Policy Analysis in Israel

International Library
of Policy Analysis
Iris Geva-May & Michael Howlett
Policy analysis in
Israel
Edited by
Gila Menahem and Amos Zehavi
POLICY ANALYSIS
IN ISRAEL
International Library of
Policy Analysis
Series editors: Iris Geva-May and Michael Howlett,
Simon Fraser University, Canada
This major new series brings together for the first time a detailed
examination of the theory and practice of policy analysis systems
at different levels of government and by non-governmental actors
in a specific country. It therefore provides a key addition to
research and teaching in comparative policy analysis and policy
studies more generally.
Each volume includes a history of the country’s policy analysis which

offers a broad comparative overview with other countries as well as
the country in question. In doing so, the books in the series provide
the data and empirical case studies essential for instruction and for
further research in the area. They also include expert analysis of
different approaches to policy analysis and an assessment of their
evolution and operation.
Early volumes in the series will cover the following countries:

Australia • Brazil • China • France • Germany • India • Israel •
Netherlands • New Zealand • Norway • Russia •
South Africa • Taiwan • UK • USA
and will build into an essential library of key reference works. The
series will be of interest to academics and students in public policy,
public administration and management, comparative politics and
government, public organisations and individual policy areas.
It will also interest people working in the countries in question
and internationally.
In association with the ICPA-Forum and Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis.

See more at http://goo.gl/raJUX
POLICY ANALYSIS
IN ISRAEL
Edited by Gila Menahem and Amos Zehavi
International Library of Policy Analysis, Vol 7

First published in Great Britain in 2016 by
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Contents
List of figures and tables vii

Notes on the contributors viii
Foreword Lessons from Israel’s experience xi
Yehezkel Dror
Introduction Policy analysis in Israel: a late developer’s story 1

Amos Zehavi and Gila Menahem
Part One: The styles and methods of public policy analysis in Israel
One Policy analysis under intense pressures 21
Ira Sharkansky
Two Policy analysis evolution in Israel: building administrative 37
capabilities
Jennifer Oser and Itzhak Galnoor
Part Two: Policy analysis by the executive and the legislature

Three Policy analysis in Israel’s central government: latest 55
developments and challenges ahead
Gal Alon
Four Local government and the challenge of policy analysis 71
Nahum Ben-Elia
Five Policy analysis and the legislature 93
Shirley Avrami
Six The making of disability policy in Israel: ad hoc advisory 109
expert panels
Arie Rimmerman and Michal Soffer
Part Three: Policy analysis in specific government units

Seven Policy analysis in the treasury: how does the Israeli Ministry 123
of Finance arrive at a policy decision?
Momi Dahan
Eight Policy analysis at the Bank of Israel 141
Karnit Flug
Part Four: Policy analysis from the outside

Nine Insiders within? The third sector and policy analysis in Israel 155
Hagai Katz
Ten Policy analysis education in graduate programmes in Israel 171
Iris Geva-May and Anat Gofen
Index 197
v
List of figures and tables
Figures
0.1 Number of policy studies, Ministry of the Economy 4
3.1 Policy units and councils in the Prime Minister’s Office in 2012 59
3.2 Outputs of policy units in ministries today 61
3.3 Number of policy units in ministries 2006–14 61
Tables
2.1 Public sector organisations in Israel 39
6.1 General guidelines for the revised SMW assessment process: expert 113
committee suggestions and MOITAL’s response
vii
Policy analysis in Israel
Notes on the contributors
Gal Alon is a former advisor at the Israeli Prime Minister’s Office. Currently, he
is the chief executive officer of Insights.US, a start-up company that develops a
decision-making tool to enable governments gather policy advice directly from
their stakeholders.
Shirley Avrami is the head of the Israeli Parliament (Knesset) Research and
Information Center and lectures in the Department of Political Science at the
Hebrew University of Jerusalem. She is a former professional advisor to ministers
of Labor and Welfare, and director of the parliamentary committee of Labor,
Social Affairs and Health. Dr Avrami has published many papers in peer-reviewed
journals and two books.
Nahum Ben-Elia is an independent policy analyst and strategic planner focused

on local government policies and local development. He served as director of
Evaluation, Social Policy Group, Prime Minister’s Office (Jerusalem). For more
than three decades he has provided policy analysis and strategic advice to key public
institutions as well as civil society NGOs. As a senior researcher at the Florseheimer
Institute for Policy Studies he has produced a wide range set of studies on
central–local governance and alternative visions for Israeli local government.
He has contributed to professional publications and authored Strategic Changes
and Organizational Reorientations in Local Government (1996, Macmillan) and The
Fourth Generation: Towards a New Local Government in Israel (2006, in Hebrew).
Momi Dahan has been a faculty member in School of Public Policy at the
Hebrew University and a senior research fellow at the Israel Democracy Institute
since 2002. Previously Professor Dahan was a chief economist in the Bank of
Israel (1989–99), a senior advisor in the Ministry of Finance (1999–2001) and an
economic advisor in both the IMF and the Inter-American Development Bank
(1997–99). He has also served on several public committees and has published
four books and various papers in leading scientific journals.
Yehezkel Dror is a professor emeritus of political science and the Wolfson Chair
of Public Administration at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. In 2005 he
received the Israel Prize for advancing the theory and practice of policy planning.
Professor Dror served in the following capacities: president of the Policy Studies
Organization; senior staff member of the RAND Corporation; senior policy
planning and analysis advisor for the Israeli Minister of Defense; advisor to Israeli
Prime Ministers; advisor to the UN, UNDP and OECD; international consultant
on policy planning and statecraft; guest professor at different universities and fellow
at centres for advanced studies, in the US, Europe and Asia. He is the author of
viii
Notes on the contributors
15 books published in 12 languages, most recently Avant-Garde Politician: Leaders

for a New Epoch (2014, Westphalia Press).
Karnit Flug is the governor of the Bank of Israel. In 1984 she joined the IMF
as an economist before returning to Israel in 1988 and joining the Research
Department of the Bank of Israel, where she worked and published papers on
topics including macroeconomics, the labour market and social policies. In 1994–
96, while on leave from the Bank of Israel, Dr Flug worked at the Inter-American
Development Bank as a senior research economist. In 1997, on returning to the
Bank of Israel, she was appointed deputy director of the Research Department,
and in June 2001 was appointed director and a member of the Bank’s senior
management – a position she held for 10 years.
Itzhak Galnoor is the Herbert Samuel Professor of Political Science (emeritus)

at Hebrew University of Jerusalem and a senior fellow at the Van Leer Jerusalem
Institute.
Iris Geva-May is a professor of public policy at the School of Public Affairs,

Baruch College of the City University of New York, and Simon Fraser University,
Vancouver, Canada. She is the founding editor-in-chief of the Journal of
Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice, which has pioneered the field of
comparative public policy since 1997, and founding president of the International
Comparative Policy Analysis Forum.
Anat Gofen is an assistant professor in the School of Public Policy at Hebrew

University of Jerusalem. Her main research interest is outliers in the nexus of
policy change and social change, with emphasis on the interrelationship between
citizens, government and policy implementation. Current research projects
include citizens’ policy non-compliance and its implications, the motivations
for policy non-compliance among street-level bureaucrats and the educational
breakthrough of first-generation higher-education students.
Hagai Katz is a lecturer in the Department of Business Administration at the

Ben-Gurion University of the Negev. Since 1996 Dr Katz has researched Israeli
philanthropy, third sector and civil society and global civil society, and has
published numerous books, reports and articles on these topics. Previously, he
directed the Israeli Center for Third Sector Research and chaired the Nonprofit
Management MA programme. He is a board member and treasurer of the
International Society for Third Sector Research.
Gila Menahem is an emerita professor at Tel Aviv University, and held a joint
position in the Department of Public Policy and the Department of Sociology
and Anthropology. She has written on the processes of policy formulation, policy
paradigms and policy networks in the domains of water, higher education and
ix
urban policy. Her current research project deals with collaborative governance
and metagovernance. She has co-edited a book titled Public Policy in Israel (2002,
Frank Cass) and is the co-editor of three volumes of Tel-Aviv–Yafo Studies: Social
Processes and Public Policy (2005, Tel Aviv University).
Jennifer Oser is an assistant professor in the Department of Politics and

Government at Ben-Gurion University of the Negev.
Arie Rimmerman is Richard Crossman Professor of Social Welfare and Planning

at School of Social Work, Social Welfare and Health Sciences, University of Haifa.
He is the author of two recent books published by Cambridge University Press:
Social Inclusion of Persons with Disabilities: National and International Perspectives
(2013) and Family Policy and Disabilities (2015).
Ira Sharkansky is professor emeritus of political science and public administration

at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. He has written on topics of public policy,
religion and politics, policy making in Israel and the United States.
Michal Soffer is a senior lecturer at the School of Social Work at University of

Haifa, Israel. Her main research interests are stigma toward disability and illness
as reflected in policies and social structures and processes. She has co-authored a
book on women inmates in Israel and published papers on illness-related stigma,
mediated images of illness and disabilities, women inmates, and disability-related
policies.
Amos Zehavi is a senior lecturer with a joint appointment in the Department

of Political Science and the Department of Public Policy at Tel Aviv University.
His main areas of interest are comparative social policy, the political implications
of privatisation, policy analysis, innovation policy and mechanisms of institutional
change. He has recently published in Comparative Politics, Comparative Political
Studies, Administration & Society, Research Policy, Regulation & Governance, and
Social Policy and Administration.
x
Notes on contributors
FOREWORD
Lessons from
Israel’s experience
Yehezkel Dror
Thought experiment
In 1897 the First Zionist Congress in Basel adopted the programme to ‘establish
a home for the Jewish people in Eretz Israel secured under public law’. It took
only 51 years for this dream to be realised with the establishment of the State
of Israel in 1948 on the basis of a decision by the United Nations Organisation.
And it took less than 50 years for Israel to become a thriving ‘revolutionary state’
(Adelman, 2008), despite a continuing deep conflict with parts of the Arab world
and some serious domestic problems (Shavit, 2013).
Zionism and the State of Israel are an extreme case of deliberate efforts to
radically change a trajectory of history, which can serve as a test case of the
potential and limits of present mainstream policy analysis to help political leaders
and other future-affecting decision makers to influence significantly alternative
futures.
In this volume many interesting findings on policy analysis in Israel are presented.
To add another perspective and to pose a challenge to the global community of
policy analysts, in this foreword I claim that Israeli is a success story mainly without
the benefit of policy analysis. Israel’s success could be attributed, at least in part, to
not relying on ‘normal’ policy analysis in some of its most critical choices, which
required leaping to higher states of being rather than optimising prevailing ones.
This leads to a double lesson from the experience of Israel (and some other newly
created countries, such as Singapore): (1) To significantly assist political leaders in
shaping crucial aspects of the future for the better, policy analysis must undergo a
quantum jump to what I call ‘grand-policy professionalism’; (2) even given such
professionalism, many fundamental policy choices depend largely on the quality
of political leadership, culture, social negotiation and historic processes rather than
on deliberate pondering – with ‘judgement‘ (Vickers, [1965] 1995), ‘intuition’
(Duggan, 2013; Klein, 2013) and creativity (Joas,1996; Csikszentmihalyi, [1996]
2013) playing a crucial but not well understood part.
To set the stage let us engage in a thought experiment: assume that in 1897
the emerging Zionist movement had a top-quality policy analysis unit equipped
with all knowledge available in 2014 and asked for its opinion on the chances of
establishing in the twentieth century a viable Jewish State in the Promised Land,
which at that time was a part of the Ottoman Empire. Surely, the professional
xi
opinion would have been that this was a pipe dream and that the Zionist
organisation had better concentrate on improving the situation of Jews in the
Diaspora, building on increasing legal acceptance of Jews as equal citizens in
enlightened parts of Western Europe, such as Germany.
To add a concrete example: on 12 May 1948 the provisional governing body
of the Jewish community in Palestine (Minhelet HaAm) convened to vote on
declaring independence. The choice was between an American proposal for a
truce or a declaration of independence. Put to a vote, six of the ten members
present supported the declaration of independence. It was the personal judgement
of David Ben Gurion which carried the day against very strong opposition. A
good mainstream policy analysis staff would probably have taken into account the
quantitative military balance, which looked very bad, and preferred the seemingly
more prudent option of accepting a truce, which easily could have prevented the
establishment of the State of Israel.
These are fateful cases, but comparable limitations of mainstream policy analysis
apply to some types of lesser choices. Thus, building the Hadassah Medical
Center’s high-tech, luxurious and very expensive Sarah Wetsman Davidson
Hospital Tower inpatient facility, which opened in 2012, nearly bankrupted
the Hadassah hospital, despite being largely financed by the American Jewish
Hadassah organisation. No mainstream policy analysis unit would have approved
building it. But the Tower will for many years to come increase the welfare
of patients, while the financial problems will be overcome within a couple of
years. Entrepreneurial risk-taking thus fits some important projects better than
mainstream policy analysis, and has played a large role in making Israel into a
striking success in many respects.
The emerging proposition is that mainstream policy analysis (as well represented
by Dunn, 2011; summed up in Fischer and Miller, 2006; with broader perspectives
presented in Moran et al, 2008, and different ones in Dewar, 2002), can be
very helpful for limited and relatively incremental choices, but not for history-
changing endeavours, such as the Zionist attempt to bring about a total break
in the history of the exiled Jewish people and build a uniquely Jewish state in
its ancient homeland.
This proposition does not imply that mainstream policy analysis could not
have contributed much to the quality of life in Israel if used well within chosen
domains, such as national transportation planning and some aspects of public
health policy. But gaining a good understanding of the limits of contemporary
mainstream policy analysis is becoming increasingly necessary as humanity as
a whole is rushing into a metamorphosis which poses serious and also fateful
dangers together with unprecedented opportunities. Coping successfully with such
circumstances requires a novel type of ‘grand-policy professionalism’, together
with much improved political leadership (Dror, 2014).
xii
Foreword
Personal knowledge based

I focus on policy analysis at the highest echelons of Israeli government, where the
most critical choices are made. But it is difficult to write such a history, especially
in Israel. Much of it is not documented and most of the salient information is
classified.
Some empirical basis is provided by publications of the State Comptroller
and by public versions of reports of various committees of inquiry, such as the
Agranat Commission investigating the Day of Atonement War and the Report
of the Committee of Investigation of the Second Lebanon War (the Winograd
Committee, of which I was a member). Also, an increasing number of books
based on a mixture of personal knowledge and internal documents approved for
publication is available (for example, Dror, 1995; Dror, 2011; Freilich, 2012). But
movement between highlevel positions in government and academia is unusual
in Israel, adding to the scarcity of writings providing reliable information on
high-level decision making and the role of policy analysis in it.
Therefore this foreword takes the form of an essay largely based on many years
of my personal involvement in the advancement and application of upgraded
versions of policy analysis at the highest levels of Israel’s government. I enjoyed
access to relevant material and opportunities to observe the ‘corridors of power’
in action, receiving, after some time, clearance for selective publications based
on these observations (for example, Dror, 1995 and some books in Hebrew,
which I do not cite).
Select episodes
A few instances from the history of policy analysis in Israel and its uses and non-
uses will provide some empirical basis for the proposed history and conclusions.
German reparations
In the 1960s Germany paid large reparations to Israel for the millions of Jews
killed by Nazi Germany (the Shoah) and for lost Jewish property. Israel used these
payments rapidly, without paying much attention to optimising their utilisation.
This was also the case with later large supplementary payments. In a personal
conversation, the Minister of Finance of Israel explained to me that, given
limited time, span of attention and staff, he had a choice between concentrating
on getting more money for Israel or trying to optimise its uses, and he chose the
former. All in all, this was a good decision given the conditions at that time, all
the more so as there were reasons for expecting payments to be terminated early.
xiii
Setting up a National Policy Institute, training policy and budget analysts, and
establishing policy analysis units in main ministries
Before 1967, Prime Minister Levi Eshkol publicly approved establishment of

a National Policy Institute, operating as a kind of small-scale Israeli RAND
Corporation. A government decision approved setting up policy and budget
analysis staff units in main ministries. In addition, a residential six-week course
on policy analysis methods, with high quality participants and lecturers, including
senior RAND Corporation staff, was held in Jerusalem.
Then came the Six Day War and all these initiatives were aborted. When I
asked top political leaders privately why they lost interest in using policy analysis
for improving critical choices, their answer was frank and striking: ‘Look at our
tremendous successes in the Six Day War, without benefit of professional policy
analysis. So what do we need it for?’
University public policy schools
Nevertheless some senior officials in the Ministry of Finance recognised the need
to prepare policy analysis professionals for high-level governmental staffs. Citing
the examples of Harvard University and the University of California at Berkeley,
circa 1968, they offered a main Israeli university a large budget for setting up
a professional public policy school. Without much deliberation this offer was
rejected with disdain, as ‘not fitting an academic university’. Only years later were
a number of public policy programmes and schools set up, as discussed below.
Planning division in the General Staff of the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF)
It was proposed several times to add to the IDF General Staff a division for
strategic planning based in part on modern policy analysis, but nothing was done.
Only after the debacle of the Day of Atonement war was a planning department,
which soon became a full scale planning division, set up. With time it became a
main locus of professional strategic planning. Little is publicly known about its
operation and impact, but I can testify that it made significant contributions to
Israeli national security.
National Security Staff
In 1999, after long debates and after experimenting with a small unit in the Prime
Minister’s Office, a National Security Council was formally set up to serve as a staff
unit for the Prime Minister and the Cabinet. However, it suffered from numerous
problems, including resistance by nearly all the defence establishment, lack of
access to many relevant documents, inadequate resources, exclusion from some
of the most important issues and a location far from the centre of government
in Jerusalem. Consequently it exerted only limited influence.
xiv
Foreword
After serious failures of the top political echelon in directing the Second Lebanon
War and following strong recommendations of the Winograd Committee, in
2008 the Knesset (as the Israeli parliament is called) finally passed the National
Security Staff Law, which conferred on the renamed National Security Staff broad
functions and much authority. The National Security Staff received relatively
large resources and enlarged and diversified its staff. In contrast to the past, it
now prepares governmental meetings, participates in many forums, has full access
to salient material and has been moved to the main government buildings in
Jerusalem. Its head, who also serves as National Security Advisor to the Prime
Minister, has a room in the inner sanctum of the Prime Minister’s Private Office.
Details of the work of the National Security Staff are not published, but some of
its heads were high-quality strategists; its staff includes qualified strategic planners
and policy analysis professionals; and attention is dedicated to methodology.
Despite continuous disputes about its function and its relations with very powerful
defence and less powerful foreign affairs bodies, it exerts significant influence on
important issues, including Prime Ministerial decisions and government and its
political–security committee deliberations.
Following these developments, the Ministry of Defense set up a Security-
External Relations Divisions, the Foreign Ministry set up a planning unit, and
various other security bodies set up comparable staffs, illustrating the dynamics
of defensively establishing ‘counterpart units’ so as to reduce dependence on the
central National Security Staff while cooperating with it more or less, depending
on circumstances. Together, they add up to an impressive network of professional
policy staffs contributing to strategic planning and policy analysis on national
security, in the broad sense of that term.
Details are not published, but it is clear that these units do make a positive
contribution, based in part on policy analysis professionalism. However, some very
significant statecraft choices are not subjected to deep policy analysis; grand-policy
professionalism is probably underdeveloped; and the staff units are undoubtedly
constrained in their work by political–ideological directives.
Public policy teaching
As mentioned, Israeli academia was late in setting up a public policy programme.

After one university did so in 2002, following a period of dithering, most others
followed, however. As a result there are a number of such programmes, some taking
the form of separate schools. Some are good and others are not impressive, but
all share at least one serious weakness, namely scarcity of teachers who combine
advanced academic qualifications with personal experience in government. Also,
thus far, few teachers have studied at elite public policy schools abroad, though
their number is slowly increasing.
As a result, the supply of well-trained policy analysts is inadequate, all the more
so as very few immigrants are qualified in this domain.
xv
Think tanks
Over the years, a number of think tanks have been established, but only a few of
them have a critical mass of full-time professionals engaging in policy-directed
study of major issues. As an example, which also brings out some of Israel’s unique
features, I will briefly discuss the Jewish People Policy Institute (JPPI). (For due
disclosure, I should mention that I served for six years as its founding president.)
JPPI (initially JPPPI – Jewish People Policy Planning Institute) was established
in March 2002 by an innovative Chairman of the Jewish Agency for Israel, as an
independent think tank. ‘The mission of the Institute is to ensure the thriving of
the Jewish People and the Jewish civilization by engaging in professional strategic
thinking and planning on issues of primary concern to world Jewry.’ (http://jppi.
org.il/links_for_header/alias-7/About_JPPI/, accessed November 30, 2015).
Having a full-time and part-time staff of about 15 to 20 professionals, with a
hard core of permanent ones and a number of temporary ones with qualifications
fitting changing work subjects, it prepares policy-directed studies of primary
domestic and geo-strategic issues facing the Jewish people and relevant aspects
of the State of Israel, including annual assessments presented periodically to the
Israeli government and Jewish organisations worldwide.
Major domains of work, which also illustrate the inadequacy of mainstream
policy analysis for JPPI’s mission, are best exemplified by a book-length study of
main theories on the rise and decline of civilisations and states and their application
to the Jewish People, trying to identify critical factors shaping its future (Wald,
2013). While some policy analysis methods, such as mapping possible scenarios,
are relevant, pondering in terms of rise and decline is far beyond contemporary
mainstream policy analysis. Nevertheless, such a broad approach is critical for the
design and evaluation of grand policies for the Jewish People.
RAND Israel Initiative
The relevance to Israeli issues of the best presently available policy analysis is
illustrated by the Rand Israel Initiative. Starting in 2009 the RAND Corporation
agreed with relevant departments of the Israeli government and some Jewish
sponsors to engage in analysis of select Israeli policy issues. Two such studies
dealt with the role of natural gas in Israel’s energy future and effective policing.
Additional studies are being considered, perhaps including some having a larger
scope. But, however important the subjects and well done the studies, available
policy analysis approaches have difficulties in trying to cope fully with overriding
issues influencing energy policy and police work, such as national security, and
with other critical features of policy making in Israel, as discussed below.
xvi
Foreword
Economic and social policy
To round out the picture, the availability of highly qualified economists must
be mentioned, including some immigrants but mainly graduates of world-class
Israeli university programmes. These economists fulfil important functions in
government and engage in high-quality economic analysis, both macro and
micro. Thus, the budget office in the Ministry of Finance and the independent
Bank of Israel are crucial in assuring a good measure of ‘economic rationality’.
Despite various socio-economic councils and similar professional bodies,
however, social policy analysis is weak and integrated economic–social policy
analysis is very scarce and of doubtful quality. These weaknesses contribute to
inadequate coping with some serious problems, such as the labour market (OECD,
2010) and housing.
Israel’s economic and social policy problems focus attention on structural
reasons associated with the difficulties of doing integrated socio-economic policy
analysis. Good theories that integrate social and economic dimensions, on which
holistic policy analysis can be based, are lacking, as are comprehensive theories
on social issues. Real cooperation between good economic policy analysts and
the few available good social policy analysts is hard to achieve. Value issues and
disagreements are very pronounced in the social policy domain, but usually
hidden in economic analysis. Many social issues are political flashpoints, as, for
example, was public housing during the 2015 Israeli Parliamentary elections,
pushing aside professional analysis.
Debates on the preference to be given to settlements in Judea and Samaria (called
by others ‘occupied territories, reflecting different language games distorting
public and also some professional discourse) versus cheaper public housing in the
centre of the country further inhibit ‘sober’ analysis, illustrating a major barrier
to policy analysis.
A general, and rigid, constraint on policy analysis is posed by Israel’s limited
autonomy as a small country with an economy that depends largely on exogenous
factors. For instance, if Israel would like to adopt some of Thomas Piketty’s
important inequality-compressing proposals (Piketty, 2014), it could not do
so because of global competition for capital, a factor that makes related policy
analysis futile.
Overall assessment
The chapters of this volume clearly show that policy analysis is increasingly used
and more professional policy analysts are available. In suitable domains increasing
reliance on mainstream policy analysis is indeed advisable. However, its usefulness
is limited to sub-issues of Israel’s overall policy problematic. In particular, as
further explained below, mainstream policy analysis cannot cope with critical
grand policy issues facing Israel, which largely condition all of the policy agenda.
xvii
Put differently, three conclusion emerge, which may look contradictory but
in reality constitute one cluster: (1) more mainstream policy analysis is needed;
but (2) much more essential is an as-yet-unavailable advanced version of grand-
policy professionalism capable of making significant contributions to the most
critical issues facing Israel which dominate its policy problematic as a whole;
however, (3) the maximum help which can potentially be provided by grand-
policy professionalism, while very important and sometimes crucial, is also
circumscribed. By their very nature critical grand-policy choices depend largely
on value judgements, partly on ‘wild’ creativity, and on outstanding political
leadership and domestic socio-historic processes, in addition to many variables
outside Israel and beyond its influence.
Comparative comment
To provide some comparative perspective, it should be noted that a number of
countries – the prime illustration being the United States – have highly developed
mainstream policy professional staff units and think tanks, dealing inter alia with
major statecraft issues, as well as outstanding public policy university schools and
programmes. Also, some individual policy advisers reach on their own the level
of grand-policy professionals. But it is not obvious that the United States’ main
policies are superior to those of other developed countries lacking its richness
of policy analysis.
Relevant is the history of McNamara and his ‘whiz kids’ at the Pentagon,
all of them outstanding thinkers and pioneers of high-quality policy analysis
(with many of whom I had the privilege to work during my two years at the
RAND Corporation). In what can be viewed as a professional and in part also
personal tragedy resulting from a combination of the inherent limitations of
much of mainstream policy analysis and a lack of adequate self-doubt by its most
outstanding practitioners, their methods produced dismal errors when applied to
the complexities of Vietnam, as admitted and deeply regretted later (McNamara,
1996).
Also germane is a survey of mine of the personal staffs of heads of governments
in about 40 countries, mainly within an OECD project, resulting in the finding
that they included very few policy analysis professionals. The reason given by
some of the more knowledgeable senior politicians and their advisors was that
although they tried to have such professionals on their staffs, they did not really
contribute to handling of vexing issues, rather causing errors; and if they did
contribute, it was a result of their intelligence and broad knowledge, not of the
use of policy analysis methods.
Barriers
Without trying to provide a comprehensive mapping of main characteristics of
policy making and its settings in Israel (as in part discussed in Sharkansky, 1997; and
xviii
Foreword
Korn, 2005), I shall describe some barriers that further explain under-utilisation
of mainstream policy analysis in most of the critical governmental choices. These
barriers will also pose hard challenges to grand-policy professionalism when
available.
State in-the-making
Establishment of the State of Israel was not the outcome of an independence

movement by an existing population, as is usually the case, but a result of much
more difficult efforts by Zionism to change the demographic composition of
Palestine by Jewish immigration, which with time created a clear majority. This
makes the establishment of Israel and its development into an extremely radical
‘intervention in history’. Many of Israel’s deep and persistent problems stem from
this unique ‘making’ of Israel.
Also very significant is the short timeline of the State of Israel, which is
minuscule compared to the 2,000 years of the Jewish people in exile without a
state. Far too little time has passed for fundamental features of Israel to crystallise
and its standing in the Middle East and in the world as a whole to stabilise. This is
demonstrated in the ongoing discourse in some circles in Europe whether ‘Israel
should have been established’ and by its existence being regarded as illegitimate
by many Arab and Islamic actors.
Furthermore, Israel does not have internationally recognised or domestically
agreed borders, either in the North or in the East. The meanings of being a ‘Jewish’
state are not clear and are hotly debated. Large and partly unpredictable waves
of immigration periodically change its demographic composition. And so on.
All these add up to Israel being a ‘state-in-the-making’, uniquely so in intensity
and scope among developed democracies, despite ongoing transformations all over
the world. The resulting situations, processes and quandaries are very different
from those for which policy analysis was developed, posing fateful challenges far
beyond the scope and even dreams of mainstream policy analysis.
Lack of statehood tradition
However successful Israel has been in rapidly building many features of a thriving
democratic state, it still lacks traditions of statecraft, machineries of government,
political ethics and other aspects of statehood. Jewish traditions as developed over
more than 2,000 years are the main cultural basis of Israel, but their proto-political
parts are based either on pre-modern tribal kingdoms or exile conditions. Jews in
the Diaspora seldom achieved high political or policy positions, so immigration
did not compensate for the lack of historic statehood experience. For instance,
there is no strong tradition of a proper division of labour between professional
civil servants or policy advisors and party politicians, resulting, together with
other factors, in excessive intervention of politicians in details of what should
be professional decisions.
xix
Also missing are institutional prerequisites for utilising policy analysis, together
with lack of a culture of politicians feeling a need for professional bases for major
decisions. Security issues are an exception, but again lack of fitting traditions
produces a different imbalance, with over-reliance of the civilian political leaders
on inputs of the defence establishment. Despite improvement in recent years, the
situation is still problematic.
Scarcity of demand for better professional policy advice and lack of knowledge
on how to utilise it, with a good mix between reliance and doubts, are serious
problems in many countries. This finding leads to the conclusion that upgrading
of salient qualities of political leaders in tandem with development of grand-policy
professionalism is essential worldwide (Dror, 2002; Dror, 2014). Such double-
track improvements are all the more essential in Israel.
Traumatic history
The traumatic history of the Jewish people, and especially the Shoah, which is
a living memory in Israel, together with the constant cycle of wars and terror
attacks alternating with waves of ‘peace hopes’, have profoundly influenced policy
thinking in Israel, creating a kind of oscillating dissonance between deep fears and
a strong sense of triumph despite all odds. This psycho-cultural feature hinders the
‘clinical detachment combined with concern’ required for good policy analysis,
especially when combined with deep value disagreements, as discussed next.
Intense value cleavages
Israel is by far the most ideological state of all modern democracies. Basic ideas
of Zionism are widely accepted as a dominant ideology. But on many cardinal
national issues there are intense value cleavages that lead to deep disagreements
and furious political clashes.
A prime example is the deep disagreements on the status of Jewish religion
and its various forms in the State, including the roles of religious commandments
and rabbinical leaders in politics and statecraft choices – making Israel in some
respects an example of ‘political theology’ in action. Overlapping with religious
issues and also including divergent security views are ferocious disagreements on
the appropriate borders of Israel and the duty to settle all of the Promised Land,
including the West Bank, as against various views on the rights of the Palestinians.
There are large domains of broad agreement, such as protecting the national
security of Israel at all costs and encouraging Jewish immigration. There are
significant issues that lack intense ideological dimensions, such as science and
technology research, aspects of water policies and choice of major weapons
systems. But on the vast majority of important issues, including education,
discourse and choice are dominated by ideologies, or at least largely shaped by
them. This national characteristic imposes strict constraints on policy analysis
and limits its relevance.
xx
Foreword
Hypothetically, value sensitivity mapping could help. But just imagine a policy
analysis document presented to the government concluding that if one believes
in a God-ordained right to all of the Promised Land then policy X is preferable,
while if one thinks that peace is morally more important, then policy Y is
preferable! No cabinet desires such analyses, nor do the minds of the vast majority
of political leaders: harsh presentation of tragic choices is seldom welcome, as it
carries both high psychological and high political costs. Instead, such situations
push towards procrastination and ad hoc compromises, for which policy analysis
posing clear choices is anathema.
Furthermore, given the generally heated ideological climate, many policy
analysts themselves adhering strongly to one or another ideology. This unavoidably
affects their work, causes some of them to act more like policy advocates than
professional analysts, and undermines the credibility of policy analysis as a whole.
Demographic transformation
In a speech on 7 June 2015, the President of Israel put on the public agenda
information familiar to professionals, but suppressed in most political and policy
discussion as too disturbing: the demographic composition of Israel is changing
radically and inexorably, with the proportion of religious and ultraorthodox
Jews and Arab-Muslim citizens increasing and the proportion of secular Jews
decreasing. The only possible mitigation of this trend is the low probability, but
not impossible, contingency of new waves of Jewish secular immigration.
Such a radical demographic change, together with generational transitions, will
relatively rapidly reshape most features of Israel. But professionals hardly study
the subject seriously, because its implications are not only ‘politically incorrect‘
but also ‘taboo‘ in that they conflict with contemporary images and values.
However, this denial of emerging reality leads policies into a black hole. Even if
grand-policy analysis can help only in part, it could help break the taboo. This
task is beyond present mainstream policy analysis even at its best.
Vicious coalition politics
Israel’s cabinet-parliamentary political system is slowly evolving towards prime

ministerial government, with the Prime Minister having a preponderance of
constitutional authority and a growing policy staff. But given the policy realities
discussed above together with the absence of a dominant party and the consequent
need for heterogeneous coalitions, keeping a coalition government intact requires
leaving departmental policies largely to the discretion of individual ministers.
These circumstances inhibit holistic policies, lead to short time horizons, result
in bad policy compromises and often make dithering on critical but divisive issues
politically convenient and sometimes essential, even when involving high costs.
Furthermore, political marketing becomes a prime consideration, inter-party as
well as intra-party; and rapid turnover of ministers and top civil servants hinders
xxi
long-term policy consistency. All these make policy analysis often irrelevant, with
politicking occupying the main stage.
These problems are well recognised. In private conversations all former and
acting Prime Ministers agree that a quasi-presidential regime would enable
Israel to make much better decisions on critical issues. But, quite naturally, most
politicians, lobbying groups and other stakeholders resist a regime change which
would weaken their bargaining power.
Overall statecraft culture
As Aristotle recognised, one should pursue exactness only to the extent that the
subject matter allows. He dealt with ethics (Aristotle, 1985, book I, chapters
3–4), but this rule fully applies to culture, as recognised by modern writings on
political culture (Welch, 2013). Accordingly, generalisations on Israeli statecraft
culture must be regarded with much caution, because of ambiguity, complexity
and lack of reliable empirical studies.
Nevertheless, to understand the constraints on policy analysis at the higher
levels of government at least some additional widespread and significant features
of Israel’s statecraft culture must be added, as I perceive them based on direct
observation. These include: noticeable reliance on the transcendental, also
subconsciously, including by many non-religious individuals; much trust in
‘will’, ‘effort’ and ‘doing’ as likely to make possible what cold analysis regards as
very unlikely; a strange anti-intellectualism on the part of some very intelligent
political leaders; reliance on improvisation; uncritical confidence in intuition;
and more (Dror, 2011, 147–53).
Some of these features may sometimes be functionally useful and even necessary,
given Israel’s conditions. Thus, reliance on improvisation is essential when many
developments are unpredictable, and helps to counteract the dangers of rigid
contingency planning, which never fits what happens. And some trust in ‘Higher
Powers’ may help to maintain morale and counteract traumatisation in hard
situations, as long as it does not lead to recklessness. But some of the statecraft
culture features, even if useful in the past, are increasingly obsolete and becoming
dangerous in light of emerging problems.
In any case, they constitute a barrier to policy analysis and also to advancing to
grand-policy professionalism, a barrier which needs to be demolished or evaded.
Mission impossible
The very nature of the two most important internal and external issues dominating
most of policy making adds an overriding limit to the uses of policy analysis,
because of incongruities between the core nature of the issues and the maximum
potentials of main-stream policy analysis (and, in part, also of grand-policy
professionalism).
xxii
Foreword
This clearly is the case concerning the nature of Israel as a ‘Jewish and democratic
state’. It poses deep problems in philosophy, theology, culture, mass psychology,
elite structures, institutional and legal rules and structures, spiritual leadership,
relations between Israel and the Jewish Diaspora and more. These problems are
mainly a matter for global, Jewish people and Israeli future historic processes –
which are uncontrollable – together with temporary incremental compromises.
Mainstream policy analysis cannot be of much help with such enigmas;
and grand-policy professionalism too probably cannot contribute much more
than understanding the limits of policy making on such fundamental spiritual,
civilisational, cultural and existential issues. It should be realised, and accepted, that
future generations will view such issues quite differently – often in unpredictable
and partly unimaginable ways.
Israel faces a unique situation in regard to its most important external issue:
protracted violent conflict, in part with fanatic actors, including what I called
‘Crazy States’ (Dror, [1972] 1980), with very complex psychological and real-
political manifestations and implications (Bar-Tal, 2013). ‘Crazy States’ face
enemies with readiness, propensity and often a will to kill and be killed in order
to advance an extreme ideological goal, in this case the destruction of Israel.
Such fanaticism, as faced by Israel (and, increasingly by other countries, though
on a smaller scale), is impossible to understand in terms of public choice theory,
economic models and similar underpinnings of much of mainstream policy
analysis and related paradigms. Little wonder that western intelligence agencies
find it hard to comprehend events in the Middle East.
Israeli security bodies understand the fanatic dimension of the conflict, but
what to do about it is another matter. As was revealed in public, on several of
these issues heads of security bodies disagreed with the higher political leadership.
And on some critical issues nobody seems to have in mind any promising options,
though I personally think such failure is more a consequence of closed thinking
than ‘objective impossibility’.
Grand- policy professionalism should be able to help a lot with main national
security issues. Thus, concerning fanaticism, realistic models may help to explore
the potentials and limits of new ways of deterrence. And interactions between
various forms of peace processes and Iranian nuclear policy can be better
analysed with the help of an upgraded grand-strategy version of grand-policy
professionalism.
The ultimate challenge: fuzzy grand-policy gambling

A revealing way to capture what has been said in this foreword is a proposed
understanding of most of the critical decisions facing Israel (and, to a lesser but
growing extend, other countries and humanity as a whole) as ‘fuzzy gambles’,
some of them ‘very wild’, and often for very high stakes. ‘Gambles’, because of
uncertainty; ‘fuzzy’, because of extremely deep uncertainty; some ‘very wild’
because they are taken in the face of inconceivable contingencies; and for ‘high
xxiii
stakes’ because Israel is still in-the-making and faced with fateful choices likely
to shape its future, either rise or decline, and perhaps its very existence.
Mainstream policy analysis is unable to cope with fuzzy grand-policy choices.
Bayesian thinking is misleading, expected value calculations are inappropriate,
scenarios are unreliable, simulation tends to mislead, psychological studies on
‘irrationality’ in probabilistic experiments are irrelevant, and altogether outlook
approaches are unable to cope with quasi-chaotic (though not really so) historic
processes. It is enough to study the predictions and recommendations of highly
reputed think tanks and intelligence units, and also predictions by highly regarded
and well paid pundits (Tetlock, 2005), to have plenty of empirical evidence
of the difficulties of thinking in terms of extremely deep uncertainty and its
ruinous impact on commonly used outlook and policy analysis approaches. The
inescapable conclusion is that mainstream policy analysis is quite impotent when
choices require very fuzzy gambling – as they often do in Israel (and worldwide).
This is not the place to further elaborate such a counter-conventional thesis.
But, to provide some pointers on the changes in policy analysis needed to move
towards grand-policy professionalism, let me mention the need to consider critical
policy gambles in terms of rise and decline models, however provisional; to put
emphasis on ‘antifragility’ (Taleb, 2012), together with improved steep learning
curves and crisis handling; to think in terms of alternative futures and critical mass
interventions in future-shaping historic processes; to engage in value analysis to
help with value judgements; to take holistic views of fields instead of focusing on
sub-issues (as recommend by systems theory but seldom practiced on an adequate
scale); and, in some respects most important of all, to seek and encourage option
invention and creativity as an extra-rational dimension crucial for the quality of
choice (for detailed proposals, see Dror, 2014, 243–56).
What is to be done?
Looking at the picture as a whole, it seems fair to conclude that Israel’s main
historic achievements cannot be attributed to policy analysis. One might even
claim, with good reason, that if policy makers had relied heavily on mainstream
policy analysis, Israel might have achieved less in a number of important domains,
such as rapid absorption of large waves of immigrants and large-scale successes
of its high-tech industries.
This conclusion, however, applies to the main dimensions of Israel’s rise and
decline as a whole. If we shift attention and examine particular sub-choices,
it seems that many have been improved with the help of policy analysis (for
example, water management) and many more could have been improved with
the help of more and better use of policy analysis. But more – or less – policy
analysis would probably not have changed the overall trajectory of the history of
the State of Israel, which given its nature as a state-in-the-making the future of
which is not assured is what really matters.Consequently, the emerging overall
proposition is that mainstream policy analysis can make significant contributions
xxiv
Foreword
to specific circumscribed choices, but only very limited ones to ‘Great Politics’
choices (to borrow a term from Nietzsche, 1886) that are likely to significantly
have an impact on the future of states and humanity as a whole, and in particular
on the future of the State of Israel, which despite amazing achievements is still
vulnerable.
Therefore Israel (and not only Israel) needs all the help it can get to improve its
grand-policy fuzzy gambles. Ergo, a higher order type of policy analysis, which,
as mentioned, I tentatively call ‘grand-policy professionalism’, is urgently needed,
being not only desirable but essential for upgrading the quality of choices which
are likely to determine whether Israel’s future will be characterised by more
thriving, significant decline or perhaps demise.
A major caveat must be added, however: much of the future of Israel, other
countries and humanity as a whole, as far as the future depends on human action
and inaction, will be shaped by political and spiritual leadership and diffuse socio-
political processes, such as value transformations, creativity and collective learning,
as distinct from deliberate grand policies. Therefore, grand-policy professionalism
is an important and often essential aid to critical choices. But it is not a substitute
for human individual and collective existential discretion and does not release
political leaders and societies as a whole from moral and cognitive responsibility
for their judgement.
References
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Aristotle, 1985, Nicomachean ethics, Indianapolis, IN: Hackett
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Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press
Csikszentmihalyi, M, 1996, Creativity: The psychology of discovery and invention,
New York: Harper Perennial, 2013
Dewar, JA, 2002, Assumption-based planning: A tool for reducing avoidable surprises,
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press
Dror, Y, 1972, Crazy states: A counterconventional strategic problem, Milwood, NY:
Kraus, 1980
Dror, Y, 1987, Conclusions, in W Plowden (ed) Advising the ruler, pp 185–215,
Oxford: Blackwell
Dror, Y, 1995, Israeli gambles with history: The Lavi combat airplane and the
peace process with the PLO, in HJ Miser (ed) Handbook of systems analysis: Cases,
pp 239–68, London: Wiley
Dror, Y, 2002, The capacity to govern: A report to the club of Rome, London: Routledge
Dror, Y, 2011, Israeli statecraft: National security challenges and responses, New York:
Routledge
Dror, Y, 2014, Avant-garde politician: Leaders for a new epoch, New York: Westphalia
Press, imprint of Policy Studies Organization
xxv
Duggan, W, 2013, Strategic intuition: The creative spark in human achievement, New
York: Columbia University Press
Dunn, WN, 2011, Public policy analysis, 5th edition, Cambridge, UK: Pearson
Fischer, F, Miller, GJ (eds), 2006, Handbook of public policy analysis: Theory, politics,
and methods, Boca Raton, FL: CRC Press
Freilich, CD, 2012, Zion’s dilemmas: How Israel makes national security policy,
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press
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Klein, G, 2013, Seeing what others don’t: The remarkable ways we gain insights, New
York: Public Affairs
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New York: Oxford University Press
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of his term ‘Großen Politik’
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Sharkansky, I, 1997, Policy making in Israel: Routines for simple problems and coping
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Spiegel and Grau
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xxvi
INTRODUCTION
Policy analysis in Israel:

a late developer’s story
Amos Zehavi and Gila Menahem
Policy analysis is not conducted in a similar manner across states. Indeed, if this
were the case there would have been little reason to publish a series dedicated
to distinct national systems. Differences in national policy culture (Geva-May,
2002) and environment imply that policy analysis structure and focus is likely to
diverge. Israel’s policy environment could be considered exceptionally challenging,
consisting externally of security threats and internally of deep social cleavages. Its
policy culture is often characterised as involving a high measure of improvisation
and, accordingly, relatively little planning (Dror, Foreword to this volume;
Geva-May and Kfir, 2000). For these reasons, it is no surprise that Israel is often
considered a laggard in terms of policy analysis development (Dror, 1968; Geva-
May and Kfir, 2000). At the same time Dror claims in the volume’s foreword
that the State of Israel is an extreme case of a deliberate effort to radically change
a trajectory of history. As such, it can serve as a test case of the potentials and
limits of present mainstream policy analysis to help political leaders and other
future-affecting decision makers significantly to influence alternative futures.
As will be discussed below, while we concur with others that Israel’s relatively
unstable policy environment complicates policy analysis, we nevertheless believe
that policy analysis has much to contribute to Israeli policy making.
Comparative work often looks for and stresses similarities (DeLeon and
Resnick-Terry, 1998). We eschew, however, a depiction of Israel as moving
on a course laid out previously by policy analysis leaders, primarily the United
States. Although Israel is indeed a late developer, in terms of policy analysis, this
very fact implies that the circumstances under which its development occurs
are considerably different to those of policy analysis pioneers. Beyond its highly
particular circumstances mentioned above, Israel’s contemporary policy analysis
development draws on the experience of other countries and on the backdrop
of generally slow economic growth, compared to other Western countries (Ben-
David, 2013), that poses a relatively rigid financial constraint on policy resources.
These two factors – policy analysis learning and relatively unfavourable economic
circumstances – are likely shared by numerous other countries. Hence, despite
Israel’s unquestionably unique international circumstances, a study of Israel as
a policy analysis late developer could in fact provide important insights that are
applicable elsewhere.
1
Different lessons could be deduced from explorations of Israeli policy analysis

and, as readers of the different chapters in this volume will discover, this volume’s
authors are not always in agreement with each other. Although the conclusions of
these different contributions are not always shared, and at times could be at odds,
a broad interest in, and deep knowledge of, Israeli policy analysis’s evolution is
common to all our contributors. To guide the authors, we asked them to address
several important distinctions, or questions, in relation to their specific topic.
First, policy analysis can take myriad forms. What constitutes policy analysis
depends on one’s definition and there is no dearth of such definitions. A recent
definition by Mintrom and Williams (2012), which we find serviceable, defines
policy analysis in the following manner: ‘work intended to advance knowledge
of the causes of public problems, alternative approaches to addressing them,
the likely impact of those alternatives, and trade-offs that might emerge when
considering appropriate governmental responses to those public problems’. It
should be noted that this definition is sufficiently broad to include both what
other authors have referred to as ‘positivist’ or ‘technocratic’ policy analysis – the
use of technically sophisticated and quantitatively grounded analytical methods –
and more open-ended methods of analysis – such as interpretive policy analysis
methods (Yanow, 2000).1 Our contributors addressed policy analysis in different
institutional settings and their work indicates that not only do different styles of
analysis characterise different institutional settings, but also that different analytical
styles often co-exist in a single institution.
Second, we urged our contributors to take account of the inside–outside
distinction in policy analysis with respect to the institutional terrain of policy
analysis and policy advice in Israel. Although the lines between government and
private actors – whether for- or non-profit have become increasingly blurred,
the inside–outside distinction is still significant. In some cases, policy analysis
is very much an internal government affair. This does not necessarily imply
that dedicated policy analysis units conduct such work. In fact, ‘inside’ policy
analysis could be conducted by office holders in an ad hoc fashion and in what
appears to be a non-systemic way. Policy analysis from the outside is conducted
by a wide array of actors. In recent years, the role of Third Sector organisations
in policy analysis has grown. The same could be said for commercial firms that
often specialise in performing analysis commissioned by governments. Naturally,
moving beyond the question of ‘who does what’ leads to consideration of the
implications of the shifting ‘inside–outside’ policy analysis boundaries. First and
foremost, how does the expanding role of actors outside government affect policy
analyses tendencies and biases?
Third, we instructed the contributors to pay specific attention to the way that
policy analysis as an advisory function is construed and employed. In this context,
we ask: ‘Who initiates policy analysis: policy makers (that is, the demand side) or
policy analysis experts (the supply side)?’ (Hird, 2005; Radin, 2000); ‘What type
of access do policy analysts have to policy makers?’ (Fleischer, 2009); ‘Is there a
broader audience beyond policy makers?’; and ‘How are the tasks performed by
2
Introduction
policy analysts conceptualised (for example, the taxonomy offered by Mayer, van
Daalen and Bots (2004) and articulated by Howlett, 2010)?’
Clearly, we harboured no expectations that each and every chapter will address
all three aspects in a systematic way. Nevertheless, taken together the different
chapters do offer illuminating insights related to these three perspectives – and
others – of which some could be profitably applied to policy analysis beyond the
specific Israeli context. To complement the diverse perspectives on Israeli policy
analysis offered in the different chapters, we (that is, Menahem and Zehavi)
conducted a set of 11 semi-structured interviews with managers of policy analysis
units: mostly within central government, but also from the Histradrut (Israel’s peak
labour organisation). In addition, a detailed survey of research papers published
under the auspices of different government ministries was conducted to discern
patterns in terms of research volume, authorship, methods and so on. Insights from
this research were integrated into the discussion presented in the next section.
In the following section, we weave together insights from the different chapters
and present our impressions of policy analysis in Israel. The Israeli experience is
compared to that of other developed countries. In particular we focus on four
themes: the type of policy analysis conducted in Israel; the locus of policy analysis
– inside or outside government – and its evolution over time; policy analysis
clients and the uses of policy analysis; and how Israel’s policy environment shapes
and constrains its policy analysis. This is followed by an overview of the different
chapters that make up this volume.
Analysing Israeli policy analysis

Israel does not boast a rich policy analysis tradition. For at least the first four
decades of its existence, up to the late 1980s, systematic policy analysis was not
so much the norm as the exception within government (Dror, 1968; Geva-May
and Kfir, 2000). Outside government, as was also typical of other states at the
time, policy analysis was sporadic and largely ignored by policy makers. This
is not to say, however, that policy analysis was non-existent in the early years
(see Sharkansky, Chapter One in this volume). Policy advice, consultations,
planning and some forms of evaluation were always present. Israel’s political
economy, up until the 1980s, was generally organised along the lines of a neo-
corporatist regime predicated on the tri-partite cooperation of government,
trade unions and industry representatives. Therefore both the Histadrut and the
Industrialists’ Association conducted significant policy analysis in fields that were
relevant to their constituency – pensions for example (Interview, 28 April 2014,
Robbie Nathanson, Former Director of the Histadrut’s Institute for Economic
and Social Research: 1989–95). Nevertheless, in terms of institutionalisation,
professionalisation and scope, policy analysis was limited.
The recommendation of the Kubersky Committee – a professional committee
appointed by the government to study and recommend change in the public
services (1986–89) – to institutionalise and upgrade government ministries’ policy
3
analysis capacities indicated a change of course in the development of Israeli policy

analysis. While it would be naïve to imagine that public committees necessarily
launch change, the Kubersky Committee at the very least clearly articulated a
desire for change and most probably sparked a process that gradually brought
about a change in governmental policy analysis capacities over the following
two decades.
What change occurred and how does it compare with the experience of other
countries? One vision of how policy analysis should be conducted, in terms of its
form, is based on positivist thinking and emphasises rigorous quantitative methods
that are well grounded in microeconomic theory. Such ‘positivist’, ‘technocratic’
or ‘rational’ policy analysis characteristically dominated the early years of the
policy analysis profession in modern government (Radin, 2000; Dobuzinkis et
al, 2007; Mintrom and Williams, 2012). Undoubtedly, the aspiration of both
the Kubersky Committee and other commentators was that Israeli government
would enhance its capacity to conduct ‘positivst’ policy analysis. In recent years,
government emphasis on the use of ‘positivist’ techniques, most notably cost–
benefit analysis, has been growing although it would be a mistake to think that it
has become the norm for Israeli policy analysis practice. Indeed, in our analysis of
government, or government sponsored, research under the auspices of either the
Ministry of Welfare and Social Services or the Ministry of Economy, we found
that even in the 2000s very few cost–benefit studies were conducted. However,
at least in the Ministry of Economy, there is a marked increase in the volume of
systematic policy evaluation studies in general (see Figure 0.1) and in the number
of positivist studies more specifically.
Figure 0.1 Number of policy studies, Ministry of the Economy

