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Things Fall Apart: Dictatorships, Development, and

Democracy in Africa

Berhanu Nega & Geoff Schneider

To cite this article: Berhanu Nega & Geoff Schneider (2012) Things Fall Apart: Dictatorships,
Development, and Democracy in Africa, Journal of Economic Issues, 46:2, 371-382, DOI:
10.2753/JEI0021-3624460212

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 JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC ISSUES
Vol. XLV I No. 2 June 2012
ISSN 0021−3624/2012 $9.50 + 0.00
DOI 10.2753/JEI0021-3624460212

Things Fall Apart: Dictatorships,

Development, and Democracy in Africa

Berhanu Nega and Geoff Schneider

Abstract: Recent events in Africa provide evidence of the failure of dictatorships to

meet the needs of citizens and serve to debunk a number of development theory
assumptions: that democratization is culturally determined, that democratization
will follow economic development, and that dictatorships tend to produce durable,
stable development. Therefore, the attempt to achieve development without
democratization is risky and potentially very costly. We argue that dictatorship in
Africa serves a function akin to Myrdal’s backwash effects, thwarting economic
progress in a cumulative and circular way, and that democratization must become a
necessary criterion of engagement with African countries.

Keywords: aid conditionality, Arab Spring, democracy, dictatorship, Myrdal

JEL Classification Codes: H1, O200, O550

Recent events in Africa provide stunning evidence of the failure of dictatorships to

meet the needs of citizens, and they also serve to debunk a number of assumptions of
development theory and policy. The assumption that democratization is culturally
determined and Western is shown to be meaningless. The assumption that
democratization will follow economic development (modernization theory) is also
shown to be vacuous. And, the assumption that dictatorships can produce durable
development is undermined by the inbuilt instability in dictatorships that can lead to
a complete breakdown of society. Therefore, the attempt to achieve development
without democratization is extremely risky and potentially very costly. Indeed, the
events of the Arab Spring, promising though they may be in terms of freedom and
unleashing human potential, have come with a substantial cost in human life and lost
production. If the rest of Africa is to minimize this cost, an early and decisive
intervention on the side of genuine democratization is crucial.

Berhanu Nega is an associate professor and Geoff Schneider is a professor in the Department of Economics at Bucknell
University. This paper was presented at the annual meeting of the Association for Evolutionary Economics, January 6-
8, 2012 in Chicago.
371
©2012, Journal of Economic Issues / Association for Evolutionary Economics
372 Berhanu Nega and Geoff Schneider

Using evidence from the countries of sub-Saharan Africa and the countries
involved in the Arab Spring, we argue that dictatorship in Africa serves a function
akin to Myrdal’s backwash effects, thwarting economic progress in a cumulative and
circular way. Dictatorships do not develop the types of institutions necessary for broad
-based development. Instead, they develop clientelistic, kleptocratic institutions
designed to enrich supporters, buy off just enough of the populace, and shore up their
power base. Unfortunately, the institutions established under dictatorships reinforce
backwash effects, destroying civil society and productive institutions while shoring up
corrupt and unproductive ones. The extensive and expensive security apparatus
primarily designed to repress potential dissent within the country and to extend the
life of the dictatorship is but one example of a costly and development retarding
institution. Even more unfortunately, as is readily apparent from the Arab Spring, the
institutions established by dictators are extremely difficult to displace, especially when
the tenure of the dictatorship is long. The displacement comes with a huge cost in
human life and foregone production, and it subsequently requires a country to create
an entirely new set of institutions in order to develop its economy in a more broad-
based manner. Given that events of the Arab Spring have exposed dictatorships in
Africa as destructive and as damaging to economic development, we argue that
democratization must become a necessary criterion of engagement with African
countries to avoid repeating past mistakes.

