Candidate no: 20339

Review of Henry Kissinger’s White House Years, Chapter VIII,

The Agony of Vietnam

In chapter VIII. of White House Years Henry Kissinger walks through his readers his

interpretation of the Vietnam policy making during the first year of the Nixon administration,

the process he titles ‘The Agony of Vietnam’. In his walkthrough of their failed attempt to

extricate the US from its Vietnam entanglement in the first 6 and then 12 months of their

tenure, in a typical Kissingerian fashion, of blame he takes little, and distributes much, floods

his readers with a sea of information along the 85 pages of the chapter, while he omits key

elements of the story and misinterprets others. Doing so, he takes control of the Vietnam

policy making narrative, reinvents his previous views on Vietnamization conveyed through

the Kalb brothers, defends MENU against Shawcross, and distances the policy failure from

himself. However, as I am going to show, omitting key elements of his infighter nature and

operating style, he presents a distorted picture.

Kissinger begins the chapter explaining the goals of Nixon and himself in Vietnam, leading

out the USA from the conflict “as an act of policy, not as a collapse 1”. Kissinger believed, that

the Vietnam war was to be ended quickly, but in a manner that was consistent with the

maintenance of US “credibility”, due to the “stake that all men and women of goodwill had in

America’s strength and purpose2”. Moreover, going beyond the traditional national interest

based narrative, Kissinger moralized in his memoirs, that “for a great power to abandon a

small country to tyranny simply to obtain a respite from our own travail seemed to me – and

still seems to me – profoundly immoral and destructive of our efforts to build a new and

1
Kissinger 1979, 228
2
Ibid. 229

1
Candidate no: 20339

ultimately more peaceful pattern of international relations3.” However, the Nixon

administration’s Vietnam policy, forged “between the hammer of antiwar pressure and the

anvil of Hanoi4” constantly “ran the risk of falling between two stools.5”

In Kissinger’s telling of the story, the better part of 1969 was consumed by trying to square

the inherited dilemmas with the realities on ground 6. His preferred course of policy would

have been a practical application of carrots and sticks in Vietnam: US concessions and

conciliatory proposals for de-escalation to be backed up by the threat of military resolve 7.

Since the communists had no military means to defeat the United States on the ground, he

reasoned that the way out of Vietnam was making “the continuation of the war seem less

attractive to Hanoi than a settlement8.” He outlined his views in early January in Foreign

Affairs, pressing that US war aims need to be geared to the negotiation strategy 9. However,

in White House Years he writes, although Nixon and him would make multiple overture

attempts to Hanoi, they did not find reciprocity, but uncompromising ultimatums and military

escalation from the NLF and the DRVN. Nixon’s pre-inauguration letter proclaiming good will

was followed up by the February 22nd offensive10. The Vance mission proposal to Hanoi was

left unanswered – although he was not sure if due to Hanoi, Moscow or Soviet Ambassador

Anatoli Dobrynin11. Nixon’s 8 point peace plan – responding to Hanoi’s 10 point

“comprehensive peace plan” – was turned down straight out of hand. Nixon’s personal letter

to Ho Chi Minh and the August 4 th Kissinger-Thuy meeting in Paris was followed by the

August 11th communist offensive12, and no substantial progress was achieved in Paris, other

than the establishment of the North Vietnamese backchannel 13. In short, the North

3
Ibid. 228
4
Ibid. 261
5
Ibid. 265
6
Ibid.
7
Ibid.
8
Ibid. 262
9
Kissinger 1969
10
Kissinger 1979
11
Ibid.
12
Command History 1969 187
13
Kissinger 1979

2
Candidate no: 20339

Vietnamese refused to engage in substantive negotiations, and stuck to their guns all along

1969.

This, however disappointing to Kissinger, was not entirely unexpected. Although entering the

White House, the Nixon administration anticipated a DRVN that was ready to engage in

substantive negotiations – I must add with some merit, after all the parties were already at

the table in Paris – according to Kissinger’s memoirs they were aware, that only if military

tactics were geared to negotiation goals could they achieve a breakthrough14. Negotiating

from a position of strength, using the principle of excess power in order to move the stalled

negotiations and the use of superior US military capabilities to pressure the DRVN into

negotiations were referred to routinely by Kissinger15.

