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All animals are equal, but some animals are more equal than others
- George Orwell, 1984

Equality, But Among Whom?

Introduction

There has been a rooted philosophical tradition that either disregards or undervalues
nonhuman animals’ moral consideration. Even though there were some attempts within both
Western and non-Western traditions that pointed out nonhuman animals’ moral values, they
were not successful enough to change the common understanding (Nussbaum, 2023, p.5).
That is to say, it has been proceeding to treat nonhuman animals as an object or resources of
human needs. However, in the 1970s, the modern animal rights movement was initiated
(Wise, n.d). The movement is based on the recognition that nonhuman animals have interests
that deserve moral consideration. Veganism, for example, is one of the ideologies within the
animal rights movement. According to the definition of The Vegan Society, veganism is

a philosophy and way of living which seeks to exclude—as far as is possible and
practicable—all forms of exploitation of, and cruelty to, animals for food, clothing or any
other purpose; and by extension, promotes the development and use of animal-free
alternatives for the benefit of animals, humans, and the environment. In dietary terms, it
denotes the practice of dispensing with all products derived wholly or partly from animals.
(The Vegan Society, n.d.)

The underlying assumption of veganism is that since nonhuman animals have the
capability of positive and negative experiences, i.e. they are sentient beings, they deserve
moral consideration. In other words, veganism denies the hierarchical distinction between
human and nonhuman animals in terms of moral consideration. Hence, it is also rejected that
nonhuman animals are regarded as sources for humans’ any kind of use, such as food,
clothing, entertainment, etc. Notably, in the animal rights movement, it is widely accepted
that Peter Singer’s works have been making significant contributions to the movement
(Nussbaum, 2023, p. 57). In his influential book Animal Liberation: A New Ethics for Our
Treatment of Animals, Singer argues for moral equality between humans and nonhuman
animals. He maintains that a morally relevant feature is sentience, not being a member of the
human species; therefore humans’ and nonhuman animals’ identical interests deserve equal
moral treatment (Singer, 1975).
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In this essay, I claim that nonhuman animals are morally considerable and the principle
of equal consideration has to apply to them. For this aim, I consider two sets of arguments in
the literature. Firstly, I introduce the two main ideas that either exclude nonhuman animals
from moral consideration or undervalue nonhuman animals’ interests. The first is the claim
that prioritizes human beings because being a member of the human species morally matters.
In the second idea, some specific cognitive and/or social skills are appealed to defend the
moral ranking of humans and nonhuman animals (André, 2019). Then, I refute both
arguments and I argue that the relevant feature of moral consideration is sentience.
Furthermore, implications of Peter Singer’s moral theory for nonhuman animals proposed in
the book Animal Liberation for the animal advocacy movement are considered.

1. Arguments for the Moral Superiority of Human Beings over Nonhuman Animals

1.1 Attribution to Membership in the Human Species

It is often argued that the morally relevant feature is being a member of the human
species. The argument states that membership in the human species provides moral
superiority; hence it is morally justified to disregard or unfavoured nonhuman animals’
interests.

1.2 Attribution to Cognitive and/or Social Skills

Another common defense of human moral superiority is to appeal to certain cognitive

or social abilities of human beings which are verifiable that nonhuman animals do not
possess. Generally, the use of language, having reason or higher intelligence, being
autonomous or agency, ability to form culture, having a sense of justice, being capable of
forming a contract, etc. are attributed features to claim human moral superiority (André,
2019, p.8).

2. Refutation of the Arguments

2.1 The Begging the Question

The main problem of the first argument is committing the begging the question fallacy.
That is to say, the purpose of the first argument is to justify why it is matter to be a member
of the human species in terms of moral consideration. However, instead of proving, the
argument already presupposes that membership in the human species is morally significant
(André, 2019; Animal Ethics, n.d)

2.2 The Argument from Species Overlap

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It is known that some human individuals possess less or no these cognitive and social
abilities. Babies, toddlers, some elder people, and some people who have certain mental
illnesses by accident or by born lack these attributions. It is also the case that the possession
of these abilities may not be possible for many human beings at all. Furthermore, the human
being differs in terms of the degree of human capacities. If, for example, intellectual abilities
are relevant for determining the amount of moral consideration, then it should be accepted
that there will be a moral hierarchical distinction between human beings based on the degree
of their intellects. This means that in order to be consistent, it has to be accepted that not all
human beings can be treated as morally equal. The argument from the species overlap,
therefore, suggests rejecting having certain special human capacities as a morally relevant
criterion (André, 2019, p.9; Animal Ethics, n.d.)

