Logical Pluralism A4

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Logical Pluralism
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Logical pluralism is the view that there is more than one correct logic.
Stanford Encyclopedia Logics are theories of validity: they tell us which argument forms are
of Philosophy valid. Different logics disagree about which forms are valid.[1] For
example, take ex falso quodlibet (EFQ):
A, ¬A ⊨ B
Classical and strong Kleene logics classify EFQ as valid, but relevant and
paraconsistent logics say it is not. It is quite tempting to think that they
Co-Principal Editors: Edward N. Zalta & Uri Nodelman cannot all be right. If EFQ is valid, then the relevant and paraconsistent
Associate Editors: Colin Allen, Hannah Kim, & Paul Oppenheimer logics are not correct theories of validity, or as we might put it: they are
Faculty Sponsors: R. Lanier Anderson & Thomas Icard not correct logics. And if EFQ is not valid, then classical and strong
Editorial Board: https://plato.stanford.edu/board.html Kleene logic are not correct logics. Logical pluralism takes many forms,
Library of Congress ISSN: 1095-5054 but the most philosophically interesting and controversial versions hold
that more than one logic can be correct, that is: logics L and L can1 2
Notice: This PDF version was distributed by request to mem- disagree about which arguments are valid, and both can be getting things
bers of the Friends of the SEP Society and by courtesy to SEP right. What exactly it takes for a version of logical pluralism to be
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philosophically interesting is addressed more fully below, especially in §6.
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SEP Society and obtain authorized PDF versions of SEP entries, Much current work on the subject was sparked by a series of papers by JC
please visit https://leibniz.stanford.edu/friends/ . Beall and Greg Restall (Beall & Restall 2000, 2001; Restall 2002), which
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy culminated in a book (Beall & Restall 2006) on what we here call case-
Copyright © 2023 by the publisher based logical pluralism. This work has generated a substantial literature,
The Metaphysics Research Lab
including papers arguing against pluralism, for logical monism—the view
Department of Philosophy
Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305 that there is only one correct logic—and more recently exploring logical
Logical Pluralism
nihilism—the view that there are no correct logics. Interest in this
Copyright © 2023 by the authors contemporary debate has also led to a re-examination of some older views,
Gillian Russell and Christopher Blake-Turner especially the question of whether Rudolf Carnap was a logical pluralist
All rights reserved. (Restall 2002; Kouri Kissel 2019), and similarly for the Scottish-French
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1
Logical Pluralism Gillian Russell and Christopher Blake-Turner
logician Hugh McColl (1837–1909) (Rahman & Redmond 2008). It has Other Internet Resources
also resulted in the proposal of several additional kinds of logical Related Entries
pluralism, some of which are surveyed in §5.
1. Case-Based Logical Pluralism 1. Case-Based Logical Pluralism

1.1 The Argument from Appearances
1.2 The Argument from Virtue How can two logics which disagree about which arguments are valid both
2. Objections to Case-Based Logical Pluralism be correct? One way would be if there were more than one property of
2.1 The Generality Objection validity (and so more than one interpretation of “valid”) where one of the
2.1.1 The interpretation of “every” in the Generalised logics captures validity in one sense, while its rival captures validity in
Tarski Thesis another. Some pluralists elaborate on this by maintaining that natural
2.1.2 A response from polysemy language expressions like “follows from” are unsettled, vague, or
2.1.3 Choosing a best case? ambiguous, and may be settled, made more precise, or disambiguated, in
2.2 The Normativity Objection more than one way. The best-known version of this view is presented as
2.3 The Change-of-Meaning Objection the conjunction of two main theses (Beall & Restall 2006). First, the
2.4 The Metalogic Objection Generalised Tarski Thesis:
2.4.1 Breaking metalogical harmony
3. Logical Nihilism Generalised Tarski Thesis (GTT):
3.1 Logical Nihilism via the Generality Objection An argument is valid if and only if in every
x casex in which the
3.2 Responses to Logical Nihilism premises are true, so is the conclusion.
4. Logical Pluralism via Linguistic Pluralism
Second, the thesis that the expression “case ” in the GTT can be made
x
4.1 The Principle of Tolerance

more precise in at least two, equally acceptable, ways, resulting in
4.2 Issues for Carnap’s Pluralism
different extensions for “valid”. For example, by “case” we might mean a
5. Further Kinds of Logical Pluralism
first-order model of the kind used to define classical first-order
5.1 Pluralism Regarding the Set of Logical Constants
consequence or instead we might mean a possible situation. Other
5.2 Pluralism About the Objects of Logical Consequence
alternatives include incomplete or inconsistent models, of the sort used in
5.3 Pluralism about Modelling
the model theory of intuitionistic and paraconsistent logics. Different
5.4 Pluralism about Epistemic Normativity
choices for the interpretation of “case” will result in different
5.5 Pluralism by Restriction
precisifications of the GTT analysis of logical consequence, which may in
6. What’s at Stake in the Debate about Logical Pluralism?
turn result in different consequence relations (Beall & Restall 2006: 29–
Bibliography
31). Call this view “Case-Based Logical Pluralism”.
Academic Tools
2 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Fall 2023 Edition 3

Case-based pluralists do not need to hold that every conceivable hypothesis. But if we can conceive of several different ways things could
precisification of GTT defines a consequence relation. Beall and Restall, plausibly be, we might rationally withhold judgement pending more
for example, think that the only admissible precisifications of the GTT evidence.
yield relations with certain properties—necessity, normativity, and
formality (Beall & Restall 2006: 26–35). Hence having its extension given More specifically, while Case-Based Logical Pluralism is not patently
by a precisification of the GTT is only a necessary condition on being a implausible, it does rest on a linguistic picture with two distinctive
genuine consequence relation. features: first, that the meaning of “case” is unsettled, and second, that
given that it is unsettled, the discovery of more than one reasonable
1.1 The Argument from Appearances precisification should make us pluralists. But neither of these features is
inevitable. Contemporary philosophy of language describes models in
One argument for Case-Based Logical Pluralism is the argument from which the correctness of the application of some ordinary language
appearances (Beall & Restall 2006: 30–31). According to the argument, expressions—such as “water”, “elm” or “star”—can turn on the presence
pluralism is just straightforwardly plausible—it appears to be true—and or absence of a feature that ordinary speakers need not be able to
hence ought to be accepted in the absence of reasons not to believe it. distinguish, such as having a certain constitution or make-up. Why should
“valid” not be similar? That is, though no a priori analysis of “valid”
This might seem like a surprising approach, given the presumption of uncovers the single correct precisification of the GTT, there might
logical monism in the writings of most logicians of the past—presumably nevertheless exist an account—perhaps making use of sophisticated
pluralism did not appear correct to them. But perhaps once one considers mathematical techniques—that exactly captures the extension of “valid”.
the GTT explicitly, accepts the underdetermination of “case”, and Rival accounts would then have the same status as rival accounts of stars
considers a few of the ways it can be made more precise to get different or water. Though analysis of the word “star” will not tell us that stars are
logics, it just seems clear that there will be several alternative ways to not holes in the fabric of the night, or the gods riding their chariots across
make it more specific, with none singled out as more correct than the the heavens, those accounts are still wrong. Similarly, though analysis of
others by current usage. The hardest thing about logical pluralism, one the expression “valid” might not tell us that intuitionist accounts are
might think, was answering a kind of “how possibly?”-question: seeing wrong, they might be wrong nonetheless. In such circumstances we might
how it could be a coherent view at all. But once the work of developing hold that the meaning of “valid” is not really underspecified.
and laying out the case-based view has been done, the new position can
strike one as quite reasonable. Secondly, even if the meaning of the expression is underspecified, it
needn’t be the case that any precisifications are correct, and hence
One problem with this argument is that the plausibility of a view tends to pluralism is not an inevitable consequence of the underspecificity.
vary with the onlooker’s ability to think up reasonable alternatives; if a Consider a paradigm underspecified word like “heap” and a thinker who
particular view seems like the only reasonable way a certain thing can presents themselves as a pluralist about the heap property. They hold that
have happened, then we might shrug and accept it as our best working one may specify the meaning of “heap” different ways within certain

