jmp cover (i).

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ISSN 0268-3946
Volume 21 Number 8 2006

Journal of

Managerial
Psychology
Dysfunctional leadership and
organizations
Guest Editor: Dr Alan Goldman

www.emeraldinsight.com
Journal of Managerial ISSN 0268-3946

Volume 21
Psychology Number 8
2006

Dysfunctional leadership and organizations

Guest Editor
Dr Alan Goldman

Access this journal online ______________________________ 694

Editorial advisory board ________________________________ 695
CONTENTS
Introduction ______________________________________________ 696
Dysfunctional organization culture: the role of
leadership in motivating dysfunctional work
behaviors
David D. Van Fleet and Ricky W. Griffin ___________________________ 698
Dysfunctional culture, dysfunctional organization:
capturing the behavioral norms that form
organizational culture and drive performance
Pierre A. Balthazard, Robert A. Cooke and Richard E. Potter ___________ 709
High toxicity leadership: borderline personality
disorder and the dysfunctional organization
Alan Goldman_________________________________________________ 733
Causal reasoning in dysfunctional leader-member
interactions
Paul Harvey, Mark J. Martinko and Scott C. Douglas _________________ 747
Internal terrorists: the terrorists inside organizations
David D. Van Fleet and Ella W. Van Fleet __________________________ 763
2006 Awards for Excellence ___________________________ 775
Call for papers ___________________________________________ 777

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EDITORIAL ADVISORY BOARD EDITORIAL REVIEW BOARD Editorial
Professor Neil Anderson
Department of Work and Organization Psychology,
Professor Yochanan Altman
London Metropolitan University, UK
advisory board
University of Amsterdam Dr Dean Bartlett
Professor Chris Argyris University of North London, UK
Harvard Graduate School of Business Administration, Dr Gayle Baugh
USA University of West Florida, USA
Professor Yehuda Baruch
School of Management, University of East Anglia, UK
Professor Céleste Brotheridge 695
Départment d’Organisation et Resources Humaines,
Professor Frank Bournois Université Du Québec à Montréal
Université Panthéon-Assas, Paris II, France Dr Adrian Carr
Professor Cary Cooper School of Applied Social and Human Sciences,
Lancaster University Management School, Lancaster University of Western Sydney, NSW
Martin Euwema Dr Stuart Carr
Department of Social and Organizational Psychology, Industrial/Organisational Psychology Programme
University of Utrecht, The Netherlands Poverty Research Group, Massey University,
Professor Adrian Furnham New Zealand
Professor of Psychology, University College London Professor Kerry Carson
Professor Hugh P. Gunz Department of Management, Moody College of
Joseph L. Rotman School of Management, University of Business, University of Louisiana at Lafayette, USA
Toronto, Toronto, Ontario Alf Crossman
Dr Frank Heller The University of Surrey, UK
Tavistock Institute, UK Dr Patricia Hind
Professor Geert Hofstede Ashridge Management College, UK
Institute for Research on Intercultura Co-operation, Professor Henry S.R. Kao
The Netherlands University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong
Professor Paul Iles Dr Ute-Christine Klehe
Teesside Business School, UK Programmagroep A&O Psychologie, Amsterdam
Professor Jim Jawahar Dr Robert Kovach and Brett Seamons
College of Business, Illinois State University, Normal, RHR International Co., London, UK
IL, USA Dr Peter Liu
Professor Andrew Kakabadse Verity International Ltd, Toronto
Cranfield School of Management, UK, Dr Michael Morley
Founding Editor of Journal of Managerial Psychology University of Limerick, Ireland
Dr Bruce Kirkcaldy Dr Chris Rees
International Centre for the Study of Occupational and University of Manchester, UK
Mental Health, Düsseldorf, Germany
Dr Ramon Rico
Professor Harold J. Leavitt Universidad Autonoma de Madrid, Spain
Stanford University, USA
Alain M. Roger
Professor Manuel London IAE de Lyon, Université Jean Moulin, Lyon
Harriman Hall, NY, USA
Dr Raymond Saner and Dr Lichia Yiu
Professor Dr Wolfgang Mayrhofer Centre for Socio-Economic Development,
Vienna University of Economics and Business Geneva, Switzerland
Administration, Austria
Dr René Schalk
Professor Greg Northcraft Tilburg University, The Netherlands
Department of Business Administration, College of
Business, University of Illinois, USA Dr Ruth Simpson
School of Business and Management, Brunel
Dr Francisco Gil Rodriguez University, UK
Universidad Complutense de Madrid, Spain
Dr Sherry E. Sullivan
Professor Zhong-Ming Wang Bowling Green State University, USA
Hangzhou University, China
Dr Shay Tzafrir
University of Haifa, Israel
Dr Daniel Vloeberghs Journal of Managerial Psychology
University of Antwerp, Belgium Vol. 21 No. 8, 2006
p. 695
Dr Jacob (Yaacov) Weisberg
# Emerald Group Publishing Limited
Bar-Ilan University, Israel 0268-3946
JMP
21,8 Introduction
About the Guest Editor Dr Alan Goldman’s work focuses on toxic leadership and
696 dysfunctional organizations, management consulting and executive coaching, cross cultural
management, US-Japanese management, and organizational psychology. He is the author of seven
books, and over 100 presentations and publications. Dr Goldman’s “Leadership pathology as a
nexus of dysfunctional organizations” was the 2005 recipient of the inaugural Copenhagen
Business School Award, a best paper award in the Management Consulting Division of the
Academy of Management.

Journal of Managerial Psychology
Vol. 21 No. 8, 2006
pp. 696-697
q Emerald Group Publishing Limited
0268-3946
This special issue of the Journal of Managerial Psychology explores the darker, troubled
side of organizations. It is an investigation that spans individual leaders, teams, and
organizational systems with the common unifying principles of toxicity and
dysfunction. Left undetected, unattended or misdiagnosed, simple interpersonal or
team conflict may escalate and morph into a dysfunctional system. Alternately,
misguided organizational policies, abrupt restructurings, layoffs and downsizings
become inseparable from anxiety, burnout and workplace terrorism. In some instances
toxicity originates at the top as leaders suffering from depression, adult ADHD or
borderline personality disorder impact their division or company – indicating the fine
line between individual and organizational pathology. Whether approached through
the micro lenses of trait and personality psychology, or the via macro perspectives of
systems theory, toxicity and dysfunction weave a destructive path. Dysfunctional
leadership and organizations result in decreased motivation and productivity,
turnover, grievances, and a revolving door at employee assistance programs. When
internal interventions fall short, consultants and coaches enter as external agents
attempting to assess and intervene.
In this issue the authors approach dysfunctional leaders and organizations by
weaving an interdisciplinary pathway between psychology and management. The
articles speak diverse languages of industrial psychology, management consulting,
organizational behavior, executive coaching, and counseling psychology. The
interdisciplinary venture of this issue is thought to mirror the increasingly broad
repertoire of skills required of leaders in complex global organizations. Particularly in a
decentralized, theory Y, TQM, Six Sigma influenced era, leadership emerges both
vertically and horizontally. Team leaders, middle managers and human resource
professionals are increasingly expected to work with the people side of management
and participate as emotionally intelligent coaches and facilitators. When leaders turn
toxic their people skills degenerate and organizational well being suffers. There is
ample reason for organizations to consider the merits of designating toxin detectors
and handlers as they attempt to anticipate and strategize their responses to conflict and
counterproductive workplace behaviors. Healthy, functional and productive leadership
clearly occupies a primary role in toxicity detection. Conversely, toxic leaders are at the Introduction
nexus of the dysfunctional organization.
It is my hope that this issue will point our academic and professional colleagues in
fruitful directions, and generate dialogue and research over the functional and
dysfunctional in leadership and organizations.
Alan Goldman 697
Guest Editor
 The current issue and full text archive of this journal is available at
www.emeraldinsight.com/0268-3946.htm

JMP
21,8 Dysfunctional organization
culture
The role of leadership in motivating
698 dysfunctional work behaviors
David D. Van Fleet
School of Global Management and Leadership,
Arizona State University at the West Campus, Phoenix, Arizona, USA, and
Ricky W. Griffin
Department of Management, Mays Business School, Texas A&M University,
College Station, Texas, USA

Abstract
Purpose – The purpose of this article is to expand and extend previous work on the role of
organizations in influencing deviant or dysfunctional behavior in those organizations.
Design/methodology/approach – Conclusions from previous work on the role of individuals and
organizations in influencing dysfunctional behavior is used to lead to a discussion of the interactions
between those two especially through organizational culture and leadership.
Findings – A model is developed that more carefully identifies how all of these factors come together,
resulting in no, little, some, or a lot of dysfunctional behavior.
Research limitations/implications – The model developed here can be employed to improve
understanding of the role of organization culture and leadership in motivating dysfunctional work
behaviors. Both the individual and the organization constructs utilized in the framework need more
complete conceptual development. In each instance, a more complex and integrative analysis of
diverse literatures needs to be undertaken. Clear messages regarding individual tendencies toward
violent behaviors are embedded in the literatures from such diverse areas as psychology, psychiatry,
criminal justice, medicine, sociology, organizational behavior, biology, social psychology, and
anthropology. A comprehensive review and synthesis could theoretically yield far more insights than
currently exist.
Practical implications – The proposed manifestations of dysfunctional behavior are most likely to
occur as the result of the interactive relationship between an individual displaying a relatively high
predisposition for violent behavior and an organization with a relatively high propensity to elicit
violence. Clearly, a better understanding of the characteristics of such an organization would assist
practicing managers in reducing the likelihood of occurrence of dysfunctional behavior.
Originality/value – This paper fills a gap in the literature about the role of organizations in
influencing dysfunctional behavior by delineating more fully the role of organizational culture and
leadership.
Keywords Employee behaviour, Organizational culture, Social interaction, Leadership
Paper type Conceptual paper

Journal of Managerial Psychology
Vol. 21 No. 8, 2006
pp. 698-708
q Emerald Group Publishing Limited
0268-3946
DOI 10.1108/02683940610713244
Dysfunctional behavior falls within the broader category of antisocial behavior, which
is described as “any behavior that brings harm, or is intended to bring harm, to an
organization, its employees, or stakeholders” (Giacalone and Greenberg, 1997, p. vii).
Dysfunctional/antisocial behavior, then, may range from low levels of
inappropriateness (e.g. inappropriate attire, alcohol use, smoking, inappropriate
behaviors, loud talking or radio playing, and tardiness) all the way to sabotage or Dysfunctional
violent behavior directed toward one or more individuals or the organization as a organization
whole.
Scholars who study dysfunctional work behavior typically have focused most of culture
their attention on the specific individual-level behaviors that might potentially
comprise this domain. Such behaviors include but are not limited to workplace
deviance, theft, aggression, violence, dishonesty, terrorism, sabotage, and an 699
assortment of other dysfunctional behaviors as reflected in the various papers found
in this issue. Most of these scholars, however, tend to ignore or downplay the role of
organizational factors in instigating dysfunctional behaviors.
Organizations should be profoundly interested in preventing dysfunctional
workplace behavior, particularly violence, because such behaviors can be very
costly or damaging to the organization. Indeed, the organization could face legal action
if a violent incident occurs and they can’t prove that they took steps to prevent it. Such
legal action could include worker’s compensation claims, OSHA rule violation charges,
or even civil liability for negligent hiring. Other costs to an organization include
immediate and direct costs of workplace violence – injury or death; clean-up, repair,
and replacement; hiring and training of new personnel; increased insurance premiums;
lost wages; and the like. There are also less immediate and more difficult to measure
costs, including decreased efficiency, productivity, and quality; interruption of
business operations; and decreased reputation and credibility of the organization.
This paper will develop the argument that organizational cultures vary in their
functionality in terms of contributing to or detracting from organizational performance
and effectiveness. A dysfunctional organization culture is defined as one that
constrains or limits individual- and group-level capabilities and/or that actually
encourages and rewards mediocre individual- and group-level performance. The paper
will also develop the argument that an organization’s leadership is likely to help create
and perpetuate such cultures. Implications for future theory and research will be
identified.

The role of the individual

In general, theorists and researchers who study behavior in organizations direct their
attention at how various individual and/or group behaviors benefit and enhance
organizations and the antecedent conditions associated with those beneficial
behaviors. The theories and models that have been developed, therefore, tend to
focus on how processes and factors within organizations affect variables such as job
satisfaction, employee motivation, performance, and organizational commitment.
Their approaches to the study of leadership typically examine at the group level how
the organization might improve leadership effectiveness and the leader’s ability to
motivate workers so as to achieve high levels of performance and goal attainment. The
dependent variables of interest, then, are usually things like cohesiveness, performance
norms, communication patterns, and group-level performance as well as individual
responses to a group or team context.
These theories and models generally assume that as cause-and-effect relationships
among key variables are identified, managers and organizations will be able to
increase desired individual and organizational outcomes by manipulating the causes
associated with those outcomes. A basic assumption of job characteristics research, for
JMP example, is that if researchers can identify specific job dimensions or attributes that
21,8 lead to employee motivation and high performance, managers can then redesign those
jobs to increase those dimensions or attributes. This, then, would improve employee
motivation and performance.
Newer studies of organizational behavior, on the other hand, are investigating
behaviors that are considerably less functional in that they relate to negative
700 consequences or involve direct costs to the individuals who make up organizations as
well as to the organizations themselves. These behaviors have been called the dark side
of organizational behavior (Griffin and O’Leary-Kelly, 2004). While the work of Griffin
and O’Leary-Kelly concentrated on violent behavior, it may be readily extended to
include all forms of dysfunctional or antisocial behavior in organizations. Clearly, these
forms of behavior should be controlled, minimized, or eliminated altogether
(O’Leary-Kelly et al., 1996).
Consider, for example, an extreme form of such dark side behavior – murder.
Murder in the workplace is among the major causes of employee deaths, and women
are often affected to a greater degree than are men. Indeed, ten percent of all workplace
fatalities in 2004 were homicides (US Department of Labor, 2005). So prevalent has it
become that workplace homicide has been identified as the fastest growing form of
murder in the USA (Filipczak, 1993). Less extreme dark-side behaviors may involve
physical assault through such actions as pushing or shoving, slapping or hitting, or
rap. One study estimated more than two million US workers are physically attacked at
work each year (Northwestern National Life Insurance Company, 1993). While
individuals frequently may incur the greatest costs from such behaviors, the
organization may incur costs as well – decreased productivity, medical and legal
expenses, lost work time, lowered quality, and a damaged culture and public image.
It has been proposed that all individuals enter organizations with some potential
predisposition to exhibit violent behaviors (Griffin and Lopez, 2004; Denenberg and
Braverman, 1999). That predisposition can range from very low to very high. The
greater the predisposition, the greater the likelihood that the individual will, at some
point, display violent behavior. Most scholars in this area focus on individuals with a
very high predisposition for violent behavior. The backgrounds and personalities of
those individuals with a high predisposition for violent behavior are frequently the
focus of attention so that such individuals can be identified by the organization in an
effort to prevent or minimize violence.
Examining the fundamental underpinnings of predispositions toward violence
requires surveying several literatures, particularly biology, psychology, and sociology.
A detailed study of those literatures is beyond the scope of this paper, but some general
observations are in order. In particular, genetic and biological factors and personality
should be considered.
The argument for the influence of genetic and biological factors is dependent on an
examination of the individual’s mental health. The origins of violent and aggressive
behaviors have been linked to endocrine influences and brain structures (Brennan,
1998). The limbic system, biochemistry, genetics, levels of dopamine and serotonin,
and mental illness has also been suggested as causally related to violent behavior
(Arboleda-Florez et al., 1998; Brennan, 1998). Attempts to establish a link between such
factors and aggressive behavior, however, have received only mixed results (Brennan,
1998).
 Another area of research with implications for understanding an individual’s Dysfunctional
predisposition for dysfunctional behavior involves determinants and personality organization
factors. Determinants such as social influences, including family background, and
situations are known to greatly impact the exhibition of individual behavior to varying culture
degrees, but those influences are dependent on the individual’s personality (Neuman
and Baron, 1998). On the other hand, various personality factors may more directly
serve as dispositions for violent behavior (Berkowitz, 1993). Those factors include 701
personality types that are emotionally reactive, that display under-controlled
aggression (those who lack the restraint and have weak inhibitions against
aggression), and in the extreme sense, those personality types that can be described as
finding pleasure in hurting or causing discomfort in others (Berkowitz, 1993).
Type A behavior patterns, self-monitoring behavior, and hostile attributional bias
may also be involved (Neuman and Baron, 1998). A hostile attributional bias refers to a
personality factor where the individual has a tendency to perceive others as behaving
aggressively towards him/her, thus resulting in retaliatory behavior from within the
individual (Neuman and Baron, 1998). Type A individuals are frequently described as
impatient, irritable, and controlling (Neuman and Baron, 1998). Compared with Type B
personalities, the A’s may more frequently become angry and lose their tempers,
display aggressive behaviors, and experience higher frequencies of conflict (Neuman
and Baron, 1998).
Thus, genetic and biological factors, personality, values, experiences, and motives
are all likely to affect an individual’s predisposition to display dysfunctional behavior.
Since most individuals rarely display extreme levels of dysfunctional behavior, this
predisposition may be quite low in most people. Being low does not meant that it does
not exist, however. One cannot confirm that a trait or predisposition does not exist
simply because it rarely or never manifests itself. Rather, the argument for
predisposition becomes more compelling where individuals do exhibit extreme levels
of dysfunctional behavior. In virtually all cases, for instance, detailed background
reviews of violent individuals uncover earlier warning signs such as cruelty toward
animals, interpersonal hostility, interests in weapons, proneness to making verbal
threats, and so forth. Thus, there is a reasonable basis for the suggestion that every
person has a predisposition to display dysfunctional behavior under certain
circumstances.

The role of the organization

While most research in the area of dysfunctional behavior has focused on the
individual, it seems quite likely that the organization also plays a pivotal role. For one
thing, the organization is important in that it provides a setting in which the individual
may display dysfunctional behavior. The individual spends most of his waking hours
at the job site, thus increasing the timeframe within which he is displaying his
behavior. An organization provides people toward whom the individual may find it
easier to display this behavior, rather than toward the family members he loves. And
the work setting provides all kinds of stimulants that could provoke individuals who
already have a high propensity toward dysfunctional behavior.
For another, even though few scholars have considered the context of dysfunctional
behavior, it seems reasonable to suggest that organizational factors are often cited as
the catalyst for dysfunctional events. For instance, pressure and stress in the
JMP organization, styles or patterns of supervision, and how termination and demotion are
21,8 handled by the organization are often cited as triggers for violence. Recently, the
organization’s compensation or reward structure, social pressures to conform, the
presence of negative and untrusting attitudes, unclear performance feedback,
perceived unfair treatment, and violations of trust have been identified as
organizational factors leading to deviant behavior (Litzky et al., 2006).
702 Organizational factors that are most influential are its history; the values and vision
of its leaders; the shared experiences, beliefs, stories, and rituals of its employees; the
reward and incentive system; and organizational norms about performance and
behavior, all of which contribute to an organization’s culture (Trice, 1988; Trice and
Beyer, 1993). Indeed, an organization’s culture has been shown to be an important
influence on both positive and negative consequences within organizations (Guerra
et al., 2005).
The organization’s culture develops over time and becomes a powerful force for
shaping the behavior of those in the organization and for newcomers to the
organization. It interacts with characteristics of individuals to create a propensity to
elicit dysfunctional behavior. The organization itself has some theoretic propensity to
elicit dysfunctional behavior. Similar to the individual’s predisposition to display
dysfunctional behavior, the propensity of an organization’s culture to elicit
dysfunctional behaviors can range from very low to very high. This propensity
describes the range of potential influence that an organization can have in contributing
to and eliciting dysfunctional behavior from individuals who are members of that
organization.
The organization can contribute to displays of dysfunctional behavior in one of two
ways, by “creating social conditions that promote violence by generating aggressive
inclinations” or by “lowering restraints against violent actions” (Berkowitz, 1993,
p. 281). Even when the individual predisposition is high, the actual display of
dysfunctional behavior is “most likely to occur when cognitively based inhibitory
restraints are minimal” (Berkowitz, 1993; Carlson et al., 1990, p. 622). The organization
can therefore become an important contributing factor to whether or not violent
displays of behavior are expressed by the individual, especially when, for example, the
threat of punishment from the organization is minimal or absent (Berkowitz, 1993).
Organizational influences conceivably can also be enhanced through social reality
construction processes as described by the social information processing approach to
organizations (Salancik and Pfeffer, 1978). Social information processing suggests that
an individual’s behavior in a social environment is guided by the displays of behavior
from others within their environment on information about values, norms,
expectations, and behavior outcomes (Glomb and Liao, 2003). The individual learns,
then, by observing what others do and what they can or cannot “get away with”. The
structure, values, norms, and procedures of an organization, therefore, are vital for
determining how individuals might respond to organization related situations. In
particular, Schein (2004) suggests that an organization’s culture identifies what things
members of the organization should pay attention to, how they react emotionally, and
what actions they should take.
Etzioni (1975) suggests that organizational cultures, then, can be ones in which
members of the organization identify with the organization. They tend to be committed
to the organization’s goals and need little direct supervision as there is consensus about
what needs to be done and why. But organizational cultures can involve less-consensus Dysfunctional
and be more transactional in nature. In these cultures, individuals participate only so organization
long as the exchange system is perceived as rewarding their behaviors. On the other
hand, in yet other cultures members are alienated and defensive. They view the leaders culture
as enemies and are antagonistic toward the leaders and the organization. Clearly, these
latter forms of organizational cultures are the ones more likely to elicit violence.
Characteristics of the organization, and particularly its culture, subsequently affect 703
its propensity to elicit dysfunctional behavior. Organizational cultures that constrain
or limit individual – and group-level capabilities and/or that actually encourage and
reward mediocre individual – and group-level performance are termed dysfunctional
organizational cultures, and the organizations are hence referred to as dysfunctional
organizations.

