Strategic Analysis

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Blame game on Article 370: Patel, Nehru, and

Ayyangar

Pavan Kumar

To cite this article: Pavan Kumar (2023): Blame game on Article 370: Patel, Nehru, and
Ayyangar, Strategic Analysis, DOI: 10.1080/09700161.2023.2183589

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/09700161.2023.2183589

Published online: 09 Mar 2023.

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Strategic Analysis, 2023
Vol. 00, No. 00, 1–13, https://doi.org/10.1080/09700161.2023.2183589

Blame game on Article 370: Patel, Nehru, and Ayyangar

Pavan Kumar

Introduction

O n 5 August 2019, India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi took a bold decision
and made drastic changes to Article 370 of the Indian Constitution, thus
changing the legal status of the state of Jammu and Kashmir. This further sparked
a debate over the real architect of the Article. There has been a lot of debate and
discussion around Article 370. Article 370 provided a special status to the state of
Jammu and Kashmir. The debate around Article 370 is highly political, biased, and
targeted. It is either blaming Jawaharlal Nehru for the Article or proving that
Vallabhbhai Patel was the real architect of the Article.1 This Essay goes beyond
this narrow debate and looks into the available documents for a more authentic
picture of the Article and Vallabhbhai Patel’s approach to it. The story of Article 370
follows the following trajectory.

Independence, Invasion, and Accession

After signing the instrument of Accession on 27 October 1947, India took control of
Jammu and Kashmir on three subjects: defence, communication, and foreign rela­
tions. A Constituent Assembly was constituted to draft the Constitution India on
9 December 1946. This was formed on the recommendation of the Cabinet Mission
of 16 May 1946. The Mission stated:

Before putting forward our recommendation, we turn to deal with the relationship of the
Indian States to British India. It is quite clear that with the attainment of independence by
British India, whether inside or outside the British Commonwealth, the relationship which
has hitherto existed between the Rulers of the States and the British Crown will no longer be
possible. Paramountcy can neither be retained by the British Crown nor transferred to the
new Government.2

The Cabinet Mission’s Memorandum on the Indian States, Treaties, and

Paramountcy also made it clear that the Princely States which would be part of
British India, would be free to negotiate their terms of relationship with the new
Independent State. It stated,

In the meanwhile, the Indian States are in a position to play an important part in the formulation
of the new constitutional structure for India, and His Majesty’s Government has been informed
by the Indian States that they desire, in their own interests and in the interests of India as a whole,

Pavan Kumar is Assistant Professor at the School of Modern Media, UPES, Dehradun

© 2023 Manohar Parrikar Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses

2 Pavan Kumar

both to make their contribution to the framing of the structure, and to take their due place in it
when it is completed. During the interim period, it will be necessary for the States to conduct
negotiations with British India in regard to the future regulation of matters of common concern,
especially in the economic and financial field. Such negotiations, which will be necessary
whether the States desire to participate in the new Indian constitutional structure or not, will
occupy a considerable period of time, and since some of these negotiations may well be
incomplete when the new structure comes into being, it will, in order to avoid administrative
difficulties, be necessary to arrive at an understanding between the States and those likely to
control the succession Government or Governments that for a period of time the then existing
arrangements as to these matters of common concern should continue until the new agreements
are completed. In this matter, the British Government and the Crown Representative will lend
such assistance as they can should it be so desired.3

The Indian Independence Act of 1947 made it clear that,

‘His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom have no responsibility as
respects the Government of any of the territories (p.34) which, immediately before
that day, were included in British India;

(a) the suzerainty of His Majesty over the Indian States lapses, and with it, all
treaties and agreements in force at the date of the passing of this Act between
His Majesty and the rulers of Indian States, all functions exercisable by His
Majesty at that date with respect to Indian States, all obligations of His
Majesty existing at that date towards the Indian States or the rulers thereof,
and all powers, rights, authority or jurisdiction exercisable by His Majesty at
that date in or in relation to Indian States by treaty, grant, usage, sufferance or
otherwise; and
(b) there lapse also any treaties or agreements in force at the date of the passing
of this Act between His Majesty and any persons having authority in the
tribal areas, any obligations of His Majesty existing at that date to any such
persons or with respect to the tribal areas, and all powers, rights, authority or
jurisdiction exercisable at that date of His Majesty in or in relation to the
tribal areas by treaty, grant, usage, sufferance or otherwise’.4

For the interim period, The Government of India Act 1935 was made the basis for
administrative purposes. Some new clauses were added to deal with new realities. It
added clauses to deal with Princely States and their accession to the Indian Union. It
added,

