The Contradictions of Valerius' and Statius' Jupiter. Power and Weakness of The Supreme God in The Epic and Tragic

Cecilia Criado
The contradictions of Valerius’ and Statius’

Jupiter
Power and weakness of the supreme god in the epic and
tragic tradition
The malevolence of Jupiter and the hereditary

transmission of guilt
At least until the rise of Orphism, Greek thought had wholly rejected the Meso-
potamian notion that the gods had created men as their slaves, “to bake their
bread and clean out their temples”.¹ Thus, Greek mythology had shortened
and substantially rewritten those Sumerian and Babylonian myths that, like
the myth of the flood, documented the unmotivated desire of the gods to wipe
man from the face of the Earth.² In Greek literature, deities could be benign, if
treated properly, distant, indifferent or arbitrary,³ although their attitude towards
men could also reach the point of open malevolence. Homeric gods, indeed, are
capable of taking terrible revenge when men fail to show them due honour.⁴ Yet,
contrary to Mesopotamian prototypes, the motif of a divine plan aimed at the ex-
termination of mankind had only a marginal significance in the Greek literary
tradition (Cypr. Fr. 1 B; Aesch. PV 231– 233; Pl. Symp. 190b–e; Lucian, Icar. 29
33.2– 7); and the same can be said, with a few exceptions, of Roman literature.
In fact, if we put aside the uncertainty over the intentions of Apollo in a fragment
of Lucilius,⁵ Ovid is the first Roman author to introduce a divinity, Jupiter, whose
aim is the annihilation of mankind (Met. 1.187– 188; 1.240 – 243; 1.260 – 261). In
the Metamorphoses it is only Lycaon who is guilty of having committed an act
 Kirk 1974 (1984), 7.

 In the Sumerian table of Nippur (ed. Poebel 1914, 9 – 70) and also in the Akkadian Myth of
Atrahasis and Poem of Gilgamesh, tablet XI.
 Kirk (1974) 1984, 220, 222; Detienne / Sissa (1989) 1990, 80.
 Lloyd-Jones 1971, 4.
 On the possible intention of Apollo to eliminate Roman citizens through disease, see Sat.
53 M. = 7 K. (serpere uti gangrena mala atqu<e> herpestica posset). The allusion to human evil
made by Jupiter in the Metamorphoses in terms of inmedicabile corpus (1.190) could also be seen
as evidence that in Lucilius Apollo’s plan was to exterminate humanity through disease (see
Romano Martín 2009, 255).
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196 Cecilia Criado
of blasphemy against the father of the gods; nevertheless, Jupiter gets the agree-
ment of the entire Olympic pantheon to his plan that humanity should perish
(1.244– 245). The specific means by which this will be accomplished is universal
deluge.⁶
Unlike the other Flavian epicists, Statius explores Ovid’s problematic theo-
dicy in the Thebaid in great depth.⁷ Obviously, divine malevolence is not absent
in Silius Italicus’ Punica, and it reaches a notable intensity in books 6 and 7 of
Valerius Flaccus’ Argonautica. ⁸ In the latter, the design of the supreme father is
to ensure translatio imperii (1.531– 560) that will lead to the future kingdom of
another people (gentesque fovebo | mox alias, 1.555 – 556). It is evident that this
new empire, to succeed those of Asia and Greece, is Rome. Nevertheless, the
celebratory proclamation of the Fate of the Roman Empire is not entirely exempt
from polemical overtones, given that the Urbs is not explicitly mentioned.⁹ Also,
while in the Aeneid the Virgilian Jupiter promises Rome that it will have an em-
pire sine fine (1.278), the Valerian supreme god comes closer to Ovid’s perspective
(see the words of Pythagoras at Met. 15.421– 452) and limits himself to predicting
 See Feldherr 2010, 137– 149.

 Feeney 1991, 353.
 In the Argonautica it is the evil Juno and Venus who practice a real and very Ovidian demonic
possession of Medea (6.454; 6.469 – 474; 6.490 – 491; 7.172– 178; 7.254– 255; 7.276 – 281; 7.323 – 324;
7.371– 374; 7.462), who is explicitly described by the poet as innocent and pious (6.453; 7.157).
Medea finally succumbs to the wiles of the goddesses and, by force, is transformed into a
criminal. Valerius emphasises her tragic fall and her valiant, yet futile resistance to divine
agency (6.498 – 499; 7.153 – 157; 7.200 – 209; 7.238 – 239; 7.292– 299; 7.309 – 349; 7.382– 384). See
Hershkowitz 1998a, 31– 34; Schenk 1999, 382– 386; Bernstein 2008, 55 – 61. For the sense of
chaos and contingency that the behaviour of the gods under Jupiter imparts on the level of
human actions in Argonautica 6 and 7 see Zissos 2005, 505, 511.
With respect to the Punica, the gods also exhibit an unmotivated, excessive malignancy on
occasion. Before Marcellus captures Syracuse, his army falls victim to a deadly plague. The
cause of this, as adduced by Silius, consists in the invidia and anger of the gods (14.583; 14.617).
However, while in Livy (25.25.6 – 7) and Diodorus Siculus (26.20) the plague occurred after
Marcellus had ordered the plundering of Syracuse and could thus be a sign of divine disapproval
(see Stocks 2009, 160 n. 40), such a possibility cannot be the case in Punica, in that the plague
takes place before the attack on Syracuse, the sacking of which Marcellus had expressly for-
bidden (14.670 – 675). Also, Juno’s hatred of Rome is the reason that Saguntum falls in so cruel
and tragic a way (2.526 – 542). Following the orders of the goddess, Tisiphone takes possession of
the minds of the Saguntines (agit abdita Erinys, 2.595) and induces them to suicide which,
against their will, they effect through an execrable fratricidal confrontation (2.617– 635). See
Feeney 1991, 307– 308; Hardie 1993, 81– 83; Criado 2000, 129 – 131.
 Romano Martín 2009, 314, 318 – 321. See also Adamietz 1976, 22; Hershkowitz 1998b, 239;
Manuwald 1999, 149 – 150; Spaltenstein 2002, 216 – 219.

The contradictions of Valerius’ and Statius’ Jupiter 197
longissima … | regna (1.559 – 560; see also 2.245).¹⁰ Even so, it is clear that Vale-
rius’ Jupiter sees Rome within the historical context of Destiny.¹¹ Neither is Jupi-
ter’s decree malevolent in Silius Italicus’ Punica. Certainly, his purpose is to pre-
cipitate Rome’s suffering, and he alone is responsible for the military disasters of
the populus Romanus. ¹² The war, however, is the means by which Jupiter can re-
invigorate the dormant fighting prowess of the Romans (3.573 – 581). The divine
plan is not the annihilation of the Roman people or of their supremacy (3.571–
573; 6.595 – 597; 12.639); on the contrary, it is the creation of a great Latin empire
(3.588), the nature of which Jupiter foresees: it will be a future of one-man rule
and, more specifically, a Flavian principate (3.593 – 629).¹³
In contrast to Valerius Flaccus and Silius Italicus, Rome is wholly absent
from the plans of Jupiter in Statius’ Thebaid. Perhaps because of this, Jupiter
can openly flaunt his hostile attitude to men. Although Jupiter recognises at
the beginning of the narrative that the misdeeds of the Theban family arise
from the past and continue in the present (Theb. 1.227– 235; 3.244– 245), his ini-
tial aim is not to punish the continuous crimes of this gens profana (1.232), but to
avenge the outrage that Eteocles and Polynices have committed against their
father Oedipus (1.238 – 239). For this, the god is happy to order destruction
after making himself the unexpected recipient of a prayer that Oedipus had di-
rected towards the infernal deities (1.56 – 87).¹⁴ Jupiter decrees that two houses of
which he is progenitor, Argos and Thebes (1.241– 247), should perish. If it is nec-
essary, Jupiter claims, he will himself raze Thebes to its foundations (3.248 – 249)
and destroy the innocent city of Argos, whose only crime is that of having been
descended from the criminal Tantalus (1.246 – 247), with a great flood (3.248 –
251).
The disproportionate nature of these punishments raises doubt as to the
Stoic re-establishment of cosmic order to which the god (like Ovid’s Jupiter at
Met. 1.190 – 191; 1.251– 252; 1.256 – 258) resorts so as to justify his excesses
(rogat hoc tellusque polusque | et pietas et laesa fides naturaque et ipsi | Eumeni-
dum mores, ‘earth and heaven demand it, and piety and violated faith and Na-
ture and the very morals of the Eumenides’, 7.216 – 218).¹⁵ Like Lucan,¹⁶ neither
 See Adamietz 1976, 23; Río Torres-Murciano 2010a, 143; 2010b, 1027– 1033.
 Schubert 1984, 103.
 Feeney 1991, 306.
 Carter 2001, 28; Marks 2010, 195. See also von Albrecht 1964, 17– 18; Schubert 1984, 123 – 124;
Ahl / Davis / Pomeroy 1986, 2504.
 Schubert 1984, 86; Hill 2008, 133.
 Translations of the Thebaid are taken from Shackleton Bailey 2003. Seneca, like Ovid
(Met. 1.262– 312), introduces the motif of the flood (Q Nat. 3.27– 30). However, whereas he shares

