What Is Abstract about the Art of Music?

Author(s): Kendall L. Walton

Source: The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism , Spring, 1988, Vol. 46, No. 3
(Spring, 1988), pp. 351-364
Published by: Wiley on behalf of The American Society for Aesthetics

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/431106

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 KENDALL L. WALTON
What is Abstract About the
Art of Music?
. . .music heard so deeply
That it is not heard at all, but you are the music
While the music lasts....
(T. S. Eliot, "The Dry Salvages")
WHAT IS ABSTRACTION in any of the arts?
"Abstract" works of art are sometimes con-
trasted to "representational" (or "figurative"
or "objective") ones. Even if a degree of
abstraction is compatible with representation,
as in the case of cubism or Monet's late work
from Giverny, for instance, what is entirely
abstract, in at least one sense of the term, is
nonrepresentational.' Let us begin, then,
the rough and ready commonsense distinction
between those arts or works of art that are said
to be "representational" (or "figurative" or
"objective") and those that are said not to be.
In the first category we find most pretwentieth-
century painting and sculpture, virtually all
literature, and, except for a few avant-garde
experiments, all theater and film. Nonrepre-
sentational, "abstract" works include-provi-
sionally at least-most architecture, twentieth-
century "nonobjective" painting and sculpture
as well as much design and ornament from
throughout history, and of course music-
"pure" or "absolute" music, that is. What can
be made of this distinction? Can it be made out
at all?
There is a startling difference between music
and the visual arts-painting in particular-in
their attitudes toward representation and ab-
straction. It can easily seem that music is
naturally, normally abstract, whereas painting
is naturally, normally representational. Repre-
KENDALL L. WALTON is professor of philosophy at the
University of Michigan.
? 1988 The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism
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sentational pictures are a part of nearly every
culture. Even when "graven images" are for-
bidden, the very prohibition recognizes the
naturalness of pictorial representation, the
power of the temptation to be resisted. Abstract
visual design, although no less universal, is
often thought of as "mere" ornament or deco-
ration, implying both a lack of importance and
a lack of centrality. What is ornamental or
decorative typically ornaments or decorates
something else: often a representational design,
as when an ornamented frame surrounds a
picture of a lady or a still life; sometimes a
utilitarian form, as in the case of an ornamented
spoon. Wallpaper designs and other decoration
with
not subservient to something decorated are in
many instances not to be noticed especially or
focused on. Some architectural forms are cen-
ters of visual interest, of course, but even then
the visual experience may be thought of as
subsidiary to, an enhancement of, the life that is
led in that architectural environment. We re-
member how the abstract painters of the early
twentieth century had to fight for the right to
make abstract forms central. "Painting has
always wanted to be real," Frank Stella ob-
served recently, "and by 1600 in Italy it had the
means to do it."2 By "real" Stella means
"illusionistically representational."
No one would say that music has always
wanted to be "real" in this sense. In music,
abstraction is given the highest honors (even
though music-instrumental, "absolute" music
-probably developed largely from speech, by
way of poetry and then song). Blatant program
music is often considered silly or childish.3
Musical depictions of trains, galloping horses,
and the sounds of battle, though not uncom-
mon, have the status of experiments, oddities
outside the mainstream of "serious" music-
making-the more so the more "realistic" they
352 W A L T O N

are-while the most serious mainstream paint- ing apart from their sources more easily than
ers have worked avidly on developing and sights are, as objects of perception on their
refining realistic perspective and modelling own, independent of the bells or trains or
techniques. There are, to be sure, programmatic speech which might be heard by means of them.
elements in "serious" music (Haydn's bird- A sight is nearly always a sight of something, in
calls, the tone-painting in Beethoven's Pastoral our experience; a sound can be just a sound. In
Symphony), but they are typically considered any case, since "absolute" music is so well
irrelevant to its value as music, incidentals established and highly regarded, and also tries
which the listener can safely ignore while con- so hard to keep its distance from representation,
centrating on the "musical" significance of the we will do well to focus our attention on it.
sounds.4 Ultimately of course we would like to under-
Music does have a respectable function in stand abstraction in all of the arts, and indeed
illustrating verbal texts and assisting, reinforc- abstract elements in even the most representa-
ing, representation in other media, as in song, tional works.
opera, dance, and film. Palestrina illustrates the What is "abstract" about (absolute) music,
words "descendit de coelis" with descending and how does it differ from the obviously
melodic lines.5 Trumpets laugh in Bach's Can- representational ("figurative," "objective")
tata Der Himmel lacht, die Erde jubilieret. Flies arts? I will explore three lines of thought: a) that
buzz in Handel's Israel and Egypt. But music music lacks meaning or semantic content, b)
with words or music in the service of a story is that its semantic content is more general than
considered by purists to be something less than that of figurative painting, literature, etc., and
the pinnacle to which music can aspire, music c) that music is somehow not perceptual, or is
in its highest form occurring in, for example, less so than painting and literature are. Only
the classical string quartet literature. Eduard part of the answer, if even that, is to be found in
Hanslick claims that "the rigor with which any of these directions. But considerations
music is subordinated to words is generally in raised in exploring all three will combine to
an inverse ratio to the independent beauty of the suggest a way of understanding music that not
former. "6 only clarifies its "abstract" character, but also
Much abstract visual art is parasitic on the promises to facilitate the daunting task of un-
representational. Perhaps some works are about covering the secret of its power.
representationality; at least their point some-
times consists partly in their departure from the
II.
representational norm. Viewers are expected to
notice the absence of representational content. Do music and other abstract arts lack a
But "absolute" music is not thus beholden to semantic dimension- "meanings," "subject
representational music. It stands on its own. matter," "propositional content' -that is to be
I suspect that this difference, the fact that in found in the representational arts? The works of
music abstraction is so often considered normal Dickens, Vermeer, and Shakespeare refer to
and representation requires justification, while things outside of themselves, they are of or
in painting the reverse is true, has something to about other things, they "say" things about the
do with two significant disanalogies between world, they make "statements," it would seem,
vision and hearing: In the first place, vision is whereas Bach's Art of the Fugue, the Taj Majal,
frequently more effective than hearing as a and Mondrian compositions are "just objects"
means of identifying particulars, as a source of -they just sit there. The trouble with this
de re rather than mere de dicto knowledge. (By negative characterization of abstraction, by it-
listening, the pedestrian about to cross a street self anyway, is that it exacerbates the mystery
can tell that one or more cars are coming, but he of the value of the abstract arts.
may not be able, without looking, to identify Questions about what abstraction is need to
any particular car, or even to determine whether be approached with "why" questions at least in
or not there is more than one. If he looks, he is the backs of our minds: Why is there such a
unlikely not to notice at least one particular thing as abstract art? Why and how do abstract
car.)7 Secondly, sounds are thought of as stand- works appeal to us? Why do we listen to music?