Interactions between the individual and the organization

Assuming that the constructs of individual predispositions for dysfunctional behavior
and organizational propensities to elicit dysfunctional behaviors are, in fact, valid
constructs, it then becomes possible to relate them to one another as in Figure 1. In the
figure, individual predisposition to engage in dysfunctional behavior is represented on
the vertical axis; organizational propensity to elicit dysfunctional behavior is
represented on the horizontal axis. Moreover, each is presented as a dichotomous
construct broken down into high and low levels. The resulting configuration yields
four possible situations.
Situation 1 exists when there is a high (or strong) predisposition on the part of an
individual to engage in dysfunctional behavior but there is a low propensity on the part
of the organization to elicit such behavior. We propose that in this case there will be a
moderate incidence of dysfunctional behavior derived primarily from the individual’s
predisposition. Likewise, situation 3, determined by a low propensity for the individual
to engage in dysfunctional behavior but in which there is a high propensity by the
organization to elicit such behavior, is also likely to result in a moderate incidence of

Figure 1.
A framework of
person-situation
determinants of
dysfunctional behavior in
organizations
JMP dysfunctional behavior this time resulting more from the organizational influences
21,8 than those of the individual.
Situation 2 represents the situation with the highest incidence of dysfunctional
behavior. This volatile situation reflects the combination of a high predisposition for
dysfunctional behavior coupled with a high organizational propensity to elicit violent
behavior. In sharp contrast, if individual predisposition for dysfunctional behavior and
704 organizational propensity to elicit dysfunctional behavior are both low, as in situation
4, the lowest incidence of dysfunctional behavior will be present.

The role of leaders

Organization culture evolves from myriad sources, including the organization’s
history, its pattern of successes and failures, its founder, and its policies and practices.
Leaders, however, are perhaps the most powerful determinant of organization culture.
For example, leaders are the ones who set the tone of the organization, define its values
and norms, and create and maintain a persona of what the organization is like.
Hence, if the position is taken that a culture with a high propensity to elicit
dysfunctional behavior by its members is itself a dysfunctional culture, it seems
instructive to examine how that culture developed. As previously noted, leaders most
likely play a major role. For example, if a top manager is commonly known to be
untruthful, if a leader does not respect the rights of others, or if the leader puts profits
before all else, others in the organization will likely recognize the signals. As the
signals get institutionalized throughout the firm, its culture will become increasingly
dysfunctional. In this way, the leader’s values are “taught” to others and shape their
behavior in the organization.
What leaders pay attention to sends powerful messages throughout the
organization. What do leaders seem to notice, what comments do they make, what
do they seem to reward and punish? What agendas do they set for meetings? How do
they react to problems and/or change? Is there a code of ethics and is it actually
followed? How is budgeting handled – top down or bottom up? Who gets promoted or
receives special privileges? These are all important actions by which leaders influence
an organization’s culture and the behavior of those in the organization.
Culture and leadership style are major influences on individuals (Lok and Crawford,
2004). An organization’s culture is shaped by its leaders, but it also shapes the behavior
of its leaders (Brown and Thornborrow, 1996). Characteristics of organizations have
been shown to influence the ethics or integrity of executives (Tourigny et al., 2003), and
qualities of leaders have been shown to be critical in the development of an
organization’s culture (Ribière and Sitar, 2003). Dysfunctional organizations generally
fail to achieve their goals and frequently are notable for poor leaders. Dysfunctions in
top management have been shown to prohibit groups from effectively accomplishing
their tasks (Paul et al., 2002). Kets de Vries (2004, 1991) suggests that an organization
can become dysfunctional because its culture reflects the dysfunctions of top managers
(see also Kersten, 2005).
Smith (2000) suggests that dysfunctional organizational cultures are likely to result
when leaders have poor “people” skills. With a long emphasis on productivity,
efficiency, and the “bottom line,” many organizational leaders have not developed
strong interpersonal skills and, indeed, may instead have begun to abuse their
authority in dealing with subordinates. Skills in handling change and stress, as well as
in dealing with conflict and aggression, communication, motivation and time Dysfunctional
management have all been relegated to minor roles. Under these conditions, then, organization
leaders may unintentionally contribute to the development of dysfunctional
organizational cultures. culture
Burton (2002) has taken this a step further and identified several behaviors
associated with leaders who create dysfunctional organizational climates. She suggests
that such leaders engage in threatening behaviors toward subordinates; display 705
emotional or verbal abuse and bullying; are likely to harass subordinates in one way or
another; and may even use physical assault against subordinates.
The social information processing approach clearly demonstrates the strong
influence that leaders have as role models. The leader sets the tone for his or her
followers through his or her own visible behavior that communicates assumptions and
values to others as well as through informal messages (Lewine, 1995). But role models
can be models of the wrong kind. For instance, bad examples are set for others by
abusive or bullying leaders; those who quickly assign blame and don’t set priorities;
those who make the same errors over and over; those who claim that they “don’t know”
or have bad information; leaders who worry about “my watch” rather than long-term
organizational effectiveness; those who think that apologizing is all that is necessary to
“make things right;” and those who cook the books, pad their expense accounts, and
behave unethically if not illegally. It should come as no surprise that in organizations
whose leaders display those behaviors, dysfunctional behavior will occur more
frequently than in organizations whose leaders display more reasonable and ethical
behavior themselves.

Directions for theory and research

The use of the framework presented here can potentially improve our understanding of
the role of organization culture and leadership in motivating dysfunctional work
behaviors. However, much work remains to be done. Specifically, new theory
development work and empirical research are both fully necessary.
For one thing, both the individual and the organization constructs utilized in the
framework need more complete conceptual development. In each instance, for example,
a more complex and integrative analysis of diverse literatures needs to be undertaken.
Clear messages regarding individual tendencies toward violent behaviors are
embedded in the literatures from such diverse areas as psychology, psychiatry,
criminal justice, medicine, sociology, organizational behavior, biology, social
psychology, and anthropology. A comprehensive review and synthesis could
theoretically yield far more insights than currently exist.
Similarly, dysfunctional perspectives on both organizational culture and leadership
can obviously be elevated through a focused and in-depth review and analysis. The
same literatures noted above, with the addition of organization theory, could yield rich,
substantive, and sophisticated frameworks and models of these constructs.
We also propose that manifestations of violent behavior are most likely to occur as
the result of the interactive relationship between an individual displaying a relatively
high predisposition for violent behavior and an organization with a relatively high
propensity to elicit violence. Theoretically, then, more complete understandings of the
various core constructs could then lead to better and more intricate predictions of
interactions and other interrelationships among those constructs.
JMP The model developed here suggests that an individual in an organization with a
21,8 dysfunctional culture will either leave the organization, stay with the organization and
not display dysfunctional or violent behavior, or will display such behavior perhaps
triggered by a stimulus event (i.e. a public reprimand, demotion, or termination).
Theoretical advancements could also provide meaningful understandings as to which
of these is more likely and under what conditions. Indeed, each of the cells in the
706 proposed model merits careful attention to specify the individual and organization
conditions underlying it.
More carefully derived categorizations or classifications may also provide greater
insight into the nature of triggering events for dysfunctional behavior, particularly
those associated with leader behavior. Research is clearly needed to determine whether
certain kinds of triggers are more or less likely to stimulate various kinds of
dysfunctional behaviors than are others.
Beyond the array of theoretical imperatives, there are also numerous empirical
issues that warrant attention. Unfortunately, these concepts are sufficiently sensitive
that “standard” research methods may be applicable. For instance, longitudinal
research could help further our understanding of the role that organizational responses
to dysfunctional behavior plays in the organization’s subsequent propensity to elicit
such behaviors. It could also be possible to determine and develop protocols for
organizations to follow when dysfunctional behavior occurs, so as to decrease the
potential for future episodes.
However, few organizations would be amenable to hosting a cross-sectional survey
or experimental intervention targeted at the key underlying research questions either
implied here or to be developed through more rigorous theoretical explication. As a
result, researchers will need to be especially creative in their pursuit of answers. For
example, methodologies such as retrospective accounts, direct observation, and other
qualitative approaches may need to be employed. Hopefully, however, the results will
be more than worth the complications from using nontraditional approaches.

Conclusions
Most of the work on dysfunctional work behavior has concentrated on individual-level
behaviors. The organization as a contributor to dysfunctional behaviors has seldom
been more than just mentioned. Our work suggests that organizational cultures may
contribute to or detract from dysfunctional behavior in a variety of ways. Since leaders
are an important determinant of organizational culture, we have argued that they
therefore play an important role in motivating dysfunctional work behaviors.
Hopefully, the concepts and model presented here will stimulate empirical research to
verify or refute our ideas and to further the understanding of the role that
organizations and organizational leaders play with regard to dysfunctional behavior in
organizations.

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About the authors

Dr David D. Van Fleet’s work focuses on management history, leadership, strategy, and
workplace violence and terrorism. He has authored or co-authored over 200 presentations and
publications. He is a past editor of the Journal of Management and the current editor of the
Journal of Behavioral and Applied Management. He is a Fellow of both the Academy of
Management and the Southern Management Association and is listed in Who’s Who in America
(5th ed.) and Who’s Who Among America’s Teachers (Vol. V). Dr Van Fleet can be contacted at:
ddvf@ asu.edu
Dr Griffin’s research interests include workplace violence, employee health and well-being in
the workplace, and workplace culture. In addition to his research and publications, Dr Griffin has
also written several textbooks. He has served as editor of the Journal of Management and as an
officer in two regional and two professional divisions of the Academy of Management. He is a
Fellow of both the Academy of Management and the Southern Management Association.

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www.emeraldinsight.com/0268-3946.htm

Dysfunctional
Dysfunctional culture, culture
dysfunctional organization
Capturing the behavioral norms that form
organizational culture and drive performance 709
Pierre A. Balthazard
School of Global Management and Leadership, Arizona State University,
Phoenix, Arizona, USA
Robert A. Cooke
College of Business Administration, University of Illinois at Chicago,
Chicago, Illinois, USA, and
Richard E. Potter
Department of Information and Decision Sciences,
College of Business Administration, University of Illinois at Chicago,
Chicago, Illinois, USA

Abstract
Purpose – This paper aims to describe how organizational culture is manifested in behavioral norms
and expectations, focusing on 12 sets of behavioral norms associated with constructive, passive/
defensive, and aggressive/defensive cultural styles.
Design/methodology/approach – The organizational culture inventory, a normed and validated
instrument designed to measure organizational culture in terms of behavioral norms and expectations,
was used to test hypotheses regarding the impact of culture. Data are summarized from 60,900
respondents affiliated with various organizations that have used the instrument to assess their cultures.
Also presented is a brief overview of a practitioner-led assessment of four state government
departments.
Findings – The results of correlational analyses illustrate the positive impact of constructive cultural
styles, and the negative impact of dysfunctional defensive styles, on both the individual- and
organizational-level performance drivers. The results clearly link the dysfunctional cultural styles to
deficits in operating efficiency and effectiveness.
Originality/value – The concept of organizational culture is derived from research in the field of
organizational behavior characterized by use of qualitative methods. Yet, one of the most powerful
strategies for organizational development is knowledge-based change, an approach that generally relies
on the use of quantitative measures. Although both methods share the potential for producing cumulative
bodies of information for assessment and theory testing, quantitative approaches may be more practical
for purposes of knowledge-based approaches for organizational development generally, and assessing
cultural prerequisites for organizational learning and knowledge management specifically.
Keywords Organizational culture, Organizational behaviour, Performance
Paper type Research paper

This paper is based on, and incorporates materials from, the Organizational Culture Inventoryw
with permission by the publisher, Human Synergistics International (USA). The authors extend
their appreciation to Dr Cheryl Boglarksy, Director of Research and Development at Human
Journal of Managerial Psychology
Synergistics’ Michigan office, for compiling the data set analyzed in this paper. OCI style Vol. 21 No. 8, 2006
descriptions and sample items are from Robert A. Cooke and J. Clayton Lafferty, Organizational pp. 709-732
q Emerald Group Publishing Limited
Culture Inventory, q Human Synergistics International, Plymouth MI USA. Copyright q 1987, 0268-3946
All Rights Reserved. Used by permission. DOI 10.1108/02683940610713253
JMP Introduction
21,8 The dysfunctional organization, much like a dysfunctional individual, is so
characterized because it exhibits markedly lower effectiveness, efficiency, and
performance than its peers or in comparison to societal standards. While
environmental considerations are important for individuals as well as organizations,
internal forces often play a more pivotal role. With the individual, this can be cognition.
710 With the organization, we contend, it is the culture. Consider the following two
examples that illustrate how an organization’s culture can foment dysfunction.
In the aftermath of the Columbia space shuttle accident, we learned (again) that
there were people inside NASA who were discussing critical information with each
other, but not with senior decision makers. This life-saving knowledge might have
saved the spaceship and its crew. Following the earlier Challenger accident, a nine-year
study of NASA’s standard operating procedures regarding risky decision-making – in
which technical anomalies were repeatedly considered to be of “acceptable risk” –
showed that the organizational culture created an environment in which conformity to
the rules led to the fatal errors (e.g. Vaughan, 1996, 2003). The causes of the Columbia
and Challenger disasters were not due to intentional managerial wrongdoing, safety
rule violations or any type of conspiracy. Rather, the nature of NASA’s organization
was such that the decisions to launch Challenger and land Columbia were inevitable –
and inevitable mistakes. NASA’s organizational culture, routines and systems are
designed to allow for a process of normalizing signals of potential danger. Thus,
known technical problems become an operating norm and did not prevent NASA
managers from giving the go-ahead to proceed with problematic operations (Vaughan,
1996, 2003).
Examining the multi-organization system that oversees the air travel industry, a
Gannet company investigation of the American Airlines Flight 587 crash in Belle
Harbor, New York, found widespread cultural and structural impediments at Airbus
Industrie, the National Transportation Safety Board, and American Airlines. Although
these information technology-intensive organizations are components of the nation’s
aviation safety system designed to prevent crashes by learning from close calls, the
system is dependent on airlines and aircraft manufacturers sharing their knowledge
and experience with the same federal regulators charged with their oversight (USA
Today, 2003). As critical and fundamental that knowledge sharing might be in an
organization, it is not safe to assume that it will occur unless it is a recognized norm or
expected behavior as part of the organization’s culture.
These two examples, and others like the more recent failures at the Federal
Emergency Management Administration, portray how elements of an organization’s
culture can lead to dysfunctional outcomes, even when those organizations are peopled
with earnest and capable members. In this paper we present a quantitative approach to
the assessment of organizational culture based on shared norms and behavioral
expectations at the individual and organizational-unit levels. Alternative patterns of
norms and expectations are associated with constructive, passive/aggressive, and
aggressive/defensive organizational culture styles, each associated with particularly
healthy or dysfunctional organizational drivers of performance. We discuss a
statistically normed and validated instrument and methodology that accurately
assesses the behavioral norms operating within an organization and is used to identify
the type of culture characterizing the organization. We present data from 60,900 Dysfunctional
respondents in the field along with a brief analysis, the results of which illustrate the culture
linkage between two dysfunctional organizational cultural styles and individual and
organizational-level performance drivers. We also present a brief overview of a
practitioner-led assessment of four state government departments and results that
clearly link dysfunctional cultures to deficits in operating efficiency and effectiveness.
711
Organizational culture
Organizational culture has been characterized as the “glue that holds organizations
together” (Goffee and Jones, 1996) and “isn’t just one aspect of the game – it is the
game” (Gerstner, 2002). Culture can support linkages between technology adoption and
organizational growth (Chatman and Jehn, 1994); it can be a critical success factor in
implementing manufacturing strategy (Bates et al., 1995) and can play a crucial role in
determining the success or failure of mergers and acquisitions (Weber et al., 1996;
Javidan, 2001). On a more micro level, researchers have found significant relationships
between the “fit” of employees and the prevailing organizational culture and a number
of important outcomes such as job commitment and turnover (O’Reilly et al., 1991;
Kotter and Heskett, 1992).
But many unanswered questions remain regarding the meaning and content of
organizational culture (Black, 2003; Martin and Siehl, 1983; Louis, 1983), the methods
by which it should be measured (Cooke and Rousseau, 1983; Schein, 1984; Sashkin and
Fullmer, 1985) and, more fundamentally, the feasibility of managing culture and
change (e.g. Uffal, 1983; Collins and Porras, 1994), especially when attempting to
operationalize and attain specific organizational goals. While debates around these
issues continue, culture has been accepted as a “fact of organizational life” by
managers and has become an integral aspect of many organizational development
programs. Much of the research on organizational cultures has focused on descriptors
of culture and frequently resulted in dimensions or typologies of culture (Hanges and
Dickson, 2002; House et al., 2002; Kreitner and Kinicki, 1998; Schein, 1996; Hofstede
et al., 1993; Reichers and Schneider, 1990; O’Reilly, 1989). Certain types of
organizational cultures, or certain styles of cultures, have been associated with
either positive or negative outcomes for either the effectiveness of the organization (as
the introductory discussion of NASA and the American Airlines crash illustrate) or for
individual employees within the organization (Schein, 1996; Deal and Kennedy, 1982).
Positive outcomes for individual members of organizations potentially include
motivation and satisfaction (Cooke and Szurnal, 1993, 2000; O’Reilly, 1989) while
negative outcomes might include job insecurity and stress (Kahn et al., 1964; Katz and
Kahn, 1966, van der Velde and Class, 1995). In this paper, we link organizational
culture to measures of both individual and organizational outcomes.
The concept of organizational culture is derived from research in the field of
organizational behavior characterized by use of qualitative methods. To an extent, the
use of these methods derives from the issues of interest to scholars who have studied
culture in organizations: symbolism, sense-making, and socialization (e.g. Louis, 1980;
Martin and Siehl, 1983; Smircich, 1983), issues involving unique individual
perspectives highly amenable to qualitative study. Yet, one of the most powerful
strategies for organizational development is knowledge-based change, an approach
JMP that generally relies on the use of quantitative measures (e.g. Huse and Cummings,
21,8 1985; Nadler, 1977). Qualitative and quantitative methods are complementary
approaches to the study and assessment of organizational processes and attributes.
The advantages of qualitative methods include the use of the focal unit’s own terms to
describe itself, the intensive and in-depth information that can be obtained about a unit,
and the amenability of the method for exploratory research on issues and processes
712 about which little information exists.
Alternatively, the advantages of quantitative methods include the ease of
cross-sectional assessments and comparisons (across individuals, organizations, or
sub-units), the replicability of the assessment in different units and by other
researchers or organizational development professionals, and a common, articulated
frame of reference for interpreting the collated information. Although both methods
share the potential for producing cumulative bodies of information for assessment and
theory testing, quantitative approaches may be more practical for purposes of
knowledge-based approaches for organizational development generally, and assessing
cultural prerequisites for organizational learning and knowledge management
specifically. For instance, different subgroups within an organization, such as
departments or units, may have the organizational culture in common, but also
experience a subculture unique to the individuals within the unit (Trice, 1993; Cooke
and Rousseau, 1988). Shared values and expectations within such units exert pressures
leading to a localized variation of the organizational culture for members, and
ultimately affect the culture of the organization as a whole.

The organizational culture inventoryq

At the core of our study is the Organizational Culture Inventory (OCI), a statistically
normed and validated survey used for organizational consulting and change purposes,
developed by Human Synergistics International (Cooke and Lafferty, 1987). The OCI is
a quantitative instrument that measures twelve sets of behavioral norms associated
with three general styles of organizational culture – constructive, passive/defensive,
and aggressive/defensive. Since its introduction in prototype form in 1983, the
inventory has been used by thousands of organizations and completed by over two
million respondents throughout the world. The instrument has been translated into
numerous languages – including French (Canadian and Parisian), Spanish (Castillian
and Latin American), German, Japanese, Chinese, Dutch, Swedish, Romanian, and
Korean – and is, arguably, the most globally used organizational culture assessment
instrument in the world. It has been administered for a variety of purposes, including
to direct, evaluate, and monitor organizational change (e.g. Gaucher and Kratochwill,
1993); identify and transfer the cultures of high performing units (Human Synergistics,
1986); study and enhance system reliability and safety (Haber et al., 1991; Shurberg and
Haber, 1992; Keenan et al., 1998); facilitate strategic alliances and mergers (Slowinski,
1992); promote collaborative relations within and across units (Leeds, 1999); and test
hypotheses on the relationship between culture and antecedent variables (Klein et al.,
1995a). This wide range of applications has produced an extensive information base
regarding the ways in which culture operates in different types of organizations.
The OCI measures 12 distinct but interrelated sets of behavioral norms and
expectations that describe the thinking and behavioral styles that might be implicitly
or explicitly required for people to “fit in” and “meet expectations” in an organization Dysfunctional
or sub-unit. The behavioral norms measured by the OCI are defined by two underlying culture
dimensions, the first of which distinguishes between a concern for people versus a
concern for tasks. The second dimension distinguishes between expectations for
behaviors directed toward fulfilling higher-order satisfaction needs versus those
directed toward protecting and maintaining lower-order security needs. Based on these
dimensions, the 12 sets of norms measured by the OCI are categorized into three 713
general “clusters” or styles of organizational cultures: constructive, passive/defensive,
and aggressive/defensive. Empirical support for these clusters, and therefore the
construct validity of the inventory, is provided by the results of principal components
analyses presented elsewhere (e.g. Cooke and Rousseau, 1988; Cooke and Szumal, 1993;
Xenikou and Furnham, 1996).
This focus on behavioral norms distinguishes the OCI from other questionnaires
which measure more global aspects of culture such as shared beliefs and values (e.g.
House et al., 2002; Deal and Kennedy, 1982; Sashkin, 1983). While norms and
expectations are closely related to beliefs and values, the former have a more direct
impact on the day-to-day activities and work situation of organizational members than
do the latter (Cooke and Rousseau, 1988). Thus, norms also have a relatively great
impact on individual and organizational outcomes and are potentially indicative of
environments that support organizational learning and knowledge management. In
short, by measuring norms and expectations, the OCI makes the concept of culture
somewhat less abstract and easier for organizational members to understand and
manage.

