Huth (2002)

Domestic Political Accountability and the Escalation and Settlement of International
Disputes
Author(s): Paul K. Huth and Todd L. Allee
Source: The Journal of Conflict Resolution , Dec., 2002, Vol. 46, No. 6 (Dec., 2002), pp.
754-790
Published by: Sage Publications, Inc.
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Domestic Political Accountability
and the Escalation and Settlement
of International Disputes
PAUL K. HUTH
Centerfor Political Studies
Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan
TODD L. ALLEE
Department of Political Science
University of Michigan
A political accountability model is developed to explain how the accountability of incumb

cratic leaders to domestic political opposition influences the diplomatic and military policie
ments. The model is situated within the democratic peace literature and compared with existi
work. Empirically, the hypotheses are tested on a new data set of 348 territorial disputes for the
1919 to 1995. Each dispute is divided into three separate stages so that hypotheses about the
outcome of both negotiations and military confrontations, and opposing patterns of war and
ment, can be tested. Results provide strong support for a number of hypotheses concerning the
electoral cycles and the strength of opposition parties in explaining patterns of both conflictual
tive behavior by democratic states.
An extensive literature on the relationship between democracy and interna

flict has developed over the past decade.' Nevertheless, several basic ques
puzzles remain about the existence of, and explanation for, a democratic pe
study, we present two main arguments. First, the theoretical literature on
cratic peace is underdeveloped with respect to explaining differences in t
behavior of democratic states. We present a series of hypotheses that relate v
the political accountability of democratic leaders to differences in forei
behavior. Second, the prevailing quantitative approach to testing hypothese
democratic peace based on dyad-years as the units of observation suffers fr
limitations. We propose an alternative research design that focuses on the
1. The literature is too large to cite fully here, but recent works of particular inter
Auerswald (2000), Bueno de Mesquita et al. (1999), Cederman (2001), Elman (2000), Ga
2000), Gowa (1999), Reiter and Stam (2002), Russett and Oneal (2001), Schultz (2001b)
(2000).
AUTHORS' NOTE: We thank the National Science Foundation and the U.S. Institute of Peace for finan-
cial support of our research. The comments and suggestions of Curt Signorino are especially appreciated.
The data sets used in this article can be found at the JCR data site: http://www.yale.edu/unsy/jcr/jcrdata.htm.
JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION, Vol. 46 No. 6, December 2002 754-790

DOI: 10.1177/002200202237928
? 2002 Sage Publications
754

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Huth, Allee /DOMESTIC POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY 755
stages through which international disputes progress and the diplomatic and military
policies adopted by state leaders at each of these different stages. The results of our sta-
tistical analyses provide strong evidence in support of the theoretical and empirical
approach we adopt for studying the democratic peace. In particular, we find that (a)
opposing patterns of accommodative as well as conflictual behavior by democratic
states can be explained by differences in the political accountability of democratic
leaders, and (b) the explanatory power of domestic- and international-level variables
varies in consistent ways across the different stages of a territorial dispute.
We divide this study into the following sections. First, we present a brief review of
the democratic peace literature and highlight the limitations that provide the rationale
for our theoretical and empirical work in this study. We then outline the different stages
of territorial disputes and develop a series of testable hypotheses that drawn on broader
theoretical models. In the third section, we describe a series of statistical tests and pres-
ent the results of such tests. Finally, we conclude by discussing the implications of our
findings for the literature on the democratic peace.
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

ON THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE
Although many scholars have argued that domestic political condition

tral role in explaining patterns of diplomatic and military conflict among
employing a realist theoretical framework have challenged the claim th
level variables provide powerful findings and have questioned the assert
cratic peace proponents (e.g., Elman 1997; Gowa 1999; Layne 1995). Th
our theoretical analysis is that realist critics have failed to make a comp
case that domestic-level variables should not be expected to shape the f
choices of state leaders. Thus, the starting point for our theory-building e
foreign policy leaders are attentive to the struggle within their countr
power and influence. In our theoretical framework, then, state leaders att
tect and promote national security interests abroad while seeking to ensur
and position of political power at home.
The focus of research on the democratic peace has been directed largel
ing and explaining differences in the conflict behavior of democratic vers
cratic states. Nevertheless, one of the theoretical puzzles of the democratic
ature stems from the empirical findings that indicate substantial var
conflict behavior of democratic states (e.g., Auerswald 2000; Elman 20
2000). We believe that an important subject of theoretical work, underdev
current democratic peace literature, is the extent to which domestic
straints and accountability vary in important ways for the leaders of de
ernments. As a result, a more systematic analysis of such differences
cratic regimes is required.
Finally, we believe that hypotheses about the democratic peace shoul
more directly to the unfolding of international disputes into different
choices made by state leaders at each stage of a dispute. The commonl

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756 JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION
dyad-year research design has produced many important findings (e.g.,

1998; Russett and Oneal 2001), yet such designs for empirical tests of th
peace feature several limitations. First, these studies simply code wheth
experience some conflict in a particular year but do not identify patterns o
tiation and response or patterns of conflict resolution. Second, these st
capture that international disputes progress through a number of stages
the emergence of a dispute, (2) attempts to settle the dispute through neg
the escalation of diplomatic conflict and the issuance of military threat
further escalation of these militarized crises to war. The democratic pe
addresses only those situations later in the dispute evolution process in
cratic institutions may prevent states from escalating a dispute. Howeve
peace arguments are not applicable to situations where conflict is absent
are not involved in a dispute in the first place, and thus there is no reason
consider using force (also see Gartzke 1998, 2000). Using a dyad-year d
ever, states that do not get into disputes for reasons unrelated to democrat
may appear as cases in support of the democratic peace. Finally, when u
variables that are particular to each state, such as the level of democracy o
strength of a leader's domestic political position, must be combined somew
rally into some type of joint or composite measure. As a result, it is diff
causal inferences about individual state-level behavior using dyads.
Our alternative approach for studying the democratic peace therefore
following:
1. a focus on the behavior of individual states involved in international disputes,

2. an attempt to explain how disputes progress through different stages of diplomatic and
military conflict, and
3. an analysis of the diplomatic and military actions of challenger and target states at each
stage of a dispute, including an attempt to identify patterns of initiation and response in
the policy choices adopted by state leaders.
Our theoretical and empirical analyses of the democratic peace are built around the
behavior of states involved in territorial disputes. We assemble a data set consisting of
348 territorial disputes during the period from 1919 to 1995 and examine the diplo-
matic and military behavior of states seeking to change the territorial status quo and
those preferring to preserve it.2
We believe there are several advantages to analyzing a data set of territorial dis-
putes. First, by requiring that a territorial disagreement exists to begin with, we mini-
mize problems of irrelevant "no-conflict" observations. Our data set consists of cases
in which the use of diplomatic or military activity to advance one's claim is always a
possibility. A related benefit is that focusing on state behavior in territorial disputes
allows us to develop and test more specific hypotheses about state behavior. In particu-
lar, we are able to examine the conditions under which states are likely to resolve dis-
putes through negotiations, reach a deadlock in talks, or see their dispute escalate into a
2. See Huth and Allee (2002) for a more detailed description of the coding rules used for identifying
cases of territorial disputes and summary descriptions of territorial disputes.

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Huth, Allee / DOMESTIC POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY 757
war. A third advantage of this alternative research design is that by looking at the dif-
ferent stages of a territorial dispute, we can capture the impact of particular variables a
each stage. This helps us to address potential problems of selection bias (e.g., Fearon
1994a; Huth 1996; Reed 2000; Schultz 2001b; Smith 1995). A fourth and final advan-
tage of studying territorial disputes is that they are a central issue over which milita-
rized disputes and wars have erupted. As a result, the study of territorial dispute
should provide a demanding test for the impact of democratic institutions on the con-
flict behavior of foreign policy leaders. If democratic political institutions have the
capacity to discourage military conflict and promote peaceful resolution of disputes
then territorial disputes will push that capacity to its limits.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
We start by discussing how territorial disputes typically move through

ent stages. We then present a theoretical framework to explain the fo
choices selected by state leaders in each of these stages. Our starting point
in which two states have a disagreement over the control of and sovereign r
ritory. One state, the challenger, is seeking to alter the prevailing territor
whereas a target state has rejected the challenger's territorial claims.
In the challenge the status quo stage, we focus on the decision of the
whether to actively seek a change in the status quo and, if so, by what diplo
military policies. The challenger's policy options can be grouped into thr
(1) no active challenge to the territorial status quo, (2) the pursuit of diplom
tives and negotiations over disputed territory, and (3) a coercive policy o
tary force to compel a change in the status quo. The next stage in a terri
depends on what choice was initially selected by the challenger. If the ch
sues neither diplomatic nor military initiatives, the status quo persists.
However, we move to the negotiation stage in those cases in which th
has proposed negotiations. Our theoretical analysis in this negotiating ph
the extent of concessions made by both the challenger and target in a g
talks. A policy of no concessions represents an unyielding bargaining
which political leaders maintain all territorial claims. Alternatively, le
pursue a more accommodative policy in which they offer limited or ev
concessions.
If the challenger state initiated a military threat in an attempt to alter the status quo,
then a military escalation stage ensues. The challenger and target are now in a military
confrontation, and each state must now decide whether to escalate a military confron-
tation and risk war. The challenger and target choices can be portrayed as falling into
one of two policy categories: (1) low escalation or (2) high escalation. A policy of low
escalation indicates that a state engages in at most limited military preparations and the
buildup of forces beyond initial military actions, even if the other party escalates to
higher levels of military preparedness. Escalation to high levels occurs when the chal-
lenger or target refuses to offer any territorial concessions and mobilizes for a large-