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What is Abstract About the Art of Music? 353

It is not easy to explain the interest and appeal Huxley has one of his characters in Point
of any of the arts. But the values of abstraction Counter Point contend that the slow movement
seem particularly problematic, especially so if it of Beethoven's String Quartet opus 132, the
is understood as the absence of semantic prop- Heiliger Dankgesang, is a proof of the exist-
erties. To be sure, there is a puzzle about why ence of God.
people seem to care about Anna Karenina and We may detect a grain of truth in such claims.
Willy Loman, realizing that they are merely If we were forced to choose between consider-
fictional, and why people find the portrayal of ing the Heiliger Dankgesang a statement (let's
such characters intriguing or entrancing or mov- not say a proof) that God exists, or a statement
ing. But it is obvious that Anna Karenina, that God does not exist, I would expect us to opt
Death of a Salesman, and many other represen- unhesitatingly for the former. But many will
tational works are significantly concerned with reject the choice. Many of us find many or most
topics of great interest to us, even if they do not
attributions of statements to "abstract" works
speak of particular real people and situations.8 of art crude and gratuitous projections of one's
They are, in some sense or other, "about" own preoccupations or hangups onto works of
love, or life, or war and peace, or success and art that are unable to resist only because they are
failure, or ambition, or defeat. This by itself mute. And these attributions are likely to strike
shows where to look for a plausible explanation us as having little to do with what is moving or
of the values of representational art. But if thesatisfying or marvelous about the works. (Does
abstract arts are not about anything, if they have
one have to take the Heiliger Dankgesang to
no subject matter, it is hard to see even how to have anything at all to do with theism, in order
begin going about accounting for their power. If to appreciate it fully?) Claims that the Bel-
Bach fugues and Mondrian compositions are vedere is a "speculation concerning political
just things, patterns of notes or shapes pointingpower" or that the Heiliger Dankgesang states
to nothing beyond themselves, why in the world that God exists are ripe targets for a good
should they interest us at all, let alone send satire. 10
shivers up our spines? There are less crude ways of finding semantic
It is not surprising that some have tried to content in music, of course. Its expressiveness
find semantic properties in music and other is sometimes explained in semantic terms. '
(so-called) abstract art. Assimilating them to What music expresses is usually held to include
the obviously representational arts might seem human emotions, and human emotions certainly
the only way of making explanations of their are important to us. If music is, in some sense
value possible. These attempts have taken var- or other, "about" them, that people listen to
ious forms. The horizontal and vertical ele- music should be no more mysterious or surpris-
ments of Mondrian's paintings have been asso- ing than that they read novels or look at
ciated with horizons and cathedrals. Some have figurative paintings, however much remains to
explicitly attributed "statements" to the most be done to spell out the nature of the interest.
seemingly abstract works. It is easy to point to examples of expressive
music. Much of the vocabulary of human emo-
Like all masterpieces of architecture, [the Rector's
tions is readily applied to music; we speak
palace in Dubrovnik] expresses an opinion about the
activities which are going to be carried on under its
easily of musical passages being joyful, or
roof. Chartes is a speculation concerning the nature of tense, or anguished, or exuberant. What is
God and of holiness. The Belvedere in Vienna is a meant when we speak this way? A familiar first
speculation concerning political power. With its bal- stab is to suggest that music is expressive by
anced treatment of its masses and the suggestion of
virtue of mimicking the behavior by which
fecundity in its springing arches and proliferating
capitals, the Rector's palace puts forward an ideal of an
people express their emotions. There are
ordered and creative society.9 Agitato movements, lilting melodies, driving
rhythms, nervousness and calmness, etc. But
Many have claimed abstract works to be infor- some qualities of music important to its expres-
mative or illuminating, often assuming implic- sive character have no obvious connection with
itly that the illumination is effected by virtue of human expressive behavior. Although the ma-
"meanings" or semantic content. Aldous jor mode is not invariably happy or the minor

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354
invariably sad, mode is by no means expres-
sively inert. Just try changing a melody from
major to minor or vice versa and see what
happens. (There are also the more elaborate
medieval church modes, and Indian ragas.) If
the major mode makes a particular melody
cheerier than it would be otherwise, it is not
easy to argue that it does this by somehow
resembling or recalling cheery behavior. People
don't change from major to minor or from
Phrygian to Lydian when their moods change.
Cats express contentment by purring and
dogs show joy by wagging their tails, though
neither behavior bears any evident similarity to
the ways you and I express these feelings. Just
as there are specifically feline and canine ex-
pressions of feelings, there may be specifically
musical ones. It may take some experience with
a musical tradition to understand its manners of
expression, as it takes familiarity with animals
to detect theirs. But once the connection is
learned, the detection of the emotion, the read-
ing of the expression is as immediate and
automatic as it is in the case of fellow humans.
We might worry now that the assimilation of
abstract art (insofar as it is expressive, anyway) "about" love or ambition or the human condi-
to representational art will be too successful.
Does expressive music simply "represent" oc-
currences of emotions, by "representing" be-
havioral expressions? That is just what repre-
sentational paintings and novels so often do. I
doubt that we are prepared to obliterate com-
pletely the difference between representational
works and abstract but expressive ones, or to
take expression to be simply one variety of
representation. 13
Some hope may be gleaned from the fact that
the expressive range of music, in contrast to
literature and (figurative) painting, appears to
be severely limited in certain directions. Music
can apparently express anguish or ecstasy, but it like that of sounds appreciated in the spirit of
is hard to imagine its expressing envy or guilt
(without the help of text or title or program
notes). Music can be sad or joyful, but hardly
embarrassed or jealous.
III.
Attempts to find connections between music
and the outside world have met strong resis-
tance from some quarters, even derision. That
much music is expressive (whatever exactly this
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W A L T O N
means) may be undeniable. But how important
its expressiveness is, how much it has to do
with the power of music and why we listen to it,
is quite another question. Hanslick's The Beau-
tiful in Music is a tract for the resistance.
In the pure act of listening we enjoy the music alone
and do not think of importing into it any extraneous
matter. 14
To the question: What is to be expressed with . . .
[euphony, rhythm, melody, harmony, etc.]? the answer
will be: "Musical ideas." Now, a musical idea . . . is
. . . an end in itself, and not a means for representing
feelings and thoughts.'
That there is something to such purist atti-
tudes is suggested by this comparison: Chess
moves and chess games can be marvelous,
beautiful, elegant. So can proofs in logic and
mathematics; so can scientific theories. But it
seems strained, to say the least, to attribute
these aesthetic qualities to "expressiveness,"
and downright implausible to suppose that they
consist in the expression of human emotions. A
chess game or a proof is not beautiful because it
12 joy or anguish or determination or
expresses
resignation, nor because it is in some sense
tion, let alone because it represents, say "fate
knocking on the door." If this is so there would
seem to be a kind of aesthetic value which is not
to be explained in terms of subject matter, one
which might be important in music. When a
surprising but elegant modulation or the en-
trance of a fugue subject sends shivers up our
spines, we needn't assume that the shivers arise
because joy or futility or whatever is somehow
expressed, let alone because anything is repre-
sented. (For that matter, the appeal of Italian
cuisine seems hardly to lie in its "expres-
siveness" any more than in the "statements" it
makes. But this appeal would seem to be more
John Cage than that of Bach's The Art of the
Fugue.)
Hanslick's purism is not pure. He allows
metaphorical descriptions of music ("flight,"
"reapproach," "increasing and diminishing
strength' p16), which arguably point to important
links between music and the outside world.
Metaphors can easily occupy a great deal of our
discourse about music, if we let them. We speak
of "ascending" and "descending" motives,
"thick" and "thin" textures, "strain" and
What is Abstract About the Art of Music? 355

