State Of West Bengal V.

Union of India
CASE BRIEF

Court: Supreme Court of India

Citation: (1964) 1 SCR 371; AIR 1963 SC 1241

Date of Pronouncement: December 21, 1962

Interveners:

1. Advocate- Generals for the States of:

2. Madhya Pradesh
3. Punjab
4. Assam
5. Orissa
6. Madras
7. Bihar
8. Uttar Pradesh
9. Rajasthan
10. Gujrat
11. The National Coal Development Corporation

Bench: 6 judge bench comprising of-

1. Bhuvaneshwar Prasad Sinha, C.J

2. S.J. Imam, JJ.
3. K. Subba Rao, JJ.
4. J.C. Shah, JJ.
5. Rajagopala Ayyangar, JJ.
6. J.R. Mudholkar, JJ.

Laws Referred: Coal Bearing Areas (Acquisition and Development) Act, 1957, Constitution of
India, 1950, Companies Act, 1956, Industry Policy Resolution of 1956

Facts:

 A suit was filed by the State of West Bengal against the Union of India which contended
that the Parliament is not competent to make a law authorizing the Union to acquire land
and right in/over the land, which are vested in a State. The suit challenged the Coal
Bearing Areas (Acquisition and Development) Act, 1957, enacted by the Parliament and
that specifically Sections 4 and 7 of the said Act were ultra vires; thereby challenging the
legislative competence of Parliament. The suit also asked for an injunction in order to
 restrain the Union Government from proceeding under the provisions of the Act with
regard to the coal-bearing lands which are vested in the State of West Bengal.
 The Supreme Court issued notices to all the Advocates-General of the States of India.
The States appeared through their respective Advocates-General or through other
Counsel. The States included Assam, Bihar, Gujrat, Madras, Orissa, Punjab, Rajasthan
and Uttar Pradesh. Due to a pending matter between it as one of the defendants, the
National Coal Development Corporation Limited also intervened.

Issues Involved:

 Whether the Parliament is competent to enact a law which provides for compulsory
acquisition by the Union Government of land and other properties which are vested
in/owned by a State?
 Whether the State of West Bengal is a sovereign authority?
 Assuming that the State of West Bengal is a sovereign authority, is the Parliament
entitled to enact a law for compulsory acquisition of its lands and properties?
 Whether the Act or any of its provisions are ultra vires of the legislative competence of
the Parliament?
 Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any relief and if so what relief?
 Whether the Coal Bearing Areas (Acquisition and Development) Act, 1957 on its true
construction applies to lands which are vested/owned by the State of West Bengal?

Contentions by the parties:

1. Contentions of the Plaintiff

 All the property and assets which were vested in His Majesty for the purpose of
Government of the province of Bengal, due to Article 294 of the Constitution of India,
for the purposes of the State, were conferred to the State of West Bengal.
 The State of West Bengal, by a notification issued under the West Bengal States
Acquisition Act, 1954 which it enacted in exercise of its exclusive legislative powers,
conferred all estates and rights of intermediaries and Ryots in the State, free from
encumbrances, together with rights in the sub-soil, including mines and minerals.
 The Union of India, in exercise of the powers conferred to it under the impugned Act by
the Parliament was authorized to acquire any land or any right in/ over land, in any part
of India and by notifications, the Union expressed its alleged intention to prospect for
coal lying within the lands which are vested in the State of West Bengal- the plaintiff.
 This led to questions and conflict between the State of West Bengal and the Union
Government regarding the Parliament’s competence to enact the impugned Act along
with its power to acquire the properties of a sovereign authority, i.e., the State of West
Bengal.
 Since the impugned Act enacted by the Parliament, i.e., the Coal Bearing Areas
(Acquisition and Development) Act, 1957 does not, on its true construction, apply to the
lands vested in/owned by the Plaintiff State, therefore, the notifications which were
issued under the impugned Act are to be considered as void and must be of no effect.
 1. Contentions of the Defendant

 All the legal contentions regarding the legal competency of Parliament of India to enact
the impugned Act as well as the power of the defendant to acquire any property of the
State are incorrect.
 The State of West Bengal is not a sovereign authority.
 The impugned Act is in public interest as per its underlying policy for planned and rapid
industrialization of the country, due to which it is imperative that the production of coal
should be significantly increased as it is the basic essential for industries.
 It is expedient in the public interest that the regulation for the mines as well as mineral
development should be under the control of the Union Government due to which the
acquisition of coal bearing areas by the defendant is essential not only for the regulation
of mines and mineral development but also for increase in production of coal.

1. Contention of the Other States:

 The other states supported that on its true construction, the impugned Act, does not aim
to acquire/ in any way affect the interests of the States of India. To support this
contention, reliance on the Statement of Objects and Reasons of the impugned Act was
placed.