The OCI circumplex

The 12 sets of behavioral norms measured by the OCI are graphically represented
using a circumplex, a circular diagram on which the distance between behavioral
norms reflects their degree of similarity and correlation. The collection of behavioral
norms, and their placement around the circle, enables respondents to generate a holistic
and meaningful profile of the culture of their organizations (Guttman, 1954). The
behavioral norms measured by the OCI were identified and positioned around the
circumplex on the basis of the interpersonal personality system proposed by Leary
(1957) and research on personality by McClelland et al. (1953), Rogers (1961), Horney
(1954), and others. Developmental work was especially influenced by research on
human needs (e.g. Maslow, 1954, 1959) and the extensive body of literature on
leadership styles (e.g. Katz et al., 1959; Stodgill, 1963). As noted above, the location of
the behavioral norms on the circumplex is based on the extent to which they emphasize
a concern for people versus tasks (Katz et al., 1959; Stodgill, 1963) and promote
behaviors leading to the fulfillment of satisfaction versus security needs (Maslow,
1959, 1970). The norms on the right side of the OCI Circumplex reflect expectations for
behaviors that are people-oriented; those on the left side reflect expectations for
behaviors that are relatively task-oriented. Norms toward the top of the OCI
Circumplex promote behaviors that are directed toward the fulfillment of higher-order
satisfaction needs; those near the bottom promote behaviors directed toward the
fulfillment of lower-order security needs. As shown in Figure 1, each set of norms falls
into one of three groups representing the aggregate cultural styles.
JMP
21,8

714

Figure 1.
The Human Synergistics
OCI circumplex

The statistically-normed OCI Circumplex allows members of an organization to

compare their results to those of others who have completed the inventory. The bold
center ring on the OCI profile reflects the median score for each of the twelve sets. More
specifically, the concentric circles (from the center of the profile outward) represent the
10th, 25th, 50th, 75th, 90th and 99th percentiles, or progressively stronger norms along
each of the 12 sets.

The impact of organizational culture

The culture of an organization is shaped by many factors – some of which can be
changed, and some of which might be intractable. Organizations adapt to their external
environments by designing responsive structures and systems, adopting relevant
technologies, and developing and harvesting members’ skills and qualities (Cooke and
Szumal, 2000). Though constrained by its environment, an organization makes a
number of “choices” which, collectively, eventually define its culture. These choices are
influenced by the philosophy of the organization, the values of top management, and Dysfunctional
the “assumptions” of founding principals and succeeding generations of organizational culture
leaders (Schein, 1983; Sathe, 1985). Beyond the assumptions held by leaders, their skills
and qualities (including their personal styles and leadership strategies) have a
profound impact on organizational culture. This impact can be positive and
transformational (e.g. Kouzes and Posner, 2002) – sending signals for
achievement-oriented and cooperative behaviors and thereby creating and 715
reinforcing a constructive culture. However, this impact can alternatively be
negative and dysfunctional (e.g. Kets de Vries and Miller, 1986; Litzky et al., 2006) –
implicitly requiring passive and aggressive behaviors and creating a defensive culture.
Our model of the role of organizational culture (see Figure 2) proposes a causal
chain –from antecedents, to culture, through to outcomes –that is consistent with
earlier models developed for the OCI (Cooke, 1989; Cooke and Szurnal, 2000) and the
parallel work of Kilmann et al. (1985). Our model is also consistent with more recent
work on organizational culture and related constructs, exemplified by the writings of
Collins and Porras (1994), Lawler (1996), Ulrich (1997), and Pfeffer and Sutton (2000).
The conceptual and theoretical frameworks that most closely correspond to those
developed for the OCI (Cooke, 1989) perhaps are those proposed by Kotter and Heskett
(1992). Their descriptive and retrospective study of the effects of “adaptive” versus
“non-adaptive” cultures on problem solving, innovation, and organizational
performance lend some independent support for the OCI model and the proposition
that constructive (as opposed to defensive) norms lead to organizational effectiveness.
Though organizational effectiveness is influenced by a myriad of factors, we posit
that the norms quantified by the OCI have an impact that is discernable and
significant. Specifically, strong norms for constructive behaviors should lead to
desirable outcomes and should minimize undesirable outcomes. Constructive norms
promote achievement-oriented and cooperative behaviors which should promote
individual-level outcomes such as satisfaction, organizational outcomes including

Figure 2.
The organizational
culture –performance
driver relationship
JMP quality of service, and ultimately knowledge management processes. Conversely,
21,8 expectations for defensive behaviors should have the opposite impact according to our
model of how culture works. Defensive norms create pressures for dependent and
avoidant (passive) and/or power-oriented and internally competitive styles (aggressive)
and, in turn, are dysfunctional for both the organization and its members. Specifically,
targeting outcomes at the level of organizational members, we predict:
716
H1a. Constructive cultural norms will be positively related to individual outcomes
such as role clarity, communication quality, organizational fit and job
satisfaction and negatively related to members’ comfort with those norms.
H2a. Defensive cultural norms (both passive and aggressive) will be negatively
related to individual outcomes such as role clarity, communication quality,
organizational fit and job satisfaction and positively related to members’
comfort with those norms.
Similar patterns of relationships have been found between the OCI culture styles and
individual outcomes, including stress (van der Velde and Class, 1995) and member
satisfaction (McDaniel and Stumpf, 1995; Rousseau, 1990; Klein et al., 1995b). Further
insight into the impact of operating cultures on employees is provided by other studies
that have incorporated the OCI instrument. For example, Haley (1998) found that
constructive norms were positively associated with affective commitment (that is,
commitment based on emotional attachment to the organization). On the other hand,
Lahiry (1994) found that defensive norms (particularly passive/defensive) were
positively related to continuance commitment (that is, people staying with their
organizations because they feel that the costs of leaving are relatively great). In another
study, Weidner (1997) observed a significant and positive relationship between
constructive norms and the trust of hospital personnel in their supervisors and the
organization.
Quality of customer service is a commonly measured organizational outcome in
studies of culture. The need for organizations to gain greater knowledge of their
cultures to not only improve customer service and preserve customer loyalty but also
increase revenue streams has never been stronger. Klein et al. (1995a) analyses suggest
that a positive outlook, combined with employees’ perceptions of control led to
improved customer service. Quality of customer service has also been considered in a
number of cultural analyses of health care organizations (e.g. Shortell et al., 1991;
Komoski-Goeffert, 1994; Haley, 1998; Gillett and Stenfer-Kroese, 2003). Haley (1998) is
particularly interesting in that it included patient satisfaction data and other quality
indicators (e.g. “untoward events” such as medication error rates and patient falls).
Consistent with her hypotheses and our model, patient satisfaction was positively
related to humanistic (constructive) norms and negatively related to Dependent
(passive/defensive) norms. However, rates of medication errors and patient falls
unexpectedly appeared to be higher in units with constructive cultures and lower in
units with defensive cultures. Based on qualitative data collected on the units and
previous research on the discrepancies between the number of untoward events that
actually occur in hospitals and the number that are reported, Haley (1998) proposed
that constructive norms encourage and permit nurses to report problems; in contrast,
defensive norms may impede organizational transparency by forcing members to look Dysfunctional
good and please those in positions of authority. culture
Beyond quality of service, cross-sectional studies on culture have considered a
number of other organizational-level outcomes (Szumal, 1998). A post-hoc analysis of
OCI data on supermarkets (Human Synergistics, 1986) showed that Achievement
(constructive) norms were positively related to sales per square foot of selling space as
well as to subjective measures of store effectiveness. Klein (1992) found a significant 717
relationship between the strength of constructive norms and sales growth in a study of
apparel stores. Thornbury’s (1994) study of 17 units of four European companies
showed that effectiveness in dealing with change was positively related to constructive
norms and negatively related to passive/defensive norms. Rousseau (1990) study of
multiple units of a large fund – raising organization demonstrated that
passive/defensive norms were negatively related to the generation of revenues.
Evidence that the norms measured by the OCI are causally related to organizational
performance is also provided by cultural change programs that have been evaluated
longitudinally (Dale, 1997; Human Synergistics, 1998; Sarkis et al., 1992; United Auto
Workers, 1990; Workforce, 1998). Such programs were designed to bring about cultural
change and performance improvements by means of interventions directed at systems,
structures, technologies, and/or members’ skills. Although not based on controlled
experimental designs, these practitioner-led field studies lend support to the notion that
culture has an impact on effectiveness.
Considered together, there is considerable evidence that culture is directly related to
organizational-level performance drivers, many of which bear directly on efficiency
and effectiveness, and conversely, to dysfunctional consequences. The present study
examines a number of these relationships. Consistent with the studies cited above:
H1b. Constructive cultural norms will be positively related to organizational
outcomes such as commitment to customer service, perceived quality of
products and services, organizational adaptability and quality of the
workplace and negatively related to members’ intention to leave the
organization.
H2b. Defensive cultural norms (both passive and aggressive) will be negatively
related with organizational outcomes such as commitment to customer
service, perceived quality of products and services, organizational
adaptability and quality of the workplace and positively related to
members’ intentions to leave the organization.
To test our hypotheses, we present a secondary analysis of data provided by members
of organizations using the OCI and a case study comparison of four state government
departments involved in an organizational change program.

Method
Sample
We analyzed data provided by 60,900 individuals whose Organizational Culture
Inventory (OCI) questionnaires were scored by the Michigan office of Human
Synergistics International between 2001 and the second quarter of 2004. These
JMP respondents represent a small but significant subset of OCI respondents in the field –
21,8 specifically, those affiliated with client organizations that requested from this
particular office a comprehensive computer-generated report on their culture. (Most of
the surveys are self-scored or processed by the other offices of Human Synergistics.)
The broad sample represents the demographics of organizations in America in terms of
gender, age, ethnicity, education, organizational type, profession/occupations of
718 respondents, and organizational or managerial level.
The number of men and women in the sample was roughly equal: 54 percent male, 46
percent female. Respondents’ ethnicity was predominantly White/Caucasian (83 percent)
with 7 percent identifying themselves as Black/African American, 4 percent as Asian,
and 4 percent as Hispanic. Approximately 2 percent of the respondents identified
themselves as “other” or opted not to respond to the question regarding ethnicity. The
respondents ranged in age from 20 to over 60. The modal age range was 40 to 49,
comprising 33 percent of the sample, with those between 30 and 39 comprising the next
largest segment at 29 percent of the sample. A majority (82 percent) indicated at least
some college education, with 48 percent holding a Bachelor’s or higher-level degree. The
participants identified themselves as members of various types of organizations
[including manufacturing (22 percent), transportation/distribution (13 percent), financial
and insurance (11 percent), health care (8 percent), public sector (7 percent), retail (6
percent), educational (6 percent), and non-profits (3 percent), among others] and
occupations [including general management (18 percent), engineering (11 percent),
administrative and clerical (9 percent), production (7 percent), sales (6 percent), direct
labor (4 percent), among others]. The sample consists of respondents at all organizational
levels, including non-management (55 percent), line management (13 percent), middle
management (16 percent), senior management (5 percent), executive/senior
vice-president (1.4 percent), CEO/president (0.4 percent), and owner (0.3 percent).

Independent variables
The OCI contains 96 items designed to produce 12 scales of eight items each. Each item
describes a behavior or personal style that might be expected of members of an
organization. On a scale of 1 to 5, respondents are asked to indicate the extent to which
each behavior is expected or implicitly required (of them and people like themselves) in
their organization. Responses to the items associated with the scales are summed to
derive estimates of the strength of each of the 12 behavioral norms within the
organization. Descriptions of the 12 cultural norms measured by the OCI, along with
illustrative items, are provided below:
(1) 1 o’clock position: A Hurnanistic-encouraging culture characterizes
organizations that are managed in a participative and people-centered way.
Members are expected to be supportive,constructive, and open to influence in
their dealings with one another. (Helping others to grow and develop; taking
time with people.)
(2) 2 o’clock position: An Affiliative culture characterizes organizations that place a
high priority on constructive interpersonal relationships. Members are expected
to be friendly, open, and sensitive to the satisfaction of their work group.
(Dealing with others in a friendly way, sharing feelings and thoughts.)
 (3) 3 o’clock position: An Approval culture describes organizations in which Dysfunctional
conflicts are avoided and interpersonal relationships are pleasant – at least culture
superficially. Members feel that they should agree with, gain the approval of,
and be liked by others. (Making sure people accept you; “going along” with
others.)
(4) 4 o’clock position: A Conventional culture is descriptive of organizations that are
conservative, traditional, and bureaucratically controlled. Members are
719
expected to conform, follow the rules, and make a good impression. (Always
following policies and practices; fitting into the “mold”.)
(5) 5 o’clock position: A Dependent culture is descriptive of organizations that are
hierarchically controlled and non-participative. Centralized decision making in
such organizations leads members to do only what they are told and to clear all
decisions with superiors. (Pleasing those in positions of authority, doing what is
expected.)
(6) 6 o’clock position: An avoidance culture characterizes organizations that fail to
reward success but nevertheless punish mistakes. This negative reward system
leads members to shift responsibilities to others and avoid any possibility of
being blamed for a mistake. (Waiting for others to act first, taking few chances.)
(7) 7 o’clock position: An oppositional culture describes organizations in which
confrontation prevails and negativism is rewarded. Members gain status and
influence by being critical and thus are reinforced to oppose the ideas of others
and to make safe (but ineffectual) decisions. (Pointing out flaws; being hard to
impress.)
(8) 8 o’clock position: A power culture is descriptive of non-participative
organizations structured on the basis of the authority inherent in members’
positions. Members believe they will be rewarded for taking charge, controlling
subordinates and, at the same time, being responsive to the demands of superiors.
(Building up one’s power base; motivating others any way necessary.)
(9) 9 o’clock position: A competitive culture is one in which winning is valued and
members are rewarded for out-performing one another. People in such
operations operate in a “win-lose” framework and believe they must work
against (rather than with) their peers to be noticed. (Turning the job into a
contest, never appearing to lose.)
(10) 10 o’clock position: A Perfectionistic culture characterizes organizations in
which perfectionism, persistence, and hard work are valued. Members feel they
must avoid all mistakes, keep track of everything, and work long hours to attain
narrowly-defined objectives. (Doing things perfectly, keeping on top of
everything.)
(11) 11 o’clock position: An Achievement culture characterizes organizations that do
things well and value members who set and accomplish their own goals.
Members of these organizations set challenging but realistic goals, establish
plans to reach these goals, and pursue them with enthusiasm. (Pursuing a
standard of excellence; openly showing enthusiasm.)
JMP (12) 12 o’clock position: A Self-actualization culture characterizes organizations that
21,8 value creativity, quality over quantity, and both task accomplishment and
individual growth. Members of these organizations are encouraged to gain
enjoyment from their work, develop themselves, and take on new and
interesting activities. (Thinking in unique and independent ways; doing even
simple tasks well.)
720
As stated earlier, empirical evidence for the internal consistency of the 12 scales and
their association with three different types of cultures (and therefore the construct
validity of the OCI) is provided by the results of reliability and principal components
analyses presented elsewhere (e.g. Cooke and Rousseau, 1988; Cooke and Szurnal, 1993;
Xenikou and Furnham, 1996). Means, standard deviation, and Cronbach alpha
coefficients for each scale, based on the current sample, are offered in Table I. The table
indicates that the mean scores for the four constructive styles (achievement,
self-actualizing, humanistic-encouraging, and affiliative) are higher than those for the
eight defensive styles. Since social desirability biases (i.e. the tendency to endorse
positive or desirable items and descriptions) can operate with respect to the former
items and scales, the circumplex profiles on which results are plotted are normatively
scaled to correct for such effects.

Cronbach Standard
Constructs Measurement items/first 2 order constructs n alpha Mean deviation

Constructive (CC1) Humanistic 2 encouraging scale (e.g. 59,878 0.91 3.28 1.30
culture: “help others to grow and develop”)
(CC2) Affiliative scale (e.g. “use good human 60,690 0.91 3.53 1.26
relations skills”)
(CC3) Achievement scale (e.g. “work on self-set 60,323 0.85 3.41 1.21
goals”)
(CC4) Self-actualizing scale (e.g. “emphasize 60,005 0.80 3.00 1.32
quality over quantity”)
Passive (PC1) Approval scale (e.g. “switch properties 59,985 0.80 2.71 2.01
culture: to please others”)
(PC2) Conventional scale (e.g. “rules more 60,246 0.84 3.10 1.36
important than ideas”)
(PC3) Dependent scale (e.g. “do what is 60,391 0.83 3.23 1.36
expected”)
(PC4) Avoidance scale (e.g. “take a few 59,869 0.86 2.36 1.40
chances”)
Aggressive (AC1) Oppositional scale (e.g. “look for 59,589 0.73 2.40 1.17
culture: mistakes”)
(AC2) Power scale (e.g. “use the authority of 59,829 0.85 2.61 1.51
Table I. their position”)
Constructs, example (AC3) Competitive scale (e.g. “turn the job into 59,946 0.85 2.51 1.51
items, scale reliability, contest”)
means and standard (AC4) Perfectionistic scale (e.g. “never make a 60,199 0.77 3.01 1.34
deviations mistake”)
Dependent variables Dysfunctional
The OCI includes a set of supplementary items that assess some of the outcomes of culture
culture, many of which can drive the performance and long-term effectiveness of an
organization. Results along these items provide clients with initial insights as to
whether culture change should be considered and in what direction such change should
take place. These items, which assess five outcomes pertaining to individual members
and five pertaining to the organization, are used here to test our hypotheses. 721
At the individual level, the most immediate drivers are the thinking and behavioral
styles exhibited by organizational members. Although it is imperative for all members
to be socialized into the culture, when organizational norms and expectations are weak
or inconsistent, their impact on members’ personal styles will be minimal and members
will report ambiguous roles and norms (Katz and Kahn, 1966). In contrast,
organizations with strong, positive cultures and/or effective cultural change programs
reinforce the targeted behaviors. People who “fit in” will become a node on the network
and gain influence; and those who do not will be disconnected and might eventually
leave. Those who do not fit in but stay will experience “person/norm conflict,” a source
of stress resulting from inconsistencies between personal predispositions and the
demands of the situation. Based on the work of Katz and Kahn (1966) on role conflict,
the following individual-level measures were included in the OCI (response options
ranged along a five-point Likert scale from (1) not at all to (5) to a very great extent):
. Role clarity: The extent to which organizational members know what is expected
of them.
.
Communication quality: The extent to which organizational members exchange
clear and consistent messages regarding what is expected.
.
“Fit” with organization: The extent organizational members comfortably “fit in”
the organization.
.
Behavioral conformity: The extent to which organizational members are required
to think and behave differently than otherwise would be the case (person/norm
conflict).
.
Job satisfaction: The extent to which organizational members report positive
appraisals of their work situation.

Performance drivers at the organizational or sub-unit level, while less direct and more
difficult to establish, are nevertheless important to consider. Some of these drivers are
due to the aggregated effects of norms and expectations on individual members. For
example, “quality of workplace” should be higher in organizations with Constructive
cultures than in those with defensive cultures. Similarly, turnover (based on members’
intentions to leave) should be lower in the former organizations than in the latter. The
positive drivers translate into members exercising more control at various levels of the
organization, making better decisions, and more effectively implementing decisions
and solutions. Low levels of these drivers, and intentions to leave, represent a focus on
self-protection rather than organizational goals, insularity rather than cooperation and
coordination, and rigidity as opposed to adaptability. The following
organizational-level measures were collected (response options again ranged along a
five-point Likert scale ranging from (1) not at all to (5) to a very great extent):
JMP .
Quality of products/services: The extent to which members evaluate positively
21,8 the quality of their organization’s products or services.
.
Commitment to customer service: The extent to which members make sure
customers feel good about the service provided by the organization.
.
Adaptability: The extent to which the organization responds effectively to the
722 changing needs of its customers.
.
Turnover: The extent to which members expect to leave the organization within
two years.
.
Quality of workplace: The extent to which members appraise their organization
as a good place to work.