3. Sentience as a morally relevant feature

If belonging to a member of the human species and possessing special verifiable social
and cognitive capabilities are not morally relevant, then what are the relevant criteria for it?
Regarding moral consideration of nonhuman animals, Jeremy Bentham was one of the
Western philosophers who pointed out that what is morally relevant feature is suffering
(Nussbaum, 2023). In the defense of nonhuman animals' moral consideration, in the
literature, it is commonly accepted that sentience is the feature that morally matters. Indeed, it
is a necessary and sufficient condition for moral consideration (André, 2019; Faria, 2023).
The sentience refers to “the ability to feel, to have a subjective perspective on the world
(Nussbaum, 2023, p.111). Sentient beings can have positive and negative conscious
experiences and perceive what happens to them. On July 7, 2012, a group of neuroscientists
confirmed that being conscious is not only exclusive to human beings, and they released the
Cambridge Declaration on Consciousness (Animal Ethics, n.d.). The declaration reveals that
a vast amount of animals which includes vertebrates and many invertebrates are also
conscious beings as their nervous system has the basic structure that enables them to form
consciousness, namely neurological substrates (Animal Ethics, n.d.). Significantly, the
declaration points out that “human-like brain structure” (Animal Ethics, n.d.) is not a
necessary criterion for having consciousness. Being sentient is the precondition of having an
interest in something. To say that breaking a plate would be against the interest of the plate
would be meaningless as the plate does not have the capacity for positive and negative
experiences. Since sentient beings have an interest in their well-being, a certain act or event
can be detrimental to them if it prevents them to pursue their well-being and can be beneficial
if it promotes their well-being.
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4. Peter Singer’s Moral Theory for Nonhuman Animals

Since Peter Singer is an act utilitarian, the consequences of an action determine the
moral rightness or wrongness of any particular act. However, for him, what matters is not
only pain and pleasure but to satisfy the preferences of beings. Hence, in his account of
Utilitarianism, the aim is to maximize the net satisfaction of preferences (Nussbaum, 2023).
In the book Animal Liberation, Peter Singer states that the exclusion of nonhuman animals
from moral consideration is the result of speciesism. He defines the term speciesism as “a
prejudice or attitude of bias in favor of the interests of members of one’s own species and
against those of members of other species” (Singer, 2002, p.6). He maintains that the criterion
for having an interest is to possess the capacity for suffering and experiencing enjoyment. If a
being has these abilities, then appealing to the nature of the being is not a defensible position
to devaluate nonhuman animals’ interests. In other words, like racial or sexual differences,
belonging to a different species is not relevant for moral consideration. Singer, therefore,
claims that the basic principle of equality is also applied to nonhuman animals’ interests. In
the human case, the principle refers to equal concern and consideration of human interests
and needs. The principle does not imply equal or identical treatment of beings since “equality
is a moral idea, not an assertion of fact (p.4)”; therefore the principle recognizes that different
beings require different treatment. As a result, he argues that the identical interests of any
beings are morally equal without considering the type of the being. When it comes to the
killing of a being, he claims that “...to make the boundary of the right to life run exactly
parallel to the boundary of our own species’’ is to be speciesist. Singer, however, does not
believe that all sentient beings deserve equal worth (p.20). He maintains that even though
being a member of a certain species does not matter in terms of equal moral consideration,
some characteristics of species, such as “self-awareness, the capacity to think ahead and have
hopes and aspirations for the future, the capacity for meaningful relations” (p.20) matter in
the decision of killing a being.

5. The Implication of Peter Singer’s Argument in the Animal Liberation

Peter Singer states that “the language of rights is a convenient political shorthand (...) in
the argument for a radical change in our attitude to animals, it is in no way necessary (Singer,
2002, p.8). Are, then, his theory able to provide a radical change regarding our attitude to
nonhuman animals? To put the question differently, what would be the implication of his
standpoint in terms of nonhuman animal liberation? Do they guide us in such a way as to stop
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the exploitation of nonhuman animal completely or contributes to maintaining the status quo
of the relationship between human and nonhuman animals?