parameters, and arrive at conflicting but equally correct definitions of perplexity found in many of the debates in logic in the last century.
“heap”. For example, the classical heapists might claim that a heap is any (Beall & Restall 2006: 31)
pile of items with more than 10 members, deviant heapists protest that a
heap is any pile of items with more than 13 members and the heap Pluralists have also stressed that their view encourages innovation in logic
pluralist holds that both are correct. But there are lots of alternatives to (Carnap 1937: foreword), and allows one to study more mathematical
pluralism here. For example, one might think that anyone who interprets theories, such as those that would be rendered trivial by classical logic (S.
the English word “heap” as requiring a pile of n items for any specific n is Shapiro 2014: Ch. 3).
wrong, since they are trying to import more specificity into the meaning of
Such claims can be quite difficult to assess. Some important distinctions
the word than can really be found there. Or one might be a skeptic about
need to be drawn between theoretical and practical reasons to endorse
heaps, on the grounds that the word is too vague—it fails to specify a
pluralism, and even once this has been done it can be difficult to decide
genuine meaning—or one might hold that the expression is context-
whether the view over all really possesses a virtue—it may depend on
sensitive: in some contexts it picks out the classical property, in some the
substantive empirical claims for which the evidence has yet to be gathered.
deviant, but argue that that doesn’t make one a pluralist about heaps,
It can also be hard to determine whether or not the view possesses a
anymore than acknowledging that “I” picks out different people in
greater weight of virtues than rival theories (is not logical monism a
different contexts makes one a pluralist about oneself.
simpler theory, and simplicity a theoretical virtue too?), and finally
The mere possibility of these alternatives does not, by itself, argue against whether or not that is a good reason to believe the view.
the pluralist view, but it does undermine the argument from appearances.
For example, one virtue claimed for logical pluralism is charity, but not all
The availability of alternatives makes it clear that the intriguing
instances of charity are theoretically virtuous; no-one should think that
reasonableness of pluralism is not unique.
deterministic physics is more likely to be correct because it allows a more
charitable view of wrong-doers, or of Einstein. Charity can be misplaced.
1.2 The Argument from Virtue But one place where charity is taken seriously as a theoretical virtue is in
the assessment of theories of meaning and translation—though even here
A different argument for logical pluralism invokes the view’s combined
it can be misplaced, since it is not a virtue if a theory interprets infants as
practical and theoretical virtues:
uttering true claims about quantum mechanics (Davidson 1973 [1984]).
One virtue is that the plurality of the consequence relation comes Logical pluralism is not itself a thesis about translation or interpretation,
at little or no cost. Another is that pluralism offers a more but one about logics and how many there are. Nonetheless, the version
charitable interpretation of many important (but difficult) debates outlined above rests on some substantive claims about the meaning of
in philosophical logic than is otherwise available; we will argue “valid” and “follows from” and it might be argued that it is proper to
that pluralism does more justice to the mix of insight and invoke charity in adjudicating between this theory and rival ones for that
reason: we are deciding between theories which interpret “valid” and

“follows from” differently. Perhaps one of these interpretations seems to is correct have been arguing based on a confusion. The upshot with respect
make our informants (both ordinary language users and the experts who to the argument from charity, and from virtue more generally, is that quite
have written about logic) responsible for fewer false claims. a lot remains to be done before it will be clear which virtues are desirable
and the extent to which logical pluralism possesses them to a greater
But an opponent might respond that interpreting ordinary speakers as degree than its rivals.
uttering truths concerning logic can look similar to attributing true beliefs
about quantum mechanics to infants. As the Wason selection task 2. Objections to Case-Based Logical Pluralism
experiments have shown in psychology, even educated speakers will fail
to act as if the argument form modus tollens is correct in certain 2.1 The Generality Objection
circumstances (Wason 1966, 1968; Cosmides 1989). Though the most
charitable interpretation of their behaviour might be that they do not mean
2.1.1 The interpretation of “every” in the Generalised Tarski
by “follows from” what the experimenters meant by it, by far the most
Thesis
natural understanding of what is going on here is that the subjects make
mistakes. To interpret them as meaning something different by “valid”
One way to object to logical pluralism via cases is to agree that “case” is
misses what these experiments reveal about human reasoning, and fails to
underspecified and admits of various interpretations, while rejecting the
explain why the subjects later judge that their earlier answers were wrong.
further step that those interpretations correspond to different relations of
The logical pluralist can agree with this, but distinguish between being logical consequence. One way to do this is to insist on the largest domain
charitable to ordinary speakers, and being charitable to expert logicians. It for the quantifier “every” in the GTT. There is a tradition in logic that
is expert logicians, they might maintain, that we should interpret holds that for an argument to be logically valid, the conclusion must be
charitably, including those experts who have proposed apparently true in unrestrictedly all cases in which the premises are true; if there are
incompatible systems. Relevant logicians have written “disjunctive any cases at all—anywhere, of any kind—in which the premises are true
syllogism is not valid”. Classical logicians have written “disjunctive and the conclusion not, then the argument is invalid. The One True Logic,
syllogism is valid”. Intuitionist logicians say “double negation elimination then, is the one that describes the relation of truth-preservation over all
is not valid”. Classical logicians have retorted “double negation cases—where “all” is construed as broadly as possible (Beall & Restall
elimination is so valid”. If logical monism is correct, at least two or more 2006: 92; Priest 2006: 202).[2] A monist might also put it this way: the
of these parties have claimed falsehoods. Logical pluralism would allow pluralist’s real logic can be recovered from the various “logics” they
us to say that more than one, perhaps many more than one, have been accept by taking the intersection of the sets of valid forms (like EFQ)
writing truths. endorsed by each “logic”. (The monist uses scare-quotes here, though of
course a pluralist would not.) An argument form is only really logically
But logical pluralism is also uncharitable in ways that logical monism is valid for the monist (as “logically valid” should be understood) if it is
not, since it holds that the monist participants in debates over which logic counted valid by all of the “logics” that the pluralist accepts.

Suppose we pursue this generalist strategy. One question is whether we the conjuncts hold, simply in virtue of the meaning of ∧. (Priest
will be left with any useful relation of logical consequence at all. Logics 2006: 202–203)
which are arrived at by quantifying over extra cases have a tendency to be
weaker—to classify fewer arguments as valid—since the more cases we But it is relatively common for logicians to claim that their own logical
include, the better our chances of including one in which the premises of a principles are valid in virtue of the meanings of the logical constants,
particular argument are true and the conclusion not true. Dialetheists while those who reject those same principles dispute this. It is difficult to
would include cases in which both a sentence and its negation are true, and adjudicate such disputes independently of a more substantial theory of the
this means we can have cases where P and ¬P are true, but Q is false, meanings of the connectives. This is yet another area where the dispute
making both P ∨ Q and ¬P true, even though Q is not, and thus over logical pluralism runs into an older dispute in the philosophy of logic,
providing a counterexample to disjunctive syllogism. If this is acceptable, and one that is ostensibly a question about meaning. The two key
one might think, why not allow cases where P ∧ Q is true, but P is not? questions that remain for the success of this monist objection are (i)
Or worse. Perhaps if we construe “every case” broadly enough, we will which, if any, argument forms are guaranteed to preserve truth (perhaps in
find that there are no valid arguments left, and hence the result will not be virtue of meaning) in any case whatsoever, and (ii) if there are any such
logical monism, but a form of logical nihilism, or something close to it. argument forms, are there enough of them to constitute a non-trivial logic?
Several pluralists have used this line of argument as a reductio on the idea One recent view, logical nihilism, embraces the idea that the One True
that consequence must be defined over absolutely every case: Logic might be the empty logic. We discuss this view separately in §3.
…we see no place to stop the process of generalisation and 2.1.2 A response from polysemy
broadening of accounts of cases. For all we know, the only
inference left in the intersection of (unrestricted) all logics might There is more than one plausible model for the underspecificity of “case”
be the identity inference: From A to infer A. That identity is the in the GTT. The version of pluralism we have been considering allows
only really valid argument is implausible and, we think, an different kinds of things to count as cases. Sometimes a case may be a
unmotivated conclusion. (Beall & Restall 2006: 92, emphasis in mathematical structure, sometimes a possible world (perhaps incomplete
original)[3] or inconsistent).[4] Given this, the underspecification of “case” in the GTT
could be less like the indeterminacy that results from variation in the
Priest disagrees, and suggests that what will stop the slide down this
domain of quantification, and more like the variation that results from
slippery slope is the fact that certain key consequence relations hold in
polysemy. Consider:
virtue of the meanings of the connectives:
(1) Every bank needs numerate staff.
I think it just false that all principles of inference fail in some
situation. For example, any situation in which a conjunction holds, This sentence has two readings because the word “bank”—even once
we’re talking about money—has more than one meaning. It can mean a

financial institution (such as HSBC), or the building where a such an incomplete possible worlds, and hence has not considered every case. On
institution offers its services (such as the bank five minutes from campus). the case-as-first-order-model disambiguation of “case”, the classical
Sometimes additional context can rule out one of the readings, for logician has considered every case, since incomplete possible worlds are
example: not cases in that sense.
(2) Every bank needs numerate staff in all of its branches.

