidation, took away AAA’s mobile phone, money amounting to P50.00 and sim card without
the latter’s consent. AAA testified that appellant pointed a gun at her and took away her 3350 mobile phone.
He then ordered her to go to the grassy area of a nearby children’s park where he forced and threatened her
to have sexual intercourse with him and to give him a fellatio. Thereafter, he took her remaining money and
sim card, ordered her to go to a nearby school and threated to shoot her should she look back at him. Intent to
gain, as an element of the crime of robbery, is an internal act, hence, presumed from the unlawful taking of
things. Since it was established that appellant unlawfully took away AAA’s personal properties, intent to gain
was deemed sufficiently proven, as well. (People of the Philippines v. Yumol, G.R. No. 225600, July 7, 2020, First
Division)
11. While the original intention of the appellants was to kill Pepito, robbery was committed incidentally by the
appellants when Jimmy took Pepito’s air gun and FM radio while Rogelio took the bolo after hacking the body
of Pepito. Subsequenly, appellant Edimar shouted “attack!” thereby giving the other appellants the signal to
ransack the other valuables of the spouses Gunayan, namely, a goat, two pigs, a fighting cock, and a hen without
the consent and att gun point and with use of bolos against Judith and her children. (People of the Philippines
v. Natindim, G.R. No. 201867, November 4, 2020, Third Division)
12. A careful review of the records and the testimony of Belver shows that Belver’s bag was already forcibly taken
and Belver was dispossessed of the same when Poquiz and Valencia left the scene of the crime. Poquiz and
Valencia fled in fear and dropped the bag after Belver fired his gun. When Poquiz and Valencia unlawfully took
Belver’s bag, the crime of robbery had been fully consummated. It is of no moment that Belver was able to
subsequently recover the items forcibly taken from him. Such instance does not preclude the presence of intent
to gain on the part of Poquiz and Valencia. Hence, all the aforementioned elements of Robbery under Article
293 of the RPC are present: (a) the subject property involved is one of the bags which Belver had with him when
he alighted from the bus; (b) Poquiz and Valencia unlawfully took the bag from Belver; (c) there was animus
lucrandi or intent to gain on the part of Poquiz and Valencia in taking Belver’s bag; and (d) Poquiz and Valencia
used violence by throwing punches and lunging a knife on Belver to perpetrate the crime. Accordingly, the crime
of Robbery was committed by Poquiz and Valencia. (Poquiz and Valencia v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No.
ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE

1. The elements of robbery with homicide have been sufficiently proven by the prosecution. The taking of Olitan’s
property was committed with violence and intimidation. This taking happened after Peralta and Ambas
announced a hold-up in order to rob the passengers of the van of their valuables. Olitan had no choice but to
hand over his cellphone, silver ring, sunglasses, and cash money to Ambas who was pointing a gun at him. And
undoubtedly, homicide was also committed when Bocalbos was shot in the head on the occasion of that
robbery. (People of the Philippines v. Peralta, G.R. No. 208524, June 1, 2016, Second Division)
2. In proving robbery with homicide, it is necessary that the robbery itself be established conclusively as any other
essential element of the crime. In addition, the original criminal design of the malefactor is to commit robbery;
thus, the intent to commit robbery must preced the taking of human life. (People of the Philippines v. Balmonte,
3. In proving Robbery with Homicide, it is necessary that the robbery itself be established conclusively as any other
essential element of the crime. (People of the Philippines v. Bacero, G.R. No. 208527, July 20, 2016, Third
Division)
a. In robbery with homicide, the original criminal design of the malefactor is to commit robbery, with
homicide perpetrated on the occasion or by reason of the robbery. The intent to commit robbery must
precede the taking of human life. The homicide may take place before, during or after the robbery. It is
only the result obtained, without reference or distinction as to the circumstances, causes or modes or
persons intervening in the commission of the crime that has to be taken into consideration. There is no

Robbery 335
such felony of robbery with homicide through reckless imprudence or simple negligence. The constitutive
elements of the crime, namely, robbery and homicide, must be consummated. It is immaterial that the
death would supervene by mere accident; or that the victim of homicide is other than the victim of robbery,
or that two or more persons are killed or that aside from the homicide, rape, intentional mutilation, or
usurpation of authority, is committed by reason or on the occasion of the crime. Likewise immaterial is the
fact that the victim of homicide is one of the robbers; the felony would still be robbery with homicide. Once
a homicide is committed by or on the occasion of the robbery, the felony committed is robbery with
homicide. All the felonies committed by reason of or on the occasion of the robbery are integrated into
one and indivisible felony of robbery with homicide. The word "homicide" is used in its generic sense.
Homicide, thus, includes murder, parricide, and infanticide. (People of the Philippines v. Layug, G.R. No.
223679, September 27, 2017, Second Division; People of the Philippines v. Sanota, G.R. No. 233659,
b. In the prosecution of robbery with homicide, the State must prove that the offender’s original intent was
to commit the crime of robbery. The killing of the victim must only be incidental. Nevertheless, the act of
taking the victim’s life may occur before, during, or even after the robbery. So long as the homicide was
committed by reason of or on the occasion of the robbery, the offense committed is the special complex
crime of robbery with homicide. (People of the Philippines v. Palema, G.R. No. 228000, July 10, 2019, Third
Division)
4. When the killing is committed by reason of or on the occasion of the robbery, the qualifying circumstances
attendant to the killing would be considered as generic aggravating circumstances. Thus, the circumstance of
abuse of superior strength serves to aggravate the crime. (People of the Philippines v. Bacero, G.R. No. 208527,
5. The elements of robbery with homicide are present. The prosecution succeeded in showing that the primary
aim or objective of the malefactors Buenamer and Lambada was to rob the passengers of the FX taxi. David, a
passenger oft eh FX taxi in which the two robbers staged the heinous felony, was herself of the victim of the
robbery that was staged by the malefactors that afternoon of October 20, 2009 along Espana Boulevard in
Sampaloc, Manila. David testified that she saw the faces of these two malefactors when these two boarded the
FX taxi at the Pantranco Terminal in Quezon Avenue, Quezon City; that Buenamer and Lambada, then armed
with firearms, declared a hold-up on board the moving vehicle, after which, these two divested the passengers
of their personal belongings while threatening the passengers that they would blow off their heads should the
passengers resist the robbery. In addition, Buenamer boxed or struck Ferrarie with such force that the latter
lost his grip on the handle bar of the vehicle, fell off and run over by the vehicle’s rear tire and subsequently
died. By taking the personal belongings and valuables of the passengers, employing force, violence, and
intimidation, and motivated moreover by animus lucrandi, and thereafter hitting Ferrarie causing him to fall
from the passenger jeepney resulting to his death, there can be no question that Buenamer did commit robbery
with homicide. (People of the Philippines v. Buenamer, G.R. No. 206227, August 31, 2016, Second Division)
6. The elements of homicide with robbery are present. Appellant’s co-accused admitted the taking of the cash,
checks, and pieces of jewelry of Spouses Ganzon. In fact, some of which were even found in the houses of his
co-accused. Furthermore, the testimonies of the eyewitnesses were strengthened by the admission of Rex and
Jessie that they indeed used firearms in order to ensure the consummation of the robbery. Importantly, the
contemporaneous acts of appellant and his co-accused in entering the Ganzon’s residence; ordering its
occupants to drop to the ground; asking where the money and other valuables were kept; and taking the cash
and several personal belongings of the Spouses Ganzon prove that they were initially motivated by animus
lucrandi. The testimony of the co-accused regarding the robbery to the events leading to the killing of the
victims establishes that the crime of homicide was committed on the occasion or by reason of robbery. (People
of the Philippines v. Espia, G.R. No. 213380, August 10, 2016, Third Division)
7. The prosecution should establish the offender’s intent to take personal property before the killing, regardless
of the time when the homicide is actually carried out. When the prosecution fails to conclusively prove that the
homicide was committed for the purpose of robbing the victim, no accused can be convicted of robbery with
homicide. (People of the Philippines v. Pangan, G.R. No. 193837, September 21, 2016, Third Division)
8. Concerning the legal characterization of the crime, its proper designation is not robbery with homicide and
frustrated homicide, as inaccurately labelled by the prosecution and unwittingly adopted by the trial court, but
is simply one of robbery with homicide. It has been jurisprudentially settled that the term homicide in Article
294, paragraph 1, of the RPC is to be used in its generic sense, to embrace not only acts that result in death,
but all other acts producing any bodily injury short of death. It is thus characterized as such regardless of the
number of homicides committed and the physical injuries inflicted. (People of the Philippines v. Vallar, G.R. No.
9. Accused-appellant committed robbery with homicide. Accused-appellant, together with his three companions,
boarded the public utility jeepney and declared a “hold-up.” The passengers, including Sandagan, were forced
at gunpoint to turnover their cash and possessions. When Cerbito refused to be divested of his cellphone,

Robbery 336
accused-appellant kicked him three or four times with such force that he fell off the jeepney. Still dissatisfied
with the violence he vented on Cerbito, accused-appellant fired at him twice, hitting him in his chest and
abdomen resulting in his untimely death. Accused-appellant and his three cohorts then fled together with their
loot. Undoubtedly, their main objective was to rob the passengers of the jeepney; the fatal shooting of Cerbito
was merely incidental, resulting by reason of or on occasion of the robbery. (People of the Philippines v. Gamba,
10. The following pieces of circumstantial evidence are sufficient to prove the guilt of accused-appellant for robbery
with homicide beyond reasonable doubt: (a) BSDO members sighted accused-appellant - with two others -
wounded and wearing bloodstained clothes while walking along EDSA near the crime scene; (b) accused
appellant and his companions scampered in different directions when the BSDO members tried to approach
them; (c) upon his apprehension by the BSDO members, accused-appellant disclosed that he and his
companions just robbed a store and killed its security guard; (d) the store's security guard, Marianito Palacios,
was found dead, soaked in his own blood inside the store where accused-appellant worked; (e) accused-
appellant admitted to Amalia, the branch manager of Floor Center, that he hammered the victim's head and
that he and his companions took money from the Floor Center during the subject incident. The presence of all
the foregoing pieces of circumstantial evidence lead to the inescapable conclusion that the accused-appellant
acted in conspiracy with his unidentified companions in robbing Floor Center and in killing Marianito Palacios
in the course of the robbery. (People of the Philippines v. Sulayao, G.R. No. 198952, September 6, 2017, First
Division)
11. Accused-appellants committed robbery with homicide. Through Analiza’s testimony, it was established that
personal properties and cash belonging to Victorino were taken by the appellants by means of force, and with
an obvious intent to gain. Moreover, during the heist, Victorino was mercilessly and repeatedly stabbed by the
appellants which resulted to his immediate death. However, treachery cannot be appreciated as a qualifying
circumstance. Case law sustains the rule that treachery is a generic aggravating cirumctance in the crime of
robbert of homicide. This is because the crime of robbery with homicide is classified as a crime against property.
(People of the Philippines v. Layug, G.R. No. 223679, September 27, 2017, Second Division)
12. Hermi committed robbery with homicide. It was proven that before Hermin raped AAA, he first ransacked the
drawers inside her room and even had a plastic where the things he took from the drawers and aparador such
as her jewelries and cellular phones were placed. Afterwards, Hermin sat on the bed where AAA was lying and
tied, removed her blanket, tore her T-shirt and underwear then raped her. The primary intention of Hermin
was made manifest by his actions that is, to rob AAA which precedes his intention to rape her. (People of the
Philippines v. Romobio, G.R. No. 227705, October 11, 2017, Second Division)
13. It is, therefore, clear from the foregoing that the evidence presented to prove the robbery aspect of the special
complex crime of robbery with homicide, does not show that robbery had actually been committed. From the
above testimony, it can be inferred that Gloriana merely saw accused-appellant stab the victim. He did not see
accused-appellant taking the P300 00 which the victim allegedly had. Moreover, that the victim had P300.00 in
his possession at the time of the incident was based solely on Gloriana's declaration that the victim kept his
earnings in a plastic container which he then placed in the cart. When the victim's body was found the next
morning, the P300.00 was gone. Even assuming that the victim had P300.00 in his possession when he was
assaulted, it is not impossible that someone other than accused-appellant took the money. Based on his
testimony, Gloriana merely presumed that the victim was killed because of the P300.00 he supposedly had in
his possession. Thus, it appears that Gloriana had no personal knowledge that the victim was robbed. The
element of taking, as well as the existence of the money alleged to have been lost and stolen by accused-
appellant, was not adequately established.
a. In addition, assuming that robbery indeed took place, the prosecution must establish with certitude that
the killing was a mere incident to the robbery, the latter being the perpetrator's main purpose and
objective. It is not enough to suppose that the purpose of the author of the homicide was to rob; a mere
presumption of such fact is not sufficient. Stated different in a conviction requires certitude that the
robbery is the main purpose, and the objective of the malefactor and the killing is merely incidental to the
robbery. The intent to rob must precede the taking of human life but the killing may occur before, during
or after the robbery. What is crucial for a conviction for the crime of robbery with homicide is for the
prosecution to firmly establish the offender's intent to take personal property before the killing, regardless
of the time when the homicide is actually carried out. In this case, there was no showing of accused-
appellant's intention, determined by his acts prior to, contemporaneous with; and subsequent to the
commission of the crime, to commit robbery. No shred of evidence is on record that could support the
conclusion that accused-appellant's primary motive was to rob the victim and that he was able to
accomplish it. Mere speculation and probabilities cannot substitute for proof required in establishing the
guilt of an accused beyond reasonable doubt. Where the evidence does not conclusively prove the robbery,
the killing of the victim would be classified either as a simple homicide or murder, depending upon the
absence or presence of any qualifying circumstance, and not the crime of robbery with homicide. (People
of the Philippines v. Domasig, G.R. No. 217028, June 13, 2018, Third Division)

Robbery 337
14. The circumstances surrounding the fateful day of August 28, 2002, when the victim was robbed and killed, lead
to an unbroken chain of facts, which establish beyond reasonable doubt the accused-appellants' culpability, to
wit: (a) at 10:39 p.m. of August 28, 2002, security guard Caporado saw Moeller pass through Gate 1 of
Corinthian Gardens Subdivision in his Nissan Sentra. Moeller was accompanied by Aquino, who Caporado
recognized and identified in open court; (b) the Nissan Sentra was trailed by the R&E taxi driven by Advincula;
(c) Caporado recognized Cariño as the passenger of the taxi; (d) Advincula, the driver of the taxi, confirmed that
Cariño was his passenger. He testified that he dropped off Cariño at the house of a foreigner in Corinthian
Gardens Subdivision; (e) Moeller's Nissan Sentra was seen to have exited Gate 4 of Corinthian Gardens
Subdivision at around 12:00 midnight on August 29, 2002; (f) In the morning of August 29, 2002, Taro, the
victim's housemaid, found the latter at the backyard of his home, lifeless; (g) a dumbbell was found near the
body of the victim; (h) the Medico-Legal Report showed that Moeller died due to intra-cranial hemorrhage,
which was caused by a blow inflicted using a hard and blunt object; (i) during their arrest, Cariño and Aquino
were caught in possession of a camera, video camera and charger; (j) Taro confirmed that the said items
belonged to Moeller; (k) Cariño admitted to the police officers that the Nissan Sentra was in Isabela. True
enough, the said vehicle was recovered in the said location; (l) SPO4 Jeresano testified that the accused-
appellants admitted that the Nissan Sentra belonged to Moeller; and (m) Aquino even surrendered the keys of
the Nissan Sentra to the police. The fact that the accused-appellants were the last persons seen with Moeller
prior to his demise was clearly confirmed through the testimony of the prosecution witnesses Caporado and
Advincula. (People of the Philippines v. Cariño and Aquino, G.R. No. 232624, July 9, 2018, Second Division)
15. The crime of robbery with homicide was committed. Under the given facts, the Court finds no error in the
findings of both the RTC and the CA that the prosecution was able to clearly establish that: (a) accused-
appellants forced Homer, Henry and Violeta to stop their motorcycle; (b) Dillatan declared the holdup and
grabbed the belt bag in Violeta's possession; and (c) thereafter, Garcia fired at the victims in order to preserve
their possession of the stolen item and to facilitate their escape. (People of the Philippines v. Dillatan, Sr., G.R.
16. The first two elements of robbery with homicide were established through circumstantial evidence. SPO2
Magno testified that the object of the crime was found in appellant's possession at the time of his arrest. Under
Section 3(j), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, a person found in possession of a thing taken in the doing of a recent
wrongful act is the taker and the doer of the whole act. In the case at bar, appellant failed to justify his
possession of the victim's necklace. Thus the presumption that he stole the same from the victim and that he
is the perpetrator of the crime, stands. Meanwhile, the third element, i.e. animus lucrandi, was similarly
established by the same presumption. For intent to gain is an internal act which is presumed from the unlawful
taking by appellant of the thing subject of asportation. And since the object of the crime, i.e. victim's necklace,
was recovered from appellant, his intent to gain is presumed.
a. In sum, the inculpatory circumstances on record are: first, eyewitness Manuel Bernido, Jr. testified that on
September 2, 2007, around 3:30 in the morning, he saw the victim texting on his cellphone while waiting
for a jeepney ride. He also saw appellant stealthily moving from behind toward the victim, appellant then
stabbed the victim in the neck. Thereafter, appellant dragged the victim's body toward an alley. Second,
SPO2 Kelvin Magno testified that on September 4, 2007, when he and his team arrested appellant, they
were able to recover from appellant's possession the victim's silver necklace. Lastly, the victim's father
Pedro Enriquez confirmed that the silver necklace that was recovered from appellant was the necklace he
gave his son. These circumstances, taken together, created an unbroken chain of events leading to no other
conclusion than that appellant's primary purpose was to rob the victim and the killing was merely resorted
to in order to gain easy access to the victim's personal belongings. There was no showing, as none was
shown, that the victim and appellant had known each other before the incident happened or that they had
previous conflicts which would have served as sufficient motive for appellant to end the victim's life. The
only logical conclusion is the killing was committed on the occasion only or by reason of the robbery.
(People of the Philippines v. Mancao, G.R. No. 228951, July 17, 2019, Second Division)
17. In the present case, there is no doubt that the above-mentioned elements are present. The candid testimony
of Cuadro, one of the passengers of the bus held-up by appellants, unmistakably produces a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt, viz.: “Private complainant Geovani Cuadro in his testimony vividly recalled the incident of
[the] [r]obbery, and the shooting by one of the accused Jojo Bacyaan of a passenger named Renato James
Veloso and the driver of the bus[,] Lauro Santos[,] which caused their death. He identified all the herein accused
as the persons who[,] armed with guns[,] had declared a hold-up in that morning of May 31, 2007, and
thereafter [divested them of] their belongings x x x, and among [which were] his Ipod and an Oakley shades.
Positive identification[,] where categorical and consistent and without any showing of ill motive on the part of
the eyewitness testifying on the matter[,] prevails over a denial which if not substantiated by clear and
convincing evidence is negative and self-serving evidence[,] undeserving of weight in law. They cannot be given
greater evidentiary value over the testimony of credible witnesses who testify in affirmative matters.” From
these circumstances, there is no mistaking from the actions of appellants that their main intention was to rob
the passengers of the JMK bus and that on the occasion of the robbery, a homicide was committed. Accordingly,
personal properties, such as cellphones and money, belonging to the passengers were taken by appellants by

Robbery 338
means of force and with obvious intent to gain. During the robbery, passenger Renato James Veloso and bus
driver Lauro Santos were both mercilessly gunned down by Bacyaan.
a. Intent to rob is an internal act but may be inferred from proof of violent unlawful taking of personal
property. When the fact of asportation has been established beyond reasonable doubt, conviction of the
accused is justified even if the property subject of the robbery is not presented in court. After all, the
property stolen may have been abandoned or thrown away and destroyed by the robber or recovered by
the owner. The prosecution is not burdened to prove the actual value of the property stolen or amount
stolen from the victim. Whether the robber knew the actual amount in the possession of the victim is of
no moment because the motive for robbery can exist regardless of the exact amount or value involved.
b. When homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion of robbery, all those who took part as principals
in the robbery would also be held liable as principals of the single and indivisible felony of robbery with
homicide although they did not actually take part in the killing, unless it clearly appears that they
endeavored to prevent the same.
c. If a robber tries to prevent the commission of homicide after the commission of the robbery, he is guilty
only of robbery and not of robbery with homicide. All those who conspire to commit robbery with homicide
are guilty as principals of such crime, although not all profited and gained from the robbery. One who joins
a criminal conspiracy adopts the criminal designs of his co-conspirators and can no longer repudiate the
conspiracy once it has materialized. (People of the Philippines v. Bacyaan, G.R. No. 238457, September 18,
18. The following factual circumstances establish the crime of robbery with homicide: first, on October 12, 2012,
Lignes and XXX asked Jayson, Verdadero, and Libo-on the location of Laurora’s house; second, Lignes and XXX
went to XXX Laurora’s house; third, at around 1 a.m., the following day, Jayson, Verdadero, and Libo-on,
together with Villamor, heard shouting and moaning from Laurora’s house; fourth, Verdadero went out and
noticed somebody waving a flashligh inside Laurora’s house, as if looking for something; fifth, while they were
waiting if somebody would come out of Laurora’s house, the witnesses heard a faucet being opened, and they
noticed that the water coming out of the drainage was brownish, as if mixed with blood with Lignes and XXX’s
body and hair being wet at the time they were captured; sixth, after a few moments, Lignes, wearing a black t-
shirt and carrying a backpack and followed by XXX, wearing a green shirt and carrying a pair of shoes, rushed
out of Laurora’s house; seventh, Laurora’s personal belongings were recovered from the backpack that Lignes
was carrying; eighth, Lignes was further frisked and a screw driver was found in his possession; ninth, Laurora’s
death was due to multiple stab wounds in her head, neck, trunk, and upper extremities; and tenth, Cora
identified the green shirt worn by XXX as Laurora’s. (People of the Philippines v. Lignes, G.R. No. 229087, June
19. The elements of complex crime of robbery with homicide are all present. First, appellants, through force and
intimidation, threatening physical violence and death with the use of a gun and knives, took the personal
belongings of the passengers of the jeepney. Second, the properties found in the person of appellants did not
belong to them but to the passengers of the jeepney. Third, the intent to gain is an internal act that is presumed
from the unlawful taking by the offender of the thing subject of asportation. Here, appellants were caught in
the possession of various small items that belonged to the passengers of the jeepney. Fourth, a person died on
the occasion of the robbery. (People of the Philippines v. Casabuena, G.R. No. 246580, June 23, 2020, First
Division)
20. All the essential elements of robbery with homicide are present. The evidence on record shows that at around
4:00 a.m. of July 23, 2010, Cosme and Paula left their house and were on their way to their other house in Sitio
Ilaya, Brgy. Biga, Toledo City to pasture their animals. While they were walking along the road in Sitio Danawan,
Brgy. Biga, Toledo City, Paran and Roelan suddenly approached them. Thereafter, Paran immediately struck
Paula with a hard object, causing her to fall on the ground and, while she was lying on the ground, he struck her
again. On the other hand, Roelan clubbed Cosme once in the mouth, knocking some of the latter’s front teeth
which caused him to lose consciousness. Cosme regained consciousness because Roelan kept on searching his
body. Paran also searched the body of Paula and was able to find money from her in the amount of P2,500.00,
which cash Cosme earlier gave to Paula, before they left their house. Cosme heard Paran tell Roelan that the
money was with Paula. When Macaday arrived, Paran and Roelan ran away, and took away with them them
money. Gerardo brought Cosme and Paula to a hospital. Paula expired three days after the incident, while
Cosme recovered. From the foregoing, there is no mistaking from the actions of Roelan and Paran that their
primordial intention was to rob Cosme and Paula. There was no showing that Roelan and Paran held a common
grudge against the victims which provided enough reason to maul and seriously injure them. They disabled the
couple by hitting them with hard objects precisely to facilitate the robbery as well as their escape. While Paula
was lying helplessly on the ground, Paran divested her of her cash worth P2,500.00. The killing was, therefore,
merely incidental, resulting by reason or on occasion of the robbery. (People of the Philippines v. Paran, G.R.
21. All the elements of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide are present here. Herminia and Marieta
were certain that it was Ronald who boarded the jeepney, wielded an ice pick and declared a hold-up. They
narrated how Ronald forcibly divested them of their personal belonings. Thereafter, Ronald alighted from the

Robbery 339
jeepney and drove the tricycle where his three companions were waiting. Evidently, the taking was with intent
to gain and was accomplished with intimidation against persons. Also, Carlo recounted that he was talking with
PO2 Magno when they heard someone shouting “tulong, may hold-up.” They approached the scene and it was
then that Ronald maneuvered the tricyle and his companion shot PO2 Magno in the head. Verily, Ronald’s
primary objective was to rob the jeepney passengers. The killing of PO2 Magno was only incidental to preven
the apprehension of the robbers and facilitate their escape. (People of the Philippines v. Laguda, G.R. No.
244843. October 7, 2020, First Division)
22. The Court agrees with the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, that the circumstantial evidence proven by the
prosecution sufficiently established that Agan committed the offense charged. The prosecution demonstrated
that: (a) Agan was the houseboy or “bantay” of Maricar at the store; (b) Maricar and Erlinda were at the store
on the evening of November 24, 2008; (c) Agan was the last person seen at the store immediately prior to the
incident; (d) Agan was seen picking the door lock (“parang may sinusundot” and “may kinutkot siya sa lock ng
tindahan”); (e) the victims, who were stabbed, were seen struggling to get out of the store and moments later,
Agan was seen departing from the same store; (f) upon being confronted by Manibale, Agan was evasive and
exhibited odd behavior; (g) Agan hurriedly went inside his house; and (i) Agan came out of the house again with
a shirt hanging from his shoulder. From the above circumstances, all of the elements of the special complex
crime of Robbery with Homicide were present. First, Mandreza testified that after learning about the incident,
he immediately went and inspected the store and found that the cash in the amount of P20,000.00 was found
to be missing from the cash register. Agan took the cash and on the occasion of the robbery, used violence by
stabbing Maricar and Erlinda. Second, the cash, which was reserved to be used for purchases for the store,
belonged to Mandreza. Third, Agan’s acts of tinkering the store’s door and picking the lock, ransacking the place
to look for the cash hidden inside, running away from the scene and changing his clothes immediately thereafter
showed his intent to gain. The substantial amount of money impelled Agan to take another’s property without
the latter’s consent. Last, Maricar and Erlinda, who were stabbed by reason of the robbery, met their untimely
demise. (People of the Philippines v. Agan, G.R. No. 243984, February 1, 2021, Third Division)
ROBBERY WITH RAPE

1. The elements of robbery with rape are: (a) the taking of personal property is committed with violence or
intimidation against persons; (b) the property taken belongs to another; (c) the taking is done with animo
lucrandi; and (d) the robbery is accompanied by rape. (People of the Philippines v. Gabuya and Giron, G.R. No.
209038, June 8, 2016, Second Division; People of the Philippines v. Bongos, G.R. No. 227698, January 31, 2018,
Second Division)
a. For the crime of robbery with rape, the law does not distinguish whether the rape was committed before,
during, or after the robbery, but only that it punishes robbery that was accompanied by rape. The facts do
not bear out that robbery was a mere afterthought, considering that AAA testified that accused-appellant
took time to disable her and then got away with her personal belongings. In sum, accused-appellant was
correctly convicted of the special complex crime of robbery with rape under Article 294 of the RPC. (People
of the Philippines v. Salen, Jr., G.R. No. 231013, January 29, 2020, Third Division)
2. The prosecution’s evidence established with certainty that accused-appellant, together with his brother Marvin,
and co-accused Noel, have intruded the house of spouses Teodora and Robert on the occasion of Hiroshi’s
birthday celebration thereat. They aided each other in divesting the guests of Hiroshi of their personal
belongings through violence and intimidaiton. The evidence disclosed that they were armed with guns and
knife, and they tied the hands of their victims and threatened them with harm if they disobeyed their orders.
Noel and Marvin, on the same occasion, entered the room of spouses Teodora and Robert through the window
and succeeded in taking away from their possession some pieces of jewelry, laptop, ATM card, and cash. It was
likewise proven that, on the occasion of the robbery, AAA was raped by accused-appellant.
a. For a conviction of the crime of robbery with rape to stand, it must be shown that the rape was committed
by reason or on occasion of a robbery and not the other way around. This special complex crime
contemplates a situaiton where the original intent of the accused was to take, with intent to gain, personal
property belonging to another and rape is committed on the occasion thereof or as an accompanying
crime. (People of the Philippines v. Belmonte, G.R. No. 220889, July 5, 2017, Third Division; People of the
Philippines v. Romobio, G.R. No. 227705, October 11, 2017, Second Division)
3. The elements of robbery with rape were established. In this case, the prosecution established that accused-
appellant and his three companions took the cash and gold earrings of the spouses AAA and BBB by means of
violence and intimidation. Accused-appellant and his cohorts barged into the house of the spouses armed with
firearms and tied their hands behind their backs using a nylon rope. The assailants then asked for the location
of the spouses' money. When BBB did not reveal where they kept their money, accused-appellant's companions
then poked a gun at him and punched him in the stomach. Intent to gain, or animus lucrandi, as an element of
the crime of robbery, is an internal act; hence, presumed from the unlawful taking of things. Having established
that the personal properties of the victims were unlawfully taken by accused-appellant, intent to gain was
sufficiently proven. Thus, the first three elements of the crime were clearly established. As for last element of
the crime charged, the sole testimony of the rape victim was sufficient to convict the accused since it was
credible. (People of the Philippines v. Bragat, G.R. No. 222180, November 22, 2017, Second Division)

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4. To be convicted of robbery with rape, the following elements must concur: (1) the taking of personal property
is committed with violence or intimidation against persons; (2) the property taken belongs to another; (3) the
taking is characterized by intent to gain or animus lucrandi; and (4) the robbery is accompanied by rape. In this
case, the prosecution established that accused-appellant and his co-accused barged into the house of the
victims armed with handguns. They demanded BBB to give them money and guns and when the latter refused,
Edwin hit him in the head with a gun. Intent to gain, as an element of the crime of robbery, is an internal act;
hence, presumed from the unlawful taking of things. Having established that the personal properties of the
victims were unlawfully taken by the accused, intent to gain was sufficiently proven. Thus, the first three
elements of the crime were clearly established. As regards the last element, accused-appellant did not even
deny that he assaulted AAA. He merely asserted that he just touched AAA's genitalia and did not insert his
finger. (People of the Philippines v. Llamera, G.R. No. 218703, April 23, 2018, Third Division)
5. The elements of the special complex crime of robbery with rape were established. The prosecution’s evidence
established with certainty that at the dawn of January 22, 2011, accused-appellant followed private
complainant along Zone Mars, Suarez, Iligan City and when accused-appellant caught up with her, he declared
a hold-up. At that moment accused-appellant asked private complainant for jewelry and other belongings. He
search private complainant’s bag and took her cellphone at gun point. Clearly, the first element, that the taking
is committed with violence and intimidation, and the second element, that the property taken belongs to
another, are present. As to the third element, intent to gain is presumed from the unlawful taking of private
complainant’s cellphone. Anent the fourth element, it was established that on the occasion of the robbery, the
private complainant was ordered by accused-appellant, at gun point, to lie down and out of fear she obliged.
Accused-appellant drew up her skirt and removed her panties. Soon after, accused-appellant started caressing
private complainant’s private parts. He then positioned himself on top of the private complainant and began
pumping his body to satisfy his lust. It was also established, based from the testimony of Dr. Valdehueza who
physically examined private complainant’s genital organ that while there was no laceration or bleeding on the
hymen, she however noted the presence of a grass stalk and two small seeds in the perianal area. (People of
the Philippines v. Agan, G.R. No. 228947, June 22, 2020, Second Division)
6. Appellant cannot be implicated in the rape for the reason that he was positively identified as one of Joseph’s
companions inside the house. While the trial court found that AAA heard the voice of appellant, this does not
prove that appellant had the opportunity to attempt to prevent the rape. During the trial of Joseph, AAA stated
that she does not know what the other robbers did because, after being hogtied in the living room, she and EEE
were brought to the comfort room. When AAA was recalled to the witness stand more than a dozen years later,
during the trial of appellant, she merely identified the voice of appellant, but did not say at what point she heard
him speak during the robbery. There was also no testimony to the effect that appellant saw AAA being brought
to the comfort room or being stripped of her clothing – this despite AAA’s testimony that she could still see
because Joseph and Noel were not able to fully cover her eyes. Otherwise, appellant would have had the
opportunity to attempt to prevent the rape. Furthermore, FFF testified that the house where the robbery took
place was an elevated house and that while she was blindfolded, her niece was brought upstairs where the
pieces of jewelry and firearm are kept. This is in consonance with the ruling in Evangelio that while some robbers
went upstairs and proceeded to ransack the house, the others brought AAA into the comfort room and sexually
abused her, then they left the house together carrying the loot. Considering that the rape occurred at the first
floor while the ransacking occurred at the second floor, there is reasonable doubt that appellant was aware of
what was going on downstairs, especially because AAA’s shouts came afterwards. Hence, appellant is only liable
for robbery and not for the complex crime of robbery with rape. (People of the Philippiens v. Agaton, G.R. No.
7. When Sexual Assault under Article 266-A(2) of the RPC accompanied the robbery, the accused should not be
punished of the special complex crime of robbery with rape but that of two separate and distinct crimes, as it
would be more favorable to the accused. Following the legislative intent in the passage of R.A. 7659, the penalty
of reclusion perpetua to death for the special complex crime of robbery and rape should be limited to instances
when rape is accomplished through sexual intercourse or “organ penetration.” The penalty should not be
unduly extended to cover sexual assault considering that the acts punishable under such mode were not yet
recognized as “rape” but as “acts of lasciviousness” at the time the severe penalty of death was imposed. All
the more, even after the inclusion of sexual assault in the definition of rape by R.A. 8353, Congress deliberations
show that the law never intended to redefine the traditional concept of rape. Rather, the law merely expanded
the definition of the crime of rape, with the intent of maintaining the existing distinction between the two
modes of commission.
a. The conviction of the accused-appellant of two separate offenses does not violate his right to information.
The right of the accused to information is the basis for the rule that a complaint or information, to be valid,
must charge only one offense. Failure to comply with this rule is a ground for quashing the duplicitous
complaint or information. However, the accused must raise the defect in a motion to quash before
arraignment, otherwise, the defect is deemed waived. In this case, the accused-appellant entered a plea
of not guilty without moving for the quashal of the Information, hence, he is deemed to have waived his
right to question the same.

Robbery 341
b. The separation of the charge into two distinct offenses finds further justification as the same is more
favorable to the accused-appellant. (People of the Philippines v. Barrera, G.R. No. 230549, December 1,
2020, En Banc)
8. In Criminal Case No. 2711-M-2010, the lower courts committed error in convicting Tamayo of the special
complex crime of Robbery with Rape since the prosecution failed to firmly establish the elements of the said
special complex crime.
a. Immediately after the incident, AAA went to the Hagonoy Police Station to report to the authorities.
Approximately a week after the incident or on April 25, 2010, AAA executed her Sinumpaang Salaysay
describing the incident on April 18, 2010. Noticeably, in the police blotter entry made immediately after
the incident, she only reported the robbery and attempted rape (“ginawang panghuhuldap at tangkang
panghahalay”) Tamayo allegedly committed by poking a knife on her neck and by kissing her (“tinutukan
ng patalim sa leeg saka pinag-hahalikan”). When she was asked to describe the incident in her Sinumpaang
Salaysay executed a week after the incident, she did not disclose the he inserted his penis into her vagina.
Instead, she introduced new details of the incident. It must be highlighted that AAA only introduced her
new claim that Tamayo forced her to have sexual intercourse with him during her direct examination.
b. The Court finds that the reasons advanced by the RTC for AAA’s alleged reluctance to admit that Tamayo
inserted his penis into her vagina are not supported by evidence. In the Decision of the RTC, it was stated
that AAA “was ashamed as there were a lot of people in the police station” and BBB was also present. If
she were truly hesitant to reveal how she was molested, there is no logical reason why she would mention
in her Sinumpaang Salaysay that Tamayo licked her vagina, inserted his finger into her vagina, and forced
her to suck his penis yet leave out the information that she was forced to have sexual intercourse with him
as all these acts are equally humiliating. It is also difficult to understand why she would leave out such a
vital piece of information when she reported to the authorities. Although it may be mortifying to talk about
the alleged sexual molestation she experienced, it is contrary to ordinary human experience to omit such
a pivotal piece of information which could later help in prosecuting Tamayo if the charges against him are
really true.
c. What is even more incredible to believe is AAA’s claim that the alleged molestation went on from 9:00 p.m.
to 12:00 a.m. without attracting the attention of passersby who frequented the footbridge. AAA claimed
that she was molested for approximately three hours with passersby occasionally crossing the footbridge
and witnessing the alleged molestation yet not even once did she try to seek help. Moreover, it is highly
unlikely that not even one passerby would intervene upon discovering them in a compromising position.
d. Moreover, AAA never mentioned in the police blotter and in Sinumpaang Salaysay that Tamayo punched
her.
e. AAA also cannot consistently identify which part of her body Tamayo aimed the bladed weapon. During her
cross-examination and in the police blotter, she said that Tamayo aimed the bladed weapon on her neck
and suddenly kissed her. Meanwhile, in her Sinumpaang Salaysay, she said that Tamayo aimed the bladed
weapon on her tagiliran. She did not mention in her testimony that Tamayo kissed her at that moment.
f. In the police blotter, AAA also averred that before Tamayo took her belongings, she tried to runaway but
he caught her when she fell. On the other hand, in her Sinumpaang Salaysay and subsequent testimony in
court, she asserted that Tamayo immediately took her belongings and that she did not have an opportunity
to escape due to Tamayo’s threats until BBB arrived and they were able to jump into the river. Moreover,
the Court observed that her narration of how she was undressed in her Sinumpaang Salaysay is not
compatible with her testimony during her direct testimony. In her Sinumpaang Salaysay, she alleged that
“inutusan po niyang akong hubarin ko ang aking suot na pantalon at kung hindi ko daw huhubarin ay isaksak
niya ang hawak niyang patalim sa akin at binulungan niya akong huwag sisigaw dahil sasamain daw ako at
dahil po sa takot ay naging sunod-sunuran ako sa kanya.” Meanwhile, during her direct examination, she
introduced another version of her story, alleging that it was the accused who pulled down her jeans. The
Court cannot simply consider these glaring inconsistencies as merely trivial and disregard them in the
appreciation of the evidence of the prosecution. These contradicting statements involve an essential aspect
of the crime charged, the manner by which Tamayo allegedly sexually assaulted AAA. Her failure to give a
consistent and coherent narration as to how she was undressed leads the Court to question whether the
alleged molestation ever happened during the alleged robbery.
g. The Court is also convinced that she never mentioned that she was raped when she was at the hospital or
even at the police station. If it were really true that AAA reported that she was robbed and raped when she
was at the hospital, the attending physician would have performed anogenital examination and she would
not have just been treated, for her external wounds. Had she disclosed this information to the attending
physician or police investigator, protective measures to ensure the proper treatment for her injuries and
documentation of the incident for possible prosecution would have been arranged for her pursuant to
Sections 4 and 5 of the Rape Victim Assistance and Protection Act of 1998 (R.A. 8505). In addition, ordinary
human experience dictates that, even without knowledge of the cited provisions, the attending physician
and the police investigator with whom AAA allegedly confided would have adopted reasonable protective
measures to ensure proper treatment and documentation of the injuries she sustained allegedly as a result
of the assault.
h. The prosecution also failed to present any competent evidence to rebut the evidence presented by Tamayo
tending to establish that he and AAA knew each other prior to the incident because Tamayo’s younger

Robbery 342
brother, Abril, is the former boyfriend of AAA’s sister and Tamayo’s adopted brother, Armando Trono, is a
classmate of AAA’s in her third and fourth year in high school. Armando even confirmed that AAA has been
to the house he shared with Tamayo before. It was also confirmed that AAA and Tamayo are both residents
of Hagonoy, Bulacan.
i. AAA also did not identify the perpetrator during the first opportunity to report the incident to the
authorities. In her subsequent Sinumpaang Salaysay, she mentioned that the culprit introduced himself to
her as “Mark” and as a resident of Brgy. San Miguel, Tampok, San Pascual, Hagonoy, Bulacan. PO3 Salamat,
the apprehending officer who prepared the Affidavit of Arrest on April 26, 2020 merely described in general
terms how Tamayo was arrested without correlating how the composite sketch and the follow-up
operation of the authorities led to the determination of his residence in San Agustin, Hagonoy, Bulacan and
resulted in his arrest. Noticeably, PO3 Salamat failed to narrate definitively how the information that the
culprit boarded an unidentified tricycle and the composite sketch led to his location approximately seven
days after the incident. It is difficult to believe that a composite sketch of a person AAA claims she does not
know and the follow-up operation resulted to Tamayo being readily identified. The Court cannot simply
ignore the seeming gap in the prosecution’s narration of facts. While a composite sketch was prepared a
day after the incident to help identify the assailant, and a follow-up operation was conducted by the police,
it cannot be denied that the question as to how the authorities were able to trace his residence was left
unanswered. It was not explained how these pieces of information were harmonized by the investigators
and paved the way for them to identify the culprit and his location. To the Court’s mind, the claim of
Tamayo and his brothers that AAA and Tamayo knew each other prior to the incident and that she has been
to his house before fills this gap and resolves how the authorities were able to locate his residence.
j. Moreover, AAA claimed that her boyfriend sent her a text message asking her location while she was under
the control of Tamayo. She alleged that Tamayo took her phone and replied to BBB, “Gago ka, girlfriend ko
si AAA.” Noticeably, if the testimony of AAA were to be believed, at this point of the incident, she had not
yet mentioned her name and Tamayo could not have known it either. Thus, it is illogical for Tamayo to send
the reply “Gago ka, girlfriend ko si AAA” when there was no opportunity for him to know her name yet. For
the Court, this allegation of AAA supports the claim of Tamayo that they knew each other prior to the
incident. (People of the Philippines v. Tamayo, G.R. No. 234943, January 19, 2021, First Division)
9. Herein, the attendant facts clearly establish that the primary objective of the accused-appellant and his
companion was to rob the eatery, which they accomplished through violence and intimidation, that is, with the
use of a knife to threaten the victim. This is evident from the fact that the first thing the accused-appellant did
after closing the door of the eatery, was to proceed to the drawer and took the money therein. As aptly put by
the trial court, rape herein was a mere afterthought and seemingly, was the initiative of the old man alone.
(People of the Philippines v. Coritana, G.R. No. 209584, March 3, 2021, First Division)
ROBBERY WITH INTIMIDATION OF PERSONS