35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
Source: Ministry of Economy publications
4
Introduction
Interestingly, discussions in the literature of policy analysis development

elsewhere, especially in the United States, stressed that the positivist approach
to policy analysis, while far from disappearing has become the object of intense
criticism and has been complemented, in recent decades, by broader visions
of policy analysis. Indeed, Radin in her survey of policy analysis development
in the United States distinguished between an early period dominated by the
highly technical positivist approach and a later period in which policy analysis
evolved into a far more methodologically pluralistic enterprise (Radin, 2000).
The different chapters in this book indicate that Israel is following a different
trajectory from the American ‘positivist to pluralistic’ one. In terms of policy
styles, as mentioned above, there is a gradual expansion of the use of formal
quantitative approaches. While in some cases it is state agencies that make use
of these methods (see Flug, Chapter Eight in this volume, for the Bank of Israel
example), in others, it is ‘outside’ analysts that contract with government, or are
independent of government, that perform ‘positivist’ analysis. Yet it would be a
mistake to conclude that Israel is following the American trajectory, albeit fifty-odd
years later. Israeli policy analysis increasingly relies on a range of non-technical
forms of analysis. Different government ministries now analyse policy based on
‘soft’ research techniques (for example, interviews with service clients) and plan
policy in collaboration with a host of different actors, whether within or outside
government. It therefore appears that policy analysis in Israel is skipping a stage
by concurrently developing both positivist and post-positivist methods of policy
analysis (for example, reliance on focus groups).
The fact that Israel is following a different trajectory, in terms of policy style
evolution, to policy analysis pioneers should be of no surprise. First, although a
comparativist literature on policy analysis is only now taking shape, comparative
literature in political economy has long ago demonstrated that ‘late developers’ –
albeit from an economic perspective – do not, and should not, follow in the early
developer’s path (Gerschenkron, 1962; Gourevitch, 1978). Circumstances for late
developers are not identical to that of their predecessors. Obviously, this is true
of Israel. Moreover, policy analysis learning has become increasingly common as
one manifestation of globalisation. The implication of this is that policy analysis
in Israel is developing on the backdrop, and informed by, current state-of-the-
art practices in other countries: the United States, Britain and others (see Alon
(Chapter Three) for examples of how Israeli institutional policy analysis related
reform is inspired by American and British structures). Israel, as a late policy
analysis developer, is playing ‘catch up’ and therefore its trajectory is significantly
different from the early developers. Israel obviously differs from the United
States, Canada, Britain and other early developers in this respect, but it is likely
that its experience as a late developer is shared by numerous other countries that
have entered the policy analysis world relatively late. Moreover, policy analysis
learning goes beyond institutional emulation and applies to policy content as
well. As explained to us by the Chief Scientist of the Ministry of Transportation,
recognising the Ministry’s limited ability to conduct (or contract for) original
5
research, the Ministry relies heavily on the analytical work, and resulting directives,
commissioned by the European Union (Interview, 6 April 2014, Shai Sofer, Chief
Scientist Ministry of Transportation). Thus, for Israel, not only is policy analysis
from outside government important, it appears that policy analysis from abroad is
significant as well and complements the limited capacities of the late-developer.
Finally, Israeli policy analysis also draws on established international expertise
by recruiting international experts to serve on ad hoc advisory committees (see
Rimmerman and Soffer, Chapter Six in this volume).
In the post-positivist stage of policy analysis, an increasing number of actor types
engage in policy analysis. It is difficult to disentangle the supply and demand push
and pull driving this movement: both civil society and the corporate world are
cognizant of the influence they can exert through policy analysis, and government
across the globe – far more than before the 1980s – is actively engaging the private
sector on all levels of government work. One important outcome is impressive
growth in policy analysis outside of government. Notably, the third sector’s
presence in the policy analysis world is rising (see Katz, Chapter Nine in this
volume). Non-government organisations are well aware that making a compelling
case for adopting a certain policy depends to a great extent on grounding it
in policy analysis. Indeed, as Mintrom and Williams point out, one reason for
the proliferation of policy analysis outside government is that interest groups
venture into policy analysis to counter extant policy analysis that undermines
their demands (Mintrom and Williams, 2012). Nevertheless, although as a whole
third sector policy analysis is expanding, it should be noted that traditional neo-
corporatist strongholds have lost ground. In particular, the Histadrut’s Institute
for Economic and Social Research, once one of the main policy analysis units
in Israel, was closed down in the 2000s. Evidently, the transformation of Israel
from a neo-corporatist to a liberal market economy influenced the policy analysis
terrain as well.
The intensification of ‘outsider’ engagement in policy analysis could be viewed
from different perspectives. Proponents of the process present it as a welcome
extension of the democratisation of policy analysis: policy analysis is gradually
becoming a more inclusive practice that is constantly expanding beyond the
traditional core of government ministry practitioners extended perhaps also to
policy analysis units serving unions and employers in neo-corporatist regimes
(as was the case in Israel). Nevertheless, the spectre of the ‘hollowing out of
the state’, and the concomitant loss of state capacities, casts a shadow over this
process (Rhodes, 1994; Rhodes, 1996). Indeed, as Oser and Galnoor argue
in this volume (Chapter Two), the outsourcing of fundamental policy analysis
functions, such as devising socio-economic strategies, could erode state capacities
to guide policy in a coherent and impartial way. The danger that Israel’s reliance
on external consultancy firms would prove to be over-reliance: policy analysis
would become fragmented and biased, and the decline of internal government
analysis capacities would lead to an inability to critically engage and intelligently
6
Introduction
internalise external analysis. It may very well be that Israel – under the spell of
the neoliberal zeitgeist – is moving in this direction.
Nevertheless, other chapters in this volume focus on policy analysis within
government and their descriptions of analysis evolution in government could
perhaps attenuate fears of government analysis capacity breakdown. Avrami, for
example, in her chapter about the Israel’s Parliament Research and Information
Centre (RIC) (Chapter Five), notes that the RIC was established in response to
the growth in scope of ‘outsider’ policy analysis that increasingly influenced
parliamentary work. The establishment of the RIC in 2000 did not occur because
legislators lacked policy analysis sources. Rather because abundant ‘outsider’
policy analysis was inherently biased and of varying quality. Part of what the
RIC’s function, as an ‘insider’ policy analysis body is to integrate the growing
streams of external analysis and help legislator’s make sense of it.
In recent years, we are indeed witnessing a growth of ‘outsider’ policy analysis
and government is not oblivious to this development: indeed, its use of external
sources undoubtedly motivates further growth. However, policy analysis capacities
within government have developed as well. As is true of the RIC, the National
Economic Council is also a recent addition (established 2006) to the government’s
policy analysis infrastructure. While Oser and Galnoor focus on how it was
bypassed in favour of an international consulting firm, it should be noted that
less than a decade ago there was no need to bypass it because it did not exist at
all. In an interview, the director general of the Prime Minister’s Office, during
the period in which the National Economic Council was established, stressed
that not only was the Council established, but that the government worked
hard to strengthen and routinise the work of policy units within the different
ministries (Interview, 23 July 2014, Raanan Dinur, former Director General of
PMO 2006–09). Contrary to the situation merely a decade ago, all government
ministries annually publish work plans and routinely measure performance. Then
again, the practice of government contracting out for analysis is expanding even
faster. Ben-Elia (Chapter Four in this volume) indicates some progress at the
local level with the establishment of strategic planning units in local government
since the 1980s. Still, progress has been uneven with numerous instances of units
closing down. In our interviews with top level policy analysis practitioners within
government, there was broad agreement that contracting out for policy analysis
was becoming more prevalent. Developments within government were more
ambiguous. Alon in his chapter (Chapter Three) states that the rate of establishing
new policy units in different governmental units increased considerably between
2006 and 2013 including increase in their staff. However, one interviewee
used the term ‘stagnation’ to describe the current state of affairs. Although he
acknowledged the rise of the RIC and the National Economic Council as policy
analysis practitioners, he argued that this constitutes ‘competition’ and might
have in fact weakened the status of ministries’ internal units (Interview, 28 April
2014, Benny Fefferman, Head of the Research and Economics Administration,
Ministry of Economy).
7
In sum, ‘outsider’ analysis could overstep its democratically legitimate bounds

and this might evolve into a problematic phenomenon in the future. For now,
however, it appears that ‘insider’ analysis in Israel is growing – albeit at a slower
pace – with ‘outsider’ policy analysis. As the RIC case suggests, this simultaneous
growth is no accident. ‘Outsider’ analysis is not a perfect substitute for ‘insider’
analysis: it is fragmented, often biased (in different directions) and as an exclusive
analytical source could undermine the legitimacy of policy predicated on it.
Government therefore is in need of ‘insider’ analysis to complement and balance
external sources. It could be the case that the fact that ‘insider’ growth is mostly
expressed in the establishment of new institutions within government and much
less in expansion of extant units reflects distrust in existing units. Regardless of
the reason for this disjointed growth, the outcome is that the policy analysis
infrastructure within government is more complex than it was two decades ago.
The growing impact of outsider policy analysis and government’s increased use
of diverse sources of policy analysis could be viewed as one important facet of a
neoliberal turn in governance. As Mintrom and Williams (2012) note, it is not the
only one. No less important is the fact that the balance within government has
shifted due to the ideological re-orientation of different societies in the direction
of greater reliance on markets. Ministries of Finance have grown in prominence,
across numerous countries, as the government body most closely associated with
market-centred economics. Israel could be considered as a prime example of
this change. Since the economic stabilisation plan of 1985, the Israeli Ministry
of Finance (MoF) emerged as the most powerful policy actor overshadowing all
other ministries, with the possible exception of the Ministry of Defence (Ben-
Bassat and Dahan, 2006; Cohen, 2013).
One might expect that given the MoF’s dominance in policy planning and policy
making that it would also play a leading role in policy analysis. Dahan’s chapter on
policy analysis in the MoF (Chapter Seven) uncovers a troubling state of affairs in
the Ministry’s Budget Department: the ministry’s most powerful department. The
Budget Department instigates policy change that is likely to have dramatic effects,
but especially in instances in which analysis is conducted ‘in-house’, the policy
evaluation procedures fail to adhere to any standard protocol of policy analysis.
Given that the MoF is a proponent of positivist policy work, often preaching
the virtues of performance measurement and associated reward, it is surprising
to find that Budget Department planning is not guided by such principles. Thus
a double paradox emerges: the ultra-positivist ministry is deficient precisely in
this respect in its own work and high policy-making capacity is coupled with
low evaluation abilities.
The pivotal role played by the Budget Department, and the MoF in general,
in policy formulation suggests a high degree of interaction with policy analysts
from other departments within government and also, perhaps, with a range
of analysts from without. Dahan’s description of policy analysis work through
MoF appointed committees indicates that cooperation with policy analysts
outside the ministry indeed occurs although it is infrequent. One reason for this
8
Introduction
relatively insular activity could be the ministry’s desire to retain a high degree
of autonomy vis-à-vis interested parties, which could divert policy to what the
Ministry considers as socially sub-optimal directions. However, the Israeli Budget
Department is not overly attentive to other government analysis units, not just
‘outsiders’. For instance, the director of the Research, Planning and Training
Division in the Ministry of Welfare and Social Services stated that the MoF
pays only little attention to his division’s research (Interview, 29 April 2014,
Yekoutiel Sabah, Director, Research, Planning and Training Division Ministry
of Social Affairs and Services). As argued by March and Olsen (1989), a central
function of policy analysis – even if undesirable in principle – is to legitimate
established policy preferences and not truly generate an open-minded review of
policy. As noted by others, the MoF’s policy preferences are closely guided by
a socio-economic neoliberal worldview (Maman and Rosenhek, 2011). Policy
analysis that would require that policy depart from a strict neoliberal script is
likely to be unwelcome. Moreover, the dominance of the MoF is such that even
‘in-house’ policy analysis to legitimate extant MoF policy preferences may not be
necessary. The MoF’s impregnable position might very well make quality policy
analysis more of a luxury than a requisite.
It is an open question how MoF dominance affects policy analysis elsewhere
in government. One clear possibility is that not only does the MoF enervate
policy work in other ministries, but it makes policy analysis a futile exercise: as
Alon in his chapter dedicated to policy analysis in central government (Chapter
Three) wonders: why practice analysis that would not be heeded by decision-
makers? If this is indeed the case, then one previously unnoted and unintended
consequence of MoF dominance in Israeli policy making is the stultification of
policy analysis evolution within government. Furthermore, as Ben-Elia argues
in his chapter in this volume (Chapter Four), such disregard could also result in
considerable implementation problems downstream due to ignorance of system
limitations and stakeholder preferences. However, as Dahan notes, and Oser and
Galnoor recommend, the MoF is gradually surrendering some ground to other
ministries in Israel’s highly centralised policy formulation process. This process,
we believe, would accelerate the policy analysis development trend in other
government departments.
MoF dominance, as suggested above, invokes the question of the impact of
policy analysis. Obviously, policy analysis is intended to inform policy design.
It is an open question, however, what causal chains – if at all – connect analysis
to policy. It is worth noting that in Israel academics are involved not only in
training the next generation of policy analysts (see Geva-May and Gofen, Chapter
Ten in this volume), but are also central practitioners of policy analysis. Indeed,
quite often academic policy evaluation studies are sponsored, contracted for, and
funded by government. In two of the largest ministries – Education and Health
– extending competitive grants to academic policy analysts is the most common
form of administering policy analysis. Nevertheless, funding and influence
should not be confused. Both the current and the former chief scientists in the
9
Department of Education openly questioned whether department policy was

informed by evaluation studies. In fact, the former Chief Scientist of the Ministry
of Education stated that policy analysis had very little impact on policy and during
his two years on the job he got to meet the minister only once and even then
there was no serious discussion of policy (Interview, 11 May 2014, Zecharia
Madar, former Chief Scientist Ministry of Education, 2011–13).
This disconnect between policy and analysis was also reported in other contexts
by our contributors. Rimmerman and Soffer, for instance, discuss the work of two
ad hoc advisory expert panels, formed by government ministries, which while
very different in many ways were quite similar in that their recommendations
were mostly rejected and not at all implemented. Katz, in his chapter on the
third sector (Chapter Nine), argues that the increase in policy analysis volume
does not imply a corresponding increase in influence. This sentiment is shared
by Ben-Elia who asserts that: ‘The conceptual and ideological frame, within
which central government formulates and sustains its local government related
policies, seems to be impervious to external influence, and dialogue with local
think tanks is practically non-existent.’
This bleak assessment of policy analysis influence, however, is not shared by
all. First, at least in some places and under certain circumstances, policy analysis
can directly influence policy. For instance, Flug provides an interesting example
of how government was responsive to a study conducted by the Bank of Israel
dedicated to the Earned Income Tax Credit. Moreover, it is interesting to note
that although ‘positivist’ policy analysis in Israel is certainly underdeveloped
compared to the United States or Canada, Israel does boast a few institutions that
have engaged in systematic policy analysis for decades. Chief among these is the
Bank of Israel. Flug, in her chapter, describes policy analysis work in the institute
that she now heads. Since the mid-1950s the Bank of Israel acts as an economic
advisor to government and, accordingly, conducts policy analysis based on formal
quantitative methods. Its policy analysis work is respected in government circles
and influences policy.
Second, policy makers are not the only consumers of policy analysis. Work
done by policy analysts, whether conducted within or outside government, is
increasingly accessible to the general public. At the very least, policy analysis
could inform an interested public and shape their views on a range of policy
issues. In fact, one of our interviewees, who manages a large policy analysis unit
within government, explained that he actively disseminates the main findings and
recommendations of studies conducted under the auspices of his unit to the media
and advocacy groups. The primary purpose of this exercise is to create external
pressure on government to respond to these studies – something that otherwise
might not have happened (Interview, 15 May 2014, anonymous). Finally, Carole
Weiss’s groundbreaking work is relevant here. Weiss focused on how academic
policy studies inform policy and found that their influence was mostly indirect:
they gradually shift the terms of public discourse and understanding of specific
policy issues (Weiss, 1982). This insight could offer some consolation for policy
10
Introduction
analysts – whether academics, civil servants, or think tank employees: even if in

the short run it appears that their efforts were for naught, in the long run their
work could create a real change in policy discourse and, ultimately, policy reality.2
A different factor that greatly influences the form and development of policy
analysis is the political and social environment in which policy analysis takes
place (Weimer, 2012). Sharkansky’s chapter in this volume (Chapter One) also
addresses the specific circumstances that shape policy analysis in Israel. Clearly,
Israel’s geopolitical situation is exceptional among developed nations as is true
of the huge immigration waves it experienced in the state’s early years and then
again in the 1990s (primarily from the former Soviet Union). The upshot of
external threats, security and immigration shocks is that Israel faces considerable
resource demands that go beyond that of the average OECD country. Perhaps
what is even more important is that major security and immigration events are
almost impossible to predict – and therefore plan for – in advance. Uncertainty,
which is of course common to all policy systems, appears to be even more extreme
in Israel. It is of little surprise therefore, argues Sharkansky, that Israeli policy
analysis follows a ‘muddling through’ pattern in which policy makers must learn
to cope with a constantly changing environment instead of relying on orderly
positivist policy analysis.
Textbook policy analysis is of little value where the present is a poor predictor
of the future. Pointing to similar conditions under which policy is made in Israel,
Dror offers a somewhat different lesson. In the volume’s foreword, Dror singles
out a number of ‘stressors’ (for example, intense value cleavages, extremely deep
uncertainty and protracted war) that render much of mainstream policy analysis
inappropriate for Israeli policy. Thus he argues that in order to assist decision
makers under such extreme conditions to shape crucial aspects of the future for
the better, policy analysis must undergo a quantum leap to what he calls ‘the
study, theory and practice of grand-policy design’.
It may be also claimed, however, that some of the factors that allegedly limit
the applicability of policy work in Israel might be less restrictive than they initially
appear. First, while Israel’s security budget is indeed burdensome, it limits Israel’s
policy capacities, but not so much its policy analysis capacities. Indeed, as argued
by Mintrom and Williams (2012) austerity could in fact prompt a growth in the
scope of policy analysis as governments seek new ways of ‘doing more with less’.
Second, systematic policy analysis under conditions of high levels of instability
and uncertainty is undoubtedly problematic. Nevertheless, as Dahan points out
in his chapter (Chapter Seven), Israeli policy instability might be overstated. In
fact, Israeli economic policy has been remarkably stable since the mid-1980s.
Policy stability occurred on the backdrop of a huge immigration wave, two
waves of the Palestinian initifadah (uprising) and a small-scale war in Lebanon.
Indeed, Israel weathered the 2008 economic crisis relatively well, a fact that some
commentators attributed to sound and stable economic policy (Bank of Israel,
2008). Perhaps external circumstances push Israel somewhat towards more of a
11
‘coping’ type of policy analysis. However, the record demonstrates that Israel’s
particular circumstances far from determine such an outcome.
Where we believe that Israel’s particular social and geopolitic characteristics play
a central role in shaping policy analysis is in influencing the goals of policy and
the actors that participate in policy analysis. One social-cultural dimension that
is highly salient in Israel, perhaps more so than in any other developed nation,
is religion (Zehavi, 2012). The majority of the Israeli public is Jewish and a
growing share of the Jewish population adheres to a strict ultra-orthodox school
of Judaism. Policy analysts often must take account of this fact when evaluating
and planning policy. For example, in most countries, determination of the end
of life is a health policy issue informed by the analysis of medical professionals.
In Israel, a 2008 law pertaining to the determination of the end of life was
formulated following extensive consultations and negotiations among medical
experts on the one hand and religious authorities on the other. The reason for
the inclusion of rabbis in the collaborative policy analysis process was that their
views were critical for arriving at a procedure for determining death congruent
with common interpretations of Jewish law. Absent rabbinical consent it was
feared that religious people would refrain from accepting organ donations from
the dead (Kellner, 2012).
Israeli policy analysis also takes place on the backdrop of the national/religious
divide in Israel between Jews and Arabs. Arabs make up about a fifth of the Israeli
population and are very much a marginalised minority in socio-economic terms.
During the first few decades of Israel’s existence, Arabs were nearly invisible either
as objects or subjects of policy analysis. In recent years, Arab presence in policy
analysis has been growing. One reason is the role of ‘outsider’ advocacy policy
analysis. An impressive growth in Arab Israeli civil society organisations focused
on Israeli state policy generates Arab-focused policy analysis (Haklai, 2004;
Jamal, 2011). Thus, for instance, Sikkui, an Arab–Jewish nonprofit organisation
dedicated to the promotion of Arab–Jewish equality, created and published a
Jewish–Arab equality index that targets particularly government allocations. The
organisation’s activity presents to both government and the public government’s
unequal treatment of its Arab citizens (see www.sikkuy.org.il/publication_cat/
equality-index/?lang=en). This growth in ‘outsider’ policy analysis is one
factor that influences government to become more inclusive in its own policy
analysis practices. Indeed, these days numerous policy analysis reports centre on
government policy towards the Arab public (see, for example, Prime Minister’s
Office, 2012; Liss-Ginsburg 2013a; Liss-Ginsburg, 2013b). Moreover, as part of
the policy analysis process as it pertains to Arab Israelis, government is increasingly
including representatives of the Arab public in policy circles (Interview, June 10,
2013, Aiman Saif, Director of the Authority for the Economics Development
of the Minorities Sector). What is interesting about this is that it constitutes an
example of how ‘outsider’ policy analysis not only does not undermine ‘insider’
analysis, but how it, in fact, motivates it.
12
Introduction
The chapters
In the foreword, Dror, based on the analysis of Israel’s circumstances and

experience, calls for the development of ‘grand-policy professionalism’ to deal with
the challenges facing humanity and the critical decisions needed. Contemporary
mainstream policy analysis, he contends, has limitations in coping with fuzzy
grand-policy choices, due to difficulties of thinking in terms of extremely deep
uncertainty that characterises such situations. The foreword briefly sketches some
of the features of ‘grand policy professionalism’ and how they relate to Israeli
public policy.
In Part One, which is dedicated to the styles and methods of policy analysis,
we include two chapters. Ira Sharkansky writes about the constraints faced by
policy analysts in Israel with an emphasis on the gap between limited capacity
and unlimited policy aspirations. Sharkansky argues that inspired by the Jewish
prophetic tradition, Israeli policy analysis tends to be highly critical of extant
policy and institutions. An interesting example of this is the way in which the
prophetic tradition is manifested in the work of Israel’s State Comptrollers. The
Comptroller has a very broad mandate based on a law that makes mention of
‘moral integrity’. Widespread expectations that policy outcomes would mirror
that of leading developed countries, however, fails to take into account Israel’s
particular circumstances: a below OECD average economy, high defence
expenditures and the demands made by powerful political constituencies such as
the Ultra-Orthodox and the settlers in the West Bank. Given these challenging
circumstances, Sharkansky argues, ‘coping’ is a sensible strategy even if it fails to
meet the high expectations of Israeli policy analysts.
Jennifer Oser and Itzhak Galnoor focus on the evolution of state capacity with a
special emphasis on how privatisation trends in recent years affect policy analysis.
Oser and Galnoor stress that despite Israel’s state-centred political-economic
structure in the state’s early decades, its policy analysis capacity was under-
developed. While in the early years, policy analysis capacity was constrained by
political interference, since the mid-1980s, privatisation contributes significantly
to its stultified growth. An illuminating example of this is how government
decided in 2011 to outsource the formulation of its national socio-economic
strategic plan to an international consulting firm. This naturally invokes questions
about who determines the public agenda and what tasks should be considered
as inherently public.
In Part Two, Gal Alon discusses efforts to enhance policy capacity in the central
government. Since the 1980s, several major attempts were made to dramatically
reform policy-making, and with it policy analysis, in central government.
However, these reforms were largely unsuccessful. Nevertheless, since the mid-
2000s some progress has been achieved in terms of designing work procedures for
government ministries that would enhance their policy analysis capacity. Progress,
however, is slow and Alon argues that to accomplish significant change in central
13
government policy analysis, the government must encourage ministries to make

better and more frequent use of professional policy analysis.
Nahum Ben-Elia surveys how policy analysis is conducted within, and has an
impact on, the local government level in Israel. The relationship of central to
local government in Israel tends to be highly hierarchal. Ben-Elia argues that
in Israel this relationship could be characterised as purely ‘top-down’ in which
policy analysis at the central government level – especially at the MoF – pays
scant attention to inputs from local government, public commissions, or think
tanks. This inattentiveness, however, comes at a price: the likelihood of successful
implementation is low without local government input and cooperation. The top-
down nature of inter-government relations does not mean that local governments
have no independent policy analysis capacity. Since the 1980s, Ben-Elia reports,
Strategic Policy Units were established in several municipalities with the aim of
creating a holistic perspective of the municipality’s work. However, these units
generally receive little support and some have closed down.
Shirley Avrami, who heads the Knesset’s (Israeli parliament) Research and
Information Centre (RIC), discusses the development and operation of this
new instrument that offers legislators an alternative to traditional government
policy analysis. Most of the research reports written by RIC personnel respond
to specific requests made by Knesset members. This implies an expectation that
reports will be delivered in a relatively short time span (for example, ahead of
a specific committee meeting in which the topic will be discussed), something
that precludes the use of sophisticated policy analysis methods. Members of
Knesset appear to generally value the policy analysis provided to them by the
RIC, not because they lack alternative sources of information and analysis, but
because they view RIC reports as professional and impartial. The RIC has
another advantage in comparison to external policy analysis bodies: due to its
legal standing, its researchers are able to access government data and information
that is not publicly available.
This part concludes with a chapter written by Arie Rimmerman and
Michal Soffer dedicated to the role of ad hoc advisory expert panels in Israeli
policy analysis. The authors point out that these government appointed panels
constitute a relatively inexpensive way to evaluate policy in a specific field and
produce a blueprint for a new policy direction. Nevertheless, as presented in
two separate examples of expert panel work in the welfare field, panels’ work
and recommendations are often rejected or not implemented by the relevant
government ministry. One possible reason for this is that experts and government
officials do not share the same goals (for example, economic efficiency versus
dignified treatment of service recipients).
Part Three recognises the ascendant position of public economic institutions
in Israeli policy making. This requires that special attention be paid to the role of
these institutions in policy analysis. Two chapters address this. First, Momi Dahan
writes about how the Ministry of Finance conducts policy analysis and the impact
of said analysis. Specifically, Dahan discusses, with recourse to specific examples,
14
Introduction
in-house analysis work in the Budget Department, inter-ministry committees

and public committees as three forms of policy analysis. In-house policy analysis
work is surprisingly poor. Committee work – whether inter-ministry or public
– is more rigorous than the in-house alternative but even then standard practices,
such as presenting government with policy alternatives, are usually absent. Dahan
is adamant that the weakness of policy analysis in what is widely considered to
be Israel’s most powerful executive department is not due to external inherent
constraints (for example, a high degree of uncertainty in Israel); rather, it reflects
the excessive power of the Budget Department that rarely deems it necessary to
justify its chosen policies.
Karnit Flug, Governor of the Central Bank of Israel, dedicates her chapter to
policy analysis conducted at the central bank. The Israeli Central Bank is well-
respected by policy makers in Israel and abroad. This status has magnified the voice
of the Bank’s Research Department, which deals with numerous issues that go well
beyond macro-economic policy. To accomplish its formal role as the economic
advisor to the government, the Bank employs a large research department with
about 50 senior researchers well-versed in econometric methodologies. Perhaps
due to its reputation, the Bank’s policy analysis products are widely cited and are
often influential in government circles.
The volume’s final part concentrates on policy analysis from the ‘outside’: Hagai
Katz dedicates his chapter to policy analysis and the voluntary sector in Israel.
Katz primarily discusses the convoluted government – voluntary sector policy
network that has developed in recent decades and its impact on policy analysis.
Katz describes the growth of the Israeli Third Sector and with it the growth of
its policy analysis capacities. Policy analysis is conducted by a plethora of third
sector organisations, some of them think tanks. The third sector’s relationship
with government, however, is far from straightforward. Government’s use of the
Third Sector’s analytical work is indeed increasing but government agencies prefer
to establish a top-down relationship in which non-government organisations are
fully subordinate to the government agency. In other words, in terms of policy
analysis government – Third Sector relations are not about partnership, but about
subordination. Furthermore, government also shows limited interest in policy
analysis of the Third Sector that could potentially contribute to its development.
Iris Geva-May and Anat Gofen, the series co-editor, collaborate in an
exploration of policy analysis instruction in Israel. Policy analysis instruction in
Israel is perhaps still in its infancy but it has developed considerably in recent
years. The Kubersky Committee, mentioned above, stressed that government
was in need of trained civil servants and, as Geva-May and Gofen report, higher
education institutions created specialised programmes to address this need. In a
thorough survey of seven such programmes in Israeli higher education institutions,
the authors find that the intention of these programmes to contribute to the
development of a more professionalised civil service in Israel is indeed backed by
diverse instruction programmes that all involved a significant element of policy
analysis instruction. Still, only two or three of the programmes offer stand-alone
15
classes in policy analysis. Thus, Israeli programmes produce around 1,000 graduates
a year, yet only a minority of them are specifically trained as policy analysts: client-
oriented professional ‘problem-solvers’ that offer policy solutions in a short time.
Notes
1
In what comes next, we employ the term ‘positivist’ policy analysis to denote a form
of policy analysis that tends to be narrowly instrumental and relies primarily on
sophisticated quantitative techniques deployed by highly trained professionals. It should
be noted, however, that the label ‘positivist’ is somewhat misleading because qualitative
analysis could be equally ‘positivist’, in the classical sense of the term, insofar as the
analysis is strictly predicated on empirical observations. Nevertheless, because the
usage of the term ‘positivist’ in the literature is very common, we decided to employ
it as defined above.
2
Indeed, the relatively recent experience of the National Task Force for the Advancement
of Education (the Dovrat Commission) demonstrates that what at first may appear to
be ineffective policy analysis could – even in a relatively brief period of time – affect
policy. The Dovrat Commission’s report was published in 2005, two years after its
appointment by the Minister of Education, and recommended the adoption of major
reforms in teacher’s work conditions and requirements. Due to the opposition of the
major teacher unions, the government refrained from adopting and implementing the
report and it was widely considered all but dead. Nevertheless, two major reforms in
teacher’s work conditions for primary and secondary schools, which were adopted
three years later, were largely based on the Dovrat recommendations.
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18
Part One
The styles and methods of public policy
analysis in Israel
ONE
Policy analysis under intense pressures1

Ira Sharkansky
This chapter is not so much about the techniques of policy analysis as about
elements of the Israeli society, economy and politics, as well as its international
environment, that affect policy analysis, and its capacity to influence Israeli policy.
It is appropriate to describe these as the stimuli and constraints of policy analysis
in a particular setting, which appears to distinguish it from other countries.
Other chapters in this volume will deal with the details of policy analysis
in Israel. Here, policy analysis is conceived as assessments by professionals of
prominent issues on the public agenda, without pre-set or intense ideological
commitments. The concern is to define by techniques of rational analysis the
likely benefits and costs (economic and otherwise), as well as likely side effects of
alternative ways of dealing with the demands and problems that present themselves
to policy makers.
Some reservations are in order.
‘Policy analysis’ lends itself to a wide variety of activities. It is customary to
consider it to be the analysis by professionals of problems and alternative ways of
dealing with them, with an emphasis on economic assessments of benefits and
costs associated with each alternative. However, the term may be employed for
more casual assessments, perhaps in a discussion by individuals reasonably well
informed, of issues currently on the agenda, and how authorities might deal
with them.
Yet another reservation concerns the emphasis in this chapter of external and
cultural constraints on policy analysis. Some of those constraints may in fact
be the result of decisions taken at an earlier time by Israeli policy analysts and
officials. If one external constraint is the frequency and severity of international
condemnation, this may reflect attitudes held by outsiders who object to
statements or actions of Israeli officials.
It is also appropriate to note that while Israel is a distinctive country of important
traits, it also shares many of the traits common to well-to-do democracies. These
also shape Israel’s politics and public policies.
Constraints
Israel is an especially contentious society, and is often in the world’s spotlight.
Its own traditions define its people as Chosen by the Almighty, and a light unto
the Gentiles. Those traits are associated with culturally-imbued intense self-
criticism. Israel’s location in the Promised Land also affects the political culture,
21
and attracts the attention of outsiders who want their share of the Promised Land,
or demand high – perhaps impossible to achieve – standards of excellence from
those who live there.
Israel is widely accused of violating international law by settling a significant
percentage of its population on territory that is illegally occupied. The location
of its capital is virtually unrecognised as such, and its government is said to be
largely responsible for the lack of progress toward resolving international problems
that have a prominent place on other countries’ agendas.
Policy analysis and policy makers’ acceptance of analysts’ conclusions require at
least a minimum of political dispassion. In contrast, internal and external pressures,
including those which question the legitimacy of the country’s existence, make a
profound level of insecurity part of the environment in which policy analysts and
policy makers operate. Responses to those pressures add to the agenda proposals
beyond the range of practical achievement, such as a complete withdrawal from
the West Bank or – alternatively – the annexation of land that others consider
to be theirs, and assure intense criticism – some of it motivated by religious
demands that brook no flexibility – of whatever professionals might propose and
policy makers decide.
This chapter describes key elements of Israel that frustrate or constrain policy
analysis: chronic issues of security; a culture imbued with intense self-criticism; an
economy wealthy enough to provoke demands for services of the highest quality,
but not wealthy enough to pay for them; and several elements in the population
that constantly make demands that are anti-economic.
A State Comptroller who is more aggressive and expansive than equivalent
functionaries in other countries in criticising what authorities do and fail to do
illustrates how these traits affect the policy analyses apparent in its official reports.A
style of policy making that emphasises coping with insoluble problems – as
opposed to solving them and removing them from the public agenda – reflects
the traits already described and adds its own considerable constraint on policy
analysis and the influence of analysts.
The emphasis in this chapter is on traits that frustrate, or limit policy analysis.
They do not prohibit policy analysis. There is a great deal of policy analysis
showing a wide range of economic and intellectual sophistication. Those who say
that Israel does no policy analysis are typically reflecting the country’s tendencies
toward intense self-criticism. They may be saying that they do not agree with
the results of policy analysis, or with the actions of policy makers who may pay
attention to policy analysis, but give greater weight to political constraints. Or
they may be saying that the argumentation about one or another option is not
really ‘policy analysis,’ even though it may reflect an impressive level of intellectual
sophistication.
22
Policy analysis under intense pressures
A problematic country
Israel’s problematic status may be defined by the magnitude of its financial outlays
on security, as well as the contentious nature of its territory. Israel’s military outlays
were 7.3 per cent of gross domestic product in a recent year, compared to the
average 1.8 per cent for 23 other western democracies (USCensus Bureau, 2012).
An estimated 722,000 Israelis are living beyond the pre-1967 boundaries,
in what many important countries and international organisations describe as
‘occupied territories’ (Hayom, 2012). The explicit or implicit message is that
more than 9 per cent of the total population and more than 12 per cent of
the Jews are living in violation of international law (CBS, 2011). As recently
as November 2010, the President of the United States insisted that Israel stop
construction in neighbourhoods of Jerusalem where Jews have been living since
1967. That produced a headline in Ha’aretz, ‘Netanyahu to Obama: Jerusalem
is not a settlement’ (Ha’aretz, 2010).
Currently there are about 200,000 Jews living in neighbourhoods of Jerusalem
that the country’s most important ally has said are not properly part of Israel.
They represent 30 per cent of the city’s Jews, according to Israel’s definitions
of Jerusalem’s boundaries) (CBS, ndb, Table 2.7). In a situation where that
percentage of a country’s dominant population group in the purported national
capital is said to be illegitimate by its major ally, the country hardly seems to be
of a normal type where dispassionate policy analysts are able to work in isolation
from political pressures.
Israel’s cultural roots

The extreme nature of self-criticism that is part of Israel’s political culture has its
roots in the Hebrew Prophets.
They were noted for their criticism of political and economic elites no less than
for being visionaries (Urbach, 1987). There was Samuel against Saul, Nathan
against David, Elijah and Micaiah against Ahab, Elisha against Jehoram, and –
perhaps most extreme – Jeremiah against Jehoiakim, and Zedekiah.
The prophets have achieved a sacred status in Judaism, but their lives were not
easy. We might view them as ancient policy analysts, or at least as severe critics
of those who made policy. If we accept the histories reported in the Hebrew
Bible, Elijah fled to the desert in order to avoid the fate of other prophets killed
on the orders of Queen Jezebel (I Kings 18, 19). The prophet Micaiah was last
seen being imprisoned because of his unfavourable advice to Ahab (I Kings 22,
28). Amos was sent out of the kingdom of Israel on account of his prophecies
(Amos 7, 10–17). There is a rabbinical tale that King Manasseh had Isaiah sawn
asunder because of his prophecies (Urbach, 1987, 559). King Jehoiakim had
Uriah killed for his prophecies (Jeremiah 26, 20–3). Jeremiah was in and out of
trouble during the regimes of Jehoiakim and Zedekiah. However, King Zedekiah
provided protection to Jeremiah against officials who wanted to kill him as a traitor
23
for demanding that soldiers did not resist the forces of Babylon. The essence of
Jeremiah’s prophecy was that the Babylonians were sent by the Lord to punish
the Judeans for their wickedness (Jeremiah 38).
Israeli Jews read the books of the Prophets as part of their religious rituals.
The importance of criticism may be seen in a passage from Amos, to be shown
below, that elevates justice above the rituals of sacrifice that were central to ancient
Judaism (Amos 5, 22–4).
It is useful to view the prophets’ concern with justice as carrying over to
contemporary Israel. One place where it appears is in the traits of Israel’s State
Comptroller. That institution may be unique among its counterparts in operating
according to a law that authorises the review of public bodies on the criteria
of ‘moral integrity’. The Comptrollers of other national governments focus
largely on financial record keeping, or the balance between various reports of
government income and spending. The more assertive of them deal with issues of
government economy, efficiency, and the effectiveness of programmes to achieve
their objectives (State Comptroller’s Office, 1991).
In practice, other state auditors deal with improper, or corrupt actions that
appear in the reports of Israel’s State Comptroller. However, the appearance of
moral integrity in the law empowering Israel’s State Comptroller is distinctive,
and suggests the concerns of Biblical Prophets. Whether there is more or less
assessment of immorality in government, or more or less corruption in Israel or
elsewhere, are questions that defy clear definition and systematic analysis.
The State Comptroller and policy analysis

Official reports issues by Israel’s State Comptroller demonstrate the extremism
of criticism generated by one group of policy analysts who examine what
policy makers and administrators have done, or have failed to do. The reports
generally receive headlines in the media. The controversy surrounding a recent
Comptroller, Micha Lindenstrauss, demonstrates that policy analysis is not free
of political controversy.
Critics assert that Micha Lindenstrauss pushed the limits of his office beyond
what is proper or reasonable. However, when his activities are examined in light of
the law governing Israel’s State Comptroller, and the practices of his predecessors,
it appears that he operated within the limits set both by the law and two of the
Comptrollers who came before him (Sharkansky, 2002). Lindenstrauss’s reputation
as an extremist comes partly from comparison with his immediate predecessor.
Justice Elieazer Goldberg was not the aggressive seeker after sensitive issues and
media publicity that marked Lindenstrauss’s tenure. However, Goldberg came after
Justice Miriam Ben Porat. The more passive Goldberg may have been chosen,
at least in part, to counter the view among Knesset Members (who choose
the Comptroller) that Justice Ben Porat had been too aggressive in criticising
public officials. When Ben Porat is viewed in context, however, she seemed to
24
be operating according to a model set by an earlier State Comptroller, Yitzhak

Tunik (Sharkansky, 2002).
Each of the State Comptrollers noted for pushing the limits of their office
– Tunik, Ben Porat and Lindenstrauss – did nothing of the kind. They were
working in the context of a legal framework that may be the most far reaching
in the world with respect to a country’s State Comptroller.
Israel’s law provides the State Comptroller with access to governmental bodies
in the widest sense of that term, including local authorities and government-
supported entities that operate in the private sector (sometimes called ‘Quasi-
governmental’). Israel’s law is conventional in allowing the State Comptroller
to judge audited bodies in terms of the accuracy of their financial records, the
legality of their operations, and their accomplishment of public policy objectives.
Where Israel’s State Comptroller is unusual is the law’s endorsement of ‘moral
integrity’ as appropriate criteria for the Comptroller assessments.
What is ‘moral integrity?’ The concept is one of the most open imaginable.
Its presence in the State Comptroller’s statute seems to reflect the respect for
moral judgement and criticism that has been part of Judaism since the time of
the Prophets. The prophet Amos said most clearly what is also apparent in the
Books of Hosea, Jeremiah and Isaiah. They and other Prophets saw themselves as
speaking the words of the Lord, finding fault with the behaviour of economic and
political elites, and calling down God’s punishment for wrongdoing. According
to Amos, God did not want religious ritual but justice.
I hate, I despise your religious festivals; your assemblies are a stench to

me. Even though you bring me burnt offerings and grain offerings, I
will not accept them. Though you bring choice fellowship offerings,
I will have no regard for them. Away with the noise of your songs! I
will not listen to the music of your harps. But let justice roll on like a
river, righteousness like a never-failing stream! (Amos 5, 21–4)
If the typical product of a national Comptroller is the accuracy of financial record

keeping, Micha Lindenstrauss wandered far from that. Perhaps the hottest of his
concerns, in terms of riling the media and bothering elected politicians, was
his willingness to examine, in what he called ‘real time’, issues already in the
media spotlights: the forest fire that claimed lives on the Carmel, an individual’s
finagling of real estate that became prominent when Yoav Galant’s appointment
to the top position in the Israel Defence Forces was waiting confirmation, and the
preparation of various public bodies for earthquakes (which gained media weight
after the disaster touching nuclear energy in Japan). When the price of cottage
cheese found its way to the headlines and set off social protests, Lindenstrauss
wasted no time in indicating his willingness to examine that. The cartoonist
for Ha’aretz portrayed him with a cunning, hungry look, asking for a spoon
with which to taste the problem and, presumably, to gain more news coverage
(Ha’aretz, 2011).
25
Skipping over the more conventional and low-key Goldberg, it is difficult to

differentiate Lindenstrauss’ focus on the spectacular issues from those of Yitzhak
Tunik’s concern with the kiting of bank shares, the widespread and indiscriminate
arrest of Arabs close to the scene of a terror event, the political appointments made
by a foreign minister, or the benefit–cost analysis of the Lavi military aircraft.
Soon after Tunik’s report on the Lavi, the high profile project was killed by a
close vote in the government. An angry Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir asked,
‘Who is the State Comptroller?’
Shamir’s remark had a later parallel when Prime Minister Ehud Olmert accused
Lindenstrauss of unprecedented cynicism and criminality for leaking details of a
report critical of the government’s handling of the 2006 Lebanon war.
Justice Ben Porat also did not abstain from high profile reports about sensitive
subjects. The list associated with her includes the criticism of the gas masks
distributed to the entire population by the IDF, a comparison of education in
Jewish and Arab sectors, a report about the activities of Interior Minister Ariyeh
Deri that figured in the run-up to a criminal indictment, trial, incarceration, and
the derailing, for more than a decade, of a political career that was one of the
most promising outside of the major political parties. Justice Ben Porat was also
responsible for one of the earliest inquiries into the behaviour of Ehud Olmert,
and a report that faulted him as Minister of Health for improper contracting with
a business run by a major player in Likud.
Perhaps the most political and media-centred activity in the career of Justice Ben
Porat was her willingness to enter the fray between two prominent politicians,
Yacov Turner and Moshe Shahal, where each accused the other of lying about
their roles in a quarrel concerned with a political appointment. Justice Ben Porat
made a decision as to who had lied, but found herself overruled when the party
she considered to be at fault brought a case against her in court.
It may only be a minority of reports issued by Yitzhak Tunik, Miriam Ben Porat,
or Micha Lindenstrauss that attract the attention of the media and the public.
Much of what Israeli State Comptrollers do looks pretty much like the work of
other national audit bodies. The bulk of the two thousand or so pages published
each year by Israel’s State Comptrollers deal with financial record keeping, the
administrative procedures followed by public bodies, or judgements as to whether
they have achieved their goals with a reasonable expenditure of public money.
What has made this triad of State Comptrollers interesting from the perspective
of policy analysis is their willingness to examine the most controversial of issues.
As such, they have all received their share of criticism, often of the kind that they
are overstepping their office and competing with elected politicians. Yet with
‘moral integrity’ as one of the criteria written into the law, it is not appropriate
to accuse any one of them of violating the mandate of their office. Moreover,
there is no metric that allows the ranking of Tunik, Ben Porat, or Lindenstrauss
as to the extreme nature of their reports, insofar as ‘moral integrity’ is a concept
without borders.
26
While the State Comptrollers appear to be within the normal ranges of Israeli
activity as defined by law, precedent and political culture, it is appropriate to ask
if their activity somehow threatens the appropriate balance between the various
branches of government.
This is an issue about as insoluble as the definition of ‘moral integrity’. More
than 60 years after its birth, it is difficult to conclude that the Israeli polity is
not a working success. Opposition to its activities is in plentiful supply, but not
clearly beyond what is appropriate for a democratic regime with free media
and a competitive, argumentative culture that recognises the value of criticism.
An activist State Comptroller both reflects and reinforces the cultural norm of
criticism that has been with Israel’s Jewish population for at least 2,500 years.
The prophetic predecessors of the State Comptroller are the best testimony of
that heritage. Between the Biblical Prophets and the most recent State Comptroller
are two millennia of intellectual creativity spanning prominent figures in the
rabbinic tradition, as well as leaders in various fields of science, humanities, and
political protest. Israeli-Jewish culture being what it is, it would be remarkable
if Israel’s State Comptrollers were not active in pushing the boundaries of what
their counterparts do elsewhere.
The activities of Israel’s State Comptroller demonstrate one form of policy
analysis that has a high political profile. Its association with the open-ended
value of ‘moral integrity’ both reflects ancient norms in contemporary politics,
and provokes questions about the prospects of more conventional policy analysis
– that operates at a lower emotional key with an emphasis on economic costs
and benefits – to influence policy in a society where moral integrity and intense
criticism are such prominent values.
An economy that is wealthy but far from the wealthiest

Another feature of Israel that complicates dispassionate, professional modes of
policy analysis is the level of its economy. The World Bank classifies Israel among
the wealthiest countries, but it is not close to the top of that category. While the
average of OECD members’ GDP/c was $38,217 in 2013, Israel’s was $32,065
(OECD, 2015). What this does to Israel’s political discourse, and issues of policy
analysis, is that activists demand levels of service or social conditions similar to
those of the wealthiest countries. However, those services or conditions reflect
the level of a country’s economic resources. By following the prophetic style of
intense criticism, and accusing Israel of failing to meet standards that prevail in
Northern Europe or North America, activists – some of them using the tools
of policy analysts – demand standards that Israel is not likely to meet within its
economic constraints. The resources available to Israeli policy makers across the
range of social services are even less than generally associated with measures such
as GDP/c, insofar as Israel spends almost four times the proportion of its resources
on national defence than is the norm among democracies.
27
Israel’s policy analysis may also suffer from it being a small country, and – like
others of its kind – highly dependent on others. Compared to the United States
and the large countries of Western Europe, Israel sells a large proportion of its
output on international markets, and buys on those same markets the raw materials
that it cannot produce locally. Economic dependence exposes the government
to the constant possibility of economic sanctions if it does not comply with
expectations concerned with Palestinians, Jewish settlements in the West Bank,
or other issues that attract the attention of Israel’s critics.
Again we see the complexities in sorting out the influences on policy analysis
from policy analysis itself. Israel’s environment includes activists motivated in part
by the limitless aspirations of the Hebrew Prophets for justice, who demand what
is necessary to produce an idealised peace as well as an optimum level of public
services. They do not prevent policy analysis. Indeed, the realities that activists
would change are themselves the results of earlier Israeli policy analyses and the
actions of policy makers who did what they thought was necessary or appropriate.
Nonetheless, the intensity of current demands adds to the problems of policy
analysts to follow those prescriptions of their craft that may be appropriate in
settings that are more benign and wealthier.
Coalition governments, with ultra-orthodox parties permanent

fixtures or looming possibilities, and other problematic
populations
The nature of Israel’s political structure, the importance of religion in the culture,
and the importance of ultra-Orthodox political parties also tip the scales against
conventional ways of policy analysis. Relevant here is Israel’s perpetual character
as a society ruled by government coalitions, and the role of ultra-Orthodox
parties as present or potential coalition partners. This contributes non-economic
or anti-economic constraints on prominent issues of public policy. It produces a
situation where a substantial percentage of the working age population receives
public financial support to remain outside of the workforce, where the primary and
secondary education serving the same population is kept from providing courses
in foreign language, mathematics, or science that will make a contribution to
the students’ marketable skills, and where the same population receives financial
support that encourage a rate of reproduction three or more times higher than
that of the secular population.
The ultra-Orthodox are not Israel’s only problematic population. Politically
shrewd settlers in the West Bank pressure the government to support them, despite
widespread condemnation in international forums. This is not only problematic
for Israel politically, but skews economic decisions by the costly subsidies provided
to the settlers. Prominent are the assignments of army units to guard them, and
the construction of roads built for their exclusive use and forbidden to Palestinians
in order to minimise the danger of drive-by shootings and roadside bombs.
28
Israeli Arabs are also problematic for those aspiring to a large role of rational,
non-ideological policy analysis. Arabs characteristically vote for anti-establishment
political parties that make up close to 10 per cent of the Knesset. Knesset members
of those parties spend their time challenging Israel’s legitimacy and refuse to
support the government in exchange for benefits given to their constituents.
There may be nothing a ‘realistic’ policy analyst could propose that would bring
these Knesset members into the conventional political process of negotiating for
benefits.
Coping
Being in the world’s spotlight, accused of expropriating territory and blocking
opportunities for peace, the heritage of the Biblical Prophets, a marginal economic
condition and a sector having to be reckoned with in policy making that rejects
modern norms of contributing to the workforce do not keep Israelis from
practicing policy analysis. There are ample and impressive statistical compilations
of what the country provides by way of services, and the comparative standing
of Israel on social, economic and political indicators (CBS, nda). Government
bodies, most notably the Finance Ministry and the Bank of Israel, routinely
perform systematic analyses dealing with benefits and costs. Ministries concerned
with infrastructure, such as Transportation, Communications, Construction
and Housing, Environmental Protection, as well as the Ministry of Trade and
Commerce, produce sophisticated analyses in their fields of activity.
Nonetheless, frequent threats of warfare or lower level security problems,
as well as a sizable and growing sector of religious extremists render several of
Israel’s problems insoluble under present and foreseeable conditions. They join
with intense and persistent criticism from external and internal sources, coalition
politics, and the nature of Israel’s economy and culture to assure a major role for
coping in Israel’s policy making and programme implementation.
The synonyms of coping show that it does not seek to solve problems once and
for all times: contend, deal with, endure, fight successfully or on equal terms, handle, hold
one’s own, manage, struggle, subsist, survive, negotiate, bargain, barter, weather, adapt
(Schaefer, 1986) and satisfice (Simon, 1976). These terms imply decisions that
are ‘good enough’, even if they are not what any of the participants really want.
Political scientists have tended to use coping casually to describe policy making
in difficult settings, or to prescribe how policy makers should deal with vexing
problems. A number of studies include coping in their titles or sub-titles, but
do not provide any systematic discussion of the concept. In most of these cases,
the prominent use of the word seems designed to emphasise the difficulties
encountered (Crocker, 1981; Chazan, 1986) Daniel Patrick Moynihan used
coping to convey good judgement, or a capacity to anticipate developments that
require action (Moynihan, 1975).
The concept of coping is more fully developed by psychologists, who use it
to describe how individuals deal with stress (Coelho et al, 1974). More than
29
political scientists, psychologists have been systematic in clarifying a variety of

stresses and coping behaviours.
There are differences between ‘active’ and ‘passive’ coping. Active coping
responds to stress with challenge, commitment, creative information seeking, the
definition and ranking of goals, organisation and discipline. It includes efforts
to salvage something from a difficult situation; to keep a process going in the
expectation of greater opportunities or holding off greater losses; surveying options
and recruiting support; changing expectations in the face of conditions that are
not likely to change in the short range; ranking priorities in order to achieve the
more important at the expense of the less important.
Passive coping responds to stress with a lack of control, hopelessness, confusion,
rigidity, distortion, disorganisation, randomness, disorder, distress, depression,
anxiety, withdrawal, flight or submission. It exhibits pointless emoting that
involves loss of control and direction for oneself and potential allies; quixotic
choice of options in an effort to do something! without taking account of likely
costs and benefits; and frittering away resources in efforts that do not produce
significant accomplishments.
Psychologists have made impressive progress in classifying coping behaviours
and analysing data about coping with different kinds of stress. However, there
remains considerable dispute as to the capacity of particular coping behaviours
to assure a relief of various kinds of stress (Folkman, 1984).
Prominent among the stresses of politics are contradictory demands, as when
one group demands increased spending for services while another group complains
about taxes or government debt, and urges cutbacks. There are seldom enough
resources to pay for everything that people want. Among groups willing to
innovate there are further complications between those wishing to put resources
into different programmes, or to pursue specific programmes in different ways.
There is also likely to be competition between those who want the same prized
appointment or contract.
Uncertainty is the bane of public life. Policy makers are not sure that a proposal
will accomplish what its advocates promise. Well laid plans go astray if there is an
unexpected increase in the cost-of-living index, a change in the exchange rate
of the national currency, or the threat of another uptick in terrorism. Coping is
especially attractive in a society like Israel, in a hostile environment with heavy
outlays on national defence, and actions that are never enough to solve those
problems once and for all times, as well as insoluble problems associated with
the ultra-Orthodox sectors, a feisty settler movement opposed to any likely
arrangements with Palestinians, and activists who promote social policies similar
to those of countries with richer economies.
As a political strategy for dealing with problems, coping is associated with a
variety of tactics. Or to put it more simply, there are several ways to cope. They
include accommodation, improvisation, avoidance, indirection and ambiguity.
There are no crisp definitions of these terms, or clear boundaries between
behaviours associated with each. All are fuzzy enough to cause problems for
30
policy analysts who aspire to clear definitions of one’s problems, the options
available for solution or treatment, and precise measures of the costs and benefits
associated with each option.
Prominent among the examples of unsettled issues reflecting coping is the
ambiguous legal status of Jewish settlements beyond the 1967 boundaries, and
the financial aid that flows to the ultra-Orthodox sector from a variety of public
sources without any noticeable payoffs for the values of equity or economic
growth. Also on Israel’s agenda in recent years were calls for the reform of social
and economic policies said to discriminate against the ‘middle class’. That in
itself is a vague concept, which includes individuals having different aspirations
as well as a range of economic resources and earnings potential.
Street demonstrations in 2011 of perhaps 200,000 people returned to the
headlines after the election of 2013 that made a new party the second largest in
the Knesset, and created a coalition without ultra-Orthodox parties. Demands for
evening the burdens (that is, prodding or forcing young ultra-Orthodox men into
the military or social service, and then the workforce), and easing the financial
burdens of the middle class coincided with a record budget deficit that was said
to require cuts in services and increases in taxes.
It was a time for coping with the demands of secular and ultra-Orthodox
activists that contrasted sharply, pressed policy makers to formulate proposals that
took account of intensely held secular ideology and religious doctrines, and raised
questions as to the possibilities of actually implementing whatever proposals could
find the appropriate majorities in the government and Knesset.
Soon after, the United States President and Secretary of State embarked on a
campaign to pressure both Israel and the Palestine National Authority to begin
negotiations aimed at producing a ‘two-state solution’ and finalising a number of
outstanding issues. Israelis in favour or opposed to territorial and other concessions
promised to up the political ante of any assessments of what Israel should do in
the presence of the opportunities and constraints that would be associated with
Palestinian demands and American involvement.
Jews have a history of coping. They have been doing it for the better part of
3,000 years. Their insoluble problems initially were those of a small and poor
population occupying territory on the bridge between continents that was
prized by powerful empires, and later being minorities, often set-upon by hostile
populations and regimes.
It is far beyond this chapter to rank nations on their coping skills, or to
compare Israel with other polities as to the incidence of coping in its policy
making. However, it should be no surprise that Jews were prominent in the
development of psychology and psychoanalysis that rely heavily on treating clients
by urging them to cope with issues of illness, depression, family difficulties and
aging. Modern Israel has returned to the situation of the ancient country’s small
population, occupying a strategically valuable piece of landscape in the midst
of hostile populations. No Israeli political party has yet succeeded in winning a
majority of votes in a national election, and thus having a relatively easy task of
31
formulating and implementing public policy. Coping with hostile others and its
own contentious politics is, arguably, the primary style of Israeli politics and policy
making. It is likely that Israel’s proclivity to cope via actions that are amorphous
or that evade aspirations of solving complex problems once and for all is also
factored into the work of the country’s policy analysts.
Coping is flexible in the extreme. An ideal mode of policy analysis seeks firm
answers with respect to the worthiness of one policy option or another. Coping
avoids firmness or controversy. It is likely to give at least a little bit to each interest.
Often the ‘little bit’ is defined in the amorphous atmosphere of negotiations, or
‘feeling out’ the opposition. These ways of coping are likely to leave aside the
reports and recommendations of policy analysts.
Where does this leave policy analysis?