Results
Correlations were run between the twelve cultural norms and the dependent variables
to test the hypotheses. The results, shown in Table II, support our hypotheses.
Constructive cultural norms are positively and significantly associated with members’
reports regarding role clarity, quality of communication, “fit,” and job satisfaction.
Constructive norms are negatively related to members’ reports of behavioral
conformity. Conversely, expectations for defensive behaviors (passive and aggressive)
are negatively associated with role clarity, communication quality, “fit,” and job
satisfaction and are positively associated with behavioral conformity.
Examining the drivers of organizational performance (Table III), constructive
norms are positively associated with quality of products and services, commitment to
customer service, adaptability, and the quality of the workplace. Constructive norms
are also negatively related to turnover intentions. Conversely, expectations for
defensive behaviors are negatively related to quality of products and services,

Role Communication “Fit” with Behavioral Job

clarity quality organization conformity satisfaction

Constructive: Humanistic-
encouraging 0.43* 0.33* 0.48* 20.25* 0.53*
Affiliative 0.43* 0.29* 0.45* 20.23* 0.50*
Achievement 0.42* 0.28* 0.43* 20.20* 0.48*
Self-
actualization 0.42* 0.28* 0.46* 20.20* 0.52*
Passive: Approval 20.16* 20.31* 20.20* 0.31* 20.20*
Conventional 20.17* 20.37* 20.27* 0.33* 20.29*
Dependent 20.16* 20.35* 20.25* 0.30* 20.27*
Avoidance 20.36* 20.45* 20.39* 0.40* 20.42*
Aggressive: Oppositional 20.13* 20.27* 20.17* 0.29* 20.17*
Power 20.24* 20.38* 20.31* 0.37* 20.33*
Competitive 20.15* 20.29* 20.20* 0.31* 20.19*
Table II. Perfectionistic 20.03* 20.26* 20.11* 0.26* 20.14*
Correlations between Number of
organizational culture respondents 60,742 60,693 60,615 60,531 60,670
and individual
performance drivers Note: * Significant p , 0.01
 Dysfunctional
Quality of Quality of
products/ customer Quality of culture
services service Adaptability Turnover workplace

Constructive: Humanistic-
encouraging 0.46* 0.40* 0.42* 20.31* 0.54*
Affiliative 0.46* 0.41* 0.40* 20.30* 0.50* 723
Achievement 0.46* 0.39* 0.40* 20.29* 0.48*
Self-
actualization 0.44* 0.41* 0.42* 20.30* 0.52*
Passive: Approval 20.14* 20.08* 20.12* 0.13* 20.20*
Conventional 20.19* 20.12* 20.18* 0.14* 20.30*
Dependent 20.17* 20.12* 20.16* 0.13* 20.29*
Avoidance 20.37* 20.28* 20.33* 0.25* 20.42*
Aggressive: Oppositional 20.17* 20.09* 20.10* 0.12* 20.17*
Power 20.26* 20.20* 20.23* 0.20* 20.34*
Competitive 20.13* 20.08* 20.11* 0.14* 20.19*
Perfectionistic 20.04* 0.00 20.04* 0.08* 20.14* Table III.
Number of Correlations between
respondents: 60,334 60,391 60,578 60,532 60,651 organizational culture
and organizational
Note: * Significant p , 0.01 performance drivers

commitment to customer service, adaptability and quality of the workplace and

positively related to intention to leave.
The results presented in Tables III and IV clearly demonstrate the relationships that
exist between the OCI cultural styles and performance drivers. Although correlations do
not imply causation, the results suggest that impacting on one variable may cause
another to change. This is a key underlying tenet of any cultural transformation
initiative. As the culture-outcome frameworks presented here and elsewhere (Cooke and
Szurnal, 2000) suggest, alignment of the organization’s structure, systems, technology,

Success predictors Dept. 1 Dept. 2 Dept. 3 Dept. 4

Individual outcomes: Role clarity C C C C

Communication quality C B C B
“Fit” with organization B A B C
Behavioral conformity C B C C
Job satisfaction C C C C
Organizational outcomes: Quality of prod./serv. C C C C
Commitment to customer service C C C C
Adaptability B A C B
Turnover B C B A
Quality of workplace C B C C
Totals: 0 “A” 2 “A” 0 “A” 1 “A”
3 “B” 3 “B” 2 “B” 2 “B”
7 “C” 5 “C” 8 “C” 7 “C” Table IV.
Departments’
Notes: “A” ¼ at or better than the constructive benchmark; “B” ¼ at or better than the historic performance driver
average; “C” ¼ not as good as the historical average and constructive benchmark scorecard
JMP and skills/qualities with organizational values, philosophy, and mission is critical. This
alignment cannot be assumed or taken for granted, as the following results illustrate:
21,8 .
Of the respondents, 11 percent in the current sample report little or no role
clarity;
.
Only 55 percent of respondents feel they “fit in” as members of their
organization;
724 .
A total of 27 percent of respondents do not believe that their organization adapts
to the changing needs of their customers;
.
Only 11 percent would not recommend their organization to potential customers;
.
A total of 17 percent of respondents are dissatisfied being a member of their
current organization;
.
Of the respondents, 21 percent would not recommend their organization as a
good place to work.

The case of four state departments

A state government involved in an organizational change initiative administered the
OCI to members of four different departments to generate baseline data on their
cultures. Their results are presented here to demonstrate how the OCI can be used to
evaluate operating efficiency and effectiveness. The results also illustrated, for the
client organization, that the more effective departments established systems,
structures and skills and qualities (particularly at the leadership level) that
promoted more Constructive and less defensive cultures.
The departments’ OCI results are plotted on the circumplex discussed above. Styles
at the top of the diagram (11 o’clock to 2 o’clock positions) are constructive; styles
toward the lower right (3 o’clock to 6 o’clock positions) are passive/defensive; and
styles toward the lower right (7 o’clock to 10 o’clock positions) are
aggressive/defensive. As noted earlier, the bold ring (3rd ring from the center)
identifies the 50th percentile. Scores above this ring are higher than those for the
median organizations; scores below are lower than the median. The styles that are the
most extended from the center of the circumplex are those that best describe the
departments’ current operating cultures.
Figure 3 shows that Department 3 has the most defensive and least constructive
culture of the four departments. On Department 3’s profile, seven of the eight defensive
styles extend beyond the 50th percentile and all four of the constructive styles hover
around the 25th percentile. More specifically, the culture of Department 3 is
passive/defensive, with avoidance and conventional behaviors as the dominant norms.
Department 2 has the least defensive culture of the four. While all the other
departments exhibit at least three defensive styles at or above the 50th percentile,
Department 2 has only two such styles at or above the 50th percentile. In addition, only
Department 2 has a constructive style (achievement) as one of its two most extended
behavioral norms. While Department 4’s profile shows extensions in the constructive
cluster that are even greater than some of those shown in Department 2’s profile, its
strongest cultural norms overall are passive/defensive. Based on these OCI profiles and
our research model, we would expect Department 2 to perform the most favorably and
Department 3 to perform the least favorably in terms of efficiency and effectiveness.
 Dysfunctional
culture

725

Figure 3.
OCI profiles of four state
departments

A scorecard of the departments’ operating efficiency and effectiveness was constructed

by comparing each department’s outcomes to the “Historical Averages” (based on over
1,000 organizational units) and “Constructive Benchmarks” (based on 172
organizational units with predominantly constructive cultures as measured by the
OCI). The Historical Average describes the results achieved by the average
organization whereas the constructive benchmark defines the results attained by the
most constructive and effective organizations in the norming sample. These
comparisons are shown in Table IV. Departments received an “A” in areas where
their results are the same or better than the constructive benchmark, a “B” where their
results are the same as or better than the Historical Average (but not at the level of the
Constructive Benchmark), and a “C” where their results are less favorable than both the
Historical Average and constructive benchmark.
JMP Consistent with the research model, Department 3 (which has the most defensive
21,8 and least constructive culture) is the least efficient and effective of the four
departments. Of the ten outcomes measured, Department 3 scored at or better than
average along only two outcomes – turnover and “fit” with the organization. Also
consistent with expectations, Department 2 (which has the least defensive culture) is
the most effective and efficient of the departments surveyed. Of the ten measures,
726 Department 2 scored at or better than the constructive benchmark along two outcomes
(“fit” and adaptability) and at or better than the Historical Average along three other
outcomes (behavioral conformity, communication quality, and quality of the
workplace).

Discussion
Results of this study, including the secondary analysis of over 60,000 respondents and
the comparison of four state government departments involved in an organizational
change initiative, illustrate how the OCI can be used to understand the relationship of
an organization’s culture to its efficiency and effectiveness. The correlations observed
between organizational culture and a set of performance drivers were consistent with
our predictions. Also consistent with our model, the governmental department with the
least defensive and most constructive culture was more effective in more areas than the
other departments. Similarly, the department with the most defensive culture exhibited
the weakest performance drivers.
More generally, results of the study indicate that normative beliefs and shared
behavioral expectations are quantifiable and can be used as indicators of an
organization’s or department’s culture. In contrast to the traditional use of qualitative
assessments in the study of culture (e.g. Martin and Siehl, 1983), quantitative methods
facilitate large-scale studies of organizations and their sub-units, replication, and
triangulation of other forms of assessment. Results of this study further suggest that
quantitatively assessed behavioral norms and expectations can supplement the
qualitative study of more semiotic facets of organizational culture.
Beyond facilitating the research process, quantitative devices such as the OCI have
important advantages for organization development interventions and other programs
directed toward system-wide change. Culture interventions based solely on qualitative
data collection techniques tend to be broad, and from the focal organization’s
perspective, often somewhat vague. By bringing significantly more structure to the
assessment, survey instruments like the OCI can reduce uncertainty on the part of the
focal organization and possibly improve upon its dysfunctional nature by decreasing
resistance among members to organization development and change. This resistance
can be strong given that members of organizations with aggressive/defensive cultures
are likely to challenge any type of feedback (oppositional and perfectionistic norms)
and members of organizations with passive/defensive cultures may question their
ability to effect any type of change (dependent and avoidance norms).
From the perspective of a practitioner seeking to oversee or manage the change
processes, quantitative assessments of culture such as those made possible by the OCI
can be extremely valuable. A culture analysis can identify distinct differences across
sub-units and levels, and offer specific information on features of corporate culture,
especially subgroup norms and behavior patterns, not readily available from more
global assessments. As with the government agency discussed above, departmental Dysfunctional
profiles can identify the subcultures of high-performing units, lead to an analysis of the culture
managerial styles and related factors reinforcing those subcultures, and facilitate a
“transfer” of those levers to other units. In more extreme (and negative) cases,
departmental profiles can alert managers and consultants to dysfunctional subcultures
that may be leading to paranoid and avoidant thinking (Kets de Vries and Miller, 1986),
corrupt and unethical decisions (Anand et al., 2004), or unduly perfectionistic and 727
“addictive” behaviors (Schaef and Fassel, 1988).
Finally, while the OCI is often administered on-line or through the use of
machine-scored forms, the survey is also available as a self-scored inventory. In our
experience, participants in culture assessments respond very favorably to the
self-scoring feature of the OCI, which allows them to get immediate feedback on how
they as individuals view the behavioral norms within their organization or sub-unit.
This feedback not only facilitates the process of debriefing participants, but also
involves them in discussion and interpretation of their profiles in comparison to those
of other respondents, a feature useful in both validating and making sense of the data
the OCI provides. In this manner, cultural assessment and interpretation can be both
public and participative, thereby promoting perceived legitimacy, commitment to
change, and battling dysfunctional behavior.

Conclusion
Political and social realities shape all forms of human conduct within and between
organizations and their partners. Regardless of professionalism and professed or
assumed goal sharing or congruency, organizational members may not behave in ways
that promote efficiency and effectiveness if doing so is inconsistent with their reference
prevailing culture. Within any organization there may be a variety of cultures, shaped
by characteristic differences in professional orientation, status, history, power,
visibility, or other factors. In this paper we have shown that understanding these
cultures in terms of expected behaviors and norms can explain why some
organizational units (or the entire organization) exhibit dysfunctional behaviors that
are counter to the organization’s expressed values or mission, and which hamper
efficiency and effectiveness. We have also presented a validated technology for cultural
assessment that can be used at many levels, from individual to enterprise, which
identifies these underlying cultural components. Clearly, fixing dysfunctional
organizations requires first and foremost insights into the relatively tangible aspects
of their culture that is reflected in the behaviors that members believe are expected of
them.

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Further reading
Tannenbaum, A.S. (1968), Control in Organizations, McGraw-Hill, New York, NY.

Corresponding author
Pierre A. Balthazard can be contacted at: pb@asu.edu

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www.emeraldinsight.com/0268-3946.htm

High toxicity
High toxicity leadership leadership
Borderline personality disorder and the
dysfunctional organization
Alan Goldman 733
Arizona State University, Glendale, Arizona, USA

Abstract
Purpose – This paper aims to assess highly toxic personality disorders in leaders, implications for
organizations, and methods for assessment and intervention.
Design/methodology/approach – Action research was used, including a thick description case
study narrative and application of the DSM IV-TR.
Findings – Personality disorders are a source of a highly toxic and dysfunctional organizational
behavior; borderline personality disorder in a leader may serve as a systemic contaminant for an
organization.
Research limitations/implications – A qualitative, case study approach may not lend itself to
replication or quantification; usage of the DSM IV-TR requires clinical training in counseling
psychology; the growing incidence of personality disorders in leadership warrants cognizance, ability
to assess, the creation of early detection systems and methods of intervention.
Practical implications – Through the narrative of a case study researchers and practitioners can
obtain a glimpse into the day-to-day operations and nuances of a highly toxic leader and how it
impacts an organization; interventions and solutions are provided.
Originality/value – This paper calls attention to highly toxic leadership and organizational
dysfunction by investigating borderline personality disorder as a prototype.
Keywords Personality, Organizations, Leadership, Behaviour
Paper type Research paper

Management scholars and practitioners have increasingly identified interrelationships

between leadership and organizational dysfunction (e.g. see Frost, 2003; Kellerman,
2004; Levinson, 1972, 1976; Lowman, 2002; Lubit, 2004; Fox and Spector, 2005).
Notably absent in the analysis of dysfunction is an explicit, systematic examination of
high toxicity leadership and its impact upon organizational systems (e.g. see Goldman,
2005). In this paper I identify borderline personality disorder as a prototype of
preexisting toxic behavior centered in an individual leader and permeating throughout
an organization. At stake is the ability to assess and provide interventions for what I
herein term “high toxicity” or extreme levels of dysfunctional leadership and
organizational contamination as epitomized in personality disorders (e.g. see American
Psychiatric Association, 2000; Maccoby, 2000, 2003). The farther reaches of
dysfunctional and highly toxic behavior was captured in a statement by Kets de
Vries when he explained that “some leaders go far beyond the abnormal ways of
functioning. . .they go off the deep end” (Kets de Vries, 1995, p. 217). Through the
presentation of a clinical case study utilizing the DSM IV-TR (American Psychiatric Journal of Managerial Psychology
Vol. 21 No. 8, 2006
Association, 2000) as a tool for assessment, I provide a narrative of a dysfunctional pp. 733-746
leader and organization suffering from borderline personality disorder (see Appendix q Emerald Group Publishing Limited
0268-3946
for BPD diagnostic criteria). The analysis and description is a product of my position DOI 10.1108/02683940610713262
JMP as an action researcher alternately occupying roles of executive coach, management
21,8 consultant and psychotherapist. The names of individuals and organizations have
been changed in line with the privileged communication status of the consultation.
Following presentation of the case study I engage in a discussion of limitations,
generalizability and implications for future research and consultations.

734 Borderline personality disordered leadership

Dysfunctional background narrative
Favio Burnstein is a very strong personality at Sergio Mondo Fashion House in Miami
Beach, Florida. As Senior Manager of the Creative Designs R&D Division, Burnstein
has achieved legendary status. As some of the designers put it, “when Favio is good, he
is very, very good, and when he is bad, he is wicked.” The “good” Favio has brought
Sergio Mondo Fashion House (SMFH) from obscurity to international acclaim in a
period of five years. When Favio first walked in the door he took on a new wave, punk,
hip hop, MTV styled fashion house with a clientele in their late teens and early
twenties. Favio brought a sleek international mentality and energy to SMFH,
combining the best of high courtier from houses in Milan, Rome, Manhattan, London
and Paris. Under the tutelage of Burnstein, SMFH graduated from the MTV genre into
a sophisticated, high end, mature, worldclass universe of high fashion and
international runways. Within a matter of a few years, Hollywood starlets,
European royalty, and players around the globe wanted to step onto the red carpet
in Favio’s Fashions. Favio Burnstein made such a splash, that his designs were more
associated with “Favio” than with Sergio Mondo. But the CEO and CFO of Sergio
Mondo Fashion House were tickled with the newly found status and success and were
more concerned with keeping their celebrated leader happy than with questions
surrounding who was upstaging whom. This was not about who took the bows and
got the recognition. SMFH’s top brass lived and breathed success and they were
enamored with Favio Burnstein. Favio was their ticket to be discussed in the same
breath with Armani, Versace and the top international fashion houses.
Concerning his personal demeanor and physical presence at SMFH, Favio was
“hard not to notice”. As stated by Joyce Ferber, one of the designers, “Favio was all
business but seemed to wear his personality and private life on his sleeve.” Burnstein
made it perfectly clear that he was a frequent gambler. Favio talked of his escapades at
the dog track, with the ponies and in Las Vegas and Atlantic City. On some Monday
mornings, Favio was on top of the world and other Mondays he was in the dog house. It
all depended on how his impulsive and chronic gambling habit went that weekend.
And he always bragged about his “speeding tickets” and the “scam of photo radar”.
There were some days that Favio shifted into his “soccer identity” and spoke of how
he used to play goalie in “the old country” and he questioned “what in the world am I
doing in this selfish fashion industry?” It was curious to hear a leader talk that seemed
to openly debate what he had made of his life and whether he was in the right
profession. There were days when Favio appeared very manly in his dress and manner
and other days when he was in the words of Joyce Ferber, “south of a metrosexual.” As
Morty, a colleague, put it, “there are days when Favio claims to be a man’s man and
other days when he tries to convince everyone that he is bisexual or gay.” It wasn’t so
much that anyone in the workplace really cared. It was just that Favio made a spectacle
of himself. According to Morty, “Favio is so colorful and full of personality, but he also
seems so unsure of who he really is. Will the real Favio please stand!” In his High toxicity
relationships with staff and designers, one day Favio put subordinates on a pedestal. leadership
But according to Morty, “first you walk on water and you’re a saint and a week later
Favio speaks to you in front of all your peers like you were a lower life form emerging
from middle earth.” There were many times when Favio was the center of attention and
kept all conversations going. Other times, he appeared lonely, very depressed, and he
had been abandoned by his wife, his best friends, and “booted in the butt” by the 735
company in Rome that “he put on the map”. Any talk about Favio has to recall that
infamous “prime time” evening when Favio and everybody were frantically working
on designs for a “through-the-roof” client from Paris. The stress level was surreal and
Favio pulled an all nighter. The next morning, the workplace discovered that Favio
had slit his wrists, turned suicidal and that 911 was called by Charlie Cement, the
nighttime janitor. Favio survived that one, but suffice to say, Favio is a load! After that
drama, Favio’s reputation became quite dark and legendary around Sergio Mondo.
As a leader, Favio was obviously flamboyant, dramatic, deeply troubled and
enigmatic. He engulfed, lifted and confused his workforce. In the final analysis, Favio
took his employees on a wild, steeplechase ride, through praise, hyper compassion and
wild success, to depression, anger and despair. The workplace seemed to take on
characteristics of Favio’s personality. Francesca, a former model turned fashion
designer, in her late thirties, was initially put on a pedestal by Favio. She was beautiful
and brilliantly creative. Favio raved incessantly about Francesca’s designs at SMFH
meetings and wrote e-mails to the entire staff inviting them to emulate the “elegant and
innovative, Ms. Francesca Jerry,” and follow suit. She was treated as if she was a
princess, and a brilliant one at that. Favio clearly idealized Francesca and held her up
as a role model. Although other designers might come up with an excellent innovation,
it was always a question of “finally reaching Francesca standards”. Favio would say,
“for us to break through the fashion industry’s roof and sail toward the sky and rain on
the design world, we do as Favio and Francesca does.” But, when it was a bleak day
and mood, Favio turned around and trashed his own designs and entire career and
pulled Francesca down with him. The workplace was flabbergasted.
Ironically, it was Francesca who first spoke up with human resources by expressing
her “deep concerns about Favio and what the hell is going on around here”. Francesca
later filed an internal grievance against Favio Burnstein for “extreme cruelty and
barbarism in the workplace” and for “harassment, sexism and discrimination that I
wouldn’t wish on a dog or a pig”. The grievances filed with the human resources
department were questionably handled, and according to the plaintiff, Francesca
received little if any satisfaction. Ms. Francesca Jarry followed with a civil law suit
alleging harassment, workplace discrimination and cruelty against Sergio Mondo
Fashion House and Favio Burnstein.
At the point where Ms Jarry filed her law suit, the CEO, Calvin Rodriguez attempted
to more directly engage HR and the Employee Assistant Program in conflict resolution
and in a possible assessment or counseling of Mr Burnstein. Favio appeared to be
stigmatized by any questioning of his sanity and made it perfectly clear to the CEO and
HR that he did not want “to be seen in EAP or anywhere near the seventh floor or
everyone would think that I went postal and I’m a lunatic”. Apparently, the EAP
offices were located on the seventh floor and any time spent on this floor of the SMFH
building earned you an instant reputation as “loco en la cabeza”. In response to their
JMP inability to initiate any internal remedies and the escalating grievances and charges
21,8 against Favio Burnstein, Sergio Mondo was not only concerned, they were very
perplexed. Apparently, Ms Jarry’s experiences were not unique. It was reported by HR
that Favio Burnstein had a “very erratic personality and way of dealing with
employees”. It was stated that Favio alternated between praising employee
accomplishments in a grandiose fashion and devaluating and outrageously
736 humiliating and belittling these same designers on other occasions. To make the
company crisis even more acute, Favio’s outbursts of adoring adulation and disgust
and debunking were always conducted in public. Saving face for employees was not
high on Favio Burnstein’s list of leadership skills. Another staff member reported that
“Favio turned livid and totally crazy when I was exactly nine minutes late to a meeting
due to the fact that they closed part of the highway that I drive on to get to work”. The
employee stated that she attempted to tell her reason for being late to Favio but he
“refused to hear me and ranted and raved and acted like I killed his father or something
by coming late. He was screaming in front of everyone and he scared the holy ghost out
of me. He scared everybody! You could hear his wild, screaming, ranting psycho voice
14 miles from here!”
In narrative interviews with employees, anecdotal evidence revealed that Favio was
equally unpredictable in his socializing with subordinates. Some days Favio would
spring for lunch, take two employees out and treat them like they were international
movie stars. Three weeks later, the same employees were out at lunch with Favio and
he sneered, treated them like inferiors and dogs, and snickered about the “fifth class
designs” that they were turning out. Favio humiliated his employees in public. He was
widely known for kicking his voice up several octaves and screaming obscenities at the
top of his lungs. Francesca Jarry added that Favio got irate with her at a weekly
designers’ meeting and cried out in public that she was a “third class human being who
should go back to the third world”. Jarry stated that “Favio was so angry that he spit
on the floor behind me. I was walking out of the room to get away from him and the
whole humiliation”. The “third world” ranting was of particular concern to Francesca
since she was originally from Quito, Ecuador, and felt that she “was being demeaned
and diversity laws were being trampled on”. Overall, designers and staff interviewed
reported that Favio’s personality was “beyond bizarre” and was “unpredictable and
erratic in the most dramatic, unbelievable and scariest kind of way”.