‘Accession of Indian States:—

(1) An Indian State shall be deemed to have acceded to the Dominion if the Governor-
General has signified his acceptance of an Instrument of Accession executed by the Ruler
thereof whereby the Ruler on behalf of the State:— (a) declares that he accedes to the
Dominion with the intent that the Governor-General, the Dominion Legislature, the Federal
Court and any other Dominion authority established for the purposes of the Dominion shall,
by virtue of his Instrument of Accession, but subject always to the terms thereof, and for the
purposes only of the Dominion, exercise in relation to the State such functions as may be
vested in them by order under this Act; and (b) assumes the obligation of ensuring that the
effect is given within the State to the provisions of this Act so far as they are applicable
therein by virtue of the Instrument of Accession. (2) An Instrument of Accession shall
 Strategic Essay 3

specify the matters which the Ruler accepts as matters with respect to which the Dominion
Legislature may make laws for the State, and the limitations, if any, to which the power of
the Dominion Legislature to make laws for the State, and the exercise of the executive
authority of the Dominion in the State, are respectively to be subject.’5

Thus, when Pakistan invaded the Kashmir Valley on 22 October 1947, Maharaja
Hari Singh asked for military help and signed the Instrument of Accession on
27 October 1947. Jammu and Kashmir allowed the Indian states to form policies
on defence, communication, and external affairs. But we should also remember that
the Instrument of Accession was accompanied by a letter where it was promised that
once the issue was settled, the people’s wishes would be respected. A Letter of
27 October 1947 by Lord Mountbatten reads:

My Dear Maharaja Sahib,

Your Highness’s letter dated the 26th October has been delivered to me by Mr. V.P. Menon.
In the special circumstances mentioned by Your Highness, my Government have decided to
accept the accession of Kashmir State to the Dominion of India. Consistently with their
policy that, in the case of any State where the issue of accession has been the subject of
dispute, the question of accession should be decided in accordance with the wishes of the
people of the State, it is my Government’s wish that, as soon as law and order have been
restored in Kashmir and her soil cleared of the invader, the question of the State’s accession
should be settled by a reference to the people (emphasis added).6

The White Paper on Jammu and Kashmir, 1948, also mentions the provisionality of
the accession and the will of the people. It notes:

On the 25th, the Government of India directed the preparation of plans for sending troops to
Kashmir by air and road. Indian troops were sent to Kashmir by air on the 27th, following
the signing of the Instrument of Accession on the previous night. The accession was legally
made by the Maharaja of Kashmir, and this step was taken on the advice of Sheikh
Abdullah, leader of the All-Jammu and Kashmir National Conference, the political party
commanding the widest popular support in the State. Nevertheless, in accepting the acces­
sion, the Government of India made it clear that they would regard it as purely provisional
until such time as the will of the people of the State could be ascertained.7

On 30 October 1947, Sheikh Abdullah was appointed as the head of Administration of

Jammu and Kashmir, and on 4 March 1948, a popular interim government was formed to
look into the administration. Sheikh Abdullah was appointed the head of emergency
administration. On 15 and 16 May 1949, negotiations were held on Jammu and
Kashmir’s future at Vallabhbhai Patel’s residence.8 If Patel was suspicious of Abdullah’s
intentions, Nehru was more worried about the capabilities, actions and intentions of the
Maharaja.9 Thus, to deal with the legislation of Article 370 and for other matters of the
State of Jammu and Kashmir, Nehru deputed N. Gopalaswami Ayyangar.10 Nehru
discussed the matter with Patel too. On 10 May 1949, Nehru suggested to Abdullah not
to sensationalize the matter by giving the interview on the future of Kashmir.11 On the
internal situation in Kashmir and about Abdullah, Nehru writes to Patel that Abdullah is an
excellent man and an effective leader but he lacks political foresight.12
4 Pavan Kumar

Preparing the Draft: Article 306 A

On 17 May 1949, N. Gopalaswami Ayyangar sent a letter and draft of Article 306
A to Vallabhbhai Patel. Both Nehru and Ayyangar prepared this draft, and the matter
was based on the meeting held on previous days at the residence of Vallabhbhai
Patel.13 Thus, this draft was sent for approval from Vallabhbhai Patel. After approval
from Patel, Nehru wrote a letter to Sheikh Abdullah on the future of India-Jammu &
Kashmir relations and their place in the Constituent Assembly of India. Nehru writes
to Sheikh Abdullah on 18 May 1949,

As regards (i) and (iii), it has been the settled policy of the Government of India, which on
many occasions has been stated both by Sardar Patel and me, that the Constitution of Jammu
and Kashmir State is a matter for determination by the people of the State represented in
a Constituent Assembly convened for the purpose. In the special circumstances of the State
of Jammu and Kashmir, the Government of India have no objection to the Constituent
Assembly of the State considering the question of the continuance of the association of the
State with a constitutional monarchy.
In regard to (ii), Jammu and Kashmir State now stands acceded to the Indian Union in
respect of three subjects, namely, Foreign Affairs, Defence and Communications. It will be
for the Constituent Assembly of the State, when convened, to determine in respect of what
other subjects the State may accede14