198 Cecilia Criado
Statius nor Ovid envisages a new cycle to follow universal destruction, and this
approach persists throughout both poems. With the same intensity that Ovid in
the Metamorphoses establishes the tragic consequences of the supremacy of the
gods over men,¹⁷ in the Thebaid Statius presents a series of human beings who
are predestined to enter into an unequal struggle against an ineluctable Fate and
against arbitrary and petulant gods. Thus, deities are the authors of evil against
which men remain powerless.¹⁸
In this way, Statius renounces the interplay between divine and human
realms that is found in the Aeneid, albeit in a complex form. Disregarding Virgil’s
rewriting of Hellenistic philosophical mysticism and doubtless influenced
strongly by his tragic thematic sources,¹⁹ the author of the Thebaid embraces
the Ovidian choice.²⁰ Ovid and Statius hark back to archaic Olympian religiosity
and assume, in a Homeric (and even an Aeschylean) sense, a clear distinction
between the nature of gods and that of human beings; that is, the radical sepa-
ration between men, doomed to suffer and die, and the immortal, beati gods.²¹
Yet both Roman poets unexpectedly encourage their audience to subject the be-
haviour of the father of the gods to moral judgment and, in doing so, take a ra-
tionalist perspective that is not Homeric; neither is it Aeschylean. The question of
the moral judgement of the gods was, however, of great interest to Euripides.²²
With respect to the Ovidian and Statian theodicy, some qualification is use-
ful. Their approach has a strong Homeric flavour, but strictly speaking the reson-
ances are Iliadic rather than Odyssean in nature. Indeed, it is in the Odyssey that
with the author of the Metamorphoses an emphasis on human frailty against the power of
divinity, Seneca’s theological approach is radically different and is wholly respectful of the
“theocentric nature of Stoic physics” (Inwood 2005, 159) and of the corrective order that Stoic
orthodoxy attributed to ἐκπύρωσις (SVF I 107, 109, 510; II 596 – 632; Sen. Q Nat. 3.28.7.2– 4).
 Narducci 1979, 42– 52, 152– 167.
 Rosati 2001, 46.
 Ten Kate 1955, 10; Schubert 1984, 102; Otis 1966/1970, 128 – 164.
 Kabsch 1968, 116, suggests that Statius wanted to emphasise metapoetically his debt to the
Metamorphoses in order to distinguish himself from Virgil. In this context the verbal echoes of
Jupiter’s words at the beginning of both narratives are worth noting (compare Met. 1.187– 188
with Theb. 1.224– 225, and Met. 1.242– 243 with Theb. 1.245 – 246). See Criado 2000, 199.
 The history of the Theban house had been the subject of the cyclic epics – Oedipodeia,
Thebaid and Epigoni – and, later, of a poem by Antimachus of Colophon. Nevertheless, it was
Greek tragedy (Aeschylus’ Seven against Thebes; Sophocles’ Oedipus Tyrannus, Oedipus Colo-
neus, Antigone; Euripides’ Phoenissae, Suppliants) and Roman tragedy (Accius’ Phoenissae;
Ponticus’ lost work; Seneca’s Oedipus, Phoenissae) that established the broad outline of what
would be the canonical version of the history of the unfortunate Cadmean family.
 See Bianchi 1976, 59.
 Cf. e. g. Eur. Bacch. 1346; Supp. 610 – 612; IT 570 – 573; HF 343 – 347; 1307– 1310; 1340 – 1346.

the expression of a theodicy in the mouth of a god is heard for the first time in
Western literature. Following the death of Aegisthus at the hands of Orestes,
Zeus asserts that the son of Thyestes got his just deserts for ignoring the warn-
ings of the gods not to kill Agamemnon and not to marry Clytemnestra. The god
prefaces these reflections with an explanation of the origin of evil that man suf-
fers (Od. 1.32– 34). His words show a very different moral climate from the fatal-
istic pessimism that pervades the Iliad. ²³ In the Odyssey, the divinity no longer
has the power to contemplate the totality given that, as Zeus says, man possesses
the capacity to act. It will be the very exercising of this freedom that leads him to
endure hardship beyond what was ordained by the deity (ὑπὲρ μόρον, Od. 1.34).
Human responsibility, then, has an important role in the evil that touches man. It
is surprising how clearly in this passage the Odyssean Zeus, obviously in pre-
philosophical manner, foreshadows the expression of what will become one of
the most difficult and aporetic questions of Hellenistic Greece: the problematic
coexistence of freedom and universal causal Fate.²⁴
Do Statius’ characters have that same amount of freedom that Zeus recognis-
es in the Odyssey? In my opinion, absolutely not.²⁵ In the Thebaid human beings
do not benefit from such a theodicy approach. The poet opts to look back to the
notion of the origin of evil as established in the Iliad ²⁶ and which Euripides, as
the Flavian poet could not ignore, had already declared obsolete.²⁷ Consequent-
ly, the characters in the Thebaid are inescapably doomed to crime and to suffer
 Nevertheless, Lloyd-Jones 1971, 32, is not in favour of overestimating the Odyssean modifi-
cations of the doctrine exemplified in the Iliad.
 Note the philosophical development of the statement of the Homeric Zeus in Cleanthes. In
the Hymn to Zeus, he affirms that all things proceed from Zeus’ plan, except the evil deeds
perpetrated by evil men (SVF I 537.17; Pl. Ti. 42a3–b2; 42e3 – 4). To address Epicurean criticism
and not to deny man his moral condition, Chrysippus ends up distinguishing Stoic determinism
from fatalism (SVF II 919, 974). The efforts of Stoicism to reconcile determinism and human
freedom are, nevertheless, seen to be of little success, and satisfied neither Carneades nor Cicero
(Cic. Fat. 31.1– 32.1; 38.8 – 10). Seneca was reluctant to face the problem and put off indefinitely
the question of taking a clear position (Q Nat. 2.38.3).
 Contra Venini 1961, 1964; Delarue 1990, 1173, 1176; Taisne 1994, 60.
 Its best expression, as we know, can be found at Il. 24.525 – 533. Achilles tells a distressed
Priam that the gods are ἀκηδέες, while men are doomed to suffer. In effect, the hero continues,
Zeus has two urns containing, respectively, ills and blessings. To some men, the lot conferred on
them by god contains good mixed with evil; for others, he reserves only some of the mournful
gifts. Contrast Hes. Op. 179.
 Theseus says to the Argive women (Eur. Supp. 196 – 199): ἔλεξε γάρ τις ὡς τὰ χείρονα | πλείω
βροτοῖσίν ἐστι τῶν ἀμεινόνων. | ἐγὼ δὲ τούτοις ἀντίαν γνώμην ἔχω, | πλείω τὰ χρηστὰ τῶν
κακῶν εἶναι βροτοῖς (‘some say that evil is what is most abundant in human lives, but I think
differently to them, that more good touches mortals than evil’ [my translation]).