1. The CA did not commit grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts when it found that petitioner
demanded money from private complainants in exchange for the memory card containing the latter’s private
photos, which made him liable for robbery with intimidation of persons. It may be recalled that petitioner
originally demanded from private complainant to have sex with him in exchange for the return of the private
photos. Private complainant refused and offered P5,000.00, instead. It must be stressed, however, that private
complainant’s counter-offer does not make it “with her consent,” as the same was made as a result of
petitioner’s existing and continuing threat of posting the private photos on Facebook. It is worthy to note that
petitioner did not offer to voluntarily and unconditionally return the photos of private complainant but instead
asked for something in exchange for him not to post the same on Facebook. In effect, when petitioner accepted
private complainant’s counter-offer of P5,000.00 instead of sex, his demand was merely amended or changed
from sexual into a monetary one. Accordingly, it is not entirely wrong for the RTC and the CA to conclude that,
in the end, petitioner demanded money in the amount of P5,000.00 from private complainant, which he took
at McDonald’s against private complainant’s consent. Concurrently, the second element of the crime is present
in this case – that there is unlawful taking of property belonging to another. So is the fourth element of the
crime charged anent the presence of intimidation of persons, as petitioner’s threat to post the subject private
photos on Facebook if his demand is not met produced fear in the mind of his victim, private complainant, so
that the latter was forced to give to petitioner the amount of P5,000.00, against or without her consent. (Asa
v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 236290, January 20, 2021, Third Division)
ROBBERY IN BAND
1. Under Article 294(5), in relation to Article 295 and Article 296, of the Revised Penal Code, robbery in band is
committed when four or more malefactors take part in the robbery. All members are punished as principals for
any assault committed by the band, unless it can be proven that the accused took steps to prevent the
commission of the crime.
a. Even if the crime is committed by several malefactors in a motor vehicle on a public highway, the crime is
still classified as robbery in bad, not highway robbery or brigandage under P.D. 532. It is highway robbery
only when it can be proven that the malefactors primarily organized themselves for the purpose of
committing that crime. (Amparo v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 204990, February 22, 2017, Second
Division)

Theft 343
2. The crime of robbery by a band was established by circumstantial evidence. It was proven that petitioner, a
member of the band, was liable for his acts because the following requisites concurred:
a. First, petitioner was proven to be a member of the band. Article 296 of the Revised Penal Code defines a
"band" as a group of more than three armed malefactors who take part in the commission of a robbery. In
this case, petitioner was proven to have led in entering the complainant's house five other men who were
all armed with long or short firearms when the robbery was committed.
b. Second, petitioner was proven to be present at the commission of the robbery by the band because of the
positive identification by the two eyewitnesses. Petitioner cannot raise the defense of alibi that he was
drinking in his house with his brother-in-law and was afterwards sleeping in his house beside his wife and
child at the time the crime happened. Such alibi is not entitled to much weight, even if such alibi was
corroborated by his brother-in-law and his wife, because the positive identification by the two
eyewitnesses still prevails. In this case, it was physically possible for petitioner to be at the scene of the
crime because petitioner and the spouses Denna were just neighbors, as alleged by the prosecution
witnesses and petitioner himself. Petitioner's wife is also Ocampo's niece; thus, they are related by affinity.
The RTC and Court of Appeals aptly found that the eyewitnesses were familiar with him and knew him
personally.
c. Third, the other members of the band committed an assault which is the use of force and threats against
the victims to force them to part with their personal property, money amounting to Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00).
d. Last, the petitioner did not prevent the assault. It was clear from the allegations and testimonies of the
eyewitnesses that petitioner did not do anything to stop the other armed and masked men from
committing the robbery. (Manangan v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 218570, November 22, 2017,
Second Division)
3. Petitioner is correct that to prove the corpus delicti of the crime of robbery by a band, the lawful possessor of
the object-matter of the offense must be proven. However, petitioner cannot allege that the spouses Denna
could not possibly be the lawful possessors of the Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) simply because of their
living and economic conditions. They bear no legal relation to the corpus delicti of the crime of robbery by a
band. (Manangan v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 218570, November 22, 2017, Second Division)
CATTLE-RUSTLING
1. The elements of cattle-rusting are: (a) large cattle is taken; (b) it belongs to another; (c) the taking is done
without the consent of the owner or raiser; (d) the taking is done by any means, method, or scheme; (e) the
taking is done with or without intent to gain; and (f) the taking is accompanied with or without violence or
intimidation against persons or force upon things. Thus, to sustain the conviction of cattle-rustling, the identity
of the stolen cattle must be proven with certainty. (Lopez v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 212186, June
THEFT
1. Use of PLDT’s communications facilities without its consent constitutes the crime of theft of its telephone
services and business.
a. Appropriation of forces of nature which are brought under control by science such as electrical energy can
be achieved by tampering with any apparatus used for generating or measuring such forces of nature,
wrongfully redirecting such forces of nature from such apparatus, or using any device to fraudulently obtain
such forces of nature. In this case, petitioner was charged with engaging in International Simple Resale (ISR)
or the unauthorized routing and completing of international long distance calls using lines, cables,
antennae, and/or air wave frequency and connecting these calls directly to the local or domestic exchange
facilities of the country where destined. The act of conducting ISR operations by illegally connecting various
equipment or apparatus to private respondent PLDT’s telephone system, through which petitioner is able
to resell or re-route international long distance calls using respondent’s PLDT’s facilities constitutes all
three acts of subtraction.
b. The acts of subtraction include: (a) tampering with any wire, meter, or other apparatus installed or used
for generating, containing, conducting, or measuring electricity, telegraph or telephone service; (b) tapping
or otherwise wrongfully deflecting or taking any electric current from such wire, meter, or other apparatus;
and (c) using or enjoying the benefits of any device by means of which one may fraudulently obtain any
current of electricity or any telegraph or telephone service.
c. The business of providing telecommunication or telephone service is personal property which can be the
object of theft under Article 308 of the RPC. (Laurel v. Abrogar, G.R. No. 155076, January 13, 2009, En Banc)
2. Medina is liable for theft when the jeepney parts of the jeep which was delivered to his shop for repair, are no
longer in the jeep and could no longer be found. (Medina v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 182648, June
3. Petitioner’s act of harvesting the abaca does not amount to unlawful taking because petitioner believed that
he was entitled to the produce as a legitimate tenant cultivating the land owned by private complainant. The
Theft 344
existence of the DARAB Decision adjudicating the issue of tenancy between petitioner and private complainant
negates the existence of the element that the taking was done without the owner’s consent. The DARAB
Decision implies that the petitioner had legitimate authority to harvest the abaca. (Ligtas v. People of the
4. Boquecosa is liable for qualified theft because she was, on the dates of the crime, a sales clerk and vault
custodian of the pawnshop and she admitted having pawned the missing pieces of jewelry. (People of the
Philippines v. Boquecosa, G.R. No. 202181, August 19, 2015, First Division)
5. Intent to gain can be deduced from petitioner’s possession of the foregoing pawn tickets which were
surrendered, together with the redemption payment by their respective pledgors. She submitted them during
the spot audit along with a confession letter stating that portions of the P1.2 million missing value of jewelry
were actually already redeemed. (Frontreras v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 190583, December 7, 2015,
Third Division)
6. The corpus delicti in theft has two elements: first, that the property was lost by the owner; and, second, that it
was lost by felonious taking. (Franco v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 191185, February 1, 2016, Third
Division)
7. Besides Cruz’s own admission that he took the unaccounted money without Carlos’ knowledge and authority,
Cruz’s guilt was also proven through the following circumstantial evidence: Cruz, as the manager of Chromax,
had sole access to the money and other collectibles of Chromax; he had sole authority to issue receipts; he gave
commissions without Carlos’ authority; he forged the amount in the sales report and receipts; and finally,
insinuated that it was Albaitar who misappropriated the money without providing any scintilla of proof to
support his accusations. In all these, it is undisputed that the money unaccounted for was owned by Carlos.
While Cruz is the manager of Chromax, whose authority is limited to receiving payments, issuing receipts, and
overseeing all aspects pertaining to cash purchase and sale of merchandise of the business, he has no right to
dispose of the same, and Carlos, as the owner of Chromax, has the sole power of dominion over the proceeds
therefrom. (People of the Philippines v. Cruz, G.R. No. 200081, June 8, 2016, Third Division)
8. Accused Sabado was a trusted employee of Diamond Pawnshop. In fact, circumstances show the trust and
confidence reposed on him by the shop owners, to wit: he manages the shop alone; he has the keys to the locks
of the shop; and he has access to the access to the vault and knows the combination of the same. Thus, due to
grave abuse of confidence, Sabado committed qualified theft. (People of the Philippines v. Sabado, G.R. No.
218910, July 5, 2017, Third Division)
9. The following circumstances are established during the trial: Victor, who had the habit of leaving valuables
inside his car, left P47,000.00 in the glove compartment; he hid the car keys in the filing cabinet; Catherine’s
car keys were missing since 2005; Cabanada worked as Victoria’s housemaid for several years; she has
unrestricted access to all parts of the house including the master bedroom; on April 12, 2009, she was left alone
at the house when the family when to Bulacan; the plantsadora, who only reported to work every Sunday, ahd
no access to the house and the car; Cabanada was alone from 3:00 p.m. until 9:00 p.m. after the plantsadora
left at 3:00 p.m.; the next day, on April 13, 2009, Victor discovered that the money was missing; and there was
no sign of forced entry or of an intruder entering the house. In addition to the said circumstances, Cabanada
admitted to the police in the presence of Catherine that she stole the money and led to her room where they
recovered the P16,000.00 cash and white leather wallet containing the master key of Victor’s car. The above
circumstances and Cabanada’s admission, coupled with presentation of the money, albeit less than the missing
amount, establish the presence of unlawful taking. The fact that the money was taken without authority and
consent of Victor and Catherine, and that the taking was accomplished without the use of violence or
intimidation against persons, nor force upon things, were also proven during the trial. Since Cabanada was
working as a housemaid of the Victoria family since 2002, the taking was done with grave abuse of confidence
and thus proves qualified theft. (People of the Philippines v. Cabanada, G.R. No. 221424, July 19, 2017, Second
Division)
10. Petitioners with their co-accused Pardilla were charged with Qualified Theft. Based on the foregoing precepts,
they are presumed innocent unless the prosecution established by proof beyond reasonable doubt that they
are guilty as charged. In order to do so, the prosecution must show that the following elements of Qualified
Theft are present here: (a) there must be taking of personal property, which belongs to another; (b) such taking
was done with intent to gain, and without the owner's consent; (c) it was made with no violence or intimidation
against persons nor force upon things; and (d) it was done under any of the circumstances under Article 310 of
the Revised Penal Code, which circumstances include grave abuse of confidence. In this case, the prosecution
miserably failed to establish the elements thereof, to wit:
a. First, the RTC confirmed that no one witnessed the actual taking of items belonging to Prestige Brands. To
establish unlawful taking, the RTC merely relied on the assertion that there were discrepancies in the
inventories of Prestige Brands. Such reliance, however, is misplaced because the inventories for January-
April 2003, and October 2003, contained only a list of items purportedly stored in Prestige Brands'

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warehouse and nothing more. Similar to our ruling in Manuel Huang Chua v. People, we can neither
speculate on the purpose of these inventories nor surmise on the stories behind them. While the
prosecution insists that the inventories evidenced the discrepancies of the items stored in the warehouse
and those that the company lost, the inventories themselves did not indicate such fact. Moreover, it is
contrary to ordinary human experience that Prestige Brands did not promptly investigate the supposed
discrepancies in its inventory for January-April 2003. It even waited for the subsequent October 2003
inventory to verify the supposed shortage of items. Indeed, prudent behavior would have prompted
Prestige Brands to immediately investigate and determine if it sustained any loss at the earliest possible
opportunity, and if it indeed sustained any loss, whether petitioners were the perpetrators of the unlawful
taking.
b. Second, contrary to the fmding of the RTC and the CA, petitioners and Pardilla did not have exclusive access
to the warehouse of Prestige Brands. Both prosecution and defense revealed that Dadlani authorized five
people - petitioners, Pardilla, and Tembulkar - to have access to its warehouse. In fact, Tembulkar, along
with Cruz, held its keys. Cruz could not enter the warehouse if the second lock is not opened using
Tembulkar's keys. Moreover, petitioners were being frisked by the accounting staff everytime they take
out items for delivery. The prosecution further confirmed that Cruz must turn over his keys to Tembulkar
in the evening. This only means that, aside from petitioners, other individuals may have entered the
warehouse and may have had taken the alleged missing items. Indeed, in order to justify the contention
that petitioners took the items in the warehouse, it is necessary to prove the impossibility that no other
person has committed the crime. However, given that petitioners were not the only personnel who could
enter the warehouse, the Court cannot exclude the possibility that some other person may have had
committed the alleged theft against the company. In addition, the prosecution did not present Tembulkar
as its witness. To our view, such non-presentation weakens its case since Tembulkar's testimony is crucial
in establishing the charge against petitioners. For one, and as stated above, he had access to the
warehouse, not just petitioners. For another, the Information revealed that Tembulkar represented
Prestige Brands in the filing of this case. He was also the one who allegedly informed Dadlani of the
discrepancies in the inventories, and conducted the investigation on the matter. Also, according to the
prosecution, he was the one who referred petitioners and Pardilla to Dadlani during the November 20,
2003 meeting. Hence, Tembulkar had personal knowledge of the supposed loss sustained by Prestige
Brands.
c. Third, the Court gives no credence to the supposed written confessions made by Cruz, Jervoso and their
co-accused Pardilla. On this, the Court is not unmindful of the presumption of voluntariness of a confession.
However, the confessant may overcome such presumption provided that he or she substantiates that one's
admission was not true and the confession was unwillingly given. In People v. Enanoria, the Court held that
there must be external manifestations to prove that the confession was not voluntary. These external
manifestations included institution of a criminal action against the alleged intimidators for maltreatment,
and evidence of compulsion, duress or violence on the confessant. Undeniably, these external
manifestations are present here. To note, a day after the execution of their confessions regarding the
supposed theft of Prestige Brands' personal properties, Cruz and Jervoso promptly reported the matter to
the Makati police. They even filed a case for grave coercion, grave threats, and incriminating innocent
persons, against Prestige Brands. Furthermore, petitioners also narrated the details on how they were
threatened and intimidated prior to and during the execution of said confessions. In the case of Jervoso,
he averred that Mayor Atienza talked to him at Baywalk in Roxas Boulevard and asked him to cooperate or
else he (Jervoso) would be liable. On the other hand, Cruz and Jervoso stated that NBI employees (Lontoc
and Atty. Simon) intimidated them into signing said confession. They narrated with particularity that on
November 22, 2003, they were forced to stay up to 11:15 p.m. in their office to translate into Filipino and
into their handwriting the typewritten confession they earlier executed. In the case of Manahan, he also
affirmed that Dadlani intimidated him into signing a confession by mentioning to him his (Dadlani) friends
in the media, and his connections to Mayor Atienza and the NBI. Although Manahan refused to make a
written admission, he confirmed the intimidation made by Dadlani against him. (Cruz, Manahan, and
Jervoso v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 206437, November 22, 2017, First Division)
11. There was no probable cause against respondent for the crime of qualified theft. Particularly, the elements of
lack of owner’s consent and intent to gain are evidently absent in this case. As for absence of element of intent
to gain, it has been held in cases where one, in good faith, takes another’s property under claim of title in
himself, he is exempt from the charge of larceny, however puerile or mistaken the claim may in fact be. In this
case, the accused has bona fide belief that he had authority from the real owner of the electricity and water
supply, with such belief arising from the fact that he and his family own almost all of the stocks of UM, and that
the consent of his father was sufficient for the use of BPTI’s electricity and water supply. In addition, as for the
absence of lack of owner’s consent, although UM and Virgilio are separate and distinct personalities, the Board
of Trustees of UM clother Virgilio with such apparent authority to act on behalf of UM. Thus, by giving Virgilio
an apparent authority, the Board of Trustees has given legal effect to Virgilio’s consent to accused to use the
electricity and water supply of BPTI. (People of the Philippines v. Delos Santos, G.R. No. 220685, November 29,

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12. For theft to be committed in this case, the following elements must be shown to exist: (a) the taking by Planet
Internet (b) of PLDT's personal property (c) with intent to gain (d) without the consent of PLDT (e) accomplished
without the use of violence against or intimidation of persons or the use of force upon things. All these elements
have been sufficiently averred in PLDT's complaint-affidavit and have sufficiently engendered a well-founded
belief that a crime has been committed. The test calls made by PLDT revealed that they were able to complete
international calls, which were made to appear as local calls and were not recorded in the Call Details Records
of PLDT's toll exchanges. This deprived PLDT of the appropriate charges due them. However, Planet Internet
and petitioners take issue with categorizing the earnings and business as personal properties of PLDT. Here,
aside from the allegation that Planet Internet had unauthorized use of PLDT telephone lines which enabled it
to bypass PLDT's IGF facility, PLDT also complained of Planet Internet's bypass of its PSTN, unauthorized access
of subscribers within the exclusive service area of PLDT, and use of PLDT's network facilities, without consent,
in the origination of outgoing international calls. Moreover, toll bypass operations could not have been
accomplished without the installation of telecommunications equipment to the PLDT telephone lines. Thus,
petitioners may also be held liable for violation of PD No. 401, which penalizes the unauthorized installation of
any telephone connection without previous authority from PLDT.[61] The OCP Pasig, as affirmed by DOJ, found
that Planet Internet was legally using PLDT lines legally installed to Planet Internet. However, the charge for
violation of PD No. 401 was based on Planet Internet's unauthorized connection of telecommunications
equipment to its PLDT telephone lines which enabled it to route outgoing international calls using PLDT lines,
numbers, and facilities without the required fees. The physical act of making unauthorized or illegal connections
to subscribed PLDT telephone lines is precisely the act being complained of. (Chiang v. PLDT, G.R. No. 196679,
13. Following Article 310 of the RPC, when coconuts are stolen while they are still in the tree or on the ground
within the premises of the plantation, the theft is qualified. However, for the crime of theft to prosper, it must
be established beyond reasonable doubt that the accused had the intent to steal personal property. The animus
furandi pertains to the intent to deprive another of his or her ownership or possession of personal property,
apart from but concurrent with the general criminal intent which is an essential element of dolo malus. In this
case, Igdalinos’ open and notorious harvesting of coconuts cannot be considered as theft as it made under their
belief that they, in fact, owned the land where the plantation is situated. This belief is honest and in good faith
considering that they held, in their favor, OCT No. 1068 covering the disputed land under Narciso’s name.
(Igdalino and Igdalino v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 233033, July 23, 2018, First Division)
14. The elements of Qualified Theft are as follows: (a) the taking of personal property; (b) the said property belongs
to another; (c) the said taking be done with intent to gain; (d) it be done without the owner's consent; (e) it be
accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against persons, nor force upon things; and (f) it be
done under any of the circumstances enumerated in Article 310 of the RPC, i.e., committed by a domestic
servant. Verily, the Court finds that these elements concur in this case as the prosecution, through its witnesses,
was able to establish that Jennie, while employed as Carmel's housemaid, admittedly took all of the latter's
pieces of jewelry from the bathroom drawer without her authority and consent. (People of the Philippines v.
Manlao, G.R. No. 234023, September 3, 2018, Second Division)
15. The totality of these circumstances leads us to inevitably conclude that the elements of taking of personal
property with intent to gain were not proven beyond reasonable doubt. Absent any concrete proof that
appellant indeed received: (a) cash collections of Sun Pride's sales agents; and/or (b) checks payable to cash or
in appellant's name, he cannot be adjudged to have taken the same for his own personal gain.
a. For one thing, the subject checks were issued payable to Sun Pride; hence, appellant could not have
possibly presented said checks to the drawee bank for encashment for his own personal gain. For
another, it appears that appellant, too, could not have taken the cash collections of Sun Pride's sales
agents for his own personal gain, considering that what he actually received from said sales agents were
only deposit slips of the cash payments, personally deposited by the sales agents themselves with the
bank.
b. Notably, the prosecution never denied that the company policy mandated its sales agents to personally
deposit their cash collections to the bank. It simply argued that the policy was suddenly changed for the
months of November and December [2009] and January [2010] to accommodate the high sales during said
period. The documentary evidence, however, negates this assertion completely. To illustrate, the WRTR of
Sonia Tigson (Tigson) dated December 13, 2009 showed that P47,467.80 worth of cash collections for the
period December 7 to 12, 2009 had been deposited by Tigson herself to Sun Pride's bank account. Another
WRTR dated December 13, 2009 similarly showed that cash collections for the same period in the sum of
P95,850.37 was also deposited by Tigson to said bank account. Significantly, the prosecution failed to
adduce any evidence that appellant had actually received the check and cash collections from the
company's sales agents. The supposed acknowledgment receipts proving that appellant actually received
cash and check remittances from Sun Pride's sales agents had mysteriously gone missing and could not be
located in any of the company's offices. (People of the Philippines v. Molde, G.R. No. 228262, January 21,

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16. The elements of robbery are: (a) there is a taking of personal property; (b) the personal property belongs to
another; (c) the taking is with animus lucrandi; and (d) the taking is with violence against or intimidation of
persons or with force upon things. Theft, on the other hand, is committed by any person who, with intent to
gain but without violence against or intimidation of persons nor force upon things, shall take the personal
property of another without the latter's consent. Thus, the distinguishing element between the crimes of
robbery and theft is the use of violence or intimidation as a means of taking the property belonging to another;
the element is present in the crime of robbery and absent in the crime of theft. (Del Rosario v. People of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 235739, July 22, 2019, Second Division)
a. In the case of People v. Concepcion, the Court ruled that when the complainant herself merely testified
that the offender snatched her shoulder bag, without saying that such offender used violence, intimidation
or force in snatching her shoulder bag, the snatching of the shoulder bag constitutes the crime of theft,
not robbery.
b. In People v. [De la] Cruz, this Court found the accused guilty of theft for snatching a basket containing
jewelry, money and clothing, and taking off with it, while the owners had their backs turned.
c. In People v. Tapang, this Court affirmed the conviction of the accused for frustrated theft because he stole
a white gold ring with diamond stones from the victim's pocket, which ring was immediately or
subsequently recovered from the accused at or about the same time it was stolen.
d. In People v. Omambong, the Court distinguished robbery from theft. The Court held that had the appellant
then run away, he would undoubtedly have been guilty of theft only, because the asportation was not
effected against the owner's will, but only without his consent; although, of course, there was some sort
of force used by the appellant in taking the money away from the owner. What the record does show is
that when the offended party made an attempt to regain his money, the appellant's companions used
violence to prevent his succeeding.The crime committed is therefore robbery and not theft, because
personal violence was brought to bear upon the offended party before he was definitely deprived of his
money.
17. The crime committed by Edwin is thus clearly only theft, instead of robbery. In arriving at this conclusion, the
Court is aware that Edwin was indicted under a charge for robbery, not theft. The failure to specify the correct
crime committed, however, will not bar Edwin's conviction for the crime of theft. The character of the crime is
not determined by the caption or preamble of the information, or by the specification of the provision of law
alleged to have been violated. The crime committed is determined by the recital of the ultimate facts and
circumstances in the complaint or information. In this case, the allegations in the Information are sufficient to
make out a charge of theft.
a. In the strikingly similar case of Ablaza v. People, the Court clarified that "for the requisite of violence to
obtain in cases of simple robbery, the victim must have sustained less serious physical injuries or slight
physical injuries in the occasion of the robbery." The Court added that the fact that the necklace was
"grabbed" did not automatically mean that force attended the taking. The Court explained: “The OSG
argues that the use of the word "grabbed", by itself, shows that violence or physical force was employed
by the offenders in taking Snyders' necklaces. The Court, however, finds the argument to be a pure play of
semantics. Grab means to take or seize by or as if by a sudden motion or grasp; to take hastily. Clearly, the
same does not suggest the presence of violence or physical force in the act; the connotation is on the
suddenness of the act of taking or seizing which cannot be readily equated with the employment of
violence or physical force. Here, it was probably the suddenness of taking that shocked Snyder and not the
presence of violence or physical force since, as pointed out by petitioner, Snyder did not at all allege that
She was pushed or otherwise harmed by the persons who took her necklaces.” (Del Rosario v. People of
the Philippines, G.R. No. 235739, July 22, 2019, Second Division)
18. When the prosecution witnesses had no personal knowledge of the fact of taking, the accused must be
acquitted because there was no clear and convincing evidence as to the fact of taking. This is so even if the
seized ink cartridges were admitted in evidence. (Yokohama Tire Philippines, Inc. v. Reyes, G.R. No. 236686,
19. The elements of qualified theft are present. First, the prosecution was able to establish that petitioner, as part
of her duty as principal of TGWSI, received tuition fees and other school payments from students and failed to
remit the same to the school. Second, the money taken by petitioner belongs to TGWSI. The Court, in
Paramount Insurance Corp. v. Spouses Remondeulaz, clarified that there may be theft even if the accused has
possession of the property; if he was entrusted only with the material or physical (natural) or de facto
possession of the thing, his misappropriation of the same constitutes theft. Thus, the conversion of personal
property in the case of an employee having material possession of the said property constitutes theft, whereas
in the case of an agent to whom both material and juridical possession have been transferred, misappropriation
of the same properly constitutes estafa. Third, the absence of TGWSI’s consent was shown in its attempts to
account for the missing money through a review of its books and to recover it from petitioner. Fourth, intent
to gain on the part of the petitioner was likewise established. Intent to gain is an internal act that is presumed
from the unlawful taking by the offender of the thing subject of asportation. Here, petitioner admitted to the
taking of the funds owing to TGWSI and even agreed o settle by signing a promissory note undertaking to pay
De Dios. Fifth, no violence or intimidation against persons nor of force upon things was employed by petitioner

Theft 348
in obtaining the funds. Sixth, the taking was clearly done with grave abuse of confidence. As principal of TGWSI,
petitioner was authorized to collect school fees. Such position or relation of trust and confidence was aptly
established to have been gravely abused when she failed to remit the entrust amount of collection to TGWSI.
(Reside v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 210318, July 28, 2020, First Division)
20. All the elements of the crime of theft was successfully established by the prosecution. As found by the trial
courts and upheld by the CA, petitioner took the rubber boots, frying pan, and iron pot owned by Elfa without
the latter’s consent or permission. Petitioner retained the items which shows his intention to gain. It was also
established that he entered the house of Elfa without violence, intimidation, or force upon things. (Realiza v.
People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 228745, August 26, 2020, Third Division)
21. The prosecution was able to establish the presence of all the elements of qualified theft under Article 310 in
relation to Article 308 of the RPC. Accused-appellant, as part of her duty as OIC-Property Accountant of Dasman
Realty, admitted that she received the payments from Dasman Realty’s clients for the period September 2011
to May 2013 in the total amount of P1.029 million, thus, she had actual possession of the monies, yet failed to
remit the same to Dasman Realty. As an employee tasked to merely collect payments from Dasman Realty’s
clients, she did not have a right over the thing as she was merely entrusted to collect the cash collections in
behalf of Dasman Realty. In fact, accused-appellant never asserted any such right over the collections, as she
even admitted that upon receipt of the monies, it was her duty to remit the collections to the cashier. Clearly,
accused-appellant was entrusted only with the material or physical or de facto possession of the thing, thus,
her misappropriation of the same constitutes theft. A sum of money received by an employee in behalf of an
employer is considered to be only in the material possession of the employee. Moreover, accused-appellant
identified the customer remittance record she had in her possession as well as her signatures appearing on the
same, and explained that it is where she listed down her collections. Thereafter, she claimed that she would
remit the payments she had collected from clients to the cashier, and present the customer remittance record
to the cashier so that the latter will sign on it as proof that she has received the payment collections. On cross-
examination, accused-appellant admitted that while she was able to collect payments from the clients of
Dasman Realty, she failed to record 14 official receipts which she had issued to clients in the said remittance
records. Likewise, the fact that the “taking” was accomplished without the use of violence or intimdation against
persons, or force upon things was undisputed. Thus, based on the foregoing circumstances, intent to gain is
apparent on the part of the accused-appellant. Moreover, actual gain is irrelevant as the important
consideration is the intent to gain. Furthermore, the prosecution was able to show that the taking was clearly
done with grave abuse of confidence. As OIC-Property Accountant who was tasked, among others, to assist in
the collection of the payments being paid the unit owners and lots, accused-appellant made use of her position
to obtain the payment collections due to Dasman Realty. From the nature of her functions, accused-appellant’s
position entailed a high degree of confidence reposed by Dasman Realty as she had been granted access to
funds collectible from clients. She would not have been able to take the money paid by clients if it were not for
her position in Dasman Realty. Such relation of trust and confidence was amply established to have been gravely
abused when she failed to remit the entrusted amount of collection to Dasman Realty. (People of the Philippines
v. Santos, G.R. No. 237982, October 14, 2020, First Division)
22. Albotra is guilty of theft. The prosecution satisfactorily proved that Albotra took the bag belonging to Ramos
without the latter’s consent and with intent to gain. The taking was done without the use of violence against or
intimidation of persons or force upon things, thereby removing the act from the coverage of the crime of
robbery.
a. Albotra’s contention that the prosecution failed to establish the element of intent to gain in the taking of
the bag is without merit. Since intent to gain is an internal act, it is presumed from the unlawful taking of
the bag in question. (Albotra v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 221602, November 16, 2020, Third
Division)
23. Theft is also committed by one’s failure to deliver lost property to its owner or local authorities. In this kind of
theft, it is essential to prove (a) the finding of lost property, and (b) the failure of the finder to deliver the same
to the local authorities or its owner.
a. The rationale for the “finder in law” concept is not difficult to fathom. It is precisely to protect the owner
of the lost property in the event the lost property is transferred from one individual to another and to
prevent the “finder in law” from escaping liability by claiming that he was not the actual finder thereof but
was merely entrusted custody thereof by someone who had no intention to appropriate the same.
Otherwise a person knowingly receiving lost property from the finder, who had no intent to steal, with the
felonious intent to appropriate it to his or her own use, escapes punishment. In such case, whether or not
the person taking the money is guilty of theft must be determined on the same principles which govern in
the case of the actual finder. (Pante v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 218969, January 18, 2021, Third
Division)
24. In this case, both the trial court and the appellate court found that the prosecution witnesses were able to
prove that Word lost his bundled money after alighting from his car in front of his residence and forgetting that
he had placed them in between his legs. Such fact was corroborated by the prosecution witness who testified

Theft 349
that he positively saw the accused-minor pick up the bundle of money under Word’s car. In the same vein, all
three accused admitted that it was the accused-minor who found the bundle of money in front of the bakery,
which they later divided among themselves in the following manner: US$1,700.00 for Pante; and US$500.00
and US$2,350.00 for each of the two accused-minor. Despite knowing that the money did not rightfully belong
to them, Pante encouraged the two minor accused to keep the money for themselves. He also appropriated
the money for himself by buying various items such as a a JVC component, gas tank, and construction materials.
He only returned the remainder of the money to Word when police authorities showed up in his house.
a. A finder under Article 308(2)(1) of the RPC is not only limited to the actual finder of the lost property since
the gist of the offense is the furtive taking and misappropriation of the property found. Though not the
actual finder, there is no dispute that Pante knew for a fact that his two co-accused minor merely found
the money along the road while the latter was delivering bread. Instead of returning the money, Pante
convinced his co-accused minors not to return the money and to divide it among themselves. At that
moment, Pante placed himself precisely in the situation as if he was the actual finder. Otherwise stated,
petitioner was a “finder in law,” if not in fact; and his act in appropriating the money was of precisely of
the same character as if it had been originally found by him. His criminal intent to commandeer the money
found was altogether clear at that point.
b. Having obtained possession of Word’s lost money, Pante had the opportunity and the obligation to return
the lost property to its rightful owner or to the local authorities, but he unjustifiably refrained from doing
so. Assuming for the sake of argument that he did not know that the money belonged to Word, Pante
would still be held liable for Theft for failing to return the amount. This is because the RPC does not require
that the thief must know the owner of the lost property. This is precisely why the subject penal provision
gave the finder the option to return the lost money not only to the owner thereof but also to the local
authorities. (Pante v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 218969, January 18, 2021, Third Division)
25. The prosecution failed to establish the corpus delicti of the crime of theft.
a. In this case, the Court notes that the evidence for the prosecution is largely circumstantial. Thus, it
behooves upon the Court to determine the sufficiency of the circumstances and whether the same “tend
by inference to establish the fact” constituting the elements of the crime charged.
b. The main witness for the prosecution, Lorilla affirmed that the purchase order for the missing Royal Cord
was given to Bantillo and the item subsequently purchased was brought inside the NTC-MPC premises, not
by the petitioner but by Bantillo. Petitioner did not acquire actual possession of the same. The parties
admitted and the petitioner affirmed that he directed Bantillo to place the Royal Cord in the Mazda pick-
up, the company service vehicle, which the latter accomplished. At the point relevant to this controversy,
records established that this vehicle was not used nor assigned only to the petitioner. In short, petitioner
did not have exclusive access to or control over the vehicle, as to render any item inside it within his
constructive possession. Under these circumstances, the Court cannot exclude the possibility that some
other person may have committed the alleged theft against the company. The rule in circumstantial
evidence cases is that to produce conviction beyond reasonable doubt, the evidence offered by the
prosecution must exclude the possibility that some other person committed the crime. Failure to do so is
tantamount to reasonable doubt that warrants acquittal. In this case, the inference that the missing Royal
Cord was taken by the petitioner was based on the fact that he gained control and possession over the
same, which was not proven. Clearly, the corpus delicti in the crime of theft was not proven and the
petitioner must be acquitted.
c. The RTC and the CA blindly relied on the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses that Bantillo placed the
missing Royal Cord on the passenger seat of the Mazda pick-up and that, thereafter, the petitioner left the
company premises on board the pick-up and later returned without the same Royal Cord. Both courts failed
to consider that the prosecution also averred that per the security guard's logbook, the petitioner did not
personally, but through one Ofilada, brought in one Royal Cord with a different specification than that
purchased. Verily, other than the testimony of Bantillo, there is no other evidence showing that custody
and responsibility over the missing cord were transferred to and acknowledged by the petitioner. At no
point, therefore, did the petitioner had actual possession and had exclusive control over the missing royal
cord immediately prior to its loss. As such, even with the petitioner's admissions of his instructions to
Bantillo and Ofilada, the Court cannot discount the fact that some other person may have committed the
theft.
d. The fact that petitioner is the head of NTC-MPC's maintenance department does not automatically mean
constructive possession without proof of actual transfer of accountability or possession over the missing
royal cord. If at all, the petitioner's position charges him of administrative, not criminal liability.
e. Verily, without proof that petitioner acquired possession of the missing royal cord at any time, there is no
taking. There can be no occasion in which the petitioner can appropriate for himself the subject Royal Cord
and for the crime of theft to occur.
f. It bears to add that when evidence of theft is circumstantial as in t his case, proof as to motive, that is,
intent to gain, is essential and cannot be merely inferred. "Animus lucrandi or intent to gain is an internal
act which can be established through the overt acts of the offender." In the case at bar, the prosecution
failed or did not even attempt to offer proof of such motive. On the contrary, the petitioner's submissions
which were unrebutted by the respondent belie the existence of motive to commit the crime of qualified
theft, i.e., the measly amount of the subject royal cord in comparison to the petitioner's salary and his three

Estafa 350
(3) untarnished years in service prior to the date of the alleged incident. Moreover, petitioner's conduct
after the incident is revealing. When confronted regarding the missing cord, Lorilla narrated that the
petitioner pointed her to the stock room and showed her a Royal Cord of different specification. Lorilla,
however, did not react and, instead, immediately returned to her office. Had petitioner indeed took the
cord, he would not have taken lengths in leading Lorilla to the stockroom; in the same way, if petitioner
was indeed responsible for the missing cord, then why didn't Lorilla corrected the petitioner that what he
had shown was not what they were looking for, so that the latter could rectify the situation? Questions
likewise abound as to why the petitioner would take a royal cord 14/3 and then supposedly replace it with
a new royal cord 16/2. Why would a person, who intends to make a profit, replace an item he has taken?
g. In view of all the foregoing, the Court has reasonable doubt with respect to the guilt of the petitioner for
qualified theft. (Imperial v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 230519, June 30, 2021, First Division)
ES TAFA
ESTAFA UNDER ARTICLE 315

1. The crime of simple estafa is ordinarily committed in the manner defined under the RPC; but if the accused
resorts to falsification merely to facilitate and insure the commission of estafa, then he is guilty of the complex
crime of estafa through falsification. In this case, it was duly proven during the trial that petitioner falsified
several BOC Form No. 38-A, a commercial document, in order to facilitate and insure the commission of estafa.
BOC Form No. 38-A is a commercial document used by authorized collecting banks, such as Land Bank, as official
receipt for the payment of additional or deficiency customs taxes and duties. The falsification of the BOC forms,
which are commercial documents, was a necessary means to commit estafa. (David v. People of the Philippines,
2. The elements of estafa under Article 315(1)(b) are present, considering that: (a) Rodriguez delivered the jewelry
to Cheng for the purpose of selling them on commission basis; (b) Cheng was required to either remit the
proceeds of the sale or to return the jewelry after one month from delivery; (c) Cheng failed to do what was
required of her despite the lapse of the aforesaid period; (d) Rodriguez attempted to encash the check given
by Cheng as security, but such check was dishonored twice for being drawn against insufficient funds and
against a closed account; (e) Rodriguez demanded that Cheng comply with her undertaking, but the latter
disregarded such demand; and (f) Cheng’s acts clearly prejudiced Rodriguez who lost the jewelry and/or its
value. (Cheng v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 174113, January 13, 2016, First Division)
3. Ison cannot be found guilty of estafa under Article 315(2)(a) of the RPC on the ground that in the Contract to
Sell indicated that Ison is the true and lawful owner of the fishponds but later on admitted the mistruth in the
misrepresentation. It should be noted that the prosecution failed to prove that Ison misrepresented herself as
the owner of the fishponds and entered into the Contract to Sell without authority from Col. Vergara. It was
likewise not amply established that the private complainants were completely unaware of the pertinent facts
concerning the fishponds’ ownership. Hence, the essential element of reliance upon the misrepresentation,
which should have induced the private complainants to part with their money is wanting. (Ison v. People of the
4. Petitioners are guilty of estafa. Records show that respondents were swindled into parting with their money for
the purchase of real estate properties upon the representation that petitioners were authorized to sell said
properties. Consequently, respondents suffered pecuniary losses in the form of the money they paid to
petitioners. (Belita v. Sy, G.R. No. 191087, June 29, 2016, Third Division)
5. Elements of estafa were not established. Records show that Rosalinda received P400,000.00 for the purpose of
constructing a garments factory inside the Monte Vista Park Subdivision. True to their agreement, she caused
the erection of a two-door studio-type apartment, one of which would serve as the garments factory. The
private complainants however posit that the structure was not in compliance with their agreed plan.
Nonetheless, the purpose of the money had been complied with by the petitioners, albeit modified. In fact, it
is worth noting that after the construction, the private complainants sent five sewing machines for use in the
garments factory, but were subsequently pulled out after two weeks for repairs. Finally, the records do not
show that the petitioners had malicious intent when they used the money they received to construct the two-
door studio-type apartments, one of which would serve as the garments factory. (Khitri v. People of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 210192, July 4, 2016, Third Division)
6. Accused-appellant committed the crime of estafa through falsification of public document. The accused-
appellant made certain that Tiongco would fall prey to her artifice by presenting herself as someone with
extensive connections in the BIR and the Registry of Deeds being herself an employee of the Assessor’s Office
whose function is the appraisal and assessment of real properties essentially for taxation purposes. She did not
relent until Tiongco prepared the amount of P130,000.00 supposedly necessary for the payment of taxes. The
accused guaranteed that the money will go as intended because she has done it many times before and her
transactions turned out well. This, of course, was pure farce because the title of the property was not
transferred to the private respondent’s spouse as intended, while the capital gains tax remained unpaid. More
Estafa 351
importantly, it was discovered later that the BIR receipt furnished by the accused was a falsified document per
the testimony of the assistant district revenue officer of BIR-Las Piñas. (Pascual v. People of the Philippines, G.R.
7. Accused spouses who made private complainants believe that they were authorized to undertake recruitment
and placement activities under Article 13(b) of the Labor Code and thus resulted to the latter parting with their
money as payment for documentation and processing fees, are also liable for estafa under Article 315 of the
Revised Penal Code. Private complainants were led to believe by accused spouses that they possessed the
power and qualifications to provide them with work in Macau when in fact they were neither licensed nor
authorized to do so. Accused spouses made it appear to private complainants that Beatriz was requested by
her employer to hire workers for Macau, when in fact she was not. They even recruited their own relatives in
the guise of helping them get better jobs with higher pays abroad for them to improve their standard of living.
Likewise, private complainants were deceived by accused spouses by pretending that the latter could arrange
their employment in Macau, China. With these misrepresentations, false assurances, and deceit, they suffered
damages and they were forced to part with their hard-earned money, as one of them even testified to have
mortgaged her house and another, to have borrowed from a lending institution just to raised the alleged
processing fees. (People of the Philippines v. Cagalingan and Cagalingan, G.R. No. 198664, November 23, 2016,
First Division)
8. As directors of BATELEC II that approved the ITI and Supertrac Contracts, petitioners did not receive funds of
the cooperative. They do not have juridical possession of cooperative funds. As such, they cannot be held liable
for estafa under Article 315(1)(b) of the RPC since the offenders did not receive the funds in trust, on
commission, for administration, or under any obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to refund the
same. In addition, while petitioners, as directors, may be said to be vested with control over how the
cooperative spends its funds, the same cannot be considered as receipt and possession of such funds because
they never acquired juridical possession of the funds of the cooperative. It should be noted that juridical
possession refers to that possession that is acquired by the transferee of a thing when he receives the same
under the circumstances mentioned under Article 315(1)(b) of the RPC. Additionally, petitioners never
misappropriated the funds or converted the same because in approving the ITI and Supertrac contracts,
petitioners merely exercised their prerogatives as directors of the cooperative to enter into contracts that they
deem to be beneficial for BATELEC II. (Remo v. Devanadera, G.R. No. 192925, December 9, 2016, Third Division)
9. Article 315(3)(c) of the RPC does not require that the documents or papers removed, concealed, or destroyed
are evidence of indebtedness. Assuming for the sake of argument that Article 315(3)(c) of the RPC penalizes
the removal, concealment or destruction of documents or papers that are evidence of indebtedness, still Anita
cannot be acquitted. The promissory note, the chattel mortgage, and the checks that she executed are not the
only proof of her debt to De Guzman. In a chattel mortgage of a vehicle, the OR-CR should be considered as
evidence of indebtedness because they are part and parcel of the entire mortgage documents, without which
the mortgage’s right to foreclose cannot be effectively enforced. (Capulong v. People of the Philippines, G.R.
10. Petitioner Gamaro was correctly charged with estafa under Article 315(1)(b). The Information filed sufficiently
charges estafa through misappropriation or conversion. Fineza entrusted petitioner Gamaro with the pieces of
jewelry amount to P2,292,519.00 on the condition that the same will be sold for profit. Petitioner Gamaro was
under obligation to turn over the proceeds of the sale to Fineza. However, instead of complying with the
obligation, she pawned the pieces of jewelry to M. Lhuillier Pawnshop where petitioner Umali worked as Branch
Manager and kept the proceeds thereof to the damage and prejudice of Fineza. (Gamaro and Umali v. People
of the Philippines, G.R. No. 211917, February 27, 2017, Second Division)
11. Appellant committed estafa by using fictitious names, i.e., “Manzie Delos Reyes,” “Manzie Matheus” in her
transactions with private complainants, falsely pretending that she possessed power, influence, capacity to
employ abroad or procure visas for them, making it appear that she had made the transactions to acquire their
entry permits and visas, thus, successfully inducing them to part with their money for the payment of the agreed
placement fee, albeit, knowing fully well she had no authority or license to do so. (People of the Philippines v.
Matheus, G.R. No. 198795, June 7, 2017, Third Division)
12. Accused did not commit the crime of estafa under Article 315(1)(b) of the RPC. Rafael, as the representative of
the estate of Poblador, Jr., very well knew of and concurred with the entire arrangement, including those which
had to be made with the BIR. In fact, the estate itself admitted that it received the amount of P15.2 million –
the ful amount to which it was entitled to under the terms of the sale of the Wack-Wack Share. For these
reasons, the estate could not claim that it was deceived. Moreover, there is no evidence to show that Manzano
personally received the P2.8 million from the estate with the duty to hold it in trust for or to make delivery to
the latter. In fact, Rafael categorically admitted that he did not even know who actually paid the taxes to the
BIR, and that Manzano’s name did not appear in the documents pertaining to the payment of the capital gains
tax and DST. Thus, absent the element of fraud, there could be no misappropriation or conversion to speak of

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that would justify the charge of estafa and, with it, the alleged civil liability ex delicto. (Estate of Poblador, Jr. v.
Manzano, G.R. No. 192391, June 19, 2017, First Division)
13. The prosecution has established that appellant defrauded private complainants by leading them to believe that
she has the capacity to send them to South Korea to work as domestic helpers, even as does not have a license
or authority for the purpose. Such misrepresentation came before private complainants delivered various
amounts for purportedly travel expenses and visa assistance to appellant. Clearly, private complainants would
not have parted with their money were it not for such enticement by appellant. As a consequence of appellant’s
false pretenses, the private complainants suffered damages as the promised employment abroad never
materialized and the money they paid were never recovered. All these representations were actually false and
fraudulent and thus, the appellant must be made liable under Article 315(2)(a) of the RPC.
a. It is well-established that a person may be charged and convicted for both illegal recruitment and estafa.
The reason therefor is not hard to discern: illegal recruitment is malum prohibitum, while estafa is mala in
se. in the first, the criminal intent of the accused is not necessary for conviction. In the second, such intent
is imperative. Estafa under Article 315(2)(a) of the RPC is committed by any person who defrauds another
by using fictitious name, or falsely pretends to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit,
agency, business, or imaginary transactions, or by means of similar deceits executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of fraud. (People of the Philippines v. Dela Cruz, G.R. No. 214500, June
14. A person who engages in illegal recruitment may be convicted separately for illegal recruitment under R.A. 8042
and estafa under Article 315(2)(a) of the RPC.
a. The elements of estafa by means of deceit under Article 315(2)(a) of the RPC are present. First, Sison
misrepresented her qualifications and authority to send Castuera to work in Australia. She actively made
Castuera believe that she had the ability to do so – she showed pictures of her “recruits,” had one of them
give a testimonial, and told him stories to convince him of such ability. It did not matter that they had no
agreement that their transaction was for recruitment or deployment. Second, Sison’s false representation
was made prior to or simultaneous to the commission of the fraud. Sison used these false representations
to convince Castuera that he would be able to go to Australia and be a fruit picker, just like her other
recruits. Third, Castuera relied on Sison’s representations. He believed that she could send him to Australia
because of the pictures and testimonials she showed him. He also relied on the fact that his aunt knew
Sison’s husband, a police officer, adding to her trustworthiness. Sison banked on that trust to convince
Castuera to part with his money and be recruited into overseas employment. Castuera believed that Sison
had the same ability to send him to Australia. He did not even ask for her authority or check for himself
with the POEA, relying instead on her word. Fourt, Sison’s misrepresentation resulted in damage to
Castuera. He paid the P80,000.00 downpayment that Sison required of him as processing fee, but the
purpose for which it was paid never materialized. Likewise, said amount was never reimbursed to Castuera
despite his demands for its return. (People of the Philippines v. Sison, G.R. No. 187160, August 9, 2017,
Second Division)
15. Misappropriation or conversion refers to any disposition of another’s property as if it were his own or devoting
it to a purpose not agreed upon. It connotes disposition of one’s property without any right.
a. Petitioner did not misappropriate the proceeds of the Pag-IBIG Fund Loan or converted TCT No. 261204 to
a purpose other than that agreed upon. In all his dealings with private complainant, petitioner acted for
and in behalf of GGDC which owns the title and the loan proceeds. The purpose of the loan from private
complainant and from the Pag-IBIG Fund was in pursuance of the housing business of GGDC, which is not
totally unknown to private complainant.
b. The evidence on record discloses that the Deed of REM dated May 29, 2003 and the MOA dated July 29,
2003 were both executed by petitioner, as the duly authorized officer of GGDC. In addition, in the first
Whereas Clause of the MOA, petitioner was expressly authorized by GGDC to enter into such transaction
and that GGDC, through petitioner, was desirous of borrowing TCT No. 261204 to be surrendered to the
Pag-IBIG Fund in support of its loan application. Records also show that the loan granted by the Pag-IBIG
Fund is a developmental loan to finance the house project of GGDC on the two lots covered by TCT No.
252245 and TCT No. 261204, both registered in the nmae of GGDC. Private complainant is not totally
unaware of this fact as evidenced by the very MOA dated July 29, 2003 which was the basis of his complaint
for estafa against petitioner. Hence, there cannot be any misappropriation or conversion by petitioner to
his own personal use, benefit, or advantage, of TCT No. 261204 or the proceeds of the Pag-IBIG Fund loan
granted to GGDC since private complainant is fully aware of the purpose of petitioner or GGDC for
borrowing TCT No. 261204 and how the proceeds of the Pag-IBIG Fund loan should be applied. Moreover,
TCT No. 261204 and the Pag-IBIG Fund loan proceeds are owned by GGDC and not by petitioner, and more
so, not owned by private complainant. If there was any misappropriation or conversion of TCT No. 261204
or the Pag-IBIG Fund loan proceeds, the aggrieved party should be GGDC, and certainly not the private
complainant. Otherwise stated, there is no misappropriation because TCT No. 2261204 and the Pag-IBIG
Fund loan proceeds belong to and are owned by GGDC, and not by private complainant.

