Claas Baler Rollant 240 250 250 254 255 Roto Cut Operator's Manual

Claas Baler Rollant 240 250 250 254

255 Roto Cut Operator's Manual
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Claas Baler Rollant 240 250 250 254 255 Roto Cut Operator's Manual

Agricultural Type of document: Operator's Manual Model: ROLLANT 240

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said, it is by a right of primogeniture, propagated from the first
ruler; for this must either be Adam the first of the world or Fergus
for example, the first of this kingdom. It could not come from Adam
as a monarch and father of all: for that behoved to be, either by
order of nature, or his voluntary assignment: it could not be
transferred by order of nature; for besides the difficulty to find out
Adam's successor in the universal monarchy, and the absurdity of
fixing it on Cain, (who was a cursed vagabond, afraid of every man
and could not be an universal monarch, yet Adam's first born.) It will
be asked, how this passed from him unto others? Whether it went
by fatherhood to all the sons, fathers to their posterity? Which would
multiply as many commonwealths, as there have been fathers since:
or if it went, by primogeniture, only to the first-born, that he alone
could claim the power which would infer the necessity of an
universal monarchy, without multiplication of commonwealths.

If it was by his voluntary assignment, to whom, and in what

proportion, he pleased; then the universal monarchy died with
himself, and so could not be conveyed at all: for, either he behoved
to give each son a share, to be conveyed downwards to their
children in that proportion; or whole and solid to one: so also the
former dilemma recurs, for if the first be said, it will make as many
little kingdoms as there have been sons of Adam; if the second, the
world should be but still one kingdom. But however it be, this could
never be the way that God appointed, either for raising a
magistratical power where it is wanting, or deriving a right to any in
being; considering the multiplication, division, confusion, and
extinction of families that have been. If it be from Fergus the first of
his line; then either it comes from him as a king, or as a father: not
the first, for the reason above hinted: nor as a father; for a father
may defraud his son of the heritage, a king cannot divide the
kingdom among his sons; it must then be length refounded on the
peoples consent. 3. If even where lineal succession is constituted by
law, for eviting the inconveniencies of frequent elections, people are
not tied to admit every first born of that line; then that birth-right,
where there is no more, cannot make a king; but the former is true;
for they are tied only conditionally, so he be qualified, and have a
head to sit at the helm, and not a fool or monster; neither are they
free to admit murderers or idolaters by the laws of God, and of the
land: it is not birth then, but their admission being so qualified, that
makes kings. Hence, 4. That which takes away the peoples birth-
right, given them of God to provide for their liberties in the fittest
government, and that is not to be owned; but to make birth alone a
title to the crown, takes away the peoples birth-right given them of
God of providing for their liberties in the fittest government, fetters
their choice to one destructive to these. Certainly where God hath
not bound the conscience, men may not bind themselves nor their
posterity; but God hath never fettered men to a choice of a
government or governing line; which, contrary to the intention of the
oath, may prove destructive to the ends thereof. Nor can the fathers
leave in legacy, by oath, any chains to fetter the after wits of
posterity to a choice destructive to religion and liberty. Israel was
bound, by covenant, not to destroy the Gibeonites; but if they had
risen to cut off Israel, Who can doubt but they were loosed from
that obligation? For to preserve cut-throats was contrary to the
intention of the oath: so when either monarchy, or the succeeding
monarch, proves destructive to the ends of government, the choice,
law, or oath of our fathers, cannot bind us. 5. If we are tied to the
hereditary succession, not for the right the successor hath by birth,
but for our covenanted allegiance to them whose successor he is;
then cannot his birth-right be the ground of our allegiance, and
consequently hereditary succession cannot make a king; but the
former is true; for in hereditary crowns, the first family being chosen
by the suffrages of the people, for that cause the hereditary
successor hath no privilege or prerogative, but from him who was
chosen king: therefore the obligation to the son, being no greater
than the obligation to the father, which is the ground of that, if the
father then was owned only because he was chosen, and qualified
for government, the son cannot be owned for any other cause, but
as chosen in him, and also qualified and admitted with consent. We
cannot choose the father as qualified, and tie ourselves to the
successors, be what they will. 6. If a king be not born heir of a
kingdom, then is he not king by birth; but he is not born heir of a
kingdom; for, a mean cannot be born to inherit the end, the king is
but a mean for the kingdom's preservation. If the kingdom be his, by
birth, as an inheritance, why may he not upon necessary occasions
sell his inheritance? But if he sell it, then all confess he is no more
king. 7. If that which makes a king cannot be transmitted from
father to son; then succession, by birth, cannot make a king; but the
former is true. The royal faculty of governing cannot be transmitted:
Solomon asked it from God, he had it not from his father: nor can he
be born to the honour of a king, because not born with either the
gift or honour to be a judge. God maketh high and low, not birth.
