Asian Affairs: An American Review

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The shifting identity of the Dayak in Indonesia

Anyualatha Haridison, Yuwanto , Laila Kholid Alfirdaus & Wijayanto

To cite this article: Anyualatha Haridison, Yuwanto , Laila Kholid Alfirdaus & Wijayanto (28 Sep
2023): The shifting identity of the Dayak in Indonesia, Asian Affairs: An American Review, DOI:
10.1080/00927678.2023.2262356

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/00927678.2023.2262356

Published online: 28 Sep 2023.

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Asian Affairs: An American Review
https://doi.org/10.1080/00927678.2023.2262356

The shifting identity of the Dayak in Indonesia

Anyualatha Haridisona , Yuwanto b, Laila Kholid Alfirdausb
and Wijayanto b
a
University of Palangka Raya, Palangka Raya, Indonesia; bDiponegoro University, Semarang,
Indonesia

ABSTRACT ARTICLE HISTORY

This study discusses the shift in ethnic identity poli- Received 17 February 2023
tics during local elections in Indonesia, considering Revised 1 September 2023
the prevalence of ethnicity and its several variants in Accepted 6 September 2023
the local political experience. The findings show that KEYWORDS
the changing power dynamics in Indonesia prompted Identity; primordialism;
the Dayak ethnic group to change their identi- adat institutionalization;
ty-based political features from sporadic, without a dayaks; indonesia
sovereign (primordialism) to structurally organized.
The reason was to ensure its ethnic power (based on
its values, existing ethnic polarization, and the pre-
dominance of Islam) is observed by other ethnic
groups when making political decisions. Moreover,
the development of Dayak customs to solve prob-
lems and fight for their interests has led to the sur-
vival of the Dayak identity and influenced Indonesian
power dynamics. These are contrary to the opinions
of several scholars and their supporters that Indonesia
has a weak ethnic ideology.

Introduction
Indonesia has been known as a country of “civil wars” since the collapse of
the New Order over the past two decades.1 This was mainly due to the
authoritarianism of the New Order which co-opted local autonomy. The
increase in stigma came after ethnic violence in different regions such as
the Moluccas, Kalimantan, and Sulawesi.2 This was followed by the strength-
ening of identity-political fragments in various regions of Indonesia, such

CONTACT Anyualatha Haridison a.haridison@fisip.upr.ac.id Government Science, University of

Palangka Raya, Jl. Yos Sudarso, Palangka Raya 73111, Central of Kalimantan, Indonesia.
© 2023 Taylor & Francis Group, LLC
2 A. HARIDISON ET AL.

as Riau, Central Kalimantan, Irian Jaya, and West Kalimantan.3 Examining

identity from the perspective of such ethnic politics has been variously
examined by political scientists. Sjaf ’s study in Makassar4 and Kendari5
found that the rise of ethnic identity resulted from the New Order’s severe
limitation of ethnic authority, leading to ethnic confrontation through eth-
nic segregation, ethnic demographic composition, and power symbolism.
This study looks specifically at the Dayak ethnic group of Indonesia. The
Dayak people are the largest population living in Kalimantan. Dayak is a
name as well as a characteristic of ethnic identity for the Proto-Malay peo-
ple who claim to be the indigenous people of the island of Borneo, includ-
ing North Kalimantan. Based on the history of human development, the
ancestors of the Dayak tribe were migrants from the Yunan area (South
China) who were stranded on the Borneo island.6 The Dayak are catego-
rized based on the residential areas along the watershed and inland; they
are classified into several sub-ethnicities,7 including Ngaju, Ma’anyan,8
Lawangan, Dusun, and Ot Danum.9 Dayaks have based their social life on
the cultural philosophy of the betang (longhouse of the past) adhering to
the values of hapahari (brotherhood) and handep (mutual assistance, soli-
darity, egalitarianism).10
The Dayak have played a central role in pilkada (regional elections),
according to Tanasaldy,11 Buchari,12 and Subianto.13 They argue that the
Dayak ethnic group has managed to change the dynamics of electoral
politics in the regions, as evidenced by the number of victories of Dayak
bureaucrats. In some instances, West Kalimantan has seen a surge in
identity as a result of the accumulation of violent incidents that have
drawn boundaries between ethnicity and the rule of outside powers.14
Aspinall makes a surprising proposition about the picture of
Indonesian politics over the past decade. In his opinion, post-reform
Indonesia’s political image with its emphasis on strong ethnic politics
is very weak.15 This test was answered in the case study on the choice
of Medan. In the first round, they crossed out the treatment of ethnic
identity and appeals to vote for Muslim candidates brought a maximum
benefit, and in the second round, they found religious identity attrac-
tive.16 Several scholars support them, Miichi further explored Aspinall’s
argument by describing the relationship between Islam and ethnicity
and the limitations of a religious role in 2012. He noted that ethno-re-
ligion dominated candidate Fauzi Bowo’s campaign, particularly in
influencing Betawi and Islam.17 Furthermore, some scholars refer to the
2017 Jakarta elections as “tribal nationalism”,18 while others refer to it
as “politicization of identity”19 and “successful conservative nationalists
and radical Islamist politicians”20 or “resurgence of political Islam”.21
This gives Indonesia legality as a religious nationalist country.
 Asian Affairs: An American Review 3