Obiter Dicta/ Observations:

 The word “State” in the phrase “acquisition by the State” which occurs in the preamble
implies only to the Union Government.
 The preamble does not sustain the contention that the impugned Act aimed to “acquire
only the rights of individuals, derived from prospecting licenses or based on leases, and
so exclude from the purview of the Act the rights of States in coal-bearing lands.”
 While giving a bare reading of the Sections of the impugned Act, the mention of the
phrase “any land” or “any rights in/over such land” under Sec.9 seems to cover “every
interest regardless of the person or authority who owns them, including those of a State
Government.” It does not hold true either by express terms or by necessary implication
that the sections of the impugned Act are not applicable to the rights or the interests of a
State or that such lands of a State are not to be included. Thus, the said Act is proposed to
include land as well as the rights in/over land which belong to individuals or to juristic
persons. This may encompass not only the surface rights but also the mineral rights of the
land.
 The Court opined that a statute, enacted by the Parliament, is “the expression of the
collective intention of the legislature as a whole, and any statement made by an
individual, albeit a Minister, of the intention and objects of the Act cannot be used to cut
down the generality of the words used in the Statute.”
 The Parliament is competent to pass a law which is aimed for compulsory acquisition by
the Union Government of any land as well as other properties vested in/owned by a State.
The power of the Union Government to enact laws for the regulation as well as
development of mines and minerals would by indispensable consequence comprise the
power to also acquire mines and minerals. Thus, the power to enact laws for the
 acquisition of property which are vested in a State cannot be deprived to the Parliament,
provided it is exercised consistently with the shelter which is given under Art 31 of the
Constitution.
 The provision of Entry 42 in List III and Art 31 (2) of the Constitution operate in the
same arena of legislation. The former articulates the legislative authority whereas the
latter puts limitations on the exercise of that authority. While determining whether a part
of a legislation concerning the acquisition or requisition of property is competent to be
enacted, it is essential that the two provisions of law be read together, which are pieces of
a solitary legislative pattern related to “the exercise of the right which may for the sake of
convenience be called eminent domain, the expression ‘property’ in two provisions must
have the same import in defining the extent of the power and delineating restraints
thereon.”

Hence, Art 31(2) of the Constitution inflicts limitations on the exercise of the legislative power
provided under Entry 42 of List III. Due to which property vested in a State may not be acquired
by the Union under a legislation which is enacted in exercise of the power under Entry 42 except
if the legislation complies with the conditions of Art 31.

 “While considering the true meaning of words or expression used by the

Legislature, the Court must have regard to the aim, object and scope of the statute
to be read in its entirety. The Court must ascertain the intention of the Legislature
by directing its attention not merely to the clauses to be construed but to the
entire statute; it must compare the clause with the other parts of the law, and the
setting in which the clause to be interpreted occurs. In interpreting a
constitutional document, provisions which confer legislative power must normally
be interpreted liberally and in their widest amplitude.”
 “Art 31 is couched in negative form, but recognizes the existence of at least one
important power vested in every sovereign State, not by virtue of its Constitution,
but springing from its very existence as a State, viz., the power to acquire
property for public purposes on payment of compensation which the American
jurists call ‘eminent domain’. Art 31(2) enunciates the restriction subject to which
the power of eminent domain is to be exercised.”
 Art 31(2) bestows protection of the widest amplitude against compulsory
acquisition/ requisition of property. Nothing in the Article directs security of
property of individuals or corporations. The framework within which the word
‘person’ is used does not allow the interpretation that “property is not to be
available against acquisition of State property.”

Any other interpretation would imply that properties which would fall within the ambit of State
in Part III of the Constitution, i.e., of municipalities or other local authorities cannot be either
acquired at all or if they are acquired then they may be taken without any compensation.

 On the discussion of fundamental rights, the Supreme Court opined that “the
fundamental rights are primarily for the protection of rights of individuals and
corporations enforceable against executive or legislative action of a
governmental agency, but it has to be remembered that all laws (i.e., pre-existing
 laws which are inconsistent with and post-constitutional laws which contravene
the prohibitions) are to the extent of the inconsistency or contravention void.
Some of these rights are declared in form of positive, but subject to restrictions
authorizing the State to make laws derogating from the fullness of protection.”
 Certain articles in the Constitution merely declare rights like Art 17, 25(1), 26, 29(1) and
30(1); certain others merely prohibit lacking any mention to the right of any person, body
or agency to implement them like Art 18(1), 23(1), 24 as well as 28(1). Prima facie, such
declaratory rights include an obligation which is imposed upon the “State” and all
persons to respect the declared rights which are enforceable unless it is indicated in the
context otherwise against every person or agency which is pursuing to violate them.