The draft Article 306 A, which the Government of Jammu and Kashmir proposed,
stated:

[The] President may, by public notification, alter, modify or amend this Article,

(a) Only such provisions of this Constitution shall apply in relation to the State as are
declared by the President, in consultation with the Government of the State, to relate directly
to the matters specified in the Instrument of Accession governing the accession of the State
to the Dominion of India;

(b) The power of Parliament to make laws for the State shall be limited to:
those matters in the Union List and the Concurrent List which are declared by the
President, in consultation with the Government of the State, to correspond to matters
specified in the Instrument of Accession governing the accession of that State to the
Dominion of India as the matters with respect to which the Dominion Legislature may
make laws for the State.15

Suggested Changes by Ministry of States

The Ministry of States suggested some changes in the proposed draft, which spoke
about the accession of Jammu and Kashmir State to the Indian Union and the way
forward for its accession. It spoke of the Fundamental Rights and the Supreme Court
concerning Jammu and Kashmir:

It was further pointed out that if the quantum of the accession of Kashmir State was not
extended, difficulties would arise in respect of the citizenship of the subjects of Kashmir
 Strategic Essay 5

State as also in connection with the operation of the provisions regarding fundamental rights
and Supreme Court in respect of this State. The (p.54) Government of India have considered
the matter in its various aspects and are of the opinion that in the view of the present
peculiar situation in respect of Jammu and Kashmir State, it is desirable that the accession of
the State should be continued on the existing basis till the State could be brought to the level
of other states. A special provision has, therefore, to be made in respect of this State on the
basis suggested above as a transitional arrangement. It may be added that ‘naturalisation’ is
already covered by the existing Instrument of Accession signed by the Ruler of the State,
and this may perhaps meet the requirements in respect of citizenship of the subjects of this
State.

The Ministry of States suggests for the consideration of the Drafting Committee the
following approach to this question:—

(1) Jammu and Kashmir State may be treated as part of the Indian territory and
shown in States specified in Part III of Schedule I.
(2) A special provision may be made in the Constitution to the effect that until
the Parliament provides by law that all the provisions of the Constitution
applicable to the States specified in Part III will apply to this State, the power
of the Parliament to make laws for the State will be limited to the items
specified in the Schedule to the Instrument of Accession governing the
accession of this State to the Dominion of India or to the corresponding
entries in List I of the new Constitution16

On 27 May 1949, rules were revised for the inclusion of members from Jammu and
Kashmir in the Constituent Assembly. It stated that ‘all the seats in the Assembly
allotted to the State of Kashmir may be filled by nomination and the representatives
of the State to be chosen to fill such seats may be nominated by the Ruler of Kashmir
on the advice of his Prime Minister’(p.55).17
On the debate on the inclusion of members in the Constituent Assembly,
N. Gopalaswami Ayyangar replied on 27 May 1949 in the Constituent Assembly,

“Now, the correct position is this. The accession is complete. No doubt, we have offered to
have a plebiscite taken when the conditions are created for the holding of a proper, fair and
impartial plebiscite. But that plebiscite is merely for the purpose of giving the people of the
State the opportunity of expressing their will, and the expression of their will, will be only in
the direction of whether they would ratify the accession that has already taken place—not
ratify in the sense that that Act of ratification is necessary for the completion of the
accession, but if the plebiscite produces a verdict which is against the continuance of
accession to India of the Kashmir State, then what we are committed to is simply this,
that we shall not stand in the way of Kashmir separating herself away from India. In this
connection, I should like to draw the attention of the House to the Provisions of the Indian
Independence Act under which, when a State accedes and subsequently wished to get out of
the Act of accession, thus separating itself from the main Dominion, it cannot do so except
with the consent of the Dominion. Our commitment is simply this, that if and when
a plebiscite comes to be taken and if the verdict of that plebiscite is against India, then
we shall not stand in the way of the wishes of the people of Kashmir being given effect to, if
they want to go away from us. That is all that it means. So I maintain that the statement that
the accession at present is complete is a perfectly correct description of the existing State of
things”.18
6 Pavan Kumar