2.1.3 Choosing a best case?
in which it is clear that bank-as-financial-institution is meant, and:
Let’s continue to assume that “case” is polysemous. Just as there was
(3) Every bank needs numerate staff and a large parking lot. room for someone to argue that only a single interpretation of “every” was
appropriate in the GTT, so a monist might argue here that there is only one
in which it is clear that bank-as-building is meant. appropriate disambiguation of “case” in the GTT, and hence that there is
only one relation of logical consequence.
When we were assuming that the underspecificity in the GTT resulted
from underspecificity about the domain of quantification for “every” there We can develop that thought as follows. The logician’s task is to capture
was a natural temptation to think that we would get a unique best the consequence relation on natural language sentences, but it usually
interpretation by invoking an absolutely unrestricted domain. In the simplifies things to pay attention only to particular expressions in those
polysemy kind of case however, what can vary is not (just) the size of the sentences, such as conjunction, negation, and disjunction, say, or those
domain of quantification but also which kind of object is being quantified expressions plus the universal quantifier and identity. Whichever set of
over. The result is that we can allow the domain of quantification to be as symbols we select as our so-called logical constants, the meanings of all
large as we like, and still no object of the wrong kind can count as a the other expressions in the sentences—the non-logical expressions—are
counterexample, precisely because it is of the wrong kind. To illustrate determined by the interpretations (or, as we call them in the GTT,
with “bank”: if we mean bank-as-financial-institution, then no bank-as- “cases”), and since we are quantifying over all such interpretations, in
building can serve as a counterexample to (1) (no matter how unrestricted effect we are simply ignoring the meanings of all non-logical expressions.
the domain of quantification) since the sentence is not making a claim
about such things. And conversely, if we mean bank-as-building, then no So now consider what we might say about this argument:
internet bank-as-financial institution can be a counterexample to sentence
a is red.
(3).
a is colored.
So suppose that “case” in the GTT is polysemous. Perhaps “case” Normally we’d translate this into the language of first-order predicate
sometimes means possible world, but it can also be used to mean first- logic as something like this:
order model. If the classical logician means first-order model by “case”,
then it is illegitimate to complain that he has failed to take into account

Ra In Logic we do not want to know how the understanding is and

Ca thinks, and how it has hitherto proceeded in thinking, but how it
ought to proceed in thinking. (Kant 1800 [1885: 4])
That formal argument is not valid, but one might still want to say that the
original, natural language argument is. First-order logic which fails to treat …logic is a normative subject: it is supposed to provide an account
words like “red” and “colored” as logical constants, one might think, falls of correct reasoning. (Priest 1979: 297)
short of capturing logical consequence.
Sometimes, though, philosophers have taken the position that whether or
Generalising, we might think that if you are interested only in the truth not logic is about reasoning, its claims about logical consequence have
about logical consequence, then it is never legitimate to ignore the normative consequences for reasoning:
meaning of some expression in an argument. If simplicity and
conservativeness are of no concern, then you should not be appealing to Rules for asserting, thinking, judging, inferring, follow from the
Tarski-style interpretations in defining validity—since the whole point of laws of truth. And thus one can very well speak of laws of thought
such interpretations is to allow the meanings of certain expressions to too. (Frege 1918 [1956: 289–90])[5]
vary, so that they don’t count. Better than any “interpretation” would be a
complete possible world (perhaps we can argue about which things are …logical consequence is normative. In an important sense, if an
included in “all possible worlds”, but there might also be a correct answer argument is valid, then you somehow go wrong if you accept the
to that question). Hence many of the possible disambiguations of “case” premises but reject the conclusion. (Beall & Restall 2006: 16)
give us different false theories of validity. Those might be useful because
Many critics have stressed an apparent tension between the alleged
they are simple and they approximate the true account, but since the logics
normativity of logic and the thesis of logical pluralism. Suppose, for
they capture are not correct, this is a view on which no pluralism
example that if an argument form is valid, then some normative
threatens.
conclusion follows concerning what we ought to believe. (Perhaps it is
that we ought to believe the conclusion of an instance of the argument
2.2 The Normativity Objection form if we believe the premises, though much work on the normativity of
logic suggests that it would need to be something substantially more
A different objection to pluralism (sometimes also referred to as the
complicated.) Now suppose that logical pluralism is correct. In particular
Collapse Argument) starts from the premise that logic is normative, where
logic 1, which says that disjunctive syllogism is valid, and logic 2, which
this means that logics have consequences for how we ought to reason, i.e.,
says that disjunctive syllogism is not valid, are both correct. Ought we to
for what we ought to believe, and for how we ought to update our beliefs
believe what logic 1 tells us to believe? It is hard to see how we could
when we learn new things. Many writers have thought that logic is
escape this obligation, given that logic 1 tells us that the premises entail
normative, sometimes because they have thought that logic just is the
the conclusion, and logic 1 is correct. Yet if the normative consequence for
science of good reasoning:
belief does follow, then perhaps logic 2 is falling down in some respect—

it fails to capture all of the obligations that follow from our logic. As Read In debate, monists have often been willing to allow that the pluralists’
puts it: different systems disagree, because they themselves have wanted to
maintain that their preferred logic is right, the rival logic wrong. Still, the
[S]uppose there really are two equally good accounts of deductive suggestion was famously made by Quine (1986: 81) that in a dispute
validity, K and K , that β follows from α according to K but not
1 2 1
between rival logicians “neither party knows what he is talking about”
K , and we know that α is true… It follows K -ly that β is true,
2 1
since they cease to talk about negation as soon as its core logical
but not K -ly. Should we, or should we not conclude that β is true?
2
properties are seriously questioned.
The answer seems clear: K trumps K [because] … K answers a
1 2 1
crucial question which K does not… [This] question is the central

2 Hjortland (2013) makes a useful distinction between two ways in which
question of logic. (Read 2006: 194–195) change of meaning might be thought to undermine the disagreement
between rival logics. With A-variance the meaning of “valid” differs
Versions of the objection can also be found in Priest (2006), Keefe (2014: between the two logics, leading to a disagreement about which arguments
1385), and Steinberger (2019). For pluralist responses, see Caret (2017), ought to be called “valid”. With B-variance, it is the meaning of logical
Russell (2017), Blake-Turner & Russell (2021) and Blake-Turner (2021). constants, like “¬” or “∨” that varies, so that the logics attribute (or fail to
Stei (2020b) argues that the problem can’t be resolved by rejecting the attribute) validity to different principles.
normativity of logic.
The result is allegedly that for two logical theories with the same
2.3 The Change-of-Meaning Objection formal language, say classical and intuitionistic logic, there is no
genuine conflict between validity attributions. In the case of (A)
A different question is whether pluralists are correct to take rival logicians because what is being attributed, i.e., validity, is not the same in
to be disagreeing. A classical logician accepts as a logical truth a principle the two theories. In the case of (B) because that to which validity is
which they write: being attributed, i.e., the argument, is not the same in the two
theories. (Hjortland 2013: 359)
A ∨ ¬A
while the strong Kleene logician rejects (as a logical truth) a principle The pluralist thus needs a way to exclude the possibility that each of their
which they write in the same way: preferred systems is correct, but that pluralism itself is nonetheless false,
because those logics don’t disagree about anything.
A ∨ ¬A
With respect to A-variance, case-based pluralists might choose to simply

But it only follows that they accept different logics if the symbols express
agree that the different correct logics capture different kinds of validity.
the same principle in both cases, and in particular, if “∨” and “¬” mean
They may well think that requiring that different incompatible logics were
the same in both.
correct was always too strong a requirement on pluralism. Their goal was
to show that they were different but not truly incompatible after all.

One variant of this approach takes “valid” to be a context-sensitive 2.4 The Metalogic Objection
expression, perhaps with a character (like a Kaplanian indexical) which
picks out different properties in different contexts. See, e.g., Caret (2017) Recent critics have raised the question of which logic a pluralist should
for a positive defence of contextualism and Stei (2020a) for a critical use for metalogic, i.e. for proving things or assessing arguments about
appraisal. logics, including in assessing arguments for pluralism itself. Suki Finn
(2021) argues that pluralism must be constrained on the grounds that the
Turning to the question of B-variance, one way for a pluralist to respond is metalogic must always contain both universal elimination and modus
by giving a theory of the meanings of the logical constants and then ponens. A new book by Griffiths and Paseau (2022: 50–55) argues that the
arguing on those grounds that the constants in two different systems mean pluralist can tell no coherent story about the metalogic at all.
the same thing. Proof theorists sometimes point to the introduction or
elimination rules for a logical constant as giving its meaning, and on these Presumably the arguments for logical pluralism presuppose some logic
grounds they argue that the same thing is meant by uses of it in two according to which certain argumentative moves are legitimate, others not.
different systems. There is a nice example of this in Haack’s Deviant But which logic is this?
Logic:
Griffiths and Paseau’s argument proceeds by cases. They survey a list of
But now consider Gentzen’s formulation of minimal logic, (L ): it
J answers a pluralist might give and argue that each is unsatisfactory. For
differs from classical logic, not in respect of the introduction and example, one option for the pluralist is to say that an argument for
elimination rules for the connectives, but in respect of the pluralism should be acceptable in every correct logic. But for pluralists
structural rules for deducibility; namely, it results from restricting who accept a very large number of logics (so-called eclectic pluralists),
the rules for classical logic, (L ), by disallowing multiple
K there will be too few shared principles to support interesting arguments,
consequents. Since this restriction involves no essential reference and so the metalogic will be too weak to establish anything very much.
to any connectives, it is hard to see how it could be explicable as
arising from from divergence of meaning of connectives. (Haack One might instead be a so-called modest pluralist and accept Beall and
1974: 10) Restall’s restrictions on what would count as a logic: necessity, formality,
and normativity. Such a modest pluralist could find themselves with a
Other authors take a more model-theoretic approach to connective- more restricted set of logics, and thus a larger set of shared principles,
meanings, perhaps arguing that shared (or overlapping) truth-conditions giving them a stronger metalogic on this approach. But Griffiths and
are sufficient for sameness of meaning. Stei (2020a) provides a useful Paseau argue that this overall position is under-motivated:
overview of the change-of-meaning issues as they threaten pluralism, and
the question is also engaged with in Beall & Restall (2001: §3), Hjortland [Beall and Restall’s] test for whether a feature should be
(2013), and Kouri Kissel (2021). considered settled is historical… If we look to the tradition of
writing about consequence we apparently find some features—
necessity, formality, and normativity—settled, and others—