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c. Petitioner’s May 29, 2003 Promissory Note acknowledging his indebtedness only clearly show that the
obligation contracted by petitioner on behalf of GGDC is purely civil and for which no criminal liability may
attach. (Coson v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 218830, September 14, 2017, First Division)
16. Records show that Racho defrauded Odelio, Simeon, Bernardo, Renato, and Rodolfo by representing that she
can provide them with jobs in East Timor even though she had no license to recruit workers for employment
abroad. She even collected the irrelevant documents and placement fees of varying amounts. Although
complainants were able to fly to East Timor, they remained unemployed there due to Racho's failure to obtain
their working visas. When they returned to the country and looked for Racho, complainants could not locate
her to recover the amounts they paid. Undeniably, the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt
that Racho committed Estafa against the five (5) complainants. (People of the Philippines v. Racho, G.R. No.
17. The facts clearly show the existence of all the elements of the estafa under Article 315(1)(b) charged,
considering that: (a) Rivac received various pieces of jewelry from Fariñas on a sale-on-consignment basis, as
evidenced by the consignment document; (b) Rivac was under the obligation to either remit the proceeds of
the sale or return the jewelry after the period of seven (7) days from receipt of the same; (c) Rivac failed to
perform her obligation, prompting Fariñas to demand compliance therewith; and (d) Rivac failed to heed such
demand, thereby causing prejudice to Fariñas, who lost the pieces of jewelry and/or their aggregate value of
P439,500.00. (Rivac v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 224673, January 22, 2018, Second Division)
18. Testimonial evidence established by proof beyond reasonable doubt that Estrada falsely represented herself as
possessing power to deploy persons for overseas placement. By these pretenses, Estrada deceived the private
complainants into believing that she would provide them their desired jobs in Dubai. This active representation
of having the capacity to deploy the private complainants abroad despite not having the authority or license to
do so from the POEA constituted deceit - the first element of estafa. Moreover, because of her assurances, the
private complainants parted with their money in order to pay Estrada the various fees which they thought were
necessary for their deployment abroad resulting in damage to each of the private complainants - the second
element of estafa. (People of the Philippines v. Estrada, G.R. No. 225730, February 28, 2018, Third Division)
19. Accused did not commit estafa under Article 315(2)(d) of the RPC. In this case, the prosecution failed to prove
that the accused had guilty knowledge of the fact that the drawer of the check had no funds in the bank at the
time the accused indorsed the same. There is no showing that petitioner had knowledge of the insufficiency of
funds of the check he endorsed to private complainant. Admittedly, the checks received by private complainant
were checks issued and paid to petition by a certain Ham. Upon notice that that subject checks were
dishonored, petitioner immediately searched for Ham but the same proved to be futile considering that the
latter already left the country.
a. In the crime of estafa by postdating or issuing a bad check, deceit and damage are essential elements of
the offense and have to be established with satisfactory proof to warrant conviction. Here, the 16-year
business relationship and dealings between private complainant and petitioner coupled with the private
complainant’s practice of accepting checks of petitioner’s clients, even if he did not personally know them,
negates the petitioner’s necessity of having to assure him that the subject checks would be sufficiently
funded upon maturity before accepting the same. Clearly, private complainant was not deceived to accept
the subject checks but did so out of a standard procedure which he and the petitioner developed over the
years.
b. The elements of the offense are: (i) postdating or issuance of a check in payment of an obligation
contracted at the time the check was issued; (ii) lack of or insufficiency of funds to cover the check; and (iii)
the payee was not informed by the offender and the payee did not know that the offender had no funds
or insufficient funds. (Juaquico v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 223998, March 5, 2018, First Division)
20. The prosecution sufficiently demonstrated Batac's deceit when it established that the latter induced Frias into
buying the checks at a rediscounted rate by representing to him that she had enough funds in her account to
cover them. In an effort to support her misrepresentation and further persuade Frias to believe her, Batac
conveyed to him that she was a school teacher, presumably as a guarantee of her good reputation. Batac also
signed the postdated checks in Frias' presence, presumably as a measure of good faith and an assurance that
the signature therein was genuine. All these induced Frias to part with his money. Further highlighting Batac's
deceit was her knowledge, at the time she issued the subject checks, that she had no sufficient funds in her
account to cover the amount involved. During trial, she expressly admitted that at the time she issued them,
she only had a little over one thousand pesos in her account. Moreover, when informed by Frias of the dishonor
of the checks, Batac failed to pay the amounts thereon within the 5-day grace period given to her by Frias,
prompting him to file the instant case.[
a. There is thus no merit to Batac's contention that, at most, she can only be held liable for violation of B.P.
Blg. 22. While sourced from the same act, i.e., the issuance of a check subsequently dishonored, estafa and
violation of B.P. Blg. 22 are separate and distinct from each other because they pertain to different causes
of action. The Court has held that, among other differences, damage and deceit are essential elements for
estafa under Article 315 2(d) of the RPC, but are not so for violation under B.P. Blg. 22, which punishes the

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mere issuance of a bouncing check. (Batac v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 191622, June 6, 2018, Third
Division)
21. Persons who receive money for investment in a particular company but divert the same to another without the
investor’s consent may be held criminally liable for other deceits under Article 318 of the RPC. Article 318 of
the RPC is broad in scope intended to cover all other kinds of deceit not falling under Articles 315-317 of the
RPC.
a. All the elements of Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code are present in this case. Petitioner, in soliciting
private complainant's money, falsely represented that it would be invested in Philam Life and that its
proceeds would be used to pay for private complainant's insurance premiums. This false representation is
what induced private complainant to part with her funds and disregard the payment of her insurance
premiums. Since petitioner deviated from what was originally agreed upon by placing the investment in
another company, private complainant's insurance policies lapsed. The present case is different from
money market transactions where dealers are usually given full discretion on where to place their client's
investments. (Osorio v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 207711, July 2, 2018, Third Division)
22. The four elements of estafa under paragraph 1 (b), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to Section
4 of PD 115, were established beyond reasonable doubt in the present case. First, Osental received money in
the amount of P262,225.00 from Te in trust for the purchase of RTW goods. Likewise, Osental promised Te that
she would deliver the proceeds of the sale and/or the unsold goods on 21 October 2008 as evidenced by the
trust receipt agreement duly executed and signed in the presence of Escobar who testified to attest to the
validity and due execution of the trust receipt agreement. Second, there was denial on the part of Osental that
she received P262,225.00 from Te. In her testimony, Osental specifically denied the existence and due
execution of the trust receipt agreement with Te. Osental also denied receiving P262,225.00 from Te for the
purchase of the RTW goods. Third, Te testified that she suffered actual damages in the amount of P262,225.00,
moral damages, and litigation expenses. Moreover, the fact of prejudice was also established by the duly
executed compromise agreement dated 28 August 2014 wherein Osental admitted that she owed Te
P345,000.00 representing the principal amount as well as attorney's fees and litigation expenses. Fourth, as
testified, a demand letter dated 23 April 2009 was sent by Te to Osental requiring the latter to return the
P262,225.00 within 15 days which the latter did not comply with. (Osental v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No.
23. The accused should be acquitted.

a. To establish the first element of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1(b), the CA focused on an
acknowledgment receipt executed by Legaspi to show that the latter indeed received the amount of
P9,500,000.00 from private complainant. This observation is, however, inaccurate. For one, Article 315,
paragraph 1(b) requires proof of receipt by the offender of the money, goods, or other personal property
in trust or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make
delivery of or to return the same. In other words, mere receipt of the money, goods, or personal property
does not satisfy the first element, it must be demonstrated that the character of such receipt must either
be in trust, on commission or for administration or that the accused has the obligation to deliver or return
the same money, goods or personal property received. It is therefore essential to prove that the accused
acquired both material or physical possession and juridical possession of the thing received. The
Information itself is bereft of any indication that petitioners received private complainant's money in such
manner as to create a fiduciary relationship between them. On the contrary, the Information reads that
private complainant "invested" his money with iGen-Portal. It is undisputed that at the time material to the
instant case, iGen-Portal was a duly-registered corporation engaged in wholesale and retail business, the
existence of which was never denied by private complainant as he himself admitted having scrutinized
iGen-Portal's Articles of Incorporation, income analysis and projected income analysis. Clearly, by the
transfer of stocks in exchange for the amount of P9,500,000.00, no fiduciary relationship was created
between petitioners and private complainant. However, as the undisputed facts reveal, the shares of stock
of Legaspi were transferred to Balisi, a Filipino, instead of to private complainant. This transaction was duly
evidenced by a Deed of Sale of Shares of Stock between Legaspi and Balisi. Accordingly, a stock certificate
was issued for the 2,000 shares in the name of Balisi which was recorded in the stock and transfer book of
iGen-Portal. To be sure, the issue of whether such arrangement was contrary to foreign ownership
restrictions or was used to circumvent Commonwealth Act No. 108 or the "Anti-Dummy Law" is not the
pressing concern in this estafa case. If at all, what this circumstance reveals is that there was no abuse of
confidence committed by petitioners nor suffered by private complainant; rather, private complainant
voluntarily parted with his money after he was made fully aware of foreign ownership restrictions and then,
even acquiesced to having Balisi, private complainant's domestic helper, purchase the stocks albeit the
funds therefor would come from him. It is also revealing that private complainant first demanded for the
issuance or transfer of the stock certificate in his name and when said demand was not forthcoming, he
demanded for the return of his investment and when that remained unsatisfied, only then did he file the
complaint a quo for estafa. Private complainant's demand for the issuance of a stock certificate in his name
in return for his investment negates the claim that petitioners received the money with the obligation to
return the same. For another, the acknowledgment receipt relied upon by the CA unequivocally states that

Estafa 355
the amount of P9,500,000.00 was "for the payment for 2,000 shares of stocks of [i-Gen] Portal." This is
consistent with private complainant's allegation in his complaint that he remitted the amount of
P9,500,000.00 as "payment for the 10% shares of [i-Gen] Portal." At the pre-trial, the prosecution also
stipulated that said amount was "received by i-Gen Portal in its account." The Information also charges that
private complainant deposited the amount of P9,500,000.00 "into the account of [i-Gen] Portal." Such
partake of judicial admissions which require no further proof. Thus, the inevitable conclusion is that the
sum of P9,500,000.00 was not received by petitioners, either materially or juridically, but by iGen-Portal –
an entity separate and distinct from individual petitioners which veil of corporate fiction was not pierced.
b. To convert or to misappropriate invariably require that the accused used or disposed the property as if it
were his own or devoted the same to an entirely different purpose than that agreed upon. Here, there was
not the slightest demonstration that petitioners used the amount of P9,500,000.00 at any time after private
complainant deposited said money to iGen-Portal. In fact, the CA had to rely on a mere presumption that
petitioners converted or misappropriated said money anchored upon the latter's failure to issue the stock
certificate in private complainant's name. The Court finds that the application of said legal presumption is
utterly misplaced. Under the Corporation Code, shares of stock are personal property and thus may be
transferred by delivery of the certificate. For a corporation to be bound, such transfer must be recorded in
the stock and transfer book, where the names of the parties to the transaction, the date of the transfer,
the number of the certificate or certificates and the number of shares transferred are indicated. It is only
from this time that the obligation on the part of the corporation to recognize the rights of a transferee as
a stockholder arises. Consequently, "without such recording, the transferee may not be regarded by the
corporation as one among its stockholders and the corporation may legally refuse the issuance of stock
certificates." Thus, private complainant could not have demanded for the issuance of a stock certificate in
his name when he acquiesced to having Balisi stand-in for him. As far as i-Gen Portal was concerned, the
purchase was made by Balisi and hence, if at all, the transfer ought to be made in her name. In the absence
of the first and second elements, there can be no crime of estafa; petitioners' acquittal should follow as a
matter of course. (Legaspi v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 225753, October 15, 2018, First Division)
24. What were actually proven by the evidence on record are the following: (a) Cabral and Bracamonte executed a
MOA in Makati City; (b) Bracamonte issued and delivered a postdated check in Makati City simultaneous to the
signing of the agreement; (c) the check was presented for payment and was subsequently dishonored in Makati
City. As such, the Court does not see why Cabral did not file the complaint before the Makati City trial court.
Not only were the MOA and subject check executed, delivered, and dishonored in Makati City, it was even
expressly stipulated in their agreement that the parties chose Makati City as venue for any action arising from
the MOA because that was where it was executed. It is, therefore, clear from the foregoing that the element of
deceit took place in Makati City where the worthless check was issued and delivered, while the damage was
inflicted also in Makati City where the check was dishonored by the drawee bank.
a. Case law provides that in this form of estafa, it is not the non-payment of a debt which is made punishable,
but the criminal fraud or deceit in the issuance of a check. Thus, while Cabral is not wrong in saying that
the crime of estafa is a continuing or transitory offense and may be prosecuted at the place where any of
the essential ingredients of the crime took place, the pieces of evidence on record point only to one place:
Makati City. Time and again, the Court has ruled that "in criminal cases, venue or where at least one of the
elements of the crime or offense was committed must be proven and not just alleged. Otherwise, a mere
allegation is not proof and could not justify sentencing a man to jail or holding him criminally liable. To
stress, an allegation is not evidence and could not be made equivalent to proof." Thus, since the evidence
adduced during the trial showed that the offense allegedly committed by Bracamonte was committed
somewhere else, the trial court should have dismissed the action for want of jurisdiction. (Cabral v.
Bracamonte, G.R. No. 233174, January 23, 2019, Third Division)
25. It was proven that except for the Cash Invoices issued by the suppliers, the documents required under the
DPWH Memorandum, dated July 31, 1997, were prepared, accomplished and signed by all the public officials
concerned, taking advantage of their official positions in making untruthful statements in the narration of facts.
The said documents were made to appear that the 39 service vehicles underwent emergency repairs or
required purchase of spare parts. In addition, in order to claim payment from DPWH, the Disbursement
Vouchers were also falsified to justify the release of checks. Thus, as aptly ruled by the Sandiganbayan, all the
elements of the crime of Estafa through Falsification of Official/Commercial Documents are present because
the petitioner and his co-accused utilized false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means to make it appear
that the DPWH service vehicles underwent emergency repairs or required the purchase of spare parts, and that
reimbursements are due to petitioner by using falsified documents. Through those falsified documents,
petitioner and his co-accused employed fraudulent means in order to defraud the government in paying the
claims for the fictitious emergency repairs/purchases of spare parts. Therefore, the government suffered undue
injury or damages in the amount of P5,166,539.00 through such fraudulent act.
a. As held by the Sandiganbayan: “The Court finds, and so holds, that all the aforementioned documents
submitted were falsified. Except for the Cash Invoices issued by the suppliers, the documents were
prepared, accomplished and/or executed and signed by public officers/employees taking advantage of
their official positions in making untruthful statements in the narration of facts. Through these documents,
it was made to appear, albeit untrue, that the 39 vehicles subject of reimbursements claimed and paid to

Estafa 356
accused Martinez in the total sum of P5,166,539.00 underwent emergency repairs that required purchases
of spare parts. The Disbursement Vouchers were also falsified to justify the release of checks for payment
of the reimbursements claimed. The Cash Invoices issued by the suppliers were also falsified because they
pertain to fictitious or non-existent purchases of spare parts. As earlier stated, these falsified documents
were all utilized in sinister schemes to steal government funds.”
b. The aforementioned falsified documents, as well as the Cash Invoices issued by suppliers DEB and JCAP,
were all utilized to defraud the government in a manner constituting Estafa under Article 315, paragraph
2(a) of the RPC. All the elements thereof were present, to wit: First. There were false pretenses, fraudulent
acts or fraudulent means in that it was made to appear, through the use of the falsified documents, that
the DPWH service vehicles in question underwent emergency repairs that required purchases of spare
parts, and that reimbursements were due to accused Martinez; Second. The false pretenses, fraudulent
acts or fraudulent means, in the form of falsification of documents, were employed prior to the commission
of the fraud; that is to deceive the government in paying the claims for the fictitious emergency
repairs/purchases of spare parts; Third. The government was induced to pay the claims relying on the false
pretenses, fraudulent acts or fraudulent means employed; and Fourth. The government suffered damages
in the total amount of P5,166,539.00, the sum total of the false claims paid.
c. The crime committed was the complex crime of Estafa Through Falsification of Documents, as charged in
the Information dated March 1, 2005. When the offender commits on a public, official or commercial
document any of the acts of falsification enumerated in Article 171 of the RPC as a necessary means to
commit another crime like Estafa under Article 315 of the RPC, the two crimes form a complex crime under
Article 48 of the same law. A complex crime, as earlier defined, may refer to a single act which constitutes
two or more grave or less grave felonies or to an offense as a necessary means for committing another. In
a complex crime of Estafa Through Falsification of Public, Official or Commercial Document, the falsified
document is actually utilized to defraud another. The falsification is already consummated and it is the
defraudation which causes damage or prejudice to another that constitutes estafa.
d. It must be emphasized that the falsified documents (Disbursement Vouchers, Reports of Waste Materials,
Requisition for Supplies and/or Equipment and Certificates of Emergency Purchase) involved in this case
are official or public documents. Public documents are: (i) the written official acts, or records of the official
acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the Philippines
or of a foreign country; (ii) documents acknowledged before a notary public except last wills and
testaments; and (iii) public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents required by law to be
entered therein. A public document, by virtue of its official or sovereign character, or because it has been
acknowledged before a notary public (except a notarial will) or a competent public official with the
formalities required by law, or because it is a public record of a private writing authorized by law, is self-
authenticating and requires no further authentication in order to be presented as evidence in court. In
considering whether the accused is liable for the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public
documents, it would be wrong to consider the component crimes separately from each other. While there
may be two component crimes (estafa and falsification of public documents), both felonies are animated
by and result from one and the same criminal intent for which there is only one criminal liability. That is
the concept of a complex crime. In other words, while there are two crimes, they are treated only as one,
subject to a single criminal liability. While a conviction for estafa through falsification of public documents
requires that the elements of both estafa and falsification exist, it does not mean that the criminal liability
for estafa may be determined and considered independently of that for falsification. The two crimes of
estafa and falsification of public documents are not separate crimes but component crimes of the single
complex crime of estafa and falsification of public documents. In this case, the prosecution was able to
prove the elements of the crime. (Arias v. People of the Philippines, G.R. Nos. 237106-07, June 10, 2019,
Third Division)
26. The element of deceit was established from the very beginning when petitioner misrepresented herself as
Vicenta Abalos, the owner of the check. To fortify the misrepresentation, petitioner issued and signed the
checks in front of Sembrano presumably to show good faith on her part. Petitioner also showed Sembrano
documents such as an Identification Card and Community Tax Certificate to prove that she is Vicenta Abalos.
And lastly, she showed a transfer certificate of title of a land registered under the name of "Vicenta Abalos"
presumably guaranteeing her capability to pay. As observed by the RTC, at the outset, petitioner's fraudulent
scheme was already evident. The misrepresentation of petitioner assured Sembrano that she is indeed dealing
with Vicenta Abalos who has sufficient means and property, and the capacity to make good the issued checks.
It is safe to say that Sembrano was induced to release the money to petitioner relying on the latter's false
pretense and fraudulent act. Evidently, petitioner's act of issuing a worthless check belonging to another who
appears to have sufficient means is the efficient cause of the deceit and defraudation. Were it not for the said
circumstance, Sembrano would not have parted with her money. At any rate a prima facie presumption of
deceit arises when the drawer of the dishonored check is unable to pay the amount of the check within three
days from receipt of the notice of dishonor.
a. What sets apart the crime of estafa from the other offense of this nature (i.e., Batas Pambansa Bilang 22)
is the element of deceit. Deceit has been defined as "the false representation of a matter of fact, whether
by words or conduct by false or misleading allegations or by concealment of that which should have been
disclosed which deceives or is intended to deceive another so that he shall act upon it to his legal injury."

Estafa 357
b. In Juaquico v.People the Court reiterated that in the crime of estafa by postdating or issuing a bad check,
deceit and damage are essential elements of the offense and have to be established with satisfactory proof
to warrant conviction. To constitute estafa, deceit must be the efficient cause of the defraudation, such
that the issuance of the check should be the means to obtain money or property from the payer resulting
to the latter's damage. In other words, the issuance of the check must have been the inducement for the
surrender by the party deceived of his money or property. (Abalos v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No.
27. The offense of estafa under Article 315(1)(b) of the RPC requires misappropriation or conversion of money.
Absent any evidence proving misappropriation or conversion, the accused cannot be justly convicted of said
crime.
a. Also the estafa charged herein requires breach of trust and confidence as an indispensable element. It is
not committed if the transaction is a sale by which the ownership of the thing sold transfers to the accused
the vendee even if the vendor is not paid the proceeds in full by the vendee. The former only becomes an
unpaid vendor, whose remedy is to enforce the sale. (Ibanez v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 198932,
October 9, 2019, First Division)
28. The elements of complex crime estafa through falsification of commercial documents have been established.
Here, the crime of falsification was already consummated, and the falsified documents were, thereafter, used
to defraud the bank to release money purportedly to Malang. Records show that petitioner falsely represented
that Malang pursued the loan application and promissory note that were signed in blank through petitioner’s
prodding; and orchestrating the whole process until he, with his now deceased co-accused Ilagan, succeeded
in withdrawing the proceeds thereof from RBSM, coursing them through MRBTI and Land Bank, and thereafter
applying the same to his previous irregular loans also with RBSM. Clearly, petitioner employed deceit to acquire
money, on antoher person’s account, and use the same for his personal use and benefit, which resulted to the
damage and prejudice of the RBSM in the amount of P14.775 million. Again, petitioner could not have acquired
the said amount to pay off his previous loans without the act of falsification. The falsification was, therefore, a
necessary means to commit estafa, and falsification was already consummated even before the falsified
documents were used to defraud the bank. (Soriano v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 240458, January 8,
29. The deceit and false pretenses committed by Arriola prior to the transfer of money are supported by evidence.
a. First, Arriola did not have any special power of attorney to sell Candelaria’s lot. The Authorization conferred
by Candelaria to Arriola contained no such authority in favor of Arriola to sell Candelaria’s lot. Assuming
that the Authorization was genuine, its wordings gave Arriola nothing more than an authority to receive
the payment for the supposed sale of Candelaria’s lot. There was no explicit mention of any sale to be
facilitated by Arriola. Despite such a patently defective Authorization, Arriola still volunteered information
to Del Rosario that he was also the broker of Candelaria’ lot and could negotiate the sale of the property.
In addition, an authority to receive the payment cannot be impliedly construed as an authority to sell a
piece of real property. Here, the Authorization was not in any way the special power of attorney
contemplated and required by law. Being a real estate broker by profession, Arriola should be well-
equipped with the basic knowledge on the technicalities in conveyances of real property for another
person. This pretense can only be perceived as misleading, false, and fraudulent, as Arriola acted before
Del Rosario as though there was an express grant of authority to sell Candelaria’s lot in his name, when in
fact, there was none.
b. Second, Arriola also presented to Del Rosario a fax transmission allegedly from Candelaria addressed to
him simultaneous to the full payment of the supposed purchased price. As with the semantics of the
Authorization, the fax transmission was likewise bereft of any indication that Arriola, or anyone else, had
been particularly entrusted with the sale of Candelaria’s property, other than the processing of its alleged
documentation and the pertinent government transactions.
c. Third, Arriola presented to Del Rosario a ready-made Deed of Absolute Sale with Candelaria’s signature
already affixed thereto. Nothing else attested to the genuineness of this document aside from the
compelling assurances by Arriola to Del Rosario. These assurances having successfully blocked any doubt
on the Deed of Absolute Sale, Del Rosario signed it on June 28, 2001 and Arriola had it notarized on August
2, 2001. It is curious, however, that while it is established that Candelaria resided in Australia, there was
no indication or testimony that Candelaria was actually present in the Philippines to sign the Authorization
or appear before the notary public for the notarization of the Deed of Absoltue Sale. (Arriola v. People of
the Philippines, G.R. No. 199975, February 24, 2020, Second Division)
30. Return o the amount owed to Del Rosario will not cancel Arriola’s criminal liability for estafa. The ruling of
Salazar v. People finds no application because, unlike the present case which involves estafa by false pretenses
under Article 315(2)(a), Salazar deals with estafa by misappropriation under Article 315(1)(b).
a. Moreover, even if so similarly situated, Salazar declared that the transaction between the parties therein
was simply that of sale, and a delay in the performance by a party to the contract entailed only a civil
obligation to return the advance payment made by the other. No such sale of a piece of land transpired in
this case due to Arriola’s lack of authority to sell. There was no contract in the first place. Also, unlike in

Estafa 358
Salazar, evidence of false pretenses and the resultant damage to Del Rosario clearly obtains against Arriola.
This creates not just a civil obligation on Arriola to return Del Rosario’s money, but also a correlative
criminal liability for the perpetration of fraud on Del Rosario. (Arriola v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No.
31. While it is settled that a person who commits illegal recruitment may be charged and convicted separately of
illegal recruitment under the Labor Code and estafa under the RPC, a conviction for illegal recruitment does not
automatically result to a conviction for estafa. In the same manner, one’s acquittal of the crime of estafa will
not necessarily result in his acquittal of the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale, and vice versa. (People of
the Philippines v. Espiritu, G.R. No. 226140, February 26, 2020, First Division)
32. Rios is guilty of illegal recruitment under R.A. 8042, Section 6(m), which penalizes illegal recruitment through
failure to reimburse documentation and processing expenses. As president and general manager of Green
Pastures, Rios had control, management, and direction of the business. She knew, or ought to have known, of
the failure to deploy the applicants without their fault and the need to reimburse their documentation and
placement fees. Despite this, Rios and Green Pastures did not reimburse the applicants, prompting the latter
to file the present cases. While partial reimbursements were made to Tigalo, Dacillo, Milanes, Papio, and
Custodio, the reimbursements were made only after the case had been filed in court. There was thus no genuine
effort on the part of Green Pastures and Rios to comply with the law and immediately reimburse the
complainants for all their documentation and processing expenses after they were not deployed for work
abroad.
a. However, Rios cannot be held for estafa since the element of false pretense or fraudulent representations
is lacking. Green Pastures was a duly licensed recruitment agency registered with the POEA, as shown in its
license. Moreover, the Job Order Balance Report issued by the POEA shows that Green Pasture had 24
approved job orders for Taiwan for the period 2007-2008. Thus, Rios and Green Pastures possessed the
qualifications and business transactions necessary to deploy workers to Taiwan. The prosecution, in fact,
did not present any document from DOLE during trial to establish the reason for the failure to deploy the
private complainants. Thus, it cannot be assumed that the same was due to the fault of the agency. (People
of the Philippines v. Espiritu, G.R. No. 226140, February 26, 2020, First Division)
33. The elements of the crime of estafa under Article 315(2)(a) are present in this case. The acts of Maria of
deliberately misrepresenting herself to the Pablicos as having the capacity to facilitate Jun’s entry into the police
force through her husband so hat she could, as she did, collect money from them allegedly for medical
examinaion, service firearm, and other so-called requirements and her failure to return the same clearly
amounts to estafa by means of deceit. More so, failure to produce receipts of the amount allegedly suffered is
not fatal to this case, as long as the prosecution was able to prove, by the positive testimony of the private
complainant, that the accused was the one who received the money in consideration of a fraudulent
representation. (Artates v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 235724, March 11, 2020, First Division)
34. There is no probable cause to charge respondent of estafa under Article 315(2)(a) of the RPC. First, petitioners
failed to sufficienly allege all of the elements in their Complaint-Affidavit. Their allegation that respondent Jaye
induced them through fraudulent representations and false pretenses to invest their money is instantly belied
by their own statement in their complaint. It must be noted that petitioners were the ones who asked Onate to
be introduced to respondent Jaye and it was Onate who introduced respondent Jaye as her broker. Clearly, it
was through the representation of Onate that petitioners will earn substantial amount of money in the stock
market that induced them to invest their money. Verily, no deceit or fraud could be attributed to respondent
Jaye as would induce the petitioners to part with their money or property. (Favis-Velasco v. Gonzales, G.R. No.
35. There is no probable cause to indict respondent for estafa under Article 315(1)(b) of the RPC. There is no
evidence that respondent Jaye received the petitioners’ monies in trust or under any other obligation involving
the duty to deliver, or to return them and that upon receiving the amounts respondent Jaye misappropriated
or converted them. The pieces of evidence showed that the checks issued by the petitioners were made payable
to the order of either the B.A. Securities, Inc. or DAMSI and not in respondent Jaye’s name. Also, the amounts
of money delivered by the petitioners were deposited to the account of either BASI or DAMSI and never in
respondent Jaye’s bank account. Thus, contrary to the findings of the DOJ Secretary, there could be no way that
respondent Jaye could appropriate the amounts of money invested by petitioners as these investments were
not deposited in respondent Jaye’s account. (Favis-Velasco v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 239090, June 17, 2020, Second
Division)
36. The fact that accused-appellant had a license does not negate the fact that accused-appellant employed deceit
against private respondents. Here, the prosecution was able to prove that the accused-appellant
misrepresented to the private complainants that she could provide them with overseas employment when in
fact there was none a the time she made such misrepresentation. Because of the assurances, private
complainants parted with their mone with the expectation of employment abroad which did not materialize;
thus causing damage to private complainants to the extent of the sums of money they turned over to the

Estafa 359
accused-appellant. Further, as to one of the five private complainants, she was made to believe that accused-
appellant would purchase her a plane ticket for which she paid P51,000.00. However, she was not deployed
because the ticket given to her by the accused-appellant was outdated and invalid, it being dated 2004. (People
of the Philippines v. David, G.R. No. 233089, June 29, 2020, Second Division)
37. It cannot be gainsaid that petitioner, in addition to her duties as principal, was authorized to receive or collect
matriculation fees from the parents and/or students enrolled in TGWSI. Per a verbal agreement with De Dios,
petitioner shall forward all payments received together with the remittance voucher slips to the school. As it
happens, the money merely passes into petitioner’s hands and her custody thereof is only until the same is
remitted to the school. Consequently, petitioner, as principal and temporary cash custodian of TGWSI, acquires
only physical or material possession over the unremitted funds. Thus, being a mere custodian of the unremitted
tuition fees and not, in any manner, an agent who could have asserted a right against TGWSI over the same,
petitioner had only acquired material and not juridical possession of such funds and consequently, cannot be
convicted of the crime of estafa under Article 315(1)(b).
a. When money, goods, or any other personal property is received by the offender from the offended party
in trust or on commission or for administration, the offender acquires both material or physical possession
and juridical possession of the thing received. Stated plainly, mere receipt of the money, goods, or personal
property does not suffice, it is also essential that the accused acquired both material or physical possession
and juridical possession of the thing received. Juridical possession refers to a possession which gives the
transferee a right over the thing transferred and this, he may set up even against the owner.
b. Guzman v. CA already demarcated the line between possession by an employee who receives funds in
behalf of the company and possession of an agent. In the former, payment by third persons to the teller is
payment to the bank itself; the teller is a mere custodian or keeper of the funds received, and has no
independent right or title to retain or possess the same as against the bank. An agent, on the other hand,
can even assert, as against his own principal, an independent, autonomous, right to retain the money or
goods received in consequence of the agency; as when the principal fails to reimburse him for advances he
has made, and indemnify him for damages suffered without his fault. Therefore, as it now stands, a sum of
money received by an employee in behalf of an employer is considered to be only in the material possession
of the employee. Notably, such material possession of an employee is adjunct, by reason of his
employment, to a recognition of the juridical possession of the employer. As long as the juridical possession
of the thing appropriated did not pass to the employee, the offense committed is theft, qualified or
otherwise. (Reside v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 210318, July 28, 2020, First Division)
38. Petitioner did not acquire juridical possession of the money appropriated; thus, petitioner cannot be held liable
for estafa through misappropriation. Records show that petitioner received the payments of the customers of
Baliuag on behalf of the latter. In fact, as provided in the Information, petitioner received the payments of the
customers of Baliuag in her capacity as cashier of the latter. Thus, petitioner only had material possession over
the money paid by the customers of Baliuag. Petitioner was merely a collector of the payments and she has the
obligation to immediately remit the same to Baliuag. Petitioner’s function as cashier of Baliuag is akin to that of
a bank teller who has no juridical possession over the missing funds. To repeat, Benabaye v. People of the
Philippines decrees that a sum of money received by an employee on behalf of the employer is considered to
be only in the material possession of the employee.
a. Nevertheless, petitioner can be convicted of theft as punished in Article 308 of the RPC. The prosecution
has sufficiently established that petitioner, as cashier and over-all in charge of the store in San Miguel,
prepared the sales invoices of the customers of Baliuag and collected payments of the customers. In fact,
customers of Baliuag testified that they already paid petitioner the amount corresponding to the
questioned sales invoices. Despite receipt of the said payments, petitioner failed to remit the same to
Baliuag. The fact that petitioner took the payments without the consent of Baliuag was established when
petitioner failed to account for the same when demanded. Petitioner claimed that she only prepared the
sales invoices and had no participation in the delivery and payment of the goods sold. She cannot argue
that she is only liable for the amount of P19,720.00 since only the said amount was supported by official
receipts. As correctly stated by the CA, sales invoices are evidence of transactions with various customers
of Baliuag and with the consummation of those documents arose the presumption that money was paid to
petitioner for its issuance. Sales invoices are proof that a business transaction has been concluded. Be it
noted that petitioner admittedly prepared those sales invoices. Further, she cannot deny any liability for
the unremitted amounts evidenced by the sales invoices and official receipts after she made partial
payment in the amount of P110,000.00 prior to the filing of the criminal complaint against her. Petitioner
is an accountable officer since she was the cashier and overall in-charge of the San Miguel store of Baliuag,
thus her taking of the payments of the customers can be characterized as taking with grave abuse of
confidence. But since the said qualifying circumstance was not alleged in the Information, petitioner can
only be held guilty of simple theft. (Libunao v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 194359, September 2,
39. Estafa under Article 315(2) of the RPC is committed by any person who defrauds another by using fictitious
name, or falsely pretends to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business, or
imaginary transactions, or by means of similar deceits executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission

Estafa 360
of the fraud. In this situational context, the offended party must have relied on the false pretenses, fraudulent
act, or fraudulent means used by accused-appellant Bautista and sustained damages as a result thereof. Here,
it is not disputed that private complainants Randy, Rolando, and Efren all relied on accused-appellant Bautista’s
promise that he would be able to arrange for their placements in jobs in South Korea, but that despite payments
of varying amounts of fees and the processing of the supposedly required documents, they were unable to
leave the country to work abroad as they were assured, and as a consequence, all three suffered damages.
These facts squarely fall within the definition of estafa, and belie accused-appellant Bautista’s insistence that
these were merely cases of benign unfulfilled promises. Instead, and as found by the lower courts, these
consisted of a series of deceitful acts that are precisely within the contemplation of estafa under Article 315(2)
of the RPC. (People of the Philippines v. Bautista, G.R. No. 218582, September 3, 2020, First Division)
40. Apart from the crime of illegal recruitment in a large scale, appellant is liable for estafa. The active
representation by appellant of having the capacity to deploy Ramirez, Tucay, and Yambao abroad despite not
having the authority or license to do so from the POEA constituted deceit as the first element of estafa. Her
representation induced the complainants to part with their money, resulting in damage that is the second
element of estafa. (People of the Philippines v. Palicpic, G.R. No. 240694, September 7, 2020, Second Division)
41. The elements of estafa under Article 315(1)(b) are present. First, the trust receipt covering the July 23, 2003
transaction unequivocally shows the fiduciary relationship between the parties. Arrivas was entrusted with the
diamond ring with the specific authority to sell the same, and the corresponding duty to return it, or the
proceeds thereof should it be sold, within two days from the time of the execution of the receipt. These matters
were admitted by Arrivas during trial. Second, Arrivas failed to return the ring, or the proceeds thereof, within
the period agreed upon in the trust receipt, and even after a written demand. The failure to account upon
demand, for funds or property held in trust, is circumstantial evidence of misappropriation. Third, Arrivas’
failure to return the subject ring or its value, despite demand, resulted to the damage and prejudice of Bacotoc.
Lastly, oral and written demands were made to Bacotoc to the petitioner.
a. Novation will not apply even if the P20,000.00 was made before demand. Novation, as a rule, is never
presumed and it is incumbent upon the party alleging the same to show clearly and unequivocally that
novation had indeed taken place rests on him or her. This, however, petitioner failed to do. (Arrivas v.
Bacotoc, G.R. No. 228704, December 2, 2020, First Division)
42. The Sandiganbayan correctly found petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of estafa
through falsification of documents. First, there were false pretenses, fraudulent acts or fraudulent means in
that it was made to appear, through the use of the falsified documents, that the DPWH service vehicles in
question underwent emergency repairs that required purchases of spare parts, and that reimbursements were
due to accused Martinez. Second, the false pretenses, fraudulent acts or fraudulent means, in the form of
falsification of documents, were employed prior to the commission of the fraud; that is to deceive the
government in paying the claims for the fictitious emergency repairs or purchases of spare parts. Third, the
government was induced to pay the claims relying on the false pretenses, fraudulent acts, or fraudulent means
employed. Fourth, the government suffered damages in the total amount of P5.16 million, the sum total of the
false claims paid. Clearly, the falsification of the DVs and supporting documents was a necessary means to
commit estafa. Without making it appear that there were emergency repairs and/or purchases of spare parts,
the accused would not have been able to obtain P5.16 million in reimbursements from the DPWH. (Dela Cruz
v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 236807, January 12, 2021, First Division)
43. Manalang is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa under Article 315(2)(a) of the RPC. The
elements of deceit and damage are present. The Court notes that the accused-appellant, without any license
or authority to do so, promised private complainants overseas employment, then required them to undergo
training and collected fees or payments from them, while continually assuring them that they would be
deployed abroad, but failed to do so. Persuaded by these assurances given by Manalang, the private
complainants paid their placement fees, albeit partially. Thus, her representation induced the victims to part
with their money, resulting in damage. The Court also finds that when private complainants paid their
placement fees, Manalang issued receipts using the fictitious name of “Tess Robles.” In view of the foregoing
deceitful and illegal acts of Manalang, the private complainants undoubtedly suffered damage.
a. Manalang may be convicted separately for illegal recruitment and estafa. In estafa, damage is essential,
but not in the crime of illegal recruitment. As the latter, it is the lack of the necessary license or authority,
but not the fact of payment that renders the recruitment activity as unlawful. (People of the Philippines v.
Manalang, G.R. No. 198015, January 20, 2021, Third Division)
44. Considering the absence of the first element of the crime of estafa by misappropriation in this case, it would be
futile to discuss the presence of the remaining elements. The absence of the first element alone sufficiently
shows respondent's failure to prove that Vicente is guilty of estafa under Article 315(1)(b). As such, he must be
acquitted.
a. The first element of estafa under paragraph 1(b), Article 315 of the RPC is absent in this case. There is no
question that Vicente had an agreement with Roxaco. Vicente presented a letter dated May 20, 2008 to
Roxaco regarding his proposal for the supply of the creative design and printing of the Palm Estates and

