Barretta Noto 2022

Received: 27 January 2021 Revised: 30 August 2022 Accepted: 18 October 2022
DOI: 10.1111/faam.12349
RESEARCH ARTICLE
Management control practices in

interorganizational initiatives: The case of a public
program
Antonio Davide Barretta1 Guido Noto2
1
Department of Business and Law, University
of Siena, Siena, Italy Abstract
2
Department of Economics, University of In the last decades, public management and accounting
Messina, Messina, Italy
scholars have focused increasingly on the study of interorga-
Correspondence nizational initiatives involving multiple public organizations
Guido Noto, Department of Economics,
in the pursuit of common goals. This paper is an investiga-
University of Messina, Via dei Verdi, 75, 98122
Messina, Italy. tion of management control in a public interorganizational
Email: guido.noto@unime.it
program. It adopts a “management control as a package”
approach with the aims of (i) identifying the control mech-
anisms used in interorganizational initiatives; (ii) exploring
the interdependencies between them; and (iii) understand-
ing the contribution of organizational controls in supporting
collaborative actions. To address the research objectives,
this paper presents the case study of a public initiative. The
empirical research combines an interventionist approach
with semistructured interviews. As a result, the research
highlights that management controls in public interorganiza-
tional initiatives could require a package of multiple control
mechanisms interdependent; moreover, controls at the inter
and intraorganizational level influence each other to guide
administrations toward the achievement of common objec-
tives. In particular, in the case analyzed, interorganizational
controls seem to support public organizations in overcoming
the silo logic that often characterizes public administrations’
structure.
Financial Acc & Man. 2023;39:493–513. wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/faam © 2022 John Wiley & Sons Ltd. 493
14680408, 2023, 3, Downloaded from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/faam.12349 by University Of Glasgow, Wiley Online Library on [03/11/2023]. See the Terms and Conditions (https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/terms-and-conditions) on Wiley Online Library for rules of use; OA articles are governed by the applicable Creative Commons License
494 BARRETTA AND NOTO
KEYWORDS
collaborative governance, interorganizational initiative, manage-
ment accounting, management control, public network
1 INTRODUCTION
In the last decades, new models of governance based on collaborative relationships have emerged in the public sec-
tor (see, among others, Agranoff & McGuire, 2003; Ansell & Gash, 2008; Emerson et al., 2012; O’Flynn, 2007; Provan
& Milward, 1995, 2001). These new governance models have been implemented to deal with problems that, due to
their complexity, cannot be tackled by a single organization—that is, the so-called “wicked problems” (Bianchi et al.,
2017; Cristofoli et al., 2017; Head & Alford, 2015; Jacobs & Cuganesan, 2014; Rittel & Webber, 1973; Steccolini,
2019; Weber & Khademian, 2008). Interorganizational setting has been deeply explored by public management and
accounting scholars adopting multiple perspective aimed at focusing on their characteristics and functioning (Ansell &
Gash, 2008; Emerson et al., 2012); their effectiveness (Provan & Milward, 2001; Turrini et al., 2010); their implications
(Rogers & Weber, 2010; Siddiki et al., 2017); and their management (Choi & Moynihan, 2019; Cristofoli et al., 2017;
Kickert et al., 1997; Klijn, 1996).
In this context, management accounting scholars have focused on how management control and performance
management systems should be designed and implemented effectively to support interorganizational initiatives
in managing, controlling, steering, and monitoring their performance (Bianchi et al., 2017; Steccolini, 2019;
Thomasson et al., 2020). Many of the solutions identified by the literature are related to the development of shared and
formal management control mechanisms (Kurunmäki & Miller, 2006; Noto et al., 2022; Ryan & Walsh, 2004); on the
other hands, other scholars highlighted the importance of informal control mechanisms when analyzing such contexts
(Agostino & Arnaboldi, 2018; Dudau et al., 2020).
As several authors have highlighted, management control (MC) could also be defined as a package of different tools
used to align employees’ behaviors and decisions with the organizational objectives (Ferreira & Otley, 2009; Grabner
& Moers, 2013; Malmi & Brown, 2008; Merchant & Otley, 2020; Otley, 1980). For instance, Malmi and Brown (2008)
adopt a concept of control that goes beyond the traditional control tools and consider also cultural and administrative
control mechanisms. In spite of the multiple calls to adopt a wider (or holistic) view when doing management control
research, most of the studies in this field tend to look at single control mechanisms and at the interaction between
few of them (Bedford et al., 2016; Grabner & Moers, 2013; Merchant & Otley, 2020). This is particularly true in the
case of public network; to the authors’ knowledge, there are just few articles focused on management control in public
interorganizational initiatives that adopt such a broad and holistic approach (Barretta & Busco, 2011; Kenis & Provan,
2006; Romzek et al., 2012).
Thus, the purpose of this study is to contribute to the literature on the management control of interorganizational
initiatives between public organizations by adopting a “management control as a package” approach, focusing on (i)
the interorganizational control mechanisms that guide people and organizations toward collaboration; (ii) the inter-
dependencies between these controls; and (iii) the adaptation of the organizational control mechanisms to support
interorganizational collaboration.
Accepting the invitation of Merchant and Otley (2020) who suggested the adoption of field research when engag-
ing with management control studies, this paper develops a case study based on a public interorganizational program
aimed at managing the negative impacts produced by the marble industry in Tuscany (Italy). The objective of the pro-
gram, launched in 2016, was to improve workers’ health and safety and to protect the environment. To reach these
goals, the Tuscany Regional Administration has involved other public institutions: the district attorney’s offices of
Lucca and Massa-Carrara; the Local Health Authority; the Regional Agency for Environmental Protection; the Forest
Army; the Coast Guard; and the Apuane Park Guard.
BARRETTA AND NOTO 495
The paper is structured as follows. In the next section, the theoretical background of the study is explored so as to
make the research gap and the related research questions explicit. Section 3 outlines the research methodology and
introduces the case study. The fourth section reports the results, while the last two sections present discussions and
conclusions.
2 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The role of management control in supporting interorganizational collaborations is a consolidated topic in the inter-
firm relationship literature (Birnberg, 1998; Caglio & Ditillo, 2008, 2012; Coad & Cullen, 2006; Cooper & Slagmulder,
2004; Dekker, 2004, 2008, 2016; Dekker et al., 2019; Ding et al., 2013; Fayard et al., 2012; Håkansson & Lind, 2004; Li
et al., 2013; Mouritsen et al., 2001; Mouritsen & Thrane, 2006; Thrane & Hald, 2006; van der Meer-Kooistra & Scapens,
2008; van der Meer-Kooistra & Vosselman, 2000). However, it has been less explored in the public context (Agostino
& Arnaboldi, 2018; Barretta & Busco, 2011; Goddard, 1992; Kastberg, 2016; Thomasson et al., 2020).
The extant literature supports the role and importance of management control as a practice to foster the joint
action of public administrations involved in interorganizational initiatives. For example, some scholars have high-
lighted that the way in which objectives are defined and monitored by each organization in a network may represent
a driver of interorganizational collaboration (Glendinning et al., 2005; Kickert et al., 1997; Nies, 2006; Provan & Mil-
ward, 1995). According to Kurunmäki and Miller (2011), management control practices are indeed key in fostering
policies and reforms aimed at promoting integration between public organizations. Kickert et al. (1997) maintain that
the lack of shared objectives may be a cause of failure when launching collaboration initiatives. Shared objectives,
together with the institutional pressures of a regulating authority, are also mentioned by Grafton et al. (2011) as
drivers in fostering interorganizational collaboration and coordination. In contrast, the lack of alignment between
the objectives of different organizations has a negative impact on their willingness to collaborate. Moreover, the
degree to which interorganizational goals are unambiguous is a critical factor affecting the allocation of management
resources and the coordination of the activities by the network managers (McGuire, 2002). According to Agostino
and Arnaboldi (2015), performance measures matter in supporting public network initiatives; however, they call for
a participative process to define them; similar results have been also achieved by Noto et al. (2022). Marques et al.
(2011) support the view that the nature and use of management control is shaped by the motivation to participate
in the interorganizational network and the contribution to performance by the various organizations. Dekker et al.
(2019) maintain that interorganizational controls enhance the influence of collaborative scope on performance and
that boundary-spanners individuals and their relational behavior play a key role in fostering network performance.
This brief review does not pretend to be exhaustive but rather aims to provide an overview of the literature on
management control in public interorganizational initiatives. As anticipated in the introduction, despite the call of sev-
eral scholars in this direction (Grabner & Moers, 2013; Malmi & Brown, 2008; Merchant & Otley, 2020), what emerges
is that this literature tends to focus on single mechanisms neglecting a holistic view of management control. More-
over, with a few exceptions, these researches are mainly focused on the tools and devices of traditional management
accounting control; that is, they do not take into account other types of control mechanisms that in fact support collab-
orative action (Dekker, 2016). For instance, Carlsson-Wall et al. (2011) observe that interorganizational collaboration
is highly supported by cultural control mechanisms that guide the operations of the professionals belonging to the
different organizations involved. Other authors maintain that formal management accounting alone is not sufficient
in addressing control in interorganizational relationships (Goddard, 1992; Kenis & Provan, 2006; Romzek et al., 2012)
and that coexistence between formal and informal control mechanisms may be desirable (Agostino & Arnaboldi, 2018).
According to Dudau et al. (2020), the choice between the formal and informal controls largely depends on the type of
environment in which the network operates. In environments characterized by clarity about goals and measurability
of outputs, formal controls appear more suitable, while a high degree of uncertainty—which usually characterizes the
context of interorganizational action—leads to the adoption of informal controls such as trust.
TA B L E 1 Management control systems package (Source: Malmi & Brown, 2008)
Cultural controls
Clans Values Symbols
Reward and
Planning Cybernetic controls compensation
Long- Action Budgets Financial Nonfinancial Hybrid
range planning measurement measurement measurement
planning systems systems systems
Administrative controls
Governance structure Organizational structure Policies and procedures
Because of this, and in accordance with management control as a package literature (Grabner & Moers, 2013;
Malmi & Brown, 2008), this research adopts a broad definition of management controls that includes “all the devices
and systems managers use to ensure that the behaviors and decisions of their employees are consistent with the orga-
nization’s objectives and strategies” (Malmi & Brown, 2008, p. 290). Thus, since personnel behavior is not exclusively