Nor can the call and constitution of a king, according to the will of
God, be transferred from father to son, for that cannot be in God's
way without the intervening consent of the people, that cannot
make him a born king. 8. If no dominion can come by nature, as is
proven before, then can no man be a born king: nature and birth
cannot give them a sceptre in their hand, nor kingly majesty, they
must have that alone from God and the people, and may only expect
honour from their own good government: kings (as Plutarch says)
must be like dogs that are best hunters, not these who are born of
best dogs. 9. The peculiar prerogative of Jesus Christ must not be
ascribed to any other; but this is his peculiar prerogative, to be born
a king, of whom it might be truly said, Where is he that is born king
of the Jews? And for this end was he born, who came out of the
womb with a crown on his head, which no creature can bear. 10. In
scripture we find that a king was to be so and so qualified, not a
stranger, but a reader of God's word, &c. Deut. xvii. 15, &c. he was
not qualified by naked birth. Hence, if all the qualifications requisite
in an heir cannot make a king qualified according to the institution of
God, then his being heir cannot make him king: but the first is true,
an heir may be an heir without these qualifications. 11. We find in
the scripture, the people were to make the kings by that law, Deut.
xvii. 15. Thou shalt choose him whom the Lord chooseth: yea,
neither Saul nor David were kings, till the people met to make them:
therefore birth never made them kings, even though the kingdom
was tied to David's line. That was only a typical designment by
special promise, because Christ was to come of that line; it was
therefore established in David's family for typical reasons, that
cannot be now alledged. 12. We find in the disposal of government
among brethren, this birth order was not seldom inverted; as when
Jacob was preferred before Esau, Judah before all the elder sons of
Jacob, Ephraim before Manasseh, Solomon before Adonijah. Hence if
this gentleman, now regnant, have no better pretences than these
now confuted, we cannot recognize his right to reign; yea, though
this last were valid, yet he cannot plead it, it being expresly provided
in our laws against the succession of a papist. But there is one grand
objection against all this. The Jews and other nations are
commanded to bring their necks under the yoke of the king of
Babylon, and to serve him, and yet he had no other right to these
kingdoms; than the Lord's providential disposal, because the Lord
had "given all these lands into his hand," Jer. xxvii. 6, 7, 12. Ans. 1.
He was indeed an unjust usurper, and had no right but the Lord's
providential gift; which sometimes makes "the tabernacles of
robbers prosper, into whose hand God bringeth abundantly, Job xii.
6. And gives Jacob sometimes for a spoil, and Israel to the robbers,
Isa. xlii. 24. And giveth power to the beast to continue forty and two
months, and to have power over all kindreds, and tongues, and
nations," Rev. xiii. 5, 7. His tyranny also was very great extensively,
in respect of his oppressions and usurpations by conquest; but it
was not so great intensively, as our robbers and spoilers may be
charged with; he was never such a perverter of all the ends of
government, nor a treacherous overturner of all conditions, he was
never a persecutor of the Jewish religion, he never oppressed them
upon that account, nor endeavoured its extirpation, he never
enacted such mischiefs by law. The Lord only made use of him to
bring about the holy ends of the glory of his justice and wisdom, in
which respect alone he is called his servant, as elsewhere his rod
and hammer, having given him a charge against an hypocritical
nation, to trample them down in his holy providence; and
accordingly there was no resistance could prevail, they must be
trampled upon, no help for it; but no subjection was required,
acknowledging his magistratical right by divine ordinance, but only a
submissive stooping to the holy disposal of divine providence; no
owning was exacted either of the equity of that power, or of fealty to
the administrator. 2. This behoved to be a particular command, by
positive revelation given at that time, not binding to others in the
like condition; which I refer to the judgment of the objectors: put
the case, and make it run parallel, if the king of England were in
league with the king of France, and breaking that league, should
provoke that aspiring prince, growing potent by many conquests to
discover his designs, make preparations and give out threatnings for
the conquest of England and all Britain; were the people of England
bound to surrender themselves as servants and tributaries to him for
70 years, or for ever, under pain of destruction, if they should not?