200 Cecilia Criado
divine punishment, whether or not they have deserved it. The position adopted
by Statius is strange for two reasons. First, because Roman literature was always
more reluctant than Greek literature to accept the omniscient power of Fate, and
second, because in the Roman tradition the arguments with which Academicism
had fought the rigour of Stoic determinism were welcomed almost unanimously.
Voluntas, studium and disciplina were the instruments with which the Roman vir
(not only Aeneas) accepted adversity. But above all it was with the virtues that he
managed to overcome his innate predisposition to vitium (Cic. Fat. 11.1– 7). The
Statian Jupiter, by contrast, argues that the character abides stamped on all
members of the Theban family (mens cunctis imposta manet, 1.227). The genetic
legacy, the god seems to say, is as immovable as Aeneas, who remained unper-
turbed by Dido’s entreaties (mens immota manet, Virg. Aen. 4.449). In the The-
baid the effect of this legacy is as compelling as the power that Jupiter himself
attributes to Fate in the Aeneid in his reply to Venus (manent immota tuorum |
Fata tibi, 1.257– 258; see also 7.314). Hence, the language of the Statian Jupiter
at 1.227 is Virgilian; his thinking, however, is Ovidian.
In fact, it was Ovid who, using precisely the phraseology of the Aeneid, con-
ferred programmatic epic status on the motif of immutability. Conspicuously,
Callisto, after her metamorphosis, retains her former essence (mens antiqua
tamen facta quoque mansit in ursa, Met. 2.485). Neither is this an isolated exam-
ple. Repeatedly in the narrative, the natura of the characters is seen to be im-
mune to the transforming activity of the deity. It is significant that in a poem
that is the quintessential song of constant and unfailing mutatio, the only
items that are immobilis and immutabilis are, besides Fatum,²⁸ human essence
and genetic heredity. This fact almost implies a denial of the possibility of
change, and it will have theological consequences in that the hyper-epic punitive
measures that the Ovidian supreme god takes to re-establish his justice will in
the end be reduced to ineffective and barren gestures.²⁹ Ovid discussed the prob-
 Jupiter affirms the immutability of Fate and recognises that he himself is subordinated to it
(me quoque Fata regunt, 9.434). See p. 211 below.
 See Criado 2011, 263 – 264. The futility of the divine transforming actions recurs throughout
the Metamorphoses. In book 1, Jupiter converts the blood of the sacrilegious giants into human
figures. His corrective gesture, however, leads to a relatively unsuccessful anthropogenic act in
that the offspring will continue to be deprecating towards the gods and hungry for crime (1.161–
162). Immediately afterwards the father of the gods relates the punishment that he inflicted on
Lycaon for blasphemy against the divinity and for feritas. Despite the fact that Ovid presents
Jupiter as the image of incontestable royal power (1.163 – 181), his vengeful and punitive will
(vindice flamma, 1.230) is left ineffective, given that Lycaon, once transformed into a wolf, retains
traces of his previous form and nature (1.233 – 239) – see Anderson 1989, 97. Also in the case of
Actaeon and that of Cadmus and Harmonia, mens tantum pristina mansit (3.203; cf. 4.603).

lem of epic theology to an extent previously unknown, and Statius took note of
this. Thus, in the Thebaid, Jupiter recognises that his previous punishments
against mankind failed (nil actum, 1.222).
One aspect of the inheritance that Statius shares with Ovid is the hereditary
transmission of guilt. This was a core concern of Greek tragedy, and Roman lit-
erature exploited it for the construction of the discourse on civil war.³⁰ Yet the
central status that both poets confer on this motif has no precedent in epic. In
the Ovidian and the Statian narratives the father of the gods has no power
over hereditary guilt. The sins committed by characters remain indelible, mark-
ing the fatal predisposition of their descendants to crime (also to civile nefas) or
to error. ³¹ But if such is the Fate of men, and Jupiter can do nothing about it, we
must agree that the perspective of Ovid and Statius differs largely from that
which had emerged from the theological optimism of philosophical Greece
and which held the absolute subordination of Fate to a personal and benevolent
god. Thus, we must also admit that it seems that the Statian supreme god either
lies or falls into carelessness, when he affirms his absolute power over Fate as
well as when he claims his powerlessness in view of the Fates.
The relationship of the Statian Jupiter to Destiny

and the Stoic doctrine of Fate
In the divine assembly in Thebaid 1 Statius attributes to Jupiter the status of the
sovereign of Destiny. Thus, grave et immutabile sanctis | pondus adest verbis, et
vocem Fata sequuntur (‘his holy words have weight heavy and immutable and
the Fates follow his voice’, Theb. 1.212– 213). Juno’s prayer that her husband
does not make Argos the target of his wrath follows. The manner of Jupiter’s
Equally, the cowardly gesture of Phineus and his servile attitude persist after his metamorphosis
(sed tamen os timidum vultusque in marmore supplex | submissaque manus faciesque obnoxia
mansit, 5.234– 235), and Galanthis retains her former stoutness (strenuitas antiqua manet, 9.320).
Neither did transformation change the coarseness of the soul of Midas (pingue sed ingenium
mansit, … ut ante, 11.148), and the love of Ceyx and Alcyone survived when they were trans-
formed into birds (tunc quoque mansit amor nec coniugiale solutum | foedus in alitibus, 11.743 –
744). See also the declaration of Pythagoras at 15.170 – 172.
 See Zeitlin 1986, 126; Hardie 1990b, 225 n. 12; Criado forthcoming.
 Ov. Met. 6.213; 6.458 – 460; 8.485; 9.123 – 124; 9.149 – 151. For guilt as inheritance in the house
of Thebes see Met. 3.185; 3.293 – 295; 3.333; 3.557– 558; 3.701– 731; 4.1– 4; 4.272– 273; 4.390; 5.420 –
421, and Stat. Theb. 1.86 – 87; 1.126; 1.180 – 185; 1.227– 231; 1.266 – 270; 2.462– 464; 3.179 – 206;
3.241– 243; 4.434– 442; 7.208 – 214; 7.364– 365; 10.612– 614; 11.484– 492; 11.617– 620; 11.637– 638.
See Heuvel 1932, 144– 145; Markus 1997, 79 – 87.