influenced by traditional management accounting controls, the research also considers as controls the other mecha-
nisms operating simultaneously (and not necessarily in coordination) with the former. Malmi and Brown (2008) define
five typologies of management controls, namely, planning, cybernetic controls, reward and compensation systems,
administrative controls, and cultural controls.
Table 1 summarizes the Malmi and Brown (2008) control taxonomy.
As reported in Table 1, cultural controls comprehend values, symbols, and clan controls. Planning is an ex ante
form of control that includes action plans and medium- and long-term plans. Cybernetic controls are represented by
information and decision support systems aimed at detecting performance gaps and undertake corrective actions.
These could be financial, nonfinancial, and hybrid. Reward and compensation systems focus on the extrinsic motiva-
tion of people and groups. Last, administrative controls include the organization design and structure, the governance
structure, policies, and procedures.
Based on these premises, and on the Malmi and Brown (2008) framework, this work aims at answering as first
research question (RQ1) the following: which control mechanisms are used to support the management of public
interorganizational initiatives?
The analysis of the type of control mechanisms used in an interorganizational context is preparatory and instrumen-
tal to comprehend how management control systems (MCSs) work. According to the advancements of management
control as a package literature (Bedford et al., 2016; De Jong et al., 2014; Demartini & Otley, 2020; Grabner & Moers,
2013), the authors believe that the exclusive focus on single control mechanisms, or single typologies of controls,
might have been misleading since, in practice, different control mechanisms usually exist and interact with each other.
Management control is often organized in complex systems in which different mechanisms and semi-autonomous sub-
systems are coupled in a variety of ways to form an emergent whole (Bourne et al., 2018; Demartini & Otley, 2020;
Merchant & Otley, 2020; Orton & Weick, 1990; van Hengel et al., 2014). Recent literature has widely debated the
conceptualization of MC as a “package” highlighting the importance to take into account the interdependencies and
the integration between control mechanisms in the representation and/or design of MC (Demartini & Otley, 2020;
Grabner & Moers, 2013)—some authors thus prefer using the term MC “system” rather than MC “package” distin-
guishing the two based on the strength of the coupling and integration between the different mechanisms (Demartini
& Otley, 2020; Merchant & Otley, 2020). From such a view derives that focusing on a single control mechanism could
produce unreliable results, since the MC effect in orienting organizations and individuals’ behavior may be influenced
by interdependencies with the other existing mechanisms (Cäker & Siverbo, 2011; Demartini & Otley, 2020; Grabner
& Moers, 2013; van der Kolk et al., 2020). In general terms, these interdependencies may be classified as complemen-
tary or substitutive. Controls are complementary when the benefits of a mechanism increase with the combined use
of other mechanisms and vice versa. Controls are substitutive when the benefits of a mechanism decrease with the
combined use of other mechanisms and vice versa (Grabner & Moers, 2013).
Extant literature mainly focused on the interdependencies of control mechanisms by considering only two mecha-
nisms at a time (Bedford et al., 2016; Grabner & Moers, 2013). Bedford and Malmi (2015) suggested the adoption of
regression and path analytic techniques to analyze interactions between control mechanisms and to identify how the
coupling between mechanisms varies across different configurational subgroups. Cooper et al. (2019) investigated the
relations between the formal control system and the effective practices characterizing control in a real organization
case study. Demartini and Otley (2020) developed a “coupling index” to investigate the effects of controls’ coupling on
outcomes at the organizational level.
However, this stream of literature has exclusively focused on single firms’ arrangements and, to the authors’
knowledge, a gap exists in the analysis of interdependencies between mechanisms in public interorganizational
initiatives.
As such, the second research question (RQ2) this study aims to address is: which interdependencies exist among
the identified mechanisms at the network level?
A peculiar characteristics of interorganizational networks is that MC is usually addressed at managing vertical and
horizontal relationships between separate organizations (van der Meer-Kooistra & Scapens, 2008). To the authors’
knowledge, however, there is a research gap for what concerns the exploration of the relationships between the
interorganizational MC systems and the intraorganizational ones—that is, the management control system of each
organization participating to the collaborative initiative. In fact, as highlighted by Dekker (2016), although prior studies
explicitly recognize the importance of such relationships (Carlsson-Wall et al., 2011; Cuganesan & Lee, 2006; Håkans-
son & Lind, 2004; Thrane & Hald, 2006; Tomkins, 2001), few research has explicitly focused on the ways in which these
occur.
According to Mouritsen et al. (2001), who have analyzed in their research two interorganizational initiatives in the
private sector, controls at the network level create a stimulus for adapting organizational management control sys-
tems. Similar results have been obtained by Dekker (2003). McFarland et al. (2008) and Reusen et al. (2015) addressed
the issue of “management control contagion” examining the imitative practices of MC systems in supply chains. Look-
ing at the relationship between interorganizational and interorganizational mechanisms through another perspective,
some authors highlighted the way in which intraorganizational controls (or their lack) may hinder or foster the adop-
tion of collaborative practices and interfirm mechanisms (Coad & Cullen, 2006; Dekker, 2004; Fayard et al., 2012;
Kajüter & Kulmala, 2005; Mouritsen & Thrane, 2006; Seal et al., 1999).
Even in this case, extant literature has exclusively focused on private sector partnerships. Therefore, the third
research question (RQ3) aims to advance this stream of literature also in the public sector. In particular, RQ3 is: how
do public administrations adapt their internal control mechanisms to support collaboration?
3 RESEARCH METHOD
In an editorial issued in 2020, Merchant and Otley called for “more field-based studies by academics who are better
connected with the world of practice” (Merchant & Otley, p. 1), highlighting that research on management control
“has become disconnected with the practical concerns of managers and systems designers” and that “even work that
is connected to practice focuses on small subparts of MCSs, with little or no concern for the omitted variables.” As
such, they suggested for the development of case studies, field experiments, and action research (or interventionist
research). Following this recommendation, this article develops a case study combining semistructured interview with
an interventionist approach.
The case study focuses on a public interorganizational program aimed at managing negative impacts in terms of
safety in the workplace and environmental protection as they relate to the marble industry in Tuscany. These problems
emerged as part of a public debate, after a number of serious accidents occurred in workplaces in Carrara, a Tuscan
province. The need to improve safety in the workplace was then combined with environmental goals mainly relating
to the use of natural resources, soil protection, and the management of waste processing.
Addressing these challenges can be considered a “wicked” issue due to the uncertainty, pluralism, and institu-
tional fragmentation that characterize them; they thus require a collaborative effort. In order to tackle them, the
Tuscany Regional Administration (TRA), with the support of the local district attorneys, promoted an interorga-
nizational program in which different public administrations operating at various levels have been involved. The
program is called “Promoting the safety and sustainable development of mining activities in the Apuo-Versiliese
district.”
The program started in 2016 and consisted at the operational level of the planning and execution of multiple
prevention activities such as inspections. They were aimed at soil and environmental protection and improving work-
ing conditions in the firms operating in the marble industry. The program was based on the political will to achieve
objectives shared by multiple public organizations. The organizations that are part of the program are the TRA;
the district attorneys’ offices of Lucca and Massa-Carrara; the Local Health Authority (LHA); the Regional Agency
for Environmental Protection (RAEP); the Forest Army (FA); the Coast Guard (CG); and the Apuane Park Guard
(APG).
With regard to the program, TRA is responsible for the environmental protection and safety in the workplace pro-
viding authorizations to firms operating in the marble sector and controlling their activities directly and through the
support of the LHA and the RAEP. LHA is the organization responsible for the public health in the territory and it is
financed by the TRA based on capitation. The RAEP is responsible for environmental analyses and it is also financed
by the TRA. The district attorneys’ offices operate as local prosecutors under the Ministry of Justice. FA belongs
to the Carabinieri Army, one of the national police forces, and can be considered as operative support of the dis-
trict attorneys for what concerns environmental safeguard and surveillance. CG is a Ministry of Infrastructure and
Transportation corps that, with regard to the program, is appointed to monitor the discharge of processing wastes
in rivers and the sea. Last, the APG is the corps responsible for the surveillance of the Apuane Park in which some
marble extraction activities take place. Given the different missions and role of the institutions involved, an effort
was required to implement a management control system to guide the organizations toward the common goals of the
program.
The reason why the authors focused on this specific case study is because the characteristics of the interorgani-
zational initiative—a network of public organizations and a multiyear program—and the accessibility of information
relating to the case allowed them to undertake an in-depth analysis. As previously mentioned, the research was con-
ducted using the combination of an interventionist approach (see, among others, Baard, 2010; Bracci, 2017; Jönsson &
Lukka, 2006; Lukka & Vinnari, 2017) and multiple semistructured interviews with key informants who were identified
among the representatives of the organizations involved in the program.
The choice of adopting an interventionist approach was aimed at addressing the research topic both at the theory
and practice level (Hastrup, 2005; Jönsson, 2010). According to Dumay (2010), the combination between the academic
and the practitioner view in the development of the case is indeed aimed at contributing both to the theoretical domain
(management control as a package literature)—that is, etic—and to the practical domain (control in public networks)—
that is, emic. Moreover, such an approach allowed the adoption of a longitudinal perspective of the case study (Jönsson
& Lukka, 2005) since the study comprehends 4 years of observation.
One of the authors is an academic who occupied the top management position in one of the leading organizations
of the program; this allowed him to actively contribute to the design and implementation of the management control
package used to support the initiative at both the interorganizational and organizational levels. In particular, he was
appointed as the top manager of the program “managerial committee.” Because of this, to answer the research ques-
tions identified, a preliminary conceptualization and interpretation of the relevant facts and events were developed
TA B L E 2 Key informants’ organization and position
Key informant Institution Role