This were one of the most ridiculous inferences that ever was
pleaded; nay, it would make all refusal of subjection to invaders
unlawful. 3. I will draw an argument from this to confirm my plea:
for these commands of subjection to Babylon, were not delivered,
until after the king of Judah had surrendered to Nebuchadnezzar,
and entred into covenant with him to be subject to him, 2 Kings xxiv.
chap. in keeping which covenant the kingdom might have stood, and
after he had rebelled against him, and broken that covenant, "when
lo, he had given his hand," after which he could "not prosper, or
escape, or be delivered," Ezek. xviii. 14, 15, 18, 2 Chron. xxxvi. 13.
Then the commandment came, that they should disown their own
king Zedekiah, now forfeiting his right by breach of covenant, and be
subject to Nebuchadnezzar, whence I argue, if people are
commanded to disown their covenant-breaking rulers, and subject
themselves to conquerors, then I have all I plead for; but the former
is true, by the truth of this objection: therefore also the latter. There
is a 2d Objection from Rom xiii. 1. "Let every soul be subject to the
higher powers, the powers that be are ordained of God;" yet the
Roman emperor, to which they were to be subject, was an usurper.
Ans. It cannot be proven, that the apostle intendeth here the Roman
emperor as the higher power: there were at this time several
competitions for the empire, about which Christians might have their
own scruples whom to own; the apostle does not determine their
litigations, nor interest himself in parties but gives the general
standard of God's ordinance they had to go by. And the best
expositors of the place do alledge, the question and doubt of
Christians then was not so much in whom the supremacy was, as
whether Christians were at all bound to obey civil power, especially
Pagan? Which the apostle resolves, in giving general directions, to
obey the ordinance of magistracy, conform to its original, and as it
respects the end for which he had and would set it up: but no
respect is there had to tyrants. 2. It cannot be proven, that the
supreme power then in being was usurped, there being then a
supreme Senate, which was a lawful power; nor that Nero was then
an usurper, who came in by choice and consent, and with the good
liking of the people. 3. The text means of lawful powers, not
unlawful force, that are ordained of God by his preceptive will, not
merely by his providential disposal, and of conscientious subjection
to magistracy, not to tyranny, describing and characterizing the
powers there, by such qualifications as tyrants and usurpers are not
capable of. But I mind to improve this text more fully hereafter, to
prove the quite contrary to what is here objected.

8. From the right of magistracy, flows the magistratical relation,

which is necessary to have a bottom, before we can build the
relative duties thereon. This brings it under the fifth commandment,
which is the rule of all relative duties between inferiors and
superiors, requiring honour to be given to fathers, masters,
husbands, &c. and to rightful magistrates, who are under such
political relations, as do infer the same duties; and prohibiting not
only the omission of these duties, but also the committing of
contrary sins; which may be done, not only by contrary acts, as
dishonouring and rebelling against fathers, magistrates, &c. but also
by performing them to contrary objects, as by giving the father's due
to the father's opposite, and the magistrates due to tyrants who are
their opposites. Certainly this command, prescribing honour, does
regulate to whom it should be given; and must be understood in a
consistency with that duty and character of one that hath a mind to
be an inhabitant of the Lord's "holy hill," Psal. xv. 4. "In whose eyes
a vile person is contemned, but he honoureth them that fear the
Lord." So that we sin against the fifth command, when we honour
them that we are obliged to contemn by another command. Hence I
argue, if owning or honouring of tyrants be a breach of the fifth
command, then we cannot own their authority: but the former is
true: therefore the latter. I prove the assumption: a honouring the
vile, to whom no honour is due, and who stand under no relation of
fathers as fathers, is a breach of the fifth command; but the owning
of tyrants authority is a honouring the vile, to whom no honour is
due, and who stand under no relation of fathers, and is yet a
honouring them as fathers: therefore the owning of tyrants authority
is a breach of the fifth command. The major is clear: for if the
honouring of these to whom no honour is due, were not a breach of
the fifth command, that precept could neither be kept at all or
broken at all. It could not be kept at all; for, either it must oblige us
to honour all indefinitely, as fathers, and other relations, which
cannot be; or else it must leave us still in suspense and ignorance,
who shall be the object of our honour; and then it can never be
kept: or finally, it must astrict our honouring to such definite
relations, to whom it is due; and then our transgression of that