Nonetheless, Kissinger points out, that due to the domestic public pressures, the dove’s ‘self-

hatred’ and the democrats political gambit to rebrand the war as Nixon’s own, the president’s

manoeuvring room was significantly curtailed in Vietnam16. US resolve and Nixon’s firm

support for RVN could not be demonstrated overtly, and they were forced to rely on secret

operations17. This, according to Kissinger, necessary secrecy then also sparked its own

controversies, due to the unavoidable press leaks and the administration’s commitment to

defend the covert nature of their policies 18. Their attempts to ensure domestic outcry not

undercutting successful Vietnam policy, Kissinger wrote, that they engaged in what at the

time he understood as standard procedures, wiretapping many of his own aides 19.

Furthermore, the regular diplomatic threats made over the summer and early autumn through

various channels to Hanoi and Moscow, that radical escalation would follow a failure to

achieve rapid negotiated settlement by November, were not backed up by the decisive

knock-out blow, Kissinger hoped he can orchestrate – although this in part he claims was

14
Ibid.
15
Ibid.
16
Ibid.
17
Ibid.
18
Ibid.
19
Ibid.

3
Candidate no: 20339

due to his own conclusions that such was impossible at the time 20. Finally, the public

pressures pushed first and foremost Rogers, the resulting Congressional pressures Laird,

and the combined effects President Nixon too towards a premature unilateral de-escalation,

endangering allowing North Vietnam to simply “sit and wait out” the US troops leaving21.

In his telling of the events concerning Vietnam in 1969, Kissinger attempts to distance policy

failures from his person, to establish his and Nixon’s reputation as a negotiators – opposed

to a Cold Warrior image, and to take control of the historical narrative around Vietnamization,

Camboida and the wiretappings – levied against him by prior works of Shawcross, his own

interview with the Kalb brothers and public discourse. However, he as often, achieves this

while he omits key elements of the story. He fails to mention his treatment of his staff, and

the resulting resignations, and paints his tendencies for picking fights with his colleagues in a

very generous light He forgets about his biggest instances of his failures, such as his defeat

against Laird over Vietnamization and Duck Hook, or the Dobrynin backchannel ‘s futility

over finding a way out of Vietnam. Last and may be most importantly, he ignores evidence

that would incriminate him in the strongest charges brought against him, such as evidence

cited by Shawcross over Cambodia. Furthermore, he leaves out the RAND corporation study

in its entirety, outlining policy options for Nixon with regards to Vietnam and describing

Vietnamization and escalation at the two maxims, not as a set of interconnected policy.

Finally, Kissinger also significantly misinterprets or misrepresents situations, for example in

his defence of the Cambodian bombings.

Kissinger’s chapter gains its significance in two ways. On the one hand, by sticking to his

narrative over Cambodia, he incited rather then settled the controversy. On the other hand it

supports the argument, that the better part of 1969 was taken up by road searching 22. It

20
Ibid.
21
Ibid.
22
Casey 2014

4
Candidate no: 20339

serves with a detailed outline, putting between question marks those like Birgham 23, arguing

that essentially the Nixon administration set out on a path of de-escalation, that necessitated

further escalation and a race with time before all the negotiating means are withdrawn.

Furthermore, it also provides with important details that raise question regarding the point of

those like Dallek24 and Kimball25, arguing that the chief policy goal of the Nixon administration

was escalation, whose failure produced Vietnamization and de-escalation. In the final

analysis, the Nixon administration was largely searching for a way out of Vietnam in 1969,

trying different approaches at the same time, from escalatory threats, to Vietnamization,

often advocated by rival factions.

Kissinger’s chapter is most convincing in presenting a detailed picture of the process, how

the Nixon administration settled for the policy of Vietnamization during 1969. In 1974, based

on an interview with Kissinger himself, Marvin and Bernard Kalb wrote, that “Even before his

inauguration he [Nixon] had decided to launch a program of gradual, unilateral U.S. troop

withdrawals from Vietnam26”. This approach was understandable at the time, even if not

sincere: with the 1973 Paris Peace Accords signed, but South Vietnam still standing, he

could take full credit of Vietnamization. Six years later, when Nixon had been brought down

by Watergate, Saigon by the communists and he himself by Carter’s 1976 election victory,

Kissinger must have felt less enthusiastic about taking such a credit. At the time of the policy

debates being a strong opponent of Vietnamization yet suffering his first major policy defeat

over it, Kissinger’s approach to Vietnamization is two faced all along the chapter.

