11 Dynastic Loyalty and Dynastic Collapse in Macedonia Elizabeth D. Carney Illyrians often invaded and not infrequently defeated the Macedonians. Justin (7. 2. 5-12) tells a tale about the aftermath of one such loss. Though their current king Aeropus was an infant, the Macedonians then put the royal cradle at the rear of their battle lines and turned defeat into victory. Justin asserts that they attributed their initial defeat to the fact that they had fought without the auspicia (leadership, authority, command) of a king and that this superstitio (religious awe or superstition), as well as pity for the young child, inspired their subsequent victory, demonstrating that they had lacked not courage, but their king. While the anecdote is doubtless not literally true, it nonetheless demonstrates the centrality of the monarchy and the royal family in Macedo- nia, particularly in the context of those commonplaces of Macedonian history, invasion and defeat. Justin’s story, which has the feel of a folktale, also conveys something of the semi-religious attachment of the Macedonians to their royal house, the Argeads. Indeed, the rule of the Argead clan, from perhaps the seventh century on, proved the only certainty in a kingdom that regularly suffered from foreign intervention, invasion, and dynastic strife. Yet from 323, the time of the death of Alexander the Great, the last Argead to rule in more than name, until the establishment of the Antigonid dynasty as the ruling family ca. 277, dynastic instability plagued Macedonia. The dynastic chaos of this roughly fifty-year period contrasts dramatically with the previous and subsequent history of the kingdom." This paper will focus on that chaotic period, looking more briefly at the eras of greater dynastic calm before and after it, in order to consider the causes of the rise and fall of dynastic loyalty. This seems an appropriate topic for a 1 See Hammond and Walbank 1988: 180-289 and Errington 1990: 122-73 for general narratives of this period,148 Elizabeth D. Carney Festschrift honouring the greatest living scholar of Alexander and his era, since A. B. Bosworth has himself examined the factors leading to successful establishment of all the Hellenistic dynasties.” My task is similar, but narrower in coverage (only those dynasties that attempted to control Macedonia itself), longer in time period (the entire stretch of Macedonian monarchy), and somewhat broader in focus (successful dynasties rather than successful kings), The notion of the loyalty of a whole people to one family over many generations is, by definition, an irrational one, since, as generations pass, inevitably some members of the royal clan, if only through age or physical incapacity, will prove incompetent or at least less than competent, unworthy as individuals of the devotion of a nation. Measuring and analysing dynastic loyalty proves highly subjective and would be even if Gallup polls on the topic were available for fourth and third century Bc Macedonia. Individuals or groups may demonstrate loyalty in one context but not another; feelings may fluctuate rapidly. Admittedly, our evidence for dynastic loyalty in Mace- donia is limited. Ancient authors preserve comments about the relative popu- larity of various leaders and recount incidents that demonstrate varying degrees of commitment to a royal family. Most of the information we have relates either to the loyalty of the army or of members of the Macedonian elite; little deals directly with the mass of the civilian population. Much must be deduced. Distinguishing loyalty to an individual ruler from that to an entire family is not always easy, particularly since one kind of loyalty can easily merge into another: a great ruler can generate loyalty for generations to come. No general treatment of dynastic loyalty as a cross-cultural phenomenon exists, though many scholars have considered the topic in terms of specific dynasties, periods, and events. Some of these studies have, nonetheless, proved suggestive in terms of Macedonian material.’ Let me begin with consideration of the factors that established and long maintained loyalty to the Argead dynasty.* Their claim of heroic Heraclid descent—highlighted by the Heracles coins that appeared with increasing frequency—proved compelling, especially when combined with the stories told about how the clan took over rule of Macedonia,> supposedly enabled ? Bosworth 2002: 246-78. * Shedel 1990 and Unowsky 2003 offer some relevant observations while discussing late nineteenth-century Hapsburg rule, despite the fact that Hapsburg dynastic loyalty was important in good part because of the multinational empire the dynasty controlled. Borza 1990; 237, with some hesitation, suggests that the lack of evidence for a ‘well- developed aristocracy’ may be relevant to the long-term success of the Argeads. To my mind, there is evidence for the existence of an elite, but, as we shall see, one that was closely tied to the monarchy and so supported rather than opposed the enduring success of the dynasty. 5 ‘The story of the foundation of the dynasty told in Herodotus (Hdt. 8. 137-9), apart from its implications of divine favour, is suggestive in other respects. The original royal brothers are exiles doing menial work, and one brother figured out how to use the grudging payment the earlier king had offered his former employees to his own ends. Then the brothers successfully flee their enemy. The character of the brothers resembles the Odyssean clever, crafty king image we will note in other aspects of Macedonian history.Dynastic Loyalty and Dynastic Collapse in Macedonia 149 by divine favour.® As this might suggest, religion and rituals that the kings uniquely performed, sacrifices and celebrations, were vital. Apparently, other Argeads played a part in these ceremonies (Curt. 10. 7. 2).” Both ancestral legend and ritual generated connections between past and present, thus intensifying the fundamental continuity of dynastic rule, of a series of kings, of leadership passed from father to son (if, in reality, often to nephews, cousins, or other male kin). The tradition of past Argead rule legitimized the present Argead ruler.® Aegae, the first capital of Macedonia, may have func- tioned as a kind of centre of dynastic loyalty, particularly because it early on became the place Argead kings were buried (Just. 7. 