axiomatizability, a priori knowability—unsettled. When we metalevel, making the argumentative step there, and then disquoting to get
consider the tradition, however, no such picture emerges. Rather, back to the object language.
we find a thoroughly unsettled picture that couldn’t possibly
motivate a modest variety of pluralism. It would certainly be hard The underlying issue is that the truth-values of sentences in the object
to argue that some feature is more part of the tradition than the idea language and metalanguage are not independent. The simplest relationship
of monism itself: so if anything is a settled feature, it’s the thought between them would be an unrestricted biconditional disquotation
that there is one correct logic. (2022: 51) principle:
A further option for the pluralist is to be to be a monist about the “P ” is true if and only if P
metalogic, though continuing to allow that other logics may be used when
Such principles are highly intuitive, though commonly restricted to avoid
we are not doing metalogic. Griffiths and Paseau argue that this position is
paradox. Yet even with the restrictions, a strong relationship between the
unstable. For suppose the pluralist accepts two logics, say LP and K3, as
truth-values of sentences in the object language and in the metalanguage
correct, but for the metalogic they accept only classical. Now we are
remains. And since validity concerns patterns of truth-preservation over
presented with an argument (in the object language) that uses modus
sentences, there is reason to suspect that the logic of the metalanguage
ponens:
can’t be completely independent from the logic of the object language.
P , P → Q ⊨ Q. Griffiths and Paseau (2022: 54) use the same strategy to dismiss the idea
that the metalogic for a pluralist might be an “arbitrary correct logic”,
This is valid in K3 but not in LP. So now what about this argument: since (as they put it) “the true metalogic must be in harmony with the true
object-level logics”.
“P ” is true.
“P → Q” is true. The final option that Griffiths and Paseau consider on behalf of the logical
“Q” is true. pluralist is that there might be an argument for each accepted logic without
there being a single argument which is valid according to all of those
Each premise states that one of the premises of the original instance of
logics. There might be different arguments, as long as for each logic, L,
modus ponens is true, and the conclusion states that the conclusion of the
the pluralist accepts there is at least one valid argument for pluralism.
L
instance of modus ponens is true. Unlike the original argument however,
Here the worry is again that the eclectic pluralist’s weakest logic is likely
this one employs only metalinguistic sentences, and we might expect it to
to be too weak to provide such an argument, and that the modest pluralist’s
be a place where the hypothetical strategy tells us to use classical logic—
restriction to a set of stronger logics is unmotivated.
the logic for the metalanguage—and hence that the current strand of
pluralism would infer that the conclusion—“Q” is true—is true. But if so,
why not just disquote and get Q? The metalogical monist seems to be able
to get around their weak logic in the object language by ascending to the

2.4.1 Breaking metalogical harmony This last step resembles the move that is sometimes called “classical
recapture”—something which is common among subclassical monists
Let’s consider what a logical pluralist might say in response to questions (see, e.g., Priest 2006: 198 and Rosenblatt 2022). For example, a monist
about the metalogic. Griffiths and Paseau have tendency to write as if the intuitionist motivated by constructivism in mathematics may think that it
only kinds of pluralist are (a) the eclectic, who embraces a plethora of is fine to use instances of the classical law of excluded middle when the
non-standard logics—perhaps out of a spirit of generous inclusivity—and topic is something other than infinite mental constructions. And a
(b) the modest, who has found any desire to be inclusive constrained by paraconsistent logician may think that it is fine to use instances of the
their loyalty to the history of logic, which insists on logics being classical principle EFQ when working in a language not rich enough to
necessary, formal, and normative. But a different, quite realistic, kind of formulate the paradoxes. Neither accepts the principles as logically valid
pluralist is motivated by a combination of different monists’ arguments, —on the grounds that they are not reliable in mathematics or when
along with a desire not to be stuck with too weak a logic. reasoning about the paradoxes. But that doesn’t mean that you can never
make use of their safer instances. In fact, the situations in which they fail
So suppose—for the sake of a concrete example—that deviant monist A might be quite esoteric and rarely encountered in everyday life.
argues that empty names make a sentence neither true nor false, and that
we should accept the gappy logic K3 as the only logic for this reason. By Though it is standard to refer to such work as “classical” recapture, it need
contrast, deviant monist B argues from the semantic paradoxes to the view not aim at recovering classical principles specifically; what is key is that it
that a sentence can be both true and false, and moreover that we should permits limited use of the principles from some stronger logic, and so here
accept the logic LP as the only logic on these grounds. Now consider we will refer to it as strength recapture, or sometimes just recapture for
someone who studies the views of both deviant monists A and B, and short.
agrees that empty names and the semantic paradoxes give rise to sentences
The pluralist response is slightly different: instead of saying that it is often
which are neither or both respectively. That person cannot be a K3-monist
fine to use invalid arguments (since they are often, though not universally,
(because of the semantic paradoxes) but nor can they be an LP-monist
truth-preserving) they relativise validity itself to the phenomena which
(because of the empty names). Rather, they have two choices: accept only
disrupt it. In our example, they say that: classical logic is valid on
the entailments shared by both logics—perhaps accepting the very weak
languages which lack empty names and without the resources to form
Logic of First Degree Entailment (FDE) or similar as the only logic—or
paradoxes; whereas on languages with empty names but no paradoxes, K3
instead relativise validity to the phenomena we are engaging with. Where
is valid (but LP and classical are not); on languages with no empty names
you have a language with no empty names: use LP. In the absence of
but resources for paradox, LP is valid (but K3 and classical are not); and
semantic paradoxes: use K3. Where both are in the offing, you are stuck
on the richest languages with both empty names and the resources for
with FDE. But when working in languages which have neither empty
paradox, FDE (but not LP, K3 or classical) is valid. Here the pluralist’s
names nor the resources to formulate the semantic paradoxes, go ahead
motivation is not generous inclusiveness. Rather, they have been driven to
and use the full-resources of classical logic.

their pluralism by the deviant monists’ arguments and by the desire to but if our object language contained them, and our metalanguage
avoid being stuck with a logic that is too weak to be useful. contained our object language, then our metalanguage would have those
resources too). But even if we assume that this feature of Tarski’s
What should this logical pluralist say about the metalogic? Absent new hierarchy holds generally—that is, that every metalanguage is at least as
reasons to adopt a weaker logic, they can at least allow the use of FDE, expressive as its object language—it might be that the part of the
but even given their fairly modest pluralism, this leaves them with rather a metalanguage we require for a certain proof, or a certain argument
weak logic. There would be no modus ponens or law of excluded middle, requires only a fragment (a sublanguage, as it were) of the metalanguage,
no disjunctive syllogism or EFQ. All those things can be quite useful for and this sublanguage might not contain empty names or paradoxical
proving things and giving arguments. So it would be nice to have sentences. We can formulate a language for talking about a language
something stronger. which contains empty names, where the (meta)language names all refer.
For instance, all the terms in the metalanguage might be quotation names
And the natural question for this kind of pluralist to ask is: is there any
for expressions in the object language, and hence the metalanguage would
danger of semantic paradoxes, or of empty names, in the language in
have no empty names itself. Or the object language might have truth-
which they are doing their metatheoretical work? If there are no empty
predicates which apply to its own expressions, though the part of the
names, then they would seem to be free to use LP, and if there are no
metalanguage that we need for showing that this results in
semantic paradoxes, then they would seem to be free to use K3. And if
counterexamples to EFQ does not.
neither, then they would seem to be all the way back to using classical
logic for their metatheory—even though they are a logical pluralist For this kind of pluralist, it is quite natural for the logic of the object
overall. language and the logic of the metalanguage to come apart in a principled
way. It is also quite natural for them to maintain that they in fact continue
In the tradition that runs through Tarski’s (1944) “Semantic Conception of
to be a pluralist at the level of the metalanguage. For what is the logic of
Truth” we usually expect a metalanguage to be at least as rich as its object
the metalanguage? Well, for the fragment of the language that contains no
language (and the metametalanguage at least as rich as the metalanguage
empty names and insufficient resources for paradox, it’s classical logic.
and so on up the hierarchy). Tarski’s metalanguage, for example, contains
And for the fragment that contains empty names but no resources for
all the expressions from the object language, as well as names for all those
paradox it is K3. And for the fragment that contains resources for paradox
expressions, logical vocabulary, and a truth-predicate, all of which allow
without empty names, it is LP. And for the metalanguage as a whole it is
us to express instances of Tarski’s disquotation schema, such as: “Snow is
FDE. Pluralism about the logic of the object language, and pluralism about
white” is true if and only if snow is white.
the metalogic as well.
If our metalanguage continued that Tarskian tradition, then it would
contain empty names if the object language contained empty names, and
the resources for constructing paradoxes if the object language contained
those (of course, Tarski’s object language does not contain those resources

