.

I
Battle Orders

Japanese Army in
World War I1
Conq the Pacific 1941-42
,&,
 RE* publashed In Great h e m 1n 2m by &pmy Publahlng Elms GUR Acknowledgements
C h s p e l w . Bodey. W o r d OX2 3LP.Unuted Ulngdnm
Ern~ll'~ n f o ~ o r p ~ u b l ~ s hcorn
ung
Howard, and
Special thanks are due to Ak~raTakizawa.Will[am
D 2M5 0 1 p y Publlshln~Ltd
Shigeyuki Mituno.

All rrghl~m e d Awn fmany hhl- dealung br rhc prpore 01 pr4y.w study
fe#arch, cmlclzm rrr rwlew. as oerrnmcd undrr h e C o ~ n g Oengns
h~ and R t e m
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or trnnrmmed bn any farm or by any mnnr elxtronk. elervroi, chemrul, rneJunlLal.
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the copyrlghr w e r Enqulne should bc ~ d r e s s c dto the Publhhen

ISW 1 8.1 176 789 1

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Key to military symbols

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Division Bnpde Regrnent Battalion

' Platoon U Sectron U SquadU E

Infantry !
Cauzlry ! Anlllery ! ~
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Anti-tank (
Armorlmnk o
A t r Forte (
Ami-aircralr ~
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Headquarters Infantry Eun Lrghr machme gun Mlllrary Pollce Malnrenance Mortar .s-
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 Introduction
The genesis of the Irnperlal JapaneseArmy The ourbreak of t i e PacificWar. 194 1

Combat mission
Southern Operadons farces

Doctrine
Offensive operations Seishi~rrengthof will Amphibious operations

Unit organization
Unit designatton practices -Task organintion for combat .The 1940 swndarel & infantry division
The square infantry dlvislan Independent brigades .Tank regfmanrs

Tactics
Envelopment and encirclement .Tank and artillery coordination
Small-unit tactics in the Philippines

Weapons and equipment

Platoon weawns Companylbamlion weapons
Regimenral weapons Ardltery Tanks

Command, control, communications, and intelligence

.
Command Cornrnunltatians Incelllgence

Corn bat operations

The Philippines Netherlands East lndies South Seas New Guinea

Lessons !earned

Chronology

Bibliography

Abbreviations and linear measurements

Index
Introduction

'IZ'e. t ~ vthe grace of H c s v ~ n ,Emperor nf Japan, reatcd o n the 'Throne of

a line unbrclkrn fnr aRcr eternal, enjoin tipon ye. Our loyal and brave
F L I hjtcts:

\\:e liereh!. declare war nn the United States of Amcrica and tlre Rritish
Cmpirc, Tlic mcn and officers of Our :\nny and Y a w <hall do their u m o ~ t
rn prn5cc11 tin# the war, Our puhlic servan tr or various departtncnts
rhall perform laithhhl!. and diligently their appointed tasks, and a11 other
rubjccis of Ours shall pursue their rc.cpcctivc duties: the cntirc nation with
n united tvill xhall mobilize thcir total ~trrnflh ro that nothing will
miscam- in the attainment of Ottr war aims.

lapan (Xipporrr viewed 1:orId War 11. which i t called t h c Grealrr Fast !I$il
War tDrri 7ijn .Trrrrr~Scv~krrnr).a3 a rerics ot intcrrelatecf wars. It had clccupivd
part5 af Sort11 China in 1931, and the war i l l China [Slrirrrr [EIlrrll hega~lin
earnc.\t in 1'3.37, in which Japan continued its crerping expansion. Conflict
with t h e Ewlct Lttlion had nccurred o n [lie Siherian hordcr In 1938-39 in
blancl~uria,r>r hiancIrirkn, ~vherca pt1pllet gtatc had heen cstahli~hedby Japan
in 1932. In J u l y 1941, lapan occupicd French Indochina in Stlr~theastAsia.
The Pacific \Var (7iti/1(~ivo SIJIICIIJ hcgan st 02.15, Dcc~mherX , 2601 Tokyo Tirnc'
( " X-D;Iv" I rc11t.n 1 hc 2 J Coilit~crnExpcditionar\, I:Tect bombarded Rritirh forces
a t Kata Aharu. Walaya fr~llorrctltry ~ ~ ~ r ~ p l ~ ilandings. l ~ i o u s The firrt bomb
dctonaled nn Ford Irlar~d,Peart Harlmr. Hawaii 0.3.4.5 Tokyo ~ i m r 'The .
ramp day, bpanesr. land, sea, anit air forces also struck the northern
l'hilip]line<, elzervherc tn %tal;lya, Singapore, I-long Kong, Guam, Wake, and
nthrr I'nrific idantis.
'Thc goal of thc G r ~ a t c Enrt
r A ~ f aIZ9r I V ; ~trs Jrivc the armed Forces of the
Mre~lrtncolonial pnwcrx from the resource-rich Netherlands East lndies (NEI 1,
t h c UC-tnntrt>llc>rl I'hilippinc~, thr Commonwealth pos~csxions in the
South Pxiflc, and Hrili511-controtled Malaya and Burma. :\ military operation
c ~ fgrrat i ~ ~ a g n i t u dwould
c inflic-t a dccisive defeat. rcwlting i r ~the I V e t c r n
nittinns suing f o r pcacc, and allowing Japan to cstat)li~hthe Greater I:a~t X ~ i a
C o - t x - t ~ p p ~ rSIIIIP~C
it~ (/hiT i l t 1 K ! ~ o i u j - K c l ~Osrensilsly
~!, thi.; rvaq aimed a t t h e
mutual hcnrfit and lihpratlnn af all :!rians; In r~ality,i t s rnal war Sipprm's
enrichment. Japan wot~ldcc~lnniseand maintain tntal cnntrr7? "ryei East Asia
exploiting its resorlrccs and crtablishing a securip tnnc tn ptl,t.rr: : frnm tIlc
thrcat of il'r~iterninfluence.
Thir honk covers tllc pcrind from the beginninl: c ~ fthe Grt:rtr F ~ r Asia t
W;ir in Ijecemher 1941 to the war's turning point in Itm? :":? Rattle nf
klidrvay. It covers opcratinns in the Pliillppine~,SEI, Y?,!
not t h n w in China or Southca5t :lsia. Future plannrc! r . ' 3- -
I l c ~ f i c ,1 ~ 1 t
:kc Rattle
Order series will corer ,lapane\c ripcrntinns in \tlu!h~-z.' ' * ' - 2 - 4 5 , tIlc

II mdrc~redlor m m p l e , 03 45.- apposed ca 0344 Date* m r t al the Inremarroni~1- 9C1C KI

thc can Jyanhad adopred the Wcstsm r o l ~ ro? , Grtpnan, rallrndxr In 187: to m'-- 3a:ea
b c l adnnced
~ threc t o sbr w k l to brwg days a d month%~ n t o
common a l l g n r c . * U?r
b e a n IN zhcWertern year of 660 BC lthp loundlq of tthebmam Srare.prcder-%c= : - ,441
bc81;~dtsagnarcd 260 1
5011th Pacific and Ncn7 C;liinca Irnm Ic~4? In IL)44,t h c 19.14-45 dct'cn3r nf the
Philippinex, and Central and \\rest Pacific ~>pcr~tionr frrrni 1943 to 1945.

The genesis of t h e Imperial Japanese Army

Prior 10 rhc 18705, lapan !\'a$ a Ieudal rocict?"nrmprihing i>ilcr 71111 rcnin-
alltunonlous domailir rulcd bv warlord\ al the \trr)rrmri clan. 'l'liey owcd Ihcir
altcginnre t c ~1f1c S l l r ~ ~ ~ thr ~ u l ,~nilitavntlcr; the F.nlperur had becn a mcrc
fiplrcilcnd sincc thc Intc-12th tentur\.. For centlrricr Kipl>r>rlcui5tctl in the
form ot a Mfcstcrn rnecl~rvalstate, and t m s nihjctt to almost crrntinttuu> c i ~ i l
war a n d rchcllion.
lapan w a s opened to i l k s t e r n influence in tlze rr.alrc of Ci";Coi~irnodorr
Matthew Parry's 1853 visit. I t 5 exposure tn ri~nrlcrntechnnlngicr, c~pcc-ially
with regard lo wrapon$ rc5ultcd in a wric5 t ~ tradc l trcatiw with l l ~ cCTS,
Britain. Kuqria, France, and Hnlland. \ I popular Jngan of thc time wnl, "Eastern
cthicr. \Vestern science, " btit othcn alch as "lllc~erct h c kmpcror, cspcl t h e
harlrarians" demonrttated t h e tcnsinnq that sirnnlcred t,cnealh rlie rurtncc.
,\ltIiough Japan had I ~ c c intrt~duced ~l to firearms in lhe nlz~l-l hth century,
its d;c!p.trrrr~tr> armics st ill largcl!' cclmpri3cd \rvord-. \pear-, anrl t>o~v-arld-arrcitv-
arincd r[lrntrrni hacked IT^ prxar1t ievicr that owerl allegiance tn their partici~lar
ctan. R?. 1H60 rnurkets and cantrolw had come into wider ll'rc. In 1H62 rlfle
units [Slrotr~ijrvcre formed with a rnis of traclitionnl and modcrtl weapons.
and the first distinctions were made b ~ n % ~ cinfant? cn cavatn7,and nrt1lIery
t~ranchcs.In 1866 t l ~ cmodern SF~otirl, manned with na t i o n ~ist l strnltiri~i~ \ ~ \ l o
sought the rertoration of the Emperor, d c i e a t ~ dthe slrt),ptirrrrtr army in hattle.
The 6mpernr wat re<tored in 1868. Japan aI5o seized control of Okinawa and
rhe Ayukyu Islands in F M 7 .
The .\ftliii (Enlightened Rulel Era r lX6R1912 r sarv major cffnrt~to crtablish
lapan'$ r~ghtfulplsce in the rrorld and lruild 3 modern socict!.. Yot only wcrc
gcmernment and wcietr. con~iderahty\~'cstcmizcdanti mndcnl ind~~strialization
efforts b e g ~ n but , mllitary ad~isorsrvcrc rllco cnga~cd,mostly from France. I ~ i i t
with otlierr from Germally, I3i-itain, and America. Officer training rcllot,ls wcrc
estahli~hed,although train in^ was rertrictcd to company level. The Inlperial
Guards r KOIIOL*) were crtablisllrd in 187 I frtlrn t lit. exi3ting Imperial Rotlyguard
r ( ; o ~ / ~ i l t p nc rid
i ~ armcd a r ~ r ltmincd along i\'e:tern lines. In Fellruarv 1x71
scparatc arm!' and nai? rvcrc tomally C F ~ ~ ~ I I F IThe I P L armv
I. wa% callerl the
Siltrr~r~~rrrr or f i ~ k r r , ~ ~ ~ t ~ - J a p aor
n ' \tlir YatintiJ\ army.
Conwription w a s institutctl in I X 7 4 , r t ith srscrvc senlice required nCter three
years' active d u * Japan strclvc to t.rtahli5li a 1nodc.m natirinal arm!' and
fallowed rhc best Enropean nlndcls, atlapting tlicm to it> own requirerncrit~.In
the wake of Prutrin'r dervc.at nf I-rance in 1 X;O, la par1 ddopted German general
ctaft arlrl, organizatiuni~T prlnl-ipala iniplcnientin): it! znin tienera! Staff in
1879. The Genera2 Staff College rvas r~penecl in 18W. 'The LIilitan' l'olicc
1Kt>t'r7rrpr~itnil was ra~redIn 1881 and an lr~tendallceCrrrpq railrnitii~tratio~i and
service<)in 1888.
Tactically, Japan retained the mncept of massed troop formntionr, n ~ u c h
ar per tlic old hdt~d-to-llarrd battlcs. t a t h c t than the dispersed formalions
adnpted in Europe. Thr ~1a:- oft he ~ t ~ r r ~ r x r irvhn ri, lirprdnn government stipends,
wax corninn to an e r ~ dthough. 'I lin' were nffcrcd a final lump sum, \+-Rich
was made compulsory in 1876: thnw ~ ' h 1 7rejeclr~li t were fnrh~ddento rrear
word^.
In IRS5 the Ernpcror was given nvu mean$ nf direrting military authrwiy,
,prtrrri and p l t ~ w i :i t !+-as a move that wul~ldI~il~,e a major impart on how Japan
madc war i n t h r f~rtlire.rirr~rn-icmered conlmancl, ctrategy. training, trnr 113
deploymenl, and d i s c ~ p l ~ n'I'h~s e . was esecuted tl-iruugh t h e !\rnly Chief of Staff,
and impacted nn foreigm affairr. Ilv-pawing t h e Prinlt klinistcr and Cahinet.
(;lrrrwi diclatrd nlil~taryadminirtmtion, the Army's size, armament, wpplics,
and conscription, anti rmr esrcuted tlirnugh tlir M'ar Mlni~tcx.
 In .4umst 1894 Japm declared war on China to acllieve its goal of gaining
control of Korea, a longtime enemy. The stage had been set for ruch a mot^ long
before thir in 1881. when Japan" rrrcurity needs were defined to include the
possibility of trrritorjal expansion. In October 1894 the Japanese Army entered
hlanchusia in purnait of a battered Chinese arm!' driven from Korea. Japan's first
modern war, and its first overseas expedition in centuries, won the Empire Korca,
Formosa (Taiwan),the Pecadores Islands, and Liaotung Peninsula. In less than two
decades Japan had progr~sredfrom a collection of clan armies led by feudal
warlords wearing lacquered bamboo armor and kimonor and armed with swords
and spears, to a unified, six-divis~on,mmbined-arms force led by professional
nfficess and aimed with bolt-aaiun repeating rifle! and breech-loading artillery.
The Chinese army defeated in the Sino-JapaneseWar was admittedlv a poorly
armed and led rabble, but Japan would prove her military prowess again soon
after. Six more combined-arms divlslons were authorized in 1896.
The construction of the Trans-Siberia Railroad increased lapancsc Fcars of
Russian expansion in Siberia. In 1900 the Roxer Rebellion broke out in China,
and Japan provided almost a third of the troops for the eight-nation Pcking
relief expedition. As a result, Japan gained the right to station troops in China's
international settlementr, Peking and Tinsejn, and the China Garrison Army
was instituted. The 1904-05 Russo-Japanese War astounded the world with
Japan soundIy defeating Rurria e n both land and sea In a conflict over control
of Manchuria. rllltl~oughthe Russians did not posses5 the mort professional of
armies, and the Japanese had their own shortcomings. the war saw tlre defeat
of a long-established European potvcr by a n CJriental artnv still emerg-ing from
the medieval era.
In the Russo-Japanese War, the Japanese employed corps-level commands,
designated "armies." It began the war with 13 djiqsions and ended with f 7.
Six [note divisions were raised between 1305 and 1908 working toward the
goal of 25 standirlp, uobi) and 25 smaller reserve [Kohil divisions to serve as
rcplaccrnents for the standing divisions. At the same time the Navy adopted
its "cight-eight fleet" plan, comprising eight battleships and eight cruiserr. By
1907 there were 10 active divisions. 'The war Teft Japan in control of Russia's
Guandong (Kwantun~)Prninrula leased territory2, the Russian-huilt South
Manchuria Railroad, and in a strong enough position to annex Korea outright
in 19113. The Manchuria Garrison Force was ertablished to secure the newly
acquired territory. Japan war now in a perfect position to expand further into
China in 1931.
l h e victory over Russia achiwed far more than merely gaining territory
and economic advantage forJapan;it gained the world'spnzddn~respect. It also
gavelapan a new self-confidence, increased its industrial capabilities, and placed
the a m e d forces in a position of esteem. All of these faaors would contrit~ute
ro the Empire's increasing aspirations in acquiring territory and resources.
The 7 i r i r l n (Great Kighteousnesc) Era began 1~1ththe accession of Empcror
Yoshihito En 1912 With rhe armed forces still basking In the glorlcs of the
Russo-Japanese War, this era would soon see further expansion of thc Armv to
gnmson its territorial gains as well as the acqtrisition of new territories. It would
end, however, with a reduction of its divisions by one fifth.
Wit11 the opening shots of World War I in 1914Japan prornpt4y took over the
German colony In Tsingtao (Qingdao),China and the Kaiser's possessions in the
Central Pacific, the Mariana, Caroline, and Marshall Islands, which would
become springboards Inr Japan's future Paclfic conquests. During World War 1 an
additional 'two divisions were raised specifically to garrison Korca as the Chosen
(Korea)Ann?. and a brigade was establisherl on Formosa. In 1919 the Manchuria
Garrison Force was redesignated t h e Kwantung Army. Japan hegan occupying
m Port Arrhur h skurrcd.]urr~ogmto t h e r e n w ka b e w e n b r e a sndTrmum
1 Kmnwng n a small p e n ~ n d ~Hm~ch
Chma Wh~lebmr~ngthe des?gnadonof ch~rrmatl arpa,rhe K w n t u q A- us$ errnrually m p % Y efor nll of Wanthuna
and p a n of Inner Mongol~a
the Russian northern half of Sakhalln [stand in 1920. This was a result of thr
otl~enuise ~nuddled Siberian Expedition in wh tch Japan supported Rri rain,
America, and Francc to extract a Gzcchoslovak amv that hat! I~cenfighting
with the Russians against Germany. It developed into an Allied effort tu back
the Whites tighting thc R ~ d sin which Japan rcfu~edto participate, c x c ~ l ~tut
consalidnte its gain< In the region. Thc Japanese Army nowrstood at 21 division?.
While Ihr Japanwe studied World \Var t. its resources and its premnceiwd
self-worth prevented it from absorbing manv of its lesxms, especially with regard
to weapon? It hifly realized the ~*alue of light machine guns, trcnch mortars, and
infantry f l m s and how these new weapons were critical to the infantry, They werP
adopted, but not until 1922. TheJapanesestill held that Held a r t i l l e ~pieces
~ were
direct-fire weapons that belonged in the line alongride tlie infantry To position
artiIlery in the rear firing horn protected positions wa$ considered Hmld and
would weaken the infant^? morale. They were slow in adopting artilIery with
high-trajectoryfire and modern fire-control technlqucs. Another defect of artillen.
organization war that it lacked organic antiaircraft w a p n r . Likewise, t a n k .
aircraft, and poison gas were weapnns embraced nnIy reluctantly. They were
not clos~cornbatweapons, and were exp~nsi\~e as Japan lacked the industrial
resources and technolorn to build them in quantity, Two air battalions were
authorized in 1921, but had no fighters or bombers, only ohservatIon aircraft.
Tank development was nnt begun untll 19.25 and rwuId never catch up with the
pace of Western advances.
In 1925 a major .Army reduction was Implemented. Four divisions (the
13thr 15th, 17th, and 18th) were deactivated with their I6 regiment-some
34,000 trnopr. This did have the benefit of allowing the fielding of w n
an tiaircraft regiments an LIan experimental tank unit, adding much nceded
machine-gun and motor-transport units. expanding the trvn air battalions to
regimen tr, and further development of radio cornmunicatjons. These division3
would later be reactivated when the Army hegan to expand, Additional!?
I39 mostlv non-divlrional artillery companies rverc deactivated. Rather than a
wax l a h ~ l l ~ar lm n m l i d a t i n n permitting m n d ~ r n i ~ a t i n though
rpdilrtinn t h i ~ n,
many tratfitionalistr nppored it. Enamored with tire belief that military spirit
could prevail over weapons. they branded rnodtrnization a false ~ o and
d
a r t i l l e ~was sacrificed to retain infantn' rtrengh.

The reason for it all: Japanese

cruops selze a Netherlands Easr
lndies onlfield. the ultimate goal of
the Southern Operauons and rhe
main reason for the conquest of the
Southern Economic Zone.The
troops a r e armed wlth 6.5rnm Type
38 ( 1 905) rifles and 6.5rnm Type I I
( 1 922) MGs.
 Thc K t r k ~ t q l n r , rhr naticllial arilit; rvar redmiqnated Iloi Sipptrrl 7i~iknkr1
IlibupJ:ur~(or >irnpl\. K ~ ~ v r r r ~ ) - t hImperial
e Japan~sr..\mi!- tIJh!.l'hir, alorlg
with changing Ir?gi';Intion, had rvide-ranging effects on t h c prpchological
and Icgal autlinrity of thc .Irnry, anti i t 5 role. l\ihatc\'er it did nclrv, it did it
tor thy 'I-mpcror.
TIlc acccqrion crf En~pernrI-llrohito in 1426 5 i i w thc dn~viiof thc Stmw
(Fnlighteneci I'eace! En and r\rould socln scc rcncwcd effort< tcl d(~ininatt.
(711ir1a. Ikncecn 19% arld 1Y.W ~vcllover a dnzcn ncrv nludelr of individ~raland
i niantry crew-srrvcd wcapons. from pirtols thrnugh machine @Ins to mortars
a n d infantry ptln5, wcrc adopted. Ycrr artillery, antiaircraft guns, anti tank>
were al5o Relilctd, hut were inferior tu colitrrInpor;ir>hWc.ster11 rlcsignr anti too
few. !vlotIc.rn antitank tucaponq wcre c>ccntiall~non-es~stenl.
Tlic 19305 ralv Japan purating a n aggressive pclllcy in China initiatinl: a
writ\ of '"incidcntq," c ~ ~ r n ~ i l a t iinn gthe I0:I; C'liina Incictcnt, f.l J a p n n c ~ c
"incident" coulri bc an!' political-military cvcnt r a ~ r ~ i nfroni g a minor
skirrnid? ta large-scale conflict, but slicjrt OF ilccfarcd war.) 'I hc .\tmy incited
m u c h o f thi\ 01i t # own accord. etTenignoring nrdcrs to ccart.. Qffic-cr\ of the
Kt\,antung Army initiateif a plot to incrte Chinew forces t-ry dynamiting
~ c c t i n no~f the Soi~tltJlarrchuria RaiIrond. Urill): this a5 an cscurc, t h e
lapanew r\ccirpied klukden. While prnmising tlie laague nf Natic1n5 i t would
cvithclraiv, a i ~ o t l i c rinc~den! tva5 lrl~tiatcdr c ~ u l t ~ nIna rl~e~nvakionnt the
~ o t ~ t h c rIvI;~nchuria
n pri>r.inccr <till in C'lrincsc h a l ~ d s ending
, in t l ~ cn p i d
dcfcat of the dcfcrlctrrs. In cart!-1032 the Fir+[ \ h a n ~ l ~ aIii ~ r i d ~ nwas t
I7rnught aho~tt,and t h e lapanew occtipit=rl t h r city to "prntect" Japarlew
nariclnal5. Furthcr attach', rrcrr lat~nchcd,mtwc r j f X l s n r l ~ i ~ r i a occupied,
and the pupprt stat(- of Marrcli~tkuo\$+a% rctahlished. I.argc- nurnhcrr of
Cliinew xtierrillas contintled to fight In bfanchuria, although thc lapancse
"anti-hnridlt" cnrnpaignr; Ilad been mostly ~ucccwAi1by late-19-34. Japan w a s
cnndcmnctl by nhe League c ~ fXatiunc In early-1931 for it$ aggression in
(Iliina. which jt ignored. Thi5 rcrr~lted in Japan tendering ~ t strrcr-year
notification ut its ~zithrlrarvalfrom t h e L.eague, which rvar finalized in 1935.
or! ltic I~cclsu l the rtrnclc.mnntinn, Japan ~lccupiedInore of Inner !v!on~olia,
iflcorporatin~it irito Manchukun. Thc Japancst. iwsition in Chin;! wa5 now
3t1 sirtmfi that it kwceil thc withdraw41 of C h i n e x fnrcvr fro~rrrcking and
T i e n ~ i n .:\ rvtoccrs of divisinna2 triangular~rationhexan in 1936. wit11 tlic
elim~natioii nt a brigade headquartcrt a n d the rvithrirawal of a n infantry
regimrnl. Thi5 allotvcd the fnrnlation of atidititma1 rliuirions. The t i z \ r a t ~ t t t n ~
Army contlnucd vnnll-~ralc operations rhrt~ughout northcrn China intn
1947. C3n July 7 . l u 3 7 tlre Japanese engineered t h e klarco Pnlrr Rrirlge
Incidcnt nutridc OF Peking, leading to all-out tcilr with China know11 as thc
China Incidcnt. Tliir was seen as e chance to ncutraSi7e the Chincsc as a
threat tn the J a ~ ~ a l i c southern
re flank. It would tIlcn aIlow Japan ta face the
"rcal" eRetYlV, t h e Sovictr thrcatcninfi V a n c h t ~ r i a .'Thc polic!, ovcralI r Y a F
known as the "Strike North."
Over 180.0I)O Japancrc troops died in China and wr-r 4fl0,Ol)Owerc takcn
sick o r ivuunclcd-onlv a fcrv !.cars prior to tllc t~rginningof t t ~ crilrific Itf;lr.
\Vitli 23 divisions fi~titirlgthe Chinecc, n i n r were prepared to fight t hc Sovictf.
Figtiling I~rokeout on ~ I E CSiheriatl I>onlcr with the USSR in 1'13% and 1935,
reruIting in e m h a r r a s ~ i ~Japancw
~g cictcat\ in the lrjnfi awaited conlmntation.
Frenrli Inclochina was nccupied in 1941 through "agrecrllent" with t h e
colonial gc~\wnmcntafter tile fall nF France. I\million tmop\ rcrrc rno'hilizcd
cturlng ?(1-l(t 7'11~fcasihility of invading tlic south rvax ~ t u d i ~and d what were
termed "Strike Snutl~"c-ommnnd cxcrrises were conduutrrl. Thnrugh all h i 3
Japan cigniticnntlv i n r r m ~ r r il l rlivixinn<,
~ air ~ r m i t ranrl
, ntller unit\ tc, hring
thc Il,\ I n 5 E divisinns, 39 brigade cquiralentq, and t 5 1 air hattalicjnr; on Zhc
eve nf t h e Greater Ea\t t h i i ! \Vi~r.0 t tt1c.s~diviqionr nine had hecn o r ~ n n i z c din
194n a n d one in I W l .
I Table I :disposition ofImperial japanese Anny forces. December 1,194 1
I {exclusive of Southern Opetarionr Forcer)

I Home Islands
I General Defense Command
Eastern District Army
52d Division
I d , 3 d , 5 1 st, 57th Depot diiirions
Central District Army
53d, 54th divisions
I 4th, 5rh. 55th Depot divisions
Western Distrlct Army
6th, 56th 'Depot divisions
Norchern Distrrcc Army
7th D~vision
Karafuto Miwd Brigade
InAir Group (nine air battalions)
4th Divisron (ICHQ Reserve)
Manchuria
KwantungArmy
1 10th. 28th. 29rh divisions
23d Tank Regiment
I 3dArmy
9th. I Zth divisions
I st Tank Group
4th A r 7
I st. 14th, 57th divisions
5th Army
I
I Ith. 24th divisions
I
I
I
2d Tank Group
I
6th A m y
23d Division

I
8th. 25th divisions
Four brigades
1 Manchuria Defense Command
Five brigades
Manchuria Air Brimde {21 air bmlions)
2d Air Group (35 air battalions)
North China
China ExpeditionaryArmy
North Chrna Area A m y
27th.35th. I l Oth divisions

(continued on poge 101

I
I 1 5th Tank Rdment
I 1st A m

-
17rh Army
-
171.h. 32d divisions
-
5th. 6th IMBs
Mongolia Garrison Army
26th Division
M m ~ l i Cavalry
a Group

15sh, 22d, 1 16th divisions

I Ith, 12th, 13th, 17th 2Orh IMBs
23d A m

I 19th IMB
I s t Air Brigade (1 6 air bamilons)
KO-
Chosen Army
E 9th. 20th divisions
Formosa
Formosa A m y (combat units deached to Southern Army)

T h e outbreak of t h e Pacific War, 194 P

A detailed expos6 of Japan's reasons for going to war with .America, Great
~ r i t a i n ~and
. thc N~tlierIandr is beyand the scope of this book. In
brief, the League of Nations condemned Japan's increasingly brutal, but
bogged down, war of aggression in China. Economic ernbargos were
implemented by the Pacific colonial powers as a resuIt, especially forbidding
the exportation of oil and other resources to Japan, resources, it did not
possesr. Vcrging on a collap~eof its war cffott and national economy,
Japan was forced to secure a vast region of Southeast Asia and the South
Pacific in order to control the natural tesouaces it required for its survival. At
the same time it would establish a security zone in which to exptoit and
transport these resources to the Home Islands and between the areas
it controlled. Japan realized an extended war was possible. It was essential
that the "Southern Resource Area" be secured and exploited as quickly
as possible in order to wage a protracted war. She possessed liquid fuel
stockpiles adequate for less than two years of war. A National Defcnsr Zone
would be established through Burma down though the YE1 (Sumatra, Java,
Timar), Western New Guinea, the Caroline and Marshall Islands Uapanese
Mandated Territory), anchored on thc remote Wake Irland jn thr nnrtll.
3 japan made Idrdc dirr~ncrlon B r i ~ . A u r ~ n mN dm Zealand and seldom Mef& w te k ~ C k~ M I P N ~ B ~
m ]rpan+seye% Bneln n a s a colen~alpower and rhe Cornrnonweahh members mere colonm d r m r lapin 51mptr
med''Bna~n'or "rhe Brrt~rK'sr celtuun terms
japanese officers, both A m y and
Navy, lead the victory march
through Hong Kong after c5 611
on December 27. 194 1.