2. 1-4; Diod. 19. 52. 5), thus generating a kind of symbolic capital for the dynasty whose long-term significance we will encounter in later events.” Royal weddings—like that of Philip II's daughter Cleopatra held at Aegae (Diod. 16. 91. 4-93. 3)—and funerals can be critical in the generation of dynastic loyalty, particularly since they involve the populace in the ceremony.!° Moreover, public processions and celebrations made the Argeads visible to the civilian populace, splendidly so.'' Monuments containing images of the members of the dynasty also generated loyalty by making the dynasty both tangible and eternally present.’ © See Borza 1990: 172-3 on the Heraclid aspect. The major sources for the foundation myth are Hat, 8. 137-9 and Thuc, 2, 99. 3-6 where the Argeads are described as descendants of ‘Temenus, himself a descendant of Heracles. The king list in these two sources was apparently revised, probably by Archelaus or at least by Euripides on his behalf, in order to make an Archelaus, son of Temenus, the first Macedonian king (Hyg. Fab. 2. 19). Shedel 1990: 75-7 reports a similarly evolving and manipulated story about the origin of the Hapsburgs, one focused on divine selection and thus legitimacy. See discussions and references in Borza 1982 and Greenwalt 1985 and 1986 on the various manipulations of the lineage and religious symbolism inherent in the myth, 7 See Hammond and Griffith 1979: 155-6 for a good summary of the king’s religious role. ® Shedel 1990: 73-4 makes this point about nineteenth-century monarchy but it applies equally well to Macedonia. ° The Justin passage, which attributes to the dying Perdiccas I the wish not only to be buried at Aegae, but to have his successors buried there, also has him predict that kingship would remain in his family so long as his descendants were buried there. Justin concludes the anecdote by commenting that people believed that Alexander the Great, by choosing not to be buried at ‘Aegae, caused his line to die out. Obviously the anecdote is fabulous and one may wonder if there was a real Perdiccas I, but, like the story of the infant king Acropus that immediately follows this passage, it too has the feel of a folk tale. In any event, it certainly spells out the connection between Aegae and the dynasty and the importance of the royal tombs. 10 See Carney 2000b: 203-7 for the importance of wedding festivals. Connor 1987 suggests that such public festivals and ceremonies should be understood as interactive, turning individual or dynastic experience into shared communal experience. See also Carney 2010 on the staging of Macedonian monarchy. 11 Colley 1992: 235, discussing the appearance of early nineteenth-century members of the house of Hanover at public spectacles and visits, comments, ‘the monarchy must be seen to be splendid, but above all, it must be seen’. 12 ‘The most famous Argead dynastic monument is the Philippeum (see Carney 2007b and Palagia 2010), but it was placed at Olympia. In Macedonia itself, we know that Philip I's mother Eurydice dedicated a statue that was possibly a portrait, but, more interestingly, a surviving inscription with her name on a statue base that appears to have been the far end of the base for150 Elizabeth D. Carney Promotion of the image of the king and his court via athletic competition and patronage of artists and intellectuals, though primarily directed toward out- siders, may have gained the dynasty internal support as well.” Kings bound the elite to them and their heirs by sharing and competing with them not only in fighting, but in hunting and feasting as well.'* Prior to Philip Il, the Argeads did not regularly achieve military success, though they usually led Macedonian armies in person. Greater powers fre- quently defeated or bullied them. They did not always win, but kept fighting to regain what was lost. The kings used bribery, diplomacy, and the occasional victory. Of course, royal patronage, when victorious, awarded plunder and land to members of the elite and eventually to non-elite Macedonians as well.!® The Argead kings managed to avoid prolonged loss of large amounts of territory, to hold on to their kingdom.'® Argeads displayed a kind of Odyssean, wily character that entailed physical bravery, toughness, and resili- ence. They coped." Polygamy did Argead monarchy more good than harm.'* For generations it created a large number of possible heirs. While the excess supply of male Argeads could cause dynastic strife and assassination, it also meant that ina region where death in battle and foreign invasion and royal exile were frequent, the Macedonians could feel that there was always another member of the royal clan available. Polygamy may have weakened the hold of indi- vidual rulers, but strengthened that of the dynasty, Violence against rivals within the dynasty—clearly connected to royal polygamy and fluid succession patterns—does not appear to have had a significant negative effect on dynastic loyalty, though occasionally it created difficulties for individual kings.” a statue group suggests that her image may have appeared as part of some Argead group erected near Aegee (see Saatsoglou-Paliadeli 2000). Unowsky 2003: 146 points to the building of monu- ments commemorating the dynasty as one of the ways the Hapsburgs constructed dynastic loyalty 3 On sports, see discussion and references in Adams 2003 and on patronage of artists and intellectuals, see Carney 2003: 50-4. \ See Carney 2002 and 2007a. While Philip I doubtless made changes in the role of the youths often called ‘Pages’, in my view he was probably systematizing a traditional practice that drought elite youths to court and meant that they grew up with royal sons, See further Carney 2008: 146-8. 15 See Anson 2008: 17-30 on the general practice and Philip I's more extensive use of it, made possible by his unprecedented conquests. "6 Austin 1986 argued that war and the consequent plunder was essential to the success and legitimacy of Hellenistic kings. For the classical period, though war and plunder are clearly important, it seems self-evident that in Macedonia in the Argead period kings did without both and survived, as did their dynasties. 