KI_1 TRA (Infrastructure department) Operative
KI_2 TRA (Infrastructure department) Managerial
KI_3 TRA (Soil protection department) Managerial
KI_4 TRA (Health department) Managerial
KI_5 RAEP Managerial
KI_6 LHA Managerial and also operative
KI_7 FA Managerial
KI_8 FA Managerial and also operative
KI_9 FA Managerial and also operative
KI_10 FA Operative
KI_11 CG Managerial
KI_12 CG Managerial
by this author. Although it is intrinsic to the interventionist approach that the researcher is part of the process ana-
lyzed and thus cannot be considered neutral, to provide a more objective view of the analysis of the results, the other
researcher—who did not play any role within the analyzed initiative—conducted in 2020 a total of 12 interviews with
key informants from the organizations involved. Both authors discussed the results of these interviews and developed
a shared interpretation of the case study.
Table 2 reports detailed information about the key informants interviewed. In particular, it shows their organization
and whether their role in the program is operative, that is, they actually run activities such as inspections, or manage-
rial, that is, they belong to the top management of their institution and participate in the planning processes of the
program activities.
Interviews lasted an average 2 h each. They were semistructured through the support of a questionnaire aimed
at deepening the aspects relating to the three research questions, namely, the various interorganizational control
mechanisms used, the interdependencies among them, and the adaptation of organizational control mechanisms to
support interorganizational collaboration. The questionnaire was sent to the key informants prior to the interviews to
ensure that they would be fully aware of the themes on which the authors wanted to concentrate. The interviews were
then transcribed and the text indexed to support the analysis and interpretation of results. To make sense of the col-
lected data, the authors adopted a deductive coding approach (Linneberg & Korsgaard, 2019). This approach focuses
the coding on theoretical concepts or themes drawn from the existing literature. Codes identified as theoretical
concepts are as follows: “cultural controls,” “administrative controls,” “planning and cybernetic controls,” “interde-
pendencies between interorganizational controls,” and “interdependencies between interorganizational controls and
intraorganizational controls.”
4 RESULTS
To answer the research questions efficiently, the results were organized in three subsections. The first subsection pro-
vides an overview of the package of management control mechanisms put in place to support the interorganizational
program analyzed; the second subsection explores the interdependencies between the different control mechanisms
identified; and the third subsection focuses on the adaptation of organizational management controls to support the
interorganizational goals.
4.1 The management control package supporting the interorganizational