Enrtcrn Ncrv Gu~ncatvould be recurcd ar well a? the Gilbert and Solomon

3 d a n d ~ar n hulfcbs ?one, l'lir cnr~quercdSoutheast .A.iia arcas oi t h e NI'.I,
British Romeo, and tlic I'liilippines rz.c>uld hc dcfcndcd h!+ t h e IJ.4,and naval
and air hrces of the Cn11rhinc.d Fleet wnuld engage an!' a t t a c k ~ n gfleet$
in what tzrax t?r~\-isic~ned as a J~itland-likcd e c i r i ~ ~engageinent.
e Tlic IJN tva5
ntrn s ~ s p n n s t l ~ lFnr
c l h ~ defense ot nlort of Ncw Luinca, the Solomon\.
Carnliner, M ~ r ~ h a l land q , Ciilberts. It was hopcri that the .l\llies, after rcpcatcd
humiliating defeats, ivolrltl sue for peace and leave the Ernp~reuf t h e Sun to
itself within i t s Greater Fast .4ria Co-pruryerity Sphere.
!\'it 11 nn diplomatic solutiorl hclievcd ol?tsinal>le,Japan wmniittcd itqclf to tvar
with tllr \%'externcnlonfal pc~we'error1 S o v e m h c r 5, l(141. Initial preparations for
" 2 Operation" had long heen undenva!'; the Pcarl Harbor at.tack had Ileen
propnred in lanuan. 194 1 and llr\ units had hcpun training in Auguqt. but it was
in Ihc cnrly days of ?In~c.cmt)cr that t f ~ clinal ordcs~\\,ere irrucrl. 1ntclligc:cncc
coltcction had bcen undenvay for ycarr. -Theobjcctlves were thc de5tnlction of the
major US and Cnmmonwealth flect units and thc seizurc of the Philippines. KEI,
Malaya, Thailand, 5ot1tllcnl Burma. Hung Kong. Singap>rc. and Commonwealth
pn$scs$innrin the Suuth Pacific. Illc American ierritov of Guam, within the
Japancsc \4andatecl Territorl;, wns also n kc? o11iecttr.e.
Since the mid-1920s t h e 11.4 had allotted t l ~ r dlvi51ons r~ to wizc I.uzcln and
onc fnr Cllrarn. America though was not considered the main enemy. That
dirtinctlon fcFl tcl the UFSR. Bogged dorc-n in a rcrrningly endlegs war in China.
japan hoper! to secure tllc Southern Kcw~~rce Zone t v ~ t h i nfive mnnths and
the11 riuleploy halt of thr forcc5 to Manchuria. 7lley wcluId he prepared by thc
spring of 1C14:( fnr the U U K to onllalxe iunder the I~crmaninvarion or pull most
of itr 20 dividons out of Siberia to tnce the Gcrrr.an5. The fact that France and
t l ~ Ucthcrlandr,
c had heen occupied hy Gcrma t ~ y a, n d that Rrltain Innkcd likely
trr folloiv lirmn, ~ p u r r e ttl h e Japancte on. .America war viewed a t weak hecause
it\ Indir.irlualiun and liberalisln tvould prevent ir from Fighting a lengthy war,
Ry !\u~ust 1WI lapan had temporarily abandoned thc idcn of attacking the
USCR and began to focus attention In t h e "Sttikc Sauth" concept.
Ilic order asri~nir~g f o r m tn the Snuthern .4rrnp was issued on November 6
and obiectives assigned to spccific unit4 on the 20th. The Combined Fleet
issuctl i t 5 k t orders and assignment\ on Noruemtler 5 and "X-Oa);" the ?tart
of htntilitie~,~4.35 rlesignaterl ar IJcce~nher8. Tills was fised on Deccmlwr 2, a5 the
IVei-l Marhnr Insk I.orc-ewar en route ta its target, t o commence at appmsimately
05.30 err L)cccmher 8 (Tokyo I'itnc~.:\ liigl-1 degree of cooperation would be
rc~li~irccI 1xltwi.t.n t l ~ c11.4 atld fnlpcrial Japanr#e N a v y ~ I ~ N'1'Ilc
I . Amly-Navy
Ucntral ,\greernent was ~ i p e on d No1+crnl7cr 10 by t h e co~nmandcn-inchief01:
t t ~ Southern
c i\rmy and Cr>ml-linetlf:lcct.
 Combat mission

'The Southern Arm! I ~ ~ f t cinctlrrectly

n identified a\ "So~ttl~errr Area .Army",
tvnr c~tablislicdo n Novcrnllcr 6, 104I to control all UA units axsigned t o thc
So~tthcrnOperations. -l*Iiccnrnrnand w a s Iieadr1~1itrterc.din Snignn. Frcncli
Indacliina t ~ n d c rGrn. Cnunt I h r a ~ ~ c l Hisaichi
ii ( a h li5ted as Juichi). Thc
plan was certainly ambitious. TElc ~cizusc[if 811 o f Snl~tlleast,\qiii, tlre S E I , t h r
l'hilippines, and regir)n< of thc South I'acific rrould t)c accornpli~hcill ~ only y
F 1 infantry divisiclnr, four hrigadc-rim fnrcc\, and JtlO I!..\ aircraFt-4tIO.OOn
ttnclps in total. Thir area rtretched acrors five titile 7nner a n d M-a5 1argc.r t h a n
the Continental Unired Stater. lapan rva+ coutltiny: nn surpriw. and lhe
relatively unprepared and rvenb force\ fleldcd hy thc colonial pnwcrs. I th orvn
resource\ n+c~uldhe stretdied t o the l i mil with t r a n ~ p n r t511 ippirlg pulling
douhlc d t ~ t ytn ~ i ~ o tronpr.
vc The unit5 irl~tlarlva r s i ~ n c ~tol Zhc I'hiliyipine~,
llong Ksng. klala!.a, and Guarn M ~ L ~ U I C hr I tarkrrl wilh Ir)Ilnr~-onrniqrinn5
and then ser1.c ar nccupatinn troops o r C ' O I I ~ L I Clurtl~t'r
~ conlhnt apcrationr.
Atmtlrt half of the ll:\'s [.SO0 combat aircraft 1i.ou1d he required and the
best air units were. taken Iroln other commands fnr iirri~rirncnttn t h c :ld and
5 t h Air G~OUPP.
In Decemhcr 194 1 japan possesred 5 1 dicirionr .rripple~ncnted 54)
hrigade-eqrrivalent\4, hut many uf thew IVCP !>on-deplnyahlcbeing pi-riro,i and
line-of-co~nmunicatinngsecurity lower in Chlna. Twrn t!--eight rflvitic~t~r wcrc in
China with most engaged in combat or occupation dt~ty.:\notlier I.< were in
Manchuria and Korea to pmtcct thc empire'^ northrrn trr~ntierwith t12c USSR.
Two of the five Jivirions rcmiiining in the IJonie Islands tvrrc nctvly raised and
partl)' trained. -1'31~cxccptior~srvcre the 7d committed to the Soutllcrrl (Jperatinnr.
tllr 4th as tlir PGHQ Rcrenrc, and the 7th tied down prcltcctinfi norther11 lapan
from the USSR. fhcre rcere alrn 1 0 brigades in ,bpan ant! nine depot divirirlnr
training replaccmen t.;.
The 11 divisIon5 anti othcr ft~rccsasrigned to thc Southcrn Army were drarvn
Cmm a nurnbrr of ~ourc-cqand scattered thmughnut thc Ernplrc when the
Snl~tl~em .Army tvas organized. Five division5 cam? from t h e I Inlnr Islands. five
from China, and orle t r t m rorrnnsa.
The 14th .L\rrnv war. drrignatcd thc Vliilippine5 Attack Force 1~1thits
Ireadquarterr anti army trnollr, -!fit11 nitisinn, and 1 6 t h Brigade t11i Fc:clrmo,rawhilc
Ithe 16th Divi$ion was im "-imarni Shima In t l ~ cR!ul;\w IsIands. Cltlier sn~nll
clcmcnn !\.ere in llie I'alatn and I'cw-adorcs. The 5th .\ir Cirot~p( 3 1 air I,anal~ons~
from ktanchuria w a s dcplo!,ed to Forn~n*iafor thc Philippines opcratirln with ttvo
lighter, hvo light-hornher, and onr heaiy-bon1bc.r rc~imcntsplus a rcu.unlraiw;ancc
unit. It w a s rftinlated tlip operation woulil require spt~rcruimately3)da!.r. .At the
end of tl1i.r phaw part [rF I-ltli ;\r~ti\*forces wr)~ildhe macripned lo cornplctc thc
mure critical YE1 operatinn. 'llie 4th [livirioii, the ICHQ Resvn-c. i r Jayxrn,
~ ~ctluld
he comrn~ttedIn the I'llilippinc~ later.
The Hunna jttack Fnrcc, rrl>icli rrr)i~ld First srcirrr Tliailnntl, i v a t huilt
around t h e 13th clrrn]; in 1ndt)china ~ v i t hthe heatlrluartcrs ant1 a detachtncnt
of t h e 55th LXviqion in the qouth along tT1lh the Ciiiardq IJivision ttrmporarily
detached Frnm 35th Army!. 'Phe 55th [Jivirion !Ice% c l c m e c ~ t ~waq r in the north
and the follnw-nn 33d nit-i~innstifl in Central E:hina. Bttrrna opcr,~tionswnulci
~ u b s c q u e tnly be reinforced from ~tnibcreleasrd froin othcr artad\. 1t 5 cornplc.tion
was forecast to he zvithin 100 tlayr.
4 Independemr m~xedbnqrder. Independerr. Inf~nrrybrlpder ~ r d c p a n d ~ nInfantry
t grouv Indepemenr rnmd WeR'mchti.
mdcytl~dcn: rmhvtrf rqlmcru lrrd n C e $ r n d e ~ l l ~ ? l : c n bn,m

Japanese troops rake down the
Stars and Stripes on Corregidor.
May 6, 1942.TheJapanese were
reported ro have Fast 900 dead
and 3.000 wounded in the assaulc
but th~sappean to be an inflated
flgure as fewer troops than crh~s
parricipated.The flagpole was
removed from a captured Spanish
ship in 1898.The US flag was raised
agarn here when the island was
recaptured on March 2, 1945 and
still remains on the island today,
The East Indies Attack TOKP's16th Armv headquarters was in Japan with the
2d Dit4sion while t h t 56th Infantry Group was forward-deployed in the Palauq.
The operation was allotted approximateiy 150 days to complete-an almost
leisurely pace. Other units would later be assigned to complete the operation.
The 25th Arrny, the Malaya Attack Force, rvas nidely scattered its
headquarters and 5th Division on Hainan Island off the South China coast,
, the army troops on Formma. Resides Malaya,
18th Divklon a t Canton, C h ~ n aand
the 25th Army would also seize Sumatra, Borneo, and Celebes in the NEI. The
38th Dirision, the Hong Kong Attack Force, was under the control of the
23d Army under Lt Gerl S a k i Takashi in Canton. It was allotted 10 days to
complete itr mission. The 3d Air Group I48 a i battaltons)
~ detached from the
China Expeditionary Army would support the Malaya invasion, Based in South
China and northern Lndochina, it consigted of five fighter, Four light-bomber, four
heaw-hamher, and Zwo reconnaiaance regiments.
* h e South Seas Detachment was huili around the 55th Infantry Group of
the 55th Division and located in the Bonin Islands. I t was assigned to the
Guam Occupation Force, an IJS command under the direct control of the
IGHQ. It would later seize New Britain. T h e Southern Arrny Reserves were
the 21st Division in North China and the 56th Division (less elements) In
Japan and they too mtould be committed in the later stager of the Southern
Operations. The 21rt Independent Mixed Brigade was in Indochina, but would
not he mmlnitted to Malaya until later. Southern Army service and support
units were targely drawn from the Kwantung Amy.
Special Naval Landing Force (SNLF)' units were assigned to all operations
to secure specific objectives, some independent of the 1J.4 and others in
joint operations. Only naval forces would secure the Gilbert5 and Solomons.
Extensive participation by land-based Navy Air Service INAS) units of the
Formosa-based 1 I t h Air Fleet t2lst and 23d Air flotillas, 414 aircraft) would
be seen In the Philippines, Malaya, and NEI as well as carrier aircraft. The
Navy had longer rangc poalr than the Army. Rabaul on NcW Elritain would be
a base from which to continue the conquest, Thc Army thought of Rabaul
only as a n out guard for the naval base at Truk In the Carollnes. The Navy
desired to seize Port Moresby in May, Midway and the western Aleutian
Islands in June, hoping for a decisive engagement with the US Pacific Fleet,
New Caledonia In July, and Fiji and Samoa in August. The IJN's future plans
were even more ambitious with proposals to invade Hawaii, northern
.Australia, and Ceylon off India.
The plan further allowed for the reduction to seven divisions in the south and
their redeployment to Manchuria to prepare for war with the USSR. Even longer
range planning wa5 conducted tu prepare for a 10-year war with the USSR and
America. Some 3 00 divisions and 1,000 air battalions were foreca~tfor 1950.
Southern Operations forces
l'he 14tI1, 15th, and 16th armies had heen organized specifically for the
Southern Operations. The 25th Army had previously operated in China. Army
troops varied greatly. but usually included a signal regiment, one or more tank
regiments, ~everalartilIery regiments and independent battalions, field A4
battalions and companies, mortar battalions, specialized engineer regiments
and smaller units, construction units, transport units, shipping endneer and
debarkation units, hospitals, field motor transport and ordnancc depots, and
small service units.
5 An SNLF ftckubeuu R~kmrmcallwas me dxe or a hrge bamHon *he nm! b a ar~A * t h d w mrr r r r d p d x d thew
desrgnatlonr Ir n ancorrm ro rekr to them zs"lmpn~lM m n ~ *
 fable 2: Southern Operations initial forces I

Southern Army, Cen CountTerauch3 Hisaichi

2 1st. 56th (-1 drvls~ons Southern A m y Reserve
2 l st Independent Mexed Brigade
4th Independent Mixed Reglment
14th Army, LrGen Homrna Masaharu PhilippinesAttack Force
16th, 48th dwisions
I
65th Brigade I
4th. 7th Tank regimenu
5th Air Gmup LtGen Obata Hideyoshi
15th Army. LtGen lida Shojim Burma Attack Force
Guards, 33d, 55th (-) dlvis~ons
2d Tank Regiment
16th Army, LtGen Imamurn Hitoshi East lndies Attack Force
Zd D n ~ s ~ o n
35th lnfanrry Gmup
I
56th lnfantr Group
25th Army, LtGenYamashitaTornoyuki Malaya Attack Force
5th, 18th (-) divisions
Fsr 6rh. 14th Tank reps (3d Tank Group)
3d Air Gmup LtGen Sugawara Htch~ta
38th Divisian (23d Armycontrol)
South Seas 'Detachment (IGHQ-control)
Hong Kong Attack Force
Guam Occupation Force
I
Note.component unhs of these drvisrons and brigades ore provided in the Unit Organization chapter.
I I

2 1 st Division This division w a s activated at Kanazawa,japan in July 1938 and deployed to China before the year's
end. In November 1943 rt moved to Indochina.The 2 1 sr: Infantry Group and 62d Infantry landed on
I Luzon in February 1942 to complere operations there.They returned to Indochina in early- I943
1 where i c remained. Commander: LtGen bnaka Hisaichi.
56th Division This was a new division raised ~nAugust 1940 in Kururne,Japan. Its 56th Infantry Group landed on
Mindanao, Philippines in December 1941 and later fought on ]ava.The divlsion itself served in Burma
from March I942 w h e n it remained through the war. Commander: LtGen MasuyamaYuzo.
I %st findependent Organized in January 194 1 from the 170th lnfanrrl, 104th Division a t 0saka.Japan.
I Mixed Brigade It served as an occupation force in Indochina a t the beginning of 1942 and was chen sent ro Malaya,
1 and later foughr at Rabau!, Part of the brigade was destroyed on New Guinea after landing In
I December. 111I70 was sta~iorredon Wake and absorbed inco 13th lndepcndenr Infantry Regiment
The brigade was deactivated in July 1943. Commander: HajGenYamagataYikaa
I I6th Divis;on Activated in Kyoto. Japan ~n 1905 because of the Russa-japanese War. in which it did not fight Ir was
deployed t o Manchuria in 1934, returning to Japan in 5936. It fought in North China from 1937 to
I 1939 and [hen again returned to Japanwhere it was triangularized in 394 1. It landed on Lvzan in I
I
December 194 1. It remained there until t r a n s f e d ro Leyte in Aprll t944 w h e n ~twas destroyed. I
Commander: LtGen Morioka Susumu.
48th Division Organized on Formosa in late- 1940 from the Formosa Mixed Brigade and the 47th Infantry dropped
from the 6th Division, which had also fought in China.The brigade had fought rn Chrna from 1937 to
1940, soon after it had been raised. I t fought on Luron from December 1941 unul deployed to JmIn
I January 1942 to complete operations there. It was then wansferred toTimor In lzte-1942. where lr
remained. Commander: LcGen Tsuchihasht Yultsu. I

16 {continued on poge 17)

 --

65th Brigade Thts brprr w a s raised at Hiroshima.Japan in ea*-I 941 from the 65th Independent Infantry Group.
k was .p,?.r.a n in December 194 I,Ithu@rthere and remained
U IthRR W e d an h
F Q ~ ~ Rand
on .the rriana unril December 1942 when one regiment and the HQ were sent w Rabaul and the
other m m e m elsewhen.The brigade was dissolved in late1943 after k units were absorbed Into
a iA k i a

Guards Division P 1 867 in Tolkyo. It grew* in ske over rhe years. I=2d Guards Brigdde and two regiments
(Konoe Shidan) were ssvrr. LOChina in 1I a 7A n1 w-- -..-
~ ~~wtienc e first combat in 194 1 the I st Guards Brigade and its
their
units were dletached and mrganlz.XI a the C;uards Mixed Brigade.The 2d Brigade units in China
became the new Guards Division mth augmentation by the 5th Guards Infantry. en mid-1941 the
. . - .. . .
d~vlsionwent to Indochlna men 1 nallana ana Malaya. In March 1942 Is was deplayd to Sumatra. and
i ri June 1943 was -designated the 2d Guards Division when the Mixed Guards Brigade iri japan
bmecame the 1st Guards Qivislon. Commander: LtGen Muto A k i n
33d Dfvision C,Yn,,, March I939 a t Sendai.japan and sent to China the following month where I t tbmptered 1
III

valning. It fc~ughtin Ce nadl China until departing for Th;ailand ln December 1 94 1. By March 1942 ~t
was fighdng in Burma. vh e r e it rernained. Cornmander: Lffien Sakurai Shozo.
55th Division A~ti~acedinnuguac ,- a c ,,,,,uii,Japan.The Divislon (less etements) arrived in lndochlna in
December I94 1 and went into B u m ler; 55th Inbntry 4Sroup and 144th Infan- brmed the South
Seas Oetachmens which secured Guam and kbaul.'firm,ed back frorn POR Moresby durlng the Battle
. 1 , .
d the Cora! Sea, k was lamr landed at Bum. and was desrropa. rr was rebuilt and reioined the
in Burma in 1943 where it ended the war. Commander: LtGen TakeuthiYiroshl.
div~s~on
2d Division Raised in 1870, it fought Fn the Sino-japanese and Russo-Japanesewars. It deplopd to Manchuria In
the 1930s and was soan engaged In M o d China; it then fought the Soviets in Manchuria in 1939. It
returned to Japan In 1940, and w i n departed in January 1942 to arrive on Java in March, where it
helped complete the operation. It was sent to Rabaul. later destroyed on Guadalanal. rebullr at
Rabaul. and swenr the rest of h e war in Swtheasr Ash Commander: LtGen Marupma Masao.
5 t h Division C m l n e d a square dwisiion at the beginnlng of the war and was partly
n nphibious uatned. It fo,ught in the Sfno-Japanese and Russo-Japanese wars. It
deptoyea to cnlna In 1937,fighting h e r e until .xptemoer
- 0
1940 when It went to Indochina. I t
conducted brief operations in Chha and then mwed to Hainan Isrand off South China before landing
in Thailand. From late1942 k occupied and garrisoned various small Islank In the NE1.The 41s
Inhnrry was detached and fought on Panay and Mindanao in the Philippines and then on New
C !re it was p:a d y desuoyed. I t was reassigned to the 30th Division. Commander: LtGen
b -0.

lath Division k c c ~ v a ~~n

u r 7w;r ac rurrurne. fapan. it was deacdvated in 1925 as part of the IJA'smduerion. I t was
reactivated in Septernb a square dFvision. it mtwed to Chiina in Nowmber to c o m p l tts~
valning, where it saw niuch action unnl late-l 941. Ir landled in Malqa in Decenrber and subsequently
. . A-. . -. . ... ." . .
faughr In Burma where It remained. ~ t s55th Inrantry srtgaae ana I L Inrantry~ were detached and
served on Borneo, thesI Mindanao,, and finaliy Guadaltanal where it was largely desvoyed.It w
rrbuilt on TIuk and senr ro B u m,where It vwas reassigned to the 3 1 st Owision. Commander: LcGen
r4vtaguchi R:enya.
38th Divislon Ftaised at Nia gv,japitrI in Februar7 1439,itcleplopd to China in Ckcember. It soon seize!d Hong
Ebrig. From there it serit regiments to Jam,SL~mata,Thn or. and othl ds. It asserr)bled on
1:
a m in late-l 1942 and mo n d to Rabaul, Much
Rabaul, where it rernair
of the division
rength. COImmandw: Lsuen =no
-
was
"
10s
Tadayoshi.
~lcanal.tt was rebuilt a!t

4th Division Organized in 1 870. it fc rughr in the Sino-japanH e and Russo-jrrpnnes,e wars. It dleplopd to Manchuria
. .
t

. ..
in 1937 and fwghr in Cn~nauntil November rr+ I. lt landed on Lunon In k b r ulary 1942 and
c he operaticIn. I t returned to japan in June whtwe ic remained until September 1343 when
1

ht was sent I:ogarrison Sumata 5>medemched battalro~ i r fought in &umxThedivision moved to

7hailand in I4pril 1945. command^!r: LrCen Kimno Ken243. I

SNLF troops shine flashlighrs on an
Amer~canflag to ~ndrcatero aircnk
rhat rhey have capturedi4gaha.
Guarn.This drawing from the
50th Ann~venarybooklet shows the
rmops wearing rising run armbands.
a derail wh~chhas not been rerifled.
The Japanese forces were Ialrly well
equipped wrth light bridging and
bridge-repalr moterieb They
recognned the necessiy of
rnalntainlng the speed d offensive
operarrons thmugh difficult remin.
Doctrine
Thc lI.1 rlevelrq-d it5 tactic31 doctrine over thc 41l-year period prior to the
mthreak of \\'nrId It'ar 11 by ~tudyinnant1 adopting arpec-tr at IVeterterrl amim that
h e ~ ruitcd
t its needs. So onc army wrved as ii pure mndel thougll, and arpects of
doctrine woutd hr modificd to t i t I heit traditional concepts. Japanerc combat
experience durinp thr 4fl-ycar pcriorl in questjon 5sa5 morc divare than often
thot~ght.n i c y fnught Cliincw f ~ r c of c ~t - a ~ i n gquality, ranfinx fmm warlord-led
gangs, through gurrrillas, to pral'~ssiona!Iyled. rrrE1-organizecE forcer of ndxtantlal
rize and quality. They also fought well-trained. ~killhrllt,led, and better-equipped
Soviet force\. 'The IT:! a l w ~ a i n c dvast experience onf fighting in d i t f e r ~ n tterrain,
clirnatc, and operationaT conditions. Ilictere included the barren plains of Sibcria
against amlored and mechanized forcer; the itrest%, plain?, rugged hills and
mnuntai115 of northern and urntral China; and in cities arad villages. 1 1 e cllrnate
eutrcmcr ranged from hiting cold to desert Ileat, from tnrscntial rain to dust
rtnrmr. X tany of the areat fought In lacked rfevelopd road sqtcrns and mllmailr.
Cnntmr-y to p p u b r earl\-war ~jerception,the Japanese were not trained
for jungle warfare nnr were thrs "natural" jungle fighters. japan had n o place in
which to conducl such training and most trot>ps wcrc farmers, fishcrnian, and
u r h n workerr. \fort unit5 that inught i n the Pacific and Sou theart Asia depIoycd
' climates of China, Stancliurla, or Japan. What their
dirt.ctl!- from the c i ~ i l h fall
prr~~iour eslicrience did provide was the ability to operate In varied terrain and
climate cunditioni against enczay Forces of equally varied qualit). and capahilitics.
'I'heir orvn $el(-infkted aurtere field conditinns w-re a major fartar and prcpar~d
thutn wclE. With r ~ c lexperience
i behind them the Japanesc were able tn 5tuiFs the
conditin~lrrrf the expcctcrl areas of operation and aclapt their tactics, ecluipnaent
Icvels, ta5k nrganizatia~, and logistia accordingly. The)' were not always
aicce5rfrd irr thi5, for example on Sew Guinea, tuhcrc they greatly unclesrqtimated
the cnnditirrnr. Their equipment rvas alread!? camp~rativel!~ light and much nf ~t
dedgncd to he man- or animaI-packed, Their logistics tall wax less b l ~ r t E ~ n . ~ n m e
than any Wrtern anny'r. although this mrnnt it was fragile and easily disrupted.
Offensive operations
,Iapanc~ctactical doctrine for~~sed on attack, suy-~rise,rnpiri motVernent,cnrnm-
anderr n p r a t i n g n~cllfonz*ard,and relatively rlrnple plans. C)ffcnsivc actions were
the norm. In the 1928 edition ot 7brtri K o n r ~(Prfr~ipli~v of Shnti~,vir(br~mrnnd~,the
drknse, rctreat, and sumnder were expunged, as they were considered
r%--nrrls
detrimental t c ~morale arld t ! *-rr!*an~ rpirit. 'l'l~e lapanese found defenrivr
act ion5 t o 11c ahhnrrrl~t.IIa lapan~-st.n 6 i c r ir conf~onted with an ~ ~ n e s p c d e d ,
u n u ~ u a l ,nr complicateti sihrallrln tn tldttIc, hc irould filld a way to attack, :It1
c t ~ dand places, along unanticipated
attack wcllttd IT cr;ccutcd a t i ~ n ~ ~ p c tirncs
route\ and often with force ratios that i\ertcm a m ~ i c srz.ouId 13ot I)il\'c ~lrcd,all
of ~ v l t i c t ~vould
~ increare the element of si~rprise.Rapid mavcmcnt, hrridc~
benefiting tactical and c~perakirrnal manewer, also incrca5cd thh, and unnr
achieved by fnrced marcher. Thc Spartan crluipnient and austcrc lo~isticsa l l ~ j ~ + ~ c d
t r c ~ l p cto mnvc at cnrnpilmtiucly high ~ p r c over~ l terrain that lYvstcrn amiies
would con~idcsdiffintft tor large force<.

Scishin-strength of will
-Ihe 11.4 also placed conlplctc faith in rei5hin, its rtrengtli of will and spirit nvcr the
r r r l ~ t ~ ~superiority
it~f of i t 3 enemic5. \lrhilc \Vestem thoii~littcnded to dixrniss \uch
intan~lhlcaspccts, oftcn pointing to wveral lapanere tli.instcn i1rrj~1~h 1 ilt~olitI I ~
mirpliiccd faith ill this, it ivd\ rionetIiclcs~an influencing Ihz-tor, with certain
limitationr. Relief In illis rvar q n Ftrrlng and thc lapanerr \ol~ller hasrlcned to
f ~ c l dconditions that v~i;tlrirl certainly contrihutcd tcl many of t l ~ cteats ol
'urance that astoi~nticd\Vcqtcrn opponents. Kc~ardlc\rrlf the dalr y t c m and
separatir~nbcttvc'c'n ( d f l r y r c ant l rnm, I;lpntb\ta nffirrrr r.ri Elinglv \ltarcrl thc A well-known photo of vrctorious
15 i71'combat with their troupr. OfFicvrs led From the Iront, and a t mucll higher 61sr Infantry troops on
Corregrdor-Ttnna Heiho! Bonzor'
:k)rir than war common drnonx tl~cir\Vv'cctt'rt~counterparts. G~mmandp i ~ t s
(Long Llve rhe Emperor! Hurrahi')
wci-r often Itrcat~iIfurthet t'onvard than iVe5tt.m practice. Officefi were ruqi~ired
to hc as phvsically and mentall!- totrgh nr their men. 'rhc Japcnese counterattack
In thc first clays o f thc Is44 I;uam landing ir a F~ttingexample of this. : l t ~ n i ~ l
115 percent of thc attacking units' tvfficcrr were killed inclitding most company and
hattalicm commandcn, along with the c-omrnandcrs 01: tlie attacking hr!ga:;ldcand
two regim~ntr.Thc fint cr[~eriencerthat Liii trnvps cncu~interednf Ealxirle$e
troops fighting to the death. on 'Iulngi and c ; a v t ~ t u : r i a lrlandr on : \ t ~ p ~7r ,t
1942. came as a \hock. Son~c9nll SSL-F, t o n r t n ~ a i n n ,and air rcrvicc tmnps
dcfcndrd thew three tiny islanrlr acros5 The Slnt From Guadalcanal. :Ihout 7 0
c>c,caped by rtvitnn~ing tn largcr Flnrtda Idand. 13 prisonerr were takcn, and
t21c rest died fighting. Thc three Marine awault I~attalirmslogt 145 dead and I'M
rvclunded. I t war a snl~cringexperience and troutd prow to hc ~ I I C norm, An c ~ r l i c r
i n ~ t a n c eof this. when a Japanese battalion Iandcd behind UI;-Tilipino lines on
Wataan in January lW2, w a ~not cornnl~mlyknown of by \mcrican trnop5
remnquerin): the Pacific, The trapped battalion aF 900 mctr t o u ~ h tto the dca tli
without n single man ~urrcndering.
Tlir Jayanew often violated certain fimda~nental principlc5 of doctrine. 'Shcir
biggest failurc war to underc5timate the enemy especially foIIut~ingan initial
wcceT5, T h i c war a combination of nverct~nfidencc,arrogance, and uvrr-reliance
o n the strenflh of rpirit. The expectation war that the enemy ~\-oulddo as lapancrr
planr had predicted: the Japanese thernselveq wcrc often tclo inflcxiblc 10 adapt to
unanticipated encnly reactions. Oftcn, another l c r i n u ~fliur wi~ct h e lack of reron-
naisance. ll'hilr detailed recnnnaiss;lnce ti.a\ ertahlir;hcd dcrctrine, in pmctice,
with the n ~ s l ito attack, i t was often ncglccterl or tla\t.~l on unrealistic cstifnale~,
rvItl1 illre mnsquences. .Inrithct arca in rvhich thcrc wert. rcverv 4iottfall\ %\.a\
logstics. \Ian?. staff officers tclt lugirtlcal mnctlms were lxaneat!~them ,)nil toctned
on offensirPeplanning. Thc early operatinn5 againrt unpwparert cnemv tnrccq wrrc
succcr$h~lin s p tc ~ ot maranal loprtics support, rci ntorcing this h e l i ~ t
Complete an!~ihklatinnot thc cncniy war tlic goal sollglit in mn%topcratinm.
.If lo1z.ir1.y the enern!! to ercnpc tn fight again was uriauccptahlc. ' T h i ~nf cmlrse
resultcd rn the \tlrrvnrt.er of large numllers of :Illicrl ~~riqoncr\. t+'hr~dirl rlnt f ~ ~ h t
to thc death ar thrJ;~paneredid anrl ~ v l ~ o no1 hc tnrily dirporrd r ~ tnr
ctruld , the
Cliine~ewere. 'rile Lonilirenng of cc lloninl tcrritarics nl\n Ilieant that l a r p
r~unihcr\ill' IVc.5tc.m civilians rverr ~ntenicd, for rvhich t lie Japanese were totally
ul~prcl~wcd. The treatment of priwner~and intcmces varicd greatlt. depending 011

Mamru7,d SNLF landing $Iter:
be,
Huon Gulf, norrheast Now Gutnu,
March 8,1942
local commanders. There was little guidance on such matters. TNs was also
often the case wfth matten such as the disposition of captured equipment and
installations, the treatment of local populations, local security arrangements, and
the establishment of effective defensesin occupied ternto*.
Amphibious operations
The IJA's amphibious doctrine was well developed long before the start of the
Greater East Asia War, a precess that had begun in the 1920s.Japan was one of the
fint countries to aognize its importance, and a great deal of experience had been
gained during the conflict in Cbma where joint-landing operatioas were
commonly conducted by the UA and UN. Doctrinal development did not progress
much after the mid-1930s though. It remained focused on China and the USSR,
and was not as advanced as is often stated: o p t i o n s were generally conducted
on a smaller scale and were less robust than later Allied operations. However, the
I]A did possess adequate landing craft and specialized shipping engineer units to
supportsuch operations.
While the ITA took the leid in am~hibiousdoctrine and landing craft desiw,
the l a m in&endng early Allied &signs, the IJN also develGed doctrine.
Regardless of the IJA's and 1JN%much touted rivalry, a joint dottrine was created
and the early-war landings were successfully accomplished. This joint doctdne
called for thorough planning; reconnaissance of the helanding areas; a sequence of
assault unit, resem and support landings; rehearsals; naval gunfire and air
support; and deception procedures. The aoss-loading of transports was nitlcal, for
example, so €hat the loss of any one ship would not mean the Loss of an entire
artillen unit. Supplies and equipment were loaded to allow their debarkation
acmfdhlg to the priority of need:
The naval force conducting the landing operation, usually designated the
"occupation force," was responsible for the overall operation. The escort force
commander, superior to theconvoy commander, pmvided fife and air support.
The convoy commander was tespgndMe for the embarkation, movement, and
debarkation of the landing force. The drmy transport officer commanded the
shipping engineers and other troops supporting the debarkation.
To maintain surprise, reconnaismce elements were seldom landed.
Remnnaissauce was u W y conducted by m h w from the q r n and air. Often
d y geneal landing sites were selected in advance and preefse sites designated
after reconnaissanceand assessment ofthe enemy situation. Transportanchorages
and landing sites were often selected by m i n g fast patrol boats through the
inshore area. Every effort was made to land unopposed There were instances
when the Japanese encountered fire from the shore, and as a tesult the landing
forcessimply shiftedto another site; after land~ng,they then anempted to enCirde
the defenders from the rear. The Japanese conducted very few opposed landings
and nothing comparable to those undtxhken by the US, such as Tarawa, Saipan,
and Pelella In most instances the only resistance encountered came fmm artillery
fire and air attack. However, a major goal of Japanese landing operations was to
gain local sea and air superiority.
The actual landing was almost always conducted in darkness, just before dawn
or even earlier (most Allied landings were conducted well after dawn). This led to
c o n o l problems and confusion on the beach, factors outweighed by inneased
surprise and protection of the landing force from acUllery and air attack. There
were several exsmples of the defenders expecting daylight landings, only to
Bnd themselves o v e m before dawn. If a daylight landing were tequired, ship
generated smoke would blind defenden and screen the approad3b.g landing craft.
Another significant difference between Japmese and Allied landings was that the The Port Momby plan,
Japanese would not land units on adjoining beaches; instead, they would land
on sites often widely separated from each other. For example, fom forces were
*,
Mpy 194t Even in an
a ~ ~ s r docvine
h e ofnmklng m d
landed on Guam with anything from five to 20 miles separating them.On some enveloping the enenq can be reen.

