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To cite this article: Asteris Huliaras & Nikolaos Tzifakis (2010) Celebrity Activism in International
Relations: In Search of a Framework for Analysis, Global Society, 24:2, 255-274, DOI:
10.1080/13600821003626567
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Global Society, Vol. 24, No. 2, April, 2010
The article examines the growing celebrity activism in world politics and attempts to
develop a framework for analysis. It briefly reviews the relevant literature on the emer-
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Introduction
In recent years celebrities have taken an active interest in world politics. A con-
siderable number of them have become well-recognised global activists. There
are plenty of examples. George Clooney has campaigned against the Sudanese
government for the crimes committed by government militias in the western
parts of the country. Jessica Lange and Angelina Jolie have visited and distributed
aid to refugee camps in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Bono has travelled to
some of Africa’s poorest countries and set up a pressure group called DATA which
lobbies Western governments for debt relief of less developed nations. From the
corridors of the United Nations to the slums of Nairobi and Luanda movie stars
and pop singers are increasingly active in campaigns against hunger, disease
and inequality.
While celebrity activism evolves into an ever-growing internationally visible
phenomenon, very little has been written on its causes and, even less, on its
impact.1 Is celebrity activism emerging into a distinct influential factor in inter-
national politics, or is it merely an extension (or a new dimension) of those
figures’ public relations and image-making strategies? Are celebrities capable of
making governments review aspects of their policies?
The authors would like to thank Efstathios T. Fakiolas and the journal’s anonymous referees for
their comments and suggestions on an earlier version of this article.
1. Some notable exceptions are: Andrew F. Cooper, Celebrity Diplomacy (Boulder: Paradigm, 2008);
Joshua William Busby, “Bono Made Jesse Helms Cry: Jubilee 2000, Debt Relief, and Moral Action in
International Politics”, International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 51, No. 2 (2007), pp. 247– 275; Lisa Ann
Richey and Stefano Ponte, “Better (Red)TM than Dead? Celebrities, Consumption and International
Aid”, Third World Quarterly, Vol. 29, No. 4 (2008), pp. 711 –729.
This article seeks to shed more light on this form of transnational activism. The
first part discusses the factors that may facilitate the emergence of influential
individuals as transnational activists. The second part systematically organises
and presents additional factors that account for the specific growth of celebrity
activism. It also analyses the repercussions of celebrity activism in terms of
raising public awareness, mobilising resources and influencing political decisions.
Finally, the third part examines two case studies: Princess Diana’s participation
in the campaign to ban anti-personnel landmines and Mia Farrow’s activism in
respect to China’s policy towards Sudan. These particular case studies were
chosen for a number of reasons. First, both activists were women. According to
some IR scholars gender matters and, other things being equal, women have
structurally smaller possibilities to influence international politics.2 Secondly,
both celebrities emerged in the developed world. The article does not intend
to further endorse the West-centrism of IR. Instead, it acknowledges the fact
that transnational celebrity activism is predominantly an Anglo-Saxon phenom-
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enon. Thirdly, the decade-long distance between the two case studies permits
us to observe how this form of activism has evolved. In other words, we can
look for any major differences in the activists’ modus operandi over that time.
Altogether, the case studies confirm most theoretical propositions on the emer-
gence of celebrity activism, with the notable exception of the argument that
celebrities are motivated by their desire to remain celebrities. The article also
confirms all propositions on the effectiveness of their activities: despite press
reports to the contrary, celebrities are not very influential, on their own, in
affecting policy outcomes.
The meagre literature, in both volume and depth, on the role of individuals who
are not state agents in international politics can be analytically divided into two
categories. The first concerns attempts to examine the enabling (contextual or
external) conditions for individuals to adopt a more active international role.
The second category includes studies on the personal traits of individuals.
In relation to the first category, Philip G. Cerny has widened the agent-structure
debate to allow for a more consistent account of the role of “social agents”.
Although Cerny makes no explicit reference to individuals, he also does not
exclude them from his conceptualisation of “social agents” in which he assembles
transnational-cause groups and social movements. Cerny argues that while the
structure may constrain or enable the activities of such actors, the latter may,
under certain conditions, in turn contribute to the preservation or the transform-
ation of structure. Cerny’s assertion that the current conditions of globalisation are
permissive for such a structural change is worth noting.5 Indeed, technological
advances and the growth of interdependence among nations have given a new
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impetus to a concern for distant and different others.6 Several people with a
sense of mission find ways to cooperate and coordinate their actions.
From a different perspective, Kiyoteru Tsutsui and Christine Min Wotipka have
examined patterns of citizen participation in global human rights movements
through membership in human rights non-governmental organisations (NGOs).