Initial assessment
Sergio Mondo Fashion House is a smaller company with 711 employees. A total of 212
employees were under the leadership of Favio Burnstein’s “design division”. Over a
period of approximately ten months, nine complaints and five formal grievances were
filed with HR. Some of these employees were also in consultation with the employee
assistance program. Of these, two were escalated into pending formal litigation. The
majority of the allegations contained references to the type of behavior already
referenced. HR and the Sergio Mondo CEO, Calvin Rodriguez, wanted to handle this
problem “in the most discreet manner possible”. Rodriguez had been concerned all
along about the Americans with Disability Act rights afforded Favio, and the fact that
if he had any “official” mental or emotional problems that this was all protected as
privileged information. Meanwhile, HR and the EAP attempted on numerous occasions
to sit down with disgruntled employees and with Mr Burnstein to attempt to find
reasons and solutions for these workplace conflicts. The disturbances reached a High toxicity
crescendo when there were allegations from a top designer, Miles Berish, that “Favio leadership
purposefully gave me six assignments over two days so that I would fall on my face.
When I questioned him, he told me, and I quote “you should forget about your personal
life, Miles, if you want to be a designer under me. You are lucky I am even giving you
three seconds of my time, you gnat”. Once again, Favio got so angry that he spit on the
ground near Mr Berish and slammed his fist through a thin wood door, drilling a hole 737
through the wood and fracturing a bone in his right hand. Another grievant alleged
that “Favio complemented my work at our weekly meeting and later that same day
called me vile names in an e-mail that he sent to about 90 people in our division that I
work with everyday!” Still another grievance reported that Favio Burnstein “cursed me
out in front of two of our biggest clients and accounts and he set me and our company
up for failure. We lost the clients because he had an indignant tantrum! Am I dreaming
or is this sucker sick?”

HR contacts the consultant/executive coach

The HR department contacted me after 13 months of complaints and faced with two
potential legal cases. They invited me in for a series of three long talks that included
the CEO, Calvin Rodriguez, and a representative of the EAP. They were extremely
concerned with internal grievances, pending litigation and a massive, destructive trend
in the design division. Clearly making the point that design was their “bread and
butter,” CEP Rodriguez disclosed that Sergio Mondo had lost four “very substantial
accounts” over the last six months. Over the past year and a half, “since Favio got
weird,” they had a net loss of approximately 12 key clients. Their company was “going
in the dumpers” and “all roads seemed to point back to Favio Burnstein”. They were
convinced that there was no quick solution and they had tried to talk with Favio on
numerous occasions and they came up “empty”. They were still struck by his track
record and talents and dumbfounded by the downward spiral. Since the Favio problem
emerged turnover had reached epidemic proportions. Turnover was always high in the
design division but it had “gone through the roof” since Favio “turned psycho”.
In the process of conducting a limited organizational needs assessment, including
semi-structured narrative interviews of chief officers and the director of HR, I found out
that despite everything, Sergio Mondo did not necessarily want to fire Favio. I
uncovered little if any client or organizational resistance from executive management
and HR, and rather found an extraordinarily high level of support for a consultation.
Clearly, the top brass had already conducted their own needs assessment but this
turned out to be fairly consistent with my own assessment. CEO Rodriguez and the
director of HR, Manny White, felt “strangely stuck with the loco genius” and wanted to
see whether they could “salvage his brilliant and innovative side and get his personal
garbage out of the picture”. They genuinely wanted to explore and get to the bottom of
all the conflicts and see whether Burnstein could be salvaged. CEO Rodriguez made it
crystal clear that “Favio is a remarkable yet trouble man. Whatever is going on, I want
to save him and make him a fixture at Sergio Mondo. The good and brilliant Favio is
absolutely, positively irreplaceable”. Rodriguez was very much swayed by “the first
two golden years with Favio when Sergio netted in excess of 55 million dollars under
his twisted leadership and brilliance”. I was struck by the “twisted leadership”
reference.
JMP The consultation may have been initiated by a series of internal organizational
21,8 crises within the fashion division of Sergio Mondo, a condition that spread to HR and
the grievance system, but our collective needs assessment pointed toward a single,
primary source – Favio Burnstein. The next issue in the consultation strategy was
how to make initial contact with Favio. Was this going to be “required” by the CEO
and/or HR that Favio see me as a client? The decision was that HR would make a
738 “strong recommendation” that Favio consider “talking with an outside expert”. Since I
alternatively wear hats of psychotherapist, management consultant and executive
coach, how would I identify myself to Sergio Mondo, Favio and other members of the
organization? Would I risk stigmatizing Favio by referring to myself as a
psychotherapist, and positioning him as “patient?” Or would it be more comforting
to identify myself as “executive coach” or “management consultant” with Favio
occupying the role of a “client?” We collectively decided on the “executive coach” hat.
But HR had some reservations, however. In the event that my clinical psychology
background pointed in the direction of a psychopathology, then this would have to be
appropriately addressed and might entail a changing of hats. These concerns were due
to the company’s preoccupation over the Americans with Disability Act. In the event
that Favio did have “official mental or emotional problems” and “there was a
psychological diagnosis” they recognized that the coaching might morph into a
therapeutic consultation bound by privileged communication and the fact that Favio
had significant “rights” as a mentally disabled worker who just happened to be
functioning in a leadership role. HR and the CEO asked a number of questions
concerning whether Favio would wind up being a “protected class of employee” if he
was “mental”. I referred these very delicate issues to their company lawyers and stayed
closely in the loop. I assured Rodriguez and HR that everything would remain
completely confidential and that we would consider options once we got further down
the road into the coaching situation. Inasmuch as I approached coaching with a strong
thrust of trust and relationship building and therapeutic dialogue, I anticipated that
any conversion into the psychotherapeutic realm would be fairly seamless.

Executive coaching consultations with Favio Burnstein

Mr Burnstein contacted me via e-mail and we set up a first appointment in my
professional office, miles away from Sergio Mondo. Favio was candid and savvy. He
knew something was really the matter. Favio felt “empty” and in rapid fashion
disclosed some of his concerns in the workplace and in his private life. Favio was
graphic about his substance abuse history, reckless driving record, sexual escapades
with numerous “love partners” and what he himself labeled as a “somewhat reckless
and unstable past history”. Burnstein had a pattern of very hot and cold workplace and
personal relationships, fleetingly intense and then out the door. He idealized lovers and
workers and alternatively shattered them in public, bringing them down in fits of
anger. Favio’s world was very “black and white”. His real self or identity was very
shaky and he gravitated toward extremes in his personality. You were either
completely on his side or a mortal enemy and to be scorned and shunned. Favio felt
very vulnerable in the workplace and in his personal life. He claimed that “everyone
walks out the door on me. I can’t trust that anyone will stay”. He went on to disclose
this pattern in his love and family life, and also at Sergio Mondo. Clearly, there was a
pattern of turnover and instability throughout the fashion industry and particularly in
the design division of SMFH. He said it “made him feel insecure”. He confessed that “I High toxicity
read in a paperback romance book about SAD, you know, separation anxiety disorder, leadership
and I bet I have that”. Favio desperately wanted stability in his workplace and this was
connected to his “feelings of emptiness” and several incidents where he “slit his wrists”
because “it was all crap and I couldn’t stand the stress and I desperately wanted
everyone to salute Favio and tell him I will stay with you forever”. When he suspected
that there was going to be a revolving door at Sergio Mondo, he subconsciously 739
empowered himself to be abrasive and abusive and kick designers and staff out the
door before they would have a chance to abandon him. Favio wanted to beat his
subordinates to the punch.
Working with Favio’s psychological issues as cues and prompters I gradually made
the transition from coach to psychotherapist explaining to Favio that I “wore both
hats” and that the “therapy hat would allow me to do a better, more comprehensive
job”. Favio was a bit baffled but pretty much unconcerned. I explained that in the event
that it was necessary, I might come up with a psychological diagnosis at some point in
time. Favio was agreeable. I officially announced my identity as psychotherapist. I
believe that the business, workplace and leadership “persona” of initially dealing with
an executive coach allowed Favio to open up, take down his defenses and let the
personal issues gush out. At that later point, it was not difficult to transition to
therapist inasmuch as the territory had already been entered and it was for Favio only
a slight alteration in the semantics and identity of the professional he was disclosing to.

DSM IV-TR diagnosis: individual and organizational

Over the course of several months of sessions conducted two to three times per week, I
increasingly recognized that Favio Burnstein’s erratic and destructive style of
leadership, and deeply troubled intrapersonal and interpersonal behavior was centered
in a pre-existing (prior to Sergio Mondo) “borderline personality disorder”. This
disorder (DSM IV-TR 301.83) is characterized by:
[. . .] a pervasive pattern of instability of interpersonal relationships, self-image, and affects,
and marked impulsivity that begins by early adulthood and is present in a variety of contexts
. . . (American Psychiatric Association, p. 706).
Favio had a longstanding pattern of undermining his achievements just when he was
about to reach his goal. His borderline personality disorder was prevalent when he first
dropped out of high school in the last month of his senior year and returned to obtain
his GED some five years later. Similarly, he dropped out of his Bachelor’s degree
program in college in the last semester of his senior year and returned later to obtain
that degree. This predictable pattern was repeated yet again in his MFA program
when he withdrew his senior year and returned some seven years later to complete the
degree. Ironically, after his first two years at Sergio Mondo, Favio was reaching his
goals and was very successful, exceeding all personal and company expectations in
innovation, design, expansion into an international client base, world markets and
profitability. But in typical, undermining, borderline personality disordered fashion,
Favio jumped ship and started to sabotage his efforts and the workings of his
designers and staff. His troubling and self-defeating interpersonal patterns of
destructive behavior, severe doubts regarding identity, self-worth and abandonment,
and lethal driving, gambling and promiscuity took over. The once again active
JMP borderline personality disorder was boldly expressed throughout the Sergio Mondo
21,8 workplace and Favio emanated dysfunctionality.
In addition to his pre-existing borderline personality disorder, there were
precipitating factors in the organizational environment that contributed to the
reappearance of Favio’s older symptoms. The center of the “triggering” is the
instability of the designer world and how this played into the many insecurities and
740 abandonment issues faced by Burnstein. Clearly, Favio’s personality disorder made
him a poor fit for a transient organizational culture. Favio was desperate for stability,
for a workplace that was not in constant upheaval. Although Favio was a worldclass
innovator in design and thrived on constant change in the clothing industry, a closer
examination revealed that he always did favor the “classics that never go out of style”.
In the interpersonal realm, Favio was extraordinarily vulnerable to turnover. In
examining the interface between individual leader and organizational system it is
fairly clear that in cases of leaders with pre-existing personality disorders, extremely
stressful and disruptive forces in the daily workings of company life will necessarily
fuel the pathology. The coach or consultant addresses the issues of “organizational fit”
and “triggers” and attempts to negotiate more favorable conditions alongside
treatment of the personality disorder. It is an example of blending individual
differences research with a more systems dynamics approach (e.g. see Senge, 1990; Von
Bertalanffy, 1950, 1968). In this case, Favio is extraordinarily valuable as a leader to his
company and Sergio Mondo was amenable to become more of a “learning
organization” in order to preserve their eccentric and troubled meal ticket.
The fact that Favio suffered from a long-term personality disorder in no way
diminished the severity of the abusive and harassing behavior dished out by the leader.
Many of Favio’s subordinates viewed themselves as targets of emotionally abusive
behavior characterized by “hostile verbal and nonverbal behaviors (excluding physical
contact)” (e.g. see Keashly and Harvey, 2005, p. 203). Some anecdotal reports of the
effects of emotionally abusive behavior by Favio’s subordinates included: negative
mood, anger and resentment (see Ashforth, 1997; Richman et al., 1999); anxiety (see
Tepper, 2000); decreased psychological well-being and lowered self esteem (e.g. see
Cortina et al., 2001); reduced organizational functioning and decreased job satisfaction
(e.g. see Keashly and Jagatic, 2000); job tension and greater turnover; work withdrawal
behaviors and greater intention to leave (see Harvey, 1996); increased absenteeism;
decreased productivity (e.g. see Ashforth, 1997); and decreased organizational
commitment (Duffy et al., 2002).
Through a high impact, incremental approach to executive coaching (see Schaffer,
2002) and rational-emotive psychotherapy (e.g. see Ellis, 1993), I increasingly
understood some of Favio’s internal locus of control issues and how his disordered
world is ordered. We were still left with decisions regarding individual and
organizational interventions for both Favio and Sergio Mondo Fashion House. After
diagnosing Favio with borderline personality disorder and referring him to his
internist, medication was prescribed for his personality disorder and he began a drug
treatment regiment conducted in concert with an agenda of talk therapy.
At Favio’s urging and as a result of extensive communication with Sergio Mondo’s
HR department and CEO, Calvin Rodriguez, he wanted to “open up a dialogue about
his borderline personality disorder” with key employees who had filed grievances
against him. He said that he “wanted to be a man, not give excuses, but face the facts
and clear up the mess and move on to greater things”. There was a month long delay High toxicity
due to ADA, Title I issues handled by the attorneys. Finally, Favio “received clearance leadership
to communicate and open up”. In a series of meetings and group sessions, Favio,
myself, and at times members of HR and the CEO, all participated in some key
“psychological” and “management consulting” issues aimed at reinstating the “golden
era of Favio’s first two years at Sergio Mondo”.
Improvement in the mental and emotional health of Favio Burnstein was 741
anecdotally tied to an increase in overall Sergio Mondo motivation and profits, and a
decrease in hostility, turnover and retaliation from his staff. I viewed the coaching and
psychotherapy with Burnstein and employees as part of a broader systems
consultation with Sergio Mondo. Assuming that Sergio Mondo Fashion House was a
living organizational organism and an open system (e.g. see Von Bertalanffy, 1950), I
perceived Favio as a pathological part and nexus of a systemic problem engulfing a
significant number of employees. My continuing work with Favio led to more systems
consultations with Sergio, in an effort to integrate both the part-problems and the
organization’s processes (see Levinson, 1981, 1987, 1991, 2002). I worked on the
assumption that the individual progress made with Favio Burnstein alleviated not only
mental and emotional pain and anguish but gradually cleared the way for personal
productivity in his position as a leader within his company. In essence, it is not too
much of a stretch to hear the executive consultant or organizational psychotherapist
reflect on the treatment and successes with an individual leader and state that “this
increased productivity is potentially leverageable for the increased productivity of the
entire organization” (Lowman, 2002, p. 153).

Interventions and postscript

In a series of “escalations” I moved from a more individually focused coaching and
psychotherapy orientation to a more companywide, systemic consultation. Once Favio
convincingly came out of the closet, loud and proud about his “disorder”, a series of
team consultations followed. After several months of healing talks and group sessions,
I attempted to strategically propose significant organizational change in the form of a
plan to consider a “dual leadership” approach to the design division. As Favio felt
progressively stronger and his symptoms went further into remission, I came up with a
conflict resolution and systemic change strategy initially pitched to Rodriguez and
then to HR. Francesca Jarry’s litigation was still pending with a court date rapidly
approaching – but her persistence and drive was dissipating due to the progress being
made with Favio and the entire division. Healing was underway. Francesca was at first
reluctant to attend our management consultation sessions (later to be termed “conflict
resolution meetings”), but finally did check in for a few breakthrough sessions. The ice
was broken and she began a minimal dialogue with Favio. Influenced by the fact that
Francesca had been in leadership positions in the past and that Favio was wounded
but improving, my proposal was that Francesca would serve as a co-leader with Favio.
I hoped to approach some conflict resolution first via our consultations and dialogues
and secondly through our new therapeutically guided partnership in leadership. I
drafted, with the assistance of HR and the attorneys, a plan for a six month trial period
of dual leadership. Meanwhile, HR and the CEO further negotiated with Jarry’s
attorney that if this co-leadership experiment was successful and Burnstein satisfied
Jarry’s request for apologies, that the lawsuit be dropped. In addition, for a period of six
JMP months, team consultations and conflict resolution meetings with the division would
21,8 precede enroute to a longer term and deeper healing. During this period of time I was
also engaging two counselors from the employee assistance program of Sergio Mondo,
in a train-the-trainer agenda as a vital part of the consultation is long-term
organizational follow-up, commitment and implementation. Following best practices of
high impact consulting (Schaffer, 2002), I was engaged in an incremental, sub project of
742 a larger systemic and organizational consultation. We were collaborating in the
individual and group healing process and were all emerging out of dysfunctionality
and into a more functional and learning organization (Senge, 1990).
The fatally flawed Favio showed strong signs of improvement. He realized that this
company was in it for the long haul. Half of his healing was due to the fact that his CEO
and his company were committed to him. He had never experienced a boss like CEO,
Calvin Rodriguez. Instability was slowly replaced with hopes of a stabile career. He
was surrounded by caring, compassionate individuals and it appeared to Favio that he
had gotten to the root of his old problems that were destroying him and Sergio Mondo.
Sergio Mondo was extremely pleased to have a newer, improved model of Favio on
board, and one-by-one they were able to amiably resolve all but two of the grievances
and successfully settled the two formal litigations (both resolved out of court). The
dysfunctional behavior characterized by plunging motivation, productivity and
profits, widespread instability, loss of key clients and a myriad of workplace conflicts
was gradually subsiding and we were on an upswing. A fatally flawed Favio was
reinvented as a merely flawed and “mildly toxic” Favio. He was brilliant and
innovative and even learned how to share the stage and stress of leadership with
Francesca. Curiously, the co-leadership strategy is still in operation, some seven years
later.

Discussion and limitations

In the course of disclosing the Favio Burnstein case my agenda has been to “utilize
extreme cases to develop rich theory” (Elsbach, 2005, p. 10). The extreme case of a
borderline personality disorder (BPD) is an example of what the DSM IV-TR describes
as “Cluster B Personality Disorders (American Psychiatric Association, 2000,
pp. 701-717)”. As illustrated in the narratives of Favio Burnstein, characteristic
behaviors of Cluster B leaders include: highly dramatic and emotional in the
workplace; conflict and crisis prone in social and organizational life; their behavior
repeatedly violates cultural norms and players in the organization; they suffer from
pervasive, inflexible mental, emotional and interpersonal disturbances that are stable
over time; and they experience repetitive patterns of distress or impairment in social
and work life. Personality disorders affect as much as 10-15 percent of the adult
population in the US at some point during their life. There are no reliable data
available, however, for the prevalence of personality disorders among US leaders
within organizations in part due to therapist-client confidentiality and the privileged
communication status afforded individuals with psychological or psychiatric
conditions as protected by the Americans with Disability Act (ADA). Lacking data,
I am working on the assumption that personality disorders in leaders and
organizations will roughly mirror the data generated in the general US adult
population.
 The BPD case study investigates a “preexisting” personality disorder thought to be High toxicity
at the eye of the high toxicity organizational storm. The DSM guided diagnosis of the leadership
BPD is not viewed as a mere by-product of a dysfunctional organizational culture but
rather a primary result of a “pre-existing” individual pathology. This determination
was in part based on reports of Favio Burnstein’s history of conflicts with other
employers – all pointing toward a long-term pattern of BPD separate and apart from
Sergio Mondo. As indicated in the case study, systems variables do interact with the 743
BPD leader, at times triggering and aggravating seemingly dormant or remissive
dysfunctional behaviors. The Sergio Mondo organization clearly triggered or activated
dimensions of Burnstein’s BPD by bringing some separation anxiety issues to the
forefront as a result of the Sergio Mondo turnover turnstile. Although another
researcher may have focused more on the organizational system as a precipitator of
dysfunction, in the Sergio Mondo case I found that the high toxicity disturbances were
far more pronounced and centered in the leader than at the systems level of analysis. In
essence, the nexus of dysfunction and highest toxicity was in my clinical judgment
traceable to the BPD of Favio Burnstein.
Curiously, the systems dynamics of any personality disorder or high toxicity
behavior is always in relation to and operant within a larger system. Individual
toxicity ultimately cannot be separated from a family or organizational system.
Accordingly, the BPD of Favio Burnstein at some point lends itself to a far more
complex and all encompassing entertaining of a BPD diagnosis for the entire Sergio
Mondo Fashion House. This was manifest in the response of subordinates and
colleagues to Burnstein’s erratic behavior as a leader. In essence, the work force
immediately surrounding Burnstein was necessarily engaged in dimensions of a
borderline personality disordered system of interaction. The anecdotal reports of the
effects of Favio’s allegedly emotionally abusive leadership led to a myriad of
dysfunctional worker responses as exemplified in escalating leave taking behaviors
(e.g. see Harvey, 1996), absenteeism, decreased productivity (e.g. see Ashforth, 1994,
1997); and decreased commitment to the organization (e.g. see Duffy et al., 2002).