Estafa 361
The Orchards' marketing materials. Roxaco's Vice-President, Mr. Santiago Elizalde, wrote "OK" and signed
the letter. The parties likewise admitted that Roxaco issued checks to Vicente as payment for the billboards.
However, respondent failed to prove that Winner was a party to this contract or that there was a contract
between Winner and Roxaco. Liwanag testified that Roxaco informed her that its contract was only with
Snydesign and Winner was not a party to it. In addition to Liwanag's testimony, respondent also presented
the Price Quotation supposedly showing the conformity of Roxaco to Winner's proposal for the digital print
on block-out tarpaulin. Liwanag said that it was Gamboa who signed the Price Quotation for Roxaco but it
was never proven that he was duly authorized by Roxaco to be its representative.
b. Article 1311 of the Civil Code states that "contracts take effect only between the parties, their assigns and
heirs, except in case where the rights and obligations arising from the contract are not transmissible by
their nature, or by stipulation or by provision of law." Since Winner is not a party to the contract between
Roxaco and Vicente, it is not entitled to any of the benefits under the contract, including the payment made
by Roxaco. Accordingly, Vicente did not receive the money from Roxaco in trust or on commission, or for
administration, or under any obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return to Winner.
Vicente received for his own account the payment from Roxaco. Vicente's obligation to pay Winner
P35,400.00 is separate and distinct from Vicente's contract with Roxaco.
c. However, Vicente must pay the amount of P35,400.00 that he admittedly owes to Winner. Liwanag likewise
confirmed during her testimony that Winner is only entitled to receive P35,400.00 from Vicente. Vicente's
obligation is neither a loan nor a forbearance of money, the latter referring to "arrangements other than
loan agreements where a person acquiesces to the temporary use of his money, goods or credits pending
the happening of certain events or fulfillment of certain conditions such that if these conditions are
breached, the said person is entitled not only to the return of the principal amount given, but also to
compensation for the use of his money equivalent to the legal interest since the use or deprivation of funds
is akin to a loan." (Vicente v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 246700, March 3, 2021, First Division)
45. The charge of estafa against Toston lacks basis. Given the Court’s findings that: (a) Toston was a validly
documented employee of a validly registered recruitment agency at the time he transacted with the
complainant; and (b) Mary Ann's non-deployment was not only partly attributable to her own fault but also
based on a justified reason, the Court must likewise absolve Toston of the crime of estafa. Under the current
law on illegal recruitment, a person who commits acts constituting illegal recruitment may be held liable not
only for the crime of illegal recruitment but also for estafa under Article 315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code.
The elements of estafa under said provision are (a) that the accused defrauded another by abuse of confidence
or by means of deceit, and (b) that damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation is caused to the
offended party or third person. While Mary Ann did suffer pecuniarily estimable damage in the form of the
P50,000.00 placement fee she paid to Gutierrez and Runas, the element of fraud by abuse of confidence or
deceit with respect to Toston is negated by the fact that, at the time of the act complained of, Toston was an
employee of a validly licensed recruitment agency. Assuming arguendo that Mary Ann was indeed defrauded
when Gutierrez lied to her about the result of her medical examination, such fraudulent act cannot be attributed
to Toston, absent any proof that he directly participated in or abetted the commission thereof. However, as the
Court had previously mentioned, the prosecution was unable to prove that Toston knew about the result of
Mary Ann's medical examination or that he was privy to the concealment of this fact from Mary Ann by
Gutierrez, the general manager of Steadfast. Likewise, the defense was able to prove that Toston was not
present and had no participation whatsoever in the payment of the placement fee, which was handled by
Gutierrez and Runas. (Toston v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 232049, March 3, 2021, First Division)
46. The courts a quo did not err in ruling that petitioner is guilty of committing estafa under Article 315(2) of the
RPC. First, she took advantage of Malibiran’s misunderstanding that she had the authority and the capacity to
facilitate the issuance of the approved plan, tax declaration, and the certificate of title on Fernando Mamaril’s
land when she had neither. Petitioner claimed in her petition that she referred Malibiran to Castillo, whom she
knew could have the said property titled. Then again, Castillo was only an accounting clerk and also had no
authority to process the documents requested by Malibiran. Second, petitioner committed the fraudulent
representation prior to or simultaneous with the commission of fraud. Third, relying on petitioner’s
representations, Malibiran paid petitioner the total amount of P640,000.00. Fourth, petitioner failed to deliver
the documents requested by Malibiran. Neither did she return the amount that he paid. Consequently,
Malibiran suffered actual damages in the total amount of P640,000.00. (Umpa v. People of the Philippines, G.R.
Nos. 246265-66, March 15, 2021, Third Division)
47. The prosecution failed to prove the first element under Article 315(1)(b), i.e., that personal property is received
in trust, on commission, for administration, or under any other circumstance involving the duty to make delivery
of or to return the same.
a. The Court, however, finds that Zenaida only had material possession, and not juridical possession, of the
goods delivered to her for sale in Alson's Polangui. It is undisputed that Zenaida was the "branch manager"
of Alson's Polangui. Unfortunately, Ballesteros and Zenaida did not have a written agreement as to what
Zenaida's responsibilities were; thus, the evidence in this case hinged altogether on testimonial evidence.
The prosecution's own evidence, presented through the testimony of Ballesteros, is as follows: “Asked by
the court, complainant maintained that from the time [Zenaida] started managing Alson's Polangui branch,

Estafa 362
he had an employer employee relationship with her. As his employee, she was paid a monthly salary of
(Php5,000.00], plus additional benefits if she meets the sales quota of almost half a million pesos in a
month, at that time. He was the one who paid the salaries of the secretary/cashier and utility and the
monthly rental of [Php2,000.00] for the store space, which rental was paid through [Zenaida] because it
was she who had a (lease) contract with the Bichara family. Cross-examined, Mr. Ballesteros averred that
when Alson's Polangui started its operation, he already prevented [Zenaida] from continuing with her
previous business of buying and selling appliances, because it was incompatible to his business. There was
no written employment contract with [Zenaida] and all instructions to her were also verbal. [Zenaida]
directly reported to him about the operation of the business. While he delegated to [Zenaida] the selection
of a SecretaryCashier and Utility, he was the one who explained to the latter their duties and functions in
the office.” The foregoing testimony was corroborated by Zenaida and Repuyan, both of whom essentially
testified that Ballesteros had control over the operations of Alson's Polangui through his verbal instructions.
To the mind of the Court, these testimonies establish that Zenaida was a mere employee – not an agent -
of Ballesteros and Alson's Polangui.
b. In Chua-Burce v. Court of Appeals, the Court, citing People v. Locson and Guzman v. Court of Appeals,
emphasized that "[j]uridical possession means a possession which gives the transferee a right over the
thing which the transferee may set up even against the owner." The Court held that the cash custodian of
a bank who misappropriated the bank's funds was not guilty of estafa for she only had material possession
of the missing funds. There is an essential distinction between the possession by a receiving teller of funds
received from third persons paid to the bank, and an agent who receives the proceeds of sales of
merchandise delivered to him in agency by his principal. In the former case, payment by third persons to
the teller is payment to the bank itself; the teller is a mere custodian or keeper of the funds received, and
has no independent right or title to retain or possess the same as against the bank. An agent, on the other
hand, can even assert, as against his own principal, an independent, autonomous, right to retain money or
goods received in consequence of the agency; as when the principal fails to reimburse him for advances he
has made, and indemnify him for damages suffered without his fault.
c. In the present case, the records are bereft of any evidence pointing to an existence of agency between
Zenaida and Ballesteros. There is likewise no proof that Zenaida received the items delivered to Alson's
Polangui on consignment basis, or that any title passed to her by virtue of the said delivery. The Court
cannot find anything which indicates that Zenaida would have independent title over the goods as against
Ballesteros. Ballesteros had (i) the power to control the operations of Alson's Polangui, (ii) the power to
control what Zenaida could and could not do, and (iii) the responsibility to pay the salaries of all Alson's
Polangui's employees, including Zenaida. The foregoing indicates the existence of employer-employee
relationship between Ballesteros and Zenaida. Thus, the Court holds that Zenaida did not have juridical
possession of the goods delivered to her. (Layson v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 207249, May 14,
48. The second element of Article 315(1)(b) of the RPC, i.e., conversion or diversion of such property by the person
who has so received it, is absent.
a. As to the Undeposited Net Collection for the Day and the Net Short Deposit of Collection for the Day, the
RTC and the CA erred in anchoring Zenaida's criminal liability on the entries in Repuyan's columnar logbook.
To recall, Repuyan herself testified that she was in charge of "issuance of receipts to customers;
preparation of documents for delivery of stocks; and collection of remittances from customers." In
addition, Ballesteros testified that although he authorized Zenaida to hire a utility and secretary/cashier,
he specifically instructed Repuyan to be the one to receive the payments and deposit the collections in the
bank. But since he seldom visited the branch, he later discovered that Zenaida was the one depositing the
collections in the bank. From the testimonies of Repuyan, Ballesteros, and Zenaida, it appears that it was
Repuyan who transacted with the buyers. Repuyan was the one in charge of receiving the payment from
buyers and issuing the corresponding receipts. She would then make an entry into the columnar logbook,
and remit the collections to Zenaida, who would then deposit the money in Ballesteros' bank accounts.
Accomplishing the columnar logbooks and making entries therein were, therefore, solely under Repuyan's
control. Zenaida had no hand in their preparation, and neither were they ever signed by her. Instead,
Repuyan claimed that when she would remit money to Zenaida, the latter would issue acknowledgement
receipts to her. When asked to present these acknowledgment receipts to prove that Zenaida indeed
received the exact amotmts reflected in the columnar logbooks, she stated that Zenaida's daughter, Swisa
Manjares King (Swisa), had borrowed and had never returned the originals. She also stated that she had
photocopies of these acknowledgment receipts, but they were also lost because she kept them in a drawer
that Zenaida had access to. All of these claims, however, were uncorroborated. Zenaida denied executing
acknowledgement receipts, and claimed to only execute three deposit slips each time Repuyan would remit
money to her for deposit. No one also witnessed that Swisa indeed borrowed the originals, if they even
really existed. Given the foregoing, the columnar logbooks are worthless in proving that Zenaida received
more than what she deposited in Ballesteros' bank accounts. That the columnar logbooks were "entries in
the course of business" is immaterial, for such evidentiary rule only determines the admissibility of the
logbooks, not their evidentiary weight. The prosecution was not able to prove that the amounts in the
columnar logbooks exactly reflects what Zenaida received. Repuyan herself "admitted that amounts for
deposit as stated in the columnar books was no proof that they were received by [Zenaida]." To emphasize,

Estafa 363
the preparation and accomplishment of the columnar logbooks was under the responsibility and control of
Repuyan alone. Under the rule on res inter alios acta, "the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act,
declaration, or omission of another." Hence, the columnar logbooks, accomplished completely by a third
person, cannot prejudice Zenaida. Simply put, the columnar logbooks, by themselves, cannot be used as
the basis to determine her liability. At this juncture, it is important to point out a glaring fact which both
the RTC and the CA missed. In her testimony, Repuyan admitted that "per company procedure, a copy of
the deposit slip is given to her x x x for checking if the amount therein corresponded to the amount in the
[acknowledgment] receipt." If Zenaida truly did not deposit certain amounts, or she deposited less than
what she received from Repuyan, then the latter would have been easily alerted of the same. A simple
comparison between her copy of the deposit slips, on the one hand, and the columnar logbooks and the
acknowledgment receipts, on the other, would have enabled her to notice that Zenaida was pocketing
money that rightfully belonged to Ballesteros. Yet, she alerted no one, and it was not until Ballesteros asked
Pan to conduct an audit of Alson's Polangui that the irregularities were supposedly discovered. This glaring
fact all the more points to the plausibility of Zenaida's defense: that she was depositing in Ballesteros' bank
accounts all the collections that Repuyan remitted to her.
b. As to the Disallowed Payment of Salesman Commission, it must be pointed out that these refer to amounts
which were paid to fictitious agents, or the agents themselves claimed to have not received the amounts
as stated. The amounts were paid were culled by Pan from “receivable cards” of customers. Meanwhile,
Zenaida disclaimed any knowledge of such payments, pointing out that agents transacted directly with
Repuyan. Similar to the first two items, these "receivable cards" cannot be made a basis for Zenaida's
criminal liability. The prosecution did not present any evidence that Zenaida had any participation in making
entries in the said "receivable cards." It is well to remember that, based on the testimonies of Zenaida,
Ballesteros, and Repuyan, it was Repuyan who was in charge of preparing documents relative to the
payments of customers. There is no evidence on record that Zenaida dealt with the agents themselves.
Moreover, there is also doubt on whether there were agents who did not receive their commissions. The
prosecution only presented Pan to testify to this fact in the course of testifying on his audit findings. The
agents who claimed that they did not receive anything, however, were never presented in court. They were
therefore not cross-examined regarding their claims. Thus, the finding that these agents did not receive
their commissions is supported by mere hearsay evidence which has no probative weight.
c. As for the Unreplaced Bounced Check Used for Liquidation of Stocks, it was alleged that there was a check
for P10,000.00 that was returned for insufficient funds. The allegation was that Zenaida transacted with
four customers, all of whom paid in cash for a total of P9,991.00. Instead of depositing it directly into
Ballesteros' bank account, she deposited the check into said bank account, which check was returned for
insufficient funds. Once again, this cannot be used to adjudge Zenaida guilty of the charge. First of all, the
prosecution did not present anything to prove this allegation apart from Pan's testimony The prosecution
did not present the check itself or any other document from the bank proving that the check bounced. As
well, it is worth to recall that based on the testimonial evidence in this case, it was Repuyan who was
transacting with customers. In fact, as Zenaida pointed out, the delivery receipts issued to the four
customers were not signed by her. Moreover, there is a discrepancy, albeit minimal, between the amounts
allegedly collected as compared to the one Zenaida tried to deposit. Why would Zenaida deposit try to
deposit P10,000, when what was supposedly given to her was merely P9,991.00? Given the foregoing, the
Court finds that there is very serious doubt as to Zenaida's accountability on this item.
d. As to the Unreceipted/Undeposited C.O.D. Sales, the amounts charged against Zenaida on this item were
again obtained from the columnar logbooks. These refer to items which were traced to have been delivered
to customers but there were no entries in the columnar logbooks representing said sales. To prove that
Zenaida had a general practice of receiving money without issuing receipts, the prosecution presented
Mendoza, a customer, on the witness stand. However, his testimony did not prove anything considering
that upon clarification during cross-examination, it was revealed that Mendoza never personally gave
money to Zenaida. As narrated in the facts above, his testimony was that in the two instances when he
paid money to Alson's Polangui but was not issued any receipt, he handed the money to a certain "Amor,"
not to Zenaida. It is clear from the foregoing alone that the evidence was utterly wanting as regards
Zenaida's liability under this item. It is worth to reiterate that Zenaida did not have any participation in the
preparation of the logbooks. Repuyan was in charge of "preparation of documents for delivery of stocks"
and was in full control of what was entered into the logbooks. Zenaida cannot be adjudged criminally liable
based on the acts of another person, unless there is a finding of conspiracy between them. There being
none in this case, Zenaida must be absolved of criminal liability in this item.
e. As to Customers with Remaining Balance but had Fully Paid, these refer to installment sales wherein the
customers claimed to have already paid a larger amount than what was reflected in Alson's Polangui's
records. For instance, there was one customer who claimed to have already paid P17,000.00, but the "index
card" in the store's records, as well as the official receipts issued to the customer only reflected payments
totaling P13,829.00. These cannot also be charged to Zenaida. Apart from the lack of clear evidence of
Zenaida' participation in the preparation of the "index cards," none of the customers alleged to have paid
larger amounts were presented in court to testify on these allegations. The only evidence that these
customers indeed paid a larger amount than what was reflected in the store's records was Pan's testimony
as regards his investigation in connection to the audit he conducted. Similar to the alleged unpaid

Estafa 364
commissions of agents in item C, the testimony of Pan on this item is hearsay; therefore, devoid of any
evidentiary weight even if it was admitted into evidence.
f. As to the Current Cost of Unaccounted Stocks and Charges for Unaccounted Repossessed Unit, the
amounts under these items represent the cost of goods that were confirmed to have been delivered to
Alson's Polangui, or repossessed from customers by Alson's Polangui, all of which could no longer be
accounted for when Pan was auditing the store. While Zenaida denied any liability for the goods under this
item as the deliveries were handled by other employees of the store, the lower courts declared that
Zenaida was liable because she was the store's branch manager. The RTC, in particular, held that Zenaida
exercised control and supervision over the work of Repuyan and the other employees. Hence, she was
ultimately liable for the loss of the goods. The Court disagrees. While Zenaida may be responsible for the
goods as branch manager of the store, she may only, at most, be made liable civilly for the value of the
goods based on the facts of this case. Zenaida cannot be made criminally liable for the loss of the goods,
absent any proof that she converted, or misappropriated them. As earlier mentioned, Zenaida did not have
juridical possession of the items. Thus, the legal presumption of misappropriation "when the accused fails
to deliver the proceeds of the sale or to return the items to be sold and fails to give an account of their
whereabouts" does not arise in this case. In other words, to make her criminally liable for the loss of the
goods, it was incumbent upon the prosecution to offer evidence that it was she who took or
misappropriated the goods - and not someone else who had access to the store. The reasoning of the lower
courts effectively convicts Zenaida of estafa for her negligence as a branch manager which cannot be
countenanced by the Court.
g. As for Confirmed Short Remittance of C.O.D. Sales and Price Difference/Excess Payments for Confirmed
Installment Sales but are Reported as C.O.D. Sales, for these items, Zenaida's defense was that there was
an agreement between her and Ballesteros that the amount of "overprice" would be given to her. She
explained that she was allowed to get additional remuneration from the "overprice in the cash sales of
appliances." She also explained that the customer copies of delivery receipts for cash transactions would
reflect the "overprice" - the price as advertised - so that the buyer would not suspect that there was an
"overprice." What was reflected in the office copy of the delivery receipts was the "listed company price"
of the stocks being purchased. The Court rules that there is also reasonable doubt on Zenaida's liability on
this item. The Court has, time and again, declared that if the inculpatory facts and circumstances are
capable of two or more interpretations, one of which being consistent with the innocence of the accused
and the other or others consistent with his guilt, then the evidence in view of the constitutional
presumption of innocence has not fulfilled the test of moral certainty and is thus insufficient to support a
conviction. In this case, the inculpatory acts could be interpreted as evidence of estafa, on the one hand,
or could be perfectly explained by the agreement between Zenaida and Ballesteros, on the other. While
Zenaida's defense appears like a convenient excuse, it is important to note that, as mentioned, Ballesteros
and Zenaida did not have a written memorandum of their agreements. The Court, and even the lower
courts, have had to rely only on the testimonies of the both of them to establish what their agreements
were. For this item, Zenaida insists that Ballesteros allowed her by agreement to charge an "overprice" as
additional compensation. Meanwhile, Ballesteros did not have any testimony regarding the existence of
such agreement. Neither has he denied its existence. Ballesteros only testified that he has prohibited
Zenaida from further engaging in her buy-and-sell business when she started as his branch manager as he
deemed it inconsistent with his business. To the mind of the Court, this further bolsters the possibility that
Zenaida and Ballesteros indeed had an agreement so that the former could have additional compensation
on top of her P5,000.00 monthly salary as his branch manager. (Layson v. People of the Philippines, G.R.
No. 207249, May 14, 2021, First Division)
49. Due to the novation, the elements of the crime of estafa under Article 315(1)(b) of the RPC became non-
existent.
a. The Court finds that the original contract of commodatum between the herein parties was effectively
novated when they entered into an amicable settlement before the barangay in March 2005, which
amicable settlement came about before the Information for Estafa against petitioner was filed in January
2006. To reiterate, the subject of the amicable settlement were the unpaid accounts which petitioner
supposedly owed Nelly and her husband. The purpose of the proceedings, in other words, was to settle
these monetary or civil liabilities of petitioner to the spouses Van der Bom. These unpaid accounts included
the value of the cement mixer and some other personal properties, as well as alleged loans and cash
advances which petitioner and his wife had borrowed from the couple. Correlatively, in January 2005 or
prior to the barangay proceedings in March 2005, the lawyer of the Van der Boms wrote a demand letter
to petitioner about the supposed monetary liabilities which he incurred from the couple. The amount of
P25,000.00 representing the amount of the cement mixer which petitioner obtained from the couple in
2004 was among those listed, along with other sums which were all included in the unpaid accounts made
subject of the barangay proceedings. Also, in his testimony before the trial court, the Pangkat Chairman,
Rudy de la Torre, affirmed that the cement mixer was included as a subject matter before the barangay
proceedings.
b. The amicable settlement stipulated, in no uncertain terms, that the parties agreed that they would desist
from filing countercharges in the future. Contrary to the findings of the CA, as well, the minutes of the
proceedings further revealed that Nelly agreed to waive her ownership of the properties subject of their

Estafa 365
dispute in favor of petitioner. Unmistakably, one of these properties was the cement mixer. Moreover, the
waiver made by Nelly was on the condition that petitioner would not file any case or countercharge against
Nelly in the future. Petitioner kept to his end of this bargain. The labor case which he filed against the
couple was not a violation of the agreement since it was filed in January 2005, or prior to the barangay
proceedings in March 2005.
c. With Nelly waiving her ownership over the cement mixer in favor of petitioner in exchange for the
concession that he would refrain from filing any case against her in the future, there was clearly an implied
novation of the original contract of commodatum between her and petitioner. The waiver effectively
extinguished the original contract of petitioner and Nelly and, in its stead, a new contract in the form of
the amicable settlement they executed before the barangay, emerged. The intention to extinguish the old
obligation might not have been done expressly, but considering that the new contract of the parties was,
by all accounts, incompatible with their original contract of commodatum, novation had effectively
occurred. The incompatibility was far from being merely incidental or modificatory as the original bailor-
bailee relationship between the parties was altogether severed. While ownership by the bailor over the
thing loaned is not an indispensable requirement in commodatum as Article 1938 of the Civil Code very
well provides that the bailor in commodatum need not be the owner of the thing loaned, it is important to
note in this case, however, that the waiver over the ownership of the property, which was the very object
of the original contract of the parties, was made in favor of petitioner. This went against a well-established
concept in commodatum that ownership of the thing loaned does not pass to the borrower.
d. In plain terms, prior to the filing of the Information in court, Nelly had already renounced or relinquished
her ownership over the property subject of the criminal case in favor of petitioner. Consequently,
therefore, the elements of the crime of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1(b) of the RPC became
nonexistent. In particular, there is no longer any duty or obligation on the part of petitioner to deliver or
return the cement mixer to Nelly or to any other person for that matter because the ownership thereof
had already been transferred to petitioner by Nelly's waiver and renunciation in his favor. It follows, too,
that there is no longer any prejudice caused to another. Perforce, with the new obligation under the
amicable settlement between Nelly and petitioner having the effect of novating their old obligation, Nelly
is now estopped from insisting on the latter. Accordingly, any incipient criminal liability of petitioner
involving his failure to return the cement mixer was effectively averted. (Sorongon v. People of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 230669, June 16, 2021, First Division)
50. The lower courts correctly convicted petitioner of the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public
documents. Records show that petitioner was in possession of TCT No. N-245848, a spurious and falsified
document. It was likewise established that petitioner, through false pretenses or fraudulent representations,
had lured private complainant into entering into a business venture with her by falsifying TCT No. N-245848,
and thereafter obtained from the latter the sum of P1,440.000.00 as shown by the statement of account
presented during trial. In other words, petitioner used the falsified title, took advantage and profited from it,
and successfully convinced private complainant to invest her money to her own damage and detriment.
Moreover, in the absence of a satisfactory explanation, one who is found in possession of a forged document
and who used or uttered it is presumed to be the forger. Thus, the conviction stands. (Brisenio v. People of the
51. All the essential elements of estafa under Article 315(1)(b) of the RPC are present in this case.
a. First, there is no dispute that petitioner received merchandise from Gacayan as evidenced by TRAs 0081
and 0083 signed and executed by petitioner herself. However, contrary to the ruling of the courts below,
petitioner could not be held liable for the other TRAs as they were not signed by petitioner but either by
Castillo or Vargal. The Court is not persuaded by Taberna’s bare and uncorroborated testimony that
petitioner authorized Castillo and Vargal to sign on her behalf. Aside from the testimony of Taberna, no
other evidence was presented by the prosecution to prove that Castillo or Vargal were authorized by
petitioner to sign or to receive the goods on her behalf. The evidence presented by the prosecution as to
the other TRAs fell short of the standard of moral certainty. Hence, petitioner could not be made liable for
the TRAs other than the ones she signed, namely, TRAs 0081 and 0083. Any doubt on petitioner’s guilt
should eb considered in her favor.
b. As for TRAs 0081 and 0083, the documents clearly stated that petitioner received in trust the merchandise
from Gacayan to (i) hold the goods in trust; (ii) dispose or sell them for cash and to receive the proceeds in
trust; (iii) turnover and remit the proceeds of the sale of goods on or before the due date less petitioner’s
commission; and (iv) return the goods in the event of non-sale within the period specified or upon demand.
Upon default or failure of petitioner to comply with any of the terms and conditions, Gacayan may cancel
the trust receipt and take possession of the goods subject of the trust or the proceeds realized therefrom.
The agreement or contract between the parties is the formal expression of the parties’ rights, duties, and
obligations and is the best evidence of the parties’ intention. thus, when the terms of agreement have bene
reduced into writing, it is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and there can be, between
the parties and their successors-in-interest, no evidence of such terms other than the contents of the
written agreement.
c. Contrary to petitioner’s contention, she entered into a trust receipt agreement with Gacayan and not a
barter or exchange. The terms of TRAs 0081 and 0083 were clear that she received the products listed

Estafa 366
therein in trust for Gacayan. She obligated herself to dispose the goods and receive the proceeds of sale in
trust for Gacayan. In case the goods were not sold, she must return them to Gacayan. Although, admittedly,
Gacayan testified that she likewise procured Avon merchandise from petitioner through the same trust
receipt agreement, the said transactions will not negate petitioner’s obligation under TRAs 0081 and 0083.
Their offsetting agreement did not modify, amend, or novate petitioner’s obligations under TRAs 0081 and
0083.
d. Second, petitioner failed to turn over the proceeds of the sale of the products procured from Gacayan
under TRAs 0081 and 0083 upon the latter’s demand. Petitioner even admitted that a similar case with
respect to the same transactions were the subject matter of a criminal case for violation of BP 22 before
the MeTC of San Juan for an amount of P50,000.00. She apparently attempted to pay Gacayan post-dated
checks worth P50,000.00 which eventually bounced for having been drawn against a closed account. This
fact alone proves petitioner’s culpability that she misappropriated or converted the proceeds of the sale
of the items she held in trust for Gacayan.
e. Third, petitioner’s misappropriation or conversion of the proceeds of the sale of Gacayan’s products caused
damage to the latter in the total amount of P8,275.00. Gacayan is deemed to have suffered damage when
she parted with her goods and did not receive the proceeds of the sale thereof or the unsold items were
not returned despite demand.
f. Lastly, Gacayan demanded payment from petitioner under TRAs 0081 and 0083 which went unheeded.
g. The prosecution had proved petitioner’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of estafa. The
element of damage was sufficiently established when Gacayan parted with her goods and failed to recover
the proceeds of the sale thereof or the unsold despite repeated demands. Petitioner herself admitted that
she tried to turn over the proceeds of the sale under the TRAs through the issuance of post-dated checks
which were however dishonored. Petitioner even admitted before the trial court that the post-dated
checks were issued with respect to the same transactions in this case. She also presented a Compromise
Agreement with respect to the dishonored post-dated checks executed by the parties before the MeTC of
San Juan. (Barlin v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 207418, June 23, 2021, Third Division)
SYNDICATED ESTAFA
1. Syndicated estafa has the following elements: (a) they must be at least five in number; (b) they must have
formed or managed a rural bank, cooperative, samahang nayon, farmer’s association, or any other corporation
or association that solicits funds from the general public; and (c) they formed or managed such association with
the intention of carrying out an unlawful or illegal act, transaction, enterprise, or scheme, i.e., they used the
very association that they formed or managed as the means to defraud its own stockholders, members, and
depositors.
a. In this case, petitioners do not constitute a syndicate. They did not use BATELEC II as a means to defraud
its members of their contributions. No such fraud – that fraud which pertains to the association’s receipt
of contribution or solicitation from its stockholders, members, or the public – is absent in this case. First, it
is undisputed that the contributions of the members of BATELEC II were paid to the latter not out of any
fraudulent act, transaction or scheme. As admitted, the contributions of the members of BATELEC II
comprise of their payments for the electricity being supplied by the cooperative. In other words, the
contributions of the members of BATELEC II were received by the latter through legitimate transactions.
Second, as BATELEC II received the contributions of its members via legitimate transactions, it cannot be
said that the petitioners had used the cooperative to commit fraud on any of tis members. Any alleged
misuse of such contributions committed after BATELEC II has already received them through legal means
would not constitute as defraudation committed through the cooperative, but would merely be an act of
mismanagement committed against it. (Remo v. Devanadera, G.R. No. 192925, December 9, 2016, Third
Division)
2. The elements of syndicated estafa obtain in this case, considering that: (a) more than five persons are involved
in Multitel’s grand fraudulent scheme, including Baladjay and her co-accused – who employed deceit, false
pretenses, and representations to the private complainants regarding a supposed lucrative investment
opportunity with Multitel in order to solicit from them; (b) the said false pretenses and representations were
made prior to or simultaneous with the commission of fraud; (c) relying on the false promises and
misrepresentations thus employed, private complainants invested their hard-earned money in Multitel; and (d)
Baladjay and her co-accused defrauded the private complainants, obviously to the latter’s prejudice.
a. It can be observed that, using Multitel as their conduit, Baladjay and her more than five (5) counselors
employed deceit and falsely pretended to have the authority to solicit investments from the general public
when, in truth, they did not have such authority. The deception continued when Baladjay’s counselors
actively solicited investments from the public, promising very high interest returns starting at 5% per
month. Convinced of Baladjay’s and her counselors’ promise of lucrative income, the private complainants
were then enticed to invest in Multitel. However, unknown to them, the promised high-yielding venture
was unsustainable, as Multitel was not really engaged in any legitimate business. Eventually Baladjay and
her cohorts ran away with private complainants’ money causing them damage and prejudice. (People of
the Philippines v. Baladjay, G.R. No. 220458, July 26, 2017, Third Division)

Estafa 367
3. It is clear that all the elements of syndicated estafa are present, considering that: (a) the incorporators/directors
of MMG comprising more than five people, including herein accused-appellant, made false pretenses and
representations to the investing public – in this case, the private complainants – regarding a supposed lucrative
investment opportunity with MMG in order to solicit money from them; (b) the said false pretenses and
representations were made prior to or simultaneous with the commission of fraud; (c) relying on the same,
private complainants invested their hard-earned money into MMG; and (d) the incorporators/directors of MMG
ended up running away with the private complainants’ investments, obviously to the latter’s prejudice. (People
of the Philippines v. Mateo, G.R. No. 210612, October 9, 2017, Second Division)
4. Dissecting the pronouncement in Galvez for our present purposes, however, we are able to come up with the
following standards by which a group of purported swindlers may be considered as a syndicate under PO No.
1689: (a) they must be at least five (5) in number; (b) they must have formed or managed a rural bank,
cooperative, "samahang nayon," farmer's association or any other corporation or association that solicits funds
from the general public; and (c) they formed or managed such association with the intention of carrying out an
unlawful or illegal act, transaction, enterprise or scheme, i.e., they used the very association that they formed
or managed as the means to defraud its own stockholders, members and depositors. None of the three
abovementioned standards for determining the existence of a syndicate was present. (HDMF v. Sagun, G.R. No.
205698, July 31, 2018, En Banc)
a. Delfin Lee, Dexter, Sagun, and Salagan were, respectively, the President/Chief Operating Officer, Executive.
Vice-President, Head of the Documentation Department, and Head of the Accounting/Finance Department
of Globe Asiatique. In view of their number being under five, the original charge brought against them was
only for simple estafa. It was only in the assailed Review Resolution of August 10, 2011 that SDSP Villanueva
recommended the filing of the charge for syndicated estafa due to the addition of Atty. Alvarez as a co-
respondent, thereby increasing the number of the respondents to at least five. But Atty. Alvarez was the
Manager of the HDMF's Foreclosure Department whose only connection with Globe Asiatique was by
reason of his having rendered notarial services for the latter. If Atty. Alvarez was not related to Globe
Asiatique either by employment or by ownership, he could not be considered as part of the syndicate
supposedly formed or managed to defraud its stockholders, members, depositors or the public. This alone
immediately removed the respondents' supposed association from being found and considered as a
syndicate in the context of P.D. No. 1689. (HDMF v. Sagun, G.R. No. 205698, July 31, 2018, En Banc)
b. Even assuming that Atty. Alvarez was juridically connected with Globe Asiatique in the context of P.D. No.
1689, the association of the respondents did not solicit funds from the general public. Globe Asiatique was
incorporated in 1994 as a legitimate real-estate developer "to acquire by purchase, lease, donation or
otherwise, to own, use, improve, develop, subdivide, sell, mortgage, exchange, lease, develop and hold for
investment or otherwise, real estate of all kinds, whether improve, manage, or otherwise dispose of
buildings, houses, apartments, and other structures of whatever kind, together with their appurtenances."
It is quite notable, too, that there was no allegation about Globe Asiatique having been incorporated to
defraud its stockholders or members. In fact, the HDMF, the only complainant in the estafa charges, was
not itself a stockholder or member of Globe Asiatique. (HDMF v. Sagun, G.R. No. 205698, July 31, 2018, En
Banc)
c. Moreover, the DOJ concluded that it was the HDMF itself, not Globe Asiatique, that had solicited funds
from the public. The funds solicited by HDMF from the public were in the nature of their contributions as
members of HDMF and had nothing to do with their being a stockholder or member of Globe Asiatique. It
is further worth noting that the funds supposedly misappropriated did not belong to Globe Asiatique's
stockholders or members, or to the general public, but to the HDMF. The pecuniary damage pertained to
the FCLs extended to Globe Asiatique through ostensibly fictitious buyers and unremitted monthly housing
loan amortizations for the Xevera Project in Pampanga that were supposedly collected by Globe Asiatique
in behalf of the HDMF pursuant to the FCLs and MOA. (HDMF v. Sagun, G.R. No. 205698, July 31, 2018, En
Banc)
d. Based on the established circumstances, therefore, it becomes inevitable for the Court to affirm the CA's
following conclusion that the statement made by public respondent that there is probable cause because
a huge amount of money was transferred from the coffers of respondent HDMF and released to GA through
a complex scheme that could only have been accomplished by and through the sustained supervision and
action in concert of a group of persons for the attainment of the same criminal objective," to be in the
nature of a speculation only and carries no weight in the determination of probable cause. Jurisprudence
dictates that in the determination of probable cause, the same should be based on hard facts and solid
evidence and not dwell on possibilities, suspicion and speculation. From the afore-quoted paragraph alone,
petitioner's (Delfin Lee) participation, if there was any, in the offense for which he was indicted, was not
established or ascertained. Worse, petitioner was not even named either were his cohorts in the alleged
defrauding of respondent HDMF. (HDMF v. Sagun, G.R. No. 205698, July 31, 2018, En Banc)
e. Nonetheless, respondents made false representations that gave rise to probable cause for simple estafa
agains them. Allegedly using the "special buyers" scheme, Globe Asiatique entered into the FCAs with the
HDMF during the period from August 12, 2008 to July 10, 2009 wherein Globe Asiatique represented that:
(a) the buyers of its real estate projects were members of Pag-Ibig, hence, qualified to apply for the takeout
loans under the Pag-Ibig Housing Loan Program; (b) the members-borrowers and their respective housing
loan applications had been properly evaluated and approved in accordance with the applicable guidelines
Estafa 368
of the Pag-Ibig Housing Loan Program prior to their endorsement to the Pag-Ibig Fund; (c) that all
documents submitted to the Pag-Ibig Fund, inclusive of the individual titles and the corresponding Deeds
of Assignment, were valid, binding, and enforceable in all other respects that they purported to be; (d) that
any person or agent employed or allowed to transact or do business in its behalf had not committed any
act of misrepresentation; and (e) that all pertinent laws, rules and regulations had been complied with,
among others.[96] As the result thereof, the HDMF extended the FCLs in favor of Globe Asiatique amounting
to P2.9 billion. On July 13, 2009, the MOA was forged between the HDMF and Globe Asiatique for the latter
to again avail of a loan takeout from the HDMF. Accordingly, additional FCAs were extended to Globe
Asiatique totaling P3.55 billion. While the MOA did not contain the same representations made in the
previous FCAs, it nevertheless required Globe Asiatique to undertake the following corrective measures in
case defects in the HDMF membership and housing loan eligibilities of the buyers should arise, namely: (i)
require the borrower to complete the required number of contributions, in case the required 24 monthly
contributions is not met; (ii) require the borrower to update membership contributions, in case the
membership status is inactive; (iii) Require the borrower to update any existing Multi-Purpose Loan (MPL)
if its in arrears or pay in full if the same has lapsed; (iv) buyback the account in case the member has a
HDMF housing loan that is outstanding, cancelled, bought back, foreclosed or subject of dacion-en-pago.
Had Globe Asiatique, through the respondents, not made the foregoing representations and undertaking,
the HDMF would not have entered into the FCAs and granted the loan takeouts to Globe Asiatique to its
damage and prejudice. (HDMF v. Sagun, G.R. No. 205698, July 31, 2018, En Banc)
f. The alleged fraud perpetrated resulted in the misappropriation of funds of the HDMF or PAG-IBIG Fund
which is undisputedly a provident fund of the general public. The PAG-IBIG Fund consists of mandatory
contributions solicited by HDMF from all employees in the public and private sectors. The PAG-IBIG Fund
includes the mandatory contributions of the approximately 28,000 employees of the Judiciary whose
contributions were part of the P2.9 Billion loan proceeds received by Globe Asiatique from HDMF through
the nine (9) FCAs executed by Globe Asiatique with HDMF. These nine FCAs dated 12 August 2008 (P500
Million), 11 December 2008 (P100 Million), 9 January 2009 (P500 Million), 20 February 2009 (P500 Million),
23 April 2009 (P100 Million), 28 April 2009 (P300 Million), 18 May 2009 (P300 Million), 16 June 2009 (P300
Million), and 10 July 2009 (P300 Million), were executed prior to the execution of the MOA on 13 July 2009.
Thus, even before the execution of the MOA dated 13 July 2009, which Globe Asiatique contends relieves
it of its warranties, estafa was already consummated. After the MOA dated 13 July 2009, eight more FCAs
were executed between Globe Asiatique and HDMF totaling P3.55 Billion: 13 July 2009 (P500 Million), 24
September 2009 (P500 Million), 22 October 2009 (P700 Million), 15 December 2009 (P250 Million), 5
January 2010 (P500 Million), 17 March 2010 (P500 Million), 19 March 2010 (P500 Million), and 12 May
2010 (P100 Million). On 24 May 2010, HDMF issued a Notice to Delfin S. Lee for Globe Asiatique to validate
the 351 buyers which were discovered by HDMF to have either surrendered or withdrawn their loans. In
response to the Notice, Delfin S. Lee admitted that they are monitoring about 1,000 accounts which are
suspected to be from questionable buyers, and that these accounts remain current with PAG-IBIG because
Globe Asiatique had been paying for them. Clearly, Globe Asiatique tried to cover-up or conceal the
defaulting questionable buyers by paying on their behalf, thus keeping their accounts current. Globe
Asiatique is the instrument used to defraud the HDMF of the PAG-IBIG Fund. In short, the PAG-IBIG Fund
consists of monetary contributions solicited from the general public by HDMF, which is indisputably a
corporate entity. Under Section 13 of Republic Act No. 7679, "the Fund (HDMF) shall have the powers and
functions specified in this Act and the usual corporate powers." Under Section 14 of the same law, the
"corporate powers and functions of the Fund shall be vested in and exercised by the Board of Trustees
appointed by the President of the Philippines." The PAG-IBIG Fund is the fund that was defrauded by Delfin
S. Lee and his four (4) co-accused through the use, and submission to HDMF, of loan applications and
mortgage documents of fictitious loan applicants. (Dissenting Opinion of Justice Carpio in HDMF v. Sagun,
G.R. No. 205698, July 31, 2018, En Banc)
5. The notary public’s act of notarizing the document cannot be held liable for the fraudulent scheme, provided
that the notary public is not affiliated with Globe Asiatique Realty Holdigns Corporation. (HDMF v. Sagun, G.R.
No. 205698, July 31, 2018, En Banc)
a. I cannot countenance Atty. Alvarez's actuations as that of a "mere" notary public. Atty. Alvarez was the
Manager of HDMF's Foreclosure Department with Salary Grade 24. Despite being Manager of HDMF's
Foreclosure Department, Atty. Alvarez ignored the glaring conflict of interest when he notarized loan
applications with HDMF at the office of Globe Asiatique where he held office part-time, moonlighting as
head of the legal department of Globe Asiatique. Worse, Atty. Alvarez notarized the loan applications
without the personal appearance of the loan applicants. As Manager of HDMF's Foreclosure Department,
he would be foreclosing on loans with fictitious borrowers based on mortgage documents that he himself
notarized. Atty. Alvarez probably thought that the fictitious loan applicants would never be discovered
since as Manager of HDMF's Foreclosure Department he had control of the foreclosures, and he could just
expeditiously foreclose the mortgages without disclosing the fictitious mortgagees. For a monthly salary of
P30,000 from Globe Asiatique, Atty. Alvarez made wholesale guarantees that the loan documents and
supporting papers were submitted to him by persons who "personally appeared before him." Any
agreement between Globe Asiatique and HDMF would not have materialized if it were not for Globe
Asiatique's submission of mortgage documents notarized by Atty. Alvarez. Atty. Alvarez's participation in

Estafa 369
the entire scheme was a crucial and necessary step in Globe Asiatique's inducement of HDMF to release
the loan proceeds to Globe Asiatique. (Dissenting Opinion of Justice Carpio in HDMF v. Sagun, G.R. No.
205698, July 31, 2018, En Banc)
6. A judicious review of the records reveals that Felix and his co-accused repeatedly induced the public to invest
in Everflow on the undertaking that their investment would yield a huge percentage of returns. Under such
lucrative promise, the public – as represented by private complainants – were enticed to invest their hard-
earned money into Everflow. Initially, Everflow would deliver on their promise, thus hooking the unwary
investors into infusing more funds into it. However, as the Everflow officers/directors, i.e., Felix and his co-
accused, knew from the start that Everflow had no clear trade by which it can pay the assured profits to its
investors, they could no longer comply with their guarantee and had to simply abscond with their investors'
funds. It is settled that where one states that the future profits or income of an enterprise shall be a certain
sum, but he actually knows that there will be none, or that they will be substantially less than he represents,
the statements constitute an actionable fraud where the hearer believes him and relies on the statement to his
injury, as in this case.
a. Far from being a legitimate business venture, the Court herein observes that Felix and his co-accused's
modus operandi is constitutive of criminal fraud as they used the same to commit a crime. In fact, their
modus operandi may be characterized as a kind of Ponzi scheme, which schemes have gained notoriety in
modern times. As generally defined, a Ponzi scheme is "a type of investment fraud that involves the
payment of purported returns to existing investors from funds contributed by new investors. Its organizers
often solicit new investors by promising to invest funds in opportunities claimed to generate high returns
with little or no risk. In many Ponzi schemes, the perpetrators focus on attracting new money to make
promised payments to earlier-stage investors to create the false appearance that investors are profiting
from a legitimate business. It is not an investment strategy but a gullibility scheme, which works only as
long as there is an ever increasing number of new investors joining the scheme. It is difficult to sustain the
scheme over a long period of time because the operator needs an ever larger pool of later investors to
continue paying the promised profits to early investors. The idea behind this type of swindle is that the
'con-man' collects his money from his second or third round of investors and then absconds before anyone
else shows up to collect. Necessarily, Ponzi schemes only last weeks, or months at the most.
b. In this light, the courts a quo correctly found that all the elements of Syndicated Estafa are present in the
instant case, as shown in the following circumstances: (i) the officers/directors of Everflow, comprising of
Felix and his co-accused who are more than five (5) people, made false pretenses and representations to
the investing public, i.e., private complainants, regarding a lucrative investment opportunity with Everflow
in order to solicit money from them; (ii) the said false pretenses and representations were made prior to
and simultaneous with the commission of fraud, which is made more apparent by the fact that Everflow
was not authorized by the Securities and Exchange Commission to solicit investments from the public in
the first place; (iii) relying on the same, private complainants invested various amounts of money into
Everflow; and (iv) Felix and his co-accused failed to deliver their promised returns and ended up running
away with private complainants' investments, obviously to the latter's prejudice. (People of the Philippines
v. Aquino, G.R. No. 234818, November 5, 2018, Second Division)
7. The Court finds no existing syndicate in which Ramon and the other accused had any participation. As found by
the DOJ Secretary, Atty. Debuque acted on his own, without the participation or involvement of Ramon or the
other accused. Atty. Debuque was never authorized by the ILC shareholders, i.e., Ramon and the other accused,
to transact with Wilson. The third standard provided in Remo v. Devanadera, therefore, is not satisfied. There
is simply no proof that all of the accused, including Ramon, acted through ILC in defrauding Nilson. There was
also no showing that Ramon acted on his own and defrauded Nilson. On the contrary, the evidence shows that
Nilson parted with his money solely because of Atty. Debuque’s misrepresentations and false pretenses.
a. Remo v. Devanadera clarifies the standards on what constitutes a syndicate under PD 1689, to wit: (i) the
group must be at least five in number, (ii) the group must have formed or managed a rural bank,
cooperative, “samahang nayon,” farmer’s association, or any other corporation or association that solicits
funds from the general public, and (iii) the group formed or managed such association with the intention
of carrying out an unlawful or illegal act, transaction, enterprise or scheme, i.e., they used the very
association that they formed or managed as the means to defraud its own stockholders, members and
depositors.
b. Moreover, there was no conspiracy among Ramon, Atty. Debuque, and other accused. Implied conspiracy,
as correctly ruled by the CA, must be proved through the mode and manner of the commission of the
offense, or from the acts of the accused before, during and after the commission of the crime indubitably
pointing to a joint purpose, a concert of action, and a community of action. Here, it was not shown that
Ramon performed any overt act in consonance with Atty. Debuque’s intent to defraud Nilson. That Ramon
and the other accused were relatives of Atty. Debuque and incorporators and officers of ILC, standing
alone, would not suffice to warrant the finding of implied conspiracy absent the commission of an act in
furtherance of a joint purpose or community of interest with Atty. Debuque. Being incorporators and
officers of a corporation does not automatically connote conspiracy.
c. There being no syndicate in the first place, only Atty. Debuque is to be held personally liable. The DOJ
Secretary, in his August 23, 2007 Resolution, correctly found probable cause for Estafa only against him.