collaboration
This subsection aimed at presenting the results of the case study relating to the first research question of the research:
which control mechanisms were used to support the management of public interorganizational initiatives? Answer-
ing this research question, as previously stated, is preparatory and instrumental in order to develop further analyses
related to the interdependencies between control mechanisms.
The research activities conducted allowed the authors to identify a package of multiple control mechanisms that
had been put in place to coordinate the interorganizational program and the activity of the network. The control mech-
anisms identified and used in the program were classified into the five categories defined by Malmi and Brown (2008)
and presented as part of the theoretical background of this work—that is, cultural, administrative, planning, cybernetic,
and reward and compensation.
4.1.1 Cultural controls
The analysis of the mechanisms that support the interorganizational collaboration starts from the cultural controls
(i.e., shared goals and socialization) adopted in the initiative. First of all, it is worth highlighting that participation in the
program implies the presence of shared goals that the interorganizational network of public organizations aims to pur-
sue. They relate to the willingness of all the public organizations to achieve the full compliance of the firms operating
in the marble industry with regard to work safety and environmental protection norms and rules. These shared goals
can be considered as a cultural control—that is, values—since they direct the behavior of the organizations and peo-
ple involved in the program by aligning their overall aims. This evidence emerges also by the interventionist author’s
experience, who witnessed a strong commitment from the participant joining the program. This commitment can also
be demonstrated by the increasingly ambitious targets proposed by the organizations and confirmed by the program
committees.
Another cultural control is the socialization process that occurs through the various meetings between the partner
organization’s members. According to Malmi and Brown (2008), socialization processes that instill in individuals a set
of skills and values—as was so in the case analyzed—can be considered as clan mechanisms.
KI_1: “Public administration employees and police officers do not work in the same way. We managed
to smooth many differences and get to work together.”
KI_8: “It is nice to meet people working in other organizations; the relationships that we had created
are not exclusively professional, but also personal. If I need information, I don’t feel like contact-
ing the organization, but I feel like contacting the person I know. This program created this kind of
socialization.”
KI_10:‘When we go to the headquarter of a business for inspections, we feel like being a team. We built
up a relationship so that we also work on activities beyond the scope of the program.
4.1.2 Administrative controls
The authors identified a number of administrative control mechanisms: the governance structure; personnel place-
ment; guidelines; checklists; and a shared database. The program Establishment Act defines an interorganizational
governance structure organized into three levels and with a meeting schedule for each. The first level is represented
by the so-called “strategic committee,” which is composed of the political representatives of the institutions involved.
It meets twice a year (every 6 months) to define the strategic objectives and to verify the results achieved. The second
governance level has been called the “managerial committee.” It comprises the top management of the organizations
participating in the network and it meets approximately every 45 days. The managerial committee is called to trans-
late the political and strategic objectives into operational targets to be achieved. During their meetings, each member
verbally reports results achieved by their organization with respect to the targets fixed and discusses other issues
that may have arisen. The third level is represented by the “operational committee,” which is appointed to coordinate
and run the activities at the operational level. Their components—mainly organizations’ staff appointed to run the
inspections—usually meet every month, before and after joint inspections.
Many of the people interviewed emphasized that the “rhythm” of the meeting at the various levels was pivotal in
ensuring the success of the program.
KI_3: “Participating once a month in the meetings and in the meanwhile running the operational activi-
ties was not easy. But I believe that the frequency of the meetings and the commitment of each member
are the determinants of the success of the project.”
KI_7: “It was a positive experience to meet at regular intervals at different governance levels. It allowed
us to work homogeneously and effectively.”
KI_5: “The rhythm the meetings gave us was useful for carrying on with the project.”
Another administrative mechanism employed in the program referred to personnel placement, that is, the ability
to place the right person in the right position. In fact, during the program it happened that one organization’s repre-
sentative was less inclined to run its activities in collaboration with people from other organizations, such as the joint
inspections. According to the people interviewed, this attitude appeared to be strongly linked to the individual char-
acteristics of the people representing that organization, and consequently, to the personal relationships that had been
created.
KI_10: “They have never participated in the operational activities [. . . ] this is the only thing that has not
worked [. . . ] if this would have happened with other organizations the overall results would not have
been so good [. . . ] unfortunately, coordination and collaboration problems can only be solved through
personal relationships.”
In this sense, using personnel placement—that is, choosing a collaborative person as the organization representa-
tive in running the program activities—as a control mechanism would have supported the function of the program.
In the present case, to tackle this issue, top governance levels were called to attribute coordination responsibilities
to another organization whose people had good relationship skills and were willing to collaborate. As a result, one
might argue that the placement of the personnel appointed to participate in the network governance levels may be
considered as a key driver in supporting collaboration and the functioning of the network itself. Thus, in the authors’
opinion, the placement of personnel should be considered as an important control mechanism in supporting the
interorganizational initiative.
Other administrative control mechanisms refer to the production of guidelines aimed at supporting the interpre-
tation of different issues that emerged during inspections (e.g., workers’ health and safety, waste management, and so
on). These documents were created primarily to provide firms operating in the marble industry with a clear interpre-
tation of a complex set of norms and rules relating to safety and environmental management. In this sense, firms are
familiarized with how they should comply with these norms and regulations and what to expect from the inspections.
Nevertheless, the guidelines are here considered as a control mechanism, since they also influence the behavior of the
interorganizational personnel called to perform the inspections. Moreover, a checklist for conducting inspections was
developed at the operational level. It was designed to standardize personnel activity during inspections and to ensure
that all the inspections activities were carried out.
During the project, the managerial and operational committee levels felt the need to implement a shared inspection
database so that every organization could have access to information about the results of the inspections, and which
firm was controlled and when. The database is a control device that guides interorganizational personnel behavior. In
fact, through the exchange of information on the inspections performed, each organization in the network can improve
its inspection planning capacity by knowing which firm is being controlled and how, thus reducing the risk of a dupli-
cation of efforts (e.g., when a firm is controlled more than once over particular issues) and lack of control (e.g., when a
firm, or some aspect of that firm, is not controlled by anyone).
KI_1: “The regional database has been structured to be interorganizational. Access to the database
fields is restricted, but they are open to all of the program’s participants. It is unusual for the Forest
Army to have access with full permission to a regional database. If they want to carry out some analysis,
they can do it autonomously, having access to the inspections performed by every organization of the
network; which is no small feat.”
4.1.3 Planning and cybernetic controls
Two planning and cybernetic control mechanisms were identified in the development of the case study: the annual plan
and the monitoring report. The annual plan is developed by the managerial committee, using the directions provided
by the strategic committee (which is called to approve the plan before its implementation). The aim is to set and share
objectives and targets with the organizations participating in the program at the beginning of each year. The plan is
monitored through a cybernetic mechanism, which is a monitoring report produced once every 6 months. The report
shows the results achieved by every organization in the network, and it compares them with the objectives defined in
the annual plan.
KI_4: “An annual plan is defined at the beginning of the year. In particular, every organization defines
the number of inspections to be made and the other activities to be performed. [. . . ].”
KI_1: “Objectives are set at the beginning of the year, there is continuous monitoring, and every six
months a monitoring report is produced.”
Some of those interviewed maintained that both the plan and the monitoring report were key in supporting the
functioning of the interorganizational program.
KI_2: “If you don’t use indicators, you will never have an effective tool. A control system is pivotal. It is
simple: plans, half-yearly monitoring, and effectiveness indicators.”
As to provide an example of the abovementioned goals, Table 3 displays the objectives of the 2019 annual plan.
The control mechanisms described above, each of which emerged from the development of the case study, are
reported in Table 4. The table specifies the typology for each control, and uses the Malmi and Brown (2008) taxonomy.
TA B L E 3 Annual plan (2019) objectives
Organization Activity
LHA Inspections
Inspections—stone sector
Meetings
Guidelines production
Coordination with local authorities
CG Inspections Carrara
Inspections Viareggio
RAEP Inspections
Water analysis
Development of a GIS informative system
Development of environmental modelling
Development of an operational plan
FA Inspections
Fighting tax evasion
APG Inspections
TRA Program coordination
Communication campaign
TRA (Infrastructure department) Inspections
Regional database development
TRA (Soil protection department) Inspections
Stakeholder engagement
TRA & RAEP Development of guidelines
Training activities
4.2 The interdependencies between the different interorganizational control

mechanisms
This subsection aims to answer the second research question, that is, which interdependencies exist among the pre-
viously identified mechanisms? Multiple examples of interdependencies emerged from the analysis are reported,
labeled (see text in capital letters in brackets), and commented on.
Consistent with management accounting literature, the most evident interdependence emerging from the case
study is that between planning and cybernetic mechanisms [PLAN & CYB]. These are highly connected since the
objectives of the annual plan are the ones measured in the monitoring report. Thus, every semester, the managerial
committee measures the results corresponding to each objective in the plan and represents them in the monitoring
report that is then delivered to the strategic committee, who use the feedback to define the strategic objective to be
considered in the next annual plan.
KI_4: “Every 6 months, each organization sends a table with the inspections made. The reported num-
ber is compared with the planned one and gaps are identified. At the end of the year, we have two
documents: the monitoring report for the current year and the annual plan for the following.”
TA B L E 4 The management control mechanisms of the interorganizational program
Control mechanism Category