Their survey demonstrates that there is a correlation between the citizens’ decision
to participate in such NGOs, on the one hand, and the extent of domestic and
global opportunities as well as the level of education and development of their
country, on the other.7
In relation to the second category of the relevant literature, Sydney Tarrow has
made a systematic attempt to identify common features and characteristics among
transnational activists.8 According to Tarrow, these people usually have three
common features: (i) they emerge from domestic political or social activities
(they do not usually begin at the international level), (ii) they are better educated
and connected and more frequent travellers than most of their compatriots, and
(iii) they soon return to their domestic activities. Their main difference from
national activists is their ability to move between domestic and international
levels and take advantage of opportunities for the advancement of their causes.9
Their constant connection to the domestic level leads Tarrow to the adoption of
Mitchell Cohen’s term of “rooted cosmopolitans”.10 Moreover, Tarrow has made
a preliminary attempt to classify transnational activists in relation either to their
traits: (i) the non-instrumentality of their actions, (ii) the low emphasis on
arguments and ideas, and (iii) the highlighting of differences and divergences
of identities.14 According to Chandler, the actions of these activists are designed
to elaborate upon their individual identity and “make us aware of their
‘awareness’ rather than engage us in an instrumental project of changing or
engaging with the outside world”.15
Above all, Paola Grenier has probably made the most thorough attempt to study
the role of individuals in the international scene.16 She employs the term “pioneer”
that was put forward by Lord Beveridge in 1948 to describe those people who
crafted the UK voluntary sector in the 19th century. Beveridge had identified
three factors that seem to enable the emergence and success of pioneers. These
were: (i) middle-class origin, (ii) strong motivation, and (iii) access to material
resources.17 Grenier took into account Beveridge’s earlier work in order to study
the profile of 27 leading global civil society figures. Her research led to the formu-
lation of three propositions. The first was an endorsement of Tarrow’s concept of
“rooted cosmopolitans” denoting the pioneers’ ability to connect local and global
opportunity structures. Grenier attributes this ability to the international exposure
and experience that many pioneers witnessed during childhood and upbringing.
The second proposition is that the pioneers become involved as a result of their per-
ception of the existence of “systemic paradoxes” and “disharmonies or anomalies
between different institutions and practices”. It is their feeling of injustice that
makes them take action. Finally, the third proposition is a confirmation of
Beveridge’s argument that there are certain enabling conditions facilitating the
emergence of a pioneer. More precisely, Grenier uses the term “transformational
11. Tarrow, op. cit., pp. 12– 13.
12. Paola Grenier, “Social Entrepreneurship: Agency in a Globalizing World”, in Alex Nicholls
(ed.), Social Entrepreneurship: New Models of Sustainable Social Change (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2006), p. 120.
13. Ibid., pp. 130– 131.
14. David Chandler, “The Possibilities of Post-territorial Political Community”, Area, Vol. 39, No. 1
(2007), p. 116.
15. Ibid., pp. 117– 118.
16. Paola Grenier, “The New Pioneers: The People behind Global Civil Society”, in Anheier et al.
(eds.), op. cit., pp. 122–157.
17. Cited in ibid., pp. 122–125.
Celebrity Activism in International Relations 259
Celebrity Activism
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Enabling Factors
Celebrity involvement in international politics is not a recent phenomenon. Bob
Dylan, Neil Young and John Lennon made, with their songs, pop protest fashion-
able in the 1960s. George Harrison and Ravi Shankar organised a concert for
Bangladesh in 1971 and Bob Geldof raised tens of millions of dollars for Ethiopian
famine victims with the 1984 Band Aid. Yet the current scale of celebrity involve-
ment in international politics, with particular emphasis on the less developed
world, has no historical precedent.
Aside from globalisation and the level of human development of the country of
origin of celebrities, there are three more external factors that explicate the growth
of celebrity activism. First: the United Nations. Especially since 1997, the organis-
ation has made an extensive effort to mobilise movie stars, singers and athletes for
global causes. The concept of “goodwill ambassadors” was first introduced by
UNICEF several decades ago with the nomination of Danny Kaye, the comic
movie star. Indeed, the idea has not always worked smoothly. Sofia Loren was
heavily criticised for “turning up for her UNICEF appointment ceremony in a
brown Rolls Royce that matched her fur coat”.19 And more recently, when
Harry Belafonte declared President George W. Bush “the greatest terrorist in the
world”, many UN officials felt extremely uneasy. Nevertheless, the number of
UNICEF’s ambassadors continued to rise unabatedly as the successful appoint-
ments clearly dominated the scene. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, Audrey
Hepburn—with her strong commitment to children’s issues—created a role
model for star involvement in global causes and the idea of “goodwill ambassa-
dors” was copied by several other specialised UN agencies.
The man who gave particular boost to the UN courtship of celebrity was Kofi
Annan. In 1997, the then Secretary-General had a propensity to view all criticism
directed against the United Nations as a public relations problem and decided to
use writers, actors, singers and sportsmen extensively in order to persuade reluc-
tant governments to honour their pledges made in UN forums and to inspire inter-
national public opinion to support UN causes.20 His vision led to a spectacular
18. Ibid., pp. 144–150.
19. Cooper, op. cit., p. 21.
20. Mark D. Alleyne, “The United Nations’ Celebrity Diplomacy”, SAIS Review, Vol. XXV, No. 1
(2008), pp. 177– 178.
260 Asteris Huliaras and Nikolaos Tzifakis
21. By 2008, UNICEF had 28 international, 9 regional and more than 150 national ambassadors,
UNESCO had 40, FAO 25, UNAIDS 16, UNFPA 14, WFP 10, UNDP 6, UNHCR 7 (among them Angelina
Jolie and Giorgio Armani), UNIFEM 3 (including Nicole Kidman), UNODC 3, WHO 3 and UNIDO 3;
available: ,http://www.un.org/sg/mop/gwa.shtml. (accessed 10 July 2008).
22. Peter Ford and Gloria Goodale, “Why Stars and Charities Need Each Other”, Christian Science
Monitor (13 January 2005), available: ,http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/0113/p01s04-wosc.html.