Estafa 370
However, as stated, this criminal case of estafa may not be initiated anymore due to his death. (Debuque
v. Nilson, G.R No. 191718, May 10, 2021, Third Division)
OTHER FORMS OF ESTAFA

1. In order to validly charge petitioners with the crime of estafa under Article 316(2) of the RPC, it is imperative
that the Information must allege and contain specifically that petitioners made an express representation in
the deed of conveyance that the subject real property is free from any encumbrance. Article 316(2) of the RPC
does not prohibit the sale of an encumbered real property. Criminal liability is brought about by the deceit in
the selling of the property where the seller expressly represented that such real property is free from any
encumberance.
a. For petitioners to be criminally liable for Estafa under Article 316(2) of the RPC, the prosecution is burdened
to allege in the information and prove the following essential elements of the crime: (i) that the thing
disposed of be real property; (ii) that the offender knew that the real property was encumbered, whether
the encumbrance is recorded or not; (iii) that there must be express representation by the offender that
the real property is free from encumbrance; and (iv) that the act of disposing of the real property be made
to the damage of another. (Spouses Tayamen v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 246986, April 28, 2021,
Third Division)
2. Petitioners must be acquitted of the crime of estafa under Article 316(2) of the RPC on the ground that the
Information failed to charge an offense.
a. A cursory reading of the questioned Information would readily show that there was no allegation that
petitioners made an express representation in the second Deed of Sale with Margarito G. Pacia that the
subject real property is free from any encumerance.
b. In Naya, Naya sold a property to Spouses Abing and the parties executed a contract to sell. After two years,
Naya sold the same property to William Po. Upon learning that Naya sold the same property to William Po,
Spouses Abing filed a case of estafa defined under Article 316(2) of the RPC. The Court acquitted Naya
based on the fact that the Information failed to charge an offense, regardless if such defect was not
objected to by Naya before his arraignment nor was the issue raised on appeal. The Information failed to
indicate that Naya expressly represented that the property was free from any encumbrance. The Court said
that there was no allegation in the Information that petitioner expressly represented in the sale of the
subject property to William Po that the said property was free from any encumbrance; thus, petitioner was
not charged with estafa under Article 316(2) of the RPC.
c. In Estrellado-Mainar v. People, the Court applied the ruling in Naya and acquitted accused on the ground
that there has been no allegation in the Information that the accused made an express representation that
the property sold is free from any encumbrance. A perusal of the Agreement to Buy and Sell did not also
contain any representation by the accused that the property being sold was free from any encumbrance.
(Spouses Tayamen v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 246986, April 28, 2021, Third Division)
BOUNCING CHECKS LAW (B.P. 22)

1. Case law states that if the notice of non-payment by the drawee bank is not sent to the maker or drawer of the
bum check, or if there is no proof as to when such notice was received by the drawer, then the presumption or
prima facie evidence as provided in Section 2, B.P. 22 cannot arise, since there would simply be no way of
reckoning the crucial 5-day period. In this case, there is no way to ascertain when the five-day period would
start and end since there is no showing when Chua actually received the demand letter. It cannot be presumed
that Chua received the letter on the date of the demand letter since no such presumption exists in the rules of
evidence. (Chua v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 196853, July 13, 2015, Second Division)
2. When the first and third elements of the offense are present, as in this case, BP 22 creates a presumption juris
tantum that the second element exists. Thus, the maker’s knowledge is presumed from the dishonor of the
check for insufficiency of funds. The clear import of the law is to establish a prima facie presumption of
knowledge of such insufficiency of funds under the following conditions: first, the presentment within 90 days
from the date of the check, and second, the dishonor of the check and failure of the maker to make
arrangements for payment in full within five banking days from notice. Here, after the checks were dishonored,
HSBC duly notified Reynolds of such fact and demanded the payment of the full amount of said checks, but the
latter failed to pay.
a. In addition, the fact that Navarra signed the subject checks in behalf of Reynolds cannot exculpate him
from liability. Thus, Navarra cannot insist that he cannot be held civilly liable since he is a mere corporate
officer who signed checks for the corporation. This is because when a corporate officer issues a worthless
check in the corporate name, he may be held personally liable for violating a penal statute. Moreover, the
corporate officer cannot shield himself from liability on the ground that it was a corporate act and not his
personal act. (Navarra v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 203750, June 6, 2016, Third Division)
3. The prosecution failed to establish that petitioner had knowledge of the insufficiency of her funds at the time
she issued the checks. It should be noted that petitioner denies receipt of any notice of dishonor. On the other
hand, the representative of Land Bank merely testified that notices of dishonor were issued. Thus, the burden
of proving notice has not been satisfactorily complied with.

Estafa 371
a. As for the demand letter sent through registered mail, the same was not proven beyond reasonable doubt
that petitioner received the same. Although the Registry Return Card shows that the letter was received
and signed for by a Jennifer Mendoza who identified herself as a househelper of petitioner, it was not
proven that the same person is a duly authorized agent of the addressee or the petitioner. For notice by
mail, it must appear that the same was served on the addresse or a duly authorized agent of the addressee.
To establish beyond reasonable doubt that the issuer of the check indeed received the demand letter is
highly important because it creates the presumption that the same issuer knew of the insufficiency of the
funds. It is also essential for the maker or drawer to be notified of the dishonor of her check, so she could
pay the value thereof or make arrangements for its payment within the period prescribed by law. To
assume that because the Registry Return Card appears to have the signature of a person other than the
addressee and that same perosn had given the letter to the addressee, is utterly erroneous and is not proof
beyond reasonable doubt as required in criminal cases. (Alburo v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No.
4. The prosecution merely presented a copy of the demand letter, together with the registry receipt and the return
card, allegedly sent to petitioner. However, there was no attempt to authenticate or identify the signature on
the registry return card. Receipts for registered letters and return receipts do not by themselves prove receipt;
they must be properly authenticated to serve as proof of receipt of the letter, claimed to be a notice of dishonor.
To be sure, the presentation of the registry card with an unauthenticated signature does not meet the required
proof beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner received such notice. It is not enough for the prosecution to
prove that a notice of dishonor was sent to the drawee of the check. The prosecution must also prove actual
receipt of said notice, because the fact of service provided for in the law is reckoned from receipt of such notice
of dishonor by the drawee of the check. (Dela Cruz v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 163494, August 3,
5. A corporate officer who issues a bouncing corporate check can only be held civilly liable when he is convicted.
Thus, the civil liability of a corporate officer in a BP 22 case is extinguished with the criminal liability. (Pilipinas
Shell Petroleum Corporation v. Duque, G.R. No. 216467, February 15, 2017, Second Division)
6. The crime of B.P. 22 was not committed since it was legally impossible for Cu to fund those checks on the dates
indicated therein, which were all past G7 Bank’s closure because all the bank accounts of G7 Bank were closed
by PDIC. At the time SB Corp. presented the subject checks for deposit or encashment in October 2008, it had
no right to demand payment because the underlying obligation was not yet due and demandable from Cu and
he could not be held liable for the civil obligations of G7 Bank covered by the subject dishonored checks on
account of the Monetary Board’s closure of G7 Bank and the takeover thereof by PDIC. Even payment of interest
on G7 Bank’s loan ceased upon its closure. Moreover, as of the time of presentment of the checks, there was
yet no determination of the exact amount that SB Corp. was entitled to recover from G7 Banks as this would
still have yet to be ascertained by the liquidation court pursuant to the PDIC’s distribution plan in accordance
with the rules on concurrence and preference of credits under the Civil Code. In addition, it must be emphasized
that SB Corp. knew at the time it deposited in October 2008 the subject postdated checks that G7 Bank was
already under receivership and PDIC had already taken over the bank by virtue of the Monetary Board’s closure
thereof.
a. After the closure of G7 Bank, its obligations to SB Corp., including those which the subject checks were
supposed to pay, are subject to the outcome of the bank’s liquidation. The exact consideration of the
subject checks is, thus, contingent and any demand for the payment of the obligation for which those
checks were issued after closure and pending liquidation of the bank is premature. Furthermore, there was
no way for Cu to pay SB Corp. the amount due on the subject checks or make arrangements for its full
payment in full within five banking days from after receiving notice that such checks had been dishonored
pursuant to B.P. 22, Section 2, because as of that time, the exact amount due on the subject checks was
not known or uncertain. (Cu v. Small Business Guarantee and Finance Corporation, G.R. No. 211222, August
7. Petitioner’s receipt of notice of dishonor was not proven. Yao testified that the personal secretary of petitioner
received the demand letter, yet, said personal secretary was never presented to testify whether she in fact
handed the demand letter to petitioner who, from the onset, denies having received such letter. It must be
borne in mind that it is not enough for the prosecution to prove that a notice of dishonor was sent to the
accused. The prosecution must also prove actual receipt of said notice, because the fact of service provided for
in the law is reckoned from receipt of such notice of dishonor by the accused. In this case, there is no way to
ascertain when the five-day period under Section 22 of B.P. Blg. 22 would start and end since there is no showing
when petitioner actually received the demand letter. The MeTC, in its decision, merely said that such
requirement was fully complied with without any sufficient discussion. Indeed, it is not impossible that
petitioner's secretary had truly handed him the demand letter. Possibilities, however, cannot replace proof
beyond reasonable doubt. The absence of a notice of dishonor necessarily deprives the accused an opportunity
to preclude a criminal prosecution. As there is insufficient proof that petitioner received the notice of dishonor,
the presumption that he had knowledge of insufficiency of funds cannot arise. (Chua v. People of the

Estafa 372
8. What the Bouncing Checks Law requires is that the accused must be notified in writing of the fact of dishonor.
This notice gives the issuer an opportunity to pay the amount on the check or to make arrangements for its
payment within five (5) days from receipt thereof, in order to prevent the presumption of knowledge of the
insufficiency of funds from arising. Petitioner admittedly received the 21 June 2001 demand letter of private
complainant, expressing the dishonor of the subject check. In the memorandum he filed before the CA,
petitioner admits that he is "not unaware of the fact that a date, June 11 [sic], 2001 appeared at the bottom of
the NOTICE OF DISHONOR just below the signature of PETITIONER-APPELLANT." He never disputed receipt of
said letter, as in fact, he does not dispute that the signature below said date of receipt is his. He merely harps
on the alleged infirmity in the marking and offer of said date. Notably also, it appears on record that during the
proceedings before the MTCC, both the prosecution and the defense jointly moved for the termination of pre-
trial due to the possibility that the case could be settled amicably as to its civil aspect, which the trial court
granted — indicating petitioner's awareness that the subject check was dishonored and that he had an
outstanding obligation to private complainant. It was never shown that petitioner paid nor made arrangements
to pay the amount on the check, as in fact the trial before the MTCC proceeded and the court ordered petitioner
to pay the amount. Clearly, the 5-day period within which to settle his obligation had long expired and petitioner
is presumed to have had knowledge of the insufficiency of his funds at the time he issued the subject check.
(Montelibano v. Yap, G.R. No. 197475, December 6, 2017, Third Division)
9. Contrary to Lim's claim that only the unauthenticated registry return card was the only proof presented by the
prosecution to establish service of a notice of dishonor, the evidence on record shows that the prosecution also
presented the registry receipt and the testimony of Enriquez who sent the demand letter by registered mail.
Here, the transcript of stenographic notes confirm that the prosecution complied with the requisite proof of
service of the notice of dishonor by presenting Enriquez, who testified on the sending of such notice by
registered mail, and identified the demand letter, the registry receipt and the registry return card. (Lim v. People
of the Philippines, G.R. No. 224979, December 13, 2017, Second Division)
10. The elements of B.P. 22 are as follows: (a) the making, drawing, and issuance of any check to apply for account
or for value; (b) the knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue there were no sufficient
funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment; and (c) the
dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or the dishonor for the same
reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the drawee bank to stop payment. (Mandagan v.
Jose M. Valero Corporation, G.R. No. 215118, June 19, 2019, Second Division)
11. Knowledge of the maker, drawer or issuer that at the time of issue of the check, there were no sufficient funds
in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment was not
established. Records show that the notice of dishonor, which is the demand letter dated June 20, 2003, was
not offered into evidence. Moreover, there is no mention in the pre-trial order that the defense admitted that
the accused received the demand letter. (Mandagan v. Jose M. Valero Corporation, G.R. No. 215118, June 19,
12. The presence of the first and third elements is undisputed. However, while the prosecution established the
second element, i.e., receipt of the notice of dishonor, with respect to petitioner Socorro, it failed to do so in
the case of petitioner Marie Paz. The prosecution identified and formally offered in evidence, and petitioners
admitted to have issued the four (4) subject Allied Bank checks as guaranty checks, to wit: Check No.
0000122834 dated December 10, 2011 in the amount of P90,675.00 as Exhibits "D" to "D-2"; Check No.
0000122835 dated January 10, 2002 in the amount of P90,675.00 as Exhibits "E" to "E-2"; Check No.
0000122836 dated February 10, 2002 in the amount of P90,675.00 as Exhibits "F" to "F-2"; and Check No
0000127109 dated November 30, 2001 in the amount of P525,000.00 as Exhibits "H" to "H-2." When presented
for payment, all said checks were dishonored for having been drawn against insufficient funds. The MeTC
admitted m evidence the prosecution's said Exhibits with their sub-markings. It is of no moment that the subject
checks were issued as a guarantee and upon the insistence of private complainant Sugiyama. What is significant
is that the accused had deliberately issued the checks in question to cover accounts and those same checks
were dishonored upon presentment, regardless of the purpose for such issuance. It is, therefore, clear that the
real intention of the framers of B.P. 22 is to make the mere act of issuing a worthless check malum
prohibitum and, thus, punishable under such law.
a. Inasmuch as the second element involves a state of mind of the person making, drawing or issuing the
check which is difficult to prove, Section 2 of B.P. 22 creates a prima facie presumption of such knowledge.
For this presumption to arise, the prosecution must prove the following: (i) the check is presented within
ninety (90) days from the date of the check; (ii) the drawer or maker of the check receives notice that such
check has not been paid by the drawee; and (iii) the drawer or maker of the check fails to pay the holder
of the check the amount due thereon, or make arrangements for payment in full within five (5) banking
days after receiving notice that such check has not been paid by the drawee. In other words, the
presumption is brought into existence only after it is proved that the issuer had received a notice of
dishonor and that within five (5) days from receipt thereof, he failed to pay the amount of the check or to
make arrangements for its payment. The presumption or prima facie evidence, as provided in this Section,

Estafa 373
cannot arise if such notice of nonpayment by the drawee bank is not sent to the maker or drawer, or if
there is no proof as to when such notice was received by the drawer, since there would simply be no way
of reckoning the crucial 5-day period. The prosecution was able to establish beyond reasonable doubt the
presence of the second element with respect to petitioner Socorro, who received the notice of dishonor
through her secretary. Prosecution witness Marilou La Serna, a legal staff of Sugiyama's private counsel,
testified that the letter dated March 5, 2002 demanding payment of the dishonored checks was received
by the secretary of petitioner Socorro, as shown by the handwritten signature on the face of the said letter.
La Serna clarified on direct examination that (i) it was petitioner Socorro's secretary who acknowledged
receipt of the said demand letter with the permission of Socorro, who was in another room of her office;
and (ii) that there were several calls in the office of Socorro, as well as a time when she went to the law
office of Sugiyama's counsel, to inform that she acknowledged receipt of that demand letter
b. Meanwhile, Marie Paz cannot be faulted for failing to refute with evidence the allegation against her,
because Sugiyama and La Serna hardly testified as to the service of a notice of dishonor upon her. La Serna
never mentioned that Marie Paz was, likewise, served with a notice of dishonor. There is also no proof that
Socorro's secretary was duly authorized to receive the demand letter on behalf of Marie Paz. When service
of notice is an issue, the person alleging that notice was served must prove the fact of service, and the
burden of proving notice rests upon the party asserting its existence. Failure of the prosecution to prove
that the person who issued the check was given the requisite notice of dishonor is a clear ground for
acquittal. It bears emphasis that the giving of the written notice of dishonor does not only supply proof for
the element arising from the presumption of knowledge the law puts up, but also affords the offender due
process. The law thereby allows the offender to avoid prosecution if she pays the holder of the check the
amount due thereon, or makes arrangements for the payment in full of the check by the drawee within
five banking days from receipt of the written notice that the check had not been paid. Thus, the absence
of a notice of dishonor is a deprivation of petitioner's statutory right.
c. After reviewing the records and applying the foregoing principles to this case, the Court rules that the
prosecution has proven beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner Socorro received a notice of dishonor of
the four (4) subject checks, but failed to do so in the case of petitioner Marie Paz. Perforce, petitioner
Socorro should be convicted of the four (4) charges for violation of B.P. 22, but petitioner Marie Paz should
be acquitted of the said charges. As a general rule, when a corporate officer issues a worthless check in the
corporate's name, he or she may be held personally liable for violating a penal statute, i.e., Section 1 of B.P.
22. However, a corporate officer who issues a bouncing corporate check can only be held civilly liable when
he or she is convicted. Conversely, once acquitted of the offense of violating B.P. 22, a corporate officer is
discharged of any civil liability arising from the issuance of the worthless check in the name of the
corporation he or she represents. This is without regard as to whether his acquittal was based on
reasonable doubt or that there was a pronouncement by the trial court that the act or omission from which
the civil liability might arise did not exist.
d. Here, petitioner Socorro should be held civilly liable for the amounts covered by the dishonored checks, in
light of her conviction of the four (4) charges for violation of B.P. 22 and because she made herself
personally liable for the fixed monthly director's dividends in the amount of P90,675.00 and the
P525,000.00 loan with interest, based on the Contract Agreement dated April 6, 2011, the Addendum to
Contract Agreement dated February 4, 2003, and the Memorandum of Agreement dated October 2001,
which were all formally offered by the prosecution, and admitted in evidence by the trial court. To be sure,
petitioner Marie Paz was never shown to have been part of or privy to any of the said agreements; thus,
she cannot be held civilly liable for the dishonored checks. (Ongkingco v. Sugiyama, G.R. No. 217787,
13. All three elements of BP 22 are present. The prosecution was able to present the two original BDO checks with
Check No. 157580 dated October 28, 1996 in the amount of P12,270.00 and Check No. 157581 dated November
20, 1996 in the amount of P29,300.00. These checks were dishonored upon presentation for payment for the
reasons “Account Closed” and “Drawn Against Insufficient Funds.” Petitioner also failed to rebut the statutory
presumption of knowledge of insufficient funds which attaches when the two checks were presented and
dishonored by BDO within 90 days from its issuance and that petitioner failed to pay the amount of the check
or make arrangemen for its payment within five days from the time the written notice of dishonor was received
by him on December 17, 1996. In his Complaint-Affidavit for Qualified Theft and Falsification filed against
respondent before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasig, petitioner admitted that he indeed received the
Notice of Dishonor on December 17, 1996. Incidentally, this Complaint-Affidavit was also the basis of
respondent in filing this present case of perjury against petitioner. (Saulo v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No.
242900, June 8, 2020, First Division)
14. When a corporate officer issues a worthless check in the corporate name, he may be held personally liable for
violating a penal statute. The statute imposes criminal penalties on anyone who with intent to defraud another
of mone or property draws or issues a check on any bank with knowledge that he has no sufficient funds in such
bank to meet the check on presentment. Moreover, the personal liability of the corporate officer is predicated
on the principle that he cannot shield himself from liability from his own acts on the ground that it was a
corporate act and not his personal act. Evidence showed that what was issued here were corporate checks
issued against the account of Khumbmela. Petitioner admitted that he was the President of the said corporation

Arson 374
and as testified by the prosecution witnesses, petitioner was the one signing the check for the corporation.
Also, petitioner never disputed the authenticity and genuineness of his signatures in the two checks subject
matter of these cases. (Saulo v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 242900, June 8, 2020, First Division)
AR S O N
1. There is no complex crime of arson with multiple homicide. This is because the crime of arson absorbs the
resultant death or is a separate crime altogether. Accordingly, in cases where both burning and death occur, in
order to determine what crime or crimes was or were perpetrated – whether arson, murder or arson and
homicide or murder, it is important to ascertain the main objective of the malefactor. Hence, if the main
objective is the burning of the building or edifice, but death results by reason or on the occasion of arson, the
crime is simply arson, and the resulting homicide is absorbed. On the other hand, if the main objective is to kill
a particular person who may be in a building or edifice, when fire is resorted to as the means to accomplish
such goal, the crime committed is murder only. Lastly, if the objective is to kill a particular person, and in fact,
the offender has already done so, but fire is resorted to as a means to cover up the killing, then there are two
separate and distinct crimes committed – homicide or murder, and arson. (People of the Philippines v. Abayon,
G.R. No. 204891, September 14, 2016, Second Division; People of the Philippines v. Cacho, G.R. No. 218425,
2. Simple arson, defined and punished under P.D. 1613, Section 1, essentially the destruction of property by fire
that is not under the circumstances enumerated under Article 320 of the RPC. The corpus delicti rule is generally
satisfied by proof that a fire occurred, and that it was intentionally caused. (People of the Philippines v. Abayon,
G.R. No. 204891, September 14, 2016, Second Division)
3. The circumstances all point out to the incidents from 9:00 p.m. (when the quarrel between Abayon and his wife
started) until 11:00 p.m. (the time when Abayon’s alleged attempt to burm the houses was thwarted.
Additionally, the records reveal that Abayon bought a match from Edmund Felope at around 12:15 a.m. When
Edmund asked what the match was for, Abayon uttered, “Wala, may susunugin lang ako.” Through that
statement, Abayon is clearly linked to the fire that broke out past 12 a.m. It also makes all the more significant
the pieces of circumstantial evidence enumerated by the courts especially in proving the motive for the crime,
i.e., what led Abayon to burn his and his neighbors’ houses. The combination of all these circumstances, vis-à-
vis Abayon’s answer to Edmund’s question, leads to no other conclusion than that Abayon deliberately started
the fire that resulted in the death of three innocent victims. There could be no doubt on this conclusion: Abayon
had the motive (i.e., he was characterized as a “good-for-nothing husband” by his wife during a violent quarrel);
he had made a previous attempt to start a fire (by turning on and off the gas tank’s regulator, while holding an
unlighted cigarette and match); and he bought a match at past midnight, stating to the vendor that he will use
it to burn something. (People of the Philippines v. Abayon, G.R. No. 204891, September 14, 2016, Second
Division)
4. No one saw petitioner actually set fire to the nipa hut; however, the prosecution has established multiple
circumstances, which, after being considered in their entirety, support the conclusion that petitioner is guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of simple arson. First, the evidence was credible and sufficient to prove that
petitioner stoned private complainant’s house and threatened to burn him. Second, the evidence was credible
and sufficient to prove that petitioner returned a few hours later and made his way to private complainant’s
nipa hut. Third, the evidence was also credible and sufficient to prove that petitioner was in close proximity to
the nipa hut before it caught fire. Private complainant also testified that he saw petitioner walk to and fro in
front of the nipa hut and shake its posts just before it caught fire. (Bacerra v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No.
5. Aside from the fact that accused-appellant already admitted to the commission of the crime of destructive
arson to his plea of insanity, which he was unable to successfully proven, the prosecution was able to sufficiently
prove that the accused-appellant burned the house of the victim in order to hid or conceal the commission of
the crime. It was established that accused-appellant first beheaded the victim before setting the latter’s house
on fire. Therefore, two crimes were committed by accused-appellant, homicide and arson. (People of the
Philippines v. Cacho, G.R. No. 218425, September 27, 2017, First Division)
6. According to Jocelyn, when Artemio refused to open the door, the group began shooting at the house. The
group followed Artemio when he ran under the house, and there shot him - facts that unerringly leave the
conclusion that the group's objective was to kill Artemio. Jocelyn testified that when Artemio refused to heed
the demand of the group to give them food by opening the door, the group started to burn the house using a
lighted torch of coconut leaves, which flames Artemio was able to put out. When Artemio still refused to open
the door, the group threatened that they would burn the house. They made good their threat before they went
after Artemio who ran below his house. Undoubtedly, the group's intent was also to burn down the house of
Artemio, not only to kill him. With these established facts, the prosecution was correct in charging Sota,
Gadjadli, and the three unnamed persons with murder and arson.
a. Since the arson was committed by at least five individuals, which circumstance was alleged in the
Information for arson, the special aggravating circumstance that arson was committed by a syndicate

Arson 375
should have been appreciated in this case. (People of the Philippines v. Sota and Gadjadli, G.R. No. 203121,
7. Arson requires the following elements: (a) a fire was set intentionally; and (b) the accused was identified as the
person who caused it. The corpus delicti rule is satisfied by proof of the bare fact of the fire and that it was
intentionally caused.
a. Where the main objective is the burning of the building or edifice, but death results by reason or on
occasion of arson, the crime is simply arson. The resulting homicide is absorbed. (People of the Philippines
v. Dolendo, G.R. No. 223098, June 3, 2019, Second Division)
8. Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to identify appellant as the perpetrator of the arson. Both the trial and
appellate courts held that the following circumstances point to the logical conclusion that appellant
commenced and caused the fire: (a) February 22, 2012, at about 2 a.m., Parcon, Jr. and his family were sleeping
in their house at Holy Family Village I, Banilad, Cebu City; (b) after having been roused from his sleep by the
smell of smoke, Parcon, Jr. leaped from his bed and slightly opened the door of his room to check outside; (c)
Parcon, Jr. saw a thick cloud of smoke on the second floor and fire spreading on their stairs; (d) Parcon, Jr.
opened the fire exit by the window of their bedroom and his family passed through it to jump unto the roof of
their garage, away from the fire; (e) the firearm recovered the burned remains of Cornelia Tagalog and noted
that accused-appellant was missing; (f) at early dawn of even date, Parcon, Jr.’s neighbor, the witness Umandak
spoke with accused-appellant who had with her a bag which later turned out to be the deceased Cornelia
Tagalog and that appellant had fled the village by climbing over a fence and jumping over to the adjacent Holy
Family Village II; (g) at about 6:00 a.m., another resident of Holy Family Village I, witness Umandak, told Parcon,
Jr. that he saw and spoke with a woman, later identified as the appellant; (h) after the appellant was arrested
following a hot pursuit operation, police investigators recovered from the appellant two cellular phones that
belonged to Parcon, Jr. as well as a handbag, cash, and personal effects belonging to the deceased Cornelia
Tagalog as identified by Parco, Jr.; and (i) appellant admitted to a news reporter that she burned employment
documents inside Parcon, Jr.’s house and that she was willing to face the consequences of her actions. Indeed,
the circumstances constitute an unbroken chain of events which points to the appellant as the one who started
the fire which gutted the house of the Parcons, and eventually killed Cornelia. The Court notes that the evidence
was adequate to prove that appellant was present at the scene of the crime before the incident and was the
one who started the fire. This is clear when she narrated during her interview with Sorote that she burned her
employment papers at the home office of Parcon, and that the fire turned into a conflagration that burned the
entire Parcon house. Moreover, sufficient evidence was also presented to prove that appellant was in close
proximity to the gutted Parcon house after the incident. Umandak, a neighbor of the Parcons, positively
identified appellant as the one he spoke with two hours after the incident. (People of the Philippines v. Soria,
9. The Court agrees with the findings of both the trial court and the appellate court that the following combination
of circumstances pointed to the logical conclusion that accused-appellant commenced and caused the fire as
to support a judgment of conviction beyond reasonable doubt against her: “[F]irst, at 12:00 in the morning of
14 September 2010, Mae went home from SM Mall of Asia; second, Mae arrived at their house in Lennox Anne
Black Street, BF Village, Talon Dos, Las Piñas City at 1:20 in the morning; third, Mae instructed Grace to get her
child, Leila, from the room of Ameerah and Sarah; fourth, Mae bought four (4) liters of gasoline from Optimus
Shell Gasoline Station, Talon Dos Branch at around 2:59 in the morning of 14 September 2010: fifth, Mae and
her child rode a tricycle driven by Tudio going home to Lennox Street and picked up something at Optimus Shell
Gasoline Station, Talon Dos Branch; sixth when Mae alighted from the tricycle Tudio noticed a liquid substance
on the floor of his tricycle and when he wiped it, it smelled of gas; seventh at around 3:20 in the morning of 14
September 2010, Morallos saw Mae come back to B.F. Las Piñas and she handed to him a Zesto tetra pack and
five (5) sticks of Marlboro cigarettes; eighth at the time Mae gave Morallos the Zesto tetra pack and five (5)
sticks of Marlboro cigarettes, he noticed Mae was hiding something; ninth, Mae instructed Grace to buy
pandesal at 3:00 in the morning; tenth, Mae was admittedly at the guard house when the fire was ongoing, on
the pretext that she was looking for Grace, who had taken long in coming back, but since it was drizzling, she
supposedly took shelter in the guard house; eleventh, Miciano retrieved the CCTV of the gas station and it
showed Mae together with Leila purchasing gasoline, cigarettes and chocolates in the early morning of 14
September 2010.”
a. The testimonies of the other credible witnesses, all of whom were assessed and observed firsthand by the
trial court, corroborated the above findings. They all point to the fact that accused-appellant was the one
who started the fire which gutted the Al-Saads' house, resulting to the deaths of Ameerah and Ibrahim and
causing serious physical injuries to Sarah, all of whom are accused-appellant's stepchildren.
b. The gasoline attendant of Optimus Shell Gasoline Station, Talon Dos Branch, positively identified accused-
appellant as having purchased gasoline from their store. The lead Fire Investigator also testified that the
dirty kitchen area where accused-appellant reported to have seen a spark and smelled something burnt
was not even damaged by the fire.
c. Thus, absent any circumstance which could affect the outcome of the case, the findings of the lower court,
as affirmed by the appellate court, remain binding on the Court. In fine, accused-appellant's guilt for the
offense of Arson with Homicide has been proven beyond reasonable doubt. The trial court and the

Malicious Mischief and Other Mischiefs 376
appellate court thus correctly convicted her of the offense and sentenced her to reclusion perpetua. The
lead Fire Investigator also testified that the dirty kitchen area where accused-appellant reported to have
seen a spark and smelled something burnt was not even damaged by the fire. (People of the Philippines v.
Al-Saad, G.R. No. 242414, March 15, 2021, Third Division)
10. Accused-appellant is undoubtedly responsible for the burning of the store, which resulted in the death of
Florencio. Intent, being a mental act, is deduced from the external acts performed by a person. There is a
presumption that one intends the natural consequences of his act. Here, it was shown that accused-appellant
deliberately lit a mother rocket, which was directed and flew towards the fireworks displayed at the store and
caused an explosion that burned the building to the ground. As found by the CA: “[T]here was intent on the
part of appellant to cause the fire. He directed the mother rocket he was holding towards the other mother
rocket which was on display at the grocery store. Naturally, when the mother rocket which he launched ignited
the store's mother rocket, the sparks coming therefrom lit the other pyrotechnic devices such as the fountain,
luces, small firecrackers, mother rocket and bawang which were all on display on the table just in front of the
store. This caused the fire to spread easily in the store which was made only of wood.” Accused-appellant's very
act of lighting the rocket in front of the store and pointing it towards the mother rocket and other fireworks on
display show a "reckless disregard for human lives" and property. The natural consequence of accused-
appellant's act is the burning of anything remotely near such collection of dangerous and flammable materials.
Accused-appellant did not present any evidence from which the Court may consider the cause or motive that
impelled him to act as he did. Neither did the circumstances allegedly overlooked by the Regional Trial Court
sufficiently show his lack of intent to burn the store. Had it been true, as contended by accused-appellant, that
the fire was an accident, he could have helped the store owners put out the fire. Instead, he attempted to
escape, but was restrained by Franklin. The Court has held that although flight does not create a legal
presumption of guilt, nevertheless, it is admissible in evidence against the accused. If not satisfactorily explained
in a manner consistent with the accused's innocence, the same will tend to show his/her guilt for the crime
charged. (People of the Philippines v. Pugal, G.R. No. 229103, March 15, 2021, Third Division)
MALIC IO U S MIS C HIEF AN D O TH ER MIS C HI EFS

1. The elements of malicious mischief have been duly proven in this case: (a) petitioners admitted in their kontra
salaysay that Teofilo deliberately destroyed the fence and its cement foundation, and made diggings in the
subject property; (b) the destruction did not constitute arson or other crime involving destruction; and (c) the
act of damaging another’s property was committed merely for the sake of damaging it.
a. Under the third element, assuming that petitioner Teofilo owned the property in controversy, he and his
co-accused were not justified in summarily destroying the improvements built thereon by Bolbes. They
unlawfully took the law into their own hands when they surreptitiously entered Bolbes's enclosed lot and
destroyed its fence and foundation. Evidently, petitioners' actions were made out of hatred, revenge or
evil motive. As aptly found by the RTC, accused did the act complained of not for the purpose of protecting
his right as the alleged owner of the subject property but to give vent to their anger and disgust over private
complainant's alleged act of putting the fence and cement thereon without their consent. Considering that
all the elements of the crime of Malicious Mischief are present in this case, petitioners were properly
adjudged guilty thereof. (Grana v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 202111, November 25, 2019, Second
Division)
AN TI -FEN C IN G L AW
1. The essential elements of the crime of fencing are: (a) a crime of robbery or theft has been committed; (b) the
accused, who is not a principal or accomplice in the commission of the crime of robbery or theft, buys, receives,
possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells, or in any manner deals in any article,
item, object, or anything of value, which has been derived from the proceeds of the said crime; (c) the accused
knows or should have known that the said article, item, object, or anything of value has been derived from the
proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; and (d) there is on the part of the accused, intent to gain for himself
or for another.
a. In this case, the first element is absent. It has not been established by the prosecution that DPWH owns
the grader. In addition, the presumption of fencing as provided by P.D. 1612, Section 5 has been overcome
by petitioner upon his presentation of the notarized Affidavit of Ownership which he secured from
Banosing. Finally, both the trial court and the CA erred in ruling that petitioner should have first secured a
clearance or a permit from the police, in compliance with P.D. 1612, Section 6, as the clearance stated in
Section 6 is only required if several conditions are met: (a) that the person, store, establishment, or entity
is in the business of buying and selling of any good, articles, item, object, or anything of value; (b) that such
thing of value was obtained from an unlicensed dealer or supplier thereof; and (c) that such thing of value
is to be offered for sale to the public. In this case, the requirement is inapplicable in this case since the
nowhere was it established that petitioner was engaged in the busienss of buy and sell and that petitioner
intended to sell or was actually selling the subject grader to the public. (Lim v. People of the Philippines,
G.R. No. 211977, October 12, 2016, Third Division)
2. In this case, the courts a quo correctly found that the prosecution was able to establish beyond reasonable
doubt all the elements of the crime of Fencing, as it was shown that: (a) Lariosa sold to petitioner the subject
Anti-Fencing Law 377
items without authority and consent from his employer, Tan, for his own personal gain, and abusing the trust
and confidence reposed upon him as a truck helper; (b) petitioner bought the subject items from Lariosa and
was in possession of the same; (c) under the circumstances, petitioner should have been forewarned that the
subject items came from an illegal source, as his transaction with Lariosa did not have any accompanying
delivery and official receipts, and that the latter did not demand that such items be replaced with empty bottles,
contrary to common practice among dealers of soft drinks; and (d) petitioner's intent to gain was made evident
by the fact that he bought the subject items for just P50,000.00, lower than their value in the amount of
P52,476.00. (Cahulogan v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 225695, March 21, 2018, Second Division)
3. The law on fencing does not require the accused to have participated in the criminal design to commit, or to
have been in any wise involved in the commission of, the crime of robbery or theft. To recall, the essential
elements of the offense are: (a) a crime of robbery or theft has been committed; (b) the accused, who is not a
principal or accomplice in the commission of the crime of robbery or theft, buys, receives, possesses, keeps,
acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells, or in any manner deals in any article, item, object, or
anything of value, which has been derived from the proceeds of the said crime; (c) the accused knows or should
have known that the said article, item, object, or anything of value has been derived from the proceeds of the
crime of robbery or theft; and (d) there is on the part of the accused intent to gain for himself or for another.
(Estrella v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 212942, June 17, 2020, Second Division)
4. The prosecution was able to establish beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of the offense of fencing. First,
the occurrence of theft was duly established by the prosecution. Yao categorically testified that despite the
downsizing of PAL’s operation in 1998 or reduction of Aircraft. There was still unusual upward movement of
PAL’s Skydrol consumption. Thus, it was concluded that someone was stealing Skydrol from PAL which
prompted its management to conduct an investigation and seek assistance of the PNP-CIDG. Second, petitioner
was caught in possession and in the process of disposing pails of Skydrol to Air Philippines. PO3 Bolido testified
in detail how he and his team caught the petitioner in possession of three pails of Skydrol. From his testimony,
it can be gleaned that petitioner failed to produce Jupel, the alleged source, and the legal documents supporting
the ownership of the confiscated pails of Skydrol which clearly suggest that the pails of fluid proceed from the
crime of theft. In addition, Yao explained that only PAL and no one else owned the Skydrol, which was exclusively
supplied by Solutia. Third, for failing to prove ownership of the Skydrol confiscated from him, petitioner should
have known that the three Skydrol pails were derived from an illegal source. Petitioner failed to present his
alleged supplier, a certain Jupel, and the pertinent documents proving that their transaction was legal. As for
the last element, petitioner had intent to gain. There is no question that the pails of Skydrol Hydraulic Fluid
were found in possession of petitioner. The positive identification by PO3 Bolido and Yao that petitioner was
caught in possession of the subject pails of Skydrol, and the pieces of evidence pointing to PAL as the owner of
these pails of hydraulic fluid gave rise to a presumption of fencing under the law. P.D. 1612, Section 5 states
that mere possession of any good, article, item, object, or anything of value which has been the subject of
robbery or thievery shall be prima facie evidence of fencing. It was thus incumbent upon petitioner to
overthrow this presumption by sufficient and convincing evidence, bu he failed to do so. (Estrella v. People of
the Philippines, G.R. No. 212942, June 17, 2020, Second Division)
5. Without proper factual foundation, the presumption of fencing must be upended in favor of the presumption
of innocence enjoyed by the accused. No prima facie evidence or case shall arise in the absence of the required
facts on which the same must operate. The prosecution cannot, and should not, merely depend on the
operation of the presumption of fencing to establish moral certainty for convicting the accused. More
importantly, the courts should be mindful in applying such presumption, subject to a careful scrutiny of the
facts of each case. This, considering that unjust convictions result to forfeiture of life, liberty, and property.
a. The identity of the bicycle in issue was not established; hence, the presumption of fencing did not arise.
Records show that apart from the police blotter of the alleged robbery, no evidence was presented to
prove Mendoza’s ownership of the bicycle in issue. The photos presented did not show any distinctive
features to identify the bike. Worse, the evidence at hand did not establish that the bicycle given by
petitioner to Magno is the same bicycle stolen from Mendoza. Indeed, the features of the bicycle allegedly
stolen from Mendoza and the one owned by petitioner are principally different from each other. The color
of the fork of the bike owned by private complainant is aluminum or silver, while that of petitioner is blue.
The composition or the material used for the frame is also different. Mendoza’s is magnesium while
petitioner’s is aluminum, which was established by Mendoza’s testimony. As to the serial number,
Mendoza’s bicycle has the number “8303042” on its frame, while accused-appellant’s serial number is
A303042 on its fork.
b. The lower courts put much emphasis on the presumption under Section 5 of PD 1612 which states that
mere possession of any object which has been the subject of robbery or thievery shall be prima facie
evidence of fencing. However, this presumption was overcame by petitioner upon presentation of the
notarized affidavits of the President and Chief Mechanic of Bicycle Works that indeed, petitioner bought
the bicycle subject of the case from their store.
c. Without establishing beyond reasonable doubt that the item which has been the subject of theft is the
same object in the possession of the petitioner, the presumption under PD 1612, Section 5 would not
operate. (Lopez v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 249196, April 28, 2021, First Division)