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scale attack or resorts to the large-scale use of force when the other party st
and refuses concessions.
Over the duration of a dispute, decision makers make numerous choices regarding
the maintenance of the status quo, strategies for negotiations and dispute settlement,
and the use of coercive military pressure. These choices regarding diplomacy and mili-
tary force-and the resulting pathways to stalemate, dispute settlement, and war-are
the focus of our analysis in the remainder of this article. We present our hypotheses by
discussing the expected impact of each independent variable on state behavior in each
of these three stages.
POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY MODEL
We begin our theoretical analysis at the domestic level with a focus on

ability of incumbent leaders to domestic political opposition. We provi
mary description of the model here due to space limitations (see Huth a
We first describe a number of premises that provide the foundation for o
building efforts and then move to the presentation of the hypotheses t
THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS
Premise 1: The primacy of retaining officefor incumbent leaders. A critical g

bent leaders is to maintain their position of political leadership and protect th
office from political opposition.
Building on this first premise, we expect political leaders to be strategic

suit of both domestic and foreign policies and to try to anticipate the dom
responses to various policies they might adopt. Leaders generally shou
expected to choose policies that might produce high political costs; they sh
prefer policies that will maintain, if not improve, their political standin
Premise 2: The strategic behavior of political opposition. In all political syste

political elites who seek to remove the current leadership from office and
tions of political power themselves. Opposition elites, however, are strateg
when to challenge incumbents and seek their removal.
We expect that counterelites and political opposition will be more act

lenging incumbents when the latter's foreign policy initiatives have fai
controversial (e.g., Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson 1995; Goemans 200
understand what foreign policy actions by governments are likely to prov
sial, we argue that the policy preferences of opposition elites and groups i
disputes are often characterized by what we term a pragmatic nationalist
a policy of unilateral concessions by state leaders in a territorial dispute is
generally risks greater domestic political opposition than a policy of con
matic stalemate. Furthermore, although the threat or use of military force
territorial claims is likely to generate short-term domestic support, co

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attempts at military coercion will also mobilize domestic opposition. Opposition elites
and mass publics therefore do not generally hold more dovish diplomatic and military
policy preferences than incumbent leaders. Instead, they simply seek to punish leaders
who adopt controversial or failed foreign policies.3
Premise 3: Differences in domestic political institutions lead to varying levels of political

accountability. The accountability of state leaders varies across and within political sys-
tems because differences in political institutions affect the ability of opposition groups to
contest government policies.
We expand on this third premise with two specific claims. First, we believe that
democratic leaders are typically more accountable for their foreign policy choices.
This is because political opposition in democratic regimes is generally more capable
of derailing policy programs and removing leaders from power (Bienen and van de
Walle 1992; Gelpi and Grieco 2001; Bueno de Mesquita and Siverson 1995) due to
institutions such as well-organized and independent political parties, regular competi-
tive elections, and independent legislatures. Second, the degree of political account-
ability among democratic leaders can vary depending on political conditions. In par-
ticular, we believe two factors-election cycles and differences in the strength of
opposition parties in legislatures-affect the degree to which democratic leaders are
accountable at any point in time (e.g., Alt and King 1994; Lohmann and O'Halloran
1994; Martin 2000; Milner 1997; Powell 2000).
Premise 4: The impact of political vulnerability on foreign policy. The greater the political
vulnerability of leaders, the higher the political costs to leaders for pursuing controversial
or unsuccessful foreign policy actions.
We believe that this fourth premise provides insights into bluffing and deception in
international disputes. Because bluffing is always a possibility in international dis-
putes, state leaders try to judge whether their adversary is in fact bluffing (e.g., Fearon
1994b). Leaders who are less vulnerable to political opposition should be more willing
to bluff because the domestic political risks of retreating from a clear and firm diplo-
matic or military policy are less extensive.
HYPOTHESES ON COMPARISONS ACROSS POLITICAL SYSTEMS
We now turn to a series of hypotheses that draw on the theoretical f

have presented. In this first section, we focus on comparisons between
nondemocratic regimes.
Hypothesis la: The leaders of democratic states should be less willing to rely
force to achieve territorial goals. As a result, democratic leaders should b
3. We are not convinced that mass opinions are consistently anchored at dovish polic
do we accept the claim that the foreign policy preferences in the mass public are consist
than the preferences of incumbent political elites (e.g., Gaubatz 1995; Holsti 1996; Ninc
Page and Shapiro 1992).

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(a) less likely to initiate military threats as opposed to accepting the status qu
likely to challenge the territorial status quo with a call for negotiations rat
threat of military force,
(b) more likely to make concessions in negotiations,
(c) less likely to resort to higher levels of escalation in military confrontat
Because we argue that political opposition in authoritarian systems is

of effectively contesting state policies (see our discussion of premise
political leaders from such countries to be more willing to adopt more con
cies in an attempt to overturn the territorial status quo by coercive threats
Such leaders are not only more willing to escalate the level of force, but
back away from threats with fewer domestic political costs if the target st
our discussion of premise 4). Therefore, we should expect more frequen
military probes by nondemocratic leaders to test the resolve of targets, in
frequent threats of force to bolster their bargaining position in negotia
trast, democratic leaders should be more cautious about initiating such mil
because limited military probes and bluffs should carry a greater likelihoo
opponents charging the government with irresolution and a foreign po
Democratic leaders generally prefer a nonviolent settlement through
because they view any possible military conflict as potentially more cost
nondemocratic counterparts. As a result, although we do believe that ter
cessions can be politically costly for democratic leaders, the generally hi
political costs of threatening and using military force should induce dem
ers to rely more frequently on offering limited concessions as part of
strategy designed to achieve an agreement based on reciprocal comprom
Hypothesis lb: The greater domestic audience costs of retreating in the face
and military pressure can provide a bargaining advantage to democratic
result, we expect leaders to be
(a) less likely to challenge the status quo with military threats against demo
states,
(b) more likely to offer concessions in negotiations when democratic adversari
signal their resolve to stand firm,
(c) less likely to escalate to higher levels in military confrontations when
adversaries strongly signal their resolve to use military force.
The logic of hypothesis lb is that if adversaries know that democrati

constrained by domestic audience costs to avoid foreign policy retreats
matic or military pressure, then they should prefer to target nondemoc
who have greater domestic political flexibility to back down in the fac
threats and probes. Furthermore, the greater costs of backing down should
cratic leaders to send more credible signals of resolve in rounds of nego
military confrontations. As a result, if democratic leaders clearly and publ
nicate their intention to stand firm in talks or to use force in a military c
then their adversaries should believe that they face a resolved opponen
adopt less confrontational policies (see Fearon 1994b; Schultz 2001a, 20

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The next two hypotheses build on the general logic supporting hypothesis la, but
now we focus on the unwillingness of democratic leaders to offer concessions when
domestic political costs are expected to be high.
Hypothesis 2a: The bargaining strategies of nondemocratic leaders in response to stalemates

should be more variable and difficult to predict. In contrast, democratic leaders should
pursue more consistent policies of
(a) responding to a deadlock in talks by continuing to seek further talks as opposed to
turning to military coercion, but
(b) avoiding a sharp reversal of policy in subsequent negotiations, in which intransigence
is followed by concessions.
In nondemocracies, the limited ability of political opposition to challenge incum-

bent leaders lessens the political costs for such leaders of either making concessions or
turning to military coercion. Thus, nondemocratic leaders should display more diver-
gent patterns of diplomatic and military behavior in deciding how to respond to a situa-
tion of deadlocked negotiations. Democratic counterparts, however, have less flexibil-
ity in their bargaining position because unilateral or high levels of concessions are
potentially quite costly once negotiations have already ended in deadlock. This is
because we expect both parties to publicly blame the other side for the prior deadlock
in talks. As a result, negotiations in context of continued stalemate become a much
more salient issue domestically for democratic leaders, and opposition elites and seg-
ments of public opinion are likely to be very critical of offering concessions to a trucu-
lent adversary (see our discussion of the pragmatic nationalist bias associated with
premise 2). Threats of military force and coercive bluffing are also potentially more
costly for democratic leaders. Therefore, we expect such leaders to be wary of turning
to military threats or offering concessions as way to break a stalemate.
The next hypothesis argues that the greater accountability of democratic leaders
under certain conditions can induce such leaders to adopt more conflictual diplomatic
and military policies.
Hypothesis 2b: When ethnic conationals populate disputed territory, democratic leaders will
face stronger domestic pressures to adopt hard-line policies than their nondemocratic
counterparts. As a result, democratic leaders should be
(a) more likely to challenge the status quo with calls for talks and military threats and
especially likely to favor military threats over a reliance on negotiations,
(b) less likely to make concessions in negotiations,
(c) more likely to escalate military confrontations to high levels.
On the basis of earlier findings by Huth (1996) and Saideman (2001), we generally
expect incumbent leaders in all political systems to secure domestic support for back-
ing demands of greater political self-determination when ethnic conationals are
located across international borders in disputed territory. However, we argue further
that democratic leaders will face particularly strong pressures from domestic opposi-
tion groups and public opinion to take forceful initiatives to challenge the status quo
and support their ethnic conationals. We expect the defense of principles of political

