Professional Documents
Culture Documents
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Title Page
1 Strategic Setti- 1
2 ~perational/TacticalSituaticn 16
3 Conduct of Operations 37
4 Conclusions 57
Annexes
A Strategic Setting
C Correlation of Forces
D Planning Sequence
F Disposition
OPERATION BAGRATION
1. S t r a t e g i c S e t t i n g .
a. P r i n c i p a l Events.
Wehrmacht saw before i t on 22 June 1941. They had not, however, counted
and timing, July, of t h e German offensive. The Red Army' then prepared t h e i r
other ways. They commenced Lend-Lease a i d , although this would not amount
1944, and the Soviet leadership had been s o informed a t the Teheran
kilometers, and Soviet forces on t h e border o.f Estonia. The blow i n the
t h e summer offensive.
By t h e time o p e r a t i o n s halted, t h e S o v i e t s had regained almost a l l o f
guns, 3,500 mortars, 23,500 machine &a, 18,400 r i f l e s , 1,000 tanks and
a s s a u l t guns, 3,300 t r a c t o r s and prime movers, 61,300 v e h i c l e s , 11,700,000
b. S t r a t e g i c objectives.
(1) S o v i e t Union:
simultaneou sly.
The first look a t s t r a t e g i c concept8 by which t o accomplish t h e
three options:
fran Germany, and i t would have had t o be done with very powerful,
S o v i e t t e r r i t o r y l a y n o r t h o f t h e P r i p e t Marshes.
deciaive results..
of sequential offensives.
Center.
(2) Germany:
(b) S o v i e t ( s e e h e x A) .
Although t h e Soviet Union, l i k e Germany, had a two-front
fit on t h e t e r r a i n a v a i l a b l e .
I n s p i t e o f t h e l o s s e s suffered during t h e winter campaign, t h e
Red Army had continued t o grow. Although personnel had increased by only
100,000 had been replaced. The shortage of German manpower was acute, and
production could not make up the l o s s e s , nor could i t catch up with the
production i n 1943 w a s 10,800, and i t jumped i n 1944 t o 17,800. For the war
from 25,200 i n 1943 t o 34,300 i n 1944, but i n 1943 17,400 a i r c r a f t had been
destroyed, and t h e proportion was holding i n 1944, e s p e c i a l l i on t h e Western
l i n e s t o t h e r e a r , a s h e f e l t t h a t such p r e p a r a t i o n s became a
f o r the Germans.
I n production, t o o , t h e S o v i e t Union was f a r i n g b e t t e r than were t h e
t h e war a s a whole.
f o r t h e y e a r s 1939-1945.
o f t h e S o v i e t f o r c e s , c o n c e n t r a t i o n a t t h e s e l e c t e d p o i n t s - t o overwhelm t h e
enemy with a t t a c k s throughout t h e depth o f h i s position, and e x p l o i t a t i o n a s
fewer tank corps o r more mechanized corps depending on the mission and
s t r a t e g i c operations.
15
2, ~ ~ e r a t i o n a l / T a c t i c aSli t u a t i o n .
one supporting each f r o n t except 1st Belorussian where two a i r armies were
63% of t h e guns and mortars, 769 of t h e tanks and assault guns, and 73% of
explained below. .
The S o v i e t f i g u r e s i n C o r r e l a t i o n of Forces do n o t r e f l e c t t h e
armies, one t a n k army, and one a i r army. However, they would only e n t e r t h e
Smolensk t o be s u r e , b u t u n a v a i l a b l e t o t h e f r o n t commanders f o r t h e i r
commitment on t h e i r own a u t h o r i t y .
t h e i r a r t i l l e r y a t d i v i s i o n c o n d u c t e d . d i r e c t f i r e i n support of i n f a n t r y ,
and a t t a c h e d a r t i l l e r y u n i t s o r a r t i l l e r y a t corps f i r e d i n d i r e c t f i r e
f i e l d amy.
r e s e r v e ) , t h r e e Hungarian d i v i s i o n s , and f i v e s e c u r i t y d i v i s i o n s i n t h e
p i l o t s be obtained. -
(3) Logistical.
i n 150,000 m e t r i c t o n s of r a t i o n s , 900,000 m e t r i c t o n s of a r t i l l e r y
19
c l a s s e s o f supply. I n a d d i t i o n , t h e o p e r a t i o n would need 45,000 metric t o n s
u n i t s , pr$marilymobile groups.
o f a v i a t i o n would a l s o a r r i v e a t t h e f r o n t s .
had a c h i e f o f o p e r a t i o n s communications l i n k s on t h e r o l l s of t h e f r o n t
were expected t o o p e r a t e c l o s e t o t h e f r o n t .
detachments of s p e c i a l l i a i s o n o f f i c e r s e q u i ~ ~ ewdi t h s p e c i a l r a d i o s ,
(5 ) Deception and i n t e l l i g e n c e .
tank armies, two mechanized corpa and two cavalry corps, eleven a v i a t i o n
operational, anti t a c t i c a l l e v e l s .