Meanwhile, Prasetyawan measured the pilkada of Jakarta in 2012 and

2017 with a method that is different from those of previous studies. The
time frame is used to prove that Aspinall’s major opinion is disproved. He
criticized the views of previous scholars who placed more negative per-
ceptions of ethnicity on electoral politics. The relationship between eth-
nicity and voting pattern is not static but is highly dynamic depending
on the particular political context. Recent studies have also refuted several
arguments related to the decline in ethnic tension in Indonesia’s political
polarization. Warganegara and Waley22 found the legacy of transmigration
formed a pattern of contestation in Lampung, Sumatra. Javanese ethnicity
has a very large determination in local politics and become a reference
for ethnic Lampung candidates gaining electoral support, both in config-
uration, campaign strategy, and intermediation patterns.
The term “identity” in many studies refers to “ethnicity”. For example,
there is the opinion of Horowitz,23 Fearon and Laitin,24 and Kanchan
Chandra25 that ethnic identity includes several identity categories related
to one or more of the following types: religion, sect, language, dialect,
ethnicity, clan, race, physical difference, nationality, region, and caste.26
This rigid perspective understands ethnic identity as a fixed and single
category, emphasizing rootedness and origin. But ethnic identity is biolog-
ically determined, just as conflicts are rooted in ancient hatreds, emotions
are important in ethnic conflict, and ethnic attachments are “deeply
rooted” and as a solid proposition, from the perspective of primordial-
ism.27 However, social constructivism offers an alternative perspective, in
the sense that ethnic identity can change, although it does not have to
change. “Constructivism”, like “primordialism”, is a broad label encom-
passing a variety of positions. Proponents of the constructivist approach
differ as to the variables they believe drive changes in ethnic identity. The
minimal proposition that unites constructivist arguments is that ethnic
identities can be diverse, changeable, and can change endogenously
according to the processes that occur in humans.28 The social construc-
tivist position argues against the definition of ethnic identity as part of
an identity category whose membership depends on heredity-based
attributes.
From the literature above, there are several important points discussed.
The perspective of primordialism (being an instrument) is more domi-
nantly used than the perspective of social constructivism in explaining
the phenomenon of ethnic identity in Indonesia. The focus is on the can-
didate’s victory, what issues are the candidate’s victory, and what is the
ethnic and religious identity of the candidate, so that the conclusion is
addressed to one of the dominant identities associated with the identity
of the majority of voters. Then, several scholars have also used a
4 A. HARIDISON ET AL.

constructivist perspective in discussing ethnic identity, for example, the

study of the adaptation of the native Lampung ethnicity to gain power
amidst the majority of ethnic Javanese voters. The perspective of social
constructivism has new academic prospects in Indonesia, for example,
Aspinall’s study of “identity switching” from ethnic to religious categories
in the pilkada of Medan. He cites several phenomenal works such as
Kanchan Chandra,29 Brubaker,30 and Fenton31 to analyze the phenomenon
of identity in Medan. However, the study of how the phenomenon of
displacement of identity features into ethnic sub-categories and how the
process of constructing an identity into a shared value is less discussed.
What is also important is that the analytical framework for drawing con-
clusions is based on one event and in the short term it becomes prob-
lematic when looking at ethnicity in general Indonesian politics.
Our study from Central Kalimantan (Figure 1), Indonesia, however,
shows that the social constructivism framework used in most of the stud-
ies is incomplete, at least in some studies where ethnic and religious
polarization is prominent. In particular, we found that the phenomenon
of identity in Indonesia is often based on considerations of the configu-
ration of the candidate’s ethnic and religious basis in relation to the eth-
nic and religious majority of voters. We need a similar approach to
understanding the phenomenon of ethnic identity, but our analysis of the
displacement of Dayak ethnic identity features is more complete by exam-
ining key events just before the local contestation and seeing their rela-
tion to the contestation events.
This finding is based on the opinions of journalists (media) whose
data refers to the four periods of the Central Kalimantan regional elec-
tions, in 2005, 2010, 2016, and 2020. We collected and sorted data on

Figure 1. Map of Central Kalimantan, adapted by the authors.

 Asian Affairs: An American Review 5

events that occurred to ethnic Dayaks before the pilkada happened.

Moreover, we conducted in-depth interviews with 20 selected people,
including Dayak leaders, members of organizations, local governments,
Dayak communities, and other ethnic groups. Some of them conducted
interviews with additional informants as a cross-check of their opin-
ions in the media and at this stage triangulation has been carried out.
The time frame for analysis is in the span of the four election
periodizations.
Our questions focus primarily on important events around the Dayak
ethnicity according to the timeframe above. Of course, in the end, the
Dayak ethnicity will be used as material for political social constructivism
in creating opportunities to gain power, both at the local and central lev-
els. Our study, as a whole, aims to analyze the shifting of Dayak ethnic
identity features over a long period. We offer an analysis related to the
articulation of Dayak ethnicity in creating momentum in constructing
ethnic identity features that can be accepted by all groups and these con-
ditions make the Dayak ethnic group survive in the circle of power. We
find that Dayak’s political identity has shifted in features based on context
and situation in the last two decades. This study found that there is an
innovation of the Dayak ethnic group in constructing identity so that it
becomes a tool in the struggle for ethnic power interests in the long
period. The constellation of identity politics in this study is different from
that of the previous studies and can be used as comparison material for
studies in other regions in Indonesia.
Furthermore, the discussion of the article begins with an explanation
of post-ethnic conflict events and the social constructivism of events with
opportunities for local political power in the pilkada of 2005. Second, it
describes the social constructivism of identity by the Dayak elite, which
is termed the institutionalization of Dayak adat, and the momentum of
the pilkada in 2010. Third, it presents the recent dynamics of DAD-KT
and the emergence of Dayak intellectual organizations toward political
power in the regions and paving the way for power in the central gov-
ernment. Fourth, analysis of the momentum of the shift in Dayak ethnic
identity features and the meaning of identity in each phase of the inci-
dent. Some of the events presented will confirm that Dayak’s political
identity is not stagnant but has shifted features according to the intended
power agenda.