(accessed 25 May 2008).
23. Quoted in James Traub, “The Celebrity Solution”, New York Times (9 March 2008), p. 38.
24. Quoted in ibid.
25. Available: ,http://www.charitywatch.org/hottopics/africa_crises.html. (accessed 15 July 2008).
26. Daniel W. Drezner, “Foreign Policy Goes Glam”, The National Interest, No. 92 (2007), p. 23.
27. Dorothy Pomerantz, “The Star Economy: Hollywood’s Most Overpaid Stars”, Forbes
(18 November 2009), available: ,http://movies.yahoo.com/feature/forbes-most-overpaid-stars.html.
(accessed 20 November 2009).
Celebrity Activism in International Relations 261
in transnational activists and pioneers. Yet there are two additional individual-
level factors that explain celebrity activism.
The first and probably the most important factor is that celebrities embrace
global causes or take political initiatives in order to remain celebrities. We live
in a world where fame cannot be retained without continuous publicity. And
the image of a star in a war-torn African country, surrounded by undernourished
black children and thus making a nice contrast for photographers, attracts
immediate attention. Moreover the positions of goodwill ambassadors provide
international clout and offer to their holders “clear advantages of both credibility
and ability to expand personal networks”.28 Also, celebrity activism can reflect
other self-interests like the effort to change a tarnished image or to distract
public attention from past scandals. Clearly, personal interests drive celebrity
involvement in global causes. When they visit poor countries or donate money
to charities they usually do it with the maximum of publicity. Celebrity activism
is done rather professionally: many stars employ “philanthropic advisors” that
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prepare notes, organise meetings and develop priorities. Some celebrities are
at least as much motivated by self-promotion as by philanthropy. But the
commitment and quality of celebrity engagement varies widely. And there is a
lot of evidence that many of their actions reflect genuine interest. As Bill
Clinton said in a recent interview: “It’s easy . . . to say ‘Oh, this is not serious,
[artists, including movie stars] are just trying to get press’. My experience has
been this is not true.”29
Some celebrities seem extremely sincere. However, in general it is extremely dif-
ficult to determine what people’s motivations really are. Angelina Jolie has not
only visited refugee camps around the world but she has also donated more
than $6 million to help them. The actress has said that she gets paid a “ridiculous
amount of money” and that she has decided to donate one third of it to charity.30
Some, however, dispute her good intentions. According to a commentator “she
is trying to create a brand image that lets Americans forget about her role in
breaking up Brad Pitt and Jennifer Aniston”.31
The second factor that explains celebrity activism is diffusion. Celebrities
mobilise celebrities. A clear case is Bono who “built the superhighway between
Africa and Hollywood”.32 In 2004, he was invited to Brad Pitt’s home to
address a group of celebrities that included Tom Hanks, Sean Penn, Julia
Roberts, Justin Timberlake and the architect Frank Gehry. Pitt joined and Bono
played a crucial role in mobilising many celebrities in the One Campaign33 to
push for “an additional 1% of the U.S. budget toward providing basic needs
like health, education, clean water and food” in Africa. Bono has also recruited
George Clooney. He and some other celebrities (like Hepburn) have also acted
as examples that have impressed others who have then attempted to mimic
28. Andrew F. Cooper, “Beyond Hollywood and the Boardroom”, Georgetown Journal of International
Affairs, Vol. 8, No. 2 (2007), p. 127.
29. Danna Harman, “Star Power Brings Attention to Africa”, Christian Science Monitor (22 August
2007), available: ,http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/0822/p01s01-woaf.html. (accessed 5 June 2008).
30. Danna Harman, “Can Celebrities Really Get Results?”, Christian Science Monitor (23 August
2007), available: ,http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/0823/p01s02-woaf.html. (accessed 5 June 2008).
31. Drezner, op. cit., p. 24.
32. Quoted in Traub, op. cit.
33. Available: ,http://www.one.org/. (accessed 20 July 2008).
262 Asteris Huliaras and Nikolaos Tzifakis
Sean Penn was also very much engaged in the campaign against the US invasion
of Iraq. However, most celebrity activists today tend to avoid the most controver-
sial domestic or international political issues. There is an obvious reason for that:
political controversies endanger their careers. The fight against global malnu-
trition and AIDS or the call for the deployment of a peace-enforcing mission in
Darfur are indeed political but, in a sense, rather “soft” issues for Western govern-
ments’ foreign policies. Celebrity campaigners’ real message to policy makers in
Washington and London is a call for “more attention” to Africa than a demand
for radically changed policies. Bono asks for more aid and more debt relief. He
does not question the structures of the global economic system.
Celebrities tend to endorse legitimate causes. This in turn has enabled politicians
to sign up to celebrity causes; pop singers and actors are courted at the highest
level of national government. In 2002 the White House insisted that, during the
announcement of the Millennium Challenge Account, Bono should stand next to
President Bush. During the 2007 G8 Summit in Heiligendamm the U2 singer
secured separate meetings not only with the US president but with the German
Chancellor and the French President as well. When Stephen Harper, the Prime
Minister of Canada, said he was too busy to meet him, Bono stated that it was
Harper who had “blocked progress” on aid to Africa. The Canadian prime minister
changed course and promised to find time for a meeting with the Irish singer.37
Politicians have found out that they cannot—even if they chose to—ignore cele-
brities. Indeed, politicians—who feel the erosion of their legitimacy as fewer and
fewer people turn out to vote—find in celebrities “a perfect way to connect with
the population at large and to give the sense that politics can make a difference”.38
But what’s the impact of celebrity activism? This question can be discussed at
three levels: in terms of public awareness, fundraising and political lobbying.