oubuna

.....- -.-._
aI .-,... './
Cl~hannel .....---'
0 c4nMIYlWrn
IH W m I W
@J *mtm
0 I 7PtA

D I 10 lam
--- - -
I - --- - -1 idand\ three or four
of the larger I ' l ~ i l i p p i n ~
I P :
9-k- m forces r\-cst' landcd rcparatctf by rven gre;i her

'i r.
1 distances. Rccimcntal and divirional landings tz.erc
b,. ,,,,ding nrn nr tt~rct*onit\
t~i-ten r,,n,~lc+c,
ahrcau, the distancc ~ e p r r ~ t i l tllrrn
lg dellendin): nn
--- -, g tvtmin, erierny del-krymenl,
\i~itat>leI n ~ i d i ~ritcs,
ruad netrvorks, arlrl the lncat~orlnC inland nl~jectiver.
F- - ..
7 . . ky-
r l i i l woilltl potition flit units to advmcv iinland
I in t~conr thrcc cc!tirnns, ar rra5 standard prar-tire
-+. 1 for~~ffensivt.r~pcr.~tit~n';.!\~ain,tliirdiffcrcd fmnl

The 49ft Type A landrng barge, or.
Darsmu,was the most cornmon!y
used model by the IjR. It was
powered by a 6-cylmder gasoline or
d~esel,englne, gwmg at a top speed
of 8-10 knots. It rn~ghcbe armed
w ~ t htwo LMGs.and cculd carry
t 00- 120 men, or I0 horses. or an
arrrllery piece, or a lrght tank. or a
I1gh1rruck.There was also a longer-
ranged 1jN verslon of tieType A.
Japanese land~ng cperatjons
relied heavrly on manpower for
ofnoadlng supplies and equhpment.
Mo~orizat~on was l~mitedHere
shipping engineers d n a ~[ruck
ashore from a Type A landing barge.
.,
- -
-
thc .-\llictl prat-ticc r ~ lirrt
l e\tehlirhin~ a he:~cl~llr.ad.
frrm nrliich t r r iidvancc inland and tn provirlc a Ilaw
1
-- --y
- of nperations, n o t l i r r major d~lkrcncrhetwrcn
Japanere and .\llled l a r ~ r l i rwax ~~~ that only rhmrt
Isrepam tcaIknaml pi~nfirebarrajie5 %\'errRrccl, crbcn nnly aRcr Ihc Innding tsnnp
w C r r cml)arkcrl. In crlii tr'tst lo pmlnnged .\Hied homhardmcnls.
Ol'lcn an SNLI, i t \ \ize tailorcrl for the spccil~coperation, u-nuld rrrve as
thc first-wrc nisiir~lttrtmpr t o ertablish thc rnitisl landing rite or v i l e s k v
rthicctivc. - I m y t~t7011~ tvould f n l l ~ ~ift % nrhure or Ennd simultaneourly ekewhere
to rrm~plete tile nperatinn. latlding craft trol~ld awemble in a column formatinn
t o r ttlr~r nln achorc to ~lrovidclnrrrr !rrntrt.tion from fire. Stern llghtr aiclcd
orien t a tl(~i~.Just \llort OF rlinrc the craft n~ovedInto a I ~ n fmnabnn. e If nppo~ition
\uerP rvyectcd Ilicv t v ~ ~ iopen l d lire tcitll machine gun5 durit~gthe approach. 'l'lic
awault tmnps w~~trld advance as quicklr as possible a r m s the Lwacli to the ncarclt
a\'ailahtc cover. :I\qault companies and battdlinnr d ~ dnot maintain a reserve, n;l
s u l ~ u ~irncrc
~ i t ~in thc I i n ~ Machine-gun,
. infantry-gun, and mort;lr unit5 wnuld
accnn-lpnny tlrc. ;ia\ault unit'\ r i n r ~artillcry cnuld riot bc landrii until later, The
asrat11t tsncsp<wo11Ii1move as qtiickl! as 11nrsihit 50 seiw thc initial nbjei.thuersuch
ar ;I ~x)rt,a~rfield,torrn, garrjrnz~,or rclads leading to obleair*e<hlrthcr inland.
Infai~ty rescrver, artilletll; and engineers ti-ould follow ashore, tra~~spostcrl by thc
fint ware's returning lanrIlng craft. Once tthc senior Army cr,mmandcr asl~arctms
certain he couId hold tlic bcauhcr, lie asrumcd command of operatiur~rashore,
rclicving thc Nnl? mcupatinn force comnlandcr rc~pon~ihiiity. D l i r i n ~daylight
mnrc troopr, vcrvicc unit<. and i ~ lcast t 70-davt ' wl~plieswoulrl he landed. 7 he
tranrports wnult! t > ~ i c a l l clcpast
y thc area as xonn a\ debarkation {\#a5 cclrnplctcd
f r w fear (ti air attack.
I n the latc-192fir the Sth, I 1 th, and l l t l i rIivl~ionrtvcrc dc\ignntcd frr
amphitliclus traininx. There rliviriol~s were ~ t tinned
a ncar Ctjina, Hiro~li!ma'~ plrt,
hclnlc. clf thc II.\k Shipping En~incrrCommand and t hc port fru~.)lnwhiuh
capcditionar]: forccx Ivcrc. lai~nchcd.These divl%ons were committed to CIr ina
aftrr thr h(.ginrlin): of thc Chirla Incident. I n 1937 the reac'tivated t 8th Llhl5ion
replaced thtb 11 th as a n arnl>llihioi~\di~~ixinn. kt'hile tticre diviric~nrm~rducte~l
anphil,ic>u\ oprmtion5 in Chtna, m o q entIed 1111 i r ~h,lanchuria. I l n l y the 5th
rrrruld rcc ncliot~in the Pacific I+'ar. Other divi~kmrthough were to conduct
Innclings In China, ruch ar tlre .<d, hth, 16th. and 114th.
rt-
- - .- . .,. . . . . . . . ."
I{ctr\'eeil I Y . ~/ R I N IY+ I rlxteen mu~t~p~e-na~tallon
. ....
to tllvlslor-
/ F ~ Z Planding5 lverc ~ r e f l l t e d
'The 114 d~\~c!opcd
in China.
hvn F p c 3 of landing craft i n the latc-

I =' 7 w f i 1 19205, thc rarnpcd /Liaarrr rNh, 101)-I10 troop) and [he
rarnplms Koirt~r\rr (30ft, 4 1 trr~ol~c). kitbre adva~lcctlthan ;my
Tfg2;
I Lw-g-d!! p&
* 7E-:c-
,
pericd
anrl ured
landing
thew
craft,
craft
tlic IJ
through
conducted
the war. In
no h~i-thcrdcrclnpmcnt.
contrast, .\llicci landing
-L->
-A
-- .
:;-.
L . ,

~levelnlirn~nl continued thruuphouf f hc war. Shipping

( craft
0

6 .-<- -
.-- fl
cn~inccrrcglmcntr operated thew a11rl other l a l ~ d i t ~ craft,
f i cach
will1 IS0-241l I craft and up tn 1,100 troops organized into three
cornpanlcr. Dehnrkation units consiqted of some 1,WH) troops.
1 a a i s t i n ~tllc Innding and unlmding of tranrports.
Unit organization

Wliile the Japanese bn3ically i~dhcrcdtc, a tria~tgularorganization conccpt.

there wen many cxcc.prron5 found 111all echclonr. l'hrsr nuerestill square units
with sullunit5 nrganized in rn~rltiplcsof four. hlt-rst i n fanny hattalionr had four
companies, hut rnme had only three and others had five. German, French, and
Rritirli unit nrganizaliaml co~iceptsmav have inlluenced lal~ancw m i t
~tructure,hut they v e v tnuch adjusted unit organization t o quit their nced5. In
regards tn "~tandnrd"table5 of organitatioil, tlie lapat1l.w could hnrr two or
no re f c ~ rany give11 unit as well as ~';triatisnsof thcsc. It dcpcndcd on rvhat thc
unit'> mission rvaF and avajlnblc resnurccs wlren it rvnr activntrd. The number
of crew-served 1%-pitpons assigned to a gircn unit might he less or nlorr ttinn tllc
~ t a n d a r dertablirhment.

Unit designation practices

l'he transliiticm r>! lapar~csct u ~ i tdelignations was oftcti cnrrupted early in tllc
rvar as the interpreters, mostly lapancrc-.imericanr t :Yi\rail with little rn~litary
cxpriencc, nbouldtranslate unit dcrignntion~without rcfcrencr to an?,common
rtandard. This resulted i n thc sanlt! types of units rolnrlirnt.~being identitied h!,
hvo or three conflictinfi titles. Another problem w a s that 5r)nlc intrlliacnre
a n a l p r attempted to assign Jilpanesc unit\ ccluivalcnt US dc3igr1ations giving
thcm rnisloadi~lghlnctiondl title>.
[)A hrancllcs of <ennicewere d~viiletlinto the l irle -1r111r rHtdkt71: infanin.,
artillery { f ~ e l d ,mountain, medium, heavy, coaft, .\.\I, cavalry (hnrse,
rrconnairsance, tankl, i n f a n t v mnrtar. engineer, chemical, transport ( h n r ~ e ,
motor,, railway, nr etenrolr yical, and air wn~ice,'Thr 5cr1'icell~I K ~ ~ l r l inc1~1deJ
~lu~~
the following: intendance, technical lordnancr,, medical, veterinary, iudicial,
and militarv hand.

-\rrny level
'Grnups of armies" were desigrlaled by naines muall\, detining their area of
~iperationr(for esamplc, tlie SnutIiern, Kwantung, and C l i ~ n aCspediticlnan.
annic?). Thc group armies tva3 r o u ~ l i l yequivalent to an 4llicd theater of
operalicln 35 ~t would corer forcer re~punsihlefor a broad arca. The Sorth
China Area Arm!. existed prior to the WJT. It w a s not until the qrlrnmcr of 1442
that numbered area amtier l~egant o be activated. The "area army" I H I I ~ J I ~ I I ~ ~ I ~ I I )
roughly rorsespondcd to d n :\lliud fietd arm!: hut tvns usuali!- tied to its
assigned area, in effect a sub-command of a gmup of armies. It cnnsisted nl
cmc o r morc armics, air units, and trolild hn1.c vmlc d l ~ ~ s ant! ~ o nhrigarle5
~
under its dircct control. The " a r z n ~ ~{Grrrr,
" was r q u i n l e n t to an ,-1Ilied cclrps
con~istingof trvo to tour rIi\,~sionscrome may have had unly one or tip to
5 i s ) plus arm!' troops (combat support and st.r\.ice unitsl. Any nunlbcr nf
independent mixed brigade$ r n i ~ h tbe arsigned. .-krmies were num bcrt,d, but
there were also named armjes tied to tht.ir area of rcspnii5ihility ~ ~ ar cttich
Clioren and Formrtra armies, for example!; thew shciuld not he cunfir.;etI with
N~an~rl.arrl area armies. "Pi\trict armies" were ~ ~ l ~ radmintstrat
ely ive cnmmand*
conhollrng units in the H u m t Irlands and rPsponqible for mohiliratinti,
training, and fvrrning nctr unit$.

Divisional level a n d hclrrrr,

lnfantn divisions ( S f i i t k t r ~ l 1vei-r rlu~nhcrrrf a n d did lint includc. "infantry"
within ttlcis designatii~ns.Ijivisions %zrt.rcrr ot nece5rarilv nunlt~eredin the

&A panshute mwp sleeve insignia
This insignia wasseldom worn in
combat
Special Navd Landing Force
parachurn m o p insignia.
The imperial Guards Dnislon
displayed thla insignia on thew
cap,@apposed to the simple s W
worn by other uniffi
sequence inwblch they were aaiveted and some numbers were skipped. Depot
divisions (Ruru Suidan) were found bearing the same numbers as infanby
divisions. Divisions were sometimes known by their home districtctsuch as the
Zd or Sendai Divisfon. Infantry regiments were originally assigned to divisions
in numeric sequence, but over the years this changed as divisions were
ttianguladzed from 1936, with units deactivated, reactivated and twrganized
Divisions raised in the late-1930s and dudng the war were often assigned
infantry regiments in numeric sequence Infantry groups assigned to divisions
and most divisional units bore the parent division's number. For the most part,
diiional artillery regiments did not coincide with the division's number.
Regiments and Indegendent battalions were numtmed in sequence by branch
or functional designation. The term '%dependentv ( D o k b m ) defined brigades,
regiments, ba-ns, and smaller units not oganlc to divkiom. "h.lixedN(&met)
referred to a composite or combined arms unit rather than a untt comprising
organic subunits of the same hranch.
Idanfry brigades organic to a square division, m a l l 9 numbered in
sequence, conrlsted of twn'iufaritryregiments. An independent mixed brigade
(IMB) usually consisted of several independent infantry battalfans (IIB) and
organic d e r y , engineer, and signal units.
Infantry and atiilery regiments consisted of three organic batfalions
designated by Roman numbers 0-m). AUied intelligence usually identified them
with Astbic numbers. Rifle and arHU'ry companies were Arabic-numbered in
sequence through the regiment or independent battalion The Japanese did
not use the term "battery" but rather "company." AUied intelligence usually
designated d e r y and AA companies as battertes though. Eattalion machine-
gun companies were designated, for example, Machine Gun Company,
Battalion, 16th Idantrp. The same applied to companies organic to a regiment,
for example, AT Company, 16th Infantry. AnAntiaa£t and some obher types
of regiments often had two bmalions. In this baok infantry, cavalry,
reconnaissance, field aaillery, mountain aaillery, heavy amery, tank, and
w e e r regimental designations do not include the word "regimmt'' (for
example, 144th Infanfry).
Tank, reconnaissance, cavalry, engineer, shipping e-eer, signal, and
many transport re-nts were actually batwon-me, being eomposed of
thtee to five companies and with no battalion structure. The nondescript
term "unit" (Tat or Butat) is often encountered. A "unit" could range in size
from a platoon to a battalion or larger support unit. They might be organic to
a division, or an IMB, or be independent.
Task organization for combat
The 1JA maintained a flexible capability to tailor units for specific missions.
There were no reservations with regard to attaching units from one formation
to another in order to facilitate deployment and accomplish a given rmssion,
even between divisions and regiments. With limited matPliel resowces, the
Japanese pooled weapons in independent units that were asslgned to area
armies and armies. These units or detached subunits would be attached to
divtsions and smaller units as required by the mission. A deployed division
could have well over a dozen smaller supporting units attached There was no
set standard, nor "habitual attachments."
Early in the war most triangular divisions still possessed an infantry group
headquarters. This was often detached along with a single infantry regiment,
artillery battalion, engineer company, and other supporting units to conduct
an independent mission. It might be identified by its group designahon or as a
"detachment" preceded by the group commander's name; for example, Kimura
Detachment. Reinforced regiments and battalions could also be detached for
similar independent operations. Such special detachments (Shitafl were
essentially task forces ranging in size from battalion to division. The Allies
usually called them "forces" or "detxhments." A number of such detachments
were formed from detached regiments and banalions for use m the Southern
Operations. During prolonged operations their attached units could change.
Platoons and sections from regimental AT, infantry-gun, and battalion
machine-gun companies were attached to battalions and rifle companies as
required. Support units £tom higher echelons were seldom allocated to
subordinate units on an equal basis m the divisions within an m y or to a
division's regiments. The attachment of supporting units from army level and
J ~ r l s i o n Icwl
~ l In a ilivision's infantry regiments, I'nr euainplr, dcprndcd nn cach
regilncnt's mi w o n , fllc iiiv-hion did ltahinzall~attact1 an engirlerr rt1rnparl!:
medical uriit (litter cclrnpany. treatment and drnhulanre platnnn\r, and radio arid
tclcllhnnc ccctinn5 to regi~nmtr.
I'hc ur~a1ii7ationr)l riivi\itrns varied greatly and depended t ~ o only t on the
time and place activ~tcrl.t~utthe divis~rm'rt'orerast nilrrlon. lapan's resourcer
wcre wcli thal it ditl not ha\'? tlie luxury nf organizing all of it$ divi5lons
a\ fully q u i p p e d . gcncral pltqrow forniationr capal~Ic ot perlorrning all
nli~5ionr Some " < r c ~ ~ r i dt ti'~ ' ~ s i n n + t ( "I!klrr Slrlri4~11)rwrc organized with lewer
61emy weapnnr and lackir~ccertain support components, ar they were intended
I.
for gi~rrirrsn (r>ccupation an ti-bandit, nr 11ne-of-comnrunication ~ e ~ i i r i g - .
\2'liile o n the rmr Itand c t ~ n w ~ v i nrcsnurce5, g nn the nthet i t meant that less
than c;rpahle dix'iricins were deplnycd to con~Iutzone\ when reinforcen~ent
war necessary. I t alro caused sn~ncdiFFiculty in tactical planning and mir5ion
awignrnentr a\ snme of t h e w division5 werc not triangularIy orgai~izedand
were differently a m c d from t h e "standard" dil-~sioo. The 1st-20th 4c.xcept
1Jth, ISth, 17tI1, lt5tt1) divisions and t h c d Guards Division were considered
permanent divirionr ~IO-SI~MLI Slri~livl).Other5 were classified as temporary
division\ r 7 r k r r w t c i 1 S I l i i f i ~ ~ r l .
'I'hsec infarltr!' divisitrns were motorized tcl w m e rlcgrec In lanuarv 1~141.In
addition to I w n g trained for amphibinux operation\, t t ~ crquarc 5th and
18th dlcl<iclns and t h e rriarl#lllnr Guards Dix7i~ionreccivcd varyirlg q ~ a n t i t i ~ ~
of additional motor transport. The 5th had S612 trucks, making it thc most
heavily motorized, I~uutit rtill had Far fervw trucks than many f-uropcan
clivi5itms. T l ~ c1Ytt1 had even fctvcr and still relied t~cavilvon horse-drawn
dstillcry and transport. The Guarrls Divicinn, smaller in ttrcngth, hatl
660 trucks. Ilue to this rnrrttlri7atio11, it was nci accident that tlitr<c divisions
were commlttcd to k6alaya. l h c 4Kth had a slightly higher percmtage o f
trucks as wcll. :'l standard triangular division st Tull complement had only ZOO
!nicks: manv ~~orscssed fdr Ipss.
rriangubr tiv virions I Son-t;t?l-ESltiil~ltr\ wcrc first proposed i l l 1921 and called
for ~ h celimination nf thc t w t ~Ixigadc Iiuarirluartcrf, dcactiratfon of one
regiment and t t 7 ~reductit~n t75 tlie battal inns' Four cnmpanicr tn three-a
nrt saving c*f a p p r o ~ i i n a t ~ lrix y divi\ion5 t ~ trnups.
f Conrideretl ton d r a ~ t i ca
redut-tion, only crnc c-nmpany r*.ar cut fro111 each infantry Ilattalinn ant1 orte
unmyany hrlm each ua\.alry rrgiment, retlucinl: the .4riny I J fin,ntloO ~ men, The
C O F ~cavings allnrved J machine-gun compani. tto he adtied ro each infanttv
regiment and cavalry I~rigaderaiwd.
Tlic dcactival ion ol Rvc divirionr in 1925 resultcd in serious morale problemr
for officers, ~ ' h uIrere nwigned to a rcfiirnent for life. Onl?* small numbers c f
offirerr acllici~cdgcncral ntl'icer rank and higher ~ t a f farqignrnents. Unit officer5
were seconded to training and <chon1 a s r i p m e n t \ , I ~ L I E ~tsuallyretlimerl to their
parpat regiment. LIfficcr5 of lhc tfcacti~aterlr e d m r n t s were rearsignerl to nttlerr,
but a 1 w . 1 ~Fclt~ like nutslders. This lirnblem was encnllntered again d ~ ~ r i n ~
thc \vat when units were split from the pawnt regiment5 and divisions as
vspeditionary units, or used tu form new unltr.

The 1940 standard B infantry division

On paper, the IL140 standard R, or r Itsti, t r i a n ~ u l a ri n f a t ~ t ndii,ision consisted
of lo,OOn troops, although thi? cc~uldbc a n v l l ~ i n gfrom 18,000-71,000 troops.
T71i3 depended o n the rpccific assigncd units, as, there werc scvrraI alternativw.
The dir.ision 11Q consisted of thc general ~ t a f tant1 administrative Gaff
sections plus small guard, ~ i g n a l ordnance,
, and veterinary detarhmctitr alonq
wilh a small 1 TQ tmin for transport and hapgagc. 'She infant? group ( H I I / I P ~ ( / ~ I ~
Flu in d i r e c ~charge nt thc t l ~ r c cinfantry rcglmcnts, had an admini5trative >taff,
v ~ n r ddctachmmt, and small HQ train. Some infantry groupr had a tankette
company 1 Keisokrrr/m t'larfni) with 10-1 7 rnacli~nc ~un-arnietltan kettes.
 Table 4: standard B infantry division
Standard unit Strength (oficerEEMltotal) Alternate unit Sh.ength (oficerlEMltotal)
Dlvision HQ 50Kl501300
Infantry group HQ' 10185195 Moy h m been deleted

Tankette company c.00- I 20 total Moy hove b n n deleted II

Infantry regiment ( ~ 3 ) ~ 1 l313.73213.845 Infantry regimenr ( ~ 3 ) ~ 10 l /3,17413.275 I
I
Artillery group HQ4 c. 1 60 total

FA reniment 8012,02012.100 Mountain arrillery regr 9 113.40913.500

-
Recon regiment 2015801600 Cavalry regiment 4619041950
Tanke~ecompany5 c.8&120 total
Ennineer reniment
-
Tmnsnort regiment SO11.7601 1.8 1 0
-
Signal unit 8l2321240
Ordnance d q unit
Division medical service
6110411 30 I
I
Medical unit 401E.07011.I I 0
I
I Field hospital (x4) 251225l250 I
Water supply unit 1 11224l235
I
Veterinary hospiral 10110511 15
Total 72411 9,276120,000 I
Notes
%uards. Id, 2 Isc 38th.48th. and 56th divismns only.
I
I
Bottolions with four rifle cornponies. I

htmlions with shm rifle compunia.

1
I
Assrgned only to Guords und Zd divisions.
%ormolly ossigned to the vrfanrry group.

Standard B rriangufw infantry division

-
The infantry regiment
The infantry regiment (Hohei RentaO, comprising roughly 3,800 troops and
over 700 horses, was a well-balanced unit requiring few attachments to be
effective in combat. Its basic organization remained constant throughout the
war, but many variations of subunit internal organization and the types and
allocation of crew-served weapons can be found. Organic medical support was
light, with two surgeons and two orderlies in the regimental administrative
section, three surgeons and four orderlies in each battalion, and four orderlies
in each company. Additional medical support was attached from the division.
It must be noted that the following strength fig- represent typical unit
strength; the actual s-8th in the field varied greatly and few intelligence
documents agree with each other on this matter. Note also that when numbers are
provided the flrst number refers to officers and the second to NCOs and enlisted
men. Where only one number is shown, it refers to NCOs and enlisted men.
 *-
Standard B Infantry rsginent

I I I I I

@J,2:
I

0I
Mnuh

Bf
ern
@
.
h
:
I

E
l &%

mm
I

a
I

on -tmm w.=uucsbxlml

R E C ~ A HQ L
The regimental HQ consisted of the staff,administrative (2116), code and
intdligence (l/lO), ordnance (I/$), intendance (1141, and LMG sections (5) plus a
color guard (115). The staff, such that it was,consisted only of tfle comman&er,
operations officer, adjutant, and gas offtcer. It also included a 121-man regimental
train with &Id and ammunition sections. The 40-manfield section had 30 one-
horse Miowheel carts or 40 packhorses. It onied a day'smtions for the regimental
companies alongwith headquarters supplies and equipment. A field kitchen from
the division might be attached. The 81-man ammunition section W e d a day's
supply of ammunition for the entim regfment in some 60 twc-wheel horse carts
or on 120 packhams.

THE WANTRY BATWON

The three, roughly 1,100-maninfantry battalions (HoheiDaitai) had a 30-man HQ
with a commander and adjutant, admin&ative (4/14), code and intelligence (31,
ordnance and intendance (2/3), liaison (41, and LMG sections (5). The 110-man
battalion train had a 50-man field section and a 6Qman ammunition section with
h o w carts or packhorses. The battalion ttains were sometimescombinedwith the
regimentaltrain.A labor unit of 100-200 men organized into six sections plus an
equipment section augmented some regiments. This was by no means a standard
Rxture. More often than not, labor detailswere drawn from the infantaybattalions
orfromextemallaborunits. -

InEuItry W i a n

I I I I

El
WI,=mmE M=ErdWrn
 TITI RII! I O\II*!Y\
The fnur, I Xcrnan riflc companlc~had a 14-man f-117, 1viH1 the crjrnrna!rder, a
pc~onnclwarrant ofFicer rcquivalcnt t o an csec~ttivcn r i~dm~nishativc. r*ffirrr), ;L
rcrpcnnt mnlor i r ~c h a r ~ c( ~ f[wrvmncl rrt'clrrls i rclugtily etluating t o ,I fir%!-

DR. T
Enl. 18

w 3 x grenade
l t PMG dtshcnargm
OR t Wl~cm Enl = Enllsled men

I Rifle platoan

a Platwn commando- lplslon t Secood mch~negunner (pistol) ~ l f f . ~ ~ ~ m e d

girtoh usu~llymeiW iflles
b sergean)
~ i a ~ w n (rillel 4 fhm mxhme wnnsr IDistoll HachlnP p ~ n n w w r e
am~d
c Sect~onlmder rnffe) h Ameman o4?lrW I : rhlG~
~

d LMG crm leader tolshll) i Grenadier (grenadedlschetger)

B Machlne gunnerlprdnll j Secnnd grenadrer trAel

1st ligm rnachlne gun secHon

1 36 IIght machine gun &Ion

sergeant), a supply sergeant, d n arms and equipment $ergcant, four mcdical
ordrrlicr, an officer'r ordcrl!; h ~ ~ g l eand
r , right mcrrengem. The three, 54-man rifle
p l a t o u ~ nhad a triuo-man HQ rcith a plarorrn ct~mrnanderand a Iiaison sergeant.
Roughly equating to n LfS plattmn ccrgciint. rhc latter'\ main duty to e n w e
orders n7ererclavcd to the ~cctionrthroi~gharm sijinaIs and rncrscngcrs. Thc t!lrcc,
13-manlight nlncliine-gun seair-lnsrvcrc led hy cnrporr~ls.b v h C O I I P ~ C ~ofC ~tight
riflemen and a four-man rnachrne-fl~ncrew: tlie latter consirted of a crew Icadcr,
machine gunner. and ~ecflrldand third gunncrr lan~mlrnitionbcarrrs). All fnur of
the crew rcere armed with plrtols, but in practicc nRcn canicd rifler. One rifleman
usually carried a rille-grcfiadc launcher. Sectir~n?asrignccl to ~ t s r n g t h e ~ l er~rlits
d
had the additinn ot a two-man -5cm grenadedischarger crew. De$ignazing the
s~i-tion"Iight machine-grn" rather than " riClc" cmphaqizcd tlre h c l r ~on thc
machine Elin ar the fire haw for thc ~ectiorl,and thc role of t l ~ critlcincn in
pmte~?lng it. TTlc xi-ma<-c-di~chatgct~ e c t i n n\\,as led Zy a corporal and had
three, twc-man grenade-discliarger crew\ plu\ is riflemen. rvho al w carried
dmmunition. nlc jiret1adicr5 werc armed o r ~ l ywith the di3cliarger arld a Ilaynnrt,
I ~ u Tonte
t may hnvc carried rlflrr. Ten- to twelve-man ~rc-tionswere cnnrrnon. In
coml~at,when ~trcngthdwindled the prenacic-rl~scharger rcction hma5mually
abqorbed into thr LMG section\.
Some baLtalic>n~h a r l onlv three rifle companies, though morl 5tIll had four
early in the war. Thnugh not a normal fixture, wnlr ~tren&!henedcompanies had
a 4h-man weapons platoon. This would have hva HMGs and huo 2cm r\l- rifles.
each manned hy an 1 1 -man section. 15 ruch a platoon wcrc asrigned, the rccapons
tvere reaHocated from the battalion machine-gun comliany and i n f a n t y - g ~ n
platoon, ar clpp>~etlto having the allocation increased.

OTHFI;h t 1 - r ~to\- 1x13 U~(;I\IF\T\L-I FVII i:m\

The standard I 74-man hattalion machine-pn company had a I 4 m a n HQ ant!
three machine-gun platorms. The platonn~liad a hvn-man HQ and four 1 I-nian
sections, cach with an FiJIG for a total of 17, h t ~ tsome had only eight HMCFs.
Thew zvas also a =-man ammunition p l a t o ~ ~ nCornplcte
. plstonns might be
attached to the forward ccrmpanies nr pairs rsf gunr [night be atzachcd. Some
HMGs were retained under battalion cnntml. Battalions featuring cumpany
tveapons platoons, with nvcl HXIGs arsigned to mch, i\.crc urganiz~dintcl two.
74-manH\fG platoons of two rcctions rnch plus a IS-man ammunltion platoon.
Thv 55-man battalion gun platoon had a lo-man H Q ii 15-man alnnlilnitinn
section, anti trvo 15-man Din sections, cach rvitt~a Jcm int'antw gun. ,I fvr%-units
p~5essfida 122-man hattalion gun crprnpany a 77-man ammunitinri platclon, and
two 31-man wn plataclns. tach $pith hro 7nn infantry gun$. Linits bc~rh~natc
enough to he provided Zcm -IT rifles wPnuldalso have tnur ..IT riflc platoon.i addcd
to the g l n cornIran!' along with an enlasgcd .39-man ammunition platonn. F;7ch
24-man platc~onhad a nvn-man H Q and two 1 1 - n ~ a nrcctionr, each manning an
,\I'rii'tc. 'TIle~c~~latooiis
dtd nnt cxist if thr :Z-Trifles rvcrc nrsi~ncrlto rifl c company
wcaponf platnnnr.
Scvcr~lcorn pan!--size unit5 ~wrcdirectly ~ ~ n d re~irnen
cr tal conl~ol,enhancing
it3 com21at capabilitic\. The 127-man rcgimcntal gun coinpa1ry had a 25-man I4Q.
an ohsen-ation sect ion, n 3 I -man alnnr ~ ~ n i t i oplat(~on,
r~ and tIr rev 33-inan gun
platoons. Gun platc~clnrhad two 15-mali u l n rectlon<, cach ri,ltli a 7.5cm infantt~'
gun. A few regiment<Iiatl 3h4-man regimental gkin h.31talwns cvi th %r\.a,17U-man.
tclur-wn companies and a 2-1-man I-IQ.
The regimental .YT company had 111 nien in a 20-man FIQ a 21-man
arnnlunition platnnn, and three 25-man :\T nun pl~toc.rii~, cad) with m1r>3.7cm
/\I' guns n ~ a n n e dhy 1 I-innn wctint~s.Sornc Inrv-priority units hati h m 3.7~111.YI-
guns in the regimental wn company alnng rvitl~only htlo7.5~7~1 regimental guns.
Ttre 132-nran regrrnental Ggnal mmpan!. r r a 5 organired intu a 30-man HQ
a telept~clneplatnon with four to six ~ e c k i o t ~each
< with three tclcplloncr and
a switchhoard, and a radio platoon rcith five to cight ~cctinns.cach o p c r n t i n ~
one radio. The telephone and s @ c W % were atta&ed M battalions and
reg$mentalmrnpanim.