Ethnic riots: the power of primordialism

Dayak and Madurese riots erupted in Sampit and spread to several areas
in Central Kalimantan about 21 years ago.32 International Crisis Group
reports, the riots occurred after several decades, where the Dayaks – who
6 A. HARIDISON ET AL.

make up more than half of the province’s population – experienced dis-

locations, due to the transmigration program. Immigrants began to reduce
the opportunity for Dayaks to seek economic opportunities.33 During
1969–1998, there were 117,380 families or around 5.9 million people and
this number represented 65% of the population growth there.
Transmigration to Central Kalimantan focused on a mega-project in
Central Kalimantan aimed at converting one million hectares of peatland
into agricultural land.34
Based on the interviews, we found that the impact of the economic
and political structure and cultural stereotypes of immigrants triggered
the riots. The concept of ‘development’ promoted by the New Order
regime for over 30 years eroded forest in Kalimantan. The law which
states “the forest belongs to the state”, systematically causes the Dayak to
be distanced from their rights to land and natural resources which are the
center of livelihood and traditional activities. Thus, political leadership
became an issue where the majority of Dayaks felt more excluded from
the government. The ratification of Law 5/1979 concerning villages
changed the overall village governance system where the central govern-
ment still has control over village areas and this shifted the important
role of Damang (traditional head) in Central Kalimantan.35 Dayaks felt
represented when the first Dayak governor, Tjilik Riwut, became a figure
in the nationalist struggle for independence. Although the governor was
officially elected by the provincial legislative, in reality, President Soeharto
was in full control and was not fazed by the formalities of the election.
He continued to appoint governors for the Dayaks for sixteen years, but
in the following period, starting in 1984, the governor was not a Dayak.
Cultural stereotypes sharpen the resistance of newcomers. The stigma
attached to Dayak, considered ethnically “backward”, “uncultured”, and
“uncivilized” fueled the psychological situation. Dayaks are accused of
destroying the environment due to centuries of shifting cultivator tradi-
tions while logging companies that destroy forests are seen as contribut-
ing to national development. At this time the saying “where the earth is
stepped on, there the sky is upheld” emerged as a response to acceptance
of customs and traditions.
We found that the political rhetoric of “anti-Madura” (immigrants) is
the result of the social constructivism of the Dayak elite by seeing the
opportunity for power in the era of regional autonomy to win over Dayak
votes.36 How this engineering is said to have succeeded can be seen at the
level of the Dayak community, in daily social interaction because the riots
are always echoed continuously and are considered as a form of success
in the struggle for Dayak identity. Stories about the tradition of cutting
heads in the time of the ancestors also appear for the first time in the
 Asian Affairs: An American Review 7

modern world and these increase the self-confidence.37 We are not mak-
ing this barbaric tradition special, but rather presenting that it was the
only way the Dayaks could promote their identity at that time. This is a
gap in the source of power for indigenous people when formal power is
closed to them.38 The riots of ethnic groups became a source of Dayak’s
articulations in dealing with political competition and this rhetoric has
been continuously proposed in the dimensions of a multicultural and plu-
ralistic society.

Gubernatorial elections in 2005

The 2005 gubernatorial election in Central Kalimantan was the first direct
election for a regional head and this has also occurred in other regions
in Indonesia. Ethnic riots created a resonance effect among Dayak people
and elites and this influenced the political constellation and was charac-
terized by the strong sentiment among Dayak ethnic groups toward polit-
ical leadership. Moments before the local elections, issues were thrown
into the community, one of which was the leadership concept of “son of
the region” which was always propagated to drag down the rejection of
other ethnic groups. Thus, there are also those who throw a discourse on
reconciliation after the riots, such as Teras Narang,39 Chairman of the
Commission of the Indonesian Parliament, stating that local governments
are less responsive in dealing with solutions to ethnic conflicts. He said a
figure with the ability to communicate with Dayak and Madurese leaders
is needed. Citizens’ rights to land must be legally protected. The govern-
ment has not taken strategic steps in inter-ethnic reconciliation and there
are still political overtones in resolving the Sampit case.40 Empowerment
of “oloh bakas” (traditional elders) or customary institutions plays an
important role in the reconciliation of the people of Kalimantan. Now is
the time to empower customs in every development program in
Kalimantan. Each damang must be given the opportunity to coordinate
its citizens.41
We found in the pilkada of 2005, and strengthened by some evidence
in other areas in Kalimantan, that the Dayak ethnic group created polit-
ical changes in the region, such as the study of Tanasaldy42 and Subianto.43
All candidates for Governor are Dayaks, a display which shows sympathy
with past events and is ready to fulfill the expectations of the Dayak.
However, from the five candidate pairs, only Agustin Teras Narang and
Achmad Diran displayed a pattern of ethnic configuration with the
Dayak-Javanese formation. The multicultural strategy is shown to fill the
void of other candidate pairs, but the basis of Dayak’s identity is still
drawn from the figure of Agustin Teras Narang. From Achmad Diran’s
8 A. HARIDISON ET AL.

point of view, the strength of the Pakuwojo (Javanese family) association

has provided a magnet for ethnic Javanese voters. At least the chance of
winning was successfully created with a rate of 43.94% outperforming the
other candidates. This candidate represents a multicultural nuance and
highlights the progress and overcoming the isolation of the Dayak com-
munity in remote areas.