This statement clarifies India’s position on Jammu and Kashmir. It clearly states that
Jammu and Kashmir have acceded to the Dominion of India. It says it is part of India
until the people of Jammu and Kashmir reject this accession by plebiscite. Thus, it
was expected that they would take part in the drafting of the Constitution for India.
On 16 June 1949, representatives from Jammu & Kashmir joined the Constituent
Assembly. The representatives included Sheikh Abdullah, Mirza Afzal Beg, Maulana
Masoodi, and Moti Ram Bagda. And it was expected in return that this new
Constitution would apply to Jammu & Kashmir too. To this understanding, the
drafting committee, in its meeting on 4 October 1949, prepared a draft for the special
status of Jammu & Kashmir. This draft was discussed from 4 to 15 October 1949.
The original draft of 4 October made no special concession on Part VI of the Indian
Constitution. Part VI, which deals with the status of the Indian states, was also
supposed to apply to the states included in the third part of the First Schedule.
Jammu & Kashmir was placed in Part III of the First Schedule. New provisions were
added to deal with specific provisions of Jammu & Kashmir. Articles 306 A and 306
B were proposed. These proposed Articles read as follows:

Temporary Provisions with Respect to the State of Jammu & Kashmir

Article 306 A. Notwithstanding anything contained in this Constitution, until such date as
the President may by public notification announce to be the date on which this Article shall
cease to be operative

(a) the power of Parliament to make laws for the State of Jammu and Kashmir
shall be limited to those matters in the Union List which the President, in
consultation with the Government of that State, may by order specify;
(b) the provisions of Article 211A of this Constitution shall not apply in relation
to that State; and
(c) the provisions of Part V and Parts IX to XVII of this Constitution shall apply
in relation to that State subject to such exceptions and modifications as the
President may by order specify.
Temporary Provisions with Respect to States in Part III of the First Schedule
306B. Notwithstanding anything contained in this Constitution, during a period of ten
years from the commencement thereof, or during such longer or shorter period as Parliament
may by law provide in respect of any State, the Government of every State for the time
being specified in Part III of the First Schedule shall be under the general control of, and
comply with such particular directions, if any, as may from time to time be given by, the
President, and any failure to comply with such directions shall be deemed to be a failure to
carry out the Government of the State in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution.

Provided that the President may by order direct that the provisions of this Article
shall not apply to any State specified in the order.19

Abdullah’s Betrayal
Sheikh Abdullah and his other associates opposed the above draft on the inclusion of
Jammu & Kashmir in the Indian Union and the power Indian Union would have in
the future. Sheikh Abdullah’s National Conference disapproved of the draft. In
a letter to V. Shankar (PS to Vallabhbhai Patel) dated 14 October 1949, Vishnu
 Strategic Essay 7

Sahay writes that as the earlier draft is being rejected by the National Conference,
Sheikh Abdullah sent a modified draft that spoke of the Indian Dominion’s power to
make laws only on matters mentioned in the Instrument of Accession, namely
defence, communication, and foreign relations.20 Vishnu Sahay further writes:

“I saw N. Gopalaswami, who told me that Sheikh Abdullah has written to him that the draft
Art. 306A (to which Sheikh Abdullah and his colleagues had agreed) had not met with the
approval of the Working Committee of the National Conference. Sheikh Abdullah has sent
an alternative draft which merely says that the provisions of Constitution shall apply to
Kashmir only in regard to the acceded subjects. . . . Parts II, III, and IV of the Constitution
would apply automatically to Kashmir unless the position is expressly saved. These refers to
Fundamental Rights, Citizenship, and DPSP . . . The Kashmiris are perhaps worried about
the occupation of their country by Punjabis”.21

From this letter from Vishnu Sahay, it is more than clear that Abdullah and his
associates agreed to the earlier draft of 306 A, which spoke of making laws other
than just three subjects mentioned in the annexure and Parts II, III, and IV of the
Indian Constitution. Later, Abdullah either failed to get this passed through the NC,
or was against the draft. Whatever the case, this angered Patel and Ayyangar. But
Ayyangar gave in to Abdullah’s threats by changing the draft according to his wishes
to the maximum extent.
Abdullah and his associates protested these powers of the Indian Union on
Jammu and Kashmir; they spoke to Ayyangar on 15 October 1949. Jawaharlal
Nehru was not available in India at the time. Therefore, the responsibility to deal
with Jammu & Kashmir fell on the shoulders of Ayyangar and Patel. Ayyangar wrote
a letter to Patel and informed him about the protest from Abdullah and his associates
on the issues of the new Articles, namely 306 A and 306 B. In this, Ayyangar, made
it clear that there is no substance in the objections made by Abdullah. Ayyangar
writes,

At the end of it all, I told them that I had not expected that, after having agreed to the
substance of our draft both at your House and at the party meeting, they would let me and
Panditji down in the manner they were attempting to do. In answer, Sheikh Abdullah said
that he felt very grieved that I should think so but that in the discharge of his duty to his own
people, he found it impossible to accept our draft as it was.22