3. Logical Nihilism But it’s important to realise that the nihilist has no need to reject this
simple instance of modus ponens. Their view is that modus ponens is not a
The pluralist’s response to the generality objection has generated interest law of logic, which would require that every instance of the argument form
in a related view: logical nihilism—the view that there is no correct logic modus ponens is truth-preserving. That’s a much stronger and more
(Russell 2017, 2018a,b; Cotnoir 2018; see also predecessors in Estrada- general claim. Like other proponents of weaker logics, the nihilist can
Gonzáles 2012 and Mortensen 1989). Nihilism fits naturally into the reject the validity of a putative law based on some quite rare and unusual
spectrum that includes monism (exactly one correct logic) and pluralism cases, and then—following the intuitionists and dialetheists discussed in
(more than one correct logic). As with monism and pluralism, what the section on breaking metalogical harmony above—engage in a project
nihilism amounts to will depend on what counts as a logic, and what it of strength recapture that allows them to employ the principles of a
takes for one to be correct. stronger logic in circumstances where the esoteric counterexamples don’t
threaten. The nihilist thinks that arguments needn’t be logically valid to be
On the version most relevant here, the nihilist holds that the set of correct good—in part because the requirement of logical validity is so strong.
logical principles of the form Γ ⊨ A is empty, so that there are no laws of
logic (see Russell [2018a: 309–11] for a nihilism-focused discussion of the A second reason people sometimes think that nihilism deserves no further
form taken by laws of logic). thought is that they regard it as self-defeating. After all, people sometimes
say, if the nihilist were right, there would be no good arguments. Nihilism
In the next subsection, we will look at one argument for logical nihilism, therefore undermines any argument for itself, and so there is no need to
but before doing that, we should address the fact that many people’s initial consider arguments for it.
reaction to nihilism is that there is no point in considering arguments for it,
because the view is manifestly absurd, or because it is somehow self- But, as we have already seen, a nihilist needn’t think that there are no
defeating. good arguments, only that there are no logically valid arguments. This
leaves open three kinds of argument that a nihilist can employ. First, an
People sometimes think that nihilism is absurd because it appears to argument might be useful merely because it is valid according to their
conflict with obvious truths about logic, things that students learn when opponents; that at least permits an argument for nihilism that the
they are first introduced to the subject. For example, it might be suggested opponents should accept by their own lights. Second, there can be good
that the following simple argument is just obviously truth-preserving and arguments which don’t even pretend to be logically valid; perhaps they
hence any view on which this is not the case is not worth further employ inference to the best explanation instead. Anti-exceptionalists, for
consideration: example, often expect the correct logic to be justified abductively, and so
would not expect the argument for the correct logic to be a logically valid
If snow is white, then grass is green.
one (Hjortland 2017). And third—and most crucially for understanding the
Snow is white.
nihilist’s position—the argument form employed might be not be truth-
Grass is green.

preserving over all cases (and so not logically valid) but still be truth- (ID) A ⊨ A
preserving in the case under consideration.

For a pluralist employing the argument as a reductio, it doesn’t really
With these preliminaries out of the way, we examine one argument for matter whether P2 is true, or only very nearly true; either is sufficiently
logical nihilism. absurd or unattractive (on their view) for the reductio to function.
3.1 Logical Nihilism via the Generality Objection But if we want to argue that nihilism is literally true, we need to argue for
the truth of P2. So why think that for any set of premises, Γ, and
The pluralist, as we explained in §2.1.1, can use a reductio to respond to conclusion, A, there is always some case in which the premises are true
the Generality Objection: if we insist (with the monist) that complete but the conclusion is not?
generality is a constraint on being a logical law, then it will turn out that
One argument notes that we can think of cases as interpretations for the
there are no logical laws, and that—the argument assumes—is absurd. So
non-logical expressions of the language, and that the ones permitted by
we should reject complete generality. But the nihilist thinks this is too fast.
classical logic are quite constraining and idealised: there are no empty
Why couldn’t nihilism be true? Then the pluralist’s reductio could be
names, indeterminate or overdeterminate predicates, sentences that take
repurposed as a positive argument for the view:
multiple or no truth-values, or ways to model context-sensitive
(P1) A principle of the form Γ ⊨ A is logically valid iff A is true in all expressions. Natural language might be thought to contain expressions
cases in which each γ ∈ Γ is true. which have all these different kinds of interpretation, so that some
(P2) Every principle of the form Γ ⊨ A is such that there are some cases arguments expressible in natural language are not well modelled by
where A is not true but each γ ∈ Γ is true. classical logic. Once we start enriching logical languages to include these
(C) No principle of the form Γ ⊨ A is logically valid. “non-ideal” kinds of expression, the logic has a tendency to weaken
(though the details depend on one’s substantive philosophical views).
This naturally draws attention to P2. Why think that all putative logical
laws fail in some cases? The pluralist didn’t need to worry too much about To take a few examples, some people think that natural languages contain
P2. As we saw in section §2.1.1, their embrace of multiple rival logics empty names, that sentences with empty names are neither true nor false,
tends to lead to a view on which counterexamples to logical principles are that the truth-values of complex sentences containing subsentences which
relatively common and so the insistence on P1 leads quickly to either are neither true nor false are determined according to the Strong Kleene
logical nihilism, or at least a logic that is too weak to be the One True tables, and as a result that no form is true on every interpretation: atomic
Logic (what we might call logical minimalism). In fact, it’s common for sentences, like F a are always neither when the term is interpreted as
pluralists rehearsing the argument to first suggest it leads to nihilism as a empty, and any compound sentence constructed from such an atomic
sort of rhetorical hyperbole, and then back off to a logic that is merely sentence (including F a ∨ ¬F a) is neither too. Hence there are
unappealingly weak: perhaps the only law is identity, interpretations on which the law of excluded middle (LEM: A ∨ ¬A) fails
to be true (because it is neither) and so LEM is not logically valid. On

some views vagueness and future-contingents can also give rise to P REM
sentences that don’t have one of the classical truth-values. Some hold that P REM
the universality of natural languages allows the expression of sentences

The nihilist argues that once we have seen ∧-introduction and ID fall to
(like the Liar) that are both truth and false, and from here we can
these kinds of non-standard interpretation, it is plausible that no entailment
implement the truth-table for LP (taking true and both as designated
will hold quite generally.
values) to get a logic in which EFQ, modus ponens, and disjunctive
syllogism all fail. Still, it can be hard to see on these familiar grounds
3.2 Responses to Logical Nihilism
alone how some of the safest logical laws, things like ∧-introduction or
ID, fail:
Despite its recent provenance, there are already several interesting
A responses to logical nihilism. Dicher (2021) raises the question of whether
B PREM and SOLO should be treated as logical constants, rather than as
A ∧ B
non-logical expressions. He points out that if they were, their inclusion in
a language would instead give us new kinds of valid argument, such as:
A
A A
¬P REM
One move the nihilist can make here is to exploit context-sensitive
expressions whose extension varies with syntactic context (see Russell or
(2017; 2018a) for a more formal presentation). If we have a sentence
SOLO
SOLO which is true any time it appears as an atomic sentence but false
¬SOLO
when embedded in more complex constructions, then the following
instance of ∧-introduction will take us from true premises to a false (See also Russell (2018a: fn. 15) for related discussion of ⊤, ⊥ and logical
conclusion: minimalism.) Fjellstad (2021) argues that PREM can have a place in non-
nihilist logics. Haze (2022) argues that the counterexamples using PREM
SOLO
and SOLO commit a version of the fallacy of equivocation and hence are
B
not really instances of ID and ∧-introduction respectively. And N. Wyatt
SOLO ∧ B
and Payette (2021) reject P1 of the argument from generality in order to
Similarly, if we have an atomic sentence PREM whose truth-value is true endorse a view they call logical particularism (see also Payette and Wyatt
when it features in the premises of an argument, but false when it appears (2018) as well as the last section of Russell (2018a), which proposes a
in the conclusion, then the following instance of ID will take us from a constraint on logical generality based on Lakatos’s idea of lemma
true premise to a conclusion which is not true: incorporation).

4. Logical Pluralism via Linguistic Pluralism examining them, but tolerant in permitting linguistic forms.
(Carnap 1950 [1958: 221], emphasis in original)
The contemporary debate over case-based logical pluralism has lead to a
revival of interest in an older form of pluralism advocated by the famous The second kind of tolerance is a tolerance for different logics, something
logical positivist, Rudolf Carnap (1937: §17; 1950 [1958]; see also Restall that is naturally construed as a kind of logical pluralism. The phrase
2002; Cook 2010; Field 2009; Kouri Kissel 2019; Varzi 2002; Eklund “everyone is at liberty to build his own logic” suggests that no-one would
2012). be making a mistake in so doing. And it seems clear from the phrase that
immediately follows—“i.e., his own language”—that Carnap takes the
4.1 The Principle of Tolerance two kinds of toleration to be extremely close, perhaps he even thinks that
linguistic tolerance and logical tolerance amount to the same thing.
In §17 of The Logical Syntax of Language, Carnap writes:
It might not be obvious to a modern reader why that is the case. Why
In logic there are no morals. Everyone is at liberty to build his own could we not be tolerant of alternative languages, which seems only
logic, i.e. his own language, as he wishes. All that is required of sensible, without thereby committing ourselves to being tolerant of
him is that, if he wishes to discuss it, he must state his methods alternative logics? Moreover, logicians who disagree about which
clearly, and give syntactical rules instead of philosophical sentential logic is correct (e.g., classical or intuitionist) seem to be able to
arguments. (Carnap 1937: §17) use the same language (containing ∧, →, ¬, etc.) even while they suppose
that one logic is right for that language, and one logic wrong. If that
Two kinds of tolerance are expressed in this passage. The more famous is position is coherent, then one side must have made a mistake after all,
Carnap’s tolerance for different languages, and it is motivated both by the implying they were not really “at liberty to build their own logic”.
thought that verbal disputes are not really theoretical disputes about the
domain we are describing. At best they are practical disputes about the That view seems at least an open possibility, though whether two rival
most useful and efficient ways to use words, given our goals, and by the logicians are really advocating different logics for the same language can
thought that such practical matters are best left to those working in the be difficult to determine. It will not be sufficient that they are using the
relevant field. As Carnap wrote later, same symbols, since they might each be using the symbols with different
meanings in which case they will be using different languages. But what
Let us grant to those who work in any special fields of more, beyond using the same expressions, is required?
investigation the freedom to use any form of expression which
seems useful to them. The work in the field will sooner or later This is a question to which there are many rival answers, even for the most
lead to the elimination of those forms which have no useful basic logical constants. Perhaps the expressions must denote the same
function. Let us be cautious in making assertions and critical in truth-function, or have the same intension, or share a mode of
presentation, or a character, or a conceptual role. But The Logical Syntax
of Language was published (in German) in 1934, before the innovations of