Conclusion
As a researcher and consultant trained in both the management and psychology
disciplines I have increasingly employed a growing number of interdisciplinary tools
including a recent increased usage of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders (American Psychiatric Association, 2000). Bringing the psychological and
psychiatric standard for assessment into executive coaching and management
consulting assignments I have been able to extend my repertoire into the further
reaches of toxic leadership and organizational behavior. Particularly in cases
characterized by a more “911” state of pathology or “high toxicity”, I have found the
DSM particularly useful in sorting out the lighter or milder forms of toxicity from those
cases red flagged by Kets de Vries and characterized by leaders who “go far beyond the
abnormal ways of functioning. . .they go off the deep end” (Kets de Vries, 1995, p. 217).
Favio Burnstein was going off the deep end as a leader – attempting to productively
function, despite a borderline personality disorder. Without an ability to appropriately
diagnose and treat the leader, the high toxicity inevitably encompasses and
contaminates a growing number of players within the organizational system
JMP culminating in something roughly approximating a borderline personality disorder
21,8 Organization.
In the event of an extreme level of leader toxicity as signified by Favio Burnstein’s
BPD, this case suggests that the intervention of an outside third party may be
necessary for recovery. Falling outside the expertise of most managers and human
resource specialists, psychopathology is best delegated to psychological and
744 psychiatric trained EAP therapists and external specialists. Left undetected, toxicity
escalates and permeates organizations. As indicated by Goldman (2005),
Lipman-Blumen (2005), and Frost (2003), the threat of highly toxic leadership
requires advanced scouts or toxin detectors within the organization who are able to
initially distinguish whether an individual may require further assessment by an
outside third party. Clearly, high toxicity leadership presents a complex challenge for
management to incorporate psychological and psychiatric expertise into an
organization’s repertoire.

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Appendix. Diagnostic criteria for 301.83 – Borderline personality disorder

A pervasive pattern of instability of interpersonal relationships, self-image, and affects, and
marked impulsivity beginning by early adulthood and present in a variety of contexts, as
indicated by five (or more) of the following:
(1) Frantic efforts to avoid real or imagined abandonment.
(2) A pattern of unstable and intense interpersonal relationships characterized by
alternative between extremes of idealization and devaluation.
(3) Identity disturbance: markedly and persistently unstable self-image or sense of self.
(4) Impulsivity in at least two areas that are potentially self-damaging (e.g. spending, sex,
substance abuse, reckless driving, binge eating).
(5) Recurrent suicidal behavior, gestures, or threats, or self-mutilating behavior.
(6) Affective instability due to a marked reactivity of mood (e.g. intense episodic dysphoria,
irritability, or anxiety usually lasting a few hours and only rarely more than a few days).
(7) Chronic feelings of emptiness.
(8) Inappropriate, intense anger or difficulty controlling anger (e.g. frequent displays of
temper, constant anger, recurrent physical fights).
(9) Transient, stress-related paranoid ideation or severe dissociative symptoms (American
Psychiatric Association, 2000, p. 710).

Corresponding author
Alan Goldman can be contacted at: alan.goldman@asu.edu

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Dysfunctional
Causal reasoning in dysfunctional leader-member
leader-member interactions interactions
Paul Harvey and Mark J. Martinko
Department of Management, College of Business, The Florida State University, 747
Tallahassee, Florida, USA, and
Scott C. Douglas
Department of Management, School of Business Administration,
University of Montana, Missoula, Montana, USA

Abstract
Purpose – The purpose of this article is to develop a conceptual model predicting the influence of
biased causal explanations for subordinate behaviors and outcomes on a leader’s functionality and the
quality of leader-member relationships.
Design/methodology/approach – Attribution theory is used to analyze the effect of leader
perceptions and emotions on the functionality of leader-member relationships. It is predicted that the
negative emotions and expectancies stemming from biased leader attributions will promote
dysfunctional leader behaviors. These dysfunctional behaviors, in turn, are believed to reduce the
quality of leader-member relationships.
Research limitations/implications – Although much of the proposed model is based on empirical
evidence, it is acknowledged that some key relationships have not been tested directly in past research.
It is suggested that future research can seek to validate these aspects of the model. It is also suggested
that future research explore the role of subordinate, as well as leader, attributions in dysfunctional
relationships.
Practical implications – Several implications of the model for promoting functional leadership in
organizations are described. The importance of leaders being aware of their attributional biases is
indicated and information provided on how to assess one’s attribution style. Also discussed are
implications for reducing situational ambiguity and increasing causal feedback in the workplace.
Originality/value – This paper builds on past attribution theory research to address a shortage of
research on the cognitive, interpersonal aspects of functional and dysfunctional leadership.
Keywords Leadership, Management effectiveness, Organizational behaviour
Paper type Conceptual paper

The role of causal reasoning in dysfunctional leader-member interactions

A leader’s ability to interact effectively with subordinates is generally held to be crucial
in creating or maintaining an effective organization. The study of leader-member
relationships has developed as a means of increasing our understanding of how leaders
form productive bonds with their subordinates to achieve this goal. Past research in
this area indicates that functional leadership and high quality leader-member
relationships result in desirable outcomes such as citizenship behaviors (Townsend
et al., 2000), heightened organizational commitment (Kinicki and Vecchio, 1994), and
decreased turnover (Townsend et al., 2000) on the part of subordinates. Journal of Managerial Psychology
Vol. 21 No. 8, 2006
At present, however, our knowledge of leader-member relationship outcomes such pp. 747-762
as these is considerably more developed than our understanding of the individual and q Emerald Group Publishing Limited
0268-3946
interpersonal antecedents that can influence the functionality of leader-member DOI 10.1108/02683940610713271
JMP relationships. Several researchers have made note of this fact in the past. For instance,
21,8 Bourantas and Papalexandris (1990), Gillespie and Mann (2004), Kinicki and Vecchio
(1994), Phillips and Bedian (1994) and others, have indicated that the predictive role of
individual-level variables on the effectiveness of leader-member relationships requires
more attention. This appears to be particularly true in the context of dysfunctional
relationships (Townsend et al., 2000).
748 Drawing on past attribution theory research, we argue that an examination of the
causal reasoning process can provide insight into how the cognitions and emotions of
functional and dysfunctional leaders can influence the quality of their working
relationships. A number of researchers have examined the impact of causal
attributions on the leader-member dynamic (e.g. Barry and Crant, 2000; Fadil, 1995;
Dobbins and Russell, 1986; Douglas and Martinko, 2001; Green and Mitchell, 1979;
Jones and Nisbett, 1972; Martinko and Gardner, 1987; Wilhelm et al., 1993) and have
generally concluded that biased and/or inaccurate attributions (i.e. causal
explanations) for subordinate behaviors and outcomes are detrimental to
leader-member relationship quality. Specifically, biased attributions are thought to
deteriorate working relationships by negatively influencing leaders’ emotions and
expectancies concerning subordinates’ future behaviors.
Our goal is to build on this research by suggesting that functional leadership is, to
an important degree, an outcome of the attributions leaders make in response to
workplace outcomes. We suggest that the behaviors of dysfunctional leaders are
frequently driven by biased causal perceptions, creating a situation in which conflict,
negative emotions, and unproductive behaviors are likely. Conversely, we argue that
functional leaders create situations in which the negative influence of attributional
biases on leader-member relationships is minimized. In these situations, the emotions
and expectancies of leaders and subordinates are thought to be congruent and to serve
as a source of motivation.
To develop this argument, we begin with a review of past research on dysfunctional
leadership and its influence on the quality of leader-subordinate dyads. In this review,
we focus on the individual and interpersonal factors thought to promote dysfunctional
leadership. We then introduce a theoretical model in which attributional biases are
predicted to reduce the functionality of leader-member relationships by promoting
attributional conflict, particularly in situations characterized by high levels of
ambiguity and psychological distance. Following this discussion, we suggest steps
leaders can take to shape working environments in order to neutralize the influence of
attributional biases and to promote attributional concordance with subordinates. We
conclude with implications for future research in this area.

Dysfunctional leadership and the leader-subordinate relationship

Past research on the various factors that can positively or negatively influence the
quality of leader-member relationships has frequently focused on the role of leadership
styles and behaviors (see House and Aditya, 1997 for a review). One construct that has
emerged from this research is the notion of dysfunctional leadership, defined as
counterproductive leadership behaviors that undermine trust and effectiveness in a
leader-member relationship (Hall et al., 2004; Johnson and Huwe, 2002). Hall et al. (2004)
noted that dysfunctional behaviors can take the form of illegal activities, but also Dysfunctional
include behaviors that are simply inappropriate and unproductive. leader-member
Given the recent corporate scandals around the world, and the media attention these
scandals have received, a great deal of research attention has been given to illicit forms interactions
of dysfunctional leadership (e.g. Hall et al., 2004; Lerner and Tetlock, 1999; Tepper et al.,
2004). Our focus, however, is on the cognitive antecedents of unproductive leader
behaviors that are not necessarily scandalous or illegal, but still undesirable from an 749
organization’s perspective.
In this section we briefly summarize research on dysfunctional leadership at the
individual and interpersonal levels of analysis describing factors that can promote
either functional or dysfunctional relationships. We then develop a theoretical model
explicating the possible role of causal attributions and emotions in determining the
functionality of leader behaviors.

Individual and interpersonal factors affecting the functionality of leadership

In response to a number of high-profile ethical lapses among organizational leaders,
several researchers have sought to identify individual level factors that might promote
dysfunctional leadership behaviors. For instance, Hall et al. (2004) recently argued that
factors such as leadership style, leader accountability, and leader reputation could
influence the functionality of leader behaviors as well as followers’ perceptions of these
behaviors. Specifically, they argued that the functionality of a leader-member
relationship is largely dependent on the extent to which followers trust their leaders
and that effective leadership styles and behaviors are necessary to establish trust.
Similarly, in a discussion of dysfunctional mentorship, Johnson and Huwe (2002)
noted that leaders’ characteristics such as incompetence and perceptual bias could
negatively affect their functionality. Again, the authors explain that the
trustworthiness of a leader is fundamental to his or her functionality and the quality
of leader-member relationships. Because competence and objectivity can both increase
trustworthiness, the authors argue that they are key requirements of functional
leadership.
Related research by Lord and Alliger (1985) identified factors that can promote
leadership behaviors that are perceived as being functional by subordinates. These
factors include fit between leader behaviors and situational norms and, to a lesser
degree, the extent to which leader behaviors are appropriate to the demands of the task
at hand. More recently, a study by Morgan (2005) concluded that supportive coaching
by leaders and leader preparedness were positively associated with members’
perceptions concerning leader effectiveness. In terms of dysfunctional leadership, then,
these findings suggest that an absence of these characteristics is likely to promote
dysfunctional leader-member relations by reducing members’ confidence in the ability
of leaders and the appropriateness of their leadership behaviors.
From a leader-member exchange (LMX) perspective, research indicates that factors
such as members’ levels of effort and their attitudes toward their job and their leader
can promote functional leadership behaviors that help foster high quality relationships
(e.g. Dienesch and Liden, 1986). A study by Paul et al. (2002) also highlights the role of
subordinate attitudes. Their findings indicate that when subordinates hold
passive-aggressive attitudes or are overly dependent on leaders, the ability of
JMP leaders to behave in a functional manner is diminished. Additionally, Johnson and
21,8 Huwe (2002) argued that poor fit between a leader and a subordinate, in terms of
personality, communication style, work patterns, or any other interpersonal factor,
could reduce a leader’s functionality.
Johnson and Huwe (2002) also noted that conflict between leaders and members can
diminish a leader’s functionality and the overall quality of the relationship. They
750 explained that while major conflicts can have an immediate impact on leader
functionality, even minor conflicts can escalate to the point that a working relationship
becomes unmanageable and disintegrates.
Of particular relevance to the model we present, Hall et al. (2004) argued that conflict
between leaders and followers could be driven by the attributions subordinates make
for leader behaviors. They argued that when subordinates form negative attributions
concerning the intent of leader behaviors, their belief in the leader’s effectiveness and
the quality of the leader-subordinate relationships decreases. Similarly, Green and
Mitchell (1979), Martinko and Douglas (1999), and others have argued that the
effectiveness of a leader and the quality of leader-member relationships can be affected
by the attributions leaders make in response to subordinate behaviors. For instance,
the attribution of leader behaviors to self-serving causes (e.g. greed) or to incompetence
is thought to reduce the trust that subordinates place in their supervisors. As noted
above, this lack of trust is believed to reduce supervisors’ ability to act as functional
leaders (Hall et al., 2004; Johnson and Huwe, 2002).
Building on this notion, we seek to examine the impact of leader attributions for
subordinate behaviors and outcomes on the functionality of leader behaviors and the
quality of leader-member relationships. In the next section we develop a theoretical
model describing the factors that can influence leaders’ attributions, and the affect of
these attributions on emotional responses and functional or dysfunctional leader
behavior.

A causal perception model of dysfunctional leadership

Our conceptualization of the role of attributions in predicting leader functionality or
dysfunctionality is shown in Figure 1. To help illustrate this process, it is helpful to
consider a typical workplace situation where the relationship between a leader and
members might be strained. For instance, a situation in which members fail to meet a
leader’s deadline might cause tension between the two parties and, ultimately,

Figure 1.
An attributional model of
dysfunctional leadership
and leader-member
relationship quality
deteriorate the quality of the relationship if a functional leadership solution to the Dysfunctional
problem is not implemented. We suggest that an examination of leaders’ attributional leader-member
processes in the context of such situations can help to illustrate the relationship of
attributions and functional leadership behaviors. interactions
As Figure 1 indicates, a leader’s attributional process begins with the experience or
observation of subordinate outcomes or behaviors (e.g. missing a deadline). A causal
search process (i.e. the attribution process) is then initiated in order to determine the 751
cause of the outcome or behavior. This process is a function of information obtained
from interpersonal feedback and situational factors, as well as individual factors such
as attributional biases. The resulting attribution is argued to influence the leader’s
emotions toward the subordinate in question. These emotions are thought to help
shape the leader’s functional or dysfunctional response.
The attributional process depicted in Figure 1 is therefore an episodic model in
which leader behaviors responding to specific subordinate-related events are
influenced by attributions and emotions. Over time, we suggest that attributional
biases held by leaders can consistently lead leaders toward inaccurate attributions and
dysfunctional behaviors. We now discuss each step of this process in turn.

Subordinate outcomes/behaviors
Attribution theory holds that individuals form attributions in order to understand the
causes of behaviors and outcomes that are relevant to their lives (Heider, 1958). Weiner
(1985a) explained that individuals are therefore most likely to engage in a thorough
attributional search when they encounter negative and/or unexpected outcomes or
behaviors. Thus, as shown in Figure 1, we expect that leaders will engage in a detailed
causal search process when subordinates behave in an unusual way, such as arriving
at work late, or when a negative workplace outcome, such as falling short of
productivity goals or missing a deadline, occurs. As we explain below, the ensuing
causal search involves both an information gathering process and a cognitive appraisal
of this information.

The attribution process

As mentioned, the purpose of the attribution process is to form a perception regarding
the cause of relevant outcomes. Research by Weiner et al. (1971) and Abramson et al.
(1978) concluded that the causal factors identified in the attribution process could be
classified as internal or external, as stable or unstable, and as controllable or
uncontrollable. Internal causes are those thought to be inherent in the individual, such
as skill or effort whereas external causes are those that are not directly related to an
individual, such as luck or chance. Stable causes of outcomes or behaviors are
perceived to be constant over time, such as one’s gender or intelligence, whereas
unstable causes, such as effort level or luck, are variable over time (Weiner et al., 1971;
Weiner, 1985b). Finally, controllable causes are those that an individual has direct
influence over, such as effort level, as opposed to causes an individual has no control
over, such as their intelligence level (Abramson et al., 1978).
Thus, in the aforementioned example in which members fail to meet a deadline
imposed by their leader, the leader might form a number of different attributions. The
leader might attribute the missed deadline to members’ lack of effort (an internal,
unstable, and controllable cause) or lack of intelligence (an internal, stable, and
JMP uncontrollable cause), or to bad luck (an external, unstable, and uncontrollable cause),
21,8 for instance. Weiner’s (1985b) achievement-motivation model explains that the type of
attribution an individual makes can ultimately influence their behavioral response to
an outcome, via the affect of attributions on emotions. Before explaining the
implications of this attribution-emotion-behavior relationship for dysfunctional
leadership, it is important to understand the sources and types of information used
752 to form attributions and the individual factors that can influence the way this
information is interpreted.

Sources of causal information

As shown in Figure 1, we argue that three sources of causal information are
particularly important to the process by which leaders form attributions concerning
subordinate behaviors and outcomes. First, the situational context of the outcome or
behavior must be considered. Second, the actual behavior of the subordinate is
analyzed. Third, causal information in the form of feedback from the subordinate
might also influence the leader’s attributional process.
The situation. The situational context is important because it can provide a
significant amount of causal information. In fact, Weiner (1985a) noted that in many
instances the situation can give perceivers enough information that a thorough causal
search is not needed. For instance, in the example where members have missed a
deadline, it may be that an overtly obvious causal factor, such as a power outage, is to
blame. In more ambiguous situations, however, there is less causal information
available to the leader. In these cases, research indicates that leaders will focus on
causal information from the subordinates themselves when forming attributions
(Mitchell and Kalb, 1981; Wood and Mitchell, 1981).
Subordinate behavior. Kelley’s (1973) model indicates that a subordinate’s behavior
provides leaders with three types of information that can be used to form attributions.
The first, consensus, describes the extent to which a subordinate’s behavior is similar
to others in a given situation. Behaviors that are high in consensus are typically
attributed to external situational factors whereas low consensus behaviors are
commonly attributed to the subordinate himself or herself. Thus, if one subordinate
misses a deadline while each of his peers meets the deadline, Kelly’s model suggests
that a leader will attribute the missed deadline to some internal aspect of the
subordinate (e.g. lack of effort or ability). Conversely, if every subordinate misses the
deadline, it is argued that the outcome will be attributed to a situational factor (e.g. a
power outage) that affected everyone’s performance.
The second source of information concerns the consistency of a subordinate’s
behavior over time. Highly consistent behaviors are logically attributed to stable
factors whereas inconsistent behaviors are more likely to be attributed to unstable
causes (Kelly, 1973). Thus, if subordinates are consistently punctual in meeting
deadlines, missing a single deadline would likely be viewed as an inconsistent behavior
and could logically be attributed to some external cause. If subordinates are
consistently late with their work, on the other hand, it might be concluded that a
missed deadline is a reflection of an internal characteristic that causes subordinates to
be inefficient.
 Third, the distinctiveness of a subordinate’s behavior across situations can also Dysfunctional
influence a leader’s causal attribution. Highly distinct behaviors are generally leader-member
attributed to a specific and unique interaction of the situation with the individual,
whereas behaviors that are low in distinctiveness are generally attributed to a global interactions
characteristic of the person (e.g. low intelligence) or situation (e.g. poor working
conditions) (Martinko and Thomson, 1998). Thus, if an employee is a generally
punctual person but always missed deadlines at work, it might be assumed that some 753
unique aspect of the work situation is causing the distinct behavior (i.e. lateness).
Conversely, an employee that regularly misses deadlines in every aspect of his or her
life, leaders might logically attribute missed deadlines to an internal aspect of the
employee (Kelly, 1973).
This research suggests that subordinates unintentionally communicate information
about the causes of their behavior to their supervisors. Past research also suggests,
however, that subordinates frequently attempt to deliberately communicate causal
information in form of feedback.
Subordinate feedback. Research on impression management indicates that
employees frequently attempt to influence their supervisors’ opinions through the
use of verbal feedback (Yukl and Tracey, 1992). Attribution theory research suggests
that a primary goal of this impression management technique is to manipulate the
causal attributions leaders make concerning subordinates’ behaviors and performance.
Thus, feedback can be used to guide leaders toward attributing positive outcomes and
desirable behaviors to internal, stable, and controllable factors. Conversely, feedback
can be used to sway leaders toward attributing negative subordinate outcomes and
behaviors to external and uncontrollable factors (Mezulis et al., 2004; Wood and
Mitchell, 1981). For instance, if employees miss a deadline they might explain,
accurately or inaccurately, that external factors such as competing demands or a lack
of resources are to blame, with the intention of avoiding the blame associated with the
attribution of such outcomes to internally controllable factors.