Adat institutionalization
We refer to the institutionalization of adat in this article as the conver-
gence of Dayak activities into real organizational platforms to fight for
aspirations and dignified actions and away from violent and sporadic
actions. The presentation in this section is data collected from 2006–2010,
the periodization of Agustin Teras Narang’s leadership assimilated by the
interests of the Dayak communities. An idea emerged to expand Dayak’s
work in Kalimantan, not only to act partially but also to expand its reach
on a national scale and only materialized in the post-reform era.
At the second national meeting at Pontianak in 2006, the National
Dayak Customary Council (MADN) was formed and became the highest
structure in the Dayak customary organization and acted on a national
scale. Agustin Teras Narang was elected chairman of MADN for 2006–
2010 and was still serving as Governor of Central Kalimantan Province
for the 2005–2010 period. The role of Agustin Teras Narang is often asso-
ciated with the birth of DAD-KT. Siun Jarias, as Regional Secretary with
expertise in customary law, is very concerned about the authority of
Dayak traditional institutions and wants to revive traditional institutions
that were once shackled by the New Order regime. The Central Kalimantan
Province gave recognition to DAD-KT after the enactment of Regional
Regulation 16/2008 concerning Dayak Customary Institutions and is the
first province to dare to stipulate a Regional Regulation concerning cus-
tomary community institutions.44
The Dayak Customary Institutions were formed in stages and struc-
tured to encourage the empowerment of Dayak so that they are able to
build Dayak character through efforts to preserve, develop, and empower
customs and habits, and uphold customary law in society. This effort is
intended to support the improvement of the welfare of the local commu-
nity, support the smooth running of government and the continuity of
development within the framework of the Unitary State of the Republic
of Indonesia.
Dayak customary institutions carry out their duties and functions in
stages from the national level, namely, MADN as the highest institution,
carrying out duties such as coordinating, synchronizing, communication,
 Asian Affairs: An American Review 9

service, assessment, and forum for accommodating and following up on

community aspirations at all levels of Dayak customary institutions. The
DAD in Central Kalimantan Province has a tiered structure from the pro-
vincial, district/city, sub-district, and village levels. Sub-district DAD is
assisted by the “kedamangan” area (customary territory led by a damang
at the sub-district level) and village DAD is assisted by the Mantir (cus-
tom device in the village). Each level has the duty to follow up the work
program of the level above and carry out the coordination and supervi-
sion functions for the DAD level below it. The regional government of
Central Kalimantan Province fully supports the implementation of
DAD-KT tasks and programs, some of which are budget support and
providing monthly incentives to damang and mantir in each region as
stated in Regional Regulation 1/2010.
What is the urgency of establishing DAD-KT for the Dayak commu-
nity? According to them, Dayak land is famous for its natural resource
prosperity, but ironically, Dayak life is not linear with the existing poten-
tial. In order for this problem to be resolved, it is necessary to strengthen
an adat institution with intact legal rules in order to strengthen the role
of the damang in empowering betang customs and cultural values. Besides
that, past traumatic pressures, and ethnic conflicts, encouraged the for-
malization of Dayak customary institutions. This is to promote the prin-
ciple of justice and the real role of the Dayak community in the
development of Central Kalimantan. The increase in Dayak’s human
resources in relation to existing competition is related to the question of
why the Central Kalimantan Dayaks have never taken part at the national
level in the past. On the other hand, this encouragement will provide
organizational and institutional order from the previous condition. In
addition, it becomes a forum for channeling the aspirations of the Dayak
people. This study also harmonizes Schiller’s study which focuses on the
activities of the East Kalimantan Dayak organization. The difference lies
in the formalization of rules, acting on shared concerns, whereas in
Central Kalimantan it is strengthened by the legitimacy of the local
government.45
The 2010 Governorship Election was followed by four candidate pairs.
The chance to win again was created by the pair Agustin Teras Narang
– Achmad Diran with 42.27%. The configuration of ethnicity describes
the dynamics of contestation where Dayak formations are still taken into
account. Only the couple Achmad Amur – Baharudin Lisa did not come
from Dayak.
This study explores how the dimensional power of Agustin Teras
Narang plays an important role in centering voter psychology. The incum-
bent position places him as the holder of power in the government. This
10 A. HARIDISON ET AL.

role paved the way for constructing Regional Regulation 16/2008 which
implies an ethnic political machine similar to a bureaucratic structure.
Analysis at this level shows the role of DAD-KT which is legitimized by
regional regulations legitimizing ethnic movements in supporting Dayak
candidates. At this level, the struggle for Dayak’s interests is channeled
through DAD-KT. The written work program facilitates proportionally
increasing the participation and political aspirations of the Dayak through
the existing political system and institutions. A similar movement was
carried out by the East Kalimantan Dayak Organization in political per-
formances.46 It was this Dayak symbolization of power that wanted to
highlight at that time, as was the analysis of the power face theory of
Steven Lukes.47 Implicitly, the analysis focused on the dimensions of
power at the level of government and Dayak customary institutions. The
face of “Dayak is still in power” is very visible and attracts the attention
of other ethnic groups to agree with that. Some have also received atten-
tion, namely the launch of the “Kalteng Harati” (Smart Central Kalimantan)
program on May 3, 2010. Its meaning can be seen from the name of the
program which takes the Dayak language, implying more attention for the
Dayaks. Critical Dayak figures to evaluate only Agustin Teras Narang
have indicated to revive the ideals of Sjarikat Dajak in 1914 and the
dreams of the founders of the Central Kalimantan Province. Other can-
didates put less emphasis on Dayak issues even though they are Dayaks
themselves.48 With the advent of DAD-KT, the struggle for Dayak inter-
ests was more consolidated than in previous decades. Agustin Teras
Narang succeeded in constructing the face of Dayak identity to the adat
modernization.

The track record of the Dayak organization

In the 2011–2015 period, the Dayak organization – DAD-KT displayed
the implementation side of ethnic power along with the power of the
newly elected local government. The MADN Decree appointing Sabran
Achmad as general chairman of DAD-KT 2011–2016 shows several
dynamics in the struggle for Dayak interests, as described in the follow-
ing case.