Kissinger explains, that even though he, Nixon, and pretty much the whole administration

was committed to leaving Vietnam, they were diverging over how to do so. Nixon, sceptical

of the effectiveness of a negotiated settlement, “favored a policy of maximum pressure, …

23
Brigham 2018
24
Dallek 2007
25
Kimball 2004
26
Kalb and Kalb 1974, 127

5
Candidate no: 20339

until some military progress had been made27.” Only then, he thought, will Hanoi abandon its

uncompromising line. The major thrust for Vietnamization came from “Rogers and Laird…

constantly pushing for faster and faster withdrawal28” – as White House Chief of Staff

Haldeman also recorded in his diary. This is backed up by Laird’s early concern with de-

escalation showcased in his meeting with Wheeler and Kissinger on January 30 th, and

evident in Laird’s March 13th memorandum to the President, arguing that “it is essential that

we decide now to initiate the removal from Southeast Asia of some U.S. military personnel
29
.” Furthermore, Laird’s own views, cited by Isaacson, are also in line with that of Kissinger’s

1979 one: “I knew that time was running out for us because the public wasn’t going to

support the war any longer. Henry didn’t understand this30” – Laird said.

As mentioned by Laird, Kissinger himself was bitterly opposed to unilateral withdrawal.

However, he may sense his opposition behind his lines he is not too vocal about it. He settles

it with stating that “I had my doubts about Vietnamization … we had to husband our

negotiating assets31”. The thrust of his opposition is presented emphasising the negative

effects of the decision, rather than outlining his then held opinion. One reason for this may

be, as noted by Isaacson, Brigham Hanhimaki and Casey, was that the Vietnamization

debate was lost by Kissinger32. Laird successfully side-lined him, begun untying the US with

unilateral steps. Once the first hundred days of the administration elapsed and the critics

begun to make their voice heard over for example the ‘Hamburger Hill’ incident, Nixon

accepted the political necessity of Vietnamization. What is largely absent from this story is

Kissinger’s fierce opposition, that is apparent in his March 8 th memorandum to Nixon writing

that “If we now de-escalate, Hanoi will get for nothing what it has had to pay heavy, perhaps

excessive casualties to obtain: the effective neutralization of U.S. forces with respect to the

27
Kissinger 1979, 261
28
Haldeman 1994, 69
29
FRUS 2006 Document 12 and Document 38
30
Isaacson 1992, 237
31
Kissinger 1979, 262
32
Hanhimaki 2004, 42; Isaacson 1992, 237; Brigham 2018, 29; Casey 2014, 180-183;

6
Candidate no: 20339

Communist infrastructure.33”, or in Laird’s comment in Isaacson’s telling that “I felt I had to

keep pressure on Kissinger and prevent him from getting Nixon to back away 34” – certainly

not for lack of trying.

Kissinger’s attempt to take control of the narrative surrounding the Nixon administration’s

decision to bomb Cambodia is more controversial. William Shawcross publishing his book

Sideshow the same year as Kissinger did, just somewhat earlier, famously concludes the

book writing “Cambodia was not a mistake; it was a crime. 35” Kissinger fails to address

Shawcross directly, and in large part only reiterates his already known views regarding the

bombings, however the unfolding debate highlights some of the crucial questions with

regards to Cambodia. According to Kissinger, the rationale behind the bombings “was not

from a desire to expand the war” as also suggested by among others Dallek36 – “but to avoid

bombing North Vietnam and yet to blunt an unprovoked offensive 37” that the communists

initiated on February 22nd. Having inherited no contingency plans for such an offensive from

the Johnson administration and at this point being fully committed to explore the possibilities

of negotiations, the Nixon administration discussed and on March 18 eventually executed

operation BREAKFAST, strategic bombing campaign against the Central Office for South

Vietnam (COSVN) – the commanding structure of the communists – and once the precedent

has been established, between March 1969 and February 1970 against several other

sanctuaries along the Cambodian border under the code name operation MENU. Since these

territories were reported to be unpopulated according to Kissinger, occupied by enemy

forces, and consequently outside of King Sihanouk’s control, Cambodia effectively

acquiesced to the operation. Furthermore, Kissinger notes, their relations improved over the

period, and crucially no civilian death was reported by any party. Finally, Kissinger notes
33
FRUS 2006 Document 34
34
Isaacson 1992, 237
35
Shawcross 1986 396
36
Dallek 2007 117
37
Kissinger 1979, 240

7
Candidate no: 20339

without evidence, that instead of expanding their sanctuaries in Cambodia, the DRVN forces

simply returned to Vietnam38.