What I should like to write is a book about nothing, a

"repose," "conflict" and "concord," "move-
book dependent upon nothing external, which would be
ment," "return," "destinations," "renewal,"
held together by the internal strength of its style, just as
"soaring" and "whispering" melodies, "throb- the earth, suspended in the void, depends upon nothing
bing" rhythms, etc. This will be of little con- external for its support: a book which would have
sequence if the metaphors are no more than almost no subject, or at least in which the subject would
ways of speaking, colorful means of describing be invisible, if such a thing is possible.22
music's formal or acoustic properties. 17 But It is as though the very remoteness from our
lives of abstract elements in works of art, which
they may well be essential,'8 immortal. What is
said when one speaks of ascent or descent or is what makes their power so hard to explain, is
movement or destinations in music may neces- at the same time the source of their power!23
sarily involve reference to spatial phenomena. It is too soon to conclude that music and other
If it does, this fact will be welcomed by those abstract arts lack significant links to matters of
who hope to find a subject matter for music. nonmusical import, however. Music may con-
More than a few recent music theorists at- nect with our lives in ways which, though
tempt to do Hanslick one better and avoid even profoundly important, are less direct and less
metaphors. Heinrich Schenker tended to shun obvious than the examples of representational
words entirely in his musical analyses, prefer- painting and literature and even straightfor-
ring diagrams that combine musical notation wardly expressive works lead us to expect. The
and his own symbols.'9 The most pure concep-evident futility, even the foolishness of attempts
tion of music has it consisting of nothing but to say what a piece like The Art of the Fugue
sounds and relations among them: musical mo- "means" or what it is "about" does not close
tives and their elaborations, suspensions, inver- the door on the idea that it does have meanings
sions, strettos, modulations, recapitulations, or a subject matter, and that they contribute
Ursdtze, tone rows, etc. -all of this existing forsignificantly to its beauty. Could it just be that
its own sake and appreciated without reference there is no saying, that language is simply
to anything else. inadequate to convey music's semantic proper-
Purists tend to have a deep reverence for ties or how it relates to our lives?24 This of
music. Their feeling seems to be that to attributecourse is the familiar idea that music is
programs or emotional qualities or thoughts "ineffable. " 25
(except "purely musical" ones) to music is to Substantiating this thought is a daunting task.
trivialize it, to cheapen it, to insult it. Semantic
How are we to establish that music does have
content doesn't do justice to the exceptional meanings (or whatever) if we can't specify what
profundity of musical values. But in rejecting they are? And why should we be unable to
semantic content they are rejecting what can express them verbally? Satisfactory answers to
easily seem the most promising, even the only these questions are a long way off, but I will
promising route to an explanation of musical venture a start on the second one. If we can
value. understand how it might be that musical mean-
The deepest values in painting and even ings are inexpressible in language we will have
literature, as well as music, are sometimes held deflected the challenge to come up with them.
to be those which have least to do with repre- And we will have boosted the credibility of the
sentational content or other semantic properties. idea that our halting attempts to say, by the use
This may be the point of Pater's claim that all of metaphors, for instance, what musical works
arts aspire after the condition of music. Paint- mean might sometimes point at least in the right
ing, though it may be more naturally represen- general direction, notwithstanding their evident
tational than music has had its purists: Clive inadequacy and the apparent impossibility of
Bell held that representational elements in the doing better.
visual arts are irrelevant aesthetically, that only The ineffability of musical meanings, if it
"significant form" matters.2" Similar sugges- can be made out, will do much to accommodate
tions have been made even about literature, the intuition that there are none and to explain
which can scarcely avoid representationality. how music is "abstract," while the presence in
[T]he genuine writer has nothing to say. He has music of meanings at all, however ineffable,
only a way of speaking.21 takes the edge off the mystery of our interest in

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356
it. But notions of "abstraction" other than that
of lacking or appearing to lack semantic content
come into play as well, ones which will turn out
to be importantly related to ineffability. Let's
look at what else might be meant by calling
music "abstract."
IV.
Abstraction, in one sense, is generality.
Rather than lacking semantic content, perhaps
abstract works of art have content that is in
some way especially general. There are two
possibilities here. It may be that musical works
are like predicates ("house," "building") that
apply to many different things, whereas paint-
ing and literature are analogous to proper names
denoting individuals (or to statements contain-
ing proper names). Or music may be merely
more general than the obviously representa-
tional arts are, in the way that "building" is
more general than "house." We will consider
the second alternative first.
Hanslick urges that music cannot portray
definite (specific) emotions, but allows that it
can express "indefinite" ones. His point, elab-
orated a little, seems to be that emotions have
two aspects. They have a cognitive component:
thoughts or judgments or evaluations or beliefs
or attitudes. "The feeling of hope [for instance]
is inseparable from the conception of a happier
state which is to come. "26 They also involve a
"dynamic element," "psychical motion,"27
what we might call feelings or sensations (un-
derstood not to have intentional objects). Music
is incapable of capturing the cognitive ele-
ments, but it can portray the "psychical
motion"; it can express "intensity, waxing and
diminishing, hastening and lingering. "28
Different emotions can have the same
"psychical motions." Anger and fear might (in
one sense of the term) "feel" alike; what
distinguishes them is their cognitive content:
anger involves a desire to harm something and
perhaps the thought that one has been wronged,
whereas fear involves the thought that one is in
danger.29 So music can't distinguish between
them. It can't express anger, specifically, as
contrasted to fear. But it might portray what
fear and anger have in common, a less specific
state of feeling of which both are instances.
Similarly, music can't distinguish between love,
longing, and religious fervor (not without a title
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WALTON
or a text or program notes), or between piety
and eroticism,30 but it may express more gen-
eral "ideas" from which cognitive elements
have been abstracted.31
Music may be unable even to differentiate
emotions from physical events. There may be
no telling whether a given musical passage
expresses fury or a forest fire.32 Nonetheless, if
it expresses (represents, portrays, depicts)
something of which both are-instances, it does
apparently have semantic content, a subject
matter-a very general one at least.
The resistance many of us feel to claims that
a piece of music is about this or that weakens
the more abstract, the more general the pur-
ported semantic content is. It may be gratu-
itous, presumptuous, "unmusical" to suggest
that a sonata (apart from title or text) is about
the Trojan war, or even about warfare. But it
seems less so to suggest that it is about struggle
in general, struggle in a sense that includes
political as well as military struggles, legal
battles and business competition, personality
clashes, struggles against poverty and for dig-
nity, struggles between one's own desires and
one's better judgment, and so on as far as the
imagination can see. (Even if this judgment
about the subject matter of the sonata is not
rejected as automatically as a more specific one
would be, however, it is hard to see how one
might demonstrate that it is true or plausible,
and even how one might become convinced of
it oneself. Part of the problem may be that we
have a very weak grasp of the relevant broad
notion of struggle.) It may be silly to read into
a recapitulation the thought of someone's re-
turning to the home of his parents, but less silly
to regard it as expressing a very general notion
of returning, of which not only returns to one's
home but also returns to health, to the scene of
a crime, to one's former convictions, and who
knows what else are instances.
The point here is not that music and other
"abstract" arts are concerned with such gener-
alities whereas the representational arts are not.
Novels and figurative paintings may ultimately
treat notions of equal generality.33 The differ-
ence presumably is that they present them by
illustrating them, by representing instances of
them. A novel may present the abstract notion
of struggle by portraying Napoleon's struggles,
whereas music may present that notion more
What is Abstract About the Art of Music? 357