1” The career of Philip Ils father Amyntas III (see Borza 1990: 180-9) exemplifies this patter. © See Greenwalt 1989 and Ogden 1999, especially xvi-xvii. Ogden considers Argead polyg- amy to have had somewhat more negative effects than I do. 3 Bor instance, Philip II had problems with his half-brothers and dynastic murders often followed or preceded a succession. Suspicions that Alexander the Great had played a role in his father’s murder dogged him throughout his reign and caused him political trouble. During theDynastic Loyalty and Dynastic Collapse in Macedonia 151 The Argead house foundered primarily because of the lack of an adult male capable of rule. Alexander’s sons were very young when he died,” and his half brother, Philip Arrhidaeus, could not rule on his own.?! Alexander's post- ponement of marriage did not contribute in any significant way to the fall of the Argeads. Had he married at the beginning of his reign,”? and had his bride immediately produced a son, that hypothetical son would only have been eleven or so at the time of his father’s death, with no better chance at survival than his actual sons. After Alexander’s death his generals accustomed them- selves to administering the empire themselves. By the time his sons neared adulthood, Alexander’s generals had moved toward establishing their own royal dynasties and therefore chose to eliminate the two youths.”> Factors other than the brevity of Alexander’s life also contributed to the end of Argead monarchy. The kingship of the mentally limited Philip Arrhidaeus and the infant Alexander IV encouraged contempt for Argead rule,”* particu- larly within the elite,’ and institutionalized a division within the royal house. Remaining Argeads persisted in their traditional divisiveness, further reducing their own numbers. Macedonian armies demonstrated more loyalty to the dynasty than did most of the elite, but this did not prevent the defeat and/or murder of surviving Argeads.”° As the era of the Successors went on, Argead era, killing uncles, nephews, half-brothers, and stepsons (let alone in-laws) did not cause the dynasty serious difficulty (e.g, Just. 8. 3. 1), though the concealment of some of these murders suggests concern about popular disapproval by individual rulers (e.g. Plato Gorg. 4712-c). 2° Heracles, Barsine’s son, was about four at the time of Alexander's death (Diod. 20. 20. 1). Justin (15. 2. 3) seems to make him three years younger, but his testimony is usually rejected (see Yardley, Wheatley, and Heckel 2011: 233-4). Rhoxane was either six (Curt. 10. 6. 9) o eight (Just. 13. 2. 5) months pregnant at the time of Alexander’s death; thus Alexander IV was born posthumously, a month or two after the death of his father. ** On Philip Arrhidaeus, see Greenwalt 1984 and Carney 2001. 2 Diodorus 17. 16. 2 claims that Antipater and Parmenion advised him to produce an heir; the advice is either apocryphal or pethaps self-serving (each had marriageable daughters, possibly the reason for Alexander's reluctance). 28 Diodorus 19. 1. 3 observes that it is difficult for those who have gotten hope of rule to abstain from becoming kings. See further Carney 2000b: 118, especially nn. 12 and 13. 8 Bosworth 1993 argues that Alexander IV was not proclaimed king until about a year after his birth. 25 See Bosworth 2002: 29-63. Whereas the infantry wanted Arrhidaeus (Curt. 10. 7. 1-8. 4), the elite considered government by committee (Curt. 10. 6. 15-16), ruled by Perdiccas (Curt. 10. 616-19), and ultimately favoured a regency by Perdiccas for Rhoxane’s baby, if it proved male. Apart from Nearchus, who was related to him by martiage, Heracles received no support at all (Curt. 10. 6. 10-12). 26 ‘Apart from the infantry’s preference for Arrhidaeus, there are other incidents: the army rebelled when Perdiccas’ brother murdered Cynnane, Alexander's half-sister, and forced Per- diccas to arrange the marriage she had intended between her daughter Adea Eurydice and Philip Arrhidaeus (FGrH 156, F. 9. 23); Adea Eurydice brought the Asian Macedonian army to near rebellion against the generals (Diod. 18. 39. 1-4; FGrH 156, F 9. 30-3); the sight of Olympias, mother of Alexander, led a Macedonian army to change sides (Diod. 19. 11. 1-3); later, even after she had been condemned, the Macedonians refused to execute Olympias (Just. 14. 6, 6-12; Diod. 19, 51. 4-6). See below for examples of continuing loyalty to remaining Argeads during Cassander’s domination.152 Elizabeth D. Carney Macedonian armies were easily won over to people they had only recently opposed. Neither of Alexander's sons gained sustained military backing from one of the Successors.” The manpower demands Alexander had made upon the general population may have contributed to the deterioration of pro- Argead sentiment in Macedonia itself, or at the very least, been perceived to do so2% More important, no Argead ruled Macedonia in person after Alex- ander’s departure for Asia in 334; Alexander's general Antipater managed the country from that date until his death in 319. Alexander IV may not have arrived in Macedonia until 317 and never ruled for himself, while his half brother Heracles never was recognized as king and was murdered before he reached Macedonia (see below). ‘Thus, it is no accident that it was Antipater’s son Cassander, after his defeat of the forces of Olympias and Polyperchon and capture of Alexander IV, who took control of Macedonia ca. 316. Though Cassander immediately began to act like a king, imprisoned Alexander IV, and deprived him of signs of royal status (Diod. 19. 50-51; 52. 1-5), he delayed the young king’s death until 310 or 309, and even then had him murdered secretly, thus concealing the crime for some time (Diod. 19. 105. 2-4; Paus. 9. 7. 2; Just. 15. 2. 5).?? He may also have postponed taking a royal title until somewhat later than the other Successors.” Soon after the murder of Alexander IV, Polyperchon brought an army to the borders of Macedonia that sponsored the kingship of Heracles. Some Macedonians, even some in Cassander’s army, supported Heracles’ candidacy, but Cassander nonetheless managed to persuade Polyperchon himself to kill Heracles (Diod. 20. 20. 1-2; 28. 1-4). Cassander could not immediately erase loyalty to the Argeads. His delay in eliminating Alexander IV and the secrecy with which he acted when he finally did so, as well as the near success of Heracles’ candidacy, all indicate that some loyalty to the Argeads remained, at least as late as 308, and that Cassander was well aware of it.