Oligarchs, State Power and Mass Opinion

Tigran Babajan
Linnaeus University Dissertations

No 313/2018
Tigran Babajan
– A Study of the Role of Oligarchs in Post-Soviet Pseudo-democracies

Oligarchs, State Power and Mass Opinion
Oligarchs, State Power
and Mass Opinion
Lnu.se
ISBN: 978-91-88761-39-2 (print), 978-91-88761-40-8 (pdf )
linnaeus university press

Oligarchs, State Power
and Mass Opinion
No 313/2018
O LIGARCHS , S TATE P OWER

AND M ASS O PINION
– A Study of the Role of Oligarchs in Post-Soviet
Pseudo-democracies
T IGRAN B ABAJAN
LINNAEUS UNIVERSITY PRESS

Oligarchs, State Power and Mass Opinion – A Study of the Role of
Oligarchs in Post-Soviet Pseudo-democracies
Doctoral Dissertation, Department of Political Science, Linnaeus University,
Växjö, 2018
ISBN: 978-91-88761-39-2 (print), 978-91-88761-40-8 (pdf).

Published by: Linnaeus University Press, 351 95 Växjö
Printed by: DanagårdLiTHO, 2018
Abstract
Babajan, Tigran (2018). Oligarchs, State Power and Mass Opinion – A Study of the
Role of Oligarchs in Post-Soviet Pseudo-democracies, Linnaeus University
Dissertations No 313/2018, ISBN: 978-91-88761-39-2 (print), 978-91-88761-
40-8 (pdf). Written in English.
This thesis attempts to understand the role of oligarchs in post-Soviet pseudo-
democratic regime trajectories. The two dominant, competing streams of prior work
have emphasized either the importance of state power or that of mass opinion in
these processes in order to explain why some regimes successfully maintain their
grip on power, while others make gradual steps towards democratization. However,
the role of oligarchs has been largely overlooked; a gap filled by this study. It
employs both widely accepted, as well as unique data to approach the research
problem. The work presented in this thesis involves large-N surveys, analyses of
media reports and an in-depth case study. There are three key findings:
First, for an overwhelming majority of citizens in post-Soviet pseudo-democracies,
oligarchs’ actual, negative influence on the political system as well as popular
perceptions of unfair wealth concentration are conducive to beliefs that a non-
democratic regime is what is needed in order to set things right in their country.
Second, the findings from Armenia, Georgia, Russia and Ukraine demonstrate that
four politically motivated, rival oligarchs focused on enhancing their reputation and
organizational capacity in their struggles for power. In all four countries, regimes
used their state power to counter the rival oligarchs. Evidence from Armenia and
Russia provides a nuanced understanding of these interactions. In particular,
incumbents in these countries used their state power to manipulate public opinion
in order to damage the reputation and credibility of the rival oligarchs. This thesis
suggests that the main regime leaders do so in order to portray themselves as more
trustworthy than their oligarch rivals.
Third, a survey analysis of Kyiv university students shows that they view most
oligarchs as corrupt and harmful to their political system. According to the survey
results, oligarchs’ concentration of wealth appears to disqualify them from being
legitimate political players. Yet, further evidence from this thesis suggests that
people differentiate between oligarchs as a group and as individuals, which allows
at least some oligarchs to enhance their reputation by using their vast material
wealth. I conclude this thesis by discussing possible policy and societal implication
of the results and by setting out some new venues of future research.
Keywords: oligarchs; post-Soviet pseudo-democracies; state power abuse; mass

opinion
Acknowledgments
I would like to express my special appreciation and thanks to my advisors
Staffan Andersson, Torbjörn Bergman and Karl Loxbo. I am thankful for your
guidance, encouraging of my research and dedication.
I would also like to express my sincere thanks to my fellow PhD students and
friends at Linnaeus University for their true friendship and professional
collaboration. Sara Fransson, Mattias Gunnarsson and Emma Ricknell—
thank you for inspiring me to strive towards my goal!
A special word of thanks also goes to Thomas Sedelius, Magnus Hagevi, Per
Strömblad, Martin Nilsson, Johanna Jormfeldt, Stefan Höjelid, Helena
Ekelund and Daniel Silander—thank you for all your professional advices and
comments on my drafts!
Greatest appreciation is due to Linnaeus University, Helge Ax:son Johnsons

stiftelse and the Swedish Network for European Studies in Political Science
(SNES) for making my research possible through awards to undergo advanced
method studies in Ann Arbor and to conduct fieldwork in Ukraine.
A very special gratitude goes out to my family. Words cannot express how
grateful I am to my parents for all of the sacrifices they have made on my
behalf. I am also profoundly thankful to my two younger brothers for offering
me great support and always willing to be beside me. At the end, I would like
to express appreciation to my life partner Hemik and my son Areg for
spending sleepless nights with me and being my support in the moments when
no one else was around.
Stockholm, February 2018

Tigran Babajan
Table of Contents
Chapter one. Introduction: Oligarchs and pseudo-democratic regimes ................ 7

Aim and research questions .......................................................................... 10
A brief background on post-Soviet pseudo-democracies .............................. 13
Overview of the thesis................................................................................... 18
Chapter two: Setting the stage for the thesis ...................................................... 19
Who is an oligarch?....................................................................................... 19
What is a pseudo-democratic regime? .......................................................... 22
What this thesis refers to by regime trajectories ........................................... 24
Previous literature ......................................................................................... 27
Oligarchs and pseudo-democratic regime trajectories ............................. 27
Explanations for different regime trajectories in pseudo-democracies .... 29
The analytical framework and hypotheses .................................................... 36
The relationship between oligarchs, their political power and popular
support for democracy in principle .......................................................... 37
How key, rival oligarchs perform their bid for power against the ruling
leadership by emulating the regime’s state power and efforts to
manipulate mass opinion ......................................................................... 40
Chapter three: Research design, method, material and operationalization of
hypotheses .......................................................................................................... 47
Mixed-method research design ..................................................................... 47
First empirical chapter: Case selection, research material,
operationalization of hypotheses and method ............................................... 50
Second empirical chapter: Case selection, research material,
operationalization of hypotheses and method ............................................... 55
Third empirical chapter: Case selection, research material,
operationalization of key variables and method ............................................ 61
Chapter four: Oligarchs and normative support for democracy ......................... 67
Support for democracy in post-Soviet pseudo-democracies over time ......... 67
A general description of post-Soviet oligarchs as a group ............................ 69
Political inequality to the benefit of oligarchs, unfair wealth distribution
and normative support for democracy........................................................... 72
Control variables...................................................................................... 72
Model ....................................................................................................... 73
Results ..................................................................................................... 74
Robustness checks ................................................................................... 82
Summary of the results ............................................................................ 85
Appendix ................................................................................................. 86
Chapter five: Four oligarchs and their quest for power in four pseudo-
democracies ........................................................................................................ 99
A description of four post-Soviet pseudo-democracies .............................. 101
Armenia ................................................................................................. 101
Georgia .................................................................................................. 104
Russia .................................................................................................... 106
Ukraine .................................................................................................. 108
Four oligarchs and their political struggle against the incumbent regime .. 111
Gagik Tsarukyan in Armenia ................................................................ 112
Bidzina Ivanishvili in Georgia ............................................................... 117
Mikhail Prokhorov in Russia ................................................................. 120
Petro Poroshenko in Ukraine ................................................................. 125
Summary and a comparative analysis of the results .............................. 130
Appendix ............................................................................................... 133
Chapter six. Oligarchs, mass opinion and struggles for political ascendancy
during two color revolutions in Ukraine .......................................................... 135
Struggles for power and mass opinion about the oligarchs in Ukraine ....... 137
Ukrainian politics and oligarchs during the 2004 Orange Revolution .. 137
Ukrainian politics and oligarchs during and after the 2014 Euromaidan
Revolution................................................................................................... 140
Mapping out student attitudes towards oligarchs in Ukraine ...................... 143
The determinants of support for oligarchs among Ukrainian students ....... 148
Summary of the results ............................................................................... 153
Appendix..................................................................................................... 156
Questionnaire......................................................................................... 156
Chapter seven. Conclusions: Oligarchs, state power and mass opinion ........... 163
Results......................................................................................................... 164
Discussion of the results and the implication of the findings ..................... 168
Areas for future research............................................................................. 173
References ........................................................................................................ 175
Table of Figures
Figure A. Level of democracy (Freedom House/Polity) ................................. 14

Figure B. GDP per capita (current prices in USD) .......................................... 16
Figure C. Economic (income) inequality in post-Soviet pseudo-democracies 17
Figure D. Mean democracy approval .............................................................. 68
Figure E. The level of political inequality to the benefit of oligarchs in five
post-Soviet pseudo-democracies ..................................................................... 74
Figure F. The average (median) level of perceived unfair distribution of
wealth in five post-Soviet pseudo-democracies .............................................. 75
Figure G. Random variation of normative democratic support in post-Soviet
pseudo-democracies ........................................................................................ 81
Figure H. Predicted effects of political inequality on normative support for
democracy ....................................................................................................... 86
Figure I. Predicted effects of attitudes about unfair wealth distribution on
normative support for democracy .................................................................... 87
Figure J. Predicted interaction effects of political inequality and attitudes
about unfair wealth distribution on normative support for democracy ........... 88
Figure K. The quality of the electoral process and democratic rights in
Armenia, Georgia, Russia and Ukraine since 2010 ....................................... 100
Figure L. Tsarukyan’s path to exiting politics ............................................... 112
Figure M. Ivanishvili’s successful ascent to power ....................................... 117
Figure N. Prokhorov’s path to withdrawing from politics ............................ 120
Figure O. Poroshenko’s successful way to becoming the president of Ukraine
....................................................................................................................... 125
Figure P. Comparison of the struggle for power by the four oligarchs ......... 131
Table of Tables
Table 1. Coding scheme for measuring relevant indicators ............................ 58

Table 2. Key variables from the Kyiv university student survey .................... 63
Table 3. Having a democratic political system ............................................... 76
Table 4. Having a strong leader....................................................................... 76
Table 5. The determinants of normative support for democracy..................... 78
Table 6. The determinants of normative support for democracy. Robustness
checks .............................................................................................................. 83
Table 7. The variables and summary statistics ................................................ 89
Table 8. Question wordings and original scales of WVS variables ................ 90
Table 9. Pairwise correlations between the dependent and independent
variables .......................................................................................................... 97
Table 10. Countries and years included in the analysis ................................... 98
Table 11. Reliability check for coding of a key variable............................... 133
Table 12. Attitudes towards oligarchs as a group and individuals ................ 143
Table 13. Attitudes about the political participation of the oligarchs (in %) 145
Table 14. Determinants of student opinion about the oligarchs as a group and
individuals ..................................................................................................... 148
Table 15. Summary statistics of the variables in the Kyiv university student
survey ............................................................................................................ 160
Chapter one. Introduction: Oligarchs
and pseudo-democratic regimes
The overall topic of interest for this thesis is how oligarchs 1 influence regime
survival or drifts to democratization in post-Soviet pseudo-democracies. Prior
research on the importance of oligarchs for regime trajectories 2 is scant, but
burgeoning. This literature has offered contradictory findings about the role of
oligarchs in these processes. 3 While one branch of this literature has
maintained that oligarchs enable or deliberately do not obstruct pseudo-
democratic regimes to maintain their grip on power (Zudin, 2000; Kuzio,
2003; Shlapentokh, 2004; Matuszak, 2012; Junisbai, 2012: 898), another
stream of research has stressed that oligarchs both help to overturn pseudo-
democracies (Radnitz, 2006b, 2010, 2012; Areshidze, 2007; Pleines, 2009)
and enable their countries to take gradual, but important steps towards
democratization (Åslund, 2008, 2009). Yet and as will be clarified in more
detail subsequently, two dominant explanations in the literature trying to
understand these processes and differing regime trajectories in the post-Soviet
context of pseudo-democracies put emphasis either on mass opinion about the
regime and its leader or state power concentration in the hands of the regime.
Surprisingly, the literature on the role of oligarchs has largely overlooked the
need to study the importance of oligarchs in the framework of these two
dominant explanations. This inattention is unfortunate because oligarchs have
been powerful players in the post-Soviet context and have played a key role,
for instance, in ousting pseudo-democratic regimes by force in connection
1
By oligarchs, I refer to very wealthy businesspersons that hold a substantial economic and political
sway over many key sectors in a society. Oligarchs are businesspersons who have a huge wealth that
can be instantly parlayed into substantial political power. I discuss previous definitions of an oligarch
in more detail in the chapter that follows this introduction.
2
By this term, this thesis refers primarily to successful maintenance of pseudo-democratic status quo
or gradual drifts towards democratization. For further discussion of this concept, see subsequent
chapter.
3
See Junisbai (2012: 898) for an engaging account of this literature.
7
with popular uprisings (Radnitz, 2006a, 2010). In this regard, focusing more
closely on the role of oligarchs is also justified due to the more recent
evidence in prior work suggesting that political changes towards
democratization follow partly from forcing pseudo-democratic leaders out of
power, who, in most cases, desperately cling to it at whatever cost
(Przeworski, 2015: 104).
Pseudo-democracies have constituted the plurality of the Soviet successor
states. The Soviet Union lasted for almost seven decades and was a key
political, economic and military superpower during its existence. All of its
fifteen former member republics declared independence one after another as
the union began to crumble in 1991. Armenia, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova,
Russia and Ukraine have all been caught somewhere between being
autocracies and electoral democracies. To describe this category of countries
“in the gray zone” (Carothers, 2002), existing scholarship has come up with a
multitude of labels that differ in their emphasis on the proximity of these
countries to either the authoritarianism (Levitsky & Way, 2002; Diamond,
2002; Schedler, 2015) or democracy (Case, 1993; Diamond, 1996; Zakaria,
1997; Cammack, 1998; Colton & McFaul, 2003; Karatnycky, 1999) poles of
the political system classification scale. This thesis refers to this category of
countries as pseudo-democracies.
There is a massive body of knowledge concerning regime maintenance and
regime change in pseudo-democracies (Hellman, 1994; Karl, 1995; Diamond,
2002; Brownlee, 2002, 2009; Boix, 2003; Lust-Okar, 2005; Gandhi &
Przeworski, 2007; Svolik, 2009; Levitsky & Way, 2010a; Bunce & Wolchik,
2011; Svolik, 2012; Berglund et al., 2013; Treisman, 2015; Escribà-Folch,
2016). We know a lot about the factors and mechanisms that drive such
regime trajectories and why they differ across countries of this context (Bunce
& Wolchik, 2006, 2011; Hale, 2016a). Regime trajectories vary across the
pseudo-democracies of this context because the ruling elites of these countries
have varying levels of state power and other important leverages that help
them to pro-actively discourage and split their opposition (Way, 2012; Silitski,
2009; Hale, 2005). Existing research shows that the more overlap of political
and economic power in the hands of the ruling regime’s main leader (Fish,
2000; Colton, 1995; Hale, 2005, 2015), the more unequal is the political
playing field and the more stable is the regime’s grip on power (Levitsky &
Way, 2002; 2010a; Way, 2012). We also know that public opinion about the
regime is crucial for regime maintenance or its downfall (Huntington, 1991b;
Gibson, 1996; Colton & McFaul, 2002; Kuzio, 2008; Person, 2010; Gel'man,
2010; Korosteleva, 2012; Gill, 2015). In particular, public opinion about the
main regime leader (Magaloni, 2006; Colton & Hale, 2009; Bunce &
Wolchik, 2009; Fairbanks Jr, 2009; Koesel & Bunce, 2012; Petrov, Lipman &
Hale, 2014; Hutcheson & Petersson, 2016) and the expectations about his
political future (Hale, 2015) explain why some regimes are better than others
in maintaining their grip on power. More specifically, the more popular main
8
regime leaders are, the more likely that the pseudo-democratic regime will
succeed in surviving political challenges against the regime (Frye et al., 2016;
Hale, McFaul & Colton, 2004; Dimitrov, 2009). In addition, several studies
evidence that lower public support for democracy as an alternative to
authoritarian forms of rule is associated with successful regime maintenance
in pseudo-democracies (Nodia, 1996; Kuzio, 2006a; Simon, 2009: 16; Ekman,
2009: 25-26; Pietsch, 2015; Karp & Milazzo, 2015).
Despite this vast body of research on regime trajectories in the post-Soviet
context of pseudo-democracies, a substantial drawback in this literature is that
the main emphasis has been placed either on factors that relate to regime
strategies and country-level factors or on mass opinion. However, this is only
one side of the coin if we are to understand different regime trajectories in
post-Soviet pseudo-democracies. The flip side is that big money plays an
enormous political role in most countries in general (La Porta, Lopez-De-
Silanes & Shleifer, 1999; Faccio, 2006; Fukuoka, 2013; Gilens & Page, 2014),
and in pseudo-democracies in particular (Johnston, 2005, 2014; Winters,
2011). In fact, the presence of vast capital holders such as the oligarchs has
been shown to affect the entire political life in post-Soviet pseudo-
democracies (Zudin, 2000; Pleines, 2008, 2009; Åslund, 2015). Oligarchs
have been influential players in the post-Soviet context since their emergence
in the wake of the Soviet Union’s breakdown. They gained substantial profits
from the disastrous neoliberal “shock therapy” reforms during the 1990s and
acquired vast assets in the energy sector, manufacturing, banking,
telecommunications, transport, food and beverages production as well as trade
and real estate (Hellman, 1998; Åslund, 2005; Treisman, 2016). All of this
provided them with a central role in the economy of their respective countries.
Most scholars, however, tend to agree that they could not have reached such
successes without their formal and informal political connections that are
crucially important for the protection of their wealth and businesses (Zudin,
2000; Frye, 2003, 2002; Åslund et al., 2007). Moreover, the involvement of
oligarchs in politics and factors related to this presence such as wealth
concentration in the hands of the few, corruption, patronage and clientelism
are serious political problems in the post-Soviet context (Goldman, 2004;
Stefes, 2007; Åslund, 2015; Shlapentokh, 2013). Their participation also has
devastating effects on business competition between them and the rest of the
citizenry (Black, Kraakman & Tarassova, 2000; Puglisi, 2003; Fortescue,
2006; Åslund, 2015). Moreover, evidence is mounting that their direct or
behind-the-scene engagement in politics brings with it political inequality to
the detriment of the public at large (Pleines, 2016, 2008; Winters, 2011;
Johnston, 2014; Puglisi, 2003). Thus, there are indications in prior research
that oligarchs’ political participation is menacing for the strategic interest of
the public with regard to economic, social and democratic development
(Åslund, 2015; Hoffman, 2011; Hoff & Stiglitz, 2004; Stiglitz, 2002;
Shlapentokh, 2004; Black, Kraakman & Tarassova, 2000). These are all
9
aspects with an immediate relevance to the linkage between oligarchs and
regime trajectories in the framework of such key aspects as mass opinion and
state power concentration in the hands of the ruling regime. Surprisingly, prior
work on regime maintenance or gradual democratization has largely
disregarded this plausible bond.
Aim and research questions

This thesis seeks to contribute to the literature on pseudo-democracies,
democratization and oligarchs and its understanding of pseudo-democratic
regime trajectories in the post-Soviet context. As already mentioned, one
important body of literature explains autocratic regime maintenance or
democratization with mass opinion (towards the main regime leader and the
regime in abstract), while another competing body of literature stresses the
importance of concentration of state power in the hands of the regime. My aim
is to study and understand the role of oligarchs in these processes in the post-
Soviet context of pseudo-democracies. For this purpose, this thesis addresses
three specific research questions:
• What is the relationship between oligarchs, their political power 4 and

popular support for democracy in principle?
• Given that dominant theories point either to mass opinion or to state
power as the dominant factors in understanding regime maintenance
or change, how do oligarchs interact with incumbents and mass
opinion?
• How does the aforementioned interaction between incumbents and
oligarchs play out in situations where oligarchs have been most
prominent for regime change?
Although the primary focus of these guiding research questions is on the

behavior of oligarchs and ruling elites given the centrality of state power and
mass opinion, the discussion of prior work in the theory chapter will also
involve system-level 5 factors since the boundaries between powerful elites and
the political regime are blurry in the post-Soviet context of pseudo-
democracies. 6 In addition, the selection of cases, material and methods will be
justified in full detail in the research design chapter. However, I now present
4
In this thesis, I refer to the political power of oligarchs as their actual political influence (both visible
and behind-the-scene) that gives their strategic interests, with a particular focus on their wealth
accumulation and protection, an overarching priority in relation to that of the broad masses. I offer a
much more detailed discussion on this in the theory chapter.
5 I refer to factors that are primarily related to state-level developments (hence, a level above individual
leaders or elite groups).

6
See subchapter “What is a pseudo-democratic regime?” for further details.
10
very briefly how I will study these specific questions in addition to how my
empirical studies that address these questions will help me to answer this
thesis’s overall research aim.
The first research question is addressed through systematic, statistical
analyses of normative regime support for democracy in five post-Soviet
pseudo-democracies (Armenia, Georgia, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine) in
Chapter four. It is worth repeating that six countries in total constitute the
entire population of post-Soviet pseudo-democracies, the remaining country
being Kyrgyzstan. Using widely employed comparative datasets, this thesis
will examine how actual political inequality to the benefit of oligarchs and
perceptions of unfair distribution of wealth influence people’s support for
democracy as a regime in principle. Thus, answering the first research
question provides the basis for gaining a better understanding of how the
political role of oligarchs is linked with preconditions for attitudinal
democratization. 7
The second research question is mainly addressed in Chapter five through
a detailed comparative case study of the interactions between four rival
oligarchs and the regimes in Armenia, Georgia, Russia and Ukraine,
respectively. Throughout this thesis, I will use the concept of interaction
between individual oligarchs and incumbents to refer to what these players do
in their quest for ascending to power or staying in power respectively in the
framework of such key factors as mass opinion and state power abuse. All
justifications for choosing these four countries are presented in the research
design chapter. Yet, it is worth stating here that these countries were selected
mainly due to their differences in state power concentration in the hands of
their regimes, but also because of social and cultural similarities. 8 The four
oligarchs of study are Gagik Tsarukyan (Armenia), Bidzina Ivanishvili
(Georgia), Mikhail Prokhorov (Russia) and Petro Poroshenko (Ukraine). I
offer a reasoned justification for choosing these oligarchs in the research
design chapter. In short, I justify this selection of oligarchs due to these
oligarchs’ systematic quest for political power by opposing the incumbent
regime’s main leader. In other words, choosing these oligarchs is primarily
justified by their similar struggle for the ultimate political power 9 through their
own political parties or by leadership in key political alliances. By using
original qualitative data based on reports from news media outlets, I study
how these four oligarchs interact with the incumbents in the framework of
such central factors as mass opinion and state power. Hence, of key interest is
how rival oligarchs struggle for power against the incumbent regime and its
7 I provide a thorough definition of attitudinal democratization in the subsequent chapter.

8
For instance, there are striking cultural similarities between Armenia and Georgia as is the case
between Russia and Ukraine.
9 I am referring here to becoming the main regime leader, which pertains mainly to becoming president
or prime minister.
11
abuse of state power by focusing on developing their personal reputation,
organizational resources and credibility as a rival. Thus, by answering this
research question this thesis seeks to enhance our understanding about the role
of oligarchs in the regime trajectories of post-Soviet pseudo-democracies
given the two dominant, competing explanations with focus on either mass
opinion or state power. In a region where politics is person-centered, this
analysis will help us gain a better understanding of the role of oligarchs in
these processes.
I investigate the third research question through an explorative study on
Ukraine in Chapter six. Ukraine is a country where oligarchs have been most
prominent for regime change. The major focus is on how the aforementioned
interaction played out in connection with the two color revolutions in Ukraine
(The Orange (2004) and Euromaidan (2014) Revolutions). The first part of
this chapter examines the triggers and consequences of the two color
revolutions with the primary aim of understanding the role of oligarchs in
these processes. Based on this initial part of the chapter, I then examine a
unique survey of Kyiv university students to explore how such interactions (as
perceived by a well-informed group of citizens in Ukraine) are reflected in
mass opinion about oligarchs as a group and individuals. As for the latter, I
refer to Rinat Akhmetov, Ihor Kolomoyskyi and Petro Poroshenko who have
all been crucial oligarchs during the post-Soviet era of Ukrainian politics. 10
In addition, I also provide a systematic overview of the evolution of
politics in the four countries, the role of oligarchs and briefly discuss the
levels of regime support in principle in all post-Soviet pseudo-democracies.
This will provide a necessary background to the respective sections where I
address each of the three aforementioned research questions.
Thus, what is the interlinkage between these three empirical chapters (four,
five and six) as to how they help this thesis to achieve the overall aim?
Chapter four provides a broad basis for understanding the role of oligarchs in
regime maintenance or democratization given the centrality of mass opinion
about regime in principle as a key to maintaining the regime or bringing about
gradual change. Chapter five provides a basis for understanding how rival
oligarchs make their quest for power against the incumbent regime in the
framework of such key aspects as the regime’s state power abuse and the
centrality of mass opinion. Chapter six delves deeper into how these
interactions played out in a country where oligarchs have been most important
for regime change in addition to exploring how this role is mirrored in mass
opinion about them among university students. Thus, Chapter four mainly
provides an understanding about how oligarchs’ actual power is related to
ordinary citizens’ deep-seated attitudes towards the best form of government.
Chapter five is linked with Chapter four in terms of showing how rival
10
See further details about the oligarchs in the chapter on Ukraine.
12
oligarchs make their bid for power in contexts where their participation as a
group is related to greater support for authoritarian rule among the public. The
chapter seeks to provide a better understanding of how rival oligarchs’
interaction with the incumbent regime may be seen as a key regime
maintenance tool in post-Soviet pseudo-democracies with higher state power.
In addition, Chapter six complements the earlier findings by digging further
into what specific dimensions of oligarchs’ political role are most crucial for
understanding mass opinion about them as a group and individuals. It also
further highlights how the interaction between incumbents and oligarchs plays
out in situations of critical political event and in a context of oligarchs being
very prominent for regime change. Through these intermediate links, this
thesis aims to offer a nuanced understanding about the importance of oligarchs
for regime trajectories in post-Soviet pseudo-democracies within the
framework of such central factors as mass opinion and state power.
A brief background on post-Soviet pseudo-

democracies
The section provides a brief outline of the level of democracy, economic
growth and income inequality over time in the six post-Soviet pseudo-
democracies. This overview is meant to provide a brief background on the
broad country-level settings of these six countries.
The entire post-Soviet region consists of 15 former Soviet member states.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the three Baltic States of Estonia,
Latvia and Lithuania gained independence and progressively developed into
settled democracies. At the same time, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Kazakhstan,
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan moved in the opposite direction
towards authoritarianism. However, six remaining countries of this context—
Armenia, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine—have more or
less developed into pseudo-democracies. This post-Soviet context of pseudo-
democracies is of exclusive interest for this thesis. The following section
offers a general background on these six post-Soviet pseudo-democracies
although this thesis in later analyses only focuses on five of them for reasons
clarified in the research design chapter.
Nearly 200 million people live in the six post-Soviet pseudo-democracies.
Russia is the largest country by both territory (nearly 17.1 million square
kilometers) and population (almost 144 million inhabitants). Russia has been a
dominant player both during and after the Soviet era. Figure A below depicts
the level of democracy in this context of pseudo-democracies:
13
Figure A. Level of democracy (Freedom House/Polity)
Armenia Georgia Kyrgyzstan
Most democratic
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
Least democratic
Moldova Russia Ukraine
Most democratic
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
Least democratic
1990 2000 2015 1990 2000 2015 1990 2000 2015

Year
Notes: The variable fh_polity2 emanates from the QoG dataset (Teorell et al., 2016). This
indicator is measured by the average of the Freedom House’s (fh_pr and fh_cl) and Polity’s
(p_polity2) measures for level of democracy in contrast to dictatorship. The variable ranges
from 0 (least democratic) to 10 (most democratic).
As can be read from Figure A, the level of democracy has varied over time in
all the six countries. We can see that the level of democracy has been slightly
higher in Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine as compared with Armenia,
Kyrgyzstan and Russia. One can also see that Russia has been moving
somewhat towards the pole of least democracy following Vladimir Putin’s rise
to power in the 2000s. These trends corroborate the view of most scholars in
prior studies agreeing that Armenia, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova and
Ukraine are pseudo-democracies that have generally been neither dictatorships
nor full democracies (Beichelt, 2012: 17, 23). However, views have differed
on how to classify Russia on the same scale (Levitsky & Way, 2010a; Ekman,
2009: 10; Motyl, 2012). Although this thesis recognizes that Russia under the
Putin era has moved somewhat in the direction of the dictatorship pole, I still
consider Putin’s Russia as a pseudo-democratic regime. In doing so, I entirely
subscribe to the arguments of Henry Hale (2010) and Nikolay Petrov et al.
(2014) who maintain that the reason why Putin’s Russia should be viewed as a
hybrid regime (i.e. a pseudo-democracy in this thesis’s conceptualization)
instead of a consolidated authoritarian regime (Freedom House, 2017) is due
to the presence and substantial role of regular elections where “at least some
14
real opposition is allowed to compete” (Hale, 2010: 35). Indeed, Putin has
incrementally consolidated the power in his own hands, but has not been able
or willing to eliminate all the threats against his regime by resorting to brutal
repression because his regime has been extremely eager to promote the
popularity of Putin as the primary tool of regime maintenance (Hale, 2010:
38). This strategy has involved both benefits and risks to the regime because
the latter has been able to use the regime leader’s popularity to strengthen its
hold on power. However, the primary risk with such a strategy is that a potent
rival may be able to trigger popular outrage against the incumbents if he/she
succeeds in gaining more popularity than the incumbent regime’s main leader
(Petrov, Lipman & Hale, 2014: 2). In fact, we have more recently seen clear
indications of such perils in the case of the regime critic Alexei Navalny’s
struggle against Putin, which has been largely supported by the crowds of
mostly young Russians (Higgins, 2017).
Turning to the level of economic growth in these six countries, data from
the World Bank displays in Figure B that the Gross domestic product (GDP)
per capita (current prices in USD) was well below $5,000 for the better part of
the 1990s in all of these countries except Russia. This is not that surprising as
Russia has been one of the world’s most important petroleum industries with a
particular focus on the export of natural gas. As we further observe in Figure
B, Russia’s GDP per capita soared starting from the 2000s, which contributed
to the popularity of Putin and his regime (Treisman, 2014). Although not by
the same magnitude as in Russia, the GDP per capita has also risen steadily in
Armenia, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. The economic growth in
Kyrgyzstan, however, has not been that robust.
15
Figure B. GDP per capita (current prices in USD)
20000
15000
10000
5000
20000
15000
10000
5000
1990 2000 2015 1990 2000 2015 1990 2000 2015

Year
Notes: The variable gle_cgdpc emanates from the QoG dataset (Teorell et al., 2016). This
variable measures the value (current prices in USD) of all goods and services produced in a
country in a given year divided by its total population.
There is no doubt that economic growth plays an important role in the

development processes of most countries. However, equally important is
reducing economic inequality in a country that strives to maintain socio-
political order (Boix, 2015; Phillips, 2016). Figure C depicts the major trends
of income inequality in the six post-Soviet states.
16
Figure C. Economic (income) inequality in post-Soviet pseudo-democracies
50
40
30
20
50
40
30
20
1990 2000 2015 1990 2000 2015 1990 2000 2015

Year
Notes: The variable Gini emanates from the World Income Inequality Database (WIID3.4)
(United Nations University, 2017). This variable measures the distribution of income in a
society. A Gini coefficient of zero suggests perfect income equality, while that of 100
percent indicates extreme income inequality (concentration of all income in a society in the
hands of one person).
The Gini coefficient measures the distribution of income in the hands of the
population in each country. The highest level of income inequality has been
observed in Georgia and Russia (over 40). We can furthermore see a clear
downward trend of income inequality in Moldova (going from 45 to 25) in
contrast to Armenia (movements within the ranges of 30 and 40) and
Kyrgyzstan (ranging from 30 to 25). In addition, there appears to be a very
cautious downward trend in Ukraine (going towards 29) Yet, the Gini
coefficient available for post-Soviet countries does not clearly measure the
distribution of net wealth among the segments of the populace of these
countries. In fact, Gini has generally been criticized for not being able to
capture concentration of wealth, which, as Piketty (2014) has shown, has been
much more decisive for the growing inequality (wealth polarization) in the
world. 11
11Unfortunately, we still lack access to freely available measures for actual wealth inequality in this
context of pseudo-democracies despite the emergence of some promising projects such as the World
Wealth and Income Database (Alvaredo et al., 2017) and the more recently established Palma index
17
Overview of the thesis
The remaining part of the thesis involves six chapters. Chapter two offers the
definitions of key concepts and discusses prior research. It concludes with
developing the analytical framework and hypotheses guiding the thesis.
Chapter three outlines the research design of this study, reviews the strengths
and limits of the thesis with regard to data collection and modes of analysis. It
also operationalizes the key variables and hypotheses. Chapter four first
provides a brief account of normative regime support in the post-Soviet
context of pseudo-democracies. This chapter then goes on to study the
relationship between oligarchs, their political power and people’s normative
support for democracy in five post-Soviet pseudo-democracies. Chapter five
starts by looking at the evolution of politics in Armenia, Georgia, Russia and
Ukraine with a particular focus on incumbent regime strategies and tools for
persistence. It then moves on to see how four rival oligarchs have carried out
their bid for the ultimate power in their respective countries. A central aspect
in this chapter is how the oligarchs interact with incumbents and mass opinion
in the framework of state power abuse by the incumbents as a key tool for
regime maintenance. Chapter six begins by examining how this interaction
played out before and after the two color revolutions in Ukraine. The chapter
then moves towards a descriptive and explanatory analysis of Kyiv university
student attitudes towards the oligarchs as a group and individuals. This
opinion is key to understanding how oligarchs have interacted with the
incumbent regimes and mass opinion in a country where they have been most
prominent for regime change. This thesis concludes with a summary and
discussion of its key findings, the implications for and the contribution to the
scholarship on post-Soviet pseudo-democracies, oligarchs and regime
trajectories. It finally offers suggestions on some venues for future research.
(Cobham, Schlögl & Sumner, 2016) for measuring economic inequality. The reason is that these
projects either do not provide any or as extensive data coverage on the post-Soviet context at the time
of writing.
18
Chapter two: Setting the stage for the
thesis
In this part of the thesis, I provide the definitions of an oligarch, a pseudo-
democratic regime and regime trajectories. The rationale for discussing these
theoretical concepts in a separate section is twofold. First, this chapter’s
specific goal is to devote particular attention to clarifying what this thesis
refers to by these central concepts. Doing so is necessary in order to prevent
any risk of misconception arising from confusion surrounding some of the key
terms in this thesis. Second, the goal of this chapter is also to justify the choice
and conceptualization of the broad dependent variable that the discussions in
prior literature on post-Soviet pseudo-democracies revolve around. Overall,
this focus is indispensable due to the still ongoing conflicting debates
associated with different conceptions of movements from pseudo-democratic
status quo towards democratization—crucial aspects in the conceptualization
of regime trajectories in this thesis.
A systematic review of prior literature on regime trajectories and the
presentation of an analytical framework and the hypotheses of this thesis will
follow the subsections on definitions of the key terms. With these
clarifications at hand, we can now turn to the discussion of the key concepts of
this thesis.
Who is an oligarch?
Over centuries, people across the world have invented many new labels for
mega-rich people. Landlords, proprietors, barons, industrialists, moguls or
tycoons are but some examples of these epithets. What all these concepts have
in common is the primary focus on huge capital and personal enrichment
through large-scale entrepreneurship or ownership. After the collapse of the
Soviet Union, people and experts have reinvented the ancient Greek term
“oligarch” in order to clearly identify a new group of extremely wealthy and
politically connected businesspersons in the post-Soviet space.
19
Oxford Online Dictionary defines an oligarch as “a ruler in an oligarchy” or “a
very rich businessman with a great deal of political influence” (Oxford Online
Dictionary, 2014). Åslund (2013: 202) argues that oligarchs in Russia,
Ukraine and Latin America are reminiscent of the robber barons in the United
States 12 since they all rationally reacted to the political, economic and legal
settings within which they made their efforts to gain large profits. In this
thesis, by the term oligarch I refer to wealthy entrepreneurs that wield a
significant economic as well as political influence on many or rather specific
sectors of a society. Oligarchs are firmly rooted in the economic circles of a
country’s elite. 13 In many studies, the political side of their elite membership is
considered as auxiliary in order for them to sustain the political influence
needed for unconstrained capital accumulation (see Worth, 2005: 105; Åslund,
2007b: 256-257; Pleines, 2009: 116). However, some argue that several
distinctions exist between elite cartels and oligarchs. In particular, Johnston
(2005: 135) contends that oligarchs, in contrast to elite cartels, are not
occupied with governing a whole country, less subject to regular
investigations and they are to a much lesser degree exposed to international
shocks and domestic rivalries. I claim that such conceptualization of oligarchs
disregards evidence from the post-Soviet context. In fact, the experience from
this region clearly shows that oligarchs are exposed to systematic
investigations as part of their conflicts with other oligarchs or due to their
political disloyalty to the ruling regime (Shlapentokh, 2004). We should,
however, be mindful that Johnston (2014: 17), in a more recent book,
concedes that his earlier stance on the distinctions in question was certainly
debatable, and that the differences are at times of a qualitative type rather than
“matters of degree”.
A relatively more accurate conceptualization of an oligarch, proposed by
Winters (2011), states that oligarchs can also possess elite forms of power
(organizational, political etc., my remark). Yet, elites are not oligarchs if they
are not personally holding a huge amount of material power (Winters, 2011:
9). Hence, what constitutes the ultimate distinction between the two ideal
types is a considerable personal wealth that is instantly accessible for
achieving political purposes. This is why many top-level managers,
bureaucrats and other similar players fall outside the scope of this definition of
an oligarch. However, such players can bolster the power of oligarchs who
12
Robber barons were 19th century American businessmen who were strongly questioned for their
rapacious practices of wealth accumulation. See Josephson (1962) and Jones (1968).
13
Several definitions of the concept of elite are found in literature (e.g. Mosca, 1939; Schattschneider,
1960; Pareto, 1968). In this thesis, I refer to elites as a set of individuals who make decisions or have a
significant impact on the decisions involving profound implications for a large number of citizens (The
so called "Power Elite". See Mills, [1956] 2000: 3-4).
20
may employ them through their conglomerates since these are seen as
“potential instruments of oligarchs” (Winters, 2011: xvi). 14
Unfortunately, prior work on oligarchs in the post-Soviet context has been
predominantly qualitative. This has resulted in considerable obstacles to
providing an account of adequate statistical measures for the distribution and
total number of oligarchs in this region of pseudo-democracies. Yet, what we
know for certain is that by individual oligarchs (holding huge fortunes)
prominent scholars in the comparative literature on oligarchs generally refer to
those at the top 1 percent of the wealthiest population (Winters & Page, 2009).
Part of the difficulty for pinning down the entire population of oligarchs in the
post-Soviet context is the fact that most oligarchs generally prefer not to be
visible in media or in formal political life (Winters, 2011). Moreover, neither
is their wealth that easily traced by investigative journalists or researchers as
the oligarchs have professional staff that helps them to dodge taxes by moving
it to other countries or transferring it to other people (relatives, cronies etc.)
(Sarukhanyan & Tchobanov, 2017). These are the main reasons why the
analyses of this thesis, consistent with most prior work on oligarchs’ political
importance, primarily will be informed by rather qualitative accounts of
oligarchs and their total “population” given by renowned country experts.
Undoubtedly, prior research has faced major challenges in clarifying the
thin theoretical boundaries between oligarchs and other well-off elites.
Although I throughout this thesis largely follow Winter’s definition of an
oligarch, I consider it important to complement this definition by clarifying
that a person is an oligarch if and only if he 15 amassed his vast wealth while
not serving in public or elected office. Thus, oligarchs are only those mega-
wealthy players who come to the political sphere from the private sector and
employ their wealth to gain either direct or behind-the-scenes political power.
Are there more recent and widely known examples of oligarchs and non-
oligarchs from a comparative perspective? While current U.S. President
Donald Trump, former Prime Minister of Italy Silvio Berlusconi and present
Czech Prime Minister Andrey Babiš are the archetype of an oligarch for
having amassed their vast wealth prior to their service in elected office, neither
Russian President Vladimir Putin nor his Congolese colleague Denis Sassou
Nguesso are oligarchs according to the definition as they made their huge
fortunes while serving in public office. 16 However, it is also worth keeping in
mind that the term oligarch may have some other and slightly varying
dimensions in the eyes of the broad masses in general and among the populace
14
Gessen (2017), for instance, has dubbed such players as “stooges” of oligarchs.
15 Due to the fact that the absolute majority of oligarchs are men, I will refer to them as such
throughout this thesis.
16 In fact, the Hungarian political scientist Balínt Magyar (2016) would define them as “Poligarchs”,
i.e. political oligarchs who made their vast capital solely due to their political power and not the other
way round. See also Masha Gessen’s interesting piece on the issue in the New Yorker (Gessen, 2017).
21
in the post-Soviet context in particular. Still, we as researchers always benefit
from making certain that our conceptual tools are justified and clarified
theoretically.
What is a pseudo-democratic regime?