Even in a polity that most often seems to be coping with intractable problems,
there is room for policy analysis.
Intelligent coping is better than a haphazard or panicked selection of tactics,
or the shifting of postures from one fashionable activity to another. Knowing the
likely costs, effectiveness and side effects of an action comes from policy analysis,
even if the ‘analysis’ is little more than extended discussion in a committee
among individuals with some knowledge of the issue, the policy options and
their constraints.
It is tempting to say ‘the more the better’ in terms of the sophistication of
what goes into a policy analysis. Yet Israel’s social, political, economic and
international constraints are always somewhere in the near background. If the
issue is one of dealing with troublesome neighbours by means of military force,
realism involves taking account of what the great powers will tolerate. Realism
also involves taking account of the partners in the governing coalition, including
the ultra-Orthodox. Even if they are not members of the present coalition, the
ultra-Orthodox are potential partners of the next coalition. Realism also involves
taking account of Israel’s economy. For the foreseeable future, the country seems
likely to be among the less wealthy of the wealthiest countries. That is a setting
that provokes aspirations for the best of policy options, but without the resources
that make them practical.
There is a lot of policy analysis in Israel. As other chapters in this volume
demonstrate, the Finance Ministry and the Bank of Israel are staffed by
professionals. There are professionals in other ministries that produce detailed
studies that fit within most conceptions of policy analysis. The State Comptroller
aspires to assess accomplishments in some of the most sensitive issues faced by
the country.
Those who say that there is no policy analysis, or not enough, often seem to
be saying that current policy does not conform to their desires.
Even if policy making in response to sophistical analysis in its idealised image
suffers, the country has done well. Among the one hundred or so countries that
32
emerged in the period after the Second World War, Israel has been outstanding
in its records of economic growth and the quality of its democracy.
Israel is different, but not in all ways

While the theme of this chapter is Israel’s peculiarities, it is unwise to carry that
theme too far.
Concepts of the Promised Land, Chosen People, and Light unto the Gentiles
have served the Jews well. Since biblical times they have been associated with self-
esteem despite adversity. We can surmise that Jewish self-esteem has contributed
to communal solidarity and survival, as well as individual success in economics,
culture and politics.
There is no denying that Israel has distinctive traits. The period 1945 to 1967
saw a change in Jewish fortunes from victims to victors, a mass migration of Jews
that recalled the return from Babylonian exile described in the biblical books of
Ezra and Nehemiah, and the uniting of Jerusalem under Jewish rule for the first
time in two millennia. Believers saw all of this in the context of Judaic themes
of redemption. Even non-religious and anti-religious Zionists also saw parallels
with the Hebrew Bible (Benvenisti, 1989; Harkabi, 1983).
Modesty may be more than can be expected from a people thought to be
chosen by God.
For those who are not satisfied with a reasonable level of aspirations, as defined
by the country’s resources, an insistence on ever greater achievements in a favoured
field of policy can produce a distortion of allocations. The results may be shortfalls
in the accomplishments of other public policies that are not currently fashionable,
or damage to the private sector as a result of taxes that are higher than in counties
that are its competitors in international markets.
Political intensities attach to several of the items that have long been on Israel’s
public agenda, and intensities do not sit well with dispassionate policy analysis
that seeks a rational balance among competing interests. No one should deny
that economic claims and counter claims also figure prominently in Israeli policy
disputes. Whether those economic considerations do better or not as well in
competing with other considerations prominent in national politics – as compared
to other democracies – is a tantalising question that is beyond the realm of this
chapter.
33
Note
1
My thanks to Mattan Sharkansky, Department of Political Science, University of
Rochester, for helpful comments on an earlier draft.
References
about.com, nd, HDI – The Human Development Index, http://geography.about.
com/od/countryinformation/a/unhdi.htm
Benvenisti, M, 1989, The shepherds’ war: Collected essays (1981–1989), Jerusalem:
Jerusalem Post
CBS (Central Bureau of Statistics), 2011, Statistical abstract of Israel, Table 2-1,
Jereusalem: Central Bureau of Statistics
CBS (Central Bureau of Statistics), nda, Publications and products, www1.cbs.gov.
il/reader/cw_usr_view_Folder?ID=141
CBS (Central Bureau of Statistics), ndb, Statistical abstract of Israel 2011, Table 2.7,
www1.cbs.gov.il/reader/
Chazan, N, 1986, Ghana: Coping with uncertainty. Boulder, CO: Westview Press
Crocker, CA, 1981, South Africa’s defense posture: Coping with vulnerability, Beverly
Hills, CA: Sage Publications
Folkman, S, 1984, Personal control and stress and coping processes: A Theoretical
analysis, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 46, 4, 839–52
Coelho, GV, Hamburg, DA, Adams, JE, 1974, Coping and adaptation, New York:
Basic Books
Ha’aretz, 2010, 9 November, www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/
netanyahu-to-obama-jerusalem-is-not-a-settlement-1.323825
Ha’aretz, 2011, 21 June, Amos Biderman
Harkabi, Y, 1983, The Bar Kokhba syndrome: Risk and realism in international relations,
Chappaqua, NY: Rossel Books
OECD, 2015, Gross national income (indicator), doi: 10.1787/8a36773a-en,
www.oecd-ilibrary.org/economics/gross-national-income/indicator/
english_8a36773a-en
IsraelHayom, 2012, 15 January, www.israelhayom.com/site/newsletter_article.
php?id=2676
Moynihan, DP, 1975, Coping: On the practice of government, New York: Vintage
Books
Schaefer, RH, 1986, Coping with life crises: An integrated approach, New York:
Putnam Press
Sharkansky, I, 1999, The promised land of the chosen people is not all that
distinctive: On the value of comparison, Israel Affairs, Winter–Spring
Sharkansky, I, 2002, Israel’s State Comptroller and public administration, in DN
Menahem, Public policy in Israel, pp 133–50, London: Frank Cass
Simon, H, 1976, Administrative behavior, New York: Free Press
State Comptroller’s Office, 1991, State audit and accountability, Jerusalem: State
Comptroller’s Office
34
State Comptroller, nd, The State Comptroller and Ombudsman of Israel, www.
mevaker.gov.il/serve/homepage.asp
Urbach, ET, 1987, The sages: Their concepts and belief, Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press
US Census Bureau, 2012, The 2012 statistical abstract: The national data book, Table
1406, Washington, DC: US Census Bureau
35
TWO
Policy analysis evolution in Israel:

building administrative capabilities
Jennifer Oser and Itzhak Galnoor
Introduction
This chapter examines how policy analysis has evolved in Israel over time in
relation to governmental public administration. The main question we will address
is how policy is formulated and policy-making capabilities have evolved over
time in Israel, despite the relative dearth of policy analysis as formalised practice
in the public sector. We address this question by examining governmental public
administration in its broadest meaning, focusing mainly on the civil service for
which government ministers have ministerial responsibility.
The civil service is first and foremost a state institution, and due to its
permanence and continuity it is in some ways even more representative of ‘the
state’ than elected institutions. In the Israeli context this raises several questions:
is the weakening of the state also evident in the civil service? Has the relationship
between the civil service and the political echelon changed over time? Is the
Israeli civil service capable of making an autonomous, professional contribution
to better policy-making?
Since the governmental civil service plays a key institutional role in making and
executing policy decisions, this chapter begins by examining the evolution of its
role and functioning. We first review the basic elements of public administration
in Israel, and then contextualise this description in comparative perspective in
order to assess the changes that have taken place in Israel since the founding of
the state. Subsequently, we review shifting sector boundaries between the public,
private and civic spheres. A consideration of these boundaries provides the context
of the trend toward privatisation, meaning the shifting of responsibility from the
governmental–public sector to other spheres. To consider privatisation and its
limits, two cases in the 2000s are considered – the attempt to start the privatisation
of the prison system, and the tender for international consultants to outline a
strategic plan for Israel’s socio-economic future. Since these cases are so recent to
the time of this writing, the assessment of their ultimate impact on policy change
is necessarily speculative in nature. These examples, however, serve as useful
windows for gaining insight about key factors that have influenced the evolution
of policy analysis in Israel, and will continue to do so in the foreseeable future.
The chapter concludes with a consideration of how administrative capabilities
in Israel can be developed in the years to come.
37
Even though it is beyond the scope of this chapter to add to the literature that
attempts to define the term ‘policy analysis’ (compare Howlett and Wellstead,
2011, 613), a definitional note is in order. The evolution of policy analysis in Israel
in this chapter is analysed through the lens of the evolution of the administrative
capacities of public institutions and public officials who are charged with the
responsibility of policy analysis and implementation, broadly defined. This
scope is intentionally broad, drawing on recent insights that the work of high-
quality policy analysis is not generally conducted by technocrats using formal
policy analysis techniques (such as cost–benefit analysis) but rather by ‘process
generalists’ working in an institutional environment that develops individual skills
and organisational learning over time (Howlett and Wellstead, 2011).
An overview of public administration in Israel1

It has been claimed that politics is the art of the possible; if this is so, then public
administration is the institutional mechanism which makes politics possible
(Galnoor, 2011, 12). We should therefore begin with an overview of this
mechanism. In a democratic system, it is the elected officials – the politicians
and no one else – who are accountable to the public for carrying out collective
missions, and for producing public goods. To carry out the public functions for
which elected officials are ultimately accountable, executors are required, and
these are the civil servants.
A prime area of commonality between politics and public administration
is that in democratic regimes the legitimacy of the political system, as well as
its management mechanism, is rooted in efforts to achieve common goals. In
addition, ‘politics’ in the conventional sense also exists within public administration
since bureaucrats in public offices are not immune from managing conflicts.
However, two simple distinctions are crucial for understanding how politics
and public administration differ. First, political and administrative processes are
fundamentally different due to the fact that politicians are elected, whereas civil
servants are appointed. Second, power struggles in the political realm are more
external and directed at mobilising support, whereas power struggles in the realm
of public administration are primarily intra-organisational.
In Israel, the civil service performs three main functions. First, to participate
in the process of policy-making and to take responsibility for its implementation.
Second, to provide services to individuals, groups and organisations. Third, to
establish and implement the regulatory function of overseeing tasks performed
by others in order to protect the public interest and safeguard individual rights.
While the ‘civil service’ narrowly defined as state employees still plays a central
role in carrying out these three functions, one of the main developments in
Israel over time is that organisations outside of the confines of the governmental
civil service ministry are increasingly carrying out all the above listed functions.
A useful distinction for our purposes is to assess to whom the organisation is
accountable in political-administrative terms.
38
Policy analysis evolution in Israel
Three main categories of organisations must be taken into account in order to

understand the political-administrative capacity of the state in context. The first
of these three categories – public sector organisations – are further delineated in
Table 2.1. In particular, this table demarcates the distinction between governmental
public administration organisations in the executive branch which together
constitute the civil service, as distinct from public sector entities that are not part
of the executive branch.
Table 2.1: Public sector organisations in Israel

Governmental public administration (civil service)
Governmental ministries and subsidiary units
Statutory authorities
Government corporations
Service provision to individuals, groups and organisations
Nongovernmental public administration1

Office of the President
State comptroller
Knesset administration
Bank of Israel
Public administration in local authorities2

Departments
Municipal corporations
Notes
1
This category sometimes includes the ‘national institutions’ – the Jewish Agency, World Zionist Organization, Jewish National Fund, Keren
Hayesod/United Israel Appeal and its affiliates – as well as the institutions of higher learning, health funds and religious institutions.
2
In addition, there are municipal nonprofits as well as associations formed by several local authorities for purposes of sharing services.
Table 2.1 shows that the civil service is only one part of the public sector. It is
therefore necessary to have a broader picture of the institutions which constitute
the ‘public sector’ outside the executive branch. Namely, nongovernmental
public administration and the local authorities are both prominent public sector
organisations in Israel that operate beyond the boundaries of the civil service.
This categorisation is intended to provide a framework for understanding the
different bodies that are responsible for governmental public administration,
broadly defined.
The development of the civil service in Israel

Understanding the evolution of the relationship between policy analysis and the
civil service over time requires a clear snapshot of the civil service at its inception
in Israel. Initially, the civil service was part and parcel of the political party
structure, which created inherent difficulties in fulfilling the distinction between
39
politics and public administration. The close connection between political parties
and the civil service at the founding of the state has, by necessity, had an impact
on the civil service’s complex and subdivided organisational structure. It also
affected civil service performance in all three functions of government described
in the previous section – policy-making, service provision and regulation. In
short, professional non-ideological policy analysis was rather rare in that period
(Galnoor and Blander, 2013).
In the early years of the state, the Israeli civil service dealt with almost every
task, similar to new states whose social and economic institutions are evolving,
but even more so due to a number of special circumstances: integrating scores
of new immigrants, building an army, constructing new towns, developing and
managing water resources, promoting industry and providing services to an ever-
growing population. Even as these tasks kept governmental departments extremely
busy carrying out state functions, senior public bureaucrats also assisted political
leaders with their policy-making tasks.
Despite its structural stability, the Israeli civil service has undergone significant
changes since its inception that have emerged from two transformations in Israeli
society. First, the standard of living in Israel has increased dramatically to be on
a par with other developed nations, which has led to increased demands from
citizens for better services from government ministries. Second, the state and its
institutions have weakened over time. Consequently, the political-bureaucratic
system that dominated the state in the early years and penetrated all social spheres
has gradually surrendered its monopoly to new institutions – the economic market
as well as social organisations.
In some senses, the weakening or contraction of the state and its institutions is
characteristic of the evolution of a state-in-the-making. An example of a policy
area that has experienced a contraction of state involvement is the reduced direct
governmental involvement in handling immigration and the absorption of new
immigrants. Initially, this task was the responsibility of governmental ministries,
the Jewish Agency and the Histadrut. In the 1990s, the public coffers still bore
the cost of absorbing the wave of immigrants from the former Soviet Union and
Ethiopia, but the task was increasingly handled by nongovernmental and social
organisations, as well as the local authorities. Yet, in the twenty-first century, it is
clear that the central government still affects all aspects of the lives of Israeli citizens,
and therefore the importance of its policy-making capacity has not diminished.
For example, a glance at the State Budget Law reveals that it deals with a vast
range of issues, in addition to the classic tasks of the state of maintaining the rule
of law, defence, and taxation.
Contraction of the Israeli civil service and the state: changing

sector boundaries
Despite the continued involvement of the state in a broad range of policy issues,
the scope of activity of the governmental civil service in Israel has contracted
40
significantly over time. State expenditure constituted some 30 per cent of GDP
in the 1960s, reaching a high of approximately 80 per cent after the Yom Kippur
War in 1973 (Galnoor, 2011, 44). Public expenditure decreased significantly by
1990, to 56 per cent of GDP, but even with this steep decline Israel was still placed
second highest (behind Sweden) on the rate of state expenditure in comparison
to 23 OECD countries. However, public expenditure as a percentage of GDP
in most OECD countries has grown in recent years, whereas in Israel it has
continued to decline to 45 per cent in 2010, which was lower than 16 of the 23
nations surveyed (Ben-David, 2011, 57–8).
Concurrent with this decline in public expenditure, a major institutional shift
has taken place in the division of labour in comparison to the first three decades
when public activity was shared by the government, the Histadrut and the Jewish
Agency, with these three partners comprising about 50 per cent of the national
product (Barkai, 1964, 25). The turning point took place in 1985 with a new
economic plan, after which a process of privatisation began as part of overall
reform of the government market structure (Galnoor, 2015).
An important component of the new economic plan in 1985 was ‘The
Arrangements Law’, which was designed to allow the Finance Ministry to take
drastic measures to overturn policy made by the Knesset in order to ensure
economic stability at a time of unprecedented financial crisis. Though instituted
as a short-term fix to an unusually dire economic situation, the Arrangements
Law was never revoked, and over time the Finance Ministry has consistently used
it as a powerful tool for instituting or cancelling policies by bypassing regular
processes of democratic legislation. Structural changes instituted through this
law have at times included matters only tenuously related to the Arrangements
Law’s stated purpose of facilitating long-range efficiency. The ascendance of the
Finance Ministry as a policy actor following the economic crisis of 1985 went
hand in hand with an ideological effort to enhance the market economy at the
expense of the welfare state.
The state contraction is clearly reflected in the human resources employed by
the governmental public sector. Between 1950 and 2005, the number of civil
servants increased from 22,885 to 60,527, but the number per capita decreased
by a factor of 2.2 (Galnoor, 2011, 25). Since the 1980s, ministries have shrunk
due to contraction of the core civil service, while other components have simply
been eliminated. These numbers however can be partly misleading because some
employees of government ministries were transferred to authorities or government
corporations, and because the number of nonpermanent civil servants employed
through contractors has increased considerably. Still, the overall picture is clear:
government ministries accountable to ministers have significantly diminished in
size over the years. In addition, some public services are now provided jointly
with private and third sector organisations, so even the label ‘public sector’ has
become less clear. Some praise this change on the grounds that it reflects greater
efficiency, while others view it as damaging to the scope and quality of services
provided by the state to citizens.
41
In sum, since the 1980s, public policy-making in Israel has taken the same
direction as in Western democracies writ large: reduced involvement of the state
in the economy at the expense of public welfare services. The push for this change
came from a number of factors, including public pressure to improve services in
exchange for taxes, globalisation trends that created pressures on governments
to open the economy to competition, an increased tendency to rely on market
mechanisms for the provision of public services, and the rapid development of
technology that enabled new administrative processes (Galnoor et al, 1999, 117).
Differences between countries aside, Israel has experienced changes in public
administration which have been prevalent in advanced democracies in general,
including the following:
• Ideologically, the monopoly of the state has been increasingly challenged in all
arenas.
• Institutionally, independent organisations created to carry out state functions,
known as ‘quangos’ (quasi-NGO’s), have become more common and more
prominent.
• In terms of state budgets, governmental funds have been transferred to private
business firms and nonprofits to provide services on a contractual basis,
leading to the increased prevalence of extra-budgetary public authorities and
government corporations.
The main implication of these changes for policy-making is that the boundaries
between the public, private and third sectors have become blurred in terms of
the responsibility and capacity for deciding upon, designing and implementing
policy. In the 1960s in Israel, sector boundaries between the government,
society and the private economy were almost non-existent, given the strong
presence of a centralised government, a developing business sector, and a very
weak autonomous civil society. Over the years, political parties lost their pivotal
position in shaping the public agenda, and in their place came influences of public
bureaucratic mechanisms, the media, and a variety of interest groups (Nachmias
and Sened, 1999, 28). In the current era, the boundaries have shifted: the scope
of state tasks continues to narrow given the contraction of a traditional welfare
state; the economic market has become increasingly dominant, both ideologically
and practically; and civil society and the third sector have prospered and have
replaced government services in many fields.
All of these shifts have taken place to some degree in most advanced democracies
in recent years. In Israel, however, they have been fairly dramatic and rapid given
the initial dominance of the governmental public sector. While the growth of
civil society worldwide in recent decades has been referred to as an ‘advocacy
explosion’ (Berry and Wilcox, 2007) and an ‘associational revolution’ (Salamon,
1994), the relatively vibrant civic life in contemporary Israel is particularly
remarkable in comparison to the Israel of only 30 years ago. Independent extra-
parliamentary activity was not encouraged in the early years of the state, and
42
a series of unsuccessful attempts to pass a law governing associational activity

shows governmental efforts to control civic activity (Hermann, 1996; Yishai,
1991). Yet, the government’s tendency to restrict the right of association has been
challenged over time by civil society activity on behalf of freedom of association
(Kabalo, 2006).
The subsequent liberalisation of civic associational regulation led to a rapid
increase in the number of civic associations beginning in the mid-1970s, and
an increased willingness to challenge the state (Yishai, 2003). A new generation
of Israeli political activists came of age which led to the appearance extra-
parliamentary activity in the 1970s, along with the Black Panthers movement
in the early 1970s, post-1973 war protests, and the prevalence of mass rallies on
a range of social and economic topics (Gidron et al, 2004; Hermann, 2002).
Although the degree of autonomy and influence of Israeli civil society is open to
debate, its capacity for democratic engagement has increased considerably since
the founding of the state (Oser, 2010; Silber and Rosenhek, 2000).
The summer protests of 2011 are a recent and prominent example of the call
from citizens and social groups for changes in the social-economic policy. Indeed,
these protests exemplified objections to the contraction of the state and support
for reinstating welfare services as well as opposition to the private sector influence
on governmental policy-making. The public outcry led to the establishment
by the government of the Trajtenberg Commission in the wake of the protests
(Hermann et al, 2012, 69).
The policy claims of the protesters were wide-ranging, as was the list of policy
changes recommended by the Trajtenberg Committee. Protesters demanded a
decrease in the cost of living for middle and lower classes, increased investment
in public housing and education, health and welfare and the reversal of the
growing regressive tax system. In addition, more general claims were raised to
strengthen the welfare state, to stop privatisation and outsourcing, and to take
social solidarity into consideration in establishing national policy. The Trajtenberg
Committee’s recommendations directly related to many of the protesters’ claims,
and the government confirmed the report in October of 2011. Yet, at the time of
writing (in mid-2015), few of these recommendations have been implemented,
and the ultimate impact of the protests on subsequent policy-making is yet to be
determined. What is clear, however, is that the protests evidenced changes in the
perceptions of the public regarding citizens’ direct participation in policy-making,
and their demands for a stronger presence of the state in policy-making regarding
central issues of social and economic policy (Galnoor and Paz-Fuchs, 2015).
Privatisation: examples of changing boundaries and policy

implications
The reason for discussing privatisation here is that one of the assumptions
underlining this policy is that rather than building policy analysis and administrative
capabilities, it is better to shift responsibility to the non-governmental sectors,
43
either private or non-profit. Yet, the governmental sector and its policy-making
capacities in Israel are not simply ‘crowded out’ by the increased capacity and
breadth of the private sector and civil society. Rather, privatisation is a deliberate
attempt to change the public policy-making structure and processes. Policy analysis
is of course still performed when policy-making responsibility is shifted to the
nongovernmental sector, and the primary authorities for conducting the analysis
become the private or nonprofit actors who have gained responsibility as a result
of privatisation. Without sufficient governmental accountability, however, the
public sector may lose the capacity to weigh in on policy change over time, and
to regulate these nongovernmental actors accordingly. Therefore, in addition to
providing an overview of general trends of Israeli privatisation policy, this section
also presents two examples that test the boundaries of state responsibility: the
attempt in the 2000s to begin privatising Israeli prisons and the growing trend to
outsource Israel’s socio-economic planning to international consultants.
Privatisation is the most meaningful, wide-ranging and consistent reform
in the political-administrative system in Israel since the 1980s, with major
implications for policy-making and policy analyses (Galnoor, 2015). Privatisation
can be understood as the redefinition of the responsibilities of the state, by
shifting the public sector boundaries, in one or more of the following elements:
transferring assets, goods and services from the management or the financing of
state organisations to profit or to non-profit organisations through the transfer
of ownership (for example, selling a government corporation); cancelling or
decreasing financing from the state budget (for example, institutions of higher
education); cancelling supervision over selling a product (for example, foreign
currency); or changing regulation practices (for example, cell phone regulation)
(Galnoor et al, 2015). Without opening here the broad (and rather ideological)
discussion on whether functions of the state should be privatised, several cases
in Israel have raised the question of whether privatisation has in effect begun to
cede significant areas of inherently governmental functions, including policy-
making and implementation, to non-governmental bodies with inadequate or
nonexistent government oversight.
The first example is the attempt to privatise a prison in Israel in the 2000s.4
Prisons in Israel operate within the framework of the Ministry of Interior
Security, and prison workers – like police officers – are civil servants subject to
ministerial responsibility. In 2004, the Ministry of Finance initiated a legislative
amendment aimed at establishing a pilot private prison. The Israeli variant of
prison privatisation proposed by the government was among the most complete
in ceding state authority to a private business company including financing,
planning, building and management – a model copied from the prison system in
Texas in the United States. The government proposed several potential benefits
to privatisation, including the improvement of prisoners’ conditions along with
budgetary savings. The pilot was legislated by the Knesset, but it was challenged
by a petition to the Supreme Court in which the petitioners claimed that even
if the government’s positive expectations were fulfilled, the prison system is a
44
special public good which must remain under the complete responsibility and
governance of the state (Galnoor, 2015).
In 2009, the Supreme Court of Israel made a precedent-setting decision by
ruling that a private prison in Israel was illegal, thus positing that the imprisonment
of citizens and the protection of their rights is the responsibility of the state. In
essence, much like the public good of collecting taxes and running a court system,
it would simply not be possible to write out a contract that would completely
detail how privatised prison workers must operate in each situation that would
arise. Privatisation of this sort could potentially lead to an undesirable influence
of financial interests over decisions of citizens’ rights. The Supreme Court’s
decision clarified that a main concern regarding the potential implications of the
privatisation would be ceding policy decisions on preserving prisoners’ rights –
a sensitive state function – to for-profit companies. The profit motive of these
businesses would potentially clash with the public’s interest of taking responsibility
for prisoners who are inherently vulnerable and marginalised members of society.
Beyond the specific details of this case, what could be the impact of the Supreme
Court decision on policy analysis in Israel and perhaps elsewhere? First of all,
it requires a much wider vista of state responsibility than mere economic cost–
benefit calculations. When scholars who opposed prison privatisation warned
against the emergence of private ‘prison industry’ (Timor, 2006) the predictions
of deregulation, reduced supervision and longer prison terms seemed entirely
imaginary. The so-called ‘kids for cash’ scandal that erupted later in a Pennsylvania
county in the USA showed the dangerous outcome of the prison privatisation
policy. Juvenile offenders were punished for minor offences with incarceration
rather than community service or suspended sentences to provide ‘customers’ to
the private prisons (Ecenbarger, 2009). Eventually two judges were sent to prison
for receiving bribes for their good services from the private prisons companies.
Second, the lesson from this case is that privatisation does change the method
of structuring the relevant information for policy analysis and limits the scope of
the choices for policy makers (Gill and Saunders, 1992). When the overriding
assumption is that governments do not know how to manage and therefore the
first (and sometimes only) choice is to contract out, there is no more room for
public policy analysis. In Israel, the Supreme Court ruling led to the specific act
of closing the door to prison privatisation. At the same time, this ruling led to
the more general act of opening a new door for facilitating the discernment of
overarching principles that determine whether or not an inherently governmental
function is suitable for privatisation.. Moreover, even though the Supreme
Court decision by definition could not create a general policy for other areas,
it established a precedent that the burden of proof for the economic and social
worthiness of privatisation rests on the shoulders of the state.
The second example of testing the boundaries of the state was a tender in 2011
for an international consultant firm to prepare Israel’s socio-economic strategic
plan. This example raises fundamental questions regarding policy analysis and
policy-making. Vigoda-Gadot and Cohen (2011) describe this tender as the
45
‘privatisation of policy-making’, and ask whether the privatisation of the process

of developing strategic plans and thus formulating or even determining policy
is in fact ‘one step too far’.
In addition to the general influence of business practices on the public sector
in advanced democracies within the framework of the New Public Management,
Hood and Jackson (1991) coined the term ‘consultocracy’ to describe the increased
power of external management consultants over democratic governmental systems
and decision-making. In other words, there has been an increased reliance on
private consulting companies for the purpose of receiving advice – and often
guidance as well – on public policy-making and implementation. In the above-
mentioned tender Israel’s government has joined other countries in embracing
this approach.
The use of international consulting firms is not a new phenomenon in the Israeli
public sector. For example, in 1988, the Israeli government adopted a ‘Master
Privatisation Plan’ which was developed by ‘First Boston Bank’, an American
investment bank. This plan suggested criteria and techniques for privatising
governmental corporations. In just a few years, this plan served as a basis for the
privatisation of 25 governmental corporations, including some of the largest and
most prominent companies in the Israeli economy (for additional examples of
the extensive involvement by international consulting companies see Deloitte
and Touche, 2001).
In March 2011 the Prime Minister’s Office published a tender for the sum of
NIS 3.5 million requesting consulting services for the development of the state
of Israel’s socio-economic strategy (Ben Simhon-Peleg, 2011). The tender by
definition limited the potential applicants to international consulting companies
by establishing the requirement of prior experience of consulting to a foreign
government or an international state corporation or entity like the European
Union. The ‘Rand Corporation’ won this tender, and is expected to develop a
two-pronged long-term plan: first, to improve the processes of strategic economic
planning with a particular focus on increasing long-term planning capacities; and
second, to assess the strengths, weaknesses, threats and opportunities that face the
Israeli economy in the 15 years to come (Vigoda-Gadot and Cohen, 2011, 8).
The decision to ‘privatise’ such high-priority domestic tasks can be seen as
a move to overcome internal and external criticism of the lack of long-term
thinking and strategic development in Israel compared to other advanced
democracies. To be sure, there is also external pressure, such as the demands
of the OECD to carry out certain reforms in order to meet minimal standards
to gain membership into the organisation. However, the decision to outsource
Israel’s socio-economic strategic planning raises a number of questions regarding
the long-term development of public policy in Israel, including responsibility for
setting the agenda, and the degree of oversight of consultants over the policies they
suggest. In fact, critics of the tender have noted that it bypasses the institutional
responsibilities of existing governmental bodies to supplement the strategic
planning of public institutions such as the National Economic Council with the
46
kind of uncoordinated advice sought in this tender (Vigoda-Gadot and Cohen,

2011). Likewise, the Governor of the Bank of Israel who is legally mandated to
serve as an advisor to the government on economic matters was not invited to
assist in this plan and has not participated in it (Hazani, 2011). The act of bypassing
such central public institutions brings us full circle to the opening overview
discussion of public administration in Israel, and the delineation of specific public
sector organisations in Israel in Table 2.1. As in any organisational bypass action,
the implications for the public sector organisation include weakened authority,
lessened organisational experience, and decreased budgetary and operational
capacity. Each case in which these key public sector organisations are bypassed in
favour of private actors, this results in the weakening of public sector organisations
at the same time that private actors are strengthened.
The cases of privatisation efforts reviewed above are by no means unique in the
Israeli context. An additional example is the call from the Minister of Improvement
of Government Services to a number of consulting firms to propose standards of
service in governmental units. Hiring international companies for preparing a
strategic plan implies an orientation which will necessarily be international and
global (Ben Simhon-Peleg, 2011) and there is no guarantee that the perceptions
of the advisers will reflect the needs and socio-economic context of the Israeli
society. It can be claimed that even with the use of international consultants on
the strategic development of a project this sensitive in nature the government
remains ultimately responsible for making decisions. Yet, outsourcing the public
discussion of such a central governmental responsibility to private consultants is
akin to outsourcing Israeli democracy with an emphasis only on the final product.
This kind of privatisation of strategic advice is by no means unique in other
countries as well. In response to these kinds of privatisation efforts in New Zealand,
Jonathan Boston (1994) reviewed a number of key theoretical considerations
about the ‘limits to contracting out’ when nations choose to purchase policy
advice. Although concerns for efficiency or effectiveness are often invoked as
the motivating factors behind the choice to contract out such advice, Boston
reviews a range of potential pitfalls that must be considered, including the potential
lack of relevant expertise and/or trust, the risk of opportunistic behaviour, and
higher ‘transaction costs’ of hiring external experts. Even though this important
topic has received relatively little attention by scholars in the field, a recent study
of outsourcing strategic policy advice in Estonia (Raudla, 2013) is particularly
informative for the Israeli case. In addition to fleshing out how the problems
reviewed by Boston (1994) manifested themselves in a single case study, Raudla
(2013) identified an additional problem that is highly relevant to Israeli policy
analysis: the difficulty of contracting out for strategic advice in small countries,
in which the potential market for actual competition is greatly reduced, thereby
increasing the likelihood of opportunistic behaviour and/or lack of appropriate
expertise. The Estonian case highlights another key problem that is highly relevant
to the concern of building administrative capacities: contracting out for advice
led to a fragmented and inconsistent reform plan that also hindered the public
47
service’s capacity to learn from past iterations of the policy process in order to
manage and lead necessary reforms.
In sum, as boundaries between the governmental–public, business–private,
and civil society–nonprofit sectors have shifted in recent years, there is greater
need to clarify the responsibility for policy-making and implementation in
contemporary democracies. Extensive privatisation can be beneficial in terms
of short-term results, but can also create problems in terms of the long-term
capacity of public administration to develop policy analysis writ large. It could
hinder the development of internal policy-making mechanisms, and is therefore
likely to leave the public sector lacking in terms of the skills, experience, and
the capacity to carry out this work on its own. In the examples above the state
has evaded its responsibility for core areas of its activity under the pretence of
being merely assisted by others or by experts, while retaining the final say for the
outcomes. States that do not perform such inherently governmental functions
cannot regulate them well, simply because the public interest is gradually removed
from the policy-making equation.
Conclusion
In comparison to the unusually strong state-centred model regarding the
responsibility for policy analysis and implementation at the founding of the state,
it can be argued that Israel is now more similar to other advanced democracies
in the more balanced roles of different sectors. The presumption that policy is
set and carried out only by official public authorities is no longer valid, when
in practice many organisations in all three sectors carry out complicated policy-
related activities. However, Israel still lacks the policy-making capacities that
would accompany an effective civil service with a clear division of responsibilities
between the political and administrative echelons.
It is not incidental that the review of policy analysis evolution in this chapter
paid close attention to recent cases of privatisation. In many ways, the shift of
governmental responsibility and activity to the private sector – to both business
and nongovernmental organisations – is the main way in which policy analysis has
evolved in Israel in recent years. Israel is on par with other advanced democracies
regarding increased privatisation since the mid-1980s. However the Van Leer
research project cited above shows that privatisation has been a consistent policy,
regardless of which party has been in power, even in the absence of any evaluation
of the results of this policy. Moreover, the process of privatisation in Israel was
rapid without complementary steps to strengthen regulatory governance in order
to guard the public interest. The resulting ‘regulatory deficit’ is likely to harm the
Israeli government’s policy-making capacity to advance the welfare of its citizens
(Levi-Faur et al, 2015).
While reforms instituted in most western democracies since the 1990s have
emphasised the effective management of public institutions as an integral part
of administrative capacity-building (Fukuyama, 2004, 122), attempts at overall
48
reform in public administration have not yet succeeded in Israel (Galnoor, 2011;
Galnoor et al, 1999). We therefore conclude by proposing a number of reforms
that would strengthen the capacity of the state in conducting policy analysis and
implementation.
Past failures at civil service reform have led to a vicious circle of doubts regarding
the feasibility of broad reform: an unstable political system leads to controversial
political decisions, causing frequent changes of ministers and directors general,
which in turn contribute to lowered standards and diminished public trust in
politicians and administrators, alike. With the backdrop of increased privatisation,
this vicious circle leads to an erosion of administrative capacities.
The first prerequisite for implementing civil service reform would be the
creation of an agency within the executive branch that would be granted the
authority to launch and sustain reform for a significant period of time – at least
ten years. We suggest the establishment of a Public Administration Department
headed by a minister with extensive authority over the civil service and public
sector reforms. Restructuring the civil service to build administrative and policy-
making capacities would entail four key elements:
1 legislation: enacting a ‘Basic Law: Civil Service’ in order to constitutionally

anchor the civil service in the executive branch, and to integrate existing laws
and fill in gaps where necessary;
2 structural changes: redefining the basic structure and ministerial responsibilities
in the executive branch, in government ministries, in statutory authorities, and
in government corporations. The reforms would create autonomous executive
agencies, and set clear guidelines for regulation and deregulation;
3 deregulation of authority: decentralising the current structure by delegating
authority from the Finance Ministry divisions to other ministries, and from
these ministries to executive agencies and local authorities;
4 budgeting: ending the Budget Division’s monopoly over the budgeting process
to increase transparency in all stages of the process, foster discussion about
the alternative options for socioeconomic policies, ensure the professional
contribution of the ministries, and abolish the arrangements law.
Considering the changing role of the Finance Ministry in Israel over time, it
comes as no surprise that two of the elements reviewed above (deregulation of
authority and budgeting) are directly related to balancing the growing power of
the Finance Ministry with other administrative capacities of the state. Delegating
authority would arguably reduce wasted resources by producing sounder
ministerial planning, and increasing incentives for creative and effective policy
making and public management. Structural reform in the budgeting process as
suggested above would reform the processes and tasks related to the budgeting
process, as well as the public perception of lack of transparency and democratic
accountability in the budgeting process.
49
A necessary step in carrying out these structural changes to build administrative

and policy-making capacities will be to redefine the civil service itself, and
transform ministries into professional policy units. Central to the success of this
transition would be the creation of a cadre of senior civil servants as a professional
corps that would include the directors general, and the directors of statutory
authorities and the echelons below them. The training and development of
this kind of an elite corps of public administrators would break the current
departmentalisation within the civil service and increased general administrative
and policy-making capacities. In an era where the sharp distinction between
public and private management has come to a close, the collaboration between
sectors described by Donahue and Zeckhauser as ‘collaborative governance’ (2011)
requires advanced training and ongoing professional development of civil servants
throughout the public sector. In the face of increased privatisation in Israel in
recent years, however, this kind of broad proposal for public sector reform has
become a necessity for building the policy capacity of the state.
Notes
1
This section is based on Galnoor (2011).
2
The claim was presented by the Human Rights Clinic of the Academic Center for Law
and Business of Ramat Gan in the High Court of Justice claim 2605/05, Academic
Center of Law and Business and others versus the Minister of Finance and others.
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52
Part Two
Policy analysis by the executive
and the legislature
THREE
Policy analysis in Israel’s central

government: latest developments and
challenges ahead
Gal Alon
Abstract
Recent years have seen a sharp increase in the number of policy professionals
serving in the Israeli government. The sixth floor of the Prime Minister’s
Office accommodates more than 30 employees working in policy units, crafting
government strategies and providing professional analyses. New policy planning
departments are being set up all across government following new incentives and
regulations introduced by the Civil Service Commission. Since 2006, ministries
have been presenting their annual performance plans and the requirement for
outcome and output indicators was recently adopted by the Budget Department
at the Ministry of Finance.
This chapter explores the current state of affairs on the Israeli government’s
road to improving its performance. It presents the current policy structure of the
PMO before delving into the actions taken across government between 2006 and
2012. Reforms were designed both to create an infrastructure for policy analysis
and to establish routines for policy planning. However, it is unclear whether the
Israeli government moved to a culture of performance management or created
performance bureaucracy, as there is no systematic measurement of the reforms’
outcomes. The chapter sets two challenges that lie ahead: the need for greater
incentives to use professional policy inputs and the necessity of professional
training to keep policy units effective and influential.
Introduction
The Israeli public service was modelled after its British predecessor. But whereas
Britain and several other OECD countries have been through several structural
reforms (see, for example, the Ibbs Report [HMSO, 1998]), until recently, Israel
paid little attention to the way its public service functioned. In the US, an executive
order issued in the 1970s led to the appointment of Under Secretaries for Policy
Planning and Evaluation in most federal departments. At the same time, in Britain,
the first central Policy Unit was set up at 10 Downing Street by Prime Minister
55
Edward Heath. Similar reforms intended to improve government capacity to

deliver better outcomes have been instituted in several other OECD countries.
In Israel, there have been three major attempts to pursue structural reforms
in government, all of them ending with marginal, incremental changes. The
first of these was the Kubersky Report published in 1989. Headed by a former
director-general of the Ministry of Interior, the Committee sought to devolve
authority to ministries, strengthen their capacity for policy analysis, design and
delivery, and simplify internal bureaucracy (Kubersky Report, Government of
Israel, 1989; Galnoor, 2011). It recommended setting up units in each ministry
to focus on policy and evaluation and to create a central unit for policy analysis
under the Government Secretariat. Four years later, the cabinet approved its
recommendations ‘in principle’ (Government Resolution 1240, 1990), but most
of the practical recommendations were shelved for almost three decades.
The second attempt to introduce significant reform in central government
was in 1995. State Civil Commissioner Itzhak Galnoor devolved elementary
managerial authorities to several ministries, assuming that authority would help
them deliver their outcomes. It was argued that the inability of ministries to
manage their own staff (recruit employees, promote them, and define their roles
and responsibilities), was preventing directors-general from managing change and
delivering outcomes. How can ministries lead contested policy reforms when
they have no authority to prioritise their budgets or change job titles of their
employees? Policy analysis should eventually lead to action, but action requires
authority. The hopes for a new era faded as Galnoor’s successor reversed the
reforms several years later.
The latest attempt to reform the public service was in 2001. A newly appointed
taskforce for Civil Service Reforms set up in the Prime Minister’s Office published
a series of proposals – to be consigned to the State Archives only a few months
later. The founding principles were similar to Kubersky and Galnoor: devolving
authority to ministries, strengthening their internal capacity for policy analysis, and
helping them deliver. However, with the early fall of Ehud Barak’s administration,
these efforts were also shelved. While western governments were trying to reinvent
government following the pioneering thinking of Osborne and Gaebler in 1992,
Israeli executives could barely revise their employees’ job titles.
Remarkably, all three reforms targeted a similar weakness in the Israeli
government. Ministries were preoccupied with micro-management of resources,
instead of designing and evaluating policies. They had limited authority to make
decisions on appropriation or regulation and had almost no professional capacity
for policy analysis, policy design and policy delivery. There was rarely a policy
unit that tracked outcomes, analysed data, evaluated programmes and facilitated
change. It was not research that was lacking, but a culture of synthesising data
and inputs from various sources into a coherent policy proposal, and making
informed decisions on appropriation and regulation.
The lack of policy capacity in central government emphasised the dominancy
of the Budget Department, the Accountant General, the Legal Advice Unit and
56
Policy analysis in Israel’s central government
the Civil Service Commission in setting priorities and making policy tradeoffs.
All four internal regulators (often defined as ‘the Quartet’) have powers vested
in them by Parliament. Thus, not only the Accountant General approval was
required for every significant joint venture ministries initiated (such as ‘Birthright’
that funds a free trip to Israel for young Jewish people), but it was also needed for
ridiculously insignificant transactions (such as a $100 gift to retired officials). Fears
from corruption turned the legal advisors into a dominant power in approving
funding criteria, so that even the Prime Minister could not allocate funds to
exceptional proposals of cities.
The latest effort to improve the way government functions began in 2006 with
a low profile low expectations approach, and virtually no committees. Unlike
previous efforts, the first goal was to strengthen the ministries from within, not
to weaken the internal regulators at the Ministry of Finance or the Ministry of
Justice. Changing the balance of power by reinforcing the spending ministries
was defined by former Prime Minister Ehud Olmert as a key element for success
(2007). The strategy designed by his Director-General Raanan Dinur, Head of
Policy Planning Department Ehud Prawer, and the author focused on building
capacities, establishing routines and providing incentives. Instead of a ‘top down’
approach, it created a ‘bottom up’ infrastructure for planning and evaluation.
Policy planning and policy analysis are related but not identical. The efforts
to bridge the gap between the two can be seen in various governments, but
the methods and language used by policy units are still different to those used
in Mintrom and Williams’ definition of policy analysis (2012). In the US, the
Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) of 1993 makes no mention
of ‘policy analysis’ or ‘alternative approaches’, nor does the GPRA Modernisation
Act of 2010. In the UK, the ‘Strategy Survival Guide’ published by the Prime
Minister’s Strategy Unit in 2004 relies heavily on research and analysis, but
major emphasis is on outcomes and effectiveness. The methods developed by
OECD countries are also outcome-based (2007). The Israeli case followed its
international counterparts, and not the academic narrative as taught in the Israeli
public policy schools.
Box 3.1 presents the guiding principles and the building blocks of the reform
that has been implemented by the PMO since 2006. The effort was directed
at ‘leveraging government’s capacity to define and achieve its goals, as part of
deliverable reform of planning, management, execution, and monitoring’ (PMO,
2008). Although policy analysis was not stated as an objective, the ability of
ministries to define outcomes, explore alternatives, gather data, and decide on
trade-offs was almost equivalent. Back in 2006, the Israeli government did not
even know how many children at risk received state support, how many classrooms
should be built or what training is currently needed in the labour market.
57
Box 3.1: Parts of the internal guidelines written and revised in the
PMO from 2007–09
Goals and tasks: Reforming the Israeli government
(Version No 9, dated 17 March 2008)
Goal: To leverage government’s capacity to define and achieve its goals, as part of
deliverable reform of planning, management, execution, and monitoring. The Ministry
will be at the centre of this reform.
Strategy: Creating a balanced package of shifts in the allocation of authority, scopes of

responsibility, and work routines, leading to fundamental reform in the performance of
the Ministry and the functioning of Government.The package will include gradual changes
to strengthen capacities, institutionalise procedures, and create incentives, backed by
binding government resolutions and parliamentary legislation.
Major shifts:
• Strengthening the Head: creating incentives and building capacities for outcome-
based policy making; creating incentives and building capacities for monitoring
outcomes, while pursuing self-evaluation of policies; adjusting budgeting procedures
and budget structure to the concepts of planning and evaluation.
• Strengthening the Body: expanding Ministry authority by devolving significant
powers from the Civil Service Commission, Budget Department, and the
Accountant-General; improving the quality of new government employees by
changing the recruitment, promotion and compensation procedures.
• Strengthening the Legs: transferring most of the operational activities to
independent executive agencies.
Key objectives:
1 Authority and responsibility: expanding the authority and responsibility of the

Ministry’s Director-General.
2 Planning: building policy capacity, planning procedures and an evaluation framework
in central government.
3 Budgeting: adjusting budgeting procedures to support planning and evaluation,
while reflecting national priorities.
4 Monitoring: strengthening procedures of monitoring implementation, while shifting
the focus from resources to outputs.
5 Execution: moving government units to an evaluated, outcome-based framework
of executive agencies.
58
Before describing the transformation in the ministries, further elaboration on

the new structure within the Prime Minister’s Office is required. Clearly, the
PMO’s capacities were an essential prerequisite for changing government as a
whole. To create a solid ‘backbone’, one policy unit was re-created, one policy
council was founded, and the entire structure and methods were redesigned. As
of today, three policy units and two policy councils operate in the Israeli PMO.
Three of them report to the Director-General (Department of Society and
Government, Department of Interior and Development, and the Department of
Economics and Infrastructure) and two report directly to the Prime Minister (the
National Economic Council set up in 2006 and the National Security Council
set up in 1999). During the Olmert administration, the number of employees in
these policy units tripled.
The transformation was not welcomed by all. The new reality sparked a fierce
battle between the Prime Minister’s Office and the Ministry of Finance. In 2008,
the Director of the Budget Department refused to send his staff to meetings
at the PMO, arguing that decisions on appropriation can only be made at the
MOF. At the same time, the newly established NEC issued a paper that sought
to revolutionise the way budget decisions are made. Notably, policy units at the
PMO approved their policy recommendations directly in government – sometimes
against the will of the MOF. The ability of the PM policy units to provide quality
analysis of policies, compare alternatives, and recommend changes in appropriation
or regulation exposed the weakness of other government departments, which
rarely had such capacities.
Figure 3.1: Policy units and councils in the Prime Minister’s Office in 2012
The Prime Minister
National Security Director-General National Economic

Council (NSC) (DG) Council (NEC)
Department of Society Department of Interior Department of Economy

and Government and Development and Infrastructure
There are various differences between the units and the councils (see Figure 3.1).
The NEC and the NSC are more independent in nature (the Head of the NEC
is also the Prime Minister’s Economic Advisor, and the NSC’s status is enshrined
in law). Both Councils also have a relatively high number of academics on their
staff. Practically, they are more likely to focus on long-term challenges and their
occupation with the daily management of government is limited. There has
59
been a long debate in Israel over the impact – or lack of impact – the NSC has
on policy making (Arad and Harel, 2012; Eiland et al, 2011). As for the NEC,
a professional committee found that its ‘long-term advice is not sufficiently
integrated into the government’s work plans’ (PMO, 2012, 16).
The three policy units are monitored by the Director-General and coordinate
several government resolutions every month – but they lack the academic rigour of
the NEC. There is no official borderline between the units and the two councils,
although the units are more involved in the short-term management of ministries’
resources, and each has a list of ministries which it handles. Their methods of
operation echo the UK Prime Minister’s Strategy Unit (2004) and the Delivery
Unit (Barber, 2008). Whereas the narrative of policy analysis involves problem
definition, policy alternatives and selection criteria – the units’ strategic work
places greater emphasis on outcomes, effectiveness and efficiency. The tension
between the two narratives translates into tension between the various units.
The new structure of the PMO was a first step to create greater capacity
for policy analysis in the ministries. Notably, the Israeli public administration
has neither a mission statement nor a written vision. Whereas the ‘Basic Law:
Government’ (dating back to 1968) defines the role of the executive branch as a
political vehicle, the Civil Service laws are occupied mostly with appointments,
discipline and procedures. The words ‘vision’, ‘goals’, ‘roles’ and ‘mission’ are also
absent from the Internal Regulation File (the ‘Takshir’). A conceptual framework
of the civil service’s goals has never been created.
Government is the greatest vehicle invented for collective action. Citizens forego
some of their liberties and contribute production to a common pool of resources
managed by the civil service to achieve these goals. Policy making can thus be
seen as the profession that bridges the gap between election pledges (defined in
outcomes) and government production (defined in outputs and reflected in resources).
Minimising the gap between outcomes defined and outcomes delivered can be
seen as the goal of government. Holding government accountable for effectiveness
by measuring the ‘outcome gap’ turns the civil service into a vehicle for public
change.
Reducing the outcome gap was officially defined by the PMO as its goal. From
a point in which almost none of the ministries could set measurable outcomes,
today almost all of them prepare and publish annual performance plans and
around half have functioning policy units (see Figures 3.2 and 3.3, prepared by
Roei Dror of the Prime Minister’s Office). The roles of these units vary between
ministries, but their horizontal responsibility for preparing the ministries’ plans
gives them influence in decision making. Mintrom and Williams defined policy
analysis as ‘work intended to advance knowledge of the causes of public problems,
alternative approaches to addressing them, the likely impact of those alternatives,
and trade-offs that might emerge when considering appropriate governmental
responses to those public problems’ (2012, 4). Considering the tension between
pure policy analysis as produced in academic departments and the daily pressures
60
Figure 3.2: Outputs of policy units in ministries today
Prepared assessments
Have a policy unit
Submitted a plan
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
Yes No
Source: Roei Dror of the Prime Minister’s Office
Figure 3.3: Number of policy units in ministries 2006-14