202 Cecilia Criado
reply is consistent with the preceding passage: Stygia aequora fratris, | obtestor,
mansurum et non revocabile verbum, | nil fore quod dictis flectar (‘and verily I call
the dread waters, my brother’s Stygian sea, to witness, pronouncement fixed and
irrevocable: no words shall ever change my purpose’, 1.290 – 292). Hence, both
the poet and Jupiter firmly assert that it is the vox of the god that establishes im-
mutable Fate in the very moment of his act of speech. With a forcefulness, which
seems to presage a firm theological position on the part of the poet, Statius suc-
ceeds in disambiguating the amphibology underlying the etymological play be-
tween for and Fatum, which Jupiter employed in the Aeneid when he answered
Venus (1.261– 262).³² It also seems to answer resolutely the uncertainty of
Lucan in 5.92– 93 with respect to whether predetermined Destiny exists prior
to the enunciative act of the gods.³³ Undoubtedly, the ability of the Statian Jupiter
to take action is evident when he states that certo reliqua ordine ducam (‘the rest
I shall guide in sure process’, 1.302).
However, the Statian Jupiter mentions his relationship with Fate on two fur-
ther occasions. He consoles Mars, progenitor of the house of Thebes, for the ills
that his city suffers. Saturn’s son now affirms that these events are due to the
dictates of the Fata and the Parcae and that they have remained fixed since
the beginning of time. Whether or not -que in 3.241 is epexegetic, it is clear
that Jupiter comes to accept his subordination to these figures of Destiny: sic
Fata mihi nigraeque Sororum | iuravere colus: manet haec ab origine mundi |
fixa dies bello (‘Thus the Fates, the dark distaffs of the Sisters, have sworn to
me. This day stands fixed for war from the world’s origin, …’, 3.241– 243).³⁴ Jupi-
ter reaffirms his subordination to Fatum again in the scene in which he comforts
the Theban Bacchus. Jupiter states that it is not personal resentment that leads
 Fabor … | … et volvens Fatorum arcana movebo (‘I shall tell you … and I, unrolling the secrets
of Destiny, shall put them in motion’ [my translation]).
 Sive [sc. deus] canit Fatum seu, quod iubet ille canendo, | fit Fatum? (‘whether he merely
predicts the future or the future is itself determined by the fiat of his utterance’ [trans. Duff 1928]).
 Lactantius ad loc. understood that with these words Jupiter declared himself to be subditus
Fatis. Legras 1905a, 168 – 169, 185; Heuvel 1932, 138; Snijder 1968, 125; Vessey 1973, 83; Delarue
1990, 295 – 296, hold that in this passage Jupiter contradicts himself in presenting himself as the
executive agent of a Fate whose course he cannot determine. Dominik 1994a, 27– 28, also notes
that in Theb. 3.241– 243 Jupiter claims he is subordinate to the Fates, yet Dominik prefers to
interpret this as the god feigning impotence at the hands of the Fates with the purpose of
avoiding responsibility for the abominable events that will result from his cruel design. To my
knowledge, Statius is the only Roman author in which the Parcae prophesy the future by means
of an act of swearing. Significantly, the goddesses also do this at Stat. Silv. 5.1.262, where,
flaunting the same power and autonomy as at Theb. 3.241– 243 (see also Ov. Ib. 243), they swear
to fulfil Priscilla’s prayers.

him to sacrifice the Cadmean race but that immoto deducimur orbe | Fatorum
(‘our lot is spun by the changeless wheel of the Fates’, 7.197– 198). In these latter
two passages Jupiter, leaving Fate in the hands of the Parcae, does not dictate it,
but limits himself to ensuring that it is complied with. Neither he nor any other
deity can affect the Stoic series of Fata.
Evidently, the Statian Jupiter contradicts himself. The opinion of both human
and other divine characters also differs here, with some placing Jupiter on a
plane of universal supremacy, while other protagonists present him as co-execu-
tor or superintendent of Destiny.³⁵ In any case, Statius’ procedure is not new in
the context of Flavian epic. While Silius Italicus’ Jupiter at no time verbalizes his
relation with Destiny,³⁶ the first of the Flavian epicists, Valerius Flaccus, offers
comprehensive information in this respect. In the first divine council of the Ar-
gonautica, Jupiter declares that he is the conditor of immutable Fate (vetera haec
nobis et condita pergunt, 1.531; cum Fata darem, 1.534). Thus, with a verbal auda-
city unprecedented in Roman epic, the god bestows on himself the role of the
Stoic Demiurge. His diction (condita) is, of course, Senecan.³⁷ As has been
noted, Jupiter gives a direct Stoic response to the metaphysical uncertainty
that Lucan showed as to whether the world was driven by the Stoic Founder
of all things or by blind chance (2.7– 13).³⁸
The words that Valerius places in the mouth of the summus sator have in any
case a wider reach in that they aim at disambiguating not only the theological
 Dominik 1994a, 27. As he rightly notes, comments by characters never suggest, as Jupiter
himself claims, that he is subordinated to the Fates. Nevertheless, a tragic ignorance and lack of
understanding of all things concerning the divinity is a feature common to human characters in
the Thebaid (see n. 53 below).
 Although the theology of the Punica merits close study, let us simply note here that the
absence of an allusion to the relationship of Jupiter to Fate in the narrative is conspicuous. It is
not even mentioned in what would have been its natural location, that is, in the conversation
that Jupiter has with Venus to reassure her as to the Destiny of Rome (3.557– 629) and which is a
rewriting of the analogous scene in Aen. 1.223 – 296. But, while Virgil had converted this passage
into the canonical moment of identification (although not an unproblematic one) of Jupiter with
Fate, Silius’ Jupiter refrains from naming Destiny. Only after the god has finished speaking is it
clarified through the narrative voice that Jupiter has revealed Destiny or, in Stoic phraseology,
the sequence of future events (pandit seriem venturi Iuppiter aevi, 3.630). It is not clear in the
Punica whether Jupiter is the agent of Destiny (as statuit Fata at 17.385 seems to indicate) or a
mere vehicle for its transmission (as the role assigned to the Parcae at 9.475 – and perhaps at
17.361– 362 – might indicate, and the Fato cano at 9.548, which echoes a sentence that the
Augustan poets had consecrated for use in referring to the inspired voice of seers and vates).
 Sen. Dial. 1.5.8 (see p. 206 below); Ep. 119.15. See Billerbeck 1986a, 3129 – 3130; Wacht 1991, 8.
 See Stover 2012, 36 – 37, and pp. 206 – 207 below.

204 Cecilia Criado
uncertainties of Lucan, but also those of Virgil himself ³⁹ and, I would dare to
suggest, those of practically the whole Greco-Roman epic tradition. Certainly,
the god asserts that his design encompasses the totality (cuncta, 1.532) and,
what is more important, that it remains immovable (fixa manent, 1.533; see
also 1.548 – 549; 1.555 – 556) from the beginning of time (rerumque a principe
cursu, 1.532). Now, Valerius’ Jupiter is far from being capable of maintaining
his Stoic substance. Indeed, Valerius seems to find some pleasure in the fact
that the god, in his very first speech, demonstrates full awareness of the ambi-
guities that he has inherited from the philosophical and literary tradition. Thus,
without the solution of continuity, Jupiter contradicts himself and verbalizes his
relation with Fate in the kind of inextricable terms that foreshadow those of Sta-
tius. Jupiter suggests, first, that he is not the ruler of Fate, but that they are two
separate, yet concurrent forces (sic Fata locos, sic ipse fovebam, 1.541); secondly,
contradicting his earlier affirmation that the rerum cursus is fixed from the begin-
ning of time, he claims that he can form his own plans in the future (1.558 –
560).⁴⁰
Jupiter’s assertion that he established Fate at the beginning of time becomes
yet more problematic in light of Valerius’ interest (1.499 – 502) in the reader of the
Argonautica being conscious that he “is witnessing the end of the Golden Age,
and the beginning of Jupiter’s kingdom for mankind”.⁴¹ Jupiter has succeeded
his father Cronus and has inaugurated a new era. The poet presents the god rev-
elling in the greater power that he now holds over the other deities (2.82– 93) and
delighting in the memory of the details of his triumph in the struggle for succes-
sion in the kingship of the sky (1.563 – 565; 5.692– 693). In the narrative frame of
the Argonautica Jupiter is effectively a new arrival on the throne. This, clearly, is
not in itself possible, given that the Golden Age had ended long before the Ar-
gonautic expedition.⁴² Neither is it feasible that, as a member of the generation
 See p. 212 below.