34. A good example is provided in the case study that follows. It concerns Farrow’s assailing of
Steven Spielberg for working as an artistic consultant to the Beijing Olympics opening ceremony.
35. James Panton, “Pop Goes Politics”, The World Today, Vol. 63, No. 6 (2007), p. 5.
36. Mark Lawson, “Unfair and Unbalanced”, The Guardian (10 February 2006), available: ,http://
www.guardian.co.uk/world/2006/feb/10/usa.pressandpublishing. (accessed 8 May 2008).
37. Gideon Rachman, “The Aid Crusade and Bono’s Brigade”, Financial Times (29 October
2007), available: ,http://us.ft.com/ftgateway/superpage.ft?news_id¼fto102920071419060865. (accessed
10 October 2009).
38. Panton, op. cit., p. 6.
Celebrity Activism in International Relations 263
39. Matthew A. Baum, Soft News Goes to War: Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy in the New
Media Age (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003).
40. Drezner, op. cit., p. 25.
41. “Africa Hot Destination for Committed Celebrities”, Associated Press (19 June 2006), available:
,http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/13371729/. (accessed 21 July 2008).
42. Baum, op. cit., p. 288.
43. Mmoma Ejiofor, “Generous Celebs”, Forbes (5 May 2006); see also The Chronicle of Philanthropy,
available: ,http://philanthropy.com/., available: ,http://www.forbes.com/2006/05/04/celebrity_
charity_giving_cx_me_0505feat_ls.html. (accessed 20 July 2008).
44. Ejiofor, op. cit.
45. Nora Boustany, “Hollywood Stars Find an Audience for Social Causes”, Washington Post (10
June 2007), p. A01.
46. Ibid.
47. Interview with Jonathan Watts, The Guardian (26 August 2006), available: ,http://www.
guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2006/aug/26/comment.highereducation. (accessed 14 July 2008).
264 Asteris Huliaras and Nikolaos Tzifakis
Case Studies
Princess Diana and the Campaign to Ban Anti-personnel Landmines
In the early 1990s, about 1,000 NGOs from more than 60 countries launched a
vigorous transnational campaign calling for a total ban on anti-personnel landmines.
They established an umbrella organisation, the International Campaign to Ban
Landmines (ICBL) and organised conferences, media events and public demon-
strations that included the “placing of mountains of shoes on legislative grounds
to symbolise those who no longer need footwear”.49 At that time, it was reported
that there were up to 110 million mines deployed in 64 countries that were
responsible for killing or maiming about 26,000 people per year.50 As the campaign
gathered momentum several important people added their voices to the cause.
Among them were UN Secretary-General Boutros-Boutros Ghali, Pope John-Paul
II, Archbishop Desmond Tutu, the Dalai Lama and Diana, Princess of Wales.51
Very few people attracted more media attention than Diana, both during her
lifetime and, especially, at the time of her tragic death. Diana’s life is the archetype
of the princess myth. She was a relative unknown, beautiful young woman,
discovered by the heir apparent prince. Despite the subsequent divorce and the
resulting clashes with the House of Windsor, she retained her celebrity status
by focusing on helping the less fortunate and creating an image of a “people’s
princess”.
Since the mid-1980s, the Princess of Wales had become well known for her
support of numerous charities. Indeed, this stemmed from her role as member
of the royal family. Her visits to hospitals and humanitarian organisations were
typical of the role model of royal patronage. However, Diana did develop an
48. Rob Long, “Using Your Star Power”, Foreign Policy, No. 154 (2006), pp. 74– 78.
49. Richard Price, “Reversing the Gun Sights: Transnational Civil Society Targets Land Mines”,
International Organization, Vol. 52, No. 3 (1998), p. 618.
50. Ibid.
51. Ibid., p. 621.
Celebrity Activism in International Relations 265
landmines, where she toured a minefield and was photographed with limbless
children. The whole trip was organised by the British Red Cross. In mid-June
1997 she attended a Washington fundraising event and called on the Clinton
administration to “ban landmines and make the world a better place”. And
three weeks before her tragic death she toured Bosnia, in a trip planned by two
other humanitarian NGOs, where again she posed with youthful victims who
had been maimed by mines. There she met a young Muslim woman crying for
her child in a cemetery. The emotional encounter was reported and seen world-
wide.54 Diana was successful in attracting wide public attention to the campaign
to ban landmines and generated innumerable stories for the reporters who
followed her. Photogenic, victim of an admittedly adulterous husband and
outcast from the royal family, the Princess was the ideal celebrity. But, above all,
Diana understood well the power of the media: although the paparazzi had
made her life difficult, she was always camera-ready, willing to give interviews
or respond positively to other media requests and she never filed a single
complaint against newspapers for violating her private life.55
On 30 August 1997, the Princess of Wales was killed in a car crash in Paris. An
estimated 2.5 billion people watched the worldwide satellite transmission of the
funeral to 200 countries in 44 languages.56 “If the whole world was watching”,
reported The Washington Post, “then the whole world was weeping too”.57
Emotions ran high: she was too young, too beautiful and too unhappy to die. In
the words of The Economist: “Had she lived, Diana would eventually become
less beautiful, less interesting, perhaps less unhappy.”58 Her death immortalised
her as the “queen of hearts”.