What is a political regime in contemporary terms? Answering this question
before defining the term pseudo-democracy is inevitable. Neither in classical
nor in contemporary work has there been any consensus on what should
definitely be conceived of as a political regime. The classical work on social
and political thought tended to disagree on whether it was important to focus
on the number of people who ruled (Aristotle & Ackrill, 1987), the group
characteristics of people who ruled (Marx, 1919 [1867]) or the way they ruled
(Montesquieu, 1750) in defining a political regime. Divisions along related
lines appear also in contemporary studies (Wahman, Teorell & Hadenius,
2013; O’Donnell, 2001). Yet, the major cause of disagreement in the more
recent scholarship is whether we should put emphasis on the institutions of
rule/governance (Geddes, Wright & Frantz, 2014: 314) or rulers of flesh and
blood (Toktomushev, 2017: 1968; Shama, 2014: 14). I do not intend to engage
in this stimulating theoretical discussion, but rather strive to find a practical
definition of a political regime that focuses on both the people who rule and
the institutions that undergird this rule. Thus, my main goal is to find a
feasible compromise between these different points of view.
Many definitions of regime in empirical studies contain several elements of
Fishman’s (1990: 428) definition of political regime as:
“…The formal and informal organization of the center of political

power, and its relations with the broader society. A regime
determines who has access to political power, and how those who
are in power deal with those who are not.”
Moreover, Fishman places the regime as the intermediate layer between a state
and a specific government. Yet, a widely shared argument is that the
boundaries between these three layers are typically blurred in non-democratic
countries, to put it mildly (Jackson & Rosberg, 1986). My definition of a
regime is inspired by a classical understanding of a regime in pseudo-
democracies (Schmitter, 1975: 20), which is also reflected in a more recent
and related study by Gel’man (2015: 4-5). I use the term political regime to
refer to a set of individuals and institutions that control the ultimate political
22
power in a country. Hence, I emphasize the crucial role of dominant actors 17 of
flesh and blood along with the institutional dimensions of a regime. This
argument derives credence from more recent studies showing that the
preferences of persons in dominant positions of the ultimate political power
are superior to existing institutional constraints in pseudo-democracies
(Murillo & Levitsky, 2014). In fact, ruling elites in such regimes face little
hurdles in adjusting the key formal institutions of the state when it really
counts (Lust-Okar, 2004, 2005). Their sway over formal political institutions
is more pronounced in post-Soviet pseudo-democracies due to the prevalence
of patronal politics revolving around powerful political patrons with extensive
political, economic and executive powers (Hale, 2005, 2010, 2016b). Now, let
us turn our attention to defining the concept of pseudo-democratic regime.
A plethora of definitions exists of countries that are neither electoral
democracies nor dictatorships (Case, 1993; Diamond, 1996, 2002; Zakaria,
1997; Cammack, 1998; Karatnycky, 1999; Levitsky & Way, 2002; Colton &
McFaul, 2003; Schedler, 2015). Pseudo-democracy is an umbrella term that
covers most key features found in the earlier cited definitions of pseudo-
democracies. Important among these characteristics are the toleration of
political pluralism in the form of independent opposition parties, civil society
and regular national elections. Personalistic politics in pseudo-democracies
prevails in the interrelations of elites as well as between them and the masses.
Moreover, the incumbents employ their state power to discourage and weaken
all effective opposition to them (Diamond, 1996: 25). A question that naturally
springs to mind is why then such countries are undemocratic in spite of
exhibiting many seemingly democratic facets?
Influential scholars of this field provide a few reasons for why pseudo-
democracies simply are not democracies. First, pseudo-democratic rulers,
much more often than not, refuse to abandon their power even when losing in
national elections. Second, pseudo-democratic rulers nearly always determine
the outcomes of legislative processes, and if needed, undo them. Third,
pseudo-democracies are not constrained by formal institutions (Przeworski,
1991; Gandhi & Przeworski, 2006: 21-22). 18 Fourth, pseudo-democracies are
not democracies because they can circumvent electoral rules and civil liberties
even without employing repression (Svolik, 2012: 16). Such regimes eliminate
any possibility of fair conditions for democratic political competition through
which the opposition can ultimately throw them out of power (Diamond,
1996: 25).
17 Following Gel’man (2015: 6), I refer to the core leaders of the ruling groups or the authoritarian
leaders.
18 Institutions are straightforwardly ignored, manipulated or altered on fateful occasions in such
regimes (Way, 2015). Hence, they only serve as another tool in a pseudo-democratic regime’s adaptive
toolbox needed to remain in power.
23
In a more recent and very ambitious study concerned with bridging together
disparate definitions of pseudo-democracy, Cassani (2014: 550) shows that all
authors in the extant literature on pseudo-democracies observe two broad
democratic and authoritarian regime features. The democratic facet found by
all studies is that the opposition is represented in multi-party parliaments that
are formed by regular elections. In contrast, the typical authoritarian attributes
they find are the heavy concentration of arbitrary executive power in the hands
of the chief executive and widespread violations of the political as well as civil
rights of the populace. These common observations fit well with the general
intuition about how and why pseudo-democratic incumbents, which I
interchangeably use with the term authoritarian leaders throughout this thesis,
abuse their state power to deny the opposition access to crucial resources. Key
among these resources are media, finances and law, whose absence seriously
harms the ability of the opposition to pose credible challenges against the
regime in national elections (Greene, 2007; Levitsky & Way, 2010b: 57-58).
What this thesis refers to by regime trajectories

The use of the term regime trajectories in this thesis should not be mistaken
for cyclical regime dynamics over time. I use the concept of regime
trajectories more specifically to refer to the successful maintenance of pseudo-
democratic status quo or gradual qualitative changes towards democratization.
Hence, the primary emphasis is on the qualitative characteristics of these
changes or successful pseudo-democratic regime persistence. The question of
how such changes ought to be conceptualized has stimulated much scholarly
debate following the end of the Cold War. This unsettled debate revolves
mainly around the stability of the direction and the pace of democratization.
As for the former, while many earlier studies regarded democratization as a
unidirectional movement towards full democratization (see further discussion
in Herbst, 2001; Carothers, 2002), relatively more recent studies expect back
and forth movements during democratic advancement (Howard & Roessler,
2006; Teorell, 2010; Donno, 2013). As for the pace of democratization, prior
research provides conflicting views on whether democratization happens
randomly (Przeworski & Limongi, 1997; Przeworski et al., 2000), at critical
junctures in history (Acemoglu et al., 2009), in sudden waves (Huntington,
1991b, 1991a) or rather takes place gradually and fragmentarily without
predetermined time and course stability (O'Donell, 1994; Tilly, 2007; Kuzio,
2005c; Svolik, 2015; Przeworski, 2015; Teorell & Wahman, 2017).
Reconciling these conflicting views is not an easy task. Part of the difficulty is
that the cited studies adopt substantially different definitions of
democratization.
24
I use democratization interchangeably with democratic advancement or
progression in this study. I assume that democratization consists of, at least,
two underlying processes—political and attitudinal democratization. To
explain what democratization is, one has to clarify what one refers to by
democracy. Earlier writings are replete with various definitions of democracy
(e.g. Sartori, 1987; Dahl, 1989, 2005; Schumpeter, 2003 [1943]: 269;
Schattschneider, 1960: 135). A widely used contemporary empirical definition
of democracy is provided by Freedom House (2012). It considers a country to
be an “electoral democracy” if 1) the political system is multiparty and
competitive, 2) universal adult suffrage is implemented (unless justifiably
restricted because of criminal offenses), 3) regular and competitive elections
that represent the public will and are characterized by ballot secrecy and
security, as well as the absence of massive electoral fraud, 4) major political
parties are ensured significant public access to the electorate by means of
media and political campaigning. Broadly speaking, this definition is
reminiscent of the one advanced by Schumpeter (2003 [1943]: 269) that is
worded as “the democratic method is that institutional arrangement for
arriving at political decisions in which individuals acquire the power to decide
by means of a competitive struggle for the people’s vote”. This definition of
democracy has been used by many scholars and experts in the research on
democratization (Beetham et al., 1994; Manin, 1997; Zakaria, 1997;
Karatnycky, 1999; Lindberg, 2006; Gerring, Teorell & Zarecki, 2013).
My conceptualization of political democratization accounts for the most
important components of the above minimalist definition. In particular,
gradual democratization is taking place whenever rivals of pseudo-democratic
incumbents come to power through democratic elections. This is in line with
the views of Howard & Roessler (2006) and Donno (2013) who stress that a
further step towards more democracy occurs whenever leaders come to power
by free and liberalizing elections. I also maintain that it is part of
democratization, when no other viable means are available, that people and the
opposition successfully unseat pseudo-democratic rulers who refuse to resign
in the face of broad popular uprisings. Contested national election results and
authoritarian rulers refusing to deliver on key campaign promises generally
trigger such broad mass protests (Robertson, 2013; Tucker, 2007). When
pseudo-democratic regimes simply refuse to hand over their power, the only
solution is to force them out of office in order to be able to organize
democratic elections. In fact, a more recent work by Adam Przeworski (2015)
lends additional empirical support to such conceptualization of political
democratization by showing that single experiences of regime change by
means of competitive elections are conducive to democratization in the long
run. In particular, Przeworski (2015: 104) shows that most transitions to
democracy follow from removing pseudo-democratic leaders by force. He also
stresses that alternations through competitive elections are a prerequisite of
democracy. Moreover, Przeworski (2015: 121) provides substantial evidence
25
that such alternations have historically been favorable to the reduction of
political violence as a means for political players to maintain their hold onto
power or implement coup d’états. Hence, if oligarchs can contribute to or
impede the removal of pseudo-democratic regimes, they, thereby, can play a
key role in regime trajectories (But see Migranyan, 2015: 15).
Arguably, collaboration between elites and ordinary people for enabling
free and fair elections is crucial for the political dimension of democratization.
The foremost reason for this is that such actions contribute to increasing
competitiveness (political pluralism) and inclusiveness (liberalization of the
masses through their direct participation in critical political processes such as
popular uprisings). Both political competitiveness and inclusiveness are key
components of democratization (Sorensen, 2008; Teorell & Wahman, 2017;
but see Carothers, 2002).
Yet, several scholars maintain that substantial democratization also
requires attitudinal democratization, which implies that ordinary people
support democracy as the best form of government regardless of short-term
regime performance (Simon, 2009: 16; Welzel & Inglehart, 2008: 127;
Diamond, 1999, 2008; Linz & Stepan, 1996; Almond & Verba, 1963). The
main reason is that positive attitudes towards democracy make people more
willing to struggle for the establishment and consolidation of democratic
institutions (Welzel & Inglehart, 2008: 136; but see Qi & Shin, 2011). Still,
how do the two dimensions of democratization (the political and attitudinal
facets) interact? Many prior studies have uncovered strong evidence in support
of the argument that both elites and ordinary people “learn” to love and accept
democracy over the course of its gradual successes through alternations by
competitive elections (Przeworski, 2015; Svolik, 2013; Mattes & Bratton,
2007). Hence, as democracy gradually becomes the “only game in town”
among the elites, it simultaneously influences the public’s acknowledgment of
the superiority of the democratic method of arriving at government or key
political decisions. It is fully plausible to theorize that solid mass attitudes can
in return incite the political elites to accept the superiority of democracy. Next,
I provide a review of the literature related to oligarchs and regime trajectories
in pseudo-democracies.
26
Previous literature
Oligarchs and pseudo-democratic regime trajectories
As previously stated, there is a growing body of literature on oligarchs’

prominence in pseudo-democracies with regard to the social, economic and
political spheres of society. However and surprisingly, the role of oligarchs for
regime maintenance or gradual democratization remains unexplored as to the
more specific ways in which oligarchs’ importance is reflected through such
crucial factors as mass opinion and regime maintenance strategies by means of
state power abuse. An important aspect in this regard is the fact that oligarchs
have been of key importance for toppling many post-Soviet pseudo-
democratic regimes by force, which, in turn, is of key importance for gradual
drifts towards political democratization (Przeworski, 2015). Accordingly, I
offer a detailed account of several seemingly disconnected branches of the
scholarship that attributes differing regime trajectories in pseudo-democracies
to the primacy of oligarchs, ruling elite strategies for regime maintenance and
mass opinion, correspondingly. This overview will help to bring the whole
theoretical gap to a head and to highlight the rationale for putting forward a
more coherent theoretical framework for understanding the role of oligarchs
(as a group and individuals) in the aforementioned key processes. The review
of prior work starts with the discussion of previous studies that draw a
connection between the strategic choices of oligarchs and differing regime
trajectories in pseudo-democracies.
The first stream of the literature claims that oligarchs help pseudo-
democratic regimes to maintain their hold on power by supporting the regime
through the entire electoral cycle. A crucial factor in this respect is their
monetary assets. In many post-Soviet pseudo-democracies, for instance Russia
and Ukraine, oligarchs have been engaged in the control and trade of lucrative
goods, commodities and services. In fact, the oligarchs have been prominent
employers, producers and merchants in these (Guriev & Rachinsky, 2005;
Åslund, 2015) and several other post-Soviet states (Stefes, 2008; Radnitz,
2012; Junisbai, 2012). These activities generate huge wealth that is parlayed
into substantial political power (Barnes, 2003). Furthermore, many oligarchs
are integral parts of influential patronage networks that the ruling regime
employs throughout the entire electoral cycle to secure a convincing victory in
elections. Such evidence has been observed in many post-Soviet pseudo-
democracies where pro-regime oligarchs’ financial resources have been
funneled into vote-buying and other forms of expensive vote manipulation that
are crucial for regime maintenance (Puglisi, 2003; Kuzio, 2005b; Stefes, 2006;
Way, 2012; Radnitz, 2012). Some observers have suggested that many
incumbents in post-Soviet pseudo-democracies have more often than not
engaged oligarchs in piling up and hiding their financial resources from the
27
public (Petrosyan, 2010; Kasparov, 2014). Such undertakings help the ruling
regime leaders to deflect public attention from their vast capital and to avoid
provoking public opinion (Chernykh, 2008). For instance, Russian President
Vladimir Putin’s formal annual salary was $150,000 in 2014, but according to
Bill Browder, once the largest foreign investor in Russia, Putin owns more
than $200 billion in hidden wealth (Spinella, 2015).
Another argument for why oligarchs help pseudo-democratic regimes to
endure centers on the incompatibility of oligarchs’ strategic interests with
those of the average citizen (Winters, 2011; Winters, 2013; Pleines, 2009;
Singh, 2000). In particular, the argument is that oligarchs help such regimes to
survive due to their fear of wealth redistribution (Acemoglu & Robinson,
2006). At the heart of this fear is the assumption that the toppling of pseudo-
democratic regimes and democratization would most likely entail
expropriation or redistribution of their vast wealth to the poor (Boix, 2003).
This major concern of possible redistribution of their wealth generates
political conformism among vested oligarchs as to the interests of the ruling
leadership to stay in power and stymie democratization (Winters, 2011; Boix,
2003; cf. Acemoglu & Robinson, 2001). This claim finds support in studies of
politics in Latin American (Albertus, 2015) and Southeast Asian countries
(Winters, 2013).
The opposing argument in prior studies is that oligarchs can help the
masses to overturn pseudo-democratic regimes and facilitate gradual steps
towards democratization. The claim is that oligarchs are inclined to contribute
to the aforementioned processes and challenge ruling elite if the latter
seriously endanger their wealth or wealth accumulation (Zudin, 2000;
Matuszak, 2012; Sidel, 2008; Shlapentokh, 2004; Radnitz, 2012). Although
the majority of oligarchs are indifferent to political regimes, many of them
tend to unite around a core set of shared strategic interests and similarly
perceived threats from the regime against their material wealth (Åslund, 2015;
Graham, 1999). In such settings, oligarchs have successfully helped to oust,
for instance, General Pervez Musharraf in Pakistan (2008) (Albertus & Gay,
2016: 13) or Rojas Pinilla in Colombia (1957) (Palacios, 2007). A case in
point from the post-Soviet context is the Orange Revolution in Ukraine that
led to the departure of President Leonid Kuchma from office in 2005.
Thousands of small entrepreneurs and several significant oligarchs backed his
opponent Viktor Yushchenko although the three most powerful oligarchic
groups provided major backing to Kuchma (McFaul, 2006: 168). An
additional example from this context is the toppling of Askar Akayev in
Kyrgyzstan in 2005 by popular protests supported by influential regional
oligarchs who succeeded in their objective by appealing to the sympathies of
the masses (Radnitz, 2006b). However, a contrasting example is found in
Russia where several prominent oligarchs, among whom the then influential
oligarch Mikhail Khodorkovsky, failed in their attempt to revolt against
Vladimir Putin in 2003 (Shlapentokh, 2004; Shlykov, 2004; Gudkov & Dubin,
28
2005). Scholars suggest that such country differences may emanate from
different levels of oligarchic autonomy from the state (Radnitz, 2010, 2012;
Pepinsky, 2009).
The above review of prior research points to different directions. We have
studies claiming that oligarchs back pseudo-democratic regimes due to their
fear of losing their wealth to either rivals or the masses, whereas others
emphasize their importance for toppling pseudo-democratic regimes and
facilitating democratization when they perceive threats to their capital from
ruling elites. This contrast, in my view, points to two particular limitations in
this scholarship. The first one is the neglected focus on the importance of mass
attitudes towards the fairness of oligarchs’ wealth accumulation for people’s
regime support in principle. In particular, the major argument in the literature
on oligarchs is that they are primarily concerned with defending their huge
material wealth, something that puts them at odds with the strategic interests
of the broad masses (Winters, 2011). Therefore, it is reasonable to believe that
the unduly concentration of wealth and political power in the hands of
oligarchs is of significant political importance for pseudo-democratic regime
maintenance, democratization and popular regime support. The second
limitation is the literature’s disregard of the actual level of oligarchs’ political
power that may vary between countries. Undoubtedly, the reviewed studies
differ considerably with regard to their case selections and generalization
ambitions. Yet, what all the studies point to is the fact that oligarchs act
differently in different countries. The difference in their choices of action is
associated with varying country settings. Thus, there are important contextual
differences for reasons I explore next.
Explanations for different regime trajectories in pseudo-

democracies
In contrast to the burgeoning literature on the nexus between oligarchs and
regime trajectories, we have many established studies on pseudo-democratic
regime maintenance and gradual democratization. This scholarship explains
why pseudo-democratic regimes stay in power or lose their grip by centering
primarily on two broad categories of explanations that revolve around external
and domestic factors. As for the former, studies have argued that powerful
authoritarian (black knights) and democratic (white knights) countries play a
considerable role for the survival or collapse of pseudo-democratic regimes
(Tolstrup, 2009, 2014; Levitsky & Way, 2010a; Risse & Babayan, 2015).
More precisely, influential countries like Russia can leverage their resources
and core competencies to support pseudo-democratic leaderships in their
satellite states in coping with critical military, economic and political
problems (Silitski, 2010b; Bader, Grävingholt & Kästner, 2010; Bader, 2015;
Ambrosio, 2016). In contrast, the European Union (EU) and individual
powerful democracies in the West can influence pseudo-democratic regimes
29
by conditioning their aid to these countries not only on long-term
macroeconomic stability, but also on important political factors conducive to
democratization (Levitsky & Way, 2010a). Although structural linkages to
both democratic and authoritarian regional powers are important to account
for, domestic factors still play a much greater role in determining the level of
success for pseudo-democratic regime maintenance—especially in the post-
Soviet region (Way, 2008; Gel'man, 2010). The major reason is that domestic
background conditions make some political outcomes more likely and others
rather impossible even given external regime backing or pressure (Solonenko,
2009; Simão, 2012; but see Tansey, Koehler & Schmotz, 2016; Brownlee,
2017).
The literature concerned with domestic factors has been more fruitful as its
branches have focused on three major categories of explanations. The first is
elite-level explanations with greater focus on the political opposition and
ruling elite strategies. The second is mass-level explanations with an emphasis
on mass opinion about specific regime leaders and the public’s normative
support for regimes. Finally, a third group of explanations interlinks the elite
and mass-level explanatory frameworks by focusing on the interplay between
the elites and masses in the framework of patronal politics. Next, I offer a
more detailed account of these branches in prior work and conclude with a
clear rationale for why we instead need to study how oligarchs interact with
incumbents and mass opinion in order to gain a better understanding of their
importance for regime trajectories in post-Soviet pseudo-democracies. Thus
and as will be discussed in more detail later, the theoretical framework of this
thesis theorizes about the role of oligarchs by expanding on dominant
explanations for regime trajectories with a particular emphasis on mass
opinion and the degree of state power in the hands of the regime. Now, I
provide a thorough review of these three major branches of explanations in the
previous literature.
The proponents of elite-level explanations first accentuate the role of
political opposition in accounting for different regime trajectories.
Confronting a legitimate, strong and unified political opposition against their
regime is one of the worst political evils from the perspective of ruling state
elites in pseudo-democracies (Bunce & Wolchik, 2011; Tucker, 2007;
Albrecht, 2005; McFaul, 2005). There are three main reasons for this. First,
such an opposition is more likely to successfully push for important political
reforms when the opportunity arises (Lust-Okar, 2004). By this opportunity,
scholars conceive of economic and political crises driven by severe structural
and institutional problems or elite-level struggles within pseudo-democracies
(McFaul, 2005; Gould & Sickner, 2008; March, 2009; Lust-Okar, 2004;
Reuter & Gandhi, 2011). Second, a strong opposition is more likely to win the
support of the regime’s bureaucracy and cause elite defection due to its
pronounced strength (Tolstrup, 2015a: 676). Finally, evidence is mounting
that this kind of opposition is more successful in mobilizing masses in order to
30
credibly challenge the ruling authoritarian leadership’s firm grip on power
(McFaul, 2005; Bunce & Wolchik, 2006; Beissinger, 2007). Hence, although
not necessarily democratic as to its value system, a strong and united
opposition is worrisome for pseudo-democratic rulers as it may capably strike
at the heart of the regime’s top-down command structure and conduce to
deposing pseudo-democratic regimes (Kuzio, 2005b). The case of the
Bulldozer Revolution in Serbia that resulted in the overthrow of Slobodan
Milošević in the autumn of 2000 is a prime example (Bieber, 2003; Birch,
2002; Bunce & Wolchik, 2009). However, evidence from other countries such
as Armenia (2008), Azerbaijan (2003) and Belarus (2001) suggests that the
opposition, despite its unity, was still unable to unseat the incumbent regimes.
Scholars ascribed this inability to the ruling elites’ long-term, preemptive
manipulation of the political scene. In fact, the main objective of pseudo-
democratic incumbents is to drive a deep wedge within the opposition as well
as between the opposition and the broad masses (Bunce & Wolchik, 2010: 63,
74).
A second stream of research on elite-level explanations for different
regime trajectories claims that the ruling elites of pseudo-democracies create
and institutionalize some key pro-active mechanisms that enable them to
sustain themselves in power. Instant measures to counteract their opposition
mainly involve impulsive, brutal repression or cooptation of rivals. However,
a major risk associated with suppression is that it can provoke massive
protests or international repudiation (Levitsky & Way, 2010a; Escribà-Folch,
2013; Escribá-Folch & Wright, 2015). In the same way, the peril of the
cooptation strategy is that not all forces can be voluntarily contained and even
if contained, they may pose a further risk to intra-elite conflicts (Magaloni,
2008). Therefore and to avoid provoking public opinion, incumbents in
pseudo-democracies may resort to establishing fake (pocket) opposition
parties to manipulate the political scene by diverting or channeling opposition
votes (Hale, 2011b: 36; Wilson, 2005; Solinger, 2001). In this respect,
incumbent elites in Russia have been an exemplary role model for establishing
new or transforming old parties to pocket opposition (March, 2009, 2012).
Most authoritarian leaders, yet, opt for creating lasting formal institutions that
enable them to divide and discourage opposition at earlier stages and rule
more consistently (Lust-Okar, 2004).
The ruling elites employ durable, preemptive mechanisms of domination to
deter elite defection, fragment their political opposition and demobilize the
public (Finkel & Brudny, 2012; Bunce & Wolchik, 2010; Silitski, 2010a,
2009). Among several of such mechanisms, one can distinguish the idea of an
uneven playing field (UPF) that enables the regimes to wear down their
opposition. The rich body of work that Lucan Way and Steven Levitsky have
produced has been a major source for understanding pseudo-democratic
regime trajectories across the world in general and the post-Soviet context in
particular (Way, 2005a, 2005b, 2009, 2015, 2016; Levitsky & Way, 2002;
31
Way & Levitsky, 2006; Levitsky & Way, 2010a; Levitsky & Way, 2015).
Levitsky and Way (2002; 2010a) argue that authoritarian leaders maintain
their hold onto power by establishing and nurturing an UPF. This skewed
platform rests on extremely politicized state institutions, uneven access to
public and private resources as well as media to the detriment of the
opposition (Levitsky & Way, 2010a: 368). However, as they further maintain,
UPF must be clearly separated from general incumbent advantage, also
present in mature democracies (Diamond, 2002: 28), as UPF harms most
preconditions of democratic advancement. In stark contrast to routine
incumbent advantage, UPF entails the abuse of incumbents’ state power for
narrow political reasons. The arbitrary use of state power blatantly retards the
opposition’s ability to organize and compete for power (Levitsky & Way,
2010b: 58). UPF has been emphasized in many studies explaining regime
maintenance (McFaul & Petrov, 2004; Puddington, 2009; Zimmerman, 2014;
Kuzio, 2015b) and divergent regime trajectories in the post-Soviet context
(Bader, 2010; Stewart et al., 2012). An informative example of this literature
is Way’s (2012) comparative study of Armenia and Georgia. He shows that
pseudo-democratic regime maintenance has been more successful in Armenia
than in Georgia owing to the presence of relatively stronger state institutions
and UPF in the former. UPF and its three essential elements of resource
inequality, unequal access to media and the law wield an immediate adverse
effect on the necessary conditions for meaningful and viable political
competition (Levitsky & Way, 2010b: 58). Moreover, the long-term effect is
that they produce a politically disengaged society when regimes recurrently
manage to stifle their opposition (LaPorte, 2015: 347-349).
The research stream of mass-level explanations focuses primarily on the
popularity of the regime leader as a key dimension of public opinion about the
regime (Bunce & Wolchik, 2009; Fairbanks Jr, 2009; Koesel & Bunce, 2012;
Petrov, Lipman & Hale, 2014; Frye et al., 2016). Scholars in this branch of
mass-level explanations have stressed the importance of the main regime
leader’s real popularity or the impression thereof among ordinary people for
the survival of pseudo-democracies (Magaloni, 2006; Dimitrov, 2009; Hale,
2015). Although studies do not deny the significance of the degree of state
power concentration for understanding regime trajectories in post-Soviet
pseudo-democracies, they view it as epiphenomenal to popular support for the
chief regime leader (Hale, 2015: 448-449). Vast popular support for the main
regime leader rests on the leader’s economic performance. The support grows
when there are higher levels of social spending, increases in salary or
decreasing levels of poverty and economic disparity (Dimitrov, 2009: 78-79).
The main regime leader’s popularity allows him to consolidate his own power
to the detriment of the opposition. Two related studies of pseudo-democracies
illustrate this point well. Levitsky and Loxton (2013) show, for instance, that
populist leaders in Peru, Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador credibly opposed
and defeated powerful ruling elites mainly by seeking a direct mandate from
32
the people (the period of study is 1990-2010). Unsurprisingly, they then used
the very same support to establish and maintain an UPF to discourage
opposition. Esen and Gumuscu (2016) find similar evidence in their
examination of Turkey’s turn to pseudo-democratic rule in the wake of Recep
Tayyip Erdogan’s and his ruling Justice and Development Party’s (AKP) rise
to power. Another fine example is Putin’s emergence to power and his
regime’s survival (Dimitrov, 2009).
The other line of research on mass-level explanations centers on lasting
mass value orientations in explaining different regime trajectories in pseudo-
democracies (Kuzio, 2006b; Bauer & Bell, 2009; Gill, 2015; Karp & Milazzo,
2015; McAllister & White, 2015; Pietsch, 2015). Studies claim that the reason
why some post-communist countries have experienced democratic
breakthroughs, while others have remained in status quo or relapsed to more
authoritarianism have depended broadly on differing citizen preferences for
democratic ideals and political support for democratic political forces (Kuzio,
2008; Gill, 2015). Indeed, normative support for democracy is a major driving
force for ordinary people across the world to enhance their awareness of their
political rights irrespective of the severity of social, economic or political
crises (Easton, 1975; Geddes & Zaller, 1989; Huang, Chang & Chu, 2008). In
this respect, studies have shown recurrently that democratic support among
ordinary people is a necessary precondition for democratic consolidation (Linz
& Stepan, 1996; Bratton & Mattes, 2001; Diamond, 1999, 2008; Haerpfer,
2008: 423). Other observations suggest that support for authoritarianism
fosters mass and elite consolidation around the chief leaders of pseudo-
democracies (Stevens, Bishin & Barr, 2006; Chaisty & Whitefield, 2013:
399). In related fashion, a more recent study shows that higher support for
authoritarian values is associated with lower levels of voter participation in
East European elections (Karp & Milazzo, 2015). What is more, evidence
from Russia (2012) suggests that authoritarian attitudes among the citizenry
also depress individual proclivity to participate in anti-governmental protests
(Gill, 2015). In fact, Ekman (2009: 25-26) argues that the sustainability of
pseudo-democratic regimes is associated with popular support for
authoritarian forms of power, which, in turn, is related to citizens’ political
disillusionment and demobilization—two conditions that are much coveted by
authoritarian leaderships (Koesel & Bunce, 2012: 406-407; King, Pan &
Roberts, 2013; LaPorte, 2015: 347).
A third category of explanations for different regime trajectories in post-
Soviet pseudo-democracies rests on a broad societal framework that draws a
more immediate connection between elite- and mass-level processes (Hale,
2005, 2013, 2016b; Bunce & Wolchik, 2011). A cornerstone in Henry Hale’s
analytical framework is that pseudo-democratic regimes of this region are a
corollary of the underlying patronal societies. Two important aspects
distinguish this type of society from others. One is that people pursue political
and economic power primarily through broad networks of personal
33
acquaintances. For that reason, sticks and carrots used to induce behavior are
directed towards specific individuals (Hale, 2015: 423). The second aspect
that sets patronal societies apart from other societies is that single patronal
leaders are extremely important due not only to their formal powers, but also
to their popularity that enables them to attract key individuals into their power
pyramid even in the absence of formal position of power or authority. (Hale,
2015: 424). This is partly why it is no wonder that politics in patronal
societies, such as those in the Soviet successor pseudo-democracies, are
marked by greatly personalized struggles for power rather than through
political parties (Hale, 2006). It is, also, in this light that political players do
not treat formal constitutions of such countries as sacred principles of
government (Way, 2017: 580). At the same time, constitutions are neither
irrelevant nor superfluous as incumbent elites carefully amend them on fateful
occasions. Constitutions serve as credible power-sharing mechanisms between
the chief leader and his key allies within the ruling elite (Albertus & Menaldo,
2012). In fact, ruling state elites in pseudo-democracies use constitutions to
facilitate their legal and illegal behavior, consolidate their influence around
one or multiple chief leaders and to signal their confidence in their own
political supremacy to everyone (Hale, 2016a: 31-32).
Despite the huge literature on why post-Soviet pseudo-democracies have
experienced different regime trajectories, only a handful have focused on the
role of oligarchs in these processes. In particular, and to the best of my
knowledge, there remains a paucity of evidence on how rival oligarchs interact
with incumbents and mass opinion in the framework of state power abuse by
the incumbents who do their utmost to stay in power. This thesis offers a
systematic understanding of the role of oligarchs in post-Soviet pseudo-
democratic regime trajectories by first focusing on the relationship between
oligarchs’ actual political power and people’s normative support for either
authoritarian forms of rule or democratic regime support. Second, the detailed
review of prior explanations, with particular emphasis on the centrality of
mass opinion and state power concentration and abuse, suggests that we still
know very little about how rival oligarchs interact with incumbents and mass
opinion in the broad processes of regime maintenance or gradual drifts
towards democratization. Finally and taken together, we need to focus on how
the interaction between oligarchs and incumbents plays out in circumstances
where the former have been most prominent for regime change. The main
justification for doing so is the overlooked need to explore and understand
how oligarchs as a powerful group and individual players may converge with
mass opinion given the central importance of public opinion for regime
trajectories. Next, I set out the theoretical framework for this study. While this
analytical framework partly draws from the previous discussion of prior work,
this thesis seeks to contribute to the broad scholarship by providing a coherent
framework for understanding the largely undisclosed role of oligarchs for
34
regime trajectories within the framework of mass opinion and state power
concentration in the hands of post-Soviet pseudo-democracies.
35
The analytical framework and hypotheses
As discussed at length previously, several institutional factors and the
significance of institutional frameworks have been emphasized in prior
research (e.g. Gel'man, 2008a; Levitsky & Way, 2010a; Silitski, 2010a) as
important aspects to account for in understanding varying regime trajectories
in post-Soviet pseudo-democracies. While this thesis acknowledges the
important contribution of the aforementioned branch of research, the emphasis
here is rather on the importance of the actor-level perspective in the post-
Soviet context of pseudo-democracies. Thus, this thesis adheres to the branch
of extant research that focuses on the understudied role of person-centered
processes within the framework of dominant players’ political game of either
maintaining or ascending to power in the post-Soviet context (Hale, 2015).
Given the above review of the extant literature, it ought to be reasonable to
believe that the rationale for oligarchs to challenge the regime differs in
countries with different levels of state power in the hands of incumbents. As
discussed above, this variation in state power suggests different preconditions
for political opposition to compete for power and play a greater role in
influencing public opinion. This thesis seeks to contribute to the literature on
regime trajectories by assessing the role of oligarchs in post-Soviet regime
trajectories with regard to how they interact with incumbents in the framework
of the latter’s state power abuse and efforts to manipulate mass opinion. In
contrast to prior studies (Levitsky & Way, 2010a), my study also digs deeper
into how rulers with greater state power (and thereby greater coercive
capacity) still seek to manipulate public opinion about their rival oligarchs in
order to ensure the sustainability of their regime. This will help the thesis to
illustrate in more detail how mass opinion and state power mutually reinforce
each other in crucial struggles for political ascendancy between rival oligarchs
and incumbents in post-Soviet pseudo-democracies.
This thesis departs from prior studies in assuming that the level of state
power as well as mass opinion are equally important factors for our
understanding of different regime trajectories. As will be made clear
subsequently, I believe that pseudo-democratic regimes reinforce their state
power primarily not by openly repressing their opponents, but rather by
showing that the rival oligarchs are unpredictable and untrustworthy
challengers of the regime’s chief leader. Obviously, pseudo-democratic
regimes with greater state power stand a better chance of succeeding in their
efforts to tarnish the reputation of their rival oligarchs. However, it is worth
recalling that scholars categorize pseudo-democracies precisely as such
because all these regimes fundamentally undermine their opposition’s ability
to compete for power. This is valid for all pseudo-democracies—irrespective
of the level of state power concentrated in the hands of the incumbent elite. I,
therefore, assume that while the politically motivated rival oligarchs will seek
to develop their reputation and their organizational capacity in all pseudo-
36
democracies, the authorities will do their utmost to demonstrate to the public
that the oligarchs will unlikely be able to surpass the regime’s main leader in
their quest for power. Hence, this thesis seeks to contribute to the literature by
offering a more nuanced understanding of the role of oligarchs in the
framework of such important explanatory factors for regime trajectories as
mass opinion and the ruling elite’s abuses of state power.
Before turning our attention to the analytical framework of this thesis, I
want to clarify that I am well aware of the fact that there are influential
oligarchs and coalitions of oligarchs both at the local and regional levels in
post-Soviet pseudo-democracies. Yet, I do not consider them as politically
motivated rivals to the incumbents as long as they do not systematically and
visibly organize (perform) their political struggle against the incumbent
regime and its main leader. In other words, although I do not dispute the fact
that there may be other politically motivated oligarchs who are not entirely
satisfied with the regime and the main leader, I have opted not to place too
much theoretical emphasis on their role as long as they do not personally and
visibly choose to challenge the regime’s hold on political power. This
delimitation follows in particular from this thesis’s aim to study the
importance of oligarchs in the framework of the central importance of state
power and mass opinion for regime trajectories. Thus, this delimitation is
justified theoretically as it enables us to focus on how rival oligarchs
manifestly perform their political struggle for power against the regime as well
as on the latter’s abuse of state power to avert such threats. With these key
clarifications at hand, let us now turn to the presentation of the major
components of the analytical framework.
The relationship between oligarchs, their political power and

popular support for democracy in principle
In a seminal work, Easton (1975) argued that regime support has two main
forms—specific and diffuse 19 regime support. While the former pertains to a
more immediate understanding and evaluation of the government’s and
political elites’ performance, the latter refers to a general, long-term
evaluation of what a regime is or represents (Easton, 1975: 444). He (1975:
447) further argued that diffuse regime support very seldom veers from one
extreme to another since it is not affected by government failures to provide
both political and economic goods 20 in the short run. However, persistently
bad regime performance, as perceived by people, affects diffuse support for
19
Following past studies (Rose, Mishler & Haerpfer, 1998; Norris, 1999), this thesis uses diffuse,
normative and regime support in abstract or in principle synonymously.
20
By political goods, I refer to political trust, the rule of law, respect for civil rights, democratic
representation, electoral institutions, control of corruption and political competition. What of economic
goods? Scholars conceive of economic goods as monetary and other such resources that people desire
to own a lot of even though these are not critical for their physical survival (Huo, 2002: 539).
37
democracy (Easton, 1975: 444-445). Milan Svolik (2013), in related fashion,
suggests that the trap of pessimistic expectations provides potent explanations
for why pseudo-democracies emerge and thrive. He argues that poorly
performing politicians develop negative reputation and contribute to public
cynicism as well as political distrust. This generates popular perceptions of
most politicians as crooks since people generally tend to paint all politicians
with the same brush. Many sincere politicians that are well aware of this fact
start to engage in irregularities. Thus, this vicious spiral of distrust and
cynicism leads to the trap of pessimistic expectations affecting the polity as a
whole (Svolik, 2013: 686).
Perceived bad political and economic performance of the political system
ought to affect normative support for either of the regime alternatives. I
suppose that two key epitomes of these two lasting patterns of bad
performance are political inequality to the benefit of oligarchs and unfair
wealth distribution, respectively. I conceive of political inequality as the
extent to which decision makers disregard the preferences and interests of all
citizens (Verba, 2003: 663). However, due to the elusiveness of this concept,
Robert Dahl argued that our best strategy is to resort to subjective, ordinal
measures of the degree of political inequality (Dahl, 2006: 74). As for the term
unfair wealth distribution, I refer to the unequal distribution of assets within a
population. Yet, it is worth emphasizing that I am primarily interested in
citizens’ subjective evaluation of the fairness of the distribution of wealth in
their society.
As already clarified in the introduction of this thesis, I conceive of
oligarchs’ political power as their political influence that is visible or taking
place behind the scenes. This influence enables them to sway the politics in a
way that ensures that their fundamental strategic interests of defending and
increasing their accumulated wealth are placed above the general interests of
the broad public (these interests are in conflict as to the actual occurrence of
wealth polarization in society). What, then, are the more detailed mechanisms
that drive the relationship between normative regime support and political
inequality to the benefit of oligarchs in addition to perceptions of unfair
wealth distribution in the post-Soviet region? Scholars have repeatedly shown
that policy implementation in this context has been largely contingent on a
strict power hierarchy between the political leadership and the administrative
and judicial power (Gel'man, 2004, 2008b, 2015; Hale, 2011a, 2016b).
However, the oligarchs have exerted considerable influence on the
implementation of policy even though they have not necessarily been
represented as such in the formal political system (Åslund, 2007a, 2014, 2015;
Hale, 2015). What is more, past research shows that there are clear
distributional and strategic interest conflicts between the oligarchs as a group
and the people at large (Åslund, 2015; Shlapentokh, 2004; Zudin, 2000).
Surprisingly, studies in the scant literature on perceived inequality and regime
support in the post-Soviet context have not found any significant linkages
38
between the two (Whitefield & Loveless, 2013; Loveless & Whitefield, 2011).
We, however, know that multiple facets of economic inequality result
primarily from how well a government formulates and implements its policies
of great relevance to the distribution of wealth (Uslaner, 2008; Piketty, 2014;
Davies et al., 2009). The rise and large success of oligarchs as a group in post-
Soviet pseudo-democracies occurred simultaneously with the trauma of the
1990s resulting from political and economic reforms associated with the shock
therapy (Stiglitz, 2002; Puglisi, 2003; Short Rennie, 2013: 33). The
concentration of wealth has gradually risen in this context in parallel with
ordinary people experiencing deteriorating life standards and worsening
economic outlook (Wegren, 2014; Alexeev, 1999; Remington, 2011; Åslund,
2015). Moreover, evidence suggests that many key oligarchs usually
outperformed main regime leaders with regard to maintaining political
influence behind the scenes (Matuszak, 2012; Åslund, 2015; Kostiuchenko,
2011). Growing evidence also suggests that the citizenry harbors hostile
attitudes towards the oligarchs as a group (Gudkov & Dubin, 2005; Zudin,
2000; Pleines, 2009). The public’s disfavor of oligarchs as a group is
attributed to oligarchs’ shady past of wealth accumulation, a widely shared
belief of an unfair redistribution of wealth to the oligarchs and state capture by
kleptocratic oligarchic interests since the initial phases of the post-Soviet era
(Shlapentokh, 2004, 2008; Shlapentokh & Arutunyan, 2013; Kuzio, 2016b).
Accordingly, the broad masses regard the oligarchs and the shock therapy
reforms with distaste, holding both responsible for the initial chaos during the
1990s and subsequent widespread deficiencies in their political system
(Shlapentokh, 2004). Against this background, the first hypothesis to be tested
in this study reads as follows:
Hypothesis 1 (H1): Political inequality to the benefit of oligarchs

and perceptions of unfair wealth distribution are negatively
associated with normative support for democracy across all post-
Soviet pseudo-democracies.
However, past studies suggest that some pseudo-democratic regimes manage

better than others to exploit the linkage stated in H1 to strengthen their own
legitimacy and people’s support for more authoritarian rule in contrast to
support for democracy in principle. Some scholars argue that, for instance,
Vladimir Putin gained much public support for his authoritarian forms of rule
and the concentration of state power in his own hands precisely by
demonizing the oligarchs in the eyes of the broad public with regard to their
shady past of wealth accumulation during the nominally democratic market
reform programs in the 1990s (Goldman, 2004; Sakwa, 2008a). In fact, some
observers stress that Russians essentially do not reject the idea of democracy,
but rather want an elected, strong-handed leader to whom they can delegate
the powers needed to put their country and political life in order after what
39
they experienced during the allegedly more democracy-friendly direction of
the pre-Putin era (Hale, McFaul & Colton, 2004). Relatedly, other scholars
assume that similar mechanisms successfully shape support for authoritarian
rule even elsewhere as most people generally loathe political, social and
economic insecurity and disorder (O'Donnell & Schmitter, 1986; Inglehart &
Baker, 2000). This is why I believe that successful regime strategies to
communicate clear connections between the experienced disorder in the 1990s
and oligarchic influence on the political system help to construct a negative
image of democracy as the best form of government. I expect all post-Soviet
pseudo-democratic regimes with greater state power concentration to be more
successful in strengthening the negative image of oligarchs. The reason is that
a greater degree of state power entails the ruling elite’s effective control of
most economic, political and administrative levers, which altogether help the
regime to augment the negative relationship formulated in H1. Thus, a
complementary hypothesis is:
Hypothesis 1a (H1a): The negative effect of political inequality to