Grice, Gentzen, Montague, Kaplan, Lewis, Putnam or Kripke, (and, One of Carnap’s reasons for accepting logical pluralism is that he saw it as
moreover before Tarski’s (1936 [1956]) “On the Concept of Logical making space for innovation in logic. In the foreword to The Logical
Consequence” (Schurz 1999)) and in an environment in which Syntax of Language he writes:
Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus was a powerful influence.
Carnap has quite definite and explicit ideas about both meaning and logic, Up to the present, there has been only a very slight deviation, in a
and these help to explain why he thinks linguistic tolerance leads straight few points here and there, from the form of language developed by
to logical tolerance. In the foreword to The Logical Syntax of Language he Russell which has already become classical. For instance, certain
writes: sentential forms (such as unlimited existential sentences) and rules
of inference (such as the law of excluded middle), have been
Up to now, in constructing a language, the procedure has usually eliminated by certain authors. On the other hand, a number of
been, first to assign a meaning to the fundamental mathematico- extensions have been attempted, and several interesting, many-
logical symbols, and then to consider what sentences and valued calculi analogous to the two-valued calculus of sentences
inferences are seen to be logically correct in accordance with this have been evolved, and have resulted finally in a logic of
meaning. Since the assignment of the meaning is expressed in probability. Likewise, so-called intensional sentences have been
words, and is, in consequence, inexact, no conclusion arrived at in introduced and, with their aid a logic of modality developed. The
this way can very well be otherwise than inexact and ambiguous. fact that no attempts have been made to venture still further from
The connection will only become clear when approached from the the classical forms is perhaps due to the widely held opinion that
opposite direction: let any postulates and any rules of inference be any such deviations must be justified—that is, the new language-
chosen arbitrarily; then this choice, whatever it may be, will form must be proved to be “correct” and to constitute a faithful
determine what meaning is to be assigned to the fundamental rendering of “the true logic”.
logical symbols. (Carnap 1937: xv)
To eliminate this standpoint, together with the pseudo-problems
According to Carnap then, the right way to specify a language is to pick and wearisome controversies with arise as a result of it, is one of
some expressions, and then give the rules of inference for them. It is this the chief tasks of this book. (Carnap 1937: xiv–xv)
specification which gives the expressions their meanings, and so, first,
there is no question of their being the wrong rules for the expressions— This passage highlights several features of Carnap’s logical pluralism and
everybody is at liberty to build his own logic, to choose whatever rules he philosophy of logic more generally. It seems clear that he intended his
likes—and second, to be tolerant about language choice is already to be logical pluralism to be both “horizontal”—that is, to allow for different
tolerant about choice of logic—for languages so-conceived come with logics at the same level, such as classical and intuitionist sentential logics
different logics already “built in”. —as well as “vertical”—allowing for logics for new kinds of expression,
such as intensional logics and second-order logic (the terminology is from
Eklund 2012). Furthermore the passage expresses a “logic-first” approach,

and rejects a “philosophy-first” approach, suggesting that rather than Carnap would perhaps not have taken this objection seriously, since, like
trying to figure out which is the best logic a priori from first principles the Wittgenstein of the Tractatus (e.g., §§4.26, 4.461–4.465), he does not
(the “philosophy-first” approach), we should let logicians develop believe that logical truths and rules are “out there”, waiting to be
languages as they like, and then make our judgements based on how discovered:
things turn out.
The so-called “real” sentences, constitute the core of the science;
The most obvious contrast here is with W. V. O. Quine, who criticised the mathematico-logical sentences are analytic, with no real
second-order logic as “set-theory in sheep’s clothing” and rejected tense content, and are merely formal auxiliaries. (Carnap 1937: xiv)
and modal logics on philosophical grounds (Quine 1986: ch. 5; 1953a;
1953b [1966]; Burgess 1997; 2009). Such a stand-off is quite intriguing, Nonetheless, such a “conventionalist” view of logical truth (and along
given Quine’s rejection of such “philosophy-first” approaches in with it, analytic truth) has been argued against by, for example, Quine,
epistemology more generally. Yablo, Boghossian, and Sober, and it no longer enjoys the popularity that
it had in Carnap’s time (Quine 1936; Yablo 1992; Boghossian 1996; Sober
4.2 Issues for Carnap’s Pluralism 2000). It also highlights the extent to which it is odd to call Carnap a
logical pluralist, since in a way his view is not that there is more than one
A number of contemporary writers have been happy to endorse Carnap’s correct logic, but that there is nothing for logic to be correct about (Cook
approach to pluralism (see, e.g., Varzi 2002: 199), and Restall argues that 2010: 498). Perhaps it would be more illuminating to call Carnap a logical
it is less radical than his and JC Beall’s case-based version (Restall 2002). constructivist.
Nonetheless there are several issues that someone who wanted to defend
Another issue is whether Carnap’s conception of meaning is correct. These
Carnap’s position today would need to address. A first concern about the
days there are many alternative approaches to meaning and lively debate
view is that while we are working within the various languages we invent,
about them. Field writes:
we could be missing the “correct” rules—the ones that were out there, in
effect, before we invented anything. In the words of Paul Boghossian, On some readings of “differ in meaning”, any big difference in
theory generates a difference in meaning. On such readings, the
Are we really to suppose that, prior to our stipulating a meaning
connectives do indeed differ in meaning between advocates of the
for the sentence “Either snow is white or it isn’t” it wasn’t the case
different all-purpose logics, just as “electron” differs in meaning
that either snow was white or it wasn’t? Isn’t it overwhelmingly
between Thomson’s theory and Rutherford’s; but Rutherford’s
obvious that this claim was true before such an act of meaning, and
theory disagrees with Thomson’s despite this difference in
that it would have been true even if no one had thought about it, or
meaning, and it is unclear why we shouldn’t say the same thing
chosen it to be expressed by one of our sentences? (Boghossian
about alternative all-purpose logics. (Field 2009: 345)
1996: 365, emphasis in original)

Field concludes that “the notion of difference of meaning is unhelpful in different feature—e.g., precisifications of “case” (for Beall and Restall),
the context” and that Carnap’s view of the meanings of the logical sets of logical constants (for Varzi), kinds of truth-bearer (for Russell),
contexts is therefore hard to defend. goals (for Cook’s less radical approach), and epistemic norms (for
Field’s).[6]
But proponents of particular alternative views about the meanings of the
logical constants might instead hold that they can make good sense of Occasionally it is objected that one or more of these views does not
difference in meaning in these contexts, and that Carnap has simply constitute a “real” logical pluralism, on the grounds that it merely
endorsed the wrong theory of meaning and as a result drawn the wrong relativises consequence to some new parameter, and (the objection
conclusions for logic. One specific issue that they might point to is continues) this would make the view a form of relativism, rather than a
associated with Prior’s 1960 paper “The Runabout Inference Ticket”, in form of pluralism.[7] We take up the question of what makes for a “real”
which he provides rules for a new connective, tonk. The connective or substantive logical pluralism in more fully in §6. But it is worth
quickly leads to triviality, suggesting that Prior was not quite “at liberty to remembering that not just some but most of the views standardly discussed
build his own logic” by introducing rules for his expressions. under the heading of logical pluralism—including the most central case-
based versions—can be understood as relativising logical consequence to
Another issue is the fact that one can generate different logics, not by something distinctive. They are standardly described as logical pluralisms
varying the rules governing any particular expression, but rather by anyway, presumably because they are views on which it can reasonably be
varying the more general structural rules of the logic, which govern things claimed that more than one logic is correct. The literature is thus easier to
like whether or not one is allowed multiple conclusions, and whether or follow if one doesn’t assume that the words “pluralism” and “relativism”
not a premise can be used more than once in a proof (Restall 2000; Paoli mark an important or widely agreed-upon distinction (S. Shapiro 2014: 1).
2003). This suggests that even if the meanings of the logical expressions
are governed by the rules that tell you how they can be used in proofs (as 5.1 Pluralism Regarding the Set of Logical Constants
Carnap suggests) two logics can agree on those rules, whilst disagreeing
on the relation of logical consequence. Hence even if you have Achille Varzi (2002) points out that one way to generate competing
successfully chosen a language, it seems that you might not yet have relations of logical consequence is to vary the set of expressions that we
determined a logic. treat as logical constants. If we take “=” to be a logical constant, then the
following argument will be valid:
5. Further Kinds of Logical Pluralism
Fa
Several other varieties of logical pluralism have been proposed since Beall a = b
and Restall’s early work, and five are outlined in this section. A useful Fb
way to classify these different views—including Beall and Restall’s case-