52. William Over, Human Rights in the International Public Sphere: Civic Discourse for the 21st Century
(Stanford: Ablex, 1999), p. 74.
53. Ibid.
54. Ibid.
55. Raphael Cohen-Almagor, Speech, Media and Ethics: The Limits of Free Expression (London:
Palgrave, 1996), p. 96.
56. Michael Blowen, “With Grace and Depth, ABC Ruled”, Boston Globe (7 September 1997), p. A32.
57. Tom Shales, “Live Television Coverage Unites the World in a Good Cry”, Washington Post
(7 September 1997), p. 23.
58. “Carnival Queen: Diana’s Reactionary Legacy”, The Economist (25 August 2007), p. 38.
266 Asteris Huliaras and Nikolaos Tzifakis
Shortly after Diana’s death, the campaign to ban landmines gained a success.
The real political influence of her very short involvement is difficult to gauge.
Some have argued that her role had been extremely significant. “The chances of
gaining a comprehensive and effective treaty”, a journalist concludes confidently,
“seemed unlikely—until Diana became involved.”59 A few hours after her funeral,
400 delegates from about 100 countries assembled in Oslo to negotiate the treaty to
ban landmines. Some participants argued that it was Diana’s role in the campaign
that persuaded some previously reluctant governments to send representatives.60
The Prime Minister of Norway opened the conference by stating that the treaty
should be titled the Diana, Princess of Wales Treaty.61 Then the delegates observed
a minute’s silence in honour of the dead princess. On 3 – 4 December 1997 the
Convention Prohibiting the Use, Sale, Production, Transfer, and Stockpiling of
Anti-personnel Landmines (Mine Ban Treaty) was opened for signature in
Ottawa, Canada. The six original ICBL campaigners were awarded the Nobel
Prize for Peace. Some claimed that had she still been alive, Diana might have
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been honoured as well. The process of signing and ratification moved unusually
quickly. In March 1999 the treaty came into force as the 40th nation ratified its pro-
visions. It was an amazing result: within a few years the campaigners had
managed to transform the global perception of landmines from a security issue
best left to military specialists to a major humanitarian issue of great importance
to ordinary people.
Others, more persuasively, have claimed that the Princess of Wales’ influence
was only important in mobilising public opinion. In particular, her visit to
Angola is considered by many observers as a turning point in the ICBL campaign.
The photographs were powerful and played a significant role in raising public
awareness at a time when the campaign was gathering momentum. In Andrew
Cooper’s words, “the picture of Princess Diana with an Angolan land mine
victim in 1997 galvanised the initiative from one owned by an impressive (but
still not overwhelming) group of NGOs—with support from a cluster of second-
ary countries—to one that had broad-based backing from an attentive public and
the mass media”.62 Indeed, the effect was largely felt in Britain. As Kenneth
R. Rutherford argues, Diana’s Angola visit created more publicity about British
policy towards landmines than it had ever experienced hitherto.63
In terms of policy, some observers argue that Diana did play a significant role in
persuading the British government to change its policy towards landmines.64
There was indeed a spectacular change of British policy from total opposition to
full support for a ban within a matter of months. However, this was less the
effect of campaigners’ pressure than the result of governmental change. The
Tory government was among the treaty’s strongest opponents. Diana’s visit to
59. D’Arcy Jenish, “The Lady with a Cause”, Maclean’s, Vol. 110 (15 September 1997), p. 55.
60. Cited in D’Arcy Jenish, op. cit.
61. Kenneth R. Rutherford, The Evolving Arms Control Agenda: Implications of the Role of NGOs in
Banning Anti-personnel Landmines (London: Routledge, 2005), p. 589.
62. Cooper, Celebrity Diplomacy, op. cit., p. 25.
63. Kenneth R. Rutherford, “Post-Cold War Superpower? Mid-size State and NGO Collaboration in
Banning Landmines”, in Kenneth R. Rutherford, Stefan Brem and Richard A. Matthew, Reframing the
Agenda: The Impact of NGO and Middle Power Cooperation in International Security Policy (Westport, CT:
Praeger, 2003), p. 30.
64. Rutherford, The Evolving Arms Control Agenda, op. cit.
Celebrity Activism in International Relations 267
Angola and her comments in favour of a total ban of landmines deviated from
official policy and provoked negative reactions from the British government. A
junior defence minister dismissed her as a “loose cannon”.65 A Tory MP compared
her concern for landmine victims to “Brigitte Bardot and cats” and added that she
“was not up to understanding an important, sophisticated argument”.66 However,
the opposition Labour Party had already promised to ban landmines. Thus, when
assuming office in May 1997, the new Blair government changed the previous
Tory government’s policy and announced its support for a ban but with significant
reservations such as “the right to use mines in exceptional circumstances”67. This
directly contravened the ICBL’s goals of allowing no exceptions. However, under
the pressure of Princess Diana and several British NGOs, the Blair government
again changed its position and announced its support for a complete ban. This
in turn increased the diplomatic isolation of the United States, one of the most
vocal opponents of the treaty, and limited its ability to build a strong opposition
to it.68 A December 1997 US intelligence report that leaked to the British press
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65. “Princess Diana Sparks Landmines Row”, BBC (15 January 1997).