Activating customary courts

Customary justice is a form of peace against people who violate custom-
ary law. Dayak Customary Law is a reference that was agreed upon in
Tumbang Anoi in 1894. This event is revived in the present, especially in
response to violations of Dayak values and cultural norms. Customary
 Asian Affairs: An American Review 11

courts will be held when there are demands for certain events that are
suspected of violating customary law.
In 2011, the sociologist from the University of Indonesia, Thamrin Amal
Tamagola, stated that “sexual relations before marriage are common among
the Dayak people” and this refers to the findings of qualitative research in
West Kalimantan 1982–1983.49 This statement evoked a reaction from the
Dayak community by holding demonstrations at the Jakarta Hotel Indonesia
roundabout50 and the large Palangka Raya roundabout. Agustin Teras
Narang said Thamrin’s statement hurt the feelings and dignity of the Dayak
people who put forward the principle of “Belom Bahadat” which means
living with manners and civility.51 MADN asked Thamrin to take respon-
sibility for what had been claimed by the Dayak customary law to avoid
disharmony and horizontal conflict that could damage people’s lives.
Dayak customary court (Figure 2) under the name “Maniring Tuntang
Manetes Hinting Bunu” (breaking a long-standing grudge toward peace in
a better direction between the Dayak community and those on trial).52
Thamrin was subject to customary sanctions and an apology to the Dayak
community through print and electronic media both local and national.
Then, he was sentenced to a customary fine and bearing the cost of the
traditional peace ceremony of IDR 87 million.53

Rejecting the establishment of the Islamic Defenders Front

Central Kalimantan Province is one of the targets for the establishment
of the Islamic Defenders Front (FPI) in 2012. The Dayak community
rejects the establishment of the FPI because it is contrary to the betang
cultural philosophy and its activities so far have been synonymous with
anarchism.54 The Dayak Youth Movement and DAD-KT have previously

Figure 2. Customary courts of Thamrin Amal tomagola. Source: jpnn.com.

12 A. HARIDISON ET AL.

expressed their rejection of FPI's presence. The Dayak people know very
well that FPI is a radical ideology that is not needed and disturbs reli-
gious harmony. The head of DAD-KT, a Muslim Dayak figure, said “FPI’s
rejection is not related to religious sentiments. The Dayak people are one
family consisting of various types of religions, such as Islam, Christianity,
Catholicism, Hinduism, Buddhism, and even the Kaharingan religion,
which is a Dayak religion, also still exists.55
The signing of the position statement was carried out by all elements,
including elements of the regional government, police, prosecutors, legis-
lature, religious organizations at the Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI),
Nahdlatul Ulama Executive Board (PB NU), Muhammadiyah Regional
Leadership Council, Central Kalimantan Religious Harmony Forum,
Communion of Indonesian Churches in Central Kalimantan, and DAD-KT,
Dayak Youth Movement and a number of other ethnic organizations
(Figure 3). The statement emphasized that FPI's rejection had nothing to
do with religion and ethnicity.

Forming the “Dayak Misik” organization

The Dayak Misik (Dayak Wake Up) organization is known as the Central
Kalimantan Dayak Misik Farmer Group Coordination Forum (FKKTDM).
Its formation was based on DAD-KT Decree No.05A/DAD-KT/KTPS/
VI/2014 and was declared at the “Pumpung Hai” (big meeting) event in
Tumbang Anoi Village 2014. Agustin Teras Narang said this event was one
of the platforms to strengthen the existence of Dayak in the success of a
development. The meeting raised the theme (1) the participation of the
Dayak community in the utilization of natural resources (SDA); (2) Regional

Figure 3. The Governor of Central Kalimantan, the deputy Governor, the head of the
regional police, and a number of interfaith community leaders signed an agreement
against FPI. Source: Tempo.
 Asian Affairs: An American Review 13

autonomy from the perspective of Dayak Customary Law; (3) Re-reflection

on the spirit of forming the Province of Central Kalimantan and the exis-
tence of the Dayak community in regional and national leadership in the
future.56 The event which was attended by Dayak people from all over
Kalimantan reminded one of the historical event “The Tumbang Anoi
Peace Meeting” which was held 120 years ago in Tumbang Anoi Village.57
The participation of the Dayak community in the utilization of natural
resources is operationally handled by FKKTDM. According to Siun Jarias,
the formation of this forum was motivated by thoughts related to the current
condition of the Dayaks who are in a state of dilemma. Dayak is at the
crossroads between being an oppressed native and being part of the
Indonesian context. There are 258 villages in Central Kalimantan, where
80–90% of the village area has been controlled for investment, transmigra-
tion, and other development purposes. Abundant natural resources that have
been exploited since 1970 are not linear with Dayak’s welfare. The FKKTDM
program prioritizes (1) giving 5 ha/household land with free certificates; (2)
providing legality of at least 10 ha of customary forest for each Dayak village;
(3) the 5 ha/household land, after being recognized and granted legality, is
facilitated for cooperation with the investor in the form of a partnership.
After its launch, FKKTDM received appreciation from the Dayak com-
munity, and by 2016, the forum had been formed in 800 villages in the
Central Kalimantan region. In implementing it in the field, we found
many polemics, among other things, the FKKTDM program needed to be
intensively reviewed and coordinated. Another fact is that the people who
are members of this organization have started to set up stakes in their
respective villages, even taking other people’s land”.58 Then, from the gov-
ernment’s point of view, this program is contrary to state regulations and
does not yet have a clear foundation, especially regarding the 5 ha/house-
hold. Land in forest areas that have been cultivated by the community
will be inventoried based on state regulations.59 Several parties dramatized
that this program was irrational and had practical political interests.60 The
promise in the form of a welfare program ahead of the gubernatorial
election is called Sulang61 “the wind of heaven”. What is worrying is if the
“heavenly wind” does not come, the hope that is inflamed turns into dis-
orientation– a form of despair following failure. Großmann’s study con-
firms that the Dayak Misik program is full of politicization and is a form
of Dayak hegemony for its own interests.62