Debunking Modernization Theory

For more than 50 years, some Western theorists argued that democratization is
culturally determined and Western in nature and that democratization follows
development and is therefore the purview of rich countries. A number of theorists
disputed these ideas (Acemoglu et al. 2009; Barber 2008), but the debate was
unresolved. However, the events of the Arab Spring appear to have resolved this
debate once and for all, and modernization theory has been found wanting.
For example, Huntington (1968, 1991a, 1991b) offered a cultural explanation
for the lack of democratization in Arab countries, blaming Islamic precepts. Clearly,
the fact that a number of Arab countries are now experiencing democratic revolutions
while many others are seeing democratic reforms puts to rest the notion that specific
cultures are inherently resistant to democracy. Similarly, scholars promoting
Modernization Theory argued that economic development gives a nation a greater
chance of obtaining and sustaining democracy (Huntington 1968; Inglehart
and Welzel 2009; Lipset 1959). The Arab Spring provides a major challenge to this
theory. According to the World Bank classification system, Yemen, Syria and Egypt
are lower-middle-income countries, while Libya and Tunisia are upper-middle-income
countries and Bahrain is a high-income country.1 Yemen, with a GDP per capita (PPP)
of $2,606 in 2010, ranks in the poorest 25% of economies in the world while Libya,
with a per capita GDP of $13,846 in 2010, ranks in the richest 35%.2 The countries
engaged in the democratic movements of Arab Spring are neither the wealthiest nor
the poorest countries in the world, and there is no clear connection between
 Things Fall Apart 373

democratic uprisings and economic development among Arab Spring countries.

Instead, the commonalities include the presence of a large, often educated, disaffected
youth population with high unemployment rates and poor prospects, and a
dictatorship that can no longer deliver economic well-being in exchange for human
rights.
While Modernization Theory was challenged by many scholars even prior to the
Arab Spring, its influence in shaping Western foreign policy in relation to developing
countries was substantial. The foreign policy position that emerged out of this
thinking was that democratization could not be forced because developing countries
did not have the institutions or the constituency for meaningful democratization.
Rather than pushing dictatorships to democratize, the West worked with
authoritarian regimes to try to build the necessary institutions and help develop their
economies so that the conditions for democratization could be met in the future.
Implicitly, dictatorships were seen as useful vehicles for development until a country
was sufficiently wealthy and prepared for democracy. This argument conveniently
provided support for Western security interests, allowing them to support dictators
who were seen as bulwarks in the war on terrorism. This position too has been
rendered untenable by the events unfolding in the Arab Spring.

Dictatorships and Backwash Effects

Although one can imagine a situation in which a benevolent dictator could facilitate
economic development in a particular country for a limited duration, the experiences
in Africa expose the futility of this approach. Dictatorships in Africa have not
developed the type of institutions necessary for broad-based development. Instead,
they create clientelistic relationships that reinforce backwash effects.
According to Myrdal (1958), a particular region may experience “backwash
effects” such as brain drain, capital flight, few linkages, and declining terms of trade
that reinforce its underdevelopment in a cumulative and causal fashion. Myrdal notes
that backwash effects are exacerbated by government inefficiencies, including
inadequate provision of health care, education and infrastructure. Corrupt autocrats
who undermine the provision of public goods contribute directly to the vicious circle
of cumulative causality. Furthermore, corruption and the capricious nature of
autocratic regimes in Africa contribute directly to brain drain and capital flight,
augmenting existing backwash effects.
The ongoing existence of corrupt, autocratic regimes in Africa is well-established
fact. Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) demonstrated that dictatorships in Africa and
elsewhere who primarily answer only to a small group of elites, especially the army and
the judiciary, have a direct incentive to establish patronage systems that preserve their
coalition, usually at the expense of broad-based development. This relationship is
stable as long as the dictator can continue delivering to its elite supporters.
Unfortunately, it is much easier for kleptocracies to extract revenues from the existing
economy to support their patronage systems than to create new, internationally
374 Berhanu Nega and Geoff Schneider

competitive industries. The debilitating effects of dictatorships on development in the