directly.34 But in some cases music or a passage Here is a story of great generality, one which
in music may present a very general concept by abstracts from an enormous number of specif-
being, not representing, an instance of it. A ics:
recapitulation may itself be one example of the
Once upon a time there was a person.
general notion of returning. The recapitulation,
The End.
a "purely musical" event, may on the surface
at least appear to be the main focus of the It is "about" personhood, I suppose. All of us
listener's interest, as Napoleon's invasion of have a considerable interest in people, in certain
Russia may appear the main focus of War and people and in certain particular aspects of them;
Peace. This may be the element of truth in no doubt this is true of everyone in every culture
Hanslick's claim that the ideas expressed by and every age since the beginning of time. But
music are "purely musical" whereas the ideas the story I just recited is notable for its excru-
expressed by language are thoughts "distinct ciating lack of interest. It is vapid. It doesn't
from its medium."35 speak to our specific concerns with particular
The generality of the semantic content of people at all; it doesn't connect with our lives.
music and other arts might at first seem a greatIt is guaranteed to flunk the test of time (unless
virtue, allowing a work to speak to many the Guinness Book of Records immortalizes it
different interests and concerns. One person as the dullest story ever told). We want to hear
might be interested in Napoleon's military more. We want details. "Once upon a time
struggles, another who doesn't care beans about there was a person who..
that may be immersed in family power strug- Or consider a theatrical event which abstracts
gles, a third may be preoccupied with the from the "cognitive" aspects of its characters'
conflict between his desire to succeed and his emotions, their thoughts (broadly speaking),
natural laziness, someone else may have on his and represents only the "dynamic element,"
mind the tensions aroused by someone who "psychic motions"; so no "definite" emotions
both attracts and repels him. A piece of music are portrayed. The actors laugh and cry, they
which is "about" struggle in general, which scream, moan, and giggle, frown and smile,
abstracts from what is unique to any particular stiffen and relax. But there is no indication of
struggle, would seem to have something to say the characters' thoughts, no hint of their beliefs
to each of them. One might expect such a piece or desires or hopes or expectations. The audi-
to get high marks on the test of time for ence can only speculate about why they laugh
aesthetic greatness. It ought to appeal to differ- and cry and frown and smile. I don't dare say
ent ages, different cultures, people with differ- that such an event would be of no interest; if I
ent interests and preoccupations, to anyone who did someone would stage it and somehow make
is concerned with "struggles" of any sort. It it interesting (perhaps as an instance of theater
ought to outlive works dealing specifically with of the absurd?). But the idea is hardly promis-
one kind of struggle, which will likely be ing. (And it is almost certain that such theater
forgotten when circumstances or interests would not be interesting or thrilling or satisfy-
change. Do we now have the key to understand- ing in anything like the way Bach's Art of the
ing the special aesthetic profundity some find in Fugue is.) Again, we want details; we want to
abstraction? see the emotions in context, to understand what
If we do, we are a long way from opening the they are about and why they are felt.36
lock with it. If struggles of a certain sort are Is it even true that musical portrayals are
important to me, or a particular instance of especially general? Certainly music and other
returning is, it is not clear why I should be nonrepresentational works have no monopoly
interested in the notion of struggle or of return- on generality. A stick figure of a person drawn
ing in general. Probably I already realize per- in black ink probably abstracts from anorexia
fectly well that the object of my immediate and obesity, from color, race, sex, mood, type
interest is a struggle, or a return. What I want to of clothing, etc. The person in the picture may
understand, probably, is its particular nature, be sitting or standing, or running, but if the
the specific kind of struggle or return it is. Isn't sketch is sufficiently stylized it may abstract
generality just vacuity? from any particular manner of running or

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358 W A L T O N

sitting. It may be almost as unspecific as the "struggle" or "return" even in its extended
phrase, "a sitting person." Much of the serious sense may correspond only approximately to
representational art we think of as (partially) the properties expressed by a piece or passage
"abstract" is general in this way, if not to this of music.) One writer finds the apparent con-
extent. (A cubist portrait in which a rectangular tradiction "gay melancholy" the best he can do
shape represents the sitter's head doesn't in describing the character of the alla tedesca
thereby depict the sitter as having a rectangular movement of Beethoven's B-flat Quartet.
head; it is simply very unspecific about the "Both elements are present, not as contrasting,
shape of his head.) but strangely unified in one haunting phrase. "38
I will suggest later that music does present So music organizes things differently from
cognitive elements of the emotions it expresses how language does; its categories cut across
(though in a manner very different from those inthose of English. This supports the claims of the
which painting and literature most obviously ineffability of music, of the impossibility of
do, and though the cognitive elements it capturing what it expresses in words.39 But it is
presents may be importantly different). But only a small part of the story, as we will see.
even if it doesn't, the difference between music
V.
and the representational arts is hardly one of
degree of generality. Music may well express "Abstract" things are sometimes contrasted
the "dynamics" of emotions with extreme to objects of perception; we see and hear what is
specificity, in much more detail than can be "concrete," but we conceive or apprehend
done easily or at all in painting or literature. "with the mind" what is "abstract." Music
Music may not be able to distinguish between and painting are usually thought of as percep-
fury and fear, but it may portray very precisely tual arts, one aural and the other visual, in
the nature of certain (nonintentional) feelings or contrast to literature (and, for that matter, to the
sensations one might have when one is either "conceptual" art of the 1960s and 1970s). But
furious or afraid. Perhaps a particular recapitu- there is a sense in which music is less an aural
lation captures a specific manner of returning in art than (figurative) painting is a visual one.
great detail, one which might characterize a This comes out most obviously in the fact that
return to Athens and a return to health and a when music is representational or illustrative it
return to earlier convictions.'3 The difference often does not represent sounds, whereas rep-
between music and the representational arts resentational painting seems always to represent
may lie less in the degree of generality of their sights.40 Patience, which Handel illustrates in
semantic properties than in the respects in Belshazzar by means of long notes, is not an
which they are general and the respects in which aural phenomenon, nor are instances of pa-
they are specific. tience. Bach illustrates the words "I follow
It seems also that the properties which music Christ" with a canon in his Cantata 12, Weinen,
is able to portay are often ones for which we Klagen, Sorgen Zagen, one voice imitating
have no words. The English language groups all another. Ascents and descents are often por-
of the various sorts of "anger" together, and trayed in the obvious way.
separates them from cases of fear and from Pictures can represent nonvisual phenomena,
forest fires. It less easily expresses sensations of course. Rudolf Arnheim pointed out that in
which some cases of fear and some cases of Sternberg's silent film, The Docks of New York,
anger may have in common, especially very the report of a revolver is indicated by the rising
specific ones ("agitated" or "upset" might of a flock of birds.4' Odors can be represented
express unspecific ones), and less easily still by depicting wrinkled noses. But it is by means
captures what they share with forest fires. of depicting sights in these cases, the looks of
"Struggle" and "return" may strike one as things, that sounds and smells are portrayed. It
puns when applied as broadly as I have sug- is because we see the birds suddenly take flight
gested. Music might serve to show us what that we know the sound of a shot has occurred.
certain instances of returning from a trip, re- But musical portrayals needn't involve the por-
turning to health, returning to previous convic- trayal of sounds at all. It is not by representing
tions, etc., have in common. (And of course any sounds that long notes indicate patience, or