Singer’s theory consists of three components: the rejection of speciesism, the principle
of equal consideration of equal interests, and consequentialism. In his theory, the fact that he
is a consequentialist results in several significant controversies. Since, for him, what is
morally right or wrong is determined by calculating the consequences of the action, he cannot
oppose any particular act that is imposed on nonhuman animals by human beings without
calculating the result of the action. For instance, according to him, nonhuman animal
experimentation can be morally justifiable if the end result produces more benefit, e.g.
treating a disease affecting many people. Moreover, the theory requires the assessment of all
the parties’ interests that are affected by the action. However, is it really easy to make the
necessary calculations and see the result? Let’s take the example of the current animal
agriculture practices. If one considers the bigness of the animal agriculture industry, it seems
evident that to claim that the industry is morally unjustifiable is not that simple. In the
industry, Regan (as cited in Francione, 1997, p.5) states that “[i]t is uncertain exactly how
many people are involved in it, directly or indirectly, . . . the number must easily run into the
many tens of thousands”. Related to this issue, there is also another problem with
calculations. According to his theory, comparing inter-species experiences are needed
(Francoine, 1997). When Singer clarifies what he meant by the “same amount of pain or
pleasure”, he gives an example that the force of the slap that one will apply to both a baby
and a horse has to be different as the skin of the beings is different. In this example, it seems
that he also recognizes the difficulty of assessing the particular action that produces the same
amount of pain and pleasure for different types of beings. As he states “But there must be
some kind of blow-I don't know exactly what it would be, but perhaps a blow with a heavy
stick-that would cause the horse as much pain as we cause a baby by slapping it with our
hand” (Singer, 2002, p.15). Therefore, the first obvious problem seems that it is very
difficult, if it is not impossible, to make these calculations precisely. However, the most
significant implication of the theory is that it does not necessarily lead us to give up on any
animal exploitation. When Singer’s theory argues for the rejection of speciesism, it only
guarantees to be impartial towards the same interest of humans and nonhuman animals.
Hence, it still remains compatible with nonhuman animals’ use for human beings. Then how
this would bring a radical change on behalf of nonhuman animals? Furthermore, the
empirical evaluation of the consequences is dependent on the calculations that are made by
human beings, can we assure that the evaluation would be impartial?
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As noted above, one of the elements of Singer’s theory is the rejection of speciesism in
terms of moral consideration. Even though this is the case, Singer maintains that species’
differences affect the treatment of their interests. For instance, it seems almost clear that no
one is going to defend providing a scholarship for higher education to a dog instead of a
human being by appealing to they differ from each other in terms of their intelligence
(Francione, 2002, p.14). However, not all the differences are that obvious and away from the
conflict. Then, the question arises as to whose interests should be protected in the case of
conflict. The significance of the question becomes sharper Singer’s account about taking
one’s life is considered. This means that Singer may claim that killing nonhuman animals for
human consumption is not immoral as long as they are raised in a humane way. It is known
that for the majority of people consuming nonhuman animal products is tasty; so gives
pleasure. Moreover, almost every culture’s cuisine involves food mainly made from
nonhuman animal products and food has a significant place for social gatherings. As Dunbar
states social eating makes a positive contribution both socially and individually by making
people feel happier and more satisfied with their life and supporting and improving social
bonds (2017). In other words, the claim that people have an interest to eat nonhuman animal
products can be strongly argued by pointing out its contribution to their social and individual
benefits. On the other hand, nonhuman animals also have an interest to pursue their life even
if they are killed painlessly (Faria, 2023). However, if species’ traits justify giving different
treatment to their interests, and if killing nonhuman animals can be allowed when certain
conditions are provided, i.e. humanely raised, whose interest will be given more importance?
Interests of those who possess more complicated cognitive and social skills or interests of
nonhuman animals?

Conclusion

This essay has two aims: the first is to argue for nonhuman animals’ moral
consideration since the morally relevant feature is sentience. The second purpose of the essay
is to question the possible implications of Peter Singer’s moral theory of nonhuman animals
for the modern animal rights movement. Even though Singer aims to provide animal
liberation, his theory carries serious drawbacks both because of his adherence to
utilitarianism and the idea that the rejection of speciesism does not necessitate the equal
worth of being.
I believe that Singer’s remarks about speciesism and the idea that the equality
principle is also valid for nonhuman animals are significant in terms of recognition of
nonhuman animals’ suffering in modern agricultural practices. However, I do not think that
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his standpoint is a promising approach to nonhuman animal liberation since his theory still
morally allows us to exploit nonhuman animals.

REFERENCES

André, L. de M. (2019). The relevance of sentience: shaping nonanthropocentric

politics (dissertation).

Definition of Veganism. The Vegan Society . (n.d.).

https://www.vegansociety.com/go-vegan/definition-veganism

Dunbar, R.I.M. Breaking Bread: the Functions of Social Eating. Adaptive Human
Behavior and Physiology 3, 198–211 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1007/s40750-017-0061-4

Encyclopædia Britannica, inc. (n.d.). The Modern Animal Rights Movement.

Encyclopædia Britannica.
https://www.britannica.com/topic/animal-rights/The-modern-animal-rights-movement

Faria, C. (2023). Animal ethics in the Wild Wild Animal Suffering and intervention in
nature. Cambridge University Press.

L., G., & Francione. (1997, January 1). Full title name: animal rights theory and
utilitarianism: Relative normative guidance. Animal Law Legal Center.
https://www.animallaw.info/article/animal-rights-theory-and-utilitarianism-relative-normative
-guidance

Nussbaum, M. C. (2023). Justice for animals: Our collective responsibility. Simon &
Schuster.

Singer, P. (2002). Animal liberation. HarperCollins.

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