African case can be illustrated with the notorious case of capital flight from Africa.
According to a recent study by Global Financial Integrity (Kar and Cartwright-
Smith 2010; Kar and Curcio 2011) total illicit financial flows out of Africa from 2000
to 2008 were 448.4 billion in 2004 dollars.3 In 2009 alone, the illicit outflow is
estimated at about $59 billion.4 In comparison, the Official Development Assistance
(ODA) to all African countries in 2009 was about $47.7 billion.5 While there are
different reasons pertaining to individual countries for such massive transfers of
desperately needed capital from the continent, for the region as a whole the factors
that directly relate to lack of accountable governance by way of “bribery, theft,
kickbacks and tax evasions,” which the Change in External Debt (CED) method
captures, account for 66.3% of the total capital outflow while the remaining is related
to trade mispricing, which is captured by the Gross Excluding Reversals (GER)
method.6
A closer look at the data for Africa confirms the view that lack of democratic
accountability is the primary source of capital flight. As Table 1 below shows, if we
rank the top ten African countries by the amount of illicit capital transfers from 2000
to 2008 as a proportion of their 2008 GDP, the top ten countries account for over
297.7 billion dollars or 66% of all the continental capital outflows during this period.
Furthermore all ten countries are ruled by authoritarian regimes with little or no
democratic accountability. According to Freedom House, seven of the ten countries
are designated as “not free” while three of the countries are “partly free” where
corruption and absence of rule of law are prevalent.7 The argument that foreign aid to
dictatorships could possibly lead to development by way of building “institutional
capacity” in these countries becomes even more vacuous when we consider that these
top perpetrators of capital flight include known darlings of the aid community, such
as Ethiopia, the top foreign aid recipient in the continent in 2009. Ethiopia is
sometimes offered as an example of the “authoritarian development model” by
advocates in the aid industry. But, as the data in Table 1 show, corruption and
instability has significantly eroded the country’s capital base and its development
potential along with it. As one of the authors of the Global Financial Integrity report
aptly stated in a recent blog post (Freitas 2011):

Ethiopia is one of the poorest countries on earth. Plagued by famine, war,

and political oppression, 38.9% of Ethiopians live in poverty, and
life expectancy in 2009 was just 58 years. In 2008, Ethiopia received
US$829 million in official development assistance, but this was swamped
by the massive illicit outflows. The scope of Ethiopia’s capital flight is so
severe that our conservative US$3.26 billion estimate [for 2009] greatly
exceeds the US$2 billion value of Ethiopia’s total exports in 2009. The
people of Ethiopia are being bled dry. No matter how hard they try to fight
their way out of absolute destitution and poverty, they will be swimming
upstream against the current of illicit capital leakage.

The financial and economic cost of dictatorship is, indeed, extremely high.
Table 1. Illicit Capital Outflows of Top 10 African Countries (Ranked by Illicit Flows as a % of GDP)

Country Illicit Total 2000– GDP per

(ranked by illicit outflow, 2008, (Millions of GDP 2008 capita 2008 Illicit total, % of ODA total 2000– Level of Freedom
as a % of GDP) 2004 $)1 (Millions of $)2 ($)2 2008 GDP 2008 (Millions of $)3 (2011)4
Congo Republic 11,915.9 11,789 3,073 101% 2,635.68 Not Free
Zimbabwe 4,198.8 4,416 355 95% 2,651.47 Not Free
Nigeria 169,871 207,118 1,375 82% 22,615.92 Partly Free
Madagascar 4,306.6 9,395 481 46% 6,280.87 Partly Free
Cote D'Ivoire 10,717.5 23,414 1,233 46% 3,154.06 Not Free
Gabon 5,713.8 14,533 10,020 39% 323.86 Not Free
Zambia 5,120.4 14,641 1,183 35% 8,827.24 Partly Free
Egypt 53,268.9 162,836 2,079 33% 10,626.51 Not Free
Ethiopia 8,487 26,642 335 32% 16,373.80 Not Free
Angola 24,058.1 84,179 4,667 29% 3,831.71 Not Free
Total, Top Ten
African Countries 297,658
Africa Total 448,431.3
Top Ten, Proportion
of Africa Total 0.66