“The rights declared in the form of prohibition must have a concomitant positive content;
without such positive content they could be worthless. Relief may be claimed from the High
Court or from the Supreme Court against infringement of the prohibition, by any agency, unless
the protection is expressly restricted to State action. ”There are other different articles which are
in form not of rights due to fundamental disabilities such as Art 18(2), 18(3), 18(4) of the
Constitution. There are some other particular articles which seem to identify affirmative rights of
the States like Art 19(g), Art 24(2) as well as Part II of the Constitution.

 Justice Subba Rao gave the dissenting opinion on the question relating to the relation
between the Union and the State Legislatures with respect to the acquisition of property
under Art 246. The majority opinion was that the power of legislation of the Parliament
to acquire property is unobstructed, subject to the express provisions of the Constitution
and that to denote restrictions on that power on the notion that the degree of political
sovereignty due to which the States synchronize with and free of the Union, is to envision
a scheme, constitutional in nature, which does not exist in law or in practice.

Thus, the distribution of legislative and executive powers does not sustain the notion of full
sovereignty of the States thereby making it exceptional from the legislative power of the Union
Parliament especially with respect to the acquisition of property of States. However, Justice
Subba Rao dissented and opined that the political sovereignty lies with the people of the nation
and the sovereignty, which is legal in nature is distributed between the Union and the States
(constitutional entities), who are juristic authorities which possess properties and which function
via the instrumentalities generated by the Constitution.

Though within the territorial limit of both the States and the Union in terms of legislative and
executive arenas determined by the Lists, their jurisdiction can only be found in the specific
constitutional articles which forge links between the two. The provisions which grant emergency
powers to the Union to encounter extraordinary situations do not affect the exclusive field of
operation of the Union during normal times.

Judgment:

 The Court confirmed that the Parliament does have legislative competence to enact a
Statute for compulsory acquisition of land and other properties by the Union Government
which are vested in/owned by a State.
  Though the State of West Bengal is a sovereign authority, but it does not disentitle the
Parliament under Entry 42, List III of the Constitution to exercise its legislative powers.
 The impugned act – Coal Bearing Areas (Acquisition and Development) Act, 1957 is not
ultra vires the legislative competence of Parliament and that it applies to lands which are
vested in/owned by the State, on its true construction.
 The suit was dismissed with costs and the Plaintiff State was not entitled to any relief.

Conclusion:

Being the first momentous case where the issue of federalism was deliberated in depth, the case
of State of West Bengal v. Union of India not only notes the legislative competency of the
Parliament but also touches various aspects of law, such as the proper interpretation of statutes as
well the scope of certain Constitutional provisions.

The Calcutta Gas Company vs. State of West

Bengal And Others
CASE BRIEF

Civil Appeal No. 138 of 1961.

Appellant – The Calcutta Gas Company.

Respondents- State of West Bengal And Others.

Bench- Justice B. P. Sinha (Cji), K. Subbarao, N. Rajagopala Ayyangar, J.R. Mudholkar, T.L.
Venkatarama Aiyyar.

Decided On- 05.02.1962

Statues Referred-

 The Constitution of India- Arts- 226, 246, Schedule VII, List II Entries 24, 25.
 Oriental Gas Company Act, 1960.

Case Referred-

 State of Orissa v. Madan Gopal Bungta 1952 SCR 28.

 Chiranjit Lal Choudhary v. Union of India 1950 CR 869.
 Raghubir Singh v. State of Ajmer 1959 SCR 478.
 State of Bihar v. Ummh Jha AIR 1962 SC 50.

Facts –

 The appellant was appointed as Manager of the Oriental Gas company which owned an industrial
undertaking for the manufacture and sale of fuel gas in Calcutta by an agreement between the
appellant company and the Oriental Gas company.
 The West Bengal Legislature passed the Oriental Gas Company Act, 1960, and Section 4
provided that the said undertaking shall stand transferred to the State Government for five years
for management and control.
 On 3rd October 1960, the State Government issued a notification stating that the management and
control of the said undertaking would be taken over by it.
 The appellant filed a writ petition impugned the constitutional validity of the said Act and sought
appropriate writs restraining the State Government form giving effect to it and quashing the said
notifications.
 The High Court rejected the petition and held that the State Legislature had the competence to
enact the impugned Act and its constitutional validity was beyond question.
 The appellant filed an appeal in the Supreme Court of India against the said order of the High
Court.

Issue-

 Whether the state legislature is competent to enact the Oriental Gas Company Act, 1960?