restriction shall be a breach of it. Next, if it were not so, it could not
be broken at all: for if prostituting and abusing honour be not a sin,
we cannot sin in the matter of honour at all; for if the abuse of
honour be not a sin, then dishonour also is not a sin: for that is but
an abuse of the duty, which is a sin as well as the omission of it. And
what should make the taking away of honour from the proper object
to be sin, and the giving it to a wrong object to be no sin? Moreover,
if this command do not restrict honour to the proper object, we shall
never know who is the object. How shall we know who is our father,
or what we owe to him, if we may give another his due? The minor
also is manifest: for if tyrants be vile, then no honour is due to them,
according to that, Psal. xv. 4. and yet it is a honouring them as
fathers; if they be owned as magistrates; for magistrates are in a
politic sense fathers; but certain it is, that tyrants are vile, as the
epithets and characters they get in scripture prove. But because, in
contradiction to this, it may be said, though fathers be never so
wicked, yet they are to be honoured, because they are still fathers;
and though matters be never so vile and froward, yet they are to be
subjected unto, 1 Pet. ii. 18-20. and so of other relations, to whom
honour is due by this command; therefore though tyrants be never
so vile, they are to be owned under these relations, because they
are the higher powers in place of eminency, to whom the apostle
Paul commands to yield subjection, Rom. xiii. and Peter to give
submission and honour, 1 Pet. ii. 13, 17. Therefore it must be
considered, that as the relative duty of honouring the relations to
whom it is due, must not interfere with the moral duty of
contemning the vile, who are not under these relations; so this
general moral of contemning the vile, must not cassate the
obligation of relative duties, but must be understood with a
consistency therewith, without any prejudice to the duty itself. We
must contemn all the vile, that are not under a relation to be
honoured, and these also that are in that relation, in so far as they
are vile. But now tyrants do not come under these relations at all,
that are to be honoured by this command. As for the higher powers
that Paul speaks of, Rom. xiii. they are not those which are higher in
force, but higher in power, not in authority, but in power, not in a
celsitude of prevalency, but in a pre-excellency of dignity; not in the
pomp and pride of their posterity, and possession of the place, but
by the virtue and value of their office, being ordained of God not to
be resisted, the ministers of God for good, terrors to evil doers, to
whom honour is due; those are not tyrants but magistrates. Hence it
is a word of the same root which is rendered authority, or an
authorized power, 1 Tim. ii. 2. and from the same word also comes
that supreme, to whom Peter commands subjection and honour, 1
Pet. ii. 13. Now these he speaks of have the legal constitution of the
people, being the ordinance of man, to be subjected to for the Lord's
sake, and who sends other inferior magistrates for the punishment
of evil doers, and for the praise of them that do well, who are to be
honoured as kings or lawful magistrates; this cannot be said of
tyrants. But more particularly, to evince that tyrants and usurpers
are not to be honoured according to this command, and that it is a
breach of it so to do; let us go through all these relations of
superiority, that come under the obligation of this command, and we
shall find tyrants and usurpers excluded out of all. First, They cannot
come under the parental relation: we are indeed to esteem kings as
fathers, though not properly, but by way of some analogy, because it
is their office to care for the people, and to be their counsellors, and
to defend them, as fathers do for children: but roaring lions and
ranging bears, as wicked rulers are, Prov. xxviii. 15. cannot be
fathers. But kings cannot properly be owned under this relation, far
less tyrants (with whom the analogy of fathers cannot consist) there
being so many notable disparities betwixt kings and fathers. 1. A
father may be a father to one child; but a king cannot be a king or
politic father to one only, but his correlate must be a community; a
tyrant can be a father to none at all in a politic sense. 2. A father is a
father by generation to all coming out of his loins; a king not so, he
doth not beget them, nor doth their relation flow from that; a tyrant
is a destroyer, not a pro-creator of people. 3. A father is the cause of
the natural being of his children, a king only of the politic well being
of his subjects; but tyrants are the cause of the ill being of both. 4. A
father, once a father, as long as his children live, retains still the
relation, though he turn mad and never so wicked; a king turning
mad may be served as Nebuchadnezzar was, at least all will grant in
some cases the subjects may shake off the king; and if in any case,
it is when he turns tyrant. 5. A father's relation never ceases,