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What is Abstract About the Art of Music? 359

an ascending melodic line someone's rising into
heaven.
I believe that this difference is tremendously
important. When we look at a picture we
imagine ourselves taking in the sights that it
depicts. On viewing a painting of a wheat field
one imagines seeing a wheat field. One also
imagines, I claim, that looking at the picture, is
an instance of seeing a wheat field.42 Represen-
tational music frequently involves no such
imagined perceiving. I don't imagine myself
hearing patience or anyone's being patient or
anything else, when I hear the long notes of
Belshazzar and understand them to portray
patience. Still less do I imagine of my hearing
of the music that it is a case of hearing anything
having to do with patience. To listen to music,
even representational music, is not, in general,
to be perceptually involved with what is repre-
sented. In paintings and other visual represen-
tations there are fictional worlds to which we
have perceptual access. Sometimes we are in-
cluded in the world in a special way, as when
Caravaggio's Bacchus offers the viewer a glass
of wine, or a character in a play asks the
audience's advice. Insofar as music is not
perceptual, we don't have this access to a
fictional world, and we can't expect to be
included in that special way. The listener's
relation to what is represented or portrayed
would seem often to be fundamentally non-
perceptual, in this sense, and thus fundamen-
tally different from the viewer's relation to whatily consciously, and certainly not deliberately)
a picture depicts. In fact, this nonperceptual
character of musical portrayals may connect
with what is meant by those who describe music
as "ethereal," "incorporeal," "disembodied"
(or "unembodied"?), and with suggestions that
music (music like Bach's Art of the Fugue,
anyway) is "introspective," "cerebral,"
"conceptual."
It goes nicely, also, with the idea that music ine this of our actual introspective awareness of
involves generality in a way that painting does
not, if we put it together with the suggestion bycan be said to "portray particulars" in the sense
several recent philosophers that all identifica-
tion of individual things is at bottom demon-
strative, indexical, and hence(?) perceptual43-
the idea is not that music is more general than
painting, but that it is general in something like particular sensations of well-being, etc., as in
the way all predicates are, whereas painting,
like proper names, involve something more like
reference to particulars.
Even the sketchiest stick figure drawing is in
one sense a picture of a particular person, an
individual.4' Viewers imagine themselves see-
ing and identifying some one individual person,
even if the picture indicates very little about
how he or she differs from other people. It may
be that, when music does not induce imagina-
tive perception, it presents only concepts, prop-
erties, universals (even if not very general
ones), not particular things. Music may portray
the notion of patience, or ascent, or struggle, or
return, but not particular instances of some-
one's being patient or ascending or struggling
or returning.
It may seem puzzling, however, how a mu-
sical passage can get connected to the notion of
patience or struggle or whatever in the abstract,
without somehow portraying a particular (pos-
sibly fictitious) instance. I will suggest shortly
how this can be.
VI.
I propose that, although music does not in
general call for imaginative hearing or imagina-
tive perceiving, it often does call for imagina-
tive introspecting. We mentioned the possibility
that music is expressive by virtue of imitating
behavioral expressions of feeling. Sometimes
this is so, and sometimes a passage imitates or
portrays vocal expressions of feelings. When it
does, listeners probably imagine (not necessar-
themselves hearing someone's vocal expres-
sions.45 But in other cases they may, instead,
imagine themselves introspecting, being aware
of their own feelings. Hearing sounds may
differ too much from introspecting for us com-
fortably to imagine of our hearing the music
that it is an experience of being aware of our
states of mind. My suggestion is that we imag-
auditory sensations.46 If so, the music probably
that figurative paintings do, rather than simply
properties or concepts. Presumably the listener
imagines experiencing and identifying particu-
lar stabs of pain, particular feelings of ecstasy,
viewing a painting one imagines seeing partic-
ular things. But introspection is different
enough from "external" perception to make