Acts of Lasciviousness 378
6. The prosecution failed to establish the elements of fencing. There is no evidence shown that petitioner is
neither the principal nor an accomplice of the alleged thievery reported by Mendoza, and that he possessed or
disposed of the latter’s alleged bicycle. No proof was offered to show that petitioner had knowledge that the
bicycle he gave to Magno was stolen, or that he had intent to gain therefrom. It is necessary to remember that
in all criminal prosecutions, the burden of proof is on the prosecution to establish the guilt of the accused
beyond reasonable doubt. It has the duty to prove each and every element of the crime charged in the
Information to warrant a finding of guilt for the said crime. (Lopez v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 249196,
April 28, 2021, First Division)
AC TS O F L AS C IV IO U S N ESS
1. The crime of acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC is not duly established since the first element –
that the accused committed an act characterized by lewdness – was not proven beyond reasonable doubt.
Accused-appellant conceded that he entered the purported victim’s room and down beside her, but he
vehemently denies mounting her and sucking her breasts. On the other hand, Jacqueline alleged that accused-
appellant mounted her and sucked her breasts while she was asleep. In essence, the testimony of the purported
victim is pitted against the testimony of the accused-appellant. Applying the equipoise rule, the scales of justice
should tip in favor of accused-appellant.
a. In addition, the element that criminalizes lewdness, or the criminal circumstances of its commission were
not proven beyond reasonable doubt. The facts indicate that the alleged acts of accused-appellant are in
the nature of amorous advances made by an ardent lover or sexual partner, at the very least. Such
conclusion can be drawn from the invitation made by the purported victim an hour before the said incident.
Plainly, accused-appellant went to Jacqueline’s bedroom with what he had reason to think was an invitation
to a tryst. There was, however, either a change of mind or a completed teasing.
b. Although prior consent in sexual acts does not amount to consent for subsequent sexual acts, the
circumstances in this case call for a different treatment. The invitation indicative of the purported victim’s
consent must be interpreted vis-à-vis the incidents which occurred a few minutes before and after they
parted ways. Records show that the invitation was made when Jacqueline left the gathering, which was
minutes after they were fondling each other and barely half an hour before the said incident. From the
time the invitation was extended and until the time accused-appellant entered the room, there was no
significant occurrence which could have led accused-appellant to conclude that Jacqueline changed her
mind. Simply put, in the span of an hour, there was no reason for accused-appellant to believe that the
invitation was withdrawn. Viewed in this light, accused-appellant’s initial reaction of – “Mare, pasensya na,
pasensya na, mali ako ng inakala ko sa iyo” – would make sense. It would then seem that there was a
continuing acquiescence on the part of the purported victim as the fondling incident by the mango tree up
to the time she reached home would constitute an unbroken chain of events. The consent was only
effectively and categroically withdrawn or revoked when she pushed accused-appellant away, exclaiming
“putang ina mo, bakit ka nakapasok dito?” Upon witnessing Jacqueline’s initial reaction, it being very clear
that the consent and invitaiton were being revoked right then and there, accused-appellant immediately
apologized and abandoned his intentions. That accused-appellant chose not to wake up Jacqueline upon
entering the room should not be taken against him.
c. The elements of acts of lasciviousness under Artice 336 of the RPC are that the offender commits any act
of lasciviousness or lewdness and that it is done under any of the following circumstances: (a) by using
force or intimidation, (b) when the offended woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, or (c)
when the offended party is under 12 years of age. (Angeles v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 212562,
October 12, 2016, Third Division)
2. Failure of AAA to shout during the incident would not exculpate petitioner. AAA could have been submissive
due to her tender age, but the fact that she did cry after the incident was a true indication, indeed, that she had
felt violated. Worthy to note is that her own brother, upon notcing her crying, inquired why she was crying, and
then she told him that petitioner had touched her vagina. (Awas v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 203114,
3. The prosecution established the crime of acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC in relation to
Section 5(b) of R.A. 7610. Records reveal that on various occasions, i.e., August 24, October 13 and 15, 2003,
Monroyo succeeded in touching AAA’s private organ. Monroyo’s overt acts were done against AAA’s will and
much more, committed without any other justifiable reason, hence, demonstrating its lewd character. AAA also
sufficiently established that she was a minor during that time. In this relation, it should be pointed out that
Monroyo was AAA’s uncle and thus, exercised moral ascendancy and influence over her, which according to
case law, constitutes intimidation.
a. As to penalty, in view of Monroyo’s conviction of three counts of Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 336
of the RPC in relation to R.A. 7610, Section 5(b), Monroyo suffers the penalty of imprisonment with an
indeterminate period of 14 years and eight months of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to 20 years of
reclusion temporal, as maximum. (People of the Philippines v. Monroyo, G.R. No. 223708, June 28, 2017,
First Division)

Sexual Abuse and Lascivious Conduct under R.A. 7610 379
4. A judicious examination of the records reveals that all the elements of the crime of acts of lasciviousness under
the RPC and lascivious conduct under R.A. 7610, Section 5(b) have been sufficiently established. The
prosecution was able to prove AAA’s minority at the time of the incident through the presentation of her
Certificate of Live Birth, showing that she was born on September 3, 1995. At the time of the commission of the
lascivious conduct, AAA was then 12 years old. It was likewise established that accused-appellant, an adult who
exercised influence on AAA, committed a lascivious act by ”squeezing” her vagina.
a. The courts a quo erred in convicting the accused-appellant of the crime of unjust vexation instead of Acts
of Lasciviousness on the finding that there was no element of lewdness in accused-appellant’s act.
However, it should be noted that the mere fact of “squeezing” the private part of a child – a young girl 12
years of age – could not have signified any other intention but one having lewd or indecent design. It must
not be forgotten that several years prior, accused-appellant had raped AAA in the same house, for which
act he was appropriately convicted. Indeed, the law indicates that the mere touching – more so,
“squeezing,” in this case, which strongly suggests that the act was intentional – of AAA’s genitalia clearly
constitutes lascivious conduct. It could not have been done merely to annoy or vex her. That AAA was fully
clothed at that time does not foreclose his intention to lie with her and is thus inconsequential. (People of
the Philippines v. Ladra, G.R. No. 221443, July 17, 2017, First Division)
5. All the elements of acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC and sexual abuse under Section 5(b) of
RA 7610 were sufficiently established in the afore-numbered cases. Specifically, appellant committed
lasciviousness when he poured cooking oil on the victims' private organ and rubbed them with his penis. The
victims were under 12 years of age as established by their respective birth certificate and therefore way below
18 years of age. They were subjected to "other sexual abuse" as required under Section 5(b) of RA 7610. "A
child is deemed subjected to 'other sexual abuse' when he or she indulges in lascivious conduct under the
coercion or influence of any adult." There is coercion or influence when there is some form of compulsion
equivalent to intimidation which subdues the free exercise of the offended party's free will. In the present cases,
the victims were sexually abused as they were coerced, influenced, threatened and intimidated by appellant
who was the helper of "CCC's" father. (People of the Philippines v. Bejim, G.R. No. 208835, January 19, 2018,
First Division; People of the Philippines v. Molejon, G.R. No. 208091, April 23, 2018, First Division)
6. The New Rape Law (R.A. 8353) did not expressly repeal Article 336 of the RPC. In addition, there is nothing
inconsistent between the provisions of Article 336 of the RPC and R.A. 8353, except in sexual assault as a form
of rape. Hence, when the lascivious act is not covered by R.A. 8353, then Article 336 of the RPC is applicable,
except when the lascivious conduct is covered by R.A. 7610.
a. In fact, R.A. 8353 only modified Article 336 of the RPC, as follows: (a) by carrying over to acts of
lasciviousness the additional circumstances applicable to rape, viz: threat and fraudulent machinations or
grave abuse of authority; (b) by retaining the circumstance that the offended party is under 12 years old,
and including dementia as another one, in order for acts of lasciviousness to be considered as statutory,
wherein evidence of force or intimidaiton is immaterial because the offended party who is under 12 years
old or demented, is presumed incapable of giving rational consent; and (c) by removing from the scope of
acts of lasciviousness and placing under the crime of rape by sexual assault the specific lewd act of inserting
the offender’s penis into another person’s mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object into the
genital or anal orifice of another person. In fine, Article 336 of the RPC, as amended, is still a good law
despite the enactment of R.A. 8353 for there is no irreconcilable inconsistency between their provisions.
(People of the Philippines v. Dagsa, G.R. No. 219889, January 29, 2018, Second Division)
S EXU AL AB U S E AN D LAS C IV IO U S C O N DU C T U N DER R .A. 761 0

1. Here, AAA was a child at the tender age of seven when the offense was committed. She was residing with her
father in Palagas, Ligao City, Albay, while her mother works as a household helper in Batangas. Her father,
however, is out of the house most of the time, working two jobs as a vendor and barangay tanod. Petitioner,
on the other hand, was known to the victim and her siblings as the caretaker of their grandmother’s ducks.
Thus, when petitioner brought some vegetable viand to the victim’s house at the day the crime was committed,
he was requested by the children to stay with them because they were afraid. AAA entrsuted to petitioner her
safety and that of her siblings, only to be betrayed. Because of the relative seniority of petitioner and the trust
reposed in him, petitioner abused the full reliance of AAA and misused his ascendacy over the victim. These
circumstances can be equated with “intimidation” or “influence” exerted by an adult, covered by R.A. 7610,
Section 5(b). The element of being subjected to sexual abuse is met. (Quimvel v. People of the Philippines, G.R.
No. 214497, April 18, 2017, En Banc)
2. Escalante committed child abuse under Section 5(b) of R.A. 7610. First, in forcibly sucking AAA’s penis and
thereafter inserting it in his anus, Escalante, without question exposed AAA to lascivious conduct. Second, AAA
is a child subjected to other sexual abuse. Third, AAA’s minority was sufficiently established, as shwn by his birth
certificate.
a. Caballo states a child who engages in sexual or lascivious conduct due to the coercion or influence is a child
subjected to other sexual abuse. It further adds that age disparity between an adult and a minor is an indicia
of coercion or influence. In this case, AAA was only 12 years old at the time of the sexual abuse. The records,
on the other hand, disclosed that Escalante was 20 years old at the time of the commission of the crime.

The disparity of eight years between them placed Escalante in a stronger position over AAA to exert his will
upon the latter. In addiiton, AAA testified in open court that he could not resist because he feared Escalante
as the latter was taller and bigger than him.
b. The fact that the sexual encounter between Escalante and AAA occurred only once does not remove it from
the ambit of R.A. 7610, Section 5(b).
c. The fact that Escalante was charged with violation of Section 10(a) of R.A. 7610 does not preclude his
conviction under Section 5(b) of the same law. This is because both the Information and evidence on record
spell out a case of sexual abuse punishable under Section 5(b) of R.A. 7610. (Escalante v. People of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 218970, June 28, 2017, Second Division)
3. The Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. 7160 defines lascivious conduct as the intentional touching,
either directly or through clothing, of the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks, or the
introduction of any object into the genitalia, anus or mouth, of any person, whether of the same or opposite
sex, with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person,
bestiality, masturbation, lascivious exhibition of the genitals, or pubic area of a person. (Awas v. People of the
4. Applying the variance doctrine, Aycardo, who was charged with one count of rape by sexual assault, can still be
convicted of acts of lasciviousness under Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. 7610 even though he was unable to
insert his finger into the victim’s vagina, because the prosecution has proved that he intentionally touched the
same – an act which is deemed a lascivious conduct. In addition, Aycardo, an adult, took advantage of his
influence as the uncle and a relative by affinity with the 3rd civil degree of AAA and was able to touch her vagina,
while he forcibly removed her shorts and panties.
a. Intentional touching, either directly or through clothing, of the genitalia of any person, with intent to abuse
or gratify sexual desire falls under the definition of lascivious conduct under Section 2(h) of the rules and
regulations of R.A. 7610. As such, Aycardo’s act of touching AAA’s vagina after forcibly removing her shorts
and panties, and trying to insert his finger into it, satisfies the first element of acts of lasciviousness under
Article 336 of the RPC, in relation to Section 5(b) of R.A. 7610. (People of the Philippines v. Aycardo, G.R.
No. 218114, June 5, 2017, Second Division; People of the Philippines v. Udtohan, G.R. No. 228887, August
5. Caoili can be convicted of the crime of lascivious conduct under R.A. 7610, Section 5(b). It is undisputed that at
the time of the commission of the lascivious act, AAA was 14 years, one month, and 10 days old. In addition,
evidence confirms that Caoili kissed AAA on her lips, touched and mashed her breast, and inserted his finger
into her vagina and made a push and pull movement with such finger for 30 minutes.
a. It is settled that R.A. 7610, Section 5(b) does not require a prior or contemporaneous abuse that is different
from what is complaint of, or that a third person should act in concert with the accused. (People of the
Philippines v. Caoili, G.R. No. 196342, August 8, 2017, En Banc)
6. In this case, it has been established that petitioner, who was AAA's teacher and then the CAT Commandant in
her school, was able to carry out his lewd acts by asking her twice if she was determined to become a CAT
officer. Petitioner's inquiry strongly suggested that if AAA really wanted to become a CAT officer, she should
accede to his demands and allow him to commit lascivious conduct upon her person. Therefore, petitioner
exercised influence and coercion upon AAA in order to commit the crime against her, thereby satisfying the
element of force and intimidation in this case. Besides, although petitioner was not armed nor did he threaten
AAA, his moral ascendancy over her is a sufficient substitute for the use of force or intimidation, as pointed out
by the CA. (Orsos v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 214673, November 20, 2017, Second Division)
7. All the elements of sexual abuse under R.A. 7610 were proven beyond reasonable doubt. Villacampa inserted
his finger into the vagina of his minor victims, and in the case of DDD, he inserted his penis, threatening them
by using force and intimidation. Moreover, Villacampa was the common-law husband of the mother of the
victims and thus, he exerted moral ascendancy over them. Moral ascendancy takes the place of the force and
intimidation that is required in rape cases. The minority of the victims was all proven during the course of the
trial and also admitted by Villacampa. The victims were all subjected to sexual abuse by Villacampa as he
engaged in lascivious conduct with them. (People of the Philippines v. Villacampa, G.R. No. 216057, January 8,
8. Inserting a finger in a 12-year-old girl’s vagina and mashing her breasts are not only acts of lasciviousness but
also amount to child abuse under R.A. 7610. (Perez v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 201414, April 18, 2018,
Third Division)
9. A review of the evidence presented by the prosecution reveals that the elements of the crime of sexual abuse
under R.A. 7610, Section 5(b) were sufficiently established. With respect to the first requisite, the prosecution
was able to show, through the credible testimony of AAA, that Basa committed lascivious conduct against her
when he dragged her to the room of Pastor Eddie, pulled up her skirt and, through the side of her underwear,
inserted his finger into her private part, causing her to feel pain. Moreover, the prosecution duly established

the element of intentional touching, either directly or through clothing, of the genitalia of any person, with
intent to abuse or gratify sexual desire. This act constitutes sexual abuse and lascivious conduct under the
definition provided by Section 2, paragraphs (g) and (h) of the rules and regulations of R.A. No. 7610, known as
the Rules and Regulations on the Reporting and Investigation of Child Abuse Cases. As regards the second
requisite that the lascivious conduct be done under the enumerated circumstances, it has been said that "force
and intimidation" are subsumed under "coercion and influence" and such terms are used almost synonymously.
As AAA expressly testified, Basa grabbed her right arm and forcefully dragged her to the office of Pastor Eddie
and threatened to kill her should she tell anybody of what he did to her. Anent the third requisite, a child is
deemed exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse when the child indulges in sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct (a) for money, profit or any other consideration; or (b) under the coercion or
any influence of any adult, syndicate or group. Again, AAA was clearly coerced, in fact dragged, by Basa into
going with him to the room of their pastor, where he forcefully inserted his finger into her private part. Fourth,
as previously mentioned, it is undisputed that AAA was only below 18 years old. (People of the Philippines v.
Basa, Jr., G.R. No. 237349, February 27, 2019, Third Division)
10. The term "other sexual abuse," on the other hand, is construed in relation to the definitions of "child abuse"
under Section 3, Article I of R.A. No. 7610 and of "sexual abuse" under Section 2(g) of the Rules and Regulations
on the Reporting and Investigation of Child Abuse Cases. In the former provision, "child abuse" refers to the
maltreatment, whether habitual or not, of the child which includes sexual abuse, among other matters. In the
latter provision, "sexual abuse" includes the employment, use, persuasion, inducement, enticement or coercion
of a child to engage in, or assist another person to engage in, sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct or the
molestation, prostitution, or incest with children. It cannot be denied from the facts of the case that AAA was
subjected to sexual abuse under the foregoing definitions. She is clearly a child who, due to the coercion or
influence of Manuel, indulged in lascivious conduct. In fact, it must be stressed that Manuel is the father of AAA.
As such, he has moral ascendancy over his minor daughter. Settled is the rule that in cases where rape is
committed by a relative, such as a father, stepfather, uncle, or common law spouse, moral influence or
ascendancy takes the place of "force and intimidation" as an essential element of rape. (Ramilo v. People of the
11. "Lascivious conduct" means the intentional touching, either directly or through clothing, of the genitalia, anus,
groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks, or the introduction of any object into the genitalia, anus or mouth, of
any person, whether of the same or opposite sex, with an intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse
or gratify the sexual desire of any person, bestiality, masturbation, lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic
area of a person. Meanwhile, "Sexual abuse" includes the employment, use, persuasion, inducement,
enticement or coercion of a child to engage in, or assist another person to engage in, sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct or the molestation, prostitution, or incest with children. (People of the Philippines v. XXX,
12. BBB recalled an instance in 2009 when appellant commenced to sexually ravish her and was about to penetrate
her vagina but was abruptly interrupted when CCC arrived home. The trial court accurately synthesized BBB's
testimony. It stated that it was evident from the testimony of herein private complainant BBB that all the above-
mentioned elements and requirements of the law for the crime of Lascivious Conduct under Section 5(b) of
Republic Act No. 7610 have been fully established by the prosecution. BBB maintained that sometime in the
year 2009, while at home for being sick, accused suddenly put down her shorts and underwear to her knee and
raised her t-shirt up to her breast. Accused then proceeded to touch and kiss her on her private parts despite
her resistance. Not satisfied, accused took off his t-shirt, shorts and brief and was about to insert his penis into
her vagina, when her younger brother CCC arrived and abruptly stopped the advances of the accused.
Indubitably, appellant committed lascivious conduct when he performed acts of lasciviousness by pulling down
AAA's shorts and underwear, touching and kissing her private parts, and attempting to insert his penis into her
vagina. Notably, BBB was a minor, being only fourteen (14) years old at that time. (People of the Philippines v.
XXX, G.R. No. 235662, July 24, 2019, Second Division)
13. Accused-appellant is guilty of lascivious conduct. Records readily reveal that accused-appellant sexually abused
his own step-daughter by lifting her skirt, pulling down his own shorts and brief, inserting his penis into her
anus, and then “picking” her vagina. Notably, AAA was a minor, being only 13 years old at that time. During her
testimony, she revealed that she did not disclose her ordeal to anyone, including her mother, because she was
afraid of accused-appellant who was then making threats on her. Indubitably, accused-appellant succeeded in
coercing AAA to engage in lascivious conduct. Not only did he scare her with his threats should she disclose his
bestiality, he even used his moral ascendancy as her step-father. It is doctrinal that moral influence or
ascendancy takes the place of violence and intimidation. (People of the Philippines v. XXX, G.R. No. 230981, July
14. Contrary to the contention of petitioner, the Information filed against him sufficiently alleged the element that
the lascivious act was committed against a child subjected to sexual abuse. While the Information charged
petitioner of violation of R.A. 7610, Section 10(a), his conviction of Section 5(b) of the same Act did not violate
petitioner’s constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him. As held in

Tulagan, the failure to designate the offense by statute, or to mention the specific provision penalizing the act,
or an erroneous specification of the law violated, does not vitiate the Information if the facts alleged clearly
recite the facts constituting the crime charged, for what controls is not the title of the Information or the
designation of the offense, but the actual facts recited in the Information. In this case, the body of the
Information charging petitioner contains an averment of the acts committed which unmistakably describes acts
punishes under R.A. 7610, Section 5(b). The Information evidently recites the ultimate facts and circumstances
constituting the offense for which petitioner was found guilty of. The Information, in fact, specifically alleges
that petitioner committed acts of child abuse. Hence, petitioner cannot be said to have not been apprised of
the nature and cause of accusation against him. The absence of the phrase”exploited in prostitution or subject
to other sexual abuse” or even the specific mention of “coercion” or “influence” is not a bar for the Court to
uphold the finding of guilt against an accused for violation of R.A. 7610. In fine, both the Information and the
evidence on record spell out a case of child abuse through lascivious condut punishable under R.A. 7610, Section
5(b).
a. Anent the proper penalty to be imposed, under R.A. 7610, Section 5, the penalty for lascivious conduct,
when the victim is under 12 years of age, shall be reclusion temporal in its medium period, which ranges
from 14 years, 8 months and one day to 17 years and four months. Accordingly, applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, the maximum term of the indeterminate penalty shall be that which could be properly
imposed under the law, which is 15 years, six months, and 20 days of reclusion temporal. On the other
hand, the minimum term shall be within the range of the penalty next lower in degree, which is reclusion
temporal in its minimum period, or 12 years and one day to 14 years and eight months. (Capueta v. People
of the Philippines, G.R. No. 240145, September 14, 2020, Second Division)
15. The relative seniority of petitioner over AAA, who was merely nine (9) years old at the time of the incident,
clearly established petitioner’s moral ascendancy over AAA. As held in Quimvel, when the victim of the crime is
a child under 12 years old, mere ascendancy will suffice, to establish influence or intimidation and such
elements of force and intimidation are subsumed in coercion and influence. (Mendoza v. People of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 239756, September 14, 2020, Second Division)
16. Although the Court declared in Malto that the Sweetheart Theory is unacceptable in violations of R.A. 7610
since a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse cannot validly give consent to sexual
intercourse with another person, the Court deems it judicious to review the decision of the court a quo and
reiterate the pronouncements in Tulagan and Monroy and clarify the ambiguioty created in the Malto case in
resolving the case at bar. As such, where the age of the child is close to the threshold age of 12 years old, as in
the case of AAA who was only 12 years and one month old at the time of the incident, evidence must be strictly
scrutinized to determine the presence of sexual consent. The emotional maturity and predisposition of a
juvenile, whose age is close to the threshold age of 12, may significantly differ from a child between 15-18 who
may be expected to be more mature and to act with consciousness of the consequences of sexual intercourse.
(Bangayan v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 235610, September 16, 2020, Third Division)
17. The accused cannot be held liable for violating R.A. 7610, Section 5(b). Records show the existence of special
circumstances that reveal the presence of consent of AAA, who was already 12 years old at that time. The sexual
congress between Bangayan and AAA was not limited to just one incident. They were in a relationship even
after the incident alleged in the Information and had even produced two children. To the Court’s mind, these
are not acts of a child who is unable to discern good from evil and did not give consent to the sexual act. The
Court also notes that the conclusion of the RTC that the moral ascendancy or influence of the accused over the
victim is beyond question because of their 15 year age gap, not to mention that the former is also her brother-
in-law, he being the brother of the husand of her older sister is erroneous. Contrary to the ruling of the RTC, it
cannot be said that Bangayan exercised moral ascendancy over AAA simply because of their 15-year age gap
and the fact that he is her “brother-in-law.” Following the concept of brother-in-law in its ordinary sense,
Bangayan is not AAA’s brother-in-law because a brother-in-law refers only to a wife’s brother or a sister’s
husband. It does not include a brother of the husband of AAA’s older sister. The Court must take into account
Bangayan’s defense that, at the time of the incident, he and AAA were lovers. The conduct of Bangayan and
AAA, which is the subject of the Information against him, is not the sexual abuse punished by the law. While
placed in an unusual predicament, the Court recognizes that Bangayan and AAA are in a relationship that had
produced not just one offspring but two. While AAA was a child, as defined under R.A. 7610, being under 18
years of age at the time she and Bangayan engaged in sexual intercourse, there was no coercion, intimidation,
or influence of an adult, as contemplated by the law. AAA consented to the sexual act as reflected in her conduct
at the time of the commission of the act and her subsequent conduct shown in the records. Moreover, AAA did
not testify during the trial. Had she testified, the trial corut would have been able to confirm the veracity of the
allegations in the sworn statement she executed and the statements she allegedly made to Dr. Villar during her
medical examination on April 24, 2012. (Bangayan v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 235610, September 16,
a. Subsequent cohabitation cannot act as pardon to the sexual abuse committed against the victim. More so,
while the law may admit voluntariness on the part of the child who reaches the age of 12, voluntariness or
informed sexual consent of a child must be determined cautiously. Cases involving younger victims must
be resolved through more stringent criteria. Several factors, such as the age of the child, his or her

psychological state, intellectual capability, relationship with the accused, their age difference, and other
signs of coercion or manipulation must be taken into account in order to protect the child. Accordingly, a
12-year-old girl, who is merely in the sixth grade, cannot give a mature and informed consent to sexual
intercourse with an adult 15 years her senior. Children of her age, generally, are still under the supervision
of their parents or guardian, needing guidance and direction as they are only about to enter adolescence.
(Dissenting Opinion of Justice Leonen in Bangayan v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 235610, September
18. Coercion or intimidation was present when petitioner, at the place where there were no houses, blocked AAA’s
way and then pulled her to a forested area, where he then succeeded in performing his lascivious acts with her.
AAA pleaded for petitioner to stop and also tried to resist and pull herself away from him. AAA could not move
when petitioner inserted his hand inside her panties and touched her private part as she was already afraid.
Moreover, petitioner told AAA not to be noisy. (Uddin v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 249588, November
19. The elements of acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC and sexual abuse under Article III, Section
5(b) of R.A. 7610 were sufficiently established. The introduction of any object into the mouth of a child under
12 years partakes of a lascivious conduct under R.A. 7610, more so in this case when taken in light of accused-
appellant’s preparatory acts of removing his pants and underwear, taking out his penis, and forcing the child to
hold it.
a. AAA testified that accused-appellant’s penis was not actually inserted into her mouth, however slightly,
when she categorically declared that accused-appellant’s penis merely touched her lips by reason of her
resistance when she pushed him away. From her testimony, it cannot be ascertained whether the said
touching had sufficient force so as to, at least, make the lips part and permit a slight opening, through
which the tip of accused-appellant’s penis, or any part thereof, may have probable entry. As accused-
appellant’s conviction cannot be made to rest on such possibility, accused-appellant cannot be held liable
for sexual assault in its consummated stage.
b. While accused-appellant failed to consummate the offense of sexual assault, the totality of his acts in trying
to achieve his bestial purpose, i.e., removing his shorts and brief, and forcing AAA to hold his penis and
insert/put it inside her mouth, likewise established the elements of Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 336
of the RPC, in relation to Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. 7610. Applying the variance doctrine, accused-
appellant can be convicted of acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC, in relation to Section 5(b)
of R.A. 7610, which was the offense proved though he was charged with rape through sexual assault in
relation to R.A. 7610. (People of the Philippines v. Manuel, G.R. No. 242278, December 9, 2020, Third
Division)
20. The Court finds that petitioner’s acts of putting AAA’s penis inside his mouth and playing with it for ten (10)
minutes constitute lascivious conduct under R.A. 7610, Section 5(b).
a. It was error for the courts a quo to have convicted him under Section 10(a) of the same Act. True, the
Information filed against petitioner charged him under R.A. 7610, Section 10(a). However, it is a well-settled
rule that the nature and character of the crime charged are determined not by the specification of the
provision of the law alleged to have been violated but by the facts alleged in the indictment, that is, the
actual recital of the facts as alleged in the body of information, and not the caption or preamble of the
information or complaint nor the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, they
being conclusions of law. The facts alleged in the body of information, not the technical name given by the
prosecutor appearing in the title of the information, determine the character of the crime. Further, the
information must sufficiently allege the acts or omissions complained of to inform a person of common
understanding what offense he is being charged with – in other words, the elements of the crime must be
clearly stated.
b. A perusal of of the Information filed against petitioner in this case discloses that it is sufficient to charge
him with lascivious conduct under R.A. 7160, Section 5(b). It reads: “That on or about the 27 th day of
December, 2011, in xxx, Philippines, the said accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously commit an act of child abuse prejudicial to the development and welfare of one [AAA], a minor,
16 years old, by then and there placing the latter’s penis in his mouth and played with it, which acts
debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of said AAA, as a human being, to his damage
and prejudice.” Here, as both the recital in the Information and the evidence presented by the prosecution
for a case that can be prosecuted and penalized as Lascivious Conduct under R.A. 7610, Section 5(b),
petitioner should be properly convicted and penalized therefor. (Encinares v. People of the Philippines,
21. The elements of sexual abuse under R.A. 7610, Section 5(b) were sufficiently established by the prosecution.
AAA’s minority had been sufficiently established with the presentation of her Certificate of Live Birth showing
that she was born on November 15, 1986. Thus, it is undisputed that AAA was only 11 years old during the
commission of the crimes against her person. Evidence likewise reveals that petitioner was then the Grade VI
teacher of AAA in FCIC, and therefore, a person who exercised moral ascendancy and influence upon her.
Finally, AAA clearly testified how the separate counts of Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC in

relation to R.A. 7610, Section 5(b) were committed. She categorically stated that petitioner kissed her, touched
her private parts while she was lying on top of the table in the computer room, and that he repeatedly made
pumping motions after he removed his pants and lifted her skirt until he ejaculated. The prosecution had
likewise emphasized that petitioner’s penis never penetrated AAA’s vagina in any of the sexual incidents. These
established facts show that petitioner committed the acts with lewd desires and that his lascivious conduct
subjected AAA to sexual abuse. Because there was neither an insertion nor an attempt to insert petitioner’s
penis or any object into AAA’s vagina, petitioner’s conviction of Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 336 of the
RPC in relation to R.A. 7610 and not attempted rape is in order. Even the Informations alleged that “accused’s
male organ was not able to penetrate nor touch the labia of the pudendum.” (Valenzona v. Peopple of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 203785, January 20, 2021, Third Division)
22. Petitioner, who was senior to the child victim by four years, manipulated and subjected AAA to his lascivious
conduct, under the threat of ruining her reputation. Petitioner intimidated AAA by threatening her that he
would tell others that she taking birth control pills. As succinctly put by the RTC, it was enough that fear was
produced in the mind of the 15-year old victim from the threat of petitioner, whom she may have identified as
her “kuya,” he being the boyfriend of her older sister. It bears emphasis, as well, that consent is immaterial in
cases involving violation of Section 5(b) of R.A. 7610. The law being mlaum prohibitum, the mere act of
committing lascivious conduct with a child subjected to sexual abuse already constitute the offense. (Carbonell
v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 246702, April 28, 2021, Third Division)
23. Petitioner is guilty under Section 5(a) of R.A. 7610 for acting as procurer of a child prostitute.
a. The elements of Section 5(a) of R.A. 7610 are as follows: (i) the accused engages in, promotes, facilitates,
or induces child prostitution; (ii) the act is done through, but not limited to the following means: (1) acting
as a procurer of a child prostitute, (2) inducing a person to be a client of a child prostitute by means of
written or oral advertisements or other similar means, (3) taking advantage of influence or relationship to
procure a child as a prostitute, (4) threatening or using violence towards a child to engage him as a
prostitute, or (5) giving monetary consideration, goods, or other pecuniary benefit to a child with intent to
engage such child in prostitution; (iii) the child is exploited or intended to be exploited in prostitution; and
(iv) the child is below 18 years of age.
b. Here, AAA’s declarations established that petitioner exploited her in prostitution when he procured a
customer to engage in sexual intercourse with her for a fee, from which pay he also benefited. (Brozoto v.
People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 233420, April 28, 2021, Third Division)
24. All the elements of violation of sexual abuse under R.A. 7610, Section 5(b) are present. Records indicate that
AAA was 13 years old at the time of the incident. The court a quo found the testimony of AAA to be
straightforward, categorical, and convincing when she testified that petitioner forcibly kissed her while touching
her breasts, tantamount to lascivious conduct as defined under the law. It must be borne in mind that the Court
has consistently given full weight and credence to a child’s testimonies as youth and immaturity are badges of
truth and sincerity. Worthy to mention is that the RTC observed that AAA was crying while testifying. Crying is
but a natural display of emotion indicating the pain that the victim feels when asked to recount a traumatic
experience; the tears indicate truth and sincerity.
a. A child is deemed subjected to “other sexual abuse” under R.A. 7610, Section 5(b) when the child is
subjected to lascivious conduct under the coercion and influence of any adult. Case law clarifies that
intimidation need not necessarily be irresistible. It is sufficient that some compulsion equivalent to
intimidation annuls or subdues the free exercise of the will of the offended party. This is especially true in
the case of young, innocent, and immature girls who could not be expected to act with equanimity of
disposition and with nerves of steel. Young girls cannot be expected to act like adults under the same
circumstances to have the courage and intelligence to disregard the threats.
b. It cannot be denied that the presence of coercion and intimidation is attendant in this case. As aptly found
by the RTC and the CA, the fact that the accused is the subject teacher of AAA played a great role for the
latter to satisfy his dastardly desires. As laid down in People v. Errojo and People v. Clado, the Court has
determined that the vast difference in age between the victim and the offender is indicative of coercion
and intimidation. Clearly, AAA, a minor, was vulnerable and would have been easily intimidated by an
attacker who is not only a grown man, but is also someone exercising moral influence or ascendancy over
her. It is doctrinal that moral influence or ascendancy takes the place of violence and intimidation. (Dela
Cruz v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 245516, June 14, 2021, Third Division)
25. The CA correctly convicted Carlos for violation of Section 5(b) instead of Section 10(a). First, the three separate
indictments sufficiently alleged the punishable acts and its elements punished by Section 5(b). the elements of
Section 5(b) for sexual abuse are: the commission by the accused of the act of sexual intercourse; the act is
performed on a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse; and the child, whether male
or female, is below 18 years of age. And, second, as can be gleaned from the above-mentioned provisions of
Section 5(b) of R.A. 7610 specifically applies in case of sexual abuse committed against children; whereas,
Section 10(a) thereof punishes other forms of child abuse not covered by other provisions of R.A. 7610.
Parenthetically, the offense will not fall under Section 10(a) of R.A. 7610 if the same is specifically penalized by
a particular provision of the law such as Section 5(b) for sexual abuse.

a. The CA aptly observed: “In the instant case, the existence of the first and third elements remains
undisputed. Accused-appellant committed an act of sexual intercourse, on three (3) separate dates, when
he inserted his penis into the vagina of private complainant, who was only thirteen (13) years old, having
been born on 12 January 1996 as shown by her Birth Certificate. Thus, the only bone of contention lies in
the presence of the second element. On this note, the defense submits that accused-appellant cannot be
convicted of Section 5(b) absent any allegation that there was persuasion, enticement or coercion on his
part. Section 5, Article III of RA 7610 provides that when a child indulges in sexual intercourse or any
lascivious conduct due to the coercion or influence of any adult, the child is deemed to be a "child exploited
in prostitution and other sexual abuse." In this manner, the law is able to act as an effective deterrent to
quell all forms of abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation and discrimination against children, prejudicial as
they are to their development. In this relation, case law further clarifies that sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct under the coercion or influence of any adult exists when there is some form of compulsion
equivalent to intimidation which subdues the free exercise of the offended party's free will. Corollary
thereto, Section 2 (g) of the Rules on Child Abuse Cases conveys that sexual abuse involves the element of
influence which manifests in a variety of forms. It is defined as the employment, use, persuasion,
inducement, enticement, or coercion of a child to engage in or assist another person to engage in, sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct or the molestation, prostitution, or incest with children. To note, the term
‘influence’ means the ‘improper use of power or trust in any way that deprives a person of free will and
substitutes another’s objective.’ Meanwhile, ‘coercion’ is the improper use of power to compel another to
submit to the wishes of one who wields it. The Court finds that accused-appellant's actuations may be
classified as "coercion" and "influence" within the purview of Section 5, Article III of RA 7610. First, the
most crucial element is private complainant's minority. It is undisputed that private complainant was only
13 years old at the time of the commission of the crime and is, hence, considered a child under the law. In
this respect, private complainant was not capable of fully understanding or knowing the import of her
actions and in consequence, remained vulnerable to the cajolery and deception of adults, as in this case.”
(Carlos v. AAA and People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 243034, June 28, 2021, Third Division)
SEXUAL ABUSE UNDER R.A. 7610 VS. RAPE AND/OR ACTS OF LASCIVIOUSNESS UNDER THE RPC
1. In designating or charging the proper offense in case lascivious conduct is committed under R.A. 7610, Section
5(b) and in determining the imposable penalty, the following guidelines must be imposed:
a. The age of the victim is taken into consideration in designating or charging the offense, and in determining
the imposable penalty.
b. If the victim is under 12 years of age, the nomenclature of the crime should be “Acts of Lasciviousness
under Article 336 of the RPC in relation to R.A. 7610, Section 5(b).” Pursuant to the second proviso in
Section 5(b) of R.A. 7610, the imposable penalty is reclusion temporal in its medium period.
c. If the victim is exactly 12 years of age, or more than 12 but below 18 years of age, or is 18 years old or older
but is unable to fully take of herself/himself or protect herself/himself from abuse, neglect, cruelty,
exploitation or discrimination because of a physical or mental disability or condition, the crime should be
designated as “Lascivious Conduct under R.A. 7610, Section 5(b),” and the imposable penalty is reclusion
temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua. (People of the Philippines v. Caoili, G.R. No. 196342,
August 8, 2017, En Banc)
2. Since AAA merely testified that her father touched her breasts and vagina, and thereafter placed himself on top
of her ("pumatong siya"), and there was no specific mention of a penetration of Ursua's penis or fingers into
AAA' vagina, the CA correctly ruled that Ursua cannot be held liable for rape by sexual intercourse as charged
in the Information in Criminal Case No. 134834-H. Be that as it may, Ursua can still be convicted of sexual abuse
under Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610 pursuant to the variance doctrine under Sections 4 and 5, Rule
120 of the Rules of Court, because the same offense was proved during trial and is necessarily included in acts
of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC which, under settled jurisprudence, is necessarily included in the
crime of rape. (People of the Philippines v. Ursua, G.R. No. 218575, October 4, 2017, Second Division)
a. A comparison of the essential elements or ingredients of sexual abuse under Section 5(b), Article III of R.A.
No. 7610 and acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC barely reveals any material or substantial
difference between them. The first element of sexual abuse under R.A. No. 7610, which includes lascivious
conduct, lists the particular acts subsumed under the broad term "act of lasciviousness or lewdness" under
Article 336. The second element of "coercion and influence" as appearing under R.A. No 7610 is likewise
broad enough to cover "force and intimidation" as one of the circumstances under Article 336. Anent the
third element, the offended party under R.A. No. 7610 and Article 336 may be of either sex, save for the
fact that the victim in the former must be a child. I therefore posit that the sexual abuse under Section 5(b),
Article III of R.A. No. 7610 is necessarily included the crime of acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of
the RPC. Applying the variance doctrine in this case where the crime charged is rape by sexual intercourse,
Caoili can still be convicted of sexual abuse under Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610. This is because
the same crime was proved during trial and is necessarily included in the crime of acts of lasciviousness
under Article 336 of the RPC which, under settled jurisprudence, is necessarily included in a complaint for
rape. (Separate Concurring Opinion of Justice Peralta in People of the Philippines v. Caoili, G.R. No. 196342,
August 8, 2017, En Banc)