*' He nonetheless retained control of Macedonia until the end 2” Eumenes was defeated and killed in 317/16. The absolute date of Eumenes’ death is disputed because of the uncertain chronology of the period, but there is general agreement that his death happened about the same time as Olympias’; see Bosworth 2002: 98-168; Errington 1977: 487; and Wheatley in this volume, Chapter 14. Polyperchon proved both ineffective and treacherous. On Polyperchon’s actions, see Wheatley 1998b: 12-23. %8 Opinions differ as to the severity of the problem and its causes: see Adams 1984: 79-80; Bosworth 1986; Billows 1995; Bosworth 2002: 64-97. On any view, Macedonia was diminished and the troubles of the period made this humiliatingly evident. Whether or not all these troubles were Alexander's sole responsibility, it may have seemed that they were. 2 See Wheatley 1998b: 12-23 for a persuasive discussion of the dates of the deaths of the two sons of Alexander. 3° See discussion in Adams 1983: 25; Gruen 1985: 259. 3 Diodorus’ narrative makes it clear that Cassander’s actions, particularly his negotiations with Polyperchon, were based on his concern about continuing loyalty to the Argeads. Adams 1983: 22 notes lack of loyalty to Cassander as late as 304: 6,000 Macedonians deserted ftom hisDynastic Loyalty and Dynastic Collapse in Macedonia 153 of his life for a number of reasons. First, his initial military victory against the forces of Olympias and Polyperchon, as well as subsequent victories that re- established secure borders, was fundamental. His father Antipater’s long rule of Macedonia as regent (despite the fact that Antipater, oddly, chose the incompetent Polyperchon as his successor rather than his very competent son) clearly gave Cassander a quasi-royal aura and established the feeling in the populace that he was his father’s successor.” Cassander married Alexander’s half-sister Thessalonice immediately after defeating Olympias. Their marriage produced three half-Argead sons.>? Dio- dorus (19. 52. 1) asserts that Cassander hoped for kingship at this time, and therefore made this marriage, so that he could be recognized as belonging to the royal clan. To underline his relationship to the Argeads and his legitimacy (Diodorus comments that he was already acting like a king), he buried Adea Eurydice, her mother Cynnane, and Philip Arrhidaeus at Vergina, as was the custom, and celebrated funeral games in honour of the dead (Diod. 19. 52. 5).° It is likely that he also provided a royal burial at Aegae for Alexander IV, if not until some years after he had ordered his murder. Thus, in effect, Cassander created a funerary commemorative at Aegae to the last of the Argeads.*° Apart from these numerous and varied attempts to build continuity with the Argead army to that of Demetrius Poliorcetes (Plut. Demetr. 23. 1). Adams sees 302 as the point at which Cassander had thoroughly established himself as ruler. * On Antipater's preference for Polyperchon, see discussion and references in Adams 1983: 18, especially n. 5. 55 Palagia 2008, based on her analysis of an intriguing grave relief from Veria, has argued that, prior to his marriage to Thessalonice, Cassander martied a sister of Adea Eurydice, had a daughter by her, and that his eldest son Philip was not Thessalonice’s son, but that of his first wife. It is true that no ancient author names Thessalonice as Philip’s mother (the only reason we know for certain that she was the mother of Antipater is that sources comment on the matricide), but ancient sources do not in any way suggest that Cassander’s sons were half-brothers. Thus, it remains reasonable to conclude that all of Cassander’s sons were born to him by Thessalonice. ¥ Landucci Gattinoni 2010 discusses Cassander’s relationship to the legacy of the last Argeads. S Whether or not Adea Eurydice and Philip Arthidaeus were the occupants of Tomb II at Vergina, as opposed to Philip II and Cleopatra, remains to be seen, though I consider it very likely. See Borza and Palagia 2007 for discussion and references. In any event, itis significant that ‘Adea Eurydice had apparently saved her mother’s ashes (Cynnane had been murdered in Asia shortly after the death of Alexander the Great) and brought them home, though she had not managed to bury them before her own death. Clearly burial at Aegae was of great importance. %© The youth buried in Tomb Ili at Vergina is generally assumed to be Alexander IV. Obviously, this burial at Aegae must have happened some years after the murder. Our literary sources claim that his initial burial was secret, so this would have been a reburial. See Adams 1991: 29-31; contra Landucci Gattinoni 2010, who believes that Demetrius Poliorcetes buried Alexander IV at Aegae. Her suggestion, while attractive in some respects, fails to deal with the apparently close relationship between tombs II and III in terms of time and construction. On the delay between the murder and official confirmation that it had happened, see Wheatley 1998b: 17, n, 23. Like Adams, I am inclined to think that Cassander created the earlier red earth mound under the Great Tumulus, though I think that it originally covered only Tombs T and II and that he added ‘Tomb III to it.154 Elizabeth D. Carney past, Cassander’s cautious and competent rule of Macedonia over many years, during which he gradually consolidated support, enabled him to build loyalty to his new dynasty.” Moreover, he fits the earlier model of the scrappy Macedonia king, often but not always successful in battle, adept at diplomacy. Cassander did everything one could reasonably expect to create loyalty to the Antipatrid dynasty. Nonetheless, the Antipatrid dynasty began to fail within months of Cas- sander’s death.>* His eldest son Philip died soon after (ca. 297; Euseb. 1. 231 Sch. Syncellus 265A 504 Bonn; Paus. 9. 7. 3; Just. 16. 1. 1). Cassander’s comparatively early death and that of Philip meant that his remaining sons came to the throne very young and fatally inexperienced.> They shared rule of Macedonia (Just. 16. 1. 2; Euseb. 1, 232 Sch.).“° We do not know whether their co-rule was Cassander’s choice, that of his widow Thessalonice, or perhaps a compromise worked out between two factions at court.