Contentions by Parties-

Petitioner’s Arguments
  That the finding of the High Court that the appellant has no locus standi to file the petition cannot
be sustained, as under the impugned Act the appellant’s legal rights under the agreement entered
into by it with the Oriental Gas Company were seriously affected.
 That the two entries in List II, namely, entries 24 and 25, cannot sustain the Act, as entry 24 is
subject to the provisions of entry 52 of List I; and entry 25 must be confined to matters other than
those covered by entry 24, and, therefore, the West Bengal Legislature is not competent to make a
law regulating- the gas industry.
 That Assuming that the State Legislature has power to pass the Act under entry 25 of List II,
under Art. 254(1) of the Constitution the law made by Parliament, namely, the Industries
(Development and Regulation) Act 1951, shall prevail, and the law made by the State Legislature,
namely, the impugned Act be. void to the extent of repugnancy.

Respondent’s Arguments

 That the appellant has no legal right to maintain the petition.

 That the appellant cannot question the validity of the Act on the ground that its provisions
infringed his fundamental rights under Arts. 14, 19, and 31 in view of Art. 31A(1)(b) of the
Constitution.
 That the West Bengal Legislature had the Legislative competence to pass the impugned Act under
entry 42 of List III of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution.
 That entry 25 of List II also confers sufficient authority and power on the State Legislature to
make laws affecting gas and gas work and even if the Act incidentally trenches upon any
production aspect, the pith and substance of the legislation is gas and work within the meaning of
entry 25 of List II.

Judgment-

The Apex Court held that the Legislature of a State has the exclusive power to make law in respect of gas
industry by virtue of entry 25 of List II, and that entry 24 does not comprehend gas industry.

As we have indicated earlier, the expression “industry” in entry 52 of List I bears the same meaning as
that in entry 24 of List II, with the result that the said expression in entry 52 of List I also does not take in
a gas industry. In the result, we agree with the High Court that the impugned Act was within the
legislative competence of the West Bengal State Legislature and was validly made.

Conclusion-

It can be perceived from this case that statutes are drafted by the legislatures and there is every possibility
of situations of ambiguity, conflicts, etc.

Here, Courts come with several doctrines of the constitution to protect the statutes and acts as interpreters
to render justice. Courts must acknowledge such practices so as to avoid repugnancy and make access to
justice for the purpose of satisfying the welfare needs which the constitution upholds to protect.
Gujarat University v. S.K. Ranganath
Mudholkar
DETAILS OF THE CASE

 NAME OF THE CASE: Gujarat University v. Sri Krishna Ranganath Mudholkar

 CITATION: 1963 Supp (1) SCR 112
 DECIDED: September 21, 1962
 COURT OF APPEAL: Supreme Court
 BENCH: Shah, J.C., Sinha, Bhuvneshwar P. (CJ), Imam Syed Jaffer, Subbarao, K.,
Wanchoo, K.N., and Ayyangar, N. Rajgopala

BRIEF FACTS:
In March 1960, Shrikant, son of Shri Krishna Madholkar, attempted the secondary
school certificate examination held by the state of Bombay and succeeded in it.
Almost all the compulsory topics were taught to him in Marathi. Shrikant enrolled in
St. Xavier’s college, which was associated with Gujarat University. English was used
as the medium of instruction at the college. Following the first, he applied for
enrolment to classes preparing for the University’s intermediate arts examination in
English.
The principal of the college informed Shrikant that, under the rules of the Gujarat
University Act, 1949, he could not permit him to attend classes in which instructions
were given in English unless the university permitted him. Shrikant's father sought
permission from the Vice-Chancellor but was denied, so he filed a writ of
mandamus in the High Court of Gujarat, seeking directions requiring the University
to treat Sections 4(27), 18(i)(xiv), and 38A of the Act as void and inoperative, and to
refrain from acting on or enforcing those provisions, as well as directing the vice-
chancellor to treat any letters or circulars he issues in connection with the medium
of instruction as illegal and to refrain from acting on or enforcing them, as well as
the University to refrain from objecting to or blocking Shrikant’s admission to
English medium classes.

ISSUE:
The writs were issued by the Gujarat High Court. With certificates of fitness given by
the High Court, the university and the state of Gujarat filed separate appeals to the
supreme court.
Two considerable questions came up before the Supreme Court for determination:
1. Whether it is permissible for the University, under the Gujarat University Act,
1949, to mandate Gujarati or Hindi, or both, as the only medium of teaching and
examination in affiliated colleges, and
2. whether legislation authorizing the University to impose such media would
violate the Constitution's Entry 66 of List I, Seventh Schedule.

RULE:
1. Gujarat University Act, 1949, and Statutes 207, 208, and 209 - An Act to establish
and incorporate a teaching and affiliating University in the Province of Bombay to
be known as the Gujarat University. (1) This Act may be called the Gujarat University
Act, 1949 (Bombay L of 1949).
2. The Gujarat University Act, 1949, was adopted by the Legislature of the Province
of Bombay to create and incorporate a teaching and affiliating university "to
decentralization and reorganization" of university education in the province. All
educational institutions admitted to the privileges of the University of Bombay and
located within the University region of Gujarat were regarded to be admitted to the
privileges of the University of Gujarat as of the designated date under section 5(3)
of the Act. The University incorporated Section 3 with eternal succession and a
common seal. The Act's Section 4 enacted a provision that is not commonly found
in comparable Acts establishing Universities.