Pield and momitah bstSlery regiments

The Z,~ZZ~WI field d e t y [FA) regiment (YWRerlGai) had a dHQ
en qimrvatfm group, a r@nmtal aain wlth a field and three amrnunitiion
m , n s , md @meth5man artillery httaEems These had a Small HQ
ot~smtlan goup, battalion asin, and b e aaillery companies.A mullpany had
an ebwmitton group, eanpany train, and iwn glatg~rw, with two
7.5- ggns aaaned by 14 men,giving a mtd of 33 hWtxe& There were a w f
z,Q(K) horses assign& to tW p@mefit fot rotYing. guns, and ammunttiw and
baggage c@s. The -ental, baW~n,and ~ m l p i tibmvati~n
p p p had
observation and sfgnal pktoms, wWcfl became pmgmsWely wa&S at each
e&n. ,%me regiments may ha= had me. 7 . 5 ~b#@ir% 9 h W d bY a
l o a n ~ W a n . a i e ~ . K 1 o ~ m ~ u n t a t n ~ ~
 A mountain artillcry unk
tnnsporclng a 7.5cmType 94 { I 9341
gun codld cover up to 10-1 5 miles
a day.While much slower than
motorked vansport. packhorse
units could travel across terrarn
impassable to trucks, such as
swamp. jungles. and mountarns.b
packhnrse could carry a little under
300 Ibs.The drawback was that
packhorse unirs requimd more
manpower and large quantities of
Iodder, resulrtng In supply problems.

Riwtni) was organized much the same way as the FA regiment. It was equipped
with thirty-six 7.5cm mountain guns, which were transported by 1,400 draft and
packhorses. A crew of 24 manned each mountain ,gun.

Reconnaissance and cavalry regiments

The 730-man reconnaissancc regiment (Sulmklr Renlai) war a cavalry-branch
unit, which gradually replaced the cavalry regiment as the war progressed. It
consisted af a 130-man I4Q and train, a mounted company, twn truck-borne
npanies, a tankette or armored car mmpany, and a truck transport company.
e 130-man mounted company had four 30-man platoons. Few regiments
ually possessed the tankette or armored car company.A regimental cnrnpany
d either seven tanketTer or armored cars. The 160-man truck-homecompanies
had two SO-man platoons organized and armed essentially the srtrne as a rifle
platoon, a 24-man m a c h i n e g ~ ~platnon
n with twe M?VIGs, and a 24-man AT
piatoon with two 3.7cm AT guns-which many units lacked. The 1 ~ - m a truck
n
transport company had WC,pfatoons, at least on paper, with one to transport
each truck-bomr company-.
The 950-man divisional cavalry regiment IKilrei Rer?tr~TIhad an 82-man HQ
and hain, a machine-gun, and three rifle and saber companies. The companies
had three platoons each amed with three LMGs and two grenade dischargers
plus a machine-gun platoon with two I-IMGs. The machine-gun company had
two pratoons each with two HMGs and two Z m AT rifles plus a platoon of *No
3 . 7 m AT guns and an ammunition platoon. Although srupplied with some 1, l I W The IjA fielded a wide m r i q of
hoses, It was not uncommon for these units to he dismounted latcc in the war. specialized engineer units. Hand
TOOISwere used for much of the
Engineer, transport, and signals units work. but some powered equipment
The 900-1,000-man engineer regiment ~KullriRent119 ha3 a 100-man H Q and was amllable. like this German-built.
f 928-model, diesel-powered,
train and a tnntttrirE platoon of 50-100 troop%.The three engineer companies
8-ton mad roller.The scarclty of
had approximately 250 men in four SO-man platoonr plus a 25-man mott:ri~I equipment forced h e Japanese
section with trucks and some powered engineer equipment. The platoons to limit the excent of thew
had four sections each. A company was habitually attached to each infantry construcuon proiem.
regiment to provide basic obstacle clearing, light r o d repairr, fuothridge
constmction, and other minor tasks. Kon-dluisional engineer regiments were
attached to divisions from army level for more specializd engineering tasks.
Transport regiment ( S l ~ i r ! d dRentnil organization varied greatly depending on
the number of trucks available. Ideally it consisted of a truck kansport battalion
and a draft wanspott bartalion. The mck battalion hart two nr three companies,
each with up to 50 truck cs! 1.5-ton capacity. Many had fewer and some vimrally
none other than commandeerd vehicles. 7hc drat? battalion had three or four
companies, each with some 740, two-wheel, single-horse-drawn carts and 35fl
&3S,.E Truck ransport was In short
supply, and m Japanese d~vtsronsw a
on a much lower scale than m their
European counrerparcs A commonly
used I .5-ton cargo mrk was the lsrnu
Type 94 1 1934).The rezr wheels mre
powered, but not the front ones. which
hmited 11s cross-counrry mobility,
W'lC-lT 6t x lnfanrry m a p s cover an
englneer as he sprays a Correg~dor
bunker w~rhaType 93 (1334)
flamethrower 5mce the Japmese did
nor use thickened fuel.its mnge was
only 25-30 yds.
troops. ?rtatlyr c ~ i ~ n e ndid
t r not pone?%a battalion smlcturc, hut liad up to eight
draft companies plus a v r ~ a l lveterinary unil. Such an ci~ht-companyregiment
nnrmally allocated four companies for rations and torage, hvo for artillcry
ammunition, and one for sinall-am~sammunition. In some units packhorse
cclmpanies substituted drdft compqnics on the hnris of Itvn packhor~ecom[>anleF
for one draft. Thcy tiad 3M packhor~crand 431 t r n p s . ..\lhrr~~t one-third nf the
tmops tverr arn1c.d.
liad two telephone, une radio.
-l'lie larjic. company-3izc \Ignal unit (Ikr!rltir!t~~i!
and a i?rat?rit31platoc-hn 11lm a 21)-man M Q and mcrrengcr sect inn. Thc 50-ma n
trlephot~cplatoonf cacll had Inur sections operating twc) ttlephones and a
srvitchl~rwrrl.Thc 100-man radio platoon had k t r z ~ e e neighr and twelve strut ion^,
each operating a radio. The wire and radio sections were dctaifed to seg1mcnt.r
and other divkic~nalunits. .lrtill~ryunits posstssed organic signal eYc.~ncnt~
thc>u#h. 'rhc c:>nipany-rize ortlnance dut?. unit provided weapon rcpalr and
t c ~ h n i c a lwrvices.

Medical and veterinary serviccs

The primary means of t a d c a l
transport found at all levels was she
one-horse.two-wheel cam. which
could c a y 4 W 5 0 0 Ibs of cargo. Here
add~uonalmules have been hitched to
the cart to drag ~tthrough mud. In
occupied areas. w r y morotized
veh~clew a s confiscated lor milinry use.
i ~ ~ n ~ c n i c eheaded
Thc ~ I i v i ~ 11ledi~ill , IT-a mlnncl, was sizeahlc in oriirr to trcat
ca\uaItie.; in fonvanf arcas. This allowcd the wounded a n rarlier rcturn to thih'
ant! rcd~~ctd cvacuatiorl requirements. It included a medical staff ~ e c t i o nin the
dPi5ion stafl. Thc divisional medical unit CSld(lir~tF i w i h l i l , ctrmmandcd I q ' a
coloncl ur linttenant-cnlnncl, had a 265-man headrluartcrv providing variol~q
spe~i~ilized medirnl, dental, and pharmaceutical <en'iccr; ~ I E three I ~ trratme!lt
pla ttjorir, t l i r ~ clitter companies 1711 litter tcanls), and an arnh~ilancccompany
(-1.5 anihulance1. .I Iittcr cnmparly, trcntmclnt platoon. and ainht~lnnceplatoon
lonz~ctia regimental rncdical trnit for atlachrnent to each infantr)?regiment.

'
Table 6: Southern Operations triangular divisions
Division Infarthy regs Artillery regt Aec~nlcavalryreg Engfneer regt Transport regt
Guafds 3.4.5 Guards Guards FA Guards Recon Guards Guards

I 2d
4th
4, 16.29
8.37,6 1
2 FA
4 FA
2 Recon
4 Cavalry
2
4
2
4 I

1
' 33d

I
38th
48th
216,217.218
228.229.230
P , 2 Formosa. 47
33 Mountain
38 Mountain
47 Mountain
-
Tan kette Co
47 CmFry
33
38
47
33
38
47
I 55th 112. 143,144 55 Mounrain 55 Cavalry 55 55
I 56th 113. 146.148 56 FA 56 Recon.Tankette Cop 56 56
Notes-
Designated, far example.Tonkette Cornpony, 56th l n f o Group.
~
 The)'~imvidcilcolIc.ction, initial trr.;ltmcnt, atid c\.nruation to t hc ficId hn\pital>
for woilndcd rold~err.'the thrce clr ftlur. 5iKl-patient field hmpitalr I ~ ' ~ T F ~I U< IE, II > ~ I I ,
cluqignatcd 1$t--lth in each diciri~mr cacti had a mrdical ctlmpany tn operate
the Ropitd, perform xurgery, and tri'nt Zhc sick and wotinrled. It also hacl a
tranrport cnmpnnl; to hnul c q u i l ~ n ~ c rwpplicr.
~t. and pcrst>nncl. It pro\*idrd
manpnwcr to ertal~lirlrthe liofpital faciliticr in tpnts. The large ~ater-supplyarrd
purificntinti uttit focated, purifictl, attd dirtrihuted nvater \ u p p l ~ ea5
~ \t'cll ar
p ~ f o r r n i n gmany ~lre\~entivc
niriiicnl and f i ~ l dhy~lcnctaqku.
The compaiiy-5i~errterlnary lio<pital rrc;ttcd ~iclt.iniurci!, and woundcd
hnrscf. It was also rcgpcln~iblcfor advising on the carc and I~etliny:clt t h c
division's 7.5130 horses, as even a few hundred ill knrser cuulrl rt.ducc ;I
division's effectiveness. k r z - medical and vetmriary t r o n p ~rverc ar~notl.

The square infantry division

7 he few remaining square divisions I liar-tnii-1 ,\lariirtl~rvcrc cllritr large, c-onillrising
some ZS,fl00 troopr. l ' h q %<.ereholclat'crs aftcr thc 1193ri reorgani7alicrn when
thc prcrccn of trianguIaritation got underway for mnst d2~i5ioi1r.'I hcy had trro
infantw hriqadc (I1rJrr.i l ( l r ~ i l i i ? l!~IQs, each with two infanly rCgimcnt 5 rnnt to k
mnfurerl with thc "brigadeddivisinn" of two hrigndcr with fo~rrI I I h apicce. ~ v h i c l ~
will he discusrcd in a subseq ucnt wlumc.). 7hc 5th niviqirln'\ 5111 1.A Ilepl~nrnt
had two i.5cm battalinns and a Ickm hmvitzer hattali~~n, rrhlch were t r ~ ~ c k -
drawn. The 18th t)ivi>ion's 18th Slrxrntain - \ r t i l l c ~Iiatl thrcc hattalinns of
pack-trampurtctl 7.5cnl nt>uiitain gunr. C:ompment unltr were 5iniilas trl the
trinngular divi~~rmr, Iwt slightlv t~ighcrin ~trengtliand pcmerretI more truck
trancport. The motorized Z d L'amln Ralralinn (2.2' Mlrri Unirtri, tvss cn~nllcrthan
a cavalq+regitncut with 600 trtlclps. The 5th 13i~~irion 1475 triaiip~larirrdin car!!'-
19.12 with the Jctachment ot tlie 4 l r t I n l b r i t ~ lhr 18th wa5 re~1rgani7cdin Al~ril
t h 124th En fantry detaclietl and the 27d Cavalq. Rattalion disbanded.
1 q43 \ ~ ~ i the
Both diiisiom drol~pc.dthe tjrigarlr H Q .

I
Table 7: Southern Operations square divirions
Division Infantry Infantry Artillery Reconlcavalry Engineer Transpore
brigades regtr rw unit
I

5th 9 11.41 5 FA 5 Recon Regt S 5

21 21.42
23 55.56 18 Mounmin 22 Cavatrj Bn. 12 12
35 1 14, 124

Square infantry divisfon

j
I m
A
&I 1/1OT
a Dr
A
I
3
 lndependent brigades
The concept of the independent mixed brigade W,D W t s u Konret Ryodan)
stretched back to 1894, when the deployment of troops to Korea was considered
to force a confrontation with China. A suffaently strong f o m was deemed
necessary in order to infUct enough damage on the Chinese,with the aim of
provoking them into sending more troops. Fearing the Wme Minister would
reject the deployment of a strong force, an Army general suggested to the
Foreign Minister that only a "brigade' be sent, typically compnslng 2,000 men-
but this would be a "mixed brigade' reinforced with additional infantry, cavaly,
artillery, and service troops, totaling 7-8,000 men.
IMBs were mainly intended for occupation duty and line-of-communication
security. Most had from three to six 1,000-man independent infantry battalions
(W, DoKwZtru Hohei Daitai), with five being typical, giving the IMB 6,150 men.
It also had a 160-man HQ, 600-man battalion-size FA unit, 250-man engineer
unit, and 140-man signal unit. Other infantry brigade-sized units included
independent infantry brigades (Dokuritsu Hohei Ryodan) with four IIBs and no
support units; independkt infantry groups (Dolnsitru Hohdan) with three
divisional-type infantry regiments and no support units (which later provided
core troops for new divisions); independent mixed regiments (Dokuritsu Konset
Rentai); and independent infantry regiments (DokuritruHohei Rortai).
The two brigades employed in the Southern Operations featured a W e n t
organization though. The 5,000-man 21st IMB, instead of IIBs, was assigned the
3,3633-man 170th Infantry Regiment; a 140-man HQ, 3633-man arUllery unit;
engineer and signal units as other IMBs; a 130-mantankunit with 11light tanks;
a 110-man 2an AAunit; a 260man transport unit; and a 250-man field hospital.
The 6,659-man 65th Brigade (65Ryodan, no other descriptivedesignation in
ik title) was a unique unit consisting of the 1.920-man 122d. 141st, and 142d
infantry regiments. They initially had only two battalions and a gun company
apiece and lacked an AT company, The 65th was assigned company-size
engineer and medical unlts, and a platoon-size signal unit.

Southern Operations independent b r i d e s

as Independent Mixed Brigade
t I I I I 1
Tank regiments
Battalion-size tank regiments (Senrha R m i ) varied in internal organization.
They could consist of 7OC-850 troops and 30-plus to 50-plus tanks. The three
or four tank companies might have been light, medium, or mixed. A standard
regiment had one medium and two light tank in the H9; the 1st or 4th
Company had one light tank in the HQ and four platoons of three light tanks
each; and the other companies had three platoons with three medium tanks
plus one medium and two light tanks in the HQ. This gave it 21 light and 31
medium tanks. Some regiments eliminated the light company assigning a light
platoon to each medium company. Light tanks were used for scouting and

Standard fou~arnpanytank N r n e n t

-
 flank sect~rity.Some company Flub nmy have had one rtr Iicn tankettex in lie11
nl light raiikr. There werc in5tanct.s nt ylatcrc)rls liav~nl:f c w r o r five tank?. whllc
oilier rrgitn~ntzwere ttndcrstrengtll. 1 fcrv rcgirnei~ts had only thrcc light
cnmpanle5 with tlircc platoonr apiccc.. Thc rtagiillcntpn~srcreda t tuck-l>rrriic.
nlaintenancc companv and cacll tank company hnd a motorized amrnuniticln
ta!ltI lvigjiagc! Irain.
fhc rccimcl~ts in A h l a y rcere under the .3d T ~ n kGroup 13 Srr~\kalt~rt,
incorrc,ctly called a "hrigade"~. tirn~ipc were adminirtntit'e licadrli~arter\
inadequate for tactical contr~rland were rliminatcd in IQ-lZ. The tank refiinlcnts
cmploytrd in thc Svutllerrl Opratitjns ~arircigrc;ltly in tenns of their cnmplimcnt
nncl intern;!l organization, n\ rhown in Tnhle H.

Table B: Southern Operations tank regiments I

Malaya
IscTank 37 x Type 97 medium tanks Col Mukaida
20 x Type 95 lighr tanks
6th Tank 37 xType 97 medium tanks Col Kawamura I
20 x Type 95 light nnks
14th Tank 45 x Type 95 light tanks Col Kim
1 ~hili~~ines'
I 4thTank 38 xfype 95 lighr ranks LtCol Kurnagaya
7thTank 34 xType 94 medium ranks Col Sonoda
2 x Type 97 med~urntanks
14 xType 95 light mnks
!
Nethedands East bndies2
31 x'lipe 97 medium tank Col Mori
I Id Tank (-)
5 x M3 llghr mnkz (captured)
5urma3
1 IsrCornpany,ZdTank I 2 x Type 95 light sank L t Okada
Notes:
I Some captured 115 M3 light rooks were obo ernpIc&.
I
4th Tank Regiment arrived later from the Philippines.
1st ond 4dr Tank regiments arrived in April 1942.

A 7th Tank Reg~mentfype94 ( 1 934)

medlum rank crosses a hasttly
repaired br~dgeen route ro Manlla.
Thc white five-pornted star
ident~fiedche I sr Compnny.The
3d Company used a star wirh round
"po~nts"and the 4th Company
(Ligh~)used the below insrgnla'
The clasc-cornhat tratlitinns of the ~wrirnriessentially lived LIII as lapan cnttrcd
the modern age. Thc arri~alof rcpeatin): ri flcs, machine glnc, ant1 breech-loading
artillery (lid I~ttlrto diminish thif. \Vhcn new field ma-~ualswcre ~~r~hlishetl in
1909. thc i n f a i l t r y mama1 c m p l i a ~ i z e dthc infantry attack prccedcd hy a barrd~c
ot riff c fire fnllowcd b!. a bayrmet charge. tkgartllers of thy lcrsonr learrrctl at I'rrrl
Art l i ~ ~nr~, h e r eJapanese troops were mown down by machine gun5 and art illen
in World h'ar I fashion, cornhincd arms rrartnrc na5 rccnnda? rhc t ~hvr t hranrll
rnallualr fo~r~setl solely nn \upprtIng I l ~ eintantry attach.
Machine gilnr WCTC I O C ~ Z C ~ C I oi11y a t rcgimcnia! level until 1924 w h e n the
liglit machinc gun cvau tielded, much Inter than irsucd at rqilad level i n
IYc~ternarmies. Thc pr~nciplecof clasc combat rvith the bayonct, advancing
in skirmish linrc, and direct-firc artiller!. were adhcrrd to tong after they were
abandoned in the \Vest. Huwei~er, it mu5t he siliil tliat Japanrsr qliiukly
emhraced tlic IIgFit machine gun as 3 principa! i n t a n t ~w1eapon and d c ~ ~ r l n p e d
all their small-urlit tactics around it. This war especially allparent in the I'avific
when, coupled with the ~ r e n a d cdisclinrgcr nntI protected hy riflemen, t hesc
weapons crealcd h a r ~ i ~am[-lngc ;lllied t r n n p ~in close-ranjic jungle firefightq.
Even In open terrain t hc Japanrrwc l n p h a ~ i ~ eclodnp d rapidly with the enemy
and cngaginp him in clasc c o ~ ha n t, to rxploi t their supcriclr r r ~ i s l ~ i rIl?ht.n
l. Inring
~ " E~adthe atIdcd hencfit of lerrening any artillery
lZllicd f(>rc-rsthis " h t t ~ g i n tachc
and clorc atr support ailvarrtngc For [ear nt causing friendly casual ties, The suggcd
terrain and denre vexeta kion errcouiltereil in much of the Pacific and Southc~st
Asia pn)vidc.d an ideal, if lianti and u n t o r g i ~ ~ i tenvirc~nrnrrnt
~g, for slaw-cornhat
tac-ticr. While most arrnles might ranction night attackr, the [I:\ waf one of tlic
few that practiced then1 aggre5riceEy and sccompli~hcdthem succcntully nn a
regular baqls.

Envelopment and encirclement

1 he 11.4 placctl great tnirt i n the envclopingattack, which might takc nnc nf rc.venl
I'nrrnr: single eiivc~loprnentto one flank, double cnrelr~pmentto bclth flanks, snrl
encirclement. Envelopments attacked the enemv's flank(< I , H~~IIIIccncirc-lement
dmve deeper to n~tt h enemy ~ off From the rear Isornetirncq from only one flank,.
r\t thc same time pressure was applied to the enemy's front anti flanks.

A paratrooper of she 1 s t Raiding

Force mans a 7.7rnm Type 99 11439)
L M L T h l s two-regiment IJA unlr
executed lumps rr Palembang,
Sumarrz and Kcepang.T~morIn
February 1942-
I Envelopmentand encirclement

Encirclement requited a dlvisionllzed or larger force Divisionsand regiments

could conduct single and double envelopments. The sixe of the J a m force
and its exact deployment obviou$ly depended on the mengrh, deployment, and
composition of the enem? as well as the tea.&. The Japanese would often
execute envelopmenfs with forces numwically rmaUer than the A l l b wsuld
have used though.
The most common method of conducting an envelopment was to advance
In two or threep a a d columns. When contactwas made with the enem%one
or t w columns
~ would move to attack the flanks or rear. This was the common
means of an advance to engagement by a division. A brigadeor regiment might
advance in one or two m l w s until making contact. 'The lead elements would
place pressuce on the enmy's fsont, a holdlng attack, while following units
would encircle to one or both flanks. Another, though more complex method,
was to engage the enemy and move units through concealing teiTain or under
the cover of darkness to attack the flanks. Even a rifle platoon, when meettng
an enemy force, was to conduct a holding attack while ode S e a n attacked
from the flank.
In Southeast Asia, the NFJ, and PhUippines the Japanese would conduct
enveloping mwemenfs 2-3 miles to the flanks of the Allied fame and several
miles deep. They would establish battalion- and larger-slaed roadblookd on the
line-of-communicaUons, and Allied units, finding such a large force in their
rea~and lacking sufficient wms,were forced to withdmw frontline units to
deal with the new threat. The Japanese to the front would then conduct. direct
or Mltration attacks on the weakened force. Infiltmtlng platoons, when
counterattacked, would simply go to ground in the deiw vegetation, allow the
attack to pass through,atrd engage the enemy from behind.

Frmtal attack
The IJA cautioned against the frontal attack, but h~ practice the Japanese
frequently executed it. This was often due to the ~ o udesireto s amihilate
theenemy, but terrain and memy dlspositionsmight also prevent an enveloping
mad6 InHtratlon and probes to lomte weak sectors would precede the
main assault, and the main at&&d d strike here. The goal was to penetrate
deep into the enemy's rnand attack command post& d e r p , and savice5.
Tanks would be employed i£ available, Artillery support was usually inadequate
and maximum use would be made of heavy machine guns, infanuy guns,
and m o m .
The W o n would normally a d ~ n in ~ etwo columns, with a reinforced
regiment In each. The reserve regiment would move behind one of the lead
coiumns, depend'ig on whieh Bgnk the commander had anticipated wwld be
the most effect3ve to envelop fion tf moving ln three columm the third
column, situated on either flank as a meen or security force, m a y cansisted
of a reinforced battalion, which may have been detached from one of the lead
regiments or the reserve. These ~ o t m m might have been designated the left,
 This diagram shorn a d~v~slon
in two colu advancing In two coiurnns. In this
situation.the division commander
has assessed chat It will be beneficial
to envelop the enemys lek flank
using hls right colurnn.The unk
derlgnatlons shovin are nodonal,

I and do not represent a particular

I
m
LEnEDLUHN RlOhlEOWMN
division.

, I*'
 center, and right w i n p o r units. An adcancc ~ u a r dnf
I Division advancing in three columns up ti1 b~ttiillc~n ctrenflh preceded column, frnm
rrll~ic.hit rvas de-zacl~~d. Thc column nm5t libelv t u
enwge the main enemv force might he more hcavlly
CEFl C O L W CEmREDUlMM RIGHT WWMW
reinfrjrccrt than the crthcr!st. The rcconnai5~ancecr
cavalry r ~ ~ i r nte nrvaulcl praride a rccnnnaisralice
pJ
I
l ( - t l l B i % ~ 2&
-!dbu"h.J
rletachment, a r l m n c i n g c\.en f ~ ~ r l h carhead. It !could
I
also provide. flank-scrc-r.ninji detachments. Thr divisioll
rhommnnderwould maintain direct cnntml rwcr the

II rnby::t,m f+l
1 11 column mart likely to c n p g e the enemy i t s advance
FA ~ ~ ~ a rthe d , rcconnaiswnct. d e t a c h n ~ e n t , and the
I t r \ ~ z R*ll I
diri<ic>n main [hat column. Th15
I .~ncluded the it ~ t a n tfl~llotvtng
ngrorrp lic.adquarters, reren e
i
&I . I m l l Y & ~ O " 3 F]I
;z I
regiment, and ~erviccunits. The other column and its
sth.ance guard wcrc undrr ttrc control of the regimental
mrnn~andcr.Each calumrl was reinforced hy ir rtillcw,
engineer, and rncdical units and, depending on the

, p q a 1 *
AT B n
[q threat, )LA and .$'I rubunit5.
Once thc r-ncmy had been located and ctrtltact was
imminent, the cc>lu!nn~would deplny thcir rubunit5
q , a cocwdinatcd deployment:
hnvard in 11t ~ a ~ e in

I Bunshin Break from march column into smaller

columns while our of anillery range and
I I continue to advance.
I Tenkai Deploy on a line of departure br a
I
I I

coordinated attack.
I

11 1 5okoi Advance from the line of departure in

secrions and platoons. 1
I '
'''0- Sonkoi Final deployment with units armnged to
attack by close assault
I

I 0..

3 r n l & ~ t
I

I
I Rvgardlers 01 the hencfits of s11tl1 coordinated
m.8 I attacks, the lapallesc tended to cxtrcutr. piccrmeaE

i
I
3 Bf&*
m !
attacks in hoth escrciscs and cambat. Mort armies
diwourage piccenlcal attacks hccar~senF the low chance
of success owing to Jncal attack5 heinx conrluctcd at
different times, a lack ot critical mafs, and litlle

I ,
This diagram shows a division
advancing In three coiumns.
The unlc designauons shown are
notional, and do nor represent a
parzlcular division.
coordination hentlc.en attacking un~tr. Theyshould
only he conducted iii I I I thc oI3jective i? lirnitcd; r2b
inwfficicnt time i% a~'ailahlc:a ~ d l n r(3, the attacker is
vastly ruperior to tire defender. 'nlr lapanere, in
contrast, lire~crihcdthe piecemeal attack in durtrinc. nley adhered tn the first
trw points ahor.e, but frerlucntlv attackcd stipi~ior,well-prepared cnemv F ~ t ~ c u .
IVhile thi\ wm rrcquentl~successful i n China and a ~ a i n 5 till-prepared .4llied
forces in 194 1-47, it Inter led to dirihrter.

Tank and artillery coordination

I'hr J~panese clt.rvt.6 tanks mainly 35 i11 h nt ry FLIPPORweapons. Likc artillc*nr
thrg M v r c most effective if dcplo!vcd in the trnnt alcrngsidc the infantry. Thcrc
war n t t ln\tnlction f o r them to l r mnswcl
~ 13T tn engage in battles with encrn?'
armor. 3,fsic)r cfdnrts would bc nladc to ~mriiionti111k\ with the d ttacking
infantry in sccrcuv. 'hnk o ~ m l ~ a n i eanrl
\ platnnns ~ r c r cucually attaclir-d
directly to infantrv hal!alion\ ancl <cldomi cn~plnycdin larger formations.
T l ~ ctanks' n i ~ s s i n nwcrc
~ tn breach wirc oh5taclc.r and clc\trily crcn--\t.r\-c.4
wenl>on pnritiofis. Tarik3 were rlot neces\sriIv ~-iei\-irl ar dccisive \\.rapoils. hut
?kricllrr ar aids to the infantry. .Is a rcrt~it,the intanti-!. wac Sol11 to t'onti~~uc ih
i ~ d v ~ n cifcthe tanks were kc~ockednut.
I l n c of lapan's greatert nrcas of dcficienq war In it5 artillery. Shiq applied
not nnl!. to the limited capahilitics of lapancw aflilleryml711t 3150 1 0 itr c p a l ~ t j t v
anil itr methods crf crnployrnent. I3ivfsions urunll! hnrf only three lifilit ur
mountain attillery battalions, w h ~ c hrrcrr h n h i t ~ ~ n latt;ichetl
ty trr ~ n c h~nf;intr\-
reglrnent, an cxtcnrian of the old concept of posititming a r t i l l e ~rlirectlv
in t h c fmtrtlinc. alongside infarrtrb .4 m~ediumhattalic~n,I1 azlauhcd, might t ~ e
kept under di.r3irion contruI for ccrunterhattery fire. Iliir !nt*anr of ari~llerv
ernploymcnt rlenietl thc di).ir;lnn ct~mmantlerthe allility tn atfec-t ct~mbat
powcr t ~ ? . nlassirlg h i s artillerv or prn\.iding general support. ;\rtillcr!.
preparations prior t o ; ~ r i attack rvrrc ia~lr;!lly short, no mcyrc than one or
two hours. Thiq inclttdcd ndjustrnrnt and ran~ing,lirntted countcrhattery fire.
breech in): ohstnrles !which w a s of onlv lin1itcrl1.1 lt.tiver~e+rw i t h 7.Scrn piece%,
which meant o n l y ahour n h a l f - l l r ~ i ~ rfirc ' ? cln thc dctentlen' frontline pclritiorlh.
X great deal ot crnpha~iswa\ placed tin thc emplq.ntcnt nf iufantn* crew-
served rueapons. The LJlG ftjrnied t l ~ ccore nb section and platcmn f~repower
nlot~gsidethe grenadc di~chnrgcr.T t ~ cHLIt1 W A S cr)r~<idt'redpivotal to thc
at t ~ c b h!' provirliiig \~tpl~rcrrive (ire t lirough gaps behceen advancing w l ~ u n i t ?
nnml to the franks. I t wa< alrn crrcntlal to defense. tt'hilc rifienlcri protcctt'd
ILlrlGr, l3ll;s protected I-IhlCtr. I ~ r f a n tguns ~ were estrcmelv light, compact,
nncl simple, and were intended to wpplernent di\-hional artiller!.. Tuch
rvcaponr nvrc* found in other arrnic\ a t regimental levcl, h t ~ the,lapaac~c t alw
allr~ttcdthem In hattalion 3eveI in lieu of mortars. Unlike \,tTcPcrnarmics, in
which mortars were organic to cnrnpanicr and battalionf, the lapanerv
emplnxvcdmortar5 in non-di~riqirsnal unitr for atrathment as required. 'J'l~estare
of Jnpancsc .1T weapons was dixmal. The 2cm tYl' rifle was heavy, cunlbersu~nc.
anti ineffectlre against a l l but the lightert Allied tanks. 'l'hev were f c in ~
numhcr too, 11crt nll unilr pcrssessed them. The 3.7cm AT gun m.;tj ai-tuallv LI
rapid-lire i n h t i t ~xun derigned to knock out pillhoxcs. With the nnt,hl,lr
c ~ c e p t i o nnf rndcl?ine guns, !he laynnese allocalcrl i l l i i ~ l l tc-rrW-.;crvc~d
~
rrt.api"ns on a s l n ~ l l e Cr C J I ~ 'tlla11il'estcr!l ilrnlies.
Small-unit tactics in the Philippines
A number of characteristics of Japanese small-unit tactics were noted in the
Philippmes. Attacks would often begin at dusk with Mtration thmugh gaps
between units and flank attacks. After securing as much ground a9 possible
before complete darkness, they consolidated and prepared defensesfor an enemy
dawn counterattack. Even though many Japanese battalions had suffered heayr
losses during the Bataan assaults, they would strive to keep up pressure on
US-Filipino positions, constantly seeking out gaps and weak points. When
these were found, they would immediately infiltrate them, to he followed by
supporting troops in the hope of establishing a foothold within the US-Filipino
position. Harassment of frontline positions was constant with infiltration by
individuals and small w p s , sniper fire, probes from unexpected directions,
and sections frequently opening fire intermittently--all to cause confusion and
uncertainty. This was also an effort to draw fire to locate US-Filipino positions.
On several occasions the Japanese rapidly occupied abandoned villages and
brought in troops by true$, with the result that they received heavy enemy
artillery fire. From this they learned to bring troops in through the fungle on
foot, and to remain dispersed and concealed.
Japanese artillery tactics were initially ineffective,as they had little experience
against an artillery-armed enemy. The camouflage of gun positions was poor and
companies were positioned too dose together, making them vulnerable to
wunterhattery firr. They learned quickly though, concealing their guns better
and dispersing firing units more widely. They would sometimes employ a single
artillery piece to range a target, and then move in a company to accomplish the
fire mission; meanwhile the single gun moved M another position, repeated its
ranging task for another target, with the company following on quickly to
acwmplish the next mission.
One American offlcer commented, "The Japanese are crafty, shrewd, glven
to deception. They are amazingly patient and wait for hours, wen days, for
their chance. They are tough individual soldiers and work well in small groups
of two or three men."