To accommodate Abdullah’s wishes, Ayyangar made some changes to the above

draft and sent it to Patel for consideration. He writes, ‘I have since thought over the
matter further and dictated a draft which, without giving up the essential stands we
have taken in our original draft, readjusts it in minor particulars in a way which I am
hoping Sheikh Abdullah would agree to’.23

Changed Draft and Patel’s Opposition

This may have been the crucial mistake Ayyangar made. Patel opposed any change
in the original draft. The modified draft (16 October 1949) read as follows:

“Provisions with Respect to the State of Jammu and Kashmir 306-(A)

8 Pavan Kumar

(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Constitution:—

(a) the provisions of Article 211-A of this Constitution shall not apply in relation to the
State of Jammu and Kashmir;
(b) the power of Parliament to make laws for the State shall be limited to
(i) those matters in the Union List and the Concurrent List which are declared by the
President to correspond to matters specified in the Instrument of Accession governing the
accession of that State to the Dominion of India as the matters with respect to which the
Dominion legislature may make laws for that State, and
(ii) such other matters in the said lists as with the concurrence of the Government of that
State, the President may, by order, specify
(c) the provisions of Article I and Part II of this Constitution shall apply in relation to that
State;
(d) the other provisions of this Constitution shall apply in relation to that State subject to
such exceptions and modifications as the President may, by order, specify
(i) after consultation with the Government of that State, in cases where such exceptions or
modifications are necessary by reason of, or, are incidental to, or are consequential upon, the
provisions of clause (a) or clause (b) of this Article; and
(ii) with the concurrence of that Government, in other cases,
(2) not withstanding anything in the preceding clause of this Article, from such date as he
may specify, the President may, on the recommendation of the Constituent Assembly,
constituted for the purpose of framing the Constitution for the State, direct that this
Article shall cease to be operative, or shall be operative only with such exceptions and
modifications as may be agreed on.24

Ayyangar also wrote to Abdullah about the issue on the same day and enclosed the
draft of the modified Article 306 A. It seems he sent the draft to Patel and Abdullah
together. As the sent date is 15 October 1949 for both the letters, he writes to
Abdullah, ‘I have, therefore, since you left me this morning, tried to find a way out
of the present situation in regard to Article 306-A. Enclosed a draft of Article 306-A
with the language of it readjusted so as to meet practically all your main points’.25
Patel got infuriated when he received Ayyangar’s letter. He was not happy with
Abdullah’s behaviour and that of his associates. He told Ayyangar that this was
a complete betrayal on the part of Sheikh Abdullah. In his letter to Ayyangar on
16 October 1949, Patel writes:

“I find there are some substantial changes over the original draft, particularly in regard to the
applicability of fundamental rights and directive principles of State policy. You can yourself
realise the anomaly of the State becoming part of India and at the same time not recognising
any of these provisions.
I do not at all like any change after our party has approved of the whole arrangement in the
presence of Sheikh Sahib himself. Whenever Sheikh Sahib wishes to back out, he always
confronts us with his duty to the people. Of course, he owes no duty to India or to the Indian
Government, or even on a personal basis, to you and the Prime Minister who have gone all
out to accommodate him.
In these circumstances, any question of my approval does not arise. If you feel it is the right
thing to do, you can go ahead with it.”26

After much discussion, the final draft was agreed upon on the evening of 16 October.
The final draft, which was to be placed before the Constituent Assembly, reads as
follows:
 Strategic Essay 9

“306A. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Constitution, (a) the provisions of
Article 211A of this Constitution shall not apply in relation to the State of Jammu and
Kashmir.
(b) the power of Parliament to make laws for the State shall be limited to
(i) those matters in the Union List and the Concurrent List which, in consultation with the
Government of the State, (p.63) are declared by the President to correspond to matters
specified in the Instrument of Accession governing the accession of the State to the
Dominion of India as the matters with respect to which the Dominion Legislature may
make laws for the State; and
(ii) such other matters in the said Lists as, with the concurrence of the Government of the
State, the President may by order specify;
Explanation:—For the purposes of this Article, the Government of the State means the
person for the time being recognized by the Union as the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir
acting on the advice of the Council of Ministers appointed under the Maharaja’s
Proclamation dated the 5th March 1948.
(c) the provisions of Article 1 of this Constitution shall apply in relation to the State.
(d) such of the other provisions of this Constitution and subject to such exceptions and
modifications shall apply in relation to the State as the President may by order specify: —
Provided that no such order which relates to the matters specified in the Instrument of
Accession of the State aforesaid shall be issued except in consultation with the Government
of the State;
Provided further that no such order which relates to matters other than those referred to in
the preceding proviso shall be issued except with the concurrence of that Government;
2. If the concurrence of the Government of the State referred to in sub-clause (b) (ii) or in
the second proviso of sub-clause (d) of clause (1) was given before the Constituent
Assembly for the purpose of framing the Constitution of the State is convened, it shall be
placed before such Assembly for such decision as it may take thereon;
3. Notwithstanding anything in the preceding clauses of this Article, the President may, by
public notification, declare that this Article shall cease to be operative or shall be operative
only with such exceptions and modifications and from such date as he may specify;
Provided that the recommendation of the Constituent Assembly of the State shall be
necessary before the President issues such a notification.27