the benefit of oligarchs and perceptions of unfair wealth distribution
on normative support for democracy will be more pronounced in
countries with a greater degree of state power concentration in the
hands of the regime.
How key, rival oligarchs perform their bid for power against the
ruling leadership by emulating the regime’s state power and
efforts to manipulate mass opinion
Following from the discussion of the previous literature on post-Soviet
pseudo-democracies, this thesis has hitherto highlighted two dominant
explanations that center on either the crucial importance of mass opinion or
state power concentration for understanding regime trajectories in this context.
The more specific research question that this thesis asks is how such crucial
actors as rival oligarchs interact with incumbents and mass opinion given the
importance of the latter and state power for understanding regime trajectories
in post-Soviet pseudo-democracies. I assume that politically motivated rival
oligarchs organize their struggle for political power against the incumbent
regime mainly by emulating the regime’s strategies to maintain power. The
broad pattern in this struggle, in my view, is that oligarchs strive to match or
surpass the regime’s state power by developing their own organizational
capacity. In addition, they devote significant resources to increasing their
reputation and credibility as a rival among the public (hence, striving to sway
mass opinion). As for oligarchs’ bid for power against the regime, I assume
that they make primary efforts to: a) increase their organizational capacity, b)
develop their personal reputation and c) perform a credible opposition to the
40
regime. Furthermore, the degree of the regime’s state power shapes not only
its ability to counteract all these efforts by rival oligarchs, but also provides
the regime a largely overlooked, yet perfect opportunity to manipulate mass
opinion by showing the superiority of the main regime leader over wealthy
and powerful rival oligarchs. I believe that this is a crucial maintenance tool
because struggles for power revolve primarily around influential individuals in
post-Soviet pseudo-democracies. This thesis underlines that this overlooked
tool is of key importance for improving our understanding about how pseudo-
democratic regimes use their state power to manipulate mass opinion in order
to stay in power and the oligarchs’ crucial role in these processes.
As briefly noted previously, one central component in a quest for power is
establishing and maintaining an effective organizational capacity.
Unfortunately, the meaning of organizational capacity for political purposes
remains poorly defined across political science research (Anderson & Jones,
1998; Burnell, 2000; Bunce, McFaul & Stoner-Weiss, 2010; Carnes, 2014).
However, such a capacity, in my view, consists of four major pillars of
organizational resources—monetary, human, administrative and media
resources. Monetary/financial resources are the liquid funds for financing
goods and services for the political struggle. Wealth obviously plays one of
the most important roles in enhancing one’s organizational capacity. One
example in point is Ukraine where wealthy oligarchs paid nearly $5 million to
buy a seat for their entourage in the Ukrainian parliament (Rada) during
Viktor Yanukovych’s tenure (Åslund, 2014: 67). Another example is from
Russia where the then influential oligarch Mikhail Khodorkovsky reportedly
offered two oppositions parties $100 million to join him in opposing Putin and
his party of power (Goldman, 2004: 37). Another key pillar in organizational
capacity is human resources. This pillar refers to the people oligarchs employ
to work in their political team in their quest for power. Such resources involve,
but are not limited to, creating or joining a political party or party alliance, the
successful recruitment of skilled and respectable persons to the political team,
having cronies appointed to political commissions, ministries or other offices
alike (also in the legislative body). The pillar of administrative resources
refers to the oligarch’s ability to use his official positions in his quest for
political power. Important examples of such positions include ministerial and
other formal positions within the state administration or other prominent
influential organizations (Hale, 2005: 145; Allina-Pisano, 2010: 374). Finally,
the media resources pillar pertains to traditional TV channels, radio stations,
traditional and online news agencies that are crucial for carrying out political
campaigns. In particular, direct access or possession of media resources helps
the candidate to spread the political word and mobilize the masses, which are
central to the improvement of the overall political and organizational strength.
For instance, studies suggest that oligarchs in many parts of the post-Soviet
context have enhanced their media coverage by acquiring popular newspapers,
websites and TV channels (Nemtsov, 1999; Pleines, 2009).
41
I assume that all the four pillars are interrelated and mutually sustaining for an
oligarch’s mobilization for political purposes. Moreover, successful
management and improvements in each of these pillars may contribute to the
public appearance of an oligarch as a strong and credible rival. Hence, I make
the assumption that organizational capacity is closely linked to oligarchs’
efforts to enhance their reputation. Overall, gaining a potent organizational
capacity ought to be necessary in efforts to influence elite and mass
expectations about the rival oligarch’s capacity to organize and steer dominant
networks of power in case the main regime leader is dislodged. The basic
assumption here is very simple; people and elites alike generally dislike crises
and unpredicted political developments as these are perceived as more likely
to deteriorate their life conditions (Diaz-Cayeros, Magaloni & Weingast,
2007). A potential rival oligarch needs to build this organizational capacity on
his own and under active monitoring by or interference from the authorities.
The rival’s organizational capacity is not only central to developing a solid
reputation among the public, but also in inducing elite desertion by incumbent
elite members (Bunce, McFaul & Stoner-Weiss, 2010). Indeed, elites tend to
defect or disobey orders if they sense their patron’s weakness and growing
organizational strength of the rival (Bunce & Wolchik, 2010; Reuter &
Gandhi, 2011). Scholars have observed several examples of such
developments in many post-Soviet pseudo-democracies, including Ukraine,
Georgia and Kyrgyzstan, during the color revolutions (Fairbanks, 2004: 119;
Way, 2005a: 237-238; Hess, 2010). In Ukraine, for instance, the Mayor of
Kyiv, Oleksandr Omelchenko, disobeyed the orders of President Kuchma to
disperse the protesters camped out in tents in central Kyiv (D’Anieri, 2006:
344). He also provided the crowds of the Orange Revolution with necessary
assistance and resources for them to prop up their uprising against Kuchma
(Kuzio, 2005a: 35).
Another vital factor in struggles for power is the personal reputation of
those who compete for power (Bunce & Wolchik, 2010). Politicians derive
their popularity from their charisma (Weber, 1965), decent economic
performance (Treisman, 2011) and media manipulation (Dimitrov, 2009). But
what determines the credibility and reputation of an oligarch in opposition
among the bulk of the populace? Undoubtedly, charisma and popular
perceptions about the skills of the rival play important role in political
struggles as has been shown in several cases of regime changes across the
Third World (Solinger, 2001). The scholarship on business elites provides
several additional clues on the sources of oligarchs’ solid reputation (Payne,
1994; Shlapentokh, 2004). In particular, oligarchs generally establish and
maintain their own charity organizations to serve the common good. Recurrent
examples of such philanthropic activities by oligarchs include the building and
refurbishment of places of worship for believers, schools and kindergartens,
42
scholarship to students and grants aimed at covering the health expenses of the
poor (Frye, 2004; Radnitz, 2006a; Antonyan, 2015). 21
Oligarchs can also aim at receiving the endorsement of famous people.
Celebrities receive recognition and attention from the public. Boorstin (1962:
57) argued that a celebrity “is a person who is known for his well-known-
ness”. Celebrity status is typically accorded to several categories of famous
people, including, but not limited to, actors, singers, talk show hosts, famous
athletes, religious leaders and other widely known persons (Kurzman et al.,
2007). However, what all modern celebrities have in common is that they are
integral parts of an entertaining celebrity culture that prevails in and through
mass media (Jackson, 2007: 77; Kurzman et al., 2007). Ruling incumbents in
the post-Soviet context have engaged pop artists (mass concerts and other
forms of mass entertainment) to entice the public during times of severe
political threats against their regime (Korosteleva, 2012: 45). In general, the
scholarship on the effects of celebrity endorsement suggests that politicians
mainly hope that their endorsement by superstars can help them reach even
broader groups of voters. Still, the primary objective is to persuade more
voters that the politician is reputable and enjoys considerable credibility
(Marsh, Hart & Tindall, 2010). However, while evidence shows that Oprah’s
endorsement of Barack Obama in the 2008 U.S. presidential election
positively contributed to his electoral success, we more recently could witness
that the widespread celebrity endorsement of Hillary Clinton was not enough
for her to defeat Donald Trump 22 who enjoyed much lesser support among
American superstars (Bryant, 2016). I, however, find it reasonable to expect
that oligarchs will make substantial efforts to receive celebrity endorsement in
their struggle for power. The major rationale is twofold. On the one side,
studies have yet to show how decisive Trump’s own celebrity status was for
his victory. This is something we can generalize to other politically motivated
business elites who have the resources to increase positive media coverage
about them. On the other hand, since influential politicians seek to boost their
election campaigns and the main leader’s popularity by recurrently deploying
celebrities (Street, 2012; Amos, Holmes & Strutton, 2008; Jackson, 2007;
Garthwaite & Moore, 2008), we should also observe that the political struggle
between a wealthy rival oligarch and a pseudo-democratic regime will include
21
The skeptical reader might argue that such charities are pure articulations of clientelism. However,
Hicken (2011) maintains that four factors separate clientelism from other forms of social relationships.
Clientelism is characterized by 1) personal relationships between individuals and the patrons or their
brokers, 2) exchanges of services and goods in patron-client relationships that are contingent on the
promises of or the immediate delivery of beneficial services or goods, 3) personal exchanges marked
by a clear hierarchical order between the patron and his clients and 4) clientelistic exchanges that are
always iterative. Finally yet importantly, Hicken further asserts that these four factors tend to overlap.
22
Trump fits well into the typical definition of an oligarch discussed in this study.
43
efforts to receive celebrity endorsements as part of their efforts to sway mass
opinion given common practices of state power abuse by the incumbents.
A third central factor in oligarchs’ bid for power by enhancing public
opinion about them is the importance of performing a credible opposition to
the regime. How can rival oligarchs develop the reputation of a credible
challenger in their quest for the highest political power? The pertinent
literature on oligarchs’ political quest is virtually silent on this issue, which is
why I derive my inspiration for this argument from Andreas Schedler’s (2013)
recognized and much praised work on pseudo-democratic regime maintenance
and breakdown. The major focus in his explanatory framework is on the
importance of performing acts of power dominance by the regime and
opposition by its rivals. More specifically, Schedler (2013) points out that
pseudo-democratic regimes use their power and resources to shape political
realities and appearances. These need to be emitted to the masses since a
distinguishing characteristic of pseudo-democracies is a substantial lack of
reliable information about the true state of affairs in the regime. What also
characterizes pseudo-democracies is the substantial lack of trustworthy
communication owing to the fact that the political life is uncertain and
distorted. Therefore, everything pseudo-democratic authorities do means
something if these performances are communicated to audiences. The same
goes for challengers. Their acts of opposition are of importance mainly as
performances of opposition (if these are displayed to multiple audiences).
Showing strength, mobilizing or rather remaining inactive always says
something about the relations between the opposition actor and the regime
(Schedler, 2013: 44).
To sustain themselves in power or to minimize the risk of ouster from
office, incumbents in pseudo-democracies need to stage several important
factors “in the authoritarian theatre of politics” (Schedler, 2013). The first is
performing elite cohesion. Factionalism and elite struggles are inherent in all
countries (Schedler & Hoffmann, 2012; Geddes, 1999: 121) and harmless for
pseudo-democratic regime survival unless being displayed publicly. Strong
state and coercive capacity deters such articulation of elite fissures (Schedler,
2013: 47). The second key factor is staging public support or compliance with
the domination of ruling state elites. Pseudo-democratic governments generate
believable signs of such support and obedience by resorting to persuasion or
intimidation in the framework of their state power (Schedler, 2013: 49). What
is more, I assume that pseudo-democratic regimes demonstrate the
organizational strength of their state power against their political rivals to
shape a reality of their invincibility and the absence of formidable and credible
challengers. It therefore comes as no surprise that such performances of power
are most intensive close to national elections (Simpser, 2013) that serve as a
crucial focal point for the manifestation of the regime’s capacity and political
dominance (Blaydes, 2011: 239). Correspondingly, the recipe for a credible
rival’s success is to provide a competing performance that shows the opposite
44
of the appearances and realities that regime actors constantly shape to secure
their stay in power (Schedler, 2013: 49). Overall, I believe that performing a
credible opposition to the regime is about developing an organizational
capacity and reputation that appear to outperform the rival ruling leader’s state
power and efforts to ensure popularity and elite cohesion. I, hence, assume
that the struggle for popular support is reciprocal: when one side works to
enhance its credibility, the rival needs to counteract these efforts. In other
words, neither the incumbents nor the politically determined rival oligarchs
can desist from undertaking countermeasures to the rival’s performance of
opposition or power, respectively.
The acts of regime domination or rival actors’ opposition are performed
and emitted to multiple addressees in pseudo-democracies. These
communicated performances always tell us something about the actors and
their interaction with others (Schedler & Hoffmann, 2016; Schedler, 2013).
Media, as already hinted, is one of the most important tools in such political
struggles over shaping the reality. In particular, media provides shortcuts to
massive values of information (Cialdini, 2009). Access to media helps to
enhance a politician’s reputation and with favorable coverage politicians can
mobilize the large masses for a common cause (Dimitrov, 2009: 80). I
therefore suppose that oligarchs are most likely to exploit the full potential of
their own media resources or other media outlets to disseminate their
performance of opposition to the regime aside from elevating themselves
above their competitors. Given the theoretical discussion on the centrality of
mass opinion in oligarchs’ and incumbent elites’ political strategies, the
second hypothesis to be tested in this thesis reads:
Hypothesis 2 (H2): All individual, politically motivated rival

oligarchs operate with the intention of enhancing public opinion
about themselves by developing their personal reputation,
organizational capacity and by performing a credible opposition to
the regime.
Furthermore, I theorize how politically motivated, rival oligarchs can conduct

such performances of opposition in contexts with differing levels of autonomy
from the state. In particular, I hypothesize that the mechanism of state
interference with oligarchs’ bid for power through their primary aim at public
opinion, as expressed in the aforementioned three key components, differs
slightly due to varying degrees of state power of ruling pseudo-democratic
regimes. As already hinted earlier, we should expect less oligarchic autonomy
from the state in countries with relatively stronger state power and UPF. In
such contexts, where the overlap of politics and economy is more common
(Hanson & Teague, 2005), the regime will be more successful in counteracting
rival oligarchs. However, the more nuanced perspective of this thesis is to
look at these supposed differences in light of the slightly different incentives
45
of incumbent elites with stronger state power. In particular, I believe that these
incumbents’ major aim ought to be to show the regime’s absolute dominance
and the lack of credible rivals capable of ousting or outperforming them. Thus,
it is not primarily about repressing the rivals by means of greater state power,
but about manipulating mass opinion about their rival oligarchs. I thus assume
that we should expect that the oligarchs competing for power in countries with
stronger state power and UPF would display unpredictability and wavering in
their opposition to the regime by yielding to incumbent elites’ demands in
critical circumstances. It is therefore more likely that we will observe the two
aforementioned patterns close to national elections and in the wake of
collective challenges against the regime. Put differently, although we should
expect the authorities in all pseudo-democracies would abuse their state power
to prevent oligarchs from developing their organizational capacity, reputation
and credibility, we are more likely to observe that oligarchs essentially fail in
these undertakings as well as in struggles for power in pseudo-democracies
where the regime has greater state power and UPF. This key assumption forms
the basis for the last hypothesis to be tested:
Hypothesis 2a (H2a): We should expect that all pseudo-democratic

regimes abuse their state power against their rival oligarch.
However, a stronger state power enables the authorities to damage
the credibility of the rival oligarch primarily by making him appear
unpredictable and unreliable in the eyes of the public (H2a). This
enables the main regime leader to elevate himself above key, rival
oligarchs and thereby improve the prospects for regime
maintenance.
46
Chapter three: Research design, method,
material and operationalization of
hypotheses
This chapter is divided into several sections. The subsequent part introduces
the main rationale for choosing mixed methods as the research design of this
thesis. In the remaining sections of this chapter, I discuss at length the
processes of collecting and analyzing data for the empirical chapters of this
study. This discussion will focus on the operationalization of key variables
and hypotheses as well as on methodological considerations with regard to the
more specific research questions of this study. I will also focus on discussing
the rationale behind the selection of cases that constitute the subunits of study
interest.
Mixed-method research design

The study design is a key blueprint of all scientific inquiry. Research design is
generally defined as the framework of methods and procedures that instruct
the researcher in how to organize data gathering and the analysis of variables
based on the theoretical framework of the study (Creswell, 2013). Thus,
important aspects that the current section of the thesis needs to pay particular
attention to are defining the study type of this thesis, data collection
approaches and the plan for analyzing the data (Philliber, Schwab & Sloss,
1980). Last, but not least, all these crucial components of the research design
need to be discussed in relation to the more specific research questions of this
thesis.
This thesis rests on a mixed-method research design involving both
qualitative case studies as well quantitative analyses. The choice of mixed-
method design was indispensable as the research questions this thesis
addresses necessitate both qualitative and statistical analyses in order to gain a
better understanding of the role of oligarchs in the multifaceted framework of
47
mass opinion and state power concentration with regard to regime trajectories.
Next, I spell out the components of this research design in more detail.
Scholars have proffered various definitions for case study (Stake, 1995;
Hancock & Algozzine, 2011: 15; Yin, 2003; Baxter & Jack, 2008). In this
thesis, I refer to the case study research as a thorough examination of an event,
situation, activity or organizations and individuals within their natural context
for the purpose of understanding a broader group of similar units (Gerring,
2004: 342; Hancock & Algozzine, 2011: 15). A central concept hierarchy in
case study research is composed of four key terms—the population, unit, case
and observation. Gerring stresses that a population is composed of the studied
(a sample) and unexamined cases. The sample, in turn, is comprised of one or
more units that we observe at distinct points in time, which represent the term
“cases”. Finally, the cases built upon relevant variables that are represented by
“observations” (Gerring, 2004: 342). The primary unit of analysis in my thesis
is an activity or spatially and periodically bounded phenomenon—the role of
oligarchs in regime trajectories in the framework of such key processes as
mass opinion and state power concentration and abuse in post-Soviet pseudo-
democracies. This unit of analysis is composed of several cases that represent
different instances of the previously mentioned aspect in a number of post-
Soviet pseudo-democracies. Hence, the immediate population that this thesis
primarily draws inferences to is to be found in the post-Soviet context of
pseudo-democracies. Above this level, we can more cautiously also attempt to
infer to the comparable interrelationship in the remaining (omitted from the
sample) pseudo-democracies of the world. In other words, this hierarchical
logic resembles the substantial design of a nested Russian doll because every
nested level is crucial for understanding the entirety. Gerring further argues
that social science research is concerned with multiple levels of analysis. This
implies that the definitions of the discussed terms in the hierarchical
conceptual apparatus of case study research may differ due to alternative
specifications of the research question. Nevertheless, all the mentioned nested
concepts have distinct meanings in the context of a single research proposition
by helping the researcher to define the principal unit of analysis (Gerring,
2004: 342).
A growing number of scholars have stressed that separating single case
study research from cross-unit, comparative case studies is indefensible (Yin,
2003: 46; Gerring, 2004; Hancock & Algozzine, 2011: 33). The reason is that
these modes of analysis are epistemologically interrelated. In particular, cross-
unit research draws on case study work and, conversely, single-unit studies
typically make comparisons to broader groups of cases. Thus, the single-unit
and comparative cross-unit study frameworks are inescapably intertwined
(Gerring, 2004: 353; Bennett, 2004: 21). In addition, the case study research is
perfectly compatible with the inclusion of qualitative and quantitative
methods. In fact, scholars recommend using mixed methods since it enables
the study to profit from various sources of evidence (Yin, 2003: 13-14).
48
An important aspect in the framework of the case study research within a
mixed-method design is the extension of research findings to the population.
In such a research design, there are two approaches to generalization of
results. The first one refers to statistical generalization. Scholars apply
statistical models to a sample of cases from the entire population of cases in
order to make statistical inferences about the population (Agresti & Finlay,
2014). In contrast to statistical methods, replication refers to a common
approach in qualitative methods to reproduce the results of prior studies. The
replication in this respect implies that previously developed theories are used
as an analytical framework to interpret the empirical results of the case study
(Yin, 2003: 32-33). In other words, while in purely statistical studies scholars
are able to refer to generalization of the results in their sample, in case studies
scholars should rather speak of successfully replicating prior results and
suggestions in the framework of analytical generalization (Yin, 2003: 33).
This thesis subscribes to the discussed arguments by carrying out mixed-
methods studies in a framework of both single-unit as well as cross-unit
modes of analysis. In addition, it also follows the recommendations about the
differences in generalization approaches.
There is a large variety of case study types (Stake, 1995; Yin, 2003;
Goodrick, 2014). However, most case study research deals with describing
and explaining bounded (in time and space) phenomena and activities
(Gerring, 2004; Sprinz & Wolinsky-Nahmias, 2004; Bennett, 2004).
Descriptive case studies aim at presenting a thorough description of a
phenomenon or activity within its context. Explanatory case studies seek to
establish causes and effects that illustrate how some events occur and
influence particular outcomes (Hancock & Algozzine, 2011: 33). This thesis
combines these two types in order to gain a better understanding of the
principal unit as well as the subunits of analysis in this study.
Thus, the foundation of this thesis is a mixed-method research design with
a particular focus on case study research. Yin argues that case studies focus on
a single unit of analysis, which can have multiple subunits (Yin, 2003: 45).
Yin further argues that an analysis of subunits can provide the reader with
better insights into the primary unit of analysis. In addition, he stresses that
scholars should reorient their analytical attention back to the main unit of
analysis. However, a greater shift of the focus to the subunits is justified if it
can be shown to improve the understanding of the theorized relationship (Yin,
2003: 45-46). Against this background, the subunits of this thesis are as
follows: 1) the relationship between oligarchs, their political power and
ordinary people’s normative support for democracy in five post-Soviet
pseudo-democracies (Armenia, Georgia, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine), 2)
four individual rival oligarchs’ bid for power with respect to how they interact
with incumbents and mass opinion in Armenia, Georgia, Russia and Ukraine,
respectively and 3) a focused, single subunit case study of the aforementioned
interaction in Ukraine—a country where oligarchs have been most prominent
49
for regime change. All these choices of subunits correspond to the three
respective research questions of this thesis, through which it aims to gain a
better understanding of the role of oligarchs in key processes for regime
trajectories with respect to mass opinion and state power abuse by the ruling
leadership. In the remaining part of this chapter, I provide the rationales for
the selection of cases, materials, methods as well focus on the
operationalization of key variables and hypotheses in this thesis.
First empirical chapter: Case selection, research

material, operationalization of hypotheses and
method
What is the relationship between oligarchs, their political power and popular
support for democracy in principle? This is the research question that guides
the first empirical chapter (Chapter four). Two hypotheses have been proposed
earlier in order to address the question: H1—we should expect that actual
political inequality to the benefit of oligarchs and perceptions of unfair wealth
distribution are negatively associated with normative support for democracy
across all post-Soviet pseudo-democracies; H1a—the negative effect of
political inequality to the benefit of oligarchs and perceptions of unfair wealth
distribution on normative support for democracy will be more pronounced in
countries with a greater degree of state power concentration in the hands of the
regime. The chapter builds upon the following selection of pseudo-
democracies in this region: Armenia, Georgia, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine.
There are three important reasons for focusing on these countries. First, they
have characteristics closely resembling each other with regard to social,
cultural and political aspects (Ishiyama & Kennedy, 2001; Hess, 2010: 30).
An additional reason for opting for these countries is data availability.
Unfortunately, there are many difficulties in finding openly available
comparative data for most Central Asian countries such as Kyrgyzstan. There
have indeed been several important case studies of Kyrgyzstan and the
evolution of its politics. However, we still lack reliable and openly available
comparative data from this region. This is of course unfortunate for our field,
but it constitutes an externally imposed limitation the overcoming of which
calls for improving data sharing incentives among social scientists. The third
reason for selecting these five countries is the variation in their degree of
proximity to Europe—the cradle of modern democracy. In particular, many
scholars have repeatedly stressed that democratization and cultural influences
travel more easily between neighboring regions (Huntington, 1991b; Linz &
Stepan, 1996; Gleditsch & Ward, 2006; Brinks & Coppedge, 2006). Hence, by
studying this set of countries we should also be able to take into account such
key aspects important for regime trajectories.
50
The chapter employs quantitative data that are publicly available. I use key
variables from such established data sources as the World Values Survey
(WVS), the Quality of Government (QOG) and Varieties of Democracy (V-
Dem) projects. Since the support for democracy is studied at the individual
level and the hypotheses H1 and H1a involve contextual elements, we need to
resort to such statistical models that enable us to measure the effects (rather
than controlling for them by fixed effects) from these different categories of
variables. Before presenting the choice and rationale for choosing multi-level
mixed methods, I operationalize the key variables and hypotheses guiding the
first empirical chapter.
This study has been largely guided by prior research in operationalizing the
dependent variable. More specifically, there has been a long discussion about
what variables are most relevant in capturing support for democracy in the
abstract. One important argument supported by many prior studies is that
several parameters need to be estimated as to measuring democratic support
(Diamond, 1999; Krieckhaus et al., 2013). Magalhães (2014) shows that some
specific dimensions of democratic support can be discerned in the WVS
dataset. Following the conventional wisdom in prior research (Magalhães,
2014: 82), I constructed an additive index variable quantifying normative
democratic support among the public. It is here, again, worth noting that past
literature on democratic support has interchangeably used such labels as
abstract or diffuse support to refer to normative support for democracy (Rose,
Mishler & Haerpfer, 1998; Norris, 1999). Normative support for democracy is
in this thesis measured by an additive index of the WVS variables e117
“Political system: having a democratic political system” and e123
“Democracy may have problems but it’s better than any other form of
government”. This composite variable 23 was further transformed to a scale
ranging from 0 to 10 so that higher values reflect increasing support for
democracy. Descriptive statistics for all variables of the first empirical chapter
are provided in the Appendix to the first empirical chapter.
It is important to employ a variable that focuses on general mass attitudes
towards wealth concentration in their society as the relationship between
oligarchs and their political power (as discussed in length in the theory
chapter) revolves primarily around the key incentive of oligarchs to
accumulate a vast wealth and ensure a lasting protection against possible
attacks by rivals and the broad masses. Moreover, it is necessary that such a
variable also measures the level of fairness as to the concentration of wealth.
23
Cronbach’s alpha for this composite variable is 0.5938 and Pearson’s r is 0.4491 (significant at the
95 % level). Following the discussion of the Cronbach’s alpha value of the exactly same composite
variable in Magalhães (2014: 94), I similarly opt for justifying the use of this composite measure as
Cronbach’s alpha has been criticized for underestimating true reliability (Sijtsma, 2008) and mean item
inter-correlation when the number of original variables it is constructed on is low—in this case, only
two variables (Iacobucci & Duhachek, 2003).
51
In these respects, the WVS variable e041 taps into citizens’ attitudes as to the
extent to which wealth accumulation in their society is considered to be taking
place at the expense of others. This individual-level variable has been
demeaned by country and year to make sure that it is relative to the context of
each respondent (this is a necessary condition for the statistical models used in
the first empirical chapter) (Scott, Simonoff & Marx, 2013). The variable
measuring attitudes towards unfair wealth distribution is central to the
empirical models below since many scholars have argued that the significance
of economic inequality is conditioned on whether it is viewed as unjust
(Bollen & Jackman, 1985: 440). Furthermore, this empirical indicator is
consistent with the theoretical concept of wealth distribution unfairness as it
measures both people’s attitudes to the wealth distribution in the society and
their evaluation of the general underlying mechanisms that shape that same
distribution. As I discussed in more detail in the theory chapter, oligarchs are
the most prominent group that has profited greatly from the post-Soviet
economy and concentrated huge wealth in its hands to the detriment of the
public at large. I, therefore, assume that this variable provides an important
complementary basis for the theorized mechanism (see the theory chapter) that
drives the relationship between oligarchs, their political power and mass
support for regime in principle in the post-Soviet context of pseudo-
democracies.
A key explanatory variable at the context level originates from the V-Dem
project (Coppedge et al., 2016a). The original variable v2pepwrses_ord
(labeled as political inequality in the regression models of the first empirical
chapter) is based on the following question:
“Is political power distributed according to socioeconomic position?
Clarification: All societies are characterized by some degree of economic
(wealth and income) inequality. In some societies, income and wealth are
distributed in a grossly unequal fashion. In others, the difference between rich
and poor is not so great. Here, we are concerned not with the degree of social
inequality but rather with the political effects of this inequality. Specifically,
we are concerned with the extent to which wealth and income translates into
political power. Responses: 0: Wealthy people enjoy a virtual monopoly on
political power. Average and poorer people have almost no influence. 1:
Wealthy people enjoy a dominant hold on political power. People of average
income have little say. Poorer people have essentially no influence. 2: Wealthy
people have a very strong hold on political power. People of average or
poorer income have some degree of influence but only on issues that matter
less for wealthy people. 3: Wealthy people have more political power than
others. But people of average income have almost as much influence and poor
people also have a significant degree of political power. 4: Wealthy people
have no more political power than those whose economic status is average or
poor. Political power is more or less equally distributed across economic
groups.”
52
I have recoded the original variable into three new categories: 1 (the old
values 0 and 1), 2 (the same old value 2) and 3 (the old values 3 to 4) for the
purposes of this thesis. The above variable is based on the evaluations of a
large number of country experts and, to my knowledge, is the best available
proxy for domination of oligarchs as a group with the wealth component at the
center. Moreover, the original creators of this variable emphasize this variable
as a measure of political inequality based on the prominence of wealth
(Coppedge et al., 2016b). Since my operational definition of an oligarch rests
primarily on the possession of huge wealth and its importance for political
influence, using this proxy in my study is motivated in the absence of more
specific variables mentioning the concept of oligarchs in the original question.
In addition, using this variable as a proxy for oligarchs’ political power is
justified since it focuses primarily on the role of wealth and not political office
for political power and dominance. Taken together, I expect that the variables
v2pepwrses_ord (proxy for political inequality to the benefit of oligarchs) and
e041 (mass attitudes towards an unfair wealth distribution) are negatively
associated with my composite variable (consisting of the WVS variables e117
and e123) for normative democratic support (hence, hypothesis H1).
The hypothesis H1a expects that the negative effect of political inequality
to the benefit of oligarchs and perceptions of unfair wealth distribution on
normative support for democracy will be stronger in post-Soviet pseudo-
democracies with a higher level of state power concentration in the hands of
the regime. For this purpose, I employ an original, combined measure of state
power and UPF provided in Levitsky and Way (2010a). The composite
variable rests on several key components: state coercive capacity, the strength
of the ruling party and discretionary state control of the economy. The first
and second components involve both the scope and cohesion of the security
apparatus and the ruling party, respectively. The third component includes
measures that take into account the level of privatization and overlap of
economic and political power. Overall, the composite measure of a state’s
organizational power ranges from 0 (low power) to 8 (high power) (Levitsky
& Way, 2010a: 376-379). I believe that using this measure in my study is
justified for two main reasons. First, this is the variable used in most
established studies of pseudo-democracies of this context. Second, this
measure neatly incorporates both state power and the most important
components of an UPF. Thus and based on H1a, I assume that the state power
and UPF variable significantly and negatively amplifies the linkages tested in
H1. Put differently, the negative relationship formulated in H1 will be much
stronger in countries with higher state power in the hands of the regime. Now,
I turn to discussing the statistical method employed in the analyses of the first
empirical chapter.
A growingly popular quantitative approach in the pertinent literature on
democratic support is mixed regression models that cover both fixed and
random effects (Magalhães, 2014; Dahlberg, Linde & Holmberg, 2014). Fixed
53
effects regressions remove the omitted variable bias by looking at the effect of
a specific independent variable on the outcome variable within each case.
Random effects models, in contrast, estimate the mean of a distribution of
effects. This implies that each case in the random effects model is allowed to
contribute equally with information about the effects of each case irrespective
of its impact on the dependent variable (Scott, Simonoff & Marx, 2013).
Mixed regression models overcome most drawbacks of fixed and random
effects models by merging them into a joint regression model. This regression
model estimates the fixed effects (analogous to standard regression
coefficients) as well as provides us with the random effects that estimate
variances and covariances. Multilevel mixed models, in their turn, enable us to
account for the random effects at different levels of a nested system
(Goldstein, 2011). The random part of these models involves both random
intercepts and random slope. Random intercept models enable us to both
control for and measure variation in the dependent variable due to the
contextual level of study interest. In particular, such a model estimates
separate intercepts for the group variable in question. Random slope models,
instead, enable the explanatory variable to have a different slope (different
effect for each group) (Snijders & Bosker, 2012). More plainly, the main
advantages of mixed model regression are that it enables the researcher to
measure what proportion of the variation in the dependent variable is due to
the context of interest (such as the country) in addition to estimating the
impact of the independent variable on the outcome variable by controlling for
the nested structure of the data (Rabe-Hesketh & Skrondal, 2006; Bickel,
2007; Rabe-Hesketh & Skrondal, 2012; Snijders & Bosker, 2012). Following
the current stream of contemporary research on regime support, this thesis
likewise employs this statistical model in studying the pertinent hypotheses of
this thesis. It is still worth emphasizing that because only five country-
contexts (Armenia, Georgia, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine) are employed in
the random parts of the mixed multilevel models, drawing inferences from
results to all other pseudo-democracies in the world requires extreme caution.
However, it is at the same time worth noting that the use of this method is
greatly justified as the main empirical focus of this thesis is to infer to the
population of six post-Soviet pseudo-democracies of which five are part of the
analysis, and because it enables us to measure between-country variations in
contrast to simply controlling for them by country dummy variables (fixed
effects).
54
Second empirical chapter: Case selection, research
material, operationalization of hypotheses and
method
The second empirical chapter (Chapter five) of this thesis is guided by the
research question that asks how oligarchs interact with incumbents and mass
opinion given that dominant explanations of regime trajectories in post-Soviet
pseudo-democracies accentuate the crucial role of either mass opinion or state
power concentration in the hands of the regime. Two essentially qualitative
hypotheses are proposed to answer this question. First, we should expect that
all individual, politically motivated rival oligarchs operate with the intention
of enhancing public opinion about themselves by developing their personal
reputation, organizational capacity and by performing a credible opposition to
the regime (H2). Second, although we should expect the authorities in all
pseudo-democracies would counteract rival oligarchs’ efforts to develop their
organizational capacity, reputation and credibility, we are more likely to
observe that oligarchs essentially fail in these undertakings as well as in
struggles for power in pseudo-democracies where the regime has greater state
power and UPF. Thus, the stronger state power enables the authorities to
damage the credibility of the rival oligarch primarily by making him appear
unpredictable and unreliable in the eyes of the public (H2a).
As already noted earlier, this will be primarily studied by exploring the
political struggle of four rival oligarchs who vied for the ultimate political
power in Armenia, Georgia, Ukraine and Russia. There are several important
reasons justifying the choice of these countries. The primary reason relates to
methodological considerations. Armenia, Georgia, Ukraine and Russia
comprise an interesting set of countries that are similar as group, but also have
a significant variation within the group. In particular, Armenia and Georgia,
on the one side, and Russia and Ukraine, on the other, share similar cultural
identities, respectively. However and as already discussed earlier, Armenia
and Russia have been recognized as countries with higher state power
concentration in the hands of the incumbent regime in contrast to Georgia and
Ukraine. The current discussion is intended to emphasize the fact that
although post-Soviet pseudo-democracies as a group are more similar to each
other in contrast to other pseudo-democracies in the world, they also have a
significant variation within the group. Thus, the main reason for choosing this
set of countries relates to the objective of finding a design that offers a broader
perspective on how oligarchs interact with incumbents and mass opinion given
the centrality of mass opinion and state power abuse in the regime trajectories
of post-Soviet pseudo-democracies. In this regard, Peters argues that the “most
different design”, which is the closest prototype with regard to the comparison
of this set of four countries, enables us to investigate whether the assumed
relationship in H2 also holds in different contexts (the level of state power and
55
UPF is of particular importance in H2a). The most different design, thus,
offers a greater degree of confidence in that the linkage in question is not
driven by omitted variable bias that is much greater in relatively similar
contexts (Peters, 1998: 40). It is here also worth repeating that this thesis does
not intend to explain regime trajectories, but rather seeks to contribute to the
pertinent literature by assessing the role of oligarchs in regime trajectories
within the framework of such central factors as mass opinion and state power
abuse for understanding regime trajectories. In other words and as clarified
earlier, the main aim of this thesis is to study how the role of oligarchs plays
out in the aforementioned dimensions underlying regime trajectories.
There are a number of additional reasons why I chose these countries and
opted for focusing on the four oligarchs Gagik Tsarukyan (Armenia), Bidzina
Ivanishvili (Georgia), Mikhail Prokhorov (Russia) and Petro Poroshenko
(Ukraine). First, these oligarchs have made their very similar bids for power
more recently, which can be seen from the perspective of certain waves in
oligarchs’ concerted efforts to take over the ultimate power. Although this
thesis has no intentions to provide more details about any possible diffusion
effect, I still want to particularly mention that as in the case of democratic
waves I assume that political ideas travel from one country to another in such
tightly interwoven geo-political regions as the post-Soviet context of pseudo-
democracies. To provide just one example, as will be shown later key players
referred to the actions of Tsarukyan in light of Ivanishvili’s political path to
power. Second and relatedly, all these countries gained their independence
almost concurrently and mainly followed similar political development.
Therefore, such important regime maintenance tools as the abuse of state
power and manipulation of mass opinion have been key factors in the regime
trajectories of all four countries. Third and from a more practical and applied
point of view, qualitative data collection from e-sources has been relatively
easier in these four countries in contrast to a larger set of countries for reasons
of availability of resources with respect to periods of time of interest and the
author’s proficiency in the original languages of sources. While being fluent in
every of the main languages in these four countries would have been a great
advantage, the author only has a good command of Armenian and Russian.
My knowledge of Russian has been a necessary precondition for being able to
gather qualitative data from web-based news agencies in Georgia, Ukraine and
Russia. The same is valid for Armenian. Indeed, Gerring contends that the
collection of data is typically easier and coding schemes are more reliable if
the researcher has a good command of the language of the data material
(Gerring, 2004: 353). Finally, these prominent oligarchs created their own
parties or party alliances, and invested substantial resources in their political
struggle for power against the incumbent elites of these four countries who
abused their state power to maintain their regime. In sum, the justification for
choosing this set of oligarchs is in line with the recommendations of case
study research that instructs us to bind the cases that are studied. More
56
specifically, scholars with expertise in case study research (Baxter & Jack,
2008: 546-547) stress that we need to place clear boundaries on our selection
of cases based on considerations of time and space (Creswell, 2013), time and
activity (Stake, 1995) and by definition and context (Miles & Huberman,
1994). In my view, my previously outlined justifications for choosing these
four oligarchs correspond well with these guidelines on binding the cases of
study interest.
Chapter five is mainly a qualitative comparative study that employs unique
data gathered from four online media outlets in Armenia, Georgia, Ukraine
and Russia. News reports are essential resources as they provide evidence of
patterns, sequences and detailed accounts of processes, events and activities
(Beach & Pedersen, 2011: 143). In the same vein and for all the four countries,
I used the local versions of the most widely used search engines such as
Google or Bing to search for the names of the four oligarchs. By going
through more than a dozen news media outlets, I chose only those that offered
the largest coverage of articles on these oligarchs. In the case of Armenia, I
chose the Armenian version of the very popular Azatutyun.am, Radio Liberty
Armenia’s official website. This media resource has been one of the most
established news media agencies in Armenia with great coverage of political
issues. In the case of Georgia, I used Sputnik-Georgia.ru for the greatest
coverage of political news in Georgia. It is here worth mentioning that Sputnik
has more recently given rise to considerable public concerns with regard to it
being an unspoken outlet of Kremlin propaganda. This information was not
available at the time of the author’s data collection. However, it is worth
mentioning that special care was given to all original articles from this source
with regard to its potential to report fake news or exaggerated facts.
Fortunately, no such occurrences have been found in Sputnik-Georgia.ru for
the period studied in this thesis (a sample of articles was crosschecked by the
author against articles in other media reports). I collected reports from Ria-
Novosti.ru in order to follow Prokhorov’s political path. This resource is an
established media outlet with great coverage of the Russian political life.
Finally, I used news reports from Censor.net.ua to gather information about
Poroshenko in Ukraine. I used the Russian version of the website, which has
almost as good coverage of Ukrainian politics as the Ukrainian version.
Overall, I searched for and pulled out every media report about the four
oligarchs from these media outlets.
I coded 13 indicators of relevance to my study and this was primarily
based on the research question and hypotheses that guide Chapter five. Let us
have a closer look at the criteria for coding schemes in Table 1 below:
57
Table 1. Coding scheme for measuring relevant indicators
1. Efforts to increase IF: Charity, recruitment of/ support for (from) popular athletes,
his reputation superstars, religious leaders or current/former elected officials
etc.
2. Increase in financial IF: increase in business resources or wealth.
resources
3. Increase in media IF: purchase of such media resources as TV and radio channels,
resources traditional and digital newspapers etc.
4. Increase in his IF: establishing a party; joining a political alliance or party;
human resources employment of important persons in his staff or party; he or his
closest relatives are being appointed to political commissions/
ministries / offices alike.
5. Increase in his IF: Important examples of such positions include ministerial and
administrative other formal positions within the state administration or other
resources prominent influential organizations.
6. Attack against his IF: negative statements about the oligarch (general rumors are
reputation excluded) made by his political opponents.
7. Attack against his IF: attacks by the authorities against his own or other
media resources broadcasters/outlets that favor him and his political agenda.
8. Attack against his IF: attacks/investigations against his staff, party, foundation,
human resources affiliated ministries /commissions
9. Attack against his IF: attacks against factors mentioned in (2) above.
financial resources
10. Russian attack IF: (9) is made by Russian authorities.
against his financial
resources
11. Politically IF: specific legal obstacles posed by the authorities to prevent
motivated him from standing in elections or serving in an elected office.
discrimination against
him
12. Contribution to IF: contributes to joint opposition challenges against the
collective action incumbents. Such contributions involve being among the leaders
of demonstrations or being part of a collective monitoring of
electoral procedures.
13. No contribution to IF: he or his representatives / staff do not contribute to (12).
collective action
Notes: IF: means that at least one of the listed criteria should be met in order to score 1.
I applied the above criteria to all media reports in coding the indicators
presented in Table 1. Multiple variables were coded from one and the same
news media report in those cases where more than one of the above criteria
were met during my reading of the original source. In addition, I made every
possible effort to avoid coding the same “event” as additional events due to
repetitive news reporting or a summary of previous events in the end of some
news media articles.
Chapter five employs mixed methods in analyzing news media reports. In
particular, I quantified qualitative data from the media reports in order to make
a brief quantitative content analysis (see Table 1 for the variables). Such an
58
analysis calls for clear identification and coding of theoretical themes and
concepts derived from the theoretical discussion (hence the hypotheses) of this
thesis. Following concrete recommendations in the pertinent literature
(Hancock & Algozzine, 2011: 59), my thesis quantified qualitative data by
reading through media reports and by establishing analytical categories that
are guided by the discussion in prior work and the theory chapter. I later
counted the number of entries in each category for descriptive statistics to be
able to demonstrate the patterns in the empirical data. The analysis in the
second empirical chapter starts by focusing on the political path of the four
oligarchs to either a successful rise to power or a failure in this struggle. All
four oligarchs’ political struggle is presented as a narrative that follows the
chain of events in news reporting. The chapter will then conclude with a
synthesizing analysis by focusing on the common findings from all the four
cases (Hancock & Algozzine, 2011: 56; Goodrick, 2014: 2-7). Next, I
operationalize the key variables and hypotheses that guide the analysis of the
oligarchs’ struggle against the regime in the framework of mass opinion and
state power abuse.
Based on the discussion of this thesis’s analytical framework for
understanding how oligarchs interact with incumbents and mass opinion in the
framework of state power abuse, I first coded four variables that capture the
development of oligarchs’ organizational capacity. Variables 2 to 5 in Table 1
are coded as 1 correspondingly if the criteria for increases in the specific
components of organizational capacity are met. In particular, I coded as
increase in financial resources if the oligarch in question received gains in his
business resources or wealth (based on the earlier, more specific discussion in
the theory chapter). Additional increase in media resources was coded
whenever the oligarch purchased TV and radio channels, traditional and
digital newspapers etc. The variable “increase in his human resources” was
coded as 1 if the media reports showed that the oligarch founded or joined a
political party or alliance, recruited key individuals to serve in his staff/party
or if his close relatives were appointed to key political commissions, offices or
organizations. I coded as increase in his administrative resources if the
oligarch was appointed to ministerial and other formal position within the state
administration or some other influential organization since these factors
improve his ability to use his official position in his bid for power. An
additional key variable is No. 1 that is coded as efforts to increase his
reputation whenever media reports showed that he made charity, recruited or
got support from various celebrities and politicians.
As already discussed earlier, prior work has emphasized the centrality of
collective challenges against incumbent regimes in pseudo-democracies
(Bunce & Wolchik, 2010). I therefore coded two additional variables: No. 12
and No. 13 that capture whether or not the oligarchs contributed to collective
challenges against the regime. These variables were coded partly as measures
for performing credible opposition to the regime. Contribution to collective
59
action against the incumbent regime (No. 12) was coded as 1 whenever media
reported that he personally or his team contributed to joint opposition by being
among the leaders of protests or by participating in the opposition’s collective
monitoring of elections. As to No. 13, it is coded as 1 if he or his
representatives were expected or asked to contribute to collective action, but
remained neutral or refused (this is the main difference between the variables
No. 12 and No. 13). Taken together, all the discussed variables are empirical
measures for oligarchs’ organizational capacity, efforts to develop their
reputation and performance of a credible opposition to the regime as proposed
is H2. Yet, it is worth stressing that performing credible opposition is more
than joining or desisting from participation in collective challenges against the
regime. For this reason, the qualitative analysis of the four oligarchs’ political
bid for power will focus on additional qualitative measures such as not
standing for crucial elections or being an unreliable rival to the president.
Variables 6 to 11 measure the regime’s actions and reactions to the
oligarchs’ political struggle. As attack against oligarchs’ reputation (No. 6)
were coded 1 whenever media reported negative statements about the
oligarchs made by his political opponents (for instance, politicians from
regime-loyal parties). Variables 7 to 9 and 11 were coded as 1 correspondingly
whenever the regime attacked his media resources, human resources, financial
resources or when the regime discriminated him personally by posing legal
obstacles in order to prevent him from standing in elections or serving in an
elected office (No. 11). According to H2a, we should expect media reports
about such attacks in all pseudo-democracies in question (thus, occurrence of
state power abuses). Yet, H2a also hypothesizes in rather qualitative terms that
in countries with greater state power (such as Armenia or Russia), we will
observe that the incumbent regime will make its best to damage the rival
oligarch’s credibility by making him appear unpredictable and unreliable in
the eyes of the broad masses. This will occur in crucial circumstances, such as
collective challenges against the regime or ahead of key elections (Simpser,
2013), and will help the main regime leader to elevate himself above the rival
oligarch.
I also coded variable No. 10 that indicates whether the Kremlin attacked
the rival oligarch’s financial resources. As discussed elsewhere in this thesis,
Russia has been the black knight in the post-Soviet context by playing a
considerable role for the survival of pseudo-democratic regimes. This variable
controls for such external influence. However, it is here worth emphasizing
once more that this thesis follows those branches in prior research that
attribute decisive importance to domestic factors rather than influence from
external factors and actors in understanding regime trajectories. In other
words, what happens in domestic politics is much more important than
external influence on the polities in the post-Soviet context of pseudo-
democracies.
60
Finally, I want to devote some space to discussing the reliability of the
measures I coded from qualitative resources. In particular, in coding this
material I was greatly inspired by the coding concept used by Levitsky and
Way (2010a: 376-379) who produced quantitative measures of UPF and state
power concentration from their subjective evaluation of qualitative
phenomena simply by departing from specific criteria to be met in order to
code a given variable as 1. Moreover, such method of coding has been rather
common in prior studies of post-Soviet pseudo-democracies (Hale, 2015). It is
by definition not possible to conduct inter-coder reliability tests since only one
person (the author himself) was involved in coding the variables of the
author’s unique compilation of media reports on the four oligarchs. However,
the Appendix to the second empirical chapter contains a sample of web links
to news media reports about oligarchs’ efforts to increase their reputation (a
key variable in this study). The reader is welcome to verify the reliability of
my coding by visiting the web links and evaluating the information. As
clarified in more detail in Table 11, I used 12345 as the seed value for
subsampling to make the selection of links for replication entirely random (to
ensure impartiality in the selection of the subsample), but still replicable for
the interested reader. 24
Third empirical chapter: Case selection, research

material, operationalization of key variables and
method
The final empirical chapter (Chapter six) is a single case study of Ukraine.
The specific research question that guides this chapter is how the interaction
between incumbents and oligarchs in the framework of mass opinion and state
power plays out in situations where oligarchs have been most prominent for
regime change. Ukraine is of primary study interest in this chapter as it has
gone through the so-called color revolutions twice—as of yet. Moreover,
Ukraine has been the only post-Soviet country with a very high level of
oligarchic political domination (Åslund, 2015). In addition to these two major
reasons, a third rationale for focusing on Ukraine alone is that this country
stands on the brink of an extremely difficult turning point due to the severe
war with Russia and its proxy army. Since Ukraine was an influential member
country in the former Soviet Union (Solovei, 2015: 87), its cultural, political
and economic impact on the rest of post-Soviet pseudo-democracies ought to
be of great magnitude whether it successfully progresses towards more
24Unfortunately, the entire contents of all media reports cannot be presented in this thesis due both to
copyright issues and for reasons of space. However, the reader is welcome to contact the author to have
access to the data for further checking.
61
democracy or remains in pseudo-democratic status quo. These reasons for
choosing Ukraine as a case for closer study tally with the rationales offered in
the case study research. In particular, it represents a critical test of existing
theory, a unique circumstance or is revelatory (Yin, 2003: 45-46).
Accordingly, the main reason why no additional hypotheses have been
formulated earlier for this chapter is that the case of Ukraine offers a valuable
opportunity to look closely at and discuss the role of oligarchs in regime
trajectories in the framework of such central factors as mass attitudes and state
power abuse. Specifically, the first part of the chapter focuses on the role of
oligarchs in regime trajectories of Ukraine given their importance in the
crucial framework of public opinion and state power abuse. In particular,
oligarchs’ political influence and mass opinion about them was important in
struggles for power that took place in Ukraine in connection with the two
color revolutions. I attempt to reveal the preferences of incumbents and
oligarchs in Ukraine by focusing on reports of their behavior described in
prior studies. The main rationale for this exploratory approach is to offer a
better understanding of how the interaction between incumbents and oligarchs
plays out in these critical situations where oligarchs have been key players for
regime change.
The second part of the Ukraine chapter maps out and examines university
student attitudes in Kyiv about oligarchs as a group and individuals. The
chapter employs unique student survey data that was collected by the author in
the spring of 2017 in Kyiv. The main reason for opting for surveying this
group of citizens is that young people and university students in Ukraine were
the particular driving force of the two color revolutions in Ukraine
(Nikolayenko, 2007; Shveda & Park, 2016). They were the primary group of
protesters and contributed to the expansion of the number of protesters by
providing essential logistical support to the popular uprisings (McFaul, 2005;
Diuk, 2014).
The major background for understanding the justification for the specific
questions asked in the original survey derives its support mainly from the first
part of the chapter. More specifically, in constructing the original survey, the
author was guided by two major considerations. First, we need to learn more
about university student attitudes towards the role of oligarchs in the political
system and regime trajectories due to their crucial importance in the two color
revolutions in Ukraine (a further motivation is provided in the empirical
chapter). This is why I initially offer descriptive statistics on Kyiv students’
perceptions about the oligarchs’ political participation and its implications for
regime trajectories and the political system as a whole. Second, the survey
also contains variables measuring university student opinion towards the
legitimacy of oligarchs as political players in addition to their perceptions of
whether oligarchs’ participation in politics is due to their wealth accumulation
incentives. Taken together, all these aspects will help us to gain a better
understanding about how oligarchs interact with incumbent regimes and mass
62
opinion in a country where they have played a central role in regime change
(the toppling of prior pseudo-democratic regimes by two color revolutions).
Chapter six then moves on to examine what shapes Kyiv students’ opinion
towards oligarchs as a group and individuals. In particular, this chapter
explores in more detail how more specific perceptions of oligarchs’ political
role are related to mass opinion about them as a group and individuals. The
entire survey questionnaire is provided in the Appendix to the Chapter six.
Yet, here it can be stated that the survey asked the respondents the questions
about oligarchs according to a number of broad dimensions presented in the
form of statements below:
Table 2. Key variables from the Kyiv university student survey

