224 (CHAPTER TEN
reckon that higher taxation is a smaller price to pay for their own health
and security than what they'd have to shell out on BUPA [private health
insurance—Ed.] improved antiburglary systems, a house inthe suburbs,
and 50 on. But however they figure those sums, inviting them to consider
the issue primarily in that framewor a pretense of common
interest, is a cop-out at the level of principle.
this pape.
Chapter Eleven
HOW TO DO POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY
1, Peorre tke ME, who have been trying to do philosophy for more
than forty years, do in due course learn, if they’re lucky, how to do what
they do learn how to d
although I've learned how to d
1, s0 far as I would guess, nobody
do philosophy, is that those of us
re we mow are that we're now selfishly relucta
2. But however all that may be, let me now give you some tips abo.
0 do philosophy, in no particular order. After I've given these p
nary tips about how to do philosophy in genera
about political philosophy in parti
3. My first piece of advice is that you should t
sible about exactly what you think you're
fan argument. To be more precise: when you pi
sce Figure 1}, try to be as clear as possible whether you think the argu-
opponent holds, and only in that way
the argument in quest
Editor is chapter
standing Oxford M.Phil
plans co sevse and pol226 ¢ CHAPTER ELEVEN
Decisively ‘Nondecisively
Supports my position Proves,
Auacks her position __Refutes
Prove
Refute
Fig. 1. Two-by-owo matrix that classifies considerations or arguments
your opponent, whether it refutes her po
‘or displays a weakness in it. And, analogous
consideration pinion favors
vors that position of yours oF deci
between the columns in Figure
of types of argument in philosophy, of, for that ms
f types of argument in philosophy and in everything
ot merely challenges ity
‘try to be clear whether a
ir own position merely fa-
rely establishes it. (See the difference
So we've now got a foutfold classifica-
a classifica-
4, Note that I said try to be clear about which box contains your argu-
rnot—be clear, the latter, then, if yo
be clear, and you wanted to follow
not try to be clear, for fear of violating the instr be clear. Lam
not saying that clarity is a necessary condition of anything worthwhile in
philosophy. Philosophy is « very hard subject, so hard that it can be very
hard to be clear about what I've suggested you try to be clear about, that
is, exactly what you're doing, exactly what the force of a consideration
that occurs to you is, Sometimes one senses that a consideration has some
sort of bearing on a controversy, without knowing eithcr to which row
and it is nevertheless worthwhile bringing
it may provoke a discussion
that leads to a clearer idea of the polemical significance of the consider-
ation, that s. One should aspire
for the sake of avoid-
dumb, or simpleminded. If, for example,
you 60 obviously mistaken that you cot
something, keep fe conclusion, which is
that they are missing something, or sceing something that isnt there, even
if they are the teacher. Some of the most successful philosophical inter-
ventions that F've witnessed have been a matter of pointing out that the
emperor's not wearing any clothes. This is a subject in which seasoned
HOWTO DO POLITICAL PHILOSOPEY 227
professionals can make huge mistakes, equivalent in size to a chemist
forgetting that molecules consist of atoms—which is not, of course, a
mistake that any chemist would ever make.
6. Let me now turn to political philosophy, and, in particular; to chat form
Here my first tip ip.that when
as we 50 in political philosophy, and we
tions, then there are three questions that we should not
hy that are in fact
often as they should be, to the det
rigor of argument within our di
ought to be brought abou
more of those questions with each other. Ozhers see that the qu
they take for granted that the answers to some
ce of them ace identical. They take for granted, for example,
ts business
n between question
the concept of what the state should do. Conversely, not all justice is ro be
achieved by the state: ox if you prefer, the very concept of justice does not
is ta be achieved by the state. Question
places a restriction, and question
‘whatever isto be brought about is to be brought about. And finally ques-
is not the same question as question is not the228 (CHAPTER ELEVEN
Consider, for example, the view associated especially with Harry
Frankfurt, but also, to a degree, with Joseph Raz, which says that equal-
ity isa false ideal and that what really matters is that everyone should
have enough.’ According to this view, many who are drawn to the ideal
of equality are drawn to it because they confuse the false desideratum of
equality with the true desideratum of sufficiency. The sufficiency view
isparages equality and says that what matters is not that people be
‘equal, but that everyone have enough. Enough for what?—well, there is
ry here, but it doesn’t matter for my present purposes. Never
as saying that economic justice is complete if everyone is assured a de-
it, and possibly quite high or is it an answer to question
which says that the responsibility of the state in economic justice
ends when everyone has enough; or
answer to question (i), one which say
tate ends with ensuring universal
particular may or may not be
guestion (ii), which asks what distributional states of affairs are no:
tively preferable to cach others, an says that certain
are all that count, and that equality is not even normatively profer
tld do, and how soci
say, distinct questions, and itis controversial w!