Gubernatorial election in 2016

In the 2016 gubernatorial election, the DAD-KT strategic steps described
above, show a relationship of mutual interest. In order to increase pride
14 A. HARIDISON ET AL.

in Dayak’s identity, the local government must place DAD-KT at the fore-
front of resolving governmental instability. Turning on customary justice
in dispute resolution without a positive legal settlement is a Dayak pro-
motion. Rejection of the establishment of FPI is a form of revival of the
betang cultural philosophy as a unifying symbol. The establishment of
FKKTDM is a form of concern for the welfare of the Dayak community.
The success of Agustin Teras Narang’s leadership in its development pro-
gram and the social constructivism of Dayak’s political identity became a
model and framing for later generations, one of which was Siun Jarias
with the “Dayak Misik” project. However, Siun Jarias failed to promote
himself through independent channels, so the FKKTDM carriage sup-
ported one of the candidates.
The configuration of the 2016 gubernatorial election was followed by
two pairs of candidates and the gubernatorial candidates remain focused on
Dayaks. The deputy governor is polarized into other ethnicities. Sugianto
Sabran took the Banjarese ballot and Willy M. Yosep took the Javanese and
Banjarese ballots. Sugianto Sabran created a win at 52.52%. According to
Sandi’s research, DAD-KT's support for the two candidate pairs was split.63
Based on the interview argument, it was stated that DAD-KT wanted to
bring in cadres before entering into the election process. He gave an exam-
ple, such as Papua in regional head elections being very good at bringing
in cadres from indigenous peoples. Pros and cons views were always
addressed to DAD-KT, including when they did not involve themselves in
political affairs or even played a direct role in political affairs.
Regardless of all that, the events that occurred before the gubernatorial
election had a relationship with the interests of the candidates, and
DAD-KT was still used as legitimacy in gaining the sympathy of Dayak
voters. For example, the social constructivism “Dayak Misik” describes the
pockets of potential Dayak voters. One of the candidates allegedly received
support from this organization. However, in terms of Dayak contestants
vis-a-vis the analysis developed for other entities, religious identity still col-
ors this contestation, even though it only moves at a symbolic level. In this
election, each candidate has played a clientelism strategy64 and is affiliated
with several factions within DAD-KT. The combination of other strategies
in ethnicity battles is commonplace, but the analysis still presents the fact
that there is competition for power relations within the DAD-KT body. In
a sense, the struggle for ethnic interests still pivots on the majesty of adat.65

Dayak Organization today

After the election of Sugianto Sabran as the Governor of Central
Kalimantan for 2016–2020, at the same time, there was a change in the
 Asian Affairs: An American Review 15

leadership of DAD-KT and a reshuffle of the management. At the second

regional meeting, Agustiar Sabran was elected by acclamation as Chair of
the 2016–2022 DAD-KT who is none other than Governor Sugianto
Sabran’s older brother.66 He was committed to continuing the leadership
relay of DAD-KT and bringing prosperity to the Dayak people”.67 The
change of leadership at the regional government level was accompanied
by a desire to control DAD-KT as a symbolic power in Central Kalimantan.
The discussion below will describe several cases related to the current
activities of DAD-KT.

Awarding titles to non-Dayak figures

The Dayak customary title award is given to Dayak people who have
contributed to the struggle of Central Kalimantan. In terms of authority,
DAD-KT has the authority to grant titles to Dayak figures who have con-
tributed to the progress of Central Kalimantan. The honorary title
“Temanggung Antang Basehai” (a wise leader who can protect all parties)
was pinned on Agustin Teras Narang and Sugianto Sabran.68
In the current periodization, Dayak customary titles are also given to
non-Dayaks (Figure 4). The title of Raja Dayak was given to (1) President
Jokowi69 as “Raja Haring Hatungku Tungket Langit” (a wise king with a
noble personality and support for national integrity); (2) Vice President
Jusuf Kalla70 as “Raja Marunting Batu Pangumbang Langit, Teras Rangkang
Duhuna Pasihai, Rujin Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia” (a leader
who is able to elevate the dignity of the nation); (3) Governor of Bank
Indonesia, Agus Martowardojo71 as “Mantir Hai Panambahan” (a respected,
wise and wise person). The DAD-KT policy has drawn protests and
debate. Some of the issues that have surfaced are around the ease of
granting titles to those who do not contribute to Dayak. Meanwhile,

Figure 4. The awarding of the Dayak title “raja Haring Hatungku Tungket langit” to
President Jokowi. Source: m.merdeka.com.
16 A. HARIDISON ET AL.

others mention the awarding of titles is referred to as the behavior of

selling “utus” (self-esteem) of the Dayak community.
Based on the interviews we conducted, giving titles to people outside
the Dayak is not a “utus” selling behavior, but a concept toward a mod-
ern and independent DAD-KT. It is proper for the Dayak not to be con-
fined by old values and today’s spirit must be in accordance with the
progress of the era. The awarding of titles to the President, Vice President,
and Governor of Bank Indonesia is interpreted as a prayer so that they
are able to lead the country wisely and prudently. They are expected to
increase their popularity and prioritize the Dayak community in their
policies. The awarding of this honorary degree aims to build an emo-
tional connection between the degree recipient and the Dayak commu-
nity.72 We assert that Dayak adat and ancestral wealth are believed to be
the source of power and the articulation of local political practices.
Hadi’s73 confirms that the use of this title effectively mobilizes people in
political choices and makes the elite as patrons.