Experience of oligarchs’ efforts to develop I personally or someone in my family
their reputation received material support from an oligarch’s
charity foundation (Q10b).
Perceptions about the political role of I trust political parties that have oligarchs in
oligarchs leading positions (Q11c).
The oligarchs are an integral part of our
current political system; expecting some
positive political changes is too naïve
(Q13c).
Our president is an oligarch (Q13b).
Perceptions about their influence on the All oligarchs in our country are corrupt and
political system promote corruption in the public
administration (Q10c).
Bureaucrats should stop working for
oligarchs (Q14a).
Only pro-Western oligarchs are conducive
to democratic development in our country
(Q11a).
Only those oligarchs who are disloyal to our
political leadership contribute to
democratization (Q11b)
By means of their political parties, oligarchs
contribute to increasing
political competition in our country (Q9c).
Perceptions about the true incentives for Oligarchs are in politics due to narrow
oligarchs’ involvement in politics material interests (Q9a).
Oligarchs are in politics to ensure their own
and their families’ survival and prosperity
(Q9b).
Some oligarchs are prepared to оr capable
of actively combating corruption (Q13a).
63
Table 2. Key variables from the Kyiv university student survey (continued)
Attitudes towards the political role and People will not accept oligarchs’
legitimacy of oligarchs given their past of participation in politics due to their
wealth accumulation strategies contested methods of wealth accumulation
(Q10a).
People would accept oligarchs as legitimate
political players if they were ready to share
their massive wealth with the people to
eradicate economic inequality (Q12a).
The dependent variables To what extent do you consider the
following persons to be honest and
politically credible (Q15)? a) Ihor
Kolomoyskyi, b) Petro Poroshenko, c) Rinat
Akhmetov.
In general, to what degree do you like the
oligarchs as a group in your country (Q8)?
Notes: The question numbers in the parentheses above refer to the questionnaire put in the
Appendix to the Ukraine chapter (Chapter six).
The entire questionnaire, which also contains important background variables,

is available in the Appendix to the empirical chapter on Ukraine. Table 2
displays the key variables from the survey fit into five coarse categories. 25 As
can be read from the table, the questions asked in the survey tapped into the
perceptions and experiences of the respondents with regard to oligarchs’
efforts to develop their reputation, the political role of oligarchs as to the
political system, their incentives for involving in politics and questions about
more specific attitudes towards oligarchs’ political legitimacy. In addition, the
questionnaire contains specific questions about Kyiv students’ attitudes
towards the oligarchs as a group and individuals (see the dependent variable
row for the names of three key oligarchs in Ukraine). 26 It is also worth
stressing that Q11a was included as a proxy variable for attitudes towards the
influence of Russia and the West on Ukrainian politics and oligarchs. Using
such a (distant) proxy as an alternative to a more direct question about Russia
was an inevitable measure in order to reduce the very likely risk of
respondents opting out from the survey due to perceived dangers of being
exposed to Ukraine’s security services for showing sympathies with Russia
that has been in war with Ukraine through its proxy armies in eastern Ukraine.
I have formulated all the specific survey questions in Table 2 to capture
how oligarchs interact with incumbents and mass opinion in the framework of
prior explanations for regime trajectories with particular focus on mass
25
It is worth stressing here that some variables in the table can be fit into more than one dimension.
26As will be clarified in detail in the first part of the Ukraine chapter, Rinat Akhmetov, Ihor
Kolomoyskyi and Petro Poroshenko have been influential oligarchs during the post-Soviet era of
Ukraine.
64
opinion and state power abuse. Departing from an integrated perspective based
on the entire theoretical discussion (see the prior research and theory chapter)
and findings from the first and second empirical chapters below, I assume that
Kyiv university students generally disfavor oligarchs as group and
individuals—central explanatory variables being their negative perceptions of
oligarchs’ shady past as to wealth accumulation and their behind-the-scene
influence on politics. Yet, I believe that individual oligarchs’ efforts to
develop their reputation by means of charity improve their reputation even
among Kyiv university students. To be sure, I use this survey mainly to
explore how the interaction of oligarchs with incumbents and mass opinion
plays out in a context of a higher level of oligarchic influence on the political
system and their greater importance for regime trajectories (Åslund, 2015).
Below, I provide more technical details about the survey and its collection in
Kyiv.
The author received money from The Swedish Network for European
Studies in Political Science (SNES) to carry out a survey of university
students in Kyiv. Since the survey questions involve sensitive questions, the
author consulted with the Regional Ethical Review Board in Linköping,
Sweden to ascertain whether the questionnaire called for an ethical review.
Although the common approach of the board is not to make preliminary
judgments, via phone and email conversations with multiple members of the
committee, we could conclude that there was no need put the questionnaire
under an ethical review. There were two specific reasons for this. First,
Swedish law on ethical review stipulates that it does not apply to data
collection outside of Sweden. The second reason is that the author designed
the questionnaire and the fieldwork in a way that made it impossible to trace
back the answers to a particular individual. Important aspects in this regard are
that the author employed only age categories, did not include questions that
asked about university affiliations or any other information that could connect
the anonymous respondents to any university or student program. The
practical data gathering added other important aspects to further securing the
anonymity of the respondents. The author employed several smartphones that
where equipped with prepaid sim-cards with access to the Internet. The author
also distributed the printed versions of the questionnaire in Russian. Thus,
every respondent that consented to be part of the questionnaire was offered the
choice to provide his/her answer either electronically or in the traditional
form. The majority of the respondents chose to provide their answers by
taking the questionnaire with them and filling in the questionnaire on the web.
All except two respondents who opted for the English version, answered the
questionnaire in Russian.
This study used the one-stage cluster sampling method (Pfefferman & Rao,
2009; Hansen, Hurwitz & Madow, 1993) to gather university student data as it
was impossible (for the previously discussed ethical considerations) to obtain
an exhaustive registry of all Kyiv students that make up the statistical
65
population of this survey. As will be shown in more detail in the empirical
chapter on Ukraine, university students in Kyiv were the driving force of the
two color revolutions in Ukraine, which justifies the focus of the survey on
this segment of population in Kyiv. The author visited the major universities
in Kyiv: Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv, Kyiv International
University, National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy, Kyiv Law School
(part of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine), Kyiv National
Economic University, Kyiv National University of Trade and Economics,
Kyiv Polytechnic Institute and Kyiv School of Economics. In particular, I
drew a simple random sample of university students from the aforementioned
cluster of universities. The author asked students outside the university
buildings to take part in the survey by handing out printed questionnaires. This
was necessary to ensure their anonymity since many universities in Kyiv
require visitors to register the reasons for their visit before they are allowed
access to university buildings. The author devoted almost two weeks to
collecting data. The respondents were current, newly enrolled or recently
graduated students. This width of the respondent category was necessary to
ensure a substantial variation in the age span of the respondents.
The survey data from Kyiv is analyzed by employing descriptive statistics
as well as simple ordinary least square regressions (OLS) with robustness
controls. OLS is one of the most established forms of regression used in all
social science research. It fits the data of this type well and enables the
researcher to examine and draw inferences about linear relationships between
the dependent and independent variables (Agresti, 2015). The goal of OLS is
to minimize residuals and generate the smallest possible standard errors. By
default, OLS grants equal importance to all observations, which increases the
risk of the regression estimating misleading results when there are significant
disturbances in some observations (Agresti & Finlay, 2014). Robust standard
errors are therefore used to downplay the effect of influential observations that
cause heteroscedasticity. Ultimately, both descriptive analysis and OLS
regressions aid this thesis in digging deeper into what university students in
Kyiv think about the oligarchs and what actually drives their opinion about
them. The latter is necessary to better understand the interaction between
incumbents and oligarchs in the framework of mass opinion and state power
abuse in a country where oligarchs have been most prominent for regime
change.
66
Chapter four: Oligarchs and normative
support for democracy
Support for democracy in post-Soviet pseudo-

democracies over time
In this part of the thesis, I provide a brief overview of normative democratic
support in the post-Soviet context of pseudo-democracies and what meanings
people attach to democracy in this context according to prior research. In
addition, I offer a brief description of the individual characteristics, group
behavior, asset types, political and media resources of post-Soviet oligarchs.
These accounts will serve as a necessary background for later statistical
analyses centered on the research question about the relationship between
oligarchs, their political power and support for democracy.
There has been an interesting body of work on how people conceive of
democracy in the post-Soviet region (Rose, Mishler & Haerpfer, 1998;
Haerpfer, 2008; Person, 2010). Studies have provided considerable evidence
about what ordinary people refer to when they think about democracy. An
early study on Russia and Ukraine from the 1990s shows that people
understood democracy as freedom of speech, freedom of beliefs, individual
choice, the rule of law and the power of the people (Miller, Hesli & Reisinger,
1997: 170). Surprisingly for the authors, people conceiving of democracy as
equal political opportunities for citizens constituted only a minuscule share of
the respondents. What was even more unexpected was that only a few number
of individuals perceived democracy as a means for furthering economic
opportunities and privatization (Miller, Hesli & Reisinger, 1997: 171). Yet,
every seventh citizen expressed negative remarks about democracy. Moreover,
scholars have warned that positive attitudes towards democracy appear to be
fluctuating from time to time (Miller, Hesli & Reisinger, 1997: 178). The
instability in democratic support has been ascribed to the absence of a deep-
rooted, ideological structure of democratic values in the political culture
(Miller, Hesli & Reisinger, 1997: 187). However, more recent studies on
67
regime support in principle in post-Soviet pseudo-democracies found
substantial bonds between positive perceptions of economic system
performance (Person, 2016), favorable attitudes towards privatization and the
free market, on the one hand, and support for democracy on the other
(Haerpfer, 2008).
Figure D. Mean democracy approval

Democracy Approval in Post-Soviet Pseudo-democracies

8
6
4
2
0

8
6
4
2
0
1990 2000 2010 1990 2000 2010 1990 2000 2010

Year
Notes: The country-averaged wvs_psdem variable emanates from the QoG 2017. However,
the original source of this variable is the World Values Survey. The original WVS question
read: “I’m going to describe various types of political systems and ask what you think about
each as a way of governing this country - Having a democratic political system.” The
respondents could choose from the following alternative answers: 1. Very bad, 2. Fairly
bad, 3. Fairly good, 4. Very good. The author has recoded this variable to range from 0 to
10 so that the max value indicates full normative approval of democracy as the best form of
government.
As can be read from Figure D, support for democracy has been varying across
post-Soviet pseudo-democracies. The figure depicts how general trends in the
approval of democracy in principle evolved over time. Normative support for
democracy has been relatively higher in Armenia (4-7) and Georgia (5-8). In
addition, support for democracy has been fluctuating most in Moldova (4-6),
and Ukraine (3-5). The lower degree of support for democracy over time
appears to be in Russia (between 0-4) and Kyrgyzstan (3-4). Yet, one can see
that it has been a significant upward trend in Russia in contrast to Kyrgyzstan
(downward trend). Taken together, Figure D depicts revealing aggregated
68
patterns of an important dimension of this chapter’s composite dependent
variable. However, of much greater importance is focusing on how such
attitudes relate to oligarchs’ behavior and political power at the individual
level of normative support for democracy. This is what this empirical chapter
will analyze a little later. Before turning our focus to these analyses, I provide
an overview of the individual characteristics as well as group behavior of post-
Soviet oligarchs in addition to the types of their assets and some other key
resources.
A general description of post-Soviet oligarchs as a

group
The main objective of the rapidly implemented economic transition from
commanded to market economy during the first half of the 1990’s was to
profoundly transform the property structure of the economy in order to break
up the old economic elite and promote foreign investment (Böröcz & Rona-
Tas, 1995: 752; Johnson, 1997: 337). A major part in these processes was
privatization that refers to the transfer of state owned assets and companies
into private hands (Braguinsky, 1994: 130). Although the primary goal of
privatization was to reduce state dominance in state interactions with firms,
the miscarried, partial liberalization of the economy led to the strengthening of
late communist era economic elites and the emergence of a new group of
oligarchs in the first half of the 1990’s. Moreover, this wave of privatization
created a huge wedge between the strategic interests of the oligarchs and the
broad social interest. The oligarchs reinforced their newly acquired position in
the economy by developing clientelistic ties with politicians through
corruption (Hellman, Jones & Kaufmann, 2003). Several scholars have
maintained that the oligarchs—the real beneficiaries of these failed reforms—
managed to secure their economic achievements by capturing the legal and
regulatory structure to the detriment of the broad public (Hellman, 1998;
Hellman, Jones & Kaufmann, 2003). Interestingly, some scholars still viewed
them as the only convincing group that was both eager and capable of
promoting economic growth and developing market institutions in a very
unfavorable business environment (Shleifer & Treisman, 2001; Boone &
Rodionov, 2002; Åslund, 2004).
In the early stages of the privatization wave (early 1990’s), the typical
oligarch was a well-educated professional with a technocratic, nomenklatura
background and Soviet era business experience. Over time, however, the
archetypal characteristic of an oligarch changed simply to prior business
experience (Böröcz & Rona-Tas, 1995: 777). In fact, while the older (insider)
group of oligarchs turned their managerial control of state enterprises into
personal ownership, the newly emerged post-transition (outsider) group of
younger oligarchs generally started from the scratch (Guriev & Rachinsky,
69
2005: 139). The outsider oligarchs made their first capital over the course of
Perestroika (the second half of the 1980s) by gaining large profits from the
loopholes of the co-existence of regulated and quasi-market prices (Guriev &
Rachinsky, 2005: 139). The newly emerged oligarchs became billionaires at
the age range of 30 to 40 years (Guriev & Rachinsky, 2005: 138). Scant
evidence from Russia suggests that the oligarchs in the outsider group were
predominantly male, better educated and most typically of Jewish descent
(Braguinsky, 2009: 315). Another key difference between these two groups of
oligarchs was that the annual incomes of the insider, Communist party linked
oligarchs were four times higher on average (Braguinsky, 2009: 326).
The oligarchs acquired vast assets from the privatization of state
enterprises in several sectors. Important among these were the energy sector,
manufacturing, banking, telecommunications, transport, food and beverages
production as well as trade and real estate (Hellman, 1998; Åslund, 2005;
Treisman, 2016). In resource-rich countries, oligarchs’ pursued their wealth
accumulation primarily through buying chemicals, minerals, oil and gas for
state-regulated, knockdown prices and by selling them abroad for much higher
market prices (Puglisi, 2003: 104-105). There is also plenty of evidence that
there has been an incessant transfer of oligarchic wealth to offshore tax havens
(Black, Kraakman & Tarassova, 2000; Fortescue, 2006; Åslund, 2015). In
fact, many post-Soviet oligarchs have moved an enormous amount of money
overseas by purchasing companies, sport clubs and immovable properties
(Hay, 2013). Evidence from the UK shows that post-Soviet oligarchs have
invested hundreds of millions of pounds in the London housing market alone
(Moss, 2014). Such acquisitions have been accompanied by allegations that
the oligarchs exploit the host country’s toleration of the secrecy laws of
offshore financial centers in moving their capital out of their home countries
to make investments (Leigh, Frayman & Ball, 2012).
The presence of oligarchs is also prominent in the post-Soviet media
market. Studies from several post-Soviet countries indicate that the oligarchs
own popular, nationwide TV channels (Ryabinska, 2014; Berglund, 2014). For
instance, key oligarchs in Ukraine own the most popular TV channels and top
national dailies. Evidence suggests that these media outlets are very seldom an
immediate source of monetary profits, but rather are crucial from a political
and social point of view. The major rationale for possessing such media
resources is to promote their own reputation and to provide coverage of their
products and services (Ryabinska, 2011). A similar situation was going on in
pre-Putin era Russia when influential oligarchs owned the most prominent
private media outlets. However, these channels were renationalized or
restructured in the wake of Putin’s rise to power—of which the most
prominent is the case of the then very popular NTV that belonged to the then
powerful oligarch and media tycoon Vladimir Gusinsky (Beumers, Hutchings
& Rulyova, 2008).
70
Political connections are equally essential for oligarchs to carry on big
business activities in the post-Soviet context. Oligarchs invest time and money
in their formal and informal political representation in order to further their
business interests. Some of the oligarchs opt for establishing their own
political parties (Matuszak, 2012; Junisbai, 2012; Sakwa, 2008a). However the
majority of oligarchs appear to stay behind the scenes and rather prefer to
engage in immediate exchanges with political and administrative elites
informally (Åslund, 2015; Frye, 2002). In this regard, an intriguing study on
Russian gubernatorial elections provides important clues to why oligarchs
choose formal participation in politics over informal influence. The study
suggests that oligarchs prefer to run for public office in regions that are
marked by a rather weak institutional environment (low media freedom and
government transparency). The authors explain this by arguing that such an
institutional environment does not hold elected officials accountable to voters
and rather facilitates their reneging on campaign promises (Gehlbach, Sonin &
Zhuravskaya, 2010).
Overall, all the discussed group behavior patterns of the oligarchs indicate
that the oligarchs as a group have been in constant flux. The Russian
experience during its post-Soviet era illustrates this argument well. First,
relatively younger oligarchs with important links to President Boris Yeltsin’s
family gradually supplanted the initial group of oligarchs with roots in Soviet
nomenklatura. Second, the composition of the oligarchs as a group changed to
tycoons with ties to president Putin and siloviki (people with roots in the
security or military services). Putin’s concerted strategy of taming several
defiant, Yeltsin era oligarchs by forcing them out of country or stripping their
assets was a key cause of this flux. At present, the Putin era oligarchs are
mainly connected to him personally. This is why current EU and American
sanctions imposed on Russia have gradually come to involve key oligarchs.
What this all implies is that the economic power of oligarchs is tightly
interwoven with political influence. Moreover, it appears to be almost an
impossible task to be an oligarch and simultaneously be politically
unconnected. Those oligarchs who have really been in conflict with the ruling
leaders have either lost or gained ground since there is very seldom any
intermediate way in the short term. I now turn to quantitative analyses of the
determinants of normative support for democracy in post-Soviet pseudo-
democracies.
71
Political inequality to the benefit of oligarchs,
unfair wealth distribution and normative support
for democracy
Two major hypotheses guide the present chapter. The first is that normative
support for democracy is negatively affected by actual levels of political
inequality to the benefit of the oligarchs and perceptions of unfair wealth
distribution (H1). An additional hypothesis is that the aforementioned negative
linkage is more pronounced in countries with higher degree of state power and
UPF (H1a). The justification for the two hypotheses has been discussed in-
depth in the theory chapter. In brief, this investigation seeks to examine the
relationship between oligarchs, their political power and the public’s
normative support for democracy as oligarchs have been crucial players in
post-Soviet pseudo-democracies.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In the subsequent
sections of this chapter, I introduce the control variables of this study (see the
operationalization of the main variables and hypotheses in the research design
chapter). Then I introduce the reader to the main statistical model. The section
that follows is the results section where the main empirical findings of this
analysis are presented. This chapter is concluded with a summary of the main
findings and the presentation of supplemental material.
Control variables
Consistent with prior studies, several control variables will be considered in
the statistical models of this study. The individual level variables were
obtained from the WVS. 27 The variables age (x003), gender (x001), level of
education (x025), scale of incomes (x047) and self-positioning on the left-right
scale (e033) are used as control variables in the majority of prior studies. As
for the latter, we have strong evidence that ideological preferences profoundly
affect people’s evaluation of the political system (Anderson et al., 2005). The
variables measuring the importance of religion in life (a006), interest in
politics (e023) and general trust in people (a165) have been included to
control for the effects proposed by the socio-economic modernization theory
(Inglehart, 1997). An additional variable at the individual level is the extent of
citizens’ confidence in their government at the given time of survey (e069)
included in the WVS. The variable measuring confidence in government is a
central control variable in this thesis as prior research on democratic support
27
For question wordings and original variable scales of the WVS variables, see Table 8.
72
has shown that support for democracy is typically conflated with support for
the incumbents (Lipset, 1959; Przeworski, 1991; Svolik, 2013). All these
control variables have been demeaned by country and year as in the case of
the key variables discussed earlier. It is worth noting here that the exclusive
focus of my analysis will be on analyzing the key variables of this study with
regard to the hypotheses H1 and H1a. Hence, the aforementioned variables
will only be used to control for other prominent explanations for regime
support.
Model
When comparatively examining multidimensional phenomena such as
democratic support, a multi-level approach is necessary to take into account
both contextual and individual level factors. In particular, I have in the
research design chapter discussed in length that mixed multi-level modelling
enables us to make correct estimation of standard errors of regression
coefficients by assessing substantive group or contextual-level effects on
individual-level variables and by identifying effects due to observed and
unobserved group characteristics (Scott, Simonoff & Marx, 2013; Goldstein,
2011). Below, I introduce the structure of the multi-level models used in this
study. The subsequent empirical model includes both fixed (given in
parentheses) and random effects:
Democratic supportij = b0 + b1j (Political inequality) +

b2j (Level of state power and UPF) + b3ij (Gender) + b4ij (Age) +
b5ij (Education level) + b6ij (Self-positioning on left-right scale) +
b7ij (Income level) + b8ij (General trust in others) + b9ij (Political
interest) + b10ij (Religion’s importance in life) + b11ij (Confidence in
the government) + b11ij (Attitudes towards the fairness of wealth
distribution) + u0j + (u0j×u1ij) + e.
Expressed in words, the above model aims to explain the variation in the
dependent variable, which is support for democracy by individual i in country
j. In the random part of the above mixed effects model, we, on the one hand,
find multiple random intercepts by countries (u0j). On the other hand, we also
find random slope coefficients of political inequality to the benefit of oligarchs
for variation of democratic support in post-Soviet pseudo-democracies
(u0j×u1ij). Finally, the model also takes into account the remaining residuals at
all levels (e). The present thesis primarily departs from the assumption that the
residuals are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) from a normal
distribution (eijt ∼ N (0,σ2e)). The same applies to the random effects models.
The model also includes fixed effects coefficients labeled as b with subscripts.
73
Results
Let us begin by looking at Figure E that displays the level of political
inequality to the benefit of oligarchs in contrast to that of the broad masses in
five post-Soviet pseudo-democracies (one of the key independent variables in
this chapter). The graph shows that there had been an equal or almost equal
distribution of political power between oligarchs and the broad masses in
Armenia between 1990 and 1995, in Georgia between 1990 and 2012, in
Moldova between 1990 and 1992, in Russia only in 1990 and in Ukraine
between 1990 and 1994. In addition, we can see that the political inequality to
the benefit of oligarchs increased thereafter in all countries. This inequality
deteriorated largely both in Armenia and Russia starting in 1996 as well as in
Ukraine starting in 1995.
Figure E. The level of political inequality to the benefit of oligarchs in five post-
Soviet pseudo-democracies
Armenia Georgia Moldova

3
2
1
1990 2000 2015

Russia Ukraine
3
2
1
1990 2000 2015 1990 2000 2015

Year
Notes: The original variable (v2pepwrses_ord) emanates from the V-Dem project (Coppedge et
al., 2016a). As discussed in detail in research design chapter, I have recoded the original
variable according to the following values: 1 = Equal or almost equal level of political power in
the hands of the wealthy people and broad masses; 2 = Wealthy people have more political
power when it really matters and 3 = Wealthy people have a strong or dominant hold on
political power.
74
Now, let us turn our attention to the average level of popular perceptions about
unfair wealth distribution in their society in the five pseudo-democracies
(another key independent variable in this chapter).
Figure F. The average (median) level of perceived unfair distribution of wealth in

five post-Soviet pseudo-democracies
Armenia Georgia Moldova

0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1990 2000 2015

Russia Ukraine
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
1990 2000 2015 1990 2000 2015

Year
Notes: The above graph is based on the WVS variable e041 that taps into citizens’ attitudes as
to the extent to which wealth accumulation in their society is considered to be taking
place at the expense of others. I have recoded the original variable so that the min value stands
for “Wealth can grow so there’s enough for everyone” and the max value stands for “People
can only get rich at the expense of others”. As discussed in more detail in Chapter three, I
operationalized the min value as an indicator for perceptions of an unfair distribution of wealth,
whereas the max value stands for its opposite.
As can be read from Figure F, the average level of perceived unfairness of

wealth distribution has been constant in Armenia (3), varied between 2 and 3
in Georgia, increased from 2 to 4 in Moldova and from 2 to 5 both in Russia
and Ukraine over time. These aggregated results corroborate the evidence
from prior studies suggesting that people in post-Soviet pseudo-democracies
generally agree that wealth accumulation has been more unfair than fair in
their societies. The respondents in Russia and Ukraine expressed the most
negative perceptions in this regard.
Let us now look at descriptive statistics about what citizens in five post-
Soviet pseudo-democracies think of democracy and authoritarian forms of
rule. Table 3 below is one dimension of the composite dependent variable that
75
will be employed in regression models below. It is worth noting that the below
tables are based on variables that are aggregated at the country level.
Table 3. Having a democratic political system

Armenia Georgia Moldova Russia Ukraine
Don’t know 3.7 4.2 9.4 10.9 3.6
Very good 36.8 48.9 29.2 17.0 26.8
Fairly good 47.6 40.0 46.1 48.4 52.4
Fairly bad 8.9 5.4 11.4 17.5 12.3
Very bad 2.9 1.7 3.8 6.2 5.0
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
N (2882) (4544) (2952) (6059) (4414)
Notes: The original question from the WVS is: (e117) Having a democratic political
system. This variable measures the aggregated level of support for democracy based on the
following country-years: Armenia (1997 and 2011), Georgia (1996, 2009 and 2014),
Moldova (1996, 2002 and 2006), Russia (2006 and 2011) and Ukraine (1996, 2006 and
2011). These limitations are due to data unavailability.
Table 3 suggests that nearly or over 80 percent in Armenia, Georgia and

Ukraine and approximately 75 percent in Moldova in addition to 65 percent in
Russia support democracy in principle. Thus, the overwhelming majority of
the population in these five countries sympathizes with the idea of democracy
as a superior form of government. However, the data suggests that there is also
a significant share of citizens who find democracy as fairly or very bad across
all these countries. Let us have a look at Table 4 that displays what proportion
of the citizenry supports the idea of a more authoritarian form of rule.
Table 4. Having a strong leader

Armenia Georgia Moldova Russia Ukraine
Don’t know 4.9 8.4 8.9 9.5 3.9
Very good 19.8 26.2 23.2 20.7 24.6
Fairly good 33.3 29.7 33.5 35.5 35.3
Bad 25.6 23.6 25.3 24.8 25.4
Very bad 16.4 12.0 9.0 9.5 10.7
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
N (2912) (4521) (2956) (6211) (4475)
Notes: The original question from the WVS is: (e114) Having a strong leader who does not
have to bother with parliament and elections. This variable measures the aggregated level
of support for a strong-handed leader based on the following country-years: Armenia (1997
and 2011), Georgia (1996, 2009 and 2014), Moldova (1996, 2002 and 2006), Russia (2006,
2011) and Ukraine (1996, 2006 and 2011). These limitations are due to data unavailability.
We can see in Table 4 that a strong authoritarian leadership that does not have
to bother with parliament and elections is a popular idea among citizens in
post-Soviet pseudo-democracies. In particular, in most of the above countries
a substantial majority of respondents (55 percent in Armenia, nearly 56
76
percent in Georgia, Moldova and Russia, and 60 percent in Ukraine) accepts
this idea as very or fairly good. Overall, both Table 3 and Table 4 suggest that
there is a significant level of normative support for democracy, but that we
cannot rule out that people in this context are more likely to approve
authoritarian forms of rule in some circumstances. Hence, normative regime
support appears to be polarizing the citizenry in these countries according to
the findings in the two tables. Let us, therefore, turn our attention to the
explanatory models for normative support for democracy.
The results of the estimated multi-level regression models are presented in
tables and figures below. The hypothesis column indicates which hypothesis
the models test and the direction of the expected relationship. When looking in
detail at the results displayed in the first model of Table 5, we find that
country clusters explain 8.5 percent of variation in normative support (see the
value of Intraclass correlation, ICC). This evidence suggests that our data is
hierarchically structured and multi-level modelling is necessary to account for
the variation due to country-settings. In Figure G, which I will discuss later, I
plot the difference of country settings in substantial terms.
77
Table 5. The determinants of normative support for democracy
Hypothesis
direction)
(expected
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Model 5
Main effects
Level of state 0.0363 0.0373 0.0363 0.0349
power and UPF (0.0984) (0.0985) (0.0984) (0.0984)
(state_power)
Gender (male=1) 0.148** 0.146** 0.148** 0.150**
(0.0582) (0.0582) (0.0582) (0.0581)
Age categories -0.0276 -0.0287 -0.0276 -0.0257
(0.0241) (0.0241) (0.0241) (0.0241)
Educational level 0.0870** 0.0867** 0.0870** 0.0873**
(categories) (0.0161) (0.0161) (0.0161) (0.0161)
Self-positioning 0.0569** 0.0565** 0.0569** 0.0562**
on left-right scale (0.0129) (0.0129) (0.0129) (0.0129)
Income level 0.0406** 0.0404** 0.0406** 0.0392**
(steps) (0.0140) (0.0140) (0.0140) (0.0140)
General trust in 0.172** 0.168** 0.172** 0.174**
other people (0.0671) (0.0672) (0.0671) (0.0671)
Political interest 0.0796** 0.0782** 0.0796** 0.0820**
(0.0314) (0.0315) (0.0314) (0.0314)
Religion is 0.138** 0.137** 0.138** 0.140**
important in life (0.0312) (0.0312) (0.0312) (0.0312)
Confidence in the 0.204** 0.208** 0.204** 0.205**
government (0.0324) (0.0325) (0.0324) (0.0323)
Unfair distribution H1 (-) -0.0680** - - -0.0143
of wealth (0.0107) 0.0802** 0.0680** (0.0205)
(wealth_ineq_unf (0.0139) (0.0107)
air)
Wealthy people H1 (-) -1.279** -1.278** -1.279** -1.281**

have more (0.556) (0.557) (0.556) (0.556)
political power
when it really
matters
(pol_ineq_matters)
; Ref.=pol_equal
Wealthy people H1 (-) -1.002 -1.002 -1.002 -1.002

have a strong or (0.632) (0.633) (0.632) (0.632)
dominant hold on
political power
(pol_ineq_dom);
Ref.=pol_equal
78
Table 5. The determinants of normative support for democracy (continued)
Hypothesis
direction)
(expected
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Model 5
Interaction effects
pol_ineq_matters* H1 (-) -0.0811**
wealth_ineq_unfair (0.0248)
pol_ineq_dom*wea H1 (-) -0.0468
lth_ineq_unfair (0.0327)
pol_ineq_matters*s H1a (-) ---
tate_power
pol_ineq_dom*stat H1a (-) ---
e_power
wealth_ineq_unfair H1a (-) 0.00638
*state_power (0.00469)
Intercept 6.515** 7.261** 7.264** 7.261** 7.264**
(0.248) (0.429) (0.429) (0.429) (0.429)
Random-effects
Parameters
SD for random 0.605* 0.420** 0.420** 0.420** 0.420**
intercept by country (0.176) (0.137) (0.137) (0.137) (0.137)
SD (overall 2.040** 1.945** 1.945** 1.945** 1.943**
residual) (0.0154) (0.0200) (0.0200) (0.0200) (0.0200)
AIC 37644.5 19718.8 19719.0 19718.8 19712.0

BIC 37665.7 19822.2 19828.8 19822.2 19828.3
Intraclass 0.0809 0.0445 0.0446 0.0445 0.0446
correlation (ICC)
Number of 5 5 5 5 5
countries
Number of 8821 4718 4718 4718 4718
individuals
Log -18819.2 -9843.4 -9842.5 -9843.4 -9838.0
Pseudolikelihood
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Independent covariance structure between the

variance components is assumed since no significant unstructured covariance structure
could be observed by preceding, alternative estimations (omitted above). All models were
estimated with robust standard errors. Stars indicate * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05 significance
levels. SD indicates standard deviation. The symbol --- indicates that the variable has been
excluded from regression model due to multicollinearity.
79
It is worth repeating here that all subsequent interpretations of key variables
are on average and with control for all other variables included in the models.
Model 2 involves all independent variables in the fixed part of the mixed
regression. Turning to the key variables of this study, we can see in the table
above that normative support for democracy, as expected in H1, is negatively
associated with perceived unfair wealth distribution (see wealth_ineq_unfair, -
0.0680**, see also Figure H). Moreover, we also observe that actual political
inequality to the benefit of the oligarchs is significantly and negatively
associated with democratic support when wealth matters for them on fateful
occasions (see pol_ineq_matters, -1.279**; as expected in H1; see also Figure
I). However, it is worth noting that the results suggest that normative support
for democracy wanes only in contexts where oligarchs have significant
political influence on matters that are vital for them (see the differences
between pol_ineq_matters and pol_ineq_dom). In addition, the coefficients for
pol_ineq_matters and pol_ineq_dom do not change considerably in the
subsequent models presented in Table 5. Note that these results are valid in
reference to contexts of political equality between the oligarchs and the broad
citizenry.
Turning to the results of possible interaction between perceived unfair
wealth distribution and actual political inequality to the benefit of oligarchs
when it really matters for the latter, we see in Model 5 that people prefer
authoritarianism to democracy in principle whenever perceptions of unfair
distribution of wealth increase concurrently with that form of political
inequality to the benefit of oligarchs (see pol_ineq_matters*wealth_ineq_unfair,
-0.0811**). Figure J illustrates this interaction effect on normative support for
democracy. In fact, the interaction effect of
pol_ineq_dom*wealth_ineq_unfair is not significant. Thus, the influence on
regime support by oligarchs’ actual total monopoly on political power is not
significantly dependent on the extent to which people perceive an unfair
distribution of wealth in their country.
Regarding the expectations of H1a, we observe in Table 5 that the level of
state power and UPF does not have any significant moderating effect on the
negative relationship between perceived unfair wealth distribution and
normative support for democracy (see wealth_ineq_unfair*state_power
above). As for actual political inequality to the benefit of oligarchs, we,
however, see that there are no coefficients presented in Model 4 of Table 5.
The reason is that there is a high collinearity between political inequality and
state power (see pol_ineq_matters*state_power and
pol_ineq_dom*state_power) in Model 4 despite the fact that the bivariate
correlation between the variables is fairly low and not statistically significant
(r = 0.1726). This indicates that we can hardly separate the effects of these two
key variables on normative support for democracy in contexts where they
occur simultaneously and at a greater level. In other words, it is difficult to pin
down the statistical impact of the increasing co-occurrence of state power
80
concentration (and UPF) and political inequality to the benefit of oligarchs on
the public’s normative support for democracy. However, I will later employ an
alternative measure of political inequality in order to check for the robustness
of these results. In addition, it is worth noting that the major findings from
Table 5 hold even in simple OLS regressions with clustered standard errors
(not reproduced in the above table for reasons of space).
As concerns the substantial effects of random intercepts in above models,
Figure G reveals that support for democracy is on average more than one point
lower (the range of my dependent variable is 0-10) in Russia at any given
level of the remaining independent variables. In contrast, support for
democracy is on average up to 0.5 points higher in Armenia, Georgia and
Ukraine at any level of the independent variables employed in regressions. In
addition, Figure G illustrates that the variation in support for democracy due to
country settings is not significant in Moldova.
Figure G. Random variation of normative democratic support in post-Soviet

pseudo-democracies
Armenia
Georgia
Moldova
Russia
Ukraine
-1 -.5 0 .5
Normative Democratic Support
Random Intercept by Country

Confidence interval
Notes: Random intercepts per country with 95 % CI.
Next, I employ several robustness checks in order to ensure that my main

results are robust to alternative specifications of the key variables.
81
Robustness checks
An additional variable from WVS used in this study is citizens’ perception of
whether their country is run by big interest vs. for all people’s benefit (e128).
As of yet and to my knowledge, the variable e128 has not been used in any
other studies concerned with democratic support. A number of studies,
however, have used this variable to measure various, but closely related
factors. In particular, it has been used to measure individual (Paxton & Knack,
2012: 177) and political trust (Bean, 2005; Farnsworth, 2003: 28), cynical
attitudes towards national affairs (Grammich & Fair, 2007) and internal
political efficacy (Mongkuo et al., 2014). However, some other studies have
operationalized the variable as perceptions of societal fairness (You, 2012:
714) or as perceptions of state capture by the few (MacCulloch, 2005: 107)—
yet, they did not use the language of political inequality to the benefit of
oligarchs as a group. In a relatively more recent study, Di Tella and
MacCulloch (2009) have employed the variable as an indicator of mass
perceptions of state capture by business interest groups. Still, they (2009: 301)
are well aware that the variable “does not talk about business explicitly but
instead mentions ‘big interests’”. I believe that this variable is a tolerable
proxy for oligarchic interest domination of the political system (see Pleines,
2009: 114). Hence, this variable will help me to capture ordinary citizens’
perspectives on whether they consider their current political system primarily
to serve oligarchic interests in contrast to that of the public at large. I,
however, mainly use this variable in below models to check the robustness of
my results in general and political inequality in particular.
82
checks
Hypothesis
direction)
(expected
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Model 5
Main effects
Level of state 0.0291 0.0309 0.115 0.0313** 0.122
power and UPF (0.109) (0.108) (0.124) (0.0117) (0.0934)
(state_power)
Gender (male=1) 0.120* 0.118* 0.121* 0.117* 0.121*
(0.0688) (0.0699) (0.0686) (0.0700) (0.0687)
Age categories -0.00474 -0.00635 - - -0.00403
(0.0283) (0.0279) 0.00510 0.00526 (0.0286)
(0.0281) (0.0284)
Educational level 0.0892** 0.0885** 0.0898** 0.0888** 0.0901**
(categories) (0.0306) (0.0302) (0.0310) (0.0304) (0.0312)
Self-positioning 0.0593 0.0584 0.0581 0.0584 0.0581
on left-right scale (0.0420) (0.0407) (0.0412) (0.0407) (0.0412)
Income level 0.0375 0.0370 0.0369 0.0387 0.0386
(steps) (0.0337) (0.0343) (0.0334) (0.0350) (0.0341)
General trust in 0.108 0.104 0.105 0.103 0.105
other people (0.195) (0.193) (0.195) (0.193) (0.196)
Political interest 0.0850* 0.0832* 0.0848* 0.0833* 0.0848*
(0.0465) (0.0461) (0.0466) (0.0461) (0.0467)
Religion is 0.103 0.102 0.103 0.102 0.103
important in life (0.0687) (0.0685) (0.0681) (0.0683) (0.0679)
Confidence in the 0.176* 0.184* 0.177* 0.184* 0.177*
government (0.103) (0.104) (0.104) (0.104) (0.104)
Unfair distribution H1 (-) -0.0817** -0.0967** -0.0810** -0.0966** -0.0809**
of wealth (0.0237) (0.0325) (0.0232) (0.0325) (0.0231)
(wealth_ineq_unf
air)
Our country is H1 (-) 0.210 0.199 0.286** 0.202 0.292**
run to the benefit (0.167) (0.164) (0.108) (0.162) (0.104)
of big interest
(big_int)
Wealthy people H1 (-) -1.258** -1.258** -1.254**
have more (0.619) (0.619) (0.619)
political power
when it really
matters
(pol_ineq_matters
); Ref.=pol_equal
83
checks (continued)
Hypothesis
direction)
(expected
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Model 5
Wealthy people H1 (-) -0.996** -0.997** -1.005**
have a strong or (0.237) (0.237) (0.234)
dominant hold on
political power
(pol_ineq_dom);
Ref.=pol_equal
Interaction
effects
wealth_ineq_unfa H1a (-) 0.00939 0.00940
ir*state_power (0.00805) (0.00804)
big_int*state_po H1a (-) -0.0896 -0.0925
wer (0.0809) (0.0834)
Intercept 7.050** 7.066** 6.981** 6.057** 5.954**
(0.0842) (0.0957) (0.0634) (0.0964) (0.129)
Random-effects
Parameters
SD for random 0.432** 0.432** 0.436**
intercept by (0.137) (0.137) (0.138)
country
SD (overall 1.934** 1.934** 1.934** 1.932** 1.933**
residual) (0.0355) (0.0356) (0.0350) (0.0354) (0.0348)
AIC 15450.0 15446.7 15448.5 15423.8 15425.5

BIC 15482.1 15478.8 15480.6 15455.9 15457.6
Intraclass 0.0475 0.0476 0.0484
correlation (ICC)
Number of 5 5 5 5 5
countries
Number of 4519 4519 4519 4519 4519
individuals
Log -7720.0 -7718.4 -7719.3 -7706.9 -7707.8
Pseudolikelihood
Country-year No No No Yes Yes
fixed effects
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Independent covariance structure between the

variance components is assumed since no significant unstructured covariance structure
could be observed by preceding, alternative estimations (omitted above). All models were
estimated with robust standard errors. Stars indicate * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05 significance
levels. SD indicates standard deviation.
84
All models above involve the weight variable s109a from WVS at the
individual level. Moreover, I have also added the alternative measure of
political inequality to all above models. As can be seen in Table 6, all key
results of this study are robust to alternative specifications and controls. In
particular, evidence lends support to H1, but not to H1a despite employing the
alternative measure of political inequality. To put it differently, the degree of
state power neither moderates the negative effect of perceived unfair wealth
distribution (see wealth_ineq_unfair*state_power above) nor of political
inequality (see big_int*state_power above) in contrast to the expectations of
H1a. Thus, the levels of state power and UPF neither have any direct nor
conditional effects on people’s support for democracy in the abstract. All these
results are even robust to controlling for the level of democracy 28 and country-
year settings (as in Model 4 and 5 presented in Table 6, see the indicator row
of country-year fixed effects). In the subsequent Appendix to this chapter, I
provide summary statistics for all the regression variables, bivariate
correlations and figures illustrating the substantial effects of my key variables
on the dependent variable of this study.
Summary of the results