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self-determination to have a high level of legitimacy in democratic system

opposition elites and mass publics will take advantage of their greater ab
political pressure to push for supporting the political rights of ethnic conat
puted territory. For democratic leaders, the domestic political costs of d
military inaction in such circumstances are greater, and thus they are a
likely to consider initiating and escalating military threats and to adop
positions in negotiations.
HYPOTHESES ON COMPARISONS WITHIN DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL SYSTEMS
In this section, we present hypotheses that focus on comparisons among

regimes. Our primary argument is that varying levels of political accou
linked to electoral cycles and differences in the strength of opposition par
latures and parliaments.
Hypothesis 3a: The presence of strong political opposition forces in legislature

ments generally induces more conservative foreign policy choices by democ
On the other hand, the stronger the ruling government's position in the le
more likely political leaders are
(a) to challenge the territorial status quo with calls for talks and threats of for
through the use of threats of military force;
(b) to make concessions in negotiations;
(c) to resort to higher levels of escalation in military confrontations.
Hypothesis 3b: As the strength of the ruling government's position in the leg
democratic adversary increases, leaders are
(a) less likely to challenge the territorial status quo with threats of milita
instead to favor negotiations,
(b) more likely to make concessions in negotiations,
(c) less likely to resort to higher levels of escalation in military confrontat
Weak party support (e.g., divided government or minority governm

push democratic leaders away from an active foreign policy and toward
nance of the status quo. This is because the lack of a cohesive majority in t
should make a president or prime minister wary of diplomatic or milita
For one, the executive is likely to lack bargaining flexibility in internat
tions, and therefore stalemate is more likely because a settlement is un
based only on the other state's unilateral concessions. The same logic ap
sions to initiate militarized disputes. The political costs of a military setback
ure to achieve diplomatic gains as a result of coercive pressure (military
bluffs) are higher because opposition parties are in a stronger position in t
or parliament to criticize failed government policies and more credibly thr
of no confidence (for prime ministers). However, if these constrained le
lenge the status quo by initiating negotiations or military threats, then the
avoid the high political costs associated with either accommodative poli
tial concessions in negotiations) or war (military setback following escala
levels).

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In contrast, when the executive's party commands a majority position in the legisla-
ture, then opposition parties should be in a much weaker position to (a) veto the terms
of international agreements they dislike, (b) ensure criticism through legislative debate
and hearings, and (c) threaten removal in the event of a diplomatic or military retreat.
As a result, democratic leaders with greater political security should be more willing to
pursue controversial policies such as making concessions in negotiations or initiating
and escalating military confrontations.
In hypothesis 3b, we argue that secure democratic governments are more likely to
be the targets of calls for talks based on the expectation that they can offer concession
and still secure domestic ratification. It follows, then, that adversaries will view secure
democratic governments as more politically capable partners for trying to achieve a
negotiated settlement. The important task for a country's leaders is to calculate the
most opportune time to put offers of concessions on the negotiating table that will be
reciprocated by their negotiating partner. Political leaders do not want to incur the
political heat at home for offering concessions unless they believe their negotiating
partner can withstand the same type of domestic political pressure in their battle fo
ratification and approval of any agreement. If leaders expect a negotiated agreement to
unravel due to domestic opposition in the other country, then they have few incentives
to expose themselves politically to charges of selling out from their own domesti
opposition.
Because of the greater political flexibility of secure democratic leaders, one might
argue that such leaders are more likely to be targets of threats and higher levels of esca-
lation. The argument would be that if opponents know that secure democratic leaders
are better able to fight off domestic opposition following a military retreat, then these
opponents should be more willing to probe, bluff, and even escalate. Although this
logic is plausible, we emphasize the military risks associated with gambling that a
secure leadership in another country will back down under military pressure or accept
a limited military defeat. We would only expect risk-acceptant states to gamble by
challenging secure adversaries, yet we do not think that most states are consistently
risk acceptant in this way.
The next set of hypotheses considers the effects of elections on foreign policy
choices.
Hypothesis 4a: The more recently national elections have been held, the more likely are
incumbent leaders to
(a) challenge the territorial status quo, especially through a threat of military action;
(b) make concessions in negotiations;
(c) resort to higher levels of escalation in military confrontations.
Hypothesis 4b: The more recently national elections have been held in a democratic state, the
more likely are adversaries of that democratic state to
(a) challenge the territorial status quo with calls for talks instead of threats of military
action,
(b) make concessions in negotiations,
(c) avoid higher levels of escalation in military confrontations.

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Competitive elections and the threat of electoral defeat can be powerf

political accountability for democratic leaders. Opposition parties and
expected to draw on controversial issues and setbacks in foreign policy t
vince voters that incumbents should be removed. International agreemen
territorial concessions or failed military initiatives to change the territori
are the types of foreign policy issues that opposition groups should seize on
to discredit incumbents. Because leaders are aware of the electoral risks associated
with such policies, we should expect a pattern to emerge between the timing of elec-
tions and the diplomatic and military policies pursued by leaders in territorial disputes.
In hypothesis 4a, the logic is that the accountability induced by elections should be
greater when democratic leaders expect to face elections relatively soon.4 In contrast,
when elections are not expected for some time, then the threat of electoral defeat
should have weaker political effects (e.g., Gaubatz 1999; Milner and Rosendorf
1997). Therefore, the more recently national elections have been held, the more will
ing incumbents should be to adopt an active foreign policy in which they seek negotia-
tions or threaten the use of force in an attempt to change the status quo. Furthermore,
democratic leaders should be more willing to make concessions in negotiations and
resort to higher levels of escalation in military confrontations in the periods shortly
after national elections.
Precisely because democratic leaders are less constrained in the period shortly after
elections and more capable of withstanding the political fallout of more accommoda-
tive policies, we argue in hypothesis 4b that other states will recognize this and judge
this to be a favorable time to seek a negotiated agreement based on the logic we devel-
oped in support of hypothesis 3b. As a result, it makes political sense for state leaders
to offer concessions to democratic negotiators when they believe that democratic lead-
ers are less constrained by the political risks of concession making (i.e., elections are
not expected to be held soon). Conversely, when democratic leaders face upcoming
elections, they should shy away from territorial concessions in negotiations. Knowing
this, adversaries should be less willing to offer concessions themselves.
When we consider the effects of recent elections in a democratic adversary on the
choices of state leaders to initiate or escalate the use of military force, we encounter the
same opposing arguments about what to expect as discussed above for hypothesis 3b.
Again, although it is possible that other states might be tempted to initiate and escalate
military challenges against democratic governments that have recently held elections
in an attempt to pressure secure leaders into making territorial concessions by military
bluffs or the use of force, we believe this is a quite risky strategy. Instead, we argue that
adversaries would be less likely to initiate and escalate military confrontations
because they are worried that politically secure democratic leaders are more willing to
risk a military conflict to defend their territorial claims.
4. Of course, in presidential systems, the time period between elections is fixed and thus known in
advance. In parliamentary systems, elections must be held within a certain period of time, but exactly when
they will be held is likely to be a function of a range of political conditions. Despite the greater uncertainty
facing leaders in such a situation, the general logic of the argument still holds. Once elections have occurred,
they are unlikely to be held again within a short period of time.

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HYPOTHESES ON COMPARISONS AMONG DYADS
In this last section, the hypotheses focus on the political institutions of

lenger and target and how they influence patterns of strategic interaction.
Hypothesis 5: Lower levels of diplomatic and military conflict are expected in terr
putes between two democratic states. As a result, state leaders in democr
should be
(a) less likely to initiate military challenges and more likely to seek negotiations,
(b) more likely to make concessions in negotiations over disputed territory,
(c) less likely to resort to higher levels of escalation in military conflicts over disputed
territory.
The logic of hypothesis 5 extends the reasoning presented in support of hypothesis

la by considering the effects of high levels of political accountability in both chal-
lenger and target states. When foreign policy leaders in both states face political oppo-
sition forces that are in relatively strong positions to hold them responsible for pursu-
ing policies in territorial disputes that prove controversial or fail, we should expect
decision makers to be particularly wary of the political costs associated with active
military policies. As a result, democratic leaders should be worried about the political
dangers that crises and the large-scale use of military force entail (i.e., the audience
costs to be borne for backing down or suffering high losses in a war), and each side
should be less inclined to initiate military threats. Instead of relying on military threats
and coercion, democratic leaders should turn to negotiations more frequently. Never-
theless, the political costs of conceding territory should compel democratic negotia-
tors to avoid unilateral concessions and instead to favor mutual compromise as a way
to secure domestic support for a territorial settlement despite criticism by political
opponents who reject any territorial concessions.
The next hypothesis considers diplomatic and military interactions in territorial
disputes between mixed dyads (i.e., disputes between a democratic and an authoritar-
ian state).
Hypothesis 6a: In mixed dyads, military confrontations generally result from nondemocratic
challengers threatening democratic targets.
Hypothesis 6b: In mixed dyads, the resort to high levels of escalation in a military confronta-
tion is most likely by nondemocratic leaders against democratic adversaries.
The argument of hypotheses 6a and 6b is that in territorial disputes between demo-

cratic and nondemocratic states, it is the decisions of nondemocratic leaders that typi-
cally lead to military confrontations and higher levels of military escalation. The logic
centers on the more limited political costs that nondemocratic leaders face both in initi-
ating military probes and bluffs and resorting to the large-scale use of force (see our
discussion of premises 3 and 4). As a result, if military conflict is frequent within
mixed dyads, the primary explanation is not that democratic states often adopt aggres-
sive policies or that democratic states are targeted because they are vulnerable to