Abdullah and his associates agreed on the above draft. However, on the morning of
17 October, Ayyangar made a minor change in the draft and asked for Abdullah’s
approval for this change. Abdullah rejected the amendment.28 The said change was
made in the explanation, ‘I am making, Sir, with your permission, a change here.
Instead of the word ‘appointed’, I am substituting the words, ‘for the time being in
office’—‘under the Maharaja’s Proclamation, dated the fifth day of March 1948’.
Thus, the full explanation reads:

Explanation:—For the purposes of this Article, the Government of the State means the
person for the time being recognised by the Union as the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir,
acting on the advice of the Council of Ministers, for the time being in office, under the
Maharaja’s Proclamation, dated the fifth day of March 1948.

I have there substituted the words ‘for the time being in office,’ for the word ‘appointed.’

‘(c) the provisions of Article 1 of this Constitution shall apply in relation to the State.

(d) such of the other provisions of this Constitution and subject to such exceptions and
modifications shall apply in relation to the State as the President may by order specify.29
10 Pavan Kumar

Playing the Trick

Hence, this change was made and passed in the Constituent Assembly on
17 October. This change allowed the Indian Union to have enough powers to exploit
the situation. Abdullah wrote an angry letter to Ayyangar, threatening to resign from
the Constituent Assembly for getting this passed inappropriately.30 But Ayyangar
told him that nothing could be done now, and enough ground had already been
conceded by him, Patel, and his other colleagues in the Congress. He asked Abdullah
to communicate with Jawaharlal Nehru to discuss the matter further.31 It seems Patel
also had a hand in changing the wording of the draft at the last minute. In his letter to
Nehru on 3 November 1949, he justifies the said changes:

“He insisted on certain changes of a fundamental character which would exclude in their
application to Kashmir the provisions relating to citizenship and fundamental rights and
make it necessary in all these matters as well as others not covered by the accession to three
subjects to seek the concurrence of the State Government which is sought to define as the
Maharaja acting on the advice of the Council of Ministers appointed under the proclamation
of 8 March 1948. After a great deal of discussion, I could persuade the party to accept all the
changes except the last one, which was modified so as to cover not merely the first Ministry
so appointed but any subsequent Ministries which may be appointed under that proclama­
tion. Sheikh Sahib has not reconciled himself to this change, but we could not accommodate
him in this matter, and the provision was passed through the House as we had modified”.32

Patel’s Compulsions and Helplessness

But on the question of the real author of Article 370, which was Article 306 A in an
earlier form, there seems to be another perspective which brings forth Patel’s
reluctance to go with the modified draft. In one of his letters to Ayyangar on
16 October 1949, where he asks him, ‘If you feel it is the right thing to do, you
can go ahead with it’, Patel shows his disagreement with the changes made by
Ayyangar to accommodate Abdullah. But he is the one who helped Ayyangar pass
the Article with some modifications because Nehru was abroad. To understand the
true nature of his approach to Article 370, references from V. Shankar’s My
Reminiscences of Sardar Patel provided an exciting insight. According to
Ayyangar, he had prepared a draft after consulting Jawaharlal Nehru before his
departure to the US. Sheikh Abdullah accepted this draft.33 This statement is also
supported by Patel’s letter to Ayyangar, where Patel mentions the agreement
Abdullah had with Nehru and Ayyangar on the draft.34 Srinath Raghavan has argued
that Patel was the real architect of Article 370,35 but this is not supported by either
Patel’s correspondence or V. Shankar’s account. V. Shankar writes:

In the party there was a strong body of opinion, which looked askance at any suggestion of
discrimination between the Jammu and Kashmir State and other States . . . and was not
prepared to go beyond certain limits in providing for the special position of Jammu and
Kashmir. Sardar was himself fully in accord with this opinion, but due to his usual policy of
not standing in the way of Pandit Nehru and Gopalaswami Ayyangar who sorted out
problems in their light, he had kept his own views in the background. In fact, he had not
taken any part in framing the draft proposals.36
 Strategic Essay 11

However, Patel helped Ayyangar pass the draft in the Constituent Assembly by using
his influence. V. Shankar describes this. When Ayyangar could not get the accep­
tance of Congress leaders, he called Patel and asked for his help in getting it passed.
Patel assigned V. Shankar to deal with some of the members who were opposing the
draft. V. Shankar describes the meeting of 17 October in the following words:

“The meeting was held at appointed hour. It transpired that Ayyangar’s draft was not acceptable to
Abdullah and Maulana Azad was there to plead for Abdullah’s point of view. The meeting was one
of the stormiest I have ever witnessed. The opinion in opposition to Gopalawami’s formula was
forcefully and even militantly expressed, and the issue even brought in the sovereignty of the
Constituent Assembly to draw up the Constitution without being tied down to the apron-strings of
the Kashmir State Constituent Assembly. It was left to Sardar to bring the discussion down to the
practical plane and to plead that because of the international complications, a provisional approach
alone could be made leaving the question of final relationship to be worked out according to the
exigencies of the situation and the mutual feelings and confidence that would have been then
created. In line with this view, he felt that the Constituent Assembly or the Government of India
must define in consultation with the State Government the content of the present accession, but
any further accession must depend on the willing consent of Government of Jammu and Kashmir
for the time being. Finally, this view prevailed, and Gopalaswami Ayyangar’s draft with necessary
modification was adopted. This became Article 370”.37

V. Shankar was disappointed with Patel’s stand on the draft because he believed that
Patel would never allow this much power to Jammu & Kashmir. But Patel had his
reasons to support the draft. He says,

“So you are annoyed with me for having accepted Gopalaswamy’s formula. I was deeply
concerned at the situation. Gopalaswamy had acted under Panditji’s advice. If Jawaharlal
were here I could have had it out with him. But how could I do so with Gopalaswamy who
was only acting under orders? If I did, people would have said that I was taking revenge on
his confidence when he was away. Gopalaswamy had appealed to me for help. How could
I have let him down in the absence of his Chief?”38

Thus, Patel explained the complexities of the issue and his helplessness to
V. Shankar. Apart from his helplessness, Patel also pointed out the problems related
to issues being discussed at the international level after India complained at the UN.
When Nehru was criticized for Article 370 in Parliament on 7 August 1952, he held
Patel responsible for the Article.39 However, in Shankar’s view, it was a betrayal on
the part of Jawaharlal Nehru. V. Shankar met Gopalaswami and questioned Nehru’s
stand on the same, and to this, Ayyangar replied, ‘it is an ill- return to the Sardar for
the magnanimity he had shown in accepting Panditji’s point of view against his
better judgement’.40
This one mistake or giving in to Abdullah is the reason for so many issues in the
Jammu & Kashmir policy. This was a different approach from Patel, Nehru and
Ayyangar.

Conclusion
From the above description and Patel’s engagement in Jammu & Kashmir affairs, it
can be argued that Patel played a crucial role in the accession of Jammu & Kashmir
12 Pavan Kumar

to the Indian Union. Without him, it would have been impossible for Nehru and
other leaders to deal with Hari Singh and his Prime Minister.
From early 1946 to October 1947, he was continuously interacting with the
different sections of society of the state. The Hindu population and Pandits had
trust and some kind of hope from him. Thus, they always sent letters to him and not
Nehru. Nehru and Abdullah were close comrades and had a socialist worldview.
They hoped to make the world more democratic and tolerant. However, they were
always in a hurry, at least in the case of Jammu & Kashmir. They had good
intentions, but their approaches at times were self-defeating. A good intention does
not always result in good outcomes.
On the other hand, Patel focused on the ‘principle of necessity’. All of his actions
in Jammu & Kashmir were guided by necessity. In his view, whoever and whatever
is a barrier to the integration of Jammu & Kashmir into India needs to be removed.
Thus, Patel supported Abdullah on many occasions. His dislike for Abdullah was
very much evident. However, he realized the importance of Abdullah for integration,
and thus handled him sagaciousy. He understood the bad influence of Ram Chandra
Kak on Hari Singh; he forced him to leave through various methods and helped
appoint Mehr Chand Mahajan who would assist him in integration.
Personally, Patel did not approve of the inclusion of Article 370 in the Indian
Constitution. However, he helped Ayyangar pass the modified draft because he did
not want to be seen as an obstacle in the affairs of Jammu & Kashmir which
Jawaharlal Nehru and Ayyangar directly dealt with. He was upset when Abdullah
and his National Conference opposed Article 306A, which they agreed on at the
meeting with Nehru and Patel. V. Shankar’s reminiscences and Patel’s letter indicate
his displeasure and frustration in dealing with Abdullah and the National
Conference. He was against giving too much independence and wanted less freedom,
which was part of the earlier version of Article 370, more precisely Article 306 A.