What is the relationship between oligarchs, their political power and popular
support for democracy in principle? This question guided the above analysis
for regime support in principle. The current chapter employed internationally
recognized, comparative datasets to study normative support for democracy in
five post-Soviet pseudo-democracies (Armenia, Georgia, Moldova, Russia and
Ukraine). Results suggest that actual political inequality to the benefit of the
oligarchs as a group (when it really matters for their vital interests) and higher
levels of perceived wealth distribution unfairness negatively influence
normative support for democracy in post-Soviet pseudo-democracies (hence,
H1 is supported). Moreover, Russia stands out as a context where people
harbor significantly lesser normative support for democracy even when
controlling for the most important variables discussed earlier. Thus, we can
see that actual levels of political inequality to the benefit of oligarchs and
perceived unfair distribution of wealth are detrimental to mass opinion about
democracy. Interestingly and in contrast to our expectations in H1a, the level
of state power and UPF neither had any significant effect on regime support in
principle nor on the negative linkage between actual political inequality to the
benefit of oligarchs and perceived unfair distribution of wealth, on the one
side, and normative support for democracy on the other.
28I estimated all the models in Table 6 with the help of the variable fh_polity2 used in Figure A, but
omitted the results from the table for reasons of space and because country settings have been
controlled for in all previous models as well.
85
Appendix
Figure H. Predicted effects of political inequality on normative support for

democracy
10
Density of the Level of Political Inequality
8
8
7
6
4
6
2
5
0
Political equality Political inequality when Political
it really matters inequality -
for the wealthy power monopoly
by the wealthy
The Level of Political Inequality
Notes: The figure above shows the predicted effects (with 95 % CI) of political inequality
on people’s normative support for democracy. The effects are calculated from the fixed part
of the regression. Following the recommendations by some scholars (Berry, Golder &
Milton, 2012), the histogram in the background shows the density of responses for the level
of political inequality.
86
Figure I. Predicted effects of attitudes about unfair wealth distribution on
normative support for democracy
Density of Attitudes Towards Wealth Distribution

7.5
.4
.3
7
6.5
.1 .2
6
5.5
0
Fair Unfair
Distribution of Distribution of
Wealth Wealth
Attitudes Towards Wealth Distribution
Notes: The figure above shows the predicted effects (with 95 % CI) of attitudes towards unfair
wealth distribution on people’s normative support for democracy. The effects are calculated
from the fixed part of the regression. Following the recommendations by some scholars (Berry,
Golder & Milton, 2012), the histogram in the background shows the density of responses for
the attitudes towards wealth distribution.
87
Figure J. Predicted interaction effects of political inequality and attitudes
about unfair wealth distribution on normative support for democracy
Wealthy people have more power

Equal political power when it really matters
9
8
7
6
5
Fair Distribution Unfair Distribution

of Wealth of Wealth
Wealthy people have a strong
or dominant hold on power
9
8
7
6
5
Fair Distribution Unfair Distribution

of Wealth of Wealth
Attitudes Towards Wealth Distribution
Notes: The figure above shows the predicted effects (with 95 % CI) of the interaction
between political inequality and attitudes towards unfair wealth distribution on people’s
normative support for democracy. The effects are calculated from the fixed part of the
regression.
88
Table 7. The variables and summary statistics
N Mean SD Min Max
Political inequality to 4519 1.8659 .6591097 1 3
the benefit of
oligarchs as a group
(pol_ineq),
v2pepwrses_ord (V-
Dem)
Level of state power 4519 2.089843 2.356812 0 6
and UPF
(state_power)
Gender (male=1), 4519 .4874972 .499899 0 1
x001 (WVS)
Age categories, x003 4519 1.943572 1.237475 0 4
(WVS)
Educational level 4519 .2308679 1.833244 -4.5695 3.505607
(categories), x025
(WVS)
Self-positioning on 4519 .0322454 2.244753 -4.926617 5.066484
left-right scale, e033
(WVS)
Income level (steps), 4519 3.591724 2.228916 1 10
x047 (WVS)
General trust in other 4519 -.0004975 .421273 -.3097244 .8128624
people, a165 (WVS)
Political interest, 4519 .1034309 .9327362 -1.473873 1.930796
e023 (WVS)
Religion is important 4519 -.0255395 .9311407 -2.27309 1.677598
in life, a006 (WVS)
Confidence in the 4519 .020244 .8913078 -1.362157 2.053034
government, e069
(WVS)
Unfair wealth 4519 -.1225284 2.709207 -3.32951 6.232307
distribution
(wealth_ineq_unfair),
e041 (WVS)
Our country is run to 4519 .9203364 .2708017 0 1
the benefit of all
people v.s. big
interest (big_int),
e128 (WVS)
Normative 4519 6.685476 2.074616 0 10
Democratic Support,
e117 and e123
(WVS)
Notes: All independent variables are centered at the country-year level except those coded
as a dichotomy. For question wordings and original variable scales of the above WVS
variables, see Table 8.
89
Table 8. Question wordings and original scales of WVS
variables
Question Original variable
wording scale
Gender (male=1), x001 Sex of respondent 0 No answer
(WVS) 1 Male
2 Female
Age categories, x003 Age 18-25
(WVS) 26-36
37-47
48-58
59-69
More than 70
Don’t know (DK)
Educational level What is the highest -5 Missing;
(categories), x025 (WVS) educational level Unknown
that you have -4 Not asked in
attained? survey
-3 Not applicable;
No formal
education
-2 No answer
-1 Don’t know
1 Inadequately
completed
elementary
education
2 Completed
(compulsory)
elementary
education
90
variables (continued)
wording scale
Educational level What is the highest -5 Missing;
(categories), x025 (WVS) educational level Unknown
that you have -4 Not asked in
attained? survey
-3 Not applicable;
No formal
education
-2 No answer
-1 Don’t know
1 Inadequately
completed
elementary
education
2 Completed
(compulsory)
elementary
education
3 Incomplete
secondary school:
technical/vocational
type/(Compulsory)
4 Complete
secondary school:
technical/vocational
type/Secondary
5 Incomplete
secondary:
university-
preparatory
type/Secondary
6 Complete
secondary:
university-
preparatory
type/Full secondary
7 Some university
without
degree/Higher
education - lower-
level
8 University with
degree/Higher
education - upper-
level tertiary
91
wording scale
Self-positioning on left- In political matters, -5 Missing;
right scale, e033 (WVS) people talk of “the Unknown
left” and “the -4 Not asked in
right”. How would survey
you place your -3 Not applicable
views on this scale, -2 No answer
generally speaking? -1 Don’t know
1 Left
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10 Right
Income level (steps), x047 Here is a scale of -5 Missing;
(WVS) incomes. We would Unknown
like to know in -4 Not asked in
what group your survey
household is, -3 Not applicable
counting all wages, -2 No answer
salaries, pensions -1 Don’t know
and other incomes 1 Lower step
that come in. Just 2 Second step
give the letter of 3 Third step
group your 4 Fourth step
household falls 5 Fifth step
into, before taxes 6 Sixth step
and other 7 Seventh step
deductions. 8 Eigth step
9 Nineth step
10 Tenth step
11 Highest step
92
wording scale
General trust in other Generally speaking, -5 Missing;
people, a165 (WVS) would you say that Unknown
most people can be -4 Not asked in
trusted or that you survey
can’t be too careful -3 Not applicable
in dealing with -2 No answer
people? -1 Don’t know
1 Most people can
be trusted
2 Can’t be too
careful
Political interest, e023 How interested -5 Missing;
(WVS) would you say you Unknown
are in politics? -4 Not asked in
survey
-3 Not applicable
-2 No answer
-1 Don’t know
1 Very interested
2 Somewhat
interested
3 Not very
interested
4 Not at all
interested
Religion is important in Please say, for each -5 Missing;
life, a006 (WVS) of the following, Unknown
how important it is -4 Not asked in
in your life. Would survey
you say it is: -3 Not applicable
-2 No answer
Religion -1 Don’t know
1 Very important
2 Rather important
3 Not very
important
4 Not at all
important
93
wording scale
Confidence in the I am going to name -5 Missing;
government, e069 (WVS) a number of Unknown
organizations. For -4 Not asked in
each one, could you survey
tell me how much -3 Not applicable
confidence you -2 No answer
have in them: is it a -1 Don’t know
great deal of 1 A great deal
confidence, quite a 2 Quite a lot
lot of confidence, 3 Not very much
not very much 4 None at all
confidence or none
at all?
The national
government
Unfair wealth distribution Now I’d like you to -5 Missing;

(wealth_ineq_unfair), tell me your views Unknown
e041 (WVS) on various issues. -4 Not asked in
How would you survey
place your views -3 Not applicable
on this scale? 1 -2 No answer
means you agree -1 Don’t know
completely with the 1 People can only
statement on the get rich at the
left; 10 means you expense of others
agree completely 2
with the statement 3
on the right; and if 4
your views fall 5
somewhere in 6
between, you can 7
chose any number 8
in between. 9
10 Wealth can
grow so there’s
enough for
everyone
94
wording scale
Our country is run to the Generally speaking, -5 Missing;
benefit of all people v.s. would you say that Unknown
big interest (big_int), e128 this country is run -4 Not asked in
(WVS) by a few big survey
interests looking -3 Not applicable
out for themselves, -2 No answer
or that it is run for -1 Don’t know
the benefit of all 1 Run by a few big
the people? interests
2 Run for all the
people
Normative support for I'm going to -5 Missing;
democracy, e117 (WVS) describe various Unknown
types of political -4 Not asked in
systems and ask survey
what you think -3 Not applicable
about each as a way -2 No answer
of governing this -1 Don’t know
country. For each 1 Very good
one, would you say 2 Fairly good
it is a very good, 3 Fairly bad
fairly good, fairly 4 Very bad
bad or very bad
way of governing
this country?
Having a
democratic political
system
95
wording scale
Normative support for I'm going to read -5 Missing;
democracy, e123 (WVS) out some things Unknown
that people -4 Not asked in
sometimes say survey
about a democratic -3 Not applicable
political system. -2 No answer
Could you please -1 Don’t know
tell me if you agree 1 Agree strongly
strongly, agree, 2 Agree
disagree or disagree 3 Disagree
strongly, after I 4 Strongly disagree
read each one of
them?
Democracy may
have problems but
it's better than any
other form of
government
Normative support for I'm going to -5 Missing;

authoritarian rule, e114 describe various Unknown
(WVS) types of political -4 Not asked in
systems and ask survey
what you think -3 Not applicable
about each as a way -2 No answer
of governing this -1 Don’t know
country. For each 1 Very good
one, would you say 2 Fairly good
it is a very good, 3 Fairly bad
fairly good, fairly 4 Very bad
bad or very bad
way of governing
this country?
Having a strong
leader who does
not have to bother
with parliament and
elections
96
Table 9. Pairwise correlations between the
dependent and independent variables
Normative
Democratic
Support
Political inequality to the -0.176***
benefit of oligarchs as a
group (pol_ineq),
v2pepwrses_ord (V-Dem)
Level of state power and -0.0972***
UPF (state_power)
Gender (male=1), x001 0.0210
(WVS)
Age categories, x003 -0.0454**
(WVS)
Educational level 0.0567***
(categories), x025 (WVS)
Self-positioning on left- 0.0784***
right scale, e033 (WVS)
Income level (steps), x047 -0.0523***
(WVS)
General trust in other 0.0360*
people, a165 (WVS)
Political interest, e023 0.0554***
(WVS)
Religion is important in 0.0723***
life, a006 (WVS)
Confidence in the 0.0993***
government, e069 (WVS)
Unfair wealth distribution -0.105***
(wealth_ineq_unfair),
e041 (WVS)
Our country is run to the 0.0165
benefit of all people v.s.
big interest (big_int), e128
(WVS)
N 4519
Notes: Significance levels are according to * p <

0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Pearson's r.
97
Table 10. Countries and years included in the analysis
Country Year
Armenia 1997
Georgia 1996
Moldova 1996
Russia 1995
Ukraine 1996
98
Chapter five: Four oligarchs and their
quest for power in four pseudo-
democracies
This chapter is guided by a specific research question asking about how
oligarchs interact with incumbents and mass opinion given that the two most
important streams of prior work emphasize the crucial role of either mass
opinion or state power in understanding regime trajectories in post-Soviet
pseudo-democracies. This thesis hypothesizes that we should expect that all
individual, politically motivated rival oligarchs operate with the intention of
enhancing public opinion about themselves by developing their personal
reputation, organizational capacity and performing a credible opposition to the
regime (H2). They do so primarily to emulate the incumbent regime’s efforts
to maintain its power. Although I expect to find state power abuse against
these efforts in all pseudo-democracies, I assume that we will observe that
oligarchs in countries with a greater level of state power concentration and
UPF essentially will fail in these efforts and, accordingly, in their individual
struggles for power. This thesis, thus, hypothesizes that the regime abuses its
stronger state power primarily to damage the credibility of the rival oligarch
by making him appear unpredictable and unreliable in the eyes of the public
(H2a). Thus, I believe that the abuse of state power to damage the political
reputation of rivals is a largely overlooked, yet key regime maintenance tool in
the hands of post-Soviet pseudo-democracies with higher level of state power.
Accordingly, this important mechanism is a crucial factor in advancing our
understanding about the interaction between state power, oligarchs and public
opinion.
It may be appropriate to center our attention initially on how the quality of
the electoral process and democratic rights of citizens changed or remained
unaffected in Armenia, Georgia, Russia and Ukraine in the wake of the four
oligarchs’ struggle for power. To be sure, Figure K is not intended to illustrate
exhaustive and conclusive causal links between the individual oligarchs’
ascent to power and improvements in the electoral process and democratic
99
rights. However, the figure indicates that there is at least some substantial
coincidence in time between the broad patterns of these specific dimensions of
political democratization and the outcomes of the oligarchs’ bid for power.
Figure K. The quality of the electoral process and democratic rights in

Armenia, Georgia, Russia and Ukraine since 2010
Armenia Georgia
10
Associational and Organizational Rights
5
The Quality of the
Electoral Process
0
and
Russia Ukraine
10
5
0
2010 2015 2010 2015

Year
Electoral Process Associational and Organizational Rights
Notes: The variable fh_ep measuring the electoral process emanates from the QoG 2017.
However, the original source of this variable is Freedom House’s expert evaluations of the
extent to which the national legislative representatives and the national chief authority are
elected through free and fair elections. The countries were graded from 0 (worst) to 12
(best). Measuring associational and organizational rights is the variable fh_aor in the QoG
2017. Similarly, this variable originates from Freedom House’s expert evaluations of the
freedom of assembly, demonstrations and open public discussion as well as the freedom for
nongovernmental organizations, the freedom for trade unions, peasant organizations and
other professional and private organizations. The variable fh_aor ranges from 0 (worst) to
12 (best).
In particular, the patterns of the bars in Figure K suggest that the electoral
process improved gradually both in Georgia (since 2012) and Ukraine (since
2014) when Ivanishvili and Poroshenko came to power. However, the quality
of the electoral process remained at the same level in Armenia and Russia. As
for such key democratic rights as those of the freedom of association and
organization, Figure K shows that these analogously improved in Georgia and
100
Ukraine 29 after the two oligarchs successfully rose to power. In contrast, the
quality of these rights remained unchanged in Armenia or gradually
deteriorated in Russia. Although the figure illustrates key aspects for regime
trajectories more recently, I next offer a brief overview of the emergence and
evolution of politics during the entire post-Soviet era of these four countries.
This overview will serve as a solid background for addressing the more
specific research question about how the four oligarchs Gagik Tsarukyan
(Armenia), Bidzina Ivanishvili (Georgia), Mikhail Prokhorov (Russia) and
Petro Poroshenko (Ukraine) interacted with incumbents and mass opinion in
the framework of state power abuse by the incumbent regime.
A description of four post-Soviet pseudo-

democracies
Armenia
Armenia is a landlocked country in South Caucasus. According to official
figures, its population is over 3 million, of which more than 93 percent are
ethnic Armenians. Armenia declared its independence from the Soviet Union
on August 23, 1990. Semi-presidentialism is a system of government where a
popularly elected president shares his executive power with the parliament.
This system gives the president the right to appoint a prime minister and a
cabinet, but the latter two are responsible to the parliament (Sedelius &
Berglund, 2012: 23-24). 30 This system of government was in effect until 2015.
Armenian constitution was amended in the end of 2015 by a referendum.
Semi-presidentialism was abandoned and supplanted by a parliamentarian
form of government with lots of power vested in the office of the prime
minister (Grigoryan, 2015).
Armenia has been at war with neighboring Azerbaijan over Nagorno-
Karabakh since the late 1980s. The active fighting came close to ending in the
April 1994 cease-fire brokered by Russia. However, the most intensive clashes
since the 1994 ceasefire broke out during the 2016 April War (between April
1-4), where hundreds of military personnel and civilians were killed on the
frontline. Shooting and shelling still claim lives on both sides of the conflict.
This conflict has had far-reaching implications for the political development in
29
It is, however, worth emphasizing that on July 26, 2017, President Poroshenko approved the
decision of Ukraine’s Citizenship Commission to revoke Mikheil Saakashvili’s citizenship (Al Jazeera,
2017). This politically motivated decision against one of his key political rivals caused substantial
harm to the democratic reputation of Poroshenko’s regime.
30
It is worth noting that there are typically two specific subcategories of semi-presidentialism: a)
president-parliamentary and b) premier-presidentialist systems. What distinguishes the former from the
latter is the greater power in the hands of the president since the government is also accountable to the
president in addition to the parliament (Sedelius & Berglund, 2012: 24; Sedelius & Linde, 2017)
101
Armenia. Armenia is currently the only independent country in South
Caucasus hosting a Russian military base. The military base was established in
1996 after the formal closure of the Soviet military base in Armenia. Russian
military has since been monitoring the Armenian border with Turkey.
To date, Armenia has had three popularly elected presidents. The two more
recent of them came to office through fraud-tainted presidential elections. The
presidents of Armenia have maintained strong control over the state power in
the country (Levitsky & Way, 2010a; Way, 2012). Armenia has been on the
decline for much of its post-independence era. The war with Azerbaijan,
systematic corruption and a lack of confidence in the future among its citizens
has led hundreds of thousands of its citizens to leave the country. The exit
option has been the only viable mean for many Armenians to escape war,
poverty, corruption and high unemployment. In an interview with the
newspaper 168 Hours in 2011, the then Prime Minister Tigran Sargsyan
inadvertently admitted that the emigration helped the government to avoid
successful revolutions that could have been sparked by large critical masses
opposing their regime (Epress.am, 2011).
For the better part of the 1990s, the Armenian National Movement (ANM)
was the incumbent party. It won the legislative elections in 1995 and formed a
ruling coalition (the Republican Bloc, 43.9 percent of the votes) with the help
of such minor parties as the Democratic Liberal Party (DLP), Christian
Democratic Union (CDU) and the Republican Party of Armenia (RPA)
(Nohlen, Grotz & Hartmann, 2001: 329). Since the 1999 parliamentary
elections, the RPA, however, has supplanted the ANM as the ruling party in
Armenia and formed ruling alliances first with the People’s Party (Nohlen,
Grotz & Hartmann, 2001: 335), then with the Armenian Revolutionary
Federation (ARF) and the Country of Law party (CLP) (following the 2003
parliamentary elections) (Eurasianet.org, 2004). The RPA was in a ruling
coalition with the Prosperous Armenia party (PAP) and CLP after the 2007
parliamentary elections (Ademmer, 2016). The ruling alliance with the CLP
and the PAP persisted even after the 2012 parliamentary elections, although
the PAP left it prematurely. The most recent parliamentary elections in 2017
resulted in a ruling party alliance between the RPA and ARF. It is worth
stressing that both in the case of the ANM and RPA, the presidents of
Armenia had held a dominant grip on their respective incumbent parties (Hale,
2015: 354-363).
The elites have generally been cohesive in Armenia. While some scholars
have attributed this unity to the conflict with Azerbaijan (Way, 2012; Stefes,
2008), others have put emphasis on the importance of the relatively strong
state power and the institutions of super-presidentialism (Hale, 2005, 2016b).
Armenia belongs to the large group of post-Soviet countries that still have not
managed to build legitimate formal institutions and a party system that allows
for genuine political competition. Rather, Armenia has been referred to as a
country governed by a strong president and his ruling pyramid of power.
102
However, recurrent attempts to topple the presidents have taken place in post-
Soviet Armenia. The opposition made less successful efforts to overthrow the
president through mass protests following the presidential elections in 1996,
2003, 2008 and 2013. An even more important and bloody event happened on
October 27, 1999, when a group of armed men rushed at the Armenian
parliament and killed Prime Minister Vazgen Sargsyan and Parliament
Speaker Karen Demirchian among others. The perpetrators stated that their
action was a putsch to liberate Armenia from Vazgen Sargsyan’s despotism
(Matsuzato, 2006; Laitin & Ronald Grigor, 1999). Sargsyan was one of the
most crucial elite members in post-Soviet Armenia due to his post as minister
of defense between July 25, 1995, and June, 11, 1999.
Robert Kocharyan, the second president of Armenia, made new
amendments to the constitution by a referendum in 2005. The 2005
constitution gave the president even stronger executive powers. According to
that constitution, the president of Armenia was qualified to appoint the prime
minister and cabinet as well as granted more ample control over the army,
police and national security service. Moreover, most legislation in post-Soviet
Armenia has been proposed by the presidential administration and enforced by
the ruling party, which has held the effective majority of seats in the
parliament (International Crisis Group, 2012: 3). As already noted, the third
President Serzh Sargsyan amended the Armenian constitution through
referendum in 2015. Many observers have viewed this constitution with vast
executive and administrative powers vested in the post of the prime minister
as Sargsyan’s plan to remain in power by switching to the prime minister’s
seat.
Oligarchs in Armenia are considered powerful and dangerous due to their
massive wealth and inclination to resort to violence when dealing with their
problems. Powerful oligarchs have been elected to the parliament during the
entire post-Soviet era despite a formal constitutional ban on active
businessmen becoming members of the parliament (Ishkhanian, 2008). The
MP-ship provides elected oligarchs with the coveted legislative immunity and
considerable influence on policymaking. Hence, there has been mutual
political dependence between the ruling leadership and the oligarchs since the
latter have assisted the former in remaining in office by manipulating elections
through vote buying, intimidation, ballot stuffing and carousel voting (Stefes,
2006, 2008; Wikileaks, 2009). Yet, presidents in Armenia have typically kept
most threats from dissenting political and economic elites at bay due to their
effective control of all economic, political and administrative levers (Welt &
Bremmer, 1997; Stefes, 2006).
103
Georgia
Georgia is also located in South Caucasus. It became independent from the
Soviet Union by a referendum held on March, 31, 1991. The Georgian
population amounts to around 3.7 million inhabitants. The populace is mainly
composed of 87 percent ethnic Georgians, 6 percent Azerbaijanis and 4.5
percent Armenians. Georgia has been severely hit by wars against its
breakaway republics of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and a civil war during
the first half of the 1990s. Zviad Gamsakhurdia, the first president of Georgia,
came to power in the spring of 1991 by popular vote. However, his tenure was
short as he was ousted in January 1992 by a coup d’état. Eduard
Shevardnadze, the former Soviet minister for foreign affairs, became president
of the State Council (a pseudo-parliament) during this tumultuous time in the
political history of Georgia. He used this position to consolidate all
oppositional forces against the Gamsakhurdian nationalists and ultimately
became president of Georgia in late 1995 by reinstituting the presidency in the
new constitution (Stefes, 2006: 46).
Corruption was vast and decentralized during Shevardnadze’s tenure.
Shevardnadze sat as president of Georgia between 1995 and 2003. His re-
election in April 2000 was marred by significant allegations of electoral
irregularities. Students of Georgian politics have generally agreed on the
divided nature of Georgian elites. In October 2000, Shevardnadze appointed
Mikheil Saakashvili as minister of justice. Saakashvili introduced major
reforms aimed at fighting corruption in the criminal justice system. Yet, he fell
into disfavor of Shevardnadze when he accused the state security minister and
Tbilisi police chief of corruption and transgressing the law. Important elites
defected from Shevardnadze’s camp. Saakashvili left the cabinet in September
2001. He explained this move by Shevardnadze’s reluctance to combat
corruption in the highest echelons of power. Saakashvili gained more
confidence and popularity after the resignation. He formed the National
Movement opposition party in November 2001.
Mikheil Saakashvili led the Rose Revolution that followed the fraud-
tainted parliamentary elections in November 2003. More than a hundred
thousand protesters took to the streets of Tbilisi in anti-governmental protests.
Shevardnadze seemed to be unmoved by these mass demonstrations and
attempted to open the new session of the Georgian parliament on November
22, 2003. The masses led by Saakashvili stormed into the parliament building
with roses in their hands and forced Shevardnadze out. State security services
and the military refused to obey to the orders from the president who had
declared state emergency. In a Russia-brokered meeting between the
opposition and Shevardnadze, the latter yielded to the demands of protesters
and resigned as president. On January 4, 2004, Saakashvili was elected
president by around 96 percent of the vote.
104
The most important ruling party of the 1990s Georgia was the Union of
Citizens of Georgia (UCG) established and headed by President Eduard
Shevardnadze since 1995. The UCG garnered nearly 42 percent of the votes in
the 1999 parliamentary elections (Hyde & O’Mahony, 2010: 696). The United
National Movement (UNM) (established and led by Saakashvili) supplanted
the UCG as the main ruling party in the wake of the ouster of Shevardnadze in
the end of 2003. The UNM ruled in coalition with the United Democrats (UD)
of Nino Burjanadze (Mitchell, 2012). In the 2008 parliamentary elections,
Saakashvili’s UNM received the majority of votes (59.18 percent) (Chedia,
2009). However, the UNM lost in the 2012 parliamentary elections to Bidzina
Ivanishvili’s Georgian Dream (GD) (Nichol, 2012).
Prior studies on Georgian politics evidence that the patterns of oligarchs’
political behavior and wealth accumulation strategies have been similar to that
found elsewhere in the post-Soviet context. Oligarchs in Georgia, likewise,
have been in possession of significant political, economic and media
resources. For instance, the two Georgian oligarchs Badri Patarkatsishvili and
Vano Chkhartishvili owned important media outlets and TV channels. Their
channels promoted their owners and their political ideas. The channels were
shut down in 2005 by the authorities (Kakabadze, 2005). Interestingly,
Patarkatsishvili defected from Shevardnadze to Saakashvili in the wake of the
Rose Revolution. His relations with the regime worsened gravely as he began
to provide media coverage to President Saakashvili’s political opponents. He
also supported anti-governmental rallies against the president. Patarkatsishvili
announced in the fall of 2007 that he was going to finance most opposition
parties and run for president in January 2008. He, however, escaped the
country as the Georgian authorities released video and audio recordings
showing that Patarkatsishvili was planning to overthrow Saakashvili by force
in connection to the snap 2008 presidential election (Cornell & Nilsson, 2009;
Lanskoy & Areshidze, 2008)
Saakashvili vested more powers in the post of president by swiftly
amending the constitution in 2004. The president, for instance, was given the
power to dismiss the parliament. In the course of his presidency, Saakashvili
concentrated more executive, judicial and administrative power in his own
hands. Saakashvili not only toppled Shevardnadze and his nomenklatura elite,
but also waged a holy war against corruption. He implemented successful
reforms that radically reduced the level of public corruption in Georgia. These
reforms were praised around the world for being highly effective despite
involving harsh authoritarian policies in breaking up well-established, regional
networks of corrupt bureaucracies and criminals (Light, 2014; Mitchell, 2009).
Saakashvili, once more, amended the constitution in 2010 to convert the
Georgian system of government to full parliamentarian. Saakashvili’s main
goal with this constitution was to transfer the ultimate power to the parliament
and the prime minister (Mootz, 2010: 216-217). Saakashvili and his ruling
UNM came to lose their power in the 2012 parliamentary elections to the
105
Ivanishvili-linked Georgian Dream coalition. The 2016 Georgian
parliamentary elections showed that Georgians still prefer Ivanishvili’s
political team to that of Saakashvili.
Russia
Russia is the largest territorial state in the world with a multiethnic population
estimated at 144 million people in 2017. Russia was the key member country
in the Soviet Union due to its population and territorial size as well as military
and economic capacities. The constitutional form of government in Russia has
been semi-presidentialism with a directly voted president and two chambers of
the Russian parliament. The post-Soviet Russian constitution was ratified in
December 1993. Many formal and substantial powers have been vested in the
post of president of Russia. For instance, Boris Yeltsin, Russia’s first
president, was authorized and used to rule Russia by presidential decrees that
had the power of law in the entire territory of Russia. This took place in a
period when Russia underwent troubled political and socio-economic
transformation during Yeltsin’s tenure. The country was strongly affected by
major political and economic calamities as well as territorial integrity
challenges due to the Chechen wars and the resulting elite fractionalization.
Generally, the Russian Duma has acted as the extended arm of the president
through an effective majority of the ruling party (Sakwa, 2008b; Remington,
2012). However, the Russian semi-presidential system does not require the
president to appoint a prime minister and cabinet from a party majority in the
Duma (Remington, 2012: 62).
The office of president implies a position of enormous formal and informal
authority. This power has been strengthened and centralized gradually through
constitutional amendments. For example, President Vladimir Putin abolished
direct elections for governors in 2004 and granted himself the exclusive right
to appoint heads of Russia’s regional governments. 31 Another example is the
2008 constitutional reform made by the then President Dmitry Medvedev,
inter alia, to extend the presidential term of office from four to six years
(Remington, 2012).
A major share of the world’s crude oil and dry natural gas is produced in
Russia. This resource abundance has generally been a major advantage and
key income source for the regime. Putin has frequently used this to stabilize
and consolidate his regime in Russia. In particular, some scholars have linked
Russia’s natural resource richness to the autocratic turn in Putin’s Russia. In
contrast, others have argued that the crises of 1990s’ Russia have discouraged
the majority of Russians to believe in the necessity of Russia developing into a
democracy (Shlapentokh & Arutunyan, 2013). The failed shock therapy and
popular aversion against the rule of the so-called pseudo-liberals in Yeltsin’s
31
However, in 2012 the Kremlin reinstated the direct election of senior officials in the regions.
106
cabinets are still fresh memories in the minds of average Russians. Moreover,
Putin and his regime have employed most traditional state media resources
and quasi-independent outlets to endorse and intensify such a narrative. Thus,
democracy, free market and decentralization have been promoted as primary
threats to the national interests of Russia. Putin’s ruling regime has amplified
this narrative by discrediting the color revolutions in the post-Soviet region
and by supporting many Eurasian breakaway republics. The foremost goal
with the latter is to revenge on or punish the leaders of partitioned countries
that maintain a hostile orientation towards the Kremlin for fostering or staging
their territorial dismemberment (Tolstrup, 2015b).
Oligarchs played a key role in the Russian economy during 1990s. They
capitalized on the structural disorder that characterized the economy during
the initial phase of the transition from communism. Prior to Putin’s rise to
power, Russian oligarchs made great fortunes in the energy industry,
construction, banking, finance, insurance and telecommunication. The Putin
era oligarchs have primarily been involved in the same segments of the
economy along with real estate, chemicals, transport and manufacturing
(Treisman, 2016: 240).
Oligarchs have also been central to key political processes. Oligarchs’
sway over the government has varied during the post-Soviet era. Yeltsin
surrendered to key oligarchs in advance of the 1996 presidential election.
These oligarchs were publicly known as “the Gang of Seven” (the G7),
referring to the then powerful oligarchs Boris Berezovsky, Vladimir
Vinogradov, Vladimir Gusinsky, Vladimir Potanin, Alexander Smolensky,
Mikhail Friedman and Mikhail Khodorkovsky (Fortescue, 2006: 25-28).
Yeltsin was no longer popular and the G7 opted for boosting Yeltsin’s
presidential campaign as their only feasible option at that moment. The main
reason was their fear of the return of the communists since the Communist
Party leader Gennady Zyuganov was expected to win a crushing victory
against President Yeltsin (Schroder, 1999; Fortescue, 2006). On 3 July 1996,
Yeltsin received 54.4 percent of the votes in the second round and defeated
Zyuganov. The presidential elections were marred by serious electoral
irregularities.
The power of the G7, viewed as part of the Yeltsin family clan, 32 waned
when Putin and his siloviki came into power. Putin and his close partners from
St. Petersburg gradually deprived the family clan of their access to most
important buttons of power in a fierce struggle between the two most powerful
32
The term clan has been used somewhat misleading in the post-Soviet context. The political and
sociological literature on the Middle East and Africa refers mainly to kinship-based ties between
individuals (De Waal, 2015). In contrast, Christoph Stefes stresses that the term clan in the post-Soviet
context mainly refers to a group of individuals who are tied together not necessarily only by kinship,
but by shared economic interests. Moreover, membership in these amorphous groups is dynamic and
individuals may be part of several such groups at the same time (Stefes, 2006: 93).
107
fractions in the Kremlin (Fortescue, 2006; Shlapentokh, 2004: 137). Putin
renationalized big enterprises and regained control over media outlets that
were in possession of rival oligarchs. He did so directly or through his proxies.
Putin put his siloviki and other allies at the helm of all of these newly acquired
organizations.
Overall, the elites in Russia have been rather divided prior to Putin’s rise to
power and cohesive afterwards. Underlying the division between elites (that
was regarded as some form of political pluralism) was the relative economic
freedom of powerful oligarchs linked to different fractions of the ruling elites.
Some scholars go so far as to argue that Putin’s arrival at power was endorsed
by oligarchs who saw him as the most able person to adjudicate between the
diverging interests of influential oligarchic coalitions (Fortescue, 2006). Yet, it
is worthwhile noting that Putin struck at the then powerful oligarchs
Khodorkovsky, Berezovsky and Gusinsky when consolidating his power. He
deprived them of their political, economic and media resources. He jailed
Khodorkovsky and forced Berezovsky into exile for their disobedience. Some
argue that this attack on and humiliation of oligarchs boosted his popularity
among Russians (Shlapentokh, 2004). Putin was able to displace his rivals by
strengthening his personal power in putting the control of the “power
agencies”, such as Defence and Interior ministries and the Security Council of
Russia, directly under the president.
Ukraine
Ukraine’s current population amounts to nearly 42.5 million (including
Crimea and the two breakaway republics of Donetsk and Luhansk). Ukraine
became independent from the Soviet Union in late August 1991. It inherited
its first constitution from the late Soviet Union era. The constitution was
amended multiple times between 1991 and 1996. Key Soviet bureaucrats and
communist elites retained their position throughout the 1990s. During the first
half of the 1990s, the executive power in Ukraine was distributed among the
prime minister, president, the parliament (Rada) and its speaker (D’Anieri,
2007: 80). Although Rada in the end came to acquiesce in creating the post of
president, it purposefully imposed key limitations on the president. Key
parliamentary resolutions stipulated that Rada could override presidential
vetoes and executive decrees by a simple majority vote, dismiss the entire
government or reject the appointment of single ministers (Przeworski, 1991:
87).
Things, however, changed radically during Leonid Kuchma’s presidency
(in office 1994-2005). At the outset, he put on the agenda that Ukraine’s
divided executive authority was to be blamed for the economic hardship the
country faced during his first five-year term as president. Using the extra-
constitutional threat to circumvent the parliament by directly organizing a
referendum on his proposed amendments to the constitution, Kuchma
successfully forced the parliament to enact his proposals. The constitution
108
entered into force in June 1996 and considerably strengthened the post of
president (D’Anieri, 2007: 85). Using similar tactics, Kuchma attempted to
ramrod more super-presidential amendments to the constitution through Rada
in 2000. This ultimate attempt failed due to the murder of investigative
journalist Heorhiy Gongadze, whose body was found beheaded in November
2000. 33 The oppositional Socialist Party of Ukraine (SPU) released secret
audio recordings indicating that Kuchma himself was giving orders to the
Ministry of Interior to make Gongadze disappear. The distaste for Kuchma
swelled explosively among the political opposition and the broad masses
(D’Anieri, 2007: 92-93).
On November 22, 2004, Central Election Commission of Ukraine declared
Viktor Yanukovich (the intended successor of Kuchma) the winner of the
2004 presidential election. No one except Russian President Putin was willing
to accept this fraud-tainted victory. The Orange Revolution was initiated when
hundreds of thousands of people gathered in the Maidan square of Kyiv to
show their disenchantment with the tainted elections results. These protests led
to elite defection and the further strengthening of the opposition. Another
major blow to Yanukovich’s plans to gain presidency was the agreement
between president Kuchma and the main rival candidate Viktor Yuschenko to
re-run the second round of elections in the end of December 2004. Yuschenko
became president by 52 percent of the vote (D’Anieri, 2007: 96-98).
Ukraine is arguably one of the most illustrative countries in the post-Soviet
region when it comes to having faced substantial influence by oligarchs on the
highest echelons of political and bureaucratic power. In spite of the fact that
super-presidential institutions had been in place during a significant part of its
post-Soviet era, scholars have generally identified Ukraine as politically
pluralistic much due to the observable economic competition between several
established networks of rent-seeking oligarchs. Ukrainian oligarchs, similar to
their peers in Russia, emerged after the demise of the Soviet empire. When the
free market reforms were introduced in Ukraine, a group of businessmen
began to engage in trade and financial transactions. They started to reap huge
gains from key segments of the Ukrainians economy. Their major fields of
activity, include, but are not limited to, metallurgy, media, banking, transport
and real estate trade (Matuszak, 2012). The oligarchs in Ukraine have been
capable of helping presidents to secure supportive majority in the parliament
by their informal influence on oppositional lawmakers (Pleines, 2009: 103).
Key oligarchs own media holdings, incorporated in their large conglomerates,
33
Heorhiy Gongadze was an investigative journalist and film director. He disappeared on September,
16, 2000, after receiving documents on grand corruption in Kuchma’s inner circle. His beheaded body
was found on November 3, 2000. Oleksandr Moroz made public tape recordings where President
Kuchma discussed with his chief of staff and interior minister the importance of getting rid of
Gongadze. The Kuchmagate scandal sparked widespread public outrage and substantial political
turmoil between the incumbents and the opposition (Kuzio, 2007).
109
which operate popular TV channels, radio stations, print or web-based
newspapers and magazines (Pleines, 2009, 2016; Matuszak, 2012; Åslund,
2015).
Many oligarchs in Ukraine have been favorably disposed towards gaining
formal political offices in the parliament (Pleines, 2016: 116). Moreover,
leading oligarchs have also accepted different presidents’ invitations to
become governors or ministers. Ihor Kolomoyskyi, for example, was
appointed governor of Dnipropetrovsk Oblast in March 2014 (in office until
late March 2015). The current president of Ukraine, Petro Poroshenko, was
put at the helm of the Trade Ministry and Foreign Affairs in the government of
two presidents from conflicting political camps (Yushchenko vs.
Yanukovych). The oligarchs in Ukraine have been powerful in their home
administrative districts. More often than not, scholars have been able to
observe networks of oligarchs driven by the general political and civilizational
rift between western and central Ukraine on the one side, and eastern Ukraine
on the other (Kuzio, 2006a; Pleines, 2016). This gap is well reflected in the
fact that voters in western and central Ukraine have mostly voted for the same
presidents and political parties in clear contrast to the electoral preferences of
the eastern regions (Kudelia & Kuzio, 2015; Kuzio, 2015a).
During Kuchma’s presidency, the three most significant oligarchic clans
were “The Donetsk clan” (Rinat Akhmetov, Serhiy Taruta and Vitaliy Hayduk
etc.), “The Dnipropetrovsk clan” (Ihor Kolomoyskyi, Henadiy Boholyubov,
Viktor Pinchuk and others) and “the Kyiv clan” (Viktor Medvedchuk and
Surkis brothers) (Matuszak, 2012: 14-15). These oligarchic networks
reorganized themselves more radically around the regional division after the
Orange (2004) (Åslund, 2007a, 2006) and Euromaidan revolutions (2014)
(Åslund, 2015). Yet, the key oligarchs Kolomoyskyi and Akhmetov opted for
supporting Ukraine’s territorial integrity during the recent war. While the
former organized and sponsored several battalions to fight the rebels in the
breakaway republics, Akhmetov relocated to Kyiv and assumed a much-
favorable role of a mediator between Ukraine and the breakaway republics of
Donetsk and Luhansk. Akhmetov has been capable of maintaining this
position due to his holdings in the energy and mining sectors of the breakaway
republics. His factories have been exporting their products and energy to
Ukraine and the West. This has been beneficial to all parties of the conflict.
The Kyiv government has been able to receive continued tax revenues and
secure the supply of energy to Ukraine, whereas the two quasi-republics have
been able to secure jobs (Associated Press, 2015).
110
Four oligarchs and their political struggle against
the incumbent regime
This section of the chapter employs both qualitative and quantitative data as
well as mixed methods (as already discussed in the research design chapter) to
illustrate how events and situations unfolded over time in the struggle for
power of the four rival oligarchs Gagik Tsarukyan (Armenia), Bidzina
Ivanishvili (Georgia), Mikhail Prokhorov (Russia) and Petro Poroshenko
(Ukraine) against the incumbent regimes in the respective country. To restate,
this is done in order understand the role of oligarchs in regime trajectories
through their interactions with incumbents and mass opinion given that mass
opinion and state power are key for our understanding of regime maintenance
or gradual change towards democratization in post-Soviet pseudo-
democracies.
It is worth repeating that I have already discussed the operationalization of
key variables and hypotheses in detail in the research design chapter. The
primary empirical material of this chapter consists of media reports from web-
based news agencies. The below narratives and content analyses about each
oligarch’s political path are primarily guided by the period of time of available
media reports on their political activities 34: Gagik Tsarukyan (2004-11-22 to
2015-09-26), Bidzina Ivanishvili (2010-06-18 to 2013-07-03), Mikhail
Prokhorov (2007-01-12 to 2015-06-05) and Petro Poroshenko (2007-06-18 to
2014-05-26). However, limiting the reports to the outlined last dates is due to
their ascent to power or reported substantial withdrawal from politics.
Furthermore, it merits emphasis that it is an uneven distribution of media
coverage across the four countries. In particular, the study has a better
reporting of data from Russia and Ukraine. While his unexpected and swift
path to power naturally explains the relatively smaller number of articles on
Ivanishvili, Tsarukyan’s case may be attributed to his primary goal to
broadcast his propaganda on his own TV channel. Undoubtedly, media outlets
are, to say the least, slightly biased in this context. One way of dealing with
this problem is to include only publications of facts that were officially
verified by the oligarch or his representatives. For this reason, I opted for
entirely disregarding rumors, expert opinions on or third-party interpretations
of oligarchs’ actions when coding the data. I coded several indicators of
central relevance to my study and the operationalization of these variables has
been discussed in length earlier in the research design chapter. Let us now turn
our focus to the four oligarchs’ political struggle for power against pseudo-
democratic regimes in Armenia, Georgia, Russia and Ukraine, respectively.
34
See a detailed discussion on the selection of media outlets in the research design chapter.
111
Gagik Tsarukyan in Armenia
Figure L. Tsarukyan’s path to exiting politics
Elected President of the National Olympic Committee of Armenia
: :-
Member of the National Security Council of Armenia

President of the Prosperous Armenia Party
2012 2013 2014 2015
Efforts to increase his reputation Attack against his human resources