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360 W A L T O N

music, understood in this way, differ very sion is what he says it is-metaphorical exem-
substantially from painting. For a start, there is plification;49 virtually any property might be
the important fact that one introspects one's metaphorically exemplified. But it seems to me
own psychological states, while one sees and that music does not express color or fragility or
hears the expression of the psychological states angularity or weight in the same direct way that
of other people. There is also the fact that the it expresses anguish or joy or elation or despair
results of introspection seem immune from (or anyway the "dynamic elements" of some
error in ways in which the results of external such feelings). (This point is obscured by pred-
perception are not. We have here a start toward icates such as "strength," "struggle," and
developing the thought, expressed aphoristi- "heavy," which metaphorically characterize
cally by Carroll Pratt, that "music sounds as psychological states though their primary appli-
feelings feel."" cation is elsewhere. The fact that a work can
We may also have stumbled upon some express "strength" or "heaviness" need not
insight into evocation theories of expression. conflict with the idea that expression is preem-
There is a persistent tendency to regard expres- inently or even exclusively of psychological
sive works of art (musical or otherwise) as ones states.)
which arouse in appreciators feelings of the Even if expression (in one sense) is a matter
kind expressed. A lot of argument has been of imaginative self- awareness, however, music
directed against this thesis, but it dies hard. On
may present, let us say (express indirectly, or in
the present suggestion expressive works don't a different sense?), nonpsychological properties
actually arouse feelings but they do induce the or concepts-ones akin to that of returning or a
appreciator to imagine himself experiencing certain manner of returning, or struggling, or
them. That is close enough to cause confusion, power, or achievement. What the listener imag-
and to explain the appeal of evocation theories. ines being introspectively aware of may be an
Notice that there is hardly any temptation to impression of or a feeling about (the relevant
understand the representation of emotions in variety of something like) returning or strug-
terms of evocation. If anything counts as rep- gling or power, a phenomenological response
resenting anguish it is, I presume, representing or reaction to it, a way of experiencing or
a character (in a picture, or a novel, or what- understanding it. He is thus imaginatively aware
ever) as being anguished. That involves induc- not just of "psychical motions," the "dynamic
ing the appreciator to imagine that someone elseelements" of emotions, but of "cognitive
feels anguish (perhaps, but not necessarily, by elements" as well, objects toward which the
inducing the appreciator to imagine seeing an feelings are directed. These objects are not
anguished expression on his face, or hearing presented independently of the feelings about
him express his anguish verbally, or hearing a them, however. My suggestion is not that the
third person describe his anguish). Imagining music portrays an objective event or circum-
that can hardly be confused with feeling an- stance, and then induces the listener to imagine
guish oneself.48 This gives us a sharp contrast responding to it in a certain manner; it just
between the representation and the expression induces the listener to imagine the experience of
of emotions. responding to an object of a certain sort. We
To the extent that expression consists in might say that the music conveys "subjective
inducing imaginative awareness of one's feel- aspects" of objective phenomena.
ings, we also have an explanation of the fact Does one imagine knowing about and re-
that feelings (emotions, moods, "inner" states sponding to a specific (possibly fictitious) in-
of one sort or another) are so often taken to be stance of struggling or returning? Perhaps. If
the sole or the primary objects of expression. so, this need not involve imagining anything
Goodman is an exception. He speaks of the about how one knows about it. The listener is
expression of color, sounds, weight, fragility, likely not to imagine hearing or perceiving a
movement, and being a glue factory no less struggle, for example, or being told of one, or
readily than of the expression of feelings; for having perceived or been told about one previ-
him there is nothing especially psychological ously. The world of his imagination is likely to
be indeterminate with respect to the means by
about expression. Certainly he is right if expres-

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What is Abstract About the Art of Music? 361

which he is aware of the (imaginary) struggle. abstract from any specific mode of awareness,
The focus is on other aspects of it. including first- and third-person perspectives as
This means that musical portrayals can lack well as perceptual and other means of episte-
points of view of kinds common in the repre- mological access. And music may fail to differ-
sentational arts. Paintings, typically if not inev-entiate between properties and their instances.
itably, depict things as perceived from a certain These abstractions are, in varying degrees,
angle and distance or in certain conditions; awkward or difficult or impossible to capture in
novels present events as reported or described language, and they are foreign to much of what
in a certain manner by a person of a certain sort we call "thinking." When we have in mind a
(the narrator).50 But music may portray a strug-particular return or struggle we usually have
gle or a return or an ascension without portray- some idea how we are aware of it. (One may
ing it in any such manner. have forgotten the source of one's awareness of
An even more basic point of view may be a struggle long past, but insofar as a musical
absent as well. It may be indeterminate whether passage can be said to portray a particular
or not the imaginary instance is one in which struggle it would seem to portray a present
one participates oneself. Does the listener imag- instance, a struggle occurring now.55) Although
ine himself returning or struggling or does he in English one can easily refer to things without
imagine someone (or something) else doing so? specifying how one knows about them, whether
I, for one, find it impossible to say, even when by perceptual experience or hearsay or what, I
it seems to me reasonably clear that a passage understand that this is not so in some languages.
does portray a particular instance of returning It oris not easy in English to avoid having to
struggling and that my experience involves choose between first- and third-person construc-
imagining such an instance. I imagine some- tion.56 One is very unlikely to be unsure
one's struggle or return and my having certain whether a given struggler or returnee is oneself
impressions of it or responding to it in a certain or another (especially if the struggle is a pres-
manner, but I imagine neither that I am the one ently occurring one), and it is hard to conceive
struggling or returning, nor that I am not.51 of thinking of someone in a way which is
Then again, what the listener imagines may neither first- nor third-person. (One can de-
not be a particular instance. He may imagine scribe and think of oneself in a third-person
simply having an impression or conception of a manner, even if one realizes that it is oneself.)
kind of returning or struggling (or power or There is no simple way to refer to something as,
achievement).52 It is even more likely, I think, indifferently, either a given property or an
that there will be no answer to the question instance of it. (There are ambiguities, but that is
whether what one imagines is a particular in- different.) I don't know what it would be like to
stance or merely a kind. One may imagine be aware of and to reflect introspectively on an
having an impression of "struggle" without impression of something which is either a
imagining either that one's impression is of a particular struggle or merely the thought or
particular struggle or that it is not. Much the notion of struggle in general, without knowing
same feeling (a subjective sense of the which it iS.57
"dynamics" of struggle) might accompany ei- We noted earlier that the properties which
ther an awareness of a particular actual strugglemusic expresses (or which figure in one way or
or merely the thought of (a certain sort of) another in its "meanings") are likely not to be
struggle in general.53 The music may capture easily accessible by verbal means. The notion
this impression without being specific about its which a musical passage presents to listeners is
source. probably not exactly that of struggle or of
return, perhaps not even approximately that,
VII. but rather something more general or less gen-
eral or both. We now see that the ineffability of
We have uncovered grounds for recognizing musical "meanings," the "incommensura-
new and surprising dimensions of generality in bility"of music and (verbal) languages, may go
"musical meanings.' 'S The musical portrayal much deeper than this. It is not surprising that
of an awareness of an individual thing may any (verbal) suggestions one might come up

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 362 WALTON

with about what music "means" seem, so
often, to be ludicrously inadequate. And if one
cannot come even close to saying what the
semantic content of a musical passage is, we
can surely understand the powerful (even if
Drawing an Object," in On Art and the Mind [Harvard
University Press, 1974], ??24, 25). "Representational" as
understood here can be taken to be an approximate equiv-
alent of his "figurative."
2 Frank Stella, Working Space (Harvard University
Press, 1986), p. 40.