ANALYSIS:
To summarize on what the court held; a law that has been drafted that prescribes
the mode of education including instructions drafted with it cannot be considered
as a component belonging to list II of the 7th schedule of the constitution of India.
List II is the State list that focuses on items that the state legislature or government
can make laws relating to. Parliament does have the power to make certain
amendments or could even repeal such laws and there must be no restrictions
specifically drafted that prevent the parliament from doing so.
The court had pointed out that the words “subject to” are included particularly to
ensure that components that are not prescribed and set aside by certain items in
the list cannot be decided by the state government. Considering that language
specifically spoken in a region was set aside by that item in the list, this proves that
the state legislature does not have the power to make laws on this particular
matter. This exact power had been prescribed in the Union list and in item 66 to be
exact. When state legislatures bring in such laws, it overlaps with the powers
constituted in the Union list. There are questions about supremacy and standards
that are brought in. Since India has a federal structure, these questions would have
serious implications regardless of Article 254(1) of the constitution of India. Such an
article ensures the Union legislature has preceding powers over state laws, but
several legal questions must be answered before it is set aside.

CONCLUSION:
The concept of harmonious construction must be taken into importance when
matters relating to conflict of laws are present. Education had primarily been a part
of the state list until the parliamentary amendment in 1976 which pushed this item
to the concurrent list. Yet, the central legislature does have the power to make laws
about the standards that must be followed in higher education, which is placed in
item 66. This is where the problem of repugnancy and the only solution present in a
harmonious construction. It is a tool used by courts to ensure the resolution of
conflict. The laws present are carefully analyzed to ensure the laws are interpreted
with no intention of rendering a law of no use. When it comes to which law would
prevail over the other, interpretation and the reasoning for the introduction of such
a law are taken into importance. In cases of lists present in the seventh schedule of
the constitution of India, legal questions can be raised for its inclusion in a
particular list, but items present in the Union list would preside.

State of Kerala Vs. Indian

Aluminium Co. Ltd. & ors.
Appeal: Civil Appeal No. 2008 of 1990

Petitioner: State of Kerala

Respondent: Indian Aluminium Co. Ltd. & ors.

Apeal: Civil Appeal No. 2008 of 1990

Judges: V.N. KHARE & R.P. SETHI, JJ.

Date of Judgment: Jun 04, 1999

Head Note:

Section 49(3),(5) with Kerala Electricity Duty Act – Section 4, proviso –

Exemption under – Old agreement to supply electricity at concessional rates –
Amendment brought – Concessional rates rescinded – Demand of duty at
higher rate – Validity. Held that High Court was right in setting-aside demand
of duty as consumer was not obliged to pay specified duty till exemption
continued.
Held:

State of Kerala has granted partial exemption in the matter of payment of duty
to the company. So long as the exemption Order continued to remain in force,
the Company was not liable to pay specified duty under Section 4 of the
Kerala Electricity Duty Act. Neither the State Government nor the Board was
within its rights to demand from the company electricity duty at the rate over
and above what has been provided in the exemption Order. That the High
Court was right in setting aside the demand of duty which was based without
reference to the statutory exemption provided to the appellant-company.(Para
6).

R.S Joshi, STO Gujrat vs Ajit Mills, Ahmedabad & Anr

1977 Supreme Court of India 31 August 1977 Bench: J. V.R. Krishna Iyer, J. M.H
BEG (CJI), J. Y.V Chandrachud, J. P.N Bhagwati, J N.L Untwalia, and J Fazal Ali.

Cited: 1977 Supreme Court of India, AIR 2279, 1978 SCR (1) 338

Legislation Cited: 1. Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1955

Issue:
Bombay Sales Tax Act, 1955 Sec 37, 46, 63 – validity of section of this act – Sec
46 Prohibits any person from collecting any sort of money by way of tax in
respect of sale of any good on which tax is payable by virtue of Sec 5 of same
Act – No person, who is unregistered dealer, shall collect any money by virtue
of tax on Sale of good, from any person, and no registered dealer shall collect
money excess than that payable by him under the provision. – Sec 63 provides
punishment for contravention of the Sec 46, states that any person, not being
dealer liable for pay tax under this act, collects any sum of money excess than
that payable by him, or otherwise contravenes the provision of sec 46, shall be
liable for penalty which does not increases than 2 thousand rupee and in
addition to sum collected by him by way of tax from other person. The excess
amount collected as tax shall be forfeited to the government.
Facts:
Respondent were registered dealer of sale tax, which was collected from
various customers, this amounts to violation of S.46 of Sales Tax Act, 1955 r/w
S.37(1), on which sale tax officer imposes penalty and forfeited the sum
collected (Less amount refunded). It was also contended that the
aforementioned provision violates Article 14 and 19(1) (f) of the Constitution
of India. Also determination of the word “Forfeiture”. High Court struck down
Sec.37 (1) and declared it to be unconstitutional on the grounds of – It was
incompetent for state legislature to forfeit the public exchequer punitively –
Entry 54 r/w 64 of List U – Sums collected by the dealer of way of tax, was not
exigible under the Act.