*! The precedents for such shared rule were hardly encouraging,” and, as in the earlier two cases, the co-rulers and their supporters struggled with each other, dividing the dynastic loyalty their father had fought so hard to construct. Dynastic violence had been the norm in Macedonia, but Antipater, probably the elder of the surviving sons of Cassander,*? did something unprecedented: he murdered his own mother Thessalonice because he believed she somehow favoured his brother (Just. 16. 1. 3-4; Paus. 9. 7. 3; Diod. 21. 7. 1). 57 Adams 1983: 23-30 for a lengthy discussion of the policies he considers brought success to Cassander, which included his ability to share power and willingness to award independent commands to other members of the elite. Adams 1984 discusses Cassander’s ability to cope with limited military forces, avoid battles when possible, and build coalitions. See also Landucci Gattinoni 2003. 58 Carney 1999 discusses the reasons for the collapse of the Antipatrid dynasty at length. 3° His contemporaries Lysimachus and Seleucus did not die until 281 and 280; Ptolemy died in 283, We have only a rough estimate on the ages of his surviving sons, but they were probably born in 315 and 314 and were thus still teenagers at the time of their father’s death. They were, however, probably married by the time of his death, so they were not born much later than the dates I have suggested. *° Other sources speak only of the factions the brothers formed and do not call either brother king, thus implying that they shared rule (Plut. Demetr. 36. 1; Paus. 9. 7. 1). * See Carney 1999: 210-12, 214-16 for discussion of the possibilities. Thessalonice, despite the prestige of being the last Argead, is not known to have had any political power previously, so Cassander or court factions seem more likely as the originators of the plan. ® ‘Several of the sons of Alexander I apparently shared rule until Perdiccas II won out, and Philip Arrhidaeus and Alexander IV were co-kings (see references in Carney 1999: 210). 8 Plut. Pyrrh. 6. 2. Porphyry (FGrH 260 F 3. 5), however, says that he was the younger. They would have been close in age, but Antipater’s action suggests that he believed he had some sort of stronger claim to the throne and that would most likely have been that he was slightly older. The nature of her favour is unclear but, as argued above, if Antipater was the elder brother and his mother supported continued co-rule, he may have seen this policy as favour for his brother. One might suppose that she actually supported Alexander over Antipater, but Justin (16. 1. 4) says no blame could be attached to her actions, an inappropriate judgement if she had indeed favoured one son to the exclusion of the other.Dynastic Loyalty and Dynastic Collapse in Macedonia 155 The murder of Thessalonice, the last living Argead, destroyed the dynastic ontinuity Cassander had created by marrying her. Her murder reminded oe Macedonians of something Cassander had spent his career making aem forget: the Antipatrids had been enemies of Alexander the Great’s kin, )lympias believed that they had murdered Alexander the Great (Diod. 19. 11. \-9; Plut. Alex. 77. 1-3), and Cassander actually did cause the deaths of the vst two male Argeads.® Indeed our sources blame the end of Cassander’s lynasty on its destruction of the Argead house.** Moreover, ‘Thessalonice’s nurder precipitated events that led to the elimination of her sons by more sxperienced generals. Alexander did get some assistance from Pyrrhus (Plut. oyrrh, 6. 2-7. 1; Demetr. 36. 1-37. 3), thus forcing Antipater to flee to his ‘ather-in-law Lysimachus, but ‘Alexander lost territory to Pyrrhus, and Deme- :rius, rather than helping Alexander, lured him to his death and then forced his remaining entourage and troops to recognize him as king (Paus. 9. 7. 3-45 Just, 16, 1. 5-19; Euseb. 1. 231 Sch Diod. 21. 7). Demetrius then persuaded Lysimachus to kill his son-in-law Antipater (Just. 16. 2, 4; Euseb. 1. 232 Sch.). ‘The Antipatrid dynasty foundered because demographic chance placed rule in the hands of young men who possessed some of the ruthlessness, but none of the coping skills of their rivals, Ironically, those who could claim descent from Antipater through his daughter Phila, but not by his son Cassander, would ultimately rule Macedonia.” Demetrius Poliorcetes had gained the throne of Macedonia (ca. 295 or 294 to 287) by his assassination of “Alexander, son of Cassander. Plutarch (Demetr 37, 2-3) attributes Demetrius’ recognition as king to Macedonian fear of his military might, dislike of the matricide Antipater, antipathy toward Cassander because of his crimes against the children of Alexander the Great, but also to the fact that Demetrius was married to Phila, whose father Antipater was remembered as a moderate, and to the fact that he had a son by her, old enough to succeed.** As Bosworth has noted, the Macedonians accepted 45 Antipater had quarrelled with Olympias and had public confrontations with Alexander's sister Cleopatra and his niece Adea Eurydice. Plutarch (Demtr. 37. 2) says that the troops that had accompanied Alexander, son of Cassander, went over to Demetrius partly because they had aa able alternative, but partly out of hatred for his brother's matricide. ‘45. Pausanias (9.7. 2-4) considers the murder of Thessalonice divine punishment for Cassan- dder’s earlier crimes, See also Just. 16, 1. 15-175 2. 5; Plut. Demetr. 37. 2. Even if Antigonid propaganda via Hieronymus coloured popular opinion preserved in our sources, it did so successfully. SF Miter the death of Ptolemy Ceraunus in battle against the Gauls (see below), a nephew of Cassander's (by his brother Philip) named Antipater (Etesias) ruled for forty-five days, but failed Carey his military incompetence (Diod. 22 4; Euseb. 1. 235 Sch); he was offered rule only afer a brother (or uncle) of Ceraunus ruled briefly and was expelled. 48 Justin (16. 1. 1-18) gives the gist of a speech ‘Demetrius delivered to an assembly. Bosworth 3002: 251, n. 22 takes this speech seriously whereas Hammond and Walbank 1988: 217-18 do not.156 Elizabeth D. Carney Demetrius primarily for reasons that had comparatively little to do with his military successes.” Although the Antigonids would ultimately re-establish themselves as the enduring royal dynasty of Macedonia, their first attempt foundered. Deme- trius lost ground quickly. His frequent absences in southern Greece and his ambitions in Asia prevented him from consolidating power within Macedonia itself. Poliorcetes’ reputation for arrogance, contempt for Macedonian trad- ition, extravagance, and irresponsibility, weakened him (Plut. Demetr. 