66. Cited in Leon V. Sigal, Negotiating Minefields: The Landmines Ban in American Politics (London:
Routledge, 2005), p. 185.
67. Rutherford, The Evolving Arms Control Agenda, op. cit.; idem, “Post-Cold War Superpower?”,
op. cit.
68. Idem, The Evolving Arms Control Agenda, op. cit.
69. Rob Evans and Richard Norton-Taylor, “US Feared Diana’s Mine Action”, The Guardian (26 August
1999), available: ,http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/1999/aug/26/monarchy.freedomofinformation.
(accessed 5 October 2009); David Hencke and Rob Evans, “Diana’s Landmine Crusade Put Tories in
a Panic”, The Guardian (3 January 2000), available: ,http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2000/jan/03/
monarchy.freedomofinformation. (accessed 5 October 2009).
70. Orders of the Day—Landmines Bill, House of Commons Debates, 10 July 2008.
71. Price, op. cit., pp. 639– 640.
72. Cited in Cooper, Celebrity Diplomacy, op. cit., p. 26.
268 Asteris Huliaras and Nikolaos Tzifakis
Mines Advisory Group, a British NGO and founding member of the ICBL, was
also similar: “I always had this real frustration that we could always get stories
in the Guardian, but you were preaching to the converted. We wanted to have
stories on the front page of the Sun, the Mirror, and the Mail”.73 Diana served
this goal well. The Princess of Wales’ support gave the ICBL campaign great
momentum. As Andrew Cooper correctly observes: “it is a now accepted view
that the campaign only took off when Princess Diana lent her name and face to
it”.74 Of course, her tragic death played a very significant role in attracting
media attention and public support. Few doubt that her death speeded up the
treaty process by several years. The princess was probably far more influential
after death. Even today, the Diana Memorial Trust continues to allocate funding
to charitable interests, including organisations that are involved in mine-clearance
activities.
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continues to act. In contrast to other celebrities, Farrow’s activism does not seem to
be part of a career strategy.
By 2004 the crisis in the Darfur region of western Sudan was attracting her
attention. According to a recent interview, she was moved by two articles by
Samantha Power on the 10th anniversary of the Rwandan genocide.78 Farrow
decided to travel to Darfur to see the situation for herself. There she met a
woman whose baby had been torn from her back and killed by the Sudanese
militia, the Janjaweed. Farrow said that this woman told her: “Tell people what
is happening here in Darfur or we will all be slaughtered by our own govern-
ment.”79 On her return to the States, Farrow launched a website (www.
miafarrow.org) devoted to the Sudanese crisis. Although her first trip to Darfur
was made in her official capacity (UNICEF) she returned to the region seven
times as an individual. Each of these trips made her increasingly passionate.
She gave a number of interviews and appeared on several TV shows talking
about the atrocities. Her photos of Darfur appeared in People magazine in July
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2006. But above all she chose to campaign through major newspapers, writing
(often with her 19-year-old son Ronan or the Nobel Peace Prize winning activist
Jody Williams) in the Wall Street Journal, Chicago Tribune, LA Times, Washington
Post, Boston Globe and other dailies. She started to focus on the Chinese government
for its close relationship with Sudan. The most influential of her op-eds was a
March 2007 piece in the Wall Street Journal in which she and her son used the
term “Genocide Olympics” to characterise the 2008 Olympic Games.80 “Beijing”,
argued the Farrows, “is uniquely positioned to put a stop to the slaughter,
yet they have so far been unabashed in their refusal to do so”. In particular, they
cautioned director Steven Spielberg—the artistic director of the 2008 Olympics—
that he could go down in history as the Leni Riefenstahl of the Beijing Games, a
reference to a German director who made Nazi propaganda films. Four days
later, Spielberg sent a letter to the Chinese President Hu Jindao, asking Beijing to
use its influence in Sudan to “bring an end to the human suffering there”. And
after a few weeks, the well-known director announced that he would no longer
act as an artistic advisor for the Olympic opening and closing ceremonies.81 This
is a classical case of a celebrity mobilising another celebrity.
Mia Farrow created her own “Dream for Darfur” initiative (based on the
Olympics motto “One World, One Dream”), demonstrating in front of the
Chinese embassy in Washington DC, organising symbolic torch relays in countries
that have suffered from genocides (Rwanda, Bosnia, Armenia, Cambodia) and
insisting that Olympic sponsors lean on China to pressure Sudan to let in the
UN peacekeepers. In August 2007 she offered to trade her freedom for that of
Suleiman Jamous, a Sudanese elder. She wrote a letter to the Sudanese president
arguing that her freedom was worth sacrificing because Jamous “will apply
his energies toward creating the just and lasting peace that the Sudanese
78. “Powerful Acts: An Interview with Mia Farrow”, Guernica Magazine (July 2007), available:
,http://www.guernicamag.com/interviews/367/powerful_acts/. (accessed July 2008).
79. McFerran, op. cit.
80. Ronan Farrow and Mia Farrow, “The Genocide Olympics”, Wall Street Journal (28 March 2007).
81. Dave Skretta, “Farrow, Spielberg Assail China on Darfur”, Associated Press (12 February 2008),
available: ,http://www.huffingtonpost.com/huff-wires/20080212/oly-farrow-beijing/. (accessed 25
August 2008).