-
*
Germans.
a c t i o n a g a i n s t Vitebsk on i t s f a c e r a t h e r t h a n a t t h e shoulders of i t s
Beresina.
forswore h i s prepared a t t a c k .
a t t a c k s by Gennan f o r c e s i n t h e s p r i n g , t h e Belorussian p a r t i s a n s s t i l l
numbered 143,000 i n 150 b r i g a d e s and 49 s e p a r a t e detachments. DuriQ3 t h e
i n resupply a s well.
i c s t a l l a t i o n s r a t h e r than engaging i n a e r i a l i n t e r d i c t i o n .
The Germans d i d o b t a i n some o f t h e p i c t u r e , b u t , because of t h e i r
i n d i c a t o r s as r e f l e c t i n g a d e f e n s i v e r a t h e r t h a n o f f e n s i v e i n t e n t i o n i n Army
which had replaced t h e 5th Guards Tank Army. They a l s o s a w t h e 2d Tank Army
a v i a t i o n i n t h e s o u t h , a l r e a d y t h e s t r o k e s t p a r t o f t h e S o v i e t Air Forces,
it.
concentration near Orsha could be a main a t t a c k , and frcm 16 June on, they
e a s t of t h e Beresina,
knowledge .
(6) Doctrine.
(a) Soviet.
By t h e t h i r d p e r i o d o f t h e war, S o v i e t d o c t r i n e had come t o
s t r e n g t h a t t h e p o i n t of d e c i s i o n , zassed u n i t s t o c r e a t e high t a c t i c a l
t h e l e a d r i f l e d i v i s i o n s , o f t e n c o n s i s t i n g of a r i f l e b a t t a l i o n , t a n k
t h e enemy's r e a r a r e a s .
(b) German.
b. F i l i t a r g 0 b jectives/2lissions/Tasks
( 1 ) Missions of opposing f o r c e s .
see Annex D.
33
--Encircle Vitebsk from west and south, s e i z e Vitebsk,
3d B e l o r u s s i a n Front o n l e f t .
1st B a l t i c Front.
i n v i c i n i t y of Borisov.
~orisov.
f u r t h e r operations.
them.
Beresina River.
-4. . Is t B e l o r u s s i a n R o n t .
-Penetrate enemy d e f e n s e s from Rogachev n o r t h of
west o f B e r e s i n a River.
and Bobruisk-Baranovichi.
a f t e r t r o o p s of r i g h t wing p a s s Slonim.
key c o r p u n i c a t i o n s c e n t e r s .
c. Courses o f a c t i o n considered.
o t h e r German f o r c e s w i t h i n t h e s a l i e n t s u f f i c i e n t l y , i t aimed a t l o c a t i o n s
o p e r a t i o n a l one.
simultaneously a t s u c c e s s i v e l y g r e a t e r d e p t h s , f i x i n g t h e Gerinan f o r c e s i n
(2) German-
would be c a t a s t r o p h i c .
3. Conduct o f Operation.
a. Disposition o f forces.
(1) Soviet. See Annex E f o r o v e r a l l . groupings. See map f o r
a r e a s s e l e c t e d f o r t h e s i x p e n e t r a t i o n s and e x e r c i s e d economy of f o r c e
-
elsewhere. Even so, t h e number of d i v i s i o n s and t h e l e n g t h of t h e s e c t o r
c o n c e n t r a t i o n s achieved by t h e S o v i e t s a t s e l e c t e d p e n e t r a t i o n s e c t o r s .
a g a i n s t o b j e c t i v e s 200-250 k i l o m e t e r s deep.
Amy's s e c t o r .
o f i t s f o u r c o r p s c o n c e n t r a t e d i n a very narrow s e c t o r on t h e l e f t f l a n k ,
r e s e r v e a t Bobruisk.
they d i d a l o t o f t a s k o r g a n i z i n g o f low l e v e l u n i t s , i n c l u d i n g t h e c r e a t i o n
support o f s u b s t a n t i a l proportions.
o f t h e i n d i v i d u a l s e c t o r s , even t h e d i v i s i o n s could n o t c o n c e n t r a t e i n v i t a l
d i v i s i o n , F e l d h e r n h a l l e , which w a s u n d e r s t r e n g t h i n i t s a s s a u l t gun
German b a t t a l i o n .