41. 4-42. 6), but the lack of further military success against the coalition of Lysimachus, Ptolemy, and Pyrrhus proved decisive. The Macedonians in- creasingly preferred Pyrrhus and many of Demetrius’ own soldiers went over to him or to Lysimachus (Plut. Demetr. 41. 4-5; 44. 3-7; Pyrrh. 8. 11; 11. 8). His army was tired of fighting wars they felt contributed only to his wealth (Plut. Demetr. 44. 6). Finally Demetrius fled and the Macedonian army offered kingship to Pyrrhus (Plut. Demetr. 45. 1). Pyrrhus, king of Epirus, ruled Macedonia for brief periods twice (288-284, 273-272). Despite his recognition as king, Pyrrhus actually shared rule of Macedonia with his ally Lysimachus, who had invaded Macedonia at more or less the same time as Pyrrhus (Plut. Pyrrh. 12. 1-2; Paus. 1. 10, 2). In both periods of Pyrrhus’ rule of Macedonia, he failed to continue the initial military success that had won him the kingdom (the Macedonians initially found his military success kingly, particularly by comparison to Demetrius; Plut. De- metr. 44. 5), partly because of his commitments elsewhere. Pyrrhus was an ‘Aeacid, the great-nephew of Olympias, and a Molossian. This identity was a two-edged sword. Plutarch claims (Pyrrh. 8. 1; Demetr. 41. 3) that Pyrrhus reminded the Macedonians of Alexander the Great in a way the other Suc- cessors did not.5! Moreover, blood relationship to Alexander, quite apart from any real or constructed similarities in generalship or temperament, was rare by the 280s. On the other hand, Pyrrhus was a Molossian attempting to rule Macedonians. He did not always trust them (Plut. Pyrrh. 12. 1) and they seem to have come to resent being part of what amounted to a Molossian or Epirote empire rather than their own. Lysimachus apparently used ethnic hostility to win leading Macedonians away from Pyrrhus and finally drive Pyrrhus out (Plut. Pyrrh. 6-7). Lysimachus, long the ruler of Thrace (323) and parts of Asia Minor (301),°? gained sole rule of Macedonia ca. 285/4 by defeating Pyrrhus. His history as ® Bosworth 2002: 251. *° Hammond and Walbank 1988: 225; contra Bosworth 2002: 252-3. The defeat of Deme- trius’ general Pantauchus was critical, though the failure of his public image as compared to that of Pyrrhus (see below) was certainly vital as well. 5" Bosworth 2002: 254. As he notes, in fact Demetrius and Pyrrhus seem similarly daring and heroic in battle; popular perception, however, was apparently different. 52 Hammond and Walbank 1988: 234 $3 On Lysimachus' career see Lund 1992 and Landucci jattinoni 1992,Dynastic Loyalty and Dynastic Collapse in Macedonia 187 one of the friends and royal bodyguards of Alexander helped too (Plut. Pyrrh. 12. 6); many of the Successors used their relationship to Alexander to help craft an image for themselves and their emerging dynasties.** Nonetheless, his dynasty began to self-destruct soon after he took complete control of Mace- donia. At the time, Lysimachus was in his seventies. One of his sons, Agatho- cles, then about thirty, had recently defeated Demetrius (Plut. Demetr. 46-8; Just. 17. 1. 4), a victory that brought Agathocles popularity in the Greek cities of Anatolia and a large number of philoi committed to his succession. Lysi- machus also had three sons by Arsinoé, daughter of Ptolemy Soter. The eldest of these, Ptolemy, was in his middle teens. Unlike Seleucus and, more recently, Ptolemy Soter, Lysimachus had not made Agathocles his co-ruler. Many, however, expected Agathocles to succeed his father.** Nonetheless Lysimachus either arranged or allowed the murder/execution of Agathocles and Arsinoé’s son Ptolemy now became his presumptive heir. While Soter’s choice of Arsinoé’s full brother Ptolemy II as his successor doubtless elevated the status of Arsinoé and her sons, it does not explain Lysimachus’ willingness to shake the dynastic boat.” The only compelling reason for Lysimachus, at his advanced age, to disrupt the succession was that, rightly or wrongly, he believed that Agathocles was plotting against him. Not surprisingly, Lysimachus’ sudden switch in the succession had greater impact in the region where Agathocles had been active than in Macedonia, where he was comparatively unknown: it cost Lysimachus the support of much of the ruling elite in his lands in Asia Minor and furnished an excuse for Seleucus to invade. Lysimachus’ defeat and death in the subsequent battle (281; Memnon FGrH 434 F 5. 7; App. Syr. 64) must have been, at least in part, the consequence of his loss of support in his Asian territory. In essence, Lysimachus, by his long delay in choosing an heir, had allowed groups within his empire to become invested in Agathocles’ succession; after his murder, *4 Bosworth 2002: 275-8. #5 Lund 1992: 196-7 points to some signs that Lysimachus had consciously limited Agatho- cles’ power. ° See discussions in Lund 1992: 184-98; Landucci Gattinoni 1992; 209-14; Carney 1994: 125-7. Memnon (FGrH 434 F. 5. 6) says that Arsinoé influenced Lysimachus, first to poison Agathocles and then, when poison did not work, Lysimachus threw him into prison and ordered him executed, on the charge that he was plotting against his father. Memnon states that the actual perpetrator of Lysimachus’ orders was Ptolemy Ceraunus. Most historians think that Memnon or his epitomator confused Ptolemy Ceraunus with Ptolemy son of Lysimachus. Pausanias (1. 10. 2-4) says that Arsinoé, fearing for what Agathocles would do to her children after Lysimachus’ death, is said to have plotted against him. Supposedly Lysimachus did not know until after she had murdered Agathocles and then he overlooked her crime, Justin (17. 1. 4-5) says that Lysimachus developed a hatred for Agathocles and had him poisoned by Arsinoé, despite the fact that he had chosen him as successor to the throne and though he won many victories for his father. Strabo (13. 4. 1) says that Lysimachus, encompassed by troubles in his household, was compelled to kill Agathocles. °” Contra Dmitriev 2007.158 Elizabeth D. Carney they saw no advantage in further loyalty to Lysimachus. Lysimachus’ house did not, however, yield up its claim to Macedonia after his death. Arsinoé and her three sons continued to control some territory in Macedonia (Just. 24. 