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coercive pressure. Rather, military conflict occurs because nondemocratic

less constrained in initiating and escalating the use of force.
ESTIMATION AND RESULTS
Now we examine the performance of the political accountability model

nation for the behavior of states during the various stages of territorial d
should note that when we test each variant of the political accountability
also include in the statistical model a number of common control variables t
to capture the international strategic environment in which states interact.
ables include measures of common security ties, the value of the disputed te
military balance between the two states, and each state's involvement in o
rized disputes.5
Once again, we are interested in three decisions: (1) the decision of ch
states regarding whether and how to challenge the territorial status quo,
sions of both challengers and targets to offer concessions during rounds o
the disputed territory, and (3) the decisions of challengers and targets to esc
military confrontations by resorting to higher levels of force. We investigat
ferent stages and test our hypotheses through a series of quantitative test
data set on 348 territorial disputes that span the period from 1919 to 199
It is useful to begin by describing a few features of our data. First, we pi
outcomes and dates of all rounds of talks and all military confrontations b
challenger and target in each dispute, and then we measure all such actions o
specific basis. Instead of using an annual observation to summarize the o
any talks or military confrontations that might have taken place during that
the actual rounds of negotiations and military confrontations serve as th
observation. This allows us to identify and code multiple foreign policy a
disputed territory that take place within a given year.6 Because the actu
themselves serve as the unit of analysis, we are able to more easily accommo
tions in which a given round of negotiations or military confrontation spill
the next year (see Bennett and Stam 2000). Furthermore, nearly all explan
ables in our data set are also measured in a month-specific manner. This
more accurately capture the timing of important events, such as any foreign
tiatives concerning the disputed territory. We can also pinpoint more precise
ing of important domestic political shifts-such as elections, changes in
coalitions, or broader changes in regime type-that take place within a give
5. See Huth and Allee (2002, chap. 3) for a more detailed description of these internati
and military variables.
6. In our data set, there are 211 instances in which multiple foreign policy initiatives co
puted territory are initiated within the same year. For example, two states might hold talks twic
a pair of states might engage in negotiations over disputed territory in March, only to see
mobilize troops against the target in October.

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month-specific nature of our data also ensures that the sequencing of important events
is captured accurately.
Although we employ a different statistical model for the status quo stage as
opposed to the negotiation and military escalation stages, several model estimation
features are common across the three stages. First, for each stage, we estimate three
separate statistical models to test the various hypotheses from the political account-
ability model. These three models mirror the distinctions between accountability-
based arguments we made in the earlier theoretical section. We estimate an "across-
regimes" model, a "within-regimes" model, and then a "dyadic" model. Dividing the
estimation in this manner makes the most sense conceptually and is the most effective
way to test such a wide range of arguments. When estimating each model, we also
include the set of international political-military variables described at the beginning
of this section. Furthermore, due to the nonlinear nature of all of our models, we also
present a series of predicted probability results to provide a more substantive interpre-
tation of variable effects (see Tables 4, 8, and 12). We estimate the impact of discrete
changes in particular variables on the predicted probability of certain outcomes by
holding all other variables constant. Although the coefficient results for each econo-
metric model generally provide a basic sense of the estimated direction and signifi-
cance of hypothesized relationships, these predicted probability results are often more
substantively meaningful. Finally, we estimate all models using Huber or "robust"
standard errors due to concerns with possible contemporaneous correlation and
nonconstant variances across the units of observation.7
ESTIMATION OF THE CHALLENGE THE STATUS QUO STAGE
Our first question concerns the decision of challenger states to initiate diplomatic or
military actions in pursuit of their country's claims to disputed territory. There are
three distinct options available to the leaders of challenger states: (1) refrain from any
initiatives and maintain the status quo, (2) propose talks and rely on negotiations in an
attempt the alter the status quo, and (3) resort to threats of military force in support of
territorial claims. Because these three choices are not clearly ordered, we require a
model that treats outcomes as nominal instead of ordinal (Long 1997, chap. 6). As a
result, we estimate a series of multinomial logit models to explain the decisions of
leaders in the challenge the status quo stage. The primary drawback of multinomial
logit is the fairly restrictive independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) assumption.
However, we employ the two best-known tests for the IIA assumption and find no evi-
dence to reject IIA in any of our models.8
7. Because the observations in our data set span different numbers of months, we are especially sensi-
tive to concerns with heteroscedasticity.
8. The independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) assumption is met when an individual's prefer-
ences among alternatives remain consistent regardless of which choices are or are not available (see
McFadden 1981). We employ both the Hausman and the Small-Hsiao tests to examine the IIA assumption
(Hausman and McFadden 1984; Small and Hsiao 1985). In all cases, we perform the tests after first eliminat-
ing the option of negotiations and then the option of military force. At times, we obtain a negative chi-square
statistic, which Hausman and McFadden (1984, 1226) claim should be interpreted as evidence that IIA has
not been violated.

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We end up with 6,542 observations for the challenge the status quo stage. T
1,782 cases in which a challenger initiates a round of talks and 390 cases i
challenger initiates the use of force. For operational purposes, informatio
pendent variables for the challenge the status quo stage is drawn from the
which the challenger initiates a militarized confrontation or a round of ta
Cases in which the challenger does not challenge the status quo are more d
conceptualize and operationalize. We use a "12-month rule," which holds
months have elapsed since a challenger state has threatened force or called
then it is considered to have "done nothing" during that period of time. That
then included in the data set as a case in which no challenge was made.9 E
sive 12 months of activity is treated in the same way until the state once again
new round of talks or threatens force.1' Finally, the temporal structure of t
raises some concerns about serial correlation. In the spirit of Beck, Katz,
(1998), we include a variable to count the number of months since the chal
undertook some activity-whether it was a call for talks or threat of forc
Beck 1998). This variable serves primarily as a control for the impact of tim
history on decisions to challenge the status quo.
RESULTS FOR THE CHALLENGE THE STATUS QUO STAGE
The multinomial logit results are presented in Tables 1 through 3. In each of these
models, we set the choice to accept the status quo as the baseline category, which gen-
erates results that compare the options of doing nothing versus both pursuing negotia-
tions and initiating force. However, because we also care about the choice between
challenging through talks versus force, we also present results for this direct compari-
son." Tables 1 through 3 contain three columns of coefficient results that compare each
choice to the remaining two options. The impact of discrete changes in hypothesized
variables on the probability of calls for negotiations and threats of force is summarized
in Table 4.
We first examine the results of the political accountability model hypotheses (see
Tables 1-3). In sum, the very clear overall conclusion we draw is that democratic lead-
ers are much less likely to turn to threats of force in attempt to change the territorial sta-
tus quo and are considerably more likely to challenge the territorial status quo by call-
ing for negotiations. These results hold in both the monadic and dyadic contexts and
9. In this case, we randomly sample one of the months during this period of no challenge and include
it as an observation in the operational challenge the status quo stage data set.
10. We also consider and employ a number of additional specifications for the decision "not to chal-
lenge." One option is to use a modified version of the 12-month rule, in which case the 12-month rule is used
for up to 5 years after some action and 3 or fewer years before some observable action. The logic is that states
are only likely to actively consider contesting territory when the territorial issue is salient as opposed to dor-
mant. Yet another strategy is to randomly sample periods of inactivity from the months in which no action
was taken. We include varying numbers of random "no-challenge" cases and find only negligible differ-
ences based on the number of random observations included. As a result, we find the results for the challenge
the status quo stage to be remarkably stable regardless of the coding rule we employ for including observa-
tions in which no challenge was made.
11. The comparison of talks versus force is a straightforward transformation of the same model (see
Liao 1994).

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TABLE 1
Multinomial Logit Model of Challenger Decisions to Challenge the Status Quo:

Political Accountability Model-Comparing Differences across Regimes
Talks vs. Force vs.

No Action No Action Force vs. Talks
Political accountability across-regimes variables

Challenger democracy level .018 tt -.056tt -.074ttt
(.006) (.012) (.013)
Target democracy level .002 .005 .003
(.004) (.008) (.008)
Challenger Democracy x Stalemate -.003 -.014 -.011
(.010) (.018) (.018)
Control for recent stalemate .450*** .332t -.119
(.127) (.209) (.216)
Challenger Democracy x Ethnic Ties .015t .049ttt .034tt
(.008) (.016) (.016)
Control for ethnic ties .144t .258t .114
(.099) (.169) (.180)
International politics variables
Common security ties -.050 -.431 tt -.381 tt
(.063) (.130) (.135)
Strategic value of territory .196ttt .365tt .168t
(.067) (.119) (.125)
Challenger involved in other dispute -.101t .503*** .603***
(.074) (.126) (.133)
Target involved in other dispute -.020 .322tt .342ttt
(.068) (.129) (.135)
Military balance -.012 1.48ttt 1.49ttt
(.125) (.218) (.230)
Months since last challenge -.006ttt -.016ttt -.009***
(.001) (.003) (.003)
Constant -755*** -3.22*** -2.47***
(.088) (.199) (.205)
NOTE: Robust standard errors in parentheses. N=

pendence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA): drop talks
2 2
=.22
reje
***
sug
atio
neg
dem
dom
Fir
rac
less
com

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TABLE 2
Multinomial Logit Model of Challenger Decisions to Contest

the Territorial Status Quo: Political Accountability Model-
Comparing Differences within Democratic Regimes
Talks vs. Force vs.