13 July 19443
Operation BAGRATION d i d n o t commence a t one time, b u t r a t h e r ,
h i s a s s a u l t f o r c e s , some f i f t e e n b a t t a l i o n s , were a l r e a d y 5 k i l o m e t e r s i n t o
detachments of t h e a s s a u l t r i f l e d i v i s i o n s l e d t h i s advance.
day. The southern a t t a c k by 65th and 28th Armies had been d e v a s t a t i n g , with
. t h e a r t i l l e r y p r e p a r a t i o n a l o n e n e a r l y vaporizing t h e f a c i n g German
divisions. The 65th Army committed i t s mobile group, 1st Guards Tank Corps,
a c t i o n i n n e i t h e r s e c t o r t h a t day.
hours t o accomplish.
.
Guards Tank Brigade, and t h i s helped t h e advance d r i v e deep.
Behind i t , 5th Guards Tank Army was assembling and would be ready f o r
and moved forward 30-50 kilometers. The 49th Army continued t o make steady,
Bobruisk.
o n m s h i n g juggernaut.
Stavka t o r e v i s e i t s d i r e c t i o n s t o t h e f r o n t s . It e s s e n t i a l l y changed t h e
r a i s e i t t o a s t r a t e g i c success.
c . Subsequent Phases.
envelope t h e 5th Panzer Division from t h e north, while 2d GTC had reached
50
armies, 3lst , 33d, 49th.. and 50th, pursued t h e German 4th Army (with
51
t h e railway i n t o Minsk a t S t o l b t s y . He a l s o - d i r e c t e d the 9 t h TC from t h e
on Minsk, led by 5th GTA and' 2d GTC on i t s l e f t entered uinsk on July 3,-
and 1st GTC from southeast. No sooner d i d they reach the city than they
Minsk, and they had done i t i n two days. In t h e pocket thus formed were
lines.
With t h e magnitude o f t h e s t r a t e g i c success c l e a r now, Stavka on 4
J u l y i s s u e d new o r d e r s f o r t h e o f f e n s i v e , d i r e c t i n g 1st B a l t i c F r o n t on
make a n e f f o r t t o r e l i e v e t h e g a r r i s o n .
Baranovichi f a l l i n g on 8 July.
.
It f e l l t o a Soviet f o r c e breaking through
54
quickly. By 10 July, t h e 61st Army, 1st BRP, which connected t h e r i g h t wing
Pinak on 1 4 July and linked up with 1st BRF, which -had advanced 150-170
d i v i s i o n s from Amy Group North, Army Group North Ukraize, and Army Group
Tank Anny reached R a g a beside Warsaw on 31 July, and 8th Guards Anny under
~eneraC
l huikov, the bulldog defender of S t a l i n g r a d , crossed t h e Vistula on
1 August. The advance-was some 300 kilometers i n two weeks, a pace which
d. Outcome.
taken o u t o f t h e w a r .
operation. They had taken o n l y one week t o reduce t h e Kinsk pocket, while
soon a s t h e f i r s t day. The pace had averaged 20-25 kilometers per day
4. Conclusions.
winter.
simultaneously.
ultimate a i m of t h e operation,
p a r t i s a n s n e c e s s a r i l y be a v a i l a b l e i n o p e r a t i o n s o u t s i d e t h e countrg.
I
1. Abramov, K., Rekorotye osobennosti t y l o g o obespecheniia v o i s k v
pp. 49-60.
pp. 31-38.
pp. 44-52.
4. Arnold, Joseph C., "Current Soviet Doctrine," Hilitazy Review, LVII:7, '
1968.
10. Dick, Charles J., "soviet Operational Concepts, Part I," M i l i t a r y Review,
59-72.
14. Glantz, David M., "The Great P a t r i o t i c War and the Maturation of
Operational A r t : 1941-194 5. " C a r l i s l e Barracks, PA, 1985.
pp. 22-29.
11
22.. irlikhalkin, V., Boevoe primenenie a r t i l l e r i i v Belorusskoi o p e r a t s i i
64
23. Ogarkov, 1. V. , "Dal'naia o p e r a t s i i a ( b o i ) [The Deep Operation
( B a t t l e ) 1, " S o v i e t s k a i a voennaia e n t s i k l o p e d i i a , v. 2. Roscow, 1976.
28. Sasso, Claude R., S o v i e t Night Operations i n World Yar 11. Fort
Leavenworth, KS , 1982.