whithersoever his children go; but subjects may change their
relation to a king, by coming under another king in another
kingdom; a tyrant will force all lovers of freedom to leave the
kingdom where he domineers. 6. A father's relation never changes,
he can neither change his children, nor they change their father; but
a king may naturalize new subjects, and subjects may also change
their sovereign. Royalists will grant a state or commonwealth may
make a king, and there is great reason sometimes that a monarchy
be turned into a commonwealth; but a tyrant changes those that are
under him, expels the natives, brings in foreigners, and all good
patriots do pant for a change of him every day. 7. A father hath no
power of life and death over his children; a king hath it over his
subjects according to law; a tyrant usurps it over the innocent
against law. 8. A father is not a father by consent of his children; as
a king is by consent of his subjects; a tyrant is neither a father with
it nor without it. 9. A father is not made by the children, as a king is
by his subjects, as was shewed: a tyrant is neither a natural, nor by
compact, but a self created power. 10. A father is not chosen
conditionally upon compact, as a king is by the free suffrages of the
community; a tyrant in this differs from a king that he is not chosen,
and in tyranny from a father. 11. Children wanting a father cannot
choose whom they will to be their father; as subjects wanting a king
may choose whom they will, and what form they please; but though
they can, yet if they be rational, they will never choose a tyrant, nor
a tyrannical form of government. 12. Children cannot restrict their
father's power to what degrees they please; as subjects may limit
their kings, at their first erection; but a tyrant, though he ought, yet
he will not be limited, and if he might, he should be restrained. 13.
Children cannot set bounds how long they will have their fathers to
continue; subjects may condescend upon the time, in making laws
how long such an one shall be their sovereign, during life, or while
faultless, according as the fundamental law is made at first; tyrants
ought every day to be repressed that they should not continue at all.
Yet giving and not granting, that a king were to be owned under the
relation of a father; though every man be bound to own and
maintain his father's parental authority, yet let the case be put, that
the father turns a robber, murderer, an avowed enemy to God and
the country, is his person and authority in that case to be owned, to
the dishonour of God, and hurt and hazard of the country? or ought
he not rather to be delivered up even by the son to justice? Much
more then will it follow, that a king who turns the more dangerous,
because the more powerful robber, and legal murderer, and enemy
to God and the country, cannot be owned seeing the relation
between father and son is stronger and stricter as having another
original, than can be betwixt king and subjects, and stands
unremoved as long as he is father, though turning such, they ought
to contribute, (in moral duty, to which their relative duty must cede)
that he should no more be a father, nor no more a living man, when
dead by law. Secondly, They cannot come under the herile or
masterly relation, though analogically also sometimes they are stiled
so, and subjects are called servants, by reason of their subjection,
and because it is the office of kings to command, and subjects to
obey, in this there is some analogy. But kings cannot properly be
owned under this relation, as masters over either persons or goods
of subjects, far less tyrants, yea kings assuming a masterly power
turn tyrants. Now that the magistratical relation is not that of a
master, is clear from many disparities and absurdities, whether we
consider the state of hired servants or slaves. For hired servants, the
difference is vast betwixt them and subjects. 1. The hired servant
gets reward for his service, by compact; the subjects none, but
rather gives the royal reward of tribute to the king for his service;
the tyrant exacts it to maintain his tyranny. 2. The hired servant is
maintained by his master; the subjects maintain the king; the tyrant
robs it from them by force. 3. The hired servant bargains only for a
time, and then may leave him; the subject cannot give up his
covenanted allegiance, at that rate and for these reasons as the
servant may his service; a tyrant will make nor keep no such
bargain. 4. The hired servant must have his master's profit mainly
before his eyes, and his own secondarily; but the magistrates power
is primarily ordinated to the public good of the community and only
consequentially to the good of himself. 5. The master hath a greater
power over the hired servant, to make and give out laws to him,
which if they be lawful he must obey; than the king hath over the
nation, to which he is the sole lawgiver, as is shewed. 6. The hired
servant's subjection is mercenary and servile; but the subject's
subjection is civil, free, voluntary, liberal, and loving to a lawful king.