Political accountability within-regimes variables

Strength of challenger ruling coalition -.001 .010 .011
(.003) (.010) (.010)
Strength of target ruling coalition .001 -.004 -.005
(.002) (.005) (.006)
Months since elections in challenger -.008ttt -.01 i -.002
(.003) (.007) (.007)
Recent elections in target .219ttt -.002 -.221
(.092) (.194) (.202)
Control for challenger democracy .670*** -.949* -1.62***
(.204) (.624) (.632)
Control for target democracy -.075 .155 .229
(.168) (.363) (.378)
Common security ties -.101 -.528t*t -.428ttt
(.063) (.126) (.132)
Strategic value of territory .157ttt .315*tt .158t
(.066) (.116) (.122)
Challenger involved in other dispute -. 109 .480*** .589***
(.074) (.125) (.133)
Target involved in other dispute -.041 .369ttt .410tt
(.067) (.129) (.136)
Military balance -.076 1.25'tt 1.32'tt
(.124) (.214) (.228)
Months since last challenge -.007ttt -.017"t -.010***
(.001) (.003) (.003)
Constant -.581*** -2.35*** -1.77***
(.080) (.157) (.164)

pendence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA): drop talk
2 2
= -.1
reje
*p <
dem
(see
cra
ver
dya
ter
12.
catio

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TABLE 3
Multinomial Logit Model of Challenger Decisions to Contest the Territorial Stat

Quo: Political Accountability Model-Comparing Differences across Dyads
Talks vs. Force vs.

Political accountability dyadic variables

Democratic dyads .477ttt -.876ttt -1.35ttt
(.094) (.246) (.251)
Nondemocratic state in mixed dyad -.304*** .426tt .730ttt
(.104) (.215) (.224)
Control for mixed dyad .322*** -.467** -.789***
(.092) (.186) (.193)
Common security ties . 105t -.550ttt -.445ttt
(.062) (.126) (.132)
Strategic value of territory .162ttt .328tit .166t
(.066) (.116) (.122)
Challenger involved in other dispute -.1 0t .479*** .590***
(.074) (.124) (.132)
Target involved in other dispute -.038 .370ttt .408ttt
(.068) (.129) (.136)
Military balance -.089 1.24ttt 1.33ttt
(.124) (.214) (.227)
Months since last challenge -.007ttt -.017ttt -.010***
(.001) (.003) (.003)
Constant -.563*** -2.37*** -1.81**
(.081) (.157) (.164)

pendence
2
for irrelevant
2
alternatives (IIA): drop
forc
do n
**p
pat
mix
in
How
atte
acr
bot
and
are
and
neg
On
cies
late

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TABLE 4
The Impact of Selected Significant Variables on Challenger Decisions to Conte

the Status Quo through Calls for Negotiations or Threats of Force (in percentag
Initial Postchange Change in % Change in

Probability Probability Probabilities Probabilities
Probability of calls for negotiations

Challenger democracy (very
nondemocratic -> very democratic) 26.7 36.0 +9.3 +34.8
Challenger Democracy x Ethnic Ties

(very nondemocratic -> very democratic) 27.0 30.2 +3.2 +11.9
Time since elections in challenger

(elections 6 months ago -> elections
4 years ago) 42.5 34.7 -7.8 -18.4
Recent election in target (no -> yes) 28.7 33.3 +4.6 +16.0
Democratic dyad (nondemocratic dyad -

democratic dyad) 29.4 41.6 +12.2 +41.5
Strategic value of territory (no -> yes) 26.9 30.4 +3.5 +13.0
Probability of threats offorce

Challenger democracy (very
nondemocratic -> very democratic) 8.1 2.5 -5.6 -69.1
Challenger Democracy x Ethnic Ties (very
nondemocratic -> very democratic) 6.5 14.4 +7.9 +121.5
4 years ago) 3.5 2.6 -0.9 -25.7
Democratic dyad (change from a
nondemocratic dyad) 6.5 2.4 -4.1 -63.1
Nondemocratic challenger in mixed dyad

(change from a democratic challenger
in mixed dyad) 3.8 6.3 +2.5 +65.8
Security ties (no common TD opponent ->

common TD opponent) 5.1 3.4 -1.7 -33.3
Military balance (1 to 10 disadvantage ->
10 to 1 advantage) 3.3 10.3 +7.0 +212.1
NOTE: Unless specified otherwise, the territory

tary balance is 3:2 in favor of the target, and de
majority and to have won an election 2 years a
rial dispute.
with ethnic conationals, democratic challengers now become more than twice as likely
to threaten force compared with nondemocratic challengers (see Table 4). According
to our data, democratic leaders in such scenarios stand a 14.4% probability of threaten-
ing force, whereas nondemocratic leaders are predicted to threaten force only 6.5% of
the time.'1
13. These probabilities represent the impact of democracy only in the presence of ethnic ties, remov-
ing the impact of democracy in any other way. All other democracy-based interaction term probabilities are
examined in a similar manner.

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Among democratic states, electoral cycles (hypotheses 4a and 4b) also help explain
when challengers are likely to challenge the territorial status quo, especially by turning
to negotiations (see Table 2). Many of the hypothesized relationships about the impact
of election timing are significant and in the predicted direction. As challenger states
begin to approach elections, they become more conservative and less likely to issue
any form of territorial challenge. Democratic leaders in challenger states are nearly
20% less likely to call for negotiations near the end of an electoral cycle and 25% less
likely to threaten force to pursue territorial claims when they face upcoming elections.
Similarly, the electoral cycle in target states also affects the challenger's calculations.
Challengers are 16% more likely to pursue talks right after the target has recently held
an election as opposed to when the target is nearing a general election.
We now turn to the results for the control variables relating to international
political-military conditions. The impact of these variables is robust across the three
different specifications of the political accountability model (see Tables 1-3).'4 On the
whole, these variables provide a strong explanation for decisions by challengers to
employ threats of force to pursue their territorial claims, yet they say very little about
challenger decisions to use negotiations to address territorial claims. Four of the five
variables regarding threats of military force receive strong support. In general, military
threats to the territorial status quo are more likely when the territory has strategic
value, the military balance favors the challenger, and the target is currently involved in
another militarized dispute. For example, challengers are 34% more likely to turn to
military force in at attempt to acquire strategically valuable territory. In addition, chal-
lengers are more than three times as likely to threaten force to acquire disputed terri-
tory when they have a sizable military advantage compared with situations in which
they are at a significant military disadvantage (see Table 4). On the other hand, chal-
lengers are less likely to issues coercive challenges to the territorial status quo when
they share common security ties with the target. In fact, the likelihood of a military
challenge drops by one-third when the two states are in other territorial disputes with a
common opponent (see Table 4).
ESTIMATION OF THE NEGOTIATION AND ESCALATION STAGES
If the challenger decides to challenge the status quo either through a call
ations or a threat of force, our analysis shifts to examining the outcom
rounds of talks and military confrontations, respectively. Unlike the challen
tus quo stage, here we consider decisions made by both the challenger an
However, we do not analyze rounds of talks and militarized disputes dy
attempt to code or explain a "joint" outcome for a pair of states. Instead
separate outcome (either degree of concessions or level of escalation) fo
challenger and target. This allows us to understand how particular variabl
14. As a general rule, for purposes of consistency, we use the estimated results from
regimes version of the political accountability model to interpret the significance of the
political-military variables and calculate the impact of changes in these variables on the pred
ity of the various outcomes of interest.

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decision-making calculus of each state. The difficult task, however, is to f

consider challenger and target decisions separately, yet to incorporate the
two states' decisions are related (Signorino 1999; Smith 1999).15
We believe that a seemingly unrelated bivariate probit model provides
to estimate the separate but interrelated decisions of two states in a disp
this version of the bivariate probit model provides a unique set of estimates
challenger and target, yet it incorporates the correlation between the di
the two states' equations and provides an estimate of the magnitude of t
ship.17 Therefore, we estimate a series of bivariate probit models to exami
ior of both challengers and targets during rounds of talks or militarized
We should note a few additional issues regarding the operationalization
tion of the negotiation and escalation stages. Because conditions may ch
the course of a lengthy round of negotiations or a protracted military conf
for the observations used in the estimation of these two stages are drawn
month of each episode.18 This serves to update changes in the data from t
of the episode. In addition, the number of observations for the negotiati
tion stages is slightly lower than the corresponding number of calls for talk
of force found in the challenge the status quo stage. This can be attributed
that in some disputes, both states have territorial claims, and both can
challengers. In a handful of status quo stage cases, it is not possible to dete
state initiated the round of talks or military action, and therefore both st
as having challenged the territorial status quo. For the negotiation and es
analysis, then, one of these two observations is randomly dropped from th
final point is that the analysis of outcomes of talks and militarized dispute
sible concerns with selection bias because a challenger's decision to offe
or escalate force could be linked to its initial choice in the challenge th
stage. As a result, we also estimate a Heckman or "censored" probit model f
lenger to examine whether factors that affect a challenger's decision to cal
threaten force are also related to its subsequent decision regarding whe
concessions in talks or escalate force (Heckman 1979). In nearly all cases,
evidence of selection effects biasing our results. Nevertheless, we do
instances in which the impact of particular variables on challenger co
escalation decisions is affected somewhat once we account for the impact o
ables on the "selection" equation.
15. The use of "directed dyads" is one way to analyze the behavior of two disputants
directional observations are not independent, and the disturbances across the two observat
be correlated.
16. See Greene (1997,906-11) for a general discussion of bivariate probit and Smith (1999) for a spe-
cific discussion of bivariate models and the interrelatedness of state decisions.
17. Bivariate probit is sometimes used as a method for estimating two potentially interrelated deci-
sions of the same actor (see Reed 2000). Yet bivariate probit is also an appropriate method for modeling the
related actions of two separate actors (see Zorn 2002).
18. Recall that the data used to explain challenger decisions to challenge the status quo are taken from
the beginning month of the round of talks or militarized dispute, when the actual "challenge" was first made.