1. Source: Kar and Cartwright-Smith 2010.

2. Source: WB data. Available at http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD. Accessed December 12, 2011.
3. Source: OECD. Available at http://stats.oecd.org/qwids/. Accessed December 12, 2011.
4. Source: Freedom house, Freedom in the World, 2011. Available at ww.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=363&year=2011&country=8044. Accessed
December 10, 2011.
375
376 Berhanu Nega and Geoff Schneider

Also problematic is the extent to which dictatorships undermine support for

democracy itself. “[R]egimes have been remarkably effective in appropriating
discourses of democracy, in claiming democracy’s mantle, and in abusing corrupt
electoral systems to claim democratic legitimacy. . . . Democracy itself is seen as little
more than a cover for corrupt, authoritarian politics as usual” (Heydemann 2010, 7-
8). Heydemann highlights what may be considered an additional backwash effect: The
undemocratic nature of autocratic regimes operating under the banner of democracy
is undermining support for legitimate democracy, despite the fact that democracy
could lead to a substantial improvement in economic development as compared with
corrupt dictatorships.
An added problem is the fact that the hardships imposed by dictators on the
populace retard the development of modern institutional arrangements. Myrdal
observed that the combined backwash effects fostered by dictators reinforce “the more
primitive variants of religion. . . . Their entire systems of valuations would take on
such an imprint of poverty and backwardness that they would become even less
susceptible to the experimental and ambitious aspirations of a developing
society” (Myrdal 1958, 30). The recent electoral success of the Salafists and the
Muslim Brotherhood can be seen as evidence of the extent to which poor Egyptians
are clinging to religion in a turbulent time, on the one hand, and the kinds of illiberal
political institutions tolerated by dictatorships, which find themselves in an
opportune place to claim power when dictatorships crumble. By shoring up
ceremonial institutions and destroying technological institutions, to use Ayres’s
(1978) schema, dictators are an essential contributor to the backwash effects that
developing countries experience, and their effect is likely to live on long after they are
gone.

Western Aid and Institutional Rigidity

One must also consider the role that Western aid has played in this unfolding
scenario. Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003, 478) establish convincingly that “aid
benefits less democratic recipients in their quest to hold onto office,” especially in
Africa. It is worth focusing on Egypt and Tunisia, the two countries involved in the
Arab Spring that are furthest along the path to democracy, to consider how aid has
affected the institutional makeup of each country.
In Egypt, “the survival of Mubarak’s regime was . . . aided by the support
conferred to it by Western governments. Both the EU and the U.S. were very
cautious, moderate and inconsistent in advancing political reform in Egypt, fearing
that this would destabilize the country and therefore, their vital interests in the
region” (Paciello 2011a, 5). Even economic liberalization “reforms” served to further
entrench the regime. Mubarak was able to keep economic sectors important to the
military and regime supporters untouched, while “the regime used economic
liberalization to re-distribute privileges to regime supporters and co-opt important
segments of the private sector, thus reinforcing its social basis. . . . Privatization . . .
benefited only men with connections to Egyptian politicians and the military
 Things Fall Apart 377