But if the set of logical constants does not include “=” then it will not be
based pluralism—is as each taking logical consequence to be relative to a
valid, since our models will now include those that assign non-reflexive

relations to “=”, and these can generate counter-examples. 5.2 Pluralism About the Objects of Logical Consequence
Should “=” be treated as a logical constant? Tarski himself endorsed the Another variety of logical pluralism results if we consider that there might
view that any expression in the language might be taken to be logical: be different correct logics for different kinds of truth-bearer, as is argued
in Russell (2008). Suppose that logical consequence is indeed a matter of
The division of all terms of the language discussed into logical and
truth-preservation over cases. Then we could coherently talk of truth-
extra-logical… is certainly not quite arbitrary. If, for example, we
preservation relations on (sets of) sentences, on (sets of) propositions, or
were to include among the extra-logical signs the implication sign,
on (sets of) characters (as in Kaplan 1989), and ultimately on any truth-
or the universal quantifier, then our definition of the concept of
bearer whatsoever. This would not be very exciting if those logics all
consequence would lead to results which obviously contradict
turned out to determine a single “parallel” consequence relation, so that,
ordinary usage. On the other hand no objective grounds are known
for example, a sentence, S , had a sentence, S , as a logical consequence if
1 2
to me which permit us to draw a sharp boundary between the two
and only if the proposition S expressed (namely, P ) had the proposition
1 1
groups of terms. It seems to me possible to include among the
expressed by S (namely, P ) as a logical consequence. Russell uses
2 2
logical terms some which are usually regarded by logicians as
various examples involving names, rigidity, direct reference, and
extra-logical without running into consequences which stand in
indexicals to argue that this is not always the case. To take just one, on the
sharp contrast to ordinary usage… In the extreme case we could
assumption that the sentence a = b contains two different, directly
regard all terms of the language as logical. (Tarski 1936 [1956:
referential names, a = b and a = a express the same proposition. Given
418–419])
the minimal assumption that the relation of logical consequence is
Varzi is inclined to endorse Tarski’s liberalism with respect to the choice reflexive, that means that proposition expressed by a = b is a logical
of logical constants: consequence of the proposition expressed by a = a, even though the
sentence a = b is not a logical consequence of the sentence a = a. Hence
The relevant claim is that all (or any) terms of the language could the relation of logical consequence on sentences is interestingly different
in principle be regarded “as logical”—and I agree with that. (Varzi from that of the relation of logical consequence on propositions, and there
2002: 200) are at least two different, correct relations of logical consequence.
The result is that on his view there is more than one correct relation of
5.3 Pluralism about Modelling
logical consequence, since that relation is relative to the choice of logical
constants, and there is more than one equally correct set of these, resulting Shapiro and Cook have suggested that the job of a formal logic is to model
in different, equally correct logics. a natural language (S. Shapiro 2006, 2014; Cook 2010). Since models are
simplified structures intended to exhibit some but not all of the features of
The Tarksi/Varzi view is controversial. Varzi defends it in his paper of
the phenomenon being modelled, there may be several rival models of the
2002 and there is useful discussion in the entry on logical constants.

same language, each capturing different aspects of that language. As pluralism about epistemic normativity. Field holds that there are many
Shapiro writes: possible epistemic norms, and that we might think of agents as endorsing
one, or—more likely—different norms at different times, and as having
…with mathematical models generally, there is typically no views about how good different possible epistemic norms are. We use
question of “getting it exactly right”. For a given purpose, there these epistemic norms to evaluate themselves, and other norms (think of
may be bad models—models that are clearly incorrect—and there using numerical induction to evaluate both induction and counter-
may be good models, but it is unlikely that one can speak of one induction). Some norms do well by their own lights, in which case we feel
and only one correct model. (S. Shapiro 2006: 49–50, emphasis in no tension. Some do badly even by their own lights, in which case we feel
original) pressure to change them. There’s no sense, on Field’s view, in regarding
any of these norms as correct or incorrect, but he does think that it makes
This sounds like it might support a species of logical nihilism—a view on
sense to call them better or worse, so long as we recognize that these
which there is no correct logic (see §3)—but Cook prefers to think of it as
evaluations are relative to our epistemic goals. Still, though this makes
offering two different kinds of pluralism. The first, less controversial, kind
norms criticizable and evaluable, it doesn’t mean that there will be a
holds that which logic is the correct one is relative to one’s goal. If one
uniquely best norm.
wants to study vagueness, the correct logic might be one that allows for
intermediate truth-values, whereas if one wants to study identity, perhaps For instance, there might be a sequence of better and better norms
first-order classical logic with identity is to be preferred. Since the correct for achieving the goals; in addition, there might be ties and/or
model is goal-relative, so is the correct logic. incomparabilities “arbitrarily far up”. (Field 2009: 355)
But Cook wonders whether his and Shapiro’s logic-as-modelling view Hence we have an epistemic normative pluralism.
could also support a more radical pluralism, since it seems possible that
even relative to a specific purpose, there could be two rival logics, each Similarly, we can use our epistemic norms—including deductive logics—
clearly better than all the rest relative to that purpose, yet neither of which to evaluate how well various deductive logics perform in achieving
is better than the other. Under such circumstances Cook thinks we might epistemic goals we have, e.g., resolving the semantic paradoxes. And
want to say that both are correct, and hence that there is more than one again
correct logic. However one could also hold that in such circumstances
there are two equally good logics, neither of which counts as correct. …it isn’t obvious that there need be a uniquely best logic for a
given goal, much less that we should think of one logic as
5.4 Pluralism about Epistemic Normativity “uniquely correct” in some goal independent sense. (Field 2009:
356)
Hartry Field proposes another kind of logical pluralism (Field 2009). The
The result then, is a kind of logical pluralism: logics are better or worse
view rests on the thesis that logic is normative (see §2.2) along with a
relative to different goals, but even relative to a particular goal, it might

be that no single logic is the unique best one. The emphasis, however, should be on the fact that these are
instances of classical principles. The mathematical proofs do not
5.5 Pluralism by Restriction rely on any of these principles being unrestricted generalisations of
the form that Williamson defends. They do at most rely on the
Finally, Hjortland explores another kind of logical pluralism in defending principles holding restrictedly for mathematical discourse, which
sub-classical logics from Williamson’s abductive argument that classical does not entail that the principles of reasoning hold universally. Put
logic is the One True Logic (Hjortland 2017: 652–657; Williamson 2017; differently, mathematical practice is consistent with these
see Blake-Turner 2020 and L. Shapiro 2022 for discussion). Consider the reasoning steps being instances of mathematical principles of
claim that the ubiquitous use of classical logic (rather than other weaker reasoning, not generalisable to all other discourses. A fortiori, they
logics) in mathematics is a strong point in its favour. If we had to give up may very well be principles of reasoning that are permissible for
classical logic, we might be worried about losing a lot of elegant, simple mathematics, but not for theorizing about truth. (Hjortland 2017:
and otherwise virtuous mathematical theories. But preserving virtuous 652–653)
theories, and letting go of ad hoc and otherwise vicious theories, is what
the abductive approach in logic is all about. That leaves space for a kind of pluralism that holds that some of the
stronger logical principles are correct only when they are restricted to
However, the move from the importance of classical logic in mathematics particular kinds of linguistic expression (such as those that feature in the
to the truth of classical logic is much too fast. It is one thing to say that language of Peano Arithmetic); if we don’t restrict them in this way, there
classical logic, including say, instances of the principles of Double will be counterexamples. Other logical principles (perhaps conjunction
Negation Elimination (DNE) and Disjunctive Syllogism (DS), are widely elimination is on this list) do not need to be restricted to the language of
used in mathematics. But mathematics does not require any principles Peano Arithmetic. This leaves us with a sense in which we have different
with the full strength and generality of classical logic’s DNE and DS—it correct logics, depending on which language we are assuming.
only uses some of the instances of those principles, the instances that
employ mathematical language. When we say that DNE and DS are 6. What’s at Stake in the Debate about Logical
logically valid we are saying that they are valid no matter what Pluralism?
expressions we substitute for the non-logical expressions in them—
including extra-mathematical vague predicates like “heap” or “red”, and We’ve seen that there’s a vibrant debate about logical pluralism. But there
notoriously troublesome metalinguistic predicates like “true” and is also an undercurrent of skepticism about whether the debate is worth
“heterological”. having. Such suspicion has long been deployed by monists to criticise
pluralists of various kinds: if that’s what pluralism is, then it’s true, but
Mathematical proofs do contain an abundance of instances of
uninteresting (Goddu 2002: 222–6; Priest 2006: ch. 12; see also Stei
classical principles: applications of classical reductio ad absurdum,
2020a). But more recently it’s been pointed out that it is incumbent on the
conditional proof, disjunctive syllogism, the law of absorption, etc.
monist no less than the pluralist to answer the question of what’s at stake