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RESULTS FOR THE NEGOTIATION STAGE
We now examine the decisions of challenger and target states to offer c

in negotiations over disputed territory. In total, there are 1,528 rounds of n
in our data set. Concessions are offered by challengers in 37% of the cases
and by targets in just under 36% of cases (545/1,528). Because the prevailin
to refrain from offering concessions, we are particularly interested to see w
actually become willing to offer concessions. Once again, we estimate thr
of the political accountability model. Our general conclusion is that contr
for international political-military conditions provide little explanation fo
sions that states make regarding negotiations over disputed territory. To
why states make concessions during talks over disputed territory, we mu
leaders' domestic political motivations for making concessions. In fact, m
accountability-based hypotheses that focus on differences both across r
within democratic regimes receive considerable support as explanations fo
tion behavior. There is also considerable support for the use of the bivari
models. Each of the three accountability-based models produces a statistica
cant rho of approximately .85, which indicates that the challenger and targe
decisions are highly correlated.19 Furthermore, the three Heckman probi
generate small and statistically insignificant estimates of rho, which alla
cerns with possible selection bias.20 In fact, none of the statistically signi
mated relationships from the bivariate probit models are called into question
cient estimates from the Heckman selection models.
We present the challenger results from the three bivariate probit models in Tables 5
through 7. Table 8 contains predicted probability estimates of the impact of discrete
changes in hypothesized independent variables.
The hypothesis that democracies are typically more likely to make concessions
(hypothesis la) receives some support. The coefficient on democracy level (in the tar-
get concession equation) is positive and statistically significant (see Table 5). In fact,
strongly democratic targets are more than 67% more likely to make concessions in
talks over disputed territory than are strongly nondemocratic targets (see Table 8).
There is some suggestive evidence that democratic challengers also are more likely to
make concessions, although the coefficient on level of democracy in the challenger
equation is not statistically significant. Nevertheless, the impact of challenger democ-
racy does appear positive and statistically significant when we estimate a Heckman
probit model for the challenger to check for the existence of any selection effects.2
19. Formally, the large and statistically significant rho indicates that variables omitted from the equa-
tion to predict challenger concessions are highly correlated with those variables omitted from the equation to
predict target concessions.
20. The estimated rho for the across, within, and dyadic models ranges from .16 to .21. None of the
three Wald tests for dependence between the status quo stage disturbances and the negotiation stage distur-
bances are statistically significant.
21. In fact, in the Heckman model, the coefficient for the impact of challenger democracy on chal-
lenger concessions is positive, and the p value is .04. We are hesitant to place too much emphasis on this
result because it does not account for challenger and target interdependence in any way, yet the finding is
suggestive when placed in a broader context.

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TABLE 5
Results from Bivariate Probit Model of Challenger and Target

Decisions to Offer Concessions in Negotiations over Disputed Territory:
Challenger Decision Target Decision

to Offer Concessions to Offer Concessions

Democracy level .003 .023t*t
(.005) (.005)
Democracy Level x Stalemate -.004 -.014tt
(.007) (.007)
Democracy Level x Ethnic Ties -.014tt -.013"t
(.007) (.007)
Target Democracy x Signal of Resolve .014tt
(.007)
Control for recent stalemate -.095t .013
(.067) (.070)
Control for ethnic ties -.096t -.036
(.057) (.058)
Control for signal of resolve .017
(.079)
Common security ties .179tt .189tt
(.081) (.083)
Strategic value of territory .049 -.053
(.063) (.062)
Challenger involved in other dispute -.074 .039
(.086) (.085)
Target involved in other dispute -.035 .071
(.078) (.078)
Military balance .805*** -.728tt
(.140) (.141)
Constant -.613*** .016
(.105) (.102)
NOTE: Robust standard errors in parenthese

1,528. Log likelihood = -1629.04.
***p < .01, two-tailed. tp < .10, one-tailed.
We also find solid support for the id

offer concessions when issues at sta
sionsmight be quite controversial d
cratic challengers and targets are less
nic ties with the population in the d
in challenger states are 25% less lik
concerns with ethnic conationals ar
likely than their nondemocratic cou
cumstances (see Table 8). There is als

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TABLE 6

Political Accountability Model-Comparing Differences within Regimes


Strength of challenger ruling government .012ttt .010ttt
(.004) (.004)
Strength of target ruling government -.001 .000
(.003) (.003)
Time since elections in challenger -.008tt -.002
(.004) (.003)
Time since elections in target -.005tt -.003
(.003) (.003)
Control for challenger democracy -.584** -.547**
(.246) (.237)
Control for target democracy -.433t .313
(.190) (.192)
Common security ties .183tt .190O
(.082) (.082)
(.064) (.062)
(.087) (.086)
Target involved in other dispute -.073 .049
(.079) (.078)
Military balance .849*** -.718ttt
(.143) (.143)
Constant -.744*** -.083
(.088) (.101)
NOTE: Robust standard errors in parentheses.

1,528. Log likelihood = -1628.47.
**p < .05, two-tailed. ***p < .01, two-tailed. tp
ers find it more difficult to break s

nondemocratic targets, democratic ta
current round of talks when there has
(see Table 8). The corresponding relat
statistically significant. However, th
again bolsters support for this hypoth
sigence are particularly credible rece
are more likely to make concessions w
ingness to make concessions compare
22. The coefficient for Challenger Democrac

a Heckman model of challenger concessions th

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TABLE 7

Political Accountability Model-Comparing Differences across Dyads

Political accountability dyadic variable

Democratic dyad .096 .183't
(.091) (.091)
Common security ties .195ttt .193'tt
(.080) (.082)
(.063) (.062)
(.086) (.085)
Target involved in other dispute -.021 .102t
(.078) (.077)
Military balance .723** * -.578tt
(.133) (.132)
Constant -.638*** -.099
(.073) (.095)

1,528. Log likelihood = -1641.93.
***p < .01, two-tailed. tp < .10, one-tailed. tt
democratic target (see Table 5). In fa

offer concessions to highly resolved
nondemocratic targets (see Table 8)
Differences within democratic regim
and, to a lesser extent, target decisi
leaders who possess strong support do
rial concessions to their adversarie
whose governing coalition holds 80%
more likely to offer concessions th
only 40% of seats (see Tables 6 and 8).
leaders make concessions to opponen
that is, who are well placed to offer
nearly 60% more likely to offer conc
strong domestic position as opposed t
(see Table 8). We also find evidence in
hesitant to make concessions as an e
and 4b). Leaders in challenger state
elections are proximate as opposed t
Table 8). Similarly, challengers are 1
talks when the target faces the pro

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TABLE 8
The Impact of Selected Significant Variables on Challenger and Target

Decisions to Offer Concessions in Negotiations over Disputed Territory
(in percentages)

Probability of challenger concessions

Challenger Democracy x Ethnic Ties
(very nondemocratic -> very democratic)41.1 30.6 -10.5 -25.5
Target Democracy x Signal of Resolve
(very nondemocratic -- very democratic) 35.6 46.3 +10.7 +30.1
Strength of challenger ruling coalition

(40% of seats -> 80% of seats) 25.3 42.5 +17.2 +68.0
4 years ago) 36.4 25.1 -11.3 -31.0
Time since elections in target (elections
6 months ago -> elections 4 years ago) 48.1 40.4 -7.7 -16.0
Common security ties (no alliance -> alliance) 40.2 47.3 +7.1 +17.7
Probability of target concessions

Target democracy (very nondemocratic -
very democratic) 24.1 40.3 +16.2 +67.2
Target Democracy x Recent Stalemate

(very nondemocratic29.3 20.2
-> very -9.1 -31.1
democratic)
Target Democracy x Ethnic Ties (very
27.2
nondemocratic -> very 19.2 -8.0
democratic) -29.4

22.5 of seats)
(40% of seats -> 80% 35.8 +13.3 +59.1
31.6
nondemocratic dyad) 38.3 +6.7 +21.2
31.8 (no 38.8
Common security ties +7.0 -> alliance)
alliance +22.0
Military balance (1 to 10 disadvantage -> 10
to 1 advantage) 45.9 24.2 -21.7 -47.3
NOTE: The predicted probabilities represent the margin

gardless of whether the target (challenger) also offers c
is considered to be of strategic value to both states, the mi
ocratic governments are assumed to hold a 55% legislativ
All other variables are set to median values.
there is some support for the idea that concessions are more likely between pairs of
democracies (see Table 7). Target states in democratic dyads are 21% more likely to
offer concessions in talks over disputed territory than are targets in nondemocratic
dyads (see Table 8). The result for challengers in democratic dyads is similarly positive
but is not quite statistically significant, with a p value of .15 for a one-tailed test.
Only one of the control variables, common security ties between challenger and tar-
get, receives strong support. Challengers and targets are more likely to make conces-
sions to one another when they share common security ties (see Table 5 and also