Islamic defense actions

Tolerance and diversity have become sensitive matters lately in Indonesia.
Issues of intolerance and radicalism are national issues and their practice
also occurs in the regions, including Central Kalimantan. The Islamic
Unity Action which was held at the big roundabout in Palangka Raya on
May 25 201774 was an agenda to prosecute allegations of religious blas-
phemy on one of the social media accounts and this could damage
inter-religious harmony in Central Kalimantan.
DAD-KT pioneered negotiations and mediation with Islamic figures
who joined the action and an agreement was reached to hold a peaceful
action with the theme: “Peaceful action of the Diversity of Central
Kalimantan in caring for Huma Betang”.75 Based on interviews, DAD-KT
mediated with several involved stakeholders such as local government,
police, religious leaders, and other elements. DAD-KT voices the philos-
ophy of betang culture as an ideology to maintain the unity of a plural-
istic society. The concept of the betang cultural philosophy is still agreed
upon as a shared value in diversity in Central Kalimantan and until now
it has consistently prevented religiosity from being divided. Customs and
culture still block actions that will dramatize religious politics, in contrast
to the movement of the 212 Islamic organizations in Jakarta.76

The emergence of the Dayak intellectual organization

The discourse on moving the capital to Central Kalimantan elicited
responses from various parties, especially Dayak intellectuals. Coinciding
 Asian Affairs: An American Review 17

with the momentum of the 2019 presidential election, Dayak intellectuals

founded two different organizations that have the same spirit. First, the
National Dayak Intellectual Forum (FIDN), which was inaugurated by
Indonesian President Joko Widodo in Jakarta, is a forum for conveying
aspirations, especially to the central government and also the wider com-
munity. FIDN Chairman said that Dayak intellectuals could voice the
wishes of the Dayak people to the central government while addressing
the desire of the Dayak people so that there are representatives who sit
in national strategic positions such as the Minister or other important
positions. On the other hand, Dayak is one of Jokowi’s loyalists. However,
Kalimantan, which is an island, contributes greatly in terms of natural
resources, also being a pillar of Indonesia’s development.77
Second, the National Dayak Intellectuals Association (ICDN) was inau-
gurated by the Governor of East Kalimantan at the first National
Conference in Samarinda, East Kalimantan in 2019.78 The general chair-
man of ICDN explained that this organization was formed based on the
mutual awareness of a number of Dayak scholars regarding socio-eco-
nomic conditions. The condition of the people and regions in Kalimantan
is still far behind compared to other regions in the archipelago. Even
though Kalimantan has a high commitment to maintaining the integrity
of the country, it has not been given many opportunities to participate in
determining the direction of development policies, especially at the ranks
of the central government.79
FIDN and ICDN's agenda is none other than highlighting the dis-
course on moving the nation’s capital to Kalimantan. Some of the themes
raised concerns and input from Dayak leaders regarding the lack of prog-
ress of Dayak intellectual cadres who play a role in national-level policy
making.80 The momentum of moving the national capital is a new hope
for Dayak intellectual cadres to take action and submit aspirations
(Figure 5).81

Dayak is trusted to be the deputy minister and gubernatorial

election 2020
Political opportunities are created by the hard work of Dayak intellectuals
in negotiating and dialectic with modern organizational platforms, espe-
cially the modernization of identity nationally. President Jokowi appointed
and inaugurated Alue Dohong as Deputy Minister of Environment and
Forestry on 25 October 2019. President Jokowi said, “Mr. Alue Dohong,
we believe to be Deputy Minister of Environment and Forestry. He is the
son of a Dayak, has a master’s degree in the UK, and a doctoral degree
in Australia, and has been involved in the Peat Restoration Agency for a
18 A. HARIDISON ET AL.

Figure 5. FIDN held a National seminar with the theme "the role of Dayak intellectuals
in national development" in Jakarta. Source: www.industry.co.id.

long time. So it will help Mrs. Siti Nurbaya, in preserving our forest and
nature.” Alue Dohong said to the press that he was “happy to remember
that he was the first Dayak to take on a role in the cabinet. In the history
of independent Indonesia, this is the first Dayak in the cabinet. So I'm
sure that the destiny of becoming deputy minister will be the happiness
of the Dayak tribe in Kalimantan as a whole.”82
At the local level, the momentum that followed was the 2020 Central
Kalimantan Governor Election, and the pair Sugianto Sabran – Edy
Pratowo was declared the winner following the decision of the
Constitutional Court. Sugianto Sabran – Edy Pratowo won 51.6% ahead
of Ben Brahim – Ujang Iskandar by gaining 48.4%. Sugianto Sabran’s
strength lies in the replication of innovation from Agustin Teras Narang’s
leadership pattern. But the difference lies in who the architect is and who
commodifies it. At this time the symbolic power of the Dayaks shifted
from the Narang dynasty83 to the Sabran dynasty.

The shift of Dayak politics identity

In this section, we will explain how features of Dayak’s political identity
have shifted over the past two decades. As we explained above, there is a
relationship between the events that occur and the political dynamics
during the contest. This study also finds that the political identity of the
Dayak ethnic group is not static but dynamic depending on the develop-
ing context.
 Asian Affairs: An American Review 19