25
20
15
10
0
Before 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 Planned
2006
Policy Units
Source: Roei Dror of the Prime Minister’s Office
of drawing up action plans, policy units are fighting to find a middle way. They
look for ‘what works’, spur innovation, integrate research and data into decisions
but rarely rank theoretical alternatives.
The change occurred first at the PMO itself. Back in 2006, the PMO planned
a $1 billion plan to ‘Strengthen the North’. However, the plan was based on
no data, no predefined outcomes and no delivery plan. Political pressures from
mayors to receive funding ended up with dozens of cities getting insignificant
amounts. Hundreds of millions of shekels were spent without any evidence of
‘what works’. Years later, principles of inclusive policy making were adopted to
61
design policies for holocaust survivors, ‘Welfare to Work’ reforms and a national
Programme for Children at Risk. All of these reforms were based on data and
analysis, as well as collaborative mechanisms. The Programme for Children at
Risk entailed pre-defined mechanisms for defining and evaluating outcomes.
This rarely happened before.
Having said that, most of the existing government programmes are yet to be
modified, and there is no systematic evaluation of the overall progress made in
data-driven policy making. Nevertheless, the request for outcome and output
measurements has become a common practice among civil service professionals.
The Ministry of Welfare and Social Services expanded its ‘performance venture’,
inviting social workers to proudly show what works (and what doesn’t). The
Ministry of Economy has started to measure the effectiveness of its employment
programmes in the Arab and Ultra-Orthodox sector. Policy units are constantly
asked to lead cross-governmental reforms in the fields of environment, education,
health and economics.
The difficulties of modifying the language and culture of government required
new routines, innovative methods, greater capacities and clear incentives. In order
to track the changes made in the Israeli central government, there is a need to
differentiate between the four. The central government currently has written
methods for policy planning and evaluation; it draws on two sources of capacity
to manage the task (internal policy units and licensed consulting firms); and it
follows two annual routines that require continuous analysis and evaluation. As
the years passed by, there was, however, a lack of incentives for professional policy
making: apart from sympathy and professional support, there were no real public or
financial rewards for cutting ineffective expenditures and focusing on what works.
The Israeli experience shows that changing the way government works requires
a ‘soft power’ paradigm rather than an authoritarian one. Ministries were not
obliged to opt in the new reform, but they realised the advantages of doing so.
Under such circumstances, the need for tangible incentives is even higher. This
might explain why the ‘soft power’ paradigm has changed in recent years, as
the PMO has become more of a regulator than an ally. In certain fields, such
as reducing the burden of regulation, the PMO will have a dominant role in
approving ministries’ plans. The consequences of this shift remain to be seen.
Nevertheless, the methods, capacities, routines and (lack of) incentives stayed
largely in place.
The methods developed in Israel echo the US Government Performance and
Results Act (GPRA) of 1993 and the ‘Strategy Survival Guide’ issued by the
UK Prime Minister’s Strategy Unit in 2004. Historically, under Ariel Sharon’s
administration, government ministries were required to present a list of goals
and rank their delivery in a ‘traffic light’ model: red for ‘failure’, yellow for ‘in
progress’, and green for ‘delivered’. There was no distinction between outcomes,
outputs and processes, and no central framework of policy analysis to evaluate
performance in terms of efficiency and effectiveness.
62
The lack of a conceptual framework was evident in January 2007, when the
directors-general of all ministries were asked for the first time to present their
plans. There was not even one similar concept between the Ministry of Defence’s
relocation of army camps to the Negev, the Ministry of Energy’s efforts to reduce
water consumption and the Ministry of Health’s efforts to better regulate health
providers. Following that experience, the need for a cross-government method
and language of performance was clear, as well as the need of a national dashboard
to manage government. Months later, an inter-ministerial taskforce began to
draft the first Government Planning Manual (GPM). A first version, edited by
the author, was published in December 2007 (PMO, 2007). The fourth version
was published in 2013, edited by Dr Michal Tabibian-Mizrahi and Roei Dror.
The GPM integrated several methods in one, non-binding paper. It introduced
the Annual Circle of Planning (ACP) and synced it with the Annual Circle of
Budgeting (ACB), so that policy analysis would feed decisions. It defined three
hierarchical levels of long-term planning and differentiated between measurements
of process, output and outcome. It also provided tools for strategic assessment
and evaluation of spending priorities based on effectiveness (outcomes/outputs)
and efficiency (outputs/resources). Methods of policy analysis were part of the
resources explored for the preparation of the GRM, but they were less relevant
in comparison with other methods used by the British and the American
government.
The basic guidelines presented at the GPM have been widely adopted and
implemented across Israeli central government. As of 2014, 27 out of 29 ministries
have published their annual performance plans and 14 ministries prepared a
strategic assessment at the beginning of the year. The PMO invested significant
effort in communicating the new language. Since 2007, the GPM has been
distributed in hundreds of copies, explanatory software has been distributed to
hundreds of public officials, and dozens of seminars have been held to spread
the language of outcomes and outputs. Thus, when the government wanted in
2013 to shrink regulatory burden on businesses, the need for clear outcomes
was enshrined in the cabinet resolution. A similar requirement was integrated
into the cabinet decision to design new policy for the inclusion of the Ethiopian
community in 2014.
Two annual routines are widely followed by government ministries in Israel, as
designed by the ministries themselves. The first routine leads to the preparation of
a strategic assessment in April, before each ministry begins its budget negotiations
with the Ministry of Finance. The underlying idea was to strengthen the capacity
of management to think of future policies while the MOF is willing to listen.
The second routine leads to the publication of an annual performance plan in
December, which includes indicators and milestones for delivery. At that point,
the budget is approved and delivery begins. Notably, these routines have been
partially voluntary since 2006. There is no formal obligation to follow the ACP.
Nevertheless, most senior managers in government have realised that taking their
63
policy commitment seriously brought them benefits in their relationship with

the PMO’s team.
Another routine was cancelled a short time after its introduction. Whereas the
ACP set up annual routines, the PMO’s team was eager to make policy analysis
and evaluation compulsory by changing the way government resolutions are
submitted. This reform was submitted to the Cabinet on 14 September 2008.
Resolution No 4085 was approved unanimously. It required each proposal to be
categorised, so that any appropriation of NIS 30 million or more would include
process, output and outcome indicators. The government’s commitment to
‘inclusive, accessible and transparent’ routines of ‘planning, budgeting, evaluating
and monitoring’ – was enshrined for the first time.
A new template for future resolutions was adopted, along with clear definitions
of the responsibilities of the Government Secretariat, the PM’s Delivery Unit,
and the PM’s Planning Unit. The technical implications of the decision were
incorporated in new software developed in the PMO to track cabinet performance.
The system, entitled ‘Government Delivers’, was intended to enable the Prime
Minister to finally manage the government. Up to that point, nobody had tracked
the delivery and impact of cabinet resolutions. The lack of assessment had direct
implications on the demand for data. However, this pioneering effort to monitor
the delivery and effectiveness of government resolutions eventually perished after
the government transition in 2009. Its only remnant was the categorisation of
government resolutions, which will enable them to be better managed.
The third dimension of the transformation taking place in the Israeli government
has to do with capacities. As stated in the Kubersky report (Government of Israel,
1989), the Prime Minister’s Office and the ministries themselves lacked the
professional capacity to define and monitor outcome measures. The language
of outcomes, effectiveness and performance was still obscure for the heads of
department and was rarely taught in academic departments of public policy. As
concluded by the International Committee for the Evaluation of Public Policy
and Administration Departments, appointed by the Israeli Council for Higher
Education, ‘Israeli public affairs programmes need to do a better job preparing
people with these skills’ (CHE, 2011, 7). The lack of trained staff to work closely
within top decision makers and spread the methods of performance management
and policy analysis has inhibited progress for many years.
There were two alternatives for capacity building in government: establishing
policy units with professional staff (as historically recommended in the Kubersky
report) or hiring external consultants. Both routes were taken in 2008, though
the latter materialised much quicker than the former, triggering justified concerns
of privatised policy making (Paz-Fuchs and Bensimhon-Peleg, 2014). In only a
few months, the Government Procurement Administration (GPA) had published
a central competitive bidding for consulting firms, which provided bureaucratic
and financial incentives for ministries willing to lead the change (GPA, 2008). As
for the policy units, three years were to pass before the Civil Service Commission
(CSC) published new guidelines and job descriptions for policy units across
64
government (CSC, 2011). Bureaucratic assistance to bypass normal regulations

of procurement and hiring was a resounding success. Today, half of the ministries
have policy units and many others hire consulting firms to support their policy
planning and analysis work.
The integration of methods, capacities and routines enabled the PMO to prepare
the first delivery report of the Israeli government in mid-2009. The figures showed
that ministries achieved around three fourths of their key milestones and outputs
– even though some milestones were achieved only after significant delays and
others were far from ambitious. This was at once surprising and encouraging:
surprising, since many feared the figures would be much worse; encouraging,
since there was finally a basis for analysis and improvement. The very existence
of milestones, outputs and outcomes opened the way for new analytical capacities
within ministries and between them.
The new measures affected directly and indirectly a variety of spending
programmes. In light of a massive relocation of army camps to the Negev, the
Ministry for the Development of the Negev and Galilee was leading a cross-
governmental policy-making process to fulfil the regional growth potential.
Several policy units were involved in the process, and a consulting firm was
hired to analyse data and make recommendations. The plan was integrated in the
planning routines of various ministries and presented with clear measurements.
The Programme for Children at Risk was required to report its outcomes on
a regular basis and built a national database for community programmes and
children’s progress. The integration of measurements among welfare providers was
reinforced by the work done by the policy unit at the Ministry for Social Services.
At some point, the GPM was adopted by the Budget Department at the Ministry
of Finance, which asked its staff to propose outcomes to any proposal they make.
This is first and foremost a cultural change. While progress is certainly made,
it is unclear whether the new outputs translate to real outcomes. The effort to
build an infrastructure for performance management needs to be subject to the
same analysis and evaluation as any other investment in government. However,
the failure of the PMO track its own performance (State Comptroller, 2015)
makes it difficult to assess the impact of the reforms and find ways to make them
work better. The amount of data collected and presented is indeed rising, but it
is unclear whether decisions have been changed following the resources invested
in planning. As there is no measurement of the change in government outcomes,
assessing the effectiveness of the new infrastructure is almost impossible. Notably,
such a framework is also missing in other OECD countries developing similar
concepts.
In light of these changes, there are two challenges facing the Israeli government.
The first concerns incentives provided to ministries in order to make decisions
based on rigorous analysis. Directors-general who invest resources in improving
their policy performance benefited from the sympathy and support of the PMO
– but were granted no powers to manage their own resources. As evident from
65
Box 3.1 (see p 58), the devolution of managerial powers was the undelivered
element in the 2006–09 reforms. One might argue that ministries must invest
in policy analysis regardless of their ability to use the outputs of the analysis, but
this does not correspond with the reality of government.
Policy capacity and managerial capacity cannot be separated from each other.
In recent years, the plethora of procedures required to approve any appropriation
and regulation has become a major barrier for change. Investment in policy
analysis is rendered useless when decisions are taken by internal regulators who
have the de facto ability to change policy recommendations or even ignore them,
no matter how much analysis was done. Internal regulation was rightly set up to
guarantee an impartial public service. It was never meant to leave ministries with
no authority to hire, reward or dismiss employees, to reallocate their existing
budgets, or to make decisions as part of their procurement procedures. The 2008
PMO document defined four internal regulators with powers essential to enable
ministries to fulfil their public responsibilities, but little has so far changed:
• the Budget Department at the MOF still has to approve every transfer of funds
between thousands of budget items;
• the Accountant-General in the MOF still has to approve every procurement
transaction, especially those not open for public bidding;
• the Legal Department still has to approve any new criteria for appropriation
or any new regulation proposed by the Ministry;
• the Civil Service Commission still manages the ministry’s hiring procedures
and approves every promotion or structural change.
The lack of coherency between public responsibilities and formal authorities has
been repeatedly mentioned as a key barrier to more effective management in the
Israeli public services (Shapira, 2001; Ben Bassat and Dahan, 2006; Olmert, 2007;
NEC, 2009; Galnoor, 2011). Since effective management requires better policy
analysis, one can assume that greater responsibilities will trigger ministries to invest
more time and resources in improving their decision-making processes. In 2011,
the Trachtenberg Committee for Social and Economic Change recommended
the appointment of two reform committees to consider the delegation of powers
to ministries. In June 2013, both reports were submitted and approved by the
cabinet (Resolutions 481 and 482). Their implementation is underway.
Incentives can also propagate from the public. Senior decision makers in
government need courage to define what government should be doing with
its limited resources – and what it should not. The output of policy analysis
often requires them to make tough decisions that levy certain costs on a specific
group. By nature, when public resources and liberties are at stake, every change
creates friction. Some changes have a redistributive impact, either a vertical
one (redistribution between different classes or groups) or a horizontal one
(redistribution between different ages or generations). Every decision has winners
and losers. Professional analysis, innovative solutions and greater authority can
66
hardly replace the courage needed to change existing allocations, ineffective or

inefficient as they may be.
There are very few public rewards for making tough decisions or integrating
professional policy analysis into policy making. Senior officials are not assessed
by the outcomes of their units; they are rarely asked to report on performance;
and their employment contract has no indicators at all. Academic institutes and
the press neither ask decision makers to discuss their performance nor publicly
track and report it. Lack of discussion naturally reduces the need for professional
policy analysis, which is seldom perceived as a necessary resource in managing
a ministry. Public discussion can provide an incentive to change and reward
proponents of change. This might also replace the suspicion that all too often
develops into hostility towards every reform.
A second challenge faced by the Israeli government is the one of training its
future policy analysts. As elaborated in another chapter in this volume, government
currently has dozens of training programmes operated mostly by external
providers. Some of them have been changed in recent years due to their inability
to support the reforms described here. The Israeli academic departments for
public policy are mostly detached from government routines and challenges. As
stated by a former director-general of a major government ministry, ‘In order for
policy units to impact on government, they must be capable of finding solutions
and not creating problems.’ There is an urgent need for a different training that
integrates academic and practical skills. It needs to unite government around
evidence-based, practical solutions and not only write analytical papers suggesting
what should be done. This was well propounded by the international evaluation
committee of public policy study programmes in Israel, headed by Steve Kelman
of Harvard University.
The words chosen by the International Committee evaluating Israeli academic
departments for public policy reflect the challenge for the entire policy
infrastructure created in government. In its report, the Committee stated that the
Israeli master’s programmes ‘need a dramatic shift of emphasis away from a liberal-
arts approach limited to explanation and understanding to a professional one with
significant elements of prescription and action’ (CHE, 2011, 7). The Committee
called for a reorientation of the curriculum toward professional education,
expressing their fears that ‘the problems of cynicism and blinkered viewpoints in
some of the programmes’ resulted from a ‘non-professional approach’.
Teaching and training are essential elements in improving policy analysis
in central government. The lack of integration between strategic planning as
performed in government and policy analysis as taught in universities does no
good to either field. Policy units operating in ministries need policy analysis in
order to produce effective solutions. Academic departments must know how
government functions in order for policy analysis to be useful. The absence
of government-related materials from academic curricula makes it difficult for
public policy schools to understand and affect the way policy is made. The lack of
academic input to government policy routines makes it difficult for government
67
to discover what works. Teaching and training are therefore major requisites for
better policy work in Israel’s central government.
Recent years have seen significant progress in the quality of policy making
procedures in the Israeli government. Policy units, performance plans and strategic
assessments are now part of the government’s narrative. The changes described
here reflect a transformation in at least three dimensions: structures, procedures
and capacities. They incorporate many of the analytical components from the
theory behind policy analysis; 25 years after the Kubersky report was approved
by the government, some of its key recommendations have been implemented
by the Prime Minister’s Office.
The investment needed to build such a strategic infrastructure is considerable. It
requires new employees, expensive management time and direct expenditures on
consultants. Whereas outputs can be measured in the rising number of papers and
plans published by government, little has been done to assess their effectiveness
in terms of ministries’ outcomes. The desired impact is mainly the reduction of
the outcome gap between what government plans and what it delivers. Whereas
the first is heavily influenced by the collective will as reflected in elections, the
latter was defined by the Prime Minister’s Office as the goal of the civil service.
Another impact can be defined as the change in terms of budgets and regulations
ministries decided on.
The lack of clear indication of outcomes poses a major threat. The level of talent
in the top echelons of Israeli government is remarkable. If senior managers do
not perceive policy units as being capable of helping them perform better, they
will be less likely to invest resources in supporting them and time in listening to
them. If policy analysts cannot help government close the ‘outcome gap’, they
will eventually be displaced in the decision-making rooms and find themselves
in the back corridors.
There is however a long way to go. The formal methods, capacities and routines
might improve the level of policy analysis in Israel’s central government, but
formality is not always associated with substantial impact. The lack of systematic
evaluation leaves questions open on the effectiveness of these steps. The onus
is on the PMO’s team: if the value for ministries is not significant, the entire
infrastructure will slowly lose ground. Keeping the ‘bottom up’ approach, creating
meaningful incentives, and re-designing the less-effective elements should enable
government to enhance its policy infrastructure and gradually close the gap.
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70
FOUR
Local government and the challenge

of policy analysis
Nahum Ben-Elia
This chapter aims to portray, analyse and interpret key issues of policy analysis, of
local government and in local government, affecting the institutional capability
for informed policy choices and responsible policy priorities and decisions.
Fundamental shifts in Israeli public policy during the last decades have
been reshaping the relationship between central and local government, their
responsibilities and competences. The neoliberal paradigm embraced by Israeli
governments since the mid-1980s and its concomitant policies have been
redefining the boundaries of government, organisational modes of action and
the financial basis of public institutions – among them local authorities.1 An
array of explicit and tacit policies have attempted to reform local government –
including spatial reorganisation (amalgamation), changes in financing and service
delivery modes, and more systematic regulatory controls. Policy analysis of local
government refers, here, to the conceptual and factual grounds which have
shaped the central government’s strategy for change and informed its derivative
policies. Policy analysis in local government focuses the attention on the analytical
capabilities of local authorities to assist decision-making processes. For more than
two decades Israel has witnessed the emergence of local government as the most
active and entrepreneurial force in the public scene. A variety of independent and
disjointed forces – political, institutional and economic – has been molding a new
type of local government characterised by greater autonomy, public assertiveness
and functional responsibilities. A de-facto institutional decentralisation has
expanded the role of local government, transforming it into a multi-purpose
entity handling a widespread range of critical services and activities. The need
for well-informed local policies has increased proportionally.
The discussion is set in a quadrangular perspective: policy analysis in central
government, policy analysis at the border of government, external policy analysis,
and local policy analysis. A selective number of concrete cases and issues allows
for the identification of key challenges facing policy analysis of and in Israeli local
government.
71
Local government in Israel: a brief contextual introduction
The municipal system
Local government in Israel is a single-tier system with no regional/meso-level

mediating between the central government and local authorities. It comprises 254
local authorities characterised by high heterogeneity in terms of size, geographical
coverage, socio-economic level, ethnicity and organisational capabilities. Israel is
the only western country that in the last three decades has enlarged the number
of local authorities, a partial expression of rapid demographic growth and political
considerations (for example, the 23 Jewish local authorities established in the
occupied West Bank). The relative large number of local authorities fragments
the national space through a geographical patchwork of municipal boundaries,
lacking a convincing planning or administrative logic. The formal boundaries
define political and functional enclaves of self-perceived local ‘autarkies’, with
limited inclination towards inter-municipal cooperation. They are reinforced by
their economic value. Because of fiscal benefits related to land-use planning and
development (betterment levies, development fees and an expanded tax basis),
the local space is perceived as a financial lever and as a mean for potential growth.
Israeli local government is highly unequal. There are great economic disparities
among local authorities, a composite result of physical characteristics (such as
location, accessibility, the quality of infrastructures), level of development and
fiscal strength. They mirror socio-economic fault lines within Israeli society and
the spatial distribution of the population. Ethnicity plays a role as well, due to
the collinearity between minority status and socio-economic level, as expressed
in the relative economic status of Arabs and Druzes – two main minority groups
encompassing a third of all local authorities (within the pre-1967 borders) and
20 per cent of the total population.
Local authorities in Israel play a key role in the provision of local services. Based
on competence and funding, these services are divided into two main categories:
services characterised by shared (central–local) responsibility and funding – such
as education and social welfare services, and traditional municipal services in
which the local authority holds sole responsibility for their provision and funding.
Due to their size and limited fiscal base, many local authorities cannot guarantee
appropriate services without substantial government subsidies. Compounded by
sustained management liabilities, a result of local political cycles and wanting
professional expertise, a large segment of local government have faced periodical
fiscal crises and required bailout assistance.
Central–local relationships
Central–local relationships have a dual character. On the one hand, there is a

functional axis linking service-oriented ministries and local authorities. As co-
producers of public services and programmes, their relationships are grounded on
72
Local government and the challenge of policy analysis
common interests and, in some areas, on shared professional values. On the other
hand, there is a control axis patterned by Ministry of Interior and the Ministry of
Finance, within a top-down model of regulation and supervision. The Ministry of
Interior is legally responsible for local government, its organisation, geographical
areas of jurisdiction and functional competences. It has the power to establish new
local authorities as well as to initiate their dissolution (or amalgamation). A web
of laws, procedures and instructions define the conditions for local authorities’
expected conduct of affairs, and compliance is supervised by means of external and
internal auditing.2 Notwithstanding these powers and means, the most dominant
force shaping central–local relationships is the treasury. Since the mid-1980s, the
Ministry of Finance has gained disproportional power in determining the state
budget and a tight control over policy and its budgetary implications as well as
spending discipline (Strawczynski and Zeira, 2002; Ben-Bassat and Dahan, 2006).
It has further magnified its policy steering power by means of a legislative device
known as the ‘Arrangements Law’ (the ‘Economic Policy Law’ or the ‘Israeli
Economic Recuperation Law’ in later version). 3
Local authorities are hardly subservient organisations, however. The
uncoordinated nature of Israeli governance (that is, central government as a loose
federation of ministries) and the ubiquity of political (party) considerations in
public decision-making, allow for a surprising degree of local autonomy. Local
government is frequently capable of neutralising, de facto, central decisions
through quiet political negotiations or active parliamentary lobbying.
Policy analysis of local government: analysis from within

In the last two decades central government embarked in a number of policy
initiatives to reform local government structure, competences and management.
Three of these attempts will serve to analyse representative patterns of policy
analysis within government: the urban water reform initiated in the mid-1990s,
the amalgamation of local authorities of 2003 and the Municipalities Bill initiated
in the mid-2000s.
The urban water reform

In 1995, the Israeli government approved a Ministry of Finance’s proposal,
as part of the ‘Arrangements Law’ draft for fiscal year 1996, to transfer the
responsibility for urban water and sewage services from local authorities to
independent regional utilities. It set the issue of urban water and sewage services
no longer in the context of standard, non-profit, municipal services but as public
utilities, self-financed from rates and charges collected from its customers, and
subject to public control and regulation by an independent regulator. An inter-
organisational commission was charged to analyse the basic issues and submit the
required recommendations for the implementation of the adopted policy.4 The
appointment of ad-hoc professional commissions is a typical pattern of Israeli
73
governmental policy-making, as ministerial proposals are frequently approved in

principle, without the submission of an ex-ante informed analysis of options and
implications. The Commission’s final report is of particular interest because it
illustrates the character and content of the underlying policy analysis. The report
is an argumentative device legitimising the ex-ante policy resolution. It challenges
the traditional conception of the discussed services through a neoliberal discourse
in which both the substance and nature of the services are reconstructed (Water
and Sewage Corporation Commission, 1997). Water is no longer a public resource
but a commodity subject to the logic of a market economy. Public responsibility
for delivery is trusted in the hands of dedicated utilities that as independent
‘business units’ can optimise the use of resources while opening venues for private
sector collaboration. 5
Despite serious disagreements among its members, the Commission’s
recommendations provided the legitimacy for translating the approved policy
into legislation. In 2001, regardless of local government’s opposition, the Knesset
passed the new Water and Sewerage Corporations Law. Although a comprehensive
piece of legislation, the law lacked the backing of a sound policy analysis on the
complexities of the implementation, a miscalculation that set the conditions
for a protracted and inconsistent process. Disregarding the complexities of the
corporatisation process and the need for policy learning, by means of analysis and
experimentation, the reform’s implementation evolved into spastic policy efforts
lacking coherence and credibility. It took a decade to bring a majority of local
authorities to accept the corporatisation of water and sewage services, mostly
through financial enticement and legal coercion. The outcomes, though, are
messy (Ben-Elia, 2009a). The number of corporations is far larger than originally
intended and at least half of them are in deficit. These ‘unexpected’ results have
forced the government to initiate a new policy cycle aimed at reducing drastically
the number of corporations. Once again, policy analysis plays a problematic role.
Outsourced professional analysis is requested now to corroborate pre-conceived
assumptions about the existence and benefits of ‘economies of scale’. Complex
organisational and public issues concerning this retro engineering, appear to
become ignored by simplistic, one-dimensional economic analyses.
The 2003 amalgamation reform

At the turn of the century, Israel confronted a serious fiscal crisis that brought
the government to emergency steps. They crystallised in 2003, in an draconian
policy (‘Plan for the Recovery of the Israeli Economy ‘), aimed at downsizing
the state, accelerating market liberalisation, lowering of the cost of labour and
the contraction of social welfare arrangements (Bank of Israel, 2004). It set the
conditions for the revitalisation of dormant initiatives, among them a major
restructuring of local government through a reduction in the number of local
authorities.6 The call for reform was not groundless: there were then serious
questions concerning the large number of small local authorities and their relative
74
organisational and financial capabilities to provide suitable services. An inter-

organisational commission entrusted some years before to analyse the issue of
municipal amalgamation, has already submitted a concrete programme as well
as policy recommendations concerning required minimum size for municipal
accreditation (Amalgamation Commission, 1998). The proposed amalgamations
encountered immediate political resistance from those threatened by the reform,
forcing the Commission to dilute its original recommendation: from 50 local
authorities to 20. Sensitive to the political repercussions, the Ministry of Interior
procrastinated and the proposed changes entered a dormant state.
From a theoretical-methodological perspective, it embraced a multi-criteria
approach as a basis for amalgamation decisions.7 The recommendations,
though, hardly followed the stated approach: there is no public evidence that
the Commission had the required data or an operational model that could meet
the methodological requirements of a multi-criteria analysis. Its proposal for
spatial reorganisation of specific municipal clusters relied on urban-geographical
and land-use considerations, and contextual knowledge of the relevant local
authorities. No analysis was conducted, not even considered, of the potential
implementation issues confronting the proposed changes.
In March 2003, the Cabinet decided to reduce drastically the number of
local authorities by legislative means, proposing the amalgamation of 155
local authorities (58 per cent of the total authorities at that time) into 62 new
municipal clusters. The scheme was based on a policy analysis prepared by a
former Ministry of Finance official by request of a governmental task force headed
by the Prime Minister Office’s General Director and the General Directors of
the ministries of Finance and Interior (Amalgamation Commission, 2003). The
analysis, never made public, embraced nominally the principles (the criteria) of
the 1998 Commission but actually disregarded them. Based solely on the most
accessible data – that is, gross aggregates of current revenue and spending from
current financial accounts, it was geared to show the inefficiencies of the targeted
local authorities and the expected economic benefits of amalgamation. It fitted
perfectly the government’s argumentation.8 Parallel to the submission of the
Bill draft, the Ministry of Interior decided to appoint seven public commissions
(one for each national district), which, based on public hearings and further
analysis of the proposed amalgamation, were expected to provide a list of relevant
local authorities for inclusion in the final legislation. The Commissions shown
unexpected independence; they publicly challenged the government’s reliance
on cost-savings assumptions as a rationale for amalgamation and questioned the
validity of the government’s methodology.9 In sharp contrast to the original merges
proposed by the government, they sustained the amalgamation of only 23 of the
155 local authorities included in the Bill. The gap between these two figures
exposed the weakness of the initial policy analysis embraced by the government
and its conceptual biases. Yet, the more robust analyses conducted by the regional
Commission were soon to expose their own limitations – mainly their disregard
for critical contextual factors affecting implementation.10
75
The Municipalities Bill
In 2007 the government placed on the Knesset’s agenda a new, and long expected,
piece of legislation: the Municipalities Bill. Since the creation of the state, local
government based its status and competences on the Municipal Corporations
Ordinance (1933), a legacy from the British Mandate. The Ordinance was not
a local adaptation of the then legal municipal system in Britain but a colonial
concoction that, by virtue of practical wisdom, resulted in a highly resilient and
flexible framework. Nonetheless, the evolution of Israeli local government and its
increasing complexity set the conditions for a new legislation, a need compounded
by periodical demands for additions and modifications of the 1933 Ordinance as a
result of policy developments and administrative practices. The new Municipalities
Bill was to be the answer to these need and demands.
In the late 1990s, at the time of his exit, the then Ministry of Interior’s legal
adviser was trusted by the Ministry to draft the new municipal bill, a task that he
will share later with his successor. The first stage of this undertaking was devoted
to a policy and legal analysis of contemporary developments of local government
in Western countries and Israel – including central–local relationships, approaches
to local autonomy and central regulation, local democracy and new modes of
management. An inter-ministerial team oversaw the progress of the work. This
background study was never made public. Based on personal communications by
some of those who read the final report as well as on public professional references
by the drafters, it seems that the study was sound and comprehensive. It provided
key principles, concepts and practice modes upon which, paralleling international
trends, a new legal framework could be built.
The bill draft, presented for public discussion in the first half of the 2000s,
seemed to have internalised these promising principles, concepts and modes.
The drafters proffered the proposed legislation as a reformatory effort to promote
local government autonomy, greater accountability, and transparency (Zinger
and Dana, 2009). At first glimpse, the proposed Bill seems to echo political and
administrative decentralisation reforms embraced by most western countries, aimed
to upgrade the role and competences of local governments within a joint system
of intergovernmental governance. It seems to sustain as well new modes of public
management (various components of the New Public Management approach) and
greater accountability. A critical reading of the Bill exposes, though, a perverse
mistranslation and even manipulation of central concepts and values embedded
in these international efforts. They serve as rhetorical devices that allow for a
codification of a consistent set of ideological and normative premises that guided
the central government’s municipal policy for the past two decades. An illustrative
example of this perverse mistranslation is that of local autonomy, a highlighted issue
in the Bill. Modern local government is based on the recognition of the right and
the ability of local authorities, within the limits of the law, to regulate and manage
a substantial share of public affairs under their own responsibility and in the interests
of the local population; it assumes full discretion to exercise their initiative with
76
regard to any matter that is not excluded from their competence nor assigned
to any other authority (Council of Europe, 1985). This dual expression of local
autonomy structures the relationships between central and local government. In
the new Municipalities Bill, local autonomy becomes a mistranslation for reduced
bureaucratic supervision and control. It is not a fundamental right but a granted
conditional privilege based on budgetary discipline – that is, the local capacity
to sustain non-deficitarian finances, the criterion of ‘successful self-management’
according to the drafters. In the financial reality of Israeli local government, the
release from onerous central burdens can only be the privilege of a minority of
local authorities. The background policy analysis provided no deep understanding
of the reasons why most local authorities face chronic financial constraints and
disregarded the fundamental factor underlying these conditions (Blank and Rosen-
Zvi, 2009).11 Legitimising the gradual withdrawal of the state and its commitment
to quality public services, the Bill’s financial blindness is a reflection of the non-
presence of central government. In this legal script, central government plays a
deus ex machina role. Free of any positive responsibility towards local government
and binding duties, its main role is the supervision of local authorities and punitive
intervention in case of ‘unsuccessful’ self-management (Ben-Elia, 2009b).12
Challenged by the effective lobbying of influential mayors who felt threaten by
the proposed restructuring of power and competences among the local authority
echelons – the mayor, the council, and the professional level. The draft never
reached the final third reading and it has remained in a legislative limbo since 2009.
Policy analysis of local government: analysis at the border of

government
Policy analysis at the border of government refers here to analysis performed by
the State Auditor (the ‘State Comptroller’), an institution that maintains an ‘arm’s-
length separation’ with government as auditee. Local government is a subject of
auditing examination by the State Auditor, including central government policies
and programmes and the analysis of horizontal local policy and management issues.
International Supreme Auditing standards nowadays embrace policy analysis as
‘goal achievement’ analysis – that is, the assessment of effectiveness by comparing
outcomes or impacts with the goals set down in the policy objectives (INTOSAI,
2004; Lonsdale et al, 2011). Converging with this trend, policy analysis is an
integral component of State auditing in Israel, mainly at the central government
level.13
Within its formal mandate to oversee local government’s activities and
performance, the State Auditor has produced a substantive analytical body on
the interface between central government and local authorities and on systemic
issues of the national municipal system. Overall, it is a mixed bundle of works in
terms of analysed issues, approaches and depth. At times, there are problematic
issues about internal reasoning, in terms of logical links and standards of assessment
(Dery, 2005). The public importance of the auditing reports, though, cannot be
77
underestimated. In many areas and issues, the responses to audit reports reveal the
extent of policy influence, not only in terms of explicit criticism to government
policies but also by suggesting other policies in their place – the State Auditor
as ‘policy-maker’ (Sharkansky, 1988).
The State Auditor has analysed the allocation policies of central ministries
concerning local government budgeting, periodically reviewing, in the context of
substantive issues, the formulation of these policies and their implementation. Such
is the case of the State Auditor’s analyses of the equalisation grant granted to local
authorities by the Ministry of Interior (Annual Reports, 2000; 2008). Historically
its allocation was an issue of contention because of the lack of transparency in its
determination; the grant was subject to political manipulation and biased in the
past against the Israeli–Arab local authorities. The analyses conducted by the State
Auditor assessed the actual allocation policy in the light of the more systematic
and equitable formulas adopted in past years. They confirmed improvements in
the allocation of the grant but also unresolved issues. What is more important is
that the findings showed clearly that the grant, at present levels of funding, was
incapable of serving its equalising function because of the great fiscal gap between
wealthy and poor local authorities.14
A more recent report on the issue of local municipal services, illustrates the
State Auditor’s emergent shift towards policy formulation assistance. As mentioned
earlier there is an unequal provision of local services across and within local
authorities, in terms of kind, scope and quality, mainly because of financial
disparities. The Ministry of Interior has never institutionalised, as a policy
principle, the public’s right to proper local services nor the right to know what
is being delivered, at what level and at what cost (Ben-Elia, 2006).15 Recently,
the State Auditor produced a dedicated report outlining a services policy, based
on a normative service basket and a built-capacity for service performance
measurement (performance indicators) (State Comptroller, 2012). Internationally
the need for service accountability and comparative benchmarking is hardly a new
idea but in the Israeli context, its advancement is an important public contribution.
The analytical influence of the Auditor’s reports, though, is less clear. Some
of them have had particular repercussion because of the public salience of the
reviewed issues, in terms of risk (for example, the depletion and mismanagement
of water resources) or public integrity (for example, political corruption); others
seem to escape due consideration. In the local government field, the Auditor
seems to have greater impact on procedural, administrative malfunctions, or
issues that expose the incumbents to possible judicial appeals, than on substantive
policy issues. It is possible that what is required here, given the powerful and
authoritative status enjoyed by State Auditor is a focused and steady analytical
effort on key policy factors.
78
Policy analysis of local government: analysis from outside
Policy analysis in Israel has been, largely, an activity conducted outside government,
mainly by independent think tanks and to a much lesser extent by academic-
based research centres. In the last decades, an expanding number of local think
tanks sought to inform public policy, bridging the gap between knowledge and
decision-making. Despite their differences, in term of affiliation, source of funding
and field of interest, these research bodies share two main assumptions. First, that
key issues facing Israel require in-depth understanding and systematic analysis and,
second, that public policy is frequently poorly informed – by itself a compound
outcome of organisational deficits, high-pressure decision-making and a political
and management culture that prefers to improvise ‘facts on the ground’, rather
than a disciplined process which includes analysis and a thorough examination of
alternatives (State Comptroller, 2003; Sharkansky and Zalmanovitch, 2000). Their
organisational mission and their identification of relevant public issues determine
the activities of these think tanks. There is little dependence on government as
a demand source for policy advice. Only a minority of think tanks have defined
local government as a field of interest.
Probably the earliest think tank to recognise local government as a key issue
in the public policy agenda was the Jerusalem Centre for Public Affairs in the
mid-1980s. The Centre produced the most comprehensive study at that time of
local government in Israel (Elazar and Kalchheim, 1988).16 In the following years,
though, the Centre let up its interest in local government affairs as its attention
shifted to other areas. In the 1990s, a new think tank gained substantial prominence
for its leading role in local government policy analysis: the Floersheimer Institute
for Policy Studies, a Jerusalem based non-profit organisation established and
supported by a Swiss donor. Active between 1991 and 2007, the Institute aimed
to research fundamental processes taking place in the multicultural Israeli society
likely to engage the attention of decision makers, to analyse the long-term
implications of these processes and to propose alternative strategies of action.
Despite this wide and ambitious agenda, there were primarily local government
and local governance related policy studies that became its trademark and built
its unique reputation. During its 16 years of existence the Institute produced
over 80 policy studies, the most extensive and comprehensive research effort in
these fields in Israel.17 They reached a wide audience within local government
and central government through effective distribution channels of relevant
publications and well-attended periodic public events (open conferences and
discussion forums). In 2007, funding-related issues brought the Institute to close
its doors. Occasional contributions have been made by other think tanks, even
though local government is not a central issue in their public agendas, such as
the Israel Democracy Institute. 18
The quantitative and qualitative output of these institutions warrant the
question of their impact – that is, to what extent have they been capable of
enriching the policy agenda and informing decision-making? It is extremely
79
difficult to provide a convincing answer since there is no identifiable causal link

between the think tanks’ contributions and concrete policy decisions. They are
credited fingerprints in areas such as public law (some policy studies have served
as supporting evidence for judicial decisions by the Supreme Court), legislative
support (research utilisation by the Knesset’s Research and Information Centre),
and State auditing. It is gratifying to see, for example, a policy study (Ben-Elia,
2006) being embraced and sustained by the State Auditor in one of its annual
policy reviews (State Comptroller, 2012); it is less so to realise its lack of influence
among those ministries in charge of local government policy formulation.
Occasionally, issues and solutions entering the policy-making agendas suggest a
possible link between analysis and policy.19 However, these instances are no more
than a timely convergence of independent streams of ideas (Kingston, 2002)
rather than a causal bond.
Policy analysis in local government

The increasing complexity of local affairs, the continuous demand for improved
services to a growing population and the constraints and dilemmas of changing
financing modes, have forced local authorities to develop a greater capacity for
informed guidance and control. This capacity has been sustained by external
expertise (the occasional support of outsourced professionals), and by internal
development of analytical capabilities. The need for improved internal analytical
capabilities was already recognised in the early 1980s and was translated in a
sustained effort by ‘Joint-Israel’, an entrepreneurial Jewish American NGO
involved in the development of innovative social and community services in Israel.
The central concept was the creation of dedicated internal units (later known
as Strategic Planning Units), capable of supporting policy processes through
informed inputs and more systematic decision-making.20 After a successful pilot
project in a mid-size municipality, Joint-Israel actively supported the expansion
of the project – financially and professionally. In the following decade, 30 units
were established nationwide, covering a wide spectrum of local authorities.21
Some municipalities co-opted the idea independently (for example, Tel Aviv).
The insertion of a dedicated analytical unit within a local authority is a
problematic endeavour. The municipal organisation is based on functional
divisions/departments with limited interactions among themselves. Their
activities stem from specific, at times statutory, mandates, funding sources and
professional affiliations. A dominant profession shapes each division/department
and molds the main interests, the values stressed and the favoured approaches.
This organisational assumptive world evolves into silo thinking, a trait that makes
it difficult to deal with cross-sector issues. The operational perspective focuses on
short-term considerations and the horizon of concern is usually dominated by
the time-span of the annual budget. Operational management eclipses the need
for strategic management – that is, a better understanding of trends, options and
choices. Political cycles and the concomitant interests of a dominant mayor – as
80
directly elected incumbent, and as active head of the local authority – reinforce
short-termism. The Strategic Planning Units have attempted to promote a more
holistic view of the local authority and its public tasks through critical information,
at times counter-information, comprehensive and integrative policy inputs – issue
analysis, scenarios and forecasts. Although subordinated to the mayor but lacking
the functional legitimacy and power of each division/department, the Units’
influence is felt through its capacity to build professional bridges in a proactive
and responsive approach, within the organisation and across organisations, based
on cross-sector issues (or issues without an organisational address). They have been
highly involved on matters concerning local growth, economic development,
services delivery and community integration. They turned, at a later stage, to
reflective policy analysis, through their involvement in the formulation of annual
organisation work plans (Janner-Klausner and Felsenstein, 1997).22
From a wide municipal perspective, the success of these units is inconclusive.
Some of the original Units came to an early end, victims of internal financial cuts
or lack of organisational support. Others seem to have lost their original drive
due to personnel wearing down over time. New Units were established after the
Joint-Israel’s innovative project ended, a development based on internal needs
and despite the lack of external funding support. The total number of units has
remained steady.
Frames
In linguistics, a polyseme is, in the strict sense, a word with multiple related
meanings. It is possible to argue that ‘policy analysis’ as presented here can
be conceived as a polyseme. In each of the four contextual backgrounds, the
meaning of ‘policy analysis’ is different because of the different frames in which
the policy issues are identified, conceptualised and problematised. As interpretative
constructs, frames influence attention, selectively filter new information in the
context of preconceived ideas, provide meaning and inform actions. Institutions
frame issues and problems within prevailing system of beliefs, classifying schemes,
styles of argument and action (Schön and Rein, 1994; Laws and Rein, 2003).
In the case of policy analysis from within – policy analysis of local government
in central government – the framing of this endeavour has been structured by
fundamentals of the dominant neoliberal paradigm, led and sustained by the
Ministry of Finance’s economic and fiscal policies. It permeates all areas of
public interest and challenge the purpose, structure and management of the
public sector, in line with what Peck (2010) has referred to as the ‘roll-back’ of
the state, a restructuring processes focused on the dismantling of institutions,
disorganising alternate centres of power, deregulating fields of bureaucratic
control and disciplining disobedient actors. Local government is also subject of
a paradigmatic reconceptualisation, based on an atomistic view in which local
authorities are no more than quasi-autarchic ‘business units’, expected to rely
81
on self-revenues, to conduct themselves according to economic considerations,

while central government aims at minimum involvement.23
This local version of the neoliberal paradigm frames central–local relationships
and provides a tacit rationale for key reforms.24 It sustains them through a discourse-
based structuring of public issues that logically lead to particular conclusions. Its
vocabulary is extremely effective because by means of a narrow set of leading
‘keywords’ it facilitates conceptual shortcuts, selective focusing on single aspects
of complex issues and economic (heuristic) modes of decision-making. Their
unquestioned reiteration, through multiple means of communication, normalises
them and internalises them in inferred patterns of thinking. Consider, for example,
the concept of ‘economies of scale’, a frequent ‘keyword’ in the government’s
argumentation in its call for local government reforms. The claim that larger
local authorities are more economically efficient and service effective has been a
fundamental premise behind numerous policy initiatives, among them municipal
amalgamation and the corporatisation of local services. Its non-challenged
acceptance would seem to suggest a robust concept, grounded in empirical
evidence. However, the mixed results that emerge from international studies
do not support the proposition (Byrnes and Dollery, 2002), and considerable
uncertainty surrounds local evidence as well (Ministry of Interior, 2006). The
leading ministries, though, are not concerned with evidential validity but with
confirmation and legitimation. In this context, analysis is not intended to inform
policy but to sustain, ex-post, an already adopted course of action.
Analysis at the border of government, that is analysis performed by the State
Auditor, is conditioned by a multicentric conceptual scheme, based on distinct
values and styles of argumentation. Following Pollitt’s classification of the auditors’
roles (Pollitt et al, 1999), it is possible to conceptualise the frame of auditing in
terms of four different and complementary pillars: the law (the State Auditor as
judge/magistrate), accountancy rules and standards (the State Auditor as public
accountant), organisational improvement (the State Auditor as management
specialist), objective evidence (the State Auditor as researcher/scientist).
Compliance to the law and to professional standards of financial accountability
(regularity) has been conventional frames guiding the work of the State Auditor.
An additional value pillar complements and reinforces the principles of legality
and regularity: ‘moral integrity’. The state auditing has not bound itself to a
restrictive view of legal or technical auditing, by law and institutional conviction
it has embraced moral integrity as an integral perspective in the review of
government activities (Sharkansky, 1995). These three frames determine as well,
the expectations of the auditees and the public at large vis-à-vis the State Auditor.
In comparison, the management frame is less consensual. The State Auditor has
implicitly adopted, as most Supreme Auditing Institutions worldwide – some of
them explicitly – the philosophical principles of the New Public Management
doctrine, mainly the principles of economy, efficiency and effectiveness.
By implication, policy and management derivatives condition language and
argumentation, as well as normative and practical reasoning concerning proper
82
organisational conduct and performance. Israeli public institutions, in contrast,

have not embraced the New Public Management doctrine, even if they have been
localised adoptions of terminology and instruments, including local authorities.25
As a result, there is a conceptual and practical lack of synchrony between the
analysis and recommendations of the State Auditor and the discursive, political
and operational world of the national and local public administration. From the
perspective of the final pillar (auditing as research), it is worthwhile to note the
inevitable constrained framing of analysis: mainly focused on ‘goal achievement’,
analysis is framed in the context of a given policy. The Auditor has been critical
of implemented policies when inconsistent or incoherent, but rarely questioning
policy on more fundamentals aspects: why a particular policy has been adopted?
under what assumptions? were other options considered and, if so, why were
they discarded?26 Complementing this issue is that of professional standing. Not
infrequently, audit analyses include professional judgments on issues lacking
disciplinary consensus or robust supporting evidence, tacitly legitimising policy
decisions.27 Policy analysis of local government outside central government, that
is analysis by independent think tanks, is set in a different frame. Despite their
organisational differences and affiliations, all think tanks involved in the policy
study of local government share three common traits: an adherence to scholarly
principles of analytical conduct, a problem-orientation and independence. Based
on systematic methods of inquiry and argumentation, in line with social science
standards, they actively embrace issues of public interest, by means of timely studies
attempting to untangle policy incongruities and outline possible solutions. Their
voice is independent; interested stakeholders do not fund them.28
Despite their impressive output and their willingness to ‘speak truth to power’,
their capacity to influence the policy agenda and the policy-making process is
uncertain. It is possible that this is a particular case of a generic problem – that is,
the lack of clear-cut answers about the success of think tanks at large to influence
public policy. Different think tanks might contribute in shaping public policy
preferences and choices but in different ways and at different stages of the policy
cycle, some through greater argumentation and others through more robust
research (Rich, 2004; Abelson, 2009). In Israel, there are undecided assessments
about the policy influence of local think tanks (Meyers, 2009). In contrast with
recognised references in judicial decisions (at the Supreme Court level), in audit
analyses (the State Comptroller), or in legislative policy briefs (the Knesset’s
Research and Information Centre) it is difficult to establish a direct link between
the produced studies as inputs and policy processes within central government.
It is not enough to ‘speak truth to power’, there must a willingness to listen, to
establish a dialogue. The conceptual and ideological frame, within which central
government formulates and sustain its local government related policies, seems
to be impervious to external influence and dialogue with local think tanks is
practically non-existent. The frame has become a ‘firewall’.29
Policy development within local government is a pragmatic endeavor and policy
analysis is framed largely by expediency considerations. The local authority
83
agenda has a short-term focus as public and operational demands impulses the
decision-makers to react to emerging problems through quick solutions that allow
them to move on to the next set of issues. Most decisions are not dependent on
systematic analysis but on political intuition and professional working knowledge
of municipal subject areas. Under these conditions, there is narrow space for formal
longer-term research and evaluation. Policy analysis is frequently ‘quick and dirty’,
maximising the best available information, and largely based on assumptions linked
to comparative experience and data from similar issues – within the locality or
elsewhere. The incorporation of analytical inputs involves, often, opportunistic
processes, in the context of emerging issues or uncertain options. A more formal
type of analysis is required at special policy cycles, such as the strategic planning
of services or strategic development plans. Analysis here relies in a dual set of
frames. The first one is disciplinary-based and follows the tenets, assumptions and
practices of the relevant professions – for example, urban planning, education,
human services. The second one is less evident, even transparent: it embeds the
local outcomes of the central neoliberal policy. The reversal of the financial centre
of gravity, from central to local revenues, shapes overtly and tacitly the strategic
thinking of local government. The need to strengthen the local fiscal base set
most local authorities in a competitive market for people and investments. Local
development and financial sustainability become a central policy issue and the
subject of analysis and deliberation. Local services are also the subject of analysis
due to the constant tension between supply, coverage and equity and financial
constraints.
Conclusion
The ongoing decline of public services and growing socio-economic gaps in Israeli
society, including regional gaps that add a territorial dimension, render the need
for a new public agenda and a realignment of government policies, national and
local. The complexity of the issues requires informed public decisions pertaining to
the role of government, the division of responsibilities and competences between
and across levels of government, the quality and the equity of public services
irrespective of place of residence, and the fair allocation of public resources. These
decisions also touch on the future of local democracy. Policy analysis has yet to
find effective ways of bridging knowledge and decision-making. Each of the four
reviewed institutional settings engage in different forms of policy analysis but all
of them seem to share a common trait: they have a limited capacity for bridging
– either because of self-inclusive framing or because of a systemic impairment for
dialogue. The problem is compounded by a missing additional mode of policy
analysis: public policy analysis.
In the summer of 2011, under the rallying cry ‘The people demand social
justice!’, hundreds of thousands of protesters in Israel took the streets opposing
the continuing rise in the cost of living, the lack of affordable housing and the
deterioration of public services, such as health and education. It was a massive
84
and unprecedented social protest that presented the most serious ideological
challenge to the dominant neoliberal policies of the Israeli governments. The
need to crystallise social needs into policy proposals compelled the leading protest’s
activists to a reflective recess for analysis and thinking, with the voluntary advice
and support from a wide array of experts (Jerusalem Post, 2011). ‘Thousand Table’
events aimed to hold local roundtables across the country to discuss pertinent
social issues, in lieu of the mass protests, expanded the number of people involved
(Haaretz, 2011). Thus, for a short time, policy analyses became democratised.
Although massive social protests are not ordinary contexts for policy analysis,
it illustrates a convergence point of social reality and disciplinary theory. These
events can be seen as a local expression of Hajer’s observation that ‘policy making
now is as much a matter of citizens (and their associations) and enterprises acting
in a concerted way as it is a matter of direct government intervention’ (2003,
191). It further supports the idea that in modern, heterogeneous and polycentric,
societies, there is need for rethinking policy analysis in terms of practices of
deliberation. If, from an argumentative perspective, policy-making is a process
of deliberation, then, as argued by Dryzek and Hendriks (2012), political systems
need to facilitate multiple deliberative spaces by which policy making can be
informed by a diverse range of argumentation and communication. It is, further,
a prerequisite for the building of public trust – among relevant social actors, and
between civil society and government (Sztompka, 1999). In the Israeli context,
the need for multiple deliberative spaces for policy making has reached a critical
point. Unfortunately, in their resistance to reflection, the central and local policy
systems refuse to recognise the need for opening public agendas to multiple actors
and alternative frames of interpretation, inquiry and evaluation.
Notes
1
By neoliberal paradigm I mean a set of assumptions, concepts, values, and practices
shared by diverse reform policies based on macroeconomic (for example, monetary
stabilisation, fiscal austerity) and institutional (for example, reduced role of the state
in the economy and public services’ provision) considerations. It frames, as we will
see, the issues, modes and uses of policy analysis.
2
Lack of compliance to key administrative and financial rules or cases of gross local
mismanagement allow the Ministry to dissolve municipal councils or to dismiss elected
mayors, an option that has exercised in recent years.
3
As mentioned in a previous chapter, (see p 41), this law, first introduced in 1985 as an
emergency supporting instrument for the Economic Stabilisation Programme adopted
that year, has served since as an omnibus set of bills and amendments regarding diverse
issues of economic concern, as well as a convenient mechanism for rush legislation
on structural reforms.
4
The appointed commission included senior representatives of three relevant ministries
– Finance, Interior and the Ministry of National Infrastructures, a representative of
the Union of Local Authorities and two external professionals – one of them acting
as chairperson.
85
5
This view was a local, albeit independent, expression of an international Zeitgeist. In
the last two decades of the past century the meeting of growing resource constraints
and environmental challenges and the dominance of neoliberal discourse resulted in a
paradigmatic shift: from a state-based paradigm to market environmentalism (Haughton,
2002; Bakker, 2003). The Commission opted, though, to be oblivious of the multiple
models evolving worldwide and their possible relevance (Ben-Elia, 1998).
6
The demand for municipal amalgamation was not a new one. Since the mid-1990s the
Ministry of Finance was pressing for the reorganisation of local government, both as a
component of a larger contraction of the public sector and as necessary step towards
a greater economy in sub-national public spending.
7
These criteria included issues such as allocative efficiency, economic efficiency,
performance effectiveness, enhanced professional capabilities, better service delivery,
improved land use planning, social cohesion and equity.
8
As stated clearly by the government’s proposed bill, ‘the general conditions of the
national economy and the limited resources that can be granted to local government
demand major steps towards a reduction of public expenditures and greater efficiency;
there is serious concern that otherwise the local authorities will be unable to perform
their public-duties as service providers’ (explanatory note of clause 10).
9
The Commissions’ members were senior academics and ex-public officials, most of
them with a proven record in local government affairs.
10
All the conducted analyses failed to consider required supporting factors for successful
merger, mainly : (a) the need for financial assistance to involved local authorities –
most of them suffering from crippling deficits and debts; (b) the management of
staff redundancy even though labour laws protect their security and the municipal
labour sector is part of a powerful trade union openly opposed to massive personnel
reductions; (c) the incorporation of an effective process capable of bridging sociological
and organisational differences among amalgamated localities; and (d) the development
of a positive public climate towards amalgamation.
11
Mainly the untenable assumption that local authorities lacking a sound fiscal base can
rely on self-revenues as primary finance sources, the central government’s reluctance
to provide financial equalisation measures capable to redress the structurally unequal
distribution of resources, and serious inequalities in central funding allocations.
12
The Ministry has developed a powerful arsenal of extreme interventions, including – the
appointment of Financial Controllers, accountable to the Ministry, with full command
of all financial transactions and budget allocations, the dissolution of incumbent councils
or the dismissal of elected mayors and their replacement by convened committees.
For a contextual analysis of this issue, see Kimhi (2012).
13
As stated by a former State Auditor: ‘the State Comptroller, among other things,
addresses the following questions: did the actions of the audited body result in achieving
the goals it set for itself and the implementation of the policy it established? Did it
employ the most effective and efficient means at its disposal? Were the most economical
means chosen for reaching the objectives?’ (Ben-Porat, 1995, 63).
86
14
Although the grant is equitable, the involved sums are not capable of meaningful
equalisation. In 2003 the total grant allocation was severally slashed and its present
amount is still lower than a decade ago.
15
The Ministry of Interior has repeatedly avoided a normative say on the issue of an
equitable normative service basket. Its reluctance to confront the issue of equalisation
is paralleled by the Ministry of Finance concern of potential implication on public
funding and expenditures.
16
Although an impressive piece of work, it is essentially a descriptive analysis of local
government ‘as is’; there is no systematic attempt to analyse critically the policies
affecting local government or the emergent policy trends – for example, the
implications of an unfolding new political (neoliberal) economy and the retrenchment
of the state.
17
They cover a wide range of critical policy issues, including: central–local relationships,
the spatial structure of local government, the finance of local government, local
management and professionalism, the structure, performance and standards of local
services, structural inequalities in the allocation of public resources – between
Jewish and Arab local authorities and between fiscally wealthy and fiscally poor
local authorities, and so on. For examples of this analytical endeavour see the
body of work by Razin (www.fips.org.il/Site/p_publications/list_by_author_
en.asp?AuthorID=477), Ben-Elia (www.fips.org.il/Site/p_publications/list_by_
author_en.asp?AuthorID=439), and Khameisi (www.fips.org.il/Site/p_publications/
list_by_author_en.asp?AuthorID=456).
18
As illustrated by the work on ‘Reform of Local Government’, a policy analysis
advancing the idea of differential decentralisation (Efrati et al, 2004) and ‘The crisis
in local governments in Israel’, a series of policy studies on financial policies and
management (Ben-Bassat and Dahan, 2009).
19
Such, for example, is the case of revenue redistribution among local authorities. In
the early 2013, there were reports in the media about the intention of the Ministry of
Finance and the Ministry of Interior to enforce the redistribution of revenues through
inter-municipal sharing – from fiscally well off to poorer local authorities (The Marker
2013a; 2013b). The policy need for equitable revenues and mechanisms for sharing
and redistribution were discussed in a number of policy analyses conducted in the
past decade and before (inter alia, Ben-Elia, 1998; 2000; Razin and Hazan, 2006, for
an analysis in depth).
20
I was fortunate to serve as senior consultant for this programme, to share its conceptual
development, and to implement, as a field demonstration project, the first municipal
strategic planning in the country. For a participant view by a former director of this
programme, see Forester, 2001, 176–7.
21
At this stage, the units gained the recognition of the Ministry of Interior that, for
some time, assisted in their funding.
22
Beyond its direct organisational contribution as an operational-managerial framework,
the work annual plan was an instrumental device for the Strategic Planning Units
to bring the local authority to analyse critically its current activities through analysis
87
in action. This, in the context of local policy objectives, programmes’ relevance and
effectiveness and resource utilisation.
23
This view was first expressed in a policy report produced in the early 1990s, on the
issue of the general grant as a government funded equaliser (see, Equalising Grant
Commission, 1993).
24
Neoliberalism has an almost hegemonic status in central government policy, not only
because it is embraced and sustained by the most powerful ministry (the Ministry
of Finance), but also because of the absence of alternative institutional perspectives
that can challenge the dominant tenets. Despite its statutory responsibility for local
government, the Ministry of Interior has been incapable of developing an independent
vision and has embraced uncritically the neoliberal precepts.
25
Israel’s reformers never embraced NPM as a conceptual framework for change. The
hegemonic economic thinking has opted for a ‘degovernmentalisation’ of the State –
that is, a deconstruction of the traditional public sector by means of quasi-privatisation
of public entities, ‘contracting out’, marketisation of social services, and de-facto
transfer of responsibilities, rather than internal modernisation.
26
These questions pose an additional one, should professional policies’ formulation rest
outside the State Auditor mandate?
27
See Dery (2005) on the issue of professional judgement and professional legitimacy.
28
Professional differences do exist but they are mainly expression of individual approach.
They are those who analyse policy from an instrumental (ends–means) perspective
while others adopt an openly normative standpoint, questioning not only the proper
means to given ends but what the ends themselves should be.
29
Laws and Rein (2003) argue that once a frame is embedded in policy making,
self-evident and tacitly taken for granted, it resists reflection and can no longer be
problematised or criticised.
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91
FIVE
Policy analysis and

the legislature
Shirley Avrami1
The Israeli parliament (Knesset) Research and Information Center (RIC) has a
unique role in Israeli policy analysis. This role is built upon, among other factors,
the governance system; the young age of the state of Israel and its parliament
in general, and the Research and Information Center in particular; the lack
of soundly based policy analysis methods both in the government and in the
parliament; and the power of the government, especially the ministry of finance.
This chapter describes the background for establishing the RIC, including its
rationale and vision; the building of working methods, understanding parliament
members’ roles and needs and accordingly defining the product, RIC papers
and documents; and branding it as a trustworthy alternative to professional
governmental information, resources, including personnel qualifications. The
main targets, working methods and outcomes are briefly discussed, followed by
insights into RIC’s empowerment of parliamentary activity and its importance
to the young Israeli democracy.
Literature review
According to James Madison, the fourth president of the United States (in
Robinson, 2002), ‘Knowledge will forever govern ignorance, and if a people
would govern themselves, they must first arm themselves with the power that
knowledge brings.’ Robinson pointed out that good research and information
can improve the effectiveness of the legislature along several dimensions of
parliamentary activity. First, research can improve decision-making on specific
policy issues faced by the legislature: reliable facts and analysis can contribute both
to better understanding of problems and to more realistic and effective legislative
solutions to these problems. Second, research can help improve the institutional
dynamics within the legislature. A commonly accepted body of authoritative facts
provided by a parliamentary research service can facilitate political agreement by
narrowing the range of debate to differences in values, rather than disagreements
over the facts of the case. Third, at a political level, the use of high-quality
information by the legislature can add to the perceived legitimacy of its actions.
Fourth, at the constitutional level, research for the legislature can position it
to play a more active role in the national policy process. Legislative research
contributes to a more pluralistic political process; it improves decision-making
and enhances the legitimacy of the legislature; it can contribute to democracy by
93
giving more people in society an effective voice in making decisions about their
own governance.2 Finally, it can contribute to a more democratic temperament
in the policy process. As will be shown later, these advantages of parliamentary
research are also perceived by Knesset members.
Hird (2005) explained that the role of expertise in the policy analysis realm
began to shift markedly in the late 1970s and 1980s with the introduction of a
more heterogeneous set of interest groups, think tanks and others offering policy
analysis as political rhetoric. Many experts and policy researchers began to apply
their expertise in public settings, such as congressional testimony, meetings with
executive and congressional staff and publications aimed at a wide audience.
Weiss (in Hird, 2005) outlined seven different models for research used by policy
makers. Among them, she pointed out, two exist in the political context. Her
political model sees research as enabling policy makers to rationalise decisions
and support previously held views on public policy making, while her tactical
model views research as a tool aimed at increasing the prestige of policy makers.
The role of the professional body is to support decision-making process with
facts and data. However, while such analytic support might bolster previously
held views, as Weiss contends, it could also constitute an impetus for changing
these views. Indeed, parliament members have noted, in several cases, that they
changed their views, or decided to enact or withdraw proposed legislation, based
upon data they received from the Knesset Research and Information Center.
The Research and Information Center: role and origins