Decision:
The Supreme Court held the S. 37 (1) to be Legitimate and Valid. The High
Court interpretation was wrong as exceeding legislative competence or
colorable device or as supplementary not complementary. In Orient Mill Case,
court held that the legislature was competent to grant refund of tax, collection
of unauthorized tax and unauthorized tax shall be paid to government, to a
person from whom the dealer had realized the amount. This view was already
accepted in the Abdul Quadar’s Case as well as Ashoka Marketing Case. While
The Violation of Article 14 and 19 (1) (f) was already settled out by the High
Court that the provision of this act, was not violating the aforementioned
Article as the act provides discretion under Section 37 or under 63(1), and
does not provides any guideline for the same. Under Sec 37, there is no
arbitrary or un-channelized power given to the authority, which therefore
does not contravene Article 14. The word “penalty” includes the “Forfeiture”
under the sec 37 (4). Apart from it the act consist of the provision for appeal
and revision against any order made by Commissioner, which fails the plea
from violating Article 19 1 (f).
Dr. M. Ismail Faruqui v. Union of India, AIR
1995 SC 605
Justice M.N. Venkatachaliah, Justice A.M. Ahmadi, Justice M V Verma, Justice G Ray, Justice S Bharucha

INTRODUCTION: –

The Supreme Court considered the issue of the State acquiring religious property in this case. A
sanctuary, church, mosque, and so forth are basically enduring properties dependent upon security under
Articles 25 and 26. Every immovable asset is susceptible to acquisition. Even though offering prayers or
worship is a religious practice, doing so at every location where prayers can be offered is not an essential
or integral part of the practice unless the location has a particular significance for that religion. The
supreme court ruled in the 1994 case that namaz could be performed anywhere and that a mosque was not
required. Additionally, it had decided that the government could acquire the mosque’s site. The petitioner,
Ismail Faruqui, had challenged the validity of the 1993 Acquisition of Certain Area at Ayodhya Act,
which authorized the acquisition of 67.703 acres in the Ramjanmabhoomi-Babri Masjid complex in
Ayodhya.

FACTS: –

The Vires of Ayodhya Act was challenged in both the High Court and the Supreme Court. In the case of
M. Ismail Faruqui (Dr) v. Union of India, (1994) 6 SCC 360, the Apex Court decided to transfer the
petitions that had been filed with the High Court, heard all of the issues together, and referenced Article
143 (1) of the Constitution. The High Court proceeded to consider the Suits on their merits in light of the
preceding SC judgment, with one exception: it had narrowed the scope of the dispute that was now being
considered in all of these suits. The contested area now consists solely of the space where the structure
and the premises of its inner and outer courtyards once stood. Because it was legally acquired in
accordance with Section 3 of the Ayodhya Act, the additional land is outside the scope of these suits.
ISSUES: –

(a) In light of the Commissioner, Hindu Religious Endowments, Madras v. Sri Lakshmindra Thirtha
Swamiar of Sri Shirur Mutt, and other cases, is it possible to decide an essential practice without
thoroughly examining the faith’s beliefs, tenets, and practice?

(b) Is integrality and essentiality the same criteria for determining the essential practice?

(c) Does Article 25 protect only particular faith-specific beliefs and practices, or does it cover all faith-
specific practices?

d) Do Articles 15, 25, and 26 (read with Article 14) permit comparisons of religious significance?

CONTENTION OF THE APPELLANT: –

The Court needed to figure out the setting of perceptions made in the judgment which as per the
appealing party were sketchy and to conclude whether the said perceptions outfit any ground for
reevaluation of the Constitution Seat judgment. Ashok Bhushan J. made the observation, citing that
whether a particular religious practice is an essential or integral part of the religion must be considered in
light of the religion’s doctrine, tenets, and beliefs. What Dr. Dhavan fought was that the Constitution Seat
for this situation, without there being any thought of the centrality of religion, mentioned the sketchy
observable facts.It was seen that the setting for mentioning the said observable fact was a case of
invulnerability of a mosque from obtaining. The Constitution Bench was asked to consider the question of
whether every mosque is an essential component of Islam’s religious practice, and if so, whether its
acquisition would inherently violate Articles 25 and 26. The remark was made to emphasize that the
mosque is not protected from the acquisition. What the Court implied was that except if the spot of
presenting of petitioning heaven has a specific importance so any deterrent to love might disregard right
under Articles 25 and 26, any obstacle to presenting of supplication at any spot will not influence right
under Articles 25 and 26. The perception need not be perused comprehensively to hold that a mosque can
never be a fundamental piece of the act of the religion of Islam.