Contributes to collective
Increase in his human resources challenges against the regime
Does not contribute to
Attack against his reputation
collective challenges against the regime
Attack against his financial resources : Legislative elections :- Presidential election
Politically motivated discrimination
against him personally
Notes: Data is coded by author based on electronic media reports from Azatutyun.am. There
is no inherent hierarchy between the markers. The graph simply depicts the categories of
reported activities on a timeline. Dashed lines delineate tenure.
Although this chapter will focus more closely on each of the elements in
Figure L above in the subsequent narrative on Tsarukyan’s struggle for power
against the ruling leadership, the figure is a neat, composite presentation of
this interaction in light of such central factors as mass opinion and state power
abuse. Hence, the figure is a coherent presentation of the narrative guided by
connected events as a sequence of news media reports. Since similar figures
will be used for illustrating the remaining oligarchs’ struggle for power, I want
to justify the use of such a figure on two grounds. First, it offers a clear
illustration of when in time Tsarukyan made his efforts to increase his
reputation and human resources according to news media reports. Second, the
figure also incorporates how and when the incumbent regime countered him
by abusing its state power in order to damage his reputation, attack his
financial assets and human resources. More specifically, every specific symbol
placed on a separate row in Figure L corresponds to a media report about the
coded variable. In addition, the big squares with two dots inside mark the
election days for presidential election or general elections to the parliament.
Dashed lines delineate Tsarukyan’s tenures as the President of the National
112
Olympic Committee of Armenia, presidency in the PAP or time in office as
MP. In other words, both for Tsarukyan and the remaining oligarchs these
figures are offered as an additional tool that aids the reader in visualizing how
the rival oligarchs interacted with incumbents over time. However, it is worth
noting that my analysis is primarily a qualitative case study that centers on a
narrative about this interaction from start to end. Let us now switch our focus
to that narrative.
Tsarukyan has been one of the wealthiest oligarchs in post-Soviet
Armenia. He has a degree in physical culture from the Armenian State
Institute of Physical Culture. In the first half of 1990s, he worked as a teacher
of physical education and arm wrestling coach. His conglomerate incorporates
more than three dozen diverse enterprises. He also owns Kentron TV – one of
the most popular TV channels in Armenia (Antonyan, 2015: 86). Until his
withdrawal from active politics in 2015, he used this channel to broadcast
daily television programs about his charity, church building and political
activities.
Most Armenians know Tsarukyan by his nickname Dodi Gago (idiot’s
Gagik). His political career started in 2003 when he was elected member of
the parliament. He was re-elected in all subsequent elections to the legislative
body. In 2004, Tsarukyan established the PAP and was its only party leader
until March 2015.
The PAP rapidly became popular as it came in second in the 2007
parliamentary elections (Ishkhanian, 2008: 43). Analysts have argued that
Tsarukyan was merely the proxy of Armenia’s second president, Robert
Kocharyan, in the PAP (Petrosyan, 2010: 10). 35 They have also described the
PAP as a de-ideologized party, whose primary goal has been only to be an
alternative to the ruling RPA of President Serzh Sargsyan (Nedolyan, 2013:
10). Note also that Tsarukyan’s son-in-law is a son of Hovik Abrahamyan –
former president of the parliament (in office between May 31, 2012, and April
13, 2014) and prime minister of Armenia (in office between April 13, 2014,
and September 13, 2016). Abrahamyan had been a key player in the RPA due
to his post as the RPA’s Campaign Manager during Sargsyan’s tenures as
president (Azatutyun, 2012o).
As displayed in Figure L above, Tsarukyan had a long-term plan to
improve his reputation among the public. An important element in this process
was his personal charity foundation most active since 2007 (Azatutyun,
2012m). His fund provided free transport and medical care to the poor. It also
offered personal scholarship to the best students in state universities
(International Crisis Group, 2012: 6). His charity tended to intensify close to
35This linkage has been inadvertently revealed by Ruben Hayrapetyan, “Nemets Rubo” (German
Ruben)—another powerful oligarch (yet, politically passive)—in an interview with a journalist from a
French-Armenian newspaper (Azatutyun, 2012k).
113
elections. This must have worried the ruling party and the president as
Armenia’s education minister in the end of 2011 declared these scholarships
illegal at universities (Azatutyun, 2011). Remarkably, a later media report
showed that the authorities have allowed similar scholarships by a loyal
oligarch from the RPA (Azatutyun, 2013a).
Tsarukyan’s PAP was in coalition with the ruling RPA between 2008 and
2012 (Navasardian, 2012). He was a member of the National Security Council
of Armenia from 2007 to 2015, appointed by Sargsyan. In February 2012,
Vardan Oskanyan, former minister for foreign affairs during Kocharyan’s
presidency, joined Tsarukyan’s party (Azatutyun, 2012h). This troubled the
ruling regime since the experienced Oskanyan was a welcome addition to
Tsarukyan’s organizational resources ahead of the legislative and presidential
elections in May 2012 and February 2013, respectively. In early April 2012,
Tsarukyan’s PAP signed a joint declaration with other major opposition
parties to establish an inter-party electoral headquarter. The core idea was to
collectively monitor the elections in order to prevent electoral fraud by the
incumbents (Azatutyun, 2012i). However, Tsarukyan stated in a media report
in mid-April that he was also collaborating with the government to prevent
electoral manipulation (Azatutyun, 2012j). Raffi Hovhanissyan, the opposition
Heritage party leader, did not accept this ambiguity and urged Tsarukyan to
withdraw from the ruling coalition. Tsarukyan replied with a flat refusal and
justified this by stating that the coalition anyway was going to dissolve after
the impending legislative elections (Azatutyun, 2012j). In the time that
followed, Sargsyan openly expressed that he was fully supporting his coalition
partner Tsarukyan’s run for legislative office. Moreover, the president spoke
of him as the ruling party’s “own” candidate in Abovyan—Tsarukyan’s home
region. President Sargsyan explained that the reason for him not proposing a
counter-candidate from the RPA was precisely due to that conviction
(Azatutyun, 2012n).
Media reports show that Tsarukyan was generally very careful in his
criticism of the government. He mostly avoided criticizing the president
personally. Although the PAP was not in coalition with the RPA after the
2012 elections, Tsarukyan labeled the PAP merely as an alternative, rather
than opposition to the RPA (Azatutyun, 2012c). However, the situation got
trickier when Oskanyan initiated a harsh wave of criticism against the
government and the president personally after the 2012 parliamentary
elections. When asked about his stance on Oskanyan’s critical statements,
Tsarukyan made it clear that it was only Oskanyan’s personal opinion and not
that of the PAP (Azatutyun, 2012f). The stakes rose even more when the
authorities accused Oskanyan of money laundering and tax evasion on May
25, 2012. This occurred just a day after the PAP declined to become part of a
ruling coalition with the ruling RPA (Azatutyun, 2012g). The PAP refuted
these accusations and argued that Oskanyan and some other party members
were being persecuted politically (Azatutyun, 2012a). Levon Ter-Petrosyan,
114
Armenia’s first president and the leader of the oppositional Armenian National
Congress (ANC), used this opportunity to increase the wedge between
Tsarukyan and President Sargsyan. Ter-Petrosyan declared that he welcomed
the PAP’s steps to become a real opposition party (Azatutyun, 2012q).
President Sargsyan was deeply concerned about such developments ahead
of the 2013 presidential election. In October 2012, high-ranking
representatives of the PAP complained that the authorities selectively
inspected those ministries and enterprises that were affiliated with Tsarukyan
and his party (Azatutyun, 2012b). As tensions escalated ahead of the
presidential election, Tsarukyan was repeatedly refusing to give a straight
answer to journalists whether he was going to stand in the elections or support
Sargsyan’s candidacy (Azatutyun, 2012e). However, in early December 2012
Tsarukyan and his party representatives visited high-ranking EU
representatives in Brussels and accused the Armenian government of not
being honest in their struggle to restrain bribery because the government itself
was entangled in corruption (Azatutyun, 2012l). Only a few days after this
visit, Tsarukyan’s official representative confirmed that his superior had had
an informal meeting with President Sargsyan (Azatutyun, 2012p). On
December 12, 2012, Tsarukyan announced his decision not to run for
president in the 2013 presidential election (Azatutyun, 2012d). This
unexpected move shocked large parts of the polity. The party members of the
PAP must have been negatively surprised about this decision as media reports
showed a month earlier that most of them were certain that Tsarukyan was
going to run for president (Azatutyun, 2012e). In January 2013, a key MP
from the PAP explained that Tsarukyan chose not to stand in the presidential
election to avoid societal clashes. In other words, President Sargsyan
threatened Tsarukyan to use force against him and his party members had he
not followed his ultimatum to opt out (Azatutyun, 2013b).
As already shown, the political game in Armenia has involved all the three
presidents of Armenia. Ter-Petrosyan spoke highly of Tsarukyan. In the spring
of 2014, Tsarukyan met Ter-Petrosyan and the ANC several times (Azatutyun,
2014d). Ter-Petrosyan drew many comparisons between Tsarukyan and
Ivanishvili. In fact, he stressed that a “bourgeois democratic revolution” was
possible in Armenia should Tsarukyan support it (Nedolyan, 2013). In his
turn, Tsarukyan began to denounce the system for not improving the business
climate by abolishing the monopolies and favoritism (Azatutyun, 2014a). In
May 2014, Tsarukyan vowed that both presidential and legislative elections
would be held in the near future, where the incumbent RPA was no longer
going to have any chance to win (Azatutyun, 2014b). In December 2014, he
convened a meeting with other major opposition parties to discuss the critical
situation in Armenia. He announced his readiness to challenge the president
personally. Tsarukyan formed an inter-party oppositional headquarter with the
aim of confronting President Sargsyan’s regime. However, the then Prime
Minister Abrahamyan said to media that Tsarukyan would never oppose
115
Sargsyan. Tsarukyan later replied to a journalist that Abrahamyan never said
so and accused journalists of deliberately distorting Abrahamyan’s words
(Azatutyun, 2014c).
On February 12, 2015, President Sargsyan assembled a meeting of the
RPA’s executive board. He harshly disgraced Tsarukyan by describing him as
“a scourge for the country” and that he lacked the basic intelligence, skills and
education necessary to rule Armenia. Sargsyan also expressed that he earlier
banned his employees and team members from using Tsarukyan’s nickname.
Moreover, it was hard for him to imagine how the “illiterate” Tsarukyan was
going to represent Armenia, for instance, in the EU. Abrahamyan concurred
with Sargsyan’s criticism and threatened to “hit all the slow-witted in the
head” to make them understand that amateurs have no place in politics. The
president concluded the meeting by commanding Abrahamyan to instruct the
state bodies to thoroughly investigate the veracity of unconfirmed reports
about Tsarukyan’s large-scale tax evasion (Azatutyun, 2015e). The police
subsequently dismissed Tsarukyan’s personal security staff and described
these measures solely as part of previously initiated police reforms
(Azatutyun, 2015d). Tsarukyan was also excluded from the National Security
Council of Armenia.
Media reports show that the conflict between Tsarukyan and President
Sargsyan was resolved in a meeting convened by Samvel Karapetyan—a
wealthy Armenian oligarch in Russia with close connections to the Kremlin
(Azatutyun, 2015a). After that meeting on February 17, 2015, Tsarukyan
called off a joint opposition rally planned on February 20 (Azatutyun, 2015g).
Two weeks later, he announced his exit from politics (Azatutyun, 2015c). In
early April, the government appointed Tsarukyan’s son-in-law as the head of
Abovyan region (Azatutyun, 2015b). Moreover, Tsarukyan personally
received from Sargsyan a second degree Medal of Honor for his service to the
fatherland in late September 2015 (Azatutyun, 2015f). Tsarukyan took a break
from politics until the spring of 2017, when he was re-elected as the party
leader of the PAP and member of the parliament. He has since substantially
retracted his previous opposition to Serzh Sargsyan.
116
Bidzina Ivanishvili in Georgia
Ivanishvili holds a PhD in Economics from Moscow State University of
Railway Engineering. Ivanishvili earned most of his wealth in Russia during
the 1990s (Fairbanks Jr & Gugushvili, 2013: 119). His business has since been
largely invested in Russia (Sputnik, 2011c). According to Forbes (2016), his
wealth amounts to $4.8 billion.
Figure M. Ivanishvili’s successful ascent to power
* Establishes the Georgian Dream - Democratic Georgia Party
2011 Oct 2012 2013
Efforts to increase his reputation Attack against his human resources

Contributes to collective challenges
Attack against his financial resources
against the regime
Politically motivated
discrimination against : Legislative elections
him personally
Attack against his media resources
Notes: Data is coded by author based on electronic media reports from Sputnik-Georgia.ru.
There is no inherent hierarchy between the markers. The graph simply depicts the
categories of reported activities on a timeline.
Figure M illustrates interesting facts. In particular, Ivanishvili’s organizational

resources were subject to frequent and intensive attacks by the Georgian
authorities. The same holds for his financial and media resources. However,
Ivanishvili focused specifically on improving his reputation as soon as he
entered the Georgian political scene.
In October 2011, Ivanishvili entered national politics to challenge the then
President Mikheil Saakashvili and his ruling UNM party (Fairbanks Jr &
Gugushvili, 2013: 119). Ivanishvili complained about President Saakashvili’s
total hegemony over the media landscape in Georgia and attempted to
establish a competing media house in order to thwart his monopoly (Sputnik,
2011b). The authorities responded swiftly to Ivanishvili’s apparent political
ambitions (Sputnik, 2011l). Later that same month, they launched inspections
117
in Ivanishvili’s Cartu Bank due to accusations of money laundering (Sputnik,
2011a). While Ivanishvili’s official representatives refuted these accusations
and regarded them politically motivated (Sputnik, 2011n), state officials
disavowed any political motivations (Sputnik, 2011k).
Another major offensive against Ivanishvili’s political path was
Saakashvili’s decision to strip Ivanishvili of his Georgian citizenship. This
was a politically motivated decision to prevent Ivanishvili from establishing
and leading a political party (Sputnik, 2011e). In late October 2011, the
authorities detained people close to Ivanishvili on the charges of drug and
weapon possession (Sputnik, 2011s). Immediately after this, the regime also
disarmed Ivanishvili’s bodyguards on the grounds that Georgian law did not
allow foreign citizens to be protected by armed guards (Sputnik, 2011p). In
response to this, Ivanishvili convened a meeting with several Western
ambassadors and made a call for “lowering the political heat” in Georgia
(Sputnik, 2011q).
From the beginning of November 2011, many Georgians began to open
bank accounts in Ivanishvili’s Cartu Bank as a sign of their support (Sputnik,
2011r). This exasperated the authorities that attempted to maintain a strong
pressure on Ivanishvili by postponing the hearings of the citizenship case by
the court (Sputnik, 2011o). Ivanishvili, however, did not surrender and rather
continued with his efforts to offset the adverse impact of the authorities’
oppression by improving his credibility among the public. He recruited
adherents from different layers of the Georgian society. Among them were
famous football, tennis and chess players, producers, musicians and the
Patriarch of the Georgian Orthodox Church (Sputnik, 2011j, 2012v, 2012r,
2012j). On November 13, 2011, the Patriarch asked Saakashvili to restore
Ivanishvili’s citizenship, but in vain (Sputnik, 2011d).
Ivanishvili announced the foundation of the GD party on December 11,
2011. He accused the government of elite corruption and condemned its
disgraceful attitude towards the Georgian church (Sputnik, 2011f). A day later,
the GD arranged its first public meeting and opened its first office in Tbilisi
(Sputnik, 2011h, 2011m). By the end of December, the Patriarch once more
showed his support for Ivanishvili and urged the authorities to restore his
citizenship. A few days later, the authorities restored the citizenship of his
wife (Sputnik, 2011g).
On February 21, 2012, Ivanishvili’s GD formed a large oppositional
coalition involving the then most influential oppositional forces (Sputnik,
2012p). The incumbents used different obstacles to prevent Ivanishvili from
standing for election. The dilemma was that while the Georgian authorities
required him to abandon his French citizenship to receive one in Georgia,
French law allowed him to do so only if he already had another citizenship
(Sputnik, 2011i). Notwithstanding this major legal obstacle, Ivanishvili and
his political team made huge efforts ahead of the 2012 legislative elections.
Ivanishvili increased his pressure on the authorities and the president himself
118
by multiple means. He and his representatives frequently met with foreign
ambassadors to Georgia to denounce the political persecution of the GD by the
authorities (Sputnik, 2012f). Media reports show that Ivanishvili paid a lot of
money to media outlets both to advertise and cover live broadcasts from the
GD’s meetings (Sputnik, 2012w).
Ivanishvili and his associates stepped up their counter-attacks on the
authorities and the president personally. They sued the president personally for
illegally revoking the citizenship of his wife (Sputnik, 2012s). They similarly
sued the authorities for the unlawful confiscation of Cartu Bank’s capital
(Sputnik, 2012b). The response of the authorities to Ivanishvili’s bold
campaigning was to deter people from supporting the GD financially by
various anti-money-laundering regulations (Sputnik, 2012i). Moreover, reports
show that they banned the Georgian edition of the much popular Forbes
Magazine from writing about Ivanishvili (Sputnik, 2012g). However,
Ivanishvili’s movement gained popularity among the public and the majority
of Georgians condemned Saakashvili’s decision to strip Ivanishvili of his
citizenship (Sputnik, 2012c). In late April 2012, Ivanishvili announced that his
intention was to ascend to power only by means of democratic elections
(Sputnik, 2012k). By June 2012, Ivanishvili’s political campaign was in full
steam. The authorities appeared to be extremely worried by his increasing
popularity. They successfully discouraged radio and TV stations from
broadcasting Ivanishvili’s political advertisement (Sputnik, 2012q).
Ivanishvili’s team responded to this by handing out free satellite dishes to the
public, which the authorities deemed to be vote-buying (Sputnik, 2012e). The
authorities also arrested Ivanishvili’s shares in two Georgian banks in late
June 2012 (Sputnik, 2012d). Moreover, the Prosecutor’s Office addressed a
request to arrest the financial resources of the charity foundation KOMAG
which authorities considered as part of the GD (Sputnik, 2012o).
On June 19, 2012, Ivanishvili’s alliance offered a helping hand to the
government in coping with the natural disaster in Kakheti region (Sputnik,
2012l). The authorities accepted the offer. However, almost two months later
the youth association of the GD demanded more details about how the
government had spent Ivanishvili’s financial contribution for dealing with the
disaster (Sputnik, 2012m). In mid-August, media reported that the GDS TV
channel (affiliated with Ivanishvili) was given permission to broadcast over
cable (Sputnik, 2012u). However, the political climate became extremely
polarized close to the legislative elections in early October 2012. Reports
show that the authorities imposed heavy fines on Ivanishvili supporters for
donating money to the GD (Sputnik, 2012t). They undertook similar actions
against the team members and campaign workers of Ivanishvili (Sputnik,
2012a). Yet, a critical event occurred on September 18, 2012. National TV
broadcasted several videos showing how prison officers raped and tortured
inmates in Gldani Prison (Sputnik, 2012n). This spawned mass demonstrations
against Saakashvili and the government in major cities of Georgia. On
119
October 1, 2012, Georgians went to the polls. Ivanishvili’s GD won the
majority of seats in the parliament and President Saakashvili conceded defeat
to the GD (Sputnik, 2012h).
Mikhail Prokhorov in Russia

Prokhorov graduated in 1989 from Moscow State Financial institute with a
degree in international economic relations. For the better part of the 1990s,
Prokhorov’s capital was invested in commercial banks and industrial
conglomerates (Ria Novosti, 2008). Prokhorov possessed a controlling interest
in RBC Multimedia Holding between 2009 and 2017. The holding has
operated the popular RBC TV channel and internet media outlet covering
political and business news (Boyd-Barrett, 2012).
Figure N. Prokhorov’s path to withdrawing from politics
Member of the Presidential Commission on Innovation
:-
:
President of the Right Cause Party
President of the Civic Platform Party
President of the Russian Biathlon Union
2009 2011 2012 2013 2015
Efforts to increase his reputation Contributes to collective challenges against the regime
Increase in financial resources Does not contribute to

collective challenges against the regime
Increase in human resources : Legislative elections :- Presidential election
Attack against his human resources
Notes: Data is coded by author based on electronic media reports from Ria-Novosti.ru.
categories of reported activities on a timeline. Dashed lines delineate tenure.
Figure N suggests that Prokhorov focused particularly on improving his

reputation. Moreover, this behavior was most evident close to elections. It is
also apparent that he generally rejected invitations to cooperate with the
opposition. In hindsight, it is clear that he was a political loner who generally
chose to go his own way. In addition, the figure illustrates that the incumbents
threatened neither his media nor financial resources. However, his human
120
resources were attacked ahead of the 2012 legislative elections. Let us now
take a closer look at the different phases of Prokhorov’s political pathway.
Prokhorov’s political career may be characterized as vacillating. It
oscillated between active and passive phases—big promises and abrupt exits
from politics. Media reports show that he on several occasions announced his
readiness to leave his business to entirely engage in politics (Ria Novosti,
2013h, 2011a). On June 25, 2011, Prokhorov became the president of the
Right Cause party (RCP). Moreover, the RCP’s members voted for
abandoning co-chairmanship in the party to fully concentrate the party
leadership in his hands (Ria Novosti, 2013c). Prokhorov announced that the
ruling United Russia (UR) was the RCP’s main political rival. However, while
he spoke critical of the UR, he was more cautious when referring to Putin (Ria
Novosti, 2011i). Speaking at the party congress in late June 2011, Prokhorov
suggested not using the label “opposition” for the RCP because, according to
him, most Russians associated that label with marginalized political forces
(Ria Novosti, 2011m).
In July 2011, Prokhorov declared that he completely left his business for
engaging fully in politics (Ria Novosti, 2011a). In late August 2011, the RCP
published its manifesto in which it vowed to implement important reforms.
Two key proposals were the RCP’s plans to cancel MPs’ immunity and
introduction of a law enabling parliamentarians to impeach both governors
and members of the government. Prokhorov made clear that he regarded many
parliamentarians as crooks, which, he further noted, necessarily were to be
exposed to criminal investigations (Ria Novosti, 2011k).
In September 2011, his organizational capacity suffered great damage. His
rivals in the RCP convened a parallel party congress, chaired by Andrei
Dunayev, and voted for ousting Prokhorov. Prokhorov blamed Vladislav
Surkov, the then deputy head of the presidential administration, for his
removal and urged all his adherents to leave “the puppet” Kremlin party
(Shlapentokh & Arutunyan, 2013: 45). Later, he, however, stated that the
capture of the RCP was nothing personal against him, but rather the
“system’s” resilience to the reforms he aimed to enforce (Ria Novosti, 2011n).
In mid-September 2011, Prokhorov left the RCP (Ria Novosti, 2011o) and
declared that neither he nor his colleagues were going to stand for or vote in
the upcoming legislative elections (Ria Novosti, 2011f). Prokhorov also stated
that he was demanding his invested money back from the captured party (Ria
Novosti, 2011j).
On December 4, 2011, Russians went to the polls for the State Duma
elections. As expected, the incumbent UR party won the majority of
legislative seats. On December 10, 2011, the non-systemic opposition
organized large-scale protests against the regime, claiming electoral fraud in
the election. Meanwhile, media reported that although Prokhorov
acknowledged Putin’s popularity, he was critical of the UR and pointed to the
urgent need of its reformation (Ria Novosti, 2011h). On December 12, 2011,
121
Prokhorov announced that he intended to run for president in the 2012
elections (Ria Novosti, 2011d). He declared that he had ties neither to the
Kremlin nor to the White House (Ria Novosti, 2011c). Prokhorov also
expressed that he would collaborate with the then Finance Minister Alexei
Kudrin should he become president in 2012 (Ria Novosti, 2011e). He
promised to reduce the presidential term of office to five years and set an
upper limit of ten years for the same president. Moreover, he ensured that he
would reintroduce popular vote for governors with immediate effect (Ria
Novosti, 2011g).
On December 24, 2011, Prokhorov took part in the oppositional protest
against the authorities only as a fellow citizen, but expressed criticism of the
Kremlin’s alleged electoral fraud (Ria Novosti, 2011l). In mid-January 2012,
Prokhorov spoke of the urgent need to reform most state institutions in order
to ensure the rule of law and democracy, which he saw as the foremost
demand of the Russian protesters (Ria Novosti, 2012a). Close to the 2012
presidential election, a high-ranking official from a systemic opposition party
opposed Prokhorov by accusing him of plagiarism in his political program
(Ria Novosti, 2012y). A more radical opposition party expressed its intention
to request a revision of the Central Election Commission’s (CEC) decision to
accept Prokhorov’s candidacy for president (Ria Novosti, 2012b).
Prokhorov countered such attacks by recruiting key figures from Russian
show business to his political team of advisers. Alla Pugacheva (one of
Russia’s most beloved singers) and other popular actors and athletes led the
list (Ria Novosti, 2012w). Moreover, Prokhorov reassured that he was ready
to quit his business activities and devote himself entirely to politics if he
would be elected president (Ria Novosti, 2012p). Surprisingly, Prokhorov did
not rule out the possibility of him working in the cabinet of the other president
should he lose in the upcoming presidential election. However, while he did
not provide any more specific details on this, he added that his goal was to
help or personally implement policies that his team and supporters endorse.
Prokhorov also mentioned that he was going to establish a new party after the
presidential election on March 4, 2012 (Ria Novosti, 2012m).
In late January 2012, Prokhorov said that he was expecting people
disapproving Putin and the Communist Party leader Gennady Zyuganov to
vote for him (Ria Novosti, 2012h). He also criticized CEC for denying the
registration of the opposition Yabloko party leader Grigori Yavlinsky’s
candidacy for president (Ria Novosti, 2012s). Moreover, Prokhorov opted for
not attending a regular meeting in the Presidential Commission of Innovation
since his political rival Putin was the chair of the commission. He justified this
decision by stating that he wanted to avoid being part of Putin’s presidential
campaigning which took place in most state commissions close to the
elections (Ria Novosti, 2012i).
Prokhorov was significantly restrained in his criticism of Putin only a
month prior to the 2012 presidential election. Yet, he vowed to criticize Putin
122
personally after the second round of the elections (Ria Novosti, 2012f). Still,
only a day later Prokhorov declared that he did not see any prospects for Putin
staying in government should he garner the majority of Russian votes in the
presidential election (Ria Novosti, 2012g). Putin, who was prime minister at
the time, spoke rather highly of Prokhorov for his honesty, contemporaneity
and strong desire to develop the Russian economy. Putin also added that some
of Prokhorov’s ideas were worth a great deal of attention (Ria Novosti,
2012x). However, Putin personally declined all political debates with the
opponents due to a “busy schedule” (The Moscow Times, 2012). In reality,
this was a signal to the public that he did not view any of his competitors
worth enough for him to devote time for political debates.
In the beginning of February 2012, the opposition was still protesting
against the authorities’ electoral manipulations. Prokhorov did not contribute
to these collective challenges against the regime, but was again among
protesters simply as a compatriot. He defended this decision by asserting that
he wanted to avoid debating with “the marionettes of Putin” on stage (Ria
Novosti, 2012r). Just a few weeks before the presidential election, Prokhorov
intensified his criticism of the government’s policies for the business climate
(Ria Novosti, 2012c). He attempted in vain to unite the opposition by
introducing the idea of jointly monitoring the elections (Ria Novosti, 2012l).
Prokhorov also admitted that Putin was better than he was at using the media
to inform the public about his political program. Prokhorov added that he was
going to improve his own media strategies (Ria Novosti, 2012d).
In late February 2012, Zyuganov’s confidant urged Prokhorov to suspend
his campaign in favor of his superior (Ria Novosti, 2012q). On that very day,
Zyuganov did not bother to personally attend a state-run TV debate with
Prokhorov but rather sent his confidant to debate him. Prokhorov left the TV
studio during the live broadcast as soon as Zyuganov’s decision to abstain
became evident (Ria Novosti, 2012j).
Putin won a sweeping victory in the presidential election held on March 4,
2012. Prokhorov received 8 percent of Russian votes. He conceded his defeat
to Putin, but announced that he was about to establish a new party and run for
president in the future. He added that possible electoral manipulations were
due to the flawed political system and not necessarily instructed by Putin. Yet,
he ruled out any possibility of him working in Putin’s cabinet (Ria Novosti,
2012e). The radical opposition, however, did not accept the results of the
elections as easily. The situation on the streets became more violent as tens of
thousands of Russians took to the streets to show their dissatisfaction with the
election results. Prokhorov did not join the opposition rallies against Putin.
Rather, he called for calm and avoidance of clashes (Ria Novosti, 2012o,
2012u).
In the beginning of June 2012, Prokhorov introduced his new Civic
Platform party (CPP). He surprised everybody by not joining the party
himself. Initially, he announced that only “professionals” were welcome to
123
become members of the CPP (Ria Novosti, 2012v). However, he later
abandoned this idea and attempted to convert the CPP to a more traditional
party (Ria Novosti, 2012n). In general, he used his financial resources to
improve his reputation and organizational resources during 2012. To this end,
he offered $50,000 to each Russian family that wanted to adopt children which
Russian law prohibited being adopted by American citizens (Ria Novosti,
2012k). He continued recruiting famous people to his party in order to both
improve his human resources and personal reputation (Ria Novosti, 2012t).
In the beginning of 2013, he expressed criticism of the State Duma and the
elected opposition as being puppets of the Kremlin. He also heavily criticized
President Putin for not being “an initiator and leader of social processes”
anymore (Ria Novosti, 2013d). In April 2013, Prokhorov spoke positively of
Alexei Navalny—a popular oppositional politician who announced his plans
to run for mayor of Moscow. Notwithstanding this, Prokhorov suggested
Navalny to form a new party before the elections. He also announced that he
and the CPP were going to stand in the Moscow parliament elections (Ria
Novosti, 2013e). However, he later reneged on this decision by declaring that
neither he nor the CPP would run. A representative of the Just Russia (JR),
another systemic opposition party, explained that Prokhorov’s decision was
unsurprising because the government had entirely controlled him. The JR’s
representative further noted that Prokhorov’s run for mayor would endanger
UR candidate Sergey Sobyanin’s chances to be elected as Mayor of Moscow
(Ria Novosti, 2013g).
The authorities detained the Mayor of Yaroslavl due to accusations of
corruption in August 2013 (Ria Novosti, 2013f). He was a key member in
Prokhorov’s political team. In September 2013, Prokhorov regretted that he
opted for not standing in the Moscow elections that were held three months
earlier (Ria Novosti, 2011b). He alleged the obstacles to transferring his
foreign assets to Russia as an excuse for that decision since his conviction had
always been to separate politics from business (Ria Novosti, 2013a).
In late December 2013, Prokhorov’s sister Irina Prokhorova became the
president of the CPP (Ria Novosti, 2013b). This led to his gradual exit from
politics. During 2014, Prokhorov did not appear in media with any
controversial political proposals or criticism against incumbents. However, he
still announced certain suggestions on how to improve the business climate in
Russia, in which he stressed the need of privatization in many inefficient
sectors of the economy (Ria Novosti, 2014). In mid-July 2014, his sister left
her post in the CPP due to her disagreement with the party leadership’s
endorsement of the annexation of Crimea (RBC, 2014). In February 2015, the
leadership of the CPP joined pro-Putin rallies against the opposition in Russia.
This prompted Prokhorov to quit the party a month later. He also demanded
the elimination of the CPP if its name was not changed (Ria Novosti, 2015).
124
Petro Poroshenko in Ukraine
Poroshenko has been one of the most publicly known oligarchs in Ukraine. He
has a degree in economics from Kyiv State University. He is the owner of the
popular 5 TV Channel in Ukraine (Pleines, 2009). He earned his major capital
by supplying cocoa beans to the Soviet Union starting from 1989. Since 1998,
the Petro Poroshenko Charity Foundation has provided support for large
Ukrainian families and orphans. His fund has also made considerable
contributions to social movements and organizations that work for justice,
equality and democracy.
Figure O. Poroshenko’s successful way to becoming the president of Ukraine
: :
Member of the National Security and Defense Commission
Minister of Economic Development and Trade
:- :-
:-
MP in Rada
Chairman of the Board of Ukraine's National Bank
Minister of Foreign Affairs
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Efforts to increase his reputation Attack against human resources

Increase in financial resources Russian attack against financial resources
Media resources increase Contributes to collective challenges against the regime
Does not contribute to
Increase in human resources collective challenges against the regime
Attack against financial resources : Legislative elections :- Presidential election
Notes: Data is coded by author based on electronic media reports from Censor.net.ua.
categories of reported activities on a timeline. Dashed lines delineate tenure.
Figure O illustrates that Poroshenko attached great importance to enhancing

his reputation and organizational resources. Similar to previously discussed
oligarchs, this behavior intensified close to elections. The figure also shows
that Poroshenko has over the years been well entrenched in government since
he headed the National Bank of Ukraine, Ministries for Foreign Affairs, and
Economic Development and Trade. This is most likely why his organizational
resources were not attacked as often as was the case with the three other
oligarchs examined in this chapter. However, the figure indicates that Russian
attacks against his financial resources in Russia and Crimea took place in the
125
mid of the Ukraine crisis in the spring of 2014. Let us now focus on the details
of Poroshenko’s path to becoming president in 2014.
Poroshenko had good relations with Viktor Yuschenko—the second
president of Ukraine. Prior to Viktor Yanukovich’s election victory in
February 2012, Poroshenko was not as active in politics. In particular, in
February 2008, Poroshenko pointed out that he stayed aloof from politics due
to his presidency in the National Bank (Censor, 2008). He, however, made
several sweeping political statements during this politically more passive
period. For instance, Poroshenko stated that Ukrainians were sick of
politicians (Censor, 2009f), the presence of Russia’s naval fleet in Crimea was
not to be politicized (Censor, 2009d) and Russia was not a threat to Ukraine’s
national security (Censor, 2009e).
In October 2009, President Yuschenko appointed Poroshenko as member
of the National Security and Defense Commission (Censor, 2009c).
Yuschenko described him as an “effective” politician and skilled official when
he appointed him as minister for foreign affairs (Censor, 2009a, 2009b). In
contrast, the then leader of the Party of Regions (POF) Yanukovich criticized
the appointment by remarking that there were more professional candidates
for that position (Censor, 2009b).
One of Poroshenko’s foremost tasks in his role as minister for foreign
affairs was to improve Ukraine’s relations with both Russia and the West. In
late October 2009, Poroshenko declared that the question of Ukraine joining
NATO was not on the agenda. He also added that Ukraine’s foreign policies
were to pursue pragmatic relations with all partners (Censor, 2009i). By the
end of 2009, Poroshenko, however, announced that Ukraine would become
member of NATO only if there would be a political and popular consensus on
the issue (Censor, 2009j). Poroshenko made every effort to enhance his public
image. In late December 2009, he declared that he had been financing all his
official journeys as minister with his own money. He justified this decision by
pointing to the difficult economic situation of the state economy (Censor,
2009h). In addition, he personally assisted Ukrainian passengers to put
pressure on Wizz Air 36 to compensate for delayed flights (Censor, 2009g).
Yanukovich became president after garnering the majority of Ukrainian
votes in February 2010. During one of his first official visits to Brussels, he
was accompanied by Poroshenko (Censor, 2010a). Poroshenko had already
developed good relations with the West while he was minister for foreign
affairs. Moreover, in March 2010 Poroshenko called on all politicians in
Ukraine to unite around the idea of Ukraine’s European integration (Censor,
2010b). Poroshenko kept a steady pressure on the government. He criticized
its economic policies and accused it of corruption (Censor, 2010c). In late
36 Wizz Air is currently the largest low cost airline in Central and Eastern Europe. Its head office is
located in Budapest, Hungary.
126
November 2010, a large number of owners of small-scale enterprises took to
the streets of Kyiv urging the president to cancel the new law implying higher
taxation. Poroshenko fully supported these demands (Censor, 2010d).
In 2011, Poroshenko stated that the economic policies of the government
were going to generate a new and much harsher popular uprising than was the
case in 2004 (Censor, 2011d). Poroshenko further denounced the whole
political system and corrupt politicians in Ukraine for performing extremely
bad (Censor, 2011a). In early November 2011, Poroshenko also leveled harsh
criticism against powerful oligarchs, among them Rinat Akhmetov, for not
paying an adequate level of taxes (Censor, 2011e). Later, Poroshenko also
pointed out that the gap between the rich and poor in Ukraine must be reduced
and that charity alone was not enough to eradicate economic disparity
(Censor, 2012d).
In December 2011, Poroshenko declared that he had no plans of running
for president (Censor, 2011b). A month earlier, the ruling party proposed
important changes in the electoral legislation of Ukraine. Poroshenko
considered them hazardous for Ukraine (Censor, 2011c). In February 2012,
Yanukovich and his Prime Minister Nikolay Azarov offered Poroshenko to
head the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade (Censor, 2012b). He
assumed the office the following month (Censor, 2012k).
It is worth mentioning that key opposition leaders Yulia Timoshenko and
Yuriy Lutsenko were sentenced to prison for abuse of office and forgery. In
March 2012, Poroshenko urged the authorities to ensure fair legal process in
which the democratic rights of the suspects were respected (Censor, 2012o).
He also vowed to involve the civil society of Ukraine in monitoring public
procurement and render them more effective (Censor, 2012m). Poroshenko
stated that he agreed to collaborate with the government of Yanukovich to
develop the Ukrainian economy by improving the business climate (Censor,
2012n). He also announced that he intended to stand in the upcoming
legislative elections (Censor, 2012e). On March 30, 2012, media reported that
he was the richest public official in Ukraine (Censor, 2012i). Poroshenko
announced that he gave up his official salary and was going to publish a
complete declaration of his assets (Censor, 2012g).
Within the years 2012 to 2013, Poroshenko leveraged his tenure in the
Yanukovich government both to strengthen his links with the West and to
extend his political influence domestically. In particular, he used the linkages
with the West to put pressure on the president and the government as to their
policies towards Ukraine’s full integration in the Eastern Partnership (EaP) of
the EU. Prior to the parliamentary elections in the end of 2012, he condemned
the government for their passivity in implementing the requirements of the
EaP (Censor, 2012s). Perhaps coincidentally, Yanukovich appointed
Poroshenko’s son Olexiy Poroshenko as deputy consul of Ukraine in China
only a week after that criticism (Censor, 2012r).
127
On May 28, 2012, Poroshenko announced his decision to stand in the
parliamentary elections in November 2012 (Censor, 2012j). Two days later,
media reported that the public prosecutors had launched an investigation into
one of his car companies to check whether the company complied with
security and construction regulations. Poroshenko’s representatives announced
that the authorities’ complaints were groundless (Censor, 2012q). In June
2012, Poroshenko suggested that taxes on luxury should be collected from
cabinet ministers in the first place. He further criticized the government for not
dealing with rife corruption in Ukraine (Censor, 2012p). Ten days later, the
president appointed him as the manager of the Black Sea Trade and
Development Bank (Censor, 2012a).
Poroshenko was elected MP in November 2012 (Censor, 2012l). In
December, he announced that he was going to take a neutral political stance in
the parliament (Censor, 2012f), but support the opposition in its struggle for
principal causes (Censor, 2012h). He reasserted his condemnation of
Yanukovich’s wavering between joining the Russia-led Customs Union (CU)
or the EaP. Poroshenko once more made very clear that the CU was not an
alternative for Ukraine (Censor, 2012c).
During the spring of 2013, Poroshenko sought to develop his bonds with
the opposition. He announced that he had good chances of becoming Mayor of
Kyiv. Yet, he stated that he would run for the post only if his candidacy was
endorsed by the opposition (Censor, 2013l). Well before the Kyiv mayoral
elections in June 2014, Poroshenko showed his support for Vitali Klitschko
for that post (Censor, 2013j). In late February 2013, he also urged the
authorities to release Yulia Timoshenko (Censor, 2013o). A month later,
Poroshenko’s son Olexiy joined the faction of Timoshenko’s oppositional
Batkivshchyna (Fatherland) party in the regional council of Vinnitsa—
Poroshenko’s home region (Censor, 2013g).
In April 2013, the president of the parliament agreed on the inclusion of
Poroshenko in a parliamentary commission for cooperation with the European
Parliament (Censor, 2013m). On April 20, 2013, Poroshenko expressed his
“forecast” that Russia was going to offer Ukraine the status of observer in the
CU, but that President Yanukovich would reject it in favor of the EaP (Censor,
2013c). Poroshenko also declared that a new candidate for the post of prime
minister should had been proposed by the opposition which had the majority
in the parliament (Censor, 2013h). However, Poroshenko did not attend the
parliament on the day the opposition voted for the motion of no-confidence in
the government in late April 2013 (Censor, 2013d). Some fractions of the
opposition criticized his nonappearance and blamed Poroshenko for not being
in “real” opposition to Yanukovich (Censor, 2013s). In late June 2013,
Poroshenko again “forecasted” that the president was going to release
Timoshenko and send her abroad for medical treatment (Censor, 2013k).
In mid-July, Russian authorities initiated attacks against Poroshenko’s
business in Russia (Censor, 2013p). This happened only two days after
128
President Putin visited Ukraine (EurActiv, 2013). In particular, the Federal
Consumer Protection Service of Russia inspected and found toxic contents in
Roshen confectionery, which led to the Russian ban on the import of Roshen’s
products to Russia (Censor, 2013n). Russian officials announced in mid-
August that Roshen could well be back on the Russian market, but that a lot of
work remained to be done before it could happen (Censor, 2013e). Later in
September, Poroshenko declared that Roshen won the trade war that Russia
waged against Ukraine. The reason for this statement was that Roshen’s sales
increased despite the Russian attacks against it (Censor, 2013q). In sharp
contrast to this, Poroshenko made clear in November that Roshen was
compelled to implement mass reductions in staff due to the Russian ban on
Roshen (Censor, 2013b). However, he added that the primary threat against
Roshen was directed by the government and the security forces of Ukraine
(Censor, 2013a). Poroshenko also noted that he was leveraging all his
organizational resources and international connections to put pressure on
Russia to lift the ban (Censor, 2013r).
In early December 2013, Poroshenko mediated between the police and
protesters during the Euromaidan protests (Censor, 2013f). Poroshenko
announced that the opposition was ready to negotiate with Yanukovich only
after he dismissed the government and signed the Association Agreement
(AA) for the EaP (Censor, 2013i). Poroshenko had been very active behind the
scenes of the Euromaidan. He made great efforts to coordinate the opposition,
Western colleagues and the international business community to put pressure
on Yanukovich. For instance, in late January 2014 Poroshenko attended the
World Economic Forum in Davos and urged the business community not to
collaborate with the Yanukovich government (Censor, 2014j). On January 25,
Poroshenko described the situation in Ukraine as a national crisis and called
for consolidation against the tyranny of the ruling regime (Censor, 2014f). He
announced that the international community did not accept Yanukovich and
his criminal regime as the legitimate leaders of Ukraine. He added that they
instead considered the legitimacy to lie with the Euromaidan (Censor, 2014l).
On February 2, 2014, Poroshenko expressed his gratitude to the EU and the
U.S. Department of State for their support of the Euromaidan (Censor, 2014a).
On February 3, media reported that Poroshenko had initiated talks with many
MPs from the ruling POF party to urge them to defect to the opposition
(Censor, 2014m). Two days later, he also urged president Yanukovych to
withdraw all the special forces from Kyiv (Censor, 2014d). The Euromaidan
Revolution toppled Yanukovich on February 22, 2014. Poroshenko became
the speaker of parliament in late February. In early March, polls showed that
Poroshenko was a favorite president candidate prior to the forthcoming
presidential election (Censor, 2014e). On March 28, Poroshenko officially
announced his candidacy (Censor, 2014h). A day later, Vitali Klitschko
withdrew his candidacy to support Poroshenko (Censor, 2014b). He advised
Yulia Timoshenko to do the same, which she declined (Censor, 2014c). Many
129
other oppositional leaders endorsed Poroshenko as the most viable candidate
for president (Censor, 2014p). Moreover, the first president of Ukraine Leonid
Kravchuk announced his support for Poroshenko’s candidacy in late March.
He expressed that Poroshenko had always been independent and pragmatic
(Censor, 2014q).
In April 2014, Poroshenko stated that he was willing to sell Roshen should
he become president (Censor, 2014g). He also added that he did not consider
himself as an oligarch since his definition of an oligarch only encompassed
those who accumulated their wealth while being in office (Censor, 2014k). On
May 15, 2014, media reported that many members of the former ruling party
were campaigning for him in his run for president (Censor, 2014n).
Poroshenko’s main rival Timoshenko sought to debate with Poroshenko close
to the elections, but he avoided it completely (Censor, 2014o). His press
service justified this by pointing to Poroshenko’s busy schedule (Censor,
2014i). On May 25, 2014, Poroshenko won the elections garnering nearly 55
percent of the votes.
Summary and a comparative analysis of the results