RMe platoon attack-preferred

iKawmmmKbr
ii ussasanssnt
Weapons and equipment

Japanese individual and infantry crew-served weapons were adequate (with the
notable exception of AT weapons), even though they had h e n developd
in the 1920s and 1930%and somehmes even earlier. They were rugged and fairly
reliable, but were comparativeIv short ranged and did not match the capabilities
of contemporary Western weapons in most cases. The short range of infantry
weapons was not much of a hindrance in the Pacific though. and the Japanese
became adept at employing them offensively and defensively to exploit this
characteristic. Their lack of sufficiently heavy and long-range artillery prnv;d to
be more of an issue though, This, coupled with outdated fire-control measures,
caused them significant prob!erns. .AmmunitIan packaging proved 20 be
inadequate for the extremes of the tropics and was more troublesome than the
weapons themseIves.

Platoon weapons
Rifles and pistols
The Arisaka 6.5rnn-1Type 38 (1905)and 7.7mm Type 99 (1939) rifles, while
heavy and not as finely finished as Western counterparts, were as reliable and
rugged as any five-shot bolt-action in service. Thesc rifles had a Mauser-type
action stronger than the US MI903 Springfield's. Other versions of the 6.5mm
Type 38 incIuded the Types 38 (19053 and 44 1197 1) carhiner, the latter with a
permanently attached folding spike bayonet; Type 38 (1905) short rifle; and
Type 97 ( 1 937) sniper rifle with a 2 . 5 ~scope. The 7.7mrn Type 99 was provided
in two Iengths, the long rifle For infantry and the short rifle for cavalry,
engineers, and other specialty troops {test 7.7mm carbines had too hard a
recoil). The long rifle was 50in. in length while the short's was 6in. shorter.
Various untts within a division carried spare rifles, totaling almost 2,000,
Japanese automatic pistols were of poor quality and lacked knockdown
power. The Nambu Type 14 (1925j and the even mare poorly designed Type
94 (1934)had eight and six-round magazines, respectively. Both fired an
underpowered 8mm cartridge. Rather than being issued as an improvement
over the Tvpe t4, the Type 94 was produced only as a lower-cost alternative.
Pistols were issued to officers and crew-served weapons' crewmen.

In the mid- 1920s. the IJAadopted

the b i w l e m improve ~nfantry
moblliry. One bamtion In same
regimen= was equtpped with them.
Some regiments deployed LO
Sourheasc Asia were enrirely
equipped with bicyc1es.A bicycle-
mounted infantry battalion could
average 1 C-15 mph if necessary, and
could carry rations for up to five
days.Trceps would walk beside
herr bicycles for a short urne each
hour to exercise different leg
muscles to prolong their endurance.
The core weapon of the Japanese
section (squad) was the l~ghr
mach~negun.Th~s6.5mrn Type 96
(1936) LMG Is shown wtrh a spare
30-round rnagazrne and a rnagazlne
Ioaderlorler.The 7.7mm Type 99
(1939) war slm~larrn appearance.
but had a cone-shaped flash
suppressor and a folding monopad
butt supporr. Both were based o n
the Czechoslovakian Brno des~gn.
dre same weapon from whrch the
Brirish Bren gun was derivpd.
Japanese weaponry and
equipment designation
characters
Character Meaning
A note on lapanese designattons:
the terms "type" and "model"
were both used to translare h e
Japanese Konli rdeogaph Shik,
whlch is acrually "type."The
japanese ideograph forUmodel"
tsKm.Contemporary
intelligence documents often
used both terms In che same
docurnent"~ypeUis used
throughout thus book and
"Model" is used for sub-variants.
Machine guns
Thc Namhu ri.5mm 'rypc q h I l03hl and 7.7n1m T q l e q9 I 1039) LMGs were
hi pod-mounted and fcd t?y .3r)-rr~iindtop-fit r d nlaga7incs. Tllc obrulete Nambtt
h.5mm Type I I ( lc)221 LAIC; rvar isued a\ a a~F~rltftutc to wrnc unit5 ant1 cviw
found nk)ngridt. t h e I'ype 96. I t had a unique feed hnpper in rz~hichh fixre-rnl~nd
rifle chareing cliljr n1prestacked. This tended to mflcct dirt and \-cgctatic~ndcbris,
cau~in):i t to lam. Beslrlcs i t s hipncl, a tripod war availal~lefor thc I'ypc 1 1 .
The Japancrc lrtld ~ o m cprtll)lcn~qwith thcir L.MLis, Their rapid cstractinn
winetimes caurcd ctoppaxes. Tc) nwrcrrlne Illis the 'Type 1 I Irad a complr\ oil
rcqcnair, rvhich had lo hc kept full tn nil tile cartridges ar tllcy Wert. fed. l'lle
Typc 3ij Pqulrcd I t r cartridges 11roiled bcforc loarling in thc rnagazjiie, which
w i l 5 ncconiplis~icdby an oiler hitil t intn the rna~arineloadcr. 5pecinI rcducetI-
charxe rnund was i\sued. CtantPard-Inad 6.5mtn riflc r n u n d ~mulrl Ilc urcd, hut
with an incrcawd dlancc 01 strlppagc. Tlic 7.7rnrn T?-pc qo was an imprr~verl
Ty~>e 5Fh. It w a s designcd tn eliinlnatc the nccd for luhricaierl arnnlt~nition.Both
the types ufi and had 2 . 5 h Lelr~coyicsights, quick-change harml%,carryil~g
handler, ; ~ n little~ l used shield platc5. 7h emphasirc lllr Japanese propenrity tor
clorc combat, thcrc 211 Ih capons could hc fitted with a riflc bayonet.
Iapan adc~ptedIhe 7.in1m rnund for rifles and t \ l G ~011 the eve 01 the
Gre:~tcr kart .\sia War. f j c l d i n ~the fir\t wcapnnl in mid-1939. 'The o..iinm had
pcrfnrincd pnnrly in Cllina wtiesr. a longer range, grrater poiver, and more
penetration were nccdcd. Ilivisions and hrrgadeq in lapan Icere the first to
be armed with J.7inm wraponr, follouvcrl by units in Chiria, thcn Xfanchc~rla
and lower priority units in all arcar. By thc timc of thc in\-arion of t h r F O U ~ ~ I
tntne units deployiny: from hfancht~riartill had h.5ri1m weapons. I t w a 5 not
uncommon for itnitr dcploycd to a give11 area to hc armed with dtffcrcnt
caliber Iveapntis. causing ammunition suppt!- prtjblerns.
Grenade dischargers
7 he 5cm Type Xg 1 102c)I heavy grenade dirchager was not only an inipc~rtarlt
c l o s ~ c n ~ n b weapon,
at btit was nlro providcd with a full rangc nf colored signal
~lnokeand FInrrr. Re5idcr tlfIcd high rtplosivc ( Htl) and whitc pho.;pIiorur
mortar rounds, thc T!-pe RO m i r l t l fire hand ~ r e n a d c swith ;I propellant charge
fitted. 'The Type 10 r I l P 1 ) grrnadc dircharger wa* still irsuf~las a sttt~~titute.
Goj~iilarlycallctl "knee rnnrtars" by .Allied troops due to thcir runred haw plate,
there conlpact lveapnns could not hr f~redfrom thc thigh, as wat rumored,
 This Nambw 6.5rnm Type 3 ( 1 9 14)
HMG equlpped barnlion machine.
gun cumpanres. FF was partly
replxed by the 7.7mrnType 92
( 1 %!).The w o weapons were
rim~larin appearance.fhe Type 3
had vertical spade grips with large
coollng fins on the rear half of the
barrel.TheType 92 had w o
horiionral plstol grips and large
cooling fins on only a quarter of the
length of the barrel with smaller
ones on rhe rest. Both were baed
on the French Horchkiss.

without Imaking a l e ~.4.nother

. theory for the sourcc of lticir nicknarnc ir that
they were carried in a canvas bag strapped to the thigh-wlrerea5 in fact they
were carried in n canvas carc slung from the shot11dcr.'I'he 'I'ypc 100 (1940) rifle
grenade launcher was or the cup-type fitting on 6.Smm and 7.7mm rifles. It
lired the Type 07 rl937) H E grenade, also t l ~ cstandard hand grenade.

Cornpanylbattalion weapons
'The battalion machine-gun company im\ ,~rmcdwith either Namhu 6.5mm
'Type 3 ( 1914) or 7.7mm Type 91 e 19.771 H14cts. Ever1 t l i t w ~ hthese tripod-
mounted weaprjns wcrc Cerl 21v .30-roundmctallir strip^, a high rate o i firc could
Ilc maintained. A:\ adapzcrs could he fitletl t r l 130th weapons' tripodc and there
w a s a special :I, -\ for the Type 3 . 1IIP J.7mm 1-141G used a wmi-rimmed
tripod
cartridge. which could not bc lired in rifles and L X f t i f . Thr remi-rimn~cdround
had been adoptcd seven years hetc~rcthe new riflc. and 1.hIG round.
Another wrapclrr war tlie Icm TyiV 97 r Ig.'<i) .IT rifle, CapahIe of wmi- and
fully-automatic firc witti a ~ e ~ e n - r o u nma~azinr,
d it war rurprisingly cffcctile
again~tlight t a n b and perst~nnrl.Itc AP-tracer anti HF.-tracer rounds were r~ot
inten-lian~cahlewith thc I n n machine canr~on'~. 11 was Ilcas?;, at 150 Hlr, and
cxpcnsivr tc? ~)rorlucercw lllng in its limited Isruc. Units pnrse~singihem normally
irrtlcd them t o thc"I~attalbnpun company, alongsicle the 7ctn infnntygun.

The 7tm Type 92 ( 1932) battalion

infantry gun was issued on rhe basis
of having two In che battallon gun
p1amon.A few unlcl had a battallon
' b . 1 " gun company with four pieces A
complex weapon. Ir nonetheless
prov~dedeffective direcc and
indrrec~lire support All Japanese
~nfan~rymen were issued a Type 30
( 1897) bayonet w ~ r ha 15.75in.-long
blade, whecher they were armed
;< 3 -7 a with a r ~ f l eor pistol. or even If
,,. -=
--nr-~$.L+.5+ Lz--Z? h e y were unarmed
The 3.7cm Type 94 (1934) rapidafire
iofanrry gun was odg-nally designed
as an infantry support weapon for
kntxking out machine-gun nests.
However, ir served as rhe main
Japanese AT gun-+ role for which
it was 111 suked, bur in Wnlch IC
remained until the war's end.

The 7cm Type 92 (1932)battalinn @En war a comparatively compact weapon

weighing 4& lbs, and it could be broken down into a halfdozen man- or
animal-pack loads. It had a range of 3,060vds with HE,AT shaped-charge, and
illumination rounds. Normally there were no crew-served weapons assigned at
company level, but some units did possess company weapons platoons, which
may have had a few HMGs and AT rifles. Otherwise, these weapons could be
attached to companies from the battalion.

Regimental weapons
The regimental gun company was equipped with the 7.5cm Type 41 (1WR)
infantry @gun (a.k.a. the reHrnental gun1 to provide direcl and indirect fire.
Comparatively compact and light 4 1,180 lbs~, it could be broken down into six
packhorse loads. This weapon was originally adopted as a mountain artillev
piece, but when replaced by a new 7.5cm gun in 1934 it was relegated to the
infantry-gun role. It was provided HE, shrapnel, armor-piercing high explosive
IAPHE), AT shaped-charge, and white phosphorus rounds and had a 7,OC)lW
range. The ammunition was not interchangeable with 7.5cm artillery rounds.
? h e principal Japanese 'antitank' gun was the 3.7cm Type 94 11934) infantry
rapid-fire gun, Oridnally intended to deliver direct fire to knock out machine
guns, It was provlded with H E ammunition. Even though a n APHE round war
Issued, it performed poorly as an AT gun owing to its low velocity and poor
penenation. rt could knock out a US light tank with multiple hits though. Some
units deploying from China were armed wjth more effective 3.7cm Type 97
(1937)AT guns.These were German-made Pak.35136 pins captured from China.

Artillery
While Japanese artiljery pieces were upgraded or replaced by new models
between 1925 and 1934, no new designs were fielded after that point. The
earllerJapaneseartillery pieces were based on German Krupp designs, while the
new models were bawd on the French Schneider. The newer guns had longer
barrels, improved velocity, increased elevation and traverse, and split trail5
rather than box trails; they could he towed by vehicle too, though most were
still horse-drawn as towing by vehjcle proved to be impractical on I'acific
islands and in Southeast Asia jungles. Most still had wooden-sp~kedwheels.
I The T.ScmType 7'4 ( 1 934) rnountarn
g ~ wmghed
n 1.200 Ibs. It equipped
half of the CZ d~visionalartillery
regiments cornrn~rredro the
Southern Operar~onsThe mcml
* ammunition containers each held

- SIX rounds and we~ghed1 18 Ibs

when full.R packhorse could carry
two conrainen.

, - -- - 4

Thc standard ditFirlonal artillery piecc Ira$ the 7.5cm T?'pe 38 4 I W S I

improved gun. l'hirr we;lpcln waq an improved version of the original ' r y p 3X
In 1915, ~ i i hharrcl trunnions filrtt~ertn the rear for incre;l~edelcvatiotl,
impro~~cd equilibrator5 tn counter the h e a n * 1.1-r;rrc.i,a variable ppc rccoiI
r y t c m , and an u p n I)nu trail to further increase clcvation. Fvcn with tIlr5t'
ilnprovcmcnts i t way \till an ol~rolercent weapon barelv atlequatc lor Its rolc. I t
had a tO,4Oecl range and ct~uldRre 10-12 round\ a 111l utc for r;hort [wc'iods.
.Immun~ t ion inclutlcd H E , APHE, shrapnel. white plrocphonn, chemical. 6inrl
illumination round\.
Thc J.Scm T\.pc. 95 I: 10.351gun wag intended to ruplacc the Tyyts 18, hut raw
\.cry limited issue. It ofrered a nu~nbcrot dcs~gnimpravements and a \plit trail,
hut only a 1,220vd rarlgr advantage. ..\TI cl-en les5 crJtnmon wuaprm war
thc 7..icm Iypr Llcr (I9.301. I t was a nlnrc" modem deqijin than the Type US and
intcnrled for t m c l t o ~ r - ~ n being
g, providrrl with ~lnctlfnaticnrer. It r r a F mainly
issucd to independct~tart~llen'regiments and tanh unitr. 9 <poked-r\,hcelvcfiinn Most Iapanese field ardtery was
did w e 11rn1tedinue to d~\+is~clnal artillery regimcntr. I t had a l o n ~ c rlxbrrcl than horre-dnwn,fhls 7,Scmfield
other mcldeIr and was fitted ~vitha muvle break and long split I r a ~ l r .1 lilr ga.at-e howlner caisson(left) held 60
It a higher !nuzzle ~clocit?. and Its wider trax'erse lrladc rt all effective f l we;Ipon, rounds,and the limber 40 rounds.
Both the tl-pes s.i and !IO ured the wrnc ~ n ~ n l u n r t j n.I\r ~the Tvpu 1s. \Ian!* and was drawn by 51% harres

-.

-
-- 4
..

.'
3 -
dil.isional artillery regiments were armed with the 7 . 5 m Type 94 iI9341
mountain @In. It could be broken down Into 11 components for 5ix packhorse
loads. 1Ifhileusing the same ammunition as othcr 7.5cm guns, its mnge was only
9,000 yds.
Japanese '"Om" weapons were acnralk 10Smrn weapons. T h e l0cm Type
?1 (193 1 ) howitzer equipped both divisional and independent a r t i l l e ~
regiments, although ferc divisions were provided with a lOcm battalion. It
could be found with both pneumatic tires and woodcn-spoked wheels. The
weapon could fire HE, :IPME, shrapnel, and white phosphorus to 11,500 yds at
a rate of silt to eiplht rounds a minute. Medium a~tilleryregiments had the
10cm Type 92 (1932) gun. It fired HE, APHE shrapnel, and phosphorus
to 20,000 yds. It required a different type of ammunition to the lOcm howitzer.
This \\*asknown for it5 mnlparatively long range, making it difficult to
detect In hidden jungle positions. On Guadalcanal the Marines dubbed these
gun5 "Rstol Pctes," .4 TOcm mountain howitzer was also available in pack
transport farm. It only had a 6,OOOyd range and its HE and illuminating rounds
were cntircly different t o other 1 ncm ammunition Q-per
Ileavicr, non-diiiqional artillery included the following:

Weapon Range
12cm Tvw 38 119051 howitrer 6.300 vds

1 5cm Type 38 ( 1 905) howitzer 5.450 yds

15cm Type 4 (1 9 1 5 ) howlner 10.800 yds
1 5cm Type 96 (1 936) howlaer t 3,OW yds
1 5cm Type 89 (1 929) gun 27.450 yds
24cm Type 45 ( 1 9 1 2 ) howiner IS.300 yds
24cm Trpe 96 (1936) h o w i ~ e r '1 5.300 yds
30.5m Type 7 ( I 9 1 &) short hmtaer 13.1000 yds
30.5cm Trpe 7 (1918) long how'mer 1 6,600 yds
3Zcm Type 98 (1 938) spigot rnomr' 1.200 yds
Nates:
I Often designated 25m far the spgot diameter; 3 5 m pmpclile caliber.

Antiaircraft gunr and mortars will be dircussed In detall in the second

Am~v~ I hforln'
volume i n this series, Rattle Orders 11:Slrr Jnpo~ese I Mbr IF: Sorrtil
Pncioc 1711d ;r'ml Glrina~1942-44. The princ~palA4 weapons used by the IJA
included:

13.2rnrn Type 33 (1 933) machine gun

%fype 38 (1 938) machine cannon
7.5cm Type I I (1 922) AA gun
7.5crn Type 88 1 928) AA gun
I Ocrn Type P 4 ( 1 925) AA gun (actually IOSmm)

M u r t a ~ incIuded
s the 8cm (81 mm)types 97 1 1937) and 99 (1 939); qcm types
91 (1'1341 and 97 (1937);and 1Scm Q-pes 93 (19331, 96 ('1936)and 97 (1937).
With thc exception of the 9cm, t t ~ e q ewere of the cornnion Stakes-Rrandt
desi~n.Thew mortan were assigned ta non-divisional mortar battalions {see
C'rsprev New Vanguard 54: I~lfirnrryMortnrc nf World M+fr 11).
 The diminutive Type 92 (I 932)
tankerne was armed with a single
7.Jmrn Trpe 97 (1 937) machine gun
(removed here). based on the
Czechoslwakian Bmo design. tr had
replaced the 6.5mm Type 9 1 ( 133 1 ).
Fed by a 30-round magazine. 3t was
the principal tank machine gun.The
Type 94 ( 1934) rankette was
idenrical in design to the Type 92.
bur had a much larger rear rniling
~dlerwheel. and featured other
suspension Irnprovementr.

n an I<s
lapanere t a n k , with most dcsigns dating from the mid-193Qs,were inferior to
Western models encountered at 'the beginning of the war. They were very
lightly armored, although the armor was of good quality. Their top speed was
in thc region nf 25rnph, but the obsolete Type 94 could only manage 2Omph.
AIL used diesel engines, but their mobility across rough terrain was somewhat
limjted. Accommodation was cramped for the rnedlum tank's four-rnan crew
and even more so For the light tank's three-man crew. No periscopes or
bulletproof vision blocks were pmvided, only vision slits, making them
vulnerable ta small-arms fire. The 3.7131 gun on light tanks was suitable for
knocking out pillhaxes, as was the S.7cm on medium tanks. Both were low-
velocity weapons and ill suited for engaging enemy tanks. 7.7mrn Type 97 A Type 94 ( 1934) rnedlum mnk
1 1937) machinc guns were mounted in the hull bow and rear of the turret. emerges from a strearnbed,This
obsolete o n k was stdl In use by
The types 92 ( 1932) and 94 { 1934) tan kettes were used for reconnaissance,
the 7th Tank Regiment in the
screening, liaison, and hauling supplies to forward positions. They were little Philippines.fhe white insignfa on
use in direct cornlwt. Both had a two-man crew and were sometimes provided the bow identified the reg~ment's
with a small 0.75-ton capacity fufl-tracked trailer for the supplv role. Japanese 2d Company.The Type 94 was
tanks employed in the Southern Operations included the foIlowing: similar in appearance ro rhe Type
#A and B,but the driver's and bow
gunner's positions were reversed.
We Armament Weight
-hrpe 94 (193,4) medium tank 5.7cm gr rm MGs 15 tons
-

-b
-
,7)medium tank 5.7cm gl im M t s 15 tons ,
Tvpe 95 (1935) light mnk 3.7cm gun. r x t./mrn MGs I0 tons

rpe 92194 (1 93U 1 934) tankette I x 7.7mm MG 3.4 tons

Trpe 94 ( 1 934) mnks of the Sonda

Detachment chum forward as
US-F~l~pinoforces wichdrim onto
the Bataan Pen~nsula.The
demchment consisted of both or
the 14cb Am#s mnk regimenu
re~nkrcedby a bamlion of the
2d Formosa 1nfantry.A light
machine gunner can be seen in
the foreground.
 Command, control,
communications, and
intelligence
Command
fEigh camnianct
Ihc Emperor was thc Supreme Commander of all Armed Forcer. I-lc relied nn
the trnperial (;cneral Haadquartea tIGHQ) to csecute hir will. The Suprcrnc
blilitary Council and the Rnard of Llarqlralls and .Admirals served as advisors to
thc Empcror. The IZHQ clversal*. the Xfiniqtry ol \Tar. Army General StnfF.
hlinirtv chf the Y a y , and Sax? Gcnrral Staff p l i ~ sthc ln~pectorGeneral nf
Llilitary Training and tn5pcctor I;cncrdl of .\rmy :\viation. Gencral 'fnjn f l ~ c f e k l
srr\.pd as t h e War Minister and Prime Minister. Admiral Shimada Shigetaro %Val.
thc Navy Minirter. I'hc IGHQ was divided into the ..\lnny and Nazy se~-tions
encompassing Zl~crnini5tder of cach ber~~ices and the general staff. Ccnerel
Sugi?.;lrn;tHnjima war the Chief of the Xrmy General Staff.
'ntcJapane~e General Staff q.~trrmrvas borrowed frnm the Germans. Graduates
of tlie ,Irniy Staff Collesc [ I I i k r ~ ~ i ~Urnr ~i ~ i ~ kork ~ Riklrdni
. for short) con~idercd
tlir=msrlvc~ to he elite. Llnlike iri moqt annics, the cornnund of a division was
not ccl!lsidered the pinnacle o f a general officer's career in tllc Ild. Young ~ e n e r a l
staff nilicen, idcntlfied hy a rpec~aillrcart hadgc, develntwd tactical plans wit17
tvl~ich cornmandcrf required to comply {Gcmiany and thc USSR u5c.d ~ i mlar i
systansl. Dir~sioncornmandcrs !tiere more cmrdinators than t n l c commanden.
Thc keg echelon for 'tactical planning r\ar at a r m v Icvcl. Regulations required
d bur it 11.a~not desirahlc on their part.
general staff officcn 10 s t t r ~ ~ c n r n r n a ntime,
(;cncral Staff officers rwre called 7 i . t r p l ~ c r rGrrrri ~TcnposcnCroup) after tllc special
hadge they ribose, which was similar to a largr coin nf the -Tr~kli~rtr~*(r period. Unit
) , had not ancnded the Xtrly Staff Collc~e,were called
riffirer~(Titizrrki S l ~ t ~ k otvho

MalGen E d w r d P King,
Commandrng General. Luzon
Force. flanked by h ~ ssmfffld~scusses
surrender rerrns wirh Col Nakyama
Moroo. 14th Army Operations
OHicer at the Experimenral Farm
Srac~onnear Lamaon on Banan's
lower south coast.
,\.l~rtc*tr Cirttti 1 ncm-badgc gruup~ant! H ~ l dr*rrTcrcsr rmlv a lin~itedarilutltll in their
carccrs, outsitle at good f~>rtuneIn .xarrlm.:.
The arloptlcln of the (;crnmazz riencml 5tnff system in~pactedat the highest
levels of cvtnrnanrl. In f R 3 the o p r a t ~ o n aandl administrative fi~tlctionsof tlle
:trrnywcrc scpnratetl with thc fonncr being acsifined to the Ct~lctof the Gcticra)
StaH d ~ i dthe latter to thc \l*ar \lini5ter. Ihi5 rcsultcd in n unity nf cc>mmand
onlv a t t hc very highest levcl-the Ltnprror, as Suprcmc Corn!nar~clernf trotll
the Army and Nay. This qvstern allotrcr! the Chiefs ot the .4rmy and
Cienernl StaFR dircct acccr5 trl thc Emperor liirklr /lojew,, a privllcgc granted rmIy
later to the \j7ar and Naxy ministers. l%-liatthis nwant was that the Anny and
Xaiy were allorved indttpendcncc. of ctlmmand ( I o ~ t ~ i k i vHO l (loki1riI~111I Toni
ci\llinn control, namely thc \Var and Navy rninistcrs.
For all practical Ilrlrpo\c\ t h e operating forces of t h e 11.4 n r r c ~~ncler
t hc dircc-t
cot~trnlof thc ICiHQ. Thir includer! the (;enern! Dcfcnw Cnnlrnal~di n the Mclrnr
Islands, the Kwantung -4rrny in Manch~rria,the Chin;[ Expeditionary ;Zrnly, anti
the Southern .Amly. *]'heSouthern Army escrcired clirccl control over t l ~ rl-lth,
15th, ldt11, and 25th armieq plus a rewrvr. of two divi~lon?and an IXIB. :\
division fsnnl the 23d Army r~ouldtemporaril~IN under its control to seize
I-long Kong. 7 he Guards Dirision wnuId he detached from tllc 25th .Army to t h e
15th for initial apcrations in Tlrailannd t h r n rrturnrd tn tlw 2 5 t h 4rnrnr.. Tile 48th
Division iwsuld be transferred from the 14th Army after the fall of Manila to the
16th Arn~!*for Irre r)nJal's.

Command and staffs

Japancsc t~tlitc-omnranderr rvrrc not arQsted by a dc!,uty commander. second-
in-commantl, or cuccitti\.c nfticttr. Only in di\,irionr po~sessinfiarr infantry ProuI?
M Q commanded by a major-~encmlcould a recond-in-cnrninnnd be raid to cxiqt.
Thc infantry grcxtp comrnanrlcr ~ c r v c da%a tactical commander af the collcdcd
infantry rcgimrnts, but n7a5 often detached \nvitli a reinforced re~imcnton
indcl~eridcntmissiclns. The fnrmatic~n'rchief of staff was the clrlre~tthing to a
iicputy cornnlanrler. hut tliere rvcre onl!* Fr~undat division anti Iiiglier echclon5.
tit rcgirnental level the operation\ officer nr one nf tllc l ~ ttaliori
a cnmnrandrrs
woultl Ile d e r i ~ ~ ~ a to
tedacsume command i f the carnrnnnder becanic a c a r u a l t ~
i\t battalion Ic\*cl either the adjiltant or n company commander rvcruld ht. \o
de3ignaled.

able 9: unit commnnde*s

--
Init Commanderlleader
Secuon sergeant
Platoon lieutenant
Cornpany captain
Battallon malor
Reglmenr colonel I

BrtgadelGroup maim-general I
Qlvis~on I~eutenant-general
Army I~eutenanr-general
Area Army general
Noter
I Took, cmolry, n?cunnoissance.engineer, mnsport regimenn. which wen of bdtdfion size.
were commonded by o colonel or Ireutenont<olnnel.

lapanest rtaffs were rxtremel!. air5tcre hy \*stern <tandartis.On)!. the dfvi~ion

staff pc-lwrsed inrmal. 5peciali~edstaff sections whilc regiments and battalion5
had n mi t~imalrtatf, Additinnal junior officers secc>ndcdfrom subordinate ~ t nt3i or
LtGen Homrna Masaharu.
Commander. 14th Army. arrives in
the Philippines in December 194 1 .
Meld responsible for rhe Banan
Death March, he was shot a t Los
Bairos. Luzoo on ApriT 3. 1946 while
h ~ ssubordinates were hung.

overage officers rvnuId sometimes augment staff5 though. Regimental and

battalion staffs have been defcrilhcd already in the Orlit 0qn81i7atiln1section.
The dkision staff con~iqtedof the commander (lieutenant-genrral),chief of
swif (coloncll. and adjutant (lieutenant-colonel assisted bv a captain and lieu-
tenant) plus a general ~tatfwction and an administrative staff section. The general
staff seclion, essentially planners and coord~natoa,consisted of:

G-1 (lieutenant-mlnnelb Opemtions, training, and communications.

.Assisted by signal, code, ordnnnce. and gas
officers.
G-2 (rnajor~ Intelligence, maps, censorship,and
mobilization.
G-J (captain) Rear senices, lopisticr, and lines-of-
communication.