CONTENTION OF THE RESPONDENT: –

At the point when the matter arrived at High Court, the Muslim disputants requested that the case ought
to be heard by a bigger seat of seven appointed authorities as it relates a land having a place with a
mosque and consequently has suggestions on the opportunity of religion, a key right ensured by the
Constitution. The case is currently before a bench of three judges led by India’s Chief Justice Dipak
Misra. Using the Supreme Court’s Ismail Faruqui decision as a basis, the Hindu lawyers opposed the
demand. They said that the matter was for some time settled. They asserted that because a mosque is not a
fundamental component of Islam, a title dispute ruling does not violate the right to religious freedom. The
Muslim side then asked the Supreme Court to reconsider its 1994 decision in Ismail Faruqui, arguing that
a mosque could not be separated from Islam.

LEGAL ASPECTS: –

In This case, the main concern was regarding Article 25 and Article 26 of the Constitution of India.
Article 25, In contrast to Article 26 of the Constitution, Article 25 does not make any mention of
property. Article 25 of the Constitution of India guarantees the right to practice, profess, and spread
religion. However, the right to acquire, own, or possess property is not always included. In a similar vein,
the right to worship at any and all places of worship is not included in this right. As a result, any
restriction on worshipping at a particular location may violate the religious freedom guaranteed by
Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution.

Article 26 It appears from the decisions this Court has made, which are discussed further, that places of
religious worship like mosques, churches, and temples are protected by Articles 25 and 26 of the
Constitution. can be obtained through the sovereign power of acquisition of the State. Neither Article 25
nor Article 26 of the Constitution are in any way violated by this acquisition in and of itself. The
sovereign power of the State to acquire property is unaffected by the management takeover decisions.

JUDGEMENT: –

The Hon’ble High Court has held that the Option to Practice, Purport, and Engender Religion ensured
under Article 25 of the Constitution doesn’t stretch out to One side of Love at pretty much every spot of
love so any deterrent to revere at a specific spot in essence might encroach the strict opportunity ensured
under Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution of India. Articles 25 and 26 provide protection for religious
practice, an essential component of that religion’s practice. While the proposal of petition or love is a
strict practice, its contribution where such petitions to God can be offered wouldn’t be a fundamental or
necessary piece of such strict practice except if the spot has specific importance for that religion to frame
a fundamental or basic part thereof. Spots of love of any religion having the specific meaning of that
religion to make it a fundamental or vital piece of the religion stand on an alternate balance and must be
dealt with diversely and all the more respectfully.

CONCLUSION: –

The Supreme Court ruled that Muslims can offer namaz (prayer) anywhere, even in the open, and that a
mosque is not necessary for the practice of Islam. Unless the Right to Worship at a particular location is
itself an integral part of that right, the Right to Worship is not valid at any and all locations so long as it
can be practiced effectively. Based on the aforementioned ratio, it is argued that offering prayer at Sri
Ramjanamsthan, which is referred to as the Babri mosque in the plant, is permissible; however, offering
prayer at any other location instead of Sri Ramjanamsthan is not permissible because the merit gained by
worshiping at Sri Ram’s birthplace cannot be obtained elsewhere, which would be in violation of the
sacred Divine Sacred Scripture of the Hindus and would result in the destruction of a most sacred Hindu
shrine. The Islamic religion does not require a mosque, and Muslims can offer namaz (prayer) anywhere,
even in open spaces. Therefore, the provisions of the Indian Constitution do not prohibit its acquisition.
According to the Constitution of India, a mosque’s status and immunity from the acquisition in the
secular ethos of India are the same and equal to those of other religions’ places of worship, such as
churches, temples, and so on, regardless of its status as an Islamic country for the purpose of immunity
from acquisition by the State in the exercise of sovereign power. It is neither more nor not exactly that of
the spots of love of different religions. It goes without saying that religious property should only be
acquired in unusual and extraordinary circumstances for the nation’s greater good, keeping in mind that
such acquisition should not end the right to practice religion if the location has such significance. A
mosque has the same acquisition power as any other religious institution, subject to this condition. As
long as it can be effectively practiced, the right to worship does not extend to every location unless the
right to worship there is itself an integral part of that right.
K.C.Gajapati Narayan Deo v. The
State of Orissa
1953 AIR 375

Bench: Hon’ble M. Patanjali Sastri (Cj); Hon’ble B.K. Mukherjee; Hon’ble Sudhi
Ranjan Das; Hon’ble Ghulam Hasan and H Natwarlal Bhagwati, Hon’ble J.J.