270 Asteris Huliaras and Nikolaos Tzifakis
people deserve and hope for”.82 The Sudanese government did not accept Farrow’s
offer but freed Jamous. In general, Farrow’s “Genocide Olympics” campaign
seemed sophisticated and calculated, belying “the image of celebrities as
enthusiastic amateurs”.83 In order to build networks and aiming to mobilise
rather than antagonise athletes, Farrow did not call for a boycott of the Beijing
Olympics. She asked only for a boycott of the Games’ opening ceremonies.84
However, press reports on Farrow’s role in the Darfur campaign tend to over-
estimate her importance and also tend to overestimate its impact on China’s
policy towards Sudan. There are two “power illusions”. First, Mia Farrow was
neither the first celebrity that focused on the Darfur crisis nor the first activist to
blame China for its policy vis-à-vis Sudan. In fact Farrow was and is part of a
large coalition of US NGOs, ethnic lobbies, religious groups and celebrities that
focused on the plight of the western region of Sudan. The Darfur conflict
started in 2003 and quickly escalated, leading to 200,000 deaths and 2.5 million
displaced. In April 2004, the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum issued its
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first-ever “genocide alert” for Darfur. At about the same time the American
Jewish World Service and 100 evangelical and human rights groups joined
forces to form the Save Darfur Coalition. The Coalition’s membership grew
quickly to more than 180 groups and was strengthened by the active involvement
of celebrities such as George Clooney and Don Cheadle.85 It campaigned con-
stantly, aiming to raise public awareness and affect the policies of the US
administration.86
By 2006, and after an internal debate, the US Darfur activists turned their sights
on China. Apart from having a monopoly over Sudanese oil production,87 China
was the main arms supplier to the Sudanese government and its policy of blocking
the imposition of sanctions by the UN Security Council had undermined the
efforts of other Security Council members to end the crisis. Above all, China
was the host of the 2008 Summer Olympics and was considered vulnerable to
external pressure. The 2006 speed-skating gold medallist Joey Cheek founded
Team Darfur, a group of almost 250 athletes from 42 countries.88 And in 2008
eight Nobel Peace Prize laureates wrote an open letter to Hu Jindao, urging
Beijing to exert its political and economic leverage on Sudan’s government to
help end the crisis in Darfur.89
So Farrow was far from alone. Even in her own “Dream for Darfur” campaign
she worked together with well-known human rights activists such as Jill Savitt,
82. Mike Nizza, “Mia Farrow’s Darfur Gambit”, New York Times (8 August 2007), available: ,http://
thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/08/06/mia-farrows-darfur-gambit/. (accessed 25 June 2008).
83. Andrew F. Cooper and Andrew Schrumm, “How Mia Farrow Got UN Troops in Darfur”,
Embassy (25 April 2007), available: ,http://www.cigionline.org/articles/2007/04/how-mia-farrow-
got-un-troops-darfur. (accessed 12 June 2008).
84. Mark Starr, “Darfur is Low-hanging Fruit for Beijing”, Newsweek (17 April 2008), available:
,http://www.newsweek.com/id/132417. (accessed 25 August 2008).
85. J. Stephen Morrison, “Will Darfur Steal the Olympic Spotlight?”, Washington Quarterly, Vol. 31,
No. 3 (2008), p. 184.
86. Asteris Huliaras, “Evangelists, Oil Companies and Terrorists: The Bush Administration’s Policy
toward Sudan”, Orbis, Vol. 50, No. 4 (2006), p. 716.
87. “The Oil Factor”, The Economist (23 June 2007), pp. 54–55.
88. Victor D. Cha, “Beijing’s Olympic-sized Catch-22”, Washington Quarterly, Vol. 31, No. 3 (2008),
p. 110.
89. Ibid., p. 109.
Celebrity Activism in International Relations 271
the Sudan expert Eric Reeves, the basketball player Ira Newble and the president
of the American Jewish World Service Ruth Messinger.90 In fact, the campaign
was characterised by a chain effect that makes it difficult to distinguish who
mobilised whom.
The second illusion is the overestimation of the campaign’s impact. Several
press stories have noted how successful the “Genocide Olympics” campaign
was in changing Chinese behaviour to pressure Sudan into accepting UN peace-
keepers. In a recent interview, Anthony Lake argued that “the pressure brought on
[the Chinese] by people like Mia Farrow and Steven Spielberg over the Olympics
apparently led to their doing more [. . .] over Darfur”.91 Two analysts went
even further, writing: “how Mia Farrow got UN troops in Darfur”.92 And a
journalist for the New York Times concluded that the “credit” for the “surprising
success” goes to Hollywood—with Mia Farrow playing a “crucial role”.93
At first glance, although it seems that the campaign played a role in shifting
China’s policy towards Sudan, Beijing’s policy started to change long before the
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“Genocide Olympics” campaign reached its peak.94 Indeed, in 2005, China did
not veto the Security Council resolution that referred to the Prosecutor of the Inter-
national Criminal Court the alleged crimes that were committed primarily by
government forces in Darfur.95 Since then, and long before the “Genocide
Olympics” campaign gathered momentum, China showed a willingness to
engage in Darfur. In November 2006, the Chinese ambassador to the United
Nations attempted to broker a compromise deal on the so-called “Annan Plan”
which called for an expanded UN peacekeeping role in Darfur.96 During his
February 2007 visit to Sudan—three months before Farrow’s article was
published—President Hu Zindao aired his criticism and told his hosts that it is
imperative to stop the deaths in Darfur.97 Thus, in reality, the change of Chinese
policy towards Sudan was far less abrupt than many commentators assume. It
evolved gradually within a three-year period from a rather passive posture to a
clear position and, finally, to a policy of active persuasion. According to some
analysts, this was not only the result of external pressure but also an attempt to
promote long-term stability and the need to protect China’s long-term interests.98
In short, Mia Farrow’s contribution in altering Chinese policy was grossly exag-
gerated—probably the result of extensive publicity. In general, our original
90. Nora Boustany, “Symbolic Torch Relay Aims to Shine Light on China, Darfur and Death”,
Washington Post (15 August 2007), available: ,http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
article/2007/08/14/AR2007081401489.html. (accessed 26 July 2008).