3. In this case, it has been established that Ejercito committed the act of sexual intercourse against and without
the consent of AAA, who was only fifteen (15) years old at that time. As such, she is considered under the law
as a child who is "exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse;" hence, Ejercito's act may as well
be classified as a violation of Section 5 (b) of R.A. 7610. Between Article 266-A of the RPC, as amended by RA
8353, as afore-discussed and Section 5 (b) of RA 7610, the Court deems it apt to clarify that Ejercito should be
convicted under the former. Verily, penal laws are crafted by legislature to punish certain acts, and when two
(2) penal laws may both theoretically apply to the same case, then the law which is more special in nature,
regardless of the time of enactment, should prevail. Following the ruling of the Court in Caoli, in instances where
an accused is charged and eventually convicted of having sexual intercourse with a minor, the provisions on
rape under RA 8353 amending the RPC should prevail over Section 5 (b) of RA 7610. (People of the Philippines
v. Ejercito, G.R. No. 229861, July 2, 2018, Second Division)
4. In sum, the following are the applicable laws and penalty for the crimes of acts of lasciviousness or lascivious
conduct and rape by carnal knowledge or sexual assault, depending on the age of the victim, in view of the
provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 266-A and Article 336 of the RPC, as amended by R.A. No. 8353, and
Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610:
Age of Victim
Crime Committed Under 12 years old or 12 years or below 18, or 18 years old and above
demented 18 under special
circumstances
Acts of Lasciviousness Acts of Lasciviousness Lascivious conduct under Not applicable
committed against children under Article 336 of the Section 5(b) of R.A. No.
exploited in prostitution or RPC in relation to Section 7610: reclusion temporal
other sexual abuse 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610: in its medium period to
reclusion temporal in its reclusion perpetua
medium period
Sexual Assault committed Sexual Assault under Lascivious Conduct under Not applicable
against children exploited in Article 266-A(2) of the RPC Section 5(b) of R.A. No.
prostitution or other sexual in relation to Section 5(b) 7610: reclusion temporal
abuse of R.A. No. 7610: reclusion in its medium period to
temporal in its medium reclusion perpetua
period
Sexual Intercourse Rape under Article 266- Sexual Abuse under Not applicable
committed against children A(1) of the RPC: reclusion Section 5(b) of R.A. No.
exploited in prostitution or perpetua, except when the 7610: reclusion temporal
other sexual abuse victim is below 7 years old in its medium period to
in which case death reclusion perpetua
penalty shall be imposed
Rape by carnal knowledge Rape under Article 266- Rape under Article 266- Rape under Article 266-
A(1) in relation to Art. 266- A(1) in relation to Art. 266- A(1) of the RPC: reclusion
B of the RPC: reclusion B of the RPC: reclusion perpetua
perpetua, except when the perpetua
victim is below 7 years old
in which case death
penalty shall be imposed
Rape by Sexual Assault Sexual Assault under Lascivious Conduct under Sexual Assault under
Article 266-A(2) of the RPC Section 5(b) of R.A. No. Article 266-A(2) of the
in relation to Section 5(b) 7610: reclusion temporal RPC: prision mayor
of R.A. No. 7610: reclusion in its medium period to
temporal in its medium reclusion perpetua
period
For the crime of acts of lasciviousness or lascivious conduct, the nomenclature of the crime and the imposable
penalty are based on the guidelines laid down in Caoili. For the crimes of rape by carnal knowledge and sexual
assault under the RPC, as well as sexual intercourse committed against children under R.A. No. 7610, the
designation of the crime and the imposable penalty are based on the discussions in Dimakuta, Quimvel and
Caoili, in line with the policy of R.A. No. 7610 to provide stronger deterrence and special protection to children
from all forms of abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation, discrimination, and other conditions prejudicial to their
development. It is not amiss to stress that the failure to designate the offense by statute, or to mention the
specific provision penalizing the act, or an erroneous specification of the law violated, does not vitiate the
information if the facts alleged clearly recite the facts constituting the crime charged, for what controls is not
the title of the information or the designation of the offense, but the actual facts recited in the information.
Nevertheless, the designation in the information of the specific statute violated is imperative to avoid surprise
on the accused and to afford him the opportunity to prepare his defense accordingly. (People of the Philippines
v. Tulagan, G.R. No. 227363, March 12, 2019, En Banc; People of the Philippines v. Adajar, G.R. No. 231306,

June 17, 2019, Third Division; People of the Philippines v. BBB, G.R. No. 232071, July 10, 2019, Third Division;
XXX v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 242101, September 16, 2019, Second Division; People of the
Philippines v. XXX, G.R. No. 233661, November 6, 2019, Third Division; People of the Philippines v. XXX, G.R. No.
5. Considering the development of the crime of sexual assault from a mere "crime against chastity" in the form of
acts of lasciviousness to a "crime against persons" akin to rape, as well as the rulings in Dimakuta and Caoili,
the Court holds that if the acts constituting sexual assault are committed against a victim under 12 years of age
or is demented, the nomenclature of the offense should now be "Sexual Assault under paragraph 2, Article 266-
A of the RPC in relation to Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610" and no longer "Acts of Lasciviousness under Article
336 of the RPC in relation to Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610," because sexual assault as a form of acts of
lasciviousness is no longer covered by Article 336 but by Article 266-A(2) of the RPC, as amended by R.A. No.
8353. Nevertheless, the imposable penalty is still reclusion temporal in its medium period, and not prision
mayor. Whereas if the victim is 12 years old and under 18 years old, or 18 years old and above under special
circumstances, the nomenclature of the crime should be "Lascivious Conduct under Section 5(b) of R.A. No.
7610" with the imposable penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua, but it should
not make any reference to the provisions of the RPC. It is only when the victim of the sexual assault is 18 years
old and above, and not demented, that the crime should be called as "Sexual Assault under paragraph 2, Article
266-A of the RPC" with the imposable penalty of prision mayor. (People of the Philippines v. Tulagan, G.R. No.
227363, March 12, 2019, En Banc)
6. The Court rules that when the offended party is under 12 years of age or is demented, only the first proviso of
Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610 will apply, to wit: "when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age, the
perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3, for rape." The penalty for statutory rape under
Article 335 is reclusion perpetua, which is. still the same as in the current rape law, i.e., paragraph 1(d), Article
266-A in relation to Article 266-B of the RPC, as amended by R.A. No. 8353, except in cases where the victim is
below 7 years of age where the imposable penalty is death. Note that the second proviso of Section 5(b) of R.A.
No. 7610 will not apply because it clearly has nothing to do with sexual intercourse, and it only deals with
"lascivious conduct when the victim is under 12 years of age." While the terms "lascivious conduct" and "sexual
intercourse" are included in the definition of "sexual abuse" under Section 2(g) of the Rules and Regulations on
the Reporting and Investigation of Child Abuse Cases, note that the definition of "lascivious conduct" does not
include sexual intercourse. Be it stressed that the purpose of indicating the phrase "under twelve (12) years of
age" is to provide for statutory lascivious conduct or statutory rape, whereby evidence of force, threat or
intimidation is immaterial because the offended party, who is under 12 years old or is demented, is presumed
incapable of giving rational consent. (People of the Philippines v. Tulagan, G.R. No. 227363, March 12, 2019, En
Banc)
7. Considering the definition under Section 3(a) of R.A. No. 7610 of the term "children" which refers to persons
below eighteen (18) years of age or those over but are unable to fully take care of themselves or protect
themselves from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation or discrimination because of a physical or mental disability
or condition, the Court finds that the opinion in Malto, that a child is presumed by law to be incapable of giving
rational consent, unduly extends the concept of statutory rape or acts of lasciviousness to those victims who
are within the range of 12 to 17 years old, and even those 18 years old and above under special circumstances
who are still considered as "children" under Section 3(a) of R.A. No. 7610. While Malto is correct that consent
is immaterial in cases under R.A. No. 7610 where the offended party is below 12 years of age, We clarify that
consent of the child is material and may even be a defense in criminal cases involving violation of Section 5,
Article III of R.A. No. 7610 when the offended party is 12 years old or below 18, or above 18 under special
circumstances. Such consent may be implied from the failure to prove that the said victim engaged in sexual
intercourse either "due to money, profit or any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any
adult, syndicate or group." It bears emphasis that violation of the first clause of Section 5(b), Article III of R.A.
No. 7610 on sexual intercourse with a child exploited in prostitution or subject to other sexual abuse, is separate
and distinct from statutory rape under paragraph 1(d), Article 266-A of the RPC. Aside from being dissimilar in
the sense that the former is an offense under special law, while the latter is a felony under the RPC, they also
have different elements. Nevertheless, sexual intercourse with a victim who is under 12 years of age or is
demented is always statutory rape, as Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 expressly states that the perpetrator will
be prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3 of the RPC [now paragraph 1(d), Article 266-A of the RPC as
amended by R.A. No. 8353]. Even if the girl who is below twelve (12) years old or is demented consents to the
sexual intercourse, it is always a crime of statutory rape under the RPC, and the offender should no longer be
held liable under R.A. No. 7610. For example, a nine (9)-year-old girl was sold by a pimp to a customer, the
crime committed by the latter if he commits sexual intercourse with the girl is still statutory rape, because even
if the girl consented or is demented, the law presumes that she is incapable of giving a rational consent. The
same reason holds true with respect to acts of lasciviousness or lascivious conduct when the offended party is
less than 12 years old or is demented. Even if such party consents to the lascivious conduct, the crime is always
statutory acts of lasciviousness. The offender will be prosecuted under Article 336 of the RPC, but the penalty
is provided for under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610. Therefore, there is no conflict between rape and acts of
lasciviousness under the RPC, and sexual intercourse and lascivious conduct under R.A. No. 7610.

a. Meanwhile, if sexual intercourse is committed with a child under 12 years of age, who is deemed to be
"exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse," then those who engage in or promote, facilitate or
induce child prostitution under Section 5(a) of R.A. No. 7610 shall be liable as principal by force or
inducement under Article 17 of the RPC in the crime of statutory rape under Article 266-A(1) of the RPC;
whereas those who derive profit or advantage therefrom under Section 5(c) of R.A. No. 7610 shall be liable
as principal by indispensable cooperation under Article 17 of the RPC. Bearing in mind the policy of R.A.
No. 7610 of providing for stronger deterrence and special protection against child abuse and exploitation,
the following shall be the nomenclature of the said statutory crimes and the imposable penalties for
principals by force or inducement or by indispensable cooperation: (i) Acts of Lasciviousness under Article
336 of the RPC, in relation to Section 5(a) or (c), as the case may be, of R.A. No. 7610, with the imposable
penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua; (ii) Rape under Article 266-A(1)
of the RPC, in relation to Article 17 of the RPC and Section 5(a) or (c), as the case may be, of R.A. No. 7610
with the imposable penalty of reclusion perpetua, pursuant to Article 266-B of the RPC, except when the
victim is below 7 years old, in which case the crime is considered as Qualified Rape, for which the death
penalty shall be imposed; and (iii) Sexual Assault under Article 266-A(2) of the RPC, in relation to Section
5(a) or (c), as the case may be, of R.A. No. 7610 with the imposable penalty of reclusion temporal in its
medium period to reclusion perpetua.
b. If the victim who is 12 years old or less than 18 and is deemed to be a child "exploited in prostitution and
other sexual abuse" because she agreed to indulge in sexual intercourse "for money, profit or any other
consideration or due to coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group," then the crime could not
be rape under the RPC, because this no longer falls under the concept of statutory rape, and there was
consent. That is why the offender will now be penalized under Section 5(b), R.A. No. 7610, and not under
Article 335 of the RPC [now Article 266-A]. But if the said victim does not give her consent to sexual
intercourse in the sense that the sexual intercourse was committed through force, threat or intimidation,
the crime is rape under paragraph 1, Article 266-A of the RPC. However, if the same victim gave her consent
to the sexual intercourse, and no money, profit, consideration, coercion or influence is involved, then there
is no crime committed, except in those cases where "force, threat or intimidation" as an element of rape
is substituted by "moral ascendancy or moral authority," like in the cases of incestuous rape, and unless it
is punished under the RPC as qualified seduction under Article 337 or simple seduction under Article 338.
(People of the Philippines v. Tulagan, G.R. No. 227363, March 12, 2019, En Banc)
8. The Court now clarifies the principles laid down in Abay, Pangilinan and Tubillo to the effect that there is a need
to examine the evidence of the prosecution to determine whether the person accused of rape should be
prosecuted under the RPC or R.A. No. 7610 when the offended party is 12 years old or below 18.
a. First, if sexual intercourse is committed with an offended party who is a child less than 12 years old or is
demented, whether or not exploited in prostitution, it is always a crime of statutory rape; more so when
the child is below 7 years old, in which case the crime is always qualified rape.
b. Second, when the offended party is 12 years old or below 18 and the charge against the accused is carnal
knowledge through "force, threat or intimidation," then he will be prosecuted for rape under Article 266-
A(1)(a) of the RPC. In contrast, in case of sexual intercourse with a child who is 12 years old or below 18
and who is deemed "exploited in prostitution or other sexual abuse," the crime could not be rape under
the RPC, because this no longer falls under the concept of statutory rape, and the victim indulged in sexual
intercourse either "for money, profit or any other consideration or due to coercion or influence of any
adult, syndicate or group," which deemed the child as one "exploited in prostitution or other sexual abuse."
To avoid further confusion, the Court dissects the phrase "children exploited in prostitution" as an element
of violation of Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610. As can be gathered from the text of Section 5 of R.A. No. 7610
and having in mind that the term "lascivious conduct" has a clear definition which does not include "sexual
intercourse," the phrase "children exploited in prostitution" contemplates four (4) scenarios: (i) a child,
whether male or female, who for money, profit or any other consideration, indulges in lascivious conduct;
(ii) a female child, who for money, profit or any other consideration, indulges in sexual intercourse; (iii) a
child, whether male or female, who due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group,
indulges in lascivious conduct; and (iv) a female, due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or
group, indulge in sexual intercourse. The term "other sexual abuse," on the other hand, is construed in
relation to the definitions of "child abuse" under Section 3, Article I of R.A. No. 7610 and "sexual abuse"
under Section 2(g) of the Rules and Regulations on the Reporting and Investigation of Child Abuse Cases. In
the former provision, "child abuse" refers to the maltreatment, whether habitual or not, of the child which
includes sexual abuse, among other matters. In the latter provision, "sexual abuse" includes the
employment, use, persuasion, inducement, enticement or coercion of a child to engage in, or assist another
person to engage in, sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct or the molestation, prostitution, or incest
with children. In Quimvel, it was held that the term "coercion or influence" is broad enough to cover or
even synonymous with the term "force or intimidation." Nonetheless, it should be emphasized that
"coercion or influence" is used in Section 5 of R.A. No. 7610 to qualify or refer to the means through which
"any adult, syndicate or group" compels a child to indulge in sexual intercourse. On the other hand, the use
of "money, profit or any other consideration" is the other mode by which a child indulges in sexual
intercourse, without the participation of "any adult, syndicate or group." In other words, "coercion or
influence" of a child to indulge in sexual intercourse is clearly exerted NOT by the offender whose liability

is based on Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 for committing sexual act with a child exploited in prostitution or
other sexual abuse. Rather, the "coercion or influence" is exerted upon the child by "any adult, syndicate,
or group" whose liability is found under Section 5(a) for engaging in, promoting, facilitating or inducing
child prostitution, whereby the sexual intercourse is the necessary consequence of the prostitution. “Force,
threat or intimidation" is the element of rape under the RPC, while "due to coercion or influence of any
adult, syndicate or group" is the operative phrase for a child to be deemed "exploited in prostitution or
other sexual abuse," which is the element of sexual abuse under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610. The
"coercion or influence" is not the reason why the child submitted herself to sexual intercourse, but it was
utilized in order for the child to become a prostitute. Considering that the child has become a prostitute,
the sexual intercourse becomes voluntary and consensual because that is the logical consequence of
prostitution as defined under Article 202 of the RPC, as amended by R.A. No. 10158 where the definition
of "prostitute" was retained by the new law. Therefore, there could be no instance that an Information
may charge the same accused with the crime of rape where "force, threat or intimidation" is the element
of the crime under the RPC, and at the same time violation of Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 where the
victim indulged in sexual intercourse because she is exploited in prostitution either "for money, profit or
any other consideration or due to coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group" — the phrase
which qualifies a child to be deemed "exploited in prostitution or other sexual abuse" as an element of
violation of Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610.
c. Third, if the charge against the accused where the victim is 12 years old or below 18 is sexual assault under
paragraph 2, Article 266-A of the RPC, then it may happen that the elements thereof are the same as that
of lascivious conduct under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610, because the term "lascivious conduct" includes
introduction of any object into the genitalia, anus or mouth of any person. In this regard, the Court held in
Dimakuta that in instances where a "lascivious conduct" committed against a child is covered by R.A. No.
7610 and the act is likewise covered by sexual assault under paragraph 2, Article 266-A of the RPC
[punishable by prision mayor], the offender should be held liable for violation of Section 5(b) of R.A. No.
7610 [punishable by reclusion temporal medium], consistent with the declared policy of the State to
provide special protection to children from all forms of abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation and
discrimination, and other conditions prejudicial to their development. But when the offended party is
below 12 years of age or is demented, the accused should be prosecuted and penalized under paragraph
2, Article 266-A of the RPC in relation to Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610, because the crime of sexual assault
is considered statutory, whereby the evidence of force or intimidation is immaterial.
d. Assuming that the elements of both violations of Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 and of Article 266-A,
paragraph 1(a) of the RPC are mistakenly alleged in the same Information – e.g., carnal knowledge or sexual
intercourse was due to "force or intimidation" with the added phrase of "due to coercion or influence,"
one of the elements of Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610; or in many instances wrongfully designate the crime
in the Information as violation of "Article 266-A, paragraph 1(a) in relation to Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610,"
although this may be a ground for quashal of the Information under Section 3(f) of Rule 117 of the Rules
of Court – and proven during the trial in a case where the victim who is 12 years old or under 18 did not
consent to the sexual intercourse, the accused should still be prosecuted pursuant to the RPC, as amended
by R.A. No. 8353, which is the more recent and special penal legislation that is not only consistent, but also
strengthens the policies of R.A. No. 7610. Indeed, while R.A. No. 7610 is a special law specifically enacted
to provide special protection to children from all forms of abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation and
discrimination and other conditions prejudicial to their development, We hold that it is contrary to the
legislative intent of the same law if the lesser penalty (reclusion temporal medium to reclusion perpetua)
under Section 5(b) thereof would be imposed against the perpetrator of sexual intercourse with a child 12
years of age or below 18. Article 266-A, paragraph 1(a) in relation to Article 266-B of the RPC, as amended
by R.A. No. 8353, is not only the more recent law, but also deals more particularly with all rape cases,
hence, its short title "The Anti-Rape Law of 1997." R.A. No. 8353 upholds the policies and principles of R.A.
No. 7610, and provides a "stronger deterrence and special protection against child abuse," as it imposes a
more severe penalty of reclusion perpetua under Article 266-B of the RPC, or even the death penalty if the
victim is (i) under 18 years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative
by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or common-law spouse of the parent of the victim;
or (ii) when the victim is a child below 7 years old. (People of the Philippines v. Tulagan, G.R. No. 227363,
March 12, 2019, En Banc)
9. Nor is there merit in appellant's contention that the proper imposable penalty in this case is that provided by
Section 5 of RA 7610. RA 7610 is inapplicable in the present case because the said law governs criminal cases
where the victims are children exploited in prostitution or other sexual abuse. In this case, AAA was not an
exploited child who indulged in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct for money or profit or any other
consideration; neither was she coerced or influenced by an adult, syndicate, or group to indulge in the said
conduct. Given the fact that AAA was not a child exploited in prostitution, the penalty provided for under RA
7610 does not apply. Hence, the RTC correctly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua provided for under
Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code for the crime of simple rape. (People of the Philippines v. Avelino, Jr.,

10. CCC testified that Baya raised her shorts and pressed his penis into her vagina. However, since the shorts were
tight, his penis did not penetrate her. BBB corroborated CCC's testimonies. Clearly, the act complained of
constitutes as lascivious conduct under the IRR of RA 7610. Moreover, the element of minority is proved by
CCC's birth certificate, which showed that she was nine years old on September 26, 2006, having been born on
May 16, 1997. The prosecution sufficiently established all the elements of acts of lasciviousness under the RPC
and RA 7610, which proved Baya's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Therefore, the Court sustains the CA's
conviction on acts of lasciviousness under R.A. 7610, Section 5(b).
a. Statutory rape and statutory acts of lasciviousness are punishable under the RPC and R.A. 7610. (People of
the Philippines v. Baya, G.R. No. 242512, August 14, 2019, Second Division)
11. An accused charged and convicted with the lower court with violation of R.A. 7610. Section 10(a) can still be
found guilty, on appeal, for a graver offense of rape by sexual assault under Article 266-A(2) of the RPC in
relation to R.A. 7610, Section 5(b), provided that the elements are established by sufficient evidence on the
record. This is because the accused’s greater culpability for statutory rape by sexual assault in relation to R.A.
7610 cannot be overlooked. (People of the Philippines v. Pueyo, G.R. No. 192327, February 26, 2020, Second
Division)
12. Accused can be convicted for Lascivious Conduct under R.A. 7610, Section 5(b) even if the designation of the
crime alleged in the information is rape by sexual assault provided that the elements are present. The
prosecution has proven beyond reasonable doubt that Nocido, together with his co-accused Bagon and
Ventura, sexaully abused and raped AAA, a minor. (People of the Philippines v. Nocido, G.R. No. 240229, June
13. Accused-appellant’s act of inserting his penis into AAA’s vagna through force and intimidation constitutes rape
through carnal knowledge under Article 266(1)(a) of the RPC. Moreover, accused-appellant’s acts of
intentionally holding AAA’s vagina and inserting into it his right forefinger plainly constitute sexual abuse and
lascivious conduct. Under the law, sexual abuse includes the employment, use, persuasion, inducement,
enticement or coercion of a child to engage in, or assist another person to engage in, sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct or the molestation, prostitution, or incest with children. Meanwhile, lascivious conduct
means the intentional touching, either directly or through clothing, of the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner
thigh, or buttocks, or the introduction of any object into the genitalia, anus, or mouth, of any person, whether
of the same or opposite sex, with intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual
desire of any person, bestiality, masturbation, lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of a person.
a. Quimvel v. People decreed that force and intimdation is subsumed under coercion and influence. As
gleaned from the testimony of AAA, accused-appellant, her own father, employed force, intimidation,
coercion, and influence upon her. He threatened to maul and kick her if she would make a report about
what happened. Also, he was holding a knife in his left hand throughout the molestation.
b. Tulagan explains that the phrase “children exploited in prostitution” contemplates four scenarios: (i) a
child, whether male or female, who, for money, profit, or any other consideration, indulges in lascivious
conduct; (ii) a female child who, for money, profit, or any other consideration, indulges in sexual
intercourse; (iii) a child, whether male or female, who, due to the coercion or influence of any adult,
syndicate, or group, indulges in lascivious conduct; and (iv) a female, due to the coercion or influence of an
adult, syndicate or group, indulges in sexual intercourse. Meanwhile, the phrase “other sexual abuse” is
construed in relation to the definitions of child abuse. Based on the facts of the case, it is undeniable that
AAA was subjected to sexual abuse. She is a child who, due to the coercion or influence of accused-
appellant, was subjected to the latter’s lascivious conduct. It also bears stressing that accused-appellant is
the father of AAA; as such, he has moral ascendancy over AAA, his minor daughter. Where rape is
committed by a relative, such as a father, stepfather, uncle, or common law spouse, moral influence or
ascendancy takes the place of force or intimidation as an essential element of rape.
c. Given that AAA was only 15 years old at the time of the incident, instead of rape through sexual assault
under Article 266-A(2) of the RPC, accused-appellant should thus be held liable for lascivious conduct under
R.A. 7610, Article III, Section 5(b). This is in addition to accused-appellant’s conviction for rape through
carnal knowledge under Article 266-A(1)(a), in relation to Article 266-B, of the RPC. (People of the
Philippines v. VVV, G.R. No. 230222, June 22, 2020, Second Division)
14. When acts of lasciviousness is committed against a child under 12 years old, the designation of the crime
committed shall be Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 336 of the RPC in relation to R.A. 7610, Section 5(b).
Meanwhile, R.A. 7610, Section 5(b) provides that when the victim of Acts of Lasciviousness is under 12 years of
age, the offender shall be prosecuted under the RPC, provided that the penalty for lascivious conduct shall be
reclusion temporal in its medium period. BBB candidly narrated, and successfully established, accused-
appellant’s lascivious conduct towards her. Accused-appellant licked, and inserted his finger into her vagina. A
perusal of BBB’s testimony reveals that accused-appellant committed the crime of Sexual Assault against her
by inserting his finger insider her vagina. Accused-appellant, however, cannot be convicted of sexual assault
because the Information charged him with acts of lasciviousness only. Verily, sexual assault is a crime greater
than acts of lasciviousness. While it is true that the crime of acts of lasciviousness is necessarily included in the
crime of sexual assault, the crime of sexual assault however is not subsumed in the crime of acts of

lasciviousness. Thus, accused-appellant can be convicted, and found guilty of, acts of lasciviousness only.
(People of the Philippines v. Jagdon, Jr., G.R. No. 242882, September 9, 2020, Second Division)
15. Pursuant to R.A. 7610, Section 5(b), when the victim is under 12 years of age, the perpetrator shall be
prosecuted under Article 336 of the RPC for lascivious conduct. (Capueta v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No.
16. The facts recited in the subject Information made out a charge for violation of Article 336 of the RPC, in relation
to Article III, Section 5(b) of R.A. 7610. The prosecution established that accused-appellant, who exercised moral
ascendancy over the child AAA, engaged her in lascivious conduct within the purview of sexual abuse under
Section 5(b). Thus, the CA correctly convicted accused-appellant of Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 336 of
the RPC, in relation to Article III, Section 5(b) of R.A. 7610.
a. The prosecution sufficiently established the element of “lascivious conduct.” Records show that AAA
positively testified that on June 15, 2009, accused-appellant instructed her to masturbate him, by making
her hold his penis and guiding her hand in upward and downward motions, which lasted for about 20
minutes.
b. The second and third elements require that the victim was either exploited in prostitution or subjected to
other sexual abuse, and that she is a child as defined under R.A. 7610. By “other sexual abuse” is meant to
cover not only a child who is abused for profit, but also in cases where a child was engaged in lascivious
conduct through the coercion or intimidation by an adult. Intimidation must be viewed in the light of the
victim’s perception and judgment at the time of the commission of the crime, taking into consideration the
age, size, and strength of the parties. Intimidation need not be irresistible; it suffices that some form of
compulsion equivalent to intimidation annuls or subdues the free exercise of the will of the victim. As
disclosed by her birth certificate, AAA was 9 years old at the time of the incident. Also, as admitted by
accused-appellant, he was at the common-law husband of AAA’s mother. As a close kin of the child, actual
force or intimidation need not be employed by him. Here, it is enough that fear was undoubtedly produced
in the mind of the child victim AAA, whose innocent age of 9 years at the time of the incident clearly made
her vulnerable and easily intimidated by accused-appellant, whom she had known and identified as her
father since she was just 3 years old. Accused-appellant’s moral influence over the child cannot be denied.
c. Although the Information made no particular mention of Article III, Section 5(b) of R.A. 7610, this omission
is not fatal to the accused-appellant’s right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him. Indeed, the actual facts recited in the information as constituting the offense charged prevails over its
caption or designation. (People of the Philippines v. Manuel, G.R. No. 242278, December 9, 2020, Third
Division)
17. Considering that petitioner committed acts of lasciviousness on complainant AAA, who was 15 years of age at
the time of the commission of the crie, the nomenclature on the crime should be Lascivious Conduct under
Section 5(b) of R.A. 7610.
a. Considering that petitioner was 15 years old at the time of the commission and below 21 years old at the
time the RTC promulgated its decision, his sentence was properly suspended pursuant to R.A 9344 (Juvenile
Justice and Welfare Act), Section 38. However, Section 40 of R.A. 9344 limits the said suspension until the
child reaches the maximum age of 21. Hence, petitioner, who is now beyond the age of 21, can no longer
avail of the suspension of sentence under Section 38. Nevertheless, the Court has already extended the
application of R.A. 9344 beyond the age of 21 years old to give meaning to the legislative intent of the law.
Petitioner shall be entitled to appropriate disposition under Section 51, which provides for the confinement
of convicted children. The case shall thus be remanded to the RTC to effect petitioner’s confinement in an
agricultural camp or other training facility, following the Court’s pronouncement in People v. Sarcia. (CICL
XXX, Child in Conflict with the Law v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 246148, March 18, 2021, First
Division)
18. With respect to the CA findings of Rape by Sexual Assault in Criminal Case Nos. 807-M-2010, 808-M-2010 and
809-M-2010, there is a need to clarify the proper nomenclature of the crimes. Instead of Rape by Sexual Assault,
accused-appellant should be held liable for Sexual Assault under paragraph 2, Article 266-A of the RPC in
relation to Section 5(b) of RA 7610 pursuant to People v. Tulagan. In here, AAA testified that accused-appellant
inserted his finger into her vagina on three different occasions since she was five years old. Her testimony
established in a clear and straightforward manner her age at the time of the incidents, the identity of accused-
appellant, and the details of the crimes committed against her. Under the circumstances, it is unfathomable
that a 6-year-old child would be able to describe in such detail how she was molested by her own uncle unless
her statements were true. Her candid, straightforward, and consistent testimony prevails over the self-serving
allegations of the defense. The CA aptly discussed: “In the present case, the first incident of sexual abuse was
committed when private complainant was merely five years old. It should be noted that there were several
incidents of sexual abuse, thus, private complainant cannot be expected to have a flawless recollection of her
harrowing experience in the hands of appellant. Furthermore, the inconsistencies in the private complainant's
testimony regarding the place and time of the incidents are immaterial to prove the elements of the crimes
charged. Moreover, the findings laid down in the Initial Medico-Legal Report issued by PCI Marianne S. Ebdane

Forcible abduction 392
bolstered private complainant's testimony.” (People of the Philippines v. BBB, G.R. No. 249260, May 5, 2021,
Third Division)
FO R C IB LE AB DU C TIO N
1. Accused cannot be found guilty for forcible abduction with rape.
a. First, AAA’s narration that Librias forcibly took her from Mandaue Plaza to a house on Colon Street, Cebu
City, is very unlikely considering that AAA could have easily escaped or, at least, have called for help. In
addition, Librias did not have a weapon nor did he threaten to use one should AAA not accede to his
demands. Without a weapon of any sort, AAA could have broken free and run away – without any risk to
her life – as the plaza was an open space where she could have run in any direction.
b. Second, AAA’s statements as to how Librias brought her to the taxicab buttress the conclusion that she
voluntarily went with him. Holding her arms and tying them are completely different ways of restricting a
person’s movements. Thus, for AAA to narrate that Librias was simply holding her, then later say that her
arms were tied with a towl is very unusual for a person who is supposed to be telling the truth. Also, AAA
again could have easily asked help from the taxi driver if she was really being held against her will. (People
of the Philippines v. Librias, G.R. No. 208067, September 14, 2016, Second Division)
2. There is no complex crime of forcible abduction with rape if the primary objective of the accused is to commit
rape. In such instance, the crime is only rape. The forcible abduction is absorbed by the crime of rape.
a. The crime of forcible abduction with rape is a complex crime that occurs when the abductor has carnal
knowledge of the abducted woman under the following circumstances: (a) by using force or intimidation,
(b) when the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, and (c) when the woman is under 12
years of age or is demented. (People of the Philippines v. Domingo, G.R. No. 225743, June 7, 2017, Third
Division)
3. The elements of forcible abduction under Article 342 of the RPC are: (a) the taking of a woman against her will
and (b) with lewd designs. (People of the Philippines v. Domingo, G.R. No. 225743, June 7, 2017, Third Division)
4. Forcible abduction is deemed complex by rape when the culprit has carnal knowledge of the woman and there
is (a) force or intimidation; (b) the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or (c) she is under
12 years of age or demented. However, forcible abduction is absorbed by rape when the primordial intent is to
have carnal knowledge of the victim. There is no complex crime of forcible abduction with rape if the primary
objective of the accused is to commit rape. Here, it was through the pretense that she would be brought to
work that AAA was induced to board the company car with accused-appellant. Indubitably, there was no valid
consent on her part, as the deceit became the constructive force that amply constituted the crime of forcible
abduction.
a. Nevertheless, accused-appellant can only be convicted of rape. From the trial court’s findings, it can be
reasonably deduced that his main objective for the taking was to have carnal knowledge of AAA. Records
show that when AAA noticed that they were heading towards Manila and later to North Expressway, she
repeatedly questioned the accused where they were going and when accused simply ignored her
continuing queries, she begged that she should be brought to her workplace or if not drop her somewhere
so that she will just commute to her workplace in Canlubang. Notwithstanding her pleas, accused persisted
to bring her to Pampanga and while there, accused brought her to a motel where she was being forced to
alight from the car and when she resisted, accused succeded in raping her inside the car. (People of the
Philippines v. Pingol, G.R. No. 219243, November 4, 2020, Third Division)
B IGAMY
1. The accused can still be held for bigamy even though their marriage was void for having been securing without
a marriage license. This is because they themselves perpetrated a false Certificate of Marriage by
misrepresenting that they were exempted from the license requirement based on their fabricated claim that
they had already cohabited as husband and wife for at least five years prior to their marriage. Thus, it is the
height of absurdity to allow the accused to use their illegal acts to escape criminal conviction. (Santiago v. People
of the Philippines, G.R. No. 200233, July 15, 2015, First Division)
2. Respondent cannot be held liable for bigamy because respondent’s second marriage was solemnized by an
officer who had lack of authority. Thus, no second marriage can be imputed against respondent.
a. However, respondent disobeyed Article 350 of the Revised Penal Code which prohibits knowingly contract
marriages against the provisions of law. This is because respondent knew that the solemnizing officer
during her and her husband’s marriage in 1990 had no civil authority to solemnize the marriage. (Perfecto
v. Esidera, A.M. No. RTJ-15-2417, July 22, 2015, Second Division)
3. All the elements of bigamy are present in this case. Petitioner was still legally married to Gina when he married
Alice. In addition, the criminal liability for bigamy persists even if petitioner presents a certification from the
Office of Civil Registrar of Imus, Cavite which states that no marriage license was issued to him and Gina.
However, this certification does not prove that petitioner’s first marriage was solemnized without a marriage

Libel, Slander, and Oral Defamation 393
license. Finally, petitioner admitted the authenticity of his signature appearing on the marriage contract
between him and his first wife, Gina.
a. Persons intending to contract a second marriage must first secure a judicial declaration of nullity of their
first marriage. If they proceed with the second marriage without the judicial declaration, they are guilty of
bigamy regardless of evidence of the nullity of the first marriage. (Vitangcol v. People of the Philippines,
4. Redante admitted that he had contracted two marriages. However, he put forth the defense of the termination
of his first marriage as a result of the divorce obtained by his alien spouse. However, he failed to prove the
existence of the divorce as a fact or his capacity to contract a subsequent marriage.
a. While it is true that Redante presented a certificate of divorce, it is not enough. First, the certificate of
divorce is not the divorce decree required by the rules and jurisprudence. As discussed previously, the
divorce decree required to prove the fact of divorce is the judgment itself as rendered by the foreign court
and not a mere certification. Second, assuming the certificate of divorce may be considered as the divorce
decree, it was not accompanied by a certification issued by the proper Philippine diplomatic or consular
officer stationed in Canada, as required under Section 24 of Rule 132. Lastly, no copy of the alleged
Canadian law was presented by the defense. Thus, it could not be reasonably determined whether the
subject divorce decree was in accord with Maria Socorro's national law. Further, since neither the divorce
decree nor the alleged Canadian law was satisfactorily demonstrated, the type of divorce supposedly
secured by Maria Socorro - whether an absolute divorce which terminates the marriage or a limited divorce
which merely suspends it – and whether such divorce capacitated her to remarry could not also be
ascertained. As such, Redante failed to prove his defense that he had the capacity to remarry when he
contracted a subsequent marriage to Fe. His liability for bigamy is, therefore, now beyond question.
(Misalucha v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 206284, February 28, 2018, Third Division)
5. There can be no quibbling over whether or not the elements of bigamy were successfully proven by the
prosecution. Petitioner does not deny that he contracted a second marriage without a judicial declaration that
his absent spouse from a prior marriage may be legally presumed dead. The gist of petitioner's claim is alleged
good faith and that there is no need for a judicial declaration of a disputable presumption (of death of the
absent spouse) that has already been provided by law.
a. According to petitioner, it was the prosecution's burden to prove that his absent wife was still alive when
he contracted his second marriage. Petitioner essentially asks, what if his absent spouse was in fact already
dead, which is undeniably possible? It is argued that there is no substantial distinction between such a
situation and that of a present spouse who contracts a subsequent marriage with the knowledge that the
absent spouse is already dead. The legal questions raised are not novel. As discussed in Manuel v. People
of the Philippines, such judicial declaration also constitutes proof that the petitioner acted in good faith,
and would negate criminal intent on his part when he married the private complainant and, as a
consequence, he could not be held guilty of bigamy in such case. The petitioner, however, failed to
discharge his burden. The phrase "or before the absent spouse has been declared presumptively dead by
means of a judgment rendered on the proceedings" in Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code was not an
aggroupment of empty or useless words. The requirement for a judgment of the presumptive death of the
absent spouse is for the benefit of the spouse present, as protection from the pains and the consequences
of a second marriage, precisely because he/she could be charged and convicted of bigamy if the defense
of good faith based on mere testimony is found incredible. The requirement of judicial declaration is also
for the benefit of the State. Under Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution, "the State shall protect and
strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution." Marriage is a social institution of the
highest importance. Public policy, good morals and the interest of society require that the marital relation
should be surrounded with every safeguard and its severance only in the manner prescribed and the causes
specified by law. The laws regulating civil marriages are necessary to serve the interest, safety, good order,
comfort or general welfare of the community and the parties can waive nothing essential to the validity of
the proceedings. (Bagaporo v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 211829, January 30, 2019, Second
Division)
LIB EL, S LAN DER , AN D O R AL D EFAMAT IO N

1. Petitioner is only liable for slight oral defamation when he uttered “Walang hiya kang mangongotong na pulis
ka, ang yabang yabang mo noon. Patay ka sa akin mamaya,” against SPO3 Leonardo. This is because, as to the
relationship of the parties, they were obviously acquainted with each other as they were former jogging
buddies. Prior to the purported gun-pointing incident, there was no reason for De Leon to harbor ill feelings
towards SPO3 Leonardo. In addition, as to the timing of the utterance, this was made durign the first hearing
on the administrative case, shortly after the alleged gun-pointing incident. The gap between the gun-pointing
incident and the first hearing was relatively short; hence, the utterance made by De Leion was but a mere
product of emotional outburst. Lastly, such words taken as a whole were not uttered with evident intent to
strike deep into the character of SPO3 Leonardo as the animosity between the parties should have been
considered.

a. The utterances of De Leon against SPO3 Leonardo were not in connection with the latter’s public duties.
However, these were evidently geared towards his reputation as private individual. (De Leon v. People of
the Philippines, G.R. No. 212623, January 11, 2016, Second Division)
2. In claiming that he did not intend to expose the Omnibus Motion to third person, but only complied with the
law on how service and filing of pleadings should be done, petitioner conceded that the defamatory statements
in it were made known to someone other than the person to whom it has been written. Despite the fact that
the motion was contained in sealed envelopes, it is unreasonable to expect that the person other than the one
defamed would be able to read the defamatory statements in it, precisely because they were filed with the
Office of the City Prosecutor of San Pablo City and copy furnished to Nezer, the respondent in the estafa
complaint, and the Office of DOJ. Then being a lawyer, petitioner is well aware that such motion is not a mere
private communication, but forms part of public record when filed with the government office. Inasmuch as
one is disputably presumed to intend the natural and probable consequence of his act, petitioner cannot brush
aside the logical outcome of the filing and service of his Omnibus Motion. It is not amiss to state that generally,
the requirement of publication of defamatory matters is not satisfied by a communication of such matters to
an agent of the defamed person. In this case, however, the defamatory statement was published when copy of
the Omnibus Motion was furnished to and ready by Michael, the son and representative of respondent Nezer
in the estafa complaint, who is clearly not an agent of the defamed person, Assistant City Prosecutor Lagman.
In addition, there was publication to Flores and Enseo, the staff of the OCP of San Pablo City who had read the
contents of the Omnibus Motion. As mere members of the administrative staff of the OCP of San Pablo City,
Flores and Enseo cannot be said to have a duty to perform with respect to the subject matter of his motion,
which is to seek reconsideration of the dismissal of his estafa complaint and to disqualify ACP Lagman from the
preliminary investigation of the case. Their legal duty pertains only to the clerical procedure of transmitting the
motions filed with the OCP of San Pablo City to the proper recipients. (Belen v. People of the Philippines, G.R.
3. While it is true that allegations or statements made by parties or their counsel in pleadings or motions or during
the hearing of judicial and administrative proceedings, as well as answers given by the witness in reply to
questions propounded to them in the course of said proceedings are absolutely privileged communication, said
allegations or statements must be relevant to the issues and the answers are responsive to the questions
propounded to said witnesses.
a. The statements in petitioner’s Omnibus Motion filed before the OCP of San Pablo City as a remedy for the
dismissal of his estafa complaint during preliminary investigation, fall short of the test of relevancy. An
examination of the motion shows that the following defamatory words and phrases used, even if liberally
construed, are hardly material or pertinent to his cause, which is to seek a reconsideration of the dismissal
of his estafa complaint and the disqualification of ACP Lagman from further acting on the case: (a) “manifest
bias for 20,000 reasons;” (b) “the Investigating Fiscal’s wrongful assumptions were tarnished in silver
ingots;” (c) “the slip of her skirt shows a corrupted and convoluted frame of mind;” (d) “corrupted and
convoluted 20,000 reasons;” (e) “moronic resolution;” (f) “intellectually infirm or stupid blind;” (g)
“manifest partiality and stupendous stupidity;” (h) “idiocy and imbecility of the Investigaitng Fiscal;” and (i)
“a fraud and a quack bereft of any intellectual ability and mental honesty.” These statements are neither
relevant grounds for a motion for reconsideration nor valid and justifiable reasons for disqualification.
These diatribes pertain to ACP Lagman’s honor, reputation, mental and moral character, and are no longer
related to the discharge of her official function as a prosecutor. They are devoid of any relation to the
subject matter of petitioner’s Omnibus Motion that no reasonable man can doubt their irrelevancy, and
may not become the subject or inquiry in the course of resolving the motion. In other words, the
defamatory statements in petitioner’s Omnibus Motion fail the test of relevancy in order to be considered
an absolutely privileged communication, because they are neither relevant grounds for a motion for
reconsideration nor valid or justifiable reasons for disqualificaiton of ACP Lagman. (Belen v. People of the
Philippines, G.R. No. 211120, February 13, 2017, Second Division)
4. To satisfy the element of identifiability, it must be shown that at least a third person or a stranger was able to
identify him as the object of the defamatory statement. It is enough if by intrinsic reference the allusion is
apparent or if the publication contains matters of description or reference to facts and circumstances from
which others reading the article may know the person alluded to; or if the latter is pointed out by extraneous
circumstances so that those knowing such person could and did understand that he was the person referred
to. (Manila Bulletin Publishing Corporation v. Domingo, G.R. No. 170341, July 5, 2017, Second Division)
5. The December 20, 1990 article is not libelous since it was a fair and true report based on the documents
received by him. The first sentence of said article warns the successor of JoeCon of the brewing problem that
he will inherit at the DTI Region VIII Office. The immediately following sentences relate that in a letter to
Batuigas, the Waray employees of Region VIII made known their disgust on how DTI Region VIII was being run
and handled. According to the Waray employees, the complaints as to the mismanagement, low morale,
improper decorum, gross inefficiency, nepotism in the office had already been made known to the DTI Makati
Office, the CSC, and the Ombudsman, only that “wala raw nangyari sa reklamo nila.” The letter further provided
that the Waray employees turned instead to Batuigas knowing that his column produces results. The article

cannot be considered as defamatory because Batuigas had not ascribed to Domingo the commission of a crime,
the possession of a vice or defect, or any act or omission, condition, status, or circumstance which tends to
dishonor or discredit the latter. The article was merely a factual report which were based on the letter of the
Waray employees reiterating their earlier complaints against Domingo and other co-workers at the DTI Region
VIII. (Manila Bulletin Publishing Corporation v. Domingo, G.R. No. 170341, July 5, 2017, Second Division)
6. However, when Batuigas in his January 4, 1991 article made statements referring to the “lousy performance”
of Domingo and his “mismanagement” resulting in the breakdown of morale of the DTI Region VIII employees,
the former was impeaching the virtue and reputation of Domingo as DTI Regional Director. Notwithstanding
the defamatory imputation in the January 4, 1991 article, Batuigas cannot be held criminally liable since these
statements are matters of public interest as these relate to Domingo’s moral conduct, his capacity to lead the
DTI Reigon VIII employees, and to manage and supervise the affairs of the police, all of which undoubtedly make
it to the grade of qualifiedly privileged communication and thus, would require actual malice to be actionable.
The onus of proving actual malice rests on the plaintiff. Records do not show that Domingo was able to establish
that Batuigas had actual malice in writing this article. In fact, the statements as to the “lousy performance” and
“mismanagement” of Domingo cannot be regarded to have been written with the knowledge that these were
false or in reckless disregard of whether these were false, bearing in mind that Batuigas had documentary
evidence to suppor this statement, i.e., the letter from the Waray employees in his December 20, 1990 article.
a. It was evident that the statements as to the “lousy performance” and “mismanagement” of Domingo
cannot be regarded to have been writeen with the knowledge that these were false or in reckless disregard
of whether these were false, bearing in mind that Batuigas had documentary evidence, i.e., letters from
the Waray employees, to support his statements. This is not negated by the fact that Batuigas was not able
to present these during the trial since it can be rationally deduced that he was in actual receipt of the
complaints against the DTI Region VIII officials and employees because he was able to cite the specifics of
the grievances of the Waray employees in his December 20, 1990 article. In addition, Batuigas merely
expressed his opinion based on the fact that there were complaints filed against Domingo, among others.
If the comment is an expression of opinion, based on established facts, then it is immaterial that the opinion
happens to be mistaken, as long as it might reasonably be inferred from the facts.
b. Moreover, these statements were but fair commentaries of Batuigas which can be reasonably inferred
from the contents of the documents that he had received and which he qualified, in his December 20, 1990
article, to have been brought already to the attention of the DTI, CSC, and the Ombudsman. While these
complaints had already been dismissed by said offices, and of which fact Batuigas had not been informed
when he wrote the December 20, 1990 and January 4, 1991 articles, it must be pointed out that even
assuming that the contents of the articles were false, mere error, inaccuracy or even falsity alone does not
prove actual malice.
c. The words “lousy performance” and “mismanagement” had caused hurt or embarrassment to Domingo
and even to his family and friends, but it must be emphasized that hurt or embarrassment even if real, is
not automatically equivalent to defamation; words which are merely insulting are not actionable as libel or
slander per se, and mere words of general abuse however opporbrious, ill-natured, or vexatious, whether
written or spoken, do not constitute bases for an action for defamation in the absence of an allegation for
special damages. If a writer in the course of temperate and legitimate criticism falls into error as to some
detail, or draws an incorrect inference from the facts before him, and thus goes beyond the limits of strict
truth, such inaccuracies will not cause judgment to go against him, if the jury are satisfied, after reading
the whole publication, that it was written honestly, fairly, and with regard to what truth and justice require.
(Manila Bulletin Publishing Corporation v. Domingo, G.R. No. 170341, July 5, 2017, Second Division)
7. The doctrine of fair comment means that while in general every discreditable imputation publicly made false,
because every man is presumed innocent until his guilt is judicially proved, and every false imputation is deemed
malicious, nevertheless, when the discreditable imputation is directed against a public person in his public
capacity, it is not necessarily actionable. In order that such discreditable imputation to a public official may be
actionable, it must either be a false allegation of fact or a comment based on a false supposition. If the comment
is an expression of opinion, based on established facts, then it is immaterial that the opinion happens to be
mistaken as long as it might reasonably be inferred from the facts. (Manila Bulletin Publishing Corporation v.
Domingo, G.R. No. 170341, July 5, 2017, Second Division)
8. A privileged communication may be classified as either absolutely privileged or qualifiedly privileged.