Facts:

 The Orissa Estates Abolition Act of 1952 was enacted on 23.01.1952 in the State.
  The main objective of the concerned Act was the abolition of all zamindaris, other
proprietary estates, and interests in Orissa and after eliminating those intermediaries,
associating the occupants of lands in contact with the State Government.
 Aggrieved by the provisions of legislation enacted, the proprietors of the estates filed Six
appeals before the High Court of Orissa invoking Article 226 of the Constitution.
 The petition was filed for challenging the constitutional validity of the Orissa Estates
Abolition Act of 1952 as a whole. However, the matter was dismissed by the learned
bench of the Orissa High Court.
 Aggrieved by the dismissal, the petitioners have filed another appeal u/a 132 and 133 in
the Hon’ble Supreme Court assailing the validity of the said Act being violative of the
Constitution of India.

Issues Involved:

1. Whether the said legislation ultra vires the Constitution so far, the private lands &
buildings of owners are concerned and hence void?
2. Is the provision of the Orissa Agricultural Income-tax (Amendment) Act, 1950, and the
Madras Estates Land (Amendment) Act, 1947 valid concerning the determination of
compensation payable?
3. Whether the procedure prescribed for making compensation to the proprietors valid?

Contention of Petitioner:

The counsel for the petitioner submitted that –

1. The Orissa Agricultural Income-tax (Amendment) Act of 1950 is not a Bonafede

enactment and aims to reduce by artificial means, the net income of the
intermediaries, to reduce the compensation payable.
2. The amendment so made was drastic and was mainly done to target the class of
intermediaries under the ambit of the Estates Abolition Bill, which was expected to be
enacted.
3. In support of the argument the counsel referred to the cases, State of Bihar v.
Maharaja Kameshwar Singh and Others, where the two provisions of the Bihar
Land Reforms Act were held to be unconstitutional on the ground that the provisions
constituted fraud on the Constitution and, Union Colliery Company of British,
Columbia Ltd. v. Bryden, where the doctrine of colorable legislation came for
consideration.
4. Also, the provision of amended legislation contains improper classification contained
with unfettered Government discretion, thus being violative of Article 14 of the
Constitution.
5. Another contention was regarding the vested interest of the State Government in the
building used for the office. The appellant asserted that such a building should not be
considered as part of the acquisition.
6. That the manner of compensation payable mentioned under Section 37 of the Act is a
mere piece of colorable legislation and is unconstitutional.

Contention of Respondent:

The counsel for the State gave the following contentions to counter the petitioner’s
arguments –
 1. That the contentions asserted by the petitioner are not well framed and are irrelevant
for the instant case.
2. That the Petitioner fails to mention any grounds challenging the validity of the Estates
Abolition Act, the primary concern of the case.
3. Furthermore, the provision of the Act concerning the calculation of gross assets based
on the rent payable is not illegal. However, if the appellants wish, they can raise
objections on the computation of gross assets of an estate.
4. That if in this case, the provisions for computations are found void, such rent settled
will be set aside to be open for the appellants to include the preceding year’s rent as
rents settled.

Judgement:

The Hon’ble Supreme Court after hearing the contentions of both the sides and
discussing the constitutional questions at length dismissed all six appeals, directing the
parties to bear their respective costs.

Ratio Decidendi:

 The doctrine of colorable legislation depends upon the competency of the legislature to
enact that law, the procedure followed and not merely on the motive of the body in
passing such law. The maxim asserts, “You cannot do indirectly what you cannot do
directly.”
 The legislature was competent to make laws on the subject and also the ulterior motive
for laying the Act was not beyond the competency of the State Legislature. Thus, the
Orissa Agricultural Income-tax (Amendment) Act,1950 Act cannot render the law as
colorable and was not void.
 The State Legislature is empowered u/a 31(2) of the Constitution to place buildings
which are within the ambit of the estate for management or administration purpose in
the Government.
 The provisions mentioned in Orissa Estates Abolition Act, 1950 for determination of
compensation is not a colorable legislation as it comes within the ambit of Entry 42 of
List III of Schedule VII of Constitution.

Conclusion:

The Hon’ble Apex Court emphasized the meaning and scope of the doctrine of colorable
legislation in this matter. Thus, the substance of the legislation is primary and if the
subject matter of substance stands beyond the powers of the legislature to be enacted in
the form clothed, the law can be condemned to such extent. The Constitutional
prohibitions should be taken care of by the legislature while enacting laws.