Leader attributional biases

There are a number of individual-level characteristics that are related to an individual’s
attribution style. These include gender (e.g. Feldman-Summers and Kiesler, 1974), age
(e.g. Ferris et al., 1985; Mezulis et al., 2004), and ethnicity (e.g. Diener and Diener, 1995;
Morris and Peng, 1994), among others. However, to keep the focus of our model
manageable, we focus on the influence of attributional biases that can influence
individuals regardless of age, gender, ethnicity, or other personal characteristics.
Attributional biases are defined as tendencies toward erroneously attributing
outcomes and behaviors to specific types of causes (Martinko and Gardner, 1987).
These biases are important because they can ultimately cause leaders to respond to
workplace situations in a dysfunctional manner. Our model focuses on two
attributional biases that have been shown to influence leaders’ attributions for
subordinate outcomes and behaviors: actor-observer bias and self-serving bias.
Actor-observer bias. Jones and Nisbett (1972) defined actor-observer bias as a
tendency for observers to consistently attribute the behaviors and outcomes of actors
to internal and stable (i.e. dispositional) factors. In the context of our dysfunctional
leadership model, leaders represent the observers making the attributions whereas
JMP subordinates represent the actors. In the case of subordinate behaviors and outcomes,
21,8 the actor-observer bias can predispose leaders to inaccurately place too much blame on
subordinates when failures occur, creating conflict between the two parties (Bernardin,
1989).
Self-serving bias. Self-serving attributional bias denotes a tendency to attribute
positive outcomes to internal, stable, and possibly controllable aspects of one’s self
754 while attributing negative outcomes to external factors beyond one’s personal control
(Zuckerman, 1979; Dobbins and Russell, 1986). Evidence indicates that this bias is
especially common in individualistic Western cultures (Mezulis et al., 2004), but has
been identified in subjects across the world (Al-Zahnrani and Kaplowitz, 1993; Islam
and Hewstone, 1993; Mezulis et al., 2004; Taylor and Jaggi, 1974).
Like the actor-observer bias, self-serving attributional tendencies are argued to
promote dysfunctional leadership behaviors and to reduce the quality of
leader-member relationships. In the case of negative workplace outcomes, leaders
exhibiting a self-serving bias are apt to blame subordinates for negative outcomes such
as missed deadlines without considering their own personal responsibility for the
outcome. Conversely, the self-serving bias can cause leaders to inaccurately attribute
positive workplace outcomes to their own internal, stable, and/or controllable factors
while overlooking the contributions subordinates made to the outcome. Thus, leaders
might attribute desirable subordinate behaviors, such as high levels of productivity, to
their own management skills while blaming low levels of subordinate productivity on
insufficient subordinate effort. As noted by Martinko and Douglas (1999), either of
these situations is likely to frustrate employees, reducing the ability of leaders to
interact with subordinates effectively (Medina et al., 2005).

Attributional bias and leader emotions

Our discussion of attributional biases alluded to the role of emotions in dysfunctional
leader-member relationships. In this section we expand on the predicted role of
emotions in these relationships by examining the effects of biased attributions in the
context of Weiner (1985b) achievement-motivation model. This model predicts that an
individual’s emotional response to a behavior or outcome is influenced by one’s causal
explanation for the outcome. This relationship is indicated in Figure 1.
Weiner predicted that the attribution of negative behaviors or outcomes to
externally controllable causes (e.g. a subordinate’s lack of effort toward meeting a
deadline) would provoke feelings of anger whereas internally controllable attributions
(e.g. the supervisor’s personal lack of effort) for the same behaviors or outcomes would
promote feelings of guilt. His model also predicted that feelings of shame are likely
when negative outcomes or behaviors are attributed to internal, stable, and
uncontrollable factors, such as a lack of intelligence.
Given this attribution-emotion framework, we predict that the attributional biases
described above will influence both the causal explanations and emotions leaders form
in response to subordinate behaviors and outcomes. Specifically, we expect that
because leaders demonstrating an actor-observer bias will tend to attribute
subordinate behaviors and outcomes to dispositional characteristics of the
subordinates, these same leaders will experience feelings of anger in response to
negative subordinate outcomes (Weiner, 1985b). We also predict that these attributions
and emotions will be exacerbated by self-serving attributional biases that also Dysfunctional
influence leaders to attribute negative outcomes to the internal characteristics of their leader-member
subordinates. Thus:
interactions
P1. Leaders whose attribution styles are biased toward either or both
actor-observer or self-serving tendencies will experience anger toward their
subordinates more frequently than will those with unbiased attribution styles.
755
Attribution-based emotions and workplace behaviors
Weiner’s (1985b) model predicts that individuals’ behavioral reactions to negative
behaviors and outcomes are shaped by the attribution-based emotions discussed in the
previous section. A number of empirical studies have provided support for the
emotion-behavior relationship, indicating the importance of understanding emotional
drivers of behavior. Of particular importance to dysfunctional leadership, research by
several authors has established a link between feelings of anger and dysfunctional
behaviors such as aggression (O’Leary-Kelly et al., 1996; Skarlicki and Folger, 1997),
sabotage (Ambrose et al., 2002), and theft (Greenberg, 1990, 1993a, 1993b, 2002; Mars,
1973, 1974).
The link between anger and dysfunctional behavioral responses such as these is
thought to be a function of expectancies and the desire to alleviate feelings of anger. In
terms of expectancies, Weiner et al. (1971) explained that when individuals attribute
negative outcomes or behaviors to stable factors under someone else’s control, the
perceiver is likely to feel that he or she is unable to prevent a recurrence of the outcome
or behavior. This expectation of future helplessness is thought to provoke anger
toward the individual or individuals controlling the negative outcome or behavior.
Research on workplace deviance also suggests that the relationship between anger
and dysfunctional behaviors is driven by revenge motives and the desire to restore
equity to a situation. For example, Skarlicki and Folger’s (1997) findings indicated that
that employees engage in deviant workplace behaviors such as verbal and physical
aggression in response to externally controlled, stable factors such as adverse working
conditions as a form of revenge. Kemper (1966) reasoned that these vengeful behaviors
are often used to alleviate feelings of anger. Similarly, Mars’ (1973, 1974) findings
indicated that employees often engage in dysfunctional behaviors such as theft or
sabotage against individuals to whom they attribute a workplace equity imbalance.
In the context of dysfunctional leadership, we therefore expect that leaders are most
likely to respond to negative subordinate outcomes and behaviors in a
counterproductive manner when these outcomes and behaviors are attributed to
stable and externally controllable factors. For example, a supervisor might feel angry
and become aggressive with subordinates (e.g. yell at them or threaten them) that miss
a deadline if the leader believes that the subordinates are lazy and refuse to work hard.
This type of response is generally not consistent with effective leadership behaviors
(Bennett, 1998), and is likely to be especially harmful if the subordinates are not
actually at fault.
P2. The tendency to attribute negative outcomes to the stable and controllable
characteristics of subordinates results in anger and leads to dysfunctional
leadership behaviors.
JMP Biased attributions and leader-member relationship quality
21,8 Perhaps most important to our discussion of dysfunctional leadership and
leader-member dyads is the fact that biased attributions can cause conflicts between
leaders and subordinates. As noted above, both self-serving and actor-observer biases
can cause leaders to incorrectly attribute negative outcomes or behaviors to
subordinate characteristics. On the other hand, because of these same biases,
756 subordinates are likely to rely more heavily on situational factors when explaining
their undesirable behaviors and outcomes (Jones and Nisbett, 1972). Medina et al.’s
(2005) study indicated that this form of relational conflict is associated with negative
affective reactions by both leaders and subordinates. As noted above, negative
emotions on the part of leaders are predicted to promote dysfunctional behaviors (e.g.
yelling at subordinates instead of working with them to remove situational problems).
Further, when subordinates themselves feel angry or frustrated, it is likely that even
generally successful leadership techniques will be ineffective due to the resentment
they might feel toward their leader (Bennett, 1998). Put differently, we suggest that
subordinates will become less receptive to motivational leadership behaviors when
they experience anger that is directed toward their leaders.
A research finding from the LMX literature appears to provide some indirect
support for this argument. Specifically, Fairhurst’s (1993) study indicated that as
subordinates become detached from their leaders (i.e. become out-group members),
they acted and communicated in ways that exacerbated this detachment. As a result, it
appears that these members may act in ways that perpetuate their out-group status. In
the context of the present discussion, it may be argued that the negative subordinate
emotions resulting from attributional conflict with leaders can promote subordinate
behaviors that further contribute to dysfunctionality in the leader-member
relationship.
It therefore appears that leaders who are biased toward attributing negative
subordinate behaviors and outcomes to stable and externally controllable factors are
likely to introduce conflict into relationships with subordinates. This conflict is
expected to produce negative leader emotions that promote dysfunctional leadership
behaviors, as well as negative subordinate emotions that reduce their receptiveness to
leadership behavior. We therefore predict that the quality of leader-member
relationships will be lower as a consequence of biased leader attribution styles.
P3. Leaders demonstrating self-serving or actor-observer attribution styles will
experience lower quality relationships with subordinates than will leaders
that do not demonstrate these biases.

Reducing attributional bias and promoting functional leadership

Based on the preceding explanation of the attributional model shown in Figure 1, we
now suggest several techniques leaders can use to manage their biases so that they can
foster high quality leader-member relationships. Our suggestions stem from the
influence of leader biases, situational factors, and subordinate feedback on leader
attributions indicated in our conceptual model.
Awareness of attributional biases Dysfunctional
It is important to note that individuals are often unaware of the attributional biases leader-member
they possess. As such, it is likely that many leaders might base their behavioral
reactions to subordinate behaviors and outcomes on biased, consistently inaccurate interactions
attributions without being aware of this tendency. It is possible, however, for
individuals to assess their own attribution styles using publicly available attribution
style measures (i.e. Kent and Martinko, 1995; Martinko, 2002). By becoming aware of 757
their attributional biases, we argue that leaders can consciously reevaluate their initial
attributions by deliberately taking into account a larger quantity and variety of causal
information.

Situational considerations
As noted above, a detailed causal search is most frequently needed when a high degree
of causal ambiguity is present in a situation. Martinko and Gardner (1987) explained
that it is in these situations that attributional biases are most likely to negatively affect
the accuracy of causal perceptions. We therefore suggest that leaders take steps to
reduce the ambiguity present in their workplace situations as a means to reducing the
impact of any attributional biases they possess. Reducing ambiguity in this way could
involve forming a clear understanding of the exact responsibilities of each subordinate
so that employees are not blamed for negative outcomes for which they are not
responsible.
It is also important that leaders develop an understanding of the causal situational
factors that might influence subordinate behaviors. Both the self-serving and the
actor-observer biases have the potential to make leaders discount the importance of
situational factors in determining the causes of subordinate behaviors and outcomes.
Past research has demonstrated this tendency among leaders and has indicated that in
order to fully understand the situational causes of employee behavior, leaders must
have some level of experience in their subordinates’ work environment (Mitchell and
Kalb, 1981). As such, we encourage the implementation of hands-on training programs
that require future managers to gain experience performing subordinates’ jobs before
acting as a manager. We argue that this experience will give future leaders the
familiarity with situational factors facing employees needed to form objective
attributions for subordinate behaviors and outcomes.

Feedback in the attribution process

Finally, we suggest that leaders consider feedback from subordinates and other
knowledgeable sources before forming conclusions about workplace outcomes and
behaviors. In terms of subordinate feedback, although it is important for leaders to take
into account the possibility of subordinates using impression management techniques
to influence their leaders’ attributions (Wood and Mitchell, 1981; Martinko, 2002), we
argue that subordinate feedback can be beneficial in forming accurate attributions. The
logic behind this argument again relates to the tendency of biased managers to
overlook situational factors when forming causal explanations for subordinates’
behaviors and outcomes. Because subordinates are more likely to be aware of these
situational factors than their supervisors are (e.g. Bernardin, 1989), it is reasonable to
predict that they can communicate important causal information that leaders might
otherwise overlook.
JMP For instance, a supervisor might assume that a low consensus behavior such as one
21,8 employee missing a deadline is due to a lack of effort and experience negative emotions
toward that employee. The employee, however, might be able to provide information
regarding mitigating situational information such as defective equipment that might
have contributed to the outcome. With this information, the leader can form a more
accurate attribution and respond in a functional manner (fixing or replacing the
758 equipment in this example).
Similarly, feedback from other individuals that are familiar with a subordinate’s
working conditions and performance may also be helpful in promoting unbiased leader
attributions. A number of recent studies have indicated that multi-source feedback (e.g.
“360-degree” feedback) promotes thorough and accurate performance data (Luthans
and Peterson, 2003). As such, we suggest that soliciting performance information from
numerous sources will allow leaders to base their causal attributions on accurate data
as opposed to biased perceptions.

Limitations and suggestions for future research

To the extent possible, we have based our model and recommendations on empirically
supported arguments. Some aspects of our model, however, are supported by logical
arguments and theories but have not been subjected to direct empirical study in
leadership contexts. This specifically applies to the attribution-emotion link proposed
by Weiner (1985b) and other researchers. We suggest that future research attempt to
verify this component of our model in an experimental setting.
We also suggest that future research expand upon the model presented here by
considering the impact of attributional biases among subordinates on the functionality
of leader-member relationships. This suggestion is in line with that of several scholars
who have argued that conceptualizations of leadership should include the attributions
of followers (Hollander and Offerman, 1990; House and Aditya, 1997). In the context of
dysfunctional leadership, we have argued that negative subordinate emotions caused
by conflicts with leaders can reduce the motivational effectiveness of leadership
behaviors. Following the logic of P1, subordinates might also form negative
leader-focused attributions in response to their own biased attributions for undesirable
leader behaviors and outcomes. Although a full discussion of this potentially complex
interaction between leader and subordinate attributions and biases was beyond the
scope of the present paper, we hope that our conceptual model can serve as a starting
point for building our understanding of the perceptual dynamics involved with
functional and dysfunctional leader-member relationships.

Conclusion
In this paper we have tried to identify, explain, and integrate some of the factors that
we believe to be most salient in promulgating dysfunctional leadership. In particular,
we have stressed that although objective information often provides a stimulus for
leader behavior, it is the leader’s cognitive appraisal of these factors that is crucial in
determining whether or not the leader’s reactions to the situational factors and
subordinate behavior are functional or dysfunctional. In particular, we have stressed
that leaders’ susceptibility to the actor-observer and self-serving biases can precipitate
dysfunctional leader behaviors with biases toward internal and stable attributions for
subordinate failure that lead to unjustified anger as the most debilitating type of Dysfunctional
attributions. Most importantly, we believe and have explained that the negative effects leader-member
of dysfunctional leader behaviors can be ameliorated through attributional training as
well as informational strategies that help leaders become aware of and attenuate the interactions
tendencies to act upon the attributions resulting from the self-serving and
actor-observer biases.
759
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Further reading
Martinko, M.J., Douglas, S.C., Ford, R. and Gundlach, M.J. (2002), “Dues paying: a theoretical
explication and conceptual model”, Journal of Management, Vol. 30, pp. 49-69.

Corresponding author
Paul Harvey can be contacted at: nph02@garnet.acns.fsu.edu

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www.emeraldinsight.com/0268-3946.htm

Internal
Internal terrorists: the terrorists terrorists
inside organizations
David D. Van Fleet
School of Global Management and Leadership, 763
Arizona State University at the West Campus, Phoenix, Arizona, USA, and
Ella W. Van Fleet
Professional Business Associates, Scottsdale, Arizona, USA

Abstract
Purpose – The paper aims to expand and extend previous work on the role of employees who act in
non-violent ways to achieve their personal ends through inducing fear in others in organizations.
Design/methodology/approach – The literature surrounding internal terrorists is reviewed and
preliminary survey results are presented to support the conclusions derived from that literature.
Findings – A model is developed that more carefully identifies how the role of internal terrorists
comes about and why they are more likely to engage in non-violent as opposed to violent behavior.
Research limitations/implications – Research is needed to identify those aspects of organizations
that seem to foster or “bring out” violent and non-violent internal terrorists. Given the differences
between internal terrorists and other terrorists, more careful study of those two groups is clearly
needed. Since most terrorists express feelings of injustice, stronger links should be attempted between
the research on organizational justice and internal terrorism. Just as employee theft has been linked to
perceived injustice, so, too, internal terrorism may be linked to higher levels of such perceived
injustice.
Practical implications – Research is needed to indicate how terrorism evolves over time as well as
what measures seem to be most effective in countering such developments within organizations. Of
particular interest to practitioners would be determining the extent to which profit-seeking versus
non-profit organizations accommodate internal terrorists and the extent to which gender matches
between the internal terrorist and the target person are common.
Originality/value – This paper fills a gap in the literature about the role of internal terrorists by
delineating more fully the dysfunctional role those individuals play in organizations.
Keywords Terrorism, Violence, Fear, Organizations, Internal conflict
Paper type Conceptual paper

Terrorism in the business world was previously an issue that dealt with a few
companies operating overseas who occasionally had to deal with political and criminal
terrorists of foreign countries (Van Fleet and Van Fleet, 1998; O’Hare, 1994). However,
our shrinking world is leading to a growing “collision of cultures, political ideologies,
religious doctrines, economic struggles, and national-security measures” that increase
the likelihood of terrorism for all organizations (Bowman, 1994, p. xvii). Thus,
terrorism is rapidly becoming a domestic problem for a potentially large number of
organizations (Blair et al., 2004; Van Fleet and Van Fleet, 1996; O’Hare, 1994). This
situation plus the fact that dysfunctional leaders can foster terrorists within their Journal of Managerial Psychology
Vol. 21 No. 8, 2006
organizations (internal terrorists) makes it imperative that managers everywhere pp. 763-774
develop their knowledge of terrorism in general, as well as internal terrorists in q Emerald Group Publishing Limited
0268-3946
particular. DOI 10.1108/02683940610713280
JMP Terrorism has been studied relatively infrequently by academics, except for
21,8 international political terrorism for which a growing body of literature now exists (see,
e.g. Alexander and Swetnam, 2001; Alexander, 1992; Cooley, 1999; Hoffman, 1998;
Hoffman, 1992; Jenkins, 1978; Laqueur, 1987; Merkl, 1986; and Pillar, 2001). The
newness of the topic in academic literature is reflected in the fact that the Psychological
Abstracts had “no reference to terrorism or to related terms, such as ‘hostages’ or
764 ‘hijacking’, until the end of 1981” (Merari, 1991, p. 91). While terrorism had been
studied by psychologists for some time (e.g. Gurr, 1970), articles reporting research on
terrorists or terrorism in journals that are indexed by the Psychological Abstracts did
not appear with any substantial frequency until the 1980’s (Merari, 1991, p. 91).
The primary reason for the scarcity of research in this area is that it is difficult to
conduct research on a phenomenon that is highly diverse, very unpredictable, and
relatively infrequent, even if its consequences are lasting and, in some cases, quite
substantial (Merari, 1991). It is also clearly dangerous to conduct field studies of actual
terrorists or terrorist organizations, yet some of that kind of work has been done
(Jamieson, 1990; Soule, 1989), including a study of terrorist finances (Adams, 1986).
Some forms of terrorism can be linked to other forms of dysfunctional behavior such as
workplace violence, but that is not true of all forms of terrorism (Reich, 1990).
Additionally, the definition of terrorism is changing to encompass more forms of
dysfunctional behavior (Cooper, 2001). A few new journals are focusing on terrorism,
although most of those are devoted primarily to international political terrorism, and
little theoretical development has occurred. The potential for theory development and
research will expand as the definition expands.