After a series of back and forth between Kissinger’s aide and Shawcross over the validity of

his writing, Shawcross went on to publish their debate in the 1986 edition of sideshow. One

crucial observation of his, both in the original book and in the extended edition as well, that

Kissinger’s claimed in his Memoirs that no Cambodians were living in the base areas

bombarded. This view of Kissinger appears to be based on the briefing he received from

General Abrams’s envoys on February 18th, after which according to his memoirs, he

reported this fact to Nixon39. This observation however, appears not to be true in this, general

form. Citing an April 9th 1969 Joint Chief of Staff memorandum to the Secretary of Defence,

Shawcross points out that many of the sanctuaries were in fact populated by Cambodians,

according to the JCS itself40.

The root of this controversy can be found in Kissinger’s approach to the distinction between

operation BREAKFAST – the initial March 18th strike – and the larger MENU operation in general,

lasting from March 18th 1969 until February 1970. According to his own memo to Nixon, on

March 18th, Kissinger only received briefing on General Abrams’s planned strike against the

suspected location of COSVN41 – that is base area 353, the target area of BREAKFAST

emphasised by himself in his memoirs to be meant as a single occurrence. However, it was

followed by a few more operations during the spring and the summer of 1969, only to

escalate dramatically during the autumn of 1969, all the way into 1970, combined constituting

operation MENU – as Laird’s March 1970 memorandum to Nixon summarized 42. Unfortunately

no alternative records of Kissinger’s February 18 th discussion were found to date, however

given that he makes no reference of other base areas, and in fact the topic of the discussion

was the bombing of COSVN, it seems reasonable to expect that the civilian population of the
38
Kissinger 1979, 239-254
39
Kissinger 1979, 242
40
Shawcross 1986 28
41
FRUS 2006 Document 22
42
Memo, Laird for Nixon, 23 Mar 1970

8
Candidate no: 20339

other base areas were not subject to discussion on that particular occasion. However, in this

case, Kissinger’s claims that no civilians were living in the target areas, and that no

casualties were reported by Cambodians over the summer from the MENU bombings is a

mere fig leaf to the dramatic escalation of the bombing campaign over the autumn, and the

invasion a year later.

Finally, Kissinger’s bid for the intellectual foreign policy tsar legacy also required his flaws

and failures to be reduced or omitted from the Nixon administration’s Vietnam policy

analysis. One of the immediate fall-out of the secrecy of the Cambodian bombings was the

result of the New York Times publishing an article May 9 th about the March 18th and April 17th

bombing runs. However, its effects were not in the public, but within the White House.

Although Kissinger takes mention of the wiretapping of his own staff, only to the extent, that

he shifts blame on FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover for recommending the action, and

establishes his clear conscious that his primary goal was to ensure the success of the

administration’s Vietnam policy43. What he does not mention here, is that the resulting

wiretapping program would lead to 17 individuals – many of Kissinger’s own staff – being

tapped between 1969 and 1971. Although Kissinger tries to take a passive role in the

process, it is difficult to deny his active participation. Haldeman records in his diary on June 3

following yet another leak, that Kissinger “set up detailed plan for tapping all suspects 44”. He

was responsible for supplying Hoover with names, and received the FBI extracts, and at

least on occasions used the information he gained this way to advance his own standing in

his struggles within the administration, for example by putting a tap on Laird’s military

assistant, Colonel Robert Pursley among others, indirectly taping Laird as well45.

43
Kissinger 1979, 252-253
44
Haldeman 1994, 62
45
Isaacson 1992, 212-216; Dallek 2007, 123-125

9
Candidate no: 20339

Furthermore, Kissinger’s constant elbowing within the administration also went largely

unnoticed within his memoirs. As already mentioned, he shied away from admitting a defeat

against Laird, and instead choose to put the blame of Vietnamization on him. In a similar

fashion, he also shies away from the effects of back-channel diplomacy on his personal

competition with secretary of State Rogers. What is more, the Soviet backchannel receives

astonishingly little attention in this chapter, even if Soviet cooperation in settling the Vietnam

war in exchange for détente in other regions was a crucial aspect of Nixon’s and Kissinger’s

foreign policy – even according to Kissinger, a few chapters earlier. The crucial problem was,

that his Linkage approach, as Hanhimaki points out on multiple occasions, was flawed,

“unable to break with some of the persistent paradigms of the Cold War 46.” Consequently,

Kissinger simply largely left out the Dobrynin line from his description of the first year of

Vietnam policies, choosing to return to it later, when he could show successes.

Kissinger’s infighter approach to government, also left its marks on his treatment of his team.