establishment” (Paciello 2011a, 5). However, economic reforms did not bring the
expected increase in private investment, and there were sharp declines in the quality
of education, health services and welfare provisions. Ironically, Western “aid”
succeeded in democratizing Egypt because it failed so completely: by reinforcing the
power of a corrupt regime and undermining the conditions of much of the Egyptian
population, the West helped to create ripe conditions for revolution. Similarly, in
Tunisia, “[e]conomic reforms were used primarily to redistribute privileges to the
families of the president and his wife, to protect their vested interests, and to
reinforce the regime’s control over the private sector” (Paciello 2011b, 7). By shoring
up dictatorships for so long, the West seems to contribute unwittingly to their
eventual fall and their replacement by potentially illiberal forces.
Unfortunately, despite the dramatic changes of the last year, the institutions that
propped up the corrupt dictatorships are still largely present. In Egypt, the Supreme
Military Council, which will run the country until a new constitution is established
and which will continue to wield substantial power thereafter, “is drawn from men
who supported Mubarak’s regime until his departure and have little interest in giving
up their economic and political powers” (Paciello 2011a, 12). Local government, the
administration, the judiciary, the media, and other major institutions all remain in
the same hands, while civil society forces are poorly developed. In Tunisia, “the old
oligarchy still permeates the state apparatus, occupying key positions in the
administration, the Interior Ministry, the media, the judiciary, and so on” (Paciello
2011b, 12). These problems are exacerbated by the ties between the previous regime
and foreign entrepreneurs in Tunisia (Paciello 2011b, 20). As is typically the case
when a regime has an insecure grip on power, dictators in Egypt and Tunisia sought
to destroy or constrain civil society forces that were perceived as a threat. Libya has
perhaps the best chance to develop a fresh set of non-corrupt institutions in the wake
of its civil war due to the destruction of many of the vestiges of the old regime. But it
also paid the highest cost.

The Huge Cost of the Arab Spring

The human and economic costs of the Arab Spring are substantial and growing. First,
as Table 2 indicates, there has been a substantial loss of human life in all countries.
Table 3 lists some of the major economic costs.8 These costs do not include losses to
human life, infrastructure damage and business and foreign direct investment losses.
Table 4 illustrates some of the significant expenditures that autocratic regimes are
undertaking to buy the loyalty of the populace in the face of fears that the democracy
virus might spread. Despite the substantial promise for the future, we cannot ignore
the massive price that these countries paid to try to implement democracy, and the
substantial challenges that still remain. Surely there must be a better way to establish
democracy. Even based on this rudimentary data, however, it is clear that the cost of
transition is bound to be larger the higher the intensity of the conflict, which in turn
is a function of the relative brutality of the regime in power. The more peaceful and
short the transition, the lower the financial cost. As seen in Tunisia and Egypt, the
378 Berhanu Nega and Geoff Schneider

more the pressure from “friendly” countries, the shorter and more peaceful the
transition and its cost. However, none of these costs come close to the extremely high
cost incurred by dictatorships over their long tenure in power.

Table 2. Death Toll from the Arab Spring

Estimated Death
Country Status Income Level1 Toll2
Libya Regime Toppled upper-middle 13,000-30,000
Egypt Regime Toppled lower-middle 900
Tunisia Regime Toppled upper-middle 300
Syria Ongoing Revolution lower-middle 3,500
Yemen Ongoing Revolution lower-middle 250
Bahrain Uprising Crushed high 30

1. Source: World Bank data. Available at http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-classifications/

country-and-lending-groups#MENA. Accessed December 5, 2011.
2. Source: US News and World Report. 2011. “The Death Toll of ‘Arab Spring.’” Available at
www.usnews.com/news/slideshows/death-toll-of-arab-spring?s_cid=related-links:TOP. Accessed
December 5, 2011.

Table 3. A Preliminary Estimate of the Cost of the Arab Spring

Cost to Cost of
Cost to Public public
GDP GDP Cost as Finance Government finance as %
(billions (billions of % of (billions of revenue of Govt.
Country of US$)1 US$)2 GDP US$)2 (2010)3 revenue
Libya 62.36 7.67 12.30 6.49 42.04 15.44
Syria 59.1 6.07 10.27 21.22 12.48 170.03
Egypt 218.9 4.27 1.95 5.52 47.66 11.58
Tunisia 44.29 2.03 4.58 0.49 10.29 4.76
Bahrain 20.56 0.39 1.90 0.69 5.786 11.93
Yemen 26.37 0.12 0.46 0.86 8.861 9.71