Disclosure Statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes
1. Srinath Raghavan, ‘BJP wants to revoke Article 370, ironically Sardar Patel was its archi­
tect’, The Print, 26 June 2018 at.
https://theprint.in/opinion/ironical-that-bjp-wants-article-370-revoked-sardar-patel-was-its-
architect/74804/ (Accessed on 15 November 2021);
Shamsul Islam, (2018), “A look into contemporary documents shows RSS/BJP rulers have
shamed Sardar Patel by scrapping Article 370”, National Herald, 10 August 2019 at https://
www.nationalheraldindia.com/opinion/a-look-into-contemporary-documents-shows-rssbjp-
rulers-have-shamed-sardar-patel-by-scrapping-article-370 (Accessed on 15 November 2019);
Seema Chishti, ‘Sheikh Abdullah, Ayyangar, Sardar Patel: How Article 370 was negotiated,
debated’, The Indian Express, 6 August 2019 at https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/
sheikh-abdullah-ayyangar-sardar-patel-how-article-370-was-negotiated-debated-5881060/
(Accessed on 15 November 2019);
Makhan Lal, ‘Kashmir, Nehru’s Idealism and Article 370’, Vivekananda International
Foundation, 4 July 2018 at https://www.vifindia.org/article/2018/july/kashmir-nehru-s-ideal
ism-and-article-370 (Accessed on 10 February 2022)
 Strategic Essay 13

2. British Government Statement: Policy in India, 1946; Modern History Sourcebook, Fordham
University, From India (Cabinet Mission): “Statement by the Cabinet Mission and his
Excellency the Viceroy, Cmd 6821”, HMSO, London, 1946), pp. 2-9 at https://source
books.fordham.edu/mod/1946-india-ukpolicy.asp (Accessed on 12 February 2022).
3. Durga Das, Sardar Patel’s Correspondence (1945-49), Volume 1, Navjivan Press,
Ahmedabad, 1971, (hereafter SPC, 1), pp. 331-332.
A.G. Noorani, Article 370: A Constitutional History of Jammu and Kashmir, Oxford
Scholarship Online, Cmd. 6835, HMSO London, 2011, pp.31-2.
4. Indian Independence Act, 1947, IO & II GEO.6. CH.30, p. 4 at https://www.legislation.gov.
uk/ukpga/1947/30/pdfs/ukpga_19470030_en.pdf (Accessed on 17 February 2022).
5. Ibid., 37.
6. SPC, 1, no. 3, p. 341.
7. Ibid.,p. 46; White Paper on Jammu & Kashmir, Government of India, February 1948, pp. 2–
3.
8. Ibid., p.5.
9. Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Second Series, Volume 6, p. 204.
10. Ibid., p. 204-206.
11. Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Second Series, Volume 11, p. 115.
12. Ibid., p. 117.
13. Ibid., p. 120.
14. Ibid, SPC, 1, no. 3, p.276.
15. Indian Constitutional Document, Munshi Papers, Volume II, Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan,
Bombay, 1967, pp. 519–20, cited in A.G. Noorani, no. 3, p. 53.
16. Ibid., pp. 473,476–7, cited in A.G. Noorani, no. 3, p. 54-5.
17. A.G. Noorani, no. 3, p.55.
18. Constituent Assembly of India Debates (Proceedings), Volume VIII, 27 May, 1949 at https://
loksabha.nic.in/writereaddata/cadebatefiles/C27051949.html (Accessed on 16 April 2022).
19. Indian Constitutional Documents, Munshi Papers no. 15, p. 461, cited in A.G. Noorani,
no. 3, p.58.
20. SPC, 1, no. 3, p. 301.
21. Ibid.
22. SPC, 1, no. 3, p. 243.
23. Ibid.
24. SPC, 1, no. 3, p. 303.
25. Ibid.
26. SPC, 1, no. 3, p. 305.
27. A.G. Noorani, no. 3, p. 64.
28. SPC, 1, no. 3, p. 246.
29. Constituent Assembly of India Debates (Proceedings), Volume X, 17 October, 1949 at http://
164.100.47.194/loksabha/writereaddata/cadebatefiles/C17101949.html (Accessed on
18 April 2022).
30. SPC, 1, no. 3, pp. 306-308.
31. Ibid., pp. 308-310.
32. SPC, 1, no. 3, p. 310.
33. V. Shankar, My Reminiscences of Sardar Patel, Volume 2, Macmillan, 1974, p. 61.
34. SPC, 1, no. 3, p. 305.
35. Srinath Raghavan, “Kashmir – The State and the Status”, Manthan Samvad 2019 at https://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=OgXVMO5rdHg (Accessed on 15 August 2022).
36. V. Shankar, no. 33, p.61.
37. Ibid., p.62.
38. Ibid., p.63.
39. Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Second Series, Volume 19, p.305.
40. Ibid., p.63.