 Throughout the work the inconsistencies of Jupiter continue. When in 5.676 Jupiter says that
furores, including those of the gods, have their own destiny, he accepts the Homeric and Vir-
gilian view that there are human actions that escape the divine will. At other times, however, the
god has a fairly broad capacity to modify what he has established. This happens, for example,
when, after the death of Cyzicus, he asserts that he is capable of flectere Fata (3.250) and of
bringing an end to the unfortunate battles (see Wacht 1991, 8; Manuwald 1999, 79 n. 141). This is
equally the case when he assumes that he could save his son Colaxes from death (6.624– 629).
Logically, like the Homeric Zeus (Il. 16.441– 450), he, fearful of the reaction of the other gods,
refrains from doing so. Nevertheless, just as in the Iliad, in my opinion the inescapable reality
suggested in the text is that he has the power to do so (contra Stover 2012, 37 n. 6).
 Feeney 1991, 330.
 Manuwald 1999, 151– 152.

of the younger gods (νεώτεροι θεοί, Aesch. Eum. 162; 778; 808), Jupiter could
have been able to dictate Fate in the primordial times of the world’s creation.
Such chronological inconsistencies would certainly not easily shock either the
ancient reader or the modern one.⁴³ However, with them the poet succeeds in
bringing into relief a fact of great significance in the history of the epic genre.
Valerius demonstrates an absolute awareness that the will of Jupiter is some-
thing far more profound and complex than his mere mythological personality.
This difficult conciliation of the metaphysical and mythic entities of the su-
preme god, as well as the chronological inconsistencies that derive inevitably
from it, are already present in the founding moments of the genre. In Hesiod’s
Theogony Cronus knows from Gea that he was destined to be overcome by his
own son. Such, says Hesiod, is the will of the great Zeus (Διὸς μεγάλου διὰ
βουλάς, Theog. 465). In this passage of the Theogony Zeus has still not been
born, and it is thus not possible that he might have decided the destiny of his
father. With the aim of correcting this contradiction, many scholars have prefer-
red to consider v. 465 suspicious or spurious. However, this does not seem neces-
sary. Indeed, the inconsistency inherent in these words of Hesiod (which Magris
qualifies as being both naïve and terribly audacious)⁴⁴ will resound throughout
the entire history of the epic genre, addressed, yet never finally resolved by the
poets.
All in all, scholarship has managed to bestow on Jupiter in Valerius as well
as in Statius a philosophical consistency which he in fact lacks and to which, in
his quality of epic god, he should never have aspired. From the time of Servius
and Lactantius, Seneca’s theories about the relationship of the father of the gods
to Fatum have tended to be brought up by scholars whenever the post-Homeric
Jupiter (even the Virgilian one)⁴⁵ touches on what has come to be seen as an ‘in-
coherence’. Recourse is made to the Spanish philosopher whenever the sover-
eign king does not meet the Stoic model of Providence endowed with absolute
power over Fate, or, simply, when he does not meet our own expectations or pre-
judices about the ontological status of the ancient supreme deity.
 As affirmed by Río Torres-Murciano 2011, 195, by making the expedition of the Argonauts
coincide with the beginning of the reign of Saturn’s son, Valerius achieves his objective that the
epic action be framed in a specific mythical moment, that of the age of heroes, ruled by Jupiter.
 Magris 1985, 172.
 Heinze (1903) 1993, 237. Recourse to Seneca is a constant tendency in Flavian epics: Legras
1905a, 168; Heuvel 1932, 101; Schetter 1960, 29; Vessey 1973, 83; Thuile 1980, 222; Adamini 1981,
24; Billerbeck 1986a, 3129 – 3130; Ripoll 1998a, 312; Delarue 2000, 295; Groß 2003, 23. More
cautious are Dominik 1994a, 28, and Río Torres-Murciano 2011, 204.

206 Cecilia Criado
Seneca, indeed, attributes to Jupiter the ability to scribere Fate, yet introdu-
ces an important qualification: at the very moment that the god decides Fate, he
himself is forever subject to it (semper paret, semel iussit, Sen. Dial. 1.5.8).⁴⁶ Ob-
viously, Seneca propounds the Stoic principle that Jupiter is the law for the Cos-
mos, but also for himself. This formulation can be found in the fragment of Zeno
(SVF I 162) that the Roman philosopher limits himself to translating.⁴⁷ Thus,
Stoic rationalism tried to overcome the inherent pessimism in the ambiguity of
the figure of Zeus in archaic Olympian religiosity. God, or natural Law, undoubt-
edly governs a moral world, and he is not only benevolent, but also moral. There-
fore, he must yield to the legality of the series of Fata that he himself established.
But, as Seneca warns, this does not mean that the deity has less power
(Ben. 6.23.2– 3);⁴⁸ simply, his role is to safeguard the coherence of the Cosmos
that he has founded. The potestas of divinity is, in any case, absolute.
Clearly, the moralization to which the figure of the highest God was submit-
ted by Stoicism is hardly compatible with the malignancy that Jupiter shows to
such a degree in the Metamorphoses and the Thebaid; nor does it accord with the
coincidence between Jupiter’s decree and that of the infernal deities in the Sta-
tian narrative.⁴⁹ But above all, natural Stoic theology gives no explanation of the
contradictions in Valerius’ and Statius’ portrayal of Jupiter or of the Statian Ju-
piter’s strong affirmation that it is not he who dictates Fate (Theb. 3.241– 243;
7.197– 198). It seems that, after all, the Statian divine machine was reluctant to
step outside the equivocal paths of the primum genus theologiae (Varro, Ant.
div. 7.3 – 9), that is, of mythical theology, and to embrace naturalis theologia.
Nevertheless, there is no denying that the Stoic Lucan rendered the Senecan
notion fairly accurately in poetic form. The creator of the universe fixit in aeter-
num causas, qua cuncta coercet | se quoque lege tenens, et saecula iussa ferentem
| Fatorum inmoto divisit limite mundum (‘he … established the chain of causes for
all eternity, and bound himself as well by universal law, and portioned out the
universe, which endures the ages prescribed for it, by a fixed line of Destiny’,
Luc. 2.9 – 11 [trans. Duff 1928]; see also 5.92– 93). Lucan’s way of proceeding,
though, is heavily charged with polemical meaning. In fact, the poet allows him-
self to introduce this orthodox Stoic notion in the middle of a multiple causation,
in which it is suggested, as a second possibility, that non–theological Epicurean
 See also Sen. Ben. 6.23.1– 2; Q Nat. 2.35.2.

 This principle, although restricted to the realm of Stoic physics, can be found in Cleanthes
(SVF I 509) and perhaps in the Heraclitean κοινὸς λόγος of his Hymn to Zeus (SVF I 537).
 See the expression of Leibniz (1710) 1951, 387, on a passage from Seneca.
 Criado 2000, 196 – 204. See also Dominik 1994a, 1– 33; McNelis 2007, 9, 26 – 27.

randomness⁵⁰ was the cause of the civil war (2.12– 13). In the Roman literary tra-
dition, authors most often made use of Epicurean and Lucretian πλεοναχὸς τρό-
πος within the framework of didactic poetry and always in contexts where impor-
tant truths about the cosmos were explored.⁵¹ From Ovid onwards, these mean-
ingful potentialities were extended. In the Metamorphoses, Ovid combined mul-
tiple causality with his invitation to readers to suspend their belief in divine in-
terventions. Both strategies were institutionalized as ideal ways to describe a
world of uncertainties in which gods are rather poor purveyors of veritas with re-
gard not only to physical matters but also, and above all, to ethical and theolog-
ical ones.⁵² Both Lucan and Statius took advantage of Ovidian ingenuity.⁵³
Yet if it is a matter of adducing philosophical evidence to elucidate the prob-
lematic affirmation of the Statian Jupiter that he is subject to Fate, one of
Cleanthes’ testimonies may be more useful than that of Seneca. According to a
fragment that was attributed to Cleanthes (SVF I 551 = II 933) by Chalcidius in
late antiquity, the Stoic philosopher argued against the absolute identification
established by Zeno and Chrysippus between Destiny (εἱμαρμένη) and Provi-
dence (πρόνοια), that the concept of Fate was broader than that of Providence.
Hence, while everything ordered by Providence was also a matter of Fate,
there were things that arose from Fate, but not Providence. Before we concur
with Cleanthes’ iconoclastic interpretation of πρόνοια, Chalcidius’ authority on
early Stoicism would have to be established beyond doubt. And this, it appears,
is far from being demonstrated.⁵⁴ However, the truth is that if, through recourse
to the πολυωνυμία (legitimate both from a philosophical and literary perspec-
tive),⁵⁵ we identify Zeus or Jupiter as Providentia, this heterodox notion of
 See Feeney 1991, 281.