33- -, "Sovetakoe
. voennoe iskusstvo v Belorusskoi o p e r a t s i i 1944 goda
[soviet M i l i t a r y A r t i n t h e Belorussian Operation of 19441,"
Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal, 6:84, pp. 10-18.
37. Wright, Ronald J. , "Destroying the Wehnaacht : January 1944-Kay 1945, "
H i s t o r i c a l Analysis of the Use of Mobile Forces by Russia and the
-
U SSR. College S t a t i o n , TX, 1985.
38. Yefimov, A. I., "Opyt i s p o l ' z o v a n i i a c o e d i n e n i i vozdushnikh a r m i i v
i n t e r e s a l d t podvizhnykh grupp f r o n t o v p r i d e i s t v i i a k h i k h v
Washington, D C. . , 1968.
ANNEX A
Correlation of Porces ( s t r a t e g i c )
June 1944
1,- Soviet.
Airborne Forces
R i f l e , Mo t o r - r i f l e
Cavalry, and Airborne
Divisions
Detached Brigades
Fortified Areas
-
Detached Artillery
and Mortar Bdes
T a n k s / ~ s s a u l t Guns
2. German.
Pe r s o m e l Field dese,me
Formations Army- 0t h e r or Total
Armament Eastern Fronts Satellite
Equipment Front
Infant rj
Divisions
Pe raonne 1 Field Reserve
Formations b y - 0 ther or 'total
Armament Eastern Fronts Satellite
Ruipmen t Front
Parac hut e
. Divisions
--
Brigades
Panzer
Divisions
Panzer Grenadier
Divisions
SS Divisions 9
Tanks/Assault
Guns
Operational
Aircraft
ANNEX B - SOVIET FORCE STRUCTURE (1944)
1. SOVIET RIFLE FORCES
R i f l e Army
3 r i f l e corps
- 7-12 rifle d i v i s i o n s
1 a r t i l l e r y brigade
2 gun a r t i l l e r y regiments
1 tank destroyer regiment
1 a n t i a i r c r a f t a r t i l l e r y regiment
1 mortar regiment
1 engineer/sapper brigade
1 tank regiment
1 signal regiment
1 tank o r mechanized corps
( optional)
strength: 80,000-120,000 men
300-460 tanks ( i f tank/aech corps a t t a c h e d )
1,700-2000 guns/mortars
30-225 SP guns
R i f l e Corps
3 r i f l e divisions
1 a r t i l l e r y brigade (guard corps)
1 a r t i l l e r y regiment ( r e g u l a r corps)
1 self-propelled a r t i l l e r y regiment
1 guards mortar regiment
1antiaimnf t a r t i l l e r y b a t t a G n
1 sapper b a t t a l i o n
1 signal battalion
strength: 20,000-30,000.men
R i f l e Division
3 r i f l e regiments ( 4 x 7 h , 12 x 45ms)
1 a r t i l l e r y brigade
1 gun a r t i l l e r y regiment (32 x 76mm)
1 howitzer a r t i l l e r y regiment (20 x 122mm)
1 mortar reginent ( 2 0 x 12Qum)
1 a n t i a i r c r a f t a r t i l l e r y b a t t a l i o n (12 x 37mm)
' ( i n guards d i v i s i o n s )
1 tank destroyez b a t t a l i o n (18 x 45, 57, 7 h )
I sapper b a t t a l i o n
1 s i g n a l compazy
1 reconnaissance company
strength: 9,380 men*
64 guns
127 mortars
12 AA guns
54 AT guns
*Bifle d i v i s i o n s t r e n g t h s a r e by TOE - Actual strengths nuch smaller
i 500-6,000)
2. SOVIET CAVALRY FORCES
Cavalry Corps
3 cavalry d i v i s i o n s
2 tank regiments (39 tanks each)
I reconnaissance b a t t a l i o n
1 tank destroyer regiment
1 mortar regiment
1 guards mortar b a t t a l i o n
1 self-propelled a r t i l l e r y regiment
1 engineer regiment
1 signal battalion
strength: 14,000-15,000 men
80-100 tanks,
268 guns /mortHrs
4 8 'AT guns
.