Again for slaves, the difference between them and subjects is great.
1. Slavery, being against nature, rational people would never choose
that life, if they could help it; but they gladly choose government
and governors. 2. Slavery would make their condition worse than
when they had no government, for liberty is always preferable;
neither could people have acted rationally in setting up government,
if to be free of oppression of others they had given themselves up to
slavery, under a master who may do what he pleases with them. 3.
All slaves are either taken in war, or bought with money, or born in
the house where their parents were slaves, as Abraham and
Solomon had of that sort; but subjects are neither captives, nor
bought, nor born slaves.—4. Slavery is not natural, but a penal fruit
of sin, and would never have been if sin had not been; but
government is not so, but natural and necessary. 5. Slaves are not
their master's brethren, subjects are the king's brethren, "over
whom he must not lift up himself," Deut. xvii. 20. 6. Masters might
purchase and sell their slaves, Abimelech took sheep and men
servants and gave them unto Abraham, Gen. xx. 14. Jacob had
maid-servants, and men-servants, and asses, Gen. xxx. 43. no
otherwise than other goods, Solomon got to himself servants and
maidens, and servants born in his house, Eccles. ii. 7. a king cannot
do so with his subjects. 7. Princes have not this power to make the
people slaves, neither from God, nor from the people: from God they
have none, but to feed and to lead them, 2 Sam. v. 2. to rule them
so as to feed them, 1 Chron. xi. 2. Psal. lxxviii, 71, 72. From the
people they have no power to make slaves, they can give none such.
8. Slavery is a curse: it was Canaan's curse to be a servant of
servants, Gen. ix. 25. but to have magistrates is a promised blessing,
Jer. xvii. 25. 9. To be free of slavery is a blessing, as the redemption
from Egypt's bondage is every where called, and the year of
redemption was a jubilee of joy, so the freedom of release every
seven years a great privilege, Jer. xxxiv. 9. but to be free of
government is a judgment, Isa. iii. 4, 5. 'tis threatened, "Israel shall
abide without a king and without a prince;" Hos. iii. 4. In the next
place, they cannot be owned as masters or proprietors over the
goods of the subjects; though in the case of necessity, the king may
make use of all goods in common, for the good of the kingdom; for,
1. The introduction of kings cannot overturn nature's foundation; by
the law of nature property was given to man, kings cannot rescind
that. 2. A man had goods ere ever there was a king; a king was
made only to preserve property, therefore he cannot take it away. 3.
It cannot be supposed that rational people would choose a king at
all, if he had power to turn a great robber to preserve them from
lesser robberies and oppressions; would rational men give up
themselves for a prey to one, that they might be safe from becoming
a prey to others? 4. Then their case should be worse, by erecting of
government, if the prince were proprietor of their goods, for they
had the property themselves before. 5. Then government should not
be a blessing, but a curse, and the magistrate could not be a
minister for good. 6. Kingdoms then should be among the goods of
fortune, which the king might sell and dispone as he pleased. 7. His
place then should not be a function, but a possession. 8. People
could not then, by their removes, or otherwise, change their
sovereigns. 9. Then no man might dispose of his own goods without
the king's consent, by buying or selling, or giving alms; nay, nor pay
tribute, for they cannot do these things except they have of their
own. 10. This is the very character of a tyrant, as described, 1 Sam.
viii. 11. "He will take your sons," Zeph. iii. 3. "Her princes are roaring
lions, her judges are evening wolves." 11. All the threatnings and
rebukes of oppression condemn this, Isa. iii. 14, 15, Ezek. xlv. 9. Mic.