91. Anthony Lake, “Brangelina vs. Chinese Mercantilism in Africa”, New Perspectives Quarterly, Vol.
24, No. 4 (2007), p. 17.
92. Cooper and Schrumm, op. cit.
93. Helene Cooper, “Darfur Collides With Olympics, and China Yields”, New York Times (13 April
2007), available: ,http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/13/washington/13diplo.html?_r¼1. (accessed
10 November 2008).
94. Stephanie Kleine-Ahlbrandt and Andrew Small, “China’s New Dictatorship Diplomacy: Is
Beijing Parting with Pariahs?”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 87, No. 1 (2008), pp. 38– 56.
95. Security Council Resolution 1593 (2005) of 31 March 2005.
96. Daniel Large, Sudan’s Foreign Relations with Asia, ISS Paper No. 158 (Pretoria: Institute for
Security Studies, February 2008), p. 9.
97. Michael Wines, “China’s Influence in Africa Arouses Some Resistance”, New York Times
(10 February 2007), p. 3.
98. Jonathan Holslag, “China’s Diplomatic Manoeuvring on the Question of Dafur”, Journal of
Contemporary China, Vol. 17, No. 54 (2008), pp. 72–84.
272 Asteris Huliaras and Nikolaos Tzifakis
Another expert on Sudan has claimed that US activists have both “gravely limited
the ability of US leadership to seek new compromises” in its dealings with
Khartoum and at the same time have embarrassed Beijing by refusing to acknowl-
edge changes in China’s position towards Sudan.102 Although these are the typical
criticisms aired against celebrities (“they do not understand the politics”,
“simplistic views of reality”, etc.), they also reflect the analytical puzzlement
that characterise the ways the academic community regards the phenomenon.
Conclusions
This article has argued that there is a lack of research on the role of individuals
who are not acting as state agents in IR. The underdevelopment of theory on
the role of transnational individual activists is in sharp contrast to the enhanced
profile and the more advanced role that the latter are seeking to play.
The article has attempted to organise and systematically present the meagre
relevant literature by analytically dividing it into two categories. The first refers
to the external conditions that may enable individuals to play a more influential
role in the international scene, and the second concerns the personal character-
istics of prominent transnational activists.
Celebrity activism has been portrayed as a distinct type of transnational politi-
cal activity that has recently grown in importance and visibility. The study has
99. Philip J. Cunningham, “A Sorry Hollywood Story”, New York Times (1 December 2008),
available: ,http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/21/opinion/21iht-edcunningham.1.10273373.html.
(accessed 5 August 2008).
100. Ibid.
101. Andrew S. Natsios, “Beyond Darfur: Sudan’s Slide toward Civil War”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 87,
No. 3 (2008), pp. 77– 93.
102. Morrison, op. cit., p. 187.
Celebrity Activism in International Relations 273
campaigns who partnered with other like-minded actors to jointly advance their
causes. Diana cooperated with Elizabeth Dole and NGOs in organising her trips
to sites with heavy concentrations of landmines. And Mia Farrow’s case demon-
strated the operation of a “chain effect” in her activities explaining both her
modus operandi in “Dream for Darfur” and her attempt to bring aboard more
people to her cause. Overall, both case studies illustrate that celebrity activism
has become more pragmatic recently in the sense that it avoids getting involved
in controversial issues and it demonstrates greater restraint in its demands and
manifestations.
However, a comparative view of the two case studies also reveals the existence
of an important difference in the modus operandi of these activists. Farrow’s
campaign seems to have been more sophisticated. Her activism focused on
a specific event, the Beijing Olympic Games, and symbolically targeted the
opening ceremonies. Farrow had an elaborate tactic whose aim was to put
pressure on China to reconsider its policy on Darfur without, however, generating
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the frustration of other states, or alienating the participating athletes from her
cause. On the other hand, Diana’s campaign was much less complex and sophis-
ticated. It seemed to stop at selected acts aiming at increasing public awareness.
Some may argue that this criticism is unjust as Diana’s campaign against the
use of landmines was not long enough in time to completely unfold. Still, one
may convincingly argue that the aforementioned difference in the method of
work of Diana and Farrow illustrates that celebrity activism has recently
become more professional and sophisticated in order to bring results.
To conclude, the article has demonstrated that the literature on the role of indi-
vidual social agents has helped us gain a valuable insight into celebrity activism.
But still the phenomenon is so diverse and complex that the development of a
theoretical approach is both difficult and necessary.