 See Myers 1994, 143, and Schiesaro 2002, 62– 63, 73.
 Met. 1.78 – 81; 3.311; 3.659 – 660; 3.700; 4.272– 273; 4.520; 4.612; 8.612– 615; 8.681; 8.721– 722;
9.24; 10.28; 10.302; 11.739 – 740; 12.182– 184; 13.935; 13.941; 14.26 – 27; 15.324– 328; 15.346 – 351.
 The emphasis that Statius places on the profound aporia inherent in multiple causation
surpasses that of Lucan. In the Thebaid the narrator, the human characters and even the gods
themselves constantly bring up the impossibility of discerning what forces govern Fate (1.178 –
185; 1.326 – 328; 2.20 – 22; 2.540; 3.60 – 62; 3.67– 69; 3.241– 242; 3.304– 307; 3.483 – 488; 3.553 – 555;
4.671– 672; 4.756 – 758; 6.942– 944; 7.809 – 817; 10.162– 163; 10.831– 836; 11.188 – 189; 11.462– 463;
11.617– 620; 11.637– 638; 12.338; 12.420 – 423).
 Haase 1973, 294– 296.
 Plato identified the creator of things (Ti. 41a5: ὁ τόδε τὸ πᾶν γεννήσας) or Demiurge with
divine Providence (Ti. 30b8–c1). However, it is Stoicism that brought the force of law on invoking
the supreme deity by many names. Indeed, Cleanthes invokes Zeus as the πολυώνυμε (SVF I
537.1) and, from the perspective of Zeno and Chrysippus, is indifferent to whether the terms
Providence, Zeus, Fate, Nature or Reason are used (SVF I 102, 153, 160, 176; II 937). This is also the
case in Cleanthes (SVF I 530, 532) and in Seneca (Q Nat. 2.45.1– 2; Ad Helv. 12.8.3 – 4; Ep. 4.8.3.

208 Cecilia Criado
Cleanthes is the one that best describes the fluctuating relationship between the
supreme god and Destiny which we find not only in Valerius’ Argonautica and
Statius’ Thebaid (and, we can almost affirm, in all Roman epic), but also in Ho-
meric epic. I am aware of the evident absurdity of invoking Providence in a Ho-
meric context; my only claim here is that, within the unsystematic conglomerate
of theological ideas that the Homeric epic presents, certain passages seem to
suggest some sort of pre-eminence of the ancient figures of fate⁵⁶ over a Zeus,
who will come to be identified with πρόνοια by subsequent philosophical reflec-
tion. Obviously, this does not imply a denial that the Homeric poems, like the
Flavian narratives, simultaneously document the synonymy and virtual inter-
changeability, in a broad sense, of fate⁵⁷ and the personal figure of Zeus.
Jupiter in the Thebaid and in the Greco-Roman

epic and tragic tradition
In my opinion, any attempt to understand the behaviour of the Roman epic Ju-
piter in philosophical terms is destined to be fruitless. It does seem likely that
Stoicism, the dominant system of thought in imperial Rome and clearly more
suitable than Epicureanism as a channel of expression for epic theology, contrib-
utes to shaping the Roman literary Jupiter. Yet, as I hope to show, the weight of
the literary tradition was so great that it prevented a decisive rupture with the
Homeric model. However, despite those passages in the Thebaid in which Jupiter
explicitly states otherwise, there is a degree of critical consensus that the Statian
Jupiter rules over Fate, with a certain carelessness, or at least maintains a rela-
tionship of interdependence. Delarue⁵⁸ argues that accepting the contrary would
imply an unacceptable break with all previous poetic tradition, both epic and
tragic. I believe, however, that it is precisely the epic and tragic precedents
that argue against such a statement.
It is true that since the beginning of Greek epic poetry the constitutional role
of Zeus has remained constant, given that he is a monarch of absolute power.
The Homeric Zeus says as much himself, and this is also recognised by the
other gods.⁵⁹ However, except for the Hesiodic epics, his theological status is
 Lower-case ‘fate’ is used to refer to ‘destiny’ in pre-philosophical contexts.

 Magris 1985, 83.
 Delarue 2000, 245. See also Franchet d’Esperey 1983, 101.
 Without citing all possible examples, see Hom. Il. 1.565 – 567; 1.580 – 581; 1.589; 4.55 – 56;
8.12– 26; 8.31– 32; 15.107– 108; 15.128 – 141; Od. 5.4; Hes. Theog. 403; 506; 660; 883 – 885; Op. 4.

as unstable throughout the Greek literary tradition as in Statius. Either because

Homer documents an older stage of Greek thought than the author of the Theo-
gony or because of the greater complications of plot in his narratives, it is the
case that the Homeric relationship between Zeus and fate resists all attempts
at systematization. The most that can be said with any certainty, I feel, is that
Homer implies a strong association, and on occasions a total identification, be-
tween Zeus (Ζεὺς, αἶσα Διὸς, Διὸς νόος, Διὸς βουλή) and countless figures repre-
senting fate (Θέμις, Μοῖρα, Ἐρινύς, Aἶσα, Kῆρες, etc). Magris notes that the am-
biguity of the Iliad and the Odyssey regarding this issue is not surprising, since
raising the question of whether in the Homeric poems fate depends on a person-
al deity is a “grossolano anacronismo”. In his opinion, such a reflection will only
occur when the divinity is conceived in ‘ethical-intellectualistic’ terms; and this
will be an achievement of enlightened Greece, not archaic Greece.⁶⁰ So much is
true, but in Hesiod, who shares Homer’s pre-philosophical mentality, we clearly
find that Zeus is identified with the cosmic order of the universe, that is, with
Δίκη.⁶¹
It is even possible that to a large extent the ‘constitutional’ idiosyncrasy of
Homer’s Zeus (not Hesiod’s) led to the theological hesitations that the whole
post-Homeric world would inherit. We have said that throughout the epic tradi-
tion the monarchical character of Zeus and his condition as supreme ruler re-
main constant. However, the power of the Homeric Cronides, like that of the ar-
chaic βασιλεύς and, perhaps, the Mycenaean wanax, is not without weaknesses,
and this affects his relationship with the forces of fate. Like Agamemnon before
the assembly of noble warriors, when in divine councils, Zeus has to negotiate
and even renounce his own decrees, making collegiate decisions and taking
into consideration the interests of the other members of the assembly of the
gods.⁶²
Hesiod, in contrast, succeeds in giving the full theological dimension to the
magical royalty of Zeus. Here there are none of the ambiguities of the Homeric
poems. Through marriages, the son of Cronus magically acquires the attributes
necessary to consolidate his power and assert himself as a good sovereign.⁶³ Al-
 Magris 1985, 169.