The Israeli parliament’s Research and Information Center is a new institution:
it was established in the year 2000, when the speaker of the Knesset at that time,
MK (Member of Knesset) Abraham Burg declared that the parliament did not
suffer from lack of information – this is the information era – but rather, that
parliament members needed an objective, reliable, non-partisan in-house source
of information that they could rely on in their decision-making process. On the
occasion of RIC’s tenth anniversary, the former speaker talked at length about
the background of his idea and the vision that led to his initiative:
Let me tell you how this idea began. At that time, some Knesset
members received parliamentary assistance; I am not talking about
assistance they got from the Knesset, but there were NGOs that paid
for it. Nobody knew why they offered this help and who gained from
it, but I thought these groups and the parliamentary library cannot
be the only sources of information; parliament members should have
an in-house unit which will provide them objective information,
available to all of them.
I realised that we could reduce the excuses, that a Knesset member
would not be able to say, ‘I did not know, did not have the data and
information.’ The modern parliament deals with the most important
94
Policy analysis and the legislature
issues and decisions, and I felt that we were being cheated, we were not
told the truth, we had no professional tool to help us make decisions.
The parliament members were crushed by the most powerful interest
groups, governmental or economic or political; this was the name of the
game, which today no longer exists. There were huge powers who tried
to resist the idea, very conservative [that is, simply rejected any change]
powers, and my perception was to broaden the sources of information.
My vision today, after a decade of activity, is that it will be a tool not only
for Knesset members, as it has become, but also for the public, to judge
whether or not the parliament members actually use the professional tool
provided to them by public money. (Burg, 2010; author’s translation)
Former speaker, Reuven Rivlin (2010), who was a parliament member when
RIC was established and with whom MK Burg consulted, described the reasons
for establishing a research centre within the Israeli parliament, as he, as speaker,
saw them:
Behind the establishment of the centre was the feeling that over the
years a process of gradual degradation had occurred in the Knesset’s
status and in its ability to properly fulfil its tasks. Knesset members were
asked to cope with enormous amounts of unorganised information,
and unfortunately even with attempts to hide relevant information
from them. In the twenty-first century parliaments all over the world,
including our parliament, found it hard to cope with the complex
issues that occupy the public agenda of modern states. Up to a
decade ago Knesset members, having no other option, had to rely
on external sources of information in order to deal with the issues on
the parliamentary committees’ tables… Ironically, they had to rely on
information that stemmed from governmental sources, and in worst
cases they received biased information serving specific interests.
Rivlin pointed out what he saw as the main problem to which an in-house source
of information is the solution, namely the attempts of lobbyists to influence the
parliamentary decision-making process:
Lobbying had become one of the central characteristics of modern

democracy and modern economies. In the last decades there was
a tremendous increase in the number of lobbyist groups in the
parliaments of the most developed democracies; we must deal with
this phenomenon very seriously. The easy accessibility of this biased
information is a slippery slope…this danger must be dealt with in
different ways, such as ethical, legal and law enforcement on the
positive level; parliament must supply its members objective and
independent knowledge agents, namely RIC researchers.
95
The model chosen for the RIC was the CRS – the American Congressional
Research Service, which was at that time almost 100 years old. According
to Brudnick (2011), building on the concept of an in-house information
service developed by the New York State Library and then the Wisconsin
legislative reference department, Wisconsin Senator Robert Lafollette and
Representative John M Nelson led an effort to create a special reference
unit within the Library of Congress in 1914. Later known as the Legislative
Reference Service, it was charged with responding to Congressional
requests for information. For more than 50 years, this department assisted
Congress primarily by providing facts and publications and by transmitting
research and analysis done largely by other government agencies, private
organisations and individual scholars. In 1970, Congress enacted a law
transforming the agency into the Congressional Research Service (CRS)
and directing CRS to devote more of its efforts and increased resources to
performing research and analysis that would assist Congress in direct support
of the legislative process. Joined today by two other Congressional support
agencies, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) and the Government
Accountability Office (GAO), the CRS offers research and analysis to
Congress on all current and emerging issues of national policy. CRS analysts
work exclusively for Congress, providing assistance in the form of reports,
memoranda, customised briefings, seminars, digitally recorded presentations,
information obtained from governmental and nongovernmental databases
and individual consultations. This work is governed by requirements of
confidentiality, timeliness, accuracy, objectivity, balance and nonpartisanship.
The Knesset’s Research and Information Center defines itself in a quite
similar manner. Its aims are to assist Knesset members and committees with
data, information and research, in order to enable them to fulfil their tasks
in the three roles of the parliament: legislation; oversight of the executive
branch; and debates on current issues, issues which are on the public agenda.
Most works done in the centre are written upon demand, either by Knesset
committees or Knesset members. In most cases timetables are very short,
and data are hence gathered from ministries, agencies, professional materials,
academic resources, and so on. It should be noted that data are carefully
examined and crosschecked. This is done especially with data gathered
from governmental resources, especially the ministry of finance, in order
to enable Knesset members to fulfil, with the aid of the RIC documents,
the Knesset role of oversight the executive. When timetables allow, or the
topic demands it, field surveys are being held, including defining research
questions, tailoring questionnaires, processing findings using statistical
methodologies.
96
CRS and RIC, as well as other parliamentary research bodies which were
created in recent decades and exist today in most parliaments, function as think
tanks.3 McGann (2009) defined think tanks as agencies which deal primarily
with public policy research. He claimed that these are organisations that generate
policy-oriented research and analysis on domestic and international issues to
enable policy makers to make informed decisions about public policy issues.
These institutions are structured as permanent bodies, not ad hoc commissions;
they often act as a bridge between the academic and policy-making communities,
serving in the public interest as independent voices that translate applied and basic
research into a language and form that is understandable, reliable and accessible
for policy makers.
Avrami (2011) noted that although CRS and RIC are different in size – CRS
employs 900 workers, RIC only 30 – and in governing system, the two bodies
are very similar in working methods and in the dilemmas they are facing.
The issue of trustworthiness and how it is gained is a very important one when
a think tank, especially in a parliament, builds itself and brands its image. Knesset
members often mention this specific qualification of RIC’s product as a tool that,
since it is trustworthy, releases them from dependence upon external sources.
MK Ahmad Tibi (2010) for example, stated:
The RIC is important as a tool which does not leave the parliament
member captured by data given by the government or by the press. It
is an independent source of comparative analysis, statistics, numbers
and figures, which may empower an MK’s vision or change it, but
always on a solid basis.
MK Ronit Tirosh (2010) added:
I can testify here as a young parliament member. It took me time

to understand that not everyone who suggests data to me gives me
objective information on which I can base my decisions and votes.
Luckily enough, what restores the balance, the sanity, what returns
my faith in the information given to me is the RIC. It actually saved
me, because I understood that decisions based on information from
lobbyists might be wrong and biased. When I read a paper from the
RIC I know I can trust it; I assimilate the data and I rely on it when
I have to make decisions and vote.
A very important point, also raised in MK Tibi’s statement mentioned above,

is the impact of parliamentary research and public policy research activities in
general. In the parliament, the concept of impact has a different perspective
than in other research bodies. As parliamentary researchers, and civil servants,
RIC employees do not wish to have a specific impact on the outcome, on the
actual policy or piece of legislation to be introduced based on their work. They
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do wish, however, to have an impact on the decision-making process: to make

it more professional, to give the parliament a tool which will enable it to have
evidence-based policies. Most non-parliamentary think tanks do wish to influence
the actual policy, the ultimate decision made in the institution to which they
present their papers. This means that their papers cannot, and should not, be
objective, because in most cases the institution has an agenda which leads to its
way of perceiving, processing and introducing the facts. RIC acts in the opposite
direction. It shows the widest available picture on each topic, offering as many
different perspectives as possible and sometimes proposing alternative policy
steps, with their advantages and disadvantages according to experts in the field.
Meyers (2009) asked, does Israel need think tanks? Obviously it does, but it will
take time before policy makers learn their importance and how to use them and
the knowledge that they produce. The use of think tanks’ products as a source of
knowledge is cultural and needs time. Reading Knesset members’ statements after
a decade of RIC’s activity shows that there is a process in which the officials learn
that knowledge exists, and that using it enhances their ability to perform their
roles. Meyer also indicated the cultural part of think tanks’ activities and noted
that Israel familiarity with American political life smoothed Israel’s introduction
to think tanks. According to McGann (2010), Israel stands in twenty-third place
in the world in the number of its think tanks per capita. He noted that the most
important challenge of think tanks is how to make their knowledge accessible
to policy makers; as Avrami (2011) noted, RIC does so by making its products
user-friendly, in order that knowledge will be not only produced, but also used.
Zrahia (2010), a well-known columnist, wrote in a column entitled ‘RIC –
the lobbyists of the public’, that the RIC supplies Knesset members about 500
documents a year. Without them, he said, the public view on issues discussed
would not be presented to decision-makers. He added,
In recent years the status and positioning of the center was empowered,
thanks to the many requests of Knesset members and committees and
the impact the documents made in the press, and the dialogue with
interest groups that followed…It appears that parliament members base
their proposed legislation on models and international comparisons
they find in RIC’s documents.
Alon (2010) claimed that in the past Knesset members did not have the ability
to understand budget details and would get lost in the data. Supplementing the
budget control department with the RIC, as he put it, enables Knesset members
to request an alternative cost assessment to the government’s and decide which
one to accept.
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The centre: structure, manpower, working procedure, aims and

products
Structure
As an institution built upon the model of the CRS, RIC’s structure is quite
similar. It includes several multi-disciplinary teams, each led by a head of team
who is responsible for quality control and the final shaping of the documents. In
2007, during the seventeenth Knesset, the then speaker MK Dalya Itzik initiated
yet another expansion of the structure, namely a budget control department,
which is in charge of all the economic parts of RIC’s activity: papers concerning
macroeconomic issues, descriptions of various economic sectors, cost assessments
of proposed legislation and economical analysis. This department was modelled
on the United States’ Congressional Budget Office, which, as mentioned above,
is not part of the CRS but yet another tool of the Congress, along with the
Government Accountability Office. In Israel the GAO activity is under the
responsibility of the State Comptroller. The RIC assists parliament members
with the Knesset three parliamentary roles, that is, legislation, initiating public
debates and overseeing the executive. The last role may be perceived as the most
important one, not only because it uses critical thinking which a crucial rule
of research in general is, but mainly because this role, much more than the two
former ones, cannot be done in the way it is done in the Knesset, by an external
body. This is due to a deep knowledge and understanding of parliamentary
procedures, which shape the questions sent to ministries in order to get their
overviews and data; long-lasting set of working relations with key informants in
the ministries, and an ability to double-check data and information items. This
may be exemplified in the activity of the budget control department in the RIC.
This department, which was established in the RIC on 2007, writes alternative
papers and economic analysis in addition to those brought to the Knesset by the
ministry of finance, enables MKs, and especially members of Knesset finance
committee, to learn of the data and its costs from an alternative, objective, non-
biased source of information.
Three researchers have received a security clearance, enabling them to write
papers upon demand of the committee of foreign affairs and defence. Due to
organisational changes this committee has also its own professional staff, a fact
that narrows its requests from the RIC.
Manpower
Thirty-five researchers are employed in the centre; all have at least an MA degree,
in social sciences, economics, humanities or law. Acceptance as an employee is
done through a public process, by advertising job openings in the press, in Hebrew
and Arabic. Applicants undergo a series of examinations, including those required
99
by the commissionership of civil service, professional tasks and tests of writing

ability The typical profile of an IRC researcher is, generally speaking, 25–30
years old and in some cases undertaking advanced studies towards a PhD. The
model of employment which has changed in 2006, changed workers’ profiles: in
the centre’s first years, employment was allowed for three years only. In 2007 the
centre’s researchers were accepted as full-term Knesset employees, and although
there is turnover in manpower even today, this step has increased the average
age and education level. During the first year of employment, each researcher
gets a wide range of guidance, covering, among other things, parliamentary
activity focusing on the legislative process; research methods, search engines and
databases, search skills and the information world in general; and introduction to
governmental sources and working methods, research institutions and experts in
various fields and international resources. In this respect it should be mentioned
that RIC has observer status in the ECPRD (European Centre of Parliamentary
Research and Documentation), a status which enables its researchers to receive
comparative data about European parliamentary activity. Mutual information is
supplied upon request by various parliamentary research institutions from the
ECPRD member states.
Working procedure
The working procedure is made up of three phases. The first is accepting the
research request, either from a committee or from a parliament member, defining
its parameters with the initiator, setting a schedule and collecting the necessary
information. Information is obtained from various sources, among others
parliamentary sources in Israel and abroad, governmental sources, internet sites,
academic institutions, research institutions and relevant experts.
The second phase is the actual writing: processing the information which
was double-checked and cross-referenced, while maintaining high professional
standards via quality control, and focusing on a short, clear, substantive and
impartial document. One of the strengths of RIC is the match between parliament
members’ needs and the product the centre produces for them. Accurately
defining these needs derives first of all from the fact that the centre is located
within the parliament building; its workers are civil servants, employees of the
Knesset and not of any political body within it. Also, centre staff are familiar, and
deeply understand, the unique character of parliamentary work. One must bear
in mind that parliament members are required to make decisions on a very wide
range of issues, on a daily basis, with never enough time to study an issue more
than several days, or weeks at the most. This pressure shapes the RIC paper: it
must be as short as possible, coherent, comprehensive and understandable both
to parliament members who already have knowledge of the topic and to those
who have little or no prior knowledge of the issue. A typical paper includes a
short description of the issue; the actors involved, government ministries, NGOs,
private entities and others; the main issues and relevant former discussions and
100
decisions about them; the main dilemmas; and opinions of leading bodies and
experts. One of the most important characteristics of RIC’s papers is that they
do not include the writer’s opinion about the issue, nor do they seek to have an
impact in the sense that they want to lead to a specific decision. They do seek,
however, to make an impact on the decision-making process itself, to make it
more professional and evidence-based. MK Ronit Tirosh (2010) said: ‘I know
another professional, external source of information. The problem is that it does
not “live the Knesset,” so its papers are not useful. In the RIC’s work, the product
is focused on our needs, directed to our work in the committees, and hence it is
very useful for us.’ MK Hanin (2010) mentioned another advantage for him in
the way the papers are prepared:
We face today a reality in which there is no lack of information; on

the contrary, there is a flood of it, and we need assistance to control
it, especially with the tools of critical thinking and fact-checking. I
am chairperson of a committee dealing with topics that involve heavy
interests – the joint committee of interior and health, which discusses
environmental issues. The research dimension is very important, and
at the same time many issues are very new and there is not enough
knowledge in the professional literature about them. For these issues
in particular, the research we receive from RIC, which sometimes is
really pioneering, has no alternative.
Parliament members also mentioned the independence that the RIC enabled the
Knesset to have as its most important advantage for them, and said that in this
sense, the most important function of a RIC document is that it enables them to
fulfil their role of oversight of the executive, a task which would not be possible
without the critiques included in many papers, which are essential in papers
which aim to follow governmental activities and the implementation of laws.
The third and last phase of the working procedure is presentation: sending the
document by e-mail to the Knesset member or committee; orally presenting
to the initiator (Knesset member or committee chairperson) the main issues,
findings and topics recommended for discussion in the committee debate; and
participation of the researcher who wrote the paper in the relevant parliamentary
debate including, in many cases, presenting the document. In many cases, when a
document is prepared for a committee meeting, the researcher who prepared it is
asked to present the main findings at the beginning of the committee’s discussion,
and the paper functions as the factual basis for the discussion. In other cases, the
committee’s chairperson or the Knesset member who initiated the paper is the
one to present its findings. This presentation is in addition to sending the paper
to committee members prior to the discussion to give them time to study it, to
raise questions by phone with the writer if needed and to come prepared to the
committee debate. The RIC has its own archives, in which all papers are kept
both as files and as hard copies.
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Aims
RIC sees its aim as assisting parliamentary committees and members with
documents, data and research which will help them in implementing their
three tasks: legislation, oversight of the executive branch and initiating debates
on issues which are on the public agenda. All the roles, and especially oversight
of the executive, require the use of the initial research tool of critical thinking.
This means cross-checking and verification of each piece of data, including data
obtained from the government. In cases when there are gaps or contradictions
between data obtained from different ministries or even, as sometimes happens,
from different departments in the same ministry, these anomalies are mentioned
in the paper as issues needing to be discussed.
Friedberg and Hazan (2009) noted that in order to increase the ability of the
Knesset to oversee the government, an important tool is empowering the RIC.
They had three recommendations: (1) anchoring the status of the centre in the
basic law (2) increasing its budget and (3) re-structuring it in order to parallel its
structure to the structure of parliamentary committees, in order that separate teams
will be dedicated to the work of each committee. The former Knesset speaker,
MK Rivlin (2010), referred to the parliamentary task of oversight:
The lack of information prior to the establishment of the RIC had

been realised in two areas which are at the heart of parliamentary
activity: economic and budget control, and oversight by parliamentary
committees. Parliamentary oversight in economic issues had been
always a weak point in parliamentary activity, since discussion of
economic issues needs a high level of expertise. Add to this the lack of
information sources prior to the existence of the RIC and the rise of
the arrangement laws and you get a fatal weakness in the effectiveness
of the Knesset’s oversight and in the ability of parliament members
to lead and to have an impact on public discussion. In this aspect,
establishing RIC was, and still is, a real revolution in the ability of the
Knesset to fulfil its task of oversight of the executive branch…It should
be noted that RIC not only empowers the ability of the sovereign to
oversee governmental activities, but also the ability of the executive
itself; RIC’s papers are requested by senior governmental clerks prior
to discussions in order to find out what the Knesset knows about
the issues to be discussed. And the last aspect of oversight, enabled
through RIC’s work, is oversight by the public, thanks to publishing
the papers on the Knesset website.
One of the interesting ways in which the centre’s activity is referred to, as various
speakers put it, is by comparison to governmental bodies that do not have a
similar decision-supporting and policy analysis service. Former MK Zvulun
Orlev (2003), as minister of welfare, said:
102
In the previous Knesset term I was head of the committee on

education, and very much appreciated the work of the Research and
Information Center. I was one of their main clients. Now that I have
moved to the government, as a minister I sense the lack of such centre.
I wish that ministers could get data before government meetings like
Knesset members get from the RIC. The government secretariat has
something yet to learn from the Knesset.
Similar remarks were made by Mr Yehezkel (2010), the former government

secretary: ‘The government has to learn from the model which was developed
in the Knesset. I wish as a government secretary that I had such a tool to prepare
government members for the debates and enable them to come prepared to
government meetings, as it is today in the Knesset.’ The speaker of the Knesset,
MK Reuven Rivlin (2010), said:
The RIC continues to be a credible and independent source of

professional information, which enables Knesset members to make
considered, clear and substantive decisions. Now, one can’t imagine
the Knesset without the availability of the RIC; until its establishment,
members of the Knesset had to contend with a deluge of uncontrolled
and disorganized information, and even on occasion with efforts to
conceal relevant information.
Generally speaking this problem no longer exits. According to an amendment

added to the Knesset law (amendment no 24), all the controlled bodies, that
is, government ministries, public and governmental companies and so on, are
obliged by law to give RIC data and information upon demand for preparing
research papers and documents.4
A secondary aim of the center is the bond with the public. Partly this is
accomplished by putting RIC’s documents on the Knesset website, in order
to make them useful and accessible for the general public – students, scholars,
journalists, courts of justice and citizens. In addition, the RIC has a weekly
programme named ‘News Concept’ on the Knesset TV channel, in which RIC
researchers present to the public documents which they recently presented in
Knesset committees covering topics on the public agenda. Rivlin (2010) said of
the issue of RIC’s bond with the public: ‘Publishing RIC’s research and documents
on the Knesset website enables effective and meaningful oversight by the public
and not only by its representatives.’ In the same context, the Knesset general
manager, Dan Landau, commented on the dilemma of ‘to whom do the papers
belong,’ a dilemma also faced by other parliaments:
We have in the Knesset different perceptions regarding this dilemma.

There is the claim that every document must be accessible to all;
but there is also a perception saying no, there is competition over
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information, and as much as the governments hides information, the

parliament may do the same, in order to tactically defend itself; and
there is a dialogue between these two perceptions. But we are in the
middle of rebuilding the Knesset website, as a part of democratisation
of information, and RIC products are obviously part of this process.
All its products are on the web, and the public will be able to transform
data into information, in order to gather knowledge out of it and make
up their minds accordingly. The RIC is already the benchmark, we
are already there.
Products and outcomes
As of April 2015,3,411 titles appear on the list of RIC written documents. A

recent analysis of RIC activity showed that during the term of the nineteenth
Knesset 533 documents were prepared, of which 293 were submitted for
deliberations of various Knesset committees, 228 were submitted to Knesset
members and 21 were written at the request of Knesset departments or as initiatives
of the centre.5 The division of documents prepared in the nineteenth Knesset
term (February 2013 to March 2015) classified by committee was: finance, 79;
education, 21; labour, welfare and health, 23; internal affairs, 19; economic affairs,
28; public petitions, 17; foreign workers, 20; children’ rights, 10; constitution,
law and justice, 1; status of women, 23; science and technology, 20; drug abuse,
4; and state control, 9.
Monitoring the extent to which policy analysis is actually done in the Knesset
through RIC’s documents is done on a permanent basis by the RIC secretariat.
This task is done by collecting citations of RIC documents and findings in
Knesset debates, both in the committees and in the plenum, and by collecting
quotations and references in the press. A systematic search was done in Knesset
minutes, through the Knesset website www.knesset.gov.il, for the years 2000
to 2011, from RIC’s establishment in 2000 through to the end of July 2011.
Keywords used were research, information, research and information centre, and
also ‘mem-mem-mem’ (‘merkaz mechkar umeyda’), the Hebrew initials often
used as the name of the centre, both in the Knesset and outside it. The ‘general
search’ led to 562 results using the key words ‘research’ and ‘information’, and
another 166 results using ‘mmm’.
Impact of the reports on Bills in the Knesset
In a meeting of the parliamentary committee of state control on 8 December

2014 the chairman, MK Amnon Cohen, said:
as MKs we receive data from government ministries and ask the RIC
to check the reliability of this data, as the law is formed based on the
104
data. The data we receive from RIC researchers are undisputed, and
on many occasions we had to change the government Bills in view
of the RIC’s data.
In many cases the RIC’s contribution to the Bill is mentioned in the Bill’s
explanatory notes. For example, in the explanatory notes to the Bill ‘National
Cultural Activities Basket’, it is mentioned that according to the RIC’s report,
which was prepared at the request of the Bill’s initiator, two-thirds of the Israeli
pupils are not eligible for cultural activities at school. As the Bill further notes,
RIC’s report found out that only 45 per cent of the cultural activities
funding at school comes from the state budget, and the rest must be
paid by parents and local authorities; no wonder that only pupils from
rich communities are benefitted by this programme and hence it is
proposed to enact cultural activities for all.
A satisfaction survey conducted in August 2010, which examined the satisfaction

of Knesset members with the RIC’s services on a scale of 1 to 10, revealed the
following findings: quality of the documents, 9.50; extent to which the documents
were up to date, 9.57; credibility, 9.71; depth and seriousness of the analysis,
9.66; and timeliness, 7.64. It should be noted that the response rate was low,
about 20 MKs.
Discussion
The Knesset Research and Information Center assists parliamentary committees
and members with data, information and research, which are all parts of the
policy analysis done within the parliament. As a political entity, parliament deals
mainly with policy, whether it is through public debates, legislation or oversight.
One of the main differences between a parliamentary research institution and
other public policy research institutions is that in general, the latter wish to have
an impact, through data, on decisions made in the institutions to which they
give the data; while the Knesset Research and Information Center, like other
parliamentary research services, does not wish to influence the bottom line, the
decisions made, but rather to have an impact on the decision-making process, to
upgrade it and to enable politicians to develop evidence-based policies. Earlier
in this paper, this characteristic was mentioned positively by various parliament
members talking about the uniqueness of the data given to them by RIC.
As noted, RIC was built upon the model of the CRS, the Congressional
Research Service, and in many ways they resemble each other. As Brudnick (2011)
noted, the political powers in the United States are distributed in a way that is
intended and almost guaranteed to create competition and conflict between the
legislative and executive branches. The US system of government is characterised
by separation of powers, which leads to a shifting balance of power between the
105
two branches; and the power of the CRS as a tool for Congress’ independence
stems from this structure. Although, as Brudnick rightfully noted, this is not
the case in a parliamentary system, Knesset and Congress members have similar
needs, needs which can only be met by an in-house, independent, non-partisan
and unbiased source of information. In Israel, there are in-house research units
only in several government ministries. Occasionally requests for research and
information are sent to the RIC, but documents are written only when the
requests are connected to the minister’s parliamentary activity (most ministers
are also members of Knesset). From time to time there are attempts to deny or
postpone access of RIC to governmental information and data; an amendment
added to Knesset law on 2008 gives RIC legal opportunity to require such data,
and indicates explicitly that ministries and other agencies must comply to such
requests immediately.6
Although it was not obvious in the Knesset only 15 years ago, members’
internalisation of the understanding that ‘knowledge is power’ and that knowledge
is a vital resource for their work in the twenty-first century has led to the
current reality, where the Knesset has become a model for the use of knowledge
in decision-making. Several models of policy analysis were mentioned in the
literature review. The political model sees research as enabling policy makers
to rationalise decisions and support previously held views on public policy
making. This model is reflected in the way some Knesset members perceive
RIC’s activities. MK Oron, for example, referring to the question of the linkage
between policy analysis and viewpoints, stated that ‘In many cases I find in RIC’s
papers reinforcement of the positions I already held’ (Oron, 2010); while MK Tibi
(2010) said, on the contrary, that ‘I may say that RIC’s work either strengthens
MKs’ views or changes them, but it is always on a solid basis of data, figures,
statistics and comparative studies.’ Another policy analysis model mentioned was
the tactical one, which views research as a tool aiming to increase the prestige of
policy makers. In this regard, MK Burg said (2010): ‘The Knesset Research Center
should be strong, powerful and threatening; but its most important characteristic,
its main achievement and at the same time its big hope for the second decade is
its incredible prestige.’ Sometimes Knesset members recognise that the support
of the RIC enforces their position vis-à-vis government bodies. For example,
in a debate held in the committee for child right, the chairwoman, MK Orli
Levi-Abekasis opened:
This committee is much more powerful than we thought. You could

see in the press this morning, that we, with the Knesset Research and
Information Center, which prepared the document you see, made a
progress in the ministry of health, concerning the issue… before we
start deal with the document itself and its findings, we shall get a short
description from Maria, who is our committee’s aide from the RIC.7
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At the above-mentioned event the speaker, MK Rivlin (2010), concluded, ‘The

Knesset Research and Information Center is but a symbol of the long path the
Israeli parliament has gone through and a sign of the way we still have ahead of
us, in order to upgrade the Knesset’s work and outputs.’
Notes
1
Knesset Research and Information Center, Jerusalem.
2
Legislative research is often informed not just by the public and private sectors, but
also by NGOs and directly by citizens.
3
It is a question for debate whether this definition applies to bodies within the governance,
or only for private ones, external to government authorities. Aizencang-Kane (2004),
for example, includes in her international think tank screening, institutions which are
both private and governmental. Gaffney (1991) claimed that in the United Kingdom
and France, for example, there is an old tradition of consultation and policy planning,
done by think tanks which are bodies within government authorities and ministerial
cabinets.
4
Nevertheless, the above-mentioned amendment, exempts data related to security
and defence issues although this does not preclude the centre from dealing with such
issues. Indeed, three researchers have passed through clearance process and conduct
research for the Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee and for the Joint Committee
for the Defence Budget. A rather critical document was written and published for
the common committee, dealing with the Knesset’s oversight problem with respect
to the security budget.
5
The initiatives are rather rare, and this is mainly due to a combination of overload
requests and limited manpower, dictating on top priority the researches which are
written upon demand.
6
Knesset Law, amendment 24, 2008, The Book of Laws 2136, 6 March 2008.
7
Knesset minutes, Committee of Children’s Rights, 28 May 2013.
References
Aizencang-Kane, P, 2004, The linkage between knowledge and policy: The role of
think tanks around the world and in Israel in public policy processes design, Jerusalem:
Jerusalem Institute for Israel Research
Alon, G, 2010, The research institution of Knesset members, ‘Israel Hayom‘,
25 October
Avrami, S, 2011, What do think tanks do?, Presentation at an international
conference, the Israeli Democracy Institute, 15–16 May, Jerusalem
Brudnick, IA, 2011, The congressional research services and the American legislative
process: CRS report for congress, prepared for members and committees of congress,
CRS RL 33471, Washington, DC: CRS
Burg, A, 2010, Knesset minutes, 1st decade of the Research and Information
Center, 21 December
Friedberg, H, Hazan, YR, 2009, Legislative oversight of the executive branch in Israel:
Current status and proposed reforms, Jerusalem: Israel Democracy Institute.
107
Gaffney, J, 1991, The political think tanks in the UK and ministerial cabinets in
France, West European Politics 14, 1, 1–17
Hanin, D, 2010, Knesset minutes, 1st decade of the Research and Information
Center, pp 14–15, 21 December
Hird, JA, 2005, Power, knowledge and politics, Washington, DC: Georgetown
University Press
Landau, D, 2010, Knesset minutes, 1st decade of the Research and Information
Center, 21 December
McGann, JG, 2009, Catalysts for growth and development: The role of think tanks in
Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa, New York: Center for International
Private Enterprise
McGann, JG, 2010, The global ‘go-to think tanks’, Philadelphia, PA: The Think
Tanks and Civil Societies Program
Meriam, IC, 1985, 50th anniversary celebration of American Social Security,
Social Security Bulletin 48, 85, 30–1, Washington, DC
Meyers, HE, 2009, Does Israel need think tanks?, Middle East Quarterly 16, 1,
37–46
Orlev, Z, 2003, Knesset minutes no 38, Labor, Social Affairs and Health
Committee, 17 November
Oron, H. 2010, Knesset minutes, 1st decade of the Research and Information
Center, pp 16–17, 21 December
Rivlin, R, 2010, Knesset minutes, 1st decade of the Research and Information
Center, 21 December
Robinson, WH, 2002, Knowledge and power: The essential connection between research
and the work of legislature, Brussels: European Center for Parliamentary Research
and Documentation
Tibi, A, 2010, Knesset minutes,1st decade of the Research and Information
Center, 21 December
Tirosh, R, 2010, Knesset minutes,1st decade of the Research and Information
Center, 21 December
Yehezkel, O, 2010, Knesset minutes,1st decade of the Research and Information
Center, 21 December
Zrahia, Z, 2010, The researchers which supply Knesset members with a reliable,
non-biased data, The Marker, 2 August
108
SIX
The making of disability policy in Israel:

ad hoc advisory expert panels
Arie Rimmerman and Michal Soffer
Introduction
Ad hoc advisory expert panels are widely used by governments in the United
States and Europe to analyse current policy or propose alternative ones (Egeberg
et al, 2003; Figura, 2011; Gehring, 1999; Ginsberg, 2009). Unlike a standing or
permanent committee, ad hoc committees are generally tentative and therefore
their impact is limited to initial phase and not implementation.
An expert panel is usually composed of independent policy or programme-
specific specialists. The panel is mostly employed as an instrument for synthesising
information from a range of sources and drawing on a range of viewpoints in
order to arrive at overall conclusions (compare Dawood et al, 2011; Gornitzka
and Sverdrup, 2008; Hemerijck and Visser, 2003; Iacoboaei, 2008). The main
advantage of working with panels of experts is that they offer policy-makers
diversity of ideas and innovative directions. However, panels of experts often lead
to deadlock and an inability by the participants to reach a consensus.
These panels are often used in Israel, but they have been little studied. It is
also unknown whether their recommendations are fully or partially adopted
by policy-makers (Figura, 2006; 2011). In this chapter, we introduce, review
and analyse two cases of ad hoc advisory panels of experts appointed by the
Israeli government in 2011 in order to set a new direction for disability-related
policies. The first pertains to the realm of sub-minimum wages for people with
disabilities and the second addresses the issue of community residence of people
with intellectual disabilities (ID).
The use of committees in public policy

In recent years, there has been extensive use of public committees of experts
in examining, reviewing and evaluating government policies (Ejzenking-Qana,
2004; Harari, 1974). The European Community tends to use diversified panels
as a central tool of programme evaluation. Public committees are quick, cheap
and are considered to be part of the decision-making process which therefore
has an impact on European policy making (Egeberg et al, 2003; Gehring, 1999).
It was argued that public committees were perceived by both government and
the general public as objective and non-dependent entities (Marchildon, 2001).
109
Cartwright (1975) distinguished between three types of impartial committees:

one kind in which the members do not possess any special knowledge or interests
concerning the subjects dealt with; second, committees of experts whose members
are chosen because they are perceived to possess knowledge on the issues at hand;
and, third, representative committees whose members represent the various
interests that concern the committee’s mandate.
Scant research has been conducted on public committees; nonetheless the
overall impression is that that their recommendations are rarely implemented as
advised. It appears that the most common reason for lack of implementation is
resistance to change and the administrative difficulties involved in implementation.
In Israel, for example, poor implementation is often associated with the nature
and structure of the political and bureaucratic systems (Figura, 2006; 2011).
According to Figura (2011) most public committees are ad hoc and address
immediate concerns. Government’s expectation is that such panels will be
objective, sensitive to political issues and controversies, and helpful in improving
policy-making. Typically the committee’s discussions are open to the public and
that its reports are considered public records (Harari and Hofnung, 1988; Vickers,
1965) although they are not legally or otherwise binding (Attorney General,
2003; Harari and Hofnung, 1988).
Expert panels
The subject of expertise received extensive documentation in policy analysis and
public administration research and literature over the previous decades. Experts
are now involved in various phases of policy making processes and fulfil many
tasks (Iacoboaei, 2008).
According to Halffman and Hoppe (2005), experts offer reliable information
to policy makers and are involved in evaluating past and future policy outcomes.
Nonetheless, Halffman and Hoppe (2005) assert that experts have been involved in
policy processes in many other ways, among those, problem framing or reframing,
fulfilling interpretive and reflective roles, and acting as catalysts in the promotion
of processes (see also MacRae and Whittington, 1997; Renn, 1995).
Experts are chosen to represent all points of view in a balanced and impartial
way. The chosen experts are widely recognised as independent specialists in the
domain of the evaluated policy. They are asked to examine and analyse optional
policies or programmes and produce agreed upon conclusions. The advisory
panel is neither required to explain its judgement criteria nor trade-offs among
criteria, but the credibility of the evaluation is guaranteed by the fact that the
conclusions reflect agreement among people who are renowned specialists and
represent different ‘schools of expertise’ (MacRae and Whittington, 1997).
Presidents of the United States and executive branch agencies have been
establishing federal advisory committees since 1974. Such committees consist of
an array of experts who examine a given issue, usually complex issues or issues
which are disputed, and recommend policies and actions (Ginsberg, 2009).
110
The making of disability policy in Israel
However, federal advisory committees could be used for political purposes of

generating legitimacy, help settle political disputes, or even buy time for policy
makers (Campbell, 1988; Harari, 1974).
Zegart (2004) categorised federal advisory committees in the United States into
the following groups: agenda commissions, which are primarily geared toward
gaining support for the president’s policy initiatives; information commissions,
which are created in order to provide new information, notions and analysis to
policy makers; and political constellation commissions, which aim to maintain
consensus, reach compromises and cooperation regarding policy.
The central mechanism utilised by the European Commission, for example, in
order to attain external expert advice are temporary or permanent expert groups
(Gornitzka and Sverdrup, 2008; Iacoboaei, 2008). Ad hoc expert committees
and what are coined ‘High-Level Groups’ are created by the European Union in
order to examine specific policy issues and offer recommendations (Hemerijck
and Visser, 2003) and are defined as follows:
[A]n expert group is a consultative entity comprised of public or private

sector experts, and the Commission is in control of its composition…
Expert groups do not formally make political decisions, but feed
the decision making processes by giving expert advice, providing
scientific knowledge, sharing practical experience and information,
and serving as forums for exchange of information. (Gornitzka and
Sverdrup, 2008, 727)
It seems that when government in Israel seeks policy advice, experts panels are
often a preferred channel. Shalev and Hashiloni-Dolev (2011) for example, have
found that bioethics policy is governed by the Ministry of Health, but dominated
by the medical profession:
[The] mechanism of an expert committee with the power to make

decisions has become a key instrument in the regulatory system
that evolved, and that expert committees act in two capacities: as
governmental advisory bodies to recommend policy; and, as decision-
making bodies with the authority to allow otherwise forbidden
practices in individual cases. (p 158)
The case of the sub-minimum wage committee

Sub-minimum wage (SMW) or adjusted minimum wage (as it is known in Israel),
is a controversial policy geared to promote the employment of persons with severe
disabilities. SMW policies enable employers to pay reduced wages to employees
with disabilities according to their level of productivity. Thus, under this policy,
persons with disabilities can be paid wages which are below the mandatory or
established minimum wage (Soffer et al, 2011).
111
Adjusted Minimum Wage Regulations (Adjusted Wage for Employees with

Disabilities Having Reduced Ability to Work Regulations 5762-2002) were
formulated in Israel in 2002 and were implemented for a trial period, fixed at
four years, only on 1 November 2006, by the Ministry of Industry, Trade and
Labor (MOITAL).
Since the implementation of the regulations, SMW assessments are performed
in Israel by two different outsourced entities who differ substantially in their
assessment methods: the Company for Rehabilitation Projects, Ltd, also known as
‘Shel’ (a private service provider) and the Vocational Rehabilitation and Training
Centre at the Loewenstein Rehabilitation Hospital (an NGO), according to
geographic regions (Soffer et al, 2011).
The choice to implement two rather than one assessment method stemmed
from the fact that the Ministry felt at a loss and inexperienced with the such a
task: ‘we did not know what to do…one of the problems that I did not foresee
was that we (MOITAL) became involved in something we knew nothing about,
we are not therapists or rehabilitation personnel, I am an economist’ (Director
of the Committee for Aiding Disabled Persons in the Labor Market, MOITAL,
Mr Beni Fefferman personal communication, 26 January 2012).
In 2011, the CEO of MOITAL appointed a committee of the following
experts from academia: Prof Arie Rimmerman of the Haifa University, Prof
John Gal of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, Prof Shlomo Noy of Tel Aviv
University, Dr Naomi Hadas-Lidor of Tel Aviv University and Dr Michal Soffer
of Haifa University (Committee for Aiding Disabled Persons in the Labor Market,
MOITAL, 23 November 2011). The committee’s mission was to suggest a unified
method for assessing the sub-minimum wage of employees with disabilities who
are considered to have a diminished work capacity. In other words, the committee
served as a type policy analysis. In addition, the trial period was extended until
2012.
The members of the committee held three meetings and conducted a mini
benchmark study which entailed a comparison of SMW assessment processes in
the United States, Australia and Israel. The study’s conclusions were the basis
for the revised model for SMW assessment which was proposed to the Ministry
by the experts. The committee submitted its specific recommendations to the
Ministry (Committee for Aiding Disabled Persons in the Labor Market, MOITAL,
23 November 2011) which are listed in Table 6.1. These recommendations were
discussed and negotiated in the final meeting of the committee (November 2011).
As Table 6.1 shows, merely three suggestions were fully accepted by the Ministry.
Four of the suggestions were only partially accepted. The Ministry agreed to
make a gradual attempt to promote the transparency of the process.
The Ministry acknowledged the importance of using valid and reliable
measurements of productivity however, and agreed to examine the would-be
implemented measures’ psychometric qualities only after their implementation
(specifically, after one year). Although minimising the use of suggested measures
was generally accepted by MOITAL, the importance of certain sources of data
112
Table 6.1: General guidelines for the revised SMW assessment process: expert committee
suggestions and MOITAL’s response
Experts’ suggestions MOITAL’s response
Transparent process: both the employer and the employee are entitled to be informed of Partial acceptance (+-)
each step of the assessment process and its outcomes.
Collaborative process: the employee, the employer and the assessor should be equal partners Rejection (-)
and work collaboratively.
Measure productivity in a specific context: a given employee’s productivity should be Acceptance (+)
measured in a specific job and workplace.
Refrain from data collection on behaviors, motivations and personality, etc.: SMW assessment Acceptance (+)
should be based on measures of productivity only.
Use valid and reliable tools to measure an employee’s productivity Partial acceptance (+-)
Minimize the use of subjective measures Partial acceptance (+-)
Conduct timely surveys of customary wages in various jobs Partial acceptance (+-)
Conduct a pilot of the new assessment process Rejection (-)
Create a protocol for unique cases Acceptance (+)
Bar the use of SMW assessments in order to lower an employee’s wage Rejection (-)
was stressed, such as a functional report by the job placement worker. Finally,
the Ministry agreed to conduct timely surveys of customary wages on a few
sampled jobs only, jobs that are typically done by workers with disabilities. As
Table 6.1 shows three suggestions were fully rejected by the Ministry mainly on
grounds of cost.
A closer look at the gap between the experts’ original suggestions, and the
version that was accepted by the Ministry reveals ideological discrepancies between
the two entities. While the experts attempted to promote a more equal rights
approach to the process by way of preserving the dignity of the person with the
disability, autonomy and subjectivity, the Ministry’s stance reflects an economic
approach to disability which focuses on the impact of impairment on the ability
to work (Lav, 2002).
Noteworthy that, apart from the general guidelines for the revised SMW
assessment process, the committee of experts submitted to the Ministry a general
outline of a revised model to assess SMW which consisted of eight points.
Most (five) of the experts’ recommendations were rejected by the Ministry, two
recommendations were partially accepted and one was fully rejected.
In January 2012 the Ministry stressed that it was in the midst of designing a bid
based on the revised and unified model (Director of the Committee for Aiding
Disabled Persons in the Labor Market, MOITAL, Mr Beni Fefferman personal
communication, 26 January 2012).
On January 2013 the Ministry of Economy (previously entitled MOITAL)
announced that it is forced to temporarily refrain from further conducting SMW
assessments on grounds of budget restraints (specifically, lack of funding because of
113
the elections in Israel). Although a new budget was already established following
the elections, according to the Ministry’s website, SMW assessments have not
been resumed yet.
To date, the SMW meeting protocols have not been released to the public.
Instead, the Ministry’s website provides the public with a list of the ‘central
meetings which were held in 2011’ which comprises of various meetings
categorised by dates. The list does not provide any information as to the nature
of the SMW committee, its composition or its mandate. Furthermore, merely
government representatives are mentioned as participants in the first meeting.
The content of the meeting is listed in general bullet points, for instance, ‘tasks
for the next meeting were determined’.
The last meeting of the committee shares the same title as the first meeting. The
list of participants consists of government representatives which are mentioned by
their full names and affiliation. There is also a mentioning of ‘2-professors’. No
information is given about the content or outcome of the meeting (Committee
for Aiding Disabled Persons in the Labor Market, MOITAL, nd). It is of note
that verbatim protocols of meetings between MOITAL and other Ministries are
provided in the same website.
The case of deinstitutionalisation and community living policies

committee
The core disability policy toward people with intellectual disability (ID) in most
western countries is inclusion and community living (Emerson, 2004). This
progressive policy is based on human rights principles (see the Convention on
the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (United Nations, 2006)), but also on
evidence-based practices. In the United States and in Western Europe, small
community-based residential facilities are chosen over large congregated settings
which are gradually downsized and shut down (Beadle-Brown et al, 2007; Kozma
et al, 2009; Lemay, 2009; Mansell et al, 2007). The Israeli government has been
interested in adopting similar policies preferring community-based programmes.
The former Minister of Welfare and Social Services (MOLSA), Isaac Herzog,
instructed the Division of Services for People with Intellectual Disabilities in the
MOLSA to convene an international committee of experts in order to obtain
evidence-based data and various opinions concerning Israel’s services as compared
to other western countries.
The panel which was held in June 2011 consisted of Prof Arie Rimmerman,
Haifa University, Israel; Prof Gerard Quinn of the University of Ireland (Galway
School of Law); Dr Joel Levy, former CEO of YAI Network, New York; Prof
Peter Blanck of Syracuse University, New York; and Prof Meindert Haveman
of TU Dortmund University, Germany. The committee’s coordinator was Dr
Michal Soffer, Haifa University, Israel (see Blanck et al, 2011).
The members of the committee learned that there were various and, at times,
contradictory opinions and views on the subject of housing for people with ID.
114
For example, AKIM (National Association for the Habilitation of Children and
Adults with Intellectual Disabilities), believes that there is still a place for a variety
of forms of living for persons with ID; however, the large facilities (me’onot) should
be extensively downsized to house no more than 30–40 individuals. Bizchut
(Israel Human Rights Centre for People with Disabilities) on the other hand,
called for the closure of all large and segregated facilities in Israel, pointing out
that future policy should be driven by values such as self-determination, choice
and autonomy.
The experts provided a comprehensive report as well as detailed recommendations
for policy changes to the Ministry. The main recommendation was that Israel
should ultimately and gradually close all the institutions for persons with ID and
focus on creating community based services and housing for this population.
There was a general agreement that the panel will recommence and conduct
timely follow ups of the implementation of the policy.
While the report was discussed within the Ministry it was not released to the
public until September 2013 and was not implemented. The report was finally
released by the new Minister of Welfare and Social Services in September 2013.
It appears that the main reason for not releasing the report has been concern on
the part of the administration that the report will demand major change in policy,
in particular closure of institutions and establishing new priorities in respect to
community based programmes. Finally, the report was presented and discussed
publicly on 5 February 2014.
Discussion: lessons from Israel

In this chapter we presented two cases of experts panels which took place in
Israel during the year 2011. Both panels focused on the similar populations and
addressed fundamental and important aspects of life. Both panels were summoned
by the Israeli government, although they differed greatly in terms of their mandate
and nature.
The SMW committee was given a very specific and limited task, namely, to
suggest a standardised method for SMW assessment. It is important to mention
that SMW policies are extremely controversial. In the United States, for example,
where such policies have existed since 1938, they have been denounced by
disability rights advocates, legally challenged and it seems that they will be
abolished in the future (Soffer and Rimmerman, 2013).
The Israeli SMW committee comprised of disability scholars and practitioners
who oppose SMW policies. Nonetheless, their task was to offer revisions to
these policies rather than to voice a more fundamental issue, that is, whether
these policies should be practised in Israel at all. Since this was a given (albeit, a
major source for frustration for some), the experts, who were all trained in the
help professions (social work, occupational therapy and psychiatry) attempted to
revise SMW policies in such a way that they will reflect their professional values:
115
first and foremost, dignity and worth of the person, respect for a client’s self-
determination, and engaging in an equal and mutual partnership with the client.
These values are also in accordance with a rights-approach to disability and a
discourse of entitlement to rights. Noteworthy that, since the committee dealt
primarily with technical aspects of the policy of which the stakeholders were not
aware, they were not involved in the committee.
All government representatives in the SMW committee were affiliated with
the Economic and Research Administration (ERA) unit of MOITAL which also
oversaw and implemented SMW policies. The task was given to the unit on a
temporary basis until a designated unit for addressing competitive employment
of persons with disabilities had been developed. Albeit that the ERA held its
temporary appointment for over a decade.
The ERA is directed by a labour market economist with a strong background
in management. The staff comprises primarily economists and statisticians.
Therefore, when presented with the task of implementing SMW policies, the
ERA approached the task as they would any other economic issue. In other words,
SMW was perceived first and foremost, as a labour market tool to incentivise
employers so that they would be more keen to employ persons with disabilities.
According to economic reasoning, since persons with disabilities who have a
diminished work capacity produce less, it is only just that the employer pay for
what he or she gets.
Economic reasoning perpetuates a ‘rhetoric of need’ which differs substantially
from a ‘discourse of entitlement’. According to economic thought, employers
who hire persons with disabilities are considered benevolent and altruistic.
According to a rights-based approach persons with disabilities have a right to
be gainfully employed. Hence, what was perceived by the experts as a complex
issue that involves questions concerning human rights and justice, was viewed
by MOLSA government officials as a pure economic question with a simple
solution: productivity should be assessed objectively and the wage should be
determined accordingly. This also explains, perhaps, why stakeholders were not
a part of this committee.
The polar discourses of government versus experts were evident in the SMW
panel’s discussions. It is intriguing that, even within the limited mandate, the
experts have encountered such strong resistance to change. This chain of events
ultimately led to a compromise, a revised model with superficial changes, which
was never implemented (see Soffer and Rimmerman, 2013). In other words,
regretfully the committee did not bridge the values and empirical gaps between
the thinking of the panel and the thinking – or lack thereof – of the MOITAL staff
nor provided a common framework for discussing their continuing disagreements
and sharpening the focus of differences in values and priorities.
The International Experts’ Panel on Community-Based Residences for Persons
with ID differed from the SMW committee in several important ways. First, the
former panel had a larger task at hand and a more extensive mandate from the
Israeli government, compared to the latter committee.
116
Second, as such, the residence committee comprised of international experts

who held extensive and lengthy discussions with government officials from various
Ministries, and with stakeholders. Stakeholders were involved here, unlike in
the SMW committee, as this committee discussed fundamental issues and called
eventually for major changes in the life of people with ID, their families and
service providers. In addition, it suggested that major revisions in the allocation
and budgeting of services, should take place.
Third, the international committee of experts, unlike the SMW panel, was
summoned by MOLSA, specifically, the Division of Services for People with
Intellectual Disabilities, which is directed by a PhD in rehabilitation psychology
and houses a staff of social workers and psychologists. In other words, the
committee was asked to advise fellow professionals, unlike the SMW committee.
In comparison with the SMW committee, it seemed that all of the participants
in the Experts’ Panel on Community-Based Residences for Persons with ID
shared a common interest. All the participants were knowledgeable in disability
issues and policies, all were informed about disability rights and the concept of
entitlement.
Two of the experts are law professors while the other experts come from a social
scientist background. The legal scholars presented a more theoretical approach
to the issues at hand. The social scientists had a more pragmatic approach.
Nonetheless, these slightly different approaches did not cause friction between
the experts but rather enriched the discussions. The final report reflects both the
moral and legal aspects of the issues at hand, that is, the values involved, such as
questions of justice, self-determination, choice, as well as their translation into
concrete, operational policies and actions.
The experts did not agree upon one point: the maximum number of individuals
that should reside in one apartment (the number reflects the essence of community
based living). Some said four while others said six.
While the experts agreed on the fundamental issues, what was extremely
evident in the Experts’ Panel on Community-Based Residences for Persons
with ID deliberations was that what MOLSA referred to as ‘community-based
living’ differed greatly from what the experts, disability rights advocates and the
scientific literature defined as such. It is plausible that this somewhat unpleasant
surprise to the Ministry – which truly believed that it was actively implementing
programmes which aligned with community based services – accounts for part
of the reasons that the committee’s report was not made public until 2013. It is
important to mention that this committee and its report support fundamental
changes in Israeli services both in terms of structure and conception. This could
partially explain the reluctance to share the report as well as to implement it.
One can argue that Israel was not ready at the time for such progressive ideas.
One can also perceive the report as criticising the current system which did not
evolve with the times.
Disagreement in the residence committee was also evident between family
members and service providers on the one hand, and disability right advocates
117
and the experts, on the other hand. Family members expressed their justified
fears that the shutting down of the institutions will burden them tremendously.
Although the experts clearly specified that in order not to cause such adverse
outcomes, closing the institutions will take place only after appropriate community
based services and supports had been put in place, the families still feared that
extra burdens would fall on them.
The meaning of ‘true choice’ was also challenged. While family members and
service providers believed that choosing to stay in an institution or to move into
one is a valid choice, disability advocates and the experts believed that true choice
is reflected and exercised only in small residences (up to four or six household
members). In other words, no one can truly choose to live in an institution, even
if he or she stresses so (see Blanck et al, 2011).
In spite of the promising starting point of the residence committee, compared
with the SMW committee, ironically, the results were quite similar. The
overall impression is that while the government has been prompt to establish
the two committees, as well as to facilitate their operation, in both cases the
government has been less transparent in releasing the reports and disseminating
the recommendations.
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Part Three
Policy analysis in specific government units
SEVEN
Policy analysis in the treasury:

how does the Israeli Ministry of Finance
arrive at a policy decision?1
Momi Dahan
This article examines the process of policy analysis in the Israeli Ministry of
Finance, which plays a central role in initiating, shaping and implementing
economic policy. Previous studies showed that the Ministry of Finance has
relatively greater power than finance ministries in most developed countries.
The article describes three modes of policy analysis that are used in the Budget
Department or on its behalf: in-house work, interministerial committees and
public committees. An examination of the three modes of policy analysis
indicates that the major weakness of policy analysis is more evident in the
in-house work of the Budget Department, which does not systematically
evaluate the expected effects of policy proposals on benefits and costs. A
professional infrastructure has not been laid for using standard prediction
techniques. The interministerial committees or the public committees do not
work according to a fixed methodology, and the quality of their analytical
work is therefore arbitrary, depending on the people heading the committee.
A tradition of presenting a menu of alternatives to policy makers has not
been found in all three modes of policy analysis that were researched here.
In addition, the decision rule according to which the preferred alternative
is chosen is unclear.
Introduction
This article describes the policy analysis that is conducted in practice in the Budget
Department of the Israeli Ministry of Finance, and compares it with decision
making in the spirit of bounded rationality model proposed in standard textbooks
on policy analysis, such as Weimer and Vining (2011), Bardach (2011) and Dunn
(2012). This model includes a clear formulation of the undesirable phenomena,
problem definition, presenting a limited number of alternatives, and evaluating
them according to a limited number of major criteria, and evaluation research
that accompanies the policy. The importance of an analysis of this kind is that
it forces the policy analyst and the decision makers to pass through key stations,
thereby reducing the chances of making bad decisions.
A standard policy analysis makes it possible to see also whether the overall
expected benefits exceed the costs, while explicitly taking into account the risks.
123
Such policy analysis should also reveal the theoretical assumptions underlying
the policy proposals, initially for the policy analyst, then for the decision makers,
and finally for the public at large. Proper policy analysis should also include an
assessment of the expected effects based on the most advanced techniques. We
need to bear in mind that the impact of a policy alternative for reducing the
undesirable phenomena will only be put to the test in the future, and in this
respect is a policy hypothesis. In other words, policy implementation is bound
up with risk, which should be revealed to the public.
With the passing of time, public policy issues become more complex, which
highlights the necessity for a high quality of policy analysis. The importance that
is currently attributed to the public policy implications on environmental quality,
as opposed to the scant attention this issue received in the past, demonstrates the
intensification of the interdisciplinary dimension of policy issues.
At the same time, the ability to respond to policy issues by means of increasing
the budget has been severely reduced. Taxes in developed countries rose to
relatively high rates in the twentieth century in the wake of the considerable
expansion in the government’s share of GDP (Tanzi and Schuknecht, 2000). The
price of a further increase in the tax rate relative to the benefit from additional
expansion of government expenditure has risen significantly since the beginning
of the twentieth century, and thus the political feasibility of solutions that entail
large budgetary expenditure has dwindled.
The government’s ability to further increase the tax rate has decreased also
because of the continuing process of ‘the individual in the centre’, which is
reflected, among other things, in a rise in the value of (individual) freedom
relative to the value of (social) equality, which erodes the public’s willingness to
bear the burden of a higher tax. Under these conditions, the policy analyst has to
provide creative alternatives that do not require a (significant) additional budget.
Because of budgetary pressure, the public demands, more than in the past,
assurance that its money will be used as efficiently as possible. This cannot be
achieved without high-quality policy analysis. In the twenty-first century, the
public demands also greater transparency from its government. One of the
expressions of the demand to increase transparency in Israel is the requirement
to publish the minutes of the committees that dealt with major policy issues,
such as the Trajtenberg Committee for socioeconomic change, or the Zemach
Committee dealing with the export of gas. The public is interested not only in
the final product (the committee’s report), but also in the considerations that
guided the decision makers. It can be assumed that the demand for transparency
(overt policy analysis) will only intensify in the foreseeable future.
Policy analysis that fulfils the fundamental requirement for transparency allows to
see the distinction between evaluations and values. While the professional echelon
is responsible for evaluating policy proposals, the values and their ranking are
meant to be supplied mainly by the elected sector, even though in practice the
professional staff plays a role in this area as well. Without standard policy analysis,
one cannot learn whether a particular policy tool is preferable to other alternatives
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Policy analysis in the treasury
because of differences in professional evaluations or because of differences in the

weight given to certain values over others.
Given the central role that the Ministry of Finance in Israeli policy-making, it
is important to assess the degree to which the Budget Department deviates from
the process set out in standard policy analysis. The structure of the article is as
follows: the next section will describe the centrality of the Ministry of Finance
in policy analysis in Israel, following which we will present three different modes
of conducting policy analysis in the Budget Department and on its behalf. In
the third section we examine policy analysis in terms of the standard model of
policy analysis with the help of three significant recent events: the 2013–14 state
budget with particular emphasis on cutting child allowances, the interministerial
committee for reducing greenhouse gas emissions (the Shani Committee), and
the report of the public committee for examining the fiscal system with regard
to oil and gas resources in Israel (the Sheshinski Committee). We conclude the
article by presenting several hypotheses for explaining why such policy analysis
is conducted in the Budget Department.
The centrality of the Ministry of Finance in policy analysis