2. 1-4; 3. 3) and presumably hoped that one of them would succeed his father as ruler of Macedonia. Seleucus, however, had invaded Lysimachus’ former European territories, taking with him his protégé Ptolemy Ceraunus, but Ceraunus suddenly murdered his patron, gained recognition as king from Seleucus’ troops (App. Syr. 63; Just. 17. 2. 4-5; Strabo 13. 4. 1 624b), and then defeated Antigonus Gonatas’ attempt to invade Macedonia by sea.°* Ceraunus had still to contend with Arsinoé and Co. Ceraunus, Arsinoé’s half brother, was the son Ptolemy Soter had rejected as his heir in favour of Arsinoé’s full brother. Ceraunus’ sister Lysandra had been Agathocles’ wife and when, after her husband’s murder, she fled to the court of Seleucus, he had apparently accompanied her. Despite the fact that these two branches of the Ptolemaic line had been rivals for a generation, Ceraunus persuaded Arsinoé to marry him, having promised to treat her sons as heirs (Just. 24. 2. 9). Instead, he slaughtered her two younger sons, and seized the city she had controlled, Cassandreia. Dynastic infighting and military defeat were the most important factors leading to the failure of Lysimachus’ line. In addition, Lysimachus ruled Macedonia only briefly, as part of a larger and less than homogeneous entity. Like Pyrrhus, his problems with other parts of his territory contributed to his family’s failure to retain control of Macedonia. Ptolemy Ceraunus, after he secured the throne by means of his ruthless elimination of allies and rivals and because of his military success, lost it soon after (ca. 279) when invading Gauls defeated and then beheaded him. While his inability to cope with the Gauls was obviously decisive, the brevity of his Macedonian stay and his brutal betrayals of Seleucus and Arsinoé may have contributed to his defeat by limiting the amount of his military support (Just. 24. 4. 8). Significantly, Ceraunus had no sons; there was, as yet, no dynasty. After Ceraunus’ grisly demise, Macedonia descended into anarchy. Ceraunus’ brother Meleager and Cassander’s nephew Antipater Etesias each ruled for a few months, followed by Sosthenes, as general. Sosthenes dealt with various Gallic incursions, as well as one by Antigonus Gonatas, and then died.°° In any event, Antigonus Gonatas managed to retrieve Macedonia from chaos by defeating the Gauls and re-establishing Antigonid rule in the king- dom ca. 277/6.°' While his Gallic military victory was critical to his 58 On Ceraunus’ career see Heinen 1972; Hammond and Walbank 1988: 241-53. 5° What happened to Ptolemy, son of Lysimachus, is disputed; it seems likely that he became a dynast in Telmessus in Asia Minor, but far less certain that, as some have claimed, he co-ruled for a time with Ptolemy II. See Heinen 1972: 82. °° Hammond and Walbank 1988; 253-8. ®! Tarn 1913; Hammond and Walbank 1988; 256-316; Gabbert 1997.Dynastic Loyalty and Dynastic Collapse in Macedonia 159 recognition as king of Macedonia,” it was not the only reason he was able to establish not only personal control of Macedonia, but enduring dynastic rule. Military reputation alone did not enable him to retain the throne since Pyrrhus inflicted a humiliating defeat on Antigonus soon after his return to Macedonia. Pyrrhus invaded Macedonia a second time, in 274/3 and, after his victory, much of Antigonus’ army went over to Pyrrhus (Plut. Pyrrh. 26. 5-9; Paus. 1. 13. 2; Just. 25. 3. 5; Diod, 22. 11. 1). Antigonus was equally unsuccessful against Pyrrhus’ son, and Pyrrhus temporarily drove Gonatas out of Macedo- nia. Pyrrhus, however, did little to punish his Gallic mercenaries when they looted the royal tombs at Aegae. He thereby generated Macedonian enmity (Plut. Pyrrh, 26. 6-7) and enabled Antigonus to portray himself not only as the defender of civilized Macedonia against barbarians, but also against the general who could not control them. Indeed, while it is clear that Pyrrhus wanted to conquer Macedonia, it is not clear that he ever actually focused on ruling it (Plut. Pyrrh. 26. 7). By 272, in part because of his well chosen alliances, Antigonus had expelled the forces of Pyrrhus and his son. Antigonus’ gifts were generally more political than military, a familiar and even possibly reassuring trait for a Macedonian king. Good demographic luck and clever policy helped Gonatas stabilize Macedonia. He himself reigned for many years, time to regain his kingdom and to recover from defeat. Soon after his initial victory, Antigonus produced an heir, Demetrius II. As his heir grew older, he shared responsibilities with Gonatas: later in his reign, it was Demetrius who defeated yet another Molossian invasion (Just. 26. 2. 9-12). The Antigonids, unlike other dynasties, were famous for their closeness (Plut. Demetr. 3. 1-3); Gonatas and Demetrius embodied the stability of the succes- sion. Antigonus also capitalized on remaining loyalty (and perhaps nostalgia) for his maternal grandfather Antipater. Antigonus, because of his long and relatively stable reign, had time to craft a public image for his dynasty, one that demonstrated continuity with and respect for the Argead past. It was likely he, for instance, who built the Great Tumulus at Vergina over the tombs of the last Argeads.™ Since the fill of the Great Tumulus demonstrates that the graves of many non-royal Macedonians had been plundered as well, Gonatas’ restor- ation carried particularly powerful symbolic meaning: not only did it portray him as the legitimate successor of the Argeads and victor against barbaric ® See Strootman 2005 on the cultural significance of such victories. ® Tt is likely that Antigonus Gonatas made Demetrius his co-ruler: see Hammond and Walbank 1988; 317-18; and it is certain that Demetrius took an ever more prominent role in governance as his father grew older. “ Andronicos 1984: 62 suggested that it was Antigonus Gonatas who constructed the Great ‘Tumulus after Pyrrhus’ mercenaries had plundered the royal tombs. The suggestion is particu- larly appealing because it so clearly fits into his image as restorer of traditional Macedonian rule.160 Elizabeth D. Carney foreigners, but it also demonstrated his piety not only to the royal dead, but the Macedonian dead more generally.