Shared goals Cultural
Socialization Cultural
Personnel placement Administrative
Governance structure Administrative
Guidelines Administrative
Checklist Administrative
Shared database Administrative
Annual plan Planning
Monitoring report Cybernetic
Planning and cybernetic mechanisms are highly interrelated with the interorganizational governance structure.
Plans are indeed defined according to the objectives identified at the strategic committee level; these objectives are
translated into quantitative targets at the managerial committee level; and the quantitative targets are then used to
develop the activities at the operational committee level. The activities effectively performed are then reported to the
managerial committee every 6 months, and this information is provided to the strategic committee via the monitoring
report.
The role of the monitoring report is strengthened by the function of the governance structure functioning [CYB &
GS]. In particular, every month, during the managerial committee meetings, the representatives of each organization
have the opportunity to discuss the results achieved and to identify potential gaps between objectives and results.
Corrective actions are then considered so as to catch up with the progress of the program.
KI_4: “Results are verbally reported during the meetings.”
KI_3: “If during the meeting someone reports a delay in the progress toward the achievement of the
objective, there is always a strong commitment to fill the gap during the next period.”
The meetings at the various governance levels are also key to socialization (a clan mechanism) [GS & SOC]. The key
informants provided several examples of this kind of interdependency. For example,
KI_3: “There was a climate of tension during a meeting due to a different interpretation of a norm [. . . ]
and with a joke, it was possible to break this tension and to align the different interpretations.”
Cultural controls, and particularly the general goals, compel participants to accept challenging targets, which sub-
sequently allows the managerial committee to set them as formal targets [GOAL & PLAN]. This can be seen through
an analysis of the targets that have been fixed since the beginning of the program. In fact, from 2016 to 2019, those
assigned to each organization increased both in number and in the level of challenge. This was even more evident in
the initial phase of the program.
Overall, all the key informants interviewed provided positive comments with regard to the functioning of the man-
agement control package implemented to govern and coordinate the network of organizations involved in the program
and the coupling between the different mechanisms.
TA B L E 5 The interdependencies between the interorganizational controls
Label Description Type

[PLAN & CYB] Interplay between the “Annual plan” and the “Monitoring report” Complementary
[CYB & GS] Interplay between the “Monitoring report” and the “Governance structure” Complementary
[GS & SOC] Interplay between the “Governance structure” and “Socialization” Complementary
[GOAL & PLAN] “Shared goals” fosters the “Annual plan” Complementary
[PERS & DATA] “Personnel placement” hinders “Shared database” development Substitutive
KI_5: “I believe there is just the right level of interdependence, since a tighter control could have made
the operations more complicated due to the different ways of working of the partners.”
The governance structure, the meeting schedules, and the planning and reporting activities allowed an effective
exchange of information between governance levels and organizations’ members, thus revealing a well-functioning
interdependence between the different mechanisms. This is demonstrated by the fact that problems that arose during
the operational activities were solved through discussions between colleagues from different institutions, and when
needed they were reported to the upper level (i.e., the managerial and strategic committees) so that shared solutions
could be sought. As one of the key informants pointed out:
KI_5: “Where operational problems arose due to interpretations of regulation or standards [. . . ] these
were brought to the managerial committee and then, when needed, the problem was brought to
the attention of the strategic committee and the Tuscany Regional Administration created an ad hoc
regulation.”
Although in many cases the different control mechanisms foster each other in a complementary way and thus work
as a package, in one case a control mechanism became substitutive with regard to another mechanism. According to
the interventionist researcher experience, this occurred when the personnel placement in one of the organization
caused delays in the development of the shared database [PERS & DATA]. Placing a person with poor communication
skills and an unwillingness to participate in the program created an obstacle to the completion of the shared database
that, for a period of time, lacked the data necessary to realize its full potential in the interorganizational initiative. The
managerial committee thus agrees to act on the placement mechanism by creating a new interorganizational position
to foster the implementation of the planned action.
Table 5 synthesizes the interdependencies that emerged during the development of the case study analyzed. For
each of the labels used in the text, the authors indicate the description of the interdependency and the type, that is,
complementary or substitutive.
4.3 The adaptation of organizational mechanisms to support interorganizational goals
This subsection provides different examples that show how organizational management control has been adapted to
support interorganizational collaboration so as to answer the third research question: how do public administrations
adapt their internal control mechanisms to support collaboration?
From the interviews, it emerged that the planning and control cycle of every organization involves interactions with,
and is affected by, the interorganizational program at two key points. First, each organization is asked to provide an
estimation of the performable activities during the year and to propose a set of targets and indicators relating to them.
This is mainly done through the use of the organizations’ information systems reporting historical data on inspections
and taking into account the resources available (e.g., personnel).
KI_12: “We proposed a target that was achievable [. . . ] and we addressed it. This year we updated it and
made it more challenging. A significant deviation or defect with respect to the target that we proposed
would have meant a poor programming ability from our side.”
Second, the targets proposed by the organizations are analyzed and, when necessary, reviewed by the managerial
committee that formulates them into the annual plan. Once the targets have been set, some of the institutions involved
(i.e., the TRA, the RAEP, and the LHA) integrate them back into their organizational management control system and
link their achievement to the organizational reward system, while others (the FA and the CG) use the data to report
performance at the central national level [INT_PLAN & ORG_REW].
KI_6: “There is a feedback for what concerns the organizational budget. But our budget only considers
quantitative targets. For instance, the number of inspections to be performed.”
KI_1: “There is the organization performance plan, and the inspection targets are part of it. The achieve-
ment of the number of inspections became an internal objective [. . . ] declined at all the organizational
levels.”
Among the interdependencies between interorganizational and organizational controls, is it also worth noticing
that in some organizations (i.e., the LHA and the REAP), the pressure to achieve the interorganizational program
objectives led to changes in their organizational structure in terms of role re-definition (e.g., some job descriptions
were modified), the creation of new units (i.e., the creation of ad hoc organizational units), and the hiring of new per-
sonnel. Therefore, we may argue that in the present study, cultural controls at the interorganizational level had an
influence on the administrative controls at the organizational level [INT_GOAL & ORG_GS]. Some of the interviewees
gave examples.
KI_2: “We have hired staff [. . . ], we set up a new office in 2016 [. . . ], and an ad hoc unit has been
established in our department.”
KI_3: “At the organizational level changes were determined by the adoption of the program goals as
strategic objectives of the Regional Authority.”
KI_4: “My role was re-defined so as to include a responsibility with reference to special programs such
as this one.”
Another interesting impact of the interorganizational controls on organizational ones emerges with regard to the
adoption of a “horizontal” view of performance, which consists of the adoption of control mechanisms (e.g., targets)
shared among different departments or units within the same organization [INT_CYB & ORG_CYB]. This happened
for instance in the TRA—an organization in which multiple departments were involved in the program (i.e., infras-
tructure, soil protection, and health). This change of view is also impacting on the overall organizational culture since
interdepartmental activities are becoming a well-accepted, and sometime desired, praxis.
KI_3: “Organizational units which are not directly involved in the inspection activities are also evaluated
with those indicators when their role is instrumental to achieve them. This allows working in synergy
[. . . ] When a problem occurs, I arrange meetings with other [departments] to understand it and to design
TA B L E 6 The interdependencies between inter and intra-organizational controls
Label Description Type