The above analyses were guided by a specific research question asking about
how oligarchs interact with incumbents and mass opinion given that the two
most important streams of prior work emphasize the crucial role of either mass
opinion or state power in understanding regime trajectories in post-Soviet
pseudo-democracies. H2 hypothesized that we should expect that all
individual, politically motivated rival oligarchs aim at improving public
opinion about them by developing their personal reputation, organizational
capacity and performing a credible opposition to the regime. They do so
primarily to emulate the incumbent regime’s efforts to maintain its power.
H2a hypothesized that we should expect state power abuse against all
oligarchs in these interactions. However, the expectation was that oligarchs in
countries with a greater level of state power concentration and an uneven
playing field (UPF) essentially would fail in all the three areas as well as their
concrete struggles for power. The nuanced explanation for such findings that
this thesis offers is that the regime abuses its stronger state power primarily to
damage the credibility of the rival oligarch by making him appear
unpredictable and unreliable in the eyes of the public. Results (as restated
below) lend support for these hypotheses.
As a way of summarizing the general findings in the four sections above,
what did the four oligarchs undergo in their struggles for political power?
Figure P offers a comparative perspective based on a quantitative content
analysis of all media reports under the study (see the research design chapter
for detailed information and operationalization of the variables used in the
figure).
130
Figure P. Comparison of the struggle for power by the four oligarchs
Ivanishvili
Poroshenko
Prokhorov
Tsarukyan
0 20 40 60 80 100
Percentage (%)
Efforts to Attack against

increase his reputation his human resources
Increase in his Attack against
financial resources his financial resources
Increase in Politically motivated discrimination
his media resources against him personally
Increase in Russian attack
human resources against his financial resources
Attack against Contributes to
his reputation collective challenges against the regime
Attack against Does not contribute to
his media resources collective challenges against the regime
Notes: The share of each activity in all published media reports about each oligarch. The
total number of aggregated reports on each oligarch in order of the appearance above is 46,
84, 41, 22 across multiple years.
Figure P is revealing in several ways. First, it shows that all oligarchs

primarily focused on increasing their reputation. Second, oligarchs also paid
great attention to improving their organizational resources. Third and
relatedly, their rivals attacked these resources to restrain further advances.
Fourth, similar attacks were directed towards all but Prokhorov’s financial
resources. These results, thus, accord well with the argument of this study
emphasizing the importance of studying how oligarchs interact with
incumbents and mass opinion in the crucial framework of state power as to
regime trajectories. In other words, all the four oligarchs were committed to
continuously enhancing their reputation and gaining the credibility of a rival in
their struggle for power (support for H2). Moreover, the reports showed that
two oligarchs (Prokhorov and Poroshenko) announced on multiple occasions
their readiness to leave their businesses in order to fully engage in politics. A
shared statement by all the four oligarchs was their expressed will to combat
corruption in their respective countries. Moreover, most of them faulted the
government for a deteriorating business climate and expressed a firm
commitment to improve the situation.
131
What did incumbent regimes do against their rival oligarchs in their struggle
for power? In all four countries, authoritarian leaders employed their state
power to attack the oligarchs’ organizational resources to prevent them from
gaining organizational strength and reputation as a trustworthy rival. It was
particularly evident in situations when oligarchs had decent opportunities to
mount collective resistance against the regime. However, Tsarukyan and
Prokhorov generally demonstrated hesitancy to inciting or joining substantial
collective actions against their rivals in Armenia and Russia, respectively.
This pattern is in line with H2a. Moreover, the two oligarchs did not stand in
crucial elections when it really counted. Therefore, they appeared
untrustworthy in the eyes of the people, which paved an easy way for
Sargsyan in Armenia and Putin in Russia to neutralize them politically. In
contrast, Ivanishvili and Poroshenko articulated a much more clear and
credible opposition to their main rivals in Georgia and Ukraine, respectively.
Ivanishvili’s organizational resources were subject to frequent and intensive
attacks by the Georgian government. However, Ivanishvili focused
specifically on improving his personal reputation and credibility of a rival as
soon as he entered the Georgian political scene. Similarly, Poroshenko made
substantial efforts to enhance his reputation and organizational resources.
Similar to previously discussed oligarchs, these efforts occurred at a greater
level ahead of elections. The analysis above also shows that Poroshenko has
over time been well entrenched in the government since he headed the
National Bank of Ukraine, Ministries for Foreign Affairs, and Economic
Development and Trade. This is most likely why his organizational resources
were not subject to attacks by the incumbent regime as often as was the case
with the three other oligarchs. Yet, reports showed that the Kremlin, which
arguably early figured out his political goal to gain the ultimate political
power, attempted to persuade him to get Ukraine back in the Russian sphere of
influence. To that end, the Russian authorities blocked his business in Russia
due to accusations of selling tainted products. Moreover, his businesses were
eventually seized or forced to shut down in Crimea and Russia. Next empirical
chapter switches our attention to the interaction between incumbents and
oligarchs in Ukraine where they have been most prominent for regime change
in connection with the two color revolutions.
132
Appendix
Table 11. Reliability check for coding of a key variable
Efforts to
increase his
Oligarch Date reputation URL
https://censor.net.ua/news/108468/poroshenko_
ustroit_wizz_air_razbor_poletov_izza_hamskog
Poroshenko 2009-12-23 1 o_otnosheniya_k_passajiram
Prokhorov 2014-05-14 1 https://ria.ru/sport/20140514/1007795343.html
https://ria.ru/vybor2012_hod_vyborov/2012030
Prokhorov 2012-03-05 1 5/584957759.html
Prokhorov 2012-03-19 1 https://ria.ru/politics/20120319/599870777.html
Prokhorov 2013-06-22 1 https://ria.ru/society/20130622/945133131.html
Prokhorov 2012-01-21 1 https://ria.ru/politics/20120121/544961443.html
https://sputnik-
Ivanishvili 2012-01-16 1 georgia.ru/society/20120116/214572764.html
https://sputnik-
Ivanishvili 2011-12-11 1 georgia.ru/sport/20111211/214443187.html
https://censor.net.ua/news/278367/tyagnibok_p
odderjivaet_reshenie_klichko_o_vydvijenii_kan
Poroshenko 2014-03-29 1 didatury_poroshenko_na_vybory
Prokhorov 2013-06-25 1 https://ria.ru/society/20130625/945629348.html
Notes: Using Stata’s seed function and the seed value 12345, I created a sample of 10
articles at random as to reports about oligarchs’ efforts to increase their reputation. This
procedure ensures that my subsampling (the selection of articles to report above) has been
entirely random. The seed number of subsampling enables the reader to replicate the
selection procedure.
133
134
Chapter six. Oligarchs, mass opinion
and struggles for political ascendancy
during two color revolutions in Ukraine
How does the interaction between incumbents and oligarchs play out in
Ukraine where oligarchs have been most prominent for regime change? To
repeat, this interaction refers to struggles for power and influence between
oligarchs and pseudo-democratic regimes in the framework of such key
factors as mass opinion and state power abuse. As discussed at length in the
research design chapter, the aforementioned question guides the current
chapter. Ukraine has since the declaration of its independence undergone
multiple democratic breakthroughs which are popularly dubbed as “color
revolutions”. The first part of the chapter investigates how the interaction
played out before and after the two color revolutions in Ukraine. This
investigation employs secondary literature on oligarchs’ and the incumbents’
behavior, which makes the discussion about the “true preferences” of these
players difficult. Yet, it is here worth repeating that my analysis is inspired by
the core ideas of the so-called “revealed preference theory”. The theory
emphasizes the importance of revealing the preferences of individuals by
focusing on their behavior, rather than by asking them to state their “true”
preferences (Samuelson, 1938; Richter, 1966). In spite of some obvious
limitations associated with not being able to study the true or stated
preferences of these actors, I compensate for this weakness by relying on the
established scholarship of Ukrainian politics and the works of key Ukraine
experts. An additional strategy of coping with the weakness is to resort to
official statements by and public interviews with some prominent oligarchs in
Ukraine whenever possible. Thus, while it is generally difficult to make a
direct link between revealed preferences and actual intentions in political
contexts, the described approach of the first part of this chapter would yield
some hints as to how oligarchs and incumbent elites interact within the crucial
framework of mass opinion and state power for understanding regime
trajectories. Overall, the empirical focus of the first part of this chapter will be
135
on the triggers and consequences of the two color revolutions in Ukraine (The
2004 Orange and 2014 Euromaidan Revolutions). The primary aim is to study
and understand the role of oligarchs in these processes, which will help to
approach the specific research question that guides this chapter.
This chapter will also offer a unique quantitative survey analysis of
Ukrainian students in Kyiv about their opinion towards the oligarchs’ current
importance in Ukrainian politics. University students, as will be shown below,
were the primary group of active citizens during the two color revolutions in
Ukraine. For this reason, assessing their attitudes towards oligarchs, their role
in regime trajectories and their influence on the political system is crucial for
addressing the research question guiding this chapter. In other words,
university student opinion about oligarchs is essential to assessing how
oligarchs have interacted with the incumbent regimes in the crucial framework
of mass opinion and state power in a country where oligarchs, according to
prior studies, have been most influential for regime change.
As discussed in more detail previously in the research design chapter, the
survey analysis derives its logic from an integrated perspective based on the
entire theoretical discussion (see the prior work and theory chapter) as well as
findings from the two preceding empirical chapters. Against this background,
I assume that Kyiv university students generally harbor negative attitudes
towards oligarchs as a group and individuals. Key variables explaining this
negative relationship are university students’ perceptions of the shady past of
oligarchs as to their wealth accumulation as well their adversary influence on
the political system. However, I believe that individual oligarchs’ efforts to
develop their reputation will be conducive to positive attitudes towards them
even among Kyiv university students. As emphasized previously, this survey
aids this thesis in exploring how the interaction of oligarchs with incumbents
and mass opinion plays out in a context of a higher level of oligarchic
influence on the political system in addition to being most prominent for
regime change.
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Struggles for power and mass opinion about the
oligarchs in Ukraine
Ukrainian politics and oligarchs during the 2004 Orange
Revolution
The Orange Revolution in 2004 was the second democratic breakthrough in
the post-Soviet region of pseudo-democracies. Scholars have proposed several
decisive developments prior to this revolution. The most important of these
processes encompass the breakdown of the ruling national-democrat centrist
alliance, the Kuchmagate scandal (the brutal assassination of investigative
journalist Heorhiy Gongadze) and the rise of a new opposition in the 2002
election (Kuzio, 2007). However, the role of the oligarchs and their
interdependence with the incumbents has been stressed as another key factor
that has been decisive for the Orange Revolution to take place.
President Kuchma and his administration were dependent on influential
oligarchs in Ukraine in their efforts to curtail their opposition. Kuchma was
himself part of the Dnipropetrovsk oligarchic clan. During Kuchma’s first
presidential term (1994-1999), the Dnipropetrovsk clan ruled Ukraine,
Kuchma himself and oligarch Pavlo Lazarenko being its key members.
Lazarenko was a very influential oligarch from the Dnipropetrovsk region of
Ukraine. In 1992-1995, he served as the governor of this region. Kuchma later
appointed him as the prime minister of Ukraine (1996-1997). During his time
in office, Lazarenko built the United Energy Systems of Ukraine (YESU), the
largest industrial and financial group in Ukraine. Tensions between Kuchma
and Lazarenko rose gradually following the increasing political ambitions of
Lazarenko. In 1999, Lazarenko challenged Kuchma politically, which led to
the parliament stripping him of his legislative immunity due to charges of
corruption, embezzlement of state property and money laundering. Lazarenko
fled to the United States where he was detained for charges of money
laundering (Matuszak, 2012: 15).
Rival oligarchs to Kuchma emerged in Lazarenko’s Hromada Party in
1997. Yulia Timoshenko was a companion of Lazarenko, having served as
director of YESU in 1995-1997. When Lazarenko was forced to step down
and escape the country, Timoshenko acted temporarily as Lazarenko’s deputy
in the Hromada Party. She, however, established her own Batkivshchyna party
subsequently. The regime of Kuchma put her in jail for one month in 2001 on
charges of illegal tax fraud and gas export. Timoshenko, who briefly (from
late December 1999 to January 2001) served as deputy prime minister in the
cabinet of Viktor Yuschenko, subsequently switched to be part of the
opposition against President Kuchma (Matuszak, 2012: 32-34).
According to Taras Kuzio, one of the most quoted Ukraine experts,
oligarchs entered Ukrainian politics in the 1998 Rada elections (Kuzio, 2007:
31). As already touched upon elsewhere in this thesis, the oligarchs
137
represented deep regional divisions in the vested political and economic
interests in Ukraine. During his second term in office, Kuchma failed in his
efforts to concentrate even more powers in the office of the president. Kuchma
had for a long time attracted several influential oligarchs to his camp. For
instance, in the 2002 parliamentary elections, several oligarch-linked parties
gained seats in the Rada. While the Labour Party represented the
Dnipropetrovsk oligarchic clan, the Party of Regions represented the Donetsk
clan. These parties formed a ruling alliance with the support from
parliamentarians elected from the single-member constituencies (see Chapter
five). The newly created opposition bloc Our Ukraine, led by Yushchenko,
gained 23.5 percent support in this election. Gradually, the then less influential
oligarchs Petro Poroshenko and David Zhvania opted for backing Yuschenko
as Ukraine was approaching the 2004 presidential election (Matuszak, 2012:
17-20).
Ahead of the election, Kuchma’s public support was at a historic low level,
which required him to find other options for maintaining the ruling clan’s grip
on power. Kuchma’s major challenge was to find a loyal successor candidate
who would be accepted by most influential oligarchic clans. He ultimately
chose the then Prime Minister Yanukovych. Yanukovich was the party leader
of the strongest ruling party in the government coalition in Ukraine.
Yanukovich was member of the Donetsk clan and closely linked to one of
Ukraine's wealthiest oligarchs, Rinat Akhmetov. Although most other
oligarchs were in disfavor of Yanukovich due to his connections to Akhmetov,
they still opted for backing him in the presidential election against
Yushchenko whose central election pledge was to liberalize the market in
Ukraine (Matuszak, 2012: 20-26)
The ruling oligarchic clans that were backing Kuchma concerted multiple
efforts to amend the constitution in Ukraine. For example, Kuchma conducted
a referendum in 2001 to bring more powers to the hands of the president. The
referendum involved questions about 1) whether the president was to be given
the right to dissolve the parliament in case it failed to form a majority, 2) the
abolition of MP immunity from prosecution, 3) severely restricting the number
of MPs and 4) establishing an upper house in the Rada of appointed regional
governors. Although the referendum was successful for Kuchma and his ally
oligarchs, they were unable to implement the majority of these amendments in
the parliament due to a major rift between the ruling regime and the opposition
(Kuzio, 2007: 39).
Oligarchs played a major role in the Orange Revolution according to most
Ukraine experts. Mass protests erupted in Kyiv on November 23, 2004,
following the announcement of Ukraine’s Central Election Commission that
the then Prime Minister Yanukovych won the run-off election. Yuschenko was
backed by the large masses, less influential oligarchs and smaller
entrepreneurs (D’Anieri, 2007). Broadly speaking, Ukrainians were tired of
the ruling regime in Ukraine, which they equated with the oligarchic clans
138
who had been plundering Ukraine’s economic resources. One of the most
important issues uniting people during the Orange Revolution was popular
perceptions about the growing prosperity of the oligarchs to their disadvantage
as well as grand corruption. As in Russia, people viewed privatization as
unfair and only to have benefited a small group of oligarchs. In contrast, the
Yanukovich team in collaboration with the Kuchma regime praised the rise of
a national bourgeoisie and pledged that the new elite would emerge to put the
interests of citizens at its foremost political focus. As Yuschenko and his
political ideas of reform were more popular, the Yanukovich campaign and
Kuchma administration made use of negative PR strategies to portray
Yuschenko as a Nazi or an American puppet (Kuzio, 2006a: 51-52).
Ukrainian sociologists carried out an interesting study of protester attitudes
during the Orange Revolution. A clear majority of the surveyed demonstrators
supported the idea of mixed economy. Yet, whereas 63 percent of the
respondents favored the development of private enterprise in their country,
almost 56 percent of the respondents opposed the privatization of large state
enterprises. What is more interesting is that almost 54 percent of the
respondents expressed that privatization of land should not be allowed in
Ukraine (Beissinger, 2013: 9). In addition, what most protesters in the Orange
Revolution had in common was their deep dissatisfaction with Leonid
Kuchma, grand corruption (Beissinger, 2013: 9) and disdain towards the
ruling clan of oligarchs (Karatnycky, 2005; Kuzio, 2005a).
Indeed, the deep aversion against the oligarchs as a group has been a
prevalent phenomenon in post-Soviet Ukraine. For example, a survey from
Ukraine in 2001 asked its respondents about their perceptions of oligarchs.
More than every second respondent (55 percent) answered that he/she refers to
the oligarchs mainly as those who steal from Ukraine with the help of the
authorities. The second most popular answer (approximately 27 percent) was
that the oligarchs are very wealthy people who hold decisive sway over the
government in Ukraine. Almost 17 percent of the respondents answered that
the oligarchs are a small group who rule Ukraine. Nearly 12 percent of the
respondents stated that the oligarchs were the wealthiest people in Ukraine
(Kuzio, 2007: 32). The survey gave the respondents the opportunity to pick
from a list of names who they perceived as oligarchs. The results showed that
people perceived Pavlo Lazarenko (almost 34 percent), Yulia Timoshenko
(almost 21 percent), Leonid Kuchma (almost 12 percent) and Grigoriy Surkis
to be typical oligarchs (Kuzio, 2007: 33).
139
Ukrainian politics and oligarchs during and after
the 2014 Euromaidan Revolution
The Euromaidan Revolution in 2014 was a key turning point in the post-
Soviet era of Ukraine. The large masses were highly dissatisfied with
President Yanukovich’s abrupt U-turn in the question of Ukraine’s ratification
of the Association Agreement (AA) with the EU. In fact, a long-term reason
for the mass uprising was grand corruption and dissatisfaction with the ruling
regime.
University students were the driving force of the Euromaidan Revolution
in Ukraine (McFaul, 2005; Gorenburg, 2015; Poltorakov, 2015). In the initial
stage of the Euromaidan movement, their main demand was reorientation of
Ukraine’s foreign policy towards European integration. By the end of
November 2013, there were two parallel Euromaidan movements going on in
central Kyiv—one held by the civil society and another by the political
opposition. The major demands of Euromaidan protesters were the resignation
of Mykola Azarov’s cabinet and ratification of the agreement with the EU.
Yanukovich and his administration refused to submit to these demands. Most
protesters returned to their homes. When the number of protesters dwindled
considerably, the authorities opted for using brutal force against several
hundreds of protesters, most of which were students. This brutal repression of
peaceful protesters sparked public anger against the regime and the
Euromaidan went into the second phase. The day after the brutal beating of
peaceful students, the media broadcasted multiple videos showing the security
forces’ harsh violence. People again congregated in the central Maidan Square
in Kyiv. Almost half a million citizens gathered following the beatings. One
group of protesters occupied the office of Kyiv City Administration, which led
to severe clashes between them and the police forces. In this second phase of
the Euromaidan, protesters also added their demand for Yanukovich and his
cabinet to resign. The Euromaidan movement became violent following the
regime’s use of brutal force against the demonstrators (Shveda & Park, 2016:
87).
The third stage of the Euromaidan started on January 16, 2014, when the
parliament adopted a law that prohibited outdoor gatherings and
demonstrations. On January 22, bloody clashes took place between protesters
and the security forces close to the president’s administration building in
central Kyiv. The security forces killed several protesters during these clashes.
Western and Russian envoys as well as the opposition and the government
attempted in vain to find a solution to the political crisis. The participants of
the Euromaidan came from all parts of Ukraine as well as from Georgia and
Belarus. Euromaidan protests turned yet more violent from February 18 to 21,
with the authorities killing 88 protesters. In total, the violence of these days
resulted in 113 deaths on the activist side. The Euromaidan Revolution was
over when Yanukovich and his entourage fled after protesters stormed the
140
presidential palace. This happened after the masses declined to accept a
peaceful settlement between the political opposition and the Yanukovich
regime (Shveda & Park, 2016: 88-90). This rejection marked an important
difference between the Orange and Euromaidan movements—people agreed
that no one political leader could solve their problems and the people
themselves were to organize and build a better future for Ukraine (Diuk, 2014:
10).
Several prominent Ukrainian oligarchs made public statements and gave
interviews on the causes of the Euromaidan movement and its implications for
the society. Rinat Akhmetov, for instance, made clear in the wake of the
Euromaidan movement that he fully supported the people of Ukraine fighting
for their democratic rights. He further declared his full solidarity with the
anger of the people who, like him, were shocked by Yanukovich’s unexpected
U-turn on his election pledge to sign the agreement on deep association with
the EU. Akhmetov also said that he saw the popular protests as a clear sign of
Ukraine being a free and democratic society. He ensured that Ukraine was not
going to diverge from this political path. He concluded his public statement by
urging all the sides of the national crisis to hammer out a compromise together
(Segodnya, 2013a). Victor Pinchuk, another powerful oligarch in Ukraine,
made a similar statement. He stressed that the Euromaidan was a show of
optimism and hope for a better future for the people of Ukraine. He expressed
his genuine support for the popular uprising against the incumbents. Pinchuk
made clear that he warmly appreciated that the civil society of Ukraine truly
demonstrated its power in taking decisions and expressing its opinion on key
political issues. In addition, Pinchuk ensured that the protests made him reflect
on his own responsibility as both a businessman and citizen. In particular, he
also mentioned that, as in the course of the Orange Revolution, his goal was to
do his utmost to find a peaceful and constructive solution to the national crisis
(Segodnya, 2013b). In a 2015 interview, oligarch Dmytro Firtash also
expressed his views on the Euromaidan and Ukrainian politics after the
revolution. In particular, he said that he, contrary to generally accepted
opinion, was not among the financial contributors of the movement. He further
emphasized that the Euromaidan was not a viable solution to Ukraine’s
political problems. He pointed to the fact that ordinary people, as in the course
of the Orange Revolution, genuinely struggled for changes. Yet, as he further
stated, those who came to power after the two revolutions betrayed the people
in the same way as their predecessors had done. Furthermore, he emphasized
that the post-Euromaidan incumbent elite’s declared wish to fight against
oligarchs was nothing more than a strategy to distract popular attention from
their challenges to deal with Ukraine’s economy and the war. Firtash also
stated that the oligarchs rather constitute the driving force of the private sector
in Ukraine. They are the ones who create jobs, pay out wages and taxes.
Therefore, he saw the government’s witch-hunt against oligarchs as a clear
141
political strategy by incumbents to maintain their power by picturing the
oligarchs as the greatest enemies of Ukraine (Segodnya, 2015).
In the 2014 October Rada elections (following the ouster of Yanukovich),
two thirds of the political forces that gained seats were created and sponsored
by oligarchic clans. These parties were the Opposition Bloc (the successor to
the Party of Regions (POF) headed by Yuriy Boyko and Serhiy Lyovochkin),
People’s Front (linked to Ihor Kolomoysky), Poroshenko Bloc (Petro
Poroshenko’s own party) and Radical Party (sponsored by Rinat Akhmetov
and Ihor Kolomoysky) (Kuzio, 2017: 2). Oligarchs established and sponsored
these parties for strategic reasons. For instance, the former ruling POF
emerged to enable a compromise deal between warring groups in the Donetsk
oligarchic clan. Oligarchs also created parties to steal votes from other, more
genuine parties such as in the case of the Svoboda Party (intended to take
votes from Timoshenko’s Batkivshchyna party) (Kuzio, 2016a: 138).
Neither the Orange nor the Euromaidan Revolution was able to bring about
far-reaching changes with regard to the lessening of oligarchs’ grip over
politics in Ukraine. Moreover, genuine political parties have been absent in
Ukraine primarily due to the predominance of main regime leader or oligarch-
funded election projects (pocket opposition parties) (Kuzio, 2016a: 131).
Using their massive wealth and media resources, the oligarchs in Ukraine have
been able to maintain their firm hold on the parliament and the presidency
even in the wake of popular uprisings (Kuzio, 2016a: 131-132). Interestingly,
most oligarchs seem to have favored the option of keeping themselves out of
the limelight. In addition, no administration in post-Soviet Ukraine has ever
imprisoned any oligarch (Kuzio, 2016a: 134). Although Timoshenko
submitted to the popular demand to renationalize oligarchs’ assets in the wake
of the Orange Revolution, nothing happened subsequently because it was
condemned as a populist policy proposal among influential elites in Ukraine
and the international community (Kuzio, 2016a: 134).
In sum, the above account of Ukrainian politics with regard to how the
interaction (in the framework of mass opinion and state power) between
oligarchs and incumbents played out in connection to the two color
revolutions points to several important facts. First, oligarchs and mass opinion
about oligarchs were important factors in the struggles for power between the
ruling state elites and the opposition. As presidents in Ukraine lacked greater
levels of state power (in contrast to their counterparts in, for instance, Russia),
they were unable to establish a solid UPF for their opposition in order to
sustain themselves in power. Moreover and as expected, key oligarchs and
their clans were crucial political players that exerted an extraordinary
influence on the political life of Ukraine. Hence, the findings of this part of the
chapter point to the crucial importance of oligarchs in regime change given
their interactions with the incumbent regime in the crucial framework of mass
opinion and state power.
142
Mapping out student attitudes towards oligarchs in
Ukraine
In the previous section of this chapter, I provided a detailed account of the
revealed preferences of the incumbent elites on the one side, and the oligarchs
on the other, in struggles for power in Ukraine before and after the two color
revolutions. As expected, Ukraine is a particularly interesting case due the
higher level of oligarchization of its political and economic system in
comparison with other post-Soviet pseudo-democracies. However, the above
illustrative narrative needs to be supplemented with more specific reports
about what an informed and energetic category of Ukrainian citizens perceives
of oligarchs today. As seen above, university students were an important
segment of the population that formed the core of popular uprisings against
pseudo-democratic regimes during the Orange and Euromaidan movements. In
addition, the available evidence indicates that they will play an important
future role in the political and economic life of Ukraine. Below, I provide
systematic evidence on Kyiv students’ attitudes towards oligarchs and their
political significance. The main idea, as already noted, is to illustrate how
oligarchs interact with incumbents and mass opinion in a country where they
have been crucial for regime trajectories.
Table 12. Attitudes towards oligarchs as a group and individuals

Positive Negative Difference Indifferent/neutral Total
N
Attitudes towards 34.7 43.7 -9.0 21.5 311
oligarchs as a group
Attitudes towards 47.3 33.1 14.1 19.6 311
Ihor Kolomoyskyi
Rinat Akhmetov
Petro Poroshenko
Notes: The table is based on the following questions in order of their appearance: Q8,
Q15a, Q15b and Q15c. See the questionnaire in the Appendix to this chapter.
Table 12 takes a closer look at student attitudes towards oligarchs as a group

and individuals. We can see that the plurality of respondents (43.7 percent)
disfavor oligarchs as a group (by 9 points). However, more than one third of
the students (34.7 percent) in the survey harbor positive attitudes towards
oligarchs as a group. Another interesting aspect is that 21 percent of the
respondents neither like nor dislike oligarchs a group. Indeed, looking at the
oligarchs as a group is important for understanding the role of oligarchs in
regime trajectories given the centrality of mass opinion in struggles for power
143
in post-Soviet pseudo-democracies. Yet, focusing on three politically and
economically influential oligarchs in Ukraine is equally important in order for
us to gain a better understanding of possible nuances in the particular element
of opinion about oligarchs when people shift their attitudinal focus from the
group to prominent individual oligarchs. To reiterate, the most important
reason for this particular focus on individual oligarchs is that politics in the
post-Soviet context of pseudo-democracies is highly person-centered—
primarily revolving around powerful individuals.
As discussed earlier, Ihor Kolomoyskyi, Rinat Akhmetov and Petro
Poroshenko have been prominent oligarchs and political players in post-Soviet
Ukraine. Turning to university student opinion about these three oligarchs, we
find revealing differences between attitudes towards oligarchs as a group and
individuals. In particular, Table 12 suggests that the plurality of the
respondents answered that they are positively disposed towards both
Akhmetov and Kolomoyskyi. Later in this chapter, I will delve deeper into
this difference in attitudes towards oligarchs as a group and individuals.
As for Poroshenko, we can observe in Table 12 that the majority of the
students favor him, which most likely can be attributed to his presidency.
Overall, we see a clear paradox among university students in Kyiv. While the
plurality of them clearly disfavor the oligarchs as a group, a similar share of
respondents are positively disposed towards the three key individual oligarchs
in Ukraine (47.3 percent for Ihor Kolomoyskyi, 44.1 percent for Rinat
Akhmetov and 50.8 percent for Petro Poroshenko). Let us now turn to looking
at the perceptions of the respondents about the motives of the oligarchs’
political participation and the implications of this involvement for their
country.
144
Table 13. Attitudes about the political participation of the oligarchs
(in %)
Experience of oligarchs’ efforts to
develop their reputation
Agree Disagree Difference Indifferent Total N
/neutral
Q10b 39.9 43.1 -3.2 17.0 311
Perceptions about the political role of

oligarchs
/neutral
Q11c 41.5 42.4 -1.0 16.1 311
Q13c 57.6 28.0 29.6 14.5 311
Q6b 53.7 28.6 25.1 17.7 311
Perceptions about oligarchs’

influence on the political system
/neutral
Q10c 58.2 26.0 32.2 15.8 311
Q14a 57.2 27.3 29.9 15.4 311
Q4a 47.9 37.6 10.3 14.5 311
Q4b 46.3 34.7 11.6 19.0 311
Q9c 44.4 33.8 10.6 21.9 311
Perceptions about the true incentives

for oligarchs’ involvement in politics
/neutral
Q9a 54.7 32.2 22.5 13.2 311
Q9b 53.7 34.7 19.0 11.6 311
Q13a 50.5 33.8 16.7 15.8 311
145
Table 13. Attitudes about the political participation of the oligarchs
(in %) (continued)
Attitudes towards the political role
and legitimacy of oligarchs given
their past of wealth accumulation
strategies
/neutral
Q10a 53.1 29.3 23.8 17.7 311
Q12a 40.2 41.2 -1.0 18.6 311
Notes: The above question numbers indicate the following items in the
questionnaire: Q10b = I personally or someone in my family received material
support from an oligarch’s charity foundation; Q11c = I trust political parties that
have oligarchs in leading positions; Q13c = The oligarchs are an integral part of
our current political system; expecting some positive political changes is too
naïve; Q6b = Our president is an oligarch; Q10c = All oligarchs in our country
are corrupt and promote corruption in the public administration; Q14a =
Bureaucrats should stop working for oligarchs; Q4a = Only pro-Western
oligarchs are conducive to democratic development in our country; Q4b = Only
those oligarchs who are disloyal to our political leadership contribute to
democratization; Q9c = By means of their political parties, oligarchs contribute to
increasing political competition in our country; Q9a = Oligarchs are in politics
due to narrow material interests; Q9b = Oligarchs are in politics to ensure their
and their families’ survival and prosperity; Q13a = Some oligarchs are prepared
to оr capable of actively combating corruption; Q10a = People will not accept
oligarchs’ participation in politics due to their contested methods of wealth
accumulation and Q12a = People would accept oligarchs as legitimate political
players if they are ready to share their massive wealth with the people to eradicate
economic inequality. See the questionnaire in the Appendix to this chapter for
more details.
Before switching our focus to the results in Table 13, it bears repeating that I
have earlier thoroughly discussed the five broad dimensions that the above
survey questions measure as to perceptions about oligarchs (see the research
design chapter). Indeed, several of the above variables can be put into multiple
groups. However, the five coarse categories of variables used in this thesis are
(1) university student’ experiences of oligarchs’ efforts to develop their
reputation, (2) perceptions about the political role of oligarchs, (3) perceptions
about their influence on the political system, (4) perceptions about the true
incentives for oligarchs’ involvement in politics and (5) attitudes towards the
political role and legitimacy of oligarchs given their past of wealth
accumulation strategies. The majority of the students considered that the
oligarchs engage in politics for their own material interests (see Q9a, nearly 55
percent) and the prosperity of their families (see Q9b, nearly 54 percent).
Furthermore, we also observe in Table 13, that 58 percent of the respondents
consider the oligarchs to promote corruption in the public administration (see
Q10c). Moreover, the majority (over 57 percent) concurred with the statement
146
that bureaucrats should stop working for oligarchs (see Q14a). At the same
time, every second respondent believes that some oligarchs are willing or
capable of actively combating corruption (see Q13a, 50.5 percent). This
evidence once more lends support to the argument that people generally
distinguish between the oligarchs as a group and individuals as to their
influence on the political system.
A common thread that runs through the evidence is that the contested
wealth concentration in the hands of the oligarchs is a major cause of
dissatisfaction among the respondents. In particular, the majority (53 percent)
of the students answered that they will never accept the participation of the
oligarchs in politics due to their shady past of wealth accumulation (see
Q10a). Interestingly, there is a sharp rift between the respondents as to
whether they are prepared to forgive the past sins and errors of oligarchs. In
fact, while 40 percent of the respondents agreed that they would accept the
oligarchs as legitimate political players in case they opt for redistributing their
wealth to the broad masses, 41 percent of the students answered that they
would not accept such a deal (Q12a).
Turning to the pure political dimensions of the perceptions about the
oligarchs, we find some intriguing evidence. Forty-four percent of the
respondents believe that the oligarchs still contribute to political competition
in Ukraine through the parties they control (see Q9c). At the same time, most
students (almost 57 percent) answered that the oligarchs are an essential part
of the current political system in Ukraine and that they therefore are not
expecting substantial political changes in their country (see Q13c). However,
the plurality of the respondents perceive that oligarchs opposing the regime
(see Q4b, 46 percent) and the oligarchs who are pro-Western are conducive to
democratic advancement in Ukraine (see Q4a, nearly 48 percent). Interestingly
and expectedly, the vast majority (53.7 percent, see Q6b above) of the
respondents consider President Petro Poroshenko as an oligarch.
Overall, the descriptive evidence presented above suggests that Ukrainian
students in Kyiv clearly differentiate between oligarchs as a group and
individuals. This has serious implications for their perceptions about the
oligarchs’ primacy in their political system and for regime trajectories. What
is more, almost 40 percent of the students answered that they or someone in
their family had received grants or other kinds of material support from
oligarchs (see Q10b). All these aspects further justify a closer focus on the
determinants of students’ support for oligarchs as a group and individuals in
Ukraine.
147
The determinants of support for oligarchs among
Ukrainian students
In the subsequent regression models, I will investigate what determines
students’ support for oligarchs as a group and individuals in Ukraine. This
statistical analysis will enable us to dig deeper into the mechanism that drives
public opinion about oligarchs as a group and individuals.
individuals
Expected relationship Group Akhmetov Kolomoyskyi Poroshenko
(direction)
Experience of oligarchs’ efforts to develop their reputation

Q10b (+) 0.114** 0.125** 0.0624 0.0123
(0.0522) (0.0519) (0.0534) (0.0534)
Perceptions about the political role of oligarchs
Q11c 0.0124 0.0915 0.0810 0.123*
(0.0623) (0.0584) (0.0618) (0.0648)
Q13c (-) -0.120** 0.0121 0.0387 -0.0483
(0.0582) (0.0592) (0.0587) (0.0599)
Q13b -0.0915 -0.194** -0.0615 -0.137**
(0.0589) (0.0575) (0.0595) (0.0634)
Perceptions about their influence on the political
system
Q10c (-) -0.182** -0.127** -0.131** -0.0379
(0.0550) (0.0585) (0.0575) (0.0576)
Q14a -0.00598 -0.0165 -0.0302 -0.128**
(0.0523) (0.0581) (0.0569) (0.0620)
Q11a 0.0802 -0.0290 0.0782 0.0981*
(0.0560) (0.0526) (0.0557) (0.0577)
Q11b 0.0387 -0.0524 -0.0446 -0.0890
(0.0603) (0.0562) (0.0565) (0.0598)
Q9c 0.0339 0.0123 0.0268 0.0226
(0.0535) (0.0512) (0.0558) (0.0531)
148
individuals (continued)
Expected Group Akhmetov Kolomoyskyi Poroshenko
relationship
(direction)
Perceptions about the true incentives for oligarchs’ involvement in politics
Q9a (-) -0.00826 -0.0794 -0.0931* -0.112*
(0.0546) (0.0532) (0.0558) (0.0588)
Q9b 0.0260 0.000987 -0.0487 0.0168
(0.0532) (0.0508) (0.0552) (0.0544)
Q13a 0.149** 0.0532 0.111** 0.0323
(0.0563) (0.0507) (0.0540) (0.0547)
Attitudes towards the political role and legitimacy of oligarchs given their past of wealth
accumulation strategies
Q10a -0.111** -0.0230 -0.0882 -0.0951*
(0.0519) (0.0515) (0.0568) (0.0549)
Q12a 0.0254 -0.0579 0.0549 -0.0151
(0.0492) (0.0461) (0.0499) (0.0527)
Constant 4.808** 6.310** 5.924** 6.957**
(0.935) (0.967) (0.988) (1.064)
Notes: The models above also account for gender, age, education, income level, the degree
of political interest and political orientation. See the Appendix to this chapter for the
questionnaire and the summary statistics of the variables. N = 311; Adj. R2 = 25 % (Group);
Adj. R2 = 24.3 % (Akhmetov); Adj. R2 = 16.9 % (Kolomoyskyi); Adj. R2 = 19.5 %
(Poroshenko). Robust standard errors in parentheses. Stars indicate * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05
significance levels. The first column indicates the expected direction of the relationship.
The above question numbers indicate the following items in the questionnaire: Q10b = I
personally or someone in my family received grants or similar material support from an
oligarch’s charity foundation; Q11c = I trust political parties that have oligarchs in leading
positions; Q13c = The oligarchs are an integral part of our current political system:
expecting some positive political changes is too naïve; Q13b = Our president is an oligarch;
Q10c = All oligarchs in our country are corrupt and promote corruption in the public
administration; Q14a = Bureaucrats should stop working for oligarchs; Q11a = Only pro-
Western oligarchs are conducive to democratic development in our country; Q11b = Only
those oligarchs who are disloyal to our political leadership contribute to democratization;
Q9c = By means of their political parties, oligarchs contribute to increasing political
competition in our country; Q9a = Oligarchs are involved in politics due to their narrow
material interests; Q9b = Oligarchs are involved in politics to ensure their own and their
families’ survival and prosperity in our society; Q13a = Some oligarchs are prepared to or
capable of actively combating corruption; Q10a = People like me will never accept
oligarchs in politics due to their contested methods of wealth accumulation and Q12a =
People would accept oligarchs as legitimate political players if they are ready to share their
massive wealth with the people to eradicate economic inequality.
Table 14 above contains four regressions models: attitudes towards oligarchs

as group and three models of attitudes towards Rinat Akhmetov, Ihor
Kolomoyskyi and Petro Poroshenko, respectively. It is worth restating here
149
that university student opinion about oligarchs is crucial for gaining a better
understanding about how oligarchs have interacted with the incumbents and
mass opinion in Ukraine where they have been crucial players as to reaching
regime change. The current survey analysis departs from a holistic perspective
based on the theory chapter (see the prior work and theory chapter) as well as
earlier findings from previous empirical chapters. In particular, key aspects of
relevance to the subsequent analyses are students’ perceptions about the
political role of oligarchs and their influence on the political system,
perceptions about the true incentives for oligarchs to engage in politics,
attitudes towards the political legitimacy of oligarchs in light of their shady
past of wealth accumulation and student experiences about oligarchs’ efforts
to develop their reputation. The variables in the table are ordered according to
these coarse categories.
The first column of Table 14 reminds us what direction of the relationship
to expect according to our broad expectations. In particular, based upon most
of the indications, we should expect that Kyiv university students generally
harbor negative attitudes towards oligarchs as group and individuals. Key
variables explaining this negative relationship involve their perceptions about
the shady past of oligarchs as to their wealth accumulation as well their
corrupt influence on the political system. Yet, I assume that individual
oligarchs’ efforts to develop their reputation will be conductive to positive
attitudes towards them. It is in this light that this analysis aids this thesis in
exploring how the interaction of oligarchs with incumbents and mass opinion
plays out in a context of a higher level of oligarchic influence on the political
system in addition to oligarchs being most prominent actors for regime
change.
Starting with the non-significant results in all the four models presented in
Table 14, we can see that the variables Q9b (“Oligarchs are involved in
politics to ensure their own and their families’ survival and prosperity in our
society”), Q9c (“By means of their political parties, oligarchs contribute to
increasing political competition in our country”), Q11b (“Only those oligarchs
who are disloyal to our political leadership contribute to democratization”)
and Q12a (“People would accept oligarchs as legitimate political players if
they are ready to share their massive wealth with the people to eradicate
economic inequality”) appear not to be of statistically significant importance
for Kyiv university students’ attitudes towards the oligarchs as a group and
individuals.
Turning to the group model in Table 14, I explore what determines student
opinion about the oligarchs as a group in Ukraine. As we would expect from
the theoretical discussion of this thesis, there is a significant negative
relationship between favoring oligarchs as a group and thinking that oligarchs
acquired their wealth unfairly (see Q10a, -0.111**). In addition, we can also
observe that students in Kyiv tend to dislike the oligarchs as a group the more
they perceive that the latter are corrupt and stimulate corruption in the public
150
administration (see Q10c, -0.182**). Attitudes towards oligarchs as a group
become significantly more negative the more university students tend to
concur with the statement that the oligarchs are an integral part of the current
political system in Ukraine and that expecting positive political changes is to
be naïve (see Q13c, -0.120**). In contrast, we can see that students in Kyiv
tend to harbor positive attitudes towards oligarchs collectively when they
perceive that some of them are ready to or are already actively combating
corruption (see Q13a, 0.149**). Moreover and as anticipated, being recipient
of material support from oligarchs makes the respondents more positively
predisposed towards oligarchs as a group (see Q10b, 0.114**).
Reading further from Table 14, we can see that increasingly believing that
Akhmetov is honest and credible is positively associated with having received
material support from an oligarch’s charity foundation (see Q10b in the
Akhmetov model, 0.125**). Likewise, the more university students think that
all oligarchs are corrupt in Ukraine and promote corruption in the public
administration, the more negative attitudes towards Akhmetov (see Q10c,
-0.127**). Turning to the Kolomoyskyi model, we observe that students who
believe that oligarchs are corrupt and promote public corruption are
significantly more likely to believe that Kolomoyskyi is dishonest and
politically unreliable (see Q10c, -0.131**). Also, we can see that students who
believe that some oligarchs are prepared to or are actively combating
corruption are significantly more likely to perceive Kolomoyskyi rather honest
and politically credible (see Q13a, 0.111**). Finally and as for Poroshenko,
evidence from Table 14 suggests that students tend to perceive Poroshenko as
dishonest and politically untrustworthy the more they believe that the
oligarchs engage in politics only for their own narrow material interests (Q9a,
-0.112*). A similar negative effect on attitudes towards Poroshenko exerts
believing that oligarchs accumulated their wealth unfairly, which in the eyes
of the average respondent in Kyiv disqualifies oligarchs from being legitimate
political players in Ukraine (Q10a, -0.0951*). Moreover, negative attitudes
about Poroshenko are substantially associated with university students
believing that bureaucrats in the public administration should stop playing into
the hands of the oligarchs (Q14a, -0.128**). Yet, trusting political parties that
have oligarchs in leading positions is significantly associated with favoring
Poroshenko as an honest and politically credible person (Q11c, 0.123*). We
can further see that only in the Poroshenko model are student attitudes
significantly and positively correlated with thinking that only pro-Western
oligarchs help Ukraine in its way to democratization (Q11a, 0.0981*). This
result may be a clear sign of Poroshenko’s successful political performance as
a pro-Western politician in contrast to making efforts to bring Ukraine back to
151
Russia’s sphere of influence. 37 Finally yet importantly, those who think their
president (i.e. Poroshenko himself) is an oligarch tend to be unsympathetic to
him (see Q13b, -0.137**).
37 It is here worth restating that the variable Q11a was included in the questionnaire partly as a
controlling proxy for respondents’ attitudes towards the West’s influence on Ukrainian politics and
oligarchs in contrast to that of Russia.
152
Summary of the results
How does the interaction between incumbents and oligarchs play out in
Ukraine where oligarchs have been most prominent for regime change? This
interaction pertains to rivalry for power and influence between oligarchs and
pseudo-democratic regimes in the framework of two crucial factors (mass
opinion and state power) for understanding regime trajectories. This chapter,
initially, looked more closely upon this interaction in the wake of the two
color revolutions in Ukraine. In particular, the above account revealed that one
of the most important driving forces of the Orange Revolution was people’s
great disfavor of oligarchs along with the public’s substantial dissatisfaction
with rampant corruption at the highest echelons of power. In contrast, the
Euromaidan movement in 2014 primarily revolved around Yanukovich’s
sudden and complete change of policy with regard to Ukraine’s ratification of
the agreement on deep association with the EU. Yet, post-Euromaidan
political processes still point to the fact that oligarchs have maintained their
influence on political life by means of political parties. What however
changed after the Euromaidan is that many oligarchs opted for keeping a much
lower profile in formal politics in Ukraine.
This chapter also explored attitudes towards the oligarchs among
Ukrainian university students in Kyiv. Exploring unique survey data gathered
in Kyiv in the spring of 2017 provides interesting results. I found support for
several theoretical arguments discussed in the full theory chapter. First and as
expected, evidence from the survey suggests that the perceptions of students
about oligarchs’ political role and legitimacy is primarily seen in light of their
shady past of wealth accumulation. Thus, university students disfavor
oligarchs as a group because they perceive that the oligarchs acquired their
massive wealth unfairly. In general, they consider this fact as a major obstacle
for them to accept the oligarchs as legitimate political players. What also
generates dissatisfaction with the oligarchs as a group is their unduly influence
on public administration and their promotion of corruption. The respondents in
Kyiv tend to be dissatisfied with the oligarchs as a group the more they
perceive them to be an integral part of the current political system and status
quo in Ukraine. Hence, these results suggest that the oligarchs as group are
viewed to have adversary influence on the entire political system. However,
Kyiv student attitudes seem to become increasingly more favorable towards
the oligarchs as a group if they or someone in their family had received
material support from the oligarchs. This suggests that oligarchs successfully
enhance their personal reputation through well-designed strategies such as
charity and other kinds of provision of material support to the public.
University students’ satisfaction with oligarchs as a group also increases when
they see that some oligarchs are willing to or already are combating corruption
in Ukraine. This finding implies that the respondents tend to be sympathetic to
oligarchs if they perceive the latter are truly getting involved in politics to help
153
Ukraine to overcome such an everyday concern as rampant corruption in the
public sector.
This chapter also investigated what factors drive student opinion about
three key oligarchs in Ukraine. Results suggest that students in Kyiv equally
disfavor Akhmetov and Kolomoyskyi when they perceive that oligarchs are
corrupt and promote corruption in Ukraine (this variable was not significant in
the Poroshenko model). However, while perceptions about oligarchs’
contested methods of wealth accumulation are not significantly related to
attitudes towards Akhmetov and Kolomoyskyi, this was the case in the
Poroshenko model (see Q10a, -0.0951* in Table 14). Overall, disfavor of
Poroshenko increases when university students in Kyiv perceive that oligarchs
engage in politics for their narrow material interests and when they perceive
that bureaucrats should stop being instruments in the hands of the oligarchs. A
reasonable explanation for this difference can be the fact that Poroshenko has
been more visible politically during the post-Soviet era of Ukraine. This is
perhaps why these more “political” factors predict university student opinion
about Poroshenko. Lastly and surprisingly, it was only in the Akhmetov model
(among the models for individual oligarchs) I found evidence suggesting that
receiving material support from an oligarch’s charity fund significantly
contributes to perceiving the individual oligarch as an honest and politically
reliable person.
Overall, the findings of this chapter on Ukraine may suggest that oligarchs
develop a personal reputation among the public, which most likely constitutes
a crucial resource for maintaining their political and economic influence. In
addition, performing a more visible political opposition through making
efforts to combat corruption, or appearing to do so, seems to have a positive
effect on mass opinion about oligarchs among Kyiv university students. What
has been most fascinating to observe in Ukraine is that both ruling oligarchic
clans as well as key, individual oligarchs have persistently sought to adapt
their political game of survival to changes in their political environment in
order to maintain their political influence.
Taken together, there are two main implications of this chapter’s findings
for our understanding of how the interaction between incumbents and
oligarchs plays out in Ukraine. First, mass opinion about oligarchs appears to
be an important aspect (as suggested by the findings from the Kyiv student
survey) for our understanding of the role of oligarchs in regime trajectories
given the centrality of mass opinion and state power. Put differently,
oligarchs’ personal reputation as well their political performance seem to be
crucial aspects to account for when attempting to understand oligarchs’
interaction with incumbents in Ukraine. Second, particularly challenging for
oligarchs are perceptions about their unduly wealth concentration as well as
sway over politics (as evaluated by a particularly informed group of citizens
such as university students). In this regard, the student survey in this chapter
154
also pointed to how specific efforts by oligarchs (such as providing material
support for citizens) influence opinion about them positively.
155
Appendix
Questionnaire
1. What is your biological sex?
Male Female Other
2. What is your age? Please choose your age group
16-18 19-22 23-26 27-35 36+
3. What is the highest education you have attained?
• No education
• Elementary school
• Upper secondary school or high school
• University degree
4. What is your current occupation?
• Working
• Unemployed
• Student
• Work + study
• Other
5. What is your monthly income in dollars ($)?
• 0-50
• 51-100
• 101-150
• 151-200
• 200-299
• 300+
156
6. In general, how interested are you in politics?
(1) Not interested at all 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 (10) Very interested
7. What would you say is your political orientation on a left-to-right