°* ‘The Antigonids replicated the Argead claim to Heraclid descent and prob- ably also linked themselves by blood to the Argeads.*° Toward the middle of the third century, Gonatas dedicated a stoa at Delos that apparently embodied both these claims. The stoa displayed a long line of ancestors beginning, in all likelihood, with Heracles and probably including some Argeads. Whereas dynastic loyalty in the earlier period had centred on the Argead clan, the monarchy he crafted envisioned the dynasty as a linked series of individual rulers, just as his monument self-consciously constructed a three-dimensional lineage.’ Despite this important change, Gonatas re-created many aspects of traditional Macedonian kingship and, in many respects, embodied the trad- itional royal character. An anecdote told by Aelian (VH 2. 20) has Antigonus— whom Aelian describes as easy-going and unpretentious—remind his son that kingship was ‘glorious slavery’. Whatever the literal truth, Antigonus success- fully portrayed himself as a king like Philip II rather than his own father, like an Argead, if not an actual Argead. Some factors generating dynastic loyalty did change over time. The situ- ation in the period between 323 and 277 was unprecedented in Macedonian history. True, then as in the period from 399 to 359, invasions happened repeatedly and rulers came and went with alarming frequency, but in the earlier era all those rulers belonged to one royal clan, while in the second period, none were Argeads and no one family dominated. It must have seemed to Macedonians that their country had taken a huge step backward to the inglorious days of the fifth and early fourth century, a tremendous reversal from the era of apparently unending success under Philip II and Alexander, yet one taken without the familiar presence of the Argeads. It is difficult for us to appreciate how disorienting and destabilizing the disappearance of a royal dynasty could be, particularly in a country without many other sources of unity and order. Despite the obvious need for stability, it took a generation longer to establish a royal dynasty in Macedonia than in the other Hellenistic kingdoms. Macedonians were so committed to tradition and so slow to embrace a new royal family that their refusal to do so, the frequent and often rapid changes in ruling family, continued to destabilize the region. Apparently, the situation in Macedonia had to become truly dire before it finally generated willingness, apparently not previously present, to embrace a new dynasty. Thus, while the rulers of Macedonia were clearly Hellenistic kings and had much in common with other Hellenistic rulers, they © Lindsay Adams made this point to me in conversation and it is a good one. © Bdson 1934, © For a discussion of the monument and the view that the Antigonids narrowed the presentation of the monarchy, see Carney 2007b: 57-8.Dynastic Loyalty and Dynastic Collapse in Macedonia 161 did not always fit the patterns that led to success in the new kingdoms. Dynastic success in Macedonia happened for reasons similar to those that led to success in the other kingdoms, but hardly for identical reasons. Dynastic violence, particularly if it were prolonged or indecisive, caused more problems for the dynasties trying to establish themselves than it had for the Argeads. The growing preference for official or formal monogamy suggests a perceived connection between polygamy and destructive succession vio- lence. During the Antigonid era a clearly established succession pattern largely prevented such strife and played a part in a narrow public presentation of monarchy and dynasty. Whereas, in the twilight years of the Argeads, royal women, in the absence of adult males, had briefly played important roles in maintaining dynastic loyalty, nothing similar developed again. Women could inspire dynastic loyalty by embodying dynastic identity, but only when there was one. The Killing of Thessalonice exemplifies the change. Her son literally murdered dynastic continuity, eliminating any possibility of building loyalty to his dynasty based on loyalty to the old. Despite these differences, some common patterns do emerge if one com- pares the situations of the post-Argead dynasties to that of the Argeads themselves. Constant military success was not necessary for dynastic success; resilience and persistence, combined with personal bravery, counted as much as a glamorous victory.”° Kings could lose in the Peloponnese, but they had to defend Macedonia itself, at least in the long term. Consequently dynasties that did not focus on Macedonia did not endure; dynastic and national identity needed to mingle. Biological/demographic chance (the production of an heir who was adult at the time of his father’s death; the longevity of individual kings; the competency of individual rulers) proved critical. Incompetence at a critical moment could jeopardize dynastic loyalty. Longer reigns enabled a man to craft and publicize an effective personal image and use that to build a dynastic image, to father an heir and allow him to reach maturity, to construct or reinforce a network of connections within the elite, to form alliances, and to recover from set-backs. Most important, kings who managed to demonstrate many of the qualities of past Macedonian kings—bravery, resilience, craftiness—could suffer from a number of other failings and the dynasty would endure and even prosper. The last Macedonian king, Perseus, after his defeat at Pydna, like so many Mace- donian rulers before him, might have managed to regain control of his kingdom, had his enemy not been the Roman state with its massive manpower Carney 2000b: 198-202, 228-32. ® Carney 2000b: 198-202. 7 Bosworth 2002: 268 rightly points out that the careers of Demetrius Poliorcetes and some other Macedonian kings all demonstrate that wealth was not always necessary for success.162 Elizabeth D. Carney reserves, a state that then thoroughly fragmented the Macedonian kingdom. If, as recent research has suggested, the tholos inside the Vergina palace, with its dedications to Heracles Patrotis (Heracles the Ancestor), is a post-Roman conquest construct made from the rubble of the looted palace,” then we must conclude that dynastic loyalty did not end with Roman conquest. 7 AR 2007-2008: 71; Archaiologiko Ergo ste Makedonia kai Thrake 2006: 753-7.