[INT_PLAN & ORG_REW] Interplay between the “Annual plan” and Complementary
controls at the organizational level.
[INT_GOAL & ORG_GS] “Shared goals” fosters the changes in Complementary
organizational structures of network
partners
[INT_CYB & ORG_CYB] The shared accountability of results at the Complementary (with regard to the
interorganizational level influences program objectives) and also
accountability of results at the affecting the organizational
organizational one. culture toward the achievement of
its own aims
corrective actions. Before [the program], I had the impression of breaking up rigid organizational silos;
now I feel comfortable in doing that.”
Table 6 reports the relationship between inter- and intraorganizational controls that emerged during the devel-
opment of the case study. For each of the labels used in the text, the authors indicate the description of the
interdependency and the type, that is, complementary or substitutive with regard to the achievement of the program
objectives.
5 DISCUSSION
Coordinating the roles and activities of multiple organizations means ensuring that the behaviors and decisions of
management and employees are consistent with the shared goals that the organizations aim to achieve. According
to Malmi and Brown (2008), all the devices and systems used to address the alignment between behaviors and goals
comprise the management control system. While previous studies adapted this broad definition of control to the study
of management accounting practices in private and public organizations, few researchers have embraced the study of
MC as a package in a public interorganizational setting. As such, the article produces preliminary evidence on this
poorly explored context by adopting a field research analysis and an holistic view of MC—as required by the calls of
Malmi and Brown (2008), Grabner and Moers (2013), and Merchant and Otley (2020). This has been here verified in
public sector collaborative arrangements.
The development of the case study presented herein allowed the authors to discover which interorganiza-
tional control mechanisms can be used for coordinating a public interorganizational initiative; to explore the
interrelationships among these controls; and to investigate how organizational control can be adapted to support
interorganizational initiatives.
The first result of the analysis is that directing a network of public administrations toward common goals may
require a package of control mechanisms of various nature. By adopting a traditional concept of control—that is, those
planning and control tools and devices that are part of a formalized management control system—the analysis would
have been deprived of the evidence of important control mechanisms that play a relevant role in addressing organiza-
tional and personnel behavior with respect to the achievement of the program goals. In fact, by looking at Table 3, one
notices that, next to planning and cybernetic mechanisms, several other administrative and cultural controls have been
used largely to address interorganizational behavior. This confirms what previously highlighted by some key articles of
management control literature according to which the exclusive focus on some control mechanisms could prevent the
understanding of how MC works producing unreliable research results (Dekker, 2016; Grabner & Moers, 2013; Malmi
& Brown, 2008; Merchant & Otley, 2020; Otley, 2016).
With regard to these administrative and cultural controls, the analysis highlighted the key role played by the gover-
nance structure and the accompanying meetings in supporting the monitoring process of results. As the interviewees
confirmed, the rhythm of the meetings was crucial in ensuring the achievement of the program results. The gover-
nance structure also played an important role in fostering socialization among the members in the interorganizational
setting. Thus, one may deduce that the importance of the governance structure and its meetings is probably related
to their complementarity with the other control mechanisms, that is, the monitoring report and the socialization pro-
cess. Through an identification of the planning and cybernetic mechanisms, it emerged that the annual plan and the
monitoring report were part of the same performance management cycle in which the objectives are set in the annual
plan and monitored each semester through the monitoring report. What may surprise the reader is that, at the net-
work level, no cybernetic financial measurement systems have been used within the interorganizational management
control system as well as reward and compensation mechanisms (which were exclusively implemented at the organi-
zational level). It is worth highlighting this, since management accounting literature has traditionally focused on the
study of such financial controls (Otley, 2016). However, it emerges from the present research that successful control
of public interorganizational initiatives may also be carried out without their support. This evidence confirms what has
previously been stated in some public management literature (Dudau et al., 2020; Kenis & Provan, 2006; Romzek et al.,
2012), that is, that cultural and administrative mechanisms are key to the exercise of control in public networks, and
that traditional controls provide only a partial picture of the mechanisms by which network participants are held to
account for their performance (Agostino & Arnaboldi, 2018).
Another interesting result comes from Section 4.2 aimed at addressing the RQ2. Seeking complementarity between
the different controls implemented in interorganizational settings resulted to be a key driver to align profession-
als operating in different public administrations. In particular, a set of five interdependencies have been identified
through the development of the case study (see Table 5). The interaction and mutual support between planning and
cybernetic controls [PLAN & CYB] and administrative [CYB & GS] ones was highlighted by the interviewed as a key
success factor. However, also cultural controls are complementary to other types of control (see [GS & SOC] and
[GOAL PLAN]) adding to what supported by Agostino and Arnaboldi (2018) that beyond the coexistence of formal and
informal mechanisms, their interplay may be desirable. Moreover, when one control mechanism becomes substitutive
[PERS & DATA]—for example, a lack of interpersonal trust among one of the partners and the others—other substitute
control mechanisms have been implemented—for example, personnel selection and the attribution of responsibilities.
This result confirms the importance of analyzing the broad range of interdependences and coupling between control
mechanisms (Dekker, 2016; Demartini & Otley, 2020; Grabner & Moers, 2013; van Hengel et al., 2014), and managers
designing and implementing MC systems should carefully consider and govern them and the related tension (van der
Kolk et al., 2020). Based on this result, the authors believe that an ad hoc investigation on the strength of coupling
between control mechanisms at the interorganizational level could be a promising stream of research.
The interdependency between controls was also explored in a vertical perspective, meaning between interorga-
nizational mechanisms and intraorganizational ones. Previous literature (Coad & Cullen, 2006; Dekker, 2003, 2004,
2016; Fayard et al., 2012; Kajüter & Kulmala, 2005; McFarland et al., 2008; Mouritsen et al., 2001; Mouritsen &
Thrane, 2006; Reusen et al., 2015; Seal et al., 1999) tended to examine this relationship unilaterally—that is, by looking
at the effect of interorganizational controls on intraorganizational ones or vice versa. What emerged from the study
is an iterative process in which organizational mechanisms feed interorganizational ones and back. Three interdepen-
dencies have been identified (see Table 6). This is the case of the annual plan targets in which targets are suggested by
every organization according to its own information system and, once discussed and defined at the interorganizational
level, these are integrated back in the organizational MC system and, in particular, in their reward systems [INT_PLAN
& ORG_REW]. This interaction is mainly achieved with regard to quantitative targets. However, also other cultural
controls, such as the shared goals, pushed some of the partner organizations to change their organizational structure
in terms of recruitment of new personnel and redefinition of roles and responsibilities [INT_GOAL & ORG_GS].
The effect of the interaction between the network and the organizational level emerged also with regard to the
adoption of a horizontal perspective in the organizational MC systems. It was particularly interesting that some of
the interviewed highlighted that the participation to the interorganizational program—and particularly the adoption
of superordinate targets—allowed their organization to “break down” intraorganizational barriers and promote coop-
eration between organizational units used to work as isolated silos [INT_CYB & ORG_CYB]. This is a newly explored
aspect that can be relevant in partnerships between large and complex organizations. Horizontal coupling has been
explored by van Hengel et al. (2014) in a single organization context; our evidence suggests that it may be fostered
by the participation to an interorganizational project. Such a result also contributes to post-New Public Management
literature (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Cristofoli et al., 2017; Emerson et al., 2012; O’Flynn, 2007; Steccolini, 2019) that sees
silo logic as one of the unintended effects of New Public Management reforms—and thus proposes new governance
models and collaborative arrangements for public administrations.
6 CONCLUSION
The results emerging from the case study can be distilled into three key points. First of all, the research confirms that
the functioning of interorganizational settings may require the adoption of a package of control mechanisms of differ-
ent types. Thus, the study of their MC systems in public networks should embrace a broad concept of control, including
also nontraditional control mechanisms (Agostino & Arnaboldi, 2018; Dudau et al., 2020; Kenis & Provan, 2006;
Romzek et al., 2012). A narrower view would limit the comprehension of how management control works in interor-
ganizational settings, or might even lead to unsubstantiated conclusions. To adopt such a broad and holistic view of
control, the adoption of the Malmi and Brown (2008) framework, even though originally focused on organizational
controls, resulted to be suitable also in the case of interorganizational settings.
Second, the evidence that different control mechanisms may guide people and organizations toward interorgani-
zational aims implies that managers also need to focus on the consistency of the package of controls. In particular, the
interdependencies between the control mechanisms should be governed to leverage their potential complementarity
(Grabner & Moers, 2013) and the degree of coupling between the different mechanisms (Demartini & Otley, 2020).
While this is also true when dealing with single organizations’ management control systems, in interorganizational
settings it is even more important because of the additional complexity deriving from the presence of a wider number
of people and organizations.
Lastly, the research shows that the collaboration between multiple public organizations may also be supported
by control mechanisms of single organization when they are adapted consistently to the aims of the interorganiza-
tional initiative. This evidence was reported by some literature focusing on the private sector (Dekker, 2016) and here
explored in the public context. This adaptation may be referred to the adoption of objectives and targets to be declined
at the single organization level or the re-design of organization and governance structures. Interestingly, being part of
an interorganizational initiative may also help the organization in overcoming silos logics that often exist in public
administrations and, thus, in promoting a culture of “horizontal” collaboration (Chenhall, 2008; van der Meer-Kooistra
& Scapens, 2008). This appears to be fostered by the cultural controls introduced with the program.
The perspective and methodology adopted enabled the authors to focus on the interdependencies between
different control mechanisms, and to understand how organizational controls can contribute to the achievement
of interorganizational aims. Moreover, the adoption of a mixed-method combining interventionist research and
semistructured interviews allowed the authors to develop a field research leveraging on the experience of the inter-
ventionist author and limiting his potential bias through the analysis conducted by the author not involved in the
program.
The main limitation of this paper is the adoption of a single case study, which reduces the possibility of gener-
alizing from the findings. Moreover, the observation took into account 4 years of the network activity and, thus,
not long enough to appreciate the achievement of the broad outcomes the program aims to achieve. Considering
that the results of the case study seem to support that the control mechanisms adopted have overall supported the
collaboration of the involved organizations, further researches could investigate unsuccessful cases. This may provide
further insights to the study of management control in public interorganizational initiatives.
DATA AVAILABILITY STATEMENT