mistaken) impression that it has none. 3 Even by Tovey, who, as writers on music go, is
hardly a purist. See Donald Francis Tovey, "Programme
I have not claimed, as some have, that music
Music," in The Forms of Music (Cleveland, 1956), p. 168.
has "meanings" of a sort no possible "discur- 4"Not a bar of the 'Pastoral' Symphony would be
sive" language could express; establishing this otherwise if its 'program' had never been thought of"
would require a very fancy argument. But the (Tovey, "Programme Music," p. 168).
5In the Credo of Missa Papae Marcelli. I owe this and
fact that important aspects of the semantic
several of my other examples of representational music to
content of music are in fact inexpressible in the Peter Kivy's Sound and Semblance: Reflections on Musical
actual languages familiar to listeners (or even Representation (Princeton University Press, 1984).
just that they are thus expressible only with 6 The Beautiful in Music, ed. and trans. Gustav Cohen
(New York, 1957), p. 40.
great difficulty) promises to be significant
7 This accords nicely with the suggestion I will offer
enough. Music may be a vehicle of thought in shortly that music has a tendency to express properties-
whatever sense (verbal) languages are, but one universals rather than particulars.
which encourages a very different mode of 8 It is not obvious that depictions of ordinary still lives
thinking. To the extent that what we "think in" and mundane landscapes are, however.
I Rebecca West, Black Lamb and Golden Falcon
music is unthinkable otherwise, the listener
(London, 1967), p. 235.
feels in a different realm, a different world- 10 Such as this review of an Italian restaurant in the
one that is "purely musical" in the sense that itNew Yorker:
is accessible to him only through music.
Pasta as an expression of Italian Neo-Realistic starch is
But only in this sense, if music does make
well understood by Mario Spinelli, the chef at
reference to extra-musical realities-to (dare Fabrizio's.... His fettuccine, though wry and puckish
we try to say?) unnamable feelings or the in an almost mischievous way, owes a lot to Barzino,
"dynamics" of emotions, or awarenesses of, whose use of fettuccine as an instrument of social
change is known to us all .... I began my meal with an
indeterminately, one's own or another's return,
antipasto, which at first appeared aimless, but as I
or something vaguely like the property of being focussed more on the anchovies the point of it became
a conflict, or something which is either that clearer. Was Spinelli trying to say that all life was
property or an instance of it. Such references, represented here in this antipasto, with the black olives
an unbearable reminder of mortality? If so, where was
however indescribable, may be part of the
the celery? Was the omission deliberate? At Jacobelli's,
secret of the power music has over us. It may be
the antipasto consists solely of celery. But Jacobelli is
impossible to say which matters of interest a an extremist. He wants to call our attention to the
particular passage or piece is "about" and what absurdity of life.
it "says" about them. Perhaps we cannot hope Who can forget his scam
arranged in a way that s
to explain specifically how and why a particular
in Vietnam than countless books on the subject? . . .
passage or piece is powerful. But now that we One lovely touch at Fabrizio's is Spinelli's Boneless
understand better how it might be that music Chicken Parmigiana. The title is ironic, for he has filled
treats of things that matter to us in ways that are the chicken with extra bones, as if to say life must not
be ingested too quickly or without caution. The con-
beyond description, the fact that music affects
stant removal of bones from the mouth and the depos-
us deeply while seeming so remote from our iting of them on the plate give the meal an eerie sound.
lives should be less a mystery. Much remains to One is reminded at once of Webern, who seems to crop
be done in explaining music's power, of course. up all the time in Spinelli's cooking. . . For desert,
But if these suggestions are on the right track we had tortoni, and I was reminded of Leibniz's
remarkable pronouncement: "The Monads have no
we needn't be any more astonished by its power
windows." How apropos!
than by that of the obviously representational
arts. We now know where to look for an (Woody Allen, "Fabrizio's: Criticism and Response,"
The New Yorker, 5 February 1979.)
explanation.
11 Deryck Cooke in The Language of Music (Oxford
I Richard Wollheim considers virtually all visual art University Press, 1959) attempts to discover a vocabulary
"representational," but distinguishes that which is of musical elements, each with its own expressive meaning.
"figurative" from that which is not (Wollheim, "On In Chapter 2 of Languages of Art (Indianapolis, 1968)

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 What is Abstract About the Art of Music? 363

Nelson Goodman holds that expressive works refer to Revolution is. ... It is about love, loyalty, and self-
properties (or rather predicates). sacrifice among human beings pungently observed, . . .
12 A more radical suggestion is that there are specifi- [T]he more a novel's main interest is in the time and place
cally feline, canine, and musical emotions, not just ways of it's about, the less likely it is to be a significant work of
expressing them, and that "contentment" in cats and literature in its own right . ." (Barth, pp. 188, 190).
"cheerfulness" in music are not the same properties that 3 Cf. Schopenhauer I, Book 3, ?52. I resist the
these terms describe in people. But if this is so, why are we temptation to proclaim Schopenhauer a precursor of the
interested in musical cheerfulness; what does it have to do proposals about music I will sketch, even though one can
with us? divine in a careful selection of his remarks a certain
13 The phrase "'abstract expressionism" suggests that similarity of spirit. The vagueness of the selected passages
expressiveness (of one sort anyway) is sharply distinct from allows for construals significantly incompatible with my
representation. Beethoven spoke of expression in contrast to suggestions, and I have little sympathy for the metaphysics
sound-painting ("mehr Ausdruck der Empfindung als in which Schopenhauer's views on music are embedded. I
Malerei") in his note to the Pastoral Symphony. (Quoted in can accept the support of the fact that his views seem to
Tovey, p. 169.) derive from initial intuitions similar to those that motivate
14 Hanslick, pp. 11-12. mine, but nothing more.
'5 Ibid, p. 48. See also Edmund Gurney, The Power of 3 Hanslick, p. 23. Cf. also p. 67.
Sound (London, 1880). 36 Hanslick doesn't think that the "indefinite" emo-
16 Hanslick, pp. 47, 48. tions that music expresses are responsible for its power.
17 Ibid, p. 53. "These abstract notions . . . are by no means the subject
18 Cf. Roger Scruton, "Understanding Music," in The matter of the pictures or the musical compositions . . ." (p.
Aesthetic Understanding (London, 1983), p. 85. 23). "The function of art consists in individualizing, in
19 "Music as expounded by Schenker is . . . con- evolving the definite out of the indefinite, the particular out
cerned . . . only with the internal relationship of musical of the general" (p. 38). I do think that generality is
elements. Music is structure. Musical discourse must be important, however, in ways which tie up with the prefer-
purely musical" (Joseph Kerman, "Analysis, Theory, and ence for elegance and simplicity in scientific theories.
New Music," in Contemplating Music [Harvard University 37 Mendelssohn claimed that music has more definite
Press, 1985], pp. 74-75). meanings than words do (Tovey, "The Meaning of Music,"
20 Clive Bell, Art (London, 1914). There is also, more in The Main Stream of Music and Other Essays [Cleveland,
recently, Clement Greenberg's objections to repre- 1959J p. 397). Cf. Schopenhauer 1: 259. I disagree sharply
sentationality. here with Malcolm Budd's claim that "emotions can be
21 Alain Robbe-Grillet, quoted in John Barth, The fully revealed by the use of language" (Music and the
Friday Book: Essays and Other Nonfiction (New York, Emotions [London, 1985], p. 137).
1984), p. 191. No source given. 38 J. W. N. Sullivan, Beethoven: His Spiritual Devel-
22 Gustav Flaubert, in a letter to his mistress, Louise
opment (New York, 1960), pp. 151-52.
Collet. Quoted by Arthur Danto in The Philosophical 39 It also suggests another line of thought which I will
Disenfranchisement of Art (Columbia University Press, not pursue now: that music treats not only particular
1986), pp. 148-49. concepts, a particular way of organizing experience, but the
23 Hanslick seems to consider the appeal of music tovery be process of organizing and reorganizing it, the process
inexplicable. Cf. pp. 15, 28, 50, 51, 52, 57, 67. of adopting systems of classification and replacing one with
24 I set aside the question of what sorts of connections
another, of reconceptualizing things, of adjusting one's
between music and matters of nonmusical interest count as "conceptual scheme." (The comparison with the beauties
semantic ones. of chess can be understood to point in this direction.) There
25 See for example Schopenhauer and, more explicitly, are in music constant reorganizations and reclassifications
Suzanne Langer. and reconceptualizations of musical materials: thematic
26 Hanslick, p. 21. ideas, rhythmic motives, harmonic progressions, and for-
27 Ibid, p. 37.
mal structures are combined, fragmented, recombined,
28 Schopenhauer claims something like this also,made but to look like or unlike others, placed in new contexts,
less clearly than Hanslick does. See The World As Will and etc. (This occurs subtly and subliminally in even very
Representation I: 261-62; II: 449-50. simple melodies, as well as explicitly in, for example, the
29 The constituent judgment is what "transforms an development sections of complex sonata forms.) Listening,
indefinite feeling into a definite one" (Hanslick, p. 21). then, is perhaps an exercise in the techniques by which we
30 Ibid, pp. 29, 35. reconceptualize our extrainusical experience-whether in
31 "It is a peculiar fact that some musical forms seem the development of scientific theories or in everyday
to bear a sad and a happy interpretation equally well.... thought. This may constitute a less direct connection with
what music can actually reflect is only the morphology ofour lives than would the treatment in music of notions of
feeling; and it is quite plausible that some sad and some struggle or achievement or return, but surely not a less
happy conditions may have a very similar morphology" important one. (It may or may not be understood in
(Suzanne K. Langer, Philosophy in a New Key, 3rd ed. semantic terms.)
[Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1971], p. 238). ' Kivy (p. 40 ff.) points out that musical representa-
32 Cf. Scruton, p. 66. tion is not always of the "sounds-like" variety. Cf. also
33 "A Tale of Two Cities is not about the French Scruton, pp. 67-68. Neither seems to me to accord suffi-
Revolution in the way that Carlyle's History of the French cient importance to this fact.