Since the stabilisation plan of 1985, the professional staff in the Ministry of Finance
has played a key role in initiating, shaping and implementing economic policy.
The analysis and initiation of policy takes place in the government and outside
it (the Third Sector and the business sector), but the dominant player in policy
analysis is without doubt the Ministry of Finance. The Budget Department is
the most lively place in the ministry, even though other departments, such as the
Capital Market Department or the State Revenue Administration also conduct
policy analyses. This article will focus on describing the work of policy analysis
that is conducted in the Budget Department of the Ministry of Finance.The
influence that the non-elected officials in the Ministry of Finance wield is no
less than that of the political officials. Ben-Bassat (2011) showed that there is very
little chance that economic reform will be implemented without the agreement
of the professional staff in the Ministry of Finance. Non-elected officials in the
ministry do not hesitate to provide the media with economic-policy declarations
that are supposed to be reserved for politicians.
In research on the balance of forces in the budgeting process, Ben-Bassat and
Dahan (2006) showed that the extent of centrality of the decision making process
in Israel is among the highest in the western world. The research found that
the Ministry of Finance has a major role in all stages of the budgetary process:
preparation, legislation and implementation of the budget.
The strong position of the Ministry of Finance is also a function of the existence
of the Arrangements Law, which includes a package of laws that accompany the
state budget.2 The budget and the Arrangements Law are voted on together, so
that non-ratification of the budget and the Arrangements Law in one package
brings down the government and leads to new elections. The power of this tool
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encourages the Ministry of Finance to avoid presenting bills through the regular
parliamentary channel.
The Arrangements Law includes a mix of legislative amendments with
budgetary implications for and structural changes in (not necessarily with
budgetary consequences) the economy. While the initiation of legislative
amendments dealing directly with the budget are mainly the result of the in-
house work of the Budget Department (in conjunction with other departments
in the Ministry of Finance), the structural changes are based partly on previous
work of interministerial committees or public committees.
Conducting policy analysis in the Ministry of Finance

Three modes of policy analysis
There is no single method according to which the Budget Department in the

Ministry of Finance conducts policy analysis. For some of the policy issues the
analysis is conducted by the employees of the Budget Department through
informal consultation with external factors. For other issues the Budget
Department works jointly with the relevant government ministries, informally
or in the format of an interministerial committee.
In addition, the Ministry of Finance makes use of the policy analysis of public
committees, such as the committee for examining the fiscal system with regard
to oil and gas resources in Israel (the Sheshinski Committee), or the committee
for socioeconomic change (the Trajtenberg Committee), which include senior
representation of the Budget Department. In certain cases, the analysis is
undertaken by a private entity (outsourcing), such as cost–benefit analysis in
transportation projects.
It would appear that the Ministry of Finance decides whether to conduct the
policy analysis in-house or to conduct it with the help of an interministerial
committee, a public committee, or outsourcing, according to the level of maturity
of the policy issues and the extent of their expected political feasibility. In general,
the Ministry of Finance is not in favour of public committees, as evidenced by
the resignation of the Ministry of Finance’s director-general Haim Shani, in the
wake of the establishment of the Trajtenberg Committee. From discussions with
people in the Budget Department it seems that the use of a public committee
is reserved primarily for policy issues that have not been sufficiently analysed or
researched, or whose expected political feasibility is low. Sometimes a public
committee is used in order to circumvent opposition on the part of the relevant
designated ministry, or as a way to obtain a decision in the event of a professional
disagreement with the designated ministry. It will be interesting in a future
research to examine what factors influence Ministry of Finance choices regarding
preferred mode of policy analysis.
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Profile of the professional staff in the Budget Department
The Budget Department in Israel employs about 50 professionals, a small number

relative to budget departments in developed countries (Ben-Bassat and Dahan,
2006).3 All the professional employees are economists, relatively young (in their
late 20s or early 30s) with a bachelor’s or master’s degree in economics. In recent
years priority has been given to recruiting economists with a broader education,
such as a joint bachelor’s degree in economics, philosophy and political science,
or a master’s degree in public policy. This trend reflects the understanding that
economists with a broader education need to be recruited in order to deal with
the increasing complexity of policy analysis. Note that since the end of the
1970s, recruitment to the Budget Department is based solely on qualifications,
irrespective of political affiliation.
The Budget Department has undergone changes also regarding the composition
of its employees. In the past there were hardly any women in the department.
In 1992 one woman was employed, as opposed to nearly 50 per cent today.
Nevertheless, the Budget Department still has a long way to go in absorbing
economists from certain population groups, such as the Arab population that
numbers close to 20 per cent of the Israeli population. Up to the 1990s, Arabs
were not employed in the Budget Department. In recent years the government
is making an effort to absorb Arabs in the public service, but in practice the
ranks of the Budget Department at any given time do not include more than
one Arab economist. Recently (2013) a female economist from the Arab sector
started working in the department.
These employees are recruited following a meticulous screening process
(more than ten applicants for each available post), and are considered to be the
professional elite of the Israeli civil service. There are no economists in the Budget
Department whose job is to conduct systematic predictions of the expected
effects of a policy proposal by using advanced estimation techniques, or being
in charge of commissioning such forecasts from external bodies. There are also
none whose job entails the retrospective evaluation of the effect of policy tools
that were used, or to systematically commission evaluation research of this kind.
Naturally, an organisation consisting of 50 economists believes in a free market
economy as a central guiding principle. The Ministry of Finance is perceived by
the public as a bastion of the neoliberal camp. One of the primary aims of the
Budget Department is to strengthen the market foundations of the Israeli economy.
This is expressed in two major ways: first, a constant striving for structural changes
in non-competitive markets; and second, a reduction in government involvement.
In recent years, Budget Department economists are becoming increasingly more
diverse in their views regarding the need to reduce government expenditure on
education, health and welfare.
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Analysis of the Ministry of Finance’s policy from the perspective of

a standard model of policy analysis
The following description of policy analysis in the Budget Department will be

restricted to the time between the emergence of the issue on the institutional
agenda and the date the decision is adopted by the government (the formulation
stage). Due to space constraints, we will not be able to deal with the stages
prior to the emergence of the issue on the agenda, or the stages following the
government’s approval, such as the discussion in the Knesset and subsequently
(the implementation stage).
The mode of operation of the Ministry of Finance will be compared to the
standard stages of policy analysis. The standard policy model (in the spirit of
bounded rationality) includes: (a) a clear formulation of the undesirable conditions
(conditions that many people consider to be undesirable) that may be reflected in
a gap between the current and the desired conditions, a substantial diminution of
the public’s welfare or an unrealised opportunity to improve the public’s welfare
or promote important values; (b) a clear definition of the problem backed by the
best information/research on the theoretical and empirical scientific shelf; (c) a
close affinity between the definition of the problem and the proposed alternatives,
supplemented by theoretical or empirical backing elucidating the connection
between the alternatives and amelioration of the problem; (d) examining a limited
number of alternatives while analysing the expected effects of each alternative
on the major variables, such as the major benefits (reducing the undesirable
phenomena), the budgetary cost and political feasibility; (e) the decision rule
according to which the recommendation of the alternatives was accepted; and
(f) a parallel plan of follow up and retrospective evaluation.
The work of the Budget Department will be compared with the above
methodology with the help of policy analysis that the Budget Department itself
or external bodies conducted on three macro events of recent years: the state
budget for 2013–14 with particular emphasis on the cut in child allowances; the
interministerial committee for reducing greenhouse gas emissions (the Shani
Committee); and the report of the public committee for examining the fiscal
system with regard to oil and gas resources in Israel (the Sheshinski Committee).
An examination of the three modes of policy analysis will facilitate internal
comparison of three types of policy analysis. It is important to note that in the
policy analysis work of the Ministry of Finance, no attempt has been made until
now to document the frequency of each of the three policy analysis modes.
Examination of the three modes is based on available information. The
information is not always fully presented to the decision makers and to the
public, whether because of time constraints or because of the political unease
that full presentation of the information may create for the Minister of Finance
or the professional staff in the Ministry of Finance (we will return to this issue
in the concluding section of the article). At the same time, we reiterate that the
government makes its decisions according to the same information on which
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this article is based. The low level of transparency of the (ex-ante) information
at the time of making decisions on economic matters is well known, as opposed
to the high level of transparency of budgetary ex-post information (Ben-Bassat
and Dahan, 2006). Even though I did not enjoy access to the analytical work
that was conducted behind the scenes, I was assisted by discussions with people
at the professional level of the ministry in order to complement information that
was essential for the precise description of the policy process.
In-house policy analysis: the state budget for 2013–14
On the eve of the last Knesset elections, budget execution data for December
2012 was published, from which it emerged that the budgetary deficit for 2013
was expected to reach about 50 billion shekels, which is 5.1 per cent of GDP.
Among the members of the new government that was established after the
elections (as well as outside it) there was broad agreement that the budgetary
deficit should be reduced. The fear was that not dealing with the large budgetary
deficit could undermine macroeconomic stability and lead to a rise in the interest
rate of government bonds.
The government was required to make two decisions, the first on the size of the
budgetary deficit target, and the second the mix of the reduction in expenditures
and raising the tax rate. Because of space limitations, I will not consider in this
article the government’s decision to reduce the budgetary deficit to 4.65 per cent
of GDP in 2013, and to 3 per cent of GDP in 2014; rather I will concentrate
on the policy analysis regarding the expenditure–taxes mix in achieving the
specified deficit.
In general, the Budget Department in the Ministry of Finance could have
prepared various alternatives ranging from only a cut in government expenditure
in order to achieve the deficit target, to only an increase in taxes, as well as a
combination of cutting expenditure and raising the tax rate. Each of the alternatives
would have various implications on major variables, such as economic growth
and inequality. Thus, for example, in Keynesian terms, the negative impact on
output of cutting government consumption on aggregate demand is more severe
than raising taxes. It is also clear that raising taxes (particularly income taxes) has
a different impact on the extent of inequality compared with a cut in welfare or
education expenditures.4
From discussions with people who were involved in the process, it emerges that
the Budget Department presented various alternatives to the Minister of Finance,
but without systematic analysis of the expected effects of each of the alternatives
on the rate of GDP growth or poverty and inequality in the following two years.
The discussion with the minister on the assumed effects of the alternatives was
little more than intuitive. Due to lack of information, it is not even possible to say
what decision rule the Minister of Finance used to decide between the alternatives.
From the perspective of policy analysis, the discussion on the state budget that
subsequently took place in the government was even worse. The Ministry of
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Finance presented only one alternative, and without a description of the expected
effects. The government approved the draft budget almost without amendments.
No government member even requested discussing other alternatives.
In order to demonstrate the defects in the policy analysis that are particularly
conspicuous in budgetary decisions, I have chosen to analyse one particular
issue from the Arrangements Law accompanying the state budget for 2013–14,
namely, child allowances.5 Based on the explanations for child allowance cuts in
the Arrangements Law, I shall describe one of three modes of analysis employed
by the Ministry of Finance Budget Department. This issue was chosen for two
additional reasons. First, this is a change with substantial budgetary significance.
The cut in child allowances constitutes about 30 per cent of the overall cut in
government expenditure for 2014.6 Third, this step has macro-social implications
as will be made clear below.
As part of the steps to reduce the budgetary deficit, it was decided to cut the
child allowances budget from NIS 7 billion in 2012 to NIS 4 billion in 2014. As
a result of the cut, a family with three children (the standard family size in Israel),
will incur an income reduction of about NIS 300 a month, which is 7 per cent
of the minimum salary or 3.3 per cent of the average salary in Israel.
This proposal demonstrates one (frequent) pattern of policy analysis in the
Budget Department. First, the proposal is the exclusive product of the Budget
Department, without being preceded by systematic policy analysis in the Ministry
of Finance or outside it. The central undesirable phenomenon the Ministry
of Finance is interested in reducing is well defined. A clear formulation of the
undesirable conditions, as they are perceived by the professional staff, generally
characterises the policy analysis work of the Budget Department. This step, in
conjunction with others, reduces the large budgetary deficit, and thus also the fear
that macroeconomic stability will be undermined (the policy hypothesis).
The proposal to reduce child allowances might not have seen the light of day
had the political composition of the Knesset and the government not changed.
The Knesset elections that took place on 22 January 2013 led to a change in the
composition of the government. A new party, Yesh Atid [there is a future], which
championed increasing the participation of the ultra-Orthodox population in
the military and the workforce, entered the government and replaced the ultra-
Orthodox parties that were previously in the coalition. The leader of Yesh Atid,
Yair Lapid, was chosen as Minister of Finance, and we can thus see clearly the
close connection between the definition of the problem (child allowances are
too high) and politics (the ultra-Orthodox population will be more adversely
affected because they have many children), as we learned from Stone (1998).
Support for this hypothesis can be found in Yesh Atid’s major initiative to require
young ultra-Orthodox men to enroll in the army, like other young Jews in Israel.
The definition of the problem also matches the views of the professional staff
in the Budget Department, a viewpoint that gives greater emphasis to the value
of freedom over that of equality. This worldview relates negatively to government
support for low-income earners, and particularly those populations that have low
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participation rates in the labour market, such as the ultra-Orthodox and the Arabs.
According to this view, government support adds to the tax burden and suppresses
the incentive of allowance recipients to work, or is given to those who are not
worthy of support. As a result, taxes adversely affect the economic incentives to
work, invest and invent. To this one could add also child allowances’ potential
effect of increasing the number of children in poor families. This viewpoint in
conjunction with the political change created a suitable climate for reducing child
allowances, as could be predicted by Kingdon’s policy stream framework (1995).
An analysis of the assumed effect of policy proposals on major variables is
an essential component, but is uncommon in the routine work of the Budget
Department. This is one of the weaknesses of the policy analysis of the Budget
Department. The proposal to cut child allowances clearly demonstrates this
disadvantage. It cannot be claimed in this case that this is a step whose macro-social
significance is negligible and that there is no point in evaluating the expected
effect. Nevertheless, there is no evaluation of the expected effect of cutting child
allowances on the dimensions of poverty or the participation rate in the labour
force. It is hoped that this is not a case in which an evaluation of this kind was
undertaken, but was not presented to the government, which voted on the state
budget and the Arrangements Law.
There is no doubt that predicting the expected effect of a policy step is one of
the most difficult stages in policy analysis. Projection of the expected effect requires
expertise in technical tools and coping with uncertainty. Various techniques of
forecasting the consequences of a policy step exist, ranging from extrapolation
to theoretical models that take behavioural changes into account, and to experts’
forecast (Dunn, 2012). It is unclear how a policy proposal can be justified without
taking into consideration the social cost.7
Two weeks after presenting the state budget and the Arrangements Law for
government approval, a report prepared by the National Insurance Institute (which
is officially in charge of measuring poverty in Israel) was leaked. According to this
report, in the wake of the cut in child allowances, the number of poor people
will grow by about 90,000, about 1 per cent of the Israeli population, and as a
result the overall poverty rate will grow by 3 per cent. This report is mentioned
here in order to draw attention to the existence of an institution that regularly
conducts such predictions, but whose capabilities were not made use of.8
The Budget Department in the Ministry of Finance could have predicted
the effect of reducing the child allowance on the expected extent of poverty,
or have used the services of the National Insurance Institute, but it did not do
so. Such forecasts could have adversely affected the political feasibility of cutting
the child allowances. From a democratic perspective it is improper to abstain
from conducting an analysis or concealing it in order to increase the chances
of promoting a policy proposal. Alternatively, abstaining from conducting an
evaluation could be due to the extent of the accompanying uncertainty, even
regarding the direction of the effect (and not only its intensity). Recall that
according to the prevalent belief in the Budget Department, a cut in child
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allowances could reduce poverty if the work supply of allowance recipients grows
and the number of children decreases. Policy analysts relying on unsubstantiated
beliefs, however, are no different from people in ancient times that provided
weather forecasts on the basis of superstitions.
From discussions with people who were involved in formulating the 2013–14
Budget, I learnt that various alternatives for cutting child allowances were
presented to the Minister of Finance, but were not presented to the government.
It is unclear what criteria the Minister of Finance employed in examining the
alternatives, and what decision rule he used to decide between the alternatives.
On the basis of the available information, one cannot ascertain what decision
rule the Ministry of Finance used when it decided between two alternatives, one
of which is preferable according to one criterion (for example, efficiency), but
is inferior to a second alternative according to another criterion (for example,
inequality). With all due caution, it seems that no systematic decision rule guides
the decision makers in choosing an alternative that is presented to the government.
Policy analysis by an interministerial committee: the national programme for

reducing greenhouse gas emissions (the Shani Committee)
Policy analysis in the Ministry of Finance is also delegated to interministerial

committees that it establishes from time to time to examine a specific policy issue.
Considerable variance exists between interministerial committees in terms of the
importance of the policy issues they examine, and also their working methods. In
reality, there is no uniform methodology according to which the interministerial
committee examines the policy issue.
Exploring this mode of policy analysis is based on one interministerial
committee that formulated a national plan for reducing greenhouse gas emissions.
The committee was chosen for two reasons. First, the Ministry of Finance initiated
the establishment of the committee. Heading the committee was the then director-
general of the Ministry of Finance, Haim Shani, and two representatives of the
Budget Department played a central role in the energetic efficiency subcommittee.
Second, the committee dealt with an issue that has macroeconomic implications.
As above, we examine the work that has been done by comparing the committee’s
report with standard policy analysis.
The government established this committee in March 2010 against the backdrop
of President Shimon Peres’s declaration at the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change that took place in Copenhagen at the end of
2009. The president declared that Israel would strive to reduce the volume of
greenhouse gas emissions by 20 per cent by 2020 relative to the business-as-usual
scenario.
The analysis itself was not conducted only by people in government. As
opposed to the in-house work of the Budget Department, the committee’s policy
analysis work was accompanied by a team from the Samuel Neaman Institute
(an independent NGO) headed by Ofira Ayalon, assisted by Lior Shmueli from
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EcoFinance. In other words, the policy analysis was partially conducted through
outsourcing under the supervision and responsibility of governmental bodies. The
analysis was preceded by the work of McKinsey & Company for the Ministry of
Environmental Protection.
Before we examine each of the policy analysis stages of the section of the report
dealing with energetic efficiency (because of space constraints we will not consider
the other parts of the report), it should be said that the committee conducted a
policy analysis that is quite close to the methodology of systematic policy analysis.
The undesirable phenomenon of global warming due to greenhouse gas emissions,
which constituted the background to the establishment of the committee, is clear
and well-defined. The committee was not required to define the phenomenon,
but rather, mainly, to define the problem. The committee defined the problem
in terms of government failures (the coordination between governmental bodies
due to the multiplicity of the bodies and conflicting interests), and market failures,
such as restricted access to credit and a lack of information which act as barriers
to reducing greenhouse gas emissions.
The committee’s report does not present empirical backing for the problem
definitions that were chosen. It does not provide information regarding the extent
of the problem of limited access to credit, as a result of which consumers avoid
the beneficial replacement of energy inefficient electrical appliances. There is also
no information in the report on how unaware or unknowledgeable consumers are
about the benefits to be gained from replacing their energy inefficient electrical
appliances.
The solution that a policy analyst proposes can tell us what is the implicit
problem definition. The solutions that the committee suggests for reducing
greenhouse gas emissions, implies two different problem definitions: externalities
and lack of knowledge. Note that it ignores government failures that the
committee pointed out as potential problem definition in the introduction. The
problem of limited access to credit market that the committee presented is hardly
even considered, except indirectly and on the margins, as is evident in the seven
suggested policy proposals.
The use of the word solutions and not alternatives is intentional. The committee
does not suggest several alternatives to the policy makers, from which the
preferred alternative is to be chosen. The committee proposes implementing
simultaneously all seven solutions, including imposing a prohibition on the use of
electrical appliances below a certain threshold of energetic efficiency, subsidising
the scrapping of old electrical appliances, and subsidising energy surveys in large
organisations.9 The report is adamant that all the solutions should be implemented
simultaneously, because each policy recommendation reinforces the other.
However, there is no backing for this assertion in the report. Furthermore, the
report does not consider the adverse effect on political feasibility that arises from
all seven policy proposals. The budgetary feasibility emerged later as an effective
barrier. In the Arrangements Law for 2013–14 (p 234), the Ministry of Finance
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included a clause that postpones the implementation of the national plan for
reducing greenhouse gasses to 2016 – because of budgetary considerations.
The absence of alternatives is a salient characteristic of all three types of policy
analysis that are conducted in the Ministry of Finance, as we saw in the analysis
of the cut in child allowances, and as appears below in the policy analysis of a
public committee. In the absence of alternatives, the policy makers are restricted
to either accept or reject the suggested policy proposal. In our personal lives
we would not be satisfied with one alternative when we consider purchasing
a television. Clearly, examining several television sets will lead to an informed
decision. This is not the working routine of policy analysis in Israel.
One of the favourable prominent features of the committee’s policy analysis is
the presentation of the expected effects of the proposed solutions on the major
variables over a decade, such as greenhouse gas emissions, the benefit to the
economy, and the budgetary cost. The committee estimates that the emission of
greenhouse gasses will decrease by 2020 by the equivalent of about 16 million
tons of carbon dioxide, a decrease of 15 per cent relative to the business-as-usual
scenario. The cumulative budgetary cost of suggested policy proposals will be
about NIS 2.2 billion, and the net expected economic benefit to the economy
will be about NIS 34 billion.
There is a widespread undesirable tendency in policy analysis in Israel to conceal
the knowledge limitations of the policy analysts. This report deviates from this
defective rule. The writers of the report are aware of their knowledge limitations
and indicate explicitly on page 27 that: ‘We cannot know what the impact of
supporting the above rate (the 20 per cent subsidy) on consumers’ behaviour
will be. It is important, therefore, to track the effect of the policy step’. The
committee also conducted a sensitivity analysis of these predicted effects in light
of the uncertainty regarding the price of electricity and other parameters.
Moreover, the committee proposes a defined mechanism and a time schedule
for implementing the recommendations, and also the cost of operating the
mechanism. The committee is aware of the need for an accompanying plan for
monitoring and evaluating the policy proposals, even though it does not propose
this explicitly nor does it budget evaluation research.
As mentioned above, an analysis of the policy of the interministerial committee
does not propose alternatives, and it is therefore not possible to ascertain what
decision rule the Ministry of Finance uses to decide between alternatives.
Implicitly, this working mode is consistent with the lexicographic rule that gives
priority to the efficiency consideration (in its deeper meaning – Pareto efficiency)
over other considerations. There is one place in the chapter on energetic efficiency
where the compilers of the report propose a solution and disqualify it, which is
to involve the Electric Corporation (the electricity dominant supplier in Israel),
with the encouragement of the consumers, to develop efficient ways of consuming
electricity. This solution was disqualified because of the monopolistic power of
the Electric Corporation that would discourage the introduction of new players
in the energetic efficiency market.
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Policy analysis of a public committee: taxing oil and gas profits (the Sheshinski
Committee)
The appointment of a public committee is an additional mode of policy analysis

in the Ministry of Finance. As mentioned above, the Ministry of Finance tends
not to make frequent use of this tool because of the fear of losing control. In
order to demonstrate policy analysis by means of a public committee, we will use
the Sheshinski Committee that was appointed in April 2010 and charged with
examining the fiscal system (taxation, royalties and fees) with regard to gas and oil
resources.10 This committee was chosen as a test case for this article because it was
appointed by the Minister of Finance who apparently could have relied on the
in-house work of the Budget Department in consultation or in collaboration with
other government ministries. Chosen to head the committee was Eitan Sheshinski
from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, a well-known economist. Five senior
government officials worked alongside him in the committee, including the director
of the Budget Department at the time, Udi Nissan.
The working mode of the committee was totally different from the policy analysis
that was conducted in the Budget Department. The committee opened its doors to
the public at large and to interested bodies, such as gas and oil exploration companies,
to present their views prior to the committee’s having formulated its conclusions.
This is in contradiction to the proposal to cut the child allowances that was arrived
at without any input from the public or bodies outside the government or from
government institutions such as the National Insurance Institute. The committee
was not content with exclusive reliance on in-house work, and commissioned
two professional opinions from well-known experts (Daniel Johnston and Robert
Pindyck), which can be seen as a type of partial outsourcing of policy analysis.
The Sheshinski Committee invited any interested party to present its positions
again after the presentation of the interim recommendations in November 2010.
Already in the letter of appointment we can discern a broad hint of the major
undesirable development that the Ministry of Finance wished to limit, which was
also the major reason for establishing the committee against the backdrop of the
large gas discoveries. In terms of the existing laws, the committee concludes that
the public does not obtain an appropriate share of the profits that will be gained
from the gas discoveries along Israel’s shores. The professional staff in the Ministry
of Finance that participated in formulating the letter of appointment clearly
defined the undesirable development, in the same way as in the case of the child
allowances and greenhouse gas committee. The letter of appointment provides
signs of the definition of the problem in terms of the incompatibility of the fiscal
system (taxation, royalties, and fees) that were determined back in 1952, with the
present circumstances.
In practice, the committee’s final recommendations, which were presented in
January 2011, did not deviate from the problem definition that was outlined in
the letter of appointment. The recommendations included a series of proposals
for changing the fiscal system, the major one being the imposition of a designated
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tax rate of between 0 and 50 per cent, depending on the actual rate of profit.
The committee does not present alternatives to the decision makers in the report,
but rather indicates that alternatives were considered and rejected, such as raising
the rate of the royalties.
Because alternatives were not presented to the decision makers (by means of the
committee’s report), we cannot assess what criteria the committee members used
to choose the proposed alternative. We note here that avoidance of presenting
alternatives to the government is characteristic of policy analysis in the Ministry
of Finance, as we saw above in the analysis of the proposal to cut child allowances
and of the greenhouse gas committee. An analysis of the expected effects of the
committee’s recommendations could provide a partial picture of these criteria.
As opposed to the cut in child allowances, the committee’s report includes a
detailed analysis of the predicted effects of the policy proposals. The forecasts
include an assessment of the effect of the new fiscal system on the government’s
share in the gas resources that are discovered, which is a response to the major
undesirable development. This is an essential component in a standard policy
analysis. According to the committee’s predictions, the public’s share will increase
from a third to between 52 and 62 per cent in the wake of the implementation
of the recommendations to change the fiscal system. The report also presents
the expected effect of the recommendations on the internal rate of return (IRR)
and on the cash flow of the gas fields under different assumptions of the rate of
profitability, in order to ensure that the incentive to search for new gas fields and
develop existing ones will not be adversely affected. However, the important
implication for the economy, such as the effect of the taxation addition on the
price of the natural gas to consumers was not examined.
Explaining modes of policy analysis

A comparison of the three modes of policy analysis with the standard typical
textbook model shows that the major weaknesses of policy analysis are more
prominent in the in-house work of the Budget Department. There is no tradition
in the in-house work of predicting the expected effects of policy proposals on
a variety of benefits and costs (financial and other). In practice, a professional
infrastructure has not been built that is equipped with standard prediction
techniques to estimate policy proposals’ prospective effects.
The interministerial committees or the public committees do not work
according to a uniform methodology, and thus the quality of the analytical work
is random, depending on the people heading the committee. The analytical work
of the committees is better than that of the in-house work. There is no tradition
in any of the three modes we examined of presenting a menu of alternatives to
decision makers, and in any event the decision rule according to which the best
alternative is chosen is unclear. In practice, it seems that policy analysis consists
of one criterion (budget or efficiency) in terms of which the proposed alternative
is chosen.
136
The committees that have been established over the years to propose amendments
to the working methods of the public administration, the most prominent being
the Kubersky Committee for public administration reform that presented its
recommendations in 1989, reflect dissatisfaction with the absence of systematic
policy analysis. The recently completed work of the Governance Committee
(headed by the director-general of the Prime Minister’s Office, Harel Locker,
and the Civil Service Commissioner, Moshe Dayan) also voices dissatisfaction
that underlie its recommendations for improving the working method of the
professional staff in Israeli administration. This committee focused on the balance
of forces between the strategic ministries such as the Ministry of Finance and
the policy area ministries such as the Ministry of Education, and recommended,
among other things, enhancing forecasting transparency regarding the expected
effects of government decisions on the budget. However, implications for policy
goals were not discussed. As we have already indicated, the budgeting process in
Israel is more centralised than in most developed countries. The (excessive) power
of the Budget Department in the decision making process is partly responsible
for the absence of systematic policy analysis. A powerful body has less need to
justify policy proposals to other participants in the decision making process, and
therefore policy analysis bodies of this kind are not created at all or atrophy if
they existed previously. In recent years there are signs of erosion in the relative
power of the Ministry of Finance because of the public’s active participation,
especially in the wake of the social protest in the summer of 2011. The erosion of
the Ministry of Finance’s power is also a result of the greater involvement of the
Prime Minister’s Office in the shaping of economic policy and in consolidating
changes to the decision making process. One of the manifestations of this is the
establishment of the National Economic Council in the Prime Minister’s Office
(in September 2006) and its greater involvement in shaping economic policy.
The establishment of interministerial and public committees can possibly be
seen as de facto recognition of the limited policy analysis capability of the in-
house work of the Budget Department. A public committee provides a higher
quality of policy analysis. Indeed, analysis quality appears to be improving over
time, although more research is required to confirm this. Under these conditions,
in conjunction with the erosion of the power of the Ministry of Finance, we
expect an increase in the number of committees of this kind in policy analysis.
In the future the Budget Department may play a more active role in initiating
committees of this type, and will see its role as a body that works to promote
policy analysis conducted under the auspices of public committees.
The relative absence of systematic policy analysis in the budget department
could be explained – perhaps even justified – with reference to three factors:
extreme instability of the policy environment; the need for ‘constructive
ambiguity’; and the short timeframe for policy making. First, Israel is exposed to
greater uncertainty than typical developed countries. This is reflected both in the
relatively sharp fluctuations in GDP compared with European countries or the
United States. Since its establishment, Israel is under security threat, a situation
137
that does not encourage long-term planning, policy analysis and retrospective
evaluation. It is not surprising that a tradition of planning and policy analysis has
not developed, as researchers of public administration have pointed out (Dror,
1968; Geva-May and Kfir, 2000).
Under such conditions, the allocation of resources for predicting the expected
effect of policy proposals seems almost a waste of resources, because a sudden
war or unexpected mass immigration makes a mockery of any forecast. Indeed,
in Israel’s early years there was even an immediate fear of whether the country
would continue to exist. Improvisation, and not planning, became the accepted
working tool for coping with the uncertainty. Over the years the uncertainty has
decreased, as is reflected in the sharp decrease in the standard deviation of the
GDP growth rate from the establishment of the state until today. Despite this,
improvisation, which became part of the DNA of the Israeli society, still also
characterises part of the working modes of the Budget Department. Possibly the
professional infrastructure of the Budget Department was built on the foundation
of the considerable uncertainty, in which it is inappropriate to place forecasts on
the government’s table of the expected effects of policy proposals, which is an
essential part of planning and policy analysis, or to conduct an evaluation research
of adopted policy tools.
The way policy analysis is done in the Budget Department could be also a
consequence of constructive ambiguity designed to lower the tone of arguments in
a society riddled with disagreements. Systematic policy analysis would expose the
evaluations of the expected effect and the values underlying the policy proposals,
which may bring to the surface the rift between parts of society, thereby increasing
the potential for paralysis in decision making. This ambiguity clearly harms the
ability to identify whether the economic policy matches the public’s preferences,
or at least does not create permanent winners and losers.Apparently, it could be
claimed that the time pressure under which the Budget Department operates does
not facilitate policy analysis according to the standard model of policy analysis,
and compels the department to conduct intuitive policy analysis. An analysis of
the child allowances, however, shows that it would have been possible for the
Budget Department, within the available time framework, to conduct a forecast
of the expected effects of the policy proposal on poverty (or to request this from
the National Insurance Institute), which was not done.
Notes
1
I would like to thank Eyal Epstein, Shaul Meridor, Rotem Peleg and Reuven Kogan
who were interviewed for this article. At the time of the interview (July 2011) they
were deputy-heads of the Budget Department of the Ministry of Finance. I also thank
Galit Cohen-Blankstein, Avi Ben-Bassat, Anat Gofen, Udi Nissan, Muli San and Shaul
Zemach for their helpful comments.
2
The Arrangements Law was first legislated in 1985 as part of the economic plan for
stabilising the economy. This plan was designed to deal with one of the most severe
economic crises the Israeli economy had ever faced. Since then the emergency has
138
passed, but the Arrangements Law has become entrenched in the Israeli budgeting
process. Each year the government presents the Arrangements Law in tandem with the
Budget Law for the purpose of authorising dozens of laws and legislative amendments in
various areas. In recent years the use of the Arrangements Law has grown considerably,
and it serves also as a platform for economic programmes that were introduced during
the year (Ben-Basset and Dahan, 2006).
3
In January 2012 the Ministry of Finance had 1,067 posts, half of which were for
administrative employees (Report on salary expenditure in government service, in
the security bodies and the Prisons Service for 2011, p 125).
4
The National Insurance Institute analysed the overall effect of the taxation and the
allowances on inequality. Some of the steps (greatly) increase inequality, like cuts in
the allowances, and some (slightly) reduce it, such as raising the rate of income tax,
and overall the effect is that of increasing inequality.
5
After the new government was formed, the decision was made to present the budget
for the remainder of 2013 and the whole of 2014.
6
The overall reduction in expenditure in the 2014 budget is about NIS 10.5 billion,
and includes an uncertain cut of NIS 3 billion in the security budget (The State
Budget, Proposals for Changing the 2013–2014 Budget, p 50). In other words, the
cut in child allowances is about 40 per cent of the overall reduction, if the cut in the
defence budget were not to materialise.
7
An analysis of the effects does not include the benefit that the cut might achieve, such
as an increase in labour force participation. If there is no additional benefit from the
cut in child allowances besides meeting the deficit target, it is not clear why the cut
is made here and not in any other item of the budget.
8
Note that this evaluation is based on extrapolation and does not take into account
behavioural changes that could occur in the short run (labour supply) or in the long
run (number of children) as a result of the cut in child allowances.
9
The four other solutions are high taxation on energy inefficient appliances, accelerated
depreciation for investments in energetic efficiency, subsidising investment for reducing
greenhouse gas emissions, and broadening consumers’ obligation to move over to
pricing according to load demand.
10
The committee’s letter of appointment included also an examination of the economic
effects of discovering gas and oil on the exchange rate and the competitiveness of the
Israel economy.
References
Bardach, E, 2011, A practical guide for policy analysis: The eightfold path to more
effective problem solving, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage
Ben-Bassat, A, 2011, Conflicts, interest groups, and politics in structural reforms,
Journal of Law and Economics 54, 4, 937–52
Ben-Basset, A, Dahan, M, 2006, The balance of forces in the budgeting process [in
Dror, Y, 1968, Public policymaking reconsidered, Scranton, PA: Chandler Publishing
Company
139
Dunn, WN, 2012, Public policy analysis, 5th edn, New York: Pearson Education
Governance Committee, 2013, Report of the team for improving the staff work and
the execution ability of the government ministries [in Hebrew], March, Jerusalem:
State of Israel
Kingdon, JW, 1995, Agendas, alternatives, and public policies, London: Longman
Publishing Group
Kubersky Committee, 1989, Report of the public–professional committee for
comprehensive examination of the civil service and bodies supported from the government
budget [in Hebrew], Jerusalem: State of Israel
Ministry of Finance, 2013, The Economic Plan for 2013–2014 [in Hebrew], May,
Jerusalem: Ministry of Finance
Shani Committee, 2011, Report of the interministerial committee on a national action
plan for reducing greenhouse gas emissions [in Hebrew], June, Jerusalem: State of Israel
Sheshinski Committee, 2011, Report of the committee for examining fiscal policy
regarding oil and gas resources in Israel [in Hebrew], January, Jerusalem: State of Israel
Stone, DA, 1988, Policy paradox and political reason, Glenview, IL: Scott, Foresman
Tanzi, V, Schuknecht, L, 2000, Public spending in the 20th century: A global perspective,
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
Trajtenberg Committee, 2011, Report of the committee for socioeconomic change [in
Hebrew], September, Jerusalem: State of Israel
Weimer, D, Vining, A, 2011, Policy analysis concepts and practice, 5th edn, New
York: Pearson Education
Zemach Committee, 2012, Report of the interministerial committee for examining
government policy on the natural-gas economy in Israel [in Hebrew], August, Jerusalem:
State of Israel
140
EIGHT
Policy analysis at the

Bank of Israel1
Karnit Flug
The Governor of the Bank of Israel, unlike the heads of most central banks, has
been assigned the formal role of the economic advisor to the government. This
was the case in the original Bank of Israel (BOI) Law of 1954, and it continues in
the newly legislated 2010 law. Thus, the policy research and analysis undertaken
at the Bank is not limited to monetary and macroeconomic matters, but covers
a wide range of policy issues. This chapter will describe and discuss the policy
analysis carried out at the Research Department (RD) of the Bank of Israel. It
begins with a description of the institutional and legal framework (the first section)
and the description of the profile of researches (the second section). The next
two sections then discusses the policy analysis performed to support the conduct
of monetary policy within the framework of an inflation targeting regime and
in support of financial stability and macroprudential analysis. The chapter then
moves on to the analysis in support of the Governor’s role as Economic Advisor
to the Government (the fifth section) such as the analysis of fiscal policy and
its dynamics, primarily from the perspective of fiscal aggregates (expenditure,
taxes, deficits and debt), the analysis of labour markets, welfare and social services
provision, and so on. The review covers both current analysis (that is, from a
short-term perspective) and its evolution over time, and specific research projects
aimed at in-depth analysis of various policy issues. The final section provides
some concluding remarks.
Institutional and legal framework

The Bank of Israel was established in 1954 and according to the Bank of Israel
Law, the Governor was assigned the unique role of an Economic Advisor to
the government – ‘The Governor shall serve as adviser to the Government on
currency and other economic matters’ (the BOI Law, 5714–1954).
Many believe that the unusual task for a central bank Governor was added
because David Horowitz, the first Governor of the Bank of Israel, had served
as Director General of the Ministry of Finance until the establishment of the
Bank. It was also based on the expectation that the Bank could attract high level
professionals for its Research Department.
Each Governor has had a somewhat different interpretation of the role of an
economic advisor to the government, but nonetheless all served as active advisors.
141
In 2010, when a new Bank of Israel Law was legislated, the Governor’s role as
advisor to the government on economic matters was retained.
Policy analysis at the Bank of Israel serves two broad purposes. The first is
to provide the analytical input into policy decisions made by the Bank. This is
primarily in the area of monetary policy, financial stability and macroprudential
policy. The second purpose is to provide the Governor with the analytical input
and research infrastructure that serve as a basis for his economic advisory role.
The primary task of the Research Department at the Bank of Israel is to provide
the economic analysis that serves as the basis in the formulation of monetary
and prudential policy decisions (decisions which, under the new BOI Law, are
taken by the Monetary Policy Committee (MPC)), and in the formulation of
the Governor’s policy recommendations. As part of the economic advisory role,
the Research Department also assesses the government’s policy by monitoring
and analysing economic developments, and by creating a research infrastructure
for informed policy decisions. The results of the ongoing analysis, research
and assessments are presented to the decision makers in the Bank of Israel, to
government ministries, Knesset committees and to the public. Thus it contributes
to the understanding of economic processes, the identification of trends and
risks, the professional examination and evaluation of policy proposals, and the
formulation of policy in the Ministry of Finance and other Ministries.
One channel by which the analytical work performed at the Research
Department finds its way into the decision making process has been through
the participation of Research Department’s senior staff in public committees.
These committees are usually formed by the government or by the relevant
ministries, and are expected to come up with policy recommendations on a
specific policy issue. They are generally comprised of representatives of various
ministries, sometimes with external experts, and the BOI has been invited
to participate in many of them. The Bank’s representatives often provide the
analytical infrastructure which serves as a basis for the work of these committees.
A partial list of the committees on which the BOI representatives have served
and provided analytical input over the past five years includes: the Committee
for Economic and Social Change (the Trajtenberg Committee), the economic
team for the process of joining the OECD, the Committee Aimed at Ensuring
the Long Term Stability of the National Insurance Institute, the Committee for
Determining the Retirement Age for Women, the Committee for a Reform of
the Public Transportation System, and the Committee on a Multi-Year Defence
Budget (the ‘Brodet‘ committee).
The Research Department: professional capabilities, skills and

quality control
The Research Department of the Bank of Israel has about 75 employees, of
whom about 50 are economic researchers (with either an MA in Economics or
a PhD), 20 are students (studying for their BA or MA in economics) and the
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Policy analysis at the Bank of Israel
rest are support staff. The Department is divided into two divisions one which
covers monetary and financial issues and one covering macroeconomics and
policy analysis. The monetary and financial wing is further divided into units
– capital markets, financial stability, banking, monetary current analysis and
monetary modelling, while the macroeconomics and policy analysis division is
divided as well into the following units: macroeconomics, economic industries
and infrastructure, labour market, public sector and balance of payments. This
structure and list of units provide a sense of the broad scope of coverage and
expertise within the Research Department.
The staff at the Research Department is highly qualified, and until recently
tended to have a relatively long tenure at the Bank. About 40 per cent of
the economists hold a PhD degree and the rest hold an MA with a research
orientation. The long tenure at the Bank facilitated the buildup of expertise and
knowledge that are quite unique in the public sector.
Any work conducted by researchers at the Research Department goes
through a process of peer review and discussion in various forums before being
published or transferred to BOI management or shared with other governmental
agencies. A draft of any policy analysis or proposal is discussed in a small forum
of economists and managers and revised on the basis of the comments received
before being presented in internal or external forums as ‘the Bank of Israel’s
view’, or published in any BOI publication. Research papers are presented in a
departmental seminar where they are also assigned a discussant. Following the
incorporation of comments and the approval by the editor of the discussion papers
series (DPS) – who is a member of the Department’s management – it is published
in the DPS. Some papers that are submitted to the BOI Survey – a professional
journal – are refereed and undergo a review process as in any professional journal.
Other papers are published in other academic journals.
The work programme of the research department is developed through a
combination of ‘top down’ and ‘bottom up’ process. Naturally, most of the research
and analysis that is conducted as a direct input into the BOI’s policy decision
making is assigned by the Bank’s or the research department’s management. It is
directed at answering specific questions or providing specific input into policy
formulation. Another part of the work programme is initiated by the research
department’s management in response to, or in anticipation of policy issues that
are being discussed or that they want to put forward for discussion with the Bank’s
management and later on with the relevant government ministries. This is done
in order to provide professional input in the context of the Governor’s role as the
economic advisor to the government. The third part of the work programme
is research projects that are initiated by the researchers and are approved by the
department’s management. These projects can be either directed at specific policy
questions that arise in the public discussion, or a more fundamental or general
question (‘basic research’) that advances our understanding of economic behaviour
and relationships more broadly, and adds to the body of knowledge that serves
143
as infrastructure for economic analysis. Some projects that are initiated by the
researchers are part of their requirements in the context of their academic training.
Policy analysis in support of monetary policy

Conducting monetary policy is the principal task of the Bank of Israel like that
of any central bank. The policy decisions are made by the Monetary Policy
Committee, which was established in October 2011 in accordance with the
2010 Bank of Israel Law (under the 1954 law, the Governor was the sole decision
maker.) The committee has six members, of whom three are from the Bank and
three are from the public. It is chaired by the Governor, who has an additional
vote in the case of a tied vote.
The main objective of monetary policy, as defined by the BOI Law, is attaining
and maintaining price stability, and subject to that, supporting the other objectives
of the government’s economic policy – including growth and employment – and
supporting financial stability. Price stability is defined by an inflation target that is
set by the government, and the Bank’s objective is attaining this target. In order
to attain this target the BOI sets its interest rate (the rate at which it lends to or
borrows from the banks).
In order to decide about the appropriate interest rate each month, the Research
Department and the Market Operations Department provide analyses of the
current state of the economy and of markets abroad. The Research Department
analysis focuses on the macroeconomic indicators of economic activity and
on the inflation environment and the main forces affecting it. This is done by
analysis of current statistical data on economic activity, including trade flows,
the labour market, public finances, about the balance of payments as well as the
evolution of prices and financial market indicators. This evaluation is also aided by
econometric models and statistical tools, and surveys that are used to determine
the current state of the economy given the delays in statistical data. In addition,
in order to help formulate forward looking policy, policy makers (the MPC) are
also provided with projections of the major economic variables (growth of output,
employment, inflation and so on), using state of the art econometric models, and
assumptions about the external environment.
These models are also used to perform policy simulations to assess the outcomes
of alternative policy decisions (for example, interest rate paths) that can help in,
for example, judging the tradeoffs between inflation and growth.
The econometric models are also used to assess the outcomes under different
external scenarios (for example, alternative assumptions about the world trade
growth rate, or the evolution of energy prices).This is particularly important in
the analysis of risks given the uncertainty about the environment in which policy
decisions need to be taken.
In order to perform the policy analysis described above, which serves as a direct
input into policy decisions, quantitative models and analytic tools are developed
on the basis of econometric research conducted by researchers at the Research
144
Department, who maintain an ongoing dialogue with colleagues in other central

banks, international organisations (for example, the IMF), and academia. The
performance of these tools in assessing the current state of the economy and in
providing projections is tested both in and out of sample, and the estimation
methodology, the models and their performance are published in research papers
(see references below).
Examples of the analytic tools that help assess the current state of the economy
are: (1) The Composite State-of-the-Economy Index was developed initially in
1991 (Melnick and Golan, 1991) and redefined in 2003 (Marom, Menashe
and Suhoy, 2003). This index is based on several economic indicators and uses
advanced statistical methods to provide, in real time, an indicator for the level of
economic activity; (2) The Companies Survey was carried out by the Research
Department until recently – it is now being replaced by the Business Tendency
Survey conducted by the Central Bureau of Statistics – and provided qualitative
information about the evolution of current activity, employment, obstacles to
expansion, and so on, as well as prospects for the next quarter (Marom, 2001). This
helped in assessing the state of the various sectors and the short-term expected
trends. (3) Nowcasting econometric and statistical models provide projections of
basic National Accounts (NA) variables in real time, which is important for policy
makers given that NA data is published a month and a half after the end of the
quarter. (4) The Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model (Argov
et al, 2012), which has theoretical foundations and was estimated for the Israeli
economy, is the main model that is used in the formulation of projections for the
main macroeconomic variables over the medium term (1–2 years ahead). It is also
used to analyse various scenarios and the outcomes of alternative policy paths.
In addition to the direct analytical input into the monthly monetary policy
decisions, the BoI undertakes various research projects aimed at evaluating
particular policy tools. Policy analysis is often performed in order to assess the
potential effect of a policy tool or options that are being considered. This analysis
is reported to the Bank management or to the MPC in an internal memorandum
that serves as a basis for the policy discussion and decision. An example of this type
of analysis is the estimation of a model of the Equilibrium Exchange Rate, which
served to assess the deviation of the current rate from equilibrium – an essential
input into the discussion in 2008–09 of the need for foreign exchange market
intervention by the BoI. Another example is the estimation of the contribution
of various factors to the rise in housing prices during 2008–12. These research
projects are in most cases eventually published following an internal review
process, as part of the BoI DPS, as a ‘box’ in the BoI Annual Report, or as part
of the ‘Special Topics’ section of the Recent Economic Developments series,
issued three times a year by the research department.
Another type of policy analysis performed at the Research Department is ex-
post evaluation of the outcome of policies that were implemented by the Bank.
This is done in various forms and levels: short-term and qualitative analysis is
performed and published in periodical reports such as the BOI Annual Report
145
and the Monetary Policy Report. More rigorous evaluation is performed as

research projects using various models and estimation procedures. An example of
such a study is that of Avihai Sorezcky (2010) – ‘Did the Bank of Israel Influence
the Exchange rate?’ – which assessed the effect of the Bank’s foreign exchange
intervention during 2008–09.
Policy analysis in support of financial stability and

macroprudential analysis
As mentioned above, one of the Bank’s objectives is to support the stability of the
financial system. This objective, which gained prominence among central banks in
how they view their objectives during and after the global crisis of 2008–09, was
introduced explicitly into the BOI Law of 2010. Since then, a work programme
has been developed and implemented in this area: a programme in line with the
evolution of the international thinking on these issues.
It is important to note that while there are specific authorities in charge of
the regulation and supervision of the various types of financial institutions (the
Banking Supervision Department of the BOI regarding banks, the Ministry of
Finance’s Capital Markets, Insurance and Savings Department for other financial
institutions, and the Israel Securities Authority for securities), it is the BOI who
is in charge of the stability of the overall financial system – the macroprudential
responsibility. The close links and interactions between the various components of
the financial system (among the various institutions and between the institutions
and the financial markets) require the analysis of the system as a whole. This
means following and analysing the interactions between the various elements of
the system, the dynamic processes within the system, and the concurrent effects
of external shocks on the various elements of the financial system.
In order to do so, the BOI operates in two forums. One is the regulators team,
whose aim is to coordinate between the Capital Market, Insurance and Savings
Department at the Ministry of Finance, the Israel Securities Authority, and the
Banking Supervision Department at the Bank of Israel. The inter-institutional
team’s goals are to identify systemic risks in the financial system; to exchange
essential information among the three authorities regarding financial institutions,
financial markets status and various financial instruments; and to discuss possible
courses of actions, preventive and ex-post, in crises for dealing with systemic
risk. The second forum is an inter-departmental team inside the BOI in which
members of Research Department, Market Operations Department and the
Banking Supervision Department meet to monitor the development of systematic
risks. They do so by:
1 compilation and analysis of data on the financial system and close follow-up
of developments in the system with a focus on the main risks to stability;
2 development of analytic tools for early warning signs of threats to stability and
of early intervention tools to remedy such developments.
146
Examples of such an analysis are the consideration of alternative policy measures