1. Source: World Bank. Available at http://data.worldbank.org/sites/default/files/gdp.pdf. Accessed

Nov. 30, 2011.
2. Source: Middlebrook et al. 2011.
3. Source: Available at www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sy.html. Accessed
Nov. 30, 2011.
 Things Fall Apart 379

Table 4. New Spending Measures in Arab Countries to Preserve the Status Quo,
2011

Import cover
Budget Balance, (foreign exchange
% of 2010 GDP reserves), months
Algeria $156bn on new infrastructure; tax cuts on -3.5 38.0
sugar
Bahrain $100m to families; proposal for $2,500 for -0.1 3.6
each family
Jordan Salary increase for civil servants, military; -8.4 9.2
tax cuts on fuel and food; more money
to poor
Kuwait $4,000 for each citizen; free food for 14 +24.4 9.4
months
Libya $450 for each family; 150% wage increase +8.9 42.5
for some public-sector workers;
abolition of food taxes and customs
duties
Morocco Compensation system for wheat importers -4.3 7.1
Oman Minimum-wage increase from $364 to +1.4 5.9
$520 per month; 50,000 new
government jobs; monthly stipend of
$390 for job seekers
Saudi Arabia 15% pay increase for public-sector +6.5 34.2
workers; unemployment benefits,
housing subsidies
Syria Tax cut on coffee and sugar; reduced -4.5 11.8
customs duties on food; more money
to poor; increase wages and heating
allowances for civil service
Tunisia Increased welfare spending; food-price -5.0 5.3
subsidy increases
Yemen Increased welfare spending -5.1 6.5

Source: Economist 2011.

At this point, given the huge human and economic cost of revolutionary
democratization, and given the uneven and unfinished nature of the democratic
project in the countries involved in the Arab Spring, one must ask if it is finally time
to implement formal, coordinated aid conditionality requiring steady progress on
implementing real democracy. Structuring aid engagement such that recipient
countries must make concrete, verifiable steps toward democracy might help to avoid
the huge costs incurred during revolutionary democratization while simultaneously
380 Berhanu Nega and Geoff Schneider

fostering the development of robust civil society institutions that are essential for
development. Unfortunately, “[t]o date, no Western government has been willing to
use conditionality as a means for advancing democratic change” (Heydemann 2010,
6). This is no longer acceptable both as a moral issue and because it is a very costly
and essentially an anti-development proposition.

Notes

1. Source: World Bank. Available at http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-classifications/country-

and-lending-groups#MENA. Accessed December 5, 2011.
2. Source: International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database. Available at
www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2011/02/weodata/index.aspx. Accessed December 4, 2011.
3. Authors’ calculation from Kar and Cartwright-Smith 2010, Table 4, 36.
4. According to these reports, this is a conservative estimate using the Change in External Debt and
Gross Excluding Reversals methodology on the basis of official statistics, excluding certain known
unrecorded capital transfers through “smuggling, same-invoice faking, and hawala-style swap
transactions” and other factors. According to Kar and Cartwright-Smith (2010, 16), the estimated
illicit outflow owing to same-invoice faking in Africa alone is estimated at $207.5 billion in the 2000
to 2008 period. The CED method uses the World Bank Residual model to measure unrecorded
changes in external debt. The GER method measures Gross Excluding Reversals to estimate trade
mispricing. For a methodological discussion see Kar and Curcio (2011, 4-7) and Kar and Cartwright-
Smith (2010, 7-9).
5. Source: Organization for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD). Available at http://
stats.oecd.org/qwids/. Accessed December 12, 2011.
6. See footnote 4 above for brief descriptions of the CED and GER methods.
7. According to Freedom House (2011), “partly free” countries are characterized by some restrictions
on political rights and civil liberties, often in a context of corruption, weak rule of law, ethnic strife,
or civil war. In a “Not Free” country, basic political rights are absent, and basic civil liberties are
widely and systematically denied.
8. Middlebrook et al. (2011) calculated the economic impact of the Arab Spring using the difference
between the projected GDP for 2011 (published by the IMF in October 2010) and actual GDP
published in September 2011.

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