iii. 2, 3. Ahab condemned for taking Naboth's vineyard. 12. Pharaoh
had not all the land of Egypt, till he bought it, Gen. xlii. 20. So the
land became Pharaoh's not otherwise. Yet giving, and not granting
that he were really a master in all these respects; notwithstanding if
he turn to pursue me for my life, because of my fidelity to my
master and his both, and will withdraw me from the service of the
supreme universal master, I may lawfully withdraw myself from his,
and disown him for one, when I cannot serve two masters. Sure he
cannot be master of the conscience. Thirdly, they cannot come
under the conjugal relation, though there may be some proportion
between that and subjection to a lawful ruler, because of the mutual
covenant transacted betwixt them; but the tyrant and usurper
cannot pretend to this, who refuse all covenants.

Yet hence it cannot be inferred, that because the wife may not put
away her husband, or renounce him, as he may do her in the case of
adultery; therefore the people cannot disown the king in the case of
the violation of the royal covenant. For the king's power is not at all
properly a husband's power, 1. The wife, by nature, is the weaker
vessel, but the kingdom is not weaker than the king. 2. The wife is
given as an help to the man; but here the man is given as an help to
the common-wealth. 3. The wife cannot limit the husband's power;
as subjects may limit their sovereigns. 4. The wife cannot prescribe
the time of her continuing under him; as subjects may do with their
sovereigns. 5. The wife cannot change her husband; as a kingdom
can do their government. 6. The husband hath not power of life and
death; but the sovereign hath it over malefactors. Yet giving, and
not granting, his power were properly marital: if the case be put,
that the man do habitually break the marriage-covenant, or take
another wife, and turn also cruel and intolerable in compelling his
own wife to wickedness; and put the case also, that she should not
get a legal divorce procured, who can doubt but she can disown
him, and leave him? For this case is excepted out of that command,
1 Cor. vii. 10. Let not the wife depart from her husband, meaning for
mere difference in religion, or other lesser causes; but adultery doth
annul the marriage relation. See Pool's Synopsis critic, in locum. So
when a prince breaks the royal covenant and turns tyrant, or without
any covenant commits a rape upon the common-wealth, that
pretended relation may and must be disowned. Hence, we see, there
is no relation can bring a king or ruler under the object of the duty
of the fifth command, except it be that of a fiduciary patron, or
trustee, and public servant: for we cannot own him properly either
to be a father, or a master, or a husband. Therefore what can
remain, but that he must be a fiduciary servant? Wherefore if he
shall either treacherously break his trust, or presumptuously refuse
to be entrusted, upon terms and conditions to secure and be
accountable for, (before God and man) religion and liberty, we
cannot own his usurped authority. That metaphor which the learned
Buchanan uses, de jure regni, of a public and politic physician, is not
a relation different from this of a fiduciary servant; when he
elegantly represents him as entrusted with the preservation and
restoration of the health of the politic body, and endowed with skill
and experience of the laws of his craft. If then he be orderly called
unto this charge, and qualified for it, and discharges his duty
faithfully, he deserves, and we are obliged to give him the deference
of an honoured physician; but if he abuse his calling, and not
observe the rules thereof, and instead of curing, go about wilfully to
kill the body he is entrusted with, he is no more to be owned for a
physician: but for a murderer.

9. If we enquire further into the nature of this relation between a

king, (whose authority is to be owned) and his subjects; we can own
it only as it is reciprocal in respect of superiority and inferiority; that
is, whereby in some respects the king is superior to the people, and
in some respects the people is inferior to him. The king is superior
and supreme as he is called, 1 Pet. ii. 13. In respect of formal
sovereignty, and executive authority, and majestic royal dignity,
resulting from the peoples devolving upon him that power, and
constituting him in that relation over themselves, whereby he is
higher in place and power than they, and in respect of his charge
and conduct is worth ten thousands of the people, 2 Sam. xviii. 3.
and there is no formally regal tribunal higher than his; and though
he be lesser than the whole community, yet he is greater than any
one, or all the people distributively taken; and though he be a royal
vassal of the kingdom, and princely servant of the people; yet he is
not their deputy, because he is really their sovereign, to whom they
have made over their power of governing and protecting themselves
irrevocably, except in the case of tyranny; and in acts of justice, he
is not accountable to any, and does not depend on the people as a
deputy.