Thc administrative c;taff section was headed hp a lieutenant-colonel. wYho

dealt with reports [except those dcaling with operational matten) and oversaw
administration. A captain or lieutenant responsibfe for promotianr,
appointments, officer and KC0 personal rccc~rds,personnel and mobi1i;ration
adminirtratinn; a captain or lieutenant for departmentat services and
administrative orders; and a captain or Fieutenant respnstble For documents
and secretarial duties arsistcd him. JIsmall staff of officcrs, NCOs, and enlisted
men assi~tcdall of these ofticers. There were also five departments in the
administrative staff section:

In tmdance A colonel assisted bv three lieutenants-colonel or maims,

and seven or more captains and lieutenants.
Ordnance A lieutenant-coloncl or major with one or two captains or
fieutenants.
Medical A colonel with hvo or three medical officcrr.
Veterinary A lieutenant-colonel and one or two veterlnarv officers.
Judicial h lieutenant-cotonel with two or three officers.
Communications
The Japanese relied heavily an field tekphmes, preferring them to radios.
Telephones were more reliable, 1 s e v e , faster to produce, required fewer
technioll resources, and 603d be easily issued in large numbers to all echelons.
They required little operator training and were more secure b n intercept than
radios. Japanese field telephones were of the ground return type that is, they
used a single-strandwire and had a metaI s&e that was driven into the ground
and attached to the telephone* a short length of wire. US telephones required
a twastrand wire. The standard telephone was the Type 92 (1932) fitted with
separate mouth- and earpieces. Field switchboards were provided at battalion
and higher echelpns to establish patty line systems. A lightweight assault Jield
wire was used at regimental and lower levels while a heaviff, water-resistant
wire was available for semi-permanent systems. Both were covered with yellow
braid At division level and higher, a green, braid-covered, heavy-duty wire was
used. A man-carded 6-d wire reel was p~ovided,which could be carried on
the back for dipensing W e and on €he chest for recovery.
Radios were used in fa8t-moving offensive situations and when
communications had to be established rapidly. Field telephones assumed the
primary mle duriRg mutine anion and radio became secondary for standby
communications. Japanese radio sets were obsolescent by Western standards. TheType 92 (1932) field telephone
They had wide Frequency ranges with plug-in coUs to cover the different bands. weighed I2 lbr.The gmmd return
Tactical field radios used regeneratlw detectors without freauency -
. amDliticaUon. spike can be "IEM in front of the
whneeasy to maintain, it Gas ~ c uto ~ t them on thhfrequencyin we and s d s o ~ e front
n . .
A T..m 95 (1935)
t e l e m h set could be amched w a
netted with other sets. The Japanese used amplitude modulated (AM) radios and
telephone and used for Monc
no frequency modulated (FM) sets. The controls were unusually complex, the Coda-fvpe adminimlvt uaRc.
sets of marginal consbudion and poorly waterproofed. The opepd.tors, who WIIII& Howard Qrdnance
were highly trained, had to be well versed in radio and antenna theory. Tactical Technical lndllgence Museum.
sets were usually 1-50 watts and the transmitters, receivers, batteries, hand Largo,Florida)
A radio section In Chlna poser
bes~de~ t Types 94 ( 1934) Model
3C radio, a regiment- and dlvls~on-
I w e l set. Rad~orectjons wee
sizable In order to funct~cn
24 hours a day, to bt able to
man-pack the compwnenrs II
necessary, and to handle the
sect~on'sthree packhorses

Ccnfratr hn, and accc\soricx wcrc carricd in scpariitc cascs, reiluiring t h r n l la bc

pachd ti!. ~cvcr:il nicn. \!uri cnulrl tint hc' opcratctt t\.llilc marching, and itl~tmd
had [(I hc qct 1117. .\lo<tcx>~rldt ~ roprrateri ~rsingvoice or Llrbrw Cc~rle.
The rnclrt ccltnninn tactical setr came from t h f T!*pc W ~ 1 0 3 4 sprier. 1 ,I1
dit.i';ion and refiinlcr~tnlIc-VPIthe Ti-pe 1J-I \lode1 3 war t l ~ d rlic : Type 1 ' 4 \I~lnderl
5 and h \very u ~ ;rld l > ; l l t i ~ l i t ~and
~ i coi~ipdtlyle+:cl, Tlic \I~rJel6 lsns a "walkic-
tal hi?"-type radio. Tlicsc m ~ l l o cctxald also be rranspc>rtcdhy p a c k h n r ~ ~ .
.4notlirr tnentls of cnrnmunicntic~nrwnc tht 12-candlepnwcr \ifla! lamp. 'l'hI<
~ c cnrilil
t I>c man-packcti thrcc men and ccinristed of a ii~mll,hand-pcm~rcil
clrctric generator, and arc-ersorier. Tllc* l i q l ~war t Clarhcil u*iing a JTnrsr Ct>itc-like
5yrtetn and white, Krcca, red, and arnllcr ttltcrr. Il'llite and other color rectang~~lar
and t r l a n ~ i ~ l agrottiid-tc~air
r p,r;ncl+ n e w u \ c ~ l to signal aircraH and mark
pr,\itirrns. llcrl and ~tehitrxernaphorc I1;ixs %\'ere115ecl,bring replaced hy hlue and
ycll~,rcflap, rcspcctlt'ely, In mht. il'liilt 1 he la1)arlcw ure tllcluq;rnd<of ~ v m h o bi n
Ilicir rvtinten language, tlie K ~ I Ialpli;~hct ~~I with -1ssyn~lx~l<. each reprcsclltin~n
{ouod In the 121panere languilpc. leaf uscd tor thcir Ilnrrc Code, semnphorc, and
light 5ixnal~..\t battalion Icvcl itnd I~clurv,e~tcnsi\.cure rVa5 nladc nt mcr'icngers.
1 imitcd UFC wa'i made of nlc.s<t-rrgcr i2ngr arld carrier pig con^. :lr ctmpany ; ~ n d
Ioruer Imrclr, huclec, ~vlii?tles,flaslllights, and arm ~fgnalswere used cxtcnsi\*ely,
Calorcd-l;mokc proiectilcr and rcil, white, and arcen flare5 rrrre prol'idcd for 5ctn
grcnatic dischargcn. C3nc- ant! thrcr-hamel Kype 0 7 ( 183;) 3.5crn flarc pistclls wcrc
aIrcl u ~ dTank. cummendcrr o n p l i h y ~ an ! ciaborate ry5tcrn of red, red an11 ~ ~ ' h i t c ,
and htuc and rchitc trianglilar ~rcnnarlt'ifor ~ignnlirlgconlmandq and directionr.
(%nlotctllight$ were u ~ c da t ntghl.

Intelligence
The 2d l ! l ~ r c ; ~ rclt ~ t h e \rlny G ~ n r m Staff l w a s rcrponrihlth Inr intclli#er~ce
cnllcctinn, analysir. and dissrmination. I t \\-as a ~ l ~ d i ~ ~ intn i d c dthc 5th k c t i o n
~;\meric;rnJ H Eumpennl, ~ 6th 5ectinn (:\qiatlc-l, and the unnumhererl Secrct
Srri7iceScction r .lilC/rr~rrr Kiki111).The 5th and 6 th Scctinnr prinli~rilvfoclrsed on
collecting i ~ r t cl~gencc l nn 12merican and Furnpcnn (including .\tlstralian and
Serv Z ~ a l a n Jhorcc~ ~ i n t h r I';~clfic and nut .FO much on the home colmtrier.
Tllcrc war a l ~ oa scparntc 18th r m u p rRadir~IntclEigmco in the .(icncml Staff.
l n t r l l i g ~ r l c cwas ;11\t1 cnllerred bv the ;i;t\y C;cnrr;il Staft'+ 3d Hilrcau and
?ullnistr\ id 1:trrcigrl :Itfair\. \lililary ntlri naval nttilcl1i.i In l a l , a l l c ~rinhar5ir.5~
were a l w ir~sIrunlr!~titl i n c t r l l ~ i t i n gIntelligence.
Clvcrall, J;~panc%c intelliecncc at the 5 i r a t r . d ~ l e ~ c lnr;lr inadequate with
manv higher con1manttcn .iivinc intcllijiencc ma ttcrs little reg~ird.The lapanew
tradition to attack quickl!- and not cnn-rder thr sinration hrrther unclerniincd thc
nttcntion given tn intelligence !y the Ir:\. Httr\.cvcr. lrasic informatic ~ I on I the areas
of future operation5 ivas crlltccted. 171c order of hatlfc di\pc)ritiun$and tirnlarnpnt
of military and naval force5 rrar fairly accurate, and a great rlcal uf cffi~rtIra%given
to obtaining map5 and acrinl trhrrtugrnl~hs. I'licre ttacrc in\,arinhIe d~ortfallsof
course: for example, only about a third of nortl~ernLuzon In the Philippino, t ~ d
bccn photogrtiphctf, l~utthc coverage includrcl thc possi blc 1;lncling arcas, inanv
uf thc main highway routcs, Manila Bay arcn, and 0 t h key awarr. Thcre flight5
wcrc made in late-15140,rowcrc. slot entirely up tcl date. Rlc Llatnan I'cninsula had
nut beer1 photograpl~ed.34o\t airfidds ttirougl~ourI he Suut liem ,\rca Itad bccn
locatcd rvitll ten- mimed.
,-\rmy .Intc.lligence agcnts toured some arcs\ bcfore thr war, c5pecially in Scrr
C;uincn and thC ";El. I t 1% knc~thnthat w m e of tlrrw i~lficcrrrvcrc lntcr srrigneil
to unit5 t n ~ k c dtcl wizc the areas they had cxarnincd. Iyr>3riblelanding arca?,
approach channels, locations ot c o a ~ tdefenw guns. and militay and naval
inrtallntionr rrrerc of prima? in tcrest during thew to11rs. Much in telliffence wa\
glcanccl trnin \igndl intercepts r ~ tltlicti
f rarlio traffic, clliefly collected hy the ]IN.
il Linit 82 was, crta!>li\lied o n F ~ j r m ( ~hcforc ~ a the {car tc1 rtllrly trnpical lrarfarc
and t i i s t a w l~rcvt~nticrn, hut it> fincling3 appear tn havr had little elfec? on
cq~cration\.
11.4 !clrmatir>lis had few titctical intelligcncc col1ect:an assctr. Intclligmcc.
5t3f ICwere slilall and p,ivcn Irr~vpriority. There were o ~ l l v a small number nf rnclio
intercept and dirCctin~1 finding units. a t ~ dLhese ~ c r atr modeqt cnpabilitv. Thcre
were no ilrdicatcd around reconnaissance units abtrvc division Icvcl. The
divi5innal rccon~iai55arlr-eor caxhalryregiment tcas more c f an advalrce guard an J
screening unit. Unit patrolr were the ~ ~ r i r n a rncanr r)~ of collecting lrattlehclrl
l jion ira5 r l o ~ vand l~mired..\mial rcconnaissnncc war
infnrmnt ion, I ~ i l td i ~ ~ e nnat
tlie niost unpnrtant source of ground fc~rceintrlllgcncc. Information gained
from local nativcr and sympathi~crsalso proved valuahl~.lu thc initial phaw o t
the Pacific il'ar, thou~!r,tY1c tempcr was f;~ft-pnced rv1t11 the cnemv ~lftcriin
disarray anrl retreating. I'lieJapanese simply steamrotlercd thcir way tlirough tRr-
i d ~were only concerned ~vittiwhat rrar iinnlcdiatel!. in front d
c t ~ u n t ~ r and
them. This ntf doubt cost tlle Japanese limc and casual tie<, but they comllletcd
mort initid opcratinm %rnt.ll ~vitllin5chcdule. In tact, thi\ " ~ ' ~ r t n dr y~ r e a w "lcd
t ' r ~ ~ c 1 h 3 lnriger had a purporc.
many officer5 to hrlieve t l ~ tastaff ~ n t ~ ' I l i ~ licc'ti~~l'r
T h p Srrutlicrn 4rmy cvcu climinat~rlit5 intelli~cnccscction, aIxt>rhlng part at ~t
into the opcnti0115scction. This disclain t o r Intclli~cncceffort\ walr r r i n t t r ~ e i ht. l
the overall contempt thc Iapanrse l~arltor thcir cncnlicr.
 Combat operations

The December 10 air attack on
MtMI Ammunition Depot. Caviu
souhmst of Manih ueated a
w l m n of smoke almoa I ,XQk
high. (Chosei M W
The Commander-in-Chief, Southern Army, shall, in cooperation wfth the
Navy, concentrate his main forw in Indochina, South China, Formosa,
and the Ryukyu Islands and shall carry out preparations for the invasion
of the smtegfc southern areas.
Sme* areas to be occupied are the Philippines, Bmsh Malaya, the
Netherlands East Indies, and a part Of southern Bunna.

IGHQ High Commavd mwd

Limited space only allows a cursory study of themany campaigns and operations
In the period and theater under dis~ssion.Many of these opetations were
complex and involved the commitment of additional hmes in later phases. The
focus will be on detailing the order of battle of the committed Japanese forces
and their basic movements.
Sources, even the Japanese one, are often fn conflict, or incomplete, wlth
regard to the oxder of battle for specific operations. It war. ffequent for the
designations of mlnor units not to be included, only tWr type.
Headquarters, SouthernArmy remained in Saigon, Indochina through World
Wa%11. From there it W e d operations across a vast area of operations and
coordinated the extensive logistics and shipping efforts. Besides @e 14th, lSth,
16th, and 25th armies, the Southern Amy was assigned the following Units:

Japmese lnfmqwen in the

Philippines mzke for thbir
unit's pack train. Draft and
packhorses w e n warnid in an
army with Jitds r n m r msporc
The machine gunner is armed with
the obrolusenr 6.5mmType I i
(1922) LMG. (Ryohel Koiro)

The Philippines
Air attacks on the Philippines were precemeal and not an overwhelming Pearl
Harbor-like attack. The Pea11 HarbDr attack occurred at 0225, December 8
Phllcppine time. NotBcatirm of rhe attack was recetved at 0650. The Erst LIN
air a m sfruck a seaplane tende in Davao Gulf,Mindanaa in the extreme
south at 0715, and the M t air attacks hit Tuguegarao and hguio, noahem
Luaon. Further IJA and IJN attacks on Luzon from Pormosa occurred through
the day. The majoz attack on Clark Field arrived at 1130.Devastating attacks on
Cavite Navy Yard and Nichols Field were delivered on December 10.Air attacks
continued, with UA aircraft limited north of 16" North and the LE-4 responsible
south of that latitude, a line passing aaoss the south end of Luzon's Ungayen
Gulf.The 14th Army was supported by elements of the 3d Fleet, reinforced by
1st and 2d Fleet elements under Vice Admiral T a k W Ibo, and the 11th Air
Fleet under Vice Admiral Tsukahara Nishizo.

PACIFIC OCEAN

The mam Ph~l~pplne landtngr,

December 10. 1 9 4 1 - M ~
3,1942.

14thkmy, PhilippinesAttack F o m
December 8,1941

I I I I I I 1
44

-
 14th Army-Philippines Attack Force
16th Division ( 14,674)
48th Division ( 15,663)
65th Brigade (Army R e s e w , 6.659)
I 4th. 7th Tank I

14th S~gnalRegiment
6th Raiiway RMment

I s t (15cm howiuer). 8rh Independent ( I Ocm gun) Heavy Arrillery

9th Independent Heavy Artillery Battalion (15cm gun)

15th Independent Mortar Batsation (31cm spigot)

40th 45th. 47th. 48th Field AA Battalions

30th, 3 1st lndependenr Field AA Companies

3d. 2tsr Independent Engineer
3d Independent Engineer Company
26rh, 28th Bridge Muteriel Companies
1 3th. 28th River Crossing Mat4riel Companies
I s t Field Milltary Police Unit
I st Sea Operarion Unit

Shipping engineer units !

Line-of-communications units

38th- 62d.63d Motor Tmsport regiments

I
! 5th Air Gmup

111 atIdEtion to the troops of the division5 and brigade, the 14th .4rnly cmplo!.ed
1,021 men in its MQ, 28,447 in artillcrv and ~wppurt units under itr tlircct
cnmrnnnd, 2fi,356 linedf-carnmunication tmopr, and 9.331) dlippitrg engir~eer
trtmpq. ,\tino~r1J.OnC) Air S C M C ~ prrmnnd participated. 'here it-ere 10,5(K) US
Arnlv (incltzdin~ Air Furre), 12.000 17hilippineScautr (component of thr IIC drm!'l.
1,71X) Xlarinrs, and 120,(XIT) Philippine X r n ~ !tro>ps,
~ rnixtlp under US leadenhip
Four Advar~ccAttack Fnrc.c.5 r ~ o ~ r land
l d a t ~vidclyreparatcd cites on 1-won
with most la~~r~ching from Formoga. On Deccmbcr X a 4(jO-man Sasehn 2d SNLF,
Hatan ,Attack Force, scalrcd liny Ratan Island rrlughlv halfway hcnrrun Fnnnma
anrl I-uznn. Elements of the I),\ 24th .Airfield Batlalion jmprnvcd the dirstrip and
i w t ~fighter regilneiits arriv~d.An SSLI' element then occupiccl Camiguin Idand
on the 10th. T l ~ csame night tlie Tanka llctaciio~entlanded at ;lpnrri ot? Lunln's
north cnd along rviih an element at Gnnpaga. The Kanno I>etachment,Icd by the
1112 Formora tttkntry cnrnrnandcr, I;~iideda t i'igan nn nnrthwcst l.uzon. I h c
lrnoppored landinjir sec?~redairfields, rvlrici~wcre 5oon ol~crational.

I
I Tanaka Detachment Col Tanaka Toru (2000)
2d Formosa Infantry (- Kanno Denchment]
I I Bamltan (-). 48th MountainArtillery I
1 4Och Frld M Barlion (-1
I Aifield service elements I
I Kanno Detachment LKol Kanno 12000)
Ill Barnlion, Zd Formosa Infantry
Two companies. I Bar~fion.2d Formosa Infantry
I
Company, 40th Mountain Arrillery
Company. 40th Field AA Batralion 1
I
Company, 45ch Field AA Battalion
Airfield service elements

On December 12 the Kirnui-a Detachment, detached from 16th Pivirion,

frnm the Palaus landed unopposed at Legaspi on LztznnP snuthca~t Picol
Peninsula t o Tecurc an a~rfielcllor thc [JN. 'I'l~irlnrce pushed up the peninsula
t n ~ r a r dManila tvhllc. the 'linaka Detachment, t 'i t h the Kanno Detachment
merged into it aftcr linking up on the 12th, moved south toward L i t ~ ~ n y e n
Gulf
leaving small rccurity forces bchind.
-

Kimua Detachment MajGen Kimura Naokl (2.500)

HQ, 16th Infantry Group
33d Infantry (- I Battalion)
Company. 22d FA I

Company. 16th Engineer

Kvre I s t SNLF 575
IstAirfield Construction Unit (IJN)

~ I oofFthe ~ :ldvance Force r~ouldland on Luzon as the h'urthern Forcc, but

the Irlindanan l n ~ i s i n nForce landed near Uavao City on snirth~rnMindanao
nn L3ecein her 20 against light resistance. *t'lieSakaguchi Detachment, launched
fmm the I'alau~.war actually under 16th Slrmy contrnl, which was rc\panrible
for the NEI. 1-he kfiura Detachment landed on the nonh side of Llavao and
1)" of the Sakaguchi Detachmcut to tlie south~ccrt.'The town rva? wizeri and
\lie airfield placcd in operation. The hfiiira nctachmcnt, rIctacheJ f ~ o mI h l h
Di\-hion and drqigned to 14th .L\rmy,rcnlained ar an occupation force.Thc bulk
nl the Sakaguch~I~erachrnentprepared for thc Rrithh Borneo operation. 11
q u ~ c k l ydispatched the Mat5urnoto Detachment tcl recurc Icdn Islcland halfway
betr\-een klindanao and Bornco.

Sakaguchi Dctnchment MajGen Sakaguchi Sfiizuo (5,000)

HQ, 56th lnfanrry Group
Tankerre Unir, 56th Infantry Group
Med~calUnit
I s t Field Hospiml
146th Infantry
I Barnelon, 56th FA
I
I sr Company, 56th Engineer
2d Company, S6thT-anspoi-t I

Miura Detachment Lc Col Mlum Toshio

1 Battalion, 33d lnfanrry
Zd Kure SNLF

i 2d Airfield Construction Unit (IJN)

Luzon operations, December 10,
1941-February 26.1942.

PACIFIC OCEAN
The Ungayen Bay landlng.aiid $re drive muth to Cabnnatuan.
 7bc %lain Forcc fur the l.t17on I ~ n d i n g sincluded t h e 16th nix irirrn a~remhled
at :\mami Shima in t l l r Ry~tkyurand the -18th Division I - Tanaha and tiannrl
Dctaclimentsl u r a r nn Forlnnra and the Pcscarlures s o u t l ~ $ ~ cocft Fnrrnr)sa. 'l hc
tmn5porh were Loaded amid fenn of .4rnez1can R-17 homhcs attach and
dc.parted nn Dcce~nher17-1 X. The M transports with t h e 4Sth Divi%ionlanded
on the east ~ i r l eor Llnga!'ct~ Gulf jurt beforr dawn in a rainsrorn~nn I?ecci?llwr
22 euperirncing l i ~ h tresistance. The 48th Divi5inn had \ome\rhat more
t n ~ c ktran~pclr:than most ntlier divi5ions and one battalion in each regiment
was equi~jpedwith bicycles. n~t. much-reinforced Diviricm landed in three
cchelunr.

I Lingayen F n ~ e
I 1 s t Echelon
47th Infamrj (I Battalion)
4thTank (- one company)
48th Reconnaissance

I II Battalion,48th Mountain Amfllery

Zd Echelon

i
I
HQ. 1 4th Army
HQ. 48th Division
Isr krmora Infantry
7th Tank
Company, 4th Tank

I 48d1 Mountain Artillery (- I and 11 Battalions)

48th Engineer (-1
1 Bamlion, Ah Infantry (+) (Uejirna Detachment)
Is t and 8rh Independent Heavy Artiflev

j R h Indepndeni Huvy FA Barnlion

I 3d Echelon
I Kamijima Detachment
II Bamlion, 9th mnhntry (Army Reserve)
Ill Battalion. 9th Infantry (Left Flank Forts)
It Banalion. 22d FA
1 14th Signal Regimrnr

On Decelnbcr 23 the Tanaka Detachment motring from the north !inked up

with t h e 18th Division. After fighting a del;ning action US-Filipinn forces ~zrrc
routed ancl hegnn a f i ~ h t i n gwithdrawal tosvard Bataan. Pcninr~~Ia. The 4%th
Division cEro~rdnwtl the A g n u / f a m l ~ a n ~River
a Ltallcy south to klanila, which
rzpa>dcclarcd n n open c i h on t t ~ c37th. Thc 4kjima Detachmcnt (119 Infantr!p)
~xotectctlthe right flank under 14th Army control.
'I'lle Lamon Frlrcc consisted nl ?,I)130 tri>o;x of the 16th Ilivirion (- 9th cnd
334 Infantrp). I.anlon Hit? i s Fncated at the northeast side OF the ncck or the
Picol Peninsula ~vhcrc it joir~.; the main island sotkthcast of Manila. 'The
24 transports departcrl .4mami Sliirna on I>eccml>t.r 17 and arrived hvn r l a v ~
after thc I.ingaven knrcc. Ilecemhct 14.Landing in the dark, 111213 I i l l a n t n and
an artiller!. rubrnpan!. lantlccl a t hlauhan tn recure thc right flank ant1 1i10
and rhc rcgirnental n l n companv 5euurctI the left tlank a t Shin. 'flic Sascho 31
SNLF sccurcd trr-1-d

withdrawing heCvn. - ' -

ST.
I-
were not prcpared ti1 rr
and began nioving 'r.:
linkcd up with the 1
.. -.-:+h m o n Ray. US-Filtplno forc-c\ rrfer'
trlrnt puxhing up the pninzula a n d
7 % main hod!. landed ncnr Atimonan
':-ccrnt>cr 25 Ihv Kjnlura Lletachmc~rt
. . < r 2 n d t c ~its contfol.

Lamon Force
I
HQ, 16th Division
20th Infantry (-)
-

22d Field Amllery (-1

16th Reconnaissance
1 6th Engineer (-)
Sewice units

Thc lapanew fncuwd nrl Xlanila, wit!', hoth the 16th and 48th Divisions
racing tn the prize. -E'lie r a l u c of Rataan as a US-Filipino dcfcnsive pc>sition
war t ~ o yct
t rcalizcd. With t h e lapanew purhing from 130th t h e north and
$out11rowasd thc capital. the- US-FilipinoSnurb Luton h r c e managed tn pass
through hIanila ant1 rcacli Ilataan whilc the Korth I,uzon Force ctonductcrl a
brilliant Elolding action to krep the road open a\ the 48th Divislrlr~p u ~ l i e ctl c ~
trap the southern force. Thc tank-heatr!' Sonada Forcc Isolnetimer rcfcrred t o
ar a " t a n k brigade"), led by t h e 7th Tank Rex~mcnt'r commander.
spearheaded !he etfort tj, cut otf the $vitlidrawal aIong with tlre rcorganizcd
Kanntr Detacllmcnt to tllc ~ ' e s lhut , failed. The S o ~ t t hLuzon Forcc nladc i t
through hy lanuaty 3, I W 2 , O n the same day both 1 ilth and -18th dil-i\ion\'
advancc guards entered Manila.

Sonoda Force Col Sonoda Seinosuke

7th and 4th Tank

I Bamlfon, 2d Formosa Infantry

Kanno Detachment LrCol Kanna

Ill BattsZton. 2d Formosa Infantry

-

Company. 48th Mountain Artillery

After t h e US-Filipino forms slipped through San Fernnt~dc)to Ratann the

Ianaka Detachment to the east a n d tIic IhkaItashi Detachment to the nwt
continued the pursuit. Thc T a k a h a ~ h i Detachment 1r.x tllc rcnanlcd and
renr~anizcdZiarniiima L'lctschment, after itr commandrr had hccn killed on
Deccni1)cr -30. :\ US-Filipino rear guard continued to fight a holding action to
allorc defe~~ses to be estahtishecl nnd r he rapanese reliexrd the battered Tanaka
Detachment rrith thc Imai Llctachmcnt. The US-Sili11intr1vitl1dsawnl into Rataan
was completed on lanuan*6. To !his point the Japanese had lort nnly 627 dcaJ
and 1,282 wuunded. US-Filipitlcl torces had lort l .<,HI0in combat, to iZlncsr, or
to dewrtion.
 ashi Detachment LtColTakahashi KapumiX

- LLnfanuy (-twocompanies)
E n d e D B n d e n t Hew A d e w 6 abattalion)

SOUTH

hcaan operations. Phase I.

early-Januaryfo lateFebruary 1942
The UEFlllpino posirions shown (In
ouve p a n ) are based on Japanese
arsearmena of their deploymem
and are not necessrnly the same
as reported by the Luzon Force.
w
I

1st Formosa lnfan

h & e 14th A ~ p : ~ ~ tittece!d

i ., d ~orders* ~ ~ ,
M& n'dpw & , . ~ @ m q@$&a l%aUa&, r e s p ~ & y , Y,bl?g
wiUl man)t sup@& nni& me.6mmga& :newEd 448th rmJ- 7-8.
& WSIi Mljr
Cas&@ 'a ~ ~ a r @unig .xlwlt&'s ttirnpmplevel fxW&% it:
had~at~~~cia<~~ie;kgIVrostof@1Mh~orthas~
r m e a , lsiir i ~ . e t -
bt
q wtisstmked to the 6% Btigitae
%mi!8a . paal~arm&) mderappllpd US--0
m iwp wete netv
I ~~cmBstagnThe14thAnng~enJm~~~,,butaffeP~weeks
&ir~stanad,mt$gu&@eenunp~heasyW.?lleIW,~

Bataan operations Phase 2

late-kbruary to early-May 1942.
The UYFilipino positions shown
are bared on Japaneseassesmenu
of their deploymen6 and are not
necesarlly the a m e as reporrPd
by the Luzon Force.

I 14th Army, Bataan Force
January8,1942
Man~la,was declared an open c ~ t yon
December 27, 194 1 In an effort to
halt Japanese bombins and Iapanese
internees were released.The
advance guards of the 48th Dlvislon
from €he north and 16th Diviskon
from the sourh enrered the ciry an
January 2. 1942 to revore order, as
w~despreadlootrng a d arson had
broken our.
OPEN
C~TY
14th Army-Bataan Force
-
16th Division (-)
65th Brigade (+)
7th Tank
I sr (IScm hawltzer). 8th Independent ( IOcm gun) Yeavy FA
III B a d i o n , 5 1 s t Mounrain Artillery
l Oth Independem Air Unir
and liin~t~ra Detachment conducted a holrlit~gactlnn o n the east coa<t while
t h e hSlh Hrigarle launched t l ~ malnr attack nn thta wert coast. Thc 111120 <1tq.d
Llth In fan tn. ccl~~iluctedattacks, in thc center. 11/20 Infantry landeti scatt.rreil along
Rataalrt ~ o u t h ~ v ccoaa
\t on lanuary 2.3 and wa5 wiped out by Fehruav 1. Ncxl 1
Rattali011 landed to t t ~ cnorth on thc nigllh of lanuay 26/27 and l ebnt;~ry I,'?
anii \\.a? dcstmved by I-c.I~nlar>.12. T l ~ c9th Infant?: attach4 to the 65tIt
lirigade, revertrrl tn 1hll-i Dlvi\inn-cnntr~lon January -3 1. Exhaurted, t l ~ cInpncre
xurpended nHen'lit-ctiprrationq (in tht, R l l t after locing 7,OlHl dcacl and ~vnitnrlcd
plut lo,ooO \ick.
I Kirnura Detachment MajGen Kimura Naoki (5.000)
I
HQ. 16th Infantry Group
'
20rh Infantry (- I Battalion)
122d Infantry, 65th Brigade (- nva companies)"
Half gun company, 33d Infantry I
AT company. 33d Infantry
I
I ' 1 22d Infantrj rwested to 65th Brigod~antmlon 1 9 Febnrory.
Tlic IGHQ rcnr jiit~ilantover i t s other %lIcces%es and war not overly concerned
that Halaan Rra$ behind ~chedulc.The 1GHQ Re5c.n-e, the 4 t l i Dil'i~inn, was
dirpa tchcd frnni Shanghai, lt war pntlrly eiliiippcd ant! undermanned wi t l l only
1I1.957 tsnopr. It%hatraIinn7 had only three cornpanicr, n t ~AT Runs, and i t
lacked twn nt i t 5 four lio~pitals.l'hrec rcinfrwccd regimcntr detached from other
tl!t'i%inns along wit11 nutncrous artillen. linitr from Jlalaya and Hong Kong wcre
sent. Some 7.(InO rcplacemet~ts,for the httererl 16th Pivirion and 65th Rrigadr
a l w arrived. 'I'he rcinforccnrentr arrivcd b e h v ~ c nmid-February and early-:!pi 2.
The rcncrved ntfer~sivcbegan \\'it11 prclimilla~operations, or1 1'farcIi 12. I7n
..Ipril 3 thc main aswult hegnii w'itli the 16th nivi~ionin the west conducting a
divefiiorrarl; dttack whilc the 4th Pivisicln and tIlr Na~ano1Setachmcnt broke
thmugh El1 t l ~ ceast. Tlic 65tli nrigadc pcnctwtcd the cc~atcrrewfting i n a gcncral
CrSFilipino retreat. 'nlc 10th Indcpendcnt Garrison Unit 11fl Dt~krrritrirSltrrbitiri~
 IJNType 97 ( 1937) Model Zb "Salty"
bombers approach Corregidor.
The white strip on the island's tail
Ir Klndley Landrng Freld.The
6 l s t Infancry's planned landing slte
was rc the tight of Cavalry Point.
but the actual landing was between
Cavalry and infantry polnrs.