a. The absolutely privileged communications are those which are not actionable even if the author has acted
in bad faith. This classification includes statements made by members of Congress in the discharge of their
duties as such, official communications made by public officers in the performance of their duties, and
allegations or statements made by the parties or their counsel in their pleadings or motions or during the
hearing of judicial proceedings, as well as the answers given by witnesses in reply to questions propounded
to them, in the course of said proceedings, provided that said allegations or statements are relevant to the
issues and the answers are responsive or pertinent to the questions propounded to said witnesses.
b. The qualifiedly privileged communications are those which contain defamatory imputations but which are
not actionable unless found to have been made without good intention or justifiable motive, and to which
“private communications” and “fair and true report without any comments or remarks” belong. Since the

qualifiedly privileged communications are the exceptions to the general rule, these require proof of actual
malice in order that a defamatory imputation may be held actionable. But when malice in fact is proven,
assertions and proof that the libelous articles are qualifiedly privileged communications are futile, since
being qualifiedly privileged communications merely prevents the presumption of malice from attaching to
a defamatory imputation. (Manila Bulletin Publishing Corporation v. Domingo, G.R. No. 170341, July 5,
9. The exceptions in Article 354 of the RPC are not exclusive since jurisprudence provides for the additional
exceptions to the privileged communications. Borjal held that in view of the constitutional right on the freedom
of speech and of the press, fair commentaries on matters of public interest are privileged. Guingguing provides
that remarks directed against a public figure are privileged. (Manila Bulletin Publishing Corporation v. Domingo,
10. A judicious review of the records of this case reveals that Ramos indeed uttered the words "ukininam, puta,
awan ad-adal mo" which means "vulva of your mother, prostitute, illiterate," against Dumaua. However, no
evidence was presented to show that Ramos indeed started the altercation by instructing her schoolchildren to
throw leaves into Dumaua's yard, and eventually, throwing dried banana leaves therein as well. It must be
pointed out that Dumaua's claim to that effect was not supported by her corroborative witnesses whose
testimonies only pertain to matters transpiring during the height of the verbal altercation as they were inside
the house when the fight started. Absent such evidence, the Court is inclined to lend more credence to Ramos's
narration that she was just passing through a pathway adjacent to Dumaua's house when the latter got mad at
her; started blaming her for the garbage in her yard; and warned her not to use the pathway anymore or else
something will happen to her – all of which resulted in the two of them hurling invectives against one another.
Thus, it may safely be concluded that while Ramos indeed said defamatory words against Dumaua, the
utterances were made in the heat of anger and were with some sort of provocation on the part of the latter.
As such, the Court is constrained to hold that Ramos is only guilty of the crime of Slight Oral Defamation.
a. The elements of oral defamation were discussed in De Leon. Oral Defamation or Slander is libel committed
by oral (spoken) means, instead of in writing. It is defined as "the speaking of base and defamatory words
which tend to prejudice another in his reputation, office, trade, business or means of livelihood." The
elements of oral defamation are: (i) there must be an imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or
imaginary, or any act, omission, status or circumstances; (ii) made orally; (iii) publicly; (iv) and maliciously;
(v) directed to a natural or juridical person, or one who is dead; and (vi) which tends to cause dishonor,
discredit or contempt of the person defamed. Oral defamation may either be simple or grave. It becomes
grave when it is of a serious and insulting nature. (Ramos v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 226454,
11. Petitioner's words stated during the mnng of his program are clearly defamatory. The words "GAGO",
"TARANTADONG PASTOR", "PASTOR NG DEMONYO IYAN", "BULAANG PROPETA" disparage private complainant
Wilde Almeda (Almeda). As in Buatis, Jr. v. People, evidence aliunde is unnecessary to establish that these words
are without malice. Moreover, examination of the statements put forth in the Information does not reveal any
good intention on the part of petitioner or any justifiable motive as to negate the presumption of malice.
a. Petitioner's claim that his motive was harken to other religious leaders and pastors and members of any
religious congregation not to use the institution of religion in a manner that would subject not only the
pastors and ministers of any religious congregation but also the religion itself to public distrust and disdain,
does not make his statements justified. His purported motive is simply not reflected in his malicious
statement and insulting labels to the pastors of Jesus Miracle Crusade, International Ministry (JMCIM).
b. Neither does the Court deem petitioners statements as qualifiedly privileged communications. The
enumeration under Article 354 of the RPC is, however, not an exclusive list of qualifiedly privileged
communications since fair commentaries on matters of public interest are likewise privileged. They are
known as qualifiedly privileged communications, since they are merely exceptions to the general rule
requiring proof of actual malice in order that a defamatory imputation may be held actionable. In other
words, defamatory imputations written or uttered during any of the three classes of qualifiedly privileged
communications enumerated above: (i) a private communication made by any person to another in the
performance of any legal, moral or social duty; (ii) a fair and true report, made in good faith, without any
comments or remarks, of any judicial, legislative or other official proceedings which are not of confidential
nature, or of any statement, report or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed
by public officers in the exercise of their functions; and (iii) fair commentaries on matters of public interest
may still be considered actionable if actual malice is proven.
c. Though religion is arguably a matter or subject of public interest, there is no standard by which the Court
can declare petitioner's statements as fair commentaries. On their own, the words used by petitioner do
not appear to debunk the purported falsities in the preachings of JMCIM but actually to degrade and insult
their pastor or founder, Almeda. The Court likewise cites, with approval, the CA's finding of actual malice,
to wit: “Malice or bad faith implies a conscious and intentional design to do a wrongful act for a dishonest
purpose or moral obliquity. In the instant case, no good motive can be inferred from the language used by
Soriano against private complainants. This Court can only see Soriano's apparent objective of discrediting

and humiliating private complainants as to sow the seeds of JMCIM's dissolution and to encourage
membership in his religion.”
d. There is publication in this case. In libel, publication means making the defamatory matter, after it is
written, known to someone other than the person against whom it has been written. Libel is published not
only when it is widely circulated, but also when it is made known or brought to the attention or notice of
another person other than its author and the offended party. In this case, there is no doubt that the video
footage of petitioner was published as it was broadcasted through petitioner's radio program.
e. While the Court affirms petitioner's guilt of libel, the Court deems it proper to clarify that petitioner's guilt
stems from his statements against pastor Almeda and not the JMCIM, or any of its pastors. The Court notes
that aside from mentioning Almeda's name, petitioner's statements did not refer to any specific pastor or
member of the JMCIM. The Court finds that the facts in the MVRS case is analogous to the case at bar. The
Information in Criminal Case No. IR-4848 does not refer to any specific individual or pastor but merely
mentions "persons comprising the Jesus Miracle Crusade, International Ministry." Further, contrary to the
findings of the lower courts, The Court did not find anything in the records which establish or single out
any specific pastor, specifically Joel Cortero. Neither can the Court consider petitioner's statements, be
sweeping enough as to injure the reputation of all the members of JMCIM. Hence, the Court cannot affirm
petitioner's conviction for libel in Criminal Case No. IR-4848. (Soriano v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No.
225010, November 21, 2018, First Division)
12. Beyond question, the words imputed to Atty. Canoy as a veritable mental asylum patient, a madman and a
lunatic, in its plain and ordinary meaning, are conditions or circumstances tending to dishonor or discredit him.
As such, these are defamatory or libelous per se.
a. Indubitably, the defamatory words imputed to Atty. Canoy cannot be considered as "private
communication" made by one person to another in the performance of any legal, moral or social duty.
Neither is it a fair and true report without any comments or remarks.
b. In addition, the defamatory words imputed to Atty. Canoy cannot be said to be fair commentaries on
matters of public interest. To be sure, informing the public as to the rebellion of Col. Noble is a matter of
public interest. However, calling Atty. Canoy as a veritable mental asylum patient, a madman and a lunatic
is not in furtherance of the public interest. The defamatory words are irrelevant to the alleged participation
of Atty. Canoy in the rebellion staged by Col. Noble.
c. Locsin, Jr., alleged that he only made those utterances to show his strong opposition to the political beliefs
of Atty. Canoy to remove Mindanao from the government based on the alleged intelligence reports
identifying Atty. Canoy as part of the civilian component of Col. Noble's rebellion. As found by both the RTC
and the CA, the said intelligence reports are neither proved nor established by the petitioners. As such, the
intelligence reports are unconfirmed. As such, the said defamatory remarks cannot be considered as an
expression of opinion based on established facts nor can it reasonably inferred from established facts.
Nevertheless, even if the supposed intelligence reports were verified and Atty. Canoy supported Col.
Noble's rebellion, the defamatory remarks are not related to the alleged participation of Atty. Canoy in the
rebellion, but directed as to his mental condition. Further no evidence was presented to support that Atty.
Canoy was indeed a mental asylum patient or a lunatic. As such, the petitioners made those defamatory
remarks without any regard as to the truth or falsity of the same.
d. As alleged by the petitioners, the subject articles were centered in the rebellion of Col. Noble, and Atty.
Canoy was merely mentioned incidentally. This allegation does not help the position of the petitioners.
Rather, it even weakens their cause, as it further established the existence of malice in causing dishonor,
discredit or put in contempt the person of Atty. Canoy. It is true that every defamatory remark directed
against a public person in his public capacity is not necessarily actionable but if the utterances are false,
malicious, or unrelated to a public officer's performance of his duties or irrelevant to matters of public
interest involving public figures, the same may be actionable.
e. Examination of the defamatory remarks reveals that the same pertain to Atty. Canoy's mental capacity and
not to his alleged participation with Col. Noble's rebellion, and neither does it pertain to Atty. Canoy's duties
and responsibilities as a radio broadcaster. While Atty. Canoy is a public figure, the subject articles
comment on the mental condition of the latter, thus, the defamatory utterances are directed to Atty. Canoy
as a private individual, and not in his public capacity. As such, the petitioners' allegations that the subject
articles are fair commentaries on matters of public interest are unavailing. As stated in Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., a newspaper or broadcaster publishing defamatory falsehoods about an individual who is
neither a public official nor a public figure may not claim a constitutional privilege against liability for injury
inflicted, even if the falsehood arose in a discussion of public interest. The mere fact that Atty. Canoy is a
public figure does not automatically mean that every defamation against him is not actionable. In
Yuchengco v. The Manila Chronicle Publishing Corp., et al., the Court stated that a topic or story should not
be considered a matter of public interest by the mere fact that the person involved is a public officer, unless
the said topic or story relates to his functions as such. Assuming a public office is not tantamount to
completely abdicating one's right to privacy.
f. Having established that the defamatory remarks are not privileged, the law provides that malice is
presumed. Petitioners claimed that the defamatory remarks are privileged since Atty. Canoy failed to prove
actual malice on their part. The Court disagrees. Generally, malice is presumed in every defamatory remark.
What destroys this presumption is the finding that the said defamatory remark is classified as a privileged

communication. In such case, the onus of proving actual malice is on the part of the plaintiff. In this case,
however, the petitioners were not able to establish that the defamatory remarks are privileged, as such,
the presumption of malice stands and need not be established separate from the existence of the
defamatory remarks. (Nova Communications, Inc. v. Atty. Canoy, G.R. No. 193276, June 26, 2019, First
Division)
13. There is no sufficient evidence to indict Domingo of oral defamation or slander. As pointed out by the Regional
Prosecutor, a prosecution for oral defamation does not only require that the utterance be defamatory, but also
that it was made publicly. If it were true that Domingo had been publicly calling Urmaza a “thief” or that every
time he passed her house he would shout “Magnanakaw, magnanakaw si Meriam ng baril at balasubas kayo,”
then there should be no dearth of witnesses to prove it. On this case, the Regional Prosecution correctly pointed
outt hat there was no corroborative statement from any other witness to substantiate Urmaza’s allegations,
and the account of Maneclang, Urmaza’s aunt, that Domingo’s son Gian Carlo mentioned to her during a casual
conversaion that they suspected Urmaza of taking the gun was nothing but hearsay. As it is, the only time that
Domingo accused Urmaza of stealing the missing gun was during the confrontation before the barangay, where
the complaint for theft was filed by Domingo. Under the circumstances, Domingo’s accusation cannot be said
to have been made maliciously; therefore, he cnanot be said to have committed the crimes imputed to him.
(Urmaza v. Regionap Prosecutor Rojas, G.R. No. 240012, January 22, 2020, Second Division)
14. Unless the prosecution proves that the defamatory statements were made with actual malice – that is, with
knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not – a criminal case for libel
involving a public officer’s exercise of official functions cannot prosper.
a. Whether complainant is a private or public person is a factor that must be considered in determining the
existence of malice. Here, the prosecution admitted during pre-trial that at the time the articles were
published, private complainant Atty. So was a public officer, the then officer-in-charge of the Bureau of
Customs Intelligence and Investigation Service at the NAIA. This admission shall be considered in
determining petitioners’ liability for libel.
b. The prosecution failed to prove that petitioner Tulfo acted with malice, or with reckless disregard in
determining the truth or falsity of the imputations. Here, each Information on the series of articles in
Abante Tonite covering Atty. So includes an ending paragraph stating that “complainant was indicated as
an extortionist, a corrupt public official, smuggler, and having illegally acquired wealth.” Those allegations
all refer to acts related to Atty. So’s official functions at the Bureau of Customs. The articles as a whole
indicate Atty. So’s alleged use of connections to stay in position and conceal his misconduct. From these,
it can be deduced that the impugned articles fall within the purview of qualified privileged communications.
These columns relate to Atty. So’s exercise of his official functions. His alleged actuations refer to matters
of public interest which the citizenry ought to know. As an official of the Bureau of Customs, Atty. So is
subject to a closer scrutiny by members of the media, who act as sentinels of the public.
c. Having established the privileged nature of the Abante Tonite articles, the burden shifts to the prosecution
to prove that actual malice exists. The prosecution is duty bound to show that the alleged defamatory
statements were made with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false
or not. The reason for this rule is based on the New York Times doctrine, which provides: “To require critics
of official conduct to guarantee the truth of all their factual assertions on pain of libel judgments would
lead to self-censorship, since would-be critics would be deterred from voicing out their criticisms even if
such were believed to be true, or were in fact true, because of doubt whether it could be proved or because
of fear of the expense of having to prove it.” Here, petitioner Tulfo’s testimony on cross-examination does
not show that the allegations were false, or that they were made with reckless disregard of ascertaining
whether the statements were false or not. His testimony that no administrative case was filed against Atty.
So does not mean that the statements in the articles were false. Besides, it is not unusual that columnists
have no personal knowledge on the material they report. That petitioner has never bothered obtaining
Atty. So’s side of the story, as respondent insists, cannot amount to malice. While substantiating facts does
play an important role in reporting standards, a reported may rely on a lone source’s information, even if
such information only shows one side of the story, for as long as the reporter does not entertain a high
degree of awareness of its probable falsity. The testimony of a defense witness confirms petitioner Tulfo’s
statements in his articles that the brokers conducted a strike complaining about certain Customs officials,
including Atty. So. At the very least, this corroborates petitioner Tulfo’s submission that brokers gave him
information on Atty. So’s abuse of power in the Bureau of Customs.
d. Since the author of the impugned articles himself is not guilty of libel, it follows that petitioners Macasaet
and Quijano, the published and managing editor of the Abante Tonite columns, must likewise be acquitted.
However, the Court clarifies that petitioners Macasaet and Quijano erred in arguing that their conviction
must rest on actual participation, and not merely being the published and managing auditor. Under the
law, a claim of absence of participation by those persons responsible under Article 360 of the Revised Penal
Code will not shield them from liability. The law is clear: these persons are liable for libel as if they were
the author of the defamatory writing.
e. The constitutionality of criminalizing libel is doubtful. In libel, the kinds of speech actually deterred are
more valuable thatn the State interest the law against libel protects. The libel cases that have reached the
Court in recent years generally involve notable personalities for parties, highlighting a propensity for the

powerful and influential to use the advantages of criminal lible to silence their critics. In any event,
alternative legal remedies exist to address unwarranted attacks on a private person’s reputation and
credibility, such as the Civil Code chapter on Human Relations. Civil actions for defamation are more
consistent with our democractic values since they do not threaten the constitutional right to free speech,
and avoid the unnecessary chilling effect on criticisms toward public officials. The proper economic burden
on complainants of civil actions also reduces the possibility of using libel as a tool to harass or silence critics
and dissenters. Nevertheless, the constitutionally protected freedoms enjoyed by the press cannot be used
as a shield to advance the malicious propagation of false information carried out by unscrupulous entities
to injure another’s reputation. (Tulfo v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 187113, January 11, 2021, Third
Division)
15. As an exception to the presumption that every defamatory imputation is malicious, privileged communication
has two kinds: absolute and qualified. The distinction between these two was discussed in Orfanel v. People,
where the Court decreed: “A communication is said to be absolutely privileged when it is not actionable, even
if its author has acted in bad faith. This class includes statements made by members of Congress in the discharge
of their functions as such, official communications made by public officers in the performance of their duties,
and allegations or statements made by the parties or their counsel in their pleadings or motions or during the
hearing of judicial proceedings, as well as the answers given by the witnesses in reply to questions propounded
to them, in the course of said proceedings, provided that said allegations or statements are relevant to the
issues, and the answers are responsive or pertinent to the questions propounded to said witnesses. On the
other hand, conditionally or qualifiedly privileged communications are those which, although containing
defamatory imputations, would not be actionable unless made with malice or bad faith. It has, moreover, been
held that there is malice when the defamer has been prompted by ill-will or spite and speaks not in response
to duty, but merely to injure the reputation of the person defamed. Qualified privileged communications
include private communications and fair and true report without any comment or remarks.
a. In Borjal v. CA, the Court recognized that the enumeration of qualified privileged communications under
Article 354 of the RPC is not exclusive. It decreed that fair commentaries on matters of public interest are
likewise deemed privileged by reason of the constitutional guarantee of freedom of the press.
b. In Vasquez v. CA, the Court reiterated the actual malice test and discussed Article 361 on the defense of
truth. The Court said, “for that matter, even if the defamatory statement is false, no liability can attach if it
relates to official conduct, unless the public official concerned proves that the statement was made with
actual malice – that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false
of not.
c. US v. Bustos has early on recognized the need to read and interpret Philippine libel laws in relation to the
fundamental rights of free speech and free press. In US v. Perfecto, the Court recognized that the
development of an informed public opinion in the Philippines can certainly not be brought about by the
constant prosecution of those citizens who have the courage to denounce the maladministration of public
affairs. Similarly, in Lopez v. CA, it was stressed that no inroads on press freedom should be allowed in the
guise of punitive action visited in what otherwise could be characterized as libel whether in the form of
printed words or a defamatory imputation. (Tulfo v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 187113, January 11,
16. All of the elements of Libel were sufficiently alleged in the Informations. Both Informations state the following:
(a) the discreditable act of GMA-7 allegedly stealing and pirating the video footage exclusively taken by ABS-
CBN thereby causing dishonor, discredit, or contempt to GMA-7; (b) the publication by petitioners of such
discreditable acts of GMA-7 which allegedly exposed the latter to public ridicule and discredit; (c) GMA-7,
represented by its management, operations, production of news and public affairs officers, as persons
defamed; and (d) petitioners’ malice and intent of causing the publication of the defamatory statements.
a. The CA correctly upheld the validity of the Informations despite GMA-7’s own admission of the
unauthorized use of the footage. To recall, petitioner’s claim that the CA erred in finding that the RTC did
not commit grave abuse of discretion in upholding the validity of the subject Informations, despite private
respondents’ admission that the crime of libel was not committed in the first place. Petitioners’ claim holds
no water. Every defamatory imputation is presumed malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and
justifiable motive for making it is shown, except in the following cases: (i) a private communication made
by any person to another in the person to another in the performance of any legal, moral or social duty;
and (ii) a fair and true report, made in good faith, without any comments or remarks, of any judicial,
legislative or other official proceedings which are not of confidential nature, or of any statement, report,
or speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other act performed by public officers in the exercise of
their functions. Undoubtedly, even if GMA-7 admitted the unauthorized use of the footage, petitioners’
imputation of the discreditable act, vice or defect is presumed malicious. The serious accusation of stealing
a video coverage and broadcasting it on national television is an imputation of the crime of libel and is
presumed malicious. (Tulfo v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 237620, April 28, 2021, Third Division)
17. There is no crime of grave oral defamation in relation to Section 10(a) of R.A. 7610. Section 10(a) is clear in that
it punishes acts of child abuse which are not covered by the Revised Penal Code. Hence, on this point, Briñas is
correct – she cannot be convicted of grave oral defamation under the RPC in relation to Section 10(a) of R.A.

Libel, Slander, and O alDefamation
7610. From the plain language of Section 10(a), the acts punished under it and those punished under the RPC
are mutually exclusive. Acts which are already covered by the RPC are excluded from the coverage of Section
10(a). (Briñas v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 254005, June 23, 2021, First Division)
18. In cases of criminal libel where public figures, particularly public officers, are private complainants, actual malice
– knowledge that the defamatory statement was false or with reckless disregard as to its falsity – must be
proved. It is the burden of the prosecution to prove actual malice, and not the defense’s burden to disprove.
(Daquer, Jr. v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 206015, June 30, 2021, Third Division)
19. Petitioner should be acquitted of the charge of libel.

a. The Court has imposed a higher standard for criminal libel where the complainant is a public figure,
particularly, a public officer. Actual malice – knowledge that the defamatory statement was false, or with
reckless disregard as to its falsity – must be proved. It is the burden of the prosecution to prove actual
malice, not the defense’s to disprove. In Guingguing v. CA, the Court decreed that in order to justify a
conviction for criminal libel against a public figure, it must be established beyond reasonable doubt that
the libelous statements were made or published with actual malice, meaning knowledge that the
statement was false or with reckless disregard as to whether or not it was true. "Reckless disregard" is
determined on a case-by-case basis. There is reckless disregard if the accused was found to have
entertained serious doubts of the truth of the published statements, or if the statements were of a matter
not determined to be a legitimate topic in the area. Errors or misstatements by themselves are insufficient
to be considered reckless disregard, unless shown that the accused possessed a high degree of awareness
of the falsity. Mere negligence is not enough. To be considered to have reckless disregard for the truth, the
false statements must have been made with a definite awareness that they are untrue. That the accused
was negligent of the facts is not enough. The accused must have doubted the veracity of the statements
that he or she was making. Thus, errors and inaccuracies may be excused so long as they were made with
the belief that what was being stated is true.
b. Here, the Court of Appeals correctly identified petitioner's two articles as being a form of fair commentary
on a matter of public interest, as it involves the dealings of a public officer in relation to his public office:
“Records show that private complainant, Anrie Grande, is a public officer being the Sports Development
Officer III-Program Manager of the City Government of Puerto Princesa and the topic of the subject articles
is the alleged power struggle that occurred within the City Sports Office involving Grande and certain local
officials therein and Grande's alleged meddling with the affairs of the Palawan Press Club. Hence, We can
conclude that the subject articles fall within the scope of fair commentaries on matters of public interest
and. as such, is covered under ‘qualified privileged communication.’” The Court of Appeals then found that
petitioner failed to prove that the articles' contents were true, or that he exercised a reasonable degree of
care to determine their veracity before publication. This approach is contrary to this Court's doctrines.
When the allegedly libelous statement pertains to a matter of public interest, more so when the subject of
the statement is a public officer, the prosecution must satisfactorily prove that the petitioner either knew
that the statement was false, or that he acted with reckless disregard as to whether or not the statement
is true.
c. The Court of Appeals erred in imposing the burden of proof on petitioner to prove that the statements in
his articles are true. Moreover, the prosecution did not present enough evidence that either the two
articles are false, or that petitioner wrote the articles with reckless disregard, instead claiming that
petitioner's testimony should suffice. Proof of guilt in all criminal cases must be beyond reasonable doubt,
and the dearth of prosecution evidence cannot be held to a standard of moral certainty. The prosecution
failed to discharge this burden, actual malice was not satisfactorily proved, and petitioner should be
acquitted. (Daquer, Jr. v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 206015, June 30, 2021, Third Division)
C R IMIN AL N EGLI GEN C E

1. Petitioner is guilty of reckless imprudence in flagrantly failing to observe the necessary precautions to avoid
inflicting injury or damage to other persons and things while he was operating the Super 5 bus. The prosecution
sufficiently proved that the Super 5 bus driven by the petitioner recklessly drove on the right shoulder of the
road and overtook another south-bound ten-wheeler truck that slowed at the intersection, obviously to give
way to another vehicle about to enter the intersection. It was impossible for him not to notice that the ten-
wheeler truck in front and traveling in the same direction had already slowed down to allow passage of the
pick-up, which was then negotiating a left turn to Aglayan public market. Seeing the ten-wheeler truck slow
down, it was incumbent upon the petitioner to reduce his speed or apply on the brakes of the bus in order to
allow the pick-up to safely make a left turn. Instead, he drove at a speed too fast for safety, then chose to
swerve to the right shoulder of the road and overtake the truck, entering the intersection and directly smashing
into the pick-up. (Senit v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 192914, January 11, 2016, Third Division)
2. A perusal of the recods clearly shows that it was Paman who was at fault since he was driving at the wrong side
of the road when the collision happened. Arambala’s motorcycle was cruising along its rightful lane when
Paman’s multicab suddenly crossed his path coming from his left side along Broca Street using the wrong lane
to cross the said intersection. The accident would not have happened had Paman, the multicab driver, stayed
on his lane and did not overtake the vehicle of the private complainant Arambala. Even the position of the

multicab driven by Paman after the incident supports the conclusion that Paman was indeed on the wrong side
of the road, which eventually caused it to collide with Arambala’s motorcycle.
a. Paman’s act of driving on the wrong side of the road, in an attempt to overtake the motorcycle driven by
Arambala and suddenly crossing the path which is being traversed by the latter, is sheer negligence. It is a
settled rule that a driver abandoning his proper lane for the purpose of overtaking another vehicle in an
ordianry situation has the duty to see to it that the road is clear and he should not proceed if he cannot do
so in safety. If, after attempting to pass, the driver of the overtaking vehicle finds that he cannot make the
passage in safety, the latter must slacken his speed so as to avoid the danger of collision, even bringing his
car to a stop if necessary. (Paman v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 210129, July 5, 2017, Third Division)
3. The DOJ Panel, in charging respondent with reckless imprudence, reasoned "As First Vice-President for
Administration and team leader of Crisis Management Committee, both Capt. Benjamin Eugenio, who is in
charge of vessel operations in Manila, and Engr. Ernelson Morales, SLI safety officer, report directly to him.
Thus, he is unarguably involved in making decisions on whether a vessel would be allowed to sail out of the Port
of Manila, in fact, Capt. Eugenio reported to him on the pre-departure conference with respondent Marimon.
Considering the severe weather condition prevailing at that time, prudence should have dictated him to cancel
or discourage Voyage No. 392 of 'Stars' especially after SWB No. 8 was issued by PAGASA, pursuant to the
guidelines provided under PCG MC 04-07 as explained elsewhere above. The fact that he admittedly allowed
respondent Marimon, Capt. Eugenio, and Engr. Morales to decide among themselves whether ‘Stars’ should
depart likewise bespeak[s] of his failure to exercise extraordinary care and precaution considering the brewing
storm along the vessel's route and in reckless disregard to the 849 persons on board the ‘Stars.' Then, after
learning that ‘Stars' was navigating along its regular route when the eye of Typhoon Frank was already at the
vicinity of Romblon, he admittedly did not give any specific instruction to take shelter or drop anchor." First,
the DOJ Panel explicitly identified the decisions which respondent could have taken to prevent Stars from sailing
and, consequently, to avert the accident. Among others, he failed to closely monitor and assess the movement
of the vessel as against the movement of Typhoon Frank such that he did not instruct Captain Marimon to take
shelter in the vicinity of Batangas despite information from PAGASA that the vessel would come face to face
with the eye of Typhoon Frank if it continued along its regular route. Second, the DOJ Panel also made it clear
that respondent's acts, though not malicious, were indeed voluntary. Third, it is undisputed that as a result of
the sinking of Stars, only 32 persons survived out of the 849 on board the vessel. Finally, there was an explicit
and reasonable conclusion drawn by the DOJ Panel that respondent's act of allowing the vessel to sail despite·
the severe weather condition at that time demonstrated inexcusable lack of precaution on the latter's part. The
Court, thus, concludes that the DOJ Panel's Resolution clearly supports a prima facie finding that reckless
imprudence under Article 365 of the RPC has been committed. The DOJ Panel, in arriving at such conclusion,
did not just rely on the affidavits of the complainants and the respondents as well as their respective witnesses.
It also conducted clarificatory hearings on March 13 and 20, 2009 wherein respondent, Captain Eugenio (SLI
Manila Port Captain), Captain Ponteres (SLI Cebu Port Captain), Engineer Morales (SLI Manila Safety Officer),
Juanito Cabangonay and Gorillo (SLI Manila Radio Operators), and Noelito Alpas (SLI Cebu Radio Operator)
appeared and testified. The DOJ Panel merely acted on the belief that respondent's acts or omissions constitute
the offense of reckless imprudence. (People of the Philippines v. Go, G.R. No. 210816, December 10, 2018,
Third Division)
4. The prosecution failed to prove that petitioner was guity of reckless imprudence as punished in Article 365 of
the RPC. Records show that petitioner was slowly driving his lumber-laden tricycle on the lane where he was
supposed to be, when Ramirez’s tricycle appeared from the opposite direction, moving at great speed and in
an erratic manner, before it crashed into his tricycle. Clearly, there was no imprudent or negligent act on
petitioner’s part which led to or contributed to the collision or to Ramirez’s death.
a. While leaving the severely injured Ramirez after the collision might have been a badge of guilt, this remains
disputable and is not the willful and inexcusable negligence required to uphold a finding of guilt for reckless
imprudence resulting to homicide and damage to property.
b. Gonzaga v. People instructs that the prosecution must show the “direct causal connection between such
negligence and the injuries or damages complained of” to establish a motorist’s liability for negligence.
Gonzaga likewise stressed that mere negligence is not enough to constitute reckless driving, rather, the
prosecution must prove that the motorist acted in utter disregard of the consequence of his or her action,
as it is the “inexcusable lack of precaution or conscious indifference to the consequences of the conduct
which supplies the criminal intent and brings an act of mere negligence and imprudence under the
operation of the penal law.”
c. The doctrine of last clear chance is not applicable here since the prosecution failed to show beyond
reasonable doubt that petitioner negligently acted or that he could have avoided the accident if he had
acted with more prudence. From every indication, it was Ramirez’s act of driving his tricycle in a speedy
and unpredictable manner (i.e., zigzagging) which caused the accident. However, the lower courts also
ascribed negligence to petitioner because he supposedly had enough time to either steer clear of Ramirez
or stop his tricycle altogether to prevent the collision. The records showed that Ramirez’s tricycle hit
petitioner’s tricycle while the latter was within its lane, thereby substantiating petitioner’s testimony that
Ramirez was driving in a zigzag manner. This also demonstrated that petitioner stayed within his lane the
entire time prior to the accident. Petitioner likewise testified that he was slowly driving prior to the

accident, and this was corroborated by his passenger. Additionally, he had 46 pieces of lumber strapped
on top of his tricycle, which made it impossible for him to drive his tricycle at top speed. Also, the fact that
only two (2) pieces of lumber were dislodged from the roof of petitioner’s tricycle even after the collision
supports his testimony that he was slowly driving and that the pieces of lumber were secured to his tricycle.
The lower courts concluded that petitioner had ample time to avoid Ramirez as he became aware of the
oncoming tricycle when it was about 4-5 meters away, thus, he should have taken precautionary measures
like slowing down, parking at the side of the road, or even stopping altogether. The lower courts erred on
this point. A tricycle, traveling within the speed limit, can easily cover four to five meters in a few seconds.
A speeding tricycle would traverse the same distance even faster. Hence, from the moment petitioner saw
the approaching tricycle, which was barreling towards his lane in an erratic and unpredictable manner, no
appreciable time had elapsed which would have afforded him the last clear opportunity to avoid the
collision. Even petitioner’s act of transporting lumber on top of his tricycle cannot be said to be a negligent
act per se. The Court takes judicial notice that the use of tricycles to transport heavy objects such as
appliances and furniture is a common practice in the Philippines, particularly in rural areas, as tricycles are
readily available and a more affordable way of transporting items, especially for those who cannot afford
to rent a truck or jeepney. (Ofracio v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 221981, November 4, 2020, Third
Division)
5. The prosecution must show the direct causal connection between a motorist’s negligence and the injuries
sustained to substantiate a charge for reckless imprudence resulting to homicide. Further, mere negligence will
not suffice because it is the motorist’s willful and wanton act done in utter disregard of the consequence of his
or her action, which criminalizes an imprudent or negligent act.
a. Here, the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner’s inexcusable lack of
precaution in driving the jeepney was the proximate cause of Jaquilmo’s death. In fact, the lower courts
had diverging opinions on petitioner’s imprudent act, with the RTC stating that petitioner was probably
sleepy when he drove the jeepney, and the CA concluding that petitioner was driving the jeepney too fast.
Moreover, no one testified as to the manner by which petitioner was driving before he supposedly hit
Jaquilmo, or of personally witnessing the jeepney hit Jaquilmo.
b. The crime of reckless imprudence bears the following elements: (i) that the offender does or fails to do an
act; (ii) that the doing or the failure to do that act is voluntary; (iii) that it be without malice; (iv) that material
damage results from the reckless imprudence; and (v) that there is inexcusable lack of precaution on the
part of the offender, taking into consideration his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence,
physical condition, and other circumstances regarding persons, time, and place. Gonzaga v. People states
that to establish a motorist’s liability for negligence, the prosecution must show the direct causal
connection between such negligence and the injuries or damages complained of. Gonzaga then stressed
that mere negligence in driving a vehicle is not enough to constitute reckless driving. Rather, it must be
shown that the motorist acted willfully and wantonly, in utter disregard of the consequence of his or her
action as it is the inexcusable lack of precaution or conscious indifference to the consequences of the
conduct which supplies the criminal intent and brings an act of mere negligence and imprudence under
the operation of the penal law. (Valencia v. People of the Philippines, G.R. No. 235573, November 9. 2020,
Third Division)


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Table of Contents 1

Criminal Law – Bar Examinations 2023

#RejectMarcosAndDuterte #MarcosNoHero #NoToHistoricalDenialism

Condonation, pardon, and amnesty .................................................................................................................................. 90

#RejectMarcosAndDuterte #MarcosNoHero #NoToHistoricalDenialism

Anti-Violence against Women and their Children ............................................................................................................... 313

#RejectMarcosAndDuterte #MarcosNoHero #NoToHistoricalDenialism

#RejectMarcosAndDuterte #MarcosNoHero #NoToHistoricalDenialism

#RejectMarcosAndDuterte #MarcosNoHero #NoToHistoricalDenialism

GENERALITY, TERRITORIALITY, AND PROSPECTIVITY OF PENAL LAWS

PRO REO DOCTRINE

MOTIVE, MALA IN SE AND MALA PROHIBITA

#RejectMarcosAndDuterte #MarcosNoHero #NoToHistoricalDenialism

#RejectMarcosAndDuterte #MarcosNoHero #NoToHistoricalDenialism

5. The stab wound is the proximate cause of the victim’s death.

#RejectMarcosAndDuterte #MarcosNoHero #NoToHistoricalDenialism

ATTEM PTE D, F R U S TR ATED, AN D C O N S U MMATED C R IMES

7. Palaganas distinguished frustrated and attempted felony.

#RejectMarcosAndDuterte #MarcosNoHero #NoToHistoricalDenialism

#RejectMarcosAndDuterte #MarcosNoHero #NoToHistoricalDenialism

#RejectMarcosAndDuterte #MarcosNoHero #NoToHistoricalDenialism

#RejectMarcosAndDuterte #MarcosNoHero #NoToHistoricalDenialism

#RejectMarcosAndDuterte #MarcosNoHero #NoToHistoricalDenialism

#RejectMarcosAndDuterte #MarcosNoHero #NoToHistoricalDenialism

#RejectMarcosAndDuterte #MarcosNoHero #NoToHistoricalDenialism

#RejectMarcosAndDuterte #MarcosNoHero #NoToHistoricalDenialism

#RejectMarcosAndDuterte #MarcosNoHero #NoToHistoricalDenialism

#RejectMarcosAndDuterte #MarcosNoHero #NoToHistoricalDenialism

#RejectMarcosAndDuterte #MarcosNoHero #NoToHistoricalDenialism

#RejectMarcosAndDuterte #MarcosNoHero #NoToHistoricalDenialism

#RejectMarcosAndDuterte #MarcosNoHero #NoToHistoricalDenialism

#RejectMarcosAndDuterte #MarcosNoHero #NoToHistoricalDenialism

65. The prosecution failed to establish conspiracy among petitioners.

#RejectMarcosAndDuterte #MarcosNoHero #NoToHistoricalDenialism

#RejectMarcosAndDuterte #MarcosNoHero #NoToHistoricalDenialism

BURDEN AND QUANTUM OF PROOF

#RejectMarcosAndDuterte #MarcosNoHero #NoToHistoricalDenialism

#RejectMarcosAndDuterte #MarcosNoHero #NoToHistoricalDenialism

#RejectMarcosAndDuterte #MarcosNoHero #NoToHistoricalDenialism

#RejectMarcosAndDuterte #MarcosNoHero #NoToHistoricalDenialism

#RejectMarcosAndDuterte #MarcosNoHero #NoToHistoricalDenialism

#RejectMarcosAndDuterte #MarcosNoHero #NoToHistoricalDenialism

#RejectMarcosAndDuterte #MarcosNoHero #NoToHistoricalDenialism

#RejectMarcosAndDuterte #MarcosNoHero #NoToHistoricalDenialism

#RejectMarcosAndDuterte #MarcosNoHero #NoToHistoricalDenialism

LACK OF SUFFICIENT PROVOCATION

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#RejectMarcosAndDuterte #MarcosNoHero #NoToHistoricalDenialism

ENTRAPMENT AND INSTIGATION

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5. Contrary to accused-appellant’s claims, he was apprehended in a legitimate buy-bust operation. A police

EXEM PTIN G C IR C U MS TAN C ES

#RejectMarcosAndDuterte #MarcosNoHero #NoToHistoricalDenialism

#RejectMarcosAndDuterte #MarcosNoHero #NoToHistoricalDenialism

#RejectMarcosAndDuterte #MarcosNoHero #NoToHistoricalDenialism

#RejectMarcosAndDuterte #MarcosNoHero #NoToHistoricalDenialism

MITIGA TIN G C IR C U MS TAN C E S

LACK OF INTENTION TO COMMIT A GRAVE WRONG

VINDICATION OF A GRAVE OFFENSE

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PASSION AND OBFUSCATION

#RejectMarcosAndDuterte #MarcosNoHero #NoToHistoricalDenialism

#RejectMarcosAndDuterte #MarcosNoHero #NoToHistoricalDenialism

#RejectMarcosAndDuterte #MarcosNoHero #NoToHistoricalDenialism