scale?
(10) Extreme political

(1) Extreme political left 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 right
8. In general, to what degree do you like the oligarchs as a group in

your country?
(1) Don’t like at all 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 (10) Like them very much
9. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following

statements?
(1) Completely disagree 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 (10) Completely agree
a) Oligarchs are involved in politics due to their narrow material interests

b) Oligarchs are involved in politics to ensure their own and their families’
survival and prosperity in our society
c) By means of their political parties, oligarchs contribute to increasing
political competition in our country

statements?
a) People like me will never accept oligarchs in politics due to their

contested methods of wealth accumulation
b) I personally or someone in my family received grants or similar material
support from an oligarch’s charity foundation
c) All oligarchs in our country are corrupt and promote corruption in the
public administration
157
statements?
a) Only pro-Western oligarchs are conducive to democratic development in

our country
b) Only those oligarchs who are disloyal to our political leadership
contribute to democratization
c) I trust political parties that have oligarchs in leading positions
12. People like me would accept oligarchs as legitimate political players

if:
a) Oligarchs are ready to share their massive wealth with the people to
eradicate economic inequality

statements?
a) Some oligarchs are prepared to оr capable of actively combating

corruption
b) Our president is an oligarch
c) The oligarchs are an integral part of our current political system.
Thus, expecting some positive political changes is too naïve
158
14. Public administration is a crucial element in our country. What do
you think about the following statements?
(1) Totally disagree 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 (10) Totally agree
a) Bureaucrats should stop working for oligarchs
15. To what extent do you consider the following persons to be honest

and politically credible?
(1) Extremely dishonest (10) Extremely honest

and unreliable 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 and credible
a) Ihor Kolomoyskyi
b) Petro Poroshenko
c) Rinat Akhmetov
159
survey
N Mean SD Min Max
(Q1) Gender (1 = 311 1.4791 .5003681 1 2
Male, 2 = Female)
(Q2) Age group 311 2.311897 1.032919 1 5
(4 groups)
(Q3) Education 311 2.118971 .8918955 0 3
(4 groups)
(Q4) Current 311 1.948553 1.017868 1 4
occupation
(5 categories)
(Q5) Monthly 311 2.585209 1.595853 0 5
income in USD
(Q6) Interest in 311 5.064309 2.057805 0 9
politics
(Q7) Political 311 5.237942 1.939731 0 9
orientation from left
to right
(Q8) Attitudes 311 4.745981 2.084453 0 8
towards oligarchs as
a group
(Q9a) Oligarchs are 311 5.893891 2.235706 1 10
involved in politics
due to their narrow
material interests
(Q9b) Oligarchs are 311 5.717042 2.226743 1 10
involved in politics
to ensure their own
and their families’
survival and
prosperity in our
society
(Q9c) By means of 311 5.401929 1.997384 1 10
their political
parties, oligarchs
contribute to
increasing political
competition in our
country
(Q10a) People like 311 5.745981 2.099871 1 10
me will never
accept oligarchs in
politics due to their
contested methods
of wealth
accumulation
160
survey (continued)
N Mean SD Min Max
(Q10b) I personally 311 4.745981 2.317488 1 10
or someone in my
family received
grants or similar
material support
from an oligarch’s
charity foundation
(Q10c) All 311 5.954984 2.157784 1 10
oligarchs in our
country are corrupt
and promote
corruption in the
public
administration
(Q11a) Only pro- 311 5.33119 2.045363 1 10
Western oligarchs
are conducive to
democratic
development in our
country
(Q11b) Only those 311 5.334405 1.937093 1 10
oligarchs who are
disloyal to our
political leadership
contribute to
democratization
(Q11c) I trust 311 4.864952 2.099407 1 10
political parties that
have oligarchs in
leading positions
(Q12a) People 311 5.144695 2.23642 1 10
would accept
oligarchs as
legitimate political
players if they are
ready to share their
massive wealth with
the people to
eradicate economic
inequality
(Q13a) Some 311 5.437299 2.05609 1 10
oligarchs are
prepared to or
capable of actively
combating
corruption
161
survey (continued)
N Mean SD Min Max
(Q13b) Our 311 6.21865 2.348048 1 10
president is an
oligarch
(Q13c) The 311 5.768489 2.061421 1 10
oligarchs are an
integral part of our
current political
system; expecting
some positive
political changes is
being too naive
(Q14a) Bureaucrats 311 6.221865 2.221371 1 10
should stop working
for oligarchs
(Q15a) Attitudes 311 5.289389 1.960871 1 10
towards Ihor
Kolomoyskyi
(Q15b) Attitudes 311 5.33119 1.997488 1 10
towards Petro
Poroshenko
(Q15c) Attitudes 311 5.090032 1.985008 1 10
towards Rinat
Akhmetov
Notes: Q4 has been used in the survey, but not in the regression models of the chapter. Yet,
the variable was important during the fieldwork in Kyiv in order to reduce the risk of
oversampling some categories of university students as to their current occupation.
162
Chapter seven. Conclusions: Oligarchs,
state power and mass opinion
This thesis seeks to contribute to the literature on pseudo-democracies,
democratization and oligarchs and its understanding of pseudo-democratic
regime trajectories in the post-Soviet context. Two dominant, competing
bodies of the literature have pointed either to mass opinion (about the main
regime leader or regime in principle) or to the level of state power
concentration and abuse by incumbents (by maintaining an uneven playing
field for rivals) for understanding regime maintenance or changes towards
democratization in post-Soviet pseudo-democracies. However, this thesis has
stressed that a major limitation in this discussion is the fact that that the role of
such powerful players as the oligarchs has been largely overlooked in these
processes. The main aim of this thesis was to study and understand the role of
oligarchs in post-Soviet pseudo-democratic regime trajectories given the
framework of the two central aspects of mass opinion and state power.
This thesis has shared the claims of prior studies stating that the level of
state power as well as mass opinion are equally important factors that explain
different regime trajectories. However, it seeks to contribute to this discussion
by having addressed three specific questions: 1) What is the relationship
between oligarchs, their political power and popular support for democracy in
principle, 2) Given that dominant theories point either to mass opinion or to
state power as the dominant factors in understanding regime maintenance or
change, how do oligarchs interact with incumbents and mass opinion? 3) How
does this interaction play out in situations where oligarchs have been most
prominent for regime change?
In relation to the first two research questions, four hypotheses were derived
in order to examine the research problem guiding this study. In particular, the
two following hypotheses concerned the research question about the
relationship between oligarchs, their political power and the public’s
normative regime support: (H1)—Political inequality to the benefit of
oligarchs and perceptions of unfair wealth distribution are negatively
163
associated with normative support for democracy across all post-Soviet
pseudo-democracies; (H1a)—The negative effect of political inequality to the
benefit of oligarchs and perceptions of unfair wealth distribution on normative
support for democracy will be more pronounced in countries with a greater
degree of state power concentration in the hands of the regime. Two additional
hypotheses concerned the second research question about the interaction
between oligarchs and incumbents and mass opinion: (H2)—All individual,
politically motivated rival oligarchs operate with the intention of enhancing
public opinion about themselves by developing their personal reputation,
organizational capacity and by performing a credible opposition to the regime
and (H2a)—We should expect that all pseudo-democratic regimes abuse their
state power against the rival oligarch. However, a stronger state power enables
the authorities to damage the credibility of the rival oligarch primarily by
making him appear unpredictable and unreliable in the eyes of the public
(H2a). This enables the main regime leader to elevate himself above key rival
oligarchs and thereby improve the prospects for successful regime
maintenance. Next, I provide a condensed summary of the findings of this
thesis with a primary focus on the role of oligarchs. A section then follows
where I discuss these results in the framework of prior research with regard to
potential alternative explanations. I will also discuss the implications of the
findings of this thesis for the literature on regime survival and democratization
in addition to focusing on how oligarchs influence regime survival or drifts to
democratization in post-Soviet pseudo-democracies. Finally, this thesis will
conclude with a discussion of suggested areas for future research.
Results
The main argument of this thesis is that both pseudo-democratic rulers and
politically motivated, rival oligarchs devote considerable time and resources to
swaying mass opinion in their struggles to secure their power or overturn the
regime, respectively. The first research question about the relationship
between oligarchs, their political power and the public’s normative regime
support was mainly investigated in the chapter (Chapter four) exploring
normative democratic support in five post-Soviet pseudo-democracies
(Armenia, Georgia, Moldova, Russia and Ukraine). The evidence showed that
ordinary people’s normative support for democracy wanes when oligarchs’
strategic, political interests systematically have precedence over those of the
average citizen (H1 is supported). Moreover and as expected by this thesis,
people’s perceptions of unfair wealth distribution in their country have a
substantial negative influence on their normative support for democracy as the
best form of government. Interestingly and in contrast to the study
expectations, the level of state power does not have any significant,
amplifying effect on these linkages. Nor do the concentration of state power
164
and the existence of an uneven playing field (UPF) wield any effect on
popular support for democracy in principle (hence, H1a was not supported).
One possible, but not exhaustive explanation for these unexpected results in
contrast to H1a can be that actual state power abuse occurs in a very
sophisticated manner and thereby renders such practices less politically
charged with regard to its importance for normative regime support. Verifying
this explanation, however, would require further study.
The second research question, mainly investigated in Chapter five, was
concerned with how oligarchs interact with incumbents and mass opinion
(given the central role of mass opinion and state power). Based on the analysis
of four individual oligarchs in Armenia, Georgia, Russia and Ukraine the
findings offered interesting details about how the four oligarchs Gagik
Tsarukyan (Armenia), Bidzina Ivanishvili (Georgia), Mikhail Prokhorov
(Russia) and Petro Poroshenko (Ukraine) interacted with incumbents and mass
opinion in their respective countries. As theorized, all the four oligarchs made
great efforts to enhance their personal reputation and organizational resources
for their political struggle (thus, support for H2). Moreover, the incumbent
regimes in all the four countries employed their state power to attack and
hamper the accumulation of organizational resources of their rival oligarchs in
order to prevent them from developing a greater organizational strength and
the reputation of a trustworthy challenger. These patterns were more evident
in circumstances when the rival oligarchs had great opportunities to join or
mount collective challenges against the incumbent regime. However and as
expected, the rival oligarchs in Armenia and Russia generally hesitated to
incite or join collective actions that could challenge the incumbent regimes. In
addition, Gagik Tsarukyan (Armenia) and Mikhail Prokhorov (Russia)
performed a wavering and untrustworthy opposition to the main leader of the
incumbent regime by not standing in crucial elections on fateful occasions.
These weaknesses enabled the presidents of Armenia and Russia to neutralize
them as political threats and further secure their grip on the regime (hence,
H2a is supported). In stark contrast, Bidzina Ivanishvili (Georgia) and Petro
Poroshenko (Ukraine) performed a relatively more truthful opposition to their
main rivals in Georgia and Ukraine, respectively. For instance, Ivanishvili’s
organizational resources were subject to frequent and intensive attacks by the
authorities in Georgia. However, Ivanishvili focused specifically on improving
his personal reputation and credibility as a rival as soon as he formally entered
the Georgian political scene. Likewise, Poroshenko made substantial efforts to
improve his reputation and organizational resources. As in the case of the
other three oligarchs, these efforts were most prominent close to national
elections. The evidence from this thesis also indicates that Poroshenko has
been well entrenched in the government since he headed the Central Bank of
Ukraine, Ministries for Foreign Affairs, and Economic Development and
Trade. This most likely explains why his organizational resources were not
subject to the same frequency of attacks by the authorities in contrast to the
165
experience of the three remaining oligarchs. However, reports showed that the
Kremlin, which early noticed his political ambitions to gain the ultimate
political power, attempted to persuade him to get Ukraine back in the Russian
sphere of influence. To that end, the Russian authorities blocked his
confectionary business in Russia due to accusations of selling tainted products.
Moreover, his confectionary factories were eventually seized or forced to
close in Crimea and Russia.
The final research question (studied in Chapter six) was concerned with
how the interaction between incumbents and oligarchs plays out in situations
where oligarchs have been most prominent for regime change. It is an
explorative study of Ukraine, a country where oligarchs have been most
prominent for regime change. The chapter first offered a thorough review of
the secondary literature on Ukraine with particular regard to the
aforementioned interaction between oligarchs and incumbents immediately
before and after the two color revolutions in 2004 and 2014. This account
provided important insights into the Ukrainian context for the subsequent
analysis of survey data from Kyiv tapping into university students’
perceptions about oligarchs and their role in politics. According to key country
experts, influential oligarchs and their clans had been key political players that
wielded an extraordinary influence on the political life of Ukraine. The major
implication of this influence was that mass opinion about them has also been
central to key struggles for political power in Ukraine. In fact, while one of the
major topics that contributed to popular uprising during the Orange
Revolution was the public’s dissatisfaction with the oligarchs, the Euromaidan
movement was more specifically oriented towards the then President Viktor
Yanukovych’s abrupt U-turn with regard to the ratification of the Association
Agreement with the EU. Yet, the oligarchic clans’ substantial recourse to
behind-the-scene-arrangements has characterized Ukraine’s post-Euromaidan
politics. These aspects served as an important starting point and context for the
subsequent analysis of the survey data from Kyiv. The major reason for
focusing on university student attitudes was to gain a better understanding of
the determinants of public opinion about oligarchs from such a well-informed
and politically active category of citizens given the oligarchs’ crucial
importance for regime trajectories. The results from the survey in Kyiv offered
intriguing insights into how the competition for power between oligarchs and
incumbents plays out in Ukraine given the centrality of mass opinion and state
power in the hands of the regime. As expected, evidence from this chapter
entails that students harbor negative attitudes towards oligarchs as a group.
The main explanation for this finding seems to be related to the fact the
students perceive that oligarchs acquired their vast wealth unfair. Moreover,
this aspect also appears to be the major reason for why students generally do
not consider oligarchs as a legitimate group of political players. Other key
aspects that explain Kyiv students’ disfavor of oligarchs as a group is their
perceptions of oligarchs as encouraging corruption, the major influence of
166
oligarchs on the public administration and capture of the political system in
Ukraine. However and as we would expect from the main theoretical
argument of this thesis, the students seem to express increasingly more
positive attitudes towards oligarchs as a group if they or someone in their
family received material support from the oligarchs. What is also interesting is
that student attitudes towards oligarchs as a group become increasingly more
positive if they perceive that some oligarchs are actively counteracting
corruption or at least show clear signs of willing to do so.
The final empirical chapter has also examined the determinants of student
opinion towards individual oligarchs in Ukraine—namely Rinat Akhmetov,
Ihor Kolomoyskyi and Petro Poroshenko. These three oligarchs have arguably
been among the most politically visible and influential oligarchs in the
contemporary political life of Ukraine. By looking more closely at the
determinants of attitudes towards these oligarchs, the goal of this thesis has
been to explore the differences in mechanisms that influence attitudes towards
oligarchs as a group and individuals, respectively. Key findings suggest that
student opinion towards Akhmetov and Kolomoyskyi is negatively influenced
by their perceptions of oligarchs as a group being corrupt and promoting
corruption in Ukraine. Interestingly, this linkage was not significant in the
regression model explaining student opinion towards Poroshenko. In addition,
the regression models explaining university student attitudes towards
Akhmetov and Kolomoyskyi revealed that thinking of unfair concentration of
wealth in the hands of the oligarchs is not a significant determinant. In
contrast, perceiving an unfair concentration of wealth in the hands of oligarchs
negatively influences student attitudes towards Poroshenko. Moreover, student
disfavor of Poroshenko grows significantly with believing that oligarchs
engage in politics for their narrow material interests, when they conceive of
oligarchs’ wealth accumulation process as unfair and illegitimate as well as
perceive that bureaucrats are primarily running the errands for the oligarchs. A
reasonable guess for the difference of the results between the three oligarchs
may be the fact that Poroshenko has been more prominent politically during
the post-Soviet era. We should here not forget the fact the Poroshenko was the
president of Ukraine during the time of data collection in Kyiv. In sum, these
are the possible reasons why the more politically prominent factors predict
student opinion about Poroshenko. Lastly and surprisingly, the variable of
receiving grants from an oligarch’s charity fund is only statistically significant
in the regression model for Akhmetov (the variable is positively correlated
with perceiving Akhmetov as an honest and politically credible person). This
variable, hence, is not a significant explanatory factor in the models for the
two remaining Ukrainian oligarchs. This difference is somewhat surprising
since all the three oligarchs have actively provided philanthropic support
through their charity funds (iPressUA, 2014; Childbrand, 2014; Kostiuchenko
& Söderbaum, 2014). However, a very likely explanation for this difference
might be the fact that the Rinat Akhmetov Foundation has been more visible
167
in also providing humanitarian help to refugees from the war zone in eastern
Ukraine (Rinat Akhmetov Foundation, 2017). Taken together, evidence from
the chapter suggests that oligarchs’ efforts to enhance their reputation and
credibility may have different effects on mass opinion due the scope and
discernibility of these efforts.
Discussion of the results and the implication of the

findings
How do the findings of this thesis contribute to the literature and its
understanding of how oligarchs influence regime survival or drifts to
democratization in post-Soviet pseudo-democracies? The overall findings
point to a number of important aspects. First, mass opinion about the oligarchs
as a group and individuals is a largely disregarded, yet essential factor for
being able to understand the role of oligarchs in the regime trajectories of
post-Soviet pseudo-democracies given the centrality of mass opinion and state
power. Despite being a group in a continuous state of flux, oligarchs have
been a prominent category of influential political and socio-economic players
in post-Soviet pseudo-democracies. Oligarchs have generally concentrated a
great deal of wealth in their own hands, which has not gone unnoticed among
ordinary citizens. A substantial socio-economic disaster brought about the
collapse of the Soviet Union, in which ordinary citizens came out as clear
losers in contrast to most oligarchs as a group and individuals. This negative
spiral has been ongoing virtually uninterruptedly to date. Such experiences, as
I have attempted to show in this thesis, are among the most important factors
that drive the relationship between oligarchs, their political power and
normative regime support among the masses. Drawing from the findings of
Chapter four, the first of the three empirical chapters, one can say that
oligarchs play a negative role for such an important (attitudinal) precondition
of democratization as mass support for democracy in principle. This thesis
stresses that the attitudinal dimension of democratization is a major factor in
understanding regime trajectories in this context with regard to how
incumbent regimes maintain their power or safeguard themselves against
gradual democratic development. More specifically, the results suggest that
for an overwhelming majority of citizens in post-Soviet pseudo-democracies
(five out of a total of six pseudo-democratic countries are studied in this
thesis), oligarchs’ actual influence on the political system to the detriment of
the public at large and perceptions of unfair wealth concentration are seen as
major issues. However, what is surprising is that most post-Soviet citizens,
irrespective of the specific country context with regard to state power
concentration in the hands of the regime, believe that a democratic form of
government will not be able to solve the issues of oligarchs’ strategic interests
having systematic precedence over those of the broad citizenry. Rather, the
168
majority of citizens believe that an authoritarian leader who does not need to
care about elections and legislative bodies is what is required in order to set
things right in their country. This, indeed, is a very pessimistic and alarming
finding for those who have thought that oligarchs could play a central role in
advancing democracy (cf. Åslund, 2005).
Second, the analysis in Chapter five of the four oligarchs suggests that both
politically motivated rival oligarchs as well as incumbents in post-Soviet
pseudo-democracies make great efforts to sway public opinion in their
struggles for power. As for the part of oligarchs in these crucial interactions,
this thesis shows how individual, rival oligarchs focus on enhancing their
reputation and organizational capacity in their struggle for power. The
qualitative findings from the analysis of the four oligarchs’ political struggle
show that they bolster their organizational capacity both to counter the
incumbent regime’s abuse of state power and to develop their reputation and
credibility as a rival. In fact, the findings suggest that oligarchs particularly
aim at mass opinion in their struggle for power. However, this is what all
pseudo-democratic incumbents appear to do as well. While all the four
pseudo-democratic regimes abused their state power to counter the four rival
oligarchs in the four countries under study, evidence from Armenia and Russia
suggests a more nuanced understanding of these interactions. In particular, in
both of these countries (with a greater degree of state power concentration in
the hands of the regime), incumbents abused their state power in order to
manipulate public opinion by damaging the reputation and credibility of the
two rival oligarchs Gagik Tsarukyan (Armenia) and Mikhail Prokhorov
(Russia). This thesis believes that the main regime leaders do so in order to
elevate themselves above their powerful rivals. Doing so seems to be
important in these pseudo-democracies due to politics being largely person-
centered. Indeed, neutralizing influential rival oligarchs by damaging their
reputation and credibility, I believe, is a previously overlooked, yet key
regime maintenance tool in post-Soviet pseudo-democracies (cf. Hale, 2015;
Levitsky & Way, 2010a).
Third and relatedly, the findings of this thesis suggest that oligarchs played
a crucial political role in the color revolutions of Ukraine (the two color
revolutions toppled incumbent pseudo-democratic regimes). However, the
survey analysis of Kyiv university students showed that they consider most
oligarchs corrupt and harmful to the development of their political system. For
this group of citizens, oligarchs’ unduly concentration of wealth disqualifies
them from being legitimate political players in Ukraine. Thus, these findings
point to the further aggravation of the preconditions for political
democratization if people consider oligarchs—key players during the two
color revolutions—as crooks who enrich themselves at the expense of the
broad public. However, further evidence from this thesis suggests that people
differentiate between oligarchs as group and individuals, which, at least
hypothetically, paves the way for some rival oligarchs to make their bid for
169
power and regime change given their efforts to enhance their reputation and
credibility of a rival to the regime. Bidzina Ivanishvili and Petro Poroshenko
interacted relatively successfully with mass opinion in the face of state power
abuse and despite being part of the detested group.
Finally, it is here also necessary to devote some attention to the strategies
of the incumbents in the post-Soviet context of pseudo-democracies. As
shown in more detail earlier, all post-Soviet pseudo-democratic leaders
continuously abused their state power to maintain an uneven playing field
(UPF) in order to wear down their opposition. From the perspective of the
regime, oligarchs are a crucial group of players who can neither be ignored
nor given substantial power. As was clearly described in the empirical
chapters, most pseudo-democratic regimes abused their state power by
attacking the organizational resources of their rival oligarchs. For instance, in
case of Georgia we could read evidence of the then President Mikheil
Saakashvili banning ordinary people from financially supporting Ivanishvili’s
political campaign. Saakashvili also employed his state power to prevent
Ivanishvili from standing in election by revoking his Georgian citizenship. In
the case of Armenia and Tsarukyan, we could similarly see that President
Serzh Sargsyan abused his state power not only to damage the organizational
capacity of Tsarukyan, but also to elevate himself above him by damaging his
reputation and credibility as a rival. Hence, these examples suggest that state
power and mass opinion are mutually related in post-Soviet regime trajectories
of pseudo-democracies. By focusing on the importance of oligarchs, this thesis
has attempted to illustrate some instances of that relationship.
The findings of this thesis can also be discussed in terms of possible
limitations of this thesis’s main argument due to the predominance of
alternative explanations in prior research. Initially, it is worth repeating that
the aim of this thesis is not to explain why there have been different regime
outcomes in general. This thesis has rather aimed its focus at studying and
understanding the role of oligarchs in key processes of regime maintenance or
democratization given the centrality of two competing explanations that point
either to the crucial importance of mass opinion or state power. Concerning
whether oligarchs’ political struggles are successful, some critics may argue
that the difference in the level of state power itself accounts for the dissimilar
outcomes of the four oligarchs’ political struggle (the focus of Chapter five).
One such claim could be that relatively higher state power in the hands of the
incumbent regimes in Armenia and Russia is what essentially enabled them to
neutralize their rival oligarchs. My response to such a reasonable remark
would be that a) my thesis has shown that pseudo-democratic regimes mainly
seek to avoid using brutal repression and b) rather focus on tarnishing the
reputation of the rival oligarchs primarily to show that there is a great shortage
of potent and trustworthy rivals against them. Thus, this argument is a more
nuanced perspective on the tools for regime maintenance in post-Soviet
pseudo-democracies. While key scholars of this field have attributed
170
successful regime maintenance in pseudo-democracies to the main regime
leader’s popularity, my thesis adds important insights into this perspective.
More specifically, one could discuss from the view of the alternative
explanations that popular support for the main regime leader (higher support
for Putin in contrast to weak support for Yanukovich) or major scandals (such
as the Gldani prison scandal in Georgia, see Chapter five) essentially explain
why some of the actors were more successful in maintaining their regime or
ousting the pseudo-democratic regime leader. I, however, claim that my study
clearly illustrates that all the four pseudo-democratic regimes under study in
Chapter five, irrespective of their state power, made systematic efforts to
damage the reputation of their main rival oligarch. What this study has shown
in more detail (in contrast to prior research) is the fact that the rival oligarchs
in Armenia and Russia (higher state power and UPF) hesitated to push their
struggle for power to a new high, which clearly helped the incumbents to
tarnish the rival’s reputation and political credibility. Indeed, one can also
speculate whether or not regimes with greater state power employ powerful
rival oligarchs as puppets in their political game to ensure their legitimacy due
to some sort of behind-the-scene-agreements. While it is difficult for this
thesis to make an irrefutable claim against such a possibility, most of the
evidence revealed in this thesis still suggests that the two rival oligarchs’
failure in Armenia and Russia was most likely due to their systematic
wavering on several fateful occasions with regard to popular protests and
elections. This recurring wavering damaged the oligarch’s reputation even in
light of powerful efforts to develop organizational strength and reputation. In
other words, developing their organizational capacity (monetary, human,
administrative and media resources) and reputation indeed appear to be key
elements in oligarchs’ struggle for power against the incumbents. However,
equally important for the oligarchs is to personally maintain their credibility
through consistent political performance of opposition and to avoid appearing
as an inept rival. In sum, these findings add additional insights into the scant
literature with partial focus on the efforts pseudo-democratic regime leaders
make in order to be looked upon as unrivaled and unparalleled leaders of the
regime (Rose, Mishler & Munro, 2006: 193-195; Gel'man, 2010).
As to their possible influence on oligarchs, the role of Russia and the West
has been somewhat downplayed in this thesis, which some may see as a
possible limitation. In reviewing prior work on post-Soviet pseudo-
democracies, I very early declared that I subscribe to the more dominant
argument in prior studies stating that domestic factors are of much greater
importance for understanding regime trajectories in this context than a primary
focus on external influence from, for instance, Russia. This thesis does not
ignore the importance of sophisticated propaganda tools and leverages that
may have enabled the Kremlin to influence the actions of rival oligarchs in the
post-Soviet context of pseudo-democracies. At the time of writing, some
serious investigations are taking place in the United States as to the extent of
171
Russian impact on the 2016 presidential election by means of social media and
fake news. Most anecdotal, although highly sensible, explanations suggest that
such negative influence and manipulative efforts did indeed take place. As a
successor of the Soviet KGB, the Russian security services have incrementally
advanced their manipulative tools to a degree that makes it much harder for
social scientists to be able to recognize sophisticated manipulations on the
web. Taken together, I emphasize once more that I do not preclude the
possibility that the Kremlin could have manipulated the political scene and the
actions of rival oligarchs behind the stage. However, I have made every
possible effort to control for its possible influence and to clarify that I
subscribe to those dominant branches of prior research that assign the greatest
importance to domestic factors as discussed earlier.
The findings of this study have also societal and policy implications. In
particular, they suggest that oligarchs are key political players whose behavior
has substantial implications for the prospects of attitudinal as well as political
democratization. One of the most important societal and policy implications is
that oligarchs seem to fill an important political void left by dysfunctional or
disregarded political parties in a socio-political context marked by patronal
politics and personal exchanges. The general suggestions, for example with
regard to EU projects aimed at strengthening the civil society, perhaps need to
be revised if we really want to be able to strengthen the preconditions for
democratization in this context. In fact, most oligarchs in this context (as
expected) are primarily interested in defending their material wealth by
engaging in politics, developing their organizational strength and popularity
among ordinary citizens. Since this study finds that oligarchs in countries with
higher state power have recurrently wavered from their opposition to the
incumbent regime on fateful occasions, the EU and other influential
international policy-makers could benefit from paying greater attention to
strengthening the political democratization processes by providing greater
support for rival oligarchs. The main reason is that evidence from this thesis
indicates that they have played a critical role in ousting pseudo-democratic
regimes whose leaders desperately clung onto the power. In fact, the close
contact between some crucial oligarchs, EU bureaucrats and Western
ambassadors in the wake of the Euromaidan Revolution in 2014 seem to lend
support for policy changes in the proposed direction. Yet and as discussed in
more detail elsewhere in this thesis, domestic factors are more decisive than
external pressures and aid with regard to influencing regime trajectories in
post-Soviet pseudo-democracies (Solonenko, 2009; Simão, 2012; but see
Tansey, Koehler & Schmotz, 2016). Therefore, Western political aid needs to
be complemented with programs that can enhance oligarchs’ low level of
legitimacy in the eyes of the broad masses in the post-Soviet context of
pseudo-democracies.
172
Areas for future research
This study has focused on understanding the role of oligarchs for regime
trajectories in post-Soviet pseudo-democracies given the two competing
explanations in the literature. However, there are many pseudo-democracies in
other parts of the world and the inclusion of more pseudo-democracies outside
the post-Soviet space is necessary to generalize the results of this thesis. This
suggestion of broadening the study area is well in line with recent discussions
in pertinent literature on the regime trajectories in the post-Soviet context. In
fact, key experts in this field still seem to disagree on whether a regime’s state
power (Way, 2015, 2017) or the expectations of the main regime leader’s
political future and popularity primarily account for different regime
trajectories (Hale, 2017). One way of solving this puzzle would be to examine
the veracity of the aforementioned explanations for differing regime
trajectories in post-Soviet dynamics by applying them to cases outside the
post-Soviet context (Hale, 2017: 583). Moreover, I have shown that focusing
on the role of oligarchs is a necessary aspect to account for in solving the
aforementioned puzzle.
Thus, an important path ahead is to expand this study in time and context.
Indeed, the results of this thesis evidence that public perceptions about
oligarchs are intimately connected with people’s general experiences of the
oligarchs’ performances as a group and individuals. In this light, it would
therefore be necessary to broaden our focus to other pseudo-democracies in
the world in order to understand whether the offered understanding of the
interactions between oligarchs and incumbent regimes is valid in other
contexts as well. In my view, this would indeed be the case due the fact that
research on contemporary oligarchs, for instance in Southeast Asia and Latin
America, suggests that wealth concentration in the hands of a few, well-heeled
oligarchs is increasingly becoming a substantial factor in enabling or
hampering incumbent elites’ struggles for maintaining their regime by
safeguarding it against attacks by popular demands for democratic reforms
(Hutchcroft, 1991; Singh, 2000; Robison & Hadiz, 2005; Winters, 2013;
Winters, 2011; Johnston, 2014). Therefore, an important step forwards would
be to check the veracity of this thesis’s main arguments in the aforementioned
context of pseudo-democracies since regimes there have shown similar regime
patterns and levels of oligarchic dominance over their economies (Winters,
2011; Johnston, 2014).
Another important aspect that merits greater investigatory attention is the
perceptions of oligarchs themselves about the role of public opinion about
them for regime trajectories. Conducting elite interviews with some of the
current or past influential oligarchs would add more insights into the role of
mass opinion in elite struggles for power. Both the comparative chapter on the
four oligarchs as well as the detailed chapter on Ukraine showed that people
seem to distinguish between oligarchs as a group and individuals. An
173
important dividing line appears to be people’s perceptions about oligarchs’
charity and efforts against corruption. Although this would be a very unlikely
enterprise to achieve, the research on broad regime trajectories would merit
from looking more deeply into the motives of oligarchs for maintaining a
direct channel of contact with the masses. This would help us to overcome
some of the data quality limitation (in Chapter four) that limit the current
thesis with regard to its ability to draw generalizations about the linkage
between mass opinion about oligarchs as a group and normative regime
support to a broader group of oligarchs in other parts of the world.
A third venue for future research is to try to investigate how elite and
mass-level opinion about the oligarchs interact and the implications of this
interrelationship for the preconditions for gradual democratization or
successful regime survival. Overall, future studies based on the
aforementioned suggestions would further advance our understanding of how
elites struggling for power make capital of opinion in their political game.
174
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odnogo goda,
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objasniv raznicu mezhdu nyneshnim i pomaranchevym majdanami,
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ambicij,
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teper' zhdem ot nego plana dejstvij,
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Censor (2012c), Nel'zja byt' chastichno beremennym, - Poroshenko o strategii

vlasti po sotrudnichestvu s Tamozhennym sojuzom,
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Censor (2012d), Nuzhno sokrashhat' razryv mezhdu bogatymi i bednymi... Odna

lish' blagotvoritel'nost' ne pomozhet, - Poroshenko,
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vinnichannam,
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aktsiyu_v_rade, retrieved: 2016-02-17.
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zarplaty,
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za principy,
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_kogda_oni_derutsya_za_printsipy, retrieved: 2016-02-17.
Censor (2012i), Poroshenko priznan samym bogatym chinovnikom vysshego

ranga: Tigipko i Horoshkovskij pozadi,
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Censor (2012j), Poroshenko rasskazal kak popadet v Radu: Opredelilsja zadolgo

do vhozhdenija v pravitel'stvo»,
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Censor (2012k), Poroshenko soglasilsja stat' ministrom: Reshenie ja prinjal,

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e_ya_prinyal, retrieved: 2016-02-17.
Censor (2012l), Poroshenko zajavil, chto budet rabotat' v Rade: Pered Ukrainoj
stojat ser'eznye ugrozy. Na voznju vremeni net,
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_pered_ukrainoyi_stoyat_sereznye_ugrozy_na_voznyu_vremeni, retrieved: 2016-
02-17.
Censor (2012m), Poroshenko: Dlja prozrachnosti procedur goszakupok

privlechem ukrainskih Naval'nyh,
186
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akupok_privlechem_ukrainskih_navalnyh, retrieved: 2016-02-17.
Censor (2012n), Poroshenko: Ja soglasilsja stat' ministrom, chtoby zashhitit'

biznes,
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oby_zaschitit_biznes, retrieved: 2016-02-17.
Censor (2012o), Poroshenko: Moja pozicija po prigovoram Timoshenko i Lucenko

ne izmenilas',
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moshenko_i_lutsenko_ne_izmenilas, retrieved: 2016-02-17.
Censor (2012p), Poroshenko: Pravitel'stvo dolzhno platit' nalog na roskosh' v

pervuju ochered',
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a_roskosh_v_pervuyu_ochered, retrieved: 2016-02-17.
Censor (2012q), Prokuratura ser'ezno zanjalas' korporaciej Poroshenko: idut

proverki,
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roshenko_idut_proverki, retrieved: 2016-02-17.
Censor (2012r), Syn Poroshenko v 26 let stal vice-konsulom v Kitae i uzhe ushel
so sluzhby,
http://censor.net.ua/news/205768/syn_poroshenko_v_26_let_stal_vitsekonsulom_
v_kitae_i_uje_ushel_so_slujby, retrieved: 2016-02-17.
Censor (2012s), Uroven' otnoshenij mezhdu Ukrainoj i ES nahoditsja na samom

nizkom urovne za poslednie gody, - Poroshenko,
http://censor.net.ua/news/205290/uroven_otnosheniyi_mejdu_ukrainoyi_i_es_nah
oditsya_na_samom_nizkom_urovne_za_poslednie_gody_poroshenko, retrieved:
2016-02-17.
Censor (2013a), Dlja biznesa ne tak strashna Rossija, kak ukrainskie siloviki i
nalogovaja, - Poroshenko,
http://censor.net.ua/news/259275/dlya_biznesa_ne_tak_strashna_rossiya_kak_ukr
ainskie_siloviki_i_nalogovaya_poroshenko, retrieved: 2016-02-17.
Censor (2013b), Iz-za rossijskogo zapreta Roshen sokrashhaet personal,

http://censor.net.ua/news/258468/izza_rossiyiskogo_zapreta_roshen_sokraschaet_
personal, retrieved: 2016-02-17.
Censor (2013c), “Ja znaju tochno, kakim budet sledujushhee predlozhenie Rossii
Janukovichu - status nabljudatelja v Tamozhennom sojuze”, - Poroshenko,
187
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redlojenie_rossii_yanukovichu_status_nablyudatelya_v_tamojennom, retrieved:
2016-02-17.
Censor (2013d), Karasev rasskazal o bol'shoj oshibke Poroshenko,

http://censor.net.ua/news/240014/karasev_rasskazal_o_bolshoyi_oshibke_poroshe
nko, retrieved: 2016-02-17.
Censor (2013e), Onishhenko ne iskljuchaet vozvrashhenija Roshen na rossijskij

rynok, no nado mnogo porabotat',
http://censor.net.ua/news/250093/onischenko_ne_isklyuchaet_vozvrascheniya_ros
hen_na_rossiyiskiyi_rynok_no_nado_mnogo_porabotat, retrieved: 2016-02-17.
Censor (2013f), Pod Administraciju stjagivajutsja agressivnye molodchiki v

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Tigran Babajan

Linnaeus University Dissertations

– A Study of the Role of Oligarchs in Post-Soviet Pseudo-democracies

linnaeus university press

O LIGARCHS , S TATE P OWER

LINNAEUS UNIVERSITY PRESS

ISBN: 978-91-88761-39-2 (print), 978-91-88761-40-8 (pdf).

Keywords: oligarchs; post-Soviet pseudo-democracies; state power abuse; mass

Greatest appreciation is due to Linnaeus University, Helge Ax:son Johnsons

Stockholm, February 2018

Chapter one. Introduction: Oligarchs and pseudo-democratic regimes ................ 7

Figure A. Level of democracy (Freedom House/Polity) ................................. 14

Table 1. Coding scheme for measuring relevant indicators ............................ 58

Aim and research questions

• What is the relationship between oligarchs, their political power 4 and

Although the primary focus of these guiding research questions is on the

leaders or elite groups).

7 I provide a thorough definition of attitudinal democratization in the subsequent chapter.

A brief background on post-Soviet pseudo-

Armenia Georgia Kyrgyzstan

Moldova Russia Ukraine

1990 2000 2015 1990 2000 2015 1990 2000 2015

Armenia Georgia Kyrgyzstan

Moldova Russia Ukraine

1990 2000 2015 1990 2000 2015 1990 2000 2015

There is no doubt that economic growth plays an important role in the

Armenia Georgia Kyrgyzstan

Moldova Russia Ukraine

1990 2000 2015 1990 2000 2015 1990 2000 2015

What is a pseudo-democratic regime?

“…The formal and informal organization of the center of political

What this thesis refers to by regime trajectories

As previously stated, there is a growing body of literature on oligarchs’

Explanations for different regime trajectories in pseudo-

The relationship between oligarchs, their political power and

Hypothesis 1 (H1): Political inequality to the benefit of oligarchs

However, past studies suggest that some pseudo-democratic regimes manage

Hypothesis 1a (H1a): The negative effect of political inequality to

Hypothesis 2 (H2): All individual, politically motivated rival

Furthermore, I theorize how politically motivated, rival oligarchs can conduct

Hypothesis 2a (H2a): We should expect that all pseudo-democratic

Mixed-method research design

First empirical chapter: Case selection, research

Third empirical chapter: Case selection, research

Table 2. Key variables from the Kyiv university student survey

The entire questionnaire, which also contains important background variables,

Support for democracy in post-Soviet pseudo-

Figure D. Mean democracy approval

Armenia Georgia Kyrgyzstan

Moldova Russia Ukraine

1990 2000 2010 1990 2000 2010 1990 2000 2010

A general description of post-Soviet oligarchs as a

Democratic supportij = b0 + b1j (Political inequality) +

Armenia Georgia Moldova

1990 2000 2015

1990 2000 2015 1990 2000 2015

Figure F. The average (median) level of perceived unfair distribution of wealth in

Armenia Georgia Moldova

1990 2000 2015

1990 2000 2015 1990 2000 2015

As can be read from Figure F, the average level of perceived unfairness of

Table 3. Having a democratic political system

Table 3 suggests that nearly or over 80 percent in Armenia, Georgia and

Wealthy people H1 (-) -1.279 -1.278 -1.279 -1.281