I &pno Detachment (2lrt Division) (3,939)

HQ, 21st lnfantry Group. Maiten Nagano Kameichiro
62d Infanrry
kmlion, 5 1 st Mountain Artillery
Company, 2 1 sr Engineer
-

Kawaguchi Debchrnent (I8th Division) (3.621)

HQ. 35th Infantry Brigade. MaiGen Kawaguchi Kiptake
124th lnfantry

Kawamura Detachment (5th Division) (2.667)

HQ, 9th lnfantry Brigade. Kawamura Sbum
41st Infantry

I IkutaDetaehment
10th Independent Garrison Unit. Col Ikum Torao I
3 1st-35th Garrison battalions

6 1st Infantry troops are shown here

disembarking from landrng boats on
Correg~dor'snorch coast, m what is
pr~bablyeither a smged photograph
or one show~nglate-arriving troops.
SO many landing cnk were lost
during che first assaulr rhar the
37ch Infantry'sfollow-on assault
could nor be del~veredto the
lslendb west end. denyrng the
Japanese them typrcal dauble-
envelopment landing.
 The aauulr on Corregldor,
Mg5-b. 1942

I A unit pack tnfn psrrea &*ugh

Flli~in
a
d ~l w . It was common for
hoke.-handlers w make straw Zun
bonnetr" w pmma thelr c h a w
fmm the heat (Yoshimbu Sakakura)
 Tmops d t h e 61% InfanqRght
thew way up what they nlchmed
"Gun Smoke Road: located on
C ~ d o r k ' ~ l heading
:' paard
Malinfa Hill and the wnnel complex
housing the Island5 command pmt
The frwwept road was littered
with wrecld edvehldesaher
months of bombardment
(Genlchlm lnakuma)
relieved the 16th Divir,ion as it shifted to the east and followed the 4th Division
acound thesouth end to mop up the eastcoast. After a hard fight and existing on
starvation rations some 75,000 US-F111pino mops surrendered on April 9. Now
10,260US-Filipino troops held out on Cortegidor and other Manila Bay fonified
islands. The 4th Marin% was responsible for "The Rode's" beach de£enses.
Comgidor was pounded by bombers from December 29,1941 until January 6.
Ofasional raids were launched and d e y lwmbdment commenced on
Feb~w 5 followed by renewed air attach on March 24. Mare heavy a ~ t i l l q
toined in aft& Bataan fell to tow 116 piem (7.5, lo, 15, 24an). The Nagano
Detachment had been aslgned the assault, but it was reassigned to the 4&
Division and set fw May 5. The assault forcedeparted Bataan in darkness and was
heavily battered by Conegidor's mast defense guns. I and 11/61Infantry landed
on the north s h m of the island's eastern tall and fought toward the larger west
end, The 37th Mantry was unable to mnduct the fonow-on landing on the west
end, as so many landing barges were lost in the first landings. The ganisM
mmmdered the next morning. The other thee fortifiedislands smendered to the
33d Mantrp the next day, Japanese losses were heavy, not only on Comgidor,

LtGenJonathan M.WainwnghS
Commdlng General, US Forcer
In the Philippines, discuses term
of runander wkh LtGen Homma
MssshKu, Commander, 14chArmy
on Botb4n.on May 6. I942
Wainwright could only surrender
those forces on Corregidor and the
other Manila Bay forrified Island&
and not those in the southern
Phillppiner.Momma left the meering
and Wahrwright returned m
Corregldor, where he surrendered
to Col Sam Gempachi, Commander,
6 1n Infamy (Sahum Miyamom)
ttot tm Rataan as rvcll. T l ~ e5th and l h t h Dixislc~nrand 6jth Rripadr rvrrr no
It~ngcrcfkcliue fightitlg uni tl;. l'hrr 2.6LlO-man 31th Ir~tnn
hr- had crawd to esist.

Correaidor Landfn~Force (4th Division)

Correg~dorLefr Ftank Force
I
b l st Infanny Col Sato

I Platoon. 7thTank "

Bacrery, 5 1 n Mountain AstHlery
I st Campany, ? Independent Mortar Battalion
Cowegidor Right Flank Force
HQ. 4th Infantry Group PlajGen Taniguchi Kureg
37th Infantv Cal Koura Jim

I
Bemenu, 4th and 23d Independent Engineer
Elemenr. t s t Sea Operation Unit (80 landing barges)
Service elements
South Flank Force
3Sd Infantry, 16th Division
!
I * Four medium ton& (two lost), one captured M3.

iVhilc. thc battles for Rataan and Corregicior raged, routhern Lttzon was
c~cczipieil1) only Col Suzuki Tat\unoshkc'r 33d Intat~trv1- I and 11 Battalinns!
anrt the lhth Ueconnai5sance r- one cernpanyl. lts primar!, misrintr w a s to
~vc-vrn t Fjlipinar sending lood to Corrcgidor from \Ianiln Ray'c soltth rhore, h
new Fuzuk~Detachment ~lJ113.3Infantry; cijmpariy. Z?d F;\) was organi7cd anti
o n F ~ h r u a n26 i t IancIed unopposeil on tlrc north end of Mindort* south~vc$t
of I.uzm. Thcrc tzTerecmlv 50 detendcr5 in the routh. I.'l~rthesopcrntinns to
occupy the Virays, the many islands in the ccntral Philippines, and the ~ 0 ~ 1 t h
began in .April. I'l~e65th Brigade movcd to nnrth 1.uznn fur occupation duty.
'l'lie Katvi~guchiDehchmrnt o n Rnrnco (rletacllerl from the 18th 13iviricm i n
Slalara) landcd nn Cehu nn April 1tF. Thc main landing was on thc wcst-central
mast and a t fire nt her points t n includr t h e eav coxt. The 6,500 defenders rccrtl
pctshcd into the hi115 and the J a p n n e ~ cdeclared the island secure un the 19th.
Panay, riefendcd by 7.000 US-Filipino t roopr, tvar next. The 5th Division
had scnt the Kalvamurn LTetachmcnt from Thailand. It Isndcd on the nc?rth and
~ ~ uends ~ Apri! 16. A ~nlnllcrelement landcd on the \rest coast on thr
t l on
18th. Thc dcfcndcrr quickl!. tz?ithdre~v into the liillr and tlie irland rvac drclarcd
secure o n the 2[)tl1.
Whllc t11c rout11 conrt o J ?l.lindanao had been secured in late Dcccrnhcr,
significant US-Filipinri forces were still at farge on thc rhlllppincs' seronJ I;!rgcsL
irland. The Kawagrshi Iletachmcnt, after securing Cebu, landed o n the west-
ccntral cowt of M~ndananon April 19.The hliura Detachment, from the original
invasion force, moved west Crom tlavao Rav. The 32d Karsl Rase Forcc landed nu
the nurth mast on March 2 whik the Kawamusa Detachment from R n a y alw
landcrl I n the north the next dav. Aftcr sharp cngagcmenrs the US-Filipino force
sursendt.rcd on May 10. The Naaano Detachment, after fighting o n Rataan,
occupie~lh g r t s , Rohctl, Leyte, and Samar bctwcen \fay 71) and 25. Only small
LjSTilipint, fnrcm defendetl there irlands
After the rurrcnder nl' C:orrepiiior there rvas conf~isionas to rhe s~rrtcndcr
of UsFilipino force5 in the ccntrnl and southern Iihifipl-ri!rt?r. kfac;trthur
atten~ptcdto uoun tcr Wainwright'\ order tor t h t w farces tn wrrender. F e a r i ~ a
the capti~~cr helrf on t UP-- :a .i 'I' t*e marsacred, the a ~ u t h c r nf o ~ c fi3r1nsllv
t
rllrrrndcrcd hrtrvrrrl \!a% "1 73.: Zh Hith llie last clcmtlnt.r qutrcndcring on
l l r ~ i eI). vcrr' rmall nq;mrv-~r. thtrt Island-; actually \urrc~tciererlwith
nlo\t witlitlrawiny: lntcl 2 h P:11. ~ and ~rrgat~izing gi~rrrillaoperationr. TIP
Japanere on]!. octupicd thc cit:e%and 3 ~c'M'h r ~ c tnlvn%, r reltiorn venturing into
~ h countrv~lric
c except rn larzt- hn~ilcqin ~lnrntht~riaxt ic efforts t n e n g a p thy
gucrrillar. Sonic l 0 , O t H I :apanc+c died ill thc I'tij lippi ner. Snt c r i p p l ~ nfor ~, a
fnrcc nf 142,OI)O (CSCILIF~\*C of t l l c I ISI. t ~ i hy
t far tliv tii<hr%tlower \uffcrrd in
thc Southe~nClpcratiniir a t ~ drllc comllat units had to t,c rcl>uilt, ronw trricc.
(In June 29 the I-l!li .\rm\, 1 ~ 3 % relicvcd from S o l ~ t h c r .2rmg
~i uontrol and
l~laceddirectly ilndcr t [IF I i I HQ. L.tCren I-tornmawas rttctlllecl ti? lapan anti g i ~ c n
a ~vclcome,but ~ ' 3 5not allotvcd to r l ~ l i v r shis report directly tcl thc
1:mperor. Conrirlcrcrl dicgraced for tailing to continue thc attack rrn I3atnan A heavy mach~ne-guncrew mover
without reinforcement and for not meeting the t i ~ r ~ ~chcdulc.
v he war rclicvcd lorward. In [he East lndtes the few
131; l.tGcn fhnaka Shizuichi and plauctl on the rescwc list i l l .\ug~:rlrlIll4.3.
roads were often obstructed by
Allled madblocks and prone to air
amcks.Tl>e lungle was dense and
Netherlands East lndies trails few.The lnfanrt-y would simply
flic conclucrt of the hEl win ;I comlile.r: 2nd lengthy c)pcration, I\:iclcly use streams as rra~ls,rnak~ngfaster
scattered Roptl Nethrrtanclr Cart Indip5 .Inmy, Rriti5h and :lurtralian unitr, and headway than cuttlng through the
even a ringIe US itrtiIlcry Imtti~lior~ Jcfendcd thr vast ch3i1101 i\la~iclc.O t l l ~011 ' lungle would ach~eve.
lava ~igniflcantAll~cdfor~+c3 conccntratcd. The .\mcrican-Uritirt~~LI~itcll,
:\ustralia Cornmanil I:\RI>?\C(IC>WIw a r esiahlil;licd tc~ defend t h c "lrlalay
Barrier, " but the tclrrcs wcrc tot^ divcrw, sca ttcrcd, rvca k, ilrrtl ~ ~ n c r ~ o r trd
r l i ~In ia
be cffectii'c. !\'her1 t l ~ cScthcrliirrtls Id trl Gcrmanv on 1.5 \la?. IL140the SF1
remainvd autonomnur. !"icliy Trance agrt.c.rI to ~ ~ l a ct hc r SF.1 u n d e r t ; t p ; l r ~ ~ s r .
anti French " protcctinn." \cliich ot C ~ L I ~ tvaq\C rrj~~tc I qi lthe NTI gnvcn~int.t~t.
l ' h t S E l ~uspcndcdall export5 tn I;~pan. r v l ~ i c hrva< clcrnandin~mnrc 1111 in
Iight of thc US and Comn~onwcallhcrnhargo.
h c tint Dutch t ~ r r i t o r ywizcd by )ap,jn were the tiny 1hmc"Ian I~lnnric
hctt\,cen Rrrrnco and Singapore. ;\ n a t a l landing llarty camc a<horron I>~cefnt~cr
17.'The fiw-prong campaign was launched r>nJanuar) 1 1 , I(j42 once ~ipcralirjn\
werc wcll unilerwa!' in Xlnlitya, Ttiailan J, and Rrr r~nn.7 h c NE:T olicrat ion r%+twlcl
he condk~cterlin several pliarur. Inltiall?~ t hc 16th l r n ~ vcrmlinrtted only the 211
n 35th anrl 36th Infantry <;ro~lpstaka 5fith %tixed l n f a n t n r Group)
I j ~ v ~ r i oand
detached frnm the Sclt I1 nivi5inn. 'l he 38th and -1Xt1-1 Di\'i~ionr~z-ouldbc
tammitted later. The Zd Fleet rupported t lie SEl opemtrons.
'The f i n t oper~tionqwere actuallv nirncd at Nriti5h Bnrnco, the northern
third nF the irlantl and included Sorth Rorneti and two Britirh ~~rrsteclnrates.
Saratvak and firrznci, plt15Lal~uanl r l a n ~at l the muulh of Hrurlel Hay, one of the
British Straits Scttlcmcn:~. both Rriti~tiand Dutch Rrvneci %\.erectlvctecl Cnr
thew oil and suhhcr.
Tlie Kawaguchi l>etachmctit., dctailcd frclrn t l ~ clHtli Di1'irion i n China Inoiv
in Malayal, wss ass~grredLo rcizc Rritish Itornco. I t dcy3artcd Cam Iianh Lmy
lndoch~naan December I?. I n darknesr nn tZic 1 hth tht, Right I h n k Unit ( 124th
Ir7tantry 1-11 landed unuppflsed a t Xliri and the Lcft Flai~kL'nit I IIl/l?-F, a1 Seria.
Brunei. The nilfielrl<and airfictdc nmcrc to be capturcd and plntrcd in opcrirtir~na>
 II 16th Amy, East lndiesAttack Force

;OUTH CHINA SEA

'4 Borneo operations. December 12.1941-February 13,1942

won as possible. The -hrd demoyed most bcilities though. W124
Wanw landed from ad SbWs at Satldakan, North Bomeo on the 19th.
pespite Allied air attach, I aXl lUl24 @mubarked their transporn and landed
at Kuching, Sarawak on battalion suffered heavy
losses and was forced Borneo. The Japanese
progressively occupied They suffered few
losses and the Indian

nmor operations, k b ~ s 1942. y

The lm detachment occu~ied
Koapang. Dlll,and ~ a l r e ' l tvw
.
relived by the 48th Division
batween October and
December 1942.
 Kawaguehf
- Detachment MaiGen K v c h i Kiyotake
HQ, 35th Infantry Brigade
124th Infantry (3,275)
Company (- rwcr platoons). 26th independent Engineer
Platoon. 12th Engineer
Elernenrs. I Bth Division Signal Unit
Elements, 18th D~visionMedical Unit

F s l l o ~ \ ~ i t ~Tarakan,
ji the 5;lkagttchi Detachment rcarganized to assault
Ralikpapan and it5 hiponant oilticldr. Cln 213 fanuan, the cotlrov departed
Tjrakan and artitled at I<allkpapnnon the night of the 24th. .4mcrinn destroyers
sank \ix transports, but the troop5 had a2rcady loadcd aboard their landing
craft. nit main body, Ihc- Attack Llnit, landcd north of Rallkpapsn reaching thc
nutrkirt< on thc 25th. "-1detached hatlalion, the Surprise .4tt;1ck Unit, infiltrated
I river ~clutltof the trnvn anrl then mo\.ed nortll to Dalikppan. 'llir two units
I I ~a
nccupie~lthe town on tlll- 21311aftct rnorleratc fighting.
Ilic Kume Dctathmcnt with Ill4h I n f a n t r i- 2\\vo companies) w a ~then
l'orrncd to srcurc [he r n a j t ~ rairficjds, A detachment of thc I4hth Infantry !caf
chippctl rr~uthand mo\+cd(31-rrlond tn ~ c i z rRandjcrmasin on Hornen'r rout11
 Sakaguchl Detachment
HQ. 56th Infantry Group I
Assault Unft. Col Yamamoto

II -
146th Infantry (- II BarnIran. rwo cornpanles)
I Bamlion, 56rh FA
I 1st Company, 56th Engineer I- platoon)
Armored Car Cnrnpany. 56th Recannaissance
Surprise Amck Unit Maj Kaneuji
II Bamlion. 146th Infantry
Platoon, I st Company, 56th Engineer I
I lndependenr engineer platoon I
I Salvage Unit Maj Takagi I

Field AA bawlion

II Two cornpanles, 146th Infantry

Independenr.engineer company (- plaroon)
I
I
Transport company
I Two radio platoons
I
I Group Medial Unit I
1 Company. Kure I d SNLF I
Sakaguchi Detachment, 56th Infantry Group
a m in! Gmup

end. which accomplished i t s mission on rehniary 1 J . ti ~ thc 134th

I ~ a t t a l i o rof
Infantn; dispatched from Sarawak. occupied I'emangka t on Putcli Borneo'r
upper west coast on 27 Januav and t hcn PcmtianaE;, ilefendcd hv 5t)O Dutch.
to the south, on the 29th.
Celches rras garrjsoned 11y 3,100 D~irclitrc~op5in lhrcc remcrtr incationq. The
I1N rcizecf this rprawlinx island ~ v i t hthc 3..illI).man \asebo Cnmllirled S3I.F
(Saseho 1st and 2d SY1.I.cl landing on the ntlrtlt penin5t1la on l a n u a r y t 1 . Thc
Ibkmuka Iqt SNLF, staging frtnm Darao, .\lindaiiao, parachuted onto >,tenado
Airfield 011 the same pcnin.;ula. Elenir.i~tsof the Kure 1st 5NLF landed nn the
ro~~theast l a the 24th. On Fehmnry 9 tmnp5 of the Sarehn (:omhined
p c n ~ n ~ uon
SNLF landed at sinkassat to t)venvhelnl tile dcfendcr5, a l [ nt whom atrrcndcred
by [he ~nonth'tend.
:\mbon ip a small irlancl off the rout11 coast 01 Ceram. It? occup~tionrras
ncccswry to scrurc airbase5 to cover the baoda Sea gap h~hvccnTirnur. This \\+as
 a main approach into the NEI from Australia. The Ito Detachment was
dispatched from the 38th Division after having seized Hang Kong. The SNLF was
sent %omDavao. 2,800 NEI hoops and a reinfo& Australian battalion of 1,170
defended the island. The defenders were on the Iaitimm Peninsula jutting from
the south coast. On the night of January 30/31 the SNLFIanded at the isthmus
joining the peninsula to the main island and the Ito Detachment on the
southeast end. The Dutch forces surrendered on January 31 and the Australians
on February 1.
Timor was divided in half between Dutch (west) and Portuguese (east) Tlrnor.
Dutch Timor was defended by 600 Dutch and 1,320 Austrahan hoops. Neutral

Cam Ranh Bay

AND

*
MENTAW# IS.

NETHERLANDS
EAST INDIES

INDIAN OCEAN

:ti)mutdassaul$

Sumatm operations, February

M a r c h 17, 1942.
 I
I

Poauguese T k o r en 320 Australian

commandos and
Portuguese govemor 1
fmm the AustPallans
ocfurred. A Portugue8e'
would turn back when tt&sj&s
ckea by Japan, but this had not yet
.enroute from Mozambique, Africa, but it
landed at DiIi. The Ito Detachment and
3110 mCn of the Y o h ~ > \ ~ l k3d a SVLF I i l ~ d ~(111 t f rc.l~nraw?(I rln r ) i i t ~ I Timor'~
i
r r u t h co,lrl hrhinti t h c b dcten~lcrr,\omc 35tr paratmnllcr< ni tJ~cI q t and 7d
Ratilinw Iltgiment? l-raracliutett o n t n ,l~rt~ e l d rtVit 11 lntlrc ilrnpped nvcr the
nc\t tr\n tiavr. On Fcl?ruary 2 0 f n l m n e ~ etmops d c t n c l ~ ~ ct rl ~ > i nthe 22<lt11
Infantn. ~ ~ n r i l )al hattalitm,
v landcd near LXli drtrc~nrdingI'nrtuzat't neutrality.
Thc \urtralial~ruTittidrcwinto I'ortu~ucseTimor on thc ?-lth, 250 uur\-ivnrs
: wit 11 r hc mmmarldn rrlmpaliv. 7 h c i hcxan ii ~ u c c e s ~ f~i lul r r r i : l a
13 tc'r Iin h ~ n rti1'
war n~rl~bd Sr8- the Dutch. Pr1rt1bgi1c.w. and Timnrcc;~I l n Cast Timtjr Cirrt t\*~ng
dorvn tlic l r r j Petnchment and I a t u tlitb entire rclicving S K t h Divirinn.
I 25tli -\rniy war rcyrrmqihlc f o r Xlalaya and ~ ; idstb
'IV < signed Clunlarra
cz.txn thottgh tile Ihth \rmy \+'a\ rc<pnrl\ihlc frir the rcqt of thc X I , due t c l
5umntra'r prox~n~it!* tcb \lalava. Ilie sccnnd targ~stconc~ntrntir)nof XEl trnopl
rlefer~dc~l \umatra with 4,5(HI mcn plu\ a f c ~ vthousand .\rr\ttalinn and Eritish
~ w m n n e rcerc l un thc Irlancl, mainll- ~ircri-M-5and senicc p n o n n c l . SIorc
( c~inrnnn~\~cal:h t m n p ~ \ . o u larrive
~i afrcr Cin~aliorcfvll on Fclln~asy15. ;It tlic
~ 3 nt iln ~ l r iu~t~r7Ti~1ll and tiriti\tl ~ r o l l n rcnrn.lat
! Unit5 arri~.cd.T h c ctlnqalcFt rlf
3iltnatra r ~ n t ~ Phi- i t s r ~ n d ~ i ~ it ne dtrro phascq nlthnuch air battler tvcrc hei2g
fought over thp idand a%tlie %lalayancarn{micn intensitird.
O n 14 Fcl-nias\. l h l l paratrooper5 o l tlie 1st Raiding Regirncnr, staging
f r r ~ i nSi;llaya, drnppcti o n t o a n airficlrl .mJ n i l refineries at I'almlt~ang nn
%n~itlieact Sumatra. Ihcv nvcrc reinforcril In- rilnrc rnocr thc next co~~pYe of
dav5. Thr iqland capital. Galemhng, rnnn full on the 15th. The 38th D i v i ~ i l l ! ~
nt Can1 Ranh Ray. Intlochins, w a > a r s l ~ n c r l5 u n l ~ t r t lhaving hccn r c l i c r ~ d
frnm 2.36 .\rniy. unrirr which i t rciird Hrlng Long. .A hattallon nt t l i r 12"th
Infantry wcurccl Har~kaIsland n t f the c r ~ a 5 t Irtlrn l'aleml~arrl:on thc 14th. O n
the 15th t l ~ crest or the 22'4th Infantry. reinfnrccd I I ~11E123(11 Infantry. arid
1111dcrtIzc ctrrnmand of C o l Inrrakn, movc.d LIP thc h l u t i Ri~.crRy Izlrid~rl):
barge trr nwauI1 I'alcinban~.This torcc wnir cnterccl tlir capital. (In the I i t h
wrnc J.OO(C Comrnnnivcalth and t l u t r h trnop5 rwrc c~ acuatrd scrnsr the
Sunda 5tmit to lava after abandnnin~n ~ u c hequipment, O n !he 3 r d t h e
Jnpanc\c i n r i t r ( i a nati1.e u p r i ~ i n gon northern Sumatm. Mast r i f southern
Sutnair;~rcn5 wcurt'rl by the 24th rcii h ~ i g r ~ ~ l i cna in~t n ~ t ~ n rl dcfrrldcrr
rr nnrl
cvncucc5 trrutl 'Finpapnre surrcti~lrslng.
Ih r rrcnnd ~ ~ h a of c r tccurinfi 5umatra I~ecanun Sfarch I2 rvhctl t l i r Guarrh
Dlt'isicm ;~rrivedlrntn Sin~aporc.ISlcnlentf or the Division landcd at \ladan nn
Ihe upper norrlieart Loart arid Kr-relaradia o11Sumatra\ nnorthcal;t end a5 $+-ellar
othrr \itr\ cullcrirncing little re\i\tsrice. ,\ torct. rmm the 3Xth Division I n the
5 0 ~ 1 1 1tatcr linkcd LIP tritt?thc (;uarrl\ tlivi$iim. IYc)rtrlc Koch n.a5 r r c ~ r ~ 011d
the E 7111 arid 011 I t ~ 78th r t l i rc.ninii~ing
~ 2,1WO D u t t h rrnop? ~urrcnderrd.
1 1 1S~E.I'Fmain ant! most prlllnIaterl irland Irvar Java with -13 rnilllon. Hatavin,
iirar llir north end, was the tapital of hntll tlic S1.t and lava. l'hrec Ilutch
"di\-triiln%." Inrzc lxigild~'\.c I ~ t ~ . n rtlld~ eisland rl-ill1 9,(HM) IJutch rep!ar\, I4,tYH)
I?utcLh!~r~luntr.~rs, a ~ ~I,?h,IHKI
rl nahvt' tronpr. .3,5IH1 I(riti\ll arlci 3.(HX) A u ~ t n l j a n
trnopr plus a U S a r t i l l c y t~a'ltalionhacked thew. Tlirri* were alw sonrc 12,0011
Nrrt~\hand Dutch air f t x c pcrwnnel. 7hc mai!l n ~ v ahaw l in the NEI rvar Ir>catcd
a t Soc~~haja nn tlic castcrrr nnrth m a r t .
\t'ith Sumatra to thc r,ortlizvent n l o ~ t l v\ecurecl 111' the Japancsc. tht. .imnll
island n f Ilali off Inva'r east end \\,as thcn r e i ~ r dtn h e ~ i nthc larger islat~d's
iffilatlon. Tlic L?,Ol~o-n~an Kanernurn l>etachrncnl fmm t lic 48th nirrision, 1vjtl1
1I1 Ilattalir~n,1 ~t I h m n s a tniantry, 1nndc.d unoppo~edn n B a l i ' ~liouth coast on
Irbruary 1 ' 1 sccuring thc i ~ l a n dthc next day. \ I l i ~ driaval ff~rccs atternptvd tn
intcrccpt thc invarion fnrcc durtnx thc Ratt'c of Dadtr~ngStrajt off Ikili'r m ~ t
end, hut thp lapanew prcvailcrl. lt'ilh Surnatra i n Japanere handr 2nd tlic . \ l l i e ~
uncenain 1 ha1 J d v n could 1w held, .\IH,~\t'0\1 tvnf clissulvcd cm I:cl~ruar-25.
TW
\I lapnr~cccTOrlV#l!'?- rvcbrrn p p r n a c h ~ t ila\-a , ~ and mmt remaining Allied ships
attempted to intcrccpt thc ca5tcrrt fnrctb. 1he rerulting Rattle of tftc Java Sca on
ilic 27th mrz. the ~ l l r v i ~ i t l .\llicll
l: chip5 Flcc~ngaround lava'r wcst enti where
mare were Fost durjng *"-:
power in the area wtf- - --- --
.. qllnda Ttrart on the 28th. Allied sea and air
%--

--I:"*.
and east, would k c : , x + + - 2 - -- ,
nnn-existent. A two-prong attack, west

While the landinp me- z-• -4 .-zxv. the Allied counterattacks and delaying
actions inflictcd mme dl- .:- rmP *-? 3 [3Evision as the three detachments
pushed south and ean tmr?: .' -*:rrl Bandneng with the Naru Detachment in the
lead. Bv the 5th all A l l i ~ uWm-\
l '1,: : rrrthdrawn to Handoeng.

Nasu D-chrnent Ma Yurnio

HQ, Id Infantry Gmup
16th Infantry (- 1 Barratlon]
I Battallon. 2d FA (- I s t Cmpany)
1 st Company, 2d Engineer
Two m c lc transport cornpaales
Reconnais:sance (am[ :hed after landing]

Fukushima Detachmi!nt Col Fuk

4th Infantry (- Ill Battalion)

m A T Baet
2d Company, Zd Enginee

i to Debctrment Col Sato Hans

th Infantry

Engineer ( ranies)

With the Zd Division landing on Java's nnrthwest end, a force was needed
to land to the east to secure the flank and cut off Allied forces Born the eastern
portion of the island. The Shoji Detachment was detached from the 38th
Divirion, which had taken Hong Kong and was preparing for Sumatra, and
attached t o 16th Army o n January 16. Thc Detachment itself was a t H O ~ R
Kong, rnovcd to Formosa, then Cam Ranh Ray. It had departed the same time
as the 2d Division, but took a separate route to land well east of Ratavia at
Eretanwetan and seized an inland airfield. After inflicting heavy casualties
on the British it moved west toward Randmng. At one point though a 1st
Dutch Division counterattack forced it to withdraw from Soebang, but It soon
regained the lost ground.

-
-
Battalion, 38th MountainArtillery (- one company)

(continued on p o p 82)
 l l ~2dr 13ilLirioncontinued t o cfore in on Randoeng from the rvcrt and north
as tlir lihoji Detachment appraclied from the east. The Sakaguchi Dctachrncnt
a130 rnclr-rng in knm t h e ea5t wmrld cut off escape to the ~ o u t l ilqcc hclc~~u!. NLI
native trntqlf were demorat [zed ancl d e ~ e r t i nAllied
~ , aircraft had hcen dcrtrtlvcd
or cwcuatcd, and t h c r r by35 no hope of reinforcement or evacuation. 'l'lic I3uti.h
cnrnmander currendcrcd hh.25ll ~ C I O on ~ P H Xlarch and the Japancsc claimed
rtcfnry 111 veste ern Java rhr n w t day. It wac i l ~ t ~ r ~ ~ ~that
i r i c,I dg i i e r ~ i l lu'dr
~~
rcnuld tie impractical cmnsldcring the aiiimosit? of many Indonesian5 toward3
i\'eqtern\. O n the I l t l r 5,600 British, 2,800 .l\ustralians, and 900 Americans
surrcndercd.
Thc 4Hth Division liad bccn rvtthrlnivn fmnl the I'l~ilippines a t the end of
January and concentrated on lolo in Ihc SitEu .Ircl-lipclagcl to prepare for caslern
l a \ a operations. Its convoy clcpattcd o n f:chrua~ 1 ' j calling at Ralikpapan.
Rometl to cmhark the Sakaguchi l>rtachment frnm thr 56th Ili1~i3ion less the
detachincnt ~t~liich had captrlrcd Band jermasin 1. The contry dcllartcri nn rhtl
3 r d . but rcas attacked hy .4llied aircraft en mute. This dclavcd the Inndi112:h?'
24 I~ourqancl the a ~ n l r arrived
~ ! ~ nff eastern J a n nn 1 Alarcli. Ihc. 48th Division
lant1c.d a1 li~agnnwett of Stlerahaia that n~nrninE.l'llc Imai U n i t Inndcd rvcFt of
Kri~gnn tn qccigrr* tlitl right tlanh aud provide art~lleryrz~pport.The Ahe Unit
Isi~dctlto the r a < t nC the town tt? lirntect the 'l'anaka Unit as it seized the Tieroe
Clilfield. 'F'he Tanaka Unit would then rcr-ltrc Bodjnnegoro inland along with the
Kitarnura Lnit (aka Andjoncgortl Raidlng Llnitl under LtCoE Kifamura Kuro,
consisting of the 48th Ilcconnai~~ancc. ,411 unit\, aftcr moving wetl inland, then
advanced cln Soera haja fronl tlic routh. The Ta kagurhi Detaclimerr t rcparated
from f h c main force ,lnJ nlcn.ed rvcst tn nccup!- l'j~tatjapon the south coast
I~Fnckingthe evacuation elf .4llicd Corcer contenmated at Ra t~doeng.:Is el~cwhcrc
the Di~tchf(~ugIiL a delaying acttnn fallinx back o n Sncrabaia. They were
~ c c c \ s f i t lin hnlding hack tIreJapane5e until the Sth nhcn the i n r a d e r ~finally
cntcxcd the tit!., LInqt ,.\llieil forces had withdrawn to Madoern Idand iust off [lf
Soerahain, hirt surrendered nn the qth. The area Ira5 declared secure on the 12th.

Imai Unit (RFghtWng Unit) Col Smai Hifumi

- -

I s t Formosa lnfantry (- I tl Batmlion)

111 Battalion. 48th Mountain Ai-tlllery
I Company. 48th Engineer

Il'ith Java seaired. thc Sakaguchi L>etscIlrnent returnecf to Rllrrna mjoi rling
the 56th Divirirm. 'The Ksnvrnt~r;! l~etavhinent on Hali rejoincd the 4Etl1
D i v i d m or1 lava \vliilp the IlX !r)nk cnvrrrerponsihiliv fnr RaIf and the Iewer
d ~ nf Java. I'he rhnni PctacEmncnt on f a l a w a s mm-ed to Sumatra
5uncla l ~ l a n cast
to rt>jninthe .<Ht11 Divislon and the units an Tinlor alw dcplo!.cd t o Sumatra
with thc 48th Divi\ion taking over occupation duties un Timot. The I d Lli~ision
garrlsonect Java.