 Evidently, this notion is not as late as Dietrich 1965, 212 ff., maintained. For the presence of
the justice of Zeus in Homer, see Lloyd-Jones 1971, 35; Dicke 1978, 91– 101; Allan 2006, 1– 35.
Bermejo Barrera (1996, 60) argues that the concept of cosmic order associated with the gods was
already present in the Mycenaean and pre-Hellenic world.
 Hom. Il. 4.14– 17; 4.29; 4.37– 42; 8.39 – 40; 16.441– 450; 22.181; 24.71; Od. 1.76 – 79.
 Thus, his union with Metis gives him wisdom (Theog. 886 – 900), and his marriage to Themis
confers on him the Law or Δίκη (Theog. 901; Op. 228 – 239). In possession of both, and once the

210 Cecilia Criado
though in Hesiod’s poems tragic aspects of his justice persist,⁶⁴ the pre-eminence
of Zeus over fate is established incontrovertibly.⁶⁵
So, one could argue that when Aeschylus, in a fully philosophical Greece,
raises the issue of the dialectic between archaic and democratic religiosity, he
presents a view of the former that, being lightly Homeric, does not fit the Hesi-
odic perspective at all. The Prometheus of Aeschylus is the representative of the
old Olympic religion, whose raw essence Aeschylus puts in his mouth. The Titan
challenges the legitimacy of οἱ νεώτεροι θεοί and the nature of Zeus as fiercely as
they ever were challenged in any ancient pagan work.⁶⁶ He dares to deny the om-
nipotence of the sovereign of the gods. Zeus, says Prometheus, cannot defeat the
old forces of Fate (ἀνάγκη, Μοῖραι, Ἐρινύες, PV 514– 518).⁶⁷ Either the magical
royalty of the Hesiodic Zeus was by that time not well understood by Aeschylus,
or he consciously wanted to be overly Homeric and thus manipulated the ambi-
guities of the Iliad and the Odyssey, making them serve his interests.
Thus, the tragic author manages to bring to light the chaotic split between
the divine powers of the universe that, in his opinion, permeated archaic reli-
gion. This coincides well with the idea found in the Eumenides,⁶⁸ and in this
sense it is irrelevant to my argument whether or not Prometheus Bound was writ-
ten by Aeschylus. In both tragedies, the archaic figures of Fate have an antithet-
ical, non-supportive relationship with Zeus, unlike in Homer and, more clearly
still, in Hesiod. For reasons of space I will not dwell on the issue here, but in
struggles for divine succession in heaven are concluded, Zeus is ready to be the supreme king,
having risen to the status of μητίετα (see Detienne / Vernant [1974] 1988, 60; Bermejo Barrera
1993, 44– 47; 1996, 50 – 60; González García 1996, 227– 228) and θέμιστα.
 Crotty 2009, 22.
 Zeus knows the immortal designs (ἄφθιτα μήδεα; Theog. 545; 550; 561; Op. 265), and it is
impossible to deceive or evade his νόος (Theog. 613; Op. 105). It is he who assigns each man his
lot (Theog. 348; 520) and he who gives the Moirai the gift of apportioning happiness and
adversity to mortals (Theog. 906). At no time is any qualification or reformulation found that
might create ambiguity. The expression ἄφθιτα μήδεα referring to Zeus only appears once in the
Homeric poems (Il. 24.88). However, on countless occasions the god receives the epithet μητίετα.
It is not, though, of interest to Homer to explore the origin of this quality.
 Scully / Herington 2009, 295.
 See also PV 209 – 211; 511– 518; 752– 756; 762; 907– 910.
 It is true that at the end of the tragedy, Zeus is reconciled with the Erinyes and with the
Moirai (Eum. 1045 – 1046), but Athena makes it clear that the real winner is Zeus (973 – 975). He
turns out to be a democratic sovereign since he is ἀγοραῖος (973). The Erinyes are aware that the
religiosity of contemporary Athens has been imposed on the ancient prerogative that made them
spokespeople of Fate ruled by the Moirai and the gods (393 – 396). They also know that their
religious role of avenging crime has been declared obsolete definitively by the generation of
newly arrived gods (149 – 152).

my opinion Delarue’s claim as to the systematic pre-eminence of the father of the

gods over Fate in Greek tragedy cannot be maintained. While Aeschylus, as we
have briefly seen, expatriates Fate from the democratic polis, Sophocles rehabili-
tates it, and Euripides, in spite of recognising its irrepressible power, secularises
it and ascribes to it a largely irrelevant role in contrast to the one he generally
confers on a flagrantly a-theological nomos (I accept that this brief sketch
does not explain Euripides’ Bacchae).⁶⁹
The Roman tradition continues to document the fluctuating relationship of
Jupiter with Destiny. Curiously, it is only Ovid whose thinking is systematic in
this respect. Although he vies with Hesiod in terms of the clarity of thought,
he radically apostatizes from the theology of the Ascraean poet. Ovid, who, as
we have seen, influenced greatly the Statian conception of divinity, denies the
sovereignty of the supreme god in plain language. In Metamorphoses 9 Themis
makes a prophecy in which she announces that the sons of Callirrhoe and Alc-
meon will grow old in order to avenge the death of the latter. Among the inhab-
itants of Olympus a riot ensues,⁷⁰ since they all want to modify the ages of their
human children and in this way avoid their aging. There is a strong contrast be-
tween the authority with which Jupiter silences the rebellion of the gods (o! nos-
tri si qua est reverentia, ‘oh! if you have any respect for me’, 9.428) and his tragic
statement that he is also subject to Destiny (me quoque Fata regunt, 9.434).⁷¹ The
same subordination of Jupiter to Fate is found in the passage in which the father
of the gods dissuades Venus from attempting to save Caesar. He says that he him-
self entered the mansion of the Parcae, and he read there of Caesar’s Fate; thus
he was able to inform Venus (legi ipse animoque notavi | et referam, 15.814– 815).
In neither of these two passages do we hear Jupiter’s voice through intermedia-
 Zeus’ instability appears not only in epic and tragic poetry. The example of Pindar is of
interest here. He stresses Zeus’ sovereignty, his ability to accomplish all things for mortals and to
give fulfilment of all deeds (Pyth. 2.49 – 52; 5.122 – 123; 12.29 – 30; Nem. 10.29 – 30; Isthm. 1.5.52–
53; Fr. 35; 140d; 141 S.-M.). However, the poet does not attempt to resolve the Homeric conflict
between Zeus and Fate. This emerges, it is true to say, only on rare occasions. Thus, the son of
Cronus does not dare to revoke that which is predestined (Fr. 52– 53; 94– 95 S.-M.); his life is also
likely to be the object of a conditional oracle (Isthm. 8.31– 85a) and Moira Lachesis has to give
him her consent (Ol. 7.55 – 69; see also Pyth. 5.76). Even in the ‘theologian’ Herodotus, the idea
will survive that not even the gods can escape their lot (1.91.2– 3).
 Rosati 2001, 52– 3; Galasso 2002, 121, 129.
 Intratextually, the power of the Olympic rector turns out to be even less than that of Medea,
who, relying solely on her magic, was able to rejuvenate Aeson and Bacchus’ wet-nurses
(Met. 7.179 – 296). It would seem that in this passage the poet intended to give an intertextual nod
to the Euripidean Theonoe (Hel. 887– 891), who, despite being a mere human, usurped from the
gods their capacity to establish Destiny.