(‘macroprudential’ measures) aimed at cooling off the housing market following a
sharp rise in housing prices during 2008–11 (such as limits on the ration of loan
to value (LTVs) of mortgages, and special reserve requirements for mortgages).
It is important to note that the analytical tools and models of analysis in the
macroprudential area are still evolving, and there are no ‘state of the art’ or ‘best
practices’ that are agreed upon. The international organisations such as the IMF
and the BIS also devote a lot of resources to help define the various elements
of this task.
Policy analysis in support of the Governor’s economic advisory

role
Policy analysis conducted at the BOI’s Research Department in support of
the Governor’s role as the economic advisor to the government has four main
components: (1) basic ‘infrastructural’ research that estimates fundamental
relationships and quantifies structural attributes of the Israeli economy, (2)
construction of econometric models that can be used to estimate and evaluate
the effects of various policies on economic outcomes, (3) current analysis of
recent economic developments, and (4) research projects to estimate the effects
of specific policy interventions. In this section, I will demonstrate and provide
examples for each of these types of policy analysis.
1 Basic research
In this category we can list research projects such as an estimation of

macroeconomic models and equations for the Israeli economy that can help
understand and assess the dynamics of the economy, its reaction to shocks and
policies, its growth potential and its determinants, and some aspects of the market
structure in general and in specific sectors and industries. This type of research
is conducted on a wide range of topics. Examples of such basic research include
an assessment of the determinants of the real exchange rate in Israel (Sussman,
1998), analysis of the cyclical bias in government spending in Israel (Hercowitz
and Strawczynski, 1998), the effects of technological and structural changes on
unemployment by level of education (Flug, Kasir and Ribon, 2000), political
business cycles (Klein, 2000), the effects of technological changes on the wage
structure, the determinants of sustainable growth, the effects of fiscal policy
on private consumption, the change in banks’ market power resulting from
globalisation, the return on education, growth episodes and macroeconomic
policy, and labour diversity and productivity (Navon, 2009).
This type of basic research serves as a pool of knowledge about the economy and
its characteristics, and is important as a basis against which the effects of various
macroeconomic policies can be assessed, evaluated and projected.
147
2 Econometric models
As Economic Advisor to the government, the Governor expresses his professional

opinion during budget discussions. He often presents the trade-offs between various
paths of the various fiscal aggregates (spending, taxes, deficits, debt) and presents
the implications of various policy choices. The quantitative assessments of the
fiscal policies are based on several econometric models developed, estimated and
maintained by the Research Department. Those include a macroeconomic model
in which the relationship between various fiscal aggregates and macroeconomic
performance (for example, economic growth) are quantified. Another model is
a tax model which estimates the relationship between various macroeconomic
indicators (for example, growth, change in wages, developments in the financial
and stock markets, exports, imports) and tax revenue (Brender, 2001). This model
can help assess the effects of tax reforms on overall tax collection, and of the
effects of exogenous shocks to the economy on revenues and the deficit. These
quantitative assessments are critical in fiscal policy design.
3 Current analysis
The evaluation of the current state of the economy as a whole, and of various
sectors in particular, is an important input in the design of policies. The current
analysis is also a basis for short-term and medium-term projections on which
budgetary plans are based. The RD is regularly consulted by the Ministry
of Finance regarding its assessment of the current level of activity and its
macroeconomic projections. These consultations include the RD’s assessment
regarding the effects of various external shocks on the economy, an assessment
that is performed using the macroeconomic models noted above.
Current analysis also covers developments in specific industries. For example,
when housing prices were rising rapidly during 2008–11, the BOI was consulted
regarding the source of the rise in prices, a diagnosis that was crucial in devising
the correct policy response. The assessment that sources were both the low
interest rate and a slow supply response to the rising prices, based on research
conducted at the RD (and published in the BOI’s Annual Report and in its
DPS [Dovman, Ribon and Yakhin, 2011]), made an important contribution to
the recognition that the government needs to expedite the sale of land so as to
increase the supply of new homes. Other examples include the assessment of
future demand for natural gas as an input to reaching a decision on government
policies on natural gas exports, and an assessment of the evolution of demand for
hotel rooms as an input to the government policy in promoting the construction
of hotels (Shaharabani and Menashe, 2011).
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4 Policy evaluation research projects
In this section, I will explore in detail one example of the way in which the Research
Department of the Bank of Israel supports the Governors’ role as Economic Adviser
to the government. I will do so by describing the ‘birth’ of an important policy tool
– which the Bank of Israel played a vital role in initiating, evaluating and pushing
for implementation; I will then also evaluate the implementation and assess the
impact of the programme.
The Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) is a policy tool for reducing social gaps
and improving the income of the working population at the bottom of the income
distribution. It is a progressive income tax system, in which people earning below a
certain threshold receive supplemental pay from the government. It was developed
by British politician Juliet Rhys-Williams in the 1940s and later by Milton Friedman,
and is widely applied in the US, the UK, New Zealand and in Canada.
The idea of importing the EITC to Israel ‘travelled’ in the halls of the Bank for
some time. Early reference can be found in the BOI 2002 Annual Report (although
the name of the programme wasn’t mentioned explicitly): ‘Research undertaken in
other countries shows that programmes to subsidise the wages of individuals with
low earning ability serve to increase their participation rate’.A year later, the BOI
2003 Annual Report calls for the implementation of such a policy explicitly: ‘the
urgent need to adopt additional policy measures which will provide direct support
for the return of unskilled workers to the labour market – such as the introduction
of a negative income tax programme’.In 2004, two researchers from the Bank
of Israel – Kaliner-Kasir and Gottlieb – published a policy report which offered
strategies to reduce poverty. One of their recommendations was to give tax benefits
to low income workers. In 2005, Bank of Israel research suggested implementing the
EITC in Israel (Brender and Strawczynski, 2006). The Brender and Strawczynski
research presented a framework for cost–benefit analysis and an evaluation of the
impact of the programme on employment, poverty and budget. They showed that
the programme has the potential to make a significant contribution in reducing
poverty among the working poor. The expected impact on poverty and labour
market participation was examined under different parameters of the programme
(including the effect on different groups in Israeli society).
The policy papers and the research published by the BOI on the potential effects
of an EITC helped convince policy makers in the Prime Minister’s Office and the
Ministry of Finance about the necessity of the programme.
In February 2007, the government adopted Resolution 1134 regarding the
adoption of an EITC experimental (pilot) programme, with the intention to make
it a national programme in 2010; different governmental committees affirmed the
need for such a programme, including the Social-Economic Agenda for Israel
written by the National Economic Council.
Following the initial implementation of the EITC, the Bank of Israel continued
to monitor the implementation of the programme. Research support was given
149
during the first year of operation in order to review the take up of the programme
and its effect on poverty and employment.
A committee was formed with the participation of economists from the Israel
Tax Authority, which is in charge of implementation, the National Insurance
Institute, the Brookdale Institute for Research in Social Sciences, and the
Bank of Israel which heads the committee. The committee used statistical
and administrative data (including data from surveys constructed especially for
this purpose) to estimate on a current basis the take-up rate, and provided a
detailed analysis (including an international comparison) of different aspects
of the programme. This was published in the publication ‘Recent Economic
Developments’ of the BOI. In the summer of 2010, the Research Committee
published a report analysing the first year of implementation of the programme,
which was an important input brought to policy makers when deciding on
enlarging the programme’s scope to the national level.
The findings showed that the EITC programme accounted for lifting about 4.5
per cent of those under the poverty line, out of poverty; it reduced the depth of
poverty, expressed in terms of the poverty gap, by about 5 per cent, and boosted
the income of the bottom quintile of the recipients of EITC by some 12 per
cent. About 80 per cent of the support transfers went to the lowest four deciles
of the wage distribution. The research also shows a decline in the indebtedness
of recipients and of the share of those who had to give up essential services such
as visits to a dentist, and the share of those whose telephones or electricity were
cut off.
Based on the experience and findings to date, the BOI concluded that EITC
is a focused and effective tool that raises the level of income of the working low-
paid population, and helps improve the situation of families with income slightly
above the poverty line.
The experimental programme became a national one in 2012, based on 2011
incomes (Government resolution 1906). It received further support from the
Committee for Social and Economic Change (the Trajtenberg committee),
which recommended increasing the EITC benefit received by working women.
This benefit is expected to increase by 50 per cent starting on 2013.The example
of the adoption by the Israeli government of an important policy tool – the
EITC – based on the analytical work carried out by the Research Department
is unique. Its uniqueness is that the whole process – starting with an initial idea,
followed by a very focused research project that dealt with concrete aspects of
programme design, followed by being presented in a policy recommendations
paper, and then, following the adoption of the pilot programme, being assessed
and analysed – was initiated and carried out by the Research Department (with
some collaboration with other research bodies). In most cases, some elements
of this process are carried out by the Research Department, but it is usually less
involved in the implementation stage.
It is also important to note that most new policy programmes are not
systematically assessed by researchers.
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Concluding remarks
The purpose of policy analysis and research at the Bank of Israel is to improve the
quality of policy decisions. Macroeconomic analysis and research is an essential
ingredient in the Bank’s monetary policy formulation. The analysis and research
also supports more broadly economic policy decisions in Israel as it is the basis
for the Bank’s Governor’s advice to the government on economic matters.
Research, policy analysis and policy evaluation helps improve the policy
decisions as they become more informed and based on a methodological learning
process called analysis and research.
Note
1
I wish to thank Noa Heymann for excellent research assistance.
References
Argov, E, Barnea, E, Binyamini, A, Borenstein, E, Elkayam, D, Rozenshtrom, I,
2012, MOISE: A DSGE model for the Israeli economy, Bank of Israel Discussion
Paper 2012.06, Jerusalem: Bank of Israel
Ber, H, Ribon, S, 2004, Market power of banks against large firms: What has
changed with the opening of the Israeli economy, Bank of Israel Discussion Paper
2004.14, Jerusalem: Bank of Israel
Brender, A, 2001, Estimate of a tax function in Israel, Bank of Israel Discussion
Brender, A, Strawczynski, M, 2006, Earned Income Tax Credit in Israel:
Designing the System to Reflect the Characteristics of Labor Supply and Poverty,
Israel Economic Review 4, 1, 27–58
Dovman, P, Ribon, S, Yakhin, Y, 2011, The housing market in Israel 2008–2010:
Are housing prices a ‘bubble’?, Bank of Israel Discussion Paper 2011.06, Jerusalem:
Bank of Israel
Flug, K, Strawczynski, M, 2002, Sustainable growth: Is it around the corner? An
analysis using Michael Bruno’s conceptual framework, Bank of Israel Discussion
Flug, K, Strawczynski, M, 2007, Persistent growth episodes and macroeconomic
policy performance in Israel, Bank of Israel Discussion Paper 2007.08, Jerusalem:
Bank of Israel
Flug, K, Kasir, N, Ribon, S, 2000, Unemployment and education in Israel: On
business cycles, structural changes, and technological changes: 1986–1998, Bank
of Israel Discussion Paper 00.02, Jerusalem: Bank of Israel
Frish, R, 2007, The causal effect of education on earnings in Israel, Bank of Israel
Discussion Paper 2007.03, Jerusalem: Bank of Israel
Hercowitz, Z, Strawczynski, M, 1998, On the cyclical bias in government
spending, Bank of Israel Discussion Paper 98.06, Jerusalem: Bank of Israel
Klein, N, 2000, Political cycles and economic policy in Israel 1980–1999, Bank
151
Marom, A, 2001, The success of the companies and businesses survey of the BOI
in diagnosing developments in the economy and the business cycle [in Hebrew],
Bank of Israel Discussion Paper 2001.13, Jerusalem: Bank of Israel
Marom, A, Menashe, Y, Suhoy, T, 2003, The State-of-The-Economy Index and
the probability of recession: The Markov Regime-Switching Model, Bank of
Israel Discussion Paper 2003.05, Jerusalem: Bank of Israel
Melnick, R, Golan, Y, 1991, Measurement of business fluctuations in Israel, Bank
Navon, G, 2009, Human capital spillovers in the workplace: Labour diversity and
productivity, Bank of Israel Discussion Paper 2009.05, Jerusalem: Bank of Israel
Shaharabani, R, Menashe, Y, 2011, The hotel market in Israel, Bank of Israel
Sorezcky, A, 2010, Did the Bank of Israel influence the exchange rate? Bank of
Israel Research Department Discussion Paper 2010.10, Jerusalem: Bank of Israel
Sussman, A, 1998, The real exchange rate in Israel, 1980–1997, Bank of Israel
Yaacov, L, Strawczynski, M, 2003, The impact of fiscal policy on private
consumption in Israel with an emphasis on the fiscal expectations approach,
Bank of Israel Discussion Paper 2003.14, Jerusalem: Bank of Israel
Yotav-Solberg, I, 2001, The effect of technological changes on the wage structure
in Israel, 1980–1999, Bank of Israel Discussion Paper 2001.07, Jerusalem: Bank
of Israel
152
Part Four
Policy analysis from the outside
NINE
Insiders within? The third sector

and policy analysis in Israel
Hagai Katz
This chapter takes a specific realm of policy making in Israel – the third
sector – to demonstrate the intricate relations and the ambivalence between
‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’ in policy analysis processes in Israel. It examines the
third sector as both a target of and a participant in policy analysis processes.
The third sector in Israel was shown in international studies to be one
the largest in the world within its national context (Salamon et al, 1999).
Moreover, it plays a pivotal role in various policy realms as a participant in
both policy making and implementation. Yet, policy analysis and formal
policy making have until recently ignored this important collective actor
(Galnoor et al, 2003). This situation began to change since the late 1990s.
The change was initiated by Academia and the third sector itself, and was
only partially adopted by government. In fact, Israeli governments have been
reluctant to seriously look into the third sector for various reasons, political
and financial (Bar and Gidron, 2010). Consequently, the change process began
outside of government, with the formulation of an international study, a
national database and a policy analysis committee. The result was an ongoing
process in which different actors, including various government ministries
(Finance, Justice and Welfare), third sector actors, academics and major
philanthropic foundations attempt to influence the framing and interpretation
of the data that was produced and policies and concepts that were developed.
This process reflects an ambivalent relationship between governmental and
nongovernmental policy actors and the mixed and inter-sectoral arrangements
characteristic of policy analysis in Israel.
There are two parts to this chapter. The first part will discuss briefly the
role of third sector actors such as advocacy groups, human service providers
and think tanks, in policy analysis in general and in Israel in particular. The
second part will focus on public policy towards the third sector as a specific
realm of policy making in Israel, and analyse the actors engaged in policy
analysis and relationships between them within the broader context of the
Israeli polity and the conceptual framework of the book.
155
Third sector organisations and policy analysis
Various national and global processes have enhanced the legitimacy of third sector
organisations in public discourse in general, and in social policy in particular.
These include their immense growth in size and scope since the 1970s, what was
termed by Salamon (1994, 109) ‘a global associational revolution’; the increased
participation of the third sector in service provision through the mixed economy
of welfare service delivery (Evers and Laville, 2004), the central roles that they play
in the new (or renewed) political discourses on civil society (Walzer, 1992) and
the third way (Haugh and Kitson, 2007); the advance of new public management
(NPM), inspired by ‘public choice’ economic theories and their emphasis on
efficiency and effectiveness of public action (Anheier and Salamon, 2006); and
their heightened salience in democratic governance at all levels from local to
global (Barber, 1984; Scholte, 2002).
Correspondingly, there has emerged a body of literature on the third sector’s
part in policy analysis and policy processes more generally. Much of this literature
is dominated by work examining the third sector as a policy actor, looking at
the policy issues that third sector organisations prefer or factors that enhance
third sector organisations’ impact on policy outcomes. Elisabeth Boris and
Rachel Mosher-Williams (1998) analysed the entire universe of US advocacy
nonprofits and found that they most often engage in health, human service, the
environment and education. A later analysis by Curtis Child and Kirsten Grønbjerg
(2007) highlights their policy efforts in the fields of the environment, health,
education, human services, or arts and culture. John Casey (2004) examined
third sector organisation policy effectiveness. The model that he developed
includes the political and socioeconomic environment, the policy in question,
the characteristics of the third sector organisations involved, and the network of
actors engaged in the process. In her study of human service nonprofits in Los
Angeles Jennifer Mosley (2010) shows that the participation of these organisations
in policy advocacy is influenced by environmental resources and organisational
incentives. Susan Phillips (2007) looks at some of the effects of engagement
in policy analysis on voluntary organisations. In an analysis of the third sector
involvement in Policy Analysis in Canada, she argues that it contributes to
professionalisation, through changes in hiring practices and preferences, and
consequently brings about change in their governance so that they become less
bottom-up and less directed by their members. As well, the close interaction with
government that this work entails makes organisations and their activist repertoires
more mainstream and conventional. Notably, project funding, whether from
governments or foundations, that typically funds policy analysis work, is more
likely to fund short-term research projects and increases the funding uncertainty
and therefore intensifies the resource dependencies of third sector organisations.
The Israeli literature on third sector organisations in policy mostly describes
them as an emergent actor with growing influence. Robert Schwartz (2002)
describes the major progress made in the Israeli public administration towards
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Insiders within?
more systematic evaluation. One of the aspects he points out is the delegation of
government programme evaluation to third sector actors. While in some policy
areas evaluation is performed internally, in other areas it is mostly outsourced,
such as in aging where the JDC’s Brookdale Institute is the prominent actor. Gal
(2004) notes that policy analysis has been done for many years, even as early as
the pre-State era, by a mix of institutional and nongovernmental actors, often in
the form of ad hoc committees mixing the two.
The literature on interest group politics (for example, Yishay, 1991) places
the large and institutionalised interest groups at the centre of the third sector’s
policy activism. Yet, Michal Bar (2001) argues that not only major interest groups
such as labour or industrial interests can inform policy analysis and affect policy
outcomes. She showed how small human service organisations involved in the
field of child disability were able to engage successfully in the policy process. She
found that the low level of institutionalisation of smaller organisations rendered
them more effective in their advocacy work. They were less committed to quiet
and more cooperative tactics, and engaged in more controversial activism. As well,
their limited access to lawmakers compared to their more influential counterparts
drove them to bypass the parliament and government and engage directly with the
Supreme Court, which proved to be an especially effective move. Her conclusion
was that processes of privatisation and commercialisation of the welfare state in
Israel turned the policy making system into a more horizontal and pluralistic one.
More recently, Schmid, Bar and Nirel (2008) analysed the advocacy activities
of a large sample of Israeli nonprofit human service organisations, looking at
modes and strategies, as well as factors affecting the perceived policy impact of the
organisations. Overall the authors estimated the scope and intensity of perceived
political activity as moderate and limited. Among the activities adopted by the
organisations in their study, those in the category of ‘research and dissemination
of information’ (p 591), which are pivotal to policy analysis, ranked second
highest among their sample’s most frequently used activities. Correspondingly,
their respondents ranked their own influence the highest in the area ‘notifying
and informing policy makers’ (p 593).
Another type of third sector actors present in the literature on policy change are
philanthropic foundations (see for example Ferris, 2003). In a study of the role of
philanthropic foundations in policy making, Michal Bar and Esther Zychlinsky
(2010) looked into two cases of government-foundation collaboration. In both
cases the foundation officials saw as their role to engage in knowledge development
and evaluation that are supposed to inform the planned programmes. In one
case, of a school principles’ management training programme, the foundations
presented the programme to the government only after a long process of research,
professional and academic debates, and even after evaluating the outcomes of a
pilot programme.
Yael Yishay (1999) presented a different analysis. Looking at the legislation of
two major changes in the Israeli public health system (national health insurance
and the patients’ rights laws), she does find a diverse array of actors, governmental
157
and nongovernmental. However, despite the explicit pluralism in the process,

the different actors adhere to the foundational norm of state supremacy in the
policy process. She concludes that, despite recent changes in Israel’s polity, an
elitist model of policy making still rules in Israel. This is also reflected in how
government officials perceive the proper relationship between government and
foundations, which are frayed by inherent conflict and mutual suspicion. While
happy to bring in the funds from the foundations, government officials view is
that the policy process should be left in its entirety in the government’s hands, and
the foundation need only bring in the money and stay out of the actual policy
making (Bar and Zychlinsky, 2010).
Think tanks are possibly the quintessential third sector actors engaged in policy
analysis. These organisations, although sometimes founded and funded by business
or government, are normally nonprofit tax exempt organisations, that perform
research and advocacy concerning topics such as social policy, political strategy,
economics, military, technology and culture (Stone, 2006). These organisations
vary greatly in ideology, policy interests, level of professionalisation, academic
disciplinary affiliation, size, wealth and more. They have entered the gap between
scholarly knowledge and politics caused by the reluctance of politicians to engage
in knowledge creation on the one hand, and the hesitancy of universities to
translate knowledge into advocacy or activism on the other. Thus think tanks
represent an attempt to bridge the gap between knowledge and power and link
the role of policy makers with that of academics (Bensimhon-Peleg, 2008).
While formerly considered an American phenomenon, think thanks have been
flourishing in Israel in recent decades (McGann, 2007). Fifty-three think tanks
are listed (as of 1 January 2013) in the Global Think Tank Directory of the Think
Tanks and Civil Societies Programme of the International Relations Programme
at the University of Pennsylvania (http://gotothinktank.com/2014-global-go-to-
think-tank-index-report/). In the first study of Israeli think tanks, Perla Aizencang
Kane (2004), whose study analysed all think tanks in Israel at the time of the
study, within the context of Israel’s political culture, found 21 independent think
tanks and eight that were university affiliated, almost all established since the
1990s. She argues that Israeli think tanks are active predominantly in the early
stages of policy development, which includes policy entrepreneurship, agenda
setting, problem framing and development of policy alternatives. However, this
doesn’t necessarily mean great influence. She argues that they are consulted with
only at random, and they are only marginally involved in policy networks, partly
affected by the level of their partisan affiliation. They do serve as legitimate foci
of knowledge, but since government prefers using instruments which it has
more control of, seldom do they take part in evaluations of policy, unless they
do that on their own volition. Their influence is limited to hindering rather than
promoting policy. Aizencang Kane explains this marginality in action and impact
in the Israeli political culture, which is knowledge-unfriendly, is characterised
by short-termism and is conservative and conformist, leading to strong path
dependencies and change aversion (2004). Hannah Meyers (2009) too argues
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Insiders within?
that, despite their large numbers, the democratic regime in Israel and its intense
policy debates, think tanks in Israel have failed to significantly influence policy.
She blames the parliamentary government system that engenders party discipline
and Israel’s proportional electoral system, which, she argues, discourage elected
officials from seeking new and independent policy ideas. Although cautious not
to claim actual impact, Sarit Bensimhon-Peleg (2008) offers a somewhat more
optimistic outlook on the impact of think tanks in Israel, at least as far as the reach
of their work and their perceived influence are considered. She performed a study
of think tanks that work on issues of social policy in Israel, mapping and analysing
them in the context of philanthropy and the third sector. The 11 think tanks that
she focused on ranged on the scale between very large conservative think tanks
to small progressive ones. The majority of the think tanks in this group are more
short-term oriented, focusing on project-oriented policy analysis, rather than
working on the development of foundational and comprehensive worldviews.
Bensimhon-Peleg explains the think tanks’ short-termism, at least in part, by
the influence of philanthropic foundations who most often prefer to support
‘short-term, outcome-oriented, measurable projects’ (2008, 59). She ties the
sustainability of think tanks in Israel to the support that philanthropic foundations,
and particularly foreign (Jewish and non-Jewish) foundations, can and have been
offering, thanks to the interest they share with think tanks in promoting social
change (Gidron et al, 2006).Thus, the elitist and centralised nature of the Israeli
policy analysis arena in the first decades of Israel’s independence, has gradually
been changing in the recent two to three decades into a more pluralistic one
(for example, Bar, 2001). In this pluralistic environment Israeli nonprofits, and
especially think tanks, are increasingly involved in policy analysis in specific realms
of policy making. Nonetheless, in many cases they play a peripheral role in the
processes, as voluntary providers of data and propositions, as government does
not recognise them as an integral element of the policy process.
The third sector: awakening a neglected policy realm

The absence of an overall policy analysis tradition in Israel (Geva-May and Kfir,
2000) is remarkably clear when the policy towards the third sector is concerned.
Unlike in the UK where far fetching changes in the policy vis-à-vis the third
sector took place during the 1990s, culminating in a Compact between the
government and the third sector (Kendall, 2000), for many years in Israel there
hasn’t been a formal attempt to analyse government’s policy towards the third
sector or to publicly debate the roles of the sector in Israel:
The Israeli government has no declared, clear, or consistent policy

toward the third sector. There is no comprehensive law or document
that defines the attitude of the government authorities to this sector.
Instead, a medley of laws, regulations and provisions governing different
types of organisations has grown up haphazardly. The government,
159
moreover, has failed to adopt concrete measures to develop a consistent

and transparent policy. Instead, a system has emerged that has been
shaped by history, interests, constraints and pressures. This is true
of most countries, but Israel, unlike most countries, has not even
attempted to elaborate a clear or consistent policy toward the third
sector and its functions. Although the various laws, ordinances and
provisions regulating third sector activity create a de facto relationship
between the third sector and the government authorities, they are not
based on principles or on a rational and consistent policy. (Galnoor
et al, 2003, 42).
The task was left for the third sector and academics to take the first step. The pivotal
actor in the process was the Israeli Centre for Third Sector Research (ICTR).
The ICTR was established by Benjamin Gidron in 1997 as an interdisciplinary
research centre at the Ben-Gurion University of the Negev. Though established
as an academic research centre, it declared that it aims to ‘engage in policy analysis
on the third sector and to make third sector issues a focus of the public agenda’.
Probably it is this statement that caused some to list the ICTR as a think tank
(see for example Aizencang Kane, 2004).
ICTR engaged in many projects that entailed policy analysis aspects, but three
projects that directly involved policy analysis pertaining to public policy towards
the third sector in Israel are of interest here. The first was ICTR’s first ‘flagship’
project – ‘the Hopkins Project’, the second was the establishment of the Israeli
Third Sector Database, and the third was ICTR’s policy committee: the Review
Committee of Government Policy towards the Third Sector in Israel. All three
had effected policy analysis of the third sector in Israel, and had continuing effects
that are still in motion today.
The Hopkins Project
The Johns Hopkins Comparative Nonprofit Sector Project is the first and largest
effort to date to analyse the third sector in different countries around the world.
The project’s objectives are to document the scope, structure, financing, role and
impact of the third sector in solid empirical terms, using a comparative empirical
approach that features heavy reliance on a team of local associates in the project
countries, a common framework, set of definitions and information-gathering
strategies. The study’s first phase started in 1991 with 13 countries. Despite the
fact that Israel wasn’t formally part of the project in the first phase, Benjamin
Gidron mobilised the Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) to produce a first report
on Nonprofit Institutions in Israel (CBS, 1996). Upon the establishment of
ICTR, it formally joined the project in its second phase. A revision of the data
was generated in the third phase of the project in 2006. ICTR led the project,
assisted by a steering committee comprised of academics, experts, former and
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Insiders within?
current government officials and representatives of the third sector’s umbrella

organisation at the time.
Consequently, the ICTR team developed a comprehensive dataset of third
sector organisations, using lists obtained from the Israeli tax authority. This dataset
was then used to produce a number of macro-economic analyses of Israel’s third
sector (Gidron et al, 2004; Gidron and Katz, 1999; Gidron et al, 1999a; Gidron
et al, 2003). Despite reluctance at the CBS, ICTR continued its pressure for
production of more national macro-level data on the sector. In 2005 it managed
to raise a research grant that was used to fund data collection at the CBS for an
implementation of the UN Nonprofit Handbook guideline and produce a third
sector satellite account in the national economic statistics, and to hire an analyst
dedicated to compiling and publish an annual series of communiqués on third
sector statistics.
The Israeli Third Sector Database
The decision to develop the Israeli Third Sector Database in 1999 took place
following ICTR’s engagement in the Hopkins Project, growing disappointment
from the state of the data on the third sector and realisation that government has
no interest to improve the situation. Information on third sector organisations was
being collected at the time by various government agencies such as the Nonprofit
Registrar, tax authorities, the Ministry of Finance and more. None of these
agencies, however, were making use of the data for any sort of policy analysis, and
of course they weren’t sharing this data with each other. ICTR decided to gather
all of these data and collate them into one comprehensive database of third sector
organisations (Gidron et al, 1999b). Although this was a complex and challenging
endeavour both conceptually and technically, the greatest challenge before ICTR
was getting legitimacy and obtaining the different data from the various agencies
that were holding the data. The project was funded through a grant from the
Yad Hanadiv (Rothschild) Foundation, whose long history of collaboration with
government became helpful in obtaining the datasets necessary for the project.
ICTR engaged in negotiations with the different agencies, managed to obtain
Ministry of Justice permission for the release of data, and eventually purchased
several datasets that were incorporated into a database (see Gidron et al, 1999b for
detailed structure of the database). The database was enriched with classifications
and a categorisation using Hopkins Project’s criteria. Organisational, financial and
tax information were interlinked in the database, and for the first time in Israel
it was possible to analyse registration patterns, government funding, functions
and other aspects of the third sector (see for example Gidron et al, 2000; Katz
et al, 2006) .
The database didn’t remain only an internal ICTR resource. It has become an
essential element of Israel’s third sector data infrastructure, and was approached
by researchers, students, practitioners, policy-makers and public agencies. In fact,
the government has become a major client of the database, regularly purchasing
161
data services from ICTR. However, the government agencies that provided the
data for the database limited ICTR’s use of the data and particularly what services
it could provide to researchers and nongovernmental clients. As well, unlike the
GuideStar model that was developed in the US and the UK at the time, ICTR
was not allowed to provide online access to the database. Seeing transparency and
public access to be important functions of the database, in 2006 ICTR initiated
an attempt to develop an Israeli version of Guidestar (www.guidestar.org/Home.
aspx), suggesting a multilevel model of access, that will allow individuals to seek
a specific organisation for services or a donation, and at the same time provide
research and policy analysis capabilities. The project, called Irgunim Bareshet
(Organisations on the Web) involved also the Yad Hanadiv foundation who
has been funding the database for several years, and the Nonprofit Registrar. It
was framed as a pilot project, based on ICTR’s database, to be expanded into
a GuideStar model after a test period. ICTR was charged with developing the
conceptual and technical aspects of the system, and had performed a system
characterisation for the project. Once the project had moved from planning to
implementation, it was impeded by the top administration of the Ministry of
Justice. They expressed concern over legal difficulties due to collaboration with a
university, particularly around issues of privacy and tender requirements. The result
was a cooptation of the initiative, which was put on hold for a while and then
continued through collaboration between the Ministry, Yad Hanadiv Foundation
and JDC-Israel, without ICTR. JDC-Israel is in a special status, since it is one
of the infrastructural agencies of the Zionist movement that predated the state of
Israel and formed the foundation for the state’s emergent structures. As such it
is a dual actor, a quasi-NGO, public and private at the same time, exempt from
bidding requirements. Similarly, the Jewish Agency was shown to walk a thin line
between the inside and the outside of policy making in the area of immigration
in Israel (Bins, 2012). The new collaboration, now without ICTR’s involvement,
formed a nonprofit company to run the project, which developed into GuideStar
Israel (www.guidestar.org.il/). Consequently, the Ministry of Justice and its
Nonprofit Registrar stopped providing data on third sector organisations to
anybody except GuideStar Israel. The result was that ICTR’s database became
rapidly outdated, and macro-level analysis of the third sector in Israel came to a
full stop. Paradoxically, even the Central Bureau of Statistics and other government
agencies that relied on ICTR’s database encountered difficulties since the database
wasn’t updated and ICTR couldn’t continue to provide the necessary services.
Only in 2012 has GuideStar Israel produced macro-level data (Limor, 2012), and
the complexity of the analyses it can currently perform is considerably lower than
what ICTR could offer five years before that.
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Insiders within?
The Review Committee of Government Policy towards the Third Sector in Israel
In light of the absence of systemic policy making vis-à-vis the third sector, ICTR
decided in 2000 to convene an ad hoc public committee to review public policy
towards the third sector. The full story of the committee, chaired by Itzhak
Galnoor and therefore referred to normally as the Galnoor Committee, was
analysed in detail by Michal Bar and Benjamin Gidron (2010). I will retell their
story here only briefly, and refer to some developments since.
The committee began with eight members from the third sector, government,
business and academia. Once realising the complexity of the task, it was enlarged,
its deadline extended, and its mission expanded to not only review the policies,
but also make policy recommendations. The committee deliberated for over
two years, conducting analyses using the newly established database and other
sources, and taking testimony from dozens of witnesses. Its final report (Galnoor
et al, 2003) was presented to the President of Israel, and was disseminated widely
throughout all levels and branches of government and the third sector in Israel.
In the following years three different processes followed. The first was a
Ministry of Welfare and Social Services taskforce which developed principles
for cooperation with the third sector, and began implementing some of the
committee’s recommendations, including training of ministry staff, and setting
up ‘roundtables’ with ministry staff and third sector organisations’ representatives.
The second was an inter-ministerial committee set up to examine government
funding of the third sector. The committee (nicknamed the Aridor Committee,
after its chair, former Minister of Finance Yoram Aridor), had a very different
agenda. Its mandate was to review government allocations to the sector and
design stricter regulations. The committee and its recommendations were heavily
criticised for its one-sided and suspecting view of the sector, for the exclusive
nature of its discussions and for contradicting some of the recommendations of
the Galnoor Committee (Bar and Gidron, 2010). Third, in February 2008 the
Prime Minister’s office published a policy paper entitled ‘Government of Israel,
the civil society and the business community: Partnership, empowerment and
transparency’ (Alon, 2008). The document was prepared and published under
the new atmosphere brought about by the criticism over government’s failure
to respond to the humanitarian crisis of the Second Lebanon War, and the third
sector’s impressive mobilisation (Katz et al, 2007). In the report government
admits to the lack of policy towards the sector, declares that it is now developing
a comprehensive policy, and appreciates the Galnoor Committee’s groundbreaking
work. The document refers to the third sector (although it uses the term ‘civil
society’) as an important partner, performing key roles in society, identifies it
as a source of knowledge and expertise, and acknowledges its need for support.
The document moves to suggest a platform for discussion and collaboration,
through a model of tri-sectoral roundtables, including a central roundtable to
develop general policies and discuss foundational issue, and thematic roundtables
to focus on specific policy issues. The roundtables would include representatives
163
of government, the third sector and philanthropic business persons, and will be
chaired collaboratively.
In the call for proposals to manage the roundtables, Sheatufim won. Sheatufim
is an organisation dedicated to the promotion of civil society, established by
four major philanthropic actors – Zionism 2000, Rashi Foundation, the Jewish
Federations of North America (formerly UJC), and Gandyr Foundation (later
joined by a fifth foundation – Haruv). In 2008–09, the central roundtable,
coordinated by Sheatufim has met various times and concluded with a document
setting up the framework for the roundtables and the tri-sectoral deliberations.1
In December 2008, parallel to the ‘Cast Lead’ operation in Gaza, an emergency
roundtable was convened that dealt with cooperation between the three sectors
during emergencies. In 2009 a roundtable deliberated means to promote
volunteerism. This discussion led to a plan to establish a national centre for
volunteering, through what was termed a public–social–private partnership.2 The
winner of the tender issued in 2011 to operate the national centre for volunteering
was JDC-Israel. Further meetings of the central roundtables featured topics such
as social enterprise, the financial crisis and the mass protest of summer 2011.
On the tightrope between inside and outside

The developments shown here may have some unique aspects such as specific
actors or structures that have to do with the specific policy realm we have
analysed – the third sector. Yet, they are an example of decentralised policy
making, while at the same time maintaining government dominance and control
through manipulation of its preferred status within advocacy networks and its
close relations with philanthropic foundations and semi-institutional actors such
as quasi-NGOs.
Policy analysis in the realm of the third sector is conducted through policy or
advocacy networks that include Academia, government, philanthropists and third
sector organisations. However, these networks are very limited networks – they
are inhabited by more or less the same actors. The third sector is large and the
organisations in it are numerous, many of them are involved in policy processes in
their fields of action, such as health, the elderly or the environment. Those that
are engaged in the third sector as a policy realm of its own are few. This results
in policy networks that include mostly the same participants, or one could say
‘the usual suspects’, particularly the sector’s infrastructural organisations such as
umbrella organisations and organisations that act as collective actors on behalf
of the third sector. Certain academics that may be members of one committee
can later be contracted to prepare data for another, and possibly contradictory,
committee. There are a few foundations and quasi-NGOs that have an interest
in the third sector, are clearly seeking to be leaders in the sector, and are engaged
in many different pivotal processes and projects at once. This also creates clear
power disparities within the networks, due to the close relations between the
foundations and government, and due to the resource dependency that often
164
Insiders within?
other actors, namely academics and some third sector organisations, have on the
foundations who may be funding their own work.
RAW Rhodes highlights the importance of networks as the main institutional
form in the new governance. Accordingly, networks themselves become
institutionalised and determine the rules of the game among participants in the
policy process (Rhodes, 1996). In our case this is very clear, with the persistent
composition of participants, and especially due to the fact that some of those regular
participants are in themselves institutionalised actors or semi-institutionalised
actors that have very settled and close relationships with government. Susan
Phillips (2007) notes that an implication of these institutionalised networks is
that trust and trustworthiness matter more than ever as a basis for relationship
building. The ambivalent attitudes towards ICTR as an external actor trying to
take its share of the power afforded by the possession of information on the one
hand, and as an instigator and participant in policy analysis processes on the other
hand, indicate that trust is lacking in the case at hand. A more extreme example
is the cooptation of the Irgunim Bareshet project and the subsequent freezing
of data sharing from government to ICTR or any other research centre. This
cooptation was possible due to the power disparities within the network, the
multiple and sometimes conflicting roles that foundations play in the networks,
and the close relationships some foundations have with government. In fact, the
role of philanthropic foundations is central to our case. Foundations act as linkers
and liaisons, but also as funders, and they often fund more than one actor in the
same network. In addition to that, frequently it is expected of them to participate
in the funding of the products of the policy network. Some of the foundations
have also had a long history of collaboration with government, including build–
operate–transfer contracts for public services, or co-funding arrangements over
basic social services. Thus, foundations seem to be almost an integral actor in
political institutions, at least as far as policy towards the third sector is concerned.
Regretfully, in our case, it may be less positive than what Bensimhon-Peleg (2008)
has argued, seeing that they have more shared interests and established relations
with government than with change-seeking civil-society activists.
Another point worth making is that the relationships in the policy networks
are often lacking in trust. In a sense we can describe policy analysis in this
case as ‘duelling swords’ (Radin, 2000). In fact, as Nissan Limor (2007) shows,
throughout Israeli history legislation pertaining to third sector organisations was
strongly tainted by political motivations and bargaining, and wasn’t informed or
knowledge based at all. All legislation towards the sector is based on the notion
of state–society antagonism, and reflects attempts by government to curtail the
growing autonomy and influence of civil society. This air of distrust still lingers,
as was shown in the various attempts in Israeli government and parliament these
last few years to constrain the freedoms of human rights organisations, hamper
their international funding, and label them as anti-Zionist and anti-Israeli.
Clearly, policy analysis in the area of the third sector is a result of supply side
dynamics (Hird, 2005). Government and organised political actors have been
165
reluctant to ‘stir things up’ with regard to the third sector (Bar and Gidron,
2010). All the processes described above were started by the ICTR, and later on
joined in or taken up by government, sometimes only when political pressures
force them to, like in the case of the Second Lebanon War. Not surprisingly,
being an academic research centre, playing the role of the issue expert, ICTR
combined two policy analysis styles: argumentative and rational (Mayer et al,
2004). As such, it was conceptualised by the more powerful actors in the policy
networks as an idealistic and non-pragmatic actor, whose contribution is limited
to the beginning of the process and must be translated into more practical criteria
by those who play the mediating role in the network, that is the philanthropic
foundations and government. Other third sector actors have different roles in the
system, sometimes of client advisors or ‘hired guns’ (Mayer et al, 2004, 18) and
sometimes of participants, adopting accordingly an advisory or democratising style.
Finally, policy analysis in the area of the third sector is done by a mix of
inside and outside actors and processes. The ICTR and some of the third sector
participants are clearly outsiders, and are treated as such. Other third sector actors
are more deeply institutionalised in the policy networks, and can be defined as
outsiders-within. This is the case of the Zionist institutions, that are formally
third sector organisations, but are in fact quasi-NGOs working in close proximity
with government. It is also the case for some of the philanthropic foundations
involved in the processes, as detailed above. Foundations that have developed
institutionalised collaborations with government also tend to be on the very fluid
and blurred boundaries between inside and outside of policy analysis processes.
This causes the contradiction that can be found in our case between the explicit
pluralism of the system and the implicit elitist outcomes inherent in it. It is
compatible with Yishay’s notion of circumspect pluralism in Israel’s policy making
processes (Yishay, 1999).
In this context, what role can change seeking third sector organisations take
in policy analysis, noting that they are suspect outsiders, and also that the more
institutionalised outsiders-within quasi-NGOs and philanthropic foundations
often occupy the third sector ‘slot’ in policy processes? Being an outsider carries
its own benefits, and it is conducive to taking several important roles. One is the
whistleblower role; another is the policy entrepreneur role. Given the limited
access to information that their outsider status dictates, third sector organisations
should consider coalescing among themselves to gain power-in-numbers, on the
one hand, and collaborate with actors who possess investigative capacity such
as academics and journalists. Such coalitions can help them avoid appearing as
amateurish ‘moaners’ (Taylor, 2001, 101). This route may help these organisations
maintain their public integrity vis-à-vis their constituencies as advocates of their
causes (Taylor, 2001). Another skill that these actors should develop is taking
advantage of the opportunity structures. For example, in Israel it is sometimes
possible for an outsider policy actor to join forces with a specific government
ministry in its negotiations with the treasury. Such ‘holes’ in the system present
policy ‘windows of opportunity’ for more effective change (Kingdon, 1984).
166
Insiders within?
Thus, developing alternative policy analyses and data, supported by professional

policy analysts, and backed up by the bottom-up legitimacy granted by their
constituencies, may be the most effective strategy for third sector organisations to
engage in policy analysis. A salient example to that role in Israel is the ‘Alternative
Poverty Report’ that the Latet third sector organisation has been publishing
annually in recent years (www.latet.org.il/en/worlds/latet_change_awareness/).
This report has become very effective in stirring a lively public debate of policy,
as it galvanised journalists and opposition parties to discuss its findings in the
media and in the Kneset. This is a good example of the type of policy analysis
engagement that I suggest above, which builds on the potential advantages of
the outsider’s role.
Notes
1
For the document see: www.pmo.gov.il/policyplanning/shituf/Documents/last250209.
pdf (in Hebrew).
2
For the document see: www.pmo.gov.il/policyplanning/shituf/Documents/hamlaza.
pdf (in Hebrew).
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170
TEN
Policy analysis education in graduate

programmes in Israel
Iris Geva-May and Anat Gofen
Introduction
This chapter has a threefold role in the context of the ILPA volume entitled Policy
Analysis in Israel. It proposes to examine the contribution of the Programmes of
Public Policy and/or Administration (a) to the public service in Israel at large;
(b) to the instruction of public policy; (c) to the instruction of policy analysis.
These foci provide a basis for discussion on the state of the art of policy analysis
instruction and its challenges in Israel.
These foci, respectively, stem from the hypothesis that the educational
programmes: (a) should create education and training courses of study that are
‘fit for purpose’, that is, serve the field of public policy in general; and (b) public
policy being the operational output of any public governance framework, these
programmes should advance acceptable practices in the policy analysis domain.
Policy analysis is seen as an integral part of the public policy making process,
which renders policy planning and decision making systematic and rational –
thus more efficient, effective, reliable and transparent. As graduate programmes
at MA level mainly train present or future public servants the ability of the latter
to instill practical skills is paramount.
International normative concepts and practices in public policy and policy analysis
education
In analysing the state of the art of policy analysis graduate instruction in Israel, we
note two types of public policy programmes: the first stems from the orientation
that deems necessary the provision of knowledge about the policy processes and
their intricacies – political, administrative, or disciplinary in the social sciences
liberal arts tradition; the second, emphasises policy analysis as a crucial junction
in the actual ‘doing of public policy’, within the public policy process. These two
aspects of public policy instruction have been identified as long ago as 1989 by
David Weimer and Aidan Vining (1989; 2010) who differentiated between policy
analysis on the one hand and research in public policy, administration, political
sciences and social sciences – each with their respective purposes, constraints
and methods.
171
The distinct normative principles of policy analysis as a stand-alone domain

are at the heart of the public policy and policy analysis movement started in the
1960s in the US at a time of major public expenditure on welfare and cold war
strategic public investments. Policy analysis rationality accords with demands
that institutions account for their actions, that policy making has to prove
reliable (Weber, 1968; Hannan and Freeman, 1984) and that institutions seeking
advantage in a highly competitive and dynamic national and global market have
to be effective (Weimer and Vining, 1989: 2010; Boardman et al, 2006; 2010),
in Lindblom’s (1958) words ‘involving comparisons and interactions of values
and politics’.
In this context, since the late 1960s, the Programmes of Public Policy have
been seen as a pipeline for a better and more reliable public service. John W
Elwood, in his Challenges to public policy and public management education of 2008,
outlines the morphology of the field of public policy instruction and how public
policy graduate education can address, through policy analysis, the challenges of
public policy. The UC Berkeley Graduate School of Public Policy founded in
1969, with policy analysis as a new core field, reflects a canonic basic model for
Programmes of Public Policy that has been increasingly adopted internationally
(Jenkins Smith, 2006; Geva-May and Maslove, 2006; 2007; Geva-May et al,
2008; Elwood, 2008).
The notions launched by Aaron Wildavsky in ‘Principles for a graduate
school of public policy’ (1979, 407–19) for policy analysis as a domain of
study and instruction, feature specific policy analysis methods, and advocates
extensive practice and exposure to ‘real life’ projects, practicums and capstones.
Harvard’s Kennedy School, initiated at the same period of time, pursued similar
policy analysis principles. Their case studies series, which apply policy analytic
practices to ‘real life public policy’ circumstances, emphasise the intensive
training requirements for mastery of policy analysis skills in the profession of
policy analysis. Meltsner coins the terms ‘technician’, ‘expert’ and ‘politically’
astute analysts as opposed to those claiming to do policy analysis, but lacking
the adequate toolboxes of the profession. Majone speaks of embodied skills of a
profession through practice (1989). Endowing students with the adequate policy
analytic sets of skills in the profession has been seen by Schools of Public Policy
as an imperative task.
Ever since Wildavsky’s seminal Speaking truth to power (1979), a large international
literature offers explicit methodologies, taxonomies and frameworks for ‘doing’
policy analysis, prescribing tool-boxes of policy analysis skills and advising on
ways to practice those skills (Jenkins-Smith, 1982; Cook and Vaupel, 1985;
Torgerson, 1986; Jennings, 1987; Weimer and Vining, 1989; 2005; 2010; Dunn,
1994; Durning and Osuna, 1994; Geva-May with Wildavsky, 1997; 2002; 2011;
Bardach, 2000; 2008; 2011; Scott and Baehler, 2010; MacRae and Wilde, 1979;
Patton and Sawicky, 1993).
All in all, methodological policy analysis models share the common guiding
principle that policy analysis is a focal part of the policy process, must not be
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Policy analysis education in graduate programmemes in Israel
confused with the ‘policy process’, and is based on a very specific professional
toolbox of skills required to reliably advise policy decision-making. The policy
analysis literature fundamentally recognises a number of core elements in this
domain. The stages model (DeLeon, 1999; Geva-May with Wildavsky, 1997;
2011) captures agenda setting (Kingdon, 1995), processes of problem definition
(Bardach, 2000; 2011; Dery, 1986), modelling of policy solutions and feasibility
tests on those solutions (Geva-May with Wildavsky 1997, 2011; Majone, 1989;
May, 1989), alternative selection for implementable recommendations (Ingram
and Schneider, 1997; Pressman and Wildavsky, 1973; 2010); and advocacy and
argumentation in support of policy adoption and legal legitimation (Fischer and
Forester, 1993).
These craft specifics reflect the expectation raised in the policy analysis
instruction literature for what should be advanced by programmes of public
policy. As long ago as 1989, Majone asserted that:
Policy analysis is best appreciated in relation to the craft aspects of the

field while the craft skills of an analyst are a repertoire of procedures
and judgments that are partly personal and partly social and depend as
much on his own experience as on professional (policy analysis) norms
and culturally determined criteria of adequacy and validity. (p 3)
To adapt the craft features to the context of the policy problem, today, policy
analysis assigns an increasing role to the governance, administrative and political
culture contexts of the policy problems under investigation and their comparative
global implications for decision-making (Colebatch, 2002; Geva-May, 2005; 2011;
Geva-May and Maslove, 2006; 2007; Hanjal, 2003; Howlett and Ramesh, 2005;
Luger, 2005; Mayer et al, 2004; Radin, 2000; 2013).
The extent to which the craft aspects of policy analysis are extended by the
Israeli Graduate Programmes of Public Policy – are at the heart of this chapter.
So are the NASPAA Accreditation Standards applied to over 280 programmes
which go to make up the NASPAA12 list of accredited programmes in the US.
Thus, an overriding consideration is ‘doing’ policy analysis, that is, introducing
learners to theoretical as well, to professional reasoning (Geva-May, 2005; Smith,
2005; Weimer, 2005) through real life assignments, capstones and internships. In
this respect we can clearly identify the difference between social sciences policy
studies: that is, knowledge ‘about’ the policy process; and policy analysis, that
is, ‘doing’ and producing policy alternatives, here and now, ‘within’ the policy
process).
In the last two decades policy analysis has been widely embraced internationally,
as a profession and academic field of study to address national and inter-national
public service needs. In Europe, the policy programmes still have a strong
theoretical orientation, and public policy programmes are largely units within
Political Science, Public Management/Administration/Business. In Canada we
note the same trend with a number of new policy schools established and having
173
an impact in the field. In New Zealand and Australia policy analysis has been
heavily adopted within the Westminsterian system, with ANZOG serving as
an important institute for executive instruction. In Eastern and Central Europe
as well as in Asia and South East Asia policy analysis has strong proponents, for
example at the Policy School at Central European University, and Public Policy
at HSE, Moscow and Kazakhstan. Policy analysis also has a strong presence at the
Lee Kuan Yew School of the National University of Singapore, in Hong Kong,
Shanghai, Taipei, Seoul and so on. Many US trained faculty lead the policy
analysis domain in order to address national public service needs. Similarly, in
Israel, the development of public policy programmes has been driven by national
public service needs.Denhardt (2001) insightfully summarised the questions
applicable to designing graduate programmes of public administration or policy:
should educators educate students with respect to theory or practice? Should
MPA (Master in Public Administration) and MPP (Master in Public Policy)
programmes prepare students for their first jobs or for those to which they might
aspire later? What are the appropriate delivery mechanisms for MPA and MPP
courses and curricula?
In translating these questions into operational components for the study of the
programmes of public policy in Israel, we identified the following fundamentals
as key variables:
• Context: To what extent policy studies and policy analysis are grounded in the
history, culture, politics and other contextual realities of the specific public
service in Israel (see the next section on the background context).
• Theories of public policy and public administration: To what extent administrative
and policy-making process theories, rationales and approaches are interwoven
with policy analysis practice (see the section on profiles of the programmes
in the study).
• Policy analysis methodology: To what extent a core normative policy analysis
methodology is taught as a stand-alone domain of study and practice (see the
section on profiles of the programmes in the study).
The context: background to developments in the Israeli public

service
To understand the developments of public policy education in higher education
in Israel it is important to understand its rather late emergence, and status as a
‘work in progress’. Interestingly, despite the Israeli scholars who shaped the field
of public policy as a profession and who echoed their convictions loud and clear
across oceans – Yehezkel Dror being one of the more prominent scholars in this
emerging field – public policy, policy analysis and public administration instruction
in Israeli higher education has been adopted only in the early 1990s. In this respect
the Israeli programmes of public policy are in good company with similar late
developments in Canada and Europe, not to mention Asia and South America.
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Established in 1948, Israel has been a new state with a new public administration
which inherited two contradictory administrative traditions: the British Colonial
civil servants tradition of political neutrality and professional norms developed over
the years by the British Colonial Office; and the Jewish agencies characterised
by improvisation, political activism, internal politically oriented subdivisions
and strong nationalism. Furthermore, until the 1990s, security problems, limited
resources, lack of stability and huge waves of immigration put aside more
mundane issues such as administrative reforms and systematic policy planning
approaches for quite a while (Geva-May and Kfir, 2000). Furthermore, things
worked just fine, by default, despite the lack of systematic approaches to public
policy planning (Sharef, 1962) which reinforced the existent administrative and
policy-making routine.
In the 1990s, a number of incidents, economic concerns and the complexities
of tasks in the public service in the increasingly global and technologically astute
world indicated that the lack of justifiable tools and guidelines for policy making
could no longer be acceptable for responsible policy making. It became evident
that the role of the Ministry of Finance, the Treasury Board and the government’s
Commission roles of analyst, coordinator and assessor of outputs were not sufficient
and that there was a need for a sophisticated political and administrative leadership
(Geva-May and Kfir, 2000).
At first the criticism came from academia (especially Dror, 1968; 1972a; 1972b;
1972c; 1983), but in time it crossed lines and was raised by political and interest
groups calling for accountability and transparency, by parties and members of the
Parliament (Knesset), and constituted the work of different committees calling
for reforms in the public service. The five year work of the Kubersky Committee
identified as ‘(the) most urgent needs in public administration in Israel’ the re-
formulation of priorities and policy-making practices in the public service, as
well as the institutionalisation of systems for advanced policy evaluation, analysis,
planning and implementation (Kubersky, 1989).
The Israeli higher education institutions heard the call loud and clear. Their
faculty, mostly American trained and following the highest scholarly standards,
responded to the challenge. They attempted to duplicate principles advocated
at the time by the emerging field of public policy and policy analysis in the US,
and engaged in what would become a turning point in public policy in Israel:
the establishment of programmes of public policy.
The first programme of public policy was founded at Tel Aviv University
in early 1990s building on a unit for urban and transportation planning led by
economists. Still highly influenced by economic analytical practices, it became
a Department of Public Policy in 2006. The School of Public Policy at the
Hebrew University in Jerusalem was founded in early 2000s as a ‘programme’
and its course of studies is the only one closely following the Berkeley tradition.
Recently, Sapir College’s public policy programme, followed suit.3
The programmes of Haifa University and Ben Gurion University of the Negev
are based on a predominately liberal arts public administration orientation with
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public policy within the larger institutional arrangements. At Bar Ilan University
MPP courses are offered within the Political Science Department as a sub-sectional
course of study while at the Interdisciplinary Centre (IDC) offers public policy
courses in the School of Governance.
The study:
Profiles of Israeli programmes of public policy/affairs/administration 2013–14
To provide findings informing this chapter, we looked into Council for Higher
Education (MALAG)4 recognised MA programmes of public policy and/or
administration (see the next section).
To assess the degree to which policy analysis is enhanced in their course of
studies we grounded our criteria upon universals of public policy instruction
as well as on the policy analysis principles brought forward in the literature of
the last four decades (Meltsner, 1972; 1976; Weimer and Vining, 1989; 1992;
2010; Jenkins-Smith, 1982; Cook and Vaupel, 1985; Torgerson, 1986; Jennings,
1987; Weimer and Vining, 1989; 2005; 2010; Dunn, 1994; Durning and Osuna,
1994; Geva-May and Wildavsky, 1997, 2011; Bardach, 2011; John, 2013) and
NASPAA’s Accreditation Standards.
Rationale for the choice of institutions
The three questions driving this study apply mostly to graduate programmes.
Therefore, the programmes discussed are those recognised by the Israeli Council
of Higher Education (MALAG) as providers of an MA degree in public
administration and/or in public policy. They include seven institutions of higher
education: Bar Ilan University near Tel Aviv, Ben Gurion University in the South,
Haifa University in the north, the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, and Tel Aviv
University as well as two academic colleges: Interdisciplinary Centre of Herzliya
and Sapir College in the south.
Data collection
The data informing this chapter was collected over 2013–14 using the following
methods and tools: (a) content analysis of internet postings by the target
institutions; (b) content analysis of public policy and policy analysis course syllabi;
(c) an informative survey questionnaire for heads of the institutions or assigned
representatives; (d) email or telephone interviews with heads of programmes or
other assigned administrative faculty for clarifications, explanations and validation
of findings. The survey questionnaire was adapted from the online US survey
versions commissioned by APPAM and developed by Hank C Jenkins-Smith
(2006) for US programmes of public policy, and by Geva-May et al (2008) for
international programmes of public policy in Europe, Australia, New Zealand
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and Canada. Our triangulation of the four methods and tools, as well as the
final report approval of the heads of programmes, allowed for the validation of
information and findings about the characteristics of each one of the programmes.
Choice of variables
To establish the contribution of the institutions to public service in Israel, to

public policy in general and to policy analysis in particular, we considered their
respective vision as well as their specific policy courses of study and syllabi. More
specifically, we looked into the following, explicit variables and sub-variables for
each one of the programmes:
Vision
This variable positions the aims and scope of each individual programme, inclusive
of its specific conceptualisation of contribution to the public service in general,
public policy and policy analysis instruction.
Administrative aspects
1 The year the programme was established: indicating the length of time the
programme has been in existence and its role to advancing public policy
instruction in Israel.
2 Organisational structure: the nature of the programme, whether it has
expanded; the position granted by the university to the programme
(programme, department or school) and whether it is an independent unit or
part of a wider organisational structure with general goals.
3 Partnerships and cooperation: to what extent a programme seeks to go beyond
the academic parameters and serve the community and the public service at
large.
4 Number of faculty members and their academic status: positions the level of
expected research and teaching.
5 Number of administrative staff: indicates the support provided to the
programme.
6 Number and ‘type’ of students: the level of the students (for example, acceptance
criteria), the capacity of the programme and its public service outreach (for
example, executives, cadets).
The nature of the programme
1 Core curriculum: the main courses required, to what extent they support the
vision and scope of the programme, and the extent to which the programme
follows or diverges from normative public policy programmes.
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2 Elective courses: extent to which they address the local social or political
concerns in Israel.
3 Policy analysis courses: whether and to what extent policy analysis is offered
as a standalone normative course of study.
4 Number of credits for degree completion: points to the academic rigour towards
degree completion and the relative place given to public policy studies and
policy analysis.
5 Additional requirements: degree of practical exposure; degree of research
orientation.
Study findings
This section analyses each one of the graduate courses of study in programmes of
public policy and/or public administration in Israel based on the variables outlined
above. The questions driving this study apply to the nature of the programmes,
that is to the extent to which the programmes a) attain their respective vision as
relates to service to the public domain; b) offer theoretical liberal arts knowledge
‘about’ the policy process; (c) offer standalone courses of policy analysis comparable
to normative programmes of public policy.
Governance and Public Policy, Political Studies Department, Bar Ilan University5
Bar Ilan University’s Political Studies Department offers an MA in Political Science

with a selective specialisation in Governance and Public Policy.
Vision
The vision of this department is ‘to reach out to those interested in politics and
governance’. According to their website, the academic degree extended in political
science should provide the knowledge, analytical skills and understanding base
required for careers in the government, international relations and diplomacy, as
well as in the industry and the private sector.
Part of the Faculty of Social Sciences, this department offers six MA programmes
of study, one of which, as from 2000, is Governance and Public Policy. The
department involves 38 faculty members and 30 adjunct teachers, only three of
whom teach public policy oriented subjects. Ten administrative staff serve the
department’s faculty and students. The department has about 1,200 BA, MA and
PhD students inclusive of post-doctoral fellows; about 250 students are enrolled in
the Governance and Public Policy specialisation. The four-semester programme
offers research and non-research choices, as well as structured courses in Audit
and in Public Administration. The research programme requires 28 course credits
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and an MA thesis, while the non-research programme requires 36 credits without

a thesis. The acceptance prerequisite is a BA average grade of 83/100 for the
research programme, and 80/100 for non-research. Political science courses are
required of students who do not have this undergraduate degree background.
The structure of the programme
Approximately half of the course credit requirements in the governance and

public policy programme are the same for research and non-research students.
They include: Theories and Approaches in Political Science, Theories and
Approaches in Public Administration, Political Leadership, and Israeli Politics.
Research students take a course in research methodology towards their theses.
In summary: At Bar Ilan University policy studies is addressed within a specific,
purposely-designed MA course of study in Governance and Public Policy in the
Political Studies Department with a liberal arts orientation and with only three
faculty members supporting the policy domain alone; students may choose to
take courses about public policy, administration, politics or governance, side by
side with courses of a more theoretical nature in political science.
Department of Public Administration and Public Policy, Ben-Gurion University of