ions are. Some would say
business is justice, and others might say that its sole
business is something that they consider to be the sufficiency part of jus-
‘ice, and so on. People proceed as though these distinctions don’t have to
be made when they countetpose one principle to another without speci-
fying in which of the three contexts that I have distinguished they are
setting the competition between competing principles. Great masses of
literature ranging from the discussion of luck egalitarianism across to the
trolley problem fail to make the needed distinctions at pertinent points.
‘Take another example, the so-called leveling-down objection to egal
tarianism. The leveling-down objection says that itis a mistake to favor
ted as flatly as that, with no speci-
fication of who you are or of any wider frame in which the question is
‘See Frankfurt, “Equality as 2 Moral Ideal,” and Rav, The Morality of Freedom, chap-
ter9-—Ed]
HOW TO DO POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 29
Equal Dis Unequal Distribution
Abas 5 8
Bhas 5 6
Fig. 2. The Leveling-Down Objection
iemight
circum
stances where the equal 5/5 distribution and the unequal 8/6 distribution
in Figure 2 exhaust the feasible set, whereas, that is, it may be grotesque
1 the state to make everybody worse off, it does not follow that there is
1no injustice inthe 8/6 inequality, and, partly for that reason, it does not
follow that no one should seek to bring the 5/5
Let me try to give some color of plausibility to those judgments.
Imagine a peaceful anarchy, a state of nature with no state, in which
manna falls from heaven and gets shated equally because the sharets
think that’s the right way to deal with manna from heaven. Now sup-
pose that an extra piece of irremovable and unredistributable but de-
structi
going to make a big bonfire with it to which you're
ited, because it’s not fair it really sucks, for me to have more than
you guys do.’ ish, then you might
claim that the level
person, and I chink we should commend her for being one, and pethaps
reward her with the extra manna. Or even if we should not precisely
reward her with the extra manna (since that might contradict the very
principle of equality upon which she acted!
her have it. Justice can be mean and spiteful, but justice even
then: we shouldn't confuse different virtues. Portia was carefal not to
‘combine different virtues when she recommended that mercy scason
justice."
“Nonick himself said chat equality
hough be signally and consequent230 (CHAPTER ELEVEN
throw it away. Note, further, that if she does throw it away, that w
not be at anybody else’s expense.
Consider, now, a different example in which exera manna lands on ev-
Iso
exybody’s plot e's and only 5 om the plot of each
‘other person. uppose, farther, that do anything with
respect to whether the manna stays or not, and that if she destroys her
‘own, then everybody else's manna goes too.
is once again at no-
body's expense, but if she throws it away that will be at the expense of
hers. Now, nobody would deny that, in the original example, where she
gets extra and nobody else does, Jane has the right to throw her surplus
away, and I say that if she does throw it away, in that example, then she
shows an admirable devotion to justice. Bue one may question whether
she has the right to throw her surplus away in the second scenazio, on the
ground that Jane would thereby also rob that they
obodly else's expense. Partly for would say that if
any view, quite consistent with my judgment that the second and strongly
improving distribution is unfair,
Among the reasons that Ronald Dwor-
kin gives for opposing equality of welfare is that if we seek to make
‘welfare as equal as possible then we must reserve an enormous quan-
tity of resources for very handicapped people, such a large
should be able to be implemen
regulati
question
It is pertinent to commend, here, a breathtakingly simple phrase that
Derek Parfit has introduced for marking a distinction that is now, to the
general profit, made more often in discussions about principles th
«d through a reasonable stare
there is, in that argument, a conflation of question (i
HOW TO DO POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 231
tory and desiderata of principle that are overrideable but whose presence
te Of affairs, in Parfit’s great phrase for that,
some circumstances some people should lose even
the egalitarian can say that she would not level down, because
isn’t everything, but nevertheless maintain that equal
way betcer than its absence: something of value is los
unfairness, and therefore a kind of i ‘ome have more than
others through no relevant fault or choice of anyone. The leveling- With ehanks to Alan Ryae for excellent crtcioms ofa forerunner draft”