A definition of terrorism
The practice of terrorism is quite old (Geifman, 1992), but the terms “terrorism”
and “terrorist” are only about 200 years old (Laqueur, 1987). Even though the
terms are relatively new, there were “109 different definitions [of terrorism and/or
terrorist] provided by various writers between 1936 and 1981” (Laqueur, 1987,
p. 143). Those definitions include anyone who attempts to further his or her views
by a system of coercive intimidation (Johnson, 1986, p. 31); and a person who
commits an act of violence, be it sabotage, murder, or kidnapping, against an
organization’s facilities or personnel (Scotti, 1986, p. 5). Some definitions include
only “politically motivated” acts of violence (Bowman, 1994, p. 11) while others
include any act of violence or the threat of violence coupled with an intention to
create fear (Scotti, 1986, p. 3). The word “terror” means extreme fear, and virtually
all definitions include coercion and/or fear. Terrorism, then, involves the use of
fear to intimidate or coerce, to influence policy, or to affect the operation of
governments or organizations and generally, although not always, will involve
violent or dangerous actions.
From these various attempts to define terrorism, we developed this definition (Van
Fleet and Van Fleet, 1998):
Terrorism refers to intentional, premeditated, and sometimes retaliatory, actions on the part
of one or more individuals to create extreme stress or fear among others that lasts long
enough to accomplish the purpose of furthering the perpetrator’s own views.
Internal terrorism versus other dysfunctional/antisocial behaviors Internal
Internal terrorism is different from most other forms of dysfunctional behavior in that terrorists
it always involves the intent to evoke fear or extreme stress for the purpose of bringing
about change that reflects the perpetrator’s own views. It is intended to evoke fear in
members of the organization in general or its management in particular in an effort to
achieve the terrorist’s goals. Single, isolated incidents of criminal or aggressive
behavior or workplace violence are unlikely to create a climate of fear sufficiently long- 765
lasting and strong enough to bring about the change necessary to accomplish the
terrorist’s goal. Consequently, terrorism generally involves repeated actions that
require planning (intentional, premeditated actions) to some degree.
Antisocial behavior is generally regarded as the broadest category of dysfunctional
behavior, referring to “any behavior that brings harm, or is intended to bring harm, to
an organization, its employees, or stakeholders” (Giacalone and Greenberg, 1997, p. vii).
Deviant or dysfunctional behavior thus falls within the broader category of antisocial
behavior. Many of the behaviors associated with dysfunctional/antisocial behavior
involve violence, but not all of them do (e.g. alcohol use, smoking, and inappropriate
tardiness). Violent behavior, then, is a subset of dysfunctional/antisocial behavior (see,
e.g. Lopez and Griffin, 2004). Terrorism is yet another subset, one that overlaps both
the violent behavior set and the non-violent behavior set. Although all terrorism is
obviously dysfunctional, most forms of dysfunctional/antisocial behavior clearly do
not involve terrorism. No set of definitions can eliminate all overlap among categories
of such behavior, so it is important that each researcher clearly articulates the
definition being employed.

The dimensions of terrorism

The different definitions suggest variation along the several dimensions of terrorism,
including the following:
.
The degree of harm associated with the fear and stress that the terrorist
intentionally creates. Some terrorists do not care who lives or dies or what is
damaged as a result of their acts while others use only psychological warfare –
no physical harm to people or property – to pursue their goals.
.
The victim(s) who will be sacrificed to help achieve the terrorist’s goals. The
intended victim could be an organization (Planned Parenthood, a logging
company, a university), a part of an organization (an agency, department, or
bureau), a local branch or other physical facility of an organization (an office,
plant). The intended victim(s) could also be either a group of individuals (formal
or informal) or a single individual who is a pivotal or powerful person perceived
to be interfering with or blocking the accomplishment of the terrorist’s goals. In
addition, one or more individuals could be “innocent” bystanders with no
connection to the issue at hand but who nevertheless are injured or harmed by
the terrorist’s actions.
.
The nature of the terrorist’s goals. The goals themselves could be lofty,
superordinate goals such as world peace, disarmament, ecological balance, the
betterment of social processes, or the like. Or they could be far more mundane
like getting money, a promotion, a favorable transfer or assignment, the removal
of a coworker, and so on. In the latter cases, invariably the motives are couched
JMP in terms of helping others, although it usually does not take a careful
21,8 investigation to discern that the primary beneficiary is the perpetrator.

Terrorism inside an organization can thus be differentiated from employee or

occupational crime, which is generally regarded as a subset of white-collar crime which
in turn is different from corporate crime (Holtfreter, 2005; Sutherland, 1940). Corporate
766 crime refers to those crimes committed by members of an organization to benefit the
organization. White-collar crime refers to those crimes committed by higher-ranking
members of an organization to benefit themselves. Occupational or employee crime
refers to those crimes committed by members of an organization (generally lower
ranking) that are intended to benefit the perpetrators to the detriment of the
organization.
While some overlap may exist between internal terrorism and occupational crime,
they do differ. Occupational crime usually is committed to benefit the perpetrator
immediately and directly whereas internal terrorism consists of repeated acts or
behaviors conducted to create fear in others in the organization that will eventually
benefit the terrorist:
Occupational crimes include:
.
espionage, defined as the theft or unauthorized acquisition of secret or restricted
information;
.
kickbacks or payments or favors given clandestinely to decision-makers in
return for selecting the offender’s products or services; and
.
fraud of one or more of three broad types – asset misappropriation, corruption,
and fraudulent statements.

Related to these are:

. embezzlement, pilferage, and theft of services;
.
sabotage, robbery, burglary, larceny; and
.
crimes involving or using computers.

Categories of terrorists
Based on the above, then, the following are categories of terrorists (derived from Van
Fleet and Van Fleet, 1998). It should be noted that the categories overlap as does
membership:
.
Political terrorists and religious fanatics – the oldest type of terrorists.
.
Average citizen turned terrorist – Related to political terrorists, the ordinary
citizens who frequently turn terrorist are members of environmental,
anti-nuclear, animal rights, anti-abortion, anti-government, or religious groups
who have come to feel that “working within the system” is unsatisfactory, so the
only recourse is violent action.
.
Criminals acting as terrorists – While propounding political views, criminals as
terrorists create fear and intimidation through their terrorist acts for the purpose
of obtaining large sums of money quickly. In other words, these are criminals
who use political excuses to mask their criminal motivations.
 .
Insane terrorists – Aptly named, insane terrorists are individuals suffering from Internal
psychological disorders and are frequently “copy cats” desiring attention more terrorists
than making a point or seeking money (Scotti, 1986). Acting irrationally, they use
violent tactics such as shooting, bombing, or kidnapping, and their goals may be
only remotely or strangely related to the targets they choose (or to the people
who become the inadvertent victims).
.
Internal terrorists or psycho-terrorists – Internal terrorists (also sometimes 767
termed “organizational terrorists”, see, for example McCurley and Vineyard,
1998) or psycho-terrorists are members, former members, or other constituents of
an organization who use gossip, political tactics, harassment, intimidation, and
threats to create a climate of fear that will enable them to further their own
objectives within an organization (Kinney, 1995, p. 96). More colloquially, they
are referred to as cancers within organizations although they frequently present
such a positive face to many that they may have many supporters.

Because this latter form of terrorism is generally nonviolent, it gets little attention in
either the academic literature or the press. Nevertheless, it is a formidable and growing
aspect of organizational life with which managers must learn to cope. The purpose of
this paper is to focus on this latter group, hopefully to provide a better understanding
of it.

The internal terrorist

Griffin and Lopez (2004) have proposed that all individuals enter organizations with
some potential predisposition to exhibit violent behaviors (see also Denenberg and
Braverman, 1999). Those predispositions could range from very low (even zero) levels
to very high ones that could easily lead to violent behavior. Further, they suggest that
organizations (or parts of organizations or particularly dysfunctional leaders within
organizations) create internal environments (cultures or climates) that either diminish
or hold in check such predispositions or inflame them (see also Litzky et al., 2006).
Thus, a 2 £ 2 conceptual scheme underlies their work and that of others. Indeed,
because most of the literature focuses on workplace violence or terrorism itself, it is
really focusing only on the cell consisting of individuals with a high predisposition
toward violence in organizations that engender or inflame such violence or terrorism
(see also Van Fleet and Griffin, 2006).
We propose that it would be useful to expand that model from a 2 £ 2 to the 3 £ 2
model shown in Figure 1. In this modelthe two columns represent the organizational
predispositions as proposed by Griffin and Lopez (2004), and that the first and third
rows correspond to the two types of individuals described above. The main difference,
then, is that a middle row is now added. That middle row represents individuals who,
while they have a low predisposition toward violence, have a high willingness to
engage in non-violent behaviors that cause fear in others as a way of achieving their
own particular goals. These are the individuals identified earlier as internal terrorists,
and they are the focus of this paper.
Internal terrorists prey upon the fears of managers trying to cope with
ever-changing task and general environments as well as a maze of legal constraints.
Typically, these terrorists are intelligent and creative individuals who understand the
line between behavior that is legally permissible and that which is not. They may try to
JMP
21,8

768

Figure 1.
A framework of
person-situation
determinants of violent
behavior in organizations

get others to speak up while they remain quietly behind the scenes, thus minimizing
their own risk. They will attempt to mask their real goals by hiding behind a legitimate
issue that they anticipate the group will support. They may use anonymous letters,
notes, and/or memos to lend credence to their ideas or to discredit others. In like
manner, they may simply spread malicious gossip to discredit ideas or people. They
may perform favors for others in an attempt to co-opt those other workers to support
the terrorist’s goals. In any event, their goal is personal gain, and their tactic is to create
a climate of fear – to terrorize the organization – in a relatively low-key, non-violent
manner, and without bringing undue legal attention upon themselves (Kinney, 1995,
p. 96).
An example of this sort of internal terrorist is an employee who threatens legal
action when his or her unjustified requests are turned down, whether they be relatively
simple requests such as a change in procedure or time off for personal business, or
larger demands such as a change in assignment, a promotion, or a salary increase that
would most likely constitute favoritism or reverse discrimination. Similarly, an
individual who possesses vital information or company secrets that, if divulged, would
significantly harm the company may attempt to use that knowledge for personal
purposes and hence become a terrorist within the organization. These terrorists may
also be employees in powerful positions within the organization who are “bullies” and
accustomed to using such tactics in all of their interpersonal interactions to “get their Internal
way”. terrorists
Yet another example of the internal terrorist is the employee who attempts to
discredit someone or some organization by intentionally spreading false or
misleading information. The use of slander and misinformation campaigns,
especially through the use of computers, is increasing (Naylis, 1996). For example,
a disgruntled employee may threaten to discredit the company in the eyes of 769
customers so that they will not buy the company’s products or services. If the
objective is to create fear in management, the act is clearly terrorism; if not, it is
“only” yet another form of workplace violence, sabotage, or dysfunctional behavior
in organizations.
All of these acts could be accomplished by e-mail or the internet. The
internet already is a powerful tool as a means of instilling fear in individuals and
organizations. A simple message or suggestion posted online can cause a
public-relations nightmare or worse for an organization. Because of its speed,
considerable damage can be done before the organization even knows something has
been said. Therefore, companies are beginning to learn that they must monitor the
internet sometimes more zealously than they monitor their physical premises.
Disgruntled individuals simply raise a question or pass along an alleged comment, e.g.
“I’ve heard that XYZ’s new Product X is good on Criterion A but is severely lacking on
Criterion B. Has anybody out there tried it?” Readers tend to focus on Product X’s
suggested weakness, posting questions and concerns at other sites.
Another tactic, “mailbox stuffing” or “bombing,” can effectively shut down a
company’s online operations, costing it both dollars and goodwill. Unfortunately, the
company learns about this only when it attempts to use its e-mail. This tactic seems to
be one of the more common forms of internet revenge. In February 1997, the nation’s
largest e-mail provider, America Online (AOL), was itself the threatened victim of
vindictive hackers (CNET Staff, 1997). In a potential St. Valentine’s Day cyberspace
massacre, electronic intruders warned AOL customers that their accounts would be
canceled if they attempted to go online on February 14. Cryptic e-mail messages also
warned that computer viruses would be planted and chat rooms would be paralyzed,
apparently through an electronic attack technique called “scrolling,” which moves the
on-screen text so rapidly that it is unreadable. While this particular attempt was
unsuccessful, this is a type of attack that internal terrorists could use.
Perhaps the more frightening kind of internal terrorist is the one who makes phone
calls or leaves threatening notes implying violence, lawsuits or other legal actions, or
other actions potentially harmful to the organization. Threat management and security
firms can work with mental health providers to investigate and monitor these
individuals (Kinney, 1995, p. 96), but because of the more obvious possibility of
violence many organizations react to these individuals more rapidly and with greater
concern than those that seem to present no violent threat.
In today’s complex, global world, organizations are becoming more difficult to
control. The phone, e-mail, and the internet have given managers the illusion that they
can control far-flung empires. But modern communications and the growth of web logs
and web bulletin boards in particular, have also given power to bitter or disgruntled
employees, customers, and suppliers. Think of it as a proliferation of weapons to
internal terrorists.
JMP Most people perceive themselves as paid too little, promoted too slowly, passed
21,8 over, humiliated, easily replaceable, and generally not particularly well thought of or
rewarded for their loyalty. They haven’t realized their dreams, and they blame
everyone around them and above them in particular. Asymmetric warfare has come to
the workplace – managers may sometimes have the power to hire and fire, but
employees have the internet.
770 Is that a good thing? Possibly not. Large organizations may well become more
conservative, bureaucratic, and/or paranoid – so concerned about maintaining a happy
workplace that they avoid necessary change and fall behind markets or technological
developments. Smaller organizations, on the other hand, may be able to take advantage
of this and develop through growth in the marketplace.
In like manner customers and suppliers frequently feel that they are getting
squeezed – asked to pay more or provide more or do it faster without any
corresponding benefit to them. They, too may turn to anonymous letter writing or
blogging (participating in web logs) on the internet to try to harm the organization,
again to create an atmosphere of fear so that they can accomplish their objects through
fear and intimidation – internal terrorism.

A survey
In a preliminary effort to ascertain the reality of internal terrorism, a simple
questionnaire was administered to a convenience sample of members of organizations.
That questionnaire asked if the individual had ever observed an individual or group
attempting to use fear to “get their way” in the organization and, if so, to describe the
incident and then provide some minimal (and non-disclosing) demographic
information about those involved.
A total of 361 people were contacted, most of whom could think of bosses who used
fear as a motivational “whip” (usually termed “bully bosses”) and 162 of whom
identified non-managerial individuals or groups attempting (and sometimes
succeeding) in using fear to get their way in organizations. Interestingly, 72.8
percent of the respondents observed or experienced the event in a non-profit
organization; whether this reflected the distribution of employing organizations or the
distribution of such behavior could not be determined in this preliminary study. The
person using the tactic was slightly more likely to be a male (54.9 percent) and the
target also was more likely to be a male (62.3 percent), which may be simply a function
of the larger number of male employees in the organizations. The gender of the parties
involved generally matched (51.2 percent of the events involved the same gender on
both sides). Those responding to the questionnaire were frequently involved (53.1
percent) and were somewhat likely to be the recipients (42.0 percent), although some
respondents did not indicate whether or not they were involved. Consider these
examples from among those surveyed:
.
A member of a country club was upset with an employee and demanded he be
fired. The club manager would not fire the employee so the member threatened to
sue the club to recover his membership fees. I observed the confrontation
between the manager and member. It was successful because the threat of a
lawsuit got the club’s attention and they worked out a compromise.
. I observed a bookkeeper help to get her manager to quit because she did not like
how he was changing things. She did so using her connections to corporate
 management and passive aggressive behavior. When the manager tried to Internal
change a procedure or practice, she continued to follow the old proceedings, terrorists
causing a loss in efficiency due to lack of uniform process. She then went absent
for two weeks leaving the manager to do her job as well as his own. Finally,
when she returned, it was with news that corporate management fully supported
her actions.
.
A coworker of mine used fear to get promoted. He accidentally saw one of the top 771
managers in the company with a lady who was not his wife. The manager was
afraid for his marriage, so when my coworker asked for a promotion and
reminded him that he has seen him with another woman, the boss promoted him
right away.
.
All of the people working in my department are of the same race except one lady
who is of a different ethnic group. She is not working as hard as she is supposed
to. She misses deadlines and leaves work early. As a result the other people in the
department have to work harder and do part of her job. When my supervisor
tried to fire her, she said that the supervisor is racist and that she will sue him if
he goes through with it. The manager decided to let her keep her job because he
is afraid that she will win in court since she is the only one of a different race to
work for the company.

Research needed
There have been calls for research on international terrorism that could help to “break
the cycle whereby successive generations of terrorists follow each other into prolonged,
bloody, and pointless struggles” (Hoffman, 1992, p. 29). Similar research is needed to
identify those aspects of organizations that seem to foster or “bring out” violent and
non-violent internal terrorists. Merari (1991, p. 89) suggests that “the heterogeneity of
the terroristic phenomena makes descriptive, explanatory and predictive
generalizations, which are the ultimate products of scientific research, inherently
questionable.” Nevertheless, research is needed to indicate how terrorism evolves over
time as well as what measures seem to be most effective in countering such
developments within organizations. Crenshaw’s (2000) research on terrorist
decision-making is clearly in this direction.
Research needs to be carefully focused – “circumscribed” and “carefully
delineated” – to be more useful than large, complex models have been (Rule, 1988,
p. 268). Crenshaw (1992, p. 10) has called for research that has “more precision and
specification”. She enumerates several suggestions for such research among which are:
. focusing on only one category or classification of terrorism rather than trying to
cover all of them in a single study;
.
studying the mix of instrumental and expressive or emotional motives used by
terrorists; and
.
the identification of turning points from nonviolent to violent action.

The differences between internal terrorists and other terrorists are significant enough
to suggest that findings for other terrorists are not likely to be true for internal
terrorists. Given the differences in apparent motivations among the types of terrorists,
more careful study of those motivations is also clearly needed. Furthermore, since most
JMP terrorists express feelings of injustice, stronger links should be attempted between the
21,8 research on organizational justice (Greenberg, 1990) and internal terrorism. Just as
Greenberg (1996) has linked employee theft to perceived injustice, so, too, internal
terrorism may be linked to higher levels of such perceived injustice.
Indeed, most if not all of the forms of antisocial organizational behaviors (Giacalone
and Greenberg, 1997) for which research is on-going – arson, blackmail, bribery,
772 espionage, extortion, fraud, interpersonal violence, lying, sabotage, and theft, for
example – could be forms of internal terrorism if the motivation underlying them is to
evoke fear in an effort to achieve the terrorist’s goals. Finally, the turning points from
nonviolent to violent action could be studied through expanding already existing
research on topics such as revenge (Barreca, 1995), “reaching the breaking point” (Bies
et al., 1997), and “snapping” (Conway and Siegelman, 1995) to establish the point (set of
conditions) at which anti-social behavior becomes terrorist behavior. Developing
linkages between research on other forms of dysfunctional behavior and terrorist
behavior will greatly expand our understanding of internal terrorism, leading to better
theoretical and practical information.
Finally, the tentative findings from the survey reported here need replication over a
broader range of organizations and people. Particularly worth determining would be
the extent to profit-seeking versus non-profit organizations accommodate internal
terrorists and the extent to which gender matches between the internal terrorist and the
target person are common.

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About the authors

Dr David Van Fleet’s work focuses on management history, leadership, strategy, and workplace
violence and terrorism. He has authored or co-authored over 200 presentations and publications.
He is a Fellow of the Academy of Management and the Southern Management Association and is
listed in Who’s Who in America (5th ed.) and Who’s Who Among America’s Teachers (Vol. V).
Dr Van Fleet can be contacted at: ddvf@asu.edu
Dr Ella Van Fleet, a business consultant in Phoenix, Arizona, spent 20 years teaching,
training, managing, and consulting before health problems forced her into semi-retirement. She
focuses on entrepreneurship and on workplace violence and terrorism. She received regional and
national recognition for an innovative course she designed at Texas A&M, won a university
teaching award, and was honored by the Texas House of Representatives for outstanding
professional contributions. She also served as Associate Director of the Texas innovation center,
Institute for Ventures in New Technology.

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2006 Awards for Excellence
The following article was selected for this year’s Outstanding Paper Award for

Journal of Managerial Psychology

‘‘Multi-source perspectives of self-esteem, performance

ratings, and source agreement’’
Judy P. Strauss
California State University, Long Beach, California, USA

Purpose – To examine the relationship between self-esteem and job performance using others’
perceptions of self-esteem and to examine agreement in ratings of self-esteem across sources.
Design/methodology/approach – A sample of 143 sales representatives, 113 supervisors, 420 peers,
435 customers, and 510 family and friends completed Rosenberg’s measure of self-esteem and a
measure of acquaintanceship. Peers and supervisors rated the subjects’ job performance. Correlations
and hierarchical regression were used to explore the relationships.
Findings – Customer, peer, and supervisor perceptions of subjects’ self-esteem related significantly to
peer and supervisor performance ratings, whereas self and family/friends perceptions did not. There
was limited support for the acquaintanceship effect (greater agreement across sources when
familiarity is greater), while context affected agreement (same context sources had greater agreement).
Practical implications – The study highlights the importance of looking at an employee from a variety
of perspectives. Also, training employees to develop self-enhancing behaviors may enhance their
outcomes. Finally, training raters that their perceptions of co-workers’ self-esteem may influence
evaluations of performance could reduce unconscious errors.
Originality/value – If this had been a traditional study measuring self-esteem’s impact on
performance ratings, no significant relationships could have been reported since individuals’
perceptions of their own self-esteem were not valid predictors of performance ratings. It may be the
individual’s public self-esteem (e.g. impression management skills) that influences performance
ratings. In particular, workplace sources perceived high self-esteem as being important to job
performance. The validity of self-esteem may be understated through reliance on the self-report
method alone.
Keywords Performance appraisal, Performance measures, Self esteem
www.emeraldinsight.com/10.1108/02683940510615424

This article originally appeared in Volume 20 Number 6, 2005, pp. 464-82,

Journal of Managerial Psychology

www.emeraldinsight.com/authors
The following articles were selected for this year’s Highly Commended Award

‘‘Positive affect and feedback-giving behavior’’

Susan M. Adams

This article originally appeared in Volume 20 Number 1, 2005, Journal of Managerial Psychology

‘‘Managers’ cognitive maps and intra-organisational

performance differences’’
Geoffrey W. Goodhew
Peter A. Cammock
Robert T. Hamilton

This article originally appeared in Volume 20 Number 2 2005, Journal of Managerial Psychology

www.emeraldinsight.com/authors