34 AA guns
Cavalry Division
3 cavalry regiments (6 x 76mm. 6 x 45mm)
1 a r t i l l e r y regiment
1 reconnaissance b a t t a l i o n
1 a n t i a i r c r a f t squadron
1 engineer squadron
1 s i g n a l squadron
strength: 4,700 men
42 guns
18 AT guns
3. TANK/MECHANIZEDFORCES
Mechanized Corps
3 mechanized brigades
- 3 motorized r i f l e b a t t a l i o n s
1 tank regiment (35 tanks)
1 tank brigade (65 tanks)
- 1 l i g h t self-propelled a r t i l l e r y regiment (sU--76)
1 med self-propelled a r t i l l e r y regiment (SU-85)
1 heavy self-propelled a r t i l l e r y regiment (sU-152)
( i n some corps)
1 mortar regiment
1 a n t i a i r c r a f t a r t i l l e r y regiment
1 guards mortar b a t t a l i o n
1 motorcycle b a t t a l i o n
1 signal battalion
1 sapper, engineer b a t t a l i o n
1 medical b a t t a l i o n
1 transport company
1 r e p a i r , reconstruction company
strength: 16,442 men
183 tanks
63 SP guns
234guns/mortars
8 multiple rocket launchers
Tank Corps
3 tank brigades (6 5 tanks each) .
1 motorized r i f l e brigade
1 mortar regiment
1 a n t i a i r c r a f t a r t i l l e r y regiment
1 l i g h t self-propelled a r t i l l e r y regiment (SU-76)
1 med self-propelled a r t i l l e r y regiment (sU-85/122)
1 heavy self-propelled a r t i l l e r y regiment (SU-152)
( i n some corps)
1 l i g h t a r t i l l e r y regiment
1 guards mortar b a t t a l i o n
1 motorcycle b a t t a l i o n
1 transport company
2 r e p a i r companies ( a r t i l l e r y , tank)
1 s e d i c a l b a t t a l i o n (Nay 1944)
1 s a p p r battalion
1 signal b a t t a l i o n
1 a v i a t i o n company
1 chemical defense company
s t r e w t h : 12,010 men
207 tanks
6 3 SP g u n s
182 guns/mortars
8 multiple rocket launchers
Tank Army
2 tank corps
1 mechanized corps (optional)
1 motorcycle regiment
1 l i g h t a r t i l l e r y brigade
2 gun a r t i l l e r y regiments (76mm)
- 1 gun a r t i l l e r y regiment (1OChm)
1 l i g h t self-propelled a r t i l l e r y brigade
3 l i g h t self-propelled a r t i l l e r y b a t t a l i o n s (SU-76)
1 machine gun b a t t a l i o n
1 a n t i a i r c r a f t machine gun company
2 mortar regiments
1 guards mortar regiments
1 a n t i a i r c r a f t a r t i l l e r y div
4 a n t i a i r c r a f t a r t i l l e r y regiments
1 morotized engineer brigade
2 motorized engineer bns
1 pontoon bridge b a t t a l i o n
1 s i g n a l regiment
1 a v i a t i o n communications regiment
1 t r a n s p o r t regiment
2 repair/reconstruction b a t t a l i o n s
strength: 50,000 men .
500-650 tanks, SP guns
6 50-850 guns /mortars
ABXEX. C
CORRELATION OF FORCES
BELORUSSIA - JUNE 1944
S OVTET GERMAN
-
1st Baltic F ront (3d Air ~ r m y )( ~ B A F ) .XPanzer Army ( 3 P z ~ )
-
3d ~ e l o r u s s i a hFront ( 1 s t Air Army) (33RF)
5 t h Army ( 5 ~ )
5 t h ~ d Tank
s Army (SGTA) 4 t h Army ( 4 ~ )
1,810 Tks/sPs
-
2d B e l o r u s s i s n F ront ( 4 t h A i r Army) (2~R2)
202,900 men
-
1st B e l o r u s s i a n F r o n t (16th A i r Army-Rt W i n g ; (l3Rlj
(6th Air A m y- L e f t Xi%)
4 8 t h Army (48A)
28th Amy ( 2 8 ~ ) LV AC
9th Tank Corps (9TC) 120,000 men
5th Air F l e e t
Totals
-Two phases:
-Four penetrations:
--1st B a l t i c Front
-Six penetrations:
15 b. Southern 2d Guards
Shock Tank C o q s
Group
llth
Guards
h y ;
31s t h y
Dispositions
3 h y / 53 12 65 80 16 km 5 9TC ;
1st BR 16 taruts/~c;
/km i n f s p t
65 Army/ lGTC
1st BR 24 6 40 65 1 3 hn 5 75;b of per-
sonnel, a&
or^ guns/nor-
t a r s , 4% o f
tanks /AG ' s
13 t a ~ u t s / ~ ~
/ai n f s p t
Notes:
1 i3R/ 18th
55 Army
3. I n t r o d u c t i o n o f 2d Echelons and Xobile Groups o f Armies.