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 364 W A
4' In Film as Art (University of California Press,
1966), p. 34.
42 Cf. Kendall Walton, "Pictures and Make-Believe,"
in William Kennick, Art and Philosophy, 2nd ed. (New
York, 1979), pp. 287-315; and Walton, "Looking at Pic-
tures and Looking at Things," forthcoming in Philosophy
and the Visual Arts, ed. Andrew Harrison (Dordrecht,
Holland).
43 Saul Kripke, John Perry, Hilary Putnam, etc.
4 This isn't to be taken literally. There may be no
actual person whom the drawing depicts, and I deny that
there are any such things as purely fictional individuals,
"the man in the picture," for instance. But it is to be taken
seriously. Understood in an appropriate nonliteral manner,
"the stick figure drawing is a picture of a particular person"
is true.
45 In "Pictures and Make-Believe" I proposed that
(for example) "anguished" music is music which, make-
believedly, is an expression of someone's anguish (p. 298).
Malcolm Budd examines this proposal in Music and the
Emotions, concentrating on the idea that expressive music
is, make-believedly, someone's (perhaps the appreciator's
own) vocal expression of the emotions in question, and that
the listener imagines hearing these vocal sounds. My
present suggestion makes use of the notions of imagination
and make-believe in a very different way, centering as it
does on the idea of introspective awareness of one's
emotions rather than on that of someone's expressing them,
vocally or otherwise. But I do think that music is sometimes
imagined to be somone's expression of feelings. (Imagining
this is not incompatible with being imaginatively aware of
the feelings in question.) Budd is quite right to observe that
"the mere fact that a set of sounds is for someone
make-believedly the vocal expression of an emotion is . . .
not sufficient to endow it with artistic value for him" (p.
133; cf. also p. 141); much more does indeed need to be
said. But as grounds for summary dismissal of this fact as
playing a significant role in musical value it is clearly
inadequate. Sadness is important in our lives. A significant
connection between a musical work and sadness is a
promising step toward an explanation of why the work also
is important to us. The same goes for the very different
connection I am now proposing between expressive music
and human emotions.
46 I should add that it is in afirst-person manner,
a third-person one, that one imagines oneself to be aware of
his states of mind. The distinction is familiar, but I will not
try to explicate it here.
47 Pratt, The Meaning of Music (New York, 1931), p.
203.
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L T O N
48 Although some might argue that to the extent that
the appreciator empathizes with the character, some of the
anguish will rub off on him.
49 Goodman, Chap. 2.
50 Cf. my "Points of View in Narrative and Depictive
Representation," Nous (March 1976): 49-61.
5' R. K. Elliott distinguishes between experiencing
music as one's own expression of an emotion and experi-
encing it as that of another person, but he does not
recognize the possibility of an experience which is indeter-
minate between these alternatives. Such indeterminacy is as
important to theories linking music to the expression of
emotions as the similar indeterminancy will turn out to be to
mine; it is an important part of what might be said to make
music "abstract," despite its being, in one sense or
another, "expressive" of human emotions (Cf. Elliott,
"Aesthetic Theory and the Experience of Art," in Harold
Osborne, Aesthetics [Oxford Univesity Press, 1972], pp.
145-57; and Budd, Chapter 7).
52 It is possible that he actually has such an impression
or conception, as he listens. This must not be considered
incompatible with his imagining having one.
53 One's impressions may be of a sort which are not
even ostensibly impressions of particulars, in the way that
visual images seem to be.
54 The mere fact that music elicits imaginings does not
of course justify speaking of musical meanings or even of
semantic content, though what else is needed is a matter of
dispute. What follows is to be understood as an account of
what sort of meanings music has, on the assumption that
what it has is meanings and not just capacities to induce
imaginings.
55 If it does not, it is surely indeterminate whether what
is portrayed is present or past or future, and this is
something we are unlikely to be unsure of.
56 One can avoid reference to a struggler or a returnee
entirely by using the passive voice ("A struggle was
engaged in"). But if one does refer to the person in question
one must use either a first- or a third-person (or second-
person) personal pronoun, or a name or description which
indicates a third-person perspective.
57 One may have a visual impression as of a particular
thing, for instance, without knowing whether or not it is
veridical. But it purports to be of a particular in a way in
not which the impressions of "struggle" that listeners may be
imaginatively aware of may not be. What I suspect we
sometimes do while listening to music, and not when we
think verbally, is to imagine having an impression of
"struggle," without imagining either that it does or that it
does not purport to be of a particular.