First, the ethnic riots created a resonance effect on the 2005 local elec-
tions. The sense of primordialism in society emanated from the echo of
the conception that governors should be Dayaks, something that is com-
mon in other regions in Indonesia, especially the “son of the region”.
Candidates struggle for positions to be perceived as Dayak warriors and
this attempts to influence the minds of Dayak voters. Our analysis up to
2005, Dayak’s political identity is still very primordialism, and Dayak’s
communalism and feelings are still very strong, especially related to ties
to fellow ethnic groups who have experienced bloody riots. We find that
several forms of primordialism social constructivism in slogans and state-
ments by Dayak figures influence the political landscape in the field.
However, a shift in ethnic political identity has begun to take shape after
multicultural propaganda and the rationality of the candidates are con-
veyed to voters.
Second, the range of our analysis is in 2005–2016 when Dayak’s political
identity shifted toward the institutionalization of Dayak organizations which
were previously sporadic, this time made structured and massive. We found
and observed a number of events that occurred in that range, from the
formation of DAD-KT and its structure resembling that of the regional
government, then his actions in the field are very active in voicing Dayak
ideology and constructing adat in solving social and development prob-
lems. We call it at this time institutionalized customary social constructiv-
ism. The introduction of DAD-KT to the public is a form of propaganda
that Dayak has a broad role in the region. The structured form illustrates
that the Dayak organization is the initial step in forming an ethnic political
machine. Our findings differ from the African context where individual
networks are more effective than ethnic networks in political contestation.84
This customary social constructivism framework succeeded in delivering
several Dayak candidates in the 2010 and 2016 regional elections.
Third, in the 2016–2020 period, we found several forms of modifica-
tion of Dayak ethnic political identity, along with changes in the leader-
ship relay and changes in the composition of the management within the
DAD-KT organization. Adat has been substantially modified to be more
flexible to changes in political dynamics at the regional and national lev-
els and this has drawn a lot of criticism, for example, the awarding of
titles to those who are not Dayak, such as President, Vice President, and
Governor of Bank Indonesia. Thus, the identity of pluralism and multi-
culturalism has begun to be shown by the Dayak community, for example
in the action to defend Islam, DAD-KT is a facilitator in resolving these
misunderstandings and reducing ongoing conflicts. Then, one thing that
was interesting at that time was the ‘discussion of moving the Archipelago’s
Capital’ to Kalimantan, the provincial candidates to become the capital
20 A. HARIDISON ET AL.

were East Kalimantan, South Kalimantan, and Central Kalimantan and

each Governor became the main driving force in maneuvering to the cen-
tral level. On the other hand, the Dayaks saw this opportunity and formed
an association of scholars who joined the Dayak scholar organization,
known as ICDN and FIDN. The identity of Indigenous organizations has
shifted toward secularization with national impacts. This Dayak identity
is relatively accepted by the public and responded to by President Jokowi.
Even though in the end IKN was in East Kalimantan, the position in the
cabinet was represented by Central Kalimantan.
IKN greatly impacts all the people who live on the earth of Kalimantan
and Indonesia. Specifically for the Dayak community, the existence of
IKN has an impact on economic development and equitable development
which is Indonesia-centric, not Java-centric.85 Moreover, the impact on
improving quality of life, employment opportunities will vary and unem-
ployment can be suppressed,86 challenges for Dayak human resources with
the arrival of skilled resources,87 prone to social conflict and environmen-
tal damage,88 and promotion of Dayak culture as a tourist destination and
development of local products.89
Fourth and finally, as explained above, the shift in Dayak identity
occurred amid the momentum of power contestation at the local and cen-
tral levels. Both the Dayak elite, community and individual construct an
identity that can be used as a common reference for other communities,
it is also implied that from events and political dramatizations, there is a
meaning of politicization of adat in it. This study proposes a form of the
phenomenon of shifting features of Dayak ethnic identity that occurs in
the long term and is measured based on a period of two decades. This
study proves that Dayak has transformed and evolved into a political
identity from a primordial one to an open, pluralist, and nationalist iden-
tity. The shift in Dayak ethnic identity is a kind of adaptation to state
policy, such as the previous customary management being adapted to the
state’s management of customary rights in West Kalimantan.90 At least,
this study expands Chandra’s argument regarding changes and shifts in
political identity, especially ethnic adaptation to survive in circles of power,
and also revised Aspinall’s opinion regarding the weakness of ethnicity
ideology in Indonesia, and this study confirms that this view is wrong.

Conclusion
This study has focused on the shifting features of Dayak’s political iden-
tity in the last two decades as a way and effort to maintain power in the
 Asian Affairs: An American Review 21

hands of Dayak. Most of the events associated with this ethnic group
were intentional and revealed the behind-the-scene activities conducted,
closely related to power schemes. Events that have not been calculated or
even constructed to occur before the election for the governor of Central
Kalimantan actually have undeniable clarity that the Dayaks want to
maintain their ethnic power. We have argued that the changing power
dynamics in Indonesia have pushed the Dayak ethnic group to change the
features of identity politics from being sporadic, shifting toward more
structured organizational institutionalization so that other ethnic groups
see them as “shared values” in considering political decisions. Our find-
ings provide a new way of understanding the shifting features of ethnic
identity, including the resilience of identity which is reconstructed refer-
ring to the response to change and the ideal agreement of a multicultural
society. Indeed, Central Kalimantan is still concentrating on the role of
the Dayak ethnicity in the local political constellation and even wider
than that, such as the appointment of Putra Dayak to Jokowi’s cabinet.
Our findings regarding the strong role of ethnicity in Central
Kalimantan are not a rigid argument. Our study continues to pay atten-
tion to the influence of other factors combined with the dilemma of eth-
nicity. In any case, Aspinall’s opinion91 and its supporters must be
commended for the effort to formulate that “Indonesia has left the con-
cept of “ethnic state ideology” and shifted to “religiosity”. We agree with
that in some cases, but in this study, we prove that a small percentage of
these propositions are wrong. Central Kalimantan depicts diverse ethnic
polarization and religious pluralism dominated by Islam. The several
cases and events that have been described show that there is no room for
promoting religious identity politics in the contestation of power as has
occurred in other regions in Indonesia, as Aspinall proved. According to
this study, the Dayak with its customary and cultural coherence is still the
epicenter of achieving power in Central Kalimantan and religious diver-
sity still finds it difficult to separate itself from the Dayak.

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ORCID
Anyualatha Haridison http://orcid.org/0000-0002-4044-8753
Laila Kholid Alfirdaus http://orcid.org/0000-0001-5266-9564
Wijayanto http://orcid.org/0000-0002-4587-337X