Negev6
Vision
This programme focuses on public administration and public policy and is

designated ‘to train quality leadership to management and head office positions
in the public sector or the private sector…[and to] contribute to analysis and
decision-making skills, evaluation, policy design and policy implementation’. The
programme is multi-disciplinary, emphasises management, social and economic
aspects and reflects the multi-cultural nature of Israel.
Established in 1996 and part of the Faculty of Management, the Department

of Public Administration and Public Policy includes eight tenure track faculty
members, and 12 adjunct teachers as well as two administrative staff serving the
faculty and about 200 students per year.
The department offers both research and non-research programmes. The former
requires 30 course credits and a thesis; the latter requires 42 course credits inclusive
of one seminar. Acceptance to the research programme is granted following one
semester at Master’s level at an average grade of 85 and thesis research outline
approval.
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Priority is given to candidates with practical experience in management or

those whose BA average grade is at least 80, meet ESL requirements and have a
strong background in social sciences – specifically, Economics, Political Science,
Sociology, Psychology and Geography.
There are two optional courses of study: Economics, Business and Society;
and Public Management. Each course of study includes two core courses, three
electives and one seminar.
In both the Public Management, and the Economics, Business and Society
courses of study, the students study a basic course in Public Policy, Planning, and
Monitoring in the Public Sector, Research in Public Administration, as well as
Economics for Public Administration.
There are specific domain-related curricular requirements in the Public
Management Programme with courses in Planning, Measurement, and
Monitoring in the public sector; Organisational Behaviour and Strategy; and Public
Management. The students in the Economics, Business and Society Programme
take courses in Inequality and Economic Growth: Theory and Applied Policy;
Non-competitive Markets, Welfare and Regulation; and Government Society
and Business; and Advanced Issues in Public Policy. Knowledge about public
policy is extended through Introduction to Public Administration, Public Policy,
Quantitative Models to Policy Evaluation, and Applied Macroeconomics. Students
write a final research seminar paper but there are no practicum, capstones or
internship requirements.
In summary: the Department of Public Administration and Policy provides
a course of study, which contributes to the professional development of public
service personnel and to the advancement of the public sector. They prepare and
endow about 100 research and non-research graduates yearly, with a knowledge
base in public administration and management, as well as with concepts about
public policy and policy analysis.
The Division of Public Administration and Policy, Haifa University7
Vision
The vision, as reflected on the division’s website, points to the ‘training of public
servants and excellent scholars able to advance the field of public policy, better
serve the public, and bring the public administration to new horizons’. The
skills required are meant to allow the students to pursue public service careers
and develop public service commitment. The more operational targets refer to
identifying and resolving difficulties in the public management, policy making,
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policy design and implementation based on firm evaluation, methodological

research and analytical skills.
Autonomous since 2003, the Division of Public Administration and Policy has
been part of the School of Political Science, which comprises two additional
departments: International Relations, and Governance and Political Thought. It
includes eight faculty members, one professor emeritus, and 20 adjunct teachers.
The two administrative staff serves the Division’s faculty and about 250 MPA
students per annum.
The Division provides a research programme with thesis and non-research
programme without a thesis requirement. Their four specialisation programmes
are: Local Government, Internal and Public Auditing; an Executive Programme
in Public Administration; and as from 2013, a Cadets Programme in Local
Government in collaboration with the Israeli Ministry of Interior Affairs and an
NGO for the advancement of the municipal public service (ATIDIM).
In all programmes course completion spans two years (seven courses in
the research programme, nine in the non-research programme, and 11–12
specialisation courses). Only the Executive and Auditing programmes include
a practicum in their specific domain. The research programme extends a third
year dedicated to an MPA thesis.
Interestingly, the student acceptance criteria in this programme are a degree in
political science or equivalent supporting its liberal arts orientation and an average
grade of 80. The research programme students must obtain an average grade of
80 in their research workshop, and 86 or higher in the Scopes and Methods in
Public Administration and Policy. The Executive or Cadet candidates are accepted
with an average of 76 in fields other than Political Science.
In addition to the courses listed above, the core curriculum in the Division of
Public Administration and Policy includes Political Economics and Public Policy
Making; Advanced Research Methods for Public Administration (workshop); and
Organisational Theory. It is notable that the first two courses offer components of
public policy, policy analysis terms and policy-making implications. The research
programme students can choose between a quantitative or qualitative methods
workshops and two elective courses. The non-research programme includes
courses in Planning and Budgeting; Local Politics; and Leadership.
In summary, this Division, which is embedded within a Political Science School,
has a strong traditional public administration focus seeking to contribute to the
public service. Their annual 120 students are exposed to a variety of domains
including auditing, which is unique to this institution. It also offers two courses
bearing ‘public policy’ in their titles and in some of their content. Standalone
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Policy Analysis courses are not offered, but the research topics and student outputs
reflect knowledge about public policy processes. The programme offers both
research and non-research academic exposure, preparing both public servants
and academic track researchers.
The Federmann School of Public Policy and Government, the Hebrew University8
Vision
The School’s vision statement acknowledges that only ‘a professional, moral and
creative public sector can lead the Israeli society into the next era’. Located in
the Faculty of Social Sciences, the School aspires to contribute and advance the
professional quality and moral awareness of the public sector in Israel. To do so, it
specifically adopts a pedagogic approach aiming ‘to provide the Israeli public sector
with methodological and analytical skills to effectively participate in addressing
public problems’. To address this goal, the multi-disciplinary curriculum focuses
on research and policy analysis as well as on methodological and practical skills.
The Federmann School is an independent unit in the Faculty of Social Sciences,

with 14 faculty members, and over 20 part-time adjunct teachers. Seven
administrative staff serves the faculty and about 200 students per annum.
The School offers four MA programmes and a number of training programmes
for civil servants. The first MA programme, the Honours programme, was
established in 2002, followed by the Executive programme in 2005, the Midcareer
programme in 2011 and the Israeli Public Service Cadets programme in 2012.
The latter two are joint programmes with the Israeli Public Sector Commission
and explicitly follow the vision set in the 1990s by the Kubersky and the Public
Service Commissions. In each one of the four programmes the core curriculum
is similar, the number of students in each ranges between 25 and 35 per annum,
and spans over four semesters. The Honours programme requires 36-point core
courses and eight point elective; it is research-oriented with courses in research
methodology and a final MA thesis. All other programmes require 46 credits
and a final policy paper.
The acceptance requirements in the Honours and the Public Service Cadets
Programmes are a GRE, a BA with honours and an individual interview assessing
students’ motivation, analytical, writing and oral presentation skills.
The School’s different programmes follow a classic approach to public policy and
policy analysis studies very similar to the components and design of programmes
of public policy in North America: Public Policy Theory in the first year, an
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introductory and an advanced workshop-oriented course in Policy Analysis (first

and second year); Public Economics Micro and Macroeconomics; Statistics; Public
Law; and Civil Service Ethics. Additional courses include Introduction to Public
Administration; Decision Making; Organisational Studies (Honours and Cadets
programmes); Leadership; and practitioner-oriented courses for the Mid-career
programme students such as: Organisational Change; and the Israeli Public Sector.
The students of all four programmes are trained as policy analysts doing real life
policy analysis of real public policy issues. Throughout the course of study they
are required to write a number of policy papers, memos and reports. The Cadet
programme students are placed in one-year internships; in the other programmes,
there is a quasi-internship requirement: the production of a policy analysis paper
for a real customer.
In summary, the School seeks to provide tools for at least four types of student
populations, thus addressing several layers of the Israeli public service. The School
is primarily policy analysis oriented, offering both theoretical and practical
training. The four programmes allow for an understanding of the public policy
systems. Most importantly, they offer methodological and analytical toolboxes
through policy analysis and capstones. The School provides the field about 120
well-trained students in policy analysis, taught by a relatively high number of
faculty – 14 full-time faculty. The research and non-research academic exposure
prepares both for the public service and the academic track.
The Department of Public Policy,Tel Aviv University9
Vision
The vision adopted by this Department is to provide high-level training for public
service candidates in order to advance public policy in Israel. It aims to prepare
their graduates for service in the government, local authorities, and third-sector
organisations. It seeks to do so by extending theoretical and practical knowledge
of implementation and evaluation; and political, economic, legal and social
aspects of public policy in a variety of policy domains. To cite their website, the
programme provides ‘relevant knowledge to meet current public problems and
future policy challenges’.
Established in 1985 as a centre in urban planning, it became the first Israeli

Programme of Public Policy in the early 1990s, and an independent Department
as part of the Faculty of Social Science in 2006. It features eight tenure track
faculty members, and 12 adjuncts. Two administrative staff members provide
services to the faculty and about 150 students per annum. The Department has
been recognised as a preferred academic institution in the profession by the Israeli
Public Sector Commission. It features research and non-research programmes,
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both established in the early 1990s, an Executive programme, established in 2004,

and a joint degrees with Chicago University’s Harris School of Public Policy
(since 2005), and the Wagner School of Public Policy, New York University
(since 2012).
There are about 150 students enrolled yearly, of which 40–50 are in the
Executive programme. The completion requirements are 38 and 33 credits in the
non-research and research programmes, respectively. These comprise nine elective
credits in the research programme, and three in the non-research programme.
With the exception of the Executive’s three semesters, all other programmes span
over four semesters.
The acceptance criteria are an undergraduate average grade of 80, and at
least five years of in-service experience and a 75 average grade in the Executive
programme. Following the North American prevalent approach, those students
who do not have a BA degree in Economics and Statistics have to complete
such background courses as a pre-requisite.In the joint programme with the
Harris School of Public Policy students study, inter-changeably, in Tel Aviv and
in Chicago and have to meet the Harris School acceptance and completion
requirements in order to be granted an MA degree by both universities.
The same core curriculum is taken by both the research and the non-research
students. Conceptually and operationally the course of study follows on the
Harvard Kennedy School MPP curriculum. It includes an Introduction to Public
Policy; Introduction to Public Law and Ethics; the Social and Political Aspects of
Public Policy; Micro Economics (first semester); Statistics and Research Methods
(second semester; Public Economics (third semester) and electives in various
domains and aspects of public policy. The research programme students have a
research workshop and final thesis requirement. It is notable that there is no final
policy or policy analysis paper requirement.
Introduction to Public Policy, Social and Political Aspects of Public Policy, and
Public Economics concern public policy with mention of policy analysis aspects
and incorporate policy analytic practices overtly. In the former course, there
is significant attention paid to the training of students in approaches to policy
analysis within assignments and a course policy paper.
The programme offers two seminars which explicitly operate as clinics: the first,
designed to improve environmental management and the second conducted in
collaboration with the Israeli branch of Transparency International (‘Shvil’). In
both clinics the clients are local authorities. The students’ final assignments are
presented to actual clients in a public conference. Since 2012, the department
offers, jointly with the School of Management, a semester-long workshop
engaging students and decision makers in a dialogue on major decisions and
reforms.
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While the Executive Programme features the same course requirements, students
also take a course in Evaluation of Public Programmes and Projects using real life
public policy projects, and applying different methods of cost–benefit analysis and
evaluation, such as the World Bank method.
In summary: the goals of the Department of Public Policy at Tel Aviv University
are to provide theoretical and practical knowledge as well as economic, legal and social
awareness, attained through a rigorous course of study in these disciplines with special
emphasis on cost–benefit analysis and economic evaluation. Eight full-time faculty
teach 150 graduates yearly. The students are exposed to Introduction to Public Policy as
well as Social and Political Aspects of Public Policy implementing the knowledge base
acquired through real life assignments with a policy analysis orientation. Nevertheless,
it is notable that there are no explicit courses in Policy Analysis and its practice.
The department prepares both public servants and academic track researchers
through its research and clinical exposure contributing to the basic knowledge required
in the public service.
The Lauder School of Governance, Diplomacy and Strategy, IDC (Interdisciplinary

Centre of Herzliya)10
The Interdisciplinary Centre in Herzelya (IDC), near Tel Aviv, is a private

college. It includes the Lauder School of Government, Diplomacy and Strategy.
This School offers a BA as well as an MA in Government, with specialisations
in Public Policy and Administration; Political Marketing; Security and Counter
Terrorism; and Diplomacy and Conflict Resolution.
Vision
The vision of the School is to train students to work in the public sector and in the
academia. The faculty, according to their website, includes ‘expert theoreticians
and practitioners’.
Started in 2009 with 35 students per annum, the MA programme at IDC offers a
non-research course of study in Public Policy and Administration that lasts three
consecutive semesters over one calendar year. Their research programme takes two
years and students are required to complete a Master’s thesis and thesis defence.
The non-research programme requires seven core course credits, eight basic
course credits, and 14 compulsory course credits. Additionally, students take
five elective courses in any domain of interest, sustainability being one of the
recommended subjects. The courses can be taken either in Hebrew or English.
The research students write a research thesis. The academic faculty of the entire
School includes 21 professors and several adjunct teachers who are supported by
three administrative staff.
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Students in the specialisation in Public Policy take core courses in Research

Methodology; Decision Making; and a Topical Seminar. Additional basic courses
include Public Policy and Administration; as well as three of the following: Social
and Economic Policy; Governance and Politics in Israel; Political Leadership,
Political Thought; Public Administration Reforms; International Political
Marketing; and International Political Economy. Electives include ‘Two Harvard
Workshops’ in Persuasion, and Experimental Research; as well as Urban Planning;
Policy and Strategy Simulation; and Energy Policy.
The programme links theory to actual practice through engagement in public
affairs simulations, consulting to local government, debating guest speakers
(practitioners, consultants, government officials) and internships.
In summary, this programme addresses public service advancement through
a course of study, which contributes to the professional development of public
service personnel through a liberal arts approach rather than a practice oriented
one. Policy analysis is not a standalone course, but there is on-going exposure to
and discussions about policy foundations and policy issues across the curriculum.
Department of Public Policy and Public Administration, Sapir College11
Vision
The vision of the MA Programme in Public Policy at Sapir College is ‘to nurture a
public service leadership addressing the public challenges of Israel, in a thoughtful,
professional, responsible, yet daring, way’. Located in the Negev (southern desert
region of Israel) this programme serves a very specific diverse and dispersed
periphery population and acknowledges its needs for public service skills. The
programme involves 25 students per year ‘willing to contribute to society’ and
provides them with a ‘tool box of ideas and skills based on research, philosophy
and analytics as known in political science, economics and management’. Policy
analysis oriented, the Programme specifically seeks to endow the students with
those skills that would enable them to analyse and evaluate public policy and
recommend policy alternatives contributing to ‘public well-being’.
Part of the Faculty of Social Sciences, the Policy Programme was founded in 2007.
Eleven tenure track faculty members, two adjunct teachers and two administrative
personnel address the needs of about 40–50 students per annum.
The programme has an explicit non-research orientation. The students are
required to take 40 course credits out of which eight are electives. To be accepted
in the programme students are required to have a BA with an average of 80 and
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take part in a pre-acceptance workshop. The programme lasts four semesters and
includes an explicit major course of study in Policy Analysis.
The courses offered at Sapir College include: Economics and Public Policy;
Introduction to Policy Analysis, Leadership; Methodology and Statistics, in the
first year. In the second year, the courses are: Economics and Public Policy;
Introduction to Policy Analysis. The latter involves policy analysis assignments.
It culminates in an integrative three-days simulation of a quasi ‘real life’ policy
analysis. Students also take courses in Theories in Public Policy; Programme
Evaluation; Political Analysis; Issues in Public Administration; and an Integrative
Capstones.
In summary, his programme provides students with skills in a variety of core
courses, with an emphasis on policy analysis practice, as normatively acceptable
in schools of public policy in the US. It should be noted that this particular
programme is a professional non-research programme. Located in the Negev,
and serving a variety of ethnic and socio-economic populations of a highly
dispersed desert region, the initiation of this Programme and the foundations
that it extends, render a particularly valuable contribution to the public service
in this part of Israel.
Discussion: the state of the art

The focus of the ILPA book series and of the Policy Analysis in Israel volume is
policy analysis. This chapter looks into the role of the Higher Education Graduate
Programmes as the pipelines endowing students with adequate skills in this public
service profession.
We investigate and compare the state of the art of the programmes of public
policy and/or administration in Israel against normative methods of policy analysis
as advanced in the policy analysis and policy analysis instruction literature. These
criteria are advocated also by the NASPAA Adjudication Standards and have
been gradually adopted in Europe, Australia, New Zealand, South America and
Asia. Nevertheless, in no way do they exclude other criteria possible judgement
calls, which might have been adopted by the Israeli programmes in designing
their curricula.
This study also allows a larger scope – that of the Israeli public service
developments and needs, and the extent to which the institutions of higher
education in Israel cater for them through public administration, public policy
and policy analysis instruction. In this section we discuss the Israeli context in
which the public policy studies and policy analysis have developed, the profile of
programmes, and finally their contribution to the public service, policy studies and
policy analysis, respectively.
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The context
The big boom in the development of public administration and public

policy programmes in Israel in the last two decades followed the early 1990s
recommendations of the Kubersky and the Government Commissions to provide
the knowledge base necessary for a knowledgeable public service. The high level
of interaction of Israeli scholars with the North American academia, and the
influence of the new trends in public policy studies, namely policy research, policy
and programme evaluation and policy analysis, allowed the Israeli institutions of
higher education in Israel to jump aboard and establish a variety of programmes
ranging in their interpretation of policy studies and policy analysis as a domains
of study.
The profile of the Israeli graduate programmes
In discussing the profile of graduate programmes of the seven institutions of higher

education included in this study, we relate to the three questions that prodded
our study: do the graduate programmes extend (a) service to the public service;
b) knowledge about public policy processes; and (c) knowledge and practice of
policy analysis within the policy processes?
The findings obtained draw on three types of programmes in the Israeli higher
education:
• Programmes of Public Policy per se with policy analysis taught as a standalone

domain of expertise at various degrees of intensity, and with ranging practical
exposure in policy analysis (Hebrew University, Sapir College, Tel Aviv
University);
• Programmes which follow a liberal arts multiple foci orientation, whether in
political science, public administration, public management or business with
some courses about public policy with degrees of exposure of policy analytic
practices (Ben Gurion and Haifa Universities);
• Units or courses of study within larger Schools of Political Science or
Governance with an explicit liberal arts orientation (Bar Ilan University and
IDC) with some public policy courses.
Despite their significant differences, all programmes expose their students to aspects
of public policy studies through at least one to two courses about public policy
usually in conjunction with another topic, that is, at Haifa University: Scopes and
Methods in Public Administration and Policy (first year), and Political Economics
and Public Policy Making; at Ben Gurion University: Public Policy, Planning, and
Monitoring in the Public Sector, Research in Public Administration, Economics
for Public Administration; at Bar Ilan University: Theories and Approaches in
Public Administration, Political Leadership, and Israeli Politics.
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Contribution to the public service, public policy, policy analysis
The findings obtained in the study supporting this chapter point to significant
differences and similarities among the seven institutions both in their vision and
in their vision attainment.
Service to public service
Most programmes show partnerships with government, local and/or central

agencies, as well as with NGOs. Haifa and Ben-Gurion Universities do so through
the ATIDIM programme in municipal governance as well as through its Cadets
programmes with the Ministry of Interior; the Hebrew University partners with
the Government Commission: Tel Aviv University is a recommended course of
study by the Ministry of Interior.
The Executives, Cadets and Specialisation courses of study involve an
experienced student population, which requires specific guidance and coaching
to reinforce existing know-how for growth in the public service profession.
Though in some institutions the number of experienced, tenure track faculty
is low, they are reinforced by a considerable number of adjuncts who bring to
the programmes both public service experience, and public domain academic
knowledge. Notably, as also indicated by the 2011 External Report of the Council
for Higher Education, only few of these programmes, and their specific courses
of studies, offer practical implementation in the profession.
All institutions have similarly high student entrance requirements indicating a
high expectations level and attention to the quality of the future public servants
and analysts.
In all programmes, the length of the course of studies is similar (four semesters)
with the exception of IDC (three semesters) and Haifa University with a fourth
year in the research programme. The core courses and electives follow each
institution’s individual vision. Albeit at various degrees of emphasis on policy
analysis, all programmes provide the basic knowledge foundations for the public
service. Only some programmes (Hebrew University, Tel Aviv University and Sapir
College) can be said to produce actual policy analysts as conceived by Bardach,
Meltsner, or Wildavsky and as called for in a fundamentally professional domain.
Public policy instruction
In all institutions there is an overriding policy component dedicated to policy

studies, and policy processes, although as schools of public administration/public
affairs/public management universally, they have a multi-functional rather than
a public policy focus. Their public policy focus involves providing knowledge
about the policy process in a liberal arts approach, inclusive of some features
of policy analysis as is the case at Haifa and Ben Gurion Universities. In other
189
words, these programmes provide tools to critically and comparatively analyse

public policy processes. These programmes deem policy studies analogous with
policy analysis notwithstanding their differences and the latter’s specific practice
oriented approach.12
In all programmes, and due to the requirements of the academia, faculty are
committed to disseminating public administration and public policy research
in journals and other publications. Some do so in co-production with their
students. Policy analysis reports or policy papers are still not acknowledged by
the Israeli higher education as equivalent to scholarly investigation, and therefore
the ‘practice’ orientation is not predominant.
Policy analysis
We have identified that all seven graduate programmes provide courses about policy
processes. Nevertheless, while some exposure is given, not all of them train in
doing policy analysis, that is, as a standalone professional and academic domain
with specific frames of reference, conceptual and methodological practices. This
orientation is an explicit prerogative in the Schools of Public Policy: Hebrew
University, Tel Aviv University and Sapir College.
To revisit the question of whether the Schools of Public Policy in Israel endow
students with the embodied skills, through practice, that Majone, Meltsner and
Wildavsky, respectively, advocate, so that they can ‘speak truth to power’ – we
note that only the Hebrew University and Sapir College follow the Berkeley–
Harvard model of practical immersion over the entire four semesters. They offer
two specific Policy Analysis courses and workshops, inclusive of assignments,
policy papers, real life policy analyses at degrees of difficulty and timeliness, and
Integrative Capstones inclusive of presentations to real clients. Tel Aviv University
does not have a specific course titled Policy Analysis, but includes assignments
inclusive of policy analysis components mainly in their Introduction to Public
Policy; Introduction to Public Law and Ethics; the Social and Political Aspects
of Public Policy. In the three institutions, as normative in Schools of Public
Policy internationally, law and economics (with an emphasis on micro and
macroeconomics and cost–benefit analysis) are deemed foundations to policy
analysis.
190
In summary
1 Have the Israeli programmes met their individual targets and developed a value-
adding approach to the education of public policy and administration in Israel
endowing students with competencies required to have the public domain entrusted
to them?
This question follows a 1998 quote attributed to Derek Bok, Harvard president
at a time of the big boom of the development of public policy programmes
in the US, and which brings to light the primary rationale that public policy
programmes should address: ‘What kind of people do we want to entrust with
official power over our lives?’
Given the major developments in the public service and in public service
education in Israel in the last two decades, the answer is generally positive. The
courses of study offered by the programmes are consistent with their respective
goals, and the domains they seek to advance. While not all follow normative public
policy or public administration programme templates, they extend informative
courses of study that vary in accordance with their institutional leadership
background and perception of the field of public service.
The large number of graduates annually (over 1,000 graduates) holds the promise
of a more knowledgeable and reliable public service.
Across the border and regardless of their specific orientation, all programmes
of Public Policy and Public Administration in Israel perceive their role both as
providers of foundations in public policy, and as facilitators of public service
education including Executives, Cadets, and Specialisation streams in their research
and non-research courses of study.13
2 Is public policy instruction offered in graduate institutions of higher education in

Israel? and,
3 Is policy analysis instruction offered in graduate institutions of higher education in

Israel?
The answers to these questions are intricate because while policy studies exposure
takes place in all programmes and the curriculum offers knowledge about common
concepts and exiting approaches, policy analysis instruction challenges are not
fully met at the instructional level. In making this statement we refer to the raison
d’être of the public service which is to produce reliable and systematic policy
action. Knowledgeable skilful action can be only achieved through practice. This
is the main call and purpose of policy analysis. In medicine, psychology, law or
architecture one cannot engage in diagnosing and offering treatment, or designing
and planning a building, only by knowing about the profession without prior
training and mastery of the minutest skills in the profession. Knowing anatomy
191
is not enough in order to diagnose and treat a patient. Policy making is as acute,
costly and affects the public’s life on a large scale (Geva-May, 2005). Hence the
motivation to provide know-how not only about public policy processes but also
the know ‘how to do it’: how to diagnose and treat real public policy problems
applying a valid methodology, well trained skills, and under real time and real
client constraints.
The External International Committee appointed by the Israeli Higher
Education Council in 2011 emphasised in its report the relative lack of
‘profession’ perception as opposed to the liberal arts orientation adopted by most
of the graduate public policy/administration programmes. Their view was that
such graduate programmes at MA level should see themselves as professional
programmes reinforcing practical skills rather than learning, liberal arts style,
about the public service.
Despite its identification with western higher education standards, none of
the Israeli programmes adheres yet to the NASPAA Accreditation Standards
now including over 280 Schools in the US and internationally; nor is it part
of the accreditation efforts14 in Western and Eastern Europe through EGPA’s
accreditation system or Canada’s CAPPA for the Canadian Schools – which
adherence can facilitate a more cohesive perspective and quality control.
While decidedly much has been achieved within a very short period of time in
the Israeli higher education in support of the public service – the instruction of
policy studies in general and policy analysis in particular are, as in any developing
field, a work in progress.
Notes
1
NASPAA is the National Association of Schools of Public Affairs and Administration,
it accredits over 280 programmes in the US and recently also internationally. Each
School has to adhere to set Standards for Accreditation and is reviewed every 5 years.
The home page is: http://naspaa.org/accreditation/NS/INDEX.asp. Navigating
among the pages should answer most questions about the process.
2
The counterpart of NASPAA in Europe, established in the last decade is EGPA’s
EEAPA, and in Canada CAPPA’s accreditation committee – in an attempt to ascertain
that baseline skills and competencies are offered and maintained
3
In both cases the design was led by David Dery, a former Berkeley trained scholar.
4
See the website of the Council for Higher Education for a list of MAs provided by
colleges in Israel http://che.org.il
5
http://politics.biu.ac.il/
6
http://in.bgu.ac.il/fom/PublicDep/Pages/PublicDepHomePage.aspx
7
http://hevra.haifa.ac.il/~poli/index.php/he/#
8
http://public-policy.huji.ac.il/
9
http://socsci.tau.ac.il/public/
10
http://portal.idc.ac.il/he/schools/government/homepage/pages/homepage.aspx
11
www.sapir.ac.il/MApublicadmin
12
For a clear description of the differences see Weimer and Vining, 2010, Chapter 2.
192
13
Note that unlike countries with much larger populations, Israel’s 8 million inhabitants
are granted higher education by a total of seven research universities: Hebrew University,
Tel Aviv University, Haifa University, Ben-Gurion University, Bar-Ilan University,
Technion and Weizmann Institute. The Technion, Israel Institute of Technology and
Weizmann Institute, which are both science and/or technology oriented, do not
feature public policy programmes. In recent years, a myriad of colleges offering post-
secondary education, as well as the Open University, provide mainly undergraduate
degrees.
14
NASPAA’s Standards and Accreditation is now applied to international Schools, with
Bocconi University being the first to be accredited outside of the US (2013).
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196
Index
Index
Reference to tables and figures are in italics
A Bar Ilan University 176, 178–9, 188

Bar, M. 157, 163
academia, and policy analysis education see
barriers to policy analysis utilisation xviii–xxii
graduate programmes
Ben-Bassat, A. 125
academic policy analysis 9–10
Ben-Gurion University of the Negev 160,
Accountant General 56–7, 66
175, 179–80, 188, 189
active coping 30
Ben-Porat, Miriam 24–5, 26
ad hoc advisory expert panels
Bensimhon-Peleg, S. 159
community living committee 114–15,
Bok, Derek 191
116–18
Boris, E. 156
and expertise 110–11
Boston, J. 47
role of 110–11
Brender, A. 149
sub-minimum wage committee 111–14,
Brudnick, I.A. 96, 105, 106
115–18
Budget Department, Ministry of Finance 8–9,
use of committees in public policy 109–10
56–7
Adelman, J. xi
aims of 127
advisory panels see ad hoc advisory expert
and approval of transfers 66
panels
centrality of 125–6
advocacy groups 12, 156, 157, 164
and GPM 65
Aizencang Kane, P. 158
and in-house policy analysis 129–32, 136,
Alon, G. 98
137
Alternative Poverty Report 167
and policy analysis 123–32
Amalgamation Commission 75
and Prime Minister’s Office 59
amalgamation reform (2003) 74–5, 82
staffing of 127
Amos (prophet) 23, 24, 25
and standard model of policy analysis
annual performance plans 63
128–36
Arab-Jewish organisations 12
three modes of policy analysis 126
Arabs
and uncertainty 138
in Budget Department 127
budgets 125–6
and policy analysis 12
and in-house policy analysis 129–32, 136,
voting patterns of 29
137
Aridor Committee 163
Burg, A. 94–5, 106
Aristotle xxii
Business Tendency Survey 145
Arrangements Law 41, 73, 125–6, 130, 131,
133–4
Avrami, S. 97, 98 C
capacity building 64–5, 66
B Cartwright, T.J. 110
Casey, J. 156
Bank of Israel Research Department
Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) 160–1
and ex-post evaluation 145–6
central government
and financial stability 146–7
challenges facing 65–8
and Governor’s role 47, 141–2, 144, 147–50
cultural change within 65
institutional and legal framework of the
and incentives 65–7
Bank 141–2
and integration 65
and macroprudential analysis 146–7
and lack of policy capacity 56–7
and monetary policy 144–6
and local government 73–8, 81–2
purpose of policy analysis 142
policy units within 59, 59–65, 67–8
staff of 142–3
and Prime Minister’s Office 59–68
work programme of 143–4
197
reform of methods 62–5 Plan for the Recovery of the Israeli

structural reforms 55–60, 58, 59 Economy 74–5
structure within 59–60, 59 stability of 11, 41
see also civil service; RIC; and see also see also Bank of Israel; Ministry of Finance
individual Ministries education in policy analysis see graduate
CHE (Council for Higher Education) 64, 67 programmes
child allowances 130–2 Elwood, J.W. 172
Child, C. 156 Equilibrium Exchange Rate 145
civil service Estonia 47
contraction of 40–3 European Centre of Parliamentary Research
development of 39–40 and Documentation 100
functions of 38, 60 European Union, and committees 109, 111
organisations of 39, 39 ex-post evaluation, Bank of Israel 145–6
and privatization 43–8 expert panels see ad hoc advisory expert
reform suggestions 49–50 panels
see also central government; local External International Committee 192
government external policy analysis see outsider policy
Civil Service Commission 57 analysis
civil society organisations see third sector
coalition politics xxi–xxii, 28–9 F
Cohen, Amnon 104–5
Cohen, H. 45–6 fanaticism xxiii
community living policies 114–15, 116–18 Federmann School of Public Policy (Hebrew
Companies Survey 145 University) 175, 182–3, 188, 189, 190
comparative perspective xviii Fefferman, Beni 7, 112, 113
Composite State-of-the-Economy Index 145 Figura,Y. 110
Congressional Research Service (US) 96, 97, financial stability 146–7
99, 105–6 First Boston Bank 46
consultocracy 46 Floersheimer Institute for Policy Studies 79
coping 29–32 frames 81–4
cost-benefit analysis 4, 149 Friedberg, H. 102
craft aspects of policy analysis 173 fuzzy gambling xxiii–xxiv
Crazy States xxiii
G
D Gal, J. 157
Dahan, M. 125 Galnoor Committee 159–60, 163–4
database, third sector 161–2 gas and oil industry 135–6
demographic transformation of Israel xxi German reparations xiii
Denhardt, R.B. 174 Gidron, B. 160, 163
Dinur, Raanan 7, 57 Goldberg, Elieazer 24, 26
disability policy Governance Committee 137
and community living 114–15, 116–18 Government Delivers (software) 64
and sub-minimum wage committee Government Planning Manual (GPM) 63, 65
111–14, 115–18 Government Procurement Administration 64
Dror,Y. xxii, xxiv Governor of Bank of Israel 47, 141–2, 144,
Dryzek, J.S. 85 147–50
Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium graduate programmes
model 145 administrative aspects of 177, 178–9,
179–80, 181, 182, 183–4, 185, 186–7, 189
and central government 67–8
E choice of institutions 176
Earned Income Tax Credit 149–50 choice of variables 177–8
econometric models 144–5, 148 contribution to public service of 189
economic and social policy xvii data collection 176–7
economy evolution of xiv, xv, 174–6, 188
and local government 74–5 importance of 67–8
nature of 27–8, 41 and international normative concepts and
new economic plan 41 practices 171–4
198
Index
nature of the programmes 177–8, 179, 180, International Supreme Auditing standards 77
181–2, 182–3, 184–5, 186, 187, 189–90 Irgunim Bareshet project 162, 165
overall assessment of 191–2 Israel
and policy analysis 190, 191–2 and coalition politics xxi–xxii, 28–9
and public policy instruction 189–90, 191–2 as contentious society 21–2
study findings 178–87 coping strategy 29–32
vision of 177, 178, 179, 180–1, 182, 183, cultural roots of 23–4
185, 186 and demographic transformation xxi
grand-policy professionalism xviii, xxii, xxiii, distinctive traits of 33
xxiv, xxv economy of 27–8
greenhouse gas emissions, reduction of 132–4 and fuzzy gambling xxiii–xxiv
Grønbjerg, K.A. 156 historical development of xi–xii, xix, xx
GuideStar 162 history of policy analysis in xiii–xvii
instability of 11–12
H and international law 22, 23
as late developer 1–12
Ha’aretz 23, 25 nature of the state xix–xx, xxii
Hadassah Medical Center xii problematic status of 23
Haifa University 175, 180–2, 188, 189 and statecraft culture xxii
Hajer, M. 85 and use of policy analysis xxii–xxiii
Halffman, W. 110 and value cleavages xx–xxi
Hanin, D. 101 Israeli Centre for Third Sector Research
Harvard’s Kennedy School 172 (ICTR) 160–3, 165, 166
Hashiloni-Dolev,Y. 111 Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) xiv
Hazan,Y.R. 102 Israeli Third Sector Database 161–2
Hebrew Prophets 23–4, 25, 28 Itzik, Dalya 99
Hebrew University of Jerusalem 175, 182–3,
188, 189, 190
Hendriks, C.M. 85 J
Higher Education Graduate Programmes see Jackson, M. 46
graduate programmes JDC-Israel 162, 164
Hird, J.A. 94 Jerusalem Centre for Public Affairs 79
Histadrut 3, 6, 41 Jewish Agency 41, 162
Hood, C. 46 Jewish People Policy Institute (JPPI) xvi
Hopkins Project 160–1 Johns Hopkins Comparative Nonprofit Sector
Hoppe, R. 110 Project 160–1
house prices 148 Joint-Israel 80
I K
ICTR 160–3, 165, 166 Kennedy School, Harvard 172
IDF xiv Knesset Research and Information Centre see
immigration 11, 40 RIC
in-house policy analysis 2, 8 knowledge, and decision-making 93–4, 98,
Ministry of Finance 126, 129–32, 136 106
RIC 93–107 Kubersky Report 3–4, 56, 64, 68, 137, 175
see also outsider policy analysis
incentives 65–7 L
insider analysis see in-house policy analysis;
outsider policy analysis Landau, D. 103–4
institutionalised networks 165–6 Lapid,Yair 130
Interdisciplinary Centre (IDC), Herzliya Latet 167
185–6, 188, 189 Legal Advice Unit 56–7
interest groups 157 legislature and policy analysis see RIC
interministerial committees 132–4, 136, 137, Levi-Abekasis, Orli 106
163 Limor, N. 165
international consulting firms 45–6, 47 Lindblom, C.E. 172
International Experts’ Panel on Community- Lindenstrauss, Micha 24, 25, 26
Based Residences for Persons with ID lobbyists 95
114–15, 116–18 local government
199
amalgamation reform (2003) 74–5 Ministry of Justice 162

and autonomy 76–7 Ministry of Transportation 5–6
and frames 81–4 Ministry of Welfare and Social Services 9, 62,
inequality within 72 114, 116, 117, 163
municipal system 72 Mintrom, M. 2, 6, 8, 11, 60
Municipalities Bill 76–7 monetary policy 144–6
policy analysis at the border 77–8, 82–3 moral integrity, and State Comptroller 24, 25,
policy analysis from outside 79–80 26, 27, 82
policy analysis of 73–80, 81–2, 83 Mosher-Williams, R. 156
policy analysis within 80–1, 83–4 Mosley, J.E 156
reforms 71, 73–7 municipal system of local government 72
and relationship with central government Municipalities Bill 76–7
71, 72–8, 81–2
role of 71, 72 N
and short-termism 80–1, 83–4
and State Auditor 77–8 NASPAA Accreditation Standards 173, 187,
Strategic Planning Units 80–1 192
and think tanks 79–80, 83 National Economic Council 7, 59–60
urban water reform 73–4 National Insurance Institute 131
National Policy Institute xiv
National Security Council xiv, 59–60
M National Security Staff xiv–xv
macroprudential analysis 146–7 networks, third sector 164–6
Madison, James 93 New Public Management 82–3
Majone, G. 172, 173 Nirel, R. 157
March, J.G. 9 Nonprofit Registrar 162
Master Privatisation Plan 46 normative principles of policy analysis 172
McGann, J.G. 97, 98 Nowcasting 145
McNamara, R.S. xviii
Meltsner, A.J. 172 O
methodological policy analysis models 172–3
Meyers, H.E. 98, 158–9 oil and gas industry 135–6
Ministry of Economy (formerly Ministry of Olmert, Ehud 26, 57
Industry, Trade and Labor) 4, 62, 112–14, Olsen, J.P. 9
116 Orlev, Z. 102–3
Ministry of Education 10 Oron, H. 106
Ministry of Finance outcome gap 60, 68
Arrangements Law 41, 73, 125–6, 130, 131, outcome monitoring 58, 60, 62, 63, 64, 65,
133–4 67, 68
Budget Department staff 127 output measurements 62, 63, 64, 65, 68
and budget negotiations 63 outsider policy analysis 2, 5, 6–8, 45–6, 47,
centrality of in policy analysis 8, 125–6 64–5, 132–3
and child allowance cuts 130–2 see also third sector
and in-house policy analysis 129–32, 136
and interministerial committees 132–4, 136, P
137 Parliament Research and Information Centre
and local government 73, 81 see RIC
modes of policy analysis 126, 136–8 parliamentary oversight 102
and new PMO structure 59 passive coping 30
policy analysis within 123–38 Peck, J. 81
and privatisation of prisons 44 performance management 65
and public committees 126, 135–6, 137 performance plans 63
reform suggestions 49 philanthropic foundations 157, 159, 164, 165,
regulatory role of 66 166
and standard model of policy analysis Phillips, S.D. 156, 165
128–38 Plan for the Recovery of the Israeli Economy
and university public policy school xiv 74–5
Ministry of Industry, Trade and Labor see policy analysis (theory/concept of)
Ministry of Economy analysing Israeli 3–12
Ministry of Interior 73, 75, 76, 78
200
Index
barriers to utilisation of in Israel xviii–xxii structure of 99

constraints of 21–2 trustworthiness of 97
and coping 29–32 value of to Knesset 105–7
craft aspects of 173 working procedure of 100–1
definition of 2, 21, 38, 60, 81 see also central government; civil service
methodological models 172–3 Rivlin, R. 95, 102, 103, 107
normative principles of 172 Robinson, W.H. 93
political model of 106
stages model 173 S
standard model of 128
tactical method 106 Salamon, L.M. 156
policy analysis studies see graduate Sapir College 175, 186–7, 188, 189, 190
programmes Schmid, H. 157
policy councils 59–60 Schwartz, R. 156–7
policy units (in central government) 59, security issues xiv–xv, xx, xxiii
59–65, 67–8 Shahal, Moshe 26
political model of policy analysis 106 Shalev, C. 111
Pollitt, Ch 82 Shamir,Yitzhak 26
positivist analysis 2, 4, 5, 8, 10 Shani Committee 132–4
post-positivist analysis 5, 6 Sheatufim 164
Prime Minister’s Office 57–68 Sheshinski Committee 135–6
prisons, privatisation of 44–5 Sikkui 12
privatisation 41, 42, 43–8 SMW (sub-minimum wage committee)
Programme for Children at Risk 62, 65 111–14, 115–18
Prophets (Hebrew) 23–4, 25, 28 social policy xvii
protests 43, 84–5 socio-economic strategy, and privatisation
public, and policy-making 10, 43, 84–5, 45–7
103–4 stages model 173
public committees standard model of policy analysis 128–36
ad hoc advisory expert panels 109–18 State Auditor see State Comptroller
and Bank of Israel 142 state budget, and policy analysis 129–32, 136,
and the Ministry of Finance 126, 135–6 137
and policy analysis in Ministry of Finance State Comptroller 22, 24–7, 77–8, 82–3
126, 135–6, 137 state contraction 40–3
and third sector 163–4 state-in-the-making xix, 40
public expenditure 41 statecraft culture xxii
statehood tradition, lack of xix–xx
strategic assessments 63
Q Strategic Planning Units 80–1
Quartet, the 56–7, 66 Strawczynski, M. 149
Strengthen the North plan 61
R sub-minimum wage committee 111–14,
115–18
Radin, B.A. 5 Supreme Court 44–5
RAND Corporation xvi, 46
Raudla, R. 47
religion xx, xxi, 12, 23–4, 25 T
Research and Information Center see RIC tactical method of policy analysis 106
Research Department, Bank of Israel 142–51 taxation 124, 129, 131, 148
Review Committee of Government Policy Earned Income Tax Credit 149–50
towards Third Sector 159–60, 163–4 and gas and oil industry 135–6
Rhodes, R.A.W. 165 teaching of public policy see graduate
RIC (Knesset Research and Information programmes
Center) Tel Aviv University 175, 183–5, 188, 189, 190
aims of 102–4 think tanks xvi, 79–80, 83, 97–8, 158–9
and impact of the reports on Bills 104–5 third sector
importance of 97–8, 105–7 advocacy groups 12, 156, 157, 164
manpower of 99–100 database of 161–2
products and outcomes 104 Galnoor Committee 163–4
role and origins of 94–8, 99 Hopkins Project 160–1
201
and inside-outside balance 164–7 V

interest groups 157
Vigoda-Gadot, E. 45–6
and networks 164–6
Vining, A. 171
philanthropic foundations 157, 159, 164,
165, 166
public policy towards 159–64 W
Review Committee of Government Policy Water and Sewage Corporation Commission
towards Third Sector 159–60, 163–4 74
role of 6, 42–3, 155–60, 166–7 water reforms 73–4
and supply side dynamics 165–6 Weimer, D. 171
think tanks xvi, 79–80, 83, 97–8, 158–9 Weiss, C. 10–11, 94
and trust 165 Wildavsky, A. 172
types of 157–8 Williams, C. 2, 6, 8, 11, 60
Tibi, A. 97, 106
Tirosh, R. 97, 101 Y
Trajtenberg Committee 43, 126
Tunik,Yitzhak 25, 26 Yad Hanadiv Foundation 161, 162
Turner,Yacov 26 Yehezkel, O. 103
Yesh Atid 130
Yishay,Y. 157–8
U
ultra-Orthodox parties 28, 31, 32, 130 Z
United Kingdom, policy analysis 57
United States Zegart, A.B. 111
and advisory committees 110–11 Zionism xi–xii, xix, xx, 166
CRS 96, 97, 99, 105–6 Zrahia, Z. 98
as external consultants 46 Zychlinsky, E. 157
and graduate programmes 172
and policy analysis xviii, 5, 57
and privatisation of prisons 45
universities see graduate programmes
urban water reform 73–4
202
Vol 7
“The community of scholars in Israel working on policy analysis have made numerous
contributions to the field, especially in understanding how to make policy in
conditions of risk. This volume provides an interesting and insightful analysis of those INTERNATIONAL LIBRARY OF POLICY ANALYSIS
contributions.” Professor B. Guy Peters, University of Pittsburgh (USA), and President, SERIES EDITORS:
International Public Policy Association IRIS GEVA-MAY & MICHAEL HOWLETT
IRIS GEVA-MAY & MICHAEL HOWLETT

OF POLICY ANALYSIS
INTERNATIONAL LIBRARY
Israel is considered a developed country yet both its security issues and frequently changing
demographic makeup set it apart and imply that its policy analysts must operate in a unique
environment and grapple with exceptional challenges. This volume, part of the successful
International Library of Policy Analysis series, brings together for the first time a comprehensive
study of policy analysis in Israel. A foreword by Yehezkel Dror discusses Israel’s paradoxical
history of policy analysis, and is followed by discussion of the different aspects of its policy
analysis by leading figures from both the Israeli public and academic spheres.
While Israeli policy analysis is in some respects unique, Israel also represents a broad category
of states that could be considered as policy analysis ‘late developers’. Hence, while Israeli policy
analysis is fascinating in and of itself, its study also holds important lessons for other countries.
Features of the ILPA series
POLICY ANALYSIS IN
• a systematic study of policy analysis systems by government and non-governmental actors
Edited by Gila Menahem and Amos Zehavi

POLICY ANALYSIS IN ISRAEL
• a history of the country’s policy analysis, empirical case studies and a comparative overview
• a key reference for research and teaching in comparative policy analysis and policy studies
Recent volumes published and forthcoming
Israel
• Policy analysis in Australia, edited by Brian Head and Kate Crowley (2015)
• Policy analysis in Japan, edited by Yukio Adachi, Sukehiro Hosono and Jun Iio (2015)
• Policy analysis in Taiwan, edited by Yu-Ying Kuo (2015)
• Policy analysis inthe Czech Republic, edited by Arnošt Veselý, Martin Nekola and
Eva M. Hejzlarová (2016)
GILA MENAHEM is an associate professor with a joint appointment in the departments of public policy
and sociology & anthropology at Tel Aviv University. Her areas of expertise are policy paradigms and policy
networks, water policy and higher education policy.
AMOS ZEHAVI is a senior lecturer with a joint appointment in the departments of political science and
public policy at Tel Aviv University. His areas of expertise are comparative public policy and welfare state
development.
PUBLIC POLICY / SOCIAL STUDIES
@policypress PolicyPress
www.policypress.co.uk
In association with
International Comparative Policy Analysis Forum

Edited by
and Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis Gila Menahem and Amos Zehavi
ISSN 2059-0326
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Policy Analysis in Israel

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International Library

Each volume includes a history of the country’s policy analysis which

Early volumes in the series will cover the following countries:

In association with the ICPA-Forum and Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis.

International Library of Policy Analysis, Vol 7

List of figures and tables vii

Introduction Policy analysis in Israel: a late developer’s story 1

Part Two: Policy analysis by the executive and the legislature

Part Three: Policy analysis in specific government units

Part Four: Policy analysis from the outside

Notes on the contributors

Nahum Ben-Elia is an independent policy analyst and strategic planner focused

15 books published in 12 languages, most recently Avant-Garde Politician: Leaders

Itzhak Galnoor is the Herbert Samuel Professor of Political Science (emeritus)

Iris Geva-May is a professor of public policy at the School of Public Affairs,

Anat Gofen is an assistant professor in the School of Public Policy at Hebrew

Hagai Katz is a lecturer in the Department of Business Administration at the

Jennifer Oser is an assistant professor in the Department of Politics and

Arie Rimmerman is Richard Crossman Professor of Social Welfare and Planning

Ira Sharkansky is professor emeritus of political science and public administration

Michal Soffer is a senior lecturer at the School of Social Work at University of

Amos Zehavi is a senior lecturer with a joint appointment in the Department

Personal knowledge based

Before 1967, Prime Minister Levi Eshkol publicly approved establishment of

University public policy schools

National Security Staff

Public policy teaching

As mentioned, Israeli academia was late in setting up a public policy programme.

RAND Israel Initiative

Economic and social policy

Establishment of the State of Israel was not the outcome of an independence

Lack of statehood tradition

Intense value cleavages

Vicious coalition politics

Israel’s cabinet-parliamentary political system is slowly evolving towards prime

Overall statecraft culture

The ultimate challenge: fuzzy grand-policy gambling

Policy analysis in Israel:

Different lessons could be deduced from explorations of Israeli policy analysis

Analysing Israeli policy analysis

analysis capacities indicated a change of course in the development of Israeli policy

Figure 0.1 Number of policy studies, Ministry of the Economy

Source: Ministry of Economy publications

Interestingly, discussions in the literature of policy analysis development

In sum, ‘outsider’ analysis could overstep its democratically legitimate bounds

Department of Education openly questioned whether department policy was

analysts – whether academics, civil servants, or think tank employees: even if in

In the foreword, Dror, based on the analysis of Israel’s circumstances and

government policy analysis, the government must encourage ministries to make

in-house analysis work in the Budget Department, inter-ministry committees

Gerschenkron, A (ed), 1962, Economic backwardness in historical perspective,

Policy analysis under intense pressures1

Israel’s cultural roots

The State Comptroller and policy analysis

be operating according to a model set by an earlier State Comptroller, Yitzhak

I hate, I despise your religious festivals; your assemblies are a stench to

If the typical product of a national Comptroller is the accuracy of financial record

Skipping over the more conventional and low-key Goldberg, it is difficult to

An economy that is wealthy but far from the wealthiest

Coalition governments, with ultra-orthodox parties permanent

political scientists, psychologists have been systematic in clarifying a variety of

Where does this leave policy analysis?

Israel is different, but not in all ways