But, on the other hand, the people is superior to the king, in

respect of their fountain power of sovereignty, that remains radically
and virtually in them, in that they make him their royal servant, and
him rather than another, and limit him to the laws for their own good
and advantage, and though they give to him a politic power for their
own safety; yet they keep a natural power which they cannot
retract, the power of justice to govern righteously, yet it is not so
irrevocably given away to him, but that when he abuseth his power
to the destruction of his subjects, they may wrest a sword out of a
mad man's hand, though it be his own sword, and he hath a just
power to use it for good, but all fiduciary power abused may be
repealed. They have not indeed sovereignty, or power of life and
death formally; yet, in respect, they may constitute a magistrate
with laws, which if they violate they must be in hazard of their lives,
they have this power eminently and virtually. Hence, in respect, that
the king's power is, and can be only fiducial, by way of trust reposed
upon him, he is not so superior to the people, but he may and ought
to be accountable to them in case of tyranny; which is evident from
what is said, and now I intend to make it further appear. But, first, I
form the argument thus; we can own no king that is not accountable
to the people: ergo, we cannot own this king. To clear the connexion
of the antecedent and consequent, I add; either he is accountable to
the people, or he is not: if he be accountable to all, then he is
renouncible by a part, when the community is defective as to their
part, it is the interest of a part, that would, but cannot, do their duty,
to give no account to such as they can get no account from for his
maleversations. This is all we crave: if he be not accountable, then
we cannot own him, because all kings are accountable: for these
reasons, 1. The inferior is accountable to the superior; the king is
inferior, the people superior: ergo, the king is accountable to the
people. The proposition is plain; if the king's superiority make the
people accountable to him in case of transgressing the laws; then,
why should not the peoples superiority make the king accountable to
them, in case of transgressing the laws? Especially, seeing the king
is inferior to the laws: because the law restrains him, and from the
law he hath that whereby he is king; the law is inferior to the
people, because they are as it were its parent, and may make or
unmake it upon occasion: and seeing the law is more powerful than
the king, and the people more powerful than the law, we may see
before which we may call the king to answer in judgment, Buchan.
jure regni apud Scot. That the king is inferior to the people is clear
on many accounts: for these things which are institute for others
sake, are inferior to those for whose sake they are required or
sought; a horse is inferior to them that use him for victory; a king is
only a mean for the peoples good; a captain is less than the army, a
king is put a captain over the Lord's inheritance, 1 Sam. x. 1. He is
but the minister of God for their good, Rom. xiii. 4. Those who are
before the king, and may be a people without him: let the king be
considered either materially as a mortal man, he is then but a part
inferior to the whole; or formally under the reduplication as a king,
he is no more but a royal servant, obliged to spend his life for the
people, to save them out of the hand of their enemies, 2 Sam. xix.
9: A part is inferior to the whole, the king is but a part of the
kingdom: a gift is inferior to them to whom it is given, a king is but a
gift given of God for the peoples good: that which is mortal, and but
accidental, is inferior to that which is eternal, and cannot perish
politically; a king is but mortal, and it is accidental to government
that there be a succession of kings; but the people is eternal, one
generation passeth away, and another generation cometh, Eccl. i. 4.
especially the people of God, the portion of the Lord's inheritance, is
superior to any king, and their ruin of greater moment than all the
kings of the world; for, if the Lord for their sake smite great kings,
and slay famous kings, as Sihon and Og, Psal. cxxxvi. 17,—20. if he
give kings and famous kingdoms for their ransom, Isa. xliii. 3, 4.
then his people must be so much superior than kings, by how much
his justice is active to destroy the one, and his mercy to save the
other. All this proves the people to be superior in dignity; and
therefore, even in that respect, it is frivolous to say, the king cannot
be accountable to them, because so much superior in glory and
pomp; for they are superior every way in excellency; and though it
were not so, yet judges may be inferior in rank considered as men,
but they are superior in law over the greatest as they are judges, to
whom far greater than they are accountable.

The low and mean condition of them to whom belongs the power
of judgment, does not diminish its dignity; when the king then is
judged by the people, the judgment is of as great dignity as if it
were done by a superior king; for the judgment is the sentence of
the law. 2. They are superior in power: because every constituent