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Tables 6 and 7). In particular, the presence of an alliance between the two st
challengers and targets about 18% and 22% more likely to make concession
tively (see Table 8). The only other significant finding is that targets with a
itary advantage are 47% less likely to make concessions than targets with a si
itary disadvantage.
RESULTS FOR THE MILITARY ESCALATION STAGE
Now we examine the performance of the three variants of the political a

ity model as explanations for challenger and target decisions to escalate for
we analyze in the escalation stage consist of 374 military confrontations th
tiated by challenger states. For both parties, the decision to risk war by
high levels of escalation is relatively rare. Challengers escalate to high le
24% of the military confrontations (89/374), and targets escalate to su
about 18% of confrontations (67/374). A mutual decision to escalate to
occurs in 40 cases where a war was fought over disputed territory.
Once again, the use of the bivariate probit specification receives consid
port. The estimated correlation between the challenger and target disturb
between .93 and .95 for the three variants of the accountability model.
some evidence that a few conclusions we might draw from the escalation
may deserve further scrutiny due to possible selection bias.23 Nevertheless,
for the challenger escalation equation are considerably stronger than those
get equation. We think the relative strength of the challenger results refle
that targets often follow a policy of reciprocating the military behavior of
As a result, the following discussion of results draws almost exclusively
mated challenger behavior.
The results for the across-regimes accountability variables are relativel
only hypothesis that receives support (hypothesis lb) is the idea that dem
gets are able to compel challengers to back down from escalating to high
military force because their signals of resolve are particularly credible (see
fact, challengers are 62% less likely to escalate force when democratic sta
initial willingness to escalate force as opposed to when nondemocratic ta
similar signal (see Table 12).
One very interesting result is that we find no support for the monadic
(hypothesis la) that democracies are less likely to escalate to high levels
Table 9). There is no evidence that democratic challengers and targets are
or less inclined to escalate than are nondemocratic challengers and target
ing of no difference across regimes is very robust to a variety of specifica
23. The estimated rho for the Heckman probit versions of the three accountability models
-.53 to -.57. Wald tests for the independence of challenger status quo and escalation decisi
standard levels of statistical significance, as p values range from .10 to .12.
24. This finding also holds when we run a model that includes solely the international
ables and the single variable for challenger (target) democracy, without any of the democracy-
tion terms. Furthermore, according to the Heckman probit model, democratic challenger
somewhat more likely to escalate. In this model, the coefficient for the challenger level of
able is positive, and the p value is .18.

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result suggests that monadic findings of a democratic peace are attributable largely
the fact that democracies tend to avoid the initiation of military conflict with all states
a finding we discussed earlier in the discussion of status quo stage results.
There is some modest evidence that particular democratic regimes are associated
with decisions to escalate to higher levels of force (see Table 10). Challenger leaders
who are in a position of strength domestically (hypothesis 3a) are more than twice
likely to escalate force than are leaders who are in a weak domestic position (see Tab
12). We also find that challengers are more than twice as likely to escalate when target
face upcoming elections (hypothesis 4b) as opposed to when targets have recently he
elections (see Table 12). Similarly, challengers are less likely to escalate force agains
leaders of democratic target states who are in a strong position domestically (hypothe-
sis 3b). The predicted probability of challenger escalation drops from nearly 19% t
about 12% when target leaders command a clear majority of parliamentary or legisl
tive seats as opposed to when the target leader's party holds only a 30% minority o
seats.
Our final result for the escalation stage is that democratic dyads are very unlikely
see their military confrontations escalate to high levels of force. In fact, we find
cases in which challengers in democratic dyads escalate to higher levels of force
only one case in which a democratic target escalates against a democratic challeng
Recall from our earlier findings that territorial dispute challengers in democratic dy
are less likely to choose the route of military coercion in the first place, as only 16 of
374 military confrontations are between pairs of democratic states. But here we f
that democratic dyads are also less likely to escalate in the rare event of a democr
dyad military confrontation. The Heckman probit model for the challenger also c
firms this result.25 Finally, there is some support for the idea (hypothesis 6b) that n
democratic states in mixed dyads are more likely to escalate than are democratic stat
in mixed dyads (see Table 11). Nondemocratic targets in mixed dyads are more th
83% more likely to escalate force than are democratic targets in mixed dyads (
Table 12). However, we find no discernible difference between the behavior of de
cratic and nondemocratic challengers in mixed dyads (see Table 11).
In general, international political and military variables provide quite strong resul
for escalation decisions, especially compared to their relatively weak performanc
the negotiation stage. Five of the six control variables receive strong support, and fo
of these five supported variables push challengers toward higher levels of escalat
(see Table 9 and also Tables 10 and 11). For example, when the territory is of strat
value, the predicted probability of challenger and target escalation increases by m
than 150% and 70%, respectively (see Table 12).26
Similarly, the presence of a military advantage makes the challenger more likely
escalate military confrontations to higher levels of force.27 Also, both the short-ter
25. According to the results of the Heckman model, challengers in democratic dyads are less likel
challenge the status quo through threats of military coercion (p < .01) and are then less likely to esc
force in military confrontations (p < .01).
26. This substantively large effect remains when we estimate a Heckman probit model.
27. In the Heckman model, the relationship between challenger local balance of forces advantage
escalation remains very strong (p < .001), whereas the results for the short-term balance are only slig
weaker (p value of .12).

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TABLE 9

Decisions to Escalate with Force in Militarized Disputes over Contested Territory

to Escalate with Force to Escalate with Force

Democracy level -.004 -.016
(.015) (.013)
Democracy Level x Stalemate -.028 -.020
(.024) (.020)
Democracy Level x Ethnic Ties -.015 .012
(.018) (.015)
Target Democracy x Signal of R
(.014)
Control for recent stalemate -.392** -.393**
(.192) (.161)
Control for ethnic ties .357tt .111
(.147) (.127)
Control for signal of resolve -.097
(.118)
Common security ties -.403tt -.128
(.186) (.179)
Strategic value of territory .543ttt .350tt
(.150) (.148)
Challenger involved in other dispute .272* .088
(.164) (.166)
Target involved in other dispute .345tt .395**
(.172) (.166)
Military balance 1.03'tt -.116
(.310) (.310)
Local balance of forces advantage .489 tt .030
(.148) (.200)
Constant -1.92*** -1.12***
(.256) (.233)

374. Log likelihood = -247.69.
*p <. 10, two-tailed. **p < .05, two-tailed. *
military balance and local balance of

nificant (see Table 9).28 Challenger
are nearly twice as likely to escalate,
military balance advantage are more
levels (see Table 12). On the other h
again less likely to antagonize one a
28. There is little evidence of collinearity b

local balance of forces variable.

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TABLE 10

Decisions to Escalate with Force in Militarized Disputes over Contested Territory:
Political Accountability Model-Comparing Differences within Regimes


Strength of challenger ruling government .012tt -.006
(.005) (.009)
Strength of target ruling government -.007t .004
(.005) (.006)
Time since elections in challenger .010 .006
(.011) (.010)
Time since elections in target .011i -.001
(.007) (.007)
Control for challenger democracy -1.18* -.028
(.512) (.492)
Control for target democracy -.193 -.610
(.305) (.476)
Common security ties -.440ttt -.138
(.181) (.170)
Strategic value of territory .535ttt .403tt
(.140) (.142)
(.167) (.165)
Target involved in other dispute .353tt .480**
(.177) (.167)
Military balance .848ttt -.141
(.295) (.296)
Local balance of forces advantage .527ttt .028
(.140) (.161)
Constant -1.63*** -1.09**
(.215) (.206)
NOTE: Robust standard errors in parentheses.

*p <.10, two-tailed. **p < .05, two-tailed. ***p
tp < .01, one-tailed.
dicted probability of escalating force

bility drops to less than 9% when t
Table 12).
CONCLUSION
In this study, we tested hypotheses from a domestic politics mode

explain the diplomatic and military policies adopted by state leaders in
putes. We identified three general stages associated with territorial dis

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TABLE 11
Results from Bivariate Probit Model of Challenger and Target Decisions to

Escalate with Force in Militarized Disputes over Contested Territory:
Political Accountability Model-Comparing Differences across Dyads

Political accountability dyadic variables

Democratic dyad -6.60ttt -.838'
(.164) (.593)
Nondemocratic state in mixed dyad .014 .422t
(.287) (.288)
Control for mixed dyad -.089 -.305*
(.263) (.191)
Common security ties -.415 t -.158
(.185) (.177)
Strategic value of territory .525ttt .400ttt
(.145) (.145)
(.165) (.165)
Target involved in other dispute .383tt .493***
(.176) (.167)
Military balance .850ttt -.160
(.301) (.300)
Local balance of forces advantage .555ttt .079
(.142) (.165)
Constant -1.67*** -1.11**
(.218) (.208)

*p <. 10, two-tailed. ***p < .01, two-tailed. tp
assessed the explanatory power of t

lenge the status quo stage, we found
the hypotheses from the political ac
provided insights into decisions by
force. In particular, we found that th
leaders is linked to electoral cycles a
over issues of self-determination fo
The strongest contribution of the ac
ever, is the ability to explain why som
on negotiations and conflict resolu
international political-military cond
putes follow a pathway of military
choice of relying on negotiations is
is that it helps to explain not only w

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TABLE 12
The Impact of Selected Significant Variables on Challenger and Target

Decisions to Escalate with Force in Militarized Disputes over Contested Territ
(in percentages)

Probability of challenger escalation

Target Democracy x Signal of Resolve
(very nondemocratic -> very democratic)22.9 8.6 -14.3 -62.4

(40% of seats -- 80% of seats) 11.1 22.4 +11.3 +101.8
Strength of target government (30% of

seats -- 70% of seats) 18.6 12.2 -6.4 -34.4
Time since elections in target (elections

6 months ago -> elections 4 years ago) 10.4 21.1 +10.7 +102.9

nondemocratic dyad) 20.9 0 -20.9 -100
Common security ties (no common

opponent -> common TD opponent) 16.9 8.7 -8.2 -48.5
Military balance (1 to 10 disadvantage ->

10 to 1 advantage) 10.1 33.2 +23.1 +228.7
Local balance of forces (no advantage -

advantage) 16.9 32.0 +15.1 +89.3
Probability of target escalation

Democratic dyad (compared to a
nondemocratic dyad) 21.1 5.0 -16.1 -76.3
Nondemocratic state in mixed dyad