in the debate about how many logics are correct (Eklund 2020; Clarke- concreteness’s sake. Then the semantic version of domain-neutral
Doane manuscript [Other Internet Resources]). In this final section, we pluralism holds that—even keeping fixed the domain—“valid” has
tackle some of these issues, which have been implicit in the preceding different referents, or admits of different precisifications, all of which are
discussion. correct. Even setting aside the worries about background commitments in
philosophy of language canvased in §1.1, the onus on the pluralist is to
Any pluralism that relativises logics to different domains (§5.3) or explain why the claim of semantic indeterminacy is a philosophically,
otherwise restricts pluralism to different areas of discourse (§5.5) needs to rather than merely a linguistically, substantive thesis. The worry is that the
explain how it conflicts with monism. A monist can agree that, given monism-pluralism debate is about how many (and which) logics are
background assumptions about a domain, it may be appropriate to deploy correct, not how many are picked out by our terms. So even if “valid”
a different logic than the one they endorse. As we’ve seen (§2.4.1), the does admit of different precifisications, as Beall and Restall suggest, the
subclassical monist allows strength recapture in the right domain. For pluralist needs further argument to get the conclusion that the different
instance, a proponent of LP can allow that, when reasoning about a referents of “valid” are correct logics. Otherwise the monist can object
consistent domain, one can use classical logic, rather than a paraconsistent that, if “valid” in English is indeterminate or ambiguous, so much the
logic. So what is it about domain-relative pluralism that makes it different worse for English. There is only one correct logic, even if speakers of
from monism? One strategy is to appeal to the practices of those working English don’t always manage to pick it out. To meet this objection,
in the relevant domains. Stewart Shapiro (2014: ch. 3), for instance, domain-neutral pluralists are often better understood as offering a telic
derives a pluralism from the practices of mathematicians working in areas version of pluralism (see Eklund 2020: 440–443 for discussion).
that deploy nonclassical logics, such as Smooth Infinitesimal Analysis.
Shapiro’s argument depends on controversial assumptions in the The telic version of domain-neutral pluralism consists in two claims. First,
philosophy of mathematics, but perhaps it can be made independently of there is at least one telos or goal that a logic must meet in order to be
such commitments (Caret 2021). Even so, the challenge remains of correct. Second, more than one logic meets that goal or goals. The second
defending the pluralist’s interpretation of the data over the monist’s. Why claim might be held either because there is a single telos and more than
think that there really are two different correct logics rather than that for one logic meets it, or because there is more than one goal that multiple
the purposes of, say, doing Smooth Infinitesimal Analysis, it’s useful to logics meet. Field’s (2009) pluralism about epistemic normativity (§5.4) is
reason according to an intuitionist logic, rather than classical logic? an explicit version of telic pluralism. But even Case-Based Logical
Pluralism, which is officially about the unsettledness of various terms,
Perhaps a domain-neutral pluralism, such as Beall and Restall’s Case- might be better interpreted as telic pluralism. This is in part because of the
Based Logical Pluralism (§1), which holds that different logics are correct concerns of the previous paragraph, about imbuing semantic versions of
of the very same domain, is a more promising candidate for a substantive pluralism with substantive content. But case-based pluralists themselves
thesis. There are at least two versions of such a pluralism: semantic and sometimes write as if they’re more interested in a telic project. For
telic.[8] The semantic version has it that some logical term or concept is instance, in responding to a version of the normativity objection (§2.2),
unsettled, vague, or ambiguous. Let’s take it to be the term “valid” for

Beall & Restall (2006: 94–97) suggest that the goal of a correct logic is to there is more than one correct logic might best be interpreted about how
preserve epistemic entitlement or warrant. we should use some of the terms in the disagreement, such as “valid”.
Kouri Kissel (2021) deploys this strategy to argue that domain-relative
Regardless of how particular authors understand their construals of pluralism can allow for substantive disagreement across domains. Perhaps
pluralism, telic interpretations of logical pluralism seem to deliver the broader debate about logical pluralism can also be understood in this
philosophically substantive and interesting theses, not least because many way.
monists agree that there is a goal that a logic must meet in order to be
correct. (Let’s suppose that there is only one such goal, to keep things A final word on monism. One might think that the monist can avoid these
tractable.) Priest (2006: 196), for instance, takes the goal of logic to be vexed issues about what it is for a logic to be correct by just denying
providing an analysis of reasoning and argues that only a paraconsistent pluralism and claiming that it is not the case that there is more than one
logic best meets that goal. So it looks like we have substantive room for correct logic.
disagreement: there’s some goal that a logic must meet to be correct; the
pluralist claims that more than one logic does that equally well, the monist But this won’t do, for two reasons. First, the monist will need to say which
that only one logic best meets the goal. A problem arises if we have logic is correct. That will involve similar issues to those raised above. If
pluralism about what it is for logic to meet a goal, however (see Clarke- the claim that a certain logic is correct is given a semantic interpretation,
Doane manuscript: 17–19 [Other Internet Resources], for a similar then the philosophical upshot of that needs drawing out. If the monist’s
argument in a slightly different context). A monist who endorses only claim is given a telic interpretation, then there will need to be careful
classical logic might agree that intuitionist logic best meets the goal of articulation of, and agreement about, both what the goal of logic is and
I
logic, where meeting the goal of logic takes into account considerations also of what it would be for a logic to best meet that goal.
I
that motivate truth-value gaps. But the classical monist might nonetheless
Second, denying that there is more than one correct logic is compatible
insist that the correct logic must meet the goal of logic in some other
with both logical monism (there is one and only one correct logic) and
sense.
logical nihilism (there are no correct logics).[9] In order to be
So the challenge is to articulate the monism-pluralism debate in a way that distinguished from nihilism, monism needs to be interpreted in a way that
is substantive. There are several ways this might be done. Perhaps, after is philosophically substantive. That will require the monist to say what it
getting clearer about what it takes to meet the goal of logic, the telic is for a logic to be correct in a way that the nihilist will disagree with. For
pluralist and the monist will find some common ground from which to instance, the nihilist might grant that some logic is best suited for a given
conduct their debate. Or perhaps we can interpret disagreements between purpose, like analysing certain kinds of electrical circuit, but deny that that
pluralists and monists as involving metalinguistic negotiation. Very suffices for the logic’s being correct. Or the nihilist might allow strength
roughly, a disagreement involves metalinguistic negotiation if it is recapture under certain conditions (§2.4.1). One option available to the
conducted at a first-order level, but is best interpreted metalinguistically monist is to interpret the claim that there is one and only one correct logic
(Plunkett & Sundell 2013). For instance, a disagreement about whether noncognitively. Clarke-Doane (manuscript [Other Internet Resources]),

after finding no satisfying factualist construal of monism, interprets the Blake-Turner, Christopher, 2020, “Deflationism About Logic”, Journal of
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doi:10.1007/978-3-319-98346-2 contradiction | Bolzano, Bernard: logic | connectives: sentence connectives
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theories of | models in science | Quine, Willard Van Orman | religious 6. The one view that does not fit so easily into such a form is the more
diversity | Tarski, Alfred | toleration | value: pluralism | Wittgenstein, radical of Cook’s pluralisms characterised below.
Ludwig: logical atomism
7. As Keefe (2014: 1377) notes, Beall and Restall (2006: 88, emphasis in
Notes to Logical Pluralism original) are themselves keen to distinguish their view from relativism,
writing “we do not take logical consequence to be relative to languages,
1. More carefully: their adherents take them to disagree; whether or not communities of inquiry, contexts, or anything else”.
that disagreement is genuine is another controversial issue.
8. For other ways of interpreting both pluralism and monism, and why
2. The word “true” in the common term of art “One True Logic” is most they don’t straightforwardly yield substantive theses, see Eklund (2020)
naturally understood by analogy with the expression in phrases like “one and Clarke-Doane (manuscript [Other Internet Resources]). Note that
true king”, “one true love”, or “true calling”; most saliently, it is not there are also semantic and telic versions of domain-relative pluralism.
intended to be restricted to objects which are potential bearers of the
9. That there are no correct logics follows from our earlier understanding
familiar semantic properties of truth and falsehood, and it means
of logical nihilism as the claim that there are no logically valid argument
something like “genuine” or “legitimate”.
forms, on the assumption that a correct logic has at least some valid
3. Beall and Restall intend this point as a reductio on the assumption that argument forms.
logic is absolutely general; they do not mean it as an argument for logical
Copyright © 2023 by the authors
nihilism. Still, some authors have taken the prospect of logical nihilism
Gillian Russell and Christopher Blake-Turner
more seriously, adding an additional option to the field that includes
logical pluralism and logical monism (Mortensen 1989; Cotnoir 2018;
Russell 2018).
4. Such variation was already present in contemporary accounts of logical

consequence, and Etchemendy 1999 provides an excellent discussion that
introduces the distinction between representational and interpretational
accounts of consequence. See also Sher 1996.
5. Here Frege is saying that the laws of thought follow from the laws of
truth (i.e., logic) and he immediately goes on to deny that logic itself is the
study of the laws of thought. See Russell (2020) for doubts about whether
logic is normative.

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1. Case-Based Logical Pluralism 1. Case-Based Logical Pluralism

4.1 The Principle of Tolerance

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(2) Every bank needs numerate staff in all of its branches.

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Ra In Logic we do not want to know how the understanding is and

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crucial question which K does not… [This] question is the central

With respect to A-variance, case-based pluralists might choose to simply

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preserving in the case under consideration.

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the universality of natural languages allows the expression of sentences

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way to classify these different views—including Beall and Restall’s case-

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–––, 2017, “Anti-Exceptionalism about Logic”, Philosophical Studies, doi:10.1023/A:1025648722188

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4. Such variation was already present in contemporary accounts of logical

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