The data that support the findings of this study are available on request from the corresponding author. The data are
not publicly available due to privacy or ethical restrictions.
ORCID
Guido Noto https://orcid.org/0000-0002-2981-5401
REFERENCES
Agostino, D., & Arnaboldi, M. (2015). The New Public Management in hybrid settings: New challenges for performance
measures. International Review of Public Administration, 20(4), 353–369.
Agostino, D., & Arnaboldi, M. (2018). Performance measurement systems in public service networks. The what, who, and how
of control. Financial Accountability & Management, 34(2), 103–116.
Agranoff, R., & McGuire, M. (2003). Inside the matrix: Integrating the paradigms of intergovernmental and network
management. International Journal of Public Administration, 26(12), 1401–1422.
Ansell, C., & Gash, A. (2008). Collaborative governance in theory and practice. Journal of Public Administration Research and
Theory, 18(4), 543–571.
Baard, V. (2010). A critical review of interventionist research. Qualitative Research in Accounting & Management, 7(1), 13–45.
Barretta, A., & Busco, C. (2011). Technologies of government in public sector’s networks: In search of cooperation through
management control innovations. Management Accounting Research, 22(4), 211–219.
Bedford, D. S., & Malmi, T. (2015). Configurations of control: An exploratory analysis. Management Accounting Research, 27,
2–26.
Bedford, D. S., Malmi, T., & Sandelin, M. (2016). Management control effectiveness and strategy: An empirical analysis of
packages and systems. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 51, 12–28.
Bianchi, C., Bovaird, T., & Loeffler, E. (2017). Applying a dynamic performance management framework to wicked issues:
How coproduction helps to transform young people’s services in Surrey County Council, UK. International Journal of Public
Administration, 40(10), 833–846.
Birnberg, J. G. (1998). Control in interfirm co-operative relationships. Journal of Management Studies, 35(4), 421–428.
Bourne, M., Franco-Santos, M., Micheli, P., & Pavlov, A. (2018). Performance measurement and management: A system of
systems perspective. International Journal of Production Research, 56(8), 2788–2799.
Bracci, E. (2017). The practical relevance of public sector research: The potential contributions of the interventionist approach.
Revista de Contabilidade e Organizações, 11(30), 4–13.
Caglio, A., & Ditillo, A. (2008). A review and discussion of management control in inter-firm relationships: Achievements and
future directions. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 33(7–8), 865–898.
Caglio, A., & Ditillo, A. (2012). Opening the black box of management accounting information exchanges in buyer–supplier
relationships. Management Accounting Research, 23(2), 61–78.
Cäker, M., & Siverbo, S. (2011). Management control in public sector joint ventures. Management Accounting Research, 22(4),
330–348.
Carlsson-Wall, M., Kraus, K., & Lind, J. (2011). The interdependencies of intra-and inter-organisational controls and work
practices—The case of domestic care of the elderly. Management Accounting Research, 22(4), 313–329.
Chenhall, R. H. (2008). Accounting for the horizontal organization: A review essay. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 33(4–
5), 517–550.
Choi, I., & Moynihan, D. (2019). How to foster collaborative performance management? Key factors in the US federal agencies.
Public Management Review, 21(10), 1538–1559.
Coad, A. F., & Cullen, J. (2006). Inter-organisational cost management: Towards an evolutionary perspective. Management
Accounting Research, 17(4), 342–369.
Cooper, D. J., Ezzamel, M., & Robson, K. (2019). The multiplicity of performance management systems: Heterogeneity in
multinational corporations and management sense-making. Contemporary Accounting Research, 36(1), 451–485.
Cooper, R., & Slagmulder, R. (2004). Interorganizational cost management and relational context. Accounting, Organizations and
Society, 29(1), 1–26.
Cristofoli, D., Meneguzzo, M., & Riccucci, N. (2017). Collaborative administration: The management of successful networks.
Public Management Review, 19(3), 275–283.
Cuganesan, S., & Lee, R. (2006). Intra-organisational influences in procurement networks controls: The impacts of information
technology. Management Accounting Research, 17(2), 141–170.
De Jong, B. A., Bijlsma-Frankema, K. M., & Cardinal, L. B. (2014). Stronger than the sum of its parts? The performance
implications of peer control combinations in teams. Organization Science, 25(6), 1703–1721.
Dekker, H., Donada, C., Mothe, C., & Nogatchewsky, G. (2019). Boundary spanner relational behavior and inter-organizational
control in supply chain relationships. Industrial Marketing Management, 77, 143–154.
Dekker, H. C. (2003). Value chain analysis in interfirm relationships: A field study. Management Accounting Research, 14(1),
1–23.
Dekker, H. C. (2004). Control of inter-organizational relationships: Evidence on appropriation concerns and coordination
requirements. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 29(1), 27–49.
Dekker, H. C. (2008). Partner selection and governance design in interfirm relationships. Accounting, Organizations and Society,
33(7–8), 915–941.
Dekker, H. C. (2016). On the boundaries between intrafirm and interfirm management accounting research. Management
Accounting Research, 31, 86–99.
Demartini, M. C., & Otley, D. (2020). Beyond the system vs. package dualism in Performance Management Systems design: A
loose coupling approach. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 86, 101072.
Ding, R., Dekker, H. C., & Groot, T. (2013). Risk, partner selection and contractual control in interfirm relationships.
Management Accounting Research, 24(2), 140–155.
Dudau, A. I., Favotto, A., Kominis, G., & Sicilia, M. (2020). Building trust in public sector networks: The role of rhetoric and
persuasion. Financial Accountability & Management, 36(2), 134–150.
Dumay, J. C. (2010). A critical reflective discourse of an interventionist research project. Qualitative Research in Accounting &
Management, 7(1), 46–70.
Emerson, K., Nabatchi, T., & Balogh, S. (2012). An integrative framework for collaborative governance. Journal of Public
Administration Research and Theory, 22(1), 1–29.
Fayard, D., Lee, L. S., Leitch, R. A., & Kettinger, W. J. (2012). Effect of internal cost management, information systems inte-
gration, and absorptive capacity on inter-organizational cost management in supply chains. Accounting, Organizations and
Society, 37(3), 168–187.
Ferreira, A., & Otley, D. (2009). The design and use of performance management systems: An extended framework for analysis.
Glendinning, C., Hudson, B., & Means, R. (2005). Under strain? Exploring the troubled relationship between health and social
care. Public Money and Management, 25(4), 245–251.
Goddard, A. (1992). Perspectives on management control in a multiple agency, community service. Financial Accountability &
Management, 8(2), 115–128.
Grabner, I., & Moers, F. (2013). Management control as a system or a package? Conceptual and empirical issues. Accounting,
Organizations and Society, 38(6–7), 407–419.
Grafton, J., Abernethy, M. A., & Lillis, A. M. (2011). Organisational design choices in response to public sector reforms: A case
study of mandated hospital networks. Management Accounting Research, 22(4), 242–268.
Håkansson, H., & Lind, J. (2004). Accounting and network coordination. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 29(1), 51–72.
Hastrup, K. (2005). Social anthropology. Towards a pragmatic enlightenment? Social Anthropology, 13(2), 133–149.
Head, B. W., & Alford, J. (2015). Wicked problems: Implications for public policy and management. Administration & Society,
47(6), 711–739.
Jacobs, K., & Cuganesan, S. (2014). Interdisciplinary accounting research in the public sector: Dissolving boundaries to tackle
wicked problems. Accounting, Auditing and Accountability Journal, 27, 1250–1256.
Jönsson, S. (2010). Interventionism – An approach for the future? Qualitative Research in Accounting & Management, 7(1), 124–
134.
Jönsson, S., & Lukka, K. (2005). Doing interventionist research in management accounting (No. 2005: 6). University of Gothenburg,
Gothenburg Research Institute GRI.
Jönsson, S., & Lukka, K. (2006). There and back again: Doing interventionist research in management accounting. In C. S.
Chapman, A. G. Hopwood, & M. D. Shields (Eds.), Handbooks of management accounting research (pp. 373–397). Elsevier.
Kajüter, P., & Kulmala, H. I. (2005). Open-book accounting in networks: Potential achievements and reasons for failures.