(change from democratic state in
mixed dyad) 13.4 24.6 +11.2 +83.6
NOTE: The predicted probabilities represent the marginal probability of challenger (target) escalation, re-
gardless of whether the target (challenger) also escalates. Unless specified otherwise, the territory is consid-
ered to be of strategic value to both states, the military balance is 3:2 in favor of the target, and democratic
governments are assumed to hold a 55% legislative majority and to have won an election 2 years ago. All
other variables are set to median values. TD = territorial dispute.
very different choices are made by state leaders to pursue negotiations and refrain
from using force as bargaining leverage in possible future negotiations over disputed
territory.
In the second part of our analysis, we tested how well each of the models accounted
for decisions by leaders to offer concessions in negotiations. Although realist variables
produced weak results, the findings for the political accountability model were quite
supportive. For example, democratic leaders in challenger states are quite sensitive to
electoral cycles and prefer to offer concessions in periods shortly after national elec-
tions have been held in their own country or in democratic targets. Another finding was
that democratic leaders in challenger states are keenly aware of the domestic politics of
treaty ratification and therefore are unlikely to bring back home territorial agreements

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containing concessions unless they command strong party support in t

legislature.
In the final part of our analysis, we evaluated the power of the two models to explain
the decisions of leaders to escalate military confrontations over disputed territory to
high levels and risk war. Domestic-level variables were found to have an impact on the
escalation of military confrontations in several ways. For instance, state leaders are
generally wary of risking war against other countries when the adversary's leadership
is politically secure from domestic political opposition. Furthermore, the greater
domestic political costs of retreating in a crisis for democratic leaders can be used to
their strategic advantage-namely, to bolster the credibility of their deterrent policies
by signaling earlier on in a crisis their intention to escalate if necessary.
In sum, the results of our empirical analyses clarify and advance the democratic
peace literature in several areas. By shifting to an alternative research design that
focuses on the different stages of international disputes, new and more specific
hypotheses about the initiation and outcome of military confrontations and negotia-
tions could be developed. Furthermore, empirical tests of hypotheses could be carried
out for each stage of a dispute, allowing for more careful and systematic comparisons
of theoretical models. This type of analysis enabled us to identify differences in the
explanatory power of domestic and international variables across the different stages
of a dispute. Finally, our research provides strong evidence that there is substantial
variation in the diplomatic and military behavior of democratic states that can be
explained by reference to electoral cycles, the strength of opposition parties in legisla-
tures, and what types of issues are at stake in international disputes.
APPENDIX
Measurement of Independent Variables
Note: Additional details on all sources relied on for the operationalization of v

provided in Huth and Allee (2002, chaps. 3-4).
Short-term military balance. This is measured as the ratio of military capabilit

each state and its adversary and ranges along a continuous scale from 0 to 1. The
average ratio of three separate indicators of military capabilities: (1) total military pe
military expenditures, and (3) expenditures per soldier. The primary source for
indicators is the Correlates of War (COW) data set on national capabilities (Jones,
Singer 1996).
Local balance of military forces. This measures the forces that each side has mobilized dur-
ing a militarized dispute and therefore can be committed at the outset of an armed conflict. The
local balance is coded as a dummy variable, and a value of 1 is recorded if a state enjoys a mili-
tary advantage of roughly greater than two to one.
Other military dispute involvement of challenger or target. A dummy variable is coded with
a value of 1 when a state is currently involved in another military conflict. The primary data

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sources are the COW data set on militarized interstate disputes from 1816 to 1992, as well as ou
data on military confrontations over disputed territory.
Common security ties. Two measures are constructed. The first measure is an alliance
dummy variable for which a value of 1 is recorded if there is a defense pact or entente military
alliance between the challenger and target. The second measure is a dummy variable that indi-
cates whether the challenger and target currently share a common territorial dispute adversary.
Strategic value of disputed territory. A dummy variable is coded as equal to 1 if the territory
is strategically located or if it contained (or was believed to contain) natural resources that wer
used by the state in the production of military weapon systems.
Institutional accountability of democratic and nondemocratic leaders. The POLITY III

(Jaggers and Gurr 2000) and POLITY 98 (Gurr and Jaggers 1999) data sets are used to create an
accountability-based net democracy variable for each country. This 21-point net democrac
variable (ranging from -10 to 10) is created by subtracting each state's autocracy score (whic
ranges from 0 to 10) from its democracy score (which also ranges from 0 to 10). We use a variety
of additional country-specific sources to identify the month in which major regime changes
occur and update our data set accordingly. At times, we rescale this variable for operational pur-
poses so that all values are positive.
Dummy variablefor democratic status of challenger and target. We also code and use a con-
trol variable that indicates whether a country is democratic based on the democratic accountabil-
ity variable (see above). We consider a country to be democratic if its POLITY net democracy
score is +6 or higher. We assign a value of 1 to these cases and assign a 0 to all other cases.
Democratic leaders and signals of resolve. We generate this interaction term by multiplying
the target democratic accountability variable (see above) and a dummy variable that indicates
whether a target state signals resolve in its initial response to a challenger's threat of force or ca
for negotiations. A signal of resolve in negotiations is coded as the refusal of the target negotia-
tors to offer any concessions at the outset of talks. For military confrontations, a signal of resolv
occurs when the target's initial response to the challenger's threat was to respond with an equa
or greater level of force and to refuse any concessions.
Democratic response to stalemate. This interaction term is created by multiplying the demo
cratic accountability variable (see above) and a second dummy variable that is coded with
value of 1 if a recent round of talks had ended in a stalemate. A recent stalemate has occurred
when a round of talks within the past 2 years resulted in one side offering only limited or no con-
cessions, whereas its opponent offered no concessions at all.
Democracy and ethnic conationals. This is another interaction term created by multiplying
the democratic accountability variable (see above) and a dummy variable to indicate whether
ethnic conationals are located in disputed territory.
Strength of ruling coalition in legislature. In presidential or mixed systems where the presi-
dent is responsible for foreign policy decisions, we collect data on the percentage of seats held
by the president's party (and its coalition allies) in the lower house of the legislature, as well as
the corresponding percentage in the upper house if the upper chamber has effective treaty ratifi-
cation powers (for use in the negotiation stage analysis). In parliamentary or mixed systems in

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which the prime minister is in charge of foreign policy, we assemble data on th

tion's percentage of seats in the lower house.
Timing of elections for challenger and target. This variable measures the numbe
since the previous election for each state based on the dates of all national elect
presidents or for national legislatures (depending on the state's type of politica
operational purposes, we also create and sometimes substitute a dummy variable
an election has been held within the past year.
Democratic dyads. A dummy variable is given a value of 1 when the POLITY n

scores of both challenger and target are +6 or higher.
Mixed dyads and nondemocratic states in mixed dyads. A dyad is considered mixe
democracy score for one of the two states is +6 or higher, and the net democrac
other state is +5 or lower. We also create a dummy variable to indicate that a state
ocratic state in a mixed dyad.
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Huth (2002)

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Domestic Political Accountability and the Escalation and Settlement of International

Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/3176299

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A political accountability model is developed to explain how the accountability of incumb

An extensive literature on the relationship between democracy and interna

JOURNAL OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION, Vol. 46 No. 6, December 2002 754-790

? 2002 Sage Publications

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REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

Although many scholars have argued that domestic political condition

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dyad-year research design has produced many important findings (e.g.,

1. a focus on the behavior of individual states involved in international disputes,

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We start by discussing how territorial disputes typically move through

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POLITICAL ACCOUNTABILITY MODEL

We begin our theoretical analysis at the domestic level with a focus on

Premise 1: The primacy of retaining officefor incumbent leaders. A critical g

Building on this first premise, we expect political leaders to be strategic

Premise 2: The strategic behavior of political opposition. In all political syste

We expect that counterelites and political opposition will be more act

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Premise 3: Differences in domestic political institutions lead to varying levels of political

HYPOTHESES ON COMPARISONS ACROSS POLITICAL SYSTEMS

We now turn to a series of hypotheses that draw on the theoretical f

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Because we argue that political opposition in authoritarian systems is

The logic of hypothesis lb is that if adversaries know that democrati

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Hypothesis 2a: The bargaining strategies of nondemocratic leaders in response to stalemates

In nondemocracies, the limited ability of political opposition to challenge incum-

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self-determination to have a high level of legitimacy in democratic system

HYPOTHESES ON COMPARISONS WITHIN DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL SYSTEMS

In this section, we present hypotheses that focus on comparisons among

Hypothesis 3a: The presence of strong political opposition forces in legislature

Weak party support (e.g., divided government or minority governm

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Competitive elections and the threat of electoral defeat can be powerf

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HYPOTHESES ON COMPARISONS AMONG DYADS

In this last section, the hypotheses focus on the political institutions of

The logic of hypothesis 5 extends the reasoning presented in support of hypothesis

The argument of hypotheses 6a and 6b is that in territorial disputes between demo-

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coercive pressure. Rather, military conflict occurs because nondemocratic

ESTIMATION AND RESULTS

Now we examine the performance of the political accountability model

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ESTIMATION OF THE CHALLENGE THE STATUS QUO STAGE

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RESULTS FOR THE CHALLENGE THE STATUS QUO STAGE

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Multinomial Logit Model of Challenger Decisions to Challenge the Status Quo:

Talks vs. Force vs.

Political accountability across-regimes variables

NOTE: Robust standard errors in parentheses. N=

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Multinomial Logit Model of Challenger Decisions to Contest

Talks vs. Force vs.

Political accountability within-regimes variables

NOTE: Robust standard errors in parentheses. N=