His insecurities led him to an often denigrating treatment of his own staff, fuelled by his own

elbowing tendencies and signified by their wiretappings. This in turn led to more than a third

of his staff resigning by the end of September 1969. 47 Kissinger goes an 85 pages long way,

to shift the blame for failing to exit Vietnam in a matter of months. Nonetheless, one has to

ask the question, how much his personal operating style contributed to that. It is clear, that

the North Vietnamese were not ready to settle for a negotiated outcome in 1969 48. However,

Kissinger and his staff were unable to come up with alternatives. Most of the State and

Defence Departments being cut out from policy making however, this should be hardly

surprising. A telling example of Kissinger’s operative style is Duck Hook, a military planning

initiated in September, in order to deliver decisive blow to the DRVN, that would force them

to substantial negotiations. After a month of planning, in his memoirs, Kissinger claims that

he “concluded that no quick and ‘decisive’ military action seemed attainable 49” – what he fails
46
Hanhimaki 2004, xviii, Hanhimaki 2008, 40
47
Isaacson 1992, 188
48
Nguyen 2008, 190
49
Kissinger 1979, 285

10
Candidate no: 20339

to admit, is that this fact was drawn up against his plan by his aides after Rogers and Laird

learnt about the hitherto secret planning process and put their weight against the project 50.

One may only speculate the extent to which administration resources were wasted, and the

possible effects of a more cooperative team over policy.

All in all, Kissinger’s writing is a monumental and important element of the Nixon

administration Vietnam policy-making literature. Nonetheless, by virtue of it being a

biography, it is considerably one sided. In attempting to explain, why the Nixon administration

failed to quit the Vietnam war during 1969, Kissinger ends up putting the blame on his

political rivals, Rogers and Laird, the general US public opinion, the DRVN, and anyone he

may find. Doing so, he provides important details towards understanding the story of

Vietnamization. However, he also denies personal responsibility over the process, while

clearly furthers the controversy over his role in the Cambodian bombings.

50
Nguyen 2008, 191

11
Candidate no: 20339

Bibliography:

1. Casey, S. (2014). When soldiers fall : How Americans have confronted combat
losses from World War I to Afghanistan. Oxford. Oxford University Press.
2. Command History. 1969. Volume 1, (San Francisco 1969).
https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a955260.pdf [accessed: 03.09.]
3. Brigham, R. (2018). Reckless : Henry Kissinger and the tragedy of Vietnam (First
ed.). New York. Public Affairs.
4. Dallek, R. (2008). Nixon and Kissinger : Partners in power. London: Penguin.
5. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume VI, Vietnam, January
1969–July 1970. Eds. Edward C. Keefer, Carolyn Yee. (Washington 2006)
6. Haldeman, H. (1994). The Haldeman diaries : Inside the Nixon White House. New
York: G.P. Putnam's.
7. Hanhimäki, J. (2008). “An Elusive Grand Design”. in. Logevall, F., Preston, Andrew, &
ProQuest , issuing body. (2008). Nixon in the world : American foreign relations,
1969-1977. Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press.
8. Hanhimäki, J. (2004). The flawed architect : Henry Kissinger and American foreign
policy. Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press.
9. Herring, G. (2002). America's longest war : The United States and Vietnam, 1950-
1975 (4th ed.). Boston, London: McGraw-Hill.
10. Isaacson, W. (1992). Kissinger : A biography. London: Faber & Faber.
11. Kalb, M., & Kalb, Bernard. (1974). Kissinger. London: Hutchinson.
12. Kimball, J. (2004). The Vietnam War files : Uncovering the secret history of Nixon-era
strategy (Modern war studies). Lawrence, Kan.: University Press of Kansas.
13. Kissinger, H. (1969). American foreign policy : Three essays. London. 79-135
14. Kissinger, H. (1979). The White House years. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson :
Joseph.
15. Nguyen, L. H. T. (2008). “Waging War on All Fronts: Nixon, Kissinger and the
Vietnam War”. in. Logevall, F., Preston, Andrew, & ProQuest , issuing body. (2008).
Nixon in the world : American foreign relations, 1969-1977. Oxford ; New York:
Oxford University Press.
16. Secretaries Of Defense Historical Series, Volume VII, Melvin Laird and the
Foundation of the Post-Vietnam Military 1969–1973, Documentary Supplement, Eds.
Richard A. Hunt (Washington, D.C. 2016)
17. Shawcross, W. (1986). Sideshow : Kissinger, Nixon and the destruction of Cambodia
(2nd ed New ed.). London: Hogarth.

12