Kastberg, G. (2016). Trust and control in network relations: A study of a public sector setting. Financial Accountability &
Management, 32(1), 33–56.
Kenis, P., & Provan, K. G. (2006). The control of public networks. International Public Management Journal, 9(3), 227–247.
Kickert, W. J. M. E., Klijn, H., & Koppenjan, J. F. M. (1997). Managing complex networks: Strategies for the public sector. Sage
Publication.
Klijn, E. H. (1996). Analyzing and managing policy processes in complex networks: A theoretical examination of the concept
policy network and its problems. Administration & Society, 28(1), 90–119.
Kurunmäki, L., & Miller, P. (2006). Modernising government: The calculating self, hybridisation and performance measurement.
Financial Accountability & Management, 22(1), 87–106.
Kurunmäki, L., & Miller, P. (2011). Regulatory hybrids: Partnerships, budgeting and modernising government. Management
Accounting Research, 22(4), 220–241.
Li, P., Tang, G., Okano, H., & Gao, C. (2013). The characteristics and dynamics of management controls in IJVs: Evidence from a
Sino-Japanese case. Management Accounting Research, 24(3), 246–260.
Linneberg, M. S., & Korsgaard, S. (2019). Coding qualitative data: A synthesis guiding the novice. Qualitative Research Journal,
19(3), 259–270.
Lukka, K., & Vinnari, E. (2017). Combining actor-network theory with interventionist research: Present state and future
potential. Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, 30(3), 720–753.
Malmi, T., & Brown, D. A. (2008). Management control systems as a package—Opportunities, challenges and research
directions. Management Accounting Research, 19(4), 287–300.
Marques, L., Ribeiro, J. A., & Scapens, R. W. (2011). The use of management control mechanisms by public organizations with a
network coordination role: A case study in the port industry. Management Accounting Research, 22(4), 269–291.
McFarland, R. G., Bloodgood, J. M., & Payan, J. M. (2008). Supply chain contagion. Journal of Marketing, 72(2), 63–79.
McGuire, M. (2002). Managing networks: Propositions on what managers do and why they do it. Public Administration Review,
62(5), 599–609.
Merchant, K. A., & Otley, D. (2020). Beyond the systems versus package debate. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 86,
101185.
Mouritsen, J., Hansen, A., & Hansen, C. Ø. (2001). Inter-organizational controls and organizational competencies: Episodes
around target cost management/functional analysis and open book accounting. Management Accounting Research, 12(2),
221–244.
Mouritsen, J., & Thrane, S. (2006). Accounting, network complementarities and the development of inter-organisational
relations. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 31(3), 241–275.
Nies, H. (2006). Managing effective partnerships in older people’s services. Health and Social Care in the Community, 14(5),
391–399.
Noto, G., Coletta, L., & Vainieri, M. (2022). Measuring the performance of collaborative governance in food safety man-
agement: an Italian case study. Public Money & Management, 42(8), 627–636. https://doi.org/10.1080/09540962.2020.
1840043
O’Flynn, J. (2007). From new public management to public value: Paradigmatic change and managerial implications. Australian
Journal of Public Administration, 66(3), 353–366.
Orton, J. D., & Weick, K. E. (1990). Loosely coupled systems: A reconceptualization. Academy of Management Review, 15(2),
203–223.
Otley, D. (1980). The contingency theory of management accounting: Achievement and prognosis. Accounting, Organizations
and Society, 5(4), 413–428.
Otley, D. (2016). The contingency theory of management accounting and control: 1980–2014. Management Accounting
Research, 31, 45–62.
Provan, K. G., & Milward, H. B. (1995). A preliminary theory of interorganizational network effectiveness: A comparative study
of four community mental health systems. Administrative Science Quarterly, 40(1), 1–33.
Provan, K. G., & Milward, H. B. (2001). Do networks really work? A framework for evaluating public-sector organizational
networks. Public Administration Review, 61(4), 414–423.
Reusen, E., Stouthuysen, K., Roodhooft, F., & Van den Abbeele, A. (2015). Management control system imitation in supply chains.
KU Leuven, working paper.
Rittel, H. W., & Webber, M. M. (1973). Dilemmas in a general theory of planning. Policy Sciences, 4(2), 155–169.
Rogers, E., & Weber, E. P. (2010). Thinking harder about outcomes for collaborative governance arrangements. The American
Review of Public Administration, 40(5), 546–567.
Romzek, B. S., LeRoux, K., & Blackmar, J. M. (2012). A preliminary theory of informal accountability among network
organizational actors. Public Administration Review, 72(3), 442–453.
Ryan, C., & Walsh, P. (2004). Collaboration of public sector agencies: Reporting and accountability challenges. International
Journal of Public Sector Management, 17(7), 621–631.
Seal, W., Cullen, J., Dunlop, A., Berry, T., & Ahmed, M. (1999). Enacting a European supply chain: A case study on the role of
management accounting. Management Accounting Research, 10(3), 303–322.
Siddiki, S., Kim, J., & Leach, W. D. (2017). Diversity, trust, and social learning in collaborative governance. Public Administration
Review, 77(6), 863–874.
Steccolini, I. (2019). Accounting and the post-new public management: Re-considering publicness in accounting research.
Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, 32(1), 255–279.
Thomasson, A., Lapsley, I., & Steccolini, I. (2020). Managing wicked problems: Uncovering the roles of budgets, financial
systems, and collaboration. Financial Accountability & Management, 36, 113–116.
Thrane, S., & Hald, K. S. (2006). The emergence of boundaries and accounting in supply fields: The dynamics of integration and
fragmentation. Management Accounting Research, 17(3), 288–314.
Tomkins, C. (2001). Interdependencies, trust and information in relationships, alliances and networks. Accounting, Organiza-
tions and Society, 26(2), 161–191.
Turrini, A., Cristofoli, D., Frosini, F., & Nasi, G. (2010). Networking literature about determinants of network effectiveness.
Public Administration, 88(2), 528–550.
van der Kolk, B., van Veen-Dirks, P. M., & Ter Bogt, H. J. (2020). How combinations of control elements create tensions and how
these can be managed: An embedded case study. Management Accounting Research, 48, 100677.
Van der Meer-Kooistra, J., & Scapens, R. W. (2008). The governance of lateral relations between and within organisations.
Van der Meer-Kooistra, J., & Vosselman, E. G. (2000). Management control of interfirm transactional relationships: The case
of industrial renovation and maintenance. Accounting. Organizations and Society, 25(1), 51–77.
Van Hengel, H., Budding, T., & Groot, T. (2014). Loosely coupled results control in Dutch municipalities. Financial Accountability
& Management, 30(1), 49–74.
Weber, E. P., & Khademian, A. M. (2008). Wicked problems, knowledge challenges, and collaborative capacity builders in
network settings. Public Administration Review, 68(2), 334–349.
How to cite this article: Barretta, A. D., & Noto, G. (2023). Management control practices in
interorganizational initiatives: The case of a public program. Financial Accountability & Management, 39,
493–513. https://doi.org/10.1111/faam.12349

Barretta Noto 2022

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Barretta Noto 2022

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Received: 27 January 2021 Revised: 30 August 2022 Accepted: 18 October 2022

Management control practices in

Antonio Davide Barretta1 Guido Noto2

2 THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS

TA B L E 1 Management control systems package (Source: Malmi & Brown, 2008)

TA B L E 2 Key informants’ organization and position

Key informant Institution Role

4.1 The management control package supporting the interorganizational

4.1.1 Cultural controls

4.1.2 Administrative controls

4.1.3 Planning and cybernetic controls

TA B L E 3 Annual plan (2019) objectives

4.2 The interdependencies between the different interorganizational control

TA B L E 4 The management control mechanisms of the interorganizational program

Control mechanism Category

KI_4: “Results are verbally reported during the meetings.”

TA B L E 5 The interdependencies between the interorganizational controls

Label Description Type

4.3 The adaptation of organizational mechanisms to support interorganizational goals

TA B L E 6 The interdependencies between inter and intra-organizational controls

Label Description Type

DATA AVAILABILITY STATEMENT

You might also like