212 Cecilia Criado
ries. His words are never uttered at a hypodiegetic level, something to bear in
mind when we are dealing with Ovid. At no other point in the work is this rela-
tionship between Jupiter and Fate contradicted.⁷² For Ovid, it seems, the question
of the divinity is no longer uncertain. The power of Jupiter in the face of Destiny
is simply zero: he neither dictates, writes nor manipulates Destiny, and he nei-
ther invents nor can change it. His role is reduced to an ostensibly passive act
of reading a pre-existing text. He is, then, a mere reporter of the indestructible
text of the Fates.⁷³
This systematic Ovidian expression of the subordination of Jupiter to Fatum
is unprecedented in the Greco-Roman epic tradition.⁷⁴ Valerius and Statius do
not dare to present the meagre power of Jupiter over Fatum with the same bold-
ness as Ovid; even so Statius, as we have seen, echoes the god’s Ovidian weak-
ness at Theb. 3.241– 243 and 7.197– 198. It is true, though, that the Flavian poet
seems to have renounced Ovidian clarity and that he was not able, or did not
want, to plainly resolve the theological ambiguities that the epic father of the
gods had inherited from the Homeric poems. In any case, Virgil, whose Jupiter
was more closely linked to the Stoic notion of Fate than Statius’, was also far
from achieving this. Thus, we must accept that the Aeneid leads us inevitably
to the same aporia as the Homeric epic, and adds more in the process. Jupiter,
Venus and Juno make it very clear that it is the supreme deity who decides
Fate in the act of thinking or speaking (Virg. Aen. 1.229 – 230; 1.237; 1.257– 262;
1.283; 10.628 – 629; 10.632). However, from an intratextual perspective these pas-
sages are problematic with respect to those others in which Jupiter and Fate are
not one (9.94– 97; 10.34– 35; 10.113). Moreover, the gods deny several times that
the wars in Latium in which Aeneas engages have been willed by Destiny, de-
spite the fact that Jupiter himself had stated in book 1 that they formed part
of his designs (1.263 – 264).⁷⁵ Thus, as regards Jupiter’s hesitations over his rela-
tion with Fate, Virgil⁷⁶ competes with Homer, and Statius with Virgil.
 See Met. 1.256 – 258; 5.532.

 Feldherr 2010, 70.
 There are precedents, however, in comedy. We know that the Atellan farce ridiculed the
concept of Fate and that the comic genre as a whole tended to place it over Jupiter (Cic. Div. 2.25).
This will continue to be the case with the satirist Lucian in the second century CE (e. g. Iupp.
conf. 3.8 – 4.4; Iupp. trag. 18.3 – 5).
 Although Juno admits that the arrival of Aeneas in Italy was due to Fate (10.67– 68), she
denies that there is any divine responsibility in the war waged by the hero (10.65 – 66). In book 7,
in the prelude to the hostilities, it is Virgil himself who claims that such a war is contra Fata
deum (7.583 – 584); and in book 10 Jupiter declares that he had expressly prohibited it (10.8 – 9).
However, there is no doubt that later the father of the gods once again comes to consider military
confrontation to have been part of his original plans. Thus, although he is willing to grant Juno a

Conclusion
Clearly, Jupiter’s claims in Valerius’ Argonautica and Statius’ Thebaid about his
relationships with Destiny have flaws. I do not believe, however, that these
should be attributed either to the god’s lies or to the poets’ negligence or care-
lessness. Both poets were very conscious that the great Greco-Roman epic tradi-
tion permitted and encouraged the presentation of the power of Zeus / Jupiter
over Fatum in oxymoronic terms, as I hope to have shown. Valerius and Statius
could not ignore the fact that, except in Hesiod, the constitutional condition of
absolute monarch of the epic supreme god was in constant conflict with the in-
stability of his theological status. But Statius, with greater force than Valerius,
appears to have been aware that Ovid had clarified this last point and that in
the Metamorphoses, for the first time in the history of the genre, the weakness
of the powerful Jupiter had been systematically unmasked.⁷⁷
It is tempting to suggest that Ovid’s theological perspective paved the way
for Seneca to show the godlike authority of the human princeps,⁷⁸ but also its
limits. In fact, the philosopher is careful to point out the restrictions on the em-
peror’s absolute power. In the first place, Nero’s wrath, contrary to Fatum, must
be revocable (Cl. 1.5.6; 1.20.3; Dial. 3.6.3). Secondly, he does not have any power
over his own life (Cl. 1.19.5). Finally, his condition of rector involves subordina-
tion (Dial. 11.7.2). This subservience, obviously, bears resemblances to the condi-
tion of the Stoic providential Jupiter, who semper paret, semel iussit (Dial. 1.5.8).
But the question of the confines of Nero’s power does not lend itself to equivocal
expressions. Just as in the case of the Ovidian Jupiter, everything is simpler. The
emperor’s power is undeniably limited (non rem publicam suam esse, sed se rei
publicae, ‘the State does not belong to him, rather he belongs to the State’,
Cl. 1.19.8). In my opinion, this Senecan divine mortal princeps, is almost an
exact counterpart of Ovid’s and Statius’ Jupiter. It remains to ask whether the
delay in the death of Turnus (10.622– 624), he is careful to warn her that her hope of changing
the course of the war is in vain (10.625 – 627). For different explanations of the coexistence of
“two Jupiters so different” (Thornton 1976, 123), see Heinze (1903) 1993, 297 n. 43; Otis 1964, 354;
Hardie 1998, 96; Galasso 2002, 132.
 Adamini 1981, 24 n. 10; Wlosok 1983; Schubert 1984, 152 n. 3; Feeney 1991, 307.
 See p. 211 above. For the metaliterary implications of the Ovidian Jupiter’s lack of power over
Fate see Feldherr 2010, 69 – 83.
 Mainly in On Mercy, the philosopher constantly emphasizes the fact that the princeps plays
the role of gods on earth (Cl. 1.1.2– 3; 1.5.7; 1.19.8), being compelled to imitate their benevolence
(Cl. 1.7). Nero’s potestas, just as that of Jupiter, is indisputable (Cl. 1.1.2). Seneca, indeed, in his
advice on how to achieve ἀπάθεια, had no trouble equating the divine system of government
with that of a human monarchy (in regno nati sumus: deo parere libertas est, Dial. 7.15.7).

214 Cecilia Criado
way in which both poets present the weakness of Jupiter has something to do
with the recurring identification that they make between the divine assemblies
and the Palatine throughout their works⁷⁹ and, more specifically, between Jupi-
ter, Augustus and Domitian.⁸⁰ That is, for Ovid and Statius, the power of the em-
peror must be restricted, because even the power of his divine counterpart is
limited.
 To cite some examples, Ov. Met. 1.172– 176; 6.73 – 74; 9.245; 9.419; 9.427– 428; Stat. Theb. 1.197;
1.203 – 206.
 An abundant bibliography exists in relation to this last question, some notable examples
being Otis 1966/1970, 98; Ahl 1985, 69; Dominik 1994a, 79 – 97, 133 – 134, 148, 161; Anderson 1997,
171; Rosati 2001, 53; Hill 2008, 141; Romano Martín 2009, 246– 250.


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Cecilia Criado

The contradictions of Valerius’ and Statius’

The malevolence of Jupiter and the hereditary

 Kirk 1974 (1984), 7.

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 See Feldherr 2010, 137– 149.

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The relationship of the Statian Jupiter to Destiny

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 See p. 212 below.

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 See also Sen. Ben. 6.23.1– 2; Q Nat. 2.35.2.

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 See Feeney 1991, 281.

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Jupiter in the Thebaid and in the Greco-Roman

 Lower-case ‘fate’ is used to refer to ‘destiny’ in pre-philosophical contexts.

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as unstable throughout the Greek literary tradition as in Statius. Either because

 Magris 1985, 169.

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my opinion Delarue’s claim as to the systematic pre-eminence of the father of the

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 See Met. 1.256 – 258; 5.532.

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