South Seas
'1-lie lapar~erchad control led the llandatcd Tcrritnry sincr Irl?O having taken
it frnm (icrrnany in IS 1-1. ?airzast area of the Central I'acific encumpa~scdthe
M a r ~ h a l l ,I:amlitie, and Mariana Island3. Thc Alandatc, prilntcd b!. the Lrnguc
of Natinnr, had given Japan frill contnjl of olvcr 2.000 \mall islandr. C)nly
Guam nn the snuth end ot tlie kIariiinas, an American pnswsrion 4nce 189'1,
wag o u t ~ i d ctheir span of contml. To dcfcr~dt h e Mandates the 4th Ffeet rz+a!,
cstnhlrshcd in 1039 from !he SoutZi Sea Dcfcn5c Forcc. .lfter renoinga two-year
noticclapan withdrew from the l.eaguc of I'atlonr i n 1935 and t h e %lantlate
xva? clored to Westerners. Japan establishcd a sclf-ccmtalnc~fclcfensc .iyqtcrn in
each nf the three isIand qouys ccntcrcd 011 laluit, Truk. and Salpan,
rcspcctively. Truk was dcvclopcd ar lapan's cquirnlcn t of Pcarl H;~rhr~r. 4 s late
as lcFl9 lapan denicd it war fnrtivng thc islands.
Thc 4th Fleet rvar nnt an n p ~ r a t i o n a lfleet i r ~ the nrrrnml w n w , I>ul
contained amphibic~iis,linht forces, and air forccs to dcfcnd thc Sfandate. I t
r n q assigned n llrnitrd offensive missirm to r;ulrport t l i c I'aciiic War thtlugh. I t
tvas given thc t a ~ k clcsigniltion of the Snutl~Sear R>rccand chargett "To occupy
Iliakc. 15li1nd: defend and patrtbl t h e inner Snutl~Scar area and protect %usface
traffic: ctjclpcsatr with tlir .4r1ny i l l the w c c e s s i ~ cnccupation of Guam and
Raha~ll."l t rcould alsn seize British pmse~.;ir)n<irl t l ~ eI;ilhert Islat~dsto the
south and thcn rspand into the Snlnmons. Rlrthcr nTfon\irr nperdtrnrl\ would
hc launched from there t o cut o f f t h c Ctruthcrn I.ifc1inc F~ctwernthr I T S and
.-Itlstralis and Sew Tealand.
Initi,~Il'r' only a sing!? U J unit
~ WIIUIJ participate ill t11ese aperatlonr. Thc
Z Operation w a 5 plannfil t4) corninrt1cc (in Pccenlher R. Tlle Ciuam invnrion
 force was the South Seas Detachment (Nankai Shitai), built around the 55th
Infantry Group and 144th Infantry drawn from the 55th Division. It was
assembled in Korea in November, sent briefly to Japan and then departed for
Chichi Jima in late November. The 5th Company, Maizuri 2d SNLF, based on
Saipan, was to be the only unit to engage in combat duIng the invasion. The
4th Fleet would provide air support with the 226 Air Flotilla. The South Seas
Detachment departed Chfchi Jima on November 27 and put in at Haha Jima
the next day. It was held there until departing for Guam on December 5.
--- -
w,detjlch~
~ -
.
-~ -~ --
&H a n i , ~ j ~ i E L ! h ~ ~ i T o m ~ t
mnt.,(
~ ~
~
~ - -- - - -

MQ. 55th lnfpm~yGmup ~

-
~

~ ~~
-
I* Infantry Col Kusonare(2.925) --:

I Battalion,55th Moungin ArtiUew:-

~ e f i w , ~ 5 5 & . ~:{+&d!g:i@.php6ir~
iy
In@5bmw,.g5,i
--
- - --- -
Compq, 47th FieldAA Battalion
~
~ - --
-
.- ~

~~
~. ,

Deechmenl Medical Unit, 55th Dlvision ---- -.

-- ~~ - ~ ~~ -
- ~~-
~

Detachment, 1st Field Hospital, 55th ~ivislog

- ~ ~ ~ ~ ~

~ --
-
~

~
~~~
~

~ ~.*~-- ~
~ ~

-~
-
-.
DetachmemWater supply Unit 55th Diwirioir7-
5ch
-
Gwnpa@ ,
(*3 i
m 2 d .
SNLF~3XQ.
~~

-
- ~
~

- -
- ~ ~-
- ~-
-~
~ - ~ - ~ -- -
~ - -~~ ~ ~ - ~- . . ~.~

Only 153 Marines, 270 mostly u n m e d Navy personnel, and a Ughtly

armed militia of 300 defended Guam. There were no fartifications, heavy
weapons, or aircraft. Air attacks struck Guam on 8 December immediately
after the Pearl Harbor attack. In the early morning hours the SNLF fdmpany
landed north of Agaa, the island's capital, with 144th Infantry battalions
landing at points on the west, southwest, and east coats with all units
converging on Agaaa. Alter token resistance the defenders surrendered with
light losses on both sides. The 4th Fleet was assigned responsibility for Guam,
renamed Omiya Jima (Great Shrine Island), and elements of the Maizuru 2d
SNLF took over occupation duties.
The South Seas Detachment departed Guam on January 14 to occupy Uabaul,
New Britain, the R Operation. Rabaul and Kavieng, New Ireland and other
towns on the islands and on New Guinea were first bombed onJanuary 20. Some

South Serr D&chment,SSth Infantry Gmup

December 10,1941 @

I - 1 I I
 I,400 \u\tralinn t o o p without bcr~cfitnf fnrt i f i c a t ~ r ~ ni)r \ cnnil-rat airi-raft
clcfcndcd Rahatil. So cffr~rtwar made to rc~nforccor evaruatc t t ~ c~ a r r i w n The .
5 u t h Scdr Pctachrnrnt landed attcr n~itlnixhton thr 2jrd 511~1 routed the
detendcn h~ d a ~ nSlnst , snr\?lzm hcadctl f i ~ thc
r tiorth cnact rvhcre ak~uut4n0
ryere cvennlally e\*acu,!tcd. 'Itv~k cornpanic\ 11f i h c Llairtrru 2ii 5YLC departed
Tnlk o n lanudry ?f 11) vcc1ip! uncicfendeil liavienp nn t t ~ c23rd. \NLT elcmcntr
cnact [In Fclinlnn. C, and tlic north
cKciq'icd 5nlall trbrvri~r l t l Yew H r ~ t a i i ~fcli~th
T
on \pri I 8. I he .ldrniral tv 1qIands rvcrc uccupicrl un thc same date hv 5x1 I; trclnpl;
tml11 Rullaut. 7'11~.1ist 1 ran$port Rc~irncnt<err-?(?as, an t l r l /hlc orcuilatiorl force.
Rnl>a~llwas drr.clnpc.d a< a rn,fjl)r t~a\.aland air haw on the irland'r nnrthr.art
end and its n c ~ ~ t m l i r a t i oI>ec;~ti~r
n the tocir5 t ~ ,lllicd
f operations in the South
Pncifir once a t c i o t h ~ l dwas gained in the Snknlnon<,;Zirfieldr ant1 light dctvnscr
rvcw e\t;ll>li~hcd o r ) S\;er\'Irela tlCj t o j~totect t hC tartern a p l ~ r n a ~ l to i e ~New
liritain. Ilnbai~lIlcciunt. the lieatfguarter< hjr thc nc~cl!. organircd St11 Flcct.
whicll tcv)k (IVPI opcr;lt 1 0 t i 5 i n l h r area, relieving tlie 4th Flcct.
Tlic 23d \ i r Flc>tillaon Iloi and l.\btje lrlnnds i t 1 tlic Xlanhnlls con~met~ccd air
artack., on \\;lhr I ~ t i ~on ~ I il!jt!i. The 4th f'lc,ct
l d Ilccrn~hcr8 la?ting I I l r o ~ ~thtb
attcmptcd a landin!: nn tlrc 1 Ii h . but war rcpul~edbcforc 450 Xlaizuru 3d 5SI.I:
trrlclpc tvcrt4d c l ~ a r h ~Carrier
~d. attacks lasted Imni 17ecemhcr 21 to 73 h'tleli 1,000
4laiziini Zr! 5W.F trtwllr from Iiwajalein landcc on tlie south \hnrcs. T h e 450
\larinr and 71) SanVclcfcnctcrs. killctl alr~irlrt400 of thc landlny: lorce t~cforc
capihlkilt in^.
l'lit. 4th Flcct w;l< 5 n l ~ I yrecponqihle for initial npesatinnx i n t h r C;ill~erts and
Folnn~on\,Tlic t;ill)ert I\lancl~,part of the GilhcrL and Cllicc C'rn~mCalvnv, wcdrr
Ioca t ctl only 3110 miles to the $ o u t l ~ r ; c7f t Inpanew ~ i a r ~ h a .I)tlicr
~ ~thc l l ~ . than a
I c w cnart~vatcl~crf thcrc \\'ere n u Hriti41 ~ ~ i i l i t a forcer
rv in I h r Ciillwrtr and r ~ o
airliclds. TheJapanerr rlrsired the I;ilhert< tn deny the Allies Isa\cr ruithin cacy atr
range ot the \ l a r ~ l i a l l +and t o rt.nteas an out guard for the hiandaac.
\ h i P ~ r m h e r8 a company nf thc 5151 Guanl I.r)rcc 151 f i r / l i / r r i l n r t ~ t p i c d
Makin IsIand in nutartiari Atoll in ttie northern Ciilbertr. :Imall seaplane. hare
arlrl rndio tat ion Ivac c5tablishcd. ILrInrines raided khir facilitl. in ,\ugu.~t19-12
r\nrtlipartinI wccesr. \la khi and Tararvn rvcre r t r e ~ i g t l ~ c n cas,d a rcrult., lhc ram?
t ~ r l i tthcn landed on Rclio IsI~ntli u Tamrvn . l t ~ l un l tlie 10th. Thcv rnunded
Irp a few I k ~ r o p r a nand ~ departed, hut rc.turrietl nn the 34t11 and collected
5cvt.n coashua'tchcn. Returning on Scptember 3, 1 V42 thcy picked itp another 17
m a ~ t ~ r a t c h rand
r r f i ~ c)thcr
c Europcanr, who M'ere fiitirdercd. Tlie Ynkn~uka6th
SSLF octupjrd Tarawn i n force a t thir timc and placad a cIrtaclimc.nt nn >Inkin.
Iapanese filrays into the \ulomons did n n l crlrnmcnce i ~ n t i Ianuny l 12,
Is-&:! when tlse IIN homlled 'Iblagi, 1 hc ircjlornnns' administrative center, ar
Rahaul was reircci. O n >!arch 3 0 - i 1 SKLF trocjpr r ~ c c ~ ~ pBuka i c d Idand nn tlic
north cr~dot Bougai~ivillrand Shortland Island 1711 t h e rtwttr. Thi5 area w ~ ) u l d
serve a\ an out guard fisr Rahnr~lanrl a st as in^ area tor future operations into
the sauthcrn Snlo~nnn?.
To provide ;I forr\.artl Fta~iriparea to wppclrt op?ratIorls nn kplm atid fulurr
opcmtion\ further to t t ~ cr t i t ~ t l i e a ~At ,detachnlent of the Lure 3 ~ 1SYLl' seize<
Ii~lagiarlrl I;arzlttl nn I t a s 4. 111 mid-June the Inpancsc bcjian ctmstructinn t-rf
an airfield on (;uaJalcanal, which was di\covcrerl hy thc US i n earl? luly,
1hc lunc 4-5 Rattle of 3,lidrv;1y proved Lo \IF tlie trlrrlirlg point of t h c war iuitI'
rhc lo~rnf three carrier\. The intended b n d l n g fcrrcc uvar thc I r l Combined
Lariding Fnrce wit11 1,251) troops from the Ynkcl~uka5th SSLF and 1,200 troops
of the Ichiki Fr~rcc (2Mh I n t a n t ~I-], 7th Division) plur the UN 4 Elh dnrl
12th I:r~n>tr~~ction Units. 'rlw plarlned .4utqi~toperations nl 5cii.e Fiji. Ntbw
Znlcdonia, and Samoa were cancelled on JLI~!. 1I , lW7. 'I'Ilc 0.lllH)-~ndn
Ka\\-agu'cii Dctachmcn 1 ica5 ;a occupy hi-, thc S.500-111on South Sen\
Dctnclrmmt WEZC NCEV (jlsdnnia, and a 1 ,?(>I)-manhattatinn ol the ,\boa
I3etachincnt would land oil Fanma. I'liesc wcrc hacked Iq' t iic Yaza~c;~ Force (?el>
17th .lrrny hclnw). tn light thcb \Iliril detcnw fnrccs nn thnw illanrlq, there
forces wrrc inadcou.ire. rz;.~? no tirrthcs arlvarlcr\ nf 5i~rlificance
c~lfldu~tcd
afterJuly I I.Iu-l2.

N e w Guinea
-1-hc lal~ancccI;irgelv ~ ~ ~ t g r cPutch
rl NC!rrL;uinca i ~ n r i .4l>ril
l 19-12 when <ma11
SNLP' elcrnentr ~>ccuptt*js lcrc sites un ttic nnrth toart. tlirlield~and bargt'-
staging hare5 rvcr' t.<tnt.lishtd to si~yportoperations in northcast Ncrv Gu~nca.
h fcw small islands [ s t ! *hr rnurh and ~ o u t l i w e conrts
~t rvfrr also occ~~pied.
'The Japancw wcrc mrwr intcrc\tecl in I h r H u m n <;ukt area or1 tllc tiortlt
coast of ntwthcmt Vcrv C ~ u ~ n eand a the island" east end. l'npua. I'lar~ninghy
the 4th Frcct had h c ~ u rin 3.'t.lmar!1 tn recute the Huron Gulf area for airfield5
ancl its n~incrnlre5ourceq. t h l \larch 8, 11/1-14 ItiFantry nf the South Sen%
Detachment landccl at 5al;lnwun rzrhilc the bFaizuru I d SY1-1: wizcd Lea. On the
11 t h an SN1,I. clcmcnt totik F ~ \ c l ~ l ~ a f These
e n . unitr had staged out of Rabaul.
11E 144 was rclicvccl by the I ,.<OH-man X2d Guard Force to dcfcnd r hc nrca.
In .April t h e 4th I-lee1 Isunched the hICj Operation. a n cffort t n seize I'orl
Morerhy on the snutli coast af l'apua. The 144th Infantry, detached from thc
Smith %car[3ctacIirnent, a n t i the Kure 3d SN1.1: dcpartcd Rah;iul, I w t the attack
conloy war intercepted 4,y US carrier forcc5. Itic crlnvn?; aifferrng sc\.crc
Insfer, was tlrrned back rfuring the Battle of rhe L ' r ~ r aSea
l lasting irtlnl May 4 I r j
8.Thiq war lapan'$ Fint major dcfcat in Chc war.
On Ma!? 18 tllc 17th Army wn< activated a t Davarl, %liildarlao to cnntrnl [If\
operations in the South I'acific. Under t l ~ ccnmmnnd of I.rr;cn Hyakutahr
Seikichi, i t s heatlql~artrrswcrr ~ n o ~ ctod Ant~aulun Julv 24 fr)ll(jwctl f ~ vi t \
assignetP units, lYhcn organized all assigned units !:'cbrc at I>;l~ac~ wit t i thc
cxccptic~nelf the SuutIl Seas Uctacl~mc-nt,it Ribhaul.
Unable to scizc I'ort Morcsl)~by sen. t t ~ cYoknyatna .l~fvnncrI.clrce wa.t
landed at Gona nn the n o r t h coast of 15pua 1j11 luly 72. I\ nal ivc track Ictt from
--
f 7th Army
South Seas Derachment {55th Infantry Cmup with 144th Infantry)
Kawaguchi Demchrnent (35th Infantry Brigade with 124th InfantM !
Yazawa Force (4 1st Infantry, 55th Division)
I Aoba Detachment (4th infantry, 2d Division)* I

15th Independent Englnter

"The rrmmnder of the 2d Division m ossigned on August 2 9 t o make a second
amphibious &temp; to seize Port Moresby once the Kokodo Truil was secured. Cancelled in I
I September. !

17th Army, South Pacific Operations, May 1942

,
Chronology

1939
February Japan occuples Hainan Island off the South China roast.
May Japan rnitiares a long-runn~ngoffenswe against Sov~erfortes on
che Manchuria-Slberia border, but is defeared in September.

Due to reverses in China,Japan mobllizes 1,000.000 men.

The US enacrs export conrrol law rescricrlng the supply of fuel
and other war materials to Japan.
21 July Japan pressurizes rhe government of Indochina co accept
Japanese occupation after the fail of France.
25 September Japanese forces occupy Hanoi in Indochina.
27 September Japan forms the Tripartite Military Alllance wirh Germany
and Italy.

194 1
13 April The Japanese-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact is concluded
17 May The US Presidenr declares a sute of "full emergency."
author~zingarmed forcer to readiness levels to repel a threat
in the Western Hemisphere.
26 July The US freezes japanese assets.
5 November Japan commits co war with the Wescem Powers.
6 November The Southern Army is activated and unlts aswgned.
27-28 November 4th US Mariner depart China for the Ph~lippines.
2 December "X-Day" is sec for the commencement of hostilities.
7 December japav arracks Malaya. Pearl Harbor. and the Ph~lippines.
10 December japan assaults Guam. and US forces surrender there. Japanese
land o n northern Luzon. HMS Prmce of'vValesand HMS Repulse
a r e sunk.
1 2 December Japanese forces land on sourheast Luzon.
14 December Thailand declares an alliance wirh japan.
I b December The japanese land in Br~rishBorneo.
20 December Japanese forces land on Mindanao.
1 2 December Japanese forces land in tlgayen Gulf. Luzon.
23 December Japan assaults Wake Island, and US forces surrender.
24 December A second Japanese landing on sou~heasrLuzon takes place
1 5 December Hong Kong falls to Japanese forces.

1942
2 January Manila, capital of the Philippines, falls.
I I January Japanese troops land on Dutch Borneo (Tarakan Island)
and Celebes
15 January Japanese forces cross Into Burma frornThailand.
23 january Japanese troops land on New Bricain and sene Rabaul.
8 February Japanese forces suspend offensive operations on Banan.
14 February Japanese forces land on southern Sumarra.
I 5 February Thf fall of Singapore.
1 9 February japanese forces land on Ball.
20 February japmese forces land on Dutch and PortugueseTirnor.
26 February 1ap;nese forces land on M~ndai-a.
I March Japanese troops land en West and East Java.
12 March Japanese forces rand on northern Sumatra.
I 2 March The Japanese resume the &man offensive after reinforcement
8 April japanese troops land in the Adrnlral~Islands.
9 April US-F-ilipint, forces surrender on Ehe Banan Peninsula.
I 0 April Japanese forces land on Cebu.
16 April Japanese troop^; land on Panay.
24 April The Doolittle a i d 1s conducted on Tokyo.
4-8 May The Battle of the Coral Sea.The Japanese Port Moresby invasion
force withdraws.
=
20
May
May
japanese assault Carregidor. and US-Filipino forces surrender.
Commonwealth forces withdraw from Burma into India.
Spring Japanacrivares eight new infantry divisions.
4-5 June The Battle for N~dway.
13-3 1 ]une Japan seizes Artu and Kiska, Aleutian Islands.
9 June Last US-Filipino forces surrender in the Philippines.
I I Jury Japan cancels the Invasions of Fiji New Caledonia, and Samoa.
2 1 July Japanese forces land a t Buna-Gona and attempt to seize Port
Moreshy from inland,The Battle for the KokodoTrail continues
until September.
I August US Mar~nesassault Guadalcanal-Tufagl.
24 September The Japanesedefense of Bvna-Gona begins.
Bibliography

Cook,Taya and f i e o d ~ ~ F.r er d p n nt I4bc At? On11Histon. (New York, NY,

The New Presc, I QQZk
Daugherty, Leo ., 111 Figlr tii?,q T T - ~ I I ~c ~~f0IIopn~ft*si~
I ~ . F Ftifnt~hylr1nt1,1941-1 945:
7inir1612,Tcclrrtirrrrer, ,rrld ItVnporir ( S t Paul, MN. MRI Puhli~hlng,2002)
Drea, Idward J . Itr llrr Smoict7offlie Emprror: Essnv-$:so 1111prrir1J Irlpnr~rr~
Amry (Lincoln,S.4, University of Nebraska Press, 1998)
Forty, George jnprinc~p.4nnteHnrrrfhok, 1939-1945 (Stroud, UK, Ortton
publish in^, 1999)
Fu!ler, Richard S1nknr+HirrrhiFn'r Snrrrirmi: Lmdrrs o f rtlr )fijmt~eseJnrinJ Fnrrrr
1926-1945 (London,IrK, Arms and Armow Press, 1992)
Harris, Meirion and Susie b/iiic,rs o f tlra Swi: tlrc R i w ~ F IFill1 I I ! of t l l ~l t l l p t * k l
s i ~ 1 New Ycwk, VY, Randorn House. 19911
I i ~ p n n ~ Amry
Hayashi, Saburo and Coox, Alvin D.K#,v~tc Tilt*Inpnncse Awry in tlu*Isociflr'
1441s (Quantico, VA, Marine Corps Association, 1959). Pubfished in Japan
in T 95 1 as Tnil~r~ijlrrSP~ISURikirrerr Gnishi.
Henshal!, Kenneth G . A Hirtnnj rrf lrlpan: f r u r r ~Stonr Arc to S I I ~ P ~ ~ (New OIVLT
York, NY,St Martin's Press, 1999)
Houglr, LtCol Frank 0.; Ludwig, Maj Verle E.; and Shaw, Henry !. Jr. H i r t o ~ '
of US ~bktrineCnrpr O p ~ r n t i n t ~i lrl Mbrlrl tVnr 11. MI. I: Peilrl H n r h l r ro
G~rnlink~flr~nl (Washington, DC,US Government Printing Office, 19583
Humphrey, Leonard A, -l+Ilc12'o), o f tllr Sltw~~errEv S~vorrf:the I n p n ~ l c ~An~ly r it?
the 1920s [Stanford, C4, 19951
lenaga, Saburr, Ptn I'ncific Hlnr, 1931-1 9 4 5 a Critic-ill k r ~ p t ' ~ ? of i l Inpntr
~ Rolf
irl IVorId Ijbr ll (New York, N Y , Random Housc. 1978)
Long, Gavin M.The Six Yfnrr Wr:n Umrrise Hirtonr c~frluftmlinill t l ~ p
1939-1945 Wi~r(Canberra, Australia, The .4ustralian War Memorial and
the Australian Government Publishing Scn.ice, 19731
Morison, Samuel E. Histc~ryof US Xn17. Oplmtiuns i l l I l"r~r1dIVor I!. I'ol. {If: tlrr
Risitg Srrrr in die PociFc, 193 1-.4pri/ 1942 (Boston, Mh, Little Rrown and
Co., 1948)
Morton, Louis Utritril Stntrs Annthirr lirurld I,Ir~r 11: tlir F~IIIof the Pl~ilippir~rs
(CVashlngton, DC,US Government Printing Office, 1953)
Rottman, Gordon..I US Aforirle Corpr Order of Ri.rttle: Grni~titlnrrri Air Ujlilr bi
the Pncific IVor, 1339-1945 [Westport, CT, Greenwood Publishing,2002)
Rottman, Gordon t. IVorld llrnr 11 Pnciffc Islntld Uriiilr: r l (;ell-MilitilnnSh~ri!'
(Westpert, CT, Green~voodPublishing, 2002)
, ~ t h e Dtrlir~emtd FRII of rllr Inpt~rril.$rEl~tpir~,
Toland, John T'hc P l i s i r ~Srrr?:
1939-19.15 [New York, NY, Random Houte, J970)
War Department, Hiirrrfhorl rrir Iflpat~i~sr MilitnnnFLI~CPF, TM-E 30-480.
Septcrnher 15, 1914 with Change 3, June 1 , 1945.
Whitman, John W.B~tonrr:Olrr L ~ I FI3itdr ! (New York, NY. Hippocrene Bookr,
199n1
 Abbreviations and linear
measurements
- -

antiaircraft artillery LMG lighc machine gun

ABDACOM American-British-Dutch-Australian Command NAS Navy Arr Serv~ce
APHE Armor-piercing high explosive NtO non-comm~ssionedoficer
AT antitank NEI Netherlands b s t lndies
Bn Barn lion Regt Regiment
B~v Barcery SNLF Special Naval Landing Forcets)
Co Company
CO commanding officer Omcer ranks
CP command port LC L~eurenanr
Det Detachment l stLr Is t LIeutenanr
FA Field artillery 2dLt Zd Lieutenant
HE High explosive Capt Captain
HMG heavymachinegun Mai Malor
MQ Headquarters LtCol Lieurenant-Coionel
lGHQ lrnper~alGeneral Headquarrers Col Colonel
118 Independem Infantry Bamlion BGen Brigadier-General
11A Imperial japanese Army MajGen Maior-General
IjN rmperlal lapanese Navy LtGen Lieutenanr-Ge-teral
IMB Independent Mixed Brigade

Distances. ranges, and dlrnensionr are given in the contemporary US system of

~nches,feet yards. and statute miles rather than metric:
feet to meters: multiply feet by 0.3048
yards to meters: multiply yards by 0.9 I44
miles to kilometers: multiply miles by 1.6093

Weapon calibers are given in h e standard Japanese metric system:

centimeters to inches multiply by 0.3937
Index
References to ~llusvationsam shown m bold.
a i r bamflons 7 . 8
d ~ Group.
r 3d 13. 14
Air Group, 5th 13
arrcraf~ T3,69
Airfield Batalron. 24th 60
Ambon lsland 77-78
American-Briush-Durch.Australla Command
{ARWACOM) 73.80
arnphtbrous operarlons 20-22.23
armles, numbered (Hornengun)
14rh 13. 14. 16.73
Bataan Forte 48
lkuta Detachment 69
lmal Demchmenc 65.67
Kanno Derachment 61,H. 65
Kawaguchr Detachment 69,72 see olso
arrnres, numbered: I6rh
Kawamura Detachmenr 69.72
Ktmun Derachment 61.65.6B
Lamon Force 64.65
Mauurnoto Oecachrnent 61-62
Mura Derarhrnenr 61.72
Nagano Derachment 68.69. J t , 72
Phlllppines Atrack Force 16.59.59.10.
60.67
Sonoda Force 5 1.65
Suzuki Pemchmcnr 72
b b h a s h ~Demchment b5,bb
Tanaka Demchment 60.61.64.65.66
15rh 13. 14. 16
16th 14. 16.73
East lndies Attack Force 14. l 6.73.74
Ito Derachment 75,78-79
Kawquch~Deuchmen~93,YS. 76-86
see also armres, numbered: 14th
Kume Deechrnenc 76
Sakaguchi Demchment 61.76.77 see
afsoarmies, numberedl 25th
17th 87.88
Aboa Detachment 86,88
Hayash1 Force (1st Landing Force) 88
Yano Force (2d Landing Force) 86,88
23d 14
25th 14. 16.80
Abe Unlr 82,83
Fukushrma Detachment 8 1
lmar U n ~ t82
Kanemun Detachment 80,82
Nasu Derachment 81
Sakaguchr Detlchmenr 8x83 see obw
armres, numbered: 16th
Sara Detachment 8 1
5holi Decachmenr 8 1-83
h n a k a U n ~ c82.83
organmuon 23
Army, irnper~slJapanese
Dar N~pponTetkoku R~kugundesignation
grven B
drspwsrtron of forces. December 1 . 1941: 3d 22
9-10 4th 13. 17,68.71
genesis 5-B 5th 14, 17.22,26.35,72
sershrn (strengrh d \HI!! and rprirc) 14-20 4th 22
Army, Southern l2. 13, l 6.53.58 7th 13.
organburlon t S 1 I t h and 12th 22
pre-mvasron deployment. December 194 1: t 6th 13, 16.22.64.65.&7-68,71,72
I1 18th 14, 17.22,26,35
Reserve 14. 16 21sr 14, I6
Army General S M . 2d Bureau of 56 33d 13, 17
Army-Navy Central Agreement I2 38th 14. 17.80.81
arlillery 7.48-50.71.88 see afso weapons 48th 13. 16.26.53.64.65.67.8L 83
Geld guns 49 55th 13, 14. 17
howluer. I0cm Type 9 1 ( 193 1 ) 50 56th 14, 16
lumber and carsson. 7 5cm field howiner 49 1 14th 22
mounurn gun. 7.5cm Type 94 (19341 33. depot (Ruw Soldon) 24
49.49-50.88 Guards (Konoc 5h1don) 17.24.16.53.80
non-drvisionsl 50 rnbntry (Soidan) 23-14 rce also div~srons.
Artrllery. 18rh Mounnin 35 triangular
artillery and tank coordination 4 2 4 3 square (Yon-tan-! Shrdan) 3 5 , 3 5 , 8 8
Artrllery Command. Is t 71 permanent (Ipsetru 4S1rdnn) 36
artillery repnents see regrmencs. artillery "sccuriry" (CrEt~anShidffol 26
artrllery actlcs 44 triangular (Son-ron-r Slrrdon) 26
anlllery unbr m ~ u n a i n33 1940 standard B (Oisw), organmtlon
artillerymen. South Seas Deuchmenr 88 26-35.27,28
Ausmtnn troops 78.79.80.88,88 Dutch troops 77,78.79,80.82
Ball 80.81 East Indres Attack Force 14. 16.73.74
Balqkpapan 76 Emperor 5 . 7 , 8 . 5 2 . 5 3
B a e n Island 60 engrneer unlts 22.33
batnllons. organization 23.24.29.29 e n s 5-8
b~cyrtes 45
Borneo 73,54,75,76-?? Fmnch Indochrna. occupation 4.8
Boxer Rebellion 6
bridging and bridge-repair muter~el I 8 Garrrson Unit 10th independenr 6&71
brigades Gavuru-Tanabogo Islands 19
65th 13. 17.35.36.67.68.72 Gllberr Islands 86
independent 36.88 Greater East Asia Co-prosperrty Sphere 4,
2 1st Independent M~xed 14. 16.36.36 12
inbnrry. orgzniwtlon 14 Greater b s t Asla War, goal 01 4
Burma Awck Force 1 3. 16 Group. 35th Infantry 73
Group. 55th It\fantry 14.84
Cavalry Battallon. 22d (12 Kifiel Daitai) 35 Group. 56th Infantry 14.73.77
cavalry regrmencs (Killer Renror) 33 Guadalcanal 50.88
Cebu Island 72 Guam 12. 18, 19.2 1,83-84
Celebes Island 77 Guam Occupat~onForce 14, 16
Chlna.war In 4.6-8.9. 10. 13, 18.22 Guard Force, 5 1 sr (5 1 Ke~brtar) 86
Chlna Incident ( 1937) 8 Guard Force. 81d 87
combat operatrons 58 see also Nerherlands Guards, Imperial (Konw) 5,24 see aka
East Ind~es:New Guinea: Phillpplnes: South divisions. Guards
Seas operations
command 52-54 Hallma. Gen Sugjyama 52
commanders, unit 53 Hedek~.Gen Tolo 52
cornmunlcatlons 34.55.55-56,54 Hirohrto. Emperor 8
Corregrdor 14.34.69.70.71,71,72 Hong Kong 12.53
Correg~dorLanding Farce 72 Hong Kong Amck Furre 14, 1 6
drvision advancing in columns 4 I. 42 Imperial t e n e n l Headquaners (IGHQ) 51.
d~vdr~ons
6.7.8. 13,88 53.58.68.88
2d 13,13,&1.82,83
Battle Orders 9

World War I1

Full cuIar:t%&@ U m M & :&&

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